five. It is surprising to think how long this measure has been deferred, and how opposed the covenanted civil servants of the regulation were to its adoption, owing, as was stated, to their want of confidence both in the intelligence and the integrity of jurymen. The measure was first introduced into Ceylon in 1811 by the late Sir Alexander Johnstone. It was subsequently adopted in Candeish in 1818-19, and was practised occasionally in the principality of Sattara when under the management of a European Resident Commissioner. It proved very satisfactory in all three cases, and consequently the Honourable Mount-Stuart Elphinstone, when Governor of Bombay, called on all the judges under his government in 1825 for their opinions as to the desirability of employing juries in criminal trials. The answers of seven judges out of nine in the regulation provinces were decidedly against it, and only two were in favour; while of the four in the non-regulation Provinces the whole were in favour.

The mode in which criminals were tried in the Deccan, under the administration of Mr. Elphinstone, when sole Commissioner for the

Government of the newly-conquered districts, is thus described in his report, dated 29th October, 1819:—

"According to our practice a prisoner is formally and publicly brought to trial. He is asked whether he is guilty. If he admits it, pains are taken to ascertain that his confession is voluntary. If he denies it, witnesses are called without further inquiry. They are examined in the presence of the prisoner, who is allowed to cross-examine and to call witnesses in his own defence. If there is any doubt when the trial is concluded, he is acquitted. If he is clearly guilty, the Shastery (Hindu law expounder) is called on to declare the Hindu law.

"It often happens that this law is unreasonable, and, when the error is on the side of severity, it is modified; when on the side of lenity, it is acquiesced in.

"When the trial is concluded and the sentence passed, in cases of magnitude it is reported for the information of the Commissioner, where the same leaning to the side of lenity is shown as in the court."

Sir Thomas Munro, when Governor of Madras, took steps for introducing the trial by jury into the Madras Provinces, before his death in 1828, but his successor was opposed to the measure. It seems strange that this project should have always met with such opposition from Englishmen, but more especially so since courts-martial, composed entirely of Natives, have prevailed for the trial of

Native soldiers and camp followers, under the supervision of a Judge-advocate or his representative, for more than a century, not only without inconvenience, but to the maintenance of discipline, and to the satisfaction of all classes.

Now that the Government has opened its eyes to the expediency, not to say the necessity, of employing the Natives extensively in the public business, it is hoped that the narrow spirit of exclusiveness which for a hundred years has separated the European civil servants from free and confidential intercourse with the Natives, will gradually wear away, and that they will henceforward be treated with the indulgence and courtesy due to their position in society as our fellow-subjects, not as personal servants and dependents.

I presume there are retiring pensions for this description of Native officers; but it would bind them more firmly to the Government if their pensions were regulated as those of the covenanted service, by monthly contributions of the upper grades, and forfeiture of all advantages incidental to dismissal from the service. The Government, having at length con-

fided in their Native civil servants, as they have always done in their army, have laid a foundation of strength that it is their own fault if they do not improve upon.

We have no right, however, to suppose, that in an educated class of society, such as is extending throughout India, they will be satisfied with the small remuneration they now receive for the performance of duties which meet with so much higher emolument in the case of Europeans. Increased salaries and pensions should be regulated by length of service in each grade, so that, as long as a man can be of use, he may have a motive to continue in employ. When he has served his full time, it is fit he should retire.

The necessity of holding out prospective remuneration to the uncovenanted servants becomes imperative when we consider the habits of the race. If a general spirit of dissatisfaction happened to pervade any particular class, or the whole body of the uncovenanted servants of a district, they would probably combine and strike work. To this peaceful mode of revolt they are accustomed under their own Government, and instances frequently

occur in individual villages, and, as was the case of Mysore, of the whole body of the inhabitants quitting their habitations and deserting their lands.

Before closing these observations on the uncovenated service, it seems right to combat an erroneous doctrine which is gaining ground, that the value of a rupee, or two shillings, to a Native in India is equal to seven times that amount in England. The error is grounded on the difference in the rate of wages between unskilled labour in England and India; but there are many circumstances which intervene to render this comparison false when applied to other classes of society. A fairer criterion would be, to take into consideration the price of grain; and next, the habits of the people especially due to the influence of climate.

When the price of rice—the ordinary food of the Madras sepoy—exceeds a half-penny per pound, the difference is made up in money. Two pounds of rice and one pennyworth of condiments per diem, suffice to feed a Native soldier in India: the day-labourer cannot live upon less. Two pounds of bread at 4d., and half as much more in cheese, butter, or

bacon, would supply the same modicum of food to the day-labourer in England, where he lives better than in any other part of Europe. The mere article of food, then, may cost treble what it does in India,—to say nothing of luxuries, now become almost necessaries of life; but has the labourer in England no other necessaries to be supplied than are requisite for the Indian labourer? The climate of the former demands that he should be well sheltered from the cold and wet all the year round, that he should be warmly clad, that he should be furnished with fuel, and that he should have the means for supplying his wife and helpless children with all these necessaries. Now, how stands the case with the Indian labourer? The shelter adequate to his wants may be constructed by himself, from the abundance of grass and wood obtainable almost without cost, by asking permission, if necessary, to take it from the waste. The climate does not require him to be clothed, at any time of the year, beyond a coarse blanket, to be bought for two or three shillings; he has no necessity for fuel to keep out the cold, and what is requisite for culinary purposes

may be said to be always at hand. The Indian labourer's wife and children require no further care than himself; and, from habit, they are his helpmates. They prepare his food, and are busily employed in cutting grass and gathering firewood, to supply the neighbouring towns with fodder for the cattle and fuel for the inhabitants, who are more profitably employed, —and thus feed themselves. But the case is very different as we ascend in the scale of society. The Native who receives two pounds a month, as a clerk, is certainly not better off than the clerk who in England receives twice as much; and if we admit that the educated Native public servant in India is entitled to half, or even one-third, of that paid to the European civil servant for the performance of the same duty, we shall not over-rate the emolument due to his services.

CHAPTER VIII.

PART I.—THE GOVERNMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD.

LET us now examine the administration, at home and abroad, of the dominions of the Queen in India; whose forces having subdued empires and kings, Her Majesty still holds more than two hundred potentates, great and small,—exercising sway over millions of subjects,—in subordinate alliance to her.

First of all let us take a rapid view of the progressive steps by which this government has passed from the hands of merchant-princes into that of the Crown. While the East-India Company confined itself to mere commercial transactions, it was too unimportant to arrest the attention of the Imperial Government, but when it became possessed of territory which it held by Act of Parliament, with sovereign power, the nation began to regard its progress with a watchful eye. The military

achievements of Clive obtained for him a peerage, but he was afterwards arraigned by his masters, on the plea of having amassed enormous wealth, though he gave them a kingdom.

The rapid steps made by the armies of the combined forces of the Crown and the Company, begat increased jealousy; and the King's Government assumed the privilege of appointing commissioners as members of the councils abroad, to watch the proceedings of the Company's Governors. This step, as might have been anticipated, tended rather to embarrass than to improve the state of things, and gave rise to opposition, which hampered the wheels of government. At length the delinquencies imputed to Warren Hastings, who saved the empire of which Clive laid the foundation, caused his impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanours, and he was tried before the House of Lords.

The representations of the Government Commissioners (Sir Philip Francis and General Clavering) against Hastings were enough, even before his arrival from India, to convince the Imperial Government that the control of

the Crown was insufficient over the political and territorial powers exercised by the Company. In the year 1782 Mr. Fox brought in a bill to limit those powers to their commercial concerns, and to place the territory, with all the military and political establishments of the Company, under the Minister of the Crown. This bill, though carried through the House of Commons, was thrown out in the House of Lords. Two years afterwards Mr. Pitt brought in and carried another bill, leaving the Company in full possession of its actual functions, subject, however, to the control of a Board consisting of a President elect and five other Cabinet Ministers, together with a Secretary and an establishment correspondent with that in Leadenhall Street for all purposes unconnected with the trade of the Company. Every dispatch from the India House was required henceforward to be submitted to the Board of Control for approval, and all matters relating to peace and war to pass through a secret committee of the Court of Directors, the business of which was not open to that body: the committee to consist of the chairman and deputy-chairman, and the senior member of

the Court. The duty of this committee was to act in subordinate co-operation with the President of the Board of Control, and to forward in their own names the result of the measures approved of by him as representing the Ministers of the Crown.

The trial of Warren Hastings lasted seven years, and terminated in his full and honourable acquittal. The effect of this procedure was to afford an amount of knowledge of which the Houses of Parliament had before no conception. From the time of the passing of Mr. Pitt's Bill the Ministers no longer deemed it necessary to appoint Commissioners to the Indian councils, but boldly took upon themselves to select the future Governors and Governors-General in communication with the Court of Directors, who received the names of the choice of Ministers, as in the case of the episcopacy, by a *congé d'élire* from the throne. In order to support, however, the authority of the Company, from whom they received their orders, the Governors elect were required to take the oaths of allegiance to that body before they received their commissions, a form which has continued to the present time. It is true

that instances have occurred in which the Court of Directors have stated objections to such selection, which have been deemed valid by the President of the Board of Control, for the intercourse between these bodies has always been maintained with so much courtesy and consideration that they have seldom been brought in direct collision with each other. The law has granted to the Court of Directors as well as to the Crown, equal privileges of recalling from India any public servant of the Company, the Governors not excepted.

The Court of Directors would lead people to believe that the Governors-General are of their own choice; but it is notorious that in the Presidentship of Mr. Canning in the Board of Control, when he consented to nominate a servant of the Company as Governor of Bombay, he submitted to the Court three names, out of which to choose one, and on the next vacancy the two rejected were sent up again by the President. It has been lately stated in Parliament by a Minister of the Crown, that the Governors-General are English statesmen sent out by the Home authorities, and operating to a great extent inde-

pendent of the Board of Directors, so that, in reality, the East-India Directors are in no wise responsible for the local administration of India, excepting as assenting to the measures adopted in that quarter.

While the Company retained their charter of exclusive trade, six out of the twenty-four Directors went out in rotation annually, and were ineligible to re-election for twelve months, in order to afford an opportunity to the proprietors of East-India Stock to send, if they chose, fresh members into the Direction. This object, however, was effectually defeated by the vast amount of influence derived from the directorial patronage, evinced by the constant re-election of the same individuals who went out of office the preceding year. As long as the commercial and territorial accounts were blended together, the treasury remained wholly at the disposal of the Company, and the interference of the Board of Control, except in politics, was rarely exercised. In the year 1813 the exclusive monopoly of the trade with India was withdrawn; and in the year 1834 that of China was also abolished, and THE MERCANTILE COMPANY TRADING TO THE EAST-INDIES WAS

PROHIBITED BY LAW FROM TRADING AT ALL WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE COMPANY'S CHARTER, extending north and south over the seas and ports embraced between the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn. From and after April, 1834, the territory acquired by the Company was transferred to the Crown, with all its liabilities of debt, with a guarantee to pay to the proprietors of East-India Stock £600,000 per annum out of the territorial revenue till the year 1874, when it is redeemable out of a fund set aside for the purpose by payment of £200 for every £100 stock. The legislature, however, thought it expedient, for the ensuing twenty years, to pass an Act, conferring on the Court of Directors for the time being (to be elected as heretofore), authority to exercise its functions as a governing body, in the name of the East-India Company.

Viewed abstractedly, it is impossible to imagine any scheme apparently more anomalous than that just described. Here we have a *commercial* corporation, precluded by law *from trading*, required to elect from amongst them a Board of administration for part of her Majesty's dominions, virtually chosen for life,—

a Board in whose election the Crown had no voice, nor legal power to displace any member, a Board issuing orders in the name of a trading company, whose commercial charter is suspended; and yet, with all this apparent independence, we find this Board of government controlled in its movements by a Minister of the Crown, regulating even its financial affairs. Anomalous though it be, yet practically, excepting in the circumstance of the election of its members, it differs little from the administration of other departments of the State.

The President of the Board of Control is virtually the Secretary of State for India; that Board of which he is the head, exists only in name. The real Board for the government of India is the Court of Directors, receiving instructions from the President. In like manner we have the Minister of War directing, but not interfering in the duties of the Commander-in-Chief, the Ordnance, the Commissariat, and the Medical departments, each of which has its separate and independent functionaries.

The First Lord of the Admiralty is aided by the naval lords, who necessarily superintend

the several branches of the navy with which the first lord is supposed to be ignorant.*

It was quite open for Her Majesty's Government in 1834 to have assumed the direct management of the Indian administration, but Parliament judged it wiser to make this experiment for twenty years, and then to decide how far it had succeeded. In the year 1854 it was conceived that the proprietors of East-India stock had not fulfilled the object for which their power of electing Directors had been continued to them; still it was considered advisable to rule India through the agency of a body of men who, from their experience and known characters, were best suited to the task. The Act of 1854 reduced the number of Directors from twenty-four (or rather thirty, including the house list of six Directors, annually re-elected) to eighteen; of whom at least two-thirds are required to have served in India ten years or more in the Company's employ; one-third, or six of the Directors, to be nominated by the Crown, and two-thirds as heretofore by the Proprietors. The Directors are to be elected in future for six years instead of four, and to be eligible for immediate re-election. Such form of

government not to be continued for any definite period, but to be liable to change whensoever the Legislature may see fit. This is what constitutes the double government of India; but when viewed as a whole, it is no more a double government than that of several departments of the State, nor (to make use of a homely comparison) than the domestic arrangement of every well-regulated household; in which the President of the Board of Control represents the master, and the Court of Directors the mistress,—both having separate duties, and taking the management of the department which properly belongs to each. In this view of the case, it is clear that the business of India can be efficiently conducted in England only by the agency of functionaries who, having served an apprenticeship in India, have a competent knowledge of all the complicated peculiarities belonging to that country; and Parliament has, no doubt, acted wisely in restricting the election of a certain number of Directors to men of experience. It would not interest the public to know the process by which the business is conducted between the two Boards, but, according to the evidence adduced before the

Committee of the House of Commons, the separation of the President of the Board of Control from the working department of Leadenhall Street does entail a measure of delay and irresponsibility where they ought not to exist; but the system cannot well be changed in the present form of the Home Department.

While the East-India Company existed as a trading body, the Court of Directors took a high position among the mercantile communities of this great city, and even since their occupation is gone, they seem unwilling to divest themselves of the idea that they are a very important branch of the city corporations, and flatter themselves that, instead of being a Board of administration like any other Board of Government, they are to a certain extent an independent body. The mask, however, is being torn off every day. When the Earl of Ellenborough said, "While President of the Board of Control, I governed India," he only spoke the truth. When Lord Broughton told a Committee of the House of Commons that "He made the Afghan war, the Court of Directors had nothing to do with it," he only

spoke the truth. When Sir Charles Wood stated in his place in the House, that "No doubt the Ministers were responsible for the Government of India," he only spoke the truth. And if the present President of the Board of Control were to say "L'Etat c'est moi," he would but speak the truth. Indeed it has been lately stated in Parliament, that the Court of Directors were not only unconsulted in regard to the Persian war, but that the expedition was ordered from home without their assent. Shall it be said, then, that the Court of Directors are nobody,—far from it,—they conduct the affairs entrusted to them with zeal and integrity; they exercise the result of their experience with candour and honesty, and not unfrequently with boldness, in offering their opinions to the Ministers of the Crown, so much so that it is said they have even placed their personal liberty in jeopardy by resisting measures incompatible with what they deemed their duty and their honour. By the Act of 1854, they have been deprived of the most valuable portion of their patronage, of which a large share was also enjoyed by the President of the Board of Control, and in return the Court have

had their salaries increased by two hundred a year each,—a paltry recompense for the sacrifice required of them.

If my view of the position of the Court of Directors be correct, whence all this outcry of neglect of India on their part, and of avidity for revenue and new territory? Has it ever entered into the heads of those who make these accusations, that neither the Directors nor the East-India proprietors have ever been, *or can be, benefited by such measures?* Have not the Presidents of the Board of Control, the Ministers of the Crown, proclaimed their responsibility for acts of omission and commission, and is it not notorious that the Court of Directors have on more than one occasion stood both between the Minister of the Crown and the Governor-General, to protect the rights of the Natives of India? As for the Court of Proprietors, the power of that body was virtually extinguished in 1834, and it cannot stand beyond 1874. Meanwhile it walks the City, the ghost of a substance once real and influential; but no longer so. Does the public still require to be told that the only legitimate and effective mode of obtaining redress on

any question of complaint is through Parliament?

It is supposed that there is already a growing disposition on the part of Ministers to set aside the Court of Directors altogether and to act on their own responsibility, notwithstanding the recent act by which the composition of the body of Directors has been so completely changed and the Ministers so entirely identified in all the acts of the Indian Government. The necessity for two separate establishments for the Home Government is not apparent. There are those living who will probably see, in a few years, this anomaly extinguished, when the President of the Board of Control, as First Lord, shall assume his seat at the head of an Indian Board, comprising an adequate number of practical lords, as is the case at the Admiralty, through whom, as at present, the Government of India might be conducted.* Whenever such

* There is, in such a case, one condition, however, which seems imperative; namely, that once in office, the members should not be liable to removal but by impeachment; otherwise their utility as independent counsellors would be lost. After a fixed number of years, each should be entitled to retire on a pension; and if thought advisable, the Crown might render that retirement imperative.

a Board is established, it should be filled, as in the case of other professional bodies,—namely, the Church, the Law, the Army, and the Navy,—by a certain number of those who had served their apprenticeship in the service, and had gone through it; and be precluded from engaging in other business than that for which they will be paid. Nor is this an unreasonable suggestion, when the magnitude of the task of supervision over the numerous departments of each of the several local governments is considered, with their vast extent and population, each of which has to control nations wholly distinct from one another in language, habits, and in their moral and religious institutions. In such a Board, it is to be hoped that a portion of military officers of Indian experience will always be found, to form a department like that of the Horse Guards, consisting of military officers and clerks accustomed to all the details of that branch of the service; for which duties it is hardly reasonable to expect that civilians, however great their talents, zeal, and integrity, can be so competent. Surely a standing army of three hundred thousand men, composed of different

nations, merits some such supervision, especially as its organization is for ever changing. At the period when this anticipated alteration occurs in the India Board, the members composing it should be liberally remunerated. This, together with their new titles, would give them a status in the Government and in society, which, with their present inadequate salaries, and their long, painful, and humiliating canvass among the East-India Proprietors, it is impossible they should enjoy. India requires representation, and if she cannot have it in the Houses of Parliament, she is entitled to it in the Home Government. Time was when a sort of representation for India existed in the Court of Proprietors and in the Court of Directors, but the influence and independence of both have ceased to exist, and it is essential for the well-being of the people, and the stability of our Government in that quarter, that it should be restored in some shape or other. There are many reasons why this representation cannot exist in the Houses of Parliament. The members have not, as in the West Indies, any concerns in colonial estates, and even if they had, they would not represent the people, but

merely their own properties and English interests. The only legitimate advocates for the nations of India are those few members in both Houses of Parliament who have been in the country, and some of the Court of Directors themselves.

The present peaceful disposition of the Natives ought not to lull us into a conviction of our security in that quarter of the globe.

The several modes by which the Natives have corrected abuses, or have got rid of tyrannical masters are familiar to them. None is more common and so effectual as to withdraw from Government altogether by the process of the "Walsa" or gatherings, as practised in Mysore, and as before described in p. 68. We have seen the inhabitants of the populous city of Benares, resisting an infringement of their local privileges, by the imposition of a house-tax without consulting them, quit their homes and live for several weeks in the open fields, stopping all intercourse with the town, and obtaining universal sympathy throughout the district. We have witnessed a similar insurrection in Bareilly on a like occasion, which

cost much bloodshed. We have witnessed a general disaffection pervading the whole of our Native army of Madras, which commenced by the massacre of the European portion of the garrison of Vellore; and we have seen partial plots of a similar nature in other parts. It was often said by one of the wisest of our Indian Legislators (the late Lord Metcalfe), that we sit on a volcano, not knowing when it may burst forth and overwhelm us. We have, however, more to apprehend from revolutions commencing with peaceful withdrawal from our Government, than from the outbreaks of Native princes, who, for the most part, are not sufficiently popular with their subjects, and have no adequate resources to combat successfully against our gigantic power.

The re-organization of the Home Government need not disturb the existing system abroad, which, on examination, will be found to contain the elements of an administration well calculated to endure, and to ensure every day more and more the prosperity of the people. The maxim of the medical profession seems applicable to the existing systems of the civil and military departments in India, namely,—

to "let well alone," and to change nothing but the name till necessity demands it.

Having adverted to the scrutiny which the East-India Company's Government undergoes, it seems but fair to advert to the ordeal to which the Directors were lately submitted, when Parliament called on them to lay before it in what way they had dispensed their patronage, which was, in reality, the personal remuneration for their services, and was as much their private property as the guinea for every working day they attend the Court. That disclosure had the effect of shutting the mouths of those who anticipated a triumphant proof of abuse, not to say of corruption. I imagine there are few public men, either in this or any other country, who could have exhibited a more honourable testimony of liberal distribution of private property for public purposes than did the return which was then laid before Parliament.

It is alike honourable to the Directors,—present and past,—to be able to point to such lists as are here appended of the great men who have owed to them their first nomination to the service, and afforded them opportunities

of distinguishing themselves and adding to the national honour and reputation.

As an instance of the high estimation in which the Indian service was held so far back as 1827, we find the Minister of the day, Mr. Canning, at a public dinner given to Sir John Malcolm on the 13th June of that year, eulogizing the officers of that service in these words:—

"There cannot be found in the history of Europe the existence of any monarchy which, within a given time, has produced so many men of the first talents in civil and military life as India has first trained for herself, and then given back to their native country.

List of Officers of the Indian Civil Service selected for employment by the Government of England.

1. Sir G. Anderson, Governor of Mauritius and of Ceylon.
2. Sir G. Clarke, Commissioner for Settlement of Cape Boundaries, permanent Secretary of Board of Control.
3. Sir F. Curry, Government Nominee in the Court of Directors.
4. The Honourable Mount-Stuart Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay.

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* Kaye's Life of Sir J. Malcolm.

5. Right Honourable Sir H. Ellis, Secretary to President of Board of Control, Clerk of the Pells, Member of the Embassy to China, Ambassador Extraordinary to Persia, Ambassador to Brazils, and Member of the Board of Control.
6. Sir James Higginson, Governor in the West Indies and Mauritius.
7. John Hutt, Esq., Governor of Western Australia.
8. Right Honourable Holt McKenzie, Member of the Board of Control.
9. Right Honourable Sir John McNeil, Ambassador in Persia.
10. Right Honourable Lord Metcalfe, Governor of Jamaica and Governor-General of Canada.
11. Sir Charles Trevelyan, Under-Secretary of the Treasury.
12. W. Strachey, Esq., Précis-writer in Foreign Office.
13. P. Willoughby, Esq., Government Nominee in the Court of Directors.

Besides three Engineer Officers :—

The late Lieutenant-Colonel Irving, C.B., Superintendent of Government Docks.

Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes, Superintendent of the Mint, at the Tower.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jervis, Superintendent of Map Department at the War Office.

List of Military Officers who have received honours for public service, and have filled high Civil Offices.

†1. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir J. B. N. Campbell.

†*2. The late Lieutenant-Colonel Sir James R. Carnac.

†3. The late Major-General Sir Barry Close.

*4. Lieutenant-General Sir Mark Cubbon.
†*5. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir H. Lawrence.
*6. The late Lieutenant-General Sir John Littler.
†*7. Lieutenant-General Sir John Low.
†**8. The late Major-General Sir John Malcolm.
†9. The late Colonel Sir J. Kinneir McDonald.
†*10. The late Major-General Sir William Morison.
**11. The late Sir Thomas Munro.
†12. The late Lieutenant-General Sir William Nott.
†13. The late Major-General Sir D. Ochterlony.
†14. Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram.
*15. Lieutenant-General Sir George Pollock.
†**16. The late Sir Henry Pottinger.
‡†17. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir H. Rawlinson.
†18. Colonel Sir Justin Shiel.
†19. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Henry Willock.
†20. Colonel Sir Claude Wade.
‡21. Major-General Sir H. R. Vivyan.

** Governors or Civil Commissioners of Government.
* Members of Council.
† Representatives at Foreign Native Courts.
‡ Government Nominee in the Court of Directors.

Nor can I omit to include some of the names of those who so greatly distinguished themselves in the late war while serving in the Turkish army, such as—

Colonel Ballard,	Colonel A. Lake,
Colonel Cadell,	Colonel Nasmyth,
General Cannon,	Captain Thompson,

besides others who obtained honours and brevet rank for their services under Lieutenant-General Sir R. Vivyan.*

* *In addition to these there stand in the India Army List officers who have received the Military Orders of the Bath* :—

10	Generals.
12	Lieutenant-Generals.
52	Major-Generals.
35	Colonels.
32	Lieutenant-Colonels.
2	Majors.
2	Superintending Surgeons.
166	

Foreign Orders for Afghan War :—

11	Major-Generals.
8	Colonels.
10	Lieutenant-Colonels.
1	Captain.
2	Physician-Generals.
32	

Part II.—GOVERNMENT IN INDIA.

It may be well imagined that the immediate control over millions of subjects, spread over so wide a surface as that of our territory in India, must be distributed among several authorities possessing extensive powers. Hence we find the Governor-General of all India, directing the great political machine, and aided by a Legislative Council, framing general laws for the whole of India, or reviewing, revising, and sanctioning special laws or regulations for the local administrations of the empire. The Governor-General's Legislative Council consists of the Commander-in-Chief in India and nominees or representatives of the minor Governments (which have to be described), and a legal member appointed by the Home authorities.

The minor Governments consist of a Governor and Council at Madras and at Bombay; a Lieutenant-Governor, without a council, for Lower Bengal; and one for the North-west Provinces; the two latter nominated by the Governor-

General for the time being, subject to the approval of the Home authorities: besides which, there are Commissioners for the Government of the Punjab, Oude, Nagpoor, and Mysore, under the direct control of the Supreme Government; and Commissioners for Sind and Sattara, under the Bombay Government.

To each of the Governors, ruling, respectively, over twenty-two millions of subjects in Madras, and eleven millions in Bombay, the Councils attached consist of the local commander of the forces, and two members of the civil service. These Governments are under specific codes of regulations, which have been accumulating for the last hundred years, but which, within the last twenty-five or thirty, it has not been found expedient to extend to the several tracts of territory that have during the latter period fallen into our hands. All the Governments are required to keep diaries of their proceedings (a rule that extends to the representatives at Native courts), which are transmitted periodically to higher authorities. Those of the Governors are transmitted to England in duplicate; those of Lieutenant-Governors or Commissioners to the Governor-General in council, who transmits

their proceedings to England with any comments he deems necessary. It has always appeared to me, that where the Governors and Commanders-in-chief of the minor Presidencies are selected by the Ministers at home, without reference to their previous knowledge of India, the association of experienced members of the civil service with them is a wholesome measure, more especially as these members are required to record the reason of their dissent from any step which the Governor may think proper to carry out on his own responsibility. An Indian Governor can hardly do wrong, without being warned of the probable consequence by his council, and hence it rarely happens that he acts in opposition to it. The patronage of all civil appointments, both in the civil branches of the army and in military commands, belongs to the Governor; while nominations to the staff, in which the discipline of the army is concerned, are left to the Commander-in-chief of each Presidency; and as it seldom happens that either of these high authorities has had any previous connection with the localities to which he is attached, the patronage is, according to certain regulations and qualifications, pretty fairly dis-

tributed. The members of council are elected by the Court of Directors, and their names submitted to the President of the Board of Control, whose approval is requisite.

Thus, it seems, from the passing of Mr. Pitt's bill in 1784, the heads of the civil and military Governments in India have been nominees of the Crown, aided, in duties with which they were previously unacquainted, by councils selected from the civil branch of the service, the members of which are bound by their oaths of office to give disinterested advice, consistent with their experience and judgment.

No one thinks of calling such a Board a double Government; but in reality, the Home Government, since the year 1834, has been virtually not very dissimilar whenever the president chose to adopt the counsel of the Court of Directors, with this difference, that there are two sets of officers to perform the same duty, and the Court of Directors are ostensibly the agents of measures which they adopt under permission, and issue orders of which as a body they are in some cases wholly ignorant.

When the Home Government is assimilated to the Indian Governments abroad, and the

Houses of Parliament and the English public become better acquainted with the interests of that country and their own, then,—and not till then,—will the resources of India be fully developed, and its value properly appreciated.

CHAP. IX.—CONCLUSION.

PART I.—WHAT IS TO BECOME OF THE PEOPLE?

THE late Sir Thomas Munro, when Governor of Madras, left on record a minute, dated 31st December, 1824, in which he emphatically demands,—

"WHAT IS TO BECOME OF THE PEOPLE?

"I require it to be distinctly avowed whether they are to be raised or lowered. Are we to be satisfied with merely securing power, and protecting the inhabitants, or are we to endeavour to raise their character, and to render them worthy of filling higher situations in the management of their country, and of devising plans for its improvement."

It is more than thirty years since these sentiments were promulgated, and the question has at length been decided that the advancement of education, and the more extensive employment of the Natives in the management

of their country, is our wisest policy. The revolution in the condition of our own subjects of nearly one hundred and thirty millions of souls has already commenced, and is advancing as rapidly as can be expected. To change the character of such masses, to render them useful for the benefit of the State, must be gradual yet still progressive, and the philosopher and statesman will watch the progress with intense interest.

Let us look back only to the short period that has elapsed since the sagacious statesman alluded to recorded the sentence with which I have headed this chapter, and see what has since been accomplished. During that period the dormant population seems to have been aroused. The Government in India, freed from internal warfare, has had time, and has availed itself of the opportunity, for raising the character of the people, and elevating them by degrees to the position which, from their energy and intellectual capacity, they are entitled to hold in the social system of their native land. The stupendous hydraulic works for irrigation and inland navigation; the commencement of railways of vast extent; the

introduction of steam on the great rivers; the diffusion of education in all its branches, literary, scientific, and practical; have already raised the people to a condition to render them efficient for all departments of the State. Who could have predicted, when that memorable minute was written, that within thirty years an Indian civilian, now Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, should pronounce "the Native agency to be the foundation of our judicial system;" or that a Secretary of the India House should give it as his opinion, that "the Natives of India were competent to fill the highest offices of the State?" Who could have foretold that, within that short period, we should see Indian mechanics and navvies constructing railroads, and fulfilling all the duties of engineers, stokers, station-masters, and clerks, and even of directors of those complicated establishments? Least of all could we have anticipated, that they should construct electric telegraphs, and take their place as the station-clerks, to regulate the wires over thousands of miles, of those lightning conductors of intelligence. So much for our own subjects. Let us now look a little farther, and ask what is to

become of the other forty or fifty millions of people, the subjects of the two hundred petty, and great Principalities, with whom we are connected by treaties, more or less stringent, in regard to their dependence on our irresistible power. The imbecility of the Native rulers, and the practically vicious systems of their administrations, have led to their own destruction, and to the gradual absorption of their territories into our dominions. Our own system has, in spite of some errors and deficiencies, contrasted favourably with that of the neighbouring Native States, and has reconciled our subjects to a rule which, notwithstanding its superior advantages of security of life and property, has had a tendency to elevate the lower classes, but to degrade the upper and more influential. This contrast of systems has, in a great measure, been a main cause of our strength, and as long as ill-governed Native Principalities exist, so long will that species of strength continue, and will necessarily diminish as their extinction takes place. But it can neither be a just nor an honourable policy, to foster bad government among our neighbours for the mere sake of acquiring a factitious popularity at home.

Nor will it be consistent with our duty or with humanity, to withhold and discourage among the Native Principalities, ere they eventually sink into our arms from inanition, or provoke us into war by mad presumption, those advantages of education and advancement which will eventually take place when their subjects form a portion of that universal empire in India to which at present it seems our destiny to attain. On the contrary, whenever opportunities occur by these States falling into the hands of minors, it should be our policy, I conceive, to become the guardians of their rights,—to undertake the administration of their countries, and to introduce such regulations for the advancement of the intellectual condition of their subjects, as to render them eventually fit agents to conduct the administration under their young Native Chiefs, when they come of age, on the same judicious principles in which they and their people will have been trained. Wherever this benevolent measure has been practised, as in Travancore, Sattara, Nagpoor, and Cutch, we have succeeded in introducing good government, which has been continued after the princes themselves

were intrusted with the reins of authority. It failed in Mysore, because a Native minister, and the persons by whom he was surrounded, found it their interests to encourage the prince in the indulgence of idle and futile pursuits, instead of attending to business, and preparing him for the important duties of an Asiatic Sovereign, which would not have been the case under European guardianship. We were, no doubt, justified by our treaty with Mysore, and perhaps with Oude, in taking on ourselves the administration of these countries under the circumstances of their misrule. It is, however, an open question how far we are justified in extinguishing the dynasties in case they should have sons, whether lawfully begotten or adopted. The introduction of a system of government and European supervision, as is the case at Mysore at present, tends to enrich the coffers of the protected State, and to maintain a certain aristocracy, possessing beneficial influence, inasmuch as they fill the principal posts in the Government, both as civil ministers and military officers. This gives them an interest in the welfare of, and begets a loyalty towards, the superior State, which

upholds the existence of their Native rulers. I shall not enter into the question of rejecting the right of succession of adopted heirs to these principalities, who are not feudatory chiefs, dependent on the will of Sovereignties to which we may have succeeded by conquest, as in the case of the Jagirdars of the Peshwa, the Rajah of Sattara, and other lords paramount, because such estates really become liable to resumption on their decease, and require new patents to be granted to their successors, whether legitimately begotten or adopted according to the forms of Hindu law. An impartial reference to such law, with regard to the succession to principalities, and sovereignties competent to form independent treaties, and to the practice of all former Governments, and our own till very lately, would decide that question in their favour. At all events, it can never be our policy to violate solemn engagements for the sake of any advantage whatsoever. The question for consideration, as regards the Native princes of India, is, whether it be our true interest to hasten the time when the rest of India may be subjected to our immediate rule, with the feeling of the whole of the upper

classes opposed to us, or to retain and foster as long as it be possible the existent Native Princes, and gradually raise the character of their government to an approximation with our own, and thus secure their aid in more ways than one, in case of future wars. We ought not to forget the assistance which both the Mysore and the Hyderabad Governments rendered us in the two last Mahratta wars, by bodies of efficient troops, furnished at the moment of exigency, and kept up in time of peace,—nor the pecuniary aid which Oude has supplied, when our coffers were exhausted, and our credit at a low ebb, in similar emergencies. It is the tendency of our auxiliary alliances to increase the wealth of the subsidized states, and to place at our disposal their military, and in many cases their pecuniary resources. The maintenance of the troops to be furnished by these states in time of need should at all times be required to be kept up in a state of efficiency, and be ready for service; a policy which has not been overlooked in the supervision of such military contingents by European officers, sufficient only in number to insure their discipline and fidelity,

without degrading the chiefs who command them.

Whenever our regular army is called on to quit our own boundaries, whether in China, Afghanistan, Persia, or elsewhere, these contingents, under their European leaders, will always be available to join our regular forces left at home, and to take the place of those temporarily withdrawn, without additional expense or the necessity of increasing our own army.

My own conviction is, that by insuring good Government to the Native States, judiciously introduced, we shall add more to our moral and political strength than by their extinction; a conviction which has forced itself upon my mind after a long and deliberate consideration of the subject, and after having passed a great part of my life in official intercourse with the Ministers of several Native Courts,—a conviction which, it is my satisfaction to know, accords with that of some of the wisest Statesmen which India has produced.

Part II.—WILL RUSSIA INVADE INDIA?

In this epitome of the present condition of our Indian Empire it may be expected I should say a few words on the actual state of our foreign relations in that quarter. If the ambition of Russia leads her to look to the conquest or even invasion of India, it would behove her not only to regard the present position of England in the East, and her own position at home, but to study the geography and the history of the intermediate nations between her and the object of her desire. She should also make herself well acquainted with the obstacles presented by rugged mountains, and a broad desert lying between them and India proper. She should consider the nature of the climate, where our own European soldiers suffer so severely without the exposure incidental to campaigns; and last, not least, let her reflect how her armies are to be recruited or supplied with food and

stores, at so great a distance from her own country. Let her be reminded that, though India has suffered frequent invasions during the last three thousand years, yet, that her territorial ramparts have never changed, and, that Hindus, Greeks, Mahomedans, and Scythian or Tartar hordes, have one and all had to pass the gorges of the Sulimany range, before crossing the Indus at Attock, whence they entered the Punjab. There they had to encounter the hardy Mountaineers of Cashmere and the Himalaya, and passing over the fertile district of Jalender, found before them a desert, impassable for an army capable of protecting itself. Hence they were compelled to keep close to the Himalaya range, for the sake of water and forage, along a narrow slip of from thirty to forty miles wide; till, after a march of more than a hundred miles, they came to the plain of Panipat, where they had to encounter the army of India.

It was after the Tartar horde under Batu, the nephew of Chengiz Khan, who, in the first half of the thirteenth Century, laid in ashes the City of Moscow, and, in a few years, having penetrated into Poland and Hungary, enslaved

Russia, that a portion of the same race, spreading over Asia, drove from their thrones thirteen of the Sovereigns of Transoxania and Tooran. who found an asylum at the Court of Dehli, It was in the latter half of the thirteenth Century that these successful warriors directed their efforts against the Indian Empire. Eight different attempts were made between A.D. 1283 and 1305 by those barbarians, numbering from sixty thousand to two hundred thousand horsemen in each campaign. Once or twice they penetrated to within forty miles of the capital, when they were met by the experienced soldiers of the Empire, and driven back with great slaughter. In their last campaign, finding their retreat through the Punjab cut off, they ventured to cross the desert by Bhickanere to Tolamba, near Bhawalpore, when fifty-six thousand men, with their cattle, left their bones to bleach on those inhospitable and parching sands.

History will inform Russia that the great conquerer Mahmood of Ghizny, with all Afghanistan and part of Persia at his command, was scarcely able to establish a Mahomedan

colony in Lahore, ere he died, after a reign of forty years devoted to that end. That afterwards, it occupied a full century and a half before the Mahomedans obtained possession of Dehli, and that another century elapsed ere they crossed the Vindayan range, and drank of the waters of the Nerbadda.

It is true that Tamerlane in the end of the thirteenth, that Baber in the middle of the sixteenth, and that Nadir Shah and Ahmed Shah Abdalli in the course of the last century, all entered Dehli, but on each of these occasions the power of the reigning monarch was usurped by factions engaged in civil wars, and the invaders were, one and all, invited and aided by traitors to their country. With the exception of Baber, the founder of the empire denominated in Europe that of the Great Mogul, none of these conquerors ventured to remain longer in India than just to sack the capital, and return laden with booty. No foreign enemy can calculate on such a chance under the British rule. If Russia, however, should seriously contemplate an invasion of India, she must first possess herself, as others have done,

of the resources and the cordial support of the nations through which she will have to pass on her march onwards, and on her retreat homewards. She must bring under her subjection all the countries lying between her own frontier and the mountains of Solyman, whether she advance by the route of Persia,* or the more difficult approach by Khiva and Bamian. This will occupy time, and the eyes of England will not be shut to the danger which threatens her; and even, after all, should she pass the mountains of India, she will encounter the same race that stormed the heights of the Alma, that dared to charge her batteries at Balaklava, that repulsed her brave

* Persia, by an act of perfidy towards an ally in 1827, virtually forfeited her claim to the confidence of England, and shortly after was induced to forego her title by treaty to the *defensive* alliance which then subsisted between those two powers. Since then the influence of England in Persia has gradually declined, and she has been as gradually subsiding into a dependency of Russia. If the latter should prosecute the project ascribed to her of extending her dominion towards India, Persia can no longer remain neutral, but will have to choose between the renewal of her defensive alliance with Great Britain or her hostility.

soldiers on the heights of Inkerman, and that laid in ruins Sebastopol. Those stalwart heroes will be supported by more numerous hosts than Russia can bring into the field of as gallant foes as she encountered in the campaign of 1853-4, in the provinces along the line of the Danube, at Silistria, and at Kars. She will meet with Indian warriors trained to arms from their youth upwards, inured to the climate, and living all their lives in the tented field. She has felt in the late war what it was to supply reinforcements of men, cattle, food, and military stores, at a distance from her magazines, though fighting on her own soil. She has been taught to respect the *disciplined* troops of Asia, whom she had never before encountered. She will have to calculate how her more northern soldiers will suffer, and how they are to be reinforced at the distance they will be in India from their native land. No; believe it not! Russia is too well informed of the condition of India, of the obstacles, both moral and physical, she must expect to encounter there, as well as among the treacherous nations she will have to

pass through in her progress, for her to contemplate seriously so rash an undertaking as that which is generally ascribed to her. That she will not cease to strengthen her position on the Caspian, or give up her design in making use of Persia as an instrument to threaten the peace of Afghanistan and of India, is very probable; but that she will involve herself in a war with England before she is in a position to attack India with some surer prospect of success than is at present apparent, is not to be apprehended. The present emperor, at all events, after the experience he has gained in the late campaign, will direct his attention to the advancement of civilization among his own subjects rather than involve his country in wars which will assuredly end in the exhaustion of his strength in the East, leaving him exposed to more desperate conflicts than ever in the West.

With regard to India, I heartily subscribe to the following sentiments which I find in a late number of the *Calcutta Journal*:—

"Let England work out her destiny. Let her govern India for the people, and as far as possible by the people,

and neither England nor India need fear Russia, nor, I will add, any other foreign foe.

"India's dangers are in India, and not without."

Let us beware, however, lest by injudicious measures and too hasty encroachments on prejudices held sacred among her subjects, our Government drive to desperation her teeming and brave population. Let us not calculate on keeping down insurrection by means of our European troops, in case our Native army become extensively disaffected; for at such a season we may find that those gallant soldiers who have gained for us an empire (the largest with the exception of China, of any in the universe), may be induced to sympathize with their suffering countrymen, and either withhold their services, or even worse, turn those arms against us which they have so faithfully wielded in our favour.

Such events are unlikely to take place as long as India continues to be ruled by those who have been brought up apprentices to the duty. It can only happen when she is no longer governed for her own people, but for the sole benefit of her foreign rulers.

Heaven grant that that day may never come! If it should, I venture to predict, in the words of our immortal bard, with a slight alteration:—

COME THE WHOLE NATIONS OF THE WORLD IN ARMS,
AND WE WILL SHOCK THEM. NOUGHT SHALL MAKE US RUE,
IF *INDIA* TO HERSELF DOTH STAND BUT TRUE!

THE END.

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POSTSCRIPT.

NOTICE of the services of the late MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HENRY POTTINGER, Bart., G.C.B., under Her Majesty's Government, has accidentally been omitted at p. 238.

These services were: Commissioner and Minister Plenipotentiary during the Chinese war, and Governor of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope.