

And in these cases, tho it be found *per infortunium*, or *se defendendo* upon the special matter set forth, yet this special matter must be recorded, for tho it be not such a felony, as hath judgment of life, yet it is such an offense, as gives the forfeiture of goods, and therefore they may not find a general *not guilty*, but must find the special matter, and leave it to the court to judge.

[303] At the sessions at *Newgate* 16 *Car. 2.* upon the evidence it appeared, that *A.* a boy riding in the street upon an horse, *B.* another boy whipt the horse, the horse ran away against the will of *A.* and ran over a child and kild it, for this *A.* was indicted of murder by the grand inquest, and the jury found him generally *not guilty*; the court was in doubt of receiving the verdict, because it was *per infortunium*, and so ought specially to be found, but because the coroner's inquest had found the special matter, and concluded it, as in truth it was, *per infortunium*, which presentment *A.* was ready to confess, that so he might have his pardon of course, the verdict of *not guilty* was recorded, and so it was said was the usual course in that case; but it was agreed, that if *A.* had of his own accord put the horse into speed, and he had so kild the child, it had not been *per infortunium* but manslaughter. *Richard Pretty's* case for killing *Anne Jones*.

But now suppose the prisoner kild the party, but yet in such a way as makes no felony, as if he were of *non sane memory*, or if a man kills a thief, that comes to rob him, or to commit a burglary, or if an officer in his own defense kills one, that assaults him in the execution of his office, which are neither felony nor forfeiture, whether is it necessary to find the special matter, or may the party be found *not guilty*? *Foster* 265.

And I think, and so I have known it constantly practised, the party in these cases may be found *not guilty*, and the jury need not find the special matter.

And the reason is, that in these cases there is neither felony nor forfeiture.

And this is in effect declared by the statute of 24 *H. 8. cap. 5.* "If
 " any attempt to commit murder, robbery or burglary in or nigh
 " any common high way, or in the mansion-house, &c. and the evil
 " doer be slain, and if the same by verdict be found or tried, the
 " slayer shall not lose any goods or chattels, but shall thereof be
 " fully acquitted and discharged in like manner as he should be, if
 " he

“ he were lawfully acquit of the death,” and accordingly ruled in *Cooper's* case. *P. 15 Car. B. R. Croke, p. 544.*

But it is used in such cases (and prudently enough), for the coroner's inquest to find the special matter, and the bill [304] of indictment of the grand jury to be for murder, and to have the party arraigned upon the bill of indictment, and to be acquitted thereupon upon trial, and to enter the acquittal upon the bill, and then to confess the coroner's presentment, and to have judgment also thereupon; thus it was done in the case of *Richardson* keeper of *Newgate*, who kild *Hyde*, that had committed a robbery and made resistance, that he could not be taken without being kild. *M. 25 Car. 2. at Newgate.*

And therefore, where a thief was kild in pursuit because of necessity, if the special matter be found, the killer shall have judgment, *quod eat sine die.* 22 *Affiz.* 55. *Coron.* 179. 22 *E. 3. Coron.* 258. 26 *Affiz.* 23. *Coron.* 192. 22 *E. 3. Coron.* 261. and the reason is, because it is no felony, nor causeth any forfeiture so much as of goods, but is a justifiable act, and so differs from *se defendendo*, or *per infortunium*, which give a forfeiture of goods.

And since in an indictment or an appeal of felony the defendant cannot plead a justification, he shall have the advantage of it upon the general issue pleaded. 26 *H. 8. 3. b.* 37 *H. 8. B. Appeals* 122.

Yet *vide* 37 *H. 6. 20 & 21. per Needham* upon an indictment of murder the defendant may plead, that in an appeal before the constable and marshal of treason he being appellee kild the appellant; yet in that case it seems, if he pleaded *not guilty*, he shall have advantage of that special justification upon evidence.

But [notwithstanding] this, that I have said, where the matter itself appears not to be felony, the prisoner upon *not guilty* pleaded may be found *not guilty*, without finding the special matter, and accordingly ruled. *P. 15 Car. 1. Croke, p. 544.*

Yet if the coroner's inquest find not the special matter but murder or manslaughter, and the prisoner is arraigned upon it and plead *not guilty*, and upon the evidence it appear, that the prisoner kild the man, but in such a manner as makes no felony, as a thief that assaults him upon the highway, or a thief that resists [305] the arrest, in this case the jury cannot find a general *not guilty*, but must find, that the prisoner did it, and the manner how, and this is to be entred of record, as in case of a verdict *se defendendo*.

And

And the reason of the difference is, because in the former case the jury gives a verdict of *not guilty* generally, without inquiring who did the fact. But where a man is arraigned upon the coroner's inquest *super visum corporis*, and pleads *not guilty*, if the jury acquit the prisoner by *not guilty*, yet they must inquire who did it, for here it is apparent there was a man slain, because the coroner takes the inquest upon view of the body, and if they should find him generally *not guilty*, and yet should upon their other inquiry find he kild him, it would be a contradiction in itself, and therefore in this case, they are to find the special matter, and thereupon the court shall give judgment for his discharge.

Many special verdicts have been found, as upon the statute of stabbing, so upon the point, whether murder or not, but it is difficult to find them so that judgment may be given for murder, because there are so many circumstances required to be found, that if any be omitted, the verdict will fall only to manslaughter.

I have rarely known upon any special verdict, where the question was murder or manslaughter, judgment to be given for murder (*d*), but commonly for manslaughter or *se defendendo*. *Tutius erratur ex parte mitiori.*

Burn. Tit. Jurors. sect. 5;

(*d*) There have been however several instances, wherein it has been done, viz. Mackally's case, 9 Co. Rep. 70. a. Marw-
gridge's case, Hill. 5 Ann. B. R. K. L. 120.

Onchy's case. Trin. 13 Geo. B. R. all which were special verdicts, and the court ruled them to be murder.

Concerning the misdemeanors of jurors, and their punishment.

IF any of the jury eat or drink without license of the court before they have given up their verdict, they are fineable for it.

But tho' it be not at the charges of either party, antiently it was held it would avoid the verdict. 24 E. 3. 24. a.

But at this day the law is settled, that it is only a misdemeanor fineable in them that do it, but avoids not the verdict. 14 H. 7. 29. b. (*a*). 20 H. 7. 3. a.

(*a*) *Vide plura q. casu 15 H. 7. 1. b.*

But

But if it be at the charge, for the purpose, of the prisoner, and the verdict find him guilty, the verdict is good; but if they find him *not guilty*, and this appears by examination, the judge, before whom the verdict is so given, may record the special matter, and thereupon the verdict shall be set aside, and a new trial awarded. 14 H. 7. 30. a. b.

If a juryman before he be sworn take information of the case, this is cause of challenge, as the law stands at this day, but antiently it was held otherwise, and that it was lawful, and that was the reason given in the statute of 6 H. 6. cap. 2. which enacts, "That pannels of assises be deliverd by the sheriff to either party six days before the sessions, namely, that they might inform the jurors of their right before the session."

But this brought great inconvenience in embracery and tampering with jurors, and therefore it is justly disused and disapproved.

If a juryman have a piece of evidence in his pocket, and after the jury sworn and gone together he sheweth it to them, this is a *misdeameor* fineable in the jury, but it avoids not the verdict, tho the case appears upon examination. M. 23 Car. 1. [307] B. R. M. 40 & 41 Eliz. B. R. Croke, n. 1. Graves & Short (b); *vide tamen contra* 11 H. 4. 18. a.

But if after the jury sworn either party deliver a piece of evidence to the jury, and the verdict is given for him that deliverd it, it shall avoid the verdict, but then this must appear by examination, and be indorsed upon the *poslea* or verdict, so as it appears of record, and it must not be barely by affidavit made after. M. 40 & 41 Eliz. B. R. Graves & Short. Co. Lit. 227. b.

But if the verdict be given against him that deliverd the evidence, the verdict is good. *Ibid.*

If a piece of evidence under seal be read in court, the jury ought regularly to have it with them, but not if it be not under seal.

But yet if after the jury sworn a piece of evidence not under seal be by the court deliverd to the jury, it doth not avoid the verdict, and so it is, if it be deliverd by a mere stranger, or if it be deliverd by one of the parties, and the verdict be given against him, on whose behalf it was deliverd. M. 37 & 38 Eliz. B. R. Croke, n. 1. (c)

If after the jury sworn and gone from the bar they send for a witness to repeat his evidence, that he gave openly in court, who doth it

(b) Cro. Eliz. 616.

(c) Vicary & Farthing, Cro. Eliz. 411.

accordingly, this appearing by examination in court and indorsed upon the record or *postea* will avoid the verdict. *T. 32 Eliz. B. R. Croke, n. 17. Metcalfe & Deane (d). M. 20 Jac. B. R. Hillord & Hall (e)*, because not done openly in court, nor in the presence of the parties concerned. *M. 32 Eliz. B. R. Leon, n. 426. Elme's case (f).*

But if the jury after their departure from the bar desire to hear the testimony of a witness again, they may be sent for into court, and the witness may be heard again openly, where the court or parties may ask what questions they think fit.

[308] If depositions are read in court to the jury, and after the jury sworn and going from the bar the solicitor or prosecutor for the king or party without consent of parties or order of the court deliver the copies of the depositions to the jury, if they find against him on whose part the copies were delivered, the verdict is good, but if they find for him on whose part they were delivered, and this appear by examination, and be (as it ought to be) indorsed upon the *postea* or record, the verdict shall be quashed, and a new *venire facias*, or award for a new jury shall be returned. *M. 20 Jac. B. R. Hillord and Hall.*

If after the evidence given, where divers evidences are read on both sides, and the clerk is making up his bundle of evidences, that were under seal, to deliver to the jury, the solicitor for the plaintiff delivers a bundle of depositions to the jury, some whereof were read, and some not read, and upon examination this appeared, tho the jury swore they opened not the bundle delivered by the solicitor, yet the verdict for the plaintiff was for this cause avoided, (the matter being indorsed upon the record) and a new *venire facias* awarded, for great inconvenience may be by such a practice, and the oath of the jury, that never looked into them, was not regarded, for possibly it may be a misdemeanor in them to look into it, which they shall not excuse in this manner. *T. 1653. Webb & Taylor, 2 R. A. 714. pl. 6.*

If the party after the jury sworn speak with a jurymen, but nothing touching the business in issue, this doth not avoid the verdict given after for him. *M. 7. B. R. per curiam.*

But if he or any in his behalf say to a jurymen after his departure from the bar and before verdict given, the case is clear for the plain-

(d) *Cro. Eliz.* 189.

(e) *2 Rol. Rep.* 262. *Palm.* 325.

(f) *1 Leon.* 305.

tiff, this shall avoid the verdict, if given for the plaintiff, for it is new evidence. *H. 22 Jac. B. R. Athil & Buker* adjudged. *2 Rol. Abr.* 716. *pl.* 20.

If *A.* be challenged off, and twelve more sworn, yet *A.* goes along with the twelve sworn and is present at their consultation, if *A.* give no new evidence, nor advised or directed them to find that party, for whom the verdict is given, the verdict is good, [309] but *A.* shall be fined for his misdemeanor. *P. 17 Jac. B. R. Park's* case.

Now touching fining of jurors I shall add farther.

If a man, that is one of the indictors, be returned upon the petit jury, and do not challenge himself, he shall be fined. *40 Affiz.* 10.

If a jury say they are agreed, and it being asked, who shall say for them, they say their foreman, but upon farther inquiry they are not agreed, the jury shall be fined, *viz.* every one apart. *40 Affiz.* 10. *29 Affiz.* 27.

If a jurymen be called and refuse to appear, or if having appeared withdraw himself before he be sworn, the court may set a fine upon him at their discretion: *vide Stat. 35 H. 8. cap. 6.*

So if he be challenged, and while the challenge is trying withdraw himself, and the challenge is upon the trial disallowed, and he be not present to be sworn *36 H. 6. 27. a.* or being sworn withdraw himself from his fellows before the verdict given. *34 E. 3. Office de court* 12.

If eleven of the jury be agreed, and the twelfth refuse, and make his companions lie by it, heretofore such jurymen hath been imprisoned for his wilfulness, *8 Affiz.* 35. and fined, and the inquest taken by the other eleven jurors. *3 E. 3. Verdict* 40.

But upon great consideration both these courses have been disallowed, and the judgment upon the verdict of eleven jurors reversed, and the jurymen (fined and imprisoned) discharged, as being contrary to law, for it may be the twelfth was in the right, yet howsoever his conscience is not in this manner to be forced, and therefore former precedents of this kind have been disallowed. *41 E. 3. 11. a.* *41 Affiz.* 11.

But what if a juror give a verdict against all reason, convicting or acquitting a person indicted against evidence, what shall be done? I say, if the jury will convict a man against or without evidence, and against the direction or opinion of the court, the court hath this

false to reprove the person convicted before judgment, and to acquaint the king, and certify for his pardon.

And as to an acquittal of a person against full evidence it is likewise certain the court may send them back again, and so in the former case, to consider better of it before they record the verdict, but if they are peremptory in it, and stand to their verdict, the court must take their verdict and record it, but may respite judgment upon the acquittal.

But as touching punishing the jury, I shall say, what I think may be done, and what may not be done.

1. I think in such a case the king may have an attaint, for altho a man convicted upon an indictment can have no attaint, because the guilt is affirmed by two inquests, the grand inquest, that presents the offense upon their oaths, and the petit jury, that agrees with them, yet where the petit jury acquits, they stand as a single verdict, for they disaffirm what the grand inquest of twelve men have upon their oaths presented, and with this agrees the book 10 *H.* 4. *Attaint* 60, 64. *per Thorn.*

2. By the statute of 26 *H.* 8. *cap.* 4. the justiciar or steward, before whom any person is acquit of felony against pregnant evidence in *Wales* or the marches thereof, may bind over the jurors to appear before the president and council of the marches of *Wales*, who may, as they see cause, fine and imprison such jurors by their discretion.

3. I do confess in the king's bench there have been many precedents of jurors, that have acquitted persons of murder, or other felony tried in that court, if they have gone against pregnant evidence, that have been fined, imprisoned and bound to their good behaviour during their lives (*g.*).

The like hath been done before justices in *Eyre*, and the court of king's bench is a court in *Eyre* and much more, for that court may reverse judgment given in *Eyre*. See for this purpose *T.* 43 *Eliz.* *B. R. Rot.* 979. *Noy's Rep.* p. 48 & 49. *Wharton's* case, where the jury in the king's bench acquitting the prisoner of murder against pregnant evidence, and finding it only manslaughter were fined 20*l.*

[311] apiece, bound to the good behaviour and for the good behaviour of the prisoner, and committed, and this was done by the advice of all the judges. See the same case *M.* 44 & 45 *Eliz.* *B. R. Yelv. Rep.* p. 23.

M. 42 & 43 Eliz. B. R. Croke, n. 12. p. 778. Wats & Braines. In an appeal of murder there was a confederacy among the jury to bring in the verdict *not guilty*, and if the court disliked it, then to change their verdict, and accordingly they did, and the court disliking their verdict they went out and found him guilty, and this agreement being discovered, the principal confederates were fined and imprisoned, but this fine was for their confederacy and practice, not for their verdict.

7 R. 2. *Coron.* 108. The jury acquitted a notorious robber in the king's bench against great evidence, and the court bound the jury for the good behaviour of the prisoner; the reporter makes a *quære per quel ley*, vide the notes annexed to *Benloe* 153. to the same purpose.

4. Again, in cases of inquest of office there have been precedents in the *Exchequer*, and more frequent in the court of wards for fining of jurors, that would not find according to their evidence. *H. 28 Eliz. in Scaccario coram Theff. & baronibus.* 3 *Hughes* 196.

5. The practice of the king's bench to fine jurors for finding verdicts contrary to their evidence was endeavouring to be brought in practice before judges of *nisi prius*; and about 14 *Car. 2.* in an *Oxfordshire* case *Huntingdon* and his eleven companions jurors were fined 5*l.* apiece for such a verdict, and the fine estreated into the *Exchequer*, but by the whole court by the advice of the greater part of the rest of the judges process was stayed upon that estreat, as being imposed contrary to law (*h*).

6. Before justices of *oyer* and *terminer* and gaol-delivery, if the jury acquitted a felon contrary to their evidence, the use was to bind them over to appear in the king's bench to answer an information, but I never knew any preferd, and indeed it were impossible almost for any judge or jury to convict a jury upon such an account, because impossible, that all the circumstances of the case, that might move the jury to acquit a prisoner, could be brought in evidence; this therefore seems to me to be but *in terrorem*. [312]

* 7. But then it was endeavourd to bring the practice of the king's bench into use before justices of gaol-delivery and *oyer* and *terminer* to fine jurors in criminal causes for not observing the judges directions, and acquitting felons against their evidence, and accordingly a jury in *Gloucestershire* was fined 5*l.* a man for acquitting a person in-

dicted of burglary, the form of the fine was much the same as is hereafter mentiond, this fine was also estreated into the *Exchequer*, but all the court after great advice with the judges of the common pleas orderd a stay of process thereupon, as being neither warrantable by law nor antient precedents in any court less than *Eyre*.

At the gaol-delivery at *Newgate* 10 *Maii* 17 *Car.* 2. *Wagstaff* (i) and eleven other jurymen were fined five marks apiece for acquitting *Richard Tomson* and others indicted for conventicles, *Eo quod ipsi juratores adtunc & ibidem eosdem Ricardum Tomson &c. de prædictâ transgressione & contemptu contra regem hujus regni Angliæ, & contra plenam evidentiam, & contra directionem curiæ in materiâ legis ibidem de & super præmissis eisdem juratoribus versùs præfatos Ricardum Tomson &c. in dictâ curiâ ibidem apertè dat' & declarat' de præmissis eis impositis in indictamento prædicto acquieverunt in contemptum dicti domini regis nunc legumque suarum, & ad magnam obstructionem & impedimentum justitiæ, necnon in malum exemplum omnium aliorum juratorum in consimili casu delinquentiâ.*

They were thereupon committed, and brought their *habeas corpus* in the court of common-bench, and all the judges of *England* were assembled to consider of the legality of this fine, and the imprisonment thereupon, wherein there was some little diversity of opinion, whether without a cause of suit returned also, the common pleas could give judgment touching this fine, and if there were cause, deliver the party, or whether he must go into the king's bench by *habeas corpus* and *certiorari*.

[313] But it was agreed by all the judges of *England*, (one only dissenting,) that this fine was not legally set upon the jury, for they are the judges of matters of fact, and altho it was inserted in the fine, that it was *contra directionem curiæ in materiâ legis*, this mended not the matter, for it was impossible any matter of law could come in question, till the matter of fact were settled and stated and agreed by the jury, and of such matter of fact they were the only competent judges.

And altho the witnesses might perchance swear the fact to the satisfaction of the court, yet the jury are judges as well of the credibility of the witnesses, as of the truth of the fact, for possibly they might know somewhat of their own knowledge, that what was sworn

(i) In *Busbell's* case, *Vaugb.* 153.

was untrue, and possibly they might know the witnesses to be such as they could not believe, and it is the conscience of the jury, that must pronounce the prisoner *guilty* or *not guilty*.

And to say the truth, it were the most unhappy case that could be to the judge, if he at his peril must take upon him the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, and if the judge's opinion must rule the matter of fact, the trial by jury would be useless.

Whereupon, and upon view of the precedents in the court of common bench, where prisoners not legally committed or fined had been discharged, tho no cause of privilege were returned, the jurors were discharged of their imprisonment.

And therefore, altho the long use of fining jurors in the king's bench in criminal causes may give possibly a jurisdiction to fine in these cases, yet it can by no means be extended to other courts of sessions of gaol-delivery, *oyer and terminer*, or of the peace, or other inferior jurisdictions.

3 Wilson, 172, 177:

C H A P. XLIII.

[314]

Concerning standing mute, and the punishment of penance, or peine fort & dure. []*

I HAVE hitherto considered the pleas of the prisoner in capital causes; namely, 1. Confession. 2. Pleas in bar, and 3. Pleas to the felony, or *not guilty*.

And I have considered the proceedings in order to bring the party to his trial, and the trial thereupon by the jury.

It remains, that I should now come to consider what is to be done in case the prisoner will not answer, but stand mute and make no defense.

[*] But now by the statute 12 Geo. 3. c. 30. If any person being arraigned on any indictment or appeal of felony, or on any indictment for piracy, shall upon such arraignment stand mute, or will not answer directly to the felony or piracy, he shall be convicted of the offense, and the court shall thereupon award judgment and execution, in the same manner as if he had

been convicted by verdict or confession; and such judgment shall have all the same consequences, as a conviction by verdict or confession.

And the same law is, with respect to an arraignment for treason or petty larceny. See *Burn. Tit. Mute. 2 Inst. 177. 2 Hawk. P. C. 329:*

In this matter these things are considerable.

1. What shall be said in law a *standing mute*, and what not.
2. What the consequence or penalty is of a standing mute in capital causes, and therein of *peine fort and dure*.
3. What cautions are to be used before the inflicting of it.
4. By what law it is introduced.
- I. As to the first of these.

If the prisoner hath received his judgement already, or be convicted and brought to the bar, and demanded what he can say, why judgement should not be given against him, if convicted, or why execution should not be awarded, and he saith nothing, yet this is not such a standing mute as is in hand, for he is already convicted or attaint: And therefore in such case, if the party so called hath always remained in custody from the time of his plea of *not guilty*, if he be called to shew what he can say, why he should not have judgment

[315] upon his conviction or execution upon his former judgment, and he say nothing, it shall not be inquired, whether he can speak or not, but he shall not have present judgment or execution, as the case requires. 10 E. 4. 19. b. But if long time hath passed between his conviction or judgment and this second calling to the bar, it is prudent to make the inquiry, at least by witnesses, whether he can speak, for possibly he may have a pardon to plead.

But if a man abjure or be outlawd of felony, and after return again, and be taken and brought to the bar to shew cause why execution should not be done, if he stand mute, an inquest of office is to be taken by the court to inquire, whether he can speak or not, and if it be found, that by visitation of God since his abjuration, &c. he hath lost his speech, it shall be also inquired, whether it be the same person contained in the record of outlawry or abjuration, before judgment or execution (as the case requires), shall be awarded against him, for he may plead in bar of execution in such case, that he is not the same person. 10 E. 4. 19. b. 8 H. 4. 1. b. And so it seems to be, if he were brought in upon a *capias ut legal'* or *habeas corpus* by the sheriff; *de quo infra*.

And therefore the 'book of 26 Affiz. 19. that saith a party abjured standing mute shall have *peine fort & dure* is mistaken, for he shall be hanged, if he stand mute of malice. *Stamf. P. C. Lib. II. cap. 60. fol. 150. b.*

If

If a man indicted of felony demur to the indictment, and will not otherwise answer, this is no standing mute, but if the demurrer be ruled against him, he shall have judgment of death. 14 E. 4. 7. a. *per cur.*

If a man indicted or appeal'd of felony pleads *not guilty*, and puts himself upon the country, and the jury remains upon challenges till another day and then appears, and the prisoner at the bar will say nothing but stand mute, yet this is not a standing mute, for the inquest shall be taken upon the issue already joined; and so in an appeal. 15 E. 4. 33. b.

And yet even in that case it is possible the prisoner may be taken dumb between his plea and his trial, and so lose some advantages, that the law gives him for his defense, as challenges, [316] examination of witnesses and many matters for his defense; [therefore] the court hath used sometimes by inquest, sometimes by inquiry *ex officio* by the inquest impanelled to try his issue to inquire, whether he stand mute of malice, and then to try him, or if it be *ex visitatione Dei*, then to respite his trial, but if he spoke the same day in the hearing of the court, then such inquest of office is not taken, for the court is of their own knowledge ascertained of his ability to speak. 43 Affiz. 30. 8 H. 4. 1 & 2.

The standing mute of a prisoner is not, where he hath pleaded *not guilty* and put himself upon the country, tho afterwards he would retract it.

If a prisoner for felony plead *not guilty* and put himself upon the country, and when the jury appears he challengeth peremptorily above thirty-five, in such case the jury was not to be taken, but judgment of penance was anciently given against him, and so it was no attainder in case of felony. 17 Affiz. 6. 17 E. 3. 23. a. 14 E. 4. 7. a. 3 H. 7. 12. a. 2. a.

But the law herein was after declared otherwise, and by the advice of all the judges judgment of death shall be given, and so it was an attainder. 3 H. 7. 12. a. where it was settled for a rule in all circuits, and so it continued until 22 H. 8. cap. 14. when by act of parliament the challenge was reduced to twenty, and so the judgment of death upon peremptory challenge ceased, unless in high treason or petit treason, where it stands on foot as before, *vide Co. P. C. cap. 102. p. 227, 228.* who seems to hold, that for challenging above thirty-

thirty-five judgment of *peine fort & dure* shall be given according to 14 E. 4. 7. a. & 3 H. 7. 2. a. *per omnes justiciarios contra Keble.*

Regularly therefore a man is said to stand mute, when being arraigned for felony or treason, either 1. He answers not at all, or 2. If he answers with such matter, as is not allowable for answer, and will not answer otherwise, or 3. Where he pleads *not guilty*, but when demanded how he will be tried, either will say nothing, or not put himself upon the country.

[317] If he stand mute and say nothing at all, in case of felony the court ought *ex officio* to impanel a jury and swear it as an inquest of office to inquire, whether he stand mute of malice, and if found so, he shall have the judgment of *peine fort & dure*, or whether it be *ex visitatione Dei*, and if found so, they are to inquire touching all those points, which he might possibly plead for himself, as whether a felony were done, whether he be the same person, that is indicted for it, whether he did it, and whether he hath any matter to alledge for his discharge.

But what if all this be found against the prisoner, what shall be done? whether judgment of death shall be given against him, tho he never pleaded, seems yet undetermined (a).

If a man plead *not guilty*, and being demanded how he will be tried answers by God and holy church 4 E. 4. 11. a. or delivers in a protection 7 E. 4. 29. a. *Coron.* 30. or will not put himself upon trial of his country, this is a standing mute, as much as if he had not at all pleaded.

II. As to the consequences of standing mute.

In case of an indictment of high treason, the party standing mute, judgment of high treason shall be given against him as upon a *nihil dicit*, M. 3 & 4 Eliz. Dy. 205. a. *rule accordant. Stamf. P. C. Lib. II. cap. 60. fol. 150. a. 2 Co. Inst. super stat' Westm' 1 cap. 12. vide infra, cap. 44.*

In an appeal antiently it had been held, that if the prisoner stands mute, judgment should be given for the appellant. 21 E. 3. 18. a. (*).

But afterwards the law was held all one in case of an appeal and of an indictment, namely the defendant standing mute judgment of *peine fort & dure* was given against him, and the statute of *Westm' 1. cap.*

(a) Vide B. *Corone* 217. where a person, who could neither speak nor hear, was arraigned for felony; vide Part I. p. 34. in notes.

(*) See *State Tr. Vol. I. p. 367.* lord Audley's case.

12. speaks only of the king's suit, (+) *vide* 43 *Affiz.* 30. 3 *H.* 7. 2. a. 14 *E.* 4. 7. a.

If a man be indicted of felony and stands mute, he shall be put to penance, *T.* 18 *E.* 2. *B. R. Rot.* 20. *in dorso*, *Berks, rex* (b). And yet *vide* *H.* 18 *E.* 3. *B. R. Rot.* 16. *Ebor. rex, Petrus* [318] *Geildhird* arraigned (c) *pro deprædatione in regid viâ* stood mute, and an inquest of office being charged to inquire, if it were wilful, and found so, he had judgment to be hanged.

On the other side *T.* 30 *E.* 3 *Rot.* 11. *in dorso* *Hunt. rex*, The bishop of *Ely* arraigned for felony *dicit, quod ipse est membrum sanctæ ecclesiæ, & episcopus unctus, & frater domini Papæ*, and that he could not answer without the archbishop of *Canterbury* [his ordinary] *coram laico iudice*; there went out thereupon a writ to the sheriff of *Hunt.* to return twenty-four to inquire of the whole fact, and by the inquest he was found guilty of the felony charged upon him, [*de receptamento felonum*] and his goods seised, but he was demanded by the archbishop of *Cant.* and delivered to him as a member of holy church, so that there the fact was inquired of, tho the bishop refused to answer, which was a kind of standing mute (d).

By the statute of 33 *H.* 8. *cap.* 12. any person arraigned before the lord steward for treason, murder, manslaughter, or blood-shed in the king's palace, and standing mute shall have judgment, as if convicted so there is no penance in that case.

But upon the statute of 28 *H.* 8. *cap.* 15. for commissioners of the admiralty proceeding in maritime felonies, &c. there is no such exclusive provision, and therefore they follow herein the [319]

(+) 2 *Co. Inst.* 178.

(b) This was the case of *Stephen le Ferroux*, who was indicted before justices of oyer and terminer *pro receptamento felonum*, and upon being arraigned *mutum se tenuit*, a jury was impannelled *ex officio*, who found *quod mutum se tenet de mera & spontanea voluntate sua, & quod loqui potest si velit*, and he was thereupon put to penance, *ad penam*; the record was removed by writ of error *coram rege*, where he pleaded *not guilty*, and was committed to the marshal and afterwards produced the king's pardon, *Ideo inde quietus*.

(c) It appears by the record, that it was not upon arraignment, that he stood mute, for he had fled from justice and was outlawed, but being afterwards taken he was brought into court, and demanded why execution should not be done upon him in

pursuance of the outlawry, to this he made no answer; but this is not a standing mute to the purpose in hand, as our author himself hath shewn at the beginning of this chapter.

(d) This was not properly a standing mute, but a claiming the benefit of clergy, (which in antient times was usually done before pleading,) and was of the like nature with the case of *Alan de Beckingham Mich.* 20 & 21 *Edw.* 1 *Rot.* 4. *in dorso coram rege, Nottingham*, see *Part* 1. p. 343. *in notis*. and the case of *John de Bosco, P.* 6 *E.* 2. *B. R. Rot.* 2. *Essex*, see *Part* 1. p. 180. *in notis*, the reason therefore, why the fact was inquired of, was the same in this case, as in those, *viz.* that it might be known *pro quali ordinario liberari debeat*, whether as a clerk convict or acquit. *Vide* 2 *Co. Inst.* p. 633.

course of the common law, so that any person indicted for piracy before these commissioners standing mute shall have judgment of *peine fort & dure*. *T. 7. Eliz. Dy. 241. b. Brooke's case.*

The judgment of *peine fort & dure* is, as it is recited by *Stamf. P. C. Lib. II. cap. 60. fol. 150. b. & 4 E. 4. 11 b. viz.* "That he be sent to the prison from whence he came, and put into a dark, lower room, and there to be laid naked upon the bare ground upon his back without any clothes or rushes under him or to cover him except his privy members, his legs and arms drawn and extended with cords to the four corners of the room, and upon his body laid as great a weight of iron, as he can bear, and more. And the first day he shall have three morsels of barley bread without drink, the second day he shall have three draughts of water, of standing water next the door of the prison, without bread, and this to be his diet till he die" (c). *Vide the entry thereof Rast. Entries 385. a.*

This judgment is given for his contempt in refusing his legal trial, and therefore he thereby forfeits his goods, but it is no attainder, nor gives any escheat or corruption of blood: *vide 34 E. 3. Escheat 10. Dy. 308. a. 14 E. 4. 7. a.*

The severity of the judgment is to bring men to put themselves upon their legal trial, and tho sometimes it hath been given and executed, yet for the most part men bethink themselves and plead.

If a peer of the realm arraigned upon an indictment of felony before his peers refuses to plead, [he shall have] this judgment of *peine fort & dure*. *P. 17 Car. 1. casus domini Castlehaven. (f).*

And a woman shall have the same judgment if she stands mute. *2 Co. Inst. 177. super stat. Westm' 1. cap. 12. Wiseman's case there cited.*

[320] If a man be indicted of petit larceny and refuses to plead, it seems judgment of *peine fort & dure* shall not be given, but the party convict, for he is not to have judgment of death.

But if a woman be indicted for simple larceny of goods under 10s. tho she shall not die for it, but only be burnt in the hand by the statute of 21 Jac. cap. 6. yet if she refuses to plead, the judgment of *peine fort & dure* shall be given against her, because it may fall out upon the case, that she hath been burnt in the hand before, and then she is to be executed; and it is but a privilege, as clergy is, which she must put herself by her defense into a capacity of enjoying.

(c) But before they proceed to this extremity, it has been the practice to endeavour to make the prisoner plead by tying

his thumbs together with whip cord. *Thorely's case Kel. 27.*

(f) *State Tr. Vol. 1. p. 367.*

If a new felony be made by act of parliament, tho it makes no provision touching the penalty of standing mute, yet it is a necessary consequence thereof, tho not specially provided for, if it be not ousted by the act, that makes it felony; as clergy is an incident to every new created felony, unless specially ousted by act of parliament (*), for they are incidents: *vide Dy.* 241. *b.*

And therefore in rape, tho made felony by *Westm'* 2. *cap.* 34. if the party indicted stand mute, he shall have judgment of penance. *P.* 7 *Car.* 1. lord *Caslehaven's* case.

Tho judgment be given of *peine fort & dure*, yet if the offense laid in the indictment be within clergy, his clergy shall be allowed him, which appears by the statutes of 23 *H.* 8. *cap.* 1. 25 *H.* 8. *cap.* 3. and other statutes that oust clergy, where the party stands mute, in some particular cases, and by the books.

III. As for the third general, the necessary cautions to be used in inflicting this severe punishment are these.

1. Let not the judgment be too hastily given, let the prisoner have not only *trina admonitio*, but also some convenient respite, possibly till the afternoon, to bethink himself, if the arraignment be in the morning; or till the next morning, if the arraignment be in the afternoon: and let the judgment itself be distinctly read to him, that he may know his danger before his final refusal with due admonition [321] not to destroy himself. 4 *E.* 4. 11. *b.*

2. Before any judgment final be given, if the prisoner stands wholly mute and says nothing at all, let an inquest of office be taken to inquire, whether it be *ex malitiâ*, or *ex visitatione Dei*, unless he hath spoken in court the same day, *vide Rast. Entries* title *gaol-delivery*.

3. And likewise let the judge hear the witnesses upon oath to give a probable testimony of his guilt, for tho his malicious silence carries with it a presumption of guilt, yet it is good to have some concurrent testimony. 1. In respect of the severity of the judgment. 2. Because the statute of *Westm'* 1. *cap.* 12. *de quo infra*, seems to require it.

4. If the offense laid in the indictment be within clergy, tho in strictness of law the prisoner ought to pray it, yet it is the duty of the judge to allow it, tho not prayed, and that as well after judgment pronounced as before.

IV. Concerning the fourth particular, by what law this judgment of *peine fort & dure* is introduced.

(*) *Vide Part I. p.* 704.

By the statute of *Weslm'* 1. cap. 12. *Purvieu est ensement que les felons eseries, & queux sont apertement de male fame, & ne soy voilent mitter en enquest de felonies, que homes met sur eux devant justices a la suit le roy soient mises en la prison fort & dure, come ceux queux refusent estre al common ley de la terre, mes ceo nest my a entendre pur prisoners, que sont prises per legier suspicion.*

Some (*h*) have antiently thought, that this act of parliament introduced the penance, and therefore they did antiently think it did not extend to an appeal, because that is the suit of the party and not the suit of the king, *de quo antea* p. 317.

But it seems, that altho this statute is in some points directive, namely, that it should be applied to those, that are of ill fame, and not those, who are taken upon a light suspicion, and therefore the court before they give this judgment ought either by inquest of office, or at least by examination of witnesses to inquire concerning the probabilities of the guilt: *vide Stamf. P. C. Lib. II. cap. 60. fol.*

[322] 150. *a.* yet this statute doth not originally introduce the penance, but it was to be done by the common law, and accordingly it is agreed by my lord *Coke* in his comment upon this statute 2 *Inst.* p. 179.

And this appears 1. Because this statute only speaks of imprisonment *fort & dure*, but enacts not the punishment itself by this lingering painful death, therefore the punishment, as it is thus inflicted, was at common law, and is by force of the common law. 2. Because tho some antient opinions were, that it extended not to the case of an appeal of felony, yet the law hath constantly for many ages extended it to an appeal (*i*), which cannot be by force of this statute, but by the common law.

3. The antients, as *Fleta* (*k*), *Britton* (*l*) and *Horn* (*m*), tho they wrote since the making of this statute, mention the penance without referring of it to this act of *Weslm'* 1. (*n*).

C H A P.

(*b*) *Stamf. P. C. 129. b. Poulton de pace regis 211. b.*

(*i*) *Kel. 371*

(*k*) *Lib. I. cap. 34. § 83.*

(*l*) *Cap. 4. § 23. & cap. 22. § 73.*

(*m*) *Mirror, cap. 1. § 9.*

(*n*) This statute was made 3 *E. 1.* and tho by the manner of the exprellion it does not seem to have introduced this penance, but rather speaks of it as a thing already known, yet I cannot find, that it is ever

taken notice of in any antient author, book, case, or record before the reign of *E. 1.* on the contrary I find some instances in the preceding reign of persons arraigned for felony standing mute, who yet were not put to their penance, but had judgment to be hanged; at which time it seems to have been the usual practice, that if the prisoner stood wilfully mute, a jury of twelve were impannelled *ex officio*, and if they found him guilty, another jury of twenty

C H A P. XLIV.

Concerning clergy how it stood at common law, and how generally at this day.

HAVING in the former chapter gone through the pleas and trials of the prisoners, and the proceeding upon standing mute, I come to consider the *privilegium clericale*, and I the rather refer it to be examined in this place, because the antiently clergy was prayed and allowed upon the arraignment of the prisoner, yet at this day it is rarely done but upon his conviction or standing mute, and this is, 1. For the convenience of the court to be ascertained first of the nature of the crime by the confession or trial of the prisoner. 2. For the advantage of the prisoner, who possibly may be acquitted, and so need not the benefit of clergy: *vide Hob. Rep. 288. Searle & Williams.*

And for the full discussion of this matter, (which I must needs say is one of the most involved and troublesome titles in the law,) I shall, as near as I can, hold this method. 1. To consider somewhat in general touching the original and alteration of the privilege of clergy. 2. In what cases it is to be allowed, and in what not (*a*). 3. What persons are capable of this privilege, and what not (*b*). 4. At what time it is to be allowed, and when not (*c*). 5. The manner how it is to be allowed, and who the judge of it (*d*). 6. The consequence of the praying or allowing of it (*e*).

twenty-four were chosen to examine the verdict of the former; and if they were of the same opinion, the prisoner was sentenced to be hanged. *Placita coronæ coram iustic' itinerant' in comitatū Warwicensi anno 5 H. 3. Rot. 1.*

Aynges, quæ fuit uxor *Roberti de Bosco*, appellat *Thomam filium Huberti de morve Roberti viri sui*, & *Thomas* venit, & quia ipsa habet virum *Robertum de Verdun* nomine, qui nullum facit appellum, ipsa non habet vocem appellandi, & ideo inquiratur veritas per patriam, & *Thomas* defendit mortem, sed non vult ponere se super patriam, & xii juratores dicunt, quod culpabilis est de morte illâ, & xxiv milites, alii a prædictis xii, ad hoc electi idem dicunt, & ideo suspendatur.

Catalla Thomæ xxxiv. solidos & vi denarios, unde vicecomes respondebit.

Ibidem in dorso. "*Thomas de la Herbe* captus per indictmentum pro furtis & aliis nequitiiis & pro receptamento venit, & non vult ponere se super patriam; & juratores dicunt super sacramentum suum, quod male credunt eum de receptamento *Holbe Golightly*, qui fuit latro cognitus, & postea suspensus apud *Caumped'em*, & de hoc & de aliis furtis eum male credunt, & xxiv milites ad hoc electi dicunt idem, quod prædicti xii juratores, & quod latro est de ovibus & de averiis & aliis rebus, & ideo suspendatur.

(*a*) *Cap. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.*

(*b*) *Cap. 51.*

(*c*) *Cap. 52.*

(*d*) *Cap. 53.*

(*e*) *Cap. 54.*

For the first of these, namely the original and progress of this *privilegium clericale*.

Antiently princes and states converted to christianity in favour of the clergy, and for their encouragement in their offices and employments, and that they might not be so much intangled in suits, did grant to the clergy very bountiful privileges and exemptions, principally of two kinds. 1. Exemption of places consecrated to religious duties [324] from arrests of crimes, which was the original of sanctuaries. 2. Exemption of their persons from criminal proceedings in some cases capital before secular judges, which was the true original of the *privilegium clericale*.

The clergy increasing in wealth, power, honour, number and interest, afterwards set up for themselves, and that, which they obtained by the favour of princes and states at first, they now began to claim as their right, and a right of the highest nature, namely *jure divino*; and by their canons and constitutions endeavoured, and (where they met with tame and easy princes and states,) obtained vast extensions of these exemptions. 1. In the person concerned, namely to all that had any kind of subordinate ministration relative to the church. 2. In the causes, exempting as far as they could all causes of clergymen, as well civil as criminal, from the jurisdiction of the secular power, and wholly subordinating them immediately and only to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which they supposed to be lodged first in the pope by divine right and investiture from *Christ*, and from the pope shed abroad into all subordinate and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, whether ordinary or delegate.

And by this means they endeavoured and in some kingdoms and for some ages obtained, that there was a double supreme power, or two kingdoms in every kingdom, the one a *regnum ecclesiasticum*, absolute and independant upon any but the pope over ecclesiastical men and causes, exempt and separate from the secular magistrate; the other a *regnum seculare* of the king or civil magistrate, which yet was not so absolute, but that it had subordination and subjection to this *regnum ecclesiasticum*; so it was *regnum sub graviore regno*.

He that lists to see the whole scheme of their claim, let him read *Suarez* his large discourse of the *monumenta ecclesiastica* in his *opuscula*.

But altho the usurpations of the pope were very great and obtained much in this kingdom, until the extermination of his pretended supremacy by king *H. 8.* yet this claim of the exemption of the clergy totally

totally from secular jurisdiction grew so burdensome and intolerable, that it was from time to time qualified and abridged by the civil power, sometimes by acts of parliament taking it away in some cases, sometimes by the interpretation and construction of the judges, and sometimes by the contray usage of the kingdom; for ecclesiastical canons never bound in *England* farther than they were received, and so had not their authority from their own strength and obligation, but from the usages and customs of the kingdom that admitted them, and only so far forth as they were so admitted. And therefore,

I. As to the exemption of the clergy from civil suits between party and party only, if upon the *disfringas* he was returned *clericus & beneficiatus non habens laicum sedum*, process issued to the bishop to bring him in, and in case of a statute merchant they were by special acts exempted from arrests by *capias*. But yet they were not exempt from the jurisdiction of civil courts in civil causes, yet antiently they attempted this also in the king's courts but with ill success, and so they never attempted it after, that I remember.

M. 7 & 8 E. 1. B. R. Rot. 13. Cant. William Joye plaintiff [brought an action] against *Guy Mortimer* rector of *Kingston* for beating him and cutting off his upper lip with a knife, the defendant pleaded *quod ipse est clericus, & non debet hic respondere*, and that was all the answer he would give, *Et quia querela ista non tangit vitam & membrum, sed est de quâdam transgressione personali, nec ipse vult in curiâ domini regis respondere ad querelam istam*, judgment was given for the plaintiff to recover 100*l.* damages taxed by the court, and [the defendant was] committed to gaol, and afterwards paid twenty marks to the king for a fine (*o*).

II. If they were indicted in cases criminal but not capital, nor wherein they were to lose life or limb, there *privilegium clericale* was

(*o*) The record of that case was thus, "*Willielmus Joye de Kyngeston queritur de Guydone de mortuo mari, rectore ecclesiæ de Kyngeston, & Thomâ le Clerk de Harengton de hoc, quod Thomas simul cum aliis ex præcepto prædicti Guydonis ipsum Willielmum insultaverunt, verberaverunt, & male traxerunt, ita quod de vitâ ipsius desperabatur, & dictus Guydo manû suâ propriâ, & knypulo suo labium ipsius Willielmi superius absceidit, unde dicit quod deterioratus est & dampnum habet ad valentiam centum librarum; & inde producit sectam. Et prædicti Guydo & Thomas veniunt & dicunt, quod clerici sunt, & non debent hic re-*

spondere, & sæpius quæsitum si velint respondere, semper dicunt quod clerici sunt, & sine ordinariis suis nolunt respondere. Et quia querela ista non tangit vitam & membrum, sed est de quâdam transgressione personali, nec ipsi volunt in curiâ domini regis respondere ad querelam istam, consideratum est, quod prædicti Guydo & Thomas de prædictâ transgressione convincantur, & satisfaciant prædicto Willielmo Joye de dampnis, scilicet quilibet eorum de centum libris, & domino regi de misericordiâ, & committantur gaolæ pro transgressione &c.

not allowd them, and therefore not in indictments of trespass, petty larciny, or killing *se defendendo*. *Stamf. P. C. fol. 124. a.*

III. If they were not indicted of high treason, clergy was not allowable, and therefore *Hill. 2 H. 4. Rot. 4. B. R. rex*, where the bishop of *Carlisle* was indicted of high treason, and insisted upon his *privilegium clericale, quia episcopus unctus*, yet this claim was disallowd and he put upon his trial, and convicted (*p*).

Yet *Hill. 17 E. 2. Rot. 87. in dorso, Heref. coram rege*, the bishop of *Hereford* indicted of high treason for leyying war against the king alleged, that he was *episcopus Heref. ad voluntatem Dei & summi pontificis*, and could not answer *absque offensâ divinâ & sanctæ ecclesiæ*. Thereupon the plea was adjourned into parliament, where the bishop answered as before, and the archbishop of *Canterbury* claimed him and had him; thereupon it was ordered, that day should be given in the king's bench to the bishop, and the archbishop was to have him there at the day, and in the mean time a writ issued to the sheriff of *Heref.* to return twenty-four to inquire, as if he had pleaded, [*quòd venire faciat tot & tales, &c. ad inquirendum prout moris est, &c. pro quali, &c.*] returnable at the same day; the bishop appeared accordingly in the custody of the archbishop, and the jury found

[327] him guilty, *Ideo considerat' est, quòd prædictus episcopus tanquam convictus &c. remaneat penes prædictum archiepiscopum ut prius, &c.* and all his goods and chattels, lands and tenements were seised into the king's hands by writ directed to the sheriff: Upon which it is observable, 1. That a kind of allowance is made of clergy in high treason. 2. That notwithstanding his claim of clergy, yet a writ issued to summon a jury, who inquired whether guilty or not. 3. That upon this plea and this inquisition, tho he had his clergy, it was *ut clericus convictus*.

Nota in the parliament of the 1 *E. 3.* this judgment was reversed for this cause, that the justices took the inquisition, *licet idem episcopus in aliquam inquisitionem se non posuisset.* *Claus. 1 E. 3. Part I. M. 13.* so that the judgment was given upon the inquisi-

(*p*) The treason given in the record is in these words, "Quicumque ligens domino regi, cujuscunque status, seu conditionis, spiritualis, vel temporalis fuerit, in terrâ *Angliæ* pro altâ proditione & crimine læsæ majestatis indictatus est, & coram rege, vel justiciariis suis inde arrenatus tenetur, & debet per legem

Angliæ inde respondere.

Yet in antient times a difference was made between treasons, that were immediately against the king's person, and other treasons; *vide Part I. p. 185, 186. 222. in notis*; and the case of the bishop of *Hereford* here mentioned.

tion, and not upon *nihil dicit* for standing mute, and therefore erroneous (q).

But afterwards *T. 21 E. 3. Rot. 23. Hertford, rex, John Gerberge*, was indicted for a constructive treason namely, accroaching royal power, *de quo vide supra, Part I. cap. 11. p. 80. 138.* and thereupon claimed the privilege of clergy, *Et quia privilegium clericale in hujusmodi casu seditionis secundum legem & consuetudinem regni hætenus obtentas & usitatas non est allocandum &c. quæsitum est ab eo sepius qualiter se velit acquietare*, he still replied, that he was a clerk, *asserens se nolle aliam responsonem exhibere*; and thereupon he [328] is committed to the marshal *ad pænitentiam suam secundum legem & consuetudinem regni subiturum &c.*

Nota clergy denied in such a treason, yet penance awarded, tho the charge was treason.

Yet at common law before the statute of *25 E. 3. cap. 4. pro clero*, it seems that clergy was allowable to him that was indicted for counterfeiting coin, or for counterfeiting money. *B. Clergy 1.* But that is altered by the statute of *25 E. 3. pro clero*.

IV. If clerks were indicted with these clauses *insidiatores viarum & depopulatores agrorum*, clergy was denied them, and therefore the act of *4 H. 4. cap. 2.* was made to put these clauses out of indictments and to allow clergy, if they were in the indictment.

Again, as it was denied in respect of some offenses, so this *privilegium clericale* was by the common law abridged in respect of the person; for certainly by the canon laws Nuns had the exemption from

(q) The error of this judgment consisted not merely in its being given upon an inquisition "in quam episcopus se non posuisset," but because it was given upon an inquest, "in quam episcopus se non posuisset," after he had been allowed his clergy and delivered to his ordinary. For the *Placita Coronæ* of those times shew, that it was the constant practice of inquests *ex officio* to pass upon clerks pleading their *privilegium clericale*, where clergy was allowable the method whereof was thus. The clerk upon his arraignment pleaded his *privilegium clericale*; then came the ordinary and demanded him; then a jury *ex officio* was summoned to inquire into the truth of the charge; or as it is express in this record, "ad inquirendum, prout moris est, pro quali, &c. (i. e. pro quali ei dem ordinario liberari debeat," and according to such inquest, the clerk was delivered to the ordinary as acquit, or con-

viſt. Thus are the entries upon the rolls, "*A. B. indictatus de felonîa, ed quod, &c. & ductus coram rege, & allocutus qualiter se velit de felonîa prædictâ acquietare, dicit quod clericus est, & sine ordinario suo non debet hic responderet. Et super hoc venit C. D. &c. Et petit ipsum tanquam clericum sibi liberari; sed ut sciatur pro quali eadem ordinario liberari debeat, inquiratur rei veritas per patriam.*" Then a jury *ex officio* was summoned, by which if it was found, "*Quod A. B. non est culpabilis, liberatur ordinario pro tali &c.*" But if culpabilis "*liberatur ordinario tanquam clericus convictus, salvo custodiendus, sub pænâ quâ decet &c.*" *Vide M. 20 & 21 E. 1. Rot. 4. in dorso, B. R. Hill. 22 E. 1. Rot. 15. Ibid. Trin. 30 E. 3. Rot. 11. B. R. Res. Trin. 31 E. 3. Rot. 15. Ibid. Rex.*

temporal jurisdiction, but the privilege of clergy was never allowed them by our law: *vide stat' 21 Jac. (r)*.

Again, tho the ordinary took himself to be the judge of the allowance of the clergy and of the purgation of the clerk, yet the king's courts took that courage to make the ordinary but a minister, and themselves judges of the allowance and disallowance of the clergy and purgation. 21 E. 4. 21. b. 9 E. 4. 28. a.

And so the judges of the common law would oftentimes deliver the clerk to the ordinary, but *absque purgatione*, as where the clerk is attaint by outlawry or by judgment, or convict by his own confession, or upon an appeal. *Stamf. P. C. Lib. II. cap. 49. 3 H. 7. 12. a. 10 E. 3. Coron. 247. Hob. Rep. 288. Searle & Williams*, or if he were a notorious malefactor, *vide 10 E. 3. Corrn. 247.* or if he be convict by verdict of counterfeiting the seal or coin at common law before the statute of 25 E. 3. *Lib. Parl. 18 E. 1. Berton's case* (*), or if he be committed by record to the ordinary *absque purgatione*. *Hob. ubi supra.*

And in these cases, if the ordinary admitted him to his purgation, he was fineable for it as a great misdemeanor, and the party delivered by such purgation shall be again committed to prison, *M. 34 & 35 E. 1 Rot. 59. Kanc. B. R. the case of Hugh Forsham* delivered by *William Testa*, and another commissioned from the pope (s); and the entry in such cases is, *liberatur ordinario tanquam clericus convictus & utlegatus ad salvò custodiend' periculo, quòd incumbit &c. & inhibetur eidem ordinario, nè ad aliquam purgationem ipsius A. B. procedat domino rege inconsulto, eò quòd prædictus A. B. pro felonis &c. utlegatus est &c. H. 14 E. 3. B. R. Rot. 19. Rex. Suff. Lond.* The case of *John de Hemmyngeston* chaplain. But indeed, if the clerk had had his clergy and were generally delivered to the ordinary, he might

(r) Cap. 28. §. 6 & 7.

(*) *Ryley's Plac. Parl. p. 56.*

(s) That case was thus: Whilst the temporalities of the archbishop of Canterbury were in the king's hands, two clerks convict of felony imprisoned in the archbishop's prison had been admitted to purgation, and delivered out of custody by master *Hugh Forsham*, "Per mandatum magistrorum *Willielmi Testa*, & *Gealdi*, clericorum papæ, administratorum spiritualitatis archiepiscopatus prædicti, absque mandato domini regis." *Forsham* was brought *coram rege*, and arraigned for the said offence; and the keeper of the

gaol was also arraigned for bringing the said clerks. "coram prælato *Hagone* ad purgandum, absque præcepto domini regis;" and were both convicted by their own confession, and committed to the marshal, "Et postea finem fecerunt pro transgressione & contemptu prædictis." Afterwards the two clerks, who had been delivered by such purgation, were brought from the tower, where they had been imprisoned by the king's writ. "Et separatim allocuti qualiter de feloniam prædictam se velint acquietare, dicunt quod clerici sunt, & liberantur ordinario sub pena, quâ decet, &c.

admit him to make his purgation, and upon signification thereof by the ordinary into the chancery a writ should issue to the sheriff to deliver unto the party so purged all his goods and chattels seised into the king's hands upon that occasion, *nisi fugam fecerit eâ occasione*. *F. N. B.* 66. *a* And all this is to shew, that whatsoever weight the clergymen laid upon their canons and their exemptions from the secular jurisdictions, yet their canons or constitutions, or pretensions or claims of this kind were not binding here, nor so taken farther than either by acts of parliament or the common acceptance of the kingdom they were received, and therefore these privileges received divers alterations and corrections and restrictions by [330] the temporal judges, as the occasion required.

2 Hawk. P. C. ch. 33 per totum. 4 Blackf. Com. ch. 28. per tot. See Index to Foster. Tit. Clergy. Burn. Title Clergy. f. 2. Benefit of Clergy. 3. Peere Williams. 439—504.

C H A P. XLV.

In what offenses clergy is allowable or not.

NOW touching the offenses, wherein clergy is or was allowable, and in what not.

There are these general rules, that have influence in this whole discourse.

1. That in case of high treason against the king clergy was never allowable in this kingdom.
2. That at common law in all cases of felony or petit treason clergy was allowable, excepting two.
3. That where a statute makes a new felony, clergy is incident thereunto, unless it be specially taken away by acts of parliament; but where it makes a new treason, there is no clergy.

Upon these generals much of the succeeding business of this chapter, and some that follow will be built.

I. As to the first of these I say generally in all cases of high treason clergy was never allowed.

And this proposition will be considered two ways. 1. How the common law stood before the statute of 25 E. 3. *pro clero*, and 2. How it stood after.

The statute of 25 E. 3. *for the clergy* was made in the parliament held in *Hill. 25 E. 3.* which was in the same parliament, wherein the statute of declaration of treason is made, commonly called the *The statute of purveyance.*

By this statute *pro clero cap. 4.* it is enacted, "That all manner of
 [331] "clerks, as well secular as religious, which shall be from
 "henceforth convict before secular judges for any treasons
 "or felonies touching other persons than the king himself or his
 "royal majesty, shall from henceforth have and enjoy the privilege
 "of holy church, and shall be without impeachment or delay delivered to the ordinaries demanding them, and upon this the arch-bishop promiseth, that upon the punishment and safe keeping of such clerks offenders, which shall be delivered to the ordinaries, he shall thereof make a convenient ordinance, whereby they shall be safely kept and duly punished, so that no clerk shall take courage to offend for default of correction.

At the same parliament it was declared what was treason, and among the rest counterfeiting the great or privy seal, or the king's coin is declared treason, and put in the same rank with compassing the king's death or levying of war, and it is thereby enacted, "That no other offenses, than what are therein declared, be treason till declared by parliament.

Before this statute there were two sorts of treasons, that concerned the king, one was of a greater note, and another of a less note.

Those of the greater note were *conspiring the king's death, levying of war against the king, adhering to his enemies*, and two others, that are since abrogated by the statute of 25 E. 3. which came under the general and obscure names of *sedition*, and *accroaching of royal power.*

In any of these a party convict had not his clergy at common law, this appears by the judgment cited in the former chapter (a). *T. 21 E. 3. B. R. Rot. 23. Rex.*

But there were other treasons, that concerned the king, which were of an inferior note, namely *counterfeiting the seal and counterfeiting the coin* and these, (the latter especially,) had only judgment as in case of petit treason, namely to be drawn and hanged.

And it seems before the statute of 25 E. 3. *de proditionibus* clergy was allowed in both cases, as appears by the old book of *E. 3. B. R.*

title *Clergy, placito ultimo*, and the judgment in parliament of 18 E. 1. in *Berton's case*, who being convict for counterfeiting the king's seal had his clergy, but *tradatur ordinario sine purgatione (b)*.

But now as to the statute of 25 E. 3. *pro clero*, and the statute of 25 E. 3. at the same parliament *de prodicionibus* laying them both together in all cases of treason touching the king himself or his royal majesty clergy is wholly taken away, and in all other cases of treason or felony clergy is allowd; and consequently in murder, robbery, petit treason clergy is settled by this act of parliament.

But whatsoever is declared treason against the king by the statute of 25 E. 3. *de prodicionibus*, as well counterfeiting the seal or the money of the kingdom, as any other treason therein declared, is wholly exempted from clergy. 19 H. 6. 47. *b. Stamf. P. C. Lib. II. cap. 42. fol. 124. a. M. 31 E. 3. coram rege Rot. 18. Rex, in dorso, Bucks, casus abbatis de Mussenden (c) pro rescacatione & falsificatione legalis monete*, 24 H. 8. *Spelman's Rep. accordant adjudge. 2 Co. Instit. 635, 636. super Artic' cleri.*

So that at this day in all cases of high treason, whether those declared by the statute of 25 E. 3. *de prodicionibus*, or any other treasons newly enacted since, the privilege of clergy is wholly taken away; and, (which is the second proposition above mentiond.)

II. In all felonies, that were at common law before the statute of 25 E. 3. *pro clero*, and in all cases of petit treason by that statute the privilege of clergy is restored and settled.

And therefore in all such felonies or petit treasons, which were such at the time of the statute of 25 E. 3. *cap. 4. pro clero* clergy is allowable, unless in such cases where it is taken away by subsequent acts of parliament, and so far forth only as the same is so taken away.

But in what cases subsequent acts of parliament have taken away clergy, where at the time of the statute of 25 E. 3. it was allowable, shall be the business of the next chapter.

But yet there seem to be two felonies, where clergy was not allowable notwithstanding this act, namely certain acts, [333] that by interpretation of law were hostile acts, which was the reason, that I long since heard Mr. Noy then the king's attorney give for it

(b) Vide supra p. 328. See also Part I. p. 185, 186, in notis, & p. 223. in notis.

(c) Part I. p. 216.

in the king's bench about 7 Car. 1. viz. 1. *Insidiato viarum* & *depopulatio agrorum*. 2. Wilful burning of houses.

1. Concerning the former of these it appears, that *insidiatores viarum* and *depopulatores agrorum* were ousted of their clergy notwithstanding the statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 4. *pro clero*.

Rot. Parl. 4 H. 4. n. 30. there was a complaint in parliament by the archbishop of *Canterbury* and clergy, whereupon it was enacted, that *that* general clause should be left out in indictments and words of the same effect inserted, and that notwithstanding the indictment carried the same effect, yet benefit of clergy should not be denied, as appears at large by the statute of 4 H. 4. cap. 2.

2. As touching wilful burning of houses I have heard, as before, that clergy was not allowable by the common law, but of this more fully in the next chapter.

Now touching *sacrilege* tho some later statutes were made to oust clergy in that crime, yet it seems at common law or at least after the statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 4. *pro clero* it was allowable, as appears 26 *Affiz.* 27. where it is agreed by the justices, that a person indicted of robbing a chapel and breaking a church should have his clergy; but it seems, it was with this difference, that if the ordinary refused him, as he might, he should not have his clergy. 20 E. 2. *Coron.* 283. *Stamf. P. C.* 123, 124, but otherwise the court would allow it him. 26 *Affiz.* 27.

See the references at the end of Ch. XLIV. ante.

[334]

C H A P. XLVI.

Where and in what offenses, *that where capital at common law*, clergy is taken away in part or in all by acts of parliament subsequent to 25 E. 3. and first of petit treason.

I HAVE before declared what capital offenses were exempt from clergy at common law, and how the law stood in relation thereunto before and by the statute of 25 E. 3. and have there settled it, that regularly in all capital offenses, except treasons, which touch the king, the offender is to have the privilege of his clergy.

But

But as touching treasons, that touch the king, by virtue of the common law and the declaration of that statute the benefit or privilege of clergy is not allowable, neither is there any statute, that hath altered the law in that point of treason, but it stands still excluded from the privilege of clergy.

But as to petit treason and felonies subsequent statutes have made great alterations as to the point of clergy from what was declared by the statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 4. *pro clero*.

The inquiry therefore touching the alterations made by subsequent statutes in point of petit treason and felony may be considered in this method.

1. What alterations have been made by acts of parliament in relation to new felonies made by acts of parliament since 25 E. 3. And

2. What alterations have been made in such offenses, as were petit treason or felony at the time of the making of that statute.

I. As to the former of these this general rule holds, that if an act of parliament make a felony, and doth not take away clergy [335] in exprefs words, in all those cases clergy is allowable.

And if it doth make a felony and takes away clergy not generally, but in such or such cases, regularly in other cases clergy is allowable, as if it takes away clergy in case the party be convicted by verdict, yet he shall have his clergy, if he stand mute.

But if it enacts generally, that it shall be felony without benefit of clergy, or that he shall suffer as in case of felony without benefit of clergy, this excludes it in all circumstances, and to all intents; and because I have before in the particular enumeration of felonies by act of parliament taken notice all along what are excluded of clergy and what not, I shall dismiss that part of the inquiry referring myself to the several acts of parliament, that enact the felonies themselves; and shall proceed to the second part of the inquiry.

II. Therefore as to those felonies, that were such at the time of the statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 4. *pro clero*.

I shall first deliver some general positions, and then proceed to the particular felonies themselves.

1. Therefore it is certain, that whatsoever petit treason or felony there was at the time of the making of that statute, it was within the privilege of clergy by force of that statute at least, except those two above mentioned in the last chapter.

2. That

335 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONÆ.

2. That therefore all such petit treasons and felonies are at this day within clergy, unless where it is ousted by subsequent statutes now in force.

3. That where any statute subsequent to 25 E. 3.^o cap. 4. hath ousted clergy in any of those felonies, it is only so far ousted, and only in such cases and as to such persons as are expressly comprised within such statutes, for *in favorem vitæ & privilegii clericalis* such statutes are construed literally and strictly.

And therefore, if clergy be ousted as to the principal, it is not ousted as to the accessory; if as to the accessory *before*, it is not extended to the accessory *after*; if where the prisoner is convicted by verdict, it holds not as to a conviction by confession, nor as to an attainder by outlawry, nor to a standing mute, as we shall see in the subsequent instances.

[336] 4. That in all cases, where a subsequent act of parliament ousteth clergy in case of any felony, the indictment must precisely bring the party within the case of the statute, otherwise, altho possibly the fact itself be within the statute, and it may so appear upon the evidence, yet if it be not so alledged in the indictment, the party, tho convicted, shall have his clergy. *Stamf. P. C. fol. 130. a. Dy. 99. u. 183. b. 224. b. 261. a.*

5. Altho the case be so laid in the indictment, that it comes within the statute to exempt the prisoner from clergy, yet if upon the evidence it fall out that, tho it be a felony, yet it is not so qualified, as laid in the indictment, the jury ought to find him guilty of the felony simply, but not as to the manner laid in the indictment, (as for instance guilty of the felony, but not of the robbery, or not of the breaking of the house,) and thereupon the prisoner shall be admitted to his clergy; and this is commonly done.

And now I come to the particular offenses, wherein clergy is taken away from such felonies, where by the common law and the statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 4. it was allowable.

And those offenses are these that follow.

1. Petit treason. 2. Murder. 3. Manslaughter. 4. Rape. 5. Robbery. 6. Burglary. 7. Larceny of several kinds and degrees.

And I shall now pursue them in the same order, as they are set down.

Firſt, Petit treason, as the servant killing his master, &c.

It

It is plain, that after the statute of 25 *E. 3. cap. 4.* clergy was to be allowd until 12 *H. 7. cap. 7.* & 23 *H. 8. cap. 1.*

The first statute, that ousted clergy generally in petit treason, was that of 12 *H. 7. cap. 7.* which yet extended but to conviction or attainder, and only to the principal not to the accessary.

By the statute of 23 *H. 8. cap. 1.* it is enacted, "That no [337]
 " person, which shall be found guilty after the laws of the
 " land for any manner of petit treason, or wilful murder of malice pre-
 " pensed, or for robbing any churches, chapels, or other holy places, or
 " for robbing any person or persons in their dwelling house or dwelling
 " place, the owner or dweller of the same house, his wife, children,
 " or servants then being within, and put in fear or dread by the same,
 " or for robbing any person or persons in or near the highways, or
 " for wilful burning of any dwelling houses or barns, wherein any
 " corn or grain shall happen to be, nor any person found guilty of
 " any abetment, procurement, helping, maintaining or counselling of
 " or to any such petit treasons, murders or felonies shall from hence-
 " forth be admitted to the benefit of clergy, except clerks in holy
 " orders, viz. in the order of subdeacon or above; and that such
 " persons in orders convict of those offenses shall be delivered to
 " the ordinary, but shall remain in prison without purgation, unless
 " he become bound by recognisance before the king's justices,
 " where he was convict, with two sufficient sureties for his good
 " behaviour.

" Persons attaind by judgment upon confession, outlawry, or verdict
 " admitted to clergy to remain in prison without purgation.

" Clerks convict, and upon their clergy allowd deliverd to the ordi-
 " nary may be degraded, and then sent into the king's bench by the
 " ordinary to receive judgment upon their conviction, and the justices
 " having the record before them shall give judgment upon such con-
 " viction, as if had not had clergy.

This act, tho temporary, was continued by the statute of 28 *H. 8. cap. 1.* and made perpetual by 32 *H. 8. cap. 3.* and by the same ad persons in orders are put into the same condition, as other persons not in orders, notwithstanding this statute of 23 *H. 8. cap. 1.* or 25 *H. 8. cap. 3.*

This statute of 23 *H. 8.* as to all these crimes extended to principals and accessaries before the fact, but not to accessaries after,

But

But yet it extended to exclude principals and accessaries *before*, only in cases where they were found guilty after due course of law, *viz.* by verdict or confession, &c. and extended not to standing mute, &c. And therefore by the statute of 25 H. 8. cap. 3. it is enacted, "That every person that shall be indicted of petit treason, wilful burning of houses, murder, robbery, or burglary, or other felony according to the tenor or meaning of the said statute of 23 H. 8. and thereupon arraigned do stand mute of malice or froward mind, or challenge peremptorily above the number of twenty, or do not answer directly to the indictment and felony, whereof he shall be arraigned, shall be excluded from clergy in like manner, as if he had pleaded to the offense and been found guilty according to the laws of the land.

And provides, "That if any person be indicted in a foreign county for stealing of goods in another county, and be found guilty, stand mute, challenge above twenty peremptorily, or will not directly answer, he shall be excluded from clergy, as he should have been, if he had been arraigned for the robberies or burglaries in the same shire where they were done, if by examination it shall appear to the justices, that he had been indicted and arraigned in the county where the burglary was done, he should have been excluded from his clergy by the said statute, had he been found guilty there.

This statute was but temporary, because bottomed upon the statute of 23 H. 8. cap. 1. that was but temporary, but by the statute of 28 H. 8. cap. 1. was continued till the last day of the next parliament, and by the statute of 32 H. 8. cap. 3. made perpetual.

But hitherto in this case of petit treason, (and indeed generally in all these cases of the statute of 23 H. 8.) there were these defects.

1. That as to the principal the statute of 23 H. 8. cap. 1. did extend to appeals, as well as indictments for the offenses described in that statute, and if they were found guilty by verdict or confession, the appellee and accessary *before* were excluded of clergy, but [339] statute of 25 H. 8. cap. 3. extended only to indictments, and therefore an appellee standing mute, &c. was to have his clergy in the cases of the statute of 25 H. 8. cap. 3. Again,

2. Neither of these statutes extend, where the party is outlawd for these crimes.

3. As

3. As the law was then taken, challenging above twenty had been a conviction, or at least had put the party to his penance; but that I may observe it once for all, now that clause of challenging above twenty mentiond in the statute of 25 *H.* 8. and other statutes hereafter mentiond imports nothing as to the point of clergy, for his challenge is over-ruled and he put upon the jury, as hath been before observed (*).

But because the statute of 1 & 2 *P. & M.* cap. 10. in case of petit treason restores the peremptory challenge of thirty five, it should seem, that if he challenge peremptorily above thirty-five, he shall have the benefit of his clergy, for it is now become *casus omissus*.

And therefore by the statute of 4 & 5 *P. & M.* cap. 4. “ If
 “ any should maliciously command, hire or counsel any to commit
 “ petit treason, wilful murder, or to do any robbery in any dwelling
 “ house or houses, or to do any robbery in or near the highway, or
 “ to burn any dwelling house or any part thereof, or any barn then
 “ having any corn or grain in the same, then every such offender,
 “ 1. Being outlawd for the same, or 2. Arraigned and found guilty
 “ by order of law, or 3. Otherwise lawfully convict or attaind of
 “ the same, or 4. Who shall stand mute of malice or froward mind,
 “ or 5. Shall peremptorily challenge above twenty persons, or 6.
 “ Will not directly answer, is ousted of his clergy.

But *nota*, every indictment to oust the accessory *before* of his clergy must run *malitiosè*, otherwise he shall have his clergy. 2 *Eliz. Dy.* 183. *b.*

But now by the statute of 1 *E.* 6. cap. 12. it is enacted, “ That
 “ no person, that hath been, or shall be in due form of law attaind
 “ or convict of murder of malice prepensed, or of poisoning
 “ of malice prepensed, or breaking any house by day or by [340]
 “ night, any person being then in the house, where the same break-
 “ ing shall be committed, and thereby put in fear or dread, or of or
 “ for robbing any person or persons in or near the highways, or for
 “ felonious stealing of horses, geldings or mares, or for felonious
 “ taking goods out of any parish church or other church or chapel,
 “ or being indicted or appeald of any of the said offenses, and there-
 “ upon found guilty by twelve men, or shall confess the same upon
 “ his or their arraignment, or will not answer directly according to
 “ the laws of this realm, or shall stand wilfully or of malice mute,

“ shall be admitted to have the privilege of clergy or sanctuary, but
 “ shall be put from the same, and that all persons in all other cases
 “ of felony, other than such as are before mentiond, which shall be
 “ arraigned or found guilty upon their arraignment, or shall not con-
 “ fess the same, or stand mute, or will not directly answer, shall have
 “ and enjoy the benefit of clergy and sanctuary, as they might have
 “ had before the 24th of April 1 H. 8.

This statute doth not restore clergy to the principal in case of petit treason, but leaves the law in relation thereunto, as it stood before, and upon the statutes of 23 & 25 H. 8. tho there be no word of *petit treason*, for if the opinion of *Walsh* and my lord *Dyer* *M. 6 & 7 Eliz. Dy. 235. a.* be law, viz. that a general pardon of all offenses except murder, doth not except petit treason, and so petit treason comes not within the expression of *felony*, then the clause, *that in all other cases of felony clergy shall be allowd*, doth not extend to allow clergy in petit treason.

But if that opinion be not law (*a*), (as I think it is not) then the exclusion of clergy from murder by this statute excludes it also in petit treason.

But if it did not, yet it does not restore clergy in petit treason to the principal (*b*), where found guilty or attaind, because before [341] 1 H. 8. clergy was taken away in petit treason from the principal by 12 H. 7. cap. 7.

Again, by the statute of 5 & 6 E. 6. taking notice, that by the act of 1 E. 6. the act of 25 H. 8. cap. 3. touching robbers and burglars arraigned in a foreign county, and ousting them of clergy by examination stands repeald, whereby offenders were much emboldened, it is enacted, “ That the said act made in the 25th year of King
 “ H. 8. touching the putting such offenders from their clergy, [and
 “ every article, clause and sentence contained in the same touching
 “ clergy] shall from henceforth touching such offenses from hence-
 “ forth to be committed or done stand, remain, and be in full strength
 “ and virtue in such manner, as it did before the making of the said
 “ act in the said first year of King E. 6. any clause, article or sen-
 “ tence comprised in the said act of 1 E. 6. to the contrary thereof
 “ notwithstanding.

(a) *Vide supra, Part I. cap. 29. p. 378.*

(b) The words here in the original MS. are [takes not away clergy from the princi-

pal,] but the scope of our author's argument plainly shews he intended to have wrote [does not restore].

Now upon this act of 5 *E. 6. cap. 10.* it hath been taken, that not only the clause of the act of 25 *H. 8. cap. 3.* touching foreign felonies ousted of clergy upon examination, but the whole act of 25 *H. 8. cap. 3.* is re-enacted, and upon that account wilful burning stands by virtue of that act ousted of clergy, because ousted of clergy by 23 & 25 *H. 8.* tho no mention be made thereof in the statute of 1 *E. 6.* and accordingly resolved 11 *Co. Rep. 33.* *Alexander Poulter's case, de quo infra.*

Upon the whole matter it seems plain, that at this day in relation to petit treason the law stands thus.

1. The principal convict by verdict or confession is ousted of clergy by 23 *H. 8. cap. 1.* both in appeals and indictments.

2. The principal standing mute, or not directly answering is ousted of clergy by 25 *H. 8. cap. 3.* in cases of indictment, but not in case of an appeal; and the statute of 1 *E. 6. cap. 12.* doth not alter the case as to the principal in petit treason.

3. Yet I see no provision to oust clergy of a clerk attaint of petit treason by outlawry, but that he may claim his clergy and be delivered to the ordinary, as a clerk attaint without purgation, for this is not provided for, as it seems by these statutes. [342]

4. But in my opinion the statute of 1 *E. 6. cap. 12.* taking away clergy from persons attaint, as well as from persons convict of murder doth extend to petit treason, which is in truth murder, and consequently a person outlawd of petit treason, tho not by the statutes of 23 or 25 *H. 8.* yet the statute of 1 *E. 6.* is exempt from clergy under the name of wilful murder (*c*).

And the statute of 4 & 5 *P. & M. cap. 4.* taking away clergy from accessary before in case of petit treason, where attainted by outlawry, had committed a great piece of absurdity in putting the accessary in a worse case than the principal, unless the law had been taken, that the statute of 1 *E. 6. cap. 12.* had taken it away from the principal in the like case of outlawry, which is an attainder in law.

5. As to the accessary before the fact, he is ousted of clergy in all the cases before mentiond by the statute of 4 & 5 *P. & M. cap. 4.* and so the law stands at this day, but it must be laid *malitiosè.* 2 *Eliz. Dy. 183. b.*

¶ If this statute be construed to take away clergy from petit treason, it takes it away, as well in case of an appeal, as of an indictment, not only where the party is

convict by verdict or confession, but also where he will not answer directly, or shall stand wilfully mute.

6. But

6. But the accessary after the fact hath his clergy in all cases in petit treason, for no statute takes it from him.

I have been the longer in this, because it was necessary to take notice of the series of all the statutes, and to disentangle them, and it will serve for the briefer collection of what follows in other cases.

See the references at the end of ch. XLIV. ante.

[343]

CHAP. XLVII.

Concerning the alteration made by several statutes in cases of murder, manslaughter, rape, and wilful burning of houses or barns with corn.

I Shall briefly consider how the privilege of clergy stands as to murder, and therein.

1. At the common law, and by the statute of 25 E. 3. cap. 4. clergy was to be allowed as well in murder, as any other felony.

2. Tho there were some particular statutes, that in particular cases took away clergy in case of heinous murders (*), yet the first general law, that took away clergy in case of wilful murder *ex malitia præcogitata* generally was 23 H. 8. cap. 1. which extended only to a conviction by verdict or confession, and included accessaries *before*, and extended to appeals, as well as indictments.

3. The statute of 25 H. 8. cap. 3. extended only to indictments but not to appeals; to principals and not to accessaries *before* or after.

4. But the statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 12. took away clergy from principals in murder in all cases, *viz.* conviction by verdict or confession, attainder by outlawry or otherwise, standing mute, or not directly answering (a), but this statute of 1 E. 6. extended not to accessaries.

5. By the statute of 4 & 5 P. & M. cap. 4. all that shall maliciously command, hire, or counsel any to commit any wilful murder are ousted of clergy in all cases.

(*) *Vide* 12 H. 7. cap. 7. 4 H. 8. cap. 2. 22 H. 8. cap. 9.

(a) This statute omits the case of challenging above twenty, but this our author thinks unnecessary to be inserted, because since 22 H. 8. cap. 14. neither penance nor

judgment of death is to follow in that case, but only the challenge is to be overruled, *vide supra* p. 270. & *infra* cap. 48. however this omission is supplied by 3 & 4 W. & M. cap. 9. as to indictments.

6. But accessaries to murderers after the fact have their clergy in all cases.

So that the principal stands at this day ousted of clergy in all cases, and the accessary *before* is also ousted of clergy in all cases, but the accessary *after* is in no case ousted of clergy.

But it must be remembered, that the party indicted must be brought within the very letter of the statute.

If the indictment be *felonice & ex malitiâ suâ præcogitatâ interfecit*, yet he shall have his clergy, because there wants the word *murdravit*. Dy 261. a.

So if it be *felonice interfecit & murdravit*, and says not *ex malitiâ suâ præcogitatâ*, it is but an indictment of manslaughter, and the prisoner shall have his clergy.

So if a man be indicted, as accessary before, *viz. quod præcepit*, and says not *malitiosè præcepit*. P. 2 Eliz. Dy. 183. b.

II. As to *manslaughter*, regularly in all cases the person indicted or appealed ought to be admitted to his clergy.

But if *A. B. and C.* be indicted specially upon the statute of 1 Jac. cap. 8. setting forth, (as the indictment must) "That *A. felonice pugit & percussit D.* not having any weapon drawn, nor having "stricken first, and that *B. and C.* were present, aiding and abetting," tho *A. B. and C.* are all principals in manslaughter at common law, yet *A.* only, that gave the stroke, shall be ousted of his clergy. H. 23 Car. 1. B. R. Page's case. (b).

And therefore it seems in that case, if it be found, that *A.* gave not the stroke, but *B.* and that *A. and C.* were aiding and abetting, not only *A. and C.* that gave not the stroke shall have their clergy, but also *B.* because, tho the case of *B.* is within the statute, yet as to him the indictment brings him not within the statute, and so differs from the case of a general indictment of murder, where tho it be laid, that *A.* gave the stroke, and *B.* was present, aiding and abetting, yet if upon the evidence it appears, that *B.* gave the stroke, [345] and *A.* was abetting, &c. both shall be convict of murder, for both are equally murderers, and the indictment is true as to both *quod ex malitiâ suâ præcogitatâ interfecerunt & murdraverunt* (*).

By the statute of 1 Jac. cap. 8. clergy is ousted as to him that so stabs upon any conviction by verdict, confession or otherwise, and that as well in case of an appeal as of an indictment; but it extends,

(b) Styl. 26.

(*) Vide supra p. 292. 1 Salk. 334.

not to standing mute or not directly answering, for there is no conviction in that case, and so it seems as to an outlawry (c).

III. As to *rape*, by the statute of 18 *Eliz. cap. 7*. If any man be convict thereof by verdict or confession, or be outlawd for the same, he is excluded of clergy, but this act extends not to a standing mute or not directly answering, for this is *casus omiffus* (d), and he shall have his clergy 11 *Co. Rep. 35. b. Poulter's case*.

But at this day in all cases challenging above twenty makes nothing either for or against clergy, for the party shall not be put to his penance nor be convict thereupon, but only his challenge shall be over-ruled and he put upon his trial, as hath been before observed (†), and therefore the clause in the act of parliament ousting clergy, where he challengeth above twenty, or the not mentioning of that clause makes nothing at this day one way or another as to the point of clergy.

But neither accessaries *before* or *after* are upon this statute exempt from the privilege of clergy.

IV. As to the case of *wilful burning*.

It stands now a settled point, that if the principal be convict by verdict or confession, or stand mute, or will not directly answer, he shall not have his clergy, this is the point resolved 11 *Co. Rep. 35. a. Poulter's case*, and the constant practice is, and always hath been accordingly.

[346] And the statute of 4 & 5 *P. & M. cap. 4*. strongly proves the law to be so, for clergy is taken away from the accessary *before*, and it were a strange oversight, if an act of parliament should exempt the accessary from clergy in this case, and yet the principal should have the benefit of it.

That which caused the doubt was the statute of 1 *E. 6. cap. 12*. where it enumerates all the offenses, which were then to be exempt from clergy, and mentions not the case of wilful burning and enacts, “That in all other cases of felony the offenders shall have clergy, as they should have had before 1 *H. 8.*” and the first statute that took away clergy from wilful burning of houses or barns with corn was a statute made after 1 *H. 8. viz. 23 H. 8. cap. 1. & 25 H. 8. cap. 3.*

There have been three answers given hereunto (*), *viz.*

(c) But in all these cases the offender is excluded from clergy by 3 & 4 *W. & M. cap. 6*. upon an indictment, but not in an appeal.

(d) But this is provided for in case of an indictment by 3 & 4 *W. & M. cap. 9.* (†) p. 270.

(*) *Vide Part 1. p. 570, &c.*

1. That this was a felony, that even by the common law before 1 *H. 8.* was exempt from clergy, being an act of hostility, and this I remember was given by *Noy* attorney general about 8 *Car. 1.* but possibly this may be doubtful as to the fact, whether at common law clergy were not allowable upon this offense, and if it were not, yet it is a greater doubt, whether that law were not altered by the act of 25 *E. 3. cap. 4. pro clero*, wherein clergy was settled in all cases, except treasons or felonies, that touch the king or his royal dignity.

2. Others have agreed, that clergy was taken away in these cases of wilful burning by the statutes of 23 *H. 8. cap. 1.* and 25 *H. 8. cap. 3.* and consequently this offense not being enumerated in the statute of 1 *E. 6. cap. 12.* is by the general concluding clause of that statute restored to the benefit of clergy: But then they think, that by the statute of 5 & 6 *E. 6. cap. 10.* the statute of 25 *H. 8. cap. 3.* is wholly revived, and consequently now the repeal of the exemption of clergy in case of wilful burning is repealed by the revival of the statute of 25 *H. 8. cap. 3.* by the subsequent statute of 5 & 6 *E. 6. cap. 10.* and thereby exemption from clergy in case of wilful burning is again established.

But this hath in it many difficulties. 1. It seems by the whole scope of the preamble and the strict penning of the [347] body of the act of 5 & 6 *E. 6. cap. 10.* that that act revived only so much of the act of 25 *H. 8. cap. 3.* as concerns the ousting of felons of their clergy upon examination, where robberies or burglaries were committed in foreign counties. 2. Again, the statute of 25 *H. 8.* took away clergy from wilful burning, only in cases of indictment, and that only where the prisoner stands mute, answers not directly, or challengeth above twenty, but the ousting of clergy in case of appeals, as well as indictments upon conviction by verdict or confession stood purely upon the statute of 23 *H. 8. cap. 1.* which is no where revived as to the point in question, and yet that is the case, that must most ordinarily occur, namely, where the party is convicted.

3. Therefore the last and I think the surest answer as to this difficulty is, that the statute of 3 & 4 *P. & M. cap. 4.* taking away clergy in all cases from him that maliciously commands, hires, or counsels the wilful burning of any dwelling-house or barn with corn, in all cases of conviction, attainer, standing mute, outlawry, peremptory challenge of above twenty, or not directly answering, doth by necessary consequence take away clergy in all these cases from the principal offender in such wilful burning.

But *quâcunque viâ data* the law stands settled, that clergy is taken away in all cases from the principal in wilful burning of a dwelling-house or a barn with corn, *quod vide* 11 Co. Rep. *Alexander Poulter's case per totum.*

And therefore I can by no means think, that outlawry of the principal in this offense is within the privilege of clergy, for the accessary even in that instance is exempt from (e) clergy by 4 & 5 P. & M. cap. 4.

Now as touching the accessary by the statute of 4 & 5 P. & M. [348] cap. 4. they that shall maliciously command, hire, or counsel this fact, *viz.* accessaries *before*, are exempt from the benefit of clergy in all cases.

But accessaries *after* are within the benefit of clergy in all cases.

See the references at the end of ch. XLIV. ante.

C H A P. XLVIII.

Concerning clergy in robbery from the house, or robbery from the person.

ROBBERY is of two kinds, from the person, and from the house of another.

First, Robbery from the person is a violent assault upon the person, and felonious and violent taking away his goods putting him in fear.

The principal in case of robbery in or near the highway is ousted of his clergy, *viz.*

1. By the statute of 23 H. 8. cap. 1. "Where he is convicted by verdict or confession, whether it be in an appeal or an indictment.

2. By the statute of 25 H. 8. cap. 3. "In an indictment, where the party stands mute, will not directly answer, or challengeth above twenty

And in case the robbery were in or near the highway in the county of A. and he carry the goods into the county of B. and there be indicted of larceny, and upon examination it appears it was such a rob-

(e) The MS. has it [*is subject to*] but both the statute and the sense require it should be [*is exempt from.*]

bery in the county of *A.* that had he been indicted in the county of *A.* he should have been ousted of his clergy by the statute of 23 *H. 8. cap. 1.* the justices of the county of *B.* shall oust him of his clergy in the county of *B.* whether he be convicted, stand mute, challenges above twenty, or answers not directly.*

And tho this clause be repealed by the statute of 1 *E. 6. cap. 12.* it is again revived by 5 & 6 *E. 6. cap. 10.* and [349] stands now in force as to all robberies, where the party, if convict, is to be ousted of his clergy by the statute of 23 *H. 8. cap. 1.*

But it extends not to any felony, where clergy is ousted by any statute after 23 *H. 8. Co. P. C. cap. 50. p. 115. Stamf. P. C. fol. 128. a. (*)*.

If *A.* commits a robbery near the highway in the county of *B.* and takes away but to the value of 6*d.* yet if indicted for robbery in the county of *B.* he shall have judgment of death without benefit of clergy, but if he carry those goods into the county of *C.* and there is indicted and pleads, and the jury find him guilty to the value of 6*d.* tho upon the evidence it appears that it was a robbery in the county of *B.* yet he shall not have judgment of death, because as it now stands, it is but petit larceny (*a*), where the prisoner is not to have his clergy but to be whipt, and the examination given by the statute of 25 *H. 8.* is only to oust clergy, where demandable. *M. 31 Eliz. Moore's Rep. n. 739. p. 550.*

If a man be indicted for a robbery *in viâ regiâ* (+), or *in altâ viâ*, or *in altâ viâ regiâ*, and be convict, he shall be ousted of his clergy by the statute of 23 *H. 8.* but if it be laid to be in *in viâ regiâ pedestri ducent' de London ad Iffington*, tho he be convict, he shall have his clergy; adjudged 38 *H. 8. Moore's Rep. n. 16. p. 5.*

But in that case it might have been laid *propè altam viam regiam*, and he should have been oust of his clergy, for the words of the statute are *in or near* the highway.

If a man be robbed upon the river *Thames*, or other public river within the body of a county, this is a robbery upon the king's highway, and may be so laid in the indictment, and the party shall be ousted of his clergy upon these statutes, and so it was agreed in *Hide's*

(*) *Vide Part 1. p. 518.* But by 3 & 4 *W. & M. cap. 9.* the like clause is enacted as to all felonies, wherein clergy was ousted by that or any other statute.

(a) *Vide Part 1. p. 556.*

(+) According to what our author says *Part 1. p. 535.* if the indictment be laid only *in viâ regiâ*, this will not be sufficient to oust clergy.

case at *Newgate*, *M.* 23 *Car.* 2. for the public streams are highways, and therefore they are called *hauli streames le roy* (*).

But this statute of 25 *H.* 8. extends not to standing mute, or not directly answering in an *appeal*, but only in an *indictment*, and therefore,

3. The statute of 1 *E.* 6. *cap.* 12. ousts such robbery of clergy as well in an *appeal* as *indictment*, where the offender stands mute, or will not directly answer.

But mentions nothing of challenging peremptorily above twenty, neither need it, for, as hath been said (+), he shall be only put from his challenge, and the jury shall be charged to pass upon him, and no conviction or *peine fort & dure* shall ensue upon his peremptorily challenging above twenty, as the law now stands.

But whereas *Stamf. Lib.* 11. *cap.* 42. *fol.* 129. *b.* affirms, “That upon all these statutes, and in all the cases mentioned in them there are two cases, wherein the offender in murder, robbery, &c. shall have his clergy, namely, where the offender is outlawed, or convicted by battle,” it is not true of the former, for outlawry is an attainder, and tho 23 *H.* 8. & 25 *H.* 8. speak neither of outlawry nor attainder, yet the statute of 1 *E.* 6. *cap.* 12. saith, if any person be *attaint* or convicted of murder, &c. he shall be ousted of clergy.

And the same law it is, if the appellee of robbery be vanquished in an *appeal*, for he is thereby *convict*, and the statute doth not mention only a conviction by twelve men, but *any person in due form of law attaint or convicted of murder, &c.*

And thus far concerning principals.

As touching accessaries by malicious commanding, hiring or counselling any such robbery, they are ousted of clergy by 4 & 5 *P. & M.* *cap.* 4. in all cases, namely being convicted, standing mute, not directly answering, or outlawed, &c.

But accessaries *after* having the benefit of clergy in all cases.

Secondly, As touching a robbery from the house of any person.

This divides itself into these several heads.

[351] 1. Robbing in the dwelling house, the owner, his wife or family in the house and put in fear.

2. Robbing in the dwelling house, *any person* being in the house and put in fear.

(*) *Vide Pari.* I. p. 536.

(+) *Supra*, p. 270.

3. Robbing in the house or tent, the owner, his wife, or servants being in the house, tho not being put in fear.

4. Robbing a house, and no person being therein.

As to these in their order.

I. Robbing any person in his dwelling house or dwelling place, the owner or dweller, his wife, children, or servants being within the same and put in fear or dread by the same.

By the statute of 23 *H. 8. cap. 1.* as well in an appeal as an indictment, the principal and accessary before the fact are ousted of clergy in two cases, namely,

1. If convicted by verdict. 2. If convicted by confession.

By the statute of 25 *H. 8. cap. 3.* there is farther provision made, but only in case of indictment, not of appeal, and only against the principal, but not the accessary *before or after, viz.* 1. If the principal stand mute of malice or froward mind. 2. If he challenge above twenty peremptorily. 3. If he will not directly answer.

There is farther provision made for ousting of clergy, where robbers of houses carry the goods into another county and be there indicted of larciny, if upon examination they should be ousted of clergy, had they been indicted in the first county; but, as hath been before observed,

1. This ousting of clergy by examination in a foreign county refers only to such robbery, as by the statute of 23 *H. 8. cap. 1.* is ousted of clergy, namely, where the owner, his wife, children, or servants are then in the house and put in fear, not to such robberies, as by acts of parliament made since are put out of clergy. 2. In case of an arraignment in a foreign county, if the goods prove to be but of the value of 12*d.* here is no clergy to be demanded or allowed, being but petit larciny, and therefore no ousting of clergy by examination.

Dorothy Cole (*) was indicted in *Suffex* for stealing goods, upon the evidence it appeared, that she broke a house in *Kent*, [352] and brought the goods into *Suffex*, the jury found the goods to be of the value but of 7*s.* yet in as much as there was no putting in fear of the owner, his wife, or family, she was to have the benefit of the statute of 21 *Jac.* and could not be ousted of it by examination, for tho by the statute of 39 *Eliz. cap. 15.* clergy was taken away, yet the taking away of clergy upon examination in a foreign county extends only

(*) *Vide Part 1. p. 518.*

to robberies where clergy is taken away by 23 *H. 8.* but if it had been with a putting in fear, so that in case of a man he should have been ousted of his clergy, it deserves consideration, whether the woman, if under 10s. should have been ousted of the benefit of the statute of 21 *Jac. cap. 6.* by examination, tho' originally it were a burglary and robbery. *Sed de hoc infra.*

But these statutes did not extend to any such robbery, where 1. There was no putting in fear. 2. Where the owner, his wife, children or servants were not in the house, but only a stranger were there and put in fear. 3. Neither did they extend to one attain by outlawry or battle. 4. The statute of 25 *H. 8.* extended not to appeals.

As to the accessaries before the fact, by the statute of 4 & 5 *P. & M. cap. 4.* it is enacted, "That if any shall command, hire, or counsel any person to do any robbery in any dwelling house or houses, they shall be excluded from clergy in all cases, *viz.* convict, outlawd, standing mute, &c.

Upon this statute these things are observable.

1. It requires an actual robbing, *viz.* taking away some goods; a bare breaking of the house is not sufficient.
2. It extends to a robbing, without mentioning *put in fear.*
3. It extends to outlawry, which 23 or 25 *H. 8.* extended not to.
4. It extends to appeals as well as indictments; but accessary *after* are in no case excluded from clergy.

[353] II. Robbing of any person by day or night, any person being then in the same house, and put in fear or dread thereby.

By the statute of 1 *E. 6. cap. 12.* clergy is taken away in all cases, *viz.* if he be attain by outlawry or otherwise, convict by verdict, confession, or wager of battle, stands mute, or will not directly answer: And this as well in appeals as indictments.

It is true, it mentions not peremptory challenge of above twenty, neither is it material for the reason before given.

But this statute, tho' it speaks generally of breaking a house by day or by night, hath had this construction always allowd, *viz.*

If the breaking of the house be in the night, then it must be such a breaking as amounts to burglary, *viz.* with an intention to commit a felony, and then it ousts clergy, if it be with a putting in fear.

If

If it be a breaking the house in the day-time, then it must be also a breaking, as hath an actual robbery joined with it, and then if there be a putting in fear also, the clergy is ousted in all the cases mentioned in this statute.

But in both cases there must be a putting in fear, otherwise this statute ousts not clergy.

This statute therefore hath made these additions to the statutes of 23 & 25 H. 8. viz. 1. It exempts burglary from clergy, tho there be no robbery, if there be a putting in fear. 2. If there be a burglary in the night, or robbery in the day committed in the house, and any stranger be then in the house and put in fear, it excludes from clergy, tho it be not the owner or any of his family. 3. It excludes the principal from clergy in all cases, where he is not excluded by any of the two former statutes (*b*).

But again on the other side, it restores clergy to the accessary before the fact, tho convict by verdict or confession, and repeals so much of the statute of 23 H. 8. as excludes the accessary *before* from clergy. But as hath been said, the statute of 4 & 5 P. & M. cap. 4. [354] takes off the clergy again from accessaries where there is a robbery and a putting in fear, but not where there is only a burglary with a putting in fear, but without robbery; but accessaries *after* in all cases have their clergy.

III. If any person be found guilty of robbing any person in any part of his dwelling house or dwelling place, the owner or dweller of the same house, his wife, children, or servants then being within the same, or in any other place within the precinct of the same house or place, such offender shall not be admitted to his clergy, whether such dweller or owner, his wife or children then and there being shall be sleeping or waking. 5 & 6 E. 6. cap. 9.

And the same provision is made for excluding clergy, where a person shall commit a robbery in a booth or tent in any fair or market, the owner, his wife, children or servant being then in the same booth sleeping or waking.

Upon this act we are to observe,

1. There must be an actual breaking of the house, such a breaking as would make a burglary if committed in the night, and the indictment must run *fregit & intravit domum mansionalem* J. S.

(*b*) Viz. in case of attainder by outlawry, and also in case of standing mute, or not directly answering in an appeal.

præfato J. S. uxore & liberis fuis in eadẽ domo existent, and ſuch a breaking of the houſe muſt be provided in evidence: *vide ſupra, Lib. I. cap. 44. p. 522.*

2. The alleging of ſuch a breaking of the houſe is ſufficient to bring him within the ſtatute to ouſt him of his Clergy, if it be proved, tho it be not alleged by the way of robbery, *viz. violentiẽ & à perſonã*, but only *ẽ domo prædictã*, for it countervails a robbery within this ſtatute.

If the ſervant ſteal goods out of his maſter's houſe in the day or night, the maſter, his wife and children being in the houſe, the ſervant is not to be ouſted of clergy by this ſtatute, for here is no breaking of the houſe.

If the ſervant unlatch a door, or turn a key in a door in the houſe and ſteal goods out of that room, tho if he had been a ſtranger, that had not to do in the houſe, he ſhould hereupon be ouſted of his clergy, yet it ſeems to me the ſervant ſhall not be thereupon ouſted of his clergy, for the opening the door in this manner is [355] within his truſt and ſo no breaking of the houſe, nor robbery within this act, and the ſame law ſeems to be upon the ſtatute of 39 *Eliz. cap. 15.*

But if the ſervant break open a door, whether outward or inward, (as for the purpoſe a cloſet ſtudy, or counting-houſe,) and ſteal goods, this is a robbery and breaking the houſe within this ſtatute, as alſo within the ſtatute of 39 *Eliz.* for ſuch a breaking, tho by a ſervant in the night, would make burglary, for ſuch an opening is not within his truſt.

3. But there muſt not only be a breaking of the houſe, the owner, his wife, children or ſervants being within the ſame, but there muſt be alſo a felonious taking of the goods out of the houſe to exclude clergy by this ſtatute.

4. But a bare felonious taking of goods out of the houſe, whether by night or day without ſuch a breaking, as would make burglary, if done in the night, excludes not from clergy within this ſtatute.

5. This ſtatute both as to robbery in dwelling houſes or booths requires; that the dweller or owner, his wife, children, ſervants or ſervant be then within the houſe; ſo that the being of a ſtranger in the houſe excludes not clergy no more than upon the ſtatutes of 23 *H. 8. cap. 1. Stamf. P. C. fol. 129. b.*

6. It extends to no other case, but where the party is found guilty, *viz.* either by verdict or confession, and not to outlawry, standing mute, or not directly answering, therefore in all these cases the offender shall have his clergy. (c).

7. It extends to an *appeal* as well as indictment.

8. It doth not exclude accessaries neither *after* nor *before* from clergy.

Neither doth the statute of 4 & 5 P. & M. cap. 4. extend to accessaries in this case, but only where robbery is committed, and any person within the house put in fear.

So that upon this statute all accessaries to the felony described by this statute are to have their clergy.

IV. Robbing from the house goods to the value of 5*l.* in the day-time, no person being in the house. [356]

By the statute of 39 *Eliz.* cap. 15. it is enacted, " That if any person be found guilty by verdict, confession, or otherwise for the felonious taking away in the day-time of any money, goods or chattels of the value of 5*l.* or upwards in any dwelling house or houses, or any part thereof, or in any outhouse belonging or used with the said dwelling house, altho no persons shall be in the said house or outhouse at the time of the felony committed, such persons shall be excluded from their clergy.

1. Altho this statute speak only of *felonious taking* in the body or purview, yet inasmuch as in the preamble it speaks of *robbery* of houses, a bare taking of goods out of a house, no body therein, without an actual breaking of the house, such as would make burglary were it in the night, is not such a taking out of a house, as excludes from clergy, and thus it hath constantly obtained in practice against the opinion in *Popham's Reports* 84. *Bayne's case* (d).

2. The indictment must run according to the statute, *viz.* *quod tempore diurno, scilicet inter horas &c. domum mansionem J. S. fregit & intravit nullā personā in eādē domo tunc existentē, & ibidem &c. in eādē domo inventa adtunc & ibidem felonice furans fuit, cepit & asportavit*, for breaking the house in the day without taking goods is no felony. 11 *Co. Rep.* 36. *a. b. Poulter's case.*

(c) But by 3 & 4 W. & M. cap. 9. clergy is taken away in these cases also.

(d) This case therefore was not esteemed to be law, *Kel.* 68. but now by 10 & 11 W. 3. cap. 23. clergy is taken away from all, who shall by night or day privately

and feloniously steal to the value of 5*l.* in any shop, ware-house, coach-house or stable, or by 12 *Ann.* cap. 7. to the value of 40*s.* in any dwelling house or outhouse thereto belonging, altho it be not broken, nor any person therein.

And if upon the evidence it fall out, that it was in the night, or that any person was in the house at the time, or that he stole, but broke not the house, he shall be found guilty of a simple felony and have his clergy, but not guilty according to the statute ^(e).

[357] But there need not either in this case, or upon the statute of 5 & 6 E. 6. above-mentiond be a formal mention of a robbery, as is used in an indictment for robbery from the person, for *fregit domum* imports it.

3. It takes away clergy only from the principal, and that only where the person is convict by verdict, confession, or otherwise, and therefore excludes not clergy, where the party stands mute, or is outlawd ^(f), or will not directly answer, nor from the accessory. 11 Co. Rep. 36. b. *Poulter's case*.

4. If a man break the house in the day-time with intent to steal, but steals nothing, this is no felony, but otherwise in case of breaking the house in the night with intent to steal, this is burglary 11 Co. Rep. 31. b. *Poulter's case*.

If a man enter by the doors or windows open and steal goods, this excludes not clergy upon this statute, nor upon the statute of 5 & 6 E. 6. cap. 9. for it must be such an act to make a robbery within either of these statutes, as would make a burglary, were it in the night; it must be *fregit & intravit*.

And therefore the constant use at *Newgate* is, and always hath been upon these statutes, that if a man enter the doors being open, and breaks open a chest and steals goods to the value of 5s. this shall not oust him of his clergy within this statute, or the statute of 5 & 6 E. 6. c. 9. ^(g).

But if a man enters an house the outward doors being open, and when he is in the house, breaks open, or unlocks or unlatcheth an inward door and steals goods out of the room to the value of 5s. he shall be ousted of his clergy upon this statute, the same being done in the day-time no body being in the house; or if he steals goods of any value out of that inward room so opened by day or by night, the owner of the house, his wife, children, or servants being in the house,

^(e) But these cases are now provided against by 10 & 11 W. 3 & 12 Ann above-mentiond. Vide Part I. p. 564. in notes.

^(f) These cases are since taken in by 3 & 4 W. & M. cap. 9. by which statute

clergy is also taken away from all who comfort, aid, abet, assist, counsel, hire, or command.

^(g) Vide Part I. p. 523, 524, 527, & Kil. 69.

he shall be ousted of his clergy, being indicted upon the statute of 5 & 6 E. 6. cap. 9.

T. 16 Car. 2. *Simpson's case* (*h*) at Cambridge assises. *A.* [358]
being indicted upon the statute of 39 Eliz. it was found by special verdict, that *A.* breaking into the house by day, no body being in the house, and breaking open a chamber-door and a chest, took out goods to the value of 5 s. and laid them on the floor, and before he could carry them out of the house was taken: By the advice of all the judges of England he was ousted of his clergy upon this statute, for the taking them out of the chest was felony, and the statute doth not alter the felony, but excludes from clergy, if it were done in the house, and of the value of 5 s. and none in the house.

Trin. 13 Car. 1. *Evans & Finch* (*i*) were indicted, for that they *tempore diurno, viz. circa horam 12.* did break *domum mansionalem* Hugonis Audley in the Inner-Temple London, *nullā personā in eadem domo existente*, and stole thence 40 s. Upon a special verdict found in this case, these points were resolved.

1. That a chamber in an inn of court is *domus mansionalis* within this statute.

2. That if no body were in the chamber at the time, tho others were in other chambers of the temple, yet this was a breaking of the *domus mansionalis* Hugonis Audley *nullā personā in eadem domo existente*, and maintains the indictment.

3. Because only one of the persons indicted did actually enter the chamber and took out the money, *viz. Evans*, and the other stood without upon the ladder and received it, *Evans* was excluded his clergy, and the other who stood upon the ladder and received the money had his clergy.

And possibly the same law may be upon the statute of 5 & 6 E. 6. cap. 9. that he only, that enters the house in the day- [359]
time without putting in fear, and actually takes the goods shall be excluded from clergy, and those, that stand without the house and

(*h*) According to this state of the case here was a breaking not only of a chest, but also of a chamber-door, which is on all hands agreed to be an act sufficient to make a robbery within the statute, and so the difficulty removed, which arises from this case, as stated above Part I. p. 524 & 527, and indeed as that case is reported in *Kelyng* p. 31. and in *hoc libro* Part I. p. 508. & p. 526. the question about the chest or trunk seems to have been only

with relation to the taking away, whether the taking goods out of a chest and laying them on the floor without carrying them out of the chamber was a taking away or stealing within the statute, and not whether it was a robbery, for if it were a stealing, that would be clear by the breaking open the chamber-door.

(*i*) *Cro. Car.* 473. vide Part I. p. 527. 556.

are present and abetting, tho all principals, yet shall have their clergy, for I can see no difference in the cases; *quære tamen (k)*.

But if it were a burglary; then as well those without, that were present and assisting, as those within, shall be excluded from clergy by the general words of the statute of 18 *Edw. cap. 7. they that commit any manner of burglary*; and the like in rape and in murder.

And so I do take it without any difficulty, if *A. B. & C.* come to commit a robbery upon the person of a man, and *A.* only takes the money from the person, and *B.* and *C.* are present and assisting, or if they break a house in the day-time and commit a robbery in the house putting in fear, tho *A.* only enters the house, and *B.* and *C.* watch without, they shall be all excluded from clergy, for they are all robbers.

And if it should be otherwise, this great absurdity would follow, that *B.* and *C.* that are present, aiding and assisting in the robbery, should have a greater privilege, where they are present and so principals in the felony, than they should have had, if they had been absent, and only accessaries before the fact, in which case the statute of 4 & 5 *P. & M. cap. 4.* excludes them from clergy in all cases.

See the references at the end of ch. XLIV. ante.

(k) This doubt is now at an end, for by 3 & 4 of *H. & M. cap. 9.* clergy is excluded from all aiders, abettors, &c.

[360]

CHAP. XLIX.

Concerning clergy in burglary

BURGLARIES may be of two kinds. 1. Simple burglary, that hath no robbery joined with it. 2. Burglary, that hath robbery or theft joined with it.

1. The former of these is, when a man in the night-time breaks and enters a house to the intent to commit a robbery, theft, or other felony.

And this, as it had the benefit of clergy by the common law and by the statute of 25 *E. 3. cap. 4. pro clero*, so it was not ousted of clergy neither

neither by the statute of 23 *H. 8.* nor the statute of 25 *H. 8.* but the first statute that ousted clergy in burglary was 1 *E. 6. cap. 12.*

This simple burglary is again of two kinds. 1. Where any person is in the house and put in fear or dread. 2. Where no person is put in fear or dread, as possibly where no person is in the house, which yet taketh not away the offense of burglary. *Popham's Rep. 42. per omnes justiciarios Angliæ*, or if any person being in the house, yet is sleeping and perceives not the burglary till the next morning, &c.

1. In the first of these cases of simple burglary, namely with putting in fear or dread, the statute of 1 *E. 6. cap. 12.* takes away clergy from the principal in all cases, viz. tho attain by outlawry or otherwise, or convict, or standing mute, or not directly answering, as appears by the statute itself, and the interpretation made of it. *Stamf. P. C. fol. 126. a. 11 Co. Rep. Poulter's case.*

But clergy is not taken away from accessaries before or after by this or any other statute, for as to the statute of 4 & 5 *P. & M.* tho it take away clergy from those, that maliciously command, or hire, or counsel any person to do any robbery in any dwelling house, yet unless there be a robbery in the dwelling house, as well as a burglary, it takes not away clergy from the accessary before [361] (a), nor at all from the accessary after.

2. As to the second kind of simple burglary without putting in fear, the statute of 18 *Eliz. cap. 7.* generally takes away clergy from all persons that shall commit any manner of burglary in three cases. 1. If he be outlawed for it. 2. If he shall be found guilty of it by verdict, or 3. If upon his arraignment he shall confess it.

But in all other cases of standing mute, or not directly answering he is to have his clergy (*).

And therefore, if a man be generally indicted of burglary without pursuing the statute of 1 *E. 6. cap. 12. viz.* without alleging in the indictment, that the owner, his wife, children or servant were in the house and put in fear, the prisoner standing mute, or not directly answering shall have his clergy, (namely, where the indictment is general,) notwithstanding the statute of 18 *Eliz. cap. 7.*

But the accessaries as well before as after are within privilege of clergy, for neither this nor any other statute hath excluded them (a).

(*) By the said statute of 3 & 4 of *H. & M.* clergy is taken away also in cases of standing mute, or not directly answering.

(a) But by 3 & 4 of *H. & M. cap. 9.* clergy is taken away from the accessary before the fact.

II. But now as to burglary joined with larceny or robbery in the dwelling house, this again is of two kinds, either with putting in fear, or without putting in fear.

If with putting in fear, then by the statute of 23 *H. 8. cap. 1. & 25 H. 8. cap. 3.* the owner or dweller, his wife, children, or servants being within the house and put in fear, the offender is ousted of his clergy, not upon the account of the burglary simply considered, but upon the account of the robbery, if the party be found guilty by verdict or confession, or stand mute, or will not directly answer.

But by the statute of 1 *E. 6. cap. 12.* he is excluded from clergy in all cases, if any person were in the house and put in fear.

[362] And altho as to the accessaries *before*, the statute of *E. 6. cap. 12.* restores clergy unto them, yet by the statute of 4 & 5 *P. & M. cap. 4.* clergy is in this case taken away from accessaries before the fact, *viz.* counsellors, or commanders to do any robbery in a mansion-house are ousted of clergy in all cases.

But if it were a burglary joined with robbery of goods out of the house, whether the party were put in fear or not, the principal is ousted of clergy by the statute of 18 *Eliz. cap. 7.* upon the single account of the offense of burglary, (if the offender be outlawed or convicted by verdict or confession,) for that statute as to the point of clergy is not at all concerned as to the robbery, but singly upon the account of burglary the clergy is ousted, tho he be acquit of the robbery or larceny.

But then as to the accessaries before the fact it is considerable, whether in burglary joined with robbery without putting in fear the accessory shall be ousted of clergy by the statute of 4 & 5 *P. & M. cap. 4.* it seems to me to be with this difference.

If the principal be indicted upon the statute of 5 & 6 *E. 6. cap. 9.* specially, setting forth, that the offender *felonice & burglariter fregit domum J. S. prædicto J. S. uxore, liberis & servientibus suis in eadem domo existentibus*, and stole the goods in the same house, then the accessory to such an indictment shall be arraigned and tried, and if convicted shall be ousted of his clergy by force of the statute of 4 & 5 *P. & M. cap. 4.*

But if in that case the principal be convicted of the burglary, but acquit of the robbery, the accessory shall have his clergy, for the statute of 4 & 5 *P. & M.* doth not exclude the accessory from clergy, but where there was a robbery.

And again, if the principal be indicted generally of burglary and robbery without forming the indictment either upon 23 *H. 8.* of putting in fear, or upon the statute of 5 & 6 *E. 6.* the owner, his wife or children being in the house, tho the principal be convicted and ousted of his clergy by the statute of 18 *Eliz.* yet the [363] accessary shall have his clergy, altho here were a robbery committed in the dwelling house, and so within the statute of 4 & 5 *P. & M. cap. 4.* and the reasons are apparent.

1. Because the principal is not ousted of his clergy in respect of the robbery, for that not being laid according to either of the statutes of 23 *H. 8.* or 5 & 6 *E. 6.* if there were no burglary in the case, he should have had his clergy, and he is ousted of his clergy merely upon the account of the burglary by the statute of 18 *Eliz. cap. 7.* and not of the robbery, because not laid pursuant to either of these statutes of 23 *H. 8.* & 5 & 6 *E. 6.* and the statute of 4 & 5 *P. & M.* ousts the accessary of clergy in relation to the robbery in the dwelling house, and not in relation to the burglary.

2. Because the statute of 4 & 5 *P. & M.* cannot at all have any respect to the statute of 18 *Eliz.* which was made twenty years after, and at the time of the statute of the queen neither simple burglary, nor burglary joined with robbery had ousted the principal of clergy, unless the robbery were pursuant to the statutes of 23 *H. 8.* or 5 & 6 *E. 6.* which is not laid in the indictment pursuant to either, and therefore the accessary could not be ousted of clergy by 4 & 5 *P. & M.* in this case, when if the principal himself had been indicted of burglary and robbery generally, he should have had his clergy both as to the burglary and as to the robbery; so that upon a general indictment of the principal of burglary and robbery in the house, the accessary can in no sort be excluded of clergy, unless the principal be specially indicted of the robbery pursuant to the statute of 23 *H. 8.* the owner, his wife or children being in the house and put in fear, or according to the statute of 5 & 6 *E. 6. cap. 9.* the owner, his wife or servants being in the house, for tho the principal upon a general indictment of burglary and robbery may be ousted of his clergy by the statute of 18 *Eliz.* if found guilty of the burglary, yet he cannot be ousted of his clergy upon the account of the robbery, because not particularly laid according to the old statutes, and consequently the accessary must [364] in that case have his clergy (*b*).

(*b*) But as to this point the law is now clergy is taken away from the accessary altered, for by 3 & 4 *W. & M. cap. 9.* before in all cases of burglary.

But in all cases accessaries *after*, must have their clergy.

See the references at the end of ch. XLIV. ante.

CHAP. L.

Concerning clergy in simple larceny and other felonies.

I Come now to consider of some other kinds of felonies, wherein clergy is taken away, and especially in larcenies of several kinds.

1. Stealing of horses. 2. Sacrilege. 3. Taking from the person *clām & secretē*. 4. Servants robbing their masters. 5. Taking clothes off from racks. 6. Stealing king's stores. 7. Taking away women against their wills. 8. I shall consider of piracies and robberies upon the sea. 9. Concerning clergy of prisoners arraigned before the steward and marshal.

1. By the statute of 1 E. 6. cap. 12. the felonious stealing of horses, mares or geldings is put from the privilege of clergy.

1. If the person be attainted. 2. Or convict by verdict or confession. 3. Or stands mute. 4. Or will not directly answer. This was in effect enacted before by 37 H. 8. cap. 8. but it was necessary to be re-enacted here, because otherwise the general clause in the act of 1 E. 7. cap. 12. restoring clergy in all cases where they had it before 1 H. 8. had restored clergy in this case.

[365] There arose a doubt, whether, if there were one horse, mare, or gelding stolen, the offender should have had clergy; and the reason of the doubt was not singly, because the statute of 1 E. 6. was in the plural number, *horses, mares, or geldings*, for then it might as well have been a doubt, whether upon the statute of 23 H. 8. cap. 1. he, that had wilfully burned one house, should not have had his clergy, because the words of that statute are in the plural number *dwelling houses or barns*; and so for robbing any *churches or chapels*.

But the reason that made the scruple was, because the statute of 37 H. 8. cap. 8. was expressly penned in the singular number, *If any man do steal any horse, mare or filly*: and then this statute of 1 E. 6. thus varying the number, and yet expressly repealing all other exclusions of clergy introduced since the beginning of H. 8. made some doubt, whether

whether it were not intended to enlarge clergy, where only one horse was stolen.

To remove this doubt was the statute of 2 & 3 E. 6. cap. 33. whereby clergy is excluded from him that steals one horse, gelding or mare in all the cases of attainder, conviction, standing mute, or not directly answering.

These statutes exclude the principal from clergy in all these cases, but the accessory *before* or *after* have the privilege of clergy. 1 Mar. Dy. 99. a.

But by the statute of 31 Eliz. cap. 12. *in fine statuti* accessories both *before* and *after* in horse stealing are ousted of clergy, as the principal ought to be.

II. As to sacrilege, viz. the felonious taking of any goods out of any parish church, or other church or chapel, the principal is ousted of clergy by the statutes of 23 H. 8. cap. 1. 25 H. 8. cap. 3. and lastly by 1 E. 6. cap. 12. in all cases above-mentioned.

And by the statute of 23 H. 8. cap. 1. the accessory *before*, if found guilty by verdict or confession, was of clergy, but that is repealed by 1 E. 6. cap. 12. as to all accessories.

And the statute of 4 & 5 P. & M. cap. 4. extends not to this case, for it takes away clergy from robbery of any dwelling house, but doth not extend to robbing of churches or chapels (c). [366]

And certainly clergy was not taken away in case of sacrilege at common law, or if it were, yet the statute of 25 E. 3. *pro clero* cap. 4. restored clergy in that case as well as others, and the statutes of 23 H. 8. & 1 E. 6. had been needless in this case, if sacrilege were ousted of clergy at common law, and accordingly in the book of 26 Affiz. 19. (d) and consequently it is mistaken in Poulter's case 11 Co. Rep. 29. b.

III. As to picking of pockets, by the statute of 8 Eliz. cap. 4. "If any person be indicted or appealed for felonious taking any money, goods, or chattels from the *person* of another *privily without his knowledge* in any place whatsoever, and be found guilty by twelve men, or confess upon his arraignment, or be outlawed, or stands obstinately mute, or will not directly answer, or challenge peremptorily above twenty, he shall be excluded from clergy."

(c) But if this should be construed a burglary, as it seems to be according to the book of 22 Affiz. 95. then clergy would be excluded from the accessories *before*, by the 3 & 4 of H. & M. cap. 9.

(d) Vide accordant 26 Affiz. 27. Corone 193. Vide contra 20 E. 2. Corone 283. but according to Stamf. P. C. fol. 123. b. it was left to the discretion of the ordinary to claim him or not. Vide Co. P. C. f. 114.

Upon this statute these things are observable.

1. It must be taken from the *person*.
2. It must be taken *privily without his knowledge*, and so laid in the indictment, otherwise he shall have his clergy.
3. The goods must be above the value of 12*d.* for tho in robbery of never so small a value clergy is ousted, because done *violently*, yet here it is otherwise, for if it be not above the value of 12*d.* it is but petit larceny, for the statute did not intend to alter the nature of the crime, but to exclude clergy, where it was grand larceny. *Co. P. C. cap. 16. p. 68. (c).*

[367] 4. It doth not oust the accessory either *before or after* of the privilege of clergy.

IV. Concerning servants carrying away their masters goods to the value of 40*s.* this was made felony by the statute of 21 *H. 8. cap. 7. (f).* And by the statute of 27 *H. 8. cap. 17.* clergy was taken away.

By the statute of 1 *E. 6. cap. 12.* restoring clergy in all cases, as it was before 1 *H. 8.* except the cases mentioned in that statute, clergy is restored to that offense.

By the statute of 1 *Mar. cap. 1.* repealing all felonies enacted since 1 *H. 8.* the very act itself of 21 *H. 8.* making this felony is repealed.

But by the statute of 5 *Eliz. cap. 10.* the statute of 21 *H. 8.* is again re-enacted to have continuance for ever; but the statute of 27 *H. 8. cap. 17.* taking away clergy in that offense is not revived and so clergy stands allowable as to that offense at this day *(g).*

V. By a statute made the 22 *Car. 2. cap. 5.* clergy is taken away from those that steal clothes off the racks, with power in the judge to transport them to the king's plantations *(h).*

VI. By

(c) Vide *Part I. cap. 44. p. 529.*

(f) This statute is to be taken strictly with relation to such goods, as are actually delivered to keep by the *master or mistress Dy. 5. a. 6.* for as to other goods, it was a felony at common law, tho under the value of 40*s.* but where there was a delivery, the servant being in lawfull possession, it could not at common law be a felony, *vide Part I. p. 667.* Otherwise therefore it is in the case of a lodger stealing goods or furniture belonging to his lodgings, because he is not intrusted with the possession, but only with the use, and therefore it was felony at common law; *vide Part I. p. 506.* however to obviate all doubt, it is enacted and declared by 3 & 4 *W. & M. cap. 9.* "That if any person or persons shall take away with

"an intent to steal, imbezzle, or purloin
"any chattel, bedding or furniture, which
"by contract or agreement he or they are
"to use, or shall be let to him or them to
"use in or with such lodging, such taking,
"imbezzelling, or purloining shall be to
"all intents and purposes taken, reputed
"and adjudged to be larceny and felony,
"and the offender shall suffer as in case of
"felony.

(g) But since our author wrote is taken away again by 12 *Ann. cap. 7.* from all persons, (except apprentices under the age of fifteen years, who shall rob their masters,) if the offense be committed in a dwelling house or outhouse.

(h) By 4 *Geo. 2. cap. 16.* the stealing linen, fustian, &c. from any whitening ground