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UNDER LORD ELLENBOROUGH

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

NAWAB SALAR JUNG BAHADUR

Edward Earl of Ellenborough G.C.B.

From the portrait by Sir Thomas Lawrence in the National Portrait Gallery

INDIA
UNDER LORD ELLENBOROUGH

MARCH 1842—JUNE 1844

A SELECTION FROM THE HITHERTO
UNPUBLISHED PAPERS AND SECRET
DESPATCHES OF
EDWARD EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND APPENDICES
BY SIR ALGERNON LAW
WITH A PORTRAIT

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.1
1926

PREFACE.

THE impeachment of Warren Hastings at the bar of the House of Lords by the Commons of Great Britain lasted eight years and ended in his triumphant acquittal. The attempted impeachment of the first Lord Ellenborough who had been his leading counsel was a complete failure; the tellers of the motion for inquiry in the House of Commons found no one to enter their lobby; and all the entries in the Votes relative to the articles of charge were expunged by a motion carried *nem. con.* The impeachment of the second Lord Ellenborough, the Governor General of India, before the bar of history by the writers of "lives," diaries, political and partisan lampoons and pamphlets masquerading as honest history-books, has continued for eighty years. In the meanwhile the public who mostly prefer highly-coloured fiction to plain statements of fact and who delight in ridicule and blame applied to men of marked individuality, have been beguiled into a languid acquiesence in an adverse and absurd conclusion. Public opinion never troubled the supposed delinquent. He appraised it at its true value. He was too convinced of the accuracy and integrity of his own judgment; too happy in the approval of the Duke of Wellington, to take any heed of views and charges springing from party feeling, threatened interests or morbid self-righteousness.

His former colleagues promised to defend him and he was reluctant to embarrass them as a Government by raising a debate on the treatment he had received from the Opposition in Parliament and from that permanent opposition to disinterested administration in India, the

Directors of the East India Company. He did indeed press Lord Ripon, the President of the Board of Control, to publish certain documents in explanation of his measures, but one, who when Prime Minister had hidden himself in a panic at his responsibility, shrank from engaging in any controversy he could avoid. As time went on, Lord Ellenborough was finding ample justification for his measures in the progress of events in India; and he finally resolved to content himself with setting apart to be published after his death "without introduction or comment" his letters to Her Majesty Queen Victoria and his correspondence with the Duke of Wellington, believing that nothing more could in justice or reason be required to vindicate his fame. Unfortunately the loyal precedence assigned to the letters to his Sovereign over those to and from the Duke, introduced some confusion into the sequence of the narrative; so that "The Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough" edited by Lord Colchester has not received the attention which it deserves.

The popular attitude towards his Indian career has thus been left in a state of bewildered hostility, though with the natural decay of time-worn prejudice and partisanship a steady growth of opinion in his favour can be discerned. His papers having been presented by Lady Colchester to the Public Record Office are now open to every impartial student; and the time has come when a selection from those of them which have not yet been published should be made available in a still more accessible shape. The recent posthumous issue of a hasty and ill-informed work by one of his later successors is another and more pressing reason for publication, for the production conforms too closely to the evil precedent set in Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors and Chief Justices to be accepted as a fair or accurate estimate of one of the ablest and most independent, most fearless and far-

seeing of the rulers of India. But the exposure by the late Mr. Atlay of the calumnies heaped upon Chief Justice Ellenborough by 'honest (?) Jock Campbell,' encourages the expectation that popular judgments founded on statements no less erroneous will be drastically revised. Writing in the Times of Nov. 3rd 1925 of "the vindictive hostility of Whig writers towards King George III," and mentioning that "a succession of school-book writers continue to propagate this nonsense to this day," the Hon[ble] John Fortescue, C.V.O., the historian of the British army, who once fell into the trap himself, asks why there is such persistence in error. His answer is: "Only because it is easier to be idle and shout with the crowd than to be industrious and look for the truth." With the new spirit, there is hope. History should be something more healthy, more comely and more upright than the deformed offspring of malice and credulity.

I desire to express my dutiful acknowledgments to His Majesty the King for His gracious acquiescence in the publication of the record of Lord Ellenborough's Audience of Queen Victoria on his return from India and on his receiving an Earldom and the Grand Cross of the Bath.

For the help I have received in bringing out this volume my thanks are in the first place due to Lady Colchester who lent me some important papers before sending them to the Public Record Office. I am also much indebted to the authorities of that Office and of the India Office for the facilities afforded me. I am very grateful to the Duke of Wellington, K.G., for permission to publish certain letters written by His Grace's illustrious grandfather, who was ever my uncle's loyal friend and steady supporter.

And I thank Mr. John Murray, C.V.O., and Mr. W. A. J. Archbold most cordially for much kind encouragement and sound advice; and Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, K.G. and the Hon[ble] George Peel, D.S.O. for passing for publication letters from their distinguished grandfathers;

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and also Colonel Lord Ellenborough, C.B., for allowing his father's graphic account of a debate on India to appear.

I apologise to purists in transliteration for many orthographical vagaries in rendering names of Asiatic persons and places; but then they are not agreed among themselves; though 'Kabul' and 'Karachi' thrive 'Kalkutta' was throttled at birth; and there still exists a struggle to the death between 'Quetta' 'Q'etta' and 'Kwitta.' I am more concerned for the part I play as editor. I can only plead in excuse my inexperience in the kind of task I have undertaken and my eagerness to introduce the correspondence to the public before the night falls and the light is extinguished for ever.

THE EDITOR.

INTRODUCTION.

AS Sir James Fitz James Stephen observes in his work "The story of Nuncomar and his trial before Sir Elijah Impey," the East India Company and its leading servants were greatly disposed to regard the sovereignty of India as their private property but the policy of Parliament was to assert the rights of the King and to establish in India institutions by which those rights might be maintained. The authors of the Regulating Act of 1773, he remarks, did not wish to face the problem; they wished the King to act as the sovereign of Bengal, but did not wish to proclaim him to be so or to interfere with the Mogul Emperor or with the Company which claimed under him and which was invested with the whole civil and military government of the presidency and the ordering, management and government of all the territorial acquisitions and revenues in the Kingdoms of Bengal, Bahar and Orissa. Further the thorough-going advocates of the Company regarded the Supreme Court with aversion as at once the bulwark and the most marked instance of the usurpation by the King of what they viewed as the rights of the Company.

Such was the origin of the secular struggle between Parliament and the East India Company.

By the Act of 1784, the Board of Commissioners for Indian Affairs was empowered to superintend, direct and *control* all acts, operations and concerns which in any wise relate to the civil or military government or revenues of the British possessions in the East Indies; and the Company were required to obey such orders and directions

as they might receive from the Board on these matters. In relation to the levying of war or making of peace or negotiating with any native prince or state in India, the Board were authorized to send secret orders to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors who were bound without disclosing them to transmit such orders to the authorities in India, who were equally obliged to obey such instructions and to return their replies to them sealed (under cover) with their respective seals to the Secret Committee for immediate communication to the Board. Put concisely, India was ruled by a dyarchy in London, and by an oligarchy in India, until a strong man intervened. Thereupon an absolute monarchy took their place, limited only by spasmodic reproofs at least five months too late or in the last resort by peremptory recall, a sort of assassination of the autocrat.

The Company gradually lost ground; it came more and more under the control of the Imperial Government and the substance of power had passed from it long before the fact of its transfer received definite and clear expression in the Act of Parliament of 1858, when the obstructing mask of the Company was torn *once for all* from the face of the real authority, and Company, Directors and Proprietors were swept away. No one recognised more clearly than did Lord Ellenborough the nature of the contest and the inevitable outcome of the relations between Parliament and the Company. He regarded the Company as impotent for good and in its tendency to cling to the remnants of its commerce and revenues and the shreds of its rule as capable only of evil.

Students of Indian History do not perhaps now require to be warned against the effects produced upon public opinion by vested interests as soon as a Governor General grasped the facts and ignored legal fiction and antiquated delusions. They cannot however be too wary in accepting the most positive statements and the

most definite conclusions of contemporary writers. The reversal of Lord Auckland's policy and methods and the supersession of the adherents of that system aroused a frenzied antagonism to the determined and fearless reformer which coloured all the literature of that period.

Many of the directors and proprietors knew that in him they had a Minister who, when President of the Board of Control, was opposed to their monopolies and to the continuance of their rule and who was a foe to every form of nepotism and jobbery. Party motives demanded that the errors of Whig policy and the disasters to which they inevitably led should be hidden, buried and forgotten. The late Ministers had among their number adepts in all the craft of politicians: Palmerston, the astute and secret inspirer of the *Daily Chronicle*, the Stock Exchange speculator of 1825, now gambler in politics, the cuckoo in the Whigs' nest; John Russell, restless, peevish, petulant, vain and selfish, the "broody hen" of Reform, ready to scratch up any spiteful gossip so as to damage an absent antagonist, and Mr. Ex-Secretary at War Macaulay, not yet found out, the complete master of the fine art of discrediting and vilifying his fellow-countrymen in India, prompt to follow up his calumnies against Warren Hastings and Elijah Impey by deriding a Tory Governor General and caricaturing all his proceedings.

In order to gauge the value of Macaulay's writings as a guide to accurate knowledge of past events, lovers of truth should read the late Sir James Fitz James Stephen's above-named work. They will there find a compact example of the famous essayist's skill in investing the barest and basest fiction with the stately robes of historical narrative. Impey offered, in his private capacity, to take voluntary affidavits on matters relating to certain proceedings of Warren Hastings and to go up to Benares for the purpose. A voluntary affidavit was of no legal effect and could be

made before any person whatever. All that was required of the person in whose presence the document in question was signed and sworn, was to be satisfied of the identity of the person who signed and who pledged his oath that the statements in the document were true. He was not expected to read or to have any knowledge of the contents of the document. Macaulay, late member of the Governor General's Council for the making of laws and author of the Indian Penal Code, blinded by his *a priori* conviction that this eminently respectable and impartial judge was in the hands of Warren Hastings a tool to be used in any nefarious design which might be entertained by that illustrious but persecuted statesman, cast aside all his law books when he came to deal with Impey's well-meant honest offer to his friend. In the original essay on Hastings in the Edinburgh Review of October, 1841, Macaulay comments with severity on Impey's necessary ignorance of the contents of these affidavits, because, said he, they were in Hindustani and Persian and no interpreter was employed. Discovering later on that the victim of his animosity was well versed in those languages, he sought for a more plausible pretext to maintain his thesis and hit upon the dialects of some remote and unspecified regions as being certainly beyond the furthest ken of the unhappy Impey. Accordingly in a new edition of his essay he substituted for " Hindustani and Persian," " dialects of North India." As Stephen mildly observes, " this assertion is remarkable, because it is an error upon an error . . . . to suggest a conclusion wholly false."

If a man of Macaulay's wide attainments and high character can so far deceive his own sense of justice in obedience to an impelling belief in Impey's guilt and without any ulterior motive, how can he be trusted to be just when swayed by party spirit and when dealing with a man who had committed the unpardonable sin of being

far-seeing, prudent and triumphant on the very scene of the blind, reckless and disastrous policy of that man's political opponents!

He ridiculed Ellenborough's enthusiastic proclamation to the Princes, Chiefs and People of India. But his own unjust aspersions on English judicial rectitude and his echoings of Burke's neurotic denunciations, have done more damage to the English name in the eyes of the educated classes of India and the rest of the world than has been wrought by all the acts of all the founders of the British Empire. And yet his essay is published and re-published in cheap editions without a cancelled page or warning note, so that the poison is drawn into the mind and heart of every child who learns to read the English language.

Edward Law, the 2nd Lord Ellenborough, the eldest son of the Chief Justice, was born Sept. 8, 1790. He, like his father and his grandfather, the broad-minded Bishop of Carlisle, inherited from a long line of Westmorland "statesmen," a strong individuality and a marked independence of character. A short record of his early days is prefixed to his "Political Diary, 1828-1830," edited by Lord Colchester; an admirable notice appears in the Dictionary of National Biography; and an interesting, though somewhat erroneous sketch, is given in the "Encyclopædia Britannica." In the "Biographic Nouvelle des Contemporains, 1823," there is a striking article upon him, referring in particular to a speech by him when a member of the House of Commmons and claiming for him the esteem of statesmen and the gratitude of nations for the opinions which he then expressed with regard to the state of Europe resulting from the Congress of Vienna.

The House of Commons had, he said, on Feb. 20, 1816, been called upon to admire the annexation of Belgium to Holland as a master-piece of policy; it appeared to him to be pregnant with danger. The

frontiers of the Netherlands were provided with 18 fortresses, but when armies were so prodigiously increased, only great fortresses containing armies rather than garrisons could in his opinion, successfully oppose their career, a shrewd forecast of future developments! A week later, on the Army Vote, he remarked, that it was too much the habit of this country to conclude that what we wished must be accomplished, and that when the cause in which the danger originated had ceased, the danger ceased also. He then proceeded to observe that the small principalities and small republics, with the worst possible governments had combined the greatest quantity of practical happiness. Judging from personal observation in many of those States there was the greatest desire to return to their former governments. These governments had been supported by public opinion—they had no armed force—no taxes to maintain an armed force. They were strictly paternal; without any security for personal liberty, the subjects actually enjoyed much liberty. These States were now no more. In Italy the French who were said to have done harm wherever they went, did much good. They gave the Italians public spirit, education, courage, a desire for liberty, a confidence in themselves and a wish for a general united government. These considerations had been overlooked by the Congress at Vienna; they had left Italy, divided, discontented and insecure; they had united by force Ragusa to Venice, Venice to Lombardy and subjected the whole to a government which all Italians held in the greatest abhorrence and contempt. There was another serious danger, the general demoralisation of Europe produced in great measure by the conduct of the great allies. For with them originated the partition of Poland, and until that original sin had been washed away, it was in vain to calculate upon the restoration of morality. After urging the wisdom of holding ourselves in a state of due preparation, he added

that there was some good sense in ancient mythology in which the goddess of wisdom always appeared in armour, and it would be wise in this country, if it desired to preserve treaties, to be armed with the means of securing observance of them. Such warnings fell on deaf ears. In later times Palmerston's arrogance brought us to the verge of war with France; and the recent publication of John Russell's further correspondence discloses the depths to which our defensive forces had been wantonly allowed to sink.

Ellenborough's sympathy with the cause of Poland only ceased with his life. Another wrong, one connected with the marriage-laws of this country, he succeeded in redressing. The slightest divergence from the prescribed formalities was sufficient to enable a designing libertine to repudiate an innocent confiding woman who believed herself to be his lawful wife. This reform needed all his energy to carry through, for he had to encounter the formidable opposition of the great brothers Stowell and Eldon, whose amendments would have stripped the bill of its efficacy.

There remain other incidents in his career which have not been mentioned in those works. In a debate in the House of Commons, on the Mutiny Bill on March 15, 1813 when 22 years of age he said that the regulations of every army should be founded on the principle of honour or fear, according to the character of the nation, and the British Army should be regulated on the principle of honour; and that no such degrading punishment as flogging ought to be inflicted upon any person who had not forfeited all pretensions to honour.

He was also almost alone in advocating a British Navy equal in ships to those of the other powers.

The future Governor General in his earlier days must have learnt much of the country over which he was destined to rule. Two of his uncles had been in the civil

service of the East India Company in Bengal; an aunt was married to Sir Thomas Rumbold, formerly Governor of Madras; and his father was the leading counsel for the defence of Warren Hastings during the long years of the impeachment which ended in the triumphant acquittal of that illustrious statesman.* Having accepted the Privy Seal when the Duke of Wellington formed his Cabinet, he was glad to be transferred to the Presidency of the Board of Control of Indian Affairs. There he showed himself in favour of ending the Company's monopoly of the China trade and transferring the government of India altogether to the Crown. The Duke, disinclined to make changes until their necessity was beyond dispute, put a drag upon his colleague's reforming zeal. Ellenborough respected his high character, admired his splendid career and great talents and was warmly attached to him personally, but deplored his disposition to stand entrenched on the ground to which he was accustomed and his reluctance to move with the times; and for that reason he regretted his outburst against any measure of electoral reform in England and still more his opposition to administrative reform in India.

Ellenborough returned to the Board of Control in 1834, and on March 18, 1835, he drew the attention of the Directors of the Company to the able report of Mr. (later Sir Charles) Trevelyan on the injury to trade of the Indian internal customs or transit duties and he pointed out their serious effect upon the national wealth and national morals. He expected to obtain compensation for the loss to the revenue through their abolition mainly in the impulse which the freedom of internal trade would give to productive industry; he trusted that the neighbouring States within and beyond the

*Though Westminster Abbey abounds with monuments to Hastings's persecutors and detractors, the Parliament and people of England have not yet had the justice to expiate this wrong by placing so much as a tablet to his memory. There would be none without his widow's touching token of regret.

Indus would adopt similar measures; and he looked forward, sanguinely perhaps, but yet confidently to the time when the whole peninsula of India would without detriment to the independence of any State within its limits, be, as regards the commercial intercourse of its population, one great Empire.

He concluded by requesting that the Government of Bengal might be directed to repeal at once all the strictly internal duties to which he had drawn attention. The principle, he said, applied to all India, and he regretted every hour which passed over the head of this recognised abuse.

In reply the Court deprecated doing more than to give authority to the Local Government to take such measures after full inquiry as might seem most fit to be adopted. When the Indian Government during Ellenborough's time in India removed these duties in the Madras Presidency the Court with Lord Ripon's concurrence without the knowledge of the Cabinet disallowed the measure.

In the opinion of Brougham, a famous master of forensic oratory (Life and Memoirs, Series iii) "Ellenborough was another formidable adversary. He was one of the best speakers I ever heard—clever, nervous, short, *incisive*, with such a voice as few have for sonorous and penetrating force. It was to me one of the highest gratifications to hear him. He worked hard too, and argued as powerfully as he declaimed." . . . In his East India government he was most successful; but Peel, as usual did not well defend him and he always said he owed his defence to the Duke of Wellington and myself. His error in India was not treating the Directors with sufficient respect and flummery. Lord Wellesley, like Ellenborough, had refused to do their jobs; but he had refused with great politeness." The Duke of Argyll, another celebrated speaker, remarks (Life, vol. 1, p. 511 Edn. 1906) "In the House of Lords (December 1854) we had some

formidable opposition to encounter. Our chief enemy was not Derby, but Ellenborough, whom I always thought the finest speaker in the House. His forcible diction, his fine delivery, and his apparently passionate conviction, were qualities which made him a great orator, and we had to endure on this occasion one of the finest examples of his power . . . . Some of his language was violent and in the end he denounced the Bill (for the enlistment of foreign troops to carry on the war in the Crimea) as 'one insulting to a generous and confiding people.' When he sat down none of us rose to reply." There is in Lord Fitzmaurice's admirable Life of the 2nd Earl Granville (vol. I, ch. IX, p. 234) a passage in which he doubtless reflects the views of his grandfather Lord Lansdowne, who as Lord Henry Petty sat with the 1st Lord Ellenborough in the Cabinet of "All the Talents:" "With Lord Derby sat Lord Ellenborough whose comparatively rare appearances in debate had nevertheless earned for him a reputation as an orator superior even to Lord Derby for he had inherited much of the peculiar eloquence of his celebrated father, the Lord Chief Justice, that eloquence which Bentham described as 'commanding, fierce and atrocious' and stigmatised as an 'abomination,'" a philosopher's formula for expressing emphatic dissent!

The London correspondent of *The Manchester Guardian*, stated in 1871, that Guizot, the French statesman, had considered Ellenborough the most brilliant of the Tory orators; and that "it would be difficult to do justice to the charm and impressiveness of his manner. His voice was the finest in either House of Parliament—Gladstone's not excepted—sonorous, full, clear and penetrating. His figure was manly, the hair grey with the snows of eighty winters, yet still abundant. His features were as handsome as became his parentage . . . . His gesture was easy and dignified; the emphasis not too frequent, yet when it fell it struck like a hammer-stroke. His elocution was simply perfect."

THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR.

In a despatch from Simla, dated August 14th, 1838, Lord Auckland, Lord Ellenborough's Whig predecessor, set forth his views in the following passage: "Of the justice of the course about to be pursued there can exist no reasonable doubt. We owe it to our safety to assist the lawful sovereign of Afghanistan in the recovery of his throne . . . . we should have an ally who is interested in resisting aggression and establishing tranquillity in place of a chief seeking to identify himself with those whose schemes of aggrandisement and conquest are not to be disguised." The lawful sovereign referred to was Shah Shuja who had been deposed by his own subjects and had since been living in British territory with one intermission (when with the connivance of Lord William Bentinck he made an abortive attempt to recover his throne) as a pensioner of the Indian Government. Auckland next issued at Simla a Declaration on October 1st of the same year, to this effect: "It was now evident that no further interference could be exercised by the British Government to bring about a good understanding between the Sikh ruler and Dost Mahomed Khan; and the hostile policy of the latter chief showed too plainly that so long as Kabul remained under his government, we could never hope that the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be secured or that the interests of our Indian Empire would be preserved inviolate." This was Auckland's case. This thesis was speciously supported by the "Correspondence relating to Afghanistan" presented to Parliament in 1839. But in 1851 Kaye's History of the War in Afghanistan established beyond all doubt that there must have been a great mutilation of documents in the blue-book of 1839 and that the reports from Kabul of our agent, Sir Alexander Burnes, had been audaciously misrepresented. And in 1858 Lord Stanley the President of the India Board during the Prime Ministership of his father

Lord Derby, consented to the publication of the complete papers without any omission whatever and the full truth was then at last unveiled.

It was found that Sir Alexander Burnes's reports, during his mission to Kabul, were so garbled as utterly to distort their meaning. He was made to express opinions the very reverse of those he held. A plaintive letter from Dost Mahomed, the ruler of Kabul, to one of his own brothers imploring him to be faithful to the English Government was omitted and every other shred of evidence proving his desire to be our ally was carefully struck out. Every fact favourable to Dost Mahomed as regards Herat and Persia and the Russian mission to Kabul was eliminated from Burnes's despatches, and a long, persuasive and fervent plea by Sir Alexander on behalf of the Dost was turned into an alarmed, short, urgent appeal to Auckland to lose no time in rising up to crush him ! The meaning of an important despatch from Burnes of January 26th, 1838 was perverted. The fact that Dost Mahomed had submitted to Burnes's approval a draft of his reply to the Russian Government was also suppressed. No wonder Dost Mahomed exclaimed in one of his letters " I have not abandoned the British; but the British have abandoned me."

The war which sprang from the pursuit of this insensate policy led to the loss of an army and gave a blow to our good name and a shock to our power, which deeply affected the discipline of the native army, the stability of British rule and our credit for justice among the nations of Asia.

Whoever wishes to make a military study of the first British invasion of Afghanistan should not neglect the history of the early stages of the war by Sir Henry Marion Durand, the distinguished soldier and administrator whose exploit of blowing up the Kabul gate of Ghuzni was one of the bright spots in the chequered story. In order to

grasp the magnitude of " the grand object of re-instating Shah Shuja on the throne of Afghanistan," the student should reckon the great distance to be traversed. The British base of Ferozepor was at the time a frontier post at the N.W. extremity of our Indian territories and was 1200 miles from Calcutta. From Ferozepor to Sukkur on the broad and unbridged Indus lay 404 miles of foreign neutral territory partly desert. The first objective thence was Kandahar 450 miles beyond Sukkur over the passes of the Hindu Khush. The only means of transport for all the unwieldy baggage and supplies of an army on the move in the East were camels, mules, bullocks and horses. From the outset of the march there was want of food and forage. Man and beast were put on half rations and even quarter rations and their sufferings from hunger, thirst, heat and fatigue, were such as one hardly dares to imagine. In addition to these disadvantages, the generals who were competent were not heeded and those who were inexperienced or incompetent were employed; the political officers who were empowered to direct the generals were indiscreet and optimistic. Nevertheless, Kandahar, Ghuzni and Kabul fell. The goal was reached. The pretender was enthroned amid a sullen and indignant people. Now once again a Sovereign, he founded the Order of the Durani Empire, and Auckland the Governor General, Keane the general in command, and MacNaghten, the Indian Foreign Secretary, and others were distinguished by the decorations of its highest class! If the promise of Auckland's declaration of October 1st, 1839 had been kept the British troops would have been then withdrawn. But they were not. MacNaghten remained as British envoy and as supreme authority over Elphinstone, who weakened in body and spirit by ill-health and unable to walk had reluctantly accepted the command of the army of occupation thrust upon him by Auckland's insistence.

From time to time and from place to place, chiefs and people rose, with varying success. But Dost Mahomed deserted by his followers sought refuge in Bokhara where he was imprisoned. He escaped and while he was in hiding, MacNaghten wrote: " No mercy should be shown to the man who is the author of all the evils that are now distracting the country . . . . . I shall request His Majesty not to execute him till I can ascertain His Lordship's sentiments." Auckland indeed might have had some searchings of conscience as to the identity of the real culprit. When Dost Mahomed Khan had surrendered, MacNaghten seems at last to have felt some such qualms, for he then wrote: " I trust the Dost will be treated with liberality," and yielding to an impulse of candour confessed " We ejected the Dost who never offended us, in support of our policy of which he was the victim." While the Dost's son Mahomed Akbar Khan was gathering forces and advancing on Kabul the gay and impudent Palmerston in an address to his constituents described the whole of Afghanistan as in a state of such unexampled tranquillity that an unarmed Englishman might ride as safely in the midst of its wilds, as he could have travelled from Tiverton to John o'Groat's. But his colleague at the Board of Control had taken alarm and wrote a despatch through the Secret Committee in a tone of complaint and reprehension at the insurrections and reverses, the continued military expenditure and the growing anarchy. Auckland in reply deprecated a retrograde movement. He was able to point to the recent surrender of Dost Mahomed, the re-occupation of Kelat and Major General William Nott's successes, and the retirement of Russia from her attempt to establish her influence on the Oxus.

Sir Jasper Nicolls the Commander in Chief in India, had from the first faced the facts and foreseen the inevitable withdrawal. He knew that though money might be forthcoming, men and transport and material resources

were wanting. But Auckland heeded not. Moreover, bad policy having placed the troops in a false strategical position, blind generalship put them into a false tactical position. They should have been quartered in the Bala Hissar, the great fortress which commanded Kabul, but the general yielding to the envoy accepted a site which was very inferior. At length Akbar Khan reached Kabul. MacNaghten met him in parley and was murdered.

The harrowing sequel is graphically described in her narrative by Lady Sale, a woman with the spirit of a Joan of Arc. She tells how day by day a once fine force, paralysed by bewildered and irresolute commanders, gradually lost all confidence, discipline and cohesion. Then when its leaders come to a shameful convention with faithless foes, the army began its hurried retreat, without supplies and with scanty transport, amid snow and ice, over high passes and jagged rocks and through deep and narrow valleys, harried day and night by vengeful tribesmen and falling easy victims to fatigue and frostbite and to the gun and the knife of the relentless and treacherous enemy. Of all their number only one solitary being reached a refuge from his pursuers.

The report of the destruction of Elphinstone's army reached Calcutta on the 30th January. The occurrence of such a disaster had been considered probable so early as the 2nd of December, when Nott, the General at Kandahar, was informed by Auckland that in case Kabul was lost, the commanding officers should fall back on the nearest support after providing for the safety of the various detachments as far as possible. Nott was then to provide Colonel Palmer at Ghuzni with suitable instructions while the Sikh Government would be asked to assist the Colonel's Corps if it retired. On February 10th he was told to act on his own judgment to secure the safety of his troops and to uphold the honour of the British Arms. If he resolved to fall back upon Quetta, he was to do his best to relieve

Khelat-i-Ghilzi and Ghuzni also, if it should be within his means. Pollock in command at Peshawar was to confine himself to extricating Sale's brigade from Jellalabad. Upon George Russell Clerk, the British Agent in the Punjab, was thrown the burden of deciding what was to become of Pollock's army, which was ultimately to fall back on the Sutlej. Nott was naturally alarmed at the prospect of being left thus to bear the brunt of the hostile forces. Pollock signified his dissatisfaction with Auckland's instructions, and advanced as arguments in favour of moving on Kabul the state of his negotiations for securing by payment the opening of the Khyber pass, the friendship of two or three petty chiefs and the opinion of two prominent natives that the district beyond could furnish supplies to his force for a year if stationed at Gandamuck. He expected to be able to punish the enemy and release the prisoners. These reasons were not convincing at a moment when there was a force of 25,000 hostile, insolent and untrustworthy Sikhs at or near Peshawar, and when he had no means of movement. Pollock was also embarrassed by the refusal of some native regiments to enter the Khyber pass, and by 1,900 sick. He had allowed 3000 camels with their drivers to depart on the conclusion of their limited contract. He latterly realised his danger and remarked "What a situation ours would be, with detachments all over the country and I with four rivers in my rear, none fordable and at the mercy of the Sikhs for boats." But Sikh hate of the Afghans and Nicoll's reserves made his communications comparatively secure. Nott's position was more perilous. On him alone Ghuzni depended, but he was running short of supplies, he had no drugs, he was deficient in transport and cavalry; his communications were interrupted except for messages carried by native runners; his base, if base it could be called, was at the mercy of the Ameers of Sind. If well placed for striking,

says Durand, Nott was the most exposed to a blow. He was instructed by Auckland to prepare for ultimate withdrawal from Afghanistan "with the least possible amount of discredit"; to relieve Khelat-i-Ghilzi and, if within the compass of his means, Ghuzni likewise.

Auckland instructed Pollock on Feb. 15 "to direct all his efforts and measures to the withdrawal of Sale's force from Jellalabad to Peshawar with the least possible delay." With regard to these orders Major, afterwards Sir James, Outram in a letter to George Russell Clerk deprecates this withdrawal "in the strongest manner and does not conceive a mode more injurious to our interest in Afghanistan, or one more likely to endanger our position there, and in India, could be devised by our bitterest enemy. Trusts that as discretionary power is invested with him (Clerk), he will see the expediency of holding Jellalabad even if we are compelled to defer the invasion of the country." On Clerk's sending this abstract to the Commander in Chief, Nicolls drily observed "Of Mr. Clerk's power to control Major-General Pollock when 500 miles from him, I was not aware."

This incident is illuminating. Political agents were allowed to direct military movements; the system was leading to disaster after disaster. Outram was contemplating the re-conquest of Afghanistan.

Such was the news which welcomed Lord Ellenborough on his arrival in Madras Roads on Feb. 21, 1842. Such was the state of affairs with which he was called upon to deal a week later when he landed at Calcutta.

On the formation of Peel's second Administration in Sept., 1841, Ellenborough returned once more to the India Board; on the resignation of Lord Auckland he was appointed Governor General of India and on Nov. 6, set sail in H.M.S. Cambrian for Calcutta by the Cape route.

For the vacancy at the Board of Control, Peel selected Lord FitzGerald and Vesey, a dying man, now only

remembered as O'Connell's opponent in the celebrated County Clare election which led to Catholic Emancipation. When FitzGerald died, Peel chose in his place, Lord Ripon, then at the Board of Trade, better known as "Goody Goderich," the "transient and embarrassed phantom" of 1827, an indolent, timorous, henpecked hypochondriac, who was to prove as ignorant of his powers and duties at the India Board as Gladstone found him to be of tariffs and trade in spite of Peel's solemn and confident assurance of the ex-Prime Minister's omniscience and efficiency. He was a man who when faced by difficulties promptly succumbed and vanished.

It was high time, says Sir Henry Durand in his history of the First Afghan War, for a Governor General of another stamp to step upon the field; fortunately, he was one capable of forming a more soldierly view of the position of the British armies than to approve the contemplated directions to Nott—to retire from Candahar sacrificing guns, stores and followers and trusting to what food the fighting men could carry in their haversacks as provision for his force on its suicidal flight. Again, "Dauntless of mind and confident in his own great ability, the new Governor General turned from the bright vision of peace to the rugged realities of war, nothing disheartened by the complication of difficulties and startling misfortunes which the errors of his predecessor had bequeathed to him . . . . Unswayed by the opinions urged upon his consideration that the danger on the North West Frontier was such as to preclude the Government of India from parting with more of its available force to feed the distant and protracted contest in China, he made known his resolve that nothing that had occurred in Afghanistan would be suffered to affect the plans previously adopted for the campaign of 1842 in the remote quarter of the globe which was the scene of Gough's and Parker's enterprise. That war he was bent on rapidly

bringing to a conclusion, and he would not weakly permit the aspect of a near danger to turn him from the attainment of an object of paramount importance to his country as the termination of hostilities ruinously costly to the Government, and threatening not only temporarily to disturb a lucrative branch of commerce, but to cast it entirely in the hands of a rival people . . . . Lord Auckland . . . had latterly contemplated acting on the Pei-Ho against Pekin, and the Home Government, in the interval of Lord Ellenborough's departure and his arrival in India, having been won over to the project instructed him to carry it out." The objections to this scheme were numerous. Durand shows how strong they were, and how Ellenborough making no change in the original plan authorized the general to act on the Yang-tse-Kiang. Being apprehensive that the Chinese Imperial Government might be overthrown, Ellenborough "with a purer and higher principle than has generally characterised our Eastern transactions" cautioned the British commanders "against affording any countenance to insurrection, and doing anything which could lead to territorial acquisitions on the mainland. Having thus done all that human foresight and prudence . . . . could effect to ensure success and scrupulous moderation in China, Lord Ellenborough turned to meet and master the other difficulties of his position."

It has been asserted in the Cambridge Modern History, that Ellenborough's mind was full of the expedition to China; that on his arrival in Madras roads on February 21, 1842, when he learnt for the first time the appalling news of the destruction of the British Army in Afghanistan that his heart failed him, and that he then wrote on March 15, to the Commander in Chief that "in war reputation is strength, but reputation is lost by the rash exposure of the most gallant troops," and the letter is mentioned for special condemnation. Yet this particular

document received universal approval at the time, and Ellenborough's enemies did not hesitate to suggest that its admirable tone was due to the restraining influence of his Council at Calcutta, where it was written. Durand, his private secretary, however, vouches for its being entirely Ellenborough's own. In writing to him a year later Sir Henry Hardinge said " I desire no better proof of your ability and soundness of judgment than your despatch of the 15th of March." That Ellenborough's mind was full of China is completely disproved by his letters to Sir George Napier and Col. Butterworth who were at the Cape, as well as by those to the Duke of Wellington, Sir Charles Napier and many others; by the Memo. of March 18th which he sent to the Queen, and by his shortly afterwards leaving Calcutta for Allahabad in order to be in closer touch with the Commander in Chief and the Generals engaged in the Afghan war. Sir C. Napier replied on March 28th, that if Sir Robert Sale were relieved Lord Ellenborough would " not find much difficulty in honourably concluding this contemptible but sufficiently irksome and expensive war."

On proceeding up country he received the news of the fall of Ghuzni, a severe check* at Haikalzi, suffered by Brigadier England who was advancing to the relief of Kandahar and the surprise of General Nott. Nott had marched out of Kandahar with the greater part of his force to attack the enemy; and when he had been led in pursuit to a distance of nearly 30 miles, a strong detachment of the enemy's army, passing his flank, made a sudden and rapid movement on Kandahar, and arriving before the city commenced a desperate assault. They succeeded in obtaining possession of one of the gates, but were ultimately after a severe struggle repulsed with heavy loss.

* This repulse delayed the relief for a full month. In a despatch of April 18 Nott reported that its moral influence had been great and had added considerably to the difficulties of his position.

On the 19th April, considering that the fall of Ghuzni had removed the principal object for which the force under Nott was retained in an advanced position and that the check to England had a tendency to cripple Nott's already limited means of movement and action, Lord Ellenborough instructed that officer to take immediate measures for the ultimate safety of his corps by withdrawing it at the earliest practicable period from its advanced position into nearer communication with India. Directions were on the same day sent to the Commander in Chief to order General Pollock, either to retain possession of the country about Jellalabad during the hot season or to return to the vicinity of Peshawar. After mature consideration Sir Jasper Nicolls ordered Pollock to retire, provided that the British prisoners recently at Buddiabad were not on the point of being released, or that the enemy were not about to attack.

The mutinous conduct of our Sikh allies was the gravest feature in Pollock's situation; but as Sir Herbert Edwardes says in his Life of Sir Henry Lawrence, " At this gloomy juncture, light began to dawn. Lord Ellenborough had offered the province of Jellalabad to the Sikh Government . . . A change crept over the tone of the Sikh leaders. The remonstrances of Mr. Clerk at Lahore and Lawrence at Peshawar began suddenly to appear reasonable."

" He was so sure of his own judgment," says Sir. W. Lee Warner in the Cambridge Modern History, " that he even made the following boast to the Duke of Wellington on May 17th, " I stand alone and have to withstand against the whole monstrous body of political agents. I have acted altogether in all I have done upon my own judgment." But this quotation is incomplete and misleading, for the passage begins: " But I must tell you that in not ordering the Army to Ghuzni and Kabul *without* the means of movement and supply and *in giving up the*

irrational scheme of extending our dominions to the westward " (referring of course to Afghanistan) and then only comes the sentence quoted. It is worth while recalling that even so level-headed a man as George Russell Clerk was at first in favour of the re-occupation of Afghanistan. The aggressive spirit and gross ignorance of the Opposition are well exemplified by the speech delivered by Palmerston on July 6th, 1842 when he declared that " the great measures which they (the late Government) took in Afghanistan had opened in that country a vast field of commerce in that extensive region watered by the Indus and which embraced the greatest portion of Central Asia. And if the present Ministers did not have the weakness and pusillanimity to abandon the position which their predecessors had obtained for them, they would secure to this country a great region of commerce in that important country " !

So close was the community of thought between Wellington and Ellenborough that the same ideas were expressed by both at the same time. On the 30th of March 1842, Wellington earnestly recommends that our main position and our permanent security in India should be considered without loss of time as the first step to be taken, that the defences of our weakest frontier, that of the Sutlej should receive attention. Delhi should be secured and filled with ordinance and stores. Agra and Allahabad should be made useful for defence, and an army assemble on the Sutlej. Sukkur and Hyderabad should be maintained. Gunboats and steam-boats should be on the Indus. The power of political agents' lately given to direct military operations should be restricted. All these recommendations were aimed at the one object—that of removing the impression produced by the disasters. He also apprehended a French attack at the mouth of the Indus. On April 6, he wrote to Lord Fitz-Gerald: " The course of his (Ellenborough's)policy whether or not to

maintain a military position will have been decided long before the despatch of this night can reach him, and the state of the season will have enabled him to withdraw his troops from all the parts still occupied west of the Indus, if he should have determined to withdraw, or to support them adequately if he should have determined to maintain them."

As the first reports of Brigadier England's reverse exaggerated it into a disaster, Ellenborough was justifiably alarmed, but his constant subsequent insistence on withdrawal was aimed rather at those who clung to Auckland's policy, than at those who desired to re-establish our military reputation before retiring for good and all. He had foreseen in 1839 that the policy of the Whigs would place the British forces in a false military position.

Henderson in his life of Stonewall Jackson (vol. II p. 498, Edn. 1913), observes of him and Wellington that they were constitutionally unable to close their eyes to contingencies which might be ruinious. The promise of great results was never suffered to cajole them into ignoring the perils which might beset their path. Ellenborough had the same strategical instinct; he was bent on securing the safety of the armies' communications and on providing abundant transport and supplies and additional troops and guns before authorizing the advance on Kabul. His attitude at this particular time is justified by the admissions of the generals on the spot, as well as by the opinion of a man in England who had had unrivalled experience of Indian and European warfare, and whose achievements in both fields had won for him world-wide renown.

On the 18th day of April, the day before the issue of the order for retirement, Nott stated that in the event of field operations, he should be in want of men, ammunition, carriages and money. He might have added the difficulty of even written communication with India, for letters had

to be carried in quills by native runners between Nott and his base. On the same day Pollock said " my situation at the present moment is a difficult one; and much as I deprecate any retrograde movement, such a step is by no means improbable, as I have not yet been able to get supplies in sufficient quantities to warrant my remaining here." The checks at the Khyber and Haikalzi, the capitulation of Ghuzni, Kandahar's narrow escape from capture were warnings of possible fresh and more serious disasters which a man responsible for the whole of India would have been rash indeed to have ignored. There was a slackness in the Army first displayed at Cabul; then in the surrender of Ghuzni, again among the native regiments and camel drivers at Peshawur; and, as since revealed, at Jellalabad itself. Concentration of forces and the shortening of the lines of communication were urgently required to avoid a general catastrophe, for Sind was doubtful, the Punjab threatening, Sagar and Bundelcund in revolt, Gwalior had a swollen and tumultuous army; there had been mutiny in the south at Hyderabad in the Nizam's territory and Madras. Of these perils Pollock and Nott were not aware. It was in these circumstances but common prudence to extricate our forces from unsound strategical positions. But the world in general do not understand the risk of scattering forces and leaving them in isolated positions. Wellington, who incurred the wrath of the City of London for retreating after Talavera, fully realised the danger, and hence he approved all Ellenborough's orders, including most significantly, the order to retreat.

On April 7 Sale defeated the enemy besieging him at Jellalabad. The news of the victory reached Ellenborough on April 21. The "illustrious garrison" had freed itself.

Ellenborough's despatch to the Secret Committee of May 17, 1842 is in a bound volume of such documents for that year among the Records of the India Office. In the margin opposite to the paragraphs in which he reports the

orders which he had given for the withdrawal behind the Indus there still are to be seen the great Duke's pencilled annotations "Very right," "very right," "all very right"; not a syllable of doubt except as to the delay suggested by the generals on account of the season.

In Lord Curzon's view, Wellington supported Ellenborough because he favoured the Army! He supported him because he agreed in all his measures.

On July 3, the Duke wrote: "If the corps at Jellalabad and Kandahar are all equipped for movement and supplied as all armies ought to be, you will have an opportunity of carrying off your garrisons which had not surrendered, and you will have the honour of making a triumphant evacuation of Afghanistan. This may be a transient dream, but I cannot lose hope of its reality." Again three days later, after receipt of the above mentioned despatch of May 17: "It is obvious to me that your armies are not equipped with means of movement and supplied in a manner to carry on any active operations. At all events, I confess that Ghuzni being lost, Khelat-i-Ghilzie is I believe to be evacuated, and Quetta (*sic*, a slip for Kandahar) safe, and in a state to be evacuated, and the garrison safe at the moment, we have nothing of moment to look after. It appears to me that you do not intend to exercise any influence over the choice of the future Government of Afghanistan, the persons who are to exercise its powers, or the details of its management. There remains then but one reason for which any man could wish any forces of ours should remain on the right bank of the Indus one moment longer than suits their own convenience, and that is the influence their presence must give the general or whoever should be charged with the negotiations for the release or exchange of the prisoners. This appears to me now the only reason for leaving a British soldier in Afghanistan. I think that your instructions to General Pollock in respect of the exchange or release of the prisoners are quite correct

and judicious. Great interest is felt in this country for the fate of these prisoners, particularly for the ladies; and I would incur some risk and some expense to save them, if any such prospect or opportunity should offer. But it must never be lost sight of that even a successful operation—an attack upon the point of succeeding, upon the castle in which they may be in confinement, the surrounding the village or town in which they should be residing would not of necessity give you possession of their persons. On the contrary such a course might compel those who keep them to put them to death. In the course of my life I have witnessed scenes of this description.

And I must say Ghuzni being lost, you will quit Afghanistan with honour if you can bring away the prisoners. But on the other hand there must be limits to the expense and risk of such an operation."

One may ask whether these opinions of the great Duke are to be stamped as humiliating and cowardly by critics without his long experience of war.

The interest shown in the prisoners was even more intense on the Indus than on the Thames, and there was the greatest impatience for their release. With Auckland's approval Pollock was bent on efforts to ransom them. Ellenborough was opposed to this course, as likely to lead to higher and higher demands and to delay; as not only Dost Mahomed and his family but the family of Mahomed Akbar were our captives, he considered that the better plan was to make an exchange. Accordingly on April 24, he wrote to Pollock that the method of effecting the release of the prisoners had been a matter of anxious consideration, that the only safe and honourable way was by a general exchange, that redemption by ransom was not a modern practice and could not be revived and that failing a general exchange he might make a partial exchange but that Dost Mahomed was not to be included in such partial exchange without his (E's) express authority.

The sympathies of all, he said, are engaged in the fate of the female captives; nevertheless all British subjects have an equal claim, and it was as much his duty and that of all British authorities to endeavour to effect the release of the last Sepoy as that of the first European.

Eldred Pottinger, the defender of Herat, who was detained by the Afghans as a hostage when Kabul was evacuated in 1842 was also opposed to the policy of ransom, with the enriching of Afghan Chiefs. Moreover, he said that it would be detrimental to the interests of the State and lay the Government open to the imputation of partiality.

In a letter to Ellenborough Wellington wrote on August 6: "Your instructions anticipated the very offer made on the part of Akbar Khan, and it is wonderful that men wishing to effectuate the exchange did not at once accept the offer." But Ellenborough was not the only object of abuse in connection with the release of the prisoners. The gallant and sensible Nott did not escape criticism, and was charged with indifference to their fate because he was reluctant to detach a brigade from his exhausted force for an advance into Kohistan and denounced the folly of launching small detachments for distant enterprises, recalling the luckless ventures of England, Wild and Clibborn.

As a matter of fact, Lady Sale and her companions were well treated and able to communicate with their friends. Besides if it had been possible after the re-establishment of our prestige by the victories of Nott and Sale to have withdrawn from Afghanistan, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the prisoners would have been released by means of exchange five months sooner than they actually were.

Lack of supplies and transport rendered any movement out of the question. When these deficiencies had at length been made good, retreat might have been dangerous to the

health of the troops owing to the season of the year, but advance to Kabul became possible. Ellenborough was not less "sensible of the advantages which would be derived from the reoccupation of Kabul . . . . . even for a week" than he was when he expressed that sentiment on March 15, and when he said "Our withdrawal might then be made to rest upon an official declaration* of the grounds upon which we retired as solemn as that which accompanied our advance." But it would have been rash for him, a civilian at a distance to have definitely ordered an advance. The prudence of such a step depended on many considerations, such as the sufficiency of supplies, efficiency of transport, the health and spirit of the troops. He knew full well that to suggest the advantages to be gained from a forward movement was to encourage it, and that he would not have been the less responsible for its failure merely because he had indicated the risks and refrained from ordering it.

Sir Mortimer Durand in his Life of his distinguished father vol. I, p. 71, observes: "It was Lord Ellenborough's misfortune that the history of the Afghan war was written by Sir John Kaye whose sympathies were entirely with the ruling Indian class, the Civil Service, and who is throughout the spokesman of Lord Ellenborough's bitter opponents and his own immediate superiors, the Directors of the East India Company. By a dexterous and not very fair use of extracts from the Governor General's correspondence, Kaye has endeavoured to show that Lord Ellenborough acted with weakness and vacillation, and the sole credit of our success in 1842 was due to his subordinates, who saved our honour in spite of him. This view of the case, put forward with all the eloquence of the historian's best days, has been too easily

* The declaration he here contemplated was duly made on Oct. 1, 1842, three years to a day after that issued by Auckland, heralding the invasion of Afghanistan.

accepted. Perhaps the best answer that could be made to such an attack is the answer made by Lord Ellenborough himself when the Court of Directors brought a similar charge against him. After alluding to the exertions necessary for the assembling and equipment of an army of reserve numbering nearly 40,000 men the Governor General wrote to Lord Ripon then President of the Board of Control:

> 'The opinion of the noble Duke, since declared in Parliament, that in the direction of the armies in Afghanistan every order I gave whether to halt, to retreat, or to advance, was the right order to give under the circumstances known to me at the time, is, I say it with all due respect for the gentlemen of the East India Direction, sufficient to console me for the 'measured acknowledgement of my services,' which, according to the measure of their military knowledge and of their justice, it was alone their intention to bestow.'

It would be difficult to find a more complete rejoinder. The Directors of the Honourable Company thought Lord Ellenborough's military measures entirely wrong. The Duke of Wellington thought them entirely right. There is not much room for doubt as to which authority was the better judge; and the scale is hardly turned by the fact that the view favoured by Sir John Kaye, a popular writer, but wholly ignorant of war, and incompetent to criticize military operations against whose supporting testimony, moreover, might be placed the general verdict of the Indian army."*

On the issue of the proclamation on Sale's victory, George Broadfoot, the real hero of the "Illustrious Garrison of Jellalabad" wrote to Durand: "Lord Ellenborough's order has produced an extraordinary sensation. Rely on it this is the way to manage soldiers, who black or white

* An examination of the charges brought against Lord Ellenborough by Sir John Kaye will be found in an Appendix to Vol. I. of Durand's Life.

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are not mercenaries. Honour, distinction, approbation of superiors able to judge, these are the incentives which guide even the masses. . . . . It is *Wellesleian*, nothing like it since the great Marquis."

Three days before Sir Robert Sale crossed the British frontier at the head of the Jellalabad garrison, the Governor General's Military secretary and one of his aides-de-camp had conveyed the Jellalabad medals to Sale's camp under an escort of the body-guard; and to quote the official notification " all the officers and soldiers of the garrison passed the bridge of the Sutlej wearing the honour they have justly won." Ellenborough understood, as Sir M. Durand says, that " in such cases he gives twice who gives soon, and it might be well if the lesson were generally learnt. Delay in the distribution of honours deadens the interest with which the men receive them, and sensibly detracts from their value."

Ellenborough has been blamed for leaving to the Generals the responsibility of the advance on Kabul; and for the order to bring away the Gates of Somnauth. Wellington was of a different opinion; on October 9, 1942 he wrote: " I quite concur in the course of operations you have suggested. You have in my opinion acted most handsomely by your generals in communicating to them so freely your opinions upon points on which after all they must form their own, after considering all the reasoning on both sides of the question which you have so ably detailed for their consideration. . . . . But after all you must see as they must; they upon the spot must and will decide when the course which each of them after considering not only all the topics which you have suggested, but others of which you could have no knowledge, which must guide their judgment and their operations. Just to elucidate this point, I mention Ghuzni, of which fastness you very naturally desired General Nott to obtain possession, but to carry off from thence an important trophy.

You were quite right. . . . .You have afforded them ample means, and you have suggested the mode of execution. . . . . You could not do more You might have done less. I concur in all your objects. I think your Generals ought to be successful in carrying into execution your views." It is important also to remember that Runjeet Singh in his negotiations with Sha Shuja had tried to insert in the Treaty a stipulation for the return of these very gates; and this circumstance outweighs all adverse comment on their removal, which was a measure interesting to the troops and politic as regards the Punjab and other native states. The proclamation was written for India, and not for England, and was taken by the natives as a political act and not one offensive to Mahommedans, though Lord Ellenborough's opponents did their worst to make it so. Those who have scoffed at the incident have thought to make their condemnation complete by showing that the gates were not the originals. The argument is beside the point. What gives a relic sanctity in the eyes of the faithful is not the fact that it is authentic but the belief that it is so. The Sikhs and their neighbours thought them genuine. Moreover if Ellenborough was mistaken in his expectation of the impression the return of the gates would have on the natives, his critics were unquestionably wrong in their prophecy of evil consequences. The charge of pandering to idolatry was of course ludicrous; the idea could have occurred only to narrow minds, and have been fostered only by malignant spirits. A writer in the Agra " Ukbar " very powerfully showed that the Somnauth Gates affair had been most useful in securing our power over India, and had a very beneficial effect. Every Mahommedan in India crowed over our destruction at Cabool, everywhere their insolence had risen beyond the control of the civil power and the Hindoos were likely to be crushed; but the triumphant removal of the Gates brought the Mahommedans to

their senses and restored equilibrium between the two religions.*

It is commonly stated that the reception which was prepared for the forces on their return from Kabul has ever since been held up to ridicule. Nevertheless it has ever since been imitated in India and at home. Ellenborough must have seen the arches set up on August 3, 1814 in London to greet the army from the Peninsula and Bordeaux. Was he wrong to follow in the gorgeous East the example set in the sombre West? Was it his fault if the elephants were ill-trained and the carpenters unskilful? Has a greater misfortune never since attended a State procession in India?

Ellenborough had wished that Dost Mahomed before returning to his native land should witness a review of the forces assembled at Ferozepore as an exhibition of British discipline and British power; but when it was represented to him that the Dost's presence would seem like the exhibition of an honoured guest as an humiliated captive he at once abandoned the idea.

In giving the troops medals and honours, Ellenborough's object was to make the most of the victories in order to restore the spirits of the soldiers and to impress the native mind. The medals for Jellalabad were ready for the garrison to wear on their return. In sending medals to the widows of those who had been killed, he moreover set an example which has since been universally followed. This thoughtful action is never deemed worthy of mention by writers who gird at the choice of the sunrise ribbon, which has also been imitated in commemorating Indian campaigns and the Great War.

The notion that Ellenborough reluctantly wrote to Nott the letter of July 4th, 1842 authorizing his retirement

* Sir V. Chirol in his recent work, "India," mentions Somnath as one of the holiest and most famous shrines of the Hindus. Its spoliation by Mahmud was not likely to have been forgotten.

via Kabul and Peshawur is quite unwarranted. Reinforcements coming from home, plentiful transport, ample supplies, more satisfactory relations with the Sikhs, the formation of the army of reserve and the strengthening of the forces in Sind had changed the face of affairs. Nott and Pollock met on the very day anticipated by Ellenborough. Nott's progress was slow at first as he wished England to be well on his way to Quetta before going beyond his reach.

Having criticised Ellenborough's instructions, a recent historian goes on without a break of a paragraph to refer to the destruction of the bazaar and two mosques so as to convey the impression upon the reader that these acts were perpetrated by his orders. Yet Pollock's Corps was entirely responsible. Nevertheless these and other measures of retaliation did not go far enough to satisfy such men as Henry Lawrence and Havelock. Ellenborough however, then as in 1858, was for moderation in the hour of victory. He desired Nott to leave decisive proofs of the power of the British army without impeaching its humanity, " and he authorized Pollock to inflict just but not vindictive retribution " on the Afghans.

Another instance of this historian's methods occurs in dealing with Sind and Sir Charles Napier. In part proof of his assertion that Napier's conscience was pricked, he solemnly brings forward the apocryphal story of the ' peccavi ' message which is now known to have originated with " Punch " ! He certainly cites passages in Napier's diaries and private letters which give some colour to the statement. Others should have been quoted, for example that in which he designated the Ameers as thorough-paced villains and expressed his satisfaction at deposing them, with a full knowledge of their faithlessness, their horrid government and their still more odious practices. It may be here remarked that Sir Henry Pottinger said that " the oppressive nature of their Government is possiby

unequalled in the world" and Mount Stuart Elphinstone observed that "They have all the vices of barbarians without their redeeming virtues."

Further, the main fact is ignored, namely, that the Ameers and their followers were recent conquerors of the country, alien in race and religion to the natives, and with less excuse for their presence than the Prussians had for theirs in Alsace Lorraine for a similar period of time. Auckland and his advisers were the aggressors in Sind as they were in Afghanistan and Ellenborough's policy was to see that the Ameers who had been rendered by the acts of his predecessor more suspicious and hostile than before, should carry out their treaty obligations; and in default to exact penalties for the breach. In order not to weary the reader before reaching Lord Ellenborough's letters the history of our relations with Sind is relegated to an Appendix. Here only a few remarks will be made.

The annexation of Sind.

Paradoxical as it may seem Ellenborough's policy respecting Sind was in perfect harmony with the recommendations made to the Indian Government by the two men who were to become his most persistent critics, namely Colonel (afterwards Sir) Henry Pottinger* and Major (later Sir) James Outram. The puzzle is to discover the causes of these psychological somersaults. There will be a reluctance to attribute the change of attitude to pique in the one case and a personal grievance in the other. Ellenborough had refused to give to Pottinger's brother a post he solicited; and for reasons which will appear, he removed Outram from the political agency in Sind and Baluchistan. Yet the riddle must remain unsolved, for who shall attempt to unravel the tangled strings which link the head to the heart!

* Pottinger, a favourite of the Directors, was rewarded for negotiating the Treaty of Nankin with a baronetcy and a handsome annuity. He reaped where Gough and Parker had ploughed and sowed.

When the treacherous attack was made on the Residency at Hyderabad, the scene assumed a new aspect, and momentous events followed fast. There ensued the dramatic clash and grapple of Miani. Just as, to borrow the late Lord Salisbury's famous phrase, the "stricken field" of Omdurman altered our relations with the Soudan, so Napier's conquest changed altogether our position towards the Ameers and the down-trodden people of Sind. The Ameers, chiefs of a tribe of recent intruders, alien in race, language and religion to the subjugated tillers of the soil, were dethroned and banished; and the natives released from the yoke of serfdom and selfish tyrants, turned with relief and gratitude to the victor's wise and sympathetic rule.

Outram with many heroic characteristics had a highly sensitive nature. With the charm of a Charles Fox and the infectious emotionalism of a popular preacher, he had just those qualities which appeal to the hearts and excite the pitying sentimentality of English people. He convinced the boudoirs, the clubs and the press that the Ameers had been unjustly accused and cruelly treated. He came home burning with a sense of private wrong to himself and with a sense of public wrong to the Ameers. The Directors were delighted with the chance of making a fresh charge against their enemy; the Whigs were enchanted to find a new opening for an attack upon the Government. Outram was received by Auckland with open arms and became a guest in his house, and the Opposition took full advantage of the inspiration to be drawn from so fervent a propagandist. An unfavourable public opinion was thus formed on an ex-parte statement; and once formed, no hearing was given to the other side of the question. Every specific accusation took at least ten weeks to arrive in India; and every answer required the same space of time to reach London. Such was the start that misrepresentation and misconstruction could

gain before the days of the telegraph upon plain facts and simple statements.

The consideration of this question will be facilitated by reference to Richard Napier's "*Remarks*" on the so called "Commentary." Copies are in the British Museum and London Library. It shows that this "Commentary" was a fitting pendant to the Afghan blue book of 1839. It would seem that though it purports to be the work of a distinguished but sensitive man and bears his name as author, it was really compiled by an injudicious and intemperate friend. Richard Napier's "Remarks" are written in a calm and dispassionate spirit.

Claiming Outram as its authority, it is stated in the "Commentary" on William Napier's "Conquest of Sinde" "that all the Ameers were guiltless of the attack on the Residency at Hyderabad except Shadad." The attack took place on February 15th; Miani was fought on February 18. Outram departed on February 21st. What opportunity could he have had for investigating the truth? On the other hand there is evidence (p. 136 of the Supplemental Blue Book) that Nusseer Khan of Khyrpor and other Ameers accompanied Shadad. The plea, moreover, that the attack on the Residency was the act of the lesser Baluch chiefs and not of the Ameers was forestalled by Outram himself when he warned the Ameers in these words: "The excuse that you could not restrain them will be of no avail. As customary the Government will be held responsible for the acts of its people" (p. 503 of Sind Blue-book). And again he says: "if their Highnesses could not control their people, it would be considered that they were unfit to rule them.

In the pamphlet by a Bengal Civilian "Lord Auckland and Lord Ellenborough," published in 1845 the author who is hostile to Ellenborough on some other questions, observes: "Secure from the imputations of partisanship we will affirm that whatever firmness, humanity and public

principle could do to avert the *final* catastrophe, was done by Lord Ellenborough."

Again in a highly eulogistic biography of Outram, Capt. Trotter, who is very violent against the Governor General, makes the following striking admission: "in the light of subsequent history it may even be argued that Outram's policy of trust in the Ameers would have proved less wise for practical purposes than Napier's policy of coercion." It would have been interesting to learn when and why did Outram adopt the policy of trust.

In a letter to the Queen dated May 11, 1843 Ellenborough wrote " of the Ameers at Bombay only one, a boy, was not in communication with Shere Mahomed (of Mirpor) till the day before the battle of March 24, and every one who carried on such communication from the British camp might have been shot by the laws of war. Shahdad, who has been separately confined at Bombay ordered a Baluch to murder every Englishman he could find; and yet your Majesty will hear that at Bombay these treacherous enemies of the British Government are by many represented to be the victims of injustice and oppression."

It appears, however, that Mr. Gladstone stated in a review in 1876: "The conquest of Sind was disapproved, I believe, unanimously by the Cabinet of Sir Robert Peel, of which I can speak as I had just joined the Cabinet. But the Ministry was powerless inasmuch as the mischief of restoring it was less than the mischief of retaining it." When he employed the word ' conquest ' he must have meant ' annexation.' The misuse of a term suggests a certain vagueness of recollection at a time when his mind was overflowing with the iniquities of Disraeli's " diabolical " Government. It cannot be the fact that Peel's Cabinet was unanimous except in the terms of the despatch which left the decision as to annexation to Ellenborough and his Council. Wellington and Hardinge were distinctly favourable, probably Lyndhurst and Stanley also. Ripon

and Graham, recent converts to Conservatism would be instinctively critical and captious. Peel and Aberdeen, unfamiliar with Indian problems, would be even more than usually deliberate and circumspect. None but Wellington knew India, and he had had 8 years' experience in high military and civil stations in that country. How far Outram's influence penetrated and whether it affected the more impressionable members of the Cabinet such as Mr. Gladstone, it would be hard to say. The article on Outram in the Dictionary of National Biography has this pregnant sentence: "An idea too often took complete command of him, and it was difficult for him to see the other side of a question." In fact, his temperament bore a strong resemblance to that of Mr. Gladstone. On the other hand the action of Ellenborough with regard to the Ameers may have suggested the great cry of the Midlothian campaign against the Turks—"Bag and baggage!"

Conduct of the Opposition

The day before Ellenborough arrived in India, Peel wrote to Arbuthnot, after six months' experience of Lord Fitz Gerald at the Board of Control, expressing his sympathy with Wellington in regard to Indian matters; overwhelmed as he was with his own proper business, he found great difficulty in giving an opinion upon many measures which could only be adjusted after the fullest knowledge of small details and personal communication with the parties concerned; and complained that the Court of Directors was becoming a very troublesome body mainly from want of efficient control; they presumed upon the absence of such control and encroached accordingly. Such was the early fruit of the selection by Peel of a dying man to succeed Ellenborough at the India Board.

Before Auckland's return to England, friendly letters, marked private and confidential, which Ellenborough on his appointment to the Board of Control had written

to him were communicated to the Whig leaders and employed by them in order to contend that Ellenborough approved their Afghan policy. It was a party move to hamper the Government in the exercise of a free judgment on the acts of their predecessors and on the line to be adopted in future. This shabby conduct on the part of the opposition angered Ellenborough; he did not at first believe that Auckland was responsible for it, but cherished resentment against him for not having, when he learnt of the use to which the letters had been put, expressed any regret or made any apology. While historians and biographers blamed the tone which Ellenborough subsequently adopted in public documents towards the errors of his immediate predecessor, they forgot the provocation.

Already when in power the opposition leaders had not scrupled to stifle the truth by publishing the Afghan Blue Book of 1839. From this it was but a short step to palm off as truth a malignant calumny respecting Ellenborough's treatment of Mr. Amos* the Law Member of his Council at Calcutta. Nor were they abashed by the following letter from Mrs. Amos which Peel read out in the House: "You have probably noticed in Lord John Russell's speech on Thursday last that he asserted that Mr. Amos resigned his appointment in Calcutta in consequence of having been insulted by Lord Ellenborough. Now, as there is not a word of truth in this statement, I think it right to contradict it, at least amongst Mr. Amos' old and valued friends. When Mr. Amos went out to India five years ago he always intended to resign in 1843, and I am sure nothing would induce him to remain at Calcutta another year . . . . . As to Lord Ellenborough's conduct it has been one of unvaried politeness and civility. I believe they were mutually pleased with each other and when Mr. Amos wrote to Lord Ellenborough in the autumn, when he was up the country, saying it was his intention to

* The friend of the poet Shelley. Both were Ld. E.'s contemporaries at Eton.

resign, Lord Ellenborough replied that he was extremely sorry to lose so agreeable a colleague." According to Lord Curzon, the fortnight of the joint occupation of Government House by the outgoing and incoming rulers was outwardly a period of harmonious association, but Auckland afterwards declared that Ellenborough boasted of what he would do in such terms as to lead him, the worthy irresolute Auckland, to think that Ellenborough, full of the vigour natural to his constitution and the exuberance of spirits due to four months at sea, must be mad. If men are to be judged by their actions rather than by the careless words of casual conversation, Ellenborough would have been justified in believing Auckland insane, Auckland who allowed himself to be drawn into the design of forcing a puppet despot upon a distant, reluctant and martial people, and of risking and losing an army in the process. Auckland's opinion of his successor found ready support in his family. His family name of Eden, suggests a state of innocence, shattered by the intrusion of a serpent. One of his spinster sisters, Emily, had of old nourished a grudge against the new Governor General, as is evident from a spiteful reference to him in her Early Letters.

According to Mr. W. Bingham Baring the sisters did nothing but propagate the gossip culled from the Indian press and from their wide correspondence with disappointed officials. On this flimsy foundation a succession of writers of histories have, like a string of processionary caterpillars blindly followed one after another in heaping abuse and ridicule on Ellenborough. They have not inquired into the truth of the stories which she told or repeated or of the anonymous letters in the Indian and English press. It was enough for them if it damaged his reputation. There was another tainted source. Ellenborough took over from his predecessor two members of his staff; one out of compassion, who did well, the other whom Auckland strongly recommended and who did ill, and betrayed his

new chief as far as he could, kept up a constant correspondence with Auckland's sisters and although Ellenborough gave him a very good office, would not attend the farewell dinner given to him by two hundred officers and other friends, with the consequence that he was generally cut. It is probable that he was the author of the Amos story.

Sagar and Bundelcund.

Ellenborough in the midst of his anxieties with regard to the isolated position of the remnant of our forces in Afghanistan learnt that Sagar and Bundelcund were seething with rebellion.

The Sudder Board in Sagar misinterpreted the orders respecting the collection of the Revenue and had thereby caused the ruin of a great number of landowners in that district. The irritation excited by these proceedings was in itself sufficient to account for the change of feelings towards British rule, as was manifest to all except those responsible for the misconception of the law. The mistakes had to be corrected and the sufferers had to be restored to their rights. Ellenborough deputed Colonel Sleeman (afterwards Sir William Sleeman K.C.B.) who was familiar with the province and a man of high repute for knowledge of the people and for wise and sympathetic administrative ability, to report on the state of affairs as well as on the measures of violent repression which had increased rather than allayed disaffection. In a private letter of January 11th 1843 to Mr. Maddock, the Secretary to the Governor General in Council, Sleeman deplored that there was no longer that sympathy between the people and the agents of the government; that the European officers did not show that courtesy towards the middle and higher classes and that kindness towards the humbler which used to characterise them; that the native officer imitated or took advantage of this conduct; and that the outbreak in Sagar owed its origin to the " insolence of

office." Success in the first rising attracted those whose only object was plunder, and the disaffected or proscribed poured down from Bundelcund to share in the strife. He however considered that the troops which Ellenborough had released for service in these provinces would be sufficient for the purpose of restoring order.

Sleeman added that the people of our (i.e. the Company's) old provinces had been "like eels" accustomed to misrule, but the " Lodhu Bundela and Gouds Thakoors were a different sort of beings." He deprecated concessions to the rebels in arms; none would be necessary if cantonments could be provided on the Dussan river. On proper accommodation for the troops Ellenborough was always rightly insistent, and the Court of Directors niggardly and recalcitrant. It was one of the causes of the quarrel between the Governor General and the Company which led to his recall.

Sleeman mentions a prediction that British rule in India would end in 1843 (Sumbut 1890); and that the Kabul reverses and the Bundela and Sagar disturbances gave weight to the prophecy. Discussing the question of raising a military police—another measure which excited the wrath of the Directors and added further to the cup of Ellenborough's supposed iniquities—Sleeman comments on the folly of some officers in prohibiting the people in the midst of the confusion from bearing arms, with the natural result that only the peaceful and well-affected obeyed the order. This sagacious view was, alas, not taken by modern politicians legislating for Ireland.

On January 31, Ellenborough issued instructions to Sleeman, whose letters had confirmed all his first impressions as to the real causes of the rising in Sagar, and of the continued ferment there. As Sleeman shrank from naming the chief delinquents among the British officials, Ellenborough was driven to dismiss all replacing most of them by the best men he could find and leaving Sleeman

to fill two or three of the posts, whether from the staff then existing or from the regiments in Sagar or Bundelcund. He had done his best to investigate the character of the selected officers and believed he could depend on them all. In a private and confidential note he told Sleeman that in deference to his plea he was willing to transfer a certain officer to a place not inferior to his previous situation, but could not bring himself to let him direct an armed force in Sagar or in the Nerbuddah district, so painful had been the impression produced on his mind by the officer's own revelations.

After the lapse of more than four months, and when the revolt had been quelled, the question of dealing with the leaders arose, and in his correspondence with Sleeman, Ellenborough showed his anxiety to pardon those who had been drawn into the movement, either unwillingly or under a misconception. In this measure he had a ready auxiliary in Sleeman who assured the Governor General that nothing could have been better timed or more justly appreciated by the people.

In later years Ellenborough had occasion to reassert once more before the world the great and statesmanlike principle of sparing the vanquished when he remonstrated in his despatch of April 19th, 1858 against Lord Canning's proclamation confiscating (with some few named exceptions) the whole soil of Oudh. There the results of previous conquests had hardly had time to solidify before the kingdom was overwhelmed by the molten mass of the Great Mutiny; justice and policy alike demanded a generous forbearance and happily the warm protests of Canning's subordinates, civil and military, on the scene of action, prevailed with him over the influences around him. Canning had already modified the harshness of his measures before the orders of the supreme home authorities had reached him, but enough remained to fan the dying embers of revolt and to prolong the calamities of war.

In a letter to Sleeman, Major J. G. Drummond expressed his decided opinion that Auckland was most unfortunate in all his appointments; the men selected by him were, "generally speaking hot headed fools or self-sufficient, overbearing blockheads, and it is well," says he, "that they are turned out to make way for better men." But the harshest critics of Ellenborough's career in India are obliged to admit that in nothing was he more successful than in his appointments however distasteful to many may have been his selection of soldiers for political posts. The distinguished civilian administrator, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, in his "India as I knew it" candidly admits the advantages of a blend of the military with the civil element and puts the desirable proportion as 1 to 2. There was too behind Ellenborough's preference a sense of the justice of giving soldiers a share in posts open alike to the military and to the civil elements. There was no question of interfering with the judicial and revenue branches. The civilians, even the inefficient, received good salaries and could look forward with certainty to advancing to high lucrative posts; but the military had a lower scale of pay and wretched prospects. It was but fair to make an effort to redress the balance to some extent. Yet the Directors and their relations and protégés were frantic with disappointment and apprehension at this righteous concession to equity and reason. Ellenborough having overawed the rebels, and being convinced that injustice and misrule had been the cause of the rising, adopted measures of conciliation which Sleeman assured him would be held to be justified and would restore "confidence and goodwill between the governing and the governed."

But Sleeman's proceedings, though they had the authority and approval of the Governor General and the reward of success in the return of the province to peace and contentment, did not shield that officer from anonymous libel in the Bombay Times and Delhi Gazette written by

military men who had been removed from their situations on the ground of their unfitness. The editors of those journals accepted without scruple these false, treacherous and cowardly attacks. One of these stabs in the dark was the work of a certain Captain whom Sleeman describes as one of the worst men and officers he had ever met and who was detested and thoroughly distrusted. Another writer, who misrepresented over a pseudonym the condition of Bundelcund, was believed to be a colonel of horse who was annoyed because his selection of a site for a cantonment was not at once adopted instead of one generally preferred as by far the most healthy. A third malicious fabricator of false news was a disappointed applicant for a post for which he was quite unfit. Such letters were the material upon which, with the help of Auckland's family and friends, public opinion was formed. Major Drummond, who knew the district and had been superintending the erection of barracks, expressed to Sleeman his regret that the Governor General was going back to Calcutta where he "would have his hands full of all sorts of *ditch politics*" and his hope that Ellenborough would soon return to the Upper Provinces for truly important work. The late system, in Drummond's opinion, was bad in every respect, and no establishment called more loudly for revision than the civil and political department of Sagar and Nerbudda. One of its members he pronounced a perfect brute and totally unfit for political employment among natives, and, as for the person in chief authority, if he had been dismissed the service, it would have been no more than he deserved.

Ellenborough replied from Barrackpore, July 30th, 1843, to Sleeman's complaint of the libels in the press: "I never read Indian newspapers and rarely hear any report of what they say. Everything that I have ever been told that they have said is untrue. I do not regard what they say as far as its effect upon Englishmen is concerned;

but I fear that the extracts from English newspapers which are circulated in native *ukbars* must degrade the national character and weaken our government. . . . . .Depend upon it no solicitation upon the part of anyone will induce me to name to any office the man I think unfit for it. I have no wish to remain an hour in this country, but while I do remain here, I shall do whatever I think right and nothing else, let men say and do what they will here or in England." In a later letter of August 14th, 1843 he says: " In England it is felt that a public man must either notice everything or nothing. He cannot select without affording ground for the inference that what is not denied is true." Sleeman always cherished a deep admiration for Ellenborough.

Ellenborough's reforms created a great commotion at the India House and among the Company's shareholders and hangers-on, but Peel in a letter of December 18th, 1843, applauded the dismissals and Ellenborough's resolve " not to be bound by old official regulations and official prejudices."

Partisan critics of Ellenborough and their latter-day disciples are discreetly silent about the Nerbudda troubles. Under such an exposure to the ultra-violet rays of truth the idyllic picture they paint of Company rule before the era of Ellenborough's administrative reforms would have faded away.

GWALIOR.

Writing to Colonel Sleeman from Allahabad on June 27th, 1834, in acknowledgement of a report on the affairs of the State of Gwalior, Ellenborough expressed his concern that his own departure from Agra had occurred just when the Regent Mama Sahib, who might have saved himself by a little energy, had been displaced. The army of the State, which numbered 30,000 men, had got out of hand and was becoming a danger beyond its frontier.

As usual, the Governor General looked beyond the immediate present and began to prepare to make the situation at Gwalior safe, lest the defence of the Punjab frontier should be hampered by an outbreak in the rear of the forces on the N.W. border. He added " I will never threaten where I cannot strike, and I will never strike unless I strike very hard, and one blow will be enough. We have no case for striking yet. In the meantime the (Governor General's) body guard remains at Agra. . . . . I may return in November. In a few days the Chumbul will be full and effectually keep people quiet on both banks."

ELLENBOROUGH AT THE BATTLE OF MAHARAJPOR.

Lord Curzon in his strange book (see Appendix) says that among other follies, Ellenborough accompanied the army to the field of Maharajpor. To quote Sir M. Durand: " my father remained with Lord Ellenborough, who was for a time in the thick of the fight and greatly distinguished himself by his coolness and courage. He was blamed, and with some show of justice, for thrusting himself on this occasion into unnecessary danger. . . . . But as a matter of fact his conduct was not open to censure. His presence on the field was due to an accident. He asked Gough where he should remain and was told " in rear of the reserve battery." The advice was taken, but an unforeseen movement of the enemy brought him under fire. When his retirement to a safer position was suggested, he said " Very good " and turned his horse in a direction indicated to him. It so chanced that he was thus brought into the open within 350 yards of a Mahratta battery and he was saluted by a shower of grape. Once in it, his spirit was roused, and, as Durand afterwards said he " thoroughly enjoyed it and seemed utterly regardless as to danger." This incident and his kindness to the

wounded, (" his words did more good than the doctors ") increased his popularity with the troops.

Ellenborough had been blamed for leaving too much latitude to Sir C. Napier. On the occasion of the Gwalior troubles he was resolved not to give cause for complaint and accompanied the General so as to keep control of the situation. Besides his Council urged him to do so.

After the unmerited imputations made upon him for his orders to Pollock and Nott to retire from Afghanistan, he was not sorry to vindicate his personal indifference to the risks of battle by remaining in danger until desired to retire.

To the military operations against the mutinous army of Gwalior, the story of which is so well-known, no further reference will be made. In the papers which follow will be found the famous Minute of Nov. 1, 1843, in which Ellenborough fixed the principles upon which our relations with the native States of India have ever since been governed.

It may be interesting to mention here that when he was at Calcutta and a question connected with the Central States of India was under discussion, his attention was called by one of his Council to the principles by which the Government had been guided in regard to them. He had the satisfaction of finding that the policy adopted had been laid down by himself when President of the Board of Control a dozen years before.

The Recall.

Sir Henry Durand on learning of the recall of his chief wrote to a friend that of course it astounded all India, for it was inexplicable to the natives of India of all classes why a Governor General successful in all he had undertaken should be recalled by the Court of Directors in opposition to the Ministry; there was no doubt as to the view taken on the matter by the highest authorities; the Duke

of Wellington had throughout given Ellenborough unflinching support, though with much sensible and timely advice regarding the propriety of constitutional government and conciliatory behaviour; and the unanimous feeling of Her Majesty's Ministers, to quote the words of Sir Robert Peel, was one of deep regret; that Ellenborough retained their entire confidence and they protested against his recall as unjust and imprudent. But as Sir M. Durand points out the opinion of the Government was opposed to the opinion of a considerable section of the British public; and led by the press of India, which then in no way represented the people of India, but simply the ruling class—the civilians—whom Lord Ellenborough's measures had alienated, the English press became for a time exceedingly unjust; Ellenborough's conduct was made the mark of very severe attacks, and a good deal of popular feeling was aroused against him; the Court therefore, were sure of support when they determined upon his recall.

The main reason for their hostility says Sir Mortimer, was not difficult to see; they attacked, it is true, his public measures, and he gave them an opening for so doing by a variety of more or less imprudent acts, and by the sarcastic and defiant tone of his letters; but the main reason lay deeper; when Ellenborough landed in India, the civil administration was the patrimony of the directors, and afforded a rich provision for their relatives and all having interest with them. Of course the Civil Service was accordingly a favoured service. To quote Sir John Kaye: ' It has fattened upon the golden eggs and scattered the feathers among the military. It has not only appropriated all the large salaries, and divided almost all the honours of the State but had on every occasion been permitted to ride roughshod over the military. The Court of Directors had specially cherished this privileged class, and Governor Generals had been prone to imitate this

exaltation of one service at the expense of another. It was a just and generous thing to raise the military, too long degraded, to their right positions.' This Ellenborough soon set about doing. When leaving India, Auckland told him that he would find a lack of instruments but that they were to be got from the army more easily than from the Civil Service. Rightly or wrongly, continues Sir Mortimer, Ellenborough accepted this view, and having accepted it he proceeded fearlessly to act upon it, which Auckland had shrunk from doing. This was the head and front of Ellenborough's offending and this led to his recall.

Kaye in an article in the Calcutta Review says: 'Ellenborough distributed his patronage openly and honestly. Nepotism was far from him. Backstairs influences were never at work to turn his patronage into a corrupt channel. The importunities of powerful friends availed nothing, nay rather they injured the cause of the party for whom they were employed. Interest was not spoken of as the one thing needful to success during his administration. The Governor General. . . . . regarded the characters and qualifications of men, not their friends and their friends' friends, and determined to bestow the best appointments in his gift upon those alone whom he considered to deserve them.' Sir Mortimer Durand adds: "for the rest Lord Ellenborough's administration was remarkable in more than one respect. It was a period of almost incessant war, war uniformly successful, and conferring much honour on our armies. Lord Ellenborough is blamed for forgetting the peaceable professions with which he started for India, but it is difficult to see how he could have avoided the military undertakings which signalized his rule. . . . . .

"Lord Ellenborough introduced something like system into the routine of Indian public business . . . . . and he left the finances of the country in a greatly improved

condition." Sir Mortimer might have added that the Secretaries of the Government were for the first time assigned each a distinct department of work; and a Finance Minister was appointed.* He proceeds: "He (Ellenborough) was, perhaps, the first Governor General who fully realised the position in which the British Government now stands towards the Native States of India. Averse from wholesale annexation, as he showed in the cases of Gwalior and Indore, both of which States afforded him opportunities which Lord Dalhousie would hardly have allowed to pass, he was yet determined that our supremacy should be understood and respected by all, and that the Native States should for the future submit to such a measure of control as might be necessary for the general order and welfare of the Empire." . . . . . He (Ellenborough) was the first to put a stop to a custom by which our Governor General were required to present the 'nuzzur' of homage to the Delhi Emperor."

In 1842, Ellenborough contemplated the transfer of the imperial title to the British Sovereign and the conversion of the palace at Delhi into a fortress and a residence for the Governor General when in the Upper Provinces. In Sir M. Durand's opinion the presence of the Mogul emperor in Delhi fifteen years later doubled the danger of the mutiny by supplying the rebels with a head and the semblance of a great national cause.†

With the departure of Ellenborough on August 1, 1844, Sir Henry Durand's official connection with him ceased, but a warm personal friendship sprang up between them

* Each Secretary was instructed to attach a short memorandum stating the principal facts contained in the collection to each set of papers transmitted; and in the margin of the memorandum the number of the document and the paragraph on which the statements of fact rested. Ellenborough also introduced an improvement in the way of transacting the business of the Governor General's Council. Before his time every paper was circulated and every paper was brought up to the Council on Council days.

† It is probable that Queen Victoria was led to wish to assume the title of Empress of India by reading over again L[d] E.'s letter to her of Jan[y] 18, 1843 on receiving Lord Colchester's request for leave to publish that and other letters addressed to Her Majesty. See Indian Administration of L[d] E., 1874, page 64.

which was never interrupted. "A scholar and a gentleman, full of warm and generous impulses, of patriotism and of soldierly feeling, Lord Ellenborough," says Durand's son, "could not fail to be honoured and loved by those who really knew him and whom he trusted. He was perhaps unduly self-sufficient, and the fervency of his imagination led him at times into errors of judgement, and exposed him to the derision of men infinitely his inferiors. But Lord Ellenborough's faults were those of a fine character wholly free from cowardice or hypocrisy."

General Sir William Nott wrote of him: "I am delighted with him. Some people may laugh at his acts, but he is the keenest Englishman I have ever seen in this country, and just the man to deal with Asiatics."

An idea of the estimate formed by the public of Ellenborough's grasp of Indian affairs may be gathered from a passage in a letter written to him thirteen years later, on Oct. 16, 1857, by Lord Derby: "I should much like to have your views as to the present and future of India on which subject you know that I look upon you as my great authority; and that I am not singular in doing so, is shown not only by the general tone of the public press (vehemently as it abused you while you were there) but by a private letter which I have seen from Lord Canning's private secretary, of the 10th of September, who says: "Lord Ellenborough's speeches have taken the only statesmanlike view of things that has been taken—his words read like prophecies." Lord Derby adds: "You will have to go out after all! I wish to Heaven you had been there, with hands untied, for the last two years!"

The affronts offered to him by the Court of Directors were to be amply avenged. He more than any man was the cause of the final overthrow of the Company's anomalous authority. He had long predicted and long endeavoured to avert the disasters produced by this evil system of government. The disasters came and the Company was swept away.

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Errata: Page 25, line 4, for 'Ghizni' read 'Ghuzni.'
,, 67, ,, 7, ,, 'inpair' ,, 'impair.'

INDIA UNDER LORD ELLENBOROUGH.

MEMORANDUM BY LORD ELLENBOROUGH (when out of Office).

AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN—APRIL 23RD, 1839.

THE justice and policy of the march upon Candahar are two distinct questions

British India is separated from Afghanistan by the territories of the Ameers of Scinde, of the Nawab of Buhawulpore and of Runjeet Singh. Russia is separated from Afghanistan by Persia. Our frontier and that of Russia are nearly equally distant from Herat. The trade of the Russians is probably now and has been for 30 years more important than ours with Afghanistan. The Russians have therefore as much right as we have to cultivate commercial and political relations with Afghanistan and their proposition that neither Power should seek to establish influence there is one to which we must ultimately accede, or engage in a ruinous contest to be carried on thirteen hundred and fifty miles from our frontier.

If we attempt to retain Afghanistan the Russians will, at a small charge, discipline the Persian army. Over Persia, the position they now occupy, the weakness of the Government and the venality of its Ministers, give them at present complete control. We shall not bribe higher than they will; and we have no means of carrying any

threats into execution so as to coerce the Persian Government, while the vain attempt to do so would afford to the Russians the pretext they may desire for occupying a part of the Persian territory and disciplining and officering the Persian troops. The Persians equally capable of enduring heat and cold, and possessed of all the qualities of good soldiers, would beat our Sepoys in Afghanistan where the cold would enervate them for six months. We could only contend in Afghanistan by disciplining an Afghan Army of which the fidelity would be extremely doubtful.

But the army employed in Afghanistan whatever may be its composition, must keep up its communication with India. That communication can only be preserved by occupying two lines—one leading to the Indus from the Bengal provinces, the other from the mouth of the Indus to Shikarpore. Shikarpore itself must be occupied and, during the months of autumn, winter and spring, the pass of Bolan; to protect the march of small detachments against the predatory tribes it would further be necessary to occupy several points between the pass of Bolan and Candahar. In Sind, Karachi, the port by which communication would be maintained with Bombay, must in any case be held, and possibly Hyderabad itself in order to secure the fidelity of the Ameers. The island of Bukkur in the Indus and some point between Bukkur and Buhawulpore must likewise be in our hands. Buhawulpore itself might probably be safely left to its own Nawab, a faithful Ally. Still on the communications between Candahar and India there would be dispersed a force of not less than 10,000 men. To keep down the subjects of Shah Shuja of whom many would adhere to the family of Dost Mahomed, and at the same time to make head against a Persian army disciplined by Russians, would be required a force of 25,000 or 30,000 men. Even this force should not be left without some reserve, and perhaps the total amount

of the force which it would be necessary for us to maintain in addition to our present force would not be less than 50,000 men. We are now able by economy to pay our way to make the revenue cover the expenditure; but doing this we are unable or think we are unable to diminish taxation where its pressure is destroying the power of reproduction and disheartening and alienating the people. We are unable to expend any portion of our income in the improvement of the country by canals and tanks, which are essential in many places to its prosperity. We diminish salaries until we endanger the character of the public functionaries. We have an insufficient police, an insufficient establishment for the administration of justice. We draw the last rupee from the people and do little or nothing for it.

The little good we do would be at an end, the great mischief we do would be aggravated by any further pressure upon our finances; but operations beyond the Indus, costing millions and producing nothing would ruin those finances, and extend the suffering to the many families in this country which depend for their support upon the regular payment of dividends and allowances and pensions.

It has hitherto been our object to confine our diplomatic relations to the several states enclosed within our territory. Our intercourse with Runjeet Singh himself has only been occasional. To the people of Sind we were almost unknown ten years ago. Bahawulpore had only been visited by travellers. With Kabul we had had no official intercourse since Mr. Elphinstone's* Mission in 1809 and before that, none. The expedition to Afghanistan adds all these States to the number of those with which we must have constant intercourse, and not of the most friendly character. With Runjeet Singh we have hitherto been on good terms, but is it probable that the new King

* The Honble. Mount Stuart Elphinstone.

of Kabul could be maintained on his really dependent throne by the joint efforts of the two Powers without affording grounds of collision between them? The treaty cedes to Runjeet Singh the Valley of the Indus, Peshawar and all the country to the summit of the mountains which divide the Valley of the Indus from Afghanistan. It gives to him every pass into Afghanistan to the north of the pass of Bolan. With the new Kingdom we could only communicate by his sufferance or by the permission of the sovereigns of Buhawulpore and Sind. In order to carry our forces into Afghanistan it has been necessary to violate the express letter of the Treaty with Sind and to take forcible possession of its only port, and of its capital. To these acts of *necessary* violence (*necessary* if the expedition was necessary) we have added the further and to us disgraceful wrong of extorting money for the support of the war. This we have done against a state with which we never had the smallest ground of quarrel.

While we made war within India, whatever army we had collected, at Bhurtpore for instance, practically watched and overawed the neighbouring states, and until that army was defeated, no Prince, however hostile in feeling, would dare to move. Now that our active arm is sent beyond the frontier 900 miles, its power of repression is taken away and unless a force at least equal to that sent beyond the frontier be added to the army remaining in India the many grounds of dissatisfaction, which our own subjects have as well as our allies and tributaries may lead and will lead to a *general outbreak.*

The origin of the changed feeling of the sovereigns of Afghanistan is to be found in the conduct of Lord W. Bentinck who in 1833 not only did not prevent Shah Shuja from leaving Loodiana on an expedition to Candahar but enabled him to do so, by advancing to him four months pension and engaging to pay the pension as usual during his absence to his family. It was in vain that

Lord W. Bentinck declared that he took no part in that expedition. He saw Shah Shuja preparing it on British territory; he enabled him to move by pecuniary advances; and he received him when he returned defeated. The sovereigns of Afghanistan naturally connected the British Government with that expedition. All Central Asia did the same. It may be seen in Fraser's "Travels" that so strong was the feeling even of the distant Turcomans against the English for the part they appeared to have in that movement and for the ambitious designs it was understood to indicate, that it was not deemed safe for any European to go at that time into the Turcoman country. The feeling of the Persians appears to have been the same.

Advantage was taken by Runjeet Singh of the occupation given to the forces of Dost Mahomed by that expedition of Shah Shuja to obtain possession of Peshawur and the loss of that most important district was traced to the English who had facilitated the expedition of Shah Shuja. Hence the suspicions entertained by Dost Mahomed of English views, and his approximation to Persia and even to Russia with the view of preserving himself against the ruin with which he not unreasonably believed himself to be threatened by the union of England and Runjeet Singh.

The siege of Herat commenced on the 21st of November, 1837 and on the 27th of November, Mr. McNeill* informed Lord Palmerston that the Persian Government had openly expressed a belief that the possession of Herat would give such a hold upon England that she would no longer be able to deny anything they might demand, for that the possession of Herat would give the power to disturb us in India or to give a passage to our enemies whenever the Persian Government should think fit so to do. It is to be supposed that Mr. NcNeill must have made a similar communication to the Governor General, which must have

* H.M. Minister at Teheran, afterwards Sir John.

reached him before the end of January, 1838. Lord Palmerston had received the letter of the 27th November on or before the 12th of February, 1838.

The declaration which Lord Palmerston on the 1st of May authorized Mr. McNeill to make to the Shah of Persia, namely that "the British Government could not view with indifference his project of conquering Afghanistan, that they must look upon the enterprise as undertaken in a spirit of hostility to British India, and being wholly incompatible with the spirit and intention of the alliance which had been established between Persia and Great Britain; that consequently if the project be persevered in, the friendly relations between Great Britain and Persia must cease, and Great Britain take such steps as she might think best calculated to provide for the security of her possessions." This declaration must have been authorized to be made on the 12th day of February by Lord Palmerston and before that day by the Governor General.

What should have been the steps then taken by the British Government? Not merely to make this declaration but to act upon it:—

1. To offer at once to the Chiefs of Kabul and Candahar pecuniary aid in the event of their marching to the Chief of Herat.

2. To disclaim any wish to substitute for their rule in Afghanistan the Government of Shah Shuja, and to promise that he should not be permitted to prepare any expedition in the British territory or in that of our allies, and that his pension should be taken from him on entering into any arrangements hostile to Dost Mahomed and his brothers.

3. To offer the good offices of Great Britain for the adjustments of differences with Runjeet Singh and to promise that he should not make any further advance.

Of these three things the Government of India did none entirely—the third only partially—and consequently the

negotiations between the Chiefs of Afghanistan and Persia were carried on to completion.

The Treaty with Runjeet Singh and Shah Shuja was signed on the 26th of June, seven months after the siege of Herat had been begun, and about nine months before any army from India could possibly reach Herat. If its object were to save Herat it was nugatory. To enable the British Army to move we, by that Treaty, incurred these fatal obligations affecting the whole future policy of the British Government in India:—

1. A guarantee of the territories of Runjeet Singh as described in the treaty to his descendants.

2. In the event of their acquiescence, a similar guarantee of the dominions of the Ameers of Sind.

3. Obligations towards Shah Shuja from which, however onerous, our reputation, if not our faith, may render it extremely difficult for us to withdraw.

Thus has the whole future been at once mortgaged for the purpose of enabling us to attempt an enterprise ruinous in any case to our finances and which if successful places us in a false military position in which we turn against ourselves all the local and physical difficulties which have hitherto been relied upon as protecting us against invasion from the West.

When we see the effect which the advance of 10,000 ducats produced upon the policy of the Chiefs of Candahar, can we doubt that our pecuniary means would have enabled us to raise all Afghanistan against the Persians? If contrary to our reasonable expectations these means of resistance had failed and the Persians had taken Herat and even established their influence at Candahar and Kabul, in what a position would we have stood? We might then, had we seen fit, have entered Afghanistan as deliverers of the Sunis from the Shiahs—the three Powers lying between us and the Afghans would have felt that the war was their own. There would have been no need of

purchasing their assistance by impolitic guarantees, still less of forcing from a reluctant ally pecuniary contribution towards the war. Runjeet Singh would have been the principal. He would have trembled for the Punjaub and our armies would have been gladly received by him on the Sutleje. Our line of operations would have been that which all the conquerors of India have selected—that through the Punjaub, the nearest to our own resources. Our army would have been held intact, our resources complete till the moment of battle.

The representations made in Europe to Russia would then as now, have led to the disclaimer on her part of all designs against us, and her withdrawal or repulse would have affected her reputation and influence as much as our ultimate withdrawal from the too advanced position which we have taken up, will affect us. From that position we must withdraw. It is impossible to deny the truth of the statement made in the last letter of Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo de Borgo—

> " to abstain from disturbing the tranquillity of the people of the centre of Asia by nourishing their animosities; to be contented with competing in industry in those vast countries; but not to engage there in a struggle for political influence; to respect the independence of the intermediate countries which separate us; such is, we once again repeat it, the system which England and Russia have a common interest invariably to pursue, in order to prevent the possibility of a conflict between these two Great Powers, which, that they may continue friends, require to remain each within its own limits and not to advance against each other in the centre of Asia."

If we establish a predominant influence in Afghanistan we may use our power so as to affect the policy and conduct of Persia. We use it best to assist her in regaining the provinces she has ceded to Russia. Russia cannot be

expected to permit so great a change in her position. She will exert her present influence in Persia to induce (and her resources to enable) that Power to thwart our projects in Afghanistan, and the result must be collision between us at Herat.

Nor would this be the only result. A war in Asia would lead to a war in Europe and that war would soon become general. We must therefore at the earliest possible period withdraw our army from Afghanistan. Shah Shuja who will in all probability be nominally established must be left to his own resources, the British troops being withdrawn in the first instance to Shikarpore and afterwards to our own frontiers. The most frank and unreserved explanations are due, and must be given to Russia as to our ultimate views in Central Asia. The sums extorted from the Ameers of Sind must be carried to the account of any sums actually due by them either to Runjeet Singh or on account of Shikarpore, and the difference, if any, punctually repaid. Assurances the more formal and decided must be at once given both to them and the Nawab of Buhawulpore of our continued and *disinterested* friendship, and of our resolution to take nothing directly or indirectly from them. To Runjeet Singh should be made an explicit declaration that while we guaranteed his rule within its actual limits we could not with indifference see his dominions extended in any direction. Thus frankly avowing our policy to all neighbouring States—a policy purely defensive and conservative of the ' status quo ' in all India, we should place ourselves on ground which we could equally make good by reason and by arms.

" SUBSTANCE FROM RECOLLECTION OF WHAT I SAID IN THE HOUSE ON FEBRUARY 28TH, 1839." In ink and hand of that year. See Hansard Vol. 45, Col. 963.

I see by the report of what takes place elsewhere that it is intended to present to Parliament additional papers

illustrative of the events which have recently occurred in India. I have hitherto abstained from observing upon the papers already presented, nor will I now press for any premature disclosure or at any time urge the production of any information which might embarrass Her Majesty's Government in the very difficult position in which they are placed; but there is one question arising out of the papers already presented which I think the Noble Viscount (Melbourne) might now answer, and there is likewise information upon the subject which I think he might at once produce without any injury to the public service. The question I wish to ask is this.

It appears by the Declaration of Lord Auckland that " a guaranteed independence was to be offered on favourable conditions to the Ameers of Sind." A British force had at the date of the last account from India been five weeks in possession of a point in the Sindian territory and was preparing to march forward. I desire to know whether any treaty has been concluded between the British Government and the Ameers of Sind giving permission and affording facilities to the passage of our Army through the territories of Sind.

It is essential to the character of the British Government in India that every fact stated in a public document should be strictly true; but I regret to observe that one statement made by the Governor General is the declaration published by him and presented to the House is directly negatived by another document presented to the House; namely by the treaty between Runjeet Singh and Shah Shuja. The Governor General states that the attack made by Dost Mahomed, the *de facto* Sovereign of Kabul, upon Runjeet Singh was *unprovoked*. It was not unprovoked, for the treaty I have mentioned between Runjeet Singh and Shah Shuja is one for the recognition of Shah Shuja as the sovereign of Kabul and for the cession to Runjeet Singh of territories now occupied by Dost Mahomed.

But further I fear from the internal evidence of that Treaty, that it was formed with the cognizance of the British Government. If that be so, or it the British Government acquiesced in the expedition of Shah Shuja to Candahar in 1833-4, another statement in the Governor-General's declaration is equally unfounded in fact, for the Governor-General states that until he evinced hostility to the British Government, the authority of Dost Mahomed was respected.

Shah Shuja was at Ludiana in our dominions when he prepared that expedition. He proceeded thence through Buhawalpore, a country under our influence. We might have prevented his march, and if it should appear that we were cognizant of the treaty between him and Runjeet Singh and acquiesced in his expedition to Candahar, we did not respect the *de facto* Government of Kabul; the statement of the Governor General is unfounded in fact; and the hostility of the *de facto* Government of Kabul, the only remaining ground for the important movements now ordered in India—movements of which it is impossible to exaggerate the consequences—is an hostility produced and justified by our own want of faith, by our own real hostility, while we pretended to be friendly to that Government.

I am therefore desirous of having placed before Parliament every information which may elucidate the conduct of the British Government in India with respect to the expedition of Shah Shuja to Candahar in 1833/4. I am informed that there is a letter from Capt. Wade dated the 17th or 27th of June, 1834, which affords much information upon that point.

First then I wish to know from the Noble Viscount (Melbourne) whether any treaty or convention has been concluded with the Ameers of Sind to facilitate the passage of our troops through the country of Sind, and secondly, I wish to have laid before the House the letter of Captain Wade and any other letters which would have the effect of

showing what was the course pursued by the British Government with respect to the expedition of Shah Shuja to Candahar.

(Note. The difference between the policy of the Whigs and that of Lord Ellenborough in regard to Sind is this. The aggression upon Sind in 1838 had no justification founded on our policy in regard to Afghanistan, for the policy concerning that country had itself no justification even on the ground of Russian intrigue. Lord Ellenborough's policy with respect to Sind was based on the circumstances which had arisen through no action of his, or of the Governments of which he had been a member. The disturbance and distrust and enmity produced in the minds of the Princes of Afghanistan, Sind and the Punjab by the Palmerston—Hobhouse—Auckland policy, and its complete failure created a situation which required vigorous treatment. The early statements of Pottinger and Outram respecting the Ameers of Sind were those before Lord Ellenborough's eyes when he framed his policy as to Sind. Besides, what was the origin of the authority of the Ameers and their Beloochee fellow-countrymen and followers in Sind? It was precisely that of the Prussians in Alsace from 1870 to 1918 in point of justice and of similar duration in point of time; it was conquest and brutal subjection. Consider further, the happy results of Ellenborough's policy in regard to Sind and the Indus when we had to deal with the dangerous wars with the Punjab, and later with the widespread mutiny and the peril to our rule in 1857 when Sind lay quiet and contented.—A.L.).

To the Earl of Auckland.

Private and Confidential. Grosvenor Place. September 6, 1841.

My dear Auckland,

I am returning to my old office. I have already read the more recent letters in the Secret Department, and you

will see that I have thought it necessary to recommend that a letter should be sent to you by the mail of this day to suspend the orders for the advance of troops upon Herat conveyed in the letter of the 4th of June, unless you should be already engaged in the execution of those orders. I refer you however to the terms of the letter, for your guidance, and for an explanation of the grounds upon which it seemed necessary to despatch it forthwith.

I shall give my attention in the first instance to the state of your Finances, to the condition of the army, and to your relations with the Punjab, Nepaul and Ava, as well as with Herat and Persia, so as to be enabled, as soon as possible, to bring the whole subject before the Cabinet, and to take its decision upon the course to be pursued, with respect to the countries beyond the Indus.

I do not gather from the Public Letters that any time has been fixed by you for your return to England. My apprehension is that you will have decided upon the time of your departure as soon as you know the result of the Elections; but I think that aware of the great mischiefs attending an interregnum, you will have given the home authorities ample time to send a permanent successor to relieve you in your Government.

We shall have to give an opinion not as to the past, but as to the future policy with respect to Afghanistan, and I know not how far that opinion may coincide with yours, or how far you would be disposed to carry into effect a line of policy of which you might not entirely approve. Of this however I am convinced that your execution of whatever policy you carry into effect will be distinguished by the same ability which has been generally acknowledged in the execution of your former measures.

At whatever time you may return, I think it would be highly desirable that your successor should have an opportunity of personal communication with you. I should wish therefore to know whether you come by the

Cape, or by Egypt, and if by Egypt, at what time you will be at Bombay.

It seems to me that the communication by the Red Sea being now established it would be desirable to obtain a parliamentary enactment, enabling a Governor General to assume the Government at Bombay, or Madras, as well as at Calcutta, but I have not yet had an opportunity of communicating with the "Chairs"* upon the subject. I know not whether it would be found in any case convenient to introduce a short bill for this purpose in the ensuing short session, but if such a bill should be carried at an early period, it would enable you and your successor most conveniently to confer at Bombay.

I hope that during your continuance in India you will write to me confidentially, in the assurance that all your communications will be received by me, not only with the respect due to your character and ability, by none known and appreciated better than by me, but with the favor, with which I must ever regard the opinions of an old friend.

Believe me,
My dear Auckland,
Ever very sincerely yours,
Ellenborough.

The Right Hon^ble^ The Earl of Auckland, G.C.B., etc., etc., Calcutta.

Extract. *To Lord Auckland.*

Private and Confidential. India Board. September 19, 1841.

My dear Auckland,

This letter, begun to-day, may be finished only just before the departure of the next mail; for I propose to insert in it, as they are suggested to me by circumstances, the several matters upon which it seems to be desirable that I should communicate with you in this manner. You will probably think it right to have copies made of some of the paragraphs for the information of your

* The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the E. India Co.

successor. But I cannot mention "your successor" without assuring you that I have already seen so much ability in your administration of the Government of India that it will be a subject of much public as well as personal regret to me to be deprived of your services.

1. With respect to Ava let me refer you to the letters of the Secret Committee dated the 23rd of December, 1828 and the 29th of September, 1829. I wrote both those letters with the entire concurrence of the Duke of Wellington, and the latter of them from a Paper of Observations he wrote at my request after having read all the information we then possessed. I remain of the same opinion with respect to the inexpediency of extending our relations with adjoining states which you will find expressed in the first of those letters—and I am as desirous as I was then of withdrawing, if possible, from Tenasserin and thus from all connection with Ava. Your greater means of action by means of steam vessels may modify the plan of campaign against Ava, should you ever be unfortunately under the necessity of acting hostilely, and lead you to send a larger force than was contemplated in 1828 to the Irawaddy; but it would be principally a naval force, and while it in all cases effected a diversion, it would have for its chief object a junction with the army whenever it touched the river.

2. In the event of your abolishing the Court of the Recorder at P. of Wales Island (which I hope you will do, giving the numerous Asiatics there an administration of Justice in the Malayan language, and greatly diminishing the unwarrantable expense of the present system) I shall be disposed to assist in the economical working of the measure, by recommending the Recorder (should he appear to be a fit object for promotion) for the first vacant seat on the Indian Bench, and thus saving the expense of his retiring pension.

3. It appeared to me years ago when I was at this

office before, that you were in want of some officer in India whose duties should be similar to those of the Chancellor of the Exchequer here. . . . My idea was and is, that the general superintendence of the finances would be better entrusted to a person not educated in the Company's service, but formed to habits of business here, and it has occurred to me that the Member of Council now only authorised to attend the meetings of Council when legislative measures are before it, might be permitted to attend when matters of revenue and finance are before it, and might be made your Financial Minister.

I apprehend that it will be necessary to await a vacancy in the office before this could be done. You will tell me perhaps whether the present occupant of Mr. Macaulay's place would be of use to you in matters of finance, or willing to undertake them.

I see nothing in the Act which gives to the Legislative Member of Council a longer tenure of office than that possessed by any other member of it—or a different tenure although the mode of his appointment is different.

4. Will you tell me whether you see any limit to the duration of the expensive Law Commission?

5. One of my former plans was to make the several Members of Council in practice, as they once, I believe, used to be, heads of departments—in fact the Gov. General's Secretaries of State. I should be glad to know your views upon this point. My idea is that all business is ill-transacted by Boards, and that the secret of efficient administration is in individual responsibility. The Members of Council made Heads of Departments would still be the Gov. General's Cabinet.

6. I entirely concur in the view taken by Sir W. Macnaghten of the conduct of Captain Conolly at Khiva in his letter to that gentleman of the 14th June 1841, and I approve of the instructions given to him in that very sensible letter—but I confess I entertain much apprehen-

sion that Captain Conolly will not adhere to his instructions or execute them judiciously; and in all cases there is a great awkwardness when the line to be pursued by an Envoy is altogether altered. The new and more prudent line can hardly be advantageously followed without changing the Envoy. I rather expect to find that you have already substituted some more judicious officer for Captain Conolly at Khiva. I confess his conduct there alarms me.

7. On the 4th I found at the office the Report of the Commission at Calcutta on the causes of the great mortality at Chusan, and likewise the correspondence with Lt. Col. Craigie of the 55th Queen's Regiment, relative to the crowded state of the Orient, in which a portion of that regiment was embarked for service in China, and I immediately communicated both papers privately to Lord F. Somerset for L^{d} Hill's information. On the 6th I received from Sir John Hobhouse the copy you sent to him of the letter you most properly addressed to Sir Hugh Gough with respect to the employment of M.-General Burrell. The mail which had been detained was to leave London that night, and I instantly took the letter to L^{d} Fitzroy in the hope that some step might be taken immediately. Unfortunately L^{d} Hill was out of town. I saw L^{d} Fitzroy and afterwards L^{d} Hill yesterday the 21st (Lord Hill being just arrived in London) and I am to communicate the Report of the Commission officially, and the correspondence with L^{t} Col. Craigie confidentially, to L^{d} Hill, for his remarks which I shall receive I believe in time for transmission by the next mail.

In the mean time I will observe that it has occurred to me that the serious and indeed fatal evil of the desertion of native followers on the eve of the embarkation of a regiment might possibly be obviated by making a portion of them subject to Martial Law. Will you consult the military men about you about this point?

8. *I think you will be desirous of transmitting to England, as soon as you can do so with satisfaction to yourself, the draft of a law relating to slavery. It is obviously most desirable that you, to whom the subject must now be known so well, should prepare such draft, rather than that it should be left either to your successor sent from hence, who will have all to learn, or to any temporary successor whom your departure before the arrival of the Gov. Gen[l] sent from England, might place at the head of the Gov[mt].

Your authority will have much weight in obtaining acquiescence in what you propose, and which is more important still, in preventing the introduction of provision you do not think fit to propose. What I fear is, the disposition to legislate here if you should not soon submit your views. Here we could only legislate blindly and we might commit errors of the most dangerous consequence. I do not see that it is necessary for you to postpone all legislation until you are fully prepared to legislate upon every part of the subject.

There will be an attempt on the part of the Anti-Slavery Society to get up agitation during the next three months. I have vainly cautioned them against the danger of their creating agitation in India which would be fatal to the success of their own object.

9. We have decided upon putting forth all our military and naval strength in the next campaign against China, and you will receive by this mail instructions to make timely preparations for that purpose. The Duke is sanguine of success. The plan is that I have from the beginning of the war thought the only one likely to bring the Chinese Government to reason, and I am delighted to find the Duke of the same opinion.

* Partisan historians in recording that the Act was eventually passed by Lord E. said that he deserved no credit as it was Auckland's measure!

You will in good time have the advantage of all his views as to the mode of execution in detail. In the mean time you will have to prepare the means. . . . .

10. I have not yet been able to bring the subject of the course to be pursued in Afghanistan before the Cabinet. Our last accounts from Persia lead to the hope that our last demand, as to the commercial treaty will be complied with, and thus we shall be enabled to evacuate Karak. This would afford the best opportunity for commencing a retrograde movement to the Indus provided the affairs of Afghanistan begin to assume a settled appearance. My idea is that the Shah (Shuja's) troops commanded by our officers should be raised to 12,000 men as a preliminary measure.

I must heartily wish that this letter was to be the commencement only of a long correspondence between us, for I feel satisfied that we should go on very well together and I should entreat you to remain if I thought I had the least chance of prevailing on you to do so, but I fear the next mail will bring your absolute resignation from a day named. Your brother has already intimated that you desired the appointment of a successor.

Believe me,
My dear Auckland,
Ever most sincerely Yours,
Ellenborough.

From Sir John Hobhouse.

Private. Erle Stoke Park, West Lavington, Wiltshire. 11 Sept., 41.

Dear Lord Ellenborough,

The resignation of Sir Robert Comyn arrived by the Falmouth Packet. I received also a letter from Sir William Macnaghten and one from Captain Arthur Conolly which I wish you to see—but I will thank you to return them to me—I thought Conolly had behaved ill in staying a long time at Constantinople and having conferences with

an envoy from Kokan contrary to my positive orders—and I told him so. It is to this he alludes in the opening sentences of his letter. The remainder of his letter relates principally to a scheme which he mentioned to me at the India Board, but in regard to which I thought it advisable not to give him any written instructions. Indeed he had no mission from England, but only a strong recommendation that he should be employed in Central Asia. He is a very active, zealous, intelligent officer—but I think, too much of a politician.

I have, etc.,
John Hobhouse.

The Lord Ellenborough.

To Dowager Lady Ellenborough.

Wednesday, Oct., 13, 1841.

My dear Mother,

My colleagues want to send me to India and the Queen approves. I feel that I am bound to obey orders just as if I was in the army, and so, if the Directors choose to appoint me I must go. I am aware of all the risks, and I shall have no compensation but that of being I hope, of some use, and in any case that of knowing that I am in the right. If I go at all I must go as soon as I can.

I go to Southam early to-morrow and shall not return for a week.

Ever yours most affectionately,
Ellenborough.

To Lord Auckland.

Private and Confidential. India Board, October 14, 1841.

My dear Auckland,

It has been proposed to me (on the 8th inst.) to be your successor and I have felt it to be my duty to consent. The notification of the intention to propose me to the Court of Directors was given yesterday and from the manner in which it was received I cannot doubt that I shall go bearing with me the full confidence of the Court

as well as that of the Government. I shall sail in the Cambrian on the 1st of next month (November) if possible; but I apprehend that the preparation of the despatches by the November mail which leaves London on the 4th will detain me till that day. Beyond that day nothing shall detain me but such wind alone as can prevent a large frigate from getting out of the Channel.

I am most anxious to arrive some days at least before you leave Calcutta. As I shall arrive knowing nothing of what has passed in India since the 20th of August (except what I may pick up at the Cape) I should be very much obliged to you if you would have prepared for me a Mem^{m} (in the manner in which you must have seen them made for the Cabinet) of all the principal events in

China
Lahore
Ava
Nepaul
Afghanistan and

India generally since the 20th of August, or rather since the last date of the intelligence from those countries respectively which was transmitted to England on the 1st of August. The events in Persia should be likewise separately stated, and whatever may have been done with respect to Karrak in some more detail.

Then I should wish to have a Mem^{m} shewing the actual disposition and effective strength of the army throughout India—and the disposition of the Indian navy. You will likewise I have no doubt have the kindness to have prepared for me a short statement of all that has been done towards the fitting out of the expedition to China, shewing the amount in detail of the military and naval force, the number and tonnage of the transports, the amount of provisions and stores furnished, the means relied upon for keeping up the quantity of provisions, and the expected total charge. The letter in the Secret Department

which will be despatched on the 4th of November will tell you all that has been done here.

Then your finances! I almost dread to approach the subject; but I must grapple with it. I should be very glad to have a comparative view of receipts and expenditure (in detail) during the last three years; and it would be a great convenience to me to find prepared the statement of increase or diminution of offices, establishments and salaries in all India which was directed to be made out by one of the letters from hence which was despatched on the 4th of October.

You could most easily have ready for me a view of the trade of India for the last three years. I should like to have some details as to the new trade which is, I hope, growing up on the Indus.

If any circumstance should prevent your staying till my arrival, pray have the kindness to leave for me marked "Most Secret and Confidential and for L^{d} E. alone" some account of the view you take of the capacity and character and fitness for office of the several persons who must be employed both in the civil and military services. Your knowledge will enable you to give me the most valuable information upon this point.

Believe me,
My Dear Auckland,
Ever very Sincerely Yours,
Ellenborough.

Sir R. Peel to Mr. Arbuthnot.

Extract. Feb. 20, 1842.

Secret. I assure you that I sympathise with the Duke's feelings in respect to Indian matters, for I have to go through exactly the same ordeal he has; and, overwhelmed as I am with my own people's business, I find it very difficult to give a satisfactory opinion upon many measures which can only be adjusted after the fullest

knowledge of small details and personal communication with the parties concerned.

The Court (of Directors) is becoming a very troublesome body, mainly from the want of efficient control. They presume upon the absence of it, and encroach accordingly.

To Maj. Gen. Sir Charles Napier.

(Copy). *Private and Confidential.* Government House, Calcutta. March, 17th 1842.

General,

I am very much obliged to you for y^r^ letter from Poona, and its enclosure which I received upon the evening of the 15th inst. Unfortunately the means of transport, and the supplies necessary to carry into execution y^r^ ideas, are not at present in the possession of our armies, nor are they procurable in the countries in which we are now making war. Neither have we at our disposal the amount of force you consider to be requisite this side of Peshawar. I have desired that a copy may be made for you and sent to you in entire confidence, of the letter which on the morning of the 15th I addressed to the C. in C. my colleagues in the Government concurring in it.*

I have added two native regiments to the force already proposed by orders from England for China and I trust that we shall be able to terminate that war *with Honor* in the course of this year. That done, and the troops drawn out of Afghanistan *with Honor* everything else will be very easy. The thing I am most anxious about, is the recovery of our military reputation in Afghanistan by some decisive success. It would not vary my policy, but it is almost essential to our safety, dependent as we are upon the confidence reposed in us by our troops, and upon the fear we have hitherto impressed upon our enemies.

I remain with much respect,

Y^rs^ faithfully,

Ellenborough,

Gov^r^ Gen^l^.

* This disposes of the falsehood that he did not write it himself.

From Sir C. Napier.

Poona. 28 March, 1842.

My Lord,

Your Lordship's letter dated the 17th instant reached me on the 26th but the copy of your letter to the Commander in Chief therein referred to, has not yet reached me. Be assured that neither the contents of this letter, nor any confidential communication with which your Lordship may think fit to honour me, shall be divulged. I am sorry that the force which I proposed for the attacks of the Khyber pass cannot be assembled: perhaps I am mistaken in thinking so large a force necessary. Those on the spot ought to be the best judges: I hope they may find that which has been collected, is equal to the adventure; and that they may succeed without great loss of life, for it is peculiar to these kind of enterprizes that the bravest and the best fall first, and the honour of our Arms devolves upon those who have flinched; and although this may happen without personal stain, yet it rarely occurs without a loss of moral superiority; and this is very mischievous to troops.

Your Lordships words express, exactly what is required at this moment. "*The thing I am most anxious about is the recovery of our Military reputation in Afghanistan by some decisive success.*" *That* is the one thing necessary! and it was this view of the state of the war, that induced me to recommend the concentration of the largest possible force at Peshawar. The peculiar state of this war makes a "*decided success*" imperative. The first operation is to relieve Sir Robert Sale and if we fail to do this, our arms not only suffer the misfortune of a second defeat, close following upon the first at Cabool, but such a failure entails a *third*, in the consequent destruction of those heroic soldiers who have attracted general admiration and whose fall would have a greater moral effect to the prejudice of our name and to the courage of our troops

than would the loss of ten times their numbers on a field of battle! But this is not all, a failure in the Khyber pass might, possibly, produce great difficulty in withdrawing the garrisons of Ghizni and *Kandahar*. It is said that between these towns there are no very difficult passes, but between the latter and the *Indus*, there are *many*, and among them some that are said to be stupendous. It is therefore necessary to embrace all these considerations, and in doing so, the importance of success at the Khyber pass, increases in magnitude, and the means required to render the operations decisive should, if possible, be proportionate. If Sir Robert Sale be relieved I imagine that your Lordship will not find much difficulty in honourably concluding this contemptible, but sufficiently irksome and expensive war: a war in which I am sure, from your long experience in Indian affairs, your Lordship never would have involved this country.*

It is very gratifying to hear from your Lordship's high authority, that the Chinese war is likely to be brought to a conclusion within the year, and it is vexatious that the miserable Afghan war should shackle, as it must do, your Lordship's exertions in more important matters.

With the sincerest wish that your Lordship's exertions for the good of this great country may be attended by success, I have the the honour to be, etc.

Charles J. Napier,
M. General.

The following letter from Ld. E. to Sir R. Peel shows his state of mind two days after the Adjutant General had issued the order for the withdrawal from Afghanistan, when Ld. E. was represented by the Whigs to be in a condition of panic:

To Sir Robert Peel.

Benares. April, 21, 1842.

My dear Peel,

At last we have got a victory, and our military

* This shows that his view was the same as Ellenborough's.

character is re-established. Sir Robert Sale has completely defeated the Afghans under the walls of Jellalabad. M. Gen. Pollock has forced the Khyber Pass and is in march on Jellalabad. These events took place on the 6th and 7th of this month. The garrison of Kelât-i-Ghilzee is safe, but is not yet drawn off. Candahar has been nearly lost by the error of Gen[l] Nott.* Brig. England was repulsed in a movement he should never have made towards Candahar with an insufficient force.

I am satisfied that the momentary success of Sale and of Pollock must not lead us to change our view of what ought to be our permanent policy. We must draw back our forces into positions in which they may have certain and easy communication with India. You will see all I think in my letters to the C. in Chief and the Secret Committee. The victory of Jellalabad does not change my opinion. Send us every man you can. We want them as you will see when you read the letter to the Secret Committee. I am making the most of my victory with the troops here and everywhere. I set off for Allahabad tomorrow.

Believe, etc.,

Ellenborough.

Instructions issued by Lord Ellenborough.

Allahabad. April 26th 1842.

The Governor General deems it expedient that the conduct of all the Political Agents of the Government should be guided by one clearly understood principle and I am therefore directed to convey to you the following instructions for your future observance.

2. The Governor General enjoins that you will on all occasions manifest the utmost personal consideration and respect for the several native princes with whom you may

* Nott advanced 20 miles from Candahar leaving a small garrison but was surprised by a sudden attack in flank.

communicate. You will consult and attend to their personal wishes, you will give them whenever you may be requested so to do, or when ever it may appear to you to be required for their interest or that of the British Government, with which theirs is particularly identified such advice as may seem best calculated to conduce to their comfort and to their prosperity and their honour; but you will not unnecessarily intrude with such advice on occasions not requiring it for such high and just objects, but leave them in the ordinary concerns merely of their families and their courts, not only without control, but without observation.

3. You will consider yourself to be placed near the native princes, to whom you may be deputed, as the representative of the friendship as much as of the power of the British Government, and you will be mindful that even the necessary acts of authority may be clothed with the veil of courtesy and regard.

4. You will distinctly understand that the further extension of its dominions forms no part of the policy of the British Government; that it is desirous on all occasions of respecting the independence of native states, and that satisfied with the extent of its own rule, it has no other wish than that every state within the limits of India, should freely exercise its rights as recognised by Treaty, and contribute by the maintenance, by its own means, of peace and good government in its dominions, to the general happiness of the whole people.

5. But while you will proceed upon the conviction that these are the sincere wishes of the British Government, you will likewise understand that it will view with the severest displeasure, such an exercise of its rights by any power as may have a tendency to disturb the public peace of India.

6. Such disturbance of the public peace whether effected by direct hostilities between States or by the

outbreaks which the badness of a government may provoke, or its weakness permit could not have existence without immediately affecting the interests of the subjects of the British Government whom it is its first duty to protect.

7. But the Governor General feels that the Government has yet another duty to perform—that placed in the possession of great power, it is deeply responsible to Providence for the exercise of that power in such manner as may most conduce to the happiness of all tribes and nations within the limits of India, under whatever form of rule they may severally be placed.

8. The Governor General has advisedly selected the moment of victory for laying before you for your guidance, these principles of justice and moderation. They are the principles upon which his policy will ever be founded, adopted after deliberate reflection and as little liable to be changed by reverse as they have been by success.

9. You are directed to communicate the purport of this dispatch as contained in the accompanying Persian Memorandum, directly or through your subordinates to all the princes and chiefs with whom you are deputed to communicate.

Mem. by Lord E. on Indian Foreign Policy.

Allahabad. April. 27, 1842.

It may be expedient with a view to the navigation of the Indus to retain our relations with Sinde, even after the cessation of military operations in that quarter shall have rendered this continuance of those relations no longer indispensable; but the more recent reports as to the river Indus and our improved acquaintance with the population on its banks, and the countries with which it communicates certainly lead to the conclusion that the hopes originally entertained of extending our commerce were to a great degree exaggerated. If an account were

now to be struck of all the sums expended on account of Assam and of all the benefit derived from the possession of it during the last 18 years, it would be found that the Gov^{t}, and if the Gov^{t}, then the people that Gov^{t} represents, had been a great loser by that acquisition; and whatever may be the ultimate profit which some successful speculators may by possibility obtain there amidst the ruin of more numerous adventures, there is no present ground for supposing that the State and people of India will derive real benefit from that vast tract of jungle. There are within India itself ample means for the employment with far greater benefit to the people of India of all their capital and all their labour. The acquisitions we made from the Burmese on the coast of Tenasserim, however valuable in themselves and capable of further improvement can hardly be considered to produce a revenue or to be capable for many years of producing a revenue equal to the charge of their civil government, while the whole charge of a large military force constantly employed there, and of a further force constantly to be held in readiness to re-inforce the garrison of Moulmein in the event of an attack from the Burmese, is borne by the people of India.

It is now 77 years since the first acquisition was made of the Dewanee. During a large portion of the period which has since elapsed, we have been extending our dominions, but we have not equally increased our revenue while we increased our charges. The acquisitions which have been made may, some of them, have been necessary in order to secure what we already possessed, some of them, may have more than repaid in revenue the cost of governing and protecting them. The consequence of extended dominion has necessarily been a more extensive employment of British-born subjects in military and civil capacities, but the general revenue of the state has not been improved, and the Government has diminished means of improving the condition of the people.

The practical effect of this policy of still extending our dominion and our relations is strikingly manifested at the present moment. We have an army of 250,000 men, but a large portion of that army being stationed either upon or beyond the frontier, we are compelled to employ the contingent of Gwalior and Bhopal, and even to solicit the loan of troops from the Rajah of Berar in order to preserve the public peace in the centre of India. It is impossible to proceed further in this career of expensive conquest, and further to extend our foreign relations without endangering whatever we now possess, and incurring the certain consequence of being unable to perform the first duty of a government, that of protecting its loyal subjects and punishing the evil doer.

BONDELAS AND AORCHA.

Ld. E's Draft Despatch to Secret Committee
May 14, 1842.

As it is the duty of the L^t Gov. of the N.W. Provinces to make to your Hon. Com: a full report of all the events which have recently occurred in the Saugor district and in Bundelkand, I shall only state the impression which the first account of the outbreak made upon my mind, and the few steps I have taken with respect to that outbreak and the disputes in the State of Aorcha and Nuddeea.

The Rajah of Aorcha died on the 30th of March. Mr. O.* first anticipated a movement of the Bondelas on the 8th of April and that movement occurred on the 8th of April when they attacked some police at Narkutt. On the 9th they plundered Rindlassa, and on the 17th a British force occupied Narkutt without opposition, and it was destroyed in the evening of that day. Some skirmishing has subsequently to the occupation of Narkutt taken place in a defile through which the rear of the

* Mr. O.'s full name has been withheld by the editor.

baggage was passing, in which skirmish a few men were killed and wounded on both sides.

As far as I am at present informed the Bondelas have done nothing since although they are said to be in the jungle in some force.

Your Hon. Com^tee^ will perceive that some expressions in a letter of Mr. O. led me to apprehend that some violent proceedings had provoked this outbreak, and I have directed enquiry to be made by the Resident at Gwalior. It was likewise to be made by Mr. C. Fraser the Commissioner. I likewise deemed it necessary in a letter to the L^t^ Gov. to observe upon other passages in the letters of Mr. O., and especially upon the complacency with which he appeared to regard the burning of the village of Narkutt. In a letter to Mr. Fraser, the Commissioner, I transmitted a draft of a Proclamation which it was left to his discretion to make public. I have been informed privately that finding upon his arrival at Saugor that the measures adopted by Mr. O. for the tranquillisation of the country had been insufficient he intended to publish the proclamation but I have not heard that it has been done.

The L^t^ Gov. directed all the neighbouring force to move upon the disturbed districts, and troops were ordered to march not only from Jhansi and Chandera and other places where irregular troops are quartered, but from Nagpore and Cawnpore. I did not think disturbances near Saugor even supposing it to be connected with the display of force at Tihree in support of the Ranee's pretending to the custody of the Rajah of Aorcha, was of such a character as to justify the putting of troops in march from Cawnpore, and I directed that troops should not be moved from that station or Benares without the order of the C. in C. or mine. I feel satisfied that the marching of a force from either of those stations to suppress an outbreak would at the present moment have produced great alarm in the minds of all who wish

well to our Gov^{t}, and great excitement and exultation in the minds of all who desire its overthrow. I do not think that such a movement could have taken place without the risk of a rising at Benares and it would have most seriously embarrassed our relations with the Nepaul State. Hitherto it has not appeared that the troops ordered from Cawnpore have been at all wanted.

I request the attention of your Hon. Com. to a report which only came into my hands two days ago, from two persons employed to watch the Bondelas, by Capt. Subardore Smith, commanding a portion of Scindiah's force. To that report I am disposed to attach credit, and to think that the assemblage of armed men at Tihree under whatever pretence connected with the disputes in the Aorcha State really arises from a disposition to throw off our predominant influence for the doing of which the events at Cabool have seemed to offer an opportunity. My sudden arrival here may possibly have tended to stay the proceedings of the ill-disposed, and the return of our accustomed success in war has I have no doubt, had a very great effect in dissuading from hostilities for which there has been no pretext.

My letters of will put your Hon. Com. in possession of the principles upon which I was prepared to act with respect to Aorcha and Dubbeea, principles in accordance with those laid down in my circular instruction to the political agents. I am convinced that under present circumstances there must be no change of tone, or of conduct in dealing with the affairs of Native States—that we must act with firmness upon just principles as we should have done, had we never crossed the Indus, and maintain all the dignity of the British Gov^{t}, however impaired may be our present power. I know there is danger in our position, but I am satisfied that our safest course is to act as I have said; and that in this case if indeed not in all, the counsels of prudence are the same as those of honor.

I confess however that events such as these occurring in the centre of India, combined with the indications I think I can discover of altered opinion with respect to us in Sind, in the Nizam's territory and in Nepaul render me the more anxious to withdraw the Army from Afghanistan and to exhibit again in India the collected strength of the British power.

The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee.

Allahabad. No. 10, May 17, 1842.

Marginal comments in pencil by the Duke of Wellington.

HONOURABLE SIRS,—Major-General Pollock prosecuted his march upon Jellalabad, without further opposition than that he had encountered in the Khyber Pass, and arrived there on the 16th ultimo.

2. On the 20th, the Major-General detached a force to meet Colonel Bolton's brigade, which had reached Peshawur on the 21st; and the two formed their junction, and marched together to Jellalabad, without encountering an enemy.

3. At Jellalabad, the united force was on half rations. 4. Grain was coming in, and by the last accounts more rapidly; but the force had no sufficient means of movement, and seemed to be unable to procure any; otherwise, the discouragement was such amongst the enemy, and the confusion such, consequent upon the decease of Shah Shooja, that the march of the force upon Cabool, had it been equipped with the means of movement, and well supplied, would have been at the moment a march probably unopposed.

All this very right.

5. Apprehending that negotiations would be opened for the release of the prisoners now in

in the hands of the Afghans, I had, on the 25th of April, informed Major-General Pollock that the British Government would not ransom prisoners; but that if all our prisoners were surrendered, we would surrender all without any reservation; but that if a partial exchange only were agreed upon, Dost Mahomed could not be given up.

6th paragraph very right.

6. As soon as I had reason to believe that Shah Shooja was actually dead, I addressed a letter to Major-General Pollock, dated the 28th of April, informing him that in the present divided state of Afghanistan, the British Government could not prudently recognize any successor to the throne, although it was desirous of seeing established in Afghanistan a national Government, approved by the people, with which it could maintain relations of amity. I likewise informed Major-General Pollock that he might negociate for an exchange of prisoners with a *de facto* Government.

7th paragraph very right.

7. Your Committee is already aware that, on the 19th ultimo, I requested the Commander-in-Chief to give any further instructions his Excellency might deem necessary to Major-General Pollock. In the first instance, his Excellency informed me, by a letter dated the 27th of April, that he had not ventured to give any such instructions. Upon the receipt of his letter, I addressed to Major-General Pollock, on the 4th of May, a letter wherein I informed him, that neither his advance through the Khyber, nor the victory of Sir Robert Sale, nor the death of Shah Shooja, had varied my views. On the contrary, those events appeared to render his retirement more easy than it would

have been, had important political considerations appeared to require other and ulterior operations. I expressed an opinion that his deficient means of movement and provision would have already induced him to withdraw within the Khyber Pass. I reminded the Major-General that no great object could be accomplished by an army deficient in the means of movement and supply; and I added, that I could experience no higher gratification than that of hearing that, the health of his army having been preserved, it was in a secure position, having certain communication with India.

All very right In respect of the effects of the season in the Punjab in (illegible), I believe it is the rain which is apprehended.

8. On the 29th of April, the Commander-in-Chief did address orders to Major-General Pollock, directing him to retire *at once*, and only allowing him, under certain and specified circumstances, to delay that movement.

Upon the receipt of this communication I, on the 6th of May, expressed my entire approval of it, but again cautioned the Major-General not to endanger the health of his troops, which I feared might be seriously affected by the march across the Punjab at this season, directed by the Commander-in-Chief.

9. Anticipating the possibility that Major-General Pollock might have advanced upon Cabool, afer relieving Jellalabad, I have already, on the 28th of April, informed him that that event would in no respect vary the view I previously took of the policy to be pursued; and that I adhered to the opinion that the only safe course was that of withdrawing the army under his command, at the earliest practicable period, into positions within the Khyber Pass,

where it might possess easy and certain communication with India.

This paragraph is very right.

10. I authorised the Major-General to place the Sikhs in possession of Jellalabad, if he should receive instructions to that effect from Mr. Clerk. I had understood that the Sikhs were desirous of possessing that place, with a view to the protection of the territories on the left bank of the Cabool river, which they coveted for themselves, and which, under present circumstances, I see no reason for withholding from them; on the contrary, I considered that if the Jummoo Rajahs could be induced to give up their schemes of conquests beyond the Himalaya, and be content to extend themselves in the territory on the left bank of the Cabool river, our interests would be promoted.

11. The unfortunate repulse of Major-General England in the Pesheen valley had not the fatal consequences I was led to anticipate, when the last overland mail was dispatched. He was enabled to retreat upon Quetta, on the 1st of April, without further loss; and he was soon after joined there by the remaining portion of his force, which effected its passage through the Bolan Pass without any difficulty. He had then 3,600 men at Quetta and began to fortify his position.

This may be right depending on the necessity of waiting till October to return.

12. I instructed Major-General Nott to withdraw the garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and to retire to Quetta on his route to Sukkur, under the impression that Brigadier England's force might almost be considered as lost, and that the brigade advancing through the Bolan Pass would be seriously opposed: the more favourable state of things has not induced me to vary the order given for his retirement, which the

season will not permit him to carry into effect before October.

13. Major-General Nott has directed Brigadier England to move on the Kojuck Pass with 2,500: and he was to send a brigade to meet him. I apprehend, that about the 10th of this month, Brigadier England's force of 2,500 men, together with the force sent to meet him, having passed the Kojuck, will have reached Candahar.

14. Major-General Nott will then have under his orders above the passes a force of more than 13,000 men. He will be enabled to feed that force; but not, I apprehend, to provide any considerable means of movement; and his communications across the Kojuck Pass, and through the Bolan Pass, will be uncertain. In fact, military communication there is none between Candahar and the foot of the pass, for that cannot be called military communication upon which an army can depend, which can only be opened from time to time by the movement of strong bodies of troops.

He is right here.

15. Right.

15. Under these circumstance, I adhere to the orders already given to Major-General Nott to withdraw the garrison from Kelat-i-Ghilzye and retire upon Sukkur.

I have, &c.,
Ellenborough.

To Mr. W. W. Bird, Senior Member of the Council at Calcutta, acting as President in absence of the Governor General.

Kurnaul. 5 Sept^{r}, 1842.

My dear Sir,

It having appeared by a letter from Major General England to the Commander in Chief, that that Officer had

received direct information from two Quarters, that it had been, or was the intention of the Gov^{t} to supersede him in his position in Major General Nott's Army, I wrote to Sir George Arthur requesting him to make enquiry into the matter, and to ascertain if possible by whom the Secret and Confidential letter addressed with reference to that point to the Bombay Gov^{t} was betrayed. I enclose Sir George Arthur's Minute and Mr. Willoughby's Memorandum. It appears by the Memorandum that *nine* persons at Bombay (including the two mentioned in the margin by Sir George Arthur) three at Allahabad and six in Calcutta including the Council, in all 18 persons must have been made acquainted with the contents of this " Secret " letter. This enumeration does not include myself who wrote it, or my Private Secretary or the A.D.C. who may have copied it. I think, however, that the letter was only seen by one of Mr. Maddock's Clerks, and that the original letter was in the hand-writing of my Private Secretary.

It is obvious that if it be possible, which I doubt, to preserve secrecy at all when a letter is communicated to so many persons, it is perfectly impossible to discover under ordinary circumstances, the person by whom secrecy may be violated—the fault is in the system of the Government. In this particular case, however, the letter was made known to several persons to whom it was wholly unnecessary to communicate it.

The reference made to the Adjutant General was unnecessary. The Commander in Chief or any Member of Council could have given the information he gave, and if it had been unavoidable to apply to him, the application should have been made personally and confidentially by the Commander in Chief or the President in Council. To ask the question put to the Adjutant General in an official form, and through the intervention of a clerk to obtain a reply in such a matter, was so preposterous and absurd

that in England it would hardly be believed that men engaged in the management of great affairs could have been capable of such an adherence to official forms in despite of reason. Another thing is observable in the Memorandum: not only the Political Secretary, but the Chief Secretary and the Under Secretary were in Council when the subject was considered. Not one of these Officers should have been present—they have neither power, nor responsibility and the presence of such persons during a Secret Council, cannot but be prejudicial.

The result is, that the feelings of an honorable officer have been unnecessarily pained: he has asked for enquiry, and if such enquiry were granted, it could not fail to be in the highest degree prejudicial to the public service. It would sever and increase dissensions between the two branches of the Army which their subsequent success must before now have nearly obliterated, and in the midst of victory it would reproduce the mutual recriminations which accompany defeat. I shall send a copy of this letter to Sir George Arthur and confidentially request him to manage the future exclusion of Secretaries from the deliberations of the Council.

We really must administer the Government of a great Empire otherwise than if it were still no more than the management of a firm—and upon some better model than that which may be followed by the Managing Committee of a large Corporation.*

Believe me, etc.,

Ellenborough.

* This evil system continued at Bombay till 1851 and was the subject of bitter complaint on the part of Outram when Resident at Baroda.

*To the Earl of Clare.**

Simla. Oct. 3, 1842.

My dear Clare,

You see that through God's blessing, I have succeeded in every thing hitherto. I send a special mail with the news of these victories and the occupation of Ghizni (now no more) and Kabul.

My " Declaration " was signed on the 1st of October, 1842 in the same room in which Auckland's of the 1st Oct., 1838 was—mine terminating the war and his commencing it.

What have we gained by four years of war? 12 millions of money will have been expended, the extent of human suffering has been great. We have thrown Afghanistan into a state in which good Gov^{nt} is impossible —and we have endangered India. I believe India is now safer but we are little better than we were.

I wish you could see me review my two victorious armies on the Sutlej, and deliver the Gates of the Temple of Somnauth into the hands of the Chiefs of Sirhind for transmission in triumph through all the Hindoo States to their antient position. I shall have 36,000 men, besides 6,000 Cavalry of the Protected States. Sir Ch. Napier will at the same time have 11,000 or 12,000 men at Sukkur.

I believe I can now do what I like in India. I wrote on the 1st to Nepal, Nagpore, Oude, the Nizam, and my faithful Ally Bahawulpore, and I think I shall have them all in reins of silk. I have written to Bokhara to endeavour to rescue Stoddart and Conolly. It was well to have 42 guns in these Mountains announcing to the summit of the Himalaya the capture of Ghizni and Kabul.

Now do not suppose these things turn my head. To show you that I know to what alone I owe them I enclose the Circular I addressed on the 1st to all the Clergy of

* 2nd Earl, Governor of Madras 1830-35, Byron's friend.

Bengal. It conveys my real feeling. At the same time I cannot but feel the strength these events give me in England and in all Asia, and I shall exert it all for the benefit of India.

. . . . . .

Yours ever Sincerely,
Ellenborough.

From Sir H. Hardinge.

Extract. White-Hall Gardens. Oct. 4th 1842.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,

. . . . . .

I saw Sir James Graham yesterday and begged him as he was going to Fitz-Gerald* to take steps to have the correspondence between Brig. Gen. Roberts,† Sir Wm. McNaughten and Ld. Auckland sent home in an official shape. The object of the late Whig Gov^{t} is to endeavour to throw odium on you and the Gov^{t} for ordering the Troops to retire to the left Bank of the Indus, and to justify Ld. Auckland's policy and conduct. This correspondence clearly shews that Ld. A. was made aware of the state of things at Cabul by Gen^{l} R. several months before the insurrection broke out, and that having the facts of the case before him, he approved of M^{c}N's policy and conduct and recalled Gen^{l} R.

Ld. A. in his conversation with Peel, in *substance* admitted, that he had given the orders for the Troops to withdraw within the Indus—but a few days afterwards when he conversed with Fitz-Gerald I understand he was very cautious in making any admissions, and seemed to have learnt a lesson from Ld. Palmerston.

. . . . . .

Ever Yours very sincerely,
H. Hardinge.

NAWAB SALAR JUNG BAHADUR.

* Lord Fitz Gerald and Vesey, President of the Board of Control.
† Sir Abraham Roberts, G.C.B., father of F.M. Earl Roberts.

From the Duke of Wellington to Lord Ellenborough.

Walmer Castle. October 9th, 1842.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,

I received yesterday your letters of the 16th and 17th of August. At a very early period after the disasters at Cabul, and when we heard here of the efforts made under the direction of the late Lord Auckland's Government in India to relieve the troops still remaining in Afghanistan, I stated to you my opinion what were the objects which if attained, I should consider and would I thought in general be considered as enabling you to withdraw the troops from Afghanistan very handsomely; and in reality leaving nothing to be obtained which any reasonable or just man could desire. Unfortunately the late Government of India were not sensible even at that late hour of their existence that any army can be useful, nay that it can exist in the shape of an army, only if capable of movement; and that it cannot move unless supplied with and attended by means of conveyance for its baggage, stores of all kinds and provisions, which means are camels, horses, mules and bullocks in the countries then and now the seat of operations of the troops, and men to take care of and drive the animals when under their several loads. The consequence of the corps of troops destined to relieve those still stationed in Afghanistan being ill supplied or not supplied at all with means of conveyance, was that when successful, and even when they had joined the corps of troops which they had been sent to relieve, but those gallant efforts had in the meantime relieved them from the danger by which they were threatened; it was found that neither body, that is neither the relieving corps of troops, nor the corps of troops relieved could move for the performance of any operation whatever, on account of the want of means of conveyance. The orders of your Government to the General Officers commanding in Afghanistan, as well as with the Commander in Chief, must have been founded upon this state of affairs.

You have since been enabled by great efforts to complete the equipment of your armies in means of conveyance to enable them to move. In the meantime Ghuznee had fallen, and the massacres of retiring garrisons had been perpetrated; and the captives in the hands of the enemy had been moved out of your reach. Ghuzni fell, I believe before General Pollock had reached Jellalabad in April. But it is obvious that neither he nor General Nott could make any efforts for the relief of that garrison, or for any other purpose, till the corps under their command respectively, should be supplied with means of conveyance. It is needless here to observe upon the misunderstanding by General Pollock of orders and his disobedience of others of your instructions respecting the captives. This is certain; your armies could do nothing for their relief, while unable to move; but it must be observed that even if capable of moving, the result of any operations undertaken for the relief of the captives would have been worse than doubtful. Such operations must in that climate, and in those countries have been limited in extent. The captives might have been moved off to the westward, or to the northward, to Herat, or even to Bokhara. Supposing to the latter? Were we to apply for the mediation of the Emperor of Russia, or to the King of Persia, or to the Grand Signor, to obtain their release as we have to obtain the release of Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly; sent upon a mission to the Khan of Bokhara by the late Government?

Having equipped your armies with means of conveyance and enabled them to move, the question then came under your consideration, what course of operation you should authorize them to follow, till the season should come round at which it would be desirable that the whole should evacuate Afghanistan. I QUITE CONCUR IN THE COURSE OF OPERATIONS WHICH YOU HAVE SUGGESTED. You have in my opinion acted most handsomely by your generals in communicating to them so freely your opinions upon points on which after all they must

form their own after considering all the reasoning on both sides of the question which you have so ably detailed for their consideration. But after all you must see as they must, that they upon the spot must and will decide upon the course which each of them after considering not only all the topics which you have suggested, but others of which you could have no knowledge, which must guide their judgment and their operations. Just to elucidate this point, I mention Ghuzni, of which fastness you very naturally desired General Nott not only to obtain possession, but to carry off from thence an important trophy! You were quite right. It would be desirable to carry off the trophy. But what happens? General Nott cannot undertake to storm Ghuzni as Lord Keane did, and he will not be provided with the regular means for the attack of such a fortress, and at all events he has not time for such an operation. These observations just tend to show that it is impossible for anybody at distance, even informed as you must be to dictate the exact course of a military operation. This must be left to the officers on the spot. And you have acted most handsomely by yours. You have stated clearly your objects. You have afforded them ample means, and you have suggested the mode of execution with all the reasons in favour of and against your suggestions, the latter formed upon the knowledge acquired by experience. You could not do more. You might have done less. I concur in all your objects. I think your generals ought to be successful in carrying into execution your views.

I do not know when the mail will be despatched and I cannot add more to-day.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

Wellington.*

* Addressed on the cover to: "His Excellency, The Lord Ellenborough, Governor General etc., etc., etc., Fort William, Bengal."

Endorsed on cover in Lord Ellenborough's hand: "R. Dec. 24th 1842;" and in Lord Colchester's hand: "Wellington, Duke of. Very important, should have been published with the rest."

*From General Sir Colin Campbell.**

Queen's House, Colombo. 9th Novr 1842.

Dear Lord Ellenborough,

The great and brilliant successes which have taken place in Afghanistan and China under your Lordship's arrangements and administration is a subject of satisfaction and pride to every British heart, and I confidently trust will be the means of securing the Peace of India for many years. I cannot resist but to offer your Lordship my humble and most hearty congratulations upon this great and important occasion; your Country owes you a debt of gratitude for the prompt and determined manner you applied and brought forward the resources at your Command, which have obtained such happy results to our Native Land. I was fully aware of the many difficulties you had to contend with, but I felt assured that you would surmount them, when I saw that you had proceeded so promptly to the frontier to be on the spot to give your directions. The troops appear to have fully maintained their reputation, and your Lordship's orders upon the occasion do them every justice, and the restoration of the prisoners is a joyful and happy conclusion.

These important events will enable the Government at home to open the ensuing Session of Parliament with great éclat, and I confidently trust will be the means of promoting the prosperity and trade of the Country with those which we were lately in hostility with.

That your Lordship's Administration of India may long be distinguished with every success and calm, which the vigour and decision of its commencement has brought about, is my most sincere wish.

I have, etc.,

C. Campbell.

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* Served at Assaye, in the Peninsula and at Waterloo.

*From Gen. The Right Hon. Sir George Murray, G.C.B.**

Extract. London. 1st Decr 1842.

My dear Lord Ellenborough. I congratulate you most sincerely upon the several important and glorious successes which have been achieved in the East under your auspieces and under your immediate direction. It is difficult to appreciate at once all their value, or to take in at one view all the consequences of an advantageous nature which are likely to result from them.

I happened to be at Drayton Manor (Peel's Place) when the welcome intelligence arrived, and my remark upon it was, that I doubted whether so great a *breadth* of good news had ever been received before at the same time in any country.

As for yourself, how gratifying must it be to you to feel that your name will be inseparable hereafter from these great events, and this sudden change in the fortunes of our country. For my part when I reflect upon the warm interest which you have at all times taken in the welfare of our Indian empire, whether its affairs were managed by yourself or by others; and on your indefatigable exertions to make yourself master of every thing that concerned it, I look upon your recent triumphs as a reward which you have most justly earned; and which I heartily rejoice that you have obtained. And I anticipate, with confidence, that the tone which you have given to public feeling by the manner in which you have conducted the opening of your administration, will facilitate all your future proceedings.

I remain always,

Very faithfully yours

G. Murray.

Extract. From the Rt. Hon. Sir George Murray.

Private. 5 Belgrave Square, London. 15th Dec., 1842.

My dear Ld. Ellenborough,

Since writing some time since to offer you my con-

* Wellington's famous Quarter-Master-General in the Peninsula. See Dict. Nat. Biog. and Mr. John Fortescue's Life of Wellington.

gratulations on first hearing of your glorious successes, I have had an opportunity to read your Proclamation, your General Orders to the Army, and some other Documents of yours which have afforded me very great pleasure.

Every thing appears to me, in these papers, to be admirably calculated to turn your victories to the best account; to do away all the unfavourable impressions which may have any where resulted from preceding failures; to give a high tone and firm confidence to all throughout British India; and to inspire all Native powers with awe and with respect.

Believe me always,
Very faithfully yours,
G. Murray.

No. 7, GG.

To The Secret Committee.

BENGAL AND INDIA SECRET LETTERS, 1843, VOL. 28, PP. 67-74.

Camp Kythul. 20th Jan., 1843.

Honorable Sirs,

Mr. Maddock who rejoined my camp on the 15th instant informs me that the return of General Ventura is expected with much interest by the Sikh Chief and Army.

2. It is in contemplation to give him some military fête as a demonstration of the regard of the army. He has great influence in the Punjab, and his return will probably lead to some crisis in the affairs of that country. The party to which he may give his support, whether that of the Maharaja or of his Minister, will predominate, and in this country one party rarely predominates without endeavouring to extinguish the other.

3. Had General Ventura returned before the late successes in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of our forces within our own frontier, a new cause of anxiety would have been given to me.

4. The position of our army beyond the Sutlej would have become yet more perilous; not only would its safety

have depended, as it did, upon the fidelity of the Sikhs, but the temptation held out to the ambition of a French General would have been such as no ordinary mind could have resisted, and the friendly policy of the Maharaja founded upon a correct view of his own personal interests which are involved in the continuance of our power, would in all probability have been superseded by a totally different policy, having for its object the destruction of our power and the substitution of the Sikh sway in the whole plain at the foot of the Himalaya from the Sutlej at least to the Jumna.

5. Now, the withdrawal of our force within the Sutlej makes us secure, provided our positions within that river are not such as to invite attack by holding out to an able and powerful enemy the certainty of being successful in his attack with a concentrated force upon distant and unsupported Brigades. The positions lately occupied by our troops at Ferozepore and Loodianah without any support nearer than Kurnaul appear to me to be such as invite attack, and I shall as soon as I can obtain cover for the troops at Umballa and in concentrated positions near Umballa and in the Hills withdraw the largest portion of the troops now cantoned at Ferozepore and Loodianah, leaving at those stations only troops enough to observe the river, and to deter plunderers from crossing it; and giving to these troops at such stations the means of defending themselves until the arrival of succour by a sufficient small work.

6. Deprived as Gen. Ventura will thus be of the means of obtaining for himself great renown by a successful invasion of the British Territory, and precluded by the position we shall occupy upon the Lower Indus from establishing any communication with France, he will, I expect, after considering the strength of the two parties attach himself to that which will do most for him, and seek to overturn the other.

7. Our engagements and our obligations to the Maharaja are such as to preclude us from regarding with favor any attempt to subvert his authority. The question will at some time arise whether we shall give any active aid to support it.

8. His adherents will consist of the people of the plains and the opposite party of the people of the Hills. The parties may be nearly balanced in strength, and it would appear where the basis of a settlement would be so obviously that of separation, that to effect such a settlement would not be difficult by means of our intervention; but having effected a settlement upon that basis, our new position as the protectors of the Sikhs and people of the plains as far as the Indus would not be secure. From the Sutlej to the Indus our right flank would be continually threatened by an active enemy in possession of the Hills, and capable of bringing his force upon almost any part of our line, divided by rivers, without our having the means of foreseeing the point of attack.

9. Such a position could not be endured and the necessity would be imposed upon us of occupying the Hills and taking the summit of the Himalaya as the boundary of our Dominions.

10. I confess that I do not desire to see that state of things exist which would engage us in operations beyond the Sutlej, which could in my opinion be only safely terminated by so great an extension of dominion. I advisedly prefer the continuance of the relations which have existed for 40 years between the Government of India, and that of Lahore. Divided as the Sikhs must be before we can justifiably enter their country, still the contest could not be short, and must be expensive. It would be one in which decisive success would only be obtained by the exercise of military talents of a high order, which the Government of India cannot always command, and it would terminate in an acquisition of territory

which it would require the highest political ability in the head of the Government peacefully and satisfactorily to administer and preserve.

11. With these impressions upon my mind your Honorable Committee may be assured that I shall be slow to engage in any operation beyond the Sutlej; but if compelled to do so, I shall bring to bear upon the Punjab the whole disposable force of the army, and I will not recross the river without having effected a settlement honorable to our arms, and conducive as far as it can be made to our future security.

12. At the present time considering the state of affairs not in the Punjab alone, but upon the Lower Indus, the failing health of Scindeah and the disorders which will probably ensue upon his death—and finally the recent insurrection in Bundelkund and in the Saugor district with all their circumstances, I can have no doubt that the Governor General ought to remain in the midst of the army in these Upper Provinces where from day to day the occasion may arrive for immediate and decisive action.

I have, etc.,

Ellenborough.

No. 9 GG.

BENGAL AND INDIA SECRET LETTERS, 1843, VOL. 28, PP. 79-86.

Secret Department. Camp Delhie. 14th February, 1843.

To the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs,

Your Honorable Committee will observe that I have made very extensive changes in the persons occupying the several appointments in the Saugor and Nerbudda Territory, and some also in the functions of the several officers employed in the administration of that district.

2. I deemed it desirable that the whole administration of Civil Justice, and that of Criminal Justice in the more important cases, as well as the Appeal from the Decisions

of Magistrates in cases of less moment, should be vested in an officer entirely unconnected with the revenue, the Police and the general Government of the Territory.

3. I have selected therefore for the appointment of Civil and Sessions Judge, Mr. Caldecott, a gentleman of the highest character.

4. This appointment would almost necessarily have involved the removal of Mr. . . . . , hitherto entrusted with these judicial duties as well as with the general powers of commissioner, but I was desirous on other grounds to remove that gentleman from Saugor.

5. I have never been satisfied with the administration of that territory. I have from the first breaking out of the insurrection apprehended that it had its origin quite as much in the bad spirit in which the Government had been carried on as in the removal of troops from the district, to which, and to the disasters at Cabool, it was attributed by the officers employed.

6. No event has occurred, nor has any circumstance come to my knowledge which has tended to remove my first impression. On the contrary whatever has in any manner come before me calculated to throw any light upon the spirit in which the administration has been conducted has only had the effect of confirming that original impression, until latterly the observations made by Major Sleeman when he visited the District proved that I had been right.

7. I much regret that the private nature of the materials from which my judgment has principally been formed, deprives me of the advantage of laying them before you; but altho' thus unable to shew the correctness of my opinion by official documents, I could not hesitate to act upon that opinion, firmly believing as I do that an almost total change of men in the Saugor District is absolutely required for the purposes of re-establishing that feeling of confidence amongst the chiefs and of

personal regard for their rulers amongst the people without which in this country, Government cannot be well administered.

8. I have given much consideration to the selection of the officers appointed in the place of those removed, and I hope I have not been misinformed with respect to any one of them. I have reason to think that they will all perform their duties ably, and in a right spirit of justice and of conciliation.

9. Your Honorable Committee will perceive that I have placed several appointments at the recommendation of Major Sleeman. I apprehend that he will nominate to these subordinate situations two or three of the officers recently added to the establishment in the Saugor and Nerbudda Territory, and as far as I know, unexceptionable men; but I do not expect that he will exclusively recommend for the new appointments, officers now employed.

10. If he should recommend any one I have reason to think unfit, I must do my duty and decline to adopt the recommendation. I have placed Major Sleeman at the head of the Government of the Territory as Commissioner. I have every confidence in his conducting the Government ably upon right principles. He possesses to a great degree the confidence of Chiefs and People and he has that without which good Government is in India impossible a real feeling of regard for the natives of the Country.

11. All the officers I have appointed are men who have been on service in the field with the Native Army. They have on that service had the opportunity of appreciating the many natural virtues of the native character.

12. I should deem the measure I have adopted incomplete, without a reform of the police with respect to which I have a measure nearly matured.

13. Where a change is introduced having for its object, and I trust for its effect, a great improvement in the general character of the administration of the Country

and consequently in the disposition of the people towards our Government, I attach comparatively small value to mere considerations of economy. Of these, however, I have not been unmindful and Your Honorable Committee will perceive that the alterations made in the constitution of the establishment, and in the allowance of the officers employed will produce a monthly saving of about 10,000 rupees.

I have, etc.,
Ellenborough.

No. 25 GG.

BENGAL AND INDIA SECRET LETTERS, 1843, VOL. 28, PP. 211-220.

Agra, The 28th March, 1843.

Extract. *To the Secret Committee.*

Honorable Sirs,

The restoration of the Gates of the Tomb of Sultan Mahmood of Ghuznee to the Temple of Somnath, and the address to the Princes, Chiefs and People of India wherein I announced that measure, appear to have been equally disapproved in England.

I cannot but think that somewhat less of disfavour would have attended my conduct had the circumstances under which I acted, and the object I had in view, been more perfectly understood.

I wrote that address not for England, but for India. I spoke to men under the excitement of recent victories following unparalleled disasters. I spoke with reference to trophies of which the removal to Ghuznee is the subject of popular tradition, and the restoration to India the subject of popular prophecies from the Indus to the Nerbudda. I did not think that in addressing under such circumstances a sensitive nation, the language of enthusiasm, however reproved by the purer taste of English gentlemen, was equally reproved by Indian policy, or that to adopt towards the people terms of friendliness, and towards the Princes and Chiefs of India

the accustomed terms of princely courtesy was inconsistent with the duty or with the station of a Governor General.

It seems to be forgotten that I found in India a defeated army, and an Empire in danger. It was in danger because acquired only by arms, by arms alone can it be preserved—for in the hearts of the people it has no foundation.

The British power in India is therefore in a state of constant peril. It rests only upon the continuance of military success by which the fidelity of the troops is mainly preserved, and I found a defeated army.

It has been under a deep impression of the existence of this state of constant necessary peril aggravated by military failures, that I have acted on all occasions since I arrived in India. I have earnestly endeavoured to avail myself of every circumstance whereby I could conciliate the Army, the Princes, the Chiefs, and the people of India, and attach them all to our Government. I knew that in order to effect this object I must say things and do things not in accordance with ordinary practice or with English notions; but I found India under no ordinary circumstances of danger, and I determined to place it in a state of security whatever might be the judgment at first formed of me and of my measures in England.

I believe that India is at present secure. Victory indeed soon returned to our arms; but victory alone was insufficient to repair the consequences of defeat. After reverses attended by losses and by sufferings and by disgrace before unknown, it was necessary to impress all India with the full extent of our successes and of our power—to substitute for every other feeling amongst the troops the passion for military glory, and to omit no measure which could have the effect of convincing a retiring army that it returned victorious from Afghanistan, and was gratefully received by the Government, and by its Country.

I deemed it to be further necessary to endeavour at this time to give a new character of Nationality to the Government by identifying it with the national feeling—to prove by some decisive act that we sympathised with the people, and regarded, as we did our own, the Honor of Hindoostan. It was with this view that I directed the restoration of the Gates of the Temple of Somnath.

I know that the recovery of those trophies from Ghuzni is regarded everywhere as the strongest proof we have ever exhibited of our power: I believe that it is also gratefully accepted as the first indication of a desire to consult the feelings of the people. Nowhere have the Mussulmans evinced dissatisfaction, altho' as I am informed the Press has not been wanting in its efforts to stimulate them to acts of resentment. Mussulmans as well as Hindoos offered themselves as volunteers to escort the trophies to Somnath. Mussulmans as well as Hindoos were sent by the Sikh Chiefs to escort the trophies through Sirhind. The war in Afghanistan had assumed as no other war had done, a national character It had been my object to confirm that character and to give to the transmission of the trophies through the centre of India the appearance not of a religious, but of a National triumph, partaken by all the Chiefs and people, and protected by the Government.

Could it have been reasonably apprehended that in so transmitting in a National triumph these trophies to the Temple from which they were removed by Sultan Mahmood I was inflicting an injury upon our own religion, I admit that no views of political expediency should have induced me to adopt the measure; but entertaining no such apprehension with respect to *our* religion, I did feel that it was a measure full of practical benefit thus in effect to give a renewed assurance to all the people of India of the security of *their* religion under British rule. In that assurance resided Peace. In that resides

every hope of future improvement. To tolerate and to protect all religions was the wise policy of the first British conquerors in India, and I am yet to learn that it has been abandoned. I see no limit to the miseries which would ensue were a contrary policy to be adopted. We have created in India the elements of Revolution. We have destroyed those of Government. The subversion of our Government would lead to long and universal anarchy, and our Government could not survive for a month the adoption of a policy inconsistent with the toleration and protection of all religions. It is not only for our own interest, it is for that of humanity that I would strengthen by every means the belief that all the religions of India are as heretofore to be respected.

As long as I continue to direct the Government of India I must continue to act upon the principles which have hitherto guided my conduct. I must continue to endeavour to give to our Government a national character and to make the people feel that it exists not for the English only, but for them. I must endeavour to conciliate the Princes and Chiefs of India by treating them with courtesy and with consideration, and with justice. Above all I must endeavour to preserve and increase the attachment of the Army by recognizing and rewarding its high services. These I believe to be the only principles upon which the British Government in India can be conducted with a prospect of permanence, and my duty will not permit me to depart from them.

I have told you that India is at present secure, but it is impossible for me not to feel that the shock our power, and our character recently received was of the most serious nature, that it will long exercise a baneful influence over the minds of our enemies, of our Allies, and of our subjects, and that nothing but the most unceasing vigilance on the part of the Government, and most judicious action upon the principles I have indicated can

preserve our Empire from the extremity of danger necessarily inherent in its position.

I have, etc.,
Ellenborough.

Extract. *From Sir H. Hardinge.*

W. O. Feby 6th 1843.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,

. . . . . .

Ashley* brings on his Sind discussion on Thursday. The Papers are on the Table, and are well calculated to convince, if Papers on our Table were ever read for that purpose. However they will shame into silence many who were last year very virulent on the subject.

The Indian Press is coming round—and the Civilians I presume are also coming to their senses. The Army you have always had with you—and Napier writes in every letter, that he has recd support from you such as no military man ever did before from a Civil superior.

. . . . . .

The Duke is wonderfully well—but overworked. Colville† tells me your labours are super-human. Howr come what may or come home when you will, you have established a name, which will record yr Govt of India as second to none.

Upon the whole we are much better than we were last Session, and so are you, in spite of the Court of Directors.

. . . . . .

H. Hardinge.

* The philanthropist, afterwards Lord Shaftesbury. When Ld E. was President of the Bd of Control in 1828-30, Lord Ashley was one of the Secretaries and wrote a memo. on the salt tax so diffuse that Ld E. said laughingly: "Good God, Ashley, I wonder you did not begin at Lot's wife."

† Adml Lord Colville, Ld E.'s brother-in-law.

Extract. *From Mr. W. B. Baring, M.P.*

Feb. 6, 1843.

The Duke crushed the enemy single-handed. Any help would have marred the effect of his authority. Auckland spoke in a very subdued tone. He has himself behaved well. His sisters do nothing but propagate the gossip they glean from the Indian press and their numerous correspondence with disappointed officials. Mahon* too treats your letters very much like a woman treats a secret. I have heard this and much more. A reformer has no friends . . . . . The publication of your correspondence will open the eyes of the public to the true gist of the argument, and I cannot anticipate any other result than a new exposure of Palmerston. This great man bears himself with his usual saucy intrepidity. He will not bate one jot of his warlike policy. . . . . .

I am sorry to say that Peel was cupped two days ago. He was certainly not up to the mark on the day of the opening. . . . .

Extract. *From Sir R. Peel.*

Mch. 4, 1843.

The publication of a volume of papers containing almost all the correspondence that passed respecting operations in Afghanistan worked a very remarkable and very favourable change in the public opinion with reference to these operations and the credit due to you for your share in them.

From the Honble. Henry Law.†

26 Upper Seymour Street. March 13, 1843.

My dear Edward,

Since last mail there have been four debates in the House of Commons upon the affairs of India and China.

* Lord Mahon, afterwards Earl Stanhope, the historian.

† A younger brother of L^d E.

On the 9th of February Vernon Smith moved for your letter to the Hindoo princes on the subject of the Gates of Somnath, and he has given notice for a motion upon the subject for the 9th of March. In this debate the *Bigots* joined with the Whigs in condemning your letter and Sir R. Peel upon that point gave them an advantage by admitting that he had made some communications to you not altogether approving of what had been done, but I think that he fully repaired any mischief that he may have done by this admission, by the triumphant comparison which he drew between the state in which you had *found* India and that to which you had brought it. Nothing however could be more bitter than the speeches of Lord J. Russell and C. Buller who followed, both of whom pledged themselves not to relax in their attacks upon your administration. On the vote of thanks to the Naval and Military forces employed in China, not one syllable was said of the plan of the campaign, no comparison was made between the amount of force employed by the late and by the present Gov^{t} and your name was not so much as mentioned. In fact all *debate* was carefully avoided. In my ignorance of the policy which dictated this course I was necessarily much disappointed.

On the 14th the Blue Book with the papers relating to the affairs of Afghanistan from the breaking out of the Ghilzie insurrection to the date of the latest arrivals was laid upon the table of the two Houses. It immediately produced a very favourable change of opinion. All idea of dividing upon the Vote of Thanks to you was at once abandoned and when the debate came on, on the 20th, the opposition was very feeble. Sir R. Peel availed himself well of a letter from M^{r} Amos which contradicted one charge against you, to expose the probable equal groundlessness of other charges so greedily believed by the other side. Lord J. Russell was shabby but weak; Sir R. Inglis having been converted by the Blue Book made

some amends for his previous attack upon you. But Mr. Hogg's* was the speech of the night. He spoke admirably well and gave Lord Ebrington and some other small fry, a castigation which they will recollect for some time. On the 1st of March Roebuck† brought on his motion for a "Committee to enquire into the circumstances which led to the late hostilities in Afghanistan, to report the evidence and their observations thereon." His speech was very able and produced a great effect upon the House, but to my mind he did not dwell sufficiently upon the false military position which had been taken up, even supposing that the necessity of doing something was admitted. The case, as he made it was however stronger than L[d] John Russell could meet, and his defence was miserable, and it was only after Sir R. Peel had expressed his intention of opposing the motion for a Committee of enquiry, that the Whigs recovered their spirits even sufficiently to cheer those who spoke upon their own side. Lord Palmerston being relieved from the apprehension of enquiry made one of his most impudent exhibitions, claiming credit for having brought to a successful *conclusion* all the great and important transactions in which the late Government had been engaged! Nor was he at all put out of countenance by the laugh with which this announcement was greeted. Sir R. Peel grounded his opposition to the enquiry on the impolicy of disturbing the present friendly relations with Russia by again discussing the causes of jealousy which her conduct may have afforded to the English Government in bygone transactions, and 2[ndly] on the transference to the House of Commons of the executive authority of the Crown which would result from the *frequent* institution of such enquiries by the House.

* Afterwards Sir James Hogg, Bart. a Director of the E. India Co.

† M.P. successively for Bath and Sheffield, famous for his independence and public spirit.

His own side were not well satisfied with the line he took, nor willing to admit that an enquiry into a matter of such magnitude as the late war in Afghanistan could be quoted as a precedent for enquiry into every case of difference of opinion between two parties in the House. His speech however was a very able one. He let the members of the late Government clearly understand that they were in his power and that he spared them; and he reminded them that the unfairness of their attacks upon you, against which he had frequently protested would, had he allowed party considerations to influence him at all, have fully justified his taking advantage of this motion to retaliate. This they must have *felt*, and if they are capable of shame, I hope that Peel's conduct on this occasion will shame them into abandoning the unfair and malignant system of persecution which they have not hesitated to pursue. Macaulay the other day upon some Conservative remarking that they were likely to have a quiet Session, replied " Oh, will you ? We shall have five Indian mails and a question upon each ! "

Vernon Smith has fixed his motion for the 9th of March in the hope of something arriving by the next mail to give new point to his attacks, as the present feeling is that the subject is exhausted. Should the next mail not help his case I suspect the motion will be given up.

Thanks were voted on the 1st of March by the Court of Directors to you and the Indian armies in the same terms which they have been previously voted in the two Houses of Parliament. In the Court of Proprietors some grumbling is expected, but with no greater success than in the H. of Commons. I was under the Gallery of the H. of Commons during all the debates. That upon Roebuck's motion is not well reported. Peel's speech in the Times is unintelligible. The reporter must have been drunk. It is somewhat better given in the Herald, but not well there.

The discussions upon the policy of the Afghan war are not by any means at an end. The question of who is to

pay is being debated. It is clear that the principal object of the Whigs was to divert public attention from their own misdeeds, and I am well pleased that they should be put upon the defensive. Lord Clanricarde threatens a motion in the Lords about the Somnath letter, but he may upon second thoughts consider discretion the better part of valour, for Brougham has there constituted himself your champion, and watches the Gates as a baker's dog does his master's cart, ready to bite off the fingers of anyone who dares touch them . . . . . .

Yours affectionately,

H. S. Law.

To Lord Clare.

March 26, 1843.

My dear Clare. I was so hurried when I wrote to you by the last mail, having received all the despatches and letters from England only two days before it was necessary to send off our express for the steamer which is to leave Bombay on the 1st that I may have failed to thank you sufficiently for your friendly letter.

As to the matter of the Somnath Gates, it is evident that the measure of sending them back and still more that of writing as I did to the Princes and People of India has been very ill received in England; but it was not intended for England, it was intended for India and for India alone; and altho' the terms of the Letter may be contrary to English taste I do not know that they are, as translated, contrary to Indian taste. I should judge from what some Chiefs have written and others have told me that the measure was particularly grateful to them, and that they were fully sensible of its political importance. They consider it to be the most unequivocal proof of military strength, and as indicating a regard for their feelings never before exhibited by our Government. The Rajah of Patiala, the most clearsighted of all, said that by that

measure we had made all safe in Hindostan. You can have no idea of the extent to which the carrying away of the Gates by Mahmoud remains impressed upon the minds of the people of India. There is not a man of any education whatever who does not know the circumstances, and who did not feel the disgrace. Runjeet Singh attached so much importance to the possession of the Gates that he desired to make their delivery to him an Article in the Treaty with Shah Shooja, but Shah Shooja refused. Prophecies are attached to their restoration, not in the Upper Country alone, but in the Lower. Then, if they were to be brought away, to what place could they be so properly sent as to that from which they were taken ? And the position of that place afforded me the opportunity of carrying them in triumph through Rajwarra, over some of the very ground over which they were taken on their march to Ghuznee, and in which the tradition of their march remains.

You can have no adequate notion of the extent to which the opinions of all men with respect to us had been shaken by the events at Cabool. Some striking and unusual measure was required to bring opinion into a right state. There has not been the slightest appearance of Mussulman feeling against the restoration of the Trophy. There was much of national character in the late war, and they in India regard the moving of the Gates as a national triumph. The English have done that which no former ruler of India either could have done or, being able, would have done. This is the view in which it is regarded, and the thing done is for the honor of India, not a matter regarding ourselves. Depend upon it I was right in the judgment I formed upon this matter. I cannot tell you how necessary I think it to make it appear that our Government has an identity of feeling with the people we govern. The present want of that identity, the isolation of the English Governors amongst the vast masses of Natives, the painfully evident

indifference of those masses towards the Government, the ruins with which the whole country is covered, the absence, with the exception of two restored canals, of every work indicating greatness, and liberality, the temporary character of every building erected by us, whether private or public, the destruction of Native Temples, the want of consideration for Native Chiefs—all these things are continually pressing upon my mind, and strengthening the conviction I entertain that our Government is altogether without any hold upon the people. It is maintained wholly by the fidelity of the Army. I wish to fix it in the hearts of the Princes and Chiefs and People as well as in those of the Sepoys, and this I can do. I can make the Government as strong as it ever was in the time of Akbar; but then I must act like Akbar and not like Auckland.

I must compress my soul within the limits of that of a mere clerk, I must abjure every liberal and noble feeling. I must job for Directors, and for my own party; I must betray the secrets of Government to newspapers as the hire of their support; I must do all these things, as they have been done, in order to make mine a popular Administration. I will do none of them.

I will govern this country as if I were its sovereign, having nothing to look to out of India, I will identify myself with the People, I will do all I can for eternity, nothing merely for to-morrow, I will do whatever I think to be my duty, happen what may. I am strong enough to defend myself in England if I should not be strong enough to retain my position here. If I am compelled to retire, a press the most iniquitous and disgraceful has possessed itself of the Government of India, jobbing has triumphed over honesty, and the days of our dominion are numbered. Very few men but myself could have saved India in the state in which I found it. What I have done is as nothing compared with what I

have prevented, and in all I have either done or prevented I have been alone; for a long time not aided, but counteracted by every man in civil and political employment.* I came here to make the most entire devotion of myself to the service of this people. I fear nothing. The objects I have in view are infinitely too great to make fear for myself possible. I may succeed, acting upon my own views; I must fail, if I only act to please the clubs in London. Happen what may I will have the approval of my own conscience, and persevere.

Yours ever most Sincerely,

Ellenborough.

Extract from a contemporary letter.

"A writer in the Agra 'Uckbar' has very powerfully shewn that Lord Ellenborough's Somnath Gates affair has been most useful in securing our power over India, and has had a very beneficial effect. He says every Mahommedan in India crowed over the destruction of our army at Cabool; that everywhere their insolence had risen beyond the control of the civil power and the Hindoos were likely to be crushed; but the triumphant removal of the gates brought the Mahommedans to their senses and restored equilibrium between the two religions."

To Sir Charles Napier.

Agra. May 15, 1843.

General,

I think that on reconsidering the measure which in your letter of the 27th ultimo you mention your having adopted with a view to obtaining possession of the person of Meer Syud Mahomed you will entertain doubts of its propriety and see occasion for recalling it.

* He has expressed elsewhere his warm appreciation of many such as Bird, Thomason, Fred^k Currie, Sleeman, and G. R. Clerk. Almost all were opposed at first to the evacuation of Afghanistan.

In the endeavour to obtain possession of his person without injuring him, injury and even death might ensue under circumstances which might appear to bear an equivocal character; and the attempt would in any event invite retaliation. Thus would a new feature be introduced into the practice of war, and the persons of the Generals become the first object. Our European practice is altogether different, and it would be better to endeavour to introduce into Asiatic warfare all the usages of civilised war as adopted in Europe, than to afford the example of introducing into the practice of war here any measure of a questionable character.

I have, etc.,
Ellenborough.

Note. This is a most interesting instance of Ld. E.'s management of Sir Charles. He told Lord Dalhousie that he ought to have no difficulty in dealing with a noble mind like Napier's.

Extract. *To Sir C. Napier.*

Agra. May 15, 1843.

I most earnestly hope that the Court will have attended to my request, made eleven months ago, to have six more steamers upon the Indus. With these and the flat for the conveyance of troops which I have requested the Bombay Government to prepare for each, you would effectually command the whole river.

I cannot think of any thing further to be done from hence for the strengthening of your position. All the Force sent from our North West Frontier will now in a few days be concentrated at Sukkur.

I have repeated my instructions for the movement of the Horsemen of Marwar (with such support we can give from the Shekawattie and Jodhpoor Brigades) upon

Shahgurh and I have written to-day to the Rawal of Jessulmere but the illness of Colonel Sutherland is a serious calamity at this moment and may inpair very much the value of the demonstration to be made from this side of the Desert.

I have, etc.,
Ellenborough.

To Sir C. Napier.

Agra. May, 27, 1843.

General,

I received to-day your Excellency's Letter of the 9th in which you express your desire to have instructions as to the course to be pursued with respect to the women of the Ameers, who all refused to accompany them.

The separation of the women from the Ameers appears so extraordinary and unnatural that I can hardly think the women will persist in their refusal; however if they should do so, it is essential to our character that they should be treated with all respect and honor according to the feelings and prejudices of the East, and I shall be prepared to sanction any arrangement you may think it expedient to make for their maintenance, and for their residence.

I have, etc.,
Ellenborough.

Extract. *To M. Gen. Sir C. Napier.*

Agra. May 27, 1843.

I have read with much gratification your Excellency's Letter of the 9th instant detailing the various arrangements made by you for the Administration of Scinde.

I observe that some few slaves have applied for their freedom and have had it declared. I do not expect that

the number of slaves so applying will be at any time considerable; but the knowledge that the application can be made will have the effect of making the slaveowners even more considerate than they probably generally were in the treatment of their slaves, and do away the little desire for freedom which may exist.

I shall be glad to receive from you when you have had more extensive means of forming an opinion, some account of the extent to which slavery existed in Scinde and of its character. I cannot but apprehend that there were some importations of slaves from Africa into the Indus. The freedom given to the navigation of the river must not be allowed to favor this traffic.

No. 52 G.G.

BENGAL AND INDIA SECRET LETTERS, VOL. 28.
Foreign Department, Secret. Allahabad. 26 June 1843.

To the Honorable the Secret Committee of the Honorable the Court of Directors.

Honorable Sirs,

[*I had the honor to receive on the 13th Instant your letters of the 6th of May relative to Sind, wherein you express your hope to receive from me a full exposition of the policy which has been pursued, as well as of the opinion which has been formed by me upon the several violations of their engagements which have been imputed to the Ameers, and more particularly of the evidence by which important charges are deemed to be substantiated. 2. The views of policy upon which I have acted with respect to Sind were I hope sufficiently elucidated by the several letters addressed by me to Your Honorable Committee and to Major General Sir Charles Napier, and any thing which could now be stated by me must reach

* Parag^s omitted from Blue Book are marked by [ ].

England too late to affect the decision of the Government upon the course which is to be pursued, but it may be convenient perhaps, whatever may have been that decision, that I should place on record in a connected manner the views which have influenced my conduct.] 3. On the withdrawal of the British Armies from Cabool to the Sutlej I had to decide what course I should pursue with respect to the Lower Indus. I had to decide whether the Lower Indus should be altogether evacuated, and our Armies every where resume the positions they occupied before the Afghan War, or whether while the old positions were reoccupied upon the Sutlej certain points should still be held upon the Lower Indus which would ensure the strict performance of Commercial Treaties and give us the military command of that River. 4. The withdrawal to the Sutlej and the withdrawal from the Lower Indus appeared to me to be very different questions. The withdrawal to the Sutlej was dictated by the clearest views of military and political prudence. I shall not recapitulate the reasons for that measure as they have been placed on record in what has been called my Proclamation of the 1st of October, 1842. 5. I have adopted every measure which could have the effect of giving the appearance of triumph to the return of the Armies from Cabool; but still it was a retirement from an advanced position and it was the first retirement ever rendered necessary to a British Army. 6. I was deeply sensible of the impression which the reverses at Cabool had produced upon the minds of Native Princes, of the Native population and of our own troops; I knew that all that had taken place since, and all I had said and done, although it must have much diminished could not have obliterated that impression, and restored to our Government and to our Army the place they had before held in the opinion of India. 7. To have added to retirement to the Sutlej, retirement from the Lower

Indus, to have abandoned every part of the advanced position we had taken up in 1839, to have withdrawn from Kurachee and from Sukkur amidst the insults and exposed as we should have been to the attacks of the Beeloochees upon our rear guard, to have practically abandoned, as we should thereby have done, all the benefits which we might expect ultimately to derive from the commercial Treaties concluded in 1839 (for it was idle to imagine after what had passed, that without the presence of force those Treaties would be observed) to have abandoned also all the great prospective advantages which may be expected to be derived from substituting the Indus for the Ganges as the line of military communication between England and the N.W. Provinces, and to have left open to the ambition of the Sikhs or of an European Power that route of which we had demonstrated the practicability and the importance, to have done all these things without positive instructions from your Honorable Committee, or without some overpowering necessity, would have been in my opinion, contrary to my duty, because inconsistent with our national interests and the national honor. 8. Such a measure would have confirmed the most exaggerated accounts which had been circulated of our disasters. It would have been humiliating to the Army. 9. I had no Instructions from your Honorable Committee. There was no overpowering necessity for retirement. There is no difficulty in holding the positions of Kurachee and Sukkur. The first is during the largest portion of the year accessible in a few days from Bombay. The latter is during the whole year accessible in less than three weeks from Ferozepore. We can besides command the river by our steam vessels, if we have a sufficient number of them well adapted to the navigation. 10. The misinterpretations placed upon some provisions of the Commercial Treaty, and the various violations of its letter and of its

spirit, even while our armies were in force in Sind, satisfied me that unless some penalty were imposed upon the Ameers for such infractions of their engagements, there could be no security whatever for their future observance. 11. I saw troops collected by the Ameers contrary to their usage, and without legitimate cause; but such collection of troops in the presence of a British Army, is in itself an offence and an indication of hostility not to be misunderstood or overlooked. 12. Your Honble. Committee appear to entertain doubts with respect to the authenticity of certain letters of hostile character, ascribed to the Ameers or to their agents. 13. You will have observed how strongly I impressed upon Sir Charles Napier the necessity of caution in coming to a decision on that point. I had however, the fullest reliance upon his sense of justice, and with this reliance I felt that he on the spot, with every opportunity of personal communication with those conversant with such matters was infinitely more competent to form a correct conclusion than I could be at Simlah. To him therefore I confidently remitted the question. 14. I am satisfied with the grounds upon which he decided that the letters were authentic. 15. Major Outram's doubt as to the authenticity of the letter of Meer Roostum Khan to the Maha Raja Shere Sing, appears to have rested upon the circumstance of the party whose information led to the seizure of the letter, being inimical to Meer Roostam Khan: but assuredly, information tending to criminate Meer Roostum could not be expected from one of his friends. Lieut. Postans believed the document to be genuine. Major Outram's suggestions to Mr. Clerk, as to the use which might be made of the letter, could hardly have been given had he entertained a serious doubt of its authenticity. Mr. Clerk never had the opportunity of elucidating in a personal conference with the Maha Raja, in which he thought it could best be done, the doubts to which this

letter and the intercepted letter to Dewan Sawun Mull, gave rise, doubts which in his mind must have had reference more to his belief in the loyalty of the Maha Raja to whom the letter was addressed by Meer Rostum Khan, than to his confidence in that of Meer Roostum, who was unknown to him. Mr. Clerk truly observes that " he does not think the question could at any time be well judged of here," that is, at Simla. I thought so too, and therefore referred the question altogether to Sir C. Napier and the Officers employed in Sinde. 16. It appears by Sir Charles Napier's letter of the 17th November that Major Outram had doubts whether Meer Roostum was privy to the writing of the letter; but that the letter had his seal, and was written by his confidential Minister, there was no doubt. Lieut. Brown assured Sir C. Napier that there could not be the slightest doubt of the authenticity of the letter. There has been no officer employed in Sind, upon whose opinion I would more confidently proceed than on that of Lieutenant Brown.* Every thing that has come to my knowledge with regard to that officer has tended to make me entertain a feeling of great respect for his ability and his character. 17. But while doubts have thus been thrown upon the letter of Meer Roostum to the Maha Raja, none have been entertained with respect to the proposed agreement between Meer Roostum and Meer Nusseer Khan, " binding them to act together in every affair, whether for good or evil, peace or war," which proposed agreement, to the best of the judgment and belief of Major Outram, is in the handwriting of Meer Roostum himself. When that proposed agreement is considered in connection with Meer Nusseer's conduct and with the collection of troops, before any intimation was given to the Ameers of any

*Outram had previously taken a similar view: " I can with perfect confidence entrust the conduct of affairs here (Sukkur) to Lieut. Brown during my absence." See Goldsmid's Life of Outram. Vol. I. p 163.

intention of proposing any modification of the Treaty, it is impossible to view it in any other light than as an act of hostility. 18. That the letter of Meer Nusseer Khan to Beebrook Boogtie, bore his seal, there can now be no doubt. The seal upon that letter, by all before believed to be that of Meer Nusseer, was found to correspond exactly with the seal upon a letter of that Ameer, which bore also the handwriting of his confidential Moonshee. 19. Much care appears to have been taken to investigate all the circumstances attending the escape of Mahomed Shureef. It seems impossible to doubt the participation of Meer Roostum's Minister in that escape of an enemy to the British Government proceeding to act hostilely against us. 20. I cannot admit the convenient doctrine that a Chief is not to be responsible for the act of his Minister. That Minister known to be so hostile to the B itish Government remained with Meer Roostum to the last. 21. In India we must be satisfied with such evidence as Indian habits enable us to obtain. We cannot require the evidence of a Chief's own handwriting in a country in which it is most rare for a Chief to write his own letters, nor expect, where secrecy is the object of those who write, and intrigue their habit, all the obvious proof of authenticity which might accompany an innocent correspondence by the post in England. I was at the time satisfied with the proof of the guilt of the Ameers, and certainly subsequent events have not led me to the conclusion that they were incapable of treachery, and that their simple denial of guilt is to be believed against such evidence as may be drawn from written documents, and the yet stronger evidence of circumstances. 22. In my letter to Sir Charles Napier of the 24th Nov., 1842, I said, and I now repeat it, " If a Government were to wait in every case of suspected hostility, until it obtained such proof of the hostile intention, as should be sufficient to convict the person suspected

in a Court of Justice, it would in most cases expose itself at once to disgrace and disaster. It is necessary to proceed upon a strong presumption of intended hostility, when hesitation might seriously affect great national interests." 23. I have endeavoured to judge my own conduct as I would that of another and I cannot think in reviewing it that in the circumstances in which I stood, I was unjustified in requiring from the Ameers the specific modifications of their engagements which I instructed Sir Charles Napier to propose to them. 24. These modifications of the existing treaty involved on our part the abandonment of a considerable revenue payable to us every year by the Ameers under the name of tribute. They involved undoubtedly the sacrifice on their part of lands of more than equivalent value; but the penalty imposed did not seem disproportioned to the offence I had reason to believe they had committed. 25. Your Honble. Committee have been long in possession of the reason which induced me to think that the abolition of tribute was in itself a good. You have also long been aware of the grounds on which I deemed it politic to make a gift to the Nawab of Bhawulpore, of territory which formerly belonged to his State. Had you disapproved of the general principles upon which the new Treaty proposed to the Ameers was founded, still more had you disapproved of the intention I had announced of holding military possession of certain points upon the Lower Indus after the evacuation of Afghanistan, I presume that you would have acquainted me with that opinion; in the absence of any intimation to that effect I had reason to suppose that a new Treaty based upon those principles, if legitimately obtainable, would not be unacceptable to you. 26. Had the Ameers seen fit to reject the Treaty proposed to them, and to support that rejection openly by arms, they would have pursued a legitimate course, and their defeat

in fair fight would have admitted of subsequent arrangements on the basis of their retaining a portion of their territory, and the exercise of sovereign authority, but from the first, while they of course denied the correctness of the charges made against them, they professed their willingness to submit to the penalty imposed; still they collected more troops. At last having drawn the British General into the vicinity of Hyderabad having then actually signed the Draft of the Treaty, they with a portion of their troops made a treacherous attack upon the residence of the British Commissioner and with all their forces united they opposed the further advance of our army at Meeanee. 27. It would be to take an incorrect view of the treachery of the Ameers were we to regard them from their first acquiescence in the proposed treaty in the first week of December, to the attack on the Residency on the 15th of February, as proceeding upon any other principle than that of collecting all their forces to surround and destroy our army while they endeavoured to deceive the General by professing their readiness to submit. 28. When Sir Charles Napier gained the Battle of Meeanee he had 22,000 men in his front; but he had also had for some days 10,000 men in his rear who had crossed the Indus to attack him. 29. Such large assemblages of armed men cannot take place in any country without much previous preparation. It was in this case a levy en masse of the ruling tribe from every part of Sind. 30. Our first duty is to our own army, and it is due to that army that we should not forgive, or leave without the most exemplary and deterring punishment the far-seeing and long designing treachery by which its destruction was to be effected. 31. The example of the Afghans at Cabool was to be followed by the Beloochees at Hyderabad but the spirit in which they were met was different from that which at Cabool led to the destruction of a British army.

32. It was my duty to mark such conduct by an extent of punishment which should be a warning to every Chief and people of India, which should give future security to the persons of British Ministers and protect British troops from treacherous aggression. 33. The punishment inflicted is in itself just. To have extended clemency to the Ameers however unworthy of it, might have been possible under other circumstances and in other times but I am compelled to adapt my policy to the position in which recent events have placed the British Government in India, to remember on all occasions the extremity of peril from which it has been so hardly redeemed and to regard in all my measures the " Safety " of the Empire which I did not desire to extend, but which I will at least endeavour at all hazards of misrepresentation and of calumny to deliver to my successor, relieved from all the difficulties and dangers and disgrace in which I found it involved. 34. The Battle of Meeanee entirely changed the position in which the British Government stood with respect to the Ameers of Sind. 35. To have placed confidence in them thereafter would have been impossible. 36. To have only exacted from them large cessions of territory would have been to give them what remained as the means of levying war for the purpose of regaining what was ceded. 37. Foreigners in Sind, they had only held their power by the sword, and by the sword they have lost it. 38. Their position was widely different from that of a Native Prince succeeding a long line of ancestors the object of the hereditary affection and obedience of his subjects. 39. They had no claim to consideration on the ground of ancient possession or of national prejudice. Certainly they had none arising out of the goodness of their Government. To take advantage of the crime they had committed to overthrow their power was a duty to the people they had so long misgoverned. 40. It was essential to the settlement of the Country

that I should take at once a decided course with respect to the Ameers, and having no doubt that I was justified in dethroning them I determined on at once adopting and announcing that decision. 41. Their removal from the country with which they were no longer to be connected as Sovereigns was a measure of obvious expediency. It has apparently had the beneficial effect I anticipated from it. The willing acquiescence of the people in our rule and the adhesion of many of the Chiefs to our Government are already the just rewards of an unhesitating and decisive policy, which in taking away every hope from the Ameers has given confidence to their late oppressed subjects.

42. I have already in my letter of the 13th March intimated my opinion how far our position in Sind is improved by holding that Province in Sovereignty instead of holding only military possession of certain points. I consider it to be an acquisition of the highest value, shortening the communication between England and the main body of our Army upon the North West Frontier, cutting off the Punjab from Europe and affording a large Surplus Revenue for the relief of our distressed finances.* 43. Your Honorable Committee will have observed in my earlier letters to Sir Charles Napier that I did not desire the acquisition of any territory upon the Indus beyond what was necessary to give us secure military possession of the two points of Kurachee and Sukkur, [and that even in directing the acquisition of these points I was not without apprehension of the future misuse by a Successor of the means I was placing in his hands]. 44. Some resistance on the part of the Ameers I regarded as not an impossible event, and I considered that having once felt our strength they might thereafter be more strict observers of their engagements. Treachery

* This hope was disappointed; but there is reason to believe that burdens were cast upon the revenues of Sind which the province should not have borne.

such as that we experienced had not come within my calculations. A victory decisive as that of Meaneee, and gained under such circumstances was to me a wholly unexpected event. As I have said it entirely changed our position and I was compelled at once to decide what policy should be adopted in the new state of things. I could not for the reasons I have given re-instate the Ameers. Any other arrangement than I have made would have imposed upon us all the burthen of protecting a Government without affording us the means of benefitting the people or ourselves. Any half measure would have failed. Adopting the decisive measure of taking the Province into our hands, I determined to adapt the means to the end and not to omit any step by which security could be given to the new possession. 45. The Ameers were removed beyond Sea. All arrears of revenue due to them on the day of the Battle of Meeanee were remitted—the transit duties were abolished, the neighbouring States of Jodhpore and Jessulmere were as well as Buhawulpore interested in the overthrow of the Belochees by the intimation that their ancient possessions would be restored. The inhabitants of Sind were assured by Proclamation that the property of all who laid down their arms would be respected. As far as possible the former Officers of the Government were employed and every where as little change as possible has been made beyond that essential change of substituting justice for injustice in the administration. The Police has already attained some degree of efficiency. The most able engineers will be employed for the purpose of surveying and of restoring, if it can be done, the ancient water courses whereby the country was fertilized, and especially that first closed by the vindictive and destructive policy of the Rulers of Sind which once gave prosperity to the dominions of our Ally the Rao of Cutch. 46. The vast tracts which the Ameers have converted

into shikargahs will also be surveyed. Such of the woods as it may be necessary to retain will be carefully preserved, and extensive portions of land, having the richest soil, lately reserved for hunting grounds by the Ameers will be restored to cultivation. 47. Some of these measures have originated with myself, in others I have been anticipated by the Governor of Sind, in all, I know I shall have his most cordial co-operation. 48. One of the measures which in the first instance I adopted, that for the abolition of Slavery, has produced an extent of relief far beyond what I had expected. I was by no means aware of the degree to which that dreadful scourge of mankind had added to the misfortunes of the people of Sind.

49. Are all these beneficial measures to be arrested? Is Slavery again to reign upon the banks of the Indus? Are duties oppressive of industry again to extinguish the prosperity of the people? Are more lands to be taken from cultivation and given to new shikarghas? Are the Ameers to return burning with vengeance to wreak it upon all who welcomed us as Liberators and accepted us as Rulers? 50. I cannot think that your Honble. Committee and all the authorities in England will deem it consistent with the obligations we have incurred thus to act. Providence when it gave us the victory over the Ameers of Sind imposed upon us the deepest responsibility towards its inhabitants, and I feel assured that nothing will be done inconsistent with the first duty of a Government, that of regarding above all things the happiness of a dependent people. 51. The mere anticipation of change in our policy in Sind would, unless the most cautious measures were adopted, make the position of our Army there one of much danger. We could no longer rely upon the aid of the people, or upon its forbearance. Every hand would be raised against us in order to propitiate the returning dynasty by our ruin.

52. It is impossible to calculate the extent to which by opening ancient courses to the waters of the Indus, and by extending the means of irrigation we may improve the productiveness of the soil. As little can we calculate the extent to which the assurance of protection given to the people may increase their industry, and thus finally promote their prosperity. Your Honble. Committee may be assured that no exertions of mine shall be wanting to make the conquest of Sind by the British Arms no less the source of happiness to the inhabitants of that country than of advantage to our own, [but I should deceive you were I to allow you to imagine that those, or indeed any great objects can be effected by a Government which has not the cordial and decided support of all the authorities in England. 53. If from whatever circumstances it may arise the opinion can be created and prevail in India that a change of policy may be expected from an anticipated change in the person to whom the chief administration of affairs is confided, from that moment all strength must depart from the Government and it would be best for the public interests that the anticipated change should at once take place.

54. For myself I can assure Your Honble. Committee that it will not be ungrateful to me to be relieved from a Government which I have conducted amidst uninterrupted misrepresentation and calumny, although hitherto by the good favor of Providence through unexampled difficulties with uninterrupted success, and I must respectfully submit to you that inasmuch as I am convinced the policy I have pursued in Sind is at once just and expedient it would be impossible for me to carry into effect any other measures than such as may have for their object the permanent maintenance of the position in which I trust for the common good of India and of England victory has now placed us upon the Indus.]

I have the honor to be, &c.,

Ellenborough.

To Sir C. Napier.

Barrackpoor. August 7th 1843.

General,

Your conduct in writing to undeceive the Editor of an English Journal who had supposed you had not a sufficiency of force in Sind at the period of the battle of Meeanee, is in accordance with the spirit of truth and fairness in which you have ever acted.

The Government will, I conclude, lay all the Correspondence before Parliament, and when all, together with your recently received explanations of the position of your Army before the Battle of Meeanee, and your exposure of the delusion of Major Outram, shall be at last made known, public opinion must do full justice to you.

I have never had common justice done to me, nor do I now expect it—but you, as a soldier will have it—and even I, with all my experience of the past and present before me cannot but sometimes recollect the great consolatory adage "Magna est Veritas, et prævalebit." However let public opinion be what it will I shall do whatever I think right. My chief regret is that the persevering misrepresentation to which every act of public men is subjected must have the effect of materially diminishing their means of being useful to their Country. I think I know what course the Government *must* take with respect to Sind, but I do not yet know from them what course they intend to take. I shall continue to act upon the supposition that they must take the right course.

Had there been hesitation at any time on your part or on mine as to what was the right course, or any hesitation in acting upon what we believed to be the right course, the most serious dangers must have arisen.

I have, etc.,

Ellenborough.

From Sir H. Hardinge.

Extract.

June 6, 1843.

"The truth is there is a system of calumny which emanates from India and is greedily received and adopted here. The men the highest in the Civil Departments, the staff employed in the most confidential military transactions—all write to their patrons and friends here and give first impressions according to their own personal views; and although this is chiefly confined to your own Civil Servants, it has its effects upon the Court of Directors, who have for some time past been most hostile to you and your policy. The Board of Control is at variance with the Court (of Directors), the members of which have on the Sind affairs taken the same line as on the Gates of Somnauth—the impolicy of the measure, with the addition that it has been obtained by injustice—and this language has received great weight from Major Outram's* letters to Sir C. Napier in which he states his opinions strongly that the misconduct of the Ameers and the doubts as to the extent of that misconduct cannot justify the policy against them which he, Outram, was instructed to enforce by Treaty against them. He was whilst in town living with Lord Auckland and he does not hesitate to hold the most adverse opinions against the Sind transactions. Captain MacGregor,† the Jellalabad Political Agent is also in England. He is equally hostile in general society, where these men are listened to as oracles and looked upon as lions, and as their opinions are re-echoed by the Directors, I need scarcely observe that there is as regards the Sind affair a very strong desire to cancel the whole arrangement and give up the conquest."

* Outram took quite a different line at first. He was strong in his condemnation of the Ameers.

† He advised the surrender of Jellalabad which was opposed by Broadfoot with vigour and ultimate success.

BENGAL AND INDIA SECRET LETTERS, VOL. 28.
Fort William, Foreign Department, Secret. The 28 August, 1843.

*To the Secret Committee from the Governor General in Council.**

Honble. Sirs,

We have received the Letter of your Honble. Committee dated the 6th of July (No. 944) conveying to us the instruction of your general views as to the affairs of Sind, but not fettering our discretion by peremptory directions as to the policy to be pursued. 2. We rejoice that you have seen fit to leave to us this discretion, for we cannot but express to your Honble. Committee our decided opinion that the restoration of the banished Ameers to their landed possessions with permission to reside in Sind, would whether they were reinstated or not in their Sovereign Authority, very materially weaken the position upon the Indus which your Honble. Committee have decided that we should permanently retain, and ultimately lead to another and an unnecessary contest for a country now subdued. 3. Nor are we less impressed with the opinion that the restoration of Chiefs justly condemned for a treacherous attack upon a British Minister and a British Army would destroy all the moral effect which has been produced by their banishment; and tend to impair everywhere the stability of our power, in as far as it depends upon the fidelity of Native Princes and Chiefs to their engagements with our Government. 4. Your Honble. Committee having suggested two measures for consideration—that of restoring the Ameers to their lands only, and that of restoring them also to their Sovereign rights, and you incline to prefer the latter

* In a letter of April 7, 1852, to Sir Charles Napier, Lord E. complains that he "found that my letter of the 28th of August, 1843 in explanation and defence of the measures adopted in Sinde has never been printed at all, and it is obvious that as far back as Jan. 1845, it had not been communicated by the Secret Committee to the Court. My letter of June 26, 1843, was printed in a mutilated form." By 'printed' he means printed for Parliament.

to the former project. 5. We must respectfully submit to you that to us it appears that to restore the Ameers to their landed possessions, and to deprive them of their rights of sovereignty would be to impose upon ourselves all the expense of governing their territories without reserving the means of defraying it, to give to the Beloochees natural leaders able to pay for their willing services against us, and to aggravate the proved hostility of those leaders by depriving them of what they deem their "Honor," the object dearest to every inhabitant of the East. 6. On the other hand to restore the Ameers to their rights of Sovereignty as well as to their estates would, as it appears to us, be again to subject the Sindian People, which has so willingly accepted us as its rulers to the tyranny of its antient masters—to abandon all the great schemes of improvement which are now opening upon our view and to place hostile States upon the line of communication between Bukkur and Karachi, thus dividing the Armies of Bengal and Bombay, which the entire possession of both Banks of the Indus would enable us to bring into co-operation. 7. It is true that provisions might be imposed upon the Ameers having for their object the diminution of some of these evils; but such provisions would require constant intervention for the enforcement of their due observance, and after protracted dissensions and a renewed conflict, involving the postponement of every measure of public improvement, and the continued agitation of men's minds not in Sind alone, but in other parts of India; the British Government would be at last compelled to adopt the very measure which the Governor General resolved upon on the 13th of March* as the only safe solution of the difficulty in which we were unexpectedly involved by the treachery of the Ameers, and the entire overthrow of their power at the Battle of Meeanee. 8. That event when fully

* When Ld E. annexed Sind to the British dominions.

known and considered with all the circumstances by which it was preceded, was of a character to change every view which could have been previously entertained with respect to the policy to be pursued in Sind. 9. From the 13th of March to the present time there has not been a momentary change in the course then adopted, or a moment's doubt as to its expediency, which has indeed been confirmed by events. 10. Your Honble. Committee appear to be of opinion that as Meer Ali Morad has been left in the possession of authority, other Ameers may, on the same principle, be safely restored to theirs; and you adduce the restoration of Meer Mahomed Khan as an example of full forgiveness extended to a guilty Chief; but with submission to your Honble. Committee we must observe that to leave in possession of his rights an ally we have not a pretext for removing and to restore to their authority enemies who have justly forfeited it, are acts to which the same principle cannot be held to apply—nor can the restoration of the unimportant Chief of the destroyed Fort of Emam Ghur at the express desire of our ally, who became his surety, be justly deemed a precedent for the restoration of others, whose return that ally would deprecate, as the measure most calculated to endanger his authority and the peace of Sind.

11. There is surely an obvious difference between restoring a dependant at the desire of his superior, and restoring a competitor for power against the will of its possessor.

12. We have taken into consideration the amount of force which under different arrangements with respect to Sind it would be expedient to maintain in that Province, and we cannot but come to the conclusion that the occupation of certain military points, in Lower Sind, of Karachi and Tatta; and in Upper Sind of Shikarpoor, Sukkur-Bukkur and Roree, would render necesary the

employment of more troops if the intermediate country were in the possession of the Ameers than if it were possessed by us. In the latter case we should have to provide against external aggression rather than against internal enemies. In the former case we should be compelled to watch the restored Ameers also, and to prepare increased means for resisting external aggression invited as it would be and strengthened by the expectation of their support. 13. While more troops would thus be required, nearly all the means of paying them out of the revenue of the country would be withdrawn, for by the supposition almost the whole revenue would be transferred to the Chiefs we should restore. Our portion of it would little exceed the former tribute. 14. In effect if the suggestion of your Honble. Committee were acted upon, our position would differ little from that in which we should have been placed by the Treaty proposed to the Ameers, and they would be relieved from the first penalty of their treachery. It would be henceforth understood that Native Chiefs might try the chance of treachery and of war without incurring the risk of punishment if they sustained defeat, and that the British Government would be content to undergo all the risks of war so brought upon it, and to receive only the Honor of Victory without its substantial reward.

15. Your Honble. Committee are aware that the Governor General never considered the position we should have occupied under the proposed Treaty as one free from danger, although preferable to that in which we stood under existing Treaties, and all we could justly require to be conceded; and it would surely not appear to be consistent with prudence now to adopt after the proofs we have had of the hostility of the Ameers the very position which the apprehension of their hostility before induced us to consider insecure, and further to encourage future treachery by holding out to it dominion and revenge as

the rewards of success, and forgiveness as the only ultimate consequence of disappointed crime. 16. Your Honble. Committee appear to be desirous that the exact degree of the delinquency of each of the Ameers should be accurately ascertained, that every palliating circumstance should be taken into consideration, and that in every case a punishment precisely proportioned to the offence should be imposed—but unattainable as it has been found in the ordinary administration of the Law, how vain would it be to seek this absolute perfection of justice in the treatment of Princes convicted of treachery, and subdued in War! Their treatment must be governed by other principles than those which may be observed in the treatment of common men. It must be governed by enlarged views of national policy, and the compassion we may feel for the individuals, however innocent and even laudable its exercise, were private interests alone involved, must not be permitted to affect the adoption of measures essential to the welfare of the people we have redeemed and the State we serve. 17. The imbecility of Meer Roostum, the youth of Meer Hussein Ali, may give them peculiar claims to consideration. The treachery of Meer Nusseer may have been of a more deliberate character than that of Meer Sobdar, and the crime of no other Ameer may approach in enormity the crime of Meer Shadhad Khan; but whatever shades of difference in the personal treatment of individuals this difference of circumstances may suggest, the same principle must govern the treatment of all, and it must ever be held in view that to restore the banished Ameers to their lands, and thereby to their influence in Sind, to permit their return to their Country, and still more to reinvest them with the rights of Sovereignty, however modified, are all measures tending to unsettle the minds of the people, to impair their confidence in the permanence of our rule, and to endanger our position upon the Indus.

18. They are all therefore measures which our duty will not permit us to entertain.

19. The letters and explanations of the Governor of Sind which your Honble. Committee will have received subsequently to the despatch of your letter under reply, will have placed before you in a much stronger light than that in which you appear hitherto to have viewed it, the calculating treachery of the Ameers. Of the general hostility of their disposition from the commencement of our connection with them you have ample evidence and are yourselves apparently satisfied. With respect to the badness of their Government and its tendency to oppress the people and to make a desert of the Country no one has ever had a doubt. Their conduct since their fall in preferring false charges of the gravest nature against Sir C. Napier and his Officers is not such as to show that they have derived improvement from adversity, and we are at a loss to discover the ground upon which to the manifest injury of their late subjects, their personal feelings should be mainly consulted in the future settlement of Sind.

20. We participate in the desire entertained by your Honble. Committee to act with clemency towards the vanquished; we would temper retributive justice with all that degree of mercy which the demands of paramount duty will permit, but we cannot but feel that *Nations have claims to consideration as well as Princes, and they should at least be equally respected.*

21. We do not deem it necessary to place before you in detail all the practical difficulties which would attend the carrying out of your suggestions. We regret that we are unable to acquiesce in their principle. We consider that the adoption of them would be incompatible with the tranquil possession of our intended positions upon the Indus, and with the success of our endeavours to improve the condition of the country and people of Sind and under this impression, exercising the unfettered discretion you

have left to us we shall proceed to carry into effect the views which have been already announced to you for the administration of that country as a Province permanently annexed to the British Empire in India.

22. We cannot entertain the apprehensions expressed by your Honble. Committee, that the extension of our territorial possessions in Sind will prove injurious to our Finances. On the contrary, we see in that measure the only means of compensation for the new charge imposed upon us by the military occupation of certain points upon the Indus. That charge your Honble. Committee are of opinion that we must under any circumstances incur. The revenues of Sind cheaply governed, principally by Military Officers superintending Native Agency, will yield a large surplus applicable to the general service. Those revenues exceeded half a million under the Ameers. It is but reasonable to expect that an enlightened Government, substituted for the worst, must ultimately draw a larger revenue from an improved country with far less of pressure upon the people. No country possesses greater capabilities of improvement, and your Honble. Committee may be assured that we shall adopt every measure which may appear calculated to produce it.

23. It will be our most earnest desire to prove that the British Government is worthy of the fortune which here attends its course; that it is sensible of the high obligations imposed upon it by its position, and resolved to make the annexation of a new Province to its Empire the means of extending prosperity to a new people, as well as of giving increased security to the territories already under its Rule.

We have the honor to be, &c.,

Ellenborough
H. Gough
W. W. Bird
Wm. Casement.

Printed for the Cabinet Novr. 1843, but never published.

To Sir C. Napier.

Private. Barrackpoor. Aug. 30, 1843.

General,

I received to-day your Mem^m^ for Sir G. Arthur which has interested me very much. I shall transmit it to the Home Authorities, as there are some points more clearly explained in it than in any other Papers and in more detail.

We received by the last mail a very long letter from the Secret Committee which concluded by leaving our discretion as to Sind unfettered by any positive instructions. I have written a long letter in reply, in which all my Colleagues concur and everything done or designed by me in Sind will be adhered to. It is obvious that Major Outram's representations have had much weight. However your explanations will have deprived them of all weight for the future. We are considering on what permanent footing we shall place the Army in Sind. There are difficulties arising out of its being composed of detachments from the two Presidencies. We must place you as far as we can on the footing of a regular Government, and we must do this as soon as we can, for I fear if we leave it to be done in England it will not be done quite so efficiently as we can do it for you here.

We shall have a fine Army in the Camp of Exercise at Agra, and probably another Camp at Khytal. In Bundelcund we shall be able to bring together in a week at Jhansi 6,000 men without weakening the force employed to keep the Bundelas down; but I do not believe it will be necessary to move a man. It is well, however, to be prepared, and we shall be. There will be at Agra (besides 2 Reg^nts^ in Garrison) 12 Batt^ns^, 8 Reg^nts^ of Cav^ly^ and the Body Guard, and 42 field guns besides a Siege Train.

I have, etc.,

Ellenborough.

To Sir C. Napier.

Calcutta. October 23, 1843.

General,

Your Excellency's Letter of the 19th of September, enclosing two letters from the Khan of Kelat, praying for pecuniary aid against the Afghans was received on the 20th instant.

I transmit a copy of the Treaty with the Khan which does not appear to be in Your Excellency's possession and also a copy of a letter addressed by me last year to Major General Sir W. Nott with respect to that Treaty.

I am not aware that any communication was ever made to the Khan by Major Outram, in the sense of my letter.

Our occupation of Sind may in some respects change our position with regard to the Khan; but effective aid in troops we cannot give him under any circumstances, and any aid it may be deemed expedient to give to him, must therefore be altogether of a pecuniary nature.

It is impossible for us here to anticipate all the circumstances under which it may become expedient to give such aid, to judge of the urgency of those circumstances, or to determine the precise extent of the aid which should be given. We must leave it to Your Excellency's discretion to withhold or give such aid and to determine its proper amount, requesting you, while you bear in mind that this Khan was set up by our Government and may in a great measure depend upon us for support, to bear also in your recollection that there will be no limit to the demands of a Native Chief if he should be led to imagine that to ask for money is to obtain it, and further that money given in Afghanistan to Native Chiefs, pretending to be our friends was the main support of the armed bodies they employed against us.

I have, etc.,

Ellenborough.

*Minute by Lord Ellenborough.**

Fort William, November 1, 1843.

The British Government has now, for many years, assumed the rights and performed the obligations of the paramount Power of India within the Sutledj. It is impossible, therefore, to take a partial and insulated view of our relations with any one State within that limit. Least of all can such view be taken of our relations with the State of Gwalior, the most important to which our system applies.

Any relaxation of our system with respect to that State could not fail to be felt in every part of India, affecting our position with respect to all the other States of Hindostan.

It matters not whether our position as the paramount and controlling Power has been forced upon us by circumstances, or has been the settled object of our arms and policy. We, of the present day, must maintain what we find established; for to recede from that position once acquired would be to draw upon ourselves the hostility of many States, and to shake the confidence of all in the continuance of our military preponderance, by which alone all we have was won, and can be preserved.

Nor while, by receding from that position, we endangered our own existence, should we fail, at the same time, to bring upon all the States now dependent upon us the most afflicting calamities. The withdrawal of our restraining hand would let loose all the elements of confusion. Redress for the daily occurring grievances of the several States against each other would again be sought, not from the superintending justice of the British Government, but from the armed reprisals of the injured; and bad ambition, availing itself of the love of plunder and of war, which pervades so large a portion of the population of India, would again expose to devastation countries which, under our protection, have enjoyed many of the advantages of peace.

* This minute is held to be one of the most famous among Indian State documents.

To maintain, therefore, unimpaired, the position we now hold, is a duty, not to ourselves alone, but to humanity. The adoption of new views of policy, weakness under the name of moderation, and pusillanimity under that of forbearance, would not avert from our own subjects, and from our own territories, the evils we let loose upon India; and the only result of false measures would be to remove the scene of a contest, altogether inevitable, from Gwalior to Allahabad, there to be carried on with diminished force, a disheartened army, and a disaffected people.

The State of Gwalior is altogether peculiar. It is composed of many scattered territories in Hindostan and the Deccan, bound together by no common interest or feeling amongst the people, but coerced solely by an ill-paid and ill-disciplined army, which is neither itself national, nor generally commanded by natives of the country. The Maharajah, a boy of poor parentage, and altogether uneducated, not descended from any one of the family of Scindiah who has possessed sovereign authority, but from a remote ancestor of those by whom sovereignty was acquired, elected by the Zenana, and the Chiefs of the army, for their sole benefit, not for that of the people, exists only by our sufferance to keep together, under some nominal Government, these extensive scattered territories, everywhere adjoining ours, or intermixed with ours, and those of our tributary and dependent allies. It is not to us alone, but to all our allies, a matter of the first interest, that, within these territories, crime should be repressed, not encouraged; and that the civil and military authorities should afford their cordial and zealous co-operation in the measures necessary for the maintenance of tranquillity upon the frontier. Such co-operation we have never generally received. The private interests of the persons invested with authority by the Durbar have but too often conflicted with the punctual execution, even of the best intended orders, where such have been given.

Under a weak and corrupt Administration, the condition of the country, and of the people, has rapidly deteriorated; oppression and distress have necessarily increased the disposition to live by plunder, rather than by labour; and the same misgovernment which has created criminals within the territories of the Gwalior State, has given refuge within those territories to criminals from our own.

If such have been the consequences even under our late relations with the State of Gwalior which gave to us much of influence, occasionally exerted with effect and obvious advantage, for the punishment of offenders, and for the exclusion of bad men from office and command, it is not difficult to foresee the consequences which would ensue, were all intervention on our part withdrawn, and all the elements of evil left uncontrolled in their operation, practically to give impunity to crime in Central India.

On the decease of the late Maharajah, the British Government readily acknowledged the succession of the present Maharajah. He was the member of the family of Scindiah, nearest to the deceased Sovereign by blood. He was adopted by the Maharanee, the widow of the late Maharajah, and his claim was recognised by the Chiefs and Army of Gwalior.

But the Maharajah is an uneducated boy of nine, the Maharanee a girl of twelve; and it was necessary that the Government should be intrusted to some capable and responsible person.

The maternal uncle of the late Maharajah was, with the entire concurrence of the British Government, chosen by the Chiefs as Regent; and the Chiefs were distinctly informed, that he would be considered solely responsible for the Government, and have our support.

This announcement was represented as appearing to give general satisfaction.

For three months, affairs were quietly conducted under the Regent, with some little occasional movement of

petulance on the part of the Maharanee, but of short duration; and, arrangements having been made, by which the Nurungee, an influential slave-girl, was removed from Gwalior, and ultimately a marriage, with the apparently willing acquiescence of the Maharanee, having been contracted between the young Maharajah and the niece of the Regent, all seemed to indicate that he had consolidated his authority. In all probability, the very measure by which he thought he had consolidated it, the marriage of his niece to the Maharajah, was the very circumstance which led to his downfall. Represented to the Maharanee as leading to her supersession in dignity and in power, it enabled the Dada Khasjee Walla to effect the abrupt expulsion of the Regent from Gwalior.

The representations made by the British Resident were of no effect. The successful rival of the Regent became all-powerful. The Christian officers were, with few exceptions, ill-treated and turned out of the camp by the soldiers. Persons who had been deprived of their offices on our representations, were restored. Offices were taken from those who were supposed to be favourable to the maintenance of friendly relations with us; and Gwalior has exhibited to all India the example of a Regent, to whom our support had been promised, expelled from the territory he governed, and of a successor, whose acts shew him to be hostile to our interests, established in power, in despite of our remonstrances.

In Europe, there do not exist between any two States the peculiar relations under which the expulsion of one Minister who might be approved, and the elevation of another who might be obnoxious, could be viewed as justifying intervention. In Europe, there is no paramount State. The relations of a paramount Power to a dependent State create in India rights and duties altogether different from those which can exist in Europe between States subject to one admitted international law, and

controlled in the exercise of their individual power by the general opinion of the Great Republic of States, to which they belong; but, even in Europe, a condition of affairs in any country which manifestly threatened the general repose, would not long be suffered to exist; and the combination of the leading Powers would effect that which, in India, must be effected by the British Government alone.

When the existing relations between the State of Gwalior and the British Government are considered, it is impossible to view the expulsion of the Mama Sahib, and the elevation of the Dada Khasjee Walla to the Ministry, otherwise than as an affront of the gravest character offered to the British Government by that successful intriguer in the Zenana of Gwalior, and by the disorganized army by which he has been supported. That army of 30,000 men, with a very numerous artillery, under the direction of a person who has obtained, and can only retain, his post in despite of the British Government, is within a few marches of the capital of the North-Western Provinces.

The frontiers of the Gwalior State, for a great distance, adjoin ours in the lately disturbed districts of Saugor. They adjoin the territories of [our somewhat doubtful dependents,*] the Chiefs of Bundelcund, and so scattered are they as to touch the dominions of almost all our Allies in Malwa, while they extend beyond the Nerbudda, and even to the Taptee.

Everywhere along this line the most cordial and zealous co-operation of the Gwalior authorities is essential to the maintenance of tranquillity; and we know that, under the present Minister, the most we can expect, that such co-operation will be coldly withheld, if, indeed, it should not be covertly given to the plunderers we would repress. Under any circumstances, to permit the lengthened continuance of this state of things would have been inconsistent with the honor and interests of our Government, and of our allies;—a hostile Minister, with a large

* This and other passages in square brackets were omitted from the Gwalior Blue Book.

and ready army, watching us, and threatening us from Gwalior; while plunderers, along the extended frontier, fostered by his sufferance, if not by his protection, would soon destroy all the confidence which has hitherto been placed in our Government, and must materially weaken our power.

Still, under ordinary circumstances, we might perhaps have waited upon time, and have abstained from the immediate adoption of measures of coercion, expecting the restoration of our influence at Gwalior, from the dis-union manifest amongst the chiefs, and the usual vicissitudes of an Indian Court. But the events which have recently occurred at Lahore, will not permit the resort to a policy suited only to a state of general tranquillity in India.

Within three marches of the Sutledj is an army of 70,000 men, confident in its own strength, proud of its various successes against its neighbours, desirous of war and of plunder, and under no discipline or control. It may be hoped, it may perhaps be expected, that no hostile act on the part of this army will occur to produce a war upon the Sutledj, but it would be unpardonable were we not to take every possible precaution against such an event; and no precaution appears to be more necessary, than that of rendering our rear, and our communications, secure by the re-establishment of a friendly Government at Gwalior.

There must, however, be a most careful and accurate calculation of the extent of means, and also of the time, required for completing any military operation if such should eventually be found necessary for that purpose. If our army should appear to have involved itself in any operation demanding greater means than may have been appropriated to it, or in any operation of a seemingly protracted nature, the view of our force, so occupied, would be an irresistible incentive to Sikh inroad, at least of a desultory, if not of a more serious, character.

If, on the other hand, our success in any operation undertaken on the side of Gwalior should be at once rapid and decisive in its results, no measure would more certainly tend to prevent all movements across the Sutledj, as well as to establish our reputation and our authority in Central India. [We are not in a condition to risk a failure in any measure we may undertake. It must be undertaken with amply sufficient means directed with promptitude and decision to the object.]

It is so desirable to re-establish visibly our influence at Gwalior without delay, by the expulsion of the Dada Khasjee Walla, and thus to have freely disposable the force now assembling in Bundelcund and at Agra, that it would seem to be most prudent to confine to that one point any requisition addressed to the Durbar of Gwalior. By thus separating the cause of the Dada Khasjee Walla from that of all the other Chiefs, we shall deprive him of their support, and they will see their interest in facilitating a reconciliation with the British Government. The expulsion of the Dada Khasjee Walla will give us, for a time at least, a predominant influence *de facto* at Gwalior, and the example will be felt in the exercise of our influence elsewhere.

A predominant influence *de facto*, well and judiciously employed, will place within our easy and early reach the attainment of all just objects of policy; of these, the first in importance is certainly the reduction of the army, for whose benefit alone the Gwalior Government has so long existed, and which has been the real ruler of the State.

This reduction should bear, in the first instance, upon the regiments of Jacob and Alexander, which have sustained the cause of the Dada Khasjee Walla; at the same time it is obvious, that a reduction of the army is a measure of much delicacy, and requiring much management; and it cannot but be feared, that of the disbanded soldiers, not a few would become plunderers.

The increase of the contingent is also, on general grounds, expedient: the nomination of officers, who may be depended upon, along the frontier, is a measure obviously necessary. All these things a *de facto* predominance would ultimately give, without a Treaty; and no Treaty, without such influence, would secure; but to press now, while men's minds may be in an excited state, the formal concession of all these points at once, and especially the reduction of the army, could hardly fail to lead to the collision it is most our desire and interest to avoid.

These are the general views I entertain upon the subject of our present position with respect to Gwalior and of the course to be pursued. In what manner they should be practically carried out, and what modification they may eventually undergo, must depend, in a great measure, upon events as they arise, rapidly succeeding each other, as they do in India, and, in a few days, changing the whole aspect of affairs. It has, however, seemed to me to be expedient to place on record this general statement of my present impressions, on leaving the Council to repair to Agra, where I shall be close to the scene where the events are to take place, and at hand to adapt the measures which are to be pursued, to the actual position of affairs.

To obtain reparation for an affront, which, if left unpunished, would affect our reputation and our influence at every Durbar in India; to secure the tranquillity of our frontier, and that of our allies, by the future cordial co-operation of the officers of the Durbar of Gwalior in its preservation; and to diminish an army, which is the real master of the Gwalior State, and placed within a few marches of our second capital;—

These appear to be the just and legitimate objects to be held in view; but the time and manner of their accomplishment must, as I have said, depend upon circumstances, and be governed by a general view of our position in every part of India.

From Sir R. Peel.

Nov. 1, 1843. Recd. Dec. 18, 1843.

Extract.

"I rejoice in the good account you receive as to the qualifications and conduct of the officers you selected for service in the Saugor territory. The determination to make appointments not according to old official regulations and official prejudices (more difficult to be disregarded than regulations), brings with it at last its own reward. Inferiority and incompetence have in all countries—and probably in India in particular—very powerful allies and well know how to make use of all those instruments, clamour, combination, secret thwarting, a venal press—*quicquid habent telorum armamentaria (diaboli)**—for the purpose of preventing the irregular and unaccustomed emerging of real merit and superiority, ... Your public Letter in explanation and vindication of the policy in regard to Sinde is a very able one. I have reason to think that the Court of Directors, or some of them at least, are ashamed of their proceedings. I hope you will take care in any event that the Ameers are treated personally with all the consideration and indulgence due to former rank and to misfortune. Attempts have been studiously and successfully made to create an impression that they had not the personal comforts, to which even in the case of necessary and justifiable captivity those accustomed to luxury are wont to receive. Pray attend to this, for people are influenced as much by feeling as by reason, and many who might not regret the deposition of the Ameers, would feel great sympathy with them were they exposed to any sufferings or privations from which (without the compromise of any great political interests) they might be exempted. . . . . .

* See Juvenal. xiii, 83.

Burleigh (*sic*) Nov. 14, 1843.

My dear Ellenborough,

I have heard that Sir Henry Pottinger* declared when he was at Bombay, that he was resolved on his arrival in England to exert himself in favour of the Ameers, that he expressed very strong opinions on the subject of their deposition, and had an interview with Meer Roostum, whose cause in particular he espoused. I heard also that he had undertaken to be the bearer of two letters from Meer Roostum, one addressed to Her Majesty and the other to me.

Lord Aberdeen and I have each had interview with Sir Henry Pottinger since he came to this Country. He said nothing of these letters to either of us, and although in his interview with me he once or twice spoke incidentally of Sind and of his residence there, he made no allusion to the Ameers or their treatment.

He did not mention the name of Meer Roostum. Still I am inclined to think that he feels strongly on the subject, and his opinions will probably not be concealed.

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* Sir H. Pottinger in a letter to a friend which was reproduced in the Morning Chronicle, Lord Palmerston's paper, said: " No explanation or reasoning can, in my opinion, remove the foul stain it (the annexation) has left on our good faith and honour; and, as I know more than any other man living of previous events and measures, connected with that devoted country, I feel that I have a full right to exercise my judgment and express my sentiments upon the subject." A pamphleteer not generally favourable to L^{d} E., asks whether it was consistent for Sir H. P. to use such terms as these, when in August 1838 he declared:—' I shall not fail to tell them (the Ameers) distinctly that the day on which they connect themselves with any other Power will be the last of their independent authority, if not of their rule; for that we have the ready power to crush and annihilate them and will not hesitate to call it into action, should it appear requisite, however remotely, for either the safety or integrity of our Empire, or its frontiers,' and when later in Feb., 1839 he said ' if we are ever again obliged to exert our military strength in Sind, it must be carried to subjugating the country.' "

Pottinger (Sind Blue Book, page 32) who had experience of Noor Mahomed for a period of 20 months described him as our bitterest, most persevering and unprincipled enemy and reported that he had continued to evince the same suspicious, unfriendly and despicable conduct, and again, Jan^{y} 25, 1840 on giving over charge to Outram he said: " Noor Mahomed is still that intriguing faithless person he has ever been." Outram (p. 5. of the Commentary) describes him as a staunch friend of the British nation !

I was sorry to see by the last accounts that some of the Regiments in Sind were again suffering severely from sickness.

Ever very truly yours,
Robert Peel.

From Sir Henry Hardinge.

Nov. 15th 1843. ? Recd. Jan. between 24 and 31, 1844.

Extract.

I came to Town yesterday and I have this morning received the 7th Novr the Sind Papers printed for the Cabinet.

That of the 28th Augt has at once commanded my attention and admiration—It is a worthy pendant to that of the 26th June—both are in every respect worthy of you, every argument is well put—not a word too much and nothing left unsaid—and the whole argument well sustained, including the last paragraph, which as it relates to your personal determination is at once firm and respectful—uncompromising and dignified.

These two despatches are calculated to force respect and carry conviction, and I have no doubt will conciliate those who for the last 2 yrs have been leagued agt you, in a great degree exasperated by the tone of contempt with which they complain they were treated, and who by their conversation here and letters sent to India influenced public feeling against you, weakened your power and damaged your reputation, for when Conservative Directors denounced you as a Govr dangerous to the safety of the Empire in the East, their sentiments were eagerly responded to in the House of Commons, and if the discussion had taken place last Session, with this feeling running strong agt you and in the absence of the able justifications which have subsequently been received, we should have had a bad debate—Saints and Radicals—young England and

Irish Demagogues would have co-alesced—whereas now—the explanations are complete, the policy is decided—you have boldly and judiciously accepted the *unfettered discretion* which was offered to you and which I predicted you would take, and as we are NOW all in the same boat, will render our course in the coming Session, what it ought to be, firm and uncompromising.

Y^r^ last Despatch of the 28^th^ Aug^t^ signed by all y^r^ Council is an equally able document—you can personally take what course you please, your Sind policy is now irrevocably fixed—you have an able, honest and attached representative in Sir C. Napier to carry all y^r^ objects into effect. His correspondence has demolished Outram, and I must say his letters and his acts prove him to be a man of enlarged mind and of great ability.

No. 2 G.G.

BENGAL AND INDIA SECRET LETTERS, VOL. 29, PP. 9-16.
Foreign Department, Secret. Camp Gwalior. The 18th January, 1844.

To the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs,

I have received from Your Honorable Committee, a copy of a Resolution passed by the Court of Directors on the 29th of August, 1843, condemnatory of the measures pursued in Scinde together with an explanation of the reasons why that Resolution of the Court was not sooner communicated to me officially. At the same time I have received from your Honorable Committee a letter expressing your acquiescence in the measures condemned by the Court.

2. Your Honorable Committee must be too well acquainted with the Act of Parliament which regulates the Government of India not to be aware that it is my duty to pay regard only to the orders of the Court sanctioned by Her Majesty's Commissioners for the Affairs of India.

Of the opinion entertained by the Court itself, I can constitutionally have no knowledge, I only know the Court as the channel through which it has pleased Parliament to provide that the orders of the supreme authority in England shall be conveyed to India; but that supreme authority does not reside in the Court itself. It resides altogether in Her Majesty's Commissioners for the Affairs of India who are empowered to alter as they may think fit every order the Court may desire to transmit, and to direct the transmission of orders of which the Court may unanimously disapprove

3. It is true that while Parliament has provided that all the measures of the Indian Government shall be thus practically under the sole control of Her Majesty's Commissioners, it has left to the Court the independent power of evincing its real disapproval of the measures to which, under the control of the Commissioners it may have signified its sanction, by removing from his office the Governor General with whom those measures may have originated.

4. It is not for me to question the wisdom of this provision, but it is evident that it may be so exercised as to effect the removal from offlce in the midst of great public difficulties, of the person by whom it may be the opinion of the supreme authority in England, that those difficulties can be most successfully encountered.

5. I trust however that the person to whom the office of Governor General of India may be confided will always have enough public virtue to ensure the unbiased execution of his first duty to the State, and that no apprehension of the exercise by the Court of their extreme power of removing him from office will ever induce him to vary the measures he may deem essential to the Public Service.

6. But while it would have been my duty to pay no regard to the opinion of the Court, now officially made

known to me, at whatever earlier period it might have been communicated, and to have adhered altogether to the measures I deemed to be required by policy, and not forbidden by justice—I cannot but feel that the promulgation of that opinion in India would have had a very injurious effect upon the position of the Army in Scinde, and upon the general strength of the Government which is here administered in the name of the Court.

7. In this country the real constitution of the Home Government is not understood, and any intimation of the opinion of the Court, or even of any members of the Court supposed to have an influence over its Councils, condemnatory of the measures of the Governor General could not fail to lead to the belief that those measures would be recalled or varied, upon which in point of fact the unanimous opinion of the Court, unsanctioned by Her Majesty's Commissioners could have no possible effect.

8. I regret to inform you that even the Resolution now first officially communicated to me has not been altogether withheld from the knowledge of individual servants of the Government in India, although not publicly made known.

9. I regret to inform you that the general disapproval by the Court of the measures carried into effect in Scinde has long been currently reported in this Country, and I have always felt that the principal danger with which I had to contend in Scinde was that which had its origin in the expectation thus created that the measures I had adopted with regard to that Province would be reversed.

10. I solemnly assure Your Honorable Committee that I do not believe this ever perilous Empire can be permanently preserved, unless by the apparent concurrence of all connected with its administration in giving support and strength to the Local Government.

11. The blows which are recklessly directed against the person at the head of the Government really strike at the Government itself, and impair the security of our position in India.

12. I earnestly conjure you, if you would maintain that position in the midst of the dangers with which it is and must be at all times encompassed, to make it seem at least that the authority in England to which the Local Government is subordinate is one undivided authority; and to make it felt in India that no hostile construction will be placed upon the measures of a Governor General, but that as long as he is permitted to retain his office he will have the frank and cordial support of the Court, as well as that of the Advisers of the Crown.

I have, etc.,
Ellenborough.

No. 3 G.G.

BENGAL AND INDIA SECRET LETTERS, VOL. 29, pp. 17-20.

Camp Gwalior. 19 Jany., 1844.

To the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs,

Your Honorable Committee's dispatch No. 963, dated 5th ultimo reached me at this place two days ago.

2. In that letter your Honble Committee have recorded that, having left me discretion (as to the arrangement to be made for Scinde) and giving me credit for having deliberately considered both the justice and policy of the resolution to which I had come, and having yourselves carefully weighed the bearing of the facts of the case as they have been placed before you together with the reasons which I have assigned for my decision, you are prepared to convey to me your acquiescence in the arrangement as it stands.

3. Further on, your Committee have said that, as it is probable that consistently with all due precaution more freedom would be allowed to the Ameers when further removed from the scene of their former dominion you should not object to their transfer to Calcutta, if I should deem such a step advisable.

4. From the Enclosures No. 3. and 4 annexed to this despatch Your Honble. Committee will observe that I have requested the Honble. the Governor of Bombay to make preparations for the removal of the Ameers to Calcutta, and the Honble. the President in Council to take measures for their proper reception at that place.

I have, etc.,
Ellenborough.

No. 4 GG.

BENGAL AND INDIA SECRET LETTERS, VOL. 29, PP. 21-24.
Foreign Department, Secret. Camp Gwalior. The 19th January, 1844.

To the Secret Committee.

Honble. Sirs,

I have to regret that Your Honble. Committee should not approve of the measure of placing Cutch under the Government of Scinde instead of that of Bombay having been adopted without previous reference to you.

2d. It was the decided opinion of myself and of my colleagues that the urgency of the case would not permit of such reference being made.

3d. The measure was adopted on the very day on which the letter of the Governor of Scinde dated the 30th of June was received.

4th. I will however state to Your Honble. Committee that the insufficiency of Mr. . . . . to meet the difficulties of his position had long been apparent to me. I had once at least privately intimated that opinion to the Governor of Bombay; but no step had been taken to replace him by an abler man. To have displaced Mr. . . . . by the authority of the Governor General in Council would have been an act much more violent than that of transferring the Political Superintendence of Cutch from the Government of Bombay to that of Scinde for which measure there were obvious reasons, independent

of the insufficiency of Mr. . . . . under the then existing circumstances, and even reasons which may hereafter lead to the permanent adoption of the new arrangement. However with regard to the future it is not now necessary to make provision.

5th. I made, in conjunction with my colleagues, the best provision I could to meet existing circumstances and I have no doubt that whenever tranquillity is re-established, and it is necessary to consider the future relations of Cutch the Governor General in Council whoever he may be will give all due weight to whatever representations have been or may be made by the Government of Bombay for the re-establishment upon its former footing of the superintendence it has heretofore exercised over Cutch under circumstances totally different from those which must exist hereafter in consequence of the annexation of Scinde to our Dominions.

I have, etc.,
Ellenborough.

No. 6 G.G.

BENGAL AND INDIA SECRET LETTERS, VOL. 29, pp. 33-40.
Foreign Department, Secret. Camp Gwalior. The 20th January, 1844.

To the Secret Committee.

Honble. Sirs,

The collections annexed to this despatch contain the correspondence which has taken place between the Court of Nepal and this Government since the departure of the November mail; and the usual diaries and abstracts of intelligence.

2. The only matters treated of in these papers which deserve the attention of your Honble. Committee are 1st the withdrawal of the Nepalese Troops from the frontier of the Oude territory which had been advanced to that position, as already reported to your Committee in

consequence of the incursions into the Nepal Districts made by Raja Durshun Sing Chukladar of Bahraitch in pursuit of a refractory subject of the Oude Government and the report of the Resident that the Durbar were now satisfied with the amends which had been made by the King of Oude by dismissing Raja Durshun Sing from office, and agreeing to pay the amount of any damage which might have been committed as ascertained by Commissions to be appointed by the two States.

2ndly. The change which has taken place in the officer appointed to administer to the duties of Resident, from which change and from the altered tone and spirit of the communications now adopted by the representative of the British Government, I anticipate a beneficial result.

And 3rdly. The appointment of a new Minister by the Raja.

3. Your Honble. Committee will observe that Matabar Sing has been formally appointed Minister of Nepal.

4. I recommend to your attentive perusal the several letters which have been received from the new Resident Major Lawrence.

5. My opinion already communicated to you with respect to the character of Matabar Sing remains unaltered.

6. I believe that depending altogether upon the soldiery he will take any favourable opportunity of resorting to military operations for the purpose of increasing his influence and securing his power. While he continues Minister Nepal must always require our vigilant attention, and in every measure we may be compelled to adopt with respect to any other State we must never forget that on the least reverse, whatever force Nepal may possess for offensive operations will be employed against us.

7. Fortunately that force is but small and the Nepalese Army most formidable in its own Hills, is devoid of all the ordinary appliances required for the conduct of military operations in the Plains of India excepting always an

infantry capable of making very long marches and proverbially brave.

8. Your Honble. Committee will observe that immediately after an interview with the Resident of the most friendly character Matabar Sing sent letters to Gwalior and Lahore.

9. This is only in the ordinary course of Indian policy. The Battles of Maharajpoor and Punniar, the occupation of the Fort of Gwalior, and the dissolution of the Gwalior Army will probably for the present put an end to correspondence and give some temporary repose to the lately unquiet minds of Native Chiefs.

I have, etc.,
Ellenborough.

Extract from No. 7 G.G.

BENGAL AND INDIA SECRET LETTERS, VOL. 29, PP. 62-64.
Foreign Department, Secret. Camp Gwalior. 21st January, 1844.

To the Secret Committee.

52. Your Honble, Committee will observe that the President in Council in his letter dated the 22d of December expressed the opinion that we should ourselves assume the whole Civil and Military administration of the Maharaja's Territories [of Gwalior] during His Highness' minority.

53. I feel satisfied that if I had insisted upon that measure being acceded to before the battle I should have forced a conflict between the Gwalior army and our forces, which conflict I was most anxious to avoid, and I felt equally satisfied after the battle, that had I even then insisted upon that course, there would have been another conflict, more severe than the first, in which all those who are now acting with us would have acted against us, and of which the almost inevitable result would have been the destruction of the City of Gwalior.

54. Above all things it appeared to me most desirable to effect our purpose, if possible, without bloodshed, and to terminate our operations without delay.

55. A contest with the Chiefs united with the Army would have involved the necessity of taking the fort by force and would have detained the army here for some time time.

56. I wished to make it immediately disposable for any other service which might be required from it. Proceeding as I did I was enabled to effect the junction of the two Divisions of the Army without further conflict to obtain possession of the Fort by the means of the Chiefs themselves, and by their means also to disband almost the whole of the Infantry and Artillery of the Gwalior Army. All indeed it was not politic to leave for the personal guard of the Maharajah.

57. I cannot but think that the principles upon which I have acted will have your approval. I believe that a different course would have alarmed all the Native Chiefs of India whose confidence I was anxious to secure, and I entertain great doubts whether we had practically the means of so administering all the Gwalior Territories as to make our Administration a benefit to the people.

58. Certainly a very large military force would have been required; and it appeared to me that the best security against the adoption of some rash and hostile act by the Sikh Durbar and the Army it has so little under control, was to be found in making our Force evidently disposable for the purpose of repelling and punishing aggression. It was impossible to consider the operation in which I was engaged as an insulated transaction for which all the time I could desire could be taken, and to which all the Force of this Army could be long applied. It was a transaction having a bearing upon the whole of our policy, and affecting our position in every part of India. It was an operation in which I could only employ troops

diverted for a period from other important services, and which it was necessary for me to complete within a short limited time which should not afford to the Sikhs and others the means of entering into any combination against us.

No. 12 G.G.

BENGAL AND INDIA SECRET LETTERS, VOL. 29, PP. 113-120.
Foreign Department, Secret. Camp Futtehpore. 11th of February, 1844.

To the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs,

No material change has taken place in the state of affairs in the Punjab. Rajah Golaub Singh has committed another act of ambitious violence for the purpose of extending his authority in the Hills, and it would appear that his conduct has created much resentment in the minds of those who regard the interests of the "Khalsa," but no movement has taken place; and Rajah Heera Sing has consented to the performance of some ceremony of a religious nature deemed necessary to clothe the young Maharaja with the character of Chief of the State.

2. The Jummoo Rajahs withold from the general treasury the revenues of the districts they properly only hold subject to certain stipulated payments. Little seems to be realised and the expenses of the State must be larger than they were.

3. It is impossible that this state of things should very long continue.

4. The want of funds for the payment of the Army must ultimately produce a crisis; but it is hardly to be expected that the unscrupulous character of the Sikh Chiefs who have as the excuse for acts of violence against others that such acts are designed against themselves, can allow that crisis to be deferred till it shall be forced upon the State by an Army demanding its pay.

5. It is clearly necessary for the British Government to be prepared for all events which may occur, especially as there will be no more decided notice of the approach of those events than such as we had before and have now.

6. No neighbour can be more dangerous to us through the evil influence of example than one whose Government is in effect controlled by an Army appropriating to itself the Revenues of the State and making an increase of pay the price of its adhesion to every new successor to the Guddee.

7. We have removed at Gwalior an Army much less unscrupulous and we may be assured that the example has not been lost upon the Army at Lahore.

8. We must at least expect from that Army every act of hostility which it considers it can in prudence commit, and it is not in India that considerations of prudence always regulate the conduct either of Armies or of Chiefs. You may be assured that I am fully aware of the magnitude and of the protracted character of the military effort which would be required from us should we ever be forced into a war beyond the Sutlej. I feel too that the most decided success in such a war would be of very problematical advantage as compared with the continued maintenance in the Punjaub of a Government directed by the just views of policy which animated Runjeet Singh and that [? those] of the Jummoo Rajahs with a mutinous Army are widely different in their character and in their bearing upon British interests. From the latter we can only expect constant hostility biding its time. Our position with respect to the Punjab can now be viewed only in the light of an armed truce—the contest, whenever it may take place, must be on both sides, not for Empire only, but for life, and I must frankly confess, that when I look at the whole condition of our Army I had rather, if the contest cannot be further postponed, that it were at least postponed to November, 1845.

9. Let our policy be what it may the contest must come at last, and the intervening time which may be given to us should be employed in unostentatious but vigilant preparation.

I have, etc.,
Ellenborough.

No. 15 G.G.

BENGAL AND INDIA SECRET LETTERS, VOL. 29, PP. 137-144.
Foreign Department, Secret. Camp Futtehpore. The 12th February, 1844.

To the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs,

The measure I have adopted, after much consideration, of adding two Rissillahs of Irregular Cavalry to the Body Guard is to be considered in connection with the letter I have to-day addressed to the Nawab of Bownie* inviting him to send one of his sons to do duty with the Irregular Cavalry of the Body Guard.

2. I am most anxious to make the Chiefs and the men of rank and family feel that they are considered and respected by the Government. I wish to give them something better to do than what alone they can do if left in hopeless indolence and sensuality at home. I desire not only to conciliate them personally by treating them like gentlemen, but to act upon the minds of the Army and the people by shewing them that the sons of Chiefs and of men of rank are so treated.

3. The intercourse which young men of rank serving with the Body Guard must have with the Officers in Command must gradually lead to their acquiring some knowledge of our language, a desire for information and European ideas.

4. Returning when on furlough to their fathers' Durbar with minds so improved and elevated it is but

* Baoni a State in Central India. Nawab Muhammad Husain Han rendered good service during the Mutiny.

reasonable to expect that they will gradually be the means of introducing some desire of similar improvement amongst their relatives and their Sirdars; and thus we shall I trust see ultimately in the Native Chiefs and men of rank and family, acquirements and modes of thinking more resembling our own and find in them at last zealous co-operation in the work in which without their aid, we shall assuredly fail, that of improving the moral condition of the people.

5. I have annexed the measure of bringing the sons of Chiefs into the society of English Officers and about the Governor General with the addition of Irregular Cavalry to the Body Guard because that seemed the most effectual, indeed the only mode in which I could accomplish the purpose.

6. Service with troops never misbecomes a gentleman, and a Native Chief who might refuse to send his sons to a college, even to a college to which none but the noble might be admissible, would gladly send them to lead a body of Irregular Cavalry by the side of English officers in the field.

7. So to serve would always be deemed a distinction. I am far from thinking that occasions may not be found hereafter of employing usefully otherwise than in such service the abilities of Native Chiefs and gentlemen which the intercourse consequent upon such service would discover and develop; but even should this not be the case, and should some other of the advantages I sanguinely anticipate from the measure fail to be ultimately realized, still there would necessarily remain the benefit, scarcely appreciable in value, of making the Chiefs and men of rank and family feel that they were treated by the head of the Government with distinguished consideration and personal courtesy and regard.

8. The time is certainly arrived when we must endeavour to give to the British Government in India a somewhat more permanent foundation than it now has,

and to strike its roots deep into the feelings and affections of the great body of the people.

9. Our object should be not merely to carry on a precarious Government from year to year, but to lay the groundwork of an Empire which may endure for ever.

10. Even unconnected with this higher object of State policy which I have in view, the measure of adding two Rissillahs of Irregular Cavalry to the Body Guard would on military grounds alone be advisable, but I venture to recommend it most earnestly to your favourable reception as a means of effecting the purpose of bringing the young native gentlemen of India into familiar intercourse with our officers and within the reach and knowledge of the Governor General.

I have, &c.,
Ellenborough.

Extract from Private letter from Lord Lyndhurst.

? Jany 1844. Recd. Mch. 9.

My dear Lord Ellenborough, ...

I don't think we stand quite so well in public opinion as we did last year. The complaint is a want of decision and vigour. The Whigs and Radicals are in consequence resuming some degree of activity. Ireland plagues us, and we are not very comfortable respecting the affairs of Spain.

You have played a great part, but Sinde will give us some trouble. But in spite of Leadenhall Street we shall I have no doubt triumph in the business. The Duke has not been so well or so active for several years. Ripon is constantly unwell and seldom appears in the House.

The affairs of India seem to oppress all who are engaged in them. *You* are a bright exception,

Ever yours,
Lyndhurst.

From Sir H. Hardinge.

South Park. 5th Jany., 1844. ? Rec. Mch. 21.

Extract.

I have this instant received your letter of the 20th Novr— and I am rejoiced to hear that you are going to Agra with the unanimous consent and with full powers from yr Council. I have no doubt the best results will follow in the train of your personal superintendence, and unless you are on the spot that much mischief will occur in a state of things which will not brook delay.

As to the Court of Directors I heard from Ripon, that a much better feeling was replacing the bitter tone they had adopted for the last year—that your despatches had made a strong sensation amongst the Secret Committee—and I am now satisfied, that your remaining at the head of affairs in India entirely depends on your own decision— and I have no doubt what that decision will be—you must complete your work, which now only requires you to act with circumspection, waiting events, and turning them with your accustomed ability to the best advantage.

I long to see the Sind despatches published, and I have no doubt the Debate on yr footing will be triumphant, and silence a host of enemies, who during the last Session were very violent against you.

Minute by the Governor General.

Benares. Feb. 18, 1844.

The Court of Directors in their letter dated the 29th of November, 1843 have intimated their desire that the presence of the fourth member of Council may not be restricted to meetings held for the purpose of passing Laws and Regulations, but have at the same time cautioned us to bear in mind that at such meetings only is he entitled to a voice in our proceedings.

It is impossible to regard this otherwise than as a mere expression of the opinion and wish of the Court. If the words used could be regarded as conveying a "direction" by virtue of such direction the 4th Member of Council would become *entitled* to sit at meetings not held for the purpose of passing Laws and Regulations; but the last Charter Act expressly provides that the 4th Member of Council shall not be *entitled* to sit or vote in the Council except at meetings thereof for making Laws and Regulations; therefore any such "direction" given by the Court would be altogether invalid because inconsistent with the Act of Parliament, from which alone the Court derive their authority. The Council of India as established by Act of Parliament is as much a part of the Constitution of India as the Court of Directors and it is the duty of the Council to guard with jealousy all its rights, to resist all infringements of its powers and above all to treat as utterly null every direction which if obeyed would change its composition. Considering however that the Court can only have intended to convey an intimation of their opinion and of their wish, and not to send a direction which they are not by law competent to give, we may properly show our respect for the opinion of the Court by carrying into effect their wish that the 4th Member of Council should sit at meetings of the Council not held for the purpose of making laws and regulations in as far as it may appear that his presence may not be injurious to the public service; but it may at all times be borne in mind that above all things secrecy in council and promptitude in action are essential to the successful conduct of public affairs in India; and it must also be understood that any individual member of the Council may, at any time if he shall see fit, require that any person shall withdraw from the Council who is not entitled to sit therein by the Acts of Parliament.

Lord Ellenborough's letter to Lord Ripon on his recall.
[Never yet published.]

Secret. Barrackpore. July 4th, 1844.

My Lord,

I have been enabled by Your Lordship's favour to peruse the letters addressed to Yr Lp. by the Chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company on the 10th and 22nd of April wherein they assign the reasons of the Court for considering my removal from the Office of Governor General to be indispensable, and I beg to be permitted to place before Your Lordship some observations upon the reasons so assigned. 2. Those observations must necessarily be confined to specific allegations.

3. I am charged with having manifested a defiance of superior authority. It is alleged that it is impossible not to perceive that the effect of my letter to the Court in the Foreign Dept., dated on the 15th of January last is to declare my determination to act as long as I continue to hold office in India upon my own conviction without regard to the opinions or orders of the Court. 4. In that letter I declared that I had always acted and should continue to act upon my own opinion of what was right, however that opinion might be created in my mind.

5. I further declared that in the measure I adopted with respect to the persons entrusted with the administration of Saugor, I felt satisfied that I adopted the only right course, and having that conviction upon my mind, I was not to be deterred for an instant from acting upon my conviction by the knowledge that I should become the object of much personal abuse; or by the doubt whether I should receive the support of the Court. 6. I also declared that no apprehension of personal abuse

or even of the censure of the Court would prevent me from removing from office those, be they who they might, who were not performing their duty in a manner conducive to the public interests.

7. I have reconsidered the sentiments so expressed and I see no reason to depart from them, nor would I on reflection vary the words in which they are conveyed, although in the Camp between Dholepore and Gwalior I had but little leisure to consider in what words my fixed opinions should be expressed so as to make them least unacceptable to the Court.

8. In India where an error may affect the peace of a province or the safety of an empire, where in hardly any possible case can a previous order be received to direct the conduct of the Government and where before the receipt of any such order the circumstances upon which it may have been founded may have been very materially changed or have altogether ceased to exist, there appears to me to be no course morally permissible to a Governor General but that which I declared my intention to pursue, the course of acting on all occasions according to his own view of what is right, taking all responsibility upon himself and incurring every risk of being disapproved and censured in the honest pursuit of the public good. 9. Have I disobeyed any order of the Court? It is not so alleged. If I should have done so, let the charge be distinctly made. The Court would really appear to have expected that I should disobey orders, because in the absence of orders I have acted upon the true principle of public duty and have declared that I shall continue so to act.

10. It is alleged that further evidence of the same spirit of defiance of superior authority is contained in a letter and enclosure received from me by the last mail (that is the mail which reached England in April) regarding the presence at all meetings of the Council of India of the 4th Member of Council in which I am represented, while

admitting my own power and that of the Council consistent with the Act of Parliament to permit the presence of the 4th Member on all occasions, to deny the power of the Court to *direct*, as they did in November last, the Government to give such permission, thus placing, as it is said, the authority of the Court at naught and setting up the powers and privileges of the Council, the Company's Servants, against the power of the Court of Directors. 11. I conclude that in these observations the Court refer to my Minute of the 18th of Feb. last.

12. In that Minute I stated what I knew to be the law, and I showed that, to carry into effect the desire expressed by the Court as if it were a direction they were authorized to give, would be to place the 4th Member of Council in, a position inconsistent with the clear intention of the Legislature. At the same time I manifested a disposition to show respect for the opinion of the Court by carrying into effect their wish as far as the doing so might not appear injurious to the public service. 13. The course suggested in that Minute was the constitutional course of proceeding, and it might have been hoped that it would not have been deemed offensive; but the Court would appear not to be aware that they have no powers not expressly given to them by Act of Parliament, and that those whom they term their servants may respect them much, but are bound to respect the law more.

14. In aid of the grounds taken in their first letter for removing me from Office the Court have in their second letter endeavoured to depreciate as far as possible any little merit they may have found it impossible altogether to refuse to me, and they have stated objection to certain parts of my policy and of my conduct.

15. They have thought it right to explain that " their vote of thanks to me was solely for applying the resources of the British Empire in support of the military operations so boldly suggested, so nobly undertaken and so success-

fully conducted by Sir George Pollock and Sir William Nott."

16. No one can be more desirous than I am of manifesting on all occasions the high sense I entertain of the services of the Generals in command of the Armies which made a combined attack upon Cabul in August and September, 1542. I have rewarded those services to the full extent of my power; but I should only aid in the perversion of historical truth if I did not observe that that combined movement originated in my letters of the 4th of July, 1842 to Sir William Nott and Sir George Pollock. 17. Those letters were despatched but a few hours after I had received intelligence of a private nature on which I thought I could rely, which considered in conjunction with other facts which had been reported to me before, gave me reason to suppose for the first time that Sir William Nott had the means of moving a large proportion of his Army with ample equipment for any service and that he was thus enabled to march from Candahar by Ghuznee and Cabul to Peshawur. 18. I should have greatly erred had I, in ignorance of the events which might have occurred before Sir William Nott could receive my letter, unconditionally directed that General to undertake that march. I could only permit him to undertake it after placing before him all its advantages and all its dangers. I believed he would undertake it and I intended he should undertake it unless new circumstances of a grave character should, unbeknown to me have arisen in the interval to command the adoption of more cautious counsels. 19. Every measure taken by me subsequently to the 4th of July was taken on the supposition that the Armies would advance.

20. So entirely had I anticipated and so correctly had I calculated the march of Sir William Nott that on the 23rd of July, I wrote to Sir George Pollock, " I look forward

to the Army from Candahar being to the north of Ghuznee by the 10th of September. On that day it was precisely in the position I anticipated, but it was not until the 16th of August that I received Sir William Nott's letter informing me that he had decided on moving on Cabul.

21. I must remind your Lordship that even at the period to which Sir William Nott's advance was deferred Sir George Pollock was obliged to move to his support with very inadequate means of carriage; for, notwithstanding every exertion on my part, the vast supplies of animals collected for the use of his Army were only beginning to arrive at Jellalabad when he was compelled to march, and were principally of service in facilitating his return.

22. However bold may have been the suggestions, however noble the undertaking of the two Generals, the unsupported march of either upon Cabul would have been a movement of very doubtful result, and inevitably attended with great loss. It was by the co-operation of both Armies and by that alone that decisive success could be certainly and cheaply obtained, and such co-operation was apparently altogether impracticable before the 4th of July, the day on which my instructions were issued.

23. Had I permitted the attempt to be made at an earlier period, I might for the moment have received the applause of ignorant men, but I should have perilled the safety of an Army and with it that of an Empire in the pusillanimous desire to avoid present censure which I knew to be undeserved.

24. Nor should I omit to remind Your Lordship that the assembly of the Army of Reserve of 14,000 men at Ferozepore and the concentration of 10,000 men at Sukkur under the command of Sir Charles Napier were measures forming part of the great combined movement of the Armies of India and calculated in an eminent degree

NAWAB SALAR JUNG BAHADUR.

to secure the success of the two Corps acting in Afghanistan by protecting their communications through the Punjab.

25. But neither with these measures, nor with the measure of the sudden and unexpected concentration of 14,000 men in the disturbed provinces of Bundlecund and Saugor (another and not unimportant part of my plan of campaign) could the generals commanding in Afghanistan have by possibility any concern.

26. The instructions I gave on the 4th of July remained for more than six weeks known only to myself with whom they originated, and to the two officers of my staff who copied my letters. When the movements in advance of the two armies became known in India during the latter part of the period occupied in their execution, they did not receive the approval of high military authorities; but the instructions I gave on the 4th of July did receive the approval of the Duke of Wellington.

27. The opinion of the Noble Duke since declared in Parliament that in the direction of the Armies in Afghanistan, every order I gave whether to halt, to retreat, or to advance was the right order to give under the circumstances known to me at the time, is, I say it with all due respect for the Gentlemen of the East Indian Direction, sufficient to console me for the "measured acknowledgment of my services" which according to the measure of their military knowledge and of their justice, it was alone their intention to bestow.

28. Upon the subject of Gwalior, the Court referred to their correspondence with the Board in November last of which I had not before heard. I conclude that at that time the Court can have possessed no more accurate knowledge of the events at Gwalior than such as may be obtainable by any gentlemen who read the newspapers. They repeat the expression which, it seems, was then given of their opinion that my conduct "was in the

first instance wanting in decision and inconsistent with itself."

29. I am wholly unable to endeavour to show the incorrectness of this opinion for I have not the remotest idea to what supposed facts it can possibly refer.

30. But the Court descending to something more of particularity in their objections to my conduct, subsequently declare their opinion "that the crisis which afterwards occurred might have been averted either by the adoption of prompt measures in support of the Mama Sahib whose authority as Regent had been recognised by the British Government, or subsequently by awaiting the issue of negotiations before the passing of the Chumbul by our troops which could not fail to be regarded as an act of hostility."

31. On the 19th of May [1843] the Mama Sahib had apparently obtained the summit of power. On the 21st he was removed from the Regency; and on the 5th of June he was proceeding as an exile from Gwalior.

32. The Court do not appear to be aware that in the extreme heats at the end of May no military movement can take place in the Gwalior territory without certain ruin to the health and efficiency of the troops employed. They appear to be equally unaware that at that season regiments are weak, a certain number of sepoys being always absent on furlough, and that this was especially the case with respect to the regiments in the neighbourhood of the Gwalior frontier which having been long employed in Afghanistan had been permitted to send one half or one third of their strength on furlough (according to the duration of their employment beyond the Indus). Neither are the Court apparently acquainted with the circumstance that besides the Chumbul there are other rivers between Agra and Gwalior so swollen during the rains which might be expected before the end of June as to be often wholly impassable, and at all times obstacles of the most

formidable nature, intercepting the communications of an army. Further the Court would not have appeared to reflect that no operations in the field of large bodies of men dispersed in cantonments can safely be commenced without preparation. To have moved an adequate force to the support of the Mama Sahib at the end of May was in fact altogether impracticable. He had been offered military aid when it could have been afforded to him and he declined it. He was then advised to be extremely cautious in his conduct, for that the troops must have their furlough and that that circumstance and the season would make it impossible to assist him till November. 33. He disregarded this advice, and without previous consultation with the British Minister, he married his niece to the Maharajah and brought on his own down-fall by his thoughtless ambition.

34. But the Court also think I should have awaited the result of the negotiations before passing the Chumbul.

35. There was every reason to expect that the river would rise for a few days at Christmas in consequence of the rain that usually falls at that season, but any rise in the river would have rendered impassable the only good ford. The water there was already 3 feet 3 inches deep. 36. The ravines on the right bank of the river extending far inland would have been most serious obstacles to be overcome only with great loss, had time been afforded for their occupation by an enemy.

37. No sufficient quantity of provisions could be obtained in the Dholepore country. The troops were living on the stores of the commissariat, and a week's supply had been already consumed. It was essential to the provisioning of the army, to the making of the bridge which could only be formed of boats brought up from Agra, and to the security of the troops that a position should at once be taken beyond the ravines on the right bank of the river.

38. It was essential to the success of any negotiations that the army should be at hand in preponderating force to overcome and control the mutinous troops of Gwalior who could not be expected to submit to being disbanded without such demonstration, even had the Government been altogether with us—but the Government was practically in the hands of the troops themselves.

39. The Court appear to view the movement upon Gwalior as an insulated transaction, which with an army in the field, the Governor General could deal with at his leasure without the chance of being disturbed, however long he might be detained about it. 40. It should rather be considered as a movement upon a field of battle extending from Scinde through the Punjab, even to the frontiers of Nepaul. It was a movement of which the success depended upon the time occupied in its completion. Any delay in bringing it to a satisfactory conclusion, any reasonable expectation that there would be such delay would inevitably have induced the Sikhs to cross the Sutlej. Their advance to Kussoor, a few miles from Ferozepore, was reported to me while I was in camp at Hingonah. There were rumours of the assemblage of Afghans with a view to assist Shere Mohamed in an irruption into Scinde. As I was travelling rapidly from Calcutta to Agra, I was obliged to move what troops I could lay my hands upon to protect Lucknow from an apprehended atttack from Nepaul which the misconduct of some of the subjects of the Oude Government had in fact justified. Everywhere there were enemies open or concealed whose combination it was necessary at once to break by a decisive blow. That blow was struck at Maharajpore and Punniar.

41. It was impossible under the circumstances which then existed to leave within a few marches of Agra a mutinous army of 30,000 men with a numerous and well served artillery. Every movement which might even-

tually have become necessary towards the Sutlej was altogether paralysed by the position of that army; and it was essential to our safety that it should be removed.* No negotiation without the presence of force could have effected that object. It was always to be apprehended that the use of force would become necessary. 42. I should have remained upon the Chumbul, had I there awaited the result of the negotiation, until the time for action had gone by. I should have encouraged every enemy of our Government by the infatuated imbecility which would have appeared to them to have possession of its councils. Above all I should have disheartened and humiliated the army which would have felt that it was in irresolute if not pusillanimous hands and the Government of India was dishonoured in the person of its Chief.

43. The very limited knowledge of the Members of the Court may have led to the erroneous opinion they appear to have formed with respect to my conduct in the management of our affairs with the Gwalior State and especially in the particular points to which they have referred; but the limited knowledge which may afford an apology for erroneous opinions does not excuse their promulgation. In proportion to the deficiency of their knowledge should have been the caution with which the Court permitted themselves to form any opinion at all upon an important question of policy and war; and surely it has not been in the exercise of a due discretion that an opinion so lightly formed has been allowed to take its place as a make-weight amongst the reasons alleged in justification of the recall of a Governor General. 44. It was in the Camp at Dholepore in the midst of all my difficulties that I received from the Court various intimations of the displeasure with which they regarded my conduct.

* Subsequent events proved how true this statement was. We might have lost India during the first war with the Punjab.

From the communication I had received from your Lordship I deemed it not improbable that I might receive my recall. 45. It is necessary for me to point out to Your Lordship the serious consequences which might have ensued from the sudden revocation of the powers of a Governor General in the midst of his army and in the presence of the enemy.

46. There might have arisen hereafter consequences hardly less serious from the temporary adoption of the only measure by which the public interests could have been relieved from the immediate and pressing danger so created. 47. Fortunately the Court at that time listened to more prudent counsels; and the recall of the Governor General was graciously deferred until having removed by decisive victory, by the disbandment of the Gwalior Army and by the subsequent settlement of the Maharajah's Government every immediate source of danger from without, he had made his own return to the Presidency the pledge of his confidence in the security of peace, and was employed in devising the best means of extending all its advantages to the people.

48. The Court take occasion to declare their abiding conviction that the annexation of Scinde to the British Dominions is fraught with formidable evils and dangers seriously affecting the great sources of our power, the health, discipline and efficiency of our army, our financial prosperity and our national reputation.

49. Scinde has been occupied by British troops since the winter of 1838. Its continued occupation by British troops was a necessary part of the measures adopted at that time for the establishment of a dependent dynasty in Afghanistan. Of that measure the Court never expressed their disapproval, nor did they apparently deem the sacrifices then forced upon the Ameers of Scinde to affect the national reputation. Now when our false position in Afghanistan has been abandoned, when the

occupation of Scinde alone tends materially to improve our means of defending our frontier upon the Sutlej, and the annexation of the Province to the British Dominions, rich as it is in soil and extensively improvable, may be expected at no distant date to provide a surplus revenue after defraying all the charges of its military occupation and civil government,* the Court come forward for the first time to express their firm and abiding conviction of the evils consequent upon its being in our possession. 50. My explanation and defence of the measures pursued with respect to Scinde are on record in my letter from Allahabad of the 26th of June and in my letter in Council of the 28th August, 1843. I consider it unnecessary to add one word to what is advanced in those letters.

Your Lordship and Her Majesty's Government have since acquiesced in the measure of annexing Scinde to our Dominions and I am at least justified in inferring from the silence of Parliament that there also the measure is not disapproved.

51. The Court cannot but apprehend that " in using my power to make extensive changes in the agency for the management of our political relations a great amount of embarrassment and inconvenience has been produced." 52. I am not sure whether the changes referred to by the Court are such as were extensive in principle or such as were only extensive in the number of the persons removed. 53. I concentrated political and military authority in the hands of officers commanding armies in the field. 54. Is it with respect to this extensive change that the Court express their apprehension? I deemed it to be absolutely essential to the safe conduct of public affairs, and experience has satisfied me that I was

* Dr. J. Rice Holmes in his recently revised life of Sir Charles Napier seems inclined to think that in after years military expenditure of an external character was thrown upon Sind finances which should not properly have been charged against that province.

right. 55. Or is it only in changes extensive in the number of persons removed that the Court see cause for apprehension? 56. When I withdrew the Armies from Afghanistan, was I wrong in terminating at once the very numerous appointments of Officers who under the name of Political Agents received large allowances in that country and whose services were no longer required? Was I wrong in extending the same order to Scinde, in placing the political as well as the military authority in the hands of Sir Charles Napier, and in leaving to him the grace of recommending for appointment under him such officers as it might be necessary to retain? Did I not thus effectually make them understand their true subordinate position and give unity of direction and efficiency in the public service? Should I have done better had I placed Major General Sir Charles Napier in subordination to Major Outram." I might have avoided this censure of the Court, but I should have lost an army.

57. The Court further observe that "the selection of military men for important offices previously held by civilians can hardly fail to impair the efficiency of the Civil Service of India upon which the internal administration of the country and consequently the welfare of the people so essentially depend." 58. I am not aware to what appointments the Court intend specifically to advert. 59. They must know that I neither have appointed nor could have appointed any military man to any office in the ordinary line of the Civil Service in the Judicial and Revenue Departments. I neither have nor could have placed any military man in any office to which civilians are specially entitled. 60. In the Straits, at Moulmein and at Kathmandoo I have substituted military men for civilians. I did the same upon the N.W. Frontier when I raised Mr. Clerk, who had been Political Agent upon that frontier to the high office of Lieut. Governor of the N.W. Provinces. I did not surely by that appointment impair the efficiency of the Civil Service.

61. It is obvious that at the present time upon the N.W. Frontier, and at all times at Moulmein is it desirable that the office of Agent or Commissioner should be held by a military man of known judgment and experience who may be enabled to lay before the Government a sound and correct view of the actual state of affairs, and may avoid creating unnecessary alarm by exaggerated reports of coming dangers, while at the same time free from unsuspecting confidence which might produce yet more injurious results.

62. The Court can hardly take exception to the military men selected for these posts, to Lieut. Col. Richmond, C.B., or to Major Broadfoot, C.B. They have both justified the selection I made. 63. Very little civil business is connected with the Political Agency on the N.W. Frontier, and such civil business as exists is not of the same description as the civil business in the Provinces, under the General Regulations; no length of service in Bengal or Agra qualifies a civilian for service on the N.W. Frontier, but military knowledge and reputation, and military habits and manners are qualifications for that appointment and they are eminently combined in Lt. Col. Richmond.

64. The honest energy, the fixedness of purpose and the untiring activity with which Major Broadfoot has applied himself to the investigation, the exposure and the correction of the flagrant abuses which had grown up under civil management in the Province of Tenasserim can surely not have incurred the disapproval of the Court. 65. That officer's former acquaintance with Tenasserim and his position as one of the most distinguished officers of the Madras Army recommended him to me as a very fit person to be placed at the head of the administration of that Province. The personal communication I afterwards had the advantage of having with him while he accompanied my camp from Ferozepore to Delhi satisfied me that I was entrusting the province to one of the first

men in the public service, and I really do not know one civilian who could on the grounds of personal qualification have advanced a special claim to the administration of a province where nothing resembles what he could have seen in India. 66. On the grounds of his military character and also on that of my personal knowledge of him, I appointed Lt. Col. Butterworth C.B., to be Governor of the Straits Settlements. I had become acquainted with that officer at the Cape and had received from him some valuable information. In the midst of the great dangers in which I found India on my arrival, I wrote to Lt. Col. Butterworth requesting him to return. He did so instantly at the hazard of his life and I had a peculiar pleasure in being soon enabled to place him in a situation where without injury to his health he might exercise his superior abilities in the discharge of high public duties. 67. I could not but think that the succession of a very different person from Mr. Hodgson to the Residency at Kathmandoo would be advisable for the purpose of placing our relations with the Court of Nepaul upon a proper footing, and I considered that the appointment of a military man who had exercised political functions in the midst of Afghans and Sikhs, and who was favourably known in the then recent operations against Cabul, would afford some useful facilities in dealing with the Chiefs of a military people. I therefore appointed Major Lawrence. 68. To the Residency of Indore I have recently appointed a civilian on the retirement of a military man. It is to be hoped that this appointment which must be very satisfactory to the Court, will prove equally advantageous with the appointment of military men in succession to civilians. 69. I have never desired to exclude civilians. I was very anxious to employ some of the most promising young civilians in Scinde; but the young gentlemen objected to their work and I was compelled to recall them.

70. The Court forget that it is not easy to induce civilians to hold ill-paid subordinate political offices such as are usually held by military men, and it does seem to me but fair that military men, not civilians, should enjoy the few prizes in the Political Department. The civilians have a service of their own in which *all* men succeed to prizes.

71. It is in vain that the Court would generally impeach the appointments I have made. They can hardly intend to impeach their principle, which has been that of giving promotion to the worthiest.

72. They well know that the old spirit of patronage has not existed under my Government. I have conscientiously endeavoured to place in every situation the fittest man, or the man at least as fit as any other. I have the satisfaction of believing that I have usually been successful in the selections I have made; but wherever I have had reason to think that I had been mistaken in the qualifications of the person appointed by me to an office, I have never allowed any consideration to prevent his immediate removal. 73. I hold that men are placed in office for the benefit of the State and not for their own. I have promoted and rewarded distinguished merit wherever I could find it, and leave to my successor the Political and Military Departments as far as appointments made by me could affect them, in a very improved and efficient state.

74. The Court are pleased to admit the difficulties of my position on my arrival in India. 75. Those difficulties were indeed great. I have overcome them, and I am now recalled. 76. Those difficulties were of an extent which made it the bounden duty of all connected with the Government of India to give it their cordial and most active support, and surely to place a favourable construction upon the actions of a Governor General,

struggling to restore security to an endangered Empire. I have not had the support of the Court. I have encountered their opposition. I have not had a favourable construction placed upon my actions. 77. There has always appeared a disposition to regard them with severity.

78. It was not first after the passing of resolutions by the Court condemnatory of my policy with respect to Scinde that I had reason to apprehend my recall. Even in the month of November, 1842 when I was marching to Ferozepore there to receive two victorious armies, I had some reason to expect that the next mail might announce that I had been removed by the Court. From that time during twenty successive months in the midst of events of no ordinary character requiring constant vigilance and decided action, I have been conducting the Government of India under the known hostility of the Court and I have but on one occasion been able to feel any degree of security that the very next letters from England would not communicate my supersession. 79. I admit I did not expect that immediately after the receipt of the intelligence of the re-occupation of Cabul and of the Peace of Nankin, the Court would proceed to remove the Governor General under whose direction the measures resulting in those events had been carried on; but even then I did not feel that I could rely upon more than a month's delay.

80. I know not well to what specific cause I should attribute this early hostility of the Court. 81. It is an unfortunate peculiarity in the position of a Governor General that he cannot exercise his patronage in the distribution of appointments without affecting in some manner the interests of the relations and friends of the 24 gentlemen who sit as Directors in the Court and of the 6 other gentlemen who are out of the Court every year by rotation. 82. I have always acted on the principle of treating the relation of a Director like any other indi-

vidual, to be dealt with according to his own intrinsic claims; but it has come to my knowledge that a different principle has been gravely advanced by the relatives of a Director and the fact of his being treated without any special favour has seriously been put forward as a grievance. 83. It happened at an early period of my arrival in India that I was induced by considerations of public duty to disappoint the views of two gentlemen nearly connected with Directors supposed to have influence in the Court. 84. It happened also that I deemed it right to advert to a very improper and injurious exercise of the patronage of the Court in favour of the very near relative of another of its influential members. 85. I am of course unable to trace to these occurrences any peculiar hostility which may have been manifested towards me by these Directors, but I cannot but regard it as a circumstance arising out of the present constitution of the Indian Government, which is very much to be regretted, that a Governor General may in the honest performance of his public duties materially affect the private interests of those who have a qualified power of expressing an opinion with respect to his measures and unrestricted power of recalling him.

86. The commencement of the opposition I have experienced from the Court was also contemporaneous with my suspension of a Civilian for publishing a libel against the Army. Of that measure the late Marquis Wellesley communicated to me his entire approval. That great statesman well knew the real state of India and the character and feeling of its Army. It cannot be a matter of surprise that the same measure should be regarded with condemnation by the Court. 87. From the day on which I suspended that civilian for publishing calumnies against the Army, at a moment when upon the fidelity and devotion of that Army the safety of every British interest, every British subject in India was dependent, I have experienced

the persevering hostility of the Court to myself and to every measure of my Government it was possible to question and assail.

88. But unless that which has been reported and universally believed in India and in England be more than usually incorrect, it is not to their proceedings in the Court that the individual members of the Court have confined their opposition. 89. I must be forgiven if I continue to believe, until assured on honour by the Directors themselves to the contrary, that even resolutions passed in a Court termed "Secret" have been divulged where they injuriously affected my policy and that the strong opinion of individual members of the Direction against my conduct in the administration of affairs in India have become public in England and in India through their conversation and correspondence.

90. I am unable to reconcile these proceedings with the strict obligations of public duty. It is only for the Court under the control of the Board to communicate their opinion of the conduct of the Indian Government. It is not for the Court without the acquiescence of the Board publicly to give any opinion thereupon. Still less is it for individual members of the Court to express such opinion in a sense opposed to the Governor-General and thus, as far as in them lies, to impair and weaken the Local Government.

91. I have already solemnly warned the Secret Committee of the danger of apparent division amongst the authorities in England to which the Government of India is entrusted. I renew that warning. I distinctly declare my conviction that a Governor General—exposed to the known opposition of the Court, and to the yet more injurious, perhaps because more insidious opposition of the members of the Court in their individual capacity, extending by their conversation and correspondence the spirit of disrespect and disaffection towards his Govern-

ment through all the ramifications of their connections and friends in the services and leading to the general impression amongst our own subjects and the Native Princes of India, that his measures so viewed with constant disfavour, and so opposed cannot be expected to be maintained—is by those, whose duty it is to give whatever they can of strength to the Local Government, placed in a position in which it is impossible for him duly to administer his charge.

92. The Government which would maintain our position must always consider it to be one of danger. 93. A handful of strangers in the midst of a vast population indifferent or hostile; dependent for existence on the fidelity of the Native Army, we cannot safely exhibit our divisions amongst ourselves to that Army and to the people. We cannot safely exercise the English privilege of decrying the measures of the Government and of endeavouring to render odious the persons by whom it may be administered. What in England may be an innocent pastime will in India result in ruin. 94. Yet in England the Government is at least true to itself and it is supported by all who hold office under it.

95. Here, in the midst of unparalleled difficulties arising out of circumstances over which I had no control and aggravating in all respects the inherent danger of our position, I have been subjected to the known hostility of one branch of the Home Authorities; and the individual members of the Court have, unless I have been greatly misinformed, considered themselves at liberty to become the chief agitators, in India and in England against the Government carried on in their collective name. 96. It cannot but be satisfactory to me to be relieved from the false position in which this opposition has always placed me. The time and manner of my removal leave me nothing to desire in the termination of my connection with the Court.

97. Your Lordship may now perhaps permit me shortly to place before you the objects I had in view in coming to India, the state in which I found this Empire and that in which I leave it.

98. To terminate the war in China by a peace honourable to the Crown and durable in its provision; to establish tranquillity on both banks of the Indus—in a word, to restore peace to Asia, and, from that peace thoroughly secured, to draw the means of creating a surplus revenue to be applied to great works of public improvements: these were the objects, the sole objects which induced me to take upon myself the government of India.

99. On my arrival I did indeed find difficulties of which I could not have foreseen the occurrence and of which I could hardly calculate the extent.

100. One army had been lost in the retreat from Cabul; other corps were surrounded in Ghuznee and Jellalabad. The army at Candahar, strong in itself, was yet without open communications with India, and was deficient in the most important articles of equipment and supply; discouragement was diffusing itself amongst some of the troops ordered to Afghanistan, and the pressure of financial embarrassment had led the Government to the consideration of expedients of an extreme character for its relief. 101. On the day I first sat in Council commenced the negotiations for the surrender of Ghuznee, and before I had been six weeks in India, Saugor and Bundelcund were in insurrection.

102. Two campaigns against the Chinese had indeed given honour to our arms; but, conducted with insufficient or disseminated forces and without a plan, they had led to no decisive result, while the protraction of the contest was interrupting the trade of India and embarraasing all the commercial transactions of the world. 103. Notwithstanding all the difficulties of my position, I reinforced the expedition to China which had been prepared under

the instructions which had been agreed to by my colleagues in the Cabinet and issued before I left England. I steadfastly adhered upon my own responsibility to the plan of operations upon the Grand Canal by which alone I believed that decisive success could be achieved, and in six months after my assumption of the Government the war with China was terminated by the Peace of Nankin.

104. In less than another month all our disasters in Afghanistan had been retrieved and avenged upon every scene whereon they had been sustained; and after repeated victories in the field the cities of Ghuznee and Cabul had been re-occupied. I then withdrew our Armies with honour to the Sutlej. 105. My first objects in assuming the Government of India seemed thus to be accomplished.

106. But out of the engagements and circumstances connected with the war in Afghanistan soon arose another war upon the Indus, wherein treachery received its just punishment and the victories of Meeanee and Hyderabad added the Province of Scinde to our Empire.

107. At a later period in the same year the mutinous conduct of the army of Scindiah and the unfriendly disposition of the faction which had practically usurped the government of the State of Gwalior, rendered necessary other military movements. The victories of Maharajpore and Punniar have re-established our friendly relations with the State of Gwalior, have given tranquillity to our dominions bordering on those of Scindiah and new security to our military position. 108. On the second anniversary of my arrival in India I returned to Calcutta, having successfully terminated four great military operations in two years.

109. The most profound tranquillity now reigns in India within the Sutlej. Every preparation suggested by prudent foresight has been made to meet any danger which may eventually approach from beyond the Sutlej; but

our conduct towards the Sikhs and the Government of Lahore has been invariably consistent with the long-established friendship between the two States. Never have the Chiefs of India had more reason to entertain confidence in the moderation and justice of our Government while the signal example which has been exhibited in Scinde of our power and of our determination to punish treachery in princes is of a nature to deter all from its commission.

110. At this moment it has pleased the Court of Directors to deprive me of the office of Governor General.

111. I leave it therefore to my successor to endeavour to effect the further objects I had in view and have not been permitted to undertake. I leave to him the task of drawing from the secure peace now established in Asia the means of creating a surplus revenue and the satisfaction should he succeed in that task, of illustrating the English name and benefitting the people of India by works of public improvement emulating in magnificence those of the Mahometan Emperors.

112. But Your Lordship is well aware that even in the midst of wars I have not been unmindful of measures calculated to give prosperity to the people by imparting freedom to the internal commerce of the Country.* 113. The measures directed by me upon the acquisition of Scinde, and the subsequent engagements negotiated under my instructions with the States of Buhawalpore and Bikaneer have given almost entire freedom to the commercial communications between the mouths of the Indus and Delhi. 114. The Act passed by the Legislative Council last year has, upon the N.W. Frontier removed every restriction upon the import of all but three articles and upon the export of all but one; and the Act

* There has been a conspiracy of silence among Lord E.'s detractors on the subject of his policy of removing antiquated barriers to trade.

recently passed has abolished all the transit and town duties throughout the Presidency of Madras. 115. Your Lordship is aware that other measures for the relief of the internal trade of other portions of our territories are now under consideration and are, it may be hoped, not far from completion. 116. Already have the peace with China and the general prosperity prevailing in India so increased the revenue, that after defraying all the interest of the debt incurred under my administration, it exceeds the revenue I found by more than a million sterling.

117. The 4 per cent. Stock which when I landed in India was at 16½ per cent. discount has now for some time been nearly at par. 118. So much is the credit of the Government improved that during the four last months of 1843-4 (ending on the 30th of April, 1844) 82 lacs of rupees (£820,000) were subscribed at 4 per cent. while in the corresponding period of 1841-2 only 49 lacs and 21,300 rupees)£492,130) were obtained at 5 per cent; and in the month of February, 1844 in which I arrived, only 352,100 rupees (£35,210) were subscribed to the Loan at that rate of interest. 119. With such financial prospect did I undertake the Government, but notwithstanding all the great military operations which I have been compelled to carry on, the surplus in India in the year, 1843-4 was greater by more than 72 lacs of rupees (£720,000) than it was in the year 1841-2 and the cash balance at the close of the year 1843-4 was greater by 1,91,00,000 rupees (£1,910,000) than it was at the close of 1841-2.

120. Such are the circumstances under which I deliver the Government of India in the hands of Sir Henry Hardinge—changed indeed from those under which I received it from the Earl of Auckland—but yet I should deceive Your Lordship were I to allow you to form any sanguine hope that even under these improved circumstances, the honest zeal, the practical ability, the indefatigable industry of Sir Henry Hardinge will enable

him to overcome the many real difficulties which oppose the creation in this country of a permanent surplus revenue after defraying the heavy charges as well as those accruing here. 121. There are other difficulties arising out of the forms and spirit of the existing Government which will, as long as that Government remains unaltered, prevent the general establishment in India of any system of effectual economy and the introduction of any real and extensive reform, nor can I conceal from myself that those difficulties are most seriously aggravated at the present moment by the manifest failure of my attempt to govern India upon good English principles and by the success attending the agitation which has terminated in my recall.

122. The civil administration of India is conducted by gentlemen who have no permanent interest in the prosperity of the people. The so-called "Public" of India consists not of the people, but for the most part of gentlemen whose present private interests are not in conformity with those of the people and the State. 123. The larger the salary of the civil functionary, the easier the conditions on which he can obtain leave of absence from his duty, the more frequently he can change his station, deriving from each change an increase of emoluments, the longer he may be permitted to retain the right of resuming his office on his return from leave of absence and the greater the portion of the salary attached to his office which he may be permitted to enjoy while not performing its duties, the more popular will be the Governor General become with the "Public" of India so constituted and with the Press by which it is represented. 124. Every measure for the reduction of undue allowances and for compelling men in office to do their duty which in England would tend to make a Government strong in the support of the people must in India where the people is not heard and where men in office almost alone constitute the "Public" tend to make a Government unpopular and weak.

125. The continued opposition of this "Public" and the Press in India may be the surest indication that

a Government is doing its duty by the People. 126. But the Governor General who in despite of these embarrassments resolves on doing his duty by the People must in order to effect that purpose have the continued and cordial support of the authorities in England. 127. He is justified in expecting also the support of all the well-judging portion of the people of England, for the people of England has a permanent interest in the welfare of India.

128. But if the Governor General should possess only the general confidence of the Ministers of the Crown and not that of the Court of Directors; if they, the relations, the patrons and the friends of the civil functionaries should feel with them upon the subject of all reforms affecting their private interests and from that motive or on any other alleged ground should entertain and make public their hostility to the Governor General, thus creating a general impression that he will not long remain in office and that his measures will not be confirmed,—if further the people of England, misled by the Press of India which does not represent the people of India but men in office there, should not only abstain from giving to the Governor General that support to which he is entitled, but even unsuspectingly join in the interested clamour by which he is assailed, then, my Lord, whatever may be the honest zeal of the Governor General, whatever may be the support he may receive from his Council (and I have been fairly supported by mine), the difficulties by which he will be surrounded will become beyond his power to surmount, and he must ultimately fail, as I have done, in the vain attempt to govern India, not for the exclusive benefit of office-bearers, and of a corporation, but for the benefit of the people of India itself, whose welfare it is his first duty to regard.

I am etc.,

Ellenborough.

The following passages appear in the Extract communicated by Lord Ripon to the Court of Directors from Lord Ellenborough's letter of July 4th, 1844 on the subject of his recall, but they seem to form no part of the letter in its original form:—

The imports into the port of Calcutta, and the exports from that port (both including treasure) were greater by 20 per cent. in 1843-44, than they were in 1841-42; the imports have increased rather more than a million sterling and the exports to the extent of £1,723,000.

Imports.	*Rupees.*	*Exports.*	*Rupees.*
1843–44	6,47,66,562	1843–44	10,11,71,270
1841–42	5,42,96,722	1841–42	8,39,40,592

It may be expected that the returns for the current year will exhibit results yet more satisfactory, as the mercantile operations will have been carried on under the sense of increased security, and in the prospect of continued peace. I am not yet in possession of the returns from Madras and Bombay, which would enable me to compare the trade of those ports, in the two years of my arrival in India, and of my removal.

Duke of Wellington to Lord Ellenborough.

London. April 30th, 1844.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,

I send you the copy of a Memo. which I gave and of a letter which I wrote on the 25th inst. to Lord Ripon. I likewise send you the " Times " of this morning in which you will see the report of what I said in the House of Lords last night. I will write again by Marseilles.

Ever yours most sincerely,

Wellington.

Duke of Wellington to Lord Ripon.

(This copy was in the Duke's own hand.)

London. April 25th, 1844.

My dear Lord Ripon,

I have reflected much upon the communication which you made to us last night, as I conclude that we all have.

The Court of Directors has availed itself of the power to recall the Governor General of India entrusted to that body by Parliament, an officer selected by the Court but little more than two years with the consent of the Crown, who reached his Government scarcely more than two years ago in February 1842; and it is only necessary to revert to the state of the British Empire in India in all its branches and departments of its Government, civil, military, political and financial and to compare that state with that in which it is found at present, of which the whole world must be able to form a judgment, whether it is expedient that Lord Ellenborough should be recalled, whatever may be the ground of complaint against him personally. The law has undoubtedly given to the Court of Directors the power of recalling the Governor General. But I conclude that that body is not exempt from the necessity of exercising with discretion the power entrusted by the law, as all other bodies and individuals entrusted with authority by the provision of the law of England are bound to exercise such authority with discretion. The state of India before Lord Ellenborough's assumption of the Government compared with its existing state is *primâ facie* ground for the belief that this exercise of its authority is not discreet. The law which has given the Court of Directors the power of recalling the Governor General has not given to that body the power of sending him an instruction or an order, without the consent of the Board of Commissioners, excepting this order of recall; and has gone further by describing the mode in which the Orders and Instructions of the Home Government to the Governor General

and Governors abroad should be sent. It is the Secret Committee of the Court and that body alone, which has any knowledge of these Orders and Instructions, and of the facts found in the Reports from the Governments abroad on which they are founded. For these Orders and Instructions the Board of Control and Her Majesty's Servants are responsible. In point of fact the Court of Directors cannot have, ought not to have, and avers that it has not a knowledge of what has been those Instructions or even their nature, and if the report of transactions in India has not been laid before Parliament and before the Court by Her Majesty's servants, the Court would not have had an official knowledge of the transactions of which the result has been as I have above stated so satisfactory.

H.M. servants who *are* responsible have reason to be satisfied with the measures of Lord Ellenborough and have repeatedly sent despatches to India through the regular channel of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, expressing their approbation of his conduct. They have not consented to the recall of Lord Ellenborough, the law does not require that they should, however that recall may effect the public interests and render onerous to them the labour of preserving the public interests and maintaining the public honour after the Instrument will have been recalled in whose agency they had so much reason to feel confidence.

In the narrow view, then of the feelings which gentlemen ought to have for those with whom they are associated in the public service, for men with whom they are maintaining the common intercourse of social life, it is not a discreet exercise of authority by the Court, it is not consistent with the conduct and sentiments of gentlemen and men of honour that the Court should so far aggravate the danger of the country and the constitutional responsibility of the gentlemen exercising the powers of the Government

as to deprive them of the services of the man whom they prefer as their instrument to carry on the Government of India.

There can be no doubt that the state of India is really improved in every view since the period at which Lord Ellenborough assumed the Government. But much remains to be done, as well to secure all the advantages of the glorious events of his administration as to provide against foreign dangers of long duration, and completely to restore the prosperity of the finances of the country and to lay the foundation in peace of the increased prosperity and happiness of the people of that vast Empire. I need here only point to the completion of the settlement of the authority of the British Government in the province of Scinde, the fixation of the military establishments for its defence, the connection of that establishment with the armies of Fort William and Bombay, the manner to be adopted in the way of defensive works and permanent barracks to provide for the salubrity of the troops. Then there is much to be done as well, in Bundelcund as in Saugor, the dominion of the E. India Co., in connection with the recent settlement of the Gwalior territory of which it must be observed that the final result is not yet known.

Although as I have above observed the Court of Directors has no official knowledge of the transactions except what the Government may think proper to give, and none of the instructions founded upon the reports received, I apprehend that the individuals composing it do receive private information from individuals in India in private letters as well as in the libellous press which exists in that part of the world. The Court then must be aware of the effect which will be produced, not only throughout the provinces under the government of the company, particularly in Scinde, and generally through the East, particularly in Gwalior, where the recent settlement has been made, by the recall of the powerful, able and fortunate

Governor General. The Court may run away from the responsibility for the schemes of welfare and (from the) consequences which may ensue from this change at this moment. They are not, they cannot be constitutionally responsible, but each individual is so morally, and as a body of gentlemen, as men of honour, they will ever be held responsible for the additional difficulty imposed upon those whose duty it is to provide for the Government and security of India.

But it appears that the Court of Directors has long disapproved of the conduct of Lord Ellenborough and has expressed its desire as I am aware to recall him. But begging pardon of the Court it had no more knowledge of the course of Lord Ellenborough's Government than any other body or individual composing the public. It had avowedly no knowledge of the instructions sent to him, nor of his acts not known to the whole world, excepting such as might have been acquired from gossiping letters upon perusal of the licentious and libellous press; and I will add that excepting the power to adopt this measure of recall, the Court had no constitutional right to come to any decision on the measures of Lord Ellenborough's Government.

It is true the Court did more than once express its intention to recall His Lordship, but I hoped that its members had been convinced how little advisable it was that the Court should adopt that measure, considering the immediate consequences by which it must have been followed, detrimental to the interests of the country, to the safety and even to the honour of the troops; as it was represented to the Court that when the Governor General should be recalled, and India should be left, without a person at the head of the Councils of that country in whom Her Majesty's Ministers could feel confidence, there existed no authority whatever which could give an order of any description even for the first moment to provide

for the public safety. The Court of Directors certainly could not without the sanction of Her Majesty's servants, whom they would have annoyed, injured and insulted. And the Court having thus in ignorance not only of the instructions to the Governor General by the competent authority, but the facts themselves upon which such instructions were founded, having occasioned the evil, would leave to Her Majesty's servants to overcome the difficulty. That which the Court did not dare to do at that time, it has done now, only because renewed military successes obtained under the superintendence and direction of Lord Ellenborough have rendered the danger apparently less imminent and pressing than it was when the same measure was heretofore threatened. But I warn the Court that it still exists, that much still remains to be done, and that they cannot leave the Government of India even for a day without a person at its head in whom Her Majesty's servants can have confidence.

I recommend then that you protest in the most solemn manner against the measure, render public your protest and make the individuals comprising the Court feel that they will be held individually responsible for the evils which may and probably will be its consequence.

Wellington.

Memo. (by Duke of Wellington) March 30th 1844, at night.

I have frequently heard of the disapprobation of the Court of Directors of the E. India Co., of the conduct of the Governor General Lord Ellenborough, of his policy, particularly in relation to Scinde, of his prolonged absence from the Presidency and of the purport and language of some of his Lordship's despatches; and particularly that certain despatches had not been communicated to the Vice-President in Council at the Presidency. But I confess that I have never had positive information as to

what the matter of complaint was in respect of his despatches. I have however more than once pointed out to the President of the Board of Control the inconvenience and injury to the public interests which must be the result of a sudden change of the Governor General by the exercise of the power vested by the law in the Court of Directors to recall him; and I am inclined to believe that those of the Court who were most incensed against Lord Ellenborough, and most disposed to exercise their power of recall, acknowledged that the reasons for refraining from that exercise of authority, were such as that they could not be easily answered.

We have now come to a new era in India. Peace has again been restored after an honourable and glorious struggle occasioned by the pursuit of a course of policy founded in transactions of forty years endurance in which the Governor General was undoubtedly right, and his policy has been approved by all, and the arrangements of the terms of the peace has given additional strength to the British Government and still further confirmed the hopes of tranquillity and security. These sentiments in respect to the Gwalior war and the arrangements of the peace, has been expressed in a despatch to the Governor General in Council now in circulation; and it appears that the Governor General has quitted the headquarters of the army in the field with a view to return to the seat of his Government at the Presidency.

There can be no doubt that there is no British subject more capable than or indeed so capable as Lord Ellenborough from knowledge, experience—practical and local now—as well as general, acquired by his long administration of the affairs of India in the office of the President of the Board of Control and his great talents to administer with advantage the affairs of the E. India Co., in time of peace; to restore the prosperity of the finances and the public credit; in which he had already made progress,

notwithstanding the preparations for the Gwalior contest impending.

The exercise of the power of recall by the Court of Directors will deprive the E. India Co., and the public of all those advantages, for the Court is much mistaken if its members suppose that they will find a person willing to go to India after Lord Ellenborough will have been recalled, qualified for the performance of the duty of the Office as His Lordship is, and enjoying the advantage as His Lordship must of the confidence and regard of the whole of the military, and probably of the best judging of the civil servants of the company. But this is not all! Lord Ellenborough has now had the good fortune to bring to a glorious termination a third great military effort. The Native Powers must respect him. Even the trifling circumstance of his having been in the field in the late struggle at Maharajpore must occasion the respect of a military people for the Governor General, already so respected on account of his actions, and it cannot be true that the Court of Directors cannot be made sensible of the effect upon the mind of those at the head of the several Native Governments, upon learning that this was the moment seized upon by the constituted executive authority in England to recall this Governor General. There can be no doubt of the power of the Court of Directors to exercise this authority.

I know nothing of their grounds of complaint against the Governor General. I am sensible of the services which he has the power and ability to render to the State, and I have pointed out the feelings which will be excited by his recall. I would request the Court of Directors to cast their eyes for a moment over the history of this country and see how often it has happened that the sovereign has found himself under the necessity of retaining in his service, with the view to the public advantage, a servant with whose conduct he was not entirely satisfied, and even to take such

a one into his service. Surely the Court of Directors, because a numerous body, cannot consider themselves to be exempt from the necessity of submitting for the public advantage to those circumstances and inconveniences to which all Sovereigns are under the necessity of submitting not only those of this country, but those in which the governing power is uncontrolled and solely in the hands of the monarch.

As I have stated above I have not seen Lord Ellenborough's despatches, I am not informed of his acts of disobedience and of the tone and tenour of his despatches amounting to insubordination. But I must observe that, although the law has provided that the Government of India shall be administered by, and in the name of the E. India Co., and has given to the Court of Directors the power of recalling the Governor General appointed with the consent of the Crown, the same law has given to the servants of the Crown a participation of and a control over the administration of the Government of India, for the exercise of which these servants are responsible to Parliament.

The disobedience complained of, and the tone of insubordination contained in the despatches, must have been addressed to the servants of the Crown as well as to the Court of Directors. It is true that the last named body alone only has the power of recall. But it cannot be supposed that Her Majesty's servants would omit to draw Her Majesty's attention towards and submit that Her Majesty's displeasure should be declared upon any flagrant or important act of disobedience or insubordination. This would be the preferable move of vindicating the authority of that body vested by the law with the supreme government of that vast Empire. The adoption of this mode of proceeding would be followed by no consequences injurious to the interests of the country, unless Lord Ellenborough himself, not sensible of his error and

of the foundation in justice for the declaration of Her Majesty's displeasure, should desire to withdraw himself from his post. I don't think that he is likely to take this course. At all events, if he does, the responsibility for the evil consequences will not rest upon the Court of Directors or upon the authorities at home, but upon him who having offended the authority which the law has placed over him, will not submit to those measures which the Sovereign may be advised to adopt in vindication of the authority of the law, and of those acting under the regulations contained in its provisions. But it will not be difficult to convince Lord Ellenborough of the importance to himself and to the exercise of his own authority of his giving a constant example of obedience to the authorities whom the law requires him to obey, and of subordination and of those testimonies of respect and deference in his correspondence which are the common and usual symptoms of subordination and obedience. He must be sensible that he could not for a moment exercise his authority whether over the Civil or Political Service or the Army were those employed by him to disobey him and to write him letters of defiance only because they should feel conscious that their personal services were of inportance to the public interests and that he would not venture to dismiss them. It is true that as far as relates to the military service he has a remedy for insubordination short of dismissal. But Lord Ellenborough is not a man who if he should be brought to feel that he had been in the wrong will omit to submit to authority merely because the extremity of punishment could not conveniently be inflicted upon him. He will feel that obedience, subordination and respect to his superiors placed over him by the law are not matters of social courtesy only, but positively required by the nature of the relations between the parties, and he will be more likely to act in conformity with rule in proportion as he will feel that the public interests must suffer by his dismissal from office.

Duke of Wellington to Lord Ellenborough.

Private and Confidential. London. May 5th, 1844.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,

I conclude that you will be informed by the overland mail which will be despatched from London to-morrow that the catastrophe which I had so long foreseen and had so frequently foretold to you, has at last occurred. That the Court of Directors of the E. India Co., had on the 24th April passed a resolution to recall you from the Government of India notwithstanding the remonstrances of Her Majesty's servants. That this resolution was announced in both Houses of Parliament on Friday the 26th in answer to questions put to Ministers of the Crown in each House; and that after communication between the Chairman and Deputy Chairman and the President of the Board of Control, and the first Lord of the Treasury respectively, the Court has intimated the intention of nominating Sir Henry Hardinge to be the Governor General which will be assented to by Her Majesty, as Sir Henry Hardinge has consented to accept the office.

I wrote to you on the 30th ult., a letter of which I enclose a duplicate, of which I sent the original and its enclosures by the sea conveyance to Alexandria which ought to reach at the same time with this. The enclosures were a copy of a Mem. which I had written some time ago, which had for its object to prevail upon the Court not to adopt this lamentable act; the copy of a letter which I wrote to Lord Ripon on the 25th April, the day after I had been informed that the resolution of recall had been adopted, which if communicated to the Court I hoped might have the effect of suspending the execution of the resolution, or at all events, would have prevented its early publication, and we might have taken measures to endeavour at least to prevent the evils likely to result from it. However the resolution transpired and in point of fact questions were asked upon its existence in both

Houses of Parliament on Friday the 26th April the day but one after it had been adopted by the Court. Another enclosure in my letter of the 30th April was the "Times" newspaper of the 30th containing a tolerable report of what I said in the House ot Lords on Monday the 29th of April in answer to a question put to me by Lord Colchester in absence of Lord Ripon on account of indisposition.

You will thus have the whole case before you up to the 30th April. It is obviously the intention of the Court of Directors not only to recall you, but to do so in the manner most offensive to you and to the Government and the most injurious to your character, and most likely to be attended by public misfortunes and disasters. It must be our object if possible to defeat their evil purposes. I had a conversation with Hardinge yesterday from which I learn that it is his intention to go to his post as soon as possible. He and Sir Robert Peel I conclude, will write to you by this occasion, and, I earnestly recommend to you whatever may be your feelings, however justly you may resent the manner in which you have been treated that you should remain at your post till your successor shall have arrived, that you should give him every advice and instruction calculated to enable him to perform his important duties and to carry out the public service with advantage to the public interests.

Rely upon it that the public will eventually do you justice and with a greater degree of unanimity, and at an earlier period, in proportion as it will appear that you bear with equanimity the flagrant injustice with which you have been treated; and as you sacrifice your own feelings of just indignation and anger, and even your own private convenience in order that you may meet and confer with your successor in office, and afford him the assistance of your council, and the information which it is in your power to give him.

It has not fallen to my lot to see Her Majesty since these

events occurred, but I know having seen her notes that there is no person who is more indignant than Her Majesty. Prince Albert the same. I desired Hardinge to inform Sir Robert Peel of the honours which I thought should be conferred upon you. I afterwards saw a box in circulation in which the same was mentioned to the members of the Cabinet. Sir Robert Peel will probably write to you upon this part of the subject, and this being the case I do not think I ought to do more than advert to it.

I will here close this letter, but if I should hear of any thing to-morrow before the mail is despatched which it may appear to me desirable you should know, I will write you another letter.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,
Wellington.

Sir H. Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough.

Priaate. Whitehall Gardens. May 6th. 1844,
(received 15th June.)

My dear Lord Ellenborough,

No act in public affairs has occasioned so much astonishment as your recall from the Government of India by the Court of Directors—and to me the astonishment is still greater that I should be the person nominated to be your successor.

This exercise of power in recalling you at the very moment when you had arrived at a new era in India by restoring peace and tranquillity in every part of that vast Empire, after a succession of glorious events which had re-established our military character and proved your ability in the field to be as remarkable as your policy in commerce was wise, vigorous and successful, this termination of your great administration has taken all parties by surprise, for, although as you are aware, the blow had been threatened to be struck, no member of the Government believed that the Court of Directors would have ventured

to take a step so full of danger to the real interests of our Indian Empire. They knew by our protests that in all the great political events by which your administration has been distinguished, that the Government approved of your policy, and in the first drafts of the letter of recall, the motives assigned were confined to those which may be termed of a personal character, the disrespectful tone of defiance of your authority which marked your correspondence. When the insufficiency of such grounds of complaint for so monstrous an act of power was pointed out to them, and as Ripon hoped with decisive effect in inducing them to rescind their determination, they then amended their former draft, and added to it their disapprobation of your policy in Sinde, and even in the last crowning effort of your measures, the settlement of the Gwalior affair.

My own private opinion is that this outrageous proceeding might have been prevented if Lord Ripon's health and the death by scarlet fever of a governess in his house in town had not driven him to Putney Heath—time was lost—notes passed—and the act became irrevocable, when some of the Directors talked of their unanimity in the clubs, affording to the opposition the pretext of putting questions to the Ministers in both Houses, of which you will have seen the result in the newspapers. Whether the Government would have been strong enough to have brought in an Act to cancel the power thus unfortunately left in 1833 to the Court of Directors is a matter of great doubt. Even Hogg adhered to the Directors, and their unanimity was not disturbed by *one* dissentient voice. Passion and personal vengeance over-ruled all considerations of the public good, and the opinion was that, as the blow was by the second draft of the letter of recall struck at the Government as well as at you, by inserting in it their disapprobation of the Sinde and Gwalior policy, that we should in the present unsettled state of parties, arising

out of the Factory Bill, in all probability not be able to carry such a measure through our House.

The next question which naturally arose was the appointment of a successor. I had expressed myself in terms of strong disapprobation to Mr. Hogg, and so little contemplated the possibility of Peel and the Duke urging me to undertake this great affair, that my opinions were not withheld from many of those whom I found to be most hostile to you. When Peel sent for me last Thursday the morning of the 2nd of May, I at once told him I was not qualified to be your successor, and that I would not consent to replace you after the treatment you had experienced at the hands of the Directors. He said the Government were in a great difficulty, that the Queen was most anxious, that the Duke approved, and then followed the usual allurements ably put forward to gratify my personal ambition. I was firm and pointed out that at my time of life, with my daughters just coming into society, and the impossibility of taking Lady Emily with me, that the sacrifice was too great. He begged me to take time for consideration. I consulted with Lady Emily, and the result was that on Friday morning, having heard that the Queen intended to address me, and above all the Chairs and the Court would make no terms, but at once offered me their cordial co-operation, on the avowed principle that your policy would be carried out by Her Majesty's Government, I consented to place myself at Peel's disposal, He said the arrangement should be made on that principle. The Chairs and the Directors were consulted, and, as I understand, were unanimous, whilst on my part, *I consider* that I am placed in this great office expressly for the purpose of carrying out that line of policy adopted by you, of which the Queen's Government have approved, and of which the Chairs and the Directors in their public letter of recall state that they disapprove.

I told Peel that I also would only consent to go out, on

the ground of the arrangement being made with the Chairs on terms which should recognise me not only as a colleague who concurred and approved of all you had done, but as a kinsman and friend personally attached to you, and who admired your great talents. I have reason to believe that this brief outline of my feelings has been accurately conveyed to the Chairs and as Peel will write to you in detail, I shall now proceed to state what my arrangements and movements will be, so as to afford the best opportunity of securing the earliest communication between us.

. . . . . .

Under any circumstances believe me to be,
Yours very sincerely,
H. Hardinge.

From Sir R. Peel.

Confidential. Whitehall. Oct. 16, 1844

My dear Ellenborough,

A few days since I received the enclosed letter from Lord Lonsdale. You will perceive that it conveys his wish to relinquish the Post Office—on account of the state of his private affairs not permitting him to devote so much of his time as is absolutely required for the superintendence and control of a department which has become one of great labour and importance. It is of such importance, that I think it not impossible that members of the Cabinet holding very high offices in point of rank, might prefer it, and that I might then have one of these appointments within my control. But I will not make any such proposal without previously communicating with you.

If it be consistent with your views and feelings to resume a seat in the Cabinet with your former colleagues, it is very probable that you would prefer an appointment like the Post Office nominally of lower rank, but with much more important duties, with greater labour, greater

capacity for rendering public service than such an office as the Privy Seal. The Duke of Richmond held the Post Office concurrently with a seat in the Cabinet, and I should have therefore no new precedent to create by an union of the two functions. It is possible that you may wish to reserve to yourself a perfectly unfettered power of action in respect to events and future proceedings in Parliament, in connection with your recal[l] by the Court of Directors, and to be perfectly free from that degree of restraint which acceptance of Cabinet office, unavoidably imposes, as compared with a private station, in respect to political questions. This is a point on which you are best qualified and best entitled to form a judgment.

I am desirous (and I am confident I may speak on behalf of all the other members of the Government, as well as my own) not to let pass the first opportunity which occurs of demonstrating our *unabated confidence in you*, by proposing your reunion with us in the duties and responsibilities of Government.

As to future motions in Parliament respecting your conduct and policy in India, we shall be prepared, whether you are a colleague or remain in a private station, to vindicate that conduct and that policy, and to offer the most strenuous resistance to any inculpation of it. We should not be enabled as a Government to undertake or to concur in any aggressive proceedings against the Court of Directors. Such proceedings sanctioned by a Government necessarily imply a total subversion of the system of Indian Government, an *immediate* as well as a total subversion, for suspense and procrastination on such a question would be fraught with imminent danger.

After what passed subsequently to your recall, protested against and disapproved of by us, the application to the Government by the Court to name a Governor General, the acceptance by the Court of Sir Henry Hardinge—your brother-in-law and attached friend a party to all the

acts of the Government at home in reference to your Indian Policy, considerations of good faith would preclude us from offensive measures directed against the East India Company or Court of Directors.

I have not made any com[m]unication to the Queen on the subject on which I am now writing to you. I wished to ascertain in the first instance, your own impressions and feelings, and I shall be much obliged to you therefore to consider this letter, for the present, strictly confidential.

Believe me my dear Ellenborough,
most faithfully yours,
Robert Peel.

To Sir R. Peel.

Farrance's Hotel. October, 17, 1844.

My dear Peel,

I received your Letter too late last night to be able to answer it. I now return Lord Lonsdale's which you enclosed.

The Office of Postmaster General which he desires to relinquish is one for which I am by no means peculiarly qualified. Quite the contrary—any decent man of business who had never been engaged in the direction of great public transactions would perform the duties of that Office better than I should. I have had to deal with very minute details which will always occur in the midst of the most important transactions, and when they so occur it is not repulsive to the mind to dwell upon them for a time; but I am quite sure that my mind would refuse itself to the work of dealing all day long with small matters of detail leading to no great result. I feel that I could not hold the office of Postmaster General with credit to myself or benefit to the Queen's Service. I feel also that by accepting that office I should materially impair the means of being useful to the Government in Parliament and out of Parliament which I now possess.

I must therefore altogether decline it.

Perhaps as you mentioned the Privy Seal, I may be excused for stating that it would be by no means agreeable to me to resume that office from which I was transferred to a situation of real business and importance fourteen years ago.

With respect to the conduct to be pursued in regard to the Court of Directors, I have always considered that that must be decided upon by the Government. My duty was performed when I placed on record by my Letter of the 4th of July to Lord Ripon my answer to their charges and my opinion with relation to their proceedings. That letter and the correspondence between the Board of Control and the Court to which it refers must necessarily at some time be laid before Parliament. It is essential to the truth of History, it is due to the People of India yet more than to the People of England that the whole conduct of the Court with respect to my Government should be made known and temperately and deliberately considered; but the Queen's Government can determine better than I can at what period it will be expedient that that disclosure and that consideration should take place. The questions involved are so important, affecting not only the good Administration but the security of a distant and perilous Empire that it is in the highest degree desirable that they should only be entertained when there may be a reasonable prospect of their being dealt with without personal prejudice or passion.

I am naturally desirous of meeting all my enemies in the field as soon as possible; but I have no right to seek a victory for myself at a time when it might be productive of public detriment, and I shall ever continue to act as if the interests of India were still under my protection.

It has been very agreeable to me to receive a proof of the unabated confidence of yourself and of my former Colleagues.

I am not quite sure that I may not be of more service

to the Government out of office than if I were again in the Cabinet and I am perfectly satisfied with my present position.

Believe me, My Dear Peel,
Yours ever very sincerely,
Ellenborough.

Memorandum by Lord Ellenborough

October 30, 1844.

Had my Audience of the Queen. I said that I had to offer my humble thanks to H.M. for the marks of Her Favor she had been graciously pleased to bestow upon me, and I added that I had been supported in my difficulties by the conviction that H.M. would always place a fair interpretation upon my conduct. I then said I thought it right to express to H.M. my opinion of the absolute necessity of constant vigilance in India with a view to the continued security of the Empire which must always be considered as being in a state of danger.

I spoke of the act of the Court in recalling me as directed not against me alone, but as a Coup d'Etat against the Crown, and of its injurious effects, until counteracted by some measure, upon the local influence of the Gov^{r} General and the subordination of all the Servants of the State in India. I explained in what manner these persons always appealed to individual Directors through Private Letters and in which everything would be managed by intrigue without the constant vigilance of the President of the B^{d} of Control. I detailed some of the instances of treachery in the divulging of Correspondence in India, and in communications to the Press, and spoke of the endeavours I had made to create a moral sense of the impropriety of so dealing with Public documents. I adverted also to the effect of the Press on the feelings of Native Princes.

I concluded by assuring H.M. that out of Office I should continue to give every possible aid to the Gov^{nt} as regarded India. I presented to H.M. the Stars of Maharajpoor and Punniar.

To Sir H. Hardinge.

October 30, 1844.

My dear Hardinge,

I did not land in England till the 12th having had a very tedious and bad passage in the Bay of Biscay the worst weather I ever saw.

I found on my arrival in London an invitation to Windsor and set off at once, being just in time to see the King of the French. The Queen was very gracious.

I received your letter of the 17th August respecting the conduct of the Court with regard to the Act abolishing the inland duties at Madras and the measure of increasing the duty on Salt there, and I shewed it to Peel at Windsor. He had not been consulted with respect to the matter and knew nothing about it.

L^d^ Ripon takes the merit of the Court's orders upon himself, and I am disposed to think that the secret cause of what has been done was his little annoyance at not having been previously consulted. It was worse than idle to consult him. The delay attending such consultations is too great, and the disposition to reject every proposition from the Gov^nt^ of India is too great to encourage any Gov. Gen^l^ to endeavour to obtain previous sanction to any large measure of Reform. I have not yet seen the Letter communicating the Court's orders; but I probably shall before the Overland Mail goes out, and if I should I will tell you what occurs to me upon them.

L^d^ Lonsdale having intimated his desire to be relieved from the Post Office Peel offered it to me, and rather seemed to intimate that some arrangement might be made for my having the Privy Seal if I preferred it. I declined both appointments. I have not mentioned this matter even to the Duke. I considered it quite confidential. The Post Office would have been quite unsuitable to me, and it would have been far from agreeable to me to return to the Privy Seal from which I was translated to the India Board 16 years ago.

I found the Duke looking well, and not excited as I had been told he was now very apt to be. His complexion was clear and healthy. L[d] Ripon has been ill again, and is in the country. The two Secretaries of the India Board are, one at Nice and the other in Greece! This is all very bad, and Peel must see that it will not do; but I do not believe that L[d] Ripon will ever voluntarily go out. My letter to him respecting my recall etc., which I shewed to you is to be communicated to the Chairs, but how much farther seems at present uncertain. It must go to the Court.* The question is *when* it shall be laid before Parliament. This it must be ultimately. I have left the decision of this point, where it must necessarily in all propriety rest, with the Government. Peel is certainly not prepared to adopt any measure against the Court now.

All the world seem to have been in good humour when the Queen went to open the Exchange. The Lord Mayor Elect *Gibbs* would have been pelted had he shewn himself. There will be a great scene on Lord Mayor's day, if he has not the discretion to resign.

You will see that O'Connell although scandalously let out of prison is thoroughly scotched. They tell me however that there is growing up in Ireland a very exclusive National feeling which extends itself far into what were our Protestant ranks. I cannot however speak of this of my own knowledge.

. . . . . .

Walmer Castle, Nov 3rd.

I have seen the Court's letter about the Madras salt. I do not think the direction given was illegal, but I have told L[d] Ripon that it is contrary to all practice in India and every where else to communicate to a subordinate the letter written at the same time to his immediate superior, directing that superior to give certain orders to him, and

* L[d] Ripon considered it to be a private letter and thus took it away when he resigned instead of leaving it as a secret document at the B[d] of Control.

to instruct the subordinate to act in anticipation of the Orders so directed to be given, *unless* in a case of emergency, which case did not here exist.

The Court left to itself would always raise the subordinate Presidencies at the expense of the Gov^{nt} of India.

The Indian Mail came in on the 1st. If I should receive any letters from you requiring immediate reply I will write again.

Believe me ever, My dear Hardinge,
Very sincerely Yours,
Ellenborough.

*From Mr. (afterwards Sir Frederick) Currie.**

Extract. Calcutta. Sept. 21, 1844.

My Lord,

. . . . . .

Sir Henry Hardinge has written to your Lordship by this mail and has I believe forwarded to you copies of the letters from the . . . . . †Ameers, in wh: they express themselves to be as comfortable and happy as, under existing circumstances, they can be. Our friend Nussur Khan and his party at Dum Dum are going all wrong—they are sulky and insolent and reject all overtures of kindness and consideration. Sir H. Pottinger's visit to Poona has done much harm, all his conversations with Meer Roostum have been communicated to the Ameers at Dum Dum, and H . . . . . and L . . . . . and L . . . . . from Calcutta contrive to get access to the former, and assure them of the sympathy of the whole British nation with their case, and persuade them that their restoration to Sinde is a settled thing. They are moreover getting deeply into debt and indulging in all kinds of extravagance under the conviction that the Gov^{t} will pay every thing. I wish Sir Henry (Hardinge) would send them to . . .

* He was throughout his career loyal to Lord E. He was Chairman of the East India Company in 1858.

† Illegible in original.

Your Lordship will of course see the despatches by this mail to the Secret Committee. The only one for the supreme Gov[t] of interest regards the mutiny of the 64[th] with the trials and sentences. You will see that Sir Hugh has been blundering again somewhat, and that the Gov[t] have given full support to Sir C. Napier—who, with M. Gen[l] Hunter, has conducted the business satisfactorily

The Court have been writing furiously about the Police Corps [instituted by L[d] E.] and were surprised that no protesting minutes were recorded by the Members of Council! Their ultimatum on the subject was to follow; what has come is merely an ebullition of wrath. Sir H. H. seems disposed to try the calling in Invalids to take charge of Cantonments in case of need—on the principle of his Irish plan—wh: w[d] I think succeed very well in this country. From the way in wh: the Court write about Broadfoot's appoint[t] to Moulmein, I am afraid they will fall foul of the arrangement by wh: Durand has been sent to succeed him. Your Lordship knows that he is a very fit man for the office, and I hope the Board of Control won't let them turn him out—if he must go, H. Lawrence and he might change places perhaps. I think Broadfoot from what I know of him, will do us good service in the N. W. Provinces from wh: it will not be long ere we hear something serious, tho' not perhaps such as may involve us—the Bombay despatches will contain later intelligence than ours on that subject.

This day's post has brought a volume of memorial from Outram to be sent hence to the Court and Board. Sir Henry's hands are full to running over, and I can't put this half hundred weight of foolscap up before him to-day, so the memorial must wait till next mail—I think it is too long for him to have sent a copy home via Bombay—nor do I think he c[d] do so.

. . . . . .

I think he (Sir Henry) feels his work and does not look

so well as when he came out—but this is our most trying season,—he does not manage to keep down the talking in Council—but allows Sir Hubert [Maddock]* to maunder away his sententious inconclusive stuff till I am surprised sometimes—Sir Hubert is much hurt at not getting Bengal, and has set up a sort of little peddling opposition in consequence. Sir H. H. has evidently a thorough contempt for his opinions, but is too good natured to let him see it.

. . . . . .

I have taken the liberty of writing this letter to y^r^ Lordship in the belief that you will not have lost all interest in Indian affairs and in the circumstances of those to whom you ever shewed such unvaried kindness.

Mrs. Currie unites with me in grateful respects to your Lordship.

I am my Lord,
Yours most obed^ly^,
F. Currie.

To Lord Ripon.

Private. 12 Charles Street, Berkelev Square. Nov. 27, 1844.

My dear Ripon,

Peel told me yesterday that the Court were desirous of expressing an opinion in censure of the conduct of Officers of the Army who invited me to dinner before I left India, and of others who have since subscribed to what is called a "Testimonial"† to me, and he asked me to tell you what I knew about these two matters. If you will take the trouble of reading my speech at the dinner, which you

* Maddock was thoroughly disloyal to Lord E. and kept his opponents informed of all his secret orders until L^d^ E. deprived him of his opportunities. Maddock behaved very ill to Durand. See Durand's Life by his son.

† L^d^ E. was presented with a magnificent service of plate at the cost of several thousand pounds. It is now in the possession of the Sultan of Johore. It was sold many years after L^d^ E.'s death by his trustees under the Settled Land Act.

will find correctly given in the *Morning Herald* of the 7th or 9th of October, you will see that I said that that mark of their kindness was the more gratifying to me because given altogether on grounds personal to myself, and having no reference to the political or military measures of my Government. That was the character given to the dinner by the officers who came to Barrackpore to invite me to it, and the same character was preserved not by my speech alone, but by that of the officer in the chair, Major General Cooper. There can have been very few officers present at the dinner who had not dined with me more than once, and with many of them I was very intimately acquainted. They were my neighbours and I saw them frequently. The Court, blind as they are, can surely not be so blind as to suppose that a Governor General who has incurred their censure, without incurring that of the Crown, to which as regards all measures they are subordinate, is not to receive the ordinary civilities and courtesies of society from any military officers of the Queen's or of the Native army in India—that he is to be an excommunicated man. When I returned to Calcutta in July 1843 the officers of artillery at Dum Dum gave me a dinner and a ball—all the officers of the staff and of the regiments at Calcutta and Barrackpore gave me a ball—and the officers at the station at Barrackpore also gave me a ball. On these occasions all the speeches related to services done by me to the State; but the Court did not advert to these manifestations of the approval of the army. I was entertained by various regiments, and by the officers at various stations. All the speeches there related to public services. I apprehend it is perfectly usual for a Governor General to be entertained and if he should happen to have been successful, I can hardly think that the speakers on such occasions would refrain from adverting to his success. I know that when Sir Edwd Barnes came down the country after having been recalled

he was everywhere so entertained, but I believe no notice was taken of it either by the Gov^nt of India or at home.

The "Testimonial" I know very little about, for I never read a newspaper in India, and I have only seen one or two since I have been here. A few officers have written to me about it, deeply lamenting the opposition which has been made to it by the Civil Service, and still more the interpretation put by the Commander in Chief upon an order which seemed to him to prohibit officers from subscribing to any such "Testimonial" to me. I have since heard from Sir Henry Hardinge that the C. in Chief allows that individual officers may subscribe; but still considers that regiments cannot, consistently with the order. The subscription originated with the officers of the Queen's 39th Regiment (with which Reg^t I was at the beginning of the Battle of Maharajpoor) to whom I had presented a silver cup commemorative of that battle. The next subscribers were the officers of the Bundelcund Legion which as you are aware had been recently doubled in establishment by me as a reward for its conduct in volunteering for service in Sinde, to which Province it could not have been sent as a Local corps.

Sir Henry Hardinge wrote by the last mail to my brother desiring him to ascertain whether I should prefer a statue* or a service of plate. You are aware I suppose that Sir Henry taking a different view from the C. in Chief has interested himself about the subscription and made his son subscribe in order to indicate his opinion. I requested my brother to say that the thing most agreeable to me would be to be allowed to add to the sum subscribed an equal sum and to have the whole applied to the planting of mango groves and the building of tanks for the benefit of the troops at some of the great stations. Probably before this intimation of my wishes reaches India it will have

* It is a pity that Lord Curzon was not aware of this!

been decided that the sum subscribed shall be laid out in the purchase of a service of plate. In this case I shall give an equal sum (probably about £3500) for the purpose of building one or more great tanks probably at Agra and Umballa.

You are aware, I conclude that the subscription is not confined to the army, and that at Calcutta the Committee comprises some of the first civil officers of the Government. You must know too that there are statues of Lord Hastings and Lord W. Bentinck and even that there is to be one of L^d^ Auckland! To these military men have subscribed without censure; but in the two last cases probably their numbers were small. The Court had better take care what they are about.

Believe me my dear Ripon,
Very sincerely yours,
Ellenborough.

To Lord Ripon.

London. Dec. 7, 1844.

My dear Ripon,

The only paragraphs in the letter of the 4^th^ of July which as I understand you to say to-day, the Duke thought it would be inexpedient to publish, are those from the 80^th^ to the 96^th^ inclusive. Some day or other those paragraphs as well as the rest of the letter must come before the Public; but the subjects to which they refer should be discussed deliberately and temperately if possible, and as there does not seem to be much chance at the present moment of their receiving a discussion of that character, and the Government are not prepared to propose a remedial measure, I cannot but acquiesce in the opinion that it is not now expedient to publish those paragraphs as far as the 94^th^ inclusive; but the 95^th^ recites a known fact and the 96^th^ states the feeling with which I received my recall. To the publication of these I do not see the

objection. It would be desirable that the published paragraphs should be numbered as they now are in the letter in order to show the extent of the omissions.

The letter originally concluded with the 121st paragraph.

It was necessary for me to draw the attention of the Government to the matters touched upon in the paragraphs subsequently added; but it is for the Government to consider whether it be equally necessary to lay those paragraphs at the present moment before Parliament.

My letter ot the 15th of January respecting Saugor must of course be in the Appendix and also the minute of the 18th of February respecting the 4th member of Council. The Court refer, I think, to the letter from me *in Council* transmitting that minute and the resolution to which *we* came. That also should be published with the enclosures.

I should be very glad indeed to have the letter of the Gr Gl in Council of the 28th of August 1843 as to Scinde published, in extract, if it can not be published in extenso. I do not know how far it may be possible to disentangle the parts referring to the letter it answers from those which contain the reasons for adhering to the Policy adopted as to Scinde.

Your's ever very sincerely,
Ellenborough.

To Sir R. Peel.

Southam House. December 25, 1844.

My dear Peel,

I only received to day the letter from Mr. Currie (the Foreign Secretary at Calcutta) from which I enclose extracts. The rest of the letter relates to his son who delivered it and private matters. You may recollect that the appointment of Major Broadfoot to the Govt of the Tenasserim Provinces is adverted to in my letter to Lord Ripon of the 4th of July, 1844. The appointment was made in December, 1842 and it seems to have been censured

in a letter from the Court which must have been dated in August, 1844. It would never have been censured had he not discovered and exposed gross abuses in the former administration under Mr. . . . . Why has it been now permitted to be made the subject of censure?

The military police which it seems has likewise been censured was first established in Saugor and Bundelcund in Feb., 1843. It was extended to four or five stations in the North-Western provinces in the spring of 1844. The result in Saugor and Bundelcund has been tranquillity. The object in the N. W. Provinces was to enable two or three regiments more to take the field in case of an emergency.

The project Mr. Currie mentions of introducing into India Sir Henry's (Hardinge's) Irish plan of employing Pensioners is utterly inapplicable to the country and to the Indian pensioner. So I think Sir G. Pollock will tell Sir Henry. When I hear of these "ebullitions of the Court's wrath" I ask what is become of the Board of Control? The relative position of the Board and of the Court would really seem to have become reversed, and the Court to have the power of saying and doing what it deems fit, the Board only that of representation and remonstrance. It has not been the intention of Parliament for the last sixty years that this should be the practice of the Government of India administered here, not do I believe that, until very recently, it has ever been the practice.

I have no doubt that Lord Glenelg and Sir John Hobhouse made the Court say what they thought right just as I did, and I am sure they would tell you, as I do, that the Gov^{nt} of India cannot be carried on with safety if the Court, swayed by personal feelings, and under any circumstances incompetent to take a large and statesmanlike view of affairs, be permitted to have everything its own way.

Yours ever very sincerely,

Ellenborough.

APPENDICES.

Appendix I.

THE ANNEXATION OF SIND.

Sind now a province of the Bombay presidency was a century ago governed by an independent oligarchy composed of the clan of Biluckis, already mentioned, who came from the highlands beyond the Indus. The British Government in India had made treaties with the chiefs of Lower Sind or Hyderabad and with those of Upper Sind or Khyrpoor for the opening of the navigation of the Indus and other trading purposes. The execution of the Afghan policy of the Whigs however required that free passage should be allowed to the British troops and their allies as well as to their military supplies through the neutral territory of Sind and across the Indus at Sukkur.

In virtue of his pretensions to the throne of Afghanistan, Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk put forward a shadowy claim to tribute from Sind; and Auckland never at a loss for dubious expedients, arranged by a provision of the Tripartite Treaty between himself, Runjeet Singh, the ruler of the Punjab, and Shah Shuja, signed on June 26th 1838, that the British Government should decide the amount to be paid as arrears, and that of this sum 15,00,000 rupees should be transferred by the Pretender to the ruler of the Punjab as a subsidy for the assistance of the Sikhs in regaining the throne of Kabul. The exemption of Government stores from duty at Karachi and the freedom of the navigation of the Indus were conceded by the Ameers. Auckland then informed the Ameers that the article in the treaty with them prohibiting the use of the Indus for the conveyance of military stores must be suspended, that permission must be given for the troops of the Shah and his allies to pass through their territory, and that Shikarpore and its dependencies must be occupied by a British force. On July 26th, 1838 Colonel Pottinger the resident, was instructed by Auckland to apprize them " that the disposition of the British Government towards them was extremely favourable, and that nothing would distress the Governor-General more than an interruption of the good understanding between his Government and their Highnesses."

On August 13th Pottinger reported that he had heard that the Ameers of Hyderabad were intriguing with Persia against British influence and that he would not fail to tell them distinctly that the day on which they connected themselves with any other power would be the last of their independent authority, for we had the ready power to crush and annihilate them and would not fail to call it into action should it appear requisite, however remotely, for either the safety or integrity of our Empire, or its frontiers. The following month Auckland instructed Pottinger to adopt a rigorous policy towards the treacherous Ameers. Noor Mahomed, the chief of lower Sind, might justly be held to have forfeited all confidence and consideration, and the Resident was desired at once to transfer his supremacy to some other member of his family, and to arrange for the permanent establishment of a British force in his territory. The "incidental presence" of some 5,000 troops would ensure the success of his negotiations. He wrote again on October 5th and authorized him to call for the advance of the Bombay army with the object of excluding from all share in the Government, those Ameers who should have shown an unwillingness to co-operate heartily with us

At this time Auckland not content with putting a puppet King on the Afghan throne had the happy thought of threatening to withdraw from obscurity a descendant of a former dynasty of Sind and to set him as ruler over the country, if no member of the reigning family would acquiesce in his Lordship's demands Pottinger suggested that a force should be raised to give moral effect to this policy. At the same time Burnes was making the same threat to the Ameers of Upper Sind. But Auckland of a sudden drew back. He was anxious that the "British troops should advance upon Kandahar without the impression attending their progress that they are employed to reduce Afghanistan into the condition of a province of our Indian Empire." Then again Auckland would not brook delay: "We cannot permit our enemies to occupy the seat of power . . . . not only they have shown a disposition to favour our enemies, but they who display an unwillingness to aid us in the just and necessary undertaking in which we are engaged must be displaced and give way to others on whose friendship and co-operation we may be able to rely" The appearance of Sir John Keane at the head of a strong force brought about on January 10th 1839 a treaty with Rustam the Chief Ameer of Upper Sind and on the 15th Pottinger sent to Auckland a draft treaty to which the Hyderabad Ameers had set their seals. On March 11th Auckland returned it with stringent alterations

and July 14th they accepted it. Pottinger remarked: "The world will now acknowledge that if our power is great, our good faith and forbearance are still more to be wondered at!" In February, 1839 Pottinger prophesied that "if we are ever again obliged to exert our military strength in Sind, it must be carried to subjugating this country."

The following somewhat random summary will give a more complete impression of Pottinger's title to sit in judgment over the proceedings taken against the Ameers of Sind in 1842-43.

Oct. 18, 1838. He refers to the "utter want of truth or shame of Noor Mahomed Khan of Hyderabad. *Nov.* 23. "We should demand—the cession of all the country lying on the right bank of the Indus south of an imaginary line due west from that river to a point (more or less) north of Tatta until it meets the frontier of Baluchistan," and the military occupation of Karachi, Tatta and Sukkur. *Jan.* 6, 1839. "My idea" he writes, "is that we must settle Sind to our own satisfaction, should the Ameers force us to subjugate it, before we look beyond us." *Feb.* 12. "I warned them (the Ameers) that if a gun or even a matchlock were fired they would lose their country. The hold we have already got over many of the lower classes will strengthen daily—our forward march was lamented by the people as a calamity." *March* 11. "It seems to me that it would be better at once to take possession of Sind (or such parts as we require) by force, than to leave it nominally with the Ameers and yet deal with it as though it were our own. The one line is explicit and dignified and cannot be misunderstood, the other I conceive to be unbecoming our power, and it must lead to constant heartburnings and bickerings, if not a rupture of all friendly relations. There is no nation with whom we have been brought into contact in Asia towards whom I feel it so highly necessary to be undeviatingly firm as the Sindis."

Then the other future arch-critic of the annexation comes upon the scene. *April* 5, 1841. Instructions were issued by Auckland to Major (afterwards Sir James) Outram who had succeeded Pottinger, reviving a proposal of the year 1839, for commuting the tribute paid by the Hyderabad Ameers for the possession of Shikarpur; and suggesting that in consideration of the large expenditure by the troops the Ameers should build a road from Shikarpur to Sukkur and improve the police.

On January 10th, 1842, Major Outram wrote: "We are fortunately becoming stronger at Sukkur and Shikarpore daily or there is no knowing how far the Ameers might be excited by the disastrous accounts from Kabul when the truth can no longer be disguised."

Again on January 21st " The accompanying letter shows how the childish Meer Nasir Khan of Hyderabad is again intriguing with Sawun Mull, the Governor of Multan." On February 22nd " I shall have intrigues of some of the more restless Ameers to expose hereafter. Meer Nasir Khan of Hyderabad, particularly has been especially active of late." Lieut. Postans sent to Outram on May 5th a long memorandum in which are detailed statements as to the tribes and chiefs concerned in an organised system of rebellion, who were carrying on secret communication with Shere Mahomed of Meerpore, Nusseer of Hyderabad, and Roostum of Khyrpore, the last named being ruled by his Minister Futteh Mahomed, who was allowed by all to be unceasing in his intrigues.

Feb. 6, 1842. Lieut. Leckie reports to Outram Nusseer Khan's tyrannical conduct at Shikarpur, and his insolence. *Feb.* 22. (the day after Ellenborough reached Madras roads) Outram began a series of complaints about hostile intrigues, dated Feb. 22, May 8, 23, 24 and 31 and a series of suggestions for the assumption of the government of certain districts commanding the Indus.

The policy which Ellenborough adopted with regard to the Indus resembles that of Lord Salisbury a half a century later in regard to the Zambesi. During the Wellington Administration he had sent Burnes by way of the Indus with a present of horses to Runjeet Singh and instructed him to report upon the navigability of the river, as he hoped to open communication by water with our N.W. Provinces and to extend British commerce. The result was encouraging.

On May 8th Ellenborough wrote to Outram that " he was led to think that he might have seen reason to doubt the fidelity of some one or more of the Ameers; and he instructed him to transmit letters to them declaring his determination to punish, cost what it may, the first chief who may prove faithless by the confiscation of his dominions; but that there must be clear proof of such faithlessness and it must not be provoked by the conduct of British Agents, producing apprehensions in the mind of any Chief that the British Government entertains designs inconsistent with his interests and his honour." Outram witheld the warnings, for, said he, as I have reason to believe that almost every individual chief has been more or less concerned directly or indirectly in treasonable plotting, all would consider themselves compromised, and in mere dread of the consequences might be driven to commit themselves openly and together." He had, however, on the same day, May 8th, written to Ellenborough: " I shall have it in my power shortly, I believe, to expose the hostile intrigues of the

Ameers to such an extent as may be deemed by His Lordship sufficient to authorize the dictation of his own terms to the chiefs of Sind, and to call for such measures as he deems necessary to place British power on a secure footing in these countries. Should it be resolved to abandon the Kelat territory entirely, I should most earnestly advocate the assumption by the British Government of the entire management of the whole of the Sukkur and Shikarpore districts on fair terms to the Ameers." The reply to this letter was as follows: "It is the Governor-General's earnest desire to put an end, wherever it may be practicable, with any regard to our financial interests, to the system whereby a native State receives protection from us, in consideration of a tribute to be paid to the British Government. In most cases in which such a system prevails, it must be as much the real interest of the British Government to afford protection, as it is that of the native to receive it; and the payment of a tribute by the native state, however equitable it may be in principle, cannot fail to affect the otherwise friendly nature of our relations with it, to introduce much of disagreeable discussion; to occasion the frequent visits of the officers in the unpopular character of exacting creditors; and to attach to the British Government, in the eyes of the subjects of the tributary state, much of the odium of the acts of extortion by which native administration is too frequently conducted.

"It would be much more conducive to a permanent good understanding between the British Government and the protected States, if arrangements could be made whereby, either in exchange for territory, or in consideration for the abolition of duties burthensome to trade, such demand for tribute on our part might be altogether given up." "The Governor General would consider that it would be a most desirable arrangement if, in lieu of all tribute payable under treaty, or otherwise, by the Ameers of (Lower) Sind and of Khyrpore, such cessions of territory as may be necessary were made to us at Karachi, the island of Bukkur, and the town of Sukkur, and all claims to tribute payable by the Ameers to us, or to any other power, were, after such cessions, to be cancelled, in consideration of the establishment of the perpetual freedom of trade upon the Indus, and of such other provisions for the freedom of transit through their respective territories as it might appear expedient to make." On another occasion Ellenborough observes: "In the first instance the surrender of territory would be as painful to the Ameers as the exaction of tribute; but the latter is a grievance constantly recurring. . . .

The cession is a grievance which once submitted to, is in time almost forgotten."

Ellenborough consulted Outram as to the propriety of punishing Meer Rustam by transferring a portion of his territory to the adjoining dominions of our ally Bahawul Khan of Bahawulpore. Outram replied, suggesting that the district of Subzulcote must be conveniently situated for the purpose, believing it to have been " formerly wrested from Bhawulpore by the Sind Government and that only since the British Government guaranteed to the latter the territory which we found the Ameers in possesion of, has Bhawul Khan relinquished his claim to it.' His impressions were confirmed by Lieut. Brown whom he had consulted as having more experience of Upper Sind. Outram proceeded: " I consider making over Subzulkote to the Khan of Bahawulpore a most desirable arrangement in every respect, ... as punishing an unfaithful to the benefit of a faithful ally, without the objectionable appearance of any desire for territorial acquisition on our own part; the arrangement regarding Sukkur and Karachi bearing the aspect merely of securing ourselves on the ground we already occupy, for beyond the sites of the cantonments and ground on which these towns are situated, no cession of actual territory is involved thereby." He suggested on June 26th that Nasir Khan might be altogether deprived of his territory and that the other Ameers of Lower Sind would the more readily relinquish their shares of Karachi and their claim to levy tolls on the Indus. [They had already surrendered the right to levy tolls, see later on]. He considered that the relinquishment of tolls in exchange for remission of tribute was highly advisable. He was further of opinion that the evidence he had already submitted, even if deficient in strict legal proof, gave reason to suspect that intrigues were in progress to overthrow our power. These considerations would justify the dictation of terms to the Ameers. The question which remained was how Rustam, Sobdar and Ali Morad who were not liable to tribute should be compensated for their shares in the territory about to be ceded. Outram thus solved the difficulty. As Rustam's previous uniform friendliness might justify more lenient treatment for his recent infidelity than was due to Nasir of Hyderabad, whose intrigues had been unremitting, or his namesake of Khyrpore, he recommended that the demands on Rustam should be confined to Bukkur and the two small islets above and below that fort (which was no pecuniary deprivation and had already been tacitly made over); the surrender of the right to levy tolls from his own subjects on the river, admission of the

claim of his brother Ali Morad to the headship after his death and the expulsion of his minister Futteh Mahomed Ghoree. Outram also sketched a draft of a new Treaty and submitted it to Ellenborough. By it Subzulcote was to be transferred to Bahawulpore, Bukkur with the islets and the town and harbour of Karachi were to be ceded to the British Government, who were to have the privilege of cutting wood within 100 cubits of the river for the use of our steamers. The preamble contained a reference to the treachery of the Ameers.

Ellenborough replied on July 10th through the Secretary: "With reference to your letter of the 21st ult. and the inclosed sketch of a Treaty with the Ameers, His Lordship does not see any necessity for pressing a negotiation upon them precipitately; and, on the contrary, would rather desire to leave their minds for the present in tranquillity. . . . . The Governor-General would not deem it expedient to make any reference, in the preamble to the treaty, to the treachery attributed to the Ameers." Ellenborough a month later, August 17th, in a letter to the Secret Committee said that he had no intention to press on the Ameers any hasty change in our present relations with them. It may here be noted that the penalties which Outram considered them to merit in June 1842, were held by Ellenborough sufficiently severe to form the basis of the revised treaty, which was not issued till November, when their hostility had become more pronounced.

On August 26 Lt. Brown had forwarded a copy of an order which Nasir Khan of Hyderabad had sent to his officers at Karachi to punish the Sindians who had built houses or shops within the precincts of the British cantonment. On September 11th, Ellenborough instructed Outram to lay before Sir Charles Napier in the shortest and clearest form, the state of our relations with the Ameers of Hyderabad and the other chiefs in Sind and Baluchistan referring to the treaties with them and sending copies. He was to explain the actual condition of affairs and to place before Napier *with judicial accuracy* the several acts whereby the Ameers or chiefs may have seemed to have departed from the terms or spirit of their engagements, and to have evinced hostility or unfriendliness towards the Government of India.

Ellenborough on the same day sent Napier a copy of his despatch to Outram and informed him that if any Ameer or chief had evinced hostile designs he would inflict upon the treachery of such ally or friend, so signal a punishment as should effectually deter others from similar conduct; but that he would not do so without

the most ample and convincing evidence of the guilt of the person accused, and that he relied entirely upon his sense of justice.

Sir Charles Napier landed at Karachi Sept. 9th 1843 with his staff accompanied by some troops sent as a guard in accordance with a minute by Sir George Arthur the Governor of Bombay declaring that the hostile spirit of the Ameers and in one instance an overt act of hostility rendered such precautions necessary, and citing the " Intelligence " received from Outram in proof of his opinion and of the extent and serious nature of the designs against the British. On Sept. 25th Napier being at Hyderabad addressed a remonstrance to the Ameers of Lower Sind for prohibiting the natives of Karachi from settling in the cantonments; for taxing all imports landed at the Bunder, though those for the British were exempt; for levying tolls on Sindian boats and for contending that under Article V of the existing treaty which forbade intervention between the Ameers and their subjects, we had no ground for interference even though the treaty was being broken. No Sindian complaints had been listened to. The complaint was made by the British. No smuggling would be allowed from the cantonments into the town. Oct. 8th Ellenborough informed Napier that it appeared that the assembling of men by the Khyrpore Ameers was only for the settlement of a dispute among themselves, and that there was no longer any need for holding a considerable force at Sukkur; that unless he should be led by events to suppose that such a force would be required beyond those for the occupation of that town and the island of Bukkur the 19th Bengal Infantry should return to Firozepor. To Napier's remonstrance of Sept. 25th Nasir Mahomed the chief offender made no answer, but Sobdar immediately complied. It also appeared that Nasir had contrary to treaty levied tolls upon and fired into the boats of Bahawulpor. Napier's action was approved, Oct. 14th, and he was instructed, Oct. 23rd, to require compensation, and to say that force would be used for compelling observance, and that he was authorized to negotiate a revision of the Treaty and also upon proper and just conditions to relieve them from paying tribute: Nasir might be punished by loss of rights at Karachi; certain river ports, territory in the vicinity of Bahawulpor and Subzulcote should be ceded: a force might be moved towards Hyderabad if necessary.

On Oct. 25 Napier forwarded a statement of his views upon the state of Sind with a return of complaints against the Ameers and with a letter from Outram inclosing a " memorandum of several

acts whereby the Ameers of *Upper* Sind appear to me (Outram) to have departed from the spirit of their engagements to the British Government, shewing four cases of breach of treaty of late occurrence." These were a treasonable letter from Rustam to Shere Singh of Lahore; the compassing of the flight of a State prisoner and employing him to raise a revolt against the British; the complicity of Nasir of Khyrpor in the ill-treatment of a British subject, the servant of a British Officer; the interference with British property on the Indus, perhaps but not clearly contrary to treaty; and the seizing and imprisonment of British subjects who had been released without further redress. Outram also enclosed a mass of correspondence including the letter* to Clerk dated May 1 relating to the first case in which he suggested that the intercepted letter should be forwarded to Shere Singh, the chief ruler of the Punjab so as to elicit a reply which could also be intercepted. (Outram's letter to Clerk is an interesting example of his methods of diplomacy. Those who have read Goldsmid's *Life of Outram* may wish to examine the text in connexion with his statements to the Khan of Kelat). In sending Napier the correspondence relating to the abolition of tolls on the Lower Indus, Outram omitted an important letter† of his own dated Oct. 13, 1840 showing that the Hyderabad Ameers were fully aware of the meaning of the then existing treaty.

On Oct. 30, 1842 Outram sent Napier a translation of a further intercepted letter, bearing Rustam's seal and addressed to Nasir Mahomed of Hyderabad and containing a solemn written agreement on his part in exchange for one on Nasir's side. Outram suggested that these documents might be used in securing Ali Morad's succession to the Upper Sind chiefship. The ' News ' of Oct. 30 collected by Outram gave evidence of the alarm caused to the Ameers by the delay in the withdrawal of troops, and furnished particulars of their preparations, which seemed however, merely defensive and not likely to become offensive.

Nov. 3. Ld. E. to Napier: If the letter to Shere Singh was really genuine, Rustam deserved punishment; and also for the acts of his Minister, if he was so far in his master's confidence as to be identified with him. Treaty engagements with Rustam must be construed as implying freedom from tolls on Upper Indus as they did on the Lower part. On Nov. 4 Ld. E. gave instructions as to the course to be pursued: Strict observance of Lower Sind

* See Sind Blue Book, p. 324; inclosure in No. 338.
† See Sind Blue Book, pp. 389-396.

treaty of 1839. Upper Sind to be held by its treaty of 1838 which required acquiescence in arrangements made thereafter with other Powers as to navigation of Indus. Freedom from duty of articles for cantonments. Abolition of tribute and cession of territory in exchange. Uniformity of currency. A carefully restricted right to cut wood for fuel for steamers on Indus. Restitution of Bhoong Bhara and Subzulcote to Bhawulpor. Suggests for examination a cession of further land, so that the latter might extend to Rori, thus giving access through friendly territory on left bank of Sutlej and Indus, but only so far as to protect trade on Indus and to give military command of the river. Possession of Karachi, Tatta, Sukkur-Bukkur and Rori. The ultimate object was the entire freedom of trade throughout the whole territory between Hindu Kush, Indus and the sea, and the abolition of all tributes. On Nov. 4 Ld. E. authorized N. to employ a Commissioner to negotiate the treaties. He required N. to satisfy himself of the truth of the charges against Rustam and Nasir of Khyrpor in respect of the letters, observing that the political officers in Sind had the best means of ascertaining their validity.

Nov. 5. Napier awaits instructions as to new Treaties. Will spare no pains to convince Ameers that neither injury nor injustice is meditated and that by acceptance they will become richer and more secure than they are now. Subzulcote belongs partly to Rustam's third son who like his father is implicated in hostility. Nasir owns the rest. Sends table showing ownership in towns etc., under discussion. Rustam was formerly excused tribute. He should now lose Bhoong Bhara to put him on a par with the others; it was claimed by Bahawulpor but assigned to Rustam at outset of Afghan war.

On Nov. 12 Clerk wrote from Simla saying that the best way of his obtaining the information as to the letter to Shere Singh would be by a personal conference with the Maharajah on his return to Lahore, and not by the other means suggested by Outram.

" Intelligence " Nov. 7-12. Rustam's Minister visits Napier and asks for an interview for his master. It was to be at Roree, but excuse of illness was made by the Ameer. Shere Mahomed was to be the chief of the Hyderabad forces and would himself furnish 16,000 men. Nov. 10-15 News. Rustam taunts the Hyderabad Ameers for not collecting troops.

Nov. 14. Ellenborough writes to Napier acknowledging digest of intelligence from Outram and with regard to Ameers' preparations, offering a larger force, for though the Ameers' designs seem to be

defensive only, the least sign of hesitation on the British side would convert them into hostile measures. (It has been pretended that the authenticity of the two treasonable letters alleged to have been written by Rustam and Nasir was never substantiated. The earliest notice of the document attributed to Rustam is in the very curious letter from Outram to George Russell Clerk, our Resident in the Punjab. As the party through whom he obtained the information which led to the seizure was inimical to Rustam, he was doubtful of the authenticity of the letter and he had sent it to Lieut. Postans who had seen much of the Meer's correspondence, for his opinion as to the seal and for comparison with the writings in his office from the Khyrpore Durbar. He enclosed a copy of his reply, which pronounced the document genuine).

Nov. 17-18. Napier reports: Lieut. Brown assures him that there could not be the slightest doubt of the letters being authentic originals. With regard to Rustam's letter, there were doubts in Outram's mind, whether Rustam was privy to it or not, but of its having his seal and being written by his confidential Minister Futteh Mahomed Ghoree, there was none. Napier and Ellenborough both held that Rustam must be held responsible for the acts of his minister, whom moreover after warnings he had declined to dismiss. No one doubts that the Minister assisted in the escape of the State prisoner. With regard to the other letter Outram, Major Clibborn, and Brown all asserted that the seal was that of Nasir. Eventually Napier obtained a seal, not only similar, but attached to a letter the cover to which was in writing known to be that of the Ameer's confidential clerk. Napier was therefore supported in his conclusions, with regard to the letters, by all the political officers whose local duties qualified them to pass a judgment on the matter.

But these letters and Futteh's intrigues did not form by any means the whole case against the Ameers. The treachery of those of Lower Sind, their interference with boats on the Indus and their having opened fire upon one were matters not in dispute and therefore the incidents are ignored by the critics who prefer to rivet attention on the apparently weakest count in the indictment. Napier selects Outram as negotiator.

Nov. 19. Ellenborough addressed the Secret Committee to the effect that in exchanging tribute for territory, in not acquiring any territory on or beyond the Indus which is not needed to give command of the river and in rewarding a most faithful ally he had acted on true principles of policy. To make the Ameers feel that

the Treaties could not be violated with impunity was absolutely necessary. No concession could be made to a native power which was collecting troops.

Nov. 23. Napier has an interview with Ali Morad who asked whether Rustam would be protected in trying to deprive him of his right of succession by nominating his son, Mahomed Hussein, and was told that it would be contrary to treaty to defraud him of his right. Nov. 23. Lieut. Brown considers that there can be no doubt that the letters are authentic.

Nov. 24. Ellenborough will abide by Napier's decision as to letters. "We make a demand which we believe to be just and expedient and are prepared to abide by it. I am very desirous of effecting our purpose without bloodshed." Authorises employment of Outram as Commissioner.

Nov. 24. Quarrels among Khyrpore Ameers.

Nov. 25. Ellenborough approves Napier's answer to Ali Morad and gives him authority to call up more troops from Deesa and Cutch and offers all the Bombay troops from Nott's force as soon as they cross the Sutlej, as well as a regiment of cavalry.

Nov. 26. Napier in reply to Ellenborough's of Nov. 14 thinks he has sufficient troops. Tolls have been levied upon a merchant of Bahawulpor. Has remonstrated with Rustam for this breach of treaty. Nov. 29. Ali Morad witnesses a review. Napier reports, Nov. 30, his conviction that every letter is genuine and that Nasir and Rustam only want an opportunity to attack; Dec. 1, thanks Ellenborough for his confidence and support. Dec. 4. His protest of Nov. 26 is approved.

On Nov. 30 Rustam hearing that the English intended to advance on Khyrpor addressed the chiefs saying "See, the English having been turned out of Afghanistan and eaten dirt, have been killed so far on their return to India. Their force is large, and if they will but leave Sind I will meet all their demands for money even to the jewellery of our women. If on the contrary they do not leave Sukur and Sind, we must fight them." On Dec. 1 it was reported that Rustam had arranged to invest his son Mahomed Hussein at once with the puggree of supreme authority. Ali Morad was collecting better guns, artillery, more horses and supplies of amunition. Rustam was arranging for raising the Hill Bilukis. On Dec. 2 the chiefs at Khyrpor decided to invest Mahomed Hussein with the supreme authority, Rustam abdicating in his favour on Dec. 5, rejecting his Minister's advice and cheating Ali Morad out of his rights to the succession under Mahomedan law. It was Mahomed Hussein's intention to resist

any encroachment of the English. On Dec. 3, Ali Morad visited Rustam, but avoided making a salaam to Hussein. Dec. 5. Ali Morad disobeys the summons to Khyrpor, where it is rumoured that he has allied himself to the English (into whose arms he was thrown by the treachery of his brother).

Dec. 7. Napier reports arrival of a deputation from the Khyrpor Ameers who profess perfect submission, and deny any illegal conduct. Believes they are trying to gain time. Will not take possession of Roree, till he has the answer of the Hyderabad Ameers. If they profess submission, will take possession of Roree and move troops upon Bhoong Bhara and Subzulcote. Will issue proclamation forbidding peasants in those districts paying taxes beyond Jan. 1 next, so as to protect them from extortion. Dec. 8. Ameer of Meerpor who is one of our bitterest enemies has escaped notice; he pays tribute of half-a-lac and is 38,775 rupees in debt. Suggests cancelling arrears, and substituting future tribute for territory.

N.B.—The papers below headed by a date printed in italics were not sent to Ld. E. at the time and did not reach him till July 11, 1843.

Dec. 6. Treaty delivered to Hyderabad Ameers. Dec. 9. Rumours of probable night attack on camp at Rori. Dec. 13. Ld. E. tells Napier to insist on dispersal of Ameers' forces and to publish intention to restore to Bahawulpor, a Mahomedan State, districts of Subzulcote and Bhoong Bhara. Dec. 7-13. News: Ameers preparing to fight. Dec. 15-18, the same.

Dec. 18. N. writes to Rustam: believes him to be personally a friend to the English, but helpless among his ill-judging family; he should go to Ali Morad or an escort can be sent to bring him to N.; complains of stoppage of his letters. Threatens to go to Khyrpor. Dec. 18. Rustam reproaches Ali Morad for his desertion, but offers him the chiefship. He sent him his family and his Minister Futteh Mahomed Ghoree. The families of the other Khyrpor Ameers were sent to Ali Morad, but some returned. Nasir and Mahomed Hussein also go to him, but resolve, Dec. 20, to go to Hyderabad.

Dec. 20. Rustam's offer to visit N., who advises him to go to Ali Morad (who had already declared in our favour).

Dec. 20. Deed of surrender by Rustam to Ali Morad of chiefship.

Dec. 23. N. dissuades Ali from accepting it.

Dec. 27. Hoosein Khan and Mahomed Hoosein are said to be collecting 4,000 men. N. intends to take the great desert strong-

hold of Eman Ghur as a demonstration of power. Determined to see Rustam who however takes to flight. Dec. 29. Concentration of Ameers and their forces at Hyderabad.

1843.

Jan. 5. N. starts for Eman Ghur accompanied by Outram and Ali Morad.

Jan. 12. N. tells Ali Morad he has resolved to blow up Eman Ghur the great desert fortress (1) because it can be of no use to Ali Morad (2) its fate will show all Sind there is no refuge for those who dispute his authority or that of British, (3) if taken by an enemy it would require to be destroyed (4) no Biluchi chief could now withstand Ali Morad (5) destruction is essential to his security. Ali Morad concurs.

Jan. 12. N. reaches it and destroys it on Jan. 15. Jan. 13. Rustam writes to N.: Ali says that lands and desert strongholds have been give to British, but he has given them to his son Hoosein. Asks for delay that he may explain. Jan. 15. O. directed to meet Ameers at Khyrpor with all N.'s powers. *Jan.* 17. O. to N.: Ali Morad is intriguing. He intends to discuss every matter in the presence of both parties and thereby to check the bare faced lying they have recourse to behind each other's back. Jan. 22. N. will remain at Pir Abbukkur till O. is well on with treaty; if matter is protracted will advance. *Jan.* 22. Khyrpor. O. to N. "I am positively sick, and doubtless you are tired of these petty intrigues—brother against brother, and son against father, and sorry that we should have in any way been instruments to be worked upon by such blackguards, for in whatever way we act we must play into the hands of one party or the other, unless we take the whole country to ourselves." Again alludes to Ali Morad's intrigues.

Jan. 22. O. to N. Almost despair of saving these misguided chiefs from destruction. *Jan.* 24. O. to N. explaining the heavy financial loss which certain Ameers would suffer by the proposed cession of territory. Jan. 28, Kellaunie. N. reports: Hyderabad Ameers have sent deputies with full powers; O. sent to Hyderabad and hopes to expedite negotiations. Has written warning to Khyrpor Ameers. Jan. 30. Beeria. N. to Ld. E.; asks leave to reconsider cession of land between Bhoong Bhara and Rori.* *Feb.* 1. O. to N. News received: Mahomed Hoosein has called

* The answer which was favourable and promptly despatched reached Napier too late.

up 7000 men to fight Ali Morad; all Biluchi chiefs promise to join. *Feb.* 5. N. to O. Is marching to Mora. Rustam promises to go to Hyderabad (for the negotiations). Cannot delay owing to heat. Fears it was a mistake to remove meeting to Hyderabad. *Feb.* 5. O. to N. Rustam's party is seeking refuge with and help from Shere Mahomed of Khyrpor. Hope to prevent his joining the fugitives. *Feb.* 6. Sudoji. N. to O. To tell Ameers to disperse bands which must not enter Hyderabad territory. *Feb.* 6. N. to O. To repeat to Ameers warning of Dec. 18 to disperse troops. Hyderabad Ameers must not admit them, but must eject them. Is moving upon Koonhera. *Feb.* 8. N. to O. Has heard from Ld. E., warning him of approach of hot weather. Feb. 9. Ld. E. replies to N.'s letter of Jan. 30 just received. The object was to secure communication between Indus and British territory on Sutlej through a friendly State. " If you should be of opinion that the cession originally demanded presses too heavily on the Ameers I should be glad to receive such suggestions as you may wish to offer for its modification."

Note. Much blame has been thrown upon Napier for his advice to Rustam to go to his brother Ali Morad. The explanation is that Rustam had failed to keep an appointment to meet N. and O. at Rori; and as Ali Morad had espoused the British cause, and Rustam showed symptoms of wishing to do so likewise, it was advisable in his own interests, and expedient from the British point of view that he should join and be guided by that brother and recommended to adopt the same course. Ali Morad's conduct was natural for he had been promised by Rustam the succession to the chief-ship in accordance with custom, but Rustam had broken his word and had not only solemnly named his own son Mahomed Hoosein as his heir but had actually procured his succession on his own abdication. It was only to be expected that Ali Morad should thereupon press Rustam who was old and infirm and unfitted to rule, to hand over the chiefship at once.

Feb. 8. Interview between Outram and Ameers who declare that the only obstacle to signing the treaty was the question of restoring Rustam his rights. O. said it had nothing to do with the treaty. All the Hyderabad Ameers applied their seals to a written pledge to sign. *Feb.* 8. O. to N. Does not believe Ameers intend hostilities; it is bluster to get better terms. Deputies of five Ameers of Hyderabad have signed and sealed Treaty; but Ameers of Khyrpor did not come, having sent message to object to Rustam's supersession. Napier's comment on this is " when men bully and bluster

at the head of 60,000 men and have provisioned a fortress (Omercote), it becomes no joke for 2,800, who are within their reach." *Feb.* 10. O. to N. Rustam sends message to say he is ready to sign but feared treachery. His son will sign on his behalf and others will sign also. Suggests that Napier should halt. Should chief of Meerpor not come, perhaps N. will deem it advisable to march the troops thither as being on the way to India.

This strange suggestion was subsequently repudiated by or on behalf of Outram.

Feb. 10. Sukkurunda. N. to O. Will halt tomorrow. Tell Ameers it is at his request. *Feb.* 11. Same place. N. to O. Will inform Ld. E. of all the Ameers say. Rustam's restoration to chiefship is impossible. Tell Ameers that the plea of inability to control their armed followers is sufficient for any Government to overturn them. *Feb.* 11. O. to N. Suggests a compromise about cession of territory. 3 p.m. Deputies of Khyrpor Ameers have just come to sign the Treaty. Feb. 12. N. to O. Armed men have entered his camp and insulted some officers. Country is full of armed bodies; one with six guns. *Feb.* 12. O. to N. " These fools are in great alarm " owing to N's advance. Hopes he will halt. Treaty accepted. (N.'s comment is that all had not accepted it; that those who had, were welcoming the armies of those who had not, and that they must have known that he had halted). *Feb.* 12, 3 p.m. O. to N. Very unsatisfactory not being able to give a decided pledge for they cannot understand any motive for hesitation but deception. They have complied with all our terms. Hopes N. will come down in steamer which would remove doubts. N.'s comment on this is, " unquestionably, it would have removed all doubts and my head from my shoulders."

The blind trust and want of foresight on Outram's part even at this stage are very remarkable.

Feb. 12. O. to N. Ameers say Biluchis are beyond control, and beg him to leave. Propose to hold the Residency.

Feb. 12. O.'s Notes of Conference. All the Ameers seal the treaty and otherwise accept it as binding. On the departure of O. and his companions from the fort, they passed through a dense crowd of Biluchis and a stone was thrown which struck one of the British officers. Feb. 13. Hyderabad. Notes of Conference. O. heard that all the Biluchi sirdars had met; that unless Rustam and his brethren were restored to their rights, they would fight, and that the Ameers could not restrain them. O. replied that if they could not control them, they would be held to be unfit to rule them. Feb. 13. Sukurunda. N. to Ld. E. Capture of

Biluchi chiefs of Murrie tribe with letters proving duplicity of Mahomed Khan of Hyderabad, whose deputy Gholam Shah was acting the part of plenipotentiary, spy and recruiting too, and against us. "He had truly full power given to him." *Feb.* 13, 4.30 p.m. O. to N. The Biluchi sirdars say they will unite against British unless the Khyrpor Ameers get justice; if nothing beyond the Treaty would be required, they would disperse. O. declines to make any promise unless they disperse. He had already said that Rustam's case should be fairly placed before N. They have determined to march against it and to attack the Residency. Has little doubt all their vaunting will only end in smoke, though a commander in chief is said to have been elected.

Feb. 13. O. to N. All the Ameers have accepted treaties and applied their seals except Nassir of Khyrpor and his brother. Ameers want Rustam's restoration to chiefship. On leaving the durbar was hooted and a stone was thrown, striking an officer. Hopes N. will come down in a steamer and stop the troops. (N.'s comment is: "after the proof just had of the violence of the Biluchis, it was just the thing for me to come among them alone.") *Feb.* 13. N. to O. On Jan. 29, Meer Mahomed's deputy assured me his master was our friend and agreed to the treaty, "on Feb. 14 he summons his whole force." Begs N. not to advance for fear of alarming Rustam. *Feb.* 13, 1 p.m. N. to O. "I have not moved an inch". . . . . "I neither can nor will halt now . . . . you will see the very perilous ground on which I stand."

Feb. 13. O. to Durbar. "If injury is sustained by any subject of the British Government to the extent of a single cowrie, your Highnesses will have to answer personally for the same, and it will be of no avail to make the excuse that your Biluchis would not obey you." *Feb.* 14. Syndabad. N. to O. 'Better quit the Residency. Will be with O. on 17th or 18th, glad he sent the 22nd Light Company to him. *Feb.* 14. O. to N. Fears that seizure of intruders into N.'s camp will lead to hostilities. *Feb.* 14. O. to Hyderabad Ameers. If no hostility is shown within their territory, no injury shall befall them. Native Clerk, Feb. 14. Nasir has threatened those who do not join him with imprisonment. *Feb.* 14. O. to Shahdad, a Hyderabad Ameer. Warns him of consequence of his people opposing British. Feb. 15. O. to N. Ameers have begun hostilities by attacking Residency which after gallant defence by Light Company of H.M's. 22nd Regt he was compelled to evacuate. Attack was by force of 8,000 under Shahdad and Mahomed of Hyderabad.

The rest of the story needs no re-telling.

APPENDIX II.

OUTRAM'S SUPERSESSION.

Two days before Auckland's term of office expired and five days after Ellenborough touched at Madras on his way to Calcutta, Auckland wrote to Outram in the course of a long letter: "It has given me much pleasure to learn that you think it possible that the Khan of Kelat may at no distant period be safely entrusted with the defence of Shal, of Dadur and Sibi—and it *might perhaps* be good policy that he be made to feel at once our disposition to give to him and his tribes this accession of power and territory as soon as our difficulties in Afghanistan shall be brought to a close. It is *possible* that a very large force *may in the end* be collected by you for the summer in Shâl and Mustang, and you might safely hold the language which may please you best to all around you; and as the cold weather may approach, you might settle on your own terms all the countries between Shâl and Karachi."

These remarks were evidently not instructions. The language is vague and hesitating. They were written at a place and time when Auckland was not in a position to give orders without the expressed concurrence of his Council. It would be amazing, if besides issuing directions as to Shâl he was giving carte blanche to Outram to dispose of such extensive territories as those indicated in the last words of the quotation. It is evident that Auckland had no such intention. It is also clear that Outram understood the letter in its obvious sense, for in May he asked for instructions on the policy to be pursued with regard to Kelat. He was requested in reply to submit his correspondence on matters of a political nature through Major General Nott to whom he as a political agent had been subordinated.

Outram then asked Nott for sanction to make over Shâl and Sibi to Kelat, "in the spirit of Auckland's intimation" as Sir F. Goldsmid, Outram's biographer puts it. Nott declined to give him instructions.

Outram next wrote semi-officially to the Political Secretary with the Governor General, but feeling that time was precious, and that there was no veto on the course he proposed in pursuance of Auckland's letter and reasoning that he was right and "risking the rest took upon himself to do that for which he had vainly asked sanction and to which sanction if withheld had not been refused." He made over Shâl to the Khan, reported his action and requested authority to dispose of Sibi in the same way. Ellen-

borough's reply was to the effect that " it may have been expedient to transfer Shâl to the Khan of Kelat at that particular time, if it were determined that it should ultimately belong to him." Nott regretted that " you did not wait for my orders."

Goldsmid observes: " Outram in excess of zeal for the interests of the State having had recourse to a *diplomacy foreign to his nature,* had laid himself open to a charge of error . . . . . He had addressed the Khan to the effect that he had *received authority to make over the district* to his Highness, as though a reply on the subject had been received." He had also instructed a subordinate " to explain to the Khan that the political agent had *come to Quetta mainly* with the object of carrying out the transfer."

How far Outram was reluctant to adopt methods alien to his nature may be judged from his suggesting in his letter to G. R. Clerk of May 1, 1842, that Meer Rustum's seal and the writing of an address on a cover should be counterfeited; and from his proposing in a letter to Sir G. Arthur the interception of a letter in the post and the calling upon the addressee to reveal its contents.

Ellenborough expressed his disapprobation of Outram's conduct in regard to Kelat and never afterwards regarded him as a safe instrument. Goldsmid's defence of Outram can be read in his " Life." It is not one which would have commended itself to Ellenborough, who was determined to draw within due bounds the tendency of political agents to exceed their authority.

It has been alleged that Ellenborough resented Outram's pertinacity in offering him advice, and that it was on this account that he superseded him in Sind. On the contrary Ellenborough had intended " to bestow upon him the appointment of Envoy " with an adequate staff in reward for the " zeal and ability " he had manifested in the discharge of his duty. The real reason he stated in strict confidence to William Napier. His reluctance to divulge it is evidence of his conviction of its gravity. His language to Outram himself is proof of his indignation: " The Governor-General will not now consider to what extent if at all and under what circumstances, if any, it may be justifiable to resort to fiction in political transactions, but His Lordship must observe that to resort to fiction in communications to a native chief without the shadow of justifying necessity, if any such there can be, is conduct inconsistent with the character which he desires the diplomacy of India to maintain, and calculated to shake the confidence of the Government in the fidelity of the communications it may receive from its own officers."

Though Outram in the course of a very powerful defence of his

action denied that he could wilfully pervert the truth under any circumstances and pleaded the harassed state of his body and mind, Ellenborough unfortunately was unmoved.

It is possible that those who read Goldsmid's Life of Outram will share that author's view. The object here is to show that Ellenborough was justly entitled to hold a different opinion, and holding that opinion was bound to act accordingly. The psychological effect of the reproof upon a highly emotional nature like Outram's is very apparent in his change of attitude in regard to the Ameers of Sind.

APPENDIX III.

LIEUT. HAMMERSLEY.

Perhaps the most ridiculous charge out of the many insinuated against Ellenborough was that of being responsible for the death of Lieut. Hammersley, who was an assistant political officer at Quetta and whose duty it was to collect information for Major General England then about to advance with reinforcements and supplies to Kandahar. England's repulse at Haikalzai was attributed to Hammersley's failure to report the existence of defensive works at that place. The check was serious; it postponed the relief of Nott's force for thirty days. Ellenborough was bound to accept the statement of the military officer in command. Nothing weakens the position of a general in the field so much as to revise his judgments in such cases. In a despatch of April 22, Ellenborough writes: " The circumstances detailed in the letters I have received relative to the late disaster of Brig^{r} England's brigade satisfy me that Lt. Hammersley is of no use at Quetta; and I have placed him at the disposal of the Commander in Chief." Hammersley was ordered to re-join his regiment, like many a staff officer before and like how many more since! He fell sick from fever and in his delirium raved over his removal. Outram ever prone to an excess of pity for those in distress took up his cause with a zeal that did more credit to his heart than to his head. Hammersley died. Napier said that he should have been shot. Between the two extreme opinions, Ellenborough's was much nearer to Outram's than to Napier's. In order to whitewash a subaltern it is superfluous to blacken a Governor General.

APPENDIX IV.

HODGSON AND NEPAL.

Among the acts of Ellenborough which annoyed the Court of Directors was the removal of Brian Houghton Hodgson from the post of Resident at the Court of Nepal. Hodgson was well known as a collector of Buddhist manuscripts, texts and tracts; he took an active part in introducing the Goorkas into the Indian army; and he was firmly opposed to the "specious arguments" of Macaulay in favour of making English the chief medium of State education in India. During the earlier period of the first Afghan war he had by his courage and skilful diplomacy maintained peace in Nepal, and he received the thanks of Auckland on the departure of that Governor General.

An agreement with Nepal of Nov. 6, 1839 provided . . . . .

" 4thly. It is agreed to, as a rule for the guidance of both governments that in judicial matters where civil causes arise, there they shall be heard and decided; and the Nepal Government engages that for the future British subjects shall not be compelled to plead in the Courts of Nepal to civil actions having exclusive reference to their dealings in the plains."

At the end of Oct., 1840, Auckland announced to the British envoy that an expedition against Nepal for that year was impossible. He applauded Hodgson's efforts to obtain by diplomacy the change of ministry which he had anticipated as the result of a war. At the beginning of November he authorized him to promote . . . . " the object of procuring the removal of the present Ministers of Nepal, and the appointment of a friendly and honest administration in their place." Hodgson secured the desired result. The Senior Queen, frantic at the discomfiture of her favourite, set off on a pilgrimage to Benares. The Raja followed. Auckland opposed their entry into British territory. She returned and recalled her favourite, and her son the heir apparent, a boy of violent temper, sided with her. Auckland, afraid that the Ministers would be tortured told Hodgson to expostulate earnestly and firmly, or remonstrate temperately as the occasion might demand ! Months passed, and the Ministry with Hodgson's support was reconstructed on a firmer basis. Then occurred the disasters in Afghanistan. The Senior Queen died. An Anglo-Indian newspaper ascribed her death to poison. The Raja raved against Hodgson, but eventually apologised for his unseemly conduct.

On April 23, 1842 the Raja burst into the Residency. Kasinath,

of a mercantile house at Benares, had for two years been living within the Residency bounds under medical treatment, while prosecuting his claims and defending counter-claims in the dilatory Courts of Katmandu. Soon afterwards Hodgson reported to Ellenborough that the Raja had in person attempted to bear off from the Residency this native trader who bore allegiance to British rule and with whom he had a dispute. Hodgson had thrown his arms round the man and had said, "You take both of us or neither."

Ellenborough in a despatch to the Secret Committee of May 17, 1843 referred to the engagement respecting disputes between British subjects in Nepal, arising from transactions which had their origin in the Company's territories and reported that the matter out of which the discussion arose had been before the Court of Katmandu since 1837, and that the Resident had urged the Raja to decide this very case in 1840, a year after the date of the arrangement. Hunter in the *Life* does not allude to this apparently inconsistent attitude on the part of Hodgson. Ellenborough heard of the affair with regret and could not afford to embroil himself with Nepal in the perilous state in which India had been left by his predecessor. He therefore wrote a diplomatic letter in which he said that he would not believe that a British envoy would extend the privileges of British subjects on his own authority beyond the just limits which the law of nations and a solemn treaty assign to them; still less that he would evince a want of personal consideration for a friendly and independent sovereign; nor could he believe that the sovereign "could so far forget his personal dignity and the obligations of the public law and Treaty as to offer an intentional insult to the Representative at his Court of a sincerely friendly Power." Also he considered that the State presents on their way from Nepal in honour of his accession to the Governor Generalship "at a moment when the cloud of misunderstanding has passed over the sun of friendship should await the period when that sun shall burst forth in all its former effulgence to give light and splendour and prosperity to two great and friendly States." A reviewer in the *Athenaeum* (5 December 1896) of Hunter's *Life of Hodgson* regards the letters while written in the style of Oriental hyperbole customary with the Indian Foreign Office in addressing Asiatic potentates, as judicious and conciliatory, and the refusal to accept the gifts a very grave rebuke to a native Court. It was probably the cause of bringing the Raja into a more prudent course.

Ellenborough instructed Hodgson to communicate the letter

to the Raja; but Hodgson took upon himself the responsibility of not delivering it. He communicated however a modified version and reported his action to the Governor General. Ellenborough after some intermediate rebukes, replied, 21 June, that " the step you have taken is not only in direct disobedience of the instructions you received, but it may tend to produce serious embarrassment for the Government by compelling it to adopt an extreme course with respect to the Raja of Nepal at a time when it is certainly not desirable to create a division of the British forces and to impose new burdens on the finances." He directed therefore that " you will be relieved in your situation of Resident at the Court of Nepal at the earliest period at which the season and the exigencies of the public service may permit such relief to take place." The reviewer considers that Hunter's omission to print the "intermediate rebukes" tends to raise a suspicion that he has not told the whole story respecting his friend's disobedience of orders. He observes that Hodgson, like Henry Lawrence under Dalhousie, could not subordinate his will to another man even more masterful than himself.

On the following day, June 22, Maddock wrote privately to Hodgson that Ellenborough had spoken in the kindest terms of his sense of his merits, services and abilities, had hoped to have an opportunity of employing him in some other field and had suggested his keeping the official letter a profound secret and acting on an earlier summons to come to him and to explain the state of affairs in Nepal. At the very same time Hodgson was writing officially to explain how a change in policy could be safely accomplished, but pointing out the disadvantages of such a change. His letter, admits Hunter, was full of somewhat feeble parentheses and modifying clauses. Such involved expressions would not have recommended him to a master of concise and lucid language like Ellenborough. However, on July 6 he wrote a private letter to Hodgson: " No testimony is, I assure you, required to satisfy me that you are a most zealous and a very able servant of the Government, but I am certainly of opinion that if a change of system should be adopted in treating with the Nepal Government, you are so mixed up with a party there, that you would be unable to act efficiently in carrying out such new system. It would succeed better in other, even if much less able hands."

In his report home of 8 July, 1842, Ellenborough explained the manner in which Hodgson had mixed himself up with the domestic politics of Nepal and said: " it is not practicable to retrace our steps to a more prudent and legitimate course of conduct in our

relations with the Government of Nepal while Mr. Hodgson with whom the present erroneous system is identified remains Resident Katmandu. I have reason to think that that gentleman's health will make it expedient for him to resign his office as soon as he returns to the plains. I should otherwise have deemed it my duty to place on record all the grounds upon which I disapprove of his recent conduct, and to act according to the view of what the public interest requires by relieving him from the discharge of his present official duty."

On July 26, having been persuaded that Hodgson's intimate knowledge of Nepal and his hold on the affections of the people made him the safest man to carry out the change, Ellenborough wrote an appreciative letter in his own hand to Hodgson, and on August 8 he wrote a public despatch to him leaving it to his discretion to decide " in what manner your conduct should be regulated so as gradually to withdraw the British Government from a false position, without injury to the persons, who may rely upon its support, a support really inefficacious for their protection, although its open and abrupt withdrawal might possibly involve them in new and serious danger."

Ten months later Hodgson asked Ellenborough to be allowed to remain in Nepal for another year, and on 1 June, 1843, Ellenborough replied in a personal letter: " I received your letter of the 22nd ultimo intimating your wish to remain still longer at Katmandu. I have already twice against my own better judgment acquiesced in your remaining there: first when I consented that the public letter of animadversion upon your conduct should not be placed upon the public records, it being then distinctly understood that you would retire during the last cold weather, and secondly when I was further induced to consent to your remaining till the ensuing cold weather. I do not think it desirable that you should remain beyond that period and I shall then appoint your successor. If you desire to remain on service in India, I will endeavour to find some other fit situation for you; but you ought to leave Nepal." He eventually offered him the Assistant Commissionership in Sind, perhaps with a view to his succeeding Napier in the chief place; for if Ellenborough had had to meet that inroad of the Sikhs which brought on the first war with the Punjab, Napier would almost to a certainty have received the command of the opposing force.

Many of the Civil Servants in India hung together and formed a kind of mutual admiration society. They were aghast when a Governor General took an independent line; they looked upon

him as an ignorant intruder, the penalty to be paid for the continued existence of the Company; they resented any criticism of one of their number as a reflection upon them all.

In a political officer independent action was to be excused, encouraged rather; in a Governor General it was unpardonable. In a political officer disobedience of orders was to be condoned; in a Governor General, disregard of red tape and the avoidance of the ruts of routine were offences beyond the pale of redemption.

Ellenborough had a different idea of his duties. He was not a man to follow his advisers in leading strings. The ascendency of MacNaghten over Auckland was assuredly warning enough. Moreover, Auckland's system in Nepal bore a strong resemblance to his policy in Afghanistan; it was one of interference in the domestic affairs of an independent State. The most effectual method of changing a policy is to change the instrument. Ellenborough's first impulse was to recall Hodgson. It is not unreasonable to suppose that he wished to act quietly. He would know that if he had immediately communicated his dispatch to his Council, it would reach the Government Offices at Calcutta and the news would become public and percolate without delay to the durbar of Nepal. When, yielding to Maddock's appeal on behalf of his friend, he cancelled his dispatch to Hodgson, there was nothing to place on record. His allusion to a dead document in a personal letter to Hodgson did not revive it. The letter contains no fresh rebuke.

On Sept. 16, 1843, Ellenborough ever ready to reward and show solicitude for distinguished men wrote to Henry Lawrence " I hope your health will be re-established in the hills of Nepal, to which we have to-day sent you as Resident."

Thomason then Foreign Secretary warned (Nov. 18, 1843) Lawrence not to attempt to match the natives in intrigue, or to meet their machinations with counter intrigue for he would be foiled and discredited; he advised him to avoid demi-official correspondence on public subjects, especially with secretaries, and never to write unnecessary despatches. George Russell Clerk also wrote to him on Feb. 2, 1844 " I do not doubt there has been too much meddling at one time, I mean ostensible meddling." As to undignified subserviency to a Native Court such as folding the hands, or styling oneself the " nokur " or servant of a native prince, " it is difficult " he added " to imagine how any Resident could condescend to this, or could make so great a mistake." He suggested too that in communication with the Indian Government he should avoid as much as possible casting a slur on a predecessor's

system—at all events, for a time." Finally Sir H. Edwardes observes that each party in Nepal tried to get the Political Resident on his side and that Lawrence's predecessor fell into the snare and added to the confusion; that there had been too much meddling with the politics of this independent State and that Ellenborough sent Lawrence up to introduce a new regime of scrupulous non-interference with internal affairs. "I am afraid" wrote Ellenborough to Lawrence, Dec. 28, 1843, "that what has passed before your arrival gives you some up-hill work; but plain, straightforward conduct must always produce its effect . . . . . you are beginning in the right way," and when he thought that Lawrence was seeing too much of a leader of one of the parties he sagaciously remarked: "We must not only mean what is right but appear to do so."

All these warnings clearly glance at Hodgson's shortcomings, which his good friend Hunter does not reveal.

APPENDIX V.

SOME MISTAKES IN LORD CURZON'S POSTHUMOUS WORK.

The two volumes of "British Government in India" display on the outside a significant emblem. Impressed upon them with gold leaf are the Crown Imperial and a coat of arms which at first sight seems to be that borne by British Sovereigns. A closer inspection reveals, it is true, the royal heraldic beasts and the Irish harp, but unexpectedly quartered with the arms of Saxe-Coburg. The curious combination is apparently the coat granted to H.R.H. Prince Albert in 1840 so that the work comes before the public blazoned in error. This grotesque blunder for which the author can hardly have been responsible is the more remarkable, as the photograph of the throne, (vol. 1, p. 102) copied from one made in Germany, gives the Royal Arms as they should be.

There are several other slips: "Earl Dalhousie," "Earl Dufferin"; Lord Napier *of* Ettrick instead of, "and Ettrick;" 2nd (*sic*) Earl of Elgin linked with the 4th Earl of Minto; and "Sir H. Hardinge, Secretary *of State* for War in 1828-30 and 1841-44," a separate office not created till many years afterwards. In the 2nd Volume we learn that the Court of Directors recalled

Hobart in 1798, consoling him with a pension of £1500 a year and (!) a summons during his father's lifetime to the House of Lords, though history is silent on this temporary usurpation of the rights of the Crown by the East India Company—this surreptitious tapping of the Fountain of Honour.

It is claimed that Lord Curzon was the first Governor General to describe the Indian princes as partners in the British Administration. Yet the first to associate, not merely the princes but the people of India with its Government was Lord Ellenborough in his Declaration of October 1st 1842 on the conclusion of the Afghan War. Again it is implied that Lords Curzon and Lytton were exceptional in interfering "openly" to protect the natives of India from violence and outrage by the white man." Yet though there is a reference in a note at p. 201 to the wholesale dismissal of officials in the Nerbudda territories, no allusion is made to the reason, namely the determination, which Ellenborough had previously proclaimed in special instructions to civil and political officers, to check and punish all such conduct.

The well known expression 'in partibus infidelium' is applied in the work to a layman's residence in India. Now a Roman Catholic prelate who is a Bishop 'in partibus infidelium' never by any chance visits his titular and phantom see.

The steady support which Wellington gave to Ellenborough is ascribed to his having espoused the cause of the army. It is doubtful whether there is the faintest trace of any such motive in Wellington's correspondence. In 1828-30 Wellington was opposed to giving military officers civil posts; there is no evidence of his changing his opinion. As a matter of fact, Ellenborough was at first a severe critic of several generals, and of many other military officers. His grasp of a military situation was more comprehensive than theirs and his views were completely endorsed by the Duke.

In one part of the work (vol. 2 p. 251) it is said that Auckland resigned to avoid being recalled; but in an earlier part (p. 198) that he was abruptly recalled because Peel had never forgotten the treatment, by the Whigs, of Lord Heytesbury (who had been actually appointed)! The truth is that Auckland was contemplating retirement even when his friends were in power and resigned when he heard they were out.

The above are the lesser blemishes. The work is more seriously disfigured by the distinct animus against Ellenborough.

The bias may have sprung from the popularity of Ellenborough with the Army, who were the main contributors to the gift of

the great service of plate which he received after his recall by the Directors.

It is asserted that Ellenborough was far too busy with schemes of war and conquest to make any change in the social system which he inherited at Calcutta. He might have more justly said "*the schemes of war and conquest which he inherited.*"

Hardinge was in collision with the Punjab within little more than a year of his arrival and left another war with that country and the final settlement to his successor. Auckland's wild invasion of Afghanistan had raised a storm which was not allayed till the government of India was finally transferred to the Crown. Lord Curzon like Mr. Gladstone tabooed the word " war." Mr. Gladstone baptized it ' military operations ' in the waters of the Nile; Lord Curzon christened war on the N. W. frontier ' blockade.'

It is said that Ellenborough ignored his Council and that when they found out that he had kept from them his correspondence with Generals Nott and Pollock they were indignant, but it should be remembered that military secrets had been betrayed and that his Council had themselves passed an Act conferring upon him all the powers of the Council in order that he might be nearer the scene of operations. He could not trust his official Secretary to restrain his ready pen.

Further the Governor General was, apart from such delegation of powers, the supreme authority for the movement of troops, except those actually in the field of battle. Hardinge in his letters home testified to the excellent terms on which he found Ellenborough with his council and Secretaries and to his general popularity at Calcutta. That the verdict of the Indian press was " unanimous in censure," might be expected in the case of a Governor General who was not wedded to Calcutta, nor a reader of Indian newspapers nor guided by their advice, and who refused to allow them to be supplied with secret information.

Finally the work is silent upon the fact that Ellenborough was the originator of the system (sketched by him on June 8, 1852 before a Committee of the House of Commons) under which the government of India was carried on for half a century. At the end of this period, there came into force a new scheme, projected from without the ken of mankind like a meteoric stone of hitherto unknown composition, the eighth wonder of the world. For its adoption a Cabinet of which Lord Curzon was a member was responsible. Though only seven years have passed since the catastrophic upheaval of the old system and the catapultic intrusion of the new, this ingenious paper constitution of a modern

Sieyès has already disclosed symptoms of wear and tear and fraying which forbode its early dissolution; and an apparently bewildered Secretary of State has issued "calls for tenders" of some more workable contrivances, without it is to be hoped binding himself to accept the lowest, showiest or any other offer. Let us pray that in response to this bold appeal there will come from the politically inarticulate toiling millions of our Indian fellow subjects or from some of those who have their welfare at heart a light or a voice to guide the way to a happy solution of a problem almost as old as the Himalayas.

APPENDIX VI.

SAGAR AND BUNDELCUND.

The following extracts are from a work by the late Major-General Sir William Sleeman, the famous Indian administrator. The volume in question was probably a copy of a private edition of his "Rambles, etc." or of h s Diary. The editor of "India under Ld. E." has quite lately tried to trace it but in vain. He has on obvious grounds omitted the names of certain persons mentioned in the letters. History would not gain by their identification.

Major Sleeman to Mr. Maddock.

Camp Khurgar, Jan^{y} 11, 1843,

My dear Maddock,

I came down from Heerapore through Saugor to great Gornwara in the centre of the Nerbudda valley where I met Fraser and his party. From that place I am on my way up through Jubbulpore. It was my intention to have returned through Bundelcund through Myshera, Ochujra, Panna, Hadjugm and Maheba; but I am anxious to get back as soon as possible with Young to assist in keeping things right here; and I shall go through Dumoh, Huttah and Heerapore. The leaders of the insurgents are all being taken by degrees, and those whom it will not be unsafe or becoming to pardon will come in as they find themselves isolated.

You and I never saw the valley more beautiful than it now looks, it is one entire sheet of cultivation, and the people declare they never saw the crops finer. The settlements are exceedingly moderate; and the people have a prospect of getting a sale for the

produce as soon as the merchants see that the roads are safe, as I trust they soon will. Our old friends, the Malgozars are almost all become men of substance, and they are laying out more of their money in building handsome pukka houses to live in than in any other part of India. The people flock around me to express their gratitude for the share which I have had in producing this state of things; and from the top of Bundelcund to the south of the Nerbudda valley I can honestly assure you that there is no name more dear to the recollection of the people than yours . . . . . " A generation has risen up which knows not Joseph," and though the people know that they never had a government like ours, and never could hope to have, there is no longer that sympathy between them and the agents which government employs as there was in our day. The European officers no longer show that courtesy towards the middle and higher classes, and that kindness towards the humb.er which characterised the officers of our day; and the native officers rather imitate or take advantage of this.

The outbreak in Saugor originated in the insolence of office. Had the country been full of troops men would have submitted to it, however bitter the draught. Indignities offered to Jowakir Sing of Chundhir and Mudkore Jah of Nahut by native officers were really the source of all. Success in the first outbreak encouraged others, whose only object was plunder, to rise, and the disaffected or proscribed in Bundelcund poured down to share in the strife . . . . .

The troops which the Governor General has given to these territories and to Bundelcund will be sufficient for all our purposes.

I must qualify what I said about the deportment of the European officers to the people by stating that there are *two or three* exceptions to the rule, and that there is still more courtesy and kindness shown to the middle and higher classes here than they experienced in our old and settled provinces, though not so much as they used to get in our day and as they ought to have to secure our attachment. The people of our old provinces are like the eels, they are used to it; but the Lodhu Bundela and Gouds Thakoors are, as you know, a different sort of being. . . . .

If we could promise favourable terms (to the rebels) they would not mind, but this we cannot condescend to do. If we get the cantonments on the Dussan river we need not care for them; but if they are distant, I shall not be easy. . . . . .

I must not omit to mention it had been predicted our rule would end this year, sumbut 1890; and the Cabul reverses and

Bundela and Saugor disturbances gave weight to the prediction. Perhaps Cabul affairs were the father to the thought?

Extract, Major Sleeman to Ld. Ellenborough.

Camp near Tubbulpore, Jany 20, 1843.

(Discussing the question of raising a police force he says.,

"The use of arms had for some time been prohibited among them (the people); they neither had them nor knew the use of them; but some officers had the folly to prohibit the people from carrying or keeping them in the midst of this confusion, when they ought to have known that only the innocent and well-affected would attend to their order."

Lord Ellenborough to Major Sleeman.

Camp Gurrunda, Jany 31, 1843.

Sir,

Your letter of the 11th to Mr. Maddock has confirmed all my first impressions as to the real causes of the outbreak in the Saugor territory and of the continued ferment there. I shall at once act on the decided view I take of what ought to be done, and dismiss all the officers employed in the Saugor territory, substituting for the largest portion of them the best men I can find and leaving it to you to fill *two or three* appointments. I do not object to your placing in these appointments officers now employed in Saugor, if you should find so many really fit to be continued in office. If you should not you may select officers from the regiments now in Saugor or Bundelcund. I object to Captain ———— and Lieut ————; I do not personally object to any other, if you should think fit to recommend them for re-appointment. Mr. ———— I have disposed of at Allahabad. I am disposed to think that Lieut. ———— is not a fit man to be employed. I hear he is hasty. I have endeavoured to inform myself of the character of the officers I have appointed and I believe I may depend upon them all. I have looked to nothing but superior fitness for the selection of them, and they are recommended by the first men in the army.

. . . . . .

Lord Ellenborough to Major Sleeman.

Private and Confidential. Camp Panniput, Jany 31, 1843.

. . . . . .

I am willing in deference to your opinion in favour of Captain to place him where I can in a situation not inferior to that he now holds, but I really cannot consistently with my

feeling of duty permit him to direct an armed force in the Saugor and Nerbudda district. I cannot overcome the impression his letter produced on my mind. . . . . .

[Note. Ld. E's letter to Major Sleeman of June 10, 1843 and the reply of June 17 show how anxious the Governor General was to pardon leaders of the rebellion who had been drawn in unwillingly or under a misconception. Major Sleeman states as regards certain of such cases of clemency: " Nothing could have been better timed or more justly appreciated by the people." These I did not copy.—Ed.].

Ld. Ellenborough to Major Sleeman.

Private and Confidential. Allahabad, June 27, 1843.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter about Gwalior affairs. It was unfortunate my departure from Agra should have coincided in point of time with the late intrigues at Gwalior by which the Regent was misplaced, but my intention to return to Calcutta was formed and known at Agra before the commencement or rather I believe on the very day of the commencement of the intrigue, and I do not think that my remaining at Agra or anything but an army would have saved so very poor a creature as the Mama Sahib turned out. He might in the first instance have saved himself by a little energy. He is incapable.

Depend upon it the position of the Resident at Dholepoor is the best for the present if he makes the most of it. I will never threaten where I cannot strike, and will never strike unless I strike very hard, and one blow will be enough. We have no case for striking yet. In the meantime the bodyguard remains at Agra. This you may on occasion observe upon as leading to the conclusion that I may return in November. In a few days the Chumbul will be full and effectually keep people quiet on both banks. If I can move the Sefree force and the Bundlecund Legion I shall add to them the [?] Brigade and probably the 67th Native Infantry . . . .; but I would not move this force without moving at the same time the garrison of Agra and the regiments cantoned in the Dooab, and these should all be brought into communication with the troops in Bundlecund and the whole shall be commanded by Sir W. Nott. I should also bring the 16th Lancers from Meerut and a squadron at least of the 9th Lancers from Cawnpore.

I should be rather weak in Cavalry

Colonel Sleeman to Lord Ellenborough.

Jhanzee, July 18, 1843.

My Lord,

I hope your lordship will not be displeased with me for sending for your perusal the inclosed letter which has been printed in the "Bombay Times"* newspaper, and was certainly written by Captain H . . . . of the 18th Regt. N. I. one of the worst men and officers that I have ever met. Col. Stewart,† who does not know him sufficiently, has interested himself in his welfare, and might induce Your Lordship to place him again in a situation where he might again do much mischief, were you not made acquainted with his character. His temper and disposition are bad, and his report of circumstances and characters could never be relied upon. Mr. O. . . . . was disliked very much by the people, but he was industrious and honourable. Capt. H . . . . was detested and distrusted in everything.

I shall have occasion to submit to your Lordship a good deal of correspondence of a public nature with the Suder Board regarding misinterpretations of their orders which operated to the ruin of vast numbers of landholders in the Saugor territories, and were in themselves sufficient to account for the change of feeling towards us and our rule which was everywhere so manifest to all but those who were acting upon their own mistakes. These errors have now been or are being corrected and the greater part of those who have been suffering under these extraordinary mistakes will receive their rights. I will venture to say that this correspondence alone will be held to justify the measures adopted by your Lordship to restore confidence and good feeling between the governing and the governed in those territories.

I take the liberty to inclose a private letter which I got yesterday from Major Drummond, the D. Qu.-Master General, who knows almost as much as any man of those territories, who saw them when that confidence and good feeling was the admiration of everyone under the late Mr. Molony and Mr. Maddock, and saw them lately when they had altogether changed. He was sent down to Saugor to search for a site for the new cantonments, and he has always been in the habit of communicating freely with the people. He likes them; and they like and respect him.

The Delhi papers have been filled with misrepresentations of the state of Bundelcund in letters written I believe by Colonel

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* Not copied.

† ? Ld. E.'s military secretary.

——— of the 8th cavalry, because I would not decide upon the spot he had chosen for Brig. Young's force, when ninety-nine in a hundred of that force preferred the place they are in as likely to be by far the most healthy; and by Lieut. H———, who was annoyed because I would not recommend him for a situation in the Saugor territories. I thought (? him) quite unfit for such a situation, and your Lordship had expressed an unfavourable opinion of him as a civil officer. Men who write such letters in the newspapers seldom hesitate to deny them when taxed; and it is impossible to prove that they wrote them; but everyone knows or believes that these are the persons who penned the letters about Bundelcund, which of course your Lordship never condescends to read.

Bundelcund was never more tranquil than at present in all parts, except along the east banks of the Dussan river. . . . .

There are however a number of people who wish that the changes made in Bundelcund and Saugor may fail to produce the effect expected by your Lordship; and such people will credit the malicious fabrications of the correspondents of the newspapers I have named; but the world will soon discover that they are fabrications and editors will be ashamed to publish them.

I should mention that Major Drummond did not learn from me your Lordship's intention to return to Upper India, he like other well-wishers of India, is, no doubt, very anxious that you should, and this has led to the opinion that you will.

With much respect, etc., W. H. Sleeman.

Gwalior is tranquil because the new man is supreme, having the troops and the Treasury under him; and all the old officers set aside. The commands are given to creatures of his own, men of no character or capacity, but the troops find that they can get their pay, and that is all they care for.

Enclosure. Major J. G. Drummond to Lt. Col. Sleeman.

Cawnpore, July 14, 1843.

My Dear Sleeman,

Many thanks for your note of the 10th which reached me yesterday. I fear we can hardly expect to hear about the survey for some time to come, as the Governor General will have his hands full of all sorts of *ditch politics* when he gets to Calcutta, and we can only look forward with hope to his promised return to the Upper Provinces, when we shall have his attention again turned to the truly important subject of correct surveys of the country.

I cannot tell you the pain with which I hear that H——— (*i.e.* Lt. H.) is the author of those letters which appeared in the

"Delhi Gazette," under the signature of "A Voice from Bundelcund." I recollect reading one or two of the said letters, but I thought them such trash that afterwards whenever I saw the signature, it was sufficient for me to leave the letter unread. I am truly sorry that your opinion of him is unfavourable, for I remember interesting myself in his favour, when I saw him at Saugor, suffering from the wound he received while in the performance of his duty. And after all he had no business to stand *sniping away like a common soldier* on the occasion when he was wounded. I thought him impetuous, and perhaps rather careless and inconsiderate, but I certainly never saw anything bad about him. He was open to conviction, possessed of considerable acuteness and under the skilful direction of a superior might have been turned to good account. But the late system was bad in every respect. No establishment called more loudly for revision than the civil and political departments of Saugor and Nerbudda. From what I have heard of Capt. H.——— I should say he was a perfect brute and totally unfit for political employment among natives; and as for Mr. O——— if he had been dismissed the service, it would have been no more than he deserved. Strange to say, Mr. Robertson our late Lt. Gov^{r} had a very good opinion of O——— and also of F——— but he was forced nevertheless to admit a want of tact, and consideration for the natives, and a harshness in their dealings with them.

As to the Gwalior affair, the Mama Sahib was always hated by the other grandees of the Court, even during the lifetime of the late Maharajah, why and wherefore I know not. I should like to know what side a most respectable man among them has taken—a man who was much looked up to and respected, but whose name I have not noticed in the late accounts, I mean, Ram Rao.

I remain, etc.

J. G. Drummond.

P.S.—I am decidedly of opinion that our late Governor-General [Auckland] was most unfortunate in almost the *whole of his appointments*. They were generally speaking either hot-headed fools, or self-sufficient, overbearing blockheads; and it is well they are turned out to make way for better men.

Lord Ellenborough to Lt. Col. Sleeman.

Barrackpore, July 30, 1843.

Sir,

I received on the 28th your letters respecting the officers who write in newspapers, and two of those who I have displaced in Saugor.

I never read Indian newspapers and rarely hear any report of what they say. Everything I have ever been told that they have said is untrue. I do not regard what they say so far as its effect upon Englishmen is concerned; but I fear that the extracts from English newspapers which are circulated in the native *Ukbars* must degrade the national character and weaken our Government.

As for the persons who write in newspapers they seem to forget that to circulate anonymous reflections on men's conduct is not the act of a gentleman, and that to print that which he would not venture to say is the act of a coward. Depend upon it no solicitation on the part of anyone will induce me to nominate to any office the man I think unfit for it. I have no wish to remain here an hour in this country, but while I do remain here, I shall do whatever I think right and nothing else, let men say and do what they will here or in England.

Lt. Col. Sleeman to Lord Ellenborough.

Jhansee, August 3, 1843.

My Lord,

I hope your Lordship will not be displeased with me for having addressed a letter to the Editor of the "Bombay Times," a letter in my own name vindicating myself from some very serious charges made against me by his Allahabad correspondent, for I should be unworthy to represent Your Lordship in this province, could I be guilty of what has been charged against me, or allow the world to suppose for a moment that I could be. I take the liberty to enclose the copy of the letter for your Lordship's perusal, and I must solicit your Lordship's pardon for having made use of your name on such an occasion. There is I believe not a paper in India in which Capt. H——— has not indulged or attempted to indulge in slander, and after this exhibition of his recklessness Editors will be ashamed to publish his letters. [Would they!—Ed.].

Lord Ellenborough's reply.

Barrackpore, August 14, 1843.

Sir,

I only received to-day your letter of the 3rd enclosing a copy of your letter to the "Bombay Times" in refutation of certain customary falsehoods which had been published. The refutation is certainly perfect and I can have no objection to anything except to your having transmitted for publication in a newspaper an official document. It is not that in the present instance the

publication of documents which came before you officially and of the letter which accompanied these when they were transmitted to you can do any harm; but the principle is important that no public officer has, without the previous permission of his Government any power over the documents of which he comes into possession by means of his office, or even over the official letters he himself writes. In this country where precedent is so much adhered to, it is essential to guard against the creation of a bad one. Another public officer without your judgment might, deeming himself permitted to do so by this precedent, publish documents or letters of which the publication might be very injurious to the service of his Government.

With respect to the course you have adopted of noticing a newspaper falsehood, I must tell you that in England it is felt that a public man must either notice everything or nothing. He cannot select without affording ground for the inference that what is not denied is true. Consider only in what a position of constraint and almost of slavery a man places himself when by answering a libeller, he puts himself under the necessity of " going out " as it were with every malignant who strikes from behind the screen of anonymous falsehoods. Unless I have been greatly misinformed your character in India would have enabled you to allow such falsehoods as these which you have repelled to pass in contemptuous silence, and I must advise you to trust to your character and not, unless under most extreme and extraordinary circumstances to descend into the arena with the anonymous slanderers of the press.

NOTE.

Since the above letters were sent to the printers, the Editor has been informed by Lt. Colonel J. L. Sleeman, C.M.G., C.B.E., M.V.O., Sir William's grandson, that he, too, cannot find the book from which they are taken, although he quite remembers them.