

constable or vill delivers him to the sheriff or his gaoler, and he receives him, the constable and vill are discharged of the custody, and the sheriff or gaoler is chargeable with the escape after. 3 E. 3. Coron. 328. 337.

As touching escapes without arrests, they belong not to this title of voluntary escapes; *sed hæc vide infra & supra.*

If *A.* the sheriff of *B.* hath a felon in gaol, and then *C.* is made sheriff, till the prisoner be turned over by indenture to the new sheriff, the custody of him remains in *A.* and he or his gaoler is chargeable for a negligent escape, and his gaoler chargeable [595] for a voluntary escape.

If the bailiff of a franchise, that hath a gaol, hath the custody of a felon, he is chargeable for his escape, and not the sheriff or his gaoler.

III. Who shall be said a person lawfully having the custody of a felon: this hath been touched in the former section, but now shall be farther prosecuted.

If *A.* a meer private man knows *B.* to have committed a felony, he may thereupon arrest him of felony, and he is lawfully in the custody of *A.* till he be discharged of him by delivering him to the constable or common gaol; and therefor eif he voluntarily suffers him to escape out of his custody, tho he were no officer, nor *B.* indicted, it is felony in *A.*

So it is, if a felony be in fact committed, and *A.* hath a probable cause to suspect *B.* and accordingly suspects and arrests him, *B.* is lawfully in the custody of *A.* for suspicion of felony; and if he voluntarily lets him escape, it is felony in *A.* *in eventu, viz.* if *B.* proves really guilty of the felony.

And accordingly if *A.* delivers the party so arrested to the constable's custody, he is lawfully in his custody, and if he suffers the escape voluntarily, it is felony *in eventu.* 44 Affix. 12.

If a justice of peace makes a *Mittimus* to the gaoler for felony with an unapt conclusion, as *till the justice give order for his delivery*, whereas it should be *till he be delivered by due course of law*, tho this warrant be not formal, yet the felon is lawfully in his custody, and if he lets him voluntarily escape, it is felony, for he is sufficiently ascertained of the crime with which he is charged.

And it seems to me, if the *Mittimus* be general and contains no certain cause, tho the gaoler is not bound to receive him upon such a

Mittimus, yet if he be acquainted what the crime is for which he is committed, if he suffers him voluntarily to escape, it is felony.

For if a private person or a constable arrests a man for felony, and carries him to the common gaol, (as he may do by law, 13. E. 4. 9. [596] and the gaoler is bound to receive him by the statute (*f*) of 4 E. 3. cap. 10. if the constable or person that delivers him, acquaints the gaoler it is for felony, it is at the peril of the gaoler if he lets him escape, and yet there is no *Mittimus* in that case, but a notice *ore tenus*.

The stocks is the prison of the constable, and so long as he is in the stocks he is in the constable's custody, and therefore if the constable wilfully lets a felon escape out of the stocks, and go at large, it is felony in the constable, unless it be to bring him to a justice, or to a safer or more convenient custody.

IV. What shall be said a voluntary escape of a felon in custody, for it must be a *voluntary* escape to make felony.

If the prisoner be rescued, or rescues himself against the will of him that hath him in custody, this is no voluntary escape, nor is the gaoler, &c. punishable for the same.

If the prison be fired, and the gaoler lets out the prisoners, there being no other means to save their lives, and uses the best means he can by his officers and irons to keep them safe, and this without fraud, or if enemies force him to open the prison doors, and he doth it to save his life, it excuseth from felony.

And if it be done by rebels, tho this excuse not the gaoler or sheriff in civil actions, but he is liable to an action of debt, or upon the case for the escape, because the sheriff hath his remedy over, yet it excuseth the gaoler from felony, and also from a fine, if it be *vis major*, *quam cui resisti potest*.

If a justice of peace bails a person not bailable by law. it excuseth the gaoler, and it is not felony in the justice, but a negligent escape, for which he is fineable at common law, 25 E. 3. 39. (*g*), and by the justices of gaol-delivery by the statute of 1 & 2 P. & M. cap. 13.

And the like in case of a sheriff, under-sheriff, constable, bailiff of a liberty bailing one that is not by law bailable, it is not a voluntary

(*f*) This statute obliges the gaoler to receive felons by the delivery of the constables or townships, but says nothing as to the delivery by private persons.

(*g*) In the last edition of the year-books, which is in this place mispagged, it is 25 E. 3. 32. a.

escape, at least unless done by design to deliver the prisoner for ever, but it is a negligent escape punishable at common law, or according to the statute of 3 E. 1. cap. 15. by loss of office, [597] fine, and three years imprisonment.

And therefore I think, that if a justice of peace bails a person, that confesseth a felony before him, it is no voluntary escape, but fineable as above, for it is *error scientiæ*, 2 R. 3. 10. contrary to the opinion of *Crompt.* 39. *a Dalt.* p. 276. (h)

If a gaoler voluntarily licence a felon to wander out of the bounds of the prison and to return again, if the prisoner returns again to the gaol before the gaoler be indicted, so as he be in custody, it is held by some this will not excuse a voluntary escape as to the point of felony, but certain it is that it is punishable as a misdemeanor, and if he had never returned, it had been such an escape, as would have been felony, tho perchance the licence were special to go out and come in at night. 22 E. 3. *Coron.* 242. 8 E. 2. *Coron.* 431. because he cannot apportion his own wrong and breach of duty.

V. In whom the voluntary escape shall be.

In all civil causes the sheriff is to be responsible, or the gaoler at election, as if the gaoler, or bailiff of a sheriff suffer either voluntarily or negligently an escape of a person imprisoned for debt, the sheriff is chargeable with an action upon the escape, for the gaoler or bailiff is the sheriff's officer or minister, and gives him security. 14 E. 3. cap. 10. 19 H. 7. cap. 10.

But if the gaoler being placed there by the sheriff voluntarily suffers a felon in his custody to escape, this, in as much as it reacheth to life, is felony only in the gaoler that was immediately trusted with the custody, not in the sheriff.

But whether the escape was voluntary or negligent, yet the sheriff may be indicted for it so as to subject him to a great fine and imprisonment for the offense of his gaoler, tho not to make him guilty of felony. *Dalt.* cap. 106. p. 273. (i), *Doctor and Student* 42. (k)

For the escape must be voluntarily permitted in him that permitted it, which could not be in the high sheriff, tho it were such in the gaoler, for he was not privy to it, and therefore could not do it *felonice*, but it was a negligent escape in him in trusting [598]

(b) *New Edit.* p. 512.

(i) *New Edit.* p. 509.

(k) *Dial. g.* 2. cap. 42.

such a person with the custody of his prisoners, that would be false to his trust, and therefore the sheriff shall pay, but not corporally suffer, for the miscarriage of his gaoler.

But if the gaoler were a gaoler in fee, as antiently constables of castles were, the sheriff should not answer in any kind for the default of such gaoler or constable: but now by the statutes of 14 E. 3. cap. 10 and 19 H. 7. cap. 10. gaols of counties are rejoined to the counties.

But for escapes committed by gaolers of gaols in particular franchises, as the *Gate-house* at *Westminster* belonging to the dean and chapter of *Westminster*, escapes there permitted concern not the sheriff, but the particular gaoler and lord of the franchise.

VI. How and in what manner, and before whom felonious escapes shall be determined, tried and adjudged.

It is to be known, that I may say it once for all, altho the felony for breaking of prison may be heard, tried and determined before the felony, for which he was committed, as shall be said; yet in case of a felony for the wilful escape or rescue of a person committed to prison for felony, tho the party that voluntarily permits such escape, or rescues the prisoner, may be indicted for these offenses as felonies before the principal felony in him that escapes or is rescued be tried, yet he shall not be arraigned or put upon his trial, till the principal be convicted or attainted; and the reason is, because possibly the person escaping may be found not guilty, or if guilty, yet of such a fact as is not capital, as of petit larciny, *se defendendo*, *per infortunium*, in which case the rescuer or officer ought to be discharged: nay, if the principal person be only convicted and not attaint, but hath his clergy, I think the gaoler or rescuer shall never be put to answer to the escape or rescue, but be discharged, as the accessory, where the principal hath his clergy, shall be discharged thereby; for the rescuer and officer, that permits the escape, are a kind of accessories.

But in these cases the gaoler or rescuer may be fined and [599] imprisoned for their misdemeanor, but shall not be charged with felony, where the principal is discharged. 2 Co. Instit. p. 592.

Again, it is to be remembered, that there is a voluntary escape before indictment, and a voluntary escape of a party indicted of felony.

1. If the party that escapes were not indicted at the time of the escape voluntarily permitted, the indictment of the gaoler (and so in case

case of a rescue) ought to surmise, that *de facto* a felony was committed, and that the person escaping was imprisoned for that felony or suspicion of it.

And I need not say this must be proved upon evidence against the gaoler, for, as I said before, the gaoler cannot be arraigned till the principal be attainted by verdict, confession, or outlawry, and the record of such attainder must be shewed or proved.

2. But if the party that escaped were indicted, and so taken by *Capias*, and then escape, tho, as I said before, the gaoler or rescuer cannot be arraigned and tried till the principal be attainted, yet the indictment for the escape or rescue need not surmise a felony done, but only recite the substance of the indictment against him that escapes. 1 E. 3. 16. b. 2 E. 3. *Coron.* 158.

And the like law is in case of felony for breach of prison. 2 Co. *Instit.* p. 590.

Again it is to be known, that as to the voluntary suffering of an escape or rescuing a felon, tho the felony be not within clergy, yet the escape or rescue are within clergy, and tho the prisoner were indicted or attainted of several felonies, yet the escape or rescue of such a prisoner makes but one felony, and he shall be indicted but of one escape; but if *A.* and *B.* be indicted of one felony, and the gaoler voluntarily suffer both to escape, the gaoler may be indicted severally for both.

The means of bringing an officer to judgment cannot be barely by the calling of the record of the prisoners over, as is usually done in the king's bench, because tho this may be a sufficient cause to convict of a negligent escape, yet it cannot appear thereby that it is voluntary; the marshal or gaoler may be fined upon a record thereof made, but he cannot be convict of a felony, 39 H. 6. [600]

33. but there must be an indictment or presentment of the felonious and voluntary escape.

And tho by the statute of *Westm.* 1. cap. 3. (1) amercements upon the country for the escapes of felons cannot be set but by the justices in *Eyre*, or by the king's bench, 21 *Affiz.* 12. 27 *Affiz.* 27. or, as it seems, by justices of general *oyer* and *terminer*; yet the hearing and determining of escapes is at this day within the jurisdiction of justices of peace, or any other justices, by the statutes of 1 R. 3. cap. 3. 31 E. 3. cap. 14.

(1) 2 Co. *Instit.* 165.

And thus far concerning voluntary escapes of felons, where it is felony and where not.

In the next chapter I shall say something concerning negligent escapes, tho this hath been before, *cap.* 50. in part handled.

4 Blackf. Com. ch. 10. p. 129, 130. and 2 Hawk. P. C. ch. 18, 19. and Burn. tit. Escape.

CHAP. LII.

Touching negligent escapes.

NEGLIGENT escapes of felons are not felony, but punishable by fine upon the parties that suffer them.

These negligent escapes are of two kinds, 1. By an officer or some particular person or persons, that hath a felon in custody, 2. Or by vills or townships, whether the felon be taken and in custody, or not taken.

I. First as to negligent escapes by officers or particular persons these things are considerable.

1. What shall be said a negligent escape. 2. What the conviction of such negligent escape. 3. What the punishment of it, and by whom.

[601] As to the first of these, what shall be said a negligent escape hath been partly before described, only some things I shall add.

If a prisoner for felony break the gaol, this seems to be a negligent escape, because there wanted either that due strength in the gaol that should have secured him, or that due vigilance in the gaoler or his officers to have prevented it, and therefore it is by law lawful for the gaoler to hamper them with irons to prevent their escape (*a*), and if

(*a*) And therefore this liberty can only be intended, where the officer has just reason to fear an escape, as where the prisoner is unruly or makes any attempt to that purpose; but otherwise, notwithstanding the common practice of gaolers, it seems altogether unwarrantable, and contrary to the mildness and humanity of the laws of England, by which gaolers are forbid to put their prisoners to any pain or torment; see Co. P. C. p. 34 & 35. *Custodes*

gaolarum pœnam sibi commissis non augent, nec eos torquant vel redimant, sed omni severitâ remota pietateque adhibita judicia debite exequantur, Flet. Lib. 1. cap. 26. and the Mirror of Justices, cap. 5. §. 1. n. 54. says, It is an abuse that prisoners should be charged with irons, or put to any pain before they be attainted of felony; and lord Coke in his comment on the statute of Westm. 2. cap. 11. is express, that by the common law it might not be done. 2 Instit. 381.

this

this should not be construed a negligent escape, gaolers would be careless either to secure their prisoners, or to retake them that escape, if he should in such a case be exempt from pecuniary punishment; and we see by daily experience in civil cases of men in execution or arrested for debt, if they break prison the sheriff is chargeable.

But if a private person arrests a felon, and he escapes by force from him without any default in him, tho the township shall be amerced, as shall be said, yet it seems it excuseth the party, for he being a private person cannot raise power to take or detain a felon.

But if a sheriff, bailiff, constable, or other officer hath the custody of a prisoner bringing him to the gaol, it seems that a simple escape by the rescue of the prisoner himself doth not excuse him *a toto*, though it may *a tanto*, because he may take sufficient strength to his assistance; but if he be rescued before he be brought to gaol, *quære*, whether it be not an excuse of an escape, as in case where a man is arrested upon a mesne process, and in carrying to gaol be rescued, the return of the rescue excuseth the sheriff, 39 *Eliz. C. B. Croke, n. 22. Conyer's case*; but it is no excuse if he be taken in execution [602] and rescued, for there the sheriff shall be answerable notwithstanding the rescue, but it seems the rescue is no excuse in case of felony. 3 *E. 3. Coron. 328. 337. (b)*

And upon the same reason it is, that if a felon be attaind and be carried to execution, and be rescued from the sheriff, the sheriff is punishable notwithstanding the rescue, for there is judgment given, and the sheriff should have taken sufficient power with him, and therefore in that case the township is not fineable: *vide 27 Affix. 54.*

If a prisoner for felony be in gaol and escape, and the gaoler pursue after him, he may take him seven years after, tho he were out of his view, 13 *E. 4. 9. a. 14 H. 7. 1. a.* but that will not excuse the gaoler from a negligent escape, tho it may excuse *a tanto*; for if the gaoler hath once lost the view of his prisoner, tho he take him after, it is an escape, but if he retake him upon a fresh pursuit, and hath still the view of him, it is no escape, nor punishable. 8 *E. 2. Coron. 400. 22 E. 3. Coron. 236. M. 28 E. 3. Rot. 32. Rex. Herif. Casus Abbatis Sancti Albani. M. 45 E. 3. Rot. 17. in dorf. Rex. Essex.*

But if a man be arrested for felony, and in bringing to gaol by the sheriff's bailiff or constable he makes his escape, and they follow him

(b) These cases, as also *Conyer's case* here mentioned, prove nothing particularly as to a rescue, but only in general, that a sheriff shall be liable in case of an escape.

and keep the view of him, but cannot take him without killing him, whereby he is kild in the pursuit, yet the sheriff or constable, or township, that let him escape, shall be fined for the escape, because tho the party be kild in the fresh pursuit, he cannot now be brought to judgment, and yet by his flight, if presented by the coroner, he forfeits his goods, 3 E. 3. *Coron.* 328 and 346.

If a felon escape out of the gaol by negligence, tho the gaoler be fined for it, he may retake the felon at any time after, for the felon shall not take the advantage of his own wrong, or the gaoler's punishment, but his retaking shall not discharge the gaoler's fine, and so is the book to be intended. 13 E. 4. 9. a.

[603] 2. Touching the conviction of a negligent escape.

The proper way of conviction is by presentment and trial thereupon.

Yet where the prisoners be of record in a court, if the gaoler being called cannot give an account where a prisoner is, this is a conviction of an escape, but seems not to be presently a conviction of a voluntary escape, unless the gaoler confesses it: *vide* 27 H. 6. 7. 39 H. 6. 33. so in some cases the coroner's roll is a conviction of an escape, *vide* 3 E. 3. *Coron.* 352. so if the dozers present a felon taken and delivered to the sheriff by the vill, but shew not what sheriff. 3 E. 3. *Coron.* 345. (c)

Where an officer is to be charged either with a voluntary or negligent escape, the bare presentment of the escape by the grand inquest or the dozers in *Eyre*, or upon commission of *Oyer* and *Terminer*, or in the king's bench, is not alone sufficient to convict the officer, because upon his conviction, tho but of a negligent escape, he is to be fined.

But if the dozers in *Eyre* or in the king's bench present the escape of a felon, whereby the vill is to be amerced, because this is but an amercement, and the justices may [not in this case (d)] set a fine but an amercement, *de minimis non curat lex*, and therefore the presentment is not traversable: *vide* 3 E. 3. *Coron.* 291. & *ibidem* 3 E. 3. *Coron.* 328. 346. *Stamf. P. C. Lib. I. cap. 33. fol. 35. b.*

(c) The words of the book are, "When the dozen present, that a felon is taken for felony and delivered to the sheriff, they adjudge it for an escape in *Eyre*, if they do not say to what sheriff by name, for a man may inquire his rolls to see whence the prisoner comes, &c. and if they do not find in the sheriff's

roll, that he was charged with him, or if they do not find how he got out of his custody according to the law of the land, it shall be adjudged an escape in the sheriff.

(d) These words are wanting in the MS. but the sense of the place seems plainly to require them.

An escape is presentable in a leet, but they cannot set a common fine or amercements there, but it ought to be sent to the next *Eyre*, &c. or may be removed into the king's bench by *Certiorari*, and there the common fine or amercement set; and this by the statute of *Westm. 1. cap. 3.*

3. As to the punishment of a negligent escape by an officer or other that hath the felon in custody, it is by fine and imprisonment.

If the felon be attainted, it is said that the fine is to be an hundred pounds, and if he be only indicted, then an hundred [604] shillings, *Stamf. P. C. p. 35.* but the fine in truth is more or less according to the quality of the offense, and sometimes of the offender: *vide 3 E. 3. Coron. 370.* a bishop fined one hundred pounds for an escape.

Communia Scaccario, M. 36 E. 3. n. 5. The constable of a castle under the duke of *Lancaster* permitted a negligent escape: It was ruled, 1. That in default of the constable of the duke of *Lancaster*, that put him in, should be fined. 2. That tho the duke were dead, yet his executors should be fined (*e*), and they were fined five pounds for negligent escape.

II. I come to those fines, that are for escapes of felons either before or sometimes after arrest.

And this is that which is set upon vills, towns, cities, and sometimes upon hundreds and counties, and is usually called *escapium*, and those that have franchises to be quit *de murdro, latrocinio, escapiis*, are intended of those common fines set upon vills or hundreds for those offenses, and then he that hath such a liberty granted by the king to be quit *de escapiis*, hath a discharge for the rate or portion of such a common fine or amercement that comes to his share; and this franchise or liberty generally granted to be quit *de escapiis* extends not to voluntary escapes by officers or others, but as I said to the rate or portion chargeable upon them by such common fine or amercement for negligent escapes.

If a murder, manslaughter, or killing of a man *se defendendo* be committed in a vill not inclosed in the day-time, and the murderer, &c. be not taken, the vill shall be amerced, altho it be done after sunset, before day-light be gone. 22 E. 3. *Coron. 238.* 3 E. 3. *Coron. 293, 302.* 3 H. 7. *cap. 1.*

And if the murder be committed in a town inclosed in the day or night, and the murderer or manslayer escapes, the town shall be amerced, because by the statute of *Winchester*, they ought to keep their gates shut from sun-set to sun-rising. 3 E. 3. *Coron.* 299. 3 H. 7. *cap.* 1.

[605] If a felony be committed in a vill, and they take the felon, and commit him to four men to carry him to gaol, and they suffer him to escape, the vill shall be amerced. 3 E. 3. *Coron.* 346.

If a felony be committed in a vill, and the felon taken by them of the vill, and he escapes from them to the church of the same vill, and from thence before abjuration he escapes again, the vill shall be amerced for two escapes at common law, for they should have kept him in the church till abjuration, *Ec.* 8 E. 2. *Coron.* 422.

But if a person attaint, as they are carrying him to execution, escapes to a church, and from thence makes an escape, the vill were not amerceable, because he could not abjure being attaint, and therefore the vill were not bound to watch him, 27 *Affiz.* 54. *vide Rot. Parl.* 45 E. 3. n. 25. 50 E. 3. n. 183. But now abjuration and sanctuary are ousted (*f*), and with it much of this old learning of escapes is antiquated.

If a prisoner for suspicion of felony be brought to the hundred court, and the court grant him liberty to seek his voucher or warrant, and he escapes, the hundred shall be amerced. 3 E. 3. *Coron.* 316. and so it is if a manslaughter be committed out of any vill. *Stamf. P. C.* 34. a.

If the vill answers not the amercement for an escape, the hundred shall be distrained, and if the hundred answers not, the county shall be charged therewith and distrained. *Stamf. P. C.* p. 34. b.

And thus far touching escapes both voluntary and negligent.

4 Blackf. Com. ch. 10. p. 129, 130. and 2 Hawk. P. C. ch. 19. and Burnt. tit. Escape.

(f) By 21 Jac. *cap.* 28. §. 7.

CHAP. LIII.

Concerning rescues of prisoners in custody for felony.

RESCUE of a person imprisoned for felony is also felony by the common law.

To make a rescue a felony, 1. It is necessary that the felon be *in custody, or under arrest* for felony, and therefore if *A.* hinder an arrest, whereby the felon escapes, the township shall be amerced for the escape, and *A.* shall be fined for the hindrance of his taking; but it is not felony in *A.* because the felon was not taken. 3 *E.* 3. *Coron.* 333. *Stamf. P. C.* p. 31. *a.*

2, Again, to make a rescue felony, the party rescued must be under custody *for felony or suspicion of felony*, and it is all one, whether he be in custody for that account by a private person, or by an officer or warrant of a justice, for where the arrest of a felon is lawful, the rescue of him is a felony.

It seems that it is necessary that he should have knowledge that the person is under arrest for felony, if he be in the custody of a private person.

But if he be in the custody of an officer, as constable or sheriff, there at his peril he is to take notice of it; and so it is if there be felons in a prison, and *A.* not knowing of it, breaks the prison, and lets out the prisoners, tho he knew not that there were felons there, it is felony, and if traitors were there, it is treason. *P.* 16 *Car.* 1. *Croke* p. 583. *Benstead's case per omnes iudiciarios.*

A return of a rescue of a felon by the sheriff against *A.* is not sufficient to put him to answer for it as a felony, without indictment or presentment, by the statute of 25 *E.* 3. *cap.* 4. 1 *H.* 7. 6. *a. per curiam*, 2 *E.* 3. 1 *Coron.* 149.

As in case of an escape, so in case of a rescue, if the party rescued be imprisoned for felony, and be rescued before in- [607] dictment, the indictment must surmise a felony done as well as an imprisonment for felony or suspicion thereof; but if the party be indicted and taken by a *Capias* and rescued, then there needs only a recital that he was indicted *prout*, and taken and rescued.

The

But tho the rescuer may be indicted before the principal be convicted and attainted, yet he shall not be arraigned or tried before the principal be attaint for the reason given, *cap.* 51.

The rescuer of a prisoner for felony, tho not within clergy, yet shall have his clergy.

Vide plus capite proximo, for many things there said are applicable to the case of a rescue.

4 Blackf. Com. ch. 10. p. 131. Foster. 344. Burn. tit. Rescuer. 2 Hawk. P. C. ch. 21.

C H A P. LIV.

Concerning escapes and breach of prison, by the party himself that is imprisoned for felony.

AT common law it was held, that if any imprisoned for a misdemeanor, tho not felony, had broke the prison and escaped, it had been felony. *Bract. Lib. II. (a). Stamf. P. C. p. 30. b. 2 Co. Instit. p. 589. (b)*

[608] But by the statute of 1 E. 2. *de frangentibus prisonam* the severity of the common law is moderated, *viz. Nullus de cætero, qui prisonam fregerit, subeat judicium vitæ vel membrorum pro fractiõne prisonæ tantum, nisi causa, pro quâ captus & imprisonatus fuerit, tale judicium requirit, si de illâ secundum legem & consuetudinem terræ fuerit convictus, licet temporibus præteritis aliter fieri consuevit.*

Upon this statute, therefore, to make a felony by breach of prison these things must concur: 1. The party must be in prison. 2. He must be in prison for felony. 3. He must break that prison. Many of these things have been discussed before. I shall resume and add what shall be necessary for the explication of this felony.

I. What is a prison, and who shall be said a person in prison.

If a man be imprisoned for felony in the prison of a franchise, and breaks and escapes, this is a breaker of prison, and it is as to

(a) This should be *Lib. III. tract. 2. de Corona, cap. 9. f. 124. a.* In this place *Bracton* carries the matter very far; for he says, tho the party were innocent, and had only conspired to escape, he was *ultimo supplicio puniendus*.

(b) But this severity is complained of as an abuse, *Mirror, cap. 5. §. 1.* and it was

the opinion of *Billington*, chief justice, and the rest of the judges, 1 H. 7. 6. a. that a rescuer of a felon was felony at common law, but not in the person himself, till the statute of 1 E. 2. This lord *Coke* says must be intended, where others break the prison without his privacy. 2 *Instit.* 589.

this purpose the king's prison (*c*), tho the franchise or profit be the lord's. 2 E. 3. 1 Coron. 149. *Stamf. P. C.* 31. *a.* 2 Co. *Inst.* 589.

So at common law when sanctuary was in use, if a felon had escaped to a church, and there had been watched by the vill where the church is, and he had broken the church and escaped, this had been a felony within this statute. *Stamf. P. C.* p. 30. *b.* 3 E. 3. Coron. 290.

Whether the breach of the prison of the ordinary by a clerk convict or attaint before purgation had been felony, *vide Stamf. P. C.* p. 31, 32. but that learning is now antiquated, because by the statute of 18 Eliz. cap. 7. the prisoner is not now delivered to the ordinary; and therefore I shall not farther examine it.

If a person be taken for felony, and put in the stocks and breaks it, this is a breaking of prison, and felony within the [609] law. *Dy.* 99. *a.* 2 Co. *Inst.* 589. *Stamf. P. C.* p. 30. *b.*

So it is if the constable or any other secures a felon in the house of him that makes the arrest, or in the house of any other, and he breaks it and escapes, it is felony.

Yet farther, if *A.* arrests *B.* for felony or suspicion of felony. there being *de facto* a felony committed, and being in the hands of *A.* he violently rescueth himself and escapeth, this is a breach of prison and a felony, for so are the words of my lord *Coke*, 2 *Inst.* 589. "Nota, He that is in the stocks, or under lawful arrest, is said to be in prison, tho he be not *infra carceris parietes*." And *Stamford ubi supra* p. 30. *b.* *Et nota quanti a ceo que chescun que est sous arrest pour felony est prisoner auxy bien hors de gaol come deins, isint que sil soit lorsque in cippes in le haut street ou hors de cippes in le possession d'ascun, que lui aver arrest, & faite escape ceo est debrusement de prison in le prisoner, which must be intended, as it seems, of a violent escape, viz. rescning himself out of custody.*

II. What shall be said a being in prison for such a cause, as requires *judicium vitæ vel membrorum*.

(*c*) *Stamford* in the place here mentioned thinks it is not the king's prison, and therefore at common law the breaking of it would not be felony; but by the statute of 1 E. 2. it matters not whether it be the king's prison or no, for it speaks *de prisona* generally, and not *de prisona nostra*; how-

ever, as it must be intended a legal prison, which cannot be without a grant from the crown, our author's construction is very reasonable, that all such prisons should be taken as to this purpose to be the king's prisons.

It seems it is intended only of capital offenses, as felony, and therefore if a man be committed for petit larciny, or homicide *se defendendo*, or *per infortunium*, and breaks prison, this is not felony, for the principal offense *non requirit tale iudicium*. 2. Co. Instit. 590.

But if the commitment expresses larciny above value or manslaughter, tho *de facto* it were but petit larciny, or *per infortunium* or *se defendendo*, and possibly would appear so upon the evidence, yet this escape will be felony.

Touching my lord Coke's opinion of the form of the *Mittimus*, that it must particularly express the nature of the felony, and must have an apt conclusion, I have said enough before; I think it is sufficient if it be generally for felony, altho it wants that regular conclusion (*till he be delivered by due course of common law*); yet these defaults will not excuse the breach of prison from felony: but possibly if [610] it expresses no cause, the case may be otherwise, because the substance of the *Mittimus* must be recited in the indictment.

For it is very plain, that antiently there were more felons committed to the common gaol without *Mittimus* in writing than were with it; such were all the commitments by constable, watchmen, and private persons arresting for felony and bringing to the common gaol; and *Mittimus*'s were not of so antient a date as justices of peace, and they were not before 1 E. 3. (d), and yet breach of prison by felons was felony even from 2 E. 1. and not only from 1 E. 2.

It is therefore enough if the gaoler have a sufficient notification of the nature of the offense, for which he was committed, and the prisoner of the offense whereof he was arrested, and commonly they know their own guilt, if they are guilty, without much notification.

And again, by what hath been said, breach of prison is not only where the felon is formally committed to gaol by a *Mittimus*, but if he be put in the stocks, kept in the constable's house, nay, under the custody of him that makes the arrest, and he breaks prison, it is a felony, tho in these cases there neither are nor can be *Mittimus*'s.

If A. arrests B. for suspicion of felony, and carries him to the common gaol, and there delivers him, as he may do, 13 E. 4. 9. a. 4 E. 3. cap. 10. and he breaks prison, if he be indicted upon it there must be an averment in the indictment, that there was a felony

committed, and *A.* having probable cause did suspect *B.* and arrested him and committed him, and that he broke the prison, and this must be all proved upon the evidence.

But if *B.* be indicted or appealed and taken by *Capias*, and committed, and breaks prison, there needs no averment or proof that a felony was done, but only that there was an indictment or appeal, and a *Capias* thereupon, because all appears by matter of record. 2 *Co. Instit.* 590.

But a lawful commitment may be for suspicion of felony, and this is within this statute; yet no person can be indicted barely of suspicion of felony, but of the felony itself. 43 *E.* 3. [611] *Coron* 454. 44 *Affiz.* 12. 2. *Co. Instit.* 592.

If a felony be made by act of parliament subsequent to 1 *E.* 2. and a person be committed for such a felony and breaks prison, yet this is felony. 2 *Co. Instit.* 592.

III. What shall be said a breaking of prison by a person committed for felony to make a felony.

If the prison be fired by accident. and there be a necessity to break prison to save his life, this excuseth the felony; but if the prison were fired by the prisoner himself, or by his procurement, the breaking to save his life is nevertheless felony, for it was a necessity of his own creating. 2 *Co. Instit.* 590.

If the gaoler sets open the prison doors, and the felon escapes, this may be a felony in the gaoler, but is no breach of prison to make felony in the prisoner.

If *A.* be arrested or imprisoned for felony, and *B.* and others without the consent of *A.* rescues *A.* this is felony in the rescuers, but not felony in *A.* But if *A.* were of confederacy with *B.* to do it, then it is felony in *B.* as a rescue, and in *A.* as a breach of prison.

And so it is if *B.* had broken the prison doors, and they being open, *A.* had gone away, this had been felony in *B.* but not felony in *A.* unless it were done by his confederacy, or procurement, for *A.* did not actually break prison 2 *Co. Instit.* 589. 1 *H.* 7. 6. *a.*

IV. Touching the proceeding for felony by breach of prison.

A. is committed for felony, or suspicion thereof, and breaks prison, he may be indicted, arraigned, convicted, and have judgment for the escape, altho the principal felony be not tried, and he may be not guilty of the felony; and so it differs from the case of a rescue or escape before, and the reason is, because here it is the same per-

son, there they are divers, and therefore in the latter case the principal felony shall be first tried. 2 *Co. Instit.* 592.

And yet I hold, that if *A.* be indicted of felony and committed, and then breaks prison, and then be arraigned of the principal [612] felony and found not guilty, now *A.* shall never be indicted for the breach of prison; or if indicted for it before the acquittal, and then he is acquitted of the principal felony, he may plead that acquittal of the principal felony in bar to the indictment for the felony for breach of prison.

And so it was pleaded by myself in the case of one *Mrs. Samford*, who was severely prosecuted by the earl of *Leicester*, upon a suspicion that she had stolen his jewels; for tho while the principal felony stood untried, it stood indifferent whether she were guilty of the principal felony, or rather the breach of prison was a presumption of the guilt of the principal offense, yet now it be cleared, that she was not guilty of the felony, she is now in law as a person never committed for felony, and so her breach of prison is no felony.

The felony of breach of prison is a felony within clergy, tho the principal felony for which the party was convicted were out of clergy, as robbery or murder.

4 Blackf. Com. ch. 10. p. 130. 2 Hawk. P. C. ch. 18. Burn. tit. Prison Breaking.

CHAP. LV.

Of principals and accessaries in felony, and first of accessaries before the fact.

HAVING gone through the considerations of the offenses of treasons, and also of felonies at the common law, it will be seasonable in this place to consider of those different relations of principals and accessaries, whereof tho much hath occasionally been mentioned, yet I shall now proceed to the discussion of this matter distinctly and apart, and shall put together all the learning that occurs to me concerning this matter.

[613] In the highest capital offense, namely, high treason, there are no accessaries neither *before* nor *after*, for all consenters
aiders

aiders, abettors, and knowing receivers and comforters of traitors, are all principals, as hath been said, 3 *H. 7. 10. a. Stamf. P. C. p. 40. a. Co. P. C. p. 20.*

But yet as to the course of proceeding, it hath been and indeed ought to be the course, that those who did actually commit the very fact of treason, should be first tried before those that are principals in the second degree, because otherwise this inconvenience might follow, *viz.* that the principals in the second degree might be convicted, and yet the principals in the first degree may be acquitted, which would be absurd: *vide Somervill's case (a) before, cap. 22. p. 238.*

In cases that are criminal, but not capital, as in trespasss, mayhem, or *præmunire*, there are no accessaries, for all the accessaries *before*, are in the same degree as principals, *Stamf. Lib. I. cap. 48. & libros ibi*; and accessaries *after*, by receiving the offenders, cannot be in law under any penalties as accessaries, unless the acts of parliament that induce those penalties, do expressly extend to receivers or comforters, as some do.

Note the word *maintainers* in the statute of 27 *E. 3. cap. 1. and 16 R. 2. cap. 5.* denotes the maintainers of the offense, and not (as it seems) of the parties.

It remains, therefore, that the business of this title of principal and accessary refers only to felonies, whether by the common law, or by act of parliament.

As to felonies by act of parliament, regularly if an act of parliament enacts an offense to be felony, tho' it mentions nothing of accessaries *before* or *after*, yet virtually, and consequently those that counsel or command the offense are accessaries *before*, and those that knowingly receive the offender are accessaries *after*, as in the case of rape made felony by the statute of *Westminst. 2. cap. 34. (b), Stamf. P. C. Lib. I. cap. 47. 11 H. 4. 14.* in case of multiplication, *Co. P. C. cap. 20.* tho' *Dy. 88.* makes it a *quære*. [614]

But if the act of parliament that makes the felony, in express terms comprehend accessaries *before*, and makes no mention of accessaries *after*, namely, receivers or comforters, there it seems there can be no

(a) 1 *And. 109.* But it was ruled in that case, that upon that branch of treason, which relates to the compassing the death of the king, there is no need that the principal in the first degree, (*viz.* he who undertook to do the act) should be first tried,

for the movers or procurers are guilty of compassing the death of the king, altho' he that was procured should never assent thereto.

(b) 2 *Co. Instid. 434.*

accessaries *after*, for the expression of procurers, counsellors, abettors, all which import accessaries *before*, make it evident, that the law-makers did not intend to include accessaries *after*, which is an offense of a lower degree than accessaries *before*, as the statute of 8 H. 6. cap. 12. for stealing of records, the statute of 33 H. 8. cap. 8. for witchcraft, &c. *Stamford's P. C. ubi supra*.

It is true my lord *Coke*, *P. C.* 19. p. 72, 73. denies the opinion of *Stamford*, and affirms, that tho the statute of 8 H. 6. cap. 12. mentions only accessaries *before*, yet virtually and consequentially accessaries *after* are included, as well as in felonies at common law; but he neither allegeth any reason or authority for that opinion, and therefore the authorities being equal, the greater reason seems to be with *Stamford's* opinion, *Expressum facit cessare tacitum*, and no weight can be laid upon the statute of 3 H. 7. cap. 2. for that in express terms makes accessaries *before* and *after* to stand as principals.

And upon the same reason it is, that many of these acts of parliament mentioned before, cap. 22. p. 236. that make certain offenses, their counsellors, abettors, and procurers, to be treason, do not extend to make receivers guilty of treason, tho if the act had been general that such an offense shall be treason, it had consequentially made knowing receivers as well as abettors guilty of treason: *vide Co. P. C. cap. 64. p. 138*.

Tho generally an act of parliament creating a felony renders consequentially accessaries *before* and *after* within the same penalty, yet the special penning of the act of parliament in such cases sometimes varies the case.

The statute of 3 H. 7. cap. 2. for taking away maidens, &c. makes the offender, and the procuring and abetting, yea, and wittingly receiving also, to be all equally principal felonies, and excluded of clergy.

[615] Again, the statute of 27 Eliz. cap. 2. makes the coming in of a jesuit treason, the receiving or relieving of him felony, the contributing of money to his relief a *præmunire*, so that acts of parliament may diversify the offenses of accessory or principal according to the various penning thereof, and so have done in many cases.

And thus much as to accessaries to felonies made by act of parliament, which being general directions may be applicable almost to all cases.

I come to consider of principals and accessaries in felony, and their differences among themselves, and with relation to felonies at common law.

By what hath been formerly delivered, principals are in two kinds, principals in the first degree, which actually commit the offense, principals in the second degree, which are present, aiding, and abetting of the fact to be done.

So that regularly no man can be a principal in felony, unless he be present, unless it can be in case of wilful poisoning, wherein he that layeth or infuseth poison with intent to poison any person, and the person intended, or any other takes it in the absence of him that so layeth it, yet he is a principal, and he that counselleth or abetteth him so to do, is accessary *before*. *Co. P. C. cap. 64. p. 138.*

Who shall be said present, aiding, and abetting in case of felony, hath been sufficiently declared in *cap. 34.* in case of murder, in *cap. 48.* in case of burglary, in *cap. 46.* in case of robbery, and need not again be repeated.

Accessaries again are of two kinds, accessaries *before* the fact committed, and accessaries *after*.

An accessary *before*, is he, that being absent at the time of the felony committed, doth yet procure, counsel, command, or abet another to commit a felony, and it is an offense greater than the accessary *after*; and therefore in many cases clergy is taken away from accessaries *before*, which yet is not taken away from accessaries *after*, as in petit treason, murder, robbery, and wilful burning; by 4 & 5 *P. & M. cap. 4.*

Those offenses, which in the construction of law are sudden and unpremeditated, cannot have any accessaries before, as killing a man *per infortunium*, *se defendendo*, or manslaughter. [616]

And therefore if *A.* be indicted of murder, and *B.* as accessary *before*, if the jury find *A.* guilty only of manslaughter, there shall be no inquiry of *B.* but he shall be forthwith discharged, because bare homicide is always sudden; for if it were premeditated, it had been murder, and not barely homicide, *Bibith's case (c)*, but there may be an accessary *after*.

Again, the exility of the offense, tho it be felony, yet because it is not capital, excludeth accessaries *before* or *after*, and therefore in petit larciny there can be no accessary, *Anne Laffington's case, P. 42 Eliz.*

B. R. (d); and this is also the reason why there can be no accessory neither *before* nor *after* in manslaughter *per infortunium* or *se defendendo*, because there is no judgment of death in that case.

That which makes an accessory *before* is *command*, counsel, abetment, or procurement by one to another to commit a felony, when the commander or counsellor is absent at the time of the felony committed, for if he be present he is principal.

And therefore words that sound in bare permission, make not an accessory, as if *A.* says he will kill *J. S.* and *B.* says you may do your pleasure for me, this makes not *B.* accessory. 21 *H. 7.* 36, 37, *Crompt.* 41. *b.*

If *A.* hires *B.* to mingle or lay poison for *C.* *B.* doth it accordingly, and *C.* is poisoned, *B.* tho absent, is principal, *A.* is accessory; but if *A.* were present at the mingling or laying of the poison, tho both were absent at the taking of it, yet both are principals, for they are both equally acting in the poisoning.

But if *A.* buys the materials of the poison, knowing and consenting to the design, and delivers them to *B.* to mingle and apply it, or lay it in the absence of *A.* here it seems *A.* is only accessory before: *quod vide Co. P. C. cap. 7. p. 50. Franklin's case. (e)*

If *A.* commands or counsels *B.* to commit felony of one kind, and *B.* commits a felony of another kind, *A.* is not accessory, as [617] if *A.* commands *B.* to steal a plate, and *B.* commits burglary to steal the plate, *A.* is accessory to the theft, but not to the burglary. *Co. P. C. cap. 7. p. 51.*

If *A.* commands *B.* to take *C.* and *B.* takes *C.* and robs him, *A.* is not accessory to the robbery.

But if *A.* commands *B.* to beat *C.* and *B.* beats *C.* so that he dies, *A.* is accessory, because it may be a probable consequence of his beating, 3 *E. 3. Coron.* 314. *Stamf. P. C. Lib. 1. cap. 43. fol. 41. a.* the like it is if he commands *B.* to rob him, and in robbing him *B.* kills him, *A.* is accessory to the murder. *Plowd. Com.* 475. *Crompt.* 43. *b.*

A. commands *B.* to burn the house of *C.* *B.* kills, robs, or steals from *C.* *A.* is not accessory, for it is an offense of another kind; so if *A.* commands *B.* to steal the horse of *C.* and he steals his cow, *A.* is not accessory. *Plowd. Com.* 475. *Saunders's case.*

(d) *Corp. Eliz.* 750.

(e) *State Tr.* Vol. 1. p. 329

But if *A.* command *B.* to steal generally from *C.* then he is accessary to any kind of theft from *C.* tho it were done by robbery, for that varies the offense only in degree.

A. commands *B.* to poison *C.* *B.* kills him with a sword, yet *A.* is accessary, for the substance of the thing commanded was the death of *C.* and the differing in the manner of its execution from the command doth not excuse *A.* from being accessary.

But if *A.* command *B.* to kill *C.* and *B.* by mistake kills *D.* or else in striking at *C.* kills *D.* but misseth *C.* *A.* is not accessary to the murder of *D.* because it differs in the person. *Co. P. C. cap. 7. p. 51. Plowd. Com. 475. Saunder's case.*

A. gets *B.* with child, and before the birth counsels *B.* to kill it, the child is born, *B.* murders it, *A.* is accessary to the murder, yet at the time of the counsel given the child was not *in rerum natura.* *2 Eliz. Dy. 186. a.*

A. lets out a wild beast, or employs a madman to kill others, whereby any is killed, *A.* is principal in this case, tho absent, because the instrument cannot be a principal. *Dalt. cap. 108. (f)*

A. commands *B.* to kill *C.* but before the execution there-
of *A.* repents, and countermands *B.* and yet *B.* proceeds in [618]
the execution thereof, *A.* is not accessary, for his consent continues not, and he gave timely countermand to *B.* *Co. P. C. cap. 7. p. 51. Plowd. Com. 474. Saunder's case;* but if *A.* had repented, yet if *B.* had not been actually countermanded before the fact committed, *A.* had been accessary.

(f) *New Edit. p. 529.*

⁴ Blackf. Com. ch. 5 of Principals and Accessaries, *per totum*, and Foster in the table of principal matters, tit. Accessaries and Principals; and Burn, tit. Accessary; and Index to 2 Hawk. P. C. tit. Accessary and Principal.

CHAP. LVI.

Of accessaries after the fact.

THIS kind of accessary after the fact is, where a person knowing the felony to be committed by another, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon.

This,

This, as hath been said, holds place only in felonies, and in those felonies, where by the law judgment of death regularly ought to ensue, and therefore there is no accessary in petit larciny, homicide *per infortunium*, or homicide *se defendendo*. 15 E. 3. Coron. 116.

I shall consider, 1. What shall not be a receiving or relieving to make an accessary *after*; and 2. What shall be such a receiving or relieving to make an accessary *after*.

If *A.* knows that *B.* hath committed a felony, but doth not discover it, this doth not make *A.* an accessary *after*, but it is misprision of felony, for which *A.* may be indicted, and upon his conviction fined and imprisoned.

If *A.* sees *B.* commit a felony, but consents not, nor yet takes care to apprehend him, or to levy hue and cry after him; or upon hue and cry levied doth not pursue him, this is a neglect punishable by fine and imprisonment, but it doth not make *A.* an accessary *after*. 8 E. 2. Coron. 395, 3 E. 3. Coron. 293. *Stamf. P. C. Lib. I. cap. 45. f. 40.*

[619] *b. 14 H. 7. 31. b.* and the contrary opinion of some old books in this case is therefore rejected.

If *B.* commits a felony, and comes to the house of *A.* before he be arrested, and *A.* suffers him to escape without arrest, knowing him to have committed a felony, this doth not make *A.* accessary; but if he takes money of *B.* to suffer him to escape, this makes him accessary, 9 H. 4. 1. and so it is if *A.* shuts the fore-door of his house, whereby the pursuers are deceived, and the felon hath opportunity to escape, this makes *A.* accessary; for here is not a bare omission, but an act done by *A.* to accommodate his escape. 8 E. 2. Coron. 427.

A. hath his goods stolen by *B.* if *A.* receives his goods again simply without any contract to favour him in his prosecution, or to forbear prosecution, this is lawful; but if he receives them upon agreement not to prosecute, or to prosecute faintly, this is theft-bote, punishable by imprisonment and ransom (*a*), but yet it makes not *A.* an accessary, 42 Affiz. 5. *b. 3 E. 3. Coron. 353. Stamf. P. C. f. 40. a.* but if he takes money of *B.* to favour him, whereby he escapes, this makes him accessary. *Dalt. 263. (b). Crompt. 41. b.*

A. hath his goods stolen by *B.* who sells them to *C.* upon a just value, tho *C.* knows them to be stolen, this makes not *C.* accessary, unless he receives the felon. *Dalt. cap. 108. p. 288. (c)*

(a) Vide antea, p. 546. & notas ibid.

(b) New Edit. p. 531.

(c) New Edit. ibid.

But by some opinions, if he buy them at an under value, it makes him accessary, *per Crompt.* 43. b. and Sir *Nich. Hyde, Dalt. ubi supra*; but it seems this makes not an accessary, for if there be any odds, he that gives more, benefits the felon more than him that gives less than the value, but it may be a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment, and the buying at an under value is a presumptive evidence, that he knew they were stole, but makes him not accessary.

If *A.* hath his goods stolen by *B.* and *C.* knowing they were stolen, receives them, this simply of itself makes not an accessary, and therefore it hath been often ruled (*d*), that to say, *J. S. hath received stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen*, is not actionable, because it imports not felony, but only a trespass or misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment (*e*), for the indictment of an accessary *after*, is that he received and maintained *the thief*, not *the goods* (*f*): [620]

But yet it seems to me, that if *B.* had come himself to *C.* and had delivered him the goods to keep for him, *C.* knowing that they were stolen, and that *B.* stole them, or if *C.* receives the goods to facilitate the escape of *B.* or if *C.* knowingly receives them upon agreement to furnish *B.* with supplies out of them, and accordingly supplies him, this makes *C.* accessary (*g*); and with this seems to agree the preamble of the statute of 2 & 3 E. 6. cap. 24. *Crompt.* 41. b. for it is relieving and comforting.

But the bare receiving of stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, makes not an accessary; for he may receive them to keep for the true

(d) *Dawson's case, Telw.* 4.

(e) By 3 & 4 W. & M. cap. 9. "Receivers of stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, are to be deemed accessaries after the fact, and suffer as such;" but because these receivers often concealed the principal felons, and thereby escaped being punished as accessaries; therefore by 1 Ann. cap. 9. "Whosoever shall buy or receive stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, may be prosecuted for a misdemeanor, and punished by fine and imprisonment, tho' the principal felon be not convicted;" and this shall exempt them from being punished as accessaries, if the principal shall afterwards be convicted.

(f) But by 5 Ann. cap. 31. "If any person shall receive or buy knowingly any stolen goods, or knowingly harbour or conceal any felon, he shall be taken as accessary to the felon, and shall suffer as a felon;" this statute does not take away the benefit of clergy; but by 4 Geo. I.

cap. 11. such person may be transported for fourteen years.

(g) But because this was difficult to prove, the confederates of such thieves frequently disposing of such goods to the owners for a reward, under the notion of helping them again to their stolen goods, it is provided by 4 Geo. I. cap. 11. "That whosoever shall take a reward under the pretence of helping any one to stolen goods, shall suffer as a felon, as if he himself had stolen the said goods, unless he cause such felon to be apprehended and brought to trial, and give evidence against him;" upon this clause the famous *Jonathan Wild* was convicted and executed. 10 Geo. I. — See statute 6 Geo. I. ch. 23. for pretending to help one to stolen goods. Receivers of linen goods stolen from the bleaching-grounds, are by the statutes 18 Geo. II. declared felons, without benefit of clergy.

owner,

owner, or till they are recovered or restored by law; and so it seems are the books to be intended of 27 *Affiz.* 69. 25 *E.* 3. 39. (*h*), 9 *H.* 4. 1. *a.*

If a felon be in prison, he that relieves him with necessary meat, drink, or clothes for the sustentation of life, is not accessory.

So if he be bailed out till the next sessions, &c. it is lawful to relieve and maintain him, for he is *quodammodo* in custody, and [621] is under a certainty of coming to his trial. *Crompt.* 42. *b.* *Dalt.* p. 286. (*i*)

And therefore it is not treason thus to relieve a traitor, while he is in custody or under bail, and therefore the statute of 27 *Eliz.* cap. 2. that makes it felony to relieve a Jesuit, hath yet this qualification, *being at liberty and out of hold.*

But if a felon be in gaol, for a man to convey instruments to him to break prison to make an escape, or to bribe the gaoler to let him escape makes the party an accessory, for the common humanity allows every man to afford them necessary relief, yet common justice prohibits all men unlawful attempts to cause their escapes.

If *A.* speaks or writes in favour of a prisoner for his favour and deliverance, this makes him not an accessory. 26 *Affiz.* 47.

To instruct a felon to read thereby to save him by his clergy makes not an accessory. *M.* 7 *R.* 2. (*k*), *Co. P. C.* cap. 64. p. 139.

If *A.* be committed for felony, and *B.* an attorney advise the friends of *A.* to write to the witnesses not to appear against him, who writes accordingly, this makes neither *B.* nor the friends accessory, but is a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment. *Co. P. C.* *ubi supra.*

A feme covert cannot be an accessory for the receipt of her husband, for she ought not to discover him.

But the husband may be an accessory for the receipt of his wife. *Stamf. P. C. Lib. I. cap. 19. fol. 26. a.*

If the wife alone, her husband being ignorant, do knowingly receive *B.* a felon, the wife is accessory and not the husband. 15 *E.* 2. *Coron.* 383.

But if the husband and wife both receive a felon knowingly, it

(*h*) In the last edition of the year-books, which is in this place mispaged, it is 25 *E.* 3. 82. *b.*

(*i*) *New Edit.* p. 530.

(*k*) *Ret.* 3^o. *Rex Cant.*

shall be judged only the act of the husband, and the wife acquitted. *M. 37 E. 3. Rot. 34. in dorf. Rex. Coram Rege. (1)*

To make an accessary to felony there must be a felony committed by him, to whom he is accessary. [622]

A. gives *B.* a mortal stroke, *C.* receives or relieves *A.* or helps him to escape, and then *B.* dies, *C.* shall not be an accessary to the felony, because when he received him no felony was done.

But a man may be accessary to an accessary by the receiving of him knowing him to be an accessary to felony. *Stamf. P. C. cap. 46. f. 43. b. 22 Affix. 52.*

There can be no accessary in receipt of a felon, unless he know him to have committed a felony: *vide Stamford's P. C. 41. b.*

But yet it hath been held, that if the party be attaind of felony by outlawry or otherwise in the county of *A.* if any one of the county receive him, he is accessary, whether he had notice or not, because he is a felon by matter of record, whereof all in the same county ought to take notice. *12 E. 2. Coron. 377. Stamf. P. C. cap. 46. fol. 41. b.*

But it seems to me necessary to make an accessary after, that there be notice, altho the felon were attaind in the same county, for presumption shall not make men criminal, where the punishment is capital.

See antea, 612. ch. 55.

(1) This was the case of *Richard Day* and *Margery* his wife, (*vide supra p. 47.*) who had been indicted before the sheriff of *Lincoln* pro receptamento felonum; the indictment was sent coram rege: *Richard* surrendered himself and alleged, that he had been tried and acquitted on the said indictment before the justices of gaol-delivery at *Lincoln*, and was admitted to bail; after which the judge of gaol-delivery sent the record of *Richard's* acquittal; *Margery* the wife pleaded, that she also had been tried and acquitted, and was also bailed, but afterwards the not appearing a *Capias* was awarded against her and her bail: upon this her husband and one *John Hode* two of her bail come into court, *Et petunt ipsos admitti ad finem cum domino rege occasione prædictæ faciendum; S admittuntur;* sometime afterwards the said *John Hode* came into court and alleged, that he had been unjustly fined, "Quia prædictum indictmentum super prædictam *Margeriam* factum minus sus-

"ficiens est, et quod prædicta *Margeria* tempore, quo ipsa dictos felones receptasse seu eis consentire debuisset, fuit cooperta prædicto *Ricardo* viro suo, & adhuc est & omnino sub potestate sua [ejus], cui ipsa in nullo contradicere potuit, & ex quo non inferitur in indictmento prædicto, quod ipsa aliquod malum fecit, nec eis consentivit, seu ipsos felones receptavit ignorante viro suo, petit judicium, si ipsa vivente viro suo de aliquo receptamento in præsentia viri sui occasionari possit." The court took time to consider of this plea, and in *Michaelmas* term anno 2^{to} gave the following judgment, "Visto & diligenter examinato indictmento prædicto super præfatam *Margeriam* facto videtur curiæ, quod indictmentum illud minus sufficiens est ad ipsam inde ponere responsuram. Ideo cessit processus versus eam omnino. See Co. P. C. p. 108.

CHAP. LVII.

Concerning the order of proceeding against accessaries.

THE accessary may be indicted in the same indictment with the principal, and that is the best and most usual way; but he may be indicted in another indictment, but then such indictment must contain the certainty and kind of the principal felony.

If a man were accessary before or after in another county, than where the principal felony was committed, at common law it was punishable, but now by the statute of 2 & 3 E. 6. cap. 24. the accessary is indictable in that county, where he was accessary, and shall be tried there, as if the felony had been committed in the same county; and the justices, before whom the accessary is, shall write to the justices, &c. before whom the principal is attainted, for the record of the attainder.

This writing is to be by writ in the king's name under the *teste* of the justice so sending it. *Dy. 253. b.*

If the accessary be indicted either alone or together with the principal, process of outlawry shall not go against the accessary till the principal be attainted or outlawed, neither shall he be put to plead till the principal appear, but shall be bailed till the principal appear: *vide Westm. 1. cap. 14. (a)*

The accessary shall not be constrained to answer to his indictment, till the principal be tried, 9 E. 4. 48. a. but if he will wave that benefit, and put himself upon his trial before the principal be tried he may, and his acquittal or conviction upon such trial is good. *Stamf. P. C. Lib. I. cap. 49. f. 46. b.*

But it seems necessary in such case to respite judgment till the principal be convicted and attaind, for if the principal be after acquitted, [624] that conviction of the accessary is annulled, and no judgment ought to be given against him; but if he be acquitted of the accessary, that acquittal is good, and he shall be discharged. 8 H. 5. 6. b. *Coron. 463.*

If A. B. and C. be indicted as principals, and D. is indicted as accessary to them all, D. shall not be arraigned till all the principals be

(a) 2 Co. Inst. 183. This is now altered by 1 Ann. cap. 9.

attaint or outlawed, for if *A.* and *B.* be tried, and acquit or attain, yet *D.* may be accessary to *C.* and not to *A.* nor *B.* but if *A.* *B.* and *C.* be indicted as principals, and *D.* indicted as accessary to *A.* only, there if *A.* be attaint, tho *B.* and *C.* be not, yet *D.* shall be arraigned. 40 Affiz. 25. Coron. 216. 7 H. 4. 36. b. *Stamf. ubi supra.*

But yet the court may if they please arraign the accessary in the first case (*b*), for if he be found accessary he shall have judgment, but if acquitted of being accessary to *A.* yet that acquittal dischargeth him not of being accessary to *B.* or *C.* and therefore when they come in and plead and are attaint, *D.* may be arraigned *de novo* as accessary to *B.* and *C.* *Plowd. Com.* 98. b. *Giutin's case.* So that it is in the discretion of the court to arraign him or not before *B.* and *C.* be attaint, tho it be the safer course to respite the arraignment of the accessary till *B.* and *C.* appear or are outlawed.

If *A.* be indicted or appealed as principal, and *B.* as accessary *before* or *after* by the same indictment, and the principal plead in bar or abatement, or *autrefois acquit*, the accessary shall not be forced to answer, till that plea be determined, for if it be found for *A.* the accessary is discharged, if against *A.* yet he shall after plead over to the felony, and may be acquitted. 9 H. 7. 19. b.

If *A.* be indicted as principal, and *B.* as accessary, they may be both arraigned together, and plead together, and put upon their trial by the same jury, and the jury shall be charged to inquire first of the principal, and if they find him not guilty, then to acquit the accessary; but if they find him guilty, then to inquire of the accessary. *Seigneur Sanchar's case* (*c*), 40 Affiz. 8. 7 H. 4. 36. b. *Coke* [625] *super statute Westm.* 1. cap. 14. (*d*); but in that case judgment must be first given of the principal, for if any thing obstruct judgment, as clergy, a pardon, &c. the accessary is to be discharged.

If *A.* be attaint of murder upon an appeal, and then *A.* is indicted of murder as principal, and *B.* as accessary, the principal pleads the former attainder, *B.* shall not be put to answer as accessary, because he is not attaint upon the same suit, and so it is if the attainder of *A.* were first upon the appeal. 7 H. 4. 36. a. *Stamf. P. C.* 47. a. *Coke ubi supra.*

(*b*) To make this consistent with what goes before, we must understand the former passage to mean, that where he is indicted as accessary to all, he shall not be arraigned as accessary to them all till all be attaint or outlawed, and *ibid.* that the court may in

such case, if they please, arraign him only as accessary to him who is attaint, tho the others do not appear.

(*c*) 9 Co. Rep. 119. a.

(*d*) 2 Co. Inst. 184.

If the principal be attainted and hath his clergy, or be pardoned after attainder, the accessary shall be put to answer; but if the principal be only convicted and hath his clergy, or be pardoned, or stands mute, or dies in prison before judgment, or challenges above thirty-six peremptorily, the accessary shall not be put to answer, for the principal was never attainted (*e*), and altho formerly there were diversity of opinions in the books in these cases (*f*), yet the law is now settled as above (*g*), 4 *Co. Rep.* 43, 44. *Bibith's case* and *Syer's case*, *Coke super Westm.* 1. cap. 14.

If the principal be erroneously attaind, the accessary shall be put to answer, and shall not take advantage of the error in that attainder, 2 *R.* 3. 21, 22. but the principal reversing the attainder, reverseth the attainder of the accessary. 13 *E.* 4. 9. *b*.

If *A.* be indicted as principal, and *B.* as accessary *before* or *after*, and both be acquit, yet *B.* may be indicted as principal, and the former acquittal as accessary is no bar. 4 *E.* 6. *B. Coron.* 186. *Knightley's case*, *Crompt.* f. 43. *a*.

[626] But if *A.* be indicted as principal and acquitted, he shall not be indicted as accessary *before*, and if he be, he may plead his former acquittal in bar, for it is in substance the same offense, *Stamf. P. C. Lib.* II. cap. 36. fol. 105. *a*. 2 *E.* 3. *Coron.* 150 & 282. but the antient law was otherwise. 8 *E.* 2. *Coron.* 424.

But if he be indicted as principal and acquitted, he may yet be indicted as accessary *after*, for they are offenses of several natures. 27 *Affiz.* 10. 8 *H.* 5. *Coron.* 463. *Stamf. P. C. ubi supra*.

And so it is if he be indicted as accessary *before* and acquitted, yet for the same reason he may be indicted as accessary *after*.

(*e*) It was for this reason, that *Wesson* the principal actor in the murder of Sir *Thomas Overbury* could not for a long while be prevailed with to plead, that to the earl and countess of *Somerset*, who were the movers and procurers might escape. See *State Tr.* Vol. I. p. 314.

(*f*) See *Coron.* 51, 58.

(*g*) But since our author wrote, it is settled quite otherwise by 1 *Ann.* cap. 9. for by that statute, "If any principal offender shall be convicted of felony, stand

"mute, or challenge above twenty, it
"shall be lawful to proceed against the
"accessary, either before or after the fact,
"in the same manner as if such principal
"felon had been attainted thereof, not-
"withstanding such principal felon be ad-
"mitted to his clergy, or otherwise de-
"served before attainder; and every such
"accessary, if convicted, stand mute, &c.
"shall suffer the same punishment, as if
"such principal had been attainted.

C H A P. LVIII.

Concerning felonies by act of parliament, and first concerning rapes.

HAVING thus considered the felonies that are by the common law, I now proceed to the handling of felonies by act of parliament, and because it is hardly possible to reduce the titles of them under any dependent method, and difficult to digest them under heads, I shall take them up in order of time, according to the series and order of the reigns and years of the several kings wherein they were enacted, only where I meet with any felony in the time of any king's reign, I shall as near as I can bring together those Acts of Parliament both before and after, that concern that subject.

And first concerning rape.

Rape was antiently a felony, as appears by the laws of *Adlestone* mentiond by *Brañton*, *Lib. III. (a)*, and was pun- [627]
nished by loss of life.

But in proceſs of time that punishment ſeemed too hard; but the truth is, a ſevere punishment ſucceeded in the place thereof, viz. caſtration and the loſs of eyes (*b*), as appears by *Brañton* (who wrote in the time of *Henry III.*) *Lib. III. cap. 28.* but then, tho the offender were convict at the king's ſuit, the woman that was raviſhed (if ſingle) might, if ſhe pleaſed, redeem him from the execution, if ſhe elected him for her huſband, and the offender conſented thereunto, as appears by *Brañton ubi ſupra.*

This kind of punishment it ſeems continued till 3 *E. 1.* and then by the ſtatute of *Weſtm. 1. cap. 13. (c)*, it was enacted, “ That none
“ raviſh or take with force a damſel within age with her conſent
“ nor againſt her conſent, nor no dame, damſel of age, nor any other
“ woman againſt her will; and if any do it, the party may ſue with-
“ in forty days, and common right ſhall be done; and if none ſue
“ within forty days, the king ſhall have the ſuit, and the party con-
“ vict ſhall ſuffer two years imprifonment, and be ranſomed at the
“ king's pleaſure.

(a) *De Corona*, cap. 28. f. 147. a.

Leges Gul. I. l. 19. Wilk. Leg. Anglo-Sax.

(b) By the laws of *William I.* this of-
fence was puniſhed with caſtration. *Vide*

p. 222 & 290.

(c) 2 *Co. Inſtit.* 180.

This statute gives a punishment by imprisonment and ransom only, if attaint at the king's suit, and takes away castration and putting out of eyes; but it seems as to the suit of the party, if commenced within forty days, it alters not the punishment before, *Le roy lui ferra common droiture.*

But by the statute of *Westm. 2. cap. 34. (d)* the offense of rape is made felony, "If a man ravish a married woman, dame, or damsel, where she neither assented before nor after, *Eyt judgment de vy & member*; if she assent after, yet the king shall have the suit.

This created rape a felony, and therefore it was not inquirable in a leet, for it was made felony *de novo* by this statute, 22 E. 4. 22. a. 6 H. 7. 4. b.

[628] Rape is the carnal knowledge of any woman above the age of ten years against her will, and of a woman-child under the age of ten years with or against her will. *Co. P. C. cap. 11. p. 60.*

The essential words in an indictment of rape are *rapuit & carnaliter cognovit*, but *carnaliter cognovit*, nor any other circumlocution without the word *rapuit* are not sufficient in a legal sense to express rape. 1 H. 6. 1. a. 9 E. 4. 26. a.

To make a rape there must be an actual penetration or *res in re*, (as also in buggery) and therefore *emissio seminis* is indeed an evidence of penetration, but singly of itself it makes neither rape nor buggery, but it is only an attempt of rape or buggery, and is severely punished by fine and imprisonment. *Co. P. C. cap. 10. p. 59.*

But the least penetration maketh it rape or buggery, yea altho there be not *emissio seminis*. *Co. P. C. ubi supra*; the old expression ~~was~~ *abstulit ei virginitatem*, and sometimes *pucellagium suum*. *Bract. Lib. III. (e)*

And therefore I suppose the case in my lord Coke's 12 Rep. 36. 5 Jac. that saith, there must be both, *viz. penetratio & emissio seminis* to make a rape or buggery, is mistaken, and contradicts what he saith in his pleas of the crown; and besides, it is possible a rape may be committed by some, *quibus virgæ erectio adfit, & emissio seminis ex quodam defectu desit*, as physicians tells us.

If A. actually ravish a woman, and B. and C. were present, aiding, and abetting, they are all equally principal, and all subject to the

(d) 2 Co. Inst. 433.

(e) De corona, cap. 28. f. 147. b.

same punishment both at common law and since the statute of *Westm.* 2. *de quo infra*.

It appears by *Braſton ubi ſupra*, that in an appeal of rape it was a good exception, *quod ante diem & annum contentas in appello habuit eam ut concubinam & amicam, & inde ponit ſe ſuper patriam*, and the reaſon was, becauſe that unlawful cohabitation carried a preſumption in law, that it was not againſt her will.

But this is no exception at this day, it may be an evidence of an aſſent, but it is not neceſſary that it ſhould be ſo, for the woman may forſake that unlawful courſe of life. [629]

But the huſband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himſelf upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial conſent and contract the wife hath given up herſelf in this kind unto her huſband, which ſhe cannot retract.

A. the huſband of *B.* intends to prostitute her to a rape by *C.* againſt her will, and *C.* accordingly doth raviſh her, *A.* being preſent, and aſſiſting to this rape: in this caſe theſe points were reſolved, 1. That this was a rape in *C.* notwithstanding the huſband aſſiſted in it, for tho in marriage ſhe hath given up her body to her huſband, ſhe is not to be by him prostituted to another. 2. That the huſband being preſent, aiding and aſſiſting, is alſo guilty as a principal in rape, and therefore, altho the wife cannot have an appeal of rape againſt her huſband, yet he is indictable for it at the king's ſuit as a principal. 3. That in this caſe the wife may be a witneſs againſt her huſband, and accordingly ſhe was admitted, and *A.* and *C.* were both executed. 8 *Car.* 1. *Cafus comitis Caſtlehaven.* (f)

If *A.* by force take *B.* and by force and menace compel her to marry him, and then with force *A.* hath the carnal knowledge of *B.* againſt her will, tho this marriage be voidable, yet it is not ſo ſimply void as to enable her to maintain an appeal of rape againſt *A.* for ſhe may by her conſent affirm this voidable marriage, and therefore in the like caſe, *Rot. Parl.* 15 *H.* 6. *n.* 15. there was a ſpecial act of parliament to enable the lady *Iſabel Butler* to bring an appeal of rape againſt *William Pull* in that caſe notwithstanding that marriage; but that marriage had been diſſolvable by a declaratory ſentence in court chriſtian, becauſe obtained by a plain force; and if ſuch a diſſolution of the marriage had been obtained, then it ſeems to me, that, if the

(f) See *Hut.* 115. *Ruſſ. Coll.* Vol. II. p. 93.—101. *State Tr.* Vol. I. p. 266.

carnal knowledge of her were forcible and against her will as well as the marriage, that rape was punishable as well by appeal at the suit of the lady, as by indictment at the suit of the king, without the aid of an act of parliament, for it was really a rape, only the marriage *de facto* was an impediment of its punishment so long as *de facto* the marriage continued, but now that impediment being removed by the declaratory sentence, and the marriage made void *ab initio*, it is all one as if it had never been, and tho relation be a legal fiction and *intenta ad unum*, yet in this case the marriage and carnal knowledge being one intire act of force, and consecutive one upon another, in the real effect of that first force, it shall remain punishable as if there had been no marriage at all; but the statute of 3 H. 7. cap. 2. (g) hath provided a remedy in this case, so that this difficulty need not come in question.

An infant under the age of fourteen years is presumed by law unable to commit a rape, and therefore it seems cannot be guilty of it, and tho in other felonies *malitia supplet ætatem* in some cases as hath been shewn, yet it seems as to this fact the law presumes him impotent, as well as wanting discretion.

But he may be a principal in the second degree, as aiding and assisting, tho under fourteen years, if it appear by sufficient circumstances, that he had a mischievous discretion, as well as in other felonies.

Thus far of the nature of rape, and who may be culpable of it. Now we will consider upon whom it may be committed, and some other considerations touching this fact.

It was doubted, whether a rape could be committed upon a female child under ten years old, *Mich. 13 & 14 Eliz. Dy. 304. a.* By the statute of 18 Eliz. cap. 7. it is declared and enacted, "That if any person shall unlawfully and carnally know and abuse any woman-child under the age of ten years, it shall be felony without the benefit of clergy.

My lord Coke adds the words, *either with her will or against her will*, as if were she above the age of ten years, and with her will, it should not be rape; but the statute gives no such intimation; only declares that such carnal knowledge is rape.

[631] And therefore it seems, if she be above the age of ten years and under the age of twelve years, tho she consent,

(g) By this statute a forcible taking away and marrying a woman against her will is made felony.

But only in case of woman with substance it

it is rape. 1. Because the age of consent of a female is not ten but twelve. 2. By the statute of *Westm. 1. cap. 13. Roy defend, que nul ne ravise ne prigne a force damsel deins age, ne per son gree ne sans son gree*; and my lord *Coke* in his exposition upon that statute (*h*) declares, that these words *deins age* must be taken for her age of consent, viz. twelve years, for that is her age of consent to marriage, and consequently her consent is not material in rape, if she be under twelve years old, tho above ten years old, altho those words are by some mistake crept into my lord *Coke's* definition of rape, *Co. P. C. cap. 11.* but if she be above the age of twelve years, and consenting at the time of the fact committed, it is not felony.

But if she were above the age of twelve years, and consented upon menace of death, if she consented not, this is not a consent to excuse a rape. 5 *B. 4. 6. a. Dalt. cap. 107. (i)*

And therefore that opinion of Mr. *Finch* cited by *Dalton ubi supra*, and by *Stamford, cap. 14. fol. 24.* out of *Britton*, that it can be no rape, if the woman conceive with child, seems to be no law, *mulier enim vi oppressa concipere potest.*

If the woman consented not at the time of the rape committed, but consented after, she shall not have an appeal of rape by the statute of *Westm. 2. cap. 34.* but yet the king shall have the suit by indictment, and by the statute of 6 *R. 2. cap. 6.* if she have a husband, he shall have an appeal, and if she have none, then her father or other next of blood shall have an appeal of such rape; and by the same statute as well the ravisher as the ravished, that so assented, are disabled to have any dower, inheritance or jointure; and the next of blood of such ravisher or assenting ravished, to whom their lands should revert, remain or fall after their death, shall enter upon the same, and hold it as an estate of inheritance.

But an assent after through menace of death is not such an assent, as incurs this penalty; *quod vide 5 E. 4. 6. a.*

As in other felonies, so in this there are or may be accessaries before and after, for tho this be a felony by act of parliament, that speaks only of those that commit the offense, yet consequentially and incidentally accessaries before and after are included, and so in every new statute making a felony without speaking of accessaries before or after. *Co. P. C. cap. 10. p. 59.* and so in buggery.

(b) 2 *Instit. 182.*

(i) *New Edit. cap. 160. p. 524.*

And note, that at the time of the making of the statute of 13 E. 1. rape was not felony, for it had long continued under the nature only of a misdemeanor and not a felony, and therefore it is not at this day inquirable in a leet, because it is a felony newly created. 6 H. 7. 4. b. 22 E. 4. 22. a.

The regular means of bringing this offense to judgment was either at the suit of the king by indictment, or at the suit of the party by appeal.

The indictment ought to have these ingredients, 1. It must be *felonice*. 2. It must be *rapuit & carnaliter cognovit*. 3. It must conclude *contra formam statuti* 13 & 14 Eliz. Dy. 304. a.

It may be prosecuted by indictment at any time, *for nullum tempus occurrit regi*.

An appeal of rape lies for the party ravished, and if she consent after the rape, she is barred of her appeal, and her husband, if married, or the next of kin, if single, may have the appeal by the statute of 6 R. 2. cap. 6.

If the next of kin were the ravisher, his next of kin shall have the appeal by the equity of the statute of 6 R. 2. 28 H. 6. Coron. 459.

As to the appeal of the party ravished two things are necessary, 1. That she make fresh discovery and pursuit of the offense and offender, otherwise it carries a presumption that her suit is but malicious and feigned; this *Bracton* at large describes *Lib. III. cap. 28. f. 147. a.* *Cum igitur virgo corrupta fuerit & oppressa, statim cum factum recens fuerit cum clamore & hutesio debet currere ad villas vicinas, & ibi injuriam sibi illatam probis hominibus ostendere, sanguinem & vestes suas sanguine tinctas & vestium scissuras, & sic ire debet ad præpositum hundredi & ad servientem domini regis, & ad coronatores & vicecomitem, & ad primum comitatum faciat appellum, &c.*

[633] 2. That the appeal be speedily prosecuted, for it seems, that a year and a day be not allowed in this appeal, but some short time, tho it be not defined in law what time, but lies much in the discretion of the court upon the circumstances of the fact, yet the statute of *Westm. 1. cap. 13.* allowed but forty days: long delay of prosecution in such a case of rape always carries a presumption of a malicious prosecution. 3. If the wife hath once consented after, her appeal is barred.

By the statute of 18 Eliz. cap. 7. the principals in rape are ousted of clergy, whether they be principals in the first degree, *viz.* he that

com-

committed the fact, or principals in the second degree, viz. present aiding, and assisting; but accessaries before and after have their clergy.

Touching the evidence in an indictment of rape given to the grand jury or petit jury.

The party ravished may give evidence upon oath, and is in law a competent witness; but the credibility of her testimony, and how far forth she is to be believed, must be left to the jury, and is more or less credible according to the circumstances of fact that concur in that testimony.

For instance, if the witness be of good fame, if she presently discovered the offense made pursuit after the offender, shewed circumstances and signs of the injury, whereof many are of that nature, that only women are the most proper examiners and inspectors, if the place, wherein the fact was done, was remote from people, inhabitants or passengers, if the offender fled for it; these and the like are concurring evidences to give greater probability to her testimony, when proved by others as well as herself.

But on the other side, if she concealed the injury for any considerable time after she had opportunity to complain, if the place, where the fact was supposed to be committed, were near to inhabitants, or common recourse or passage of passengers, and she made no outcry when the fact was supposed to be done, when and where it is probable she might be heard by others; these and the like circumstances carry a strong presumption, that her testimony is false or feigned.

If the rape be committed upon a child under twelve years old, whether or how she may be admitted to give evidence [634] may be considerable. (*)

(*) For she might at that age maintain an appeal *pro raptu*, Pasch. 33 E. 1. Rot. 16. in dorso. London. Coram Rege. James Pochin merchant was attached, and brought Coram Rege to answer to Isabel daughter of Emma de Langeleye de raptu & pace regis fracta, who appeal'd him after this manner, per quendam narratorem suum dicens.—Isabella filia Emmæ de Langeleye, de ætate novem annorum & dimidii dicit, quod prædictus Jacobus die dominicâ proximâ post festum sancti Martini, anno R. R. E. 33, apud London in alia fratris regis ex opposito ecclesiæ sancti Benedicti de Scherhog borâ vespertinâ ipsam Isabellam cepit, & in quâdam tabernâ sua portavit, & contra pacem domini regis cum ea concubuit, & virginitatem suam rapuit; & petit quod iustitiam domini regis super hoc sibi faciant iustitiam & remedium. Et queritur,

quod prædicta transgressio sibi facta fuit die & anno prædictis ad dampnum ipsius Isabellæ centum librarum, &c. Et prædictus Jacobus venit, & defendit omnem feloniam, raptum, &c. Et petit allocantiam de appello ipsius Isabellæ, desicut ipsum Jacobum per verba in appello usualia, & necessaria, ac convenientia, non appellat. Et quia constat curiæ quod appellum, &c. insufficiens est, consideratum est, quod prædicta Isabella committatur marello; & postea ei remittitur prisona, & prædictus Jacobus quoad appellum ipsius Isabellæ eat inperpetuum quietus, &c. He was then arraigned at the king's suit de raptu prædicto, and was tried, and convicted; but the king afterwards remisit prædicto Jacobo iudicium vite & membrorum; & quod faciat redemptionem pro delicto prædicto, & sinem fecit cum donans rege per centum libras.

It seems to me, that if it appear to the court, that she hath that sense and understanding that she knows and considers the obligation of an oath, tho she be under twelve years, she may be sworn; thus we find it done in case of evidences against witches, an infant of nine years old was sworn. *Dalt. cap. 111. p. 297. (k)*

But if it be an infant of such tender years, that in point of discretion the court sees it unfit to swear her, yet I think she ought to be heard without oath to give the court information, tho singly of itself it ought not to move the jury to convict the offender, nor is it in itself a sufficient testimony, because not upon oath, without concurrence of other proofs, that may render the thing probable; and my reasons are, 1. The nature of the offense, which is most times secret, and no other testimony can be had of the very doing of the fact, but the party upon whom it is committed, tho there may be other concurrent proofs of the fact when it is done. 2. Because if the child complains presently of the wrong done to her to the mother or other relations, their evidence upon oath shall be taken, yet it is but a narrative of what the child told them without oath, and there is

[635] much more reason for the court to hear the relation of the child herself, than to receive it at second-hand from those that swear they heard her say so; for such a relation may be falsified, or otherwise represented at the second-hand, than when it was first delivered.

But in both these cases, whether the infant be sworn or not, it is necessary to render their evidence credible, that there should be concurrent evidence to make out the fact, and not to ground a conviction singly upon such an accusation with or without oath of an infant.

For in many cases there may be reason to admit such witnesses to be heard, in cases especially of this nature, which yet the jury is not bound to believe; for the excellency of the trial by jury is in that they are the triers of the credit of the witnesses as well as the truth of the fact; it is one thing, whether a witness be admissible to be heard, another thing, whether they are to be believed when heard.

It is true rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely and impartially to be punished with death; but it must be remembered, that it is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.

I shall never forget a trial before myself of a rape in the county of *Suffex*.

There had been one of that county convicted and executed for a rape in that county before some other judges about three assizes before, and I suppose very justly: some malicious people seeing how easy it was to make out such an accusation, and how difficult it was for the party accused to clear-himself, furnished the two assizes following with many indictments of rapes, wherein the parties accused with some difficulty escaped.

At the second assizes following there was an antient wealthy man of about sixty-three years old indicted for a rape, which was fully sworn against him by a young girl of fourteen years old, and a concurrent testimony of her mother and father, and some other relations. The antient man, when he came to his defense, alledged that it was true the fact was sworn, and it was not possible for [636] him to produce witnesses to the negative; but yet, he said, his very age carried a great presumption that he could not be guilty of that crime; but yet he had one circumstance more, that he believed would satisfy the court and the jury, that he neither was nor could be guilty: and being demanded what that was, he said, he had for above seven years last past been afflicted with a rupture so hideous and great, that it was impossible he could carnally know any woman, neither had he upon that account, during all that time carnally known his own wife, and offered to shew the same openly in court; which for the indecency of it I declined, but appointed the jury to withdraw into some room to inspect this unusual evidence; and they accordingly did so, and came back and gave an account of it to the court, that it was impossible he should have to do with any woman in that kind, much less to commit a rape, for all his bowels seemed to be fallen down in those parts, that they could scarce discern his privities, the rupture being full as big as the crown of a hat, whereupon he was acquitted.

Again, at *Northampton* assizes, before one of my brother justices upon the *Nisi prius*, a man was indicted for the rape of two young girls not above fourteen years old, the younger somewhat less, and the rapes fully proved, tho' peremptorily denied by the prisoner, he was therefore to the satisfaction of the judge and jury convicted; but before judgment it was most apparently discovered, that it was but a malicious

malicious contrivance, and the party innocent; he was therefore relieved before judgment.

I only mention these instances, that we may be the more cautious upon trials of offenses of this nature, wherein the court and jury may with so much ease be imposed upon without great care and vigilance; the heinousness of the offense many times transporting the judge and jury with so much indignation, that they are over hastily carried to the conviction of the person accused thereof, by the confident testimony sometimes of malicious and false witnesses.

See 4. Black. Com. ch. 15. page 210—215. Burn. Tit. Rape. 1 Hawk. P. C. 108. Poulton de pace Regis 134. a.

[637]

CHAP. LIX.

Concerning the felony de uxore abductâ sive raptâ cum bonis viri, super statutum Westm. 2. cap. 34.

THE words of the statute are, *De mulieribus abductis cum bonis virorum suorum habeat rex sectam de bonis sic asportatis.*

This part of the statute hath affinity with what goes before in the same statute concerning rape; and tho this learning hath been long antiquated, yet it is of use to be known.

If a wife goes away of her own consent with another man, and takes with her the goods of the husband, this seems to be felony neither in the man nor in the wife, tho *Dalt. cap. 108. p. 266.* (a) takes it to be a felony in the man that takes her and the goods; but it is a trespass, for which at common law the husband may have an action of trespass, *quare uxorem suam cepit & abduxit cum bonis viri.*

But if A. takes the wife of B. against her will with the goods of her husband, but doth not actually ravish the wife, it is felony as to the goods, for which the party may be indicted; but as to the taking away of the wife it is but a trespass, for which the husband may have his action of trespass at common law, *quare uxorem suam rapuit & eam cum bonis & catallis ad valent', &c. abduxit & adhuc detinet*, and in that action shall recover damages for the taking of his wife and goods at common law.

But it should seem, that he might have his action grounded upon the statute of *Westm. 2.* which differs only in this from a trespass at common law, 1. That the trespass at common law is *pone per vados, &c.* but this is *attachies*, 14 *H. 6. 2. b.* Again, 2. The writ at common law is general, but this upon the statute concludes *[638]*
contra formam statuti, quod vide Fitz. N. B. 89. 9 H. 6. 2. a.

But without question, if the wife were actually ravished and the goods taken, this action lies for the husband, and he shall recover damages for the rape as well as the goods, tho the wife were dead or divorced after the rape. 44 *Affiz. 13. 47 E. 3. Action sur statute 37.*

And it seems such an action was antiently in the nature of an appeal of rape and robbery grounded upon the statute of *Westm. 2.*

And by the antient law [the defendant being convicted in a writ founded upon this statute, as before, was to have judgment of death, which appears most evidently by the ordinance of parliament, *Rot. Parl. 8. E. 2. M. 3.* and afterwards sent by *Mutinus* into the king's bench, *T. 11 E. 2. Rot. 4. London*, which recites, that in such case the defendant was notailable, *Eo quod idem implacitatus, si hujusmodi transgressione convictus fuisset, suspensioni adjudicari deberet*, and therefore provides, that the defendant, if of good fame, shall be hailed.

And according to this are the books 13 *Affiz. 5. 15. E. 3. Utlagarie 49. Coron. 122. 18 E. 3. 32. a.* and a case of a vicar cited to be 13 *E. 2.* who had his clergy in this case, but it should seem it was intended, 1. When a rape was actually committed, *vide 44 Affiz. 13.* and 2. When the action was grounded upon the statute, and not barely at common law.

But the law hath been long disused to give a capital judgment upon this writ, and in process of time nothing, as it seems, was recovered but damages, tho the writ were brought upon the statute, for *rapuit* is now intended of a simple taking. 9. *Elix. Dy. 256. b. 2 Co. Instit. 435. super Westm. 2. cap. 34. 43 E. 3. 23. a.*

And it seems the law was accordingly taken, for the statute of 6 *R. 2. cap. 6.* gives an appeal to the husband for the rape of his wife in some cases, which it needed not have done, if by the law, as it was then used, the husband might upon such a writ convict the party, and obtain judgment of death against him.

And besides, it was very inconvenient, that in a civil action formed for damages, and that wants the material *[639]*

terms of law to expreis a felony, (namely *carnaliter cognovit* and *felonice*) judgment of death should be given, and so this course expired of itself.

C H A P. LX.

Of felony by purveyors taking victuals without warrant.

BY the statute of *Articuli super Cartas*, cap. 2. It is enacted, Si nul face prises sans garrant, & les emport encountre volunt de celui, a qe les biens sont, soit maintenant arrest per le vill, ou le prise serra fait, & amesne al prochain gaol: Et si de ceo soit atteint, soit fait de lui, come de laron, si la quantite de biens le demand.

If *A.* having no commission take goods by pretense of a commission as purveyor, and the party not knowing that he hath no commission sell and suffer him to take it, yet this is felony; but if the owner knew he had no commission, and yet willingly sell it to him as a purveyor, and he take and carry it away, this is not a carrying away against the consent of the owner to make a felony within this statute. 2 *Co. Instit.* p. 546. *super Articulis*, cap. 2.

This point of felony is confirmed by the statute of 18 *E. 3.* cap. 7. and 4 *E. 3.* cap. 4.

Afterwards by the statute of 5 *E. 3.* cap. 2. and 25 *E. 3.* cap. 1. “ If a purveyor shall take goods above the value of twelve-pence “ without testimony and appraisement of the constable, or without “ tallies given, this is also felony.

[640] Again, by the statute of 25 *E. 3.* cap. 15. “ If a purveyor “ take sheep and their wool betwixt *Easter* and *Midsummer*, “ it is felony, if he shore them at his own house.

Again, by the statute of 36 *E. 3.* cap. 2. “ If any purveyor take “ goods or carriage, otherwise than is contained in their com- “ mission, it is felony.

But in all these felonies the offender is not ousted of clergy, but he shall have it: *vide Co. P. C.* cap. 24.

But these acts of parliament and the punishment of purveyors is now out of date, because by the statute of 12 *Car. 2.* cap. 24. all purveyance is taken away.

Only

Only by two subsequent acts, namely 13 *Car. 2. cap. 8.* and 14 *Car. 2. cap. 20.* there is a special purveyance of carriage settled for the king's household, and for the navy and carriage of ordnance; but the statute of *Articuli super cartas*, and the other statutes making felony in case of undue purveyance do not concern this new established purveyance, because settled in another way; and therefore I shall say no more touching this matter.

C H A P. LXI.

Concerning the new felonies enacted in the times of E. 2. E. 3. and R. 2.

IN the times of those kings there were but few new felonies enacted other than those touching purveyors, whereof in the former chapter.

By the statute of 1 *E. 2. De frangentibus prisonam*, the law was settled in that point, whereof I have said sufficient *supra*, cap. 54.

By the statute of 14 *E. 3. cap. 10.* "If a gaoler or under keeper by too great durefs of imprisonment, and by pain make any prisoner in his ward to become an appellor against [641] his will, and thereof be attaint, he shall have judgment of life and member.

These words in any act of parliament *Eit judgment de vy & member* create a felony.

This act extends to a gaoler *de facto*, tho he be not a gaoler *de jure*.

The offender hath the benefit of clergy: *vide Co. P. C. cap. 29. p. 91.* touching this felony.

By an act *Rot. Par. 17 E. 3. n. 15.* but not printed, the importation of false and evil money is prohibited under pain of life and member, and the exportation of coin or bullion prohibited under pain of forfeiture, and if the searcher be of confederacy with the exporter, it is enacted to be felony in the searcher.

If it be said this act was needless to make importation of false money felony, because declared treason by the statute of 25 *E. 3.* the answer is obvious. By the act of 17 *E. 3.* before-mentioned licence was

was granted to *Dutch* merchants and others to import their own coin so it were as good as sterling, and that, if they pleased, the merchants might trade between themselves with that foreign money; and it was necessary in respect of that foreign money to impose a new penalty upon the importers of false money of that kind, because *that* foreign coin was not within the statute of 25 E. 3.

But this seems to be but a temporary law during that special intercourse between the *English* and *Dutch*, and besides by subsequent statutes the penalty of treason is annexed to the importation of counterfeit coin made current by proclamation: *quod vide supra*, cap. 20. p. 225.

By the statute of 27 E. 3. cap. 3. of the staple, the exportation of wools, wool-fells, leather or lead by any *English*, *Irish*, or *Welshman*, is prohibited under pain of loss of life and member, and forfeiture of lands and goods (a), but this was repealed by the statute of 36 E. 3. cap. 11. whereby it was enacted, that merchants denizens may pass with their wool as well as foreigners without being restrained.

[642] But yet this was not full enough, and therefore by the statute of 38 E. 3. cap. 6. there was a fuller repeal of the statute of 27 E. 3. as to the point of felony, yet the forfeiture of lands and goods continued upon merchants denizens, and the statute of the staple was confirmed in all points by 38 E. 3. cap. 7.

But by the statute of 43 E. 3. cap. 1. the staple of *Calais* was abolished, yet by 14 R. 2. cap. 5. exportation of wool, wool-fells, leather and lead are prohibited to denizens under pain of forfeiture of them.

By the statute of 27 E. 3. *de provisoribus*, cap. 5. ingrossing of *Gascoign* wines made felony, but that penalty repealed by the statute 37 E. 3. cap. 16.

So that these statutes stand now repealed.

But yet by the statute of 18 H. 6. cap. 15. the carrying of wool or wool-fells out of the realm to other places than to the staple of *Calais* without the king's licence is felony, excepts wools carried to the freights of *Morocco*.

This statute is supposed by my lord *Coke*, P. C. cap. 32 to be in force, but that being doubted, because the staple of *Calais* then in use hath been long since abolished, a new provision and a better is made by acts of this present parliament (b).

(a) Co. P. C. p. 95.

(b) 12 Car. 2. cap. 32. 13 & 14 Car. 2. cap. 18.
But

But whether that act be in force or not, the offender was not thereby excluded of the benefit of clergy.

By the statute of 34 *E. 3. cap. 22.* the concealing and taking away of an hawk was two years imprisonment; but by the statute of 37 *E. 3. cap. 19.* the stealing of a faulcon, tercelet, lanner, or laneret is made felony.

See the commentary *Co. P. C. cap. 34.* where it is declared, that this act extends only to faulcons, and those of that kind.

The proof intended by this act is not by jury but by circumstances, as varvels, &c.

The offender is within benefit of clergy.

As to the laws in the time of *Richard II.*

6 *R. 2. cap. 6.* concerning the punishment of rape, *de quo satis, cap. 58.*

7 *R. 2. cap. 8.* of purveyors, *de quo supra, cap. 60.*

By the statute of 13 *R. 2. cap. 3.* “ If any man bring
“ or send into this realm or the king’s power any summons, [643]
“ sentence or excommunication against any person for the cause of
“ making motion, assent or execution of the statute of provisors, he
“ shall be taken, arrested, and put in prison, and forfeit all his lands,
“ tenements, goods and chattels for ever, and incur the pain of life
“ and member; and if any prelate makes execution of such summons,
“ sentence or excommunication, his temporalities shall be taken and
“ abide in the king’s hands till due redress made.

“ And if any person of less estate than a prelate makes such execution, he shall be taken and arrested and imprisoned, and make fine and ransom by the discretion of the king’s council.

The bringing in of bulls of this nature is against the common law, and sometimes antiently punished as high treason, *Vide Co. P. C. cap. 36. & libros ibi.*

But now by the statute of 13 *Eliz. cap. 2.* the offense as well in the bringers in, as executors of these bulls, &c. is made high treason, as well in persons ecclesiastical as temporal.

There is nothing else in these kings reigns that enacts a new felony, only some statutes directing the process and jurisdiction, whereby felonies may be tried, as 13 *R. 2. cap. 2.* of the constable and marshal, &c.

C H A P. LXII.

Concerning the new felonies enacted in the times of H. 4. H. 5. H. 6. E. 4.

BY the statute of 5 H. 4. cap. 4. it is ordained, “ That none from
“ thenceforth shall use to multiply gold or silver, nor use the
“ craft of multiplication, and if any do, he shall incur the pain of
“ felony in this case (a).

And the reason of this act was not because they thought the real transmutation of metals into gold or silver was feasible, but the reason is given in the petition of the commons. *Rot. Car. 5. H. 4. n. 63.*

Car plusers homes par colour de cest multiplication font faux mony a grand deceit du roy & damage de son people: vide tamen Co. P. C. cap. 20. dispensations granted to particular persons by 34 & 35 H. 6. for the using of this art with a non obstante of the statute of 5 H. 4.

The offender is to have his clergy.

And altho the statute mentions not accessaries before or after, yet this statute making the fact felony doth consequentially subject accessaries before and after to the penalty, tho this be made a *quære*. *Dy. 88. in Eden's case*; yet it seems now settled according to the opinion of my lord Coke, *P. C. cap. 20.* that there may be accessaries to this new felony before and after.

[645] By the statute of 5 H. 4. cap. 5. cutting the tongues or putting out the eyes of the king's subjects of malice prepen-
sed is enacted to be felony.

This was extended to other dismembring, as cutting off ears, by 37 H. 8. cap. 6, but by an act of this present parliament (b) this and

(a) The offense prohibited by this act was not the extracting gold or silver out of lead or other metals, which is now known by the name of refining, for that is not the multiplication of gold or silver, but only a separation thereof from the coarser metal, but the design of the act was to prohibit the transmutation of one metal into another, which was pretended to be done by the philosopher's stone or elixir, whereby great numbers were bubbled and cheated; but however, because some persons were (groundlessly) afraid to exercise the art of smelting and refining metals, lest they should fall under the penalty of this statute,

it was therefore repealed by 1 W. & M. cap. 30. provided that the gold or silver extracted by the said art be carried to the Tower of London for the making of monies, and be not otherwise disposed of.

(b) 22 & 23 Car. 2. whereby the cutting out or disabling the tongue, putting out an eye, slitting the nose, cutting off a nose or lip, cutting off or disabling any limb or member, if done with an intention to maim or disfigure, is felony without benefit of clergy; upon this statute Coke and Woodburne were convicted and executed for slitting the nose of Mr. Crispe, 8 Geo. 1. See *State Tr. Vol. VI. p. 212.*

some

some other difmembrings are made felonies out of the benefit of the clergy.

By the statute of 3 *H. 5. cap. 1.* “ If any person do make, buy, “ coin, or bring into the kingdom *Galli-half-pence, Suskins* or *Dod-* “ *kins*, to sell, or put them in payment in this realm, it is felony.

And by the statute of 2 *H. 6. cap. 9.* If any man pay or receive the money called *Blanks*, it is also felony; but both these are within clergy, and by the whole disuser of these coins these statutes are of little use.

By the statute of 3 *H. 5. cap. 3.* it is enacted, “ That procla- “ mation shall issue, that all *Britons* depart out of the realm before “ the feast of *St. John Baptist* next, upon pain of loss of life and “ member.

But this was but a temporary law and expired.

By the statute of 3 *H. 6. cap. 1.* it is enacted, “ That no congre- “ gations or confederacies be made by masons in their assemblies, “ whereby the good order of the statute of *Labourers* is violated; “ and they that cause such assemblies to be holden, shall be adjudged “ felons.

But the statute of *Labourers* being repealed by the statute of 5 *Eliz. cap. 4.* this law is consequentially repealed. *Co. P. C. cap. 35. p. 99.*

By the statute of 8 *H. 6. cap. 12.* it is enacted, “ That if any “ record or parcel of the same, writ, return, panel, process, or war- “ rant of attorney in the king’s courts of chancery, exchequer, the “ one bench or the other, or in the treasury, be willingly stolen, “ taken away, withdrawn, or avoided by any clerk, or by any other “ person, by cause whereof the judgment shall be reversed; [646] “ that such stealer, taker away, withdrawer, or avoider, “ their procurators, counsellors, and abettors thereof indicted, and by “ process thereupon made, duly convicted upon their own confession, “ or inquest thereupon taken of lawful men, half whereof shall be “ of men of any court of the same courts, and the other half of “ others, shall be judged for felons; and that the judges of the same “ courts, or of the one bench or the other, have power to hear and “ determine such defaults before them, and thereof to make due pu- “ nishment, as is aforesaid.

In the consideration of this statute, it will be convenient to examine.

1. How the law stood in reference to the matters aforesaid before this act made. 2. What is the import of the several parts of this act.

At the common law, the undue rasure, or embezzling of a record, was a great offense, for which even a judge himself was punishable by fine and imprisonment. 2 R. 3. 10. *Hengham* a judge was fined eight hundred marks for raising the record of a fine of thirteen shillings and four pence imposed upon a poor man, and reducing it to six shillings and eight pence. (c)

By the statute of *Westm.* 1. viz. 3 E. 1. cap. 29. it is enacted, "That if any serjeant, pleader or other, do any manner of deceit or collusion to the king's court, or consent to it in the deceit of the court, or to beguile the court or the party, and be thereof attaint, he shall be imprisoned for a year and a day, and from thenceforth shall not be heard to plead in that court.

And if he be no pleader, he shall be imprisoned in like manner, and if the trespass requires greater punishment, it shall be at the king's pleasure. (d)

[647] Upon this act it was that *Robert de Greshope* a common attorney was imprisoned for a year and a day, and banished the court of common pleas, for embezzling a part of a record, viz. T. 19 E. 1. Rot. 57. in dorso, C. B. mentioned in Co. P. C. cap. 19. p. 71. vide *simile*, H. 22 E. 1. Rot. 33. in dorso. Cant. Coram Rege. (*)

T. 5 E. 3 Rot. 13. in dorso. Rex. B. R. Thomas of Carleton convicted of the rasure of the word *et* in a writ, is committed to the marshal, & *inhibitum est ei, ne amodo deserviat in officio sive servitio vicecom', periculo quod incumbit*, and this it seems was upon the same act of 3 E. 1. (e)

If a clerk had made a misentry of record, the judge, before whom it was, might, *ore tenus*, rectify that misentry, tho a considerable time after.

M. 24 E. 3. Rot. 41. Kane. Rex. it was presented before *Richard de Kelleghull*, and his fellow justices of oyer and terminer, 18 E. 3.

(c) *Hengham* was a judge in the reign of Edward 1. and his fine was employed for building a clock-house at Westminster, and furnishing it with a clock, which made *Sourbeat* (one of the judges of the king's bench in the reign of queen Elizabeth), when prest by the chief justice to consent to a rasure of the roll, say, that he would not do it, for he meant not to build a clock-house. Co. P. C. p. 72.

(d) 2 Co. Instit. 213.

(*) This was the case of *Giles de Barton*, who was convicted, *eo quod scienter procuravit omissionem dici in processu & recordo coram iudicariis de banco, quod coram rege venire fecit*; on account of which omission the judgment of the court of common pleas had been reversed, *pro deceptione predicta committitur marescallo, & postea finem fecit cum domino rege pro 10 solidis*.

(e) It does not appear from the record, whether the judgment was grounded on statute 3 E. 1. or on the common law.

that one *Wareſius atte Capele* had trespaſſed in the free warren of the earl of *Huntingdon*, and the abbot of *Battel*, and he was convicted by his own confeſſion, and the clerk had entred the fine ten ſhillings. The record being ſent into the king's bench, *Richard de Kelleſhult* came into court, & *inſpecto irrotulamento*, ſaid, *Quòd clericus ſuus finem illum ſurreptivè & contra recordum ſuum intravit, & dicit quòd finis ille aſſeſſus fuit per ipſum & ſocios ſuos pro quolibet articulo ad decem libras, & ſic finis ejus ejuſdem Wareſii ſummatuſ fuit ad viginti libras, & illud expreſſè ore tenus hic recordatur*, and prayed for the king, *quòd finis ille ſecundùm recordum ſuum intretur in rotulis extractorum*, and it was accordingly entred; ſo, that a judge of record is as it were a living record, and controuls the entry of the clerk.

In the time of *Richard II.* there happened two great complaints againſt the judges and clerks for the miſentry of a record: the one *Rot. Par. 7 R. 2. pars 1. n. 57.* for the lady *Spencer*, who pleaded to a *Quare Impedit* brought againſt her by the king; [648] but at the end of *Trinity* term laſt, the record of her plea was raſed in a material place to her great diſadvantage, and the judges reſuſed to amend it, becauſe after the term: the anſwer was—

Tiel plee come les juſtices voillent recorder qe ent eſtoit pletedz, ſoit de novel enre en le lieu de la raſure, nient contreſteant qe le terme, en qel le dit plee fuit pled, ſoit ja paſſ, & roy voit qe celui, qe fiſt la raſure, ſoit puniſh pur ſon malſait.

The other was *Rot. Par. 7 R. 2. pars 2. n. 20.* at the complaint of the prior of *Mountague*, That whereas in a writ of right brought againſt him he prayed in aid of the king, and was ouſted of aid by the court, who entred *quaſitum eſt a Priore, ſi quid, &c.* the judgment that was given was *dictum eſt Priori, quòd reſpondeat ſine auxilio*; and accordingly the judges came into parliament and agreed, that new entries ſhould be made, as was deſired by the prior, and thereupon the prior brought a writ of error in parliament upon the record ſo amended.

Theſe occurrences did the next parliament following, *viz. 8 R. 2.* draw on the act of *8 R. 2. cap. 4.* againſt the raſing of records, and the falſe entring of pleas, whereby it is enacted, “ That if any judge
“ or clerk be of default (ſo that by the ſame default enſueth diſhe-
“ riſon of any of the parties) ſufficiently convicted before the king and
“ his council, in that way that the king and his council ſhall deem
“ reaſonable, within two years after the default made, &c. he ſhall

“ be punished by fine and ransom at the king’s will, and satisfy the
 “ party.

Thus this act settled it, and so it stood till 8 *H. 6.* but in this act there occurred some inconveniences. 1. The way of trial before the king and council was difficult and inconvenient. 2. The punishment as to the clerks seemed too gentle. 3. It did not meet with the inconveniences of stealing records. 4. It was found of great inconvenience to the due administration of justice; for the judges have often occasion upon their own memory of the record, and sometimes upon examination, to rectify undue entries, and were [649] required in some cases to amend the misentries, or small mistakes in records by the statute of 14 *E. 3. cap. 6.* and other statutes, which could not be done without rasures and alterations of the record and roll.

To remedy the latter of these inconveniences in the beginning of this very statute of 8 *H. 6. cap. 12.* and farther by the statute of 8 *H. 6. cap. 15.* a liberal power is given to the justices to amend records, in the pursuance of which power they were by these acts of 8 *H. 6.* protected against the dangers and severity of the act of *R. 2.*

And then this act proceeds to inflict punishment of felony against clerks and others, that willingly avoid records, &c. which penal law did not at all extend to judges upon three apparent reasons. 1. Because by this very law, judges had power upon examination to amend records. 2. Because the judges of the several courts are made the judges to hear and determine these offenses. And, 3. This clause not mentioning judges (as that of 8 *R. 2.* did), but beginning with clerks and other persons, judges shall not be included, who are superior officers, upon the reason given in the 2 *Co. Rep. casus archiepiscopi Cant.*, and accordingly it is agreed by my lord *Coke, P. C. cap. 19. p. 72.*

Now I come to the consideration of the statute itself, wherein my lord *Coke, P. C. cap. 19.* hath made a full collection, to which I can add little.

1. It extends only to the four great courts of *Westminster*, and not to inferior courts.

But as to the *English* part of the court of chancery, it extends not, because as to the *English* proceeding it is no court of record.

But yet it seems it doth extend to those processes, that issue out of that court under the great seal, tho they be processes in order to the
English

English proceeding, as *subpœna*'s, attachments, commissions to examine witnesses, because these being under the great seal, are matters of record.

2. The *Treasury* is added, which doth not only extend to the records of the treasury of the courts of king's bench and common pleas, but also to the records in the receipts of the exchequer, under the custody of the treasurer and chamberlains [650] of the exchequer: and also to the records in the *Tower*, and in the chapel of the rolls, yea, and the records in the custody of the clerk of the lords house in parliament; (but not to the journals,) for those are the king's treasuries of records of the highest moment.

3. The offenses mentioned are four, *stealing*, *carrying away*, *withdrawing*, or *avoiding*; and this last word *avoiding* is comprehensive, for it extends to rasing, cutting off, clipping, yea, and cancelling a record.

4. But these must be done *voluntarily*, as well as *felonically*, and both these words must be contained in the indictment upon this statute.

A rasing or cancelling of a record by the order of that court in whose custody the record is, is no felony in him that doth it, nor in the court that commands it, for the court hath a *superintendence*, as well over the record as over the clerks.

5. It extends not to judges for the reasons before given.

6. It must be such an embezzling or avoiding of the record, by reason whereof a judgment is reversed, and therefore it extends only to judicial records in any of those four courts or treasuries, be the judgment in a case criminal or civil.

And therefore it is equally an offense against this statute whether the avoiding, &c. be after judgment given or before, in case judgment be given after the offense; and it is held, that an outlawry, tho it be *per judicium coronatorum*, is a judgment within this statute.

If the judgment be not actually reversed by such embezzling, &c. yet if it be reversible by reason thereof, it is within this statute, 2 R. 3. 10.

And it extends not only to a reversibleness by writ of error, but a reversibleness or avoidableness of judgment by plea, by reason of such embezzling, &c. is within this statute, 2 R. 3. 10.

But what if the offense of embezzling, avoiding, or rasing, be such as goes in affirmance of the judgment, and makes it good,

which otherwise were reverſible, if it ſtood as before that offence committed? tho this in ſome caſes be puniſhable by the court as a miſdemeanor in the clerk, yet it ſeems not felony within this act.

And the common practice at this day is, if the *Venire facias* or *Diſtringas* be erroneous, and would make the judgment erroneous, if filed, but being not filed, is aided by the ſtatute of 18 *Eliz. cap. 14.* the court never compels the clerk to file ſuch writs after verdict, much leſs puniſhes them for not doing it.

But if *A. B.* be ſued by the original to the *exigent* and outlawed; and afterwards the *exigent* is made *C. B.* and the original is alſo made *C. B.* to make all agree, this is felony as well in the clerk that raſeth the original, as him that raſeth the *exigent.* 2 *R. 3. 10.*

7. If the offence riſeth in two counties, then it is diſpunishable. 2 *R. 3. 10.*

8. The trial is to be one half by the clerks of the court, and the other half by others.

9. The judges of the court of the one bench and the other are by this ſtatute enabled to hear and determine it without any other commiſſion, and each of theſe courts have a concurrent juřiſdiction, and where it firſt begins there it is to proceed.

So that it ſeemeth, if the offence were in the record of the king's bench, the juſtices of the common bench may hear and determine the offence, if it be there firſt indicted.

This power is to hear and determine; the conſequence whereof is, that it enables theſe reſpective courts to take indictments of theſe offences; this, tho it be intrinſical to the court of king's bench, (for they ſwear a grand inqueſt and take indictments every term,) yet it is a new power in the common bench.

And altho the trial of the offence is to be a party-jury of clerks and others, yet the indictment may be taken either of clerks alone, or of foreigners alone, or of both, for it is only the trial that is to be by a party-jury.

[652] In the caſe of *Danby* and others, 2 *R. 3. 10.* theſe points were reſolved upon this ſtatute, 1. If the offence be entirely committed in the county where the court of king's bench or common pleas ſit, it may be tried, heard and determined by either court without a ſpecial commiſſion, for the act of parliament is a commiſſion. 2. If it be committed entirely in a foreign county, or be committed in the county where the court ſits, and then the court re-

move

move into another county, it must be heard and determined in the county where the fact was committed, and cannot be indicted, heard or determined in another county than where it was done. 3. That therefore in that case there must be a special commission to the justices of the one court, or to the justices of the other, to hear and determine the offense in that other county, and then they may there take the indictment and try the offender by a party-jury according to the act; but it seems, if the indictment be taken by virtue of such commission, it may be removed into the king's bench by *Certiorari*, if indicted before them, and then tried according to the direction of the act. 4. If the offense were committed in *London*, where, by privilege and charter of the city, the mayor is to be one in commission and of the *quorum*; yet in this case the mayor must not be named in the commission, but only the justices of one of the courts. 5. If the offense be mixt, and partly in *Middlesex*, where the court sits, and partly in *London*, or any other foreign county, the felony is punishable, and so it remains at this day, notwithstanding the statute of 2 & 3 E. 6. cap. 24. 6. But yet in this case the offender committing part of the offense in *Middlesex*, may be indicted of misprision of felony in *Middlesex*, or committing part of the offense in *London*, may be indicted of misprision of felony in *London*, and thereupon fined and imprisoned: and accordingly it was done by the advice of all the judges, and the parties fined, for every felony includes misprision.

And yet observe, 1. The felony was one entire felony committed in two counties, and therefore neither enquirable nor determinable in one county; for the jury of that county cannot take notice of part of the fact committed in another, and yet the misprision [653] of that felony was inquirable and punishable in either county, where but part of the felony was committed, and yet the jury in that case must take notice of the entire felony, part whereof was committed in another county. 2. Aliho the felony itself is by the act limited to special jurisdiction and manner of trial, yet the misprision of that felony was tried by a common jury, and before the general commissioners of *oyer and terminer* in the county where the offense was committed. In this offense the offender hath the benefit of clergy.

11 H. 6. cap. 14. It was made felony for three years to ship merchandizes of the staple in any creeks; but this is expired.

18 H. 6. cap. 15. Exportation of wools, other than to the staple of *Calais* or straights of *Morocco*, felony. *Vide supra*, cap. 61. p. 642. & *infra*. O o 4 18 H.

18 *H. 6. cap. 19.* Soldiers departing from their captain without license, felony. This, together with those other statutes, of the same kind, as 7 *H. 7. cap. 1.* 3 *H. 8. cap. 5.* I shall refer to the statute of 2 *E. 6. cap. 2.* where I shall take the whole matter of soldiers departing into consideration.

28 *H. 6. cap. 4.* It is felony to take a distress in the counties and royal feignories in *Wales* or dutchy of *Lancaster*, and carry them out of the said counties, dutchy or feignories, &c. saving for the lords of fees distraining. This act was to continue only five years, and then expired.

33 *H. 6. cap. 1.* If household servants, after the death of their master, violently and riotously take and spoil the goods of their master, and the same distribute among themselves, upon complaint made by the executors, or two of them, to the chancellor, the chancellor with the advice of the chief justices and the chief baron, or two of them, shall direct writs of proclamation to the sheriff for the offenders to appear in the king's bench upon some day certain, fifteen days at least after the proclamation.

And if he appear, he shall be committed to answer the [654] suit of the executors by bill or writ; but if he appear not at the return of the writ, after proclamation so made, he shall be attaind of felony.

This statute extends to one executor, if but one, and to administrators, if no executors, to a lord keeper of the great seal, when no chancellor.

This was a process much in use in case of great offenses, especially about this king's reign, to convict men sometimes in civil offenses, sometimes in cases criminal upon default of appearance at the return of the proclamation. *Vide Stat. 5 H. 4 cap. 6. 11 H. 6. cap. 11.*

But this attainder doth not exclude the offender from clergy: *Co. P. C. cap. 43. p. 104.*

12 *E. 4. cap. 5.* All wools, woolfells, morling and shorling of *Westmoreland*, *Cumberland*, *Northumberland*, and *Durham*, to be shipped out, shall be shipped at *Newcastle* upon *Tine*, and thence to *Calais* or *Middleborough*, there to be stapled and uttered, and all other wools, woolfells, morling and shorling, to be conveyed only to the staple of *Calais*; if any attempt to the contrary, it shall be felony, saving the king's prerogative to license transportation elsewhere. This act to continue for five years only, and so it expired.

17 E. 4. cap. 1. If any shall carry or cause to be carried out of this realm or *Wales*, any manner of money of the coin of this realm, or any other realm, plate, vessel, mass bullion, jewels of gold wrought or unwrought, or silver without the king's license, except the persons dispensed with by the statute of 2 H. 6. cap. 6. it shall be felony.

This act was to continue only for seven years.

And by the act of 4 H. 7. cap. 23. it was re-enacted again to continue twenty years; and by the statute of 1 H. 8. cap. 13. it was continued till the next parliament, (f) and then discontinued; but by the act of 7 E. 6. cap. 6. it was revived for twenty years, and then expired; so that at this day the exportation of gold and silver is not felony, but remains only under the penalty of those statutes that prohibit its exportation under pains of forfeiture; for the act of 17 E. 3. did not make exportation felony. (g) And having [655] this occasion I shall here once for all give an account of the laws in force against the exportation of money and bullion.

By the statute of 9 E. 3. cap. 1. None are to carry any sterling out of the realm of *England*, nor silver in plate, nor vessel of gold or silver, upon pain of forfeiture of the same, that he shall so carry, without the king's license; this is confirmed in substance by 38 E. 3. cap. 2. 5 R. 2. cap. 2.

By the statute of 2 H. 4. cap. 5. If any gold or silver be found in the keeping of any upon his passage over sea, in any ship or vessel to go out of any port or creek without the king's license, it shall be forfeit, saving his reasonable expenses.

Merchants strangers to lay out one half of the proceed of their merchandize upon *English* merchandize, and may carry over the other moiety.

By the statute of 4 H. 4. cap. 15. All merchants, and strangers, and others, that sell merchandizes here, shall lay out the money thereby arising in other merchandizes of *England*, to carry the same without carrying any gold or silver in coin, plate or mass out of this realm, upon pain of forfeiting all the same, saving always their reasonable expenses.

This act is still in force, and received a farther confirmation by the statute of 5 H. 4. cap. 9. 9 H. 5. cap. 1.

(f) But not as to the penalty of felony, for that is excepted in the act.

(g) Except in the searcher, if he confederated with any to export it.

2 *H. 6. cap. 6.* No gold or silver to be carried out of the realm contrary to the former statutes, except for payment of the king's soldiers, upon pain of forfeiture of the value of the sum so carried, one fourth part to the discoverer, except ransom of prisoners, and money that soldiers carry for their necessary costs, and for horses and sheep bought in *Scotland*.

3. *H. 7. cap. 8.* All foreign merchants shall employ their money received in ports, &c. upon merchandize or commodities of this real, the proof to lie upon the merchant, upon pain of forfeiture of all his goods, and a year's imprisonment. This clause of the statute of 17 *E. 4.* made perpetual.

[656] 19 *H. 7. cap. 5.* None to convey any coin, bullion, or plate, above the value of 6*s. 8d.* out of this realm into *Ireland*, nor convey such bullion, plate or coin into any ship, boat or other vessel, upon pain of forfeiture thereof, and making fine and ransom at the king's will.

So these several statutes lie in the way of transportation of bullion or coin, tho the act of 17 *E. 4.* and other acts making it felony are now expired. (*h*)

C H A P. LXIII.

Concerning the new felonies enacted in the times of R. 3. H. 7. H. 8. E. 6. and Queen Mary.

I Find no new felony enacted in the short reign of *R. 3.*

By the statute of 1 *H. 7. cap. 7.* "At every time as information shall be made of any unlawful hunting in any forest, park or warren by night, or with painted faces, to any of the king's council, or to any of the justices of peace in the county where any such hunting shall be had, of any person so suspected thereof, it shall be

(*b*) By 13 & 14 *Car. 2. cap. 31.* The melting down the silver money of this realm is prohibited, on pain of forfeiting it, and double the value; and by 15 *Car. 2. cap. 7.* it is lawful to export foreign coin or bullion, provided an entry be made thereof at the custom-house: but by 6 & 7 *W. 3. cap. 17.* and 7 & 8 *W. 3. cap. 19.* before the same be shipped, it is necessary there

should be a certificate from the lord mayor and court of aldermen of *London*, that oath had been made before them by the owner of the said bullion, and by two or more credible witnesses, that the said bullion, and every part thereof, is foreign bullion, and that no part thereof was the coin of this kingdom, or clippings thereof, or plate wrought within this kingdom.

"lawful

"lawful to any of the same council or justices of peace, to whom
 "such information shall be made, to make a warrant to the
 "sheriff of the county, constable, bailiff, or other officer [657]
 "within the same county, to take and arrest the same person or per-
 "sons, of whom such information shall be made, and to have him or
 "them before the maker of the said warrant, or any other of the
 "king's said council or justices of peace of the said county; and that
 "the said counsellor or justice of peace, before whom such person or
 "persons shall be brought, by his discretion have power to examine
 "him or them so brought of the same hunting, and of the said doers
 "in that behalf; and if the same person wilfully conceals the same
 "hunting, or any person with him defective therein, that then the
 "same concealment be against every person so concealing, felony;
 "the same felony to be inquired of and determined as other felonies
 "within this realm have used to be; and if he then confesses the truth,
 "and all that he shall be examined of and knoweth in that behalf, that
 "then the said offenses by him done be against the king our sovereign
 "lord but trespasss fineable, by reason of the said confession, at the
 "next sessions of the peace to be holden for the same county by the
 "king's justices of the same sessions to be there seised; and if any res-
 "cous or disobedience be made by any person, the which so should
 "be arrested, so that the execution of the same warrant thereby be
 "not had, then the same rescous and disobedience be felony inquitable
 "and determinable, as is aforesaid; and if any person be convict of
 "such hunting with painted faces, vizors, or otherwise disguised, to
 "the intent he should not be known, or of any unlawful hunting in
 "the night, then the same person so convict to have such punishment,
 "as he should have, if he were convict of felony. (a)

My lord Coke, *P. C. cap.* 21. hath given us the whole learning of this statute, viz.

1. The hunting with vizors or painted faces in the day-time, [658]
 and the hunting in the night with or without such vizors, is
 felony; but the party may make it trespasss only, if he pleases.
Dy. 50. a.

(a) But now by 9 Geo. 1. cap. 22. (continued by 6 Geo. 2. cap. 37.) it is made felony without benefit of clergy for any person being armed with any offensive weapons, and having their faces blacked or disguised, to appear in any forest, chase, or unlawfully to hunt, kill or steal

any deer, or rob any warren, or steal fish out of any river or pond, or for any person unlawfully to hunt any deer in the king's forests, &c. or maliciously to break down the head of any fish-pond, whereby the fish shall be lost or destroyed.

2. It doth not extend to the forest, or chase, or park of the king's (*b*), nor to forests, parks, or warrens in reputation only, and not in right.

3. The complaint may be made to any one justice of peace or of the council, and the warrant may be granted by any one.

4. The warrant must be in writing under seal, and grounded upon an examination shewing a probable cause of suspicion.

5. When the offender is brought, he must be examined of the fact done by himself, and then of the fact done by others, but not upon oath.

6. A hunting without killing is within the penalty.

7. Tho the hunting be not felony, yet the rescue or disobedience is felony.

8. But the rescue or disobedience made felony is only that which is done by the party, not by a stranger.

And altho the party rescue himself, yet if he be re-taken, so as execution of the warrant be had, it is no felony.

9. If the party plead not guilty, and is convicted of the fact, it is felony; but if he confess upon his arraignment, it then becomes only a trespass finable, tho he denied it upon his first examination.

10. It is held, that if he confess not but conceals upon his examination before the justice, this alone makes it not felony, neither can he be indicted upon this statute for such concealment; but it must be a judicial concealment, namely, if being indicted for the hunting he upon his arraignment conceals, then he shall be indicted *de novo* for such concealment; and if convicted thereof, he shall be attaind of

[659] felony for concealment, tho this seems a difficult exposition; (*c*) for upon his arraignment for the hunting he only answers to that indictment, and is not examined touching others; and besides, if he be indicted for the hunting, if there be evidence to convict him of the fact, he is convicted of felony before the indictment for conceal-

(*b*) As to this case, a remedy was provided by 31 H. 8. cap. 12. whereby this offense, if committed in the king's forests, &c. is absolutely made felony; but that statute being repealed by the general clause of 1 E. 6. cap. 12. a remedy was again provided by the statute of 9 Geo. 1. above-mentioned.

(*c*) This difficulty arises from the aforesaid construction of the act, that it must intend a judicial concealment, whereas the act seems plainly to mean a concealment

upon his examination before the justice; for after the act had given power to the justice to examine the suspected person, it immediately adds, *and if the same person wilfully conceals, &c. the said concealment shall be felony; and if he then confess the truth, and all that he shall be examined of, his offense shall be but trespass; the word then shews the time of confession to be at the examination, and therefore the concealment likewise must be intended to be at that time,*

ment comes; and if there be not evidence to convict him of the principal, how shall there be evidence to convict him of the concealment?

11. The concealment that makes a felony, must be a wilful concealment.

By the statute of 3 *H. 7. cap. 2.* It is enacted, "That whereas
 " women, as well maidens, as widows and wives having substances,
 " some in moveable goods, some in lands and tenements, and some
 " being heirs apparent to their ancestors, had been often taken by
 " raiſdoers contrary to their wills, and after married to such misdoers,
 " or to others by their assent, or defiled to the great displeasure of
 " God, contrary to the king's laws, and disparagement of the said
 " women, and utter heaviness and discomfort of their friends, and to
 " evil example of others, it is therefore ordained, established and
 " enacted by our sovereign lord the king, by the advice of the lords
 " spiritual and temporal, and commons in the said parliament assembled,
 " and by authority of the same, That what person or persons
 " from henceforth taketh any woman *ſo* against her will unlawfully,
 " that is to say, maid, widow, or wife, that *ſuch* taking, procuring,
 " abetting to the same, and also receiving wittingly the same woman
 " *ſo* taken against her will, and knowing the same, be felony; and
 " that such misdoers, takers, and procurators to the same, and receivers,
 " knowing the same offense in form aforesaid, be henceforth
 " reputed and judged as principal felons. Provided that this act extend
 " not to any person taking any woman, only claiming her [660]
 " as his ward or bond-woman.

For the making of a felony within this statute, there must be these circumstances on the part of the woman: 1. That the maid, wife, or widow, have substance of goods or land, or be heir apparent. 2. That she be taken away against her will. 3. That she be married to, or defiled by the misdoer, or some others by his consent. Without these three concurring, it makes no felony within this statute, 3 & 4 *P. & M. Dallison* 22. 4. That she be not in ward, or a bond-woman to the person that taketh her, or causeth her to be taken only as his ward or bond-woman. *Co. P. C. cap. 12. p. 61.*

In *Fulwood's case*, *M. 13. Car. 1. B. R. Cro. p. 482. 484. 488. 492.* these points were resolved: 1. That if a woman be taken away forcibly in the county of *Middlesex*, and married in the county of *Surrey*, the fact is indictable in neither county; for the taking without the marriage, nor the marriage without the taking, make not felony.
 2. But

2. But if she were taken in the county of *Middlesex*, and carried into the county of *Surrey*, so that it is a continuing force in *Surrey*, tho begun in *Middlesex*, and then she is married in *Surrey*, there the offender may be indicted upon this statute in *Surrey*. 3. Tho possibly the marriage or the defilement might be by her consent, being won thereunto by flatteries after the taking, yet this is felony, if the first taking away were against her will (*d*). 4. That if as well the marriage as the taking away were against her will, so that the marriage was voidable, yet it is a marriage *de facto*, and therefore being taken away against her will, and also married against her will, it is felony within this statute. 5. That it is not necessary in the indictment to say, that she was taken *cā intentione* to marry or defile her, because the statute hath no such words of *cā intentione*. But farther, he marrying her the same day he took her, it must needs appear, that it was *cā intentione*; yet these words, *cā intentione ad ipsam maritand'*, are usually added in indictments upon this statute, and it is safest so to [661] do. 6. That the woman thus taken away and married may be sworn and give evidence against the offender, who so took and married her, tho she be his wife *de facto*.

And all these points were accordingly resolved, *H. 24 & 25 Car. 2. in Brown's case (e)*, upon this statute, only the indictment ran, *cepit eā intentione ad ipsam maritandam*: the offender was convicted and executed: and the reasons why the woman was sworn and gave evidence in the case of *Brown* were, 1. Because the taking away of the woman and marrying were the same day, and she was rescued out of their hands, and the offender taken the next day, and so all done *flagrante crimine*. 2. It was but a forced marriage, and so no marriage *de jure*. 3. There was no cohabitation. 4. Concurring evidence to prove the whole fact. But had she freely without constraint lived with him that thus married her, any considerable time, her examination in evidence might be more questionable.

By the statute of 39 *Eliz. cap. 9.* Clergy is taken away from the principals, procurers, and accessaries before the offense committed.

By this act of 3 *H. 7.* the procurers, as well as the misdoers themselves, and any person that receives the woman thus taken away, are principals by this statute, and so ousted of clergy; but he that receives the offender knowingly, is only accessary *after*, and not excluded from clergy.

(*d*) And so it was resolved in *Swendsen's case*, *M. 1 Ann. State Tr. Vol. V. p. 468.* in which case most of the other points here

mentioned were likewise ruled.

(*e*) 3 *Keble. 193. 1 Fen. 243.*

Quære, Whether tho the receiver of the woman be made principal by the act of 3 H. 7. he were intended to be ousted of clergy by 39 Eliz. cap. 9.

The statute of 3 H. 7. cap. 14. recites, " That forasmuch as by
 " quarrels made to such as have been in great authority, office, and
 " of council with the kings of this realm, hath ensued the destruc-
 " tion of the kings and undoing of this realm, so as it hath appeared
 " evidently, when compassing of the death of such as were the
 " king's true subjects was had, the destruction of the prince was
 " imagined thereby, and for the most part it hath grown by the
 " malice of the king's own household servants, as now of late such
 " a thing was like to have ensued; and forasmuch as by [662]
 " the law of this land, if actual deeds be not had, there is
 " no remedy for such false compassings, imaginations, and con-
 " federacies had against any lord, or any of the king's council, or
 " any of the king's great officers in his household, as steward, trea-
 " surer, comptroller, and so great inconveniences might ensue, if
 " such ungodly demeaning should not be straitly punished before
 " that actual deed were done; therefore it is ordained by the king,
 " and the lords spiritual and temporal, and the commons of the said
 " parliament assembled, and by authority of the same, that from
 " henceforth the steward, treasurer, and comptroller of the king's
 " house for the time being, or one of them, shall have full power
 " and authority to inquire by twelve sad men and discreet persons of
 " the exchequer roll of the king's household, if any person admitted
 " to be his servant, sworn, and his name put into the chequer roll
 " of his household, whatsoever he be, serving in any manner, office
 " or room, reputed, had or taken, under the state or degree of a lord,
 " make any conspiracies, compassing, confederacies or imaginations
 " with any person or persons to destroy or murder the king, or any
 " lord of this realm, or any other person sworn to the king's council,
 " steward, treasurer, or comptroller of the king's house, that if it be
 " found before the said steward for the time being by the said
 " twelve sad men, that any such of the king's servants as is above-
 " said, hath confederated, compassed, conspired, or imagined, as is
 " above said, that he so found by that inquiry be put thereupon to
 " answer, and the steward, treasurer, and comptroller, or two of
 " them, have power to determine the same matter according to the
 " law; and if he put him in trial, that then it be tried by other
 " twelve

“ twelve sad men of the same household ; and that such misdoers have
 “ no challenge but for malice. And if such misdoers be found guilty
 “ by confession or otherwise, that the said offense be judged felony,
 “ and they to have judgment and execution as felons attaint ought
 “ to have by the common law.

Vide the observations of my lord *Coke* upon this act, *Co.*
 [663] *P. C. cap. 4.* where on the part of the offender there must
 be these qualifications, *viz.* 1. He must be the king's sworn ser-
 vant. 2. His name must be in the chequer roll. 3. He must be
 under the degree of a lord. 4. Tho his conspiring with another
 not of the household be an offense, yet he only of the household is
 the felon.

On the part of the person against whom the conspiracy is, are
 these requisites: 1. The conspiracy to murder the king ; or 2. A
 lord of the realm, but yet only such as is sworn of the king's privy
 council. 3. Any other of the king's privy council, tho under the de-
 gree of a lord. 4. The steward, treasurer, or comptroller of the king's
 house, tho neither a lord nor of the privy council.

The power to hear and determine. 1. The steward, treasurer,
 and comptroller, [or any two of them, have power to determine,*]
 tho the act saith, they or any one of them may inquire. 2. If a ser-
 vant of the king's house, *ut supra*, conspire the death of the steward,
 treasurer, and comptroller, yet they remain the only judges in this
 cause by this act, tho they may take others to their assistance, yet
 none but they sit as judges. 3. The presentment and trial must be
 only by the servants of the household. 4. The inquiry may be by
 twelve or more, but the trial only by twelve. 5. No challenge but
 for malice. 6. The conspiracy must be plotted in the king's hous-
 hold. 7. The offender is to have his clergy.

And *note*, this being a new made felony, and the manner of its
 determination particularly limited, it is not determinable before any
 other judges, or in any other courts, neither in the king's bench, oyer
 and terminer, or gaol delivery. *Quære*, whether their session must
 not be in the king's house.

By the statute of 7 *H. 7. cap. 1.* There is provision of felony against
 captains and soldiers leaving their service ; but this I shall take up

* The words here in the MS. are, *Or*
any one or any two of them have power to
inquire, but they seem plainly to have been

so written by mistake, the sense requiring
 them to be as above.

hereafter, as also the statute of 3 *H. 8. cap. 5.* which I shall refer to 4 & 5 *P. & M. cap. 3.*

I come to the time of *H. 8.* which was fruitful in en-acting new treasons and new felonies, and new offenses as [664] to *Præmunire*.

But there were two acts of parliament, that repeald as all new treasons and misprisions of treasons, so all new felonies enacted at any time after the first day of the reign of *Henry 8. viz.*

1 *E. 6. cap. 12.* Whereby it is enacted, " That all offenses made felony by any act or acts of parliament made since the 23d day of April, in the first year of the reign of king *H. 8.* not being felony before, and also all and every the branches and articles mentiond, or in any ways declared in any of the said statutes concerning the making of any offense or offenses to be felony, not being felony before; and all pains and forfeitures concerning the same, or any of them, shall from henceforth be repeald, and utterly void and of none effect.

1 *Mar. cap. 1.* Whereby it is enacted, " That all offenses made felony, or limited to be within the case of *Præmunire*, by any act or acts of parliament, statute or statutes made since the first day of the first year of the reign of king *Henry 8.* not being felony before, nor within the case of *Præmunire*, and all and every branch, article and clause mentiond, or in any ways declared in any of the said statutes concerning the making of any offense or offenses to be felony, or within the case of *Præmunire* before, and all pains and forfeitures concerning the same, or any of them, shall from henceforth be repeald and utterly void, and of none effect.

The former of these statutes, and also the latter repeald all new felonies enacted in the time of *H. 8.* who began his reign April 22. 1509. and the latter of these statutes repeald also the new created felonies in the reign of *E. 6.*

But neither of these statutes did extend to piracy or robbery upon the sea, nor any such act as concerned matter of proceedings touching felonies, that were such before the time of *H. 8.* and therefore those statutes in the time of *H. 8.* that concerned clergy, sanctuary, peremptory challenge, place or manner of trial of felons, or the erecting of new jurisdictions for their trial, as that of [665] 33 *H. 8. cap. 12.* for felonies in the king's court; for these acts were

not constitutive of new felonies, but only directions of the course of proceedings in cases of old felonies.

Those statutes that made new felonies both in the time of *H. 8.* and *E. 6.* are therefore of these kinds, *viz.*

1. Such as were enacted *de novo* in the times of *H. 8.* and *E. 6.* and were never after revived or re-enacted by any subsequent act of parliament; such were those of 31 *H. 8. cap. 2.* of breaking the heads of ponds, and taking fish, 31 *H. 8. cap. 12.* and 32 *H. 8. cap. 11.* stealing of hawks eggs, and hunting in the king's forests, &c. 33 *H. 8. cap. 8.* of witchcraft. 33 *H. 8. cap. 14.* of prophecies. 37 *H. 8. cap. 6.* The burning of a frame of timber. 37 *H. 8. cap. 10.* Libellous papers charging men to have spoken treason. 23 *H. 8. cap. 11.* Breaking prison.

2. Such as were repealed but enacted again in the same kind, but with some alterations, as 22 *H. 8. cap. 10.* concerning *Egyptians*, altered by 1 & 2 *P. & M. cap. 4.* and by 5 *Eliz. cap. 20.*

3. Such as were *de novo* enacted to be felonies in the times of *H. 8.* and *E. 6.* and repealed, but re-enacted again, as 22 *H. 8. cap. 11.* touching cutting of *Powdike*, renewed by 2 & 3 *P. & M. cap. 19.* 3 *H. 8. cap. 5.* concerning foldiers, re-enacted in a great measure by 2 *E. 6. cap. 2.* and 4 & 5 *P. & M. cap. 3.* 21 *H. 8. cap. 7.* servants embezzling their masters goods, by 5 *Eliz. cap. 10.* 25 *H. 8. cap. 6.* concerning buggery, by 5 *Eliz. cap. 17.* 23 *H. 8. cap. 16.* concerning *Scotchmen*, re-enacted by 1 *Eliz. cap. 7.* but finally repealed by 4 *Jac. 1. cap. 1.*

4. Some offenses were made felony by former acts of parliament before *H. 8.* but had additions to them, extending the felonies farther than the old acts, some such thing may be found in the statute of 3 *H. 8. cap. 5.* concerning foldiers in relation to the statute of 7 *H. 7. cap. 1.* and then the old felonies stand, but the additional felonies are repealed.

[666] Concerning the first of these ranks of acts, I shall say nothing, because they are now utterly void; but concerning the other three ranks of statutes, I shall proceed according to their order of time.

First, For the statute of 3 *H. 8. cap. 5.* as also that of 2 *E. 6. cap. 2.* concerning foldiers, I shall refer them to the statute of 4 & 5 *P. & M. cap. 18.*

By

By the statute of 21 *H. 8. cap. 7.* It is enacted, "That all and
 " singular servants, to whom any caskets, jewels, money, goods or
 " chattels, by his or their masters or mistresses, shall from henceforth
 " be delivered to keep, that if any such servant or servants withdraw
 " themselves from their masters or mistresses, and go away with the
 " said caskets, jewels, money, goods or chattels, or any part thereof,
 " to the intent to steal the same, and defraud his or their masters or
 " mistresses thereof, contrary to the trust and confidence to him or
 " them put by his or their masters or mistresses, or else being in the
 " service of his or their master or mistresses without any assent or
 " commandment of his master or mistress, embezzle the same caskets,
 " jewels, money, goods or chattels, or any part thereof, or other-
 " wise convert the same to his own use with like purpose to steal it,
 " that if the said casket, jewels, money, goods or chattels, that any
 " such servant shall go away with, or which he shall embezzle with
 " purpose to steal as aforesaid, be of the value of forty shillings, or
 " above, that then the same false, fraudulent, or untrue act and
 " demeanor shall from henceforth be deemed and adjudged felony,
 " &c. Provided it extends not to apprentices, nor to any person under
 " the age of eighteen years, but every such apprentice or person
 " within that age doing that act shall be and stand in the like case
 " as they were before the making of this act. This act to endure
 " till the next parliament.

By the act of 27 *H. 8. cap. 17.* Clergy was taken away in this
 case, if the indictment were laid specially upon the act of 21 *H. 8.*
 and pursuant to the same; and by the act of 28 *H. 8. cap. 2.* this act
 of 21 *H. 8.* was made perpetual; but by the act of 1 *E. 6. cap. 12*
 these acts were both repealed.

But again, by the act of 5 *Eliz. cap. 10.* this act of 21
H. 8. was re-enacted and revived, yet it did not revive the act [667]
 of 27 *H. 8. cap. 17.* for taking away clergy. 1. Because the words
 of the reviving act of 5 *Eliz.* revive only the act of 21 *H. 8.* specially
 and particularly by name, and not any other incident act concerning
 clergy. And again, 2. Because the acts taking away clergy were spe-
 cially repealed by the statute of 1 *E. 6. cap. 12.* except in those cases
 there particularly enumerated, so that at this day a party indicted and
 convicted upon this statute hath his clergy. (f)

(f) But by 12 *Ann cap. 7.* Clergy is in such case taken away from facts committed in any house or out-house, except as to ap- prentices under the age of fifteen years, robbing their masters.

And *note*, that in this case, and all other cases of this nature where a statute is repealed and re-enacted, an indictment or information may conclude either *contra formam statutorum*, or *contra formam statuti*, for it shall be intended the last statute. And so it is, if a statute be but temporary and then expires, and then is re-enacted; but if a statute be continued till the end of the next session of parliament, and before that next session be ended it is continued over, the indictment may run *contra formam* of the first statute, for it never was interrupted, or it may conclude *contra formam statutorum*. P. 42 *Eliz. B. R. Dingly and Moore*, (g) M. 31 & 32 *Eliz. B. R. Mill's case*.

This statute was introductive of a new law, when the goods were actually delivered to the servant that goes away with them; for where there is such a delivery it could not at common law be a felony.

But yet a servant might be guilty of felony at common law, if he takes the goods of his master feloniously, nay, tho they be goods under their charge, as a shepherd, butler, &c. *vide supra*, cap. 43. p. 505. and for this he may be indicted at this day as a felony at common law, and of this felony at common law, an apprentice or servant under the age of eighteen years may be guilty, and indicted thereof at common law.

And therefore tho the statute of 21 H. 8. exempt an apprentice or [668] servant under the age of eighteen years from the pain of felony enacted *de novo* by this statute, namely, where goods are actually delivered to him, yet it leaves him in the same condition as to any felony at common law, as if he were not excepted; and therefore if my butler or shepherd, under the age of eighteen years, or if my apprentice takes away my goods feloniously without my actual delivery. tho they are under the value of forty shillings, he is indictable of felony at common law.

If I deliver my servant a bond to receive money, or deliver him goods to sell, and he receives the money upon the bond or goods, and goes away with it, this is not felony at common law because the money is delivered to him, nor felony by this statute, because tho the bond or goods were delivered him by the master, yet the money was not so delivered by the master. Dy. 5. a. Co. P. C. cap. 44. And yet by the very payment of the money to the servant to the master's use, the master is by law said to be actually possessed of this money; and if taken away from the servant by a trespasser or robber, the master

may have a general action of trespass, or action upon the statute of hue and cry.

But it is held, that if the master delivers to the servant twenty pounds in silver to change it into gold at the goldsmith's or leather to make shoes, and he run away with the gold or shoes, it is felony. *Crompt. Justic. 35. b.*

If *A.* hath two servants, *B.* and *C.* *B.* by the command of *A.* the master, and in his presence delivers the master's goods to *C.* by the master's command, and *C.* runs away with it, this is felony within the statute, for it is the master's delivery; but suppose it be delivered by the master's command, but in the master's absence, *quære*, whether this be within the statute, and what difference there is between this case and the receiving money from a creditor by the master's directions? yet *vide Dy. 5.* it seems felony.

If the master's wife delivers goods of the master to the servant to keep, and he goes away with it, it seems this is within the statute, for he hath them by delivery of his mistress, and the master's wife is as well his mistress, as if she were sole, *vide* statute 25 *E. 3.* for petit treason.

By the statute of 22 *H. 8. cap. 11.* Every perverse and malicious cutting down of the new *Powdike* of *Marshland* [669] or of the old *Powdike* of the isle of *Ely*, or of any part thereof, or of any other bank, being part of the rind and uttermost part of the country of *Marshland*, made for the defense thereof, other than working upon the same for repairing or amending the fortifying thereof, is enacted to be felony.

This act was repealed by 1 *E. 6. cap. 12.* and 1 *Mar. cap. 1.* but is revived by 2 & 3 *P. & M. cap. 19.* and so continues.

But the offender hath the benefit of clergy.

By the statute of 23 *H. 8. cap. 16.* The selling of a horse to a *Scotchman*, or delivering a horse in *Scotland* is made felony.

This was repealed by 1 *E. 6. cap. 12.* and tho made penal by the act of 1 *E. 6. cap. 5.* yet never revived, (*h*) and the acts of this kind are repealed by 4 *Jac. 1. cap. 1.* as to *Scotland*.

By the act of 25 *H. 8. cap. 6.* buggery with mankind or beast is enacted to be felony, and the felon excluded from clergy.

(*b*) This must be some mistake in the MS. *Eliz. cap. 7.* tho afterwards repeal'd by 4 for this statute was revived, as our author *Jac. 1. cap.* himself says a little above, *p. 663.* by 1