

taxes are placed upon us and you say that the Act prevents you from interfering, we reply that at any rate you can make friendly representations that these things are unjust. We have never had yet the slightest announcement that any representation of a friendly character has ever been made to India at all. Now that is the position of affairs we find ourselves in. Let me repeat again the position that we hold and hold most strongly. It is that India, in its cotton industry, has no need for protection, that if cotton is the one thing that will balance the Budget by taxation, then a countervailing excise should meet the duty placed on cotton goods. We ask for no preference over anybody. All we ask is that we should be put on an equal basis with everybody else, and we think we have a claim from the record of our trade during the war and from the sacrifices that it has made since the war.

Sir William Barton I would like to recall the fact that this is a very old agitation. Many of us have been in this room time and time again, year after year. Up to 1916 our efforts did succeed in repelling taxation in India which was not counter-vailed by an excise. I want to represent, if I may for a moment, what I believe to be the true Indian view. I quite recognise that there is scarcely a politician in India who is not a Protectionist. I have not met one—and I have met a great many—who does not strongly desire protective duties for India. But I have some personal experience of India and of the intense poverty of the people of the country. They live in a state of poverty unknown in this country at any time or under any conditions, and I have no reason to believe and I have never heard any observations that would lead me to think that the ryot in India knows anything about this taxation. If he did know about it, and if he knew what has been admitted so fully to day by Mr Waddington, that it must of necessity increase the price of his clothing, I feel sure that, so far from it being a popular tax, it would be an intensely unpopular tax. Up to 1916 we did manage to oppose this taxation. I agree with what Mr. Tom Shaw has said that I think Mr. Chamberlain did treat badly at that time. It was an old agitation. Government after Government had yielded to Lancashire representations. Surely when there was to be a change of policy the interests concerned should have been consulted. I admit that it was done during a time of war, and that there was an offer of a hundred millions from the Government of India to assist in the war, and that being so we reluctantly in the end agreed that we would say nothing more about it. Then, Lord Winterton, I want you very specially to bear in mind that we had a perfectly definite promise

at that time that before anything further was done all interests concerned would be taken into consultation. The next thing we were confronted with was a further increase of taxation without any consultation whatever. I understand the justification for that to have been the new Government of India Act. The last time we were in this room, Sir, the experts brought forward by Mr. Montagu did not plead that Act, what they did say was that it was purely a fiscal measure, that the money had to be found and that it was considered that this was the best way to find the money; so that they were in clear conflict with the promise which had been made to us. Reverting for a moment to the Government of India Act, it does appear to me that there is nothing on the face of that Act which reduces the power of the Secretary of State in Council to intervene in these matters. I am aware that the report of the Committee does indeed imply such a power, but are we to be guided by the report of a Committee or by the legislation on the Statute Book? There is a clear conflict of opinion on that matter. I have read the Act many times and it seems to me quite clear that we have practically the same power although perhaps in a different spirit,—more a power of co-operation but still a power—and that we are still joint trustees with the Government of India for the condition of India. With that power in your hand I think we can fairly ask you to take into consideration the whole problem both from the Lancashire side—or rather I should like to say from the British side—and the Indian side. We do not contemplate anything in the way of antagonism between London and Delhi, nothing of the kind. Indeed, Sir, I think I may tell you this that a Sub-Committee of the Lancashire Members met in Manchester some little time ago and we were confronted with the fact that there was an intention amongst the manufacturers to raise an extensive public agitation. They had established a Publicity Committee, and we as a body came unanimously to the conclusion that we would do all we could to stop it or at any rate to postpone it and the deputation to you to-day largely arises from that. We are most anxious that there should be no public ill-feeling because we feel sure that it would do nothing but harm. But we also feel sure that you can do something to help us in this matter and that the past record of your predecessors in itself justifies you in doing so. What I do want to ask you is this: Do you think that under the Government of India Act you are able to some extent to help us in this matter; are you willing to do so, are you seized with our case and do you realise that Lancashire still has the same right of intervention which she had in the past? We come here with that friendly appeal asking for your friendly help.

An Impartial Observer & a threat'

Sir Ryland Atkins:—I speak for the moment as one who has no personal connection with the cotton trade but whose duty and whose inclination it has been to watch what is the effect of this controversy upon the Lancashire public of all kinds. I feel it my duty to assure you that what my friend Sir William Barton has said is perfectly true, that we have used every influence to prevent public agitation and to make our constituents and our friends realise the difficult position of Government as between India and England. At the same time we are anxious to impress upon you that the feeling of Lancashire in this matter is far graver, is far more widespread, is far more intertwined with the life of the country than would appear to be the case when there has been so little conspicuous public agitation. It goes beyond political differences. It transcends them. It affects dozens of businesses whose actual and personal connection with the cotton trade is not as close and intimate as is the case with many others. I do not want to lay stress on what has happened in the past but impressions have been given by Government in difficulties that they would do things that they were unable to do. There is a widespread impression that under the guise and the appearance of self-government, our Government is being compelled to do what an oligarchy of Bombay cotton merchants and cotton manufacturers require and is not doing that which is necessary or really required by the mass of the people. I cannot put the case quite comprehensively by referring to the well known passage in one of Sir Walter Scott's novels, with which Lord Winterton will be familiar, when King Richard Coeur de Lion was asked which was the more dangerous, Prince Kenelm of Scotland who was then under his influence or the Sultan Saladin, and the famous phrase was then used: "A wild cat in the chamber is more dangerous than a lion in the desert." Lancashire is close to help if it is not actually at the heart of the Empire, and we desire from you, My Lord, from Lord Peel, and from the Cabinet an expression of what we know to be your sense of statesmanship that real content at home is as vital, even more vital, than anything else for the preservation not only of Great Britain but of the Empire.

The Under Secretary's Reply

Earl Winterton:—No Government in power in this country could possibly under any circumstances afford to ignore representations made to it by such an important interest as that of the Lancashire cotton interest, even though it may not feel able to act upon those representations. I should like first of all to deal very

briefly with the constitutional point that has been raised. I will at once say that of course the ultimate financial responsibility under the Government of India Act rests with the Secretary of State, but I think it will be generally admitted that the Government of India must have wide latitude in deciding the steps to be taken in particular instances. I think no one would quarrel with that. I turn from that to deal, if I may do so, with the point of view of the deputation itself on this matter. If I were inclined to do so—but I want to avoid it if possible—I think I could put some of you in rather a dilemma. It is quite obvious that the universal teaching of history is that real self government in the long run is based upon fiscal autonomy. That is obvious. I regard this deputation as a friendly deputation but if I wanted to put you in a dilemma I would say this to you. All your arguments are really arguments against ever granting fiscal autonomy to India, therefore they are arguments against advance along the path to self-government which has been referred to by the late Secretary of State and others. If you accept my argument, real, complete, self government must always be based on fiscal autonomy. However, do not let us raise that point at this moment. I would only venture to say with all respect that sooner or later—when this question comes to be the subject of public controversy and public debate, not perhaps in this Parliament but in a future Parliament, when the advance is again made, which, I suppose, we all hope will be made as anticipated by Parliament—then Parliament will have to make up its mind when the question is most emphatically brought up of the cotton interest of Lancashire, with all its magnificent record of service and devotion to the Empire, on which leg it stands, whether it is prepared to say it will grant complete fiscal autonomy to India or not. I admit the question does not arise at the moment, but I think it is legitimate to refer to it at this point. Sir William Barton said that it is known to everyone who knows India that there is not a politician in India who is not a Protectionist, from which it follows that if a future Government—it may be a Labour Government or any other Government—gave complete fiscal autonomy, it would be assumed that it would be the wish of the people that they should have a protective system. So that while some of you may think it is dangerous ground for the India Office, it is also dangerous ground for the Lancashire cotton interest because sooner or later in the long run it will put you in a dilemma. I come now to a much easier part of the case from your point of view, and my point of view, in which you ask—and if you will allow me to say so, I think it is a perfectly fair request—that there should be the closest co-operation between the Government of this country and

India in these matters. I am sure you will agree that it would be wrong for me to make any statement on that subject in the absence of the Secretary of State, but I may say that I feel convinced in my own mind that the Secretary of State would agree most fully and freely to the suggestion that the closest co-operation should exist. The other matter that you dealt with was of somewhat the same kind. You asked that the views of your great industry might be represented very clearly to the Government of India, and that they might at all times be kept in close touch with your views, and particularly with your views, on particular instances that may arise. I think I can without committing any breach of rules of etiquette in the absence of the Secretary of State give a complete assurance on that subject. So far as my humble duties in the House of Commons are concerned, I consider it is one of the most important of them to keep in touch with the honourable gentlemen who form the deputation and constantly to hear their views, and, although I may not agree with them, to represent them to my chief, and to ask him, as I know he will do, to represent them to the Government of India. Having dealt with the question in principle, I now turn to one or two matters that have been raised with regard on the duties themselves. I should like to point out in the first place that as a result of the action taken in the Legislative Assembly both the Customs Duty and Excise Duty are in *statu quo*, that they are in the same position as they were last year. Relatively you are no worse off than you were last year.

Mr. Ben Tilghit We were better off then. There is not much comfort in that statement of yours—is there?

Earl Winterton Except this, that if your arguments are correct, you would have been worse off had they passed the increased duties. That is my only reason for referring to it. As a matter of fact you are slightly better off because the rest of the tariff has been raised. I think it is fair that everyone should realise that the cotton duties will now be 4 per cent below the general tariff, so that, taking the case of a gentleman not coming from the Lancashire district but from some other part of England who is an importer into India of other goods, he might say: "I am worse off relatively than the Lancashire cotton interest." That is the effect of what has happened in connection with the Budget, so that Mr. Shaw's point that the cotton trade has become the Cinderella of the trades does not apply so far as India is concerned, because cotton is 4 per cent better off than other trades. It is no part of my duty to speak as regards the attitude of the Government here towards the matter generally.

Mr. Tom Shaw : There is no comparison between the cotton and any other trade in India.

Earl Winterton : I was well aware of the predominance of the cotton trade ; I was not so ignorant as not to be aware of that, but still there are other imports into India from this country, and no doubt the persons who run those trade here are anxious to increase those imports; they wish to do trade.

Mr. Greenwood : May I ask the noble lord if he will deal for a moment with the point raised about splitting the difference between customs and excise?

Earl Winterton I am afraid you will not regard this as satisfactory because I can make no sort of promise or statement as to alterations of the duty in the Budget next year. I can only make representations. I will put your representations before the Secretary of State. I should like before I sit down to make a suggestion. It is sometimes said that the Members of the Government (I am afraid it is true of some Ministers, I do not mean in this Government, but in Governments I have seen) are not always willing to have a discussion in the House of Commons, but I venture to say in this case that I think it would be very useful if these questions were raised in the House of Commons and we had a discussion. I would welcome and I believe my honourable friend would welcome an opportunity of having a further debate on the subject when it can be explained more in detail.

The Indian Debate

HOUSE OF COMMONS—15TH JUNE 1922

The House of Commons went into Committee of Supply on 15th June 1922 when on the motion for the India Office vote a general debate on the Indian situation ensued. The following are important extracts from the debate.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That a sum, not exceeding £75,000, be granted to His Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1923, for a contribution towards the cost of the Department of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council including a Grant in Aid."—(Note: £45,000 has been voted on account.)

The Under Secretary of State for India (Earl Winterton): As the Committee is aware, this Vote is almost the only occasion within the Parliamentary year when the affairs of India, as a whole can be discussed in this House. The Debates which arise from time to time on Adjournment Motions, the Consolidated Fund Bill, and the like, are usually, from the nature of the case, of a desultory kind. Consequently, following precedent, I propose at the outset, this afternoon in my capacity as representative in this House of my Noble Friend the Secretary of State for India to give a review of the political, financial and general situation in India. I will endeavour to compress my remarks as much as possible, realising that the Committee is rightly intolerant of lengthy statements, and further, having at the back of my mind recollections of the dim and distant past of having made speeches from the benches in another quarter of the House protesting against the undue length of time occupied by prominent speakers on both sides. I admit that a subject which at one time in our Debates were considered dull in the extreme is to-day, I am afraid, of vivid, painful, and ever-present interests to the inhabitants of almost every country in the world with the possible exception of the principality of Monaco—I refer to taxation and finance. I am afraid that I shall have to ask the Committee to bear with me while I give a good number of figures in this connection.

India Government finance for the financial year which has just closed, i.e., the year 1921-22, has come under the full blast of the world trade depression, and it is inevitable that India, which has always

been a large exporter of raw material, should feel the effects of such times as the world has been experiencing in a very special degree. Throughout the War years, really until the end of 1920, India enjoyed what is generally described as a favourable balance of trade in respect of her exports and imports of merchandise. In the year 1919-20, the favourable balance in respect of merchandise excluding treasure, was as high as 119 crores. In the year following 1920-21 the pendulum swung round violently, when the Indian trade statistics of net imports of merchandise amounted to 78 crores. In 1921-1922 there was, fortunately, some improvement as the adverse balance had been considerably reduced, and the figures for the year showing a net import of merchandise of 23 crores. Further, in that connection, it is satisfactory to note that in February and March of this year there was actually a net export of over 8 crores, and even, allowing for transactions in treasure of which India normally imports a great deal, the statistics for the three months, February to April last, in goods and treasure combined, exhibit a favourable balance to India amounting to three crores. These figures suggest that the corner has now been turned as all of us connected with India most devoutly hope that it has been and it is particularly satisfactory that the export figures for March and April last indicate an improvement over the position in the corresponding month of the year 1921. I would add in this connection that the reaction from the abnormal conditions prevailing during the War has been of serious financial concern to the Government of India as to any other Government of the world, that the position in India was complicated by the fact that this world reaction almost exactly coincided with the introduction of new political and financial machinery by the putting into operation of the 1919 Act.

Financial Situation

Indian finance has always been handled on conservative lines, and to the fact must be ascribed the high credit that the Government of India has for many years enjoyed in the markets of the world. In 1921-22 the Government of India had to face a financial problem aggravated by a heavy fall in the exchange, an unprecedented rise in prices, and large military expenditure necessitated by unsettled frontier conditions. They hoped, by means of careful economies and by the imposition of fresh taxation, amounting to 175 crores, to obtain in 1921-22 an equilibrium Budget. Unhappily, those hopes were not fulfilled, largely owing to the world trade slump and to heavy but absolutely necessary military charges. There was also in the same year a decline in the Estimate of Customs receipts amounting to over four crores and under the net receipts

from railways of thirteen crores, while losses under exchange in non commercial Departments amounted to nearly six crores. The upshot was that a small budgeted surplus of 71 lakhs was converted into a deficit of 33 crores, the revenue for the year amounting to 109 crores while the revised estimate for expenditure came to 142 crores.

I will now deal very briefly with the situation in the present financial year. The estimates foreshadowed a deficit of 31 three-fourth crores on the existing basis of taxation, including an allowance for the yield of the taxes imposed in the preceding year. The proposals of the Government of India for new taxation which were laid before the Legislative Assembly last March, were designed to yield fresh revenue amounting to 29 crores. The new revenue is to be found under the following heads: Customs, salt, taxes on income, railways, postal telegraph, amounting together to 29 crores. Of proposals for new taxation, the Assembly rejected the increase of duty on salt, the increase from 3 three fourth to 7 three fourth per cent on cotton excise, and the increase on imported machinery. The total amount they thus cut out was 956 lakhs. The upshot of the discussions in the Assembly and Council of State was that additional taxation amounting to 19 5 crores was accepted, because some fresh taxation was accepted.

The Committee will observe from what I have just said that the Government of India in the last two years have succeeded in carrying measures calculated to increase their revenue by no less than 37 crores, which represents 25 per cent of the budgeted expenditure for 1922-23. I think that fact shows that the Government of India are as alive to day as ever to the imperative need of rehabilitating their financial position and that they are going to justify the confidence which their handling of Indian finance in the past has established. I make a special point of that fact, because I was challenged in previous debates by several hon'ble gentlemen who take an interest in Indian finance, to make some statement about the attitude which the Government of India were adopting towards this question.

Before I leave the subject of finance, I want to express the great satisfaction and delight of the Government of India and of my Noble friend the Sec. of State that Lord Inchcape, whose public spirit has been so often demonstrated in recent years, and who was for some five years a member of the Viceroy's Council in India, has consented to go to India in the autumn to preside over a Retrenchment Committee, on which he will be assisted by eminent men of affairs who have a thorough, practical acquaintance with Indian conditions. I need not refer to the names of the Committee or to the terms of reference, because they have been already announced, except to observe that I

think they are such as to inspire confidence. The terms of reference follow closely those of the Geddes Committee. They are widely drawn, and it will be within the scope of the Committee to investigate expenditure on defence and all other issues that appear relevant to

Railway Development

I explained, when speaking on the Loans Bill some six weeks ago, the urgent need that there was for increased railway development in India, and it so happens that my speech to-day almost coincides with the issue of an Indian Loan under the powers recently granted by Parliament. The money for which we are asking will be entirely devoted to Indian railway purposes, and the Committee will be interested to know that in the Budget this year the Government include 30 crores for their railway capital programme. I believe that the expenditure of this money will abundantly repay itself, not only directly from the railways, but also indirectly by increasing the prosperity of the country which, in its turn, will enhance the Government revenue through Customs and in many other ways. Having regard to the great natural wealth of India and to the increased recognition of the scope for developing that wealth, I look forward to a renewal of Indian progress in all directions. Indian public men are fully alive to the possibilities of India's commercial expansion, and I am sure that the increased association of Indians with the Executive Government is bound to lead to developments that will add strength and security to Indian finance. I have only one other word to say on the question of finance, and that is to anticipate a question that will no doubt be asked at a later stage in the Debate with regard to the action that the Government of India are likely to take with respect to this uncovered deficit to which I have referred. I think it would be premature to make any announcement at this time. It may well be that a revival of trade and an increasingly peaceful internal situation will materially improve the revenue prospects within the current year. But, whatever the situation may be, it will be faced in the future by the Government of India.

Khilafat Question.

There are two other questions to which I am going to make only a brief reference. One is the question of the Cotton Import Duty. I have already on previous occasions explained fully the attitude of the Government of India and that of my Noble Friend in this respect, and I shall be ready to reply to any criticisms that may be made during the course of the Debate. The other matter is that of military policy. I do not propose now to speak of it, but

I will of course reply to any questions, though I have no fresh announcement to make with regard to any change of policy. Let me now say a word or two about two questions, the importance of which no one connected with India can fail to realise. The first is the Khilafat question, and the second is the position of Indians overseas. With regard to the first of these questions everyone recognises, I hope and believe, the sympathy of Indian Moslems for Turkey as a great independent Moslem power under the Sultan. His Majesty's Government fully realise the position, and they desire to show all possible respect to those beliefs and feelings. It is no part of their policy, and it never has been in the past of the British Government—it has never been the policy of this Government, and it never will be—to pit one religion against another, and it is not for them a question of rival religions, their sole concern is to secure conditions which will as far as possible do justice to all parties.

Indians Overseas

Scarcely less important is the question of the political rights to be accorded to Indians overseas. It excites the most intense interest in India, and, in claiming the full rights of Imperial citizenship, Indians of all shades of political opinion are united. I would go back for a moment to the situation at the time of the last Imperial Conference. While that Conference left undisturbed the principle that each Government should be left free to determine the composition of its own population, it embodied the new and most important principle that Indians lawfully domiciled in any part of the Empire should enjoy the rights of citizenship. The Resolution was not accepted by the representatives of South Africa, and it would be folly to ignore that acute difficulties still remain in that Dominion. We can only trust to time to provide a solution. But I would make an announcement to the Committee which, I think, has not yet been made public. I am not sure whether it has or has not. The Government of India have recently, with the full concurrence of my Noble Friend, entered into direct communication with the Union Government on this question, and it is hoped that now that each Government can frankly explain to the other its own embarrassments, some satisfactory solution of this difficulty will be reached. I might say that there have been several speeches in South Africa, and notably one by Mr. Patrick Duncan, which would lead all who take an interest in this question to believe that the Government of South Africa are at any rate alive to the difficulties of the situation.

As regards the other Dominions, I think that the outlook is brighter in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The representatives of all those Dominions accepted the Imperial Conference

Resolution, and it only remains to provide means and methods of translating into practice a new principle. For that purpose Mr. Sastri is visiting Canada, Australia, and New Zealand on the invitation of the Dominion Governments and his task will be to inform public opinion and consult with the three Governments as to the best way of giving effect to the Resolution. I should like to say that as the adoption of the Resolution was largely due to the earnestness and eloquence of Mr. Sastri, it is, in my opinion, very satisfactory indeed that he should be conferring, or about to confer, with these Dominion Governments on this question. As regards the Crown Colonies and Dependencies, the position is somewhat different because, as the Committee is aware, the application of the Imperial Conference Resolution in that case lies with his Majesty's Government, and in some cases we are concerned not only with political but also with economic questions. Just recently two deputations from India have visited in the one case British Guiana, and in the other case Fiji, to examine whether those countries are suitable for Indian colonisation. The inquiries have been largely directed to such matters as the cost of living, rates of wages, and the terms on which land can be held. Neither of these two deputations has yet submitted its report, and it is not possible therefore, to anticipate their findings in any way. When they are received by the Government of India they will be referred to the Indian Legislature, and it will be for that Legislature to decide whether, and, if so, on what conditions, emigration can be allowed to those two Colonies.

There was recently passed into law in India an Emigration Bill which has to a great extent altered the situation and by it systematic emigration of unskilled labourers to all parts of the world will be controlled and prohibited unless such emigration is specifically permitted by notification. The notification, however, cannot be issued by the Government of India without the approval of the Indian Legislature which will be advised by a Standing Committee on Emigration. For this reason the reports submitted by these two deputations and any schemes put forward by other Colonial Governments will be closely examined in the light of the conditions under which Indians live in the countries in question. The Committee will see at once the importance of these new provisions to safeguard particularly the interests of the poorer class of Indian workers who go to other countries in the Empire.

As regards the question of Kenya and the position of Indians in that Colony the matter is still under the earnest consideration of the India Office and the Colonial Office. In these circumstances it is perhaps better not to comment on the unfortunate differences

which have arisen between the European and Indian settlers in that colony. The prospect of a solution, however, is very hopeful, and I trust and believe that a settlement satisfactory to Indian opinion, and indeed a settlement which will be satisfactory all round may be reached in the near future.

The Indian Services.

I come to perhaps what is one of the most difficult of all the questions with which those connected with India have to deal at the present time, and on which I know there is a great deal of no unnatural anxiety in this House—I refer to the position of the Services in India. The members of the Indian Civil Service have to contend with great difficulties with which my Noble Friend the Secretary of State for India fully sympathises. Prices have risen enormously in India, just as they have risen elsewhere, and the old amenities and attractions of life to British Civil Servants in India have largely disappeared owing to a variety of circumstances. In many cases these men find themselves worse off financially than they were 10 years ago and actually some of them find difficulty in meeting their obligations, and I am afraid in some cases in meeting the obligations they owe to their families apart from themselves. Unfortunately, it is the fact that the revisions of pay have not fulfilled expectations. The position in their respect is not peculiar. The Secretary of State in Council and the Government of India are limited by the resources at their disposal, and the Budget of the Government of India and other provincial Budget showing a deficit. Committees are sitting all over India to advise the Government where they should lop and prune their expenditure. In these circumstances I fear there can be no expectation of a great increase in Service charges at the present time, but signs are not wanting that economic conditions are beginning to improve and the Services, like the rest of the community, must reap their share of the benefits.

So much for the material side of this question. But there is an equally if not more important side to this question in India. I do not know that the material side is the real Service difficulty. You cannot expect good and contented service from men in any part of the world, whether under the Government or under a private individual who feel that their service is not wanted, and whose every day task, hard and exacting as it is at the best, is carried out under a constant stream of vituperation, misrepresentation and active or passive hostility which some at any rate of the responsible leaders of opinion have done something to foster and little to check.

In that connection may I say that anyone who has lived in a tropical country, as I have done must realise that the conditions of

service are infinitely harder than in this country because you have a hostile climate that is fighting against you. This may not be so apparent during the short visit, and it is only when you live there for about two years through hot and cold weather as I have done that you realise what men are up against who have to spend their lives in that country, and when you superimpose upon all the conditions with which Indian civil servants are faced you have a state of things which very much affects the spirit and the health and the good work of those who are serving in that part of the world.

I make every allowance for Indian impatience over the question of Indianisation and for the lack of balance arising from the sudden acquisition of powers of effective criticism and considerable control. I make every allowance for the Indian disappointment at the synchronising of this acquisition with a financial stringency unparalleled in the experience of anyone living, and yet I am afraid that the fact remains that, whatever the future may have in store, no responsible Indian in his heart would deny that the need of the assistance of the All-India services was never greater than it is to-day, and the need will continue to be greater throughout and beyond the period of transition.

Race hatred will not and cannot hasten the advent of responsible government. If any condition could point to a certain delay and is capable of destroying the chances of Dominion status for India, that condition is race hatred. There is good enough reason, unfortunately, for the belief on the part of the Services that Indians including some whose position ought to guarantee that they would act reasonably want to get rid of them. I can only say in conclusion on this matter, with the greatest emphasis, that there is no reason whatever for the belief that the Government of India, or my Noble Friend the Secretary of State for India, want to get rid of them, or ever will get rid of them. I think it is of importance that that announcement should be made in view of the accusations which have been made in certain quarters.

Sir W. Joynson Hicks: How can you stop it?

Earl Winterton: I was not referring to anyone in this House.

Sir W. Joynson Hicks: I merely asked, what are you going to do to prevent it?

Retirement Scheme

Earl Winterton: I shall come to that point later on. I wish to say a word or two now about the retirement scheme. I am betraying no secret when I say that the late Secretary of State for India agreed, with reluctance, to a general option to retire which was open for a limited period. The present Secretary of State for India has agreed, not without reluctance, to the removal of the limitation of

the period. On this point the exact terms of the announcement will be made by my Noble Friend in a few days in another place. In view of this, I ask that I should not be pressed for details now. It is a complete misapprehension to suppose that this offer represents a desire on the part of the Government of India or on the part of the Secretary of State to "thin out" British members of the Service. I think it is important to emphasise this because the original offer was made on the insistent demand of the Services themselves and of some Members of this House who had made themselves spokesmen in this matter. That is the history of this question.

The extension which I have just mentioned is not due to a desire for a more effective thinning out, but it is in the hope that the numbers who avail themselves of the offer will be smaller than if the time limit had been maintained. The number of applications for all Services up to date to retire is 97, and this includes 40 from the police and 30 from the Indian Civil Service. I admit that this is regrettably large, but I think there is ground for the hope that it will not greatly increase. Let me say one word further on this question of the Services in India. In my opinion, whether they be officials, non-officials or ex-officials who by speech or action do anything to help to increase the difficulties and help to prevent fresh British blood from coming forward to fill the gaps they are really not helping India or this country, but they are putting back the clock of progress. I think it is most desirable that I should make that announcement.

Internal Political Situation

I now come to the last question I have to deal with, which in itself is divided into two sub-questions, that of the internal political situation and the agitation and unrest in the recent history of the policy under the Act. As the Committee is aware, after a long period of unrest, characterised by much sporadic lawlessness and by several more serious outbreaks of violence, Mr. Gandhi was arrested on the 10th March, and was promptly tried and convicted, having himself accepted the justice of his sentence. Since his arrest the country has become progressively quieter. The members of the Moplah rebellion have been stamped out, although a few outlaws still lurk in the jungles. At the end of March the dangerous Akali Sikh movement in the Punjab was dealt with. Commencing as a religious movement for the better management of the Sikh shrines, it had taken on a political complexion and threatened to develop into a system of armed and organised terrorism. These manifestations have been checked, and quiet has been restored in that province.

The Aika movement in the United Provinces—a parallel agrarian movement—which was also taking on a threatening aspect and which took the form of mobs of tenants and labourers assembling to overawe landowners and general manifestations of that kind has also been put down, while the genuine underlying grievances are being investigated by the local government. An excellent spring harvest was followed by an equally abundant one last autumn. Prices are falling and signs are not wanting of some alleviations of the extreme trade depression of the past year. All these things mean a returning contentment to the country and consequently some improvement at any rate in the tone of political controversy. Those who have adopted the extreme gospel of non co operation have in some cases been assailed by doubts as to the efficacy of their faith, and they are beginning to consider whether much of what they desire might not be accomplished by a proper use of the Constitution recently provided for them. I am inclined to think myself that that movement will increase and may headway. Before I sit down I propose to say a word about the use which has been made of it by Indian public men and Indian public opinion. I was challenged by the Right Hon'ble Member for the City of London (Sir F. Banbury) to say why Gandhi had not been arrested before. I suppose my Right Hon'ble Friend desired I should deal with this subject.

Sir F Banbury No, what I said was that it was a pity De Valera had not been arrested.

Gandhi's Arrest

Earl Winterton I am glad to say that particular responsibility does not rest on my shoulders. My Noble Friend did not assume office until after the arrest of Gandhi, and if I am challenged as I have no doubt I shall be in the course of the Debate, I should like to say now quite frankly that I am not concerned with the expression of any opinion on the policy previously followed. It is understood that the view of the Government of India was that to have arrested Gandhi at the height of his triumphant career, when he was almost universally regarded as having more than human qualities, would have involved risks of grave disorder, without any certainty of stopping his propaganda. The Government of India preferred to wait until the barrenness of his political faith and its total failure to produce any constructive results had disillusioned his more intelligent supporters. Then his downfall was accepted by his followers with comparative coldness, while with the ignorant men who had been taught to repeat his name, and had been expecting the date of his promised Swaraj, and several times seen it pass, the bubble of his

supernatural attributes was summararily pricked. I neither criticise nor endorse this policy, but under existing circumstances, the Government of India are naturally in a position to say it has succeeded for the reasons I have just given. It is only fair to them to give those reasons and to point to the moral to be learned therefrom.

The Reforms Act

With regard to the policy of administration in India, of course it would not be in order, on an Estimates discussion, to deal with the Government of India Act, but I am entitled to deal with the question of administration, and I wish to emphasise again this afternoon what I said soon after I became Under-Secretary, that there has been no change of policy as a result of the change of personnel at the India Office. Parliament recorded its declaration of policy in the preamble of the Act and the Government in general and the Secretary of State in particular are the servants of Parliament in this as in all other matters, and were bound to carry out, both in its spirit and in its letter, the Act which had been passed. I should like in that connection to deprecate equally strongly two opposite contentions which have been advanced, not so much in this House, although they have been made here inferentially, but more strongly in the Press outside. The first is that practical experience of 18 months' working of the new Constitution is sufficient to show that that Constitution needs amendment to remove restrictions. The second is that the same amount of experience shows that the Act has failed and ought to be scrapped. Both these contentions are absolutely fallacies. The only reasonable answer is to say that the charge has not been proved. It is idle to deny that the Indian Legislature has established for itself a legitimate place in the machinery of the British Empire, and if one has read, as I have very fully, the Debates that have taken place in it, he is bound to admit that they have been conducted with dignity and courtesy, and have reflected great credit upon the Assembly. I may say in that connection that many members and officers, both of the Indian and the Provincial Legislatures, take the keenest interest in the working and proceedings of this House, and are constantly coming here to meet members and officials. I have singled out in particular the Indian Legislature, not in derogation of the importance of the Provincial Legislatures, but because the point of contact between the Central Legislature and the other Councils in the vast machinery of the Empire is necessarily much closer than it is in the case of the Provincial Councils. The Indian Legislature has been in existence only for three Sessions, and it is only now beginning to find the power it has. Every day of its existence is disclosing new poten-

tialities, and I think that that will continue to be the case. I am glad it should be so.

But it is reasonable to continue to say or ever to have begun to assert that the best way to keep this great machine going is to take it to pieces so soon to see if it cannot be improved by putting in some new parts or leaving out some of the existing parts. It is absurd to suggest such a thing and I do not believe that if any other Government sat on this bench it would be prepared to advocate such a policy. Any Government would fail greatly in its duty if it did not allow the scheme to work out its own salvation in its own way. There is, however, one point in this connection which I should like to mention. However capable the Legislature, however capable individual Members of it may be, the capabilities of the electorate are still practically untried and unexplored, and the immediate urgent task before India's non official legislators should be to form a live and independent electorate in India, because, after all, such an electorate is the basis of real responsible government in any country. In this country we all take the utmost pains to educate the electorate, sometimes they do us credit, at other times they do not. In the 1906 election I thought the electorate appeared to be extremely and deplorably ignorant. In the 1918 election I thought it seemed to be extremely well-instructed.

Mr Acland. And it will be ignorant next time.

Earl Winterton. I am not so sure that next time it may not carry out fully the instruction we give it. At any rate we can do our best by supplying the electorate with the facts as we see them out of our own mouths or by means of our printing presses. Really, the situation is this, that the electorate in India as a whole has had very few opportunities of being instructed in policy. As a rule, it has only heard one side. It is not to be expected that the new machine with a new and different motive power behind it, is going to perform exactly the same evolutions as the old machine with the old motive power. We have in this country generations of sound, constitutional government behind us. In India they have the model of generations to follow and it would be wrong and unfair to expect them not to make experiments. I do not think it should be said they are not to be trusted, because they show signs of departing slightly from the pattern, but at any rate we ought to do everything in our power to assist them to lay the foundation of sound Indian Government, and we might well take the motto from the Book of Common Prayer, which tells us to take the mean between the two extremes of too much strictness in refusing and too much ease in giving. That is the attitude of mind which I think we should adopt to this problem.

Indo-British Friendship

Finally, I come—no doubt to the relief of hon. Members—(Hon. Members: "No, No!")—I shall have an opportunity of replying later—I come to my last words on this question, and I should like to say something on the very delicate subject of the relationship between Great Britain and India I have been struck by the persistency with which the enemies of Great Britain throughout the world in every country and even, I am afraid, in the British Empire itself, cherish the belief that this country has lost faith in itself. That is an idea which is fostered to some extent by people at home who claim to be super-patriots, and by men who had no experience, either in the Great War or in the South African War which preceded it, of what is, after all, the real crucible in which patriotism has to be tested, namely war itself. It is these people who are helping these enemies of ours to foster this illusive dream that this country has lost faith in itself. I believe, on the contrary, exactly the opposite is the case. Thousands of British men and women who took part in the War realised for the first time the worth of their race, its courage, patience, resourcefulness and above all, its moral qualities. With this revelation went no foolish assertion of race superiority. On the contrary, we all realised the wealth of good qualities in other races of the Empire and especially so did those of us who had the inestimable advantage of fighting day after day and month after month side by side with the troops of other races of the Empire, and especially anyone who, like myself, fought alongside the Indian troops. We realised their good qualities, and consequently after the War there was an almost passionate desire to co-operate more fully with those other races than we had done before the War, while not abating by one jot our belief in our own race and our world position. This new conception of the relationship between the people of this country and the peoples of this great Peninsula of India will, I believe, succeed despite difficulties, despite all the efforts of malignancy and perversity to prevent it, and I believe that 10, 15 or 20 years hence people looking back will say that we in this Government, in the years immediately following the War, were right in our conception of the true relationship between Great Britain and India.

Mr Ben Spoor: The Committee has listened to one of the most extraordinary speeches on the Indian situation that it has ever been the lot of Members of the House of Commons to hear. The Noble Lord made a speech which, viewed from any point of view, must be regarded as unusually depressing. I do not criticise so much what

he said, but I do criticise what he did not say. The incompleteness of his survey—because he really told us nothing at all about the real situation in India—the way in which his speech from beginning to end reflected an optimism which certainly is not justified by the facts, and the easy manner in which he skated over what are very real difficulties and immensely serious problems, were exceedingly depressing. He told us, first of all, that the financial situation in India gave cause for grave disquiet. He pointed out how it was impossible to get a Budget in which both ends would meet. And then he went on, quite airily, to tell us that he looked forward to the future with confidence as we got, and apparently we were getting increasingly peaceful in internal conditions and that, as there was coming a revival of trade, all would be well in India in a very short time. In the whole speech there was not a single reference to the Indian point of view. The whole speech was the speech of a Britisher who viewed this problem purely through British eyes. There was no attempt made at all events in all that we have heard so far to meet what some of us regard as the legitimate demands of the Indian people. I submit that the speech really reflected no understanding sympathy with the Indian mind at all.

We were assured that there had been no change in policy since we had a change in the officials at the India Office, but I do submit that, if that speech represents the attitude of the India Office, there has been a considerable change in spirit. Gandhi and the whole non co operation movement were swept on one side as though they hardly counted at all. Gandhi, we were told, is in prison. We were told that a few outlaws remained in the jungle. I remember that one year we called Michael Collins an outlaw and the next year called him a hero.

Col Sir C. Yate. Never!

Mr Spoor. There were representatives of the Government who used terms upon which that interpretation could be put.

Indian Military Situation

I should like just to refer very briefly to one aspect of the military situation in India. I do not want to discuss it in any detail, I will leave that to others who are more competent than I am to deal with it, but I should like to ask the Noble Lord if he can give us some information regarding the tremendous increase in military expenditure. I believe that on British troops alone there has been an increase, since 1914, of about £7,000,000 per annum in expenditure. Compared with 1914, the Army in India in 1921 was, I believe, reduced in strength by about 6000. I understand, of course, that the increase in expenditure is in the main due to

improvement in the pay of officers and men, but at the same time it is a colossal amount, and, when one remembers that practically half the Indian revenue goes in military expenditure, one must realise that very real difficulties are bound to arise. While, however, there has been this decrease in the number of British troops in India, we are informed that there has been a rather extraordinary increase in the Headquarters Staff, and, consequently, in the maintenance of the 301 in 1914 to 444 last year. I do not know whether the Noble Lord will be able to justify that extraordinary increase, in face of the decrease as far as troops are concerned.

The Political Situation

Coming back to the speech of the Noble Lord, I would say that the day for patronising India has gone. We have there a problem too grave to be faced in that manner, and I should like to discuss, perhaps a little more intimately than the Noble Lord has done, the political situation in that country. We are told to day that India is becoming progressively more peaceful. We have been told that the non co operation movement has received a severe check. We have been told that Gandhi's influence is on the wane. We have been told also that the supremacy of British authority is being again vindicated. It would be difficult to imagine a more superficial view of what is, perhaps, the most vital issue facing British statesmanship at the present moment. For, what are the facts? At the present moment over 20,000 political prisoners are in goal. They include men of high character, men whose character has never been questioned. They include men of profound culture—of a culture, I submit, probably greatly in excess of that of the average Member of the House of Commons. Two or three years ago these men were not hostile to Britain, and so far as the British people, as distinguished from the Government are concerned, they are not hostile now. The crime of these 20,000 people is not that they are anti British; it is simply that they are pro-Indian. Their aggressive assertion of independence, and their intense nationalism, have been stimulated by a long-continued series of blundering errors in British policy. We are familiar, of course, with the story of recent happenings in our relations with India—the story of a demand for freedom which was daily growing more insistent, and the partial meeting of that demand by the Reform Scheme of 1919, and here I may be allowed to make an observation regarding the work of the late Secretary of State. That gentleman has been driven from office, but his contribution towards the freeing of India will never be forgotten by the people of that country. The Act of 1919 apparently represented the utmost that could be extracted from the Government. While, in the opinion of

some of us, its inadequacy was bound to create difficulty, and indeed, did create difficulty, it was the first really effective step taken by any responsible British statesman towards the fulfilment of pledges both express and implied during the whole of the long years of our dominance in India.

Lovers of liberty, not only in the British Empire, but everywhere, will remain grateful to the right hon. Gentleman in that he did, at all events, succeed in opening a roadway which will never again be closed. But the reforms that he introduced have never had a real chance. Amritsar and the Turkish Peace Treaty created an atmosphere in which the full benefit of that scheme could never be realised. Resentment against what many of us regard as barbarous methods of Government, against vindictive schemes of boundary re-adjustment which violated what, after all, are very deep religious sentiments—these stirred up hatred, not, let me again emphasise, against the British people, but against their Government representatives. The weapon of non-co operation was introduced and the British authorities were faced with a problem of unparalleled difficulty. Vast numbers of men and women refused even to take part in the first election. Passive resistance spread right through the country. I was in some districts in the Bombay Presidency a little over a year ago where not 3 per cent of the electorate would go to vote. It is extremely difficult for those of us who have been reared amid the purely materialistic philosophies of the West to understand even dimly, the reasoning of the Eastern mind. Longer mental perspectives than are possible in the rush and hurry of modern politics are required and temperamental sympathies which, in the main, are alien to us. So it is that this non-co operation movement is very largely misunderstood by its Western critics, but we do not get over it by calling it fanatical. We certainly shall not suppress it by imprisoning a few thousands of its leaders. The prison has not yet been built that will enclose an idea, for the gun is not forged yet that can destroy a will, however it may manifest itself, that is really making for freedom. I know that some people imagine that it may be possible to raise a dam that will hold the current in check; but the higher you raise your dam the greater becomes the pressure that is behind it. The great danger is that some day the dam will burst, as certainly some day in India the gaol doors will have to be opened.

You are dealing in India with a terrific force, a force which is altogether incalculable and almost superhuman. The policy of blood and iron can no more bring peace in India than it brought peace in Ireland. It has never brought peace in any country in the world yet. You cannot defeat non-co operation. Personally, I should

like to see it defeated, but not by the methods that are being employed by the Government of India backed by the British Government in this country. You can defeat non-co-operation by practising co-operation. When I say that, I mean the willing, ungrudging co-operation of British and Indian on absolutely equal terms in the maintenance of a common wealth jointly enjoyed. The Noble Lord told us that certain political disabilities under which Indians suffer in some of our Colonies were likely to be removed. We hope that they will very speedily be removed. We hope that even our Colonial Office will be converted to the wisdom of treating Indians as British subjects are treated; for so long as a single Indian suffers from a disability either in India or in a British Colony, so long as a single Indian is denied a right that is enjoyed by his British fellow citizens, so long will there be discord and danger and no chance of peace.

Face the Real Issue

I do ask the Government really to make an attempt to face the real issue. Instead of trying to understand Gandhi, we put him in gaol. Such policy and such approval, as it apparently has in this House in certain quarters, is a confession of hopeless incompetence. Gandhi, rightly understood, is far less an isolated leader than the incarnation of what is undoubtedly the popular will. Whether we agree with him or not does not concern my argument, but through Gandhi the hopes of millions of Indians are finding utterance. We may disagree with his ideas entirely, but it is a profound mistake to imagine that they are merely personal. The sole effect of his imprisonment is to stimulate feelings of bitterness which will ruin all possibility of a peaceful issue of this great struggle. The supremacy of British authority has been vindicated. Yes, and India is practically bankrupt. The Lancashire cotton trade is in peril. Indeed, the economic effects of this conflict are as bad as the political ones.

Unless there is a rapid change in the whole temper of the relations of Britain and India, India will be lost to Britain and Britain will be lost to India, and no one here can possibly imagine the magnitude of such a disaster as that I am convinced that there is a very much graver risk of that happening than would be inferred from the speech to which we have just listened. I submit, further, that the practical solution of this difficulty is not so terribly hard after all. India simply wants to be master in her own house, and until she is master in her own house there will be no peace. For the last two or three weeks there have been appearing in a responsible British newspaper, "The Manchester Guardian," a series of articles from its correspondent in India. In an article that appear-

ed last Monday he recorded a conversation that he had with a wealthy Parsee merchant. This was a man who was not a non-co-operator at all. The article referred to interviews with Mahomedans, Hindoos and Parsees. I quote the opinion of this Parsee gentleman because he is quite apart and separate from the political side, or indeed any side, of the non co operative movement. The correspondent asked him certain questions. He asked, "Is the root cause of the present unrest this unsatisfied national aspiration, or the economic trouble?" This was the answer:

"The root cause is the unsatisfied nationalist aspiration. That is intensified by the very serious economic trouble. But we could face those economic troubles with much greater equanimity if we feel that our hands were free to take our own measure to meet the situation. As it is we have to leave matters in your hands, and, to speak quite frankly, we think you have made a thorough bad mess of our business. Let me make myself quite clear. If our economic trouble vanished, if the exchange steadied, trade revived, budgets balanced, food prices fell, monsoons were favourable and crops were good, then you would find us still just as determined as ever to be masters in our own house."

Then he was asked by the newspaper correspondent this question: "On the day when you are masters in your own house what will happen to our capital and our people in India?" In view of the alarm that I have heard expressed in many quarters regarding the position of Europeans in that country, this answer is interesting:

"They will be perfectly safe. To-day there is friction over the question of political supremacy. So long as that question is unsettled bad blood may be engendered at any moment, and the lives of your people may be endangered. You therefore need a certain number of British troops in the country. I quite see that. But once the question of political supremacy is out of way, you will not need a single British soldier in India so far as the protection of your people and your property is concerned. And I can tell you too that you will find that we shall then need British brains and British capital as much as ever, and we shall feel much less reluctance to employ them." The correspondent goes on to say, "This is not the best held out by a non-co operator. It is the opinion of a Parsee man of business."

Labour Party's Suggestions

There are certain specific things which we in the party with which I am associated feel should be done immediately. I complain of the fact that the Noble Lord gave no indication whatever that the perfectly legitimate demands of the Indian people should be met.

Unless those demands are in some measure complied with we are bound to have increasing aggravation of what at the present moment is a terribly dangerous position. We submit that the whole of the political prisoners should be immediately released. Those of us who have met some of these men know that it is a criminal thing that men like Lajpat Rai, whose crime is that they are patriots, have been cast into prison. We submit also that a conference which would include representatives of every school of Indian thought and representatives of the British Government should be immediately called. That conference should reveal the whole situation. It should reveal the working of the system of anarchy, about which we had so much controversy when the 1919 Bill was before the House. The British and Indian Governments should give some indication that they are going to revise the whole question long before the period of ten years which is named in the Act. Some of us made an attempt when the Bill was going through the Joint Select Committee to get that ten years' period knocked out. We were not successful, but the gravity of the situation is such at the moment that the Government should give some indication that they are prepared to consider the whole question of reform at an earlier date. I believe if the Government would declare now that they are prepared to call this conference on the understanding of course that all who take part in it will faithfully and loyally abide by its decisions, and if they will further state that they are prepared to revise the reform scheme at a very early date, it will do more to tranquillise India and bring peace in that country and a better understanding there than anything else could possibly do.

We submit further, that seeing that the first election resulted in many cases in the return of men who by no stretch of the imagination could be called popularly elected, new elections should be held. More than that, every manifestation of racial superiority should be ruthlessly curbed. The Noble Lord referred to the immense dangers of unchecked race hatred. How much of that race hatred has been stimulated by men who were not fit and proper people to represent Britain in India, men who constantly asserted a kind of racial superiority? No man who has been in India but will agree with me that there are certain types of men—I am not now condemning the whole European population—who have done tremendous harm to British authority and to everything that Britain stands for because of the attitude they have again and again maintained. The Noble Lord spoke of the grievances—and I believe he was quite right in what he said—under which members of the Indian Service at present suffer, but there is one aspect of that question which should not be overlooked. There is a feeling in India that

the type of man who in recent years has gone out to represent us there is not quite as good as the type of man who used to go years ago, in other words, that there has been a certain deterioration in the personnel of the Indian Civil Service. Men familiar with India will be better able to speak of that than I am. At all events, I have heard the assertion made, not only by responsible Indians, but also by responsible White men occupying positions out there, that deterioration is probably in some measure due to the rather uncertain position in which any man entering the Indian Civil Service must feel at present. But no deterioration should be allowed which will enable men to go out there to assert that overbearing sense of racial superiority which does more than anything else to stir up Indian feeling against us.

We submit that there should be a reduction in the vast military expenditure of India. It is a terrible thing that in a country, 93 per cent of whose people can neither read nor write—and the responsibility for this state of illiteracy rests very largely with the British Government—nearly a half of the total revenue is spent in the maintenance of an Army. We should press on with the work of education. I agree with the Noble Lord that what we want in India—and indeed we could do with it in this country—would be a well-informed electorate—if we could only get that and encourage the spending of less money on military matters and more on education. We must show, too, in a way which cannot be misunderstood, a desire to help India towards complete self government at the earliest possible moment. As far as the Labour Party is concerned, we always have believed that India should be granted Dominion Home Rule within, at all events, a comparatively short time. We submit finally, that force and the rule of blood and iron will succeed no more in India than it has done in Ireland. We have an immense responsibility, and the number of Members who attend Indian Debates shows how clearly the British House of Commons realises its responsibility in this matter. We still have an opportunity. Sometimes I have felt that matters have gone so far that recovery is altogether impossible. When I came back from India in December of last year I had the feeling—and I know it was shared by others—that our policy had been so blind, so unwise, so utterly unsympathetic, so lacking in appreciation of the real Indian point of view, that any recovery could not possibly be made. I believe, however, now that we have an opportunity and that recovery is possible. Our responsibility is to make India free. Our opportunity is to win back the confidence and the trust of vast masses of people who have well nigh lost faith in the very name of Britain.

Col Wedgwood

Colonel Wedgwood. I think, perhaps, before I proceed with the business part of the Debate, I had better explain to the Hon. Baronet (Sir W. Joynton Hicks) that his attacks on the members of the Labour party who went to India leave us not only cold, but satisfied. The extracts he gave from the speeches of my hon'ble Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Spoor) might properly have been delivered by every single member of the Labour party. The Member for Bishop Auckland went to India as the delegate of the Labour party. He took with him the views of the British Labour party on Indian questions as embodied in their Resolution passed at the Annual Conference of the Labour party. These views are perfectly clearly expressed in the Resolution, and my Hon'ble Friend never in any one of the quotations which has been read went a line beyond the Resolution passed by the party. I think, he spoke, indeed, not only for the Labour Party, but, as he said, for the bulk of the democracy of this country. Surely the hon'ble Baronet realises, or, if he does not, I hope he soon will, that if the future relations of England and India are to be amicable there had better, particularly now, be drawn a clear distinction between Governments and peoples. We want to have some foundation for future amity. The Member for Bishop Auckland and myself are friends of the Indian people in their difficulties in order that when they come to their own they may look back and see that even in their dark days there were some in England who stood by them. I say to-day that the principal differentiation between England and other European countries is that all through the agitation over the Irish grievances there has been a large element in this country, among the democracy of this country particularly, who have stood by Ireland throughout their struggle, even although in so standing by Ireland they were apparently acting against the interests of their own mother country. In the long run we have seen that that attitude is the sheet anchor by means of which we may hope in the future to recover the friendship of the Irish people and to secure real stability for the future British Commonwealth. Do not, therefore, assume that everything the Member for Bishop Auckland and I do, even although it may not please Members of this House at the moment, is bad for the future of the Commonwealth to which we all believe.

As to the particular letter of my own which the hon'ble Baronet read, I think still, as I thought when I wrote it, that it was an extremely suitable letter to write. It was a private letter from one friend to another friend. I only wish that other Members of the House of Commons had the same feeling of complete

friendship for Indians, even though those Indians be in gaol, that I have written, and that they, too, could write to Indians as I wrote, not only to Dr. Kitchlew, but to other Indians who were in gaol. I wrote to those three men who were in gaol, and it may surprise the Hon'ble Baronet to hear that I sent all those three letters under cover to the Viceroy, asking him to forward them if he thought they would do no harm.

Sir W. Joynson-Hicks: Does the hon'ble and gallant gentleman really mean to say that he not only wrote to people who were in prison, but sent the letters to the Viceroy, and put him in the position of saying whether or not he would deliver such letters from an English Member of Parliament? It was a most unfair position in which to put the Viceroy.

Colonel Wedgwood: Not at all. I asked the Viceroy to forward them if he thought they would do no harm. If he had not forwarded them, the whole thing would have fallen to the ground. He forwarded them, because being wiser than the hon'ble Baronet, he considered that it would do good to show clearly to these Indians who were in gaol that they still had friends in the British House of Commons. As to whether a letter which was obviously private should have been published by Dr. Kitchlew, that is another matter. After all, it was a letter from one public man to another public man, and, although it was intended to be private, I think he was entitled to publish it.

Sir Joynson-Hicks: It was not marked "Private"?

Colonel Wedgwood: No. The two other gentlemen to whom I wrote did not publish the letters. I think that on the whole both the Hon'ble Member for Bishop Auckland and myself deserve not approbrium, but congratulations, even from extremists in the House of Commons, for having tried to keep a bridge across the gulf to prevent these two great races from drifting apart, to keep them locked together in some form of amity.

The British Official in India

I want now to pass to the real, proper matter of this Debate. As India progresses towards freedom—and, in spite of this House of Commons, India is progressing towards freedom—year by year more and more subjects are being in practice transferred to the control of the local legislatures, year by year the Assembly itself is getting more control over the finances, and the veto embodied in the Government of India Act is less and less used and less and less likely to be used—as India progresses towards freedom, it is inevitable that Debates in this House should turn more and more upon the interests of Britishers in India, whether they be in the Civil Service or engaged in British trade and commerce.

in India. We are bound to look at the question more and more from that point of view, and therefore nearly the whole of the Debate to-day has turned upon the future of the Anglo-Indian official in India. His position is very difficult. Let us realise that the better he is the sooner he will be scrapped. He is legislating, he is administering, for his own extinction, and that is an extremely difficult position. I look back with horror upon one period in my life when I was in exactly the same position, and, in spite of a radicalism which I hope will last throughout my life, I remember thinking that there was a great deal to be said in those days of keeping a firm control over the Transvaal.

I can quite understand the attitude of every civilian in India now, because the machine is inevitably working towards the elimination of himself. Just as in Japan, when the Japanese were educating themselves, they had to get Europeans in to do the teaching, and just as in Japan, they inevitably employed them on a three years' engagement and then scrapped them, so in India, as India is following along the line of civilised development, they must look forward to teaching their own people to do the jobs that hitherto have been done by Europeans. All that makes the position of the Anglo-Indian official extremely difficult. I do not want it to be thought that we in the Labour party do not realise that, that we do not sympathise with him and do not want them who are really working these reforms to work them satisfactorily. In the short time for which I was in India I found far more radicalism of view among the civil servants than among the commercial classes in India. Over and over again I found that the civilian was looking forward to working these reforms because he was really interested in them, because he really saw that in the long run the principal glory of this country will rest upon the fact that we got out of India, and not that we got into India—that we got into India when it was in a state of complete anarchy, and that we got out of India leaving democracy. That will be an enormous tribute to this country. It will be regarded as, perhaps, the finest monument to British rule, to British altruism, that exists. That point of view is seen and understood by a great number of the civil servants and of the Governors in India to-day. Even Conservative members of this House, like Sir George Lloyd, who go out to India with all the atmosphere of democracy created in the House of Commons in spite of party labels, and who become Governors with the idea behind them that they have a duty to the traditions of England, go there anxious to do what we on these benches are anxious to do, namely, to launch India on the road to freedom. Even though they are working with the knowledge that they will have finished

their work at the end of 10 years, whatever it may be, even though during those 10 years, they are ignorant, uneducated public opinion among the inhabitants of India constantly against them, and even though they find themselves criticised over and over again when they ought to be patted on the back, the consciousness of doing their duty is enough. With that consciousness they will carry on their work well, and come back to this country having done something for England which they would never have done in the old days when they simply had to say "do this," and it was done.

Naturally, when we are discussing India to-day, we look at the question of the English in India. It is quite useless for us to discuss, as the hon. Member for Seven Oaks (Sir T. Bennett) discussed, the question of Indian finance. Indian finance is a question for the Indian Government, which is becoming more and more the real Government of India. I think it is perfectly ridiculous that in India the income tax is not levied upon agricultural rents, but it is not. That is a question for India, not for us. It is monstrous that half the expenditure of the country should go on the Army. The hon. Baronet, the Member for Twickenham, says that the Army is our responsibility, but they have to find the money. They have to vote the money year by year, and I think the people who vote the money will, in the long run, call the tune as to whether that money is to be spent and how it is to be spent. It is simply beating the air for us to discuss Indian finance. In the same way, with regard to the question whether cow killing is to go on in India or whether we should interfere to stop it, I always say, when I am asked about it, that it is not my business and I am not going to ask questions about it. I tell them to go to their own Member about it and let him raise it in the Council, and I tell them that, if they cannot carry it in their own Councils, they should not bother us. They are their own governors now, and just as Mr. Speaker prevents us over and over again from dealing with questions concerning Ireland, so more and more we shall have to be barred from discussing questions concerning India. Another question that we should discuss it was governed India is that of trade union legislation. Trade unions in India are practically just as illegal as they were in this country a hundred years ago. Men can be put in prison for being connected with a trade union. They can be proceeded against, criminally, by the employers whom they inconvenience. Trade union legislation is essential to the safe conduct of industry in India to-day. But, again, what is the use of our talking about it? They do not want trade union legislation, and will not have it. As a matter of fact in the last unfortunate election of 1920, they got into the Assembly all the landholders and all the millowners in India. There is

no representation of the people of India whatever. A few members were nominated from the Friends (Servants?) of India Society, who do attempt to look after the Indian working man, but the Indian working man has no vote, and the new governors of that country are the people who were elected in 1920. At the next election we may get a different brand, I do not know, how far the narrowness of the franchise will ensure a long period of employer rule, but I am certain that it is no use asking questions about it or talking about it in the House of Commons. It is not our business.

What is our business is to see where we are going. The noble Lord made to-day his first comprehensive speech on India. For 16 years in this House I have listened to Indian Debates to speeches by Liberal Ministers on India. This is the first time anyone in the House of Commons has heard a conservative speaking for the India Office. On the whole, I am not certain that I mind the change, because when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge County (Mr. Montagu) was speaking there, although the speech was quite different, he spoke without power. He spoke without the rank and file behind him, he spoke under constant pressure from those benches, he was not a free agent. To-day we have had a different speech. It will not be so pleasing in India, it is much more pleasing in this Committee, but it has the enormous merit of being in accord with the views of the Government. I wish that, before the Noble Lord makes his next speech, he would visit India. I think it ought to be possible for the Under-Secretary of State to get out and go round India, to talk with the Governors and see what they are thinking about now. That is really the best way of learning what the present position is. I am certain that the Noble Lord, and, I suppose, the Secretary of State, are dealing with India now without understanding the real difficulties of the problem as they are seen out there. They see the difficulties of the problem under the heckling of the hon. Baronet, the Member for Twickenham. They see the Die hard point of view, I do not say they agree with it, but they see it. That has always been what they have been up against, and therefore, they have to take account of it. I want the Noble Lord to go out and see Sir George Lloyd, Lord Lytton, Sir Harcourt Butler, and all the other Governors, and find out what they are thinking of the present situation and what they want to do. All that I hear proves more and more that the Governors, who are primarily the people who have to work the Government of India Act, are all wanting to get through the transition stage and on to the next stage; that the difficulties of the present position are getting enormous. You cannot go back, you cannot cancel the Government of India Act, but the difficulties of

working the situation at the present time, when you have a constant ill will over the whole population, are becoming very great indeed. You can easily carry on by coercion, particularly in India, where there is no chance of an armed rising. You can carry on Government by coercion for a long time, but there is no heart in it, and the best of these Governors will say, I think—I have not seen them or heard from them—"let us try and save the amity of the situation by getting on to the final stage quickly. Let us try to get as far as possible over this intermediary stage and take the risk." After all, the greater part of the risk is India's risk. To us the risk of Dominion Home Rule is a loss of jobs by a number of civil servants whom it would pay us over and over again to compensate ourselves rather than have deadly hatred from India in years to come. This is a question of security for a great amount of British capital, and I believe British capitalists themselves—ask those directors of the Scotch mills at Calcutta—would say that their capital was going to be more secure under a self governing India than it is under an India in which race hatred is going on boiling up, in which the only policy of every Indian is to get rid of the English. As long as you have the struggle for independence, there is a risk to capital. When once India ceases to see that her principal business is to get rid of the English, they will be able to work with the English. I believe a visit by the Noble Lord to India, seeing business men, particularly those who are now bringing Indians on to directorates in great numbers—take the Capital Bank of India, it has always kept Indians off the Board, but is now letting them on—see the way in which capital is developed in Bombay where nearly all the capital is Indian capital. See the way in which Indian capital is becoming intertwined with English. He will find from those people that perhaps even they would be anxious to end the present situation, and bring about a lasting settlement, even though it came 10, 15 or 20 years earlier than we expected when we passed the Government of India Act. I do not like, and I do not believe anyone in the House likes, a situation where there are 20,000 agitators in prison.

Earl Winterton. What authority has the hon. and gallant Gentleman for saying that there are 20,000 agitators in prison?

Colonel Wedgwood. I have seen it in the Indian Press. I was told by an Indian the other day that there were 23,000. We cannot get the information out of the India Office. You all say you do not know. The noble Lord keeps on saying that he does not know how to distinguish an agitator from a common criminal. Unless he can distinguish them we cannot get the figures of the facts. I wish he would try to secure them. About two months ago I asked for the number of politicals in prison in each province. I think

nearly all the politicals are in prison in Bengal. In certain provinces they are being put in gaol and in others they are not. In any case we want the facts, and, I think, in spite of the fact that we are not responsible any longer for the Government of India, we ought to know these facts because they are of enormous importance to the amicable relations of the English and the Indian people. We cannot look on contentedly at a state of affairs in which the only possible way of governing India is to put the political leaders in gaol. It may operate for years. I think it has done a great deal to kill the non-co-operation movement. It has made the non-co-operation movement less vocal and I dare say it has made it actually less powerful, but in the long run the gaol is no cure for anything, and sooner or latter those people will come out embittered against England. I could wish that every Member of the House would realise that a man who goes to gaol for conscience or for his country is not a criminal. You can call him what you like but he is not a criminal in our sense of the term and whether it be Lajpat Rai or whoever it may be, they are men who are making a very great sacrifice for what they believe to be right, and although it is many hundred years since Englishmen had to go to gaol for the liberties of their country we ought to be able to appreciate that amount of self sacrifice in another race which, modelled upon our history, is trying to do the same thing that our ancestors did 300 years ago.

What can we do? My hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland has indicated what I think might be done. This is really what the Noble Lord should find out when he goes to India. We want as soon as possible an inquiry into the working of diarchy up to now. They have had two years. By the time that Commission gets to work they will have had two and half years—four sessions of the Legislature—to go upon. We want to know how it is working in the Legislative Assembly and the Councils. We want that Commission to include in its terms of reference the power to make recommendations for modification of the rules and we want it to have power to recommend, if it thinks fit, new elections. I say if it thinks fit because I think any new election in India should be dependent upon the consent of the non-co operators to drop non-co operation as far as the councils are concerned. I have always thought and said it was insanity from the point of view of the non-co operators themselves not to get themselves elected on the Assembly. They have deprived themselves of the best platform and they have given to their enemies an unduly prominent position. Now they are beginning to realise this. I do not know whether the Noble Lord has seen the views expressed by Mrs. C. R. Dass. She is a lady very much like Rosalind

Countess Carlyle in this country 10 years ago, a woman of enormous political influence, partly due to her husband's position. He is in goal of course. Mrs. Dass's views are now that it would be advisable, certainly in Bengal, where she controls the situation, to get to the Bengal Council and the Legislative Assembly. It was always her husband's view, but under the pressure of Gandhi's personal opinion to the contrary he gave way. Bengal, of course, is the most English part of the country, and a place where they appreciate democracy perhaps better than in any other part of India. There I think you would certainly have a break away.

It is obvious that if you had a general election, and if the non-cooperators decide to take part in it, you would get upon the Council of the Dominion a large number of people who would be extremists. Do not think they would be an overwhelming number, because there has been such a lot of jerry-mandering of the constituencies in India that the land-lords would still rule the roost in a great many constituencies. But you would certainly get a considerable element of extremists, if you allowed them to stand of course. They are all in prison and ineligible at present. They would make themselves a nuisance on the Council. If they were opposed they would carry on opposition even more effectively than the Labour party does now. They might make scenes in Parliament. You have got to go through that stage. If you are ever going to turn your poachers into game-keepers you have to expect them to do a little kicking over the traces. You expect them to have a night out occasionally. I am certain that is the only way in which they will learn responsibility. After all, we in this party are learning responsibility through opposition and in time to come we shall be able to carry on in India quite as well as the Noble Lord opposite. That seems to me to be our only way. Let us have an inquiry. Let us give the people who hold that inquiry into the working of diarchy the possibility of making recommendations for changes in the rules and regulations and also power if they can come to terms with the Indian die-hards to open a fresh election and elect a real Legislative Council, a real Assembly, such as we have not, unfortunately, in India to-day. If you are going to end non-cooperation, if we are ever to work together with the Indian people, break it down slowly. See, first of all that they go on the Councils, and when they realise that that means governing India the rest of non-cooperation will fall to the ground and be futile and stupid, and we shall get not only Indian Home Rule—a new Dominion within the British Commonwealth—but we shall get the foundation of real good feeling between these two great races of the earth.

The Burma Reforms

HOUSE OF COMMONS—12TH JUNE 1922

In May 1922 the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Indian affairs were working feverishly on the Draft Rules for the New Burma Reforms. This work was completed on 26th May, and the rules were published in two White Papers five days afterwards. These came up for discussion in the House of Commons on the 12th June and occupied the House for 5 hours. Only a drafting amendment was introduced on the motion of Lord Winterton, the Indian Under-Secretary of State. Colonel Wedgwood tried to move several amendments to bring the scheme more in harmony with political aspirations of Burma but they proved abortive. The whole scheme of the Burma Constitutional Reforms as put before the House was to a certain extent in advance of the other Provinces of India under the Reforms Act. The Rules for Burma followed in the main the recommendations of the White Committee (See p. 937) and the franchise proposed was more liberal than in the rest of British India. Excluding the backward Shan States (which will have no direct representation at present) the population of Burma to whom the new Constitution will apply is about 11,560,000. In the rural areas alone, with a population of 10,750,000, there will be an electorate of one and a half million. This will be rather more than the number on the electoral roll of the United Provinces, which have the far greater population of 45,000,000. In Bengal, where the population is 46,000,000 the electorate only just exceeds a million, whilst in the Central Provinces, with a population about equal to that of Burma, only 145,000 are entitled to exercise the franchise. The larger numbers in Burma are due mainly to the lower age limit (18 instead of 21) and the inclusion of all persons paying household tax and capitation tax.

On the matter coming up for discussion on the 12th, Colonel Wedgwood who took a very active interest both on the Joint Committee and in the House itself, said that the scheme was worthy of acceptance by Burma, even though the improvements which he desired to introduce were rejected. At the same time he did his best to convey to the House the views of those Burmese who regard the measure as timid and, in part, reactionary. He said that the question as to whether the new system was to be accepted or rejected by the politically conscious classes in Burma was trembling in the

balance and the main purpose of his amendments was to make the offer as generous as possible so as to obviate in Burma the policy of Non-co operation which had prevailed in India.

Die Hard Objections.

Two or three Unionist members in course of the discussion made it plain that the measure though presented by a Tory Minister was not at all to their liking. Major Glyn objected to the transfer of forests, to a Burmese Minister on the ground that it would lead to inefficiency and loss. Sir Charles Yate pitched into the system of dyarchy and protested strongly against the proposal to fix eighteen as the age for the exercise of the franchise.

Sir Thomas Bennett and Mr. Ormsby Gore gave their hearty support to the moderate scheme of reform. They said that they had no doubt as to the grave folly of allowing the present conditions to continue indefinitely. Mr. Ormsby Gore deplored the delay which has taken place in the extension of the Act to Burma, and urged that what was done now should not be done in a niggardly spirit.

Mr. Ormsby Gore was one of those who opposed the principle of communal representation contained in the Bill. This question was raised in an amendment by Colonel Wedgwood who sought to eliminate the scheme of communal electorates, substituting for it the reservation of particular seats. His speech was a very powerful argument against special minority representation, only his position would have been more logical if he had refrained from putting forward an alternative method of securing what was practically the same end. He showed how communal representation would work if applied to England. It would mean a separate register for Scotsmen, another for Irishmen, a third for Welshmen, and so on, and on the top of these racial distinctions there would be special representation for Jews, Roman Catholics and other communities as such. He further urged that such a system could never be good for minorities, whether in Britain, India, Burma, or anywhere else. Where particular communities, such as Indians and Karens in Burma, predominate in certain constituencies they will have no difficulty in securing the election of their own representatives through the medium of a general electorate, and where the same communities can only register a limited number of votes, they may still exercise a very considerable influence, both in the selection of candidates and as regards the subsequent actions of those elected. For example, as was pointed out, Roman Catholics in England were in a much stronger position by being able to use their votes in this way in a large number of constituencies than they would be if lumped together in a few communal constituencies, because in the latter case ordinary members of Parlia-

ment would take no notice of their claims and their own representatives would form only a microscopic minority in Parliament.

Lord Winterton, however, managed to persuade the House that the method of communal representation proposed in the rules was necessary in the present stage of political development in Burma, and the amendment was accordingly rejected by 146 to 43.

Amendments Rejected.

Colonel Wedgwood's other amendments shared the same fate. The rules, as drafted, in addition to enfranchising women on the same terms as men, enabled the Legislative Council to decide whether they shall be eligible to stand as candidates or not. Colonel Wedgwood, however, thought that the right to stand should be conferred at once, but by a majority of 155 to 43 the House thought otherwise.

Under Rule 5, all candidates must have attained the age of 25. Colonel Wedgwood proposed to substitute 21, and in doing so he pointed out that Lord Winterton himself had been elected a member of the House of Commons at 21 by a method which did not surely follow the election rules in Britain. Whereupon the noble Lord blushed exceedingly and afterwards confessed that he was ashamed of his conduct between the ages of 21 and 25 (as indeed he had good reason to be, for he was in those years one of the most unruly youngmen at Westminster). He stuck, however, to the age of 25 for Burma, in spite of the opposition of Lord Robert Cecil and other experienced members, and carried his point.

An effort was also made to secure for the various electorates, whether communal or territorial, freedom to choose their own representatives without regard to any residential or communal qualification, but it was unsuccessful. Equally unavailing was the attempt to prevent the disqualification for election of persons who have been imprisoned for political offences. Colonel Wedgwood pointed out how this, in itself, would exclude many of the most patriotic men in India from serving in the Councils should they at any time desire to do so, but in this matter also the Under Secretary was unyielding and the amendment was negatived.

Towards the end of the discussion Colonel Wedgwood again raised the question of the separation of Burma from India—a development which he would heartily welcome and for which he gave his reasons. His fear was that the rules as they stood would prevent the Burmese people from giving effect to their wishes in this matter at some future time, but Lord Winterton maintained that there was nothing in the rules to prejudice their ultimate decision as the root principle of the relationship of Burma to the Government of India was not affected. The Rules were then passed.

The Joint Committee

After the Burma Reform Rules, the next matter to engage attention of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Indian affairs was the huge increase in the Army expenditure of India. The second report of the Standing Joint Committee on Indian Affairs dealing with the cost of maintenance of British troops was out early in July 1922. The Committee had the advantage of the attendance of the Secretary of State on three occasions and put many questions to him. They considered that the whole question should be exhaustively explored with a view to effecting what reductions in military expenditure may be found practicable and consistent with security. The report points out that the Indian Budget for 1922-23 shows an estimate of over 62 crores of rupees on military expenditure out of a total expenditure of 141 crores, while the revenue is 132 crores and the deficit nine crores. This serious financial position, says the report, renders economies in all possible directions imperative. The expenditure in India for British troops in 1921-22 was 16 crores 81 lakhs compared with seven crores 32 lakhs in 1913-14, despite the fact that the strength had been reduced by six thousand men. The Committee is not informed on what grounds the reduction of strength was made and desire to make it clear that they do not recommend a further reduction in the size of the British army. The increase in the cost of troops however may be attributed to a considerable degree to higher pay since 1919.

It is understood, continues the report, that the increase of pay was deemed necessary by the War office on account of the increase granted in England at that time and adopted by the Home Government under abnormal conditions without any formal consultation with the India Office or authorities in India. The Indian Government had no other alternative but to accept it although there was already a serious deficiency in revenue as compared with expenditure. It is open to consideration whether the general Head Quarters Staff is not inflated and capable of reduction without disadvantage. The Headquarters Staff has increased from 96 in 1914 to 166 in 1921. The total of officers' staffs other than headquarters has increased from 203 in 1914 to 278 in 1921. The Committee has not examined this subject in detail owing to its magnitude and complexity, but in view of the facts disclosed above they feel it their duty to direct the attention of Parliament to the importance of the whole subject and to recommend that the Incheape Committee should be directed most seriously to consider the possibility of reducing expenditure as far as the British army in India is concerned,

The I. C. S. Debate

HOUSE OF COMMONS—2ND AUGUST 1922

The following is the full account of the famous I.C.S. debate in the last parliament in which the then Premier, Mr. Lloyd George delivered that notorious 'Steel frame' speech which has since then been agitating public men in India about the danger of another breach of faith regarding the Reforms.

In the House of Commons, on Aug. 2 Sir S Hoare (Chelsea, C U) raised the question of the present position and prospects in the Indian Civil Service. He said that one of the most important factors for the success of the Government of India Act was an efficient and contented Civil Service. At the present moment there was very grave anxiety and discontent in the ranks of the Civil Service. That was shown by the fact that at the recent examinations fewer Europeans presented themselves. That was a serious fact. The Indian Civil Service was suffering from a general grievance that came from the feeling of uncertainty and from a number of specific financial grievances. A great many members genuinely believed that their pay was no longer so secure as it was, that their pensions were not so certain, and that it was doubtful, as constitutional development took place in India, whether the appointments they now held would continue, and, if they ceased to continue, whether they would obtain just compensation for having their careers brought to an end. They felt that the conditions offered by the Government for premature retirement were not generous enough. They had seen many debates raised and questions asked in the new Councils and Assemblies suggesting that a great many members of those bodies thought that the Civil Service was no longer wanted in India, and that the civilians had better pack up and go home.

He urged the Prime Minister to make a clear statement that in the spirit and the letter, the Government abided by the pledges that individuals of the Indian Service should not suffer from the constitutional changes that had taken place. Owing to the fall of the rupee and the rise in the cost of living, the Indian Civil Servant was very much worse off, even with the 8 per cent rise of salary under the Ishington recommendations, than he was when those recommendations began to take effect. The Indian Civil

Servant, moreover, saw that, while his pay had only risen by 8 per cent, that of the British Civil Servant, the officers in the Navy and the Army, and the Members of the Diplomatic Service, had risen by a great deal more. The hon. member admitted that there were several very real difficulties in the way of measures that might be taken to remedy the evil complained of. One of the greatest was the financial difficulty, which was particularly felt in India. He did not wish to dictate what India should do or not do. He felt that the question could only be amicably settled with Indian co-operation. After all, the Indian Civil Service existed not for the benefit of a few Englishmen, but for the good of the whole of India. It already consisted of a number of Indians. They had just as much status in any improvement that was made as had Englishmen, and if the position were put frankly and fairly to moderate opinion in India, it would be behind the Government in any improvements that ought to be made. He suggested that there should be some sort of inquiry into the matter.

Sir W. Joynson Hicks (Twickenham, C. U.) referred to the position of the other British services in India, and said that the Indianization of these public services was proceeding apace, and during the last two years, it had been extremely rapid. Under present arrangements it was proposed that 18 per cent of the Civil Service should be Indianized. At the present rate of progress that would be completed within nine years. The Indian Education Services were to-day over 87 per cent Indianized, the Indian Service of Engineers was 28 per cent Indianised. The Indianisation process in the agricultural services was going a little more slowly, they were only 25 per cent Indianized at present. But, in the Indian Medical Service since 1915, there had been 174 appointments; 101 of these had been filled by Indians, and only seventy-three by Europeans. The Indianization of this service was proceeding so rapidly that in many parts of India—the up country districts—it was impossible for an Englishman to obtain the services of a White doctor. The Indian Medical Service was really the “key” service of the whole of our services in India. To-day we were not getting the supply of Englishmen to take up positions in the Indian services. A conference had been held recently at Oxford to consider the difficulties of getting youngmen at Oxford, Cambridge, and the other educational centres to go in for Indian examinations, and the result was such as to cause the gravest anxiety. Sir William Vincent had also stated that our officers in India had to work in an atmosphere of hostility, which gave rise to almost intolerable difficulties. It was the moderate view that this country was going to permit the complete Indianization of the services and

that Englishmen must gradually quit all those offices. During the last few years the Englishmen in India had been compelled to form associations of defence in the various provinces to protect the members from injustice and hardship.

Mr. Lloyd George's Speech

The Premier then rose and said :—

I am speaking early as I understand that by arrangement this debate is to come to end at an early hour in order to enable honourable Gentlemen opposite to raise questions in which they are specially interested. I will do my best to enable that pledge to be redeemed. I am grateful to my honourable and gallant friend Sir Samuel Hoare for bringing this important matter to the attention of the House of Commons. I have heard a great deal about this, more especially in the course of the last few months. No doubt there is a great deal of uneasiness among our British Servants and British Officials in India with regard to the future, and there is no doubt, as my honourable friend states, that they feel that their position is precarious and that they are very uneasy with regard to their pay and pensions generally. There is the apprehension that great constitutional changes, which have been introduced in the course of the last few months, will affect their position prejudicially, and they want reassurances and possibly they need assurances, with regard to all these questions. They are discharging a very great trust on behalf of the people of this country and on behalf of the people of India. Without their loyalty, capacity, and patience India could not possibly be saved from falling into the position of anarchy from which this country rescued her a century and more ago. It is but natural that great constitutional changes which took place should provoke some uneasiness in the minds of those who worked the old system. It is the effect of every great change in an establishment. Those who have been running an establishment along well-known lines are naturally unhappy with regard to the effect the changes may have upon their own prospects and conditions.

The Reforms an Experiment.

Therefore we must not be surprised to find that that is the state of British officials in India. I should like to say one or two words with regard to the working of those changes before I come to the specific point raised by my honourable and gallant friend because they have a bearing upon the problem which is suggested for our consideration. Those changes were in the nature of an experiment and they must be treated as an experiment, a great and important experiment, but still an experiment. Difficul-

ties have arisen and weaknesses have been exposed in the working of this new system, but this was inevitable. On the whole I think it may be said, taking into account the fact that the experiment has been in operation only for a year and a half, that there has been a very considerable measure of success in spite of drawbacks which have manifested themselves. India has never been governed on these principles before. The Native States are not governed on these principles now, and it remains to be seen, whether a system of this kind, adapted to western needs, perfected by centuries of experiment and marked at many stages, in fact at every stage with repeated failures, a system which the West has perfected for its own conditions and its own temperament, is suitable for India. That remains to be seen, and that we must watch carefully, but we must also watch it patiently. We must not jump to the conclusion because there have been difficulties, drawbacks and failures, that the experiment has been a complete failure.

Non-Co-Operation

Before the last election and until recently there was a very considerable non co-operative movement. Very powerful elements in India refused to associate themselves with these experiments at all and the elections were held without the assistance of that advanced section, and the Parliament or Legislature chosen did not present those elements. There have been very able and distinguished Indians who have done their best to make the experiment a complete success, and others who have steadily opposed it. I think that in another year or eighteen months there will be another election. The Non co operation movement at the present time is in a state of collapse. What part it will take in the next election we cannot tell, what influence the Non co operators and men of that kind will exert upon those election I cannot predict. A good deal will depend upon the kind of representatives chosen at the next election.

Whether they will be men of moderate temper such as those who constitute the present legislature, men who are honestly and earnestly doing their best to make this new constitutional experiment a success, or whether they will be there as men who are simply using all the powers of the machine in order to attain some purpose which is detrimental to British rule and subversive of the whole system upon which India has been governed up to now, I cannot say. That is why I say that the most serious and most trying time—a time which will constitute the real test of success of this effort—is yet to come. I think it is right that we should say that, if there is a change of the kind in the character of the legislature and in the purpose of those who are chosen in design of responsible and chosen

leaders of the Indian people, that would constitute a serious situation and we should have to take it into account.

Britain will not abdicate

One thing we must make clear, that Britain will in no circumstances relinquish her responsibility to India. This is a cardinal principle not merely of the present Government but I feel confident that it will be the cardinal principle with any Government that could command the confidence of the people of this country. It is important that that should be known not so much in this country for there is no doubt about it here, but in India, where for many reasons there seems to be doubt disseminated, sometimes fortuitously, sometimes quite unintentionally, and sometimes from facts which seem for a moment to justify conclusions of that kind. It is right that not merely here but in India it should be thoroughly understood that that is the fundamental principle which will guide every part that ever has any hope of commanding the confidence of the people of this country. We stand by our responsibilities. We will take whatever steps are necessary to discharge or to enforce them.

Anarchy before British Rule

We owe this not only to the people of this country, though they have made a great sacrifice for India, but we owe it to the people of India as a whole. We had no right to go there unless we meant to carry out that trust right through. There is a great variety of races and creeds in India, probably greater variety than in the whole of Europe. There are innumerable divisive forces there and if Britain withdrew her strong hand nothing would ensue except divisions, strife, conflict and anarchy. India would become a prey either to strong adventurers or to the strong invader. That had been the history of India up to the very hour when we took India in hand. There has always been a historical play between those two alternatives. What has happened before would ensue again if Britain withdrew her might and strength from the guidance of that great Empire. In fact, if we were to do so, it would be one of the greatest betrayals in the history of any country.

Indian Princes

We have a duty, not merely to the vast territories in India where we exercise supreme control but we also owe a duty to the great Princes of India and to the Indian States which are feudatories of his Majesty the King Emperor. They constitute about one third of India. We owe an undoubted duty to them. They have been loyal to the Throne and to the Empire under conditions where loyalty was tried in every fibre and where loyalty was vital to the existence of the Empire. There has been nothing more

glorious in the whole story of the Empire than the rallying of these Princes and those peoples to the British Empire at the moment when we needed all strength which we could command either in our own territories at home or throughout the vast domain of the British Empire. Thereof we owe a great duty to the backward parts of India which are dependent on the direction and guidance and vision which British statesmanship can command for the purpose of development of good government in that great country.

Discharging the Trust

We have invited the co-operation of the people of India in the discharge of this trust. We have invited them in increasing numbers and perhaps in increasing proportions. I think that that was inevitable. It was a natural development. We have invited them in the Army, we have invited them in the Civil Service and we have invited them to assist in the Government of India under their own people now in Legislature. That was the inevitable evolution, but I want to make it clear, if it is not already clear, that that is not in order to lead up to the final relinquishment of our trust but with a view of bringing into partnership in the discharge of that trust within the British Empire. To discharge that great trust it is essential to have the aid of the Indian Civil Servants, Indian soldiers, Indian Judges and Indian legislators. But it is vital that we should have the continued assistance of British officials. There are not so very many of them. I marvelled when I looked up statistics. There are only 1200 governing 31,50,00,000 people with all sorts of physical difficulties of climate and special difficulties for men brought up in a temperate climate like ours.

Sir Donald Maclean—Does that include all British Officials?

The Premier. That is the total simply for the Civil Service. It does not include the Police and Medical Services. Figures are 1200 British civil servants, 700 British police officers, and 600 British medical officers. That is a total of 2500 governing that gigantic Empire with its hundreds of millions of population, governing quietly and without fuss, doing it for generations. There is hardly anything that is comparable with it in the history of the world, certainly not since the days of Roman Empire. Here is something for us to be proud of.

A Triumph of Government

I do not believe there is any country in the world that can produce such a triumph of Government. As I said once in this House there are men governing huge territories there whose names are hardly known. Even when they retire and you meet them

they are introduced to you as members of the Indian Civil Service and you have never heard of them although they have been governing perhaps tens of millions of people for a very long period. Their every word is a command, every sentence a decree, accepted by these people, accepted willingly with trust in their judgment and confidence in their justice and their fairness, which ought to be the pride of our race. I have often talked to Americans about this. They are full of wonder at the achievement of ordinary and insignificant (in sense of not being known) civil servants in different parts of the world alone or almost without companionship, governing great territories. They always regard it as a great miracle of British gift for government. These Civil Servants are entitled to every word of support. They are entitled to every deed of support that this Imperial Parliament can give, and if they need it, it is the business of statesmen to give it, speaking not only on their own behalf but speaking on behalf of the whole of their countrymen to stand behind them to support them, to see that justice is done to them if they have grievances. We must pledge ourselves not merely to this Government but any other Government that comes here to see that fair treatment which is their right is dispensed to them. They ought to know that this is the attitude of the British Parliament towards them. I am one of those who believe in getting the co-operation of India in the government of the country. I believe it strengthens the Empire, it strengthens the hold which the Empire has upon them, it would be a mistake to make India regard that Empire as something which is outside, it is strength to the Empire to make them feel that they are part of it, that they are in it, part of the structure, and that when they are challenged and when the Empire is challenged they are not fighting for something which is in London but for something which is in Calcutta or Bombay or wherever they happen to be. That is what made our strength in the last war in the Dominions and in the Colonies.

Therefore I approved this question from the point of view of one who believes in getting Indians to assist us in discharging the very great trust and obligation which we have inherited and which I hope we shall transmit to our descendants in generations to come. From that point of view I should like to say this. The success of our efforts in securing the attachment of Indians to service, the recruitment of Indians to service, the embodiment of Indians in service, will depend not upon the quality of speeches delivered in the legislatures by Indians (although I do not despise that contribution in the least because that is what Parliament means, it means a place for speaking), but rather by their efficiency in the discharge of

their ordinary humdrum tasks as members of the civil and other services. I think it is important that Indians themselves should get that well into their minds. They see speeches reported in papers and they see a great deal of importance is attached to those speeches, and they say this is the art of Government. Well, it is part of the art of democratic Government, and people who try to govern without it have generally failed. In war, as I ventured to say some time ago, countries which were the most efficient on that side were also the most efficient in the conduct of war. It is a great part of the art of Government. It is the beginning but the other is vital, and unless they supplement it by showing that they are able to do their work as civil servants, then the experiment of inviting them to co operate with us will be a failure.

The British Services Indispensable

What I want specially to say is this, that whatever their success, whether as parliamentarians or as administrators, I can see no period when they can dispense with the guidance and assistance of a small nucleus of British Civil Servants, of British officials in India, this in the population of 31,5000,000 and they only number 1200. They are the steel frame of the whole structure. I do not care what you build on to it, if you take that steel frame out, the fabric will collapse. It is therefore essential that they should be there, but not for their own sakes. What does it matter finding 1200 positions from a population of 36000000. Finding jobs for 1200 is really too trivial. I see comments and unworthy comments about our finding avenues and jobs for our young men. There is not one of this 1200 that could not easily find a much better job in this country, a much better paying one. The difficulty is to get men to go there. It is not the difficulty of finding places to put them into. Therefore, I am not talking from that point of view. As I said to my Right Honourable friend, the Member for the Scottish Universities (Sir Henry Craik) when I had a conversation with him five months ago, and I am entirely in agreement with him. It is from the point of view of India I am talking. It is a question not of value to us of finding outlets for intelligent young men, but of value to India of getting men of this kind who are highly trained and full of spirit, and there must be some spirit in them to go there and undertake this task. These men are placed at India's disposal and Indians ought to feel a deep sense of gratitude, and I have no doubt the vast majority of them do. It is no secret that they often feel far more confidence in these men than they do in men of their own flesh and blood.

Therefore it is essential that we should keep this service.

Difficulty in Getting Recruits

There is no doubt at all that because of the sense of disturbances and disquietitude which recent events have created in India, a difficulty has been experienced in obtaining recruits for the Indian Civil Service. I do not think there is much in the difficulty as regards medical men or at least it is a different kind of difficulty. The difficulty in regard to the medical men, a difficulty which is experienced even here, and you certainly cannot get them in the Colonies, is due to war. When the war came young men were drafted into the Army just at time when they should have been undergoing training and the result is that there is a great gap which it will take some years to fill up. I am partly responsible in another way because the Insurance Act has increased the demand for doctors and what was supposed on the part of the medical profession to have been a great conspiracy and was denounced as such, has turned out to be a real blessing and encouragement to students to persevere in their studies. At any rate there is a shortage here. There is a shortage in the Colonies and naturally there is a shortage in India as well. But when you come to the British Civil Service and the Police in India the difficulty there is in a different category. That is undoubtedly due to the fear that there is going to be a change to their detriment and a change which will prejudicially affect their status. There are sentences like that quoted by my honourable Friend, Member for Twickenham (Sir William Joynson Hicks) and I say at once that I am rather sorry that statement was made. It is a sentence which, taken away from its context and read by parents, would have the effect of discouraging them from sending their children to the Indian Civil Service. I think it is discouraging that this sentence should be uttered at a moment when a great difficulty is being experienced in getting recruits.

Concessions to the Services

I hope when it is thoroughly realised that there is no idea of winding up the British Civil Service and that we consider it not merely as an integral part of the system but as essential to the very life of the system and that in spirit we will consider everything that affects the conditions in the service. I hope it will be an encouragement to young men once more to turn their attention to this very great career which not merely redounds to their own glory but undoubtedly to the glory of their fatherland and make its name great throughout the nations, because that is the record of the Indian Civil Service. All these questions we are considering very carefully. Questions which have been put by my two honourable friends—the questions of pay, no doubt—they have been bit

hard by the sudden increase in the cost of living attributable to war. There has been a reduction and that reduction is a still progressive one. There is also the question of passages to Europe which as a whole have been during the last few years inflated. I think in the course of a year or two or three there must be reduction upon these very high charges on people who have only got their pay to draw upon to keep themselves and their families. It will come about. But I will promise to go into that matter and as a matter of fact my noble Friends, the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary are both considering that matter very carefully. It is right they should do so, because it is essential that young men should not be discouraged from entering the service. There is no doubt at all that the setting up of a legislature has forced us to consider good many other questions in reference to the Indian Governments. I marvel when I consider the kind of work which is done not merely by Indian Civil Servants but by Indian Councillors.

They are practically the Cabinet Ministers of India with enormous responsibilities of every kind. They have no Under-Secretaries and their numbers are very few. The number of British members is only four and they have no private Secretaries.

John Marriot. Are there no Cabinet Secretaries?

Premier: That is exactly the sort of Government my hon'ble Friend would like. That shows how little he knows about India. If he had the advantage of having a discussion with one of the members of the Council he would realise what a need there was of a Cabinet Secretariat. It is absolutely impossible for them to discharge the duties they have now got in addition to the task which they had before. They have to answer questions and to take part in the discussions. The Indian representatives are showing considerable activity following the example of members in other parts of the Empire, and giving as much trouble as they can which is quite right. That precedent is followed in India with the result that it is quite impossible for the very few ministers that are there who practically are Cabinet Ministers to discharge their functions without some assistance. Now that is one of the questions which we have to consider. The difficulties in India are increasing. They are bound to increase with the spread of education, with the greater knowledge in India of what is going on outside, with the influence which comes from great movements from every other part of the world surging on the frontiers of India and sending a thrill of disquietitude throughout the whole of the country. That has come and to a certain extent, it will continue to come.

We must not be discouraged by it and say that it means disaffection in India, that it means insurrection in India, that it means that India is getting tired of British rule. The world is tired of every rule. If Hon'ble members will read the newspapers they will find that this is the only Coalition that has lasted six years.

Commander Kenworthy : "What about M. Lenin".

Premier. No, he has not lasted as long and I am not sure that he has lasted, but my hon'ble and gallant Friend knows more about him than I do. You have got it in Italy and France and everywhere else, and that simply means the sort of unrest there is throughout the world, but you must not get discouraged. It does mean however undoubtedly a considerable accession of responsibility and of work to those who are discharging the functions of Government in every land, and on the main must as far as India is concerned depend not upon what happens in this Parliament where we can get discussions only once, twice, or three times a year upon India. We cannot keep a continuous eye upon what happens in India, and that is right. You cannot do it, it depends upon the kind of Government that you have there. It is essential that should be strengthened, but whatever you do in the way of strengthening it, there is one institution we will not interfere with, there is one institution we will not cripple, there is one institution we will not deprive of its functions, or of its privileges, and that is that institution which built up the British Raj, "The British Civil Service in India".

Responsibility for India

We have undertaken the responsibility for India. We have undertaken to guide India. We have undertaken to establish and maintain law and good Government throughout its vast dominions. We have undertaken to defend its frontiers, and to protect its peoples against internal foes and external foes. The British Empire means at all costs to continue to discharge that sacred trust and to fulfil that high destiny.

Colonel Wedgwood (Labour—Newcastle-under-Lyme) wondered what evil genius inspired the Prime Minister with the necessity to make this speech to day. There was no doubt that this was a new declaration as regards India, a declaration which he would find it difficult indeed to square with the Declaration of August, 1917. He had said that we would never relinquish our responsibility for India. He was quite right. Neither States nor individual can ever relinquish their responsibility for what they say or do. But what did he mean? Did he mean a change of policy? Was it his view still that our duty as regards India was to see

that country safe on the lines of Dominion Home Rule? Did he wish to see that country self governing, even as Canada or Australia are self-governing? That was the Declaration of 1917—not immediately, but as soon as it could safely be done. Was that relinquishing our responsibility or not? The people of India, reading his speech to-morrow would want to know what the Prime Minister meant. He had said that there was one institution which should never be deprived either of its powers or its functions, and that was the Indian Civil Service. Was that the doctrine of the Government, or was ultimately self-government the doctrine of the Government? How were they going to combine the two? He said that no Government that ever followed his Government will ever dare to relinquish our responsibility for India.

No, we shall not (proceeded Colonel Wedgwood), but our responsibility for India seems to be rather different from his. Our responsibility for India consists in assisting the formation of democratic self government in India. All our dealings with India will be to bring that day about when India can safely be given democratic Home Rule.

How is it possible for the Civil Service when once there is Dominion Home Rule in India to be able to carry on without a change of functions and without a change of powers? It is notorious that one of the difficulties that the Civil Service have to face at the present time is that already under diarchy itself their powers and their functions are no longer what they were, and their difficulty is that whereas before those reforms they were the masters of India, now insensibly they are bound to become the servants of the new governments, the new parliaments, the new councils of India, and when the Assembly has complete self-government then it is inevitable that the whole status of the Civil Service in India must change and the Civil Servants in that country will be even as the Civil Servants in this country, the servants of the Government and not the masters of the country.

The best of the British officials in India (Colonel Wedgwood maintained) realised that they were doing their finest service to their mother country when they assist towards the process of their own extinction. They know quite well that the best service they could render was to make easy and not difficult a transition which must inevitably dethrone them from their power. Besides obscuring at any rate, if he did not eclipse, the famous Declaration of August, 1917, the Prime Minister went on to offer threats of the withdrawal of the diarchy reforms. He pointed out that it was an experiment from which there could be no possible going back under any circumstances. The Prime Minister pointed out the danger that every person

interested in Indian questions had seen all along the danger that non co operation might cease and that the non-co-operators might go on to the councils. To his (Mr. Wedgwood's) mind there had been no more lamentable blunder made by the Indian people than the refusal under the leadership of Gandhi to go on to the councils. They were told almost with regret that non co-operation had collapsed.

Mr. Lloyd George : With regret ?

Colonel Wedgwood : Almost with regret.

Mr. Lloyd George indicated dissent

Colonel Wedgwood said he was very glad it was not. They were told that it would be a sign of failure if when these Non-co-operators went on to the Councils they conducted themselves in an obstructive manner and did not co-operate with the Government. The Labour party wanted them to go on to the Councils and the Assembly to form part of the Opposition to the Government until they could become the Government themselves. That was the ordinary constitutional development. It might involve obstruction, but it was only in that way that they would finally acquire the wisdom to carry on successfully democratic constitutional Government. To say, as he read the Prime Minister's speech, that if the Non-Co operators went on to the Councils and conducted a campaign of opposition to the Government at present in power they would be regarded as bringing the reforms to nought as a failure which was to justify us in withdrawing the whole of the diarchy, seemed to him to be a most unfortunate threat and a threat which as a matter of fact it was quite impossible to carry out. He hoped that they were not going to have a change from a perfectly steadfast, settled policy to a policy of alternate threats and concessions. That, indeed, would be fatal in India as it had been in Ireland. The only chance was that the Prime Minister as well as the Secretary for India had definitely in view the same goal, namely, Dominion Home Rule although that Dominion Home Rule would unseat from their power at any rate the present Civil Service.

Colonel Wedgwood emphatically repudiated any suggestion that he was held in favour by the extremists in India, the fact being, he said, that nobody was so much hated by them as the man who like himself tried to erect a bridge between Indians and Englishmen. (Hear, hear). It was essential, he continued, to have a contented Civil Service, but he could wish when we came to discuss this question that we should give as much importance to the question of a contented India. With only one or two exceptions all the speeches in this debate had dealt solely with the Civil Service. That was not worthy of the House of Commons, for after all the Civil Service

existed for the country and not the country for Civil Service, and he feared the impression would be given that the interests of Englishmen, so far as India was concerned, were solely wrapped up in the status of our fellow-countrymen in India. He believed that would be a profound mistake. (Cheers)

Sir D Maclean (Peebles, L.) said that he was unable to take the same tragic view of the speech of the Prime Minister as Colonel Wedgwood had done. He hoped also that his speech would not give the people in India the impression—which would be a most harmful impression—that the Prime Minister of this country, speaking with great responsibility in the House of Commons, threatened the people of India (Cheers.) That, he thought, would be most mischievous impression to get abroad, because, after all, however they might differ from the Prime Minister, he was the chief officer of the Crown, and occupied a position of very great responsibility. The view he (Sir D Maclean) took of the speech was this : that the Civil Service in India were discharging their duty in a time of transition of exceptional difficulty and trial, India, as a whole, was seething with internal difficulties—like almost every other nation—and there was being carried on there a most remarkable experiment. There was the commencement of a great attempt which they hoped would be successful.

He felt that they ought to exercise very great care and responsibility in such a time as this as to the criticisms they made and the advice they tendered. (Hear, hear) He regretted some of the things said by Sir W. Joynson Hicks, which, he thought, lent colour to Colonel Wedgwood's criticism that the basis of the debate was not so much the well-being of India as the well being of the Civil Service. He accepted fully the aphorism of his hon and gallant Friend that the Civil Service existed for the country, and not the country for the Civil Service. (Mr Lloyd George—"Hear, hear") He had not read a note of threat or the shaking of the fist in the Prime Minister's speech. There might have been a little of the touch of the steel, but he did not gather it. It seemed to him to be an effort to let the Civil Servants know that in this exceptional time of trial we, their countrymen here, realizing their trust and our trust, were sympathetic with them, and desirous of remedying their grievances. (Cheers, Mr. Lloyd George nodding assent.) He thought that there was a case for impartial inquiry, with Indians themselves on the inquiry. He thought it his duty to say that while they sympathised with the Indian Civil Service, they were determined to see that full trust was given to that great experiment, and that it should not be withdrawn or discouraged. It was impossible to stop progress in India. It was a world movement. He hoped,

for a better state of things, and if they were wise and restrained in their language, he was convinced that the time would come when this vast dominion would perform an even better and noble part in the British Empire. (Hear, hear,)

Earl Winterton, Under-Secretary for India (Horsham, C. U), said that the accusation which Colonel Wedgwood made against the Prime Minister had already been answered by Sir D Maclean (Mr. Lloyd George.—"Hear, hear.") His right hon. friend, as every one except the hon and gallant member realised, had merely pointed out the difficulties of what was admittedly a great experiment, (Mr. Lloyd George nodded assent) It was never suggested in 1919 or in 1917 that the scheme was not an experiment. To read into the Prime Minister's speech a threat to India was to make a most mischievous accusation (hear, hear), which might have serious effects in India, and as representing his noble Friend the Secretary of state, he gave it a most complete and unqualified denial. It was quite obvious that Colonel Wedgwood, so far from believing in co operation between the British race and the Indian race, was in favour of the complete annihilation of British rule in India. The lines on which the Government had always proceeded in this matter were entirely different. They had appealed for co operation, and, to a great extent, had received that co operation. But the efforts of the Government in that direction were not helped by Colonel Wedgwood's speech, which, so far from advancing the purpose which all men of good-will in this country had in hand, would have the effect of putting it back. We had given India the tools of practical statemanship, it was now for India to use those tools, which were sealed with the impress of British good-will towards India—no mean guarantee for the good of any tool. (Hear.) hear) It was open to India to show her capacity and good will to use those tools. That was the task which India had before her, and the task in which the British Government and the Secretary of State for India would assist to the fullest possible degree, but that task would not be assisted by Colonel Wedgwood's speech (Cheers)

[N. B Details of the agitation in India which followed this debate will be found in the next issue of the Register. Immediately after the debate a deputation of Moderates waited upon the Viceroy on the language used by Mr. Lloyd George. The Viceroy however, fully endorsed the Premier's views and repeated the experimental character of the Reforms. See also pp. 673—686.]

The O'Donnell Circular

The following is the full text of the memorandum sent by the Hon'ble Mr. S. P. O'Donnell, C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India to all Provincial Governments on May 30th, 1922—on the basis of which the reactionary "Morning Post" thought fit to demand the recall of Lord Reading and out of which arose the Die Hard agitation in England on behalf of the I C S

As the Government of are aware, the question of recruitment for the All India services was debated at some length in the Legislative Assembly on February 11, 1922, when the following resolution was adopted.—"The Assembly recommends to the Governor-General in Council that enquiries should without delay be inaugurated as to the measures possible to give further effect to the Declaration of August 20, 1917, in the direction of increased recruitment of Indians for the All-India Services and also that steps be taken to provide in India such educational facilities as would enable Indians to enter the technical services in large numbers than it is at present possible".

Object of the Memorandum

The Secretary of State has agreed that Local Governments should be consulted on the issues involved in this recommendation and has requested that ultimately the views of the Government of India should be set out in a reasoned despatch for his consideration.

I am now to enclose an extract from the Legislative Assembly debates which contains the report of the discussion on February 11th, 1922, and to invite the particular attention of the Government of . . . to the statement by the Hon. Sir William Vincent in which a number of the more important aspects of the problem were touched upon.

The Government of India recognise that the decision on this question is of fundamental importance to the future well-being of India. They observe further that the declared policy of His Majesty's Government to provide for the increasing association of Indians in every branch of Indian administration was placed by Parliament in the forefront of the preamble to the Government of India Act of 1919. The position of Parliament in this respect was explained in paragraph 7 of the report of the Joint Select Com-

mittee. In that paragraph it was clearly indicated that the time and manner of each advance in the increasing association of Indians in the administration, no less than in the progressive realisation of responsible government, can be determined only by Parliament upon whom responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian people. It was also made clear that His Majesty's Government must remain free to appoint Europeans to those posts in the services for which they are specially required and qualified. The question is therefore one which must be decided by His Majesty's Government and I am accordingly to observe that though the presentation of it in the speech of the Hon. Home Member may appear to point to particular conclusions, the views expressed by him were of necessity based only upon particular aspects of the case which had been considered by the Government of India. The Government of India had not the opinions of local Governments before them and, in considering the many and difficult issues which have to be determined, they do not in any way regard themselves as precluded from modifying any provincial views he expressed should such modifications seem necessary in the light of information received from local Governments.

The existing orders regarding the percentage of European and Indian recruitment in the various All India Services embody a decision which has recently been reached. They were based upon the conclusion of the Public Services Commission and the consideration urged in the report on the Indian Constitutional Reforms. The view underlying them was that, so far in the future as any man can foresee, a strong European element will be required in any of the public services in India and that, though the utilities and the functions of European Officers may undergo a gradual change, the continued presence of English officers is vital to the successful issue of the policy of making the people of India self-governing. They assumed, accordingly, that the essential characteristics of the administration would remain unchanged and they provided in consequence only for such an increase in the number of Indians in the All-India Services as it was thought would be merged in them without altering their whole character.

It may be argued with great force that if the question were now to be decided by the application of the same it is certain there would be no adequate ground for modifying these orders in the interests of efficiency and integrity.

It is undeniable that the stability and ordered progress of India have hitherto been dependent on the assistance and the efforts of European officers and it may be held that the recent advances in the direction of responsible government have but accentuated the

need for their services. India has taken only the first steps on the road that leads to full self-government. That road is beset with dangers and obstacles and her ability to traverse it successfully may be imperilled if she discards too rapidly the guidance upon which she has so far leaned. Nevertheless, it is impossible to ignore the changes that have recently occurred - the emergence of new factors and the enhanced importance that is now attached to considerations which, though always present, were less prominent and less urgent a few years ago and it may be that these new developments render necessary a revision of the decisions previously adopted. Of the arguments that may be advanced in favour of radically modifying the existing policy the following would appear to be the most important :

(i) It may be difficult in future to secure for the Imperial Service recruits of the same class as have been forthcoming in the past, and any substantial falling off in the quality of European recruits would obviously reduce *pro tanto* the case for a strong European element. The attractions of service in India have undoubtedly diminished in spite of the recent revisions of salary and of leave rules ; the financial advantages are no longer what they were 25 years ago and on the whole, and even after allowance is made for the world-wide fall in the purchasing power of money, they probably compare less favourably than formerly with the terms obtainable in the Civil Service of England and of the Crown Colonies. Moreover, the prospects of promotion to posts above the time scale are more doubtful. Persistent demands are being made for the abolition of many of these appointments, and their continued retention cannot be regarded as assured. Again, in so far as any rate, as the Indian Civil Service is concerned, the whole tendency of the reforms and *a fortiori* of any further constitutional advances that may be in store is to reduce the status of its members to that of purely executive officials. The Civil Servant of the future cannot expect to play the same part in, or to exercise the same influences over, the administration of the country as has his more fortunate predecessor.

Many, too, of the most attractive of his former functions, such as those connected with sanitation, education and the general development of district or town, have already been made over to bodies fully divorced from his control. Lastly, the impossibility of foreseeing the character or the effects of further changes in the condition of the central and provincial Governments and the many evidences of racial hostility which have unfortunately accumulated during recent years may deter many promising candidates from the adoption of an Indian career. It is doubtful whether these considerations are fully realised in England, but any advantages that may accrue thereby to the Government in respect of the quality of

recruits secured may be more than offset by resentment and discontentment if expectations are disappointed.

Demand for Indianisation

(ii) The demand for Indianisation of the services is older and perhaps even more insistent than the demand for self-government. It is also more difficult to resist. Nothing can be more inevitable and legitimate than the desire of Indians that the services should be manned by men of their own race; and this natural sentiment is reinforced by financial considerations. The scales of pay which must be paid if Europeans are to be obtained for the services are higher than those in force in any other State, and in a country whose financial resources are as narrow as those of India, can be defended only on the ground of necessity. That the price has hitherto been worth paying need not be denied, but as education spreads year by year and as in consequence the supply of competent Indians increases the continued retention of so costly an agency will be harder to justify, at any rate theoretically, and the demand for the substitution of less expensive indigenous services will acquire added force. If the services were Indianised and if, as for the reasons indicated below would appear to be inevitable in that event they were also wholly or largely provincialised, the existing scales of pay could be greatly reduced. It is a mistake to suppose that the difference between the cost of the European officers and that of the Indian officers is represented by the present overseas allowance.

The real difference is, in fact, far greater and it seems possible that as much as one third of the pay drawn by the European officer might properly be debited to that head. Moreover, the attitude of the Indian Legislature has already been made clear. They are pressing for the rapid Indianisation of the services.

(iii) Officers entering the existing services are entitled to remain in these services for periods which in practice range on the average from 25 to 30 years. It is at least possible, however, that 20 or 15 years hence the conditions in India will be such as to render undesirable or impracticable the retention of a large number of European officers, and if, therefore, the recruitment of Europeans on the present scale is maintained the Government may eventually be faced with the necessity of retiring a great number of officers and of paying to them heavy sums by way of compensation.

(iv) At present large majority of the members of each of the All-India services are Europeans. The presence of a substantial European element is thus assured for many years to come in the Indian Civil Service. In particular the proportion of Indians (including officers holding listed posts) is only 12 per cent, and even with the complete cessation of recruitment a period of some 12 years

must elapse before the Indian element can rise to 80 per cent. The abandonment of European recruitment will not therefore mean that the country will, in a short time, be dependent entirely on an indigenous agency. For years at least, if not for more, the services will still contain a substantial proportion of Europeans sufficient perhaps to provide the necessary leavening and to ensure the maintenance during the transition to entirely Indianised services of real administrative standards and should circumstances so necessitate the whole position could be considered before the expiry of this period.

Moreover, in the case of the technical services at least any shortage of Europeans that might at any time become apparent could probably be met by recruitment on short term contracts.

(v). These arguments have been stated in the form in which presumably they would be presented by those who advocate the adoption of a new policy.

Arguments Against.

It is essential, however, that the assumptions underlying them, the qualifications to which they are subject, and the counter arguments should not be overlooked. Thus —

(a) In estimating the attractions of service in India in the future it should not be forgotten that it is the men now in the services who are naturally the most inclined to compare disadvantageously the present and future conditions of their services with those that obtained in the past. The question, however, cannot be regarded exclusively from their point of view in the case of future entrants into the services. It is not impossible that, if difficult conditions as regards employment continue to be felt in England, the Dominions and the Colonies, the time scale of pay and the pensions of the Indian services may prove an attraction sufficient to induce the right stamp of man to expatriate himself from England for a considerable portion of his life and elect for service in India. Again, whilst in general the effect of the reforms and of future constitutional advances on the character of the work of Civil Servants may be as stated in paragraphs above, it is the opinion of some that in the Councils and Assemblies the burden of voicing, guiding and justifying policy will often fall on the Civil Servant and will offer as stimulating a field of intellect and character as almost any of the duties which fell to his lot under a more bureaucratic form of Government; and even in the sphere of district administration, although local bodies are no longer under the control of the district officer, it is probable that in technical matters, in conflicts of communal interests and in cases where large sums of money are involved, his advice will for many years be freely sought.

Racial Feeling.

Finally, while the existence of racial feeling at the present moment is undeniable it cannot be assumed as axiomatic that such feelings will persist or increase. It may prove to be no more than a temporary phenomenon which will pass away with the disappearance of the special conditions that have given rise to it. Europeans employed in Indian States, it is understood, do not find the atmosphere inimical to them and many occupy in these administrations a position of peculiar privilege and regard.

(b) Although at the moment the Indian Legislatures and the educated classes are demanding the complete and rapid Indianisation of the services it does not follow that such will continue to be their attitude. The class of communal interests may eventually lead to a just appreciation of the importance of retaining in the executive a substantial proportion of European officers who will stand apart from and be unaffected by Indian class interests.

Whilst even with the complete cessation of further recruitment the presence of a substantial European proportion is doubtless assured for some years, the risks inherent in any such step must not be ignored. In particular the probability that if a stage was ever reached when Europeans would only be found in limited numbers in the higher grades of the service and it was then found necessary to reconsider the position, the reconstitution of the services would be difficult and the absence of a trained European element in the lower grades would seriously embarrass the Government.

(vi)—The Government of India will reserve their own conclusions till they have received and considered the opinions of local Governments. The problem is one of great complexity. A just conclusion can be reached only if account is taken of all the relevant factors, and the object of the Government of India is therefore simply to state the case as clearly and as impartially as possible and to draw the attention of local Governments both to the reasons that may be held to justify a radical revision of the arrangements now in force as well as that which may be urged in favour of their retention. They recognise further that there are differences in the functions and importance of the various services and that considerations which may be decisive in the case, for example, of the technical services may not be so in that of the security services such as the Indian Civil Service and the Postal service.

I am now to turn to certain questions that will arise in the event of its being decided that the recruitment of Europeans should be abolished or largely reduced. It seems probable that the adoption of either of these courses will necessitate intensive measures of reorganisation.

(1) The existing system of recruitment for the appointments included in the all-India services was natural and indeed inevitable so long as these services were composed almost entirely of Europeans. The source of recruitment being the same it was necessary to maintain some uniformity in the conditions of service for officers distributed over the various provinces. The system had the great merit of securing similar qualifications and traditions for the higher branches of the public administration throughout India, but the difficulties of retaining it for Indian recruits have already become apparent in connection with the steps taken for the introduction of an enlarged Indian element.

Provincialising Posts

The examinations in India for the Indian Police Service have had to be held on a provincial basis, and the practice in the case of the I. C. S. of posting Indian officers to the province of their origin is in recognition of the impossibility of ignoring provincial factors in the recruitment of Indians. Provincial sentiment, it is believed, will be wholly in favour of replacing the all-India services with provincial services and will be reinforced by the argument that, at least in the case of Indians to be appointed in the future, the Legislative Council must have the power to determine the pay and qualifications of the officers who are the exponents of their policies.

The Government of India are inclined to think, therefore, that the abolition or any large reduction of the recruitment of Europeans will inevitably entail the provincialisation of the posts for which in future only Indians are to be recruited.

Should provincialisation be decided upon, a further point to be determined is the method by which recruitment for these appointments should be effected. There appear to be two possible alternatives.

- (i) the appointment might be merged in the existing services, or
- (ii) might as soon as a sufficient number have become vacant be formed into separate (and upper) divisions of these services.

The arguments in favour of the latter course, at least in the case of the services, Educational, Forest and Police, are broadly those which have always been held in the Civil Service and Agricultural to justify the existing division of the services into Imperial and Provincial, as pointed out by the Royal Commission on Public Services. Where there is a large quantity of work of a less important character to be done, though of a kind which cannot be performed by a purely subordinate agency, two services or classes of one service are required, since it would be extravagant to recruit officers for the less important work on terms required to obtain officers for the higher class of duties. Further, the inclusion of the higher appointments now borne on the cadre of the Imperial services in the

provincial services would necessitate either the promotion to these posts of senior officers who, as experience in connection with the listed posts seems to show, have been engaged far too long on subordinate duties to be capable of undertaking responsibilities of a more exacting order or the selection for the posts of the best of the junior officers, a course which may be of help to open the door to favouritism and to be the production of much discontent and heart-burning among the senior men. Against this it may be argued that it will be impossible to secure for the large number of appointments in question a better class of recruits than is now obtained for the provincial service, and that, therefore, the simplest and the least objectionable solution will be a single service the higher appointments in which will be filled by men who have served for a somewhat longer period than that which members of the Imperial services are now required to serve in the inferior appointments. The balance of argument appears to the Govt. of India to be on the whole in favour of the two divisions scheme, but they have no desire to prejudice an issue in regard to which the opinions of the local Govts. will be of special value.

There are many subsidiary matters arising out of or connected with the above questions, but it is unnecessary to examine them until the broad questions of principle have been considered and determined.

In conclusion it will be convenient to summarise the questions on which the opinion of local Governments is invited. These are:—

1 (a)—Should the recruitment of Europeans for the appointments now included in the all India services be discontinued or largely reduced?

(b) If so, in what services and to what extent in each service?

2—If it is decided to discontinue or largely reduce the recruitment of Europeans

(a)—Should the appointments for which Europeans are no longer to be recruited be provincialized?

(b)—In the event of provincialization being accepted, should the appointments

(i) be merged in the existing services, or

(ii) be formed into separate or upper divisions of the provincial services?

The Government of India realise that local Governments will require time to enable them to formulate their conclusions regarding these difficult and important questions, but they would be glad if they would arrange to complete their examination as quickly as practicable and therefore to forward their considered views with as little delay as possible.

The I. C. S. Revolt.

The following letter, which appeared in the *Arglo-Indian Press* was addressed to the Secretary of State for India by the Central Provinces and Berar Association of European Government Servants through H. E. Sir Frank Sly, (Governor of the Central Provinces), and the Governor General of India in Council :

Nagpur, August 18, 1922

My Lord,—My Association respectfully directs your Lordship's attention to the Government of India's letter No. F-120 (Estbis) dated May 30th. 1922, on the subject of the stoppage of recruitment in England for the Imperial Services. There is nothing in the letter to indicate that the Government of India attach any unusual significance to what are, in fact, questions of vital importance. On the contrary these questions are propounded as ordinary administrative problems, and it is the manner in which they have been raised, as much as their substance, which cannot fail to alarm those who support the reforms so recently introduced and who understand that India can only attain full responsible self government by stages. The letter reveals as though by a flash of lightning the imminent approach of a danger so grave that it threatens not merely the success of the reforms but the safety of India and the integrity of the British Empire.

Sacrificing Old Servants.

2. My Association cannot, on this occasion, discuss the subtle methods by which the prestige and prospects of Englishmen now in the service of the Crown in India have been ruined and their present position rendered intolerable. But if the case for the Imperial Services is to be stated with candour, then it must be said that not a vestige of practical sympathy and understanding has been found either in Simla or, until quite recently at Whitehall. Whatever the reasons for it may be, the fact remains that the claims of the Imperial Services in India to just treatment remain neglected. It must be submitted for your Lordship's consideration that the spectacle of a Government prepared to sacrifice its old servants on the altar of new Councils is not one which can encourage.

Honest Recruiting Impracticable

3. The Government of India approach their subject from two points of view. On the one hand, they must fill essential posts

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in an existing administrative organisation. On the other, they are strongly attracted by the expediency of meeting present political demands. My Association does not propose to examine in detail the various arguments set forth for and against the stoppage of recruitment in England. Indeed, such an examination would be superfluous, for one of the considerations set forth in the letter leaves no room for arguments. It is a melancholy fact that suitable recruits for the service of the Crown in India are now obtained with great difficulty and in insufficient numbers, and this at a time when the demand for employment among all classes is extraordinarily keen, and unless a very material improvement in the status, pay and pensions of the Imperial Services is made in the immediate future, there is a grave risk amounting almost to a certainty that the supply of suitable recruits will be entirely cut off. It is undoubtedly a knowledge of the disabilities and grievances under which the Imperial Services in India are laboring that has led to the present shortage of candidates from the public schools and universities of England and I am to point out to your Lordship that a perusal of the letter now under reference has intensified the apprehensions of existing members of the Imperial Services. In particular, they fear that when India is administered by services which are wholly Indian, the necessary provision for the pensions of Englishmen will not be forthcoming. Until, therefore, an immediate and assured improvement in the conditions of service, and in the security of tenure and of pensions can be made, the members of my Association must, with extreme reluctance, support the proposition that at present the continuance of recruitment in England is impracticable by means which are honest.

4 My Association desires, however, to lay before your Lordship certain considerations which seem to have escaped the Government of India's notice. In the first place, that Government appears to assume that recruitment once interrupted, may be resumed at will. My Association submits that this is not so. So far from being able to withdraw what will be taken as a concession, the Government of India will be engaged in the consideration of requests for still further concessions. Indeed, it is not too much to say that once the recruitment of Englishmen has been stopped a resumption of such recruitment will not be within the sphere of practical politics until a situation has arisen in which the need for a strong English element has become necessary in the interests of peace and order. In other words, a resumption of recruitment in England must be preceded by grave disorder in India. In the second place, the stoppage of recruitment in England will stimulate the retirement of present members of the services. Their work will be carried on under still

more difficult conditions, and in greater isolation. My Association is in a position to assure your Lordship that the resulting weakening of the European element will be far more rapid than the Government of India anticipate. Thirdly, even if recruitment in England could be resumed at will there would be a gap in the ranks of English officials corresponding in size to the period during which there had been no such recruitment. The services would then consist of a small body of senior men and a few untrained cadets, and the Government would be without young and energetic officers trained in their duties. The personnel of the services would be hopelessly deficient in the very element which the conditions necessitating a resumption of recruitment would demand.

Disappearance of the English in 20 Years

5. My Associations' Chief motive in addressing this letter to your Lordship is to invite attention to certain broader aspects of the problem for which the Government of India's letter finds no space. If the recruitment of Englishmen is stopped now, the English element in the Services will, within a period of about 20 years, be so reduced as to be almost negligible. It must be admitted that one of the central features of the reforms is the complete Indianisation of the Services. But it is fundamental to the reforms that the process is to be a gradual one, carried out under the guidance of the Imperial Parliament, with the active assistance of Englishmen in the service of the Crown in India. The promoters of the reforms regard the retention of a predominating English element in the Services as essential to their successful development. The advance is to be made by a series of decennial overhauls of the constitution, and the whole process is to be spread over a series of decades. It is for Your Lordship and for Parliament to consider if the process can be completed in so short a period as 20 years.

6. Without in any way desiring to minimise the progress that India has made politically, socially and economically during the last two centuries, my Association desires to impress upon Your Lordship that she has still not attained that degree of unity which is essential in the conduct of her affairs as a nation, and that it is very doubtful whether she can attain it in 20 years. My Association also desires to point out that India is still subject to external aggression as she has ever been. If these propositions are accepted, it follows that the premature withdrawal of the English Services must lead to internal disorganisation, which, in turn, will inevitably invite aggression from without, culminating in an exhausting war in which England, however unwilling, will be forced to participate.

7. It is not necessary to give a detailed survey of the history of India to show that powerful forces of disintegration have existed in this country in the past. Before the establishment of English rule, India has only once or perhaps twice approached the conditions of a united State. Under Chandragupta and Asoka the Maurya Empire consisted of outlying provinces attached to the royal nucleus by ties of varying strength. The Moghal Empire, a foreign domination, was short-lived, and the decay of its central authority under Aurangzeb at once let loose the forces of anarchy and disintegration. It is significant that the Chief Indian competitors in the struggles for territory did not confine themselves to the establishment of what could be termed "national" States. The Muhammadan Powers of Southern India and the Maratha Powers to the North of Nerbudda were as foreign in the countries they conquered as the English. Without entering into the questions of legitimacy of title between the various contesting powers, it can at least be asserted that the English had the distinction of having the desire and the power to set up a regular administration and to maintain a *Pax Britannica*. As Sir James Stephen wrote :

"The English in India are the representatives of a belligerent civilisation. The phrase is epigrammatic but is strictly true. The English in India are the representatives of peace compelled by force. This belligerent civilisation consists in the suppression by force of all pretensions to tyranny and in compelling by force all sorts and conditions of men in British India to tolerate each other. If the British Government abdicate its functions, it would soon turn order into chaos. If the vigor of the Government should ever be relaxed, if it should lose its essential unity of purpose and fall into the hands either weak or unfaithful, chaos would come again like a flood."

It has been agreed that a hundred and fifty years of peace and the growth of a spirit of Indian Nationality have eradicated the innate forces of disunion, but I am to submit that nothing could be farther from truth. My Association desires to lay before Your Lordship a short account of some of the more important disintegrating elements in the Indian body politic

8. Nearly one third of India with more than one quarter of its population, consists of Native States or their subjects under the control of Indian Princes with varying degrees of independence. The majority of these States had their origin in military despotism and many have retained their military traditions unimpaired. Some of the larger States maintain armies whose military spirit and effectiveness have been enhanced by participation in the Great War and their military organisations now show a degree of efficiency never previously approached. Several Princes look with feelings

akin to 'desire' at the rich territories which at one time or another formed part of the dominions of their ancestors. India contains many "Terre irridente" Many of the smaller States were at one time under the suzerainty of the larger and are now maintained in their semi-independence by the power of the Crown. It is not too much to assert that if the Central power, which is the English Government, were seriously weakened some at least of these claims would be asserted. One single conflict of arms between two powerful claimants would light a conflagration that would rapidly sweep through India.

9 It is generally conceded that a national people must possess in some degree the three characteristics of 'common race,' 'common religion' and 'common language.' It would be difficult to find a country in which these characteristics are more conspicuously absent than India. The aboriginal stocks of India have been inundated by successive floods of Aryans, Arabs, Turks, Persians and Moghals. The successive waves never coalesced and India is now inhabited by a medley of races even more divergent than the jarring peoples of Europe.

10 As regards religion, leaving aside minor but nevertheless irreconcilable religions such as those of Sikh, Parsi, Jain, Buddhist and Christian, the great bulk of the population is divided into Hindus and Muhammadans, the antagonism of whose religious tenets is more provocative of bloodshed than the sectarian differences of the Catholics and Protestants in Ireland. The ancient hostility between the two great religions frequently manifests itself over the ceremonial slaughter of kine by Muhammadans, and in the Central Provinces the introduction of certain regulations to restrict the slaughter of cows framed at the instance of a Hindu majority has evoked threats of violence from the Muhammadan minority. The "Taj" of Jubbulpore whose editor is a local leader of the Khilafat party and an exponent for the Hindu Muslim entente has thus written:—

"The Hindu Ministers of moderate persuasion are bound to flout the religious sentiments of the Mussalmans. They are trying to delude the Hindus that they have resorted to such action with a view to protect cows but in fact they have done so merely to encourage their slaughter in large numbers. The religious conviction of the Mussalmans is that no power—especially a non-Muslim power—on earth can prohibit anything that has been allowed to them by God. The prevention of the slaughter of cows and all milch animals including camels below 9 years by means of an enactment only promotes the Mussalmans to disregard such rules and to respect and honour the divine laws in preference to those framed by the rulers of the land. Our Non-Co-operating Hindu brethren

are now on their trial. If they be true Non-Co-operators they will help the Mussalmans at this juncture and co-operate with them in their protest against the action of the Government. If however the religious susceptibilities do not allow them to do so they should observe silence and should not be offended if, in defying these rules, the Mussalmans slaughter cows and other animals. They should rather blame the Hindu Ministers who by framing such rules have provoked the Mussalmans."

11. Sir George Grierson has enumerated and described 98 distinct languages with 550 distinguishable dialects in India. Even in the Central Provinces there are 18 languages and 80 dialects. An attempt is being made to turn Hindi into a common 'lingua franca' for the whole of the Peninsula and Congress patriots shout for Hindi when a speaker addresses them in English. Nevertheless in spite of Mr Gandhi's adult studies in Hindi he finds himself compelled to speak in English and to conduct his paper in English when he wishes to reach the minds of his variegated following. There is only one language spoken in India which contains a word to express the conception of a native of India and that language is English.

12. To the confusion of race, religion and language which India exhibits in a unique degree there must be added the further powerful disintegrating factor of the caste system. Even those groups which enjoy a common race, religion and language are split up into mutually exclusive and frequently antagonistic organisations. Inter marriage is forbidden, social intercourse is severely restricted and certain castes have to undergo ritual ablution at the mere touch or the passage of the shadow of their fellowmen.

"Unity" and Weak Government

13. Prior to the establishment of English rule the conception of an Indian nation had not occurred to the mind of any one. The establishment of a unified administration supplied the opportunity, and the inculcation of English political doctrines taught in the schools and colleges supplied the impulse for the growth of the spirit of nationality. With its development the inevitable consequence followed—a growing feeling of shame and resentment in the minds of many of the educated classes at the dominant part played in the administration of the country by a mere handful of men foreign to them in every essential tradition. There never was a country and never will be one in which Government by foreigners can be popular and this is a fact which must be faced frankly and honestly. But to face it is not to admit that it is the only consideration, for a premature withdrawal would mean the cessation of the process of education and the destruction of the nascent spirit of nationality.

It cannot be disputed that India is being swept by strong waves of anti-British feeling. Their surge has carried Indians of widely different religions and races on to what superficial and doctrinaire observers imagine to be the solid ground of nationhood ; but what has in fact happened is that the war and the reforms and the weak Government have seriously disturbed the " Pax Britannica in India." The Muslim has not yet resolved to be ruled by or to rule with the Hindu ; the Maharashtra has no intention of submitting to Government by Sikhs, nor less will the Brahman concede to men of inferior castes, any social and political rights to which he aspires. A cloak of political unity is provided by a common belief that the days of English supremacy are numbered. Wearing that cloak the politician poses as an Indian nationalist and is ready to discard it as soon as English authority has been destroyed. He will then reveal himself as a Sikh, a Bengali, a Maratha patriot, or a champion of Islam. The outlook of England has probably been changed by the war, and it is certainly true that Indian respect for English authority has been profoundly affected by the prolonged struggle of the war and the vacillations that have followed. To suppose, however, that India has been transformed as if by magic into one country and a single nation, within measurable distance of ability to govern and defend itself is a radical mistake.

14. On the assumption that India is granted autonomy in the near future and the Services are all Indianised, three forms of Government are theoretically possible. There may be (1) a co-operative central Government or (2) a central Government controlled by one dominant element or (3) no central Government at all. As regards the co-operative Central Government, the difficulty of its composition at once arises. "If all the English were to leave India", asked Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, "who would be the rulers of the country?" In the absence of any common tie of nationality, a co-operative Central Government could be little more than the loosest federations, liable to crumble at the first breath of racial jealousy. As regards Government by one dominant element, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's question is again relevant. Which element is the Indian State could effectively impose its will upon the others? People of one Indian province are often foreigners to the people of another Indian province, and the manly race of India could never be governed by the feeble foreigners of another Indian country. Any Government erected by one element would be attacked by other elements, and would be feeble and transitory. It would be unacceptable to all the other elements, and as the probability is that it would seek its own ends the ideal of "Government by the people

for the people" would be much further from attainment than it is at present. The third possibility of no Central Government is unthinkable. India would at once revert to that endemic state of chaos from which it was rescued by English power.

15. So far the considerations set out have been administrative, but the crux or the whole question is not administrative but military. No profound military knowledge is required to understand that the keystone of the Indian regimental system is the English officer. Most regiments are composite, that is to say they consist of companies recruited from men of different races. The system is the result of long experience and has been proved by war. But with the elimination of the English officer, the system must become impossible, and if the Civil Services are entirely Indianised, that officer cannot remain. If, therefore, India is to be self-governing and self-defending, it must be seriously considered what military organisation can replace the Indian Army. Obviously that organisation cannot be a single National Army. Sikhs do not follow Bengalee officers, nor Muslims obey Hindus. It is impossible to imagine a Maratha Army, a Sikh Army, an Army of Pathans and another of Panjabi Muhammadans quietly obeying the behests of a democracy in which the fighting races of the country are in the minority. Democracy in India is possible only under the belligerent civilisation of the English, and when that civilisation disappears nothing but a military despotism will be able to preserve internal peace. Too much emphasis cannot be laid on the fact that the politically-minded classes and the fighting peoples are distinct and essentially antagonistic.

Inviting External Aggression.

16. The conclusion is thus arrived at that in its present state of development an autonomous India would be torn by internal dissensions and would be without the bulwark of a National Army. Such a state invites external aggression. The Indian politician gives himself no time to consider this menace. Mr. Gandhi has pronounced the theory that the Afghan if he invaded India would easily be conquered "by love." Even the most enlightened leaders of Indian opinion dismiss the risk of invasion with a gesture of impatience. "War", they say, "will never be waged against India" or else, "we will deal with the occasion when it comes" or yet again, "our National Army will see to that". Nevertheless the danger is present and very serious. As divided, India always has been subject to external aggression, and the least indication of the weakening of the military power of the Central Government will inevitably be the signal for foreign invasion. Had the Afghans and Waziris not believed that the English in India were so weak as to be

unable to cope with Mr. Gandhi and his revolutionaries, there would not have been the recent frontier wars. How near the dangers of a really formidable invasion are, it is difficult to estimate. There were not many people in England who listened to the warning of Lord Roberts; and of India it need only be said that she is exposed to attack on long frontiers across which armies would be poured without hindrance by sea-power. Behind the frontier tribes and behind Afghanistan, there may be before very long not only a Russia under German influence but Germany herself. In the Far East there is Japan with her growing commercial interests in India and her powerful fleet.

17. If autonomous India were to be attacked in the near future by a powerful enemy England would be faced with a very difficult problem. There are some who would urge that Britain should stand aside, and should conserve her energies for the development of her own "White Empire." But such a withdrawal would not be easy. It would involve the sacrifice of the greater part of her valuable Indian trade, and the loss of much capital and prestige, and it would lead to the ruin if not the extraction of those elements of the Indian population which are peculiarly dependent on the English Government—the domiciled Christian community and the Parsees. Demands for intervention would be made by influential elements in England and the claims of India, based on an association that had lasted for more than a century and a half, could not be disregarded. It is incumbent on English statesmen to make an estimate of the risks attending the waging of such a war. It would be conducted from a base six thousand miles distant with long land communications through a disturbed and disorganised country and with sea communications open to attack at many points particularly through the narrow neck of the Suez Canal, threatened on both flanks by Muhammedan powers. Success would lead to no tangible results for Britain, nor would it ensure the permanent immunity of India. Failure would be disastrous.

18. As a result of these and similar considerations all of which need not be set forth in this letter my Association submits that an autonomous India, whether within or without the Empire, is an impossibility in the near future. On the other hand, if the British Government is to continue to be responsible for the peace, good order and protection of India, then that Government must be strong. To this end it is clearly essential that the services should contain a strong English element. My Association takes this opportunity of directing your Lordship's attention to a clear exposition of the issues involved, contained in the final statement of the European Association of Calcutta, which your Lordship will find amongst other papers