pathetic ears. I do not lose a due sense of proportion when I say that one of the deeper causes, if not of discontent or disaffection, at any rate of the distrust of England and Englishmen that appeared on the surface in India in recent years was the strained relationship between Indians and their white fellow-subjects in East Africa. A rankling sense of injustice was aroused by the reservation of the best lands for Europeans, and by a succession of ordinances and regulations based on an assumption of race inferiority. It must be remembered that such a state of injured feeling evokes a subconscious spirit, which, in a few decades, may lead to results out of all proportion in importance to the original causes.

The situation was the more to be deplored since British East Africa had German territory as her colonial neighbour to the south, and there the relations of Indians with the administration were on a different basis. At first, in the eighties the Teutonic Government suspected the Indians of strong sympathies with the original Arab owners of the soil, and of carrying on an illicit trade in firearms with the Arabs and the natives. Consequently in shaping its original course German rule was hard and severe toward the Indians. In the early nineties, however, the Germans came to the sound conclusion that Indian assistance was requisite for the full commercial development of their colony. While, as the Indians often told me at the time, the Germans were hopelessly ignorant of Indian divisions, communities, castes, and internal organisation, they did make an effort to understand and tolerate them.

When the nineteenth century had almost run

its course a further Indiaphile movement took place. The German authorities not only encouraged Indian mercantile and skilled labour colonists, but dreamt of inducing Indian agriculturists to immigrate on a large scale on a basis of permanent land occupancy. When I was visiting my followers in German East Africa in the autumn of 1899, the Government of the colony made a number of definite propositions to me for some eight hundred Indian farmers of good class to settle there. The authorities were prepared to hand over to each settler a prospective farm much larger than anything he tilled in his native land, and to do so free of charge and with certain guaranteed privileges. From the Indian standpoint the idea was *prima facie* attractive, and I carried out some investigations as to how it might be put into execution with advantage to the cultivators.

When I visited Berlin in the autumn of 1900 to see what further progress could be made, an insuperable difficulty arose. With characteristic thoroughness the Wilhelmstrasse laid down the condition that the agriculturists to be selected should renounce their British allegiance and accept that of the German Emperor before entering on the enjoyment of the privileges they were to receive. Naturally, we were not prepared to agree to so many hundreds of Indians giving up their status as British subjects. I urged that no such difference should be made between the farmers and the Indians engaged in commercial pursuits in German East Africa.

It should be remembered that these negotiations were carried on when Germany was still regarded as the best friend of Britain in Europe, notwith-

standing occasional aberrations on the part of her versatile ruler such as the telegram to Kruger in reference to the Jameson raid. Queen Victoria's long reign had not reached its conclusion, and the affection and intimacy of the two Courts were generally known, William II being a constant visitor to Osborne and Windsor. Russia was then looked upon as the arch-enemy of British security in the East. We had almost gone to war with France a short time earlier over the Fashoda incident; and the general British attitude in reference to the Dreyfus affair was like a burning sore dividing the two nations. Still, even under such favourable international conditions, I could not agree to a scheme which would have deprived a number of fellow-countrymen of British citizenship. I therefore dropped the project, cherishing the hope that before long the Germans would come to see that the demand was unreasonable, and that they would not allow it to stand in the way of the material benefits their colony would derive from the work and skill of Indian farmers.

The opening of the present century, however, was marked by a gradual and growing estrangement between England and Germany, which reached its zenith, short of war, with the visit of the Kaiser to Tangier. Inevitably the change reacted on the relations of Germans and Indians in East Africa. Up to a year or two before the dogs of war were loosed, there was a growing and general feeling of aversion between the Indians and the authorities of German East Africa. After the Balkan wars there was a distinct rapprochement between England and Germany, and Bethmann-Hollweg evidently hoped to separate Eng-

land from Russia and France before the day came for attacking the two latter countries. This tendency had its echo in East Africa, and the German authorities began to talk of placing the Indians on the same commercial and political level as the Greek settlers. This new angle of vision was regarded with much satisfaction by the Indians. Then came the Great War, and of course a radical change in the situation, in which the Indians in the colony suffered severely at German hands.

CHAPTER XIII

INDIA'S CLAIM TO EAST AFRICA

THE preceding chapter has shown that amongst the many questions to which the war has given a new orientation and which cannot be left unsettled is that of healing the running sore of Indian resentment of the policy toward her sons of some other overseas portions of the Empire. It has to be recognised that there are some dominions, such as Canada and the temperate regions of South Africa and Australia, that have been won to civilisation by the white races, and are more congenial to their expansion, and where the view is taken that the structure of society should be predominatingly, and in some cases almost wholly, of Western type and composition. But no such claim can be made in regard to East Africa, whether British or hitherto German. These regions have provided a field for Indian immigration and enterprise from time immemorial, and we have seen that Indians played a conspicuous part in their development before the white man came on the scene as a settler.

In some British quarters in India an effort has been made, often by indirect methods, to lead public opinion to look upon Mesopotamia as the natural field for Indian expansion, and the inference has been that East Africa might be left to

the white subjects of the King. With all due respect, my countrymen are not prepared to accept this change of venue. While every Indian patriot who has given thought to the matter aspires to drawing the peoples of the trans-Gulf territories to a freewill outer federation with the Indian Empire, he has no desire that India should impose herself on these already civilised and settled regions. To Mahomedans, from prince to peasant, there is something singularly abhorrent in the idea of an economic conquest at the expense of the Arab, and settlement in a spirit of expropriation on lands that are historically contiguous to the cradle of Islam. Nor can the Hindu desire to see some hundred thousands of his race lost in a Moslem country, far removed from the life and traditions of India, with the prospect that within two generations they would be absorbed in Islam.

Regarding the matter from the standpoint of economics, Mesopotamia under the new conditions will always be open to Indian trade, friendly non-colonising immigration and financial enterprise. In East Africa, on the other hand, if the Indian loses his association with the country, the probabilities are that he will be unable to return there, and can no more look across the Indian Ocean for a field of expansion than to Canada or Australia. Again, though Mesopotamia is a rich country potentially, yet, like Egypt and Sind, it is dependent for prosperity on water supply and irrigation, and the area of cultivation cannot be indefinitely extended. Under settled rule the Arab population will grow and prosper. In my judgment therefore not more than a relatively small number of Indians can profitably make the land of the Tigris and

Euphrates their settled home. Turning eastwards we find that Southern China and Siam, the Malay Archipelago and Peninsula, while legitimate and hopeful spheres for the development of trading relations with India, are far too overcrowded for any possibility of setting up Indian immigration, other than that which exists in the case of Malaya to help in the provision of an imported labour supply. The vast tracts of Northern Australia, though suitable for Indian industry and practically useless if manual labour there is to be confined to white races, are still too little known and too undeveloped for the purpose of Indian immigration, even if the way was not blocked by the racial policy of the Commonwealth.

The moral indignation of the Indian peoples which has wiped the indenture system off the slate has carried some publicists so far that their arguments amount to a demand for the virtual interdiction of labour emigration except to such near neighbours as Ceylon and the Straits Settlements. It is alleged that India herself needs all the labour at her command, that though her population is large and rapidly increasing, there are still sparsely peopled tracts where, by a system of "internal emigration," ample employment may be found for the surplus labour of the more densely populated areas.

This argument is economically short-sighted and politically separatist in effect if not in intention. At a time when India is claiming a new and more equal place in the comity of Empire, it would be unjust and reactionary to deprive the landless labourer of external opportunities to better his condition and prospects. It would mean forcing

him to remain in a lower level of comfort than that provided elsewhere by his industry and thrift. To claim that all State intervention, in the shape of protection and regulation, should cease now that the indenture system has disappeared, would be to place great obstacles in the way of voluntary emigration, for in the present state of mass ignorance the would-be emigrant needs to have behind him the protecting care of Government. For these reasons I cannot range myself on the side of the vehement opponents of the scheme of assisted voluntary labour emigration and land settlement, with rights of repatriation if desired, drawn up by Lord Islington's inter-departmental committee in 1917 in respect to British Guiana, Trinidad, Jamaica, and Fiji, to supplement the existing thriving Indian colonies there. The scheme should have been worked out in India rather than at Whitehall, but this is an objection to procedure and not to the principles of the scheme. Not only does the opponent of any and every reasonable form of regulation lay himself open to the suspicion of desiring to keep wages low in India by blocking the way of any external competition; he also plays into the hands of white colonists in various lands who seek for their own purposes to keep out the thrifty and industrious Indian cultivator.

To the Indian conversant with public affairs there is something singularly revolting in the desire of a mere handful of his white fellow-subjects to keep East Africa as a preserve for themselves. There are but some 65,000,000 whites in the British Empire, and they have for their almost exclusive enterprise not only the United Kingdom

(of which Ireland certainly needs population and colonisation as much as any country, at least in the temperate zone), but the immense tracts of Canada, Australia and South Africa proper. Yet a small section desires to bar to the 315,000,000 Indian subjects of the King the lands of East Africa, to which their labour and enterprise for centuries have given them an unanswerable claim.

That claim is strongly reinforced by consideration of Imperial duty to promote the interests of the country most directly concerned. It is peopled by vast numbers of dark and aboriginal tribes. India, too, has her Bhils and other wild tribes in much the same stage of development. Her immigrant sons must feel stronger sympathy and toleration for the Africans than the white settler, and will be singularly fitted to help to raise them in the scale of civilisation. The Indian cultivator and the Indian craftsman do some things as these children of the wilds do them, only they do them much better. Indians would teach the natives to plough, to weave, and to carpenter; the rough Indian tools are within the comprehension of the African mind, and even Indian housekeeping would be full of instructive lessons to the negro. He does not in fact learn from the European planters, because their methods are so far above his head; they belong to another world which has no suggestions for him. Somaliland offers an object lesson of what the African can gain from contact with a superior but kindred civilisation—in this case, of course, the Arab. I am gratified to know that this aspect of the matter strongly appeals to my good friend Sir Theodore Morison after careful observation and widespread travel in "German"

East Africa as a political officer attached to Belgian and other fighting units from the summer of 1916.

There is a further argument for East Africa the most appropriate field for Indian colonisation and settlement. Nations and peoples instinctively gravitate toward certain lands, and yet, when we analyse this semi-conscious trend, we see that it is founded on reason. When East Africa becomes a real Indian colony, Indian commerce and enterprise will have outlet for a great trans-Africa development, with the Congo, Egypt, North and West Africa, and the South. The East Coast will be for India a shop window open to the West. If it is recognised that India has a special part to play in African civilisation and that she needs room for expansion westwards there, we must have clear guarantees that her sons are not to be persecuted out of these lands or artificially prevented from fully developing an immigration so beneficial to the country. Both British East Africa and what have hitherto been German territories ought to be transferred to India to be administered as a colony by the central Government. Administration would be carried on, to a great extent, by British and Indian members of the I.C.S. It would be for India to put all her pride and patriotism into the development of these great regions. This would be her special contribution to post-war reconstruction, and by the measure of her success she would be largely judged. Indian men of science will be wanted to tackle the diseases of men and cattle; Indian geologists, foresters, and engineers to conserve or develop the country. The specialised professional schools at Pusa, Rurki,

and Dehra Dun, and all the Indian universities must give of their best; and still the country should absorb more.

What would please India most and afford the best guarantee of progress, as already suggested, would be the transfer of the administration of German, as well as British, East Africa to the Government of India. Still, after four years of war, we must face facts squarely. Though disappointing, especially to those who have shared at heavy cost in conquering the German colony, it is at least conceivable that, in the interests of a general settlement, the country may be restored to Germany when the peace treaty is signed. American opinion will be an important factor, and President Wilson (who repeats, in this world war, the ideal rôle that Alexander I played a hundred years ago) has ranged himself and all for which he stands against aggressiveness on either side, so long as Prussian militarism is crushed. The Prime Minister has announced that the German colonies are "held at the disposal of a conference, whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of such colonies." Those interests in East Africa are unquestionably in the direction of a free field for India's civilising mission. Germany's natural sphere of expansion lies in the under-populated and largely Germanised Baltic provinces which have fallen to her, temporarily at least, by Russia's defection from the Allied cause.

Still, should the retrocession of German East Africa be decided upon, then British East Africa, including the island of Zanzibar, ought, in all fairness, to be transferred to the Government of

India. This course was recommended by Gokhale in his last political testament, written a few days before his death in February, 1915, and which it was my privilege to make public, in accordance with his death-bed directions, in the summer of 1917. It would be vastly better both for the Sultan of Zanzibar and his people that he should be an Indian prince dealing with the Government of India than that he should remain in existing relationships with the Foreign Office. There is no relevance in the argument that as the chief part of the work of conquering German East Africa fell to the South African forces, and not to the Indian Army, the Union has a first claim. This contention, which I have heard even from high British officials in India, I can only characterise as mean and un-English. India is without self-government; her military forces are entirely at the disposal of Whitehall; they are sent to the great and urgent danger point in the early weeks of the war, to help in saving Belgium and France and in saving England herself from the menace of German occupation of Calais; by the thousands her sons, facing the rigours of trench warfare in a northern winter, die in the fields of Flanders—and then this preoccupation and later calls to Mesopotamia, Palestine, and elsewhere are used as a ground for keeping Indians from their natural outlet across the Indian Ocean! The conclusion has only to be stated to be condemned by all "sane Imperialists."

German West Africa is both geographically and strategically the natural acquisition for the South African Union. This large addition to the already immense field of their unified territory should be amply sufficient to satisfy the aspirations of the

sparsely sprinkled Anglo-Dutch races of the Southern hemisphere. German East Africa, if retained, and British East Africa clearly ought to belong as a colony to the Government of India, to be administered as the common heritage of the autonomous provinces and principalities under a federal system. These territories must be open to full and free Indian enterprise. It would be a strange outcome of the war, and a cynical recognition of Indian loyalty, if under the British flag the portion of East Africa where Indians prospered when it was in German hands should, together with British East Africa, be closed to the enterprise of Indian subjects of the King. The risk of such a political scandal, so harmful to Imperial solidarity, is by no means imaginary and remote, as was shown a few months ago by the exclusion of two Punjab barristers from Mombassa, in spite of the representations of the Government of India on their behalf to the British East African authorities. It is plain that when a colony gets into the hands of a few thousand white settlers, there is little chance of India obtaining fair play.

As to the problem of Indians in South Africa, Canada, and Australia a reasonable *modus vivendi* ought not to be difficult, having regard to the spirit of mutual comprehension which was shown by the Dominion and Indian delegates to the Imperial War Conference in 1917. The Indians permanently settled in any of those countries should be guaranteed the ordinary rights of citizenship. In the case of future Indian migration, clear distinctions ought to be made between travellers for instruction and pleasure, the commercial representatives of large Indian houses, and such Indians

belonging to the liberal professions as desire to make their home in these countries, on the one hand; and on the other hand, the would-be emigrants who live on an economically lower standard than that of the white man in the labour and lower middle-class markets.

Under this policy India would have her own outlet for colonial expansion, and her well-to-do travellers, her commercial representatives, and her scientists and professional classes would secure a regular position in those British Dominions which not unnaturally are determined to maintain systems of protection against under-selling and under-serving the white labourer and the small trader. Such a solution should meet the legitimate rights and interests of both sides, and finally dissipate those strained relations between India and the Dominions concerned, which stand in the way of the growth of Imperial solidarity.

CHAPTER XIV

FOREIGN POLICY

PASSING from India's relations with other parts of the Empire to her foreign policy, we have to remember the two forms of intercourse between nations: one entirely commercial, economic, cultural, and amicable and not likely to be suspended by clash of political interests; the other comprising contact with neighbouring lands or with certain groups of governments, where purely political and military interests are liable to bring sudden collapse to the friendly flow and exchange of merchandise and ideas. To illustrate: the relations of Great Britain with Bolivia or Peru, Norway or Denmark are of such a nature as to make a conflict of arms a practical impossibility. But in respect to France, Germany, Russia, Japan, and indeed all the "Great Powers," there has always been the possibility of a serious clash of interests between her and one or more of them. India's position is complicated by her membership of the world-wide British Empire, whose immense interests are of importance to every component part. Thus India, in common with the self-governing Dominions, may find herself at war with countries with which she has few points of direct contact or friction. These wider problems of Empire, however, are

outside the scope of this study, since their quiescence or settlement essentially depends on the United Kingdom. We are concerned here only with such issues as might possibly lead the British Empire into entanglement through India's vital interests.

It is obvious that these possibilities might arise in relation to Japan and China, to what has hitherto been Asiatic Russia, to Persia and Afghanistan, to Germany and Turkey. Siam and the Dutch and French Colonies are too weak to threaten serious complications in the future for India. China, which would have been India's most dangerous rival and neighbour had she been a military power or even a nation with a settled government, is divided by internal conflict, by want of political unity, and by general backwardness. In her helplessness she fears the aggression of others, and can have no thought of a " forward " policy of her own.

With Japan the case is entirely different, and though, happily, Britain and Japan are old allies and friends, yet India must always bear in mind the expansionist ideals of the Island Empire. No doubt Japan has proved herself to be essentially conservative and moderate, with a far-sighted policy, free from vanity and merely aggressive Jingoism. Nor has she sought the form of power without the reality. Her annexation of Korea and protectorate over Southern Manchuria have given her a free and dominating position in Eastern Asia. Now, with the collapse of Russia, and Japan's intervention at Vladivostok with Allied approval, Northern Manchuria and South-Eastern Siberia may be drawn within her orbit. We must not

forget that, cooped up in her long and narrow islands and with a population rapidly approaching sixty millions, she is conscious of the need for exterior lands for exploitation and management. Will she be entirely satisfied with the possession of Northern China, and the general hegemony of trade and economic position over the rest of the Far East, or will she need expansion southwards? This great problem of the future does not immediately concern our present study, for Japan must have acquired and consolidated a position over the French and Dutch Colonies before she is *vis-à-vis* with India. Yet no really conscientious Indian patriot can afford to ignore the power of the Rising Sun. In a later chapter I indicate the necessity for Indian naval and military preparation in case of need in the Bay of Bengal and the South-Western Pacific.

To the west India has two neighbours with whose true interests, happily, hers do not clash. Persia and Afghanistan have small and scattered populations; but each, apart from their desert and mountain tracts, are ample enough in potentially good agricultural and manufacturing areas to be equal, the former to Germany and the latter to Italy. They could easily maintain far larger populations than now. Neither of them can ever be strong enough to menace India's position within the British Empire. On the other hand, it is to the manifest interest of India that these two neighbours should be under sane, orderly, and progressive autonomous rule.

Toward the South Asiatic Federation of tomorrow a truly independent Persia and Afghanistan would be drawn by every motive of self-interest.

Their climatic and economic conditions differ so widely from those of India that a natural outlet for exchange of commodities with their great southern neighbour would be ever a force moving them toward a good understanding. The need is for a policy that will first raise both countries to such a position of strength and independence as will remove from their governing classes all suspicion of being an object of mere desire of possession to their neighbours. Given such confidence, we may anticipate that Persia and Afghanistan would willingly enter a great and heterogeneous South Asiatic Federation, first through commercial and customs treaties, and secondly by such military conventions as would assure their position.

Something of the kind here foreseen has already been witnessed in embryo in Afghanistan, though it has not gone far yet either in developing Afghan independence and strength, or in bringing her into less meagre economic and cultural relations with India. The need is for an Afghanistan with a modern Army guaranteeing her safety from sudden attack from any quarter, and yet with railway communication through various doors, alike with India, with Persia, and with her northern neighbours. The same holds true of Persia, though there, alas! we have not seen the country being consolidated in our day under a man of genius, such as the late Ameer Abdur Rahman Khan. Still Persia, like Afghanistan, has great advantages over many other Asiatic peoples, in being a real nationality in the European sense of the word. That nationality has endured for long centuries, and has been in its time one of the leading factors in the history of the Old World The Afghans cannot

look back to such inspiring traditions; but under the far-sighted rule of Dost Mahomed and Abdur Rahman Khan in the nineteenth century they exhibited a ready consolidation of national instincts. Thus we have two national states of large territory, but with small and scattered populations, on the most vulnerable part of India's great land frontiers.

In these circumstances the interests of the Empire and of India demand a clear and definite policy, and one that is happily simple, honourable, and moral. Our influence must be exerted to the full to make Persia and Afghanistan strong, independent national entities. And then we may be sure of receiving from them advances towards economic and military union on a free and equitable basis. The dismemberment of Russia at Brest-Litovsk releases us entirely from the moral and other disadvantages of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907—some of them powerfully catalogued by Lord Curzon in Parliament in the following year. However convenient the instrument may have proved for the time being it was not in keeping, to say the least, with the principles for which the British Empire has been pouring out blood and treasure in the last four years. Now that titanic forces have reduced the Convention to a dead letter we can resume the policy of the later Victorian times toward Persia, and win back the confidence of the people of that country. Not the least of the advantages of so doing will be that of strengthening our position in relation to some of the greater foreign dangers that lie ahead. I note with pleasure the revival of the Persia Society, under the presidency of Lord Lamington, to develop sympathy

under the new conditions between Britain and Persia, and to encourage the study of questions of common interest.

Eastwards from Persia and Afghanistan there is an isolated State with approximately a similar position in relation to India. Tibet, however, from geographical and other causes is yet too backward to permit of our taking the same measures as toward these great kingdoms. But here too, on principle, we have a moral and beneficial policy to pursue. It is to leave the Tibetans to manage their own affairs as they think best, while encouraging such cultural and economic relations as should be satisfactory to both parties.

The vast upheavals of the war have entirely changed our outlook as to the greatest of Indian foreign problems, namely, the danger of aggression from some European Power or combination. From 1885 to 1905, a period of fully two generations, the fear of Russian advance southwards was like a nightmare to the rulers of India. To prepare for Muscovite attempts to invade India was the foundation of Anglo-Indian foreign policy for those seventy years. For the greater part of that time the people of India had not awakened to political life, and the general indifference to everything outside personal or caste interests was marked. But one international question even then reached the imagination of the poorest and most ignorant classes in India, and that was the possibility of a war with Russia. A vivid memory of my childhood is the immense impression which the Panjdeh incident in 1885 made on mill-hands in Bombay and gardeners in Poona. The two Afghan Wars had brought home to the humble peasant the

problems of the North-West, and were regarded as striking preludes to the inevitable and mighty struggle between England and Russia in Asia. In one of his early books Lord Curzon foreshadowed a conflict between England and Russia for Asiatic supremacy the echoes of which would ring from pole to pole.

Fate decreed otherwise. A war far more widespread and terrible than anything we dreamt of in the nineteenth century for Asia has convulsed the world, and for three years found England and Russia on the same side. In the interval Russia had become our friend stage by stage, not only in Asiatic but in world policy, though it took some years, even after 1905, both for frontier officials and average Indian observers to fully realise the change. Still recognition of the transformation had become general in the East before the fateful days of July and August, 1914.

The most unforeseen results have followed. The gigantic and apparently solid Empire of the Tsars had feet of clay. To change the metaphor: it was a reed that broke and pierced the hands that leaned thereon. Few observers in Western Europe realised before the war the real position. But to the Germans, with their commercial activity in Russia, their scientific system of espionage and observation, and spirit of aggressive calculation, the helpless weakness of Russia and its terrible internal divisions were apparent. It was known in Berlin that behind the veneer of Western culture in Petrograd and Moscow there was an ignorance equal to that of any Asiatic country, together with an indolence more reprehensible than that of the negro races. As early as 1900 I heard Germans of

high station foretell an inevitable break-up of Russia within the next twenty or thirty years, and indeed immediately should she be foolish enough to go to war against her compact and highly organised neighbour.

I was often in Russia in the years immediately before the war, and observations there excited my surprise that the idea of her prestige was so strong and flattering in Western Europe. At Kiev and elsewhere in South-Western Russia I heard Ukrainians —the people who have always hated the name of "Little Russia"—constantly declare that they were a heavily oppressed people, and that their one thought was to break away from the Tsar's dominions on the first opportunity. Austrian intrigue was rampant, and the Ruthenes of Galicia acted as the outpost of Westernism. In Poland no one, whether prince or peasant, made a secret of the fact that the Poles had an enemy in Russia, and that they would break away on the first occasion that offered. Riga was in fact if not in theory a German city, and in particular the western portions of the Baltic provinces had more sympathy and similarity with the institutions and races of Prussia than with those of the Muscovites. In the early stages of the war I failed to understand the great fear of Russia expressed by my Mahomedan friends and compatriots, who seemed to look upon her prospective occupation of Constantinople as the dawn of Slav world dominion.

The aftermath of the Russian Revolution has proved that the Germans were right in their estimate of their northern neighbour, and that Western Europe was mistaken in fondly showering its gold and energy upon her. Whatever the issue

may be, the great Power that threatened India in the nineteenth century is a thing of the past: the Romanoffs are as dead politically as the Mogul dynasty. But the weakness and break-up of Russia is no theme for Indian complacency. Like China in her impotence, what was the Northern Empire is now in her dismembered state as great a danger to the world as in her most aggressive moods of the past. The problem of Central Asia and of the Caucasus is not solved, but takes a new and far more disquieting aspect.

CHAPTER XV

GERMANY'S ASIATIC AMBITIONS

THE new orientation following on the collapse of Russian resistance to the Central Powers along the Eastern front profoundly affects the balance of forces in the Middle East, and though there are many elements of uncertainty in the tangle of international affairs which cannot be unravelled until the war is ended, our present study must take account of the possibilities thus opened up. At the time of writing there are no signs of that return of military strength and political cohesion for Russia which optimistic writers, hoping against hope, have thought possible. With Germany's dominance established in the western provinces of what was Russia, in Ukrainia and the waters of the Black Sea, her ally Turkey once more becomes, whatever the future of Syria or Mesopotamia may be, a powerful Asiatic State with great possibilities of influence. The terms of peace imposed on Russia revived the hopes of the German people in many directions, but no part of the Brest-Litovsk instrument more stirred their imagination than that which opened up new and enlarged visions of Oriental penetration. No one can read the treaties with the Bolshevists and the Ukraine in the most summary fashion without being impressed by the clauses in which Germany

insists on the national independence of Persia and Afghanistan, and on her unfettered access to those countries.[1]

So far as paper guarantees go Persia's position as a sovereign power was already assured, as attested by her signature of various international instruments at the Hague and elsewhere. Afghanistan, on the other hand, had no place at the council table of the nations, for while in everything else a full sovereign State, she was debarred from foreign relations except through and with the British Government established in India. The object of Germany in bringing both countries within the terms of the peace she exacted from Russia is obvious. She wishes to extend her influence and her so-called protectorate over these Moslem States, and thus to range them with Turkey. And behind these immediate aims there is a still greater objective. As was pointed out by Lord Lamington, a strenuous friend of Persian independence, shortly before publication of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, Germany does not restrict her vision to developing the natural resources of that country. Her aims are not only commercial, but military and territorial. "If Germany were successful in attaining this end, it would constitute a grave and constant menace to the security of India; it would be, in fact, a *point d'appui* against our Pacific dominions and Eastern possessions."[2]

It is worth while in this connection to recall the manner and methods by which the Wilhelmstrasse

[1] Article VII of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty reads: "Starting from the fact that Persia and Afghanistan are free and independent States, the contracting parties undertake to respect their political and economic independence and territorial integrity."

[2] *Pall Mall Gazette*, 27 February, 1918.

succeeded in establishing a virtual protectorate over Turkey, and how British influence, historically great at the Porte, came to an end. That influence survived Mr. Gladstone's fierce denunciations of Turkish misrule of subject races. The late Sultan Abdul Hamid knew how to play off one Great Power against another, but was by no means an unenthusiastic admirer of England. As late as January, 1901, in the course of a long audience with which he honoured me at the palace of Yildiz, he dropped the observation that he was confident the British Navy would come to the help of Turkey if she were in a tight corner.

Critics of the foreign policy of the Liberal Government of 1906 onwards have insisted since the breakdown of Russia that when Lord Salisbury talked of Britain's backing the wrong horse in the Crimean War he was himself wrong; that the policy of Canning, of Palmerston, and of Beaconsfield was right, and that if we had put our money on the Ottoman instead of the Muscovite horse we would have done better alike for ourselves and for mankind. Then, at the outbreak of the Great War, these critics maintain, the Porte would have remained under British influence, and Germany's way to the East would have been blocked from the start. It is urged that Russian inefficiency was an open book, her internal racial differences an historical fact to which our statesmen closed their eyes. This criticism could be justified on the assumption that the Liberal Government had a free and open choice in the selection of a favourite starter in the diplomatic race. No such choice was open to Viscount Grey of Falloden. We can well believe

that the Asquith Government desired to be the friends and protectors of Turkey, and to retain the position they acquired after the first Young Turk Revolution. It was not unfriendliness, but fear of opposition from both Russia and Germany which prevented the loan of British and Anglo-Indian officers to Turkey to reorganise her Asiatic provinces. Nor was it a matter of mere light-hearted choice that led to the British loss of commanding influence at Constantinople.

To comprehend the developments of world policy since the dawn of our century, we must go back to its infant years, and remember what had then become a fundamental principle of German policy, namely, that it was within the power of the Germanic States to be the dominating factor in world politics. This was no mere sentiment of the Court and the Wilhelmstrasse, or the military and ruling sets. All classes, even the barbers, waiters, and shopmen who crowded Western Europe, shared the feeling, whether consciously or semi-consciously. We read this in a hundred signs and portents, in manifold disclosures in the last four years, and not least in the hundreds of thousands of men and women of all classes subscribing in peace days to that militant organisation the German Navy League, the spirit of which has been incarnated since the sword was drawn by Admiral von Tirpitz and his Pan-German followers. Whatever the policy pursued by the Asquith Government had been (and we know from the confidential Lichnowsky memorandum, published without the consent of the ex-Ambassador in London, how earnestly they sought peace and ensued it to the last minute of the eleventh hour)

it is a foregone conclusion that Germany would have taken up the opposite line of policy. An understanding in due perspective of the many-threaded woof and web of European diplomacy in the first fourteen years of the century is impossible without keeping steadily in mind the cardinal consideration that the other Powers, both great and small, were but potential seconds and thirds in the inevitable duel of which Britain and Germany were to be the principals. These respective rôles have been maintained throughout the war, and in all its phases. It is Britain and her far-flung dominions, guarded by an unconquered Navy, which have blocked the way year after year of the quick victorious decision on which the Kaiser and his advisers so confidently reckoned.

The real choice before the Asquith Government eight or ten years ago was either to take up the moral protection of Turkey, leaving Germany to bring Russia under her influence and to repeat the formation of the Drei Kaiserbund; or to ally herself with France and Russia and draw the Entente closer, leaving to Germany the protection of Turkey from traditional Muscovite ambitions. Had Britain backed the Turkish horse she would have been faced with the fact that France, the natural counterpoise to Germany in Europe, was the ally of Russia. However mistakenly, the French Government in and beyond the first decade of the century relied more on the so-called Colossus than on their Channel neighbour. Hence there would have been danger of France either refusing the responsibility of offending her old Russian Ally by adopting a pro-Turkish policy in order to meet the wishes of Whitehall; or still worse, of the

Republic being drawn, in spite of the bitter memories of 1870, toward Germany. In that event the Continental alliance against England dreamt of by impatient Pan-Germans at certain stages of the Boer War, would have taken life and shape on substantial foundations.

Nor would this alternative policy have insured Britain's route to the East from serious menace. The history of the Eastern question points to the probability that under such conditions Russia would have attacked Turkey, after a settlement of terms with Berlin and Vienna. This is what happened in 1877. No one who has carefully read the history of the last Russo-Turkish war can deny that Alexander II, before sending his troops into Ottoman territories received the consent of his uncle at Potsdam, and that Bismarck was fully apprised of Russian intentions. It is well known that before the declaration of war, a meeting took place, at Bismarck's suggestion, between Alexander II and Francis Joseph and Andrassy. It resulted in a secret settlement by which Russia was to compensate herself in Trans-Caucasia and free Bulgaria, while Austria received the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nominally under a trusteeship. Their annexation by the Dual Monarchy ten years ago, in disregard of the terms of the Berlin Treaty, was the first step toward the cynical breach of international compacts by the Central Powers to which they were parties, whenever it has suited their purpose to treat them as mere "scraps of paper." Had English policy in recent years been directed to the protection of Turkey, rather than to the development of the Entente, we should have seen almost a repetition of the

experiences of forty years ago. It is highly probable that the Tsar, with the Kaiser's consent, would have come to an arrangement by which Austria would have absorbed European Turkey up to Salonika, and Russia would have established herself at the Golden Horn. This would not have been inconsistent with the ultimate aims of the Wilhelmstrasse in the direction of world dominion. Germany's share in the bargain would have been a free hand in the West, and a secret certainty of being able later to turn against Russia with the help of her brilliant second, Austria, thus mastering the East after having gained and consolidated the hegemony of the West of the Continent.

Confronted by these alternatives, Lord Grey and Mr. Asquith pursued a policy which had great dangers, as the war has shown, but of the two it was the more prudent. The consequences of Turkey falling into the hands of Germany could not have been wholly unforeseen, although the risk was taken, since the alternative policy would have been still more perilous. To-day we must face fairly and squarely the issues arising from the subordination of the Porte to Berlin, as affected by the Russian collapse. Whatever the reverberating effect of Japanese intervention in the Far East may be, Russian weakness and internal divisions (including the fact that the Russians were only a part of the nation that went under the name of Russia, and had forced their supremacy under Peter the Great and his successors on their unwilling and more civilised Polish and Lettish subjects of the West) leave it a practical certainty that Germano-Turkish influence in the Near East will have to be reckoned with by British states-

manship after the war. In the Middle East alone will Britain be in a position to set up a strong barrier against the extension of that influence East and South. Her successes in Palestine and Mesopotamia are enormously in her favour in this respect, and she is not hampered by any instrument, such as that the Foreign Office was prepared to make, as Prince Lichnowsky tells us, in the fateful summer of 1914. By the treaty then on the point of signature, says the ex-Ambassador, "the whole of Mesopotamia up to Basra became our zone of interest, whereby the whole British rights, the question of shipping on the Tigris, and the Wilcox establishments were left untouched, as well as all the district of Baghdad, and the Anatolian railways."

In both Persia and Afghanistan we find non-Turanian races, with their own culture and history, with their national character and with interests which ought to be the same as those of England, provided she disabuses the minds of her diplomatists amd officials of being always and on every occasion the predominant partners and superiors. Before we approach either Afghanistan or Persia with friendly assistance Britain must set her face against resort in those regions to the methods by which Egypt is governed. Even amongst the Arabs of Mesopotamia and Syria, with every cause to welcome the overthrow of Turkish rule, the traditions of real self-determination are so strong that they will be grievously disappointed if release from the heavy yoke is replaced by a just but still alien domination—if their countries, like Egypt, become mere conquered lands governed from above by the fiat of a foreign bureaucracy. The Oriental

nations may have been wanting in the passionate yet reasoned patriotism of their European contemporaries. Yet they are sensitive, and the sensitiveness increases with their education and culture. No civilised peoples care to be mere ciphers of European Chancelleries, or at best what the late Lord Cromer called them—native hands to be directed by European heads.

The South Persia Rifles, which have done such good work in most difficult conditions under Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes in the last two years, and any forces by which they may be supplemented, will require careful, tactful, and determined supervision, lest they should degenerate into corps paid for by Persia and owned by Britain, similar to the Hyderabad Contingent, until it was absorbed in the Indian Army by the agreement with the late Nizam in 1902. Care must be taken that, unlike the Egyptian Army organised by Englishmen since the occupation, the South Persia Rifles bear in mind that the Shah is their real sovereign and that Persian interests must be dominant. Happily this consideration will be thoroughly appreciated by an officer so familiar with, and sympathetic toward, Persian life and thought as Sir Percy Sykes, and the War Cabinet is pledged to the observance of the principle.[1] Still,

[1] "The force [South Persia Rifles] continued to be what it was in its inception, what it will, I hope, always remain—namely, a Persian force. The most assiduous attempts have been made by pro-German elements, with whose devices we are now so familiar, to represent this force as a part of the British or Indian Army, and as engaged in a military occupation of the country. Of course, it is nothing of the sort, it is Persian in character, composition, and allegiance, and the first to suffer from its disappearance would be Persia herself. . . . We desire Persia to remain neutral during the war, and to retain her complete independence after the war. There should be no difficulty in finding a solution to the question

it may easily be overlooked as time goes on by a nation which has had so much experience as Great Britain of ruling other races. Its disregard, whether in letter or spirit, would be a potent means of diverting Persian sympathy to Turkey and Germany.

What is true of Persia will be equally true of Afghanistan under the changed conditions. The present arrangement is ideal so long as that country has an independent sovereign, and the non-British world leaves it and the North-West frontier of India alone. The Afghans enjoy absolute Home Rule of the autocratic type, and their government, whatever we in the West may think of it, is in accord with their own wishes and history. H.M. the Ameer has kept his royal word; in spite of pressure from some hot-headed advisers and of Turco-German intrigues and embassies, he has been a true friend of Britain in these years of world conflagration. His fidelity has contributed very largely to the averting of any general rising of the tribes of the North-West frontier like that of 1897–8. His policy has been conservative in the best sense of the term. He has shown the world that the national interests of which he is the guardian come first and last in his consideration, and that the tinsel ambitions set before him by intriguers do not divert him from the wise path of concentration bequeathed by his strong father. But even in his dominions the present situation, however advantageous to those immediately concerned, the Afghans and the British Government,

[of the future of the force after the war] that will fulfil the triple criterion of satisfying Persian national sentiments, providing for the safety of the roads, and protecting the legitimate interests of trade."—Lord Curzon, House of Lords, 21 January, 1918.

cannot go on for ever. World forces draw the West to the East, and also the East to the West. Sooner or later the time must come when the Afghan, like the Persian and the Turk, will need the help of a powerful but sincere friend.

Under the changing conditions of our times, the maintenance of British supremacy in Asia is bound up, in my conviction, with the exercise of such true friendship toward Persia and Afghanistan without any ulterior purpose of mastering those countries in practice, whatever the name and outward form of the relationship. However great our detestation of German fraud and trickery may be, there is something at least to be learned from pre-war events in Constantinople as to the dealings of an European Power with an Oriental country. The lesson is that of the possibility of acquiring great influence among Eastern peoples without violating their self-respect or leading them to be apprehensive as to the maintenance of their independence. The new way of helping independent Oriental countries will mean, on the part of British diplomatic officers, the jettisoning of many traditions, other than the best, and the learning of new lessons. There is, in fact, no alternative policy, except actual acquisition by Britain, for preventing Persia and Afghanistan from ultimately falling under German influence.

Apart from the moral side of the question, which no one with responsibility and influence in King George's dominions ought to forget, there is a grave practical obstacle to absorption. The acquisition of the two great countries of the Middle East, and their administration after the manner applied to Egypt since the Occupation, would tax

England's powers almost to breaking-point. It would be an immense addition to Imperial burdens, inevitably augmented as these have been by the war. Its immorality, open or disguised, could but engender loss of Britain's great moral prestige in the East. It is to be remembered that Great Britain, which has sincerely disclaimed any rivalry to German ambitions of the hegemony of the world, cannot indefinitely add to her manifold commitments. Lord Salisbury once met Jingo pressure by the characteristic observation that if the Government yielded to every argument of this kind Great Britain would be forced to annex the moon in order to prevent an attack from Mars. I am not concerned here to define the limits to be set; but if friendly relations with Persia and Afghanistan, with Mesopotamia and Arabia, specially Southern and Eastern, are developed in correspondence with their respective claims to self-determination, we can look without alarm, if not with indifference, on events in parts of Asia more remote from India and our route thither. The policy here advocated would make of Persia and Afghanistan, through no other bond than self-interest, firm and fast friends. What is needed is that Englishmen should be ready to take service under the Shah or the Ameer as educationists, as military instructors, as scientists, as doctors, and in other capacities with single-minded loyalty to those countries and their rulers. Sir Salter Pyne, for many years Chief Engineer to the late Ameer Abdur Rahman Khan, set an excellent example of the right attitude in such service.

The good name of England in the East, however, requires as a great object lesson and at the first

possible opportunity the liberalising of the administration of Egypt, for this is long overdue. The position of the Sultan of that country and its people, their political helplessness—compared to which the Native States and even British India enjoy full liberty—tend to give Great Britain a bad name in the East, since they offer her enemies a ready example in impressing on the Orient ideas of British territorial selfishness and race pride. The very material prosperity our laws, our irrigation works, and our equitable fiscal system have brought has served to emphasise the political and intellectual, the moral and spiritual backwardness of the Egyptians, *vis à vis* the officials. At the end of the war it ought not to be difficult to evolve an *administration of the Protectorate more in keeping* with modern ideas everywhere, including the East. Nothing would do more to raise the real prestige of Britain for liberalism than a thorough reform of the Egyptian administration by a far larger infusion of native co-operation, and the grant of greater powers alike to the Sultan, to the Egyptian Ministers, and to popularly elected assemblies for both national and local municipal purposes. In these days when just stress is laid in the principle of self-determination such a corollary to the contemplated political advances in India would enormously increase the Eastern belief in British honour and beneficence.

A sincere policy of assisting both Persia and Afghanistan in the onward march which modern conditions demand, will raise two natural ramparts for India in the North-West that neither German nor Slav, Turk nor Mongol, can ever hope to destroy. They will be drawn of their own accord

toward the Power which provides the object lesson of a healthy form of federalism in India, with real autonomy for each province, with the internal freedom of principalities assured, with a revived and liberalised kingdom of Hyderabad, including the Berars, under the Nizam. They would see in India freedom and order, autonomy, and yet Imperial union, and would appreciate for themselves the advantages of a confederation assuring the continuance of internal self-government buttressed by goodwill, the immense and unlimited strength of that great Empire on which the sun never sets. The British position in Mesopotamia and Arabia also, whatever its nominal form may be, would be infinitely strengthened by the policy I have advocated.

CHAPTER XVI

ISLAMIC AND TURANIAN MOVEMENTS

THE Great War has disposed, once for all, of a modern international bogey. In the early eighties, when Turkey had just emerged from her disastrous encounter with Russia, her European misfortunes were followed by still greater losses in Africa. Her shadowy protection over Tunis was replaced by French rule; and Egypt, through the bungling of its rulers as well as of the late Sultan Abdul Hamid, was metamorphosed in fact if not in name, into a British possession. In Asia, the Arab tribes were increasingly restive. In such circumstances the late Professor Arminius Vambéry, the Hungarian Orientalist, and other Europeans who had the entrée of the Court of Abdul Hamid, let drop words and ideas that led the Sultan into his main political dream of Pan-Islamism. From that day forward, mullahs, fakirs, and other zealous emissaries were all over Asia and Africa preaching the reunion of Islam under Constantinople. The Sultan was encouraged by the astrologer Abdul Huda, as well as by Afghan and Persian readers of portents. Even after the downfall of Hamidism, the Young Turks continued this policy for some years.

Political Pan-Islamism had its foundations on sand, and could not endure. There is a right and

legitimate Pan-Islamism to which every sincere and believing Mahomedan belongs—that is, the theory of the spiritual brotherhood and unity of the children of the Prophet. It is a deep, perennial element in that Perso-Arabian culture, that great family of civilisation to which we gave the name Islamic in the first chapter. It connotes charity and goodwill toward fellow-believers everywhere from China to Morocco, from the Volga to Singapore. It means an abiding interest in the literature of Islâm, in her beautiful arts, in her lovely architecture, in her entrancing poetry. It also means a true reformation—a return to the early and pure simplicity of the faith, to its preaching by persuasion and argument, to the manifestation of a spiritual power in individual lives, to beneficent activity for mankind. This natural and worthy spiritual movement makes not only the Master and His teaching but also His children of all climes an object of affection to the Turk or the Afghan, to the Indian or the Egyptian. A famine or a desolating fire in the Moslem quarters of Kashgar or Sarajevo would immediately draw the sympathy and material assistance of the Mahomedan of Delhi or Cairo. The real spiritual and cultural unity of Islam must ever grow, for to the follower of the Prophet it is the foundation of the life of the soul.

The spread of this spiritual and cultural Pan-Islamism, this true religion of brotherhood and affection, in our time has been promoted by the facilities of modern civilisation, by the growth of the spirit of liberty, and by the general awakening of the East which began late in the nineteenth century. It had nothing to do with and nothing to receive from the Court of Stamboul. The hope-

less theory entertained by Abdul Hamid of reaching political unity among such scattered and different nationalities was as futile as it would be for the Pope of Rome to dream of gathering the Catholics throughout the world under a common temporal sovereignty. This political Pan-Islamism of the late Sultan was finally swept away on the outbreak of the Great War. Religion has more and more become a spiritual force in the modern world, and less and less a temporal one. In this war national and material interests have predominated over religious ties. The sturdy Protestantism of England and America has come to grips with the Lutherism of Germany and the Calvinism of Hungary. Catholic Austria and Catholic Italy are arch enemies. The Jews of every country have been loyal to the flags of their respective lands.

The same feature has been observable in Islam. But here new aspirations arose. Whether through personal and dynastic ambition or through deeper racial feelings of antipathy, many of the ruling families of the Arabian Peninsula have broken away from Turkey, notwithstanding all the bonds of religion. An independent Arabian monarchy has arisen in Hedjaz and has helped to clear the Red Sea coast of Turkish troops. Just as the Moslem Albanians were eager to obtain autonomy, so the Moslem Arabs have evinced tendencies toward racial home rule. Whether a united Arabian nationality will once again be reared is a question that no man living can answer.

The one thing clear is that the break-up of the Russian Empire and the disappearance of Hamidian and political Pan-Islamism have revealed a new problem. Like the German and Slav dreams

of national unity this political force, though brought into prominence by events, is not a thing of yesterday. The vast majority of the Russian Moslems are of Turko-Tartar origin and language. In the Caucasus and in Persia there is a large Turkish-speaking Turanian element. The eighties saw a literary movement begun both in Constantinople and in Asiatic Russia toward a cultural and linguistic rapprochement of the Anatolians and the other branches of the Turanian family. The preliminary efforts were toward grammatical and linguistic renovation, as well as toward bringing out both prose and poetry on modern European principles, to replace the Persian and Arabic metre but in as pure Turkish as possible.

After the still-born Russian revolution of 1905 and the coming into power of the Young Turk, sources of communication and of sympathy grew. With the outbreak of the world war, and the resulting disappointment of the Porte with the failure of political Pan-Islamism, as shown by the Arab revolt, the governing classes in Turkey turned their hopes eastwards towards their Russo-Persian cousins. Perso-Arabic words were more and more dropped, alike in Turkey and amongst the other branches of the Turanian races, and the names of Mongol heroes were more and more given to children. Such cognomens as Jenghiz, Timur, Baber, Mangu, Ordoghrol, and Hulagu were made fashionable. It is not improbable that when peace is restored Turkey will seek to exert much greater influence than hitherto over communities of related origin in the Caucasus, on the shores of the Volga, and in Central Asia. The same may be said as to

her ambitions in relation to the Turki tribes of Persia.

By way of the Sublime Porte, therefore, Germany will endeavour to exercise a powerful influence in the Middle East. This serious contingency has to be faced; but I cherish the assurance that if England is true to her traditional principles of liberty, and respect for national aspirations, there will be no danger of her influence in Asia being successfully challenged. A satisfied, autonomous India, an Afghanistan and a Persia whose independence and future are ensured, and receiving from England such economic, commercial, and cultural assistance as an independent country can have from stronger neighbours without humiliation—these will be far too strong, alike in moral and material forces, to fear anything from the Turanian races of Northern Asia.

Though Germano-Turkish influence is reaching Central Asia, in no part of the Middle East will it find the resources either in men or material to give any chance of attacking the foundations of British dominion in Asia, provided the peoples who go to make up, in the widest sense, these spheres of British influence are satisfied and happy. If we carry out the wise internal policy of founding true national self-government through federalism of all the greater races of India; if sincere friendship toward Afghanistan is developed; if toward Persia we follow a genuine policy of helpfulness without any *arrière-pensée* of reducing her right to a national and free government, or making of her a second and impotent Egypt—given these conditions we may be quite sure that the South Asiatic Federation, with England as its friend,

protector, and pivot, will be strong enough to meet any aggression, whether from Germanised Turkey or Japan.

The converse proposition may be stated with equal emphasis. The outlook would be most depressing if we took the wrong road of excessive centralisation by an impossible attempt at unilateral instead of federal government in a free India; of reducing Persian independence to a position like that of Egypt or Morocco; or of unjustified humiliation of the Afghan national pride. We should thus travel in the direction of reducing the symbol of Britain to the level of that of the Muscovite Tsar. The body politic would be inoculated with the germs of disease, such as would make India in the long run an easy prey to a combination of attack from without and sedition from within. In modern as well as ancient times great empires not built on the stable foundations of freedom, nationality, and justice, have broken down from the blows of smaller but healthier neighbours. It is for us to follow the moral, genuinely disinterested and nation-conserving policy that will make the free South Asiatic Federation of to-morrow one of the great dominions of that free union of nations of which Britain is the heart and the King-Emperor the beloved head.

CHAPTER XVII

THE PATH TO WIDER CONFEDERATION

OUR survey of international problems affecting India's neighbours may be followed by tracing in fuller detail the intimate connection between satisfactory progress in relations with them and the principles on which Indian constitutional advances, even those of the immediate future, are based. From this and other standpoints, the use of the term "responsible government" instead of "self-government" by Mr. Montagu in the historic announcement to the House of Commons on August 20, 1917, is to be regretted. We know from Lord Curzon (House of Lords, 24th October, 1917) that the terms of the announcement were the subject of "repeated discussion at the Cabinet," and I am convinced that the words "responsible government" were used in order to carry with the Secretaty of State and the Prime Minister some more conservative members of the small War Cabinet. It was employed so that the Executive Government hereafter might contain Englishmen, while at the same time the administration became sufficiently liberal to be responsible to the people. The adjective is unfortunate because it carries the technical meaning of a government responsible for its existence to an assembly elected by the

people. On the other hand, "self-government" can comprise many and varied forms of expression of the popular will.

Responsible government, in the narrow and technical sense in which Mr. Montagu's announcement is being interpreted in some quarters, has been really successful alone in the United Kingdom, and there only up to a certain point. In England the two-party system, quite inconceivable in India, was held years ago by no less a judge of constitutional history than Bagehot to have been the real cause of the success of this form of government. But in the words of a competent observer to-day "the breakdown of Parliamentary government, which had become increasingly acute in the years preceding the war, was due to the fact that the British people had persisted in attempting in one Parliament and with one executive to deal with three classes of business," viz. Imperial affairs; questions affecting the United Kingdom as a whole; and the internal affairs of the three countries.[1] Under the stress of war conditions, many of the traditional elements of responsibility of the executive to Parliament are in suspense.

In France, where, for historical reasons, there are many parties, this principle has led to unstable guidance and constant changes in ministries, and has brought to the front in public life a kaleidoscopic crowd of individuals instead of a few outstanding national characters. France is a very great nation, but a sincere admirer who loves her almost

[1] Letter to the *Times*, 5 February, 1918, by Lord Hythe (now Earl Brassey) urging the necessity for a federal form of government in the United Kingdom, both on grounds of efficiency and to provide the one effective solution of the Irish Home Rule problem. This view has gained widespread acceptance since the issue of the Irish Convention report.

as a foster-mother country may be allowed to say that she is great in spite of her governmental system. Sympathetic students of the French Constitution, such as Mr. Bodley, and passionate French patriots, such as M. Déroulède, have regretted that the immediate fear of Cæsarism led the founders of the Third Republic to adopt the English model instead of that of the other great Anglo-Saxon State.

In Spain this narrow "responsible" form of constitution has led, as it must in any half-educated country where parliamentary institutions are not a tradition of the people, to Rotativism, which, though nominally responsible to the electorate, is the very negation of good government. At this moment, heroic efforts are being made to do away with the system. So long as Portugal was a constitutional monarchy, the same hopeless plan of Rotativism strangled her development; since her change to republicanism constant revolutions and unrest have succeeded the former national inactivity. In Greece, until Venizelos, a man of genius, came to the head of affairs, the reality without the name of Rotativism held sway and nearly ruined that small but gifted people.

On the other hand, who will be so foolish as to say that the United States of America are not composed of self-governing communities? Who will allege that the Federal Government at Washington is not in the truest sense a government of the people, by the people, and for the people? Yet the system by which it exists is diametrically opposed to "responsible government" in the narrow sense. The executive is even more separate and independent of the legislature than in Germany. There

the leading ministers are always nominated by the King of Prussia as Prussia's representatives to the Federal Council; and thus, in a roundabout way by belonging to the Upper House, they come into contact with the popular assembly. In America Cabinet Ministers are entirely responsible to the President, and, by the Constitution at least, have no more influence or part in the acts of the legislature than any ordinary private citizen. Nor are they, as in Germany, of practical necessity members of the Senate.

It would be a disaster for India to be forced into the narrow form of constitutionalism that developed with its essential condition of two great rival parties, in England through historical and natural causes, but is now confessedly in need of reform. Mere imitation of features of the British Constitution, we have seen, has had most disillusioning results in the Iberian Peninsula and in Greece. It is true that a form of responsibility to parliament has succeeded in the Northern States of Europe; but here it must be remembered that in Sweden, the most important of the three Scandinavian Governments, the system is a half-way house between responsibility as understood in England, and the German practice of separation of powers as between the executive and the legislative bodies. Constitutional government has succeeded only where it has been cast in a form natural to the history and development of the people. In America, with all fidelity to democratic principles, it has taken forms widely different from those of Great Britain. In Japan, also, it is in practice anything but a slavish imitation of the English methods. Indeed, it is nearer to the Swedish than to any other system

existing in the West. In Germany and Austria it approaches the American system, though the partition between the executive and the legislature is not so marked.

Why should India be forced to imitate a system of government evolved through many centuries in a geographically small country with two historical parties? Why should India be placed on this Procrustean bed, instead of allowing the more widely elected legislature and an executive with a century and a half of tradition behind it to develop naturally their own inner working, just as they have been evolved in other countries? We want self-government, we want responsible government in the widest sense of the term—that of ultimate responsibility to the people—but we do not want our nascent national institutions to be put into swaddling clothes because one word instead of another was chosen by the British War Cabinet for its public declaration. The Indian peoples, with an instinctive sense of their need, have asked for self-government within the Empire, not for parliamentary institutions on the British model. None of the draft schemes prepared by Indians from that of Gokhale to the joint representation of the National Congress and the Moslem League hypothecate full and immediate responsibility of the executive to the legislature.

It is an unfair and prejudiced criticism of the federal form of government to argue that the free provincial parliaments will be nothing but glorified municipalities. Surely autonomy for our great provinces, with populations of from twenty to fifty millions, with their vast and varied lands, each equal in natural resources to one of the greater European

States, is a sufficient field for the ambition and devotion of any patriot. It must be remembered that as true federalists we advocate for the government of each of the great province-states the same measure of ultimate internal independence from the central authorities as is now enjoyed by the Nizam or the Rajput princes over their own territories.

This brings me to the first of two questions I wish to put to the critics of federalism as here advocated. By what other system can the Native States be brought into active union with the rest of India? No scheme of reconstruction can be complete without taking into consideration the 70,000,000 people and the 710,000 square miles comprised within these areas scattered all over India. Can these lands remain permanently out of touch with the great reconstructed India of the future? Or, as an alternative, are we to tear up treaties that assured their princes full autonomy within their respective spheres? Or is it seriously maintained that the central Government, while scrupulously avoiding interference in any question relating to a tiny principality or its court, should at the same time control the great province-states from Simla or Delhi, as if they were nothing but so many territories occupied by superior forces? The history of the past, no less than the justice and symmetry to be sought to-day, leads to the conclusion that we need a federation which can be entered by the greatest provinces and the smallest Native Raj alike without loss of internal freedom, and yet with the assurance that, in all federal matters, they will pull together for a united Empire.

Under the system I have advocated, with its checks, balances, and safeguards, there can be little danger of any province falling into misgovernment. It is common ground with students of Indian affairs that a State like Mysore should have full control of internal policy. If this principle holds good of an essentially non-democratic régime, why should it not apply to our great national states, where legislative and financial control is finally vested in a representative assembly, and where the immovable executive is strong enough to carry out measures of justice and utility ?

The second question for the advocate of a unilateral system to ponder is that of the effect on the international future in Asia. An outstanding tendency in the political ferment of to-day is for small nations, while retaining their individuality, to gather to a central, powerful State that carries them along in a common course. In recent years the United States have drawn into their orbit many of the smaller entities of the New World, such as Cuba and the republics of Central America. Germany has Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria ranged with her, and she is ambitious to secure within her sphere of influence the States that have been surrendered through the Bolshevist betrayal of Russia. She dreams of ultimately bringing Holland and Flanders, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and even Switzerland within her constellation. England and France and Italy have now taken a common route in world politics, carrying with them many wide-flung dominions. Even the three Scandinavian monarchies, free as they ordinarily are from the bewildering entanglements of world-politics, have found that practical independence can only be maintained

by greater union and cohesion. We have to-day, in fact, a common North European policy, into which the new Republic of Finland longs to be drawn. It has been ruthlessly invaded because it forms a barrier to Teutonic ambitions in North Western Europe. But the most competent observers are agreed that whatever changes peace may bring, Germany will not turn away her eyes from Middle Asia.

It is for the Indian patriot to recognise that Persia, Afghanistan, and possibly Arabia must sooner or later come within the orbit of some Continental Power—such as Germany, or what may grow out of the break-up of Russia—or must throw in their lot with that of the Indian Empire, with which they have so much more genuine affinity. The world forces that move small states into closer contact with powerful neighbours, though so far most visible in Europe, will inevitably make themselves felt in Asia. Unless she is willing to accept the prospect of having powerful and possibly inimical neighbours to watch, and the heavy military burdens thereby entailed, India cannot afford to neglect to draw her Mahomedan neighbour states to herself by the ties of mutual interest and goodwill.

A lesson of the Great War that even Germany has been reluctantly compelled to recognise is that force, though remorselessly applied by her military leaders, is insufficient to secure the incorporation of weakened nations. In Courland, in Lithuania, in Flanders herself, German policy has wavered between merciless severity and efforts to win the hearts of such elements of the population as the Flemings and the Baltes to her *kultur* and interests.

British policy ought to have no such conflict of ideals. Hence it is unthinkable that the British Empire can pursue a course of mere conquest in the Middle East. Such a policy is foreign to her ideals and repugnant to her interests. It would be more disastrous for England and India than almost anything else I can conceive, for it would mean the violation of the principles of humanity and justice, and would provoke continued unrest. On the other hand, a merely negative attitude will not meet the dangers I have indicated. We must have a policy attractive enough to draw toward our centre State the outer nations. A system of federation, just to each member, united by ties of common interest, would serve as a magnet for them. It would be a great harbour light for any weak state of the Middle East.

Once the internal federation was complete and the economic influence northwards and westwards developed, we might expect the Afghans themselves to seek association therein. The fact that Bengal and Bombay, Hyderabad and Kashmir were enjoying full autonomy, would be a guarantee to the Afghans of no risk of loss of independence in entering the federation. Just as the indigenous rulers of Rajputna would have their place, there is no reason why a group of principalities from Arabia and the Southern littoral of the Persian Gulf, should not ultimately become members of the union that will ensure peace and liberty, freedom and order to the south of Asia. Subsequently, Persia herself would be attracted, and just as the natural pride of Bavaria or Saxony has not been diminished by inclusion within the German Union, so, on a greater and more difficult

but happily beneficent basis, the empire of Persia and the kingdom of Afghanistan could honourably enter a federation of which Delhi would be the centre.

Needless to say, no compulsion, direct or indirect, can be employed. The right course is to institute such a type of community of states as to draw the sympathy and practical interest of India's neighbours. The magnet would attract, as time went on, the isolated and remote lands of Nepal, Bhutan, and Tibet. The Crown Colony of Ceylon naturally and historically belongs to India. She is cut off from the mainland by a mere geological accident, and the shallow channels and intermittent rocks that divide her therefrom are already partly, and will soon be completely, bridged by the Indo-Ceylon Railway. A unilateral government of India could have no attraction for the people of the island. They would naturally prefer being governed from Whitehall rather than Delhi, for Whitehall, being so much further away, interferes less, while the Parliamentary institutions of England afford Ceylon guarantees in normal times against injustice and needless mandates from without. The autonomous system would give the *coup de grâce* to the pleas put forward from time to time for the separation of Burma from the Indian Empire, which spring from dissatisfaction with the present centralised control.

In a word, the path of beneficent and growing union must be based on a federal India, with every member exercising her individual rights, her historic peculiarities and natural interests, yet protected by a common defensive system and customs union from external danger and economic

exploitation by stronger forces. Such a federal India would promptly bring Ceylon to the bosom of her natural mother, and the further developments we have indicated would follow. We can build a great South Asiatic federation by now laying the foundations wide and deep on justice, on liberty, and on recognition for every race, every religion, and every historical entity.

CHAPTER XVIII

ARMY AND NAVY

OUR study of a federated India would be inadequate if it did not take into account the desirable or possible effects on the problems of defence. For generations now the Army in India has consisted of two distinct portions, the one composed of the "white garrison" sojourning in India, and the other recruited within the country or in her border lands. The need for the continuance of a British contingent in the future is generally recognised. England will not be prepared, or indeed able, to leave the defence of India to her own children for many years to come. Nor is it desirable that premature attempts in this direction should be made, both because the tradition of an Imperial Army in India can develop only slowly, and because the standard of efficiency in British units will continue to afford a great example to the officers and men of the Indian Army.

The events of the last four years, however, will lead inevitably to reconstruction and readjustment. Till the outbreak of the Great War, Lord Cardwell's military system, in essentials at least, remained supreme in Britain, although great changes were made while peace remained by the Haldane reorganisation on a territorial basis. The linked

battalion system since Cardwell's day has made it a matter of easy arrangement to send troops to India for given periods of service and to maintain their drafts. Many observers believe that in the light of these searching experiences in a war engaging the great bulk of her young manhood, England, instead of returning to her former military arrangements and standards, will organise a short service national system. It is difficult to see how such a system could meet the special needs of the British Army in India. It will be for the military authorities to consider whether this requirement can be met by contingents, such as, I believe, Dilke recommended, of long service men recruited for the East alone, or whether some other plan is preferable.

Whatever the system adopted may be, I am convinced that the supreme command of the British as well as of the Indian section of the Army in India must be held by a Commander-in-Chief and staff located in the country. The concentration of command in Whitehall, advocated by some observers on account of the breakdown of organisation in Mesopotamia in 1915–16, could not make for efficiency. There would be lack of unity of control of contingents working side by side and engaged in a common purpose. Since India naturally benefits by the presence of the British garrison, she will continue to pay for its maintenance. Hence control by the War Office would be an injustice. India will rightly claim that the direction and supervision of all troops in the country, whether British or Indian, shall be in the hands of a Commander-in-Chief on the spot.

To clearly understand the position of the indi-

genous Indian Army, we must look back to its inception and the fundamental ideas of the originators. Though Clive was the main creator of this asset in the British struggle for supremacy, the underlying ideas were those of Dupleix, whose remarkable genius and immense abilities were never fully recognised by France. Long familiarity with the results have led to forgetfulness of the originality of Dupleix's conception. So far, the history of the mediæval and modern world has shown only two striking and successful methods of raising foreign troops for conquest when national forces were not strong enough or sufficiently within reach for the purpose. The first of these was the old Turkish system of Janissaries, created in the fourteenth century, and constituting the tribute of children from the conquered Christians, whose upbringing and discipline were undertaken by the State. This militia rapidly contributed to the subjugation of the Christian States in Eastern Europe; and it increased the numbers of the Turkish nation, since it absorbed the children of conquered peoples.

The other method, happily devoid of elements of individual enslavement and injustice, but also based on the principle of ruling other people through the agency of forces supplied by themselves, was conceived in the master brain of Dupleix. It was that of raising, disciplining, paying, and officering through Europeans Indian forces on a large scale and using them for the conquest of their own countrymen. Clive, Stringer Lawrence, and other military geniuses of the East India Company carried out the plan thoroughly, but the authorities are agreed that the original idea

was that of the far-sighted Frenchman who made a strong bid for the supremacy of his country in India.[1] The Native Army in India, up to a few years ago, was, in principle, still based on his conception of a body of troops for keeping the country to which they belong under the rule of their foreign masters, or the furtherance, by the absorption of troublesome neighbouring States, or the prevention of aggression from without, of the same foreign rule. The beneficence of that rule alike in intention and act did not eliminate this fundamental conception, though it destroyed the theory that India was held merely by the sword.

The first notable change in conception, though technically a verbal one only, came when at the Durbar in 1908 the name of these forces was changed from the "Native" to the "Indian" Army. It received a national and territorial basis, instead of being merely a racially different auxiliary of the British forces holding the country. A much more radical breach in the old idea was made when Mr. Montagu announced on August, 20th, 1917, the removal of the bar which had previously precluded the admission of Indians to higher commissioned rank in His Majesty's Army, and that such commissions were to be granted to nine Indian officers who had served in the field in the present war, and had been recommended for the honour by the

[1] "The raising of actual native regiments was first undertaken by the French, and it was due to the coming struggle for mastery and Southern India that we owe the first conception of a regular native army. In 1748 Dupleix raised several battalions of Musalman soldiery armed in the European fashion in the Carnatic, and a few years later Stringer Lawrence followed suit in Madras."—*The Armies of India*, by Major G. F. MacMunn. London, 1911.

"It is, indeed, hardly too much to say that we owe our native army to France."—*Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Vol. IV, p. 326. Oxford, 1907.

Government of India in recognition of their services.

Thus the first steps had been taken toward making the Indian Army a truly national force, like the armies of any normal country in any part of the world. For its development hereafter deep and strong foundations will be necessary. We have to make of the military sons of India a great central national entity, a truly Imperial force above all local or other jealousies. As long as can now be foreseen, English officers will be necessary in the Indian Army; but an early step must be the establishment of one or two great military schools in India, open alike to the subjects of Native States and of the British provinces, for the training of officers. At the same time, Indian officers of the old school who have shown ability and resource should be occasionally raised to the higher commissioned ranks. Every province and every race should be eligible to contribute to the make-up of the Army, and a short service system—short, that is, for India—of four or five years, with twelve years in the reserve, should become general. Such an army would be a national and a uniting force, and must be trusted fully by the Imperial authorities. This war must have proved to the least imaginative observer that any policy of mistrust is a cruel libel on the sentiments of the people. There would be religious and caste company organisation, and whole regiments would be formed on the same basis if found necessary; but the Army would be exclusively under the control of the Viceroy and the central executive. It would be a trained Imperial force ready to be sent wherever the needs of Empire required.

If we are to have the unity of control that is so essential, and if India is to develop on sound federal principles, the Native States must be prepared to make a sacrifice, by surrendering their present right of maintaining troops, so that all units raised should form part of the Imperial forces, with similar conditions of service, promotion, etc. The princes would lose little in reality, for even now the best of their troops are Imperial Service contingents. The opening of the door to higher commissioned rank has removed one of the obstacles to unification, since there will now be scope for the employment of Native State officers in responsible work in the Imperial Army. Nor need there be any break with the traditions of territorial origin. In England, in Germany, and in many other countries, each provincial or county regiment bears the name of its area of recruitment, and carries emblems of its own history. Similarly, forces raised in the Punjab, or in Bengal, would carry appropriate symbols, while regiments raised in Native States would proudly bear the emblems of the reigning house, and would be under the honorary command of the ruling prince. The fundamental point is that in policy, in discipline, in movement, in everything that goes to the making of an efficient defensive force, there must be a uniform and federal army for the whole of India. The time has come to establish not only proper Indian artillery on a scale in keeping with the interests to be defended, but to make the country more completely self-contained in respect to all branches of equipment, and not least for the provision of aircraft and other scientific inventions in which such great advances have been made

during the war. It is highly satisfactory to know that rapid progress in this direction is resulting from the activities of the Indian Munitions Board, under the energetic and widely informed chairmanship of Sir Thomas Holland.

As a necessary compliment to the short service system, a territorial militia or reserve should be established, of which those who have gone through the mill of the active Army would naturally form the main element. But care must be taken to ensure the absolute and complete control of the central Government over the Territorials, no less than over the Regulars. The old problem of the relations of the civil and military powers, so acutely raised by the Kitchener-Curzon controversy in 1905 and again brought into prominence by the findings of the Mesopotamian Commission, can perhaps be best solved by establishing a Ministry of War, with a soldier occupant. This would leave the Commander-in-Chief free to devote himself to the problems of strategy and military efficiency and of field inspection.

I cannot leave this part of the subject of defence without emphasising one of the vital conditions of satisfactory progress already indicated. It is that there should be no barrier to army service on the mere ground of race or religion. India's contribution of man power to the Great War, immense though its value has been, has been hampered by the narrow conceptions of a former and now distant day. In the words of a well-informed observer, "It is now recognised by the most conservative experts, in the light of war experiences, that the demarcation between martial and non-martial races in India has been too rigidly

drawn."[1] The time has come for unreserved acceptance of the principle partly recognised in what is at present a mere skeleton Indian Defence Force, laid down by Sir Satyendra Sinha from the chair of the 30th Indian National Congress, held at Bombay in December, 1915, that Indians should be entitled "to enlist in the Regular Army, irrespective of race or province of origin, but subject only to prescribed tests of physical fitness." On such tests the Madrasi or Bengali should be as eligible, so far as the regulations are concerned, as the Sikh or the Rajput. It must not be forgotten that on many battlefields the troops of Madras and Bengal did magnificent service in the eighteenth century in helping to secure British dominance in India. From those presidencies the Indian Army mainly originated.[2]

[1] *The Times*, Educational Supplement, 31st January, 1918.

[2] Since writing this chapter I have read with hearty appreciation the memorandum submitted to the Secretary of State and the Viceroy by my friend Sir Ibrahim Rahimtula, who has now succeeded Sir M. B. Chaubal as a member of the Bombay Government. As the *Times of India* observes, he at least is not of the "large number of estimable publicists in India who honestly believe that after this war we can beat our swords into ploughshares and our bayonets into chaupatti-turners." Emphasising the changed outlook on defensive problems which the scientific advances stimulated by the war have brought, Sir Ibrahim lays down the sound principle that each of the great units of the Empire should be sufficiently self-contained for the purposes of defence to stand against any sudden attack and keep the enemy at bay till the Armies and Navies of other parts of the Empire can come to its help. He urges that the number of fighting men in India should be largely increased: "There is a super-abundance of man-power in India, not only sufficient for the defence of the country, but also for the rest of the Empire. Most of the difficulties which Britain has had to contend with, during the present war, would have never arisen if full confidence had been reposed in the undoubted loyalty of India and a large Indian Army had been trained for the defence of the Empire. It is not too late even now. Britain has to recognise that India is and has always been whole-hearted in her loyalty to the British Crown. . . . Whether Government decide to increase the Indian

Command of the sea has been a vital element in the unimpaired maintenance of British supremacy. Under the East India Company's rule, the Indian Navy, manned by the seafaring communities of the great peninsula and officered by Englishmen, roamed all over the Eastern seas. It took part in many a naval fight, and piracy in Western Asia was suppressed by its constant activities. Its end came only with the completion of its work. The Royal Navy entirely replaced that of the Company in 1862, except for transport, police, survey, and other local duties discharged by the Royal Indian Marine. Thus for nearly two generations India has been dependent for maritime defence on the Navy voted by the House of Commons and maintained by the British Exchequer. Even before the war there were close students of naval strategy and history who urged that the system, necessary as it had been, was becoming antiquated, and that there was growing need for the upbuilding of a strong Indian Navy.

The arguments on this head of the late Commander C. R. Low, the historian of the old Indian Navy, and other writers have gained fresh force and validity in the upheavals of the last four years. The wonderful resources of England have

Army on a permanent basis, or whether some such system as a national second line is adopted, there does not appear to me to be any doubt that the response will be more than adequate. The best course would probably be to adopt both the systems side by side and thus reduce the cost of maintenance of the large fighting force required. The first line Army though more effective is very costly, and it appears to me unnecessary to keep the entire force required for purposes of defence on that basis. A system under which a large number of men, following different vocations in life, can and should be requisitioned for the purpose of training, to be called up when necessary in the defence of their country, will appeal to every patriotic Indian."—*Times of India*, 26 January, 1918.

been exposed to enormous strain, much of it continuous in character, and there will be many pressing demands upon them when peace has been signed. It seems to me unreasonable to expect Great Britain to bear the entire burden of keeping the Eastern seas clear. The sacrifices of the war have fallen lightly on the Far Eastern Power which has contributed to the naval work of the Allies; indeed their pressure, until the question of military intervention in Siberia arose this year, had been negligible in comparison with the rapid development of her industries and overseas commerce for which opportunity has been provided by the martial and armament-making preoccupations of the great countries fully sharing in the fight on both land and sea. Japan has had a fine economic opportunity, and has utilised it to the utmost. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance has worked so smoothly during this century that it has been easy to forget the sense in which India has been dependent on the continued goodwill of the Empire of the Rising Sun. However well intentioned, faithful to her treaty obligations, and conservative in the best sense this progressive Asiatic Power may be, it is not fitting that India should be dependent on the forbearance of any great nation, no matter how friendly and helpful. The strange mutations of foreign relations are written large in the history of the world in the last half-dozen years, and have to be provided against.

The need for tonnage to replace the very serious wastages arising from Germany's remorseless submarine campaign will be one of the great problems of reconstruction for the next twenty years. With this, also, India must help to cope. In the days of

John Company the ships built in her yards sailed in all the seas, and were known in every great port. There is no reason why this tradition should not be revived under the impetus of a pressing need and with the greatly improved facilities of modern industrial science. If India is to possess a merchant fleet of her own, she must protect it within her legitimate sphere of ocean influence by a proper defence organisation. I shall have more to say on the subject when discussing the material development of the country.

An easy, but most unfortunate, arrangement would be for India to contribute to the cost of the Royal Navy, thus limiting her share in Imperial maritime defence to the mere payment of subventions. Wise statesmanship will be careful to avoid a policy which would be the more distasteful since it would place India on a different footing to that of the self-governing dominions. If the Indian quota lacked the Swadeshi element, it would soon be represented as a burdensome addition to taxation, since there would be little to bring home to the people of the country the necessity for sharing in the naval price of Empire. Moreover, the need of Britain in the many-sided work of reconstruction after the war will be not only for money but for men. The Eastern Navy would fittingly be recruited in the East, and its headquarters should also be there. I do not dispute the cogency of the strategical reasons for the measures of naval concentration taken in the last few years of peace; but the fact remains that the depredations of the *Emden* in the early months of the war provided an object lesson as to the considerable harm a single hostile raider may be able to commit