

BOOK

II.

1603.

the whole expence of these troops should be defrayed by the king of France, but that the half \* of what he advanced should be deducted from the debt which he owed to Elizabeth. It was resolved, that in order to avoid an open rupture with the court of Spain, the utmost secrecy should be observed in levying the troops and in transporting them to the continent; but it was agreed, that in case these transactions could not be concealed, and the Spaniards, in revenge for the assistance afforded to the Dutch, should attack either, or both of the contracting princes, they should mutually assist each other, and furnish such a number of troops, to be employed by sea or land, as should be judged sufficient for their mutual defence, and the preservation of the United Provinces †.

JAMES immediately fulfilled his parts of this agreement, by giving secret orders to the lord Buccleugh to raise a body of two thousand men in Scotland, who some months after were sent over to join the army of the states ‡.

1604.

THE archdukes and the court of Spain were greatly alarmed, when they heard of the kind

\* Grotius says two thirds. † Sully's Memoirs, book xvi. Carte's History of England. ‡ Carte and Meteren, Vittorio Siri, tom. i. p. 148. For the precise sum due to Elizabeth, vide Sully, book xxi. near the beginning.

reception which the king had given to the French ambassador, and they suspected that some treaty had been concluded between them. It does not, however, appear that they received particular intelligence of the purport of it; and they still entertained the hopes of being able to fix James in their interest.

BOOK  
II.  

---

1604.

THE archdukes had early sent over the count D'Aremberg, as their ambassador, to congratulate him on his accession; and soon after, Don John de Taxis, count of Villa Mediana, arrived in the same capacity from Spain. It was commonly believed that the former of these noblemen, who was esteemed as a soldier, but was extremely ill qualified for his present employment, had, soon after his arrival in England, given his countenance to a conspiracy, formed by the lords Grey, Cobham, sir Walter Raleigh, and others, for subverting the present government, and raising Arabella Stuart to the throne. It would seem that he had, at least, lent an ear to the conspirators, without thinking it incumbent on him to communicate their intention to the king's ministers; and by this imprudent conduct he rendered himself so obnoxious to James, that, in his hands, no treaty of agreement with his master could have succeeded. But James was still as much as ever bent on peace with Spain, nor  
had

had he meant to preclude himself from concluding it by his treaty of alliance with the French monarch.

TAXIS left no art untried to confirm him in this pacific disposition; and, at the same time, laboured to remove those prejudices against the Spaniards which he had long entertained, and had been lately awakened by count D'Aremberg's concern in the conspiracy. He was warmly seconded by the queen, who, being attached to the Spanish interest, had conceived the desire of having the young prince, her son, married to the infanta, and, by bribes and promises, it was believed, he had gained over a considerable party of the English counsellors.

THE French king and the states-general thought they had much reason to dread the influence of such powerful agents, and they employed all their interest to counteract them, and to divert the king from his intention. James gave them repeated assurances, that Henry should have no ground to complain of him for any breach of the alliance into which he had so lately entered, nor the states for being inattentive to their interest; but the present situation of his affairs, he told them, rendered

tered it necessary for him to put an end to the Spanish war.

B O O K  
II.

1664.

HE accordingly gave orders to his ministers for holding conferences for this purpose, with the Spanish and Flemish ambassadors, and in the mean time caused an entire stop to be put to all hostilities.

THOSE appointed by the archdukes were D'Aremberg, and Richard of Verreicken; and Rouida, a senator of Milan, had come over to the assistance of Taxis.

THE letter which Taxis brought to James from the king of Spain was addressed to him, not in the usual style, To our Brother, but, To our Cousin; and, in enumerating James's titles, though France was mentioned, Ireland was omitted. James laughed at the latter of these absurdities, into which he supposed the Spanish court had been led, by their complaisance to the pope, who had published a bull, declaring Ireland to be a fief of the holy see; but he sharply expressed his resentment at the term Cousin.

IT soon appeared that the claims of the two nations on each other were but few in num-

VOL. I.

M

ber.



## BOOK

## II.

1604.

ber. No conquests had been made by either of the two parties, which the other could insist to have restored; and neither of them claimed an indemnification for the expences of the war; but there were two points which were difficult to be adjusted, and occasioned the holding of many conferences. The Spaniards, on the one hand, insisted that James should engage to prevent his subjects from entering for the future into the service of the United States; and he, on the other, required that they should enjoy the liberty of trade to the Indies.

THE Spanish ambassador represented, that his master had expected to find in his Britannic majesty a good and faithful ally, and hoped to have formed an offensive and defensive alliance with him; but if he was still determined, in imitation of his predecessor, to give assistance to the rebels in the Netherlands, it was impossible but the catholic king must consider him rather as an enemy than a friend. The English commissioners replied, that their master could not now regard the Dutch in the light of rebels; their sovereignty had been acknowledged by some of the greatest princes in Europe; and the king had, on his accession, found so close a connection subsisting between them and his English subjects as could not be

dis-

dissolved without considerable prejudice to his kingdom: he was therefore resolved to permit them to make levies within his dominions as formerly; but as he intended to observe a strict neutrality, he was ready to grant the same permission to the archdukes and the king of Spain, and farther to engage that he should not send any of his own troops to the assistance of the states, nor furnish them either with money or with military stores. The Spanish commissioners finding, after several conferences, that all their remonstrances on this head proved ineffectual, were obliged to acquiesce in the king's proposal.

BOOK  
II.

1604.  
Peace between Spain  
and England.

THE other article above mentioned, which related to the India trade, was the subject of several conferences, and of great altercation between the commissioners. The Spaniards maintained that, as they were the first discoverers of the Indies, and their right to these countries had been confirmed by the sovereign pontiff, no other nation was entitled to trade there without their permission; that for weighty reasons they had refused to grant this permission, not only to the king of France in the treaty of Vervins, but likewise to the emperor, and to the archdukes; that these reasons still subsisted, and therefore they must not only decline

cline granting it to the English, but insist that the king of England shall, by proclamation, prohibit all his subjects from continuing to trade in India, as they had done for some years past.

THIS chimerical pretension was treated by the English commissioners with the contempt which it merited: the Spaniards themselves had traded to many parts of India, besides those where they had established their dominion; and no reason could be given why the English should not enjoy the same liberty. James peremptorily refused to publish the prohibition which was requested of him. His subjects had for many years been in possession of the India trade, and he resolved that they should not be deprived of it by any article in the present treaty.

THE disputes on this subject rose to so great a height as to give ground to apprehend that the conferences would have proved abortive; but, as both parties were eagerly bent on peace, it was at length proposed that no mention whatever should be made of the Indies in the treaty; and to this proposal they both yielded their consent.

ALL the other articles were easily adjusted; but as Taxis had not plenipotentiary powers, the signing of it was delayed for some time longer. This however had been reserved for Don John de Velasco, duke of Frias, and constable of Castile, who, several months before had come to Brussels, in his way to England, but had remained till now in Flanders, either on account of his health, which was the excuse he offered for his delay, or, as was suspected by the English, because he judged it to be incompatible with his dignity to come over to England till he knew that peace would certainly be concluded. He had requested the English monarch to send his commissioners to treat with him in the Netherlands; but James declined complying with this request, because the catholic king, he said, had first offered to send his ambassador to England, and he chose to have the treaty carried on under his own eye\*.

BOOK  
II.  
1604.

VELASCO arrived at Dover on the 5th of August, and was from thence conducted by some English noblemen sent to receive him, with great pomp, to London. The treaty was signed on the 19th of August, and next day

\* Carte, Sully, Beaumont, Meteren, and Siri Mem. recondite, tom. i. p. 200, &c.

B O O K  
II.

1604.

was ratified by the king \*. The publication of it gave general satisfaction both to the Spanish and English nations; but was unacceptable to the English sailors, because they alone, by the numerous captures they had made, had derived any advantage from the war †.

DURING the course of these negociations, the war in the Netherlands was carried on with more than ordinary vigour. The siege of Ostend had lasted for more than two years and a half, and the besiegers, during all that time, had exerted their utmost strength and skill; yet so vigorous was the opposition which they received from the garrison, that they had not been able to make any considerable impression on the place. Those huge machines, above mentioned, which were intended for blocking up the canal, were no sooner brought within reach of the artillery of the town, than, by the well-directed shot of the besiegers, they were either demolished or set on fire. The besiegers too made innumerable sallies, in which they displayed the most determined intrepidity, and completed the destruction of such parts of

\* It was not till the following year that the earl of Nottingham, lord high admiral, was sent to Madrid to witness the notification of this treaty, by the king of Spain.

† For farther particulars relating to this treaty, see Appendix, A.

the Spanish works as could not be reached by the artillery.

B O O K  
II.

1604.

THE principal engineer employed in constructing these works was Pompeo Targoné, an Italian, who possessed an inventive genius, but had never till now enjoyed an opportunity of reducing his theories to practice. Of this man's ingenuity the archduke unfortunately entertained too favourable an opinion, and was thus too easily induced to approve of projects, which, on trial, were found impracticable, but were attended in the execution with immense expence. His machines were all constructed at some distance from the town; but when they were brought forward to the places where they were to be used, they were exposed, either to the violence of the tide, or to the fire of the besiegers; and it often happened that works were in a few hours destroyed, or rendered useless, on which the labour of many weeks had been employed.

THE archduke came at length to be deceived in the expectations which he had formed of the success of these works. His patience was now greatly exhausted; and he began to suspect that the repeated disappointments which he had met with must be in a great



BOOK

II.

1604.

measure owing to the want of skill or of vigour on the part of those to whom he had committed the conduct of the siege.

The command of the Spanish army given to the marquis of Spinola.

THE marquis of Spinola had been only a few months in the Netherlands, and, till his arrival there, had never witnessed any military operations: yet Albert, with the consent of the court of Spain, resolved to devolve on him the command of the army, and the prosecution of this siege, in which the strenuous efforts of his most experienced commanders had been of so little avail. In forming this resolution it was generally believed that, in the issue, he would find that he had been betrayed into still greater imprudence than when he reposed such undeserved confidence in the abilities of Targoné, and many of his officers were greatly incensed at a choice so expressive of his distrust in their abilities; but having conceived a high admiration of Spinola, partly on account of his spirited conduct in some enterprizes of small importance in which he had been engaged, and partly from the prudence and sagacity of which he had given proof as often as he had consulted him on the conduct of the war, Albert persisted in his resolution, and was justified by the event.

SPINOLA

SPINOLA was highly pleased with so flattering a distinction, but could not avoid feeling much anxiety when the archduke communicated to him his intention. He hesitated for some time whether to accept, at so critical a juncture, of so important a command, in which, instead of acquiring fame, he might, at his very entrance upon the military life, expose himself to so great a risk of incurring censure and reproach; and therefore, before he agreed to the archduke's proposal, he convened together such of the officers as he confided in, and desired them deliberately to consider whether it was practicable to bring the siege of Ostend to the desired conclusion.

THESE men differed widely from each other in their sentiments on the subject, and only contributed to increase his perplexity. But, being conscious of resources within himself, of which those who attempted to dissuade him could form no conception, his hopes and his ambition at length prevailed over his doubts and fears, and determined him to accept of the command.

THE failure of many enterprizes, he believed, had been greatly owing to the mutinous spirit of the troops, occasioned by the irregularity of



## BOOK

## II.

1604.

of their pay; and to remedy this evil was the first object to which he applied his attention. Upon enquiry, he found that large sums of money had been misapplied, or embezzled by those who had the care of the military chest. These persons he dismissed from their employments, and substituted others, upon a plan of greater oeconomy, in their room. But he still perceived that the military funds were too small to enable him to keep the troops in good humour, and at the same time to carry on successfully all the expensive operations of the siege. Of the truth of this he spared no pains to convince the archduke and the Spanish ministers; and, in the mean time, till they should devise expedients for furnishing him with more ample supplies, he pledged his private fortune for such considerable sums as put it in his power to give instant satisfaction to the troops.

IN conducting the operations of the siege, his deference for the judgment of the archduke determined him to persist for some time longer in the attempt, which had cost so much expence of blood and labour, to intercept the navigation of the canal; and, in order to form the intended dyke, and batteries on the banks of it, great quantities of stones and earth, and other

other materials, were brought from a distance, on floats or rafts constructed by Targoné. But this work, being exposed both to the fire and the sallies of the besieged, advanced slowly. It could not be finished, he perceived, for many months; and, even when it should be finished, though it would render the navigation of the canal more difficult to the Dutch ships; yet many of them, he foresaw, by taking advantage of the night, and winds and tides, might elude his batteries, and the garrison still continue to receive supplies. In order to prevent this, Targoné had, with the archduke's approbation, begun to erect, on large boats strongly bound together, a huge floating castle, which he proposed to station in the mouth of the canal, and to plant it with cannon. But Spinola considered this project as chimerical. A pile so huge and unwieldy could not, he suspected, be brought from the place where the engineer was employed in building it, to the mouth of the canal: although it should be found practicable to do this, yet the machine would not long resist the violence of the tide; and, unless a dyke of an extraordinary height and strength could be raised to shelter it, it would soon be demolished by the artillery of the town.

DETERMINED

DETERMINED by these motives, Spinola abandoned the design of blocking up the canal, and resolved, henceforth, to employ his whole strength in carrying on the siege by mines, batteries, and assaults. The archduke, notwithstanding the repulse which he had met with in the assault above related, would, on the second day after, have resumed his attempt, if the troops, discontented with his treatment of them on that occasion, had not refused to obey. But the whole army was now under the most perfect discipline; and having no longer any ground to complain of their want of pay, they were ready to give every proof of their attachment to their general, from whom they had received so much greater attention than had formerly been shewn them. Encouraged by this disposition of his army, Spinola issued his orders for a general assault, in the same quarter where the former one had failed, at the small canal which encompassed the fortifications on the west. In order to inspire his troops with emulation, he divided them into four battalions, one of which was entirely composed of Germans, the second of Spaniards, the third of Italians, and the fourth of Walloons, and other soldiers raised in the county of Burgundy. Great quantities of materials had been provided for forming dykes across the

the canal, at those parts where he intended the troops should pass; and the foremost ranks were ordered to carry before them a sort of rampart formed of twigs and faggots, to screen them from the fire of the enemy's small arms in their approach.

BOOK  
II.  
1604.

THE garrison, having received intelligence of his design, were well prepared for their defence; and the assailants had no sooner entered the canal than they began a dreadful fire upon them, both with their small arms and their artillery. Great numbers fell, notwithstanding the precautions which had been taken: still however they continued to advance. The Walloons having been stationed farthest from the sea, where the canal was of the smallest depth, were the first who arrived on the other side, and the rest of the army quickly followed. The garrison still maintained their ground, and kept up an incessant fire, by which the bravest of the assailants fell in heaps above one another. Spinola was in the midst of his troops, giving orders, and exhorting them to persevere. They were animated by his example, as well as his exhortations; and it being now become more dangerous to retreat than to advance, they hastened forward with the most desperate intrepidity, and attacked the ravelins and half-moons which defended the counter-

counterſcarp. The gariſon withſtood their fury for ſome time; but at length, after great numbers had fallen on both ſides, they were compelled to abandon their outworks, and retire within the ditch.

SPINOLA could not at this time attempt with ſafety to proceed any farther in the attack; but having covered his men from the enemy's fire, he immediately began, by working trenches, to make ſtill nearer approaches to the place \*.

THE ſtates-general were in the mean time deliberating whether to attempt to raiſe the ſiege, by marching the army to Oſtend; or to undertake ſome new conqueſt on the coaſt of Flanders, by which the loſs of Oſtend, which they had now more reaſon to dread than ever, might be compensated. After mature deliberation, the latter of theſe meaſures was adopted, as the eaſieſt to be carried into execution; and it was agreed to undertake the reduction of Sluys †, which, as it lay nearer to the United Provinces, would prove in every reſpect a more valuable poſſeſſion than Oſtend.

THE troops were ordered to rendezvous at Williamſtadt, where prince Maurice, attended

\* Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii.

† See volume ii. p. 237. of Philip II.

by the deputies of the states, arrived on the 24th of April, and next day he set sail with upwards of twelve thousand men for the isle of Cadfant, which is separated from Sluys by the great canal. Having disembarked without opposition, he soon reduced all the forts upon the island. From Cadfant he passed over into that part of Flanders which lies to the eastward of Sluys, and laid siege to a strong fort called St. Catherine. The garrison of this fort having made a more vigorous resistance than he expected, he resolved, rather than be detained before it any longer, to leave it behind him in the enemy's possession, and gave orders for having his artillery drawn off in the middle of the night; but one of his cannon having sunk in a marsh, a great number of sailors were employed in raising it, who made so great a bustle and noise, that the garrison, believing the whole Dutch army to be at hand, and that they were removing their artillery to a more advantageous situation, in order to renew the attack, were seized with a panic, and fled precipitately towards Isendyck. Of this unexpected event the prince received intelligence next morning, when he took possession of the fort: and from thence he proceeded to Isyndyck, Ardenbourg, and other places, all of which he easily compelled to surrender.

IN the mean time Spinola, having been informed by Serrano, the governor of Sluys, of the danger which threatened him, sent him a reinforcement of three hundred men. With this reinforcement, joined to as great a number of the garrison as could be spared, Serrano, who was an officer distinguished for his activity and enterprize, resolved to embrace the opportunity which the present distance of prince Maurice's army afforded him, to make an attack on the isle of Cadfant.

HAD his design succeeded, he must have got possession of all the Dutch transports, together with their military stores, and thus have rendered it impracticable for Maurice to proceed in his intended enterprize against Sluys. Some companies of Scotch troops, which had been stationed in Cadfant, having no apprehension of danger, were off their guard, and Serrano had time to land six hundred of his men without opposition; but the Scots, having soon received intelligence of their landing, set out instantly to oppose them; and having come upon them before they were completely formed, attacked them with uncommon fury, and drove them back in great confusion to their boats.



THE prince had now subdued all the fortified places which lay to the east of Sluys, and was advancing westward, when he was met by Velasco, general of the archduke's cavalry, who had been sent to obstruct his progress. Velasco had posted his troops in a strong situation, near Dam, which stands on the canal of Bruges. He had the good fortune in the beginning to repulse a party of the Dutch horse, who were sent before the rest of the army to attack his intrenchments; but the infantry coming up, he was overpowered by numbers. About eight hundred of his men were killed and taken prisoners, and he himself with the rest was obliged to retire precipitately towards Dam.

AFTER this success, Maurice, judging it unnecessary to lose time in laying siege to this fort, proceeded in his march, and, with little difficulty, made himself master of all the forts on the great canal, by which Sluys communicates with the sea; immediately after which, he assigned their several stations to his troops in the neighbourhood of the town, and began to form a line of circumvallation round the place, by working deep intrenchments where the soil permitted, casting bridges over the numberless little canals and rivulets, by which the ground is almost every where intersected,



and fortifying the whole at certain distances with redoubts \*.

Siege of  
Sluys

IN these laborious operations several weeks were employed; and before the works were finished, the archduke found means, at different times, to reinforce the garrison with fifteen hundred men. Prince Maurice was not sorry for the introduction of these troops into the town. He had received certain intelligence that the stock of provisions in the place was not sufficient long to support so great a number; he had no intention to carry on the siege by batteries or assaults, and he hoped soon to be able to render the blockade so complete, as to prevent the entrance of supplies.

THE archduke, on the other hand, expected ere long to be able to raise the siege, and dreaded no danger but from the weakness of the garrison. He was deeply sensible of the great importance of Sluys, which, besides affording the most commodious retreat to the Spanish gallies, was conveniently situated for an invasion of the United Provinces, and en-

\* In order more deeply to impress the minds of his soldiers with a sense of the importance of their present enterprise, Maurice appointed the 21st of May to be observed as a day of fasting and of prayer to the Almighty, for his blessing upon their arms.

abled

abled him to give great annoyance to their trade. He could not, however, persuade himself to forego the fruits of his long-continued labours before Ostend, by raising the siege of that place; but he resolved for some time to suspend his operations there, and signified to Spinola his desire that he should immediately march to the relief of Sluys, leaving no more troops behind him than were sufficient to restrain the sallies of the garrison.

SPINOLA, who was well acquainted with the character of prince Maurice, had a just sense of the difficulty of carrying the archduke's design into execution, and remonstrated against it as impracticable; but finding that Albert could not be prevailed on to alter his resolution, he agreed to accept of the command, upon condition that the officers of the greatest experience should accompany him in the expedition. He could hardly flatter himself with the hopes of success, and he wished that others should partake in the censure which he was likely to incur. The archduke readily consented to this proposal; and, being joined on this occasion by a great number of the mutineers, who had been persuaded to return to their duty, he began his march with six thousand foot and two thousand horse, besides a

train of artillery, and a large convoy of provisions.

THE garrison of Sluys had already begun to suffer greatly from the want of wholesome food; and Serrano had repeatedly sent notice, that without a supply he could not possibly hold out for many days longer. Spinola therefore advanced towards Sluys with the utmost expedition; and, having received intelligence that the weakest part of the enemy's lines was at a village called Tervarde, he made an attack upon them in that quarter in the middle of the night. But the Dutch troops were prepared for his reception; and though he had taken every precaution to insure success, he was obliged, after repeated attempts, to retire with considerable loss.

HE then fetched a compass round by Ardenborough, and directed his march towards the isle of Cadfant, in the hopes of making himself master of that island, from whence he might by water introduce provisions into Sluys. He expected to have come upon the enemy in surprise, by fording the canal which separates Cadfant from Flanders on the east. But prince Maurice, having suspected his design, had planted a half-moon battery there, and stationed  
some

some select troops to dispute his passage, under count William of Nassau. Over these troops, Spinola at first gained some advantage, and drew them from the battery: but Maurice himself, coming up with fresh troops to their assistance, Spinola was, at length, obliged to abandon his attempt, after an obstinate contest, in which he suffered the loss of five hundred killed, and as many wounded.

BOOK  
II.  
1604.

August.

HAD not Spinola entered with reluctance on his present enterprize, his prudence might justly have been impeached; but as his disapprobation of it, and his diffidence of success, were known to the enemy by intercepted letters, as it had been known from the beginning to his friends, and nothing had been wanting on his part to carry it into successful execution, it served, notwithstanding his repulse, to heighten his character for military skill, and confirmed the archduke in the high opinion which he entertained of his abilities.

HE returned without delay to Ostend; and, on the second day after his retreat, Serrano, the governor of Sluys, capitulated upon honourable terms. His garrison amounted to four thousand men, besides a great number of slaves, who had formerly been employed on board the galleys; but his stock of provision,

August 19.

Capitulation  
of Sluys.

B O O K

II.

1604.

had, several days before, been entirely consumed, and the strength of the soldiers was so much impaired, that more than sixty of them died on the road to Dam, which is only two hours march from Sluys.

By one article of the capitulation, all the artillery and military stores, and by another, all the ships and ten Spanish galleys, which had so long infested the Dutch trade, were delivered into the hands of the conqueror,

FOURTEEN hundred slaves, the greater part of whom were Turks, were set at liberty; and as many of them chose to return to their native country, the United States, in order to conciliate the friendship of the Corsairs, treated them with great humanity while they remained in Holland, and afterwards sent them in Dutch ships to Barbary \*.

THE glory which prince Maurice acquired from so important a conquest was greatly heightened by the comparison which men generally instituted between the rapidity of his progress, and the slowness of that of the Spaniards before Ostend. Judicious observers thought there was hardly room for this com-

\* Grotius, lib. xiii. Meteren, and the Triumphs of Nassau. Bentivoglio, p. 3. cap. vii.

parison,

parifon, the two cafes being extremely different in the moft important refpects from each other; but it was univerfally acknowledged that Maurice had, on no former occafion, difcovered greater vigour and vigilance, or greater military fkill.

THE archduke, on the other hand, was feverely mortified; nor was he entirely free from apprehenfions of being ere long fubjected to a ftill greater mortification, as a confiderable part of the feafon fit for action ftill remained, and he expected that Maurice, whofe army had fuffered almoft no diminution, would next attempt to compel him to raife the fieve of Oftend. In order to prevent this, which he would have confidered as the greateft calamity that could befall him, he gave immediate orders for ftrengthening the fortifications of Dam, Blackenberg, and other places, by which the prince's army could approach.

BUT Maurice had no intention of entering fo far into an enemy's country, whofe forces were fuperior in number to his own; and the ftates-general, highly fatisfied with the fuccefs which had already attended their arms, refolved to employ the remainder of the feafon in fecuring their new conquelts. No expence

was spared to render Sluys impregnable, and Cadfant, Ifyndyck, and several other places in the neighbourhood of Sluys, were strongly fortified.

THE marquis of Spinola had, in the mean time, resumed his operations before Ostend, and was daily making nearer approaches to the town. He had already crossed the ditch, and compelled the garrison to retire from all that part of the place called the Old Town, but one redoubt \*, from which, as it was considerably elevated above the other fortifications, the besiegers made dreadful havoc among his troops. He resolved, whatever it should cost him, to make himself master of this redoubt. His Spanish and Italian troops, having been again and again repulsed with great slaughter, could not be persuaded to renew the attack: and this arduous undertaking was therefore committed to two regiments of Germans, who, allured by promises, and pushed on by emulation to execute what the Italians and Spaniards had abandoned in despair, advanced towards the fort with the most determined intrepidity. The garrison sprung a mine upon the foremost of these re-

\* Called the Sand-hill.

giments, and blew up a great number of them in the air. The rest, however, supported by the second regiment, still continued to advance, and having attacked the garrison sword in hand, they drove them with irresistible fury from the place.

B O O K  
II.  
—  
1604.

THE garrison, by the advice of a Scotch engineer of the name of Dixter, had provided against this disaster, by drawing a strong intrenchment flanked with bastions, and fortified with artillery betwixt the old and the new part of the town; and behind this, they had likewise drawn another intrenchment of the same kind across the middle of the new town; being determined to dispute every inch of ground, and to maintain their defence till the last extremity.

FROM the progress however which Spinola had already made, and the skill and vigour with which his operations were conducted, it could not be doubted that he must ere long get possession of the place. The garrison still continued to make the most vigorous sallies upon his miners and his troops; but since they had lost the fort of Sand-hill, these sallies were made at a much greater expence of blood, on their part, than formerly: their new  
works



BOOK  
II.

1604.

works had not yet acquired the same solidity and strength as those from which they had been expelled ; and, being now confined within such narrow limits as could not admit of any considerable reinforcement of fresh troops, they were exposed to much greater danger than before, of being overpowered in every assault, by the superior numbers of the enemy.

THE states-general, influenced by these considerations, and thinking it extremely doubtful whether the preservation of Ostend, since the conquest of Sluys, was an object worthy of the expence and attention it must cost, resolved to persist no longer in the defence, and sent instructions to the sieur de Marquette, the governor, to prepare himself for capitulating upon honourable terms.

ON receiving these instructions, Marquette immediately conveyed to Flushing, by the ships which were then lying in the harbour, all deserters and other persons who had any particular reasons for dreading the enemy's resentment, together with a part of the artillery and stores ; after which he sent two of his principal officers to treat with Spinola of the surrender of the place.

THIS

THIS general, whether from admiration of that intrepid bravery which the garrison had displayed, or because he was still diffident of success, and desirous to avoid the farther effusion of blood, readily agreed that the garrison should march out with all the honours of war, and be safely conducted by land to Sluys; that waggons should be furnished to the sick and wounded; that the inhabitants should be at liberty to quit the town without molestation; and that all prisoners on both sides should be released. This agreement was made on the 20th of September, in the beginning of the fourth year since the commencement of the siege; and on the second day after, Spinola was put in possession of the town. He religiously fulfilled all the articles of the capitulation; and while the garrison were preparing to set out, he gave proof of a generosity of spirit, of which no other instance has occurred in the history of the present war, by inviting the governor, and all colonels and captains in the place, to a magnificent entertainment, where he treated them with every mark of distinction and respect.

FROM Oftend the governor marched at the head of his garrison, amounting to near four thousand men, with a small train of artillery,  
along

along the sea coast, till they arrived in the neighbourhood of Sluys, where they were met by prince Maurice, who received them in the most gracious manner, and gave them every testimony of applause and gratitude. They were soon after followed by almost the whole body of inhabitants, who chose rather to reside at Sluys than Ostend; and the chief magistrate of Ostend was appointed chief magistrate of Sluys.

SUCH was the termination of this celebrated siege, which, besides an enormous expence of labour and military stores, had cost the contending parties the lives of near a hundred thousand men. Ostend could not, on any account, be deemed worthy of this expence; yet the Dutch seemed to have acted wisely in defending it with so great obstinacy. They could no where else have encountered the enemy on more advantageous terms; and, while the siege continued, they not only enjoyed profound tranquillity at home, but were at liberty to secure and extend their frontier, by the acquisition of Rhinberg, Grave, Cadfant, Hyndick and Sluys.

THE conduct of the archduke does not admit of any such apology. Hardly any of the  
7 places

places which he had lost was of less importance than Ostend ; and Sluys, from its excellent harbour, and its neighbourhood to Zealand, was of much greater importance. His arms, at a juncture when his finances were low, and his troops mutinous, ought rather to have been employed in defending his own dominions than in attacking those of the enemy ; and if he had found leisure for acting offensively, he ought to have made his attack on some place of easier conquest, in the preservation of which the United Provinces were more deeply interested.

BUT if he ever came to be sensible of his error, it was not till he thought that it could not be retrieved with honour ; and he was encouraged to persist in it by the Spanish ministers, who were at too great a distance from the scene of action to judge of the conduct which it was proper to pursue.

BUT there was reason now to expect that neither the archduke, nor the court of Spain, would for the future be guilty of the same sort of imprudent conduct as that into which, on different occasions, they had been hitherto betrayed ; as both he and they were impressed with a just esteem of the prudence and great abilities

abilities of the marquis of Spinola, and had resolved to devolve on him the entire direction of the war. He had already given striking proofs of superior capacity; and no person doubted that he would still be found deserving of that extraordinary confidence that was reposed in him.

A CHIEF source, Spinola knew, of those disappointments and losses which Albert had sustained, was his irregularity in the pay of his troops; and in order to remedy this evil, the marquis resolved either to reduce their number, or to be well assured of procuring more ample funds for their support. But no sufficient funds could be procured, unless they were furnished by the court of Spain, and therefore, as soon as he put his army into winter-quarters, he set out for Madrid, in the hopes of being able to convince the Spanish ministers of the necessity of either making greater exertions, and furnishing more liberal supplies, or of resolving as soon as possible to put a period to the war.

Scarcity of  
the precious  
metals  
in Spain.

THE Spanish finances were in no better order at this time than at any former period. From that decay of industry, of which the causes have been already mentioned, Spain was

no longer able to furnish either her colonies or herself with manufactures of her own production. The gold and silver which she imported from America no sooner arrived than it was transmitted for the purchase of manufactures, to other nations that were more industrious; and the scarcity of the precious metals in Spain had risen to so great a height, that the duke of Lerma had, last year, raised the nominal value of the copper coin, which by a royal edict was made nearly equal to that of silver. But this absurd expedient served only to increase the evil which it was intended to prevent or remedy †.

COUNTERFEIT copper money, of equal intrinsic value to the current coin in Spain, was poured into that kingdom by the neighbouring nations: these nations, at the same time, received gold and silver in return: they still continued likewise to receive the price of their manufactures in gold and silver. And thus was Spain more than ever drained of these precious metals. The distress arising from thence was sensibly felt from one end of the kingdom to the other, and the ministers often found it difficult to procure money sufficient for the necessary purposes of government. But, being

† Gonzalez Davila, lib. ii. cap. xiv.

B O O K  
II.

1604.

The court  
of Madrid  
resolves to  
carry on  
the war.

now delivered from the burthen of the war with England, and hoping that henceforth the returns of treasure from America would be greater and more certain than they had hitherto been, they resolved, in conformity to the king's inclination, to spare no expence to enable the archduke to carry on the war in the Netherlands with vigour.

AGREEABLY to this resolution, the marquis of Spinola, to whom Philip, on this occasion gave every proof of esteem and confidence, was immediately furnished with a considerable sum of money. The strongest assurances were likewise given him, by the ministers, of greater punctuality in their future remittances; and there was at the same time conferred upon him, full power to employ all the money which he received, or was afterwards to receive, in the manner which he should judge to be most expedient. The conduct of the archduke, it seems, and that of those to whom he had committed the administration of his finances, had rendered this precaution necessary: he had never observed that strict œconomy which the exigencies of his affairs required; and it would appear, that being sensible of this defect in his character, and conscious of his inability to correct it, he was  
well

well pleased to have the disposal of the money sent from Spain, devolved upon Spinola.

THE marquis having thus accomplished the design of his journey to Madrid, and obtained from Philip and his ministers their approbation of his plan of operations for the next campaign, returned without delay to Brussels. The first object of his attention was to remove every ground of discontent among his troops, by applying a part of the money which he had brought along with him to the discharge of their arrears; immediately after which, he gave orders for making numerous levies in Germany and in the southern provinces of the Netherlands. The Spanish ministers had promised to send him a veteran regiment from Spain by sea; and they had given instructions to the governors of Naples and Milan to provide for him a strong reinforcement of Italians\*.

THE United Provinces on the other hand, being already well acquainted with the activity and enterprize of Spinola, had strenuously exerted themselves in their military prepara-

\* Some officers sent over to recruit in Britain, but James discouraged his subjects from entering into the Spanish service. Vide Carte. Yet soldiers were raised among the catholics, as appears from the sequel.



tions, and were sooner ready to take the field. They had formed the design of laying siege to Antwerp, where they had learnt that the number of the garrison was neither adequate to the extent of the fortifications, or the great importance of the place. Prince Maurice did not approve of this expedition, but engaged in it at the request of the states. Having put a part of his army on board transports, under count Ernest of Nassau, he himself marched over land with the rest from Bergen op Zoom, and joined Ernest at the fort of Lillo, which stands on the north side of the Scheld, about two leagues distant from Antwerp, and was still in possession of the Dutch.

His intention was to lay all the low grounds between Lillo and Antwerp under water, by cutting the dyke of the Scheld, together with the counter-dyke at Courvestain, and then to cross over the inundation, and to pitch his camp on the higher grounds which lie near the town. He would thus have had a much smaller space to inclose with his entrenchments, while his army would have been entirely secure on one side against the approach of the enemy. His design had been carefully concealed; and if his transports had not been detained by contrary winds, his enterprize would

would probably have been attended with success. But Spinola, conjecturing from the embarkation of a part of his forces, and his choice of Bergen for the rendezvous of the rest, that he could not have any other object in view but the siege of Antwerp, had time to take every precaution to prevent him from carrying his plan into execution. He had greatly augmented the garrisons of the town and of the forts upon the counterdyke; and at the same time had lined the banks of the Scheld on both sides with a sufficient number of troops to oppose his landing\*.

MAURICE attempted, however, to make a descent on the Flanders side near Caloo, but finding his utmost efforts ineffectual, and that Spinola was every where upon his guard, he abandoned his first attempt; and, after reducing the castle of Woude, a strong fort in the neighbourhood of Bergen, he embarked his army, and made a descent in Flanders, near Ifyndyck, with an intention of laying siege either to the Sas of Ghent or Hulst.

\* He had likewise come himself to Antwerp, with all the forces which he could collect together; and having thrown a bridge over the Scheld, a little above the town, he stood prepared to march whenever the enemy should adventure to begin their attack.

MAURICE himself had disapproved of this expedition, as well as of his attempt on Antwerp, and had advised to employ the army on the banks of the Rhine, where he thought there was reason to dread an irruption of the enemy; but he had yielded to the judgment of the states, who, being anxious for the preservation of Sluys, were desirous of getting possession of as many fortified towns as possible, in the neighbourhood of that important place. They had formerly had repeated proofs, how ill qualified they were to judge of the proper conduct of the war; and from the sequel, it will appear how much wiser it had been, if on the present occasion they had listened to the opinion of their general.

MAURICE had not time to begin his operations either against the Sas of Ghent or Hulst, when Spinola, who on this occasion derived great advantage from his bridge over the Scheld, arrived in fight with all his forces: but as neither of the two generals were inclined to try the fortune of a battle, they immediately applied themselves to fortify their respective camps; resolving, each of them to await till some favourable opportunity should offer of annoying his enemy, without exposing himself to danger. Several skirmishes were fought

fought by foraging parties with various success, but neither party was able to gain any considerable advantage over the other.

BOOK  
II.

1605.

AT length, Spinola having effectually provided for the safety of the two places which Maurice had intended to attack, left a part of the army under the count of Berg to watch his motions, and ordered the rest to direct their march towards Maestricht.

ABOUT this time he expected the arrival of the troops which had been raised for the archduke's service in Germany and Italy, and he had appointed Maestricht for the place of rendezvous. Agreeably to the promise given him by the court of Spain, a regiment consisting of twelve hundred men had been embarked at Lisbon, in eight ships, which, in order to elude the vigilance of the enemy, had been hired from Hamburg, of the English and Danish merchants. But notwithstanding their precaution, they were intercepted by the Dutch admiral Hautain, whom the states had ordered to lie in wait for them in the English channel. Four of them were either taken or destroyed, and the remaining four obliged to take shelter in Dover, where they were shut up by the Dutch till the following winter, when the long nights

afforded them an opportunity to escape to Flanders\*.

THE marquis of Spinola lamented the loss of the Spanish troops the more, as they were all veteran soldiers, commanded by officers of great experience. But all the German and Italian forces which he expected, having arrived in safety, he resolved without farther delay, to enter upon the execution of the plan of operations, which in concert with the arch-duke, he had formed for the remainder of this campaign. It had been his intention, ever since the surrender of Ostend, to establish the theatre of the war beyond the Rhine, in that part of the dominions of the states where the superiority of their naval force could be of no avail. His army would thus, he thought, be

Spinola's  
plan for  
conducting  
the war.

\* The states disgraced themselves, and sullied the victory which they obtained on this occasion, by ordering all the prisoners to be tied two and two together, and thrown into the sea. Yet neither Grotius nor Van Meteren, the two most respectable of the Dutch historians, have spoken of their conduct as reprehensible. Their pretext for this barbarity, was to damp the courage of the Spaniards, but it rather served to inspire them in all rencounters with desperate rage and fury; and as no better reason could be given for treating with so great inhumanity the prisoners whom they took at sea, than those who were taken in the siege of towns, or in the field of battle, it was an example calculated to revive that savage method of carrying on the war which had excited such general horror when it was practised by the duke of Alva and his son.

in some measure supported at the enemy's expence; it would be easier for him to suppress the mutinous spirit of his troops, in case it should again appear; and as the states had no dread of an attack in that quarter, he expected to find some of their principal towns unprepared for a defence. His design had been carefully concealed even from the general officers: councils of war had been held, in which the archduke, in order more effectually to prevent a discovery, had sometimes proposed to undertake the siege of Sluys, and sometimes that of Bergen op Zoom, or of Grave, or of Breda; and the different opinions of the officers had from time to time, by secret agents, been communicated to the states.

PRINCE Maurice, as already mentioned, was almost the only person upon whom these artifices did not produce the desired effect. He could not be persuaded that Spinola, who had given conspicuous proof of superior sagacity, would undertake the reduction of any of these towns, where the army of the states was at hand to interrupt his operations. He suspected that his attack must rather be intended against some more distant place, which could not be so easily relieved; and had therefore proposed to station the troops on the banks of

B O O K  
II.

1605.

the Rhine, in order to prevent the enemy from entering the Dutch dominions on the eastern frontier\*. But the states having, in consequence of the information they had received of the deliberations in the archduke's council of war, rejected this advice, Spinola was now at liberty to carry his design into execution.

July.

BEFORE he left Flanders, he had given orders to the count de Bucquoi, his general of artillery, to secure a convenient passage for his army over the Rhine; and this active officer, after planting batteries on the banks, and thereby clearing the river of some armed vessels which were stationed there, had begun to erect two strong forts, one on each side of the Rhine, at Keiserwert, a small town in the electorate of Cologn. As soon as these forts were finished, Spinola set out from Maestricht, with all the troops which he had assembled there; and having joined those which were under Bucquoi, and crossed the Rhine at the passage which had been secured for him, he called a council of war, and for the first time communicated to them his design.

THE enemy, he told them, had been led to expect an attack in Flanders, and they now

\* Grotius. Meteren.

believed



believed that he had formed a design on Rhinberg. But his intention, from the beginning, had been to lay siege to Lingen; and by the reduction of that important place, to open an entrance into Friesland. He was sensible how much it was contrary to the common maxims of war, to leave behind him so strong a place as Rhinberg, but he did not from thence apprehend any danger or inconvenience, since, with the forts which had been erected, he could always command a safe passage over the river; besides that, the success of his enterprise against Lingen must greatly depend on the celerity with which it should be executed, as prince Maurice would no sooner hear of the danger to which that place was exposed than he would hasten to its relief. That although Lingen lay at a great distance, and the march must be performed in a neutral country \*, in which the troops would not be supported by plunder, yet there was no ground to dread a scarcity of provisions; he had brought a considerable quantity along with him; he had money sufficient to purchase whatever more should be necessary; and, as he was determined to enforce the strictest military discipline, he had received assurances from the towns of Westphalia, that, on that condition, they would

\* Westphalia and the duchy of Cleves.



cheerfully furnish him with supplies. But attention to discipline was indispensably necessary, and for this reason he was resolved that every violation of the rules of it should be punished with the utmost severity and rigour.

WHAT he declared on this occasion to his officers, he afterwards carried into execution. Some of the soldiers having ventured, notwithstanding the peremptory orders which he had issued, to leave their standards, they were instantly seized and put to death. The rest were intimidated by this example; and although a great part of them had long been accustomed to rapine and disobedience under former generals; yet so great is the power of discipline over troops which regularly receive their pay, that almost no army ever marched through a neutral country against which the inhabitants had so little reason to complain. His camp, in consequence of this prudent conduct, was at all times abundantly supplied, and no time was lost in sending out detachments to procure provisions. The inhabitants still retained a bitter remembrance of their sufferings from the Spanish army, under the admiral of Arragon, and were in some measure animated with gratitude to Spinola for the justice and humanity which he displayed.

AFTER

After traversing a part of the duchy of Cleve, and Westphalia, he first directed his march to Oldenzeel, a fortified town in the province of Overyffel, and soon compelled the garrison to capitulate; immediately after which he advanced towards Lingen, which lies at the distance of only one day's march from Oldenzeel, and, without meeting with any opposition, assigned to his troops their several quarters round the town. Prince Maurice, on whom the states-general had, as formerly mentioned, bestowed the property of Lingen and its territory as a reward for his important services, had, at his own expence, made great additions to the fortification of it. But as the enemy's attention had, for several years, been turned to another quarter, it was defended, at this time, only by the ordinary garrison, amounting to five or six hundred men.

Spinola lays  
siege to  
Lingen.

EVEN with so small a garrison, however, Prince Maurice had expected it might sustain a siege of several weeks; and the governor, an officer of the name of Cobbe, seemed at first determined to defend it till the last extremity. Spinola was therefore obliged to begin the siege in form, and to make his approaches to the place as usual, by working trenches. The garrison had not sufficient numbers to interrupt his operations, and he soon reached the

BOOK  
II.

1605.

the ditch, which was of an extraordinary breadth and depth, and filled with water; nor could the water be drawn off, because the ditch lay considerably lower than the adjacent ground. But at length his troops got over it, though not without considerable slaughter, by filling it up with earth and fascines, and then began to work a mine under one of the principal bastions of the town; when the garrison, importuned by the inhabitants, and despairing of being able to defend themselves much

August 18. longer, capitulated on honourable terms.

PRINCE Maurice, in the mean time, had advanced as far as Deventer, the capital of Overijssel, and was employed in preparing for an attempt to raise the siege.

ON the first intelligence which he received of the march of the enemy from Maestricht, he had dispatched his brother, Henry Frederic, with four thousand foot and one thousand horse, to watch their motions; and a few days after, he had set out himself, at the head of another division of his forces. But, having judged it necessary to leave a considerable proportion of them in Flanders to oppose any attempts which the enemy might make in that province, he was obliged to stop for some days at Deventer, till he had collected a sufficient number

number of troops from the neighbouring towns, to enable him to undertake the relief of Lingen; and before his preparations were complete, a messenger arrived with the news of its surrender. He was highly incensed against the governor and officers, for the feeble defence they had made of a place of so great importance, and threw them all into prison, where they remained for near a twelvemonth; and though they were afterwards set at liberty, they were all of them degraded from their rank.

B O O K  
II.  
1605.

HE had just cause for the resentment which he felt on this occasion, as Spinola, who had thought it unnecessary to secure his army by entrenchments, must have raised the siege as soon as the army of the states had approached. He had ground likewise for great anxiety, when he considered the defenceless state of most of the towns in the neighbourhood of Lingen, and particularly that of Bourtang and Coevorden, by the conquest of which the enemy would have a free course into the provinces of Groningen and Friesland. It was believed, that if Spinola had immediately attacked these places, he might, without great difficulty, have made himself master of them. But having spent some time in strengthening the fortifications of Lingen, he thereby afford-

ed

B O O K  
II.

1605.

ed leisure to prince Maurice to provide for their security. He judged it to be of greater importance to preserve what he had already acquired, than to multiply his conquests; and, as Maurice had collected an army in the neighbourhood, nearly equal to his own, he thought that he could not venture any farther into the enemy's country so late in the season, without exposing himself to the greatest risk. Having, therefore, taken every necessary precaution for the safety of Lingen and Odenzeel, he returned afterwards to Keyserwert, and re-passed the Rhine.

THE forts which had been erected there having given offence to the elector of Cologne, on whose territory they had been raised, the archduke, in order to appease his resentment, had sent orders for demolishing them; which Spinola did accordingly, and then began to build other two, a little farther down the river, at Rorerort in the county of Meurs, which was at that time subject to the Dutch.

WHILE a part of his army was employed in building these forts, so necessary for preserving his communication with his late conquests, he sent the rest, under the count de Bucquoi, to lay siege to Wachtendonc, a town in Guelder-

derland, which stood in a marshy soil, and was deemed one of the strongest towns in that province, but was at this time rendered more accessible than usual, by a long continued drought. As the fortifications however were complete, and the garrison numerous \*, he had reason to apprehend that the siege must last for several weeks, and that prince Maurice, who had left Overysfel, and was encamped in the neighbourhood of Wesel, would certainly attempt to raise it. He therefore ordered the count de Bucquoi to fortify his camp with strong entrenchments; and having lately received a strong reinforcement of Italians, besides a considerable number of English, Scotch, and Irish catholics, whom James, agreeably to his treaty of peace with Spain, had permitted the archduke to enlist in his dominions, he took his station near Rorerort, with a resolution to attack prince Maurice's army in the rear, in case he should venture to approach to Wachtendonc.

IN distributing their quarters to his troops on the north side of the Rhine, next to the enemy, he committed an error which was likely to have been attended with fatal consequences, by stationing his cavalry at the vil-

\* Twelve hundred men.