

resolution to retire from public life. But he soon recovered his tranquillity; and, at the earnest desire of the states, he returned to the assembly, and afterwards continued to apply himself to the conduct of public affairs with the same indefatigable attention as before \*.

IT would be injurious to the character of prince Maurice to suppose that he would demean himself so far as to be concerned in those anonymous pamphlets and incendiary letters, replete with threats against Barneveldt and his adherents, which were published on this occasion. He took no pains to conceal his resentment, and openly inveighed against their conduct, as being calculated to involve the provinces in ruin. Having visited several of the towns in Holland, he laboured to bring over the deputies to his opinion, and with the same intention he wrote a circular letter to all the other towns in the province.

WHAT he said and wrote on this occasion was principally intended to inspire the deputies with mistrust of the archdukes and the court of Spain, whose conduct, in the present negotiation, he said, had been inconsistent with their professions in the beginning, and who could

\* Grotius, &c. lib. xvi.

not have any reason for declining to grant the most explicit renunciation of their right of sovereignty over the provinces, but that they secretly designed to assert that right when a more convenient season should arrive.

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THEY would observe the truce only so long as they found it necessary for retrieving the ruinous condition of their affairs; and mean while, the people of the United Provinces, deceived by a false appearance of tranquillity, would not only quit their arms, but would lose their military spirit, and be induced to agree to whatever terms should be prescribed to them, rather than again expose themselves to the dangers or inconveniencies of war.

THE Spaniards, it was evident, being utterly averse to a perpetual peace, hoped to be able, during the truce, to apply some effectual remedies to the disorders which prevailed in their finances; whereas the states, having so great a number of frontier towns, where numerous garrisons must be maintained, would have nearly the same expences to defray as during the continuance of the war. It would, however, be infinitely more difficult, after their apprehensions of immediate danger were removed, to persuade the people to pay the

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taxes which it would be necessary to impose; and the enemy would, at the same time, practise on their fidelity, and sow the seeds of discord among the different towns or provinces, of which they would not fail to avail themselves, without thinking it incumbent on them to delay hostilities till the expiration of the truce.

As this reasoning of prince Maurice coincided with the prejudices which the Dutch had for many years entertained against the Spaniards, it made a strong impression on the minds of many of the deputies; nor was it considered either by Barnevelt or Jeannin as frivolous. On the contrary, they treated it with the respect which was due to the person by whom it was employed, although they, at the same time, laboured assiduously to show that the arguments on their side had greater weight; and Jeannin, in his own name and that of the other ambassadors, presented a memorial to the states, of the following purport, intended to remove the objections that were urged by Maurice and his adherents.

Memorial  
of Jeannin  
presented  
to the U-  
nited  
States.

“THE princes whom we represent being deeply interested in your prosperity, and believing the truce proposed, to be necessary, in the present situation of your affairs, are there-  
fore

fore much concerned to observe the opposition which it meets with from so many respectable members of your state.

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“ You ought not, they allege, to be satisfied that the archdukes and the king of Spain are willing to treat with you as with a free people, over whom they pretend to no authority, but you ought to require a declaration that they will consider you in this light for ever afterwards, as well as during the continuance of the truce.

“ BUT in the opinion of the princes, our sovereigns, your liberty is equally well secured by the former of these declarations as by the latter; because the former, not being limited to any particular time, but expressed in terms that are general and indefinite, it must be understood by all the world in the same sense as if the words “for ever” were subjoined. Besides this consideration, it is not of the king of Spain and the archdukes that you are to hold your liberty. You have long maintained that you are already free, having asserted your liberty by a public solemn deed, founded upon reason and necessity, and bravely defended it for many years against your oppressors, by the force of arms. You ought, therefore, to rest satisfied with that simple acknowledgement of it,



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it, which is implied in the declaration, of being ready to treat with you as with a free people. You would be satisfied with such an acknowledgement from any neutral or friendly power. You have equal reason to be satisfied when it is made by the archdukes and the king of Spain. And you ought not, with so much solicitude, to require these princes to be more explicit, in declaring you to be free, lest you be considered as thereby tacitly confessing that still they have a right to your obedience.

“BUT, even allowing that the king of Spain should not think himself excluded by the form of words made choice of from his claim of sovereignty, will he call you before a court of justice, do you suppose, in order to have his rights examined by the rules of law? It is not in this manner that sovereigns assert their claims; it is only to the sword that they appeal: and if you be able when the truce expires, to maintain your liberty as you have hitherto done against the force of arms, you will then, as well as now, with justice despise your enemy's pretensions to dominion over you. It will be sufficient then, as it is at present, to find yourselves in actual possession of your liberty. And, in whatever sense the words of the truce may be understood by the king

king of Spain, you ought to be satisfied with the assurance which has been given you, and which we now repeat, that, by the princes whom we represent, whose friendship you have so long experienced, and on whose assistance you may with confidence rely, these words are considered as a clear and unambiguous declaration, that you are a free people, over whom authority cannot ever be justly pretended by the king of Spain.

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“IT is farther objected by those who oppose the truce, that it will afford leisure to the catholic king to retrieve the ruinous condition of his finances, and to prosecute the war, after the recommencement of hostilities, with greater vigour. Nor can it be denied, that if he was to listen to the advice of wise and faithful counsellors, it might be, in some measure, attended with this effect. But is it to be presumed that a young king, at the head of a nation noted for restless and inordinate ambition, with ministers inattentive to œconomy, when the exigencies of his affairs required it, will be more attentive when his situation renders it unnecessary? Is it not rather to be presumed that his treasure will, more than ever, become a prey to the avarice or profusion of his ministers? that it will be more than ever lavished

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lavished on idle pomp and show ; or that, by quarrelling with his neighbours, he shall ere long be engaged in some ambitious and expensive enterprize ?

“ It is from your republic, and not from the king of Spain, that those prudent measures may be expected, which are necessary to repair the mischiefs that have been occasioned by the war : you are equally distinguished for your private and your public œconomy ; and you are not less distinguished for your industry, your activity, and enterprize. With these qualities, which you possess in so eminent a degree, your trade must every year be more extended ; and, being carried on with smaller risks, and at less expence, the profits arising from it will be greater than ever. You will thereby be enabled to discharge your public debts, to relieve your people from the load of taxes under which they groan, and, when the truce expires, to prosecute the war with less dependence on your allies, and a greater probability of success.

“ It will still, indeed, be necessary for you to maintain garrisons in the frontier towns, and to retain a considerable proportion of your troops in pay, that, whether the truce be observed

served or violated, you may be always found in a proper posture of defence.

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“BUT at least the one half of your army may be disbanded. Your trade will, in the mean time, be carried on with much greater advantage than hitherto, and all those losses by sea and by land avoided, which you have so often represented to the kings, our masters, as the cause why you were unable, of yourselves, to defray the necessary expences of the war.

“BUT your enemies, it is alleged by the opposers of the truce, will have access, during the continuance of it, to carry on their intrigues among the people, to sow dissensions among the towns and provinces, and to persuade some of them perhaps to abandon the confederacy; while the people themselves, delivered from the apprehensions of immediate danger, will refuse to pay the taxes which the states shall find it necessary to impose.

“WITH regard to these objections, as we do not pretend to any certain foresight of futurity, we will not affirm that they are entirely destitute of foundation. There is no state of human society that is not subject to inconveniencies and dangers; and there are dangers attending

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attending peace as well as war: but the dangers mentioned are such as, with prudent precautions, it is in your power to avoid. The objections founded on the apprehensions of them are equally applicable to a peace as to a truce; and if they are sufficient to deter you from listening to our proposal of a truce, they ought to determine you to persist in the prosecution of the war, till you have accomplished the utter ruin of your enemy. But you are too wise to propose to yourselves an object inadequate to your strength. And, therefore, unless you chuse to live in perpetual war, which must much sooner prove the ruin of your republic than of the Spanish monarchy, you must, sooner or later, agree to bring the war to a conclusion, either by a peace, or by a truce. A peace on the terms which you require, is at present unattainable; and even although it were in your power to procure it, yet, in the opinion of many of your friends, a truce is more desirable. For it is a sort of medium between peace and war, and it might prove dangerous for you, before your political institutions have acquired that stability which time alone can bestow, to pass at once from the one extreme to the other. It might occasion too great a relaxation of the vigour which you have been so long accustomed to exert, and  
expose

expose you an easy prey to the resentment of  
your enemy.

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“ BUT during the continuance of the truce, you will look forward to the expiration of it. By keeping your fortifications in repair, and your troops under proper discipline, joined to a prudent administration of your finances, you will provide for that event ; and thus, when the Spaniards shall perceive that you are well prepared for your defence, they will more easily agree to those equitable terms of peace, which at this time their pride and their sense of shame have determined them to reject.

“ THE example of the Swiss cantons, whose fortune so nearly resembles your's, ought to engage you to listen to the counsel which we offer. Like you, they had thrown off the yoke of their oppressors, and their arms had generally been attended with success ; yet they agreed to a truce, when proposed to them, on much less advantageous terms than those which you are exhorted to accept ; and, during the leisure which it afforded them, they put their civil government and their military establishments on so respectable a footing, as effectually determined their ancient masters to lay aside the thoughts of a farther prosecution of  
the

the war. From the same conduct it is likely that you will derive the same advantages. The king of Spain will more easily consent on equitable terms, to a truce than to a perpetual peace, because he may think that his dignity will suffer less from making temporary than perpetual concessions: but many circumstances, it may be presumed, will concur to deter him from a renewal of hostilities. His animosity and resentment will be abated; his ancient sovereignty over you will be, in some measure, obsolete and forgotten: having tasted the sweets of tranquillity, he will desire to preserve it undisturbed: he will have experienced that it is the interest of his subjects at home, and still more of those in the Indies and America, to live at peace with you. And, as it will be impossible, unless you be greatly wanting to yourselves, but that, some years hence, you must be possessed of greater resources than at present, he must perceive the danger of engaging in war with you, after your power is established and confirmed; when he considers, that in the very infancy of your state, his most vigorous efforts to reduce you to obedience were of no avail.

“WHAT has been said will be sufficient, it is hoped, to evince that the objections against the

the truce, which have been urged by its opposers, ought not to deter you from agreeing to it, in case the consent of the king of Spain can be procured to the terms proposed. These objections indeed are urged by some of the most respectable members of the state, whose zeal for the prosperity of the republic is unquestionable. But the wisest men are subject to error. It may be true, that some inconveniencies may arise from the truce; but it should seem that much greater are to be dreaded from a continuance of the war. And it is a first principle of prudence, of two evils to make choice of the least.

“ BEFORE we conclude this memorial, it is necessary to remind you of two things, which deserve your attention. First, that it is not only the counsel, but the earnest request of those princes, to whom you have been chiefly indebted for assistance, that you should adopt the measure we have recommended: and, secondly, that so favourable a concurrence of circumstances as the present, for obtaining equitable terms of accommodation, may never again occur. The archdukes are princes on whose fidelity you can with safety rely for the punctual performance of their engagements: they are fond of peace; at their earnest intreaty, the king of Spain



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hath already made, and is still likely to make, more ample concessions than could otherwise have justly been expected; and in conducting the treaty proposed, you will have all the assistance that can be given you by two powerful monarchs, who consider your interest as their own \*."

THIS memorial did not immediately produce the desired effect upon all the deputies. Several of the towns in Holland, and the whole province of Zealand, with prince Maurice at their head, still remained as averse to the truce as ever; and Maurice still continued to employ his influence to confirm them in their resolution of opposing it. By his emissaries and his letters, he attempted to gain over the other towns and provinces to his opinion. He sometimes talked as if both the French and British monarchs were pursuing their private interest, at the expence of the republic. He insinuated, that, unless they should drop the proposal of a truce, and immediately agree to assist the states more liberally than hitherto in prosecuting the war, the more distant parts of the provinces ought to be abandoned, and the territories of the republic contracted within such

\* *Negotiations de Jeannin, tom. iii. p. 9. Ecrit fait par monsieur Jeannin, au nom de tous les ambassadeurs, jour treizieme Octobre, & mis es mains de messieurs Les Estats.*

narrow limits as might be defended by the forces which the Dutch themselves, without foreign assistance, were able to support. He alledged, that no matter of so great importance as was at present under deliberation, could be adopted, without the unanimous consent of all the towns and provinces : and threatened, that the province of Zealand, if forsaken by the other provinces, would alone maintain the war against the Spaniards, till more ample concessions were obtained \*.

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THE French monarch could not avoid feeling some resentment at his conduct, which he considered as equally violent and injurious. But Henry's candour would not suffer him to divest himself of that esteem which he had long entertained for the prince's character; nor to believe the suggestions of his enemies; that he was actuated by some sinister design. He still wrote to him as to a friend whom he highly respected, sparing no pains, and employing every argument to engage him to adopt his views.

HENRY's endeavours were well seconded by Jeannin, who acted with the most consummate prudence, and carefully avoided giving any

\* Jeannin, tom. iii.

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personal offence to prince Maurice, while he exerted himself with great activity in counter-acting his designs. By the eloquence and address of Barnevelt, joined to the influence which he derived from his great experience, and the high opinion which was justly entertained of his public spirit and integrity, Amsterdam and all the other towns in Holland were reconciled to the truce, on the terms proposed; and not long after, prince Maurice and the province of Zealand, with whom Jeannin and the English ambassadors, assisted by deputies sent thither by the other provinces, assiduously employed all their influence, were persuaded to relinquish their opposition.

Reluctance  
of Philip  
to acknow-  
ledge the  
independ-  
ence of  
the United  
States,

THE archdukes were employing in the mean time their interest at Madrid to obtain the consent of Philip; who, from the beginning, had discovered no less reluctance to Jeannin's proposal than prince Maurice or the province of Zealand. Far from being averse to a truce, this prince was exceedingly desirous that it should take place, provided it could be concluded on the ordinary condition of both parties retaining what was at present in their possession. But to acknowledge the independence of his rebellious subjects, and formally to grant them his permission to carry on their trade

trade in India, were conditions with which he himself and many of his subjects thought it ignominious to comply.

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THE archdukes endeavoured to convince him, that in making these concessions they would do nothing more than had been already done in consenting to the suspension of arms, and that no more important consequences could arise from it. They engaged to have the article relative to the Indian trade expressed in such a manner, that it should not materially affect the interest or the trade of Spain.

THEY represented, that the declaration so earnestly required by the United States could not do any prejudice to the king's right of sovereignty; that it could not remain in force but while the truce subsisted; and that the Hollanders would find it of no avail, after the renewal of hostilities, if his majesty's arms were crowned with victory. They added, that this was the opinion of the ambassadors of the mediating powers, and likewise of many members of the states of the revolted provinces, who opposed the truce on account of the insignificance of the clause which contained the declaration of their liberty.

THESE considerations, urged by such powerful solicitors, had great weight with Philip, who would have yielded his consent, provided that some concession could have been obtained in favour of the Catholic inhabitants of the United Provinces. And he had some ground, he thought, to entertain the hope of being able, in some measure, to accomplish this object, in which he was more deeply interested than in any other, when he considered that the prince, who was the chief mediator in the present negotiation, was himself a Catholic. But the archdukes having informed him, that Jean-nin, whose zeal for the Popish faith was unquestionable, had declared that it would be in vain to attempt to introduce any proposal concerning religion among the preliminary articles. Philip doubted whether he could enter with a good conscience into any treaty with such determined heretics; and therefore hesitated, for some time, whether he should not utterly reject the three, whatever consequences might follow.

In order to dispel his scruples, the archduke sent to Madrid his confessor, Ignatio Brizuela, a Spaniard of noble birth, eminently distinguished for his piety and virtue, and of great experience in the affairs of the Netherlands.

BRIZUELA knew well how to make impression on the timid, superstitious mind of Philip, and judiciously employed religion itself as a motive, which should induce him to comply with the archdukes request. If in the course of the treaty, said he, any indulgence can be procured for the Catholic inhabitants, the French ambassador will exert his most strenuous endeavours in their behalf; but it is necessary, he added, even for the interest of religion, that the truce should be concluded, lest, considering the difficulties under which the archdukes must labour in resuming the war, instead of re-establishing the Catholic faith in the rebellious provinces, it shall be exposed to danger in those which have been brought back to their allegiance.

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To this reasoning Philip listened with great attention, and seemed to be in a great measure satisfied, that he ought not any longer to withhold his consent; but chose, as usual, before he gave an explicit answer, to hear the opinion of his favourite the duke of Lerma. The duke had not, it should seem, as yet formed a decisive resolution with regard to the part which it would be most prudent for him to act on the present occasion. He had long experienced the most insurmountable difficulties in

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furnishing the necessary expences of the war; and he dreaded, if it were not speedily brought to a conclusion, that some great disaster might happen in the Netherlands, which would not be ascribed to the marquis of Spinola, who had so often given the most unquestionable proofs of military prudence and capacity, but to him, by whom that general had been disappointed in the supplies and reinforcements which had been promised him. For this reason, and perhaps too, as was suspected by his contemporaries, from his jealousy of Spinola, who had rendered himself of so great importance as to rival him, or at least to enjoy too large a share in the royal favour, he had from the beginning been extremely intent on the establishment of peace. Observing, however, that both the pride of the Spanish nation, and Philip's superstition, were alarmed by the concessions demanded by the states, he had not ventured to advise a compliance with their requests. But it would be much easier, he was persuaded, to reconcile the Spaniards to the truce than to a peace, as the concessions to be made in the former were not to be perpetual; and Philip's religious scruples being in a great measure removed, by what the confessor had represented to him, he laid aside that hesitation and reserve with which he had

had hitherto acted; and uniting his influence to that of Brizuela, and of several other Spanish ecclesiastics, who were devoted to his interest, he soon persuaded Philip to grant his ratification of the preliminary articles. It was immediately transmitted to the archdukes, accompanied with a recommendation to avoid, if possible, the consenting to an express permission of the Indian trade; and, if possible, likewise to procure some indulgence for the Popish inhabitants in the United Provinces \*.

Philip ratifies the preliminary articles.

DURING the confessor's stay at Madrid, the French and English ambassadors were employed in preparing at the Hague the several articles of the treaty. And as the archduke's commissioners had some months before, at the desire of the states, who dreaded their secret practices among the deputies, returned to Brussels, the negotiations between the mediators and them had hitherto been carried on by letters.

BUT as this method of conducting the treaty was attended with the most tedious delays, Jeannin, in his own name, and that of the other am-

\* Bentivoglio passim. *Negociations de Jeannin*, tom. iii. p. 223, 224. & 329, 330. Grotius. *Winwood*, vol. ii. p. 338. 100, &c. *Jeannin*, tom. iii. p. 10. & tom. ii. p. 335,

ambassadors,



bassadors, proposed to the archdukes that they should send their commissioners to meet with them at Antwerp. This proposal was readily complied with, and both parties arrived in that place in the beginning of February 1609.

THE ambassadors had brought with them a copy of the articles of the truce, of which they had obtained the approbation of the states: and they had engaged, that unless the archdukes commissioners should adopt it with out any material alteration, within eight days after their arrival in Antwerp, they should break off the conferences, and decline all further negociation on the subject. Both the archdukes and Spaniards, they knew, were at present utterly unprepared for the renewal of the war, and nothing, they believed, would contribute so much to quicken their resolutions, as the dread of its being instantly renewed.

BUT when the resolution of the states was communicated to the Spanish or archdukes commissioners, they complained that their masters were rather used unhandsomely, and represented that the time allowed was too short for the dispatch of business of so great importance. The ambassadors were sensible of the truth of what they said, and obtained the  
consent

consent of the states to prolong the time; after which both parties began seriously to apply themselves to the discussion of the several articles of the treaty.

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AGAINST the fundamental article, which regarded the liberty and independence of the revolted provinces, the commissioners offered no objection, except to the title assumed in it by the states, of High and Mighty Lords, which they so obstinately opposed, that instead of the terms high and mighty, the ambassadors were obliged to substitute the word illustrious. An article relating to contributions, amounting yearly to 300,000 crowns, which had been paid to the Dutch by the inhabitants of the open country in Brabant, in order to procure an exemption from being plundered, was the occasion of much altercation. The states very unreasonably required that these contributions should be continued during the truce. But the mediators, having represented to them the injustice of this request, and that the levying of contributions was equivalent to a continuance of hostilities, they at length consented that the article should be expunged; and in return for this concession, the archdukes agreed to yield to them some extensive districts adjoining to Bergen-op-zoom, Breda, and other places, in  
the

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the possession of the states, upon condition that such of the inhabitants of these districts as were Catholics should be indulged in the free exercise of their religion.

A proposal was made for a mutual exchange of towns, which the contending parties had lately conquered from each other; but as the conquests of the Dutch had been much more important than those of the archdukes, no expedient could be devised, to which the former thought it their interest to agree: and for this reason, it was at length determined that both parties should retain the towns at present in their possession. The Dutch were equally averse to another proposal, which was urged with much earnestness by the Spanish commissioners, that all those duties should be abolished, which were exacted in Zealand from ships entering the Scheld, in their way to Antwerp. They gave some ground however to expect that this matter might afterwards be amicably adjusted: and the archdukes were the more easily persuaded to drop their request, as they hoped to be able in the time of peace to improve their posts on the coast of Flanders, and thereby to rival the Dutch in those branches of commerce which they had engrossed during the subsistence of the war.

BUT of all the articles of the present treaty, the most difficult to be adjusted to the mutual satisfaction of the parties, was that which regarded the Indian trade. The archdukes were aware, that unless the Dutch were gratified in this point, no accommodation whatever could take place; nor were they or their subjects personally interested in refusing to comply with their request. But being well acquainted with the obstinate and absurd reluctance of the Spaniards against making any concession on this subject, they still suspected, notwithstanding their sanguine hopes of the success of Brizuela's application, that the king would never consent to ratify the truce, if this concession were explicitly expressed. They were, for this reason, extremely solicitous to persuade the French and English ambassadors to agree to such an indirect form of expression, as might not alarm the pride or prejudice of the Spaniards, while it would admit of being interpreted in favour of the Dutch. The ambassadors were not averse to this expedient; and they afterwards prevailed upon the states to consent to it, by giving them a declaration in writing, that notwithstanding the generality and obscurity of the terms in which the article was couched, they understood it as containing a full permission to the Dutch to carry on their

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1600.  
Content's  
about the  
Indian  
trade.

their trade in every part of India that was not under the dominion of the crown of Spain; and by engaging likewise in the name of the kings whom they represented, to guarantee this article relative to the Indian trade, as well as all the other articles of the present treaty\*.

SUCH were the principal points discussed between the archdukes commissioners, and the French and English ambassadors, in the conferences that were held at Antwerp. Soon after the confessor arrived at Brussels with Philip's ratification of the preliminary articles; and nothing now remained but to settle some matters of smaller consequence, and to give the treaty its just form, in order to its being signed by the contending powers.

IN consequence of permission from the archdukes, the Dutch commissioners formerly mentioned, who had hitherto remained at the Hague, repaired to Antwerp: and that no solemnity might be wanting to a deed of so great importance, an extraordinary assembly of deputies from all the provinces and towns of the union was summoned to meet at Bergen-op-zoom, where they might be at hand to ratify the several articles of the treaty, as soon

\* Bentivoglio. Grotius, lib. ult. &c.

as they should be digested by the commissioners into proper form. As the confederates had not for many years been engaged in any matter in which they were so deeply interested, there were more than eight hundred deputies present in this assembly.

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THE commissioners, together with the French and English ambassadors, had meetings every day in the Hotel de Ville of Antwerp; and there was still considerable diversity of sentiments among them with regard to certain articles of the treaty, and particularly with respect to the time during which the truce should subsist. It was at length agreed, that it should be concluded for twelve years from the present period; and as soon as this and the other points in dispute were settled, and the treaty drawn up in the usual form, it was transmitted to Brussels and Bergen-op-zoom, to receive the sanction of the archdukes and of the states; and was finally concluded on the 9th of April 1609.

It consisted of eight and thirty articles; the most important of which were those which have been already mentioned. The rest had been prepared by Barnevelt, and were equally calculated to promote the security and interest of

Treaty for  
a peace  
concluded.

of individuals and of the state \*. No individuals had merited so highly from the republic

as

\* Among other articles it was stipulated, that, during the continuance of the truce, all hostilities should cease by seas, rivers, and land, between the subjects, inhabitants, and persons resident in the territories of the king of Spain and the archdukes, on the one hand, and the United States on the other, without any exception of places or persons whatever.

That either party should retain safe and entire possession of whatever provinces, cities, places, lands, and principalities it then enjoyed; and that the same conditions should be observed with regard to districts, villages, and lands and territories thereon depending.

That the subjects, and persons residing in the dominions of Spain and the archdukes, of the one part, and of the United States, of the other, should naturally cultivate good-will and friendship.

That all reproach, resentment, and revenge on account of past hostilities and injuries, should cease; and that there should be a free and equal trade between the subjects of the contracting parties, by rivers, seas, and land.

That it should not be lawful to stop or lay hands on merchants, proprietors of ships, shipmasters, or their crews, or the ships or merchandize, or goods of any kind, on any pretence; but that justice should have its usual course for the recovery of debts, and in criminal prosecutions.

If any judgments or sentences had been passed against the adherents of either party, on the footing of contumacy, and that such persons had been condemned without being defended, either in civil or criminal causes, such judgments or sentences were not to be carried into execution during the truce, either against the persons or goods of individuals so condemned.

Such persons, or their heirs and executors, as had suffered the loss of their property through the rage of party, or the violence of war; by the rapine and injustice of individuals,

as those of the family of Nassau; and all parties readily concurred in giving them proof on this

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dividuals, and without the authority of the magistrates, and the countenance and protection of the laws; such persons were to be reinstated, in virtue of the present treaty, in the full possession and enjoyment of their effect and estates, even although they should have actually passed into the condition, and assumed the appearance and nature of goods confiscated: whether they might have been deposited as pledges, given away as donations, or alienated and transferred by any species of bargain, transaction, or renunciation.

If the goods or estates shall have passed out of the exchequer, and then disposed of to private possessors, then it was stipulated, that interest should be paid to the right owners of the goods, or estates, at the rate of  $6\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. per annum. And if this payment should be delayed, it was agreed, that the proprietors should be paid out of the stock or capital. But if the disposal or transference of such goods and estates, by the exchequer, had been accompanied with such solemnities as constitute legal deeds, and the names of the right owners been erased and superseded, by such legal formalities as constitute legal rights and claims, yet even in that case, it was provided, that their estates, rights and properties should be restored to the right owners, they refunding to any persons that might be at that time in possession, the bona fide price (where any had been given) which such persons might have paid on purchasing any of the said lands or properties since the confiscation, within the space of a year from the date of the present treaty.

That no length of time, not even the whole space from the very beginning of the commotions in 1567, should be considered as having conferred a prescriptive right to property.

Persons who, during the course of the present war, had



this occasion of their respect and gratitude. By one article of the truce it was provided that none of the descendants of William, the first prince of Orange, should be liable for the debts which that prince had contracted from the year 1567 till his death. And by another, that such of his estates, within the territory of the archdukes, as had been confiscated, should be restored, and his heirs permitted to enjoy them unmolested during the continuance of the truce \*.

retired into the dominions of neutral powers, were to be comprehended, and have the full benefit and advantage of the treaty: they were to return, if they were so inclined, to the places of their former abodes, or to settle in whatever place they should chuse, provided always, that they should comply with established manners, laws, and customs.

It was declared, in general terms, that all confiscations, and disinheritions, and transferences of property that had originated in the violence of civil war, and the bitterness of party zeal, should be broken, cancelled, and to all intents and purposes null and void.

\* Besides these proofs of attachment to the family of the prince of Orange, the states had, some time before the conclusion of the truce, resolved that prince Maurice's appointments, as admiral and captain-general, should not suffer any diminution from the reduction of the forces. They even gave him an additional revenue, as a compensation for his share of the prizes and contributions; and they likewise augmented the appointments of prince Henry Frederic, and count William Lewis of Nassau. Such was the conclusion of that negotiation, which, for more than two years, had employed the attention, not only of the contracting parties, but likewise of most of the other princes and states in Europe.

THE archdukes engaged that these and all the other articles should, within the space of three months, be ratified by the king of Spain; and the king's deed of ratification was accordingly delivered to the states a few days before the expiration of that term, to transfer to his brother and his children the several high employments which he held, at whatever period he should think fit. These resolutions of the states seem to have originated from the French monarch, and were formed at the instance of Barneveldt, whom Jeannin had engaged to enter into his master's views. No person questioned that prince Maurice's family were well entitled to every mark of favour which the states could bestow; it was rather unfortunate however for the prince's character, that, after so violent an opposition to the truce, his acquiescence in it was so quickly followed by pecuniary rewards. But although his enemies were disposed to insinuate that these rewards were rather to be considered as the price of his silence than as rewards for his former services, there is nothing to justify these insinuations in the numerous letters extant in Jeannin's negotiations, either of the king or the ministers of France.

THE Dutch were henceforward considered as a free and independent people. Having

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gained immortal honour by the magnanimity which they had displayed during the continuance of the war, they were now considered as having obtained the reward which their virtue merited, and were every where respected and admired. Their ministers at foreign courts were now received with the same distinction as those of other sovereign powers; and their alliance was courted by nations who had formerly regarded them as rebels, that must speedily submit to the yoke which they had shaken off.

ON the other hand, the reputation of the Spanish nation received a mortal wound; and their power ceased to be regarded with the same dread as formerly. They had been foiled by a handful of their own subjects, and would not, it was supposed, any longer pretend to give law to other nations. The high spirited nobility, and the people in general, were secretly mortified by the concessions which the Dutch had been able to extort; and were ready to ascribe the humiliation which the nation had suffered, not so much to any insurmountable difficulty in the contest in which it had been so long engaged, as to misconduct and want of vigour on the part of government.

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THE  
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PHILIP THE THIRD,  
KING OF SPAIN.

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THE Spanish nation was now at peace with all the world, except the piratic states of Barbary; and it might justly have been expected that the king and his ministers would have instantly applied themselves to the healing of those wounds which the monarchy had received during the continuance of the war. But their incapacity for government, joined to their bigoted zeal for the Catholic superstition, prevented them from availing themselves of the tranquillity which they enjoyed, and determined them to engage in a new enterprize, which, although their endeavours were attended with greater success than had accompanied their attempt to subdue the United Provinces, proved no less pernicious to the

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national prosperity.\* The Spanish arms had been unsuccessfully employed against foreign nations for more than half a century, and all ranks of men had felt the necessity of putting a period to the war; yet no sooner was peace established than it was resolved to expel from the bosom of the kingdom several hundred thousands of its most industrious inhabitants.

Account of  
the Moref-  
coes.

THE Morefcoes had lived in Spain for more than eight hundred years; and still, after so long a period, remained a separate people, distinguished from the Spaniards by their language, their religion, their character, and their manners.

THE present race were the descendants of those fanatic warriors, who, issuing forth from the deserts of Arabia, actuated with the wild ambition of compelling mankind to embrace the Mahometan superstition, had, with most astonishing rapidity, reduced under subjection to their caliphs, Persia, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, and had afterwards extended their conquests as far as the Straits of Gibraltar along the coast of Africa. From Africa they transported an army into Spain, where in less than two years they expelled the Christian inhabitants from all the open and more fertile parts

of

of the kingdom, and obliged them to take shelter in the mountainous regions of Asturia, and the other northern provinces.

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SPAIN had, about three centuries before, been conquered by the Goths, who had not only embraced the religion, but had likewise, as far as could be expected from ignorant Barbarians, adopted the language of the former inhabitants, and the distinction between the conquerors and the conquered had long been lost. Their language was that corrupt dialect of the Roman tongue, with a mixture of the Gothic, which is still the language of Castile; and their religion was the Christian, mingled with the superstitions of the church of Rome. They held the religion of their invaders in great abhorrence, and being at the same time zealously attached to their own, great numbers of them chose, rather than be guilty of apostacy, to abandon the fertile provinces which they had so long inhabited, and to fly, with their wives and children, to those uncultivated parts of the kingdom, where, amidst caves and rocks, they might maintain their religion and their liberty.

THE Moors, in the mean time, established their dominion in Portugal, in the greater part

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of Castile, Murcia, Andalusia, Valencia, and Granada. Their kings made choice of Cordova for their place of residence; and, as numerous supplies of people every year arrived from Africa, they soon attained such a degree of strength as convinced the Christians that no attempt to recover their possessions could prove effectual.

A PREDATORY war however was begun, within half a century after the conquest, and the Christians, excited and conducted by Pelagio, and other descendants of their ancient kings, gave many signal proofs of heroic bravery; but their success did not fully correspond to their exertions, till a considerable time afterwards, when various causes concurred to render the contest less unequal.

Their character.

THE Moors, naturally prone to ease and pleasure, had lost much of that warlike spirit, which they had derived from the sanguinary genius of their religion. Their kings were weak men, dissolved in luxury, had been from the beginning extremely ill obeyed by their viceroys, and at length these viceroys, on whom their kings, agreeably to the oriental maxims of government, devolved too great a share of their authority, shook off their allegiance,

ence, assumed the titles of kings themselves, and erected their governments into separate and independent states. They were often engaged in war against each other, or the king of Cordova, from whom they had revolted; their strength was thereby much impaired, and they could seldom act in concert against their common enemy.

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It was long before the Christians could rightly improve the opportunities which were thus afforded them. For they too were divided into several unconnected sovereignties; and, for many years, through misunderstandings, joined to the distance at which they lay from one another, they found it no less difficult to act in concert than the Moors. But, at length, several of these little sovereignties being united under one head\*, the war was carried on with greater vigour than ever on the part of the Christians. The Mahometans were, in numberless rencounters, overpowered. They were expelled from many parts of the open country, of which they had long held possession, and had much reason to apprehend that, if they did not correct the errors in their government or conduct, which had occasion-

\* Under Sancho, an. 1035. Mariana, lib. viii,



ed their misfortunes, they must ere long sink under the growing power and superior bravery of the enemy.

THEIR downfall was long retarded by the folly of the Christians, who, on numberless occasions, suffered equally with the Moors from the want of concord. Far from taking warning from the misfortunes of the Moors, they were almost continually at war with each other, and often seemed to be no less intent on one another's destruction than on that of their common enemy. It often happened that, by the conquests which they obtained over each other, states of a considerable magnitude were formed, the sovereigns of which, if they had acted wisely, must have proved an over match for the Moors. But these states were no sooner formed than they were again dissolved, through the pernicious practice adopted by the kings, of dividing their dominions among their children. This practice, of which there are many instances in the history of Spain, was, at different periods, a copious source of animosity and discord. It proved equally pernicious to the people, and to the families of the kings, and long rendered it impossible for them to make any considerable effort against the infidels.

THEIR

THEIR exertions, however, were generally much more vigorous and successful than those of their opponents; and before the end of the thirteenth century, they had acquired the kingdoms of Castile, Navarre, Arragon, Murcia, and Valentia. Their intestine divisions still rose, at times, to the same height as formerly; and the Christian, as well as the Mahometan parts of Spain, exhibited, almost every year, some new scenes of bloodshed and devastation; till toward the end of the fifteenth century, when, by the marriage of Ferdinand with Isabella, the crown of Castile was united to that of Arragon: an event which, while it in a great measure secured internal tranquillity to the Christians, gave them a decided superiority over their ancient enemies.

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AT this period the only Moorish kingdom which remained unconquered was that of Granada, which contained a great extent of fertile country, and several of the strongest towns in Spain. From the situation of some of the chief of these towns on the sea coast, the Moors could easily receive assistance from their friends in Africa; and Ferdinand was on this account the more solicitous to deprive them of so important a possession.

THIS

THIS artful prince was seldom at a loss to find pretexts to colour his ambitious enterprises; and the present juncture was the most favourable to his design which could justly be expected. There were two competitors, at this time, for the crown of Granada, Albohardill, and his nephew Boabdilla: and the whole kingdom was torn in pieces by the contending parties, who often satiated their vengeance in each other's blood,

FERDINAND could not suffer so favourable an opportunity to escape: he first entered into an alliance with the nephew against the uncle, under the cover of which he made war upon the latter, and expelled him from his territories; and soon afterwards, he turned his arms against his ally, made himself master of the city of Granada\*, and all his other fortified places; and, although he still affected to treat him with respect, he soon rendered it necessary for him to abandon his dominions, and retire to Africa.

IN the prosecution of the war, Ferdinand gave proof of great abilities, as well as of the most consummate artifice. Notwithstanding which, it was protracted to the unusual length

\* Ann. 1492.

of ten years; and, from the difficulty which he encountered in his operations against a people so much weakened by intestine divisions, it is probable that he would not have been able to complete their subjection, if their whole force united had been employed in repelling his attacks. Their kings had, in a great measure, lost their affection by their folly and misconduct; and, for this reason, they were not so reluctant as they would otherwise have been, against transferring their allegiance; but they required, and Ferdinand judged it expedient, to grant them such conditions as they thought would put them nearly on the same footing with his other subjects.

Of these conditions it was one, that they should be permitted the free exercise of their religion; and for the first seven years after the conquest, no violence was offered them on that account. Ferdinand expected, that after the abolition of their government, they might easily be converted to the Christian faith. But finding that the instructions of the ecclesiastics on this head were not attended with the desired effect, he resolved, notwithstanding his engagement confirmed by an oath, rather to employ compulsion than any longer to indulge so great a proportion of his subjects in the exercise of a false religion.

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HE made choice of the celebrated Ximenes, archbishop of Toledo, to carry his design into execution; and for this purpose, ordered him to repair to Granada, with full power to employ whatever measures he should judge to be most expedient. Ximenes began with carefing, and making presents to some of the leading men among the Morescoes, and thus persuaded some of them to submit to be baptized. But, making little progress in this way, and his natural impatience and severity quickly prompting him to have recourse to other methods more agreeable to his disposition, he threw all such of their leaders as refused to comply with his request, into prisons and dungeons, where they were treated as if they had been guilty of the most atrocious crimes.

The Morescoes persecuted by the Spaniards.

THE people, highly incensed against him on account of this violent procedure, took up arms, and having surrounded his palace, demanded that their leaders might be released. But having no person among them invested with authority to conduct their operations, they were quickly dispersed by the count de Tendilla, the governor of the citadel; immediately after which, Ferdinand, by the advice of Ximenes, sent judges to Granada, and by these judges the people were found guilty of rebellion

rebellion against his government. It was declared by these judges, that the whole Moreos in Granada, though only a small part of them had been concerned in the insurrection, were yet, on that account, liable to be capitally punished: and the king was well prepared with his army to carry the sentence into execution. But having offered them a pardon, on condition of their embracing the Christian religion, upwards of fifty thousand of them, all citizens of the town of Granada, submitted to be baptized.

THE inhabitants of the country were treated with equal violence: for they too, upon receiving intelligence of what had passed in Granada, had begun to put themselves in a posture of defence. The count de Tendilla was ordered to march against them with an army of veteran troops; and this general, in order to intimidate them, put all the inhabitants of one of their towns, men, women, and children, to the sword. Still, however, they refused to lay down their arms, till Ferdinand himself, at the head of a numerous army, having reduced all their fortified places, the greater part of them consented to purchase their lives at the expence of their religion; and the rest, upon paying ten dollars each of them,

them, as a ransom, were permitted to transport themselves to Barbary.

FROM this time, the Granada Morecoes were considered by the Spaniards as Christians, although it can hardly be supposed that any of them were sincerely converted to the Christian faith. They were styled the New Christians, in contradistinction from the Spaniards, who were called the Old. They were not admitted to the enjoyment of any office, either in the church or state. But when they discovered, on any occasion, an attachment to Mahometanism, they were treated by the inquisition as apostates; and great numbers of them were, every year, condemned by that tribunal, and committed to the flames.

By this treatment, which was equally impolitical and unchristian, their prejudices against the catholic religion, and the Spanish government, were strengthened and confirmed. Their ill humour, however, shewed itself only in murmurs and complaints: and the Morecoes in Granada are scarcely mentioned in the Spanish history, till the reign of Philip II. when in consequence of fresh oppression, having made an unsuccessful attempt to vindicate their liberty, most of them, as formerly related, were



were transplanted into Castile and other inland provinces.

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It is not to be doubted that Philip would have treated the Morescoes of Valentia in the same manner as those of Granada, had he not been deterred by his experience of the expence and danger with which the reduction of the latter had been accompanied. The Moorish kingdom of Valentia had been conquered by James I. king of Arragon, before the middle of the thirteenth century; and this prince had been extremely solicitous to have the people converted to the Christian faith. He had, for this purpose, erected schools where the ecclesiastics might learn the Arabic; and, in obedience to his commands, several Dominicans and other friars had applied themselves to the study of that language, after acquiring which they had entered on the office of missionaries among the Morescoes. But whether they were not sufficiently acquainted with the language to be able to teach in it, or had not sufficient patience for so arduous a task as that of combating the religious prejudice of a people noted for their bigotry, they soon began to represent the Morescoes as obstinate infidels, whom it was in vain to expect to convert by

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instruction. Even miracles, they pretended, had been wrought among them without success, and, therefore, compulsion was now the only expedient that could prove effectual.

AT the instigation of these ecclesiastics, Pope Clement, the fourth of that name, having advised the king to expel the Morescoes from his dominions if they should still refuse to be converted, James would readily have embraced his counsel, if he could have persuaded his cortes to consent. But by the free constitution of the government of Arragon, to which Valentia was now annexed, the consent of the cortes was requisite; and, although the clergy and commons were willing to gratify the king, yet the barons, who foresaw the ruin of their estates if the Morescoes, their vassals, were expelled, opposed the measure with such inflexible obstinacy, that James found it necessary to relinquish his design.

The tyranny of king Ferdinand restrained by the cortes.

FROM this period to the conquest of Granada by Ferdinand, almost two hundred years had elapsed; and during all that time, the Valentia Moors had been indulged in the free exercise of their religion. But when the barons heard of the violence with which

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Ferdinand had treated the Moors of Granada, they dreaded an extension of his tyranny to their vassals in Valentia; and, in order, to prevent it, they required, and, though with some difficulty, obtained his assent to a law passed in the cortes, in the year 1510, when it was enacted, that no Moresco within the kingdom of Valentia should either be expelled from the kingdom, or compelled to embrace the Christian faith.

NOR were the barons satisfied with taking this precaution; but, in order to prevent the court or the ecclesiastics from reviving their design in any future reign, they resolved to make it henceforth a part of their king's coronation oath, that, on no pretence whatever, he should attempt to expel the Morescoes from Valentia, or employ force to engage them to embrace the Christian religion; that he should never attempt, directly or indirectly, to procure a dispensation from this oath, nor even accept of a dispensation, in case it should be offered him.

THIS oath was sworn a few years after, by Charles V. at his accession; and the barons seemed then to possess the utmost security which they could desire against any future op-

pression of their vassals. But they soon experienced how ineffectual the wisest precautions sometimes prove against the events of fortune. A bloody war having broken out between the commons and nobles of Valentia, in the year 1520, the former, actuated partly perhaps by religious bigotry, but principally by revenge against the latter, published a manifesto requiring all the Morescoes, under the penalty of death, immediately to embrace the catholic religion. The nobles were at that time unable to afford them protection against their enemies; and as the Morescoes were themselves sufficiently acquainted with the violent character of the commons, they knew that it would be in vain to offer any remonstrance on the subject. Without delay, therefore, almost the whole of them consented to be baptized, in the hopes that, when tranquillity should be restored, no advantage would be taken by the court of this deed of theirs, which was known to be the effect of lawless force and violence.

BUT no sooner were the civil commotions of the kingdom composed, than Charles, having convened an assembly of the clergy, to consider of the validity of that baptism, to which the Morescoes had been obliged to submit; it was determined by this assembly, that although they ought not to have been compelled to submit

mit to be baptized, yet the character thereby impressed upon them was indelible, they were henceforth to be considered as Christians, and in the case of a defection from the catholic religion, to be treated as apostates; that the name of God, as is subjoined in the decree, may not be blasphemed, nor contempt brought upon the Christian profession.

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THE Morescoes, conscious of a sincere attachment to the Mahometan faith, and being at no loss to understand, that by this decree it was intended they should henceforth be subject to the jurisdiction of the inquisition, they had no other expedient left to save themselves from the cruelty of that barbarous tribunal, but to assert, (which great numbers of them did) that they had not been baptized; and as, amidst the confusion of civil discord, no register of their baptism had been kept, it was impossible in most cases to disprove their assertion.

OF this difficulty the ecclesiastics gave information to the emperor; and, about the same time, a dispensation from his coronation oath was sent him by the pope \*. Charles had acquired a great accession of power by his suppression of the late rebellion; and the power of the nobles had suffered a proportional di-

\* Clement VII. Vide Geddes.

minution. Being no longer afraid, therefore, of any opposition which he might receive from the Valentia barons, and being delivered from his religious scruples by the pope's dispensation from his oath, he first\* gave orders to the clergy to apply themselves to the instruction of the Morescoes in the Christian faith, commanding the barons to require a punctual attendance from their vassals, on the instructions that should be given them; and in the following year he ordered all the Morescoes, who denied their having been formerly baptized, either immediately to submit to that initiatory rite, or to quit the Spanish dominions, under the penalty of perpetual servitude,

THE Morescoes of Pianaguazil refused to accept of this alternative, and had recourse to arms in their defence; but these men having been easily reduced to obedience, it was believed that, after the year 1526, there was hardly a single Moresco in Spain who had not submitted to the rite of baptism.

THERE was no reason however to suppose that any considerable number of them were sincerely converted to the Christian faith; and, as it is impossible for men who act a fictitious

part uniformly to conceal their real sentiments, the History of Spain, during the reign of Charles and that of his successor is filled with complaints against them \*, on account of their infidelity. Frequent councils were held at Madrid, to consider of the proper means of effectuating their conversion. Orders were repeatedly sent from thence, requiring the clergy to exert themselves with greater activity in instructing them, and the inquisition every year exercised against great numbers of them its wonted rigour and severity.

STILL, however, it would seem that their attachment to the Mahometan superstition, as well as to their ancient manners and customs, remained as strong as ever.

NOR will this appear surprising, if it is true that men are commonly attached to a false religion in proportion to its absurdity; because, not being accustomed to employ their reason on the subject of religion, they are incapable of being convinced by reason. But, besides this consideration, there were other causes which occurred in producing that unconquerable obstinacy which the Morescoes discovered in their adherence to Mahometanism. They

\* The reader will remember, that the Morescoes here spoken of, are those of Valentia.