OBSTRUCTIONS TO TRADE IN INDIA.

A LETTER

TO

F. C. BROWN, ESQ., OF TELLICHERRY,

WITH HIS REPLY.

EDITED BY

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PREFACE.

The accompanying sequel to the correspondence between Mr. F. C. Brown and the Madras authorities respecting the "Cardamum" monopoly, will be instructive to those who have seen the pamphlet I recently published on the subject.

One reason for printing this sequel may perhaps be obvious to the reader. Taking the two following letters as an illustration of the character of the two classes to which the writers respectively belong, they show which of them is most entitled to receive public support.

When we remember that the truth of Mr. Brown's description of the monopoly in his first letter is not denied nor even qualified by his respondent, the contrast between the contracted views and callous tones of a Civilian (tax) Collector, compared to the liberal and statesmanlike spirit of a British settler, is very striking and painful.

Of these two writers, one sees and feels for nothing but "Revenue," and yet his mind has become too narrowed to understand the best way of securing that; the other is raised, by his very feeling for the people, to an elevation which gives him a comprehensive and correct view of the general interests of the State; yet the former is the man in power, the type of old Indian officialism, and the favorite of the Home Government; while the latter represents that class of "Interlopers," the hereditary foes of monopoly, long jealously and

vindictively proscribed, and still barely tolerated by genuine old Company's servants, and their allies at home.

Yes! the unchanging character of the Home Government is the worst part of the business. In India the old school of functionaries is disappearing, and a more progressive one is taking its place. At home, all is stationary.* During the 13 years that I have agitated the question of India Reform, there has been *scarcely any change in the men* who formed the Home Government of India, and never any change in their measures, except when special acts were forced upon them by temporary popular excitement in consequence of some tremendous public calamity.

But these periodical fits of public attention to India have been hitherto as evanescent as the extraordinary disasters which aroused them. They have compelled important concessions to public opinion for the moment, they have each suddenly effected some improvement in the administration which had been called for, and obstinately resisted, perhaps for a quarter of a century before; and then they have passed away, leaving *the same men in the same places*, to pursue the same principles as before.

The result is that the Home Government has learnt nothing and forgotten nothing from the vicissitudes of its existence; and its tactics are just the same in 1862 as they were in 1852, viz., to give every honour and and reward that it dares* to partisans of the old Company's Government, and stanch defenders of things

* Sometimes "I dare not, waits upon I would": the sacrifice of Mr. Laing would have paved the way for the nomination of a member of the India Council, but the public were too much scandalized to make the thing safe; Parliamentary action is threatened, and so, to allay the growing storm, Sir Charles Trevelyan is appointed, to persuade the world that if one good man is removed, at least another good one is put in his place."

as they were; and to discourage and disgrace, by every means in its power, the most conspicuous advocates of improvement in the Indian administration.

Under this reign of evil at home, no substantial reform can be hoped for in India, without exciting attention and attracting support here, and the very question which Mr. Brown has taken up, is one of the strongest proofs of it.

Any one would think, on contemplating Mr. Brown's startling picture of the Indian tariff in his first letter, that the subject must be a new one, which had never been seriously considered before: and that a scheme of such barbarous imbecility need only be properly represented to the Government to be at once corrected by its common sense.

The very idea, in our day, when it is notorious that you may count on your fingers the few articles that pay nine-tenths of the Customs' Duties, of a tariff levying duties on "515 imports, and 165 exports, that can be named, *besides every other that cannot*" (under the sweeping clause of "all articles not included in the above enumeration")—the idea of levying 10 per cent. *ad valorem* duties "according to the local valuation, at every port and outport, and according to the knowledge of trade, the judgment and honesty of Customs' Managers on 50 Rupees (£5) a month!"—all this seems so monstrous at the present day, that a charitable reader might suppose this trade-destroying system had been overlooked by the Government, and the subject had never been fairly brought to its notice until Mr. Brown took it up.

But nothing could be a greater mistake. The subject was forced upon the notice of the Home Government at least as long ago as the year 1846, by the

Chambers of Commerce in India, and the late Mr. Hume in England; it has been repeatedly pressed upon them since then; and it is no further back than December, 1860, that they deliberately revised and confirmed this very tariff, and inflicted it on a magnificent coast-line about three thousand miles in length.

And this is just what was to be expected from *the same men in the same places.* The ideas of the Home Government of India are such an anachronism at the present day, that we must go back from ten to nearly twenty years, to the time when its leading members came into office, even to understand them.

It is forgotten now by the rest of the world, that according to the "Old Indian" tradition, still represented by the Home Government, the most important State functionary was the (tax) Collector, and the principles of his art were of the most elementary description.

They were simply, first to tax the land to the utmost, and then to tax every export and import of its cultivators, without regarding anything but the immediate gain to the Government.

This system of course worked ill in the long run even for the Government itself. The land-tax had to be reduced over and over again; and the Duties still involve a loss, frequently of pounds in the profits of the ryots for every penny levied in Duties, owing to their indirect effect in stopping the development of trade, and preventing experiments in new articles of commerce.

Nevertheless the very men who gloried in this system, and defended every Indian abuse, as the Home Government of ten years ago, *are still in Office,* pursuing their career of obstructiveness, with such occasional interrup-

tions as I have noticed, for want of any continuous public attention to Indian affairs.

Perhaps, after all, the state of the Indian tariff is a less striking instance of the want of such attention, than the state of the Indian cotton supply, which more directly affects our own interests; therefore I will conclude by a few remarks on this subject, which may be developed hereafter.

Since last session, a pamphlet* has been published, which completely settles the long-disputed question, whether India could successfully compete with America in the production of cotton.

A gentleman of well-known scientific reputation and unimpeachable character, Dr. Wight, who was formerly superintendent of the Government cotton farms in Madras, has stated the results of his 13 years' experience; proving, among other things, the following propositions:—

1st. That American (long-stapled) cotton was easily naturalised in India, was suited to all kinds of soil there, though it preferred a rich one, and was rather improved than deteriorated after 13 years' introduction into the country.

2nd. That American cotton farming, so far from being superior, according to the vulgar error, was immeasurably inferior to that of the Hindoos! and that American average crops were the same as those on medium lands in India, "but much below what the best produced!"

3rd. That India is competent to supply the wants of Europe, were they even much greater than they are,

* "Notes on Cotton Farming, explanatory of the American and East Indian Methods," by Robert Wight, M.D., F.R.S., F.L.S., &c.

with good cotton, provided that there is a demand for it, from year to year, "on her own fields."

Assuming then that Dr. Wight has finally proved these propositions (and no one has attempted to refute him), the whole question is narrowed to this: Why has there not been that European demand for cotton, "on her own fields," which would have brought the required supply from India?

The answer is, that a degree of misgovernment existed in the principal departments of the Indian administration, which threatened with ruin any European, out of the public service, who should undertake the business of a cotton agent in the interior.*

The proofs of this misgovernment are on record in various official reports, which I propose to cite hereafter, with regard to three main points, viz., the tenure of land, the administration of justice, and the construction of public works, therefore, I need only add here, that, owing to the want of any continuous public attention to Indian affairs in England, the Home Government has been able to postpone the settlement of the two first of these vital questions until last session, when the cotton famine was actually upon us; and it has not even yet come to an honest or satisfactory settlement of the third (public works) question.†

I thus trace the cotton famine to the want of Indian supplies, and the want of Indian supplies to the obstructiveness of the Home Government. But who is responsible for the Home Government? I fear that the

* Such agencies were tried repeatedly by the Bombay merchants, and failed for the above reason.

† Although it *did* find out immediately after reprimanding and disgracing Mr. Laing for proposing to spend *half a million extra*, on the ground that we still had a deficit, that it could afford to spend *three millions extra*, out of *surplus cash balances*, and sent orders to spend that sum on public works.

people of this country cannot get rid of their responsibility for the acts of their public servants, by giving them any degree of rank and power, or lavishing upon them any amount of salaries at India's expense. If the acts of their servants must be held to be their acts, they are not likely to escape paying the penalty for them in the long run.

However, if the public still believes in the possibility of "putting new wine into old bottles," it can try the Home Government a little longer, and wait for some more of its fruits: in famines, droughts, insurrections, &c., and instalments of reform too late.

Meanwhile, I recommend politicians to re-read Mr. Brown's first letter published a few weeks ago, and then peruse the two following letters, concluding the correspondence.

They will see in them a picture of the two spirits which are now contending for the mastery in India; a spirit of generous youth, and hope, and progress, on the one side; and a spirit of routine, unteachable, "Old-Indianism," on the other: if the new spirit wins the reader's sympathy, as it deserves to do, let him not leave it with a merely passive support.

JOHN DICKINSON.

London, November 13, 1862.

To F. C. Brown, Esq.

Calicut, 23rd July, 1862.

Sir,

Some days ago a copy of your letter, dated 1st June last, to the Revenue Secretary to Government, Madras, was forwarded to me, with a call for an early report, on the "Wynaad Cardamum Farm."

As you have been partly instrumental in bringing the subject forward at present, I doubt not you will be good enough to favor me with your views as to a practical settlement of the Cardamum question. It is not the first time it has been discussed. The objections to the present system of managing the farm are patent; but unfortunately it is much easier to descant on them than to show how they can be avoided, without altogether giving up a *considerable* revenue derived from a *very legitimate* source.

Of course, if Government are willing to throw up the revenue, and to leave Cardamums untaxed, *as pepper and plantains, &c.*, the solution of our difficulty is simple; but *I am not at all prepared* to recommend such a course, and I do not think Government would be prepared to adopt it if I did.

The present state of things, however, cannot go on. If any revenue is to be derived from the article (and I must *again* say that as far as I can see it is a *very legitimate one* from which to draw a revenue), the only courses I can see are—to make it a monopoly by law—to impose a high export duty—or to assess the cultivation, or the land.

In these days no one would advocate the first course, *if it can be avoided*, save, as far as I can learn, the owners of the Cardamum Hills, who would *not at all object* to the measure, to judge from the spirit of Mr. Robinson's and Mr. Grant's reports (the two previous Collectors).

Both these gentlemen and the Hill proprietors appeared to think that *assessment of the land*, or of the cultivation, was hardly feasible, that it would be difficult or impossible to secure a *fair* revenue by a quit-rent on the land.

Now, perhaps your experience may be able to suggest a plan—not free altogether from objection, perhaps, but free from most of the evils of the present system—which, without unduly repressing the production, or interfering with the profits of the producers of this article, may yet secure a *fair revenue** from it to Government, and if you can do so, both the people and the Government ought to be, and I doubt not will be, ready to thank you.

As I must address Government very shortly, I shall be obliged by any remarks you may be good enough to make being sent at your earliest convenience.

I am, Sir, &c., &c.

* The Italics are mine. F. C. B.

From F. C. Brown.

Anjarakandy, 25th July, 1862.

Sir,

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 23rd July, asking for my "views as to a practical settlement of the Cardamum question;" I answer it, as you request, without delay.

The Rajas of Coorg, following the example of the Company, made a strict monopoly of Coorg Cardamums. General Cubbon abolished the monopoly, and replaced it by a very moderate tax assessed for a given number of years upon all Cardamum forests. I have not the means of learning the result of the change. You, as a Government Collector, have. If, besides this result, you will obtain a return of the annual revenue of Coorg from all sources, from the time the measure was introduced to the present time, I think the figures will satisfactorily demonstrate how best to deal practically with the Cardamum Farm of Wynaad.

Besides the Farm-price, these Cardamums, as likewise those of Coorg, contribute in two other ways to the revenue of Madras. First, both pay duty on export according to the local tariff; Second, as wherever exported for sale, the Cardamums must ultimately be paid for in India, they pay import duty when the proceeds are brought back, whether invested in English or in foreign goods.

According to Arbuthnot, Latham and Co.'s London Price Current of the 18th June, the latest I have, Cardamums were in active demand at 10s. 6d., 5¼ Rs.

a lb. Two months ago, the Travancore Government sold 60 Candies (of 600 *Dutch* pounds) of their Cardamums at public sale. As the English price would attract every pound to London, these Cardamums would net there about Rs. 180,000, which sum invested in goods, British or foreign, at an advance of 10 per cent., will, when returned to India, yield a fund of about 2 lacs of Rupees to pay import duty at 5 per cent.

It is true that the proceeds of the Wynaad Cardamums might not be brought back *direct* to this Province in goods, nor the Rs. 10,000 of import duty thus go to swell the balance-sheet of Malabar. But it is not the less plain that the amount will go to the credit of the general balance-sheet of India. The figures in that sheet are the matter of public concern. Calicut river must submit to being merged in the Indian Ocean.

From expressions in your letter, I much fear that I have the misfortune of differing with you in opinion, on the propriety, or advisability, of the Government looking for a "considerable revenue" from Cardamums, on such like forest productions. I confess it was not without a feeling of deep shame that I lately read a *Gazette* advertisement, offering to public farm, the wild honey, and the wild wax, and certain wild roots, and deer's horns, to be collected in certain Government wastes, the collector making known, as an incentive to bidders to make their fortunes, that these valuable royalties had yielded a revenue of Rs. 200 a year in previous years. It is only a very few years since the *Gazette* remitted an annual revenue of Rs. 7 or 15 a year, which a zealous collector brought to account for the grazing of sheep or goats on certain Government waste land. I once had a Bees-wax farmer come here to search, not my woods, but my very house, for the

Company's wax. But I thought all such things were now everywhere things of the past.

You Sir, and I, are both Englishmen; you the Revenue head of this large Province containing a population of a million and three quarters, I a remote Planter. The reason of both tells us, that such modes of raising revenue can no longer be, for our country, our great country, spurns them. The reflection of both must tell us, that it is not by such resources that India will be made to meet the guaranteed interest on railways costing £12,000 to £18,000 a mile, and yielding *nil;* nor by such aids, that she will supply the needs of the four millions of persons laid prostrate in England by the Cotton famine, who are offering 40 and 50 millions sterling a year to any country that will assist them in their dire necessity.

I have the honor, &c., &c.,

(Signed) F. C. BROWN.

SEQUEL

TO

"DHAR NOT RESTORED;"

AND A PROPOSAL

TO EXTEND THE PRINCIPLE

OF

RESTORATION.

BY

JOHN DICKINSON, F.R.A.S., &c.

"DISCITE JUSTITIAM MONITI."

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LITTLE QUEEN STREET, W.C.

SEQUEL

TO

"DHAR NOT RESTORED."

The publication of another Parliamentary Paper in the case of Dhar, enables me to complete the sketch given last year, of the injustice done to this State, and to explain that this injustice *is still being carried on*, in spite of the personal affront to Lord Stanley, and contempt of the House of Commons, involved in such a proceeding.

It is quite necessary to explain this, because a nominal restoration of the principality took place after Lord Stanley's question last year, which has deceived the public: a ludicrous instance of this deception having occurred only a few days ago. On the 11th of April last, the "Calcutta correspondent" of a leading journal, occupied, like other Government scribes at present, in writing down the Native Princes and landed gentry again, preparatory to another course of "looting" them—"our Calcutta correspondent" wound up a string of calumnies on the administration of Native States, by citing the "miserable condition to which the

people of Dhar had been reduced" by the restoration of that State to its Chief—the writer being unaware that we still retain our authority in Dhar, and that we are still responsible for its administration!

I proved last year in detail that the Dhar Government and every individual member of it, were perfectly innocent of the hostility imputed to them in 1857, and that the mutiny of their troops, and all the misfortunes of the State, had been due to the misconduct of the official then acting for Sir Robert Hamilton, in his absence, as Governor-General's Agent for Central India, namely, Colonel Durand, whom I charged with having sacrificed the Dhar State to save his own reputation, and having entirely misrepresented the facts of the case afterwards to his Government.

I also showed how Sir Charles Wood had been forced by Parliamentary pressure to promise the restoration of the State in 1860, and how he had doubly deceived the House of Commons in doing so; first, by representing the fine imposed on the State of Dhar as being a light one, when, in truth, it was a very heavy one; and, secondly, by promising to the House an unconditional restoration in 1862, when he had privately attached a condition to his promise, which would render it easy for the Government to evade it when the time came for its accomplishment. I also explained why nobody suspected this at the time, because Sir Charles Wood's assurances in public were confirmed by still more emphatic promises in private, and the papers in the case were not given to the public until a year afterwards, when, supposing the matter finally settled, nobody thought them worth the trouble of reading.

Finally, I mentioned that the Resident at Indore, in

1860, Sir Richmond Shakespear, deceived, like the rest of the world, by the language used in Parliament, and believing that there was a *bonâ fide* intention on the part of the Government to restore the State in 1862, had issued a proclamation in Malwa, publicly promising the unconditional restoration of Dhar, when the Rajah attained his majority. This proclamation was not disavowed by the Government in India, though when received in England, it induced Sir Charles Wood to restate, in a dispatch to the Governor-General, the condition attached to the restoration, still without the public knowing it.

I believe that for the remainder of Sir Richmond Shakespear's life, to the end of 1861, he supposed that the promise of his proclamation would be kept; because the officer he placed in charge of the State reported, only two months before the time came for fulfilling the promise, in terms which showed his impression that we meant to restore the Rajah in the following April, that there was no reason whatever why we should not do so. And, strange to say, a circumstance which had happened just before, and which ought to have shown me that the Government were still hostile to the Dhar State, and determined to persist in doing injustice to it, became the means of lulling asleep, not only my suspicions, but, perhaps, those of people in Malwa, for another year or two.

This circumstance was a fresh exhibition of Colonel Durand's implacable animosity against the Dhar State, in his new capacity of Foreign Secretary to the Government of India. Having returned to India to assume this office, after the Session of 1861, he had no sooner settled down to his work at Calcutta, than an order

went forth for the sale of the Dhar family's jewels, ornaments, and heirlooms—"Dhar plunder," as it was called, by public auction. Up to this time, it had been hoped, that considering the complete acquittal of the Dhar Durbar, that had resulted from Sir Robert Hamilton's investigations, and considering the heavy fine, *one-fourth of its net revenue*, inflicted on the Dhar Government, and the sufferings inflicted on its innocent family, before the promise of restoration, it had been hoped that such an outrage as the sale of their treasures and heirlooms by public auction would at least be spared them. But no! Colonel Durand had determined that they should drain the cup to the dregs, and on the 2nd of December, 1861, notifications were circulated in Malwa, for a public auction of the "Dhar plunder."

On hearing this news I wrote privately in the strongest language to Sir Charles Wood, telling him how the people of Central India had been shocked by such an announcement, and warning him that Colonel Durand's rancorous temper and antipathy to the Natives, which had got him into difficulties in every political situation he had previously filled, had drawn forth, on his appointment, an emphatic protest from the local press against his filling such a post as that of Foreign Secretary, which gave him the opportunity of wreaking his old grudges on every Native State that had given him umbrage in his former service, and had placed all the Native States at the mercy of a man notoriously incapable of carrying out that policy of conciliation which the British nation had professedly adopted.

Sir Charles Wood replied to this letter by giving me those conventional assurances which he is always so

ready to offer, and which deceived me at the time, though they ought not to deceive anybody in the year 1865.

I will now quote the words of the officer left in charge of Dhar by Sir R. Shakespear, written only two months before the restoration should have been carried out, with a knowledge of the condition attached to the restoration by Sir Charles Wood, that the Rajah should be pronounced competent to manage his own affairs. It will be evident from the following paragraph, that this officer, who had been living in the closest intimacy with the Rajah for nine months previously, *entertained no doubt of his competency to govern*, and only insisted on the fact that there was so much administrative work to do, that the Rajah ought to have, like other Sovereign Princes, an efficient Minister to assist him when he took charge of the State himself:—

"*From Lieutenant* H. C. E. WARD, *Officiating Superintendent Dhar, to Major* R. J. MEADE, *Agent Governor-General for Central India. (No.* 33, *dated Dhar,* 30*th January,* 1862.)*

"3. The Rajah of Dhar will attain the age of eighteen in the month of April, this year, and his Excellency the Viceroy having directed that on his attaining his majority, and being pronounced competent, the State is to be restored to him, I feel it my duty to express strongly my opinion, that a Dewan of good family and of some property, with influence in the State, should be appointed to assist the young Chief in the management of Dhar; at present everything is managed by the Superintendent; all the expenditure is regulated by him; all questions of finance are referred to him; all the kamavisdars of different pergunnahs send in their reports to him, and all judicial or civil cases are forwarded for his judgment and orders; this work, when the Rajah obtains

* Parliamentary Paper No. 196 of 1865, page 41.

the management of his own affairs, will fall upon him, and though he is neither deficient in intellect nor ability, still I do not think he has sufficient physical energy to undertake so much mental as well as bodily work, and among the personal attendants there is not, in my opinion, one man fitted for the responsible situation of Dewan, either by his talents, or his position as a man of property in the Dhar State. Of the personal relatives of the Rajah I can say nothing, they all having left either during or after the mutinies, and gone to reside on their jageers in the Deccan and Concan. During my tenure of office as Superintendent of Dhar, I have continually endeavoured to impress on the young Chief the absolute necessity of devoting a great portion of his time to study, and he has attended cutchery regularly for the purpose of learning how the work should be carried on; still, in my opinion, there is so much work, that the aid of an efficient Dewan is essentially necessary to the welfare of the Dhar State, after the British Superintendent leaves."

When Lieutenant Ward penned the above paragraph he was under the persuasion that the Government really intended to restore the State, and, therefore, he expressed no doubt of the Rajah's competency to govern. But the officer who followed him, Captain Wood, was evidently better informed of the intentions of Government, for in *thirteen days** he came to the most decided conclusion that the Rajah was not competent to govern, and he recommended a postponement of the restoration for six months: a mild expedient to begin with, not calculated to frighten people!

This officer, moreover, completely changed the system of education prescribed for the Rajah by the late Sir R. Shakespear.† He now made over to the Rajah the work of a particular district, "in order that he might, "after hearing the cases read, affix his opinions on a "fly-leaf, and return them to the Superintendent for

* Parliamentary Paper No. 195 of 1865, page 112. † *Ibid.*

"supervision"*—a process which did not improve his chances of restoration; for a year afterwards we find Lieutenant Ward, who knew more of the intentions of the Government by this time, reporting that "the "causes for the little progress made by the chief, in "qualifying himself to assume charge of the State, "still remain."† And so the farce went on for two years, with periodical reports of incompetency from India, and periodical "regrets" from Sir Charles Wood at home, and "willingness to hope that he might "eventually be found competent, &c."‡

And so the farce *would* have gone on, and the poor young Prince would have been deprived of his rights, until the time had arrived for the Solicitor-General to denounce him fiercely in the House, as "one of those "nominal Sovereigns who had no power, and to whom "no power could safely be entrusted; who had only "this attribute to sovereignty—that they were above "all law; whose existence was an unmixed evil to the "people of India, and whose abolition would inflict "no harm on a single human being." This sentiment, which was received with cheers by a bench-full of Whig placemen the other night, does not seem to express the feelings of the Natives of India, for even the last Parliamentary Paper, not compiled by friends of the young Rajah, casually admits the "much re-joicing" of the people of Dhar, when their young Prince had a son and heir born to him, and their "general satisfaction" when his nominal restoration took place last November.

* Parliamentary Paper No. 196 of 1865, page 59.
† Parliamentary Paper No. 196 of 1865, page 74.
‡ Parliamentary Paper No. 196 of 1865, pages 70, 93.

However, the farce of pretended incompetency in India, and hypocritical regrets at home, was interrupted at last. The friends of the young Prince were revolted by the dishonesty and tyranny of our Government, and furnished me with evidence to prove it. And on the publication of my "Dhar not Restored," the Rajah presented a Khareeta (official letter) demanding his restoration, and what was more important, Lord Stanley put a question in the House of Commons, which Sir Charles Wood could not venture to disregard. It became necessary to concede some apparent restoration; and the only thing that remained was to turn the concession into a sham, and restore a shadow of power without the substance, by making the Rajah bind himself to retain an obnoxious native Minister of our appointment, and to allow us to select any future Minister in case of a vacancy.

Now, the plan of forcing a native Prince to accept some "mere creature of the British authorities" as his Minister, is not new in India; it has been repeatedly tried, and, as admitted in one of Lord Dalhousie's Minutes, on the Nizam's case, it has so invariably failed, and proved so mischievous both to the native States and to ourselves, that it was long ago condemned and strongly prohibited by the British Government. There are several old Indian Residents in London, who could, and possibly did, tell Sir Charles Wood, as they told me, of the disastrous failures of this plan which had happened within their experience. But there is an entirely new feature introduced into the plan in its present application to Dhar, which has reasonably alarmed the other native Princes of India in the highest degree.

I say it is not a new thing in India for our Political Agents to force native Princes by indirect means to accept Ministers, or dismiss them, at our dictation; such despotism has been known before, though it had been authoritatively put an end to. But it is quite a new thing, and till now unheard of, that we should make it *the signed condition of our acknowledging the rights of a Native Prince*, that he should allow us to name his Minister! If this precedent is allowed to remain, there is not a native Prince in India who will not fall a victim to it, not one who may not look forward to no distant day when he or his successor will be savagely denounced by the Solicitor-General, as "one of those "nominal Sovereigns who has no power, to whom no "power can safely be entrusted, whose existence is an "unmixed evil to the people of India, and whose "abolition will inflict no harm on a single human "being;" while his sentence of doom is greeted by Whig Ministerial cheers.

We are entering on a dangerous course in the far East, but the Whigs are at least consistent in their policy. Some eighteen years ago they made up their minds to govern their Sovereign's distant Indian Empire, not through the national and natural leaders of the people, but through their destruction, by a deliberate division of the people of India into "a "Government of foreign officials on the one hand, "and a nation of serfs on the other." This precious scheme, which was to make India pay financially, was carried out by an unimaginative Viceroy with as little remorse as if he was clearing away larches in a Scotch forest. Lord Dalhousie swept down Princes, Enamdars, and Jaghirdars, by great swathes; he

trained up a rising generation to delight in the work, who are now occupying high posts in the India administration; and he bequeathed to the Whigs the most uncompromising representative of his *levelling system* in their present Viceroy, who is beginning the work again all over the Empire, from the plains of Oude to the plateau of Mysore. And this system is justified by a horrible cant about "the interests of the people!" that people who are beggared by the destruction of their best class of capitalists, who never lose an opportunity of expressing their sympathy for their native Chiefs, and who have seized many opportunities of fighting desperately to defend or avenge them!

Now let us examine both the ostensible and real reasons for imposing this degrading condition on the Rajah of Dhar as the price of his restoration. When in his Report of January, 1862, Lieutenant Ward expressed the opinion already quoted, that after his restoration the Rajah of Dhar would require the assistance of a Minister to dispatch the business of his administration (like every other Sovereign Prince that I ever heard of!), he concluded with this practical suggestion:*—

"12. I have asked the opinion of the young Chief, and of his uncle, the Rajah of Dewas, as to who, in their opinion, was best fitted for the situation of Dewan, and they have mentioned the name of Ram Rao Mankur, the maternal uncle of the young Chief, a man of very good family, but regarding whose fitness for the situation I can say nothing, as he is at present in the service of Maharajah Holkar, and has only been at Dhar for short periods during my tenure of office, and Raghoonath Narain, an official of the Durbar, whom I have never seen, as he has been on leave, and employed in the Deccan for the last four months."

* Parliamentary Paper No. 196 of 1865, page 42.

On this the Resident Major Meade remarked as follows :—"It is of course most important that the "selection should be a palatable one to the young "chief; and if either of the two persons named by "Lieutenant Ward in paragraph 12 of his Report as "being so, is found qualified for the office, his nomi- "nation thereto would be easy and convenient."* Let it be observed, that as long as the Resident feels no personal interest in the matter, he declares it to be "of course most important that the selection of a "Minister *should be a palatable one to the young Chief;*" it will now be seen that directly his ruling passion is thwarted in the slightest degree—and the ruling passion of his class is the love of despotism—he not only does not hesitate to force an unpalatable selection on the young Chief, but when obliged against his will to restore him, he insists on binding him to accept Ministers of our selection to the end of his days.

In the events which followed Lieutenant Ward's suggestion, from 1862 to the present time, the conduct of our Political Agents has been throughout, so exactly what I described last year, in speaking of "the normal "character of our Political Agents in India," that it might seem as if I had been drawing a portrait from life of these very proceedings in the appointment of the Dhar Minister, although I knew nothing about them till the publication of this Parliamentary Paper. It is curious to observe how closely the facts of this particular case correspond with the description I gave, quoting good authorities for my statements, of the habitual abuse of power by our modern Residents, always supported afterwards by the Government, and

* Parliamentary Paper No. 196 of 1865, page 39.

of their habitual calumny of "every man who has "access to the Prince, and who is supposed to have "an opinion of his own, or to give advice contrary to "that of the Resident."*

Lieutenant Ward had suggested two persons, Ram Rao Mankur, and Raghoonath Narain, as being eligible for the post of Minister to the Rajah of Dhar; and the Resident had pronounced it "of course most impor- "tant that the selection should be a palatable one to the young Chief." Before the appointment was made, the Resident was informed that one of those persons would not be "palatable to the young Chief." Then, the reader might anticipate, "of course he appointed "the other?" Exactly the reverse! In spite of the Rajah's "determined, though perhaps natural opposi- "tion to the appointment of Raghoonath Narain, and "the ill-feeling with which he was at first regarded by "the Rajah," which is admitted by Lieutenant Ward,† Raghoonath Narain was made the Rajah's Minister! and in future no language could be too strong to describe the virtues of Raghoonath Narain, and no calumny too false or too absurd to apply to every one suspected of opposing or competing with him, especially the innocent cause, in part, of the Rajah's dislike to him, Ram Rao Mama Mankur. For it is mentioned incidentally by Lieutenant Ward that "the opposition with "which he (Raghoonath) was regarded by the young "Rajah, arose principally from the wish of the latter to "have his maternal uncle, Mama Rao Mankur, ap- "pointed to the post."‡

At the same time the Resident evidently felt that it

* "Dhar Not Restored," pages 25 to 27.

† Parliamentary Paper No. 196 of 1865, page 59. ‡ *Ibid.*

was rather an awkward thing to force a notoriously obnoxious Minister on the young prince, in spite of his objections, for he catches eagerly at the following sentence in Lieutenant Ward's Report of August 30th, 1862:—"I think that Annund Rao now sees how "useless it is to offer such opposition to our wishes on "this subject, for latterly he has taken Raghoonath Narain into favor again."* On this the Resident observes—"He (Raghoonath) has already overcome "the prejudice of the young Chief to his appointment, "and will, I doubt not, by the exercise of tact, daily "acquire a desirable influence over him."† In this hope he was disappointed, for the next year Lieutenant Ward reported again:—"As regards Raghoonath Narain, I "am sorry to have to report that the Rajah does not "look upon him as favourably as I could wish; he "works with him regularly, and transacts all public "business through him; but, as mentioned to you "demi-officially, he tells me he never can look upon "him as a friend."‡

And so matters went on, and in spite of the Resident's annual declaration, in one form or other, that "a weak Prince like Annund Rao, has neither character "nor strength of mind or will which would enable him "to resist the influence of any designing person about "him,"§ this weak Prince, left almost alone in the world, and confronted by "a giant's power," did, nevertheless, resist to the bitter end the influence of our Political Agents; neither cajolery nor intimidation could render

* Parliamentary Paper No. 196 of 1865, page 59.
† Parliamentary Paper No. 196 of 1865, page 56.
‡ Parliamentary Paper No. 196 of 1865, page 74.
§ Parliamentary Paper No. 196 of 1865, page 112.

Raghoonath Narain "palatable to the young Chief," so that when the crisis came, the Resident felt that Annund Rao had "character" enough to beat him at last, unless the Government allowed him to force the Rajah to sign that infamous condition which bound him to retain a mere creature of the Resident for his Minister, and to take any future Minister from his hand.

In urging this measure on the Government, the language of the Resident Major Meade, and the Superintendent of Dhar, Captain Bannerman, becomes so outrageous, that I know not whether to wonder most at its intemperance or its absurdity.

It was not enough for them to lard over Raghoonath again with their praises, and attempt to prove that he was the Atlas who carried the whole State of Dhar on his shoulders, but, feeling that the "weak Prince" still stuck to his text, and the first use he made of his restored power would probably be to appoint his uncle Ram Rao Mankur, Minister, in the room of Raghoonath, these two officials hurled every calumny they could think of at the head of the devoted Ram Rao, winding up with the extraordinary charge that if Ram Rao were allowed to exercise any influence, there could be no doubt he would use it to make the State virtually "an appanage" of Indore, and to bring the Rajah of Dhar into indirect subjection to Holkar, "which," said the Resident, "would be a grievous misfortune "for both, and from which I feel strongly we are "specially bound to protect them:"*

. . . . . "*Tantœne animis cœlestibus iræ!*"

Really, if this preposterous stuff were not printed in

* Parliamentary Paper No. 196 of 1865, page 112.

the Blue-book, I should never have believed that our officers had been silly enough to write it. Now, let me sift this special pleading a little, and see if there is a single grain of wheat in the heap of chaff. These gentlemen begin by an exhaustive argument to prove not only that Raghoonath is unique of his kind, "the "one, entire, and perfect minister," but that his ministry is indispensable, because there is no Council of State. "There is no Durbar," says the Superintendent; "there is no Durbar," echoes the Resident. No Durbar? Surely these great wits have short memories, for not only is the Durbar referred to throughout this Parliamentary Paper, but when the Government decision arrives, in favor of Raghoonath *versus* Ram Rao, the Resident directs the Superintendent to make the Rajah sign the condition "before the assembly of the Durbar," and then to "present the Viceroy's orders to the Chief in a "full Durbar;"* so that the Durbar is alternately alive or dead, according to the interest of Raghoonath for the time being. Moreover, in the enthusiasm of their partisanship, these gentlemen prove too much, for when, after demonstrating that there is "no Durbar," and no other possible Minister, they bring us to the conclusion that "the only method by which the business of the State could be carried on,"† is by Raghoonath; the logical reader is forced to cry out—Dear me !‡ what would happen to Dhar, if anything should happen to Raghoonath? The risk certainly appears startling! What if Raghoonath, ambitious of the gold medal of the Royal Geographical Society, should take to travelling?

* Parliamentary Paper No. 196 of 1865, page 118.

† Parliamentary Paper 196 of 1865, page 114.

‡ A corruption of Dio mio.

Then, obviously, the administration would collapse, the arch would crumble into ruins, chaos would come again, in Dhar! But no, logical reader, let me hasten to reassure you. I am informed by a high official authority, an English gentleman who knows Dhar, at least as well as Colonel Meade and Captain Bannerman, that anarchy would not ensue if Raghoonath were *non est inventus*, that the Rajah could, and no doubt would, form a good ministry to-morrow, if he were left to choose for himself.

Now, let me examine the attacks made by these partisans on the man whom the Rajah originally preferred, and whom they evidently fear he still wishes to select, Ram Rao Mama Mankur. It is curious that one of Captain Bannerman's arguments for the necessity of Raghoonath is, that if the Rajah took Ram Rao into his confidence, he would be sure to betray him, "more "especially as the Rajah's uncle, His Highness Bappoo "Sahib, Chief of Dewas, who always took great interest "in Dhar affairs, and gave the soundest advice to the "young Rajah, is now no more, and there is not a "single relative to watch over the interest of the young "Chief."* Why, it was this very uncle who first pronounced that "Ram Rao, a man of very good family, "the maternal uncle of the young chief, *was best fitted* "*for the situation of Dewan*" (Minister). Captain Bannerman had forgotten this little incident when he brought in His Highness Bappoo Sahib to the rescue, "who always "gave the soundest advice to the young Rajah." But to proceed: Ram Rao is described as "a man of intriguing "disposition;"† the very words I quoted last year from

* Parliamentary Paper No. 196 of 1865, page 115. † *Ibid.*

the work of Major Bell, as "the accepted traditional "language of our Indian political officers, for every "man, whatever his rank may be, who has access to "the Prince or his Minister, and who is supposed to "have an opinion of his own, or to give advice con-"trary to that of the Resident." When, therefore, Ram Rao is described as "a man of intriguing disposi-"tion," the meaning is that he is a gentleman, who could not be made a mere tool of the Resident's office.

Again, it is said by these two officials, that Ram Rao is "a private attendant of Holkar's,"* a subject and creature of the Maharajah's, and the person most in his private confidence. This is another misrepresentation, and I had better mention who and what Ram Rao is. He is not now, and never was, "a private attendant of Holkar's," though he is one of the Sirdars of that Court. He was formerly one of the old Jaghirdars and Sirdars of the Rajah of Sattara, and is now among those of Her Majesty Queen Victoria; he is also an old Sirdar of the State of Dhar. During the lifetime of the late Rajah, owing to some misunderstanding, he left Dhar and went to Indore, where he was hospitably received, and treated according to his rank and position, receiving an appointment among the Mankurees. In the rebellion he did good service; he was first sent by the Government of Holkar to command and keep in order the mutinous Mehidpore Contingent, and afterwards was transferred to the command of the frontier troops, at Rampoora and Bhanpoora, in the vicinity of Mundisore, which was in the possession of the rebel Feroze Shah, at the time

* Parliamentary Paper No. 196 of 1865, pages 114, 112.

when the British troops moved against him. Ram Rao acquitted himself so creditably in those critical times, that the records of both Holkar's and the British Government bear testimony to his services, and his name is mentioned in the Blue Book on "Honors and "Rewards to Native Princes," as one of those district officers "who preserved peace and order in the country," and who "managed so well that none of the Neemuch "or Mundisore insurgents could gain a footing in the districts under their charge."* Finally, I repeat that Ram Rao was, in the opinion of the late Chief of Dewas, "who always gave the soundest advice to the "young Rajah," the gentleman "*best fitted for the situation of Minister*" to the Prince of Dhar.

After this explanation, probably the reader will regard as I do the attacks of Colonel Meade and Captain Bannerman on the character of Ram Rao, and consider their allegations, that he would teach the young Prince to be idle and extravagant, and use his influence to bring him into indirect subjection to Holkar, as simply gratuitous calumnies on a Hindoo officer of distinguished merit. Nevertheless, it is on these reports from Colonel Meade and Captain Bannerman that the Government has acted, *and is still acting to this day*; and, therefore, I must discuss that one of their arguments which appears to have decided the Government, viz., the argument founded on the Resident's jealousy of His Highness the Maharajah Holkar. It is evident that the Maharajah himself has given no pretext for this jealousy, or else our Political Agents would have cited it. Holkar has certainly not coveted any of the terri-

* Parliamentary Paper No. 77 of 1860, page 120.

tory of Dhar. If he had, he might have obtained it long ago, not from the Dhar Government, *but from our own.* There is negative evidence that he has not coveted any authority over the counsels of Dhar, for if there had been a symptom of it, Colonel Meade would have paraded the "intrigue" to justify his own feeling towards him. The sole cause, therefore, of this petty and mischievous jealousy of Holkar is, that if the Rajah of Dhar were made independent, he would, probably, and most reasonably and naturally, consult his powerful and sympathetic neighbour on important occasions, and be guided by his advice. So far from this result being "a grievous misfortune," as Colonel Meade calls it, I think it would be the best thing that could happen, both for the Dhar State and for ourselves. If Holkar is a friend to both parties, if he could not acquire any material power in Dhar unless we gave it him, if he could only exercise a moral influence, why should we grudge him this influence, and how could it do anything but good? The conduct of the Resident and the Government really raises the question: Do we look upon Holkar as a friend? or, to put what is substantially the same question, in another shape, are we friends to Holkar, or any other native Prince, or do we mean to absorb them all?

This is the question which is at the bottom of all such cases as that of Dhar, and which makes every such case a link in the chain of fate; and though superficial observers may not see how "our pleasant vices" will "become the whips to scourge us," there are those who have thought deeply over this India question, and who conclude, like me, that with our present hostility to the native Princes and landed gentry, we are march-

ing on in blind security, not merely to the loss of our Indian empire, but to its loss in a way which will ruin the British empire at the same time—we are sacrificing two empires for a little temporary power and patronage, and "selling our birthright for a mess of "pottage!"

Now let me examine this question, first with reference to Holkar personally, and next in its imperial aspect, which connects the fate of the higher classes in India with our own safety and interest. There was a time when the value of Holkar's alliance, and the advantage to us of his existence, was put to the test. Eight years ago, when the rulers of men in India felt the ground rocking under their feet, our English officials were suddenly paralysed over a vast extent of country, and the words of Lord Metcalf came true once more:—"Nothing can be a greater proof of our weak-"ness, in the absence of a military force, even when it "is not far removed, than the history of such insurrec-"tions as have occurred. *The civil power and all sem-"blance of the existence of our Government are instantly "swept away by the torrent.*" Again, "The prevalent "disaffection of our subjects, the uncertainty under "which we hold any part of our Indian possessions, "without the presence or immediate vicinity of a mili-"tary force; *the utter inability of our civil establishments "to stem the torrent of insurrection; their consternation and "hopelessness when it begins to roar;* constitute in reality "the greatest of our dangers in India."

Then came true, also, the words of Sir John Malcolm, which anticipated the fallacies of the Annexation-school:—"Some look to increase of revenue, from its "furnishing the means of paying a great and adequate

"force, as being the simplest and surest mode of pre-
"serving our power; but an army chiefly composed of
"natives of the country we desire to keep in subjection,
"may prove a two-edged sword; and, besides, history
"informs us that though armies are the sole means of
"conquering a country, they never were the sole or
"even the chief means of preserving it." Again:
"Though our revenue may increase, the permanence
"of our power will be hazarded in proportion as the
"territories of native Princes and Chiefs fall under our
"direct rule."

Then appeared the truth of these words of Sir Henry Russell (the same who wrote to General Briggs: "I "look upon every extinction of a Native State as a "nail driven into our own coffin"): —"The increase of "our subjects, and still more, of our native troops, is "an increase, not of our strength, but of our weakness; "between them and us there never can be a community "of feeling. We must always continue foreigners, and "the object of that jealousy and dislike which a foreign "rule never ceases to excite. The diversities between "ourselves and the people of India are so many and so "great, that we can never be blended, as in other con-"quests, into one people. We do not, and cannot, "mingle and intermarry with them. . . . . The "distinctions of color, language, and manners, between "us and our native subjects, are insurmountable. . . " . . . Our Government has no sympathy with "their opinions, nor any hold upon their attachment."

Then appeared the wisdom of those who hold, like Major Evans Bell, that wherever there is a Native State, there is a competent and visible authority, responsible for the peace and good order of a certain area, and of a

certain population; there is a Sovereign, and his Ministers, and nobles, six or eight of the most intelligent, the most influential and the most deeply interested personages in the country, who have everything to lose, who can be identified by us, and held directly responsible for their conduct, and who wield such a moral authority over their people, that in a time of disturbance, and in the face of strong local opposition, the native Prince can preserve the peace, not only in his own, but in adjacent British territory, so that we can denude his country of troops with greater security than we can march them out of any part of our own possessions; whereas, directly this Native State is turned into a British province, filled with bitter regrets and reminiscences, peopled with serfs, thenceforth excluded from the avenues of distinction and honor; ruled by alien "birds of passage," who monopolise the most valuable privileges and rights of society; in such a *quondam* Native State, the moral force of the Government is destroyed, it must be supplied by physical force; but we can no longer trust the Native levies, they require regiments from England to watch them, and in the hour of danger, in the face of Hindoo millions, the British official, isolated, and without influence, is "absolutely "powerless unless backed by European soldiers."

Well, it was in such an hour of danger, and when for above five months together we had no military force to help him, that Holkar proved a breakwater to our enemies in Central India. Throughout that crisis, especially during the whole month that Colonel Durand was absent in July, 1857, the officers who remained at the post of danger, acknowledged their deep obligations to Holkar. I could quote

from Colonel Showers, at Neemuch, Colonel Hungerford, at Mhow, Major Hutchinson, at Amjheera—who even visited Holkar at Indore, and gave counsel to him; or from Lord Elphinstone, at Bombay, with whom Holkar kept up a constant correspondence, when unable to communicate with Calcutta. But I prefer to quote the dispatch of Sir Robert Hamilton, which is accessible to everybody, and I shall now give a series of extracts from that important document* :—

"*From Sir Robert Hamilton, Bart., &c., &c., &c., the 26th April*, 1858.

"Sir,—In a previous communication I stated my intention to submit a report on the conduct of all the functionaries attached to the Indore Durbar, in order that the Right Honorable the Governor-General might form a correct opinion of the character and feeling of that Court at the commencement of and during the mutinous outbreak.

"I have now the honor to submit that report. . . . . .

"One of the most curious facts connected with this outbreak is the weight which is yet attached to the Peishwa's name. In the Deccan its revival has passed as an electric shock, inflaming every Deccan pundit, the most artful, dexterous, and plausible intriguers I have ever met in all my Indian experience.

"A reference to the former records of Government will prove that successive Residents and Agents at the Courts of Scindiah and Holkar, have represented what an influence for evil this class of men have ever exercised, and how impossible it has been to shake them off. The Chiefs themselves are quite aware of their power. Holkar has got rid of some, but they are too strong for him; and Scindiah happens to have a very faithful exception in the person of his Dewan. These are facts to be borne in mind when judging of the difficulties which surround the Chiefs in Central India. It was not the Nana Sahib personally, but it was the clever introduction of the name of the Peishwa,

* Parliamentary Papers No. 77 of 1860, page 116. N.B.—The italics in the following passages are mine. J. D.

and with its substitution the revival of the Peishwa's Raj, that touched old feelings, and roused hopes and expectations which the wily Mahrattas knew well how to foster and feed, and turn to their advantage.

"*What has really foiled them, has been the personal fidelity of Holkar, Scindiah, and Baiza Baee. Had any one of these declared for the Peishwa, our difficulties would have been beyond conception;* the smaller thakoors and rural chiefs would have instantly joined the standard of their sovereign; every village would have been openly hostile; and every impediment thrown in our way. That we should have ultimately conquered no one will doubt; but *a protracted war in India, with the Native Sovereigns against us, might have led to complications in Europe, and withdrawn from us that support from Native mercenaries which has been so advantageous and important.*

"We have—and I have on many occasions, when the advocacy of such views was not palatable, expressed the same sentiments—*we have done nothing to secure the affection or respect of the upper classes and aristocracy of the country. The effect of our rule has been to divide the country into two classes: the tax-payer and the tax-gatherer.* The Government official has been paramount in every village; the real village headman has become his subordinate; our police has never amalgamated with the people; they never had a personal interest in its system or in its working; it has always been unpopular, and such it will ever be when its instruments are selected by foreigners from amongst strangers, and the people allowed no voice in the matter. *The result of such a system is the disappearance of all our police instantly on the appearance of the mutinous revolt.* . . . .

"The functions of Government within Scindiah and Holkar's States have been, doubtless, eminently endangered, and to some degree paralysed, by recent events, which had their origin beyond the control of either of these rulers, who, but for the mutiny of our Sepoys would not have been drawn into the embarrassments which have so grievously beset them.

"From the first Maharajah Holkar evinced steadfast loyalty to the British Government, and the greatest anxiety for all its subjects within his territories. On the fated First of July, he collected everyone that he could within his palace, and *at the risk of his own life,* refused to sacrifice a hair of their heads. Being left entirely to himself, without the counsel or countenance of the Agent, he rendered every assistance in his power to those who had taken refuge in the fort at Mhow. Captain Hungerford, on whom devolved the command, bears the

strongest testimony to the good faith, steadfastness, and the hearty desire of the Maharajah to do everything in his power to assist him with supplies, &c., whilst in the fort, and distinctly says that *any wavering or doubtful conduct at this time, on the part of the Maharajah, would have made their position at Mhow intensely critical.*

"As another instance of the anxiety of the Maharajah to succour and protect the lives of European officers and families: Immediately on hearing that the political assistant at Bhopawar and the family of Colonel Stockley, the commanding officer of the Malwa Bheel corps at Sirdarpoor, had been driven from their stations by the rebellious troops of the Amjheera Rajah, his Highness at once, and of his own accord, addressed a strong and decided letter to the Rajah of Amjheera, warning him that if any injury befel one British subject, he would, with his troops, which accompanied his letter, and had been sent for the relief and protection of the British officers, destroy the town of Amjheera, and hold him, the Rajah, in his person answerable. The troops selected for this service were drawn from those considered most trustworthy, and to ensure their fidelity the Maharajah sent his own brother, Kashei Rao, with his connexion, Khooman Sing Buxee, in command of the force. They effectually did their duty. The safety of the Europeans being assured, Kashei Rao immediately returned to the Maharajah, whilst Khooman Sing accompanied them the whole way, and delivered them safe into the fort at Mhow. . . . . .

"It was not till the 15th of December, after the dispersion of the rebels at the places above referred to, that a British force appeared at Indore to support the Maharajah's authority.

"On that date I also arrived, and resumed charge of the office of the Agent to the Governor-General. What, then, I now state will be from what has passed under my own observation, and I most conscientiously declare that in no single instance have I found his Highness to hesitate or demur at doing anything to promote British interests, however much his own interests might appear to be set aside.

"This Central India field-force is indebted to the Maharajah for elephants, camels, escorts, and every kind of assistance that could be afforded by his Highness up to this date. . . . . .

"I may mention another fact, which is entitled to some weight. There is no doubt that the intriguing pundits of the Southern Mahratta country, have largely used the names of Sindiah, Holkar, and Baiza Baee, in their machinations and mischievous plottings within the Bombay Presidency. *In more than one of the intercepted letters which have*

been forwarded to me, the writer has warned his correspondents not to trust to Holkar, who was personally all for the English. Amongst the letters seized upon the emissary of the Nana's, who was arrested by Sindiah's authorities, as reported in my letter, No. 124, dated 26th ultimo, there was not one for a dependent of Holkar's. *The mutinous Sepoys who have been arrested, one and all denounce Holkar and Sindiah, and state that their want of success is attributable to neither of the chiefs placing himself at their head.* I trust I have shown that Maharajah Holkar has proved himself a loyal, faithful, and steadfast ally, and as such he will receive the recognition of our Government, *who owe to him no small obligation for having stood by us in times of great peril and difficulty.*" . . . . . .

Now I have quoted this dispatch at such length, not merely to prove that we found Holkar "a friend in "need," but to prove that we cannot do without such friends in India; that the Whig policy of hostility to the class of native Princes is absurd, and their *levelling system* is suicidal. Lord Canning, though appointed by the Whigs, originally consenting to their policy, and sent out to carry it on,—Lord Canning had his eyes opened by the rebellion, and began to see the truth clearly when he wrote his "Adoption Dispatch." In that document, he says, at paragraph 34:—

"The safety of our rule is increased, not diminished, by the maintenance of Native Chiefs well affected to us. Setting aside the well-known services rendered by Sindiah, and subsequently by the Maharajahs of Rewah, Chirkaree, and others, over the wide tract of Central India, where our authority is most broken in upon by Native States, I venture to say, that there is no man who remembers the condition of Upper India in 1857 and 1858, who is not thankful that in the centre of the large and compact British province of Rohilcund, there remained the solitary little State of Rampoor, still administered by its own Mahomedan Prince, and that on the borders of the Punjab, and the districts above Delhi, the Chief of Puttiala and his kinsman still retained their authority unimpaired.

"In the time of which I speak, these patches of Native Government served as breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have swept over us in one great wave. And in quiet times they have their uses. Restless men, who will accept no profession but arms, crafty intriguers bred up in Native Courts, and others who would chafe at our stricter and more formal rule, live there contentedly; and should the day come when India shall be threatened by an external enemy, or when the interests of England elsewhere may require that her Eastern Empire shall incur more than ordinary risk, one of our best mainstays will be found in these Native States. But to make them so, we must treat their chiefs and influential families with consideration and generosity, teaching them that, in spite of all suspicions to the contrary, their independence is safe, that we are not waiting for plausible opportunties to convert their country into British territory, and convincing them that they have nothing to gain by helping to displace us in favor of any new rulers from within or without.

"It was long ago said by Sir John Malcolm, that if we made all India into Zillahs, it was not in the nature of things that our Empire should last fifty years." . . . . .

And Lord Canning endorses that opinion.

One would think that the present generation at least would not forget these lessons of experience, and that the late Lord Canning's colleagues at any rate would "treat the native Chiefs and influential families with consideration and generosity," whatever their successors might do; but so far is this from being the case, that before half a decade has passed away, we have the same men beginning their *levelling system* again; and what Major Bell calls "that horrible mixture of cant and "cupidity by which the annexation policy was vin-"dicated," reviving again in Government organs of the press. "There is a school in India," said the late Sir William Sleeman, "characterized by impatience at "the existence of any Native State, and its strong and "often insane advocacy of their absorption. There is

"no pretext, however weak, that is not sufficient, in "their estimation, for the purpose; and no war, however "cruel, that is not justifiable if it only has this object "in view. . . . . I deprecate the doctrines of this "school, as more injurious to India, and to our interest "in it, than those of any other school that has ever "existed in India. Mr. George Campbell is one of the "disciples of this school;" (this is the gentleman who prompted that breach of faith with the Talooqdars of Oude, which is to make them the next martyrs to our *levelling system*)." "The *Friend of India* is "another, and all those whom that paper lauds most, are "also disciples of the same school;" (that paper helped to make the reputation of Sir John Lawrence, but he and his brother, the late lamented Sir Henry Lawrence, were diametrically opposed in their views respecting the Princes and Chiefs of India. Sir Henry Lawrence wrote to Mr. Kaye, the historian of the Sepoy war:— "When I read the tirades of the *Friend of India*, I "half think myself, with many better men, including "Elphinstone, Munro, and Clerk, a fool. The doctrine "now is, that it is wicked not to knock down and plun- "der every native Prince!") Sir William Sleeman goes on to notice a rabid article in the *Friend of India*, written by Mr. Marshman, and a report that he was engaged to write for the *Times*, and would be found advocating the doctrines of the Annexation-school in that paper, and adds:—"I deem them, the doctrines of "this school, to be dangerous to our rule in India, and "prejudicial to the best interests of the country. The "people see that these annexations and confiscations "go on, and that rewards and honorary distinctions "are given for them . . . . and for little else"

(as all our officials who hope for preferment will now see, in Oude, Malwa, Mysore and elsewhere.) "The "native States," continues Sir William Sleeman, "I consider to be breakwaters." . . . . . The very expression used by Lord Canning and others; yet at the present day, the *Friend of India* is recommencing its attacks on the "native Chiefs and influential families;" its editor is said to be writing the "Calcutta correspondence" of the *Times*, in the style I noticed at the beginning of this pamphlet; and Sir John Lawrence seems to have got *carte blanche* from our Government to brew them another Rebellion.

I recommend my countrymen not merely to stop the movements of this Annexation-school, but to reverse them. I repeat my conviction, that the consummation to which our present system is rapidly tending, is "the "loss of India," and its loss in a way that will ruin the British empire at the same time. To me, the words of the late Duke of Wellington sound more ominous than ever: "The extension of our territory and in-"fluence in India has been greater than our means." Instead of coveting more territory, I believe that we have already much more than we can rightly administer or safely defend. Instead of being jealous of the native Princes, I wish them to undertake to manage more of the country for us: I want them to feel, "that "we are not, in Lord Canning's words, lying in wait "for opportunities of absorbing territory, and that we "do deliberately desire to keep alive a feudal aristocracy "where one still exists." Instead of levelling the higher classes, I want to secure such friends, to assist us in case of future attacks, and to reduce the demand for European troops. The direct action of their friend-

ship in reducing this demand, may be appreciated from an anecdote which I can vouch for. In 1859 and the beginning of 1860, the highest military and civil authorities at home and in India, decided that the permanent garrison of European troops in that country could not be less than 85,000 men. In the autumn of that same year, 1860, Lord Canning came to the conclusion that the above number might be reduced by 20,000 men; and he adopted this great change of views, partly from the rapid and complete pacification of the country, which he thought nobody could have believed, but mainly from the extraordinary impression produced upon him and other members of the Supreme Government by their conviction of the future friendship and support of the Talooqdars of Oude! The number of our European troops in India has now been gradually reduced from 110,000 to about 65,000 men; and simultaneously with that reduction we are reviving doctrines and measures calculated to drive the Talooqdars of Oude, and the native Princes, to desperation! And the French, and Russians, and Americans, are watching this conduct! Is it a madness sent by Heaven,—or can we yet draw back from the brink of the precipice?

Again, I say that we want, not more territory in India, but less. Individuals among us may desire power, and patronage, and plunder; but all that the nation at large wants from India, is the friendly interchange of commerce; and that we can have, with better security for the happiness of the people, by contracting the limits of our direct Government. I repeat the advice given so long ago by Colonel Walker, to cede territory to the Native States, instead of continually

absorbing them. I think, like Colonel Walker, that the example of Hadrian is suitable to our situation in India, and that the language of Gibbon and Bayle bears witness to the prudence of the Roman Emperor. It is true that Hadrian "confessed himself unequal to the "task of defending the conquests of Trajan," in resigning his acquisitions in the East, restoring to the Parthians the election of an independent sovereign, and withdrawing the Roman garrisons from the provinces of Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Assyria—but Gibbon notices that Hadrian only did this in compliance with the sage maxims of Augustus, and he shows all the advantage of the policy in a single sentence: "A forty years "tranquillity, the fruit of valor and moderation, had "succeeded the victories of Trajan." If we also act on the sage maxim of the Duke, that "the extension of "our territory and influence, in India, has been greater "than our means;" if we, even at the eleventh hour, add moderation to valor, it may yet be possible for us to reap similar advantages from a similar policy.

I will conclude with a few more words on the Dhar case. Sir John Malcolm said, in his instructions to his assistants in Malwa:—"It is upon our success in sup- "porting their respectability that the permanence of a "system of control over great and small Native States, "such as we have established in this quarter of India, "must depend. . . . . Our principal object "must be to elevate the authorities to whom we have "left the administration of their respective territories. ". . . . . It is evident that our control can "only be supportable, to any human being who has the "name and appearance of power, so long as it is "exercised in a general manner, and regulated by the

"principles above stated. When it descends to "minute checks and interference in the collection of "revenue, to administration of justice, listens to the "complaints of discontented, or even aggrieved indivi- "duals, and allows upon system its own Native agents "to interfere and act in the name of the paramount "State, the continuance of independent power in any "shape, to either prince or chief, is not only impolitic, "but dangerous, as his condition must be felt by "himself and by all attached to his person and family "as a mockery and degradation, and the least effect "of such feelings will be the extermination of all "motive to good and great actions."

In Dhar, our Political Agents have not only undertaken a minute interference in the administration, and bound the Prince to conduct his administration henceforward on their model, but, having forced an obnoxious native Agent upon him three years ago, and being now forced by public opinion to restore him to the throne, they inflict upon him the "mockery and degradation" of making it *the signed condition of his restoration* that he should retain this native Agent for his Minister, and that he should allow our officers in the same way to nominate his Ministers for the future—a precedent that strikes at the existence of every native State in India, and that goes beyond any despotic interference with native Governments, that has been known before.

And when this arrangement of the local authorities is submitted to Sir Charles Wood, though he cannot but admit its notorious and obvious impolicy, he gives Sir John Lawrence permission to keep it in force as long as he pleases, on the flimsy pretext that "it is of "the utmost importance, for his own sake, to protect