

H. B. Smith Esquire
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With the author's Respects

Baroda

March '96

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SELECTIONS

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FROM MY

RECENT NOTES

ON THE

INDIAN EMPIRE

By

DINSHAH ARDESHIR TALEYARKHAN

LATE SECRETARY TO THE ASSOCIATION OF THE CHIEFS OF KATTYWAR, NOW MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER FOR HIS HIGHNESS THE GUICWAR'S TERRITORIES; AUTHOR OF TRAVELS IN SOUTHERN INDIA, THE BARODA REVOLUTION, THE BRITISH POLICY AND INDIAN FAMINES, REPRESENTATION ON KATTYWAR AFFAIRS, THE FORCES OF THE NATIVE STATES, AFFAIRS IN AFGHANISTAN, THE NATIVE PRINCES' OWN BOOK

&C.,

&C.,

&C.

Vincit Omnia Veritas

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THIS WORK

IS

RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED,

WITH PERMISSION,

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., C.I.E.,

LATE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

AND NOW

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER & LEADER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMON.

SC.,

SC.,

SC.,

By

His most Dutiful Servant,

THE AUTHOR

THE RIGHT HON'BLE

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., C.I.E.,

&c.,

&c.,

&c.

May, it please your Lordship,

I am much obliged to your Lordship for condescending to accept the Dedication of this my humble Work.

As your Lordship is aware, I have not ventured to solicit this indulgence at your Lordship's hands till I had reason to believe that, though not expected to admit all that I wrote and had the privilege of submitting, your Lordship had, nevertheless, thought that my proposals and elucidations on the questions of the day deserved the practical consideration of Statesmen.

Thus kindly encouraged, it has given me great honor and pleasure to propose the Dedication to one who recently pleased all India with a sustained and historical visit, and subsequently with the valuable services rendered to our country as its Administrational Head.

It would be presumptuous on my part if I attempted to make this note a flattering one to your Lordship: all I would, therefore, say with due deference is, that it is your Lordship's singular and constitutional freeness from party conventionalism, prejudices, and stiffness which has always inspired in me hopes of your Lordship being able, in some near future, to deal with the affairs of Great Britain, its Dependencies, and Colonies in a manner which, while really raising them individually from time to time in the estimation of the civilized world, would also strengthen and purify their ties with Her Most Gracious Majesty's benign and world-wide Empire.

I beg to remain,

Your Lordship's most Dutiful Servant,

DINSHAH ARDESHIR.

Baroda, 23th July, 1886.

INTRODUCTION.

THE present work is mostly composed of some of my recent contributions on the leading questions of the day referring to the interests of this country.

The original circulation of these papers having been limited, it is deemed desirable on several public grounds to collect them in the present form, which is likely to obtain the required circulation.

So many interests vital to my countrymen are now-a-days cropping up that I am, perhaps, not wrong in assuming that my quarter of a century's treatment of practical questions, affecting the advancement and welfare of India may secure to me the privilege of speaking to them with some authority on the subject-matter of this work.

Those of my readers who are accustomed to the writings of the rising writers and the sentiments of the extreme patriots who are now being formed—I of course exclude from this category those who rest on a higher platform—may not generally be prepared for an endorsement of all that I have here advocated.

I do not, however, doubt that I will carry with me the sympathetic approval of the most experienced and practical portion of my countrymen, as also of those who have to deal directly with Indian matters and warmly interest themselves in the well-being of this country.

The very fact that careful readers will find in the work much of what I have maintained as being actually borne out

either by subsequent events or the adoption of identical views, suggestions, or proposals, will, I hope, secure the indulgence of the younger generations who, too, now form the brightest hopes for the social and political regeneration of India.

I hope this work, in due proportion to its scope and merits, may be able to demonstrate one of its intrinsic objects, that the task of rendering real, sustained, and permanent service to the country is indefinitely more difficult than an indiscriminate advocacy of our rights as sons of the soil, or a similar condemnation of the apparent factors which are held as actuating the impoverishment of the country, the party aims directed towards an uncompromising contention for effecting every unqualified good or restraining all durable influences in regard to the welfare of India, and the patriotic activity which, while finding a plentiful play in a plain and seemingly smiling region of operations, is yet lying fallow, in a concrete sense, in those thick and impenetrable forests of the social, political, economic, and religious sciences, as applied to native India, in which now lie buried the rays and splendour of the Mazdiasni-Christian Light, which alone can free our country from the unethic and effeminate shackles of countless ages, for working out a vigorous civilization within itself, and inspiring amelioration and freedom in the East in general.

In regard to the get up of the work, I cannot help observing that it is defective in several respects, as I could only attend to it during the scanty leisure which my heavy official duties would afford. Though I have rendered the arrangement of the various papers and essays pretty consistent, I have not allowed the links which mark the progress and

development of thoughts, sentiments, actions, and events, for the period in which they have appeared, to be marred, so that the principles which have guided me, and may well guide those interested in the good of our country and in the stability and progress of Her Majesty's Rule, may be placed in full relief.

I shall now pass on to a consideration of some significant portion of a practical plan on which our patriots may base their future line of action, and which may also serve to show how any earnest and impartial efforts to be exercised in behalf of India are besetted with the difficulties to which I have above alluded : dreary and forbidding though these difficulties may be, they are still calculated to open up real prospects of a humane emancipation before us, as these difficulties are systematically and single-mindedly encountered.

The present period in the Indian history is very extraordinary. The fate of the vast majority of the people of India is but slightly better than a wretched one. They are not capable of much exertions, and even if they did exert much, they could not place themselves in a position above the most common wants of life. Devoid of capital, or of much intelligence and genius, the earnings of many millions are not enough to build them up to any degree of prosperity. The populations grow, and their wants grow too. The demands growing out of these indefinitely increase, but the supply does not equally become abundant. The crucial point of such an aggravation is reached when a famine or other calamities occur. The starvation and death of millions then take place. The British Government have, no doubt, done their best to mitigate these frightful human disasters to an extent and in a manner which no Native Government ever did.

The Native Press still teems with expressions of disaffection, and the patriots of the country systematically inveigh

against the present system of the British Government. The Native Journals and the Native Associations constantly maintain that the Government is not all what it should be to the people of India, and that the lower, the middle and the upper classes are all being more or less impoverished and demoralized. The reasons assigned are the refusal of the Government to reduce the civil and military expenditures, to substitute native agencies in various administrations, and to grant more extensive and more sincere self-government to the country. Another general reason assigned for the prevalent popular disaffection is the tendency of the Government to go to war for annexation and other purposes which inflict ruining expenditures on India and vitiate its capacity for internal development and progress.

The notes published in this work serve to show in what manner and how far have we been influenced by these early clamours in India, which so inadequately come upon the surface. These clamours I recognize as being early, because the mass of the people are not so far civilized as to raise them for themselves, and those who have so deservedly elected themselves as their representatives have neither sufficient leisure nor all commanding resources to invest their advocacy with that truth, weight and dignity, the fullest amount of which alone can tell on a powerful Government like the British. The contest in which the leaders of Native India are engaged is often based on personal grounds, and there is the most valid excuse for this being so. They are drawn by the Western spirit, while the influence of wealth and power in India is hardly allied with the germs of public spirit, nor shines very considerably on those graced with education and culture. Much, therefore, of the patriotism in the Indian cause lacks in genuine strength and irresistible fulness of sincerity and sympathies which can only meet those who, while influential in wealth, power, and high intellectual capacity, are also animated by an earnest desire to see large measures of amelioration planned and enforced, not in the interests of any small section of society, but in the interests of vast populations.

The grave shortcomings of the Indian leaders do not of course aid the efforts of the Government in righting itself with the people. If it is not able to consult their interests fully, and in all matters, the labours of the leaders, which are only occasionally opportune or pointed, or the uncompromising hostility displayed by some of the younger educated generations, furnish the rulers with sufficient excuse to maintain a conservative and frigid policy which, no doubt, has good deal to do with the continuance of our public miseries. Any real reforms in Indian affairs will considerably depend upon the correct and adequate ability displayed by native politicians, both of a patriotic and administrative character.

I shall here attempt to show how the Government may be induced to initiate a reformed and national policy for the general and specific good of India. In thus forecasting, I may assume that the Indian leaders will generally follow the line of action which I have denoted.

(a) Every province in India must constitute a large assembly of educated and practical persons, which should regularly assemble once or more a month, and hold public debates on all matters concerning the public finances and their disposal.

The object of these debates should be to point out the irregularities of expenditures, the sources of legitimate, and the hardships of illegitimate, revenues, and the best methods of disbursements which would conduce to the prosperity and happiness of the people. The debates and representations should be systematic and untiring, and conducted with so much of practical knowledge, skill, and moderate force, that the competency of such debators to become Legislators and Executive Members of the Government would become self-evident.

(b) These Presidential and Provincial Assemblies should, to a certain extent, be fed by secondary Assemblies which should be established in district municipal towns or the chief cities in the districts. The debating powers should be widely cultivated, and no question should be taken up without collecting the utmost possible information thereon. Each important centre should have a capable Journal to publish the

debates in extenso and assist the objects of the Assemblies from time to time. After either a measure of reform, or an important proceeding of the Assembly is well discussed, and its general propriety fully recognized, the Assemblies should not rest till the Government has been induced to accept the recommendations made.

(c) One of the primary objects of these Assemblies should be to return members for District and City Municipalities and for the Government Councils. Before, however, attempts are made in this direction, members of the Assemblies should fit themselves for the said administrative functions by exercising and displaying their abilities in the Assemblies, which would be the training Schools for Politicians, as well as effectual agencies to publish the transactions of the Government as they may affect the moral and material condition of the people.

(d) The merits of all new appointments and vacancies should be regularly discussed in these Assemblies with a view to reduce expenditures and increase the number of appointments held by the natives of the country. The eligibility of all natives who are fit by experience and character to fill up responsible district and city appointments should be constantly discussed, while the claims of really able natives to appointments of Executive and Legislative Members should be systematically and sedulously pointed out.

(e) The number of members for each Assembly should be higher according to the extent and importance of the tract of the country it may represent. A Presidential Assembly should consist of a far larger number of representatives than a Town Assembly, as the number of popular and other members should be higher in a Government Council than in a Town or District Municipal Board. Each Assembly should, therefore, contain not only members sufficient for its own business, but also for its Municipalities and the Government Council according to the proportional numbers needed in each of such institutions.

(f) Every Assembly must command the services of a large number of members, for very great portions of them

will be absorbed in the Council and the Municipalities. Though a practical voting action cannot have much freedom at the outset, every Government will be aided in commanding the services of a large number of representatives capable of discussing public questions in State meetings.

(g) The Viceregal Council will contain the largest number of popular and nominated members, as it must represent every province of the Indian Empire. The principal Assembly of a Presidency will be entitled to send its representatives to the Supreme Council from its own body and from the members with a Governor's Council. Any Government will further be at liberty to nominate certain number of members, either from the people at large or from the Assemblies.

(b) The Assembly at the seat of the Chief Government in India may be termed the Chief Indian Assembly, which must be composed of the largest number of representatives, and to which every Presidential Assembly will be entitled to return a certain number of its own representatives.

(z) The Chief Indian Assembly will also have its corresponding Assembly in London composed of such number as may be possible to send there. The Chief Indian Assembly will be entitled to depute some of their members to the India Council, these being much fewer than those appointed to the Viceroy's Council, the India Office nominating Government members from the Assembly just mentioned, or directly from the people.

(j) The public meetings of the Governors', the Viceroy's and the Secretary of State's Councils may be held every three months, the Budget quarter being considered the more important of the rest. The popular or the nominated members will be entitled to put questions to the Government, in reference to any of its actions, or those of its servants, and elicit the necessary information thereon. All records or minutes of the Government will be open to the inspection of any member, who will also be entitled to bring forward, sufficiently early, any legislative or administrative measure which may be deemed by him or the public essential in the public interests.

(k) The early constitution of a popular representation allied with any Government need not be held absolute. The majority of a Government will, therefore, be empowered on the basis of good faith to throw out any measure or censure passed by a larger majority till such time as a responsible popular representation is tentatively introduced. The Viceroy's or the Secretary of State's Council will be at liberty to take cognizance of any such proceedings, either voluntarily, or at the instance of any subordinate popular Assembly, and decide on the merits of such a case.

(l) No proceedings of any Council will be held secretly unless the great majority, or an authorized minority wish it to be so.

(m) Members of any of the People's Assemblies, or of the Government Councils, excepting officials, will be entitled to appear as candidates for the British Parliament.

(n) At the outset India should be represented in the British Parliament by as many of its representatives as may harmonize with the number of its chief British Administrators. Each group of Native States may also return their representatives, if they can afford to do so. Any Native Prince who has granted some measure of self government to his subjects will be entitled to a seat in the Council in the same manner as any ordinary member is returned or nominated.

The scheme that I have here somewhat roughly laid down should aim at creating at least 5,000 capable spokesmen for India, to influence the institutions of self-government and the Executive Governments, both here and in England. The larger number the better, for the purely popular Assemblies may, indeed, need numerous members to bring on for open discussion every village, district, city, provincial or State question affecting the people, financially, politically, socially, morally, or commercially. These thorough and fearless discussions abroad and prior to the holding of the Council and National Meetings will greatly help governmental proceedings and lay out a clear road for the popular members to follow and to confirm.

The labors of our public men and public bodies are much wasted, because they do not follow some intelligible and

consistent line of action as above briefly laid down. The 5,000 leaders required to follow one grand plan—composed of a set of well-joined constituents—are, by no means, a large number for India, and yet we cannot do with any much less number. We cannot create any large number as if by magic. Even in respect of securing a minimum number, we have to follow some consistent plan with uniform energy and perseverance throughout India. The Princes and wealthy classes should assist the present few leaders with funds, so that by the means of Associations and other methods they may succeed in adding to the present ranks of patriotic debaters and writers. Some of the principal persons should travel throughout the country and encourage their countrymen to identify themselves with public affairs and open debating assemblies to discuss and place them in suitable forms before the Government.

It must be admitted with regret that a prominent portion of our patriotic labors is based on mere sentiment. While we should work out such a practical political scheme as I have here explained, we should also engage ourselves in other practical directions as I have elsewhere pointed out. It must be taken as an undoubted fact that, unless considerable new wealth is created in India, there is no hope for a better and more extended self-government, and a more sympathetic and congenial Imperial policy. The Indian leaders have, therefore, another urgent task before them, which they cannot neglect a year further. Instead of frittering away their ability and resources in less practical matters, they have to exert in getting a broad Imperial policy created for the various popular instructions of the masses—such as I have already indicated. Let them apply themselves sedulously to pointing out to Government how they might spare 5 or 6 crores a year in the cause of the Arts, Industries and Professions of the country. A complete exploration of the now hidden, but vast and inexhaustible, resources of the country is also a subject to which they should strive to direct the most practical attention of the Government. But the following pages treat of these and other questions fully.

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SELECTIONS FROM MY RECENT NOTES ON THE INDIAN EMPIRE.

PART I.

RUSSIA, INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN.

On the advent of Lord Ripon in India, the present writer took special care in representing the state of affairs on the North-West frontiers of this Empire, presuming that, as the honest opinion of one of the thinkers in the country, it may count upon a passing reflection. The collapse of the political party in England about that time was, perhaps, too fresh to permit the new Viceroy to adopt a policy which the Conservatives had pushed on, but which the Liberals had, in a certain measure, denounced. Our own exposition of a policy in respect of the advance of Russia on the Persian and Afghanistan frontiers attempted to steer clear of the prejudices and passions which had rent England asunder in respect of its attitude towards Russia in Central Asia, knowing full well that the party in power, when the time came, was not likely to sacrifice Indian interests, or the British prestige.

In consequence of the recent subjugation of Merv by Russia, the old question of its advance towards India has again been agitated in the British Parliament. The Russian usurpation of Merv is likely, after some time, to lead to important frontier disputes between that country and Afghanistan. The Asiatic frontiers of Russia are now more closely conterminous with those of Afghanistan, with Sarakhs on the one extremity, and Kashgar on the other. Further, Russia has now approached the north-eastern frontier of Persia. England has not thought fit to check the Russian advance upon Merv. When Merv was to be annexed Russia declared its frontier line, east of the Samber, would run north to the

Attock, in the boundaries of Deregez, Mahomedabad, Kilat and Sarakhs. Having got over the objective point of Merv, the Russians are naturally inclined to set up a delimitation between itself on the one hand, and the Persians, Afghans and Turcomans on the other. It is apprehended that the Attock will also, in course of time, be swallowed by Russia, its movement from Askabad, eastwards, being unfavorable to the defence of India. It is also apprehended that Russia, on the part of Bokhara, may lay claim on Wakhan, Shignan, and Rosban, which are the disputed districts of Afghanistan, or which, however, Russia presumes to advance certain old rights.

It is fortunate at this stage of affairs that the Liberal statesmen in England are not inclined to look upon the Russian advance as requiring no action from the lord paramount of India. They have informed the Parliament that they are negotiating with Russia with reference to a permanent understanding necessary to establish between the two countries as to how far the advance of Russia can be consummated southward towards India. It is admitted on all sides that, though it was necessary for Russia to push through the Central Asian deserts on its mission of civilization, dexterous efforts have been employed to advance towards India in directions which should now be controlled by England. Suspicions are now aroused that it aims at acquiring undue strength, calculated to affect the balance of power of several European, Asiatic and Indo-British Kingdoms. That the Liberal Ministry should itself begin to entertain some such suspicion, in howsoever a remote manner, is a fact on which we congratulate the Indian princes and people alike. We are specially gratified at the dawning of this national feeling in England, for when both the Conservatives and the Liberals are generally agreed upon a similar line of action, India's dearest interests are sure to be indicated.

The time is now come when violent conflicting opinions, which have prevailed for many years on the subject, can be given a permanent repose, and when the feverish anxieties as to the insecurity of the Indian dominions can be set at rest for a portion, if not for a whole, of a century. With due deference to the high ability of the authorities in London, we would submit that something more should be done than the direct negotiations now conducted between the Metropolis of Her Majesty and that of the Czar. Some amount of direct responsibility should be thrown over the Governors-General of India in Council, who are more

intimately acquainted with the public feelings and conditions in the several States in Central Asia, now partly domineered over by Russia. It is the high Indian authorities who can exactly feel the effects created by the movements of Russia on those tribes and chiefs, whose allegiance it is essential for British India to secure. It is the Indian Viceroy and his counsellors who can ascertain at first hand what would be the measures which would serve to keep Russia within its legitimate bounds and preserve peace and prosperity in those outlying States on our frontier, which Russia gradually seeks to weaken in its own aggressive interests. It is advisable that a Commission should be appointed in India with a view to proceed on the frontiers to decide upon the boundaries of all the large and small powers, which, thenceforth, none of them could venture to violate. The Commission may consist of two or three statesmen of marked ability from India, such as the Hon'ble Mr. T. C. Hope and others, and the representatives of the Russian Emperor. Unless an able Commission proceeds to the spot and deliberates on the plan to be adopted after exhaustive enquiries into the character, capacity and needs of each of the more prominent tribes and kingdoms, no substantial solution of the difficulty will be possible. A Commission of this sort may be directed to entertain a masterly conception of the interests of each of the peoples and the States, and to concede every possible benefit to every party involved in the settlement. All of them will thus be influenced by currents of intimate knowledge and sympathies paving the way for that adjustment of dissensions and quarrels which mutual friendliness, discussion and forbearance can alone bring about. What is the use of Russia always let alone with all sorts of inferior and impoverished people whom it could always overawe? Or why should those people and the various States, such as above described, not have the advantage of impartial guidance, or a control moderated with measures of expediency and justice emanating from a Government like that of the British? The whole evil at present consists in letting an absolute power to trample upon weak nationalities without confining the former within the limits of well-defined responsibilities. As we have often stated, both the Russian and British Governments have a civilized calling to follow in Asia; what should now be firmly done is to define the respective boundaries of both—within which each one should exercise its benevolent sway. This done under solemn treaties, we shall no more hear of Russian treacheries, or of the alleged imbecility of English statesmen. If

Lord Ripon succeeds in persuading the English Cabinet to adopt some such measure as we have here put down, and be able to carry it through, he will have considerably added to the deep obligations he has already conferred on the country.—*4th May 1884.*

WE noticed in our last paper the agitation caused in the British Parliament in consequence of the Russian conquest of Merv, which places Herat virtually at the feet of that ambitious Power. Having conquered Turkestan and all the Khanates of Central Asia, in spite of England's unwillingness, it has struck on the north-west frontier of Afghanistan, its northern border being previously secured. It must be admitted that Russia could not have satisfied itself with its march through the wilds of Central Asia, without pushing on the confines of wealthy empires, thus rendering its influence felt. Hitherto it had struggled to conquer insignificant little States, though possessed of warlike material. Having secured these States, it now lies, or will at no very distant date lie, side by side with the leading powers in Lower Asia, and especially with the Paramount Power ruling our own country. That Russia has ever considered England an inconvenient thorn by its side in both Asiatic and European countries, and that, therefore, it has been fast descending upon the northern and north-west confines of India, can admit of no doubt. Unless England feels strong and supplants it in the neighbourhood, where it makes its stealthy marches, both Afghanistan and Persia must come below its thumb. Russia has hitherto had a good deal to fear from England. Russia has known this to its cost on several occasions, such as what it had to suffer at Crimea and the check which it received more recently in Turkey. It seems to have moved its chessboard in another direction altogether, having failed elsewhere for the last quarter of a century. But we must view its movements towards this part of the world from another stand-point. But for Russia the Central Asian kingdoms would have been rendered a perfect curse, and both Persia and Afghanistan would have only served to render that fair portion of the earth a greater desolation than ever. Russia is putting down plunder and bloodshed, checking abnormal slaveries, and is introducing order and civilization in the barbarous tracts that it has subdued. Its proximity to Herat and Cabul is a sort of indirect co-operation with England in spreading civilization in unfortunate Asia. What *we*, the princes and people of India,

have to look to is,—these near possessions of mighty powers do not form, in course of time, a mine of gunpowder underneath us, doing the teeming populations of India incalculable mischief. We shall be content to have the Russian bear as near us as may be desirable, but do not wish to see the Bear and the Lion converting the fair regions of the earth into a battle-field. We shall be glad to remain at peace with Russia, and even encourage its merchandize, but we should certainly resent its interference with our relations with the British power. Let it approach us as a kindly neighbour, but its evil eye on our peace and prosperity and our smooth-going civilization we shall damn with all our might and resolve. Russia ! If you feel that England does not act magnanimously with you in Turkey and elsewhere, you may have your say there, and not here. We have already paid dear for our peace and for our consolidation as an empire, and our wealth and resources have already been thinned, so that we are now striving hard for their replenishment. We cannot, therefore, allow you to exercise your malicious grudge against England on the confines of India. We have suffered a good deal from the raids hurled on us from Central Asia. We shall now take care that no more of these occur in future. Russia ! you dare not bring the beasts of the Khanates to pollute our sacred Indian soil. They will be infinitely more dreadful than our poverty, and infinitely more repulsive than our worst princes. Every one whom you might bring will be a ferocious brigand, and much more mischievous than a hungry, bloodthirsty beast. Rest quiet where you have advanced, for we know well your motives and your ability, and the savage propensities of your Generals.

We trust every native journal throughout the country, as every Anglo-Indian too, will take up this cry, and send the feeling deep into the mind of every native feudatory and every heart beating for England's supremacy.

We respectfully demand of England that she should keep her accounts with Russia square. England would do well by satisfying the aspirations of Russia. It won't do to always inflict chastisements on it. Great Britain should see to the great progress made by Russia now-a-days in the direction of India, and deal with it accordingly. England had not much to lose in past times ; now she has, from the fact of the bear having stealthily come and sat at her door.

The policy of both countries may, however, all of a sudden produce a clash in spite of the conciliatory tendencies of both. Will not England,

therefore, be ready for a dark day ? Are her resources in the East and the West sufficient to meet the Russian Bear in both quarters of the globe ? On this subject we have reflected much and written a good deal. We have shown the weak points of the forces of the Indian Empire, and fully demonstrated how insufficient they are, and how culpably do we neglect to utilize the fine material at hand. Elsewhere we have demonstrated this exhaustively. We can repeat but little of that here. The forces of the Native States should not be neglected. Already those of the leading Native States of this Presidency are being reorganized in the way they ought to be. It is a sign of better times. But whatever has to be done should be done quickly and with full heart. Every possible improvement should be introduced in the rank and file of the forces of the Native States of India. You may not be able at present to impart to them a first-rate efficiency, but make them fairly warlike. It is a culpable thoughtlessness if they are left alone wherever they could be subject to discipline and work. Any time we may want a lakh or more of the imperial army to defend our frontiers alone, while a good deal of resources may be needed in Europe simultaneously. Yet, again, considerable numbers would be required to keep internal order. If, therefore, we had a lakh and a half of native army from the States, each of the many important points in India could be garrisoned, partly by the British and partly by the force of a Native State, while the most capable army could be sent on to fight the enemy. To let some of the more deserving Native Chiefs share in the glory of the defence, their armies could even be sent to the frontiers, or elsewhere, to actively co-operate with the British columns. At present almost the whole fighting resources of the Native States are demoralized and wasted away in sheer idleness. What a mistaken political foresight ! While there is yet time let the Foreign Office in India, we humbly submit, take up the whole question seriously. Some amount of confidence should be reposed in the loyalty of Native States. When some part of the native forces has been drilled and disciplined, it would rest with the British Government how to make use of it. It could be used in such a way that wherever it is put forward, it could be an instrument of good, and not of evil, in the interests of the Empire. Till full confidence could be reposed in them—and we dare say it could be in course of time—no part of the force need be granted any independent sphere, except in joint responsibility with the regiments especially trusted by the British. But we are almost sure that

any State who could produce a working regiment will also prove worthy of the highest trust which the Paramount Power could show it. No additional expenditure should be thrown over any State ; but such States as can produce an army may utilize their present resources to a practicable extent. Again, no State should, in the case of a foreign aggression, bear more than its resources and its capability as a member of the Empire will admit of. Any delay on the part of the country in general to take definite action of the sort here mentioned would be deplorable. Russia has been always active in pursuance of the end it has so steadily kept in view. Can the Paramount Power of India and its important feudatories afford any longer to neglect the resources at their disposal ? It is true that the naval power of the British can undo Russia in Europe in a swift and telling manner, but will such a retaliation compensate for the sufferings of this country, should Russia try to upset it from the Peshawar or Herat side ? Let every house in native India be put in order before Russia endeavoured to tamper with it. The native kingdoms will in time be able to co-operate with the Empire at large in their own way. If this be pronounced a little more ambitious for them than desirable, every Native State, which has some fighting infantry and cavalry to boast of, can at least look after its own principality, and thus save the country at large from multiplied exertions and anxieties. Good princes of India, and ye thrice-blessed Government of the Queen ! Arise, and be on the alert, while the time is so favorable to work.—
11th May 1884.

THE Simla correspondent of the *Times of India* announces by telegraph

An Anglo-Russian Commission at last !—a word for the genuine Persians in India.

that an Anglo-Russian Commission will proceed early next autumn to demarcate the northern part of Afghanistan. We shall not for the present deal with the question of the limit proposed as given by the same writer. Probably the information given is not full, for the frontier on the Persian side is also to be taken into account. On the same authority it is stated that difficulties in the way of practically proposing this Commission have already been removed as between the English and the Russian Governments, though it is not certain "what officers will represent India."

This intelligence causes us very great satisfaction, as it must to all those having the permanent peace of the country at heart. It will be remembered that we had, in these columns, strongly pointed out the

necessity of deputing such a Commission. The announcement, if true, proves at least the desirability of the suggestion made. It is noteworthy that it is no longer considered that a deputation direct from the British Cabinet alone could carry out the object with efficacy. We shall watch with interest how the constitution of this deputation, which India will also have the honor to represent, is finally decided upon. There can hardly be a doubt that distinguished officials who have an immediate and acute knowledge of Central Asia as well as India will sit on this Commission. As we humbly believe, the Indian part of the Commission will hardly be complete unless a large minded, extremely shrewd, sagacious and diplomatic administrator like the present Public Works Minister of the Viceroy is deputed as President of the Indian deputation. We make this suggestion with unreserved independence, for we are entirely ignorant of what the views of the Hon'ble Mr. Hope are on this subject. His invaluable knowledge of the country is rendered more significant by his recent experience of the imperial P. W. Department. His knowledge of Oriental character, his sincere love for the country, and his keen and sagacious instincts may render a permanent service to India in the present cause. He will be a formidable, though quiet, match to any Russian diplomatist brought in the field. It is certain that he will never be taken in by any consummate wiles of either a Russ, an Afghan, or a Turcoman.

The escort may be composed of able natives of local knowledge and imperial integrity. One of these at least should be a genuine Persian claiming imperial confidence. We sincerely hope that Lord Ripon's distinguished Indian career may be signalized by that happy break in the diplomatic policy of British India which may admit into imperial confidence some of India's best sons—patriots of the country as well as profound loyalists in the Queen's Empire. The reasons for extending this imperial confidence to the ever loyal Parsis of India are at once most rational as they are most cogent. It may well be the lot of the Gladstonian Government to do justice to the aspirations of a reforming nation which once commanded a large Empire in Central Asia. A mighty nation despoiled of one of the most famous empires of the world might, on the basis of far-seeing and chivalrous public policy, be associated with modern diplomatists, to whom a Persian colleague, though of an entirely subordinate character, would certainly prove a fully reliable acquisition and a credit. His re-admission into the ancient provinces, where his nation ruled for

thousands of years, can essentially and legitimately bear the character of a most conciliatory medium, and an appreciative friend of the anarchical and semi-barbaric countries. While his deputation to the scene of his ancient country must inexpressibly rejoice the Parsi nation, young and old, would also sow the seed of an immense future utility to the British Government, pave the way to their beneficial and tentative introduction into the service of the Central Asian States on the same principle as is in vogue in Native States, and relieve a little the pressure on superior Indian services. The fresh element indicated for Foreign and British diplomatic service may always be kept under Indian control, as it will surely be of great service to the Paramount Power itself. Altogether, the cause we most respectfully advocate is worthy of the practical, generous and liberal statesmen who now rule over us, and must leave a decided landmark in the history of their achievements to be followed on a broadening and ever broadening basis of universal approbation and esteem.—15th June 1884.

One feature of Skobeloff's plan of invading India was, to quote his words, "to organize masses of Asiatic cavalry and hurl them on India as our vanguard, under the banner of blood and rapine, thus bringing back the times of Tamerlane."

It is deplorable that Mr. Seymour Keay's indictment against the British Government should attract proportionally far more serious attention than the above utterance of a Russian Devil, which has been lately unearthed from a confidential despatch of Skobeloff to his illustrious masters at St. Petersburg. We denounce Skobeloff as the veriest Devil, for we must charitably suppose that the Russian diplomatists and nation could not be at heart so wicked towards a sister country as this one of their misguided councillors. The expression of this violent design has been followed by a remarkable descent of Russia upon the frontiers of Afghanistan and Persia. What we, native writers, have now to bear in mind is, any moment relations between England and Russia are disturbed in Europe, a serious commotion may be expected by half a lakh of Russ with the wild looters of Central Asia fronting us at the North-West, or other equally accessible corner of Upper India, when Mr. Seymour Keay's teaching that our Government has got possession of India by fraud and force would surely evaporate. And we should further expect to be hampered in our discussions about the

age of the Civil Service candidates, or the propriety of saddling India with the Church expenses of the British soldiers employed in defending India.

The earnest, sound and honest patriots of the country would be so glad of an agitation of the latter questions if we were found twenty or thirty times more earnest in discovering what the terrible words of the Devilish Russ, above quoted, actually mean. We repeat we deplore—most sadly deplore—that this utterance of the Russ has not been one hundred times more scrutinized than the rusty allegation of Mr. Keay has been throughout the country. A very well intentioned and clever gentleman—but he has been leading us into a totally false and mischievous track. When the Russians have fairly approached the Gate of India with a bloody imaginary banner on their front above depicted, we to propagate the teaching of Mr. Keay, that the British is a band of horrid spoliators, is upsetting our scale of reason altogether. We certainly like to be told where the natives can strengthen their position in due relation to the integrity of the Empire, but we must consider the question of its foundations as far superior to any that now agitate India till at least that question of overwhelming importance is satisfactorily disposed of both in England and India.

We must earnestly request every native contemporary, as also the Anglo-Indian, not to lose sight of the question of Russian advance towards Herat till the world is sure that the disgraceful threat against India has been freed of its base sting. If Russia is not allowed to do what it thinks proper in Europe and Asiatic Turkey, it must immediately employ measures to threaten the honor and peace of a foreign, innocent and quiet Oriental Empire ! It must hurl on us the murderous and greedy hordes of Central Asia, and thus recover the expenses of her ruinous conquests in the wilds of Asia above us !

It behoves every Native State and every important native community to resent this rapacious design. We need not fly into a fit, but must seriously think of strengthening the position of each province in India, so that, individually, it may become stronger, and, collectively, our Empire may be sustained without a chance occurring of its being violated by a foreign foe.

When the question of occupying Candahar was mooted, we pointed out the grounds on which its friendly occupation was urgently called for. The Russian occupation of Merv and Sarakhs, and its further advance towards Herat in prospect, must now force the British Government to possess itself of the passes leading into Afghanistan. Our proposal four years ago was to

catch time by the forelock. We proposed to postpone the evacuation of the country of the Afghans, occupy a portion of it permanently, and so organize the Government that the finances may be improved, and a force organized for the defence of the country against Russian aggressions. Russia wanted to achieve some object in Turkey. England could not tolerate it, and sent a fleet to the Dardanelles. Russia, in its turn, fired a match in Cabul, plunged India into a costly war, and brought on the death of poor Shere Ali by abandoning him at the last moment. Henceforth is it to be admitted that India should be made a sport of the warlike parties as well, as she is of the English political parties ?

However unpleasant the contingency—we have to face it ; we have to admit clearly that the force we have in India are only meant for preserving the peace *in* the country. When first organized, the contingency of a disturbance in Europe giving rise to the movement of hundreds of thousands of hostile troops in the vicinity of India was hardly conceived. A large part of the British strength, both in England and India, may be withdrawn for the battle-field in Europe. The point to be considered then is—what strength would remain available for the frontiers and internal purposes. That strength must be inadequate, while the present course of mistrusting Native States, as regards their military organization, would be a grievous source of weakness.

The best authorities have been talking about the difficulties in fixing the frontiers to remain on the defensive. Such frontiers, in our opinion, should comprise the whole of Afghanistan. Is there any doubt left of the great danger of remaining in the rear of any of the Afghan tribes or any part of the country ? The abandoned country and the tribes, unless they are placed under our authority, must be won over and used by Russia. Cabul, Candahar and Herat should therefore be quickly placed under the civilizing influences of India. The resources of these provinces should belong to England and not to Russia. It would be woeful to have any more wars raging within the confines of India. For protecting weak India, and saving the honor of England as the leading nation of the civilized world, Russia should be disposed of out and out.

Though we have fully demonstrated our views on the necessity of judiciously reforming the forces of the Native States, and taking Afghanistan under our direct and honest control, we are prepared to modify our convictions, if these have not been quite right,

It would be a prudent policy not to go so far near Russia that a war between the two Powers may be easily provoked. Any inaction or delay by the British Government, as far as it may be due to this reason, can be well comprehended. But very strong reasons will be required to believe that it was a perfectly wise measure to have abandoned Afghanistan just when we could have easily taken it under our provisional, or limited control. Possibly a friendly understanding with Russia on graver points might have rendered the evacuation of Candahar in 1880 desirable, full reasons for which being at present unknown. It cannot be denied that England cannot exercise a disproportionately large influence against Russia in Europe and other parts of the world, without compromising the universal effects of civilization on the world in general. If a vulnerable point existed beyond the confines of Afghanistan, England would be less tempted to offer any obstruction to the progress of Russia, which may be considered of a somewhat wanton character. On the other hand, we have to bear in mind that, occasionally, with the best of desires on both sides to avoid a conflict, the mutual relations of both Powers may reach a straining point when peace would be impossible. In practical diplomacy, and in matters of sovereign prestige, no abstract rules of right or wrong can always and invariably subdue human passions and prejudices. We cannot therefore know for certain when a mine may be fired. In this event, as England would be at liberty to destroy the dominions of Russia at any accessible point, so will Russia seek the weakest point of the British Empire. Will the past anarchical sufferings of India and its present poor condition be able to appeal to the instincts of a foe bent upon a complete devastation? Of course not. A calamity, which cannot be expressed in words, may befall every member of the Empire, whatever may be the eventual result. The strongest and most humane Government cannot repair for half a century the ravages once caused by war to a peaceful country. The tribes and rulers on our frontiers are naturally fierce and warlike. It would be dangerous to leave them in a shaky and halting condition. Let them be so secured that they may prove thoroughly loyal to India. We have strenuously advocated a gradual intercourse between the Afghans and Indians. While the less civilized Russians have amalgamated with the barbaric hordes of Central Asia, we keenly feel our isolation from the Afghans, who can so well protect us in the worst possible position. In the interests of India, Afghanistan should no doubt be rendered friendly

and independent. It is doubtful, however, that it can remain strong and self-protective without the British Government undertaking to directly assist the Amir in all his vital affairs. The combination of Afghans with the British will on all sides be considered more beneficial and welcome to the former than their subjugation by the Russians. The other equally potent advantage is the capacity of this country to provide an almost indefinite scope for the trading resources of Afghanistan which now lie dormant. The present isolation of Afghanistan is seriously prejudicial to the interests of both countries. It is a pity the British Government have not yet perceived the manifold advantages of permitting a political and judicious mixture of certain loyal sects of India with those of the neighbouring country. The real key to secure immunity from the apprehensions now persistently raised by Russia lies in granting that brute and moral force to Afghanistan which the British, in co-operation with India, could grant without causing the depressing evils a greedy and semi-scrupulous power would cause to a weaker neighbour. Afghanistan should be so constituted gradually, that it may become as willing to resist foreign aggressions as Baroda or Mysore, or any other loyal Native State in India. For, then, Afghanistan will instinctively feel that it would have everything to lose and nothing to gain by the extinction of the British Government.

There is another factor in the frontier affairs which we *cannot* ignore, though it has a direct reference to affairs in *Europe*. We have to open our eyes to the fact that England cannot possibly take any step relating to the Persian and Afghan frontiers which can affect her relations in *Europe* through the instrumentality of Russia, or that on any complications arising in *Europe* with Russia and other powers, any step taken in the East should not be calculated to estrange England from the prevailing harmony. The Commission which we some time ago suggested for the demarcation of the various frontiers should also have the ablest of the plenipotentiaries of England, with a view that he may set forth every possible contingency in *Europe* and *Asia* which may bear upon the newly-to-be-adjusted relations of India with Russia. Any Commission to be composed should be complete in all its parts. That completion can be attained by the nominations from India which we have already suggested, and by the adoption of the further recommendation we beg leave to make, that as Russia will be represented by its imperial representative, so should England depute one of its Crown Agents (*Elchi*), who may have thoroughly mastered the

diplomatic intricacies of Europe and Asia and their extremely complicated foreign and international relations. We shall pursue in the next paper the statement of definite measures we are desirous of respectfully proposing to the distinguished head now ruling over India,—22nd June 1884.

WE had laid some stress on the theory advanced by us some time ago that in any Commission appointed to fix the boundaries of the Russo-Persian-Afghan territories, on the borders of Afghanistan and Herat, as affecting India, "England should depute one of its Crown Agents (*Elchis*), who may have thoroughly mastered the diplomatic intricacies of Europe and Asia and their extremely complicated foreign and international relations." Subsequent events have shown that both this and our other theory, that it was necessary that experienced officers should be deputed to settle the boundaries once for all by proceeding on the spot with the representatives of the other Powers, have proved to be correct. A full Commission has been appointed of a number of varied officers who have had much dealings with affairs on our North-Western frontiers, and the Afghan, Turkestan, Turcoman and Persian States beyond them. It appears that the only officers who have been appointed have seen services in the foreign, political and military departments, and the unfulfilled part of the suggestions thrown out by us from time to time was due to where we thought there were special reasons for making the principle more elastic than the conventional rules of Government allowed.

The appointment of Sir Peter Lumsden is from London. As one of the recent members of the India Council, with his actual experience of our frontier and Afghan affairs, he must have thoroughly made himself conversant with the traditions, policies and susceptibilities of Her Majesty's Government at home as affecting its vital relations with those of other Powers in Europe and Asia. He is shortly expected in India with his distinguished Mahomedan Secretary, who has seen much political service at Cabul as Native Agent of the Viceroy at that Court. Sir Lumsden is further well equipped with a staff of experienced Indian officials. There is very little to criticise in the constitution of the Commission, it already being settled, That the head of the Commission should combine Indian knowledge with his direct acquaintance with the feelings of the British Cabinet and the India Office, is a great advantage impartially secured by the Viceroy.

The Anglo-Russian
Commission.

The fixing of the authoritative *bud* by the representatives of England, Russia, Afghanistan, and Persia, is, in itself, a difficult and complex task to accomplish. It is forgotten by the general public that the question of the *bud* is one which would tend to revolutionize, in a certain degree, numerous relations of States and tribes, which, however naturally involved, do now stand on some generally understood basis, though apt to be occasionally violated. Whatever settlement that is made, it will of course have to be operative. Each Power will see to its effect as concerning itself. Persia may show a more encroaching spirit towards Afghanistan and other lesser tribes. The Amir has some serious contentions with Persia and certain tribes, which hitherto have been unruly. The interest of Russia is to descend towards Herat and Cabul as much as possible. We have not sufficient information at hand as to the precise points and directions aimed at by these Powers.

At any rate, one important measure will have been achieved if the Commission succeeds. Public agitation and disturbance of feelings may be stopped when the Russian advance is finally demarcated under expressly laid down terms. Whether an agreement is arrived at with Russia or not, if she is incited to take the offensive on the Cabul or Herat side, she will do so under any condition. But she cannot outstep the limits, if once fixed, in any ordinary state of affairs. When she does so under any of her usual pretexts, at least one thing will be clear to all concerned parties,—that she is committing a breach of faith. What she has been doing for years in the way of advancing her frontiers without any necessity for placing herself on the offensive, she would not be able to do as soon as the various frontier lines have been settled. If any tribe or State gave her trouble, she will not have the choice of putting her step forward and annexing that recalcitrant tract to her domains. Her only recourse would be to resort to diplomatic remonstrances and appeals to friendly Powers, and no dreaded measures of military subjugation and wholesale absorption. It is to be hoped that the Commission will devise a permanent plan of arbitration to dispose of all disputes or conflicts which may arise between the tribes themselves, or between any tribe and State, or between one State and another. Such a Commission as Sir Lumsden's—which we trust will effectually close its labors before the Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon ends—ought to be able to impose a sense of responsibility, in reference to territorial, political and international conduct, on each of the States and

tribes which, in future, are to fall under the suzerainty of Russia or England, as may be decided by the Commission. It would, no doubt, be difficult in persuading all the tribes to accept the sovereignty of any of the Eastern Powers—at least those of the tribes who have led a wild and unrestrained life. But that every one of these must accept the guidance of the larger Powers is, we believe, a certainty.—10th August 1884.

WE wrote in a tone of emphatic warning upwards of a decade ago that the military strength of India was so inadequate that Indian Dangers. the mere anxiety not to incur additional expenditure would involve the Empire in serious consequences. Dreading also the risk of increased taxation, and desiring a higher political position for Native States, we pointed out for utilization their unused resources found in the present rabble of about 350,000 men maintained by them. After many years of fruitless (or if it is fruitful we cannot just now confidently say) writing, we now come across certain very emphatic statements made in the columns of the *St. James's Gazette* by an administrator holding one of the most responsible positions in the Indian Government. The revelation he makes is very alarming. Whether the public should accept it or not, they may at least be informed of it. He writes thus on the inefficiency of our Army :—

In 1858, after the Mutiny had been fairly got under, we maintained 108,000 British troops in India ; to-day there are but 52,000. Our native army, too, is nearly 50 per cent. below its numbers in 1858. The regiments of the Madras and Bombay armies as a whole, and many of the Bengal regiments also, are wanting in those qualities which modern armies should possess. The men are recruited from unwarlike races ; British officers are too few in number and far too old ; native officers are uneducated and feeble. In the Sikh, Goorkha, and Punjab frontier regiments, undeniably the best in the army, the average length of service of company commanders is twenty-nine and of subalterns twenty-four years. The difficulty in obtaining an adequate supply of recruits for our native army and the difficulty of retaining the services of our short-service men are in themselves adequate proof of the unpopularity of soldiering as a profession, whether in India or England.

The strategic position of Russia in relation to India is thus described :—

Herat is the acknowledged key of India. Even so staunch a Liberal as Mr. Grant Duff has said that we must fight rather than allow Russia to gain possession of it. Russian outposts at this present moment are but 270 miles from Herat ; ours are over 500 ! In the north, Russian troops are at Samte and Kilif, whence they can reach Balkh and Chitral far sooner than we can. With Russian troops at Balkh an advance to Cabul is imperative ; with Russian troops at Chitral an advance to Cabul is an impossibility.

What can be sent up to the front at a moment's notice, on which we have so often spoken, is stated below :—

It has often been said that England's extremity will be Russia's opportunity. It would seem no fairer opportunity for enterprise than now presents itself. Many of our best troops will soon be engaged beyond hope of recall in the Soudan and the Transvaal ; one army corps is locked up in Ireland ; Lord Cardwell's Army of Reserve, which in 1878 was to number 80,000, has no existence. Our authorities would be puzzled to send 10,000 trained and capable men to India at a month's notice, whatever the emergency ; and Russia, as you have shown us, can move 200,000 upon our Indian frontier (some of them from points of vantage already gained) in four-and-twenty hours. To-morrow we may hear that the ball has been set rolling. I fear that even "personal friendship" will not avail us anything in this case. Bold decided action, and an army and navy commensurate with our wealth and our needs, will alone enable us to face the enemies at our gates,

The fleet of the China Station and that comprising the East India Squadron is pronounced to be merely a "phantom" fleet, there being, it is said, not a single torpedo boat, nor a single armour-piercing gun in our harbours. "The combined Russian and French fleets include seven ironclads of the second class, carrying breach-loading guns varying from 25 to 43 tons, and armour from 10 to 14 inches in thickness. Not only our fleets but our harbours are at the mercy of these our hereditary foes." The arterial communications in India are described as incomplete, while any leading to the trans-Indus provinces do not exist, so that Russia can penetrate the Suleman range by the Cabul, Gomul and Bolan Passes without any obstruction.

We do not fall in quite with the alarmist tone adopted. The English Ministers who preside over the serious concerns of the world should know better than *Trans-Indicus-Olim* whom we have quoted. We have simply to look into the weaknesses attached to the instability of political parties at home. The point of collision between England, Russia and other nations cannot possibly be overlooked. For a general rupture day, every part of the empire should feel strong enough. It won't do if Russia is attacked in one quarter that it should then turn upon India and involve it in murderous anarchy. As our forces are insufficient we may have to face this contingency some day. We had to write pamphlet after pamphlet to show that unless the Native States were made strong and contented, that unless we effected a friendly occupation of Afghanistan, when we were there, and when we could have done the thing so easily, and organized the whole country in a military, financial and

material sense, India would not be safe against the dangerous approach of Russia. The Delimitation Commission must end in Russia establishing herself close to the confines of Afghanistan. Thus her accession of physical and brute forces will reach the maximum, while the Indian Government, when Afghanistan fell into their grasp, did hardly anything to husband their resources beyond the frontiers of India.

Have we, then, asked in vain the deputations that will wait on Earl Dufferin on his arrival in India to impress on the mind of His Excellency the extreme necessity of directing the most serious attention to the military reorganization of India, in which the reform of the armies of Native States by their own chiefs should play a prominent part? The work is of such vast magnitude, besetted with such unusual difficulties, that not a moment should be lost in the people and Native States of India interesting themselves in bringing the question to the front to procure its satisfactory solution. The more Russia advances the greater will be the difficulties in dealing with the question in a quiet and effective manner. This is *the* question on which the attention of the whole country should be most seriously engaged. India should be prepared for the worst, no matter if the worst came to-morrow, or some time hence, or never. We should not mind so much as Russia becoming our close neighbour as that we should be able to thrust it back whenever it chose to take the offensive against us.—23rd November 1884.

Of all the political questions now affecting the condition of India, that of the reported design of Russia on India is most important, deserving of the utmost consideration of all in India. The patriots of the country are parading their various grievances, in which they are not altogether wrong. If, however, they did so after fully satisfying us that they have understood the Russo-Perso-Afghan question, and that they do not think it need cause any anxiety to India, we should not blame them. But we do blame them for their want of foresight and for their tendency to waste their precious time in wholly devoting themselves to minor internal affairs, while we are not sure as to the forces now working in our foreign relations, which may or may not disturb the whole country eventually. The question of the Empire's safety does not rest in the hands of one political party in England, nor is influenced by any solitary or local considerations. To

Russia, or the Indian
Danger.

be sure of the permanent peace of India, we must not only be sure of the adequacy of our own Imperial and feudatories' forces, but of the good faith of our several Eastern neighbours and of the powerful States in Europe and Asia, who have so much to do with our parent country and its dependencies. We should like to have the name of *one* native of India directly or indirectly engaged in dealing with Indian problems, who may have influenced the public mind in a practical manner in reference to this question of the most serious import.

What our public men have to do is to persuade the Government in England to explain how India need not be anxious as to the sufficiency of the British and Native military strength to cope with any amount of force which Russia may possibly amass on the Herat, Cabul, or any other sides of India. We have some of the highest Indian authorities declaring in the strongest terms that if Russia chose to descend upon the plains of India, British India cannot count upon even half of the military force requisite to repel it. It is a sad commentary on the doings of native patriots of India that Englishmen should seem to perceive dangers of the highest magnitude to this country, while the former have as yet failed to gain any practical idea about them.

It is possible that no immediate danger may be apprehended; that the only serious thing which may be apprehended is the natural desire of Russia, while the respective frontiers have to be marked out, to extend its own jurisdiction as much as possible towards Afghanistan and India. If this be the minimum of our apprehensions, we are bound to see that Russia is not permitted to occupy any strategic points on the side of Persia and Afghanistan which may in future weaken our hold on those countries and the tribes subject to their influence. While there is a lasting potent force in Russia perfectly consistent, so far as pushing on and on its frontiers towards India is concerned, we cannot count upon the same motive force owing to the changing tactics of political parties in England. It therefore betrays our incompetency in that we have shown no inclination to keep public attention centred in this question in the midst of changes which are being so surely wrought in the Central Asian politics by a first class power able to commit widespread mischiefs. It is very probable that in the midst of party strifes in England, India may lose certain advantages which its strongest and direct advocacy alone can secure. No one seem to care to know the motive of Russia in delaying

to meet the Commission of Sir Peter Lumsden. We must try to ascertain if Russia wishes to absent itself in this demarcation business, thereby indirectly intimating us that it will not be bound with any decision the Indian Government may now arrive at. Or is it waiting for some party rupture in England before taking a step of some great importance? Or is her abstention from joining the Commission due to her unwillingness to adopt the boundaries which are likely to be dictated by our Government? There may be some foundation for different suppositions of this sort. In any case we are called upon to ascertain the exact position of affairs. As in matters pertaining to an important diplomacy, so in respect of any probably serious contingency, we find public opinion in India so far weak that to-morrow serious complications might arise without our being able to know how to meet them. It is not in a day that India can throw out an organized army sufficient to destroy any anarchical force which may be brought to bear upon it. No duty can, therefore, be more imperative than to press the British Government to recognize the strength of its Indian allies, to seek to renovate and regulate it, and to feel certain that on a day of trouble India can not only rout every possible adversary, but it can undo it even before it inflicted any direct calamities on India—and even if England should not have been able to despatch a Reserve. As we have maintained over and over again—though our cry has hitherto been a cry in the wilderness, especially as affecting our native patriots and publicists—the question of the military reorganization of the Indian Empire to be effected in full light and publicity, resorted to when safe to do so, is the one question before which every other Indian question must give way till satisfactorily settled once for all. Whether the public men in India are competent to deal with it or not, we beseech the Earl of Dufferin to exert his influence, ability, and high and tried personal powers to the utmost in achieving this result of supreme importance during his term of Viceroyalty. Whatever else His Lordship may be able to do, his success in this direction will for all times to come remain unrivalled in the permanent security afforded to the Empire. The work of conserving our strength, and to work it up to its maximum point, is a most arduous one, to be skilfully, silently and consummately done—one which has certainly not any transient popularity to win. And it is such work that is likely, we think, to suit the consummate temperament of our present Viceroy. We earnestly desire His Lordship may have a personal and earnest conference with the Native

Princes, the Residents at their Courts, and the distinguished European and Native dignitaries immediately responsible for the conduct and adequate strength of our active Armies in India. We beg that his attention may be drawn to the exhaustive State papers submitted to the Government of India by that astute and humane-hearted politician and statesman, Sir Richard Meade, late Resident of Hyderabad, as emanating from one known for his deep-felt and long-continued interest in all that concerns the safety and good name of the British Empire, and the increasing dignity and prosperity of its native feudatories.—*8th February 1885.*

WHAT we have urged so frequently and so strongly that British India should not lose one moment in uniting with Native India in creating a larger and stronger force for the defence of the country must now clearly appear to have been dictated by the strongest reason that can be imagined for such an advocacy. We have further urged that the Native Princes and people of India should themselves combine to represent to the Paramount Power the inability of the country to defend itself during a very serious crisis. For it is deplorable to think that if Great Britain failed any time to satisfy the Russian designs on Turkey, that Power should be allowed the opportunity of molesting the Indian Empire which has done no harm to Russia.

It is no secret now that Russia keenly desires to extend her frontiers close up to Herat, and even to push them into Afghanistan. The object is clearly to overawe all the rulers and tribes who interpose between the regular Indian frontiers and those of Russia beyond the Hindu Kush. The further and more important object is the criminal intimidation of India to be adopted whenever Russia desired to retaliate on England for any real or fancied wrong she may do to the former, not in respect of anything connected with India, but if England failed any time to satisfy the Russian cravings for Turkey.

It will be a bad time for India when Russia can subject it to any intimidation, which we consider nothing short of being criminal. She must be criminal, for she has now clearly intimated to England that if you don't let us have our own way on the Bosphorus, we shall attempt to injure India. We submit to the Government of India that this is a new phase of unprovoked enmity displayed towards India directly, though she has given no cause of offence to Russia. That country will, of course,

not venture to mention the international law under which it may possibly be justified to threaten an innocent country, while the cause of its disagreement lies with another.

How shall we deserve political freedom and unity if we have not even felt that an enemy is at our door, who can at any moment cause unrest and confusion in the country? Have the leaders of the country gone to the Government of India and told them that they are ready to support them in their measure of fortifying the Indian frontiers with a force sufficient enough to deter Russia from crossing the line, which Sir Peter Lumsden's mission has now practically laid down? Have our leaders impressed on the princes of India the desirability of their assuring the Suzerain Power at once that should they be allowed to organize their forces, they could be utilized by the British in the way they might wish for the permanent security of the Empire? Both the princes and the people should understand that the sovereign power can itself propose to utilize the feudatories' armies. Before, however, the Sovereign makes a move of this sort, it is better that we should make the proposal ourselves in a manner which would befit our dignity and enhance our safety. We deplore the apathy of the Indian leaders on this subject. When the whole country should be agitated to secure the reorganization of the military resources of India, we do not find a single journal, Anglo-Indian or Native, taking up the question with that earnestness which Mr. Robert Knight employs in persuading Lord Dufferin to reject the Bengal Tenancy Bill altogether. And yet that Bill is nothing in gravity compared to the unspeakable apathy which exists in India in reference to its literal safety. There is no use in creating an uproar in the matter, but how many years more should we speak in the wilderness in reference to the dangerous inadequacy and deplorable disunity of the military strength of India? That strength should be sufficient and united enough to rout any possible number of foes who may dare to cross the neutral zone beyond our frontiers. On a dire emergency we should not have to wait for succour from the mother-country.

We ask the leaders to bestir themselves in reference to this serious problem, than which no other Indian problem is more grave at the present moment. We predict that Russia is now waiting for an opportunity to advance towards our frontiers, which she will do as soon as it finds England hotly engaged in Egypt to avenge the most treacherous, the most

cruel murder of Gordon, one of the real Saviours of the World,—of the civilized and uncivilized races alike. While our tears will yet be fresh for his undeserved fate, criminal Russia will take a step as bad and as traitorous as that of the Mahdi, whose blood is now wanted for the permanent emancipation of a barbarous country and of his own ill-treated countrymen. To save the resources of the country from a greater future ruin, the present is the occasion to baffle the Russian design to tamper with Afghanistan and Persia to the detriment of India. The Russian limits have to be authoritatively laid down at the present moment with sufficient force to back up our decree. We exhort the British Government to make real and loyal warriors of the more trusted of the Native Princes and Noblemen and Commoners of martial spirit, and slap Russia severely for her constant criminal impudence to threaten the safety and happiness of a country which has done her no harm, directly or indirectly. We address our dear countrymen to move their energies and show themselves worthy of all the talk they have been indulging in for years in the interests of their country.

Will a million volumes full of talk in behalf of their capacity to govern India be of any earthly use, or compensate for the public mischief that may be caused by a few lakhs of Russian and Mahomedan hordes effecting an entrance into the North-West, or an hostile fleet destroying a few ports of India for the mere pleasure of humiliating the British in their foreign possessions? Surely not a day should be lost in taking the needful action. Take the action calmly and collectively, but take it without further delay or hesitation. Are we ready to forcibly intercept Russia from bullying Afghanistan, Persia, and other tribes, while England's troubles may increase abroad? Is it not the duty of every prince and every native community to think of the gravely responsible position we are now placed in by the suspicious and continuously humbugging and fraudulent attitude of Russia on our frontiers?—*22nd February 1885.*

THE Anglo-Russian politics being fast removed from the pure region of speculation, the time has come when it can be said with some certainty which of the two great dogmatic parties has proved to be generally right. All those who have persistently maintained that the Northern Bear has been stealthily and dishonestly making forward move-

The Rawal Pindi Conference and the chances of War or no War.

ments from the Oxus and the Caspian, with the ultimate object of menacing India, have always been pooh-poohed by their opponents, eager in asserting the good faith of Russians in extending their conquests in Central Asia—who have had, they say, no sinister object in view. The one party strongly urged England to check Russia long before she occupied Merv. The other party have always laughed at the alarm raised at every forward movement by Russia till they have practically approached the road leading to Herat. We were the only native writer in India who published in time a full exposition of the movements and designs of Russia in Central Asia; advocated the impolicy of dreading the Bear joining hands with the Lion on the northern borders of Afghanistan, and yet most emphatically warned the British Government to strengthen themselves, both internally and externally, against the coming struggle, and to devise special measures of conciliating Mahomedan fanaticism, the source of which we traced from the centre of India to the Islam countries, which Russia had then conquered as lying far beyond the northern regions of Afghanistan. Besides publishing a correct diagnosis of the transforming and agitating Central Asian affairs, we have for years together most earnestly pointed out the necessity of strengthening and confiding in Native States, and bringing them up as no nominal, but practical auxiliaries of the Suzerain Power. So far have we felt the direness of this necessity, that even when there appeared not the least chance of a conflict on the Afghan borders we maintained that not a day be lost in taking up the reorganization of the armies of the Native States. And yet we have never allowed ourselves to be enlisted either on the side of the one party or the other. Many successive events have given us no reason to change our convictions, which have only grown stronger day by day.

We are not of the opinion that the British Commission, in the neighbourhood of Herat, has been a useless or dangerous affair. Far from being so, all India ought to take it as the most significant sentinel doing us an invaluable, but a quite unperceived, service as against the painfully uncertain and unknown affairs between the Caspian and the Murghab. As far as we may see, Sir Peter Lumsden is at present placed in the most responsible position at the same time that he occupies a position securing peace for India and Afghanistan. He must now be able to let us know precisely the limits of various sovereignties in the neighbourhood of Sarakhs and Herat. He can let us know how far the region of Afghanistan has

practically extended ; whether the Russians have violated the express Afghan limits of jurisdiction ; whether there were any tracts over which any sovereignty was *dormant* which either the Russians, on the part of the Turcomans and others, have confiscated, or the Cabul Amir has recently got possession of ; whether any of the two Powers has seized upon any territory expressly belonging to the opposite party ; or whether the whole dispute is only in reference to regions over which no sovereignty ever existed, and which both Russia and Afghanistan are in a hurry to seize to as great an extent as possible before the delimitation is defined. The suspicion at present is that Russia has made unlawful encroachments upon the Afghan frontiers. Before this suspicion can be removed, it is for Russia to give a clear proof that her recent seizures have legitimately belonged to the tribes she has conquered. Unless the Amir plays some double game with India, we cannot believe that he has ventured to garrison certain outposts though not belonging to him. In a very backward Asiatic kingdom it is possible for remote and outlying districts to remain neglected till they are placed in some danger. That they were not before garrisoned can be no excuse for a Russian aggression. Whatever be the ethnological affinities of the Turcomans with the people claimed by the Amir as his subjects, that circumstance can by no means warrant Russia to appropriate any integral portion of the Afghan kingdom. The right of sovereignty over remote parts of an eastern kingdom may long remain dormant till vivified by foreign intrigue and usurpation. The British Government have to meet one reasonable argument by the Russians, that disturbances within the Afghan limits, or beyond them in reference to her own subjects, must influence her to secure the quarters necessary for the preservation of peace in her own countries. This argument cannot of course be fully disposed of till the frontier line is settled and our Government is able to adopt effectual measures in preventing the Amir's subjects or other powers from creating any conflict on the Russian borders. The task of ensuring such a peace, or suppressing all disturbances, will not eventually be found difficult by our Government soon after the settlement and a regular administration has been established at Herat. The only difficulty of any magnitude is the present one, and that alone has to be skilfully overcome without forcing on this country one of the most singular, and at the same time barbarous, wars that was ever undertaken. While India and England should certainly put forward the strongest and the

largest forces of the Army and the Navy, we are much annoyed at the present outlook that a national war should be seriously thought of in both the opposed countries. We do not mean that there is no likelihood of anything occurring in the immediate future that would constitute a *casus belli*. The stratagems of the Russians and their rapacious designs, in that they have annexed a series of very important regions crossing the Oxus, which they had expressly before declared were beyond the range of their conquests, have been too apparent. We have of course no reason to condemn Russia for her conquests, for they may be legitimate in the case of semi-barbarous and fanatic hordes she has been subjugating from time to time. But her designs are impure and liable to chastisement when they in the least degree would intimidate either Afghanistan or India.

She has no doubt committed herself so far that Great Britain has been compelled to make grand preparations for war. In spite of these preparations the sincere advice of this country should be to avoid war at the present juncture. We are not aware of the strength of feeling of Abdur Rahaman in respect of the encroachments made by Russia. If these encroachments are really intolerable, the world may as well know all at once how they are intolerable, or perfidious. If the usurpation of Russia is of little consequence, efforts should be made to gradually bring about her retirement from the objected ground. If she does not seriously intend war, she is likely to accept a compromise under which both the Amir and the Czar ought to yield something which would smoothen the way towards a compromise. If the Czar is bent on war the frontier line dictated by Russia must be such as neither Afghanistan nor England is likely to accept. An unprovoked aggression is no doubt a most difficult thing for a courageous and senior nation to bear. A wise and well-meaning nation will have exhausted every resource of tact and diplomacy before plunging into a sanguinary war. They would not mind making the largest possible concessions compatible with safety and honor before bringing on a war, whether the opposite nation is weak or strong. There are many causes of excitement astir, but we firmly believe that neither Lord Dufferin nor the Cabinet authorities at home, headed by Her Gracious Majesty the Queen, are likely to be led away by that excitement. Those who direct the affairs will be guided by the Almighty, and He will keep their heads cool and their minds placid. If all of us have failed in checking Russia before she occupied Merv, we have now no reason to

quarrel with her if she has advanced as much as she reasonably could below Merv and Sarakhs. All that can be done justly and fairly is that she must be prevented from plundering and tampering with Afghanistan. If she has entertained any criminal design on Afghanistan ; if she is even half sure that she could stir up a revolt in Afghanistan and incite the Afghans to turn upon the British as they advanced towards Herat ; if she has any reason to believe in the inconstancy of the Afghan ally of the British or his fatal unpopularity or incapacity ; if she is really inspired with the idea that she can pour down overwhelming forces of all sorts into the plains of India ; if, further, she is animated by the base hope of replenishing herself by widespread plunder and a probable conquest of India and Afghanistan ; if, again, she does not store much anxiety on the losses which may be inflicted on her by the British Navy or by other causes springing from a war in Europe or Asia, then we must say that the preparations for the war by the British should even be more energetic and more extensive than now. We cannot always be animated by what we were able to do at the Crimea. Since then Russia has humiliated a great Empire, considerably improved her armaments, received powerful accessories to her strength, and has come close to mines of gunpowder, which our Government will have no ordinary difficulty and anxiety to prevent from bursting. We cannot be easily led into a war ; we should not allow ourselves to be. We have done well in making a weighty demonstration at Rawal Pindi and actually sounding the Amir as to his various leanings, tendencies and temperament. We do not doubt that by this time the able, sagacious and vigilant Viceroy has been able to forecast what the Amir is likely to turn out in different sets of circumstances. Is it possible that he may be overwhelmed by the faithless attitude of his own nation, and by any concealed strength of Russia, which may be deeply designing for the subjugation of Cabul and Candahar ? It is greatly to be deplored that we are not perfectly sure as to the real strength which Russia could put forth in all directions if a war broke out. In case of a war, whatever the British may be able to achieve in other quarters, India must be saved from harm's way. It must not be made even the scene of war, though the British arms may triumph here eventually. The conflict must be entirely confined to the northern and eastern boundaries of Afghanistan, for it is indispensable for the British to become so far powerful that Russia should be routed at the very threshold of her movements. It would not do for our Govern-

ment to proclaim war, and then allow it to drag its murderous course towards Candahar, the Panjaub, and the Sindh. If a blow is to be struck at the Russians, it should be struck at once and conclusively. The fire should be arrested as soon as it is ignited ; it should not be allowed to spread on the frontiers of India ; nor in the heart of Afghanistan. It is deplorable that we do not yet know what forces of the Amir may be available. They will probably not be removed from the country, lest it should rise against the Amir and enter into dangerous confederacies with internal and external foes. We have no doubt Lord Dufferin must have put the Amir in a proper way in reference to ensuring the tranquility of the Afghans, while war is proclaimed. The very fact that Abdur Rahaman has turned out a strong ruler may provoke troubles against him as his country is again made the scene of carnage. If internal anarchy breaks out ; if the Russians threaten him with the revolt of the inimical tribes and chiefs who owe him a grudge ; if he finds that the Russian arm turns out stronger than expected, is it likely that he will continue to side with the British ? though, if he is a man of fidelity and friendship, he might prefer a residence in India or England to a breach of trust with the British.

The advance of Russia on the Afghan frontiers however unjustifiable, and the vigilance displayed by England, are circumstances far from being deplorable. The present event—if not leading to any great war—must be comparatively gratifying, remembering that in the time of Lord Lytton, on the mere attempt of Russia to establish an embassy at Cabul, our Government were compelled to invade Afghanistan and undertake a ruinous and protracted war. It is desirable, therefore, that Russia is now placed within the practical range of Indian operations ; for, when everything was dark and uncertain about her movements, we could not check her ; but now that she has brought her outposts close to those which we cannot possibly suffer to go in her hands, we know what permanent defences we ought to raise, and how to bar the way of a foe to India with an almost absolute impunity. Henceforth it must be understood that the Indian Government will have practically to become the masters of the Afghan boundaries ranging on the Russian side as far as their inviolability from the Russian aggression is concerned. The British Government did not listen to the humble voice raised by the present writer years ago that Candahar should not have been abandoned, and that taking hold of the opportunity which their own installation of the Amir had offered them, they should have taken

perfectly friendly measures in guiding him in the reorganization of the resources of his kingdom, and so constituting the military organization of our frontier State that no enemy could have taken Afghanistan by surprise as has been unfortunately now done. The consequence of the British retreat has only emboldened Russia to steal a march several hundreds of miles closer to us than before, without our Government being able to repulse the criminal encroachment at once; while Russia, as she advances, has been laughing in her sleeve that once more has she succeeded in setting the British Lion in a roaring agony! Rather than that we should have suddenly to advance a large army at an enormous cost, not knowing if Russia has serious intentions, or is simply making a fun of us, the Indian Government should now see that their ally can make his own stand at a moment's notice. What is now required is a beneficial intervention in Afghan affairs to render them prepared for an evil day. We should do a great good to the Afghans, so that, as a nation, they may stand with us, and we may not have to rely any day on a broken reed of a ruler, who may be popular or not with his people. We cannot be satisfied with simply lavishing our wealth in propping up the Afghan kingdom, while it has been taught to look to us in the day of its troubles! We must certainly continue every reasonable assistance to the kingdom, but at the same time we cannot forget the other obligation that we should endeavour to make Afghanistan strong for itself, by organizing its forces and placing them under a mild but firm and conciliating European and Indian supervision. Excepting this we can very well let the Afghans do very much as they like, while they are always led to adopt peaceful methods towards their neighbours under Russian influence. We have been cheerfully placing our resources at the Amir's disposal, and the return should be that he honestly uses a part of his own resources in bringing up the efficiency of his army so far that he could for some time protect his kingdom against all wanton aggressions. In coming times we cannot pull on with a fanatic Amir as with one hopelessly incompetent. Afghanistan should be placed on the same footing as the Nizam's Kingdom, but with a greater immunity granted to the Amir in respect of his internal affairs. India has to take care that it does not wage a war with Russia without the sternest necessity being proved for such a step. As yet India has done no harm to Russia, and we do not intend to do any. Russia may have to settle old differences with England, which may have worsted her

more than once. It is, therefore, the interests of India not to sow the seed of revenge in the breast of any nation. In case of gratuitous aggressions against India, it knows how to meet them ; and in that case it must certainly do everything in repelling an invader, and even chastising him. It is highly probable that now since Russia has far advanced towards the Afghan frontiers she will be permitted by our Government to lay hold of more territory than she could legitimately claim. The Amir will be asked to make a little sacrifice to ensure a permanent peace, and experts on our side will, no doubt, point out the strategical points which we cannot, under any circumstances, yield to Russia. If she is altogether incapable of conducting a successful war, we should use all our influence in forcing Russia to give up her recent possessions, which undoubtedly form a part of the Amir's kingdom. The present negotiations will tend to clear the character and extent of rapacity which Russia is apt to employ. It is futile to believe that Russia merely intends to make a diversion on the Indian frontiers to seize Constantinople. She will be in a position to attempt the latter task as also to plunder India, provided she found England weak at any moment, and by any cause. We must, therefore, strongly and respectfully urge Lord Dufferin again to prepare without delay a complete and comprehensive measure for the permanent defences of India and Afghanistan. The armies of both the general and the local Governments of the Native Chiefs should be so constituted and distributed that, while the principle of Imperial Unity is observed in every interior portion of India, we should be able to annihilate at any moment any rapacious foe raising his head on the Afghan borders to menace innocent countries. No half measures will answer the serious purpose we have pointed out. All patriotic associations and individuals in British and Native India should unite in getting the various European and Native schemes of self-defence carried out without fail, now that all parties are agreed that, if we should continue the old indifference, Russia would not mind injuring India in a manner that would cripple it for one century. We see no cogent reason why the strongest measure should not be adopted to place India on a footing of an Independent Self-defence mainly controlled by the Sovereign Power. It gives us satisfaction to believe that our present Viceroy seem destined to carry out that full and pregnant unity in India, in which both the princes and the people will rejoice and take a pride, and which can always impose a check on the criminality of foreign designs.—*12th April, 1885.*

We have had to write this two days previous to our publication and cannot say what the next day may startle us in reference

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to the war apprehended on the Afghan borders, and in Europe and Asia in general. Statesmen of the most uncommon ability and the most profound experience and shrewdness may fail in forecasting what turn the present strained affairs may take in the immediate future. There are a few controllers of events who know what might take place, but even *they* must feel a certain amount of diffidence in framing a perfect forecast. With such deterring difficulty before us, we must satisfy the anxiousness of our readers to know whether peace or war would result from the present conflict.

The anxiety to know what is in prospect is nothing compared to the public dread which a war between England and Russia must excite in India. With a thousand pities on those who have spoken disparagingly of Russophobists, though we have not been one of them as popularly understood, we must now be prepared to know that a war between Russia and India may eventually become inevitable. Let us all, however, offer our sincere prayers to the Almighty that the black cloud now threatening us may quietly pass off.

So many various forces and complications do control the present course of affairs. Our Government not having checked the Russians at Merv, not having accustomed the Afghans to British presence and British friendliness in organizing their resources, not having strengthened the Afghan frontiers from Cabul to Herat, the Muscovite thinks he must be a fool not to aspire after the possession of Herat. He will not all at once say, "I want Herat." The garrisons of the Amir there are very weak. The British forces will take some time to appear, if they at all appeared there. He can say with some plausibility that the Merv Turcomans are entirely ours, and their region extended very near up to the Paropamisus Range. Well, that range may be the natural boundary of Afghanistan. With this ulterior view the Russian Generals of ferocious patriotism have ousted the Afghans from Penjdeh. As they have not met with any reprisals they are bound to proceed further. A mass of Afghans may thereby be exasperated; another murderous conflict may ensue; and the Russians, according to circumstances, may plant themselves at Maruchak, or leap into badly defended Herat. Should the affairs be transformed into a regular war, the Russians may probably be prepared to bring on about a hundred thousand

men to take up some impregnable position for conducting an attack on both Cabul and Candahar. Our hope is, to avoid a world-wide calamity, England may adopt more or less the frontier suggested by Russia by binding her against using any aggression against Afghanistan in the future, and to refer any dispute or grievance on the part of the Russians to the British Government.

We anticipate with extreme pain that the great motive power which may move Russia upon Herat, if the Grand Old Man fails in smothering the dreadful Bear in the *Kbud* of peace, will not be the immediate conquest and ruin of Afghanistan, but to spring a disastrous surprise on this innocent country which has done no harm to Russia. If there was the remotest chance of this dire event occurring, we cannot but throw thousands of pities on our national and princely leaders of India that they do not awake from their slumber and ask the British Government to exert every nerve to add at least two hundred thousand men to our existing forces. We heartily wish we may be wrong in apprehending the unspeakable danger as we do. But is this the moment to continue crying before the Government that no more elective freedom is granted to the country, or that the Council does not contain sufficient native patriots?

Let every mind be now exercised with the most painful anticipation that brutal Russia, on breaking the fetters of peace, may take a straight way towards Hindustan. If it did not fear losses in its own Kingdom and in Asia Minor, it must be fired with the ardor of putting India to plunder and rapine. Its demands will be unreasonable; its advances outrageous and provoking; it may impudently set the whole frontier of India in perfect terror; eventually cause the British troops to move forward, notwithstanding the pains of the Amir not to let them intrude into Afghanistan; and wage a sanguinary war with England beyond Candahar. It may demoralize the Amir and the whole of Afghanistan; present before him a most tempting picture of the extension of his sovereignty, and basely desire to put India to fire and sword.

We implore Government not to be too confident in respect of the interior resources of India. Are Government merely to rely on the loyal professions of so many helpless children of the soil? Do the Government for one moment suppose that the fanatical elements in India will remain quiet, while the most clumsy, at the same time a very powerful, country fiercely endeavoured to plunge India into the flames of war? We have

raised a warning voice years ago—we have repeated it all along the last two years. We have written for years together about the gross inadequacy of the defences of the Empire. Where are the three hundred thousand men of our Native States, to organize whom we have long beseeched the Government, both publicly and privately, both in and out of season? Where are they, we ask? Supposing the Russians gradually amassed three or four lakhs of all sorts of forces to make way towards Hindustan, where are the mixed British and Native Troops to garrison the interior of India, while the main army of our Government would be divided in Afghanistan itself to repel the foreign foe on the one hand, and repress domestic anarchy on the other?

Every one, however, asks the question, will there be a war after all? There is a possibility of it, as Russia understands that she is much stronger at home than she was in past years, and that she has now extended her conquests close to the outlying boundaries of India. She believes, we think, to be in a position to harm England much more in India than England could damage her in Europe. In this case unless Germany honestly and firmly offer mediation, Russia may provoke a great war. Though the Cabul Amir may be trusted to conduct his own campaign, that may only be to a certain extent. For, in case of failure on his part, from whatever cause, England cannot but give battle if the Russians neared Candahar, or even a remoter point than Candahar. Our Government may do well by concentrating its resources rather nearer our base of operations than far away from it as Herat. Previous to this intervention, the Amir, it is hoped, may be actively guided by distinguished European military commanders and assisted with sufficient instruments of war. In case of any untoward default on the part of Afghanistan the difficulties of our Government may be greatly increased. Certain powers, including Germany, may possibly wait till the belligerents may be so far exhausted that an opportunity may present to them to intervene, in different directions, by the prospects of certain territorial extensions nearing them. These subsequent moves will be as well regulated as consummate moves on a chess-board, though the world itself might shake with the excesses of a carnage so terrible that it never before witnessed the like of it. Should a war assume serious proportions at the present crisis, each Power may try to re-adjust the balance of power in its favor, and each one struggle to acquire new acquisitions for itself on which it may have set its heart. If

we are right in the general view we take of the internal motives of the various Powers who may be expecting to benefit themselves in consequence of a general war, we are also right, we believe, in supposing that both England and Russia will do their best to avoid a war, the former more so as it is singularly free of any selfish motive in opposing Russia, while the latter is susceptible of being moved by a mad and criminal design on India. If England is not materially backed at the present moment by an European power in chastising Russia, OUR SOVEREIGN is quite right in not drawing her sword till the moment comes to vindicate Her integrity and dignity. A further development of the present events will more clearly mark out the time when Her present energetic preparations may bear their essential fruit. HER MOST GRACIOUS MAJESTY cannot, we think, take a single premature step in consequence of which Russia may be emboldened to precipitate a big war which may yet be prevented. We would permit Russia to fully incriminate herself in Afghanistan, while we shrewdly calculated her real strength at various points, and on various occasions, and mustered every energy and resource in organizing a strength sufficient to crush Russia at the very first stroke of our action. In the interests of the highest humanity we shall pray to the ALMIGHTY, every hour till the crisis is over, that HE may, on this critical occasion, guide the invincible Arm of the Good Queen aright, and discomfit the foe who offers such wanton aggressions against her peace—which is the peace of the World ! Amen—19th April, 1885.

It cannot be denied that the Indo-Afghan-Russo affair is at present in a most unsatisfactory condition. No one in England and India has been able to say publicly, and with confidence, whether there is to be a war or not ? Meanwhile, it is apparent to everybody that both Russia and England are making preparations for war on a large scale.

The public are, of course, most deeply interested in deciding whether Afghanistan and England should declare war against Russia or not. The highest authority of the land—our own able and energetic Viceroy—has issued a solemn statement some time since that he decidedly dislikes war, but that if it was forced upon England the people of India should understand that it would come upon them in spite of the best efforts of England to be thoroughly unselfish, forbearing and peaceful. The Vice-

regal declarations as well as the consummate and cautious procedures of the Ministry of England, as guided by the Grand Old Man, must so far allay the public anxieties.

The reasons which may eventually incite England to declare war against Russia will be of the weightiest character. As we have said for the last few weeks, the more or less territory coveted by Russia on the Afghan frontier cannot be determined into a deliberate war on either side. The writers, both here and in our mother country, who urge a war upon Russia for her alleged duplicity in seizing Penjdeh and massacring its Afghan garrison, have not sufficient foresight and sagacity in counselling England on the general question of the utmost gravity. Neither England nor India can punish Russia for coming close upon the Afghan frontiers and endeavouring to filch out of the Amir as much of his frontier line as she can urge some ground or other to get into her possession. It must be clearly understood—which no writer seem to have yet done—that the territory which Russia now exerts to get for herself belongs to the zone, as to the proprietary of which the concerned Powers have been debating for the last two years—in fact ever since we were alarmed by the Russian advance upon Merv. The tribes above and below that place have acknowledged sovereignty of an unsatisfactory nature and have always made a muddle of the sovereignty rights over them. It must also be further understood what, too, no writer has yet comprehended, that though the Amir may be able to establish his right in any legal civil tribunal on the sovereignty of a part of Russia's recent possessions, this simple right of a sovereign is not in itself sufficient to forbid a foreign power from forcibly possessing itself of the said disputed ground for geographical, ethnological, or other ostensible reasons, provided that the Amir is unable to assert a similar pretension extending up to Sarakhs, and, further, is not backed by force of arms, which seem to us as the only valid argument which can operate in the uncivilized region where more than a mere civil contest has taken place. Up to this movement Russia has followed the only argument that would tell; and for all legitimate purposes of a war, while the Amir has showed his incapacity at Penjdeh, the capture of that place is no excuse for England to espouse his cause so far as by declaring war against Russia. We may form a low estimate of Russia's morality, but adopting this ground as a *casus belli* will be as rational as attacking Russia for her ill-treatment of the Georgians, or for sending out her military to crush her innocent

peasants. That Afghanistan could not at this moment set up a counter claim against Russia in respect of the portions of tribes which have an ethnological affinity with the Amir's own subjects, is the fatal inability which has caused loss to our Ally and must compel him to settle the negotiations with Russia as quickly as possible with a view to prevent any further violability of his frontier. If Russia at this moment chose to ignore all she had declared in reference to the Afghan frontiers from time to time, neither England nor Afghanistan can hold her *practically* responsible for breaking her promises. We repeat that the only valid argument which can tell against encroachments of this sort is the perfect ability of the Amir and of the Power which supports him to offer an effective resistance on the spot. It has, again, not been clearly understood that Russia has not conquered Penjdeh by means of an army corps of warlike proportions. She has conquered it by surprise and stratagems. Her action has not been serious enough to violate in a decided manner the integrity of the Afghan Empire, the action only meaning to decide, as much as possible, in her own favor the delimitation line proposed to be laid down for herself and the Afghans. It cannot, again, be contended that Russia was bound, under the pain of war, to meet the English Commissioners as soon as they appeared on the debated zone. Unscrupulous as she has been, but commanding a greater material strength *on the spot* than either the Afghans or the British, she has been active enough in seizing the frontier points which she wanted for herself. The encroacher is an independent power as much as the British, and could not of course be coerced into any constrained action except by war. And war could not be proclaimed by a first class Power of the highest culture and humanity, except under provocations of a startling and horrible character imperilling the peace of large populations.

What is the true position of affairs then? It is not by any warlike measure that Russia has taken Penjdeh. It has been taken by a violent measure of moral turpitude, but in virtue of a superior material prestige. The act smacks something of a brigandage, and is more disreputable than the act of a set of adventurers who, by pluck and brute force, break up an uncivilized community and subjugate them into a submission to which they were never before subject.

We have here shown how Russia has been able to place her aggressive action on the basis of a position of sovereign impunity which

has simply turned the forward claws of both the British Lion and the Afghan *Cheeta*. The Russians will probably keep themselves encased in this position of impunity while continuing to intimidate as being prepared for war. They will introduce a state of things denoting chronic unrest and mutual resentments. The Amir will allow none of the two Powers to be represented at his Court. He will probably lack effectual instruments on his borders to cope against Russian machinations unless the British Government succeeded in introducing capable foreign officials in his service, who, by dint of firmness and conciliation, might succeed in holding down the Russians. It is not likely that Russia will unreservedly accept the intervention of the British Government in any matters of dispute or disturbance affecting the Russian and the Afghan frontiers. We must be prepared for the times when Afghanistan will be subject to the Russian influence a good deal to the detriment of our own interests. This fear at least would have been absent to-day, had the British Government remained in Afghanistan and established political agencies and security when it was last overrun by them. The Russians are likely to prefer remaining in a state of chronic unrest and indefinite impunity with a view to subjugate Afghanistan and employ it as a base for an expedition against India, whenever they found themselves checkmated in any part of Europe or Asia by the rival power of England.

From the present moment India's responsibility towards itself and the responsibility of the British towards India have been infinitely increased. Our Government must eventually completely subjugate the Afghans; otherwise they are sure to be by the Russians. We earnestly recommend that a few thousands of the conflicting tribes of that country may at once be entertained in the military service of India to familiarize them with our temper and treatment. With Russia so close to them the Afghans cannot be left alone. They are sure to be absorbed by Russia if we still persisted in acting upon the milky humane sentiment of letting them alone. If Russia is allowed an influence over the Afghans they will be turned into a force inimical to India. If this is to be prevented, as it must be, the only course left is to occupy Afghanistan after some time in a firm but extremely conciliatory manner. We are quite sure that if we steer clear of war now, we shall have one with Russia at no distant date. It is, therefore, imperatively necessary that we should fully secure Afghanistan as our own country for military purposes. As the Russian

advance into the Afghan country is possible, not having England close enough to forbid her movement, the British Government must command overawing military strength both on the Indian borders and in Afghanistan itself. For it is not likely that Afghanistan, unaided, will be able any time to repel the Russian aggressions. The safest method for England to follow will be to take the most careful account of the military strength which Russia can hurl against us from time to time, and then to augment our own strength to a higher point of efficiency with a view to crush our foe hopelessly.

The improbability of war in the immediate future will depend upon the understanding that may now be arrived at between Russia and England. If the former gives sufficient guarantee to prevent future encroachments, Russia will not think of concentrating troops on a warlike footing. If England is unable to obtain an effectual guarantee, though the delimitation may be accepted by both Governments, the present unrest will continue, and forces will be advanced on both sides till a war was declared. It is not felt by the public that Russia has already gained her object to some extent by forcing England to incur enormous expenditures. If Russia does not bind herself down to permanent peace, but is determined to enter Afghanistan with the object of touching the sorest point of England, which is India, or of enriching herself and her dependants in a shameful manner, then England is bound to adopt the most unquestioned methods of war which must certainly end in the most complete triumph for the British arms in the East. Unless, then, Russia fully agree to treat Afghanistan as a neutral zone between India and her Central Asian Empire, solemnly binding herself against having anything to do with the Afghans, there will be nothing left to England but to teach her a lesson by which she would be forcibly removed beyond Merv. Afghanistan may be left alone on the condition that it shall have no dealings with the Czar. The moment these are commenced, the British Government must occupy the country to drive back the intriguing Russians.—*3rd May, 1885.*

THE Russians stormed their way up to Penjdeh a few weeks ago. We then anticipated that their next move would be towards Merv. Here is the fruit of leaving our frontiers

The Bear on its
Black March,

unprotected ! It is well that there was no conflict with the Afghans. And we are of opinion that there ought to be none till such time as they could offer a stout battle—till such time, too, as the wronged and insulted India were able to carefully ascertain the degrees of military strength which Russia can bring against Herat, Badakhshan, Cabul and Cashmere. The Russians will, no doubt, continue to proceed, while England puts her questions to explain her unprovoked encroachments ! We earnestly desire that the Afghans may not be provoked into a war till they have been mortally offended and till they are prepared to contest with Russia. That hungry Russia is designing to push on some overwhelming force with the express desire of bringing about anarchy and looting in India, we stated some weeks ago ; and for the first time this week a correspondent from Gulran, moving with Sir Peter Lumsden's Commission, has confirmed this fear of ours, in a long warning letter published in the *Times of India*, which every one ought to study for himself. It remains to be seen how far will Afghanistan and England tolerate the black march of the Northern Bear. Russia has even pushed further down the frontier line proposed by herself before the appointment of the Commission. It is very doubtful if the Afghans will be able to occupy Balamurghab, the Kushk and the Burkhut mountains, which issue from the Paropamisus Range, in sufficient force to repel the disgusting stratagems and violence of the Russians. Any weak stand made there will be immediately availed of by the latter in pouncing upon the Badghis and the Jemshids and in fact occupying most of the Herat region. The Russians' ascension from the Kushk will be the signal for England to declare war against Russia, unless she absolutely suspends her encroachments below Balamurghab and Gurlin. We do not doubt that the British Government will take long before declaring war. As soon as the whole line close to the Indian frontiers has been patiently and immensely fortified, the moment may come for the hundred thousand of our brave and forward warriors to advance and crush the barbaric power seeking so dishonestly to assail our united home of freedom and political glory. She would deserve nothing less than hopeless destruction all along the Persian and Afghan frontiers ; while Turkey, Austria and Great Britain maimed her in Europe and in the seas protected or invaded by our powerful naval fleet. If Russia is not closing upon her own destruction and ruining her own internal Kingdom, she must soon check her rapacity and insolence towards her forbearing neighbour, the Afghans. The aspect

of affairs will be entirely changed if the latter are any time found lukewarm in the cause of India when threatened of being assailed by Russia. Her cunning with the Afghans as affecting our own security will always have to be carefully counteracted, while Persia is firmly retained in our cause by even giving away Herat to the Persians if this concession should be eventually required for the protection of India and Afghanistan.—*3rd May, 1885.*

OUR strong presumption explained several weeks ago that England will, in a general manner, allow Russia to have the
Hopes for Peace. boundary she claims on the frontiers of Afghanistan and not declare war against her though she attacked Penjdeh, has proved to be correct. Many now ought to feel surprised why should so much bitterness have been displayed between the two nations and millions spent in preparations when England has been ready to concede and Russia willing to make no further move than that involved in the boundary line she suggested before the appointment of Sir Lumsden's Commission. Just at present all threatening appearance of a sanguinary war has vanished in thin air, and even with Herat within her clutches Russia is satisfied with her inhumane massacre at Penjdeh. Can we now affirm positively that Russia was really not in a mood to declare war, or that for a long time she does not intend to kick up an active strife at the gates of Afghanistan? The results as now appear permit us to answer in the affirmative.

As soon as the last shred of this contemptible affair is settled—we call it contemptible as viewed in relation to the vast amount of money spent after it!—an earnest inquiry ought to follow with regard to the circumstances which have created such exasperations and resentments and caused an enormous expenditure. We might then probably know that there have been some grave defects in the diplomatic constitution of even such great nations as the Muscovite and British. We shall probably come across further derangements. And these would relate to the want of all arrangements and precautions on the whole of the border lines of Afghanistan as touching the transitionary region which the Bear has been systematically swallowing. Had a proper look-out been kept up in all those directions, of course including those where at present we hear of no notable dispute or anarchy, we should not have had all the disquieting

tufan and waste of the last few months. As we have complained for years, the want of a thoroughness of action in Afghanistan has been at the root of all the evil. It may be that we may have avoided much greater evils that we may be better able to know hereafter.

We are extremely happy that an independent arbitration has been referred to to decide who have been the parties at fault in respect of the Penjdeh affair. To us it appears undoubted that the deplorable massacre would never have occurred but for the deadly resentment felt by the Russians at Lord Dufferin's brilliant action in joining the Amir at Rawal Pindi and binding him down to an open and close alliance. As Abdur Rahaman declared that he would deal with the enemies of England with the sword which the Viceroy presented him at the Durbar, so General Komaroff put to his own sword hundreds of innocent Afghans on the Khushk, meaning that that was the reply to the insolence of the Amir towards Russia. The resentment was barbarous and overstepped every limit of fairness and moderation. Though, as we said the other day, the massacre was not a sufficient cause for undertaking a wholesale war between the two Empires, we may hope, however, that England will insist on a fair adjudication of the Penjdeh question. India and all civilized countries will be interested to know whether the Russian conduct was unprovoked or otherwise. If it were a gratuitous massacre, it would be well to make it clear for the condemnation of civilized nations.

It would be difficult just now to say if costly preparations for war could have been avoided by any action omitted by England. India has reason to be proud of England that it has shown remarkable unanimity in sanctioning the large supplies asked for by the Ministry to complete the preparations for war without a moment's delay or hesitation. Russia must now be fully deceived in her calculations.

She must have greatly doubted the earnestness of England to go for a war, but she has been terribly deceived in the extensive arrangements which have been steadily going on to bring about the necessary preparedness. She has been further miserably deceived in her anticipations that, by assuming a hostile attitude on the Afghan borders, she would produce anarchy both in Afghanistan and India, though it must be remembered that once she had succeeded in plunging both countries in war.

All the recent events clearly show the unscrupulous conduct on which Russia any time would be bent as regards India for the mere grati-

fication of her old rivalry and animosity with England. We are clearing out of the present dangers by the consummate ability and tact displayed throughout the present crisis by Lord Dufferin in India and Mr. Gladstone in England. But for this marvellous patience and capacity displayed, war would have been proclaimed by this time, and we do not know what would have been the calamities in store for us. But fortunately we see the signs of England compelling peace of the world to be kept sacred, while securing the utmost possible self-respect by a demeanour which might well put Russia to shame ! We trust we may now soon hear of the final declaration of peace and the securing of an understanding so satisfactory between the three Powers that no possible loophole may be left for any future threatening of peace. A grave responsibility now rests with the Ruler of Cabul to secure a permanent protection of his kingdom against Russian aggressions. The Indian Government will, no doubt, assist him fully, and at no distant period we must induce our Government to state publicly the measures actually achieved by them in securing Afghanistan against further Russian encroachments. Not only these measures have to be carried out, but the Indian Government will have to effectually devise for an observation being continuously kept up in relation to Afghan affairs as affecting both Russia and India. A wide interest must start up in India in all that concerns the strength and motives of Russia with a view that no day may find us unguarded. The time is past when our patriotic cares may not travel beyond the merits of municipal government or forest administration.—*24th May, 1885.*

PUBLIC interest in the present political situation will not be abated till final understanding between England and Russia is actually effected. There has been much delay in arriving at this result because it is to be achieved not by the armament of England, but by the intensely peaceful professions of its Prime Minister. There are no hostile demonstrations made by Afghanistan on its threatened frontier, and its most powerful Ally has just ceased even the military demonstrations it made 700 miles away from the impudent Cossacks. The Czar probably does not care two straws when a final agreement between him and Abdur Rahaman is effected, as he knows well it is not his own frontiers which have been put into a sad plight, but those of his Afghan neighbour. The question for St. Petersburg

Treaty Stipulations
for the future.