


Four Political Essays,

WITH AN APPENDIX

BY

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PRICE ONE RUPEE

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PREFACE.

THIS pamphlet has been brought out in response to inquiries from a few friends and relations for some of the matter contained in it, and in the hope that others, too, may feel interested in the views and feelings which are expressed in it.

East is East, and the lessons of history wear a different aspect for the Eastern mind from what they do for the Western. The process of occidentalising the East is as hopeless as the reverse one of orientalising the West. But each may carry its light and life to the other so as to end the conflict of ages and thus live for the world's peace and enlightenment. The strength of the Holy Land and of the blessed Aryan civilisation lies not in the effort to multiply and satisfy wants, but in the effort to curtail and control them,—not in competition, but in conciliation,—not in the organisation of the unity of aggressive and defiant conflict, but in the organisation of the unity of harmony and loving service.

Contents

	PAGE
1. CITIZENSHIP	1
2. THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN MODERN EUROPE	50
3. POLITICS AND THE VEDANTA ..	93
4. THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN INDIA ..	146
5. Appendix—THE BOER AND THE HINDU .	1

CITIZENSHIP.

CITIZENSHIP may be explained as the status of the individual freeman in the social organism, and this status consists not only of duties and responsibilities, but also of rights and privileges. It has been the special distinction and privilege of the great prophets and preachers of religion in the past to have conceived an ideal of human society in which every individual is to think only of his duties, to believe that the performance of duties is the greatest of all human privileges in society, and to conceive of duties as the sole possible measure of all rights worth the name. A divine voice proclaimed in trumpet tones by one of the sacred waters of ancient India :—" To work you have the right, but not to the fruits thereof." The preachers and priests of religions worth the name elsewhere have also similarly insisted on the absolute and universal character of the conception of duty. That this ideal of human society founded on, and encompassed on all sides by, the performance of duties prescribed by God to man and therefore resting on the most august, the most solemn, the most impressive and the most momentous of all sanctions,—that this is the highest social ideal that can be

conceived or realised by man on earth goes without saying. But at the same time there is such a thing as the making of a premature attempt to realise that ideal in the practice of mankind; and though such attempts may fail because they are premature, it is nevertheless true that when great ideas have once been born into the world and formulated for the benefit of humanity, they may be misrepresented, thwarted, or even defeated and made to retire for a time into the background, but they are destined not to perish and they continue to live a life of their own till in the fulness of time the advance of human thought and morality reaches a stage of evolution when it becomes possible to realise them in the social order. The Vedantins of India, and after him the true Christian spiritualist of the Western world, have remained and still remain idealists of the first water, —Utopian theorists, perhaps, dreaming pleasant dreams of the perfectibility of human nature—but both have always stood up, the former so early as the fifteenth century, B.C., for the infinite ethical excellence, and spiritual freedom of the individual man, and this is the inspiring force and motive leading to the production of the seers (Rishis) of ancient India and the saints of the early ages of Christian history. Mediæval India and Mediæval Europe failed in their attempts to realise this moral and spiritual freedom in the social order, but that is because imperfect men took up these lofty ideals prematurely and, being in too great haste to realise their chosen ideals, lost their power for good when they allowed their enthusiasm to get the better of

their judgment and often employed the forces of violence and even of deceit to compass their ends without waiting to realise them by the slow and laborious, though sure, process of social evolution under the emancipating influence of service lovingly rendered by man to his fellow-man. So, when the modern epoch is ushered in, the idea of right enters and is admitted as an element of human well-being, both for the individual and for society, and all modern social advance has been achieved under the working of the conception of citizenship as including both duty and right.

In taking up the subject of citizenship as thus conceived, we propose to confine ourselves on the present occasion to a consideration of it in its purely political or governmental aspect. In its legal and civil aspect, it involves rights and obligations relative to person and property, contractual relations of diverse kinds, &c., and these topics are largely foreign to the student of historical and political science. The political aspect of citizenship is, in itself, a matter of the utmost interest and importance, especially in the present-day conditions of Indian society, and much may be gained for the cause of public order and social peace as well as for the regulation of individual activity by turning our minds to the history of citizenship in the past and the light it throws on the character of Indian citizenship in the past and in the present.

The greatest event in the intellectual history of this century is the establishment of the theory of evolution and the extension of its methods to almost every branch of

human knowledge. The application of the theory to political science has been fruitful in many ways, but the most fundamental of all the truths established by it is the great law of social evolution, *viz.*, that all the leading races of humanity, the Aryans, the Semites and also the most richly-endowed branches of the Mongolian race have passed from the horde to the tribe nomadic, from the tribe nomadic to the tribe agricultural or the village community, from the village community to the city, and thence to the large oligarchical or monarchical states. The horde, as its very name implies, was without any strong or settled principle of unity ; it consisted of a little group or flock of gregarious individuals brought together by chance or need, living promiscuously, without morality, industry, or laws, swarming together, like chimpanzees, under the command and authority of the strongest male. Gradually, under the pressure of ever-increasing and inevitable competition and strife, union and assistance among hordes began increasingly to make for human amelioration ; the family came into existence, useful customs became instinctive, hordes joined together under the working of the instinct of sociability, men began to live in tribes, and thenceforward social organisation has had a history of uninterrupted advance.

The political organisation of the tribe must be familiar to every reader of Freeman's Dissertation on the Growth of the English Constitution which opens with a singularly attractive description of the annual meeting of the popular

assemblies of one of the democratic Swiss Cantons of Uri, Schwitz and Unterwalden. The Landammann and his council of officials and subordinates go forth to the annual assembly to meet their free fellow-citizens and give an account of their conduct of affairs and seek re-election. This is an exact reproduction, or rather a continuation into modern times, of the tribal institutions of ancient days. The ancient tribe had its patriarch, or monarch and his council of advisers composed of the heads of separate families or other capable men, and there was also the assembly of the freemen of the tribe which was convened periodically to receive information as to the policy and the measures of the ruling authorities. Here the freeman, as such, had little or no rights of citizenship, in the modern sense of the term, all political power resting with the patriarchal prince and the chiefs of families. Moreover, while the tribe was yet in the nomadic state, the life of the community must necessarily have been one of hard struggle with both man and nature, and there could have been very little of leisure or culture available for the mass of the community to enable them to take an intelligent part in the performance of public and political duty.

The village community is little more than the tribe settled on the land, or originated as such. The ancient organisation of the village community is well known to us in India, and the institution survived down to a time within living memory; and though it has decayed with the growth of modern tendencies to centralisation, some at least of its

more primitive features are still accessible to the personal inspection of modern observers. The investigations of Sir Henry Maine and others have placed us in full possession of all the essential characteristics of the village community in the East and in the West, and from these we learn that in all essentials tribal politics are reproduced in these societies. The headman of the village always belongs to one of the most ancient and best known and related families of the community and represents the authority of the tribal patriarch. Then there is the village assembly. In the Western village community, this was composed of all the freemen of the community, though, as the territorial limits over which the community spread increased, it tended to lose its democratic aspect and assume the character of an aristocratic assembly or council composed of all those men of the group who had become distinguished for birth, wealth, talents or character. In the East, the place of this assembly or council is often supplied by a single headman, hereditary or elected from the members of a particular family, the eldest male being preferentially chosen; or it assumed the form of a small representative body of elderly men of great experience well-versed in the customs of the village, and every section of the community pressed for a representation in it. In the Eastern communities, the Village Panchayats were, as the name indicates, anciently composed of five persons; but later on when the village populations became composite bodies, including many classes of people with divergent claims and interests, the number

of representatives on the village council increased, though the ancient name of Panchayet was still retained. These assemblies, however, never assumed the large dimensions of those of the Teutonic Mark. In the latter, important political and military transactions affecting the very existence of the community had to be debated and decided, and so almost the entire community turned out and young men of prowess in arms and skilled in generalship had a great influence and following. In India, on the other hand, we have never been a fighting people, at least during the mediæval age of our history, and we have submitted unresistingly to the despotic rule of our kings and emperors. Indian rulers have always maintained mercenary armies to do their fighting, and the young men of villages enlisted in them for service. Economic interests predominated in the concerns of the village community; and, as ancient custom was rigidly adhered to in the adjudication of all disputed matters and as customs might often prove obscure, intricate, or uncertain, the Village Council had to be composed of the oldest and most experienced men of the group, and so the great body of the village freemen had little or no political rights and were merely passive recipients of the decisions of the Village Council in all the matters in dispute.

We now pass to the city-state of ancient Greece and Rome. The city-state rose out of an agglomeration of villages uniting together for purposes of common defence or common worship. The tie of kinship, so prominent and

all-absorbing in the tribal union and only less so in the village union, grew fainter when, with the preception of the advantages of union, or under the pressure of the strong hand and iron will of a ruling chief bent on extending his authority, or for the common worship of a deity whom all equally accepted as their guardian and protector, villages united into the city-state, by a protracted, though painful, process of amalgamation, abandoning their old narrow liberties and independent existence and accepting a position of greater responsibility and restraint as a member of a larger and more complex organisation, but reaping also, as the result of their acceptance of this new corporate life, blessings and benefits of a far-reaching character. Man's active nature attained to a higher degree of excellence in the city-state than under any other form of social organisation known to us in ancient or modern times. Aristotle, says in his *Politics*:—"When many villages join themselves perfectly together into one society, that society is a *Polis* (i.e., a city-state) and contains in itself, if I may so speak, the perfection of independence." It is only the freemen of the ancient city-states that can be said to have realised what Aristotle in the above-quoted passage calls "the perfection of independence." In all the city-states of ancient Greece, freemen enjoyed and exercised every possible right and prerogative of citizenship known to men. Every Athenian citizen had the right to take his place in the *Ecclesia*, which met regularly 40 times a year and on other occasions whenever necessary; all had the right of taking part

in its debates, all were entitled to listen to the speeches of the great political leaders and orators and to the messages of their own and foreign ambassadors, to form their own judgment on affairs and to vote whenever a poll was taken either for ascertaining the collective voice of the citizens in regard to questions of public importance or for the making of appointments to various public offices, and further every citizen of over 30 years of age could sit as a judge in one of the large panels of 500 jurymen into which the freemen of Athens were distributed. In this way the entire body of citizens came to be constituted into the state and all enjoyed equal political rights, liberties and prerogatives.

It is well known that ancient Rome was as much a city-state as any of the states of ancient Greece. The life and heart of the Roman state and people were centred in the city of Rome. As Roman dominion advanced, a large number of communities was incorporated into Roman dominion and into the Roman burgess union with the full Roman franchise, though, later on, when the Roman community became sole sovereign and all others were its servants and dependants, the former began to jealously guard its franchise and only admitted into it men of capacity and eminence in the highest class of subject communities, in fact only such members of those communities as had filled in them a public magistracy; but the Romans were still unable to conceive their State as otherwise than having its life and heart in the City of Rome, even though this idea was the source of infinite trouble later on and

finally brought on the ruin of this form of the state. In all public questions the right of final decision rested in the general assembly of citizens, meeting in the Roman Forum. There was a time when, in Rome as in the small city-states of ancient Greece, all the citizens could exercise the privilege of voting and even the rural citizens left their farms in the morning to exercise their public functions on the day of meeting of the sovereign people and returned home the same evening. To such assemblies of Roman citizens, the remarks already made in regard to the superior merits of citizenship in ancient Greece apply with full force. But, as Roman dominion advanced, the numbers of Roman citizens increased and the new citizens were all enrolled in the old Roman tribes, so that each tribe came to be composed of thousands of citizens belonging to scattered and often remote townships without any feeling of unity and subject to no common direction or influence. When we remember also that there was no freedom of debate in the Roman assemblies, it is no wonder that these Roman popular assemblies, constituted as they were of a rabble of farmers, freedmen, clients, &c., did not understand anything of the business they had met to decide on and usually played but a silly and childish part in carrying on the work of Roman government, assenting to any and every proposal placed before them by the dominant aristocracy and allowing the latter to concentrate all power and wealth in their own hands, while for themselves they were content to be led by the unscrupulous demagogues and place-hunters who were ever ready to satisfy their cry

of "Bread for nothing and games for ever." In theory, Roman citizenship maintained the same character as that of ancient Athens or other Greek states in their day of power and prosperity, but in practice it had become deteriorated and at last the day came when the Roman world could only save itself by submitting to the dominating will of one man, and Cæsarism became an established fact in the world, though three centuries or more passed before the authority of the Roman senate entirely passed away and the Roman princeps became an absolute monarch. As for the Roman people themselves, they were practically deprived of all political power, although Augustus tenderly preserved ancient republican forms and the ancient theory of the Roman constitution. Nor could this be rightly objected to, as the ancient popular assemblies had proved themselves utterly incompetent to direct the affairs or decide the policy of a great Empire; and this was inevitable, as, with the advance of Roman territorial expansion and the proportionate increase in the number of enfranchised Roman citizens, it became impossible for all the voters to assemble in the Roman comitia and so, in the later years of the Republic, only the least cultivated and responsible classes of the citizens assembled for the transaction of business to the great injury of the state and people.

It will be seen from the above account of citizenship in Rome that, while fundamentally based on the same conception of the state and having therefore the same essential character, it deteriorated owing to unavoidable historical

conditions and finally brought about the decline and downfall of the ancient Roman state.

Ancient Greece and Rome not only gave the world examples of single city-states, but also examples of federations of city states, and it is necessary to say few words on the nature of citizenship in these ancient federal states. In Greece, we have the Phokian, Akarnanian, Epeirot, Theban, Lykian, Aetolian, and Achaian federations and other less known instances of the same form of government; and though Rome itself was a city-state and never had, at any period of authentic history, a federal constitution, we meet with examples of a real federal state in Etruria, Samnium, Latium, though their history is very little known and, even where we have plenty of detailed information, the details are found to be unreliable and even semi-mythical. All these ancient examples of the federal form of government present the same prominent general features, and they are all of them federations of city-states. We must now take up the question of citizenship in these ancient federal states and compare the form which it tended to assume in them with citizenship as it was in the single city-states already mentioned. The constitution of these federal governments were, like those of the single states of which they were composed, essentially democratic, and there was also a strong tendency to assimilate at least the *private* rights of citizenship among the several cities, though we cannot say for certain whether a federal citizen could exchange, at will or even subject to certain conditions, the franchises

of any one of the states included in the federation for that of any other. All the free federal citizens shared in the common national government, possessing in theory an equal and direct share in making the laws, in appointing the magistrates, in negotiating peace and war, in sending and receiving ambassadors, &c., though in practice the government was far indeed from being democratic. While in Athens the popular assembly really and directly carried on almost all the functions of government, in the federal states of ancient Greece the direct share of the people in government was confined to the selection of the magistrates and other officials; and this arose not from any legal disability, but from practical difficulties arising from the extent of territory. While in Athens the Ecclesia met regularly thrice every month, the federal assemblies could only ordinarily meet twice a year, and even these two meetings were attended only by the richer classes of citizens who had the means to enable them to travel long distances to the city where the meetings were usually appointed to be held and who also felt sufficiently the interest in political affairs to endure the inconveniences of making so long a journey. Thus the distance to be travelled in order to reach the place of meeting, the infrequency of the meetings, and the aristocratic character of the assemblies are all peculiarities attaching to the ancient federations which in practice affected in a very appreciable manner the character of the federal citizenship. Another peculiarity must also be noted, viz., that in the meetings of the assembly

votes were taken not by the head, but by the city. Whatever may be the number of citizens attending from a city, they were collectively entitled to a single vote only, and hence it was of very little political importance whether a large or a small number attended. It was enough for a city even if only one of its freemen was present; and where a large number of citizens attended the vote of the individual citizen had but a very insignificant value, so far as its influence in determining the opinion of the assembly was concerned, and hence it was thought lightly of by those who had the franchise. Hence there existed no inducement for the citizens to turn out in large numbers for the exercise of their political functions as members of the assembly. Hence all power was practically in the hands of the President of the Federation and his Council of Ministers. But extraordinary meetings were sometimes held to decide important national issues on which much public excitement or expectation had been roused, and such meetings assumed a more truly democratic character.

Besides the popular assemblies there existed both in the city-states and in the federations of ancient times a smaller assembly or senate which was aristocratic in its ancient composition, but to which, in the course of later changes and developments, all citizens had become eligible, though at different times the constitution prescribed different methods for regulating the admission of members into it. It was in the Senate that the governing authorities introduced their measures and had them adopted or amended

before submitting them to the popular assembly for final disposal, and thus *in practice at least* citizenship in the ancient federal states had made large approaches to the character of citizenship in modern national states though, as we shall see later on, the introduction of the principle of representation in the modern state made the two fundamentally different. But what we have meanwhile to note is that, while the theory of citizenship was the same in the city-states and in the federal states of ancient Greece and Rome and while, according to that theory, all freemen had the right to assemble and take part in the public duties appertaining to the popular assembly, in actual fact only the more leisured, wealthy and intelligent classes took a practical interest in the guidance of the affairs of the ancient federations and even these allowed themselves to be led in most matters by the initiative and direction, if not also by the mandate, of a few political leaders, statesmen and ministers.

Before we proceed to compare citizenship as it existed in these ancient city-states and federal states with the modern form of citizenship in Europe, it will be well to say a few words regarding the political status of freemen in mediæval times with a view mainly to fill up a gap that may otherwise seem to exist in the treatment of this subject.

It has been said that the Middle Ages are essentially unpolitical. The absorbing interest of the European people during these centuries was religion. Christianity, its ideals and institutions, spread everywhere in Europe, the

monks played a prominent part in the christianising and civilising of the European peoples, and the Popes claimed to be the successors both of St. Peter and the Cæsars and exercised a large secular and spiritual authority. With the decay of the Imperial system and idea, feudalism had come to dominate political and economical conditions in Europe ; when kingship declined and club law prevailed everywhere, weak people could only take care of themselves and their property by seeking the protection of the stronger as their vassals, and both State and Church came to be influenced by the feudal principle and hence everywhere the hierarchical, dynastic and aristocratic classes acquired privileges and ascendancy. The free proprietors of the soil were subjected to all sorts of grasping exactions from the feudal nobility and the bailiffs and gradually sank to the status of of servile peasants. Everywhere the political status and privileges of the free peasants were curtailed, and only a few scattered communities were able to preserve unimpaired the higher political privileges. But while in the rural tracts political freedom and privilege underwent in most cases a total suppression, a new *civic* freedom sprang up in the mediæval towns which was destined to influence decisively the modern idea of *national* citizenship. Shortly after the era of the barbarian invasions, the freedom of the ancient Roman *municipia* was destroyed, and they became the possession of some neighbouring nobleman or bishop, who levied taxes and protected persons and property in them through his officials. Perhaps in

some of them some traces of their ancient freedom remained. but generally they had no political rights whatever and were under slavish subjection to their lords. Gradually the formation of trade guilds and their subsequent union for the furtherance of common interests paved the way for the dawn of a new epoch of hope and life for the towns. Industrial revival and the growth of wealth in the towns led to the formation of a rich merchant class; and, as their numbers and influence increased, they felt the promptings of ambition and began to resist the excessive and unjust taxation to which they were subjected by their feudal lords; and the result of the struggle was that they gradually won not only freedom from oppressive fiscal exactions but also charters granting them the right of self-government. In these city-communes or municipalities of the Middle Ages, it was not usually the case that all the inhabitants were accorded political privileges. Ordinarily the franchise was confined to the members of a few of the guilds, and so the constitution of the commune was aristocratic or oligarchic and not democratic. The inhabitants of these towns did not know how to profit by the acquisition of the political privileges they had acquired and their history is tainted by much factious violence, class jealousies and fraudulent expenditure of the public funds, and these led to bankruptcy and finally to the loss of their freedom, as the kings and their officials, in their attempts to secure their own dues from the communes, punished all cases of administrative inefficiency and corruption by depriving

them of their charters and by making them completely and irrevocably subject to the royal and central authority. But the new ideas of freedom which had grown up in the towns did not die; they had become deeply rooted in the habits and affections of the people and were later on extended so as to embrace the whole nation in their scope, and "the citizenship of the town," says Bluntschli, "gave birth to the citizenship of the state." From this brief summary of the political conditions of the Middle Ages of Europe we can see that the mediæval conception of communal citizenship, such as it was, was a great deterioration from the ancient classical ideal, though in the Free Cities of those ages it maintained the ancient characteristics but in a somewhat imperfect and unsatisfactory form owing to the necessity of submitting to Imperial claims and demands, still watchfully keeping up the living form of freedom till it could grow later on into something really worthy and elevating when the mediæval mind was roused from lethargy at the Renaissance by the quickening touch of ancient classical literature and the life-conception embodied in it.

In proceeding to contrast the forms of citizenship in the ancient and in the modern state, we have first to note the fact that all the differences between the two take their origin in the circumstance that, while the ancient city-state was small in area and population, the national states of modern times embrace an enormous area of territory and many millions of inhabitants and that consequently primary

assemblies such as existed in ancient states cannot exist in modern national states and have gradually given place to the theory and practice of representative government all over Europe and therefore also to a conception of the state very different from what existed in ancient times. While the ancient Greek citizen could take his place direct in the popular assembly and listen to the discourses of the leaders and orators of the community so as to give an intelligent vote on the matters coming up for decision in that assembly, the political action of the citizen in the modern national state is confined to the election of a representative who is to speak, act, and vote on his behalf in the popular branch of the modern Parliaments. It will be at once clear that the Athenian citizen is very much superior to the modern citizen and rather occupies the position of a member of the popular branch of the Legislature of the modern state than that of a mere citizen or elector. The Athenian citizen is even superior to the modern Member of Parliament, as his political education and his political responsibilities are higher. The political responsibilities of the modern Member of Parliament are once for all discharged when he decides to what party he is to belong, in fact he is elected as a party man, and he votes mechanically as a member of his party in accordance with the directions and mandates of the party chiefs and whips. It happens very rarely, if at all, that they take up an independent attitude and judge for themselves on political questions as they come up for decision in Parliament. This was exactly what the Athenian

citizen was in a position to do, and hence his sense of political responsibility was greater and his political education was higher than that of the citizen in a modern state. The position of the Athenian Assembly was in fact higher than that of the English Parliament. Though the latter may inquire, alter, amend, approve, censure, rescind, and interfere in any and every way with the whole machinery and working of the administration, there is always a hereditary King (or an elected President, as in the Republic of the United States and elsewhere) in whom the sovereign power resides and to whom the written law entrusts the whole work of administration as distinguished from the legislation of the country, and also there is a body of responsible Ministers chosen by the sovereign, though these have to be chosen from the leaders of the numerically predominant party in Parliament and so they are indirectly chosen by the Parliament itself. This body of Ministers is unknown to the written law of the Constitution, but it is all-important, inasmuch as it exercises all the powers of the sovereign, though it is responsible to Parliament and only exercises those powers so long as it enjoys the confidence of Parliament. Still, so long as the Parliament gives the Ministers its confidence, the task of carrying on the affairs of the nation belongs to them, and they manage them according to their own best discretion and not in accordance with any instructions from Parliament. Hence, the modern Member of Parliament is rarely called upon to judge for himself from day to day as to the merits

of the measures adopted by the Ministers and coming up for discussion in the assembly. On the other hand, the Athenian Ecclesia, and to some extent also the Roman Comitia, was an assembly of citizens who, in the performance of the duties of citizenship, were called on to listen to facts and arguments placed before them so as each might form an independent opinion and give a vote which was to influence the final judgment and action of the state ; and, moreover, every Athenian citizen had it in his power, if he had the capacity, to influence the opinions of his fellow-citizens in a way acceptable to himself. The proceedings of these assemblies were conducted according to recognised forms, the debates were perfectly free and open, the meetings were frequent, and thus the capacity for forming a wise political judgment was very highly developed in the citizens of these ancient city-states, and especially in those of Athens,—much more highly, indeed, than among the citizens of any other form of the state, ancient or modern. The Athenian Ecclesia exercised the functions both of a modern Parliament and a modern Council of Ministers, and hence the Athenians attained to a higher level of political ability than even the ordinary Parliamentary representatives of the free populations of modern national states.

In other respects also, ancient citizenship compares favourably by the side of the modern. As the patriotism of the former is confined to a narrow area, it is more fervid and deeper than that of citizens of states of the modern

type which extend over a large area, and this warmth of patriotic feeling is strengthened and intensified largely by the fact that the citizens of ancient states were bound together into a homogeneous community by the natural ties of common race, language and religion while the populations of modern states are more heterogeneous in composition and have therefore to be brought together mainly by the ties of common interest and common subjection to a sovereign and, in fact, these artificial ties form the principal bond of union and sympathy among the citizens of modern national states. But it must not be forgotten that the depth and warmth of ancient city patriotism had an unfavourable side, too, in its leading to frequent conflicts of interest and consequently to frequent and unrelenting wars; and hence there were more frequent alternations of political fortune among ancient city-states than in the national states of modern times. Even in modern states we find more of the bitterness and strife of persons and factions in local politics than in central or imperial politics, and so we can easily understand that the fervour of ancient local patriotism must have led to frequent and long-standing feuds between city-states. This is why we find that, when once war commences between them, it is more sustained, more bloody and more unrelenting than modern wars. Ancient wars were wars between patriotic citizens fighting for personal honor and from the intense bitterness of political animosity, while in modern states, although this circumstance is not wanting, still, as the soldier is a

mercenary, he is not actuated to the same extent as in the warfare of ancient city-states by the reckless disregard of personal considerations and by the rancour of political animosity. In these respects modern national states have a decided advantage. Though political capacity, the sense of political responsibility, and the feeling of patriotism are not developed to the same extent in the citizens of modern states, the latter suffer less from the spirit of domestic faction and less from the evils of frequent bitter and bloody warfare than the citizens of the small city-states of the ancient world.

From these and other circumstances we can easily understand that there naturally came to exist two different conceptions of the state in ancient and in modern times. In modern times, the state is looked upon as distinct from society and as external to the individual citizen, though deriving its authority by the delegation of the great body of citizens. Except when an election is going on and voting-papers are being signed, the body of citizens,—all, in fact, who hold no office,—forget that they are a vital part of the machinery of the state, for the reason that all the real work of administration is carried on by the officials who form the executive machinery of the state, and thus the idea of the state undergoes a good deal of degradation from what it was of old. The state is regarded as something altogether apart from the body of the people. On the other hand, in the ancient city-state, each citizen was at the same time both “ruler and ruled,” the state was identical with society, and

every freeman spoke and voted in the assembly, sat as a juror in the courts, and served as a soldier in the army; and the performance of all these public functions was the essential duty of every citizen as citizen. The citizen voluntarily subordinated his individual will to the will of the society, and, as Aristotle says in his *Politics*, "no citizen belongs to himself, but all belong to the state." In this act of self-sacrifice for promoting the interests of the state, every citizen became conscious of spiritual freedom and, as it were, realised his "true self." As Thucydides says of the citizens of ancient Athens, "their bodies they devote to their country, as though they belonged to other men; their true self is their mind which is most truly their own when employed in her service." The state, then, does not exist for the protection of the rights of the individual, or for increasing wealth, power, the extent of empire, &c. It is an association or brotherhood of equal men who are actuated by the desire to live the noblest life within their reach by bringing into active exercise all their gifts, moral and intellectual, and thus the state exists, according to Aristotle, not for securing "life," but for securing "good life." The Greek conception of the state has thus taught us several great lessons which are still of great value to mankind, viz., that the paramount end of the state is the moral and intellectual well-being of the citizens; that all other ends such as the increase of power, of wealth, of knowledge, of fame, of empire, &c., must be subordinated to that supreme end; that the mass of the people must attain

to the highest type of moral and intellectual culture of which they are capable in the service of the state ; that the state is an organism consisting of the entire community, and that its action is the action of the entire community and is intended to safeguard not this or that interest, but the perfection of the character and life of the individual.

In accordance with this contrast between the ancient and modern conceptions of the state, we find that the ancient Athenian citizens and others, and especially the former, were to a remarkable extent characterised by those attributes of political knowledge and political honesty which are so largely wanting even among advanced modern nations. In the latter, the electors are open to bribery on a large scale, and both in England and in America there exists a large amount of popular corruption. In the ancient Greek states, and especially in Athens, the masses of the citizens were not open to corruption and never were known to have given their votes in the assembly on receipt of bribes. Men like Kleon might have taken bribes, but the masses of the Athenian citizens were free from the taint of accepting a price for their votes. In modern times political leaders are rarely known to take bribes, but they have freely bribed the electors. Electoral corruption was till recently in England accepted as a necessary evil of the modern democratic form of Government, and in America things are said to be even worse than in England. But of the two evils, the corruption of the people at large and the corruption of the political leaders, the former is infinitely worse, as the

latter affects only a few individuals, while the former is a widespread evil affecting the very fountain head of political power and national pre-eminence, *viz.*, the moral instincts of the citizens who really constitute the state. Much of modern electoral corruption is due to the ignorance and indifference of electors regarding existing political conditions and the actual course of events, but this cannot excuse their total want of honesty and principle while voting at elections. In England, till within a few years ago, electoral bribery took the form of offers of money and beer. To put down the worst abuses, an Act of Parliament was passed and since then some change for the better has perhaps taken place, but in truth these direct forms of bribery have given place to a system of indirect bribery which is more insidious in its effects on the character of British citizenship than the former, because it cannot be easily detected and exposed, it cannot be punished, and it involves no expenditure of money to the candidates for seats in Parliament. It consists in deluding the electors by all sorts of promises of legislation which is to benefit a certain class or classes of the community at the expense of the others or of the whole community. These bids for popularity with the electorate, these new and more insidious forms of electoral bribery, have produced a serious deterioration in the character of modern citizenship, every matter of public importance is now made to assume a party turn, and all higher principles and even patriotic feelings are at a discount. In the ancient city-states, on the other

hand, some of the politicians and demagogues who wielded power were doubtless dishonest, but the citizens as a whole were free from bribery. In Rome, no doubt, and especially in the later days of the Roman republic, the electors were widely bribed and corrupted in various ways, but the Senate at least still largely preserved its ancient traditions of purity and patriotism, and it still led the state; but there did not exist among Roman citizens at large the same lofty conception of political duty as animated the Romans of an earlier date and the Athenian democracy during the glorious epoch which intervened between the Persian and the Peloponnesian wars. Greece, and Athens in particular, must ever remain the exemplar to the world of the practice of rational freedom in its noblest and truest form.

Among the great national states of the Western world to-day as among the states of the ancient classical world, we find two varieties, the single state and the federal state. We have already contrasted the forms of citizenship in the ancient single and federal states, and we may briefly compare the single and federal states now existing as regards the present question. Both are equally compact political formations, and the inclusion of a number of states in a federation by no means makes for weakness or disunion. All the existing federal states have certain important characteristics which have to be remembered before we proceed to compare the forms of citizenship existing in them and in modern single states like England or France. *First*, there is in all a central or combined representative body and a central

administrative body which is entrusted with the regulation of all joint affairs and of the most important national questions. These include all foreign relations, all military or naval questions, the national debt, customs, taxation, currency and coinage, the Post office, &c. All other questions are left to the local legislatures. There are slight variations in the different states with regard to the subjects falling within the scope of the Central and Local Governments. In the United States, where either the Congress or the local Legislature exceeds its powers, the Supreme Court, consisting of judges nominated for life by the Congress, give a final decision based on their interpretation of the original written constitution, so that the Congress is under the restraints imposed by that constitution no less than the State legislatures. Similar provisions exist in all other federations. Secondly, all the states included in the federation are represented in the central Government either on exactly the same terms, or in a manner favourable to the less populous and powerful. Now the citizens of the federal state have rights and responsibilities in relation to both the collective and the separate governments and feel both a federal and a local patriotism. In single states on the other hand, the citizens render only a single allegiance and feel only a single patriotism, inasmuch as there is only a single centre of authority and source of obligation. In these single states, there exists a system of county and local Government, but it is the offspring of the Central Government and has no independent existence. Whatever

functions it discharges are functions delegated to it by the central Government, and the authority which exercises the power of delegating them can also resume them if it pleases, so that local authorities have nothing like the honourable independence which characterises the separate State Governments included in a federal state. Hence it may seem that the freemen of the United States and other federal systems have a higher political status, inasmuch as they exercise the right of electing representatives to two separate and independent legislatures. But this does not seem to make much difference. Freeman, to whom we are indebted a good deal in preparing this paper, points out that federations stand midway between city-states and national states, in regard to our present question of the rights of citizenship. This is doubtless true in regard to ancient federations which in theory allowed the full exercise of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship to all freemen, but in which, in practice, owing to the long distances to be traversed, the right was restricted to the few who had the means or the interest in public affairs needed to enable and induce them to undertake the journey to the place of assembly, and hence citizenship tended to assume a somewhat restricted and aristocratic character. In modern times, both in the large single states and in the federal states, representative government is in existence, and hence the mere fact that two separate sets of representatives are chosen in federal states, one for the federal government and one for the separate State

governments, does not raise the character of the citizen in point of efficiency, knowledge of affairs, honesty, patriotism and other characteristics. The citizens of modern states, single and federal, stand very much on the same footing, and so far we have only three varieties and grades of citizenship, first, the form which it assumes in the ancient city-states, secondly, that which we find in the ancient federations, and lastly, that which exists in the large national states of modern times. The highest type is attained in states of the first class, especially in Athens ; in those of the second class, the theory of citizenship is the same, though in practice it tends to assume ordinarily a somewhat restricted and aristocratic character, though, in times of popular excitement, the democratic theory tends to be realised; and then the difference between the citizenship of ancient single and federal states vanishes ; and, lastly, we have modern citizenship which is confined to the choice of representatives who have to render themselves amenable to party discipline and control, and which does not reach, either in the functions performed by the electors or in those of the representatives chosen by them, the same high level of efficiency or dignity as we find existing among the citizens of ancient Athens and other independent Greek States.

A few words may not here be out of place regarding the political status of men under subjection to the Imperial idea. The Imperial idea has been in operation in ancient, mediæval and modern times, and has always been marked by the same characteristics. Cæsarism and freedom can



never co-exist. In all the Asiatic empires of antiquity the rulers were despots and the absolute masters of the lives, liberties and properties of their subjects. What the Asiatic nations were in antiquity, that they have always been. They have never experienced even the wish to rise beyond their primitive political slavery, and so free citizenship has only been conspicuous by its absence in Asiatic countries. In ancient Europe the establishment of the Roman Empire brings the same fact to light. When the Roman aristocracy degenerated and became unfit to guide the destinies of a state which, by conquest after conquest continued over many generations, had become too unwieldy to be kept in hand by the Senatorial Government at Rome ; when the Roman citizens were too numerous and scattered to be able to meet all together in the comitia for the performance of public duties ; when their character tended from a variety of causes to decay even more rapidly than that of the nobility ; when, with the extensions of the franchise, the ignorant, indolent, hungry and unruly Roman mob was able to dominate the Comitia ; it was natural that power should gradually pass into the hands of an absolute master who knew his own mind and could impose his will firmly on the people, and thus the freedom of the ancient Roman citizen became a thing of the past, and slavery took its place. Throughout the Middle Ages, the conflict between German and Roman traditions is the most prominent feature of such political life as there was in an age when men's thoughts were more or less exclusively occupied and their

activities influenced by the prevailing religious ideals. Where German traditions preponderated, they worked in favour of individual freedom, while Roman traditions were favourable to the advance of absolute tendencies. The Frankish monarchy illustrates in its legislative, military and administrative machinery the influence of the mixture of both elements, with a distinct and progressive advance of the royal power in every direction. With the decline of the Frankish monarchy rose feudal monarchy with its inconsistent combination of legality and anarchy, of baronial privilege and national impotence; and this in turn gave place to monarchy limited by the existence of privileged classes and estates and then to absolutism, pure and simple, throughout Europe till, at the commencement of the modern epoch, Revolutionary influences gave Cæsarism its death-blow and have enabled mankind to reach civil freedom as it now exists in the national states of Europe.

So far we have been dealing with the forms of citizenship appearing in dominant states, and now we have to take up citizenship as existing in dependent and subordinate states. We have to consider in succession the dependencies of oriental monarchies, then those of ancient Greece and Rome, and lastly, those of modern European states, and more particularly, India, the foremost of England's dependencies and that which concerns us most of all.

In Oriental monarchies, the state of things has remained unchanged from ancient times to the present day. The Sovereign divided his authority and power among a number

of governors or satraps, each of whom exercised in the province or dependency allotted to him the powers which the sovereign exercised over the whole kingdom. Within the sphere of his authority every one was absolute and exercised to the fullest possible extent the power to raise taxes, to collect troops, and to make what laws he chose regarding the lives and property of his subjects. The Pashas of the Ottoman Empire exercise to-day this kind of unlimited power over the territories and dependencies they are appointed by the Sultan to rule over. The same is the case in Persia and in China. The populations of Eastern states enjoy no freedom whatever, but are in a state of more or less complete political slavery and subjection to their rulers and governors.

We next turn to the dependencies of Greece, and to the subject allies of Athens in particular during the period of her supremacy after the defeat of the Persian expedition. These dependent city-states are not necessarily to be regarded as having been subjected to any kind of oppression. In most cases the subject communities retained their own constitutions, laws and modes of administration; in some cases they had even their own fleets and armies, but usually they were placed under the control of Athenian governors or military commanders who controlled, under Athenian direction and supervision, all their foreign relations. Moreover, in all important cases, the courts of the dependency had no jurisdiction, and they could only be decided by an Athenian tribunal. Furthermore. Athenian citizens (*cleruchi*)

often obtained portions of the land of subject states. The dependencies of Sparta differed from those of Athens in having their Governments made oligarchical, and also the Spartan harmosts interfered more largely in the internal affairs of the subordinate communities than the Athenian governors. These are examples of Greek communities in a loose state of dependence, but there were many cases in which this state of loose dependence was by degrees converted into one of strict dependence, and the citizens became transformed into members of the superior state either by being admitted to all its rights of citizenship, or by being kept as subjects without any political privileges, but otherwise free. Where this was not the case and the more or less loose kind of dependence already mentioned was permitted to exist, it may be instructive to compare the rights of the subject state with those of the Municipal governments in modern states. A modern Municipality has no powers of general administration or legislation, and such functions as it is allowed to discharge are, however important for the welfare of the community, of a more or less humdrum character, consisting in the care of sanitation, lighting, paving of streets, &c. But the citizens of a modern Municipal town send representatives to the parliamentary assembly which imposes taxes, makes laws and regulates and superintends foreign relations, while Greek dependencies had to submit to the entire control of their foreign affairs by the supreme or dominant city-state. The separate states of the American federal union are in

a much better position as regards general powers of administration and legislation than modern Municipalities, as they do not exist at the mere pleasure of the central or parliamentary government. In fact, the American federal constitution has conferred upon them large independent powers, but their citizens and the citizens of Municipalities are alike in respect of choosing representatives to Parliament and are thus placed in a much higher position than the citizens of Greek dependencies who, as regards their foreign relations, were entirely at the mercy of their suzerain, and who, moreover, had no voice at all in determining the affairs of the latter, either domestic or foreign. The citizens of a Greek dependency, even when they repaired to the dominant city, were in the position of mere strangers or aliens and could not perform any of the duties of citizenship. Thus in the ancient Greek states, where there existed no kind of federal connection and where the idea of representation could not possibly have entered men's minds, there existed only one of two alternatives, either political independence or political subjection. There were sovereign city-states and subject city-states, and while the citizens of the former were the rulers, those of the latter enjoyed freedom only within very narrow limits, within the limits tolerated by the sovereign state.

Before we pass to Roman dependencies, we may say a few words on the citizens of the Greek colonies. From the very moment of their foundation they were quite

independent, and the ties which bound a Greek colony to the mother-city were purely sentimental, religious and moral, not political. The relation between the two resembled the relation between a parent and an emancipated child. The colony was bound to show to the mother-city certain external marks of respect, especially in religious and ceremonial matters, while the mother-city was under the obligation to protect the colony from all external and internal dangers and difficulties. Thus the Greek colonies were in no sense dependencies, but independent city-states exactly like Athens or Sparta; and if they ever became dependencies, it must have been due to acts of aggression on the part of the mother-city, resulting in the loss of their original independence.

Ancient Rome, by numerous wars of aggression in the course of her commercial and territorial expansion, had gained a large number of dependencies. Most of these, at least such of them as were Latin and Italian, were, like Rome, city-states, once free and still permitted to retain a large measure of their old freedom, but, becoming subject to Roman domination, were kept completely isolated from each other, were watched by Roman military colonies, and were controlled and even oppressed and exploited in various ways by Roman magistrates and officials and by private Romans, but enjoyed in return complete immunity from private wars with each other. There are many interesting points of contrast between the dependent city-commonwealths of Greece and Rome. While the citizens of a

Greek dependency were, as already stated, regarded and treated as aliens in the sovereign city-states, under Roman dominion the citizens of a dependent state were admitted, though only gradually, to the rights of full Roman citizenship. But often this brought them very little perceptible advantage, but many real disadvantages. No doubt it was possible for them to attend and vote at the Roman assemblies and even to secure Roman magistracies in some rare cases. But the former privilege could never be utilised in practice, as the hungry and degenerate Roman mob was strong enough numerically over such of the allies and provincials as could attend in the forum to be able to maintain its evil influence in determining the downward course of Roman politics and to keep out the despised provincial and allied citizens from being elected to Roman magistracies. While the gains in Rome were few or none, the losses at home were many and of material importance. There, many a Roman secured, by the direct intervention of the sovereign city, places and privileges of various kinds, and even private Romans exercised much influence and enjoyed the prestige of a representative of the ruling race in ways extremely galling to the pride of the natives of the dependent state. Such were the Roman *Municipia*. As already stated, Rome, too, had its *Colonies*. The term *colony*, as applied to this class of Roman dependencies, is not quite appropriate. They were, in reality, Roman military settlements, or garrisons established for the purpose of maintaining and

extending Roman influence among the surrounding communities, the Roman soldiers composing them having been granted allotments of land for the service required of them. Their political position almost exactly resembled that of the Roman *Municipia*, the only difference being that they had the benefit of the Roman system of jurisprudence, while the *Municipia* retained their own old systems of civil law. These colonies of Roman citizens differed from Greek colonies in being from the very commencement of their existence dependencies of Rome, while the latter began with an independent political life of their own and were in no kind of subjection to their mother-cities, in matters either of internal or external politics.

The Roman *provinces* were a third and last class of Roman dependencies, those which were acquired by conquest beyond the limits of Italy. They differed from the *Municipia* and the *Coloniae* in being placed under the control of a Roman governor, originally a prætor and later on a proprætor or proconsul. At first the greatest variety existed in the relations of Rome to her subject communities, Latin, Italian and provincial, and even among the provincials themselves we find communities in various forms and stages of dependence, as regards government and taxation. But from the time of Augustus onwards we can trace a gradual process of alteration and assimilation until at last a more or less uniform system of administration prevailed throughout the Roman Empire.

Modern European colonies differ between themselves

in matters of detail in regard to their present administration and a good deal as regards the course of their past history, but they possess in common certain broad features. All of them enjoy the privilege of self-Government in internal matters of administration and taxation, and only their foreign relations are subject to the control of the mother-country. They thus combine the favourable conditions of both Greek and Roman dependent city-states, without those unfavourable features of either of them already mentioned. They resemble Greek dependencies in having entire internal autonomy, while they resemble Roman dependencies in their citizens having it in their power easily to acquire and enjoy all the privileges of Imperial citizenship.

We take up lastly, the status of the British Indian citizen. *In theory*, we seem to occupy the position of Roman province though there is all the difference between these two greatest of the world's Imperial races, the British and the Roman, arising not only from the fact that the civilisations are separated by a vast interval of time and progress, but also from the fact that our conquerors and rulers are Christians, while the Romans were professors of an old-world heathenism. Apart from the wide differences which these two circumstances now mentioned have brought about, differences wide as are the poles asunder, we must compare citizenship in India under British dominion with the state of things in India anterior to the establishment of that dominion. Then the only really living political entity in India, the only bond

of union and fellowship among men, over and above the family tie, was the village community. The distant monarch only cared for his taxes and regularly exacted them from the village communities, and he also made various extraordinary demands on special occasions which the villager had to satisfy. Notwithstanding these various payments, the villagers were left to their own resources whenever there was any foreign invasion, and it is an undoubted fact that on every such occasion they underwent every imaginable kind of misery and trouble, and their "tax-taking" monarch could give them no protection. When the foreign invader had done his worst in the shape of plunder and devastation and the resources of the country had become so entirely exhausted that it could no longer be profitable to him to prolong his stay, he took his departure, and then the village population returned to their old haunts and lands, resumed their usual avocations and set affairs in order as best as they might. This is the sum and substance of their situation as citizens of the Indian monarchies, Hindu and Mahomedan. Within the village itself, the rights and duties of every member of the community, such as they were, have already been stated and we have also contrasted the condition of both Eastern and Western village communities in this respect. Custom was the regulator of all social life in the community, and of the rights and responsibilities of every member of the community, and the Village Council or *Punchayet* was constituted so as to satisfy the demands of

the simple life of the village population. Every village was a self-contained organism, and there existed no idea whatever of the duties of the state to its subjects and, by consequence, none whatever of any rights of the latter in relation to it arising from the payment of taxes. They had to provide for their own external defences, for the cultivation of their lands, for the protection of civil rights within the village, for the rendering of mutual services of various kinds and for the protection of all common interests. Besides the Village Council they had various village officials for the performance of the various functions of village administration, and they had also to provide for the existence among them of families exercising various callings which had to exist for the smooth and satisfactory ordering of their self-sufficient communal life. This picture of rural simplicity and self-sufficiency had also its shady side. The isolation and self-sufficiency of the villages and their populations proved their ruin. Whenever the monarch resolved to enter upon a course of extortion and oppression, they had no help but to submit, even though, when the revenue or other officials made unjust and extortionate demands in their own personal interests, we may well suppose that the villagers could have resisted them effectually. In times of foreign invasion, the monarch found it impossible to unite the resources and populations of these isolated and self-sufficient communities against the common foe, and they were left to their own devices and fate. The armies of the invader and the native ruler met and fought,

and everything depended on the event of the battle, and often a single battle decided the fate of both the ruling dynasty and the people. The country had also frequently to suffer the ravages of disciplined hordes of thieves and dacoits ; and, in the intervals between one state of anarchy and another, the land was in a chronic state of insecurity and the people were placed in the most abject and helpless condition of slavery to the local feudal magnates. Moreover, the visitations of pestilence and famine were not infrequent, and nothing like preventive measures were possible in the uncertainty that prevailed. There was no central unity of organisation, no feeling of attachment in the people to their monarch or the subordinate feudal chief, no idea of interests larger than the preservation of person and property in the villages, no certainty with regard to the present or the future taxation or other demands on the village resources, no uniform system of jurisprudence, nothing whatever calculated to produce or promote the feeling nationality, patriotism, or community of interest even in those attenuated forms in which it existed in Europe during the pre-Revolutionary epoch.

All this is now changed. For the first time we have been enabled, under British rule, to feel that we are the subjects of a single sovereign state extending over the whole Indian continent, and almost every educated man in India has learnt to feel that British rule means peace, toleration and fair play for all and that every one has rights, responsibilities and interests intimately bound up with the exis-

tence of that rule. Men are becoming increasingly aware of the fact that they are reaping immense advantages by being part of a great and world-wide empire, that our future progress, economical and political, is assured under British supremacy, and that it is our duty to prove ourselves worthy citizens of the Indian state so as to make the future of the Indian people worthy of their place within the British Empire.

What is the exact place of India in regard to citizenship? India is a dependency ruled by English governors, and it takes its place alongside of dependencies of the class to which Roman provinces belonged, though *in practice* the divergence between the two is wide as the poles. The administrative systems prevailing in the Roman provinces and in India have been frequently compared and contrasted. It is no part of our present subject to enter into such a comparison, but we may roughly indicate a few of the salient features of both, so as to render* clear what a contrast citizenship in British India is to what we find in the Roman provinces. In both, the ruling state sends governors, and in both the administration is subject in the last resort to a controlling Imperial authority at home. In Rome, however, the governors received no salaries, as they were supposed to serve the state from motives of public duty, but they were entitled to levy contributions from the provincials for their own support and that of their suite or court, and they might also receive voluntary gifts. They could not be removed during their term of office, nor could any

complaints be brought against them while still in employment, as they were constituted the supreme military and civil authority in their provinces. Even afterwards, they could only be brought to trial either criminally before the people or civilly before judges chosen from the senators, and so there was very little chance of their being found guilty. Hence the provincials were much oppressed. The military forces occupying the province were maintained at free quarters, and were daily paid from the contributions of the provincial inhabitants. The provinces had to pay tribute, and this was raised by the imposition of various taxes which were farmed out among oppressive and extortionate Roman contractors, who were allowed to grow rich at the expense of the people. The natives were looked upon as conquered subjects who retained their character as enemies and might at any moment assume that character, and one of the recognised principles of Roman provincial administration was that the exactions of the rulers should be as large as possible so as to transfer as much as possible of the sinews of war to the Roman state from its possible future enemies. Moreover, the governing class resorted to all sorts of open violence, cruelty and torture in the effort to transfer to Rome all the productions of art and industry in the provinces. The Roman money-lenders were also encouraged and helped in all manner of ways to drive hard bargains against the provincials. All these iniquities were perpetrated without intermission impartially in times both of peace and war

and they grew with the growing degradation, corruption and ineptitude of the government of the republic in the days of its decline till at last the establishment of Imperial rule brought with it some change for the better.

India is no doubt a dependency ruled by British governors under the authority of the British Sovereign and Parliament, but what a contrast is it to a Roman province subject to the rule of the Republic. We pay no tributes, we are not subject to any illegal and arbitrary exactions at the pleasure of irresponsible governors or their dependants, we pay no taxes which are not determined according to fixed rules as to their nature, amount, manner and time of payment, we make no special payments for the support of the army, we have every part of civilised administrative machinery in thorough working order, we are trained in the arts of self-government in Municipal and rural areas, we are taught to believe that every chance of making progress in civilised life will be afforded us, and we are gradually learning to have faith in ourselves as future citizens of a wide, powerful, growing and enlightened empire, the greatest the world has seen.

Comfortable as is our position and cheering as are the prospects of the future, we still clearly understand that India is in theory at least a dependency, and many educated natives of India feel that they must improve their political position, if they are to take an honourable place among the citizens of the British Empire. There is no real disaffection among our educated men, and we may

safely say that throughout the continent of India there is a growing feeling that our vital interests are for ever bound up with the fortunes of the Empire. This feeling in favour of political improvement and emancipation has found expression not only in meetings of political associations, but also in the published opinion of the late eminent judge, Sir T. Muthuswami Aiyar, that India must work up towards a British Colonial constitution. When one of the foremost men of the age and a man so cool and hard-headed, so steady in his aims and judgment, could express an opinion like this, no one can deny the legitimacy of some Indian political ambitions and aspirations, if we are to understand that those ambitions and aspirations are to be utilised so as to promote the progress of India towards unity and influence as a strong, useful and respected member of the British Empire.

But, what is the exact position of a British Colony? It may be defined as a community of the same race as the English, who have developed a strong sentiment of nationality which is opposed to all interference from any authority in Great Britain which could affect its honour or its interests but which is prepared to maintain its continued association with, and allegiance to, the British Empire as one of its worthy and strength-giving associates, so that the Empire may be a strong and growing political organism. If we accept this definition as correct, then it is not easy to see how India can ever secure a form of government exactly like what a British Colony possesses.

To Englishmen at large and even to many natives of India it may well appear that the birth of a real national feeling in India is simply impossible and that it will lead only to the disruption of the present organisation of the Empire. That a national feeling exists in Ireland is beyond a doubt, and it was the recognition of this fact that induced Mr. Gladstone to devote the closing years of his public life, when his influence with the British electorate and the power of his eloquence were at their height, to the task of devising some measure of Irish Home Rule without compromising the supremacy of the English Parliament. The people of Great Britain have refused to sanction Mr. Gladstone's measures under the feeling that Home Rule for Ireland, whatever form it may take and however numerous and well adjusted the checks and balances that may be introduced, must be incompatible with the maintenance of the supremacy and integrity of the British Empire and must one day lead to its disruption. The Liberal party is no longer led by the transcendent genius of Mr. Gladstone, and his immediate successor, Lord Rosebery, seems no longer to entertain his old belief in the possibility of granting Home Rule to Ireland. Still, the Home Rule policy retains its place in the electoral programme of the Liberal party. But, for all practical purposes, that policy must be considered to have lost and to be losing ground, if not quite defunct. With this experience before us, it is difficult to believe that it will be possible for India to secure a real colonial