

"OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE."

BY

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"Reddite depositum; pietas sua foederis servet;
Fraus absit; vacuas credis habete manus."—OVID.

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"He who would rightly appreciate the worth of personal independence as an element of happiness, should consider the value he himself puts upon it as an ingredient of his own. There is no subject on which there is a greater habitual difference of judgment between a man judging for himself, and the same man judging for other people. When he hears others complaining that they are not allowed freedom of action,—that their own will has not sufficient influence in the regulation of their affairs—his inclination is to ask, what are their grievances? what positive damage they sustain? and in what respect they consider their affairs to be mismanaged? and if they fail to make out, in answer to these questions, what appears to him a sufficient case, he turns a deaf ear, and regards their complaint as the fanciful querulousness of people whom nothing reasonable will satisfy. But he has quite a different standard of judgment when he is deciding for himself. Then, the most unexceptionable administration of his interests by a tutor set over him, does not satisfy his feelings: his personal exclusion from the deciding authority appears itself the greatest grievance of all, rendering it superfluous even to enter into the question of mismanagement. It is the same with nations. What citizen of a free country would listen to any offers of good and skilful administration, in return for the abdication of freedom? Even if he could believe that good and skilful administration can exist among a people ruled by a will not their own, would not the consciousness of working out their own destiny under their own moral responsibility be a compensation to his feelings for great rudeness and imperfection in the details of public affairs?"—J. S. MILL, *The Subjection of Women*, pp. 179, 180.



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PREFACE.

IN my last revision of these pages I have been troubled by an unpleasant doubt whether, with regard to the Imperial mission of Great Britain in India, they might not, in some degree, and to some readers, convey a less grateful sense of past achievements, less hopeful views of future work, than would be truly consonant with my own feelings. I am desirous, therefore, of repeating here, in words that were published six years ago, that it is not because we have done so little, but because we have done so much, that I wish to see our work in India consolidated and naturalised. (I can see no promise or hope of permanence anywhere but in the reformed Native State. *That*, and not the model British Province, is the mature and wholesome fruit of Imperial cultivation.)

"It is a striking fact, that the satisfactions and mortifications of personal pride, though all in all to most men when the case is their own, have less allowance made for them in the case of other people, and are less listened to as a ground or justification of conduct, than any other natural human feelings; perhaps because men compliment them in their own case with the names of so many other qualities, that they are seldom conscious how mighty an influence these feelings exercise in their own lives."—J. S. MILL, *The Subjection of Women*, p. 181.

“OUR GREAT VASSAL EMPIRE.”

DURING the Session of 1869 both Houses of Parliament devoted some hours to India. Our recent policy in Afghanistan and Central Asia was brought before the Lords on the 19th of April. The same topic was entertained in the House of Commons on the 9th of July. On the 23rd of that month the Duke of Argyll, as Secretary of State for India, addressed the Peers on the subject of Indian finance, confining himself entirely to receipts and disbursements, and schemes of railway extension.

In the House of Commons Mr. Grant Duff, the Under-Secretary of State, made the annual statement of the affairs of “our great Vassal Empire” at the afternoon sitting of the 3rd, and the adjourned debate was concluded on the night of the 5th of August.

(On the former of these two days, Mr. R. W. Crawford, Member for the City of London and Chairman of the East Indian Railway Company, advocated the guaranty system under which the existing lines of railroad had been constructed in India; deprecated export duties on raw produce; suggested some improvements in the telegraph service, and proposed the consolidation of several small loans into one large stock.)

Sir Stafford Northcote, Member for North Devon and Secretary of State for India in the late Conservative Ministry, recommended strict economy in the finances; and doubted whether the Public Works Department was in a proper state to undertake the construction of railways.

Sir Charles Wingfield, Member for Gravesend and

late Chief Commissioner of Oule, advised that all expenditure, except that which was extraordinary or strictly reproductive, should be met by income; believed that the outlay on barrack in the last ten years had been "a frightful drain on the resources of India;" insisted strongly on the separation of executive and judicial functions, for "such a multiplicity of duties were now thrown upon a Collector that it was impossible he could get through them all except by devolving the larger share of the duties upon his assistants," and "with a view of ascertaining the opinions and feelings of the Natives, and bringing these into harmony with the acts of our officials, weighed down as they were by their various duties," recommended the establishment of "consultative Native Councils."

Mr. Fowler of Penryn and Sir Wilfred Lawson of Carlisle, two Members honourably noted for their attention to matters of general philanthropy and national morality, denounced the opium traffic, on which one sixth of the Indian revenue depends.

Colonel Sykes, Member for Aberdeen, felt convinced that the income of India was amply sufficient to meet any calls that might be made on it.

After the adjournment, Sir Stafford Northcote having moved for some correspondence on the subject of the extension of railways in India, (Mr. Graves, the Member for Liverpool) suggested that a map should be added to the return, and "regretted to see that some of those works would not be executed till 1890 or even 1900, and, (if that were so, the construction of railways would be entirely inadequate to the wants of India or of this country.) "Another important point," continued Mr. Graves, "was the construction of the Council of India. If more sympathy were shown for commerce in that body, there would be a more prompt extension of the railway system. He thought there should be a larger mercantile element in the Council. (The railway system of India was not a mere Indian question. For many years we should have to look to India for cotton, and every mile of railway opened there tapped new sources of production.)"

The adjourned debate on the evening of the 5th of August enabled Mr. J. B. Smith, Member for Stockport, Mr. Bazley of Manchester, and Mr. Platt of Oldham, to demand greater facilities for the supply of cotton, and for conveying that staple to the coast.

Mr. C. B. Denison, Member for the Eastern Division of the West Riding, formerly of the Bengal Civil Service, apologised for the opium revenue; desired more detailed explanations as to the expenditure on Public Works, the post, the telegraph, and the manufacture of small arms, and supported Mr. Crawford's views as to the guaranty system of constructing railways.

Sir David Wedderburn, Member for Ayrshire, proposed certain measures for promoting the health and comfort of the British army on Indian service.

All this was very well. If more railroads are wanted they had better be made and worked on the most economical and efficient principles,—on some plan very different from that which has been hitherto pursued. It is highly desirable that there should be a constant and cheap supply of cotton. Of course if sixty-five thousand British troops are to be maintained in India they must be properly housed: the only question is—and here Sir Charles Wingfield again hit a blot—whether fifteen millions sterling have been judiciously expended on solid and permanent barracks during the last ten years; whether our soldiers are not more healthy and comfortable in less costly lodgings;* whether on military, political, and financial considerations, they might not be more effectively distributed and occupied in a rotation of cantonments and in moveable camps of exercise.†

Barrack accommodation, the supply of small arms, the Post, the Electric Telegraph, the Public Works,—all these were by no means inappropriate subjects of inquiry and remark, though scarcely worthy to have formed the chief topics of discussion. The annual inquisition of the House of Commons might well have been directed less to administrative merits and defects, than to those broader and more general principles of Government, which

* Appendix A.

† Appendix B.

must not only control the action of every department in India, but affect the course, character, and credit of the British Empire throughout the world.

On the whole, the debates in both Houses were distinguished by an equal dearth of reference to the tribes and nations of India, their political and social condition, and a similar adherence to home interests and departmental criticism. They contained marvellously little mention of the people, or of the only organised communities in which popular feelings and opinions can be fairly ascertained, and in which the durable results of British tutelage can be correctly estimated—the Native States.

The peculiarly material, mechanical and selfish considerations pervading the debate, seem to have struck in their full force one Member of long standing, much respected in the House and the country, not as a leader of party or as an eminent orator, but because—like Sir Wilfred Lawson and Mr. Fowler, whom he supported in their attack upon the opium revenue,—he is one of those men over whom the moral and religious aspects of a question are always seen to exercise an irresistible attraction. The Hon. Arthur Kinnaid, Member for Perth, said:—

“The people of India might suppose from this discussion that in the House of Commons India was looked upon either as a Manchester colony or a military settlement. Was India to be governed for her own welfare or for the sake of Manchester? No doubt cotton was a good thing, and honourable gentlemen of one idea thought that India was made for the purpose of receiving Manchester goods. But he did not see it. He felt some sympathy for the Natives of India.”)

The collective temper and demeanour of the House of Commons, towards India, during the past Session, can only be adequately described as apathetic and negligent. When the Under Secretary of State commenced speaking on the 3rd of August—the regular annual opportunity for a discussion on Indian affairs—there were about thirty-five Members present, which number swelled to a maximum of fifty-five by the time he had got half way through his speech, but dwindled away towards the close to about forty, among whom was not one occupant

of the Treasury Bench. No recognised leader, no ex-Cabinet Minister, from either side of the House, except Sir Stafford Northcote, took any part in the debate. Yet the scanty attendance on the 3rd of August is said to have constituted "the best Indian Budget House ever known."

India is not governed by the British Parliament.

And it would appear as if the apathy of the House of Commons was a very fair measure of the apathy in the country. Indian affairs never once occupied the attention of either candidates or constituencies at the General Election of 1868. No pledges were exacted or offered on any subject connected with India. I can trace no manifestation of political activity relating to India in any part of the United Kingdom, during the year 1869, except the proceedings of the Cotton Supply Association.

The only events, the only projects, the only measures, affecting, or likely to affect the people of India, that seem capable of exciting any interest or discussion at home, in or out of Parliament, are those concerning the supply of cotton and the extension of railways, for the benefit of British commerce and manufactures. "

India is not governed by the British nation.

It may be said, it has been said, especially by Englishmen engaged in the public service of India, that this is all just as it should be,—that India ought to be governed in India; that even the control of the Secretary of State and his Council should be nothing more than formal supervision; that Parliamentary dictation is particularly objectionable; that although the British public cannot invest too much capital in the Indian funds, in railways, and other works of utility, their inquiries and interference should be strictly limited to the disposal and security of their investments,—a field of inquiry sufficiently wide after all to include all that was to be excluded,—and that no irresponsible persons, unqualified by local observation and experience, ought to meddle with the politics of India.

It is not by acquiescing in monstrous claims of this description, advanced by professional administrators, that the people of Great Britain can shake off their national respon-

sibility for the defects, if there be any, in the Imperial rule of India, or gain absolution from the consequences of such defects.

The error that has chiefly led to these claims, and to the too frequent acquiescence in them, is that of supposing *government* and *administration* to be identical and convertible terms. Good administration and good government are very different things, and by no means necessarily co-exist.

If we institute an analogy which may some day be found to be not unscientific, and compare a State with an individual, *government* may be said to be its *constitution*, that more or less perfect co-ordination of all the animal, moral and intellectual energies, under the guidance of a central organ, upon which, in a community as in a person, depends healthy and harmonious life. *Administration* would then correspond with that daily course of nutrition, clothing, ablution, and exercise, by which the wants of the organism are supplied. If the person, or the State, enjoys a good constitution, the means and appliances for administering to its material wants may be very rude, rough, and scanty, and yet life may be vigorous and its work well performed. On the other hand, no amount of careful administration—however lavish the provision, however exquisite the apparatus—can rectify a constitution that is inherently bad, or spoiled by long abuse. If some energies are greatly in excess, and others quite deficient, if some faculties have been over-cultivated, and others utterly suppressed, if a limb or muscle has been too long in unnatural repose, or dependent on foreign support,—harmony will not be restored to the unbalanced functions by merely palliative measures: there must be a constitutional change, a reform in the Government.

"They manage these matters better in France", is still true to a very considerable extent. In many departments of the public service France is more skilfully and more frugally administered than Great Britain, but she is assuredly not so well governed. She may be tended and supplied more regularly and systematically, but her constitution is not so good. Some of her functions may pro-

ceed with greater energy, but their aggregate is not so harmonious, nor is the central organ so sound as ours. She is liable to dangerous convulsions and hemorrhage on the slightest change of regimen. She cannot assimilate reforms as we do.

There might be many gradations of praise and blame before the administration of a country could be fairly pronounced as good, or its government as bad, as they were in the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom under Austrian rule. In all probability no provinces of Italy, at any period, were so carefully and conscientiously administered. The Italians were not excluded from office; there were no religious differences; the system was, above all, untainted by that scornful prejudice against everything Native, engendered by the premature authority and anti-social relations of Anglo-Indian officialism. From 1815 to 1859 the Austrian administration of Northern Italy steadily improved; the government steadily deteriorated and became more difficult, until latterly it became impossible, except at the point of the bayonet.

It may be that great benefits would be conferred on several disorderly and distracted States,—Mexico, for example, or Greece,—if they could be subjected for a few years to the coercive management of Great Britain or France. It may be disputed whether, since her independence of Turkey, the progress of Greece has been delayed by too much foreign interference or by too little. It may be open to question whether Mexico would not be likely to settle down more quickly and decisively, after staggering and struggling through a period of confusion under her own leaders, than after undergoing the process of foreign discipline. These are matters of speculation; but it will hardly be denied or doubted that by extraordinary sacrifices and exertions on the part of the more civilised State, order might be imposed on the less advanced nation,—life and property rendered secure, commerce protected and contracts enforced. But with the establishment of a regular administration the difficulties of government are sure to be redoubled. However enlightened and disinterested may have been the original intention, as the

term of guardianship is prolonged, its provocations and temptations almost of necessity increase. The thankless and burdensome nature of the task, on the one side, the loss and humiliation on the other, become every day more and more apparent, and are more and more sensibly felt, as the active work of organisation subsides into tranquil management. The patient, restored to consciousness and strength, expects to be relieved from restraint, requires exercise and amusement, and wishes once more to direct his own affairs in his own way. Grateful at first, perhaps, to his foreign doctors and nurses, he now resents their control, and begins to doubt their motives. Those motives have actually no tendency to improve,—they tend rather to deteriorate as the curative process is protracted. If the practice has proved lucrative, the physician is averse to lose it; if it has been unprofitable, he requires some compensating advantage.

We have had some experience of this treatment, and of the patient's feelings towards us, on a small and unimportant scale, in the Ionian Islands, now happily off our hands, just as their government, except by military force, was becoming impossible. On the great continent of India,—not able, or ready, or fit to be off our hands, but not more vitally attached to us than the Ionian Islands,—too long a course of the same treatment, in its most depressing form, over an ever widening area, has generated the same feelings in the heart and brain of its vast and various population, and threatens to render its government incalculably more difficult. Divided and diffident as it may be, ignorant and indifferent as it may seem, that vast population is not an inorganic or insensible mass.

The political diagnosis of India has been misunderstood, because no distinction has been drawn between her constitution and her daily functions,—between government and administration.

The true government of every realm, great or small, may be said to be carried on in two distinct spheres, that of the Sword, or military force, and that of the Sceptre, or civil authority. There can be no doubt or question of our occupying the former sphere in India more fully and

firmly than ever. Against external and internal assailants we are armed at all points. But military force can only deal with open assailants, and cannot be everywhere present and prepared. At a period of great national excitement or distress, the efforts of secret conspiracy and passive resistance, might cause enormous loss, expense, and terror, while military operations were yet aimless and impracticable. Civil authority and social influence can alone avail for the repression of unseen discontent and growing disaffection. From the Viceroy downwards our officials exercise no direct social influence, and no civil authority—unsupported by British bayonets,—over those leading and representative classes whose sentiments and movements determine those of the population at large, and whose disaffection and discontent must ever be obstructive and dangerous. Indirectly and intermediately, no doubt,—especially in the Native States,—our views are, to some extent, interpreted and our objects promoted, by the persuasion and example of those whom the people respect and trust.

Although we are not as yet quite face to face with the brutal appetites and wild fanaticism of all India,—although many centres of conservatism and intercommunication have been happily still preserved,—the general tendency of our rule, excessively developed between 1848 and 1856, has been to weaken all civil authority apart from officialism, to destroy our friends and multiply our mercenaries, to reject free co-operation and insist upon monotonous conformity. And thus we have allowed the Imperial Sceptre to be laid aside, and have come to rely more and more exclusively upon the Imperial Sword. We have declined all assistance; we have despised all proffered services; we have destroyed many little Sceptres, and done our best to break every little Sword.

The Marquis Wellesley's policy of inducing Native Princes to allow our troops, paid by tribute or cession of territory, to be substituted for their own, was ingenious and intelligible, at least as a policy of transition. Many Native States then maintained formidable forces, chiefly disciplined and officered by Frenchmen, with whose na-

tion we were at war. Under Lord Wellesley's treaties some of these Native armies were considerably reduced in numerical strength, and their foreign officers were discharged; while our brigades, placed in advantageous positions overlooked the whole field, and checked the few remaining States not included in the Subsidiary system.

(The victories and treaties of 1803 and 1805, completed by the campaigns and negotiations of the Marquis of Hastings between 1817 and 1820, made the British Government, with one apparent exception, the only military Power, and virtually if not formally the Imperial Head, among all the States of India.) The army of Scindia, the Maharajah of Gwalior, the last shadow of a substantive military Power in Hindostan, was dispersed in the one day's campaign of 1843.

But Lord Dalhousie caricatured the policy of Lord Wellesley when he applied the same set of terms to the subordinate and submissive States of Sattara and Nagpore, spoke of them as "obstacles to safe communication and combined military movement", and declared that their annexation would "consolidate our military strength", and "absorb separate military Powers".* They were not "military Powers", and they were not "separate" from their acknowledged superior. The military force kept up by these and most other Native States, was so small as to be nothing more than a demonstration of moral force in favour of the British Government, and always at its disposal. During the momentous crisis of 1857 the Irregular Cavalry which the extinct States of Sattara and Nagpore were bound by treaty to furnish,† would have done more, with the Princes themselves or some of their nearest relatives at their head, to keep order in the Mahratta country, Bundelcund, and the Central Provinces, and generally to prevent insurrection from spreading, than could have been done by double the number of the finest British troops.

* *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 83; *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, pp. 35, 36.

† *Collection of Treaties*, Calcutta, 1864 (Longmans and Co.), vol. iii, p. 124; vol. vi, p. 8.

Even the hungry and ragged levies of Oude and Hyderabad, though large in numbers,—and larger still if their muster-roll was to be believed,—were never dangerous or menacing to our supremacy, and could have been easily reduced, if we had undertaken in good earnest the administrative reform of those States. (But it was the main principle of Lord Dalhousie's policy that the friendly tuition and reform of a dependent State was imprudent and unprofitable.) There can be no doubt that he thought the annexation of Oude, as he had said of the annexation of Nagpore and Sattara, would "consolidate our military strength", and "absorb a separate military Power".* What was the result? What is the actual consequence after the lapse of thirteen years?

There was not a single British soldier in the Kingdom of Oude from 1846 to 1856, when it was annexed, including the period of our Sutlej and Punjaub wars, when every man was urgently required. We have now in Oude one Regiment of Dragoons, five Batteries of Artillery and four Battalions of Foot, at an annual cost of upwards of £600,000, two-thirds of the net revenue of the Province. If we add the annual charges of the Staff, the Native troops (four Regiments of Infantry and three of Cavalry), and of the Police, we shall find nearly the whole revenue swallowed up in paying for an armed force to keep the country quiet. Before the annexation in 1856 the unformed Government of Oude, with an imbecile King at its head, managed to preserve order, and play the part of a good neighbour, with no assistance from us beyond one Company of Native Artillery and three Sepoy Battalions. This is the way we "have consolidated our military strength", and "added to the resources of the public treasury".

The Rajah of Nagpore paid us an annual tribute of £80,000, one-fifth of the revenue of his dominions, and maintained a thousand of "the best description of Irregular Horse," "to serve with the British army in the field."†

* *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 83; *Rajah of Berar, Papers*, 1854, pp. 35, 36.

† *Collection of Treaties*, vol. iii, p. 124

Now we have lost the tribute, and something more—for the Nagpore Provinces, without anything being charged for the troops quartered within them, have never paid their own expenses,—and we have lost the services of a thousand Horse. But we have lost much more than the tribute and the Horse, we have lost the moral authority and influence of the Rajah and his Government. Wherever a centre of conservative interests and political subordination, such as the Court of Nagpore, Sattara, Jhansi, or Lucknow, is broken up, moral force is destroyed, and our own military force must supply its place.

Nor can any one avoid joining issue on this point by declaiming on the alleged misrule of some of these States, or the extravagance and self-indulgence of their Princes, for which, it may be said, annexation was the only feasible remedy. That plea was utterly erroneous then,—it would be flagrantly false now. It was not a plea upon which Lord Dalhousie relied. He objected to the tuition and reform of Native States, not so much because it would not be beneficial to them as because it would not, as he supposed, be profitable to ourselves. One of his avowed reasons for deciding to annex the Punjaub, after the rebellion of 1849, instead of continuing to give the promised “aid and assistance in the administration of the Lahore State, during the minority of the Maharajah Dhuleep Sing,”* was that “we should have all the labour, all the anxiety, all the responsibility, which would attach to the territories if they were actually made our own; *while we should not reap the corresponding benefits of increase of revenue, and acknowledged possession.*”†

He expected “increase of revenue” from the Punjaub, which was bound by treaty to pay, and was well able to pay, an annual subsidy of £220,000 so long as our troops remained in the country,‡ has been converted into a steady drain of about two millions per annum, undiminished to this day, from the Imperial resources of India.

In the same manner he recommended the annexation

* *Collection of Treaties*, Calcutta, vol. ii, p. 267.

† *Punjaub Papers*, 1849, p. 663.

‡ *Collection of Treaties*, vol. ii, p. 269.

of the Rajpoot State of Kerowlee by refusing to recognise an adoption, because we should otherwise "for many years to come have to bear the labour of governing this State, employing, always at inconvenience, a British officer for the purpose," and at the end of the young Prince's minority have to "hand over the country with its revenue of four lacks of rupees."*

And when in 1851 he was urged by General J. S. Fraser, the able and accomplished Resident at Hyderabad, with all the weight of many years' experience in that important post, to undertake effectual measures for reforming the administration of the Nizam's Dominions, Lord Dalhousie recorded his entire disapproval of the Resident's policy. "If," he said, "provision be made for carrying it actively and practically into operation, all the toil of a laborious task, and all its real responsibility, must ever fall on the British agent, by whom the Native ministry is controlled. The agent, on his part, while he reaps no advantage from his labours for his own State, must feel himself to be without undivided authority."†

General Sir William Sleeman, Resident at Lucknow from 1849 to 1854, during those six years pressed upon the Government of India his detailed plans for reforming the administration of Oude, and pledged his great reputation for the success of the experiment. He looked in vain to Calcutta for sanction and support. His proposals were coldly and silently received. Lord Dalhousie did not want to reform Oude but to annex it, and pronounced in one of his consultative Minutes on the subject, that if the British Government undertook "the responsibility, the labour, and the risk," of reconstructing and reforming a Native State, it ought, "after providing for the pensioned dynasty, for the administration of the province, and for its progressive improvement," to be allowed to appropriate the surplus revenue to Imperial purposes‡. There has been no surplus revenue from Oude up to the present day. On the contrary, including the proposals for

* *Papers, Kerowlee, 1853, p. 9.*

† *Papers, the Nizam, 1851, p. 12.*

‡ *Oude Papers, 1856, p. 190.*

"the pensioned dynasty," and the military expenses, the annual remittances from other treasuries to make up the cost of our administration cannot be less than £700,000. Without making any charge against Oude for extraordinary war expenditure during the Rebellion, what Lord Dalhousie called the "acknowledged possession" of this Province from 1856 to 1869, must have consumed at least eight millions sterling, which the Government of India has had to provide from the surplus revenues of Bengal and Madras.

Both Lord Dalhousie and one of his most able and distinguished Councillors, Sir John Peter Grant,* did incidentally, and as an additional argument, maintain the uselessness of temporary instruction and management, and set down badly governed Native States as "incurable." Yet the examples they adduced, if they had been carefully studied, would have been seen to be either inconclusive or adverse to their views. Even in 1855 there were ample data in the hands of Lord Dalhousie's Government to prove that all the most recent efforts at reforming Native States had succeeded, while the contemporary annexations had failed to produce any profit. Scinde and the Punjab between them had upset every calculation, and brought disorder and disaster into the finances of India. "We were not prepared," the Court of Directors wrote in 1852, "to find that the annexation of Sattara would prove a drain on the general revenues of India."

On the other hand, wherever British instruction had been allowed a fair trial it had invariably wrought a marked improvement in the administration of Native States. The State of Nagpore, though treated with great neglect and indifference between 1829, when British management ceased, and 1854, when it was annexed,† never lost the benefit of the rules and bits instituted by Sir Richard Jenkins, so that during twenty-five years of purely Native administration, under an indolent and dissolute Rajah, our active and open interference was not once required, to

* Now Governor of Jamaica.

† See the opinions expressed by Mr. Mansel, the last Resident at Nagpore, *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 17.

check oppression, to keep the peace, or to restore order. In 1847 Lord Hardinge, warning the King of Oude that his continued misrule would compel the Government of India to assume the temporary management of his country, held up the case of Nagpore before him at once as an example and an encouragement :—

“The Nagpore State, after having been restored to order by a British administration of the land revenue, is now carried on under Native management, with due regard to the rights of the Prince and the contentment of the people.”*

Even in his very unfavourable report, written after the Rajah's death, Mr. Mansel, the last Resident at Nagpore, bore testimony to the permanent results of previous British instruction :—

“The revenue system of fixed leases left behind by Sir Richard Jenkins has, on the other hand, preserved the finances of the State and the agricultural interest from being sacrificed wholly to reckless folly or temporary expedients to raise funds.”†

And in a despatch dated the 10th of August 1868, Sir Richard Temple, then Resident at Hyderabad, who had recently been Commissioner of the Nagpore Provinces, wrote as follows :—

“I have on the whole a favourable opinion of the administration of the Nagpore country by the Mahratta Sovereigns of the Bhonsla House. There were many excellent points about their rule; but some of these were owing to the care of British officers, such as Sir Richard Jenkins, Colonel Wilkinson, and others.”‡

Some reforms in the administration of the Nizam's Dominions, commenced by Sir Charles Metcalfe as Resident in Hyderabad in 1821, and carried out by English Superintendents under his guidance, were quite successful; but, unfortunately, on the very first application of the youthful Sovereign, Nasir-ood Dowla, who came to the throne in 1829, the wholesome supervision of the Resident, and his assistants was discontinued, and the beneficial results of eight years' labour were almost entirely lost.

Lord Dalhousie adduced the two experiments of Hyder-

* *Oude Papers*, 1858, p. 63, 64.

† *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 16.

‡ *Papers, British and Native Systems*, 1868, p. 69.

abad under Sir Charles Metcalfe, and of Nagpore under Sir Richard Jenkins, as instances of the total failure of temporary management,* whereas, if properly examined, they are seen to be instances of signal success, marred only by the premature relaxation and subsequent neglect, for which our Government was solely responsible.

British instruction had been eminently successful in Sattara,—so much so that, while arguing against the recognition of the second Rajah's adopted son, Lord Dalhousie admitted "the excellence" of the deceased Prince's "administration," declaring it to have been "conspicuous for wisdom and mildness,"† and only expressing a doubt whether this was not attributable rather to "the personal qualities of the Rajah" than to "the nature of the institutions of the State." But the State had been equally well governed by the first Rajah, whose rule was declared by the Court of Directors to be "a model to all Native Princes;"‡ and a great part of the credit which on this occasion Lord Dalhousie ascribed to a Hindoo Ruler, was certainly due to the careful tuition and control of Captain Grant Duff, the first Resident at Sattara, and to the institutions which he established.

Although in Lord Dalhousie's time the evidence from very recent experience ought to have been enough to demonstrate the financial failure of territorial extension and the practicability of reforming Native States, that evidence has become more clear and more abundant, in a very remarkable degree, during the last twelve years. The thriving condition and orderly administration of the important States of Gwalior under the Maharajah Jyajee Rao Scindia, and of Indore under the Maharajah Tookajee Rao Holkar,—both having been managed by British officers during the minority of those Princes,—of Travancore, the principal State under the Madras Government and Kolapore, the chief Mahratta Principality within the Bombay Presidency,—both taken in hand at different periods in the midst of disorder and revolt, and reformed by British instruction and supervision,—have from various

* *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 186-7.

† *Sattara Papers*, 1849, p. 82.

‡ *Ibid.*, 1843, p. 1268.

causes become the subject of public notoriety within the last few years. In all these instances the good work was carried on and completed without the States being over-run and their revenues devoured by those costly establishments under highly salaried English officers, whose vested interests in Mysore almost procured the annexation of that Principality, and still impede its straightforward reorganisation as a self-acting Native State.

A Parliamentary Return of 1867 thus describes the results of British instruction and management in one of the States abovementioned, Kolapore.

"In the course of the year, the Governor of Bombay made a tour through the Southern Mahratta country, and at Kolapore he congratulated the Rajah in having proved himself worthy, after a long probation, to assume the direct government of his territories. Every department of the State was found to be well administered by his Highness in person, and there was every visible mark of justice being properly administered, and of the people being well governed, prosperous, and contented."*

An examination of the series of *Reports of the Central India Political Agency* from 1865-6 to 1867-8 suggests forcibly that there are some depths in the social and administrative problems of Native States, some secrets in the statecraft of Native Sovereigns, which their appointed guides and teachers,—conscientious, energetic, and well-informed as they are,—have failed to fathom. A little more tolerance, a little more sympathy, a little more humility, might open those secrets and make those depths transparent. As it is, our Political Agents appear sometimes, and avow themselves to be, quite puzzled and bewildered to account for the fact that a system so irregular and so rude, when compared with ours, as that of a tolerably governed Native State, can work so well on the whole, and give occasion to so little complaint or perceptible discontent. In his Report dated the 1st of August, 1866, Colonel R. J. Meade, Agent to the Governor General for Central India, describes the administration of Indore by the Maharajah Holkar as "arbitrary and despotical in the fullest Eastern sense"—

* *Moral and Material Progress*, 1855-6, 1867, p. 43

words which, unintentionally, no doubt, suggest the bastinado and the bow-string. Yet, he continues,

“The marvel is that, under such a system, the administration of the State is carried on as well as is the case; and that it is so is mainly, in my opinion, due to the fact that the Chief, when roused, acts with undoubted energy; that he readily hears and inquires into complaints of corruption or oppression against his officials, and, when such are proved to his satisfaction, punishes the accused parties with the utmost severity. The dread thereby inspired amongst this class doubtless prevents the amount of aggravated mismanagement that would otherwise naturally occur; and to it may also, probably be ascribed the comparatively greater administrative activity of the District Officials of this State; while the Chief's orders to his officers are, as a rule, unquestionably promptly attended to.”

Colonel Meade “regrets that the system in this State” is not “more in harmony with the known views of the British Government;” but, he adds, “though the State is not governed in the liberal and enlightened spirit that might perhaps reasonably be expected from a Ruler who was brought up under British guardianship, and had the advantage of receiving an English education, its administration is, on the whole, better supervised and conducted than that of most of the Native Chiefships with which I am acquainted.”

Thus, from what has been already cited, we may, I think, conclude that the State of Indore and the subjects of Holkar have derived great benefit, if not all “that might, perhaps, reasonably be expected,” from the “British guardianship” and “English education” enjoyed by their Prince in his youth. The following extracts from the same Report tend to confirm that conclusion :—

“Maharaja Holkar contributes handsomely towards the Malwa Dispensaries, and the Charitable Hospitals at the city of Indore and the Residency, which are maintained by his annual grant, and some other local subscriptions, on a very liberal and creditable scale, are of invaluable benefit to the poor of the town and neighbourhood.”*

In another part of the same Report the Agent laments that so “few of the Native Rulers have any just concep-

* *Central India Agency Report, 1865-6, Calcutta, 1867, p. 20, 21.*

tion of the advantages of education," while "some of them even regard its progress among their people as undesirable and objectionable," but

"The Maharajas of Gwalior and Indore both take an interest in this question; and the Madrisas" (colleges) "at their respective capitals are creditably maintained and well attended. That at Indore has turned out several pupils with an unusually good knowledge of English, and otherwise well educated, some of whom occupy important posts in the service of the State."

The College at Indore he describes as "a very creditable institution," and believes "it will improve under the direction of a new Master from the Poona College, who has lately joined it."*

Among the leading events of the year the Political Agent refers to the approaching termination of a new land settlement for a term of twenty-one years throughout the Indore territories, in which the Maharajah had been "engaged for the last eighteen months," and he fears that "there is a good deal of dissatisfaction amongst the people at the advanced rates to be imposed under this new settlement,"—"these rates being arbitrarily fixed according to the class of the land, and the cultivators having apparently little option allowed them as to their acceptance of them or not."† In the Report of the next year, however, the Agent candidly admits that further information had led him to modify the unfavourable opinion he had at first conceived with respect to the new settlement.

"His Highness was good enough some time ago to explain to me in detail the basis on which he is endeavouring to carry it out, and the reasons which he believed had caused it to be viewed with dissatisfaction; and in illustration of these points he went over with me the settlement papers of some three or four villages, which were drawn up most clearly and creditably, and which certainly quite bore out his statements."‡

The gist of the Maharajah's explanation was that the new settlement was based on a careful Survey of each village, which deprived many land-holders as well as the local officials of the illicit profits they had been deriving

* *Central India Report*, 1865-6, p. 8.

† *Ibid.*, p. 21.

‡ *Ibid.*, 1866-7 (Calcutta, 1868), p. 7.

from unassessed land, now bought under assessment ; and that these influential persons had done their best to alarm the cultivators and to bring the measure into popular discredit. This is only what has notoriously occurred under our own Survey and Settlement operations in every part of India. The Agent adds :—

“ Maharajah Holkar has shown much readiness to hear and discuss personally with the Zemindars the representations urged on this subject, and His Highness has, in some cases, been induced thereby to authorise slight concessions being made to dissatisfied parties.”*

Another plea for an enhanced assessment is mentioned by the Political Agent very slightly, as if it were quite insufficient,—“the high prices of all agricultural produce;” yet the fact is undoubted, has raised wages throughout India, increased the profits of the agricultural classes, and increased the expenses of the public service. In all the recent settlements in the Bombay Presidency and in Mysore, the rise in prices has been taken as one element in calculating the new rates to be assessed. A Bombay paper just received states that “thirty years ago unhusked rice was sold at 12 to 13 rupees per khandi”† (500 lbs.) “in the Concan: about ten years later the price rose to from 18 to 20 rupees ; and during the last ten years it has been oscillating between 30 and 40 rupees.”‡

(We learn from a recently printed Blue-Book that the gross revenue of the Nizam's Territories had risen from £1,163,850 in 1861-62 to £1,601,846 in 1865-66, about 37 per cent. in five years ; and the increase is chiefly accounted for by “the great rise in prices,” “allowing the cultivators to command much higher rates for their produce.” The increase in the land revenue is said to be “by no means proportionate to the increased means of the taxpayer.”§)

Two subsequent short paragraphs in the *Central India Report* for 1866-7 seem to indicate a judicious and liberal

* *Central India Report*, 1866-7, p. 7.

† Often called *candy*.

‡ *Hindu Reformer*, Bombay, December 4th, 1869.

✓ § *Moral and Material Progress of India* in 1867-8, 1869, p. 114-15.

expenditure to some extent in departments hitherto neglected by too many Native Princes.

• "Three new schools have been established by the State during the past year, one, a female school, at Indore, which is attended by forty-three girls."

"The water-works and aqueduct for supplying the city of Indore were completed and opened during the past year."*

In the *Central India Report* for 1867-8 we are told that the Rajah of the small State of Dhar, which was under British management during the Prince's minority, after its narrow escape from extinction,† "takes much interest in his schools, which he visits and examines every week," also that the financial condition of the State is sound and satisfactory," and that "the Chief has adopted the essential points of the British Criminal and Civil Procedure Codes as the guide for all the Courts in his State, and exhibits an intelligent interest in their working."‡

It was of this little Principality that a most mischievous misleader of public opinion, the Calcutta correspondent of the *Times*, who for several years, both in that capacity and in his other character as Editor of the *Friend of India*, has kept up an incessant fire of slander and insult upon Native Princes and their administration, wrote in a letter dated the 10th of March, 1866, that "Lord Stanley's persistence in causing the restoration of Dhar has reduced that State" to "a miserable condition."§

Sometimes, however, facts of a very different complexion, when officially attested, will find their way even into the *Friend of India*. An article published in January, 1870, gives some interesting information from the recently printed Administration Report of the Rohilla State of Rampore, containing a dense population of nearly half a million, on an area of 608,784 acres, of which, it is said, "the cultivation is of a higher order than in any of the adjoining British districts."

* *Central India Report*, 1866-7, p. 7.

† See *Dhar not Restored*, by John Dickinson (King, Parliament Street), 1864.

‡ *Report*, 1867-8 (Calcutta, 1868), p. 18.

§ See Appendix C, 'The Little State of Dhar'

"The revenue last year was 13,00,380 Rs. (£130,038), and the expenditure 11,22,858 Rs. (£112,285), leaving a comfortable little surplus." "The Courts are modelled on the British system, an ultimate appeal lying in every case to the Nawab." "The Rampore jail is built on the plan of the Benares prison, and the convicts are employed in the manufacture of carpets." "Rampore has schools of Arabic, Persian, and English, to which students from Cabul, Kandahar, and even Bokhara resort for the study of Mahommedan divinity and law. It is pleasant to find female education thriving under the shadow of such severely orthodox institutions."

We are further informed that "the State has a little army 2,685 strong, which costs 271,692 Rs. (£27,169) a year," and the writer admits that "a 'crack' district officer would not be ashamed of the Nawab's management."*

Sir Donald Macleod, the present Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, reporting on his tour of inspection in 1866 through the Native States of Puttiala, Nabha, Malair-Kotla and Kapoorthulla, writes as follows:—

"Notwithstanding the existence in some of these States of court intrigues and factions prejudicial to good government, his Honour was glad to perceive in most of them signs of substantial progress. In all of them an attempt has been made to assimilate the administrative system in some degree to that of the British Government. Regular settlements of land revenue have been introduced; the Indian Penal Code is adopted as the basis of their criminal law; and in most of them a system of Civil Procedure has been prescribed, more or less borrowed from the Punjab Civil Code; while in all the capitals, and especially in those of Puttiala and Malair Kotla, are excellent schools, the scholars of which would not do discredit to the best schools of the adjoining districts of British territory."†

The same high authority, in a letter dated 5th September, 1867, again refers in the following terms to this brotherhood of Sikh Chieftains:—

"The principal Cis-Sutlej Chiefs and the Rajah of Kapoorthulla have made considerable progress of late years towards the adoption of more enlightened principles of government."‡

A very favourable account of the same region is given by—

* Extracted from the *Homeward Mail* of February 5th, 1870.

† *Punjab Report*, 1866-7 (printed at Lahore), paragraph 877, p. 123.

‡ *Papers, British and Native Administration*, 1868, p. 113.

Sir Richard Temple, now a member of the Viceroy's Council, who served in the Punjab for many years with great distinction, in a despatch dated the 16th of August, 1867, written when he was Resident at Hyderabad,

"From 1854 to 1860 I had particular knowledge of the protected Sikh States, Cis Sutlej. These are intertwined and interlaced amongst British districts supposed to be administered in our very best method." "The villages of the Puttiala and Jheond States especially were among the finest and happiest I have ever known, and seemed to be on a par with the choicest pieces of British territory.*

Major C. F. Prescott, a Commissioner of Survey and Settlement, replying to the circular from the Government of India dated the 1st of July, 1867, regarding the general feeling of the Natives towards British rule, naturally upholds the great advantages of our administration, magnifying especially his own office. And yet in the following extract he bears testimony to the readiness of Native Rulers to appropriate those parts of our administrative system that they see to be practicable and profitable, and that they know to be popular.

"The Survey settlement of this Presidency has conferred on the ryots a vast property in land, and given them a security of tenure they know they never would have obtained under Native rule. They, therefore, to a man, love our *Raj*; and it is a significant fact that, in all the Gaekwar's districts adjoining our territory, a Revenue Survey on our principle has been introduced, and is in progress, his Highness being thoroughly convinced of the prosperity and happiness of our ryots under that system, and fearing that a migration of his cultivators on a large scale into British districts is imminent."†

Sir Richard Temple, in the despatch already quoted, makes the following remark on the Native State last mentioned :—

"In 1864 I passed through the Baroda territory (the Gaekwar's Dominions); certainly that district, the valley of the Mhye, is in external prosperity hardly surpassed by any British district,—any that I have ever seen at least."‡

The Report on the administration of Baroda for the year 1867, by Colonel J. T. Barr, is dated in March, 1868. In

* *Papers, British and Native Administration*, 1868, p. 69.

† *Ibid.*, p. 66.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

the most unfavourable passage I can find in it, the Resident says he has occasionally received reports of "mismanagement on the part of the Durbar officials, causing loss of revenue, and sometimes injustice to portions of the population, not, however, amounting to open tyranny or oppression. These reports," he continues, "are promptly communicated to the Durbar at Baroda, and have, as a rule, been as promptly attended to, and the grievances brought to light redressed." Referring to some administrative reform introduced by his predecessor's influence, and which, for some time, it required a little watchfulness to maintain, he says, "there will be no resistance to its continuance, for Native States are never prone to alter arrangements they have become used to." The recently appointed Minister he describes as "a man of good character, highly esteemed by the Gaekwar," and under his rule "the State continues to be managed generally to suit our views."

He then refers to the circular from the Government of India "on the comparative merits of British and Native rule," intended by Sir John Lawrence to crush Lord Cranborne under what he termed "a concentration of statistics from different parts of India."*

As in duty bound, and as might fairly be expected, the Resident declares that "the superiority of the British system of rule over that of the Gaekwar, or any other purely Native rule I have known, is in my opinion clear, and not to be doubted; and yet," he adds, "I believe that the people of India do find something in the Courts of Native Princes which compensates for the better administration under our own immediate government." Probably, he suggests, "they find favour from the careers which they open out to Natives of the middle and higher classes."†

Quite lately the news from Bombay has told us of the Gaekwar having engaged in a movement for the extinction of some of the social abuses arising from caste and custom, in which direction the exertions of a liberal Prince

* *Papers, British and Native Administration*, p. 4.

† *Homeward Mail*, October 26th, 1868.

are certain to be far more effective than any conceivable amount of British legislation or missionary preaching. The subjects that he has taken up are widow-marriage, the marriage of infants, and the permission of foreign travel without loss of caste. The manner in which his Highness is giving his aid to the movement, by associating himself and co-operating with the highly educated Natives of Bombay, and bringing them into public controversy with the learned Brahmins of his own Court, affords the best promise of a decisive result on the public opinion of Western India.*

Even in the Dominions of the Nizam, the largest existing Native State,—formerly a byword for misrule, and in which Lord Dalhousie, who declined to attempt its reform, could anticipate nothing but such “a crash” as would compel the British Government to “adopt strong measures,” and the Nizam to submit to “the fate which would then have overtaken him,”†—great progress has been made under the enlightened ministry of the Nawab Salar Jung. Sir Richard Temple, when Resident at Hyderabad in 1867, wrote as follows in the despatch that we have already quoted:—

“In the Deccan, of late years, the constitution, system, and principles of the Nizam’s civil government are really excellent; this much is certain. That the result must be more or less beneficial to the country is hardly to be doubted. Whether full effect is given to the intentions of His Highness’s Government, throughout the Deccan, I cannot yet say; but independent testimony is constantly reaching me to the effect of great improvement being perceptible.”‡

(In the annual *Return of Moral and Material Progress* for 1867-8, compiled at the India Office from the latest information, we are told that

“The vigorous efforts made towards reform have now placed the financial credit of the Nizam’s Government on a satisfactory footing; it enjoys the confidence of the monied class, and it can now raise money at very moderate rates of interest, instead of the usurious charges of former days.”§

With regard to the assessment of land-revenue it is said

* Appendix D.

† *Papers, the Nizam*, 1854, p. 40.

‡ *Papers, British and Native Administration*, p. 69.

§ *Moral and Material Progress*, 1867-8, p. 113.

that "pains have been taken more and more to render the annual settlements equitable and moderate;" and that "all classes, high and low, connected with land or with trade, continue to flourish."*

The judicial institutions are undergoing the process of being entirely though gradually remodelled, and the following reference is made to the new class of regularly appointed Magistrates and Judges, who will in time replace throughout the country the hereditary and land-holding jurisdictions which are still maintained in the Sovereign's domains and on some great nobles' estates.

"All these officers are well educated, though all have not done well; several had originally received a training in one or other of the British Provinces. Many discharged their duties with more or less of efficiency; and some have by their firmness and uprightness brought credit to their department."†

(The results of the restitution to the Nizam, under the Treaty of 1860, of two of the Districts assigned to British management by Lord Dalhousie's Treaty of 1853, have been most encouraging, both by the continued good management of the retransferred Districts, and in the stimulus and example thereby given to the general progress of the country.) Complete restitution, conditional on the introduction of every essential reform into every Province, and into every department of the administration, might be made the means and occasion of regenerating the Nizam's Government.

One of the most satisfactory symptoms in the process of improvement now observable in so many Native States, is that the Sovereigns in general, even those who have themselves received no English education, are willing enough to engage the services of Natives brought up at our Colleges, and trained in our administrative system. Sir Madava Rao, K.C.S.I., the Brahmin Minister of Travancore, formerly tutor to the Maharajah and his brother, the First Prince, both of them accomplished English scholars,—is a graduate of the Madras University. The State of Jeypore, the most populous and the richest in

* *Moral and Material Progress*, p. 114.

† *Ibid.*, 1869, p. 117.

Rajpootana, owes much of the advance it has made towards a system of law and order, to the labours of the late Pundit Sheodeen, a graduate of Calcutta, who was chosen by Maharajah Ran Singh, the present intelligent Ruler, first to be his Private Secretary, and afterwards to be his Prime Minister.

The Indian papers of September, 1869, announce that the Rajah of Bikaner, another Rajpoot State, has appointed Pundit Manphool, C.S.I., late Extra Assistant Commissioner under the Punjab Government, to be his Dewan or Chief Minister.

We have already remarked that several of the judicial officers in the Nizam's Dominions had originally received a training in one or other of the British Provinces. The same may be said of some recently appointed officials in the revenue and executive departments under the same Government.

It has also been brought to our notice in quotations from the Political Agent's Reports, that several pupils from the Indore College, "with an unusually good knowledge of English, and otherwise well educated," now "occupy important posts in the service of the Maharajah Holkar."* The present Governor of Bombay, Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, speaking as Chancellor of the University on the 12th of January, 1869, mentioned as "a very great proof of the growing influence of the University, that among those who had lately matriculated two came from Indore, from the Madrissa of his Highness the Maharajah Holkar."† The local papers also explain that these students—two only having successfully passed the matriculation out of four sent from Indore,—are entirely supported at the Maharajah's expense during the prosecution of their studies for a degree.

And in describing the Convocation of the present year, a Bombay daily paper mentions as a fact very "significant of the wide range of the University's influence; that the first award of Mr. Ellis's prize of books goes to a youth from the Madrissa of his Highness the Maharajah Holkar at Indore."‡

* *Ante*, p. 19.

† *Times of India*, 14th Jan., 1869.

‡ *Ibid.*, 13th Jan., 1870.

In 1867 his Highness the Rao of Kutch, himself a good English scholar, acting, it is said, under the advice and influence of the late Anundashram Swamy, the celebrated "Political Sunyasse,"* appointed a Mussulman gentleman, Kazee Shahab-ood-deen Ibrahim, to be his Dewan or Chief Minister. Kazee Shahab-ood-deen had pursued his studies before any University degrees were conferred in India, at the College and at the School of Engineering at Poona, and subsequently rose in the service of the Bombay Government to be Deputy Collector and Magistrate of Surat. Before mentioning the reforms introduced under his administration, it ought to be observed that Kutch has for many years borne the credit of being fairly and benevolently ruled. The *Bombay Administration Report* for 1860-1 thus refers to the reign of the present Rao's father, during whose minority, from 1819 to 1834, the State was under a Regency controlled by the British Political Agent.

"The first event which requires notice in connection with the affairs of the States and Principalities in Guzerat under the political supervision of this Government, is the death of his Highness the Rao Deruljee of Kutch, which occurred at the close of July 1860, after a singularly enlightened and prosperous reign of twenty-six years. In his Highness the British Government lost a faithful and esteemed Ally, and the people of Kutch a wise and beneficent Ruler."

The following remarks on Kutch occur in the Bombay Report for 1866-7 :—

"The revenue administration has been successful, and education has progressed. The schools at Anjar and in other places were well attended during the year and have been favourably reported on by the Political Agent. A second Girls' School is to be opened almost immediately at Bhooj."

We read in the Report for 1867-68 :—

"A marked improvement has taken place in the administration of the Province of Kutch since the office of Dewan has been assumed by Mr. Shahab-ood-deen, lately Deputy Collector and Magistrate of Surat."

And after noticing several reforms effected during the year, such as the separation of judicial from revenue business, the establishment of a dispensary, the construction

* Appendix E.

of roads and works of irrigation, the Report goes on to say.

"His Highness the Rao continues to evince a warm interest in education. He has personally examined the schools at Bhooj and Mandavee, and distributed prizes. The Girls' School established by him at his capital is attended by fifty girls of different ages; the Mandavee school by about forty girls. His Highness has also employed a teacher solely for his young daughter, and has thus displayed to the Chiefs of the Province his entire emancipation from the popular prejudice against female education."

Besides the Dewan, his Deputy, Moorleedhur Geerdhur, the head of revenue affairs, Bhojlall Pranvullubh Dass, and some recently appointed judicial officers, have received a good English education, and some of them underwent their official training in the service of our Government.

Yet with all this evidence of States reformed and reforming,—with and without British instruction as the first stage,—before their eyes and recorded in their archives, the Government of Sir John Lawrence at Calcutta, and the majority of the Secretary of State's Council in London, wrote in 1865 and 1866, when striving to obtain the annexation of Mysore, as if the reform of a Native State were a hopeless task, and as if the restoration of a Native State to its own Ruler, after a period of British management, would be an unheard of and unprecedented measure. Although they ought to have known, and had the means of knowing, that several States—Travancore, for instance, under the Madras Government, and Kolapore, under that of Bombay,—had been brought from anarchy to good order by Native agency, superintended by only two or three British officers, the authorities at Calcutta assumed the necessity of quartering a full complement of English gentlemen in every department on Mysore, and protested that any less "radical alternative" would have been "futile and pernicious."* They declared in a despatch of May 5th, 1865, that—

"When once his" (the Rajah's) "mismanagement had brought things to that pass, that rebellion had to be put down by the

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 59.

march of British troops, it admitted, of no question, but that any attempt to rule the country through the Maharajah and his functionaries, by the issue of regulations and ordinances entrusted to them for execution, would have been regarded by an exasperated and revolted people as a piece of cruel mockery.*

This fine phrase of "an exasperated and revolted people," is one example of how, in their anxiety to retain so valuable a field of patronage,—for this, however disguised even from themselves, was at the bottom of all their objections,—the resources of rhetoric were stretched in Calcutta despatches and London Minutes very near the confines both of the *suppressio veri* and the *suggestio falsi*. In alluding to the Rajah's misrule and to the petty revolt in part of his territories, the original grossly exaggerated accounts are taken as accurate narrations, and no hint is given of new light thrown on the facts by subsequent careful inquiry. The Mysore rebellion of 1830 was declared by the Special Commissioners, in their Report of 12th December, 1833, to have been "partly attributable to causes which were beyond the control of the Rajah's administration," especially "to the withdrawal of the advice of the British Resident," who "was prohibited by his instructions not only from the public reception of complaints from the subjects of Mysore, but from the avowed support of the cause of those whose grievances might become known to him." The insurrection was by no means general. It broke out in the Province of Nuggur, the conquest of which by Hyder Ali was a circumstance "unfavourable to the easy maintenance of the Rajah's authority." It was not a popular rising caused by intolerable tyranny, but was chiefly the work of an ambitious pretender to a large feudal estate, aided by insurgents who flocked to the rebel standard from the British Province of Canara, and by the intrigues of an influential Brahmin family at Mysore, whose oppressive and corrupt practices were then under investigation, and who hoped to evade inquiry amid the turmoil of an insurrection.

The Commissioners say expressly :—

"The fact of the assembling of the ryots and their complaining that the taxes were too burdensome to be borne, of itself really

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 59.

proves little or nothing. At the very same time, the Ryots assembled in the same manner, and made similar complaints in the Province of Canara, where we understand the public demands have since been found, on full inquiry, to be decidedly moderate. We also understand, and it is a curious coincidence, that those proceedings of the ryots in Canara were instigated by intrigues on the part of the public servants, as has been already shown to have been the case in Mysore.”*

Both by the Commissioners of Inquiry and by the Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck, after his own strict local investigation, the Rajah was almost entirely acquitted of personal misconduct. It was indeed admitted by his Lordship, that if he had known the true history of the case, as detailed in the Report of the Special Committee, he would not have suspended the Rajah's authority, but would have resorted to milder measures of reform.

In a despatch to the Court of Directors dated the 14th of April, 1834, recommending that the greater part of the Rajah's dominions should be restored to his direct rule, three districts being retained by the Honourable Company, under a new Treaty, to secure their subsidy. Lord William Bentinck wrote as follows :—

“It is admitted by every one who has had an opportunity of observing the character of the Rajah, that he is in the highest degree intelligent and sensible. His disposition is described to be the reverse of tyrannical or cruel.” “The personal character of the Rajah has, I confess, materially weighed with me in recommending the measure above alluded to. I believe he will make a good ruler in future.”

The Court of Directors, in their reply dated the 25th of September, 1835, negative the project of partition. They advert to “the deferred and future possession of the whole Kingdom” by the Maharaja, when certain described safeguards against misgovernment shall be established, when, they say, “the same reasons which would recommend the restoration to the Rajah of a portion of the country, will, in our opinion, recommend the restoration of the whole.”† And in making some remarks on the new forms of administration proposed for Mysore, they observe :—

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 19.

† *Ibid.*, p. 23.

"We are desirous of adhering, as far as can be done, to the Native usages, and not to introduce a system which cannot be worked hereafter by Native agency when the country shall be restored to the Rajah."

But long before 1865 the vast increase of patronage in Mysore had driven far away all notions of "Native agency," or of restoring the country to the Rajah. The idea of not merely being unable to provide for the candidates already on the Governor-General's list, but of having to turn adrift, or remand to regimental duty, all the English gentlemen actually in the enjoyment of those lucrative offices, had become revolting at Calcutta. In a Minute dated the 16th of January, 1856, Lord Dalhousie advised the annexation of Mysore at the death of the reigning Rajah. Wishing devoutly, and working towards, the same consummation, the Government of Sir John Lawrence, in the despatch already quoted, loudly and emphatically pronounced as their opinion,

"That the reversion of Mysore to the power and administration of the Maharajah is synonymous with the withdrawal of the European officers, and the abandonment of a system of upwards of thirty years' growth. It is tantamount to the collapse of order, and a rapid return to the state of confusion and of insecurity of life, honour, and property, from which, in 1831, the people of Mysore were rescued."*

Why should "the system" be "abandoned," when "the European officers" are "withdrawn?" They cannot, or will not, think of any intermediate plan, by which the Prince's power might for the future be limited by law, and by which an efficient Native hierarchy might be gradually trained to replace their English instructors. No—a full complement of English gentlemen of the Civil, Military, and Uncovenanted Services having been quartered in every department—new departments having been from time to time devised for them,—that full complement must be permanently maintained in Mysore. *

The same views were urged with even greater vehemence at the India Office in London. One of the Councillors, Mr. R. D. Mangles, formerly of the Bengal Civil

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 59.

Service, and who for many years represented the Borough of Guildford and the East India Company in the House of Commons, declared that if the Maharajah of Mysore were permitted to choose a successor from his family, "only two courses would be open to us,"—

"Either the adopted son must be permitted to become the actual ruler of his country, to appoint his own officers, and to administer justice and the revenue according to his own views and principles, or affairs must be carried on, as at present, by a British Commissioner, assisted by a body of British officers."*

Notwithstanding the undeviating consistency with which Mr. Mangles for the last quarter of a century, in the Court of Directors, in Parliament, and in the Council of India, has advocated a policy of annexation, it is difficult to understand the strange blindness here shown to the happiest and most hopeful results of our political operations in India. Why must a Rajah placed at the head of a reformed Government, "administer justice and the revenue according to his own views and principles"? Why should he not administer justice and the revenue according to *our* views and principles, as several Native Princes have, to a great extent, learned to do?

This blindness to recorded facts is even more manifest in a subsequent passage of the same paper, in which Mr. Mangles avows his firm opinion that "Native Government" must be "entirely dependent upon the character of the Prince, or, if he be a nonentity, of his Minister," and that they "have, as a general rule, been going from bad to worse ever since the reign of Akbar."†

At a later period in the discussion, the same eminent authority protested once more against the people of Mysore being "handed over by Her Majesty's present Government to the capricious domination of such another Prince, with the inevitable concomitants of hungry courtiers, and a rabble of hangers-on, after they and their fathers had tasted for nearly half a century the unspeakable blessings of wise and fixed principles of law, and a just system of revenue administered by such men as Cubbon, Bowring,

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 85.

† *Ibid.*, p. 87.

and Charles Saunders."* The introduction of these English names at the end of the sentence is an effective stroke of rhetoric. But why should "capricious domination" be assumed, or the possibility of "capricious domination"? Is the British Government really incompetent to exercise Imperial supremacy?

During the same controversy another much respected Councillor, Mr. H. T. Prinsep, also an old Bengal Civilian, who had been Secretary to Government under Lord William Bentinck when the administrative sequestration of Mysore took place, maintained in a Minute dated the 15th of April, 1866, that "it would be impossible ever to make over a large territory like Mysore, that has once been governed upon system by British officers, who have made revenue settlements and decreed or otherwise established rights of property, to a Native Prince to be managed according to his caprices, assigning districts to favourites with unchecked powers, or leasing them to the highest bidders, as is the universal practice when the dominions are large." And then he assumes, as an incontrovertible and acknowledged position, that the only plan for "securing the rights and interests created by our institutions," is to maintain "a British administration."† Now the practice of "assigning districts" to "favourites," or to "the highest bidder," is not, and never was, "universal" by any means among the Native States of India, whether "the dominions are large" or small. Mr. Prinsep has here fallen into one of those exaggerations which are especially detrimental when put forward in grave consultation by a person of great official and local experience. And why must the "caprices" of a Prince, and the "powers" of his "favourites" be "unchecked"? The bad custom of granting territorial assignments to favourites and farmers of the revenue, had grown in Oude before the annexation to the greatest height and enormity it had probably ever attained in India: but if the controlling force of the British Government had been firmly and steadily applied, this abuse might have been effectually checked and abolished. This abuse does not prevail in the States of

* *Mysore Papers*, May 1867, p. 13.

† *Ibid.*, p. 9.

either Scindia or Holkar, the two largest and most important in Central India, and is quite incompatible with their administrative system, for which, no doubt, their subjects are greatly indebted to the management of British officers during the minority of the two reigning Princes. In Travancore, in Kolapore,—in any State once fairly brought under supervision, and where regular forms and public channels have been laid down, through which all acts of the Sovereign must pass,—corrupt and capricious grants of land are practically impossible. (Even in the Nizam's Dominions, the largest existing Native State,) although the prevalence of this abuse in former generations has left its trace in some overgrown hereditary jurisdictions, the executive agency of the Chief Minister, supported by the influence of our Resident, has so over-mastered the nominal despotism, that, during the last three reigns, the Prince has quite lost the Oriental prerogative of alienating the public revenue.) These limitations of arbitrary power, though secured by no public ordinance, soon grow into established rules, and an Indian Sovereign would find it quite as difficult and dangerous to break through them as have the Princes of Europe after consenting or submitting to constitutional restrictions.

(The Nawab Salar Jung, having become head of the Regency of Hyderabad upon the sudden demise of the late Nizam, and retaining all the functions of Prime Minister, has been able already to make a great stride towards the liberalisation of the Government by associating several of the principal nobles with himself in a sort of Council of State, and allotting to each of its members a department of the public administration,—a measure which was quite impracticable so long as the Minister was liable to be thwarted at every turn by petty Palace intrigues set on foot by those who could obtain no voice in the State except by supplanting their rival and stepping into his place. Having overcome and out-lastcd the despotism of the Sovereign, this enlightened statesman is now engaged in breaking down in his own person the isolated autocracy of the Minister. Properly advised and supported by our Government on a plan more consistent and more con-

rate than has hitherto been observed, the Nawab Salar Jung ought to be able during the minority of the Nizam to raise the reformed institutions of Hyderabad above all fear of retrogression, to bring a limited monarchy into working condition on principles that shall be acceptable and suitable to all ranks of the people.

It is to be hoped that our Government may do as much during the concurrent minority of the Rajah of Mysore. But there the stumbling-block of place and patronage stops the way at present.

The aggregate salaries of the English gentlemen employed in Mysore, about ninety in number, from the Commissioner with his £6000 down to the Assistant with £600, averaging £1000 a year, amount to £90,000 per annum, one tenth of the annual net revenues of the Province. The official mind cannot contemplate without horror the gradual destruction of such a splendid list of appointments, the vested rights of meritorious gentlemen having so many strong claims on the consideration of Government. Even the stagnation and stoppage of promotion among such a body, the first painful result in the process of reconstructing the fabric of a Native State cannot be faced by the dispensers of patronage without distress and consternation. What is the degradation of a race, alien in colour and creed, compared with the disheartening of a Service recruited from our own countrymen?

Consequently the instructions understood to have been issued by the Secretary of State in 1867 for the gradual substitution of Native for English officials, as opportunities presented themselves, in all district and judicial appointments, has remained a complete dead letter. In three years not a single Native has been placed in any one of the superior offices in Mysore hitherto held by English gentlemen. No such promotion has, indeed, occurred for nearly six years. Mr. Krishna Ayengar is still the only Native Deputy Superintendent; and he was appointed to the charge of a district on the 31st of August 1864. And so it will be to the very last possible moment,—the difficulties of transition will be enhanced, the immediate suc-

cess of the change will be endangered, the good faith of our Government will be compromised,—unless the professional interests and national prejudices of Calcutta are counteracted and swept away by the statesmanlike determination of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State.

It is useless to descant, as Mr. Mangles and others do, on “the unspeakable blessings of wise and fixed principles of law, and a just system of revenue,”* because these can be provided for as effectually in a reformed Native State as in a model British Province, and can be “administered” in a style much more congenial to popular feelings and much more instructive to the popular mind, by Native Princes and functionaries, than by “Cubbon, Bowring, or Charles Saunders.” The best institutions that can be devised are not permanently safe unless they are under the personal and responsible custody of men who are bound to the soil by the ties of blood and property. The happiness and progress of nations do not depend on forms.

One fruitful cause of error in the study of Indian politics, one ground for hastily taking for granted, without alloy or deduction, “the unspeakable blessings” of British administration, consists in the indiscriminate eulogy that has been too often lavished on the Indian Civil Service. Indiscriminate eulogy applied to a class, a sect, or a party, must always lead to some very false conclusions. It was once the fashion in Parliamentary speeches and periodical essays to extol that Service as “the most accomplished in the world,” at a time when a safe passage, “with great credit,” through the formal probation of Haileybury, was never refused to a Director’s nominee, and as a “nursery of heroes and rulers,” when, in proportion to its numerical strength, it had certainly produced very few men of marked originality or conspicuous power. But in those days the rapid growth of British India in territory and revenue cast a glamour over all eyes. The structure was so vast, and had been so hidden, that what was a mere appropriation seemed like a creation of our own. Distance lent enchantment to the view,—young Civilians, and military officers in civil employ, engaged for the most part in the

* *Ante*, p. 33.

formal superintendence of an immemorial routine, were transfigured into patriarchs and statesmen. And though the competitive system of first appointments has raised the standard of erudition, it is no test of administrative capacity or of the ruling faculty, and has certainly added nothing to any social authority that may be possessed by the Indian Civil Service.

When we consider the early age at which English gentlemen engaged in the public administration of India are placed in positions of great emolument, and of unattainable exaltation and command, over a large number of Native officials of tried skill and long experience, whose guidance is indispensable for the successful despatch of business, it is not surprising that they learn to magnify their office, that they habitually suppose themselves to be governing the country when they just understand the plan of administering a district, when they can make a neat English report on results furnished by their subordinates. As an illustration of the prevailing delusion on this point, we may quote the able editor of the *Bombay Gazette*, a journal representing very fairly the views of the higher class of British officials and merchants in the Western Presidency, who, recently defending the Great Council of the Empire from the charge of negligence, declares that

"What is called neglect of India is one of the wisest characteristics of Parliament. That India is not neglected, the host of able Englishmen sent here to govern her testifies before the whole world."

The writer confounds *administration* with *government*. The Englishmen, able or otherwise, annually sent out from home in the civil and military Services, do not govern India, any more than our Commissioners of Customs and Excise, officers of Police, and County Court Judges, govern Great Britain. In both countries the functionaries in permanent employ administer laws which they had no share in making, have little or no influence over public opinion, and no political influence by virtue of their office. Whether they have or have not any social influence, depends not upon their office so much as

upon their personal qualities. The social influence of English functionaries in India is scarcely appreciable. They have, as a rule, no social influence whatever among any class of the people, simply because they neither desire nor deserve to have any. They have no social influence with the Natives, because they have no social intercourse with them. Even with the most accessible of our Collectors and Commissioners in India, the practical notice at their doors is, "No admittance except on business." The subject races in their millions, high and low, rich and poor, and the scattered representatives of the dominant nation, live entirely apart, and have nothing in common. The public avocations of the Anglo-Indian "Services" give them no direct share, and their private course of life precludes them from taking any indirect share, in what is properly called the *government* of the country.

A very few British functionaries, those who rise to the Secretariat and to seats in Council, do, indeed, obtain access to a certain direct share in the Government; and these extraordinary prizes to which all may aspire, have, perhaps, contributed more than anything else to the false lustre surrounding the Indian Civil Service, and to the erroneous notions habitually formed by the members of that profession as to the sphere and compass of their daily duties.

There are, again, British Commissioners and Collectors, —very few, however, in number,—singularly free from the prevalent failings of our nation and of their profession, largely endowed with that genial tolerance and adaptability, which are supremely requisite for governing an alien race on any principles but those of coercion and contempt. Some of these have undoubtedly, from time to time, gained an influence, considerable though local and temporary, over the public mind, and have made meritorious efforts of limited success, to keep up something like social intercourse with the higher class of Natives around them.

A still larger number of British officials among the Residents at Native Courts, and the Political Agents set over the groups of petty Chieftainships, really take a cer-

tain indirect share in the Imperial Government, just because they have some social influence and control over the leaders and idols of the people. It is only in these hereditary jurisdictions, where the executive power remains in Native hands, that Native volition and intelligence are sufficiently free to make it worth while to study them, to consult them, and even to humour them. It is only in these last refuges of nationality, where there is a career for talent, and where distinctions of rank and station have a real value, and receive due recognition, that anything like personal intercourse on fair terms can exist between our representatives and those of India. As might be reasonably expected, in the dependent States, where Native influence manifestly counts for something, where it is always effective, and frequently decisive, it is more courted than in our own Provinces, where it seems to count for nothing.

Our most distinguished countrymen now or recently engaged in the administration of British Provinces, have not failed to remark and to deplore this utter disassociation of the dominant and the pupil race. Sir Robert Montgomery, late Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, in a Memorandum published in *The Times* in March 1868, called forth by the appearance of the Blue Book on the comparative merits and popularity of British and Native rule, writes as follows :—

“Our officers are young, and few and scattered; and have much to learn. To administer the mass of law imposed on them they are chained to their courts and their offices from morning till night. They have no leisure for personal intercourse, to mix with the people, to gain their trust, to disabuse them of unjust prejudices, to make known our motives of real benevolence, and to ascertain their views. An acute observer of one of our most recently annexed Provinces informs me that the gulf is increasing, the people are disheartened.”

An acute observer in the capital of one of our oldest Provinces, the official metropolis of the Indian Empire, tells the same story. The Editor of the *Friend of India*, who may certainly be considered as an unwilling witness rather than as one prejudiced against British administration, writes as follows :—

"It is as true of Bengal to-day as it has been any day for the last eighty years, that there is a Government and there are forty millions of people, but somehow the one does not come into close contact with the other. Some of the people know our policemen and the scum of our courts, and the better they know them the more they hate them and us. But the villagers do not know the district officer, and the district officer and his superiors cannot know them."

Similar testimony is given by a very able official, the late Mr. A. A. Roberts, then Judicial Commissioner in the Punjab, who declares that

"The gulf between us and our Native subjects is becoming wider year by year. It is wider in Bengal than in the North-Western Provinces, and it is wider in the latter than in the Punjab. It is becoming wider every year in the Punjab. Our executive officers, partly from increase of work, and partly either from want of inclination, or from not understanding the necessity and advantage of friendly intercourse with the people, see less and know less of them than formerly, and they know less of us, and misunderstand us and our motives and acts."*

The longer and more thoroughly our system has been established, the less we are liked. He concludes thus, after a not very hopeful allusion to "the necessity of greater intercourse with, and knowledge of, and sympathy towards our Native subjects":—

"The following words of Sir John Malcolm express so exactly my views of our duty towards the people of this country that I cannot do better than quote them:—'The people of India must, by a recurring sense of benefits, have amends made them for the degradation of continuing subject to foreign masters, and this can only be done by the combined efforts of every individual employed in a station of trust and responsibility, to render popular a Government which, though not national, has its foundations laid deep in the principles of toleration, justice, and wisdom.'"

We may render our Imperial Government popular: we can never make our direct administration popular. The divergence of feeling and interest between our people and the Natives is not an evil that tends to decrease or to cure itself. On the contrary, it has increased, is increasing, and must continue to increase, in proportion as the growing facilities of correspondence and communication with

* *Papers, British and Native Administration*, 1868, p. 112. † *Ibid.*

Europe diminish the attractions of Indian service and enhance the charms of home.

"Our own" Calcutta Correspondent, in a letter which appeared in the *Times* on the 23rd of March, 1868, says:—"No non-missionary remains in India an hour longer than he can help."

There is a remarkable unanimity in the tidings from all parts as to the growing aversion to long service or residence in India. From a paper published at the Neilgherry Hills in the Madras Presidency the following sentence is extracted:—

"Even here in Ootacamund, where so many advantages as to health, soil, and climate offer themselves, we doubt if a score of Europeans could be found who are not looking forward to return, sooner or later, to the old country. A man comes out to India, either as a Government servant, a railway employé, a planter, or what not; but not one of them has the faintest idea of making a home here:—to make a 'pot of money' and go back again is the aim of every one of them."*

The *Englishman*, the leading daily paper of Calcutta, gives the same account:—

"Individually, we are more than ever birds of passage. If Europeans did not build houses forty years ago, when they looked upon India somewhat as a home, there is very little chance of their doing so now that their main object is to get away from India as fast as possible."†

Consequently, as might be expected, the members of the most highly paid Services, civil and military, in the world, send up their continuous cry for a higher scale of remuneration, in the form of salary or pension or bonus on retirement. The Calcutta Correspondent of the *Times* tells us that

"India has ceased to offer a career to poor men. Saving by men on salaries of from £1500 downwards is almost impossible. Pitiable often is the state of an English gentleman on £500 a year in Indian exile.‡

* *South of India Observer*, extracted from the *Asiatic* of August 11th, 1869.

† *Englishman*, from the *Homeward Mail*, August 30th, 1869.

‡ "Our own Correspondent", Calcutta, March 9th, *The Times*, April 8th, 1867.

And nearly three years later the Editor of the *Friend of India*, well informed in such matters, writes as follows :—

“The Anglo-Indian with less than twelve hundred a year finds it impossible to meet the cost of living here, and pay for his children at home. That sort of pecuniary care so well known in England, but almost unknown in India before the mutiny, is silently working in Anglo-Indian society changes which are to be regretted.”*

It can hardly be expected that this “pecuniary care”, these “changes in Anglo-Indian society”, the growing aversion to long residence in India, the yearning to get home as fast as possible, will be in the least mitigated or diminished when educated Natives are admitted, in rapidly increasing numbers, to the superior branches of the public service, hitherto reserved for covenanted Civilians. That inevitable measure will certainly not accelerate the promotion, improve the prospects, or alleviate the discontent of any English official.

But, it may be said, although this measure, just, liberal, and beneficent as all must acknowledge it to be, may unfavourably affect a class of our countrymen, and even bring some administrative difficulties in its train, it will so conciliate and gratify the people of India as to render the great task of Government more easy. That flattering expectation is open to very considerable doubt. The admission of Natives to the higher official posts, except as part of a large plan of Imperial reconstruction, will not, in my opinion, strengthen, but will rather weaken, the hands of Government, and complicate the problem before it.

Native officials of high rank could not form an effective bond of connection between the British Government and the people of India. They would not be sympathetic with us so much as antipathetic to the masses. In popular estimation, and partly in their own, they have loosened their root in the soil, and have become parasites planted in our hot-houses. Natives educated in our colleges and

* *Friend of India*, extracted from *Homeward Mail*, December 6th, 1869.

seeking for our service are not a turbulent or fanatical class, and they cannot aid us in keeping such classes in order. They are not very often of the right breed to govern, and as a matter of fact they are, in manners, customs, and morals, governed by the same laws and the same lawgivers as their more ignorant countrymen. They can never wrest social influence, in our favour or in their own, from the hands of the Princes, the Chieftains, the old families possessing titles, property and traditional fame, or from the Brahmins and other classes learned in popular lore and revered on religious grounds, who are themselves by no means debarred for ever from the advantages of European learning and science. As a matter of fact old prejudices, both in British Provinces and in Native States, are yielding to the surrounding pressure, and Western education is spreading, though slowly, among the real governing classes.

Moreover, it may well be doubted whether our Government can ever possess, as it is possessed by a good Native Ruler, the faculty of selecting and distributing its agents according to their special capabilities where they can command the respect and obedience of those who are under their authority. We impose our own wide range on men whose force and value is essentially local. Relying too much on forms and regulations, disregarding not merely personal qualities but the strength and weakness, the attractions and repulsions of tribe and race, our latest liberality would send Bengalee and Parsee graduates, in a very undue proportion, to rule over Sikhs, Mahrattas, and Rajpoots. There may be Parsees and there may be Bengalees, and there may be Chettys and Moodellys from Madras, who are well qualified for such duties, but mere erudition is a very poor test of the requisite qualifications.

There is another view to be taken of this question. Educated Natives are certainly not at present a turbulent or aggressive class, but it does not follow that their open competition with English officials on something like equal terms, will make them more submissive, or will raise the reputation and heighten the dignity of those with whom

they compete. Already the transmutation of the old Head Sheristadars, or Office Managers, into the comparatively new grades of Deputy Collectors and Magistrates, Extra Assistants in the Non-Regulation Provinces and Assistant Superintendents in Mysore,—more honourable, perhaps, but not more highly paid, than their old appointments,—is understood to have vitiated the source, impaired the quality, and aggravated the corrupt results of the information and guidance on which all young English officials for a time, and the failures and “hard bargains” during their entire career, must depend for the despatch of current business. Failures and “hard bargains,” though less common under the competitive system of first appointments than during the continuance of Directors’ patronage, can not be totally eliminated from a hierarchy, in which neither dismissal nor stoppage of promotion is practically known. Formerly the untrained young Civilian, or the incompetent old one, was pulled through his daily work by a ministerial expert of long service and high salary. Now he is pulled through by a younger man of lower standing and much smaller pay. The better class of Native subordinates who used to work unseen for the relief and credit of their “covenanted” superiors, are now beginning to officiate in open day at the same description of work, endowed with the same powers and in visible emulation.

The more Natives are employed in the higher posts, the more visible will this emulation become, the more conspicuous will be their administrative superiority over the average of their English compeers,—already sufficiently conspicuous in judicial business,—the less will they be content with anything but a perfect equality of standing and preferment. Then, whether their claims are recognised or resisted, interminable jealousies and antagonisms will ensue, and the difficulty, insurmountable in my opinion, will present itself, that English gentlemen will not serve amicably and harmoniously, except in rare instances, in subordination to Native seniors. The conflict will become more bitter on both sides.

As education is extended, as the means of communica-

tion and locomotion are improved, both in India and between the East and Europe,—in which the Suez Canal may prove an unexpectedly important element,—there must come a closer approximation to our ways of thought, to our principles and practice of political movement. The reflective and influential among our Indian fellow-subjects will become at once more national and more cosmopolitan. They will better our instructions. The Press is free in India. We shall find ourselves in imminent danger of finding our own weapons turned against us. As the people become more enlightened we must expect our Government, if conducted on the present contemptuous and exclusive plan, to be depicted in the most odious colours, and our agents to be attacked at every opportunity with ridicule and invective. We must be prepared, in short, for an era of satire and sedition, which we may be led, against our will and against our convictions, to resist by coercive measures, until we give up our moral and intellectual superiority, and oppose our military force to the physical force of awakened India.

We shall never be able to deal satisfactorily with a Hindoo Savonarola, a Hindoo Junius, a Paul Louis Courier, or even a Henri Rochefort. A Native Prince would have all the aversion we could wish against both the old-fashioned fanatic and the new-fangled agitator, and could, with the countenance and support of the Imperial Power, suppress or moderate either of them more firmly, more gently, and with more discrimination, than the Imperial Power could possibly do by itself.

In the following passage of his speech on the Governor-General of India Bill in the House of Lords on the 11th of March, 1869, the Marquis of Salisbury manifested, if I am not mistaken, some statesmanlike insight into the embarrassments we are preparing for ourselves, and into the only possible remedy for them :—

“The other portion of the noble Duke’s measure was that which dealt with the difficult problem of taking Natives into Government employment. He thought the noble Duke’s plan infinitely superior to the system of competitive examinations. He thought it far better that the appointment of Natives should rest

exclusively on the responsibility of the Governor-General, but he hoped that the Governor-General would not be fettered too much in his discretion. The great difficulty would be to avoid jealousy between the European and Native Civil servants. He believed that the true way of admitting Natives to a participation in the Government would be to maintain the Native Sovereignities which are at present protected in India."

Yes,—I should say,—maintain, restore, consolidate and enlarge the Native Sovereignities. The essential problem of Indian statesmanship is how to reconcile self-government for India with Imperial supremacy for Great Britain. The true solution is that the more we concede the former, the more we confirm the latter.

The nearest approach to self-government that the people of India can make in their present phase of civilisation, must be made by means of reformed Native States, owning allegiance and subordination to the Imperial Power. The British Government of India should attempt no longer to be ubiquitously executive; it should be constructive and critical, not operative; it should everywhere contrive or revise the political fabric, but wherever Native agency is available, it should not undertake more than superintendence or visitation.

The rule which, with some real and some apparent qualifications, has long held good, is now becoming absolute, that the maximum of direct dominion and direct European agency, involves the minimum of European influence. In order to spread British principles, to extend and intensify the moral authority of our Government, the area of British administration should be considerably diminished.

The system under which local affairs are formally managed in every district and in every department by Englishmen, administering the same set of stiff regulations, lowers the moral influence of the Paramount Power, deprives of political privileges those among the Natives who, with a little help and guidance, are fit to use them, and does not educate for political life those who are as yet unfit. The continuance of such a system can only be plausibly justified on those grounds of utter contempt for

the races to be governed which must consign them to perpetual stagnation, or incite them to privy conspiracy. •

The numerous annexations and confiscations between 1848 and 1856 attracted the attention and sympathy of all India towards the Native Princes and Chieftains, whose representative value was recalled to mind when their last hour seemed approaching, and who subsequently acquired strength, credit and authority on all sides by the events and results of the Rebellion of 1857. Since that crisis we may have elaborated some of our administrative machinery,—we have certainly effected a vast amount of over-legislation,—but we have not resumed our grasp upon the popular mind or upon the popular imagination. What we have lost the Princes have gained. We have now a smaller actual share in the true government of India, in the tranquillisation and progressive direction of the Indian people, than we had twenty years ago. We may regain the leadership, which will otherwise slip from us altogether, but only by deciding to rule India as a great Vassal Empire and not as a Vassal Kingdom,—by abstaining as far as possible from direct administration, and gradually transferring a great part of our immediate possessions to Native States, thoroughly reformed and thoroughly subordinated to the Paramount Imperial Power.

Sir Robert Montgomery in the remarkable Memorandum published in the *Times* in March 1868, which we have already quoted,* says:—

“The common error lies in our insular proneness to contract and generalise—to embody in one class all the many separate nationalities and distinct races which have been successively added to the rule of England. In an Empire made up of such differing languages and distinct customs, it must be popular, as it is politic, to encourage to a great extent a local administration and a local adaptation of laws.”

That “local administration” and “local adaptation of laws”, which Sir Robert Montgomery sees is so urgently required, can never be so effectually promoted as by the maintenance, restoration, and enlargement of Native Principalities.

* *Ante* p. 40.

But we have still more recent, and stronger because unintentional testimony to the excessive centralisation and straining after uniformity of which we complain. The Honourable H. S. Maine, Legal Member of the Viceroy's Council, in a Minute dated the 8th of October, 1868, replying to the charge of over-legislation that had been brought against the Government of India, observes that "the great bulk of the legislation of the Supreme Council is attributable to its being the local Legislature of many Indian Provinces. These Provinces," he remarks, "exhibit very wide diversities, and it is growing more and more difficult to bring the population of two or more Provinces under any one law which goes closely home to their daily life and habits."

Habemus confidentem reum. India is not a country but a continent. The varying interests and requirements of its two hundred millions of inhabitants, speaking upwards of twenty distinct languages, cannot be adequately watched and tended by a centralised Government of salaried officials such as now attempts to rule all India by correspondence from Calcutta. Such a Government cannot continue for an indefinite period to be satisfactory and improving to the people in its action.

Reforms of political doctrine and practice in Native States are solid and secure; the vast administrative establishments in our own Provinces,—so far as they are dependent for their success on foreign imported agency, and foreign imported material,—are superficial and precarious. Showy specimens may be produced—under glass, as it were,—exotic fruits may be grafted on the native stock; even artificial flowers may be hung on the branches with brilliant effect; but they will not stand the climate: a bad season spoils their appearance; the first storm sends them flying. Nations cannot live in glass houses, and a horticultural show is not a harvest.

Much of our vast administrative structure in India is little more than a show,—a show very burdensome to the country. Some departments have outgrown all reasonable proportions, have quite ceased to impose upon the people, and far from being regarded by them as "un-

speokable blessings," are felt as extremely oppressive by the poor, and regarded as monstrously inefficient and expensive by those who are more competent to criticise and to condemn. I shall not attempt here to present this aspect of the question in detail, or to discuss very fully the financial delinquency which has only just been such as might have been expected from an irresponsible professional Government, instructed by no popular voice, controlled by no public opinion.

After nine years of profound peace, the revenue having increased twenty-five per cent. (from thirty-nine to more than forty-eight millions*), "the Indian Exchequer,"—to use the recent words of Mr. J. W. S. Wyllie, late Foreign Secretary at Calcutta, certainly well informed and as certainly well disposed towards the Government of India,— "shows a chronic deficit of two millions, and wholesale reduction of public expenditure combined with the prospect of increased taxation is spreading discontent and distress throughout the Empire."†

All the phenomena in that same matter of "increased taxation," which has caused so much official disagreement and recrimination, so many commercial remonstrances, so many popular complaints and so much dumb misery during the last ten years, demonstrate most clearly that want of harmony between "the opinions and feelings of the Natives," and "the acts of our officials," of which Sir Charles Wingfield is conscious,‡ which might in some degree be palliated and relieved by those "consultative Native Councils" that he suggests, but which can never be entirely cured by any thing but local self-government. And no local self-government but government by Native States will ever work smoothly. The same tax will never suit equally well, either in its incidence or in the mode of collection prescribed, all the Provinces of our centralised Empire, differing, as they do, in their prevailing races and languages, in their centres and staples of industry, in their standard of comfort and rate of living.

* Sir Richard Temple's Budget Speech in the Viceregal Council at Calcutta, on the 6th of March, 1869.

† *Fortnightly Review*, March 1870, p. 308.

‡ *Ante*, p. 2.

Having bungled for the last eight or nine years with our Income Tax and our License Tax, we are now, it is said, going to try our hand at a Succession Duty, which if levied in the same way by an Act of the Viceroy's Legislative Council, will assuredly prove a similar failure, inquisitorial and oppressive in its operation, and producing very little for a great amount of heart-burning.

We shall never have either the knowledge or the influence to make a new tax adapt itself to the local circumstances and social customs of so many various regions. Those who could help us have no inducement to do so, and have no confidence in our good intentions. In the endeavour to assess all the Provinces of a vast continent on a uniform scale and by a uniform process, whether applied to property, income, profession, or inheritance, the same results will follow. The new taxes will disgust and demoralise, but they will not draw. In some localities they will not go deep enough; in others they will not rise to a sufficient height; in all they will be evaded.

We have observed that the Indian revenues have increased nearly twenty-five per cent. in the last nine years, or by about ten millions sterling. But only a small part of this increase can be attributed to any real financial elasticity, or be considered as a proportionate measure of the general progress and prosperity of India. Partly it must be accounted for by the universal rise in prices, which has affected all new assessments as well as all expenditure. But at least nine millions out of the ten are due to heavier taxation and to a precarious augmentation of nearly four millions in a precarious resource—the Opium monopoly. Of the new and enhanced taxation of six millions and a quarter, one million and a quarter arise from increased consumption of ardent spirits, encouraged by our peculiar Excise laws,—two millions and a quarter from the additional tax on salt, raising an article essential to the health of a very poor and vegetarian population to twenty times the price it bears in England, the richest country in the world,—one million and a half from a higher Stamp duty, or in other words a higher tax on justice. The license tax only produced £650,000. The Land revenue

did not increase materially in the decade between 1859 and 1869, and the Customs, the duties having been largely reduced, did not increase at all.

The most ingenious analysis would fail to trace any appreciable share in the augmentation of the revenues of India, under any heading, to the influence of railways,*—nothing that could form the most trifling set-off against the annual charge of at least £2,400,000,† which the guaranteed railways have entailed upon the State. With this annual charge staring them in the face,—with the facts before them, admitted in recently published despatches, that the average net income of the existing lines only amounted to three per cent. on the bare cost of their formation,‡ “although the lines already completed, or in course of construction, occupy the most fruitful field for railway enterprise,”—the Government of India, with the sanction of the Secretary of State, has pledged itself to undertake the construction of ten thousand miles of new railways at an estimated expense of £100,000,000, “raising the money upon its own credit, and expending it by the agency of their own officers.”§ That is to say, nearly a hundred millions having been laid out in constructing five thousand miles of railway which, far from paying, impose an annual burden on the country of two millions and a half sterling, and all the lines of first importance being occupied, we are now to construct ten thousand miles more

* Appendix F.

† Deficiency of guaranteed interest paid by Government ..£1,500,000

‡ Interest at 5 per cent. on (at least) £18,000,000 borrowed to pay for land and for guaranteed interest ... 900,000

£2,400,000

‡ From the Viceroy in Council to the Secretary of State, dated the 11th of March, 1869. Here are the figures from the Report of Mr. Juland Danvers for the year ending 30th June, 1868 (issued in August 1869)—Capital expended, exclusive of the cost of land (paid by Government), £78,986,655; Net receipts for the year, £2,100,122, being £237,178 less than the previous year. This is less than 3 per cent. If the cost of land and accumulated guaranteed interest were added, at least £18,000,000, the net returns would be little more than 2 per cent.

§ See Speech by the Duke of Argyll in the House of Lords, on the 23rd of July, 1869.

at a cost of a hundred millions more, on lines of comparatively small traffic, and perhaps they may pay. This is the panacea for a chronic deficit!)

It would be difficult to point out any symptoms of statesmanlike originality and insight, of far extended research and inquiry, of administrative skill, or even of conscientious frugality, in the financial history of India during the last ten years. But for the candour and energy displayed by the Viceroy, Lord Mayo, on the magnitude of the crisis becoming known to him, there would be little ground for hope in the immediate future. Sir Richard Temple, in his speech before the Viceregal Council on the 6th of March 1869, introducing the Budget for 1869-70, which even then showed an acknowledged deficit of one million sterling, very soon to be more than doubled by more careful calculation, eulogised the financial policy of Government as "at once safe, just, and sound;" and proudly mentioned "the national balance-sheet exhibiting eighty millions on each side of the account,—truly a high figure demonstrative of the calibre of our power in the East," as "a spirit-stirring fact." As if there were anything "demonstrative of power," anything that ought to be "spirit-stirring," in the mere magnitude of money transactions, irrespective of their solvency and solidity. •

To an intelligent Native who has watched and analysed the extravagant expenditure and the delusive economies of the last ten years, the vituperations of the late Viceroy and of a party in the Secretary of State's Council, when advising the annexation of Mysore, against "excessive extravagance," "reckless profusion and dissipation of means,"* by a Native Prince, must seem a hollow mockery. As a general rule, the administration of a Native State is carried on with remarkable frugality, and hard cash accumulates in the treasury or in the private hoards of the Prince, to provide for future exigencies. With augmented taxes and a rapidly increasing revenue, our Government gets deeper into debt, the expenditure of the last three financial years having exceeded the income by nine millions sterling.† The excellence and purity of our motives and

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 60.

† Appendix G.

intentions cannot affect the financial results, can afford no consolation or compensation for the large amount of useless expenditure.

Without being obliged to argue, with Mandeville, that private vices are public benefits, the Natives of India cannot fail to see that what we call the "reckless profusion" of a Native Prince,—in the few cases admitting of such an imputation,—is far more advantageous to the country than the temperance and thrift of the English officials who would supplant him. Whatever the Native Prince may spend is spent in India, chiefly in his own Principality. His patriarchal bounty supports thousands who would find no place at our board. The manufacture of many fabrics and articles of luxury, the encouragement of native art and learning, depend almost entirely upon the patronage of the Sovereign and his Court. The splendour of his genial hospitality, public ceremonies and processions, is a constant source of national pride, entertainment and social recreation to all ranks and classes. All this must cease if the Principality becomes a British Province; everything then must settle down to a dull and uniform level.* The stately dinner-parties and gay balls, in which the small English community take delight, may be highly civilised and intellectual diversions, worthy of general respect and admiration; but these festivities can hardly be expected to rouse much popular interest, for Natives, even of the highest rank, are very seldom invited to them. The high moral character and domestic virtues of our officers, who do not mix with the Natives at all and never meet them except officially, afford no equivalent in popular estimation for the money they drain out of the Province to supply the wants of their families, and to provide for their future years of retirement at home.

When a well informed Native hears the Rajah of Mysore, or any other Prince, denounced for surrounding himself with "parasites," "hangers on," "favourites," and "courtiers,"* who are declared to "exist on the public revenues," and to "fatten on the corruption of the Court,"† he can

* *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 89; Ditto, 1867, p. 9.

† *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, 1854, p. 54.

hardly avoid inquiring whether the British Government has no "hangers on" of its own? What is he to think of "the hundreds of highly paid military officers leading a life of aimless idleness, under the verbal fiction that they are 'doing duty,'"—of "the hill stations presenting an array of unemployed Colonels and Majors," receiving salaries of £1000 and £800 per annum respectively, to the amount of "something like a million sterling a year." These things we find mentioned in a recent number of the *Friend of India*, by no means a seditious journal; and most people would be inclined to admit the truth of its very mild comment, that "the payment of handsome salaries for doing nothing is at best unproductive expenditure."* No doubt need be thrown on the good intentions of the Government, on the merits of the unemployed officers, far superior in every point of view to the "parasites" of a Rajah, or on the assertion that they are justly entitled to all that they receive. But it may well be disputed whether the system under which these gentlemen have become entitled in a very poor country to such very large pay for little or no work, can be fairly extolled for its far-sighted economy, or is likely to be regarded by a Native politician as an utterly "unspeakable blessing." The "parasites" of a Rajah, it must also be observed, are not regarded by Natives, who know them better than we do, with that impatient horror and indiscriminate indignation so natural and so admirable in members of the dominant race.

When we complain that as in the Army so also in almost every civil department, a superfluous number of highly paid and (if I may coin the word) highly pensionable English gentlemen, are entertained, no question or doubt is raised of the great benefits conferred by the establishment of regular and orderly government, which, in many instances, could only have been effectually initiated by British intervention. But this could have been equally well done without destroying the fabric of local institutions, without excluding and proscribing Native talent, and treating an entire population with contempt. The work for which, perhaps, forty English officers were employed

* *Friend of India*, extracted from *the Asiatic* of January 19th, 1870.

could have been performed as well, with the assistance of Natives alone, by the two or three able and well qualified men who, in fact, devised and directed the whole process. Instead of this wise and just moderation, English gentlemen with no special qualifications have been everywhere, in our own Provinces and in Mysore, forced into office, so that at the present day every district and every department is over-manned and over-paid to a degree that will not be believed until it is thoroughly and impartially investigated.

A very striking disclosure and clear admission of this abuse, at least in one department, has been very recently given in the reductions in the Police ordered by Lord Mayo in November 1869, when the magnitude of the financial emergency seems to have forced itself upon his mind. Fifteen English gentlemen of the high rank of Deputy Inspector-General, paid at the rate of £1500 a year and upwards, and about a hundred and five District Superintendents and Assistants, on an average of £500 a year each,—in all one hundred and twenty superior officers drawing salaries in the aggregate of about £80,000 per annum,—were marked down for summary removal.

If these reductions are carried out to the full extent originally ordered, and to which the Home Government is understood to have demurred,—it may well be doubted whether the efficiency of the Police will suffer in the slightest degree. Into the general merits of the Police under the new organization, as a protective or as a detective body, we need not enter at present. No one who is at all acquainted with the opinions and feelings of the Natives, more especially as expounded in their own newspapers, both English and vernacular, will deny that it is an eminently unpopular body. It is not regarded as an “unspeakable blessing.” The former system of Police having failed, particularly in Bengal, changes far too sweeping were made, and instead of building on the old foundations, which we had damaged but not destroyed, of the village watchmen and the responsibility of the village authorities, to be secured by due remuneration, the usual panacea of rules and forms under highly paid European superintend-