

can impose further burdens on the extremely poor people of India. (Cheers.) When I say the people are extremely poor, the words are not mine, but those of Mr. Fawcett and many other eminent statesmen. I do not want to detain the audience any longer, but I will only say the man is dead, but his words will remain; and I only hope that he will inspire others to follow in his footsteps and to earn the blessings of hundreds of millions of the people of this country. (Loud and prolonged cheers.)

5

DINNER TO HON. MR. DADABHAI NAOROJI BY THE RIPON CLUB.

(Before the Members of the Ripon Club at a dinner given in honour of Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji on his departure to England. Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy, Bart., C. S. I., in the chair.)

The Hon. Dadabhai Naoroji, who was greeted with loud cheers, said:—Sir Jamsetjee and friends,—I cannot but feel the greatest gratification at the honour you have done me. I value this compliment as one of the highest I can receive. Age brings with it its gratification or the reverse for the past. The individual may be able to judge truly or imperfectly of his own conduct, the true test is the verdict of his fellow countrymen. (Cheers.) If such as the present is the verdict of my countrymen, however extra sweetened it may be with the feeling of kindness towards me, I cannot but feel gratified that I have in my humble way been of some use to my country, and such a feeling is the highest reward I can possibly wish for and enjoy. I remember distinctly what feelings had actuated our first small band of workers who devoted themselves earnestly to the task of social, political, and other reforms. It was his, that educated as we had been at the expense of our country, the deep debt we owed to the British rulers being the instrument and projectors of our intellectual elevation, and having been the few fortunate recipients of such a blessing in the midst of millions of our fellow-countrymen, it was a most serious duty devolved upon us to repay our rulers and our country with loyal and grateful service in every way it may be in our power to do so. This has been all along our animating spirit, and with such reward as I, one of them, have this day received, an emphatic approval is given through me to the workers in the service of their country. It is sometimes said by some, to suit their purpose, that the educated natives do not represent their countrymen. But what is the real state of the case? It is only the educated that can at all and do represent

the wants of the dumb millions. It is the educated only who on the one hand can understand the advanced civilization and ideas of our rulers, and on the other hand, the ideas and wants and wishes of their countrymen. It is the educated only that can become the true interpreters, and the connecting link between the rulers and the ruled. (Cheers.) And, moreover, it is the educated and intellectual only that can as in all countries, not England excepted, lead the van of all progress and civilization, and whom the rest of the people follow. The few earnest and talented have always, will always, be the leaders of mankind. My elevation to the membership of the Legislative Council naturally leads me to say that while sincerely thanking you for your good words, I cannot but feel that the situation is one of most onerous responsibility. To legislate for a people, whose weal or woe depends upon such legislation, is one of the highest as well as the most responsible of human duties and functions, and I shall consider myself very fortunate if I even partially succeed in this duty. As to all my past to which you have alluded in such exceedingly kind terms, I can only say I thank you most heartily. The work in which I have had my share with such persons as our much lamented friend Nowrojee Furdoonjee, and many others, has, I trust, done something for our social and political advancement. (Cheers.) The progress has, no doubt, been yet small, but it is hopeful. If we are true to ourselves, and earnestly and single-mindedly work for the welfare of our country, all other circumstances are in our favour. Education is advancing though slowly, the mass of the people are beginning to be leavened with and awakened to civilizing influences. All India is beginning to work in concert like the National Congress held here last year. And above all we have rulers who above all others are pre-eminently the nation of progress, political advancement, freedom and human civilization. The highest ambition to which every true patriot of India should aspire is to desire the continuance of the British rule for a long, long time to come, and to strengthen it with every possible effort and true loyalty. (Loud cheers.) This is the very reason why we should not hesitate to lay ourselves freely before our rulers in order that, understanding our wants clearly, our rulers may be enabled to see their way to do what may be necessary. One thing I am assured of in the English character. Oppose and have a stand up fight with an Englishman. He may beat you or you may beat him. When the fight is over, he will respect you the more for your manliness, because he is himself manly and appreciates manliness in others. (Cheers.) You know well I have not a little exercised my birthright of English grumbling, and yet as long as it is

believed by any Englishmen to be genuine and from pure motives, I have received from such nothing but expressions and treatment of attention and respect, however much they may have differed from my views. In our present rulers we have this remarkable hopeful feature. The English nation is at bottom a nation of conscience and fairness, with an instinct to do what is right and necessary. That they may take longer than we should desire at times to meet our wishes, but in the end, we may be perfectly assured, will be done what is right and just. This, then, is a most important circumstance in our favour, in any exertions we may make for the welfare of our country in all its multifarious needs. Our work till now may have been like all beginnings slow, but if properly persevered in with continuous force, it must at last be crowned with success. Persevere should be our motto, no matter how often we may be disappointed. (Cheers.) And when the rising generation sees how even such humble efforts as mine, in conjunction with those of others, are appreciated and rewarded by such public recognition as the one you have given me, it cannot but be a great encouragement to the younger generation to move in the same path. Taking, therefore, the honor you have done me in this double aspect, I feel highly gratified not only for my own sake, but for the further good this demonstration will do to younger and fresh workers in the cause of the general welfare of our country. I repeat my most sincere thanks for the honour you have done me this evening. It is a compliment which I shall cherish all my life and with all my heart. (Loud and prolonged cheers.)

The Hon. Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji then proposed the toast of the chairman. He said :—Our worthy chairman stands at the head of our community. (Cheers.) He belongs to a stock of which we as Parsees are proud all over the world. (Cheers.) Wherever the name of Sir Jamsetjee is known, the Parsees have a free and pleasant passport. (Cheers.) I have experienced that myself many a time in England. It was enough to say that I belonged to the community of Sir Jamsetjee. (Renewed cheers.) Apart from the worth and high position of the family, Sir Jamsetjee was one of those men who always cordially and heartily joined in all things which conduced to the welfare and well-being not only of our own community but to mankind at large. (Loud and prolonged cheers.)

INDIA AND THE OPIUM QUESTION.

(Before a conference which took place at the offices of the Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, Broadway Chambers, Westminster on Monday afternoon, October 15th, 1886, to have a frank interchange of opinion with the Hon'ble Dadabhai Naoroji, M. L. C., and other Indian gentlemen on the subject of the opium trade with special reference to its Indian aspects.)

Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji said—I have listened to the remarks of the gentlemen with very great interest, for the simple reason that I am almost of the same opinion. The best proof that I can give to you, not only of my own mere sentiments, but of my actual conduct in respect to opium, is that when I joined a mercantile firm in 1855, it was one of my conditions that I should have nothing whatever to do with opium. That is as far back as 1855. In 1880, in my correspondence with the Secretary of State on the condition of India, one of the paragraphs in my letter with regard to the opium trade is this; and I think that this will give you at once an idea of my opinion:—

“There is the opium trade. What a spectacle it is to the world! In England no statesman dares to propose that opium may be allowed to be sold in public-houses at the corners of every street, in the same way as beer or spirits. On the contrary, Parliament, as representing the whole nation, distinctly enacts that ‘opium and all preparations of opium or of poppies,’ as ‘poison,’ be sold by certified chemists only, and ‘every box, bottle, vessel, wrapper, or cover in which such poison is contained, be distinctly labelled with the name of the article, and the word “poison,” and with the name and address of the seller of the poison. And yet, at the other end of the world, this Christian, highly civilized, and humane England forces a ‘heathen’ and ‘barbarous’ Power to take this ‘poison,’ and tempts a vast human race to use it, and to degenerate and demoralize themselves with this ‘posion!’ And why? Because India cannot fill up the remorseless drain; so China must be dragged in to make it up, even though it be by being ‘poisoned.’ It is wonderful how England reconciles this to her conscience. This opium trade is a sin on England’s head, and a curse on India for her share in being the instrument. This may sound strange as coming from any natives of India, as it is generally represented as if India it was that benefited by the opium trade. The fact simply is that, as Mr. Duff said, India is nearly ground down to dust, and the opium trade of China fills up England’s drain. India derives not a particle of benefit. All India’s profits of trade, and several millions from her very produce (scanty as it is, and becoming more and more

so), and with these all the profit of opium go the same way of the drain—to England. Only India shares the curse of the Chinese race. Had this cursed opium trade not existed, India's miseries would have much sooner come to the surface, and relief and redress would have come to her long ago; but this trade has prolonged the agonies of India."

In this I have only just explained to you what I feel on the matter personally. With regard to the whole of the important question, which must be looked at in a practical point of view, I must leave sentiment aside. I must, at the same time, say that this opinion of mine that the opium revenue must be abolished is a personal one. I do not put it before you as the opinion of all India. I state it on my own responsibility. There is a great fear that if the opium revenue were to cease, the people of India would be utterly unable to fill up the gap in the revenue. They feel aghast at the very suggestion of it, and they go so far as to say that the opium revenue cannot be dispensed with. I just tell you what is held there, so that you may understand both sides of the question thoroughly. Therefore you have not the complete sympathy of the natives of India in this matter, and you will find, perhaps, several members of the Indian press expressing their opinion that they could not dispense with the opium revenue. In fact, Mr. Grant Duff, in answer to some representation from your Society, or somebody interested in the abolition of the opium trade, has asked, in 1870, whether they wished to grind an already poor population to the dust. So that he showed that even with the help of the opium revenue India was just on the verge of being ground down to the dust. This, then, is the condition in which India is situated. The question is how to practically deal with it. Before you can deal with any such subject it is necessary for you to take into consideration the whole Indian problem—What has been the condition of India, and what is the condition of India, and why has it been so? Mr. Dadabhai then cited official authorities from the commencement of the present century up to the present day, including that of the late and present Finance Ministers, that British India had been all along "extremely poor." He pointed out the exceedingly low income of India, viz. only Rs. 20 per head per annum, as compared with that of any tolerably well self-governed country; that a progressive and civilizing government ought to have increasing revenue; but India was utterly unable to yield such increasing revenue. He explained how, comparatively with its income, the pressure of taxation upon the subjects

of British India was doubly heavier than that of England; that of England being about 8 per cent. of its income, and of British India about 15 per cent. of its income; that England paid from its plenty, and India from its exceedingly poor income, so that the effect on British Indian subjects was simply crushing. He pointed out that while the trade with British India was generally supposed to be very large, it was in reality very small and wretched indeed. He illustrated this by some statistics, showing that the exports of British produce to India was only about 30,000,000*l.*, of which a portion went to the Native States of India and to part of Asia, through the northern border, leaving hardly a rupee a head worth for the subjects of British India. This certainly could not be a satisfactory result of a hundred years of British rule, with everything under British control. A quarter of a century ago, he said, Mr. Bright had used these remarkable words: "I must say that it is my belief that if a country be found possessing a most fertile soil, and capable of bearing every variety of production, and that, notwithstanding, the people are in a state of extreme destitution and suffering, the chances are that there is some fundamental error in the government of that country." Mr. Dadabhai urged that the Society should find out this fundamental error, and unless they did that, and made India prosperous, they could not expect to gain their benevolent object of getting rid of the opium revenue except by causing India to be ground down to dust by increased taxation in other shapes. This of course the Society did not mean, thus they ought to go to the root of the evil. India was quite capable of giving 200 instead of 70 millions of revenue, if they were allowed to keep what they produced, and to develop freely in their material condition; and in such a condition India would be quite able to dispense with the curse of the opium revenue. Mr. Dadabhai then proceeded to point out what he regarded as the cause of the poverty of British India. He cited several authorities upon the subject, and showed it was simply that the employment of a foreign agency caused a large drain to the country, disabling it from saving any capital at all, and rendering it weaker and weaker every day, forcing it to resort to loans for its wants, and becoming worse and worse in its economic condition. He explained at some length the process and effect of this fundamental evil, and how even what was called the "development" of the resources of India was actually thereby turned into the result of the "deprivation" of the resources of India. In pointing out a practicable remedy for all the evils, he said he did not mean that a sudden revolution should be made; but

the remedy which had been pointed out by a Committee of the India Office in 1860 would be the best thing to do, to meet all the requirements of the case. After alluding to the Act of 1833 and the great Proclamation of 1858, a faithful fulfilment of which would be the fulfilment of all India's desires and wants, he said that the Committee of the India Office to which he had referred had recommended that simultaneous examinations should be held in India and England, and the list be made up according to merit; and he added to this scheme, that the successful candidates of the first examination should be made to come over to England and finish their studies for two years with the successful candidates of England. This was the resolution of the National Indian Congress which met last Christmas in Bombay. It was also necessary that some scope should be given to the military races to attach them to the British rule. If this fair play and justice were given to the natives in all the higher Civil Services, and if some fair competition system were adopted for all the uncovenanted and subordinate services, India would have fair play, and free development of herself—would become prosperous, would be able to give as much revenue as a progressive and a civilizing administration should want, and then only would the philanthropic object of the Society be fully achieved. Otherwise, if India continued as wretched as she was at present, there was no chance of the object being attained except by great distress to the Indian themselves and grave political dangers to the British rulers, or the whole may end in some great disaster. Mr. Dadabhai was glad that British statesmen were becoming alive to this state of affairs, and the highest Indian authority, the Secretary of State, fully shared his appreciation of the position, when he wrote to the Treasury on the 26th of January last; "The position of India in relation to taxation and the sources of the public revenue, is very peculiar, not merely . . . but likewise from the character of the government, which is in the hands of foreigners, who hold all the principal administrative offices, and form so large a part of the army. The imposition of new taxation, which would have to be borne wholly as a consequence of the foreign rule imposed on the country, and virtually to meet additions to charges arising outside of the country, would constitute a political danger, the real magnitude of which, it is to be feared, is not at all appreciated by persons who have no knowledge of, or concern in the government of India, but which those responsible for that government have long regarded as of the most serious order."

ENGLAND'S BEST WAY OF RETAINING INDIA.

(Before a Meeting at the Manchester Athenæum in November 1886. Mr. Samuel Ogden, President of the Institution, in the chair.)

Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji said that he, with many other native Indians, had been afraid that in the desire to make money, Manchester had altogether forgotten the duty of alleviating and humanising peoples all over the world. From all he had seen and heard, he believed so no longer, but that Manchester was true to its old traditions, and had still the old desire to be fair and just to everybody. He believed the appeal he had to make would not be unheard in this great city. (Applause.) After 100 years of British rule, he would ask the question, was India prosperous? That great empire was anything but prosperous, but was, on the other hand, one of the poorest countries in the world. Its annual production was not half even that of Turkey. The income of England was £38 per head per annum, France £25, United States £33, South America £6, India hardly £2. And this after one hundred years of British rule! The time had come, then, for Englishmen, as rulers of India, to try and understand the position of their empire, and remedy the evils of which he spoke. As to taxation, there was an utterly fallacious idea that India was lightly dealt with. But the fact was that India, on the £2 per head income, paid 18 per cent. in taxes for Government purposes, while in England the percentage was only 8. What were the reasons why India, which in his opinion was capable of paying the same rate of taxation as England, now felt so greatly the strain of that taxation? The reasons were various. One of the chief of them was the fact that India was as yet in effect under foreign rule, whereas our rule should assimilate as nearly as possible to native rule. So long as England went on draining the country of its material resources through this foreign agency, so long would the poverty of India continue. Every year from 20 to 30 millions was taken from the country in this way. Not only that, but English servants, after acquiring experience in administration, were withdrawn when they could be of most use, were pensioned and came home. This was a moral evil as great even as the material. And now with regard to taxation had come the last straw. India had to remit 17 millions of money every year to England for what were called "home charges." But the rate of exchange had fallen from 2s. to 1s. 4d., and the result was the amount of produce which the Government

had to send would have to be increased to the extent of seven or eight millions in order to make up the sum. It meant an increase of taxation on the natives to that extent. But it was impossible to grind a farthing more out of them than at present. The Government themselves confessed that the state of affairs would be an evil in any country; in a country such as India it was pregnant with danger. He agreed that the condition of affairs was becoming dangerous to the rulers themselves. The fact was that unless there was a great change, the people must either die off or English rule must be overthrown. It must be one or the other. He was convinced, as the Indian people were convinced, that as soon as the state of affairs was properly understood, England would do fairly and justly. It had been the boast of England that she helped every struggling nationality to have self-government, to be free, to enjoy political rights which God has bestowed on Englishmen. Let England do the same for India; let her perform the promises contained in the solemn proclamation of 1858 made by the Queen. India wanted self-administration and self-legislation, and with this blessing conferred the Empire would be knitted to England with a gratitude and loyalty worth more to this country than 500,000 soldiers. (Applause.) How was it to be done? The question was answered by the proclamation he had referred to. Let the Indian Civil Service be open, as the Queen had promised it should be. It was practically banned and barred to all but a few Indians who were able to come over to England to pass the examinations. The solution he proposed was the carrying out of a recommendation given by an Indian Committee—that the Civil Service examinations should take place in India and England simultaneously, and the result be according to merit. (Applause.) Mr. Dadabhai proceeded to refer to the economic position of the country and to advocate various reforms. India did not take goods from England to the extent of 1s. 6d. per head. It ought at least to be £1 per head; with some of our colonies English trade was £20 or £30 or £40. The natives were naturally industrious and productive, and if allowed to become prosperous, England would be unable to supply all their wants. (Applause.) The economic condition of India was utterly unnatural, and at the bottom of it all was the simple fact that foreign rule was a curse, and that our rule in India ought to approximate to native rule.

THE POLITICAL CONDITION OF INDIA.

(An address before the Members of the Reform Club, King's Street, October 1886.

Mr. H. Lee in the chair.)

Mr. Dadabhoi Naoroji, who was received with applause, assured his hearers that in standing before any audience in England on an Indian platform the appeal he made was not simply to any particular party, or any particular class, but was the appeal of the whole people of India to the whole people of England. He appealed as much to the Conservatives as to the Liberals on all subjects connected with India. The Manchester people were interested in it not only as belonging to the English nation or as governing India, but at the same time they had a particular and intimate interest in India, commercially and economically. The two subjects, the political condition and the economic condition of India were so intimately interwoven with each other, that without giving some explanation of the one the other could not be clearly understood. He took up the subject of the political condition of India in order that when that was clearly understood its economic and commercial position could be properly appreciated. The best thing he could do was to place before them not only his own individual opinions, but the views and opinions expressed last Christmas at a National Indian Congress held at Bombay. That Congress was attended by delegates from all parts of India, representing all the principal associations of India. Those who attended formed a portion of the picked educated classes of India. Before entering on the subject of the opinions formulated by that Congress, he must at the outset acknowledge very emphatically and clearly that great and important blessings had been conferred on India by the British rule. (Applause.) There was no question that since the accession of the British rule India had been completely changed in its whole character, physically, morally, socially, and intellectually. (Applause.) There was no doubt that from one end to the other of India security of life and property was the British rule. There was no doubt whatever that through the instrumentality of the British Government the Indian people had had education given to them, and the enlightenment of the West had been communicated to them, and for that they could never be too thankful. Sufficient information had, he believed, been given on the good England had done to India, and he would, therefore go on to consider what they required at England's hands in the future. He did not mean to speak in any spirit of cavil or complaint. He spoke with thankfulness for the past

and hopefulness for the future. It was for the future, therefore, that he placed before them what the people of India, and the educated people of India particularly, desired at their hands. He proceeded to quote from the published statements of eminent Anglo-Indians in support of the view that the educated natives were the deservedly trusted guides of the people. Any idea of the subversion of British rule was said to be abhorrent to the educated natives, from the consciousness that it must result in the wildest anarchy and confusion. It was men who entertained such views as these that met in Congress to consider the condition of India and place boldly, and at the same time with the utmost loyalty, their wishes and needs before the British public. A subject which engaged the careful attention of the Congress was the difficulties placed in the way of natives holding civil appointments in India. In 1833 it was enacted that no native of India should by reason of his colour decent, or religion, be incapable of holding office. That promise had been renewed, but as yet very little had been done to make it an accomplished fact. In the opinion of the speaker this reform in the Civil Service was intimately connected with the economic condition of India, and he appealed to England, and to Lancashire in particular, to do their utmost to secure to the natives of India a fulfilment of the solemn promises made to them years ago, in the confident belief that thereby they would be not simply gratifying the aspirations of educated Indians, but conducing in a marked degree to the prosperity of our great dependency and to the augmentation of our trade with that country. As affairs now stand the people in the Native States were better off than those in British India, because in the former countries all that was raised in taxes was spent among themselves and went back to them, whereas in British India a sum of £17,000,000 was annually raised and remitted to this country. Of course the people of India did not want to upset the Civil Service arrangements all at once. They simply pleaded for air play and to have their educated youths allowed to compete on equal terms with Englishmen for the offices at the disposal of the Government of India. India was poor, it was impossible to tax her more, and so she would inevitably remain until her own people had a fair share in the task of government. If they would consider this question carefully, they would see in what direction they had to work in order that they might make India their best customer. The next resolution he wished to bring to their notice was with regard to the Legislative Councils. The constitution of those Councils was such that the natives had no voice in whatever was done for them, in the laws passed for them, in the

taxation imposed upon them, or in the manner in which that taxation was spent. India, after being for such a long time under British rule, and after being educated for nearly half a century, had a sufficient number of people who were prepared to understand that taxation must go with representation. England did its utmost to help, either morally or materially, every struggling community to acquire freedom and to acquire constitutional government. Unfortunately she had not been as liberal towards her own possession—what had been described as “the brightest jewel in her crown.” If a proper representation was introduced into those Legislative Councils, Government itself would be relieved of a great deal of odium and a great deal of trouble, because whenever any law was passed by them with the representative voice of the people themselves, Government would necessarily be relieved of having done anything without consideration for the views and sentiments of the natives themselves. Another great change needed was that a system of interpellation should be introduced into those councils. This was a right which the natives of India expected at the hands of the British people, because if India could benefit at the hands of the British people it was by being elevated to the political level of the British people. Up to the present time the British had degraded themselves to the level of the Asiatic despotism, for their rule had been merely an absolute rule. The will of the Government was the law of the land, or rather the will of the English people as expressed in Acts of Parliament was the law of the land. Owing to the want of a few native members in Parliament, a great deal was done that was injurious to the people of India, and an urgent necessity existed for having a few native members to represent the native side of questions in Parliament. Whether the time would ever come when representatives would come from all parts of the world to sit in the British Parliament he did not know, but he thought they had good grounds on which to appeal to a few English constituencies to enable one or two natives of India to sit in the House of Commons and present to Parliament the native side of Indian questions. Another institution needing reform was the India Office Council. That was a Council which deliberated in secret, and which assigned no reasons for the conclusions to which it came. That Council ought to be either abolished or altered, because it was an anachronism, it was inherently defective, and it was naturally likely to do more harm than good. Another question which required to be dealt with was that of the customs duties, but that again was intimately bound up with the question of the prosperity of India. The most important

question after all that they had to consider was to find out why India was so poor, and if they only discovered the reason, and applied the true remedy, they would have as great a benefit as ever any nation had offered to another. (Applause.)

9

DINNER TO HON. MR. DADABHAI NAOROJI BY THE NORTHBROOK CLUB.

(At a dinner given to the Hon. Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji by the Northbrook Indian Club, London, on the 4th November 1886, to bid him farewell on his return to India. Lord Ripon in the chair.)

Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji declared himself unable to find adequate terms in which to express the feelings by which he was overwhelmed on that occasion; but whether it was modesty on his part or not, he would tell the truth and declare the intense satisfaction and pride which the honour he was receiving that evening gave him. When a native of India was thus honoured by two of the greatest and best Viceroys India had ever had—(loud cheers)—he might fairly indulge in pride. Reference had been made to his connection with Baroda, and, in connection with that matter, he wished to acknowledge the deep debt of gratitude he owed to Lord Northbrook for justice done him irrespective of his being a native of India. But it was a characteristic of England and of the English race that whenever they thought a man had done good and useful work, they had their esteem and respect ready for him whoever he might be. The generosity of the spirit in which his services had been received was enhanced by the fact that if there was one man more distinguished than others for grumbling at some fault of British rule, that man was himself. But, knowing the good purpose he always had in view, they did him honour in spite of his grumbling. And to whom was due the glory of the fact that he was able to stand before them in this way as an honoured guest? That glory was their own: it belonged to the British rule. Had it not been for the education he had received at the blessed hands of the British rulers, he would not have been with them then speaking of his gratitude that night. And for this one circumstance alone—for the enlightenment it had bestowed upon them—England was entitled to the everlasting gratitude of the people of India. Nor was this all that England had done for India. She had raised up a descending nation and had endowed it with a new political life. For the past the natives of India had every reason to be grateful to the British rule; and while England sent out such Viceroys

as the good Mayo, the just Northbrook and righteous Ripon, British rule would assuredly command the loyal devotion of India. Of the good work which it had accomplished no better illustration could be found than the National Indian Congress, held last year at Bombay. India had never, in her whole historical career, seen such a phenomenon as that. It was only possible under free and enlightened British rule. The pick of the educated natives from all parts of India met together and spoke out with the freedom that they owed to the British rule. That was a unique phenomenon and it gave some idea of the good work which had been already done. For all the kind things his lordship had said he was very grateful, but, he would repeat the glory was their own. When he received the education he had passed through, when he imbibed the illustrious literature he had been introduced to, he could not but be so influenced that the guiding rule of his life became the debt he owed to his country and to his Sovereign. He was endeavouring to repay that debt in some measure by trying to make himself useful to both sides. He concluded with an earnest reiteration of the pride with which he received the honour done him.

10

OUR RESPONSIBILITIES IN INDIA.

(Before the members of the North Islington Liberal Club, Holloway Road, London, November 1886. Mr. Newton Wilson in the chair.)

Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, in commencing his address, said the question of the evening was not one he associated with any particular political party, but he appealed to the whole British people. The first aspect of the subject he would speak upon was with regard to the constitution of the Civil Service. On this matter the whole political and economic condition of India depended. As far back as 1833 a solemn promise was made to every subject of the throne in India, that religion, descent, or colour, should be no bar to office or employment in the East India Company. Lord Macaulay said he was proud of having been one of those who framed the Bill, which included so noble and benevolent a clause. In 1858, after the close of the unhappy mutiny, the promise was repeated in the most solemn manner in a declaration of the Sovereign. Since then some attempt had been made to leave the service open for competition, but it had been only in a partial manner without any really faithful interpretation of the proclamation. The Duke of Argyll, Mr. Bright, the late Mr. Fawcett, Lord Ripon, Lord Hartington, had all at

different times acknowledged this fact. Had the promises been fulfilled in the spirit in which they were made, the condition of India would have been better and brighter, and more especially in a commercial sense would the country have been 100 times better. What was commercially the connection between England and India? England sent goods to India worth from 13*d.* to 2*s.* per head per annum, after a connection of more than 100 years. After our having full economic and political control during all these years, had the relations between England and India been of different character? Was India prosperous? That great empire was anything but prosperous, was, on the other hand, one of the poorest countries in the world. Its annual production was not half even that of Turkey. The income of England was £38 per head per annum, France £25, United States £33, South America £6, India hardly £2. And this after one hundred years of British rule! The time had come, then, for Englishmen, as rulers of India, to try and understand the position of their Empire, and remedy the evils of which he spoke. As to taxation, there was an utterly fallacious idea that India was lightly dealt with. But the fact was that India, on the £2 per head income, paid 18 per cent. in taxes for Government purposes, while in England the percentage was only 8. What were the reasons why India, which, in his opinion, was capable of paying the same rate of taxation as England, now felt so greatly the strain of that taxation? The reasons were various. One of the chief of them was the fact that India was as yet in effect under foreign rule, whereas our rule should assimilate as nearly as possible to native rule. So long as England went on draining the country of its material resources through this foreign agency, so long would the poverty of India continue. Every year from 20 to 30 millions were taken from the country in this way. Not only that, but English servants, after acquiring experience in administration, were withdrawn when they could be of most use, were pensioned, and came home. This was a moral evil as great even as the material. And now with regard to taxation had come the last straw. India had to remit 17 millions of money every year to England for what were called "home charges." But the rate of exchange has fallen from 2*s.* to 1*s.* 4*d.*, and the result was the amount of produce which the Government had to send would have to be increased to the extent of seven or eight millions in order to make up the sum. I meant an increase of taxation on the natives to that extent. But it was impossible to grind a farthing more out of them than at present. The Government themselves confessed that the state of affairs would be an evil in any country; in a country

such as India it was pregnant with danger. He agreed that the condition of affairs was becoming dangerous to the rulers themselves. The fact was that unless there was a great change, the people must either die off, or English rule must be overthrown. It must be one or the other. He was convinced, as the Indian people were convinced, that as soon as the state of affairs was properly understood, England would do fairly and justly. It had been the boast of England that she helped every struggling nationality to have self-government, to be free, to enjoy political rights which God had bestowed on Englishmen. Let England do the same for India; let her perform the promises contained in the solemn proclamation of 1858 made by the Queen. India wanted self-administration and self-legislation, and with this blessing conferred, the Empire would be knitted to England with a gratitude and loyalty worth more to this country than 50,000 soldiers. (Applause.) How was it to be done? The question was answered by the proclamation he had referred to. Let the Indian Civil Service be open, as the Queen had promised it should be. It was practically banned and barred to all but a few Indians who were able to come over to England to pass the examinations. The solution he proposed was the carrying out of a recommendation given by an Indian Committee—that the Civil Service examinations should take place in India and England simultaneously, and the result be according to merit. (Applause.) He proceeded to refer to the economic position of the country, and to advocate various reforms. India did not take goods from England to the extent of 1*s.* 6*d* per head. It ought at least to be £1 per head; with some of our colonies English trade was £20 or £30 or £40. The natives were naturally industrious and productive, and would become so if allowed to, because prosperous England would be unable to supply all their wants. (Applause.) The economic condition of India was utterly unnatural, and at the bottom of all it was the simple fact that foreign rule was a curse, and that our rule in India ought to approximate to native rule. (Applause.)

ON POLITICAL REFORM.

(At the third Annual Dinner of the Elphinstonians at the Elphinstone Institution, December 18, 1886. The Hon. Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji in the chair.)

The chairman returned thanks for the exceedingly kind manner in which they always received the toast of his health. Referring to the letter on the subject of the Public Service Commission which had appeared that morning in the English dailies, Mr. Dadabhai said they need not concern themselves much about such creakings for this reason, that the Government themselves were perfectly satisfied about the goodness of the motives by which the people of India were actuated in their action. The Government of India in one of their despatches to the Secretary of State had distinctly stated that as far as the educated portion of the people of India was concerned, and their number was rapidly increasing, the idea of the subversion of British rule was utterly abhorrent to them. (Cheers.) Such being the testimony given to them from the highest quarters, they need not feel much concern at any misrepresentations, or misconstruction or misapprehension of their motives. Mr. Pherozshaw had very well pointed out that their progress, political, economical, social and educational, depended entirely upon the continuance of the British rule. If they were now urging what they considered to be their claims, it was the best proof possible of the liberal policy of Government which had enabled them to understand those claims and ask for them; and since the Government had put them in this position, it was not possible for them to misunderstand their motives, and to think that the people of this country could ever be so ungrateful, or so devoid of all appreciation of their own self-interests as to wish for the subversion of British rule. (Cheers.) Nay, when they asked for any claims, or desired any reforms, the Government would see in it the people's desire for their own good, as well as their sincere desire for the greater stability of the British rule. (Hear, hear.) In his resolution on the Public Service Commission, the Secretary of State had stated that he wanted the Commission to devise a scheme which should have some reasonable elements of finality in it, and should do full justice to the claims of the natives of India. With such a clear and straightforward avowal of the motives of Government in this matter, there could be no room for any misapprehension, and it would be the people's own fault, if they did not now come forward and say firmly, loyally, and respectfully that such and such were their claims which in their opinion would do full justice to their desires

and requirements. The Charter of 1833 was given to them of their own free will by the Government, without any agitation on the part of the people. At that time, it was felt by statesmen, as rulers of hundreds of millions, to be their duty to decide on what basis the British rule should rest in India. A debate took place in Parliament, in which Macaulay, Lansdowne, Ellenborough and other eminent men took part, the question with all its *pros* and *cons* was fully discussed, and the result was that it was deliberately laid down that the admission of natives into the public service should be entirely irrespective of considerations of caste, creed or colour, but should solely depend upon the fitness of the individual. The Charter of 1833 was ultimately confirmed by our gracious sovereign in most emphatic and solemn terms, stating that all Her Majesty's subjects would be treated alike and would be held equally dear to the sovereign. (Hear, hear.) With these assurances before them, it was not for them to be whining and complaining that the Government was going to deprive them of what they had already got. All they had got to do now was to come forward and ask the Government plainly and distinctly to fulfil the solemn promises repeatedly made to the people. The question would then naturally arise—which would be the most effective way of carrying out those promises? It fortunately happened that soon after the Proclamation of 1858 was made known, a committee of the India Office sat upon this very subject, and after a careful consideration, they decided that the best method of carrying out the spirit as well as the letter of the Act of 1858 would be to hold examinations for the public service simultaneously in England and in India. That was the fairest solution of the difficulty. Now that the whole thing lay clearly cut out before them, all that they had to do was to place it before the Commission, asking that the decision arrived at by the Committee of the India Office should be acted upon. He would not go on that occasion into the question of the reform of the Legislative Councils, because at present the most important and burning question, as Lord Dufferin had properly called it, which had agitated them for a long time, was that of the admission of natives into the service of their country. (Cheers.) Rather than blame Lord Dufferin, they should be thankful to him for the share he has taken in this matter, and it was now for the educated portion of the community to say what they wanted the Government to do for the benefit of the country. (Cheers.)

THE INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE.

(Before a meeting of the East India Association, at which Mr. A. K. Connell read a paper on "The Indian Civil Service," July 1887. Mr. John Bright in the chair.)

Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji said : Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, —My first impulse was not to send up my card at all, but after attending this meeting and hearing the paper that has been put before us, it is necessary that I should not put myself in a false position, and as I disagree with a portion of this paper, it became necessary that I should make that disagreement known. The third part of the paper is the part that is objectionable ; and it seems to me it is a lame and impotent conclusion of an able and well-considered beginning. For me to undertake to reply to all the many fallacies that that third part contains, will be utterly out of the question in the ten minutes allotted to me ; but I have one consolation in that respect—that my views are generally known, that they are embodied to a great extent in the journals of this Association ; that I also direct the attention of Mr. Connell and others to two papers that I submitted to the Public Service Commission, and that I hope there are two other papers that are likely to appear in the *Contemporary Review* * in the months of August and September. These have anticipated, and will, I trust, directly and indirectly answer most of the fallacies of Mr. Connell's paper. I would, therefore, not attempt the impossible task of replying to the whole of this paper, but I will make a few remarks of a different character altogether bearing upon the vital question before us. This question of the services is not simply a question of the aspirations of a few educated men ; it is the question of life and death to the whole of British India. It is our good fortune that we have in the chair to-day the gentleman who put a very pertinent question, going to the root of the whole evil, as far back as a third of a century ago. Mr. Bright put the question in the year 1853. He said : "I must say that it is my belief that if a country be found possessing a most fertile soil and capable of bearing every variety of production, and that notwithstanding the people are in a state of extreme destitution and suffering, the chances are that there is some fundamental error in the Government of that country." Gentlemen, as long as you do not give a full and fair answer to that question of the great statesman—that

* These papers will be found at the end of this book.

statement made a third of a century ago—you will never be able to grasp this great and important question of the services. It is not, as I have already said, a question of the mere aspiration of a few educated men. Talking about this destitution, it is a circumstance which has been dwelt upon in the beginning of the century by Sir John Shaw. Lord Lawrence in his time said that the mass of the people were living on scanty subsistence. To the latest day the last Finance Minister, Sir Evelyn Baring, testified to the extreme poverty of the people, and so does the present Finance Minister. The fact is that after you have hundred years of the most highly-paid and the most highly-praised administration in that country, it is the poorest country in the world. How can you account for that? Grasp that question fully, and then only will you be able to see what vast interest this question of the services means. Then I come to the pledges that have been given. Here are open honorable pledges. The statesmen of 1833 laid down distinctly, in the face of the important consideration—whether India should be allowed ever to be lost to Britain. They weighed every circumstance, and they came to the deliberate conclusion which was embodied in the Act that they passed. But then you had not the experience of that fear of the risk of losing India. Twenty-five years afterwards you actually experienced that very risk; you actually had a mutiny against you, and what was your conduct then? Even after that experience, you rose above yourself; you kept up your justice and generosity and magnanimity, and in the name of the Queen, and by the mouth of the Queen, you issued a Proclamation, which if you “conscientiously” fulfil will be your highest glory, and your truest fame and reward. Gentlemen, take the bull by the horns. Do not try to shirk this question. If you are afraid of losing India, and if you are to be actuated by the inglorious fear of that risk, let that be stated at once. Tell us at once, “We will keep you under our heels, we will not allow you to rise or to prosper at any time.” Then we shall know our fate. But with your English manliness—and if there is anything more characteristic of you than anything else, it is your manliness—speak out honestly and not hypocritically, what you intend to do. Do you really mean to fulfil the pledges given before the world, and in the name of God, with the sanction of God and asking God to aid you, in the execution of that pledge—do you mean to stick to that pledge or to get out of it? Whatever it be, like honest Englishmen, speak out openly and plainly. “We will do this” or “We will not do this.” But do not expose yourselves to the charges—which I am not making, but your own members

of the India Council have made—of “keeping the promise to the ear, and breaking to the hope.” Looking at the time I cannot now enter into all the different and important considerations that this paper raises, but I simply ask you again this question, whether like honest Englishmen such as you are, in a manly way, you say the thing and do it. If you mean to fulfil these pledges honestly, do so ; if you do not mean to fulfil them honestly, say so, and at least preserve your character for honesty and manliness. Mr. Connell had in the first part of his paper laid down as emphatically as he could the principles upon which the English nation is bound to act, and the third part of the paper he has done his utmost to discredit the whole thing, and to say how not to do it. But he forgets one thing : that the pledge you have given, you have never given a fair trial to : if you only give a fair trial to that pledge, you will find that it will not only redound to your glory for ever, but also result in great benefits to yourself ; but if India is to be for a long time under your rule with blessing, and not with a curse, it is the fulfilment of that pledge which will secure that result. Ah ! gentlemen, no eternal or permanent results can ever follow from dodging and palavering. Eternal results can follow only from eternal principles. Your rule of India is based not on sixty thousand bayonets or a hundred thousand bayonets. But it is based upon the confidence, the intense faith like the one that I hold, in the justice, the conscience and the honor of the British nation. As long as I have that faith in me, I shall continue to urge and plead before statesmen like Mr. Bright, and before the English nation. Fulfil your pledge honestly before God, because it is upon those eternal principles only that you can expect to continue your rule with benefit to yourself and benefit to us. The reply to your (President’s) question, Sir, about the fundamental error is then this. A foreign rule can never be but a curse to any nation on the face of the earth, except so far as it approaches a native rule, be the foreigners angels themselves. If this principle is not fairly borne in mind, and if honest efforts are not made to fulfil your pledges, it is utterly useless for us to plead, or to expect any good result, or to expect that India will ever rise in material and moral prosperity. I do not mean to say a word against the general *personnel* of these services, as they are at the present time they are doing what they can in the false groove in which they are placed ; to them there is every honor due for the ability and integrity with which most of them have carried on their work ; but what I say is this. This system must be changed. The administration must become native under the supreme control of the English nation. Then you have one element in India, which is pecu-

liarily favorable to the permanence of your rule, if the people are satisfied that you give them the justice that you promise. It is upon the rock of justice alone that your rule stands. If they are satisfied, the result will be this. It is a case peculiar to India: there are Mahomedans and Hindus; if both are satisfied, both will take care that your supremacy must remain over them; but if they are both dissatisfied, and any paltering with justice and sincerity must produce that result. They will join together against you. Under these circumstances you have everything in your favor; in fact, the divine law is that if you only follow the divine law, then only can you produce divine results. Do good, no matter what the result is. If you trifle with those eternal and divine laws, the result must be disastrous. I must stop as the time is up.

WRITINGS.

CHAPTER V.

I.

THE BARODA ADMINISTRATION IN 1874.

(A Statement in reply to Remarks in the Baroda Blue Book of 1875, concerning Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji and his Colleagues, submitted to the Secretary of State for India, to be published as a Blue Book, Bombay, November 25, 1875.)

BLUE BOOK* No. 1.

On reading all the Numbers of the Baroda Blue Book of this year, I find the amount of misunderstanding, misrepresentation and falsehood regarding me and my colleagues as something awful. To attempt to explain or refute them all in detail would be like trying to cut down a swarm of mosquitos with a sword. Moreover it will be now an utterly unprofitable thing to enter into a minute examination of the details of every day work of administration, and for which, besides, I should have the Baroda Records before me. It will be sufficient for me to say, as it will be apparent hereafter, that from the very beginning, Colonel Phayre has taken a jaundiced view of my and my colleagues' motives and actions. I confine myself to an exposure of only the most glaring misrepresentations and falsehoods, leaving as to who is guilty of them, to be settled between Colonel Phayre and his "highly respectable" and "honorable" informers on whom he relied. It will also be for Colonel Phayre to say whether the various messages from and reports about him which I have given hereafter require any correction.

Colonel Phayre in his letter of 1st January, 1874, (page 59) says, with reference to the Gaekwar's khareeta of 31st December, 1873, "The difference of tone of this khareeta not only contrasts strongly with His Highness' last one of 25th October last, but with the strong determination expressed by Mr. Dadabhoy Nowrojee as to the reforms he was about to initiate at once." I shall now first give the history of the khareeta of 25th October 1873, as reported to me by Mr. Bapoobhoy and other old Durbarees. This Bapoobhoy is one, as will be seen hereafter, who has been pronounced "respectable" by Sir R. Meade's Commission, and considered very highly of by the Colonel himself.

When Colonel Phayre found that the Viceroy took the appointment of the Commission into his own hands and left him (the Colonel) to play a

* [C-1203. 1875.]

subordinate part, he was very much displeased, told the Durbarrees that the "Calcuttawalas bachá lõk hæ, kuch nahi samajtè," (the Calcuttawalas are mere children, don't understand anything) and suddenly turned very sympathetic towards the Gaekwar, encouraging him in his desire to remonstrate against the appointment of the Commission. He then so far showed his cordiality that the draft of the khareeta received a perusal and some fostering and suggestive care at his hands; and the khareeta contains the following high praise for the Colonel from the Gaekwar, with whom his relations had hitherto been anything but of a friendly or sympathetic character.

(Page 50) "I am deeply obliged to Colonel Phayre, whom I consider as my best friend and well-wisher of the State, * * * and further being backed in my endeavours at reform by a zealous and energetic officer and Resident like Colonel Phayre, who is only (I am happy to say) too glad to assist me with his advice, and to the best of his power, in carrying out these views, as well as those affecting the grandeur, honor, and stability of my State, and whose appointment at such a time as Resident at my Court, I have therefore reason to congratulate myself upon, what need then is there for the appointment of a Commission, when I am sincerely willing, and have resolved to carry out thoroughly this work of 'State reform,' by the advice and co-operation of Colonel Phayre?"

How significant is all this when read by the light of its little history, and it is no wonder that Colonel Phayre should look fondly back to the khareeta of 25th October.

Now with regard to the Gaekwar's khareeta of 31st December 1873, any body who reads it will see that there is nothing improper in it, but only a respectful representation of the then position of the Gaekwar, nor is there anything to contrast with my determination to initiate reforms at once. For I do not see why I may not be able to represent the just rights of the Gaekwar to Government and at the same time introduce any reforms in the State. This representation against me has gone to Government, within three weeks of the Colonel's assurance to me, when I had first seen him on the day of my arrival at Baroda, of his cordiality and support, and of his taking credit to himself that my going to Baroda was the successful result of his exertions for reform!

Colonel Phayre further says, "I was privately and confidentially informed by a highly respectable person who was present in Durbar when this khareeta was signed, that His Highness hesitated to attach his signature, saying that it required consideration. He was, however, overruled by Mr. Dadabhoi Nowrojee, the acting Dewan." This information is simply false, neither had His Highness shown the least unwillingness to send such a khareeta, nor had I overruled him. His Highness was particularly desirous to make such a representation.

Colonel Phayre says in his letter (page 21) to the Bombay Government of 18th August 1873, "I am always kept well informed of Durbar proceedings." Judging from this case and from what I shall show hereafter, it appears that the Colonel's "highly respectable" informers generally fed him upon misrepresentations and falsehoods. In spite of the above misleading and false statements in the Colonel's letter, (page 61) His Excellency the Viceroy gives the khareeta of 31st December a courteous reply and calls it "Your Highness' friendly letter." The letter of the Bombay Government to the Indian Government, of 5th March 1874, referring to my interview with His Excellency the Governor, says:—

(Page 64) "He fairly admitted that he had not had the slightest practical experience in public affairs, though he had made them the subject of much study. He likewise stated that the present Dewan would remain about the person of the Gaekwar under the title of Pritinidhe, and that the four Parsee* gentlemen from Bombay, to whom he proposed to entrust the four Chief departments of the Government, would have associated with them the Ministers who are at this moment in charge. It would be difficult to imagine a worse arrangement."

His Excellency the Governor (who I think hardly knew much about me) had, no doubt, every right to object to my want of practical experience. I might say here, on the other hand, what some persons in high position as well as some princes, who knew me well, and whose opinions would be, I think, generally respected, had thought of my selection at the time. But it is enough that the Bombay Government itself admit in the previous paragraph of the same despatch, "This gentleman stands high in the estimation of many persons both here and in England, and would no doubt make every effort in his power to introduce a better system of Government;" and Mr. Tucker, the first Councillor in the Bombay Government, says in his minute (page 71), "Mr. Dadabhoy Nowrojee is without administrative experience, but he is a man of some culture and intelligence, and with a constitutional form of Government, I see no reason why he should not be tried," and "I am not able to suggest anyone at the moment who would seem likely to have a better chance of success in such a difficult position."

Now about his Excellency's objection to Nanasaheb remaining near the Gaekwar, and the old Ministers remaining with the new, being urged as reasons against me, I have, I submit, just grounds to complain. The Bombay Government were well aware of what had already passed between them and the Indian Government. The Bombay Government in

* Not all Parsees,—One Parsee, one Hindu and one Mahomedan.

their letter of 29th August 1873 to the Indian Government (page 18) say : "But his Excellency feels precluded from entertaining any such expectations, and fears that the Gaekwar will be unable, even if desirous of so doing, to introduce and maintain a proper system, or to check and punish the evil practices of his Ministers and confidential retainers, some of whom are known to have been his evil advisers during the reign of his late brother. And I am, therefore, directed to apply for the authority of the Government of India to instruct the Resident to demand from the Gaekwar the immediate suspension of the Dewan, and the Revenue Sir Soobah with his deputy, Narayen Bhai ; the last, a man of bad character, dismissed from the service of this Government in the Rewakanta. The suspension for the present of these officers is the more essential, as I am further instructed to solicit from the Government of India, authority to appoint a British Commission for the purpose of inquiring into the system of revenue administration, and the alleged practice of the abduction of females from their families for the purpose of converting them into loundis." This Government attaches the greatest importance to the appointment of this Commission ; and as the Gaekwar will be expected to render it every assistance in the prosecution of its inquiry, it is obviously desirable that his efforts to that end should not be thwarted during its progress by the Ministers whom I have mentioned."

This pressing application of the Bombay Government to suspend three of the old Ministers was replied to by the Government of India as follows (letter 19th September 1873).

(Page 31) "The Government of Bombay have suggested that the Gaekwar should be advised to suspend or remove the Dewan, the Revenue Sir Soobah and his deputy, but the Governor General in Council is of opinion that it would be better to await the result of the enquiry before demanding their suspension or removal."

Now in the face of this, the Government of Bombay expect from me, what they themselves could not do, because the Viceroy, under a sense of justice, would not allow it to be done. I may further complain that while talking upon this subject, His Excellency the Governor did not express to me his decidedly adverse opinion of the arrangements, or I would have pointed out the above reply of the Viceroy and explained to him its temporary necessity, and also that the real power, however, was left in the hands of my colleagues. On the contrary, while talking of the various difficulties in my way, Mr. Lee Warner encouraged me with the remark, that the British Government had taken 60 years to do what they had done in this Presidency, and that much yet remained to be done, and His

Excellency himself, at my parting, in a most kindly way told me "go on quietly." Had I dismissed or suspended any of the old Ministers, as matters are now disclosed by the Blue Book, Colonel Phayre would have turned round upon me, to denounce me on my back, as having insulted the Viceroy by doing what the Viceroy had expressly desired was not to be done. Again while the Bombay Government object to Nanasaheb having been allowed to remain as Pritinidhi near the person of the Gaekwar, they forget that they themselves not only allowed him to remain so, but even as *the Dewan*, by not recognising my appointment and thereby not only retaining but aggravating the very evil they complain of. The Bombay Government having thus made up their mind to object to my appointment, without expressing it to me or to the Gaekwar, not only gave me no moral support, but refused to me the aid of Government officials which I solicited and very much needed, and by also refusing to recognise me as *Dewan*, largely impaired my position and usefulness, in the eyes of the public. This gave the "highly respectable" persons of Colonel Phayre, opportunities of misrepresenting and maligning me and my colleagues to him for their own private ends, and he, as now appears from the Blue Book, was only too willing to hear them, and to turn their information to account against us without any inquiry into their truthfulness. It was a curious vicious circle in which the affairs then moved. The Bombay Government would not recognise me, or give me any aid. My position being thus weakened and rendered uncertain as to the intentions of Government in the eyes of the public, I myself would not like to ask good hands to come to serve under me, nor would they like to come, though very willing. Thus though weakened by the action of the Bombay Government itself, and being compelled to go on with the old hands as best I could, they turned round upon me, for keeping on these old hands, besides forgetting that the Viceroy would not allow them to be dismissed or suspended.

Mr. Tucker says, (page 71)—"I disapprove altogether of the existing arrangement by which there are virtually two Ministers, and neither has, I imagine, any real power." To this objection I have already replied above. Further,—"I was present at Mr. Dadabhai Nowrojee's examination before the Indian Finance Committee of the late House of Commons last year, and was not then impressed with the accuracy of his knowledge of the subjects upon which he was examined or of his readiness in applying what he did know."

I cannot blame Mr. Tucker for his impression. 'My examination has a little history of its own, which this is not the proper occasion to

discuss. I need only say that Mr. Ayrton, the chairman, did his best to prevent me from giving my evidence upon the subjects for which I was prepared and which I had proposed in a letter to be examined upon ; and he dragged me, against my remonstrances, into questions with which I had nothing to do. I had, previous to appearing before the Committee, shown my notes to an influential and active member of it, and he had told me that the subjects I had selected were just some of those most important to be brought forward before the Committee. But Mr. Ayrton evidently thought otherwise, and at the end of my first day's examination, to which Mr. Tucker's remark applies, another member of the Committee told me that my that day's troubles were owing to my being a little too ambitious in the subjects I proposed. I then understood the cause of my unusual treatment. The next day, when Mr. Ayrton was not in the chair, I had some fair treatment given me. Be this as it may ; I am not the less thankful to Mr. Tucker for his opinion which I have already quoted before.

It is true, as Mr. Gibbs remarks in his minute of 28th May 1874 (page 350) after doing justice to the honesty and good intentions of myself and my colleagues, that the old Durbarees were then making efforts to thwart us, though they had been only *nominally* associated with my colleagues. But these Durbarees began to take heart, and lead back the Maharaja to his old bad ways, because the Bombay Government refused to aid or recognise me, and thereby were generally understood to be against me, because Colonel Phayre kept up open opposition to me and my colleagues, and gave his ear and encouragement to men like Bapoobhoy who knew well how to turn such power and opportunities to account, and because somehow or other Damodar entirely escaped any remark from Sir R. Meade's Commission, though Colonel Phayre was always talking loudly against him as the Maharaj's worst evil genius.

The long delay in the decision on the Report of Sir R. Meade's Commission also unfortunately contributed largely towards encouraging the old Durbarees and giving time for the development of their intrigues. They took much advantage of the delay by getting up "gups" from time to time, at first that the Report of the Commission was favourable to the Gaekwar, and latterly that the decision on the report was to be all right for the Gaekwar ; and with the aid of such gups they tried to lead the Gaekwar into their own ways again. In short, for what Mr. Gibbs complains, the Government and Colonel Phayre have themselves been the principal cause.

BARODA BLUE BOOK No. 2.*

Colonel Phayre, in his letter to the Bombay Government (page 15) of 9th May with a P.S. of 11th May, with reference to the Gaekwar's khareeta of 9th May, makes some remarks about me. Before noticing the most glaringly false statements in it, I may here state a circumstance, which if true, throws a clear light upon Colonel Phayre's whole future conduct towards me. Messrs. "the respectable" Bapoobhoy and Govind-rao Mama reported, that on the receipt of the khareeta, the Resident became exceedingly angry, and that at a subsequent interview two or three days after, he said that the khareeta had been written by me and that ("suited the action to the word" with a strong emphasis and gesture of hands) he would "girengá or giráengá" (fall or throw down) me. When this was reported to me by Nanasaheb, I took it only as a bit of the Colonel's big talk, and thought no more about it. But the Blue Book now discloses that he seems to have exerted all his might and main to make good his vow of "giraoing" me, and I can only account by such vow for the strangely virulent attacks against me, and the persistent dinning into the ears of the Government several misrepresentations about me, even though in some matter he had both public and personal explanations from me as to the true state of the cases.

Colonel Phayre, referring back to my having written the precedence khareeta of 5th December 1872, alludes in an insinuating way to my obtaining Rs. 50,000 for the writing of it and for the agitation of the question, though he knew the true state of the case from myself personally as well as from the public explanation I had already given. I shall have to say more about this matter further on.

Colonel Phayre calls me a "thoroughly disappointed man," "unanimously pronounced to be a failure here as an aspirant to the office of Minister not having been able up to the present time to effect any reform, &c."

I do not know how the Colonel found out my disappointment, whatever that means, unless it be that the wish was father to the thought, and it is no matter of surprise that his "highly respectable" informers, or perhaps the "respectable" Mr. Bapoobhoy, (who, we now find, was himself an aspirant to the office of Dewan, and was considered fit by the Colonel,) should have opined that I was a failure and made no reforms; and that Colonel Phayre with his desire to "girao" me or at least with his bias

against me, should welcome such opinion and make a special note of it to Government.

The fact simply being that some of the Durbarees were then endeavouring to thwart us under the circumstances I have already mentioned in connection with Mr. Gibbs' minute, and they took advantage of the Colonel's inclinations against me.

Colonel Phayre says that Nanasaheb repudiated the obvious direct meaning of the words "much as I already suffered in dignity and authority from the Resident's open hostility to my administration," &c. First of all the obvious meaning of this is simply a fact, there was nothing to repudiate. And next, if Nanasaheb made any show of repudiating a single word of the khareeta, or as the Colonel further on says, "he also expressed his disapproval of the general tone of the khareeta by saying that such a production would never have emanated from any of the old Durbaree servants, and appeared to express anxiety as to whether it would be despatched to-day or to-morrow," he told a falsehood. For the Gaekwar, Nanasaheb and all the old Durbarees, approved of the khareeta, and none more so than Nanasaheb himself. In fact it was at the desire of the Gaekwar and Nanasaheb that a khareeta of the kind should be sent, that I wrote it out, as I and Mr. Wadia agreed that this desire was reasonable. Colonel Phayre says that he had "heard from independent sources that the withdrawal of the khareeta was actually mooted in the Durbar." This is either false information, or I know nothing of such mootings.

Of the Colonel's poor tactics of making capital out of representing me as a "mischievous political agitator" I need take no notice. When I am conscious of being actuated in all my public acts only by a simple sense of duty, I can afford to treat this and other such miserable clap-trap and devices with contempt.

Colonel Phayre says "facts like these prove the utter unfitness of Mr. Dadabhoi for the work of reform." As are the premises, so is the conclusion. The so called "facts" being all fiction, there is no need to say what the worth of the conclusion is. And a question naturally arises, what is the Colonel's own fitness to judge of the fitness of others? The present Blue Book and the Sind-resolution of 1872, answer this question. Moreover, some criterion may be formed of the Colonel's own judgment, by ascertaining who are *his* fit men. This I shall have to speak about further on. It is quite enough for me to say here that his ideal being "the respectable" Bapooibhoi, there is no wonder in his

opinion about my unfitness. I may, before finishing with the Colonel's letter under comment, make a remark here once for all, that the Colonel's power of speaking Hindustani is indifferent, and I had several times to interpret his Hindustani to the Maharaja. Heaven knows how much mischief may have arisen from the Colonel's misunderstanding and being misunderstood by others.

All the above clap-trap and abuse of me seem to have gone for nothing, for His Excellency the Governor of Bombay, instead of foolishly rushing into motives, &c. looked to the khareeta itself, and in a becoming reply, endeavoured, according to His Excellency's views, to explain the Resident's conduct, and ended his explanation with the courteous conclusion, "I feel sure that your Highness, with this explanation before you, and being thus made acquainted with what had passed between the Resident and your Ministers, will perceive that the former acted in obedience to his instructions and will acquit him of any intention to offer you a public insult."

Some time after this answer was received from His Excellency the Governor of Bombay, Colonel Phayre sent me a message with Mr. Bapoo-bhoy, in Hindustani, "give Dadabhai my compliments and tell him to secure his passage in the steamer as Government has decided to turn him out." What to say or think of this, what now appears to be simple impudence and a false use of the name of Government, I do not know; or is it an invention of the "respectable" Bapoo-bhoy.

I find from this Blue Book (page 23) some expression of disapprobation against His Highness on the part of the Viceroy, with reference to the correspondence upon the subject of the insult and especially about His Highness's yad of 7th May 1874, to the Resident. I do not at present undertake to controvert His Excellency's views. I need simply say that as far as I remember, this disapprobation has not been communicated to the Gaekwar, and there was, therefore no opportunity of giving any explanation, and that with regard to the yad of 7th May, it so happens that though I do not say we objected to it, it was suggested and dictated in Marathi by one of the old Durbarees, approved of by all the others, and simply translated by us. Did the Colonel's "respectable" informers tell him this?

BLUE BOOK No. 4.*

This number contains a great deal of correspondence upon the question of redressing a variety of complaints. Instead of wading through each case it will be sufficient to give a general explanation for the whole. The "honorable" gentlemen who had the Colonel's ear, had organized a regular system by which the people were kept up in a continued state of agitation. The mode of operation was this;—with regard to the cultivators, a number of vakeels went about the districts telling people they were going to manage through the Saheb to get the assessment reduced half or more, that the ryots should resist payment and complain loudly at the least real or imaginary coercion by the authorities. Then either the vakeels or ryots would first complain at once to the Resident, then come to me, Mr. Kazi or to both of us, make insolent demands from us, and the moment we commenced any question or inquiry, they would refuse to answer, threaten us they would go back to the Saheb and complain that their complaints had not been heard or redressed, and away they would walk off to the Saheb. I explained this to the Resident several times but to no effect. He would take it for granted that we paid no attention to the complaints, hurl vexatious yads to us and write letters to Government inclosing petitions, or statements taken by himself, containing all sorts of falsehoods and exaggerations. In short either we should give all that everybody chose to demand with the Saheb at their back, or we were at once pronounced as deaf to the complaints of the people and having no intention to carry out the recommendations of the Commission, &c. &c. In this way was the farce of coming to us and getting no redress, and a continued agitation was kept up among all classes of complaints. It was simply impossible for us to come to any reasonable settlement with any complainants. They always showed clearly and openly that they were conscious of their strength that the Saheb would get them all they wanted. With regard to the Sirdars especially, it was a common report that they had advice from the Colonel himself to remain thoroughly combined and not to come to any terms directly with the Gaekwar, and a case has come to my knowledge lately that, after a certain individual obtained redress directly from the Durbar, he found the doors of the Residency shut against him for any visits. In the case of two or three settlements made by me, the parties in a day or two withdrew from the arrangements and were again among the crowd of complainants meeting at the

* [C.—1251.]

Residency. It is useless now to go into all the details of the long correspondence in the 4th Number of the Blue Book. I would only glance at some important matters.

With reference to the long and fussy correspondence about the Sirdars, the whole pith of it is contained in one sentence of Colonel Phayre's yad, (page 17) No. 1965 of 19th October 1874, *viz.* "also whether, referring to my yad No. 1502 C. 7, dated 12th August 1874, any, and if so, what steps have been taken by your Highness towards settling the grievances of this class."

Now in connection with this subject of the Sirdars while he is writing to Government about my inexperience and my inability to grasp general principles, &c., the following will explain his own actual conduct in the matter. To the above question put by him, a reply was sent, but somehow that reply does not make its appearance in the Blue Book; or that reply would have shown the character of the Colonel's proceedings and tactics. As I have not got the Baroda records at command, I write from memory. The facts are these. Soon after I commenced working with Colonel Phayre, I proposed to him as the most practicable and shortest way of settling all the claims brought before the Commission, and chiefly those of the Sirdars, that he would kindly give me his own views after a fair consideration of each case, as to how it should be settled; that I would endeavour to carry out at once such views as I could agree to, and that for all those cases in which we differed, I would draw up a statement of my views to be submitted with his remarks upon them for the consideration and final advice of Government. To this proposal he agreed, and gave me a statement of his views on some cases. Then he stopped, and whenever I pressed for more, he told me he was very busy and with one reason or other further progress stopped. And while it was thus with him that the cause of delay rested and in the face of the arrangement between us he suddenly turned round and asked the question quoted above. The Gaekwar's reply then naturally was a reminder of our arrangement, and the Colonel was red-hot angry with me when I visited him the next day after the reply was received by him, for telling him in the reply that the cause of delay was himself. After he cooled down he said he would take up the cases, and would give any assistance he could, and if I remember right, he wrote so in his reply also. But little or nothing further, I think, was done, and when one day he blurted out, "I am not going to shew you my hand," I gave up hopes of any further assistance from him, and my colleagues

and myself set to work to prepare our own proposals to be submitted to Government. To come to any reasonable settlement direct with the complainants themselves was out of the question, as long as they entertained the hope that the Saheb, who had fought so hard for them before the Commission, was sure to get them all they asked. Our proposals were subsequently forwarded to Government in a khareeta. The above explanation and the khareeta will shew first that there was no want of desire on our part to settle the claims on some reasonable basis, and secondly, that the matter required a much wider and juster consideration than the Colonel would allow with his great statesmanlike grasp. Thus it will be seen that the Colonel himself was the chief cause of the delay in the settlement of the Sirdars' cases, and yet he makes so much artful fuss about my inexperience, inability, &c. &c. to Government.

In his letter of 11th August, (page 23) Colonel Phayre says, "His Highness has long wanted to part from Mr. Dadabhai himself, but he fears, as I before reported to Government, his home influence, and that he will give him a bad name." Whether the Colonel has known this from his "highly respectable" informers, or from the Gaekwar is not mentioned. The Gaekwar knew very well and I had often told him, that if he desired a change at any time I would never be in his way for a moment, and I never held out to him any of my supposed "home influence," or even of any exertion on my part to do him harm if I left him. I had always told him openly to consult his own best interests only, and that I would go out at his desire just as I had gone in at his urgent request. Was the Colonel ever told this?

The Colonel says "Mr. Dadabhai, I am reliably informed, went so far a day or two ago as to draw up an agreement of 25 articles to the effect that the Maharaja was to make over the Raj to him and his party, in order to effect the reforms specified in His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General's khareeta of 25th ultimo." As I have to notice this misrepresentation further on when it is again repeated, I pass on to the next statement with the simple remark, that it betrays a ridiculous credulity to suppose that I could ask the Maharaja to "make over the Raj" to me and my party. But he had "reliable" information, of course, from his "highly respectable" informers!

The Colonel says, "when consulted I gave my decided opinion that Mr. Dadabhai and his party had not the knowledge, ability, experience or weight of character sufficient to carry out the reforms needed in every

department of the State." Certainly, the Colonel is quite right. We were not his men. His ideal was the "respectable" Mr. Bapoobhoy, and the report was that men like Mr. Narayan Wasudew Kharkar were considered by him a hundred thousand times better than us; and Nana-saheb said he was in favour again and could manage to get the Dewanship for himself, offering to one of my colleagues the Naeb Dewanship, which was declined. Men like "the honourable and perfectly reliable" the Bhao Poonekar, to whom I am told the Colonel has given a flaming certificate, and whose transcendent merit he has also recorded in the Residency, and the "highly respectable" informers of the proceedings of the Durbar, who, traitors to their master, also managed to sell the Colonel for their private ends, were men to the Colonel's heart. By-the-by what should be thought of an English gentleman fraternising with and encouraging men in the confidence of their master to become his informers? What wonder then that we, not possessing the knowledge, ability, experience and weight of character, and other extraordinary merits of the "respectable" Bapoobhoy and "the hundred thousand times better than us" Mr. Kharkar, were discarded by the Colonel as worthless?

Had we only shown the extraordinary merit of the policy of "please the Saheb," we would have turned out the greatest administrators and reformers in all India. But unfortunately our schools taught us one or two naughty lessons, such as to look to both sides of every question, to do our duty, &c., and so of course we must suffer the consequence of such pernicious teaching, and be denounced unfit and unequal to the superior men of the Colonel's heart! The Colonel has, several times, dinned into the ears of Government about our inability, &c. &c. I shall not repeat the above remarks, but simply note the statement hereafter.

The Colonel says "that none of the people from the Sirdar downwards had the least confidence in them." I suppose this is also the information from his "highly respectable" informers. I am speaking in no spirit of boastfulness, but I may say, that the mark we have left and the confidence we have inspired among all classes of the people, (except the harpies, the intriguers and their dupes), by showing the difference between pure and impure justice in general administration, and between honesty of purpose and shams and intrigues, and by the progress we actually made in a short time, and against tremendous difficulties, will take a long time to be forgotten. This statement is not intended to be a history

of our work, but only a notice of the matters mentioned in the Blue Book with reference to us. I may therefore only give a few broad facts. We have to clean an eugenean stable besides introducing new systems. The Nazrana system in judicial cases, which in plain English means selling justice to the highest bidder, was put down by us against great opposition. This was the very question which first brought us into collision with the Gaekwar and the old Durbarees, and the "respectable" Mr. Bapobhoy was most active in promoting the very first case of Nazrana-justice that cropped up before me.

From the day Mr. Bal Mangesh took charge of the Court, the proceedings of the Court underwent, what to the people was, an extraordinary change. Instead of the hole and corner arrangements between the Vakeels and the Judges for the amount of the Nazrana to the Gaekwar and bribes for the Judges and other Durbarees, a thorough investigation of each case in open Court and decisions based entirely upon merits, without any *private interviews* with the Judge, may well inspire the confidence which should take long to be forgotten.

In Mr. Wadia's Court a similar change was simply astonishing to the people, to see Vahivatdars and Fozdars and other officials (supposed to possess influence at high quarters) accused of corruption or oppression, tried in open Court or thoroughly cross-examined as witnesses, and made to feel the weight of law and justice when found guilty.

Sir L. Pelly testifies (No. 6, page 42) that "Until purged by the administration of Mr. Dadabhoy, the criminal and civil administration of justice was notoriously venal and corrupt."

Messrs. Mangesh and Wadia had under my direction nearly prepared the Penal Code and the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes, on the basis of the English Codes with such modifications as were adapted to the wants and circumstances of the State. Mr. Kazi Shahabudin, doing his best to meet all pressing evils that wanted immediate redress or attention, was recasting the revenue system. Re-organisation of Courts of Justice, Police, the Revenue system, the Municipality and Public Works, &c. was all being prepared, and the financial condition was fully placed by me before Sir L. Pelly. I had also then pointed out to Sir L. Pelly, that Baroda was a most promising state. That it would do credit even to ordinary management, provided that the management was honest, and that its chief want, and that most indispensable one, was good men and a thorough though gradual change of personnel in all departments. Its revenue was capable of being much increased even

with diminished incidence of taxation, and that even as the condition of the revenue then was, ordinary, careful and honest administration and check of extravagance should leave a large surplus, with a liberal administrative expenditure. But the great want was the men to carry out all the plans of reform settled upon by us. Only four of us had to slave the whole routine work till nearly the time we left. At first, the Bombay Government refused us the aid of the officials we asked, till the Viceroy's decision on the report of Sir R. Meade's Commission should be known, and latterly we lost nearly another three months before we at last got some men.

Thus therefore the obstacles to rapid progress was the Resident's open opposition, the passive opposition of the Government, and the encouragement thereby given to the old Durbarees to lead the Gaekwar back to their own ways. A fair moral and direct support from the Resident and the Bombay Government would have produced far more satisfactory results. I think, I may say that it was surprising, we were able to do what we did against such great odds. Enthusiasm and faith in the right cause alone enabled us to stand the high-pressure and harassing work we had to do and we did, and had I had the necessary time to carry out our plans of reform, I had fair hopes of showing that my appointment was not a mistake.

Again, notwithstanding that Colonel Phayre was fully aware of the nature of the obstacles I have mentioned above, and especially that I had not yet obtained the aid of men I wanted to carry out the reforms, and that I could not have had any fair trial, he endeavours to mislead Government (page 24), "that judging from the fair trial which Mr. Dadabhai has had for the last nine months, and Mr. Kazi Shahabudin for five, together with the results of that trial, I saw no hope of the requisite work being done by them." Of course not! It would not suit him to see anything of the kind in us, because his men (persons like Bapoobhoy) and he did not want us. But even the Bombay Government, with all their desire to support him, could not swallow this, and admitting partly the true causes, I find them telling him it could not with certainty be stated that we had a fair trial.

The Colonel says "that I doubted if men of ability and character from British districts would serve under Mr. Dadabhai." Certainly the Colonel may well doubt that *his* men of character and ability like Mr. Bapoobhoy would like to apply to serve under me lest they may not be accepted. As to men like Messrs. Mahadev Govind Ranade, Nana

Morojee, Dosabhoy Framji, Gopalrao Hurri Desh Mook, The Honorable V. N. Mandik, Mr. Pestonji Jehangir, Mr. Shambhooprasad and others, they of course do not, I suppose, possess any character and ability in the Colonel's eyes. If I said that Sir T. Madava Row might not have objected to serve under me, would be of no avail. None of these can reach the high standard of the "respectable" Bapoobhoy whom he proposed in this very letter as one of the Provisional Government in our place, and who was somehow discovered by the Colonel to be already then "really doing the Dewan's work," i.e., my work, even when I was still the Dewan! After this what absurdities would not the Colonel believe and say!

The Colonel says "as might naturally be supposed Mr. Dadabhai and his friends are indignant at my having expressed such an opinion regarding them." The Colonel, I suppose, either took this as a matter of course, or his respectable informers told him this. The fact is that when we heard that the Colonel was against us, we plainly told His Highness that we did not care a straw, if he thought it would be to his interest that we should leave. I reminded him especially that he knew well that it was not love of power, position or pelf that had taken me there, but only his urgent request for his and his State's good; and that he had therefore to make up his mind as he thought best and only express his wish, and we would be out of his way at once. All this the Durbarees knew, but the Colonel did not get this information, I suppose!

In his letter (page 28) to the Bombay Government of 13th August 1874, the Colonel, while objecting to the Gaekwar's proposal to make Nanasaheb Pratinidhi, drags me in as follows:—"That if this was the kind of reform His Highness was going to carry out under Mr. Dadabhai's administration, it could only end in one result, and that very shortly." Now as a mere matter of opinion I should have taken no notice of this especially as the Bombay Government have told him how wrong he was in the way in which he objected to the Pratinidhip. But this short sentence pours a flood of light for which I was not prepared, and I see the Bombay Government have been struck with it, and in their mildest manner notice it as "injudicious." But they could have hardly realised the full import of this blurring, as I cannot help reading it in conjunction with the reports and events of the time.

The Colonel was reported to have made his vow to "girao" me in May as I have already mentioned, but as matters now appeared, taking a

turn contrary to his wishes and as his clients (the complainants before the Commission) began teasing him that, after all, the Gaekwar was going to have his own way in the appointment of his Minister and a trial for 17 months, Colonel Phayre was then reported to have said that he would bring down my administration within 2 or 3 months by raising all Baroda territory up against it. I had laughed out this report at the time. I had taken it to be a bit of the constant braggardism of Bhao Poonekar and others, and whatever I may have thought of Colonel Phayre's weaknesses, and of the charm his "honorable" friends were exercising upon him, I never believed that an English gentleman of Colonel Phayre's position and education would degrade himself to such a plot to gain a triumph over me. But reading the "injudicious," out of place and illogical sentence as it is; looking back to the devices with which the Sirdars were made to rise, and the ryots kept up in a state of agitation and passive rebellion (which with the spark of a single hasty step on my part might have burst out into a conflagration); also calling to mind that only 2 days before he wrote his letter under comment, he had sent among other messages to the Gaekwar, with his "respectable" Bapoobhoy and Govindrao Mama, that my appointment would be war and not peace and that it would bring about His Highness' ruin in 3 months; and remembering the way in which the Colonel had once blurted out to me that the Gaekwar had narrowly escaped a general rising, and as if I might have still to look out for it; I think I cannot be blamed to be inclined to believe the report. The Colonel can say whether it was true or not, but one thing seems certain, that the rascals, I beg their pardon, the "respectable" and "honorable" men around him took every advantage and made splendid capital and mischief out of his blind side and weakness of great self-esteem. This same remarkable letter, containing the prophecy of my administration coming to an end "shortly," also discloses another remarkable fact; a touching wail of the "respectable" Bapoobhoy, and the Colonel's sympathy therewith. The Colonel communicates to Government, "and at last Bapoobhoy himself remarked that everything appeared to have been turned upside down, that he who was recommended by the Commission has been rejected, and that Nanasaheb who has been rejected was to have promotion." Goodness knows how Sir R. Meade's Commission made out Bapoobhoy, *the* respectable man out of the whole lot of the Durbarees, and I wonder what the Gaekwar and Nanasaheb would have to say to this, remembering how Bapoobhoy was telling them every day of the valiant fights he was fighting for them with the Resident. Verily Bapoobhoy is a

remarkable man, devoted to and in the confidence of his master, and yet "respectable" and beloved among his master's opponents and enemies ! Discovered by the Commission mainly under the guidance of Colonel Phayre's opinion, to be the *only* respectable man, amidst all the scamps of Durbarees, was it not unkind of that Commission not to have recommended that such a "respectable" person should at once be rescued from such bad company and sent out of Baroda, a consideration he so well deserved !

About the great offence (page 29) I am supposed to have committed in calling the Colonel "toom," and which in fact was an oversight on the part of the Furnis, I have already made penance, by immediately withdrawing and altering the yad when the Colonel mentioned his objection. This somehow does not appear in the Blue Book. I had no more idea of insulting him in this or any other way than of taking his place, though the Colonel gave me the credit of calling this a manœuvre on my part for some sinister object. About the second "manœuvre" with which I am credited as having said that when advice is wanted it will be asked for, and which the Colonel supposes to be "put forward in order as far as possible to prevent my (Colonel's) seeing real reforms carried out and the orders of Government respected," I need not take any notice, as the Bombay Government has disarmed him of his delusion by telling him that his objection was "most unreasonable" and "it is difficult to see what other answer the Gaekwar could have been expected to give."

Now comes the Colonel's highest effort to dislodge me and my party ; his letter of 15th August 1874 (page 31) which requires some detailed notice. I pass over his third or fourth dinning into the ears of Government about my and my party's incapability to effect reforms. Repetition seems to be in the eyes of the Colonel a grand argument. The statement in the second para. that it was under my advice the Gaekwar had refused to go to Bombay during the Viceroy's visit, is untrue. The statement that I persuaded the weak minded Malharrao to appoint me his agent in England, is untrue. And the Colonel can have no excuse of being misinformed on this subject. Not only had I publicly* denied

* *Annual Meeting of the East India Association, August 6, 1873.*

Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji said that, before the vote of thanks to the Chairman was proposed, he desired to make some brief explanations to the members, and this perhaps was the most fitting opportunity. With regard to the donations given by the Princes of India, there was, it appeared, some misapprehension. Although the Council had clearly and unequivocally shown that these donations had been given entirely upon public grounds, and simply for the general good of

this some twelve months before, but I had personally told him at my first visit to him that I had never asked to be, nor had been, appointed an Agent of the Gaekwar in England. That the Residency Parsee head

the country, he would now emphatically repeat this in order that there might be no misunderstanding or misapprehension on that point. There was absolutely no condition, no promise, no hope, held out that the donors should have any personal interest or benefit from the efforts made by the Association in England. He wished it to be distinctly understood that there were no more conditions attached to the donations than to the ordinary yearly subscriptions or donations of any of the members present, except that the gifts were princely, as became the gifts of princes. Any contrary opinion would seriously endanger the position of the Association, and therefore he wished to set the matter at rest at once and, he hoped, for ever. In further explanation, he might add that in his journey through Western India, he visited the Court of Baroda in March last year, to solicit support, but his Highness was not inclined to do anything. Some months afterwards, however, he received a letter inviting him to return, and when he went, his Highness asked his advice and assistance on certain private affairs. He accordingly undertook the performance of certain work for His Highness, without having any idea of expecting anything like pecuniary remuneration. But His Highness urged that the service performed was of great value to him, and—finding that a personal recompense would not be acceptable—he insisted upon making a provision for his (the speaker's) children to the extent of Rs. 50,000. (Hear, hear.) He (the speaker) felt the great delicacy of the position he held as regards the East India Association, and hence his first resolve to accept no pecuniary recompense even in the form so considerably urged by His Highness. Subsequently, however, he consulted with some of his best friends in India—friends who would, he knew, care more for his honour than his pocket—that they told him that, in their opinion, he need not have the slightest hesitation in accepting the provision for his children,—(hear, hear)—especially as he had earned it by honest and valued labour. (Hear, hear.) Still, he was undecided in the matter, and he had since consulted some of his English friends in England, who, after hearing all the circumstances of the case, one and all said as strongly as possible that he should not have the slightest hesitation in the matter, and that he was bound to allow his children the benefit of his work. (Hear, hear.) He would not have troubled the meeting with this explanation about a private affair, but a public character had been given to the circumstance, and it was also supposed that he had undertaken some agency of his Highness, and had come over to England to fight his cause or to excite the East India Association to do so, and to advance his personal interests. This was altogether wrong. (Hear, hear.) He had heard in Bombay that certain high officials had entertained misapprehensions of the kind to which he referred: and only the other day, when in the Committee-room of the House of Commons, a gentleman high in authority, and for whom he had respect, said "If you are going to give any evidence about Native Princes, I should look out for you." [This gentleman afterwards explained to me that he meant no reference to the report about my accepting agencies, but simply to my views about Native States.] This confirmed his suspicion that some misapprehension existed. It was to dispel this misapprehension that he held an agency, that he had ventured to trespass on the time of the Association in making this explanation, and he would distinctly repeat that he had always felt his position in regard to the Association to be so peculiarly delicate, that, although it was probable that he might have experienced little difficulty in making two or three lacs if he had chosen to undertake agencies, he had throughout maintained strictly his resolve that his character and conduct should be entirely above suspicion, and therefore to all such offers he had always replied that he had a broader work to do, and that he could not serve God and Mammon at the same time. He hoped that as long as he was the Honorary Secretary of this Association, he should ever do anything which would in the slightest degree, compromise the Association, or which would be calculated to produce any prejudice against its work. (Journal of the East India Association, Vol. VII., No. 2, page 622).

clerk had given me aid or information is untrue. This "manœuvre" comes with very ill grace indeed from the Colonel who himself tells Government "I am always kept well informed of Durbar proceedings" and who had "highly respectable" persons of the Durbar to keep him "well informed." Others may be wrong for doing such things, but in a Resident perhaps it may be all right !

About the matter of the Rs. 50,000 which the Colonel misrepresents in the 4th para. for the second or third time, I have the same complaint. As I have already said before, not only had I given a public* explanation of this matter, but I had personally explained to him my whole previous connection with the Gaekwar ; and yet the Colonel has thought proper to take every opportunity of misrepresenting this matter. To the public explanation I may add here, that had I followed my own impulse, and had I not been pressed by the Gaekwar, and strongly persuaded by friends, I would have simply declined the offer as I at first did, and the matter would have ended. That this is not an after-thought may be judged from the facts that I had declined similar offers before of 25,000 and 30,000 Rupees from two other princes, that if I had chosen, I could have entered into an arrangement with a third prince to become his Agent with 30 or 40,000 Rupees cash down, and a lac or so in prospect. Moreover, not in any of these cases was there any promise of exerting influence in high quarters. It was all the service of personal brain-work. During the last thirty years I have given such brain-work to many persons without remuneration.

I again pass over the Colonel's remarks in the 5th para. about my unfitness &c. As to the long list of counts in his indictment against me in this para., viz. the "deliberate neglect of the recommendations of the Commission for eight months, the increasing injustice done to British subjects, the continued oppression of the ryots, the systematic resistance to all reasonable demands of the British Government as represented in the large number of cases still pending ; there is the neglect to take notice of Government references of the most urgent kind ; there is the injury done to our trade, and the direct act of disrespect shown to the Resident in the opium case" and others ; I have only to say that all these are creations of his imagination. I really wonder how Colonel Phayre could think of writing such nonsense. He might just as well have proceeded to say

* See Note on pages 399 and 400.

that I was going to set fire to the ocean, or still better, to drink it all up. What strange impulse or desire must have made him write all such things!

In the 6th para. (page 32) comes again that ridiculous story of my party turning the advice of the Governor-General in his khareeta of 25th July 1874, to our own account by endeavouring to induce the Gaekwar to sign "an agreement" to the general effect that the administration should be placed in our hands for a certain period; or as he says in another place "an agreement of 25 articles," "to make over the Raj" to me and my party; and that my proposal for His Highness signing an agreement "to make over Riasat to any one whatever except the British Government" was "an offence against the sovereignty of the paramount power." Where on earth had the Colonel's common sense fled when he seriously wrote all this stuff of my "taking over the Raj" and "offending against the sovereignty of the Paramount Power!"

My colleagues did not then require any binding for a fix period. They had been originally engaged for three years; with the provision that if the Gaekwar dispensed with their services before that period, they were to receive half of the salary for the balance of the period. At this time, instead of asking for a fixed period, they were actually giving up their places of their own accord. As to myself, I had never asked a binding for any fixed period. My only condition with the Gaekwar from the very beginning was, and of which the Colonel was well informed by me, that as long as I had the Gaekwar's confidence and I felt myself useful, I serve; and when the confidence and usefulness cease, I make my salam and go. I never attached the slightest importance to any bond or signature of the Gaekwar on this matter. I went only on a call of duty, and I cared not to remain longer than I could perform that duty. I may give here a brief sketch of the facts about the extraordinary "agreement" by which I and my party were deposing the Gaekwar, and making the Raj our own; our threats to leave Baroda, and what is most ridiculous and racy, my taking Damodar into my counsels and aid.

Under the causes I have already mentioned the old Durbarees began their pranks to lead back the Gaekwar to his old way, by first reviving the practice of deciding judicial cases by Nazránás. After remonstrating and opposing this step for some time, about the beginning of July (the Viceroy's khareeta of 25th July being received by us on 3rd August) we let His Highness know, that if he was bent on reviving the Nazráná

and relapse into some other old practices, he might please himself and we should go. This message, communicated both in writing and verbally by Mr. Wadia, led to a discussion between us and His Highness, which went on for more than a fortnight. During this time Damodar had once seen me on some business, when he also communicated to me a message from the Gaekwar upon the subject of the remonstrance I had made. I then told him that His Highness had to consider carefully the course he was taking. He said he would communicate the message to His Highness, but I saw no more of him afterwards, and this is magnified into taking him into my counsels and aid, and to make my connection with him effective with Government and to shew my company, the Colonel has taken particular care to describe him as "the notorious Damoderpunth, the present favourite of the Gaekwar, the panderer to his grossest vices, the oppressor of women, &c.," though somehow Sir R. Meade's Commission did not get any information to say a word about this man, when all other evil-advisers were denounced.

Our discussion with the Gaekwar was for a few days interrupted on account of Mr. Wadia's absence to Bombay. When he returned, and we found that neither His Highness nor his Durbarees appeared to understand our remonstrances, I sent word with Mr. Wadia that we must go and that he was simply wasting time and words, and was much mistaken if he thought we would care a straw for our places, and allow him and his *mandal* to go back to their old ways.

He was now fairly roused and earnestly requested Mr. Wadia to ask me to make a memo. of what I wanted. This was on the 29th July. This request of the Gaekwar led to what Colonel Phayre calls an "agreement of 25 articles" to "make over the Raj to us," and which proved such a nightmare to him, in his anxiety for the sovereignty of the paramount power, but which in reality was simply a letter from myself to the Gaekwar to let him see clearly what we considered necessary for preventing the old abuses from creeping in again, and for making proper reform, if we were to serve him in our respective positions. As I have already said, I never cared for any signed bond or agreement, as it would both be no use if he did not observe

it, nor would I care to serve under such circumstances I give below * translation of the monstrous "agreement" of 25

* *To His Highness Shrimant Sircar.*

Ajam Hormusjee has communicated to me all that Sircar said to him in Shrimant Nanasaheb's house; after that Sircar sent to me Nanasaheb and Rajeshree Damodarpunt. I told them to communicate to Sircar that if the substance of what Sircar told Ajam Hormusjee be as stated below, I cannot carry on the work.

1. Nobody can ever alter Sircar's orders
2. Sircar will give orders as he likes.
3. Sircar will spend as much as he likes altogether.
4. To take Sircar's sanction in every matter.
5. Orders are to be from Sircar and power for Dadabhai.†

Of the above matters, Damodarpunt took a note to communicate to the Sircar, and promised to get a reply from him, but no reply has been received.

After that I sent word to Sircar, that I could not carry on the administration of the Raj. We should therefore be allowed leave to go with willingness. Thereupon Sircar told Ajam Hormusjee to bring a memo. of what Dadabhai Sett wanted.

Now if Sircar determine to continue in the same views which he expressed to Ajam Hormusjee, I cannot carry on the administration. Had I known such views at the commencement, I would not have undertaken the work; and if the Sircar's present views remain the same, I have then no hope that my views would be accepted. But as Sircar has desired to let him know my views, I cannot but accede. My simple object is the Sircar's, and Sircar's State's welfare, otherwise I have no business here. The chief foundation of the State must be laid upon justice and fairness.

And Sircar giving me his confidence, should assist in and sanction my work with a sincere heart. Bearing this object in mind, I state below what I ask.

1. Written orders should be sent to all departments, that orders written in the name of the Sircar or Hazoor and countersigned by Dadabhai are only to be obeyed. No other orders should be obeyed.

First Explanation. The necessity for my counter-signature is only this, that the order to be made coming to my knowledge, I may be able to give my opinion or advice, or make any inquiry that may be necessary, and should there be any mistake or misunderstanding, I may be able to explain it. So that proper orders alone may be given.

Second Explanation. Sircar says that if on some occasion, under a pressure from the Raneesaheb, the Sircar gave direct orders without my knowledge, I should not object to that. About this I have to submit with every respect, that if on even a single occasion Sircar would give a direct order, people will bring recommendation to Sircar and Raneesaheb and constantly interfere with the regular course of business. "Bandobust" is such a thing that if one link is broken the whole chain is rendered useless. With one irregular instance Sircar will lose all his praise. ‡

2. All "chities" or orders for payment on the State Banks must be *initialled* by me. Without that no payments should be made from the "Dookans"—such order must be made to the "Dookans." §

3. A certain amount should be fixed for Sircar's private expenditure, including that of his "Kangi Mandal" or private friends and attendants. ||

† This, I had explained, was unintelligible to me. It was meant, I suppose, that I was only to execute orders given by the Gaekwar.

‡ One additional important reason was that the Durbarees and even *Jasoods* would now and then take advantage of giving orders in the Gaekwar's name.

§ Without this arrangement irregular expenditure could not be checked.

|| Without this it was impossible to bring Finances into order.

articles which scared the gallant Colonel so much, and in which I had adopted the same principles which I had recommended to His Highness the Holkar, during his negotiations with Sir T. Madava Row, *viz.*, that in all matters to end in permanent results, the voice of the sovereign should prevail, the Dewan giving his best advice; that in all ordinary every-day administration, the Dewan should be left free and, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, a large latitude should be left to the Dewan to introduce the necessary reforms, as the responsibility of the extent and result of the reforms would be chiefly on the head of the Dewan, and as in this case it was an especial feature that it was mainly for the purpose of reforms that I had been invited.

4. It is necessary to engage the services of several new fit men, and to increase the salaries of fit men already in the service, and to make several reforms and alterations. For this purpose I should have permission to spend five lakhs per annum more for three years, than the present (administration) expenditure; (of course) expenditure will be incurred as necessary only*.

Like the above His Highness the Holkar has arranged with Sir T. Madava Row.

5. What I am *not* to do without the sanction of the Sircar.

1. To give land or village to anybody.
2. To incur any new charitable or religious expenditure, or to make a present of more than Rs. 500 to anybody.
3. To bestow a charitable, or other annuity on anybody.
4. To make new laws.
5. To entertain or dismiss servants of salary exceeding Rs. 500 per month.
6. To alter the rates of assessment.
7. To do any public work costing above Rs. 1,000.

Explanation. Sircar should give these sanctions personally; it is hoped that Sircar reposing confidence in me will give sanction quickly. Delay or inconvenience in the sanction, would produce disappointment and a check to hearty work. For taking such sanction Sircar should fix a place and time, to enable me to have private interviews for a certain time every day.

6. Nothing should be done contrary to the existing Revenue, Civil and Criminal laws, till altered by new laws.

7. All correspondence with the British Government to be carried on according to the satisfaction and sanction of the Sircar.

8. No Nazrana whatever should be taken in matters of justice, or of appointments or dismissal of officials.

Explanation. In no case, old or new, should any Nazrana be taken by anybody. The cases of Vaso and Rajmoodar must be inquired into and decided according to justice.

9. Several high officials ought to be made to resign their Durbaree posts.

10. Should Sircar have to make any appointment in state service, I should be consulted.

Explanation. Moteram Dulpatram had once applied to me for service. I had refused. Sircar knew this, and yet without asking me, Sircar has engaged him to

* Under the circumstances of the time, when the old Durbarees always endeavoured "to thwart" reforms, this latitude as well as that of the sub-clause 5 of clause 5 became an absolute necessity.

The Memorandum, asked by the Gaekwar, was at once prepared in the shape of the letter from me given at foot of pages 404 to 406, and the Gaekwar entered into a fair discussion of the conditions proposed; but while this discussion was going on, we received the Viceroy's khareeta on 3rd August. Colonel Phayre, however, makes out the "agreement" as being proposed by us a day or two before his letter of 11th August, and as being "one of our first efforts" to turn the advice contained in the khareeta to our own account, by snatching away the Raj; and the old Durbarees, for the nonce, suddenly become good men in the eyes of Colonel Phayre, as being solicitous to save their master from the clutches of the monsters who were going to devour the Riasat! When the Viceroy's khareeta of 25th July arrived on 3rd August, its consideration engrossed the attention of the Gaekwar, and the "agreement" fell into the background altogether. New intrigues started on their feet under pressure of Colonel Phayre's, what the Bombay Government call "determined personal opposition to me," and his encouragement to Bapoobhoy and to Nanasaheb as I had then heard.

When this came to our knowledge, we at once actually gave in our resignations on the 9th of August, so that the Gaekwar was left completely free to act as he liked without any difficulty or discussion from our part, and get rid of us by simply accepting our resignations. But he would do nothing of the kind, and on that very same day he brought such a pressure of entreaty upon us not to leave him, that we felt ourselves forced to withdraw our resignations. When Colonel Phayre must have heard that His Highness would not allow us to go, Bapoobhoy and Govindrao-mama brought a message from the Colonel to the Gaekwar on the 11th of August, that His Highness should not appoint me, should turn all four of us out, that he (the Colonel) was ready to say this to our face ten times over, that Manibhoy, Boevey, and Kharkar were a hundred thousand times better than I, that he would shut up the bungalow if I was appointed Dewan, that my appointment would be war and not peace, and that it would bring about His Highness' ruin in three months, &c. &c. Further in the evening we heard that

do some secret Political work. This is against my views. He should not be retained in the service.

I now most earnestly request that if Sircar would order to conduct the administration according to the above clauses, it is most essentially necessary for the Sircar to make a thorough determination, not to disturb it afterwards. It is my duty to preserve intact the rights and increase the fame of Sircar, and I shall not fail to do all I can in that way. Dated 31st July 1874.

(Signed) DADABHAI NAROJI

Bapoobhoy was also one of the Colonel's contemplated Cabinet. We again told His Highness that the Colonel was really strongly against us, and that though we thought that if he (the Gaekwar) was sincere and loyal in his promises of reform, and showed that sincerity unmistakably by his actions, no harm would come to him from the British Government, and especially the present Viceroy, who had so clearly shown his consideration and justice towards him, we still desired that he should consider carefully before he decided upon my continuing in my Dewanship. The Gaekwar, however, made up his mind and sent the yad for military honors to be accorded to me as Dewan, on the 14th of August. This yad brought forth this letter of 15th August, which I am commenting upon, and which is a tissue from beginning to end of misrepresentations and false statements. Of the rest of the letter from para. 7 and of another string of hallucinations and abuses, and of further dinnings about my unfitness, &c., I need not take any notice. They are of a piece with the rest of the letter; all false and imaginary.

Almost all the above misrepresentations, &c., and further repeated dinnings about my unfitness, want of grasp &c. are repeated in Colonel Phayre's Report of 2nd November 1874. But it is sickening and useless to go through them again. I shall notice just a few things that are new and important. I may give an instance of what is either his extraordinary gullibility and carelessness, or his desire to misrepresent me.

(Page 60) "The salary," says he, "of the new Dewan, Mr. Dadabhai Nowrojee, has been fixed at a lakh of Rupees per annum." Certainly a matter like this should be expected to be known to and described by a Resident more accurately. He could have easily ascertained this as well as many other truths by asking me, instead of writing all sorts of untruths behind my back. Now my salary proper was only 63,000 Baroda Rupees, then equal to about 53,000 Bombay Rupees. Out of the rest of the "lakh," Rupees 31,000 was simply the pay for a Paga, serving in the contingent, which was proposed to be transferred to my name, (but which I had not allowed so to be transferred, as the then holder of it had represented to me a grievance upon the subject); and 6,000 Rupees were for the maintenance of an elephant and for other state ceremonial requirements for the Dewan, 1,000 of them being "palkhi" allowance.

The report of 2nd November is in itself the best proof of the undue and vexatious interference of the Colonel which most seriously interfered with my regular work, and of either his utter want of thought, or inten-

tional ignoring, that reforms and redresses could not be made without men and time to inquire and to act, and that to very nearly the time of this very report we had not received the aid of British officials we had asked for. Even the Bombay Government recognised this necessity and recommended that 3 months more should be allowed in the probation on account of the delay; viz. "to extend this term from the 31st of December 1875 till the 31st March 1876" (page 75).

In para. 145 of this report (page 60), the Colonel writes as a matter of complaint against me, that "Again in a khareeta written by Mr. Dadabhai to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated 19th April 1874, acknowledging the receipt of the report of the Commission, he stated that he was preparing a full reply to the Report." Even if I had said so, there would have been nothing wrong, had I been of the opinion that a reply should be made. But what should we think of this statement, after reading its following short history. The Gujaratee saying "*úto Chór Kotwál ne dandé*" (The thief fining the magistrate instead) is well verified in this instance. The Report of the Commission was received at Nowsaree. I and Mr. Wadia went there on 13th April. After reading and explaining the report, a short khareeta was prepared the next day,* as the Gaekwar desired and we approved. This was copied fair, signed and sealed on the 15th April. The next morning Nanasaheb took it to Colonel Phayré. On reading his own copy of it, the Colonel flung the paper away, and said this was no reply. It was only a trick of mine to seat myself firmly, and to leave the old Durbarees out in the cold. A full reply should at once be made to the Report. The khareeta was brought back, the Resident himself so suddenly turning over a new leaf and sympathisingly recommending a full and immediate defence. I need not say that I had not the remotest idea of the motive imputed to me in the above message which Nanasaheb brought and which was repeated by Bapoobhoy. Now with the Resident's recommendation, the old Durbarees became strong in their advice to defend at once. We two gave a decided "no." We explained, that though the Report of the Commission was open to some exception and attack, it would be simply suicidal on

* "I have received with pleasure your Excellency's friendly khareeta of 31st March 1874, with a copy of the Report of the Commission.

In my khareeta of 31st December 1873, I had requested to be furnished with a copy of this Report in order that I might be able to express my views upon it before your Excellency determined upon any friendly advice to be given to me. As your Excellency, however, is to communicate to me shortly your friendly advice, I shall take the opportunity of expressing my views upon the Report, when I shall reply to your Excellency's friendly Khareeta containing that advice. I beg to express, &c. &c.

the part of His Highness to make any such attempt, and that we should not be surprised if Colonel Phayre took hold of it to shew to the Viceroy that the Gaekwar had learned nothing and forgotten nothing, and that he was still incorrigibly bent on his old ways which the Commission had so unmistakably condemned. To me, I said it was quite puzzling, that Colonel Phayre should suddenly become so solicitous about the character of those very people whom he was himself most instrumental in getting denounced. However, be the Colonel's motive what it may, we said we were decidedly against making any defence at all, especially then, till something more was known of the Viceroy's mind, and that we should not mar the friendly spirit that was shown in the Viceroy's khareeta.

His Highness took time to consider and agreed with us. Another khareeta, with certain additions to meet his wishes to some extent, was prepared, adopted, copied fair on the usual gold paper and ready for signature. But during this time the old Durbarees were at it again. Had not *even the Resident* recommended that a defence should be made, and that at once, so at last the Gaekwar turned round and refused to sign the khareeta and determined to defend at once. We repeated our advice distinctly. We would not have any defence at all, at least not any then, and left him to please himself. The stakes, large as they were, were his, and we had discharged our duty to give him our best advice. The *Resident's* recommendation and sympathy carried the day. A telegram was prepared to be sent at once to the Viceroy and a corresponding alteration was made in the khareeta, as follows. In the rejected khareeta, the paragraph was :—

“As your Excellency, however, is to communicate to me shortly your friendly advice, I reserve, for the present, the question of the opinion of the Commission about my general administration, and more particularly even about my personal conduct and that of my Dewan from which I should naturally desire to clear ourselves at an early opportunity. I need only say at present that I have an earnest desire, &c.”

For this was substituted (page 343, No. 1)—“As your Excellency, however, is to communicate to me shortly your friendly advice, I have telegraphed to your Excellency that should the opinions and recommendations of the Report of the Commission be likely to influence your Excellency adversely to my rights, I request your Excellency to postpone determining upon the friendly advice to be given to me till my reply to the Report is received by your Excellency. I am preparing this full reply to the Report. In the meantime, &c.” With this alteration the

kharecta was sent on 19th April 1874; and to which the Colonel refers in a way, as if I had done something very wrong and encouraged the Gaekwar to give a full reply. Now, be my advice sound or mistaken, it is strange that Colonel Phayre who is himself the cause of the complaint he makes, fathers it upon me and in a way to insinuate a prejudice against me in the mind of the Viceroy. Or did his "respectable" Bapoobhoy, Nanasaheb and others invent the message from him that he strongly advised a full immediate reply. And I may also ask whether his "highly respectable" informers who "kept him well-informed of the proceedings of the Durbar," had told him or not that we were all along openly against making any defence, or at least then, against the Report of the Commission, and that it was entirely owing to *his* advice being thrown in the scale that an immediate defence was determined upon. If the Colonel really recommended the reply, and then made the offer to reply, as a matter of complaint, it was, to say the least, most disingenuous on his part. I can hardly even now persuade myself that Colonel Phayre could have stooped to such conduct. If not, it is a pity that his and others' eyes should be opened when too late to his blind faith in his "respectables" and "honourables" and the injustice and mischief that must have been caused thereby.

I may here ask the Colonel whether his friend ever informed him or not that from the very first day I came in contact with the Gaekwar, I always, on every necessary occasion, used to impress upon His Highness that however strong his treaty-rights might be, and that though I would represent them from his side to Government to the best of my ability, he should never expect to preserve his rights safe, unless he performed his duties of a good ruler. These were not hole and corner conversations; they were almost always open and in the presence of the Durbarees. While I have, on the one hand, done my best to serve the Gaekwar faithfully and to take care of his legitimate rights and interests, I have never, on the other hand, failed in or shirked my duty to advise him, and to have done my best to lead him to the performance of his duties towards his subjects. But such things the Colonel never learnt.

(Page 63) Colonel Phayre's insinuation that by the terms of our appointment we were entirely subject to the will of the Gaekwar, implying as if we were bound to allow the Gaekwar to perpetrate any injustice or enormity he liked, is ridiculous and absurd. Now nothing was more well known and noised abroad than the fact that we would

not allow the Gaekwar to do as he willed, but at once protested against and prevented any irregular or undue interference with the administration. Why, that monstrous "agreement" which frightened the Colonel so much was the result of this very position that we would not submit to allow the Gaekwar or his Durbarees in his name, to do anything wrong. That was our chief and continued struggle with the Durbar. Colonel Phayre and all the Durbarees knew this well, and yet this attempt to misrepresent us! It is simply a libel to say that the gentlemen who were with me would agree or that I would agree or ask them to serve on such conditions.

After thus briefly noticing some of the most glaring misrepresentations and falsehoods in Colonel Phayre's writings, I pass over without notice his remarks upon the Gaekwar's khareeta of 2nd November 1874, as, first, they are mostly a repetition of what had been stated by him before, and upon the glaring portion of which I have already commented; and secondly, the Indian Government have done sufficient justice to the khareeta in their despatch to the Secretary of State, of 27th November 1874.

The despatch (page 104) says "the Gaekwar has addressed the Viceroy a khareeta in which His Highness has in temperate language begged for the removal of Colonel Phayre." * * "We are constrained to admit (apart from certain objections raised by Colonel Phayre to the accuracy of the Gaekwar's statement of two particular instances of interference) the general correctness of His Highness' complaints of Colonel Phayre's proceedings."

Again the Indian Government in their despatch to the Secretary of State, (No. 5, page 4) of 15th April 1875, say, "In his communications with the Gaekwar and with Mr. Dadabhai Nowrojee, the Minister whom the Gaekwar had selected, Colonel Phayre was wanting in consideration."

Lord Salisbury in his despatch of 15th April 1875 (No. 4, page 106) says, "His (Colonel Phayre's) character was little fitted for the delicate duties with which he had been recently charged, and his departure from the orders he had received was too serious to be overlooked."

Again in their despatch of 29th April 1875, (No. 5, page 43) to the Secretary of State, the Indian Government do me the justice (for which I feel thankful) to say "shortly after Sir Lewis Pelly's arrival, Mr. Dadabhai Naorojee, the Minister in whom Mulhar Rao professed to

place confidence, and who, *so far as we could judge, had been honestly desirous of reforming the administration,** resigned office, and no explanation has been afforded to us of the reason for his resignation."

With regard to our resignation the Secretary of State also in his despatch of 3rd June 1875, (page 52) to the Indian Government, says, "Almost the last incident in the history of his reign, before it was closed by his arrest on the charge of poisoning, was the mysterious resignation, without reason given, of the reforming Minister who had been appointed under the pressure of Sir R. Meade's report."

Our resignations were communicated to the Gaekwar on 21st December 1874, when nothing was known to us of His Highness being implicated in the poison-case. This was first mentioned to me on 23rd December by Sir Lewis Pelly, after I had communicated to him our reasons for our resignation. On 25th December, I repeated those reasons at an interview, at the Residency between His Highness, Sir Lewis Pelly and myself. 1st, I reminded His Highness that I had undertaken the duties of the Dewan at his pressing request, that I had plainly given him my condition in acceding to his request that as long I had his confidence and I was useful, I serve, and that when that confidence was withdrawn and my usefulness impaired, I make my salam and go; that we had on two former occasions withdrawn our resignations at his pressing and earnest solicitations, and that notwithstanding all this, he had, during the past week or so allowed himself to play in the hands of his old Durbarees, and forgotten that he had requested me to become his *Dewan* and not a karkoon merely to obey his biddings. 2nd, that after showing long and sufficient forbearance and giving a long trial to the old Durbarees to mend their ways, we had found it absolutely necessary that they should be sent out of Baroda, and I gave a list of Damodar, Bapoothoy, Govindrao Mama, Kharhar, Hurybadada (Nana Saheb having himself offered to leave Baroda for some time), and several other names. His Highness in reply expressed his regret at my first complaint and promised me every confidence, but my second demand he pressed me to waive. I then expressed our determination not to withdraw our resignations. When I decided to resign, all the 8 or 9 officials from the Bombay Government, besides my 3 colleagues, who had wilfully and readily agreed and come to serve under me, also decided to resign with me, though they had been hardly

* The italics are mine.

a month or two in their new posts. This is a strange commentary upon Colonel Phayre's views that no officials of weight and character from the British districts would like to serve under me, and that my selections would agree to serve under the old Baroda ways.

I pass over Colonel Phayre's last shot, (No. 6, page 9) fired a day after he received the private intimation to resign;—"a day or two after this, Mr. Dadabhai Nowroji made his false and malicious attack upon me in the khareeta of the 9th May." This was as much imaginary as many other things I have already noticed, if not the effect of the irritation of the previous day's intimation. In connection with No. 7 of the Blue Book, it is enough for me to extract the letter I addressed, at the close of the last Commission, to the *Times of India*.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES OF INDIA.

SIR,—As I have not been put into the witness-box either by the prosecution or the defence, I hope you will allow me to say a few words about some matters concerning me personally which were referred to at the enquiry.

It is true that I received the resolution of May 1872. The history of the affair is simply this. Mr. Hurryhund Chintamon, who is at present in England as His Highness's agent, obtained a copy, and I believe honestly, from an English friend, in England. It was when he sent it to me about last June that His Highness, myself and my colleagues came to know of it. Mr. Hurryhund brought the existence of this resolution to the notice of Lord Salisbury on the 24th June last. The document was given to the defence by me, as I had received it. In the course of a conversation I mentioned the resolution to Sir Lewis Pelly. He asked for a copy of it and I gave it.

Colonel Phayre says I made no complaints to him about his course of proceedings. Colonel Phayre may have forgotten, but as a matter of fact I did complain to him several times. Colonel Phayre says he gave me all the assistance in his power. Had I been so fortunate as to have received that assistance, no necessity would have arisen to write the khareeta of 2nd November. Colonel Phayre says I more than once acknowledged the assistance he had given me in the matter of the Sirdar cases and others. True; but I am only sorry that the occasions were few and far between. I had more occasions to thank Sir Lewis Pelly in one week than I had for thanking Colonel Phayre in three months, and I was able to do more work both towards introducing new reforms and redressing old complaints in one week with Sir Lewis Pelly, than I was able to do in three months with Colonel Phayre.

Colonel Phayre says the facts of the two instances given in the khareeta of 2nd November are not correctly stated. I have not yet learned what was incorrect in them. For my part I can say that every fact is correctly stated.

Yours faithfully, DADABHAI NAOROJI.

I close this painful task with the hope that it may open the eyes of Government to the mischief and iniquity of the present system of the political department, of receiving secret reports and acting thereon.

DADABHAI NAOROJI.

II.

CONDITION OF INDIA.

(Correspondence with the Secretary of State for India, 1880.)

I.

32, Great St. Helens,
London, 24th May 1880.

To

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON,

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA,

INDIA OFFICE.

MY LORD,

I beg to submit a series of tables, working out in detail the total production of the Punjab, for the year 1876-7.

My objects in troubling your Lordship are as follows:—

In 1876 I read some papers on the Poverty of India before the Bombay Branch of the East India Association of London. These papers are published in the Journals of the Association, and I send herewith a copy. At pages 237 to 239* I have explained how the mode of taking the averages adopted in the various Administration Reports of India, was quite wrong. When preparing my Papers on the Poverty of India, I had not sufficient time to work out all the averages for all the Provinces in detail. I have now worked out in detail the averages of all the production Tables of the Administration Report of the Punjab for 1876-7. I request now that the different Governments in India may be directed to supply their tables of production, as fully as are prescribed by the Statistical Committee of Calcutta, that the averages may be correctly taken, as I have done in the enclosed tables, and that in addition to the tables prescribed, may also be given a summary of the total agricultural production like the one given at page 21 of my tables, a summary of the whole production (agricultural, manufactures and mines) like that at page 23, and a table of the absolute necessities of life for an agricultural labourer, like that at pages 26 to 28.

It is only when such complete information is furnished by the Indian authorities, that any true conception can be formed of the actual material condition of India from year to year, and our British rulers can only then clearly see, and grapple with effectually, the important problem of the material condition of India, and the best means of improving it.

I have also to solicit your Lordship to submit my tables to the Statistical Department of the India Office, and to direct to oblige me by pointing out any mistakes of facts or figures there may be in them.

* Pages 161 to 163 of this book.

In troubling your Lordship with these requests, I have no other object than to help, as far as my humble opportunities go, to arrive at the real truth of the actual material condition of India. For it is only natural that without the knowledge of the whole truth on this most important subject, all efforts, however well and benevolently intentioned, must generally result in disappointment and failures.

I also earnestly desire and solicit that your Lordship will kindly take into your consideration the representations I have urged in my papers on the Poverty of India.

I remain,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

DADABHAI NAOROJI.

ADMINISTRATION REPORT OF PUNJAB 1876-7.

Page 77, "Upon the whole the character of the weather during the year 1876-7 was favourable for agriculture."

I have taken 1 seer equal 2.057 lbs. from the Compilation entitled "Prices of food grains throughout India—1861-76, compiled in the Financial Department of the Government of India—Calcutta, 1878."

The prices I have adopted are the average of the prices given in the Report for 1st January 1876, 1st June 1876, and 1st January 1877—the last being the latest price that is given in the Report.

For all such particulars or figures as are *not* given in the Report, I have consulted a Punjab farmer, and adopted such information as he has given me.

There are some figures in the report which are evidently some mistakes and are much in excess of probability. But I have not altered them, though by retaining them as given in the report, the quantity and value of some of the articles become much higher than what they must most probably really be.

Excepting such mistakes, the farmer thinks the tables of the Report give a fair representation of the produce of Punjab—the averages being worked out in the right way they should be, and not as they are given in the Report, worked on a wrong principle.

ADMINISTRATION REPORT—PUNJAB 1876-7.

RICE.

Districts.	Acres.	Per Acre.	Total quantity.	Price per 1 Re.	Total value.
		lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	Rs.
1 Delhi...	27,900	920	25,668,000	13'71	18,72,210
2 Gurgaon ...	1,591	720	1,145,520	19'2	59,662
3 Karnal ...	53,113	1,152	61,186,176	21'94	27,88,795
4 Hissar ...	10,506	745	7,826,970	23'31	3,35,777
5 Rohtak ...	5,326	670	3,568,420	25'37	1,40,655
6 Sirsa...	8,285	869	7,199,665	21'94	3,28,152
7 Umballa ...	117,941	880	103,788,080	19'88	52,20,728
8 Ludhiana ...	3,963	1,096	4,343,448	16'45	2,64,039
9 Simla ...	1,875	620	1,162,500	18'51	62,804
10 Jullundar ...	9,192	1,085	9,973,320	16'45	6,06,281
11 Hoshiarpur ...	28,835	752	21,683,920	17'82	12,16,830
12 Kangra ...	147,766	415	61,322,890	29'48	20,80,152
13 Amritsar ...	20,128	974	19,604,672	18'51	10,59,139
14 Gurdaspur ...	81,583	755	61,595,165	15'77	39,05,844
15 Sialkot ...	74,100	1,029	76,248,900	30'85	24,71,601
16 Lahore ...	22,415	861	19,299,315	30'17	6,39,685
17 Gujranwala ...	9,925	759	7,533,075	19'88	3,78,927
18 Ferozepore ...	6,543	795	5,201,685	20'91	2,48,765
19 Rawalpindi ...	1,093	970	1,060,210	12'34	85,916
20 Jhelum ...	233	943	219,719	11'65	18,860
21 Gujrat ...	6,969	586	4,083,834	17'82	2,29,171
22 Shahpur ...	990	790	782,100	22'63	34,560
23 Mooltan ...	9,800	750	7,350,000	13'71	5,36,105
24 Jhang ...	127	281	35,687	13'71	2,603
25 Montgomery...	7,870	1,145	9,011,150	13'71	6,57,268
26 Mazaffargarh ...	10,178	852	8,671,656	16'45	5,27,152
27 D. I. Khan ...	1,366	196	267,736	12'85	20,835
28 D. G. Khan ...	14,001	513	7,182,513	18	3,99,028
29 Bannu ...	125	880	110,000	12'85	8,560
30 Peshawar ...	10,325	894	9,230,550	13'45	6,86,286
31 Hazara ...	12,274	1,152	14,139,648	28'8	4,90,960
32 Kohat ...	2,361	1,507	3,558,027	14'83	2,39,920
Total...	708,699	Average. 796	564,054,551	Average. 20'42	2,76,17,270

I take produce of rice as 25 fold, and deduct 4 per cent. for seed. The quantity will then become lbs. 541,492,369 and value Rs. 2,65,12,580. Again the price of rice given in the Report is for "1st sort" only. The medium or 2nd sort forms the bulk and there is lower sort still. 2nd sort is generally about 75 per cent. of the 1st sort. I take upon the whole 85 per cent. The value then for the whole bulk will be Rs. 2,25,35,698.

WHEAT.

Districts.	Acres.	Per Acre.	Total quantity.	Price per Re. 1	Total value.
		lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	Rs.
1	159,900	913	145,988,700	53'82	27,12,536
2	132,425	856	113,355,800	49'37	22,96,046
3	113,110	1,319	149,192,090	48'68	30,64,751
4	39,048	548	21,398,304	48'34	4,42,662
5	99,428	732	72,781,296	49'37	14,74,200
6	56,310	255	14,359,050	49'02	2,92,922
7	296,322	1,000	296,322,000	51'25	57,81,892
8	137,012	1,013	138,793,156	51'08	27,17,172
9	3,610	550	1,985,500	38'39	51,719
10	269,010	1,339	360,204,390	49'37	72,96,017
11	349,863	692	242,105,196	48'68	49,73,401
12	144,170	460	66,318,200	37'02	17,91,415
13	263,265	1,038	273,269,070	52'11	52,44,081
14	325,529	856	278,652,824	50'74	54,91,778
15	197,000	910	179,270,000	49'02	36,57,078
16	368,000	557	204,976,000	50'39	40,67,791
17	203,745	793	161,569,785	50'74	31,84,268
18	241,180	736	177,508,480	58'97	30,10,148
19	424,135	776	329,128,760	68'9	47,76,905
20	480,273	933	448,094,709	64'45	69,52,594
21	268,316	736	197,360,576	57'42	34,37,139
22	199,325	790	157,466,750	58'62	26,86,229
23	186,040	655	121,856,200	41'83	29,13,129
24	161,169	674	108,627,906	49'37	22,00,281
25	263,494	1,252	329,894,488	53'48	61,68,558
26	201,363	1,248	251,301,024	43'88	57,27,006
27	176,055	777	136,794,735	69'42	19,70,537
28	156,594	765	119,794,410	44'57	26,87,781
29	262,728	523	137,406,744	88'28	15,56,487
30	232,975	600	139,785,000	57'47	24,32,312
31	100,570	993	99,866,010	58'97	16,93,505
32	97,533	816	79,586,928	70'89	11,22,682
		Average.		Average.	
Total..	6,609,497	840'4	5,555,014,081	53'48	10,38,75,022

I take produce of wheat 25 fold, and deduct 4 per cent. for seed. The quantity will be lbs. 5,332,813,517, and value will be Rupees 9,97,20,021. The price given in the report is for 1st sort only. The 2nd sort forms the bulk, and is generally about 12 per cent. lower in price. I take only 8 per cent. lower for the whole bulk.

The value of the whole will then be Rs. 9,17,42,419.

MAKAI (INDIAN CORN).

Districts.	Acres.	Per Acre.	Total quantity.	Price per Re. 1.	Total Value.
		lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	Rs.
1	13,900	1,500	20,850,000	72	2,89,583
2	1,344	"	2,016,000	75'42	26,730
3	6,215	"	9,322,500	67'19	1,38,748
4	89	"	133,500	51'42	2,596
5	73	"	109,500†		
6	466	"	699,000†		
7	100,736	"	151,104,000	62'4	24,21,538
8	62,802	"	94,203,000	66'51	14,16,373
9	1,282	"	1,923,000	45'94	41,859
10	86,392	1,544	133,389,248	63'08	21,14,604
11	105,651	1,500	158,476,500	55'54	28,53,375
12	65,093	"	97,639,500	39'77	24,55,104
13	44,426	1,412	62,729,512	65'14	9,62,995
14	49,977	1,500	74,965,500	53'48	14,01,748
15	33,000	"	49,500,000	58'28	8,49,450
16	34,150	"	51,225,000	65'82	7,78,258
17	16,535	"	24,802,500	61'02	4,06,465
18	42,428	"	63,642,000	81'59	7,80,022
19	66,392	"	99,588,000	94'62	10,52,504
20	2,423	"	3,634,500	64'45	56,392
21	16,507	"	24,760,500	68'57	3,61,098
22	884	"	1,326,000	63'08	21,020
23	142	"	213,000	50'05	4,255
24	2,317	"	3,475,500	65'82	52,803
25	2,512	"	3,768,000	49'37	76,321
26					
27	17	"	25,500	90'85	280
28	30	"	45,000†		
29	37,069	"	55,603,500	124'27	4,47,441
30	80,542	"	120,813,000	84'42	14,31,094
31	198,025	"	297,037,500	95'09	31,23,751
32	12,920	"	19,380,000	97'92	1,97,916
		Average.		Average.	
	* 130,818	1,499'17	196,118,760	68'4	2,37,64,323
	953,521	1,500	1,430,281,500	† add for	12,478
Total...	1,084,339		1,626,400,260	853,500 lbs.	2,37,76,801

For makai I take 50 fold and therefore deduct 2 per cent. for seed. The total quantity will then be lbs. 1,593,872,255, and value will be Rs. 2,33,01,265.

* In the report crop per acre is given for 2 districts only marked *. The average for these two, viz. 1499'17—say 1,500 lbs. is applied to all other districts by me.

† No price is given in the report for the 3 districts marked †. The average of the others, viz. 68'4 lbs., is applied to these.

Jow (Barley).

Districts.	Acres.	Per Acre.	Total quantity.	Price per 1 Re.	Total value.
		lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	Rs.
1	61,290	503	30,828,870	73'02	4,22,197
2	197,145	"	99,163,935	69'94	14,17,842
3	29,856	"	15,017,568	72'68	2,06,625
4	30,312	"	15,246,936	83'65	1,82,270
5	42,353	"	21,303,559	75'42	2,82,465
6	101,408	"	51,008,224	108'33	4,70,859
7	35,787	"	18,000,861	72	2,50,011
8	106,202	"	53,419,606	86'39	6,18,354
9	3,134	"	1,576,402	50'74	31,068
10	25,211	*856	21,586,616	75'42	2,86,139
11	21,602	503	10,865,806	76'79	1,41,500
12	56,831	*250	14,207,750	52'11	2,72,649
13	36,509	503	18,364,027	84'34	2,17,738
14	123,635	"	62,188,405	63'08	9,85,865
15	122,000	"	61,366,000	83'65	7,33,604
16	57,181	"	28,762,043	82'96	3,46,697
17	64,082	"	32,233,246	88'45	3,64,423
18	195,298	"	98,234,894	100'1	9,81,357
19	43,383	"	21,821,649	77'48	2,81,642
20	17,879	"	8,993,137	76'11	1,18,159
21	67,094	"	33,748,282	82'28	4,10,163
22	15,657	"	7,875,471	78'16	1,00,760
23	11,832	*800	9,465,600	59'65	1,58,685
24	6,083	503	3,059,749	74'74	40,938
25	21,802	"	10,966,406	69'94	1,56,797
26	10,987	*679	7,460,173	60'34	1,23,635
27	19,203	503	9,659,109	94'28	1,02,451
28	5,925	"	2,980,275	60'42	49,325
29	26,282	"	13,219,846	133'7	98,876
30	238,161	"	119,794,983	104'30	11,48,561
31	70,079	"	35,249,737	102'98	3,42,296
32	10,014	"	5,037,042	109'28	46,092
Total...	1,874,217		942,700,207	Average. 82'76	1,13,90,053

For barley I take 16 fold. Deducting for seed 1/16th, the total quantity will be lbs. 883,781,444—and the value will be Rs. 1,06,78,175.

* Crop per acre is given for only these 4 districts, the average of which for 104,861 acres is 503 lbs., and this average is applied to all the other districts for 1,769,356 acres.

GRAM.

Districts.	Acres.	Per Acre.	Total quantity.	Price per Re. 1.	Total value.
		lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	Rs.
1	57,500	645	37,087,500	72	515,104
2	101,184	* 620	62,734,080	71'65	875,562
3	119,935	* 680	81,555,800	72'34	11,27,395
4	76,534	645	49,364,430	80'22	615,363
5	119,240	* 790	94,199,600	78'16	12,05,214
6	37,762	645	24,356,490	102'85	236,815
7	175,094	"	112,935,630	76'11	14,83,847
8	171,984	"	110,929,680	77'82	14,25,464
9	5	"	3,225	51'08	63
10	65,158	* 1,233	80,339,814	73'37	10,94,995
11	46,324	645	29,878,980	61'02	4,89,658
12	370,802	* 290	107,532,580	51'08	21,05,179
13	103,350	* 1,394	144,069,900	84	17,15,117
14	31,347	645	20,218,815	73'37	2,75,573
15	21,500	"	13,867,500	74'05	1,87,272
16	171,216	"	110,434,320	89'82	12,29,507
17	31,682	"	20,434,890	83'65	2,44,290
18	255,898	"	165,054,210	96'68	17,07,221
19	38,263	"	24,679,635	76'79	3,21,391
20	34,115	"	22,004,175	65'14	3,37,798
21	34,728	"	22,399,560	68	3,08,194
22	23,817	"	15,361,965	74'05	2,07,453
23	8,404	"	5,420,580	57'25	94,682
24	12,026	"	7,756,770	73'37	1,05,721
25	81,616	"	52,642,320	77'48	6,79,431
26	12,679	* 1,942	24,622,618	55'54	4,43,331
27	11,922	645	7,689,690	95'13	80,833
28	1,961	"	1,264,845	47'74	26,494
29	53,037	* 286	15,168,582	106'28	1,42,722
30	947	645	610,815	44'05	13,866
31	222	"	143,190	61'71	2,320
32	1,984	"	1,279,680	70'36	18,187
		Average.		Average.	
Total.....	2,272,236	645	1,466,041,869	75'89	1,93,16,062

I take gram 30 fold. Deducting for seed accordingly, the total quantity will be lbs. 1,417,173,807, and the value will be Rs. 1,86,72,194.

* Crop per acre is given for these districts only. The average from them is applied to others, viz. 645 lbs.

INFERIOR GRAINS (as noted below.)†

Districts.	Acres.	Per Acre.	Total quantity.	Price per 1 Re.	Total value.
		lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	Rs.
1	114,677	522	59,861,394	66'85	8,95,458
2	404,175	447	180,666,225	66	27,37,367
3	196,787	521	102,526,027	64'79	15,82,436
4	1,256,158	393	493,670,094	76'79	64,28,833
5	441,437	412	181,872,044	64'79	28,07,100
6	680,225	118	80,266,550	104'39	7,68,910
7	195,893	680	133,207,240	66'16	20,13,410
8	214,111	1,355	290,120,405	68'91	42,10,135
9	3,406	520	1,771,120	40'11	44,156
10	165,767	395	65,477,965	62'05	10,55,245
11	111,933	685	76,674,105	58'41	13,12,687
12	30,366	362	10,992,492*		
13	71,937	590	42,442,830	67'88	6,25,262
14	154,306	648	99,990,288	48	20,83,131
15	94,070	745	70,082,150	65'14	10,75,869
16	141,579	374	52,950,546	69'94	7,57,085
17	123,515	449	55,458,235	64'45	8,60,484
18	477,728	608	290,458,624	82'11	35,37,433
19	287,941	554	159,519,314	92'91	17,16,923
20	209,379	722	151,171,638	70'28	21,50,990
21	239,040	632	151,452,480	80'91	18,71,863
22	68,819	1100	75,700,900	66'16	11,44,209
23	98,847	468	46,260,396	51'08	9,05,646
24	55,474	218	12,093,332	60'17	2,00,986
25	63,883	686	43,823,738	55'54	7,89,048
26	76,969	693	53,339,517	49'37	10,80,403
27	43,618	485	21,154,730	89'13	2,37,346
28	178,113	640	113,992,320	54'17	21,04,344
29	105,488	536	56,541,568	111'42	5,07,463
30	167,183	550	58,950,650	59'48	9,91,100
31	52,074	960	49,991,040	74'05	6,75,098
32	69,465	770	53,488,050	112'28	4,76,380
Total...	6,534,963	Average. 510'5	3,335,968,007	Average. 69'78 Add	4,76,46,800 1,57,530 4,78,04,330

for * for
which
price is
not given.

Seed required per acre.	for acres.	
† Joar per acre 40 lbs. ×	2,221,535	The total of the products of these =168,694,604, divided by the total 6,534,963 of acres, will give an average of 26 lbs. per acre of seed for a crop of average 510 lbs.—say 20 fold. Deducting then 5 per cent. for seed, the total quantity will be lbs. 3,169,169,607 and total value will be Rs. 4,54,14,114.
Bajri ... 16 " ×	2,339,796	
Kangni ... 8 " ×	58,434	
China... 16 " ×	74,842	
Moth ... 24 " ×	982,208	
Matter ... 20 " ×	106,865	
Mash ... 16 " ×	213,465	
Mung ... 16 " ×	263,324	
Masur ... 32 " ×	187,544	
Arhar ... 16 " ×	86,950	
	6,534,963	

It should be noted that the prices of Jowár, Bájrâ, Másh, Mung and Arhar are nearly the same generally, but of the remaining 5 kinds of grain, viz. Moth, Kangni, China, Matter and Masur, the prices are generally nearly 25 per cent. lower. The prices I have used in the table are as given in the Report for Jáwar and Bájrâ only—though the acreage of the lower priced grains is 1,409,893 acres out of 6,534,963 acres, or above 20 per cent. If the allowance for the lower price of the 5 kinds of grains mentioned above were made, the value will evidently be much lower than I have given above. It requires also to be noted that out of the inferior grains a portion goes for the feed of animals in about the following proportions:—

Grain	Proportion for human use.	Proportion for animal's use.
Bájrâ	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
Jowár	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{2}{3}$
Moth	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$
Másh	$\frac{2}{3}$	$\frac{1}{3}$
also Jow	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$
Gram	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$

So that out of the total acreage of grains of all the above kinds, viz.

Gram	2,272,236	$\times \frac{1}{2}$	} = 6,000,512 acres are for animal use, or nearly three-fifths of the total acres 9,903,457.
Bájrâ	2,339,796	$\times \frac{1}{3}$	
Jowár	2,221,535	$\times \frac{2}{3}$	
Jow	1,874,217	$\times \frac{3}{4}$	
Moth	982,208	$\times \frac{1}{4}$	
Mash	213,465	$\times \frac{1}{3}$	
<hr/>			
9,903,457			

And out of the whole acreage of *all* kinds of grains, *i.e.* 19,083,971 acres, about 30 per cent. is used for producing food for animals.

POPPY (Opium).

Districts.	Acres.	Per Acre.	Total quantity.
		lbs.	lbs.
7	3,620	18	65,160
8	69		
9	244	3	732
10	578		
11	163		
12	1,539	3	4,617
13	877	19	16,663
14	278		
15	140		
16	770	5	3,850
17	147	10	1,470
18	263		
19	53	15	795
20	81	14	1,134
21	336	15	5,040
22	2,182	10	21,820
23	25	6	150
24	27	10	270
25	94	9	846
26	40	11	440
27	23	8	184
28	535	20	10,700
29	15		
30	67	3	201
31	182	9	1,638
		Average.	
Total...	12,348	12.51	<div> 135,710 for 10,842 acres. add 18,840 „ 1,506 „ <hr/> 154,550 „ 12,348 </div>

{ for which no crop per
acre is given, at 12.51
average.

Government pay Rs. 5 per seer or Rs. $2\frac{1}{2}$ per lb. to the producer. The total value will therefore be Rs. 3,86,375.

The additional value at which Government sells opium is a part of the national income as it is chiefly paid by a Foreign Country as profit of trade, and therefore (as I have done in my "Poverty of India") the net opium Revenue will have to be added to the total production of the country. The particular provinces only from which this revenue is derived, viz. Bengal, Bombay and other opium producing places, cannot be credited with this income. It belongs to the whole nation, as every place is not quite free to cultivate opium.

TOBACCO.

Districts.	Acres.	Per acre.	Total quantity.	Price per Re. 1	Total value.
		lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	Rs.
1	7.472	888	6,635.136	5'14	12,90,882
2	2.424	600	1,454.400	14'4	1,01,000
3	917	525	481.425	16'45	29,266
4	2.812	582	1,636.584	16'45	99,488
5	1.851	514	951.414	16'45	57,836
6	381	850	323.850	14'4	23,489
7	4.661	560	2,610.160	12'34	2,11,520
8	1.550	925	1,433.750	27'25	52,614
9*	5	846	4,230	9'6	440
10	2.793	1,561	4,359.873	24'68	1,76,656
11	3.782	1,733	6,554.206	19'88	3,29,688
12	776	532	412.832	12'34	33,454
13	2.169	984	2,134.296	18'51	1,15,305
14	3.973	1,040	4,131.920	16'45	2,51,180
15	5.785	917	5,304.845	16'45	3,22,483
16	3.460	461	1,595.060	16'45	96,964
17	3.259	669	2,180.271	17'14	1,27,203
18	5.879	651	3,827.229	13'03	2,93,724
19	1.380	1,080	1,490.400	16'45	90,601
20	622	792	492.624	17'83	27,628
21	2.389	593	1,416.677	12'34	1,14,803
22	838	1,700	1,424.600	12'34	1,15,445
23	1.839	656	1,206.384	6'51	1,85,312
24	1.173	820	961.860	12'34	77,946
25	851	1,042	886.742	16'46	53,872
26	978	780	762.840	15'09	50,552
27	2.029	615	1,247.835	12'68	98,409
28	783	740	579.420	7'28	79,590
29	452	870	393.240	20'6	19,089
30	1.250	880	1,100.000	21'85	50,343
31	27	480	12.960	17'83	726
32*	3.307	846	2,797.722	10'97	2,55,033
Total...	71,867	Average. 846	60,804,785	Average. 12'58	48,32,541

No deduction is made for nursery or seed. The average of 12'58 lbs. per rupee is rather a high price. It is considered, 12 seers or 24 lbs. per Rupee would be nearer the average. I have, as above, kept the Report's price, though it is considered so high.

* The produce per acre for these is not given in the report. I have applied the average of the other districts, viz. 846 lbs. to these.

TURMERIC.

Neither produce per acre, nor price is given in the Report. I take 10 maunds for green, which gives 2 maunds dry or 164 lbs. dry per acre. The price is taken say 10 lbs. per 1 Rupee.

4130 acres \times 164 lbs. = 677,320 lbs.—at lbs. 10 per rupee = Rs. 67,732.

CORIANDER SEED.

As above neither produce per acre nor price is given in the Report. I take as follows:—

Acres 6934 \times 330 lbs. dry per acre = 2,288,220 lbs. at 16 lbs. per Rupee = Rs. 1,43,014.

GINGER.

As above.

286 acres \times 205 lbs. per acre (dry) = 58,630 lbs. at 7 lbs. per Rupee = Rs. 8376.

CHILLIES

Produce per acre given for 4 districts only, viz:—

				The average of 808 lbs. is applied to the rest. The total quantity then is 19,003,502 lbs. of green crop. Dry quantity will be one-fifth or 3,800,700 lbs. and at 8 lbs. per Rupee, the value will be Rs. 4,75,100.	
No.	2 acres		lbs.	}	
		774 \times 600 lbs. =	464,400		
13		611 \times 410 „ =	250,510		
18		3,604 \times 924 „ =	3,330,096		
30		77 \times 640 „ =	49,280		
		Average.			
Total...	5,066	808	4,094,286		
Add for	18,452 @ „		14,909,216		
	23,518		19,003,502		

OTHER KINDS OF DRUGS AND SPICES.

These are chiefly Ajmá, Bádián, Jeree, and Sowá. Neither produce per acre nor price is given in the Report. I take as follows:—

Acres 35,074 at 330 lbs. per acre = 11,574,420 lbs. at average of 14 lbs. per Rupee, Rs. 8,26,744.

OIL SEEDS.

Districts.	Acres.	Per Acre	Total quantity.	
		lbs.	lbs.	
1	10,260	293	3,006,180	The price of these seeds is not given in the Report.
2	11,506	237	2,726,922	
3	13,018	500	6,509,000	I take as follows :—
4	21,582	242	5,222,844	Linseed and $\frac{1}{2}$ Rs. 3 per maund or 27 lbs.
5	12,304	297	3,654,288	Sarso $\frac{1}{2}$ per Re. 1.
6	79,160	* 80	6,332,800	Til seed, Rs. 4 per maund or 20 lbs. per Re. 1.
7	27,229	560	15,248,240	Taramira, Rs. $2\frac{1}{2}$ per maund or 32 lbs. per Re. 1.
8	11,172	668	7,462,896	
9				The quantity of these seeds is about in proportion of 55 per cent. of Linseed & Sarso.
10	11,392	715	8,145,280	15 " " Til.
11	25,911	310	8,032,410	30 " " Taramira.
12	18,442	352	6,491,584	The price then will be
13	35,996	582	20,949,672	
14	24,923	408	10,168,584	lbs.
15	23,806	777*	18,497,262	55 per cent. by 27 = 1,485 } Average 27'45
16	81,894	260	21,292,440	15 per cent. by 20 = 300 } lbs. per Re. 1.
17	17,952	307	5,511,264	30 per cent. by 32 = 960 }
18	70,315	601	42,259,315	
19	69,294	311	21,550,434	Taking 27 lbs. per Re. 1, the total value
20	60,169	481	28,941,289	will be Rs. 1,22,83,423.
21	50,375	291	14,659,125	For seed,
22	4,712	750	3,534,000	per acre.
23	9,541	462	4,407,942	Linseed...6 lbs }
24	3,473	252	875,196	Sarso ...8 " } by 55 per cent.. } Average
25	29,076	477	13,869,252	Til ...6 " } by 15 " } 7'15 lbs.
26	24,453	288	7,042,464	Taramira 8 " } by 30 " } per acre.
27	17,660	464	8,194,240	
28	20,473	492	10,072,716	Taking 7 lbs. of seed required per acre—
29	4,004	136	544,544	for produce of 392 lbs. gives 56 fold. Deducting 56th part, the total quantity will
30	30,244	460	13,912,240	become lbs. 325,730,071, and total value will
31	21,005	533	11,195,665	become Rs. 1,20,64,076.
32	5,348	251	1,342,348	
		Average.		
Total	846,689	392	331,652,436	

* This evidently is some mistake. It may be 280.

COTTON.

Districts.	Acres.	Per Acre.	Total quantity.	Price per Re. 1	Total value.
		lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	Rs.
1	24,565	186	4,569,090	6.51	7,01,857
2	47,855	164	7,848,220	6.51	12,05,563
3	21,510	140	3,011,400	6.43	4,68,336
4	20,323	87	1,768,101	6.17	2,86,564
5	49,073	70	3,435,110	7.2	4,77,098
6	77	64	4,928	6.17	798
7	27,332	72	1,967,904	6.34	3,10,395
8	11,488	85	976,480	6.34	1,54,019
9					
10	26,093	122	3,183,346	5.14	6,19,328
11	24,420	136	3,321,120	5.49	6,04,940
12	6,733	22	148,126	5.14	28,818
13	23,597	64	1,510,208	5.65	2,67,293
14	37,474	50	1,873,700	5.14	3,64,533
15	11,425	65	742,625	5.65	1,31,438
16	25,305	138	3,492,090	5.49	6,36,082
17	33,376	129	4,305,504	5.49	7,84,244
18	9,680	158	1,529,440	6.17	2,47,883
19	33,745	128	4,319,360	4.46	9,68,466
20	25,557	122	3,117,954	5.27	5,91,642
21	24,716	43	1,062,788	4.63	2,29,543
22	26,029	50	1,301,450	5.49	2,37,058
23	16,550	82	1,357,100	5.65	2,40,194
24	16,881	87	1,468,647	5.27	2,78,680
25	15,838	149	2,359,862	5.31	4,44,418
26	29,632	124	3,674,368	6	6,12,394
27	11,175	115	1,285,125	6	2,14,187
28	29,739	84	2,498,076	5.7	4,38,259
29	7,544	73	550,712	5.36	1,02,744
30	16,468	* 105	1,729,140	5.23	3,30,619
31	8,280	100	828,000	4.11	2,01,460
32	6,396	121	773,916	4.41	1,75,491
Total..	668,876	Average 105	70,013,890	Average 5.66	1,23,54,344

The average of 105 lbs. per acre is evidently too high. 80 lbs. will be nearer the mark. If so, the above quantity and value are nearly 36½ per cent. above the right quantity and value.

Very probably some of the figures of produce per acre are for uncleaned or seed cotton. The report uses the word "cotton" only in the column of produce per acre, while in the column for prices it uses the words "Cotton (cleaned)."

* The produce per acre for this is not given in the Report. The average of the others (652,408 acres) is applied to this.

HEMP.

Districts.	Acres.	Per Acre.	Total quantity.	Price lbs. per Re. 1.	Total value Rs.
		lbs.	lbs.		
1	2,100	* 1,158	2,431,800	The prices are not given in the Report. I take ordinarily prepared fibre as 20 lbs. per Rupee. The value of 18,770,866 lbs. at 20 lbs. per Rupee will be Rs. 9,38,543.	
2	516	116	59,856		
3	1,085	450	488,250		
4	2,788	153	426,564		
5	16,146	465	7,507,890		
7	1,619	220	356,180		
8	1,637	305	499,285		
10	3,655	398	1,454,690		
11	6,424	192	1,233,408		
12	5,263	312	1,642,056		
13	1,002	444	444,888		
14	1,622	352	570,944		
15	3,205	177	567,285		
16	537	306	164,322		
17	355	406	144,130		
18	1,649	218	359,482		
19	417	120	50,040		
20	203	360	73,080		
21	971	286	277,706		
22	2	250	500		
25	† 25	366	9,150		
30	39	240	9,360		
		Average			
Total...	51,260	366	18,770,866		

In the Report the figures of crop per acre are given under the heading "Fibres." In the columns per 'acres cultivated'—Cotton and Hemp are given under the heading of "Fibres;" and as produce per acre of cotton is given separately, the produce per acre under the heading "Fibres" applies to Hemp.

* This is apparently a mistake. The figure is too high.

† The crop per acre for this district being not given in the Report, I have given it the average 366.

KASSAMBA (Safflower).

Neither produce per acre nor price is given in the Report. I take 40 lbs. per acre of dry prepared stuff—and price $2\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. per Re. 1.

Acres 24,708 by 40 lbs. = 988,320 at $2\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. per Re. 1, gives Rs. 3,95,328.

INDIGO.

Districts.	Acres.	Per Acre.	Total quantity.	Price lbs. per Re. 1.	Total value Rs.
		lbs.	lbs.		
1	100	30	3,000		
2	56	100	5,600		
3	588	30	17,640		
4	* 785				The price is not given in the Report. I take annas 12 per lb. which will give the total value to be Rs. 30,53,205.
5	* 1,526				
7	1,798	62	111,476		
8	2,467	33	87,351		
10	754	41	30,914		
11	1,162	44	51,128		
18	26	24	624		
21	47	101	4,747		
23	75,364	26	1,959,464		
24	2	29	58		
25	8	20	160		
26	20,603	50	1,030,150		
28	23,999	29	695,971		
Total...	129,465	Average.			
		31'44	3,998,283		
		* add	72,658		
			4,070,941		

* For these (2,311 acres) produce per acre is taken of the average for the others, viz. 31'44.

VEGETABLES.

Districts.	Acres.	Per Acre	Total quantity.	Price per Re. 1	Total value.
		lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	Rs.
1	11,700	4.753	55,610,100	43'88	12,67,322
2	* 9,387	* 6,000	56,322,000	28'8	19,55,625
3	846	4.753	4,021,030	39'77	1,01,107
4	3,485	"	16,564,205	28'8	5,75,146
5	920	"	4,372,760	35'65	1,22,658
6	677	"	3,217,781	27'43	1,17,308
7	3,495	"	16,611,735	35'65	4,65,967
8	7,560	"	35,932,680	30'17	11,91,006
9	7	"	33,271	60'34	551
10	7,731	"	36,745,443	27'43	13,39,607
11	3,586	"	17,044,258	32'91	5,17,905
12	6,551	"	31,136,903	49'37	6,30,684
13	15,175	"	72,126,775	36'34	19,84,776
14	6,790	"	32,272,870	27'43	11,76,553
15	3,000	"	14,259,000	32'91	4,33,272
16	5,746	"	27,310,738	24'68	11,06,593
17	56,988	"	279,863,964	39'77	68,10,761
18	* 4,274	* 2,015	8,612,110	32'91	2,61,686
19	4,660	4.753	22,148,980	40'45	5,47,564
20	3,709	"	17,628,877	31'54	5,58,937
21	21,904	"	104,109,712	28'8	36,14,920
22	11,072	"	52,625,216		
23	29,239	"	138,972,967	26'74	51,97,194
24	23,203	"	110,283,859	20'57	53,61,393
25	1,423	"	6,763,519	27'43	2,46,574
26	3,095	"	14,710,535	21'25	6,92,260
27	803	"	3,816,659	33'42	1,14,202
28	794	"	3,773,882	20'57	1,83,465
29	4,152	"	19,734,456	45'25	4,36,120
30	3,631	"	17,258,143	32'05	5,38,475
31	598	"	2,842,294	45'25	62,813
32	599	"	2,847,047	31'45	90,526
Total.	256,800	Average 4.753	1,220,573,777	Average 30'98	3,77,02,970 for
					lbs. 1,167,948,561

The prices I have taken above are given in the Report for potato only—and the average comes to say 31 lbs. per Re. 1. This is a high average price. The average price of potato will be nearer 60 than 31 lbs. I take however the average of 31 lbs.

* Produce per acre is given for vegetables for these two districts only, and the average of these viz., 4,753, is applied to all others.

Now out of the vegetables grown, about one-eighth only will be potato and seven-eighths other kind of general vegetables.

This will give, out of lbs. 1,220,573,777—seven-eighths of general vegetables=lbs. 1,068,002,055.

The price of vegetables is not given in the Report. It may be taken as $1\frac{1}{2}$ maunds per Re. 1 or 124 lbs., say 100 lbs. per Re. 1—which will give the total value of vegetables to be about Rs. 1,06,80,020.

Again the average of 4,753 lbs. is of vegetables, but potato will be only about 30 maunds or lbs. 2,460 per acre, and as potato will be about $\frac{1}{8}$ th of the acreage planted with vegetables, or about 32,100 acres, the total quantity of potato will be $32,100 \times 2,460 = 78,966,000$ lbs. This at the price of 31 lbs. per Re. 1 will give Rs. 25,47,290.

I make no deduction for seed potato, or seed for vegetables.

TEA.

The produce per acre is given for 1 district only. But the Report at page 78 takes the general average to be the same, viz. 96 lbs. The price is not given. I take 3 lbs. per Re. 1.

Districts.	Acres.
9	75
12	7,985
19	468
30	356

Total... $8,884 \times 96$ lbs. = lbs. 852,864—at 3 lbs. per Re. 1, will give Rs. 2,84,288.

SUGAR.

Districts.	Acres.	Per Acre.	Total quantity.	1st sort Price per Re. 1.	Total value.	
		lbs.	lbs.	lbs.	Rs.	
1	34,881	*†1,500	52,321,500	5'49	95,30,328	
2	1,125	646	726,750	6'68	1,08,795	
3	14,309	"	9,243,614	7'03	13,14,881	
4	34	"	† 21,964			
5	33,324	"	21,527,304	8'14	26,44,631	
6	6	* 389	2,334	6'34	368	
7	25,540	* 280	7,151,200	5'83	12,26,620	
8	14,400	* 661	9,518,400	6'86	13,87,521	
9						
10	43,963	* 531	23,344,353	6'51	35,85,922	
11	42,015	* 597	25,082,955	6'51	38,52,988	
12	8,139	* 494	4,020,666	6'43	6,25,297	
13	36,579	646	23,630,034	7'11	33,23,492	
14	41,375	* 360	14,895,000	5'65	26,36,283	
15	29,009	646	18,739,814	6'51	28,78,619	
16	2,527	"	1,632,442	5'65	2,88,927	
17	26,625	"	17,199,750	7'2	25,27,743	
18	1,916	* 410	785,560	6	1,30,926	
19	2,381	646	1,538,126	6'34	2,42,606	
20	414	"	267,444	5'83	45,873	
21	7,221	* 660	4,765,860	6'51	7,32,082	
22	1,312	646	† 847,552			
23	3,726	"	2,406,996	6'17	3,90,112	
24	260	* 261	67,860	5'91	11,482	
25	113	646	72,998	6'17	11,831	
26	4,355	"	2,813,330	5'83	4,82,560	
27	88	"	56,848	5'65	10,061	
28	55	"	35,530	5'23	6,793	
29	5,443	"	3,516,178	5'36	6,56,003	
30	9,914	"	6,404,444	6'08	10,53,362	
31	561	"	362,406	5'49	66,022	
32	20	"	12,920	5'74	2,250	
		Average		Average		for lbs.
Total.	391,630	646	253,012,132	6'34	3,97,74,378	252,142,616 ex.

cluding the 2 quantities marked †

* For these districts only is the produce per acre given in the Report. I have applied the average of these to others.

† This is evidently a mistake. Though other districts, such as Ludhiana (8) are better than Delhi—and while 661 lbs. is considered a fair average for Ludhiana, 1,500 for Delhi cannot be correct. It is more likely 500 than 1,500. If 500 be adopted the average will become 487 instead of 646 lbs. And it is also considered, that an average of about 489 will be near the mark. I have allowed the figure 1,500 to remain, though this increases the average above 487 lbs. nearly 32 per cent.

The average price, as obtained on the basis of the prices given in the Report, is, for "1st sort" or what is called Misri. But there are different qualities of sugar, viz. Gol, Red Sugar, ordinary 2nd sort sugar, and best or 1st sort sugar. Taking the price of 1st sort as averaging 6 lbs. per Rupee, the prices of the other kinds are :—

Gol	...	24	lbs.	per	Rupee	} Of these the first two form nearly 2rds and the last two form 1rd of the whole quantity. Taking in this ratio we get
Red Sugar	...	16	"	"	"	
Ordinary 2nd	...	7	"	"	"	
1st sort	...	6	"	"	"	
2rds at 20 lbs.	=	13½				} or 15½ or say 15 lbs. per Rupee.
1rd " 6½ "	=	2½				

The whole quantity, being 253,012,132 lbs., will at 15 lbs. per Rupee give the total value Rs. 1,68,67,475.

For seed, to deduct cane equal to 40 lbs. of sugar per acre.

This gives 16 fold, and taking the higher average of 646 lbs., I deduct say 6 per cent.

The whole quantity is then lbs. 237,831,405.

And the whole value is then Rs. 1,58,55,427.

If, as I have pointed out above, the average of Delhi (1) were taken 500 lbs. instead of 1,500 lbs., which would make the average produce of the whole of the Punjab 487 lbs. instead of 646, the above quantity and value will prove some 30 per cent. higher than they should be.

It may be noted here, that the Report itself makes the average 449 lbs. only, on the fallacious principle of simply adding up and dividing by the number of districts, while when properly calculated the figure should be 646 instead of 449. This is an instance of how misleading and incorrect the averages are as they are generally calculated in the Administration Reports.

Summary of Produce of all Districts.

Produce.	Acres.	Total quantity.	Average per Acre.	Total value.	Average price per Re. 1
		lbs.	lbs.	Rs.	lbs.
Rice	708,699	541,492,369	796	2,25,35,693	20'42
Wheat... ..	6,609,497	5,332,813,517	840'4	9,17,42,419	53'48
Makai (Indian corn)	1,084,339	1,593,872,255	1500	2,33,01,265	68'4
Jow (Barley)... ..	1,874,217	883,781,444	503	1,06,78,175	82'76
Gram	2,272,236	1,417,173,807	645	1,86,72,194	75'89
Inferior grains	6,534,963	3,169,169,607	510'5	4,54,14,114	69'78
Poppy (Opium)	12,348	154,550	12'51	3,86,375	4 { 2½ Rs. per lb paid by Govt.
Tobacco	71,867	60,804,785	846	48,32,541	12'58
Turmeric	4,130	677,320	164 (dry)	67,732	10
Coriander seed	6,934	2,288,220	330 "	1,43,014	16
Ginger... ..	286	58,630	205 "	8,376	7
Chillies	23,518	3,800,700 (dry)	{ 808 (green) 161'6 (dry) }	4,75,100	8
Other kinds drugs and spices ...	35,074	11,574,420	330	8,26,744	14
Oil seeds	840,689	325,730,071	392	1,20,64,076	27
Cotton... ..	668,876	70,013,890	105	1,23,54,344	5'66
Hemp	51,260	18,770,866	366	9,38,543	20
Kassamba (Safflower)	24,708	988,320	40 (dry)	3,95,328	2'5
Indigo	129,465	4,070,941	31'44	30,53,205	1½
Vegetables	256,800	{ 1,068,002,055 78,966,000 }	4753	1,06,80,020	100 Green vegetables.
Tea	8,884	852,864	2460	25,47,290	31 Potato.
Sugar	391,630	237,831,405	96	2,84,288	3
			646	1,58,55,427	15 { Average of 4 qualities.
Total... ..	21,616,420			27,72,56,263	