

ENGLAND AND INDIA

ENGLAND AND INDIA

BY

R. GORDON MILBURN



LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.
RUSKIN HOUSE MUSEUM STREET W.C.

First published in 1978

Temp 119348
no 12.01.11

(All rights reserved)

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE PROBLEM OF INDIA	7
II. THE CASE FOR NATIONALISM	17
III. THE CASE AGAINST NATIONALISM	23
IV. THE CASE AGAINST BRITISH GOVERNMENT	34
V. THE CHARGE OF INJUSTICE	52
VI. A SUGGESTED SOLUTION—SOME PROPOSALS	70
VII. IMPERIALISM	88
VIII. THE CONCEPT OF EMPIRE	101
IX. THE KING'S MESSAGE	109
<hr/>	
APPENDIX I. TWO SERMONS	113
APPENDIX II. FOR INDIANS TO CONSIDER	121

ENGLAND AND INDIA

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF INDIA

THE problem with which we are about to be concerned is that of the possibility of a settled policy towards India, a policy openly expressed and consciously adhered to by the nation as a whole, and, above all, by the officials through whom it is carried out. It is the problem of definite aims and definite principles as opposed to chronic opportunism. Is such a thing as a national purpose on our part with regard to India possible? And if so, how, when we have considered all the interests involved, must that purpose be defined? British policy has hitherto been determined mainly by the temporary ascendancy of this or that wave of feeling or by the personal tendencies of this or that statesman. Instances drawn from the present will readily suggest themselves. We may, indeed, have been conscious of certain general aims pursued "circumstances permitting." But it is sometimes found that these objects are difficult to harmonize with one another, and then it is simply a question whether a few highly placed officials consider it for the moment more necessary to placate these interests or those. Individual statesmen and officials may follow a consistent policy, but ultimately neutralize one another.

It is absolutely impossible that such an attitude should prove permanently effective. Administrative opportunism is merely a petty kind of cleverness in shelving the problems which administration is meant to solve, and in evading difficulties which it is the function of administration to convert into occasions of progress.

Now to the successful solution of the problem of India three things will be necessary: the right will, adequate experience, and constructive ability. I venture to emphasize this platitude because the majority of Englishmen cannot possibly have the adequate experience, and because those who are in a position to acquire it are so often lacking in goodwill. I am referring to those who think that India can be ruled by mere "firmness" and by "keeping the natives in their place." This is sheer lack of sense; no amount of overbearing conduct on our part will prevent India from becoming honeycombed with murder societies and life growing more and more unbearable for everybody. But the lack of good sense has its root in lack of goodwill, in narrowness of outlook, in racial selfishness, and in a complete absence of all idealism in the sphere of politics. Such an attitude is not merely ignoble and unworthy; it is foolish and dangerous in the extreme. On the other hand there are the uncritical democrats. The fault of these is not any lack of political idealism; far from it. But they have not discovered their ideal in the possibilities presented by actual Indian facts; they mechanically apply to India a ready-made ideal without having first acquired any instinctive sense for the way in which things tend to work out in that country. Opportunism, Zaborism, and uncritical Liberalism must all fail. Our task must be to discover a fourth road. This should be the work of a Special Commission—a commission appointed, not to inquire into

the workings of the Public Services with a view to suggesting improvements in details, but to consider the question of the right relation of England and India to one another in its widest bearings.

The following essays, taken together, constitute an attempt to formulate a fourth alternative, which shall avoid the pitfalls alike of Opportunism, of uncritical Liberalism, and of Zabiernism. Let me confess in advance that I am fully conscious how unequal I am to the satisfactory fulfilment of such a task. And further, I am aware that this fourth road may prove unsatisfying, in that it does not minister to any group of interests or any political appetites to a sufficient extent to make it practicable. Nevertheless, since it rests upon an attempt, however inadequate, to see both sides of the case, I venture to put it forward.

India is a problem; the average Englishman has his attitude towards that problem; and this general English attitude, rather than the more definite views of particular statesmen, or any Indian influences, is that which at present ultimately governs India. It is the great major premiss that lies behind all our political action as regards India, and all our conduct towards individual Indians. Our goodwill and our rudeness, our progressiveness and our despotism, our double-sidedness and "hypocrisy," all have their roots in it. There is nothing very subtle in this common English attitude, but it is complex. It contains higher and lower elements, broader and narrower points of view. These various factors in British Imperialism have not been reduced to system, and are always in a state of gentle friction. But this does not trouble the average Englishman. It will work out, he thinks, all right somehow or other. He knows that there is usually a certain amount of political unrest in India,

but with the increasing benefits of British rule, such as railways, irrigation, peace, etc., he hopes that these things will gradually be eliminated. It ought, he feels, to be possible to keep disaffection in hand by means of a firm administration of justice, with occasional resort to generous concessions when our own interests are not too deeply affected. After all, Indians have shown themselves wonderfully loyal on this or that occasion, and we ought to treat them well. Besides, our rule in India is a trust committed to us by Providence, and it is a point of national honour that the work should be well done. The promotion of British interests can perfectly well be combined with the maintenance of a just and benevolent government for the benefit of the millions of India. Of course, even in the best regulated of empires local disturbances will from time to time occur, but with a little tact and firmness the problems which thus arise should be got over without any very great difficulty. Thus the average British home-dweller's ideal has been that of an empire in which, amid the glamour of Britain's moral prestige and results obtainable only through the sterling qualities of the British character, Englishman and Indian may prosper side by side, the former as the result of good markets, cheap labour, and commercial enterprise, the latter in consequence of the *Pax Britannica*. It has, in fact, been just that ideal of moral glory, universal esteem, and material prosperity, described in the twenty-ninth chapter of the Book of Job:—

my steps were washed with butter, and the rock poured me
out rivers of oil

When I went forth to the gate unto the city,
When I prepared my seat in the public place,
The young men saw me and hid themselves,
And the aged rose up and stood;

The princes refrained talking,
 And laid their hand on their mouth;
 The voice of the nobles was hushed,
 And their tongue cleaved to the roof of their mouth.
 For when the ear heard me, then it blessed me,
 And when the eye saw me, then it gave witness unto me:
 Because I delivered the poor that cried,
 The fatherless also that had none to help him,
 The blessing of him that was ready to perish came upon me,
 And I caused the widow's heart to sing for joy.
 I put on righteousness, and it clothed me;
 My justice was as a robe and a diadem.

Unfortunately, this ideal of a British Job has only very imperfectly materialized. The trouble is that no sooner has Job delivered the poor that cried than the latter begin to come into competition with Job himself, who then finds it distinctly difficult to combine the washing of his steps in butter with the putting on of justice as a robe and a diadem. British and Indian interests tend to clash, and then it sometimes comes to an *entweder-oder*. Either the butter or the diadem, but not both. And it is not only a clash of interests. It is a clash of ideas, of ideals, of race-personality with race-personality. For Indians also have their ideal, and their national attitude towards the problems of their country. They have their vision of the day when their race, a race of ancient renown, shall hold its place once more among the nations, and be treated as a peer by the foremost peoples of the world. India must be great, as other great nations are great; and, above all that, India must have the place of special honour that rightly belongs to it as the land of spiritual knowledge. India shall yet be acknowledged as the world's greatest teacher of the higher and deeper realms of the spirit. India is now suffering humiliation; she is a subject race; the foreigner can exploit her wealth and insult her children as he will. What India is to-day

dreaming of is national honour, national *izzat*. And therefore self-government has become a necessity, for all self-respecting peoples in these days are self-governing. There are other practical reasons why it would be desirable for Indians to hold all the high offices and appointments in their own hands. But the point of view most strongly felt is that of national *izzat*.

It is, therefore, no sufficient reply to the complaints and demands of Indians to point out that India is not being impoverished, but is increasing in wealth; that the "economic drain" is a copy-book fallacy; that taxation under British rule is not exceptionally heavy, but exceptionally light; that Indians are receiving the better-paid appointments under Government in increasing degree; that India is better off under British rule than it would be either under any other foreign Power or left to its own internal divisions; that if the English were to go such and such disastrous consequences would follow. Indians are usually ready enough to admit the truth of a great deal of this, and of late years little has been heard of the alleged impoverishment formerly believed in. But the weakness of this line of argument is that it does not take sufficient account of the fact that behind all the particular grievances and particular demands of Indians there lies an Indian ideal seeking realization. No doubt India's ideal, like England's, is capable of modification. But, taken in a general way, it has to be reckoned with, and to be understood. Indians will never be satisfied with a recitation of a list of the benefits which they have received under British rule as an answer to their ambitions. Britain desires to have India for a servant. She means to be herself a kind and generous mistress. She wants Indians to be prosperous, happy, and contented. But the relation between the two must remain that of

mistress and servant, at any rate for an indefinite time to come. India desires to be a mighty nation, rich, resplendent, and renowned. Hence a problem which cannot be solved by cataloguing and recataloguing the benefits of British rule.

We have to do with the clash of British with Indian interests, the clash of British observations, theories, and (sincere) convictions, as regards the welfare of India, with the ideals of Indians themselves. We have also to do with the inconsistency and mixed character of the British ideal itself. The latter is, as already pointed out above, by no means the "pure doctrine" of German political theorists. It does not, that is to say, rest upon a relegation of religion and morality to the private life of the individual in order that the State, and therewith (in point of fact, though not of German theory) the individual in his capacity as a citizen, may enjoy the licence to indulge in unqualified selfishness. On the contrary, England would fain be as zealous as Job in succouring oppressed races that were ready to perish. An Englishman is one who cannot bear the idea of behaving like a cad, whatever his actual behaviour may be. It is a mental need of ours to think of ourselves as gentlemen. And to satisfy this need we do act at times with a touch of idealism in our politics. But we have not gone so far as to translate this side of our nature into settled political principle, and the lower element in our national attitude is certainly strong. And so we incur the charge of political hypocrisy. It is partly this moral duality, partly our empirical methods, which make the actions of Government appear so incalculable to Indians. The first problem of Indian statesmanship is now to find a policy whereby British and Indian ideals may be harmonized, and whereby, at the same time, the worthier element in our political

action may become more a matter of settled principle than it appears to be at present, and may lose its spasmodic and uncertain appearance. Thus behind all detailed and particular problems there lies this more general, fundamental question of our national attitude towards the fact of empire. This question must be answered, and answered aright, before any Imperial stability can be assured. So much depends upon the answer given. Let it be assumed that England's primary purpose is the education of India to nationality, to a worthy communal life, as England herself understands it; that she means to achieve this task within some measurable time; and that she intends to take nothing more for herself than a fair remuneration. Then such questions as free and compulsory primary education begin to appear pressing. At the other end of the scale the problem of the future rule of a resident European population by Indians must receive attention. The appointment of a few Indians to posts of the highest executive responsibility, especially in centres frequented by Europeans, would soon become a necessary experiment. In short, every administrative act or new regulation would be directed by the principle that the primary aim of British government in India was the development of worthy national life in that country. If, on the other hand, England's real aim is to retain India as a source of wealth and power to herself, granting her the minimum of freedom and independence that she possibly can, consistently with an appearance of political decency and with the exigencies of maintaining loyalty, then quite an opposite policy will suggest itself. Up till now England has not made up her own mind, and has not, indeed, as a whole realized that the problem before her is something a good deal more than the question as to the best way to deal with sedition. We have not

most of us, quite realized that this narrower problem of loyalty itself is dependent upon that of national attitude. When a period of unrest in India sets in a host of writers in the daily Press and elsewhere arise to trace it to its origin in the lawyers, the vernacular Press, in education, in the essential crookedness of the Oriental nature, in such and such a display of political or military weakness, in these or those specific grievances, or in the economic conditions of modern life. Yet when Indian feeling itself is observed (as opposed to the mere demonstration of it) it will be seen that it is truer, if vaguer, to say that the attitude of India towards England—i.e. Indian loyalty—depends upon the Indian impression of the attitude of England towards India. It will be found, I think, on examination, that Indians tend to attribute the acts of the British Government, of British officials in India, and, to a smaller extent, of Englishmen in India generally, to some real or fancied general principle or attitude, and their response varies much more with their conception of this general principle than with the measure of the benefits or hardships of British rule.

To sum up our discussion so far. The problem of greatest practical importance for India is as that of the right national attitude of this country towards India, because this implicitly involves all our decisions on big and important Indian questions. Our present attitude is a mixed and perhaps self-contradictory one. We are idealists and *realpolitikers*, aspirants to the diadem of Justice and of the Service of the needy and yet deeply devoted to the butter and the oil. Circumstances are leading us to the necessity of a choice between these two factors in our national attitude as our ultimate principle—not, of course, that in many cases the two motives may not coincide. The choice is thrust upon us by those

circumstances in which British interests clash with Indian interests or with Indian ideals. When we have made up our minds—let us suppose it to be in favour of the diadem—there still remains a great deal to think about. A desire to do the ideal thing, a profession of Liberal opinions, and a short tour in India do not necessarily confer wisdom. But before the thinking begins there must come the decision as to our underlying principle and national attitude towards India. I will from now assume that our decision has been made, and that we are as a nation resolved that in all our dealings with India we will be true to the highest when we see it. Our next step will be to contemplate the problem as it presents itself to an Indian mind.

CHAPTER II

THE CASE FOR NATIONALISM

(A CONVERSATION WITH MR. GOKHALE)

ONE day—it must have been in the year 1908 or 1909—Mr. Gokhale called to see me. As soon as he had left the house I wrote out a report of the conversation, or at least of the portion of it which was concerned with Indian political questions. I believe this report to be not merely substantially accurate, but a practically verbatim reproduction of Mr. Gokhale's words. It commences rather abruptly, and runs as follows:—

M.: It seems to me that what we want at the present time is some definite political creed which Indians and Anglo-Indians could share. . . . We cannot get into close touch or have any real fellowship with one another because there are no hopes and convictions and ideals which we are conscious of sharing with one another. I have long been wondering whether any such basis of genuinely common conviction could be formulated.

G.: I think it is a very good idea, but some Englishman ought to do it. We have said over and over again in Congress what we want, and it now rests with Englishmen to decide how far they will identify themselves with us.

M.: Well, you say you want *swaraj*. But that is a very remote ideal. We should have to have a programme

determined rather more by reference to the immediate future.

G.: There are plenty of things which you could take up. You know the kind of things that we are always asking for. But so far as Self-government goes, which, of course, is a remote ideal—do you remember asking me a year ago why Indians should be so very keen on obtaining it, although in our past history we have shown no disposition to quarrel with despotic forms of government? Well, the reason is that we feel that you have contempt for us just because we submit to personal and despotic government, and so we feel that it is not compatible with our self-respect to acquiesce in it. You would disdain to be governed in that way yourselves, and so you despise those who submit to it. You think it does very well for Indians, but it would not do for you.

M.: But when it is said that personal government is good for India, it is not by any means implied that there is anything discreditable to Indians in that. At any rate, there are many Englishmen who can respect Indians and yet believe that personal government is suited to India. Personality is the greatest thing in the world, and there need be nothing to be ashamed of in being susceptible to its influence.

G.: When personality enshrines principles. But when it does not enshrine principles I do not think much of it. But the point is that whatever may be our natural inclinations and tendencies, it is incompatible with our self-respect to be content with personal government under present conditions. We could put up with it under the Mughals and in Native States, because it is *their* form of government. They do not rule us in one way and themselves in another. But it is not your method and you cannot apply it to us without despising us.

M. : What do you think of Sir Bamfylde Fuller's suggestion of the twenty-two commissionerships? It is still a form of personal government, but it would afford greater facilities than at present exist for giving Indians an honourable position in their country? Might it not be made a means of reconciling the exigencies of personal government with the claims of national self-respect?

G. : It would not have been a bad idea if it had been started years ago, but now it is too late. Self-government is now the only possible ideal. I agree with the idea of having a greater number of provinces—of administrative units. But twenty-two is too many. I should say twelve or thirteen. The Mahrattas, for instance, and the—

M. : Which do you consider are the points on which it would be most practical to concentrate attention?

G. : It does not matter. An important question at the present time is that of decentralization. I am myself in favour of advisory councils, and I think that certain executive functions could be entrusted to them.

M. : By "decentralization" I understand you to mean the development of various forms of local self-government?

G. : Yes. The collector, for instance, should not be entirely dependent upon a higher authority, but should be responsible to an elected council. And similarly the police.

M. : Decentralization, though, can also mean the increased independence of the Collector (District Magistrate). This is not what you would advocate.

G. : No; except in the sense of the freedom of the Collector from Secretariat control. I should be in favour

I cannot be sure of the expression "responsible to." Mr. Gokhale spoke here as though he were putting forward a rough sketch rather than a detailed scheme.

of that. Then there is sanitation ; the spread of technical education ; free and compulsory primary education ; the separation of the Executive from the Judiciary ; the increased proportion of posts given to Indians ; or the reduction of military expenditure. These are all matters in which any Europeans who were willing to take us up could help us.

M. : If the reduction of military expenditure is a necessary preliminary to the co-operation of Anglo-Indians with Indian aspirations, there is not much chance for the latter.

G. : It is not necessary to wait for that. There are other things.

M. : There is another difficulty, too ; you have no doubt often heard. It would be difficult for us to join in anything without knowing what we were committing ourselves to, or how far we were going. There are some Indian leaders we might be quite willing to work with, but—

G. : (*much moved*) : I know what you mean—you want us to repudiate the Extremists. But that is a thing we could never do, and it is an insult to demand it of us. How would you like us to demand that you should dine with such and such Anglo-Indian civilians ?

M. : But surely, Mr. Gokhale, what Anglo-Indians ask for is not that you should abandon all social intercourse with Extremists.

G. : Well, perhaps not. But what do you want of us, then ? It is well known that our political opinions are different from theirs. If we were to repudiate the Extremists, political life would become a hell. They would retaliate, and Europeans would simply stand by and watch us fight. We do fight, as it is, now. If you read the vernacular Press you would know how bitterly

they attack us. But we do not repudiate them, and you have no right to demand that we should repudiate a brother-Indian. We would not accept European co-operation upon such terms. Unity is necessary for the future. Both sides are struggling to win the rising generation. Neither I nor Mr. Surendranath Banerji is immortal. We do not want to leave India divided and in disunion.

Mr. Gokhale then rose to go, and, becoming calmer, added: "I don't think much is likely to come of your idea of the co-operation of Anglo-Indians with Indians. We Indians are very suspicious. It may be very wrong of us, but we cannot help it. When any Englishman makes himself very friendly to us we can't help thinking that he wants to persuade us to give up something. I don't think there are many Indians who would join you. A man like Mookerjee might."

The result, judged from the standpoint of those who are anxious to discover some possible common ground between Indians and Europeans was certainly disappointing. Not only did Mr. Gokhale not indicate any line upon which any natural co-operation of the two races with one another could proceed, but he did not even seem anxious to find one. One felt, in listening to him, that he had the line of hope and aspiration marked out by Congress before his eyes, and that Anglo-Indians simply did not come into his reckoning at all. There was no sense of community with them in any way, no suggestion of a common interest. I was particularly struck by the expression "take up," which he used in this connection. He spoke of the possibility of a certain number of Europeans "taking up" the Indians. The aims to be pursued were to be in no sense British, so that if an

Now Sir Rajendranath Mookerjee.

Englishman took to advocating them it could only be, as it were, from the outside, and from motives of benevolent sympathy with Indians. He would have to leave his own camp and go over to that of an alien people. Even then he would be able to do no more than to accept the Congress creed as it stands, without criticism and without the exercise of any independent judgment. It is not likely that common action on any extensive scale is possible on these lines.

Mr. Gokhale was no ordinary politician. The spirit which animated him was that which is expressed in the Rules of the Servants of India Society, which he founded: "Love of country must so fill the heart that all else shall appear as of little moment by its side. A fervent patriotism, which rejoices at every opportunity of sacrifice for the motherland, a dauntless heart which refuses to be turned back from its object by difficulty or danger, a deep faith in the purpose of Providence that nothing can shake—equipped with these, the worker must start on his mission and reverently seek the joy which comes of spending oneself in the service of one's country." There can be no place for any but a very, very few Englishmen in this sanctuary of "the love of India." Co-operation between the races is not yet in sight. Indeed, the Rules of the Servants of India Society do not themselves breathe that atmosphere of co-operating comradeship which is of the essence of true democracy. They suggest, rather, a society of Jesuits, with Mr. Gokhale himself as its virtually autocratic head.

CHAPTER III

THE CASE AGAINST NATIONALISM

THE demand of the educated classes in India for Representative Government leads us to the consideration of the question as to how far that form of government is really suited to India. An Indian may feel that this is an unsatisfactory way of putting the question; that it is not simply a matter of suitableness but of moral necessity. The true aim of every government, he might urge, is the welfare of its subjects consistently with the rights of other men. The welfare of a people stands not in wealth, security, and good order alone; it includes all that goes to make life worthy. Part of the worthiness and dignity of human life is freedom, and freedom is understood to involve Self-government, Representative Government. The popular objection, that Representative Government is contrary to the traditions of Asia, and that it has proved a failure in the case of Turkey, Persia, and China, is superficial. Constitutional Government in Turkey was always merely a name; Turkey's failure is the failure, not of Constitutional Government, but of the unconstitutional rule of the Committee of Union and Progress; the failure of Persia was entirely due to Russia and Great Britain, and the dictatorship of Yuan Shih Kai was no more an instance of Representative Government than was that of Enver

Pasha and his colleagues. Besides, Indians are not Turks, nor Persians, nor Chinamen, but British subjects who have been educated in all the traditions of English Liberalism.

Nevertheless there is a great deal to be said on the other side, and we may fairly ask Indian politicians who are not merely popular demagogues to consider this aspect of the case as fairly as they would that we should consider their own pleas. And in advance let it be said that if Representative Government were the only way to racial self-respect, I would not challenge it for a moment. If it really were an inevitable alternative between the speedy attainment of "Self-government on Colonial lines," and national servitude, emasculation, and progressive degeneracy, as so many Indians appear to believe, it would be hard to blame Indians even for resort to open sedition. But to insist upon this alternative is at least premature. We have hardly as yet begun to examine the possibilities of other alternatives. The desirableness of Representative Government under all circumstances is not a self-evident axiom. Whether it would conduce to the welfare of India or not is a question which must be thought out in the light of facts. Mill—one of the chief representatives of those Liberal traditions to which Indians appeal—reckons among his list of fallacies "all the doctrines which ascribe absolute goodness to particular forms of government . . . without reference to the state of civilization and the various distinguishing characters of the society for which they are intended." The success of Representative Government, where it occurs, is a phenomenon which depends upon many conditions, and one has no right to expect it where those conditions are not present. It cannot even be postulated that Repre-

representative Government, or popular institutions generally, are always educationally valuable; and that any loss of efficiency that may be involved will be compensated for in this way. The popular, representative character of the universities before Lord Curzon's reform legislation was by no means obviously training the community to acquire a more thorough grasp of educational problems. The whole question as to what institutions are likely to be most beneficial to India depends upon a proper appreciation of Indian conditions, and cannot be settled offhand by some appeal to abstract principles. Of course there must be the right moral attitude, the will to serve India rather than to exploit India, as I have already insisted. But given the moral will, the next thing is facts. I put it to Nationalists that the facts tell against, rather than for, the view that an immediate extension of the system of elected councils would be for the benefit of India.

In the first place, there is the fact, often insisted upon, that only a very small proportion of the population of India is literate. Representative institutions would not represent the people as a whole, but only the educated classes—a numerically insignificant minority. This objection could be met only by showing that they would nevertheless tend somehow to benefit the peasantry. Such facts, however, as the dropping of the Orissa Tenancy Bill, under pressure from the classes who would control elected councils, at the time of the reconstitution of the province of Bengal do not suggest that conclusion. The tendency of zemindars to impose illegal rates and cesses, and to resort to devices to induce their tenants to contract away their rights, the fact that the magistrate, the embodiment of the method of personal government, is so often in fact as well as in name "the protector of the poor," the influence of the landed interest over those who

would constitute the councils which would partially displace the authority of the magistrate, were an extensive system of self-government to come into force—such and similar circumstances point to the conclusion that under a system of representative government the rights and interests of the great majority of the population of India would be considered far less than they are at present.

Secondly, the realization of the true end of government—the attainment of a worthy and happy life by all classes of the community—depends, among other things, upon the presence of the right principles, instincts, and interests in those in whose hands the government of the country rests. In England this end is sought not only through politics, but also through the agency of innumerable voluntary societies for promoting the welfare of this or that class of people, or for alleviating the distress of this or that class of sufferers. National education was originally a private enterprise; hospitals, charitable societies, orphanages, etc., still are. There are also organizations for the combating of evil, such as cruelty to children. The existence of such activities is some little guarantee that democratic institutions in England will be at least partially controlled by satisfactory points of view. In India this disinterested interest in the welfare of others and this initiative in promoting it is only beginning to develop. It is not nearly strong enough to exercise an appreciable influence over politics. The purely verbal character of the Social Conference is notorious. The lack of interest in the Factories Act of the Government of India in about the year 1912 and the opposition of the unofficial members to it; the unfavourable replies given by leading Hindu and Mohammedan citizens to a private inquiry instituted by the Indian Government (in about 1902) as to whether they would welcome further

legislation for the much-needed protection of girls, point in the same direction. Along with this goes a remarkable absence of anything approaching Liberalism in all issues as between Indian and Indian. The late Sir Charles Allen once remarked to Mr. Mohini Mohan Chatterji in my presence: "You are the only Indian Liberal I have ever come across." All other Indians seemed to Sir Charles Allen to stand, in home politics, simply for the privileges of their class. There were few men in Bengal more qualified to lead a genuinely Moderate Indian opinion than Mr. N. N. Ghose, of the *Indian Nation*. He had an exceptional power of calm judgment, and one looked for well-balanced and enlightened opinions from him. Yet we find him vigorously combating the proposal to permit converts from Hinduism in Mysore to inherit property. The ground on which he based his opposition to the proposal was that it was inconsistent with Hindu law. This mixture of English Liberalism, when it is a question of demanding Self-government, with an archaic standpoint in viewing all relations of Indian with Indian is characteristic of the educated classes of India. When we find the National Congress calling upon the Government to protect the rayats against the zemindars and to revise the comparative immunity from taxation enjoyed by the latter under the Permanent Settlement, it will be time to believe in the existence of real Indian Liberalism.

Another class of cases in which the Indian judgment usually seems to Europeans to be at fault is constituted by all those instances in which that judgment appears to be actuated by an unwise type of sympathy with defaulters and the like. The institution of Credit Co-operative Societies by the Government of India was very coolly and critically received by the educated classes. They would have preferred an extension of the system

of agricultural loans, whereby the cultivator could obtain an advance from Government more independently of his credit in his village, and with the prospect that the debt would be remitted if his crops turned out badly, as would not be the case if he were dealing with the village Credit Society. Yet these same politicians who so readily sympathize with the "Ham garib admi" attitude when the personality addressed is the Government of India, complain that the system of government is emasculating them, and that they would prefer something more invigorating, something more politically educative. In short, democratic and philanthropic instincts would have to be abnormally strong in a narrow electorate to make Representative Government a moral success, whereas it could not be said that these are *abnormally* strong in India; and the same is true of political judgment.

It should, in fairness, be noted that it was Mr. Gokhale who urged the much-needed extension of primary education, and British rulers who refused it. I am far from questioning the sincerity of Mr. Gokhale's patriotism, nor do I wish to defend the Government of India. But I cannot believe that the educated classes would ever voluntarily tax themselves for the sake of educating the masses.

But if this is a true account of Indian tendencies it does seem that the time has not yet come for an extension of Self-government in India. Apart from questions of racial rivalry and demands for political privileges, there does not seem to be the material for wholesome democratic politics, because those social instincts, Liberal sympathies, and broad interests in the welfare of man appear to be too little developed. Those who now in England sympathize the most with the aims of the National Party in India may well ask themselves whether the progress of the people of India would really be best furthered by the

placing of power in the hands of a narrow electorate almost entirely Tory as regards its home politics, and Liberal only in its antagonism to the paternal government of the Indian Civil Service.

And thirdly, popular liberties have been found to lead to very undesirable results. The state of things at the beginning of the viceroyalty of Lord Minto was intolerable, and it was partly the consequence of the freedom of the Press and of public meeting. Of course the state of acute disaffection which then prevailed was largely the outcome of English faults and English mistakes. But English faults and mistakes are bound to occur, and Indian faults and mistakes also. A system of government, or of popular liberties, which only needs a little provocation to lead to a state of race-war is not a system suitable to India at the present time. When such liberties tend to produce an indiscriminate abuse of Government, a daily crop of slanders and lies in the newspapers, inflammatory speeches, the organization of political murders, an atmosphere of hatred and distrust, and a general state of lawlessness and anarchy throughout the country, it becomes necessary to reject the ideal of political liberty for the time being altogether. It was a noteworthy fact, too, that the critical nature of the time did not tend to bring the best men, with a few exceptions, to the fore, so much as the noisier and shallower demagogues. In Bengal the men of most influence were such men as Mr. Bepin Chandra Pal. Those to whom the speakers and writers chiefly appealed were boys and very young men, and it was from the ranks of these boys and very young men that the assassins and political dacoits were obtained. In short, the history of popular institutions in India from the beginning of the present century down to the introduction of the repressive legislation of Lord Minto

constitutes a strong argument from experience against such institutions in the case of India.

This conclusion may seem a hard one, for the fault was by no means wholly that of the Indians. It must be remembered that the disaffection and lawlessness was by no means confined to Indians. The Anglo-Indian community is as ready to be seditious as the Deccani Brahmins. It was, it is said, the Anglo-Indian community which introduced the practice of the virulent abuse of the Government in the days of Lord Ripon. The Indians were at first shocked, but subsequently acquired the habit themselves. Even now a very little provocation is enough to elicit it. The abuse showered upon Lord Hardinge in the Anglo-Indian journals of Calcutta over the transference of the capital to Delhi equalled any Bengali attack upon Lord Curzon over the partition of Bengal. When a political murder had taken place the Indian Moderate always declared that it sent a thrill of horror throughout the country, but when the attempt upon Lord Hardinge failed, the European community of Calcutta expressed (privately) their regret. When a certain manager of a tea garden was tried for an alleged brutal assault upon a coolie, or upon some ~~other~~ gang of lawless whites was formed for the purpose of rescuing him in the event of his being convicted. Even armed rebellion in India would be no worse than armed rebellion in Ulster. Our condemnation of sedition in India must therefore be qualified by the consciousness that we are capable of equally seditious conduct ourselves, and that it is our own language and behaviour which has exasperated Indians and goaded them into disaffection. Nevertheless the fact remains that, circumstances being as they are, the extension of Self-government, with its elected councils and its freedom of the written and spoken

word, would, at this present time, be likely to do far more harm than good. The net result of Congresses, public meetings, and the unrestricted liberty which the Press enjoyed in the time of Lord Curzon was an unfortunate one, and non-partisan lovers of India have reason to ask themselves whether some other line of development for the salvation of India cannot be found.

Fourthly, the gradual extension of the democratic element would mean the institution of a particularly hopeless form of dual government. Alongside of this or that executive authority representative, or semi-representative, councils would be created. The Imperial Government would remain ultimately responsible, but the popular element would be strong enough to thwart and hamper Government to a considerable extent, but incapable of carrying through any consistent policy of its own. Violent conflicts would arise between the Indian and the European communities, and whichever way Government acted it would provoke resentment. Government would become more and more tortuous in its methods of seeking to retain ultimate control, the popular party more and more hostile to Government. If Government and people were conscious of a general community of aims and interests the case would be different, but they are not. Each conceives its own good in a way that brings it into direct antagonism with the other. Under such circumstances the institution of a dual system of government in India would be like putting two men, one of whom was determined to row up-stream and the other down, into one boat and bidding them pull amicably together.

It is true that this objection and the last apply, not to Representative Government for India in itself, but to the gradual introduction of it. But that is what

political speechmakers hold out hopes of to Indians. All such speechmakers must be either insincere or insane. I do not lay stress upon the danger of frantic internal disunion and strife, because I think it is overdrawn. The division of the country into the right number of States and the institution of a League of Indian Nations would go far towards obviating it. Apart from the loss to British financial interests, which we are not here considering, the strong arguments against Representative Government for India are the narrowness of the electorate, the backwardness of nine-tenths of the population, and the relative absence of Liberal, democratic, and philanthropic interests. In addition to these there are the arguments that free institutions, coupled with a foreign rule, are in the nature of the case bound to lead to anarchy and strife, and that they have, as a matter of fact, done so. *Either* a transference of power and responsibility, in fact of rule, to some system of native Indian governments, *or* the absolute severance of British rule from British financial interests, *or* let might be right. But to attempt to maintain our present system as a whole while seeking to adulterate it in every part with democratic councils is lunacy.

Surely, then, it follows, in the first place that self-government for India, when it comes, should come suddenly. Two or three years at the very most should be assigned to the period of readjustment. Then there must come, not merely a change of machinery, but a real transference of power and responsibility. Secondly, that it will be a crime against the masses of the population unless we take steps to secure their just rights before the transference takes place. And it may be added that until the Government of India definitely abandons all concern with the butter and the oil—that is to say, with

British commercial interests—it can do neither of these things. It cannot contemplate a real transference of power, and it cannot spend its resources, or bestow adequate attention, upon the needs of those masses of the population. What actually happens we shall see in the next chapter.¹

See also pp. 75, 76.

CHAPTER IV

THE CASE AGAINST BRITISH GOVERNMENT

THE case, then, against Representative Government for India is, not that Indians are not able enough, but that we believe that they are not moral enough for it. That is why most Englishmen, even quite Liberal-minded ones, who have had any real experience of India, are apprehensive that if democratic institutions were granted to India to-day the result would be, not education, but deterioration, not progress, but retrogression.

But there is another side to the question. Indians, even quite well-affected Indians, are just as much impressed with the unsuitableness of Personal Government for India, and for the same reason—only applied to ourselves. The truth is, in their eyes, not that the members of the Indian Civil Service are not able enough, but that they are not moral enough to govern India. They are not accused of venality, corruption, and the like, but of racial insolence, bias, injustice, guile, unscrupulousness, willingness to sacrifice India to British interests, and a desire to keep the people of India backward and divided in order the more easily to rule over them. Above all, they are thought to demand subserviency and to hate anything approaching independence of spirit. Is there any truth in these charges?

A.—POLITICAL GUILT.

It ought to be a recognized maxim of British administration that honest policy knows no guile. Not only is political craftiness morally reprehensible, but in India it is exceedingly bad policy. A reputation for absolute honesty of purpose would be an invaluable asset to the Indian Government. A political manoeuvre may succeed in its immediate object, but in the end the ungodly is trapped in the works of his own hands, esteem is forfeited, suspicion is evoked, and an atmosphere is created which is the reverse of that which the Government would desire. "We Indians are very suspicious"—that is undoubtedly true, and in consequence the motives and intentions of Government are always being suspected. And it is inevitable that this suspicion should exist until it becomes absolutely clear that the Indian Government is animated by purposes which Indians themselves will recognise as lofty and ethical. There is not a body of men in the world which, in too independent and powerful a position, would not be unscrupulous and immoral. A Church, a bureaucracy, a trades union, a nation, a class organization all have it in them to be unscrupulous, tyrannical, crooked. The Government of India is not a body of men of tyrannical instincts, but it is a body of men to whom, as to all other men in similar positions, unscrupulous and crooked methods in the pursuit of good and worthy aims are a real temptation. The reputation of the Indian Government is by no means a bad one, but no one could assert that it possessed a reputation for absolute honesty of purpose. When the boundaries of a province are readjusted, or when a new capital is created, the question naturally asked is, "Whom is it meant to dish?" Above all, the favour shown towards

Mohammedans, and in particular the separate electorates, are universally believed to aim at the perpetuation of dissensions between Mohammedans and Hindus, with a view to playing off the one community against the other. A policy towards the various communities of India on the part of the Government essentially identical with that of the Central Powers of Europe towards the Balkan States is accepted in India as a simple given fact.

The following incident occurred a few years ago. The University of Calcutta elected two Mohammedan gentlemen and one Hindu to certain readerships. Government sanction for these appointments had been asked for, and as no reply had been given, consent had been assumed. Some time afterwards, when the readers had commenced their work, the appointments (or the intended reappointment of the readers for a further session—I cannot now, speaking from memory, be sure which) were vetoed by Government on the technical ground that sanction for them had not been obtained. It was believed that the objection of Government to the two Mohammedan gentlemen was due to the fact that they had advocated the political co-operation of Mohammedans with Hindus. (The objection to the Hindu reader rested, to all appearances, upon a mistaken inference upon the part of Government.) Nothing discreditable was alleged against any of the three. It was apparently a political move on the part of Government pure and simple. Whether the failure of Government to reply to the request for sanction had been designed with a view to obtaining a ground for subsequent action I cannot say. The Vice-Chancellor of the University, Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee, laid the whole matter before a meeting of the Senate, at which the present writer was present. A protest was sent by the Senate to Government, but it was ignored. Sir Ashutosh

Mookerjee, whose term of office was nearly over, was not reappointed Vice-Chancellor by Government. This was their revenge for his independence. What lofty motives may have actuated Government in secret one cannot say. But on the face of it their action was discreditable in the extreme. Men against whom no charge had been made, against whom nothing was known, who were not seditious, had this public affront put upon them because they had desired the unity of India and the co-operation of the two leading communities of the country. Of course "there may have been something else," but it is not a healthy method of governing a country, and it is hardly fair to those concerned to assume that they must have been wicked to deserve such treatment.

The danger is lest in proportion as open high-handedness becomes impracticable, a resort to hidden and crooked methods should take its place. More and more espionage, more and more suppression based upon suspicion, more and more attempts to play off one section of Indian opinion against another—such things must inevitably spring from an attempt to govern India in the interest of British trade, while pretending to bestow self-government.

B.—OVER-CONTROL.

Some months after this event the subject of a School-leaving Examination was brought forward by Government. This proposal may or may not have had a genuinely educational object. It certainly had a political one, being designed to bring the schools under the more complete control of Government instead of that of the University. I reproduce, with a few small omissions, a letter which I wrote on the subject, and which appeared in the *Statesman*, since the question at issue is of more than incidental importance.

"In such a country as India there should be two heads under which Government should classify all political and semi-political cases with which it has to deal. The first head would be 'Normal.' In normal cases the primary aim of Government tends to determine the policy to be adopted. Now what is the aim of all government? Surely it is that a worthy, happy, and honoured life may be shared by as many as possible in the land. If we commence with the principle that the primary aim of Government is to control the people, we commence with doing the latter a wrong. If we commence with the principle that it is sufficient if the people are given the material benefits of civilization, we do them a wrong. A wrong is done so long as it is the aim of Government to do less than to promote a worthy and honoured life throughout the community. What makes life worthy, what makes it deserving of honour, it is for Government itself to consider.

"In pursuing this end the rule must be: Respect the self-respect of others, and especially those in subordinate positions. This is above all necessary when a whole race is for a time politically subordinate to another, for some kind of freedom is necessary to self-respect and to all manliness of character. If a nation is educated to be servile and abject, it will never either be honoured or worthy of honour. There are people who have developed a taste for controlling everything by order of Government. With them it is always a little more control by Government here, and a little more control by Government there. Whenever anything is not quite as it should be they straightway wish to apply their one stock remedy—more control by Government. But this propensity cannot legitimately be indulged in in normal cases. The harm it does in demoralizing a race more than counterbalances

the possible advantage of more businesslike methods. This holds good to a certain extent, even in non-political matters—even, that is to say, when it is a mere question of method and efficiency. But when circumstances are such that people feel that it is not a mere question of efficiency, but an attempt on the part of Government to debase their manhood in order the more easily to rule over them, it is far worse. In 'Normal' cases the rule must be to avoid any methods which would be likely to lead to such a result, even though they might in other respects be convenient.

"The second head is 'Special and Urgent.' In such cases despotic methods, so long as they are not the outcome of a despotic spirit, are perfectly justified. The question as to the influence of the Press a few years ago was such an instance. It was a question of either a seditious Press or a stringent Press Act. The former was far the deadlier evil of the two, and personally I approve of Press Acts, deportations, and other exceptional means for dealing with special occasions which really had become urgent and dangerous. (I am aware that by saying this I am blackening my character in the eyes of many Indian friends.) Even apart from the inconvenience caused by sedition to Government, sedition is a vice that can only do harm to the national spirit, and even constant 'criticism' and complaint, not amounting to sedition, is a form of self-indulgence that is nationally enervating and weakening. But to apply the methods suited only to special and urgent cases to normal cases is tyrannical. Government ought to feel morally bound to treat a case as normal, and therefore on Liberal lines, unless they are prepared to openly and consciously classify it as special and urgent.

"Above all is this true in the sphere of education.

Fear of inspectors and magistrates on the part of headmasters, lest their pupils should not be allowed to appear at the examination, attempts to propitiate these dangerous magnates by flattery and self-abasement, insincere exhortations to loyalty, and an excessive display of English flags, royal pictures, and the like, indiscriminate and disproportionate punishment whenever there may be cause to fear that some Government officer may have been offended by some petty schoolboy misdeed—to bring up boys or girls in such an atmosphere as this is to poison the springs of national life.

"I have been a headmaster myself. I tried to teach my boys to love their country, but to love it consistently with the wider love to all mankind, and to bear no malice nor hatred in their hearts towards men of other races, but rather to make allowance for their faults. I tried to show them that sedition was bad; that it only led to restriction of freedom; that it occasioned an enormous outlay of money at the expense of the people in unproductive ways which might otherwise have been spent on national benefits, and that it leads to further secondary evils of various kinds. But I did not make any use of Union-jacks, for I was ashamed to flourish the symbol of Imperial fellow-citizenship before people who participate so little in it themselves. In their eyes it might appear rather as the symbol of the subjugation of their nation by a foreign race, and to flaunt the symbols of subjugation before the subjugated and make them shout 'Hurrah!' thereto is at least detestably bad taste. Indians will be spontaneously loyal enough when fellow-citizenship with ourselves is felt by them to be a reality.

"These are some of the principles involved in the question of the control of schools by Government by means of a School Final Examination. I will not now

THE CASE AGAINST BRITISH GOVERNMENT 41

spent time in discussing the purely educational aspect of the case. The proposal is essentially a political proposal—a case of failure to respect the necessary conditions of self-respect in others.”

C.—MAGISTERIAL MANNERS.

We often hear that the Indian Civil Service is composed of men of whom the Empire may be justly proud. And so far as my own experience enables me to judge this verdict is true. But a single case of an official who was not a thorough gentleman, or who was not absolutely just and impartial, could not be compensated for by dozens of ideal administrators. All British officers ought to be ideal. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the absolutely invariable rule. One does at times hear the complaint that the class of young Indian civilians coming to the country is not what it used to be, and, more definitely, one hears occasionally of gross unmannerliness and inconsiderateness that make one feel uncomfortable. I have heard of an Indian Deputy Magistrate who was thus addressed by his European superior officer: “Here, Babu—you, I mean,” with a snap of the fingers in the direction of the creature indicated. One has heard of the way in which an Indian gentleman of position may be told to wait under a tree, or on the veranda, among a crowd of villagers, without so much as a chair to sit on, until the young magistrate sees fit to call for him. One has heard how a magistrate may fail to rise from his seat, or to offer a chair, on the entrance of an Indian visitor into the room, of brusque, uncourteous speech, and the like. A considerable proportion of these stories are of dubious authenticity, but there are true ones among them, and the honour of the Empire cannot tolerate it that any such cases should occur. The representative

of England in an Indian village must have all the moral enthusiasm of a Mazzini combined with all the courtliness of the proverbial Spanish don. If we are to entrust the government of India to whatever young men may succeed in gaining the most marks at an examination, irrespective of birth, breeding, or *savoir faire*, would it not be as well to issue to each a copy of The King's Regulations for Members of the Indian Civil Service, to instruct them withal how English officers should behave? I have tried to look the subject up in Mrs. Humphry's *Manners for Men*, but unfortunately I cannot find anything about it.

I take the following extracts from Mr. W. W. Pearson's booklet *For India* (published by the Asiatic Society of Japan in Tokio; price 6d.). They will help us to realize that there is such a thing as a case against British Rule.

D.—THE UNHEALTHY MORAL ATMOSPHERE FOSTERED BY BRITISH RULE.

When two years ago I was about to go to Fiji I went to visit Mr. Gandhi, who had just been decorated by the Government for his public work. I had not been in his house half an hour before we received a visit from the superintendent of police, who came to inquire into the character of Mr. Gandhi's visitors.

But this is not only the case in regard to prominent men, but even more so in the case of obscure young men who show any signs of exceptional ability for serving their fellow-countrymen. Let a young man show any enthusiasm for social work, for night-school work, or the starting of any kind of organization, and he at once becomes a suspect. I know personally of many cases where young men in Bengal and other provinces, whose one desire has been to have freedom to serve the poor and teach the ignorant, have been compelled by the con-

stant suspicions of the police to give up their work. Any association of young men, whether its purpose be for athletics or social service, is regarded with suspicion, as though it were an association of criminals.* The result is that a widespread atmosphere of mutual suspicion has grown up which prevents completely the growth of that spirit of co-operation which the Government outwardly professes it is anxious to train Indians to acquire.

E.—ENCOURAGEMENT OF DRINKING.

The Indian public has constantly urged the Government to discourage the manufacture of intoxicating liquors, the excise duty on which provides a profitable source of revenue to the Government, and yet the Excise Revenue has risen steadily during the last ten years, as the following figures show :—

1904-5	£5,295,863
1909-10	£6,462,226
1914-15	£8,747,740

India has always been a sober country, and doubtless would remain so if the people were able to direct their own policy, and yet, while on the one hand there is an insistent demand for education to which the Government remains deaf, the demand for the discouragement of the liquor traffic is met by a constant increase.* The reason is simple—to encourage the supply of liquor is advantageous to the Government Exchequer, whereas to encourage the supply of education is advantageous only to the Indians themselves.

F.—THE NEGLECT OF EDUCATION.

In the Panama-Pacific International Exposition, the following statement was exhibited in big capital letters by the United States Government :—

"The State that fails to educate dooms its children to industrial subjugation to those States that do educate. More than once have nations lost their land for lack of education."

The British have been in India for a century and a half, and yet the educational facilities which are available for the vast population of the Indian Empire have not reached a level which can bear comparison with those granted by the Japanese Government after fifty years of progress, and by the Government of the Philippine Islands after eighteen years of occupation by the Americans. In 1873 in Japan 28 per cent. of the children of school age were at school: by 1903 the percentage had risen to 90. In India at the present time the percentage is only 19.6. Bengal, which is the most advanced Province in India so far as progress in education is concerned, has more than 90 per cent. of its population illiterate. In Japan, which cannot be regarded as in any way richer than India in natural resources, the proportion of the population which is literate is over 80 per cent. Before the Civil War in America the negroes were most of them illiterate. Now fully 70 per cent. of them are literate.

But, unfortunately for India, India's children are not children of the State which governs her, and which is responsible for the failure to educate. As Sir Rabindranath Tagore said in an interview with a correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*: "Every Indian feels, and every candid student of India must admit, that you (i.e. the English) have conceived it to be to your interest to keep us weak and have discouraged education."

G.—POVERTY, TAXATION, AND BRITISH INTERESTS.

The cost of living in India has been steadily rising during the last forty years, but the income of the people

THE CASE AGAINST BRITISH GOVERNMENT 45

has been as steadily decreasing. In 1850 the estimated income per head of the population of India was 2d. a day: in 1882 it was 1½d a day, while in 1900 it was ½d. a day!—How ironical seem the words of Queen Victoria's Proclamation: "In their prosperity shall be our strength."

From the report recently published by a civilian in Bengal, on the economic life of the agricultural district of Faridpur, it appears that more than half the inhabitants of that district are unable to obtain the minimum necessities for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency.

Famines are an indication of the economic condition of a country, for the mere failure of the rains and consequent failure of crops could not bring famine to a prosperous peasantry when there is a widespread network of railways ready to bring grain from other provinces or from abroad. The British Crown took over the government of India in 1858. We find from an examination of the statistics of deaths from famine (see W. S. Lilly's *India and its Problems*) that in the first eighty years of the nineteenth century the number of deaths from famine was 18,000,000. This does not take account of the large number who died of disease after being weakened by prolonged starvation.

If the nineteenth century is divided into four parts we find that the figures are as follows:—

	<i>Estimated loss of life.</i>
In the first quarter there were five famines	1,000,000
In the second quarter there were two famines	500,000
In the third quarter there were six famines	5,000,000
In the last quarter there were eighteen famines	15,000,000
	to 20,000,000.

Since 1900 there has been a loss of life owing to famines of 20,000,000.

The Hon. G. K. Gokhale said that "from 60,000,000

to 70,000,000 of the people of India do not know what it is to have their hunger satisfied even once in a year." Sir Charles Elliott, who was an officer in charge of the assessment of land taxes and was afterwards a Lieutenant-Governor, said: "I do not hesitate to say that half our agricultural population never knows from year's end to year's end what it is to have their hunger fully satisfied." That is to say, one hundred million people are always hungry, and yet it is from these half-starved peasants that the Government takes a third of its hard-earned livelihood to support an expensive administration. For it is the unduly heavy taxation of the people which is the root cause of the famines in India. It is often stated, and even so lately as last year by a responsible British official in India, that "India is the most lightly taxed country in the world." But if this is so, why is the Government finding it increasingly difficult to discover new means of taxation? The fact is that the Indian peasant is the most heavily taxed peasant in the world, but his income being so light it appears that the amount of his taxation is light also. If, however, we are honest and compare the taxes extracted from the poverty of the Indian peasant with the taxes paid by the comparatively wealthy people of England, we find that India pays out of her poverty three times the percentage which England pays out of her wealth. According to the statistics published in 1905 the annual tax per person in India amounted to a third of the total income! The Government of India has voluntarily adopted its present policy in its own interests and in favour of British capitalists. For indeed it is not difficult to find in what direction India's wealth has leaked away. Near a newly dug grave there is always a pile, and even if the Indian peasant is ruined the Government has the satisfaction of knowing

that British capitalists are not. For example, at the beginning of the present war famine conditions were artificially created in the jute-growing districts of Eastern Bengal by the spreading of the report that jute would not be wanted for export. The reports were spread just before the time for cutting the crops, with the result that jute merchants were able to buy any amount of jute at less than the actual cost of planting and cutting it. Whole districts were practically ruined, money was lacking even in middle-class homes, and could only be borrowed at prohibitive rates of interest. Conditions similar to those prevalent in famine times were common over wide areas, but two years later the jute mills of Calcutta were able to declare dividends of from 30 to 50 per cent.

Take the case of India's railways, which are always quoted as one of the most obvious and tangible benefits of British rule. We are told they have opened up the country for trade. True enough the benefits are tangible and the country has been opened up to trade. But who receive these benefits? European officials receive highly paid posts in the different railways, an annual amount of more than £10,000,000, is paid out of India as interest on the foreign capital invested in the railways of the country, and in addition to this the railways are invariably made to serve the interests of the European passengers and business firms in preference to those of Indians themselves.

The Army is another "benefit" of British rule. It is supposed to be an army for the defence of India, but is in reality an army of occupation, which is occasionally used to put down frontier risings, but has more frequently been used in foreign wars which had as their object the aggrandizement of the British Empire. For this India is forced to pay, without getting anything in return from

the rest of the Empire except insults. India has, in fact, been made the training ground for an Imperial army, from which soldiers are drawn without the consent of India for service in foreign lands. During the last century India has paid nearly £100,000,000 for military help in wars and campaigns outside India, in which the people of India had no manner of interest, the aim of which was the extension of British power. The late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman said: "Justice demands that England should pay a portion of the cost of the great Indian Army maintained in India for Imperial rather than Indian purposes. This has not yet been done, and famine-stricken India is being bled for the maintenance of England's world-wide Empire." This demand of justice has not yet been fulfilled.

Take next the question of India's manufactures. Sir Henry Cotton, in his book *New India*, writes: "The increasing poverty of India is due to many causes, but primarily I trace it to the decay of handicrafts and the substitution of foreign for home manufactures."

India's manufactures have been practically destroyed since the British first appeared upon the scene; and why? Not because they were inferior to European products, but because they were superior and were therefore a menace to the prosperous development of British industries. Great Britain, which first entered India as a commercial Power, has ever since remained commercial in all her deepest instincts. She wanted India's markets, and she still wants them, but in order to keep a secure hold of them she must pursue a policy which is in direct opposition to the best interests of India herself. The selfishness of her policy has never been more clearly shown than by the action of all the members from Lancashire who, during a recent sitting of the British Parliament,

protested against the duty on cotton goods imported into India being raised from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The Secretary of State for India, Mr. Chamberlain, urged them to withdraw their protest on the grounds that the past policy was a "piece of injustice" to the Indian people, but the members from Lancashire could only see the question from the point of view of Lancashire. This "piece of injustice" has been removed now that the Government are in need of money which they cannot get by taxation, but why is it that, professing as it does to be governing "for the benefit of the people," it has consistently ignored the repeated protests of the Indian public against this unjust policy?

H.—PROMISE-BREAKING.

Fiji may be taken as an example of a Crown Colony in which Indians are working under what is known as the Indenture system. In 1915 I visited that Colony, at the request of Indian leaders, to inquire into the condition of the coolie class there. I found that in spite of the constantly increasing cost of living the wages of those under indenture had remained the same for thirty years. The suicide rate amongst the indentured coolies was twenty times as high as the suicide rate in India, and the proportion of crimes of violence was eighty times as high owing to the unnatural conditions under which these labourers were compelled to live.

At last, after ceaseless agitation, a promise was made by the Government of India early in 1916 that the system would be abolished at the earliest possible opportunity. The Indian public was therefore startled to find early in the present year that the planters of Fiji had been promised an extension of the system for another five years. A wave of indignation swept over the country, protests

were made in the Press and in public meetings, and for the first time in the history of British rule in India a deputation of Indian women waited upon the Viceroy to protest against this violation of the Government's pledge. The Viceroy was able to give an assurance that, owing to the scarcity of available ships no more coolies would be exported to Fiji under indenture. But the fact that the Government had gone back on its pledge on pressure from the capitalist interests of Australia, and had only stopped the traffic under pressure of war conditions, makes it difficult for the Indian public to believe that, where the interests of India clash with those of British capitalists in the Colonies, the Government will consider first and foremost the feelings and wishes of the Indians themselves.

With regard to the first of these quotations, it may be urged that the prevalence of plots for sedition, dacoity, and murder render such methods necessary. M. Protopopoff might have said as much in defence of his own police methods. If the British Raj were a success they would not be necessary; and whether necessary or not the evil fact remains, and one can well understand that to thousands of the best men in India it remains intolerable.

The remarks of Mr. Pearson upon the subject of the encouragement of drinking by Government are an understatement of the case. The complaint is not merely that Government is content to make profit out of a growing vice, which it could easily check, but that the granting of licences for distilleries is in the hands of Revenue officials, whose one concern is income. An attempt made during the first decade of this century to transfer the power of granting licences to the District

Magistrates, who are interested in the good order, absence of crime, and general welfare of their districts, failed.

I refrain from commenting upon the question of revenue policy and taxation in India because (apart from my own insufficiency in the matter) the subject is a big and complex one, and I know that an arguable, perhaps a good, case can be made out for the official side.¹ But the main fact is clear, that the burden of taxation falls, not upon the wealthy trader or official, but upon the poor cultivator, and that British rule is itself ruled by British capitalism.

¹ See especially Sir Theodore Morison's *Economic Transition in India*, also the book on Land Revenue Policy in India issued by Lord Curzon's Government.

CHAPTER V

THE CHARGE OF INJUSTICE

A. — JUSTICE IN COURTS OF LAW.

LET us come straight to the point. British justice in India is now often called in question, and I wish to inquire, how far there is any truth in these charges. First, as to the meaning of the charge. What the plain man who is not a lawyer means by it is that British magistrates and judges in India are not impartial; that they are influenced by racial bias and considerations of friendship; that they have not the desire and will to be just under all circumstances. This is what one hears expressed or insinuated in places like Calcutta. In country districts, Europeans say, there is great confidence in the justice of the English magistrate, and my impression is that this is true. But the evidence, or supposed evidence, against the magistrate is apparently entirely mofussil evidence. Does this charge rest, in the main, upon facts, or is it mainly prejudice, aroused for the purpose of political agitation? Let it be clear that we are here using the term "justice" in the moral sense of "fairness," "impartiality," "regard for rights and deserts," and not in the sense of "principles of jurisprudence" or "administration of the law." For the real charge is that of partiality.* I have sometimes heard Indians complain of the failure of British justice, and when I

have asked for instances I have been told of cases in which some British magistrate has been ignorant of, or has disregarded, some technicalities of legal procedure. Now, of course, it is quite possible that there may be a great failure of substantial justice through failure to observe the rules of legal procedure. But such cases can be discussed in their ethical bearings. Law was made for the sake of justice; the latter is not an accidental result of there being such a thing as this or that law.

An Indian gentleman was once expressing his indignation to me at the failure of British justice in India. I asked him what he understood by the term "British justice." He replied that British justice was the principle that a man was to be considered innocent till he was proved guilty, and added, apparently as part of his explanation of the meaning of the term in question, that it was better that ten thousand guilty men should escape punishment rather than that one innocent man should suffer. This amounts to the charge that magistrates sometimes convict on inconclusive evidence. We must, however, remember that this rule of "Innocent till legally proved guilty" rests upon certain assumptions as to evidence which may not hold good in this country to a sufficient extent to make the rigid adherence to the rule in question the best method of maintaining substantial justice — that is to say, the treatment of persons according to their rights and deserts. The wide prevalence of false witness in this country is not the only reason why less stress can be laid upon this principle in India than in England. There is the ignorance or the fear which prevents the villager from stating his own case accurately, the prudence which makes him often unwilling to say in public what he will assert most definitely in private, and other circumstances, among which must be reckoned

the tendencies of many Indian pleaders and lawyers, who look upon legal procedure as a competition in ingenuity, in which anything which is not expressly prohibited is legitimate—a proceeding which has no relation to real justice at all. I once asked an Indian friend why he complained of the wickedness of British magistrates, and asked for an instance of British iniquity. He gave me one. A friend of his was defending a man on a charge of bribery, *of which he knew that he was guilty*. Since he was unable to defend the case successfully on its merits, he endeavoured to embarrass proceedings by trying to get some other person—I think it was the counsel for the prosecution—involved in the matter as an accessory on some technical ground—not that he had really been concerned in the bribery. The magistrate refused to take this defence seriously, and this fact constituted his “injustice.” Of course, as a general rule, the principle of “Innocent till legally proved guilty” is strictly adhered to. If in the interests of justice it is departed from in any case, and moral certainty in the eyes of an experienced and fair-minded man accepted in place of legal proof, such a proceeding must be prepared to justify itself by an appeal to facts. And perhaps now that magistrates are so continually being shifted from station to station, it is far less possible for a magistrate to attain moral certainty than it was in the days when a *Monro* ruled in one district for very many years and wandered about o’ nights in a dhoti and brown stain, chatting with unsuspecting villagers in their own dialect. To depart from the rule “Innocent till proved guilty in due legal form” may always be dangerous; to make a blunder through lack of adequate legal knowledge may involve a failure of justice; and to sweep aside ingenious manoeuvres to defeat the ends of justice may be irregular. But to

apply the serious word "injustice" to any of these in themselves is a misuse of language. Yet in Indian legal circles this is usually what is meant by "British injustice."

The next charge is far graver. It is said that in criminal cases in which a European is charged with some offence against an Indian, neither European magistrates nor European juries will do justice to Indians. Similar injustice is said to occur in civil cases, though one hears this complaint far less frequently. Murder cases form a class by themselves. A European cannot murder an Indian. Some years ago an Englishman lost his temper with one of his servants, chased him out of the house with a loaded revolver, and shot him dead. The revolver was a safety one, so designed that it could not very well go off by accident. This man had on previous occasions, when he lost his temper with his servants, threatened, according to their evidence, to shoot them. He was not tried for murder. He was acquitted by an English jury of culpable homicide, and found guilty only of "a rash and negligent act." There was the case of a soldier in the Northamptonshire Regiment, against whom there was certainly a *prima facie* case of murder; he was not tried for murder. Other cases of a similar character have also occurred. I am aware that about half a century ago an English sailor was hanged for murdering an Indian, but this is, I believe, the only case on record, and I am told that Anglo-Indian opinion, as represented by the *Englishman* newspaper, protested violently against the sailor's execution. I do not think it can be denied that when a criminal case, in which there is an issue between Indians and Europeans, is before the public attention, a large proportion of the European mercantile community show themselves to be devoid of anything more than a most rudimentary sense of justice. When an Indian is the accused a cry-

is raised for some one to be hanged—as in the Phooobsering case—with very little regard for whether any one deserves hanging or not. When a European is the accused the idea of his conviction or punishment is resented as an outrage upon the race. The disgraceful attitude of the European public in the case of the 9th Lancers, and in certain other cases, such as the Bain case (a case of alleged assault), shows how little that community is capable of thinking justly. I once asked a European why he had such an antipathy for Lord Curzon, and well remember the passion in his voice and the gleam of intense hatred which disfigured his face as he replied: "Because I am a white man." The sole and only offence of Lord Curzon against the European community was that he had tried to be just. Under these circumstances the right to be tried by a European jury for an offence against an Indian is not far short of a right to acquittal. It would be well if a mixed bench and a mixed jury were necessary in all criminal cases in India alike, whatever the race of the accused.¹

¹ On behalf of the European community there are three things to be said. First, their attitude is partly—largely, in fact, but not wholly—attributable to a *bona fide* disbelief in the value of Indian evidence, and in the trustworthiness of Indians generally. Be it well or ill founded, this disbelief exists. I know that Europeans, especially police-officers, are sometimes also suspected of perjury in India, but it is the uneducated Indian who is almost always suspected, and this gives ground for the Europeans to object to allowing Indians to assess the value of Indian evidence against them. Europeans, for their part, may ask themselves whether since the days of Chanakya, any Indian court has seen such outrageous perjury and such travesties of justice as characterized the various trials which depended upon the evidence of Titus Oates. Still, that does not make the modern perjurer any the less untrustworthy. Secondly, it is probably only a minority of the European community which is so indifferent to the claims of "common justice." Since, however, the others do not "repudiate the extremists" of their own community in any open way they cannot

It is, however, the officials and the Government, not the Anglo-Indian community, which is the constant object of Indian criticism. Yet there seems to be very little evidence of a lack of desire on their part to be just. Surely the settled habit of imagining injustice in others is itself the greatest injustice. Or is it that there must be some fire behind so much smoke?

The chief charge brought against magistrates is their accessibility to the influence of the police out of court. Nor, it is said, is it only the police superintendent who exercises an influence. A European litigant may pay the magistrate a visit, or talk his case over with him at the club. The magistrate, who may be a personal friend of the European and often have enjoyed his hospitality, comes to the seat of justice with a mind anything but unbiased. Whether there is any truth in these allegations or whether they are the creations of popular suspiciousness I cannot say.

Finally, there is the complaint that magistrates often give direction to subordinate officers as to what decision they should come to in cases before them, and what sentence they should impose. Members of the Provincial Civil Service do believe that such cases occur, but the evidence seems to be scanty, and I have not been able to obtain any at first hand.

easily be distinguished from them. And thirdly, the European community has no teachers or prophets to hold up before it the ideals of justice and national righteousness. The chaplains of the Establishment do not regard these things as coming within their province, nor does the daily Press.

¹ The following case was narrated to me by a member of the Provincial Civil Service. A good many years ago in Eastern Bengal there was a District Magistrate of "some such name as Hancock." Under him was a subordinate magistrate named Bose. A zemindar, a friend of the District Magistrate, had brought a charge against a rayat, and the case came before Bose. In Bose's view the charge

I have discussed only the defects, or alleged defects, of British administration of justice in India. I have not attempted to appraise or appreciate the greatness of the work of English officials in establishing and maintaining what is normally a system of even-handed justice throughout the country. That it is rather for Indians to do. It behoves Englishmen to contemplate it in the light of a true ideal rather than in that of an average human performance, and to be anxious to remove every just ground for complaint rather than to be boastful over what may have been well done.

The above paper was originally read before a gathering of Indians and Europeans in Calcutta. The majority of the Europeans were members of the Indian Civil Service, while most of the Indians were lawyers. In the discussion that followed no Indian adduced any case of any failure of British justice in India, but a book by Mr. Manmohan Ghose, published many years ago, in which a number of such cases are given, was referred to. In reply it was pointed out that Government had taken notice of many of these, and adequate action had followed. The Civililians present admitted that there were occasionally failures of justice in India, as there were all over the world, but denied that it occurred with sufficient frequency to constitute a national grievance. They challenged the Indians

was altogether unsustainable, but he received a letter from the Magistrate directing him to give judgment in favour of the zemindar, or at least strongly hinting that he wished him to do so. Bose gave judgment in favour of the rayat, incorporated the Magistrate's letter in the judgment, and sent it up to the High Court for an opinion. The Judge made uncomplimentary remarks about the District Magistrate. Soon afterwards Bose was transferred from that district by the Chief Secretary. A nice letter was written to Bose by Mr.—afterwards Sir Lancelot—Hare, who was commissioner at the time.

present to quote cases. The latter, however, contented themselves with giving expression to the popular impression. On the subject of the direction of subordinate magistrates by European superiors, it was emphatically denied that this was the practice of English magistrates. It was declared to be altogether contrary to the traditions of the Service. On one occasion, however, one of the Civilian members present had made an exception to this rule; it was the only exception which any of them were conscious of. The case was as follows: For some time the fruit had been disappearing from his compound, and at last the thief was caught in the very act. There could be no doubt as to his guilt. He was tried by the Indian subordinate magistrate, to whom the narrator, the English magistrate, sent this message: "Don't be too hard on him; it won't look well." The case was reported in a certain Bengali newspaper in a somewhat different form. According to this newspaper the magistrate had had a grudge against an innocent man; he had induced the police to arrest him on suspicion; and he had then put pressure upon his subordinate magistrate to ensure a conviction. Government servants not being allowed to reply to accusations, the charge went uncontradicted. Cases of subsequent criticism of subordinate magistrates by superior magistrates were quoted, but these were easily defensible, as the judgments of the subordinate magistrates had been decidedly open to such criticism, and the comments of the superior magistrates were not of a kind that involved any detriment to Indians as against Europeans. I was personally much impressed with the result of this discussion, which constituted, for what it was worth, a complete victory for the members of the Indian Civil Service.

The Arnold defamation case in Burmah had not then

taken place. I refrain from commenting upon it for fear of giving occasion for another defamation case.

B.—THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE.

To raise the old question, "What is justice?" may well appear a hopelessly un-English method of approaching the problem of India. Justice, for most Englishmen is simply that which accords with their feelings of what is fair. I believe these feelings to be stronger in the English than in most races. But they are not infallible; they are not proof against bias; and they are not as independent of mental enlightenment as we often assume. The suggestion, therefore, that the average member of the Anglo-Indian community would do well to spend a quarter of an hour in the consideration of the question: "What is justice, and how do our conclusions affect Indian questions generally?" is not really such an extravagant, unpractical, and foolish remark as it appears on the face of it to be.

1. The conception of justice is based upon that of rights. Justice is the treatment of persons with due regard to their rights and deserts. It has been defined as the settled will to render to every man his own—"Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique tribuendi." The question, therefore, so far as India is concerned, becomes first of all a review of the principal rights involved. What is India's *suum*? What is the *suum* of this or that class of Indians? What is England's *suum*? Is England's *suum* identical with that of the Anglo-Indian community?

2. First of all there is the right to impartial treatment implied in all justice. Justice aims at perfect equality of treatment, but this equality is not a rigid or absolute equality in the sense of identical treatment irrespective

of all qualifying considerations, for there are such things as just grounds for special, or preferential, treatment. But it involves the right to equal treatment in the sense that there shall be no *arbitrary* grounds for unequal treatment admitted. An arbitrary ground is one which consists of mere prejudice, personal feeling, or wishes, and the like, or one which rests upon an untenable claim. The right to impartial treatment is the right to be treated on an equality with whoever is treated best, except in so far as the latter can establish some claim to preferential treatment. That is to say, the right to equal treatment has not got to be proved; it is the deviations from equal treatment which have to be specially justified.

3. From this it follows that wherever there is a discrimination between citizen and citizen solely on grounds of race and colour an injustice is committed. The same qualifications which entitle a white man to a vote should qualify a brown, and even a black man, unless it can be definitely shown that the enfranchisement of the latter would somehow or other involve an injury to such and such persons, who had a prior claim to consideration. Similarly, all inequality as regards legal privileges or social treatment is objectionable. Let us suppose that inequalities of this kind are, owing to peculiar circumstances, justified for the present in India, or in any other portion of the Empire. (I am not admitting that this is a fact.) Then justice demands that there shall be a desire for the removal of the causes for these disabilities as soon as may be. Equality of treatment shall always be the ultimate aim.

4. Of the grounds for discrimination between race and race the most usual is the alleged necessity for racial self-preservation. In some European countries the Jew is regarded as the undesirable alien who should be sternly

discouraged. In Canada it is the Asiatic who is regarded; in China the European. The foreigner, it is feared, may upset the economic equilibrium of the country and endanger its civilization. Even apart from the question of race-preservation, every European nation is regarded as having the right within its own territories to set its own interests before those of other nations. America, for instance, imposes her tariff for the benefit of Americans, and spends her revenue upon American objects, entirely regardless of the welfare of other nations. So far, then, as there is any justification in such discrimination it is the Indian in whose favour it must in India be exercised. Apart from questions of government, which for the moment we may leave aside, it is therefore, in accordance with justice qualified by the ideas of national equity prevalent elsewhere, that all races should be treated upon an equality in India, except that no foreign (i.e. non-Indian) trade should be permitted of a kind likely to lead to the spread of poverty and destitution in India or to depress civilization in India, and that Government revenue, after the expenses of Government itself have been met, should be spent upon schemes for the benefit of the people of India rather than upon that of the European community.

5. All rights, in their turn, rest upon the capacity to profit by them, and the general presupposition of all rights is the assumption of the capacity of man to become something more, to realize some better state of himself, by means of his rights. The fundamental right underlying all particular rights is the right to the means of worthy self-development, except in so far as this would interfere with the rights of others. Every man has a claim upon the rest of mankind for opportunities to realize all the good which is latent in him, except in so

far as this claim cannot be satisfied without the violation of prior claims. If the peasant population of India is capable of profiting by education, and through it of realizing its humanity in a way that would not otherwise be possible, it has a right to education, unless there be some really urgent reasons for making some other use of the money.

6. Along with the right to development goes the right to happiness, so far as it rests with society to grant it. "The greatest happiness of the greatest number" is not an arbitrary substitute for morality invented by certain moral philosophers, but the recognition of the natural right of all men to happiness, a principle with which all decent politics is concerned. In India it means the right of the mass of the population to first consideration.

7. There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as the right of conquest. The fact that one country, such as Germany, may overrun another country, such as Belgium, does not in itself give the former a right to possess and exploit the latter. Such a "right" is really simply an assertion of might as against right. On the other hand, when, in reply to the question of the French Ambassador as to what right we held the Soudan by, Lord Salisbury replied: "By the right of conquest," the reply was a good one. For it was Britain which, by its enterprise, its blood, its treasure, and its achievement, had rescued the Soudan from barbarism and oppression, and had established good government, security, and order. It was these facts which really gave England her right, and placed our hold upon the Soudan upon a footing totally different from an ethical point of view from that of the German hold upon Belgium. If our rule in India rested simply upon the fact that we had "conquered" it, it would have no more justification than German rule in

Belgium. As a matter of fact, the case of India is much more closely parallel to that of the Sudan, and our position holds good. But the right which this kind of "conquest" confers upon England is the right to rule (and to exact a reasonable remuneration for the work of ruling); it does not confer the right to unlimited exploitation. Moreover this right to rule, which we need not consider to have become obsolete, is the *summum* of England as an impersonal Power, or as a corporation. It does not involve any rights to special privileges on the part of the Anglo-Indian community, or of any particular Englishman.

8. There is no such thing as a right to Government appointments. The only relevant consideration is efficiency, whether immediate or ultimate. But if Government does introduce racial considerations (otherwise than as a *bona fide* attempt to attain efficiency), such considerations must be applied impartially. The propagation of loyal sentiment, or the fomenting of divisions among the disaffected, is no excuse for a failure of impartiality—of justice.

9. Every right is conditioned by that complex of rights on the part of others, which may be summed up as the welfare of humanity. This must be the real meaning of the appeal to "general considerations of utility," as opposed to "strict justice." In such cases the term "utility" must be equivalent to "the sum of other men's rights." Otherwise the appeal is immoral. In particular, when there is any assertion of "exigencies," it is important to notice whether the said exigencies do represent the needs of the world—the welfare of humanity—other men's rights, or whether they simply stand for "the convenience of officials," or "the policy of placating such and such people." A Government

which makes the maintenance of its own authority the constant and primary object of its administration cannot be just. A Government which makes the furtherance of British commercial interests its first consideration cannot be just.

10. When it is said that British rule secures justice in India, more should be meant than that British rule tends to free the administration of justice from the influence of bribery and social pressure. It should mean that a new concept of justice is introduced, through which the old customary rights of existing law (mostly British) are gradually replaced by a new social order based upon ideal rights, and that the implications of true justice are being more fully carried out in all departments of life, and, above all, in the official administration of the country. It should mean that all classes, and especially the most needy, come to their rights; that false rights are increasingly abolished (including any false privileges which Europeans may enjoy); that mutual obligations are everywhere more and more respected; that law and social custom become more and more the expression of that which justly ought to be. And therefore a Government which merely tries to carry on along the lines of least resistance, or which merely upholds an existing order of things (which no one in India considers satisfactory), or merely enforces existing rights, cannot be just.

If this is true, what is needed first of all is some new conception of ideal, or natural, rights as may form the basis of a reorganization of civilization in India. Social progress largely consists in the transition from merely customary rights to the recognition of ideal rights as the basis of society.

11. Rights may be divided into two classes—those which rest upon the social order as it is, and those

which rest upon the social order as it ought to be. The former are actual rights, and are based upon law, custom, and include rights resting upon contract. The latter are ideal, or "natural," rights. Justice, in the full sense of the word, exists only where actual and ideal rights coincide. Ideal rights are not strictly rights at all until they have been recognised by society, and so become actual rights. Existing rights which do not coincide with ideal rights (so far as these are realizable) may be called false rights. In countries where slavery is permitted, the right of a slave-owner to his slave is an actual, legal right. The right of the slave to freedom is generally considered a natural right, or a claim based upon ideal justice. The sudden cancelling of false rights with all the "natural expectations," interests, and life-plans based upon them, would not be just. But neither, on the other hand, would their indefinite persistence be just.

A "natural right" has been said to be the right to the means whereby a person, as a being who possesses the capacity of conceiving a good common to himself and others, and of freely determining his own conduct thereby, may realize that capacity. (This is Green's view. We need not trouble to refer to the old Social Contract theory, which has long been obsolete.) "There is a system of rights and obligations which *should be* maintained by law, whether it is so or not, and which may properly be called 'natural'; . . . 'natural,' because necessary to the end which it is the vocation of human society to realize." "The capacity, then, on the part of the individual of conceiving a good as the same for himself and others, and of being determined to action by that conception, is the foundation of rights; and rights are the condition of that capacity being realized." Perhaps this formulation is too much influenced by a particular theory

of ethics, and too little by the characteristics of our sense of justice when this outruns, or sets itself against, actual law and privilege. The words,

And yet it irks me the poor dappled fools,
Being native burghers of this desert city,
Should, in their own confines, with forked heads
Have their round haunches gored,

are really an assertion, even if not very seriously made, of the natural rights of beasts to life and liberty. And there are human beings, too, whose case is not well covered by this formula. Perhaps it would be more natural to say that natural rights rest upon a capacity for enjoying a real good which cannot be withheld without partiality. It well may be that there is a transcendental ground for natural rights in the fact that the realization of the potentialities of the human spirit is an immanent world-purpose. But however that may be, and however natural rights may best be formulated, India offers a great field for the application of the idea of ideal rights, and the subject may be commended to the attention of Indian jurists.

12. The most disputed kind of justice—namely, retributive justice in the form of punishment—is probably, in its ultimate analysis, neither vindictive, nor deterrent, nor remedial. It seems to rest upon the instinctive feeling that spirit has a natural right to vindication. Sin is the practical denial of the rights of the spirit to dominate life, and gives rise to the right of the spirit, in society to vindication, in the individual to expiation. The vindication might be achieved in ways other than punishment, but the right to expiation may just possibly require it. The naughty boy has an inalienable right to a good thrashing, the murderer a right to be hanged. Perhaps this feeling is confused and mistaken, but it is probably the real ground for the feeling which some ethical writers

have had that the remedial and deterrent points of view are secondary. If retributive justice is vindictive, the revenge is not so much the revenge of society upon the insubordinate individual, as the revenge of the spirit upon the "mind of the flesh." At any rate, there is no moral justification for the idea that just punishment is primarily a means for inculcating respect for Europeans.

13. The application of the idea of natural rights, or the rights of humanity, to politics would lead to such principles as the following: Every nation or community has a right to pursue its own material interests only in so far as is compatible with the welfare of humanity as a whole. The treatment of communities by Government must be impartial. When order and security have been established, the attention and resources of government shall be directed primarily to the area of greatest need. The function of humanity is its own self-humanization, the realization of its own humanity, and therefore the function of government is the humanization of the whole community which it governs. The right of the subject to protection comes first; then the right to the opportunity of realizing a worthy human life; then the right to the satisfaction of urgent practical needs; then the right to enfranchisement; then the right to such benefits as do not amount to urgent practical needs. The claim by a few for the satisfaction of a relatively subsequent need cannot hold good against the need of the many for the satisfaction of some prior right. Such generalities may not amount to much, but surely something of the kind must be in the mind of any government which really wills to be just.

This discussion has failed to bring out the fact that the rule of one country by another in the financial interests

of the latter is essentially unjust, except when a real equivalent is given; that the benefits to India of the English connection may be held to have fully justified the latter down to, say, the death of Lord Mayo, in 1872; but that to-day it is impossible for England to confer benefits commensurate with the fundamental wrong.

CHAPTER VI

A SUGGESTED SOLUTION—SOME PROPOSALS

THE immediate introduction of democratic institutions, and the indefinite continuance of the present methods of Personal Government are, we have seen, alike open to objection, while a mere reference to the future is a shelving rather than a solution of the problem. Is there yet another alternative? I venture to think that the following suggestions, taken together, do amount to a coherent policy at once definite, popularly intelligible, and derived from a consideration of specifically Indian conditions. It would be a policy of active preparation for a democratic system adapted to Indian conditions, and designed to avoid, as much as possible, the threatened dangers of Congress Liberalism, while in the interim Personal Government would continue under circumstances which would tend to obviate the opportunism, the hand-to-mouth methods, the varying colour, the double-mindedness, perchance the double-dealing, which under a foreign government ruling over an educated and aspiring community are equally threatened. Such a policy may be outlined as follows:—

- (a) A political settlement, not greatly, if at all, differing from the present system, could be made for a definite number of years.
- (b) This settlement should be accompanied by a pledge

SUGGESTED SOLUTION—SOME PROPOSALS 71

that complete autonomy shall be granted to India at the end of that period.

(c) During these years a satisfactory basis for future Indian self-government could be systematically elaborated. Some suggestions towards this end are given below.

(d) The principles of Ethical Imperialism, adopted for the period of the settlement in preference both to bureaucratic opportunism and to Congress Nationalism, could be so developed and applied as to maintain a perfectly tolerable *modus vivendi*, and also to educate British and Anglo-Indian opinion to future conditions.

(e) A few simple, but decisive, steps could be taken to obviate any unnecessary conflict between the requirements of Personal Government and the legitimate demands of Indian *amour propre*.

If no definite policy is publicly announced, we never know where we stand. The admonition "Be a good boy and wait and see what I will give you" is merely a device to gain time, and cannot be repeated with indefinite frequency. The interval of hopeful expectancy gradually gives place to resentment and disaffection. To allay popular discontent a system of councils is introduced and gradually given a more and more representative character. This process seems to be accompanied by no conscious purpose on the part of the officials through whom it is carried out, or any private belief on the part of any Englishman that India will be any the better governed in consequence. Unofficial members are, of course, useful both as a safety-valve and as a means of enabling Government to become more fully conscious of the better elements of popular opinion. But this is not what Nationalists understand by "self-government." And whenever the demand for elected majorities is pressed, or some measure is called for affecting the privileged

status of Europeans (such as the Ilbert Bill), or perhaps their pockets, Government will be in as great a difficulty as ever. Surely something a little more definite than our present intentions, and based upon principles a little more explicit than anything which we commonly profess, would not be out of place.¹

I. A FIFTY YEARS' SETTLEMENT.

My first suggestion is that a fifty years' settlement be made on the basis of the continuance of Personal Government for that time followed by the grant of complete autonomy to India. This should be understood as being of the nature of a bargain, binding both Englishmen and Indians to the loyal observance of it. It should be signed on behalf of India by some elected representative of the people. It would not bind Government to introduce no changes in the system of government, but it would be a renunciation of any claim to such changes on the part of Indians. England would undertake, not only to grant India her freedom fifty years hence, but also to do her best to prepare India for independence in such ways as Government itself might think best. The terms of the settlement might be somewhat as follows:—

1. British rule shall, unless overthrown from without, continue in India for fifty years from the date of signature of this agreement by the representatives of the Indian people.

¹ It is true that Lord Curzon's explicitly announced principle of British responsibility, British tone and standards, and British higher officials, for the Government of India aroused, for all its honesty, no satisfaction in Indian breasts. But that is hardly to be wondered at, especially since it was accompanied by unrestricted freedom to express as much dissatisfaction as was felt. It offered India neither future hope nor present honour, but merely administrative efficiency.

SUGGESTED SOLUTION—SOME PROPOSALS 73

2. At the end of fifty years the British Government shall propose to the people of India the alternative of a new *modus vivendi* (or the continuance of the then existing system) on the one hand, or, on the other, the retirement of the British Government from India.

3. The question shall be put to the people of India, or to the educated portion of the people of India, in the form of a plebiscite.

4. In the event of a vote for withdrawal a further period of three years shall be allowed for establishing an independent Government and for gradual withdrawal.

5. The new Indian Government, or Governments, shall agree not to employ non-Indians who are not British subjects in the service of the Indian Government, or Governments, for a space of twenty years.

6. During these twenty years Great Britain shall be recognised as suzerain Power, but shall not be responsible for the order or defence of the country.

7. At the end of the twenty years another plebiscite shall be taken as to whether Great Britain shall be invited to re-establish the British Raj for such and such a length of time, and, if so, on what conditions.

8. If this proposal be rejected India shall thenceforward be entirely independent.

9. In the event of the occurrence of sedition during the fifty years the British Government may notify an extension of British rule by periods not exceeding five years, and not amounting in all to more than fifty years. Such notifications of extension of British rule shall be made within six months of the offence or offences, on account of which they are issued.

10. During the twenty years Great Britain shall, if so requested by the Government, or Governments, of India, supply military and civil officers as required to serve under

the aforesaid Government or Governments. But Great Britain shall not exercise any control over India, except for the right to veto any proposed treaty with any foreign Power.

II. While the 'fifty years' settlement is in force the (British) Government of India shall take every step which they consider practicable to develop the capacities of the country for self-government.

Under this settlement it would be natural for Indians to be loyal, for the end for which they have laboured would be guaranteed, and the only result of sedition would be its postponement for fifty years. All their hopes, too, would be bound up with the maintenance of the Empire for the fifty years, for it would be through the Empire that they would acquire not only national unity and independence, but also an honourable status in the world and privileges outside of India, while they would also be secured against aggression while the new India that is to be is in process of formation and growth. It would, on the other hand, be natural for Government to be more progressive under these conditions than would otherwise be the case, for it would be pledged to a definite end within a given time, and they would have to meet with criticism which could not be evaded if it could be shown that they were merely carrying on and attending to the requirements of the moment, and not preparing for the great consummation. Indians will think that fifty years will be a dreadfully long time to have to wait. But when we consider the backward condition of the rural population, even a decade would hardly appear to be too liberal an allowance of time for traversing a tenth part of the road to their political emancipation. It depends upon whether we accept the principle which I

have ventured to enunciate above, namely, that the enfranchisement of all classes of Indian society should proceed concurrently. The educated classes should wait for the rural population and town labourers. The educational progress, economic independence, and development of habits of self-help on the part of these latter should precede the grant of political power to any class. Is the New India that is to be built according to plan or without plan? If according to plan, what place will the poor of India hold in that plan? Does Government intend to secure that place for them, or to leave them for their fellow-Indians to deal with? In neither case could they obtain enfranchisement in less than fifty years.

II. REGISTERED SOCIETIES.

My second proposal has a double object. This is partly to direct the attention and energies of the country into channels which would enable it to produce the maximum of good to the community; partly to create an ultimate electorate which would have the true welfare of India at heart. Now I do not wish to suggest that Indians are by nature even a little bit more corrupt than other folk, or that Indian politics would, under any system, be likely to be as tainted as our own were two hundred years ago. Nor do I mean that Indians are addicted to place-hunting, to faction, or to intrigue, above all men that are upon earth. But I do believe that circumstances are such that these things will be eminently characteristic of any free institutions which could be framed on Nationalist lines, and no true well-wisher of India will desire that she should take a false step for the sake of the transient good effect, which it might have in promoting a momentary loyalty, or for the sake of personal popularity. India needs freedom, but not the rule of dema-

gogues backed by a virulent Press and by armies of boys nor the rule of the canvasser—we know the remarkable power which simple request possesses in India; nor the rule of those who are able to bring pressure to bear through the family, the caste, the sect, the dispenser of appointments, the police. India needs freedom, but freedom winged by high ideals and restrained by high principles.

"If you mean," it may be objected, "that you want to have lists of welfare-workers, philanthropists, and the like, drawn up, and to treat such persons as a substitute for an electorate, you are proposing something absolutely forced and unnatural, which could only exist in a hothouse democracies are not born in that way." I know that they are not, but we are not dealing with natural birth or spontaneous developments. New India will in any case be something artificial, whether it be fashioned on the model of the British Colonies, or of the Vedic Age or after some new pattern of our own devising. It is natural for it to be artificial. And if there is any argument in horticultural metaphors, objectors may be reminded that the modern rose is an artificial product, and yet under proper (i.e. artificial) conditions it may make a vigorous growth and form a much more delightful plant than many nature-grown weeds. If, instead of arguing from the analogy of cases which are not analogous, we were to consider solely Indian conditions and their potentialities we might be less conventional in our ideas as to what constitutes progress in India. Progress means steps in the right direction, and that depends on circumstances. The proposal is as follows:—

An unofficial society might be formed for the furthering of any worthy civic object. The plan of action might be submitted to Government, and, if approved, Government might guarantee a certain proportion of the expenses

The work would be inspected by Government, but it would be as independent as possible of Government control. In some cases the measure of Government control might be greater than in the case of others. The result would be the development of a large number of unofficial departments, or commissions, for dealing with the real needs of the country. Any keen person could become a voluntary worker on one (or more) of these commissions, and might rise to be an expert upon the subject and a person of influence and importance. Useful projects would then not be allowed to slide simply because Government was too occupied with other things to attend to them. These commissions might, if need be, be quite local in character. Thus, for example, it might strike a few doctors, or a local zamindar, that an effort might be made to free such and such a district from malaria. They might form a little society for this purpose, collect funds, and apply for registration and a grant from Government.

A very useful work might be done by societies formed for the conversion of the trade-castes into trade-guilds, each with technical schools, orphanages, banks, and an insurance system of its own. In time its own peculiar religious system and *dharma* might be revised by a *panchayat* of the caste-guild, advised by a number of learned and progressive Brahmins, whose services could be obtained through the help of the Registered Society, or "Worshipful Company," of the caste. The technical skill, moral welfare, and material prosperity of the caste might in this way be greatly enhanced. A series of such societies could do a great deal to prevent the poorer classes of India from becoming merged in one indiscriminate mass of indigent inefficient coolies as the industrial system of India develops.

In some cases a new society could only be a society

for the study of some matter of public importance, perhaps on some such lines as those of the Social Study Society of Calcutta. But if the members were animated with the desire to find out what practical steps could be taken in the matter, conclusions would probably before long suggest themselves, and then it would be time to seek registration, and therewith Government recognition and, if necessary, financial help. It might, however, be the case that what would be needed would be not so much money as legislation. For instance, a society might be formed in this or that seaport town to inquire into the relation of the dock and tally-clerk system to the prevalence of poverty in the town. It might possibly then appear that a system of licensed tally-clerks (or of dock cobles) should be introduced, whether with or without the approval of the shipping companies. Obviously Government could not grant registration or a grant to a society existing simply to agitate for this or that piece of proposed reform-legislation. But a society for promoting the welfare of tally-clerks could be formed on some such lines as the trade-caste societies above suggested, and while registration and Government help might be obtained for these purposes the society might at the same time agitate for the needed legislation.

Again, a registered society might in time take over part of the work now done by the Government. Thus a society might be formed for the improvement of primary education in such and such an area. The moneys at present granted by Government might pass through its hands on the understanding that an equal amount were raised by the society. The schools of that area would then pass out of the direct control of the Education Department into that of the new voluntary Board. Government retaining only the right to inspection, to suggestion, and

to a cancelling of the arrangement if the results were unsatisfactory. Perhaps a voluntary Education Board of proved efficiency might be empowered to pass far-reaching by-laws, and even to institute free and compulsory education within the area of its jurisdiction. In this way the practical management of the country might gradually pass into the hands of voluntary corporations, whose authority would last only as long as their efficiency.

Of course this line of development would be distasteful to officials who prefer to concentrate all authority in their own hands. Here comes in the value of a general pledge. If Britain were pledged to complete her task within fifty years, officials would not be so tempted to do everything for the people and to leave them no scope for personal effort. If some kind of popularization of the machinery of Government were a settled policy, and it were only a question of alternate methods, this particular line of development would feel less objectionable to them. I do not mean to imply that I think that there would be many among the educated classes of India who would initiate societies of this kind. But such a remarkable enterprise as the Gurukul, near Hardwar, as well as other educational efforts less independent of the official and university educational system, give grounds for supposing that a scheme for the establishment of registered and aided endeavours for the practical welfare of the land might be not without good results. Meanwhile, in those who took an active part in the work of the Registered Societies, Government would have a body of men from among whom a choice could be made for nominations to councils and other responsible offices. And scope would be afforded for the co-operation of Indians and Europeans in the pursuit of common interests and aims.

Arrangements might further be made for a Provincial

Council of all Registered Societies in the Province. The Council might be empowered to draft and discuss Bills for the better attainment of the objects with which the societies would be concerned, and if passed to send them up to the Provincial, or even the Viceroy's, Legislative Council, in charge of some member of the societies, who would be given an advisory voice upon the Legislative Council for that purpose. In time Government might refer fresh questions to the Imperial Council (if any) or to the Provincial Councils, of the Registered Societies, who would then endeavour to organize, not sub-committees, but new Registered Societies to deal with them.

Under such a system an active Indian citizen would be more than a voter. Within his own district and special department he would be a ruler. He would, at one and the same time, be an official, perhaps a high official, and an independent man. To be sure, there would be no salary attached to his office beyond travelling expenses and, perhaps, a bare subsistence allowance. But that is another merit of the scheme. It is a plan for governing India cheaply, so that important things like sanitation would no longer have to be shelved for lack of funds.

The one insuperable difficulty would be the passion of Government for controlling everything and everybody. But it is just conceivable that it may in time overcome this weakness.

III. DEPUTY GOVERNORS.

Whatever may be the future system of Indian Government, one thing is morally necessary: it must be one which is compatible with the self-respect of Indians. It is as a means to this end that Indians have asked for self-government on Colonial lines. If this is not granted to them, some other method of Government equally

SUGGESTED SOLUTION—SOME PROPOSALS 81

compatible with it must be set up. The most obvious step in the direction of securing greater national izzat for India, while retaining the present form of government would be the nomination of a limited number of Indians to high executive appointments. Sir Bamfylde Fuller's twenty-two commissionerships scheme would open up possibilities in this direction. Another possibility would be the appointment of Indians as Deputy Governors and Deputy Lieutenant-Governors. Between the retirement of one Governor and the arrival of the next, Deputy Governor could officiate. At other times the post could be an honorary one. The moral value of such appointments would be enormous. In proportion as it is necessary to maintain a very high percentage of British officials in the more important executive appointments, the more necessary is it that the few that are given to Indians should be as brilliant as possible. An Acting Governorship held by an Indian for three months would be worth a dozen Collectorships, and it would not be open to the same objections. In Bengal it is already socially possible, and there are men like Sir Rajendra Mookerjee, or Sir Satyendra Sinha, who would be capable of fulfilling the duties of such a post with success. The same may be true of other provinces. There is, indeed, no reason why, with anything like a right spirit on our own part, membership in the Empire should not open to Indians such positions of honour and distinction that the craving for unsuitable methods of government would speedily pass away.

IV. THE BUDGET.

Many sad observers must have been struck with the fact that there is much political energy wasted in India. When it does not lead to disaffection it does not usually

lead anywhere at all. Congress meets year after year, but its resolutions are regarded by Europeans as proclamations of ideals rather than as practical proposals, very much as the resolutions of the Social Conference are regarded by Indians. One reason for this ignoring of popular demands by Government may lie in the fact that those who advocate them tend themselves to ignore the financial difficulties which frequently accompany them. Thus Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, as President of Congress, put forward the demand for a system of free primary, secondary, and university education for India without troubling himself about the financial impossibilities involved in it. If one draws the attention of Indians to these difficulties, the reply is given that the money required for the schemes advocated could be found by reducing military expenditure, or by some other equally contentious measure, which would have no chance of being carried into effect. No good can be gained, no political education can be effected by politics so unpractical. Indians, for their part, become depressed at the futility of their own efforts. "We have asked over and over again, but Government will not listen to us." Such is the common lament. The underlying assumption seems to be that constitutional principles require that Government should accede to any demand which is reiterated with reasonable frequency. Government and people thus remain partially estranged by this twofold impression—the impression on the part of Government that Indian ideas are too Utopian to merit attention, and the impression on the part of the people that Government will not pay any attention to constitutional agitation. I do not mean that the difficulties ignored by the popular party are always of a financial character, but that is sometimes the case, and it is with such cases that we are now concerned.

Would it not be possible to assign to the unofficial members of the Viceroy's Legislative Council the task of introducing part of the Budget, in connection with which they might put forward any schemes which they might desire to promote? Something like the following arrangement might be possible. The estimates for military expenditure, the emoluments of British officials in India, the Home charges, and the Police, might be introduced by Government and passed. A number of proposed heads of further expenditure could then be put forward by Government and discussed, but not passed at this stage. The unofficial members could then bring in the budget, incorporating the estimates passed and also any of the proposed further expenditure which they might decide to adopt. Taxation proposals would thus emanate from the unofficial members. It is probable that many suggestions would be made with regard to taxation which Government would find unacceptable, but no harm would be done by the discussion of them. Perhaps much good. It is likely enough, to be sure, that Government would often throw out the unofficial members' Budget and have to introduce their own in its place. But gradually this would come to be felt undesirable if it could be avoided, and while members acquired more skill in producing budgets which had a reasonable chance of passing, Government, for its part, would come to study more seriously the popular point of view.

The purport of this proposal is to suggest a compromise between the fiscal autonomy demanded by Indians and the present system. By it Indians would have the opportunity, if not of forthwith removing, yet at least of systematically dealing with, a number of fiscal grievances. The use which they could make of the privilege would depend upon their own ability. If year after year they

could introduce more equitable financial proposals than those of Government, the fact would soon come to be appreciated.

V. VILLAGE COMMUNITIES.

This general line of policy, if followed, would naturally involve an attempt to revive and develop village communities in India. How this is to be done, what powers should be transferred to them, whether at the expense of the law-courts or of some executive authority; in what relation they should stand to other institutions which touch village interests; whether they should receive new powers for the protection of villagers against the encroachments of zemindars; whether a central Provincial, and ultimately Imperial, organization—a kind of Peasants' Union representing village interests and resting upon the village *panchayets*—is practicable, all this I am not competent to discuss. But quite independently of intimate knowledge of village conditions in India it must be evident that if Congress Nationalism is to be rejected on the ground that the prior development of the rural population, economically and politically, is necessary or desirable, some further steps for promoting the said economic and political development of the rayat seem to be called for.

To sum up, then, these suggestions which with much hesitation I venture to make:—

(a) A set term should be placed during which India shall, even against the will of the political classes, remain a dependency of England. Autonomy should then come suddenly, as in the case of South Africa.

(b) In return for this definite pledge of autonomy within a definite time Indians shall be held pledged to abstain from disaffection and from persistent agitation.

SUGGESTED SOLUTION—SOME PROPOSALS 85

and criticism of Government, under penalty of a prolongation of British rule for such and such a longer period.

(c) The intervening period should be occupied with active preparation for autonomy on lines approved in advance by Government (as opposed to concession to popular wishes, the initiative coming from Government, or from individuals acting on lines approved in a general way by Government).

(d) The education of the country to self-government should consist, so far as possible, in semi-official local activities, which would amount to the exercise of departmental powers and personal government by the individual in some sphere in which he might be specially interested (as opposed to the Nationalist conception of self-government, which consists in the privilege of voting for representatives to municipal, provincial, or Imperial assembly). The country should be educated to Direct (as opposed to Representative) Self-government.

(e) The subject-matter of popular self-administration in India should be general needs, and especially the needs of the poorer classes, politics becoming a kind of extension of welfare-work (as opposed to the pursuit of Government appointments and other financial benefits for the class and sect to which one may oneself belong). In this way a double object may be attained: useful enterprises may be undertaken which would otherwise be shelved, and the political interests of Indians directed into better channels than they would spontaneously take. Factory Acts, and the like, being as truly "politics" as self-interested agitations.

(f) The Budget should be introduced by Indians.

(g) Village communities should be revived and developed, while free education should be introduced and peasants'

unions started, and other means inaugurated to promote the welfare of India as an essentially agricultural country.

(h) With the continuance of the present system of government, which is virtually that of the Mauryan Empire, steps should be taken to secure to India the due share of dignity which she might still possess even under British rule. The means suggested is that of Indian Deputy Governors.

(i) The unity of India should become a far more definite principle of government than it is at present. This should be sought especially by two means: the unity of the electorate and the unity of the educational system. Nothing would give better proof of honesty of purpose than the pursuit of this aim on the part of Government, nothing could more give rise to the suspicion of political guile than the appearance of following the maxim of *Divide et impera*.

(i) Every citizen should vote as a citizen and not as a member of a community. If any minority is found to be unfairly excluded from its due share of representation upon the existing councils of the country, that minority can be given special representation. Thus, for example, if Mohammedan interests require special attention, provincial Colleges of Islam could be formed as registered societies for promoting the welfare of that community in the province in question, and could receive special representation upon the Legislative Councils like the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. But the ordinary Mohammedan citizen should vote as a citizen of India and not as a Mohammedan.

(ii) Every boy educated in India should be educated under the same system of education, culminating in the Indian universities. Above all, every European or Eurasian boy educated in India should be compelled to study

SUGGESTED SOLUTION—SOME PROPOSALS 87

some vernacular with its literature, and if, in addition, he had to take up Sanskrit instead of Latin, so much the better. When different educational traditions have such a lamentably divisive influence in the country, when lack of appreciation of the excellences and the greatness of the Indian spirit lead to so much mutual ill-will, it is wantonly wicked to set up an independent Eurasian system of education, and to encourage Eurasians in their national vice of preferring to be pseudo-Europeans and bad citizens rather than to be what they are and good citizens of India. The reasons given for it are mere make-believe. It is entirely untrue that the Indian High School system is "unsuited" to Eurasians. The truth is that Eurasians do not want to suit themselves to the system because they are unworthily ashamed of the blood of their mothers, and because they wish to obtain Government posts, which they know they could not obtain in fair competition with Hindus, and when Government supports them it can hardly complain if it is suspected of wishing to keep the country divided.

And while thus pursuing a policy of active preparation for the future independence of India, Imperial citizenship must be made more of than it sometimes is at present; it must be made an adequate substitute for autonomy.

CHAPTER VII

IMPERIALISM

THE word "Imperialism" has fallen on evil days. It is now popularly used in the sense of "a desire to conquer and rule over foreign countries." But surely its correct use is with the meaning, "The principle that the Empire should, so far as possible, be treated as a single political unit." Thus, "Austrian Imperialism" should mean "the policy of treating the various races which are comprised under the dual monarchy as a single political whole—as being, in fact, politically all Austrians—rather than as so many separate peoples." Where an empire exists two opposite lines of policy are possible: on the one hand the tendency towards local separation and independence, on the other the policy of amalgamation and unity. The former is Nationalism, the latter Imperialism. The attempt to attain unity by the subjugation of the weaker elements in an empire to the stronger is, indeed, an Imperialism of sorts, but it is a very crude and elementary sort. If the subject races are white it aims at forcible assimilation, if coloured, at keeping them in a state of helotage. This kind of Imperialism may be called pseudo-Imperialism, because it does not carry out the implications of the political unity upon which it itself insists—or, better, simply "despotism." The opposite method of seeking Imperial unity through willing consent, based

upon a system of mutual rights and obligations, is Ethical Imperialism.

Now it was pointed out above that it is a weakness of Nationalism in India that, appealing, as it does, to Indian interests and sentiment as opposed to British, it tends to bring about a state of friction between the races in India, and that an Englishman will "take up" the Nationalist cause only, as it were, from the outside, and from motives which we cannot expect to be widely predominant. There is something a bit abstract and unnatural about an English Indian-Nationalist, inasmuch as he thinks and speaks as though he were not English. But an Englishman can be an Ethical Imperialist without thereby annulling the national element in his own character. It is not merely as a man that one may be interested in the freedom and progress of India, as of China, Russia, and other non-British countries. As an Englishman one may be deeply anxious that England should do the right and worthy thing. Even if my country is poor, or is being cut out by some trade-rival, or for any other reason needs to develop resources which are, or might be, at her disposal, these considerations seldom deserve the virtually exclusive attention which we are tempted to bestow upon them. What is it to me, *as an Englishman*, whether Mr. John Smith, or his chief competitor, Babu Narendranath Ghose, becomes the richer man? But the honour of England is much to me. I have a share in the greatness and goodness of a Bentinck, a Lawrence, a Canning; a share in the indignant love of justice which, scorning popularity, punished a crack cavalry regiment for a crime against a subject race; a share in the action taken by a yet later Viceroy against the indentured slavery of Fiji. As an Englishman, I have a share in all this greatness and goodness, though I could do nothing

great or good myself. But I have no share in Mr. John Smith's dividends; even if his wealth and that of his fellow-merchants and manufacturers does get me off a penny in the pound income-tax which I would otherwise have to pay a common Englishman's share in the moral greatness of England is worth a penny. Ethical Imperialism, therefore, ministers to a specifically English interest. But it also ministers to an Indian interest, in that through it India obtains the rights and privileges of Imperial citizenship. It accordingly affords that common basis for Indian and English co-operation in the tasks of Indian citizenship of which we are in search. The Indian Nationalist seeks a separate Indian good, which tends to evoke Anglo-Indian opposition. The Anglo-Indian Despotist seeks a separate, quasi-English good, which calls forth the resentment of India. But if the Englishman is a politically moral man, and if the Indian has learnt to think and speak as a member of an empire which must move as a whole, and therefore more slowly than India herself would wish, then there is hope. All things come to those who wait, provided that they maintain a worthy attitude and spirit, and they will come to India. For the present the right atmosphere is more important than immediate fruition, and for the spread of that atmosphere in both communities the explicit adoption of Ethical Imperialism both by Indians and by ourselves would be invaluable.

It may be objected that Ethical Imperialism is vague, and prescribes a sentiment rather than outlining a policy. That sentiment, however, implicitly contains a great deal of policy which will become quite definite enough for any administrator as soon as the occasion for applying its principles arises.

No clearer case for the application of Ethical Im-

perialism to practice has occurred than that of the Indians of South Africa. A community of British subjects, possessed of no means of self-defence, except in the British Government, were suffering oppression within the Empire itself. The facts of the case are admirably set forth in Mr. Henry Polak's book entitled *The Indians of South Africa*, a painfully illuminating collection of detailed facts.¹ In order to right their wrongs, the Indians of South Africa determined to expose themselves to all the cruelties which the Transvaal Government could inflict. Rather than accept the position of "Helots within the Empire," they preferred imprisonment, hard labour, floggings, privations, cold, and semi-starvation. These passive resisters included both men and women. Their leader was Mr. M. K. Gandhi. Some of them died under the hardships inflicted upon them. Within eighteen months about two thousand five hundred sentences of imprisonment, mostly with hard labour, had been inflicted in the Transvaal. The Indians carefully abstained from violence, and when the European strike occurred the passive resistance movement was suspended, since the Indians had determined to depend upon spiritual force alone, and refused to profit by the embarrassments of the Government. This occurred twice. When pledges were given by the Government, or when there seemed a prospect that their case would be listened to, the Indians for a time dropped their movement. But when pledges were broken and hopes disappointed the Indian community plunged into suffering again, and by its suffering sought to appeal to the Empire to regard the justice of their cause. This continued for six years. But no arson, no outrages, no virulent language. Simply the appeal of

¹ Published by G. A. Natesan & Co., Esplanade, Madras.
Price 1 rupee.

wrongfully inflicted suffering. In the year 1913 India was profoundly moved by these occurrences. Indignation meetings were being held all over the country. It was under such circumstances that a meeting was held at the Town Hall in Calcutta, one of the speeches delivered at which I now venture to reproduce. I quote it unaltered from the report in the *Bengalee* (December 5, 1913):—

"Let me commence by telling you why it is that I, as an Englishman, feel so strongly the obligation which rests upon the members of my own race to openly take our stand on the side of the Indian community in South Africa at this present moment. For indeed I do strongly feel that we shall be false to our own highest ideals, our most sacred national obligations, if we do not give our support to India in this crisis.

"We, as a nation, have identified ourselves in our past history, above all with the recognition of the ideal of freedom. Freedom, we have always believed, is of the very essence of adequate national existence. You may remember that we ourselves at one time were suffering under disabilities in South Africa, and what feeling was aroused by Sir Alfred Milner's dispatch which described the condition of the English settlers there as a state of helotage. Our Indian fellow-subjects are now suffering under a much worse helotage than anything which we had to bear. Shall we not identify ourselves with the cause of *their* freedom?

"If we do not feel the chain
When it works another's pain
Are we not base slaves indeed—
Slaves unworthy to be freed?

"Is it freedom but to break
Fetters for our own dear sake
And with leathern hearts forget
That we owe mankind a debt?

" Truest freedom is to share
All the chains our brothers wear,
And with heart and hand to be
Earnest to make others free.

But England is bound in honour to stand by India in this matter, not only for the sake of humanity and the principle of freedom in general; still more are we bound to do so by our own Imperialism and by the position which we have taken up in India. We who think so much and talk so much about freedom—what answer do we give to Indians when they say, 'Freedom must be good for us, too; give us *Swaraj*'? Our answer is: 'We are very sorry, but circumstances here are so peculiar that we honestly do not think that any such ideal is practicable for the present or for a long time to come. But we will give you something else instead, which will give you just as much real freedom. We will give you Imperial citizenship. Learn to feel yourselves members of a great empire, whose function is to provide the political basis for the union of East and West. Be loyal to the Empire, and the Empire will be loyal to you. Look upon King George as your own Emperor, who, through his Ministers, will care for and protect you as his own children. You shall have all the privileges which the other members of the Empire enjoy. In England and India you shall have the same privileges as the English, and you shall be free to live wherever the British flag waves—in Canada, in Australia, in South Africa—upon equal terms with ourselves.' We have, indeed, in effect said that to India, 'We have asked for loyalty—why? Because the very idea of an empire presupposes the loyalty of all its separate parts and classes to one another. There is no sense or principle in loyalty unless it is mutual. We may be a long while in becoming conscious of what exactly it is

that mutual loyalty must involve. I do not, for instance, believe that it means that the Government of India ought always to act in accordance with popular wishes. But the main principle is clear, and it is the main principle which is now at stake. Does England mean to be loyal to India? Will England accept the imperial responsibility of being absolutely just and impartial between man and man, creed and creed, race and race? Will England dare to be just and impartial when the issue is one between men of her own race and those who are, indeed, British subjects but are not of British blood? If she will not, she will be false to her own Imperialism, for Imperialism, if it is honest, must involve the recognition of imperial duties as well as of imperial rights.

"The objection is, of course, at once raised that the underselling of white labour and trade created a serious difficulty. To this I would reply, first, that from the debtor's point of view the payment of bills is often open to grave economic objections. Nevertheless justice and honour make the payment imperative. It is so in the present case. I have already tried to show that England is under an obligation in this matter—an obligation which transcends the question of economic policy. Natal is still more obviously India's debtor. One has but to remember the conditions under which the Indian colony came into existence, and what it is to which the Natal industries owe their development, in order to realize that Natal is India's debtor, and is in honour bound to pay her debts.

"Secondly, all countries must learn how to adjust themselves to changing economic conditions. The Asiatic settlement is not a more disturbing factor in the economic system than the introduction of machinery or the rise of trades unions. The closest analogy to the anti-Asiatic

movement in the colonies is anti-Semitism in certain countries of Europe. In this case most Englishmen will be of opinion that the economic reasons adduced in support of anti-Semitism are no sufficient justification for so uncivilized a policy.

"Thirdly, here in India *swadeshi* enterprise has to suffer from European competition. Not so very long ago there were, for instance, two *swadeshi* steamship companies which were undersold out of existence by a European line. If it is right for the South Africans to prohibit all *bideshi* trade, or labour, with which South African enterprise cannot compete, *swadeshi* lines, dhotis, etc., ought to be protected against competition here. If, on the other hand, the latter course is incompatible with Imperialism, so ought the former to be.

"Fourthly, the exclusion of Asiatics is not a necessary consequence of the premisses upon which it is based. If the South African or Canadian Government is afraid that the price of labour will be brought down too low, it is in their power to fix a minimum rate of wages. If they are apprehensive lest it should become possible to purchase useful commodities too cheaply, it is in their power to decree that nothing shall be sold in their shops, or hawked about their streets, at less than double its value. Indian and Colonial trade could then compete on this basis. The plain fact is that the plea of economic necessity is simply the confession of the settled determination to perpetrate an economic injustice. Is it just that Indians should enjoy neither the advantages of free competition nor those of protection? Is it fair that when it is to the advantage of their rivals to have free competition there should be free competition, and that when it is to their advantage to have protection there should be protection?

"Now let us for a moment consider the respective consequences of agitation and acquiescence. We sometimes hear the agitation decried on the ground that it must embarrass General Botha, and cause irritation in South Africa. We have no illwill towards General Botha, and do not want to embarrass either him or any one else, nor do we want to irritate South Africa. But there is no help for it. We must either abandon our highest principles, or we must, however regretfully, consent to embarrass the Union Government. The embarrassment of General Botha may be regrettable, but it is a small matter in comparison with the issue that is at stake. It was in South Africa itself that the remark was made that you cannot make omelettes without breaking eggs, and that is true of the present case also. Suppose even, that a dispute arose which led to the separation of the Colonies from England, what of that? It is better to lose colonies than to be false to principle. If the Colonies are going to drag England down, it would be better to let the Colonies go. But if England weakly yields to South Africa, what will be the consequences of *that*? The consequences will be that England will have to bear her share of responsibility for driving men into indentured slavery and driving women to sell their honour by means of this iniquitous poll-tax. England will have to bear her share of responsibility, too, for the great conflict which is threatened hereafter—the conflict between the white and coloured races brought on by the white races seizing all the best parts of the world and excluding the coloured races. If there is any part of the world where a *modus vivendi* can be developed it is the British Empire. If England takes the wrong side the consequences will be much more serious than the embarrassment of General Botha.

"What, then, are we to aim at? What should be India's policy? When those very able articles on repatriation occurred in the *Statesman* I was at first persuaded by them, and regarded repatriation as the true policy. But I since came to the conclusion that repatriation surrendered the whole principle of Imperialism and merely purchased a temporary respite, leaving India in a weaker position when the next struggle comes. Our only hope lies in Ethical Imperialism, and, consciously or unconsciously, the Indian coolies and traders of South Africa are fighting the battles of Ethical Imperialism, and until the principle of equal rights under the British flag is recognised, at least as an ideal and as the ultimate aim of Government policy, it is as well that there should be trouble. I would ask my Indian friends to keep this aim steadily in view, but at the same time to be very patient, for progress is bound to be slow. We cannot expect to overcome the crass selfishness, the unimaginative stolidity, and the narrow outlook which are our real enemies. But we can demand that the British Government should explicitly recognise the principle of equal rights and equal honour under the British flag. This recognition has not yet come, and therefore, if you have the courage to do so, 'Fight on, fight on.' What you have to aim at is to gain from the Home Government the explicit admission that Indians *ought* to enjoy equal rights with the white races wherever the British flag flies. Whether or not it is practicable to put this ideal into immediate practice is another matter. First get it recognised."

I hope I may be pardoned for thus quoting at length my own words. I will now quote words which carry more weight. In Mr. Polak's little encyclopædia on the subject, already referred to, quotations will be found

from the speeches or articles of a number of distinguished administrators and statesmen, strongly supporting the cause of the Indians.

Sir Raymond West said : " The people in South Africa, the people in Australia, the people in all parts of our Colonies, must bring home to themselves that they are parts of a great organism, and, being such parts, must necessarily sacrifice some feeling, for which sacrifice they must be prepared, and if not so prepared, they are not fit to be parts of this great organism. If you cannot arrive at a position like that—if you cannot reach some organization in which such sacrifice will become the pride of every member of the Empire—you are not fit to be an Imperial race."

Colonel Seely said : " If persons are admitted (into British Colonies) they must be given civil rights. 'Free' or 'not at all' seems to me the sound principle for the British Empire. . . . If any one is admitted under the British flag, he must be a potential citizen, and must, sooner or later, be given equal rights with all other men."

Sir Charles Elliot wrote : " What is wanted is . . . that all civilized citizens of the British Empire, whatever their colour, language, or creed, should associate as equals."

Sir Lepel Griffin said : " I beg your lordship (Lord Elgin) to think and to remember that, besides the Indians of Indian birth, against whom the insults of this ordinance are directed, there are the whole body of Indian officials, to whom I and most of the members of this deputation belong, who are insulted with the natives of India."

That is very finely said. Besides the quotations from which these extracts are drawn, there are quotations from Lord George Hamilton, Lord Selborne, Sir George Napier, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Sir Charles Bruce, Sir William Markby, Sir Roper Lethbridge, Lord Ampthill,

Lord Roberts, Lord Curzon, Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Harold Cox, Lord Stanley, Lord Morley, Lord Reay, Sir George Birdwood, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. Scott, Lord Milner, and Mr. Alfred Lyttelton. Common to all of these notable men seems to have been a standpoint of Ethical Imperialism, admirable sentiments, and complete inability to make the slightest impression upon South Africa. Finally an impression was indeed made, but it was produced by the Indians themselves, especially by Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Gokhale, by the European sympathizers with the Indians in South Africa itself, by Mr. Andrews, and by Lord Hardinge. The whole situation was beyond the grasp of Westminster.

It was in November 1913, when the tide of indignation in India was threatening to swell into disaffection, that Lord Hardinge received a deputation from the Madras Mahajana Sabha and the Madras Provincial Congress Council. In his reply Lord Hardinge, speaking of the laws levelled against the Indian community of South Africa, said :

"(These are) laws which they (the Indians of South Africa) consider invidious and unjust, an opinion which we who watch their struggle from afar cannot but share. . . . In all this they have the sympathy of India, deep and burning—and not only of India, but of all those who, like myself, without being Indians themselves, have feelings of sympathy for the people of this country. . . . I trust the Government of the Union will fully realize the imperative necessity of treating a loyal section of their fellow-subjects in a spirit of equity and in accordance with their rights as free citizens of the British Empire. You may rest assured that the Government of India will not cease to urge these considerations upon His Majesty's Government."

The effect of these words upon Indian feeling was almost magical, and to them more than to anything else may be attributed the loyalty of India in 1914. For the first time in their history the Empire had begun to mean something which appealed to their hearts. Before that it had to them meant merely the domination of foreigners who treated them as inferiors, appropriated a considerable portion of their wealth, and were never tired of insisting upon the greatness of the blessings, boons, and benefits, which this domination conferred upon the dispossessed, and the paramount duty of loyalty incumbent upon the latter. The freedom, the citizenship, the privileges, the world-wide protection, which they were given to understand British rule always involved, were not for them. But here was something different. Here was no non-committal hedging; no sitting upon two stools. "I trust that the Colonies will realize the imperative necessity of treating Indians in accordance with their rights as free citizens of the British Empire. I do not intend to let this matter drop." That is the way not only to win the loyalty of India, but, what is more, to deserve it.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONCEPT OF EMPIRE

AN empire is a heterogeneous chunk of humanity held together as a political unit by contentment, or by the will of a paramount Power, or by both, and transformed (so far as Imperial statesmanship is successful) into a new whole which is more than the sum of the parts. As contrasted with more natural political associations, such as the nation, or a federation, such as the dreamed-of United States of Europe, or an organized class-interest, such as the "solidarity of Labour," an empire appears like a chance cross-section of humanity. It seems at first to be all diversity. Such different races—such different economic interests—such different circumstances and traditions! What in the case of other bodies and interests are external relations—the relation of nation with nation, local interest with local interest—here, in the case of an empire, become internal relations, and give rise to problems of internal reconciliation in the place of competition with alien bodies. An empire is the world on a small scale, and the solution of the problems of empire would go far towards the solution of the problems of humanity generally.

In early times the basis of society was community of race. Nationality was racial, and rested upon the idea, real or fictitious, of consanguinity. Religion was racial

also; in short, a pronounced racial character is a distinguishing mark of primitive institutions and primitive thought. Next comes the feudal stage. The political unit is now determined by the chance limits of the king's dominions. The king has more authority than the primitive chieftain, and his rule is less bound by the immemorial custom of the tribe. Government is personal, and loyalty becomes the all-important virtue. We then come to the third stage in man's political development. Man is now bound by numberless ties to a certain country or, as in the case of small city States, to a certain town. Nationality is determined less by blood than by habitation. It is the land which makes the nation. The race—it may be a new, mixed race—has lived out its experience in relation to it. The cities round which life centres, the buildings of which every citizen is so proud, the common system of government, common language, common history, common conflicts with neighbouring peoples, and in most cases its common religion—all these tend to make the land and its population the primary idea connoted by the word "nation." And although the racial point of view is far from being wholly lost, yet it becomes secondary to that of the nation as a political society having certain traditions, a certain history, a certain literature, and a certain public opinion of its own. Nationalism is the movement in any country for the realization of nationality in this sense.

Somewhat apart from this evolutionary series stands the fact of empire. An empire is a union of many countries under the primacy of one. Empires are of two kinds, those which rest upon federation and those which rest upon possession. The German Empire is an example of the former kind, the Roman of the latter. The distinction is not unimportant, but it does not depend so much

upon origin as upon character. The Athenian Empire originated in a confederacy, but it became an empire of possession. The British Colonial Empire, on the other hand, originating in possessions, has become a federation. A federated empire tends to become either a single nation on a larger and more complex scale, such as the German Empire, or so many separate nations. We are not here discussing empires of this kind. An empire, in the sense in which we are now concerned with it, exists only so long as the internal diversity and the corporate unity are both real and far-reaching, the bond of unity being the hegemony of the paramount Power. In this sense the British Empire is exclusive of the self-governing colonies. The Colonies belong to the Empire only so far as the moral influence of England is strong enough to determine their policy, institutions, and public sentiment. It was this fact of the dependence of the British Empire upon moral influence which Lord Salisbury had in mind when he spoke of it as "the triumph of the Moral Idea in the history of political organizations." But the Moral Idea is much more significant, and capable of a much fuller meaning in England's possessions than it ever can be in England's Colonies. For the Colonies the Empire is a sentiment, from which, indeed, very important political and military consequences may follow, but only so long as the sentiment lasts. But here in India it means partly sentiment, it is true, but partly also the hard facts of possession and military occupation. Here the law of Empire is apt to clash with sentiment—Hindu, Moslem, and also with purely British sentiment. Here divisive tendencies are strong, and group-interests and prejudices conflicting. Here, not only in great Imperial crises, but in daily life, the presence or absence of Moral Idea means so very much.

It has been a very common thing in the history of the world for a nation to own possessions. Certain lands outside its own borders belong to it, and it holds them as a source of wealth or military power. If these possessions are extensive, they, together with the nation holding them, are often collectively spoken of as empires. As examples may be taken the Spanish Empire and the ancient Persian Empire. We may call all empires of this kind commercial or military empires. They are hardly true empires at all; they are simply cases of possessions-holding nations—peoples with other peoples in their power.

The commercial or military empire is the starting-point of such empires as we are now considering. Ethical Imperialism rests upon the conviction that a noble type of political existence may be developed out of this very imperfect beginning—perhaps a higher type than is possible upon any purely national lines. Imperialism looks forward to a form of political society in which the parts shall find their most perfect development and highest well-being in their union with the whole—a society in which all parts are alike Imperial, and manifest, over and above all local peculiarities, a certain common character and tradition, which is the expression of the soul of the empire as a whole. What the Federation of the world, inspired by a spirit of common humanity stronger than all local jealousies, would be upon a vast scale, that an ethically governed empire would be upon a small scale more completely than would an ethically governed nation. We may thus say that whereas empire normally arises in the will of a single nation to find its Good in dominion over others, circumstances thereby tend to arise in which that same nation can henceforth find its Good only (or best) by substituting the conception of the good of the whole empire, itself included, for that

of its own separate advantage as a single nation. The same word "Imperialism" may thus stand for two such opposite ideas as "the exploitation of alien territories by means of military force" on the one hand, and on the other "the doctrine of a Common Good as applied to multi-national States." The contention is that an empire, as a fellowship of what would otherwise be a number of competing and conflicting nationalities, contains greater ethical and cultural possibilities than its various elements, as separate nations, would contain. The will to pursue the joint good of a vast complex of many races of manifold type, such as the British Empire, is in itself more ethical than the will to seek the narrow good of purely British interests. And further, the will to pursue a Common Good through fellowship and co-operation, in suchwise as a successful Imperialism implies, depends for its realization upon ethically higher conditions than do national politics. It is necessarily a policy regulated by principle and by a conception of a Higher Good to which all sectional selfishness must be subordinated. The policy of a mere nation, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the immediate interest of narrow groups. Self-interest and class-interest is in the foreground. It is upon sectional self-interest that the party system rests. For a party is not so much a school of political thought as rather the organization of certain sectional interests as against other sectional interests.

It may seem that this is simply to contrast an idealized Imperialism with a real, unidealized Nationalism. The argument, however, is not that empires tend to be highly moral, but that an empire, as a society possessing great internal diversity, is peculiarly dependent upon the Moral Idea, and that, given that, it is capable of a higher type of ethical and political development than a small State.

If all British children could be brought up in the consciousness of membership in a moral commonwealth, a Realm of Ends, in which the interests of race, class, colour, nationality, were transcended—at least in idea—by something bigger and better, a new era might be entered upon in the history of mankind. And note that what is here asked for is merely an idea. The desideratum is some concept which, while possessing a generally ideal character, shall yet be no mere fancy-picture, but shall be in such relation to actual facts that it could be believed in and made a guiding principle for political and administrative action. It must be fairly precise, and such that practical deductions could be drawn from it, even if many qualifying circumstances will have to be taken into consideration. Otherwise—if we are not prepared to draw practical deductions from it—an inflated ideal would only serve to add more hypocrisy to our materialism.

The first consequence of the idea of empire is that of Imperial citizenship. For the content of the Moral Idea expressing itself in social relations turns all men into comrades, servants into partners, subjects into fellow-citizens. It is just this idea of Imperial citizenship which is the crux of the present situation. For citizenship means, in some sense and form, enfranchisement, privilege, equality, liberty. The bestowal of these things may be gradual, and qualified by circumstances. But the essential character of an ethical Imperialism lies in the will that they shall become realities. Empire cannot legitimately be more than a temporary ideal. We are bound to work for something beyond when the British Raj and its ethics shall be for India a thing of the past. We are concerned with the *Meanwhile*. And perhaps that *Meanwhile* may be morally greater than the goal in which its labours will at last culminate.

One more point in conclusion. I have referred to the dream of a United States of Europe and to the conception of the solidarity of Labour. Any such consolidation of white interests would constitute a grave threat to the realization of true human fellowship. There are few things so dangerous to the coloured man's hopes of progress as the organized power of white trade and white labour. Thrust back from every opening by these interests, he can only look to the Imperial State as to the power which may to some extent be able to secure him the right to free development. White labour is as ruthless in its subordination of the claims of humanity to financial considerations as any "profiteer," when it is the claims of the coloured man which are in question. A few years ago, therefore, the world appeared to be slowly drifting towards a state of chronic war between the white and the coloured man. A black cloud was beginning to form on the distant horizon. The foremost leader of the white races in the coming struggle had already invented "the Yellow Peril" and painted a picture which showed the earth devastated with fire and sword in the name of Buddha. Well, if a struggle ever comes the fault responsible for it will be that of the white men, and a step in the direction of it will be the federation of white interests in some new form of white solidarity. The only ultimately true fellowship is the fellowship of humanity, in which all must share, and to which all must contribute—Englishmen and Indian, German and Japanese. None of us are such fine fellows as to be justified in looking down upon the coloured man as an essentially inferior being, or in excluding whole races from the privileges which we enjoy. For the present the path of progress is the way of empire, with its problems of bringing about fellowship, just relations, and racial reconciliation in

heterogeneous chunks of humanity. If our own empire can successfully achieve the task of creating, not merely so negative a thing as peace or so mechanical a thing as order, but fellowship, co-operation, and goodwill between all the varied races which it comprises, it will indeed have proved itself a triumph of the Moral Idea. And therewith it will have exhibited to the whole world the principles on which race can live in harmony with race and goodwill take the place of the strife that was to come.

CHAPTER IX

THE KING'S MESSAGE

WHEN the people of this country are disaffected and depressed, a message from the King can bring new life and hope. When Government and people have tied themselves up in an endless tangle, a royal word will put things right again. But it must be the real own word of the King himself, and not some empty verbiage dictated by a politician. The people of this country are disaffected and depressed to-day. They feel that they are being kept in the nursery by a foreign government; their great wish is for some means of escape from a position of inferiority which is humiliating to a gifted race of ancient fame. And with it all there is the awful feeling of hopelessness—the thought that, plead as they may, be as loyal as they may, the door of hope is shut against them. Yet this feeling could, to a very great extent, be dissipated by mere words. If, for instance, a Viceroy were to make some such utterance as the following, a change almost magical would be effected in the feeling of the country:—"We definitely and explicitly acknowledge the principle of equality of citizenship, and are proud to do so. As common subjects of the Emperor, Indians and Europeans in India are, so far as race is concerned, equals. Different degrees of success,

¹ On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the assumption of the government of India by the British Crown November 1908.

corresponding to differences of personal attainment and of opportunity, there must, of course, always be. But we are in duty bound to strive to eliminate race as the ground for any such distinction. If there are practical difficulties in the way of giving full immediate effect to this principle—if progress seems to be slow and ancient methods deeply rooted—I must ask Indians to be patient and to believe that it is only a matter of practical difficulties, of conflicting interests, and of the claims of expediency, and not a matter of unfaithfulness on the part of Government to an ideal to which it is pledged." If, I say, a Viceroy, or some even more exalted person, were definitely to acknowledge racial equality in principle, with whatever reservations as to immediate practice, he would do more towards allaying unrest in five minutes than could be effected in five years by establishing many democratic institutions or by letting loose hundreds of criminals.¹

¹ The literal truth of these words was proved by Lord Hardinge at Madras five years after they were written. The equality spoken of was meant as equality as regards the ordinary status and privileges of citizenship (e.g. in a court of law) and absence of that vague caste inequality which does not mean anything very definite but which in practice counts for much. "Do you mean that that babu is my equal?" a European once asked me. *That* equality. I did not intend to challenge the resolution of Lord Curzon's Government to the effect that "The rule of India being a British rule and any other rule being in the circumstances of the case impossible, the tone and standard should be set by those who have created and are responsible for it" and therefore "the highest ranks of civil employment in India . . . must . . . as a general rule be held by Englishmen." If this reservation makes the word "equality" unsuitable, it could be avoided: my present point is not so much equality as the value of the right word, usually in royal proclamations. It may, however, be observed that if the Fifty Years Settlement were adopted Lord Curzon's principle would involve no inequality at all: it would simply mean reasonable conditions for the English race in fulfilling a certain task which it had undertaken.

Now the criticism which I would venture to make of the King's Message is just this—that it has not enunciated any definite principle, that it contains no adequately cheering words of encouragement, that it leaves matters just where they were before, and is, in fact, not really a message at all. The evil of our times is due, not primarily to specific grievances, but to the deep suspicion entertained by Indians that all the acts of Government, however beneficial they may be, are alike inspired by a wrong principle. And in the face of this suspicion, the Secretary of State, speaking for the King, has failed to proclaim the true principles of British Government with sufficient definiteness to carry any weight or conviction. "Important classes among you"—so the Message runs—"representing ideas that have been fostered and encouraged by British rule, claim equality of citizenship and a greater share in legislation and government. The politic satisfaction of such a claim will strengthen and not impair existing authority and power." We have here a statement, not of principle, but of a policy for strengthening existing authority and power. In another section the Message, referring to the "steps being continuously taken towards the obliteration of distinctions of race as the test for access of public authority and power," proceeds: "In this path I confidently expect and intend the progress henceforward to be steadfast and sure." Surely this "I confidently expect and intend" is a lamentably lame expression for a king to use. Here again there is nothing definite; nothing more than the effort of a truthful person who did not mean anything in particular to avoid saying more than he meant. Let us hope that kings will in future be allowed to write their own messages. We may then expect something a little more kingly than this feeble document. Let us have

first the right will, then the right appreciation of Indian conditions, then the right policy, and then the ringing proclamation of it in the name of the King.

I now see that what is far more needed is a proclamation to the effect that the Government of India shall not concern itself with promoting the interests of British capital. The Indian Government is virtually bound by a tacit mandate to keep those interests in view; its hands are bound, and it could not do its duty to the country, however much it would. This is the root of all India's troubles. It is not understood in England; I was myself interested for ten years in India in such things as goodwill, courtesy, social intercourse, education, co-operative credit, indenture, and the like, and yet (being apparently singularly dense) I never realized that this was what is wrong. There must be no loopholes or "excepts" about our repentance. The Government of India must not be concerned with any interests whatever except those of India herself and of humanity in general. Indians should concentrate their energies upon securing the explicit recognition of this principle.

APPENDIX I

I

SERMON TO SOLDIERS, PREACHED AT DUM DUM

WHEN a clergyman, who ordinarily has nothing to do with troops, comes to address soldiers, I believe he usually begins to talk about military things and to employ military metaphors, and merely shows that he understands nothing whatever about such matters.

Sometimes there is this amount of excuse for us—that the unusual occasion rouses ideas in us which we then want to express and talk about. Soldiers, just because they are soldiers, stand for ideas and principles, and so preach us sermons without words, which we clergy then try to express in words.

This morning I will try to tell you the sermon which you are preaching me. The main gist of it is this—that the ideal of chivalry is not nearly enough emphasized from the pulpit. You stand as the type of Christian chivalry, and thereby remind us that it is a great ideal which you represent, just as the old Rajput chivalry and the chivalry of Japan were great ideals.

Now what is Christian chivalry? Let us try to analyse the meaning of it and see what are the main ideas which it involves.

The first element in Chivalry, I suppose, is Courage. There must be readiness to face anything rather than be false to all that a man ought to be loyal to. There must be instinctive, unreasoning, uncalculating courage, like the heroism of the officers and men of the *Kiochu Maru*. As you know, there is heroism in the East and in the West also, and heroes

recognise one another and honour one another, to whatever land or people they may belong. There is a brotherhood of chivalry, and they who have part in it are raised above the narrowness of race and nationality. There is a comradeship of the brave, whether friends or foes, which is realized, perhaps, only among those who live in daily readiness to lay down their lives. Such things are beyond the sphere of our horizon—the moral horizon of those who only know what it is to live in peace and security—and perhaps we have no right to talk of them. But we can see that chivalry does to some extent raise men above the narrowness of racial feeling.¹

Then comes the second element in chivalry—and that, I think, is Indignation against all wrong—against meanness, against injustice, against brutality. Such indignation shows itself in zeal to right the wrong, to break every yoke, to let the oppressed go free. Where the weak and helpless are trodden underfoot, where monstrous wrong is wrought upon the earth, the knight, the true soldier—for every true soldier is a knight at heart—burns to go forth to overthrow the evil-doer. He will face hardships and privation, wounds and death, in order that righteousness and justice may again be established in the earth. He will make the sacrifice gladly and cheerfully, nay more, with a deep mysterious happiness, for his own heart will bid him do these things, and he will feel that in doing them and in suffering through so doing he becomes, for the first time, his own true self.

The third element in chivalry to which I want to call your attention is Courtesy. There is knightly speech as well as knightly deed. And knightly speech is gentle and considerate towards all, and especially towards the weak. To speak and behave in a bearish way towards those whom we

¹ A chivalrous respect for a brave and honourable enemy is common in time of war. It was of such cases that I was thinking. But the principle of esteem for the brave, irrespective of nationality, could be extended to that of respect for a people, even though they might be an unwarlike people, who can produce such calmly heroic men as the Bengali police inspectors—men like Nripendra Ghose or Haripada Deb and many others—or the young Bengali apothecary, Nafar Chandra Kundu.

may, often very wrongly, regard as our inferiors we feel at once to be a sign of ill-breeding. For to be gentle in our demeanour, even towards those whose own manners are defective, is one of the marks of a gentleman, and it is a far more effective way of dealing with men than the vulgar method of meeting ill-manners with worse.

These, then, are the main outlines of the ideal of chivalry we are considering. There are other elements which we cannot now touch upon, but I think that Courage, Zeal in righting the wrong, and Knightly Courtesy and consideration towards all men, but especially towards those whose right to courteous treatment is not enforced by social etiquette, and Loyalty to all that to which a man ought to be loyal to—these things at least are parts of chivalry.

Now we must remember that chivalry does not come of itself. We must first recognise its beauty, then we must deliberately cultivate it, in spite of all inclinations to the contrary. For there is a bit of the churl in all of us, and the churl is just the opposite of the true knight. He is a coward; he cares nothing about righting the wrong; in fact, he is often the cause of abominable injustice and oppression himself. In speech and conduct he is abject towards those in high estate, but bearish towards those who have no social protection.

And, as I said, there is a bit of the churl in all of us—a bit of the coward, the brute, and the boor. You can be brave when the enemy to be faced is a fabulous monster, or a battery of artillery. But suppose the enemy were your own friends and suppose they should sneer at you. Should you still be brave? It is not so very hard to right the wrongs of a beautiful damsel and to speak courteously to her. There is not much chivalry required under such circumstances as those. But suppose the wrongs to be righted were a babu's; suppose the person to be courteously addressed were an Indian manifesting some national habit or peculiarity that irritated us—should we still be courteous? Should we still wish to right the wrong?

And this brings me to my appeal. I appeal to your chivalry. Be chivalrous towards the people of this land. Be courteous and considerate in your speech towards them. They are a very sensitive people. They feel the humiliation of being

lorded over by foreigners. What should we feel like if foreigners ruled in London and flaunted it day and night before our eyes that we were a conquered people to be treated with contempt? And when it is we who are ruling, is it chivalrous that we should behave as boors? You know the abominable things that sometimes happen in railway carriages in India. Oh, the shame, the shame, the shame and disgrace of it to us!

I appeal to your chivalry. Be courteous to gentlemen in misfortune. And not only be courteous. Be right glad when they show anything of manly independence themselves, even though it be to our cost. Surely we cannot wish the people of this country to be abject—we cannot wish others to be what we ourselves despise?

(MS. apparently incomplete.)

II

SERMON PREACHED AT DARJEELING, 1906

WE often speak of following Christ's example, of becoming like Him, of His dwelling in us, and so forth. And as Christians it is quite right that we should so speak. Only we must remember that we cannot be like Him in general without being like Him in particular points. We cannot have the Spirit of Christ in a vague, mysterious way if the actual spirit of our lives, which comes out in all the daily details of work and pleasure and social intercourse, is fundamentally opposed to His. A living, practical religion is one that makes a real difference to our actual thought and speech. It is with regard to one practical detail of conduct that I wish, trying to be practical, to speak this morning. For what is the good of discussing Christian principles if we are not going to try to apply them? My practical point is simply this—that as Christians and as gentlemen we ought to make a greater point of consideration and courtesy towards our Indian fellow-citizens. There are not a few Englishmen in this country who behave in other respects as an English gentleman should behave, but who are occasionally most abominably rude towards Indians. They speak to them, if they have occasion to do so, with a marked brusqueness and almost snappish curttness that they would never think of employing towards another Englishman; they use, and take no trouble to conceal the fact that they use, rude and offensive words when speaking of them, such as "nigger."

I mention this in order that I may beseech you, by the gentleness and kindness of our Lord Jesus Christ, just to

* This term has fortunately to a large extent fallen into disuse during the last ten years.

make a practical point of avoiding terms and modes of address such as I have referred to which give far more pain than you imagine. Indians—I mean those who belong to the upper and middle strata of Indian society, in fact all except menial servants, coolies and so forth—are an extremely sensitive, in fact almost hypersensitive, people. Any mode of speaking to them or of them or of treating them which might be interpreted as implying their inferiority, or as implying contempt for them, hurts their feelings to an extent that would surprise us, and the unkind word rankles within them for years, probably for the rest of their life. Let me give you an example. A friend of mine, a high-caste Brahmin, but completely anglicized, had spent some time in England and speaks still with the warmest gratitude of the kindness he met with there. But on his return to India he found things were different. One day he got into a first-class railway carriage in which there was one other traveller, an Englishman holding a high position under Government. This Englishman was standing on the platform near the carriage, and called out to a friend who had come to see him off, "Hullo! I am travelling with a nigger," and my friend overheard him. That was some years ago, but that cruel word "nigger" still rankles in him and hurts him. He has had other humiliating experiences too. I feel we ought to think more of the way in which Indians look upon their relations with us. Let us try to look at things from their point of view. They are conscious that they are an ancient race with much to be proud of. Yet in their own country they are treated as inferiors by a race that has somehow come and planted itself over them as their superiors and everything that they can interpret as contempt for them they do so interpret, although in the majority of cases it is mere thoughtlessness and inconsiderateness on our part. Yet, as I said, they feel it very much indeed. As a well-known Indian gentleman, referring to this rudeness, once expressed himself to me, "Oh! but it hurts—it hurts." There is something in the thought that this cultured race is so dependent upon us as a nation that ought to appeal to any better feelings that we may

have. We ought not to lump them together with Zulus and Hottentots and "natives" and treat them in an off-hand way, any more than you would so treat an old nobleman in misfortune. But somehow or other when Indian gentlemen are present railway carriages in India seem to have the peculiar property of eliciting all the most unmannerly elements in our nature. Yet we are proud of the fact that the word "gentleman" is an untranslatable English word. Cannot we make just a little more point of being gentlemen inside railway carriages as well as outside them; when we have to do with Indians, as well as when we have to do with one another? It is all very well to entertain benevolent sentiments towards naked villagers or to admire the flowing robes and picturesque turbans which, in accordance with the general fitness of things, we think that Orientals ought to wear. But the real test of courtesy and goodwill comes in when we find ourselves in the presence of the ordinary babus whom we meet in our offices and in trains and trams.

And I would ask you to avoid the word "nigger" or "black" as applied to Indians, not only when they can overhear or otherwise come to know of it, but even when this is not the case. For the frame of mind which the use of these words will tend to give rise to is just that frame of mind which we want to get rid of, whereas if we make a point of speaking politely about Indians we shall find it easy to speak politely to them.

I should also like to add a word to Christian ladies on this subject, not so much on account of any evil directly done by them as on account of good so often left undone. Indians feel that they are not recognised by English society as they have a right to be recognised, and it is the ladies who legislate for society. It is the ladies who extend or refuse social recognition. It is, from the nature of the case, impossible for them to have nothing to do with these racial questions one way or another. By doing nothing you do a wrong. What must often, I think, happen is this: Mrs. Smith would gladly ask the Banerjeis or the Roys to dinner, but she is afraid she would mortally offend the Jones's who are coming that day. Mrs. Jones for her part would be quite willing to meet the Banerjeis or the Roys, but could never take the

initiative in asking them for fear of what Mrs. Smith would think.¹

We sometimes say that Indians are tied and bound by their traditions. But is it not the same with us? Surely our social customs, etiquette and traditions, ought to be consciously regulated by moral principles and Christian ideas. Why should not Mrs. Smith say: "My principle is that when I give a dinner I always ask some Indians. I am prepared to meet with adverse criticism, but I know that my Lord would not criticize me adversely. He Himself greatly scandalized His respectable friends by dining with tax-gatherers, who were not considered proper people to dine with in those days. I am prepared to meet with a good deal of unsuccess at first, but one can't expect to be successful all at once."

Let me give an actual example. Some years ago an Indian gentleman, holding at one time a very high position under Government, and his wife (who was known not to be *purdah nashin*) were in Calcutta. Two Calcutta gentlemen called on him. After they had gone an Indian called. He found that his host was by no means flattered by this visit of the two gentlemen of Calcutta. He knew perfectly well how calls ought to be paid. His comment simply was, "Have they not wives?" There was nothing whatever in the Indian's character or circumstances to excuse the wives of these two gentlemen from fulfilling their duty of calling upon his wife. They never considered. They never thought for themselves, perhaps, about the responsibilities of their position or their duty towards the inhabitants of this country. I suppose they had never been taught.

Schoolmistresses will know whether English girls are or are not taught to take an interest in the social and moral problems of the land in which they live; whether they are or are not taught to sympathize with all sorts and conditions of men and to have the wish to do their whole duty in the world. If not, and they grow up as the women that were at ease in Zion of whom the prophet speaks, I do not know that we can blame them so much. At any rate, from a

¹ Most unfortunately there was, unknown to me, a real Mrs. Jones that day in church.

Christian standpoint, it is far more important for them, as for the rest of us, to be alive to the great moral issues that are at stake around us and to love justice and mercy, than it is to be well informed about much that passes under the name of "religious teaching."

On the other hand, when we find ladies in high social positions who do make a point of trying to do their part as peacemakers to heal the ill-will and estrangement of the races, whether by availing themselves for Christ's sake of opportunities of inviting Indians to their dinners or dances or social gatherings of any kind, they are doing as good and Christian a work as if they were nursing the sick or clothing the poor or teaching the ignorant.¹

Surely this ministry of reconciliation is one which well befits their sex and their Christian profession. It is the work of turning to one another the hearts of those who are now estranged.

¹ Of course I mean "invite Indians to *the same* gatherings as those to which she invites her European acquaintances." To hold a special gathering for Indians with a few tame Europeans, who do not socially much matter, thrown in would not be felt by Indians to be the real thing. I was speaking with reference to Bengal. During the last ten years mixed social intercourse has considerably increased, and perhaps chiefly through the influence of ladies like Mrs. (now Lady) H.

APPENDIX II

FOR INDIANS TO CONSIDER

INDIA is about to sell her soul. Exasperated by a sense of her wrongs, she is about to surrender herself to that which she most condemns. She derides the materialism and commercialism, the bustle and hurry of the West; she declares that it rests upon a false conception of life, and contrasts with it (I am quoting Mr. Ramanathan) her own "ideal of living in the world, not for the pampering of the senses, but for the purification of the spirit and for its development in love and true knowledge"; the West "disowns the spirit," the East lives for it. Yet she is now about to plunge after the West in all those respects which she has been so ready to condemn. In order to be a great and prosperous nation like the nations of the West, she will have to immerse herself in commercialism like the nations of the West. India cannot expect to win for herself the position of a great trading community, and at the same time to wear the diadem of spiritual knowledge which she looks upon as her inheritance. If India attained to greatness in that respect long centuries ago it was not as the inevitable consequence of Indians being Indians, but of the fact that so many of her ablest men, age after age, devoted themselves to an unworldly ideal. The fruits of renunciation do not automatically present themselves, even to Indians, when the national mind is focused upon material prosperity. It may be that in gaining a place in the world India will lose her own soul, and therewith her power to serve the world in accordance with her own special function in it. But the question is hardly one with which Europeans can deal. It is for India herself, and that in this case means principally the more gifted of her young men at the moment

of their choosing their walk in life, to decide whether or not to make of the *ghi* with which she might wash her steps, a *prātaḥsavanam*. Is it not possible for India to frame a national policy for herself which is not based upon the imitation of the West, but upon her own professed ideals? India's real ideal will be that which finds expression in her political, social, and economic practice. But are Indian politics based upon anything different from those of the West?

This is perhaps the most suitable place to insert a dream which a mad Englishman dreamed. He was, in his dream, in India in the year A.D. 1950. He there learnt that a generation before that date the peoples of England and India had made two extraordinary resolutions and had even carried them out. England had resolved to be just and beneficent instead of talking about her justice and the benefits which she conferred. India had determined to pursue a spiritual ideal instead of talking about her superior spirituality. In 1950 the country was still governed, in the main, by British executive officials, but machinery existed whereby it was possible for the people to impeach these officials before the High Courts when they made themselves obnoxious, and to secure their dismissal. No legislative innovation was possible without the free consent both of Government and people. All that was necessary, however, to reach this consensus was the demonstration that the new proposal would probably promote the moral well-being of the country. India had herself elected to be governed in this way through fear lest the passions and rivalries of her own politicians should do her more harm than good. She had determined to take no part in the world-scramble that was then going on, but to remain a semi-closed country and to live deeply rather than breathlessly. The old land-revenue system which had been in practice at the beginning of the century had disappeared, and therewith the Permanent Settlement as a modification of it. The fiction that land-revenue represented rent paid to Government was no longer current. Government did, indeed, possess extensive farm- and forest-lands of its own, but that was another matter. In place of land-rent-revenue, whether in assessed or commuted form, Government obtained its resources from an income-tax levied upon a sliding scale upon all incomes of, or averaging, over sixty rupees a month,

whether derived from land or not. There was also a substantial poll-tax levied upon foreign residents coming from all countries in which Indians did not share equal rights with native citizens. The people of India had at first strongly objected to this tax, on the ground that it savoured of paltry resentment and tit-for-tattery. But Government had very strongly urged it on the ground that it was impossible for England to be just or truly Imperial unless she did something to redress the balance, and after a protracted discussion the majority of the Registered Associations throughout the country passed resolutions in favour of the tax as a concession to English susceptibilities.

No person, not even a Viceroy or ruling chief, was permitted to retain a private income in excess of 10,000 rupees a month. Anything above this amount belonging to him was credited to his account at the Government Bank instituted for this purpose. He could spend it as he wished upon any approved public object, such as this or that philanthropic institution, or the sanitation of some village, or upon public buildings, such as temples. Architecture was flourishing, and buildings which rivalled the Taj Mahal were rising in many places. No *pucca* building of any kind, however, could be erected without the approval of the District (or Provincial) Architectural Association. It was held that every pair of eyes in the country, including those of unborn generations, had a stake in the beauty of every building and the harmony of every scene. Picturesque *kutchas* structures, resting upon solid plinths or raised the requisite distance from the ground upon poles, were erected where means were not forthcoming for *pucca* buildings of an artistic character.

The alienation of land was prohibited, and no one could be employed as a factory hand, coolie, or servant by any private person or by any company who did not possess, or hold from Government, a certain minimum of land, or a share in a joint-holding. The rest worked upon Government farms or wharves, or in Government factories until they had earned holdings of their own. The effect of this legislation had been to check the influx of a large indigent population into the towns and to preserve the agricultural character of the country. Large factories were not encouraged, and the principle of the maximum exploitation of the resources of

the country, whether by Indians themselves or by foreigners, had been decisively rejected. It was seen to be incompatible with India's chosen ideal, with the conservation of the leisure necessary even to the moralized coolie, and with the quiet happiness of the population generally. Instead of attempting to compete with foreigners India had chosen to restrict both imports and exports. Only such goods were allowed to be imported as did not compete with native wares and which did not tend to create superfluous wants. Western furniture, for instance—a matter in which Indians had formerly shown a complete lack of taste, and which had helped to introduce that unpleasant mock-Westernism formerly so prevalent—was strictly prohibited. Handlooms were in use all over the country, and where necessary an octroi system had protected them against the competition of the mills. In place of the struggle for a maximum output Government would not permit the production of anything except that which was worth producing, and all inferior goods were confiscated by the Government inspectors without compensation. The aim throughout was to base Indian civilization upon quality rather than upon quantity—quality of work done, quality of goods produced, quality of the life lived, rather than upon the abundance of things made, sold, and squandered. Manufacture was regarded as existing to supply India's own needs, to provide scope for art, and to provide an educative means of livelihood for as many persons as possible. The use of machinery and production for export was regulated by reference to these considerations. It was the primary function of Government so to order all departments of life in the country that the Aryan Way could be followed by the whole community from the raja to the rayat. Or rather it was the function of Government to be continually surveying the whole field and to move the Associations, with its own co-operation, to take such steps to this end as were desirable. But the principal source of continually renewed inspiration was to be found in the renovated order of spiritual gurus. Numerous brahmavidyalays existed in various parts of the country where brahmacharis were trained in the principles of the moral and spiritual life, and where that yoga and tapas were exercised which is the source of spiritual power. When their training was completed these brahmacharis went out

as gurus into towns, villages, and families, and a guru (I am not using the term in its debased sense of "schoolmaster") was attached to every school. The gurus of every district were grouped in unions, or colleges, presided over by an acharya whose headquarters was the math. It was the duty of these gurus not only to promote the spiritual welfare of individuals, but also to maintain the spirituality of the national ideal. The conviction had come home to the moral consciousness of India that Indian spirituality, if it was to be true and real, must find expression in all departments of life. Though there is still a call, the gurus said, for the absolute vairagyam of the sannyasi in exceptional cases, to maintain its witness to the unreservedness of the demands of the Spirit, there is still greater and more urgent need of the qualified vairagyam of the Aryan trader, the Aryan cultivator, the Aryan lawyer, and all other sons of India. For the whole web of Indian life must be woven upon God, with God for its warp and God for its woof. That is India's vocation. Its realization shall be India's diadem. So said the gurus.

When the mad Englishman awoke he concluded that he had been trying in his sleep to see whether the general notion of Indian spirituality were capable of application in a practical, concrete form. It was not simply a matter of this or that nation's being moral, or not being moral. It was a question as to the possible bearing of India's professed ideal upon the problem of England and India.

राष्ट्रीय पुस्तकालय कोलकाता
National Library, Kolkata

Printed in Great Britain by

UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED, THE GREENHAM PRESS, WORKING AND LONDON

The International Solution

By H. E. HYDE

Crown 8vo. Cloth.

3d. net.

The author deals with what Mr. Lloyd George has described as one of our most important war aims—"The creation of some international organization to diminish the probability of war." He aims to show how the adoption by the Allies of international government (a complete scheme of which is contained in the book) and its inclusion in our war aims would in itself supply a basis for immediate peace negotiations which would insure to us the complete overthrow of militarism and a better prospect of security for the future than any military victory, no matter how complete, could hope to do.

Wars and Treaties, 1815-1914

By ARTHUR PONSONBY, M.P.

Demy 8vo. Paper Covers.

2s. net.

A very useful book of reference which gives briefly in a couple of pages the essential facts as to the origin and result of each of the forty principal wars in the last hundred years and the main provisions of the more important treaties.

Liberty, Equality, Fraternity

By REV. WALTER J. CAREY, CHAPLAIN R.N.

Fcap. 8vo.

2s. net.

In this book the author attempts to examine honestly and truthfully the ideas which underlie the popular phrases—Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. He finds a real divine quality in them, but points out how liable they are to abuse. He further sketches the part which the Church should play in the realization of a real Liberty, and acknowledges its failures and indicates its path to a better success in the future.

A Levy on Capital

By F. W. PETHICK LAWRENCE

Crown 8vo.

Cloth, 2s. 6d. net; Paper Covers, 1s. 6d. net.

The author interprets war finance in terms of national life and what has happened to the wealth of the country during the war. He discusses the problem of the national debt, and gives reasons why it should be met, when the war is over, by a levy on capital. He describes in a clear and popular way the method of imposing the levy and its probable results, financial and social, to the various classes of the community. The book contains facts and figures of value and interest to those who reject as well as to those who endorse the author's main conclusions.

The Way of Honour

By H. CARTON DE WIAERT

Crown 8vo. Cloth.

5s. net.

In this volume the Belgian Minister of Justice has collected a number of speeches made by him in the early months of the war. They form an eloquent commentary upon the more salient features of that period, the unity of the Belgian people both at home and abroad, their courage and constancy under their heavy trials, and their passionate devotion to the cause for which they and their Allies went to war. The events of the past three years have perhaps tended to obscure these things from us, and Mr. Carton de Wiaert's book is to be reckoned at this time as a valuable reminder to England of what she owes to Belgium. It is a debt that can truly never be repaid, but this is no reason why it should be forgotten.

Workhouse Characters.

By MRS. MARGARET WYNNE NEVINSON

Crown 8vo. Cloth.

3s. 6d. net.

"Workhouse Characters" is a series of short stories which have appeared in the *Westminster Gazette* and other papers, attracting much attention for the abuses brought to light, especially with regard to the law of coverture and the iniquitous legal and economic position of women under these out-of-date laws. Mrs. M. W. Nevinson writes with much power and sympathy, and her sketches have been called the best on the Poor Law since Dickens. Some time ago a grim little play, "In the Workhouse," was produced by the Pioneer Players, and attracted a storm of fury in the Press. The truth was too appalling for the innocent critics, though some of stronger fibre dared to praise: "The main value of the piece is that it is a superb genre picture. One or two of the flashes from this strange generally unknown world are positive sparks from life."

Jottings from the Front

By THE REV. KENNETH E. SHAW

Crown 8vo. Paper Covers.

2s. 6d. net.

The writer has himself served on three different Fronts in the present War, and, with touches of humour and pathos, gives his impressions of the social, moral, and religious life in the fighting area. Written while at the Front, the purpose is to give to those at home some insight into the ordinary life of the Tommy beyond the actual fighting.

LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LIMITED