

only the archdukes, but the king himself, were so deeply interested, could have been left by his ministers to be devised by an inferior clerk or secretary. It was impossible but his ministers must have perceived the want of so essential a clause as that which related to the independence of the provinces; a clause which was obviously of such a nature, that it was impossible to doubt of its having been purposely omitted, but without which they were unalterably resolved to decline all farther negotiation, either with the archdukes, or with the court of Spain.

VERREIKEN, perceiving that no arguments he could employ would prove effectual, requested liberty to remain at the Hague for six days longer, till he should acquaint the archdukes with what had passed, and receive their instructions for his future conduct. With this request the states complied; and, before the expiration of the time specified, a letter from the archdukes arrived, in which they engaged, that, though they could not perceive the validity of those objections which the states had made to the form of the king's ratification, who thought, that, as he had ratified a part of the convention without objections to the rest, the deed ought to be considered as a ratification

tion of the whole; yet, in order to remove every obstacle to the treaty proposed, and to shew how sincerely they desired the establishment of peace, they would procure another ratification in the form required: but, in the mean time, they hoped and requested that the states would give proof of sincerity on their part, by recalling their fleet from the coast of Spain.

ON this occasion a violent contest arose among the deputies, and several of them discovered an inclination to break off the treaty without delay. It was now sufficiently manifested, they alledged, that the Spaniards were not sincere in their professions. It was absurd to expect that an enemy, so inveterate and implacable, would ever seriously think of peace on fair and equitable terms, till they were compelled by some dire necessity. It was evident that their object had, from the beginning, been to disarm the confederates, and to procure a respite from the war, till their preparations for prosecuting it with greater vigour were complete. The fleet, therefore, ought not to be recalled, but to be reinforced, and the people roused from their present lethargy, by apprising them of the snare which had been laid for their destruction.

The treaty
in danger
of being
broken off.

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III,
1607.

THESE were not, however, the sentiments of the greater part of the deputies; for although the whole assembly were disposed to ascribe duplicity and artifice to the court of Spain, only some of them thought there was any ground for calling in question the sincerity of the archdukes, who, in the opinion of the generality, had, to the utmost of their power, fulfilled their engagements, and could not be justly blamed for the defects or informalities of the ratification.

The United States agree to recall their fleet from the coasts of Spain.

It was therefore resolved, partly from the respect due to these princes, and partly from dread of the imputation of insincerity in the profession which they had made of their desire of peace, that the fleet should be recalled. But they, at the same time, required, that the ratification, executed in proper form, should be produced within a limited time specified; and in order to prevent any future omission or error, they delivered to Verreiken three copies, precisely of the same import, one in Latin, another in French, and a third in Dutch, declaring, that without a faithful transcript of one or other of these, they would instantly break off the negotiation, and apply themselves to the prosecution of the war.

It was Barnevelt who made this declaration, in the name of the other deputies; after which he reminded Verreiken of the attempt which had been made by the Franciscan to corrupt the secretary. "There," said he, "is the diamond, and here is the marquis of Spínola's obligation for fifteen thousand crowns. Let them both be restored to their proper owners: such presents are not necessary for the purpose of obtaining peace, if your masters wish for it, on equitable terms; and if they are not willing to agree to such terms, their presents will not be sufficient to procure it, were it possible that one or two persons could be found in this assembly so base as to accept your bribes, and, for the sake of them, to make a sacrifice of the liberty of their country, yet a great majority will retain their integrity, and render your largesses, though they were much greater than your masters can afford, of no avail*."

VERREIKEN, being unprepared for this attack, was thrown into some confusion, and replied, that "Ney must certainly have done what he was accused of, without any authority from the archdukes." It was impossible that the states could give credit to this assertion; but,

* Grotius and Baudius.

being satisfied with having so publicly expressed their resentment, the meeting was immediately dismissed, Verreiken permitted to return to Brussels, and soon after the fleet was recalled.

THE archdukes at the same time renewed their applications at the court of Spain; and at length, though not without considerable difficulty, obtained such a ratification of their convention from the king as they hoped the confederates would accept.

IN this new deed, all the same clauses were inserted, which the copies transmitted by the states contained, and nearly the same form of expression was observed; but to the declaration that the king and archdukes were willing to treat with the confederates as with a free people, over whom they pretended to no authority, a clause was annexed, declaring, that in case the negotiation should be broken off on account of religion, or any other disputed point, the ratification should be void, and all matters remain on their present footing. Besides this, the deed was incorrectly written, some words being interlined, and others wholly omitted. It was written in Spanish, and not in Latin, French, or Dutch, as had been requested; upon paper, and not on parchment,

ment, and subscribed like the former one, not with the name of the king, but with the words "I The King ;" as if Philip had still considered the confederates as his subjects.

B O O K
III.

1607.

THESE latter circumstances, though they afforded a proof of extreme carelessness, or of the most childish obstinacy, on the part of the Spanish ministers, were deemed of small importance; and it was proved that even the king of England, in his late treaty of peace with Spain, had acquiesced in the same form of subscription. But the deputies could not be so easily reconciled to the clause annexed to the declaration of their liberty; for although, as they represented to the archdukes commissioners, they were free, whether the king of Spain should acknowledge it or not; yet the annexed clause seemed to imply that their freedom depended on the will of the king; and to accept of the ratification with a clause of this import, might be interpreted as an acknowledgment, on their part, of the truth of the position which the clause implied. Besides that, from the manner in which mention is made in this annexed clause of religion, and other disputed points, there was ground to suspect, that, in the treaty proposed, the king intended that the establishment of religion,

and

and other matters which respected the internal government of the provinces, should be discussed.

To this the people of the United Provinces would never be persuaded to consent. To insist upon it, would be to treat them as a dependent, and not as a free people; and, therefore, to the states it appeared extremely doubtful, whether, in order to save a great deal of unnecessary trouble, it were not expedient that the negotiation should be instantly broken off. But as they should be sorry to give ground to suspect that they were not desirous to put a period to the calamities of war, they had resolved to refer the whole matter to the states of the particular towns and provinces, that the people might have an opportunity of judging for themselves in a matter in which they were so deeply interested. With this answer the commissioners returned to Brussels, after receiving an assurance from the states, that, in seven weeks from the present time, information would be transmitted to the archdukes whether the ratification was rejected or received*.

AT

* Baudius, Grotius, &c. Jeannin, tom. i. Lettre au Roy, Oct. 27, 1667.

The states, on this occasion, require that the original deed itself should be left in their hands. The commissioners

AT this juncture, both the people and their rulers differed widely in their sentiments with regard to the question that was now before them; while one party maintained that the ratification ought, without hesitation, to be rejected, the other thought, that although it was not altogether such as they wished it to have been, yet it ought to be admitted as a sufficient foundation for the treaty that was proposed, Prince Maurice was at the head of the former of these parties, and Barnevelt of

ers having no instructions on this head, the Franciscan went himself to Brussels to receive them; and the archdukes agreed to the request of the states, on these conditions, that they should give an obligation in writing to restore the deed, if required; and should, at the same time, declare that the archdukes, in procuring it from the king, had fully performed the engagement which they had come under in their first agreement with the states. The states refused their consent to these conditions, but still insisted, that, as the deed was addressed to them, it should be suffered to remain in their possession. Ney returned to Brussels a second time, and prevailed on the archdukes to yield to their demand. Though the ratification was not such as the states wished it to have been, yet it should seem to have been no small gratification to them, that the king had granted a declaration, however qualified and expressed, of their being a free people, over whom he pretended to no authority. In return for the complaisance of the archdukes on this occasion, they would gladly have given the declaration required, that these princes had fully performed their engagement, but thought it was impossible to give it consistently with truth,

the

the latter; and each of these leaders exerted himself with great activity and zeal in gaining converts to his opinion. There was ground to suspect that the motives by which the prince was actuated, on this occasion, were not perfectly pure and disinterested, but that he dreaded the diminution of his power, if peace were established, and, partly on this account, was desirous of the continuance of the war. The reasoning, however, which he employed, was specious, and made a strong impression on the minds of many of his countrymen.

As the court of Spain, he said, had on former occasions given the most unquestionable evidence of their duplicity, so at present it was impossible to doubt of their being actuated by some sinister design. In their first ratification, they had not only declined to acknowledge the independence of the states, but had expressly affirmed, that they were subject to the dominion of the archdukes. To their second they had subjoined a clause which rendered their independence contingent and precarious, and wholly dependent on the will of the king. Whoever considers the vast dominions of Spain, and her inveterate habits of domination and pride, would not be easily convinced that she intended to observe a truce, or peace, any longer than it might suit her views of tyranny and

and conquest. It was the design of that ambitious and politic nation, to break the spirit of the confederates by the habits of indolence and luxury. The martial spirit would leave the republic, and would not be easily revived. The citizens would become remiss and inattentive to the defence of objects, which, when they knew them to be in danger, they considered as dearer than life. None are so easily subdued as those who think they have nothing to fear. The fear of the enemy is a bond of unity, and produces both military discipline and civil obedience, while states living in security, opulence, and ease, are subdued by habits of effeminacy, torn by intestine discords, and thus fall an easy prey to some ambitious and warlike neighbour. It was for this reason, that Scipio Nasica opposed with so much wisdom, the false policy of Cato, who advised the destruction of Carthage.

WHEN the minds of the confederates should cool, and their patriotism begin to languish, the Spaniards hoped, by various arts of corruption, to bring them again under the yoke of their former sovereigns. But whatever might be the effect of such artifices, they would recruit their exhausted strength, and whenever a fit opportunity should offer, violate the peace they now solicited.

THEIR

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THEIR army, at the present period, was universally discontented on account of their want of pay. Great numbers had already mutinied; and if the war continued, there was ground to expect that the greatest part would refuse to submit to the controul of military discipline. With such an army, no prudent general would venture to engage in any important enterprize. And the people, among whom they were quartered, being grievously oppressed, both by the government and the mutineers, were ready to shake off a yoke which had become intolerable.

THE Spaniards were still less formidable at sea than at land. From the great decrease of their trade, they found it impossible to procure sailors sufficient to man their ships of war; and their fleets, far from being able to contend with those of the states, were even unable to defend themselves in their harbours, under the cannon of their forts.

SUCH was the present state of the Spanish fleet and army; whereas those of the confederates had never been in so flourishing a condition. Their army was at present, as it had always been, under the most perfect discipline; regularly paid, and abundantly supplied with

every thing necessary to enable it to act with vigour: while their fleets, more numerous than ever, had in almost every quarter of the globe proved an overmatch for those of the enemy; and had obtained over them several important victories, which had been attended with a great increase of trade, and wealth, and power. They had established trade in many places, which, till lately, had been visited only by the Spaniards and Portuguese. They had got possession of several of the most important branches of the Indian commerce; and if they did not suffer themselves to be diverted from the prosecution of their naval enterprizes, they would ere long make themselves masters of the whole. The war, therefore, which they had carried on against the enemy at sea, had already proved, and would still continue to prove, a mine of gold to the United Provinces; while their military operations at land had neither exhausted their riches nor their strength. Their army in a great measure consisted of foreign troops, while the natives were permitted to apply themselves to manufactures and trade, and all the money expended for the support of the army was spent at home, either in purchasing the manufactures of the country, or those commodities which merchants found it so beneficial to import from foreign

foreign parts. It had indeed been found necessary to impose taxes on several commodities; and many persons complained of the burthen of these taxes, yet both the riches and the number of the people had every year increased, since the taxes were imposed; and no country abounded more in the necessaries and conveniences of life.

OF the truth of these observations, the Spaniards were sufficiently aware. They had come at length to perceive that the war had to the confederates proved a copious source of prosperity, while their own strength had been exhausted by it, and their commerce almost ruined; and they were for this reason desirous of a temporary peace, hoping thereby to avert the danger to which they saw themselves exposed; to deprive the confederates of the advantages which they at present enjoyed; to sow discord among the provinces, and to accomplish, by fraud and artifice, what they had hitherto been unable to attain by force of arms. That such was their intention, appeared from the dissingenuity of their conduct with regard to the deed of ratification.

BUT whether this was in reality a design or not, no doubt could be entertained that, as it was

was for the interest of the Spaniards that peace should be established, it was no less for that of the states that the war should be prosecuted with vigour, till the enemy were reduced to the necessity of acting with greater sincerity, and more equitable terms could be obtained than they had ground to expect at the present period.

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1607.

THIS reasoning produced the desired effect, chiefly in Holland and Zealand, where the people were conscious that their prosperity had been in some measure owing to the war; while their situation rendered them more secure against its attendant calamities than the inhabitants of the inland provinces. But the reasons on the other side, which were urged by Barneveldt, were generally thought to be more deserving of attention and regard.

THERE WAS too much ground, he allowed, for the imputation which had been cast upon the court of Spain, of insincerity in their conduct, with regard to the deed of ratification. It is evident, from the manner in which they had acknowledged the independence of the States, how extremely reluctant they had been in granting that acknowledgment. The clause annexed to it, declaring, that in case the nego-

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ings urged
by Barne-
veldt for
peace.

ciation should be broken off, the ratification should be void, ought not to have been inserted. It was even unnecessary to insert it for any purpose which the Spaniards could have in view, because, in every treaty, the validity of any particular concession must depend on the event of the treaty, and if it prove abortive, all the claims of the contending parties, whether real or pretended, must remain as before its commencement. From the insertion however of this clause, it could not be inferred that the court of Spain had formed any insidious design. Their reluctance to acknowledge the independence of the states might justly have been expected; and the little pains which they had taken to conceal it, afforded a strong presumption that their intentions were sincere.

BUT although they should in reality intend to violate the peace which they now solicited, was this a sufficient reason for refusing to treat with them, or for declining to accept of peace upon equitable terms? Ought peace to be rejected in every case, where it was possible that the conditions of it might be violated? Ought states to live in perpetual war, because there was ground to apprehend that they might not be able to maintain a perpetual and uninterrupted peace? If the Spaniards shall hereafter
revive

revive their claim of sovereignty over the provinces, will this claim derive any validity from the present treaty, in which they have so explicitly renounced it? Will they not then justly expose themselves to the reproach of having acted with duplicity; and is it not the natural tendency of such a conduct, to increase the number of their enemies, while we shall then, as well as now, be possessed of arms to maintain our liberty, and have the same or more numerous friends to assist us in counteracting their tyrannical designs?

GREAT disorders, it was true, prevailed at the present period in the Spanish monarchy: the royal navy had suffered a considerable diminution, and the archdukes army was extremely ill paid and mutinous. But although this consideration might justify the states in demanding the most advantageous terms of peace, it would not justify them for resolving to persist, at all adventures, in the prosecution of the war. From negligence and inattention, but chiefly from the folly in engaging at once in too many difficult and expensive enterprises, Spain was weakened; but it would be madness to proceed on the supposition that her strength was spent, for she was still possessed of inexhaustible resources; and nothing

but greater prudence and moderation were requisite to render her formidable to all her enemies. During the last campaign, she had exerted herself more vigorously than for several years preceding; and if the rivers that year had not been swelled to an unusual height, her troops might have penetrated into the heart of the provinces. She might still continue, and perhaps redouble her exertions; and if she were incensed, as she would justly be, in case the states should obstinately refuse to treat with her, she might be determined to direct her whole attention against the dominions of the states, and put forth a degree of strength which they would be unable to withstand.

THEIR arms had hitherto been attended with greater success than could justly have been expected against so potent an enemy; but of all human events they should remember those of war were the most fortuitous. The republic had, in former periods, been brought so low, that the states would gladly have submitted to the sovereignty of a foreign prince; and one unfortunate campaign, or the loss of a fleet, which depended for its preservation on the mercy of the winds and waves, might again reduce them to the like desperate condition.

THEY

THEY had been enabled to attain their present prosperity, by the friendly assistance of the queen of England and the king of France ; but the former of these princes, who had long been their principal support, was dead, and her successor either not so able, or not so willing to assist them ; while the latter was far advanced in years ; was desirous, for reasons which could not be easily penetrated, to have the war brought to a conclusion ; and although during his life they might trust that he would not suffer them to be oppressed, yet he might ere long leave his kingdom to an infant son, during whose minority the Spaniards were likely to have greater influence over the French counsels than the United States.

THE great object, as well as the end of war, was peace ; and advantageous terms of peace could never be so easily obtained as when the enemy found it necessary to apply for it, in order to retrieve the ruined state of his affairs. The object of the present war had, from the beginning, been to shake off the yoke of the Spanish government, and to assert their liberty. This object was now secured, and the king of Spain himself was ready to treat with them as with a free people, over whom he pretended not to any authority. Could they be justified in their

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own eyes, or could they be justified in the opinion of the world, if they should refuse to treat with him? Would the pretext, that he was insincere in the acknowledgment which he had made of their independence, and that possibly he will hereafter revive his claim, and refuse to fulfil his engagements, afford a vindication of a conduct so singular, so haughty, and contemptuous? Was the war to be prosecuted till they had accomplished the dissolution of the Spanish monarchy? Was this an event either to be expected or desired? Were the people of the United Provinces to be the only people on earth who were never to enjoy the blessings of tranquillity?

THE war indeed had been the occasion of prosperity to some, who ought to rest satisfied with the advantages which they had already derived from it: but to great numbers it had often been a copious source of distress and misery. Many groaned under the burthens which the war had made it necessary to impose; and many lamented the loss of their friends, and the ruin of their fortunes, which are the inseparable concomitants even of the most successful war. It was surely desirable to put a period to these calamities; and if they did not embrace the present opportunity of doing it, provided it could be done consistently with their honour,

honour, and their future security, they would be answerable for all the blood that should be spilt, and could not be justified in the sight either of God or man.

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1607.

THIS discourse, which was delivered in an extraordinary assembly, where deputies from all the provinces and almost all the towns were present, deriving weight from the character of the speaker, as well as from the solidity of the reasoning which it contained, was listened to with great attention; and, while it produced conviction in the minds of the greater part, it imposed silence upon the rest, and extorted their consent to the measure which it was intended to recominend. Prince Maurice, supported by the deputies from the province and towns of Zealand, proposed that the form of an explicit and unconditional acknowledgement of their independence should be transmitted to the archdukes, to be subscribed by them as a preliminary article; but this motion being rejected as harsh and offensive by a great majority, it was at length resolved to appoint ambassadors for the purpose of negotiating peace; and notice of this resolution was immediately sent to the court of Brussels *.

Dec. 24th.

* Grotius, lib. xvi. Bent. part. iii. lib. viii. The time fixed for the suspension of arms being expired, it was prolonged on the present occasion, and afterwards from time to time, on different occasions, till the treaty was concluded.

It was at the same time proposed to the archdukes, that the conferences should be held at the Hague, which for some time past had been the seat of government in the United Provinces; and, in order to induce them to comply with this proposal, it was suggested, that, as the ambassadors of the states could not be invested with very ample powers, they might often have occasion to consult their constituents; and if any other place of meeting, or any town within the territories of the archdukes were made choice of, much time would be lost, and the negotiation be unnecessarily prolonged.

Commis-
sioners for
peace on
the part of
Spain.

THE archdukes, solicitous to avoid every cause of delay, readily agreed to this proposal, and immediately appointed for their commissioners the marquis of Spinola, Mancicidor a Spaniard, their secretary at war, Richardot the president of their privy council, Verreikens their private secretary of state, and Ney the Franciscan, to whose activity and address they thought themselves much indebted for having brought the negotiation thus far.

And on
that of the
United
States.

The commissioners appointed by the states were nine in number, seven of whom were nominated by the seven provinces, and the remaining

maining two by the ancient body of the nobles. These two were count William of Nassau, a near relation of prince Maurice, and Walraeve, lord of Brederode; and those appointed by the several provinces were among the most respectable persons in the commonwealth: but the confidence of the people of all ranks, at this important crisis, was chiefly placed in Barneveldt, who was nominated commissioner by the province of Holland.

B O O K
III.

1697.

THIS virtuous and able statesman was indefatigable in his attention to every step of the present negotiation; and, before the conferences were begun, he devised an expedient admirably calculated to promote the end in view. The predominant passion in the minds of his countrymen was still, as it had been for many years, suspicion of the intentions of the court of Spain. It had been chiefly from this quarter that he encountered so much difficulty in persuading them to agree to the archdukes proposals of a conference; and he still dreaded that the same cause might prevent this conference from being attended with the desired effect. This distrust of the Spaniards he apprehended would shew itself on every occasion, and on the slightest grounds; and it would be carefully fomented by prince Maurice and
I others,

Suspicion
of Spain
the predo-
minant
passion of
the Dutch.

others, who wished for a continuance of the war. In order, therefore, to quiet the apprehensions of the people, to deprive the prince and his partizans of a pretext, of which he knew they would readily lay hold, and at the same time to intimidate or over-awe the Spaniards, he proposed to the French and British ministers, that, before the conferences were opened, their masters should enter into a new alliance with the states; that they should engage to employ their endeavours to procure for them an equitable peace; and, in case of their procuring it, should farther engage to afford them such assistance as should be necessary for maintaining it inviolate.

THIS proposal did not meet with the same favourable reception from the British as from the French monarch. Though James was determined by the motives above explained to concur with Henry in promoting the establishment of peace; yet, having ground for doubt whether the interest of his own dominions did not rather require that the war should be continued, he was never so deeply interested, as he desired that the states should believe, in the success of their present negotiation*. Besides that,

* This appears from several passages in Winwood's Memorials, and particularly from the letters writ by the earl of Salisbury to Sir R. Winwood, Sir Richard Spencer, and

that, he knew how much it was in the power of the Spaniards to disturb his tranquillity by their intrigues with the Irish Catholics, and was therefore unwilling to incur their resentment. Influenced by these considerations, he declined at this time to enter into the proposed alliance; but Henry, more decided in his conduct, and less afraid of the consequences of giving offence to the court of Spain, readily yielded his consent, and sent orders to the president, Jeannin, to finish the treaty without delay.

B O O K
III.
1607.

AGAINST this measure, which no pains were taken to conceal, the Spanish ministers having warmly remonstrated at the court of France, and having received no other answer, but that, if rightly understood, it must contribute to hasten the establishment of peace, they from

Sir Charles Cornwallis. "You added (says Salisbury, in a letter dated March 20th, 1607, to the two former) that this comfort you have, that both parties desire the peace with more than ordinary affection. Which words I rather judge to proceed out of a contemplation of the tediousness which this business is to bring with it, than out of any affectionate desire or good judgment of the effects which this business is to bring with it; considering that the best in that kind that can be opened for, is like to add but trouble and care to us in these parts; and yet I would not have you now gather that I would have you break it." Vol. ii. p. 378.

thence

B O O K
III.

1607.

thence perceived that it was become necessary for them, and therefore resolved, if possible, to procure the French king's assistance in their negociation with the states. For this purpose, but under a different pretext, the marquis of Villa Franca was sent to Paris, in the character of ambassador, and from that time Henry acted as a mediator between the contracting powers, although it was well understood how much more he favoured the pretensions of the Dutch than those either of the archdukes or the king of Spain *.

1608.

Feb. 6th.

IN the mean time the archdukes commissioners arrived at the Hague, and a few days after, the conferences were begun †. The two or three first sessions having been employed by the commissioners in examining their powers, and in discussing certain objections against them, which, after some altercation, it was agreed

* Bentivoglio, Grotius, &c. & Jeannin, tom, ii. p. 69.

† A great number of people from the other towns had come to the Hague at this time, chiefly moved by their curiosity to see Spinola, who for some years had been an object of their highest admiration, which was on some occasions mixed with terror. Prince Maurice having gone out to meet him, received him into his own coach, and conducted him to the Hague. And both these great men, it is said, were well pleased to find the high opinion which they had formed of each other's abilities, from their actions, justified by their discourse which they held together in the present interview.

were not sufficient to stop their procedure; the Dutch commissioners required, as a preliminary article, a solemn acknowledgment, in the name of the king of Spain and the archdukes, of the independence of the United Provinces; including an explicit renunciation of all right to authority over them; together with an obligation, binding on their successors as well as on themselves, that they should not henceforth use the arms or titles of the provinces, or any other marks of their ancient sovereignty.

B O O K
III.
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1608.

THE commissioners of the archdukes were much offended at the latter part of this requisition; and, besides remonstrating against it to the Dutch commissioners themselves, they bitterly complained to the British and French ambassadors, of the arrogance discovered in making so unusual a demand. It had been the ordinary practice, they observed, of princes to retain the titles of the states or kingdoms which they had lost. The Catholic king was styled king of Jerusalem, and duke of Burgundy; the king of France called himself king of Navarre; and the king of England still assumed the title of King of France. In requiring his Catholic majesty therefore to renounce his titles as well as his sovereignty, the states were not only

B O O K
III.

1603.

only guilty of arrogating to themselves the privilege of introducing a new practice, but of impeaching the conduct of the greatest sovereigns in Europe, and particularly of the kings of France and Britain, who had no less reason to be offended at the demand of the Dutch commissioners than the king of Spain.

THE French and English ambassadors, however, declined on this occasion to interpose; and the archdukes commissioners, after having obtained the consent of the archdukes, acquainted those of the states at the next meeting, that they were ready to grant the renunciation required in its full extent. The Dutch were agreeably surprised at the facility with which the Spaniards thus yielded to their request; but when Richardot, who was the speaker on this occasion, added, that in return for so liberal a concession, it was expected that the states would agree to abstain for the future from all commerce in the Indies, and rest satisfied, as they had done till about ten years before, with the trade which they had carried on with Spain, and other countries in Europe, they were inflamed with indignation, and exclaimed, that one moment the king and archdukes acknowledged them to be a free and independent people, and the next shewed they

were

The Dutch
refuse to
give up
their trade
to India.

were determined to treat them as slaves, and, if possible, to deprive them of the most valuable branches of their liberty: that these princes, in renouncing their claim to the sovereignty of the provinces, had given nothing to the states which they did not possess before; while, in requiring them to relinquish their trade to India, they, in effect, required them to abandon what was known to be the principal source of their wealth and power: but they declared, that no consideration would ever induce them to comply with a demand which was equally exorbitant and unjust; for under what pretext could the Spaniards claim the exclusive privilege of trading to the Indies? Those countries were not the property of the Spaniards, but belonged to a great number of independent princes, many of whom chose rather that their subjects should engage in trade with the Dutch than with the Spaniards or Portuguese. Those countries were likewise of an immense extent; they could furnish materials for trade to all the commercial nations in Europe; and it was a violation of the law of nature, and contrary to the general good of mankind, for any one nation to endeavour to engross the whole. The states would not refuse to agree to any arrangement with regard to the Indian trade, which was

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B O O K

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1608.

calculated to promote the mutual interest of both nations. But, having been reduced by the Spaniards themselves to the necessity of having recourse to this new branch of commerce, having begun it in the face of difficulties, which had required an enormous expence, and the most vigorous exertions to surmount, having established a company for carrying it on, and already tasted of the profits arising from it, they were determined, whatever should be the consequences, to persevere. The Spanish commissioners had no other reply to make to this answer of the states, but that the Spaniards and Portuguese had long been in the sole possession of the trade to India, and that the king of Spain had not only refused to grant a participation in that trade to the French and English, but likewise to his well affected subjects in the Netherlands: but no regard was paid to these considerations by the commissioners of the states; and they were confirmed in their purpose by the unanimous voice of their countrymen, joined to a representation which was made on this occasion to the states by the India company.

THE trade, they represented, with Spain and Portugal, had never been, and could never be productive of any advantage to individuals or
to

to the public, equal to that which arose from the trade to India. In this, and the other branches of foreign trade, of which the Spaniards wanted to deprive them, upwards of a hundred and fifty ships and eight thousand sailors were employed. These ships were all of a considerable size, and might at any time be converted, at a small expence, into ships of war; when the public exigencies should require. The Indian trade was not only infinitely more profitable than the Spanish; as it consisted in going to the fountain-head for those commodities, which they had formerly purchased at second-hand from the Spaniards and Portuguese; but was likewise much more safe and certain, because it did not, like the other, depend on the caprice of the king or of the ministers of Spain. They had formerly experienced how little they had to rely on the trade with Spain and Portugal. Their sailors had been seized and imprisoned; or sent to the galleys to work as slaves, and their ships and goods had been confiscated. It would be always in the power of the Spaniards to exercise the same oppressions. They would renew them under various pretexts, on the slightest grounds of offence; and, after having persuaded the states to abandon their Indian commerce, they would next exclude them from that of Spain and Portugal,

in the hopes that by thus reducing their naval power, they might again compel them to submit to their authority. The states might judge of how much importance the trade of India was to the Spaniards, from the eagerness which they discovered to prevent any other nation from partaking in it; but it was of still greater importance to the people of the United Provinces, who depended almost entirely upon that trade for their subsistence, and, without the resources which they derived from it, would be utterly unable to maintain their liberty and independence. Nor was it interest only which the states would sacrifice, by granting the request of the Spanish commissioners, but likewise their integrity and honour; since alliances had been formed with the Indian princes, and some of these princes, trusting to the protection of the company, acting by the authority of the states, had shaken off the yoke of the Spaniards, and thereby exposed themselves to their severest vengeance, if, by any article in the present treaty, the company were to be prevented from fulfilling their engagements.

THE states were more than ever determined, by these considerations, to reject the request of the Spanish commissioners; but, that they might afford some proof of the sincerity of their

their desire of peace, they gave them their choice of the three following proposals. The first, that, conformably to the ordinary tenor of treaties of peace, both parties should equally enjoy the liberty of commerce by sea and land. The second, that the United Provinces should abstain from all commerce with countries under the government of Spain, on this side of the northern tropic, while, on the other side, all matters should remain on their present footing; the states being satisfied that peace should take place on this side, while hostilities, if unavoidable, might continue on the other. And the third, that Spain should give no molestation to the Dutch in India for seven years; before the expiration of which a new treaty should be set on foot, in order to devise some proper means of accommodation. The Spanish commissioners replied, that they were not possessed of power to agree to any of these proposals. They knew that the king of Spain had renounced his sovereignty over the provinces, in the hopes of their consenting entirely to desist from the Indian trade; but they should appoint one of their number to go to Madrid for new instructions. The Franciscan was accordingly dispatched for that purpose; and, in the mean time, the commissioners proceeded to take some of the other points in question under their consideration.

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THE Dutch having, from the beginning, suspected, on account of the mention of religion in the king's second ratification, that it was intended to propose some change in their established religion, required of the Spanish commissioners to declare whether they had received any instructions on that head, and what their instructions were. The commissioners acknowledged that they were indeed instructed to make a proposal to the states with regard to religion; but added, that they could not enter on the discussion of this article till several others had been discussed. Of all the articles they knew, there was none in which the king and the duke of Lerma were so deeply interested; but since their arrival in Holland, they had come to be persuaded, from private information, that no proposal which they were empowered to make on this subject would be listened to by the states. They were likewise afraid that the discussion of a point of so delicate a nature, on which the passions of the Dutch would be so easily inflamed, might occasion a sudden dissolution of the conferences; and from the sequel, it is probable that they had sent the Franciscan to Madrid, as much for the purpose of sounding the inclinations of the court, and knowing their ultimate resolution on this head, as on that of the Indian commerce.

Although

Although they were repeatedly urged, therefore, by the Dutch to declare what they were instructed to propose with regard to religion, they as often declined complying with their request, and insisted that it was better previously to examine the other questions in dispute.

ONE of these related to the duties which, during the war, had been laid by the Dutch on all goods imported by the Scheld to Antwerp. The archdukes commissioners insisted that all those duties should be taken off: nor were those of the states unwilling to abolish such of them as had been imposed in consideration of the war; but they required that the same duties should still be paid by the subjects of the archdukes and the king of Spain as were exacted from the subjects of the states, to enable them to defray the expences of the fortifications on the banks of the Scheld, and of the ships of war that were necessary for the protection of their commerce. This was the pretext which they employed, although it is probable they were chiefly actuated by their dread lest the trade of Antwerp should be revived, to the prejudice of that of their own commercial towns in the maritime provinces.

ANOTHER point which engaged the attention of the commissioners, regarded the mu-

tual exchange of those towns and districts which the contending powers had acquired by conquest from one another. The states were at this time in possession of Sluys, and the isle of Cadfant in Flanders, and of Breda, Bergen op Zoom, and Gertrudenberg, in Brabant; all of which places were of the first importance, on account of their situation and strength. The Spanish commissioners, however, proposed and urged that these places should be given to the archdukes, who were sovereigns of the provinces in which they lay, and that the states, in compensation for them, should accept of Oldenseel, Groll, and Lingen. But the Dutch commissioners rejected this proposal with great disdain, alledging that the towns possessed by the states were of infinitely greater values than those which were offered in exchange for them; and declaring, that as no concessions which the archdukes could make were a sufficient equivalent, both parties, agreeably to what the archduke had proposed in the beginning of this negociation, should retain what was at present in their possession.

The property of individuals restored by the treaty for peace.

A THIRD question related to the boundaries between the dominions of the states and those of the archdukes; a fourth, to the restitution of the effects belonging to individuals which had

had been confiscated ; and, besides these, there were several other matters treated of, concerning which the opposite parties contended with great warmth, and discovered a wide diversity of sentiment.

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MANY weeks past in fruitless altercation. The parties seemed to be more than ever exasperated against each other ; and the difficulties which prevented them from coming to an agreement seemed daily to increase.

THE Dutch were extremely tenacious of their claims, and the archdukes commissioners often complained of this obstinacy to the English and French ambassadors ; but their conduct was, at the same time, explicit and undisguised ; and, from the commencement of the negotiation, they had openly declared, that, whatever concessions they might be induced to make in other matters, there were two points, religion and the trade to India, on which no such concession was to be expected as the Spaniards were likely to require.

Obstinacy
of the
Dutch.

To procure some new instructions with regard to these important articles, had, as already mentioned, been the purpose for which the Franciscan had been sent to Madrid. The time fixed for his return was expired, and no

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satisfactory account of his delay was given by the archdukes commissioners, who studiously avoided all discourse concerning him, and maintained an obstinate silence with regard to his success.

THE Dutch were exceedingly disgusted at this behaviour: they knew not to what cause it could be ascribed: they were not without suspicion of some insidious design; and they at length resolved, that either the archdukes ambassadors should give them satisfaction concerning the cause of Ney's delay, or that the treaty should instantly be broken off.

HAVING accordingly, in most peremptory terms, required to know what was the ultimate determination of the king of Spain with regard to the Indian trade, the ambassadors, thinking it unnecessary any longer to conceal what they knew, replied *, that Ney had not been able to obtain a more favourable answer to his application than this, that the king, from his ardent desire of restoring peace to his dominions, was still ready to renounce his claim of sovereignty over the provinces in the form proposed; but, in return for so great a sacrifice, required that

August 10.

Disputes
concerning
the Catho-
lic religion
and the
Indian
trade.

* Bentivoglio, Grotius, &c. Meteren, liv. xxx. folio 652, &c.

the states should abstain from all commerce to the Indies, and permit the exercise of the Catholic religion throughout the whole extent of their dominions.

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OF this declaration the deputies of the states gave immediate information to the states-general, and the English and French ambassadors. James, having lately entered into that defensive alliance with the states which he had formerly declined, and Henry, besides concluding such an alliance, having empowered * Jeannin to acquaint them, that, in case the present treaty were not broken off without his consent, he had resolved to assist them in the prosecution of the war; both these princes were well entitled to be consulted on the present occasion. Henry could not decently have neglected the opportunity which was presented to him, of interposing in behalf of the religion which he professed, and therefore he had instructed Jeannin to advise the states, if possible, to grant to their Catholic subjects the indulgence which Philip had demanded for them; but he did not insist on their compliance with his advice: he was sensible that this indulgence might endanger their internal peace,

* Negotiations de Jeannin, tom. i. p. 44. Seconde Instruction au Monsieur Jeannin,

especially

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especially if it was granted at the request of the king of Spain; and therefore left them at liberty to determine, both with regard to religion and their Indian trade, whether any concession could be made consistently with their interest and security.

THE states themselves unanimously thought that there was no room for hesitation on the subject. With the consent of Jeannin, as well as of the English ambassadors, they rejected the conditions that were proposed; and, at the next meeting with the archdukes commissioners, it was declared by those of the states, that they considered the insisting upon these conditions as a violation of the promise which had been made of treating with them as with a free people; that they could not consider the conduct of Spain as consistent, fair, or candid, and were therefore determined to break off the present treaty; and, without suffering themselves to be any longer deceived, to resume the prosecution of the war*.

THE states seem to have received sufficient provocation on this occasion for the resentment with which they were inflamed; but, from a letter of the president Jeannin's to the king

* Meteren, liv. xxx. folio 650, &c.

of France, it appears that it was not the court of Spain so much as the archdukes commissioners, of whom they had reason to complain. For Philip, it appears from this letter, had, from the beginning of the negotiation, declared that he would never consent to renounce his sovereignty, but on the condition that the free exercise of the Catholic religion should be established in all the provinces; and he had charged the commissioners to open the conferences, by acquainting them that this was his unalterable resolution. But the commissioners had thought it expedient to change the order of their instructions, and to begin with an acknowledgment of the freedom of the states, hoping thereby to render them more obsequious in other articles; and afterwards, when both parties were in better humour with each other, to obtain from Philip some relaxation in his demand with regard to the Catholic religion*.

THIS information was communicated to the deputies of the states, and afterwards to the states general, with an intention to sooth their resentment; but it served rather to turn it into another channel, by directing it against the archdukes commissioners, instead of the court of

* Negotiations de Jeannin, tom. ii. p. 403, 404.

Spain. And it likewise served to rivet their conviction, that no solid peace could ever be obtained from that court, whose bigotry was the same in the present as it had been in the former reign, without a concession on their part, which they deemed to be no less contrary to good policy than it was inconsistent with sincerity in their profession of the Protestant faith. They were confirmed, therefore, in this resolution of declining to proceed any farther in the treaty, and seem to have satisfied the English and French ambassadors, that they had sufficient motives to justify their conduct.

THESE ambassadors, however, still believed it to be practicable to restore tranquillity to the United Provinces; although not by a perpetual peace, yet by a long truce between the contending powers. The obstacles to the establishment of peace had chiefly arisen from the pride and bigotry of the court of Spain; but these obstacles, they thought, might be more easily surmounted in attempting to conclude a truce than a peace, because, if only a truce were concluded, that court might flatter themselves with the hopes, that, at the expiration of it, they might recover their concessions, and accomplish the several objects in which they were so deeply interested; besides that, there

there was ground to suspect, that, from the beginning of the negotiation, it was a truce, and not a perpetual peace, that was intended by the Spanish ministers.

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THE president Jeannin, having previously concerted with the English ambassadors certain preliminary articles, without which he knew that all farther treaty must prove abortive, requested an audience of the states, and, being admitted into their assembly, after expressing the concern of the French and English monarchs, on account of the unsuccessful issue of the late conferences, he added, that these princes, being deeply impressed with a conviction of the necessity of putting a period to the war, had, in case it should be found impracticable to establish a lasting peace, commanded their ambassadors to recommend to the states a truce of several years, provided that such a truce could be obtained on advantageous and honourable terms. For, in recommending this measure, he subjoined, it is by a regard for the true interest and honour of the provinces, that the French and British kings are prompted, and therefore they exhort you to adopt it only on the following conditions: first, that the king of Spain and the archdukes shall treat with you as with a free people,

The president Jeannin admitted to an audience of the states.

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people, over whom they pretend to no authority; secondly, that during the truce, you shall enjoy a free commerce both in Europe and in the Indies; and, thirdly, that you shall retain all the towns and territories which are at present in your possession.

DURING this truce you will have leisure to rectify the disorders which have sprung up during the continuance of the war, to pay your debts, to reform your government, to extend your trade; and, if you study to maintain internal union and tranquillity, this truce, it is probable, will terminate in a lasting peace, by which the advantages you have obtained will be perpetuated and secured: whereas, if at this time the war were to be renewed, we foresee innumerable difficulties to which you will be exposed; and perceive, that, in order to insure success, your friends must be much more liberal in their assistance than is convenient for them in the present situation of their affairs.

You are dissatisfied with the conduct of your adversaries; but let not your resentment prevent you from listening to the counsel of your friends. It is our intention to offer them the same counsel; and, if they refuse to follow it, to acquaint them that the kings of France and Britain are determined to give you every

proof of faithful friendship in their power. But in return for this, these princes expect that you will not, by your obstinacy, engage them in a war to which they are utterly averse, and for which, if this truce can be accomplished, there is no necessity.

It will be difficult, we know, to obtain the consent of the Catholic king to the preliminary articles; but, if that prince shall be found equally uncomplying and intractable, as you have hitherto experienced, and the treaty for a truce, like that for peace, shall, through his fault, prove abortive, you will be justified for again having recourse to arms; and the princes too, whom we represent will be justified for resolving to exert themselves with greater vigour in your behalf*.

To this proposal the states-general made no immediate reply, but that they would submit it to the consideration of the states of the particular provinces.

It was soon after communicated to the marquis of Spinola, and the rest of the archdukes commissioners, by whom it was received with all the satisfaction which might be expected

* Jean. II. 412.

from their well known aversion to the continuance of the war. But although they acknowledged how much pleasure it would give them, if any means of an accommodation could be devised, they dreaded that the archdukes would be unable to persuade the court of Spain to agree to the preliminary articles; and, for this reason, they laboured to persuade Jeannin to omit the two first articles altogether, and to attempt to conclude a truce without any other condition than that both parties should retain what they possessed. It had been with the utmost reluctance, they represented, that the king of Spain had formerly consented to acknowledge the independence of the states, even when he expected thereby to gain some concession from them in favour of the Catholic religion; and to exclude them from the Indian trade, had been his principal motive for desiring to put a period to the war. To procure his consent, therefore, either to the first or to the second of the preliminary articles, would be attended with difficulties which, there was ground to apprehend, would be found insuperable; and no other agreement was likely to be obtained than a cessation of hostilities, or a truce in the common form, during which both parties should retain what was at present in their possession.

JEANNIN

JEANNIN was sensible of the truth of this representation, and foresaw the difficulties which the archdukes must encounter, if they listened to his proposal; but, besides that these princes were, above all things, solicitous to be delivered from a ruinous war, which filled their minds with perpetual disquietude, and would employ all their influence to overcome the pride and obstinacy of the court of Spain, he knew that the Spaniards were at present extremely ill prepared for the recommencement of hostilities, and hoped that on this account they might be induced to agree to terms, which, on another occasion, they would have rejected with disdain.

He would not, therefore, have been inclined to withdraw the preliminary articles, even although he had found himself at liberty; but they were a part (he said) of the archdukes commissioners proposal to the states, and the honour both of the French and English monarchs, in whose name this proposal had been made, was now pledged either to procure the acceptance of them by the archdukes and king of Spain, or to furnish the states with such assistance as might be necessary for the prosecution of the war. This declaration he made to the archdukes commissioners in the

most explicit terms; and added, that while it might be difficult to obtain the king of Spain's assent to the proposed conditions, it was extremely doubtful whether these conditions were such as would satisfy the people of the United Provinces; but the commissioners might firmly believe that nothing less than was contained in the preliminary articles would give satisfaction either to them or to their friends.

OF the truth of this assertion, as far as it regarded the confederates, there was immediate proof in the difficulty which Jeannin encountered in persuading them to agree to his proposal. The greater part of the deputies of the particular provinces, being sincerely solicitous for the establishment of peace, were satisfied with the preliminary articles, and gave their opinion that the truce, with the conditions contained in these articles, ought not to be refused. But there were many, who, whether from motives of private interest, or a regard to the public safety, being desirous of a continuance of the war, maintained that no agreement whatever should be made, but on condition that the archdukes, and the king of Spain, should grant the same solemn acknowledgment of the liberty and independence of the states, to which they had formerly consented in

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treating

treating for a perpetual peace, including an explicit renunciation for ever of all their claims of authority over the United provinces.

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THE former of these parties was headed by Barnevelt, supported by the French and English ambassadors; and the latter by prince Maurice, whose opinion was espoused not only by the whole province of Zealand, over which his authority was almost without controul, but by the deputies of Amsterdam, and those of several other cities in the province of Holland.

THE former endeavoured to persuade the latter, that it was unreasonable to expect the same liberal concessions from the enemy, in the case of a truce, as where a perpetual peace was to be established; and that, while the states were conscious of being free and able to maintain their liberty, it was of no importance whether the Spaniards should acknowledge, or refuse to acknowledge, their independence; for it was sufficient for every valuable purpose which they could have in view, if the Spaniards would treat with them as with a free people, and conclude an agreement upon equitable terms.

Parties for
and against
the peace.

BUT these considerations had no weight with prince Maurice or his partizans. They were averse to the truce on other accounts besides

their objection to the declaratory clause, and laboured to convince their countrymen that a truce, on whatever terms, at the present period, though it might be necessary for Spain, must prove pernicious and dangerous to the Dutch republic. They omitted no opportunity of inculcating their opinion, whether in public assemblies or in private societies, and published innumerable letters and pamphlets, which being universally perused, became the subject of discourse in every company. Of these writings some were of the most inflammatory kind, intended to instill suspicions into the minds of the people, that Barnevelt and his friends, unable to resist the allurements of Peruvian gold, had sold their country to the Spaniards; and even the French and British monarchs, it was insinuated, by so earnestly recommending the truce, intended rather to serve the court of Spain than the United Provinces. Their suspicions on this head were heightened by the arrival at Paris and London of two ambassadors, who had been sent on their present embassy by the Spanish ministers, though under a different pretext, yet probably with no other view than to procure the good offices of James and Henry in the present negotiation in the Netherlands.

No pains were spared by the French and English ambassadors at the Hague, to convince
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the Dutch that their apprehensions were without foundation. Above all the rest, Jeannin laboured assiduously for this end; and by giving the deputies of the states the strongest assurances that his master's friendship was inviolable, and that nothing could be more remote from his intention than to enter into an alliance with Spain to the prejudice of their republic, he seems, with regard to this matter, in which they were so deeply interested, to have set their minds at ease.

THE aversion, however, of a great number of them to the truce, and their animosity against such of their countrymen as promoted it, were as strong as ever. Their resentment was principally directed against Barnevelt, who, by his eloquence and address, his great abilities, and long experience, had acquired an entire ascendant over most of the deputies: he appears, however, to have been too sensibly affected on this occasion by the odium to which he found himself exposed. Having one day bitterly complained, in an assembly of the states, of the cruel treatment which he received in the libels daily published on the subject of the present controversy, he appealed to the deputies, whether he had given just ground for such injurious imputations as had been cast upon him; and then left the assembly with a