

even the strength of our control might ultimately vanish. To cease to strive for the highest might be to destroy that spirit which has taken the English race into the far unswept places of the world.

CHAPTER VII.

INDIA AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

The General Staff, in the memorandum it prepared for the Colonial Conference of 1907, declared that "the problem of the defence of India is one that must at all times concern the Empire as a whole." Mr. Balfour said some years ago that "the problem of the British Army is the defence of Afghanistan." Lord Curzon said in 1909 that "India has become the strategic centre of the defensive position of the British Empire." These *dicta* have never been disputed, and are accepted in greater or less degree by every professional authority, but they are systematically ignored when the problem of Imperial Defence is considered in connexion with the oversea Dominions. In the official report of the prolonged discussions upon naval and military defence at the 1907 Colonial Conference, the word "India" does not once occur.

In any scheme of Imperial Defence India must be considered both for its offensive value and for the responsibilities of defence which it entails. Few people will now be bold enough to deny that if necessity ever arose Great Britain and the Dominions should fight to the uttermost to retain India. After all, as Lord Morley once said, it is our only real Empire. It is the keystone of the Imperial arch which spans the world. We are committed within its borders to an experiment without precedent in history, which draws forth some of the

noblest and most exalted qualities of the British race ; for if the possession of India brings pride and glory, it also demands ceaseless effort and many sacrifices. We are also concerned to maintain our rule because India is our best customer. She buys over £50,000,000 worth of British exports every year, and she is beginning to buy considerably from the Dominions, particularly Australia. The loss of India would not only be an irretrievable blow to our prestige, but it would inflict irreparable damage upon our trade.

The retention of India is an essential part of our strategic scheme of Empire. If the Strategic Value peninsula passed to another Power, its of India. possessor might conceivably threaten South Africa on the one hand and Australia and New Zealand on the other. It cuts athwart the main route to the Far East. It commands the Persian Gulf. It links up our chain of naval stations around the world. The Power that holds India holds the balance of dominion in Southern Asia. Though its possession imposes a severe strain upon our military resources, and though the task of holding it is the primary preoccupation of the British Army, yet its value for purposes of Imperial Defence probably counterbalances the price we have to pay. If our Army is larger on account of India than it might otherwise be, India nevertheless defrays the cost of maintaining 75,000 of the flower of our troops. Our military position in India enables us to strike rapidly in many parts of the globe. When the Peking Legations were in danger, it was from India that we sent troops to the rescue. It was the Indian contingent that saved Natal, and thus determined the course of the South African War, while the Army Corps from England was still upon the seas. Dr. Miller Maguire has stated that the possibility of such a thing as immediate reinforcements from India "did not once occur" to the Boer leaders. Just as a famous statesman is reputed to have

“forgotten Goschen,” so the Boers forgot the Army of India. The time may come when we may have to fight for India, but in the past it has been a source of strength to the Empire rather than weakness. Meanwhile it furnishes an admirable training ground for British troops, who gain in India special experience which afterwards stands them in good stead. Lord Wolseley once doubted whether Indian service was good for British soldiers, but the bulk of military opinion is opposed to him upon the point, and the prospect of serving in India certainly stimulates recruiting.

The Army of India has three distinct functions to perform. It has to preserve the internal peace of India; it has to defend the Indian Empire against external aggression; and it has to be prepared to send help to other parts of the British Empire, and under the direction of Parliament to wage war upon occasion in other portions of the globe. Considering the magnitude of its responsibilities, the Army of India is the smallest in the world. When we hear complaints of the growth of Indian military expenditure, that fact should be steadily remembered. The Indian forces have not undergone any substantial increase for a very long time, and their increased cost is chiefly due to the higher standard of efficiency which has become imperative. Against the higher charges must be set the great saving effected by the prolonged cessation of frontier expeditions, due mainly to a more prudent frontier policy. The Regular Army of India consists of about 235,000 men, of whom 75,400 are white troops, 2,400 are British officers and non-commissioned officers with the Native Army, and 159,400 are natives of India. To these must be added 35,500 Volunteers, mostly British, but including nearly 6,000 cadets; Indian Army reserves, 25,500; and Imperial Service troops (maintained by the Princes of India), 20,700. The total available forces are therefore

under 319,000, excluding a few local corps and the military police under civil control, which are of limited value. This small army holds an area of 1,773,000 square miles, with a land and sea frontier of 6,000 miles, and a population of 315,000,000.

The real fact is, of course, that Great Britain has never held India solely by the sword, but also by the acquiescence, sometimes expressed, generally tacit, of the Indian peoples. If that acquiescence were ever withdrawn, the 75,000 white troops upon whom in the last emergency we must rely could not long uphold British rule unaided. They will suffice, however, to withstand anything short of a universal, prolonged, and implacable revolt, which is almost inconceivable in a congeries of widely differing races possessing few arms and no guns. For the purposes of this particular problem, the British troops in India may alone be taken into account. The limitation implies no reflection upon the fidelity of the Native Army. Without the help of Indian troops the revolt of 1857 might have overthrown British rule in India. There were more Indians than Englishmen within the walls of the Residency at Lucknow. The Native Army has steadfastly resisted all recent attempts to sap its loyalty, and enjoys the complete confidence of the Government of India. It has to be remembered, however, that the Sepoy of to-day is not quite the same material as the Sepoy of 50 years ago. He is better educated, of a more inquiring turn of mind, distinctly more intelligent, and possibly more ready to speculate about problems which never troubled his forbears. He reads the vernacular Press, and is rather inclined to think for himself. While he remains at present as trustworthy as ever, he, too, may in time be touched with the spirit of restlessness which has infected India.

It is best, therefore, to consider the military aspects of the question of internal revolt in India solely in relation to the British troops, remembering always that experi-

ence teaches that the Native Army is made up of several different races who never act in complete unison. The possibility of a revolt is always present in the minds of the military authorities. Their belief, which is certainly justified, is that the British forces could hold their own against any form of internal outbreak without any help from overseas for many months. The conditions no longer resemble those of 50 years ago. India is covered with railways, and the principal centres are being somewhat tardily equipped with wireless telegraphy. The force that holds the main lines of railway and the principal cities will always dominate India. No living soldier has a greater experience of railways in warfare than Lord Kitchener. It is understood to have been his deliberate conviction at the time he left India that the British force at his disposal could keep the main lines of railway open in the event of internal complications, even if the native subordinate railway staff proved untrustworthy. Railways are practically indestructible, as the Boers, with unlimited supplies of dynamite, eventually found to their cost. There is little chance of any grave internal danger in India, unless it is associated with attack from without.

The moment the question of external aggression is approached, the possibility of internal revolt in India assumes, from the military point of view, a very different form. It is estimated that in the event of a great war on or beyond the Indian frontier 150,000 men would be sent to the front at once. Of these, probably 50,000 would be British troops. That would leave about 25,000 British troops and rather more than double the number of Indian troops, charged with the task of garrisoning India until reinforcements arrived. Whether reinforcements could be sent would depend upon the character of the war, but it may be taken for granted that no troops would start either from Great Britain

or from the Dominions, unless the command of the sea was assured. It is for this reason, among others, that the present numerical strength of the British Army in India must always be regarded as a *minimum*.

The issue is complicated by the situation upon the North-West Frontier. Between the administrative frontier and the Afghan boundary lies the mountainous country of the Pathan tribes and their allies. At a moderate calculation, there are probably 200,000 of these tribesmen able to bear arms, and the number may be nearer 300,000. Owing to the illicit traffic in arms, which is now being checked, it is believed that they possess possibly 150,000 serviceable rifles and large stores of ammunition. In the event of an advance beyond the frontier they might prove a formidable menace if they harassed our lines of communication. One school of military opinion holds that we should go in and subjugate them, and build strategic roads and railways in their territory, while our hands are free. The objections to this course are that the cost would be prohibitive, that the operations might be as interminable as was the Russian conquest of the Caucasus, that the tribesmen are now comparatively quiet, and that such an advance would have a gravely disturbing effect upon India. It would also almost inevitably lead to hostilities with Afghanistan, because it would be supposed that the subjugation of the frontier tribes was only the prelude to an advance on Kabul.

The more the problem of the land defence of India is examined the more formidable it appears. After the possibility of internal revolt and the danger of hostility from the frontier tribes are left behind, there emerges Afghanistan. Our present relations with the Ameer of Afghanistan are friendly but somewhat chilly. If they were not, and if an advance on Kabul ever became necessary, the conditions would be wholly transformed

from those which confronted Lord Roberts in 1879. The Afghan Army may not be all that its ruler fondly believes, but there is an abundance of arms and ammunition in the country. Experts hold that an invasion of Afghanistan by the line of the Khaibar could not now be attempted with less than two divisions, with a third division to guard the communications. The three available roads, two in the pass and one behind its northern heights, would not suffice to keep two divisions supplied. A railway is necessary for the purpose, and its construction was commenced at the instance of Lord Kitchener, but was eventually stopped for political reasons. The reasons were no doubt sound, but the fact remains that until the line traverses the Khaibar range an advance into Afghanistan will be attended with dangerous risks.

Apart from the question of hostilities with Afghanistan, we are pledged by the **The Danger from Beyond.** Kabul Treaty of 1893, renewed in 1905, to defend Afghanistan against the unprovoked aggression of any foreign Power. The only foreign Power which can menace Afghanistan, except ourselves, is Russia. By the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 Russia recognized Afghanistan as outside her sphere of influence, and she has faithfully abided by her pledge. Conventions, however, are not eternal. This is not a consideration of political probabilities, but of the cold hard factors of a military problem, which we may hope will long remain academic. We shall be fortunate if it does, for there can be no doubt that if we were ever called upon to fulfil our pledges to the Ameer we should be in considerable difficulty. Unless there is a railway to Kabul, Russia could occupy the line of the Hindu Kush beyond the Afghan capital long before our troops reached there, and no one believes that the Ameer would be able to offer a successful resistance. There is not the slightest

likelihood that a railway will be made to Kabul, and so, as a matter of strategy, a conflict in Afghanistan is not inviting. It must be understood that a sudden invasion of India from the north-west is practically impossible, unless the Tsar and the Ameer joined forces. The Russian commander would therefore first have to conquer Afghanistan, which might take a year or two. It is in Afghanistan that Russia and Great Britain would have to determine the fate of India. The military authorities calculate that it would be necessary to concentrate half a million men, partly beyond Kabul, but mostly on the line of the River Helmund, within 18 months, in order to offer an effective resistance to a Russian advance. The statement may be recorded without comment. While it is perfectly true that Russia no longer appears to turn her eyes towards India, it is also true that her Central Asian communications have improved, and the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway gives her a valuable alternative line of advance.

So far we have been considering the Indian problem in its comparatively Anglo-Japanese narrow and local aspects, but there are Alliance. larger factors which materially modify the situation. The menace of invasion from without is governed by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which has just been renewed for another ten years. The present Alliance specifically relates, among other things, to India. If India is attacked by another Power or Powers, Japan undertakes to come to our assistance. This is not the place to discuss the merits or demerits of the Alliance, but it is too often forgotten that in its new form, as in its old, it constitutes a very solid additional assurance of our security in India. The statement has been made that, even before the Alliance was first renewed in 1905, Japan was willing to hold that an attack upon India made it necessary for her to assist us. During

the Russo-Japanese War there was a report, now known to have been unfounded, that Russia was concentrating masses of men in Central Asia preparatory to moving across the Oxus. Japan is alleged to have at once inquired at what point Japanese divisions should be landed in India. The story may or may not be true, but it makes it necessary to affirm that we cannot rely upon the direct assistance of any Ally in holding India. In no sense is this affirmation due to the fact that Japan is an Asiatic Power. The same contention would apply with equal force to an offer of assistance from France. If we are to maintain our prestige in India, any fighting within or beyond its frontiers must be undertaken solely by the soldiers of the King-Emperor. So far as India is concerned, the value of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance lies in Russia's knowledge that if she enters Afghanistan, Japan will immediately strike at her possessions in the Far East. That is a signal deterrent, and if it disappeared the whole question of the defence of India would revert to an exceedingly different form.

The re-establishment of Chinese influence in Tibet and along the Burmese border may for the present be disregarded, but one other form of possible menace to India remains to be noted. The idea seems to be growing, though it has not yet found much expression, that in the event of war the Triple Alliance may attempt to invade India, either from Trieste or by way of the Baghdad Railway. This is the logical conclusion of Admiral Mahan's recent observations upon the relative abandonment of the Mediterranean by the British Navy. The inference is that the way to India is left open. The possibility does not require detailed discussion. An enormous number of transports would be required to make an effective invasion. It would never be undertaken unless the invading Powers had first obtained command of the sea, and if that is lost by Great Britain, all is lost. The same

considerations apply to the suggested European invasion of Australia.

The recital of the responsibilities which India involves may have obscured its value in any scheme of Imperial Defence, but it should be recognized that if India creates dangers, it also confers great and manifest military advantages, which have already been outlined. It commands those portions of the British Empire which are in the southern hemisphere, so long as India itself is tranquil and so long as England commands the sea. Next to the Royal Navy, the Army of India forms the chief external guarantee against invasion possessed by South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, the Malay States, and Hong-kong, and it also helps to ensure the maintenance of our control over Egypt. The Indian Ocean is at the moment a British lake. The Army of India is a powerful fighting machine, always ready for service at short notice. Since its reorganization by Lord Kitchener, its efficiency is acknowledged, even by unfriendly critics, to be far higher than it ever was before. It has already been shown that the Indian Contingent saved Natal. Had it been possible to use the splendid Indian light cavalry, accustomed to operate in spacious areas, the duration of the South African War might have been appreciably shortened. The reasons stated by Mr Balfour, which precluded the use of Indian troops, were unanswerable. It may be taken for granted, however, that no such objections would apply to the use of Indian troops against a foreign foe, and that in the event of invasion the forces of the Dominions would fight as readily by the side of Indian regiments as British and Indians fight in frontier expeditions. We are often told that the field for Indian recruiting is limited, and so it is while we take our recruits solely from the flower of the fighting races. It is difficult not to believe, however,

that amid the three hundred millions of the Indian peoples there exist untapped reserves of useful though possibly not first-class, fighting material. The policy of the Dominions, as well as of the Mother Country, should be, so far as possible, to support all movements having for their object the quickening of a sense of membership of the British Empire among the peoples of India. An Empire which includes within its borders one-fourth of the whole human race should never have to complain of lack of men to defend itself. If it does, there is something wrong with its Imperial ideals.

The naval aspect of India's place in the scheme of Imperial Defence has still to be considered. No one now thinks of India as a Naval Power, but time was when the ships of the old Indian Navy swept the Eastern seas. The Indian Navy was a useful and efficient force, and its abolition in 1862 is still regretted by many who remember it. It has since been replaced by the Royal Indian Marine, consisting of a number of fine vessels used for transport and survey work and for other Government purposes. The officers periodically undergo naval training, but the ships are not armed, although the best of them are meant to be used as commerce-destroyers in time of war. The guns designated for their use are usually kept ashore, and some of them seem to have been sent to South Africa at the time of the war. The marine defences of India are subject to strange vicissitudes. Some years ago new boilers made for the use of the torpedo-boats then stationed in Bombay Harbour were lost for many months, and the puzzled Admiralty eventually discovered them at Bermuda! In addition to maintaining the Royal Indian Marine, whose value for naval purposes lies in its officers rather than its ships, the Government of India pay a sum slightly exceeding £100,000 annually towards the cost of the East Indies Squadron. As at present constituted the

squadron is of no great fighting value, and even the flagship is a second-class cruiser. The payment is to a great extent made for services rendered by the Royal Navy in policing the Persian Gulf.

The Imperial Defence Conference of 1909 has raised new issues concerning the participation of India in the naval defence of the Empire, which must be said to be at present inconsiderable. Australia has agreed to maintain a unit consisting of one Indomitable, three second-class cruisers, six destroyers, and three submarines, though this unit will presumably be afterwards enlarged upon the lines of Admiral Henderson's report. The China Squadron, it is proposed, should be remodelled upon a similar basis, New Zealand furnishing its Indomitable. South Africa may eventually provide another unit. The report goes on to suggest the conversion of the East Indies Squadron into another unit, though the small ships for regular service in the Persian Gulf would no doubt still be required. India was apparently not consulted before the proposition was made public, and it has still to be seen whether the Government of India will accept it. The question is, of course, one of finance. The contention of most Indian politicians is that India already pays over £20,000,000 annually for defence, and they oppose further naval expenditure in addition. On the other hand, it is urged that three hundred millions of people cannot be defended cheaply, that India cannot depend upon her land forces alone, and that if each great unit of the Empire is to be self-contained India must bear her part in the task of naval defence. The question is complicated by the fact that the most important naval base in the Indian Ocean is Colombo, which is not under Indian control.

Whatever may be the correct solution of the difficulty, a settlement is not made easier by the attitude of the British Government and the self-governing Dominions. If India is to become a vital and willing member of the

Imperial organization she must be given some share in its councils. The principle upon which Imperial co-operation for defence should be based is, above all things else, willingness. In the case of India we have the necessary alternative of compulsion, and are ready to exercise it, but the compulsion should not be automatic when fresh developments are suggested. The Government of India retain the sole right to decide questions of expenditure upon defence. The representatives of the Indian peoples may criticize, but they cannot decide. They have, however, some right to be consulted and to make their views heard before decisions are made. Until their claims are recognized, India can never be expected to become a completely willing unit of the Empire.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF INDIA.

A man who derived his knowledge of India solely from an orographical map might very well be pardoned for inquiring why the country had any external affairs at all. There are few great populated regions of the world which seem to have been so effectively designed for isolation. The people themselves were wont to think of "The Black Water"—as in accents of dread they styled the sea—as a barrier which they should not cross. On land they were shielded by the gigantic natural rampart of the Himalaya, by the arid wastes of Baluchistan and Mekran, by the dense forests and wild mountaneous country on the borders of Yunnan and Siam. Beyond lay obstacles almost equally formidable, the deserts of Eastern Persia, the grim line of the Hindu Kush, the icy uplands of the Pamirs, the vast inhospitable emptiness of Tibet. Well may its earlier inhabitants have fancied that India was cut off by natural screens from intercourse with the rest of the world.

Yet from the beginning of recorded history India has never been really isolated. The sea has been a highway, and not a protecting moat. The mariners of Babylonia carried to India, as they did to China, ideas which profoundly modified Hindu thought. The trading junks of China once thronged the harbour of Bombay. There was never a time afterwards when

Early
Invasions.

the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal were not furrowed by the keels of ships. By the sea came da Gama, and all the wave of coastal conquest which followed in his wake.' The cannon seized from Turkish fleets still lie rusting on the shores of Kathiawar. The English arrived by sea, and their rule is maintained in the last resort by sea power. Nor was India ever more shielded from intrusion on her land frontier than she has been upon her coasts. Her long and stirring history shatters the myth of isolation, which grew in the West in the days when the rise of Islam barred the pathway to the Orient. The more ancient and medieval Asia is studied, the more it is seen that the whole continent has always been conspicuous for great migratory impulses among large sections of its people. The Himalaya and the Hindu Kush, the desolation of Southern Afghanistan and Mekran, never sheltered India while there were passes to be scaled and desert paths to be traversed. The tale of invasions of India began with the irruption of the light-skinned race which poured into the Punjab, and it has hardly ended with the indomitable Chinese Army which made peace with Nepal a century ago when almost at the gates of Khatmandu. In the interval, horde after horde of conquerors have swept through the passes of the north-west to the sack of Hindustan. If mere raids are counted, the number of invasions is not to be told. Mahmud of Ghazni raided India thirty times, and the remnants of the great city of Patan-Somnath, by the yellow sands of Verawal, attest his iconoclastic fury. He was the second great historical invader of India, who came thirteen hundred years after Alexander the Great entered by way of the country north of the Khyber. Then followed the first Moghuls, the Turks under Tamerlane, Baber and his Amirs, Nadir Shah and his Persian host, and the final invasions of the Afghans.

Only twice has there been a movement in the reverse direction, on each occasion headed by the British. The

two British invasions of Afghanistan were, historically speaking, little more than raids. The rapidity of the exploit of Alexander is never likely to be repeated. His men lived on the countries they invaded. Modern armies require huge transport, not only for food and forage, but also for munitions of war.* If India ever again becomes the prize of conflict between contending nations, the ground of battle will probably be sought in Afghanistan, and both sides will be forced to move slowly. A cloud of horsemen alone will never again ride through the mountains to seek empire over Hindustan.

India, then, though probably less vulnerable owing to the changed conditions of modern warfare, has a direct and even grave interest in external affairs. She has to guard her approaches, so far as may be; to endeavour to preserve peaceful conditions beyond her borders, lest her own peoples become disturbed; and to protect and develop her trade with other countries. In the earlier phases of British rule, when communication with Europe was difficult, the administrators of India took an active interest in the affairs of the whole East. The ships of the old Indian Navy, a force which was abolished when Crown control was substituted for Company control, sailed and fought throughout all the Eastern seas, from Basra to the Spice Islands. A Viceroy of India went in person to the conquest of Java. More recently, the immediate relations of the Government of India with other Asiatic countries have been greatly contracted, because steam and the telegraph have made it unnecessary for the British Government at home to delegate its authority. Some years ago a Royal Commission very clearly defined the present extent of the foreign interests of India, and its conclusions may be briefly summarized. The Commission declared that India had .—

- (1) Sole interest in punitive expeditions on her borders.

(2) A direct and substantial interest in questions affecting Persia, the coasts and islands of Arabia, and the Persian Gulf; in questions affecting Afghanistan, and that part of Central Asia which is adjacent to her borders and Afghanistan; in questions affecting Siam; in keeping open the Suez Canal; in maintaining order in Egypt so far as the security of the Canal is affected; and possibly on the coasts of the Red Sea, though not in the Sudan.

(3) A modified interest in questions affecting the East Coast of Africa as far as Zanzibar and the African islands of the Indian Ocean, except Madagascar, and in questions affecting China and the Malay Peninsula

At present the Government of India
Foreign control Aden and the protected tribal
Department. territory in its vicinity, and exercise a protectorate over the island of Socotra.

They have all the maritime tribes of the coast between Aden and Oman, including the Hadramaut, under their protection, as well as the islands of Bahrein, in the Persian Gulf. They exercise a controlling influence over the Trucial Chiefs of the Pirate Coast, in the Gulf, and maintain special and exclusive relations with the Sheikh of Koweit. They protect Musulman pilgrims to Mecca and Kerbela and administer a large fund for the maintenance of priests at the Shiah mausolea of Kerbela and Nejef. They pay £6,000 a year towards the cost of the British Legation in Teheran and various Consular establishments in Northern Persia, and maintain at their own charges a chain of Consular officers between Baghdad and Meshed. They subsidize the Ameer of Afghanistan to the extent of £123,000 annually, and maintain direct political relations with his Majesty, being represented at Kabul by an Indian Musulman agent. They have a representative in Chinese Turkestan, and conduct certain business direct with the Tibetan authorities. They pay a sum averaging £12,500 annually towards the cost of

the British diplomatic and Consular establishments in China, and settle local border questions direct with the Chinese authorities of the province of Yunnan. - The reality of Indian interests on the Siamese frontier is denoted by the fact that India pays the cost of the British Consulate at Chiengmai, in the teak districts of Siam.

The external affairs of India are in the hands of the Foreign Department, which also deals with the frontier tribes and with the whole of the Native States of India. As the Foreign Department further has control of the North-West Frontier Province and British Baluchistan, its task is enormous and complicated. At the head of the Department is the Foreign Secretary, but there is no Foreign Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, the portfolio being usually held by the Viceroy himself.

The tribes on the North-West Frontier are not the only frontier tribes with which the Government of India have to deal, but they constitute a primary and perennial problem. The tribesmen on the borders of Assam and Burma are comparative savages, extremely bloodthirsty on occasion, still addicted in some cases to the artless custom of collecting heads, but indifferently armed, and with no capacity for cohesive action. The men of the North-West are sufficiently in touch with civilization to be proficient in the use of firearms, and they are far more intelligent and capable. Every man is a warrior. Though divided into innumerable clans and septs, and prone to fierce quarrels among themselves, through them all there runs the green thread of Islam. They will unite with fanatical zeal at times, sinking their differences for the common purpose of opposing the British. Probably, if they mustered their full strength, old and young, they could put 200,000 fighting men into the field, though not all of equal fighting value. The great influx of arms from the Persian Gulf during the last three or four years has enormously increased the

North-West
Frontier.

offensive capacity of the tribesmen. The number of modern rifles now distributed among them has been variously estimated at from 80,000 to 150,000, and is probably much nearer the larger figure than the smaller.

Strictly speaking, questions affecting the frontier tribes do not come within the category of external affairs. They dwell within the political frontier of India, but outside the administrative frontier. They are practically independent, but many of them receive allowances conditional upon good behaviour. For many years punitive expeditions against them were frequent, but during the last 13 years the peace of the frontier has rarely been broken. Lord Curzon created the North-West Frontier Province, a step which has been conspicuously successful, and he developed a policy the essence of which was the withdrawal of British forces from advanced positions and the employment of tribal forces in the defence of tribal country. It has worked so well that frontier wars have almost ceased to figure in the Indian Budget.

Nevertheless the frontier is always like a powder magazine which a spark may explode. Some military experts argue that the tribesmen should be finally subjugated right up to the political frontier. The insuperable objections are that the cost would be prohibitive, the operations would be prolonged, and a war with Afghanistan would inevitably follow. Whenever a frontier rising occurs the blame is always laid on the fanatical *mullahs*, who stir the tribesmen to frenzy. It is true that the *mullahs* are usually responsible, but they never preach war without a reason. The gradual advance of British influence was unquestionably the ultimate cause of the rising which ended in the Tirah War. A contributory factor at present is that the tribes find it increasingly difficult to exist. In former times they depended largely on raids into the plains. The extension of British control has rendered raiding difficult and dangerous, and certain to result in retaliatory measures.

The Mahsud Waziris are at present the most troublesome tribe on the frontier, and the real reason is that they have not sufficient cultivable land to maintain themselves. The remedy lies, among other things, in judicious grants of land.

The Kingdom of Afghanistan has been an abiding preoccupation of the British in India ever since their outposts reached the frontier hills. The Afghans held the Derajat, and actually ruled in Peshawar, early last century. When, therefore, we complain that the tribesmen on our side of the frontier are wont to turn their gaze too frequently towards Kabul it is only fair to remember that they do so in pursuance of conditions which existed almost within memory of men still living. The Sikhs drove the Afghans out of Peshawar and Bannu, and the British in turn became their successors upon the annexation of the frontier. The then ruler of Afghanistan, Yakub Khan, only relinquished in 1879 his claim to the Khyber and the Mohmand country, Tirah, and the adjacent regions, and the districts of Pishin and Sibi in Baluchistan. The actual frontier has been still more recently demarcated, and certain portions remain undefined. So recently as 1849 an Afghan force fought against the British at the battle of Gujerat, in the vain hope of recovering their possessions in India.

Afghanistan.

The first direct intervention of Great Britain in Afghan affairs ended in disaster. An army which was sent to establish Shah Shuja on the throne of Kabul was massacred in 1842, mostly in the Jagdallak defile. Stern retribution was enacted,* but when Shah Shuja was assassinated the Government of India allowed his rival, Dost Mahomed, to resume possession of his kingdom. They even helped him to regain possession of Herat, which had been seized by the Persians, by sending an expedition to Persia in 1855. The intrigues of his successor, Sher Ali, with Russia led to the second invasion of Afghanistan

in 1878. Kandahar and Jellalabad were quickly occupied, and Lord Roberts took the Peiwar Kotal. Sher Ali died, and a treaty was negotiated with his son, Yakub Khan, who not only ceded various districts to the British, but agreed to accept a Resident at Kabul. The Resident, Cavagnari, was speedily murdered, and a British Army marched to Kabul. Yakub Khan abdicated, and his throne was offered by the British to Abdur Rahman Khan, a grandson of Dost Mahomed. In return Abdur Rahman, while preserving his own independence, agreed that his external relations with foreign Powers should be subject to the control of the Government of India. Upon that agreement, which still subsists, the whole Afghan question turns

Though Abdur Rahman faithfully abided by his obligations the secret of Afghan Policy. his policy was that he held the British at arms' length. He spent the rest of his life in establishing his authority in the outlying portions of his dominions. The British only made him Ameer of Kabul, and left him to fend for himself. When he died his writ ran without question to the utmost confines of Afghanistan. He ruled his people with great severity, and created an army of some efficiency, though its value has since declined. He established various manufactures, including factories for arms, but steadfastly set his face against the introduction of railways. His object was to surround his country, in effect, with a ring fence. Though he kept clear of Russia, and though Russia, on her part, had already in 1873 declared Afghanistan to be outside her sphere of influence, there can be no doubt that Abdur Rahman conceived his safety to lie in playing off Russia and Great Britain against each other. While he held comparatively aloof Great Britain always had in mind the possibility that he might lean towards Russia. While he maintained definite relations with Great Britain Russia was always ready to contemplate

the chance of closer union between Great Britain and Afghanistan, which might prove inimical to Russian interests. Abdur Rahman thought, perhaps with justification, that his real security lay in maintaining the isolation of Afghanistan, and that it was discreet not to lean too palpably to either side. In the belief that he thus cherished lies the explanation of the numerous minor incidents which occasionally placed some strain upon his relations with the Government of India.

When Abdur Rahman was made Ameer he received an assurance that if any foreign Power committed acts of aggression upon Afghanistan, the British Government would come to his aid in the manner it thought best. The assurance was repeated at the time of the Durand Agreement in 1893. After he died in 1901 it was renewed with his son Habibullah on the conclusion of a new treaty by Sir Louis Dane at Kabul early in 1905. Great Britain is, therefore, in effect, pledged to undertake the defence of Afghanistan if the country is invaded. The position is, however, somewhat complicated by the Anglo Russian Convention of 1907. In that Convention Russia again declared Afghanistan to be outside the sphere of Russian influence, though, as Lord Curzon pointed out in the House of Lords in 1908, it was a declaration made on that occasion for the twelfth time. Great Britain responded by declaring that British influence would be used in Afghanistan "only in a pacific sense," and though the statement represented the general character of British policy, it was the first time that such an assurance had been formally conveyed to Russia. The rest of the provisions concerning Afghanistan need not be here quoted. The difficulty caused by the Convention was that the validity of the Afghanistan section was made dependent upon the consent of the Ameer. Habibullah has never signified his consent, because he considers that he ought to have been consulted before

British
Pledges.

the Convention was signed. He was not consulted beforehand because the two Governments could not face the interminable delays involved in a reference to Kabul; and it is believed, though never officially stated, that both Governments have now waived the clause about the Ameer's consent, and mutually agreed to regard the Afghanistan section as operative.

The Ameer is understood to regard the Convention with dislike because **The Ameer's Attitude.** he perceives that a better understanding between Russia and Great Britain regarding Afghanistan renders largely nugatory the traditional policy of his dynasty. Obviously he cannot play off against each other two Powers who are fully agreed about their respective policies towards Afghanistan. It has been alleged, though never publicly proved, that had there been no Convention emissaries from the Afghan side of the border would not have stirred up the revolt of the Mohmands and the Zakka Khel in 1908. Whether that be true or not, the Convention has left traces of uneasiness in Anglo-Afghan relations. Yet intercourse between Peshawar and Kabul is not without cordiality, and last year a Joint Commission met on the frontier to settle various local disputes.

Much misconception prevails about the present Ameer. Though he has no very restrained idea of his own importance, he has considerable ability, and his position is by no means insecure. His recent policy of permitting the distribution of arms broadcast among his subjects is now believed to have been deliberate. His visit to India taught him that his standing army was of little value, and at a great review at Agra he reviled his sirdars for having deceived him; but he knew that, with rifles in their hands, and among their own hills, his people were among the finest guerilla fighters in the world. The risk of scattering arms throughout the country was great, but he felt himself strong enough to take it,

The real index of his strength is that, whereas his father had to crush three rebellions, Habibullah has held the throne for ten years, and even left his country for months, and never had a shot fired against him. He seems to have an excellent understanding with his brother Nasrullah, despite reports to the contrary. The Ameer leads the progressive element, and Nasrullah controls the more orthodox people and the reactionaries, but their aims are probably identical. The voluntary isolation of Afghanistan, though not without difficulties and dangers, probably best suits the policy of Great Britain. Soldiers contend with some justice that we cannot be in a position to fulfil our responsibilities to Afghanistan unless roads and railways are made, and the Afghan troops are better trained; but precedent and pledges alike forbid any departure from existing conditions.

If the North-West Frontier of India is always more immediate in its possibilities of trouble, the Persian Gulf remains the real danger spot in the external affairs of India. It is the only point whence British rule in India can be effectively menaced—not overthrown, be it remembered, but menaced and harassed. The way to the conquest of India probably still lies, as of yore, through Afghanistan. But it is quite possible, under certain circumstances, for a Great Power to worry the British in India, and to create among the Indian peoples an impression of the possible impermanence of British rule, without advancing to a direct attack. Russia, from the farther side of the Oxus, was able to produce innumerable “alarums and excursions.” How much more effective would be the veiled hostility of a Power seated, not beyond a sea of mountains, but on the shores of the Persian Gulf, or within sight of the Arabian Sea?

The comparative tranquillity of British rule in India has been due, among other things, to the fact that no other

Great Power of militant strength has been within easy reach. All round India lie regions which do not threaten her—the still unknown territories of Southern Arabia, the desolate ridges and valleys of Mekran, the vast buwarks of the Hindu Kush and the Himalaya, the enormous solitudes of Tibet, the dark forests of the Brahmaputra and the Salween and the Mekong, the uplands of Yunnan, the neutralized plains of Siam. The one vulnerable place which lies open to easy acquisition, and extends a tempting invitation, is the Persian Gulf. Turkey, with Germany at her back, sought to aggrandize herself in the Gulf region even in the day of Abdul Hamid. The weakness of Persia, whose shores and islands command the entrance to the Gulf, is a constant source of anxiety. A foreign Power established in Gulf waters, even without armaments, and for the ostensible purpose of commerce, or to gratify that passion for the coal trade which afflicts all great Powers, would shake the stability of British rule to its foundations without firing a single shot. India's credit would be impaired, the growth of industries would be checked, the flow of native capital into commercial enterprises would instantly cease. The peoples of India have seen alien rulers rise and fall too often for our comfort. The presence of a foreign Power in the Persian Gulf would assuredly suggest to them the handwriting on the wall.

Hence ever since their first advent into India the British have been preoccupied about the Persian Gulf. Not for 100 years, as is sometimes stated, but for 300 years, they have sought to maintain a policy excluding others from that inland sea. In 1621 the East India Company entered into a treaty with the Shah of Persia by which they agreed "to keep two men-of-war constantly to defend the Gulf," and the British flag has been flown there ever since. In the follow-

ing year they joined the Persians in ejecting the Portuguese from Hormuz, the first of a long series of encounters which always aimed at maintaining British supremacy. How the Gulf was cleared of all intruders, how piracy was suppressed and slavery terminated, how the chiefs of the Arabian coast were pacified and restrained, how the Gulf was turned from a marine Alsatia into a waterway as peaceable as the Irish Sea, how its coasts were buoyed and surveyed and lighted and policed, how Great Britain took no territory and claimed no advantage which other nations might not share, are stories too long to be told again. Possibly too much stress has been laid upon British services in the Persian Gulf. They are very great, but they were performed for our own interest and security, and we cannot expect other Powers to register self-denying ordinances out of sheer gratitude. We can only preserve our predominance and protect the rights we have created by showing ourselves determined to resist any attempts at aggression.

That determination has been repeatedly and emphatically expressed by the British Government. In 1903 Lord Lansdowne, then Foreign Secretary, said in the House of Lords:—"I say it without hesitation, we should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal." In 1907, when the Anglo-Russian Convention was signed, Sir Edward Grey drew attention to "the special interests possessed by Great Britain in the Gulf," and the Russian Government "explicitly stated that they do not deny" them, a statement of which the British Government formally took note. Both before and since these declarations the attitude of Great Britain regarding the Persian

Official
Declarations.

Gulf has been repeatedly made clear by Ministers of both parties.

Great Britain maintains in the Persian Gulf a Resident and Consul-General, who is jointly responsible to the Government of India and the Foreign Office, and has his headquarters at Bushire.* Under him are Consuls at various points, and there are also a number of British representatives in important centres of Southern Persia. British gunboats patrol the Gulf, protect the native dhows from capture in the date season, preserve order at the pearl fisheries, and stop gun-running. The chiefs who inhabit the Pirate Coast of Arabia maintain a maritime truce under British supervision, and refer local disputes to the Resident. The islands of Bahrein are under British protection and the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah maintain special arrangements with Great Britain. To catalogue the varied activities of British officers in the Gulf and its vicinity would be a formidable undertaking.

Formerly the two Powers who seemed chiefly disposed to challenge British influence in the Persian Gulf were France and Russia. Changed political conditions have led them to modify their policy. Since the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention Russia has ceased to display her former disquieting interest in the Gulf. France, too, no longer endeavours to acquire a preferential position in the State of Oman, and the only remaining difference with the Republic relates to certain treaty rights under which gun-runners still find shelter at Muscat. The new factors are Turkey and Germany. Turkey is not really a new factor, for Midhat Pasha in the seventies made large acquisitions on the Arabian coast; but since the Revolution Turkish attempts to obtain increased influence on the Arabian side of the Gulf have grown more marked. Turkish claims to the peninsula of El Katar have never been acknowledged either by

Great Britain or the local tribesmen, and are only ineffectively established. Germany began by not very successful attempts to develop a trade with Gulf ports, and followed by still less fortunate endeavours by German agents to gain possession of various islets. A larger issue, in which Germany and Turkey are jointly interested, is presented by the Baghdad Railway. The question whether this projected line will infringe British interests in the Gulf is a subject of much controversy. Great Britain cannot object if the line terminates at Basra, which is indisputably Turkish, but has the right under agreements to decide whether it shall be continued to Koweit. Some experts hold that a terminus at Basra will not be a menace to British interests, and think that Great Britain should confine herself to refusing to sanction a terminus at Koweit; but the British Government is inclined to entertain an invitation to assist in building the section from Baghdad to the sea, if sufficiently satisfactory terms can be arranged. In that case the terminus will probably be at Koweit. It may be regarded as tolerably certain that, whatever is the upshot of the negotiations respecting the Baghdad Railway, the British position in the Gulf will be less undisputed, and more difficult to maintain, in the future than it has been in the past. The more reason, therefore, to exercise vigilance in safeguarding British interests, which will not be accomplished by speeches alone.

The problems of Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf have been discussed at considerable length, because they bulk most largely in the external affairs of India. They by no means exhaust the foreign interests of the Indian authorities. Next in importance comes the question of Persia, which is to a great extent distinct from that of the Gulf. The welfare of Persia, and the preservation of Persian independence, is a matter of great concern to India. The present policy of Great

Other
Countries.

Britain and Russia, acting in conjunction, is to abstain as far as possible from intervention in the internal affairs of Persia. It cannot, however, be implicitly observed without certain qualifications. While the Teheran Government lacks strength, and is unable to assert its authority in the outlying provinces, difficulties are bound to arise from time to time. Trade routes are closed by banditti, British or Russian subjects are attacked and even killed, the securities which Persia has pledged for the service of foreign loans become imperilled, or the revolt of provincial leaders creates a general menace. Thus Great Britain was compelled to address a peremptory Note to the Persian Ministry last year about the condition of Southern Persia, which had brought about an almost complete interruption of trade. Russian troops, introduced to protect Russian subjects, have not yet been entirely withdrawn from Northern Persia. A British force was recently sent to Persian Baluchistan, where the local chieftains were assisting Afghan gun-runners and had openly repudiated the authority of Teheran. Generally speaking, however, British policy, with which the Government of India is in complete accord, aims at leaving Persia to work out her own salvation. The process seems likely to be a slow one.

Indian relations with China open up another large set of questions which chiefly concern Tibet. Here again British policy aims at abstention, though again with qualifications. In the latter half of the 19th century Chinese suzerainty over Tibet became a mere shadow. The Government of India had direct relations with the Tibetan authorities, who committed various acts of aggression and obstruction, and were also found to be intriguing with Russia. A British expedition was sent to Lhasa, and it had only one permanent result of importance. It paved the way for the rehabilitation of Chinese suzerainty, which had never been denied by Great Britain. Under the Anglo-Russian Convention, both Powers

agreed to abstain from further interference in the affairs of Tibet, and even undertook to prevent their respective subjects from seeking commercial concessions in that country. They signed what was in effect a mutual self-denying ordinance. Great Britain, however, had hardly contemplated the substitution of Chinese for Tibetan rule. We had only anticipated a revival of Chinese suzerainty. The flight of the Dalai Lama, the arrival of Chinese troops in Lhasa, the merciless oppression of the Tibetan people, raise new issues which were unexpected and still await definite conclusion. At the same time, the decision that British interests in the north stop short at the Himalayas is fixed and irrevocable, unless unforeseen factors are revealed.

Of the other foreign questions of India, such as the better control of the wild tribes on the North-East Frontier, the difficulties raised by the Arab revolt in Yemen, the more precise definition of British interests on the Southern Arabian coast and in the Hadramaut, and a multitude of minor complications, nothing can be said. The general tendency of Asiatic politics is to draw India more and more from her seclusion. With the rapid development of oversea communications and the spread of railways, India's external affairs have ceased to possess any really local character. To every student of Imperial policy they have become as important as the politics of Europe, and it is imperative that they should be better understood.

CHAPTER IX

THE INDIAN ADMINISTRATION. HOW IT WAS DEVELOPED.

[BY SIR WILLIAM MEYER, K.C.I.E.]

I — BEFORE 1832.

In the middle of the 18th century, on the eve of the event, which were to transform its mercantile outposts into vast territorial acquisitions, the East India Company had three principal settlements or "Presidencies" at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, each of which controlled dependent out-factories and was administered by a President and a Council consisting of the principal local servants of the Company and varying from 12 to 16 in number. In Council the President was merely *primus inter pares*, and each Presidency was directly subordinate to the Court of Directors in London. The issue of the long conflict between the British and French in Southern India, the battle of Plassey and the events which followed it, and the further expansion associated chiefly with the Governor-Generalships of Cornwallis, Wellesley, and the Marquis of Hastings, constituted these Presidencies into great dominions. By the end of the period of which we are now treating the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay had attained much to their present size, save for the subsequent addition of Sind to Bombay, while the

Bengal Presidency included roughly the present provinces of Bengal, Eastern Bengal, and Assam, and Agra, with Ajmer and some outlying territories in what are now the Central Provinces and Burma. The fact that the new Empire required control by a single Government in India, and in fundamental matters by the British Crown and Parliament, had been recognized by the series of Acts commencing with Lord North's Regulating Act of 1773, and including Pitt's Government of India Act of 1784, which gave the Bengal Presidency a Governor-General in Council with powers of superintendence and control over the Governors in Council, as they were now styled, of Madras and Bombay.

The Governors-General and the Governors were now persons of high *status* appointed from England, and each was associated with a small Council of three or four members, including the local commanders-in-chief, while, after the disadvantage of a purely collective administration had been evidenced by the quarrels and intrigues which so disturbed the rule of Warren Hastings, the Governor-General and the Presidency Governors had obtained the right of overruling their Councils in matters of grave importance. Indian affairs had been placed under the control of the British Government of the day by the establishment of a Board of Control—the President of which soon became *de facto* the entire Board and was to develop later on into the Secretary of State for India—to which the substance of the Company's power over the Indian Government was practically transferred. Each Presidency had its separate army, while in civil administration, too, the difficulties of communication, and the as yet isolated position of the three Presidencies still gave the Governments of Madras and Bombay a large degree of internal autonomy. The administration at first followed that of the native Governments whom we superseded, and was only gradually altered, the chief advance being, at the outset in the direction of settled order,

safety of life and property, milder judicial punishments, and more certain and equitable taxation.

The main unit of administration was then, as now, the district, though the **Unit of Administration.** districts of those days were, as a rule, considerably larger than they are at present. Each district was in charge of a Collector (styled Deputy Commissioner in the new provinces acquired after the end of this period), whose primary function was the realization of the revenues. He was also, however, and still is, the chief magistrate of the district, and was responsible for police arrangements. Each Collector had assistants belonging to the Company's service who were either in subordinate charge of outlying portions of the district or worked directly under his orders. Apart from larger subdivisions under such an assistant, each district was, as now, split up into smaller areas generally designated *tahsils* or *taluks*, and in the immediate charge of native officers (*tahsildars*—in Bombay *mamltdars*). Towards the end of this period, too, Lord William Bentinck inaugurated the appointment of native officers of a higher class, Deputy Collectors, who are now entrusted with the same duties and responsibilities as the Collector's European assistants. The Collector's principal subordinates, European and native, were like himself generally entrusted with magisterial and police functions also, their powers varying according to the revenue position they held.

At the base of all came, as ever in India, the village, with its own staff of petty officials and a large degree of autonomy which has perforce been subsequently curtailed by the advance of British administration. For the greater part of this period Collectors were directly responsible to the Presidency Governments, and in Madras and Bengal to the Boards of Revenue which these had established at headquarters; but in 1829 the important

step was taken, in the Bengal Presidency, of establishing an intermediate authority—viz., Commissioners of Divisions, each of which contained several districts. The Commissioner supervised the work of his Collectors in revenue and police matters, and also for a time exercised judicial functions, but these last have long passed, save to some extent in Upper Burma, to District and Sessions Judges. The Commissioner system has been applied to all the large provinces that have grown out of the old Bengal Presidency, and in Bombay. It has never, however, obtained in Madras, where the Collector continues to be in direct subordination to the Board of Revenue in revenue matters and to the local Government otherwise.

The Supreme Courts of the Presidencies were of a double character. The Supreme Courts proper established in Calcutta by the Regulating Act of 1773

The Courts.

and in Madras and Bombay subsequently consisted of British barristers; but their jurisdiction was practically restricted territorially to the Presidency towns and personally to European British subjects outside these.

Alongside of these Supreme Courts were Company's Chief Courts for civil and criminal matters, which served as courts of appeal in respect of the Company's interior or *mufassal* Courts. There was further a right of appeal to the King in Council (now the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) in important cases from all the Supreme Courts. The system of appointing natives of India to be subordinate civil Judges had already been applied.

Except in Bombay, where a code of regulations forming a body of substantial criminal law had been drawn up by Mountstuart Elphinstone no attempt had, however, been made to codify the criminal or civil law administered by the Company's Courts, which was generally based on the Mahomedan law in criminal matters, though with a dropping of the harsh punishments, such as mutilation

and stoning, which that law permits, and on the personal law of the parties in respect of civil disputes. Occasionally, however, native custom, which was absolutely repugnant to Western ideas, was specifically overridden, as by Lord William Bentinck's legislation against the burning of widows in 1829.* Such legislation as was required—and it was mainly confined to revenue and administrative matters—was carried out in the form of regulations by the Presidency Governments as such (the Indian statutes became known as Acts after 1833).

The Public Works Department, as we now conceive of it, was non-existent. **Public Works Department.** The roads were few and poorly maintained, while as regards irrigation little had been done beyond taking advantage of such works as had been constructed by previous native rulers. Mail runners were kept for Government purposes along main lines of communication, but the use of this post by private individuals was conceded only as a privilege. As regards State responsibility for famine relief and prevention, little advance had been made over native methods, which may be described as a policy of *laissez faire*, tempered only by occasional and generally unsuccessful attempts to start spasmodic relief works or to send food to famine areas. It may be noted, however, that the policy of granting what is known as *takari* advances—that is, small loans to cultivators where circumstances seemed to require it—was recognized so early as 1793.

The Company had a medical service, whose officers, though maintained chiefly for military purposes, were also available at the larger Civil stations. Hospitals had long been in existence in the Presidency towns, but their number in the *mufassil* was still small.

The educational efforts of the Government were still in the main confined to the establishment of a few colleges for Oriental learning, but missionary bodies in Calcutta

and in the South of India had already done much in the direction of starting schools and colleges, and in Bombay, Mountstuart Elphinstone had initiated a sound vernacular system of education.

The principal fiscal resources of the Government—apart from the trading operations of the Company which disappeared after the close of this period—consisted of (1) the land revenue ; (2) receipts from opium, Customs including a vexatious system of internal pass duties since abolished, and salt ; (3) Abkari or Excise revenue ; and (4) stamp duties and fees on judicial proceedings.

The land revenue was, as usual in Oriental countries, the mainstay of the Land Revenue Government. During the first years of System. British rule it had been exacted without any definite principle, except that of obtaining as much as it was thought the land could yield to the State by means of frequent and arbitrary reassessments and by farming the collection of these to the highest bidder, a method which had become generally prevalent under native rule with the decay of the Mogul Empire and the political anarchy that set in subsequently. But in 1793 Lord Cornwallis placed Bengal under a permanent settlement, which not only gave the great landlords with whom he dealt fixity of assessment, but precluded the Government from raising this for ever. The alternative system since adopted outside the permanent settlement area, of giving the landholder an assessment which should yield him a material portion of the profits of cultivation, and which should be fixed for a considerable period of years, but be liable to revision thereafter with reference to the circumstances then existing, was now in process of development. At the close of this period the ryotwari system of Madras had already been framed by Sir Thomas Munro, and in the Upper Provinces of Bengal (now the Province of Agra) steps were being taken towards the well-organized land revenue system which that Province

owed subsequently to the labours of Bird and Thomson, and which resulted in the settlements of Upper India being made with large landowners or joint proprietors of villages, and not with peasant occupiers as in Madras, or in permanency as in Bengal. In Bombay matters were not yet definitely settled, but the ryotwari system in that Province may be said to have commenced in 1836.

The currency arrangements were as yet anything but uniform, and the rupees issued from the Company's mints were still of different standards and weights. In short, outside defence, law and order, and taxation, the Government was still mainly of an exceedingly *laissez faire* character; very little had been done towards economic improvements and for the education and health of the people.

II.—FROM 1832 TO 1857.

This period was one of large territorial expansion and internal development. At its commencement the Company's territories consisted mainly of large coastal tracts with an extension inland up the Gangetic Valley; its close marks the attainment, by the annexation of the Punjab, Nagpur, Oudh, Lower Burma, and some minor tracts, of the British India of to-day, less only Upper Burma and Baluchistan. The control of the Home Government over affairs in India, exercised through the Board of Control and the Court of Directors, had become fuller and closer. The Charter Act of 1833 had developed the Governor-General in Council of the Bengal Presidency into a Government of India, with much fuller powers over the subordinate Governments, the Madras and Bombay Presidencies losing the right of legislation and all financial independence. Following on this Act came the creation of a Lieutenant-Governor without a Council for the North-Western Provinces of the Bengal Presidency, now the Province of Agra. Lower

Bengal was similarly placed under a Lieutenant-Governor in 1854, while the Punjab and Oudh were after annexation constituted into Provinces under Chief Commissioners. The Government of India had thus become a central authority dissociated from the administration of any large Province. The Charter Act of 1853 commenced the present discrimination between the Executive and the Legislative Councils of the Governor-General by adding to the former for legislative purposes an outside element, which, however, was still purely official, and the proceedings of the Legislative Council were from this time published and officially recorded. The same Act, it may be noted, threw open what is now known as the Indian Civil Service to competitive examination, in England, thus replacing the old system of nomination by the Board of Directors. This period was one of constantly increasing administrative efficiency, combined with growing centralization. A uniform code had been introduced, and English had become the official language. Internal and economic development, chiefly associated with the Governor-Generalships of Lord Dalhousie (1848-1856), had led to the creation of new or improved departments for the management of post-offices, telegraphs, civil accounts, railways, other public works, education, and gaols. The first three of these were under the direct management of the Government of India, the last three mainly under the Provincial Governments, while the control of such railways as existed was divided between the Central and the Local Administrations.

In the older provinces tranquillity and improved communications were enabling a better developed administration. Districts were being gradually reduced to more manageable size, and the proceedings of the Collectors and Commissioners were necessarily becoming subject to greater check by the Provincial Governments, and those of the latter to larger control by the Govern-

ment of India. The revenue and judicial systems were being improved, and native agency was being employed in increasing proportion. As regards land revenue, the methods of revenue settlement had been greatly improved, and were gradually becoming systematized, while towards the close of this period it was already becoming an axiom that the Government should not, as a rule, take more than half the net assets upon a fresh settlement.

The gradual increase in the number of hospitals and dispensaries involved the larger employment of native agency and the establishment of medical colleges and schools for its training. Lastly, old-standing municipal arrangements in the Presidency towns had been widened, and the first practical commencement of *mufassal* municipal administration had been made by an Act of 1850, chiefly utilized in the North-Western Provinces, which enabled the establishment of nominated Town Committees, who were permitted to levy local rates.

III.—FROM 1858 TO 1876.

This period though short in duration, is marked by large administrative change, due partly to the necessity for rebuilding and strengthening foundations which had been shaken by the Mutiny, and partly to the assumption of direct government by the Crown which emphasized the responsibility of the Government of India for improved administration, while it enlarged the ultimate control of the Home Government and of Parliament. The first years of the period witnessed a series of important Acts of Parliament affecting Indian administration. This legislation, the most important portions of which are the Government of India Act of 1858, and the Indian Councils, Indian Civil Service, and Indian High Courts Acts of 1861, regulated the Government of India under the Crown and provided for its appointment of the Governor-General (henceforth commonly styled the Viceroy), the Governors of Madras and Bombay, and the

members of their small Executive Councils. The portfolio system was introduced into these Councils, so that a member in charge of a particular Department can deal with minor matters relating thereto on behalf of the collective Government. Home control was provided by the Secretary of State for India, assisted by a Council, to whom all important questions have to be referred from India. The Indian Legislature was placed on a new footing by adding to the Governor-General's Council for purposes of administration a considerable number of additional members of whom not less than one-half were to be non-officials, thus providing for the participation of native Indians. Similar Legislative Councils, consisting also of high officials and nominated non-officials, were created for the provinces of Madras, Bombay, and Bengal, and became competent, subject to the control of the Government of India and the Secretary of State, to pass legislation of a local character. The old Supreme Crown and Company's Courts of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay were amalgamated into High Courts, and a similar Court was established at Allahabad, while Chief Courts which are practically High Courts though on a somewhat lower footing, were later on established for the Punjab and for Lower Burma

This period further witnessed the creation of three new important provinces, the Central Provinces, Assam, and Lower Burma, each of which was placed under a Chief Commissioner, and the elevation of the Punjab into a Lieutenant-Governorship, while a larger measure of control was established over the Native States. Criminal and civil law and procedure, and the Courts to which their working was entrusted, were placed on a satisfactory and generally uniform footing, while there was a large amount of salutary codification as regards other branches of law, and in fiscal subjects such as ~~the~~ relating to stamps and Customs. The Presidency armies

Further
Changes.

were reorganized and placed under the closer control of the Government of India, while the abolition of the Company's separate European forces brought British and Indian military arrangements into intimate connexion. The police and gaol services were organized on the lines on which they are still worked, and a Forest Department was created. The adoption of the policy of constructing railways and productive irrigation works from borrowed money led to a vigorous prosecution of these, and the control of railways necessarily became more centralized. The machinery for executing public works was gradually improved by a special recruitment of civil engineers from England and by the development of engineering colleges in India. The Government of India took over the control of the paper currency and rendered the accounts and audit organization effective. Lord Mayo gave the Local Governments a salutary control over various services in which they were specially interested and assignments to meet the expenditure thereon; and concomitantly with this came the first important development of local self-government, giving opportunities for local interest in, and larger expenditure on, sanitation, education, and roads, by developing the municipal system, and providing for local rates, and the establishment of committees to apply these in rural areas.

IV.—FROM 1877 TO 1911

This period, which commences with the Proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India, has been marked by great administrative improvement and the expansion of the economic activities of Government, by the creation of fresh provinces, by the development of the financial resources and responsibilities of the Local Governments, by a large increase of local self-government in municipalities and rural areas, by the greater association of natives of India in the administration, by Army reforms, and by a large extension of the character and powers

of the Legislative Councils. Its varied activities are mainly associated with the Viceroyalties of Lord Ripon and Lord Curzon (1884-1889, 1905), and with Lord Morley's tenure of office as Secretary of State for India. The following is a necessarily bald summary of the progress made in this period.

(1) New Provincial Arrangements—viz., the creation of two minor provinces, the North-West Frontier Province (detached from the Punjab) and Baluchistan; the unification of Oudh and the old North-Western Provinces as the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh; the detachment from Bengal of its Eastern districts and their conjunction with Assam as the Lieutenant-Governorship of Assam and Eastern Bengal; the annexation of Upper Burma and the conversion of the Province as thus enlarged into a Lieutenant-Governorship, the permanent leasing from the Nizam of Berar, held on a temporary tenure since 1853, and its conjunction with the Central Province.

(2) The formation of Legislative Councils in the United Provinces, the Punjab, Burma, and Eastern Bengal and Assam (the Central Province is now the only large Province without such a Council), and the development of the Central and local Legislative Councils carried out by the Indian Councils Acts of 1892 and 1909. The Councils now include a large elective element chosen directly or indirectly (the elective element in the Central Legislature is largely supplied by election by the non-official members of the Provincial Councils) by municipalities, district boards, and special constituencies such as bodies of landholders, chambers of commerce, and Universities, while a special measure of representation has been given to the Mahomedan minority. Including nominated members, the non-official element now predominates in all the Legislative Councils, but that of the Governor-General, and the councils have the right not merely of

dealing with legislation, but of discussing the Imperial and Provincial budgets, and of submitting resolutions on matters of public policy, while individual members can address interpellations to the Government. The resolutions of a Legislative Council are, however, not binding unless accepted by the Central or Provincial Government as the case may be.

(3) The disappearance of the separate Presidency armies of Madras and Bombay, and the present organization of the unified Army of India, which owes so much to Lord Kitchener, into divisions and brigades.

(4) Successive reorganization of the Governor-General's Executive Council which have given the administration of Army affairs, formerly in charge of a separate military member, to the Commander-in-Chief in addition to his previous functions as executive head of the Forces, and have provided members to deal specially with (a) Commerce and Industry, and (b) Education and Local Self-government. The other portfolios entrusted to specific members of council are now those of the Finance, Home, Revenue, and Agricultural (including the Civil Public Works), and Legislative Departments. Two Indian gentlemen have successively been admitted to the Viceroy's Legislative Council as legal members, and the Councils of Madras and Bombay have each been reinforced by an Indian member. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal has been provided with a similar Executive Council of three members (two civilians and one Indian), and power has been taken to provide like councils when required in other Lieutenant-Governorships. Lastly, the Secretary of State's Council in London now includes a Hindu and a Mahomedan member.

(5) Increasing development in the construction of railways and productive irrigation works, and the complete control of railways by the Central Government; but, on the other hand, the devolution to a Railway

Board, working under the Member for Commerce and Industry, of many administrative matters which formerly had to be considered by the Government.

(6) Successive stages of financial devolution which have provided the principal Local Governments with large permanent and growing sources of revenue, and have also given them wider discretion in the application of those resources.

(7) A policy which has extended the powers, functions, and resources of municipalities and rural local boards, and has given a large, and in many cases a predominant, elective element to these bodies. The distinct boards, corresponding roughly to our county councils, still work, however, for the most part under the presidency of the collectors.

(8) The closure of the mints to free coinage of silver, and the consequent throwing of the responsibility for fresh coinage upon the Government of India.

(9) A considerable extension of native agency in the higher administrative and judicial appointments, a policy the further development of which is now under consideration.

(10) The carrying out of important reforms in regard to famine administration, provision for railways and irrigation works, which (though not financially remunerative) are valuable as protectives against famine, education, medical and sanitary work, and police and Excise administration.

(11) The appointment of Imperial Inspectors-General, expert officers of the Government of India, who tour through the Provinces and advise the Central and Local Governments on subjects on which they have special knowledge, for important branches of the Civil admini-

stration which are controlled locally by the various Provincial Governments.

The general functions of Government in India are, as has been aptly observed by the Decentralization Commission of 1907-9, in many respects much wider than in the United Kingdom. "The Government claims a share in the produce of the land; and save where (as in Bengal) it has commuted this into a fixed land tax, it exercises the right of periodical reassessment of the cash value of its share. In connexion with its revenue assessments, it has instituted a detailed cadastral survey and a record of rights in the land. Where its assessments are made upon large landholders, it intervenes to prevent their levying excessive rents from their tenants; and in the Central Provinces it even takes an active share in the original assessment of landlords' rents. In the Punjab and some other tracts it has restricted the alienation of land by agriculturists to non-agriculturists. It undertakes the management of landed estates when the proprietor is disqualified from attending to them by age, sex, or infirmity, or, occasionally, by pecuniary embarrassment. In times of famine it undertakes relief works and other remedial measures upon an extensive scale. It manages a vast forest property, and is a large manufacturer of salt and opium. It owns the bulk of the railways of the country, and directly manages a considerable portion of them; and it has constructed, and maintains, most of the important irrigation works. It owns and manages the postal and telegraph systems. It has the monopoly of note issue, and it alone can set the mints in motion. It acts, for the most part, as its own banker, and it occasionally makes temporary loans to Presidency Banks in times of financial stringency. With the co-operation of the Secretary of State it regulates the discharge of the balance of trade as between India and the outside world through the action of the

Indian Council's drawings. It lends money to municipalities, rural boards, and agriculturists, and occasionally to the owners of historic estates. . . . In India, moreover, the direct responsibility of Government in respect of police, education, medical and sanitary operations, and ordinary public works is of a much wider scope than in the United Kingdom. The Government has, further, very intimate relations with the numerous Native States, which collectively cover more than one-third of the whole area of India, and comprise more than one-fifth of its population."

In the discharge of their functions, the Indian Government are largely subject to the control of his Majesty's Government as exercised through the Secretary of State for India. Practically no fresh legislation can be undertaken without the Secretary of State's assent, which is also required to any new important departure in policy, whether financial or administrative, and specifically in regard to a number of matters principally connected with expenditure. The authorities exercising the functions of government in India may be divided into three grades.—(1) The Government of India; (2) the Local Governments; (3) statutory bodies, such as district boards, municipalities, and Port Trust, which have been created for the more efficient discharge of local duties. The Government of India retain in their own hands matters relating to foreign affairs, including relations with the principal Native States, defence, general taxation, currency, debt, tariffs, posts and telegraphs, railways, and accounts and audit, while other matters of ordinary internal administration fall mainly to the Provincial Governments. There are now eight principal or major Provinces, Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam, the United Provinces, the Punjab, Burma, and the Central Provinces; and five minor administrations of a less important and more

The Division
of
Control.

dependent character, the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Ajmer, Coorg, and the Andaman Islands. Coorg and Ajmer are, however, little more than districts, which are respectively administered by the Resident of Mysore and the Agent to the Governor-General for the Native States of Rajputana; and the Andamans are primarily a penal settlement. None of the Provinces are, however, independent entities. The Governments are subordinate agents of the Government of India, and it may be said generally that no Local Government can take any important step without reference to Calcutta or Simla, while the Central Government also lays down the lines of general policy for the country as a whole.

The local bodies above referred to are entrusted with functions relating mainly to the development, within their jurisdiction, of ports, education, medical relief, sanitation, vaccination, roads and streets, the control of markets, and suchlike matters, and are provided for these purposes with separate local sources of revenue. The control exercised over them by Local Governments is roughly analogous to that which the Government of India imposes upon these latter.

CHAPTER X.

EDUCATION IN INDIA.

When considering the advance made under the British Government in India in the various branches of the administration, it is too often the practice to take it for granted that our responsibilities date back to the latter end of the 18th century, and that, therefore, the destinies of five or six generations of Indians have been under our control. In no department of public life is such an assumption more unfair than in the case of education. In the first place British India, as we now know it, hardly came into existence as an organic whole until the time of Lord Dalhousie, and, secondly, it was only a few years before the expiration of the Company's Charter, and the direct assumption of the government of India by the Crown that our responsibilities in the matter of education were susceptible of realization. It would, indeed, be fairer to say, rather, that it was only in the year 1839 that the British in India deliberately decided to go beyond the limits of their obvious responsibilities by undertaking a task which has no parallel in history. M. Chailley, in his admirable "Administrative Problems of British India," says, indeed, that "All colonizing nations are sooner or later faced with the problem of the education of the natives. It is a grave, a difficult, one may say a distressing, problem which cannot be evaded, and which involves a conflict between interest and conscience." And he goes on to claim

that "it is to the credit of the civilized peoples that in this conflict between interest and duty none of them has long remained deaf to the voice of honour."

In the case of India, however, it may be doubted whether M. Chailley was in a position to realize to the full the difficulties of the problem. There was hardly the antithesis of civilized *versus* uncivilized peoples, which existed in the majority of the other countries he no doubt had in mind. The complexity of the problem as it confronted the East India Company, and, later, the Government of India, was enormously increased by the existence in India not only of a very old civilization, resting upon some of the highest philosophic teaching with which the world is as yet acquainted, but also of institutions of very long standing devoted to oriental learning. It is true that nothing in the nature of general education had ever been organized, or indeed thought desirable, by the governments in India which preceded ours; nay, education was, under the Hindu system, regarded as the close preserve of some of the higher castes, by no means to be invaded by those of the baser sort. But this fact, of course, added to the difficulties of initiating any scheme based on Western, and more democratic, ideas, while it also gave pause to those desirous of establishing an educational system on a broader basis, inasmuch as it appeared that any such innovation would tend to an infringement of the customs and traditions of the people.

In such circumstances it is not strange to find that the earliest attempts in India to establish schools for general education were made by missionaries, a fact which in itself not improbably retarded action by the Company, one of whose principles, emphasized on the assumption of the government of India by the Crown in 1858, was the observance of a strict neutrality in regard to the

religions of India. Apart from missionary institutions, such colleges as were established in the 18th century were for the promotion of Oriental learning; and the Charter Act of 1813, which required the expenditure of a lakh of rupees annually on education, may be said to be the first overt recognition by the rulers of the Company's territories of their responsibilities in this matter. With a growing demand for Indian clerical subordinates, literary attainments obtained a commercial value, while a knowledge of English ensured employment by the rulers of the country. The interests of the Company, it now began to be realized, also demanded the systematizing of education; and in 1823 a Committee of Public Instruction was established for Bengal to organize matters on a proper footing. Similar arrangements followed for Madras, and, later, for Bombay, but before the organization of this educational machine had reached this stage a most important decision was reached by the Government of Lord Auckland in 1839.

Until 1835 the Company's government had halted between two opinions, and their hesitation and the delay in the expansion of education which it involved are an illustration of the wide difference between India and other conquered and colonized countries in relation to this problem. Had India been, in M. Chailley's phrase, uncivilized, there could have been no difficulty in deciding upon the nature of the general educational system. We should have had a *tabula rasa* upon* which to work, and the introduction of a Western system need have occasioned no hesitation. For the reasons given, however, there was a strong body of opinion in favour of establishing in India a system of education based upon the methods we found in operation there, since it was held that these were more in conformity with the genius of the Hindu and would be

The
Influence of
Macaulay.

less subversive of the social customs and traditions of the people. It was the strong personality of Lord Macaulay, at that time a member of the Governor-General's Council, which carried the day against the Orientalists and in favour of conferring upon India an education based upon English ideas. It is not necessary, indeed with our present knowledge it would be impossible, to agree with him in his low estimate of the value of Oriental learning and the ancient Hindu literature; but there can be little doubt to-day that, in all essentials, the decision to which he led the Government of his day was the wise one. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that, had the contrary opinion prevailed at the time, the system it advocated could have survived to-day as that of the British Government in India. But it is undoubtedly the case that the divorce of Oriental learning from the Government's programme, coupled with the obligation to preserve the strictest neutrality in religious matters, has given rise to difficulties for which no parallel can be found in the case of any other country in the world.

**The Present
System.**

Education on Western lines came, then, gradually to be organized in all provinces, and received special furtherance at the hands of Mountstuart Elphinstone in Bombay and Mr Thomason in what are now known as the United Provinces; but, while the State expenditure, despite the encouragement given to the subject by Lord Dalhousie's Government, continued small, no great advance could be achieved. The basis of the present system, by which the cost of primary education is met by a rate levied on the land revenue, was devised first in 1851 by the Collector of Muttra, who succeeded in raising a voluntary rate of about 1 per cent. on the land revenue. The system was speedily adopted elsewhere. It is thus clear that the problem had been seriously grappled with, and that the local authorities had already gone considerable lengths in

the direction of organizing public instruction upon a systematic basis, when, in 1854, Sir Charles Wood addressed to the Government of India the celebrated despatch which outlined and directed the adoption of the measures for improving the educational system which continue, in substance, in force to the present time.

The chief specific directions conveyed in this despatch, with a view to securing a much wider extension of English and vernacular education, included the establishment in each province of a separate department for the purpose; the institution of Universities at the three Presidency towns; the establishment of training schools for teachers, the maintenance and further extension of colleges and high schools; and increased attention to elementary education in the vernacular schools. Finally, Sir Charles Wood urged upon the Indian authorities the introduction of a system of grants in aid, anticipating (as results have proved with too great confidence) that this would ultimately lead to the discontinuance of the need for a general system of education entirely provided by the State.

Sir
Charles Wood's
Despatch.

In the light of what has been said as to the earlier customs of the Hindus in respect of their social system and of education it will not be a surprise that the Indian community failed to respond to Sir C. Wood's expectations in the matter of primary education. Efforts at securing local support to the project tended to make the whole educational scheme unpopular, and it became clear that a policy which aimed at imparting primary instruction broadcast was not likely to secure the unqualified support of the higher castes. The suggestion was accordingly made, in conformity with the general plan which had been in operation for some time, that it would be more expedient to impose a special rate on land to

defray the cost of elementary education, and this is the system now in force.

The arrangements inaugurated in Commission of pursuance of the scheme outlined in 1882. the despatch of 1854, which had been approved and supplemented by the Secretary of State for India in 1859 after the assumption of the Government by the Crown, resulted in a very large expansion of education ; and the trend of results has come under observation and special inquiry in 1882 and again in 1901-4, during Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty. It was evident, on the earlier occasion, that elementary education was not receiving that share of State or local support to which it was entitled ; and it was found necessary to lay down rules of a stringent character requiring local boards and municipalities to devote a fixed proportion of their educational expenditure to primary schools. The Commission of 1882 further urged the gradual transfer to local management, whenever possible without loss of efficiency, of secondary schools as well as primary.

Before noticing the more recent reforms, it is necessary here to trace **Attitude of Higher Castes.** briefly some of the idiosyncrasies of the Hindu character as reflected upon the results of the educational system. It will be realized readily that the community into which we introduced the system culminating in the directions given in 1854 was one differing both in its social customs, its past traditions, and its domestic organization from any other in Asia, and as far asunder from Western communities as it is possible to conceive. On the one hand, in the hereditary priestly and clerical castes of the highest degree of intelligence, in some cases highly educated, there existed, at the summit of the social organism, material which was ready to adapt itself to our requirements with almost marvellous promptitude. Accus-

tomed, by hereditary right, to direct the domestic affairs of the lower castes, and also, in the majority of States, to exercise a preponderating influence in public affairs, this class suddenly found that their road to influence and affluence lay in adapting themselves to an Occidental system of tuition. Full and prompt advantage was taken of the opening afforded. On the other hand, the submerged millions made a lamentably slow response to our invitation. The social fabric had never contemplated the education of the masses, nor had these ever experienced the need of it. The agriculturist and artisan classes had been accustomed to rely for such literary and mathematical skill as was occasionally needed in the pursuit of their callings upon a special class of the community whose function had thus been prescribed for countless generations. In a country where labour was not only meticulously subdivided, but where the subdivision formed exclusive social groups circumscribed and hedged about by marriage and other restrictive ordinances, it naturally took a long time for the new ideas to filter downwards. And meanwhile the aristocratic castes were profiting.

Two results ensued. In the first place, by the promptitude with which **Brahmans and the Brahman and writer classes fell Writers.** in with the new order of things they succeeded, to a large extent, in perpetuating to themselves a practical monopoly of the proffered educational advantages; and, in the second place, the practice grew up of looking upon these as the means to an assured end—viz, employment by Government. In other words, the scheme of a Western education, designed to raise the masses of India from the depths of the ignorance in which they had remained content for ages, came to be an instrument in the perpetuation of the traditional social system of the Hindus. The highest castes took advantage of it to regain, with the

English rulers of India, the political as well as the religious prestige which had been threatened by the democratic notions of the newcomers.

This was not, of course, a policy consciously pursued. It is merely an interesting instance of the persistence of an inbred characteristic. Unconsciously the special feature of the social system of the past two thousand years overrode the superficial tendencies of an imported scheme; and this fact explains the failure of the people to respond to the grant-in-aid system. It explains, too, why elementary education was, at all events until recently, sacrificed to secondary and higher education, and why rules and regulations have been necessary compelling the local bodies who administer education to devote a fixed proportion of their resources to primary schools. The local bodies being preponderatingly representative of the priestly, mercantile, and writer castes, their interests are chiefly the provision of facilities for the higher tuition of their own children. Again this is not of set and conscious purpose so much as of the nature of innate proclivity, almost instinct. It is not necessary to reprobate the automatic tendencies of a social system and a civilization more than twice as old as our own; but it is desirable to appreciate the fact, since it affords an explanation of the failures to achieve desired results which successive investigations have brought to notice. The degree of our failure should not, however, be exaggerated. When the conditions are properly viewed it is perhaps legitimate to wonder at the measure of success which has attended the efforts of the British Government in India in a matter of such complexity. The figures showing the number of schools and scholars are, in this view, full of encouragement; and before proceeding to consider the latest developments of educational policy in India it may be well to

glance at these, together with the sums of money now being expended on public instruction.

In 1871 there were 19,646 primary and secondary schools in India, giving instruction to some 700,000 scholars. In 1881-2 these numbers had risen approximately to 90,000 institutions with 2,200,000 scholars, while in 1901-2 the figures approached 104,000 and 3,900,000 respectively, including 400,000 girl scholars. In 1882 there were only 67 colleges giving tuition to 6,000 students, while in 1901 there were 191 colleges (including special colleges) attended by about 23,000 students. The cost of public institutions is met from provincial revenues, local funds, municipal funds, fees, and other sources, such as donations, &c., and in 1908-9, the last year for which complete figures are accessible, the total number of scholars appears to have reached nearly six millions, the cost of educating them amounting approximately to £4,500,000. Having regard to the tendencies adverse to the spread of general education already noted, these statistics cannot fairly be regarded as giving cause for despondency.

A discussion of the present stage of educational policy in India can best proceed side by side with a consideration of the measures for reforming the system which were initiated by Lord Curzon between the years 1901 and 1904. After he had been three years in India, and had thus obtained ample knowledge of the practical working of the educational methods pursued, Lord Curzon was persuaded that the time had arrived to make a searching investigation into their defects, and to this end convened a strong and representative Conference, over which he himself occasionally presided, whose deliberations covered practically every branch of the system. The first result to take shape was the appointment of

Some
Statistics.

Inquiries.

a Director-General of Education, whose function was to be advisory, not only in relation to the Central Government, but also to the provincial Administrations. Without executive powers, he was to be a referee in educational problems, and the hope was that the varying systems in different provinces would, by means of his appointment, become more co-ordinate in their policy.

The second, and perhaps the most important, result was the appointment of the Universities Commission in 1902. It had long been felt not only that the Indian Universities, up till then purely examining bodies, had failed to influence general education in the right manner, but also that their constitution required amendment before improvement could be expected. The standard of qualification for the Senate of the Indian Universities was low, and the unlimited tenure of fellowships tended to swell the body of fellows without securing vigour to the administration. Again, the regulations governing the affiliation of colleges to the University were found to be faulty and to need revision. These and other matters formed the subject of specific recommendations for change by the Universities Commission, of whom five members were distinguished Indian educationists, and they were eventually embodied, in 1904, in a new Universities Act. The subjects of technical and European education in India were dealt with at considerable length by the Conference of 1901, as were also questions relating to the improvement of normal schools and training colleges, the extension of primary and female education, the inculcation of moral training, &c. ; but the most important for present purposes, of the remaining subjects, were the discussions of the Conference on the subject of the

abolition of competitive tests for Government employment.

The deliberations of Lord Curzon's Conference, in fact, brought to light **Government** and placed on record the inefficiency of the administration of the Indian **Service.** Universities, the incompleteness of their control and influence over affiliated colleges, and the need for according greater encouragement to pupils to take up an industrial and technical course of training. The Conference condemned the system which encouraged the idea that all educational tests were to be regarded as qualifications, more or less analogous to bills payable on demand, for Government service. It will be seen that in all these deficiencies we have really symptoms of that extraordinary conservatism of India which is the obstacle to change or reform in whatever department of life. Permeated with the ineradicable idea that education should be the perquisite of those classes of the community to whom it is an hereditary appanage, and as a corollary that those classes should *prima facie* find themselves the recipients of State patronage, the notion that educational qualifications are the gateway to influence and Government office is at the root of the Hindu conception. Control and discrimination in administrative matters have never been a distinguishing feature of the Indian character, and hence, when the University Senates had grown to unwieldy size, and included a majority of Indians, reform and advance became impossible. The idea of raising the standard of University or other qualifications was attacked as being an endeavour to stifle the aspirations of the students and to deprive them of their prospective livelihood. On the other hand, the practical interest taken in primary education by Indians was comparatively small, and Lord Curzon's Government was compelled then, and later (in 1904), to give

strong emphasis to the need for furthering this by all possible means.

Educational matters illustrate anew what is so plain to those familiar with other departments of Indian administration—namely, that reform must come from without, and must, in the first instance, be unpopular. To reform, to strengthen, to add to the sphere of usefulness of the Universities; to improve the quality of the affiliated colleges by demanding a higher standard of control and tuition; to raise the standard of University tests, and to widen the plane of education generally—all these aims involved the infringement of past practice and a disturbance of the *status quo*; and it required energy and courage of no mean order to initiate and carry through the stages of investigation and legislation necessary as a foundation to change.

It is, unfortunately, open to question whether, in India as a whole, the policy of reform, of which the foundations were thus laid, has lately been prosecuted with the same vigour and determination. It may, indeed, be doubted whether the reforms in regard to the Universities were themselves sufficiently drastic. Endeavours made recently in Bombay to induce the University to modify its tests and to expand its curriculum have hitherto failed to produce results, and the Bombay Government have been compelled to rule out the lowest University test as a qualification for Government employment. Such conflicts seem to indicate that the ambition for complete self-government in matters of higher education has come into being prematurely, and while this ideal has doubtless developed as the outcome of past policy, dating from the establishment of the three Presidency towns Universities in 1857, and from the hopes expressed in the Despatch of 1854, it is clearly desirable, if progress is to be made on the right lines, that reforms, even if they should bear an

outward semblance of being retrograde, should be enforced where necessary.

And it would be idle to contend that all is well in matters educational in India. As early as 1904, before overt symptoms of unrest had made themselves apparent, the Government of Lord Curzon, in reviewing educational progress, had to take cognizance of certain tendencies, "unfavourable to discipline," which criticism had attributed to the extension to India, without modification, of a system of education modelled upon that of the West; and the Government orders proceeded—correctly enough, so far as they went—to rule that the remedy for such tendencies must be sought not so much in any formal methods of teaching conduct by means of moral text-books or primers of personal ethics as in the influence of carefully selected and trained teachers. The provision of proper persons as teachers is, of course, one of the most important—but in India, under present conditions, one of the most difficult—requisites as a condition precedent to the attainment of satisfactory results, and until the general condition of the subordinate educational staff is raised much above its present level it will be unreasonable to hope for material improvement.

It is most important that this, perhaps the most urgent need of all, should be borne steadily in view, especially at a time when the facile cry of free and compulsory primary education is being raised. The unreality of such a cry can best be appreciated when two facts are realized. First, four villages out of five (taking India as a whole) are without a school building or school staff, and it would therefore be impossible to make compulsory primary education a reality. In the second place, every province has a free list, and the free list is never full. It is the fact that not a single boy whose parents wish to have him educated is debarred from gratifying their desire by the existence of the very small

**Reforms
Required.**

fee which is levied. But even if the demand for abolition of all fees were a reality, there can be no question whatever, where the financial resources of Government are limited, between the relative importance of the unlimited provision of inadequately staffed primary schools and of placing existing schools upon a satisfactory footing. When assistant masters in village schools receive, as they did till quite recently in some provinces, pittance of Rs.3 or Rs.4 per month, it is idle to talk of an unlimited expansion of primary education. Even now the lowest paid assistants receive not more than Rs.8, except in Bombay, where the *minimum* salary has just been raised to Rs.9. Lord Curzon's Government were right in laying emphasis upon the value of the "influence of carefully selected and trained teachers"; and when we have secured them in existing institutions it will be time enough to contemplate the gradual expansion of facilities up to the ideal point where every village shall have its school.

But it is not only in the primary schools—nor even in the secondary schools—that the qualifications of the staff of the educational department are deficient. When a competent observer like M. Chailley remarks that the teaching staff in Indian colleges is far too small he is criticizing the University which permits the affiliation of an institution which is inadequately equipped, and, through the University, the Government, from whom the authority is derived : and when he proceeds :—"Nor does the quality of the teachers compensate for their numerical feebleness. On the contrary, defective quality is the weakest point in the college teaching," he, in effect, condemns the inadequacy of the Government control throughout.

A great deal of discussion has recently taken place regarding the **Religious and Moral Training.** secularization of Indian education, and there seems to be a growing conviction, among Indians and English alike, that the

complete divorce of all religious and moral training from the curriculum has been an error which is in no small measure responsible for the recent unrest in India. So much has recently been written on this aspect of Indian education that it may be accepted as inevitable that the Government of India will endeavour to modify past policy in this respect in so far as modification is possible with a strict regard to the observance of religious neutrality; but in no aspect of the education of youth is the provision of properly trained and qualified teachers more desirable than in that of ethics. The parrot-like assimilation of text-books in which the Indian student is such a past master can have no value in such a subject; and it seems not impossible to hope that the institution, as part of the curriculum, of moral training may of itself result in raising the level of the teaching capacity of Indian schoolmasters.

Local autonomy in educational matters, as in many other departments of Indian administration, is a most desirable goal to have in view, and, with certain rigorous safeguards, the policy, advocated in 1854 and 1882 and since reiterated, of leaving the management of primary and secondary schools to the control of local boards and municipalities, is the one most likely to achieve permanent success. Absolute uniformity in educational matters in a continent like India, with its wide diversities of race and language, would be most undesirable, even if it were possible. But there must be the safeguard of inspectability. If in England there is such necessity for inspection by the Board of Education inspectors, how much more urgent is the need in India! And it is precisely in this department of the Government's past educational policy that there is need for criticism. The Indian Educational Service—that is to say, that small fraction of the educational staff of India which is re-

The Need for
Inspection.

cruited in India—should be recognized as being one of the most important branches of the public service, and should be selected with the utmost possible care. As a service it should be made to attract the best available men. The number of posts in each province filled by Europeans is at present far too small for the requirements of the case ; but if it be impossible, on financial grounds, to increase the numbers, it is of urgent importance to place the service upon a footing, both as regards methods of recruitment and of prospects, which shall attract men of the highest calibre.

Reference has been made to the need for closer inspection of public schools in India ; the value of such inspection must depend upon the numerical adequacy and efficiency of the European inspecting staff. Again, since we are proceeding upon a Western system of education, the professorial staff of the high schools and colleges should include not only a leavening of Europeans, but of Europeans carefully selected for their proficiency. The system of recruitment at present in force, coupled, perhaps, with the unattractive prospects offered by service in the department, fails to secure the best men available, and does not provide for a sufficient number.

A hopeful feature is the renewed attention which is again being accorded to the subject of education, and although the reforms which Lord Curzon initiated have perhaps not as yet been brought to complete fruition, and although the unrest in India may have diverted the attention of the authorities from the subject, it is to be hoped that it is realized what a close connexion exists between the two. If one cause, more than any other, can be said to account for the unrest it is the inherent defects in the stupendous scheme of giving a Western education to an Eastern people. It was inevitable that mistakes should be made ; and it has been characteristic of us to shut our eyes to possible

dangers. That the authorities in India are determined to grapple with the difficulties, and endeavour to find means of improvement, is evidenced by the recent creation of a Department of Education in separate charge of a member of the Viceroy's Council. That appointment, it is true, raises an apprehension that a most undesirable process of centralization may be pursued ; but, provided that this tendency is rigorously resisted, there is ground for hoping that a persistent and logical effort will be made to see that the reforms advocated are gradually brought into being.

The vitalizing and strengthening of the Universities, which should be the mainspring of the system, must be carried into effect. The methods upon which the Indian educational service is recruited in England and organized in India should be carefully investigated and revised ; and the strength of that service, both in the professorial and inspectorial branches, strengthened. The pay of the lower grades of the educational service should be revised throughout India so as to render it reasonable to expect that competent assistant masters will come forward to join the department ; and the tests qualifying for admission should be so arranged as to afford some guarantee of their moral and educational fitness for their work. The curriculum should include such moral or religious teaching as may be desired in each province or locality ; and the whole system throughout should be subjected to a more rigorous and real inspectorial control than is possible with the inadequate staff which is at present made to suffice.

Reforms such as these will cost a great deal of money, but they will achieve real results, and when the public instruction organized by the State upon Western lines has thus been revitalized, it will be time to consider the question of the further extension of the system by the adoption of free and compulsory elementary education.

It has been impossible to deal at length with the important development of industrial and technical education ; but the success of these depends in large measure upon the adoption of the progressive and enlightened attitude by the Universities which should follow upon what has been advocated. The germs of all these improvements are to be found in the resolutions of the Conferences of 1882 and 1901, and in the orders of the Government of Lord Curzon in 1904 ; and it is now for the Government of India to falsify the apprehensions of those who feared that the reforms then initiated would remain a dead-letter.

CHAPTER XI.

INDIA AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT.

The future of India is inseparably bound up with industrial development. Whether British rule endures in its present form, or is ultimately modified, the country will require a systematic development of its resources and the organization of a trained industrial population if it is to work out its own salvation. It has to create fresh wealth rather than to hoard what it already possesses, and it cannot hope to preserve its existence upon a solid basis by agriculture and the export of raw materials alone. People are constantly explaining the needs of India, but they do not always stop to think where the money is to come from to satisfy those needs. For instance, India requires better military and naval protection. A country with an enormous land frontier and a coastline of abnormal extent in proportion to its area will not for ever maintain its integrity with an army of 235,000 men and a few small ships. That expenditure on defence in India is destined to increase rather than to decrease must be pronounced inevitable.

Again, the system of education requires vast development if India is to gain her rightful place in the world, and for that purpose also much money will be required. The system of administration is bound to grow more complex if progress is to be attained. The dream of primitive simplicity in governance is utterly at variance with the needs of great modern States, and the craving for

national advancement will entail more officials instead of fewer. Wealth is needed to create wealth. Every successful Indian industry breeds other industries. The money made in the cotton mills of Bombay to-day is used to smelt iron and make steel in Bengal to-morrow. In this great issue the interests of Indians and English are identical, though for different reasons. The British are concerned, because the increasing prosperity of India, and the creation of capital which is wisely employed and not hidden, may reasonably be supposed to strengthen the stability of their rule. The Indians are concerned, because they derive the most direct benefit from the growth of prosperity. Even the most ardent Nationalist has a direct interest in the industrial development of India. He dreams of the day when his country will stand alone without external aid; and though most of the Nationalists are unpractical dreamers with no conception of economics, they must surely see that to stand alone India requires power, and in her case power cannot be gained without wealth. Three hundred millions of people, whose country lies on the main highway of the world, can never hold their own by the methods which have served a handful of Montenegreins in a wilderness of mountains. Thus, whatever turn events may take, the industrial development of India becomes everybody's business.

The clue to the present condition of India probably lies not so much in possible antagonism to British domination, or in the wave of reviving aspiration which has swept through Asia, but rather in the fact that India, perhaps more than any other Asiatic country, is in the throes of a great transition. In no respect is the effect of the transition more marked than in questions affecting industrial development. For centuries the basis of the life of the country was the village, which, as Mr. Yusuf Ali has said,

was "a self-contained economic community." Invaders swept through the peninsula, princes warred with one another, Emperors marched their armies far and wide, but the village people followed their immemorial ways. There was a great deal of manufacture, but no organization of industry in the modern sense. Gold was worked, but most of the minerals of the country lay untouched. Foodstuffs were chiefly consumed where they were produced, and in the absence of railways little attempt was made to distribute food products throughout the country, while practically none were exported. Such enterprises as the vast jute industry were still undreamed of.

The impact of the West has changed the old conception which made the village the only real basis of the Indian communities. Certain industries are being organized in the Western manner. The mill chimney is no longer an unfamiliar feature of the Indian landscape. One may stand on the railway bridge at Byculla, Bombay, and gaze upon an array of busy mills which to Lancashire should be a portent full of warning. In the great cities of the United Provinces and the Punjab, and on the banks of the Hughli, the adoption of the factory system is creating many new industrial centres. The vast red-brick mill, with its whirling machinery, may not always be the best symbol of progress, but it is an index of wealth. No one who has studied the question wants to see the small individual worker who toils in his own home crushed by the competition of great enterprises backed by large capital. There are two million hand looms in India, and the Government wisely desire to shield and encourage those who work them. Room will always exist for the handloom workers and kindred artisans in the midst of so huge a population. But India needs more wealth, and wealth in the volume required can best be produced by the organization of industry.

Some experts argue that the factory system upon

Western lines is perhaps not best suited for the Indian artisan. The climate is not favourable, the waste is often great, the business methods are frequently defective. The objection need not be discussed, because it is hardly pertinent to the main issue. It would be easy to show examples of great mills which prove that healthy conditions, successful management, and substantial profits are by no means difficult of attainment in India. Experience seems to suggest that large mills are best, but it may be that a network of smaller factories will be more in keeping with Indian conditions. The real point is that organization is imperative, and that the industrial regeneration of India, the creation of those larger material resources which will enable India to stand as an Empire upon a firmer basis, will never be effected by the encouragement of individual workers alone.

When the problem is approached more nearly, it is soon discovered that the transitional stage through which India is passing is the dominant factor. There are innumerable artisans in India, but the majority of them are still tied to the village, the economic unit to which they belong. So far there is no large permanent class dwelling in the towns and cities all their lives, accustomed by tradition to work, not in their own homes or shops, but in a mill or factory with thousands of others. They flock to the towns seeking work, they even obtain a certain degree of skill in a particular task, but in their own minds they remain birds of passage. The city is not their permanent home, and they do not desire to dwell there for ever. To all these broad generalizations there are necessarily large exceptions, but it may be stated roughly that the average worker in a mill or a mine does not wish to make himself a home near the scene of his transitory labours. Circumstances often compel him to spend his whole life there, but he does so with reluctance. The village, the home of his ancestors, calls him, and