

BOOK  
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1599.  
A fleet sent  
to cruise  
against the  
English.

In Spain the duke of Lerma, desirous to give some proof of vigour in the beginning of his administration, fitted out a fleet of fifty ships of war, which he put under the command of Don Martin de Padilla, and sent to cruise against the English; but this enterprize proved equally unfortunate as most of the former ones which the Spaniards had undertaken against their northern enemies. Padilla had not been many days at sea when a violent storm arose, which obliged him, without having seen the English fleet, to return to Spain.

Lenity and  
moderation  
of the duke  
of Lerma

THE duke of Lerma was more successful in the measure which at this time he suggested to the king for conciliating the affections of his subjects in Arragon, who had been disgusted by the treatment which they had received in the former reign. Philip and his young queen, accompanied by the duke and many other courtiers, having set out to visit the city of Saragossa, notice was sent to the inhabitants, by order of the king, that he could not enter their town with pleasure till the heads of those citizens, who had suffered in the unfortunate affair of Antonio Perez, were taken down from the gates, and that inscription erased which recorded their pretended crime. This order, so agreeable to the people, and which was instantly obeyed, was accompanied with  
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the royal pardon to all those who had been concerned in the insurrection, and a declaration, that the king could not be happy while any of his faithful subjects had cause of grief. He then made a magnificent entry into the town, amidst the strongest demonstration of affection and joy on the part of the inhabitants; and soon after he solemnly confirmed all their rights and privileges \*.

B O O K  
I.  
1599.

AMONG the entertainments which the people of Saragossa presented to their king on this occasion, there was one, which, at the present period, will appear somewhat extraordinary; a dispute held at the university, at the conferring the degree of doctor; the subject of which was, whether the emperor be the lord or sovereign of the whole world † ?

DURING the course of the transactions that have been related, Albert and Isabella arrived in the Netherlands †. They entered Brussels with a splendid court and retinue, and were received with extraordinary magnificence. There was considerable difficulty in adjusting the form of the oath of allegiance which they ad-

September.

The arch-  
duke's ar-  
rival in the  
Nether-  
lands.

\* Gon. Davila, lib ii. cap. 8.

† Davila.

† He had† tarried much longer than his new subjects had reason to expect, but no contemporary historian has informed us of the reason of his delay.

ministered to their new subjects ; and the states of Brabant demanded that, beforehand, certain forts and citadels should be demolished, and the ancient rights and privileges of the province ratified; but, finding that the archdukes, (this was the title which Albert and Isabella now assumed) were utterly averse to comply with their requests, they were persuaded to desist from their purpose, and agreed, though with much reluctance, to take the oath required. It was likewise a matter of great offence to the Flemings, that Albert, besides assuming the Spanish dress, and requiring to be served upon the knee, had formed his court according to the model of that of Spain, and in every thing adopted the Spanish manners and customs, in preference to those of the Netherlands. This conduct was probably intended to gratify the Spaniards, on whom Albert saw he must principally depend during the continuance of the war; but it contributed to alienate the affections of his Flemish subjects, and to prevent them from exerting themselves with active zeal in his behalf \*.

HE stood however much in need, at the present juncture, of all the assistance which they were able to afford. Although he had receiv-

\* Grotius, lib. viii. p. 379. & Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. v. ed

ed a considerable supply from the duke of Lerma, before his departure from Spain, yet having, in conformity to the practice of the age, expended large sums in idle pomp and show, in his marriage solemnity, and his magnificent entrance into Bruffels, and other towns which he and Isabella visited on their accession, he found himself utterly unable to discharge the arrears due to his troops, who no sooner entered their winter quarters than they began to mutiny against their officers. The Spanish forces, to the number of two thousand foot, and eight hundred horse, having abandoned their commanders, took possession of the town of Hamont, in the bishoprick of Liege, where, having first strengthened the fortifications, they lived at free quarters on the inhabitants, and laid all the adjacent country under contribution. Their example was quickly followed by sixteen hundred Italians, and soon afterwards the garrisons of Crevecoeur and St. Andrew, consisting of Germans and Walloons, expelled their officers, and elected others from their own number in their room \*.

B O O K  
I  
1599.

A mutiny  
among the  
Spanish  
troops.

PRINCE Maurice having received information of these disorders, did not suffer so favourable an opportunity of action to escape,

1602.

\* See Metern, fol. 451.



## BOOK

## I.

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1600.  
January  
Siege of St.  
Andrew.

After reducing the town of Wachtendonc, and the fort of Creveccœur, and making a successful attack on the Spanish cavalry, in the neighbourhood of Bois le Duc, where he put near five hundred of them to the sword, he laid siege to Saint Andrew. This fort, the only fruit of the operations of a whole campaign, the archduke justly considered as a place of the first importance, both on account of the strength of the fortifications, and the great advantage which it afforded him for invading the revolted provinces. He was therefore extremely solicitous to preserve it, and for this purpose assembled together at Bois le Duc such a body of troops as were deemed sufficient to raise the siege. Of these troops he gave the command to Velasco, by whom the fort had been erected; and on the part of this officer no time was unnecessarily lost. But all his attempts were rendered ineffectual by the vigilance and foresight of Maurice, who, besides fortifying his camp and all the approaches to it, had cut the dyke of the Maëse, and laid all the low grounds betwixt it and Bois le Duc under water. The garrison consisted of twelve hundred men, who although they had mutinied against their officers, yet regarding the fort as their only pledge, for the payment of their arrears, strenuously exerted themselves in its defence.

BUT

BUT perceiving that, notwithstanding their most vigorous efforts, Maurice was making daily progress in the siege, and having no prospect of deliverance, they listened to a proposal which was made to them by the prince, in order to save time, and agreed to surrender the fort for a sum of money equal to their arrears \*. Immediately after which, conscious that they had committed an unpardonable crime against the Spaniards, they enlisted in the army of the United States; and as they knew that they could not expect quarter in case they should fall into the hands of their former masters, they were on many occasions of singular use, by the desperate intrepidity which they displayed †.

BOOK  
I.  
1600.

May.

By these disasters the archdukes were afflicted in the most sensible manner. They received information at the same time, that prince Maurice, having on no former occasion exerted great diligence in his military preparations, was resolved to prosecute the approaching campaign with extraordinary vigour, in the hopes of making some important conquests before the mutineers were persuaded to return

\* A hundred and twenty-five thousand guilders.

† Triumphs of Nassau, printed 1613. Grotius Hist. lib. ix. and Bentivoglio.

BOOK  
I.

1690.

to their duty. All their endeavours for this end had hitherto proved ineffectual. They had some ground to suspect that the rest of the troops were infected with the same mutinous spirit, and dreaded that many of them might be induced to imitate the treacherous example of the garrison of Saint Andrew.

Convention  
of the states  
of Brussels.

THE states of the provinces subject to their authority, having been lately convened at Brussels, Albert represented to that assembly, that, as the source of all the disorders which prevailed was his inability to discharge the arrears due to his troops, it was necessary they should grant him an extraordinary supply. He had reason to expect that ere long he should receive remittances from Spain; but the demands of the mutineers must be immediately satisfied, otherwise there was ground to dread that the most pernicious consequences would ensue.

THE states replied, by expressing their apprehension of these consequences, and by giving him the strongest assurances of their attachment and fidelity; but insinuated that, considering the exhausted state of the provinces, and the difficulty which the court of Spain had ever found in supporting so great a number of forces, no other effectual remedy could

could be applied to the present disorders but an accommodation with the revolted states.

BOOK  
I.

1600.

THEY had conceived hopes at this time that an accommodation might be brought about by the mediation of ambassadors, whom the emperor had sent into the Netherlands, in order to procure a restitution of some towns on the German frontier, of which the contending parties still retained the possession. The ambassadors found no difficulty in accomplishing the object of their commission; and having passed over into Holland, they prevailed on the United States to send deputies to Bergen op Zoom, to negotiate a treaty with deputies sent thither by the archdukes. But the Dutch being unalterably determined to maintain their independence, and discovering the same distrust of the archdukes, with which they had long been actuated towards the Spaniards, the conferences were no sooner begun than they were broken off; and both parties retired, extremely dissatisfied with each other.

Advise an accommodation with the revolted states.

WHILE a reconciliation was thus, in vain, attempted between the archdukes and the United Provinces, a negotiation was begun for restoring peace between the queen of England and the king of Spain. Some advances had been made for this purpose to the English ministers

A negotiation for peace between Spain and England,

B O O K  
I.

1600.

abortive.

nisters by the cardinal Andrew, while he was governor of the Netherlands, and neither of the courts at variance seemed at this time to have been inclined to prolong the war. It was agreed that a congress should be held at Boulogne; and ministers were sent thither by the contending powers. But this negotiation likewise proved abortive, as the plenipotentiaries found it impossible to adjust the ceremonial among them to the satisfaction of their respective courts. The precedence had, from time immemorial, been yielded to the crown of England, by the kings of Castile and Arragon; and Elizabeth maintained that it still belonged to her, notwithstanding the union of these crowns, and the conquest of Granada, since Spain, considered as one kingdom, was greatly inferior to England in respect of antiquity, which was the only ground on which a point of this nature could properly be decided. But the Spanish ministers could not perceive the force of this reasoning. They claimed the precedence on account of the superior extent and power of the Spanish monarchy; and, even when Elizabeth, in order to prove the sincerity of her pacific disposition, offered to agree to an equality, they rejected this offer, and insisted that the superior dignity of the catholic king should be recognised. To this the

the queen as peremptorily refused her consent ; and, soon afterwards, the plenipotentiaries left Boulogne.

BOOK  
I.  
1600.

THIS unexpected issue of the congress was matter of great joy to the United States. They had suffered much anxiety from the apprehension of losing so powerful an ally as queen Elizabeth ; and now, when they were delivered from this apprehension, they resolved to improve to the utmost the advantages which they derived from her alliance, by employing the English forces, and as many of their own, as could be spared from the defence of the frontier towns, in an invasion of Flanders. To form this resolution, they were encouraged by the mutiny of the Spanish troops ; and they were, at the same time, earnestly solicited to carry it into execution by the merchants of Zealand, who were extremely desirous of dispossessing the archdukes of the sea-ports in Flanders, which afforded shelter to some Spanish ships of war, by which their trade had lately received considerable interruption. In compliance with their request, it was agreed to undertake the reduction of Nieuport ; and, about the middle of June, the army, amounting to fifteen thousand foot, and

United  
States re-  
solve to  
invade  
Flanders.

BOOK  
I.

1600.

two thousand five hundred horse, set sail from Ramekins in Walcheren, the place of rendezvous, and landed in Flanders near Ghent: After reducing some small forts, prince Maurice led them towards Bruges, and passed almost within reach of the cannon of that place, not without hopes, which proved fallacious, that by the sight of so flourishing an army, and the late disasters which had befallen the archdukes, the inhabitants might have been induced to throw off the Spanish yoke, and return to their former connections with the United Provinces.

Siege of  
Nieuport.

FROM Bruges he marched towards Nieuport, and, by the way thither, made himself master, with little difficulty, of certain forts called St. Albert, Snaerfeerck, Bredene, and Oudenbourg, in which he left garrisons, with the view of retarding the progress of the enemy, in case they should venture to approach \*. He then invested Nieuport by land, while his fleet blocked up the harbour; and, as the town was neither very strong nor well prepared for a vigorous defence, he hoped in a few weeks to be able to compel the garrison to surrender.

\* Maurice was attended by a number of the deputies of the states.

THE archduke, in the mean time, exerted himself with great activity in his preparations for an attempt to make him raise the siege; and, having had the good fortune to persuade a considerable number of the Spanish mutineers to return to their duty, his army soon amounted to twelve thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse. Both he and Isabella, upon the first news of the enemy's arrival in Flanders, had repaired to Ghent, in order to provide for the security of that important place, and the other towns of the province. The troops were ordered to assemble together at Bruges; and as in their march thither they passed near Ghent, Isabella, mounted on horseback, went out to meet them, and rode along the lines animating and exhorting them, giving them repeated assurances that, in future, they should not have the same ground as hitherto to complain of the irregularity of their pay; and declaring that, rather than their demands should not be satisfied, she would expose to sale her plate and jewels, and deliver up to them the funds appropriated to the support of her court and servants. This speech, joined to her majestic air and manner, produced a powerful effect upon the minds of the soldiers, who received it with shouts of high applause, and called out to her that they were ready to expose their lives to every danger in her defence. Albert,



B O O K

I.

1600.

on this occasion, omitted nothing in his power to confirm them in their present disposition, and acquainted them that he was determined to fight at their head, and to share their fortune.

AGREEABLY to this resolution, having joined his army at Bruges, he set out with it from thence about the end of June. His first object was the reduction of the forts above mentioned, in which his success corresponded with his most sanguine hopes. The garrisons which Maurice had left in these forts, were intimidated by the sight of so great a force, and after a feeble resistance surrendered them, on condition that they should be suffered to depart with their arms and baggage. The archduke himself subscribed the capitulation; but, though his intention was sincere, he could not protect the garrison of Snaerfeerck, consisting of two companies of soldiers, from the fury of the Spanish mutineers, who fell upon them, notwithstanding their officers prohibition, and put them all to the sword.

PRINCE Maurice being at the same time informed of the surrender of the forts, which he had expected would have held out much longer, and of the near approach of the enemy, was thrown into great perplexity. From his confidence

confidence of bringing the siege to a speedy conclusion, he had neglected to fortify his camp; the number of his troops was not sufficient to enable him both to continue the siege, and to oppose the enemy in the open field; and he had even reason to dread, from the rapidity of their march, that he should not have leisure, before their arrival, to put himself into a proper posture of defence.

B O O K  
I.  

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1600.

IN order to retard their progress, and to gain as much time as possible, he immediately dispatched his kinsman, count Ernest of Nassau, with two regiments of foot, consisting of Zealanders and Scots, and four troops of horse, to lieze on the bridge of Lessinger, by which the enemy must pass in their way to Nieuport. But before count Ernest could reach this place, they had advanced, and taken possession of it. Ernest, however, knowing how necessary it was to afford time to Maurice to prepare for their reception, resolved, how fatal so ever the consequences should prove to himself and his detachment, that he would not retire without fighting: and this generous resolution was happily attended with the desired effect. Albert, believing that Maurice's whole army must surely be at hand, spent a considerable time in making the proper dispositions for a general engagement. At length,

B O O K  
I.

1600.

July 2.

being informed that Ernest's troops had received no augmentation since their first appearance, and that no other part of the enemy's army was in sight, he gave orders for an attack. The troops under Ernest kept their ground for some time; but, the horse having quickly given way, they were overpowered by numbers, and obliged to retire. In this action, upwards of five hundred of the Scots were slain, with many officers of distinguished reputation \*.

THE archduke's hopes were greatly heightened by this success, and he wrote to Isabella, that having with so great facility discomfited the van-guard of the enemy's army, he expected soon to inform her of the defeat of the whole. He judged, however, that there was ground to hesitate with regard to the conduct which it was proper to pursue; and, in order to assist him in forming his resolution, he called a council of his most experienced officers. Gaspard Zapena, a Spaniard of great experience, was of opinion that it was altogether unnecessary, and would therefore, in the present circumstances, be extremely imprudent to risk a battle. The enemy's general, through his confidence of being able to reduce Nieu-

\* Piafecius, p. 112.

port before an army could be assembled to oppose him; had brought himself into the most dangerous situation in which he had been ever placed: He durst not, now, in the face of so powerful an army, continue his operations against the town. His communication with Ostend was intercepted, since the archduke was fortunately situated between him and that place; and, should he attempt to make his escape by sea, when his highness was ready to fall upon him, in the hurry of embarkation, the greatest part of his troops must be cut to pieces. He therefore thought that the archduke ought not immediately to advance, with a design to attack the enemy; but ought rather to take the proper measures for reducing them, without exposing himself to the chance of a battle; and if he did, he believed, that ere long he would be able to oblige the enemy to lay down their arms. But whether his opinion on this head should be rejected or embraced, it was at least necessary that, before he advanced any farther, he should procure information of the situation of the enemy, of which he was entirely ignorant; and, before adventuring to attack them, should wait for the arrival of Velasco, who in a few days would join him with a reinforcement of three thousand troops.

BOOK  
I.  
1600.

THIS prudent council was warmly opposed by the sieur la Barlotte, an old Flemish commander, of no less experience than Zapena, but whose courage, notwithstanding his advanced age, still bordered on temerity. He maintained that the present favourable opportunity of attacking the enemy ought not to be suffered to escape; that the archduke would find them entirely unprepared for their defence, intimidated by the rapidity of his approach, and disheartened by the defeat which their troops, under Ernest of Nassau, had so recently sustained; that, as the advantages he must derive from these circumstances were more than sufficient to compensate for the want of the troops under Velasco, so his inferiority in number to the enemy was more than counterbalanced, by the superior discipline and bravery of his troops; that his troops were at present animated with the highest degree of ardour; and that the delaying to lead them forward, when they were so eager to engage, would only serve to damp their alacrity, while it would afford leisure to the enemy, either to fortify their entrenchments, or to secure their retreat.

THIS reasoning was received with high applause by a great majority of the council; and

the soldiers, especially the Spanish mutineers, impatient to advance, could hardly be restrained.

B O O K  
I.  
1600.

ALBERT, however, being strongly impressed with a sense of the solidity of Zapena's reasons for delay, still hesitated as to which of the counsels given him, he should embrace; when chance, which often directs the most important events, contributed to fix his resolution. The army having a view from their present situation of the sea-coast, a great number of ships were seen in their course from Nieuport to Ostend. The Spaniards, prepossessed with the idea that the enemy durst not wait for their approach, concluded that they had already begun their flight, and that, at least, a part of them were on board the ships which they observed. Albert himself too readily yielded to this delusion; and instantly gave orders to his troops to begin their march. He was, at this time, only at the distance of a few miles from Nieuport, and as he advanced with great rapidity, his cavalry arrived within sight of the enemy about mid-day, and his whole army about four or five hours before sunset.

HE soon discovered how greatly he and his officers had erred in their conjectures with re-

BOOK

I.

1600.

gard to the conduct and situation of the enemy. Far from meditating flight, prince Maurice had ordered his fleet to quit the coast, and retire to Ostend ; by which prudent measure, he at once gave his army proof of the confidence which he reposed in them, and reduced them to the alternative of death or victory. He had withdrawn all troops from the siege, except a number which he judged sufficient to restrain the sallies of the garrison. He had advanced to a little distance from the town, partly to encourage his troops, by shewing that it was not with reluctance that he had resolved to accept of battle ; and partly because the situation of the ground was more convenient for drawing them up in the order which he most approved.

BESIDES his Dutch forces, he had several regiments of British, French, and Swiss, commanded by officers of distinguished merit, who had acquired the most consummate knowledge of the military art in the civil wars of France, and in the Netherlands ; and these men, he well knew, from long experience, would execute his orders with equal skill and valour.

He thought it necessary, however, to encourage and animate the troops, and for this purpose, he rode from rank to rank, reminding them

them that were about to engage with an enemy who were not only inferior in numbers, and fatigued with their march ; but who, in the manner of their approach, had given proof of extreme temerity : that it entirely depended on themselves whether they should return to their country and their friends, crowned with glory and victory, or be cut to pieces by an enemy over whom they had often triumphed, and have their names for ever covered with infamy. From his confidence in their bravery, he had ordered the transports to leave the coast ; and he now led them on to battle, under a conviction that they would follow the example which he would set before them, and resolve either to die or conquer. These exhortations were every where received with the most joyful acclamations ; and the whole army seemed to be animated with that intrepid spirit which he wished to inspire.

He gave the command of his van-guard to sir Francis Vere, that of his main body to the count of Solms, and of the rear-guard to Oliver Vander Temple, lord of Corbeck. He distributed his cavalry, commanded by count Lewis of Nassau, partly in the front, and partly on the flanks : and having taken no particular station to himself, he was at liberty to go



B O O K  
I.  
—  
1600.

from place to place, wheresoever he found his presence necessary. He was accompanied by his brother, the celebrated prince Frederick Henry, who was only sixteen years of age \* ; and by the duke of Holstein, the prince of Anhalt, the count of Coligni, lord Grey, and sir Robert Drury, grandson of the famous admiral of that name, and by several other noblemen of the first rank, in the different protestant states in Europe, who had lately come into the Netherlands to improve themselves, by his lessons and examples, in the art of war.

HAVING drawn up his army upon the downs by the-sea shore, and planted his artillery on some of the highest of the little hills of sand of which the downs are formed, he resolved, in that posture, to wait for the enemy's approach. Albert was greatly disappointed, when he found him so well prepared for his defence ; and he was somewhat discouraged when he observed, that from the position he had made choice of, the Spanish army would have both the sun and the wind in their face : the latter of which circumstances he dreaded

\* Maurice urged his brother to go by sea to Ostend, but Henry insisted that he should be permitted to remain, and to share his brother's fate.

would

would prove particularly inconvenient, from the light sandy soil on which they were about to engage. It was not, however, too late to entertain the thoughts of a retreat; and his troops were as confident and as eager and impatient for the combat as before. They had long cherished a contempt of the enemy; and they were now heard in all the ranks uttering threats, that they would give no quarter to any of the heretics, except prince Maurice and his brother, whom they would reserve to adorn the triumph of their general.

E O O K  
L  
1600.

THE battle was begun by the Spanish cavalry, under Mendoza, admiral of Arragon, who endeavoured to gain the flank of the Dutch army, by advancing along the sands between the sea and the downs; but Maurice, having foreseen that this might be attempted, had made provision against it by planting cannon on the sands, and ordering some of his ships of war to approach the shore as near as possible. Mendoza was therefore unable to effectuate his purpose, and was obliged to retire, after having sustained considerable slaughter.

Battle of  
Nieuport.

IN the mean time, the two armies, after a discharge of their artillery, having advanced within musket-shot of each other, the English forces

BOOK

I.

1660.

forces in the van, under sir Francis Vere, were attacked by the Spanish mutineers, who, in order to retrieve their honour, displayed on this occasion the most desperate intrepidity. The British troops received their assault undaunted, and for some time withstood their fury; their general had his horse shot under him, and was twice wounded. Still, however, he maintained his ground, refusing to give any attention to his wounds, till his brother, sir Horatio Vere, arrived with fresh troops to his relief. These troops, while engaged in combat with the mutineers, having been vigorously attacked in flank by the Spanish cavalry, were thrown into disorder, and many of them began to fly towards the shore.

BUT the battle was instantly restored. Prince Maurice, having divided his army into battalions, ordered two of those which composed his main body to advance; and by them, the Spaniards were in their turn compelled to retreat, and time afforded to the British troops to rally. In support of the Spaniards, the archduke brought forward his Walloon and Irish, and with their assistance, the mutineers would once more have regained their superiority, had not Maurice, without delay, led on another fresh battalion, consisting of Swiss, and of those Walloons who had surrendered to him

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the fort of Saint Andrew. The British forces likewise returned to the charge; and soon after the whole of both armies, horse and foot, were engaged from one wing to the other.

B O O K  
I.  
1600.

THE Dutch cavalry, commanded by count Lewis of Nassau, who in this battle highly distinguished himself by his activity and valour, proved in every rencounter an overmatch for that of the enemy, and having broken their ranks, drove them with great slaughter from the field of battle.

THE combat was better supported by the Spanish infantry; where Albert himself was present, exposing himself to every danger, and sometimes mingling with the foremost combatants. His troops in every quarter gave proof of the most determined bravery. The battle had lasted for more than three hours; during which time, notwithstanding the fatigue of their rapid march from Liffingen, they had fought without intermission, and often repulsed the fresh battalions of the enemy. From the beginning they had been extremely incommoded with the sun and wind in their face, and still more with the dust or sand. The Dutch artillery too had kept up a constant fire upon them during the whole engagement, and having been not only planted on higher and firmer

BOOK

I.

1600.

firmer ground, with planks under it, to prevent it from sinking in the sand, but better served and more skilfully directed, it had made great havock among the Spanish troops. Still, however, they preserved their ranks, and ~~seemed~~ determined sooner to lay down their lives, than yield to an enemy ~~whom they~~ had been so much accustomed to despise. Albert had made several attempts to get to the windward of the enemy, but had been as often prevented by the prudent precautions and vigilance of prince Maurice. At length, having thrown off his helmet, that he might be the more easily distinguished by his men, he received a wound in the ear with a pike, and was obliged to retire. Through some accident, his horse, which was conspicuous, fell into the hands of the enemy. His troops observed this, and believing that he himself had been taken prisoner, or killed, were greatly disheartened. They still kept their ranks; but in the languor of their exertions, they gave manifest symptoms that both their strength and courage had begun to fail.

THIS abatement of their vigour did not escape the vigilant eye of Maurice, who instantly resolved to improve the advantage which it afforded him; and for this purpose, having collected the whole force, he renewed the

the assault upon the enemy in front, with his infantry, and with his cavalry in flank. It happened, at the same time, that the Spanish magazine of gun-powder, designed for the use of the artillery, took fire. The Dutch cavalry ~~availed themselves~~ of the confusion which this accident occasioned, and pushed forward with irresistible force, crying out, Victory! victory! This cry being instantly communicated to the rest of the army, animated them with redoubled ardor. The Spaniards, unable any longer to resist their fury, gave way on every side, and falling soon after into confusion, betook themselves to flight. The victors pursued for some time, and put great numbers to the sword; but the night coming on, the prince gave orders for sounding a retreat. His troops, he knew, must be exceedingly exhausted and fatigued, as they had taken no food since the morning, and, almost the whole day had either stood under arms, or been engaged in battle; besides that, he was well acquainted with the intrepid spirit of the enemy, who might rally and return when he was unprepared for resistance, and most of his troops employed in the pursuit. For this reason, he selected such of them as had suffered least from the fatigue which they had undergone, and stationed them as a guard to the rest of the army, who remained all night on the field of battle.

THE contemporary historians differ widely in their accounts of the number of the slain. On the part of the Spaniards, Reidan, an historian who is generally well informed, says that it amounted to five thousand, but Grotius makes it only three thousand; while the loss on the side of the victors did not exceed one thousand: and the greatest part of these, he says, were of the English troops, who distinguished themselves by their intrepidity in this engagement, and had eight of their captains killed, and all the rest wounded, except two.

THE British officers were almost the only persons of distinction who fell in the army of the states; but in that of the army of the archduke, besides so great a number of his best troops, Zapena, and colonels Bastock, de Lasso, D'Avalos, and many other officers of great merit, were either killed in the field of battle, or died afterwards of their wounds. The admiral of Arragon and De Vigliar were taken prisoners; and the count de Boutquoi, Barlotta, and many others, wounded, and rendered long unfit for service. All the Spanish artillery, baggage, and provisions, with more than a hundred standards, fell into the hands of the victorious army\*. Such was the battle of Nieuport,

\* Among the Italians who fell in this battle, the cardinal Bentivoglio mentions his brother and his nephew, two young

Nieuport, or, as it is sometimes called, the battle of the Downs, the event of which proved so extremely different from what the confidence of the Spaniards and their generals ~~had~~ prompted them to expect. Their defeat was, no doubt, partly owing to the disadvantages ~~under~~ which they fought; although it was acknowledged by all parties that nothing could surpass the prudence, vigour, and intrepidity, which prince Maurice displayed from the beginning to the end of the engagement. His skill in the siege of fortified towns had long been highly celebrated; but it now appeared that he was equally possessed of all the other talents which form a consummate general, and all Europe at this time resounded with his praise\*.

ALBERT, having left the field of battle immediately after seeing his troops give way, arrived on the same night at Bruges, whence he soon after set out for Ghent, and was there received by Isabella, with the same firm and masculine spirit which she had discovered upon

young noblemen, about twenty years of age, who had lately entered into the service of Spain, and were much regretted on account of their youth and bravery.

\* Grotius, lib. ix. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vi. The heroic acts of prince Maurice, printed in the year 1613. Piatecii Chronica Gest. in Europa singularium, an. 1600.

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BOOK

I.

1668.

the various reports that had reached her, first of his being killed, and afterwards of his being wounded and taken prisoner. He returned next day to Bruges, and there employed himself in collecting his scattered troops.

PRINCE Maurice, ~~in the mean time,~~ had retired on the next day after the battle to Ostend, to recruit his army in a place of safety, and to consult with the deputies whom the states-general had sent thither to assist him with their advice. His enterprize against Nieuport was a measure which the states themselves had first suggested, and which Maurice had undertaken at their desire. It does not appear that he himself had approved of this measure, and it was strongly condemned by his kinsman, count William of Nassau, whom the Dutch historians celebrate as a person of the most consummate prudence.

To lead the army so far into the enemy's country as Nieuport, trusting to an event so extremely uncertain as the continuance of the mutinous spirit of the Spanish troops, William had represented as a rash and dangerous enterprize, by which the existence of the commonwealth would be exposed to imminent danger for the sake of acquiring a single town. That  
even

even although they should conquer Nieuport, yet the great expence of defending a place at so great a distance from them would more than counterbalance all the advantages they could derive from the possession of it; and that, if the archduke should be able to appease the mutineers, the army of the states might suffer a defeat, or they might be reduced by famine, as the supplying them with provisions would entirely depend on the winds and waves.

THESE apprehensions had hitherto been happily disappointed; but from the events which had fallen out, it manifestly appeared how much reason there had been for entertaining them. The mutineers had easily been persuaded to return to their duty. The archduke had in due time collected a sufficient force; and if he had listened to the counsel that was given him by Zapena, and waited for the arrival of Velasco, without precipitating an engagement, the army of the states would probably have either been obliged to lay down their arms without fighting, or in the hurry of attempting to get on board their ships, the greater part of them would have been destroyed.

THE deputies, after the defeat of their troops at Lessinguen, had come to be, in some mea-

sure, sensible of the error into which the states had been betrayed; and, from that time till the victory was fully decided, they had been disquieted with the most dreadful apprehensions. From these apprehensions they were now happily delivered; but being still impressed with a sense of the danger which they had so narrowly escaped, they thought that, notwithstanding the great advantage they had obtained, there was ground for hesitating whether it was expedient to persevere in the plan of operations that had been begun.

THEY gave proof on this occasion, by the slowness of their deliberations, how much wiser it had been on the part of the states to have left prince Maurice at perfect liberty, with regard to the conduct of the war, than to require him, as they had done, to follow the opinion of men, who, from their ignorance of military affairs, were so extremely ill qualified to advise. They differed widely in their opinions from each other; and while some thought that the army ought immediately to return to Nieuport, others were of opinion that it ought rather to penetrate into the interior parts of Flanders. The former of these opinions at length

length prevailed; and, on the fourth or fifth day after the battle, the siege of Nieuport was resumed.

BOOK  
I.

1600.

THIS measure ought either not to have been adopted, or carried sooner into execution. The archduke, having exerted great activity in repairing the faults which he had committed, had sent Velasco \*, with a reinforcement to the garrison of Nieuport of two thousand five hundred men, who having marched with great expedition, had entered the town before prince Maurice had invested it. The operations however of the siege were renewed; but the garrison, after making some vigorous sallies on the besiegers, soon convinced prince Maurice, that he could not justly expect to reduce them before the archduke would arrive with another army, which he was collecting together for their relief.

Siege of  
Nieuport  
resumed.

MOVED by this consideration, and dreading that he might soon be again involved in the same danger, from which he had so recently escaped, he raised the siege, and having led back his troops to Ostend, he put them on board the transports which the states had pro-

\* Bentivoglio, Grotius. Thuanus says it was Barlotta, and not Velasco.

BOOK

I.

1600.  
July 18.

vided for that purpose, and returned to Holland; judging it impracticable, on account of the difficulty of his situation, in the heart of the enemy's country, to derive any advantage whatever from the decisive victory he had obtained \*

THE greatest part of the season fit for action still remained; but both parties were greatly exhausted with the exertions which they had already made, and no other memorable transactions passed during the course of the present year †

\* Bentivoglio. Thuanus, lib. cxxiv, &c.

Before he embarked, Maurice made an attempt to reduce a Spanish fort in the neighbourhood of Ostend, called St. Catherine; but in this too he was disappointed by the vigour and activity of Barlotta, who by forced marches arrived with a considerable body of forces, before the prince had time to make any progress in the siege. Barlotta himself however lost his life on this occasion. He was a native of Luxemburg, and had practised surgery in Paris, where having been employed in his profession by count Charles of Mansfeldt, when he commanded the Spanish troops in France, the count took an attachment to him, and gave him a commission among his troops. He soon distinguished himself by his activity and enterprize, obtained the highest military honours, and was considered as one of the ablest officers in the service of Spain. His low birth, joined to his native arrogance and presumption procured him many enemies among his inferiors and equals; but the archduke was sincerely sorry for his death.

† Davila, &c. p. 77. ch. ix.

IN Spain, the operation of the several causes of decline, above mentioned, was at this time sensibly felt in every department of the state. Complaints were heard all over the kingdom of the neglect of agriculture and the decay of manufactures; and great numbers of the people, being without employment, were reduced to a state of indigence, which rendered it impossible for them to contribute their proportion of the taxes and supplies.

BOOK  
I.

1600.  
Decline of  
agriculture  
and manu-  
factures.

SEVERAL councils were held to consider of the proper remedies for those evils; but the duke of Lerma, and the other Spanish ministers, appear to have been extremely ignorant of the causes from which they proceeded. They supposed them to have arisen principally from the scarcity of money: and this they ascribed partly to the great quantities of plate that were employed in the churches, and in the houses of the rich, and partly to the exportation of gold and silver for the purchase of foreign manufactures.

BUT as no expedient occurred at present to prevent the latter of these practices, while the manufactures of Spain were at so low an ebb, they resolved immediately, if possible, to put a stop to the progress of the former; and, with  
G 3 this

Expedients  
for reme-  
dying those  
evils.

B O O K  
I.

1600.

this view, a royal edict was published, requiring all churches, corporations, and individuals of whatever rank within the kingdom, to deliver upon oath, to certain magistrates who were named, an exact inventory of all the plate, whether gold or silver, in their possession. In the body of the edict this reason for the publication was assigned, that from the information which his majesty had received, there was ground to believe the quantity of the precious metals in plate and in church utensils to be so enormous, that if it were converted into coin, and circulated throughout the kingdom, it would be found sufficient to restore the nation to that happy state of wealth and prosperity which it had formerly enjoyed; and that, for this reason, the king had, with the advice of his present counsellors, resolved, not only to prevent the farther increase of plate, but afterwards, under the severest penalties, to prohibit the exportation of it to foreign states,

BUT it was soon found impracticable to carry this edict, which would not probably have been in any degree productive of the advantages proposed by it, into execution. The clergy were highly incensed because the sacred utensils were comprehended in it; and, both in writings and harangues from the pulpit, they

they represented the edict as an attack upon the privileges of the church. Neither Philip, nor his minister the duke of Lerma, had resolution to contend against an order of men whom they dreaded, and whose favour they had been above all things solicitous to conciliate. Their design was therefore suddenly relinquished, and no other attempt made, on the present occasion, to remedy the disorders which prevailed.

It was not probable that any effectual remedy could be applied to them, till peace should be established with England and the United Provinces. Notwithstanding which, it was judged necessary, for the reasons formerly mentioned, to continue the prosecution of the war against both these powers, without regard to the prejudice which from thence the monarchy was likely to sustain\*. Orders were given for the equipment of a fleet to support the catholics of Ireland in their rebellion against Elizabeth; and both money and a reinforcement of Italian and Spanish troops were sent into the Netherlands,

THE archduke had at the same prevailed upon the states assembled at Brussels to grant him

\* Gonzalez Davila, lib. ii. cap. 9.



BOOK  
I

1602.

much greater supplies than formerly; and these he employed in making numerous levies in Germany, and the Walloon or southern provinces. The enemy however was sooner prepared to take the field. Prince Maurice, having drawn his army out of winter quarters early in the spring, and ordered them to rendezvous in the neighbourhood of the fort of Schenck, seemed for some time to intend an attack on Bois le Duc; but it soon appeared that his real design was to attempt the reduction of Rhinberg; the possession of this important place being necessary in order to facilitate the expulsion of the Spaniards from Guelderland, a part of which was still subject to their authority.

THE archduke no sooner received intelligence of his design, than he ordered count Herman of Berg to set out with a body of troops to reinforce the garrison; but before the count had time to execute his commission, Maurice had drawn lines of circumvallation round the place, and fortified the approaches to his camp in such a manner, as rendered all access impracticable. Albert had therefore no other expedient for saving Rhinberg left, but to make a diversion, by attacking some important place belonging to the

United

United States, in the hopes that Maurice might be thus induced to abandon his present enterprize.

BOOK  
I.  
1601.

AT the earnest request of the people of Flanders, he resolved to lay siege to Ostend; the garrison of which place, though somewhat checked by adjacent forts, had been able to make incursions into the heart of the province, and often laid the inhabitants of the open country under the most burthensome contributions.

THE states of this province, notwithstanding the peculiar hardships under which they laboured, had discovered great alacrity in raising their proportion of the supplies lately granted to the archkude; and they now promised strenuously to exert themselves in furnishing him with every thing necessary for carrying on the siege with vigour.

SUCH were the motives by which Albert was influenced in forming his resolution to undertake the siege of Ostend; the most hazardous enterprize in which he had ever been engaged, and which was attended with more important consequences, than any other which occurs in the history of the Netherlands.

OSTEND

## BOOK

## I

—  
1651.  
Description  
of Ostend.

OSTEND stands on the sea coast, in a marshy soil, and almost surrounded with canals, two of which being much larger than the rest, and communicating with the sea, receive smaller vessels at all times, and at high-water admit of ships of a considerable magnitude. . . It was an open fishing town, till the year 1572, when it was first fortified with a palisade by the duke of Alva. At the pacification of Ghent, the inhabitants having thrown off the Spanish yoke, the fortifications were so much strengthened and augmented by the United States, that the duke of Parma, who invested it in the year 1583, despairing of success, abandoned his enterprize, and could never afterwards be persuaded to resume the siege.

OSTEND is divided into two parts, called the Old and the New Town. The former of these is washed by the sea, against the ravages of which it is secured by a strong fortification, formed of huge and well compacted beams or palisades; and the latter was defended by a wall flanked with bastions, and the canals already mentioned, to which there had lately been added a covered way, fortified with numerous redoubts. As, from the situation of Ostend, on the coast of Flanders, it afforded a convenient shelter to the ships of the United Provinces,

Provinces, the states had ever been extremely solicitous for its preservation. They had spared no expence in rendering the fortifications as complete as possible, and besides a numerous garrison ~~under~~ the command of an experienced officer, they had always kept it richly furnished with provisions and military stores. Nor was these the only circumstances which had deterred the duke of Parma from renewing his attempt against it. He considered, what was of much greater importance than even the strength of the place, that while the Dutch preserved their superiority at sea, the garrison might continue to receive whatever supplies and reinforcements they should stand in need of, till his strength and resources being exhausted, he should be compelled to raise the siege. To this consideration, the archduke seems not to have paid that attention which it merited. He did not possess the same military skill as the duke of Parma, and could not therefore so clearly perceive the difficulties he must encounter in his intended enterprize. He was not by nature bold or rash; yet from the facility of his temper, he was apt too readily to adopt the rash imprudent measures that were recommended by his counsellors\*.

\* Vide Bentivoglio, Le Clerc, and Grotius. Thuanus, lib. vi. p. 76, &c.

BOOK  
I.

1601.

Rhinberg  
capitulates.Siege of  
Ostend.

HAVING set out with his numerous army about the end of June, he began his operations against Ostend on the 4th or 5th of July. Prince Maurice, in the mean time, who secretly rejoiced to observe his enemy engage in so dangerous an undertaking, persisted in the siege of Rhinberg; and in a few weeks, notwithstanding the most vigorous defence on the part of the garrison, he compelled them to capitulate.

BUT the attention of both parties was now almost totally engrossed by the siege of Ostend; where Charles Vander Noot the governor, before the besiegers had time to complete their intrenchments, had sallied out upon them, and killed upwards of five hundred men. This unfortunate beginning, however, did not deter the archduke from the prosecution of his enterprize.

HAVING taken the necessary precautions to prevent the future sallies of the garrison, and stationed one part of his troops in the downs, to the westward of the town, and the rest of them on the south and east, he soon opened his batteries, and began a furious cannonade in every quarter. But his distance from the body of the place, occasioned by the canals, ditches,

ditches, and other outworks, which the industry of the besiegers had greatly multiplied, rendered his fire of small effect; and showed him that it must long remain impossible to compel the garrison to surrender, unless he could prevent them from receiving reinforcements and supplies by sea.

IN this opinion he might have been confirmed by the proof which the United States had lately given, how much they were determined to exert themselves with vigour in the defence of the place. Though Vander Noot was an officer whom they highly esteemed, yet they had taken from him the chief command, and given it to sir Francis Vere, who, next to prince Maurice, was the most renowned of all their generals, for his military prudence and capacity; and to engage Vere to accept of this command, they had consented to the selecting the flower of the English forces, for a reinforcement to the garrison. They had, at the same time, sent to Ostend a copious supply of military stores and provisions; and were unanimous in resolving that, whatever it should cost them, they would defend the town to the last extremity.

THIS resolution and vigour which the states had begun to display, drew the attention of  
all

all Europe to the operations of this important siege; and with the permission of the states, the town was visited by many illustrious foreigners, from Germany, Denmark, France and England \*, who were led there by curiosity, to view so interesting a scene of action, and the desire of being thereby enabled more clearly to comprehend the relations of those military achievements which they expected to be performed by the contending parties.

THE archduke had ground for much solicitude, with regard to the final issue of his enterprise; but he could not now desist, without exposing himself to reproach and ridicule; and therefore he applied himself with redoubled ardor to the prosecution of the siege.

IT might be brought to a period, he imagined, either by carrying it on in the ordinary form, by mines, batteries, and assaults, or by rendering himself master of the entrance of the canals, and thereby intercepting the communication of the garrison by sea with the United Provinces. He ought maturely to have considered which of these two methods of procedure was the most likely to prove effectual, and to have confined his attention to one

\* As the duke of Holface, the king of Denmark's brother, the earl of Northumberland, and others.

of them, without suffering it to be diverted by the other. But instead of this, he employed his forces, sometimes in carrying on attacks upon the enemy's entrenchments, and sometimes in attempting to block up the canals; and, by this division of his strength, as the siege was protracted to an enormous length, so it was attended with an immense expence of blood and treasure.

For several weeks his principal object was to approach still nearer than where his batteries were first opened to the fortifications of the town. The garrison, on the other hand, omitted nothing in their power that could obstruct his approach. They adventured, on some occasions, to sally out, and to attack the besiegers sword in hand: and in the mean time, they laboured indefatigably in casting trenches, and raising new redoubts, wherever they apprehended there was danger of the enemy's attempting an assault. An incessant fire was all the while kept up from the Spanish batteries on the one hand, and the fortifications on the other; and great numbers were killed on either side.

At length the archduke, perceiving that his operations were not attended with the success which he expected, had recourse to the other



BOOK

I.

1601.

other expedient above mentioned, and employed great part of his forces in attempting to obstruct the entrance of the canals. One of them was the entrance to the harbour, and here he began his operations. But, as all the ground to a considerable distance from the shore was sand, no mound which he formed of it, could sustain a battery, or resist the violence of the waves. He was therefore obliged to collect together, from the neighbouring towns, a great quantity of huge beams, of which and bricks he resolved to form a dyke at the mouth of the canal. The beams were driven deep into the ground, then bound together, and the intermediate spaces filled with bricks. Of this sort of building one was piled upon another, till the whole was raised to a sufficient height; after which, being planted with a numerous battery of cannon, the enemy's ships found all access to the harbour utterly impracticable.

BUT the hopes which Albert had from thence conceived of being able to reduce the town by famine, were quickly frustrated by the ingenuity and great exertion of the governor and garrison. They instantly applied themselves to enlarge the mouth of the other canal which passed through the heart of the town,

town, and soon rendered it capable of receiving the largest ships.

B O O K  
L

1601.

THE archduke however did not despair of being able to deprive them of this resource; and he immediately began the same sort of operations at the entrance of this canal, as those by which he had made himself master of the other. At first, his troops and pioneers proceeded with great alacrity, as they were sheltered from the fire of the besiegers, by a dyke which had been raised to defend the town against the encroachments of the sea. But the garrison resolved to forego the advantage which they derived from their defence; and having strengthened their fortifications as well as they could, by stakes, huge stones, and other materials fitted to repel the fury of the waves, they demolished the dyke, and as by this expedient the Spanish works were exposed to the artillery of the town, and a great part of the adjacent country laid under water, the archduke was obliged to draw off his troops to a greater distance, and to have recourse to other measures, which required greater experience and time to carry into execution.

IN the mean time, the states-general of the United Provinces held frequent conferences

## BOOK

I.

1600.

to consider how they might best improve the leisure which they enjoyed, while the Spanish army was detained before Ostend. They wished to have made an attack on the island of Cad-fant, and afterwards to have undertaken the reduction of Sluys. But at the present juncture, they had neither the money nor the troops which prince Maurice thought necessary for so difficult an enterprize. The flower of their army had, after the taking of Rhinberg, been sent to Ostend; and the great expence which attended the defence of that place had almost exhausted their finances. Much time was spent in deliberating, and various expeditions were proposed. At length, towards the end of October, when the season of action was nearly elapsed, they formed the resolution of undertaking the siege of Bois le Duc, the garrison of which important place, they understood, amounted only to three hundred men.

Siege of  
Bois le Duc.

IN obedience to their commands, though extremely diffident of success, prince Maurice immediately began his march, and having arrived before the place on the first of November, he judged, that, considering the great extent of the fortifications, the garrison must soon find it necessary to capitulate, provided he could prevent the entrance of more troops. With this view, he instantly began to draw

lines of circumvallation round the town, and at first, this work was carried on with great rapidity. But soon afterwards, it was retarded by a violent frost, which happened, this year, much sooner than usual: and the archduke had time to send a large detachment of his army, above a thousand of which forced their way into the town, before the entrenchments were complete; while the rest lay at a little distance from the prince's camp, with the design of embracing an opportunity that might offer, of annoying him. Still, however, he persisted in his design: but as the frost continued daily increasing in violence, and put an entire stop to his operations, he complied with the desire of the deputies of the states, who, as usual, attended him in the camp, and raised the siege\*.

MAURICE had no sooner retired from Bois le Duc, than Albert, having recalled his troops, resumed his operations; which had been suspended during their absence, against Ostend; and in a few days after he had ground to entertain the hope of being able to terminate the siege. The fortifications of the town next the sea had lately suffered considerable prejudice from the fury of the waves; and the

End of November.

\* Metern, lib. xxii. Grotius, lib. x. Bentivoglio, &c.

BOOK  
I.

1601.

garrison, through sickness and desertion, and the great numbers killed by fatigue and the incessant fire of the besiegers, was reduced from eight thousand to between two and three thousand men. Sir Francis Vere had given repeated notice of his distressful situation to the United States: but till the raising of the siege of Bois le Duc, they had no troops which they could spare; and after troops were procured, and put on board the transports, they were prevented from sailing by contrary winds. About the same time, the archduke had ordered a select body of forces to pass over the harbour at low-water in the middle of the night, who set fire to a temporary defence, composed of huge piles of faggots and other combustible materials, which had been placed at the foot of the rampart, on the north side of the town, to prevent the further encroachments of the sea. The fire burnt furiously for three days and nights, baffling all the attempts of the garrison to extinguish it. The rampart was thus much weakened, that a greater number of men were necessary for its defence. In the midst of this distress, the governor received notice that the archduke had been assiduously employed in preparing for a general assault, and would certainly carry his design into execution on the next day, or, at farthest,

on the day immediately following. Vere, though possessed of the most unquestionable courage, was too sensible of the present weakness of the garrison and fortification, and too well acquainted with the perseverance and intrepid spirit of the Spanish troops, not to be alarmed with the danger which threatened him; and, in order to avert it, he made use of an expedient to which a brave man will hardly, even when necessity requires it, have recourse. Without any serious intention of capitulating, he secretly sent over to the archduke an officer, to signify that he was ready to treat with him for the surrender of the town. Albert, suspecting no dissimulation, gladly listened to this proposal, and hostages were instantly exchanged. He came soon, however, to entertain some doubt of the governor's sincerity, and urged, him without delay, to propose his terms. This the governor, by employing different pretexts, found means to defer from day to day, till a reinforcement of troops which he had expected arrived from Zealand. This reinforcement consisted only of five companies, amounting to four hundred men. But finding that the archduke could not be any longer deceived, and having already gained sufficient time to repair the breaches in the rampart, he sent them word, that since his

B O O K  
I.  
1601.

BOOK

I.

1601.

masters the states had augmented his garrison, he could not now, consistently with his honour, consent to give up the town.

As Vere had begun this transaction without communicating it to his officers, some suspicions were at first entertained of his fidelity by all such persons as were averse to a surrender; and the states-general were not entirely satisfied, either with the duplicity he had employed, or the example which he had given of entering into a treaty with the enemy, without the knowledge of his council of war. But no person had so much reason to be offended as the archduke, who, though he did not hesitate to send back the hostages, was both incensed and mortified when he considered how he had been deceived by an enemy, whom he might probably have compelled to lay down his arms\*.

THE fortifications of the place were now more secure than formerly, and the garrison had been reinforced. Still, however, being moved by passion more than the probability of success, he resolved to execute the design which the hopes of a capitulation had induced him to lay aside, and give orders for a general

\* If he had improved the opportunity which he had lost.  
assault.

assault. He intended to make his principal attack on the west, near the harbour, which had been for some time in his possession; but, in order to divert the enemies attention and divide their forces, he resolved at the same time to make attacks in other quarters, and gave the command of a body of troops, destined to act on the east side, to the celebrated count de Bucquoi; having committed the execution of his principal design to Augustin Mescia, an experienced officer, and governor of the citadel of Antwerp.

EARLY in the morning he began to play off his batteries, and kept up a furious cannonading in every quarter till mid-day, when, the tide having gone back, Mescia led forward the Spanish troops. They were drawn up in a compact body, forty men in front, and the foremost ranks clothed in complete armour, followed by the musketeers and others, who were provided with scaling-ladders, and whatever else was judged necessary, either for acquiring or securing possession of the rampart. They advanced across the old harbour, in which there was between three and four feet water, with great ardour and the most determined intrepidity; but the garrison were well prepared for their defence. The governor

January  
7th. 1601



B O O K

I.

1601.

had beforehand ordered the cannon to be removed from that part of the fortifications where he expected their principal attack, and in their place had planted seven large mortars, which were loaded with stones, flints, bullets, and other instruments of mischief. He had likewise instructed those to whom he had committed the charge of those mortars, to keep up their fire till the enemy should approach. This order was well obeyed, and the Spaniards had almost reached the foot of the rampart, when the mortars were discharged, and made dreadful havock among the foremost ranks: a great number was killed and wounded, and the ranks were thrown into confusion. Still however they continued to advance, those who were behind pushing forward those who were before, till the greater part of them were so near that every stroke and shot of the besiegers did certain execution. The night came on, yet the Spaniards seemed still determined to persist. To prevent a surprize, the governor ordered a great number of fires to be lighted up within the rampart, and the battle continued to be as bloody and desperate as before.

THE Spanish troops at the same time crowded together in the harbour, ready to advance to fill up the places of those who fell; when the governor

governor had recourse to an expedient which he had meditated from the beginning. There were two sluices within the fortification, one of which served in the time of ebb to keep the water in that part of the canal which lay within the town, and the other to restrain it in that part which ran up into the country. Having ordered both these sluices to be opened, so great a quantity of water was poured into the harbour, that many of the Spaniards were carried down by the violence of the stream and drowned; while many others, attempting to save themselves by laying hold of the pallisades on the rampart, were slaughtered by the enemy. The arch-duke had commanded his cavalry to keep close in the rear of the infantry, to prevent them from having recourse to flight. It was thus rendered impossible for the latter to make their retreat so soon as necessity required: and by this means they were obliged to stand exposed to the fire of the besiegers, long after it was manifest that their most vigorous efforts could be of no avail. A part of the cavalry having entered the water, with a design to obstruct the violence of the current, several horses with their riders were likewise drowned, and Meschia at length found it necessary to give the signal

of retreat. The assailants having been equally unsuccessful in every other quarter, were obliged to abandon the assault. In this rash and desperate enterprize, about fourteen hundred of the Spaniards and Italians were either killed or drowned, among whom were several persons of the first rank, while the loss of the besiegers amounted only to forty killed, and a small number wounded \*.

THE archduke would have renewed the assault on the second day after his repulse, but was prevented by a mutiny of his Italian and Spanish troops, who were highly exasperated at the barbarous, and what they deemed disgraceful manner in which they had been used. They bitterly complained that they had been treated like slaves or brutes, and not like soldiers of unquestionable bravery, when they were compelled by the cavalry to stand exposed to the enemy's fire, after the sluices being opened, it was rendered impossible for them to advance. They complained that this measure, which had been adopted without consent of the council of general officers, was contrary to every rule of war, and they declared, that since they had not been treated as

\* Meteren, liv. xxiii. Grotius, lib. xi. ab initio. Bentivog. part. iii. lib. vi.