to an attempt for delivering Austrian Italy from the foreign rule under which it has been brought without the consent of its people? Lord Ellenborough inferred that the Ameers suffered no wrong in being dethroned, because "Foreigners in Sinde, they had only held their power by the sword, and by the sword they have lost it."* Why not apply this in Europe? Is it because its advocates dare not, or because their sympathies are capricious—that haters of tyranny in Asia, especially when any thing is to be gained by putting it down, they care nothing for its existence in Europe?

And now that Europe has been mentioned, let us see how the acquisition of Sinde was regarded at home. The House of Lords passed highly complimentary resolutions, acknowledging the services of Sir Charles Napier in the military operations, and those of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, both European and Native, serving under him. The House of Commons passed similar resolutions. The Court of Directors and the East-India Company assembled in General Court, followed the example. But while the stream of laudation was thus flowing from every quarter upon the general and his troops, how was it, that not a single rill was directed to slake the Governor-General's burning thirst for fame? Do honour to the hands, and pass over the head! This is not usual. Lord Ellenborough, however ill he might deserve the compliment, was not passed over at the conclusion of the war in Affghanistan. He was thanked by Lords and Commons—coldly enough indeed, but still he was thanked—"for the ability and judgment with which the resources of the British Empire had been applied by him." It has been said, his lordship was entitled to the praise of a good

* Supplementary Correspondence, page 101.

commissary, and the parliamentary resolution in his favour amounts to this. To this extent too the Court of Directors and the Proprietors of East-India stock concurred in praising his lordship. But why are Lords and Commons, and Directors and Proprietors, alike silent with regard to Sinde? Above all, why are Lord Ellenborough's friends silent? Why do they not challenge that, which never was withheld before under similar circumstances? Alas! alas! his lordship's reputation "dies," and his friends "make no sign." Bitter, most bitter, must have been the duty imposed by Parliament upon his lordship of conveying to the army those thanks, in which he was not permitted to have even the smallest share.

Affghanistan and Sinde furnish the field upon which Lord Ellenborough's reputation is to be established, if established it can be. On his policy in minor matters there is not room to dwell, but his conduct in regard to the Mahratta state, subject to the House of Scindia, is too extraordinary to be altogether passed over. In 1803, the British Government concluded a treaty of peace with Scindia. In 1804 this measure was followed up by the conclusion of a treaty of alliance and mutual defence. This was near the close of the administration of the Marquis Wellesley. The Marquis Cornwallis, who succeeded to the administration of the government, disapproved of the latter treaty, which, indeed, had been virtually annulled by the conduct of Scindia himself, who, after it was concluded, had pursued a course of hostility against the British Government, in coalition with another Mahratta chief, Holkar, had held the officers and dependents of the British residency in durance, had plundered their camp, and committed many other acts of violence. A new defensive treaty of amity and alliance was concluded in 1805. By this treaty, the earlier of the

two treaties above referred to—the treaty of peace of 1803—was recognized, and every part of it not contravening the new treaty of 1805 was declared to be binding. But no notice was taken of the treaty of alliance and mutual defence of 1804; that was passed over, and was obviously regarded as defunct. In 1817, another treaty was concluded, the immediate object of which was the suppression of the Pindarrie freebooters. This treaty refers to the treaty of peace—that of 1803, and to the treaty of defence, amity, and alliance—that of 1805; and it is declared that the provisions of those two treaties, so far as they were not affected by the treaty of 1817, shall remain in full force. An engagement (not sufficiently important to be called a treaty) relating to the maintenance of a body of auxiliary horse, and their payment, was made in 1820, and thus matters rested till the year 1843, when Junkojee Rao Scindia died. That chief left no son, but his nearest male relative, a boy about eight years of age, was adopted by the Ranee (the widow of the deceased prince), and raised to the throne. The years of the Ranee, however, did not greatly outnumber those of her adopted son. She was under thirteen, and though this is a far riper age in Asia than in Europe, it was obviously necessary to commit the government to some one better qualified by age, as well as sex, for its management. A regent was accordingly appointed under the immediate influence of the British Government, but in the conflict of intrigues which prevailed at Gwalior, as at all native courts, he fell, after retaining his post only about three months—the authority which had set him up wanting resolution to maintain him. Every thing done by Lord Ellenborough was by fits, and, as might have been expected, the cold fit was succeeded by a hot one. After a time, a

military force was assembled, and the Governor-General accompanied its advance towards the river Chumbul. Here his lordship's usual obstinate wrongheadedness continued to govern him. He was desirous of enforcing the conclusion of a new treaty, and in all probability he might have effected his object without bloodshed, could he have been content to postpone crossing the Chumbul, a measure repeatedly pressed upon him by the British Resident at Gwalior, but to no purpose. His lordship resolved to cross the river, and he did cross it. The result, as is known, was, that the British army may almost be said to have been surprised by the enemy, and though the Governor-General's object was attained, it was not without some very severe fighting. It seems as though Lord Ellenborough's evil genius was always with him, and that whenever he did any thing not wrong in itself, he was sure to make it wrong by some adventitious absurdity. Passing over the minor follies of the Gwalior expedition—the wooing "golden opinions," by the personal distribution of golden mohurs on the field of battle, after the fashion of the hero of a Minerva press romance—passing over this and other pretty sentimentalities of the like nature—let us look at the ground taken for the proceedings in which these were interesting episodes. The interference of the British Government was rested on the "treaty of Boorhampoor"—the treaty of 1804—which had never been acted upon, which in fact was a nullity from the beginning, and all reference to which had been studiously excluded from the engagements subsequently formed. Yet, upon this obsolete treaty, which for thirty years had been looked upon, and justly, as a dead letter—which was a waste sheep-skin, and nothing more, does Lord Ellenborough ground his policy;* and in the

* See Proclamation, 20th Dec. 1843.

treaty concluded with Scindia on the 13th January, 1844, this said treaty of Boorhampoor, though it had been substantially disavowed by later engagements between the two states, is formally revived and declared to be binding. Either Lord Ellenborough was ignorant of the state of the engagements existing between the British Government and Scindia, or, knowing them, he, from mere wilfulness, recalled into active existence and operation a treaty long before consigned to the worms, and by the revival of which no good object could be attained, though some embarrassment might possibly result from it. Let Lord Ellenborough's friends choose on which horn his lordship shall be impaled. If they choose the latter, they will have another task before them—to reconcile Lord Ellenborough's disregard of treaties in Sinde, whenever they stood in his way, with his extreme reverence at Gwalior for every thing bearing the name of a treaty, whether in force or not in force, obsolete or operative, dead or alive.

We have now traced Lord Ellenborough through the more important acts of his government. We have seen him quailing before the difficulties which confronted him in Affghanistan, week after week, and month after month, calling on the generals to retire, leaving the prisoners to the tender mercies of the enemy, and the name of Great Britain to become a bye-word and a scoff. We have seen him, when prevailed upon, with great difficulty, to suffer the officers commanding to make an effort to avert these fearful results, meanly shaking off all responsibility, and like an adept in the science of betting, making up his book so as to have a chance of winning something, while he should be secure, as he supposed, from the possibility of loss—so shuffling his cards, that whichever might happen to turn up, he should be safe. We have seen, that for the final triumph which

crowned the British arms in Affghanistan, not one jot of praise is due to his lordship, except so much as may be claimed for affording the means, a quantum meted out both by Parliament and the East-India Company with a stinted precision, which places the honour on an equality with the noted Cambridge distinction of the "wooden spoon." We have seen his mad proclamation about the gates of Somnauth, and have glanced at the frightful consequences which might have followed this frenzied ebullition of vanity and folly. We have given a passing notice to the scarcely less foolish proclamation in which he reviled the policy of his predecessor; declared the Indus one of the natural boundaries of British India, and, as he had before done in England, pronounced peace to be the main object of his administration. We have observed how this limitation and this boast were illustrated by his lordship's conduct in regard to Sinde. We have seen him there intent not on peace but on conquest. We have followed him through the various steps of his aggressive policy, till we have found the reputation of the British nation for honour and good faith tarnished as deeply as would have been the military character of our country had the dictates of his lordship's judgment been allowed free scope in Affghanistan. We have seen him sometimes ordering, sometimes sanctioning and confirming by his after approbation, a series of measures utterly unjust in themselves, and calculated to render the British Government an object of hatred and suspicion to every native state throughout the East. Who shall trust to a British alliance while the memory of Sinde and Lord Ellenborough's policy there endures? When that great man, whose glory will be to future ages the landmark of our time—when the Duke of Wellington, then Sir Arthur Wellesley, during his distinguished service in India, was remonstrating against

what he conceived to be an undue extension of an article in a treaty which he had concluded with Scindia, he said, "I WOULD SACRIFICE GWALIOR, OR EVERY FRONTIER OF INDIA, TEN TIMES OVER, IN ORDER TO PRESERVE OUR CREDIT FOR SCRUPULOUS GOOD FAITH." Shortly afterwards he asks: "What brought me through many difficulties in the war and the negotiations for peace? THE BRITISH GOOD FAITH, AND NOTHING ELSE."* And where is that faith now? Wrecked on the sands of Sinde, by the recklessness of the man to whose keeping it was intrusted. Lord Ellenborough seems, indeed, to lay claim to some forbearance, because he had no very definite instructions for his guidance;† but did he want instructions to induce him to act with common justice and honour? Was good faith in his eyes a thing to be maintained or not, according to circumstances, with reference to which he was to look for instructions? Instructions to observe good faith!! When a traveller, reputed to be an honest, respectable man, is about to proceed on a journey, would any one deem it necessary to say to him, "Now, mind how you conduct yourself; do not pick a fellow-passenger's pocket in the railway carriage, nor knock down and plunder any solitary traveller that you may meet in an evening walk." On matters of policy, his lordship might look for instructions—on matters where plain honesty was a sufficient guide, he surely might be expected to be "a law unto himself." We have seen that however reasonable this expectation, it was not fulfilled—but that pusillanimity inconceivable in an English nobleman in regard to Affghanistan was succeeded by a course of tyranny and oppression in Sinde,

* Letter to Major Malcolm, 17th March, 1804 (Wellington Despatches, Edition 1837, vol. iii. page 168).

† See Supplementary Correspondence, page 100.

from which the unsophisticated mind of an English labourer would recoil. Lastly, we have seen that even in a very ordinary matter, that of dealing with the affairs of Scindia, his lordship manifested so lamentable a degree of incompetency as evineed him to be utterly unfitted for the high office which he so unworthily filled. Here, as in Sinde, he had recourse to violence, when every object which he could lawfully seek might have been attained by skilful negotiation. Incompetency to an extent almost inconceivable—despondency under difficulties—braggadocio swaggering when there are none—cowering fear when danger seems to threaten—reckless disregard of justice and good faith when the feeble are to be coerced—indiscretion extreme and uncontrollable, with scarcely a lucid interval—indiscretion associated with, but not constrained by, a considerable portion of that low and unstatesmanlike quality, cunning—indiscretion so monstrous, that men lift up their hands in astonishment at its manifestations, and wonder whether he who has perpetrated such things can be in his right mind—these are the qualifications of Lord Ellenborough for the office of Governor-General of India, as developed throughout the period during which he abused that most important office, and they are crowned by arrogance so unbounded that it would be ludicrous even in a Cæsar or a Napoleon. Lord Ellenborough was recalled; shall we ask why? The only question will be, how was it that this step was not taken earlier? To this only a conjectural answer can be given. We may ascribe something to the forbearance of the Court of Directors, founded on a hope that their wild and wandering Governor-General might settle down into a state of mind better befitting his position—something to the fact that the more important political correspondence is known in the first instance to those Directors only who form the Secret

Committee, and that they are under the obligation of an oath of secrecy—something to the desire of the Court not to embarrass her Majesty's Government. But at least no one can fairly say that the step was taken too soon. The evidence before the public is amply, and more than amply, sufficient to justify it; there may be much more of which the public are ignorant; there may even be reasons for the recall of which they have no suspicion. But whether there be or not, the Court of Directors stand acquitted of having exercised their power capriciously or unjustly. Nor in the absence of all evidence ought it to be concluded that they exercised it violently or suddenly. We are not to suppose that the Court met one day, and passed a resolution of recall without any previous notice to her Majesty's ministers of their feeling towards the Governor-General. We are in perfect ignorance as to the fact in this respect; but as the Court of Directors are, and always have been, cautious, almost to a fault, we cannot believe that on so important an occasion they cast aside this their peculiar characteristic.

Lord Ellenborough was recalled, and the last scene of his varied performances was equal to any that preceded it. Some military officers belonging, it is understood, to both services—the Queen's and the Company's—thought fit to soothe his lordship's wounded feelings by inviting him to an entertainment given in his honour. What view military men may take of this step we know not; but it is yet within the memory of living men, how civilians regarded the design of some officers of the army to express an opinion favourable to their commander-in-chief, when his conduct had been subjected to accusation. What said the late Mr. Whitbread? He said—"Sir, general officers ought to know that they owe obedience to the state, and that they have no more right to assume the functions of a

deliberative body than the privates of the army or navy." * The Secretary-at-War, who was connected with the proceedings of the officers, came forward anxiously to declare that those proceedings "had no reference whatever to the circumstances of the present moment, or to what was now passing in that house."† Mr. Canning, a cabinet minister, spoke more directly to the point, admitting that the proceeding of the officers "could not be approved of,"‡ and that it was calculated to injure the illustrious individual whom it was intended to serve. On a subsequent day, the subject was again adverted to, and Mr. Canning, repeating his former expression of disapprobation, added that "if there did exist an attempt on the part of any military officers to protect the Duke of York against the House of Commons, a more culpable idea never entered into the head of man."§ No one ventured to defend the meditated proceedings. Ministerialists and oppositionists united in the opinion that it was most improper. Apply this universal judgment of the House of Commons to the conduct of the officers at Calcutta. The two cases are not precisely parallel, but the points of difference tell against the Indian admirers of the disconsolate Governor-General. The Duke of York was himself a soldier—Lord Ellenborough is none. The Duke of York's conduct was under inquiry by the House of Commons; the conduct of Lord Ellenborough had been inquired into by the Court of Directors, and condemned in a manner the most formal, authoritative, and severe. The officers who proposed to bear testimony to the merits of the Duke of York were not servants of the House of Commons; they were bound to respect both Houses of Parlia-

* Hansard's Debates, vol. xiii. page 700.

† Hansard, vol. xiii. page 707.

‡ Hansard, *ut supra*.

§ Hansard, vol. xiii. page 744.

ment, but they were servants of the Crown. A large portion of those who rushed forward to condole with Lord Ellenborough are directly and immediately servants of the Court of Directors, and all were acting under a Government which derives its authority from that Court.

Of the conduct of Lord Ellenborough's hosts, however, let military men judge; but what shall be said of that of his lordship in accepting the invitation? Is his appetite for flattery so inordinate that he cannot restrain it even under circumstances where a regard for others, if not a regard for his own dignity and consistency, might have been expected to induce him to forbear? So it appears; for, regardless of the embarrassment which he might possibly occasion to those whose cheers he was begging, his lordship, still writhing under the punishment which had just descended upon him, sought, amidst blazing lights, and smoking dishes, and flowing wines, and prolonged hurras, to assume an impotent air of defiance towards the authority whose just displeasure he had incurred. And there his lordship panegyrized the army, as if the army of India needed any praise from him; "I shall soon be far from you," said his lordship—according to the *Indian News*, 4th October, 1844—"I shall soon be far from you, but my heart remains with the army, and wherever I may be and as long as I live I shall be its friend"—as if it could be of the slightest consequence whether he were its friend or its enemy. He did not mention that he left part of the army in a state of mutiny—the crime having its origin in his measures. As his lordship is somewhat given to the sentimental, we must not criticise the declaration that his heart remained with the army—but why with the army alone? could he not spare one morsel of sentiment for the Indian millions whom he had been sent to govern, and who were now to lose him—

or did he think that they would benefit by the change? Then his lordship talked, it seems, of "two years of victories without a single check,"—so says the report, but surely it cannot be correct; where would have been part of those victories, if his lordship had not for once given up his own judgment to that of others? "Two years of victories without a single check," he says. He forgets—not without a single check; there was a check to the career of the armies in Affghanistan given at the outset, and by his lordship himself—something like what Malthus calls "a preventive check;" it was happily removed, and then began the course of victory of which his lordship boasts, as if all were owing to him. But the exhibition made by his lordship is so truly lamentable, that pity takes place of indignation in contemplating it. He had lost one of the highest and most honourable posts to which a British subject can aspire, but he had the satisfaction of being for one evening again a lion, of walking up a flight of steps bedizened with lamps and laurels to partake of a dinner where he was the "observed of all observers," of seeing a transparency representing a besieged town, and of reading the softly soothing sentence—"Ellenborough, farewell!" and let us hope that for three hours he was happy.

Yet, even for the sake of such a dinner, and such a transparency, and such an inscription, and such cheers, it is not to be imagined that any future Governor-General will follow the example of Lord Ellenborough. His name will be a beacon suggestive of danger. Should any of his successors be likely to fall into errors like his, the recollection of his fate may give timely warning to eschew them. In this respect, though rarely exercised, the power of recall by the Court of Directors is a most valuable security for the good government of India. The Court are never likely to exercise

it without very sufficient cause; their discretion and moderation have been shewn by the infrequency with which they have resorted to it, as have their firmness and sound judgment, by not shrinking from its use when justly called for.

As for the idle babble about depriving the Court of this power, it is not worth a moment's notice. The idea of committing a power of any kind to any person or number of persons, and then upon the first occasion of its being exercised turning round in great astonishment and great wrath, and depriving them of it, is too ludicrous for discussion; it can provoke nothing but laughter. To say that it is anomalous that the Court should possess this power, is nothing—the entire government of India is anomalous according to the notions of scholastic legislators. No philosopher in his closet would ever have framed such a plan of government as that to which India is subject, and under which it prospers. It has grown up under the pressure of circumstances, like that of Great Britain, and though widely different in construction, is equally well adapted to answer its purpose. The value of a form of government is to be determined with reference not to symmetrical proportion, but to practical utility. If the Court of Directors are fit to appoint a Governor-General, surely they are fit to decide upon his removal. The two powers seem in common sense to go together. The right of choosing an agent involves the right of dismissing him when he ceases to give satisfaction to his principal.

But there is another consideration. Under the Act 3rd and 4th William IV., cap. 85, the members of the East-India Company gave up a vast amount of property, and suffered another portion to remain at interest, chargeable on the revenues of India, on certain conditions. One of these conditions is, that they shall retain, through their representatives, the Court of Directors, the administration

of the government of India. The mode in which the government is to be carried on is laid down in the Act by which the respective rights of the various parties interested are defined, and the limitations under which they are to be exercised prescribed. Among the rights expressly recognized as appertaining to the Court of Directors, is that of recalling any Governor-General, or other officer in India (except appointed by the Crown), and this right is to be exercised without control of any kind. Here is a most important security for the proprietors of East-India stock. The safety of their dividends is involved in the prosperity of India, and the permanence of its connection with this country. They elect the persons through whom the government of India is carried on, and those elected are endowed with very large powers, among the most important of which is the right of removing any public servant in India, from the Governor-General downwards. This is the chief, the most efficient—the only efficient security which the Indian stockholder enjoys. So long as it is possessed, the instructions of his representatives, the Court of Directors, cannot be set at nought with impunity.

And does any one talk of taking this power away? What, get possession of people's property under a solemn agreement that they shall have a certain security, and then tear the security from them! Their dividends indeed may still be secured nominally upon the revenues of India, but their control over India through those who represent them is virtually at an end when you deprive the Court of Directors of the power of putting a stop to misgovernment in that country, and substantially the security is void.

> "You take my house when you do take the prop
> That doth sustain my house."

What would be said of a mortgagor who, after agreeing that the management of the mortgaged estate should be

vested in certain persons to be named by the mortgagee, should seek to get rid of the obligation, and at the same time to keep the money? The legislature indeed may do this—that is, they have the physical power of doing it, as they have of doing many other things which no one in his wildest imaginings ever supposes they will do. They may deprive the great Captain of our country of the estate bestowed on him by a nation's gratitude, and consign his honoured age to penury. They may apply the sponge to the national debt—burn the books, and shut up that part of the Bank of England devoted to its management. They may—all the estates of the realm concurring—abolish the two Houses of Parliament, and convert the Government into a despotic monarchy; or, the Crown consenting, they may establish a republic. Any of these things they *may* do—but no one expects that they will. Neither will they take away that power which is a security at once to the proprietors of East-India stock for their property, to the people of India for good government, and to those of England for the safety of England's noblest dependency. We are not inquiring what a repudiating legislature might do, but what the legislature of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland will do; and of this much we may rest assured—that having deliberately made a solemn compact, they will keep it.



A PAMPHLET,

ENTITLED

"INDIA & LORD ELLENBOROUGH."

By ZETA.

LONDON:

JOHN OLLIVIER, 59, PALL MALL.

MDCCCXLV.

Price Two Shillings.

WALTON AND MITCHELL, PRINTERS, WARDOUR STREET, SOHO.

REPLY,

&c. &c.

THE attention of the political world has latterly been excited to a degree somewhat unusual at this dull period of the year, by the appearance of a Whig pamphlet, with the taking title of "INDIA *and* LORD ELLENBOROUGH;" in which the conduct of the late Governor-General is handled with much bitterness, and, as is usual with the party from which this *brochure* emanates, with gross and palpable injustice.

Having formerly undertaken the defence of Lord Ellenborough in the columns of the *Morning Post* (at a time when I was the favored correspondent of that journal), I feel to a certain extent personally interested in the vindication of his Lordship's Indian policy; and I have therefore imposed upon myself the task of replying to the several arguments—good, bad, and indifferent—which are advanced by this new champion of the Whig faction. Under ordinary circum-

stances, I should have craved permission, as usual, to convey my sentiments to the world through the medium of the *Morning Herald;* but the question to be discussed is so complicated, and the arguments to be advanced so voluminous, that, had I adopted my customary channel of communication, I should have been compelled to solicit from the Editor an amount of space much larger than he could conveniently spare or I reasonably expect. Such being the case, I have resolved to charter a vessel of my own, and, in imitation of my Whig antagonist, to appear before the public in the character of a pamphleteer. I am free to confess, that I do not greatly admire this mode of publication. The age of political pamphlets has long passed away in company with full-bottomed wigs and three-cornered cocked hats. In former times, the political pamphleteer was a personage of immense importance;—Ministers stood in awe of him,—party leaders were guided and governed by him,—and the general public listened to his revelations with profound respect. This point is curiously illustrated in Hawkesworth's *Life of* DEAN SWIFT. "On the 27th of November, 1711," says the biographer, "just ten days before Parliament met, SWIFT published his pamphlet, entitled '*The Conduct of the Allies;*' and before the 28th of January, above eleven thousand were sold, seven editions having been printed

in England and three in Ireland. The Tory members, who spoke in both Houses, drew all their arguments from it; and the resolutions, which were printed in the Votes, and which would never have passed but for '*The Conduct of the Allies*,' were little more than quotations from it."* These were the glorious days of pamphleteering,—departed never to return! In this age of railway rapidity, the communication of knowledge must be regulated by the universal desire to "push along;" and hence the daily press has now become the great engine of political controversy,—superseding the old political pamphlet, just as the rattling railway carriage has superseded the old slow and steady stage coach. As I said before, I am no great admirer of the ancient mode of communicating with the public through the pages of a pamphlet; but, as the Whig writer has thought proper to adopt it, I have deemed it my best plan to follow in the same track.

The object which the assailants of the late Governor-General of India have in view by the publication of their contemptible pamphlet at this juncture, cannot for a moment be mistaken. The Earl of Ellenborough, having been recalled by the Court of Directors without the assignment of any specific ground of recall, and in defiance

* Some Account of the Life of Dr. SWIFT, p. 67.

of the repeated remonstrances of Her Majesty's Ministers, who are alone empowered to instruct the Governor-General of India, and who are responsible for his proceedings,—the Earl of Ellenborough, I say, has now returned to England,—prepared to meet his accusers face to face, and to defend the whole course of his Indian policy from the moment of his arrival at Calcutta in February, 1842, to the moment of his departure in June, 1844. Of this fact the Whigs are fully aware,—they know the Earl of Ellenborough too well to suppose for an instant that he will remain silent under the load of calumny which has been heaped upon him in his absence; and hence, fearful of the effect which will be produced by the Noble Earl's anticipated defence, they have hastily brought out their coarse and scandalous pamphlet, in order to prejudice the public mind against him. The Whigs were ever a mean set of pettifogging politicians; but this attempt to condemn a man unheard, is a specimen of meanness which is without a parallel even in the fruitful annals of Whig trickery.

A variety of ingenious conjectures have been hazarded respecting the authorship of the pamphlet, "India and Lord Ellenborough." By one party it is strenuously urged, that the author *must* be a member of the Court of Directors, because the said Directors cannot fail to see the necessity of furnishing the public with some ex-

planation of their abrupt and arbitrary measure of recall. Others again argue not less strenuously, that Lord Auckland has madly rushed into print,—jealous, as it is hinted, of the Conservative Governor-General who so triumphantly repaired the blunders of his Whig predecessor. By a third party, the pamphlet is attributed to Mr. T. B. Macaulay, merely because the right hon. gentleman has been in India, and on that account considers himself a very great authority in all discussions respecting Indian affairs. For my own part, I am not disposed to adopt either of these ingenious conjectures, but incline rather to the opinion of a fourth and more numerous class of persons, who insist that the author is neither more nor less than *a penny-a-liner* connected with "*the Times!*" The character of the Whig pamphlet is certainly such as to bear out this latter opinion; for it is a tedious wire-drawn long-winded affair, and in fact just the sort of trashy production which might be expected to emanate from the pen of one, who, being accustomed to scribble by measure, is thence naturally more anxious about the quantity than the quality of his composition.

The author of "India and Lord Ellenborough" has extended his remarks to the length of 123 closely-printed pages, of which the first 24 pages are devoted to a history of British India. The discovery of this fact excited in me a mingled

feeling of surprise and apprehension. I had invested *half-a-crown* in the purchase of this Whig pamphlet, and I began to tremble for the safety of my investment. Surely, I exclaimed, I have not been bamboozled into paying *two shillings and sixpence*, good and lawful coin, for a stale description of British India, filched from guide-books and gazetteers! The anticipation of such a dead take-in was truly dreadful; and yet what else could I reasonably anticipate from the writer's ominous exordium? I open the pamphlet in the expectation of beholding a smart attack upon Lord Ellenborough's Indian policy; and to my utter amazement I find myself involved in a tedious and twaddling description of our Indian possessions! "India," says this learned Theban at the outset of his remarks, "is no longer the land of enchantment and romance;—it has been transferred from the realms of fancy to that of fact;"—a piece of information for which we are bound to feel grateful, although we are cruelly left in the dark as to the precise period when the said "transfer from the realms of fancy to that of fact" was happily effected. In the second paragraph of his remarks, the writer intimates, that "opinions differ as to the extent of country properly comprehended under the name of India," and then proceeds to favour the world with his own opinion upon the subject,—adding, by way of augmenting the reader's stock of knowledge,

that "the soil and climate are peculiarly suited to the production of various commodities." At page 4, the writer startles his readers with the novel announcement, that "India gives to Great Britain a vast accession of political power;" and in the succeeding page, this tremendous quidnunc hazards a conjecture, that "were India lost," the possessors of East-India stock might possibly have to whistle for their dividends! Arriving at page 6 of this interesting publication, we there learn, that "politically, commercially, and financially, the safety of India is an object of paramount importance to Great Britain;" a piece of information which is quickly followed by another equally new and surprising, to wit, that "great empires have arisen from small beginnings!" After proceeding with this sort of twaddle through more than a dozen dreary pages, the Whig writer condescends at length to throw some light upon his motives in giving publicity to the pamphlet before us. He says, p. 24:

"It will be evident from the above sketch, that "the policy adopted by successive Parliaments, "from the year 1784 downwards, has been to "secure to the Court of Directors of the East "India Company a large and responsible share in "the Government of that country, and that to "that end very extensive powers have been re-"served to the Court. Among the most import-"ant of these is *the power of recall.*"

Here then we perceive the Whig writer's real object in assailing the Earl of Ellenborough, which is neither more nor less than to justify the abrupt recall of that Nobleman, in opposition to the urgent and repeated remonstrances of Her Majesty's Government. In furtherance of this object, and as a preliminary to his attack upon Lord Ellenborough, the writer devotes fourteen pages of his pamphlet to the needless task of proving what no one denies, namely, that "from the year 1784 downwards," the Court of Directors have possessed the power of recalling the Governor-General of India. The question at issue, and which the Directors have themselves placed at issue by their arbitrary removal of Lord Ellenborough, is, not the legal existence of the power of recall, but *the propriety of its continuance.* Is it fitting, is it just, is it consistent with common sense, that the Court of Directors, who are not responsible for the conduct of the Governor-General of India, should possess the power of recalling that officer in defiance of the wishes of the Ministers of the Crown, who are alone responsible for his conduct? This, I repeat, is the real question at issue; and with every feeling of respect for the Court of Directors, with every desire to give them full credit for prudence and sagacity, I must say, that, in my humble opinion, their possession of the power of recalling the Governor-General of India is an anomaly, which

ought to be got rid of as soon as possible. In the hands of the Directors, this power of recall is an *irresponsible* power, and, as such, it is utterly repugnant to the spirit of the British Constitution. The Whig writer argues, that the Court of Directors is *not* free from responsibility; but his argument upon this point amounts to mere assertion, unsupported by a shadow of proof. To whom are the Directors responsible? An answer to this question is fortunately furnished by the Whig writer himself. "If," he says, p. 37, "any quality were selected as peculiarly characteristic of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, it would be caution; for *every member of the Court has a pecuniary stake in India.*" This is unquestionably true; and herein consists the sole responsibility of the East India Director,—*he is responsible to his own breeches' pocket!* Upon the whole, after a careful and deliberate examination of the subject in all its bearings, I am strongly inclined to agree with Lord Brougham in thinking, that the possession of the power of recall, now for the first time exercised, invests the Court of Directors with "a most anomalous and extraordinary jurisdiction."

Having thus stated my opinion, briefly and plainly, upon the new and delicate question of diminishing the political power of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, I will now apply myself to the main object of my present

writing, namely, the vindication of Lord Ellenborough's policy and conduct during the brief term of his government. The Whig pamphleteer directs his attention to three leading points in the policy of the late Governor-Genêral, which may be thus classed: 1. The operations in AFFGHANISTAN,—2. The conquest of SINDE,—3. The military brush under the walls of GWALIOR. "Affghanistan and Sinde," says the writer, "furnish the field upon which Lord Ellenborough's reputation is to be established, if established it can be. On his policy in minor matters there is not room to dwell, but his conduct in regard to the Mahrattâ state, subject to the House of Scindia, is too extraordinary to be altogether passed over." I accept the challenge here given;—I undertake to establish Lord Ellenborough's reputation as Governor-General of India, and utterly to demolish the whole fabric of calumnious charges, which has been so carefully prepared by the Whig pamphleteer.

And, first in point of time as also of importance, let us turn our attention to the operations in AFFGHANISTAN, subsequently to the arrival of Lord Ellenborough at Calcutta on the 28th February, 1842.

The bill of indictment, which the Whig writer has prepared under this head, is amazingly voluminous,—extending over forty pages of his pamphlet; but he who peruses these forty pages in

the expectation of finding either fair or rational argument, will perform as bootless a task as the fabled quidnunc, who hunted for a grain of wheat in a bushel of chaff! In the course of my political experience, I have had occasion to wade through divers dull and heavy controversial effusions; but I do not recollect ever to have met with so trashy an affair as that now under consideration. This remark applies generally to the whole of the pamphlet entitled "India and Lord Ellenborough," but more especially to that portion of it which has reference to the military movements in AFFGHANISTAN. Garbled extracts from official documents, ingeniously patched and dovetailed so as grossly to pervert their real meaning, —assertions, unsupported by a tittle of corroborative evidence, boldly advanced in one paragraph and disproved in the next,—petty quibbling and hair-splitting, which would disgrace a tenth-rate pleader in the Westminster Court of Requests,—coarse and unmeaning invectives against the late Governor-General, coupled with praises, equally unmeaning, of every other official personage, high and low, from Sir Jasper Nicolls, the Commander-in-Chief, down to Mr. Clerk, the Political Agent,—these are the leading characteristics of that portion of the Whig pamphlet which treats of Lord Ellenborough's Affghan policy. I had some idea, in the first instance, of quoting and replying to the writer's remarks paragraph by pa-

ragraph; but it would really be a sheer waste of time to attempt anything of the kind with such a mass of verbiage as that now before me. One might as well attempt to make a decent garment out of the ragged remnant of a mendicant's shirt! Under all circumstances, my best plan will be to give, in his own words, the substance of the writer's charge against the late Governor-General, and then proceed to refute it,—not by special pleading, not by a garbled and distorted representation of the progress of events,—but by a plain straightforward reference to notorious facts, and by the aid of official documents of unquestioned authenticity.

After stating, that "it must be admitted, in ordinary candour, that on the arrival of Lord Ellenborough in India, his situation was neither enviable nor easy," and furthermore, that "the earliest impressions and earliest declarations of his Lordship were such as became a British Governor-General;" the writer opens his attack upon Lord Ellenborough (p. 40), after the following fashion:—

"Thus much was well; but how did his Lord-
"ship fulfil the expectation which he had thus
"excited? He found that *considerable prepara-*
"*tions had been made for re-commencing opera-*
"*tions in Affghanistan,* and he proceeded to
"complete and to add to them. He left Calcutta
"and his Council, in order that he might be

" nearer to the seat of war, and give the weight
" of his personal influence and the advantage of
" his personal superintendence to the affairs in
" progress on the frontier. This seemed to indi-
" cate not only great energy, but great determi-
" nation of purpose; and those who observed
" the conduct of the Governor-General,—who
" knew the character of the officers and men at
" his disposal,—and who thought, moreover, of
" the great objects before him,—the military re-
" putation of Great Britain to be re-established,
" —the terror of its name to be restored,—treach-
" ery to be punished,—and its surviving victims,
" comprising women and children as well as men,
" to be rescued; those who felt the importance
" of these objects, and who witnessed or heard
" of the restless vivacity of the Governor-General,
" never doubted that all would be well,—never
" supposed for a moment, that any check would
" be put upon the ardour of the military com-
" manders,—that any obstacle would be inter-
" posed between their desire for action and the
" gratification of it; or that he, who had thought
" the prosecution of the war a matter of so much
" importance, as for the sake or aiding it, to
" separate himself from his Council and make a
" journey of several hundred miles, was prepared
" to acquiesce in so pitiful a termination of the
" labours of himself and his predecessor, as that
" of merely getting the troops in Affghanistan

" back again to India. Yet thus it was. Some " ill success befel the British cause,—Ghuznee " was surrendered to the enemy; General Eng- " land failed in his attempt to join General Nott " at Candahar; and further, a bad spirit was un- " derstood to prevail in a part of the force under " General Pollock. The new Governor-General, " it became apparent, in spite of his high pur- " posings, was not a man to encounter difficul- " ties or persevere under discouragements,—his " moral courage oozed away as he approached " the scene of action, and the 're-establishment " of our military reputation—the decisive blow " at the Affghans'—and the safety of our pri- " soners—were all cast to the winds. On the " 19th April, General Nott was ordered to destroy " Kelat-i-Ghilzie, to evacuate Candahar, and to " fall back to Quetta."

We have here, in his own words, the sum and substance of the Whig pamphleteer's charge against the late Governor-General of India, which amounts in effect to this,—that Lord Ellenborough enunciated his Indian policy with all the bluster of a bully, and carried it out with all the pusillanimity of a poltroon. In support of this monstrous charge, the writer flounders through a lengthy elaborate argument, which I do not hesitate to characterize as the most contemptible specimen of controversial imbecility that I ever remember to have met with,—being

frivolous in its character, atrociously unfair towards the nobleman against whom it is directed, utterly destitute of coherence and consistency, and in many parts so muddled and confused as to be altogether incomprehensible. As a sample of the manner in which the Whig writer conducts his case, let me beg the reader to refer, *en passant*, to page 44 of the pamphlet. "The burden of Lord Ellenborough's instructions," says the writer, "was *retire* — fall back — get towards India as fast as you can—leave the Affghans to themselves, and by consequence leave the British prisoners to be maltreated and murdered by those, whom our pusillanimity will thus relieve from the restraint hitherto imposed by their fears." This, we are told by the Whig pamphleteer, was "the unvarying tenor" of Lord Ellenborough's language,—"the burden of his instructions;" and yet we are informed by this same writer in the very same page of his pamphlet, that "on the 28th of April, the Noble Lord caused no less than three letters to be written to General Pollock,—one intimating his belief in the reports of the death of Shah Shoojah; a second giving permission to treat with a *de facto* government for the exchange of prisoners; and a third, the crowning letter of all, announcing that the aspect of affairs in Upper Affghanistan appeared to be such, that his Lordship could not but contemplate the possi-

bility of General Pollock having been led *to advance upon and occupy the city of Cabool!*" This is a specimen of our author's consistency. In the following page, the worthy gentleman (who, like *Iago*, is "nothing if not critical"), quarrels with the mode of expression which Lord Ellenborough adopted in alluding to the possibility of an advance to Cabool. "The Noble Lord," he says, "speaks of marching to Cabool as coolly 'as maids of thirteen do of puppy dogs!' At one time, to advance is treated almost as much beyond rational contemplation as a journey to the moon; at another, the march of an army from Jellalabad to Cabool is spoken of as lightly as a walk from London to Highgate." This passage will enable the reader to judge of the general style of remark which the Whig writer has thought proper to adopt in discussing the grave and important question of Lord Ellenborough's Indian policy. I give the passage merely as "a sample of the sack;"—the same sort of frivolous absurdity of argument is to be found in every page of the pamphlet.

To return, however, to the main charge of the Whig writer, as set forth in the paragraph which I have quoted above. If any person were to read this paragraph without possessing a previous knowledge of the facts of the case, he would naturally enough conclude, that Lord Ellenborough, having been suddenly sent out to India

to supersede Lord Auckland, for no other purpose than that of reversing his policy, had basely, treacherously, and with eager haste abandoned an advantageous position in Affghanistan, which had been gained by the superior wisdom and energy of his Whig predecessor, and for the future maintenance of which ample provision had been made by the aforesaid Whig functionary. "On his arrival at Calcutta," says the writer of the pamphlet, "Lord Ellenborough found that *considerable preparations had been made for recommencing operations in Affghanistan.*" Now, what are the real facts of the case? Instead of finding that "considerable preparations," or indeed any preparations at all, had been made for "re-commencing" the campaign in Affghanistan, Lord Ellenborough found, on arrival at Calcutta, on the 28th of February, 1842, that his Whig predecessor had resolved *to evacuate the country without delay*, and without making any effort, beyond that of a pecuniary negotiation with Akbar Khan, towards the release of the prisoners at Cabool. In a despatch, dated "Fort William, 2nd December, 1841," Lord Auckland thus wrote to Sir Jasper Nicolls, the Commander-in-Chief:—

"Your Excellency will have received full details of the important events, which appear to have placed our troops at Cabool and Jellalabad in a position of considerable difficulty. We have now to inform your Excellency, that *the only measure*, which we deem practicable and prudent to adopt at

present for the support of these troops, is to concentrate an effective brigade *at or near* PESHAWUR, by which a good front can be shewn towards the northern portion of Affghanistan, and a point of union and strength provided in case of emergency.

"Generally we would solicit your Excellency to exercise your discretion in regard to the details of these arrangements, and to give orders without reference to us,—bearing always in mind, that our present object is only to establish a point of support and demonstration at Peshawur, and NOT *to require the forcing at all hazards of the passes to Cabool.*"*

The reader will perceive from this extract, that, although Lord Auckland was constrained to acknowledge that our troops at Cabool and Jellalabad were in "a position of considerable difficulty," yet nevertheless "the only measure" which he deemed himself called upon to adopt, was, "to concentrate an effective brigade at or near Peshawur." Again, on the very next day, December 3rd, Lord Auckland, anxious only for a speedy retreat, reiterated his instructions to the Commander-in Chief. The following passages are worthy of notice :—

"Since addressing your Excellency yesterday, we have received an express from Mr. Clerk, of the 24th ultimo, containing information of the events at Cabool to the 9th, and at Jellalabad to the 15th ultimo.

"It would be vain to speculate upon the issue of the contest at Cabool; but in the extreme event of the military possession of that city, and the surrounding territory hav-

* Papers relating to Military Operations in Affghanistan, 1843, p. 33.

ing been entirely lost, *it is* NOT *our intention to direct new and extensive operations for the re-establishment of our supremacy throughout Affghanistan.*

"We can scarcely contemplate in such case, that there will be any circumstances or political objects of sufficient weight to induce us to desire to retain possession of the remainder of that country, and, unless such shall be obvious as arising from the course of events, we should wish our military and political officers *so to shape their proceedings as will best promote the end of retiring* WITH THE LEAST POSSIBLE DISCREDIT!!"*

The Whig pamphleteer tells us, that Lord Ellenborough "found that considerable preparations had been made for recommencing operations in Affghanistan." We learn, however, from the above passages in Lord Auckland's instructions to the Commander-in-Chief, that arrangements were made for the evacuation of Affghanistan *full three months before Lord Ellenborough's arrival in India*,—Lord Auckland's object being, *not* "to direct new operations for the re-establishment of our supremacy in Affghanistan," but in his own words,—and let those words never be forgotten!—"So to shape proceedings as best to promote the end of *retiring with the* LEAST POSSIBLE DISCREDIT!!" But it will perhaps be argued by his Lordship's friends and supporters, that this determination to retreat was formed before the murder of Sir William Macnaghten and the

* Papers, *page* 35.

subsequent disasters at Cabool. Very well. Let us afford to the Whig Governor-General all the benefit which can be derived from this argument, and, in order to do so, let us proceed to ascertain what measures of retaliation Lord Auckland adopted, when this murder and these disasters were made known to him.

The murder of Sir William Macnaghten, the British Envoy at Cabool, was announced to the Governor-General in a brief note from Major Pottinger, dated the 25th of December, 1841,—the Major stating at the same time, that the British troops were in a desperate condition at Cabool, and that a negotiation was in progress for their retirement from that place. On the 6th January, 1842, the troops marched from Cabool, "devoid of all provision for food, for shelter, or for safety; and thus, exposed to the attacks of enemies in the mountain defiles, and in the worst severity of a winter season, they became after two or three marches dispirited and disorganized, and were, as a military body, ultimately wholly destroyed or dispersed."* How did Lord Auckland act on the receipt of this melancholy intelligence? Did he make "considerable preparations" to retrieve the disasters of Cabool,—to re-establish our military reputation,—to punish the treacherous Affghans,—and to rescue his unhappy countrymen and

* Papers, *page* 103.

countrywomen from the hands of Akbar Khan? No such thing. Lord Auckland had decided upon retreating from Affghanistan *before* the murder of Sir William Macnaghten and the rout of the British troops at Cabool;—his Lordship was equally resolved upon a retreat *after* the occurrence of those disasters. The writer of the Whig pamphlet sneers at Lord Ellenborough on account of the frequency, with which he repeated his instructions for retirement to Generals Pollock and Nott; but we shall presently see, that Lord Auckland's instructions upon this point exhibit "damnable iteration."

On the 31st January, 1842, the Governor-General in Council transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief a letter of instruction, suggested by the calamitous course of events at Cabool; and the 7th paragraph of this letter runs as follows:—

"If Major-General Pollock can safely maintain the position of Jellalabad, he will, until otherwise ordered, continue to do so—and it will be highly desirable, that he should find an opportunity of asserting our military superiority in the open country in the Jellalabad neighbourhood. But Jellalabad is not a place, which the Governor-General desires to be kept at all hazards; and after succour shall have been given to Sir R. Sale's brigade there, and relief shall have been given to parties arriving from Cabool, the Governor-General in Council would wish Major-General Pollock *to arrange for withdrawal from it.**

* Papers, *page* 114.

Again, on the 10th of February, the Governor-General to the Commander-in-Chief:—

"The intelligence, received since the transmission to you of our despatches of the 31st ultimo, has convinced us, that, excepting under some very unforeseen change, no sufficient advantage would be derived from an attempt to retain possession of Jellalabad.

"The fate of the gallant garrison at that place will probably have been determined before the intimation of our opinion to the above effect can reach Major-General Pollock. But we would request your Excellency without delay to inform the Major-General, that the main inducement for the maintenance of a post at Jellalabad, namely, that of being a point of support to any of our troops escaping from Cabool, having now unhappily passed away, it is the object of the Government that *he should confine himself to measures for withdrawing the Jellalabad garrison in safety to Peshawur.*"*

On the same day, a copy of this dispatch was transmitted to Mr. Clerk, the Governor-General's Agent, who was instructed frankly to inform the Lahore Durbar, that a resolution had been formed by his Lordship in Council "*not* to attempt the prosecutions in advance of the Khyber Pass."† Between the date of this dispatch and the 15th of February, some communication appears to have been received from Mahomed Akbar Khan, relative to the prisoners detained at Cabool; but the Governor-General, writing to the Commander-in-Chief, "reserved" his remarks and instructions upon that matter, and desired his Excellency "expressly to instruct Major-General Pollock,

* Papers, *page* 120. † Papers, *page* 121.

to direct all his efforts and measures to the withdrawal of Sir Robert Sale's force from Jellalabad, *with the least possible delay.*"* On the 24th of February, a dispatch was addressed to Major-General Pollock himself, in which that officer was informed, that the Governor-General in Council did not contemplate "any great effort for the re-occupation of Affghanistan;" and a hint was thrown out (which sufficiently proved the miserable state of dejection to which Lord Auckland was reduced) that the Affghans might be induced to deal leniently with the British troops, if they were given to understand that the said troops were prepared to sneak out of the country. "On the other hand," observed his Lordship, "the knowledge that we do not intend to return as principals to Affghanistan, might disarm some of the opposition which would otherwise be made to our object of retiring."†

After all these reiterated instructions to withdraw the British troops, there is something marvellous in the cool effrontery of the Whig pamphleteer, when he gravely informs his readers, that Lord Ellenborough, on his arrival in India, "found that considerable preparations had been made for re-commencing operations in Affghanistan!" The real truth of the matter is, that Lord Auckland was utterly prostrated in spirit by the

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* Papers, *page* 141 † Papers, *page* 153.

disastrous failure of his aggressive policy, and resolved to prevent a repetition of such defeat and disgrace as had been incurred at Cabool, by an immediate evacuation of the Affghan territory. The language which the Noble Lord addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, is too plain to be misunderstood. "It is *not* our intention to direct new operations for the re-establishment of our supremacy throughout Affghanistan." And again: "His Excellency will instruct Major-General Pollock to direct all his efforts to *the withdrawal* of Sir R. Sale's force from Jellalabad to Peshawur." There can be no mistake here. From the 2nd of December, the date of Lord Auckland's first order to retire, to the 24th of February, the date of his last, the Noble Lord's mind was filled with cowardly apprehensions; and to his Lordship may be fairly applied the sneering remark, which the Whig pamphleteer has applied to Lord Ellenborough, —namely, that "the burden of his instructions was *retire*,—fall back,—get towards India as fast as you can,—leave the Affghans to themselves, and by consequence leave the British prisoners to be maltreated and murdered." Lord Auckland evidently had no care for the re-establishment of our military reputation,—no care for the safety of the unfortunate captives at Cabool; his sole object was to get himself out of the mess into which he had floundered, and with a view to effect this, he instructed his military and political

officers "so to shape their proceedings as best to promote the end of retiring *with the least possible discredit!*"

The letter of instruction, bearing date February 24th, 1842, as quoted above, closed Lord Auckland's connexion with the military movements in Affghanistan. On the 28th of February 1842, Lord Ellenborough assumed the reins of government; and we have now to ascertain how far the Noble Earl is open to the charge of vacillation and cowardice, which has been so strenuously urged against him by the Whig press. In conducting this portion of my subject, I shall not follow in the track of the Whig pamphleteer,—I shall not resort to the shallow service of special pleading, nor shall I fill my pages with little bits of garbled extracts, cut and pared down and dove-tailed together to suit the purpose of the moment. Convinced that, in this instance as in all others, the envenomed shafts of malicious misrepresentation will be most effectually turned aside by a plain unvarnished statement of the truth, I shall proceed to rebut the charges which have been urged against Lord Ellenborough, by a simple reference to the contents of such official documents as are now before the public—touching occasionally, as I proceed, upon the absurd and frivolous remarks of the Whig pamphleteer. The intelligent reader will perceive, on a moment's reflection, that this is the best course of replica-

tion which I can possibly adopt, and indeed the only course which the circumstances of the case require. The question at issue is not one which calls for any elaborate argument,—it is not a question of opinion or of inference,—but a mere question of fact. We have seen that Lord Auckland, confounded by successive disasters, issued orders for an immediate and unconditional evacuation of the Affghan territory. Did Lord Ellenborough do the like? Did Lord Ellenborough ever contemplate, did he ever command, the withdrawal of our troops from Affghanistan *at a time when a forward movement was practicable*? I say—*no;* I say, and I will prove, that Lord Ellenborough's first thought was to remove the stain which had been cast upon our military reputation by the disastrous blunders of Lord Auckland, and that the Noble Earl only issued orders to retire after he had ascertained, on competent military authority, that it was impossible to advance.

In reviewing the Indian policy of Lord Ellenborough, as far as relates to the occupation of Affghanistan, we must bear in mind the actual position of affairs on his Lordship's arrival at the seat of government in February, 1842. On the 1st of October, 1838, Lord Auckland issued a Proclamation at Simla, explanatory of the assemblage of a British force for service across the Indus. "His Majesty Shah Shooja-

ool-Moolk," said the Governor-General in this Proclamation, "will enter Affghanistan surrounded by his own troops, and will be supported against foreign interference and factious opposition by a British army; and the Governor-General confidently hopes, that the Shah will be speedily replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents." The Whig Governor-General's "confident hopes" were miserably disappointed. At the end of three years, Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk was again a fugitive, while the British army, which accompanied him to Cabool, was utterly annihilated,—none remaining out of a force of 10,000 men, exclusive of camp-followers, save and except a few prisoners, in the hands of the rebellious chief, Mahomed Akbar Khan. Such was the lamentable position of affairs on Lord Ellenborough's arrival at Calcutta,—such the legacy of disaster and disgrace, which was bequeathed to him by his Whig predecessor. How, then, did Lord Ellenborough proceed to act on assuming the reins of Government? Did he shrink back affrighted at the heavy responsibility imposed upon him? Did he, in imitation of Lord Auckland, propose to sneak out of Affghanistan like a beaten hound? Did he talk of "retiring with the least possible discredit,"—leaving the prisoners at Cabool to their fate, and the treacherous Affghans to exult unpunished? No such thing. On the 15th

March, 1842, the Earl of Ellenborough transmitted a dispatch to Sir Jasper Nicolls, the Commander-in-Chief, in exposition of his Lordship's views and wishes respecting the future movements of the British troops in Affghanistan. After stating, that the recent occurrences at Cabool had led to the conclusion, that "the continued possession of Affghanistan would be a source of weakness rather than of strength," and further, that "the conduct of Shah Shooja had not been such as to compel the British Government to peril its armies in his support," Lord Ellenborough proceeded as follows:—

"5. Whatever course we may hereafter take *must rest solely upon military considerations*, and have, in the first instance, regard to the safety of the detached bodies of our troops at Jellalabad, at Ghuznee, at Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and Candahar, to the security of our troops now in the field, and finally, *to the re-establishment of our military reputation by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Affghans* which may make it appear to them, to our own subjects and to our allies, that we have the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities and violate their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately from Affghanistan, not from any deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because we are satisfied, that the King we have set up has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he has been placed.

"8. In war reputation is strength; but reputation is lost by the rash exposure of the most gallant troops under circumstances which render defeat more probable than victory. We would, therefore, strongly impress upon the Commanders of the forces employed in Affghanistan and Sinde the im-

portance of incurring no unnecessary risk, and of bringing their troops into action under circumstances, which may afford full scope to the superiority they derive from their discipline. At the same time, we are aware, that no great object can be accomplished without incurring some risk; and we should consider that the object of striking a decisive blow at the Affghans, more especially if such blow could be struck in combination with measures for the relief of Ghuznee,—a blow, which might re-establish our military character beyond the Indus,—would be one for which risk might be justifiably incurred, all due and possible precaution being taken to diminish such necessary risk, and to secure decisive success.

"9. The Commanders of the forces in Upper and Lower Affghanistan will, *in all the operations they may design*, bear in mind these general views and opinions of the Government of India. They will, in the first instance, endeavour *to relieve all the garrisons in Affghanistan*, which are now surrounded by the enemy. *The relief of these garrisons is a point deeply affecting the military character of the army*, and deeply interesting the feelings of their country; but to make a rash attempt to effect such relief, in any case, without a reasonable prospect of success, would be to afford no real aid to the brave men who are surrounded, and fruitlessly to sacrifice other good soldiers, whose preservation is equally dear to the Government they serve. *To effect the release of the prisoners taken at Cabool, is an object likewise deeply interesting in point of feeling and honour.* With reference to this object, and to that of the relief of Ghuznee, it may possibly become a question, in the event of Major-General Pollock's effecting a junction with Sir Robert Sale, whether the united force shall return to the country below the Khyber Pass, or take a forward position near Jellalabad, or *even advance to* CABOOL."*

* Papers, *page* 167-8.

It is impossible to peruse these passages in Lord Ellenborough's opening exposition of his Indian policy without admiring the singular combination of energy and prudence which is displayed therein. Sensible of the importance of re-establishing the military reputation of the British army, so lamentably lowered and degraded under Lord Auckland's miserable government, Lord Ellenborough expresses a strong desire "to inflict some signal and decisive blow upon the Affghans;" but, at the same time, sensible that the integrity of the British power in India would be affected by a second failure similar to that at Cabool, the Noble Earl strenuously insists, that no attempt must be made to punish the treacherous Affghans "without a reasonable prospect of success." Lord Ellenborough's dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief, from which the above passages are extracted, is a state paper of very remarkable merit,—so remarkable indeed as to draw an expression of reluctant approbation even from the Whig pamphleteer. "The earliest impressions," he says, at page 38, "and the earliest declarations of Lord Ellenborough were such as became a British Governor-General;—he arrived at Calcutta on the 28th of February, 1842, and on the 15th of March following, his Lordship addressed Sir Jasper Nicolls in language

well suited to the circumstances which surrounded him."*

Every one who reads Lord Ellenborough's famous dispatch of the 15th March, 1842,—every one who contemplates the "pluck," with which, in the face of the then recent and apparently overwhelming disasters at Cabool, the new Governor-General threatened to inflict "a striking and decisive blow upon the Affghans,"—will naturally enough expect to learn, that, when the proper moment arrived, his Lordship was prepared to carry his threat into vigorous execution. Not so,—that is to say, not so, according to the *dictum* of the Whig pamphleteer. This veracious historiographer assures us, that, after crowing so lustily, Lord Ellenborough turned dunghill at last! "The new Governor-General," he says, "in spite of his high purposings, was not a man to encounter difficulties, or persevere under discouragement,—his moral courage oozed away as he approached the scene of action; and the re-establishment of our military reputation,—the decisive blow at the Affghans,—and the safety of the prisoners—were all cast to the winds."† We shall presently see how far this charge of cowardice and vacillation is borne out by facts.

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* "India and Lord Ellenborough,' p. 38. † Pamphlet, p 41.

The writer of the Whig pamphlet states, with an exulting chuckle, that, on the 19th April, General Nott was ordered to evacuate Candahar and fall back to Quettah, and that, on the same day, the Governor-General addressed a letter to Sir Jasper Nicolls instructing him to order the return of General Pollock below the Khyber Pass as soon as he had relieved the garrison at Jellalabad; but this honest writer takes no notice of the events which occurred between the 15th of March, the date of Lord Ellenborough's first dispatch, and the 19th of April, the date of the instructions to retire,—leaving it to be supposed and wishing it to be supposed, that these instructions resulted solely from the Governor-General's vacillating disposition. Now, Lord Ellenborough distinctly stated in his dispatch of the 15th March already quoted, that "whatever course might hereafter be taken must rest solely upon *military considerations;*" and I think it will not be difficult to prove, that his Lordship's instructions of the 19th April, having reference to the withdrawal of the troops, *did* rest wholly and solely upon "military considerations."

The idea of the impossibility of marching to Cabool under the then existing circumstances was not one, which originated with Lord Ellenborough;—it was first urged by Sir Jasper Nicolls in a dispatch to Lord Auckland, dated

January 24th, 1842. The Commander-in-Chief writes therein to the following effect:—

"After I had dispatched my letter to your Lordship in Council, I had a second discussion with Mr. Clerk on the subject of holding our ground at Jellalabad, in view to retrieving our position at Cabool by advancing upon it, at the fit season, simultaneously from Candahar and Jellalabad. *I am greatly inclined to doubt, that we have, at present, either army or funds sufficient to renew this contest.* Money may perhaps be obtainable, but soldiers are not, without leaving India bare.

"Shortly before I left Calcutta, there were at least 33,000 men in our pay in Affghanistan and Sinde, including Shah Shooja's troops, but not the rabble attached to his person.

"How insufficient that number has been to awe the barbarous, and at first disunited, tribes of Affghanistan and Sinde, our numerous conflicts, our late reverses, and our heavy losses fully prove. I admit, that a blind confidence in persons around the late Envoy, &c., &c., have led to these reverses; but we must not overlook the effects of climate, the distance from our frontier, and the fanatical zeal of our opponents."*

There can be no mistake about the tendency of the opinion here deliberately expressed by the Commander-in-Chief. On the 24th of January, 1842, Sir Jasper Nicolls,—a tolerable authority on such a point,—was "strongly inclined to doubt" that we were then sufficiently strong either in "army or funds" to renew the contest in Affghanistan. That this inclination "to doubt" was not removed after a lapse of six weeks, is evident from the annexed passage in a letter addressed

* Papers, *page* 118.

by the Commander-in-Chief to Mr. Clerk on the 5th of March :—

" 6. I agree with Major Outram, when he says, 'We have to pause for a season before commencing our advance against Cabool.' Undoubtedly, *it would require the greatest part of* 1842 *to re-equip General Nott's force*, which had but 262 camels and 148 bullocks, on the 1st of December, for 9,000 men without followers at Candahar. "*

Again, on the 30th March, Sir Jasper Nicolls wrote to the Governor-General in Council :—

" 5. If Major-General Pollock could have carried up stores of all descriptions and spare cattle for Sir R. Sale's force, I should have thought it practicable for these united bodies to have moved next month upon Cabool, to have left some marks of our power and displeasure there, and to have retired by Candahar. *The want of cattle and of followers is not, I fear, to be overcome.*"†

On the 22nd of March, Brigadier England, being in camp near Quetta, wrote to Mr. Maddock, Secretary with the Governor-General : —

" 10. I cannot too strongly lament the paucity of troops with me, the slender means of carriage, and the especial deficiency of cavalry *both here and at Candahar*, for I should not doubt, if somewhat more formidably equipped in these respects, that our supremacy in these countries, and to the northward, would be at once placed in a true and rapid progress of re-establishment."‡

From these several extracts announcing a positive deficiency of moving power at every point from which it would have been advisable to direct a second attack upon the Affghan force,—at Jel-

* Papers, *p.* 176. † Papers, *p.* 197. ‡ Papers, *p.* 219.

lalabad, at Candahar, and at Quetta,—it is quite clear that, when Lord Ellenborough issued his first order for retirement across the Indus, of the 19th of April, his Lordship was convinced of the utter impossibility of a forward movement with any reasonable chance of success. If the slightest doubt upon the subject had remained in the mind of the Governor-General, it must have been effectually removed by the severe check which Brigadier England experienced on the 28th of March, in his attempt to advance beyond Quetta.* Under all the circumstances of the case, one course only, that is to say, one prudent course only, was left open to the Governor-General,—to withdraw the British troops as speedily as possible. A forward movement having been proved, on competent military authority, to be at that time altogether impracticable, it was clear, that no great object could be accomplished, but that, on the contrary, great danger would be incurred, by maintaining advanced positions, in which our soldiers, ill-provided with the means of defence, would have been subjected to the harassing attacks of an active and vigilant enemy. Hence arose the orders for retirement, addressed on the 19th of April to Generals Pollock and Nott,—the object of those instructions being, as Lord Ellenborough expressly stated in his dispatch of the same date to Sir Jasper Nicolls, to

* Papers, *page* 220.

enable those officers "to bring their respective corps into easy and certain communication with India."* It is not true, as the Whig pamphleteer asserts, in his eagerness to write down the late Governor-General, that "the re-establishment of our military reputation,—the decisive blow at the Affghans,—and the safety of the prisoners,—were all cast to the winds." The retrograde movement, ordered on the 19th of April, was merely a measure of temporary precaution; for in his dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Ellenborough distinctly alluded to "new aggressive movements upon Affghanistan," and spoke of a probable change in "the line of operations."

Following in due order the course of events, we come now to a dispatch, dated 28th April, addressed by Mr. Maddock to Major-General Pollock. "The aspect of affairs in Upper Affghanistan," says Mr. Maddock, "appears to be such, according to the last advices received by the Governor-General, that his Lordship cannot but contemplate the possibility of your having been led, by the absence of serious opposition on the part of any army in the field, by the divisions amongst the Affghan chiefs, and by the natural desire you must, in common with every true soldier, have of displaying again the British flag in triumph upon the scene of our late disasters, *to advance upon and occupy the city of Cabool*."†

* Papers, *page* 225. † Papers, *page* 235.

And here we have another sample of the Whig writer's talent at misrepresentation. It must be evident to every one, who reads Mr. Maddock's dispatch of the 28th April with a desire to ascertain the truth, and not for the factious purpose of calumniating a political opponent,—it must be evident to every such person, I say, that the Governor-General merely *conjectured* that Major-General Pollock, exercising the discretionary powers entrusted to him, might have been induced, "by the altered aspect of affairs in Upper Affghanistan," to advance upon the city of Cabool; and the object of his Lordship's reference to this contingent possibility is clearly explained in the succeeding paragraph of Mr. Maddock's dispatch. "If that event shall have occurred," says Mr. Maddock, "you will understand, that it will in no respect vary the view which the Governor-General previously took of the policy now to be pursued." It is obvious from this passage, that the dispatch of the 28th April was intended solely to caution Major-General Pollock not to lose sight of the Governor-General's desire to withdraw the troops into a safe position at the earliest possible period; and yet the Whig pamphleteer attempts to distort it into a proof, that Lord Ellenborough, in defiance of his repeated instructions to the contrary, "hoped" that General Pollock was then *in full march to Cabool!* The reason for this gross

misrepresentation of the Noble Earl's palpable views and opinions becomes apparent in the succeeding page of the pamphlet, where the Whig writer vamps up a charge of *inconsistency* against the late Governor-General, because on the 4th of May—"within a week after he thought it *possible* that General Pollock had gone to Cabool,"* —his Lordship stated his expectation, that Major-General Pollock would have already decided upon withdrawing his troops within the Khyber Pass,—adding, "His Lordship is too strongly impressed with confidence in your judgement to apprehend that you will ever place the army under your command in a situation, in which, without adequate means of movement and supply, it could derive no benefit from its superior valour and discipline, and might be again subject to a disaster, which, if repeated, might be fatal to our power in India."† This passage in the dispatch of the 4th of May affords the Whig writer an opportunity of exercising his powers of sarcasm with magnificent effect. "Most just was this his Lordship's impression," he exclaims, "but *how is it to be reconciled with his former impression or supposition, something less than a week old?*"‡ How? Why easily enough, if this cunning Isaac will only take the trouble to refer to the fourth paragraph of the dispatch of the 4th

*Pamphlet, *p.* 46. † Papers, *page* 241. ‡ Pamphlet, *p.* 47.