

172.A.429.

STATE OF INDIA:

IN TWO LETTERS FROM

WARREN HASTINGS, Esq.

TO THE

COURT OF DIRECTORS;

AND ONE FROM THE

NABOB ASUFUL DOWLA,
SUBADAR OF OWDE.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

A SERIES OF

EXPLANATORY FACTS AND REMARKS.

*Magnoperé vos et hortor et moneo, ut his Provinciis seriùs
vos quidem quam decuit, fed aliquandó tamen consulatis.*


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MDCCLXXXII.

1782



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Legibus laboratur.

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most

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The Editors beg leave to return their warmest thanks to those Noblemen and Gentlemen, by whose distinguished patronage and aid they have been able to conduct this publication through the last and present Parliament, in a manner that hath entitled the Work to the approbation of the Public. The communications with which they have been honoured, have been attended to with the utmost care, and upon every question the strictest candour has been observed, that the Work might contain a true and faithful account of every important Debate.

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T O T H E
HON. THE COURT OF DIRECTORS,
O F T H E
HON. UNITED EAST INDIA COMPANY.

FORT WILLIAM, 29th November, 1780.

HONOURABLE SIRs,

Y O U will be informed, by our consultations of the 26th of June, of a very unusual tender, which was made by me to the board that day, for the purpose of indemnifying the company for the extraordinary expence, which might be incurred by supplying the detachment under the command of Major Camac, in the invasion of the Maratta dominions, which lay beyond the district of Gohud ; and drawing the attention of Mhadajee Sindia, to whom that country immediately appertained, from General Goddard, while his was employed
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in the reduction of Basseeen, and in securing the conquests made by your arms in Guzerat. I was desirous to remove the only objection, which had been or could be ostensibly made to the measure, which I had very much at heart, as may be easily conceived from the means which I took to effect it.

—For the reasons at large, which induced me to propose that diversion; it will be sufficient to refer you to my minute recommending it, and to the letters received from General Goddard, near the same period of time. The subject is now become obsolete, and all the fair hopes, which I had built upon the prosecution of the Maratta war, of its termination in a speedy, honourable, and advantageous peace, have been blasted by the dreadful calamities, which have befallen your arms in the dependencies of your presidency of Fort St. George; and changed the object of our pursuit from the aggrandizement of your power, to its preservation.——

My present reason for reverting to my own conduct on the occasion, which I have mentioned, is to obviate the false conclusions or purposed misrepresentations, which may be made of it either as an artifice of ostentation,

or as the effect of corrupt influence, by assuring you, that the money, by whatever means it came into your possession, *was not my own ; that I had myself no right to it, nor would or could have received it, but for the occasion, which prompted me to avail myself of the accidental means, which were at that instant afforded me, of accepting and converting it to the property and use of the company ;* and with this brief apology, I shall dismiss the subject.

Something of affinity to this anecdote, may appear in the first aspect of another transaction, which I shall proceed to relate, and of which it is more immediately my duty to inform you.—You will have been advised by repeated addresses of this government, of the arrival of an army at Cuttack, under the command of Chimnaje Boosla, the second son of Shoodajee Boosla, the Rajah of Berar.

The origin and destination of this force have been largely explained and detailed in the correspondence of the government of Berar, and in various parts of our consulta-

tions. The minute relation of these would exceed the bounds of a letter ; I shall therefore confine myself to the principal fact.—— About the middle of last year, a plan of confederacy was formed by the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, by which it was proposed that, while the army of the Marattas under the command of Mhadajee Sindia and Tocajee Holdar, was employed to check the operations of General Goddard in the West of India, Hyder Ally Cawn should invade the Carnatic, Moodajee Boosla the province of Bengal, and he himself the Sircars of Rajamundry and Chicacole.——The government of Berar was required to accept the part assigned it in this combination, and to march a large body of troops immediately into Bengal. To inforce the request on the part of the ruling members of the Maratta state, menaces of instant hostility by the combined forces were added by Mhadajee Sindia, Tocajee Holdar, and Nizam Ally Cawn, in letters written by them to Moodajee Boosla on the occasion. He was not in a state to sustain the brunt of so formidable a league, and ostensibly yielded.——Such at least was the turn, which he gave to his acquiescence

acquiescence in his letters to me, and his subsequent conduct has justified his professions. I was early and progressively acquainted by him with the requisition and with the measures, which were intended to be taken and which were taken him upon it.—

The army, professedly destined for Bengal, marched on the *Duffarah* of the last year (corresponding with the 7th of October). Instead of taking the direct course to Bahar, which had been prescribed, it proceeded, by varied deviations and studied delays, for Cuttac, where it arrived late in May last, having performed a practicable journey of three months in seven, and concluded it at the instant commencement of the rains, which of course would preclude its operations, and afford the government of Berar a further interval of five months to provide for the part, which it would then be compelled to chuse.

—In the mean time, letters were continually written by the Rajah and his ministers to this government, explanatory of their situation and motives, proposing their mediation and guarantee, for a peace and alliance with the Peshwa; and professing, without solicitation on our part, the most friendly disposition

tion towards us, and the most determined resolution to maintain it.

Conformably to these assurances, and the acceptance of a proposal made by the Moodajee Boosla, to depute his ministers to Bengal, for the purpose of negotiating and concluding the proposed treaty of peace, application had been made to the Peshwa, for credentials to the same effect :——In the mean time, the fatal news arrived of the defeat of your army at Conjeveram. It now became necessary, that every other object should give place or be made subservient to the preservation of the Carnatic; nor would the measures, requisite for that end, admit an instant of delay. Peace with the Marattas was the first object. To conciliate their alliance and that of every other power in natural enmity with Hyder Ally; the next instant measures were taken (as our general advices will inform you) to secure both these points, and to employ the government of Berar as the channel and instrument of accomplishing them. Its army still lay on our borders, and in distress for long arrears of pay, not less occasioned by the want of pecuniary funds,

funds, than a stoppage of communication.

—An application had been made to us for a supply of money, and the sum specified for the complete relief of the army was sixteen lacs.—We had neither money to spare, nor, in the apparent state of that government in its relation to ours, would it have been prudent or consistent with our public credit to have afforded it.—It was nevertheless my decided opinion that some aid should be given, not less as a necessary relief, than as an indication of confidence, and a return *for the many instances of substantial kindness*, which we had, within the course of the two last years, experienced from the government of Berar.—*I had an assurance that such a proposal would receive the acquiescence of the board*;—but I knew that it would not pass without opposition, and it would have become public, which might have defeated its purpose.—Convinced of the necessity of the expedient, and assured of the sincerity of the government of Berar, from evidences of a stronger proof to me, than I could make them appear to the other members of the board, I resolved to adopt it, and take the entire responsibility
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of it upon myself. In this mode, a less considerable sum would suffice. I accordingly caused three Lacks of Rupees to be delivered to the minister of the Rajah of Berar resident in Calcutta. He had it transmitted to Cuttack. *Two thirds of this sum I have raised by my own credit, and shall charge it in my official accounts — the other third, I have supplied from the cash in my hands belonging to the honourable Company.* I have given due notice to Moodajee Boosla of this transaction, and explained it to have been a *private act of my own, unknown to the other members of the council.* I have given him expectation of the remainder of the amount required for the arrears of his army, proportioned to the extent, to which he may put it in my power to propose it as a public gratuity by his effectual orders for the recall of these troops, or for their junction with ours.

I hope I shall receive *your approbation* of what I have done *for your service*, and your indulgence for the length of this narrative, which I could not comprize within a narrower compass.

I have the honour to be

Honourable Sir,

Your most faithful, obedient and humble Servant.

(Signed)

WARREN HASTINGS.

T O T H E

TO THE
COURT OF DIRECTORS,
OF THE
EAST INDIA COMPANY.

FORT WILLIAM, 2d. December, 1780.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

IN the present alarming situation of your affairs, which their distance, the long and momentous interval, which will have passed before you can receive the knowledge of them, and the dissentions which are ever attendant on public calamities will be too apt to exaggerate, you will probably expect that I should inform you of my particular sentiments concerning them, and I am the more desirous of conforming to this supposition, from a belief too strongly founded, that the measures necessary to the preservation of your possessions in India, will inevitably

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bly be productive of one consequence, of which you ought to be early apprised, that you may be enabled to obviate it in the provisions, which I understand will fall regularly under your consideration, soon after the probable receipt of these dispatches. I have too high a respect for the characters to which I address myself, to treat them with the management of a preparatory, and gradual introduction of an unpleasing report, and as it is the only point of substantial information which I shall have to convey to you in this letter, I shall therefore make it the first subject of it.

The consequence to which I allude, is the necessity to which I foresee that we shall be compelled of making a large reduction, and possibly a total suspension of your investment for the ensuing year. I cannot pronounce what our ability may be beyond that period; this will depend on contingencies too variable and remote for present conjecture. — In justification of the measure itself which I have predicted, I must remark, that it will be less an act of the board, than, as I have before intimated, the result of an unavoidable

unavoidable necessity, in which no option will be left us, but either to sacrifice the temporary profits of the company, or to hazard for ever the existence of all that they possess for the sake of retaining them.

It will be impossible, at the same time, to provide for the vast expence which will be required for the subsistence and defence of both your other presidencies, and the supplies for an investment, in addition to the increasing exigencies of this government, and all from its own unassisted resources.

We have been already reduced to the mortifying extremity of borrowing money at interest, by which we have raised the sum of, Rupees 64,44,60 1 6.—This resource cannot last.—It must cease at a certain period, and that perhaps not distant; but the exigency which called it forth will still remain the same, and must be answered. —We have no other fund from which we can defray it, with the present appropriation of our means; for, exclusively of the foreign calls, our own internal expences have accumulated, and will yet increase,

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notwithstanding all the care and œconomy that we may use to check them ; as we must replace all the native troops which we have detached to the relief of the Carnatic, and as it is to be apprehended, that our revenue may suffer by the large drafts which we shall be obliged to make of our current specie.

I will confess that I am myself more alarmed at the novelty of the measure, than convinced of any real detriment of which it will prove to your interests, when I consider that your ships are detained in their outset for months by the want of hands to navigate them, and liable, without any exemption or distinction to the same hardships, as the necessities of public service impose on common vessels of trade ; that they arrive too late to be all dispatched in the same season ; that equal delays often attend them in their return, which is accomplished with hazards so great, that at least a part of their cargoes cannot fail, without great negligence of our national enemies, to fall into their hands, and in that sense so much of your investment
may

may be affirmed to be provided for their benefit, equally with your loss.

I can venture to assure you, that every precaution will be taken by this administration with the advice of the board of trade, to prevent the inconveniencies to which the business of your investment may be liable, in its renewal from its having been discontinued. Respecting the expedients which may be recommended for supplying the deficiency of your investment, in case of its stoppage beyond the next year, upon these I do not presume to offer my opinion. They will not escape your penetration, and I know that they will be suggested by a judgment and experience, in these points superior to my own.

I do not know whether your supra cargoes at Canton will stand in any need of our assistance ; I should think not ; but it is unnecessary to add, after what I have herein premised, that it will be equally out of our power to afford it.

I wait in anxious expectation of an answer from the government of Berar to my dispatches

patches, which conveyed the treaty proposed for its guaranty, and the ratification of the administration of Poonah. This may arrive in the course of another week. I have every reason to believe that it will be entirely consonant to my own wishes; with the aid, or even the neutrality of this power, I have no doubt of being able to make the resources of this government equal to every service, which may be exacted from them, both for the maintenance of the actual peace of these provinces, and the restoration of your affairs in the Carnatic, however desperate they may now appear, if they continue under the conduct of your present commander in chief.

I can venture to pronounce what may be the determination of the administration of Poona.—Considered as a state, it has certainly every cause to dread the aggrandizement of Hyder Ally Cawn, its natural enemy;—as a faction, though not wholly uninterested in the event of his success, it may be influenced by other causes; by the ties of confederacy; by its own weakness; by the jealousy of Ragonaut Row; by the ascendant of Mhadajee Scindia, and his separate

parate views ; which are incompatible with peace, and perhaps by national resentment ; yet I think it probable that the example of the government of Berar may contribute to turn the scale in our favour ; but I have no grounds for such an expectation in any recent act or appearance.

Permit me to offer a brief reflection on the present state of your political affairs.—I have been told that the Maratta war has been, I know not on what ground or suggestion, attributed to me.—Your honourable court is possessed of the fullest evidence of the contrary.—The occasion of the war was planned and executed without the knowledge or previous concurrence of this government ; which has no other participation in it, than in providing, by an extraordinary exertion, for the support of the measures undertaken by the presidency of Bombay, if these succeeded, and for its preservation if they failed. Our detachment arrived seasonably for the last of these objects, and for the redemption of the national honour, which had, without it, been irretrievably lost. I had indeed flattered myself that the war
would

would have soon terminated in such advantages, as would have amply atoned for the past calamities which had attended it.——

Whatever conviction I may entertain of such a conclusion, it is now reduced to an argument of unavailing speculation, in which every person is at liberty to form his own opinion.

Another and more interesting occasion, has now called for the exertions of this government, in the preservation of your government at Fort St. George.——This, at least, will not be imputed to the government of Bengal.——If the extorted and palliated confession of the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn may be credited, and we have the evidence of the most public notoriety to confirm it, it was the sole effect of a confederacy formed at his instigation, and dictated by his resentment of the infringements, made by the select committee of Fort St. George, on his rights obtained by the treaty subsisting between him and the company, and his natural apprehension of hostilities intended by that government against him. Whatever be the cause, such have been the effects; and it is our duty
to

to do all that may be in our power to avert them. This we have already done to a degree as great as the time and our means would admit.-----We have exhausted our treasury, we have deprived ourselves of the flower of our army for their relief; we have abandoned our own measures in the crisis of their success; we have formed a powerful detachment which will be in a condition to march, in a few days from this date, and have used means, which, though new and untried, were the most likely to prove of speedy and of certain effect, to win allies to their cause, even of our present enemies.-----

I hope it will not appear the assumption of an undue merit to observe, that extensive as the aids are which we have already afforded them, and at a season in which the rules of your service have hitherto interdicted the navigation of these seas, in consideration of the danger attending it, they arrived in safety at Fort St. George in less than two months from the date of the calamity, which furnished the occasion for them, computed from the return of the army under Sir Hector Munro at the mount, on the 14th of September to the arrival of the last ship of the

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fleet,

fleet, the Duke of Kingston, at Fort St. George on the 5th of November.

We shall continue to employ the same vigilant attention to your interests, and I have no fears for the event, while I have the happiness to possess my present means, with the same *able and willing assistance, which fortune has given me in my present associate* in this government.

I most humbly beg leave to conclude this letter, with recommendation of Major Popham to your favour. The services, which he has rendered, in the expulsion of the Marattas from the dominions of your ally the Ranah of Ghodud, and especially in the capture of the important fortress of Gualier, have given him a claim to my solicitation in his behalf; and you will permit me to observe, that in whatever mode you may be pleased to stamp your approbation of his services, you cannot have a more deserving subject for it, nor a season, in which the zeal of your servants will better entitle them, on every principle of policy, as well as justice, to such rewards and encouragements.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WARREN HASTINGS.

Translation of a letter from his Highness the Nabob Asufal Dowla, Subadar of Owde and Vizier of the Empire, to Charles Purling, Esq. Resident at his Court, on the part of the East India Company. Dated Lucknow, 19th of November, 1779.

THE friendship between the honourable Company, Mr. Hastings governor general, the supreme council, and myself, has not the least shadow of disunion. Dominion, property, and honour are the same to us.

The situation of my affairs, respecting the present time, I informed Mr. Middleton of, both by writing and conversation, and I now proceed to lay the whole before you.

During these three years past, the expence occasioned by the troops in Brigade and others, commanded by European officers, has much distressed the support of my household, inſomuch that the allowance made to the ſeraglio and children of the deceased Nabob has been reduced to the fourth part of what it was, upon which they have ſub-
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sisted in a very distressed manner for these two years past. The attendants, writers, servants, &c. of my court have received no pay for these two years, and there is at present no part of the country that can be allotted to the payment of my father's private creditors, whose applications are daily pressing upon me.-----All these difficulties I have for these three years past struggled through, and found this consolation therein, that it was complying with the pleasure of the honourable company, and in the hope that the supreme council would make enquiry from impartial persons into my distressed situation ; but I am now forced to a representation.

From the great increase of expence, the revenues were necessarily farmed out at a high rate, and deficiencies followed yearly.-----The country and cultivation is abandoned ; and, this year in particular, from the excessive drought of the season, deductions of many lacks have been allowed the farmers, who were still left unsatisfied ; and I have received but just sufficient to support my absolute necessities ; and, for this reason
many



many of the old chieftains with their troops and useful attendants of the court were forced to leave it, and now there is left only a few foot and horse for the collection of the revenues ; and should the Zemindars be refractory, there is not a sufficient number left to reduce them to the obedience of my collectors.-----The late raised brigade at Futtighur is not only quite useless to my government, but is moreover the cause of much loss, both in the revenues and customs ;-----The detached bodies of troops, under other European officers, *bring nothing but confusion to the affairs of government, and are entirely their own masters.*

In this distressed state of my affairs, it is just and requisite that Mr. Hastings, General Sir Eyre Coote, and the Supreme Council should give me relief.-----This year I cannot possibly provide for the new brigade at Futtighur, the corps of horse, and other detached bodies of troops in my country.-----I hope you will consider well these representations, and explain them, in a manner you may judge proper, to the Governor General and Supreme Council.-----On my part, country,

try, property, and life, are devoted to the will of the honourable Company, and I hope they will therefore do justice to these my complaints, and prevent my falling into distress, *by not having wherewith to support the necessary expences of my household.*-----For the expence of the brigade at Cawnpoor, and other disbursements, I have given other Tunkas, * and orders upon my country; the remainder of my revenues, on account of the drought, has fallen so short, as not to be sufficient for my necessary expences, being deficient to the amount of fifteen lacks, and the above provision will bring upon me this year very great distress.

* *Assignments.*

FACTS.

F A C T S.

I. **O**N the 10th of August 1778, Mr. Barwell affirmed, and produced at the Council board a statement to prove, that the unapplied cash of that day, in the actual possession of government, amounted to current rupees, one hundred and five lacks, twenty thousand, (105,20,000) ; and he described it to be, a real unappropriated treasure that instant in their possession. He further added, that, by unappropriated treasure, he meant all sums of money, whether in the treasury or elsewhere, not subject to the current disbursements of government, and totally distinct from the annual revenue, which he regarded as appropriated to civil and military charges, and to remittances to

Bombay .

Bombay and China, and sufficient to provide for *all possible material demands*.

II. On the same day, Mr. Hastings laid before the board an official estimate of resources and disbursements, which stated an unappropriated balance of current rupees, two hundred and thirty five lacks sixty six thousand, (2,35,66,000), expected to remain in the company's treasury, after deducting all the probable disbursements, from the expected resources on the 30th of April 1779. From this balance, Mr. Hastings deducted thirty lacks for extra disbursements, not provided for in the estimate, leaving a *corrected* balance of current rupees, two hundred and five lacks, sixty thousand, (2,05,60,000), to exist on the 30th of April 1779.

III. From the 1st of May, 1778, to November, 1780, the treasury of Bengal received aids, external to its own resources, to the amount of current rupees, sixty two lacks, thirty seven thousand seven hundred and five, viz.

Amount

Cur. Rupees.

Amount of Monies received for draughts on the Court of Directors, ———	52,21,705
Extra contribution from Cheit-fing, Raja of Benares, ———	10,16,000
Total, Cur. Rupees, ———	<u>62,37,705</u>

IV. On the 30th of November, 1780, all the preceding surpluses, and savings, if they ever existed, were gone, together with all the extraordinary supplies ; and the state of the Bengal treasury stood as follows.

<i>Cr.</i>	<i>Cur. Rup.</i>	<i>Dr.</i>	<i>Cur. Rup.</i>
Ready Money, —	4,63,725	Amount of bonded	
Bills, — — —	1,19,972	debt, and deposits	
Mint, — — —	98,443	of private pro-	
Unforted Treasure,		perty, — —	83,27,239
estimated at —	12,94,584	Orders issued on the	
	<u>19,76,724</u>	Treasury, and not	
Balance against the		discharged, —	8,62,944
Treasury, —	72,13,459		<u>91,90,183</u>

IV. On the 30th of April, 1780, the bonded debt of Bombay stood at Bombay rupees, fifty lacks, eighty nine thousand

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two hundred and thirteen, (50,89,213). Their disbursements for the year ending in April, 1781, were estimated by themselves at Bombay rupees, seventy five lack, eighty one thousand two hundred eighty nine, (75,81,289). Their resources for the same period, are estimated at Bombay rupees, thirty seven lacks, forty six thousand seven hundred and ninety seven, (37,46,797). The excess of the disbursements added to the bonded debt, will make the whole debt against that presidency on the 30th of April, 1781, amount to Bombay rupees, eighty nine lacks, twenty three thousand seven hundred and five, (89,23,705). At the foot of the estimate it is observed, that, " As the re-
 " venues from the late acquisitions are not
 " estimated in this account, so neither are the
 " advances, which may be made to Gene-
 " ral Goddard's army."——If any portion of the expences be defrayed by supplies from Bengal, the effect will be rather worse, on on the whole, than if the money were entirely borrowed at Bombay ; since an equal debt must be incurred in Bengal, with the addition of the risque and expence of sending the amount in specie, or of the difference of exchange

exchange and premium on a remittance by bills. In autumn 1779, five lacks of rupees, destined for Bombay, were actually lost in the *Stafford*. The loss on the head of exchange, from Calcutta to Bombay or Surat, has been constantly from six to ten per cent. It appears on the consultations, that it was solely owing to the strenuous opposition of Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, that ten lacks (proposed by Mr. Hastings, and voted for by Mr. Barwell), were not lost instead of five on board the *Stafford*.

V. From April 1778, to November 1780, the actual expence of the government of Bengal, incurred on account of the Maratta war alone, and for the support of the establishments at Bombay, amounted to almost one hundred and seventy six lacks of current rupees, viz.

	<i>Current Rupees.</i>
Remitted to Bombay,	43,45,640 12 9
To General Goddard's	
army, ———	1,18,85,808 12 1
To Major Camac's	
first detachment,	4,55,551 13 5
E 2	Brought

	Current Rupees,
Brought over —	1,66,87,000 10 3
Major Popham's detachment, —	6,25,403 13 1
Major Camac's second detachment, —	2,70,583 3 3
Total, Cur. Rup.	<u>1,75,82,988 6 7</u>

To this sum should be added the sum of three lacks of Sicca rupees, (or current rupees, (3,48,000), given privately in November, 1780, by Mr. Hastings, without the knowledge of the Governor General and Council, to the Maratta army then stationed in Cuttac, near the frontier of Bengal.

The sum total must be considered as part of the price, at which the acquisitions of territory, said to have been made on the Malabar coast, have been certainly purchased. When the Maratta war shall be at an end, and all the military establishments, created to support it, shall have been paid off and reduced; the India Company, if they please to enquire, may know the amount of

of their expence on this head. When they have ascertained the net balance, arising from the revenues of these acquisitions and applicable to other services, after all expences of management and of new military establishments to defend a new frontier, shall be allowed for and defrayed, they will then know the real value of the thing they have acquired.——And finally, by comparing the price with the value, they may be enabled to comprehend, how much they have lost or gained by the whole transaction. At present, they are not quite sure of any thing but their actual expence.

VI. As mere matter of fact, it is rather more evident, that the great unappropriated surplus, of two hundred and five lacks, sixty thousand current rupees, which Mr. Hastings assured the Company, would exist in their treasury in Bengal, on the 30th of April 1779, does not exist there at present, than that it ever did exist in the said treasury. Admitting the latter fact nevertheless, on Mr. Hastings' authority, to be as evident as the other, it is as clear as either of them, that on the principles assumed and insisted on
by

by Mr. Barwell and Mr. Hastings, the extraordinary expences of the war will not account for the disappearance of the surplus abovementioned, and for the subsequent debt incurred. Mr. Barwell affirms that the annual revenue was sufficient to provide for *all possible material demands*; and Mr. Hastings, after deducting, not only *ALL the probable disbursements* from the expected resources, but also thirty lacks for extra-disbursements, insists on his *corrected* balance of 205,60,000 current, and asserts that it would exist in the treasury on the 30th of April, 1779. Yet, at the end of November, 1780, the whole of this great unappropriated surplus was gone, together with large sums obtained by draughts on the court of directors, and exclusive of and in addition to the whole revenue of Bengal, &c. and, besides all this, a bonded debt at eight per cent. incurred, to the amount of seventy lacks.——Is it possible that neither the Company or Parliament should ever ask what is become of all this money?

VII. Within a year after the arrival of General Clavering, Colonel Monson and Mr.

Mr. Francis in Bengal, a bonded debt of a hundred and ten lacks, which they found existing, was paid off; and from the years 1775 to 1780 inclusive, above a hundred and ten lacks per annum, one year with another, was allotted and paid to the commercial board out of the territorial revenues, for the purchase of an investment for the East India Company.——Under prudent management, such and so great was the public gratuitous tribute returned by Bengal to Great Britain, exclusive of the amount of private fortunes remitted in the same period !

——Mr. Hastings now fairly tells the Company, *that he shall be compelled to make a large reduction, and possibly a total suspension of their investment for the year 1781; and that he cannot pronounce what their ability may be beyond that period;* and the Court of Directors have empowered the Governor General and Council, to *draw on the Company for fifty lacks, to be applied to the purchase of an investment, lest, if it were totally suspended, the manufactures should be lost. Such are the effects of war and conquest !*

On the 19th of May, 1777, Mr. Francis, in the course of a debate on a proposed augmentation of the army, took occasion to observe, *that the augmenting the standing force of the country, in order to promote circulation, was a new idea*; and that, without such augmentation, *the surplus of cash, then existing in the treasury, might be gradually sunk and appropriated.*——The Court of Directors took fire at this intimation, and affected to receive it with indignation and abhorrence. Their remark on the subject, with Mr. Francis's reply to it, stands as follows.

General letter, 4th of March, 1778.

Paragraph 70th.

“ We agree with Mr. Francis that the
 “ idea of augmenting a standing army, in
 “ order to promote circulation, is perfectly
 “ new ; and that, in operation, it might be
 “ destructive to the country ; but we differ
 “ totally from Mr. Francis in his supposition,
 “ *that the present surplus existing in our trea-*
 “ *sury, can, with proper management, ever*
 “ *be absorbed in the support of our government,*
 “ *and the provision of our investment* ; nor do
 “ we need better authority for this opi-
 “ nion,

“ nion, than his own very able and accurate
 “ statement of internal resources and of ser-
 “ vices, to be provided for in Bengal ; which,
 “ after proposing a deduction of ten per cent.
 “ upon the whole revenue for the relief of
 “ the provinces, allowing twenty lacks for
 “ other settlements, and appropriating upwards
 “ of ninety lacks for commerce, establishes an
 “ *unappropriated*, and, as he justly observes,
 “ an increasing surplus of more than ten
 “ lacks per annum, exclusive of the subsidy
 “ of thirty-one lacks paid by the Vizier, and
 “ of all external resources arising from bills
 “ of exchange, and from the sales of our Eu-
 “ ropean cargoes.”

MINUTE OF Mr. FRANCIS.

November, 16, 1778.

“ I am far from presuming to affirm, nor
 “ would I be understood to believe, that any
 “ one opinion of mine, however deliberately
 “ formed, may not be erroneous. But, I
 “ confess, I am not equally ready to admit,
 “ that my opinions stand mutually in contra-
 “ diction, or that any one of them includes

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“ or

“ or amounts to a compleat refutation of any
 “ other. Error of judgment is no defence
 “ against a charge of inconsistency.

“ The Court of Directors, in the 70th
 “ paragraph of their letter of the 4th of
 “ March, 1778, are pleased to say, that they
 “ differ totally from me in a supposition stated
 “ in a former minute of mine, that the sur-
 “ plus existing in our treasury in May, 1777,
 “ could, *with proper management*, EVER be
 “ absorbed in the support of their govern-
 “ ment, or in the provision of their invest-
 “ ment ; and that for this opinion they need
 “ no better authority, than my own statement
 “ of resources and services, sent home in Ja-
 “ nuary, 1776, which establishes an unap-
 “ propriated and increasing surplus of ten
 “ lacks, after all demands and services are
 “ provided for.

“ In the first of the preceding declarations
 “ attributed to me, I see plainly I have not
 “ had the good fortune to make myself un-
 “ derstood. I am supposed to affirm that,
 “ *notwithstanding proper management*, the
 “ surplus existing in May, 1777, might still
 “ be

“ be absorbed in current services, including
 “ the investment. The proposition, with
 “ the condition annexed to it by the Court
 “ of Directors, is such a one, as I have no
 “ idea of attempting to support. *With proper*
 “ *management* the resources of Bengal are
 “ undoubtedly equal to its expences, as they
 “ stood in January, 1776, including com-
 “ mercial charges at 93 lacks.—But, so
 “ far from supposing *proper* management
 “ in the revenues and expences of this go-
 “ vernment, my whole argument implies
 “ the contrary; and, if *improper* manage-
 “ ment is supposed to prevail, I presume it
 “ is not hazarding much to say, that a sur-
 “ plus, existing in the treasury at any given
 “ period, may be gradually appropriated and
 “ absorbed.—This is the utmost, that the
 “ opinion, expressed in my minute of the
 “ 19th of May, 1777, amounts to.

“ With respect to the unappropriated sur-
 “ plus, established by my statement of re-
 “ sources and services, sent home in January,
 “ 1776, I must entreat the attention of the
 “ Court of Directors to the following obser-
 “ vations.

“ The statement makes part of a plan of
 “ settlement of the lands, and cannot be se-
 “ parated from it. The first direct object of
 “ the plan is to secure private property.
 “ This I consider as the wisest, the most be-
 “ nevolent, and the surest means of arriving
 “ at my ultimate object, the security of the
 “ public revenue. I mean that regular
 “ and permanent revenue, on which alone
 “ a wise government ought to place its de-
 “ pendance. Extortion and violence may
 “ obtain greater returns, for a short time ;
 “ but these are the resources of profusion.
 “ They are equally incompatible with
 “ œconomy, and ruinous to regular revenue.
 “ If agency or farming were not, as I
 “ deem it, the direct and intended instru-
 “ ment of extortion, still it could never sup-
 “ ply the place of proprietorship ; because
 “ many of the principal duties of a proprie-
 “ tor are such, as an agent or farmer has
 “ no personal interest in performing. But
 “ these duties are essential to the permanent
 “ prosperity of the government itself, since
 “ they belong to the care and improvement
 “ of that fund, from which government re-
 “ ceives its support.

“ Now

“ Now it is not the mere name of pro-
 “ prietor, that will engage any man to per-
 “ form these duties, if he has not a *real* se-
 “ curity, that he shall not be robbed of the
 “ surplus produce of his industry and labour ;
 “ that is, if he does not know, once
 “ for all, how much he is to pay to govern-
 “ ment, and be not assured that the remain-
 “ der will be his own.

“ A plan of settlement, formed on these
 “ principles, may safely promise a revenue
 “ exceeding our expences as they were esti-
 “ mated in the statement, which accompa-
 “ nied the plan. The surplus too in all ap-
 “ pearance, may fairly be deemed an increas-
 “ ing fund. But, unless we adopt the pre-
 “ mises, we have no right to the conclu-
 “ sion. Whenever the Court of Directors
 “ shall give us their direct and unreserved
 “ approbation of the plan, with a compleat
 “ authority to carry it into execution, they
 “ will be entitled to all the benefits and ad-
 “ vantages, which the plan promises to
 “ produce.—Until they do so, it is not
 “ possible, in *my* judgment at least, that their
 “ territorial acquisitions and revenues can
 “ be

“ be *properly* managed. It is for *them* to
 “ judge of the effects of *improper* manage-
 “ ment ; how soon it may exhaust the
 “ funds that exist, or at what period, and by
 “ what gradations it may operate to the ruin
 “ of their revenues.”

P. FRANCIS.

IX. It appears by Mr. Hastings's letter of the 29th of November, 1780, to the Court of Directors, that he had actually given away three lacks of the Company's money to the commanding officer of a Maratta army, then stationed near the frontier of Bengal, that he had promised thirteen more to the Raja of Berar, to whom that army belonged ; and that he had done all this without the consent or knowledge of the Council General, that is, of the government of Bengal.—It is the act of an individual, who has access to the Company's treasure, and is no more authorised in Mr. Hastings, than it would have been in the sub-treasurer, Mr. Croftes. The Court of Directors, who are themselves only trustees for the Company, are bound to consider,

sider, whether they *can* give their *approbation* avowedly to an unlawful act, though said to be *done for their service*. Whether the precedent it establishes be not of a very dangerous nature ; and if they allow the first or any other member of the government, to take money *secretly* out of their treasury at his pleasure in one instance, by what limits they can bind or restrain the exercise of such discretionary power hereafter.

The Company's Instructions to the Governor General and Council, containing the following strict Injunction on this head.

“ WE direct that all monies, which may
 “ arise from our revenues, or be received by
 “ you on our account, be secured under three
 “ locks as usual, that the keys be kept by
 “ the Governor General, and such other
 “ Members of Council as you shall appoint,
 “ who shall be a Committee of Treasury ;
 “ that exact particulars of all monies, paid
 “ into our treasury, be first regularly entered
 “ on your consultations, specifying from
 “ whom received, and on what account.”

“ and that all issues of money from our said
 “ Treasury, be made by warrant under your
 “ hands, directed to the Committee of Trea-
 “ sury, *and not otherwise.*”

It is also their duty to consider the precedent, set by Mr. Hastings, in another very important point of view:—Whether to give money to a Maratta army, in order to induce them not to invade Bengal, could be, at any time and in any circumstances, a firm and spirited measure;—whether it could even be a prudent and judicious measure, in any situation of the government of Bengal, but that of the last extremity and distress;—and whether, in every view, in which the measure can be considered, it does not acknowledge the existence of such distress, and proclaim it to the world. Another question would finally occur to men, who had any sense of the trust reposed in them, or of the duty they owe not only to their immediate constituents, but to the King and to the Nation;—viz. by what means and by whose misconduct Bengal has been reduced, in the short space of three years, from the secure and prosperous state, in which it stood at the end of the year,

1777,

1777, to the distresses with which it was surrounded, and to the hazard of ruin, to which it was exposed, at the end of the year, 1780?

X. Mr. Hastings, in the same letter, says ; — *I had an assurance that such a proposal would receive the acquiescence of the board ; but I knew that it would not pass without opposition.* The board at that time consisted of the Governor General, Mr. Francis, and Mr. Wheler.—Sir Eyre Coote was at Fort St. George ; and if he had been present, it would be unfair to him to suppose, on any authority less than his own, that the commander in chief of the Company's forces, would have subscribed to a measure so humiliating to the government of Bengal, and so disgraceful to the British arms.—Undoubtedly he would rather have joined with Mr. Francis, in demanding a categorical answer from the Marattas in Cuttac, and insisting on their instant removal, or an explicit declaration of their intentions. The Governor General and Council had already temporised with them long enough.—But three years before the period in question, the British

power predominated and was dreaded all over India. In November 1780, the Governor General pays a tribute to a Maratta army to prevent their invading Bengal.— Considerations of this nature would probably have occurred to Sir Eyre Coote, and determined his conduct.

In his minute of the 4th of September, after stating the infinite prejudice and mischief we suffered by the continuance of this Maratta army on our frontier, he says, “ It is my opinion, that, under whatever authority they may be, an immediate application should be made for them to retire, as their remaining where they are disturbs the peace of our provinces. This requisition will soon discover the reality of their intentions towards us. And, in order that we may not suffer ourselves to be further injured by delays, time should be stipulated for receiving an answer. Should this be denied us, our own safety and interest will dictate to us how to act.”

It remains then to be ascertained, between Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, by which of them

them the *assurance* was given to Mr. Hastings, *that such a proposal would receive the acquiescence of the board*, and by which of them he *knew* it would be opposed.——The ~~select~~ committee of the House of Commons will of course make this point one of the objects of their investigation, and demand an explanation of it from Mr. Francis, and Major Scott,—the Governor's authorised agent. The honour of Mr. Wheler and Mr. Francis is at stake.

XI. It is asserted, in the same letter from Mr. Hastings, that the extraordinary expence was *the only objection, which had been, or could be ostensibly made to a measure, which he had very much at heart*. A very different statement of that matter is exhibited in the minutes of Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, dated in June 1780. At present it is sufficient for the vindication of those gentlemen, to join issue with Mr. Hastings, by meeting his assertion with a direct denial.——Into this point also, the ~~select~~ committee will undoubtedly enquire.

XII. The Company and the Public have received the most flattering accounts, of the happy effects of Brigadier General Goddard's march across India, of his successes against the Marattas, and of great acquisitions of territory in Guzzerat. Leaving this whole representation of facts to stand undisputed for the present, and leaving the ultimate value of such successes and acquisitions, to be adjusted by the Company at a future day, when they have ascertained the entire amount of their expence;—it is immediately of moment to observe, that the merit of the measure, whatever it may be, and whether estimated by its own intrinsic policy or merely by the event, does not belong to Mr. Hastings, as the public have been industriously taught to believe, but on the contrary has been expressly disclaimed by him. In his minute of the 4th of March, 1779, he says, “ I wish equally with Mr. Francis
 “ for the *return* of the detachment into Be-
 “ rar, and equally dread to hear of its pro-
 “ ceeding to the other coast.” And happy would it have been for India and for England, if General Goddard had immediately turned back, supposing he could have reached the
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province of Corah in safety, from whence the detachment commenced its march about a year before. The last accommodation with the Marattas, would then have ended the war on the Malabar coast. The presidency of Bombay could not have taken up arms against their inoffensive neighbours *a third time*. • The peace of India, with any tolerable degree of prudence and moderation on our side, might have been re-established and secured. Hyder Ally would never have ventured singly to attack the English power; and, in all human probability, none of the distresses and disasters, which have since befallen us, would have taken place. But it pleased God, by whom all things are designedly permitted to come to pass, that General Goddard never saw an enemy, and accomplished his march without opposition.

At that point of time, when the board had just heard of the defeat and surrender of the Bombay army to the Marattas near Poona, every member of it felt great and apparently equal anxiety for General Goddard's safety. The resolution he took, to proceed from the Western frontier of Berar to Surat, seemed

to be dictated by necessity, and the execution of it did him credit; but it was not warranted by the orders of the board; nor was it compatible with the proposed terms of Mr. Hastings's project, of an offensive alliance with the Raja of Berar, which General Goddard had instructions and full powers to conclude.

The event of those pernicious measures, which forced the Marattas into a war with the India Company's servants and representatives, at the expence of their constituents in the first instance, and ultimately of the nation, and the ruinous consequences of every sort, with which it has been attended, are likely enough to alarm the parties concerned. Each of them will now of course endeavour to fling his respective portion of guilt and responsibility, upon his neighbour; that is, the same men, who would have contended for the honour of advising the measure, if it had succeeded, will now be as eager to disclaim it. There is no other imaginable ground or principle, on which the following declaration of Mr. Hastings can be accounted for. " I have been told that the Maratta
" war,

“ war, I know not on what ground or sug-
 “ gession, is attributed to me. Your honour-
 “ able Court is possessed of the fullest evi-
 “ dence of the contrary. The occasion of
 “ the war was planned and executed, with-
 “ out the knowledge and previous concur-
 “ rence of this government.”

These assertions will be received in India, where men and things are better known than at home, with universal amazement. In England, if the question ever comes to issue before a competent tribunal, they will be opposed and overpowered by a long series of indisputable facts, and by evidence of every quality and degree, of which the subject is capable; particularly by the recorded declarations of Mr. Hastings himself, in a multiplicity of instances.

For the present, opposing one assertion to another, it is sufficient to say, that the merit or demerit of the Maratta war belongs wholly and solely to Mr. Hastings; and that the Court of Directors are possessed of the fullest evidence of the truth of this proposition; so
 full

full indeed and so voluminous, that it is probable they have never examined it.

Admitting that *the occasion of the war was planned* by the presidency of Bombay, it is nevertheless a fact, that their plan was communicated in proper and sufficient time, to the government of Bengal, without whose *consent and approbation, first had and obtained*, it could not have been carried into execution ; and that it did receive their *previous concurrence*, in the clearest and most explicit terms, in which such concurrence could be expressed. It is not easy to determine what is meant by *executing an occasion*. The plain matter of fact is, that the original plan of the gentlemen of Bombay was known to the Governor General and Council, in January 1778, and highly approved of, when it might have been condemned and effectually prohibited by them ; and that no attempt was made at Bombay to carry it into execution, until November following. The presidency of Bombay have enough to answer for in the course of this unfortunate transaction, without being made responsible for the acts or resolutions of a superior power, whose
concur-

concurrence they solicited, whose approbation they received, and whose orders they were obliged to obey.

With respect to the Governor General and Council, if the Maratta war *is not to be attributed to Mr. Hastings*, supported by Mr. Barwell, that is, to the persons, who had the whole political power of India in their hands, and who might have prevented the war with the same ease and effect with which they approved, encouraged, supported, and plunged themselves and the India Company, and the nation headlong into it ;—in the name of truth and justice, to whom *are* we to attribute the Maratta war?—There never was an example of a more strenuous, steady, persevering, and ineffectual opposition to any measure, than that, with which it was constantly resisted and condemned by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler, for almost three years together. If therefore it does not belong to Mr. Hastings, it is *an effect without a cause*.

Whatever may be the decision of this part of the question, no man will now deny, that

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the war itself is the *cause* of the ruin, which desolates India, and that it has actually converted our territorial acquisitions in that country, from a great and powerful resource, into an insupportable burthen to Great Britain. The time is coming, when the East India Company and the nation will know, to their cost, that India may be lost, without losing a foot of the ground on which we stood. In every sense, in which India, but four years ago, was a resource and a benefit, of the first magnitude, it is at this moment a distress and a burthen to England. In proper time and place, if parliament will give audience to the question, it will be *proved* that the Maratta war (let who will be the author of it) is the true source and origin, of all the mischief and disgrace that has fallen upon us in India, and of every distressing consequence, which we have still to suffer, when the period of direct and immediate disasters shall be past.

Observations, numerous and important, occur at almost every sentence of the two preceding letters from Mr. Hastings. But it would be unwise to press so much matter at once on the public, and unreasonable to expect so
general

general an attention to it, as in truth it would deserve. Yet some passages, in these letters, are too singular, as well as too material, not to demand particular notice.

The Governor, after telling the Company, “ that they (the Governor General and “ Council) shall be compelled to make a “ large reduction, and possibly a total suspension of the Company’s investment for “ the ensuing year, and that he cannot pronounce what their ability may be beyond “ that period ;” proceeds to comfort them with the following consolation ;—“ that “ he is more alarmed at the *novelty* of the “ measure, than convinced of its proving any “ *real* detriment to their interests ;—that “ their ships are detained by the want of “ hands to navigate them, and liable to hardships in common with other trading vessels ;—that they arrive too late to be all “ dispatched in the same season ;—that their “ return is liable to delays and hazards ;— “ and that a part of their cargoes cannot “ fail of falling into the hands of the enemy, “ for whose benefit consequently so much of

“ the investment may be affirmed to be proved.”

From these *self-evident* principles, Mr. Hastings, leaves it to the India Company to conclude, if they think proper, that, considering all circumstances, it is more for their advantage not to have an investment provided in Bengal, than to have one. Yet if the steward of a great family, possessing their confidence and intrusted with the care of their income, instead of providing a subsistence for the family, should gravely tell them, *that all their money was gone, but that they had no reason to regret the loss of it, for that, if he had been able to provide a dinner for them, some part of it would probably have been stolen in its passage from the kitchen ;* they, who had no immediate reason to weep, would laugh at his discourse, while they admired the serenity, with which it was delivered.

How the Court of Proprietors may relish this doctrine, I know not. For myself, and as one of that body, I protest against it, not only as essentially injurious to my interests,
but

but as an outrage to my understanding. The Court of Directors, it is to be presumed, have not entirely concurred in opinion with Mr. Hastings; since, instead of acquiescing in his reasons for stopping the investment, they have, immediately on the perusal of those reasons, ordered an investment to be purchased with money *remitted from England*. Yet, on *his* principles, the moment the nation is at war with France, the East India Company ought to shut up shop, or at least send no more ships to sea, for fear of their being taken by the enemy. Push the same sort of reasoning to its obvious and unavoidable conclusion, and *all* foreign trade must be suspended, as long as the enemy are able to keep the sea. The India Company, in most of its commercial operations, represents a great merchant, and acts or ought to act as a merchant ought to do. The essential difference between such a trading corporation and a trading individual is, that the former may run risques, to which the latter should not expose his fortune. In conformity to the spirit of this distinction, the Company never insure their ships. But extraordinary occasions require extraordinary principles,

principles, which too often find a reception and establishment in the credulity or inattention of mankind. There is a privilege annexed to novelty, of which a cunning man may avail himself, and which a wise man will not abuse.

Mr. Hastings, speaking of the invasion and ruin of the Carnatic by Hyder Ally, is pleased to say, *this, at least, will not be imputed to the government of Bengal.* Mr. Hastings is supported by a numerous and powerful party, who will suffer nothing, that happens in India, to be attributed to its true cause. The truth of this proposition however, though supposed to be indisputable, is nevertheless positively denied. The question will assuredly be brought forward in proper time, and the judgment of parliament demanded upon it.

Without defending any part of the conduct of the President and Council of Fort St. George, which it is their own business to justify if they can, it is affirmed and will be maintained, that the invasion and ruin of the Carnatic, originated from measures projected and

and acts done by Mr. Hastings and no where else ; or that if any part of the imputation can be removed from him, it must be transferred to the projects of the President and Council of Bombay, to which Mr. Hastings gave encouragement, approbation, and promised support ; though he soon deserted those very projects, in favour of another of his own, and suffered them to fail for want of that assistance, which he had engaged to afford them. Such at least was the event of his measures, but not the only effect they produced. If the Maratta war had not been undertaken or continued, there could have been no union between Hyder Ally and the Marattas ; but, on the contrary, the war, then existing between those powers, would have continued, and the Carnatic would not have been invaded. It was but in 1777, that the presidency of Bombay furnished Hyder with six thousand stand of arms, to enable him to prosecute his operations against the Marattas.

With respect to the views and operations of Hyder Ally, it is a fact, of which abundant proof will be exhibited from the consultations of
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the Governor General and Council, that before his army was actually on the frontiers of the Carnatic in July 1780, Mr. Hastings would never admit the possibility of his attacking the English, much less of his uniting with his *natural enemies* the Marattas. In truth they were so, nor could any thing have united them, but the measures of Mr. Hastings. In this idea he constantly and uniformly persisted, and for some time, even imposed it on the council, notwithstanding he had repeated and positive advices, for a year before, from the presidency of Fort St. George, of the hostile intentions of Hyder Ally, and of his intimate union with the Marattas and the Nizam. He confided in his own superior knowledge of the political views and interests of those powers; and, as usual, was utterly misled and deceived by it. In January 1780, Mr. Francis perceived and was convinced of the great mistake, into which Mr. Hastings, perhaps undesignedly, had drawn the government of Bengal on this subject, and was alarmed at the consequences, that might attend it. The following minutes, written on the occasion, deserve attention.

Mr.

January the 17th, 1780.

“ MR. FRANCIS desires it may be men-
 “ tioned, that he is informed by a private
 “ letter of the first authority from Fort St.
 “ George, that it is now certain that the Ma-
 “ rattas and Hyder Ally have formed an
 “ alliance.”

GOVERNOR GENERAL. “ That a peace
 “ may have taken place between Hyder
 “ Ally and the Marattas, I do not doubt,
 “ my own advices confirm it, but no alliance
 “ between them can be of long duration,
 “ as it is unnatural. I am convinced, from
 “ the whole tenor of Hyder Ally’s conduct
 “ and disposition, *that he will never molest*
 “ *us*, whilst we endeavour to preserve a good
 “ understanding with him. These were
 “ lately Mr. Francis’s sentiments as well as
 “ mine, and his distrust of the same autho-
 “ rity on the same subject I recollect to have
 “ been yet stronger marked, than my own
 “ (see consultation 20th December). I
 “ therefore object to this information being
 “ given to the Court of Directors, in the

“ general letter, *as only tending to alarm*
 “ *them without sufficient cause for it.*”

MR. FRANCIS. “ The intelligence I
 “ have stated to the board is of a much
 “ later date than that, which the Governor
 “ General alludes to. It contains the posi-
 “ tive assertion of a fact, to which I cannot
 “ refuse giving credit, considering the autho-
 “ rity I have for it. It does not say any
 “ thing of Hyder Ally’s intentions to invade
 “ the Carnatic. That was the point, on
 “ which I entertained the distrust alluded to
 “ by the Governor, but even that distrust
 “ may be removed by new facts and later
 “ advices.”

It is of little moment, in the present ques-
 tion, whether the conduct of the Presidency
 of Fort St. George towards the *Nizam* can
 be defended or not. The Governor General
 and Council were *unanimous* in condemning
 their proceedings, as well in the affair of the
 Guntoor Circar, as in the detention of the
 Peshcush, or annuity due to him by treaty.
 Mr. Hastings could not take a stronger and
 more decided part in that business, than was
 taken

taken by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler, who had no personal animosity to Sir Thomas Rumbold. The great point, on which the affirmative will be maintained and established against Mr. Hastings, in his own terms, is, that the conduct of the Presidency of Fort St. George to the Nizam, though he complained of it with reason, was not and could not be the cause of *the plan of the confederacy formed by the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, about the middle of the year 1779.* Mr. John Hollond, who was deputed to him by the government of Fort St. George in May, 1779, for the special purpose of facilitating the acquisition of the Guntoor Circar, did not open to him the subject of his deputation until the eighth of that month.* As to the remission of the *Peshcush*, which gave the principal offence, it was never mentioned to him till the 24th of June. But nothing said or done at that time, however offensive to the *Nizam*, could be the cause of a plan of confederacy, which, by the terms of the proposition, he must already have

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* *Vide Appendix to the second report of the Secret Committee. No. 116, &c.*

formed between Hyder Ally, the Maratta government at Poona, the Raja of Berar, and himself. Leagues and alliances, between great and very distant princes, are not so speedily negociated or so easily accomplished. The truth is that the Nizam's resolution to endeavour to unite all India against the English, took its rise from an act of Mr. Hastings, in which the interests and safety of the Nizam were much more deeply concerned, than they could be by any disposition of the Guntoor Circar, (on which the Company had an undisputed claim of succession) or by the detention of a paltry tribute of two or three lacks a year. In July 1778, Mr. Hastings deputed the late Mr. Alexander Elliot to Moodajee Boosla, the *supposed* Raja of Berar (for it has since been affirmed by Mr. Hastings, that this man is not the *true* Raja, but only acts for his son) with instructions and full powers to conclude an offensive alliance with him, one of the avowed objects of which was to make war on the Nizam, and to dispossess him of a considerable portion of his dominions.

The following is an Extract from Mr. Elliot's Instructions, dated the 18th of July, 1778.

“ The Nabob, Nizam Ally Cawn, who
 “ has always been connected with the
 “ French, is, from his situation, the *natural*
 “ *enemy* of the government of Berar, and
 “ personally that of Moodajee.”

Mr. Hastings has a wonderful talent at reconciling natural enemies, and uniting them all against the single power of Great Britain in India.

“ The points, which appear to us the
 “ most likely to excite Moodajee Boosla's
 “ ambition, are the assertion of his pretensions to the inheritance of Ram Raja, and
 “ *the recovery of the conquests, which have*
 “ *been made from his country by NIZAM*
 “ *ALLY.*

“ The latter is a more distant object, and
 “ at this moment appears to us, *foreign*
 “ *from our present interests.* You may receive any propositions, which he may
 “ make to you on this subject. You may
 “ treat

“ treat upon them ; but you must refer them
 “ to *us* for conclusion, *unless he shall require*
 “ *it* as an indispensable condition of his for-
 “ warding our views in the Western part
 “ of India ; and, even in that case, your
 “ engagements must be confined to the
 “ places originally appertaining to the govern-
 “ ment of Berar, and wrested from it since
 “ the death of Janojee.”

*Extract from Mr. Francis's Minute on the
 Instructions to Mr. Elliot.*

“ The second condition, relative to our
 “ assistance against Nizam Ally, is at first
 “ stated as a subject of negociation, to be
 “ referred to *us* for conclusion. But it is
 “ presently added, *unless Moodajee Boosla*
 “ *shall require it as an indispensable condition,*
 “ &c.—that is, in effect, we tie and unbind
 “ Mr. Elliot in the same breath. In the
 “ end, we authorise him to agree to such
 “ terms, as may be proposed by the Raja on
 “ this point, if he, (Mr. Elliot) shall be per-
 “ suaded that the execution of them will
 “ tend to the accomplishment of our views ;
 “ and, in such case, he is authorised to ful-
 “ fil

“ fil his part of the agreement, *with ut wait-*
 “ *ing for our sanction.*”

Extract from Mr. Wheeler's Minute.

“ I am at a loss to conceive, how we shall
 “ be able to fulfil stipulations with Moodajee
 “ Bgolla, for forwarding his pretensions either
 “ to the dignity of Peshwa, or to the domini-
 “ ons said to be taken from him by Nizam
 “ Ally ; how our army is to act or be sup-
 “ plied at that distance, or what good effect
 “ such measures are to produce, either for the
 “ defence of Bengal or Bombay, other than
 “ that of driving those states, from apprehen-
 “ sions of our ambitious views, entirely into
 “ the arms of the French, *and compelling*
 “ *them to form a general alliance for extir-*
 “ *pating us from Indostan.*”

Mr. Elliot died on his journey, in conse-
 sequence of a very spirited and hazardous
 exertion to catch the famous Monsieur Che-
 valier, who had escaped in disguise from
 Chandenagor, and was then making the best
 of his way to Europe, in order to give the
 French ministry the earliest and most accu-
 rate

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rate information, (which no man possessed more perfectly than he did) of the state of India, particularly of Bengal. Mr. Elliot was in a bad state of health when he set out, and by falling into a river, or being excessively wetted while in pursuit of Chevalier, unquestionably caught his death. When he was taken and sent back to Calcutta, the tribute paid to the memory of Mr. Elliot was, that Chevalier was immediately set at liberty, and dispatched express to France, *over land*, by a special passport from Mr. Hastings, against the warmest and strong est remonstrances that could be urged by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheler. His wife and family, whom he was in too great a hurry to wait for, went round the cape in a Danish Indiaman.

THESE FACTS ARE ON RECORD.

After Mr. Elliot's death, the *same* powers and instructions to treat with the *supposed* Raja of Berar, were transferred and continued to Colonel Goddard; and, for aught that appears to the contrary, are in force to this day. Yet, on the 24th of May, 1779, when it was Mr. Hastings's object to precipitate a third rupture with the Maratta government

vernment at Poona; and to leave no opening for an accommodation with them, and when it was urged that it would be prudent at least, before we recommenced hostilities with a people, *who had never injured us*, to secure the friendship and assistance of some of the country powers, he then declared, "that Moodajee Boosla's unwillingness to join us, was
 " an additional motive for our preferring a
 " scheme of military operations practicable
 " by our own force, and *unincumbered with*
 " *the weight of a timid ally.*" Without disputing the incomparable wisdom of the reason then assigned for engaging in a war, without alliances, and for preferring that system to any other, it may be proper to observe, that this man, so described by Mr. Hastings, is the very same Moodajee Boosla, with whom he has assiduously laboured to form an offensive alliance, for no less an operation than the conquest of the Maratta Empire, and for divesting the Nizam of the Decan of a third of his dominions.—This is the *same timid ally*, whose alliance he was so passionately solicitous to obtain, that, on the 23d of November, 1778, he thought he should conciliate his confidence and esteem

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by telling his minister, "*In the whole of my conduct, I have departed from the common line of policy, and have made advances, when others, in my situation, would have waited for solicitations ;—but I trust to the approved bravery and spirit of your chief, that he will ardently catch at the objects presented to his ambition.*" (*Vide Appendix*).

Again, This is the same *timid ally*, to whom, on the 9th of February, 1779, he made the following *portentous* declaration. "I am sorry that you entertained this distrust, and do declare that, had you accepted of the terms offered you through Colonel Goddard, and concluded a treaty with this government upon them, I should have held the obligation of it superior to that of any engagement formed by the government of Bombay, and should have thought it my duty to maintain it, and to defend the faith of this government pledged for the performance of it, against every consideration, even of the most valuable interests and safety of the English possessions intrusted to my charge."

From

From May 1779, the Maratta war is solely and exclusively his own. The government of Bombay discouraged and opposed it. In January 1779, they had received a severe and bitter lesson near Poona, when their whole army in effect capitulated, and owed its subsequent release and safety, to the generosity and moderation of the Marattas. They indeed have suffered for their imprudence, as every Indian state has done, that has ever reposed a confidence in the honour, good faith, or gratitude of the Company's governments in that country.

In justice to Mr. Hornby, President of Bombay, it ought to be observed, that he thought himself bound by a great obligation to *Madajee Scindia*, one of the principal Maratta Chiefs, for the lenity and indulgence, with which the Bombay army was treated. The following extract from his Minute on the occasion, dated the 19th of February, 1779, will be found to deserve particular attention.

‘ There can be no hesitation in declaring
 “ such a convention invalid. Yet we are

“ indebted to *Madajee Scindia* for our having
 “ this still left in our power. He, the whole
 “ army, and we, must be equally struck with
 “ this fact. I do therefore think *our nati-*
 “ *onal honour* concerned, in finding some way
 “ of acquitting ourselves to *him*. It is im-
 “ possible to proceed on *such rotten ground*,
 “ as that of renouncing both the engage-
 “ ments with the Durbar, and him, who
 “ enabled us to reject them. *It would be*
 “ *breaking faith with the whole world at once;*
 “ *with our friends and with our enemies.*”

Mr. Hastings also, in his Minute of the
 24th of May, 1779, speaking of the same
 transaction and the same person, declares
 that “ the obligations of justice and honour,
 “ were pledged for the retribution of *the most*
 “ *signal* (though humiliating) act of kind-
 “ ness, that a nation could have received
 “ from the bounty of an individual.”

The method taken to acquit the Com-
 pany and the nation, of their obligations
 to Madajee Scindia, was to form a plan
 for the direct invasion of his country,
 by another expedition from Bengal, under
 the

the command of Major Camac; on which plan, Mr. Hastings and Mr. Francis finally broke, in June 1780.

With all the preceding evidence in view, and with much more, which might be collected from the Company's records, can it be doubted, whether it was an essential interest of the Nizam to counteract and defeat the views of Mr. Hastings, of which all India was thoroughly apprised? And if it was impolitic and unjust, in the presidency of Fort St. George, to run the risque of a quarrel with the Nizam, in June 1779, for so inconsiderable an object as the Pashcush, or the immediate possession of a district, which was of course to devolve to the Company, on the death of the present occupant; by what names are we to qualify the project, formed by Mr. Hastings in July 1778, for attacking the Nizam in the midst of a profound peace, and conquering such a portion of his country, as might satisfy the ambition of his rival and his enemy? Can it be denied that this project struck directly at the Nizam's existence? Or is it to be supposed that all his resentment was reserved for a subsequent and comparatively

tively a petty offence, received from the presidency of Fort St. George, and that he felt no apprehensions or concern for the effects of an union, projected between the government of Bengal and his natural enemy Moodajee Boosla ; one of the specific objects of which was, to invade and conquer his dominions. His conduct shews that he perfectly understood his interests, that he dissembled his resentments, while he clearly saw his danger, and wisely provided against it. Certain acts, done afterwards, and declarations made to him by the Presidency of Fort St. George, might possibly have added to his apprehensions; and compleated the measure of his resentment. They might also have furnished the ostensible and immediate pretences for a rupture ; because *things done* are in general better evidence *to be held out to the world*, as the motives of action, than things of far greater reach and extent, projected but not executed.

But the question is, whether he had not already taken his resolution, and formed his measures on much more important grounds ? An attentive inquiry will soon discover the connexion

connexion between his *real* motives and his actions. A great *effect* evidently exists. A selection of *causes* is presented to our judgment. Shall we ascribe it to a *little* motive, or to a great one? At all events, there is no conceivable argument or principle, on which the proceedings at Fort St. George can be condemned, which will not apply with infinitely greater force, as well from parity of reasoning, as from the singular concurrence of his own authority, to the condemnation of Mr. Hastings.

F I N I S.



APPEN-

A P P E N D I X.

*Copy of a Letter from Mr. HASTINGS, to
DEWAJUR PUNDIT, Prime-Minister to
the Rajah of Berar, dated in Calcutta,
November the 23d 1778.*

*"IN the whole of my conduct I have de-
parted from the common line of policy,
and have made advances, when others in my
situation, would have waited for sollicita-
tion." As the greatest advantages, to
which I can look, cannot in their nature
equal those, to which the prosperous issue of
our measures, may conduct the state of the
Maha Rajah's government. But I know
the characters to which I address myself.
I trust to the approved bravery and spirit of
your Chief, that he will ardently catch at the
objects presented to his ambition, and to your wis-
dom; of which, if fame reports truly, no minister
ever possessed a larger portion, that you will
view their importance in too clear a light to
hazard the loss of them, by attempting to
take an advantage of the desire, which I have
expressed for their accomplishment. This inti-
mation is not so much intended for a caution
to you, as for an explanation of my conduct
to those, who may be less able to penetrate
into the grounds of it.*