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**HISTORICAL SKETCH**  
**OF THE**  
**B U R M E S E W A R ;**  
**COMPILED FROM**  
**ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS.**

**BY**  
**HORACE HAYMAN WILSON, Esq.**

**Calcutta :**

**FROM THE GOVERNMENT GAZETTE PRESS, BY G. H. HUTTMANN.**

**1827.**





TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

EARL AMHERST,

*Of Arracan,*

GOVERNOR GENERAL OF BRITISH INDIA;

*&c.*

*&c.*

*&c.*

THE FOLLOWING PAGES,

ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE EVENTS OF A WAR,

CONDUCTED UNDER HIS AUSPICES,

TO A

SUCCESSFUL AND HONOURABLE TERMINATION,

ARE

RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED.



# **HISTORICAL SKETCH**

## **OF**

# **THE BURMESE WAR.**

**T**HE occurrence of hostilities with the neighbouring kingdom of Ava, was an event which was not unforeseen by the British Government of India, as the probable consequence of the victorious career, and the extravagant pretensions of the Burman state.\*

Animated by the re-action which suddenly elevated the Burmans from a subjugated and humiliated people, into conquerors and sovereigns, the era of their ambition may be dated from the recovery of their political independence, and their liberation from the temporary yoke of the Peguers, was the prelude to their conquest of all the surrounding realms. The vigorous despotism of the Government, and the confident courage of the people, crowned every enterprise with success, and for above half a century the Burman arms were invariably victorious, whether wielded for attack or defence. Shortly after their insurrection against Pegu, the Burmans became the masters of that kingdom. They next wrested the valuable districts of the Tenasserim coast from Siam. They repelled, with great gallantry, a formidable invasion from China, and by the final annexation of Aracan, Manipur, and Asam, to the empire, they established themselves through the whole of the narrow, but extensive tract of country, which separates the western provinces of China from the eastern boundaries of Hindustan. Along the greater part of this territory they threatened the open plains of British India, and they only awaited a plausible pretext to assail the barrier, which, in their estimation, as presumptuously as idly, opposed the further prosecution of their triumphs. :

The imperious disposition of the Court of Ava, was manifested at a very early period, and even the liberator of his country, Alompra, not satisfied with disdaining the proffered alliance of the Company, authorised a barbarous massacre of their servants on the island of Negrais, which was never disavowed nor excused by his successors, nor resented by the British Government

\* Documents 1 and 2.

Government of India.\* Shortly after the conquest of Aracan, a Burman army entered the territories in pursuit of robbers, without any previous representation of the cause of their aggression, or intimation of their purpose—whilst a force of twenty thousand men assembled at Aracan to support the invasion. The advance of a British detachment, under Colonel Erskine, and the prudence of the Burman commander, prevented hostilities; but the presumption of the Burman Government was so far encouraged, that the principal individuals who had incurred its displeasure were secured, and delivered to its vengeance.† The communication thus opened, was thought to afford a favourable occasion for a pacific mission, and Colonel Symes was, accordingly, despatched on that object. The reception of the Envoy, however, as detailed by himself, clearly exhibits the interpretation given to it by the Court, and they evidently regarded it as the tribute of fear, rather than as an advance towards liberal conciliation and civilised intercourse.‡

Upon the subjugation of Aracan, great numbers of the native population fled from the cruelty and oppression of their conquerors, and either found an asylum in the district of Chittagong, or secreted themselves amongst the hills and thickets, and alluvial islands, along its southern and eastern boundaries: from these haunts, they occasionally sallied, and inflicted upon the Burmans in Aracan, a feeble retaliation for the injuries they had sustained: retiring to their fastnesses, when their purpose was effected, or when encountered by superior force. In general, their efforts were insignificant, and their incursions were rather predatory than political; but in § 1811, a more formidable invasion took place, and the fugitives having collected under the command of Khynberring, a Mug Chief, attempted an aggression of a serious character. They were joined by many of the Mugs from Chittagong, and being aided by those still resident in Aracan, they soon overran that province, and recovered the whole of it, except the capital, from the Burmans. Their success was transient. Reinforcements arrived from Ava. Khynberring was defeated, and his followers put to the route, and the insurgents were compelled to return to their hiding places on the frontiers of Chittagong. Although every exertion was made by the police of Chittagong, aided by the military, to prevent all assemblages of armed men in the district, and to disperse them as soon as formed, the nature of the country, and the general devotion of the Mug population

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\* On these subjects, Dalrymple's Repertory furnishes some characteristic details.—Vol. I. pages 151 and 394.

† Of this transaction, Dr. Hamilton remarks, "The opinion that prevailed both in Chittagong and at Ava was, that the refugees were given up from fear, and this opinion has, no doubt, continued to operate on the ill-informed Court of Ava, and has occasioned a frequent repetition of violence and insolence, ending in open war. The consequence of this will, no doubt, be fatal to Ava, but may produce subsequent difficulties to the Government of Bengal. These evils might possibly have been avoided by a vigorous repulse of the invasion in 1794, and a positive refusal to hearken to any proposal for giving up the insurgents, after the Court of Ava had adopted hostile measures in place of negotiation, to which alone it was entitled. *Account of the frontier between the southern part of Bengal and Ava.—Edinburgh Journal of Science, for October, 1825.*

‡ Symes's Mission to Ava, 8vo. 1. 275. See also Cox's Burmhan Empire.

§ Calcutta Annual Register for 1821.

population to the cause of Khynberring, rendered every measure of but limited efficacy, whilst the issue of the insurgents in such numbers from the Company's territory, under the command of an individual who had resided many years under the protection of the local authorities, did certainly afford reason to the Court of Ava to suspect that the invasion was instigated and supported by the British Government. In order to efface such an impression, letters were addressed to the Raja of Aracan, and Viceroy of Pegu, and Captain Canning was sent on a mission to Ava, to offer every necessary explanation. These advances were unsuccessful, and the Envoy, after experiencing much indignity at Rangoon, and incurring some personal peril, was recalled to Bengal, without communicating with the capital. As long as the chiefs of the insurgents were at large, the Burman Government declined all amicable communication. They insisted upon the seizure of the obnoxious individuals, and their delivery by the British officers, or threatened to overrun the district of Chittagong, with a force more than sufficient for their apprehension. This menace was frustrated by the presence of a body of troops, but due attention was paid to the just claims of the Burman Government, and parties were dispatched against the fugitives, and rewards offered for their capture. Khynberring escaped; but several of his chief followers were secured. Common humanity forbade their being resigned to the barbarity of the Burmese, and the refusal to deliver them was a source of deep and long cherished resentment to the Court of Ava. After a few years of a precarious and fugitive life, during which, deserted by his followers, and straitened by the vigilance with which his movements were watched by both British and Burmese, Khynberring was deprived of the means of doing mischief, that chieftain died, and left the Court of Ava no cause of complaint against the Government of British India.\*

The death of Khynberring, the dispersion of his adherents, and the confinement of the principal leaders, produced a favorable change in the state of the country, and divested such disturbances as subsequently occurred of all national or political importance. The insurgents generally manifested a disposition to return quietly to their homes, but a few, unable to resume at once habits of tranquil industry, continued to lurk in the hills and jungles of Chittagong, under the command of Kyngjang, a chief of Khynberring's party, who continued at large. At first, his band did not consist of more than thirty followers, but it gradually increased to about a hundred, and with these he committed some predatory excesses, but solely upon the subjects of the British Government; being impelled to this conduct by the terror of a prison and the want of food. The depredations of this chief, and his adherents, were speedily checked by the activity of the Magistrate, and in May 1816, were finally suppressed by the surrender of the chief. Their existence, however, furnished the Court of

Ava,

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\* Although we have thought it advisable to refer to these occurrences, as explanatory of the feelings which have since influenced the Court of Ava, we do not conceive it essential to enter into them in detail, nor to record the authorities upon which the preceding summary is founded. The events of the period are narrated in the works which we have cited, or form the bulk of the papers printed by order of the House of Commons, in May 1825, to which, therefore, we refer our readers for any further illustration, which they may think the subject requires.

Ava, with no additional ground of complaint, as they were restricted to the territories of the Company.

The perfect immunity of the Burman frontiers from aggression for a period of two years, and the repeated assurances of the British Government of India, that, as far as depended upon their officers, this desirable state of things should be perpetuated, might have satisfied the Government of Ava of the sincerity of the pledge, and justified the expectation that amicable relations would be permanently formed.

The second year, however, of the restoration of tranquillity on the confines of the two states had not quite expired, when the demand for the surrender of the Mug refugees was renewed by the son of the Raja of Ramree, who brought a letter from his father to that effect.\* The Magistrate of Chittagong was directed to reply to the letter of the Raja of Ramree, but the Governor General, the Marquis of Hastings, thought it advisable to address a letter to the Viceroy of Pegu, in which it was stated, for the purpose of being communicated to the King of Ava, that "the British Government could not, without a violation of the principles of justice, deliver up those who had sought its protection, that the existing tranquillity and the improbable renewal of any disturbances rendered the demand particularly unseasonable, and that whilst the vigilance of the British officers should be directed to prevent and punish any enterprize against the province of Aracan, it could lead to no advantageous result to either state to agitate the question of the delivery of the insurgents any further." No notice was ever taken of this letter, and the silence of the Court of Ava, for some time afterwards, confirmed the Government of Bengal in the belief, that "there was not the least reason to suspect the existence or the future contemplation of any hostile design on the part of the Burmese Government," in consequence of which impression, the Government countermanded "the extraordinary preparations of defence against the Burmese, which had been adopted upon the general tenor of the intelligence obtained after the receipt of the communication from Ramree, the knowledge possessed by Government of the arrogant spirit of the Court of Ava, and the extreme jealousy which it had always entertained of the protection granted, by the British authorities, to the emigrant Mugs."†

The impression thus entertained, was by no means justified by the result, and after the expiration of another twelve month, a second letter was received from the Raja of Ramree, making a demand, on the part of the King of Ava, for the cession of Ramoo, Chittagong, Moorsheabad, and Dacca, on the alleged grounds of their being ancient dependencies of Aracan, now annexed to the Burman dominions, and filled with extravagant and absurd menaces, in the event of a refusal to comply with the requisition. A letter in reply, was written to the Viceroy of Pegu, treating this demand as the unauthorised act of the Raja of Ramree, and stating that "if the Governor General could suppose it to have been dictated by the King of Ava, the British Government would be justified in considering it as a declaration of war." The letter

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\* Documents No. 3 and 4.

† Public Letter to the Honorable the Court of Directors, of the 20th December, 1817.

letter from the Raja, it may be observed, was never disavowed, and the demands it conveyed as well as the tone, in which they were expressed, could not have emanated from a subordinate officer, if he had not been previously armed with the full authority of the Court. Nor, in fact, was the demand altogether new, although now, for the first time, directly urged. The claim was repeatedly advanced both in public and in private, as far back as 1797, when Captain Cox was at Amerapura, and it must even then have been familiar to the discussions of the administration.\* It was therefore, not the unauthorised impertinence of a provincial governor, but the expression of sentiments long entertained by the Government of Ava, and presently, as we shall observe, explicitly avowed by other and more important of its functionaries. Had not the attention of the Government of India been directed to more emergent considerations in other quarters, there is no doubt that a satisfactory explanation of so extraordinary a procedure would have been insisted on, or that the alternative would, as intimated by Lord Hastings, have then been war.

The successful termination of hostilities in central India, was, perhaps, one cause of the subsequent silence of the Burmese Government, but other reasons may be found in the death of the King of Ava, who expired in 1819, in the arrangements consequent upon the succession of the reigning prince, the active interference of the Court of Ava in the politics of Asam, and the reduction of that country to its authority.†

The constitution of Asam comprised even to a greater extent than usual with Asiatic Governments, the seeds of civil dissension. Although the Government was hereditary in the same family, the choice of a successor rested with the King, or the great council, or the persons of most authority in the state. These were also, for the greater part, hereditary, not only as to rank, but function, and the son of a minister ordinarily succeeded to his father's post. The chief ministers were three in number, the Barputra Gohain, the Bara Gohain, and the Boora Gohain : next to these was the Bar Barua, or great secretary, and then came the Phokuns and Baruas, who filled the different public offices of the state, and were mostly supposed to be descended from the original companions of the founders of the ruling dynasty, in consequence of which they were entitled to the influence and authority they enjoyed.

*Amidst*

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\* "A desultory conversation then took place, in which the Woonghees, Woondoks, and others indifferently joined. One advanced, that Chittagong, Luckipore, Dacca, and the whole of the Casimbazar island, formerly made part of the ancient dominions of Arracan, that the remains of chokeys and pagodas were still to be seen near Dacca, and that they would further prove it from the Arracan records, and hinted, that his Majesty would claim the restitution of those countries. Cox's *Burmhan Empire*. p. 300. The Woondok again brought forward his Majesty's claims on the ancient territory of Arracan, and reduced it to the form of a demand of half of the revenues of Dacca. p. 302. The Woondok renewed the subject of the Burmhan claims on Dacca, &c., but lowered the demand to one-tenth of the revenues. He said it was evident, we were dubious of our right, by Captain Symes having so strenuously urged the building of a chokey on the Naaf, to mark that river as the boundary between the two countries. Had the Naaf been the proper boundary, there was no occasion for Captain Symes's agitating the subject : we had betrayed our consciousness of our want of right by his solicitude on that occasion. They have publicly said, that three thousand men would be sufficient to wrest from us the provinces they claim." p. 304. So little change did nearly thirty years effect in the ideas of the Burman Court.

† Document No. 8.



Amidst these individuals, jealousy and intrigue were always busy, and the annals of Asam present a singular picture of intestine discord. It was, however, between the Rajas and the Gohains, that the principal struggle prevailed, in which the Boora Gohain had acquired an irresistible ascendancy, and subsequently to the year 1796, usurped the sovereign authority, the Raja being a mere cypher in his hands.

Upon the death of Raja Kamaleswar in 1810, his brother, Chandra Kant, was raised by Purnanand, the Boora Gohain, to the throne, but the new Raja soon became impatient of the controul of a servant, and encouraged his adherents to enter into a conspiracy against his minister. The plot was, however, discovered : the Raja was obliged to disavow all participation in it, and his adherents were put to death with the most horrible cruelty. The Bara Phokun, who was one of the conspirators, made good his escape to Calcutta, where he applied, on behalf of his master, to the British Government. Meeting with but little encouragement in that quarter, he had recourse to the Burman Envoys then at the presidency, and accompanying them on their return to Ava, immediately procured military succors. Six thousand Burmans, and eight thousand auxiliaries, accompanied him to Asam, where the Boora Gohain had breathed his last, two days before their arrival. The son of that minister, who succeeded to his father's station and ambition, retreated to Gohati on the approach of the Burmans, leaving the Raja at Jorhath to welcome their arrival, and reward the activity of the Bara Phokun, by making him his minister. The Burmans were reimbursed their expences, and dismissed with honour, and a female of the royal family was sent with valuable presents to Amerapura.

The services of the Bara Phokun were unable to protect him against the effects of court intrigue, and the Bara Barua and Bara Gohain influenced Chandra Kant, to put him treacherously to death, on which his friends and kindred fled to Ava. In the mean time, the son of the late Boora Gohain, inheriting his father's resentment against the reigning Raja, invited a Prince of the royal family, Purandar Sinh, who had resided sometime in obscurity, to become a competitor for the throne, and in his cause, defeated and deposed Chandra Kant. Purandar Sinh was satisfied with slitting an ear of his rival, a mutilation which was held to disqualify him for the regal dignity.

The Court of Amerapura, on hearing of the murder of their ally, the Bara Phokun, despatched a large army to Asam to avenge his fate. The force entered the country early in 1818, and were opposed at Najeera, a place three days from Jorhath, with some spirit, but a panic seizing the Asamese commander, he fell back to Jorhath, from whence Purandar Sinh and his party retreated to Gohati. Attributing, apparently, the murder of the Bara Phokun to Chandra Kant's advisers, rather than to himself, the Burmans re-established that Prince in his authority, and on their departure, left a division, under Maha Thilwa, for his defence. The Bara Barua and the Bara Gohain were taken, and put to death at Rangpur. Upon the advance of the Burman force to Gohati, Purandar Sinh and the Boora Gohain took refuge in the territories of the Company. Their surrender was demanded by Chandra Kant.

A very short interval elapsed when Chandra Kant's brother-in-law, and one of his ministers, having incurred the displeasure of the Burman general, was put to death by his order.

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This act having alarmed the Raja for his own safety, he fled with his sister to Gohati, and although Maha Thilwa endeavoured, by professions of friendship, to dissipate his alarm, he could not be induced to trust himself again in the power of the Burman general. In resentment of his mistrust, a great number of Asamese were put to death. Chandra Kant retaliated on the Burman officers who had been deputed to persuade him to return, and the bitterest enmity separated him from his allies. The Burman commander sent a force against him, which compelled him to evacuate Gohati, and retreat towards the British frontier. There, however, he made head against his enemies, and having purchased supplies of arms and ammunition, and being joined by a number of the Asamese, he became, in his turn, triumphant, and at the end of 1821 had again established his authority over the western part of Asam, as far as to the vicinity of Jorhath. His success, however, was of no long duration, for in the beginning of 1822, the Burmese in Asam, who had set up another pretender to the throne, were joined by considerable reinforcements from Ava, under Menghee Maha Bandoola, an officer of rank and military ability. Chandra Kant was defeated at Mahagar-ghat in an action, in which he displayed great personal bravery, and was compelled to seek safety once more in flight. He refrained from retiring to the Company's territories, but the Burman commander anticipating that he would take that direction, addressed a letter and message to the officer commanding on the frontier, stating, that although it was his wish to remain on friendly terms with the Company, and to respect the British authorities, yet, should protection be given to Chandra Kant, he had received orders to follow him wherever he might go, and to take him by force out of the British dominions.\* Although it was not thought likely that these menaces would be enforced, yet orders were, in consequence, sent to the Magistrate, that should Chandra Kant or any of his party appear within his district, they should be disarmed and sent to a distance, and measures were taken to strengthen the force on the frontier. In the meantime, a general feeling of insecurity prevailed amongst the inhabitants of Rungpore, and on various occasions, parties of Burmese crossing the river, committed serious devastations within the British territory, burning a number of villages, and plundering and murdering the inhabitants, or carrying them off as slaves. These proceedings, when complained of, were disavowed, but no redress was ever obtained.

The pretence of maintaining the lawful Prince in possession of his throne, was soon abandoned by the Burmans, and a chief of their own nation was appointed to the supreme authority in Asam. The vicinity of a powerful and ambitious neighbour was therefore substituted for a feeble and distracted state, and this proximity was the more a subject of reasonable apprehension, as, from the the country being intersected by numerous rivers, and from the Burmese being equally prepared to combat by water as by land, it was at any time in their power to invade and plunder the British provinces, without its being possible to offer effective opposition, or to intercept their retreat, under the existing constitution of our defensive force. It was also to be anticipated, from the known pretensions of the Burmese, and the spirit they had

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\* Document No. 9.

had invariably displayed, that it would not be long before they found some excuse for disturbing the amicable relations which, chiefly through the forbearance of the British Government, in not exacting retribution for the injuries offered to its subjects, were still suffered to subsist on the frontiers of Asam. This anticipation was speedily realised. An island in the Bramahputra, on which the British flag had been erected, was claimed by the Burmese ; the flag thrown down, and an armed force collected to maintain the insult.\* It does not appear that this conduct was ever resented, but sickness weakening the Burmese force in Asam, and the rising of some of the native tribes engrossing their attention, they desisted for the time, from their unwarrantable encroachments. They were, however, likely to renew them whenever the opportunity was convenient, and a sense of insecurity could not fail to be entertained by the authorities in Asam, until the actual occurrence of war relieved the apprehension by the certainty of danger.

The threatening attitude of the Burmese, at either extremity of the frontier, now rendered it incumbent on the British Government to advert to the position which they likewise occupied in the more central portion, and to take such measures as were at once practicable for the defence of the eastern provinces. With this view they determined to accede to a requisition that had been some time under their consideration, and to take the principality of Cachar under British protection, by which arrangement they were enabled to occupy the principal passes into the low lands of Sylhet, and thus effectively oppose the advance of the Burmans from the district of Manipur, which they had some short time previously reduced to their authority.†

Bhogi Chandra, Raja of Manipur, who died about 1796, left several sons, of whom the eldest, Hersha Chandra, succeeded. After a few years, he was put to death by the brother of one of his father's wives, but this chief was speedily slain by Madhu Chandra, the second son of the late Raja. He was killed after a reign of four or five years by his brother Chourajit, who then became Raja. Of the remaining brothers, Marjit fled to the Court of Ava, and Gambhir Sinh continued in Manipur. After repeated alternations of reconciliation and animosity, Marjit, having obtained a strong Burmese force, invaded Manipur about 1812, and succeeded in dispossessing his elder brother, and compelling him to fly. Chourajit took refuge first in Cachar, and subsequently in Jyntea. The youngest brother, Gambhir Sinh, after residing with Marjit for a twelve month, found it also expedient to leave the principality, and he entered into the service of Govinda Chandra, the Raja of Cachar, by whom he was invested with the command of his troops. In 1817, the new sovereign of Manipur invaded the neighbouring state of Cachar, on which the Raja fled into Sylhet, and solicited the aid of the British Government, offering to hold his country under an acknowledgement of dependency. As these offers were declined, he had recourse to the brothers of the Raja of Manipur, and invited Chourajit from Jyntea, promising to divide with him and Gambhir Sinh, the territory of Cachar, as the price of their services. The succour of the two brothers, and the exertions of his own adherents, proved effectual, and Marjit was

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\* Documents Nos. 10, 11, 12. † Document No. 13.

was compelled to withdraw to Manipur. The allies of the Cachar Prince were, eventually, equally detrimental to his interests, and Chourajit and Gambhir Sinh uniting their forces against Govinda Chandra, expelled him in 1820, from Cachar, and divided the country between them. Govinda Chandra again took refuge in the Company's territories. Some time afterwards, probably after the death of the King of Ava, Marjit was summoned to Amerapura, and declining to comply with the summons, a powerful Burman force was sent against him, which drove him from the country, and annexed Manipur to the Burman empire, connecting and concentrating its conquests in this direction. Marjit was received by his brothers in Cachar, with kindness, and a portion of their principality was assigned to him. This harmony did not last long, and Chourajit and Gambhir Sinh disagreeing, the former was defeated, and fled into the Company's territories. On this occasion, Chourajit tendered his interest in Cachar to the Company. The Burmese taking advantage of these dissensions, now prepared to invade Cachar, on which, both Marjit and Gambhir Sinh hastened to invoke the support of the British Government of India, and for the reasons above referred to, it was determined, that Cachar should be taken under the protection of the Company. The same was extended, upon his request, to the Raja of Jyntea. Notwithstanding the intimation of these determinations to the Burmese, they persisted in their purpose of invading Cachar, and thereby provoked the commencement of actual hostilities in that quarter, as will be hereafter noticed : in the mean time, the discussions on the side of Chittagong had assumed a decided tone, and left the question of peace or war between the two states no longer a subject of speculation.

The insolence of the Burman authorities in Aracan and the adjacent countries, had not been restricted to the extravagant menaces which have been noticed. Repeated instances of actual aggression had still more distinctly marked either their intention of provoking hostilities, or their indifference as to their occurrence. The chief objects of these acts of violence were the elephant hunters in the Company's employ, whom the Burmese seized, and carried off repeatedly, under the pretext, that they were within the territories of the King of Ava : a pretext that had never been urged throughout the long series of years, during which the Company's hunters\* had followed the chase in the jungles and hills of the eastern frontier. In May 1821, the Burmese carried off from the party employed in the Ramoo hills, the Darogah, the Jemadar, and twenty-three of their men, on whom they inflicted personal severities, and then threw them into confinement at Mungdoo, demanding from the prisoners a considerable sum for their ransom.

In the following season, or February 1822, the outrage was reiterated : the party employed at the Keddah, was attacked by an armed force, dispersed, and six of the hunters were carried off to Aracan, where they were thrown into prison, and threatened with death, unless they paid a heavy ransom. The place whence these people were carried off was, undoubtedly, within the Company's territory, being considerably to the west of the Morassi rivulet,

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\* Documents Nos. 14 and 15.

rivulet, which, in 1794, had been acknowledged by the Burmans to separate the two states. Urgent applications were made therefore, to the Raja of Aracan, to release his unfortunate captives, and a representation on the subject was made to the Court of Ava, but no notice was taken of either application. Several of the people, after experiencing much ill usage, were released, but some died in captivity. The object of the Burmans was evidently to establish themselves, by intimidation, upon the hilly and jungly tracts, which were calculated to afford them a ready and unexpected entrance into the level and cultivated portions of Chittagong.

The same system of violence was adopted in another part of the Chittagong district, in order to maintain pretensions to territorial jurisdiction equally unfounded with those made upon the elephant grounds of Ramoo, and in like manner, without communication with the local authorities. A boat laden with rice, having, in January 1823, entered the nullah, which is on the British side of the Naf, was followed by an armed Burmese boat, which demanded duty.\* As the demand was unprecedented, the Mugs, who were British subjects, demurred payment, on which the Burmese fired upon them, killed the manjee, or steersman, and then retired. This outrage was followed by reports of the assemblage of armed men on the Burmese side of the river, for the purpose of destroying the villages on the British territory, and in order to provide against such a contingency, as well as to prevent the repetition of any aggression upon the boats trafficking on the Company's side of the river, the military guard at Tek Naf was strengthened from twenty to fifty men, of whom a few were posted on the adjoining island of Shahpuri.

The determination thus shewn by the British authorities to maintain the integrity of their frontier was immediately resented by the Burmese, and the Mungdoo Ucherung, or police officer, to whom the conduct of these transactions was committed by the Viceroy of Aracan, was urgent with the Magistrate of Chittagong to withdraw the guard, asserting the right of the King of Ava to the island, and intimating his having authority from the Viceroy to declare, that if the detachment was not immediately recalled, the consequence would be a war between the two countries.

The Raja of Aracan was therefore addressed on the subject, who replied by reiterating the demand for the concession of Shahpuri.† In answer to his demand,‡ the right of the Company was asserted, but at the same time a disposition to investigate the claim in a deliberate and friendly manner was expressed, and a proposal was made, that Commissioners on the part of either Government should be deputed in the ensuing cold season, to meet and determine all questions respecting the disputed territory on the borders. Before this reply could have reached the Raja, however, he proceeded to carry his threat of applying force, into execution, under the express orders, as was carefully promulgated, of his sovereign the King of Ava. A body of one thousand Burmese, under the Raja of Ramree, landed on Shahpuri, on the night of the 24th September, attacked the British post, and killed three, and wounded four of the sipahees stationed

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\* Document No. 16.

† Do. No. 17.

‡ Do. No. 18.

stationed there, and drove off the rest off the island. The Burmese then returned to the main land.\*

The act was reported to the Bengal Government, in a menacing letter from the Raja of Aracan himself, stating, that unless the British Government submitted quietly to this treatment, it would be followed by the like forcible seizure of the cities of Dacca and Moorshedabad.†

Notwithstanding the assertions of the Burmese, that the island of Shahpuri had belonged to their Government, the earliest records of the Chittagong jurisdiction, shewed that it had been always included in the British province, that it had been surveyed and measured by British officers, at different periods from 1801 to 1819, and that it had been repeatedly, although not uninterruptedly, held by Mug individuals, under deeds from the Collector's office, ever since 1790.‡ It lay on the British side of the main channel of the Naf, and the stream which separated it from the Chittagong shore was fordable at low water. With these facts in its favour, however, the British Government invariably expressed its readiness to investigate the subject in a friendly manner, which offer being met by the forcible irruption of the Burmese, placed them under the necessity of upholding their character, as well as vindicating their rights.

It was not the value of the island of Shahpuri, which was, in fact, of little worth, being of small extent, and affording only pasturage for cattle, that was in dispute. The reputation of the British Government, and the security of their subjects, enjoined the line of conduct to be adopted, and, in fact, the mere possession of Shahpuri was clearly not the object of the Burman court. The island was avowedly claimed upon the very same pretext, as the provinces of Chittagong, Dacca, and Moorshedabad, and its abandonment would have been an encouragement of other and more serious demands. It was, therefore, no more than prudent to make a stand at once in this quarter, with the view of deterring the Burmese from the further prosecution of those encroachments, which they evidently projected.

In order, however, to avoid till the last possible moment, the necessity of hostilities, the Government of Bengal, although determined to assert their just pretensions, resolved to afford to the Court of Ava an opportunity of avoiding any collision. With this intent, they resolved to consider the forcible occupation of Shahpuri, as the act of the local authorities alone, and addressed a declaration to the Burman Government, recapitulating the past occurrences, and calling upon the Court of Ava to disavow their officers in Aracan. The tone of this dispatch was that of firmness, though of moderation, but when rendered into the Burman language, it may, probably, have failed to convey the resolved and conciliatory spirit, by which it was dictated, as subsequent information of the most authentic character established the fact of its having been misunderstood, as a pusillanimous attempt to deprecate the resentment of the Burmese, and it was triumphantly appealed to at the Court of Ava, as a proof, that the British Government of India was reluctant to enter upon the contest, be-  
cause

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\* Document No. 19.

† Do. No. 22.

‡ Do. No. 149.

cause it was conscious of possessing neither courage nor resources to engage in it with any prospect of success. The declaration was forwarded in a ship bound to Rangoon, with a letter addressed to the Viceroy of Pegu.\*

In the mean time, the island in dispute was re-occupied. Two Companies of the 20th Regiment, which had been forwarded from Calcutta, were landed on Shahpuri, on the 21st November,† and stockaded on the island: no opposition was offered, nor did any Burmese appear. A proclamation was distributed at the same time, stating, that the only object of the detachment was the re-occupation of the island, and that the intercourse of the people on the frontier, should suffer no interruption from their presence. The force left on the spot was two Companies of the 20th Battalion 20th Regiment Native Infantry, and two field pieces, six pounders, on the stockade at Shahpuri: one Company at Tek Naf, and the *Planet*, armed vessel, and three gun-boats, each carrying a twelve-pounder carronade, were stationed in the Naf.

Although no resistance was offered to the occupation of the island, yet, a variety of concurrent reports, and the unreserved declaration of the Burmese officers with whom communications were entertained, made it evident, that the result would be a war between the two states. Certain information, also, that the Burmese were collecting troops, both in Asam and Aracan, and menaced an attack upon the different exposed points of the Company's frontier, rendered it necessary, that the Bengal Government should look to the occurrence of hostilities, as an impending contingency.‡ Under this impression, the correspondence that had taken place was referred to the Commander-in-chief, who, during a great part of the time, had been absent on his military tour to the upper provinces. His Excellency was also requested to take the subject into his consideration, and provide, as he might think most advisable, for the defence of the frontier, as well as for the system of offensive operations, that might be expedient, should war between the two states become inevitable.

In reply to this communication, the Commander-in-chief suggested, that for the defence of the eastern frontier, three brigades should be formed, to consist of three thousand men each, to be stationed at Chittagong, Jumulpore, and Goalpara, and a strong corps of reserve, to be posted under a senior commanding officer in Dinagepore, to which all communications should be made, and from whence all orders should be issued. His Excellency also urged the formation of an efficient flotilla on the Burrampootra, towards Asam, and in the vicinity of Dacca. The course of operations on the frontier, he recommended, should be strictly defensive, or, at the utmost, limited to the re-establishment of the states subdued by the Burmese, whilst the offensive system, which was likely to be the only effectual mode of punishing the insolence of the Burmese, was an attack from sea, on such points of their coast, as should offer the best prospect of success.§ In a subsequent dispatch, in reply to a further communication from the Supreme Government, his Excellency declared his conviction, that the conduct of the Burmese had rendered hostilities inevitable; and reported the  
dispositions

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\* Documents Nos. 20 and 21.

† Do. No. 26.

‡ Do. No. 23.

§ Do. No. 24.

dispositions which had been made for the defence of the eastern frontier ; and the views adopted by the members of Government at the presidency, being thus confirmed by the sentiments of the Commander in Chief, arrangements were adopted for carrying on the war upon the principles in which he had concurred.\*

In the end of October, information was received by the Commissioner of the N. E. frontier, that the Burmese were concentrating their troops in Asam, for a military expedition, which, in the first instance, was intended for Cachar, and, according to general report, eventually against the British territories.† Instructions were sent to the Commissioner, to lose no time in apprising the Burman Government of Asam, that Cachar was placed under British protection, and warning it to abstain from any project of molesting that country, and that any attempt against it would be regarded as an act of hostility, and communications were accordingly made by him repeatedly to that effect, to the authorities in Asam. A force was also advanced from Dacca to Sylhet, consisting part of the 1st Battalion of the 10th (14th) Native Infantry, three companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 23d, (46th) Native Infantry, four companies of the Rungpore local corps, and a few guns : divisions of which, under Captains Johnstone and Bowe, and Major Newton, were posted at Bhadrapur, Jatrapur, and Takain, in advance of the Sylhet frontier, and covering that station against an attack from either of the directions in which it was menaced.

These arrangements were scarcely matured, when events justified their policy. The Burman armies, notwithstanding the representations of the Commissioner in Asam, entered Cachar in different quarters,‡ and it became necessary to resist their progress, before they occupied positions, which would give them the command of the Sylhet frontier, where their irruption into Cachar had already spread a general panic, and inflicted much serious mischief, causing many of the Ryots to abandon their homes, and materially impeding the collection of the public revenue. As it was evident, that there was little hope of attention being paid to any representation, or remonstrance, the British officers were instructed by the Civil authority, to oppose the advance of the Burmans by force, and hostilities shortly ensued.

In the early part of January, a force of about four thousand Burmans and Asamese advanced from Asam into the province of Cachar, to the foot of the Bherteka pass, and began to stockade themselves at Bikrampore.§ Intelligence was also received that the troops under Gambhir Sinh, had been defeated by a Burman force from Manipur, and that a third Burman division was crossing into Jyntea, immediately to the north of the station of Sylhet. It was therefore judged advisable by Major Newton, the officer commanding on the Sylhet frontier, to concentrate his detachment at Jatrapur, a Cachar village about five miles beyond the boundaries of Sylhet, and thence advance against the invading party from Asam, before they should have time to compleat their entrenchments. The British division accordingly marched at two A. M. on the 17th January, and at day-break came in sight of the stockade, whence a few shots were fired upon the advanced guard. An attack upon the positions was immediately made in

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\* Document No. 25.

† Do. No. 27.

‡ Do. No. 19.\*

§ Do. No. 20.\*



two divisions, one commanded by Captain Johnstone, upon the south face of the stockade, and the other under Captain Bowe, upon the village adjoining. The Burmans in the village presently gave way, but those in the stockade made a resolute resistance. The Burmans lost about a hundred men, whilst six Sipahis were killed on the part of the British. The Burmans who escaped, fled to the hills.

Shortly after the action of the 17th January, the Commissioner, Mr. Scott, arrived at Sylhet, and thence advanced to Bhadrapur, to maintain a more ready communication with the Burmese authorities. On the 31st of January, a messenger sent by the Magistrate, returned to camp, and from his information, as well as a letter previously received, it appeared, that the Burmese Generals professed to have advanced into Cachar upon an application formerly made by the Ex-Raja, Govind Chandra, for assistance, and that they had orders to follow and apprehend Chorajit, Marjit, and Gambhir Sinh, wherever they might take refuge. In reply, a letter was addressed to the General commanding in Asam, stating, the English Government had no objection to the re-establishment of Govind Chandra under their protection, and that the interference of a Burman army for this purpose could not be permitted: that although the Manipur Chiefs could not be delivered up, they should be prevented from disturbing the tranquillity of the province, and finally, the Burmese were required to evacuate the country, or the forces of the British Government would be compelled to advance both into Cachar and Asam.\* It was also intimated, that any attempt upon Jyntea, which it was known was in contemplation, would be resisted.† A letter had, in fact, been addressed by the Commander of the Asam force, to the Raja of Jyntea, calling upon him, and his ministers, whoever they might be, to bow in submission and send offerings, and ordering the Raja to come to the Burmese camp. The Raja had, accordingly, thrown himself upon the British Government for protection.‡

To these communications, no answer was received, the Burman Commander declaring he would give none, until he had received instructions from Ava. The messengers sent by the Commissioner were also detained for a considerable period in the Burmese camp under different pretexts, and it was evidently the object of the Burmese to procrastinate the negotiations, until they had strengthened themselves in the position they occupied, which they might then hope to maintain until the state of the weather rendered it impossible to act against them with advantage.

Subsequently to the action of the 17th January, Major Newton returned, with the force under his command, to Sylhet, withdrawing the whole of the troops from Cachar. The Burmese then advanced to Jatrapur, about five miles east of the frontier, and eight miles from Bhadrapur, where the two divisions from Asam and Munipur effected a junction, and erected stockades on either bank of the Surma, connecting them by a bridge across the river. Their united force amounted to about six thousand, of whom four thousand were Asamese and Cacharees: a detachment of two thousand more was posted at Kila Kandy, in the  
S. E.

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\* Document No. 21.\*

† Do. No. 22.\*

‡ Do. No. 23.\*

S. E. quarter of Cachar. The main body of the Burmese proceeded to push their stockades on the north bank of the Surma, to within one thousand yards of the British post at Bhadrapur, where Capt. Johnstone commanded, having under him a wing of the 10th (14th) N. I. the third company of the 23d (46th), and a small party of the Rungpore Local Corps. With these, he determined to dislodge the enemy before the entrenchments were completed, and having the concurrence of the Commissioner, he moved against them on the 13th of February.\* Having divided his small force into two parties, one under Captain Bowe crossed the river, whilst the other, under his own command, proceeded higher up. Finding it unlikely to prevail upon the Burmese to discontinue their arrangements, by amicable expostulation, Captain Johnstone ordered the columns to attack. The Burmese fired as they advanced, but the troops pressed on without hesitation, and drove the enemy from their unfinished works at the point of the bayonet. The Asam division of the Burmese, fell back upon the Bherteka pass and the Jetinghi river, whilst the Manipur force stockaded itself at Doodpatlee.

With the view to expel the former of these detachments altogether from Cachar, Lieutenant-colonel Bowen, who had joined, and taken the command, marched in pursuit of the retreating enemy.† They were found at the foot of the Bherteka pass, stockading themselves in a strong position on the opposite bank of the Jetinghi river. The stream being deep and rapid, a passage was effected with some difficulty, and after a division of the force had crossed, it was found that a rivulet opening into the stream, rendered an advance along the bank impracticable. It was therefore necessary to make a detour through the thick jungle, which was accomplished only with great exertion ; but the passage to the north-east angle of the stockade being at last effected, the troops formed, and carried it with the bayonet. The enemy fled to the hills, and left no further force in the direction of Asam to be encountered.

There still remained, however, the Manipur division to be expelled, and with this object, Lieutenant-colonel Bowen directed his march against their position at Doodpatlee, which proved to be much stronger than any yet assailed. The Burmese were stockaded on the north bank of the Surma river. Their rear rested on steep hills. Each face of the entrenchment was defended by a deep ditch, about fourteen feet wide : a fence of bamboo spikes was constructed along the outer edge, and the approach on the land side was through jungle and high grass. After the post had been reconnoitred, and the three field pieces with the detachment, had been brought to bear upon it with considerable effect, the Commanding Officer directed the assault to be made upon the western front. The Burmese remained passive, till the troops advanced to the spikes, when they poured upon them a destructive and well maintained fire, which checked the advance of the assailants, although they kept their ground. After being exposed to this fire for some time, and, as it appeared, with no hope of advantage, the attempt was abandoned. The force was withdrawn to Jatrapur. Four officers were wounded, two severely : Lieutenant Armstrong, of the 10th, was killed, and  
about

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\* Document No. 24.\*

† Do. No. 25.\*

about one hundred and fifty Sipahis were killed and wounded.\* On the 27th February, Colonel Innes joined the force at Jatrapur, with four guns, and the 1st Battalion of the 19th Regiment, (38th,) and assumed the command. In the mean time the Burmans retreated from the position at Doodpatlee, and fell back to Manipur, so that Cachar was freed from the presence of an enemy. As there seemed little reason to apprehend their speedy return in force, and the nature of the country rendered it difficult to procure supplies for any number of troops for a protracted period, it was thought sufficient to leave a detachment of the Rungpore Local Infantry in Cachar, whilst the main body went into cantonments at Sylhet.

While these events were taking place in Cachar, the occurrences in the southern extremity of the frontier partook of the same character, and equally indicated the determination of the Government of Ava to provoke hostilities.† Early in January, the British detachment stationed on the island of Shahpuri was withdrawn, in consequence of the unhealthiness of the post, and, at the same time, intimation was conveyed to the Raja of Aracan, that two British officers, Mr. Robertson, the Civil Commissioner, and Captain Cheap, had arrived at Tek Naf, where they were ready, under the orders of their Government, to meet any persons the Raja might depute, for the purpose of defining and settling the boundary. The Raja sent four persons to meet the British authorities with a letter, demanding the unconditional surrender of the island; and his envoys, in the conferences that ensued, declared they would not enter upon any conversation respecting boundary, until the island was acknowledged to belong to the King of Ava, or at least allowed to be considered as neutral, and to be occupied by neither power. As this demand was not at once submitted to, they returned to Aracan, where it had been ascertained, a considerable force had been assembled under the four Rajas, under whose several jurisdiction the province of Aracan was divided. These were shortly afterwards placed under the supreme command of the Maha Bundoola, or chief military officer of the state, who quitted Ava early in January, to take the supreme command, both civil and military in Aracan, and brought with him considerable reinforcements. Shortly prior to his arrival, however, four individuals, said to have been deputed by the Court of Ava, arrived at Mungdoo, and under their authority, a wanton outrage was perpetrated, which could only tend to precipitate the commencement of the war. When the Sipahis were withdrawn from Shahpuri, the Hon'ble Company's Pilot vessel *Sophia* was ordered to join the gun-boats off that island, to serve in some degree as a substitute for the troops that had been removed. Upon the arrival of the deputies, or Wuzeers, at Mungdoo, on the opposite bank of the Naf, they invited the commanding officer of the *Sophia* on shore, under the pretext of communicating with him amicably on the state of affairs, and on his unguardedly accepting the invitation, they seized him, and an officer and the native seamen who accompanied him, and sent them prisoners to Aracan, where they were threatened with detention until the chief Mug insurgents should be delivered in exchange. Mr. Chew, the commander of the *Sophia*, was kept at Aracan from the 20th January to the 13th February, when he was sent back, with his companions and

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\* Documents Nos. 26\* and 27.\*

† Do. No. 28.

and some natives of Chittagong, to Mungdoo. The motive of this seizure was, the *Sophia's* being anchored off Shahpuri, and the act was no doubt intended as one of intimidation. In a similar light might be considered the circumstance of the Burmese agents, crossing from Mungdoo to Shahpuri, and planting the flag of Ava on the island. This was a bravado little worthy of notice, and was only important as displayed after the arrival of the Maha Bundoola, and, consequently, indicative of the spirit by which he was likely to be actuated, but the forcible arrest of an officer in the British service, was a national insult, that could not be suffered to pass without apology or excuse, neither of which, it was likely, would be tendered. As the two states might now be considered as actually, although not declaredly, at war, the British Government, agreeably to the usage of civilised nations, promulgated the grounds of their recourse to hostile measures, in a declaration,\* addressed to the Court of Ava, and the different powers of India, and a public proclamation,† dated the 5th March. In these documents, the causes of the war were declared to be the acts of encroachment and aggression, so perseveringly committed on the south-east frontier, the attack upon the post of Shahpuri, the arrest of a British officer and crew, the invasion of Cachar, and the menaces addressed to the Jyntea Raja, and the tacit approbation of the conduct of their officers by the Court of Amerapura, which evinced a determination not only to withhold all explanation and atonement for past injuries, but to prosecute projects of the most extravagant and mischievous ambition, pregnant with serious danger to the British Government. The proclamation was speedily followed by a communication from Pegu,‡ in reply to that addressed to the Court of Ava in the preceding November, which might be considered as a counter-manifesto, as it declared, in terms of singular arrogance, that the Governors on the frontier had full power to act, and that until every thing was settled, a communication need not be made to the golden feet.

The war being now formally declared by the British Government, and virtually announced by the Court of Ava, measures were taken at once for its prosecution, upon the principles adopted with the concurrence of the Commander in Chief. The operations on the frontier were to be limited to the protection of the British provinces, and the expulsion of the Burmese from the adjacent territories, which they had recently wrested from the native princes, whilst a powerful force was to be directed against the most vulnerable and important points of the maritime provinces of the enemy. Of the former plan, it appeared, in the first instance, only necessary to dislodge the Burmese from Asam, as Cachar was already cleared of them, and the invasion of Aracan was not immediately proposed. In Sylhet and Chittagong, therefore, a strictly defensive line of conduct was pursued. Colonel Innes, with his brigade, remaining at the sudder station of the former, and Colonel Shapland commanding at the latter. The Chittagong force consisted of the left wing of the 13th (27th) Regiment Native Infantry, five companies of the 2d Battalion 20th (40th) Native Infantry, and the 1st Battalion 23rd (45th), with the Provincial Battalion: a Local Corps, or Mug Levy,

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\* Document No. 29.

† Do. No. 30.

‡ Do. No. 31.

Levy, was also raised, and the whole amounted to about three thousand men. Of these, a detachment under Captain Noton, consisting of five companies of the 45th Native Infantry, with two guns, and details from the Provincial Battalion and Mug Levy, was left at Ramoo, to check any demonstration on the side of Aracan. It was in Asam, however, the first hostilities occurred after the war was proclaimed.

The Asam force stationed at Goalpara, under the command of Brigadier McMorine, consisted of seven companies of the 2d Battalion of the 23d (46th) N. I., six companies of the Rungpore Local Corps, the Dinapore Local Corps, and a Wing of the Champarun Local Corps; three brigades of six-pounders, and a small body of Irregular Horse, besides a gun-boat flotilla on the Brahmaputra.

This force moved from Goalpara on the 13th March, 1824. The route lay along both banks of the river, occasionally through thick jungle and long grass, in which the troops were completely buried: a number of small rivulets and ravines also intersected the road, and heavy sands, or marshy swamps, rendered the march one of more than usual toil. Through the greater part of the advance, the signs of cultivation were of rare occurrence, and all the supplies of the divisions were carried with them on elephants, or in boats. On the 28th, the force arrived at Gohati, where the Burmese had erected strong stockades, but evacuated them on the approach of the British. The necessity of retreat had apparently exasperated them against their unfortunate subjects and fellows in arms, the Asamese, the bodies of many of whom, barbarously mutilated, were found upon the road and in the stockade at Gohati. On entering Asam, a proclamation was addressed to the inhabitants, encouraging them with the prospect of being released from the cruelty of their Burman invaders, and assuring them of British protection. Several of the barbarous tribes in the eastern portion of Asam, as the Khamtis and Sinphos, availed themselves of the unsettled state of affairs to harass the Burmese, but their operations were equally directed against the unfortunate natives of Asam, numbers of whom were carried off by them as slaves. The Asamese displayed the most favourable disposition towards the British, but their unwarlike character, scanty numbers, and reduced means, rendered their co-operation of no value, and the uncertainty of support, and doubt of the capability of the country to maintain a large advancing force, as well as inaccurate information of the state of the roads, induced the Commanding Officer to pause at Gohati, and at one time to abandon all thoughts of prosecuting the campaign further in the season, notwithstanding the fairest prospect offered of expelling the Burmans altogether from Asam, even by the partial advance of the British force.

Mr. Scott, the political agent, having crossed from Sylhet through Jyntea,\* arrived at Noagong, in advance of the Brigadier on the 15th April, with a party of some strength. Leaving his escort under Captain Horsburgh to occupy Noagong, a town, or series of villages, extending twelve miles along the Brahmaputra, and which the Burmese had deserted, he traced a retrograde route to Gohati, to communicate with the head-quarters of the invading force. The  
Burmese

Burmese had retreated to their chief stockade at Moura Mukh, but finding that no steps were taken in pursuit of them, they, in the end of April, returned to Kaliabur. Colonel Richards was now, therefore, detached from Gohati with five companies of the 23d, and the flotilla, and having joined the Commissioner's escort at Noagong, he advanced to Kaliabur, a place on the left bank of the Brahmaputra, near the junction of the Kullung with that river. The Burmese stockaded at Hautbur, pursued their previous system of not waiting for an attack, but deserted it, and retired to Rangligher, a post at the distance of about eight hours' march. A small party, however, having returned to re-occupy the Hautbur stockade, were surprised by Lieutenant Richardson, with a resala of Horse, and a company of Infantry. The surprise was effectual. The enemy, in attempting to escape, fell upon the Horse, by whom about twenty were killed, besides a Phokun, or officer of rank.

Whilst the main body of the detachment continued at Kaliabur, a small party was left under Captain Horsburgh, in the stockade of Hautbur on the Kullung, at a short distance from its junction with the main stream. The Burmese exhibited, on this occasion, the only proof of enterprise, which they had yet displayed in the campaign in Asam, and advancing from their entrenchment at Rangligher, they attempted to cut off Captain Horsburgh and his division. Their advance was, however, seasonably ascertained, and arrested by the picquet, until the whole detachment could form. Upon Captain Horsburgh's approach with the Infantry, the Burmese fled, but the Irregular Horse, which had been sent into their rear, having intercepted the retreat of about two hundred, a great number of them were sabred on the spot, or drowned in crossing the Kullung. After this repulse, they abandoned the Rangligher stockade, and retrograded to Maura Mookh, where the chief force of the Burmese, now not exceeding one thousand men, was posted under the Governor of Asam. Colonel Richards having succeeded to the command, upon the death of Brigadier McMorine, of cholera, early in May, established his head-quarters at Kaliabur; but upon the setting in of the rains, it was found necessary to retire to Gohati, in order to secure the receipt of supplies. The operations of the first campaign in Asam were closed by a successful attack upon a stockade on the north bank of the Brahmaputra, by Captain Wallace: the enemy had time to escape, but the stockade was destroyed. The general result of the operations was decidedly favourable, and the British authority established over a considerable tract of country between Goalpara and Gohati. It is likely, however, that had an advance like that made by Colonel Richards in April, been authorised a few weeks sooner, the Burmese might have been expelled from a still greater portion of Asam; their force in this country never having been formidable, either in numbers or equipment.\*

In prosecution of the offensive system of operations, a powerful force was fitted out by the presidencies of Bengal and Madras, destined to reduce the islands on the Coast of Ava, and to occupy Rangoon, and the country at the mouth of the Irawadi river. The Bengal armament left the Hooghly in the beginning of April. Their further proceedings we shall, hereafter,

hereafter, notice in order to keep the course of them entire, and in the mean time shall terminate the military transactions on the British frontier.

It has been already noticed, that a large Burman force had been assembled in Aracan, under the command of the chief military officer of the state of Ava, Maha Mengee Bundoola, an officer who enjoyed a high reputation, and the entire confidence of the Court, and who had been one of the most strenuous advisers of the war, in the full confidence, that it would add a vast accession of power to his country and glory to himself. His head-quarters were established at Aracan, where, probably, from ten to twelve thousand Burmese assembled. Early in May, a division of this force crossed the Naf, and advanced to Rutnapullung, about fourteen miles south from Ramoo, where they took up their position, and gradually concentrated their force, to the extent of about eight thousand men, under the command of the four Rajas of Aracan, Ramree, Sandaway, and Cheduba, assisted by four of the inferior members of the Royal Council, or Atawoons, and acting under the orders of the Bundoola, who remained at Aracan.

Upon information being received of the Burmese having appeared, advancing upon Rutnapullung, Captain Noton moved from Ramoo with the whole of his disposable force to ascertain the strength and objects of the enemy.\* On arriving near their position, upon some hills on the left of the road, in which the Burmese had stockaded themselves, they opened a smart fire upon the detachment, which, however, cleared the hills, and formed upon a plain beyond them. In consequence, however, of the mismanagement of the elephant drivers, and the want of Artillery details, the guns accompanying the divisions, could not be brought into action, and as, without them, it was not possible to make any impression on the enemy, Captain Noton judged it prudent to return to his station at Ramoo, where he was joined by three companies of the 40th Native Infantry, making his whole force about one thousand strong, of whom less than half were regulars. With these, Captain Noton determined to await at Ramoo, the approach of the Burmese, until the arrival of reinforcements from Chittagong.

On the morning of the 13th of May, the enemy advanced from the south, and occupied, as they arrived, the hills east of Ramoo, being separated from the British force by the Ramoo river. On the evening of the 14th, they made a demonstration of crossing the river, but were prevented by the fire from the two six-pounders with the detachment. On the morning of the 15th, however, they effected their purpose, and crossed the river upon the left of the detachment, when they advanced, and took possession of a tank, surrounded, as well as other tanks in this situation, by a high embankment, which protected them from the fire of their opponents. Captain Noton drew up his force behind a bank about three feet high, completely surrounding the encampment. Upon his right hand, and about sixty paces in front to the eastward, was a tank, at which a strong picquet was posted, and his right flank was also protected by the river. On his left, and somewhat to the rear, was another tank, in which he stationed the Provincials and Mug Levy. The regular Sipahis were posted  
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with the six-pounders on his front, or along the eastern face of the embankment. From this face a sharp fire was kept upon the Burmese as they crossed the plain to the tank, but they availed themselves with such dexterity of every kind of cover, and so expeditiously entrenched themselves, that it was much less effective than was to have been expected.

Information having been received on the 15th, that the left wing of the Battalion of the 23d, N. I. had left Chittagong on the 13th, and its arrival being therefore looked for on the following day, Captain Noton was confirmed in his intention of remaining at his post, although the Burmese were in very superior numbers, and were evidently gaining ground. Several of the officers were wounded, and the Provincials had manifested strong indications of insubordination and alarm.

On the morning of the 16th, the Burmese, it was found, had considerably advanced their trenches. The firing was maintained on both sides throughout the day, but no important change in the relative position of the two parties was effected. The officer in command of the guns, however, was disabled, and it was with some difficulty, that the Provincials were intimidated from the desertion of their post; a retreat was still practicable, but a reliance upon the arrival of the expected reinforcement, unfortunately prevented the adoption of the only measure which could now afford a chance of preserving the lives of the officers and men.

On the morning of the 17th, the enemy's trenches were advanced within twelve paces of the picquets, and a heavy and destructive fire kept up by them. At about nine A. M. the Provincials and Mug Levy abandoned the tank entrusted to their defence, and it was immediately occupied by the enemy. The position being now untenable, a retreat was ordered, and effected with some regularity for a short distance. The increasing numbers and audacity of the pursuers, and the activity of a small body of Horse attached to their force, by whom the men that fell off from the main body were instantly cut to pieces, filled the troops with an ungovernable panic, which rendered the exertions of their officers to preserve order unavailing. These efforts, however, were persisted in, until the arrival of the party at a rivulet, when the detachment dispersed, and the Sipahis throwing away their arms and accoutrements, plunged promiscuously into the water.\* In the retreat, Captains Noton, Trueman, and Pringle, Lieutenant Grigg, Ensign Bennet, and Assistant Surgeon Maysmore were killed. The other officers engaged, Lieutenants Scott, Campbell, and Codrington, made their escape, but the two former were wounded: the loss in men was not ascertained, as many of them found their way after some interval, and in small numbers, to Chittagong: according to official returns, between six and seven hundred had reached Chittagong by the 23d May, so that the whole loss in killed and taken, did not exceed probably two hundred and fifty; many of those taken prisoners were sent to Ava, where they served to confirm the arrogant belief of the Court, in the irresistible prowess of their troops, and their anticipations of future triumph. The defeat of the detachment at Ramoo, was also the source of some uneasiness at Chittagong and Dacca, and even at Calcutta, although there was, in reality, no reasonable  
ground

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\* Documents Nos. 34, 35, 36, 37, 38.



ground of apprehension, except perhaps at the former station. All anxiety, however, was soon allayed, by the evident want of enterprise in the victors, and by confidence in the measures immediately taken to oppose the remote possibility of their further advance.\* Colonel Shapland was speedily re-inforced to an extent, that placed the frontier out of danger, had the Burmese shewn any inclination to prosecute their success. With exception, however, of an advance to Chekeria, whence they soon retrograded, the capture of the small post at Tek Naf, and an unsuccessful attempt to cut off the *Vestal*, cruizer, and the gun-boats in the river, the Burmese General undertook no other military operations in this quarter, and was shortly after recalled, with the most effective portion of his force, for the defence of the provinces of Ava. By the end of July, the Burmese abandoned all their positions to the north of the Naf.†

The absence of the British troops from Cachar, and the system of active operations, apparently adopted at this period by the Court of Ava, seem to have induced the Burmese to renew their invasion of that province. They advanced from Manipur, and resumed their position upon the heights of Talain, Doodpatlee, and Jatrapur. The force that occupied these positions, was estimated at about eight thousand men, and it was given out, that they formed the advance of an army of fifteen thousand, destined by the Court of Ava, to march upon the frontier in this direction.

In consequence of the apprehensions excited for the safety of Chittagong and Dacca, after the defeat at Ramoo, the force at Sylhet had, in the first instance, moved from the latter station, towards the south. The alarm having subsided, the movement was countermanded, and Colonel Innes returned to Sylhet on the 12th of June,‡ with the troops under his command, amounting to above twelve hundred men, with which he again proceeded to Cachar to expel the invaders, after resting a few days at Sylhet from the fatigues to which the period of the year, and the inundated state of the country, had exposed the troops. On the 20th June, Colonel Innes arrived at Bhadrapur, from whence he proceeded by water, along the Barak river, to Jatrapur, where, with considerable difficulty, he arrived on the 27th. On the route, an opportunity offered to reconnoitre the position of the enemy on the heights of Talain, where they were strongly stockaded, and it was determined to attempt to dislodge them from their post.§ With this view, part of the force was landed, and a battery of two howitzers, and four six-pounders, erected on a rising ground, about six hundred yards on the south-west of the stockade, which opened on the 6th July. As the guns, however, made but little impression at the distance at which they were placed, they were removed on the 7th, to an eminence nearer to the stockade, the occupation of which was spiritedly, though unsuccessfully, opposed by the enemy.¶ On the 8th, however, they assembled in force upon the heights, in rear of and commanding the battery, dislodging the party of Raja Gambhir Singh's men, who had been posted on the hills for its protection, and frustrating, by their superior numbers, an attempt made to turn their flank. It was therefore found necessary to bring off the

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\* Document No. 40.    † Do. Nos. 39 and 41.    ‡ Do. No. 42.    § Do. Nos. 43 and 44.    ¶ Do. No. 45.

the guns, and as the troops were exhausted by the fatiguing service they had undergone, and the season was becoming every day more unfavourable for military operations, it was determined to fall back to Jatrapur, to which the troops accordingly retired.\* The increasing sickness of the men, induced by constant exposure to the rain, in the midst of a country abounding with swamp and jungle, compelled a retreat to a more healthy situation, and the force was disposed along the river near to Bhadrapur, either in boats, or in elevated situations on the banks. The Burmese remained in their entrenchments, being, in fact, confined to them by the rise of the rivers, and no further movements took place on either side, during the continuance of the rains.

We have thus terminated the first period of the system of defensive operations, and shall now proceed to the more important enterprises of an offensive war, to which those we have noticed, were wholly subordinate. The results of the operations described, were of a mixed description ; but such as to leave no question of the issue of the contest. In Asam, a considerable advance had been made. In Cachar also, a forward position had been maintained, although the nature of the country, the state of the weather, and the insufficiency of the force, prevented the campaign from closing with the success with which it had begun. The disaster at Ramoo, although it might have been avoided, perhaps, by a more decided conduct on the part of the officer commanding, and would certainly have been prevented by greater promptitude, than was shewn, in the despatch of the expected reinforcements, reflected no imputation upon the courage of the regular troops, and, except in the serious loss of lives, was wholly destitute of any important consequences. In all these situations, the Burmese had displayed neither personal intrepidity, nor military skill. Their whole system of warfare resolved itself into a series of entrenchments, which they threw up with great readiness and ingenuity. Behind these defences, they sometimes displayed considerable steadiness and courage, but as they studiously avoided individual exposure, they were but little formidable in the field as soldiers. Neither was much to be apprehended from the generalship, that suffered the victory at Ramoo to pass away, without making the slightest demonstration of a purpose to improve a crisis of such splendid promise, and which restricted the fruits of a battle gained, to the construction of a stockade.

The difficulty of collecting a sufficient force for a maritime expedition from Bengal, owing to the repugnance which the Sipahis entertain to embarking on board vessels, where their prejudices expose them to many real privations, had early led to a communication with the Presidency of Fort Saint George, where there existed no domestic call for a large force, and where the native troops were likely to undertake the voyage without reluctance. The views of the Supreme Government were promptly met, and a considerable force was speedily equipped.

equipped. The like activity pervaded the measures of the Bengal authorities, and by the beginning of April, the whole was ready for sea.

The period of the year at which this expedition was fitted out, was recommended by various considerations of local or political weight. Agreeably to the information of all nautical men, a more favourable season for navigating the Coast to the eastward could not be selected, and from the account given by those who had visited Ava, it appeared, if the expedition, upon arriving at Rangoon, should be able to proceed into the interior without delay, the rising of the river, and the prevalence of a south-easterly wind, rendered June and July the most eligible months for an enterprise which could only be effected, it was asserted, by water conveyance.\* That no time should be lost in compelling the Burmese to act upon the defensive, was also apparent, as by the extent of their preparations in Aracan, Asam and Cachar, they were evidently manifesting a design to invade the frontier with a force, that would require the concentration of a large body of troops for the protection of the British provinces in situations, where mountains, streams, and forests, could not fail to exercise a destructive influence upon the physical energies of the officers and men, and would prevent the full developement of the military resources of the state. To have remained throughout the rains, therefore, wholly on the defensive, would have been attended, probably, with a greater expense, and, under ordinary circumstances, with a greater sacrifice of lives, than an aggressive movement, as well as with some compromise of national reputation. The armament, therefore, was equipped at once, and was not slow in realising some of the chief advantages expected from its operations.

The Bengal force was formed of his Majesty's 38th and 13th Regiments, of the 2d Battalion of the 20th (now 40th) Native Infantry, and two companies of European Artillery, amounting in all to two thousand, one hundred, and seventy-five fighting men. The Madras force, in two divisions, consisting of his Majesty's 41st and 89th Regiment, the Madras European Regiment, seven Battalions of Native Infantry, and four companies of Artillery, besides Gollandaz, Gun Lascars, and Pioneers, amounted altogether to nine thousand and three hundred fighting men, making a total of eleven thousand, four hundred, and seventy-five fighting men of all ranks, of whom nearly five thousand were Europeans. In addition to the transports, the Bengal force comprised a flotilla of twenty gun-brigs, and as many row-boats, carrying one eighteen-pounder each. The Bengal fleet was also accompanied by his Majesty's sloops, *Larne*, Capt. Marryatt, and *Sophie*, Captain Ryves, by several of the Company's cruisers, and the *Diana*, steam

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\* During the dry months of January, February, March, and April, the waters of the Irawadi subside into a stream that is barely navigable: frequent shoals, and banks of sand retard boats of burthen, and a northerly wind invariably prevails. *Symes*. 1. 24. In the months of June, July, and August, the navigation of the river would be impracticable, were it not counteracted by the strength of the south-west monsoon: assisted by this wind, and cautiously keeping within the eddies of the banks, the Burmans use their sails, and frequently make a more expeditious passage at this, than at any other season of the year. *Ibid*. 1. 128. See also Appendix, p. xliv. where it is said, that the internal trade from Bassein was carried on in boats of large size chiefly, which assembled about the end of April, ready to take advantage of the rise of the river, and the prevailing winds from the south. *Account of Bassein*.





steam boat. Major General Sir A. Campbell, K. C. B., was appointed to the command of the joint force, Colonel Macbean, with the rank of Brigadier General, commanded the Madras force, and Captain Canning accompanied the expedition as Political Agent and Joint Commissioner with the Commander in Chief. The Bengal expedition sailed from Saugar in the middle of April, for Port Cornwallis, in the Great Andamans, which was appointed the place of rendezvous for both divisions. The Bengal ships, after a somewhat tedious, but in all other respects most favourable passage, reached the rendezvous between the 25th and 30th April. They were joined on the 4th May by his Majesty's frigate the *Liffey*, Commodore Grant, and on the 6th by the *Slaney* sloop of war. The first division of the Madras ships sailed on the 16th April, and joined the Bengal fleet either at Port Cornwallis or on the voyage, and on the 5th May, such of the armament as had assembled commenced its progress towards Rangoon. The second division of the Madras force, left Madras on the 23d May, and joined at Rangoon in June and July. Further accessions to the force were received from the Madras Presidency in August and September; and by the end of the year, from Bengal, including a weak regiment of the line, His Majesty's 47th, and the Governor General's Body Guard, making the whole force engaged in the first campaign nearly thirteen thousand men.\* From the rendezvous at Port Cornwallis on the voyage to Rangoon, detachments severally under Brigadier McCreagh and Major Wahab, were sent against Cheduba and Negrais.

The expedition arrived off the mouth of the Rangoon river on the 9th, and stood into the river on the morning of the 10th, when the fleet came to anchor within the bar: on the following morning, the vessels proceeded with the flood to Rangoon, the *Liffey* and the *Larne* leading, and the *Sophie* bringing up the rear: no opposition was made to the advance of the fleet, nor did any force make its appearance, although a few shots were occasionally fired from either bank.

The town of Rangoon is situated on the northern bank of a main branch of the Irawadi, where it makes a short bend from east to west, about twenty-eight miles from the sea. It extends for about nine hundred yards along the river, and is about six or seven hundred yards wide in its broadest part: at either extremity extend unprotected suburbs, but the centre, or the town itself, is defended by an enclosure of Palisades ten or twelve feet high, strengthened internally by embankments of earth, and protected externally on one side by the river, and on the other three sides by a shallow creek or ditch, communicating with the river, and expanding at the western end into a morass crossed by a bridge. The Palisade incloses the whole of the town of Rangoon in the shape of an irregular parallelogram, having one gate in each of three faces, and two in that of the north: at the river gate is a landing place, denominated the King's wharf, in which situation the principal battery was placed, and opposite to which the *Liffey* came to anchor about two P. M. After a short pause, a fire was opened on the fleet, but was very soon silenced by the guns of the frigate. In the mean time, three detachments were landed from the transports

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\* Documents Nos. 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51.

ports of his Majesty's 38th Regiment, under Major Evans, above the town, and his Majesty's 41st, under Colonel McBean below it, whilst Major Sale, with the Light Infantry of the 13th, was directed to attack the river gate, and carry the main battery. These measures were successful. The Burmans fled from the advance of the troops, and in less than twenty minutes the town was in the undisputed possession of the British. Whilst the divisions were moving to the shore, Mr. Hough, an American Missionary, came on board the *Liffey*, accompanied by a native officer, having been deputed by the Raywoon to demand the object of the attack made upon the town, and intimating that, unless the firing ceased, the lives of the Europeans in confinement would be sacrificed. Any stipulation for terms of surrender was now, necessarily, of little avail, but assurances were given, that persons and property would be respected, and the release of the European prisoners, was insisted on, under menaces of severe retaliation, if they suffered any violence. The chief authorities of the town, however, were too much alarmed to await the return of their messengers, and abandoned the place before they relanded.\*

Upon taking possession of Rangoon, it was found to be entirely deserted. The news of the arrival of the fleet had scarcely reached the town, when the population began to depart, and to secrete themselves in the adjacent thickets. This desertion was, in a great measure, the effect of a universal panic, but it was promoted by the local authorities, in order to deprive their invaders of the resources of the population. The perseverance, however, with which the natives of the country submitted to the privations to which they were exposed in the jungle, during the heavy rains that ensued, clearly proved that the abandonment of their homes was, in a considerable measure, a voluntary act, emanating, not perhaps from any feeling of rancorous hostility, but a firm conviction, that the occupation of Rangoon by the invaders would be but temporary, and that to submit to their rule, would only involve themselves in that destruction to which they were devoted. However this may be, the absence of the population, and the impossibility of deriving any aid from their local experience and activity, were productive of serious inconvenience to the expedition, and more than any thing else disconcerted the expectations which had been formed of its immediate results.

One of the first objects of the British Commander on occupying the town, was the rescue of his countrymen and other christians, who were in confinement, and the party under Major Sale discovered, and released in the custom house two English traders, with an Armenian and a Greek, who had been left there in irons : seven other prisoners of this class had been carried away by the Burmans in their flight, but they were all liberated on the following morning by the detachment sent out from the town to reconnoitre the ground, who found them in different chambers where they had been secured, and forgotten by the Burman chiefs, in the confusion of their retreat.

The days immediately following the capture of Rangoon, were appropriated to the landing and disposition of the troops, who were posted in the town, in the great pagoda of Shwe-

Shwe-da-gon, about two miles and a half from the town, or on the two roads which, leading from each of the northern gates, gradually converge until they unite near the pagoda, leaving a tolerably open space between them. Parties of seamen from his Majesty's vessels, with detachments of the European Regiment were also employed in scouring the river, and to discover and destroy any armed boats or fire rafts, which it was thought likely the enemy would prepare. In one of these excursions, a stockade having been observed in course of construction at the village of Kemendine, about four miles distant from the town, it was attacked by the Grenadier Company of his Majesty's 38th, and the boats of the *Liffey*, and stormed with great intrepidity, although maintained by four hundred of the enemy, who behaved with considerable spirit, and, notwithstanding the strength of its defences, it was carried accordingly not without some loss. Lieutenant Kerr, of the 38th, was killed, and Lieutenant Wilkinson, R. N., who commanded the boats, was dangerously wounded : the enemy suffered still more severely, and left sixty killed in the stockade.\* Detachments were also sent in the interior, to endeavour to find and bring back the population ; but without success. On this occasion, parties of the Burmans were sometimes encountered, and skirmishes ensued, with invariably advantageous results to the invading force : measures were also adopted to collect boats and supplies as far as practicable, with the view to the ultimate advance into the interior. Some heavy falls of rain occurred in the latter part of May, and cover was provided for the troops with the least possible delay. They were cantoned chiefly along the two roads before mentioned, in the numerous pagodas and religious buildings, which connected the chief temple with the town. The Staff and different departments were placed in the town, whilst the terrace of the great pagoda was occupied by part of his Majesty's 89th Regiment and the Madras Artillery, and formed the key to the whole position. The Shwe-da-gon Pagoda stands upon a mound, to which the ascent is by eighty or a hundred stone steps, and the summit of which is about eight hundred yards square. Besides the central edifice, or the temple itself, a number of buildings, smaller shrines, or the habitations of the attending priests, chiefly of teak, and curiously carved and gilt, surmount the elevation, and formed not incommodious dwellings. It very soon appeared that there was little chance of quitting this position before the end of the rainy season, as the disappearance of the inhabitants rendered it impossible to provide and equip a flotilla necessary to proceed up the river, or to man it with rowers when equipped. The same circumstance, and the desolate state of the country, from which nothing in the shape of supplies was to be procured, rendered it equally certain, that both for the temporary occupation of Rangoon, and eventual march into the interior, the force was entirely dependant upon the Presidencies of Bengal and Madras, for every description of conveyance and food : a state of things which was little to have been expected, from the known commerce and supposed resources of Rangoon, and for which, accordingly, no previous preparation had been made.

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Whilst thus situated, the force at Rangoon was re-joined by the detachments which had been despatched against Cheduba and Negrais. The latter, a small island of about six miles in circumference, was found uninhabited, but the enemy having collected in some force on the opposite main land, and constructed a stockade, Major Wahab detached a part of his force against them. The first division, three companies of the 17th Regt. Madras N. I., having landed within a short distance of the enemy's entrenchment, the officer commanding determined to advance at once against them without waiting for support, and giving them time to prepare for the contest. Having carried a breast-work, which had been thrown up by the enemy, the party came upon a stockade, one angle of which being still open, they were able to direct their fire amongst those within it, supposed to amount to between seven and eight hundred men, who abandoned the defences after sustaining some loss. Having destroyed the stockade, and brought off the guns and ammunition found in it, Major Wahab re-embarked his men and sailed for Rangoon, being short of provisions, and not considering that any further advantage would be derived from the occupation of Negrais, or an advance to Bassein, the success of which was, in some degree, doubtful, from his comparative inferiority to the Burman force.\*

The capture of Cheduba, by the force under Brigadier McCreagh, was attended with more permanent results, and was more vigorously contested. The transports with the *Slaney*, sloop of war, collected off the mouth of the river leading to the chief town, on the night of the 12th of May, and early on the 14th, two hundred of his Majesty's 13th, and one hundred of the 20th Native Infantry, being embarked in such boats as could be assembled, proceeded up the river: about a mile up the river, the enemy were discovered in some force, on the northern bank, and as the headmost boat arrived upon their right flank, they opened a slight fire, on which the troops landed, and after a short contest, compelled them to retreat. They retired with some precipitation upon the village, and passing through it, gained a strong stockade at the further end. The guns were landed from the ships without delay, and a battery opened upon the gate-way by the 18th, the fire of which having much weakened the defences, Major Thornhill, with a company of the 13th, forced an entrance into the stockade, without much difficulty. After a short contest, in which their Commander was slain, the Burmans retreated by the opposite gate, leaving a great number killed. The loss of the assailants was inconsiderable. On the 19th, the Raja of Cheduba was taken by a reconnoitring party, and sent prisoner shortly afterwards to Calcutta: such of the Burman force as had been sent to his succour, and survived the late action, returned to the main land, and the people of Cheduba very readily submitted to the British rule. Brigadier McCreagh, therefore, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Hampton with his detachment of the 20th Native Infantry, and the sloop *Slaney*, for the protection of the island, proceeded with the European division to Rangoon, where he arrived on the 11th of June.†

Between

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\* Document No. 55. (B) (C) (D)

† Do. No. 57 (B)

Between this date and the attack of the Kemendine stockade, on the 10th of May, several engagements had taken place with the Burmans, who having received reinforcements, had been for some days closing upon the British lines, and entrenching themselves in their immediate vicinity, or concealed in the dense jungle that grew close to the posts, maintained a system of harassing attacks, cutting off stragglers, firing upon the piquets, and creating constant alarms by night as well as by day, which subjected the troops to much unnecessary and hurtful exposure and fatigue. In order to deter them from persisting in this mode of warfare, as well as more precisely to estimate their number and position, Sir Archibald Campbell marched out on the morning of the 28th May, with four companies of Europeans from his Majesty's 13th and 38th Regiments, two hundred and fifty Sipahis, one gun, and a howitzer, against the entrenchments in the vicinity of the Camp, which were supported, it was said, by a considerable body of troops under the command of the Governor of Shwedang. After passing and destroying three unfinished and undefended stockades, and exchanging a few shot with such of the enemy as shewed themselves from time to time in the jungle, the Artillery-men being exhausted with fatigue, the guns were sent back under escort of the Native Infantry, and Sir Archibald continued to advance with the Europeans, through rice fields, some inches under water, and in a heavy fall of rain. After a most fatiguing march of eight or ten miles, the enemy was discovered in great numbers at the village of Joazong, and defended in front by two stockades. The attack was immediately ordered, and the stockades were carried at the point of the bayonet, in the most daring and determined manner. A demonstration was then made of advancing against the Burman line, which immediately fell back, as if intending to retreat into the thicket, and, as it seemed doubtful if they could be brought to action, the detachment returned to the lines. The loss they sustained was severe. Lieutenant Howard, of the 13th, was killed, and Lieutenants Mitchell and O'Halloran, severely wounded, each subsequently losing a leg by amputation. The enemy was said to have left three hundred dead in the stockades, in which the conflict was maintained for some time man to man.\* Brigadier General Mac Bean, with two regiments and some howitzers, was sent out on the following morning to the same spot, to see if he could again fall in with the Burman force, but they had disappeared, and the stockades remained deserted. On the following day, a party of the enemy were driven with some loss from a stockade in the jungle, not far from the Shwe-da-gon pagoda, by the Light Company of the 38th, under Major Piper, and on the same day a detachment, under Col. Godwin, was sent against Siriam, which fort was found, on the opposite side of the Pegu river, abandoned.

The strongest position occupied by the Burmans, at this time, was at Kemendine, upon the river, nearly two miles above the post called, also, the Kemendine stockade, from which they were driven on the 10th of May. At this place the Burmans had erected one main stockade of unusual strength and extent, whilst in the vicinity there were several others, more or less elaborately constructed. In order to remove them from the position, two columns

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\* Document No. 55 (A)

of the Madras force, one under Lieutenant-colonel Hodgson, and the other under Lieutenant-colonel Smith, marched on the 3d of June from the Shwe-da-gon pagoda, to attack the post by land, whilst Sir Archibald Campbell proceeded up the river with two cruizers, and three companies of his Majesty's 41st. The vessels advanced abreast of the entrenchment, and the troops landed and burnt the village. The land columns arrived in the vicinity of the stockade after a very harrassing march, but as they moved through the thicket within gun shot, they were mistaken for a body of Burmans, and received a heavy cannonade, which occasioned some loss, and disconcerted the troops, so that they could not be afterwards led to the attack : the force therefore was obliged to return without accomplishing the object for which it had marched.\*

Previous to the attack upon this post, two Burmans, of inferior rank, had come into Rangoon, stating that they were sent to ascertain the objects of the British, by the newly appointed Meywoon, or Viceroy, who was at Kemendine with the Governor of Prome : as they could produce no credentials, it was supposed that they were merely spies ; but they were civilly treated, and sent back. On the 5th of June, two other messengers arrived to announce the proposed mission of other officers of high rank, two of whom, whose attendants, and gilt umbrellas, indicated them to be personages of consequence, came down to Rangoon in two war boats ; the senior had been the Woon of Bassein, but was now a personal attendant, on the King. They were received by the Commander in Chief and Political Commissioner, and stated that they were deputed by the Thekia Woongyee, recently nominated Viceroy of Pegu, and then at Donabew, to which they invited Sir Archibald Campbell, or Major Canning, to repair, expressing themselves willing to remain as hostages for their return. As such a proposal, however, could not be listened to, and it appeared, that the Thekia Woongyee could do no more than forward the result of the conferences, supposing him sincere in wishing to open them, to the Court, it was stated in reply, that the Commissioner would be content with an opportunity of forwarding despatches to Ava : to this the Deputies engaged to obtain the Viceroy's assent, and promised to return with it on the 15th. As, however, they did not repeat their visit, it seems probable, that their only object was to gain time, and suspend the British operations until the force assembling at Donabew should be ready to act. If such was their object, it was disappointed, and on the 10th of July, a strong force was sent once more against Kemendine and the stockades inland, between it and the great pagoda.

The force destined for this service, consisting of nearly three thousand men, with four eighteen-pounders, and four mortars, moved from the lines on the morning of the 10th of June, under the Commander in Chief, whilst two divisions of vessels proceeded up the river to attack the stockade in that direction. On the march, the land columns came upon a strong stockade, about two miles from the town : in front, the palisades were from twelve to fourteen feet high, strengthened by cross bars and railing of great solidity ; on the other three sides, it was protected

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by the denseness of the surrounding jungle : it was invested on three sides, and a breach being made in front by the fire of the two eighteen pounders, the Madras European Regiment, supported by his Majesty's 41st, made good their entrance, whilst, at the same time, the advanced companies of the 13th and 38th, clambered over the palisadoes on another side, and co-operated in clearing the entrenchment.\* The enemy fled into the thicket, but they left one hundred and fifty dead, including a chief of some rank, as indicated by his golden chattah. Several of the British officers and soldiers distinguished themselves by their personal prowess on this, and on similar occasions, being engaged repeatedly in single combat with their antagonists in the melé that followed the storm of a stockade. Before the Burmans had learned to appreciate the valour of those with whom they had to contend, these conflicts were of necessity sanguinary ; for, unaccustomed to civilised warfare, they neither gave nor expected to receive quarter ; and whenever, therefore, unable to escape, they rushed desperately upon the bayonets of their assailants, and often provoked their death by treacherously attempting to effect that of the soldiers by whom they had been overcome and spared.

After carrying this post, the force moved forward to the river, where it came upon the chief stockade, which was immediately invested. The left of the line communicated with the flotilla, but the right could not be sufficiently extended to shut in the entrenchment completely between it and the river, in consequence of the enemy having thrown up other works beyond the stockade. By four o'clock, the troops were in position in a thick jungle, and no time was lost in bringing the guns to bear. Notwithstanding a heavy fall of rain, batteries were erected during the night, and opened at day-light on the 11th : after a cannonade of two hours, a party advancing to observe the breach, found that the enemy had evacuated the stockade, carrying with them their dead and wounded. The immediate contiguity and thickness of the jungle, enabled them to effect their retreat unobserved. The stockade of Kemendine, commanding the river between it and the town, and connecting the head of the British line, the Shwe-da-gon pagoda with the river, secured the latter from being turned, or the town of Rangoon from being threatened in that direction, and it was therefore occupied by a small European detail, and a battalion of Native Infantry. The Burmese, after the capture of their post, retired for a while from the immediate vicinity of the British lines, and continued to concentrate their forces at Donabew.

In the short interval of comparative tranquillity that ensued between this date and the renewal of active operations, the British authorities had leisure to consider the position in which they were placed. An advance up the river, whilst either bank was commanded by the enemy in such formidable numbers and by strong entrenchments, was wholly out of the question, as, although conveyance for the troops and ordnance had been provided, the impossibility of deriving supplies from the country was undeniable, and it was equally impracticable to maintain a communication with Rangoon. It was clearly necessary, therefore, to begin by annihilating the force immediately opposed to the invading army, before any advance could be attempted.

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\* Document No. 57.

attempted. But this was not so easy a task as was to have been anticipated from the superior organisation and valour of the British army. In the field, the enemy were as little able as inclined to face the British force, but their dexterity and perseverance in throwing up entrenchments, rendered their expulsion from these an undertaking, that involved a loss of time, and sacrifice of lives, and the country and seasons stood them in the stead of discipline and courage. The vicinity of Rangoon, except about the town or along the main road, was covered with swamp or jungle, through which the men were obliged to wade knee-deep in water, or force their way through harassing and wearisome entanglements. The rains had set in, and the effects of a burning sun were only relieved by the torrents that fell from the accumulated clouds, and which brought disease along with their coolness. Constantly exposed to the vicissitudes of a tropical climate, and exhausted by the necessity of unintermitted exertion, it need not be matter of surprise, that sickness now began to thin the ranks, and impair the energies of the invaders. No rank was exempt from the operation of these causes, and many officers, amongst whom were the senior naval officer, Captain Marryatt, the Political Commissioner, Major Canning, and the Commander in Chief himself, were attacked with fever during the month of June. Amongst the privates, however, the use of spirituous liquor, and the want of a sufficient supply of fresh meat and vegetables, the consequence of the unexpected flight of the inhabitants of the town, which threw the force wholly upon their sea stock for sustenance, augmented the malignant influence of the climate, and crowded the hospitals with the sick: fever and dysentery were the principal maladies, and were no more than the ordinary consequences of local causes; but the scurvy and hospital gangrene, which also made their appearance, were ascribable as much to depraved habits and inadequate nourishment, as to fatigue and exposure. They were also latterly, in some degree, the consequences of extreme exhaustion, forming a peculiar feature of the prevailing fever, which bore an epidemic type, and which had been felt with equal severity in Bengal. The fatal operation of these causes was enhanced by their continuance, and towards the end of the rainy season, scarcely three thousand men were fit for active duty. The arrival of adequate supplies, and more especially the change of the monsoon, restored the force to a more healthy condition.\*

Although, however, the proportion of the sick was a serious deduction from the available force, it was not such as to render it unequal to offensive operations altogether, or inadequate to repel, in the most decisive manner, the collected assault of the Burman force that had been  
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\* A correct notion of the extent of the prevailing sickness, may be formed from the following statement of a competent observer. "During June, July, August, September, and October, the average monthly admissions into hospital from the Artillery, was sixty-five Europeans, and sixty-two Natives, being nearly one-third of the greatest numerical strength of the former, and one-fourth of the latter; and large as was this number, I am assured, that it was considerably less, in proportion, than that which was exhibited by any European Regiment, in either division of the army. The aggregate number in hospital, during the whole fourteen months, to which this account is limited, was six hundred and five Europeans, and six hundred and eighty-seven Natives, a large proportion being made up of re-admissions for dysentery. Of the former, forty-nine died, including twelve, who died in the field hospitals of Rangoon and Mergui, or a fraction less than one in twelve and half. Amongst the latter, thirty-four deaths occurred, or something less than one in twenty. On the setting in of the cold season, the general sickness began to decline, and from January to July, 1825, it was comparatively moderate." On the diseases prevailing amongst the British troops at Rangoon. By G. Waddell, M. D. Transactions of the Medical and Physical Society of Calcutta, vol. 3d.

some time assembling in its vicinity. During the month of June, several affairs of minor importance occurred, and on the first July, the only general action in which the troops had yet been engaged, took place.

On receiving intelligence of the occupation of Rangoon by the British armament, the Court of Ava was far from feeling any apprehension or alarm : on the contrary, the news was welcomed as peculiarly propitious : the destruction of the invaders was regarded as certain, and the only anxiety entertained was, lest they should effect a retreat before they were punished for their presumption. \* Notwithstanding the unseasonable period of the year, therefore, orders were sent to collect as large a force as possible to surround and capture the British, and one of the chief officers of state, the Thakia Woongyee, was dispatched to assume the command. The result of these arrangements was little calculated to inspire the Court of Ava with confidence in its officers or men.

On the morning of the 1st of July, the Burman force was observed in motion : the main body drew up upon the left of the British lines in front of the Kemendine stockade, and Shwe-da-gon Pagoda, but they were screened from observation by the intervening thicket, and their disposition and strength could not be ascertained. Three columns, each of about 1000 men, moved across to the right of the line, where they came in contact with the piquets of the 7th and 22d Regiments of Madras Native Infantry, which steadily maintained their ground against these superior numbers. The enemy then penetrated between the piquets, and occupied a hill, whence they commenced an ineffective fire on the lines, but were speedily dislodged by three companies of the 7th and 23d Regiments M. N. I., with a gun and howitzer, under Captain Jones, and the personal direction of the Commander-in-Chief : after a short but effective fire, the Sipahis were ordered to charge, which they did with great steadiness, and the enemy immediately broke and fled into the jungle. The body in front of the head of the lines apparently awaited the effect of this attack, and fell back immediately on its failure : part of the force re-crossing the river, a considerable division entered the town of Dalla opposite to Rangoon, where Lieutenant Isaack, of the 8th M. N. I., in command of the post, was shot, as he advanced to drive them out : the town of Dalla was, in consequence, destroyed.\*

The check sustained by the Burmans on the 1st had not altered their plans, and they continued gathering strength in front of the lines and giving constant annoyance. It again, therefore, became necessary to repel them to a greater distance, and on the 8th, a column, about twelve hundred strong, under Brigadier General Macbean, moved out to operate by land, whilst Brigadier General Sir A. Campbell, with another division of eight hundred, proceeded by water. The boats with the *Larne* and several of the Company's cruisers advanced to a place where the Lyne river, or branch of the Irawadi, falls into the Rangoon branch, and at the point of their junction, termed Pagoda-point, they found the enemy strongly posted. The main entrenchment was constructed on the projecting tongue of land at the junction of the two rivers, whilst

stockades

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\* Document No. 58.

stockades on the opposite bank of either stream commanded the approach, and afforded mutual support. Notwithstanding these formidable dispositions, the post was soon carried. A breach having been effected by the fire of the vessels, a gun-brig, and three cruisers, under the command of Captain Marryat, of the Royal Navy, the troops consisting of the Madras Infantry, supported by part of his Majesty's 41st and the Madras European Regiment, landed and stormed the first stockade: the second was carried by escalade, and the enemy abandoned the third. Brigadier General Macbean, supported by Brigadier McCreagh, was equally successful. He advanced to Kamroot, about six miles from Rangoon, a short way inland from Pagoda-poifit, and, notwithstanding the fatigue they had undergone, the troops under his command, headed by the 13th and 38th, under Majors Sale and Frith, maintained the character they had already so well earned for desperate valour, and captured, in rapid succession, seven strong stockades. The enemy, driven from the inferior defences, fell back upon the central position, consisting of three strong entrenchments within each other, in the innermost of which Thamba Woongyee, who commanded, had taken his station, and endeavoured to animate his men to resistance, not only by his exhortations, but example. This conduct, so contrary to the usual practice of the Burman Chiefs, who are rarely even present in an engagement which they direct, was equally unavailing, and served only to add his death to that of his followers. Another leader of rank fell also on this occasion, in a personal contest with Major Sale, who, in every attack, had distinguished himself by his personal intrepidity, and who engaged in this encounter to rescue a soldier, who had fallen beneath the sword of the Burman Chief, and was about to become the victim of his revenge. The capture of so many stockades by so inferior a force, and without any assistance from artillery, was an achievement unsurpassed during the war, and first made a profound impression upon the minds of the enemy, who henceforward learnt to think themselves insecure within the strongest defences. The business was accomplished also with a trifling loss on the part of the assailants, whilst eight hundred of the Burmans were left dead in the stockade, and numbers of their wounded were left to perish in the surrounding jungle, or the adjacent villages.\*

The inundated state of the country, now precluded the possibility of undertaking any movements of importance, but the period was not suffered to pass unimproved. Information being received of the assemblage of a force at Kykloo, Sir A. Campbell despatched a column of one thousand and two hundred men against them by land, on the 19th July, whilst he himself, with six hundred more, proceeded up the Puzendown creek in boats to the same point. The land column was unable to make good its advance, and the division by water, deprived of its expected co-operation, returned to head-quarters, having on the way seen only a few flying parties of the enemy, and liberated several families, inhabitants of Rangoon. It was satisfactory also, to find an indication of reviving confidence in the appearance of the population of the villages, who, although they had fled on the advance of the detachment, gathered courage to return to their homes, by the time of its return, and saluted it as it passed.†

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\* Documents Nos. 58 and 59.

† Do. No. 60.

The head man of the district of Sirian, near the junction of the Pegu with the Rangoon river, having collected, in obedience to the orders of his Government, a considerable force, and being actively engaged in constructing works to command the entrance into the river, the Commander-in-Chief undertook to dislodge him, and embarked on the 4th of August, on board a flotilla for that purpose, with about six hundred men, consisting of part of his Majesty's 41st, the Madras European Regiment, and 12th Madras Infantry, under the command of Brigadier Smelt. The Burmans, it was found, had taken post within the walls of the old Portuguese fortified factory at Sirian, having cleared the jungle from its surface, filled up the chasms with palisades, and mounted guns upon the ramparts. As the troops advanced to storm, they were received with a brisk fire, but the enemy had not resolution to await an escalade. They fled towards a Pagoda in the vicinity, and were pursued by a detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Kelly. The Pagoda also was guarded and mounted with guns, but after a hasty fire, its defenders abandoned the post with precipitation, leaving the assailants in possession of the temple.\*

Reports having reached Sir A. Campbell, that much dissatisfaction had been excited in the district of Dalla, by the orders of the Court for a general conscription, a force of four hundred men was embarked under Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, and despatched on the 8th of August, to take advantage of any opportunity that might offer of giving support to the discontented. The party entered a large creek, about two miles from the mouth of which they came upon a couple of stockades, one on either bank, which they landed to storm. In consequence of the difficulty of getting through the mud, they were exposed for some time to the enemy's fire, and suffered some loss. Here, however, as in the preceding instance, the entrenchments were carried as soon as the escalade was attempted, and the Burmans immediately fled into the neighbouring jungle.†

In the begining of August, Major Canning, the Political Agent, who had been some time ill of fever, went on board the *Nereide*, in order to return to Bengal for the recovery of his health: he died shortly after his arrival in Calcutta.

In the impossibility that existed of engaging in any active operations in the direction of Ava, it was judged advisable to employ part of the force in reducing some of the maritime provinces of the Burman kingdom. The district of Tenasserim, comprising the divisions of Tavai and Mergui, was that selected for attack, as containing a valuable tract of sea coast, as well as being likely to afford supplies of cattle and grain. Accordingly, an expedition was detached against those places, consisting of details of his Majesty's 89th and the 7th Madras Native Infantry, with several cruizers and gun-brigs, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Miles. They sailed from Rangoon on the 20th August, and reached the mouth of the river leading to Tavai, on the 1st September: some difficulty occurred in working up the river, in consequence of which, the vessels arrived off the town only on the eighth. A conspiracy amongst the gar-  
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\* Document No. 62.

† Do. No. 63.



risson facilitated the capture of the place, the second in command making the Maiwoon and his family prisoners, delivered them to the British officer, and the town was occupied without opposition. At Mergui, whither the armament next proceeded, and where it arrived on the 6th October, a more effective resistance was offered: a heavy fire was opened from the batteries of the town, which was returned by the cruisers with such effect, as to silence it in about an hour. The troops then landed, and after wading through miry ground between the river and a strong stockade, which defended the town, and being exposed to a brisk fire from the enemy, they advanced to the stockade, and escalated in the most gallant style. The enemy fled. The town, when first occupied, was deserted, but the people soon returned, and both here and at Tavai, shewed themselves perfectly indifferent to the change of authorities. After leaving a sufficient garrison of the Native troops and part of the flotilla, Colonel Miles returned with the European portion of his division to Rangoon in November, in time to take a part in the more important operations about to occur.

In the end of August, and throughout September, nothing of any importance took place: the Burmese continued in force about Pagoda-point and in the Dalla province, and were evidently only waiting till the country should be more practicable for some important enterprise. In the mean time they were engaged in perpetual night attacks upon the piquets, whose musquets they frequently contrived to carry off, and on two occasions, a considerable body of chosen men, designated as the Invulnerables, made an attack upon the piquet of the Shwedagon Pagoda, but were repulsed with loss. An attempt was also made in the beginning of September, to cut off three gun-brigs stationed in the Dalla creek, and a number of war-boats attacked them at eleven at night, the crews of which were engaged in boarding, when a re-inforcement of row-boats arrived, and drove off the assailants. Five of the enemy's boats were captured. The men serving as marines on board the gun-brigs, behaved with great steadiness, and received the Burmans, as they attempted to board, at point of the bayonet. Towards the end of September, a detachment was sent under Brigadier General Fraser to Panlang, by which a post of the enemy at that place was taken and destroyed.\*

The beginning of September was marked by a failure, on our part, of some magnitude. This occurred against the post of the enemy at Kykloo, fourteen miles from Rangoon. Colonel Smith was detached against this place, on the 5th of October, with eight hundred Madras Native Infantry, two howitzers, and forty Pioneers. On the first day's march, the division came upon a stockade at Tdaghee, which they carried, although not without some loss. Information was here received, that the strength of the enemy at Kykloo was greater than had been anticipated, and Colonel Smith applied for re-inforcements, and especially for a small body of Europeans: three hundred of the 20th and 30th Madras Infantry, and two other howitzers, were directed to re-inforce him, but no Europeans joined the division. On the 8th of October, the force arrived in the vicinity of the stockades, and carried a succession of breast works,

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\* Documents Nos. 64, 65, 66, 67, and 68.

works, thrown across the road, which delayed their approach to the main position, an entrenchment resting on an eminence on its right, which was crowned by a fortified Pagoda. As the storming party, conducted by Major Wahab, advanced to escalade, a round of cannon was fired from the Pagoda, but the troops in the stockade reserved their fire until the assailants were within fifty or sixty yards: they then poured down volleys of grape and musketry, with an effect and regularity till then unequalled, by which Major Wahab, with the leading officers and men were knocked down, and the rest so panic-struck, that they lay down to evade the fire. As the evening was too far advanced to allow of repairing the evil, Colonel Smith ordered a retreat. Upon the first fire from the Pagoda, a detachment had been directed to attack, but it was found too strongly stockaded, and the discomfiture in this quarter, adding to the alarm already excited by the repulse from before the stockade, completely banished all regard for discipline, and the whole of the troops retreated in a confused and indiscriminate mass to a plain at the foot of the rising ground of Kykloo. The second division of the force, which had been detached into the jungle, hearing the retreat sounded, came back in good order, and in time to cover the retreat of the fugitives. The detachment being again formed, proceeded without molestation to Tadaghee, carrying with them their wounded. The loss, on this occasion, was twenty-one killed, and seventy-four wounded; amongst the former were Captain Allen and Lieutenant Bond, and amongst the latter Major Wahab, Captain Moncrieff, and Lieutenants Campbell, Chalon, and Lindesay.\*

As a counterpoise for this temporary discomfiture, complete success attended an expedition directed at the same time against the post of Thantabain, at the junction of the Lyne river, or branch, to which the Prince of Tharawadi, the favorite brother of the King of Ava, who had been latterly sent with very considerable re-inforcements from the capital, had pushed forward some of his army. Instructions were also circulated by him to the heads of the districts, to assemble every inhabitant capable of bearing arms, and either to join him, or take up such positions as should prevent a single man of the 'wild foreigners,' as he termed the British, from effecting their escape. They were also to block up the passage of the river, so as to render the retreat of the flotilla equally impracticable. The Prince's head quarters were fixed at Donabew, but the advance division of his army, under the first Minister of state, the Kyec Woongyee, was posted at Thantabain, against which Major Evans was sent, with three hundred of his Majesty's 38th, and one hundred of the 18th Madras Native Infantry, a detachment of Bengal Artillery, and a division of gun-boats; the flotilla being under Captain Chads, of his Majesty's Ship *Arachne*, who had joined the expedition at Rangoon, relieving the *Larne*, of which the crew was completely disabled by sickness. The force sailed on the 5th of October, proceeding up the Lyne river, and skirmishing as they advanced with the war-boats of the enemy, and flying parties on the bank. One war-boat, carrying a gun, was captured on the 6th, two stockades were taken, and seven war-boats destroyed

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\* Document No. 69.

on the 7th, and on the same day, the force arrived opposite to the village of Thantabain, which was defended by three breast-works of large beams, and by a flotilla of fourteen war-boats, each carrying a gun. After the exchange of a brisk fire the troops were landed, and the work carried with little resistance. On the following morning, the principal stockade was attacked, and, notwithstanding its unusual strength, carried without a struggle.\* It was two hundred yards long, and one hundred and fifty broad, built of solid timber, fifteen feet high, with an interior platform, five feet broad and eight feet from the ground, upon which a number of wooden guns, and shot, and jinjals were found, whilst below, were seven pieces of iron and brass ordnance; the entrenchment was strengthened by outworks, and altogether was capable of containing two thousand men. In the centre of the stockade was found a magnificent bungalow, the residence of the Kyee Woongyee, who, as well as the Thakia Woongyee, was present at the commencement of the action. The bungalow was found perforated, in many places, by the shot from the vessels. Only seventeen bodies were discovered in the stockade, although the enemy's loss must have been more considerable. For some time past, however, the Burmans had made it their practice to carry off their dead and wounded, wherever an opportunity occurred. The British detachment returned to head-quarters without the loss of a man, not having had, in fact, any opposition to encounter beyond the ineffective fire of the ill-constructed and worse-managed artillery of the Burman force. The absence of opposition, notwithstanding the strength of the post, and the encouraging presence of officers of high rank, clearly showed the impression made upon the Burmans by the intrepidity of the British troops. The first lessons they received, were finally confirmed by the daring escalade of the seven stockades at Kamaroot, on the 8th July, by the troops under Brigadier Macbean, and from that moment, although they might be induced to keep up a fire from behind their palisades, and to evince considerable determination against the Sipahis alone, they never offered any effective opposition to British troops in the storm, and rarely, if ever, awaited the consequence of an escalade.

Nor were the Burmans suffered to indulge in the idea of the impregnability of the Kykloo stockades, as, on the same day that Colonel Smith's detachment returned to head quarters, Brigadier M'Creagh was sent, with a combined force of Europeans and Natives, to attack the post. He arrived at the entrenchments on the 11th, but the enemy had deserted them, and fallen back to one said to be of still greater strength. Colonel M'Creagh, accordingly, advanced, and overtook the Burman force in their entrenchments at a considerable village, but they again fled and dispersed in all directions, after setting the village and stockade on fire. After further destroying the works, the detachment returned to Kykloo, and thence to Rangoon. On their advance, they had an opportunity of witnessing the barbarous character of the enemy, many of the bodies of the Sipahis and Pioneers, who fell in the former attack, having been fastened to the trunks of trees, and mangled and mutilated by imbecile and savage exasperation.†

During

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\* Document No. 70. (C) (D)

† Do. No. 70. (A) (B)

During the rest of October and November, the troops enjoyed a state of comparative repose, and this interval, together with the gradual approach of a more healthy season, and improved supplies, contributed materially to diminish the number of sick, and to preserve the health of those who had hitherto escaped. The force was therefore gathering vigour, for the renewal of active operations. On their side, the Burmans were not idle. The successive capture of the strongest stockades, the discomfiture of every attack, and the prolonged occupation of Rangoon, had begun, in the estimation of the Burmese themselves, to change the character of the war, and to inspire the Court of Ava with uneasiness and alarm. Ascribing however the impunity of the invaders to the want of energy in their generals, rather than to any inferiority in arms, the Court still looked with some confidence to the effect of the measure which had been adopted at an early period, of recalling the Bundoola, and his victorious army from Aracan. That chief, as we have already noticed, withdrew his troops from Ramoo in July and sending his army in detached parties across the mountain towards Sembewghewn and Prome, with instructions to assemble at Donabew, repaired to Ava to receive the rewards and commands of his Prince. No pains nor expence were spared to equip this favourite general for the field, and by the approach of the season for active operations, it was estimated that fifty thousand men were collected for the advance upon Rangoon, who were to exterminate the invaders, or carry them captives to the capital, where the chiefs were already calculating on the number of slaves who were, from this source of supply, to swell their train. Reports of the return of the Aracan army soon reached Rangoon, but some period elapsed before any certainty of its movements was obtained. By the end of November, an intercepted despatch from the Bundoola to the governor of Martaban, removed all doubt, and announced the departure of the former from Prome, at the head of a formidable host. His advance was hailed with delight, and preparations were made immediately for his reception.

Before we advert, however, to the results of the conflict, it will be convenient to notice some other occurrences which took place in the interval, connected with the general course of the war in this direction.\* In the course of September, the Company's cruizer *Hastings*, stationed off Cheduba, had made several reconnoissances of the large and neighbouring island of Ramree, and cut off several of the enemy's war-boats. In the beginning of October, Lieut. Colonel Hampton, commanding on Cheduba, detached a party of two hundred men, who, with a part of the crew of the *Hastings*, landed on the island and destroyed some stockades: nothing further was attempted. A more important measure was the capture of Martaban by Colonel Godwin, who was detached on this duty in the end of October, with part of his Majesty's 41st Foot, the 3d Regiment of M. N. Infantry, and Madras Artillery, under convoy of his Majesty's ships *Arachne* and *Sophia*. They reached Martaban on the 29th November: the place was found to be of considerable strength, and was, at first, warmly defended by Maha Udina, the governor, a bold and active chief. After a mutual cannonade, the troops were landed under

\* Documents Nos. 72 and 73.

under a heavy fire from the enemy, who, as usual, did not await the effects of the storm, but evacuated the entrenchments as soon as the British entered. The town was at first deserted, but the inhabitants, chiefly Taliens or natives of Pegu, gradually returned, and the post was occupied by a British detachment throughout the remainder of the war.\* Towards the end of November also, Lieut.-Colonel Mallett was detached to display the British flag in old Pegu, which was effected without opposition, and the division returned to head quarters in time to take a part in the brilliant operations of the ensuing month.

The concentrated effort to which the energies and expectations of the Government of Ava had been, for some time, directed, was at length made, and the first half of December was the season of a series of operations which shewed, by the perseverance of the Burman generals, how much they had at stake. The grand army, which had been sedulously forming along the course of the Irawadi, and which had been gradually approaching the British lines, now ventured seriously to invest them. The force was now estimated at 60,000 men, of whom more than half were armed with musquets, the rest with swords and spears; a considerable number of jinjals, carrying balls of from six to twelve ounces, and a body of seven hundred Casay Horse, were attached to the force, whilst a numerous flotilla of war-boats and fire-rafts proceeded along the stream. No opposition was made to the advance of the enemy to the immediate proximity of Rangoon, which took place on the 1st December, and encouraged by this seeming timidity, as well as inspired by the confidence that they were now to exterminate their invaders, they formed a regular investment of the British lines, extending in a semicircle from Dalla, opposite to Rangoon, round by Kemendine and the great Pagoda, to the village of Puzendown on the creek communicating with the Pegu branch of the river, their extreme right being thus opposite to the town on one side, and their extreme left approaching it on the other, within a few hundred yards. In many places, their front was covered by thick jungle, but where it was more assailable, the Burmans entrenched themselves with their usual dexterity, throwing up these defences within a couple of hundred yards of the piquets.

The British force, reduced by sickness, and by the casualties of the service, was far from adequate to the defence of the position they occupied: their numerical insufficiency was, however, compensated by their superior skill and valour, whilst the openings in the lines were covered by the judicious disposition of the artillery, in batteries and redoubts along the assailable front. The shipping protected Rangoon, and the position on the river side, whilst the extreme left was defended by the post at Kemendine, supported on the river by his Majesty's sloop *Sophie*, and a strong division of gun-boats.

The operations on the part of the enemy were commenced on the morning of the 1st of December, by a resolute attack on the post of Kemendine, which was met with equal vigour, and repulsed by the garrison and flotilla, the former under Major Yates, of the Madras Service, the latter under the Commander of the *Sophie*, Capt. Ryves. Repeated attacks were  
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made during the day, but with invariably the same results, and a bold attempt after dark to direct fire-rafts of formidable construction down the stream against the shipping of Rangoon, was frustrated by the skill and intrepidity of the British seamen.

In the afternoon of the 1st, a reconnoissance was made of the enemy's left, by a Detachment of his Majesty's 13th, and the 18th Madras Native Infantry, under Major Sale, which broke through their entrenchments, and after killing a number of the enemy, and destroying their works, returned loaded with military spoil. In the evening of the same day, two companies of the 38th, under Major Piper, drove back a considerable force, which was approaching inconveniently near to the north-east angle of the great Pagoda, and on the following morning a party was dislodged from a commanding situation in front of the north gate of the Pagoda, by Capt. Wilson, with two companies of the 38th, and a Detachment of the 28th Madras Native Infantry. With these exceptions, and the reply to the enemy's fire by the artillery, nothing was attempted for a few days, in order to encourage the Burman Generals to trust themselves completely within the reach of the British army.

Between the first and the fifth of December, the Burmans accordingly advanced their entrenchments with incessant activity close to the principal points of the British lines. On the north of the great Pagoda, they occupied some high ground within musquet shot, separated from the temple by the reservoir, known by the name of the Scotch tank. They thence formed at a right angle, facing the eastern front of the temple, to the vicinity of a morass, beyond which their lines proceeded parallel with those of the British, nearly to the Puzendoun creek, and at their southern extremity, within gun-shot of Rangoon. From these positions, they kept up a constant fire upon the Pagoda and the advanced piquets, and made it dangerous for the men to shew themselves beyond the defences. On the opposite side of the river, they cannonaded the shipping with little intermission, whilst at the post of Kemendine, scarcely any respite was given to the garrison, and frequent fire-rafts were launched against the vessels in the river. Little harm was effected by this shew of activity, but as the Burman force could no longer be permitted to harass the troops with impunity, and it was now impossible for them to escape from the consequences of a defeat, the Commander-in-Chief resolved to become the assailant, and terminate the expectations in which they had hitherto been permitted to indulge.\*

With this view, on the 5th December, a division of the Flotilla and gun-boats, under Captain Chads, was ordered up the Puzendoun creek, which cannonaded the enemy in flank, and drew off their attention in that quarter: at the same time two columns of attack were formed to advance from the Rangoon side, one eight hundred strong, under Major Sale, and the other of five hundred, under Major Walker, of the Madras service. A party of the Governor General's Body Guard, which had arrived on the preceding evening, was attached to Major Sale's column. The columns advanced at seven o'clock: that under Major Walker, first came in contact with the enemy, who, at first, offered some resistance, but the entrenchment being carried at the point of the bayonet,

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\* Documents Nos. 76 and 78.

bayonet, they quickly broke and retreated. The other column equally forcing the point of attack, completed the discomfiture of the Burman army, the whole of whose left was driven in scattered parties from the field, leaving numbers dead on the ground, and their guns, and military and working stores in the hands of the assailants. The loss of the latter was inconsiderable, except in the death of Major Walker, who was shot, gallantly leading his troops into the works, by a jinjal ball. The Bundoola made no attempt to recover this position, but collecting the fugitives upon his right and centre, continued to carry on his approaches to the great Pagoda, until the trenches approached so close that the bravadoes of his men could be distinctly heard in the barracks of the British force. In order to terminate the contest, therefore, now that the chief part of the enemy's force was in his front, Sir Archibald Campbell directed an attack to be made on the 7th, by four columns, under Lieut.-Colonels Mallet, Parlbly, Brodie, and Captain Wilson, and under the general superintendence of Lieutenant-Colonel Miles, Major Salé, with his division, acting upon the enemy's left and rear. The advance of the columns was preceded by a heavy cannonade, during the continuance of which they moved to their respective points of attack. The left column, under Colonel Mallet, advanced against the right of the enemy, and that under Colonel Brodie, upon their left, whilst the other two marched directly from the Pagoda upon their centre. They were saluted, after a momentary pause, by a heavy fire, in spite of which they advanced to the entrenchments, and quickly put their defenders to the route. The Burmans left many dead in their trenches, and their main force was completely dispersed. Their loss, in the different actions, is supposed to have been five thousand men; but they suffered most in arms and ammunition, which they could not easily replace, two hundred and forty pieces of ordnance of every kind, and a great number of musquets, were captured. The right division at Dalla, lingering at that position after the dispersion of the main body, was expelled from their entrenchments on the 8th, by Lieutenant-Colonel Farrier, and were driven from the neighbourhood, on the following day, by a more considerable detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Parlbly.\* The loss of the British, in these different affairs, was less than fifty killed, but above three hundred were wounded. Amongst the former were Lieutenant O'Shea, of H. M. 13th, and Major Walker, as noticed above.

The utter incompetence of their means to oppose the British force should, it might be thought, have pressed itself upon the Burman Commanders, and they might have been cautious how they ventured again upon an encounter with such an enemy. The Maha Bundoola, in spite of the confidence he had always expressed, appears to have received some impression of this nature, as, although with that perseverance which the Burman Chiefs displayed, he speedily re-organised his troops at no great distance from the scene of his late defeat, he seems to have withdrawn himself from the dangerous proximity, and relinquished the command to an officer of rank and celebrity, Maha Thilwa, who had been Governor of Asam, and under whom the Burmans were soon stockaded at Kokein, a place about mid-way between the Lyne and Pegu

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\* Document No. 77.

Pegu rivers, and about four miles to the north of the Shwe-Da-gon Pagoda. Their removal was necessary to confirm the impression made by the late victory, and to open the country to the further advance of the army, as well as to secure the safety of Rangoon, which was endangered by the practices of Burman warfare, that not only launched fire-rafts down the stream, but employed incendiaries to set the town on fire: on the night of the 14th, a great part of Rangoon was in flames in different quarters, and more than half the town was consumed, including the quarters of the Madras Commissariat. Upon the first alarm, the troops were at their posts to repel any attack that might be attempted, whilst parties, from the fleet and land force, were detached to suppress the conflagration. It was subdued by their exertions in the course of two hours, without any serious damage beyond the destruction of the wooden houses of Rangoon.

Accordingly, on the morning of the 15th, Brigadier General Campbell moved out against the enemy in two columns, the right of five hundred and forty men, with sixty of the Body Guard under Brigadier General Cotton, the left eight hundred strong, besides one hundred of the Body Guard, under Major General Campbell himself, the former being directed to make a detour, and take the work in the rear, whilst the latter attacked them in front. They were found to be of great strength, consisting of two large stockades on either flank, connected by a central entrenchment: each wing was about four hundred yards long by two hundred broad, and projected considerably beyond the center: the whole was occupied by a force of twenty thousand men. The right column having gained the rear, attacked the centre, whilst the left, forming into two divisions, commanded by Brigadier Miles and Major Evans, stormed the flank stockades. In fifteen minutes, the whole of the works were in the possession of the assailants. Besides the loss sustained by the enemy in the entrenchment, a number were destroyed in their retreat, by Colonel Miles's column, and many were sabred by the Body Guard. The British loss was also more than usually severe and the 13th suffered heavily, in consequence of having borne the brunt of the rear and principal assault, and having been, for some interval, exposed to the whole of the enemy's fire in a disadvantageous position, before the escalade could be effected: This regiment, which was foremost in every action, and particularly distinguished itself throughout the war, had, on this occasion, three officers, Lieutenants Darby, Petry, and Jones, killed, and seven officers, including Majors Sale and Dennie, wounded. Lieutenant O'Hanlon, also, of the Bengal Artillery, died of his wounds. The total killed amounted to eighteen, and the wounded to one hundred and fourteen, of whom twelve killed and forty-nine wounded, were of the 13th Regiment alone.

During these operations, the boats of the *Flotilla* were equally active, and with the assistance of the *Diana* steam packet, which filled the enemy with equal wonder and terror, succeeded in capturing thirty war-boats and destroying several rafts.\*

These several actions changed the character of the war. The Burmans no longer dared attempt offensive operations, but restricted themselves to the defence of their positions along the river,



river, and the road was now open to the British force, which, agreeably to the policy that had been enjoined by the events of the war, prepared to dictate the terms of peace if necessary, within the walls of the capital. Before prosecuting their course, however, we shall revert to the renewal of active hostilities on the north-eastern and eastern frontier of the British Indian dominions.

Upon the return of the British forces in Asam to their cantonments in Gohati, Burman parties re-occupied the stations of Kaliabur, Raha Chokey, and Noagong, levying heavy contributions on the people, and pillaging the country. They even carried their incursions into the neighbouring states, and devastated the frontier districts of the British ally and dependant, the Raja of Jyntea. The renewal of operations in this quarter, therefore, commenced with their expulsion once more from these positions. The force under Lieutenant-Colonel Richards, who had been continued in the command, and had been instructed to clear Asam of the Burmans during the ensuing campaign, consisted of the 46th and 57th Regiments of N. I., the Rungpoor and Dinapore local battalions, and the Champaron L. I., with details of Artillery and Flotilla, and a detachment of Irregular Horse, amounting altogether to about three thousand men; a corps more than adequate for the purposes it was directed to effect, being fully equal, if not superior, to the aggregate of the Burman troops in Asam, and infinitely superior in equipment and efficiency.

The numbers of the army, and the necessity of recourse to water-carriage, preventing the forward movement of the whole body at an early period, Colonel Richards detached two divisions about the end of October 1824, to put a stop to the exactions and excesses of the Burmans. Major Waters, with a Flotilla, and part of the Dinapur Battalion, was directed to proceed to Raha Chowkey and Noagong, and the other boats, with one wing of the Chumparun Light Infantry, with four guns, under Major Cooper, advanced to Kaliabur. The latter arrived at Kaliabur on the 29th October, surprising a small party of Burmans on his route, who were dispersed with the loss of one of their chiefs, and the capture of another. Major Waters also, on his way, dislodged a party from the village of Hathgaon, and on his arrival at Raha Chokey, on the 3d of November, took the party stationed there by surprise. They were scattered about in the houses of the village, and in their attempt to escape from one of the columns into which Major Waters had divided his force, fell upon the other, by which many were killed. A small body which had been detached to reconnoitre, returning in ignorance of these transactions, was, on the following day, drawn into an ambuscade, and nearly half destroyed.\* In these affairs, the completeness of the success was not more owing to the steady courage of the troops, than to the accuracy of the information obtained through Lieutenant Neufville, in charge of the Intelligence Department in Asam. On the morning  
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\* Document No. 87.

of the 3d, learning that the Boora Raja, the Burmese governor of Asam, was meditating his retreat from Noagong, Major Waters made a forced march in order to anticipate and intercept him. He was unable, however, to reach the village before the following morning, when he found the enemy had the start too far to leave any chance of his being overtaken.\* From information obtained on the spot, it appeared, that the retreating division amounted to about one thousand and three hundred men, of whom five hundred were Burmans, and the precipitate abandonment of their defences by so considerable a body, upon the approach of a force not one-third of their strength, clearly shewed how little they were disposed to offer effective opposition to the entire reduction of the country. The advanced posts being thus secured, Colonel Richards moved the remaining portions of his force up to Kaliabur, but the head-quarters were not transferred thither earlier than the 27th of December; the chief means of transport being water conveyance, and the boats being tracked against the current, the progress of the stores and supplies was necessarily slow, and the advance of the army was proportionately retarded: no difficulty was experienced from any other cause, as the people were friendly, and there was no enemy to encounter. From Kaliabur, the route was resumed to, and the force arrived at Maura Mukh on the 6th January. On their arrival, intelligence was brought that a party of the enemy were about three miles off, on the road to Jorehat. Colonel Richards immediately detached a company from the 46th Regiment, under Lieutenant Jones of that Corps. They proceeded, under the guidance of Lieutenant Neufville, to the spot, but unluckily, the enemy were found on the move, and only a few of their stragglers were seen and pursued without effect.†

Having afterwards received intelligence that two parties were in the hills to the southward, one of which, at Kaleana, was considerably in his rear, Colonel Richards deemed it expedient to endeavour to dislodge them, as, if allowed to remain, they would have it in their power to command the road between his force and Kaliabur, and cut off its supplies; besides deterring the inhabitants from returning to their homes. The enemy being reported also to have parties in stockaded positions at Cutcheree Hath, Deogoroo, and Deogaon, different parties were detached against them, under Captains Macleod, Waldron and Martin, whilst other detachments were sent out to intercept the enemy, after they should be dislodged in their retreat.

The party under Captain Martin, accompanied by Lieutenant Neufville, reached Deogaon, against which it had been sent, a distance of nineteen miles, about one A. M. on the morning of the 10th of January, but found the enemy too much on the alert for a surprise. Several of their scouts had been on the line of route during the day and night, looking out for the advance of the force expected, and, although the Detachment moved in perfect silence, and avoided two of their advanced posts, by a detour of half a mile, its approach was evidently known, as the party were repeatedly challenged, and signals by fire made from the Chokies. They gained, however,

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\* Document No. 87.

† Do. No. 88.

however, the western entrance of the stockade, as the rear of the enemy were quitting the opposite one, when some of the hindmost were killed, and some made prisoners ; but the main body taking to the jungle could not, in the uncertain light, be effectually pursued. Captain Martin accordingly, in obedience to instructions, halted the following day, and after destroying the stockade returned to camp.

Captain Waldron's party proceeded on the 9th to Deogooroo, and on their arrival at the place, were informed that the enemy had gone on to another post, about fifteen or eighteen miles distant, where they had a stockade. They accordingly pushed forward, and succeeded in falling upon them at day-break, when they immediately carried the place by assault, with a loss to the enemy of their Chief and twenty men, the remainder flying towards Cutcheree Hath. Captain Waldron then returned to camp.

The detachment under Captain Macleod, succeeded in cutting up some small parties on their route, but on reaching Cutcheree Hath, found it vacated by the enemy, who, the day preceding had taken the direction of Dodurallee. Captain Macleod was, however, fortunate in encountering the fugitives from Captain Waldron, who fled upon Cutcheree Hath, in ignorance of its being in the possession of a British detachment.\*

The success that attended these arrangements compelled the enemy to concentrate their forces at Jorehat, and left the country open for the British advance. At Jorehat, intestine division contributed to weaken the Burmese still further, and the Chief, known by the name of the Boora Raja, who had been considered as the head of the Burmese party in Asam, was killed by the adherents of Sam Phokun, a rival leader, although equally an officer in the Burman service. Despairing, consequently, of defending the position at Jorehat, the Burman Commanders, after setting fire to the entrenchment, fell back upon the capital, Rungpore, on the banks of the Dikho, about twenty miles from its junction with the Brahmaputra.

The country being thus cleared of the enemy, Colonel Richards advanced to Jorehat on the 17th January ; the movements of the force, on the following days, were much impeded by heavy rain, but by the 25th, the head-quarters were at Gauri Sagar, on the Dikho river, about eight miles from Rungpoor. The Flotilla was left near the mouth of the Dikho, which was too shallow to admit of boats of burthen, and the left wing of the 46th Native Infantry remained for its protection. The guns and supplies of ammunition were removed into camp by land conveyance.

On the morning of the 27th, the Burman garrison of Rungpore made an attack upon the advanced post of the encampment, at a bridge over the Namdong nullah, which was defended by the Rungpore Light Infantry, under Captain Macleod : on hearing the firing, Colonel Richards moved out with two companies of the 57th Regiment, and the Dinagepore Local Corps, and found the enemy in considerable force, extending themselves into the jungle, right and left, and threatening to surround the party defending the post. The thickness of the  
jungle

jungle rendering it impossible to attack the enemy with advantage, Colonel Richards withdrew the party from the bridge and suspended his fire, by which the assailants were encouraged to show themselves more boldly, mistaking these arrangements for weakness or apprehension. As soon as they offered a sufficient front, Colonel Richards directed a charge to be made, which the Burmans did not wait to sustain. After giving their fire, they broke and fled, but they were overtaken, and a considerable number put to the sword: the loss of the British was trifling.\*

Having been joined by the requisite reinforcement of guns, Colonel Richards resumed his march towards Rungpore on the morning of the 29th. The approach of the capital had been fortified by the enemy: a stockade had been drawn across the road, the left of which was strengthened by an entrenched tank, a little way in front, and the right was within gun-shot of the fort: the position mounted several guns, and was defended by a strong party. On approaching the defences, the assailants were saluted by a heavy fire, which brought down half the leading division, and caused a momentary check: a couple of shells, and a round or two of grape having been thrown in, the column again advanced, and the stockade was escalated and carried by the right wing of the 57th Regiment, under Captain Martin, supported by the 46th. The tank on the right was also occupied, and two temples, one on the right and the other on the left, were taken possession of, by which the south side of the fort was completely invested, and the enemy were driven in at all points. In this action, Lieutenant-Col. Richards and Lieutenant Brooke were wounded; the former slightly, the latter severely; the number of wounded was considerable, but the loss in killed was of little amount.†

The result of these two engagements not only dispirited the Burmans, but gave renewed inveteracy to the divisions that prevailed amongst them. The two chiefs, the Sam and Bagli Phokuns, were willing to stipulate for terms; but the more numerous party, headed by the subordinate chiefs, were resolutely bent on resistance, and threatened the advocates of pacific measures with extermination. The latter, however, so far prevailed, as to dispatch a messenger to the British Commander, a Bauddha priest, a native of Ceylon, but brought up in Ava, Dhermadhar Brahmachari, to negotiate terms for the surrender of Rungpore, and they were finally agreed upon through his mediation.‡ Such of the garrison as continued hostile, were allowed to retire into the Burman territory, on their engaging to abstain from any act of aggression on their retreat, and those who were pacifically inclined, were suffered to remain unmolested, with their families and property: their final destination to await the decision of the Governor General's Agent; but in the event of peace with Ava, they were not to be given up to that Government. Colonel Richards was induced to accede to these conditions, by his conviction of the impossibility of preventing the escape of the garrison, upon the capture of the fort, or of pursuing them on their flight. It was also to have been apprehended, if the evacuation of the province had been much longer delayed, that it might not have been cleared

\* Document No. 90.

† Do. No. 91.

‡ Do. No. 92.

cleared of the enemy during the campaign, as the want of carriage and supplies would have detained the army some time at Rungpore, and might have delayed its movements till the season was too advanced to admit of its progress far beyond the capital. By the occupation of Rungpore on the terms granted, much time was saved, as well as some loss of lives avoided; and the object of the campaign, the expulsion of the Burmans from Asam, without the fear of their renewing their irruptions with any success, was peaceably and promptly secured. The persons that surrendered themselves, by virtue of these stipulations, were Sam Phokun and about seven hundred of the garrison; the rest, about nine thousand, of both sexes and all ages, including two thousand fighting men, withdrew to the frontiers; but many dropped off on the retreat, and established themselves in Asam.

The surrender of Rungpore, and the dispersion of the Burmans, terminated the regular campaign on the north-eastern frontier; but the state of anarchy into which Asam had fallen, and the lawless conduct of the Sinhpho, and other wild tribes, inhabiting its eastern portion, continued to demand the active interference of British detachments throughout the remainder of the season.\* The Burmans also appeared in some force, in May, at Beesa Gaon, a Sinhpho village, on the right bank of the Nao Dehing, where they erected a stockade; they also advanced to Duffa Gaon, a similar village, a few miles inland from the same river, about ten miles to the north of the former, where they entrenched themselves. The force at these posts consisted of about one thousand men, of whom six hundred were Burmans, the rest Sinhphos, under the command of the Governor of Mogaum. From these stations they were dislodged in the middle of June, by a party of the 57th Native Infantry, under Lieutenants Neufville and Kerr, after a march of great exertion and fatigue. At Beesa Gaon, the stockades were five in number, and were carried at the point of the bayonet: the enemy at first formed in front of the stockades, as if determined to offer a resolute resistance; but they retreated precipitately before the charge of the British detachment, who, following them as quickly as the preservation of order, and the nature of the ground would permit, drove them out of each stockade in rapid succession, without firing a shot: on quitting the last entrenchment, the Burmans fled towards their frontier, but their retreat was pursued by a party under Ensign Bogle, and they were so closely pressed, that they were obliged to abandon several hundred Asamese, whom they were carrying off as slaves.†

The plan of operations on the Sylhet frontier, during the campaign of 1825, comprised the march of a considerable force through Cachar into Manipur, whence an impression might be made on the territory of Ava, or at least the anxious attention of the Court be drawn to its frontier in that direction. With these views, a force of about seven thousand men was collected under Brigadier Shulldham, who was appointed to command the eastern frontier. The army consisted of six Regiments of Infantry, the 7th, 44th, and 45th Native Infantry, forming the 3rd Brigade, and the 14th, 39th and 52d Regiments Native Infantry, Brigaded as the 4th Brigade,

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\* Documents Nos. 93 and 94.

† Do. No. 95.

Brigade, two Companies of Artillery, four of Pioneers, the Sylhet Local Corps, a Corps of Cavalry, Blair's Irregular Horse, and a body of Cacharis and Manipuris about five hundred strong, under Raja Gambhir Sinh.

At an early period, after the rains had ceased, a reconnaissance was made by Brigadier Innes, of the positions which the Burmans had occupied throughout the season at Talayn, and which they had now abandoned, after sustaining a serious reduction of their force by the climate and want of supplies.\* There was nothing, therefore, to apprehend from the enemy on the advance to Manipur, nor was it probable that they were to be found there in any strength: the defence of Arracan and the Irawadi furnishing ample employment to the resources of Ava. Although, however, hostile opposition was not to be dreaded, the face of the country to be traversed, and its utter unproductiveness, afforded obstacles equally serious, and which proved insurmountable to a numerous and heavily-equipped army. From Bhadrapur to Banskandy, a road was speedily made by the exertions of the Pioneers, on which General Shuldham, with the Artillery and the third Brigade, advanced to Doodpatlee, there to await the further operations of the Pioneers, and the arrival of carriage cattle and supplies. Captain Dudgeon, with the Sylhet Local Corps, Gambhir's Levy, and a wing of Blair's Horse, was sent in advance to cover the Pioneers. The country from Banskandy towards Manipur was a continual series of ascents and descents, the route being intersected, at right angles, by ridges of mountains running nearly due north and south, the base of one springing from the foot of the other, with the intervention only of a mountain rivulet, swoln into a deep and precipitous river after every shower; for the first thirty miles, also, the sides of the mountains were completely covered with a thick forest, the intervals between the trees of which were filled up with a net-work of intertwining reeds and brushwood, except where a narrow and often interrupted foot-path wound through the labyrinth. The soil was a soft alluvial mould, converted by the slightest rain into a plashy mire, and to aggravate all these difficulties, frequent and heavy showers commenced early in February, and continued with slight occasional intermission until the proximity of the rainy season rendered the attempt to reach Manipur hopeless.

During the whole of February, the Pioneers, assisted by a few of the Mountaineers, some Coolies from Sylhet, and working parties from the Local Corps, contrived, with immense labour, to open a pathway through the forest to the banks of the Jiri nullah, about forty miles from Banskandy, but the nature of the soil, and the state of the weather, rendered their success of little avail, as the road continued impassable for guns and loaded cattle. In the attempts to move forward, and in the conveyance of supplies to the Pioneers and the advanced guard, several hundred bullocks perished, a great number of camels were destroyed, and many elephants were lost, both by the fatigue they underwent, and from their dislocating their limbs as they laboured through the mire, or from their becoming so deeply plunged into it, that no efforts could extricate them. After struggling against these physical obstructions in vain, through  
February

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\* Documents Nos. 96 and 97.

February and March, General Shulldham reported the impracticability of the advance to Manipur, in consequence of which the attempt was abandoned, and the force broken up. The head-quarters were removed to Dacca, a force under Brigadier General Donkin was posted at Sylhet, and two Corps of Native Infantry, with the Sylhet Local Corps, and the Manipur Levy, were left in Cachar.\*

That the difficulties which had thus arrested the progress of a heavy body were not insurmountable to a small force differently organised, was very speedily established, and the Burmese were driven out of Manipur by a corps attached to the invading army, on the strength of which it was scarcely enumerated. At his earnest solicitation, Gambhir Sinh was allowed to undertake the recovery of his ancestral possessions with his own Levy, formed of five hundred Manipuris and Cacharis, armed by the British Government, but wholly undisciplined. Lieutenant Pemberton volunteered to accompany the Raja. They left Sylhet on the 17th May, and did not reach Banksandy till the 23rd, the direct road being impassable, in consequence of heavy rain, which compelled them to make a circuitous detour. They started with the Levy on the 25th, and after a march of great difficulty and privation, chiefly owing to repeated falls of rain, which compelled them to halt several days together, they gained the western boundary of the valley of Manipur on the 10th of June. In the town of Manipur, and at two villages in advance, they found the Burmans posted, but the enemy retreated to a village called Undra, about ten miles to the south. The Raja and Lieutenant Pemberton advanced to attack them, but they again fled, and information was shortly afterwards received, that they had evacuated the district. The season of the year, and the want of supplies, rendering the valley of Manipur equally untenable for friend or foe, Gambhir Sinh leaving a division of his Levy, and a body of armed inhabitants, to defend the chief town, returned with Lieutenant Pemberton to Sylhet, where they arrived on the 22d June, having, in this manner, accomplished one of the objects of the campaign, and, with a few hundred undisciplined mountaineers, cleared Manipur of the enemy.

An effort on a still more extensive scale than the armament on the Sylhet frontier formed part of the plan of this campaign, and important results were expected to follow the employment of a powerful force on the side of Arracan. With this intention, an army of about eleven thousand men was assembled at Chittagong in the end of September,† and placed under the command of Brigadier General Morrison, of his Majesty's Service; a Flotilla of Pilot vessels and gun-brigs was attached to it, under the direction of Commodore Hayes, and a numerous equipment of brigs, boats, and other craft, was prepared on the spot by the Political Agent, for the conveyance of the men and stores along the coast, and across the numerous creeks and rivers by which the approach to Aracan was intersected. General Morrison arrived at Chittagong, and assumed the command of the force on the 5th September, 1824.

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\* Documents Nos. 98 to 105.

† Do. No. 106.

The state of affairs at Rangoon had operated sensibly upon the effective strength of the Burmans in Aracan, and they no longer threatened offensive operations. After quitting the stockades at Ramoo, they retreated to Mungdoo and Lowadhong, and finally concentrated such of their forces as remained in the province, at the city of Aracan, which they laboured diligently to fortify agreeably to their usual method. Considerable detachments, however, moved across the mountains to the Irawadi, whither the Bundoola himself followed, leaving about five hundred men under the command of the Atwen Woon, Maungza, an officer of distinguished intelligence and courage.

Although no serious obstruction to the march was to be apprehended from hostile opposition, yet the advance to Aracan was impeded by the same difficulties which had been found the most formidable foes in every stage of the war. The country thinly peopled and overrun with jungle, afforded no resources, and the stores and provisions, as well as cattle and carriage, were necessarily brought from a distance, and collected slowly with much labour and expence. The elements were also unfriendly, and the rainy season of 1824 being protracted to the end of November, rendered it impossible for the troops to quit their cantonments, or the supplies to advance by land, and retarded the preparation of a military road from Chittagong to the Naf, by which the artillery and loaded cattle were to proceed. This was completed without delay, as soon as the season permitted; but a considerable portion of the stores and cattle had not arrived at Chittagong as late as January 1825, in the beginning of which month General Morrison determined to move out. The troops were, accordingly, ordered to march, and, in the course of the month, they were assembled in the vicinity of Cox's Bazar, to which place they were accompanied along the coast by the transports and flotilla.

At this point it became necessary to determine on an election between pursuing the road along the coast to the mouth of the Naf, or, by taking a more easterly direction, cross it at a higher and more practicable portion of its channel, or avoid it altogether. The rivers of Aracan rise in a range of mountains at a short distance from the sea coast, and neither by the length of their course, nor communications with other streams, become of considerable depth or expanse. They are, indeed, in general, fordable, except after heavy rain, but as they approach the coast they suddenly change their character, expanding into vast estuaries, and spacious creeks, communicating with each other and the sea, spreading, at high water, over the soil for a considerable extent, and leaving, at the ebb, broad miry deposits on either bank. The whole coast is to be considered as indented by spacious inlets of the sea, receiving mountain torrents, rather than as broken by the mere passage of rivers of magnitude; and the difficulties immediately on the sea shore were, accordingly, as serious as they were trifling on this account, but a few miles inland.

General Morrison preferred following the direction of the coast, as free from the risk attending a march inland, and recommended by important advantages. The existence of any  
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road was, with some, a matter of doubt, and there could be no question that it led through a wild and impracticable country, amidst thickets and over mountains, through which, although the troops might make their way, the artillery and loaded cattle could scarcely be conducted. Whilst proceeding along the coast, the vicinity of the flotilla ensured supplies and conveyance to a certain extent, and it was hoped that, with their aid, the delay in crossing the mouths of the rivers would not be such as to frustrate the objects of the campaign, the expulsion of the Burmans from the province of Aracan, and the possible co-operation of the force with the army on the Irawadi. How little likelihood existed of accomplishing both these purposes appeared from the very first occasion that offered of transporting the army across the debouche of a river on the coast of Aracan.

The army arrived at Tek Naf on the 1st of February, and a detachment was sent across the river on the following day, by which Mungdoo was occupied. No enemy made his appearance, and the population was decidedly friendly.\* A proclamation was addressed to them by General Morrison, calculated to keep alive the amicable feeling they displayed. The troops were gradually crossed over the river, but the delay inseparable from such an operation, exceeded anticipation, and, notwithstanding every exertion, the force was unable to quit Mungdoo before the 12th of the month, at which time a considerable part of the baggage was still on the western bank, and a great portion of the carriage cattle had not even reached the Naf. From Mungdoo, a road led by Lawadong to Aracan, by which the Burmese retreated to the latter, and which presented a much less questionable inland route than that from Ramoo, but acting on the principles first adopted, General Morrison continued his march along the shore to the mouth of another large river, the Meyu, about five marches south from the Naf. To this point his Majesty's 54th, the 10th Madras Native Infantry, and left wing of the 16th Madras Native Infantry, proceeded by sea; whilst the right Field Battery, his Majesty's 44th Foot, 1st Light Infantry Battalion, four Companies of the 42d Native Infantry, five Companies of the 62d Native Infantry, the left wing of the 16th Madras Native Infantry, and two Resalahs of the 2d Local Horse, moved by land. Brigadier Richards, with the remainder of the force, was left at Mungdoo, with directions to follow as soon as carriage cattle capable of conveying three weeks supplies, should have crossed the Naf. This officer had previously been detached to Lowadong, which the Burmans had deserted.

The land column advanced to the Meyu, without much difficulty, by the 22d February,† but the detachment, by water, encountered a squall on the 17th, which compelled the gun-boats, conveying his Majesty's 54th Regiment, to return to Mungdoo, with the loss of much baggage and camp equipage thrown overboard. The boats with the native troops on board were also scattered, and seven were driven on shore, but without any loss of lives. No inconvenience beyond further delay was experienced from this disaster. Provisions were forwarded from Mungdoo to the land force, and the detachment proceeding by water,

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\* Documents Nos. 107 and 108.

† Do. No. 109.

was speedily re-embarked, and reached the river in safety. Upon arriving at the Meyu, the difficulties of the route were experienced in a still greater degree than at the Naf. The mouth of the river was about five miles broad, and was separated by the Island of Akyab, scarcely twelve miles from the mouth of the Oreatung, or Aracan river, which, at its debouche, expanded into an estuary of above ten miles in breadth : at a short distance from the mouth of the Meyu, a creek running north of Akyab, formed a communication between the two streams, opening into the Oreatung at a point marked by the site of a pagoda, and opposite to a similar channel which led to the spot chosen for the encampment, Chang Krein Island, a part of the country, insulated like many others in its vicinity, by the innumerable communicating and intersecting ramifications of the rivers and creeks. The gun-boats, with other boats and rafts, having joined on the 27th February, the force was gradually transported across the Meyu and along the canals above described, to Chang Krein Island, where a sufficient force for forward movements was collected by the 20th of March ; nearly a month having elapsed since the arrival of the force at the mouth of the Meyu. From Chang Krein, the main body was advanced on the 20th of March, a short distance to Kay Krang Dong, with the right pushed forward five miles to Natonguay, to cover the working parties employed in rendering the nullahs passable, and the left in position at Chang Krein,\* threatening some stockades at Kheoung Peela, or Chambala, which had been the scene of a temporary check to the marine division of the invading force. Commodore Hayes having entered the great Aracan river on the 22d February, received information which induced him to believe that the principal Mug Chieftains were confined at Chambala, a stockade garrisoned by about one thousand men, half a tide from the capital, and concluding that their liberation would prove of essential service to the advancing army, he determined upon attacking the work. Accordingly, on the 23d, he stood up the Prome Pura Khione, or Branch, leading from the Oreatung river to Aracan, in the *Research*, *Vestal*, and several gun-vessels, having on board one Company of his Majesty's 54th Regiment. At two p. m. they came in sight of the enemy's works at Kheoung Peela, which immediately opened a heavy fire upon the *Gunga Saugor*, and *Vestal*, the headmost vessels. The *Research* getting within half pistol shot, commenced a heavy cannonade and fire of musketry upon the stockade and breast-work, which was returned by the enemy with great regularity and spirit. On ranging to the northern end of the stockade, with intent to anchor and flank it, as well as to allow the other vessels to come into action, the Commodore found his ship raked from forward by another stronger battery and stockade, of which he had no previous information, and the strength of the defendants was more considerable than had been anticipated, amounting, as subsequently ascertained, to three thousand men, commanded by the Son of the Raja of Aracan and other Chiefs of rank. After a severe engagement of two hours duration, the tide beginning to fail, the Commodore was obliged to wear round and drop down the

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\* Document No. 110.

the river. The *Research*, *Asseergurh*, *Asia Felix*, and *Isabella*, took the ground, and remained fast for several hours near the batteries; but the enemy made no attempt to fire at or molest them. The loss in this attack was severe. Three privates of his Majesty's 54th were killed, and several of the natives of the Flotilla. Amongst the killed also was Mr. Rogers, the second officer of the *Research*, and Major Schalch, a distinguished officer of the Company's service, commanding an extra Pioneer and Pontoon Corps attached to the army, who was on board the *Research* for the recovery of his health. He was struck whilst standing on the poop by a musket ball in his breast, and died on the morning of the 25th. The fall of this Officer deprived the army of professional talent of the highest description, animated by unwearied zeal, and guided by equal judgment. His remains were consigned to the deep with military honours.\*

The arrangements for moving being completed, the troops advanced on the 24th of March. The line of march lay along the eastern bank of the branch of the main stream, or Aracan river, and was directed against the south-eastern face of the defences of the capital. This road was intersected every few miles by nullahs, communicating at right angles with the main river, and by occasional ridges of low hills parallel to the nullahs, and equally resting on the stream. On these, it was supposed, the enemy would endeavour to make a stand, but little was to be apprehended for the result. In other respects, the march was made under auspicious circumstances. The weather was favourable, the country productive, and the people warm in the cause of those who were likely to liberate them from Burman oppression.

On the 24th of March, the army encamped on the southern bank of the Chabattee nullah. The 25th was occupied in preparing to cross this, and the Wabraing, a similar channel, above a mile in advance, beyond which the road was intersected by the Padho hills, on which it was understood the enemy were posted. The nullahs being crossed on the morning of the 26th, by day break, the force was formed into four columns, the right commanded by Brigadier Grant, the centre by Brigadier Richards, the left by Captain Leslie, and the reserve by Lieut. Colonel Walker. The left column proceeded up the main branch of the river; but the boats soon grounding, the men were landed, and the column was directed to skirt the river, in order to turn the hills on the enemy's right. The right and centre columns moved upon the passes, which had been ascertained to lead through the range.

When the right and centre columns first moved towards the hills, no appearance of an enemy was discernible amidst the forests that crowned their summits, and the presence of armed men was only indicated by the occasional tolling of a Gong, or the report of a single Jinjal, at distant intervals; at last, however, a wild irregular shout, followed by a scattered and desultory fire, announced a hostile force. In order to dislodge them, the Light Companies of the 26th, 28th, 49th, and 63d Regiments, were directed to ascend the summit, which they effected in a most gallant manner, and then moving along the heights, carried several intrenched posts, whilst the column below, proceeding in a parallel direction to the left, cleared an unfinished stockade, and  
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\* Document No. 111.

drove the enemy from the heights above where they attempted a stand. The passes were thus gained, and the army crossed the hills to their northern side, which opened upon an extensive plain, intersected by several deep tide nullahs, skirted with jungle, and, consequently, favourable to the escape of the flying Burmans. They made a demonstration of resistance at one point, and menaced the 49th Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Smith, which was in advance with an overwhelming force; the Sipahis, however, stood their ground, and before the affair became serious, the approach of the columns obliged the Burmans to resume their retreat. The army bivouacked within a mile and a half of the enemy's principal post at Mahatee. The reserve and the Artillery joined at midnight.

On the morning of the 27th, after the fog with which it commenced had dispersed, the advance was resumed. The post of Mahatee was a peninsula, protected in front and on the left by broad rivers, and backed by high conical mountains: deep entrenchments along the front, with epaulments to protect them from an enfilading fire, and with stakes in the banks of the rivers, formed its defences, and the hills in its rear were crowned with stockades and fortified pagodas. In front of these works, and on this side of the nullah, was a small elevation, in which a party was stationed, but who speedily retreated across the river upon the approach of three Companies of the 44th Regiment, under Major Carter, forming the advance. The return of the outpost within their lines, was the signal for the enemy's Artillery to open, but their fire was soon silenced by the guns of the British, and the troops descended to the fords as soon as they were left, by the ebb tide, passable. The enemy did not await their crossing, but fled towards Aracan. A Resalah of Horse that had crossed further to the right, to gain the road by which they were retreating, arrived in time to do some execution on their rear, and to prevent the destruction of the bridges on the road to the capital.

On the 28th, the whole of the troops in the rear, and the Flotilla, with Commodore Hayes, having joined, the enemy's position was reconnoitred, and at day-break on the 29th, the army proceeded to the attack of the defences of Aracan on its eastern front. These proved to be a connected series of stockades, carried along the crest of a range of hills, from three hundred and fifty to four hundred and fifty feet high, running parallel for some distance with the town, immediately to the east and south of it, but extending considerably beyond the town, and strengthened by escarpment, abbatis, and masonry, where such means could be advantageously employed. One pass alone, at its northern extremity, led through the hills to the capital, and that was defended by the fire of several pieces of artillery, and about three thousand muskets. The whole number of the enemy was estimated at about nine thousand men. The ground in front was a long narrow valley entirely clear of underwood, and in depth not wholly out of the range of the enemy's artillery. Along the foot of the hills ran a belt of jungle, which partly screened the advance, and an interrupted piece of water extended, serving as a natural fosse; but above these the ground, again, was clear and open, not only to the fire of the defenders, but to the large stones which they precipitated upon the assailants, who attempted to scale the summit.

The first attempt to carry the position was by a direct attack upon the pass, and the division

division appointed to the duty was placed under command of Brigadier General MacBean. The assault was led by the Light Infantry Company of his Majesty's 54th, four Companies of the 2d Light Infantry Battalion, and the Light Companies of the 10th and 16th Madras Native Infantry, with the Rifle Company of the Mug Levy, under Major Kemm, and supported by six Companies of the 16th Madras Native Infantry, under Captain French. Notwithstanding the utmost gallantry of the troops, the attempt to escalade failed, in consequence of the steepness of the ascent, and the well-directed fire and incessant rain of stones which knocked down the assailants as fast as they approached the top of the pass. After a fruitless struggle, in which the Sipahis and Europeans vied with each other in the display of cool and determined courage, every officer being disabled, and Captain French, of the 16th Madras Native Infantry killed, the troops were recalled, and the force took up a position for the rest of the day.

Having determined, in consequence of the failure of this attempt, and the nearer observation of the enemy's defences, to attack them on their right, as the key to their position, whilst their attention should be drawn by a continued fire to their front, the 30th of March was spent in the construction of a battery, to play especially upon the works commanding the pass, and on the 31st, at day light the guns opened, and maintained, during the day, a heavy cannonade, which had the effect of checking, though not silencing the enemy's fire. At about eight in the evening, Brigadier Richards moved off with six Companies of his Majesty's 44th, three of the 26th, and three of the 49th Native Infantry, thirty seamen, under Lieutenant Armstrong, of the *Research*, and thirty dismounted troopers of Gardener's Horse.

Though there was moon-light, yet it was evident from the silence of the Burmese, that the movement from the camp had not been detected from the heights. The hill was nearly five hundred feet high, but the road by which the party ascended was winding and precipitous, and an anxious interval elapsed before it could be known that the undertaking had succeeded. At last, a few minutes after eleven, a shot from the hill proclaimed, that the enemy had discovered the advance of the assailants. The whole camp was in a moment on foot: a yell or two from the Burmese, was followed by a sharp fire for a very short period, and then the drums and fifes of the Detachment proclaimed that the point was carried, even before the preconcerted signal, by rockets, had been given.

On the following morning, as soon as a six-pounder, carried up the hill with some difficulty, had been brought to bear upon the enemy, Brigadier Richards advanced to the assault of the entrenchments on the adjacent height, whilst a simultaneous movement of the advance, under Brigadier General McBean, was again directed against the pass from below. The enemy, apparently panic-struck, abandoned the hills after a feeble resistance, and the capital of Aracan was in possession of the British force. The loss in these subsequent operations was inconsiderable.

Aracan stands upon a plain, generally of rocky ground, surrounded by hills and traversed by a narrow tide nulla, towards which there is a prevailing slope. On the northern face, another nulla intervenes between the wall of the fort and the hills, and both these streams unite a little below the Baboo Dong hill, through the rocky fissures of which they rush, at low

low water, with the velocity, and noise of a rapid. The space on which the town stands is not an absolute square, nor are the hills arranged with rectilinear regularity ; but allowing for the ruggedness of the natural outline, and supposing the surface to be sprinkled with a few detached and separate little eminences, a tolerably accurate idea of the situation of the place may be formed. The fort stands at the N. W. corner of the space above described. It consists of three concentric walls, with intervening spaces between the third and second, and the second and inner wall, which forms the citadel. These walls are of considerable thickness and extent, constructed with large stones, and with a degree of labour such as a powerful state alone could have commanded. Where the masonry is dilapidated, the interstices have, by the Burmese, been filled up with piles of timber. This interior work is comparatively trifling to that by which, in former days, the defects in the circumvallation of hills appear to have been supplied. At every point, where the continuity of their natural outline is broken, artificial embankments, faced with masonry, some of a very great height, connect them with each other, and the excavations whence the materials were quarried, have now formed into what resemble large natural ponds. The Burmese entrenchments merely followed and took advantage of this ancient line of defensive outworks. The extent of the circumference is nearly nine miles. At the gateways, the stone walls appear to have been of considerable elevation and great solidity, but where the steepness, or altitude of the hill rendered artificial defences of less importance, a low wall of brick or stone has been carried along the summit. These defences are said to have been constructed several centuries ago.

All the hills and hillocks contiguous to the town are surmounted by Pagodas, which, by resembling spires, give the place something of a town-like appearance ; but, with the exception of these edifices, and the walls of the fort, its palaces and its huts were all of the same materials—bamboos, timbers, straw, and mats, with not a single stone or brick-building among them. The number of houses in the town was said to have been eighteen thousand, but half had been destroyed by fire. The greater part of the population had abandoned the place on its first occupation, but speedily returned to their homes, and shewed themselves well satisfied with the change in their Government.

The first days after taking possession of the town were occupied in preparing for further operations : the nature of the country defeated one object of the attack from the eastward, and assisted the Burman force to effect their escape, although in small scattered parties, across the low lands between the capital and the mountains, and across the latter to Chalain by the passes from Talak and Aeng.\* Two of the four provinces of Aracan, or Aracan and Cheduba, were therefore cleared of the enemy, and it only remained to dislodge them from the remaining divisions of Chynda (or Sandoway) and Ramree, for which purpose a part of the force, under Brigadier General MacBean, was dispatched on the 8th of April.

We have already seen that the Burman posts on Ramree were kept on the alert by the  
troops

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\* Document No. 144.

troops at Cheduba, under Lieutenant Colonel Hampton, and the crews of the *Hastings* frigate and gun-boats, under Captain Hardy, and that several successful descents upon the Island had been made during the preceding year. Encouraged by the result of these attempts, and anticipating the reduction of the enemy's force in order to strengthen Aracan, Lieutenant Colonel Hampton determined, in the beginning of the current season, to undertake the reduction of the Island with a few of his Majesty's 54th and European Artillery-men, and five-hundred and twenty men of the 40th Native Infantry, with the seamen and mariners of the frigate. The party landed on the morning of the 3d February, and proceeded to attack the defences by land, whilst the gun-boats effected a passage up the creek leading to the harbour, across which strong stakes were planted. In consequence of the treachery of the guides, the assailants, after a fatiguing march through a considerable part of the day, found themselves in a thick jungle, at a considerable distance from the stockades, and it was therefore necessary to return to the beach before the day should close, without effecting the object of the attack. As the troops retired, the Burmans kept up a scattered fire from the jungle into which they had been driven, from some intrenched positions that had been stormed and carried at the point of the bayonet. Upon the junction of the reserve with two six-pounder field pieces, this annoyance was checked, and the party re-embarked, without further molestation, by six in the evening. The loss was much less considerable than might have been anticipated.\*

The detachment now sent against Sandoway and Ramree, embarked on board the Flotilla on the morning of the 17th April, and anchored, on the night of the 18th, within three miles of the Cheduba-roads. On proceeding for water to Low Island, to the south of Ramree, information was brought by the Mugs of the evacuation of the latter by the enemy, which proved to be correct, and the town was occupied without opposition on the 22d. Had resistance been attempted, its possession might have been dearly purchased, as its defences were of unusual strength, and judiciously constructed.

After leaving a detachment in Ramree, General Macbean proceeded against Sandoway, on the main land, and arrived at the mouth of the Sandowi river on the 28th. The troops ascended in boats on the 29th, and reached the town on the morning of the 30th. Stakes had been planted across the river in various places, and several stockades were observed, but there was no appearance of the enemy, who had withdrawn from all their positions in Aracan upon hearing of the downfall of the capital.†

The entire occupation of the province of Aracan thus fulfilled one chief object of the expedition, and, in as far as it excited the apprehensions of the Burman Court, of an invasion in that direction, proved a seasonable diversion in favour of the Rangoon force. It was not found practicable, however, to carry into effect the other main purpose of the force, a junction across the mountains with Sir Archibald Campbell. Several reconnoissances were made, with the view of determining the practicability of a route across the mountains, but they failed to afford satisfactory information.

Little

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\* Document No. 115.

† Do. No. 116.

Little was to be apprehended from the enemy until near the Burman boundary. They had retreated over the mountains with great precipitation, losing great numbers by the way from want, fatigue, and contests with the mountaineers. At Chalain, in the Ava country, they halted, and whilst the chiefs, the Atwen Woon Mounnga and the Viceroy Toroo-wyne, proceeded to the capital, an officer of high military repute, Maha Mengyee Thilwa, assumed the command with considerable re-inforcements. The chief impediments, however, were of a physical character, and consisted in the face of the country and the change of the season. Above eighty miles of a low jungly tract, crossed by numerous rivulets, intervened between the capital and Talak, at the foot of the mountainous ridge which separates Aracan from Ava. It thence passed, for ninety miles more, over lofty and rugged precipices, where no supplies could be expected, and even water was scarce, and which could be rendered practicable for guns and baggage only by great effort and with considerable delay. A force was formed of the Light Companies of his Majesty's 44th and 45th, and 16th Madras Infantry, and three Companies of the 2d Bengal Light Infantry, and placed under the command of Major Bucke, to explore this route in pursuit of the enemy. They proceeded to Talak by water, and thence made four marches over the mountains, in which the men and cattle underwent extreme fatigue. When arrived at Akowyn, within one stage of Tantabain, on the Burman frontier, they learned that the Burmans were there in strength, and the exhausted state of the detachment, and the impracticable nature of the route, induced Major Bucke to retrace his steps, and return to Talak. At a more favourable season the route might have been traversed by the army, but it was now too late, and at any time would have been a work of much difficulty. A much more practicable road across the mountains by Aeng, was not discovered until the end of the war, but it would not have been of much avail for the passage of troops had its existence been known earlier, as none of the carriage cattle of the army had crossed the Meyu river in June, and some were even then to the north of the Naf. Even their presence would not have enabled the army to advance, as the rains set in early in May, and precluded all possibility of military operations. The season also brought with it, its usual pestiferous influence, in the midst of a low country overrun with jungle, and intersected by numerous rivers. Notwithstanding the precautions that had been taken in the timely cantonment of the troops at Aracan, fever and dysentery broke out amongst them to an alarming extent, and with the most disastrous results. That the unavoidable privations of troops on service tended to aggravate the severity of the complaints, was a necessary occurrence; but all ranks were equally affected, and a large proportion of officers fell victims to the climate. Brigadier General Morrison himself, after struggling through the campaign against it, was obliged to quit the country, and died on his way to Europe. The maladies were so universal, and the chance of subduing them so hopeless, that the Government of Bengal was at last impelled to the necessity of recalling the troops altogether, leaving divisions of them on the



the Islands of Cheduba and Ramree, and the opposite coast of Sandoway, where the climate appeared to be not unfavourable to their health.\*

From these transactions, we return to the operations of the army at Rangoon.

The capture of the stockades at Kokain on the 15th of December, was followed by the complete dispersion of the Burman army, and the exertions of the chiefs were vainly directed to its re-organization. Two or three small bodies were thus assembled on the Lyne river, at Mophi and Panlang, whilst the Maha Bundoola retreated to Donabew, where he exercised his utmost efforts, and ultimately with some success, to concentrate a respectable force, which he strongly intrenched. The victory produced also a change in the sentiments of the enemy, and a letter was addressed to some of the European residents at Rangoon by the Maha Bundoola, which, although of a vague and indefinite character, evinced a material alteration in the temper of that chieftain, and a disposition, if not to treat for peace, to respect his antagonists. The tenour

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\* On this subject, we are able to cite the most authentic testimony in the following extracts from the Transactions of the Medical and Physical Society of Calcutta: "The causes of this sickness were too obvious to be overlooked: the locality was sufficient to satisfy every Medical observer, that troops could not inhabit it with impunity, and a reference to the meteorological register, will shew a severity of season to which the men were quite unaccustomed, and which no covering could wholly resist. Exposure to the weather, which no precaution could prevent, and intoxication, which European soldiers are unfortunately too prone to, had their share in producing disease; but a still greater in pre-disposing to or rendering more violent the endemic, with which nearly every one was visited in a greater or less degree." *Sketch of the Medical Topography of Aracan, by R. N. Burnard.* "In a country like Aracan, and in Cantonments, such as have been described, it seems not difficult to trace the causes of disease, and after what has been advanced regarding the influence of a raw, variable, and impure atmosphere, little remains to be said, either of the causes of the sickness, or of the mortality which followed it. But it is the opinion of some, that the sickness of the south-eastern division of the army arose, not from the unwholesomeness of the climate, but owed its origin to the bad quality of the supplies. That the provisions were occasionally bad, and that the army suffered from the want of many little comforts which such a situation required, may be admitted, but that the great mortality in Aracan owed its origin to this source, is a conclusion of which there is no proof." *On the sickness prevailing in Aracan, by J. Stevenson.* In further proof, that the sickness arose from climate, Mr. Stevenson cites the different fate of the two detachments sent against Talak and Ramree: both were supplied from the same stores; but the former, who, on their return, had to travel through jungle and marsh after the rains had set in, almost all fell ill of fever and died. The latter, who spent about six weeks at sea, had only two deaths, one from fever, and the other from dysentery, and it was observed, that the men who composed the detachment resisted the influence of the climate after their return much better than those who remained behind. The detachment of Europeans and Sipahis stationed at Sandoway preserved their health during the rains. From tables included in Mr. Burnard's paper, it appears, that the European force, amounting to above one thousand five hundred men, lost, between May and September, two hundred and fifty nine; and at the end of the latter month, had nearly four hundred in hospital. During the same time, ten native corps, the strength of which was nearly eight thousand, lost eight hundred and ninety-two, and had three thousand six hundred and forty-eight in hospital. It appears, also, that during July, August, and September, the Thermometer ranged from 92° 8' to 78°, and the fall of rain was a hundred and twenty-three inches, of which a hundred and three fell in the two first months.

of the letter, and its address to unofficial persons, precluded its being made the basis of negotiation, but a letter was written by Sir A. Campbell to the Burman Commander, to point out to him the propriety of addressing the British General direct, if he had any communication to make, to which he was desirous the latter should pay regard, and assuring him that Sir A. Campbell would ever be accessible to any correspondence of an amicable purport. No notice of this letter was taken by the Bundoola, and even if sincere in his first advance, the re-assembling of his forces probably encouraged him to make another appeal to the chance of war.

Having been joined by his Majesty's 47th Regiment, a detachment of Rocket Artillery, and a division of gun-boats, Sir A. Campbell determined to make a forward movement upon Prome. In order to leave no obstruction in his rear, he dispatched Colonel Elrington against the only remaining post in possession of the enemy, in the vicinity of Rangoon, the old Portuguese fort and the Pagoda of Syrian, which had been re-occupied by part of the grand army in December, and from whence they were once more driven, after a slight resistance, on the 11th February, and the army was at liberty to commence its advance.

The departure of the army from Rangoon was encouraged by the indication of favourable changes in the political situation of the country. The major part of the population in the lower districts of the Burman kingdom, are Taliens or Peguers, who, although depressed by a long course of servitude, retain some memory of their ancient greatness, and hostility to their oppressors. During the presence of the Burman force in the immediate neighbourhood, and the compulsory removal of their families, they had been obliged to avoid all communication with the British, and to desert the town: now, however, that the Burman leaders had retreated, and the army was scattered, they began to recover confidence, and join the invaders, in which they were encouraged by a proclamation issued by Sir A. Campbell, copies of which were conveyed even into the enemy's camp at Panlang, where the greater part of the troops consisted of Peguers.\* The consequence was, the desertion of nearly the entire division in the direction of Dalla, and their retreat being supported by a detachment sent to their succour, they effected, their escape, with their wives and their children, to Rangoon, and the population, thenceforward, daily and rapidly returned to its original enumeration.

During the period of Burman ascendancy, vast numbers of Peguers had sought refuge in the kingdom of Siam, and these also manifested, apparently at the suggestion of the Siamese, some inclination to come forward and join their countrymen in the Rangoon province, in an attempt to recover their political existence.† Some of their chiefs addressed both the British Commander and the head men of the towns and villages in Pegu, offering the assistance of the Siamese forces under their command, against the Burmans. This circumstance, and the actually existing state of hostility between the Courts of Bankok and Ava, were a sufficient guarantee of the disposition of the Siamese, although, with the timid and selfish policy of a semi-barbarous state, they were averse to committing themselves by any decided step in favour

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\* Document No. 121.

† Do. No. 119.

favour of a power, whose success they probably knew not whether to hope or fear. In further confirmation, however, of a friendly feeling, the Siamese Commanders addressed a complimentary letter to Sir A. Campbell, upon the success that had attended the British arms.\*

On the other hand, the advance into the heart of the country was not without its unpropitious accompaniments. There was no doubt that a similar policy would be pursued in the interior that had been adopted at Rangoon, and that all the local resources would be removed from the reach of the invaders. It would, therefore, be necessary to maintain an uninterrupted communication with Rangoon, for which purpose a considerable force must be left there, and at different points on the line of march, and, above all, the navigation of the Irawadi was to be commanded by a numerous and well-equipped Flotilla. Whatever carriage was required for the baggage, artillery, and stores, was procurable only by sea from Bengal and Madras, from whence few of the class of bearers or coolies would consent to embark, and the transport of cattle was attended with much delay and loss. The Bengal cattle also were found too small and feeble for effective field service, and the chief dependance was necessarily placed on those sent from Madras, which had been shipped with great promptitude for the use of the army. Still, the whole number of available cattle was far from adequate to the transport of guns, ammunition, and provisions, and General Campbell was, accordingly, obliged to reduce his force materially, leaving a much larger portion than he had contemplated at Rangoon, to join him at a subsequent opportunity. His determination to advance remained unaffected by these embarrassments, and, confiding in his own resources, and the tried courage of his gallant troops, he did not shrink from assailing the concentrated force of the kingdom of Ava, formidable from its positions, its numbers, and the spirit of pertinacious resistance, which repeated defeat seemed unable to shake or to subdue.

Before breaking up his cantonments at Rangoon, General Campbell considered it expedient to dislodge an advanced division of the Burman force stationed at Thantabain, on the Lyne river, and Colonel Godwin was dispatched for this purpose, on the 5th February, with a detachment of his Majesty's 41st, and the 30th and 43d Madras Native Infantry, with the *Satellite* armed vessel, the steam vessel, and gun-boats, under Captain Chads, R. N.† The enemy, about three thousand strong, with thirty-six pieces of artillery, of various calibre, were posted in a strong stockade upon the point of a peninsula, and received the detachment with a brisk fire, which was more effectively returned by the guns of the *Satellite*, and some rockets from a division of the rocket troop, under Captain Graham, on board the steam vessel. As soon as a near approach was secured, the troops were landed, and the stockade carried by storm, with little difficulty or loss. The enemy suffered severely. The two branches of the Panlang river were reconnoitered on the following day, for a considerable distance, and many fire-rafts were destroyed, but no division of the enemy appeared, and the path was, thenceforward, open to the advance of the main army.

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\* Document No. 120.

† Do. No. 122.

Every thing being now ready for the advance, General Campbell formed such force as he possessed the means of moving, into two columns: with one, about two thousand four hundred strong, he purposed moving by land, whilst the other, of the strength of eleven hundred and sixty-nine, under Brigadier General Cotton, was to proceed by water to Tharawa, where the land column it was intended should reach the bank of the Irawadi, carrying on its way the entrenched posts of Panlang and Donabew. The Flotilla consisted of sixty-two boats, carrying each one or two pieces of artillery, and the boats of all the ships of war off Rangoon, the whole under command of Captain Alexander, of his Majesty's navy. It having been reported, that a friendly disposition was manifested by the people of the district of Bassein, a third division, of seven hundred and eighty, was sent thither, under Major Sale, who, it was expected would be able, after occupying Bassein, to penetrate across the country to Henzada, on the Irawadi, and form a junction with the main army. The rest of the force, nearly four thousand effective men, was left in Rangoon, under Brigadier McCreagh, who was to form a reserve column as soon as means of transport could be collected, and to follow the advance of the Commander in Chief. These arrangements being completed, General Campbell began his march on the 13th February: the water column moved on the 16th, and the detachment for Bassein sailed on the 17th of the same month. Two days after the departure of Sir A. Campbell, the Talien chiefs arrived at Rangoon, and represented themselves as desirous of negotiating for the independance of Pegu. It proved, however, that they were officers in the service of Siam, from which state they brought a letter to the British commander. As, however, they possessed no authority to enter upon any definitive discussion, and the movement of the army precluded the possibility of Sir Archibald Campbell's holding any personal communication with them, they were referred to Lieut.-Col. Smith, who had been appointed to the command of Martaban, from whence they had come, and in the vicinity of which place, but within their own frontier, it was ascertained that a Siamese force had assembled.\*

The land column under the Commander in Chief proceeded along a narrow and difficult path, a short distance from the left bank of the Lyne river, and tending obliquely, in a north-westerly direction, towards the main stream on the Irawadi, through the provinces of Lyne and Tharawadi. On the 17th, the force arrived at Mophi, where the Burman General Maha Thilwa had taken up his post, with between two and three thousand men, in an old Peguan fort, where he seemed determined to await an attack; but as the division approached, the Burmans, after firing a few shots, fled, and escaped into the jungle. The column halted at Mophi till the morning of the 19th, when it moved onwards to Lyne, the capital of the province, where it arrived on the morning of the 23rd: on the 24th, the march was resumed, and on the 26th, the division halted at Soomza two days, to allow two Native battalions, which had been left at Lyne, to replenish the carts from the boats, which accompanied the march as high as Thaboon, up the river, to rejoin. On the 1st of March, the column forded the Lyne river at Thaboon,

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and moving nearly due west, a march of fourteen miles, came on the 2nd to Tharawa, on the Irawadi. Throughout the whole march from Rangoon, the country had continued to improve, and, although much overrun with jungle, offered ample evidences of fertility. The villages were mostly deserted, but some of the Carian tribes remained, and some supplies were collected; and in various places, after the first panic had subsided, the people, both Carians and Burmans, returned to their homes before the troops had taken their departure. The men composing the column, kept their health, although the weather was beginning to be hot. As the column entered Tharawa, the whole of the population was observed crossing to the opposite bank, who, after halting for a short time, disappeared in the adjacent thickets.\*

The water column reached Teesit on the 17th February, and destroyed three stockades newly erected, but unoccupied: on the 19th, the advance arrived at Panlang, where the Burmans were strongly stockaded.† Two stockades were constructed on the opposite banks of the main stream, at Yuathat and Miaghee, and one still stronger, on a point of land between the Elenchinnaer and Dalla branches: on the 20th, a battery was erected, from which, as well as the *Satellite*, and steam boat, shells and rockets were thrown into the stockades, with admirable effect, so that when the troops landed to take possession, they encountered no resistance. The troops then advanced against the great stockades, and the right column forded a third branch of the river, breast high. The *Satellite*, unfortunately grounded, but the steam vessel and the boats, keeping up with the troops, embarked them across the Yengen-chena branch, against the main stockade, from which, after a feeble fire, the enemy precipitately retreated, and the passage of the river was cleared. The stockades at Yuathat and Miaghee, were destroyed, but a division of the 18th Madras Native Infantry, was left in the Panlang stockade, to maintain the communication with Rangoon. Brigadier General Cotton then advanced to Yangen-chena, where the Panlang, or Rangoon, river branches off from the Irawadi. He arrived at this point on the 23d February; on the 27th, the whole of the Flotilla entered the main stream, and on the 28th, the advance came in sight of Donabew, where the Maha Bundoola was strongly posted with all the troops he could assemble, amounting to about fifteen thousand men. The post consisted of a series of formidable stockades, extending nearly a mile along the bank, commencing at the Pagoda of Donabew, and continuing to increase in strength, until completed by the main work, situated on a commanding height, and surrounded by a deep abbatis, with all the usual defences.

Some delay having occurred in getting the whole of the most heavily-laden vessels, across the sands, at the mouth of the Yangen-chena branch, the whole of the force was not in position until the evening of the 5th March. On the 6th, Brigadier General Cotton advanced to within two miles below Donabew, and sent a summons to surrender; to which a refusal was returned in a tone of unusual courtesy: on the receipt of the reply, a party of the 89th was landed opposite to the main stockade, to effect a reconnoissance, which was successful, notwithstanding

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\* Document No. 124.

† Do. No. 125.

withstanding a heavy fire from the enemy: on the 7th, five hundred men were disembarked a mile below the Pagoda, and formed into two columns, under Lieutenant-Colonel Donoghue, and Major Basden, with two six-pounders and a detachment of Rocket Artillery: after receiving and returning the enemy's fire, the men rushed on to the stockade, and forced an entrance into it, with a determination that overpowered the resistance offered, although more resolute than had for some time been encountered. The first stockade was carried with the loss of about twenty killed and wounded. The enemy fled to the next defence, leaving two hundred and eighty prisoners in the power of the assailants.

The second defence was at the distance of about five hundred yards from the first, and at an equal distance from the main work, by which it was commanded. Previous to assailing it, two other six-pounders, with four mortars, were brought up and placed in position, and a fresh supply of rockets was procured. The enemy remained quiet until the near approach of the storming party, when a destructive fire was opened from all parts of the face of the work, which checked the progress of the column, and inflicted so severe a loss upon them, that it became necessary to order a retreat. Captain Rose, who commanded the detachment, and Captain Cannon, of the 89th, were killed, and the greater number of the men were killed or wounded. In consequence of this failure, Brigadier General Cotton deemed it advisable to abstain from any further attempt against the post, until joined by General Campbell, or at least reinforced, and he therefore re-embarked the men and guns, and dropped down to Yoong-yoon, to await the result of his communication with the Commander of the forces.

On receiving intelligence at Nangurh, about twenty-six miles above Tharawa, of the occurrences at Donabew, Sir Archibald Campbell determined to retrace his steps, and attack the post with all his strength. He accordingly returned to Tharawa, from which place the force had to cross the Irawadi with such scanty means as could be procured. A few small canoes were collected, and rafts were constructed, and in the course of five days, between the 13th and 18th, the passage of the whole division was compleated, and the head-quarters established at Henzada. Information having been received, that the Kyee Woongyee was posted about fifteen miles from thence, to intercept the detachment expected in that direction from Bassein, a party, under Lieut.-Col. Godwin, was sent off by night to endeavor to surprise him. The alarm, however, was given in time for the Burman force to escape; but it was completely scattered without a contest, their commander setting the example of precipitate flight. After halting two days at Henzada, to prepare carriage for the stores, the army resumed its march along the right bank, and came before Donabew on the 25th: a communication was opened with the Flotilla on the 27th, and both divisions zealously co-operated in the reduction of the place.\* Batteries, armed with heavy artillery, were constructed without delay. Spirited attempts to interrupt their progress, were frequently made by sorties from the work, and on one occasion, the Bundoola ordered out his elephants, seventeen in number, each carrying a complement

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\* Document No. 126.

complement of armed men, and supported by a body of Infantry. They were gallantly charged by the Body Guard, the Horse Artillery and Rocket Troop, and the elephant drivers being killed, the animals made off into the jungle, whilst the troops retreated precipitately within their defences, into which rockets and shells were thrown with a precision that rendered the post no refuge from danger.

The mortar and enfilading batteries opened on the 1st of April, and the breaching batteries commenced their fire at day-break on the second, shortly after which, the enemy were discovered, in full retreat, through the thicket. The entrenchments were immediately taken possession of, and considerable stores, both of grain and ammunition, as well as a great number of guns of various descriptions, were captured. The sudden retreat of the enemy, it was ascertained, was occasioned by the death of their General Maha Bundoola, who was killed, on the preceding day, by the bursting of a shell. With him fell the courage of the garrison, and the surviving chiefs vainly attempted to animate the men to resistance. The death of the Bundoola was a severe blow to the Burman cause. He was the chief instigator of the war, and its strenuous advocate, and, in courage and readiness of resource, displayed great abilities to maintain the contest. He was a low and illiterate man, who had risen to power by his bravery and audacity. When the war broke out he professed himself ready, and no doubt thought himself able, to lead a Burman army to the capital of British India, and wrest from its Government the lower districts of Bengal. Although not present in the action at Ramoo, he commanded in Aracan, and derived additional reputation from the result of that campaign. When called to the defence of the territory of his sovereign, he anticipated fresh triumphs, and engaged to conduct the invaders captives to Ava. The operations at Rangoon taught him a different lesson, and, although they seem not to have shaken his pertinacity and valour, they inspired him with a new spirit, and engrafted courtesy on his other military merits. Of this the reply, he is reported to have returned to the summons sent him by General Cotton, is a remarkable instance. He is said to have answered, "we are each fighting for his country, and you will find me as steady in defending mine, as you in maintaining the honour of yours. If you wish to see Donabew, come as friends, and I will shew it you. If you come as enemies, LAND!"

Immediately after the capture of Donabew, Sir Archibald Campbell resumed his forward movement, and was again at Tharawa on the 10th of April.\* There he was joined by the column of reserve from Rangoon, consisting of the Battalion Companies of the Royals and 28th N. I., with a supply of elephants, under Brigadier McCreagh. From thence he pushed forward to Prome; the brother of the King of Ava, the prince of Tharawadi, who now commanded the Burman force, and who had recently received a reinforcement of six thousand men from Ava, falling back as the British advanced: consequently, the force reached Prome unopposed on the 25th of April, and occupied the place without the necessity of firing a shot. The weather, though

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\* Document No. 127.

though hot, was not found oppressive, and the troops took up their position in high health and spirits.

Upon the advance towards Prome, at Turrip Miu, thirty miles from the former, an intimation was received from the Burman authorities, of a disposition to enter upon negotiations for peace.\* A letter from them was brought into a camp by a Burmese, accompanied by a soldier of the 38th Regiment, who had fallen into the hands of the Burmans, and who, with two native Khlassis likewise taken, was liberated on this occasion. Two Burman messengers were sent back with an answer, professing the readiness of the British commander to treat with the Burman deputies, but declaring his determination to advance to Prome. To this communication a reply was received,† when within eight miles of Prome, in which the Atwen woons proposed, that the army should halt where it had already arrived; but they abandoned the city without waiting for a reply, and Sir A. Campbell having continued his march, arrived only just in time to save the town and its granaries from fire; an act, which coupled with information, that large reinforcements were on their way from Ava, rendered it probable, that the overtures of the deputies were made without authority, and were rather with a view to gain time than in consequence of instructions received from the Court of Ava. That it was the sincere wish of the Prince of Tharawadi to terminate the war, was proved satisfactorily by subsequent information, and he shortly afterwards quitted the camp for the express purpose of advocating a treaty of peace, in opposition to the infatuated councils of the war party of the Lotoo, at the head of which were the Queen and her brother.‡

Upon the first appearance of the force before Prome, the city, although strongly fortified, was deserted, and part of it consumed: the same was found to be the case for a considerable distance along the course of the river, the villages being everywhere abandoned and laid in ashes; but this state of things, the result partly of the fears of the people, and partly of the policy of the Burman Court, was not of long continuance, and a few days sufficed to bring back the population of Prome to their dwellings. The command of the lower provinces acquired by this position, inspiring the people with confidence, they soon began to resume their usual avocations, and to form markets along the river, and especially at Prome and Rangoon, by which the resources of the country now began to be fully available for carriage and support. This was the more satisfactory, as in the commencement of May, the periodical change of seasons took place, and obliged the force to establish itself in cantonments at Prome. Previous to the setting in of the rains, the Thermometer had risen in the shade to 110°, but the nights remained cool, and the climate was not found unhealthy. The monsoon brought with it, its ordinary effects upon the condition of the troops, but by no means to the same extent as in the previous season at Rangoon, the face of the country being mountainous, and free from swamps, and of some considerable elevation above the sea.

The temporary repose enjoyed in the cantonments at Prome was, in the early part of the season, enlivened by the accounts of the success of Major Sale, in the direction of Bassein, by  
advice

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\* Document No. 128.

† Do. No. 129.

‡ Do. Nos. 130 and 131.



advice of the successful repression of the kidnapping practices of the Siamese, in the districts of Tenasserim, and the further developement of the relations with that power and the Talien Chiefs of Pegu, through the agency of the British authority at Martaban.

Major Sale, with his detachment, arrived off Pagoda-point on the 24th February,\* and on the 26th, the Flotilla stood in for the Bassein river. Parties of the force having been landed, several stockades were encountered and destroyed, but in no place did the enemy offer any opposition. On the 3d March, the detachment arrived at Bassein, which it was found had been set on fire and abandoned; the Governor of the district having retreated to Lamina, a town about six days journey up the river. Having occupied Bassein, the town was soon restored to a comparatively flourishing state, and the population gradually returned. The chief part of the force, with its gallant commander, was speedily recalled to Rangoon, to reinforce the main army, after the line of its operations had passed the point at which a diversion in the direction of Bassein was likely to be useful, but the place continued to be occupied throughout the war. A reconnoissance was also made as far as Lamina, about one hundred and forty miles from Bassein, by two hundred men of his Majesty's 13th, one hundred Native Infantry, and seventy seamen, under Major Sale, who proceeded up the river in boats, bivouacking at night upon the banks. They encountered no opposition, although flying parties of Burmans hovered about them throughout their course, and the river was, in many places, very narrow, and ran between lofty banks, mostly covered with long grass and jungle, from which an enemy might have opposed a resistance that it would have been difficult to overcome. The Woongyee, who had commanded at Bassein, was but a short distance ahead, and the party was repeatedly upon the eve of overtaking him. He contrived, however, to escape. All the villages on the banks of the river were deserted, and in general burned, and the population driven into the interior by the retreating Burman force. Lamina also, although a place of great extent, was found abandoned, and as no resources, therefore, were available for the support, or the further progress of the detachment, Major Sale returned to Bassein, after an absence of fourteen days. A state-boat and two war-canoes were captured. Whilst on the march, the firing at Donabew was distinctly heard.

Although no declared war existed between the powers of Ava and Siam, active hostilities had been only suspended for some years past, by the mutual fears and weakness of the parties, and a system of border-inroads had been maintained, by which the countries on the confines of the two states had been almost depopulated. The Siamese commanding the passes, and the southern points of the Peninsula, had the advantage in this contest, and, availing themselves of their position, annually made incursions, especially into the districts of Ye, Tavai, and Mergui, and carried off the inhabitants, whom they detained in slavery. These practices were, however, now to cease, and the protection thus afforded to the persons of the people of Tenasserim, was no unimportant benefit for which they were indebted to their new rulers. In the course of January 1825, a Siamese Flotilla, of thirty large boats, made  
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\* Document No. 125. (D)

its appearance near Mergui, on which, a party of Sipahis was sent to prevent any aggression. On falling in with the Siamese commander, he professed his ignorance of the country being in the possession of the English, and consented to repair to Mergui, where he restored ninety of the prisoners he had taken.\* Finding, however, that nothing short of the surrender of the whole would satisfy the British authorities, he suddenly made off, and accounts were shortly after received of Old Tenasserim having been attacked and plundered. It was calculated that five hundred persons had been thus carried into captivity. In February, other parties were heard of, but were sought for in vain, and in March, a large party landed and scoured the country about Tenasserim: on this occasion, they were surprised by a detachment sent against them: a chief and a few men were taken, and the rest dispersed. In the end of March, however, Lieutenant Drever, with a detachment, being sent against a marauding party, captured several of their boats, nearly secured the person of their Chief, the Raja of Choomp-hon, drove them from their cantonments on the island of Yeagudan, and inflicted so severe a loss upon them, that they never again ventured to molest the territories under the British authority. The negotiations also that presently ensued with the Court of Bangkok, not only contributed to prevent the repetition of the predatory incursions, but eventually obtained the liberation of almost all the Burman inhabitants who had thus been carried into bondage.

We have already noticed the arrival at Rangoon, of deputies from the Siamese army that had advanced to the frontiers, and the transfer of the duty of ascertaining the characters and objects of these emissaries to Colonel Smith, in command at Martaban. That officer conducted the deputies with him to his head-quarters, furnished with a letter to the Siamese commander, the Ron na Ron, a Talien, or Pegu Chief, who had, with many of his countrymen, found a refuge from Burman oppression in the territories of Siam.† The communication of the British authorities was duly acknowledged, and the Siamese General having announced his intention of approaching to Martaban, to hold a conference with Colonel Smith, arrangements were made to facilitate his advance, and provide for his accommodation, when information was received of the recall of the army, upon the plea of the rainy season being near at hand, and the troops being required for the cultivation of the country. Further enquiries, however, left little doubt of the unreality of this excuse, and the chief cause appeared to be a suspicion entertained by the Siamese Court of the views of their own General. Possessing, in a great degree, the affection of the Talien people, and being encouraged by the chief men, an apprehension was excited, that he might induce the English to put him in possession of those towns and districts which the Siamese coveted for themselves. It is also highly probable that they were not sorry to avail themselves of any plea for delaying active operations, until they should be better able to judge of the progress of the war. That they were in some degree sensible of the inconsistency of their conduct, was rendered apparent by a subsequent letter from the Chief, apologising for his retreat, upon the plea of sickness. This document was remarkable, also, for an affected apprehension

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\* Documents Nos. 132 to 136.

Dos. Nos. 137 and 138.

hension of the retreat of the English, which was apparently designed to draw from the British functionaries some declaration of the future purposes of their Government. Shortly after the receipt of this dispatch, others arrived from the Siamese Ministers, as well as from the General, to the address of Sir A. Campbell, in which they renewed their professions of esteem for the English, and their promise of affording active co-operation after the rains had ceased, a measure now far from desirable, and one which there was little reason to anticipate. The aid of a Siamese army could be but nominal, and the presence of an undisciplined rabble would only be formidable to the provinces now subjected to the British authority.

Immediately after the occupation of Prome, Sir A. Campbell detached Colonel Godwin with a force of eight-hundred Infantry, a troop of the Body Guard, and two field pieces, to the eastward, on the route to Tongho, the capital of the province of Tharawadi, in order to ascertain the state of the country, and the strength of the enemy in that direction. The force left Prome on the 5th of May, and marched in a north-easterly course till the 11th, when they came upon a mountainous and difficult country, beyond which, apparently interminable forests extended. They then turned to the left, and moved to Meaday, sixty miles above Prome, on the Irawadi, which they found deserted. They thence returned to Prome, where they arrived on the 24th. At setting out, they disturbed a gang of plunderers, who fled, and effected their escape, notwithstanding a party of the Body Guard was sent in pursuit, but no enemy was seen: the villages were all burnt, and the people living in the thickets: the intercourse held with them dissipated their alarms, and great numbers came into Prome. A stock of cattle was collected, but no grain, and the army continued to depend upon Rangoon for its principal supplies.\*

The months of June, July, and August, were necessarily spent in inactivity, from the setting in of the rains, and the prevalence of the inundations. The monsoon, however, proved mild: the men were comfortably hutted: there was no want of provisions, and, although extensive sickness occurred, it was not more than was fairly attributable to the nature of the service and the season of the year, and was by no means so severe as that of the previous rains at Rangoon, nor, indeed, more so than it would have been in any of the lower Gangetic provinces. The casualties were comparatively few.

The same cause that suspended the operations of the British force, arrested the activity of the Court of Ava, and during this interval, it was unable to send any armies into the field. The only military occurrence, was the expulsion of the Thekia Woongyee, who had retreated to Old Pegu, where his force having gradually become thinned by desertion, the people themselves rose upon his detachment, and put it to the rout, taking prisoner a Burman Chief of rank, whom they brought into Rangoon, and delivered to Brigadier Smith.† At their request, they were furnished with a small Sipahi force, for their defence against any attempt of the Thekia Woongyee to recover his footing in the city. The presence of this detachment, it was ascertained, gave much uneasiness

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\* Documents Nos. 139 and 140.

† Do. No. 141.

uneasiness to the Ava Government, as supposed to indicate an advance upon Tongho, the garrison of which was, accordingly, reinforced.

The capture of the stockades at Donabew, and the death of the Bundoola, were events that excited the utmost consternation at Ava : no person about the Court ventured to communicate to the King the first reports of these disasters, and when the official intelligence arrived, the first feeling of the Government was that of utter despair. The members of the administration, however, soon resumed their lofty tone, and declared it would be better they should die, than consent to the humiliation of their Monarch, or the dismemberment of his dominions, and the Pagahm Woongyee, especially, undertook to remedy the evil consequences of the Bundoola's failure, and still drive the invaders from the country. The impressions thus, at first, made upon the Court, gradually gave way to reviving hope ; but that upon the people was more permanent, and high bounties, as much as a hundred and seventy rupees per man, were necessary to induce them to enlist in the army. The necessary sacrifices were, however, made, and information was received at the end of June, of the assemblage of a numerous force at Ava, preparatory to the season for resuming operations : early in July, a reconnoissance was made in boats up the river, when about three or four thousand men were found cantoned near a village about ten miles above Songhee, or about eighty-four miles from Prome : a few shots were exchanged, and it was ascertained that the equipment of the force was far from formidable.

Although prepared for the renewal of hostilities, the English General being sensible that it was not the wish of the Government of India to urge them to extremities, availed himself of an opportunity that occurred at this period, to afford an opening to a negotiation for peace. Amongst the individuals of all ranks, who had now flocked to Prome, was a confidential servant of the Prince of Tharawadi, who made no secret of his relation to the Prince, nor of the distress which the latter suffered from the occupation of his Government by the English. A private letter was, accordingly, addressed to the Prince, through this channel, by Sir A. Campbell, stating the disposition of the British Government to terminate the war, whenever the Court of Ava should be inclined to offer reparation for the injuries which had provoked it, and to indemnify the British Government for the expense. This attempt, however, was unavailing, and no answer was received. In the mean time, the whole of the lower provinces were becoming habituated to the change of masters, and yielding their new governors cheerful submission. The villagers issued from their hiding places in the thickets, re-constructed their huts, and resumed their occupations, and the Miuthagis, or head men of the districts and chief towns, tendered their allegiance, and were restored to their municipal functions by the British General. A state of desolation and anarchy once more gave way to order and plenty, and from Bassein to Martaban, and Rangoon to Prome, every class of natives, not only contributed their aid to collect such supplies as the country could afford, but readily lent their services to the equipment and march of military detachments.

At the end of July, General Campbell quitted Prome for Rangoon, to expedite arrangements connected with the Commissariat, which his presence materially forwarded. He left  
Prome

Prome in the steam vessel, the *Diana*, and after spending a few days at Rangoon, returned to the former place on the 2d August. The entire security with which his journey was performed, satisfactorily established the settled state of the country under English administration.

In compliance with the repeated injunctions of the Government of Bengal, that no opportunity should be omitted of entering upon pacific negotiations, Sir A. Campbell judged it expedient, upon the approach of the season for active operations, to address a letter to the Court, declaratory of his being authorised and desirous to abstain from further hostilities.\* Various reports were current at this time, which rendered it probable that the overture would be acceptable. Insurrections had taken place, it was asserted, in different parts of the Burman dominions, and a rumour of the deposition of the King seems to have found extensive currency. These reports turned out to be incorrect; but there was no doubt that the war was highly unpopular, and that the Lotoo, or great council of the nation, was much divided. The Queen, however, and her brother, both possessing great influence with the King, were resolutely bent on the continuance of hostilities, and great exertions were made to collect a formidable force, which, as it was formed, was advanced to positions approaching to the British cantonments at Prome, and stationed at Pagahm, Melloon, Patanagoh, and finally at Meaday, where the troops arrived in the beginning of August, to the extent of about twenty thousand men. The whole force in motion was estimated at double that number, under the command of Memia Bo, a half brother of the King, besides twelve thousand at Tongho, under the Prince of Tongho and the Thekia-woon. To oppose them, General Campbell had, at Prome, something less than three thousand effective men, and had ordered about two thousand more to join him in time for the opening of the campaign.

On receiving intelligence of the advance of the Burman army, Brigadier General Cotton was despatched in the steam boat, with fifty men of the Royal Regiment, to reconnoitre.

The enemy were discovered on the morning of the 15th August, at Meaday, on the left bank of the river. A large nullah runs into the Irawadi, immediately below Meaday, from the mouth of which the Burman force was ranged to the extent of a mile and a half up the bank of the main stream. This bank had several Pagodas upon it, for the most part near the nullah, all of which the enemy were stockading, and had entrenched, and they had thrown a ditch and breast-work between them and the river, to protect their boats, which were ranged underneath.

During the progress of the reconnoitring party along their line of defence, the Burmans opened a battery of sixteen guns, of different calibre, from four to six pounders, upon the steam vessel, but, the width of the river being at least one thousand five hundred yards, their shot fell short.

The force displayed by the enemy was estimated, by Brigadier General Cotton, at between sixteen and twenty thousand, who appeared to be all armed with muskets, and  
twenty

twenty golden chattahs were counted. They had also a small force on the right bank, with jinjals, opposite to the right of their line, as it faced the river. On the return of the party, the gun boats which the steam vessel had in tow, were disengaged to cannonade the enemy's line, and make them develop their whole force; and it was then ascertained, that they had an advanced party across the nullah already mentioned, thrown on the road leading to Prome, and occupying some Pagodas which overlook it, and which they were stockading. This party were working also on a breast-work on the side of the hill, which would likewise command the road. Three golden chattahs were visible with the latter force. About four hundred boats were seen at Meaday, but only one regular war boat.\*

The menacing aspect of the Burman force was, however, suddenly changed to pacific demonstrations, and the letter addressed by Sir A. Campbell to the Ministers promised to produce the happiest effects.† On the 6th September, a war-boat, with a flag of truce, arrived at Prome, and two Burman deputies, on being conducted to the British General, presented him with a letter in reply to his communication of the 6th of August. This letter purported to be from the General of the advanced army, acknowledging the petitions of the English agent, and officers, and directing them, if they wanted peace, to come and solicit it. This style was not very conciliatory, but being the Court language, it was not thought proper to object to it, beyond pointing out its impropriety to the deputies, and explaining to them, that although the English General was willing to meet Burman commanders half-way, he could not condescend to seek them in their entrenchments. They admitted the force of the objection, and proposed that two officers should be deputed to the Burman commanders, which request was readily complied with, and in order that, if necessary, full powers to negotiate might be obtained from Ava, the British General proposed to grant a suspension of hostilities for a term of thirty or forty days. This proposal, the deputies expressed their conviction, would be concurred in by the Burman commanders. The deputies returned to their entrenchments on the following day, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Tidy, Deputy Adjutant General, and Lieutenant Smith, of his Majesty's ship *Alligator*.

The British Officers were met on their way, by a flotilla of war-boats, having on board several Chiefs of rank, who escorted them to the Burman advanced cantonments, about a mile from Meaday. On their arrival there, they were received with every demonstration of respect, and conducted through a guard of two thousand men, armed with muskets, to a house prepared for their accommodation. On the following day, a deputation visited them from the Kyee-Woongee, the chief in command, to assure them of his anxiety to conclude a pacific treaty; but requesting them not to urge immediate negociation, as it would be necessary to receive instructions from Memia-bo, who was at Melloon. The British deputies having acceded to this proposal, were treated in the interval with the greatest possible attention and kindness: no guard was set over their movements, and all comers had free access to them, which  
afforded

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\* Document No. 143.

† Do. No. 144.

afforded them ample opportunity of learning the sentiments of individuals of every rank, who were unanimous in expressing a hope that hostilities were about to cease. On the 13th of September, the officers waited, by appointment, on the Kyee-Woongee, but the result of the interview was their assent to wait two or three days longer for the arrival of instructions. On the 16th, it was intimated to them, that full powers had arrived, and on the 17th, they again visited the Kyee-Woongee, when it was settled, that the latter should meet General Campbell at Neubenziek, a place mid-way between the two armies, on the 2d of October, to discuss the conditions of peace, and, in the mean time, the terms of an armistice were agreed upon between them and the Atwen-Woon Menghie Maha Menla Raja, and Wondok Menghi Maha Senkuyah. By this stipulation, hostilities were suspended till the 17th of October: the line of demarcation was drawn from Comma, on the western bank of the Irawadi, through Neubenziek to Tongo. The armistice included all the troops on the frontiers in other parts of the dominions of Ava, none of whom should make a forward movement before the 18th October. With respect to the meeting of the 2d of the ensuing month, it was also settled, that two officers on either part should meet on the 23d of September, at Neubenziek, to determine the requisite arrangements, and as it was contrary to etiquette for the Burman Minister to move with a less escort, than one thousand men, half armed with muskets and half with swords, the option was given to General Campbell to be similarly attended. On the conclusion of these preliminary negotiations, Colonel Tidy and Lieutenant Smith returned to Prome.\*

On the 30th of September, the British General proceeded to Neubenziek, assisted at his request, as Commissioner, by Sir James Brisbane, Commander of his Majesty's Naval Forces in the Indian Seas, who had arrived at Rangoon, in H. M.'s ship *Tamar*, early in September, and reached Prome on the 22d, where he assumed the direction of the operations by water.† The ground was found prepared for the encampment of the respective chiefs, with their attendants, and a Lotoo, or hall of audience, erected in the intermediate space, equi-distant from the British and the Burmese lines. At a few minutes before two o'clock, on the 2d of October, two Burmese officers of rank arrived in camp to conduct Sir A. Campbell to the Lotoo, Lieutenant Colonel Tidy and Lieutenant Smith, R. N., were dispatched at the same time to the Burmese cantonment, to pay a similar compliment to the Kyee Woongyee. At two o'clock, Major General Sir A. Campbell and Commodore Sir J. Brisbane, accompanied by their respective suites, proceeded to the Lotoo, and met the Burmese Commissioners, Kyee Woongyee and Lamain Woon, entering the hall, arrayed in splendid state dresses. After the whole party were seated, Sir A. Campbell opened the conference with an appropriate address to the Woongyees, who replied in courteous and suitable terms, and expressed their hope that the first day of their acquaintance might be given up to private friendship, and the consideration of public business deferred until the next meeting. This was assented to, and a desultory conversation then ensued; in the course of which the Woongyees conducted themselves in

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\* Document No. 145.

† Do. No. 146.

in the most polite and conciliatory manner, inquiring after the latest news from England, the state of the King's health, and similar topics, and offering to accompany Sir A. Campbell to Rangoon, England, or wherever he might propose.

On the following day, the appointed meeting took place, for the purpose of discussing formally the terms of peace, at which the following officers were present on the side of the British, Major General Sir A. Campbell, Commodore Sir J. Brisbane, Brigadier General Cotton, Captain Alexander, Brigadier McCreagh, Lieutenant Colonel Tidy, and Captain Snodgrass.

On the part of the Government of Ava, the Chiefs present were Sada Mengyee Maha Mengom-Kyee Woongyee, Munnoo Rut, ha Keogong Lamain Woon, Mengyee Maha Menla Rajah Atwenwoon, Maha Sri Senkuyah Woondok, Mengyee Maha Menla Sear Sey Shuagon Mooagoonoon, Mengyee Attala Maha Sri Soo-Asseewoon.

The principal conditions of peace proposed by the English Commissioners, were the non-interference of the Court of Ava with the territories of Cachar, Manipur, and Asam, the cession of the four provinces of Aracan, the payment of two crores of rupees, as an indemnification for the expences of the war, one to be paid immediately, and the Tenasserim provinces to be retained until the liquidation of the other. The Court of Ava was also expected to receive a British Resident at the capital, and consent to a commercial treaty, upon principles of liberal intercourse and mutual advantages.

In the discussion of these stipulations, it was evident, notwithstanding the moderate tone of the Burman deputies, and their evident desire for the termination of the war, that the Court of Ava was not yet reduced to a full sense of its inferiority, nor prepared to make any sacrifice, either territorial or pecuniary, for the restoration of tranquillity. The protection given to fugitives from the Burman territories, was urged in excuse for the conduct of the Burman Court, although the actual occurrence of the war was attributed to the malignant designs of evil councillors, who had misrepresented the real state of things, and suppressed the remonstrances addressed by the Government of India to that of Ava, thus virtually acknowledging the moderation of the former Government. It was also pleaded, that in the interruption of trade and the loss of revenue, the Court of Ava had already suffered sufficiently by the war, and that it became a great nation like the English, to be content with the vindication of its name and reputation, and that they could not possibly be less generous than the Chinese, who, on a former occasion, having conquered part of the Burman territory, restored it on the return of peace. To this it was replied, the Chinese were the vanquished, not the victors, whilst the British were in possession of half the kingdom, the most valuable portion of which they were still willing to relinquish; but that as the war had been wholly unprovoked on their part, they were fully entitled to expect such concessions, in territory and money, as should reimburse them in the expence they had incurred, and enable them to guard more effectively against any future collision. The manner in which these points were urged, satisfying the Woongyees of the firmness of the British Commissioners, they, at last, waved all further objections, and confined themselves to requesting a prolongation of the armistice till the 2d of November, in order that they might put the Court fully in possession of the views of the  
British



British negociators, and be empowered to give them a definitive reply. This request was readily acceded to. On the representation of the British General, the Woongyees also pledged themselves, that all British and American subjects detained at Ava, should immediately be set at liberty, the British Government liberating the Burmans taken on the coast, and confined in Bengal. On the day after this conference, the Burman officers dined with the British General, and this intermixture of friendly hospitality with the prosecution of hostilities, whilst it excited their astonishment, taught them a lesson of civilization, which it is to be hoped may not have proved in vain. The Burman character, although not worthy of implicit trust, is far from suspicious, and no feeling of uneasiness or alarm appeared to impair their enjoyment of British hospitality. The parties separated, well pleased with each other. Captain Alexander and Brigadier McCreagh accompanied the Kyee Woongyee to near Meaday, and three of the Burman Chiefs attended Sir A. Campbell to Prome.

The notion of treating upon a perfect equality, which evidently pervaded the recent negociations on the part of the Burman Commissioners, and which probably originated not only in the haughtiness of the Court of Ava, but in an impression entertained by it, to which the acknowledged anxiety of the British authorities for peace had given rise, that they were unable or disinclined to carry on the war, rendered the ultimate result of the conferences at Newbenzeik little problematical, and arrangements for resuming hostile operations were actively pursued. Their necessity was soon evinced.\* The Court of Ava, indignant at the idea of conceding an inch of territory, or submitting to what, in oriental politics, is held a mark of excessive humiliation, payment of any pecuniary indemnification, breathed nothing but defiance, and determined instantly to prosecute the war. With more regard to the existing treaty, however, than was to have been expected from the Burman commanders, no operations of a decidedly hostile character were attempted by them, and although, in the end of October, several Burman parties passed the line of demarkation, and pillaged and burnt the villages within the British lines, these outrages were attributable to the difficulty of checking so ill organised a force, under the immediate expectation of renewed hostilities, rather than to any design of the Commanders to violate the terms of a solemn stipulation. In the pause that ensued before hostilities were renewed, Sir Archibald Campbell addressed the Kyee Woongyee, relative to the prisoners, whose liberation was refused on the plea of troops having moved by way of Negrais to Rangoon; and in reply to his enquiry, as to the probable termination of the truce, that Chief intimated, that the demand for any cession of money or territory, precluded all possibility of a renewal of friendly intercourse. Nothing remained, therefore, but a further appeal to arms.†

The information of the last few weeks, had fully established the assemblage of a very considerable force along the line of the river, between Meaday and Ava, which was gradually drawing towards the British position at Prome. From a direct attack, there was nothing to apprehend,

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\* Document No. 147.

† Do. Nos. 148 and 149.

apprehend, but any serious movement on either flank, might have been attended with some inconvenience. In order to oppose an advance on the right, Colonel Pepper was stationed in Old Pegu, whilst it was thought the detachment at Bassein, after the division at Donabew had been withdrawn, would be a sufficient check against any annoyance from this quarter. The chief point, however, was to keep the enemy on the alert in the line of his immediate advance, and draw his attention as much as possible to Prome. Upon the close of the armistice, the state of the country, and the yet incomplete concentration of resources, rendered the forward movement of the whole army impracticable; but Sir A. Campbell lost no time in detaching a force to drive the Burmans back from an advanced position which they occupied at Wattigaon, about twenty miles from Prome.\* With this view, Colonel Macdowall marched with two brigades of Madras Native Infantry, to attack the post from the left, and Major Evans, with the 22d Native Infantry, was ordered to move upon the front of the position, and attack in concert with the main body, whilst the 18th Native Infantry was advanced to support the 22d, if required. The 38th Native Infantry also was sent round by Saagee, to make a diversion in favour of the assailants. The state of the road did not admit of artillery being attached to either column.

The result of this attempt was disastrous. The main body marched on the evening of the 15th of November. On the morning of the 16th, they encountered the Burmese in great force, who maintained a spirited contest, and, although forced to fall back, kept up a fierce and destructive fire, as they slowly retreated to the works in their rear, which proved to be too strong for the attacking force to carry by storm, and which their want of artillery prevented them from breaching. In attempting, however, to overcome the fire of the enemy, and approach the works, the officers set their men the example of personal exposure, and, consequently, sustained a severe loss. Colonel Macdowall himself was shot in the head by a musket ball, and four of the junior officers were disabled and carried from the field. Lieutenant Colonel Brooke, who succeeded in the command, finding it impracticable to make any impression on the post, was compelled to order a retreat. This was effected with as much regularity as circumstances would permit, the country being a thick jungle, in which the enemy lurked in great numbers, and kept up a galling fire. After a march of severe fatigue, in which a number of the wounded and exhausted were unavoidably left behind, the detachment came to a nullah about nine miles from Prome, where the enemy desisted from pursuit, their attention having been diverted by the movements of the other detachments.†

Major Evans having moved on the night of the 15th, fell in with the enemy's piquets at day-break on the following morning. After driving them back, he proceeded to an opening in the jungle, when he was checked by a very heavy fire from a strong stockade, by which the Light Company, who had preceded the advance, were almost annihilated, and the men of the other companies struck down in considerable numbers. The firing in the direction of  
Colonel

\* Document No. 150.

† Do. No. 151.

Colonel Macdowall's column had been heard early in the morning, but as no appearance of their co-operation was indicated, and the enemy were in much too great a number for a single Regiment to make an impression on them, Major Evans also retreated. The enemy pursued for about three miles, and harassed the rear, but the corps effected its return after a fatiguing march in good order. In this division, as well as Colonel Macdowall's, many of those who fell on the march, through wounds or fatigue, were left behind: the dooly bearers having, at an early stage, thrown down their loads, and fled into the thicket.

The 38th Regiment, under Colonel Smith, approached Wattygaon, only about twelve o'clock on the 16th, and then fell in with what appeared to be the rear of the enemy, at this time engaged in the pursuit of the main division. On the first appearance of the corps, the Burmese fled, but no traces of the main division being visible, and the firing having ceased, Colonel Smith found it necessary to measure back his course to Prome, which he reached after a fatiguing march, without encountering any opposition. The loss on this occasion was severe; besides Colonel Macdowall killed, thirteen officers were wounded, of whom Lieutenant Ranken, of the 43d Regiment, subsequently died of his wounds: fifty-three Rank and File were killed, and about one-hundred and fifty were reported wounded and missing. The principal cause of this disaster appears to have been misinformation as to the enemy's strength, as, instead of two or three thousand, at which their numbers were originally computed, Major Evans estimated those opposed to him to be not fewer than five thousand, whilst those engaged by the main division were reckoned, by Lieutenant Colonel Brooke, at between ten and twelve thousand men. The position was also one of considerable strength, and, from the density of jungle, of difficult access.

The ultimate consequences of this disaster were not unfavourable, as it encouraged the Burman Generals in the high opinion, they were still rather inclined to entertain, of their own power, and induced them to adopt a system of confident warfare, which brought them within the reach of the British Commander. Relying on the manifestation of their purpose to attack him in his position, General Campbell determined to await their advance, and the enemy soon made their appearance round Prome to the extent, it was estimated, of between fifty and sixty thousand men. As their numbers enabled them to spread over a considerable tract of country, they were enabled to detach parties past both flanks of the British position, by which the communication with Rangoon was threatened, and the districts below Prome, on both banks of the river, exposed to the depredation of irregular and marauding bands.\* The entire command of the river by the British Flotilla gave them an important advantage, and on the western bank, a position at Padownmew, was occupied by a small detachment in concert with the river force, and maintained, with great spirit, against repeated attempts of the enemy to dislodge them: a detachment was also sent out under Lieutenant Colonel Godwin, to Shudaun, which cleared the left bank of the river of the enemy for ten miles below Prome, and a party of Burmans  
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\* Document No. 152.

having fired upon a division of the 87th, on their way to join the army, the men landed and dispersed the assailants.

After awaiting for some days the expected approach of the Burman force, General Campbell finding that they were reluctant to quit the cover of the jungle, and that they continued to harass the country, and disturb the line of communication, determined to make a general attack upon every accessible part of the enemy's line, to the east of the Irawadi, which extended from the Napadee hills, a commanding ridge on the bank of the river, to the villages of Simbike and Sembah inland, about eleven miles to the north-east of Prome. The Burman army was divided into three corps : the right was formed on the western bank of the river ; the centre was stationed upon the hills of Theybu, or Napadee, and communicated through a thick forest by a line of posts with the left, which was posted at Simbike, upon the Nawine river. The left was commanded by Maha Niow, the centre by the Kyee Woongyee, and the right by the Sada Woon ; the divisions were all strongly stockaded, and occupied positions of difficult approach.

Leaving four regiments of Native Infantry for the defence of Prome, General Campbell marched early on the morning of the 1st December against the enemy's left, whilst the Flotilla, under Sir James Brisbane, and the 26th Madras N. I. acting in co-operation, by a cannonade of the works upon the river, diverted the attention of the centre from the real point of attack.

Upon reaching the Nawine river, at the village of Ze-ouke, the force was divided into two columns. The right, under Brigadier General Cotton, proceeding along the left bank of the river, came in front of the enemy's entrenchments, consisting of a series of stockades, covered on either flank by thick jungle, and by the river in the rear, and defended by a considerable force, of whom eight thousand were Shans, or people of Laos, under their native chiefs. The post was immediately stormed. The attack was led by Lieutenant Colonel Godwin, with the advanced guard of the right column, consisting of his Majesty's 41st, the flank companies of his Majesty's Royal and 89th Regiments, supported by the 18th Madras Native Infantry, and the stockades were carried in less than ten minutes. The enemy left three hundred dead, including their General Maha Niow, and all their stores and ammunition, and a considerable quantity of arms were taken. The left column, under the Commander in Chief, which had crossed the river lower down, came up as the fugitives were crossing, and completed the dispersion of the Burman army.\*

Following up the advantage thus gained, General Campbell determined to attack the Kyee Woongyee in his position without delay. The force accordingly marched back to Ze-ouke, where they bivouacked for the night, and resumed their march on the following morning at day-break. The nature of the country admitted of no approach to the enemy's defences upon the hills, except in front, and that by a narrow path-way, accessible to but a limited number of men in line. Their posts at the foot of the hills were more readily assailable, and from these

the se they were speedily driven ; but the attack of the heights was a more formidable task, as the narrow road by which they were approached, was commanded by the enemy's artillery and breast-works numerously manned. After some impression had been apparently made by the artillery and rockets, the first Bengal Brigade, consisting of his Majesty's 13th and 38th, Regiments, advanced to the storm, supported on their right by six companies of his Majesty's 87th. They made good their ascent in spite of the heavy fire they encountered, and to which scarcely a shot was returned ; and when they had gained the summit, they drove the enemy from hill to hill, until they had cleared the whole of the formidable and extensive entrenchments. These brilliant advantages were not gained without loss, and in the affair of the 1st, Lieutenants Sutherland and Gossip, of his Majesty's 41st, and Ensign Campbell, of the Royal Regiment, were killed, and Lieutenant Proctor, of his Majesty's 38th, Lieutenant Baylee, of the 87th, and Captain Dawson, of his Majesty's ship *Arachne*, in that of the 2nd. On the 4th of December, a detachment, under Brigadier General Cotton, proceeded across the river, and drove the left wing of the enemy not only from their post upon the river, but from a strong stockade about half a mile in the interior, completely manned and mounting guns. The enemy were dispersed with severe loss in killed and prisoners, and their defences were set on fire.\*

The beneficial results of this action were immediately apparent in the disappearance of the flanking parties of the enemy, and the re-establishment of a free communication along the river ; but in order to realise all the advantages to which it was calculated to lead, Sir A. Campbell immediately advanced in pursuit of the retreating army. As it was known that the enemy had fortified the positions along the river from Meaday to Paloh, and had strengthened them with great labour against the direct line of attack, General Campbell determined to move upon them circuitously, with one division of his force, so as to turn them as high as Bollay, whilst another division proceeded along the river, communicating and co-operating with the Flotilla. Of the first division he took the command himself : the second was placed under Brigadier General Cotton, and the Flotilla proceeded under Commodore Brisbane, having on board a military force, commanded by Brigadier Armstrong. General Campbell marched on the 9th of December to Wattygaon : on the 11th, the column was detained by a heavy fall of rain, which continued for thirty hours, rendering the roads almost-impassable, injuring a considerable quantity of Commissariat stores, and inducing extensive sickness amongst the troops : cholera, in particular, became alarmingly prevalent both in this and General Cotton's division, but luckily was not of long continuance. In consequence of these causes of detention, the column did not reach Bollay till the 16th, when it came into communication with the other divisions. The enemy having abandoned Meaday, General Campbell pushed on to Tabboo with the advance, whence he detached the Body Guard in pursuit, who overtook the Burman rear about five miles beyond Meaday, and made some prisoners. General Campbell fixed his head-quarters at Meaday on the 19th.†

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\* Document No. 154.

† Do. No. 155.

The column under General Cotton moved on the 13th December, and on the 16th, approached Bolly; but just below that place was stopped by a deep nulla, across which it was necessary to throw a bridge. On the 18th, the division crossed, and encamped at Inggown on the 19th. On the road, the column passed the enemy's stockades below Palho, which, had they been defended, could not have been carried without great loss, the stockades extending along rugged and deep ravines, and being screened by a thick bamboo jungle, so as not to be visible till the road led to within a few yards of them. These defences were, however, abandoned, and the villages everywhere deserted.\*

The Flotilla moved on the morning of the 12th December, and worked up against the current with great labour, but failed to encounter that opposition for which the extraordinary strength of the works along the river had been prepared. The channel of the river being also, in many places, so narrow, as to oblige the boats to pass within two hundred yards of either bank, the passage, if opposed, could not have been forced without sustaining considerable loss.† Their defeats, however, early in the month, and the unexpected movement of the main force on the flank of their positions, seem to have disconcerted the Burman commanders, and they precipitately retreated to Melloon on the right bank of the Irawadi. Their losses in the field, and by desertion, had likewise been augmented by the ravages of disease, and the road was strewn with the dying and the dead, or the mangled remains of the Burmese, who had perished in vast numbers on the retreat. At a short distance from Meaday, it became necessary to halt the European part of the force, owing to a failure in the supply of animal food. Sir A. Campbell, however, moved on with the Madras division towards Melloon. The Flotilla also proceeded on its route.

On the 26th of December, General Campbell was met on his march by a flag of truce, with a letter expressing the wish of the Burman commanders to conclude a peace, and proposing that the leaders, on both sides, should meet to determine its conditions. Two British officers, Lieutenant Colonel Tidy and Lieutenant Smith, R. N., were deputed to ascertain what arrangement was contemplated by the Woongyees, and, in the mean time, the army continued its march to Patanagoh, opposite to the Burman entrenchments of Melloon. It arrived at Mingoun on the 28th, where a letter was received from the Burman General, postponing the meeting till the 24th of January, a delay that was declared inadmissible, and a definitive reply was demanded before sun-set on the 29th, at Patanagoh, where the army arrived, and encamped without molestation. The Flotilla also ascended the river, and anchored above the Burman lines, without experiencing any demonstration of hostility; an indication of the sincerity of the Burman commanders.‡

In the communications that ensued, Sir A. Campbell was assisted by Mr. Robertson, the Civil Commissioner in Pegu and Ava, who had been appointed to the general superintendence of the civil affairs in the provinces under British authority, and to the conduct, jointly with

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\* Document No. 155. (B)

† Do. Do. (C)

‡ Do. No. 156.

with the Commander in Chief, of political intercourse with the Court of Ava. Mr. Robertson arrived at Rangoon in October, and joined the army at Prome on the 27th November. Shortly after his arrival, arrangements were made for the civil administration of Rangoon, Bassein, Martaban, and Ye, as well as for the collection of the revenue from such parts of the Country, as had not suffered from the desolating system of Burman warfare.

In the train of the Commissioner, was a Burman priest, designated as the Rajgooroo, the spiritual preceptor of royalty, who, with his followers, had been allowed to return from Bengal. At the breaking out of the war this person had been travelling, ostensibly, for purposes of devotion, in Hindostan, and after leaving Benares was arrested by the British authority at Lucknow. After being detained some time in Calcutta, he was liberated, and sent back to Rangoon, and he reached Prome in the suite of Mr. Robertson. As the period of his arrival was the eve of important military operations, he was not allowed to proceed immediately on his journey; but, after the defeat of the Kyee Woongyee at Napadee, and the advance of the army to Meaday, he was permitted to continue his route, and was furnished with a private note, expressive of the undiminished readiness of the British officers, to grant peace to the Court of Ava upon liberal conditions, which it was expected he could communicate to his master. It seems doubtful if he displayed much anxiety to smooth the way to the restoration of tranquillity, and it is probable that his influence was little felt in any respect. The Burman priests, generally, possess but a slight hold upon the minds of the people, and the personal character of the present king renders it unlikely that he would listen to the councils of the Gooroo.

In the present instance, however, a sufficient interval had not elapsed for his interference to have produced any effect at Ava, although, from the letters of the Burman Generals, it appeared that he had been instrumental in inducing them to make their present overture. Kolein Woongyee, who had lately joined the army, had been furnished with authority to enter upon negotiations, and had been sent from the Court for that purpose. There could be no doubt of the prevailing feeling amongst all ranks of Burmans. The war had long been most unpopular: the best troops of the state had been destroyed or disorganised: the new levies raised to supply their place, were of the worst description, procured at an immense expense, and were thinned by desertion the moment they took the field. Most of the members of the Lotoo, or great council, and the King's own relations, warmly advocated peace, and he was well inclined to listen to their advice. The Queen, and the small party of her kindred and adherents, still, however, counselled opposition, and the pride of a barbaric sovereign could ill stoop to make the sacrifices, by which alone tranquillity could be purchased. The advance of the British army from Napadee seems, however, to have turned the scale in favour of pacific councils, and Kolein Woongyee was, in consequence, sent from Ava to Melloon, to endeavour to set a treaty on foot. In this he was cordially seconded by the Kyee Woongyee, who, although he continued high in command, and discharged his duties with credit, was, throughout, opposed to the war.

After some unimportant preliminary discussions, it was agreed that Sir A. Campbell, Mr. Robertson, and Sir James Brisbane, whom the British Commissioners solicited to co-operate

operate with them in the pending negotiations, should hold a conference with Kolein Menghee and the Kyee Woongyee, on the Irawadi, between Patanagoh and Melloon, in a boat fitted up by the Burmese for the purpose. The first conference took place on the afternoon of the 30th December; each party was accompanied by fifty unarmed attendants, and the conference was public. At the first meeting, the terms were stated generally, and their further discussion postponed till the next day. On this occasion, Kolein Menghee declared, that, besides the general orders issued by the Court to make peace, he had lately received particular instructions to that effect, and that his acts were to be considered as those of the King. On the next day, the Burman Commissioners acceded to those terms which were previously proposed as the basis of the treaty, with the addition of the provinces of Ye, Tavai, and Mergui, which were now included amongst the demands for territorial concession. The pecuniary demand was reduced to one crore of rupees.

A third interview, for the purpose of adjusting the payment of the stipulated indemnification, was to have taken place on the 1st of January; but Kolein Menghee being unwell, it was deferred till the 2d. The Burmese Chief requested the aid of an English Doctor, and Assistant Surgeon Knox was selected, for his conversancy with the language, to wait upon him. On the 2d, the meeting took place, when the Burman Commissioners endeavoured strenuously to evade the money payment, which they asserted the country was unable to make, and they solicited its remission as an act of charity. They were also very reluctant to concede the province of Aracan, as compromising the national honour; and, with respect to Manipur, they declared that they had no objection to withdraw from all interference with the affairs of that country, although they hesitated to acknowledge Gambhir Sinh as the Raja, as they asserted that the person whom they regarded as the lawful Prince was residing under the protection of the Court at Ava. Finding, however, the British Commissioners could not be induced to deviate from the conditions stipulated, they finally yielded, and Kolein Menghee closed the conference by exclaiming, "Now we shall be excellent friends." The English copy of the treaty was signed on the 2d, the Burmese on the 3d of January, and an armistice was agreed upon till the 18th of January, by which period it was expected the treaty would receive the ratification of the King, and would be returned from Ava, and that all prisoners would be delivered up, and the payment of the first instalment commenced.

During the conferences, the Burman Commissioners repeatedly declared their being furnished with full powers, and their firm persuasion, that whatever they agreed to, the King would ratify; they expressed their entire satisfaction with the spirit in which the negotiations had been conducted by the British Commissioners, and their gratification at the prospect of a speedy renewal of friendly relations: they made no secret of their motives, and frankly and unreservedly admitted, that the King had been ruined by the war; that the resources of the country were exhausted; and that the road to Ava was open to the British army. There appeared every reason to credit their assertions, and all who had an opportunity of exercising personal observation, were impressed with the conviction, that the negotiators were honest.



To the treaty now agreed upon, the Siamese were made a party, as far as regarded the establishment of amicable relations. Although they had taken no part in the war, they had continued their military demonstrations. In December, a letter was received by Captain Fenwick, at Martaban, from the Ron na Ron, announcing that he was on his march towards the Pegu frontier, with a Siamese army, and had moved to Kamboori on his way. It was, accordingly, arranged by the Commissioners, that Captain Williamson should be attached to the Siamese, and a letter was addressed to the ministers of Siam, in encouragement of the disposition thus manifested. In the mean time, however, Captain Burney had been dispatched by the Supreme Government to congratulate the King of Siam upon his accession, the former sovereign having expired on the 22d July, 1824. His remains were burnt on the 5th May, 1825, agreeably to the Siamese custom, which delays this ceremony for about a year from a sovereign's demise. His successor was crowned on the 4th of August, and Captain Burney reached Bangkok on the 4th of December. He found the Siamese Court much alive to what was passing in their vicinity, but rather sceptical as to the extent of the advantages gained by the English over the Burmans, and by no means confident of the ultimate termination of the war. Neither was it any part of their policy to take an active share in it, or their wish to contribute to the re-establishment of Pegu, as an independant kingdom. The Court of Siam would have been well pleased to have recovered the Tenasserim provinces, which had been wrested from them by the Burman arms, but they hesitated to render the services that might have entitled them to some compensation, not only in the uncertainty of the return they might expect, but in mistrust of their own army, composed as that was, in a great degree, of Peguers, and commanded by a General of Pegu extraction. It was very evident, therefore, that they were by no means in earnest in any intention to co-operate in the war, and the objects of the Envoy were limited to frame a treaty of friendly and commercial intercourse, to adjust some disputes of local importance, and procure the release of the individuals carried into captivity, in which he fully succeeded.

The establishment of the independance of Pegu would have been a serious infliction upon the Burman state, and was well deserved by its procrastinating the war. The measure might have been carried into effect with extreme facility, as the bulk of the inhabitants of the lower provinces were of Pegu, or Talien origin, and were well enough disposed to shake off the heavy yoke of their Burman conquerors. At the same time, there were obvious objections to the arrangement. The people were very much mixed with the Barman race, and their characters indicated neither personal intrepidity, nor national spirit, which could have been relied upon as available in undertaking their defence: neither did it appear that any individual of rank or influence existed, round whom the population would have rallied, as the common object of their reverence or attachment. Subsequent events did not invalidate these conclusions, as, in the short-lived insurrection which immediately followed the war, the Taliens displayed neither steadiness nor valour, and the person who came forward as their leader, was an individual who had actively opposed the British, and who derived his importance from his connexion

connexion with the royal family of Ava, not Pegu, his sister having been one of the wives of the present King. The only persons of any importance in Pegu were the head men of the villages, who had been all appointed under the Burman rule, and the Ron na Ron, a General in a foreign service, boasted no higher an origin than that of the head man of Martaban, which situation had been held by his father, under the Burman Government. The burthen of maintaining Pegu in its independance, must, therefore, have fallen entirely upon the British power, and in the difficulty of nominating a ruler, it would, probably, have been compelled to assume the sovereignty, involving an extension of dominion compatible neither with its policy nor advantage. These considerations induced the Commissioners to abstain from urging any stipulation to this effect, and to reserve it as an extremity, to which the obstinate perseverance of the Court of Ava, in a course of hostility, might compel them to resort.

In the interval that elapsed before the close of the armistice, the utmost cordiality prevailed between the two camps, and the officers of either army associated in the most unreserved manner. That the spirit of the Court was also improved, was evinced by its sanctioning, though unavowedly, an intercourse with the English prisoners at the capital. A boat from Ava arrived in eight days at Patanagoh, on the 6th January, with letters from Dr. Sandford, and Lieutenant Bennet, of the Royal Regiment. These officers left Prome for Rangoon on sick certificate, and fell into the enemy's hands a little below Padoun. It was evident, that their letters were written under dictation, as both the writers were made to say, that the religious principles of the ruling dynasty, and the high sense of honour entertained by the Burmese, would never consent to the dismemberment of their empire, or to the violation of an oath, which had not been broken for ages. They also wrote, that "the Emperor had always been well-disposed towards the British, and neither sanctioned nor approved the present rupture," which, at any rate, was an indication of his now entertaining pacific dispositions. They added, that they were not closely confined, and had been treated, both on their way to Ava, and in the capital, with every indulgence that they could reasonably expect.

In fact, the treatment of the prisoners, who experienced much ill usage, rather perhaps through the haughty indifference, than the cruelty of the Court, and especially through the barbarity and extortion of the inferior officers, was much amended after the capture of Prome, although still frequently and wantonly severe. They had been removed to Amerapura, and from thence to a place about ten or twelve miles from Ava, Aong-ben-le, where they were kept closely confined, and subsisted wholly upon the charity of the poorer and middling classes of Burmans, and upon the earnings of their native servants who were not imprisoned, and who behaved with exemplary fidelity : most of the Sipahis taken prisoners died in confinement, either of hunger or disease, brought on by long abstinence and occasional repletion ; and one prisoner, an old Greek, died on the way to Aong-ben-le, of extreme fatigue, and the barbarous treatment he experienced. As the British army advanced, the fears of the Burman Court secured better usage for the captives, and their services and mediation soon became of importance in the negotiations that ensued.

The happy prospect of an immediate termination of the war at this period was once more disappointed.

On the 17th of January, the day before the armistice expired, the Atwenwoon, Maun Yeet, and three other Chiefs, were sent to the British camp, to apologise for the non-arrival of the ratification of the treaty: at the same time they offered to pay the first instalment of the crore of rupees, or four lacs of ticals, about five lacs of rupees, and to deliver hostages for the safe return of the English prisoners from Ava, who it had been stipulated, should be liberated. These conditions, the Burman Commissioners proposed to fulfil on their own authority, professing not to have received, in consequence of some accidental delay for which they could not account, any answer from Ava, and they solicited, in return, the retreat of the British force to Prome, or at least a further suspension of hostilities. In reply, a conference with the principals was proposed, which being declined on the plea of indisposition by Kolein Menghee, Mr. Mangles, Secretary to the Commissioners, Major Jackson, Lieutenant Smith, Royal Navy, and Mr. Assistant Surgeon Knox, were deputed to Melloon, to confer with that officer. On landing at Melloon, they were conducted to the house of Kolein Menghee, in the principal stockade; but a short interval elapsed before the principal Chiefs made their appearance. When the Kyee Woongyee, and Kolein Menghee entered the hall, and were informed of the ultimatum of the British Commissioners, Kolein Menghee stated, that it would be necessary to refer the matter to Memia Bo, the King's brother, who was now in the immediate neighbourhood, and went to him accordingly to receive his instructions. He returned in about a quarter of an hour, and declining to sign a compliance with the terms required, a further appeal to arms became unavoidable.\*

On the 18th, the Burman Commissioners proposed a further suspension of hostilities for six or seven days, which was at once refused; as it was well known that their excuse of not having received any communication from Ava, was untrue, boats passing daily between the capital and the camp. They were told, that if they evacuated their position at Melloon by sun-rise on the 20th, and withdrew towards Ava, hostilities would not be re-commenced, and the British force would halt wherever the ratified treaty should be received. As they declined compliance with this alternative, they were apprised, that hostilities would commence after midnight on the 18th. Batteries were accordingly erected with such expedition, that by ten the next morning, eight and twenty pieces of ordnance were in position on points presenting more than a mile on the eastern bank of the Irawadi, which corresponded with the enemy's line of defence on the opposite shore: nor had the Burmans been idle, having, in the course of the night, thrown up additional defences of considerable strength and extent, and well adapted to the purposes for which they were constructed.

At eleven o'clock on the 19th, the cannonade began, and having produced the desired impression by one, the troops, previously embarked under cover of the fire, moved off to the opposite

site bank. Lieut.-Col. Sale, with his Majesty's 13th and 38th Regiments was ordered to drop down the river, and assault the main face of the enemy's position near its south-eastern angle, whilst Brigadier General Cotton, with the greater part of the remaining strength, crossed above Melloon to attack its northern front. The boats pushed off together, but the current carried Lieutenant Colonel Sale's party against their point of attack, before that under Brigadier General Cotton had passed the river. Colonel Sale was wounded whilst in his boat, but the Brigade having landed and formed under Major Frith, rushed on to the assault, and bore everything before them with their usual intrepidity. The place was in their possession before Brigadier General Cotton's division could attack the entrenchments, and he therefore directed one of his Brigades, under Lieutenant Colonel Blair, to cut in upon the enemy's line of retreat, by which they suffered considerable loss. The loss of the assailants was inconsiderable, in comparison with the importance of the object achieved, and the resolute manner in which all the divisions, both military and naval, exposed themselves to the enemy's fire. No officer was killed, and but two were wounded besides Lieutenant-Colonel Sale, Major Frith, of his Majesty's 38th, and Lieutenant Dickson, of the Bengal Engineers. In addition to the ordnance and military stores captured, a large magazine of grain was taken, and specie to the value of ten thousand rupees. The efforts of all concerned in the attack were of the most meritorious description, but to none was the success due in a greater degree, than to the Artillery and Rocket Corps, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hopkinson and Lieutenant Blake. The precision and rapidity of the practice in both branches, spread destruction and panic through the Burman entrenchments, and paralysing the energies of the defenders, enabled the assailants to reap the fruits of their daring with so comparatively trifling a sacrifice of life.\*

The original treaty was found in the lines of Melloon, and from this, and from letters ascribed to the Raj Guru taken at the same time, it seemed probable, that the Burman Commissioners had been playing a treacherous part, and had sought only to protract the war by their negotiations for peace, to which they had never intended to obtain the sanction of the King. As far, however, as the Burman Commissioners are concerned, subsequent information exonerates them from the imputation of insincerity. A copy of the treaty was sent to Ava. The treaty which they signed was not submitted, for, in the formal execution of it they rather exceeded their powers, and presumed to anticipate the intentions of their Royal master. Their offer to pay a portion of the instalment, and the discovery of a sum of money in their possession, were further evidences of their integrity, as were their offer to deliver hostages for the release of the European prisoners at Ava, and their actual liberation of Lieutenant Flood, of his Majesty's 12th. There is no reason, therefore, to suspect them of any want of candour, nor is it doubtful, that the Court was anxious for peace. The terms of the treaty were however unquestionably very unpalatable, and the cession of Aracan, and the payment of money, most galling to the feelings of the King and those about him. That he

he should hesitate to give them his acquiescence was not surprising, and those who advocated desperate resistance, taking advantage of this mood, urged him to withhold his final concurrence. Whilst he thus fluctuated, a Chief, whose incapacity was only equalled by his presumption, volunteered his services to lead another army against the English, and promised to retrieve the sinking glory of the empire. As a last hope, his offers were accepted, and it was resolved to try once more the fortune of war. The opportunity was not long wanting.

In the mean time, advices of the capture of Melloon reached the capital, and created the utmost consternation. In the uncertainty of the ultimate result of negotiations for peace, the military operations were suffered to proceed, but the Court determined to renew communications of a pacific tendency with the British General. It was, however, no easy matter to find negociators in whom the British and Burman authorities could now confide, and the high officers of the latter state were very reluctant to be sent upon what they considered a hopeless, if not a dangerous errand. In this dilemma, the Court applied to Mr. Price, a member of the American mission to Ava, who was liberated from confinement on the occasion, and obtained his consent to be employed as an envoy to the British camp. In order also to amend the chance of success, Mr. Sandford, the Surgeon of the Royals, a prisoner at Ava, was associated in the negotiation, upon his giving his parole to return, and in order to conciliate the British authorities, four prisoners of war, three soldiers and the master of a gun-vessel which put into Martaban by mistake, at the beginning of the war, were restored to their liberty, and sent down with the deputies. Mr. Price and Mr. Sandford reached head-quarters on the 31st of January, and after conferring with the Commissioners, returned to Ava on the following day. They were made acquainted, that the terms proposed at Melloon were still open for the acceptance of the Court of Ava, and that with respect to the pecuniary indemnification, the army would retire to Rangoon upon the payment of twenty-five lacs of rupees, and would evacuate the Burman territory upon the discharge of an instalment of similar amount. The advance of the army was not retarded by the stipulations, but was continued towards Pagahm, where it was understood, the enemy's force was collecting. On the route, a small but brilliant affair took place between a reconnoitring party of the Body Guard, under Lieutenant Trant, in which a party of between four or five hundred Burmans was charged, and their Chief killed. The army left Patanagoh on the 25th of January, and reached the Petroleum Wells, at Yenau Gheoun, on the 31st, over a most bleak and sterile country. From thence it moved to Pakang Ye, where it was halted from the 4th to the 6th of February. Above Yenau Gheoun, the country improved at every step, and began from thence to assume the appearance of verdure and cultivation.\*

Having marched from Pakang Ye on the 6th of February, the army under General Campbell reached the village of Yapang on the 8th, and a reconnoissance, on the evening of that day, discovered the enemy about five miles in advance, on the road to the ancient city of Pagahm.

**Pagahm.** On the morning of the 9th, the army proceeded to the encounter, and for the first time found the Burmans had abandoned their system of combating behind barriers, and prepared to dispute the day in the open field, in front of their position at Loganunda Pagoda. Their numbers were estimated at sixteen thousand men, under Zay-yah-thoo-yan, the new General, who had received, on his departing to take the command of the army, the title of Na-wing Phuring, or Prince of Sun-set. His dispositions for the action, whilst they displayed unwonted audacity, exhibited considerable judgment, and he had formed his men in the prickly jungle, on either side of the main road, by which he had calculated the British army must necessarily advance. The object of this manœuvre was easily detected, and frustrated by a corresponding change of position, by which the army advanced in two columns against his flanks. The right, under the Commander in Chief, was formed of his Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, four guns of the Bengal Horse Artillery, and a small detachment of the Body Guard, supported by his Majesty's 89th. The left, under General Cotton, consisted of his Majesty's 38th, supported by his Majesty's 41st, and two guns of the Madras Artillery, whilst the extreme left was further protected by the 43d Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel Parlbby.\*

On moving to the attack, the advanced guard of the right column, consisting of thirty-eight troopers of the Body Guard, and fifty men of his Majesty's 13th, followed closely by General Campbell and his staff, with a couple of guns, and a howitzer, had pushed on considerably a head of the main body, when they came upon a strong piquet of the enemy, who observing their detached position, made a well-concerted movement on both their flanks to enclose and cut them off: a party even succeeded in forming in their rear, but were presently attacked and dispersed by the rest of the 13th continuing their advance and proceeding in open order. After clearing the road of the enemy, the advance proceeded, and left the Commander in Chief behind, with his personal escort and the guns, when the few men immediately in his front were driven in by a mass of Manipur horse, and forced back precipitately upon the guns. Their situation, and that of the whole party, was one of imminent peril, from which they were extricated by the gallantry and steadiness of the small division of the Body Guard, attached, as his personal escort, to the Commander in Chief. Dashing past the retreating skirmishers to right and left, they deployed in their rear, and with a cool determined courage, that would have done honour to any cavalry, kept the superior number of the enemy at bay: falling back gradually till within range of the guns, they then filed off to the right and left, to allow the latter to open, which effectually checked the assailants, and gave time for additional troops to come up, and drive them from the field.†

The attack upon the main divisions of the enemy was eminently successful, and they soon broke and fled before the fire of the advancing columns; part retreated to a well-constructed field work, from which they were immediately dislodged by the bayonet, with great slaughter.

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\* Document No. 160.

† Do. No. 161.

slaughter. They then made an attempt to rally within the walls, and about the Pagodas of Pagahm, but were followed with unremitting activity, and in the course of five hours, this last hope of the kingdom of Ava was utterly annihilated. Their vaunting General made his escape into the neighbouring jungle, and shortly afterwards returned to Ava, where he earnestly solicited another opportunity to redeem his credit. The presumption of the request was held less venial than the defeat, and for that, he was ordered from the presence on the night of his arrival, to the place of execution, cruelly tortured on the way thither, and finally beheaded. One gratifying result of this action was, the liberation of the population of the country from the restraint under which they had been kept by the Burman army, and the compulsory separation from their homes. Immediately after the action, they began to come into the camp for protection, and several thousand boats, crowded with people, passed Pagahm downwards, on their way to their native villages and towns. The contest was now evidently about to close, and it remained to be seen, whether the Burman Court would offer timely submission, or whether the British army was to add the capital to its other conquests. To prepare for either alternative, and refresh his troops after their late fatigues, Sir A. Campbell halted the army for a few days at Pagahm.

Whilst these transactions were taking place on the upper line of the Irawadi, the province of Pegu had been the scene of some military operations, which we may here pause to notice. The force stationed at Pegu, under Colonel Pepper, had been originally intended to act only on the defensive, and to cover the province from the Burman detachments that might be sent out from the main body or the garrison of Tongo, which, with some other fortified posts on the Sitang river, still remained in the possession of the enemy. Encouraged by the absence of molestation, and obtaining in the person of Ujina, the former Governor of Martaban, an active and enterprising leader, the Burmans in the end of 1825, became daring and troublesome, and by the acts of pillage and devastation which they committed, occasioned some mischief, and still more alarm. In order to check their incursions, therefore, Colonel Pepper moved from Pegu on the 23d December, and marched to Shoe-gein, on the left bank of the Sitang, which he occupied without resistance. Parties of the enemy shewed themselves occasionally in the jungle, but attempted no collective opposition. A party of one hundred and fifty men was posted at Mikow, and Lieutenant Colonel Conry, with the 3d Light Infantry, was detached to reduce Sitang, the Burman post between Tongo and Martaban.

Lieutenant Colonel Conry reached Sitang on the forenoon of the 7th January, and immediately made his dispositions for the attack, which, from the strength of the place and the inadequate number of the attacking force, entirely failed, with the loss of Lieutenant Colonel Conry and Lieutenant Adams killed, Lieutenants Harvey and Power wounded: one native officer and nine privates were killed, and eighteen rank and file wounded.

On receiving news of the repulse, Colonel Pepper moved with a re-inforcement of the 12th and 54th Regiments Madras Native Infantry, the flank companies of the 1st European Regiment, and a small detachment of Artillery, and at nine in the morning of the 11th of January, reached Sitang. The stockade was found of great extent, built entirely of teak timber: its height

was from twelve to fourteen feet, and it was constructed on an eminence, which commanded every approach: the north face was protected by a creek fordable only at low water. After placing the guns in position, the force advanced to the attack in three columns, the right commanded by Major Home, 12th Native Infantry, the left by Captain Cursham, 1st European Regiment, and the centre by Captain Stedham, 34th Local Infantry. A simultaneous advance was ordered; on which the creek was forded, and the stockade was attacked and carried in about twenty minutes: the advance was made under a heavy fire from the enemy, and the loss was proportionately severe. Captains Cursham and Stedman were killed. Major Home, Lieutenant Fullerton and Lieutenant Gower, were wounded, and the loss in rank and file was fourteen killed and fifty-three wounded.\*

The number of the enemy was computed at three or four thousand. Three hundred dead bodies were found in the stockade, and their loss was estimated at double that number, many being thrown into the river, or into wells, or carried off. The whole of the defences were destroyed on the morning of the 13th.

Shortly after the reduction of the stockade of Sitang, Colonel Pepper was joined by strong re-inforcements from Rangoon, consisting of four companies of his Majesty's 45th, seven companies of the 1st Madras Native Infantry, besides details of the 3d and 34th Madras Native Infantry, altogether eight hundred strong, by which all apprehensions for the security of the country were dissipated, and the population once more resorted with confidence to their homes and ordinary avocations. The efforts of the enemy were not however relaxed, and in the month of February, they made a vigorous attack upon the British post at Mikow, which maintained the communication between Pegu and Shewgein, and covered the country between the former and the Sitang river. The attempt was gallantly repulsed by the young officer who commanded the position, Ensign Clark, with a small detachment of the 3d Madras Native Infantry. Immediately after the news of the action reached Colonel Pepper, a re-inforcement of a hundred rank and file of the 13th Regiment, with twenty Pioneers, under Captain Leggett, was sent to Mikow, as well as a hundred from Pegu, by which the post was secured against the repetition of a similar attempt. The establishment of peace suspended further operations in Pegu.

No occasion had offered for the further prosecution of hostilities against the Burmans in Aracan or Asam, and those provinces continued in the undisturbed possession of the British authorities. Cachar had been likewise unmolested by any foreign force, but it was not till about this time that Manipur was finally cleared of the enemy. It has been already mentioned, that Gambhir Singh and Lieutenant Pemberton, after reaching Manipur in the beginning of the year, were obliged to return to Sylhet for want of supplies. Being furnished with adequate provisions and arms, the Raja, with Captain Grant and Lieutenant Pemberton, again set off for Manipur with the Levy. They quitted Banskandi on the 4th December, and arrived

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\* Documents Nos. 162 and 163.



arrived at the town of Manipur on the 18th.\* There was no Burman force in the vicinity of the city, but a considerable body of them were stockaded at Tummoe, in the south-east corner of the valley, against which a detachment was sent. Finding, however, that the enemy was too strong for the force sent against them, the Commander of the detachment applied for re-inforcements, on which the Raja and Captain Grant immediately marched to his assistance, with the rest of the Levy, across the Mirang hills, into the Burman territory, in which route they passed several stockades that had been commenced in the defiles, but abandoned on their unexpected advance: they joined the detachment on the 18th of January. On reconnoitring the stockade, it was found to be of considerable strength and extent: the party were unprovided with artillery, and an attempt to carry it by escalade must have been attended with serious loss. It was ascertained, however, that the water of the stockade was procured from a Nullah sixty paces distant, and advantage was promptly taken of this circumstance to cut off the Burmans from their supply.†

On the 19th, the Manipur troops effected their advance through a thick jungle, and were not discovered till they had obtained command of the spots whence access to the stream from the stockade was practicable. The enemy on perceiving them, opened a heavy fire, but the men being sheltered by the thicket, suffered little. The Burmese made several spirited sorties to drive them from their positions, as well during the rest of that day, as on the two days succeeding, but they were received with great spirit in a desperate, and, as it appeared, final sortie on the night of the 21st, being repulsed with severe loss, they commenced their retreat. They retired in small parties, three or four at a time, and had completely cleared the stockade by the night of the 22d, when it was taken possession of by the Raja. Four small guns and several jinjals were captured in the stockade, with a quantity of rice, sufficient for two months' supply of the Levy. Lieutenant Pemberton joined the force on the morning of the 20th.

Immediately after this success, a detachment of three hundred men was sent forward, who succeeded in capturing a stockade on the right bank of the Ningti river. More than two hundred of the people of Manipur were liberated on this occasion, and many others were rescued from captivity, by flying parties of the Levy, the whole of which was advanced to the banks of the Ningti, by the 2d of February, whence a ready road lay before them to the capital of Ava. The restoration of tranquillity, however, arrested their advance, and saved the frontier districts from that retaliation, which a long series of cruelty and oppression exercised by the Burmans in Manipur, would, no doubt, have provoked, and would almost have justified.‡

After halting two or three days at Pagahm, General Campbell resumed his march, which now seemed likely to conduct him to the capital of Ava. There, one feeling alone prevailed, and although various reports were thrown out, at one time, of the intention of the King to defend the city to the last extremity, and at another, to protract the war by flying to the mountains, these purposes,

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\* Documents Nos. 164 and 165.

† Do. No. 166.

‡ Do. No. 167.

purposes, if ever conceived, originated in the anxiety of the moment, and were never seriously entertained. The King and his Ministers felt, that they were in the power of the British, and their only anxiety was, that the personal dignity and security of the sovereign should not be violated. It was with as much satisfaction as astonishment, therefore, that they learned from Mr. Price, on his return from Ava, that the British Commissioners sought to impose no severer terms than those which had been stipulated in the treaty of Melloon. To these there was now no hesitation to accede, although a lurking suspicion was still entertained, that the invaders would not rest satisfied with the conditions they professed to impose. With a mixture of fear and trust, Mr. Price was again despatched to the British Camp to signify the consent of the Burman Court to the terms of peace, and Mr. Sandford was now set wholly at liberty, and allowed to accompany the negociator to rejoin his countrymen. These gentlemen returned to Camp on the 13th of February\*, but as the Envoy had brought no official ratification of the treaty, Sir A. Campbell declined suspending his march until it should be received. Mr. Price having returned to Ava to obtain this ratification, the army advanced to Yandabo, within four days' march of Ava, when the negociator, accompanied by the Burman Commissioners, again made his appearance, with the ratified treaty, and the amount of the first instalment, or twenty-five lacs in gold and silver bullion. By this treaty, the Burman Government engaged to abstain from all interference with the affairs of Asam, Cachar and Jyntea, to recognise Gambhir Sinh as Raja of Manipur, to receive a British Resident at Ava, and depute a Burman Resident to Calcutta, to concur in a commercial treaty, and to cede, in perpetuity, the four provinces of Aracan as divided from Ava by the Anupectumien mountains, and the provinces Yeh, Tavai, Mergui and Tenasserim, to the south of the Sanlue or Martaban river. The treaty was concluded on the 24th February 1827.†

On the 5th of March, the troops commenced their return, the greater part proceeding by water to Rangoon: one detachment marched by Sembewghewn to Aeng, over the mountains, and another by the Tongho pass to Ramree, and both reached the places mentioned within a moderate period. At Rangoon, no time was lost in embarking such portion of the force as was no longer required. Mr. Robertson, the Civil Commissioner, returned to Calcutta early in April, and Sir A. Campbell also visited the Presidency by the same opportunity; but shortly afterwards returned to Rangoon, which continued to be occupied, agreeably to the terms of the treaty by a British force, for some months after the termination of the war.

It is foreign to the object of the present Sketch to notice the subsequent intercourse with the Court of Ava, and it is sufficient to remark, that the terms of the treaty have, up to the present period, been fulfilled with as much punctuality as could reasonably be expected. That the Government of Ava feels humiliated by the result of the late contest, cannot be questioned, and any great cordiality between the two powers is not to be looked for, until that impression shall have yielded to the influence of time, the interchange of friendly communication,  
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\* Document, No. 172. † Do. No. 170.

and the realization of those advantages which improved commercial intercourse must eventually afford. In the mean time, the just appreciation of British valour, and of the power and moderation of the Government of India, which the Burmans have derived from the late events, will, it is to be hoped, prevent the possibility of any unfriendly collision, or endanger the harmony that is now happily restored.

It has been already shown that the occurrence of hostilities was unavoidable on the part of the Government of India. Their conduct will best be judged from the details already given, or may be learned from the explanation afforded by the Supreme Government of the principles which influenced their measures.\* Whatever disappointments were felt in the outset, were chiefly the result of physical difficulties, aggravated on the Rangoon side by the judicious but barbarous policy of the Burman Court, and in other quarters by the employment of armies unnecessarily numerous, and consequent embarrassment in providing adequate equipment. These impediments, in some degree inseparable from the prosecution of hostilities amidst local peculiarities, which could not be fully estimated until they had been actually experienced, were, however, no sooner overcome, than a career of rapid and brilliant success ensued; such as was to be expected from the resources of British India. To the intrepid exertion of every branch of the force, native and European, military and marine,† and to the spirit and skill with which they were led, the Government of Bengal paid appropriate acknowledgements in a public Order, and also yielded the tribute of its regret to those who had fallen in the course of the war, by the sword of the enemy, or the still more destructive influence of the climate. The public thanks of the Court of Directors‡ were also given to the Governor General, and Governor of Madras, to Sir Archibald Campbell and Sir James Brisbane,¶ and the Officers and men engaged

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\* Document No. 175.

† Do. No. 171.

‡ Do. No. 176.

¶ During the progress of these pages through the press, the Quarterly Review for April 1827, has reached us, in which we find it asserted, that the command of the Expedition to Rangoon was entrusted to the Quarter Master General. How far this is from being correct, the subjoined Documents, to which we have been permitted to have access, will shew.

*Extract from a Letter from the Secretary to Government in the Political Department, to Commodore Grant, c. B. ; dated the 12th March, 1824.*

I am directed by the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 25th ultimo, and to convey to you the cordial acknowledgements of the Government, for the prompt and valuable aid, which it is your intention to afford his Lordship in Council, in the prosecution of offensive operations against the Burman nation.

In the event of your being able, without injury to the service in which you are now engaged, to proceed to Rangoon in the months of May or June, either touching at Madras, for the purpose of accompanying the second division of troops from that presidency, or repairing at once to the scene of action, his Lordship in Council would anticipate the most essential benefit to the expedition from the presence of his Majesty's ship, and your personal superintendence of the measures which it may be found expedient to undertake against Rangoon, and the other maritime possessions of the enemy.

gaged in the war,\* and his Majesty's Government signified their approbation of the conduct of the Governor General, in his elevation to superior honours.

That the results of the war cannot fail to be widely beneficial, will be evident from a consideration of the state of those countries which are now annexed to the British empire. Distracted hitherto by incessant feuds, and overrun by hostile armies, or predatory bands, regions once animated by a happy and numerous population, had been converted into wide and unwholesome thickets, and ceased not only to be the haunts of man, but had become hostile to human life. Under their new masters, Asam, Cachar, Aracan, and the Tenasserim provinces, will experience a tranquillity and security they have not known for ages, and must once more assume that character of plenty and prosperity, which the latter wore when the Europeans first visited their coasts, and which tradition, and the remains of roads and towns still found in them, indicate were equally the enjoyment of all.

The contracted territory of the Burman kingdom will be productive of little real diminution of its resources, from the circumstance already referred to, of the desolate condition of the provinces which it has consented to relinquish. Its most valuable districts, those along the Irawadi, and at the mouths of that river, are still untouched, and if the lesson the late war has inculcated, induce the Court of Ava to forego schemes of military conquest, and in their room to cultivate the ample means of domestic wealth, which the forests, the fields, and the mines of Ava, and an active and intelligent population supply, it will derive from the contest more solid benefits, than if it had come out of the struggle with undiminished honor or augmented rule.

The advantage to the British empire of India is dependant upon that which its new acquisitions will realise, and will be proportioned to their increased prosperity. A variety of valuable raw produce is procurable, or may be raised from the new territories, to be replaced by the manufactures of India or of Britain. Indigo, Cotton, Salt, Spices, Lac, Dying woods, Timber, Antimony and Tin, are amongst the products of Aracan and the Tenasserim coast, which are likely to invite enterprise, and reward industry. Before, however, the capabilities  
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*Extract from a Letter from the Secretary to Government in the Political Department, to the Officers Commanding His Majesty's Sloops Larne and Sophia; dated 2d April, 1824.*

The Expedition under the command of Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell, being about to proceed against Rangoon, in the dominions of the King of Ava, after touching at the place of rendezvous, Port Cornwallis, on the north-east of the Great Andamans; I have been directed to intimate to you the request of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council, that the senior officer of his Majesty's sloops of war, detached by Commodore Grant to accompany the armament, should assume the naval command of it, subject to the general direction of the Brigadier, commanding the forces.

Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell will apprise you in detail of the objects of the Expedition, in which the services of the naval force will be of the most essential use, and his Lordship in Council relies with confidence on your affording that cordial and zealous co-operation, which ever distinguishes his Majesty's navy, when employed with land forces in the service of their country.

of these regions can be turned to full account, the people by whom they are tenanted, must be raised both in number and character, so as to become productive labourers in their own country, and liberal consumers of the produce of others. That this must be the result of the present order of things cannot be doubted, although any attempts to precipitate so desirable a consummation, would only lead to disappointment.

The acquisition of the southern provinces, as well as the war itself, have brought British commerce more immediately in contact with the Burman kingdom, and are likely to enhance those advantages which have hitherto been reaped from it. It will, indeed, be no unimportant benefit to the merchant to be relieved from the vexatious arrogance which he heretofore experienced from the officers of the Burman ports, and which it is not likely they will feel disposed or be permitted to reassume. The same will be the case at Siam, the trade with which state, under the treaty formed with its Government, and the sentiments of fear and respect which the late events and the proximity of the British power must inspire, will be conducted hereafter on principles more consonant with the practice of polished nations.

To commerce, the provinces of Cachar and Asam hold out less promising prospects ; but they are politically of value as forming a well-defined and naturally strong frontier ; and in the approximation they afford to Tibet and China, it is not impossible that trade may be extended in those directions. Even from the intercourse with the barbarous mountain tribes on the frontiers, some advantages may be obtained, which will gradually augment, as the people are brought within the nearer reach of refinement.

In all these countries, valuable accessions to science are already made, and must gradually accumulate. In Geography, alone, the dark mist that overhung so extensive and interesting a tract, is rapidly clearing away, and the natural features of river and mountain, which are here developed on a magnificent scale, are becoming visible and distinct. Geographical knowledge may seem, indeed, an inadequate compensation for the cost and peril of war ; but its consequences are of the utmost importance to humanity, as well as to science, as a country that has been once rendered accessible to European energy, is no longer excluded from the chance of being visited by the blessings of CIVILIZATION.





