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H I S T O R Y
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE THIRD,
K I N G O F S P A I N.

THE FIRST FOUR BOOKS,
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THE TWO LAST,
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THIRD EDITION.


V O L. I.

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This is a fine Book



ADVERTISEMENT.

THE first four books of this volume, which contain the progress of the war in the Netherlands, the establishment of the truce with the Dutch, and the expulsion of the Morescoes from Spain, are printed literally from the manuscript of Dr. Watson: nor has the smallest alteration been made, either in the arrangement of his matter, or in his style. It is, however, but justice to the memory of that author, as well as to the public, to acknowledge, that, in the two last, he had not the least participation. These were written by the editor of Dr. Watson's manuscript, at the desire of the guardians of his children. This was deemed an attention due to the curiosity of the reader; a curiosity which, in the present important æra, may be supposed to be somewhat enlivened by the great events which have lately happened in the world.

It is evident, that Dr. Watson has exerted in this work, all that care to discover the truth, which distinguishes his *History of Philip II.* He has consulted the most approved writers on this subject: and by that respectable friend to literature, the Earl of Hardwicke, he was favoured with manuscripts of equal authority and importance. It is to the same nobleman that the editor is indebted for the manuscripts which he quotes in the proofs and illustrations that he has added to this second impression of the present publication, in notes and an appendix.

The

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The conference, now first published, between the Spanish and English Commissioners, for effecting a peace between their respective nations, at London, in 1604, were carried on with extraordinary ability, decorum and dignity, on both sides: and they serve not only to gratify a curiosity relative to their particular subject, but also, to throw light on the interests and views of the courts of London and Madrid, at that time; on the state of commerce; and the sentiments, manners, and general character of the age.

The continuator of Dr. Watson's narrative has not thought it proper to give a detail of those hostile operations at sea, which were continued, beyond the line, even after the pacification of Antwerp. These operations, in his opinion, enter into the Spanish History, by the most natural connection, at the expiration of the truce, when the Spanish ministers compared the advantages and disadvantages that had resulted from the engagement, and deliberated whether they should prolong the peace, or renew the war.

V.B.51

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE THIRD,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK I.

PHILIP the Third, King of Spain, son of Philip the Second, and of Anne of Austria, daughter of Maximilian II. Emperor of Germany, was in the 21st year of his age at his accession to the throne. He was a prince of a character extremely opposite to that of the late king, although no pains had been spared to form him to a similarity of manners. From the instructions delivered to those who had the charge of his education, it appears * to have been a principal object of his father's attention, to inspire him with the same bigoted attachment to the superstition of the church of

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* Historia de la vida y hechos, del inclito monarcha D. Felipe tercero. Por Gil Gonzalez Davila, Cronista de los Senhores Reyes D. Felipe III. y IVto. lib. i. cap. 6.

Rome, by which he himself had been actuated; and the means which he employed for this end, were attended with the desired success. But he was not equally successful in his endeavours to overcome that aversion which his son, from the natural indolence of his temper, early discovered to almost every species of manly exertion and activity *

WITH this part of the young prince's character, Philip was well acquainted; and foresaw, with much anxiety, the unhappy consequences which it was likely to produce in his future reign. In order to introduce and habituate him to the management of public affairs, he formed a council of his ablest and most experienced ministers, who, in the presence of the prince, debated three times a week concerning various important matters, relating to the administration of the kingdom; and the prince was required to preside in this council, and to report the opinion of the majority to the king †. But neither this, nor any other expedient which Louisa, the prince's faithful preceptor, could devise, proved effectual for the purpose for which it was intended. Inactivity or indolence still remained the most conspicuous feature in his character; and it

* *Addiciones a la Historia del Marquis Virgilio Malvezzi, in Yanez Memorias, p. 136.* † *Davila, lib. i. cap. x.*

early excited in the king, a strong and well grounded apprehension that his son, unable or unwilling himself to hold the reigns of government, would surrender them into the hands of the marquis of Denia, or of some other favourite. Against this conduct, which is so commonly attended with the most pernicious consequences, Philip had often put the young prince upon his guard; and it was his last advice to him, which he delivered with great earnestness a few hours before his death, that he should govern his kingdom by himself. He had likewise requested of him to employ, as his principal counsellors, Don Christopher de Moura, marquis of Castel Rodrigo, and Don John Idiaquez; from whose experience, fidelity, and great abilities, he might derive the highest advantages, especially in the beginning of his reign*.

THE soft and gentle temper of the prince had hitherto rendered him extremely obsequious to his father's will †: but, conscious of his

* Gon. Davila, lib. i. cap. 12. Porreno Dichos y Hechos, passim. It was a saying of Philip's concerning his son, Que era mas para ser mandado, que mandar. Adiciones di Malvezzi.

† The author of *Addiciones a la Historia de Marquis Virgilio Malvezzi*, gives the following singular instance of the truth of this assertion. Philip II. intending that his son should marry one of the daughters of Charles,

his incapacity, and prompted by his indolence, he no sooner mounted the throne, than, disregarding the counsels which had been given him, he resolved to avoid the perplexity which might attend his having recourse, on any occasion, to different counsellors; and therefore committed the whole administration of affairs to his favourite the marquis of Denia,

THE marquis del Castel Rodrigo, in whom Philip II. had long reposed the most perfect confidence, was honourably dismissed from court, and appointed viceroy of Portugal*. Idiaquez had the presidency of the military orders conferred upon him; and being of a less ambitious, and more complying temper, than Castel Rodrigo, and willing to act in an inferior or subordinate capacity, he was suffered

archduke of Austria, and having sent for the pictures of these princesses, he one day, in presence of his daughter Isabella, and several of his ministers, desired the young prince to examine the pictures, and make his choice of the princess whom he would prefer for his wife. Philip, with his usual deference and humility, submitted his choice to the king. The king remonstrated with him on the impropriety of requesting any other person to judge for him, in this matter, in which his own taste alone ought to be consulted; and desired him to carry the pictures to his own apartment, where he might carefully examine them, and fix his choice. I have no choice, replied the prince, but your majesty's pleasure; and I am certain that that princess will appear to me the best and the most beautiful whom your majesty shall prefer: p. 137.

* Davila, p. 36.

to remain, and occasionally consulted, on account of his long experience and the high character which he held for prudence and sagacity *. But all power was lodged in the hands of the favourite, who having been chief equerry to the king, before his accession to the throne, and having in that station had frequent access to his person, had gained his affections, and acquired an entire ascendant over him

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He was instantly created duke of Lerma. and admitted into the council of state: after which, the king transmitted edicts to all the councils in the kingdom, requiring obedience to whatever orders should be communicated to them in his name by the duke †.

THIS determined partiality, which Philip was at no pains to conceal, occasioned a general discontent. The grandees of the first rank were filled with indignation, when they beheld one whom they had been accustomed to regard as their inferior, invested with such unlimited authority; and all ranks of men, judging from former instances of the same nature, dreaded an unprosperous and unquiet reign. Their complaints were the louder and the more generally diffused, as the duke of Lerma was utterly unpractised in the affairs of govern-

* Davila, p. 37.

† Davila, p. 41.

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ment, and had not yet given any proof of merit or abilities. It was a demonstration, they thought, of extreme weakness in the character of the king, so avowedly, and in contradiction to the advice and example of his father, whose memory they revered, to declare his choice of a favourite; and they apprehended that, on trial, the character of this favourite would be found, in this respect, too nearly similar to his own *. Their apprehensions were not without foundation. By his courteousness and affability, the duke imposed on the penetration of many of those who approached him; and, by discovering on all occasions the most devoted attachment to the church, he conciliated the favour of the ecclesiastics; but it soon appeared that his views and abilities were extremely limited, and that he neither possessed the œconomy, the firmness, or the capacity requisite for the difficult and important charge with which he was intrusted †.

It was peculiarly unfortunate for the Spanish monarchy to have the helm of government committed to such weak hands at the present period. The late king indeed had foreseen, and, in some measure, provided for this event,

* Vide *Addiciones to Malvezzi*, p. 144. † *Mayerne Turquet*, p. 1295.

by the peace which he had concluded with France, and the resignation of his sovereignty in the Netherlands; which he hoped would put an end to the war in that country, and prove the means of recovering the revolted provinces. He had likewise left all his other dominions, not only in Spain, but in Italy, and in the new world, in the enjoyment of peace; and Portugal, now accustomed to the yoke, yielded a ready obedience to his authority.

BUT although Philip II. through the vigilance and vigour of his administration, had left his dominions every where, except the Netherlands, in the enjoyment of internal tranquillity, he had not left them in a flourishing condition. On the contrary, Spain, his place of residence, and his seat of empire, was greatly exhausted, and some of the principal sources of her opulence and prosperity were dried up.

By the war in which he had made so many great exertions, both by sea and land, and, still more, perhaps, by the migrations of the people to the new world, the inhabitants of Spain were greatly reduced in number. All emoluments and honors which the sovereign could bestow, had, for ages past, been divided between the military and the ecclesiastical

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professions. By this means, the mechanic arts and agriculture having come to be regarded as comparatively mean and despicable, were alike abandoned by the indolent or inactive, and by those who were endued with a spirit of ambition and enterprise. This contempt, and the consequent neglect of the more useful arts, the profits arising from which, though sure, are always moderate, was heightened by the frequent instances of enormous fortunes, suddenly acquired by the adventurers in America. That proportion of the riches arising from the American mines, which the sovereign received, was spent either in those countries in which his wars were carried on, or in purchasing naval and military stores from other nations. The greater part of what was imported by merchants and other individuals was laid out in England, Italy, and the Netherlands, for manufactures, which the colonies required, but which Spain was become unable to supply; and the remainder was drained off by taxes, which the king had, from time to time, been necessitated to impose. From this scarcity of money; from the want of manufactures; from the neglect of agriculture, joined to the numberless losses sustained at sea, where Philip had been almost always foiled by his enemies, trade of every kind was reduced to the lowest ebb; and so great was the consequent disorder in the finances,

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finances, that, besides a debt of 140 millions of ducats which he left upon the Crown, he had been obliged to have recourse to the disgraceful expedient of employing ecclesiastics to go from house to house, to receive from his subjects in Spain such assistance as they were willing to afford: a measure which was not attended with the advantages which he had expected to derive from it, while it contributed to sink his reputation in Spain, as his refusal to pay the interest of his foreign debts, before related, had already done in the rest of Europe *

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THE danger to which the Spanish monarchy was exposed, from that debility to which it was reduced at the present period, was the more to be dreaded, because many parts of this widely-extended empire were removed to so great a distance from the seat of government, and nothing, there was ground to believe, could avert the impending ruin, but a vigorous exertion of the highest abilities, joined to the most rigid and judicious œconomy. It was likewise obviously necessary that peace should instantly have been established with the maritime powers; who, having for several years past held the sovereignty of the seas, seemed to possess sufficient naval force entirely to destroy the Spanish trade, and

* Gon. Davila, p. 25.

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BUT the duke of Lerma was equally incapable of discerning this danger, and of providing against it. As he had seen the difficulties in which the late king was involved, through the disorder of his finances, and could not be ignorant of the exhausted condition of the kingdom, it might have been expected, that one of the first objects of his attention would have been to retrench the unnecessary expences of the court, by attempting, if practicable, to reduce the number of superfluous offices, to which, in times of greater prosperity, the vanity of former kings had given birth. But instead of this, he greatly multiplied such sort of offices*; and, in the very infancy of his administration, gave other signal proofs of a degree of profusion which would have been unjustifiable, had the kingdom been in the most flourishing condition.

ONE of the first events of this reign was the marriage of the king with Margaret of Austria*, whom the archduke Albert had conducted into Spain. He had gone, for this purpose, from the Netherlands to Germany, about the time of the late king's death; and

* Ibid. p. 45.

† Daughter of Charles, archduke of Gratz.

had

had soon afterwards set out with her from Gratz, by the way of Italy: but so great were the preparations made for her reception in Spain, and, agreeably to the character of the nation, so slowly were they carried on, that the fleet sent to bring her thither did not arrive at Genoa till several months after. In the marriage solemnity, in the city of Valentia, above a million of ducats were expended, besides a great number of rich presents, which were made to foreign princes and to the church *. By the ecclesiastics, who on this, as on many other occasions, shared amply of the duke of Lerma's munificence, his conduct was extolled as highly liberal and magnificent, but filled the minds of the more impartial and discerning part of men, who were concerned for the true glory and interest of the nation and of the crown, with indignation, mingled with contempt †.

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ABOUT the same time with the royal nuptials, those of the archduke with the infanta were solemnized ‡; but not long after, they set out together for the Netherlands, having received full assurance from the king and his minister, that no assistance in money or in

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End of
May.

* Gon. Davila, lib. ii. † Addiciones a la Historia de Malvezzi, p. 152. ‡ Albert had before-hand resigned his dignity of cardinal into the hands of the pope.

troops,

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troops, which Spain could afford, should be wanting to support them in their new sovereignty, and to enable them to accomplish the reduction of the revolted provinces.

IN forming this resolution, there was no room for hesitation. From the conditions upon which the late king had transferred the sovereignty of the Netherlands to his daughter, joined to the age of that princess, there was little ground to doubt that it would, ere long, revert to the Spanish monarchy. It could not be considered, even during the life of the infant, in any other light than as a fief of Spain: for she and her successors were expressly required to take an oath of fidelity to the kings of Spain; and, in order to insure the faithful observance of this oath, the liberty was reserved of putting garrisons of Spanish troops into Antwerp, Ghent, Cambray, and other places; besides which, both parties had solemnly engaged to regard the same powers as enemies, or as friends, and promised mutually to assist and defend each other against all the world besides*.

It would probably have saved the Spanish monarchy from the extreme debility into which

* Thuanus, lib. cxxi. cap. 2.

it fell in the present and in the following reign, and would have highly contributed to lessen those difficulties which, in his future administration, the duke of Lerma was about to encounter, had the sovereignty yielded been enjoyed free and independent, by the infanta, and Spain been delivered from the burthen of the war with the United Provinces. But Isabella could not, in this case, have accepted of the sovereignty conferred on her. Without the assistance of Spain, she must have sunk under her unequal contest with the Dutch, supported by the queen of England; or she must instantly have made peace with these powers, on whatever terms they should be pleased to prescribe. The sovereignty of the United Provinces would thus have been established, and both their religious and civil liberty have been recognised.

To embrace a measure which would be attended with so disagreeable a consequence, Philip was hardly less averse than his father had ever been. With a temper, gentle and obsequious to excess, he was devoted with the most bigoted attachment to the Popish faith; and being entirely governed by his minister, who, on all occasions, assiduously courted the favour of the Spanish ecclesiastics, and the sovereign pontiff, he would have believed himself highly criminal in the sight of God, had

he not resolved to employ his utmost power to reduce the revolted provinces under obedience to the holy see. He had, besides, before his father's death, formerly given his consent to the deed of transference, with all the conditions that were annexed to it; and, as he could not, consistently with honour, so, from his affection to the infanta, he was not inclined to retract.

PROMPTED by these motives, which were not likely ever to lose their force, he resolved to consider his sister's and her husband's interest as his own, and to take the same concern in all the affairs of the Netherlands, as if the sovereignty of that country had never been transferred. Conformably to this resolution, both the money and the troops of Spain continued to be employed in the Low Countries, as in the preceding reign. All the affairs of these provinces were directed as formerly by Spanish councils. The interest of the Spanish monarch was affected as much as ever by what happened there; and, for these reasons, almost all the important transactions which passed in the provinces, for several years after the present period, make an essential part of the Spanish history.

THE archduke having, during his absence, committed the government of the Netherlands

to his cousin, cardinal Andrew of Austria, bishop of Constance, and the command of the forces to Mendoza, marquis of Guadalete and admiral of Arragon, had instructed the latter to secure some convenient passage over the Rhine, which might open an entrance into the northern provinces, and enable him either to support the army at the expence of the enemy, or, if that should be found impracticable, to quarter them in the country of Cleves, and the other neutral adjoining states. Albert gave Mendoza instructions, at the same time, to avoid exposing the army to any unnecessary risk, before his return; and therefore there is little room for doubt that his principal intention, in ordering him to cross the Rhine, was to furnish the troops with free quarters, in compensation for their pay. To form this extraordinary resolution, it is said, he was determined by necessity; the southern provinces of the Netherlands having been greatly exhausted by the depredations of the Spanish troops, which had so often mutinied, and his exchequer drained, partly by the sums lately advanced in payment of their arrears, and partly by the preparations for his journey to Spain, which, in honour of the young queen, had been performed with unusual magnificence*.

* Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. v. p. 473.

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September.

BUT whatever were Albert's motives for having recourse to so unjustifiable an expedient, it should seem that he could not have made choice of a person better qualified, by the native temper of his mind, for carrying his plan into execution. Immediately after the arch-duke's departure, Mendoza, having collected together all the troops which could be spared from the necessary defence of the country, passed over the Maese near Ruremond, and directed his march, at the head of twenty thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse*, towards Orfoy, a town on the west side of the Rhine, belonging to the duchy of Cleves. The garrison of this place, being utterly unprepared for a defence, were easily induced, by promises mingled with threats, to open their gates and receive him. He then applied himself to strengthen the fortifications of the town and citadel, and at the same time employed a great part of his forces for several weeks in fortifying Wassum, a small town on the east side of the river, directly opposite to Orfoy.

ALTHOUGH his communication with the country beyond the Rhine was thus secured,

* This army consisted of seven thousand Spaniards, three thousand Italians, two thousand Burgundians, a thousand Irish, and seven thousand Germans and Walloons, besides the cavalry.

he

he judged it to be of great importance to get possession of some other town upon the Rhine, at a smaller distance from the enemy, and therefore he marched down the river, with all his forces, and laid siege to Rhinberg. This place, belonging to the bishopric of Cologne, was, as above related, in the hands of the United Provinces. It was deemed a place of considerable strength, and was defended by a sufficient garrison. The Spaniards, after battering the walls, attempted to take the town by storm, and were repulsed with great slaughter.

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BUT the siege was much sooner brought to a conclusion than the besiegers had reason to expect, through one of those fatal accidents which have often happened since the invention of gunpowder, when the utmost precaution is not employed in preserving it. Having caught fire, from a spark occasioned by the stroke of a cannon-ball against the tower where the magazine was kept, and which the ball had entered by a window, not only the tower, but a great part of the wall of the town was thrown down. Several vessels in the river were, by the violent agitation of the water, overwhelmed and sunk, and the governor, his wife and family, with a considerable number of the inhabitants, were buried in the ruins. The garrison stood aghast at this unforeseen disaster;

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and, dreading that the town must now be taken by assault, they resolved, without farther resistance, to capitulate on terms, to which Mendoza, in order to save time, immediately agreed *.

October 15.

By the success which attended the Spanish arms in the reduction of Orsoy and Rhinberg, all the other towns in that quarter were filled with anxiety and terror. Burick, a town on the west side of the Rhine, in the duchy of Cleves, having, without hesitation, admitted a Spanish garrison, Mendoza began to make preparations for employing force against Wesel, one of the most flourishing places in the circle of Westphalia, and which had lately received a considerable augmentation of protestant inhabitants from the neighbouring provinces. Having abolished the exercise of the Catholic religion, and established the Reformed, as taught by Calvin, in its stead, they knew how guilty they must appear in the eyes of a Spaniard, and were at the same time conscious of being unable to defend themselves against so great a force. They attempted, by sending the general an embassy, with presents for himself, to divert him from his purpose. But Mendoza, laying hold of this op-

* Thuanus, lib. cxxi. cap. 9. Grotius, lib. vii. Bentivoglio, p. 474.

portunity to colour his present expedition with the pretext of zeal for the Popish faith, peremptorily required they should immediately restore the exercise of the Catholic religion. With this condition the inhabitants, in order to avoid a siege, were obliged, though extremely reluctant, to comply *. After which, though he had before rejected their presents, he demanded a large supply of provisions, and of money for his troops: and having obtained his demands, he continued his march down the river, and took possession of the towns of Rees and Emerick.

THE inhabitants of the latter of these places, having been long distinguished by their attachment to Popery, had, from some interested motive, invited the Spanish army to come into that quarter, and had received a promise in writing from Mendoza, that neither their town nor territory should suffer any inconvenience from the neighbourhood of his troops. He insisted however upon their admitting a Spanish garrison; and when they reminded him of his promise, by one of their principal ecclesiastics, he replied, that the service of the king and the interest of religion made it ne-

* The Spanish army had no sooner left Germany than the priests were again expelled, and Calvinism re-established.

cessary for him to change his views and measures. The priest asked him if, after such a declaration, it was surprising that the revolted provinces should refuse to put trust in the faith of the king of Spain, or of his generals; and warned him of the vengeance threatened by heaven against deceit and falsehood. But Mendoza, unmoved by this remonstrance, gave orders for the immediate admission of his troops *.

IN order however to appease the people of Emerick, he readily promised that only four hundred should be sent, and he even required the German officer who commanded them to swear that he would not admit a greater number. Notwithstanding which, so little regard did he pay either to his character or his faith, that he afterwards attempted to introduce another cohort, under Barlotta, an Italian; to whom the German refused admittance, saying openly, that though the general had set the example, he would not violate his faith.

AFTER getting possession of Emerick, the Spanish army was at the distance only of a few miles from the fort of Schenck, and other places belonging to the United Provinces; nor

† Grotius, lib. vii. p. 351.

had the states been inattentive to the danger which so nearly threatened them. Having, from the commencement of Mendoza's expedition, suspected that his design must be to make an attack upon their eastern frontier, prince Maurice had hastily assembled together at Arnheim, a body of troops, amounting to six thousand foot, and fifteen hundred horse, and had ventured to cross the Iffel, and advanced towards the enemy as far as Zevenaer, which lies at little more than a day's march from Emerick.

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WITH such unequal forces he could not pretend to cope with the enemy in the open field; but on no occasion had he ever exhibited greater military skill and conduct. By making choice of the most proper stations, which the nature of the country could afford, and the prudence and vigilance which he displayed in strengthening all the approaches to his camp, he rendered it impossible for the Spanish general to attack him with any probability of success; while, at the same time, he prevented him from advancing any farther, or undertaking the siege of any of the frontier towns upon the Iffel. The two armies, between which there was so great a disparity of numbers, lay for a considerable time almost in sight of each other; and, from the anxiety

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which Mendoza discovered on that occasion, it should seem he was deeply impressed with a sense of his inferiority to prince Maurice, in respect of military knowledge and capacity. For ten days and nights, without intermission, his whole army, horse and foot, stood under their arms; and were permitted to take no other rest, though it was in the middle of winter, but in their ranks in the open air. It was necessary, meanwhile, to send out his cavalry, and the retainers of his camp, in search of forage and provisions; and between them and detachments of the prince's army various rencounters happened, in which they were always worsted, and considerable numbers taken prisoners.

BOTH the Spanish infantry and cavalry had begun to suffer so much from the cold, joined to a scarcity of provisions, and were at the same time so much disheartened by that anxiety and dread of which their general's conduct was so expressive, that there was ground to believe, that if Maurice had thought himself at liberty to attack them, he would have acquired a cheap and easy victory,

FINDING it at length impossible, on account of the want of provisions, to remain any longer

in their present situation, they directed their march towards Doesburg, which commands an important passage over the Iffel, into the territory of Velue. But Maurice, who lay nearer to that place, easily reached it in time to be fully prepared for their approach. They stopt short therefore at Dotechem, a town on their road to Doesburg; and there deliberated what course they should next pursue.

November.

To a general of such mean capacity as Mendoza, and so little endued with the spirit of laudable ambition or enterprize, there appeared to be no room for hesitation. By the severity of the season, by the sword of the enemy, and by desertion, his army had suffered considerable diminution; and, having been long permitted to plunder the country through which they passed, and to live in the most licentious manner, they were become reluctant to submit to the controul of military discipline. He dreaded, besides, the great abilities of Maurice, and thought it doubtful whether, in case he should succeed in effecting his passage over the Iffel, he would find it practicable to support his army during the winter season in the territories of the states, where almost all the towns were fortified, and prepared for their defence. Determined by these consider-

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Mendoza.

ations, he resolved to turn back, and to take up his winter-quarters in the duchy of Cleves, and other neutral states in the territory of Westphalia. He accordingly retired with precipitation, leaving behind him many of his sick and wounded, exposed to the mercy of the inhabitants of the country, who were highly exasperated by the injury and outrage they had received. Maurice pursued him for several miles, and cut off or took prisoners so great a number of his troops, that, including those who had deserted, and those who had fallen or were taken prisoners in former rencounters, it was computed that he had lost above seven thousand men.

He fixed his head-quarters at Rees, having left a strong garrison in Emerick, which lay nearer to the enemy, under the command of the count de Boucquoi, one of his ablest officers. But the count, having soon after been taken prisoner in a skirmish with count Lewis of Nassau, Maurice conceived the design of making himself master of the town. For this purpose he ordered count Hohenloe to invest it; and, in order to prevent Mendoza from returning to its relief, he cut the dyke of the Rhine, and laid all the country between Rees and Emerick under water. By this device the
garrison,

garrison, having no prospect of assistance from their friends, were intimidated, and, after a feeble resistance, laid down their arms. Maurice was equally successful against the garrison of Zevenaer : but being well pleased with an opportunity of showing his condemnation of the conduct of the Spanish general, who, with so great a contempt of the established laws of nations, had seized on the towns of neutral powers, he retained possession of neither of these places, but delivered Emerick to the citizens, and Zevenaer to the duke of Cleves*. After which he put his troops into winter-quarters, and went himself to the Hague, where he was employed during the remaining part of the winter in making preparations for the next campaign.

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Magnanimous policy
of Maurice.

IN the mean time, Mendoza, equally inattentive to his character and to the laws of humanity, permitted his troops to exercise the most cruel oppression over the people of Westphalia, from whom he could not pretend that either the king of Spain or the archduke had received the smallest injury. After plundering the inhabitants of the open country, and leaving them neither corn nor cattle for their support, he allowed his soldiers to employ

The licentiousness of
the Spaniards.

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force against such of the towns as refused them admittance; and the towns being generally unprepared for defence, they got possession of many of them, where they not only lived at free quarters on the citizens, but robbed them of their most valuable effects, which they sold at Cologne, and, by the merchants there, transmitted the price, amounting to very great sums, to Antwerp or other places in the Netherlands. Nor were they satisfied with pillage or plunder, but indulged themselves in every species of licentiousness; and treated the inhabitants, on innumerable occasions, with a degree of barbarous cruelty and outrage, of which the troops under Frederick de Toledo had, in their treatment of the people of Zutphen and Naarden, furnished the only instance which occurs in the annals of Europe for many years*.

Their barbarity.

IN order to compel such of the people as they suspected of being rich, to reveal their treasures, they wounded some, they mutilated others, and, under the pretext of their being heretics, they committed others to the flames. Count Falcostein, lord of Bruck, a Protestant, having refused them admittance into his castle,

Grotius, lib. vii.

which

which for some time he defended against them with great resolution, at length surrendered, on condition that he and his domestics should be allowed to depart in safety ; but he was no sooner in their power, than they first butchered his domestics before his eyes, and afterwards himself. Mendoza had the effrontery to avow and vindicate some instances of this kind, by alleging, that those who had suffered were heretics ; but it was not the Protestants only, but great numbers likewise of the Catholics, who experienced the barbarity of his troops ; and even many of those who had distinguished themselves by their attachment to the Spanish interest in the Netherlands ; among whom were the subjects of the bishops of Munster, Paderborn, Liege, and Cologne, as well as the duchies of Cleves, and Juliers, who were all treated with the same violence and inhumanity*.

B O O K
I.
1598.

By these enormities the German princes were affected in the manner which it was natural to expect. They were fired with indignation against their barbarous oppressors, and had early deliberated concerning the measures proper to be pursued. No European nation

* Grotius, lib. vii. Thuanus, lib. cxxi. Pisacii Chronica, anno 1598. Gestorum in Europa singularium.

BOOK

I.

1599.
State of
Germany.

had been more distinguished than the Germans by their warlike disposition, and their military prowess, as no nation had exerted greater intrepidity and vigour in the defence of their property and liberty when attacked. But, having enjoyed profound tranquillity for near half a century, and all of them, but a few who had entered into the service of foreign states, having been disused to war, their tameness and timidity invited the injuries of the Spanish soldiers; who found not only the inhabitants of the open country, but those likewise of most of the towns, utterly defenceless and unarmed. It was probably Albert's knowledge of this, joined to the consideration of the character of Rodolph, the present emperor, a prince of a tame and indolent disposition, that had induced him to resolve to support his army at the expence of the Germans; and what they suffered affords a striking proof how necessary it is that every people, exposed by their situation to be invaded, should, instead of trusting to their neutrality, or to the faith of treaties, stand, on all occasions, in a posture of defence.

THE people who suffered most from the depredations of the Spaniards were the subjects of the duke of Cleves, and of Ernest of Bavaria, who held, at the present period, the

four bishoprics of Munster, Paderborn, Liege, and Cologne. Ernest, who had formerly been much indebted to the court of Spain, and was extremely desirous of avoiding a rupture with the archduke, in order to obtain redress, resolved to content himself with making remonstrances and complaints.

B O O K
I.
— — —
1599.

THE duke of Cleves was a weak prince, and, being at times disordered in his judgment, was incapable of holding the reins of government. But his place was well supplied on the present occasion, by his sister, Sibylla, a princess of a masculine spirit, who exerted great activity in rousing the indignation of the neighbouring states and princes, and laboured to convince them of the necessity of uniting together, in order to drive the Spaniards out of Germany. The elector Palatine, the landgrave of Hesse, several imperial cities on the banks of the Rhine, and a great number of counts, and other sovereign princes in Westphalia, readily entered into Sibylla's views, and endeavoured to interest the rest of the empire, or at least the neighbouring circles, in their cause.

Confederacy of
German
princes a-
gainst Men-
doza.

THEY began with remonstrating to the archduke against the iniquity of his conduct; and
they

BOOK

I.

1599.

they were seconded by an ambassador, sent for that purpose by the emperor, who likewise published a rescript, commanding Mendoza immediately to evacuate the towns and territories of which he had taken possession. But finding that no regard was paid by Mendoza to the emperor's rescript; and that, instead of complying with their requests, Albert only lamented that the necessity of his situation had obliged him to adopt a measure which he said was equally disagreeable to himself as to them, they assembled together at Munster, and resolved all of them, but the bishop, or elector of Cologne, to have recourse to arms. It was agreed that a numerous army should be raised with the utmost expedition. The proportion of money and troops which each prince or state should furnish was ascertained; and the count de la Lippe, lieutenant-general of the circle of Westphalia, was appointed to be commander in chief. From the unanimity, alacrity, and ardour which appeared in this assembly, there was ground to hope for the utmost dispatch and vigour in carrying the plan adopted, into execution; yet from the slowness incident to the motions of a league, in which no one member possesses authority sufficient to controul the rest, the season, as will be seen in the sequel, was far advanced before the count

count de la Lippe was in a condition to take the field *

B O O K
I.

1599.

THE Spanish army, in the mean time, kept possession of all the towns into which they had entered; and, without restraint from their general, continued to exercise over the people the same oppression as before; till the season arrived when the cardinal governor of the Netherlands judged it proper to begin the operations of a new campaign. They were then withdrawn from all the towns in which they were quartered, except Orfoy, Rhinberg, Rees, and Emerick; the last of which places they had again obliged the inhabitants to surrender, after prince Maurice had retired.

THE cardinal having come to Rees, where he held a council of war, to deliberate concerning an expedition against some of the frontier towns of the United Provinces, it was determined to undertake the siege of Bommel, the conquest of which would open an entrance into Holland: but, in order to conceal this intention from the states, and to facilitate the landing of the troops on the isle of Bommel, it was agreed to send a detachment of the

Siege of
Bommel.

* Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. v. ab initio. Grotius lib. vii & viii. Thuanus, lib. cxxi, &c.

BOOK
I.

1599.

army to make a feigned attack on the fort of Schenck, which, as formerly described, is situated on the upper extremity of the Betuwe. This detachment was sent down along the right or north side of the Rhine, while Mendoza, with the main army, marched down on the other; and both divisions began about the same time to play off their batteries against the fort; the former from the banks of the Rhine, and the latter from those of the Waal.

PRINCE Maurice's head-quarters were at Arnheim, only a few leagues distant from Schenck. He had never before experienced so great anxiety or fatigue. Almost all the officers, on whom he chiefly depended for the execution of his orders, were absent: count Hohenloe was in Germany, employed in exciting the princes of the league of Munster to take the field against the Spaniards; colonel Vere was not returned from England, whither he had gone to hasten a body of fresh troops, which had been promised by Elizabeth; and the younger la Noue had not finished some levies, which with the connivance of the king, he had been making among the Protestants in France. All the troops therefore which Maurice had been able to muster, after leaving

April.

ing sufficient garrisons in the fortified towns, amounting only at this time to four thousand men. With this little army he crossed over to the Betuwe: and having reinforced the garrison of Schenck, and strengthened the banks opposite to Mendoza, where only he had occasion to suspect that an attack might be designed, he lay prepared to oppose him in case he should attempt to land on the island.

BOOK
I.

1699.
Beginning
of May.

THE Spaniards, having the river between them and the fort, were at too great a distance to do execution with their artillery; and, as this attack was only a feint to amuse prince Maurice, and that for this reason they had not taken time to employ the usual precautions for their shelter from the enemy's fire, they lost upwards of four hundred men. This expence of blood, which the prince could easily observe from the ramparts, contributed to confirm his belief that their design against the fort was serious, and his attention was therefore wholly engrossed with providing for its defence. In the meantime the count of Berg, with a body of troops, under the command of the colonels Stanley, Zapeau, and Barlotta, was ordered to march down along the left or south side of the Waal; and, in order to cover his intention, a great number of boats had been transported to this

river over land from the Maese, on board of which he embarked his troops, and seemed to intend passing over to the Betuwe. Prince Maurice could hardly doubt that this was his design; and, to prevent him from accomplishing it, he carefully watched his motions with a part of his forces, which being put on board of boats collected together at Nimeguen, kept directly opposite to the Spaniards in their progress down the river. In this manner both parties continued to advance, sometimes approaching within reach of each other's fire, and the Spaniards seemingly intending on some occasions to effect a landing on the Betuwe, till they both arrived in the neighbourhood of the Voorn; when the count de Berg, having disembarked his troops, drew all his boats on shore, and having put them into carriages which had been prepared for that purpose, he marched with great expedition across the country, from the Waal to the Maese, where having again launched his boats, he sailed down the river till he arrived at Empel, and thus secured a passage into the isle of Bommel.

THE fortifications of the town of that name, which stands on the other side of the island, though, on account of its situation, deemed a place of great importance, had, amidst the multi-

multiplicity of objects which required the attention of Maurice and the states, been extremely neglected; the old fortifications were ruinous, and new ones, which had been begun, were yet unfinished.

BOOK
I.
1599.

HAD the troops, therefore, under the count de Berg, been sufficiently numerous, or had Mendoza advanced in time to his support, he might without much difficulty have accomplished the object of his expedition. But the army having been detained longer than it ought to have been in the fictitious attack on the fort of Schenck, the count was obliged to rest satisfied with securing his station at Empel, or with making short excursions into the country. Prince Maurice was, in the mean time, every day receiving fresh supplies of troops from France, England, and other places; and his army amounted now to so great a number, that he could afford to leave a part of it for the defence of the Betuwe, and lead the rest to Bommel.

HE accordingly no sooner received information of the count of Berg's invasion of that island, than he set out with the greater part of his army, and arrived there in time to prevent the inhabitants from abandoning the town,

B O O K
I.

1599.

which they were preparing to do, from their despair of being able to defend it. Mendoza, left his camp opposite to the Schenck about the same time, and, having in his march reduced the fort of Crevecœur, which would have interrupted his communication with Bois le Duc, he transported his forces into the isle of Bommel, and began to lead them towards the town. He first attempted to make himself master of the dyke of the Waal, on which he intended to have erected batteries, in order to straiten the navigation of the river, but was prevented by an incessant fire from a great number of armed vessels, which Maurice had prepared for that purpose. From the delay occasioned by this unnecessary enterprize, and the reduction of Crevecœur, a general of so great activity as Maurice had leisure to put the town of Bommel into a proper posture of defence.

His army, at this time, was not inferior to that of the enemy, and amounted to eighteen thousand foot and three thousand horse. Having pitched his camp on the right side of the Waal, opposite to Bommel, and constructed two bridges *, formed of barks covered with planks, one above and the other below the town, he committed the defence of the place,

† Each four hundred and fifty paces in length.

to a select body of four thousand foot and two thousand horse.

BOOK
I.

1599.

BOMMEL was too small a place to admit of so numerous a garrison ; but, in order that he might avail himself of the great number of his troops, his first care had been to give the town an artificial magnitude, by drawing round it, at a little distance from the walls, an intrenchment, strengthened with a ditch, and with redoubts at proper distances ; to which he added a covered way, a new species of fortification, of which he himself was the inventor, and which he first put in practice on the present occasion.

Maurice
invents a
new species
of fortifica-
tion.

MENDOZA was greatly disconcerted by the celerity and dispatch with which these works were executed : and as not only the cannon planted upon them, but a strong battery which Maurice had raised on the dyke of the river, was ready to be played off upon the Spaniards, as soon as they approached, they suffered a considerable loss of men, before they could cover themselves with their trenches. Mendoza might now have seen his error in not advancing sooner to the siege : and, if he reflected on the strength of the place, and the number of the garrison, or on the neighbourhood of the prince's army, and the facility with which, as he was master of the river, he

B O O K
I.

1599.

could, at all times, introduce supplies or reinforcements into the town, it must appear surprising that he did not perceive the impossibility of succeeding in his attempt.

Suspicion
concerning
prince
Maurice.

PRINCE Maurice, on the other hand, was blamed by many of his countrymen for resting satisfied with defending a town against an enemy, whom it was alledged, as he was superior to them in numbers, he might have successfully encountered in the open field. It began to be surmised that Maurice did not wish to bring the war to a conclusion; and the states sent deputies, to represent to him, that as they could never expect to assemble a more flourishing army than was at present under his command, and the expence which their late preparations had cost them was enormous *, they could not help expressing their desire that he would shorten the campaign as much as possible, and must therefore recommend to him, if he could do it with safety, to try the fortune of a general engagement.

MAURICE was the more surpris'd at this remonstrance of the states, as they had hitherto been extremely averse to all adventurous

* Twelve thousand gilders. See Reidan. quoted by Le Clerc, p. 197.

measures;

measures; and, on many occasions, had discovered a degree of caution bordering on timidity. He could not account for it, but on the supposition that they had listened to the insinuations of his enemies, who accused him of protracting the war, with the view of perpetuating his own authority; and, in order to wipe off this groundless aspersion, he would not have declined the risk of a battle, in case a favourable opportunity had offered. “ But, in the present situation of the Spanish army, in a country so narrow and confined, where his cavalry, in which only he was superior, could be of little use, no such opportunity could reasonably be expected. Should he attempt to transport his army over the Maese into Brabant, Bommel must thereby fall into the hands of the Spaniards; and, although, after the reduction of that place, they should be induced to follow him, and to offer battle, yet, without the greatest probability of success, he should doubt whether it would be expedient to accept; as the fate of battles often depended on accidents, which no human prudence could foresee; and the king of Spain, with such inexhaustible resources, could much more easily sustain the loss of an army than the states. It was for these reasons, not only his opinion, but that of his most experienced officers, that the

B O O K
I.

1599.

enemy should be permitted to spend their strength in the siege of Bommel, which, should they persist in it, he was confident would prove their ruin." The states, convinced by these considerations, entered without much difficulty into the prince's views, and left him at liberty to pursue the plan of operations which he had laid before them. The cardinal Andrew, in the mean time, having with great activity, formed at Bois le Duc, the most ample magazines of every thing necessary for the siege, Mendoza was enabled to make his approaches to the town, with greater expedition than there was reason to expect. His troops were now, in a good measure, covered from the enemy's fire; and he began to play off his batteries. But it soon appeared how little reason he had to flatter himself with the hopes of success in his enterprize. The garrison, supported by fresh troops, sent to their assistance by the prince, could not only prevent them from making farther progress in the siege, but sallied out against them, sometimes by day, and sometimes by night, demolishing their works, and putting a considerable number to the sword. The Spanish troops displayed, on every occasion, the most determined intrepidity; and thereby fully justified the caution of prince Maurice, in declining to reduce them to the necessity of

a ge-

a general engagement. They gave the most striking proofs likewise of the excellence of their military discipline, by recovering themselves with a facility which astonished the enemy, from the confusion into which they were sometimes thrown; and they were every where successful in repressing the sallies of the garrison, although these sallies were performed by numerous bodies, amounting to five or six thousand men, of the best of the French and English forces, conducted by La Noue, colonel Vere, and other officers of the most unquestionable bravery. They suffered, however, considerable loss. In the space of three weeks upwards of two thousand perished; and the cardinal governor, being at last convinced of the absurdity of persisting in his enterprize, sent orders to Mendoza to raise the siege.

He was determined, however, by the advice of Colonna, the historian, who was at this time an officer in the Spanish army, to attempt accomplishing, in another way, the object of the present expedition, by erecting a fort in another part of the island, from which the same advantage might be derived as from the possession of Bommel: and, for this purpose, agreeably to the counsel that was given him, he made choice of a narrow neck of land which

Invention
of the his-
torian Co-
lonna.

B O O K
I.

1599.

which unites the upper with the lower part of the island, intending to occupy, with a fortification of the strongest kind, the whole space between the Maese and the Waal; and thus, not only to facilitate an invasion of the United Provinces, but to check the enemy's navigation in both rivers,

Beginning
of June,

THE construction of this fort was committed to Velasco, general of the artillery. A thousand soldiers, and two thousand pioneers, were employed in the work; and the army was posted about the neighbouring villages of Herwyn and Rossem, to prevent the approach of the enemy.

MAURICE having penetrated this design, led up his troops along the north side of the Waal, and took his station directly opposite to the Spaniards; where, having planted batteries of his largest cannon, he greatly annoyed the workmen, and, though not without some loss, did considerable execution. Velasco, however, persevered, and was at length able to cover his men from the enemy's fire.

THE prince finding then that all his efforts in this quarter must be ineffectual, transported his army into the adjoining isle of Voorn; and, from thence, sent over a detachment of
three

three thousand men, to the upper part of the isle of Bommel; giving them instructions to entrench themselves at the village of Hervorden, which lies at a little distance from the place where the Spaniards were employed in making the new fort. His orders were executed with the greatest expedition, and the entrenchments almost completed before the Spaniards got notice that the troops had landed on the island.

B O O K
I.
1599.

MENDOZA, sensible of the danger and inconveniencies to which he was exposed, from having the enemy so near him, immediately dispatched the count de Berg, to attack their lines, with a numerous body of chosen troops. The count was repulsed with the loss of more than five hundred men, among whom were many officers of distinguished merit: but having stationed the greater part of his army on that side of the fort which lay next to the enemy, he kept the prince at bay, and enabled Velasco, without interruption, to carry on his operations in the construction of the fort.

THE Spanish cavalry, in the mean time, which could never have proper accommodation, nor be supplied with forage in the isle of Bommel, were quartered in Brabant, in the neighbourhood of Megen. Their communication

BOOK

I.

1599.

cation with the main army was kept open by a bridge over the Maese; but as they lay at the distance of several miles, a fort called Durango, from the name of the engineer employed in constructing it, and several redoubts, had been erected on that part of the dyke of the river by which the enemy might approach. Notwithstanding these prudent precautions, prince Maurice still resolved to attack the Spanish cavalry, and, with this view, having thrown a bridge over the Maese from the isle of Voorn, he kept his own cavalry in readiness to march as soon as orders should be given them. But judging it necessary before hand to dislodge the Spaniards from their fortifications on the dyke of the river, he sent the fleur de la Noue, and colonel Vere, with a select body of troops, chiefly English and French, to make an attack on fort Durango. Nothing could surpass the spirit and intrepidity which these troops, animated by the example of their leaders, displayed in the attack. Having thrown down their pikes and muskets, they scaled the ramparts in several places, and attacked the garrison, with extraordinary fury, sword in hand. But this garrison, consisting of Spaniards and Walloons, though amounting only to five hundred men, commanded by Ladeiano, an officer of distinguished bravery, in
their

their defence discovered a degree of intrepidity not inferior to that of the assailants. The smallness of their number was compensated by the advantages of their situation; and the combat was thus prolonged for several hours, with mutual slaughter, till la Noue and Vere, being informed that Mendoza was approaching towards them with superior forces, judged it prudent to retire.

No other memorable transactions happened between the contending parties during this campaign. Maurice could not venture now to attack the Spanish cavalry with safety; and, from the precautions which had been taken to cover the workmen employed in erecting the fort in Bommel, joined to the advantageous situation of the Spanish army, he found it impossible to prevent them from carrying that design into execution.

THE fort was accordingly finished in the most regular manner: the ramparts, flanked with bastions, and instantly planted with cannon, in a great measure commanded the navigation of the Maese on the south, and of the Waal on the north. On the east and west, they were secured with ditches of extraordinary breadth and depth, which, being at all times filled with water from the rivers, served as harbours

A fort
erected
the site of
Bommel

harbours from twelve armed vessels, stationed in them, to cruise against the enemy. And, in imitation of the example which Maurice had exhibited in the fortifications of Bommel, the whole was strengthened with a covered way, which was strongly fortified with redoubts.

THE cardinal came himself to visit this fort as soon as it was finished ; and having marked out a place for a church, of which he laid the first stone with his own hand, he gave, both to the church and to the fort, the name of Saint Andrew. He had been extremely desirous to distinguish his administration by some remarkable achievement ; and he was overjoyed to have been able to finish so great a work, which he hoped would be found of great importance towards the reduction of the revolted provinces.

PRINCE Maurice, on the other hand, notwithstanding his successful defence of Bommel, could not fail to be severely mortified ; although, as will appear in the sequel, this fort, the erecting of which he had exerted his utmost skill and vigour to prevent, served only to furnish him with one opportunity more than would otherwise have occurred to display his wonted activity and enterprize. In the mean time, he built another fort directly opposite to Saint Andrew, on the right side of the Waal, which

which rendered the country of Betue secure against the incursions of the enemy*.

BOOK
I.

1699.

DURING the course of these transactions in the Netherlands, the Germans, in the circle of Westphalia, had begun their operations against the Spanish garrisons in Rhinberg, and the other towns upon the Rhine. But as neither the emperor, nor the electors of Cologne, Mentz, and Treves, besides several other Popish princes, were willing to come to an open rupture with the court of Spain, their preparations for war had not been carried on with that alacrity which might have been expected from the strong and just resentment with which they were inflamed; and the season of action was far spent before they were ready to open the campaign. The elector Palatine had withdrawn his contingent of troops, under the pretext that the league had been violated by the other electors; and the bishop of Cologne, though his subjects had suffered greatly from the depredations of the Spaniards, had carried his complaisance to them to so great a length, as to permit them to make levies in his dominions, and to furnish them with provisions and military stores. It was

Trans-
actions in
Germany.

* Grotius, lib. viii. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. v. Thuanus, lib. cxxii.

there-

Netherlands had found means to appease, being unwilling to supply his troops with provisions, he soon abandoned his attempt, and directed his march towards Rees, where he expected the Dutch could more easily convey to him such assistance as his exigencies should require.

B O O K
I
1599.

THE garrison of Rees was ill prepared for their defence, and if la Lippe had listened to the counsel of count Hohenloe, who advised him to station a part of his army on the other side of the river, to prevent them from receiving any reinforcement or supplies, they would soon have found it necessary to lay down their arms: but he neglected this necessary precaution. The garrison were several times reinforced by detachments from the army in Bommel; and, at length, finding themselves possessed of sufficient strength, and observing that the siege was carried on in the most remiss and negligent manner, they made a vigorous attack upon his trenches, put a great number of his men to the sword, nailed up several of his cannon, and even carried off some of them in triumph to the town.

September.
Siege of
Rees.

THIS disaster increased the division which from the beginning had subsisted among the

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leaders.

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leaders.

leaders. The troops were disheartened, and became more disobedient and refractory than ever ; and in two days after the count gave orders to raise the siege.

THE retreat of this army was still more disgraceful than their conduct during the siege. Dreading that the garrison would renew their attack upon the trenches, they fled in the most precipitate manner, leaving behind them a great part of their baggage and provisions. The Spaniards hung in their rear for several miles, put many to the sword, and threw the whole army into confusion. Not long after, a party of them mutinied against their officers, left their standards, and, in their way home, indulged themselves in the same rapine and depredation against their countrymen, as had formerly been exercised by the Spanish troops.

THE Dutch had, in the beginning, entertained the hopes of finding useful allies in the Germans. With this view they had exerted all their influence in rousing them to arms, and had several times supplied them with stores and provisions. On the present occasion they sent William de Nassau, a near relation of prince Maurice, an experienced officer, and a person of distinguished prudence, to attempt to re-establish discipline among the troops, and a
good

good understanding among the leaders; but all, his endeavours having proved ineffectual for these ends, and the winter season approaching, it was judged necessary to disband the army, and put an end to this inglorious campaign.

BOOK
I.

1599.
November.
German
army dis-
banded.

SUCH is frequently the fate of confederacies formed by the union of independent princes, even when there is one common interest to unite them, unless the supreme command be devolved on some person of extraordinary abilities, whose want of power may be supplied by the confidence inspired by his superior merit.

NOTWITHSTANDING the feeble efforts of this confederacy, the archduke having only intended, by seizing the German towns, to accommodate his troops for a season, ordered most of them to be evacuated. He likewise promised to indemnify the several states for the injuries and damages which they had sustained; and two commissioners were appointed by the emperor to estimate their losses; but it does not appear that any thing effectual was ever done in consequence of this appointment*.

* Grotius, lib. viii. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. v. Pia-
fecii *Chronica Gestorum in Europa Singularium*, an. 1599.
Gonsale Davila, & lib. ii. cap. 4. Thuan, *Hist. lib.*
cxvii. cap. 6, 8, &c.