



E17838



# LETTERS

TO THE

Rt. Hon. EDMUND BURKE.

By J. S.

L O N D O N :

Printed in the Year. 1782.





# LETTERS &c.

## LETTER I.

*To the Right Honourable EDMUND BURKE.*

SIR,

GOVERNOR Johnstone has so fully replied to the illiberal and unjustifiable abuse which you bestowed upon Mr. Hastings on Monday, that I shall make no further observations upon it. It will not excite surprise in any man of the least reflection, that you should depreciate the character of the statesman who has hitherto had so great a share in preserving our possessions in India, when he considers that for seven years you abused your noble friend Lord North, in the grossest terms, because he differed from you in politics; that you

accused Lord Cornwallis of sacrificing the lives of thousands in Virginia, whose quivering limbs you saw—or *seemed to see*, hanging upon every tree in that province; and that you would have prevented the return of Lord Rodney to the West-Indies, in 1782, because he had done his duty at St. Eustatius; nay, that you would have tried him by a Court Martial, because Count De Grasse had asserted, in his dispatches to France, that he had offered the British Admiral battle in 1781, which he thought proper to decline. With a knowledge of these facts before us, which the most sanguine of your friends can neither palliate nor deny, knowing too, that your relation Mr. William Burke, the Paymaster of his Majesty's forces in India, is the avowed agent of the Raja of Tanjore, we account from interested motives, as well as from the impetuosity of your temper, for the violence of your conduct to the Governor General.

But what offence have you received from the great body of the Company's civil and military servants, the Free Merchants, &c. who reside in Bengal, that you should attack them with so much severity? I will take upon me to assert, that the small fortune which I obtained in the course of fifteen years service in Bengal, (and I am

positive I can say the same of the fortunes of my cotemporaries, ) was as honourably and as fairly acquired, as that which you may now or hereafter possess; and I assure you, Sir, I never acted either as agent to an Indian Raja, nor did I ever hold so useless, so unnecessary, or so advantageous an appointment from the East-India Company, in the fifteen years I was in their service, as that which the late Marquis of Rockingham bestowed upon your Cousin Mr. William Burke last year. It is not impossible, but that one thousand or fifteen hundred pounds of my little fortune, may be remitted home next year, by that mode which you have censured so severely. Many of my friends may also have a share of the remittance. I will therefore state it fairly as it is, and I will even leave *you* to judge if there is any thing in the transaction we need to blush at. The Governor General and Council were obliged to borrow money for an investment, to supply the European market, to prevent the manufactures standing still, and the diminution of the revenues. There were orders from the Company in force, that their servants in Bengal should not draw upon them beyond a certain amount. The first idea therefore was to send home cargoes to be sold on account of those Gentlemen who advanced money

money in Bengal. This scheme was certainly liable to many objections; these were foreseen, and the Supreme Council who had adopted the scheme on the 8th of April last, relinquished it on the 10th of May, for the more eligible mode of granting Bills on the Directors at one and two years sight, and sending the cargoes to Europe on the Company's account. The terms were as follow: That those who subscribed the money, should be allowed 8 per cent. interest (the legal interest of the country is 12 per cent.) from the time the cash was paid, to the day the Bills were granted; and the exchange was to be two shillings the current rupee. Now, Sir, is it possible that you can blame Mr. Hastings and the Supreme Council, who proposed those terms, or the Company's servants, who accepted them, and at the same time call General Richard Smith your Honourable friend, who actually proposed, on the 25th of September, 1769, in the hour of peace and tranquillity, to grant bills upon the Company at the rate of two shillings and three pence the current rupee, and 4 per cent. interest in England, till the time of payment, being above twelve per cent. more favourable to the bill-holders, and of course so much more disadvantageous to the Company, than the present remittance.

The

The proposal of your Honourable Friend was not then accepted, though he very strongly urged the propriety of it ; but on the 23d of October following, at the distance of twenty-eight days, the scheme was again brought forward with the General's consent and approbation, and accepted with this difference, that the bill-holders were to have but 3 instead of 4 per cent. interest in England, from 90 days sight to the periods of payment, *and to be allowed 8 per cent. interest in Bengal, from the time the cash was paid into the Company's treasury, to the day the bills were granted* ; the very circumstance in Mr. Hastings's remittance which appeared to strike you with astonishment. Your Honourable Friend the General remitted above eighty-three thousand pounds by the channel he had so strongly advised the Council to adopt.

If you will be at the pains to read the letter which Mr. Francis (the Gentleman whom you intend to send out Governor General of Bengal) wrote to the Court of Directors on the 19th of November, 1781, you will find that he recommends it to them to authorise the Supreme Council to draw upon the Company at the rate of two shillings and one penny the current rupee ; so that Mr. Hastings and his Council, after all,  
must

must be allowed the merit of getting money upon better terms than Mr. Francis had recommended, as equitable for one party to offer, and the other to accept.

J. S.

*April 28th,*  
1783.

## L E T T E R II.

*To the Right Honourable EDMUND BURKE.*

S I R,

**Y**OUR candid, humane, and rational defence of Mr. Powell and Mr. Bembridge gave me great pleasure. The resentment which you expressed, when the words “enormous offenders” were applied to men *unconvicted of any crime*, was manly and just. But while I applaud your interposition in favour of Mr. Powell, because *delinquency has not been proved against him*, because it would be *hard to condemn a man from ex parte evidence*, what excuse can be offered for your ungenerous treatment of the Governor General of Bengal? I would ask you, Sir, if that gentleman has been heard in his defence? I would ask you, what crime has he committed, that you should call

call him, upon all occasions, "a most notorious delinquent?" You have, it is true, repeatedly pledged yourself to prove his delinquency; but when Governor Johnstone, on Monday last, stated the indecency and impropriety of your abuse of a man *unconvicted of any offence*, and expressed the readiness of Mr. Hastings's friends to reply to any charge you could bring forward, you directed the Clerk to read the resolutions of the House of Commons, as your justification for having used such harsh and unwarrantable expressions.

I will suppose for once, that those resolutions had not passed when there were but 28 Members in the House, that the Rockingham party was not in the zenith of its power at the time, and that no previous conversation had been held between Sir Adam Ferguson, General Richard Smith, and yourself, still I am at a loss to conceive, how these resolutions justify you, in calling Mr. Hastings a "notorious offender." They condemn the Court of Directors, Mr. Hastings, and Mr. Hornby, for *their political conduct*; and as they stood originally, the Governor General was said to have acted, in a certain instance, from an "interested partiality to the Vizier." Mr. Powys objected to the word "interested," thinking it conveyed an idea of corruption on the part of Mr. Hastings. Such an idea was instantly



disclaimed, and the word "interested" was changed to "unreasonable:" admitting, therefore, that the resolutions were well founded, I must still insist upon it, that Mr. Hastings was never accused of delinquency by the Secret Committee. I am, however, of opinion, that the resolutions, as far as they affect Mr. Hastings, have been fully and fairly refuted.

Has the Select Committee proved Mr. Hastings guilty of delinquency? Certainly they have not, and I refer you to the Letters of "Detector" for a complete and satisfactory reply to every insinuation contained in them. You have threatened us with a report that is yet to come forward. I understand it is entirely confined to the trade of India. Whenever you produce a charge, it shall be answered; but I earnestly intreat you, Sir, to shew that candour, fairness, and decency to the Governor General of Bengal, which you think due to Messrs. Powell and Bembridge; do not in future call Mr. Hastings a "notorious offender," until you have proved him one.

It is above a year ago, since you told Major Scott there was a direct charge of corruption against Mr. Hastings; but although you were pressed to bring it forwards, I have heard no more of it.

At

At the eve of an election Mr. Sullivan and Sir William James were said to have falsified the records of the Company. A letter was written to several Proprietors, which was suspected to come from the Treasury, in which the most unwarrantable liberties were taken with the characters of Gentlemen "*unconvicted of any offence ;*" but *they* carried their election, and we have heard no more of falsified Records.

May 3, 1783.

J. S.

### L E T T E R III.

*To the Right Honourable* EDMUND BURKE.

S I R,

I N a letter, which I did myself the honour to address to you a few days ago, I flatter myself I proved, that Mr. Hastings, in a season of war and distress, had negotiated a remittance more advantageous for the East-India Company, by above 12 per cent. than that which General Richard

Smith recommended in the time of peace and tranquillity. Permit me now to compare the conduct of Mr. Hastings, and your honourable friend, in another instance ; and I trust, I shall be able to convince you, that even in this case, Mr. Hastings has been more scrupulously attentive to the orders of the Company, than the General : if I can do this, I am sure you will retract the censure that you have already passed upon the Governor General, since you have been more than commonly warm and eloquent, in defence of your honourable friend, when his conduct has been under discussion, and the General has not neglected to remind us repeatedly of “ the uniform tenor of his actions,” “ his  
 “ conscious integrity,” “ and the regard he  
 “ has ever paid to his own honour.” These declarations you may find recorded, in almost every letter he wrote, when he filled a public character in India.

In the month of October, 17<sup>th</sup> 1781, the Vizier and his Ministers offered Mr. Hastings, the sum of ten lacks of rupees, which he accepted. So much of it as he then received, he expended in the public service. He informed the Directors he had done so ; he told them, that the remainder should be paid into their Treasury, as soon as he received it, and to them he left the disposal of his money.

About

About the middle of the year 1767, his Majesty Shaw Allum made General Richard Smith a present of two lacks of rupees. The General took the cash, but gave his bond and security to the Council to refund it, provided the Directors would not permit him to retain it for his own use.

In January, 1768, the General paid Sujah Dowlah a visit at Fyzabad. The customary presents of horses, clothes, &c. were made by him to the Vizier, and presents suitable to the General's rank and station were received by him in return. In the course of the visit, in order to shew the world their friendly dispositions to each other, the General presented Sujah Dowlah with *his hat*, and received in return *the turban* of the Vizier, but refused to accept a present of two lacks of rupees, which, as he says, the Vizier repeatedly pressed upon him.

In June, 1769, a letter was received from the Directors, by the Council of Bengal, in which they say, they cannot permit General Smith to retain the present the King had made him, because it is universally known, his Majesty is less able than any Prince in Indostan to make presents; but should Sujah Dowlah renew his offers, they have no objection to his receiving that sum from him. This paragraph was sent to the General at Allahabad. On

On the 7th of September, 1769, the General, being then in Calcutta, produced to the Council two letters, authenticated as translations from the originals, by the signature of Mr. C. W. Boughton Roux, the one from the King, the other from Sujah Dowlah. The latter contained in substance, that Sujah Dowlah had offered the General two lacks of rupees some time ago, which the General would not accept; he adds, he is very happy to find there will be no impropriety in his accepting that sum now, as the Directors have given their consent, and he offers to repay to the King the two lacks which his Majesty had given to the General two years before. This letter was received the 24th of June, 1769.

The letter from the King expresses surprise and concern at the idea of receiving back what he had once given away; and concludes by saying, that Sujah Dowlah had paid to the Royal Treasury the two lacks of rupees which his Majesty had given to the General in 1767.

This letter was received the 3d of July, 1769. These papers being read and entered, the Council delivered to General Smith his bond and the bonds of his securities; and thus was the business adjusted.

Now, Sir, from this authentic statement,

you will perceive how differently Mr. Hastings and your honourable friend have acted; not that I mean to impute the smallest degree of blame to the latter, very far from it; but Mr. Hastings has certainly been more observant of the Company's orders, which were equally binding on both. Your honourable friend actually received the cash; he had the advantage of employing it above two years, when the common interest at the time was 12 per cent. so that if he had refunded the original sum, the interest would have been above 6000*l.* to him; but as Sujah Dowlah settled the business with the King, and the General had not a rupee to pay back, and as he was enabled to remit at a very advantageous exchange, I think I may fairly state the value of the present at thirty-three thousand pounds.

Mr. Hastings effectually precluded himself from every possibility of advantage for the present, by paying in the money as fast as he received it, and leaving the entire disposal of principal and interest to the pleasure of the Court of Directors.

I trust, Sir, when you next mention this circumstance, you will recollect, how your honourable friend acted in a situation something similar, and that you will give Mr.  
Hastings

Hastings, the credit which is due to him for his disinterestedness.

May 9, 1783.

J. S.

P. S. Your honourable friend did not deem it necessary to account for any trifling presents he received during his command ; for in looking over the 5th Report of your Select Committee, I find that General Richard Smith received about sixteen thousand pounds sterling from the Company, being the amount of presents he had made in his publick character ; but it did not occur to him to bring to account the value of the horses, clothes, jewels, &c. &c. which he received in return.

## L E T T E R IV.

*To the Right Honourable* EDMUND BURKE.

S I R,

**I**T has been very generally said, for some time past, that you mean, during the present Session of Parliament, to bring in a  
Bill

Bill of Regulation for India, and that one object of that Bill will be to appoint Mr. Francis, Governor General of Bengal, General Richard Smith, second in Council, and Commander in Chief, Mr. Dudley Long, and Mr. William Burke, 4th and 5th Members of the Administration. By this arrangement, Mr. Hastings, Sir Eyre Coote, Mr. Wheler, and Mr. Macpherson, are to be removed, and Mr. Stables to remain, I presume in compliment to his connection with your *new friends*, though I must admit it would be difficult to find a plea for removing him, as we have no official intelligence of his arrival in Bengal. With what propriety you can propose to recal Mr. Macpherson, for having acted as Agent to the Nabob of the Carnatic, and appoint in his room your cousin, Mr. William Burke, who is at this moment the avowed Agent of the Raja of Tanjore, I cannot comprehend. Mr. William Burke may have great merit, but I believe, Sir, he is only known in Leadenhall-street, as one of those gentlemen who speculated very deeply in India Stock some years ago, and smarted severely for his speculation. Mr. Long has never been employed in the Company's service. This will be an objection to some, and a recommendation

C



mendation to those who think we are all *rotten to the core.*

Your honourable friend, Mr. Richard Smith, is an old servant of the Company ; his merits or demerits, as a public man, may be found upon the Company's records.

If I am not misinformed, he went first to India about the year 1753, but not in a military character, though his active and aspiring mind soon led him into the army. He served about 10 years on the Madras establishment, with reputation, but without having had any very particular opportunities of distinguishing himself. He resigned the service with the rank of Captain early in 1763, and from that day never saw a shot fired by an enemy. He was promoted to the rank of a Major by the Court of Directors while on his passage to England, and he arrived at a time when party disputes ran very high in Leadenhall-street. He was enabled to serve the late Lord Clive very essentially, by purchasing India Stock, and splitting votes. In return, his Lordship procured for him a very high military command in Bengal, and the rank of Colonel in his Majesty's service in India.

The General arrived in Calcutta the 1st of May, 1765. Sujah Dowlah surrendered himself to General Carnae very soon after,  
and

and tranquillity was perfectly restored. In 1766, your honourable friend commanded an army of observation, which the Mahrattas never ventured to approach; and on the 27th of January, 1767, he succeeded to the stations of Commander in Chief, and third Member of the Administration. On the 23d of November, 1769, he resigned the service, having been but four years and seven months in Bengal, and two years and ten months only of that time in the command of the army: so that, in fact, General Smith has not been longer in the Company's service, calculating the time he was employed, both at Madras and in Bengal, than Major John Scott, whose promotion was deemed of consequence enough to be inserted in one of your Reports.

Your honourable friend's declarations of disinterestedness, uniformity of conduct, &c. may be found in almost every minute, and in every letter he wrote, while in Bengal: yet he acknowledges to Mr. Verelst, Feb. 8, 1768, that he was concerned in the attempt to purchase all the cotton imported into Bengal from Surat; that he had made advances for cloths at the Aurungs; that he had purchased goods, at the Company's expence, in Calcutta; and that he had obtained an exclusive privilege for making saltpetre in

Oude. He assigns, as a reason for entering into commercial concerns, the scantiness of his allowances from the Company, and he adds, that he gained nothing by cotton ; that he divided the profits of his trade in cloths, &c. amongst the gentlemen of his family ; that he soon relinquished his saltpetre Perwannah, and that he saw the impropriety of a Commander in Chief being concerned in trade. Although the honourable General may be perfectly sincere, and doubtless he is so, in his assertions to Mr. Verelst, yet very serious consequences resulted from Mr. Bolt's endeavours to participate in the trade of saltpetre, which he knew to be very advantageous. The violence, with which his Gomastahs were treated, the seizure of his person, and sending him by force to England, are clearly imputable to your honourable friend, and these acts occasioned the establishment of the Supreme Court of Judicature. The measure of keeping above a third of our army at Allahabad, contrary to the recommendation of Lord Clive at his departure from Bengal, a measure which General Smith represented to the Committee as absolutely necessary, the importation of *good Sonaut Rupees* for the payment of the troops (though it is well known they were paid in a baser coin), the expensive  
and

and useless deputation of the Sujah Dowlah in 1768, the proposition made by the honourable General on the 25th day of September, 1769, for granting bills upon the Directors, against their positive orders, the subsequent adoption of that proposition to so considerable an amount, to which amount he so largely contributed; these measures, which the records of the East India Company will prove, did actually originate with your honourable friend, brought such distress upon the Company in England, that they were obliged to petition Parliament for assistance, and the consequence was, to use your own language, "Relief" and reformation went hand in hand." The Regulating Act passed—To that act the honourable General says, we owe all our misfortunes—I perfectly agree with him—but I add, that to him we owe that act.

The honourable General served the Company about fifteen years. He has retired from their service almost fourteen years, and I think it highly probable, that he has not the most distant idea of returning to it again. But as you have very wisely pointed out the necessity of examining into the merits of every man, who, having been once employed in India, aspires to the elevated station

station of a Member of the Supreme Council in Bengal, you will, I am sure, be obliged to me, for any authentic information I may convey to you respecting the honourable General, provided (which however I do not believe) you do really intend to propose him as one of the Members of your new arrangement.

The public transactions, in which Mr. Francis has been concerned, are so generally known, that it will be needless for me to say a syllable about them.

*May 21<sup>st</sup>, 1783.*

J. S.

## L E T T E R V.

*To the Right Honourable EDMUND BURKE.*

S I R,

**I** Can with truth assure you, that no man living more sincerely applauds than I do the equitable resolution of the House of Commons on Wednesday last, and I earnestly hope that what has already passed respecting two gentlemen,

gentlemen, who, I trust, have been more imprudent than guilty, will not prejudice them in the public opinion. There were parts of your Speech which affected me, and they certainly made an impression upon the House: but while I honour your humanity in one instance, let me conjure you to exercise your justice at least, if not your humanity, in another. Two gentlemen of considerable rank in life, and a Clerk in office, have been represented as having committed a fraud; the fact is, no fraud has been committed. Mr. Sullivan and Sir William James can and will defend themselves; but Mr. Wilks, in consequence of a long and painful illness, brought upon him by intense application to business, is really that timid man in office whom you described Mr. Powell to be. The determination of the business to which I allude has been put off for another week; and, in order to prevent the malicious and envious part of mankind (and Lord John Cavendish has justly said, there are too many who come under that description) from supposing that gentlemen, who have served their country ably, faithfully, and successfully, both at home and abroad, have been guilty of a fraud, I must state the transaction very shortly, premising, however, that the whole of this trifling business  
is

is fully elucidated by "Detector," and in a "few observations" which have been very generally read.

In July 1781, two Acts of Parliament, respecting India, received the Royal Assent. On the 2d of August they were received by Mr. Wilks at the India House from Mr. Strahan, the King's Printer. The next day (as Mr. Wilks has sworn) he packed up five of each in a box, and they were carried by him to the Admiralty, to be sent to Bengal by the *Agamemnon* and *Prothee*; two sail of the line, which were intended to proceed in the most secret manner to reinforce Sir Edward Hughes, at a moment when we trembled for our existence in India. The Chairman and his Deputy were in the Secret, but every circumstance of the dispatch was concealed from the Directors, and from the Captains of the men of war. The letter to Bengal was upon points of very great public importance. You very fully proved in your first Report of last year, that the regular official mode of transmitting Acts of Parliament is from the Court of Directors; nay, you have insinuated, that any other mode of transmission might be dangerous. Admitting, as I do, this fact, is it surprising that Mr. Wilks, *Clerk to the Secret Committee*, with so much important business on his hands,

hands, forgot to insert, in the letter of the 3d of August, that he had transmitted the Acts? though there is not any doubt of his having mentioned them in the list of packets in this manner, "No. 10 and 11, Copies of Acts of Parliament."

The ships sailed, fell in with Admiral Darby, returned with him to Torbay. The scheme was given up, and the packets were received back by Mr. Wilks from the Admiralty on the 21st of November: so that one fact is incontrovertible, whether the acts were sent or not, no injury has been sustained, *because the ships did not proceed*. Now, Sir, I come to Mr. Wilks's crime, stiled a fraud by the honourable General. The Select Committee, in December 1781, wanted to know what had been done respecting the transmission of the acts, and ordered all the papers from the India House before them. Mr. Wilks told Mr. Sullivan, he had sent the acts on board the Agamemnon. Mr. Sullivan called for the letter, observed there was no mention of their transmission. Mr. Wilks went home, altered the letter, so as to make it correspond with the strict matter of fact; but, as he has solemnly sworn, without any order from any person, and that he never communicated the circumstance either to

D

Mr.



Mr. Sullivan or Sir William James. Here, Sir, is the extent of Mr. Wilks's offence—He has sworn to it. He calls the act a most unwarrantable one himself, and he submitted to the mercy and the justice of the Select Committee. That he acted imprudently, nay foolishly, I will allow; but the transaction could not injure any human being; and would you, Sir, with your boasted humanity, damn a man for ever in this world, for such an act of folly?

With respect to Mr. Sullivan and Sir William James, it will appear that they could have no view or interest in delaying the transmission of the Acts; that by sending them in a secret dispatch from themselves, they performed an Act of superelevation at least, since you have proved that the regular channel of transmission is from the Court of Directors; and they were regularly sent by the Trial on the 29th of August, though from various accidents, for which neither Sir William James nor Mr. Sullivan are accountable, she did not finally sail from Ireland till the 12th of February, 1782.

Now, Sir, I come to the fault which is exclusively Mr. Sullivan's. He had promised your Committee to send orders to Bengal for certain sums to be paid to the  
Patna

Patna Magistrates. In the extreme hurry of important business, when the Trial was dispatched, he forgot to bring the subject forward. The vessel, however, returned. He confessed his neglect to you, but he told you it was of no consequence, as the Trial had returned, and the order for compensation should go. It was sent. The Acts, &c. &c. all arrived in Calcutta the 7th of July, 1782, in the Trial—being in fact the first arrival from England in Calcutta, either by land or sea, from the Day the Acts received the Royal Assent, and within a year of their passing; which surely was not any considerable Delay, during an extensive and complicated war.

Did you, Sir, shew humanity to Mr. Sullivan; nay, did you shew justice to him? Were not resolutions of censure brought forward by your Committee? Were they not passed? Did not Mr. Sullivan petition to be heard in his defence? Was he allowed this reasonable indulgence? Did you not say, that the House might come to any resolution, but unless further proceedings were held, Mr. Sullivan had no right to be heard? Was he not obliged to submit, and was not the resolution of censure against him, of last year, called for by you at the very eve of an election, and read to the

D. 2

House

House on the day the 7th Report of your Committee was presented. Nay, further, is not your brother, Mr. Richard Burke, supposed to be the person who authorised letters to be sent from the Treasury in which Mr. Sullivan and Sir William James are pointed at as having incurred the just censure of Parliament. I can produce one of these curious epistles, and can bring presumptive evidence at least of its having been sent from the Treasury. Your brother, if he did not act from himself in the affair, best knows by whose order he interfered as a public man in an East-India election. I am not apt, I hope, to mention matters of such consequence loosely or lightly, and the transaction ought to be strictly enquired into. Where is the justice, or the humanity of such proceeding? The world well knows your hatred to Mr. Hastings, that you stand pledged to God, the House of Commons, and your country, to prove that Gentleman a most notorious delinquent; but surely, Sir, you ought not to extend your hatred and your prejudices to every person with whom Mr. Hastings is connected.

I hope and trust, after what has passed lately, that Mr. Hastings's character will be spared, until a *specific charge* shall be preferred against him. The moment that ap-  
 pears,

pears, I pledge myself to God and my country, for I am not honoured with a seat in the House of Commons, to answer it fully, fairly, and I hope satisfactorily.

*May 24th, 1783.*

J. S.

## L E T T E R VI.

*To the Right Honourable EDMUND BURKE.*

S I R,

**I** VERY sincerely congratulate you on the favourable intelligence received from Bengal by the Lively, and I have the pleasure to inform you, that the Patna Magistrate, whose ghost you saw about thirteen months ago, hovering over that assembly which betrays such strong signs of impatience whenever you address them, is alive, in health, and released from his confinement. I forbear to say a syllable of the conclusion of Mr. Sullivan's business; but I trust, as you have failed both in your attempts to keep that gentleman out of the direction, or to  
remove

remove him from it after he got in, as you also dropped your enquiry into Lord Rodney's conduct, and accused Lord Cornwallis without a cause that you will be a little more cautious how you attack deserving individuals in future.

Were I, Sir, as anxious to expose the inconsistency of your conduct, as you are to criminate every man connected with Mr. Hastings, I should remark upon the extraordinary assertion you made in the House of Commons relative to the late unfortunate Mr. Powell. You said, that you restored him to his office, because that restoration was absolutely necessary for conducting the public business, and you dwelt very forcibly upon this circumstance; yet you have sworn before the Coroner, that the unhappy man was in a state of insanity from the moment the *late Lords* of the Treasury commenced a prosecution against him.

But surely your conduct with respect to Mr. Hastings is extraordinary and unpardonable.—I attribute the unworthy treatment which that gentleman met with last year, to the violence of your passions, and to your influence with the Rockingham Administration. I have heard, and from tolerable authority too, that the late Marquis absolutely threatened to break up the Ministry

if Mr. Hastings was not removed. The nation, thank God, has at last recovered its senses. I have repeatedly pointed out to the public the manner in which the Resolution to remove Mr. Hastings was carried ; but as he has loudly complained of the injustice done to him, as he very properly disclaimed all responsibility until something decisive should be done, previous to his knowledge of the interference of the Court of Proprietors, I do think the subject worthy the consideration of every honest, independent man in this kingdom.

Two Committees had sat for a considerable time upon India affairs ; the one to enquire into the cause of the war in the Carnatic, the other to take into consideration the administration of justice in Bengal. The former brought into the House forty-four Resolutions, which condemned the conduct of the Court of Directors, Mr. Hastings and Mr. Hornby, previous to any resolutions relative to the affairs of the Carnatic. The latter, after having disposed of Sir Elijah Impey, and having censured Mr. Hastings for an act of great wisdom, prudence, and necessity, turned their whole attention to personal matters : I mean to a critical examination of every act of Mr. Hastings's Administration, and to the appointment of Mr. John Macpherson

person to the Supreme Council. These occurrences took place during the Rockingham Administration. The views of General Smith and Mr. Dudley Long to fill up two of the places they were taking so much pains to vacate, were publicly mentioned, God knows with what truth; and it was further said, Sir, that you expected the station of a member of the Supreme Council for your Cousin, Mr. William Burke, the Tanjore agent, and Paymaster of his Majesty's forces in India. These, probably, may be stories industriously circulated with a view to lessen the dignity of your proceedings; for I believe it will be found that General Smith, Mr. Long, and Mr. Burke, form a majority of members present upon almost every occasion, and your joint and separate abilities are well known. It would not degrade Mr. Smith, Mr. Long, and Mr. Burke, if they were to step forwards, and honestly avow that they have no views of filling up any stations in India, either in their own persons, or by promoting their near relations;---the public would then have some confidence in your proceedings.

The measure of removing Mr. Hastings was easily determined; but the difficult point was, how it should be done. Had it been by bill, that gentleman's friends must have been  
heard

heard in his defence. Such a proceeding must have opened the eyes of a deluded public. It was therefore agreed to effect his removal by a parliamentary manoeuvre. Your present noble friend, Lord North, had fled the field. The honest and independent country gentlemen, wearied with the American war, and having a confidence in his Majesty's Ministers, did not interfere, but had generally retired to their counties. Under these circumstances a resolution was brought in, and passed without difficulty in a very thin House, "that it was the duty of the Court of Directors to remove Mr. Hastings." You may now, perhaps recollect, (for *you* have had *some cause* to be humbled) though your pride and your consequence would not at that time allow you to listen to a friend of Lord Rodney, how pointedly Governor Johnstone spoke on that occasion. He told you, if you were determined to remove Mr. Hastings, you must do it constitutionally, you must do it by Bill; that the Proprietors would interfere, unless they should be of the same opinion with the House of Commons. I well recollect how you declaimed upon that occasion, "that the Proprietors had nothing to do with Mr. Hastings;" who would dare to oppose a Resolution of that House, &c. &c.

J. S.

May 31<sup>st</sup>, 1783.

E



## L E T T E R VII.

*To the Right Honourable EDMUND BURKE.*

S I R,

**A**S the proceedings of the India-House during the summer recess are so well known, it will be sufficient barely to observe that Mr. Hastings was continued in that office from which 13 of the Directors wanted to remove him, by a majority of above six to one of his respectable constituents. Many of the first and best characters in England actually came up from distant counties, without sollicitation, to ballot in his favour.

You may remember, that on the first mention of this transaction in Parliament, the Lord Advocate avowed his intention to propose the removal of Mr. Hastings by Bill. You perfectly agreed with him, and took that opportunity of accusing the Governor General of delinquency. The Lord Advocate, however, instantly disclaimed every idea of delinquency, and declared, that all he wanted or expected to prove to the House

was,

was, the expediency of removing Mr. Hastings. When Mr. T. Pitt earnestly entreated the House to proceed with temper and with caution, and was pleased to mention Mr. Hastings's character with that degree of respect with which it is universally spoken of, except by those who have an interest in depreciating it. What was your reply? That he was a most notorious delinquent, and you pledged yourself to God, to that House, and your country, to prove your assertion; that you opposed your character to the Governor General's, &c. &c.

This solemn declaration was made early at the month of December, in a full House; and I am now writing to you on the 4th of June, at a time, as Mr. Fox has said, "when it is impossible to compel or procure an attendance." To this day we have not heard a syllable of Mr. Hastings's delinquency. How, Sir, can you answer to God, your country, and the House of Commons, for speaking, as you have done, of a man, whose public and private character is so superior to your own, unless you had intended to bring forward your proofs. Was it necessary, Sir, with the advantage of having all the Company's records to resort to, with the additional assistance of that "*quarto volume*," from whence, as you told

Major Scott, in the month of May, 1782, you had discovered "a direct charge of corruption against Mr. Hastings," and with the opportunity of examining every man who has served in India, with the labour, the industry, and the abilities of your Honourable Friend the General, so powerfully exerted, in conjunction with your own; with all these advantages operating against an absent, unconnected individual; was it, I say, necessary, Sir, that you should wait until, by the confession of his Majesty's Ministers, "an attendance cannot be procured," before you bring forward a single charge of delinquency? What will the world think of your justice? In the month of December, you assert, "That Mr. Hastings is a most notorious delinquent; that you will prove him one, &c." A reasonable man would suppose the proof was at that moment in your pocket, in your house, or, at least, in your favourite Committee-room, and that it would have been speedily produced, in conformity to so solemn a pledge. So far, however, from this being the case, the truth is, that, from that time to this, we have heard nothing on the subject, though six months have elapsed, except unmeaning declamation, whenever Mr. Hastings's name has been mentioned, which, if it proves any thing,

thing, proves your invincible prejudices. Do not suppose, Sir, that by fairly stating the injustice of your proceeding, I mean to shrink from any accusation you can bring forward. In God's name, produce your charge of corruption, and although, as his Majesty's Ministers have told us, an attendance cannot be procured, it shall be completely answered.

A report has lately prevailed, that, although an attendance cannot be procured at this advanced season of the year, his Majesty's Ministers mean to bring forward a bill for the change of our Government in India. Mr. Fox has stated, that every person who has read the Lively's dispatches, must see the necessity of something being done. I have read them with great attention, and they convey to my mind the fullest conviction of the integrity, the ability, and the successful exertions of the Government of Bengal. It is true, indeed, Mr. Hastings hath, with as much spirit as propriety, pointed out the necessity either of confirming or removing him, that the public interests might not continue to suffer from the vote of the 28th of May, 1782. Will his Majesty's Ministers, at this advanced season of the year, when an attendance in Parliament cannot be procured, bring in a Bill  
to

to remove Mr. Hastings, against the declared sense of the East-India Company, and against the sense of the nation at large, because you have asserted what you have so often been called upon, though in vain, to prove, or because Mr. Hastings, like a man, has avowed that he will not be responsible for any fatal consequences that may happen in India from the measures pursued last year in England? I have so great a respect for the honourable Members who compose the present Cabinet, and so high an opinion of their justice and their wisdom, that I am convinced they never will adopt a system which is to destroy the present harmony and exertion of the Government of Bengal, without a very full discussion in the great Council of the Nation, of the advantages and disadvantages that would result from a change of men at this critical juncture. Such a discussion is impossible at a season when an attendance cannot be procured.

A few words only relative to your Committee.

I cannot bring myself to believe, that General Richard Smith, or Mr. Long, have the most distant views of succeeding to appointments in India; and I trust and believe you do not mean to propose your relation, Mr. William Burke, the agent to the Raja of Tanjore,

Tanjore, and the Pay-Master of his Majesties forces in India, to be a Supreme Counsellor in the room of Mr. John Macpherson. If such ideas, however, had not gone abroad for many months, I should not presume to mention them; and I am convinced his Majesty's present Ministers, whenever they may think proper to take the appointments of Governors and Counsellors from the East-India Company, will at least allow the Proprietors the liberty of objecting to such Gentlemen, as (however worthy and respectable their characters may be) they shall not approve of.

J. S.

*June 4th, 1783.*

## L E T T E R VIII.

*To the Right Honourable EDMUND BURKE.*

S I R,

**W**HEN I stated in my last letter, that Mr. Hastings had, with as much spirit as propriety, pointed out the necessity either of confirming or removing him, I by no means meant to imply that any further confir-

confirmation was now wanted. The Court of Proprietors, his constituents, confirmed him in his government; by the greatest majority that ever appeared upon any public question at the India-House : — but Mr. Hastings, on the 8th November, 1782; when he disclaimed all responsibility until he should be confirmed by a decided act of his employers, was ignorant of the generous and honourable interposition of the Proprietors, either on the 19th June, or 31st October. Intelligence of the first event arrived in Calcutta on the 12th December; and was attended with very beneficial effects to the public interests.

I mention this circumstance, to obviate any opinions that may be formed of the absolute necessity of doing something decisive by Bill in relation to India, at a time when an attendance cannot be procured in the House of Commons.

I am convinced, his Majesty's present Ministers, when they maturely weigh the great importance of the subject, and the long discussion it must necessarily bring on in both Houses, will postpone any intention they may have formed of bringing in a Bill of Regulation for India at this advanced season of the year.

*June 6, 1783.*

*J. S.*

T W O  
L E T T E R S

TO THE

Rt. Hon. *Edmund Burke*,

IN REPLY TO THE

*Infinuations and palpable Misrepresentations,*

I N A

P A M P H L E T,

ENTITLED THE

N I N T H R E P O R T

F R O M T H E

S E L E C T C O M M I T T E E, &c. &c.

---

By J. S.

---

L O N D O N:

Printed by GILBERT and PLUMMER, No. 13, Creechurch-  
Lane, Leadenhall-Street.

Price ONE SHILLING and SIXPENCE.





A  
L E T T E R  
T O T H E  
Rt. Hon. EDMUND BURKE,  
In Reply to the Inflections  
I N T H E  
*N I N T H R E P O R T*  
O F T H E  
S E L E C T C O M M I T T E E,  
Which affect the Character of Mr. HASTINGS.



## P R E F A C E.

**T**HE following letters, not originally intended for a general publication, have been circulated amongst such honourable Members of both Houses, as I conceived were most likely to take part in the consideration of India affairs, and amongst the respectable and independent proprietors, who voluntarily stood forth in defence of Mr. Hastings, from a regard to justice, an esteem for his character, and an opinion of his integrity. If the insinuations and misrepresentations contained in every page of the 9th report, so far as Mr. Hastings is concerned, were to remain uncontradicted, even his friends might blame him for acts, which, when candidly and truly stated, do him infinite honor. While the 9th Report

was printed by an order of the Honourable House of Commons, for the information of its ~~own Members~~ only, it might have been deemed improper and disrespectful in me, to have offered any remarks upon it, subscribing my name to the publication, but to my great astonishment, I have seen a correct copy of this Report exposed to sale at the shops of the principal booksellers; and in order to attract the attention of the public to its contents, it has been advertised in several news-papers, as containing "an account of the conduct of the " Hon. Warren Hastings, Esq;"

The dazzling talents, and the unremitting industry of Mr. Burke, either to accuse or to defend, are well known. His enmity to Mr. Hastings, from the time his cousin William was appointed Vakeel to the Raja of Tanjore, and his solemn pledge to God, the House of Commons, and his country, in the early part of the late session, that he would prove him a most notorious delinquent, are also of public notoriety.

Mr. Burke has had access to every Record of the East India Company.—He has industriously sought for information from every gentleman

tleman who has served in India. It is fair therefore to presume that the Ninth Report contains every thing, which tends to fix the charge of delinquency upon Mr. Hastings.—The public will judge for themselves. I have not attempted, as Mr. Burke has done, to draw false inferences from assumed facts. The Records of the East India Company are the authorities from whence, I trust, I have refuted every insinuation that affects Mr. Hastings.

\* There was a time when Mr. Burke censured His Majesty's Ministers for the exposure of the Company's affairs, and for aggravating their distresses "with all the parade of indignant declamation," when he termed two Committees of the House of Commons, "our dear-bought East India Committees," but what was done then was politic and wise, when compared to late proceedings.—The Governor General fills one of the first and the most important offices under the British empire. Is it consonant to sound policy, that the world should be informed the Government of this country can have no confidence in him? Is it

\* Vide his famous speech of the 19th of April, 1794.—  
Printed by Doddsley.

decent or fitting that a pamphlet, stuffed with insinuations and misrepresentations of the grossest kind, tending to ruin his reputation, and to blast his character with his fellow subjects, and amongst foreign nations, should be circulated under the sacred name of a Parliamentary Report, unaccompanied by an explanation ?

Whether Mr. Hastings is to be removed or to be continued in the Government of Bengal is not a point of much consideration with his friends ; but as long as any set of men, either from interested views, or from any other motive, shall attempt his removal on the plea of delinquency, so long will they stand forth with confidence, and with success too, in his justification, and they will be equally ready to argue the charges produced, and the expediency of his removal, whenever those questions are brought forward.

Every dispatch from India brings a fresh proof of the activity and successful exertions of the Government of Bengal. The resources procured by Mr. Hastings, to supply the pressing exigencies of the Presidencies of Fort St. George,

George, \* and Bombay, have far exceeded the sanguine hopes of his friends, and fully refuted the woeful predictions of his enemies.

These facts are so strong, that notwithstanding the honour of Parliament was imprudently committed with the Proprietors of East-India Stock, by a hasty, ill-considered Vote, in a thin House, " That it was the  
 " duty of the Court of Directors to recall Mr.  
 " Hastings;" notwithstanding the same Parliament, and his Majesty's present Ministers were pledged to the Nation by a Solemn Vote, at the end of the Sessions of 1782, to resume that subject in the beginning of the last Session; notwithstanding the Secretary of State had illegally restrained the East-India Company from transmitting to the East-Indies, in an official manner, the Vote of the General Court of Proprietors, in favor of Mr. Hastings, " because his Majesty intended to lay  
 " the whole of those proceedings before his  
 " Parliament:" Notwithstanding by such incongruous proceedings, the Government of our possessions in the East is almost dissolved, at a moment too, when it requires the firmest basis; nay, notwithstanding all the powers of  
 govern-



government were called upon by Mr. Hastings, in his manly minute of the 8th of November, 1782, to come to some decision on the subject,\* yet such is the general prejudice

\* After stating the mischievous consequences of the late Reports, relative to a change of the government in Bengal, Mr. Hastings adds, “ With respect to myself, I hereby declare and protest, that I am not, nor will acknowledge myself responsible for any disappointment, loss, misfortune, or embarrassment, which shall attend the political interests of the Company, dependant on this Government, from the present hour, to that in which I shall either deliver over the charge of my office, if I am to be relieved from it; or in which I shall be confirmed in the possession of it—I hope I shall not be suspected of the baseness of intending to abandon my trust, and thus preparing a plea for the effects of my own infidelity. — While my sense of what I owe to my king, my country, and my employers, shall require me to remain in my office; while I am allowed to remain in it, and allowed the full and free exercise of it, no consideration of family, life, or fortune, shall tempt me to desert it; and I hope I know myself when I declare, that no sense of personal injury or disgrace shall abate the zeal with which I have hitherto discharged the duties of it. For this assurance let my past conduct be the pledge.—I have now held the first nominal place in this government almost twelve years.—In all this long period I have almost unremittedly wanted that support which all my predecessors have enjoyed from their constituents,—from mine I have received nothing but reproach, hard epithets, and indignities, instead of rewards and encouragement: and instead of being allowed to exercise the powers of my own government,

dice of opinion in favor of this great man ; such is the conviction on the face of the public dispatches, of the extreme difficulties he had to encounter, and his arduous exertions to surmount them, that though called upon by the supposed delinquent, pressed by every obligation, private and public, possessing the chief power of the state, yet disregarding their own honour, and the honour of Government, by leaving all things in the chaos above represented, they rather choose to submit to these reproaches, than to hazard the question of the merit and demerit of Mr. Hastings, when the facts are recent on the minds of men, and they prolong the anarchy for another year, instigating and permitting their instruments, in the mean while, to disseminate every species of abuse, and to poison

“ ment, for the benefit and improvement of their service,  
 “ these, during a series of six years, were not only denied me,  
 “ but converted, even with their connivance and encourage-  
 “ ment, into instruments of hostility, of which I myself per-  
 “ sonally, and all my measures, were the objects ; yet under  
 “ all the difficulties which I have described, such have  
 “ been the exertions of this Government, since I was first  
 “ placed at the head of it, that in no one period of the Com-  
 “ pany’s annals has it known an equal state, either of wealth,  
 “ strength, or prosperity ; and let it not be imputed to me as a  
 “ crime, if I add, of Splendid Reputation.

the

the minds of the public; by distorting recent facts, and bringing forth the refuted charges as matters of new discovery.

Here I meant to have closed; but this day's proceedings in the House of Commons, and a few minutes only before the House was prorogued, have, I confess, excited both my indignation and my contempt.—It is true, Mr. Burke spoke almost to empty Benches, yet his motion was assented to, and therefore claims my attention.—I pass over the ridiculous, the fulsome compliments which he paid to the labours of that Committee, of which, though not the sole, he is undoubtedly the most active Member.—He then observed, it was an accident only, which prevented the Committee from making a further Report to the House of Commons, in which some very extraordinary instances of speculation, connivance, &c. (for it is impossible to follow Mr. Burke, when his imagination runs away with him) would have been laid before the House.—He therefore moved, that certain papers should be presented for the information of the Members.—The Motion was seconded by Lord North, and carried of course.

course.—The principle papers called for, indeed all of any consequence, were those sent to England by the Majority of the Supreme Council, in the year 1775, which tended to fix upon Mr. Hastings, the imputation of having acquired no less a sum than Four Hundred Thousand Pounds, by indirect means, in thirty Months.—The opinions of the most eminent Lawyers in England were taken, and they all declared, that there were no grounds for an action at Law, the present Lord Loughborough excepted, who though he advised an action, yet confessed that the charges were confused and imperfect.—The majority of the Supreme Council, who sent these extraordinary charges from Bengal, in 1775, promised proofs by a future dispatch : None however were sent, and the Court of Directors, unable, with the assistance of the first Law Officers of the Crown, and the advice of Lord Ashburton, Mr. Serjeant Adair, and Mr. Sayer, to make any thing of such an heterogeneous jumble of matter, dropped every idea of a prosecution.\*—Lord North was the

b

Minister

\* It is a curious fact, that a bare majority of the Court of Directors would have removed Mr. Hastings, in 1776, upon  
the

Minister at that time—He was consequently acquainted with every circumstance relative to these extraordinary transactions, and at a distant period, in two subsequent and successive years, 1780, and 1781, the noble Lord proposed that Warren Hastings, Esq, should again and again be appointed the Governor-General of Bengal.—Not a syllable was heard of peculation.—Not a suspicion of corruption,—though the papers, this day moved for, had been canvassed most critically at the India-House, and the west end of the town, in 1775, and 1776. The men attached to General Clavering, whose upright intentions I never doubted, lamented that so respectable a man should have been imposed upon by so dark a villain as Nundcomar.—In 1781, two Committees of the House of Commons were nominated, the one to enquire into the cause of the war in the Carnatic, the other to consider

the charges alluded to, but they were prevented by the interposition of the Court of Proprietors, and on that occasion every member of the Rockingham Party voted in favor of Mr. Hastings; yet Mr. Burke *now* brings these charges forward as if the world had never heard of them before, though they were very fully investigated, and the subject of long debates at a General Court, where the question was carried in favor of Mr. Hastings, by a prodigious majority of independent men, against the whole force of Government.

consider the state of the judicature in Bengal. Not an idea of Mr. Hastings's delinquency was ever entertained, by any Member of the Secret Committee, tho' the Lord Advocate would have removed him on the ground of *expediency*.

The Select Committee were investigating the cause of Sir Elijah Impey's appointment to the Sudder Dewanne Adawlet, when I arrived in London, on the 18th of December, 1781.—I had the honor to be repeatedly examined by the Committee upon various subjects :—Soon after the change of the Ministry, in March, 1782, Mr. Edmund Burke told me that there was a direct charge of corruption against Mr. Hastings, and he summoned Mr. Charles Goring to attend the Committee, with a view, I suppose of substantiating this charge. — I wrote a Letter to General Richard Smith upon the occasion, in which I expressed my readiness to reply to any charge that could be brought against Mr. Hastings ; that if Mr. Burke meant to revive in 1782, the charges which had been sent from Bengal in 1775, an ample and complete refutation of them would be found at the India-House ; that if any further charges were brought forward,

ward, I was then ready to reply to them, &c., &c.—My Letter was read in the Committee, on the 10th, of May, 1782, about the time, I believe that Mr. Burke was attempting to substantiate the extraordinary charges he had brought against Lord Rodney and General Vaughan. Both enquiries were dropped, as I thought, for although I shewed as strong an anxiety out of the House, to lift the charge of corruption against Mr. Hastings to the bottom, as Lord Lisburne did in the House, to bring the accusation against the General to an issue, we heard no more of Mr. Hastings, Lord Rodney, or General Vaughan, as having acted corruptly, or oppressively, during that Session of Parliament.—When the House met in December last, the Select Committee was revived, but not a word passed relative to “this direct charge of corruption,” until this day, when, to my utter astonishment, a motion was made by Mr. Burke, and seconded by Lord North, that all the papers relative to this charge, as Mr. Burke is pleased to style it, should be laid in their crude state before the House of Commons.—Let any rational and honest man consider for a moment the nature of these proceedings, which I will recapitulate.—

In the month of May, 1782, Mr. Edmund Burke, the confidential dependant of the Minister of that day, with all the coercive power of this country in his hands, enjoying the confidence of a ministry omnipotent in Parliament, and popular without doors, tells the agent of Mr. Hastings, that there is "a direct charge of corruption" against the Governor-General. Tho' the power of Mr. Burke was so great, and popular prejudices then at the height; tho' Mr. Hastings was so totally unconnected in this country, and the Agent deprived of every means of support; yet, relying solely upon the integrity of his principal, and the justice of his country, he pressed Mr. Burke to bring forward the charge, and pledged himself to answer it. Will any man, who knows the impetuous temper of Mr. Burke; who knows his enmity to Mr. Hastings, suppose that he would have declined to prefer the charge, if he could have supported it? But the fact is, that that session of Parliament was prorogued without my hearing a syllable more of this "direct charge of corruption."—In December last the Committee met again.—It has made five Reports, yet, no "direct charge of corruption :—" And this day, just as his Majesty



Jeffry is on his way to the House of Peers, Mr. Burke (without any previous notice) tells fifteen or twenty members, who were assembled in the House of Commons, that the Committee is prevented by an accident from making such a Report as would expose the peculation, connivance at peculation, &c. of the principal servants of the Company abroad and at home; and then moves that those papers, in their crude state, should be laid before the House, which the first Law Authorities in this country pronounced, in 1776, to be imperfect, confused, and unintelligible.

I have so unfeigned a respect for, and so high an opinion of Lord North, that I am sure he seconded the motion from the most laudable motives.—His lordship must have read those papers officially, in 1775, which contain the “charge of corruption.”—Since that period he has twice proposed Mr. Hastings in Parliament, for the high and important office of Governor-General of Bengal. I want no further proof of his Lordship’s conviction of Mr. Hastings’s integrity, honour, and abilities. By seconding a motion for laying the papers before Parliament, he is desirous of course, that the Members, having the same

means

means of information, may entertain those favourable sentiments of the Governor-General, which his Lordship did when he brought him forward three times to fill the most important office under the British Empire, and which, I hope and believe, he still entertains for him.—As to Mr. Burke, I have seen such strange marks of prejudice in him, towards the most distinguished characters in this country, Lord North, Lord Shelburne, Mr. Pitt, &c. &c. when they have differed from him in opinion, that I despair of making a convert of him, unless indeed it should be his interest in future to call Mr. Hastings “His Honourable Friend.”

Queen-Square,  
16th July, 1783.

JOHN SCOTT.



TO THE

Right Hon. EDMUND BURKE.

*London, 19th June, 1783.*

S I R,

THE ninth Report of the Select Committee has at length been published. Several months have elapsed since you first declared, that the merit of this extraordinary composition, whenever it appeared, would be solely and exclusively your own. The seventh Report, which was confined to the business of Mr. Sullivan, Sir William James and Mr. Wilks, was the production of your honorable friend, General Smith; but as the members within doors, and the public with-

B

out,

out, have been less warm in commendation of that performance than yourself, it has so happened, that tho' you were both solemnly pledged to prove the matter, neither trivial, unimportant, nor worthy to be presented *on the 1st of April*, you consented to the proposition of Mr. Fox, that the consideration of the subject should be postponed to a future day, which was in fact dismissing it for ever. The ninth Report however treats of so many subjects of great importance, that it can neither be hastily or lightly answered. I shall not presume to anticipate the defence, which the East-India Company will doubtless make to so many very serious and heavy charges; nor shall I say a syllable in reply to the illiberal abuse which you have heaped upon the Court of Proprietors, for presuming to exercise those Rights legally vested in them, when they acknowledged the merits and qualifications of Mr. Hastings. I shall confine myself solely to the correction of such errors and misrepresentations, as may tend to impress the public with an unfavorable opinion of his character. Indeed almost every thing contained in the present Report, in which he is concerned, has already been brought forward

ward by your Committee, and fully, fairly, and satisfactorily refuted by a Detector. The only new points are, the remarks upon the plan of the 8th of April, 1782, for furnishing an investment, and the history of Mr. Hastings's pretended resignation in 1776,

I give you, Sir, every credit you can require, for the many very ingenious arguments, which you have made use of to depreciate the plan of the 8th of April, but I really do not see with what propriety they were introduced into a Report, professedly made for the purpose of giving information to the House of Commons, *in order to enable them to adopt the most proper means for regulating the British Government in India.* You knew, on Friday, the 13th Instant, at the time your worthy Chairman presented the Report, that the plan, whether good or bad, was abandoned; you had known it above two months; even the *Lively's* packet had been a month at the India-House, and they contained a minute from the Governor-General and Council, from which I have been able to extract *some solid reasons*, which they have given for altering the plan of the 8th of April. It would  
not

not have swelled your Report much, but it certainly would have evinced your candour, if you had inserted the minute at length in the body of your Report, instead of publishing it in your Appendix, and representing one part of it in a false point of view. However as you have not thought proper to do this, I beg leave to inform such Members of the Honorable House of Commons, as may condescend to read this letter, that the Governor General and Council, in their minute of the 10th of May, 1782, observe

“ that the plan of the 8th and 15th of April  
 “ was liable, as they had been advised, to  
 “ strong and weighty objections, and that  
 “ since the publication of the plan, *they had*  
 “ *received a latitude from the Company to draw*  
 “ *bills upon them, in particu'ar cases, such as*  
 “ *they conceived the present to be:* They there-  
 “ fore resolve to draw upon the Company for  
 “ eighty lacks of rupees, at an exchange of  
 “ two shillings the current rupee, payable in  
 “ one and two years, without interest, in  
 “ England, but 8 per cent to be allowed in  
 “ Bengal, from the time the money was paid  
 “ into the Treasury, to the day the bills  
 “ were granted; and they further say, that  
 “ it

" it shall be recommended to the Court of  
 " Directors, (*they having no power to grant*  
 " *such an allowance*) to allow the President and  
 " Members of the Board of Trade 5 per  
 " cent. on the produce of the sales in Eng-  
 " land, after the manner in which the Com-  
 " pany gratify their *supra*-cargoes in Can-  
 " ton."

In a letter which I did myself the honor  
 to address to you some time ago, I proved,  
 from authentic evidence, drawn from the  
 Records of the East-India Company, that  
 this remittance, negotiated in the moment of  
 war and distress, is more advantageous, by  
 above 12 per cent, than that which your  
 worthy Chairman General Richard Smith  
 recommended to the Council in Bengal, in  
 the time of peace and tranquillity. I also  
 find, Sir, that Mr. Hastings has not sub-  
 scribed five thousand pounds to this remit-  
 tance, but your Chairman remitted the e-  
 normous sum of Eighty Three Thousand  
 Six Hundred Pounds by that which he had  
 so strongly recommended. I confess, it is  
 with difficulty I can restrain my indignation,  
 when I am vindicating the character of Mr.  
 Hastings



Hastings, from such gross aspersions as are cast upon it. In the first place he is blamed for adopting a plan, which, upon more mature reflection, and *receiving a latitude from the Company for drawing upon them*, he relinquished. Then he is said to have allowed the Board of Trade, in his improved plan, 5 per cent. on the sales in England, when the real fact is, the Supreme Council have merely recommended to the Court of Directors to make that allowance, which after all, it is at their option to grant or to reject, and the recommendation was in consequence of a very considerable reduction in the cost of the investment.

These strictures upon a plan *that has never been adopted*, and as you well know, *never will be adopted*, remind me of the very curious observation the General made in his 7th Report, as to the manner in which two acts of parliament were mentioned, in a letter from Mr. Sullivan and Sir William James, to the Supreme Council. The General proves, almost in the following page, that such paragraphs *made no part of the letter*, and you have now favored the House with an elaborate treatise

treatise upon an impolitic plan, and then gravely observe, that " the judgment formed " on the scheme of April (abandoned) has " nothing to do with the project of May," adopted. Then you assign two curious reasons for not suppressing your reflections, the first not founded in truth, the last merely an insinuation ; for I must inform you, Sir, that the Company received the plan of the 10th of May, by the Lively, a Month before your report was presented, though you assert that the Company does not know of it, by any regular transmission.

The Governor-General's disobedience of orders is again asserted. No new facts are adduced, and I trust I have in a former publication fully cleared up every point of this kind. I call upon your Chairman, General Smith, who knows something of India, to declare, as a man of honor, whether the measures pursued in England in 1776, and the two following years, were not of a most dangerous and mischievous nature, that they tended to weaken the necessary influence of the first British subject in India. If you do not already know it, I inform you, Sir, that

Mr.

Mr. Hastings's language, both to his Majesty's Ministers, and to the Court of Directors, has been uniform and consistent." " Remove me, or confirm me, but do not leave me at the head of the government, and deprive me of the necessary powers of acting with effect for the public good." As often as you mention Mr. Hastings's conduct to Mr. Bristow, and Mr. Fowke, so often will I repeat the evidence which I gave to your Committee, and I desire General Richard Smith, who has served the Company almost as long as I have done in India, may contradict me, if what I advance should not be founded in truth and common sense.

Mr. Hastings succeeded to the Government of Bengal in April, 1772, at that time, and for two years afterwards he enjoyed the full confidence of his constituents—a confidence which he never abused. I ask General Smith, if at that period, as well as during the Government of Lord Clive, Mr. Verelst and Mr. Cartier, the Court of Directors interfered in the internal arrangements of the Government of Bengal. They appointed civil servants as they had always done, but they left it

it to the Government abroad to employ them as they thought best for the public service. What would Lord Clive have said, had the Court of Directors nominated the junior servants to offices of trust and confidence in Bengal. He would have declared at once that such an interference would effectually destroy the necessary authority of the Government upon the spot.

The acts of disobedience which you have again brought forward, when stripped of the sophistry and misrepresentation, in which they are involved in the Report, are as follows.

Mr. Bristow and Mr. Fowke, two gentlemen of very fair and irreproachable characters, were appointed Residents at Oude and Benaris; the former in the room of Mr. Middleton, who had been nominated to that employment by Mr. Hastings about a year before, the latter was appointed to a new office the very moment that his father, not in the Company's service, had rendered himself conspicuous by taking an active part against Mr. Hastings, in the unfortunate contentions which at that time divided the Supreme Court.

Council. The Governor-General opposed both appointments, but as you well know, Sir, he had no more power at that time in the Council, than I had. When by the death of Colonel Monson, in September, 1776, he became possessed of some share in the Government, of which he was the head, he proposed the recall of Mr. Bristow and Mr. Fowke, not from any personal objection to any part of their conduct. I have before observed, I again repeat it, and I call upon Mr. Francis to contradict me, if I assert an untruth, that the attention of every man from Calcutta to Dehly was fixed upon this act, as the criterion by which he was to judge, whether Mr. Hastings meant to retain or to give up the Government. Whether it was the intention of General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, to proclaim to every power in Indostan, the annihilation of Mr. Hastings's political influence, when they appointed Mr. Bristow and Mr. Fowke, is of no moment to enquire, but that such was the effect of it, is a point which I believe no man will dispute. Mr. Hastings thought their recall was necessary, to fix his own influence upon its proper footing,

ing, for the conduct of the public service. The Court of Directors, however, thought otherwise. Without deigning to reply to the reasons assigned by Mr. Hastings for recalling Mr. Bristow and Mr. Fowke, they peremptorily ordered them to be restored. The order arrived in July, 1778, about the time we heard of the French war. Mr. Bristow had quitted India before the order arrived. Mr. Fowke was on the spot, but the execution of the order respecting him was suspended. Sir John Clavering died several months before this period.

Mr. Hastings opposed carrying the order into execution upon a ground, which in my opinion is unanswerable. That if it had been obeyed just then, the Country powers would have looked upon Mr. Hastings's immediate removal from the Government as certain, for at that period, Sir, it was asserted, as I can assure you upon my honor, that the reinstatement of Mess. Bristow and Fowke, were steps preparatory to Mr. Hastings's dismissal, and a letter of compliment and thanks from the Court of Directors to the late Sir John Clavering, was at that time translated into  
the

the Persian language, and circulated so high as in the camp of Nuzeph Cawn, near Dehly. Mr. Hastings, in acting as he did, was not influenced by resentment to Mr. Fowke, but merely wished to prevent an idea being circulated through India, that he was himself on the point of dismissal from his office. Here, Sir, I will readily join issue with you, that when the Court of Directors heard of this suspension of a positive order, they ought not again to have repeated it. If the reasons urged by Mr. Hastings, for delaying or declining to carry their orders into execution, did not appear satisfactory, they should have taken immediate steps for his dismissal: but while the Government of England thought proper to continue Mr. Hastings at the head of the Government in India, they should have allowed him the exercise of the same authority which his predecessors had invariably possessed, an authority inherent in every Government. I should be extremely glad to know, Sir, if you disapprove this necessary act of exertion in Mr. Hastings, in which he had no personal interest; upon what principle you can justify the Duke of Portland, who dispossessed two very honorable

honorable and able men of the posts of Secretaries to the Treasury, to make way for your brother, Mr. Richard Burke, and Mr. Sheridan. Colonel Monson avowed in Bengal, like a man, that no wise Government would employ men, of whose attachment they were not convinced. He looked upon General Clavering, Mr. Francis, and himself, as the Government at that moment; and he took away a trifling office in point of responsibility, tho' not trifling in emolument, from the late Mr. Playdel, and gave it to the brother-in-law of Mr. Francis.

An additional and a weighty reason determined Mr. Hastings not to reinstate Mess. Bristow and Fowke.—He conceived, and with justice too I think, that every Native in India, from Calcutta to Dehly, would have deemed their restoration as immediately preparatory to his own removal. In this light I again affirm, it had been represented by the party attached to Mr. Francis. If Mr. Hastings did, at that disgraceful period, adopt measures of harshness or injustice to the rights of individuals, let those be blamed for it, who absolutely forced the Governor-General  
of



of Bengal, into a personal contest with two junior servants of the Company. You have attempted to impress the world with an opinion, that Mr. Hastings has avowed a principle of disobedience, and that his Agent, Major Scott, has to far adopted Mr. Hastings's sentiments, as to hold a similar language in England. My sentiments, however, upon this subject, are neither new nor extraordinary. I think the Governor-General and Council are undoubtedly bound to obey the orders of the Court of Directors. I must have been an idiot to have thought otherwise; but where they think obedience to their orders may be attended with dangerous consequences to the public, they certainly may dispense with them, assigning whoever their reasons for so doing, and if those reasons should not be satisfactory, dismissal from the service ought to be the consequence. I am astonished how so plain a case can be misunderstood? Did not your Chairman, General Richard Smith, when a Member of the Council in Bengal, avow, on the 25th of September, 1769, that he knew the proposition, which he then brought forward, was in direct opposition to the positive orders of the Court

Court of Directors, but that the situation of public affairs fully justified him, in proposing to open the Company's Treasury for Drafts upon England? Did he not upon another occasion say, that he would risk his life and his honor, rather than carry into execution orders which he thought incompatible with the welfare of the State,—that he knew, however, he was responsible for every deviation of that kind. Without such a latitude, how in the name of God, can a great Kingdom, at the distance of twelve thousand miles, from the superior State be governed. Orders highly proper may be issued here in January, but when they arrive in Bengal in October, circumstances may be so changed, as to render them impolitic. In short, Sir, it is for the abuse, and not for the proper use, of power, that men in high stations, at the distance of half the globe, should be punished. What was the substance of Mr. Hastings's arguments for recalling Mess. Bristow and Fowke originally? "I am of opinion those Gentle-  
 " men were appointed to convince the Pow-  
 " ers of Indostan of the annihilation of my  
 " authority. Their recall alone can convince  
 " them that any share of power in this Go-  
 " vernment

"vernment has reverted to me." When the  
 orders were repeated our situation was criti-  
 cal. War had been declared against France,  
 and a large detachment was marching to  
 Bombay. Mr. Hastings then observed,  
 "The restoration of Mess. Bristow and Fowke  
 "has attracted the attention of every Prince  
 "in India. If they are restored, my dismissal  
 "will be deemed certain. The letter from the  
 "Court of Directors to the late Sir John Cla-  
 "vering, has been circulated even to Dehly,  
 "as well as through our own Provinces.  
 "While I am permitted to retain the Go-  
 "vernment, I must support the dignity of  
 "my station as far as I can,—declaring that  
 "no man can more earnestly wish for a final  
 "decision than I do." It is remarkable, Sir,  
 that the Directors do not, in the first disap-  
 probation of Mr. Hastings's conduct, nor in  
 the repetition of their orders respecting Mess.  
 Bristow and Fowke, take the smallest notice  
 of the arguments offered by Mr. Hastings in  
 his own defence. But I should be exceed-  
 ingly glad to hear any man, who has served  
 in India, dispute the force or the propriety  
 of them.

Mahomed Reza Cawn's appointment stood precisely on the same ground: He had been made an object of party;—but I beg, Sir, you will be pleased to recollect, that this respectable Mussulman has repeatedly declared, that, to the justice, the impartiality, and the attention of Mr. Hastings, he was indebted for his fortune, his honour, and his life, at a time when he was accused by Nundcomar of the most flagrant crimes and enormities.

Mr. Bristow, as you know, has been lately appointed to the Residency of Oude, by Mr. Hastings. The necessity no longer existed of declining to carry the Company's orders into execution, and obedience to them in their fullest extent has taken place. I am very sorry therefore that any circumstance respecting that Gentleman is again brought forward. Mr. Bristow certainly did write a very intemperate letter to the Supreme Council of India, on the 1st of May, 1780, claiming, as a right, that office, which the Court of Directors had conferred upon him, and styling them in three several parts of the letter, “our “Honorable Superiors,” saying his claim was grounded on “the highest authorities,”

&c. &c. You have remarked upon Major Scott's former evidence, who declared, that in his opinion Lord Clive would have sent any man a prisoner to England, who had written such a letter to the Board in his time, and you now say that your Committee finds nothing reprehensible in the letter, though it excited the warmest resentment of Mr. Hastings. How your friend, General Richard Smith, could subscribe to such an opinion, does, I confess, astonish me; no less so his acquiescence in the new and dangerous doctrine, which in your eagerness to criminate Mr. Hastings, you wish to inculcate. "That Mr. Bristow was not the servant of the Supreme Council, as Mr. Hastings hazards to call him, but their fellow servant."

When the honorable General was a member of the Government of Bengal, I believe no man saw in a stronger light than he did the necessity of supporting the dignity of it, in its fullest extent, nor did any man require a greater degree of subordination, obedience, and respect, from every inferior rank in the civil and military service. How would the General have bounced at the Board, if a civil  
servant

servant had, in dictatorial terms, claimed an appointment as his right, because "our honorable superiors had conferred it upon him," &c. &c. Would not the General have said, "The dignity of this Government must be preserved. We are responsible to the Court of Directors for our conduct: To them we will explain our reasons for deviating from their orders; but we will not be dictated to, or called to an account by our own servants."

I am confident this would have been the General's remark upon the occasion. Did he not cause three Armenians to be seized and imprisoned in Oude? Did he not instigate the Council to send Mr. Bolts a prisoner to England; and for what? Because the stories they circulated through Indostan, tended to lessen the *necessary weight and influence of the Governor of Bengal*. Did he not procure the dismissal of a most worthy, respectable, and gallant officer, Major Graham, without a Court Martial, because that gentleman had made use of an expression, which was deemed disrespectful, in a letter he wrote to the General? An expression mild indeed compared to several in the letter of Mr. Bristow. I have a  
very

very great respect and regard for Mr. Bristow. The business is now most happily adjusted—but as my name is again introduced, I trust Mr. Bristow will pardon me for saying, what every man who read that letter in India, said, that it was not written in such a style as the Supreme Council had usually been addressed in.

In short, Sir, the violence of contending parties, at the period these appointments were agitated, had tended so far to weaken the necessary power of the Government, that Mr. Hastings was left for two years in such a situation as I trust will not be the lot of any future Governor General. I must suppose, Sir, that there is as much integrity, ability and industry, in the Secret, as in the Select Committee; and yet how strangely different are your ideas as to the future regulation of the Government of India. You term a senior merchant in Bengal, the Fellow-Servant of the Governor-General.—The Lord Advocate of Scotland, on the other hand, judging, doubtless, that many of our misfortunes have resulted from the system which was so industriously pursued for three years, of reducing the authority of Mr. Hastings, proposes to confer the most des-

potic

potic power upon the Governor-General. If his ideas are carried too far, still I look upon his bill as being a complete confirmation of every thing Mr. Hastings has urged, as to the insufficiency of the power of the Governor-General, as far as the Lord Advocate's sentiments, and the sentiments of those with whom he has acted, can have weight with the public.

I am sorry to observe, Sir, that you have once more brought up the business of Nundcomar. It is impossible to reply to insinuations. I have again and again asserted, that whenever a charge is brought forward it shall be fully answered. All that I can now do, is, to repeat what I have asserted before, that Mr. Hastings had no concern, either directly, or indirectly, in the apprehension, the prosecution, or the execution of Nundcomar. I confess I do not clearly understand your expression. "Nundcomar appears at the very  
 "time of this extraordinary prosecution a  
 "discoverer of some particulars of illicit  
 "gain, then charged upon Mr. Hastings,  
 "the Governor General." Nundcomar, Sir, made no discovery whatever, he accused Mr.  
 Hastings,



Hastings of having accumulated millions of Rupees in about thirty months. The absurdity of the charge was palpable ; it was fully enquired into, and proved to be false in every part ! Why would you not favour the world with a few further particulars respecting this most notorious of all delinquents, Nundcomar, You must know that it was generally said in Calcutta, about the time of his execution, that he had made several very important discoveries. On the 4th of August, 1775, a servant of Nundcomar brought a paper to General Clavering. On the 5th the Raja was hanged. On the 6th the General ordered the paper to be translated. On the 14th he brought it to the Board, and said he thought it contained several particulars, which his Majesty's Ministers, and the Court of Directors, should be acquainted with. Some conversation ensued, and Mr. Hastings insisted upon the paper being produced to the Board. It was then read and entered in the Records. On the 16th Mr. Francis moved, that the paper should be burned by the hands of the common hangman, as a libel, and the copy of it expunged from the Records. Here the business ended, and I should hope, Sir, that  
you

you will not in future insinuate any thing to the disadvantage of the Governor-General, upon the evidence of such a man as Nundcomar was. I again repeat, that a Committee was expressly appointed to examine into the charges brought against Mr. Hastings by the Raja, they had every means given them of investigating every particular most fully, and the enquiry ended, as your "direct charge of corruption," has ended, Nothing was found that reflected either upon the honor or the integrity of the Governor-General.

The next point which you have introduced into your Report, with a view to prejudice the House against Mr. Hastings, is an account of the resignation; and here, Sir, I confess my unwillingness to follow you. Two of the parties concerned in that mysterious business are no more: but your noble friend, Lord North, and the gentlemen who filled the two Chairs of the Direction, at the time this transaction happened are upon the spot, and are able to clear up every dubious circumstance in it. I will relate the affair as circumstantially as I can: Soon after the Supreme Council arrived, and had commenced their opposition

tion to every political measure of Mr. Hastings's government ; Mr. Maclean went to England, impowered by the Governor-General, to act as his Agent. His instructions were undoubtedly to endeavour to procure for Mr. Hastings, that support which he thought due to his station ; but if that support could not be procured, Mr. Hastings declared, very explicitly, that he did not wish to remain in the Government. His letters to his Majesty's Minister, and to the Court of Directors at that period, breathed the same sentiments exactly. The conversation alluded to, was of a similar nature :—In the course of a few months, however, the attacks upon Mr. Hastings became very personal ; it was roundly asserted, that there was no species of peculation of which he had not been guilty, and proofs were promised to be sent to England by the latter ships' of 1775. Thus circumstanced, Mr. Hastings wrote to the Court of Directors, in the most explicit and positive terms, that painful as his situation was, and would be, he was determined to retain it until forcibly removed from it.

Now, Sir, as the instructions under which Mr. Maclean resigned the Government for  
Mr.

Mr. Hastings, were dated in December, 1774, surely the Court of Directors ought to have regarded his positive declarations to them, in letters of subsequent dates, by three and six months, as of more force than loose paragraphs picked out of letters to Mr. Maclean, tho' in the hand-writing of Mr. Hastings, which contained simply this, "if I am not supported, I wish to give up, because any government is better than a divided one." However, Sir, the Committee of Directors, who examined Mr. Maclean's powers, were as you say of opinion, that they were full and sufficient,—a most extraordinary declaration from gentlemen, who had read letters of a later date from Mr. Hastings, notifying his determined resolution to remain in the Government, the several steps were taken to fill up the vacancy, but so great was the doubt of the legality of the act, that the parties concerned did never ask the opinion of Council upon it, though required so to do, in a general Court, by Governor Johnstone.

The news of this remarkable event arrived in India, to the general astonishment of all parties. Mr. Hastings disavowed having giv-

en any authority to Mr. Maclean to resign for him, but declared at the same time, that he would give up the Government, because he thought that gentleman had acted for his interest, to the best of his judgment. Now, Sir, came on the great difficulty in settling this business. It had never been intimated to Mr. Hastings that he was instantly to resign. Such an idea would have been too absurd for Mr. Maclean to come into, of course he meant to continue until the season for quitting Bengal. Sir John Clavering on the other hand had been informed by private letters, that he had succeeded to the Government. It was natural for him to suppose, that if Mr. Hastings could keep the chair a day, he could keep it as long as he pleased, so that this very circumstance rendered the resignation of no effect. It made it, in fact, an agreement which required Mr. Hastings's consent before it could be complete, and such undoubtedly it was. I pass over the subsequent events in Bengal. Both parties made their representations to England. Mr. Hastings called loudly upon the Chairman of the Court of Directors, to publish to the world, what the powers were which had been produced by Mr. Maclean.

He

He wrote in as strong a style of complaint to his Majesty's Minister. These letters were dispatched previous to the death of Sir John Clavering. See, Sir, in what a dilemma you are involved. If you mean to insinuate that Mr. Maclean was really possessed of full powers to resign for Mr. Hastings, that he made use of those powers when he saw Mr. Hastings on the point of being dismissed from the service, that his Majesty's Ministers, and the Court of Directors were, and still are, fully satisfied of the sufficiency of those powers ; what excuse can you make for the conduct of your new friend, Lord North ? That noble Lord, since the period of this pretended resignation, has twice presumed to come forward to Parliament, to propose a man to fill the high and important office of Governor-General of Bengal, who has dared, by your account, to practise such a deceit upon the nation, as no punishment could be too severe for. I did hope, Sir, that this transaction would not have been revived at so great a distance of time : since you however have revived it, why will you not call upon such of the parties now in England, as have seen the powers which Mr. Maclean produced ? Lord North was the Minister

Minister when the resignation took place. He was the Minister when Mr. Hastings denied the authority under which it had been made. He was the Minister when Mr. Hastings called for the powers to be produced to the world, under which his agent had acted ; and in the two following years, his Lordship proposed that Mr. Hastings should be appointed Governor-General of Bengal. Can we, Sir, have a stronger confirmation of Lord North's sentiments of Mr. Hastings's conduct than he has given ? Would he have proposed a man to fill the first office in India, who was so far wanting in honor as to deny or to explain away, powers he had once given. There was a time when the argument I now use would have had less weight with you. There was a time, if I mistake not, when you would yourself have impeached the noble Lord ; but at present, I presume, his Lordship's sentiments of a transaction, which I am sorry to dwell so long upon, will have some weight with you.

I have so great an opinion of the honor of the noble Lord, that I am convinced no consideration upon earth would have induced him to propose Mr. Hastings, a second and a third  
time

time for the Government of Bengal, in a British House of Commons, had he not been fully satisfied of the propriety of his conduct, as well in the business of the resignation, as in every act of his government, to the year 1781.

In short, Sir, you ought not to have mentioned a syllable about the resignation; or if you had entered upon the subject, common justice required that you should have examined as many of the parties who were concerned in that transaction as are now in England. Some of them are no more,—and

“ Let no renew’d hostilities invade,

“ The peaceful grave’s inviolable shade.”

If Mr. Maclean was the Agent of the Nabob of Arcot, Mr. William Burke is the Agent of the Raja of Tanjore,

Now, Sir, I must inform you, that the very curious reasons which you have assigned for Mr. Maclean’s conduct are totally without foundation. Every idea of removing Mr. Hastings at the India-House was at an end. He had gained a complete victory there, against the whole force of a Government, whose interest was at that period extremely powerful; but the idea was, that his Majesty’s Ministers  
were



were determined to carry in parliament what they could not effect in the city. I am convinced, Sir, if the compromise had not taken place, and the affairs of India had been agitated in the House of Commons, in the winter of 1776, Mr. Hastings would have had your warmest support, for at that period he was in the opinion of your party, an able, honest, great, and injured man, nor were his demerits discovered by you, until Lord North shewed an inclination to support him. In the first Report of your Select Committee, you have published a copy of Mr. Hastings's public letter to the Chairman of the Court of Directors, which he wrote when he did me the honor to nominate me his Agent. That letter contains the following paragraph, " It is material to  
 " me to make one observation, that in my in-  
 " structions to Major Scott, I have particu-  
 " larly provided, that I will suffer no person  
 " whatever to perform any act in my name,  
 " that shall be construed to imply a resigna-  
 " tion of my authority; protesting against  
 " the exercise of so dangerous a power, from  
 " its having been assumed upon a former oc-  
 " casion, without being warranted by my  
 " consent, or by any previous instructions,  
 " that

“ that could bear the most distant tendency  
 “ to such a measure.”

Would Mr. Hastings dare to provoke an enquiry in the manner he has done, if he had ever empowered any man to make a surrender of his Government for him, or would the Court of Directors have submitted to such a notification, provided they had believed that the transaction of 1776, was a legal, valid resignation, and complete in all its parts.

I have now, Sir, gone through the insinuations contained against Mr. Hastings, in your Ninth Report. There is certainly no direct, (or implied) charge of corruption; and tho' you are pledged to God, to the House of Commons, and your country, to prove the Governor-General a most notorious delinquent; you have as yet produced not a single instance of his corruption in office. It is true you have laboured hard to prove, that an opium contract has been given to Mr. Stephen Sulivaa upon terms not so advantageous as probably it might have been concluded upon.

It happens unfortunately too, that this gentleman is the son of a Director. : As the Appendix to your Report is not yet published, I have not read Mr. Hastings's reasons for disposing of the opium contract without putting it up to public auction: I dare say they are of some force; but what does the charge amount to,—that the gentleman, who has been eight times Chairman of the East-India Company, has served that Company abroad and at home above fifty years, is possessed of so small a fortune, that he procured for his only son, an appointment in the Civil Service at Madras; that Mr. Stephen Sullivan went at the end of three years to Bengal; that Mr. Hastings, who had been for many years in habits of intimacy and friendship with the father, appointed him his Private Secretary and Judge Advocate-General; and that he afterwards gave him a contract, which has been a profitable contract to every man who has held it. I believe, Sir, no man who has filled so great an office for so many years as Mr. Hastings has done, can be clearer from the charge of wasting the public money for private purposes, than he is : to mere insinuations I shall oppose positive facts. Look around you, and tell

tell me how many of the gentlemen, who have arrived in England in the course of the twelve years, that Mr. Hastings has been Governor of Bengal, were of his family, or particularly patronized by him. With truth and justice I can say, that as Mr. Hastings's fortune is moderate in the extreme, for his station, so have the views and expectations of those attached to him been moderate. I desire you will point out a single person, either of his family, or intimately connected with, or dependent upon him, who has returned from Bengal with a large fortune or a dubious character. " The  
 " few who are called his friends cannot rise  
 " above an humble mediocrity, and the great-  
 " est part are now soliciting to return to India  
 " for bread."

If the Governor-General has wasted the public Treasure for private purposes, surely it will not be difficult to fix upon some of those individuals, who have benefited by an unauthorized exertion of the power of patronage. Produce a single instance of a gentleman, now in England, who accumulated a fortune in the course of the twelve years Mr. Hastings has been at the head of the Government of Bengal,

by enjoying improper advantages at the Company's expence, or in your own words, " by a waste of public treasure for private purposes," and you will go further to establish one species of delinquency against Mr. Hastings, than by fifty insinuations, unsupported by facts. That advantageous contracts have been given away in Bengal, as well as in other countries, cannot be doubted, but to every declaration, that rapid fortunes are continually made in Bengal, I shall oppose a positive fact. The Company's civil servants are some of them of above twenty-six years standing in the country, many above twenty, and a great number indeed of more than fifteen years length of service. The Company's military servants are of equal, if not of longer standing, and I refer you, Sir, to the evidence of your reports to prove, that almost all the gentlemen who have been examined by you, have served the Company abroad from fifteen to twenty years. It was at the time of the acquisition of the Duanne, before Mr. Hastings's return to Bengal, that those rapid and enormous fortunes were acquired in a short period; and as you well know, your honorable friend, General Richard Smith, was but four years

years and seven months in Bengal. It would be impertinent in me to presume to guess at the amount of his acquisitions; but certainly we have had no instances, during Mr. Hastings's administration, of rapid and enormous fortunes being acquired, though by the extension of our influence to Oude, the means of providing for individuals has been considerably increased.

You have searched the Company's Records with industry; you have had the additional advantage of conversing with every man who has returned from India; and what have you discovered? that an improvident contract, as you state it, has been granted to Mr. Stephen Sullivan—This is “The waste of public “Treasure for private Purposes.”—Have *you*, Sir, been as moderate in exercising the power of patronage as Mr. Hastings has proved himself to be, in a difficult and trying situation?—How many of the name of Burke, are now fed at the public expence—your relation, who first acquired, and afterwards lost a fortune, in the Alley, made two journeys over land to India, and appeared here as the avowed agent of the Raja of Tanjore, was,

1000

soon after the change of the Ministry, in March, 1782, nominated to the new and useless office of Receiver of the Ballances due from the East-India Company to the Crown, on account of the Regiments serving in India; or, in other words, Paymaster of his Majesty's Forces in India: but I decline the invidious task of stating to what an extent you have exercised the power of providing for your relations at the public expence, during the short time your party has been in office.—It is sufficient for me to assert, that Mr. Hastings, and his friends, are as free from the vice of rapacity, as from the folly of extravagance.

You have said, Sir, that Mr. Hastings, when he first heard of the Resignation, had recourse to one of those unlook'd for and hardy measures which characterize the whole of his administration.

Was this meant as a compliment or a reflection? it was, I grant you, a hardy measure to march a detachment across India—but it succeeded——It was a hardy measure to invade the country of Madjee Sindia—but it produced

produced an immediate peace with the only active Member of the Maratta state, and a general peace with the Marattas has been the consequence.—It was a hardy measure, and big with personal responsibility, to draw off the Maratta army at Cuttack, by advancing Chimnaje Boosla a Sum of money, without the consent of Mr. Francis, but the East-India Company has felt the good effects of it.—It was a hardy measure to propose embarking six hundred and forty Europeans, with a large supply of treasure, to relieve Madras, at the moment that the navigation was interdicted, on account of the dangers that attended it.—But the necessity for exertion was pressing, and the Measure succeeded.—The Responsibility of this meritorious exertion was thrown upon Mr. Hastings, and Sir Eyre Coote.—These hardy measures have secured to the Governor-General, the applause of his countrymen, and have saved our empire in India from destruction.

I must confess, Sir, it does appear something extraordinary, that Mr. Hastings should be censured by Mr. Burke, for betraying signs of an impatient, independent, and overbearing



bearing temper, and for presuming to avow a principle of disobedience to superior authority. Does such an accusation come with a good grace from a gentleman, who in one instance has acted in direct opposition to the sense of the late and present Law-officers of the Crown ; and in another, has set his judgment up in opposition to the solemn determination of the great Council of the Nation ? and who, having satisfied his own mind of the propriety of an alteration in a depending Bill, deemed it useless and unnecessary to communicate his discoveries to the House of Commons ? If these are instances of amiable weakness, and are not to be censured on that account, why, Sir, will you not make some allowance for the difficulties of Mr. Hastings's former situation.

Were I to adopt your mode of reasoning ; were I to attribute every action of your life to the worst possible motive, how easy would it be, to say, that when you took upon yourself to restore two men to offices, from which they had been removed on suspicion of delinquency, you meant to obstruct the course of public justice, or that when you examined  
evidence

evidence without doors to prove the propriety of altering a bill which had been debated clause by clause in a Committee of the House of Commons; and when you made such alterations upon evidence you thought of no moment to communicate, you shewed a stronger instance of an independent spirit, than Mr. Hastings has ever displayed.

I trust I am warranted in supposing that every part of the Ninth Report was written by yourself. Of this fact there will, I believe be no doubt; but the respectable Committee, of which you are a member, having adopted the reasoning contained in it, perhaps some apology may be necessary to the gentlemen who attended when the Report was read, as well as to Mr. Burke. I assure you, Sir, I mean to take no improper liberty with them, or with you; and if in defending Mr. Hastings from the insinuations which are contained against him in the Ninth Report, I have been hurried into any disrespectful expressions, I very sincerely acknowledge my error, and crave pardon of you, and the Committee.

I well know the deference and respect which is due from an humble individual, like myself, to a gentleman who possesses so eminent a rank in the literary world, who fills so high an office in the state, and is admitted to the Councils of our most gracious Sovereign ; if in any expression in this letter, I shall appear to have lost sight of that deference and respect, I trust you will attribute it to my firm conviction of the injustice which has been done to Mr. Hastings's character, in the Ninth Report of the Select Committee.

I have the honor to be,

S I R,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. S.

P. S.

P. S. In the concluding paragraphs of your Report, you observe that many material papers, lately arrived from India, have been laid before your Committee,—I presume you mean the dispatches received by the Lively: You appear, however, to have selected the resolution of the Council-General relative to the investment, as the only document necessary to be brought forward at present; and even this paper is consigned to an Appendix, *not yet published*,—Your Report is brought forward at so late a period of the session professedly, *in order to enable the House to adopt the most proper means for regulating the British Government in India*:—If this was your intention in bringing the Report forward on the 13th of June, surely, Sir, it would have been candid to have said something further relative to the Lively's dispatches. The idea without doors is, that they contain undoubted proofs of the spirited and successful exertions of the Governor General and Council, and give the Company a well-founded hope of their being able to surmount the astonishing difficulties and embarrassments in which every Presidency has been involved. Not a hint of this kind, however, is to be found in your Report, and the only

G

paper

paper alluded to is that in which the Supreme Council have recommended to the Court of Directors, to allow the Members of the Board of Trade, resident in Calcutta, 5 per cent. upon the amounts of the investment. Any person reading your Report, would conclude, I am sure, that the grant of the 5 per Cent. was absolute by the Supreme Council, instead of being merely a recommendation, and instead of this "memorable transaction," binding the Board of Trade to take no unlawful "emolument," and consequently implying, that such had hitherto been taken, the meaning must be, as the words express, "that they were to take no further emolument ;" by which was understood, I presume, a restriction from trade, in such articles as might affect the Company's investment for the ensuing season.

A  
S E C O N D  
L E T T E R  
TO THE  
Rt. Hon. EDMUND BURKE,  
In Reply to the Infimations  
IN THE  
*NINTH REPORT*  
OF THE  
SELECT COMMITTEE,  
Which affect the Character of Mr. HASTINGS.

---

By J. S.

L O N D O N :

Printed by GILBERT and PLUMMER, No. 12,  
*Cree-church-lane, Leadenball-street.*

M DCC LXXXIII.



TO THE  
Right Hon. EDMUND BURKE.

*London, 9th July, 1783.*

S I R,

WHEN I did myself the honor to address you on the 19th of June, the Appendix to the Ninth Report was not published. In candour and fairness both should have appeared at the same moment, because it is possible that very different conclusions may be drawn by different men, from the same facts. If I presumed to animadvert with some degree of freedom upon the insinuations contained in the Ninth Report, and to complain of the gross injustice which has been done to the Governor-General's character, I shall be less able to restrain myself, when I proceed to the elucidation of such parts of his conduct, as the documents which you have published in the Appendix will afford me an opportunity of justifying.

On



On the 13th of June, a Report from a Committee of the House of Commons, professedly compiled by Mr. Burke, is presented. This Report is made, "in order to enable the House to adopt the most proper means for regulating the British Government in India."

It is drawn up with great art and ability, and may not unaptly be styled a Critical Review, palpably calculated to catch the passions and prejudices of the moment. The Appendix from whence I mean to refute every syllable that affects Mr. Hastings, is kept back until the fifth of July, twenty-two days from the delivery of the Report. If you should say, that its bulk prevented an earlier publication, I must beg leave to observe to you, Sir, that common justice should have induced you to have produced the Report and the Appendix at the same time.—Mr. Fox, one day informs the House, after passing a warm, if not a just, eulogium upon the ability, the integrity, and the labours of the Select Committee, that a Report of very great importance is soon to be presented, and then the affairs of India will be fully discussed. I do  
not

not enquire into Mr. Fox's motives for postponing the consideration of India affairs to another session, and thus playing with an empire, although the Governor-General had so spiritedly called upon Ministers, either to remove or to confirm him, nor do I seek to know what arguments induced you to sit silent for the first time since my arrival in England, when Bengal, or Mr. Hastings, was the subject of discussion in the House of Commons. I am convinced that His Majesty's Ministers have an high opinion both of the ability and the integrity of Mr. Hastings, Can any reasonable man in this kingdom believe, that a single Member of the Cabinet really thinks Mr. Hastings the author of the calamities of India, that he has acted contrary to the honour and policy of the nation, or brought enormous expences on the East India Company ? If one of his Majesty's Ministers entertained such an opinion, would he have consented to postpone the consideration of India business for so many months, when all parties agree, that Bengal is the last great stake left to this divided, unhappy country ?

In my last letter I stated the case of Mr. Bristow, but I omitted to take notice of a very severe and a very unjust insinuation contained in the course of your strictures upon it. In truth, I knew it to be so unfounded, that it made not the smallest impression upon me, though upon further consideration it will be absolutely necessary to reply to it, lest the charge may have weight with the world.

After stating the proceedings in Council relative to the restoration of Mr. Bristow, you say, “ Mr. Hastings proposed, as a compromise, a division of the object in question, “ one half was to be surrendered to the authority of the Court of Directors, the other “ was reserved for his dignity.” And then you go on to state, “ That Mr. Bristow ought “ to have been appointed to the pecuniary “ trust, and Mr. Middleton to the Residency, provided Mr. Hastings wished to avoid “ all suspicion with respect to the purity of “ his Motives.”

I am truly sorry, Sir, that in your eagerness to criminate Mr. Hastings, you should entirely forget what were the orders of the Court  
of

of Directors relative to Mr. Bristow, upon which the proceedings professedly were founded. In 1775, Mr. Bristow was appointed *Resident at Oude*. In 1777, he was removed. In 1779, he was restored to *the Residency* by the Court of Directors. In 1780, Mr. Francis moves, in consequence that he shall be nominated to *the Residency*. Sir Eyre Coote and Mr. Wheler agree, the former however expressing his disapprobation of carrying into execution the orders of the Court of Directors at that particular moment, if they could have been avoided, and expressing his readiness to adopt any measure Mr. Hastings could propose, for supporting the *necessary influence* of his station.

Mr. Bristow was put in possession of the *Residency of Oude*, in conformity to the order of the *Court of Directors*; the other appointment was no part of the office to which Mr. Bristow had originally been nominated, and might be made totally distinct, without *an infringement of their orders*; but had Mr. Middleton been appointed public Resident, and Mr. Bristow to the office of Paymaster of the Troops, and Collector of the Tuncaws; how would the *Court of Directors*

*refers orders* have been carried into execution, at all?

Nothing can be more ungenerous and unjust than your reflections upon this affair. The attention of the Legislature, and of the people of England, is now however so strongly drawn to the cause of the Governor-General, that it is no longer in your power to injure him by insinuations. If you mean to prove, or to attempt to prove, Mr. Hastings a notorious delinquent, which you are pledged to do, you must produce a specific charge to which I will give a specific, and I dare say a satisfactory reply; if Mr. Hastings's character for integrity is not too firmly fixed, to be affected by this part of your report, I will bring a proof positive, that he had no private, no interested views to gratify, when he proposed sending Mr. Middleton to Oude, and I could wish, Sir, that you had thought proper to insert the following letter, either in your Report, or in your Appendix. It was received on the 27th of May, at the India-House.

In September, 1782, Mr. Hastings thought he had reason to be dissatisfied with the public conduct

conduct of Mr. Middleton, on these grounds, that he had not exerted himself to procure the payment of the balances, due from the Vizier to the Company, and that he had neglected to transmit some material information to the Board, after stating these points in a letter to the Supreme Council, dated on the Ganges, 22d of September, 1782. Mr. Hastings adds,

“ The obstacle which opposed itself to the  
 “ nomination of Mr. Bristow, to the Residency  
 “ ship of Oude, no longer exists. I have the  
 “ pleasure of finding, upon the most impartial  
 “ enquiry, that the conduct of Mr. Bristow,  
 “ during his former Residency at the Court  
 “ of the Vizier, has been proper and attentive.  
 “ I accordingly wish him to succeed to the  
 “ present Resident, provided the Vizier has  
 “ no reasonable objection to his appointment.

“ I have now great satisfaction in informing you, that my letter to the acting Minister of the Vizier has had the happiest effects in realizing the heavy balances due to the Company from Oude, and it is said that the present Resident, and his Deputy, are brought to a proper sense of their duty to the Company.

" But as in every act of my administration of  
 " the affairs of the Company, I never had an  
 " object in view, but their permanent inter-  
 " est, as far as my judgment could direct  
 " me, and as prejudice in favor of those in  
 " whom I have confided, or against those who  
 " oppose me, vanish in my mind, when the  
 " good of the service requires it; I now wish  
 " you to recall Mr. Middleton from the  
 " Court of the Vizier, and to appoint Mr.  
 " Bristow in his room.

" My weak state of health obliges me to  
 " dictate this letter from my bed, yet I can-  
 " not but add, that your instructions to Mr.  
 " Bristow should be strong and positive upon  
 " these points; 1st. That he should always  
 " shew every possible respect to the Vizier  
 " and his family. 2dly, That he should  
 " take the most effectual steps for securing  
 " all that may remain unpaid of the Com-  
 " pany's balances; 3dly, That the security  
 " and internal peace of the Vizier's domi-  
 " nions, and the happiness of the people,  
 " should be constantly in his view, and that  
 " he should communicate fully and freely  
 " with this Government upon these subjects."

I should

I should hope, Sir, after reading this extract you will be of opinion, that it is not possible to impute the Governor-General's conduct to base or sinister views, and here I shall drop the subject.

From your statement of the Opium monopoly in the Reports, I was inclined to believe that I had been hitherto misinformed relative to that branch of the Company's Revenues, but upon reading the papers published in the Appendix, I find, as I always understood, that Mr. Hastings is clearly entitled to the merit of having brought the amount of this advantageous monopoly to the credit of the Company.

Your honorable friend, General Richard Smith, will undoubtedly recollect, that while he was a Member of the Administration in Bengal, the Opium of the Revenue of Bahar was avowedly a monopoly for the emolument of individuals. It had been so during the Government of Lord Clive and Mr. Verelst, and continued on the same footing until Mr. Hastings succeeded to the chair.

In



In the first year of his Government, he stipulated that 800 chests should be prepared on the Company's account, which was in fact adding two lacks of rupees to the Revenues of that year.

In the second year the whole of the Opium in the Province of Bahar was provided on the Company's account, for which they paid 320 rupees a chest, and might probably gain five lacks by the sale of it.

And here, Sir, I must observe, that you do not state the transaction fairly, or truly, when you say, "at length it engaged the attention of the Company." The fact is, that it had *previously* engaged the *attention* of Mr. Hastings, to whom the credit is certainly due of having turned the monopoly of Opium to the advantages of his employers; a circumstance, which from design or accident, you have omitted to mention. It did not in fact engage the attention of the Directors till December, 1775, and all they then say upon it is, that it shall be under the management of the Supreme Council.

After

After the arrival of General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, the Supreme Council determined that the Opium should be provided by contract, and all persons were invited by an advertisement to send in proposals.—There were twelve candidates for the contract; Mr. Griffiths, whose proposals were the lowest obtained, and held it two years; it was then given for three years to Mr. Mackenzie, unless the Directors should in the mean time order the monopoly to be abolished.—But you observe, “that the contract was not put up to public auction, as it ought to have been, for which the Governor General and Council were severely reprimanded.”

The words of the Directors are, “that the contract should have been put up to auction, or previous enquiries should have been made, necessary to guide your judgment therein, and to warrant the measure, we therefore must disapprove your conduct on that occasion.” I would ask any reasonable man, whether the paragraph I have quoted should be called a *severe reprimand*?—

What

What proof have you given, that previous enquiries were not made ? The fact is, that the Board, before they concluded Mr. Griffiths's contract in 1775, had made every necessary previous enquiry to guide their judgement, and the information of the 'Patha Council' being on Record, a further enquiry in 1777 was unnecessary.

When Mr. Mackenzie's contract was nearly expired, he renewed it for another year, and then it was granted to Mr. Stephen Sullivan for four years, the precise time Mr. Mackenzie had held it, and upon the same terms.

I shall forbear, Sir, to remark upon the very extraordinary style and manner in which you detail this business, so different from any thing that has hitherto appeared in a parliamentary report, but I will endeavour to relate plain matters of fact in plain and intelligible language.

From 1765 to 1772, the Opium of the province of Bahar had been a monopoly in the hands of individuals. If it was wrong to permit

permit the Company's servants to enjoy so great an advantage at the expence of their employers, your honourable friend, General Smith, having been a part of the time a member of the administration, is Particeps Criminis ; but in those days, the rage of Reformation had not seized him. In 1772, Mr. Hastings caused the Company to participate in this monopoly.—Their share that year was 800 chests.—In 1773, the Company became possessed of the whole at 320 Rupees a chest, not in consequence of orders from England, but by Mr. Hastings's attention to the interests of his constituents, and for this, amongst other œconomical arrangements, he received the thanks of the Court of Directors.

In 1775, the Supreme Council determined to dispose of the Ophium contract to the lowest bidder.—There were twelve competitors, and Mr. Griffiths's proposals being the most favorable for the Company were accepted.—It is fair to presume that the terms, which he took the contract upon, were very low; that they were highly advantageous to the Company is clear, and General Clavering, and Mr. Francis thought so, or they would not

not have consented to Mr. Mackenzie's holding the contract for three years, upon almost similar terms, without its being again put up to public auction,—for you will be pleased to observe, Sir, that neither General Clavering nor Mr. Francis, made such a proposition.—This is a fact, which I beg you will attend to.—When Mr. Mackenzie's term was expired, he was permitted to hold the contract for one year longer, and then it was given for four years to Mr. Stephen Sullivan, upon the same terms that Mr. Mackenzie had held it—terms something lower than the lowest that had been offered by twelve different competitors, when it was put up to public auction in 1775.—Let any honest man read this plain state of facts, and then declare upon his honor, if it is such a transaction as Mr. Hastings need to blush at.—

If Sir John Clavering (of whose integrity and honor I ever had the highest opinion) coincided in opinion with Mr. Hastings, that the Opium contract, upon the terms which Mr. Griffiths had held it, was placed upon a very fair and equitable footing, if he consented to permit Mr. Mackenzie to hold it  
for

for three years, with a trifling alteration in favor of the company, and one proviso, *unless the monopoly itself should be abolished*, within that period, if the only objection stated by the Directors to Mr. Mackenzie's contract was, that it had not been put up to public auction, nor \* *previous enquiries* made, if Mr. Hastings has but merely continued a contract to Mr. Sullivan, upon terms which General Clavering and Mr. Francis approved of, why in God's Name, have you purposely involved the affair in so much obscurity? — Ridicule in one paragraph, insinuation in a second, and misrepresentation in a third.

You say, “ This Monopoly continuing and  
 “ gathering strength, through a succession of  
 “ Contractors, and being probably a most  
 “ lucrative dealing, it grew to be every day  
 “ a greater object of competition. The  
 “ Council of Patna endeavoured to recover  
 “ the contract, or at least the agency, by the  
 “ most inviting terms; and in this eager.

\* The Court of Directors did not recollect, perhaps, when they made this observation, how fully the subject had been considered in 1773, which precluded the necessity of a further enquiry, in the opinion both of Mr. Hastings and General Clavering.

“ state of mutual complaint and competition  
 “ between private men and public bodies;  
 “ things continued until the arrival of Mr.  
 “ Stephen Sullivan, son of Mr. Sullivan,  
 “ Chairman of the East-India Company,  
 “ which soon put an end to all strife and  
 “ emulation.”

I really, Sir, do not know how to reply  
 to this Paragraph.—There is such a strange  
 misrepresentation of facts throughout.—In  
 the first place, the offer from the Council of  
 Patna was made *in March, 1775*, in reply to  
 a letter to them from the Supreme Council,  
 requiring their opinion *as to the best mode of  
 providing Opium in future*.—The offer was  
 not accepted, as Mr. Griffiths’s terms were  
 much more favorable for the Company, and  
 I can find no subsequent application from the  
 Patna Council.—The Board of Trade, which  
 is an Imperium in Imperio, had applied to  
 the Directors to be allowed the management  
 of the Opium as a commercial concern;  
 but since the year 1777, they appear not to  
 have written respecting the Contract;—so that  
 “ the eager state of mutual complaint,  
 “ competition,” to which you allude; but  
 of

of which I can find no trace in the Appendix must have been from March, 1775, to August, 1777, *above three years prior to Mr. Stephen Sullivan's arrival in Bengal.*—How can you, Sir, attempt to mislead the public in so gross a manner?—Would not any man of common understanding suppose from reading your account, that the Ophium contract had been a continued object of contention, from 1775, till Mr. Sullivan got it in 1781? Yet I cannot find a line upon the subject in your Appendix, between the months of July, 1777, when the contract was granted to Mr. Mackenzie, and April, 1781, when it was given to Mr. Sullivan—A period of almost four years.—

Mr. Francis observed, when the Ophium contract was first under consideration, on the 23d of May, 1775, “ *I should think it unadvisable to engage on very low terms with any contractor.*” Here Mr. Francis speaks as every sensible man will speak, who thinks upon the subject. But if this Ophium contract was to be put up annually to public auction, and given to the lowest bidder, as you assert it ought to be, it may fall into the hands, as Mr. Francis says,



*says, " of persons who have the power to indemnify  
 " themselves at any rate ; and from whom the  
 " Ryots and Farmers would in fact have no appeal.*

I know your regard for Mr. Francis ; it gives me therefore much pleasure to quote what you deem so respectable an authority. I find also in your Appendix an unanswerable argument in favour of the Opium Contract being extended beyond the period of one or two years ; Mr. Griffiths says (and a contractor may speak truth sometimes) " As the extent  
 " and improvement of the poppy cultivation  
 " wholly depends on the measures adopted by  
 " the contractor, it is unquestionably *his*  
 " *interest* (when his engagements are for a long  
 " term) to conduct himself with that justice  
 " and lenity, which is the only mode of conciliating the good opinion of the Ryots, and  
 " thereby encouraging them to pay their  
 " whole and unremitted attention to the produce of their lands ; they will then, *and not*  
 " *till then*, heartily join with the contractor, in  
 " extending the cultivation, and readily adopt  
 " any mode which he may point out for the  
 " improvement thereof.—These happy effects  
 " can never be experienced, while the engage-  
 " ments

“ments are limited to *one year*; the contractor,  
 “*having no future object*, finds it necessary to  
 “*exact his utmost dues* from the Ryot, who, as  
 “he expects a new master, his whole attention  
 “is consequently bent on taking advantage of  
 “the new and old contractors, &c. &c.”

Mr. Griffiths was permitted ~~to~~ hold the contract a second year.

Mr. Mackenzie, the next contractor, says,  
 “The Ryots, from every information I have  
 “been able to obtain, suffer great hardships  
 “and distress from a frequent change of con-  
 “tractors; your granting me the exclusive  
 “privilege of manufacturing the Ophium for  
 “a term of years, will make it *my interest to*  
 “*cherish the Inhabitants*, and experience will  
 “teach them to confide in me, and encourage  
 “them to apply themselves to the culture of  
 “their lands with chearfulness and alacrity.  
 “These desirable effects can never be felt,  
 “whilst they have a *yearly change of masters*, as  
 “the contractor, in that case, confines his  
 “study and attention solely to temporary ad-  
 “vantages, without any view to future im-  
 “provement, or the cultivation of this valu-  
 “able branch of revenue.”

I do

I do not enquire into the motives which induced Mr. Griffiths and Mr. Mackenzie to offer these Remarks to the Board, but they are founded in reason, truth, and common sense.

I have now explained the nature of the contract granted to Mr. Sullivan. I will not pretend to say, that I believe it to be, even upon the present fair and equitable terms, a disadvantageous contract; but I beg you to consider, Sir, that if Mr. Hastings had not interfered in behalf of the East-India Company, the monopoly might to this moment have continued in the hands of the Patna Factory.—Some person must hold it, and as Mr. Sullivan has it upon lower terms than the lowest of the twelve competitors, who gave in proposals in the year 1775, I do not see how it can reasonably be supposed, that any other person could have taken it upon more favorable terms for the Company.—I cannot however help observing the stress you lay upon Mr. Higginson's evidence;—"That it was generally believed in Calcutta, Mr. Sullivan had sold the contract, tho' he could not specify for what sum."—Adopting this doubtful evidence, as  
if

if it were positive to the fact you add, “ From  
 “ this transaction it appears clearly, that the  
 “ contract was given to Mr. Sullivan, for no  
 “ other purpose than to supply him with a  
 “ sum of money.”—

Is this reasoning fair, just, or candid? You have no proof that Mr. Sullivan has disposed of his contract, and if you had, you are ignorant of his motives for the disposal of it.—The point to consider is this, was the contract given to him upon such terms as to make the transaction appear to be a job? Certainly not.—What would your Chairman think of me, if I were to entertain the Committee, by telling them, that when I had the honor to serve under General Smith’s command, as a Subaltern Officer in Bengal, the Provinces of Corah and Allahabad were called the Commander in Chief’s estate, and that it was generally believed he rented those Provinces from Shaw Allum; and further, that he paid him the Bengal Tribute in Vizieri Rupées?—Yet you might certainly receive this evidence from me, with as much propriety as you did Mr. Higginson’s, relative to the sale of Mr. Sullivan’s contract.—The  
 transactions

transacted, I allude to, were as much the subject of public conversation and general knowledge, as that to which you examined Mr. Diggle.

I do not pledge myself to prove the fact, but I have very good reason to believe, that Mr. Sullivan has not, even to this moment, disposed of the contract.

That I may be able to quit this drowsy stupor of the East altogether, I shall proceed to state how it was disposed of last year; and here again, I shall have much reason to complain of your want of candour and fairness.

With submission to you, Sir, it was not quite fair to state that the Governor-General and Council had entered upon a daring speculation, without observing the strong and urgent necessity, which compelled them to appropriate every rupee they could collect to the relief of the Company's pressing exigencies upon the coast of Coromandel. The question was this: Whether, under the circumstances which existed in Bengal in 1781, it would have been more eligible to have sent no supply whatever

whatever to China, or to adopt a plan which gave the Factory at Canton a chance at least of sending cargoes to England? Neither money nor bills could be spared. The scheme might have been a daring one, but it was a necessary one, and *has been crowned with success.*

Your Report states, that two ships sailed from Bengal with opium on board, consigned to China and the eastward; and you have published a private letter in your Appendix, from Mr. Fitzhugh to Mr. Gregory, in which it is observed, that the importation of opium is condemned by the laws of China; and, without adverting to the necessity which impelled the Supreme Council to adopt this mode of supplying the factory at Canton with specie, Mr. Fitzhugh condemns the transaction in very harsh terms. The mode in which the question is put to Mr. Fitzhugh is something curious: "Whether it would be proper to send opium from Bengal to China on the Company's account?" As Mr. Fitzhugh's answer was to become a record both at the India-House and in your Committee the question from a gentleman of Mr. Gregory's acknowledged candour, ought to have been

transactions I allude to, were as much the subject of public conversation and *general belief*, as that to which you examined Mr. Higginson.

I do not pledge myself to prove the fact, but I have very good reason to believe, that Mr. Sullivan has not, even to this moment, disposed of the contract.

That I may be able to quit this drowsy syrup of the East altogether, I shall proceed to state how it was disposed of last year; and here again, I shall have much reason to complain of your want of candour and fairness.

With submission to you, Sir, it was not quite fair to state that the Governor-General and Council had entered upon a daring speculation, without observing the strong and urgent necessity, which compelled them to appropriate every rupee they could collect to the relief of the Company's pressing exigencies upon the coast of Coromandel. The question was this: Whether, under the circumstances which existed in Bengal in 1781, it would have been more eligible to have sent no supply  
whatever

whatever to China, or to adopt a plan which gave the Factory at Canton a chance at least of sending cargoes to England? Neither money nor bills could be spared. The scheme might have been a daring one, but it was a necessary one, and *has been crowned with success.*

Your Report states, that two ships sailed from Bengal with opium on board, consigned to China and the eastward; and you have published a private letter in your Appendix, from Mr. Fitzhugh to Mr. Gregory, in which it is observed, that the importation of opium is condemned by the laws of China, and, without adverting to the *necessity* which *impelled* the Supreme Council to adopt this mode of supplying the factory at Canton with specie, Mr. Fitzhugh condemns the transaction in very harsh terms. The mode in which the question is put to Mr. Fitzhugh is something curious: “Whether it would be  
 “proper to send opium from Bengal to  
 “China on the Company’s account?” As Mr. Fitzhugh’s answer was to become a record both at the India-House and in your Committee, the question from a gentleman of Mr. Gregory’s acknowledged candour, ought to have been,  
 D “Whether



“ Whether it would be better to risque sending  
 “ opium to China from Bengal on the Com-  
 “ pany’s account, in order to give the Supra-  
 “ Cargoes a chance of loading the Company’s  
 “ ships,—or to send no supply whatever for a  
 “ whole season from Bengal, which would ne-  
 “ cessarily detain the ships for one year at  
 “ Canton ?”

But I shall pass over your reasoning and  
 Mr. Fitzhugh’s Letter, and relate the matter  
 of fact.

The Nonsuch armed ship, with 1601 chests  
 of opium on board, arrived safe at Canton,  
 and the Supra-Cargoes disposed of the opium  
 without incurring any of those penalties which  
 you foretold. They write upon the subject to  
 the Court of Directors as follows : “ The  
 “ object of the Governor General and Coun-  
 “ cil was to raise a sum of money to answer  
 “ the exigencies of the Company’s affairs in  
 “ that part of India, and at the same time  
 “ afford us a supply for providing the invest-  
 “ ment for the present year. Had opium  
 “ not been imported in Portuguese ships, and  
 “ *had the Captain obeyed his orders*, we have not  
 “ *the*

“ *the least doubt* but it might have been sold to  
 “ a considerable advantage.”

“ The total loss to the Company, after pay-  
 “ ment of every charge, in consequence of the  
 “ Captain’s disobeying his orders, was  
 “ 69 973 dollars.” For this loss, Sir, the  
 Supreme Council are not accountable; but  
 even as the voyage has turned out, it  
 enables the Supra-Cargoes to load the ships of  
 the present year, as they actually sold the  
 the opium for above eighty thousand pounds  
 sterling, and there was no other possible mode  
 could have been devised for supplying them  
 with a tythe of that sum.

Speaking of the ship sent to the Eastward  
 with opium, the Supra-Cargoes say :

“ The Betsy was taken. Had her voyage  
 “ been accomplished, we have great reason  
 “ to imagine, that the Honourable Company  
 “ would have received considerable advan-  
 “ tage from it. She sold as much of her  
 “ cargo as produced 52,600 dollars, which  
 “ was paid into the Honourable Company’s  
 “ Treasury here.”

Altho’

Altho' the Betfy was taken, it appears, that 59,600 dollars were received for a part of her cargo, previous to the capture; so that, in fact, the Supreme Council merit the approbation the Directors gave this part of the plan, instead of the ridicule and censure which you have been pleased to treat it with.

The produce of the cargo of the Nonfuch added to the sum paid into the Company's Treasury in Canton, makes the whole amount ninety-three thousand, three hundred, and forty-five pounds sterling. All charges were paid by certificates upon the Court of Directors. The scheme was temporary. The necessity of supply, both in Bengal and China, most urgent, and the transaction upon the whole highly laudable.

Here, Sir, I close my remarks. And I ask you, Whether you think, that Mr. Hastings deserves the very severe, unjust, and ungenerous strictures, which you have passed upon him, either for granting the Opium contract to Mr. Sullivan, or for adopting that "daring speculation," by which ten lacks of rupees in specie was procured for the public service in Bengal, at a moment of general distress, and a cargo purchased, which has  
been

been resold at China, and has enabled the Factory at Canton to dispatch all the China ships to Europe this season ?

I imagine, Sir, you depend very much upon the opinion which the House of Commons entertains of your candour and fairness, or you *must* suppose the Appendix will never be referred to. In my life I never saw such false inferences from assumed facts, or so many misrepresentations crowded in so short a space.

You say, “ These extraordinary changes, in  
 “ favour of Mr. Sullivan, were attended with  
 “ losses to others, and seem to have excited  
 “ much discontent. This discontent it was  
 “ necessary in some measure to appease. The  
 “ Vendue Master, who was deprived of his  
 “ accustomed dues on the public sale of the  
 “ opium, by the private dealing, made a formal  
 “ complaint to the Board against this, as  
 “ well as other proceedings relative to the  
 “ same business. He attributed the private  
 “ sale to “ *reasons of state* ;” and this strong  
 “ reflection, both on the Board of Trade and  
 “ the Council Board, was passed over without  
 “ observation. He was quieted, by appointing  
 “ him to the duty of those very Inspectors,  
 “ whose office had just been abolished as  
 “ useless.

“ *useless.* The House will judge of the effi-  
 “ *cacy* of the revival of this office by the mo-  
 “ *tives* to it, and by Mr. *Hastings* giving *that*  
 “ *to one* as a compensation, which had been  
 “ *executed* as a duty by several.”

In another place you add, “ But here their  
 “ *constant* and vigilant observer, the Vendue  
 “ *Master*, met them again. They seemed to  
 “ *live* in no small terror of this gentleman !”

I can find no trace in the Appendix of much  
 or of any discontent being excited by Mr. Su-  
 livan’s contract. The Vendue Master, Mr.  
 George Williamson, a gentleman *not in the*  
*Company’s service*, whose *office* may be abolished  
 at the pleasure of the Supreme Council, and  
 who holds it *himself* only during their pleasure,  
 wrote a very respectful and proper letter to  
 the Board on the 18th of October, 1781, sta-  
 ting that broad cloth, copper, and opium,  
 not having been lately sold by public sale as  
 heretofore, his expences had exceeded h s pro-  
 fits. He begs to be allowed a commission on  
 private sales, as he must keep up his establish-  
 ment of servants ; and he most humbly en-  
 treats, at the conclusion of his letter, that  
 should there be any future sales at Chinsurah,  
 he may be directed to conduct them.

The

The Board grant his first request, but deny the second. You say, “ *Mr. Hastings gave Mr. Williamson the commission as a compensation.*” This is not true. *Mr. Hastings was at Benares at the time it was granted*, and could not possibly interfere directly or indirectly in the business. The fact is, as appears in your Appendix, that the Board (Mr. Wheler and Mr. Macpherson) on the 6th of Nov. 1781, “ appointed him to receive charge of the “ Ophium, and further intrusted him with “ the charge of repacking and shipping such “ quantities as may be ordered for exportation, drawing for his trouble the same “ commission as has been allowed on the “ Company’s Sales, as a compensation for the “ losses he would otherwise sustain by the “ exportation, and in lieu of all other expences “ incidental to his present establishment of “ public Vendue Master.”

It is impossible any man in England can be absurd or weak enough to believe, if he will consider for a single moment, that Mr. Hastings, and the Supreme Council, “ should “ live in no small terror” of a gentleman, who

who as Lord Keppel said of Sir Hugh Palliser, they could put down with a filip, if they should have any cause to disapprove of his conduct.

You have not carried your remarks upon Salt to as late a period as you might have done. Had you really meant to furnish the House of Commons with a candid and a fair statement of that branch of the Company's Revenue, you would have observed, that by a plan formed by Mr. Hastings, and carried into execution at his own separate responsibility, under the immediate management of Mr. Henry Vansittart, the revenues of the Company from Salt are 48 lacks of rupees; and that three years ago they did not realize a lack of rupees from this article.

The present contract for supplying the army in Bengal with draft and carriage cattle was proposed by Sir Eyre Coote; and I will undertake to prove, that it is one of the most advantageous contracts the Company have ever entered into. If you really wish to be informed upon the subject, you may find documents at the India House that will convince you, the Supreme Council were attentive to  
the

the true interests of the Company, and the Natives of Bengal, when they concluded a contract upon such terms as insured a proper supply of draft and carriage cattle for every corps in the army. As I have marched from every station in Bengal and Bahar, between the years 1767 and 1779, I have had an opportunity of seeing the distress of the country, the vexation of the farmers, and the loss to the Revenue, occasioned by the necessary and unavoidable severities which have been exercised in pressing bullocks for the public service, whenever a brigade or detachment has been in motion. If you mean to act fairly, I desire you will look into the Revenue Accounts of the provinces of Bengal and Bahar, previous to the conclusion of the bullock contract in 1779; add to the amount of the former contracts the deductions that have been allowed from the Revenue, whenever a brigade or a corps of the army has marched, and you will find, I believe, that the amount of the present is considerably less than the amount of former contracts. If to this you consider the temporary distress and terror of the poor farmers, who were subject to see



their cattle forcibly seized from the plough, and the chance after all of their not being paid for them, you must allow, that a contract calculated to remedy every inconveniency of this kind, and to enable every corps to march at a moment's warning, was highly proper for the Supreme Council to adopt, when it came recommended by so distinguished an officer as Sir Eyre Coote.

Let General Richard Smith declare, as an officer, whether he does not think it would be better, that our army in Bengal should consist of twenty thousand men upon a war establishment, and ready to march at a moment's warning, than of thirty thousand upon a peace establishment, without a proper supply of draft and carriage cattle attached to each corps, so as to enable them to move without distress to the country? We have been engaged in war from the moment Mr. Croftes's contract was concluded, and I do not hesitate to pronounce, that, in every point of view, it has turned out a most beneficial and advantageous contract for the Company.

**You**

You say, “ The case of Mr. Belli’s contract  
 “ for supplying provisions to the Fort is of  
 “ the same description (as Mr. Croftes’s) and  
 “ what exceedingly encreases the suspicion  
 “ against this profusion in contracts, made  
 “ in direct violation of orders, is, that they  
 “ are *always found* to be given in favour of  
 “ persons clearly connected with Mr. Hastings in his family, or even in his actual  
 “ service.”

To so pointed an assertion, I must oppose a positive denial. The fact, as you have stated it, is not true. Mr. Belli is the only instance that I know of, or that you have produced of a gentleman in Mr. Hastings’s family, holding a contract. He has been twelve years in the Governor-General’s family, as Private Secretary of the Civil Department of the Government ; he is a man, whose honour and integrity are too well established to be wounded by any insinuation in your Report ; and I am convinced, that he would be a considerable gainer, was he to give up his whole fortune, acquired in the course of the twelve years he has been confidentially employed, in exchange for the annual income which your family

family at present enjoys under the British Government. No man living can be clearer than Mr. Hastings is from the crime of providing for those who are attached to him, at the public expence.

As you are fond of singular anecdotes, the following may both amuse and instruct you.—The late Sir George Wombwell, either as a Chairman, Deputy-Chairman, or a leading Director, had a very principal share in the management of the East-India Company, from 1775 to 1780.—You will find his name to every letter from the Directors in that period (except when he was out by rotation) which censured the conduct of Mr. Hastings, and he was particularly severe upon him for not obeying the orders of the Court of Directors with respect to contracts, which were positively directed to be given to the lowest bidder, and for one year only.—Yet this same Sir George Wombwell actually made use of Mr. Hastings's arguments upon the subject of contracts, when Sir Philip Jennings Clarke brought in a Bill for excluding Contractors from Seats in the House of Commons.—Upon this occasion, Sir George observed,

May

May 4th. 1778, \* “ That he believed putting up  
 “ Contracts to Sale would be prejudicial to the  
 “ public service. Men inadequate to the ac-  
 “ complishment of the Contracts would. at all  
 “ times bid lower then men of ability and repu-  
 “ tation, and they would do much more injury  
 “ by serving the public badly than the differ-  
 “ ence of expence. He had seen instances of it  
 “ in the Contracts of the East-India Company,  
 “ and those of so fatal a nature, that he could  
 “ not agree to the motion : Gentlemen unacquaint-  
 “ ed with business, and of little consequence in  
 “ the eye of the public, might move for refer-  
 “ mation in every department of Government.”

If Sir George Wombwell spoke so well in May, yet in December of the same year, when Chairman of the Court of Directors, he and his brethren wrote to Bengal, “ altho’  
 “ the Governor-General has thought proper  
 “ to express so direct and pointed a disap-  
 “ probation of the mode enjoined by the  
 “ Company, we adhere to the propriety of  
 “ the Court’s Orders, and renew the in-  
 “ junction, that in all cases you accept the  
 “ lowest proposals, with sufficient security  
 “ for the performance.”

\* Vide Parliamentary Register, published by Almon.

“Every reasonable man will think, that a contract ought to be concluded upon such fair and equitable terms between the Company and the individual, as to afford the latter an honest profit for his labour, and to insure to the former a punctual observance of the conditions. If you should tell me, that it is the business of the proposer to take care, that the terms he offers are not so low as to preclude him from the probability of a future profit, I reply, that, to my knowledge, Gentlemen in Bengal have offered to take contracts upon lower terms than it was possible to execute the service for. I will give you an instance in point. In 1775, the Supreme Council, being then complete, contracted with the late Colonel Parker to keep the cantonments of Burrampore and Dinapore in repair for two years, at a certain annual sum. General Clavering offered Colonel Parker the contract for five years, which the latter declined, on a supposition that he might be a loser by it. When his contract was on the point of expiring, he wished to renew it on the same terms, but the General then objected. New proposals were accordingly advertised for, and upon opening them it was found, that an Ensign in the service

vice

vice actually proposed to keep the cantonments in repair for less than two thirds of the amount of Colonel's Parker's contract. According to established custom, this gentleman was entitled to the contract; but Mr. Hastings being fully convinced, as General Clavering, and every other man conversant in the business was, of the impossibility of executing the contract upon the terms proposed, it was agreed, that the business should be done by agency in future.

I have been more full upon the subject of contracts, because I recollect perfectly well, that on the 28th of May last year, when the House of Commons passed that memorable vote for the removal of Mr. Hastings, Mr. Secretary Fox said, "That tho' he did not  
 "doubt the integrity of Mr. Hastings, yet it  
 "might happen to him, as it had happened to  
 "a noble Lord (North) that without being  
 "guilty of peculation himself, he had winked  
 "at it in others."

It remains still with you, Sir, to prove Mr. Hastings guilty of a waste of public treasure for private purposes.

I really

I really am astonished at your misrepresentation of the opinion of the Council, who were consulted relative to the propriety of commencing a prosecution against Mr. Hastings, upon the strange jumble of inconsistent charges transmitted from Bengal, in 1775, and received at a time when his Majesty's Ministers and the Court of Directors would gladly have seized any tenable ground for his Removal.

You say "none of them gave a positive opinion against the grounds of the prosecution."

Mr. Smith, the Company's Solicitor, says, "I cannot bring myself to think, there is sufficient grounds to bring a suit against Mr. Hastings."

Lord Thurlow, then Attorney-General, says, "upon the whole, I see no evidence in my judgment sufficient to maintain an action."

The Solicitor-General (now Lord Loughborough) says "the Company may proceed  
" by

“ by action, or a bill on equity; and the latter  
 “ method seems, *from the imperfect and confused*  
 “ *account of* the evidence of the transaction,  
 “ to be the most proper method of proceed-  
 “ ing.”

Mr. Serjeant Adair says, “ at all events, I  
 “ cannot think it advisable for the Com-  
 “ pany to commence any suit against Mr.  
 “ Hastings.” Mr. Sayer, says, “ there is not  
 “ sufficient ground for an action at common  
 “ law,” and adds “ As I am satisfied a dis-  
 “ covery will not be injurious to his defence  
 “ or integrity, it is my advice, that a Bill be  
 “ filed in Bengal, &c.”

Mr. Dunning says, “ *if it can be proved,*  
 “ that Mr. Hastings received the lack and a  
 “ half of Rupees in question *as a gift, &c. &c.*  
 “ the money may be recovered of him.” — He  
 adds, “ it appears to me difficult to reconcile  
 “ the evidence stated.” — He does not ad-  
 vise a prosecution, yet you say, “ three of  
 “ them, Mr. Wedderburn, Mr. Dunning and  
 “ Mr. Adair, were clear in favour of the  
 “ prosecution.”



Of these three opinions, there is not a syllable in either that appears, even by a forced construction, to recommend a prosecution, except in Mr. Wedderburn's, and he states the evidence to be *confused and imperfect*.

What could induce you to bring forward to public view the transactions of so distant a period, and to misrepresent in so gross a manner the opinion of the Council who were consulted? — “Is this the direct charge of corruption,” which you told Major Scott, in May, 1782, you intended to produce against Mr. Hastings?—Be assured, Sir, you cannot injure him by such an attack as this is.—

Never, I believe, were so many insinuations, or misrepresentations, crowded in so short a space.—You say, after giving us your account of the resignation, that the Court of Directors observations upon it, “are just and well applied, but that with these declarations, they appear to have closed the account, and dismissed the subject for ever.”—And why did they so? was it out of regard to Mr. Hastings? By no means.—The Court of Directors had assigned their  
privilege

privilege of examination to three of their body.—These three Gentlemen reported to the Court, that the powers, produced by Mr. Maclean, were “ full and sufficient,” and in this opinion they were not unanimous;—but when Mr. Hastings denied he had ever given such powers, I do not find that either of these Gentlemen stepped forward to support their former assertions.—The more I consider this business, the more clear it appears.—In the Letter of the Court of Directors, to which you have alluded, they say, “ although “ General Clavering acted unwarrantably, and “ even *illegally*, in directing the Secretary to “ issue the Summons in his name as Governor-General, &c. &c.” Now, Sir, by this declaration, the Directors do in fact vindicate Mr Hastings most completely;—for if General Clavering was not Governor-General, the moment the notification of Mr. Hastings’s resignation arrived (and the Directors allow he was not) Mr. Hastings is fully justified for his subsequent conduct,

You add, “ a sanction was hereby given to  
 “ all future defiance of every authority in  
 “ this kingdom.—Several other matters of  
 “ complaint

“ complaint against Mr. Hastings, particular-  
 “ ly the charge of peculation, fell to the  
 “ ground *at the same time.*”

This assertion is not true.—The letter from the Court of Directors was dated the 23d of December, 1778 ;—but the opinion of Council, on the charges sent to England against Mr. Hastings, was taken in July, 1776 ;—and do you insinuate, Sir, that the Directors would have dared to quash all prosecutions, had they not been convinced of the impossibility of criminating Mr. Hastings ?

I believe, I have omitted no part of the Report, which affects the character of Mr. Hastings.—I thank you most heartily for publishing the Appendix.—I hope every Member of the House of Commons, who may in future vote upon an India question, will take the pains to read and compare it with the Report.—The Governor-General will then be fully justified.

How, Sir, shall I account for your treatment of Mr. Hastings ?—You were one of his  
 warm

warm admirers, as I understand, in the year 1776, and every Member of the Rockingham party, who possessed India Stock, voted for him in Leadenhall-Street, at that period.—What has he done to forfeit your good opinion? Has your connection with the Raja of Tanjore occasioned this mighty change, added to the impetuosity of your temper? I have, indeed, seen such extraordinary changes in political opinions, since my arrival in England, that I shall in future pay attention to facts only, and not to expressions.—It was so much the fashion to abuse your noble friend Lord North, until he was compelled to resign, that what fell from you in particular may not be in the general recollection of the public.—The following Extracts from the Parliamentary Debates, as published by your patriotic friends, Almon and Debrett, will prove, that, if you have accused Mr. Hastings of inconsistency, you have asserted, that it was the great characteristic of the noble Lord, and his adherents, to eat their words, and renounce their principles; if you have treated Mr. Hastings's expressions and actions with ridicule, you have said, the noble Lord was a curiosity; but he was more fit for the British Museum,

than

than the British House of Commons; if you have pledged yourself to God, the House of Commons and your Country, to prove Mr. Hastings a notorious delinquent, you were pledged to bring the noble Lord to the block.—If you have accused Mr. Hastings of being the author of all the rapine and bloodshed in India, you have accused the noble Lord of plunging America in all the horrors of war.—If you have charged Mr. Hastings with wasting the Public Treasure for private purposes, you have been still more violent in your attacks upon Lord North, with respect to the expenditure of Public Money.—Yet at this moment, Lord North is the noble friend of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke.—The noble Lord, with a confidence, which is the result of conscious innocence, has again and again pledged himself not to run away, but to reply to any charge you could bring forward; I pledge myself, that Mr. Hastings will be equally ready to defend himself; but for God's sake, Sir, confine yourself in future to positive charges, and do not amuse the world, as you have hitherto done, by dealing in general assertions, which you never mean to prove.

November

November 27, 1781.

\* “ Mr. Burke rose next, and with great  
 “ warmth reprobated the language of the  
 “ noble Lord. He avowed, that it was *im-*  
 “ *pudent*, it was *audacious*.—He was averse  
 “ from deceiving and amusing the people  
 “ with what he felt impracticable. He trust-  
 “ ed a day of *reckoning would come*, and *when-*  
 “ *ever* that day came, he should be able by  
 “ *impeac'ment* to bring upon the *heads* of the  
 “ authors of these unhappy affairs the punish-  
 “ ment of them.—The nation as an animal  
 “ was dead ;—*but the vermin which fed on it*  
 “ *bad still an existence.*”

November 28, 1781.

“ Here, Sir, I behold the bloody remnants  
 “ of our faithful friend, Mr. Williams, gib-  
 “ betted up for a terror to all who adhere to  
 “ us ; and a little further another friend,  
 “ and yet another and another.—He worked  
 “ up his passions so much in discanting on  
 “ the shocking cruelty of the circumstance,  
 “ that his whole frame was visibly and  
 “ violently agitated.”—(I remember perfect-  
 ly well, Sir, that in speaking of the late

\* Vide Parliamentary Debates, published by Debrett.

famine

famine at Madras, the effects of which Mr. Hastings and the Supreme Council have done their utmost to alleviate, you were led away by your humanity, as in the case of Lord Cornwallis, to mention circumstances, which never had existence, except in your imagination.)

Nov. 28, 1781.

Mr. Burke,

Good God! does the noble and learned Lord know so very little of the Minister, as to imagine, that the shortness of time, which a delusion could exist, was any reason for his not practising it? *The noble Lord dealt in cheats and delusions*; they were the daily traffick of his invention! A week! The noble Lord had often held out a cheat for half that time! For a day only, nay for a single hour. He had practised cheats upon the House, which died away even before the debate was ended, to favour which they were contrived. The noble Lord would continue to play off his cheats and delusions in that House, as long as he thought it necessary, and had money enough at command to *bribe* gentlemen to pretend they believed him.

“ After

“ After working up himself and his hear-  
 “ ers to the most distressful state of emotion,  
 “ he branded the Ministers as the cause of  
 “ the horrid disasters he had described, and  
 “ declared the address to be the most hypo-  
 “ critical, infamous, abandoned, lying paper,  
 “ that ever that House had been called upon  
 “ to vote.”

Dec. 4, 1781.

In this debate Mr. Burke throws out the  
 severest insinuations against Lord Rodney, and  
 adds, “ Governor Meynell *was supposed* to have  
 “ fallen a victim to the hardships he had en-  
 “ dured.

“ Tobago was taken under the very eye of  
 “ Sir George Rodney, as De Grasse expressed  
 “ himself; and the same Admiral said in his  
 “ dispatches, he had several times offered the  
 “ British Admiral battle, which the latter had  
 “ thought proper to decline. This might be  
 “ called a *ground of crimination*. The first no-  
 “ tice Admiral Byng had of a charge against  
 “ him, was a copy of Mr. de Galissonniere’s  
 “ account of the action; but as this was in his  
 G “ opinion



“ opinion a hardship on Admiral Byng, he  
“ would not charge Sir George Rodney from  
“ Compte de Grasse’s dispatches ; but the  
“ capture of Tobago gave nevertheless an ap-  
“ *pearance of truth to the assertion of De Grasse.*

( This is really, Sir, very like the insinuation against the Honourable Mr. Stuart, to which that gentleman has so fully replied in a letter to General Smith.)

“ For his part he declared he never would  
“ abandon those whose cause he had under-  
“ taken, ’till he had sifted the matter to the  
“ bottom. The character of an accuser it was  
“ true, was odious ; but it was so only when  
“ the accusation was brought against the in-  
“ nocent, the weak, the oppressed, or per-  
“ haps indigent culprit—but it was not odious  
“ to accuse *guilt* in stars or ribbons : *guilt* re-  
“ warded and countenanced by the official and  
“ the opulent.

“ Mr. Burke replied to the conclusion of  
“ Lord North’s speech. With indignation he  
“ declared, he wondered how the noble Lord  
“ *dared*

“ *dared* to talk of British feelings. He! he!  
“ *dare* talk of British feelings! He! that has  
“ ruined the British empire, and wasted its  
“ blood and treasure.—He desired the House  
“ would suffer the enquiry to be gone into,  
“ and he \* *would pledge himself* he would sup-  
“ port every thing he had said.”

December 17, 1781. Speaking of the treatment Mr. Laurens met with, Mr. Burke says, “ The Turk, the savage Arab, the cruel Tartar, or the piratical Algerine, when compared to our Ministers, might be thought humane.”

Jan. 28, 1782.

“ He had heard that words were but wind,  
“ and that they were here more windy than  
“ any where else.”

[ No bad remark. ]

Feb. 1, 1782.

“ Mr. Burke once again, and in the severest  
“ and most pointed language, attacked the

\* Yet Mr. Burke, though pressed by Lord Lisburne, declined to proceed.

“ noble

“ noble Lord, for declaring it was a matter in  
 “ which he was not immediately concerned ;  
 “ an affair that it was peculiarly his province  
 “ to have made himself acquainted with, and  
 “ to have closely examined. What, says he,  
 “ is it not the business of the First Lord of  
 “ the Treasury to see that money matters of  
 “ such consequence as these are, should be  
 “ stated fairly and justly, previous to their  
 “ being brought before the House; cer-  
 “ tainly it was; and I am convinced too, so  
 “ important a transaction could never be done  
 “ without his *management* and *consent*. In  
 “ which case, I say, he has *cheated* the public.

Feb. 25, 1782.

Speaking of the loan, Mr. Burke said, “ he  
 “ blamed the conduct of the Minister thro’  
 “ the whole of this business. The last year  
 “ he had made an *infamous bargain* in a bung-  
 “ ling manner. He now wished to make a  
 “ bargain *equally advantageous to influence with*  
 “ *more safety.*”

March 6, 1782.

“ The noble lord (North) had told them  
 “ he would continue in his office, out of  
 “ gratitude

“ gratitude to the people.” “ Gratitude, the  
 “ noble Lord’s gratitude ! Oh, Sir, said  
 “ Mr. Burke, (addressing himself to the  
 “ Speaker) the Noble Lord’s gratitude is like  
 “ that of another *fallen angel* like himself, de-  
 “ scribed by the poet.

“ The debt immense of gratitude,  
 “ So burthenfome, still paying, still to owe.”

“ So with the Noble Lord, his debt im-  
 “ mense of gratitude was endless, and could  
 “ never be discharged, and therefore he had  
 “ presumed to *fly in their face*, and to *insult*  
 “ them with such language as ought to be  
 “ *reprobated* by every man in the house, &c.

March 8, 1782.

Mr. Burke, at the close of a speech, which  
 Mr. Debrett observes, was “ one of the best  
 “ adapted pieces of satire we almost ever re-  
 “ membered to have heard him make,” says,  
 “ The noble Lord in the Blue Ribbon had  
 “ declared, that he would never quit his  
 “ office, until he could quit it with honor,  
 “ he

“ he therefore congratulated the House on the  
 “ happy prospect they had of keeping the  
 “ noble Lord in office, for if he never quitted  
 “ his post *until he could quit it with honor, he*  
 “ *would* be bound to say, he would *retain it*  
 “ *until the last hour of his life?*”

On the memorable 20th of March, 1782, when Lord North informed the House of Commons, His Majesty's Ministers were no more: Mr. Burke observed, “ That that was  
 “ not a moment for levity, or exultation. He  
 “ regarded it with a calmness of content, a  
 “ placid joy, a serene satisfaction; he looked  
 “ forward with fear and trembling, &c.

“ The present, he farther said, was the pe-  
 “ culiar period of mens lives, *when their am-*  
 “ *bitious views* were unlocked, when *their pre-*  
 “ *judices operated most forcibly*, when all their  
 “ desires, their *self opinions*, *their vanity*, *their*  
 “ *avarice*, were set at large, and begun to  
 “ shew themselves, &c.

I am now, Sir, arrived at the period in  
 which you became a Minister. Your first  
 declaration

declaration in this character was on the 9th of April, 1782, "That it was the intention  
 " of the Servants of the Crown to purge the  
 " nation of its foul humours, and to restore  
 " it to its former purity."

I find you on the 15th paying that tribute of praise to His Majesty, which he so well deserves, "It was the best of messages to the  
 " best of people, from the best of kings." How far you were sincere in this declaration I do not know. I have been in England long enough to discover, that Mr. Burke in place, and Mr. Burke out of place, are two very different men.

When Lord Shelburne succeeded the late Marquis of Rockingham, and Mr. Burke resigned, he seriously asks General Conway, "would he have taken Cataline for his colleague in the Consulship, or be co-partner  
 " with Borgia in his schemes?" Yet Mr. Burke is at this moment united with Lord North, whom he has frequently traduced in the harshest language.

I forbear

I forbear, Sir, to proceed to the early period of the present sessions, but I recollect you were not less warm in your praise of Mr. Pitt, during Lord North's Ministry, than you have been hostile to him, when his political principles did not exactly coincide with your views.

I understand, Sir, that while a patriot, you were in the habit of publishing your speeches. Whether these from whence the foregoing extracts are taken, were printed by your authority, I do not know, but they are doubtless very correct. Mr. Debrett is your old friend. He was a warm admirer of your abilities and public spirit, which he never missed an opportunity of extolling; when the noble Lord, your present friend, was the constant butt of your ridicule. Words in the House of Commons, as you say, Sir, are but wind, I shall therefore regard your future abuse of Mr. Hastings, as idle sounds, "signifying nothing," for I do not believe the English language affords more opprobrious epithets than you applied to the noble Lord, when he retained a station, which interfered with your political, or interested views. Mr. Pitt too, "that excel-  
lent

“lent young man,” “who must and should  
 “be employed,” on a sudden became a “pe-  
 “tulant forward youth;” and the Earl of  
 Shelburne from being the respected colleague  
 of Mr. Fox, became in one summer’s day,  
 “fifty times worse than the noble Lord  
 “(North) who had been reprobated and re-  
 “moved by the House of Commons.”

The circle of patronage is considerably cir-  
 cumscribed of late, and I most sincerely believe  
 it is the determined perseverance with which  
 Mr. Hastings retains an office yielding twenty  
 five thousand pounds a year, that excites your  
 resentment.

You may remember, Sir, that a few days  
 after Lord North resigned in March, 1782,  
 you positively declared, that Mr. Hastings  
 and Mr. Macpherson should be removed. I  
 thought the declaration a most extraordinary  
 one at the time, but from the moment your  
 persecution commenced, Mr. Hastings’s cha-  
 racter has acquired additional lustre in the pub-  
 lic opinion, and I have too entire a confidence  
 in the justice of his Majesty’s Ministers, to be

H

at



at all alarmed as to the event of the strictest enquiry that can be made into the public or private conduct of the Governor-General.

I have the honor to be,

S I R,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. S.

P. S.

P.S. In the course of a late debate you observed, that some of the first and most respectable characters in the House, were of the Select Committee. I most readily and heartily agree with you, but it is equally true that seldom more than five, and scarcely ever above six gentlemen attend, and they are invariably the same members. \* General Smith, Mr. Burke, Mr. Long, Mr. Elwes, Lord Maitland, and Mr. Annesley. I declare most solemnly I do not question the justice, or the purity of the motives by which these gentlemen are actuated; they are gentlemen of fair, honourable characters, and of independent fortunes. The Select Committee, however, has now sat above two years. It was originally instituted upon public grounds; but their proceedings have long been purely personal. Far be it from me, Sir, to dispute your knowledge of human nature, and you have told the world, that “*Our natural disposition leads all our enquiries rather to persons than to things.*” Upon your own principles it is absolutely impossible that six gentlemen should brood over the same subject for two years, without imbibing very strong prejudices. The well known, if  
not

not the avowed object of your reports, has been to remove Mr. Hastings, Mr. Wheeler, and Mr. Macpherson from their stations. It is universally believed that two of the six attending Members, General Richard Smith, and Mr. Long, have for these twelve months past entertained views of going in high stations to India. Is it possible that this report should have remained so long uncontradicted, had it been untrue? Your Tanjore connections are generally known, and let me ask you seriously, all prejudice apart, if you in your conscience believe, that two gentlemen who wish to fill up those places they are taking so much pains to vacate, and a third who is deeply involved in the politics of a Gentoo Prince, ought to be deemed impartial judges of the merits of Mr. Hastings. Have the remaining three gentlemen composed a single line of your ten reports? have not General Rich. Smith, and yourself, paid the most fulsome and disgusting compliments to each other on the merits of your several productions. Mr. Burke is to be immortalized by General Smith's account, for his critique on Sir Elijah Impey's appointment, and the honourable General receives his portion of

adulatory

adulatory praise, for his attempt to keep Mr. Sullivan and Sir William James out of the direction. But, notwithstanding, “ these windy expressions,” as you justly term them, one Member of respectable character and independent fortune, declines to attend the Committee, as Governor Johnstone observed, “ because he had seen so much prejudice and passion in their proceedings, he was determined to go amongst them no more ;” and from the general disinclination of other gentlemen to be present at your meetings, we may fairly conclude, that they entertain similar ideas.

P I N I S.



**T H E**  
**L E T T E R S**  
**O F**  
**A C I T I Z E N**  
**O N**  
**I N D I A A F F A I R S .**

**L O N D O N :**

**Printed by GILBERT AND PLUMMER, CREE-CHURCH-  
LANE, LEADENHALL-STREET. 1783.**



# P R E F A C E.

**W**HEN I wrote the following Letters, I had not the most distant idea of collecting them together; but some of my friends at the London Tavern and the Queen's-Arms, have assured me that they have been favorably received by the public, and have therefore advised me to publish them.—This I do, in justice to my friend the Proprietor, whose sentiments on India Affairs, as contained in some of the letters, may perhaps afford information to those, who may have been misled by the insinuations in the Ninth and Tenth Reports.



## P R E F A C E.

I was also induced to collect these letters together, from having seen the Ninth Report advertised for sale, and earnestly recommended to all captains of ships and others, who were desirous that their friends in India, should be thoroughly and authentically informed of the state of the Company's Affairs. I do think it the duty of every honest man, to detect and expose, as far as in his power, the falsities contained in that gross libel, which was printed some time ago as a pamphlet, and is still publickly sold under the title of "the Ninth Report of the Select Committee," and has been repeatedly advertised as containing an account of the Hon. Warren Hastings, Esq.

A CITIZEN.

*Broad-Street,  
Sept. 10, 1783.*

# L E T T E R S, &c.

## L E T T E R I.

Mr. EDITOR,

**I** HAVE lately read two letters, addressed to Mr. Burke, by a Major John Scott, and I find, upon enquiry, that this person is the agent of Mr. Hastings; and that Mr. Hastings has hitherto baffled every attempt made by Parliament, by Ministers, and by the Court of Directors, to remove him from the government of Bengal. I must confess to you, Mr. Editor, that I looked up to Mr. Burke, for many years, as to a superior being.—His eloquence, his learning, his philanthropy, and his disinterestedness, were unquestionable with a great majority of the nation, as well as with myself. His conduct in office  
last

last year, was not, however, quite upon a par with his former professions, and the eagerness ~~with which he has~~ pursued his own interest, and the interest of his relations, since the memorable and disgraceful coalition took place, has induced me to believe that Mr. Burke is at least as frail a mortal as myself.

I know nothing of Mr. Hastings, and I believed Mr. Burke was actuated by the purest motives, in opposing that gentleman. He represented him as the author of the Maratta war ; the cause of the invasion of the Carnatic ; and, of all the subsequent miseries and distresses, to which that unhappy country has so long been subject. I was present too, in the gallery of the House of Commons, when he so solemnly pledged himself to God, the House of Commons, and his country, to prove Mr. Hastings a most notorious delinquent ; and when he said the world would be astonished at a Report he was soon to bring forwards. I was so much affected, Mr. Editor, with Mr. Burke's eloquent declamation, that I really wondered how any set of men could be so mad as to protect, for a moment, such a shocking character as this Mr. Hastings appeared

peared to be. I watched with impatience the publication of Mr. Burke's Report; I read it with attention, but without finding proof of Mr. Hastings' delinquency; though, to be sure, it did appear to me that he had carried the power of patronage to an unwarrantable extent, in one instance, as Mr. Burke stated it. The appendix I had not then an opportunity of seeing, as it was not published.

When this Mr. Scott's letters came out, I sent immediately to Sewell's for the pamphlet; I read them, and I must declare to you, Mr. Editor, if what Major Scott advances is founded in truth, he has most completely exculpated Mr. Hastings; but if he has misrepresented any circumstance, I hope he will be punished with the utmost severity of the law. One point I can vouch for, that his quotations from the Appendix, which I have lately read, are very exact; and I wish, Mr. Editor, the conduct of his Majesty's ministers would, at all times, bear so severe a scrutiny as the conduct of Mr. Hastings has done, particularly in the article of the expenditure of public money.

I really

I really conceived, Mr. Editor, that Mr. Hastings had sent Mr. Scott to England, with a view of securing him in the possession of the government of Bengal, by *management*, a word of extensive signification; but I find, upon enquiry, that Mr. Hastings has invariably pressed for a decision, without expressing much solicitude as to what it may be; and that Mr. Scott's sole object has been to defend the character of Mr. Hastings from the ungenerous attacks of men, who are eagerly waiting for appointments to the Supreme Council of India. I find too, upon enquiry, Mr. Editor, that such is the opinion Mr. Hastings's constituents have of his abilities, integrity, and honor, (and the Proprietors of India Stock are as independent men as any in this kingdom) that although the late ministers were against him; although the Rockingham party, (formerly his firmest friends) and thirteen Directors, including the Chairman and his Deputy, were against him, yet their united and strenuous endeavours, aided by Treasury letters, could only produce seventy-five votes, out of five hundred and four, for his dismissal; four hundred and twenty-eight voting for his continuance. A  
majority

majority so considerable in his favor, must necessarily have had great weight, and will, I dare say, induce every Member of the House of Commons to examine and judge for himself in future ; and not, as I am afraid was the case last year, depend upon the judgment, the integrity, and the impartiality of Mr. Edmund Burke. Let me again observe to you, Mr. Editor, that if Major Scott has dared to misrepresent a single circumstance in his letters, he ought to be prosecuted with the utmost severity of the law ; if he has not, what reparation can the author of the Ninth Report make, for wantonly traducing the character of an absent man ?

*Broad-street,  
July 29, 1783.*

A CITIZEN.

## L E T T E R II.

Mr. EDITOR,

**I** THANK you for your speedy insertion of my letter of the 29th ult.—and I feel so well pleased with being in print, for the first time these fifty years, that I may perhaps trouble you in future. I assure you, Mr. Editor, my attention has been very strongly drawn to the Ninth Report of the Select Committee.—Our Parliamentary orators have represented East Indians as little better than Devils upon earth, and I expected to find some proofs of the delinquency of the man Mr. Burke describes, as the first and most notorious of these plunderers: I mean Mr. Hastings. There is but one accusation against him in the Ninth Report, which appeared to bear hard upon him; and that is what I hinted at in my last letter,—giving a contract to the son of Mr. Sullivan, the late Chairman of the Court of  
 Direc-

tors, upon improper terms.—To be sure, Mr. Editor, if this could have been proved, it would have sunk Mr. Hastings in the opinion of every honest man ; but, to my surprize and satisfaction, I find this transaction so fully explained, so completely justified from authentic records (unless the Appendix deceives me) that every honest man on our side Temple Bar, will pronounce Mr. Hastings exculpated from the charge of wasting the public money for private purposes.

I have a very great respect, Mr. Editor, for our most excellent Constitution.—But I do think it a misfortune, that it should be strictly constitutional for a Committee of the House of Commons to represent a man in high office, as a very base and unworthy character, and then to let the matter drop altogether ;—for in this Ninth Report it is observed, “ That the Committee do not bring  
 “ charges, though their Reports may furnish  
 “ matter for charges.” And further, “ That  
 “ they are not obliged to report all they hear  
 “ or know upon a subject.”—“ That it is at  
 “ the discretion of the party accused, to re-  
 “ ply, or not, hereafter.”—Why, what a  
 B doctrine



doctrine is this, Mr. Editor ? What honest man, in future, can sleep in peace in his bed, who has had any transactions with the public ? He may be abused and scandalized, his character may be attacked, to answer a private purpose, as was really the case with Mr. Sullivan and Sir William James ;—and, after all, a Secretary of State may get up in the House, and say, the determination of his innocence must be postponed to a future day ; by these means leaving the malicious part of mankind to draw conclusions of the guilt of gentlemen who were ready and eager to prove their innocence. Now in the case of Mr. Hastings, to be sure, any man who reads the Ninth Report, will think him guilty : but let the same man read the Appendix, and Mr. Scott's letters, and he will pronounce, as I do, that Mr. Hastings has been basely, and scandalously treated.

I have seen, Mr. Editor, in several of your papers, and indeed in other papers too, an account of the appointment of one William Burke, Esq; to the office of Receiver of the Balances due from the Company to the Crown in India. You have been so accurate as to  
state

state the different orders that were issued from hence, and the periods at which they were issued. Still, however, this affair appeared to me so extraordinary, that I could not give credit to it. That a man, who like Mr. Edmund Burke, had talked for many years of the necessity of public œconomy; who had even attacked the Civil List; who interfered in the domestic arrangements of our most gracious Sovereign, God bless him! who had brought in a bill to abolish sundry offices, by which very many worthy families are reduced to beggary and want: That such a man, Mr. Editor, should have created an useless office for his cousin, just to put three thousand pounds a year into his pocket, and to take so much from the state, was, to me, absolutely incredible! I spoke to a brother citizen yesterday, a very honest, worthy man, who is in the Direction. I asked him if it was true, that William Burke, Esq; was appointed Mr. Edmund Burke's Deputy in India; and if it was true that no such appointment did exist, in the time of that profuse Minister, Lord North, as Mr. Burke formerly described him? He told me, "It certainly is so; no such appointment did exist  
 " in

“ in Lord North’s time. I have examined  
 “ the Records of the Company, and I find  
 “ that *William Burke, Esq;* was appointed, by  
 “ the Lords of the Treasury, Deputy to  
 “ *Edmund Burke, Esq;* at the recommendation  
 “ of the said Edmund Burke, Esq; and that  
 “ this appointment was notified to us by  
 “ *Richard Burke, Esq;* a few days before the  
 “ death of the Marquis of Rockingham; and  
 “ I can further tell you, my friend, that the  
 “ appointment is worse than useless—it is  
 “ mischievous.”—Really, Mr. Editor, I can  
 find no instance like this, of a waste of public  
 money for private purposes, by Mr. Hastings,

*Broad-street,*  
*Aug. 1, 1783.*

A C I T I Z E N,

## L E T T E R. III.

Mr. EDITOR.

**A** Serious and attentive perusal of some late publications, excited my curiosity in a very great degree, to be fully informed of the conduct of our great men towards Mr. Hastings. Amongst us old fashioned folks in the city, he is a man, whose extraordinary and persevering character has attracted our particular attention. All people allow him to be a despiser of money. I never heard of him soliciting a Peerage, or even the title of a Baronet of Great-Britain from any Minister. He has neither family nor parliamentary interest, nor has his agent Mr. Scott, attempted to force himself into the Lower House, that he may meet Mr. Burke upon equal terms. Our city oracles say, that Mr. Hastings possesses very great abilities, with uncommon application to business; and my  
worthy

worthy friend the Director, tells me, that even his enemies in the India-House, allow him to be a sound politician, an able statesman, and a skilful financier. He added, even the croakers, who would persuade us all was lost, have held down their heads abashed and ashamed, since we received the accounts of our late successes, and the Murrata peace. I lately asked a friend of mine, who has four votes, and great interest in the Proprietary, what would have been the consequence had Mr. Hastings been recalled in 1782? We should have lost India, he replied; a new Governor could not have raised the supplies, and our negotiations with the Murratas must have been suspended. As you wish to be acquainted with our politics in Leadenhall-street, I will give you a short history of them. When Lord North laid violent hands upon the Company, in 1773, Mr. Hastings was the Governor of Bengal; it was thought prudent to continue him, but two Gentlemen powerfully connected, were sent out in the Council, and upon the breaking out of the disputes in Bengal, Lord North and his friends determined to remove Mr. Hastings; they procured a majority of one vote  
amongst

amongst the Directors, several of whom enjoyed Government contracts, to second their views; but the Proprietors overset the attempts of the Ministry, and in this virtuous struggle, were even assisted by the Duke of Richmond, and all the good men of the Rockingham party, who used to say in those days, that the East-India Company ought not to be managed by John Robinson. You and I, my friend, have lived to see strange alterations. The two powerful men, General Clavering and Colonel Monton died; then it was that Lord North shewed a desire to support Mr. Hastings; and tho' he had taken much pains to remove him, in 1776, yet in 1780, and 1781, he was the very man who proposed him to be continued at the head of the Government. See, my friend, how matters are carried on in this silly country; for though Mr. Hastings had committed no crime, yet his former friends, the Rockinghams, deserted him the moment Lord North took him up! Thus matters went on till March, 1782. You remember with what advantages the Rockingham people then came in, and in how high a light many of us in  
the

the city held Edmund Burke, the panegyrist of that party. We were tired of the American war; we heard of nothing but defeats in all quarters. Many of our friends were so far impoled upon, and led away by the inflammatory speeches of Mr. Fox and Mr. Burke, that we believed Lord North to be the most extravagant, abandoned, and flagitious Minister that this country had ever been cursed with. To be sure in those days, we never thought these three men could kiss and be friends in less than a year; so ignorant we citizens are of high life!—We gave the new men credit for every thing they did, and every thing they said; even Lord Rodney's recall and Mr. Burke's attack upon him, did not excite the popular resentment; what then could the friends of Mr. Hastings expect? An absent man; no family or parliamentary interest; the salary of his office twenty-five thousand pounds a year; a prospect opening of further removals; for Mr. Hastings once disposed of, Mr. Hornby, Mr. Wheeler, and Mr. Macpherson would soon have followed: The salaries of these Gentlemen amounting to sixty one thousand pounds a year, independent of the great power and patronage

patronage annexed to their offices. Think my friend, what a temptation to the many needy dependents of our great men, who were themselves, most of them, at least, in the greatest distress, and in debt to every one that would trust them! Such a prospect was, indeed, enough to allure almost every gambler at Brooks's, to the standard of the Minister. Two Committees sitting, the virtuous Edmund Burke, and the immaculate General Richard Smith, the leading members of one of them. Popular prejudices strong; what then had the Ministry to fear? Victory was secure; they had only to fix the mode of attack. To be sure there were some members of the cabinet, to their eternal honor be it spoken, who thought the long and faithful services of Mr. Hastings, his spirit, and decision during the war, his relief of the Carnatic, and his wonderful exertions in every part, deserved a better return than a disgraceful and ignominious removal; but they were borne down by the weight of the Rockingham party, and compelled to submit. The temerity and presumption of Mr. Hastings's enemies did, what his great merits would not otherwise have enabled him to do: it left him



to save India. The Ministers ordered the Directors to do, what the Proprietors in the end would not permit them to perform. If a Bill had been produced in May, 1782, Mr. Burke and his friends might have hurried it through in a month; but they had so completely silenced Lord North, who scarcely appeared, except in defence of Mr. Rigby, that they did not conceive any body of men would be hardy enough to dispute their pleasure, when it came forth in the form of a vote of the House of Commons. When this vote did pass, though the fate of India depended upon the wisdom of it, there were fewer Members present, as our Epsom friend tells me, than generally attend a common Turnpike Bill. Mr. Johnstone told them then, that the vote would be nugatory if the Company differed from the House in opinion, as to the merits of Mr. Hastings; but Mr. Fox, and Mr. Burke, in the height of their power and popularity, treated this wholesome hint with disregard. "Who dare dispute a vote of this House?" was the laconic reply, and the ministerial fiat was sent to the India House, where thirteen Directors, including the Chairs, were obedient to the mandate. But  
now

now was the time, my friend, for Mr. Fox and Mr. Burke to find, that they were not quite so powerful on this side Temple-bar as at Westminster. The independent Proprietors who owed Mr. Hastings protection and support, in return for long service, tried fidelity; and sound integrity, in difficult and tempting situations, were determined to judge for themselves. The result you know, and in your next letter ask Mr. Fox, Mr. Burke, and the thirteen Directors of their party, if they do not think the Proprietors performed good service to their country and the East-India Company, when they preserved Mr. Hastings in the government of Bengal.

These, Mr. Editor, are my neighbour's sentiments, and his words, as nearly as I can recollect them. You shall have my opinion in another letter.

*Broad street,  
Aug. 4, 1783.*

A CITIZEN.

## L E T T E R IV.

MR. EDITOR,

**I**N reading Mr. Scott's preface to his letters, I was a good deal struck, by the account he has given of Mr. Burke's moving for papers of so old a date as 1776, to be laid before the House of Commons, with a view of making the world suppose that Mr. Hastings had about that time been guilty of some act of delinquency, or at least that a discovery of former misdeeds had then been made. We all of us know, Mr. Editor, how sturdily Mr. Burke stood up in the House of Commons, in defence of two men, whom four great lawyers had thought proper objects of a public prosecution, and whom the late ministry had solemnly dismissed from their offices. The reasons assigned by Mr. Burke, for restoring them to their stations were "because delinquency had not been proved against

ainst them," and " that it would be hard to punish men unconvicted of any crimes."— Now, Mr. Editor, it was natural for me to enquire particularly what grounds Mr. Burke had for supposing Mr. Hastings to be a delinquent, nay, for asserting that he was one? Either the'e grounds must be very strong, I said to myself, or Mr. Burke must be a very bad man — for in one instance he restores men to responsible offices, against whom there were the strongest suspicions of mal-practices, and in another case, he positively pronounces a Gentleman in high office, a notorious delinquent, previous to his even calling for the proofs. Indeed, Mr. Editor, the proofs ought to be very strong to justify Mr. Burke, in using such language. Mr. Scott has already detected the false statement of the opinion of the several lawyers who were consulted, and he has proved from their own words, that instead of advising a prosecution, as the Ninth Report states, they actually did the very reverse. In looking over the appendix, I was much struck with the opinion of John Smith of Drapers Hall, the Company's Solicitor, a shrewd, sensible, long-headed man; and if he, Mr. Editor, gave such an opinion in 1776,

as I now copy from the Appendix to the Ninth Report, No. 111, A. what, I ask you, and through your means I desire to ask Mr. Burke, can any Member of Parliament make of these charges in the Autumn or Winter of 1783?

“ Upon the whole of this evidence, I cannot bring myself to think, that there is sufficient ground for the Company to commence a suit against Mr. Hastings, for recovery of those sums to which my observations are confined ; I mean all the sums stated, except the lack and an half upon which the opinion of counsel has been taken. The proof is exceedingly confused ; but when I consider the eagerness the majority of the council have shewn to establish those charges ; *the extraordinary measures they pursued for the purpose* ; the very easy mode of proving the facts if true ; the very slender proof (if any that is given, the observation arising upon the face of the proof, and the flat contradiction of Muny Begum ; these various circumstances, on my mind, amount almost to *an absolute conviction*, that the story  
“ cannot

“ *cannot be true.* If the fact had been true,  
 “ the persons mentioned by Nundcomar, as  
 “ those through whose hands the first four  
 “ articles were paid, might have been ex-  
 “ amined, and they must have proved the  
 “ facts; but it does not appear, that any one  
 “ of them was called upon, although most  
 “ of them were resident in Calcutta. This  
 “ proof would have been easy and certain;  
 “ if any thing had been given for procuring  
 “ the Naibship for Goordass, he must have  
 “ known it; but he was not asked a question  
 “ upon that subject: The only witnesses  
 “ that attempt any proof are Nundcomar,  
 “ and his son-in-law Goordass. As to Nund-  
 “ comar, if his bad character was not too  
 “ well established, not to deserve credit, the  
 “ manner in which he tells this story would  
 “ destroy his credit. In the outset, he avows  
 “ making those charges against Mr. Hastings,  
 “ only because he feared complaints would  
 “ be made against himself, and because he  
 “ was angry at Mr. Hastings shewing disre-  
 “ spect to him, and favour to others. He  
 “ states the money all to have been paid  
 “ in August, September, October, and No-  
 “ vember 1772; but the letter produced by

" him, in confirmation of this story, is not  
 " pretended to be received till 1773, long  
 " after the payments are pretended to be  
 " made; yet the letter imports the request of  
 " a loan, to make a payment of One Hundred  
 " Thousand Rupees. If Nundtomar had  
 " either paid or engaged to pay such large  
 " sums for Muny Begum, no doubt in the  
 " letter, he is supposed to have written to her,  
 " he would have informed her of it. I can-  
 " not help thinking that this letter was forg-  
 " ed."

Here, Mr. Editor, I have given you John  
 Smith's opinion. The sentiments of the  
 counsellors were equally honorable for Mr.  
 Hastings. The matter dropped; yet at this  
 distance of time, Mr. Burke revives it. In-  
 deed, indeed, Mr. Editor, these are shame-  
 ful proceedings. Is this to be one of the  
 blessed effects of the coalition, that Lord  
 North shall assist Mr. Burke in the persecu-  
 tion of so great a character as Mr. Hastings?  
 I cannot think so favorably of Lord North's  
 conduct as Mr. Scott does; but I venture to  
 prophecy, Mr. Editor, that Edmund Burke  
 will be as unsuccessful in attacking the cha-  
 racter

rather and honest fame of Mr. Hastings, as he was in defending the men whom he restored some time ago to their offices.

When I see such scandalous doings going forward, I cannot forbear speaking out. If I go to 'Change, to the London Tavern, or the Queen's Arms, I meet nothing but long faces: that we are a ruined nation all men agree, and if Lord North, by his measures, has not brought us to this sad pass, Mr. Fox and Mr. Burke, by their opposition, have done it. Who would have thought, Mr. Editor, that after such bitter enmity, these men could have joined, for no other purpose than to share amongst themselves, and their dependants, the little that is left! Here we see Lord North with places for himself, his sons, cousins, and others, to a great amount. Then again we behold Mr. Burke with places of old standing, or newly created, in the possession of himself, his son, brother, and cousins, to the enormous amount, as I have seen in print, of 25,500*l.* a year. Then again Mr. Fox with his connections at the Treasury, Admiralty, &c.—Thus dividing the patronage of England amongst them, and not con-



tented with that, we have seen Mr. Burke attacking in a shameful manner, (as every man in the city allows, even the few friends that are left to Edmund Burke allow it) a man, who amidst all the struggle for places and power in this abandoned country, has proceeded in a spirited and honorable discharge of his duty, and has had the glory to save India before he knew of the peace in Europe: That Mr. Burke from interest, passion, envy, and disappointment, should behave as he has done, it is not to be wondered at; but that Lord North should act the part of Nell Bluff to this Sir Joseph, is indeed most extraordinary!

A CITIZEN.

*Broad-street, 6th August 1783.*

LETTER

## L E T T E R V.

MR. EDITOR,

I Dined yesterday with a friend in Surrey, who has a seat in parliament, and in his parlour window lay the 10th report of the Select Committee. "What the duce!" exclaimed I—"another report from that industrious, *impartial*, and indefatigable body!"—"Yes," replied the Member, "and a very severe one too."—"I think quite the contrary," said my friend, the Proprietor, who was present: "I have read it with attention, but can find nothing in it to the disadvantage of Mr. Hastings: it will doubtless be completely answered; but as I have some little knowledge of India matters, picked up by a constant attendance at General Courts, reading all India pamphlets, and having, for a Bengal

cor-

correspondent, a very intelligent young man, my nephew William; I could not read the Tenth Report without putting the reflections, that occurred at the time, upon paper, and they are at the service of my friend the Citizen, if he chuses to make them the subject of his two next letters."——To be sure, Mr. Editor, I readily accepted his offer, and I hope the following account will be as acceptable to your numerous readers, as, I confess to you, it was to me.

‘ Mr. Hastings has said, and the truth  
 ‘ of the observation will strike every man who  
 ‘ attentively reads the Tenth Report, That  
 ‘ there is no proposition which the wit of  
 ‘ man can devise, which the wit of man can-  
 ‘ not find plausible, and perhaps even just  
 ‘ cause of censure, by a false and partial re-  
 ‘ view of it ; and I, of all men, may be al-  
 ‘ lowed to dread this treatment, after having  
 ‘ invariably experienced it in every instance  
 ‘ of my public life.’

The Tenth Report is in fact the speech made by General Richard Smith, at a Court of Proprietors, on the 24th of October last,  
 enlarged

enlarged, and improved. I remember the General told us then, that though we would not hear him, he would take care to be heard in another place ; and I was present when he made his complaint in Parliament, that he was interrupted by clamour by the Proprietors, though unluckily he forgot to state that he was heard for upwards of an hour with great attention ; it is true, the Court would not patiently attend to a second Philippic from him, on the same day. The Report states what the General then said, that Mr. Hastings went up to Benares, with a view of getting fifty lacks of rupees, for the Company, from Cheyt Sing ; but being disappointed, he persuaded the Vizier to seize the treasures of his mother, for the Company's service, under the pretence of his having levied troops for Cheyt Sing at the time of his revolt, through her eunuchs, Jewar Ally Cawn, and Behar Ally Cawn. The General ludicrously compared these men, and their efforts, to Pachierotti and Tenducci, exciting a revolt in London — This is the outline of General Richard Smith's speech on that day of triumph for Mr. Hastings, and it is the outline of the Tenth Report too. In the  
 Re-

Report, as in the speech, there are many artful appeals to the passions and prejudices of the moment; but the suspected compiler of it has at last talked himself out of all credit. Indeed his professions and his actions are proved to have been so far at variance, that men will, in future, examine for themselves, and not take for matter of fact, the sublime rapsodies of the person who protected two public defaulters, and prosecuted Lord Rodney and Mr. Hastings;—who from being the calumniator, is become the panygerist of Lord North,—and who earnestly recommending œconomy when out of place, was the person to solicit the establishment of a sinecure office, when in place, for the emolument of a near relation. The people of England having, by sad misfortune, recovered their sober senses, and seeing how miserably they were disappointed when they trusted to the flowery professions of Mr. Burke;——perhaps the following plain narration of authentic facts may now be opposed, with success, to the splendid misrepresentations contained in the Tenth Report. I find, by my nephew William's letters, that the late Vizier died in the month of  
January,

January, 1775, and that he was supposed to leave behind him above two million sterling, in specie and jewels, besides other valuable effects.—These, as is the custom of the East, were lodged for security in the Zenana, or womens apartments; and by that means fell into the hands of the Begum, the wife of the Vizier. When Affolph ul Dowlah succeeded his father, he found a large army greatly in arrears, clamorous, and mutinous for want of pay, and he himself deprived of his father's treasures, which of right belonged to him, was unable to satisfy their just demands. The presence of the English army saved his life more than once.—Frequent applications were made to the old woman, the mother of Affolph ul Dowlah, for his father's treasures, but without success. In October, 1775, Mr. John Bristow went to Fyzabad, and he writes to the Supreme Council, Appendix, No. 1, “ that in explaining  
 “ particularly to the Begum, in writing,  
 “ how impossible it was for the Nabob to  
 “ conduct his government without further  
 “ assistance. I further insinuated to her, that  
 “ the treasures she possessed, were the *treas-*  
 “ *ures of the state*, as she had not *succeeded*  
 “ to

“ to them by any *legal right*, and that they  
 “ had been hoarded up to provide *against an*  
 “ *emergency*.”

After some negociation, the old woman consented to pay thirty lacks of rupees, on condition Mr. Bristow would engage, on the part of the Company, that no further demands should be made upon her.—This he was obliged to consent to, without waiting for instructions from the Supreme Council ; and they approved the measure, since it was absolutely necessary.—There were several disputes between the Begum's Eunuchs and the Vizier's Minister, relative to the nature of the effects which were paid in part of the thirty lacks ; and the Begum herself wrote a very violent letter to Mr. Hastings, on part of which Mr. Francis makes the following observation, “ I cannot conceive the (the Begum) has the least right to interfere in the Nabob's government. In a country where women are not allowed a free agency, in the most trifling domestic affairs, it seems extraordinary that this lady should presume to talk of appointing Ministers, and governing kingdoms. Upon the whole, I  
 “ look

“ look upon the letter as not of her writing,  
 “ who probably cannot read, but as the com-  
 “ position of some of her servants ; perhaps  
 “ of the *Eunuch* who brings it.”

The Begum's complaints were sent to Mr. Bristow, and his observations upon them will perhaps throw as much light upon the real character of the Begum, and her Eunuchs, as the committee's reflections on Lieutenant Colonel Harpur's evidence, who quitted Bengal ten years ago, and before the death of Sujah Dowlah, which event made the Eunuchs of consequence in Oude.

Mr. Bristow says, “ In making this com-  
 “ plaint, the Begum forgets the improper  
 “ conduct of her own servants, who have hi-  
 “ therto preserved a *total independence of the*  
 “ *Nabob's authority*, beat the officers of his go-  
 “ vernment, and *refused obedience to his Pere-*  
 “ *wannabs*.—The Begum's Eunuchs did  
 “ industriously spread reports of Murteza  
 “ Cawn's ill intentions, to break into the  
 “ Zenana, and seize all the effects and money  
 “ that could be found,—The Begum had  
 “ great interest in the late Vizier's time.



“ On the Nabob’s accession, he at once placed  
 “ the sole management in the hands of Mur-  
 “ teza Cawn, which disgusted both her and  
 “ her adherents, *particularly their Eunuchs,*  
 “ *who have their views in keeping the wealth in*  
 “ *the Begum’s possession.* The principal, Bahar  
 “ Ally Cawn *enjoys her entire confidence.*” Mr.  
 Bristow sends the Supreme Council, with these  
 remarks, a letter from the Begum to him,  
 which concludes thus, “ Cause the 56 lacks  
 “ to be restored to me ; do not you then take  
 “ any part in the affair, and then let Assolph  
 “ ul Dowla, and Murteza Cawn, in *whatever*  
 “ *manner they are able, take sums of money from*  
 “ *me. They will then see the consequences.*”

You shall have the remainder of my  
 friend’s remarks, Mr. Editor, in another  
 letter.

*Broad-street,*  
*Aug. 10, 1783.*

A CITIZEN.

## L E T T E R VI.

Mr. EDITOR,

I Now send you the remainder of my friend the Proprietor's account.

“ The agreement between the Vizier and his mother, to which Mr. Bristow, on the part of the Company, was guarantee, was executed on the 15th of October, 1775, but it was not until the 7th of July, 1776, that she paid the balance, or gave assignments, and then the Vizier was obliged to submit to a considerable deduction from the sum specified in the original treaty. And Mr. Bristow observed to the supreme Council, “ the Begum can make no great claim on the Company for protection, *when she herself has infringed the conditions of the treaty, of which they were the guarantees.*” In the same letter,

ter, dated 3d of January, 1776, Mr. Bristow says, "How far she (the Begum) may be better affected to the English than the Nabob, I leave to the consideration of the Honorable Board, from the following fact. On the conclusion of the treaty between the Company and the Nabob, the Begum blamed his Excellency very highly, and insisted on his not ceding Benares, offering *of herself* a sum of money in lieu of it."—Mr. Bristow writes to the Begum in reply to a letter of complaint from her. "With respect to your Highness jaghiers, the Nabob agrees to one method, which is, that you give them up entirely, and instead thereof receive a monthly stipend, through the channel of any person you choose to fix on; for the Nabob observed to me, *that two rulers were too much for one country*. By this proposal, the Nabob is desirous of promoting your Highness' quiet, tranquillity, and satisfaction. The Nabob says that in this case you will have no vexation, and will constantly receive your stipend without trouble."

This

This extract proves that the idea of resuming the Begum's jaghier was entertained as early as 1776 by the Vizier, and not, as is insinuated in the report, mentioned to him for the first time in 1781, by Mr. Hastings.

The Vizier however could not procure his mother's consent, to accept an annual sum in lieu of her jaghier, and her Eunuchs were in possession of very great power and influence, till the time of Cheyt Sing's revolt. Her activity in his behalf, is proved beyond the possibility of a doubt—Her disaffection, and the intrigues of her Eunuchs were equally well proved. Was not Mr. Hastings, under such circumstances, strictly justifiable in withdrawing our guarantee, and by that means enabling the Vizier to possess himself of those treasures which were his undoubted right, and which were to be applied to the pressing exigencies of the East-India Company? However pathetically Mr. Edmund Burke may talk of these matters, his pretended humanity will no longer deceive in the City; and my nephew, William, assured me in one of his last letters, that we owe the preservation

tion

tion of India, to the considerable sum of seven hundred thousand pounds, which we received from the Vizier in February 1782; that he could not have paid this money, except from the hoarded treasures of his deceased father, and those ought to have been in his possession many years ago, since the Begum, had not the smallest right to retain them.—This is the true state of a transaction, which the ingenuity of the compiler of the tenth report, has turned and twisted so as to bewilder a man of common understanding. An old lady immured by custom in a seraglio for life, was permitted by us, to retain a large treasure, the property of her son; she employs this money, and her extensive influence, in opposition to the British government—She is compelled in consequence to relinquish the treasure—no further violence is offered, nor are her Eunuchs ill treated, though well deserving an exemplary punishment. Least the term Eunuch should inspire my worthy fellow citizens with the idea of a poor, miserable, squeaking, Italian ballad singer, I will copy an account of a disturbance excited by an Eunuch in Qude,

as it was sent to me by my nephew William, in 1776.

Cojee Buffaun a *complete Eunuch*, was the favorite general of Sujah Dowlah, and very well known to General Smith and Sir Robert Barker. His influence at the court of Oude was considerably lessened by the death of Sujah Dowlah, though he was continued by his successor at the head of a large body of his forces, He was jealous of Murteza Cawn, the favorite minister of Assof ul Dowlah, and was supposed to have entered into engagements with Saudut Ally and the Begum, for the deposition of the Nabob, and the destruction of his minister. In December, 1775, Cojee Buffaun, according to a pre-concerted plan, invited the minister, Murteza Cawn, to an entertainment with several of his principal friends. The Company drank hard, the dancing girls were called in, and, after a little time, Murteza Cawn, the prime minister, was carried in a state of intoxication into another room, and there inhumanly murdered.—After perpetrating this shocking act, Cojee Bassaun, with his sword drawn, rushed into the presence of the Vizier, and was advancing

vancing towards his person, either to seize him, or to put him to death.—Bussaun had drank hard himself, and betrayed such strong marks of confusion in his countenance, that the Vizier with great presence of mind called out “ Will no one rid me of this traitor?”—twenty swords were drawn, and in an instant Cojee Bussaun was cut to pieces. Saudut Ally fled with a few of his confidential attendants, nor were the parties concerned in the plot ever discovered; so far is clear, Murteza Cawn, the Vizier’s prime minister was murdered by the Eunuch, Cojee Bussaun, who was himself put to death by the Vizier’s attendants.—I relate this fact to prove that Eunuchs in India are bold, intriguing, and enterprising men, nor was it right in General Smith to attempt to mislead us, by comparing them to Pachioretti and Tenducci; he knew better, though some of us perhaps did not.

In the tenth report there are some remarks upon a transaction, which I thought could not be related to the discredit of Mr. Hastings. He received a present of ten lacks of rupees from the Vizier and his ministers, and  
sold

told the Company of it: He received other presents, to the amount of nine lacs more, making in all one hundred and ninety thousand pounds sterling. This large sum he has paid into the Company's treasury. He does not even touch a farthing of the interest of it, instead of retaining the principal, which would have enabled him to vie with the gamblers at Brooks's, to be ranked as a companion for princes of the blood royal of France, and to have procured himself and a few of his friends, seats in a certain assembly, at the *next general election*, by bribery. The compiler of the tenth report has had wit and ingenuity enough to find out that "when these facts become known in India, it is to be feared that the servants of the Company will be inclined to lessen their reverence and respect to those acts of parliament which were made to restrain them in pursuit of wealth; and that they will be apt to reconcile to their own minds, any deviation from a strict obedience, by quoting the example of the Governor-General, as a rule by which they may guide their own conduct!"



I conceive it impossible that a transaction so honorable to Mr. Hastings in every point of view, can operate to the disadvantage of the state, unless indeed, the servants of the Company seeing that a man who has served faithfully and honestly for above three and thirty years; and when he has every reason to believe his service is drawing towards a close, candidly declares that he has received presents to the amount of one hundred and ninety thousand pounds, and accounts to the public treasury for every shilling of the principal and interest; if such a man, instead of receiving from his constituents a part of this sum, a life interest in a part of it, or even the most trifling mark of approbation, shall have the mortification to be abused for so singular an act of disinterestedness and integrity; if this transaction shall be misrepresented without doors, and be the subject of a parliamentary Report; if that Report shall be presented to the House of Commons by a man who served in Bengal four years and seven months only, in a station inferior to Mr. Hastings, but who was permitted by the Court of Directors to retain a present to the amount of thirty-six thousand

thousand pounds, although he actually made the Company pay for all the presents he made in his public character, to the amount of above sixteen thousand pounds, and retained in his own hands those he received in return; if, I say, the servants of the Company observe, how unequally rewards, and commendations are conferred upon different men, as the spirit of party, rather than that of justice prevails; then, and then only, can this honorable act of the Governor-General operate to the disadvantage of the state, by inducing the Company's servants in India to believe, that no rectitude of conduct can screen them from the malignant invectives of party malice, patriotic spleen, and interested misrepresentation."

These, Mr. Editor, are my friend's remarks, I will give you my homely sentiments in another Letter.

*Broad-street, August 11, 1783.*

A CITIZEN.

## L E T T E R VII,

Mr. Editor,

**M**Y good friend and neighbour, the Proprietor, called upon me last night, with some further remarks upon the Tenth Report, which I now transcribe, not doubting but that you and your Readers will be amused and instructed by them.

“ I cannot help noticing a very curious assertion contained in the Tenth Report: “ That the decision of the Court of Directors, as to the ten lacs of Rupees given by the Vizier and his Minister to Mr. Hastings was very unjust.” It appears to me that these five or six *virtuous* Reporters (not possessing among them a shilling of property in India-stock) would persuade the Court of Directors to return this money, because they represent the Vizier to be a vassal of the Company’s

pany's. Surely neither the Chairman, Sir Henry Fletcher, nor any of the Directors, will permit one or two men behind the curtain to manage the affairs of the East-India Company. If any person should propose, either in a Court of Directors, or in a Committee of Correspondence, to send orders to the Governor-General and Council, to pay back these ten lacks of Rupees to the Vizier, we should be at no loss to guess from what quarter that person, bringing forward such a proposition, was advised and directed; but should a single Director adopt the ideas of the Select Committee, after having given orders several months ago upon the subject, which were highly proper (because they do not preclude the East-India Company from rewarding hereafter the important services of Mr. Hastings) I hope there will be firmness enough in a majority of the Directors to resist the proposition. If we are to adopt this wild idea of Mr. Burke, let us act consistently. That gentleman's humanity is so subservient to his party views, that from him partial justice only can be expected: but let me ask General Richard Smith, if the Emperor Shaw Allum, the King of the world,

was not a vassal of the Company, and as poor as any king upon earth, when the General accepted presents from him? Why not require the General to return them all? I believe the cash would be very acceptable to his Majesty, for my nephew William, writes me, that from the time he quitted the English, he has suffered the greatest distress. Why not order the Company to pay his arrears of tribute, for we have some patriots amongst us, who say we had no right to withhold it? Why not pay back to the poor distressed unhappy Nabob of Arcot, some of the money that the Company has taken from him? and why not call upon many English gentlemen to refund the presents they have received from him? Let us, for God's sake, be amused with no more of these rapsodies; Mr. Hastings is not a man to make use of unfair means to procure presents to himself; he has too much spirit, and too great a disregard for money to obtain it by improper means; if the Company thinks proper to retain every shilling of the money received, amounting to 190,000*l.* for their own use, let them do it; they have a right to it; but let not the ingenuity of Edmund Burke persuade

suade the Chairman or any other Director of his party, that we shall be disgraced, if we do not pay to the Vizier and his Minister, the ten lacks of Rupees which they gave to Mr. Hastings in September, 1781. I believe there is not a more distressed Prince in India, than the Raja of Tanjore; why not call upon the family of the Burkes to refund all that they have received from him? and, to complete with equity, this system of reformation, let us send transports from this country, let us embark every Englishman in India, and let us in future appear there in the character of traders only. If we are not already sick of the Utopian schemes of Edmund Burke, let us give the world a sure proof of our moderation. Having lost America, let us abandon India. I remember the time when General Richard Smith possessed a very large property in India-stock, and when he wished to be thought the protector of the rights of the East-India Company. He has now sold out even his single vote, has declared we are not solvent, and has exerted himself by every possible means in his power, both in and out of Parliament, to remove Mr. Hastings.—  
 Surely

Surely, neither Mr. Fox, or any other Minister will think of desiring the Directors to employ a person in future, who has been so hostile to us."

Here, Mr. Editor, I have given you my friend's account at length.—I am a blunt citizen, but in my opinion it is very curious that the Select Committee should fix upon Mr. Hastings's presents as the only ones that ought to be returned. To be sure, Mr. Editor, it is very generous of Mr. Burke and General Smith, to dispose of other people's money as they do, I wish I could see them give up a little of their own with all my heart: a plain man like me must wonder how this money business can be a proper object of enquiry for a Committee instructed to *enquire into the state of the judicature in Bengal, and how the British possessions in India may be best governed.*"——The Court of Proprietors are much obliged to these gentlemen for their laudable zeal, and I hope, in return, they will appoint William Burke, Esq; the Tanjore agent, a Supreme Counsellor; and General Smith, to the government of Bombay.

As you may not hear from me again for a month or two, Mr. Editor, I cannot avoid copying, for the edification of your readers, a few lines from a very extraordinary book just published, entitled, *The Life of Mr. Fox*,—  
 “ But the public was peculiarly charmed and  
 “ struck with admiration, by the generous  
 “ and disinterested patriotism of Mr. Burke,  
 “ &c. &c. &c.”—I will not surfeit you by a longer extract, but I wish to know if Edmund Burke’s coalition with Lord North, and securing to himself and his family 25,500l. a year, are proofs either of disinterestedness or patriotism?—If by the Public, the writer means the Citizens of London, or the People of England, I believe, Mr. Editor, they deem all Patriots in the Ministry, men of words and not of deeds, having been so grossly duped and deceived by the very best of them.

Aug. 18, 1783.

A CITIZEN





A

L E T T E R

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

CHARLES JAMES FOX.



A  
L E T T E R

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

CHARLES JAMES FOX,

ONE OF HIS MAJESTY'S

PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES OF STATE

BY

MAJOR JOHN SCOTT.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. STOCKDALE, opposite BURLINGTON  
HOUSE, PICCADILLY.

M.DCC.LXXXIII.



# LETTER, &c.

RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR,

WHILE the iron claw of ministerial encroachment is stretched out over the delegated powers, the chartered Rights, the very corporate existence of all public bodies in this kingdom, while an universal alarm for *the safety of our admirable Constitution*, and for the *essential Liberties of Britons* sits pallid upon every countenance, and trembles upon every tongue, it is become my peculiar and unavoidable province to excite (if I can) a momentary attention to *subordinate concerns*, to set up a separate plea of my

B

own,

own, on account of my immediate principal ; and while the cause of Mr. Hastings goes hand in hand with that of the public, I cannot tamely suffer the animadversions unmeritedly cast upon *him*, to operate, (as it is meant they should,) to the annihilation of the East India Company, to the perpetuation of *your* ascendancy, and to the establishment of corruption *by Law*. It is indeed very extraordinary, that while all your Argument in support of your present Bill is so palpably personal, so pointedly harsh against the Governor General of Bengal, you should call repeatedly upon the House to leave the defence of Mr. Hastings out of the question. Nothing can exceed your Artifice, but the plausibility by which it is masked—You bring in a Bill for a Reform of the East India Company—In support of the necessity of that Reform, You adduce various specific abuses said to exist in India, and You charge those abuses separately and collectively to Mr. Hastings. You then insinuate something of corrupt influence acquired by that gentleman, even on a part of the Legislature : and having with wonderful management engrafted the Company's difficulties on *his* conduct, You in the same breath

breath disclaim all hostile intentions towards *him* : You insist that opposition should *generalize* the whole of its reply : You would banish even the name of Hastings from the other side of the House, and after pronouncing your own harangue, You would arbitrarily dictate the measure and the terms of the answer.

In fact, therefore, because gentlemen are unwilling to lie under the obloquy (however unjust) of intriguing in favour of a man, whom You profess not to attack, (even while you are stabbing him to the heart) all the principal topics of this grand question must necessarily pass untouched. Even the public prints are instructed to stifle all the virtuous members, who from any cause whatever oppose your bill, "The partizans of Mr. Hastings:" when it is obvious, that the line of your attack is and must be the clue to their retort; when it is most notorious, that nothing but the impossibility of throwing any light upon the subject, *as stated by You*, without a reference to the measures of Mr. Hastings's administration, could have overpowered their reluctance to admit any personalities whatsoever in a debate of



such general, of such national importance. But that which in every other man in the kingdom might be misrepresented as proceeding from partial or improper motives, and which, if it could not be proved *corrupt*, would at least be branded as *officious*, is in me the plain simple outline of duty to my employer, the immediate function of my appointment. I am not fit, Sir, to cope with Your talents : and it is in full sense of my own insignificance that I venture my appeal to the public against a Minister of State.

But as the whole scope of your reasoning turns equally upon two points, the pecuniary distress of the Company at home, and the instant calamities arising from the misconduct of Mr. Hastings abroad, I know not why in one case the Company's property should be under-rated or frittered away at your pleasure, to exhibit an artificial bankruptcy; nor in the other, why a manifest mis-statement of our political situation in India should be at all events admitted, because an impartial and more comfortable account would necessarily include some portion of Mr. Hastings's merits. I have avowed myself, Sir, as Mr.

Hastings's

Hastings's political agent: but it is not only in that capacity that I have now the honour to address you; I am also *a Proprietor of India stock*: *My* property, *my* bread is involved in the consequences of your bill, together with that of many hundreds; *My* privileges, as holden under a royal charter, *my* rights, as sanctioned by the faith of Parliament, are attacked in common with those of every member of every corporation in England. I examine your bill not with the calm criticism of a speculative reasoner, not with the dispassionate eye of an unconcerned spectator, but with the breathless curiosity of home-felt alarm, but with the trembling calculation of personal interest. Would to God the contents of Your bill for vesting the affairs of the East-India Company in the hands of certain Commissioners had answered my expectations, and the flattering promises of the title, in disclosing something that would be for the benefit of the Proprietors and the Public!—But neither in the bill itself, nor in any of Your speeches on the subject, have I been able to discover a single item from which I can promise to myself any *benefit as a Proprietor*:—nor indeed can I divine, how a forcible transfer of the whole concerns of

a com-

a commercial body from the hands of twenty-four Directors (mostly bred in commercial habits) to those of seven Commissioners (of whom the greater part most certainly were never instructed in business at all) should ever have passed upon the public, as a probable mode of rendering those concerns more productive.

*Profit* is the life of *commerce*; and my stock is staked upon the Company's commerce. What is it to me, that the Company's books be better kept, that the compting-house be more decently arranged, that the shop-men be more ingeniously distributed, by your new bill, and under your Commissioners, if its *trade* produce no additional *gain*? Had you pointed out new sources of wealth, new channels for commerce, new markets for our commodities, you would have been deservedly hailed as the friend, as the saviour of the Company. But is there any thing like this in your Bill? on the contrary, whenever the present servants of the Company come forward with their estimates fairly drawn up, and state to the public the different objects on which they found their expectations of the Company's future responsibility, and the vari-

ous articles, which while they form the credit-side of their account, comprehend their whole and ultimate means of solvency—You with emphatical industry attempt to deny and invalidate them all—You affect to prove, and you lay your whole stress on proving, that under every posture of events the Company is and *must necessarily* become bankrupt for eight millions—yet you would flatter me with hopes of deriving *benefit* from the appointment of your Commissioners. If a bankruptcy must ensue, I, as a creditor, do not mean to resign my right of becoming a trustee for management and recovery of the bankrupts effects. Men are always most quick-sighted in their own immediate concerns: and you may be assured that no stockholder will risk (if he can help it) the loss of his stock. It cannot possibly therefore be for the benefit of the Proprietors, that seven Commissioners should be appointed to manage their concerns, who (not possessing nor being bound to possess a farthing of stock) would not lose a single farthing by the Company's ruin. But at the very moment in which you declare the Company to be bankrupt in eight millions, you would set aside that property which is stated on the credit-side of its account: as if a bankrupt's estate could be accurately

ly

ly exhibited, without a complete enumeration of the several articles which compose that estate. To me, as a Proprietor, who on the Company's bankruptcy can only look to the reimbursement of my capital—it is perfectly indifferent whether the Company's effects be sold by auction, or seized by your Commissioners—provided their true and intrinsic value be fairly brought to account: But it is a new refinement in commerce, that your seven Bailiffs should come expressly by act of Parliament, “ *immediately to enter in and upon, and* “ *to possess themselves of all lands and tenements,* “ *houses, warehouses, and other buildings whatever,* “ *of or belonging to the said United Company,*” and that the said Company should not be permitted to charge the authentic valuation of those lands, &c. in account current with its own creditors. I repeat it, that all the *benefit* which you offer me as a Proprietor, is the fallacious benefit of Parliamentary security for my dividend of 8 per cent. *fallacious*—because if the Company's affairs be not desperate, I am entitled to that dividend without your interference: and because, if the Commerce cannot afford to pay the dividend, I am one of the public who must be assessed my proportion

portion to make up the deficiency of my own dividend as a Proprietor. How then will your bill in any light *benefit the public*? By an appropriation of the revenues of India to the national exigencies. But how will you render those revenues productive here? You cannot remit them in specie : for that would impoverish the Colonies an hundred-fold faster than it would enrich this country. You cannot import them through the medium of commerce, unless you find a new vent and increased consumption for its commodities : which if the commercial sagacity of the present managers cannot discover and turn to account, I must doubt if it be within the power of your political penetration to suggest ; you can only shift it to your own—Friends. I am indeed utterly lost in tracing to substantial existence any one article by which you can hold out the prospect of *benefit to the public*. The items of the Company's credit you in general depreciate : Its houses, warehouses, &c. you strike off from the account ; the debts due from the Vizier of Oude, from the Nabob of the Carnatic and the Rajah of Tanjore, you would incline to pay from our sinking fund, rather than suffer them to be gradually liquidated

on the spot ; and all that can possibly be deemed of advantage to the public, is the difference between 4,200,000*l.* sterling lent to Government (*as sterling*) by the East-India Company, and the present value of the 3 per cents, which this very bill has already tended to reduce.

But how much soever the *public* might abstractedly be *benefited* by the new plan, it will most assured be injured in a much greater degree by the blow thereby given to all public credit. Charters, which not long ago were held as the strongest ties upon the justice of the Legislature, as the most sacred security upon earth, are now to be infringed — openly, avowedly, in the face of God and man, ostentatiously infringed. Former violations (which in truth and reason exaggerate the crime) are triumphantly pleaded in defence of subsequent violation. “ The act of 1773 was a “ violation of the charter, those of 1779 and “ 1780 were equally so ;” and the necessity of the measure (of which necessity neither the Cabinet, nor the Parliament, nor the nation, could, perhaps, ever form a decisive idea) was the warrant of its execution. I believe, however, that  
the

the present is the first instance in which so *problematic a necessity* was ever produced in the House of Commons as a persuasive for a breach of parliamentary faith, and a previous absolution of national perfidy. Such was not the ostensible doctrine of opposition to the India bills, formerly brought in by a noble Lord now high in office. Such political necessity was never admitted by the strenuous patriots of that day, as a valid apology for such turpitude; and none but themselves could have set up as precedents for their own conduct, those tyrannical and unjustifiable measures, which themselves had so repeatedly and so forcibly exposed.

Let me now, Sir, humbly request your attention to the case of Mr. Hastings: much has been said, and much more insinuated against that gentleman's influence in the House of Commons, as well as in the Court of Proprietors; and *this influence is attributed to money*. The *personal friends* Mr. Hastings may have in either place, are proportionate to the very slender opportunities he has ever enjoyed of cultivating friendships in his own country. Those independent characters who ho-



nour him *as Governor General* with their support, give it upon *public grounds*: and I am sure they need not blush to avow their motives. Unintelligible, Sir, as the language I am now about to use, may appear to you, I do not hesitate to affirm, that Mr. Hastings has a soul that would startle at the very suggestion of such a scandalous traffic, that would re-gorge at the nauseous influence that could be put up to sale. I now pledge myself to take my oath (whenever called upon) at the bar of the House, that Mr. Hastings has never, to my knowledge, expended one shilling, directly or indirectly, in the purchase of any influence at all; not even of a *drop of ink*, but what I have paid for *to the press*: and that if it will tend to undeceive the public with respect to the mode by which his character has been established in this country, I am ready to deliver in *upon oath* to the House of Commons, my accounts for every farthing disbursed by me, as his agent, and chargeable to his estate, up to the present day. I will add, that being his political agent only, I am not entrusted with the receipt and disposal of his private property; but that the gentlemen whom he has appointed to execute that

charge

charge (Sir Francis Sykes, Mr. Waller, and Mr. Woodman) are also prepared at any time to lay before the public, a full and accurate account current, of the whole fortune (in England) of their principal, with every article of expenditure, since the first instant of their management. Mr. Hastings's fortune as much precludes him from the power, as his principles estrange him from the wish of recurring to such iniquitous means of support. It is the influence of meritorious services, operating on the public opinion, and *nothing else*, that has enabled him to withstand so many parties, and so many Ministers; an influence, which as bribes did not collect, you find it out of the power of bribery to dispel.

In Your endeavours to establish the necessity of Your new Bill on the mismanagement of the Company's affairs in Asia, You have selected a number of occurrences more or less connected with the Governor General's Administration; And by a happy confusion of dates, of circumstances and of persons, have at once thrown a very undeserved odium upon him, and drawn a most unfair and distorted picture of the state of

India.—And here I cannot but feel with double anxiety the mortifying disproportion of my powers to the magnitude, to the celebrity of my subject: and how can I comprize an epitome of Mr. Hastings's Government for twelve years, and a connected account of the present situation of our settlements—within the narrow boundaries of a few pages? much more, Sir, how shall I venture to exhibit in its native purity, that canvas which your masterly colouring has so effectually disguised?—You will, I trust, pardon my presumption, for this effort of duty, and my incapacity, for the faintness of the sketch I shall produce.

Mr. Hastings arrived in Bengal as President and Governor of Fort William in 1772. His plan was that of peace, his system was that of œconomy, his views were those of internal reform. On the instant of his taking the chair, our Frontier Brigade was marching to assist the Vizier Sujah Dowlah at the very extremity of the Rohilla Country, on the requisition of Sir Robert Barker, then Commander in Chief, and without previous communication with the Presidency. Mr. Hastings instantly issued orders for the return of the  
brigade

Brigade—and the greatest part of it actually returned to its cantonments at Dinapore—Does this argue an inordinate thirst for conquest, an unjustifiable ambition to extend our dominions? Three battalions, however, belonging to the brigade had pushed forward with such rapidity as to escape the countermanding order : they joined Sujah Dowla, and put a stop to the incursions of the Marattas. The march of the remainder of the brigade next season, the junction of the whole body with the Vizier, entitled him to forty lacs of rupees, which the Rohillas had bound themselves by treaty, under the guarantee of Sir Robert Barker, to pay the Vizier as the price of their defence. This very money was the cause of the Rohilla war, which you have once again called up to condemnation. The Company's Commander in Chief had pledged himself to the Vizier for the performance of the treaty, and it was therefore *not unjust* that the Company's troops should enforce its articles on those whom that very Commander in Chief had styled in his letters to the Governor and Council “ The most faithless and treacherous of men.” On this state of the case, it would hardly have been decent in

Mr.

Mr. Hastings to with-hold the Company's aid; but while he sacrificed his own pacific system to the support of that guarantee granted by Sir Robert Barker, he at the same time essentially consulted the interests of his employers, by stipulating that the Vizier should pay *the whole expence* of the troops furnished for his assistance: and thus removed the grand political objection to the employment of our forces on distant service, while their support had been hitherto constantly remitted in specie, to the great impoverishment of our own provinces. The Rohilla war, therefore, arose from *their* breach of that treaty of which we were guarantees; and the Rohillas, a tribe of Afghan Tartars, who had invaded, subdued, and settled in the province of Rohilcund not forty years before, were forced to relinquish their ill-gotten conquests. The Gentû natives, the Aborigines of the country, continued in the peaceable exercise of agriculture and of their several trades during that war, and continue there to this day. They were before subjects to the Rohilla Chiefs, and they are now subjects to the Nabob Vizier: and the one has at least as good a claim as the others. But as the effects of that war have no longer

longer any influence upon the mass of Indian politics, a mention of it was by no means necessary or pertinent in a detail of the present state of India. And if it be true, that the principle of that war was condemned by the Court of Directors and Proprietors in 1775, it is also true, that in 1779 and 1780 Lord North, with this condemnation before his eyes, twice proposed in Parliament, the man to whom that war had been generally (I will not add *justly*) imputed, for Governor General of Bengal—Mr. Hastings had been found so able in other respects, so useful a servant to the Company, so meritorious a subject to the Crown, that the single demerit of the Rohilla war was of no weight in the opposite scale; a reference, therefore, to that war at this distant period, can never impress the public with an opinion of your candour—can never influence, now that the subject is so remote; can only be intended to stifle cool argument, by an appeal to the passions: an affecting picture of the calamities of any war, since or before that of Troy, would have served just as well.

It is Mr. Hastings's peculiar misfortune, that being most zealously attached to the arts and to

the enjoyments of peace, he has been under an almost constant necessity of engaging in involuntary hostilities. You loudly blame him for the Maratta war, and yet you know it originated at Bombay in 1776. You know that it was suspended, rather than concluded by the treaty of Poorunder, and that upon a dispassionate revision of the recrimination of each party, it may yet be doubted whether we or the Marattas were the first aggressors in its renewal. But at all events you must allow, that the treaty of Poorunder, in the loose indefinite style of its articles, contained the seeds of future dispute; that the Presidency of Bombay, the Governor General of Bengal, and the Court of Directors, equally reprobated its terms, and that the Company's servants were in general encouraged to seize the first decent plea for not abiding by it. After all, it was incumbent on Mr. Hastings to counteract the intrigues of the French agents at Poonah. Positive intelligence, and that from the highest authority of this country, assured him, both of the existence and of the danger of those intrigues, and his exertions on that occasion were no less approved by his Majesty's Ministers, than by the Court of Directors.

**Directors.** But you now criminate the Governor General as author of the renewal of the hostilities, for not consenting to the cession of Salsette in 1779; yet you are not to be informed that Bombay derives its immediate support, its daily bread from that island, and that the Company were anxious to risk almost any thing, or every thing on that side of India, for its acquisition. I repeat it again and again, Mr. Hastings was not the author of that war, he was not the promoter of it; *but he has an exclusive merit in the Maratta peace;* in that peace which, by his efforts, has been ratified upon honourable terms to the Company, when I would stake my existence on the belief, that no other man could have procured any peace at all: In that peace, which an apostate to his duty in the Company's service, an interested convert to the principles of your new bill, has insidiously asserted to have been purchased by the inglorious sacrifice of Broach, worth 16 lacks of rupees per annum. Let him cloak his iniquity, and palliate his misrepresentations as he may, but I here tell him from the records at the India house, that the territory of Broach produced, of nett revenue,



In 1779,	— —	270,000 rupees
In 1780,	— —	240,000
In 1781,	— —	77,000

and he knows that six-tenths of this sum was ceded to the Marattas, *unexceptionably and by treaty*, and Scindia's guarantee is surely more than a counterbalance for the rest.

You, Sir, have objected to the Maratta treaty, on very different grounds—on grounds, which while I cannot acknowledge them to convey the smallest reflection on Mr. Hastings's politics, at least do not discredit your understanding nor impeach your veracity: You have objected to it, on the danger of its eventually provoking fresh hostilities with France, by the possibility of our junction with the Peshwa in protraction of the war against Tippo Saib on the spirit of the ninth article of the treaty. It was prudence, it was policy, it was necessity that dictated the terms of this article, and at any other moment you would have been the first to applaud it. At the signing of the preliminaries, as late as the ratification of the definitive treaty with the Marattas, we were at war equally with the French and with Tippeo Saib

Saib — It was impossible for Mr. Hastings to foresee and provide for the articles of a peace to be settled among the belligerent powers of Europe. We had an undoubted right of reprisals on the Myfore country for the devastation caused by Hyder Ally in the Carnatic — we had a laudable motive in diverting the attention and arms of the restless Marattas to a new object; we had a formidable French force to oppose both by sea and land. I will answer for the Governor General's caution in avoiding all cause of umbrage or offence to the French in India, from the instant that peace shall be promulgated between the two nations, and for his steady compliance with every stipulation of the treaty.

In your efforts to invalidate the debts of the Company as charged in the late estimate to different powers in India, you have particularly enlarged on the connection with the Nabob Vizier of Oude: and, as usual, you have attributed all the misfortunes which he appears to have incurred by that connection, to Mr. Hastings. To this debt, which the Company states at 730,000l.

you

you at once declare, that eternal oblivion ought to be annexed, notwithstanding the very latest advices from Mr. Bristow give assurances that the whole will be very speedily recovered. But perhaps you rely on the probability of this recovery having already taken place, and are therefore the more unguarded in advising an unconditional release. The cruelties which you have so pathetically painted (if Woodfall be correct) as being the necessary consequence of an attempt to recover the Company's debts in India are most shamefully misstated and most unwarrantably exaggerated. The Continent of India, like the continent of Europe, comprehends many different nations, in very different degrees of civilization : and in very few of them is to be found that regularity of police, or that refinement of manners which is the charm of the western world. The districts *on the coast of Coromandel*, under the sway of those subordinate Chiefs called Poligars, are inhabited by a particularly rude, brutal, and savage race — and the very letter which you caused to be read from Colonel Bonjour, incontestably demonstrated it.

But

But you surely would not by your exclamations against extortion, inhumanity, and oppression, insinuate that all force is unjustifiable in the recovery of a just debt: nor is the desertion of the peasants from an Indian village any proof of the exercise of great cruelty or monstrous rapacity. Some abscond, because they find an occasional concealment less irksome than a faithful discharge of their engagements; some because they will not be pressed to carry baggage—and some merely from an abhorrence of intercourse with strangers. Even in more flourishing times of the empire, the march of the Mogul's army through his own country never failed to cause a temporary depopulation. No revenue is ever collected in India without some degree of force, and the whip is there at least as necessary an instrument to the tax-gatherer as his inkhorn: I will add, that at no period, in no part of India, has severity been so sparingly applied to the operations of finance, as in Bengal since the period of the Company's government. But you could not resist the temptation of a *touch* at the revolution of Benares—At that revolution, which,

while

while it stands perfectly justifiable on the grounds of propriety and expediency, is proved beyond the possibility of cavil to have originated with Cheyt Sing and not with Mr. Hastings—is proved to have commenced in massacre, and concluded in rebellion :—is proved to have been founded on lying pleas of poverty, and gross instances of disobedience. But on your principles the demands of the Company for all debts, however incurred, are at once to be cancelled. I believe indeed the race of *creditors* in general has but small obligations to your justice, or your compassion—but I am astonished that you should be so ready to take the bare assertion and interested *ipse dixit* of the Vizier of Oude, or the Rajah of Tanjore, or of any of the Company's renters, on a plea of incapacity to pay their debts. I can discover but two circumstances, which can reasonably be supposed to operate against the claim—*Either* that the charge is exorbitant, usurious, ill-authenticated, *or*, that the contracting party laboured at the time under some known incapacity and disqualification for binding itself in an obligation to pay. Neither of these objections can fairly be urged against the demand

mand on Asoph ul Dowla. His debt was incurred for articles fairly furnished, for troops regularly employed in his service for his defence, and upon a stated allowance settled by treaty at the express motion of General Clavering and his majority. The former treaty with the late Vizier Sujah ul Dowlah, was, as you know, upon very different terms—and *that* was the treaty of Mr. Hastings. No encroachments were *there* attempted to be made upon the independence of that Prince ---the whole stipulation consisted in his agreement to pay 210,000 rupees per mensem for one of our brigades, so long as it should act under his orders, or in conjunction with his forces. This treaty, as it stood at his death, the Governor General thought binding upon us, and upon his successor. Not so the majority of that day, General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis. *They* pronounced upon the propriety of a new treaty, and *they* dictated the articles. *They* obliged the Vizier to cede to the Company the sovereignty of Gauzipoor and Benares in perpetuity: *They* saddled the Vizier with an additional charge of 50,000 rupees a month for the subsistence

tence of the auxiliary brigade; and under ~~them~~<sup>\*</sup> (through the channel of *their* resident, Mr. Bristow) were British officers appointed to command the residue of the Vizier's troops. All this was in 1775. In 1779 the Vizier refused to grant assignments for the pay of those very troops thus *officered*; and Mr. Hastings was only prevented from immediate compliance with his request for disbanding them, by the necessity of holding out an ostensible balance to the armies of the Sieks, and of Nejes Khaun, then in the field in great force.

It was on the subject of this refusal that the Vizier, during the interval of a cock-fight or a horse-race, dispatched the very *poetical chapter of lamentations*, with which you have so animatedly warmed the feelings of the House. That he was very sore upon the refusal, I do not doubt; and this establishment of British officers was certainly as well a severe check upon his independency, a great derogation of his dignity in the eyes of the native Princes, as an intolerable burthen upon his finances.

Mr.

Mr. Hastings however was neither answerable for the measure by which those officers were appointed, nor for the several circumstances, by which their conduct might irritate the Vizier and oppress his country. But *in September 1781*, the instant that political necessity permitted him, *He disbanded them.*

You were particularly pointed on the late resumption of the Begum's Jaghires—a measure which you also attribute exclusively to the Governor General—as if it were impossible for a despotic monarch to have the slightest principle of independent action, or the most trivial attention to his own concerns. Even so long ago as the year 1775, and very soon after the Vizier's accession to the musnad, the predominating influence of the Begum was a thorn in his side——And he observed to Mr. Bristow, that “two rulers were too much for one country.”——A negotiation was at that time entered into for substituting a regular payment of the value of the Jaghire in money, instead of the possession of the land itself and the troublesome management of



the collections : but the old lady had too deeply tasted the sweets of uncontrouled dominion, to part willingly with so flattering a prerogative ; she refused to listen to any terms of resignation, and supported her servants in a conduct of disaffection, opposition and contumacy, that at last, on the revolution at Benares, broke out into open rebellion. Can there be a doubt but that the Vizier felt the indignity offered to his government, and the danger that involved his throne ? Can there be a suspicion that he would fail to discover in the military jurisdiction and unjustifiable encroachments of his Jaghiredars the true source of the mischief, can there be a motive assigned why it should not equally be his wish as it was his interest to suppress the very possibility of future disturbance ? I will be bold to say, that the Vizier *ought* to have resumed the Jaghires—and that the advice of Mr. Hastings (if indeed the Vizier had no plan of conduct, no policy of his own) was perfectly wise, political, and expedient. It is an additional proof of the necessity of the measure, that the servants of the Begum should have presumed to oppose *their* *lawful*

*lawful Sovereign* in its operation. Nothing can so strongly evince their full conviction of the existence of “two rulers in one country” as their most unwarrantable and rebellious appeal to the sword: nothing can so unanswerably establish the propriety of an instant remedy to the anarchy that prevailed in the Subah of Oude. The Begum was therefore on the justest of all pleas dispossessed of an authority which she had constantly perverted to the very worst purposes, but the nett amount of her collections was secured to her by a new agreement; the treasures of which she had possessed herself by very suspicious means, by a fraudulent concealment of her husband’s will, or an artful appropriation of a deposit, those treasures which had always been understood to belong to the state, and which our Resident at Oude reported in 1775 to have been notoriously set aside for the supply of political emergencies, she *consented* to restore to her son, for the wants of his government, after twelve days of reflection upon the loss of her ill-exerted authority, had reconciled her to a just notion of her subordinate situation. We have the Resident at Oude’s testimony

mony, in the appendix to the tenth report from the Select Committee, that her treasures were *surrendered by agreement*.

In your indiscriminating search for arguments in defence of your new bill, you have not omitted to state the discordant situations of our different governments in India, and your particular apprehensions for your very valuable friend Lord Macartney. You not only fear that, he may have been deposed from his government, but *even* that he may have experienced *the fate of Lord Pigot* ! I ask you in your candour, Right Honourable Sir, if that *fate* were any thing more than *deposition* ? and I flatter myself, I may for this time presume to answer for you in the negative — at least Mr. Hastings cannot by the most extravagant stretch of insinuation be implicated farther than in the *suspension*, which (if Woodfall be right) you are pleased to term a *deposition*: and even here there is nothing in the Company's records, nor in private intelligence, to warrant your conclusion. On the news of certain propositions having been offered to Tippoo Saib, equally unsatisfactory to the Commander

mander in Chief and to the Council General, Mr. Hastings in Council, desired to know “ whether  
 “ the Members thought that the President and  
 “ Select Committee of Madras had or had not incurred the penalty of the act of the 13th of the  
 “ King, by deputing the Tanjore Vakeel to  
 “ Tippoo Saib to treat of peace on the condition  
 “ of ceding to him a part of the Carnatic?” This question was determined in the negative; and on this simple ground, did your informer in this business, Sir Henry Fletcher, build his assertion, that Mr. Hastings’s proposal *for the suspension of Lord Macartney* had been carried against him by a *one* only; as if a *majority of one* were in the Supreme Council any other than the ordinary and almost necessary consequence of the smallness of its number. But the discordant situations of our governments abroad might be most easily reconciled at home without the interference of your bill, or the annihilation of the Company’s charter. The Supreme Council at Calcutta is *by law* to have the sole and entire control in all political negotiations and matters relative to war and peace, except in cases of the most urgent necessity. Did that  
 that

that necessity exist when Lord Macartney and the Select Committee assumed the liberty of proposing a separate treaty with Tippo Saib? Sir Eyre Coote positively and pointedly denied it.

I cannot here deprive myself the pleasure of contributing my humble mite of gratitude and applause to that worthy and gallant old general, who to the inflexible virtues of the man, joined the most exalted talents of the soldier, who redeemed us from utter ruin in the Carnatic, who sacrificed the declining years of a most active life, to the difficulties and labours of war, rendered doubly severe by the severities of an Asiatic climate, and who lived but to the moment when his country had just begun to flatter itself with the possibility of sparing his exertions. Methinks I see the wonderful veteran reclined on his laurels, struggling in the very arms of Death, and collecting the last remnant of his exhausted strength, while he dictates to the disconsolate Secretary the animated conclusion of the forcible minute he delivered on this occasion: "Though for my part" says he "I may with propriety say that I have one  
" foot

“ foot in the grave, and the other on the verge of  
 “ it, I trust in God I shall retain sufficient strength  
 “ both of body and mind to put an advantageous  
 “ and glorious end to this destructive war in India,  
 “ instead of having our national honour and  
 “ military credit degraded by any solicitation  
 “ for peace to an enemy already dismayed :---and  
 “ therefore I trust that this Board will never con-  
 “ sent to so degrading and unjustifiable a measure,  
 “ as is now proposed by the President and Select  
 “ Committee of Fort St. George.” Alas! great  
 and fortunate commander, your country’s ser-  
 vice can but ill brook your loss !---But you have  
 at least left us Mr. Hastings: and you are now  
 looking down with a smile of complacency on  
 those spirited exertions, to which, even in the mo-  
 ment of rival emulation, you had the generosity  
 to ascribe the preservation of the Carnatic! Peace  
 and glory attend your shade!

However meritorious Lord Macartney’s con-  
 duct may have been, however strict his care and

cautious his attention to obey the Company, he has most certainly been involved in differences and disputes upon almost every public question since the commencement of his government. He reminds me of the venturous scholastics of the sixteenth century, who in the fury of disputation, supported theses *de omni Scibili* against all opponents: We have Lord Macartney *versus* the Supreme Council, Lord Macartney *versus* Sir Eyre Coote, Lord Macartney *versus* Sir Edward Hughes, Lord Macartney *versus* General Stuart, and Lord Macartney *versus* the Nabob of the Carnatic. I have an unfeigned respect for his Lordship's character and abilities; but I cannot help lamenting that his exertions should be so unfortunately cramped, and so confined to perpetual struggles against his associates in the public service.

I shall now take the liberty, right honourable Sir, to conclude with a few words on the present state of our affairs in India: my description will, undoubtedly, form something of a contrast to  
your's,

your's, and with profound humility I acknowledge that the *ingenuity* is all on your side. Bengal is certainly in a flourishing condition ; its revenues productive ; its government united ; its internal tranquility secured. The same may be said of Benares. Oude is slowly, but gradually recovering from a relaxed system of policy, from disordered finances, from domestic anarchy. —The debts due from thence to the Company are liquidated—or in the way to speedy liquidation (no prejudice I hope to our sinking fund.) It has resumed in a great degree its proper rank of respectability among the powers of India, and its frontiers are on every side in peace. —Tippoo Saib has evacuated the whole of the Carnatic ; and it now depends on the combined exertions of our government and of the Nabob of the Carnatic to restore by every species of encouragement, the population of the country, and the advantages of commerce.



On the Bombay side, Peace is effectually ratified with the Marattas—and on terms, which while they are not gallingly severe on either party, are most likely to be permanently observed by both. Tippoo Saib is said to be still formidable in that quarter, but every dispatch from Bombay teems with confidence in the success of their efforts, which they are now free to direct in full force against him. The province of Bednore we have lost by the fortune of war, as we most probably should have been obliged to relinquish it on the conclusion of a peace. It is even likely that we shall confine all our exertions to the acquisition of a specific sum from Tippoo Saib, as a compensation for the ravages of his father's arms—and this seems our wisest policy—But this circumstance will not be at all promoted by the provisions of your Bill—and if I might venture to play the statesman (as precedents are not wanting to encourage me) I would roundly assert, that there is as little mismanagement, corruption and oppression in the different seats of the British government

vernment in India, as are to be found in any part of the world—that a few years of peace will restore the India Company's affairs to the highest prosperity in Asia:—and that if your Bill were *lost* to-morrow, every corporate body in this kingdom, and every man who values his birth-right and the freedom of his country, would have reason to triumph in the event.

I remain with the greatest respect,

Right Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient

And most humble Servant,

J O H N S C O T T.

L O N D O N,  
November 30, 1783.

T H E E N D.



**I**T has been boldly asserted, that if the India bill should pass, the Minister will acquire no accession of patronage, but will enjoy that power openly, and with responsibility annexed to it, which Lord North, when the Minister enjoyed in secret. It would have been honourable in his Lordship had he contradicted so bold and so ill-founded an assertion — as he did not do it, I will explain what portion of patronage Lord North did, and what he did not enjoy.

All appointments to the command of ships, and of inferior officers in that branch of service, have been under the Court of Directors, without any interference on the part of the Minister.— All appointments to offices in the India House, or the warehouses — all contracts for supplying the East India Company with stores of every kind for their settlements in India, comprehending a most extensive patronage, have been solely under the management of the Court of Directors, without any interference on the part of the Minister.

All appointments of writers, officers, cadets, surgeons, &c. &c. to the several governments in India, have been made by the Court of Directors—In fact the great and principal inducement to almost every gentleman in the direction, to obtain his election, has been that he might have his share of this species of patronage—Most, if not all the Directors have sons, or brothers, or cousins, or intimate friends, whom they wish to provide for, and the Company's service abroad has hitherto afforded an honourable and an advantageous provision for the relations or the friends of the Directors—Consequently they have been exceedingly tenacious of this branch of the lawful patronage annexed to their offices. Lord North when Minister, has not at all times been able to send a writer to India, and if the lists of gentlemen appointed to the civil and military service of India, since the year 1773 were examined, it would be found, that his Majesty's Ministers have been complimented with about one twenty-sixth part of such appointments, *and no more!* This assertion is capable of proof or refutation.

The

The patronage of India has been hitherto in the gift of the respective governments abroad, except in a few instances where the Directors have interfered, namely, in the cases of Mr. Bristow, and Mr. Fowke, the son of Mr. Gregory, the nephew of Sir Henry Fletcher, and a few more instances, in which a faction among the Directors has sacrificed the public interest in order to serve their friends: but in general the Directors have faithfully discharged their public duty, by appointing the servants who are to be employed, and by leaving it to the respective governments to employ them as they thought proper.

This is the present state of the patronage of the East-India Company, and widely different indeed from that which the bill now before the House of Commons means to throw into the hands of the Minister. He nominates seven Commissioners with absolute power to direct, order, govern, appoint, and remove all persons, of all ranks employed by the East-India Company both at home, and abroad---and the patronage, thrown into his hands by so bold a step, is rated very low indeed, at two millions sterling a year.



L E T T E R

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

EDMUND BURKE.





A  
L E T T E R

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

EDMUND BURKE,

PAYMASTER GENERAL

OF HIS

MAJESTY'S FORCES.

BY

MAJOR JOHN SCOTT.

L O N D O N :

PRINTED FOR J. STOCKDALE, OPPOSITE  
BURLINGTON HOUSE, PICCADILLY.

M.DCC.LXXXIII.



L E T T E R  
TO THE  
RIGHT HONOURABLE  
EDMUND BURKE.

Right Honourable Sir,

**I**N the distribution of different parts to the ministerial orators who support the new India bill, in the application of their different powers to this one important object, it was natural that all the topics which afforded play to a wandering imagination, and to tragic description, should have been allotted to Mr. Burke. The field of fancy is almost exclusively your's; and when it was resolved, that in or-

der to palliate the intended invasion of our charter and our property, the atrocious acts of barbarity and cruelty committed by the servants of the East-India Company abroad, should be held up to the detestation of the House, and of the public, and form one grand engine of the attack, your talents both for the *pathetic* and the *fabulous*, gave you a double claim to this branch of the service. Your feelings are so tremulously acute, your nerves are so strung to compassion, your language is so attuned to lamentation, that forms of horror and distress, scenes of destruction and desolation, seem to arise *spontaneously* in your mind, and to occupy that portion of the sensorium, which, in men of irritable habits, is the province of reason, of judgment, and of common sense. I am, therefore, one of those who were exceedingly surprised that the right honourable framer of the new bill should so palpably have encroached upon your privilege in his late harangues, as to exhibit a very glowing and highly-coloured picture of the inhumanities of our countrymen in India. There is honour among thieves: surely it cannot be wanting among Ministers. But I shall hereafter be less inclined to wonder at any unwarrantable attempt to invade the prerogatives of the subject,

subject, since I have seen, among yourselves, ~~for~~  
glaring an invasion of your's!

If avarice and rapacity were subjects open to the eloquence of Mr. Fox, the tortures, the bloodshed that accompanied them were themes that appertained solely to Mr. Burke. The right honourable *Secretary* might inveigh as he pleased on the manner in which the debts due to the Company had been contracted—but it belonged to the right honourable *Paymaster* to expatiate on the severities necessary for extorting payment of them. In short, Sir, you have been superseded in your functions: *The Minister*, who is soon to unite in his own person the rights of the Company, the powers of the Crown, and the riches of the East, has begun his career of injustice by excluding you from the path in which you hoped to have trodden without a rival. *He* snatched from your hands Colonel Boujour's letter—*He* told the piteous tale of Cheyt Sing, the woes of Asophrul Dowla, and the misfortunes of his grandmother! I wonder you can ever forgive him. To take your long prepared victim out of your clutches, to go out of his way, and against his own repeated professions, for the sake of abusing the Governor General of

Bengal; and to abuse him too for a sanguinary, murderous disposition, of which till that moment you had prided yourself (and with reason) as the sole discoverer, was a hard trial of your patience. But to drive you from every strong hold of your Committee, to leave you nothing but the stale defence of Shah Allum, the expulsion of that virtuous monarch Cossim Ally, and the defraudation of that disinterested Plenipotentiary, Onichund, whereon to erect your plea of participation in the spoils of Hindostan, must engage your very opponents in your behalf. They cannot but have beheld with an eye of pity the shifts to which you were driven, the distress in which you were involved by the necessity of a vague and uninteresting retrospection.

To plunge into the forgotten abyss of distant revolutions, to revive the convicted slander of artificial famines, to tread on the tender ground of injurious monopolies previous to the year 1772, (*with your friend General Smith at your elbow*) was indeed a bitter pill—but gilded as it is with five and twenty thousand a year from Government to yourself and your relations, you contrived somehow or other to swallow it: and even now that it is down, it cannot fail,

fail, I think, to excite a few qualms — for you must, at times be apprehensive that your language and your conduct on former struggles with respect to India, should live in the world's recollection: that it should be whispered how strenuous and how loud an advocate you were in the year 1772 for the chartered rights of the East-India Company. How you then reprobated the ministerial iniquity of your now-noble friend Lord North — How warmly you defended the innocence of the Company's servants of *that* day — and how quickly, upon a proper application, *pulveris exigui jactu*, you can “renounce your principles, and eat your words.”

In this formal recantation of your un-pensioned habits of thinking and speaking, Mr. Woodfall has been particularly cautious not to omit that you were upon your legs upwards of two hours. This is a morsel of information for us out of doors only. The members who retired to dinner when you got up, knew they had full two hours of spare time; and when they returned, you had not sat down. But as you took only somewhat more than two hours to disgorge all you had taken in during three years of hard study, and as in that time you contrived to unsay *every thing* that



that you had been heard to utter on the discussion of the Regulating Act of the 13th of the King, I must allow that you performed it *with great expedition*; with an expedition proportioned to the *necessities of the times*, and to the hurry of the whole transaction. The speech which Mr. Woodfall has made for you in Tuesday's Chronicle, deals so exceedingly in *generals*, that I cannot follow up with that accuracy and closeness which I am inclined to bestow upon the subject your "prodigious detail of the conduct of the Company in Asia, from their first establishment there." But I must be permitted to remark, that it is somewhat extraordinary to observe you ostentatiously vaunting your late three-years course of study, as the ground of your claim to the attention of the House, when it is notorious to the most superficial observer of your Reports, that every object of enquiry in your committee, has been religiously confined to the single period of Mr. Hastings's administration, and when it is evident, from the whole tenour of your oration, that you had been almost expressly referred, by a ministerial mandate, to events antecedent to that administration. One article was indeed generously given up to you, wherein there was a possibility of implicating the Governor General:—a history of that pomp-

ous non-entity, *the mildest of Monarchs*, that Allah. His *mildness* however I shall leave in your quiet possession; for that quality has been seldom disputed to Monarchs who were without subjects. But that he is “the most beneficent, humane,” (i. e. *mild* once more) “generous,” (i. e. *beneficent*) “wise, philosophical,” (*wise* again) “and religious of men,” I must a little contest with you, notwithstanding your ingenious reduplication of epithets. Of his beneficence I cannot at once recollect an instance, except a donation (hardly gratuitous) of two lacs of rupees—and that portion of his merits you should have left to the panegyric of General Smith. In wisdom I hold him greatly inferior to the Raja of Tanjore; for in the *choice of friends*, which is one great criterion of judgement, the latter has infinitely the advantage. His religion, as it is that of a Mahometan, is of little consideration in a Christian assembly; and you had better have given him a good share of morality; however, I must acknowledge to have heard, that his Majesty is famous for copying the Koran with peculiar neatness of character, and that he is not much interrupted in this august employment by attention to the management of his extensive empire, and to the welfare of his innumerable

able subjects. Between ourselves, Sir——He is a weak man. Lord Clive gave him the provinces of Corah and Illahabad, which would afford him a handsome maintenance, and were five times as much as he could ever have acquired in any part of India without us : and we also allowed him twenty-six lacs of rupees yearly from Bengal for the support of his dignity. But he was too much of a *philosopher* to attach himself to the good things of this world, so threw himself into the arms of his natural, hereditary, and constitutional enemies the Marattas; ceded to them, *without our consent*, the provinces we had given him, and undertook a chimerical expedition to Dehli. Are you surpris'd that we took those provinces back again, when the King could not, or would not, keep them ? or that we did not continue him the subsidy of twenty-six lacs of rupees to be lavished away among Marattas ? Self-preservation forced upon us the conduct we observed on that occasion ; it was warmly approved *at home*, by both ends of the town ; and it certainly has contributed more than any other cause, to keep Bèngal still in our hands. I hope the new Commissioners will now afford this great and virtuous Prince some solid instance of their compassion — and that they will restore him those

provinces,

provinces, or some others in their stead, as well as his subsidy—by way of contrast to the measures of Mr. Hastings.—In the “Magna Charta of Hindostan,” it would be a miserable oversight to omit the Great Mogul; and surely he has a claim upon the justice of the state, and still more upon the gratitude of individuals, for restitution of his countries and revenues.

It does not indeed perfectly meet my comprehension how you could explain the circumstance of the *sale* of this monarch to Sujah Dowla, nor the *sale* of Sujah Dowla *to himself*. No doubt you made this matter perfectly clear to your scanty remnant of an audience, but Mr. Woodfall has sunk the particulars. I know very well, that when his beneficent and philosophical Majesty ran away, we re-assumed the provinces which he chose to evacuate. I know that as they were too difficult to be managed by us, we parted with them for a valuable consideration to Sujah Dowla; by which means we strengthened our own frontier against the Marattas. I know also, that upon various occasions on which we afforded powerful military assistance, or important political services to Sujah Dowla, we endeavoured to balance the ac-

count in some degree, by stipulations for a pecuniary return. If, however, that Visier purchased *himself* by any of those transactions, he certainly thought himself a gainer by the bargain : and as there is evidence before the Select Committee, that he lived and died *in perfect independence*, it is manifest that, in this instance at least, the Company broke through the system of treachery, dishonesty, and injustice, with which you have charged them, by leaving Sujah Dowla in full and quiet possession of himself, after they had thus sold him to himself.

So you have asserted that “ that they sold Ragoba to “ the Marattas, and the Marattas to Ragoba.” What a childish play upon words ! Did we not in the same manner sell America to France and France to America ? What is there in the resolutions respecting Ragoba to justify such indecent puerilities ? Our Bombay Council had seen *that* Chief the ostensible and the avowed head of the Maratta government. — A revolution displaced him, and he threw himself under our protection. — It was natural he should make liberal offers for our aid in re-establishing his affairs : it was politically just that we should accept them.

Was

Was it ever imputed as a crime to the French Court that King James was received and protected there after his abdication? or can it be doubted that he had bound himself to the performance of most ample concessions, in case of a restoration through the means of France? On that first treaty with Ragoba you mean, I presume, (for I have no data) to ground the sale of the Marattas to *him*; on the treaty of Poorunder you must of course fix the sale of Ragoba to the Marattas — But here, a vote of the House of Commons authorises the sale, by an approbation of that treaty. But the second and late treaty of peace which provides a residence and a stipend in the Maratta dominions for Ragoba, nearly the same as was done by the treaty of Poorunder, has another article, by which “ the English and the Peshwa mutually agree, that neither will afford any kind of assistance to the enemies of the other;” and this inclines you to tremble for the safety of Ragoba. — Had you turned to the sixth article of the same treaty, you would have seen that Ragoba’s quiet abode, comfortable support, and perfect security, is expressly provided for *by name*: and therefore if the Peshwa, or any of his people, offer any injury to Ragoba as long as he continues quiet, *they* will

have infringed the sixth article; and consequently the fourteenth, on which your objection is founded, will have become void of course.

The other Rajas and Princes whom the Company may have *sold*, are all packed up by the *dozen* or *grofs* in Woodfall's paper, so that it is not in my power to go into the merits of each particular bargain : but from the general purport of your speech I am led to conclude, that let who will have been guilty of this general auction, this *sale* of Hindostan, the Crown (or rather the present Ministry) is understood to have a right to all the benefits of a purchaser. I am not indeed yet exactly clear whether the present possessions, territories, and sovereignties belonging to the East-India Company, be liable to be ranked among the *lots bought*, or the *lots sold*; but I am sure that Government exhibits at once the most interested eagerness in appropriating the whole to itself, and the most perfect indifference as to the validity of the title by which they are now held. To me it appears very little consonant to justice, that the Crown should profit by the iniquities of the Company. Nothing can be more evident, than that the Crown was not concerned in the *acquisition*

*cession* of the Company's present estates: on what plea should it now assume them? If there were rapacity, or treachery, or fraud, or barbarity, in the manner by which they were first gotten, nothing short of restitution can repair the mischief. Is it less rapacious, or treacherous, or barbarous, for a Government to seize the property of its own subjects, guaranteed to them by frequent acts of its own, than for those subjects to have originally seized it in the same manner from the then lawful owners? Of the 180,000 *square miles*, which this Bill is to vest in the hands of . . . . . I know not whom — much has been granted by public and authoritative deeds of cession to the East-India Company: — and such is indisputably the tenure of the twenty-four Pergunnahs near Calcutta, and of the province of Gauzipoor and Benares. These are held by grant from the Nabob of Bengal, and the Vizier of Oude, who were then sovereigns, *proprii juris*, and competent to the grant. The Dewanny of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa rests on a very different title, on a firmaun from the present Mogul, whose power was never acknowledged in any of those provinces, and who by that act gave away what he never could have the smallest



smallest hope of making his own. The *Dewanny* itself, considered as a Mogul establishment, confers nothing more than the appointment to collect the revenues for the Emperor's use. The internal government, the military command, are offices totally distinct, and were never, that I know or suspect, granted to the Company at all. These are branches of the *Nizamut*; and a part of them at least is still exercised under the name, and on the authority, of the Soubadar of Bengal. Surely a Bill brought into Parliament for the express display of national justice, for the declared purpose of doing away former acts of violence and oppression, a Bill which is to benefit both the Company and the Public at home, and to be the *Magna Charta* of Hindostan, should have paid some attention to these differences in the tenures of the Company's possessions. A plea of political necessity may perhaps be sufficient to wrest from them the exercise of *sovereignty*: but their *private* property should at least be inviolate. Even that despotic monarch, the Vizier of Oude, did not at once confiscate to his own use the nett collections of all the Jaghires which he took out of the hand of the Jaghiredars. There is a medium for tyranny itself to observe — and if the Company were

to be deprived of all power, of all credit, of all existence abroad, it would at least have been decent to have left them their house and warehouses at home untouched. A whole province forcibly seized in Asia would have excited less murmur and indignation, than the bursting of a single door in Leadenhall-street: and though your cousin may hector and domineer in the palace of the Rajah of Tanjore, I trust in God that the sag-ends of Mr. Fox's ministry will have the modesty to wait a few months before they assert their superiority over all the dukes and peers of the realm. It cannot however be doubted, but that as soon as this bill is passed, the very secretary of a secretary, the very deputies of those who will then be the masters of the Crown with the title of its servants, will have more real importance, more weight, more efficacy in the government of this devoted country, than the first independent members of the House of Lords.

Much has been said of the insufficiency of the present Court of Directors to manage the Company's affairs; I believe it indeed to have been but indifferently served by some few of them: and the public is at no loss to discover something more than suspicious traces of  
underhand

underhand management. But in fact, the objections, I find, went not so much to the incapacity of the persons, as to the imperfection of their powers: and I think the four and twenty gentlemen of the present list might have been as competent to the better direction of the Company's concerns, as your sixteen new Directors, had you but given them the same enlarged authority. I would not be personal — and therefore I avoid all comparison of the present objects of preference with the rest of their brethren; as a Proprietor, however, I have something of a plea for knowledge of their several merits, and I own I am in some instances at a loss to divine the motives for their selection. You, Sir, have ascribed much of “the evils which have desolated India, to the sort of persons sent out by the Company. Young men without education, and with no other talents than such as matured to rapacity and barbarity. A grey-bearded Englishman is a phenomenon unknown in India.” (Vide Morning Chronicle.) Mr. Hornby, surely, who has been at Bombay forty-two years, must have a wonderfully green old age, if he be not yet grey. But perhaps the *grey-bearded Receiver in the city* is not satisfied with his present pickings, and this speech is preparatory to his Indian appointment.

appointment. And why object, Sir, to young men? Is there not something to be learnt, is there not some apprenticeship necessary in every sphere of life? Would you have the trade, and the revenue, and the government of all our affairs in India turned over at once to blockheads who have not the smallest idea of the principles of commerce, or of the laws, or the customs, or the language of the country, merely because they can display a few grey hairs? Nor do the young men who are usually sent to India want education so much as you would insinuate. That error perhaps you may have adopted on the observation of some classical deficiencies in one of the luminaries of your Committee: but He has figured most in a military line; and few soldiers, you know, pride themselves in an attachment to the belles lettres. I must beg leave to inform you, Sir, that the Company's service in India is of itself a system (and no bad one) of education for a man of business: and that if you were in habits of conversing with those gentlemen who have come from thence, you would find them at least on a par in liberal and classical accomplishments with any of their home-bred neighbours. Let me add, that Mr. Hastings is, in the strictest sense of the word, *a Scholar*—That his

knowledge of the Persian and Hindostanic dialects is superior to that of most of his countrymen, that in school proficiency he excelled most of his contemporaries at Westminster, and that his style of composition in his native language is such as few writers by profession can emulate. Mr. Rouse, one of your Committee, who (though he went young to India, and continued there several years) had previously received the best of educations, will, I doubt not, corroborate my assertion. "This rapid succession of boys" to which you impute so much of our calamities, is another creature of your own imagination. A moment's glance at the printed lists of the Company's civil and military servants at the different presidencies would have proved the contrary. In Bengal, exclusive of the Governor General, whose services are of more than thirty years standing, the seniors on the civil line take date from 1762—at Madras are several who have been there upwards of twenty five years---at Bombay there are six whose residence is of thirty years duration. But it suited the purpose of the moment that they should all be thought boys---and one of the usual figures of your rhetoric made them so---I wish there had been no other unqualified assertion! But your doctrine of monopolies

lies (as given away in India,) was equally unwarrantable—"A monopoly of opium" you are made to say "was sold on the moment of the contract entered into for 40,000l. the next moment it was sold for another profit; and in the course of a short single day, with an almost equal enormity of advantage, was sent through a variety of hands."—By this account here must have been upwards of five lacks of rupees, perhaps ten lacks, made at once by the mere transfer of a contract from hand to hand; than which nothing was ever more remote from reason, from probability, from fact. The whole of your information in this business arises from the evidence of Mr. Higginson given before your Select Committee, who mentions it as a current *report* at Calcutta that the opium contract granted to Mr. Sullivan had been by him disposed of to another. Mr. Higginson could not ascertain the *truth of the report*; and I have very good grounds for believing it to be false. After all, the monopoly of opium, and some other monopolies, *must* of necessity subsist in some shape or other, as your new Directors, and new Sub-Directors, and new Governor General and Council will find—or the trade will go rapidly to ruin. I do not indeed pretend to dive into the system by which the

Despots of the present bill will render their appointments a benefit to the Proprietors and the Public ; but I am sure if they tamper with the established routine of the trade, if they unhinge the business of the investment, and try *experiments* in the commercial line, as is the fashion in the political, the Company's threatened insolvency will exceedingly anticipate the close of their present commission.

It is curious to observe the different grounds on which the present bill has been supported : the Right Honourable Secretary admitted that it was a violation of charter, but pleaded a precedent in the act of 1773, in *that act* which you at the time so manfully opposed on the very principle that it *was* a violation. You now take the opposite line, and deny *this act* (which is a thousand times more grossly subversive of our rights, than the former was) to be any violation at all—You soften it down to “ the “ generous modelling of charters that had been “ strictly forfeited for delinquency”—You say “ the “ equity of the present bill is unparalleled.” And you add that “ the *rights* and *property* of the “ India Company are safe as merchants, but their “ government is justly taken from them, as incom-  
“ petent

\* See Mr. Burke's speeches in the Parliamentary Register of 1773,  
printed by Almon.

“ patent politicians.” Facts are utterly against you in the whole of these assertions. The company is no longer free ; its rights no longer subsist, either to the merchant, to the proprietor, or the politician. This I undertake to prove. The accursed act of 1773 cramped them in all these capacities, and the present bill rivets their chains. It is the nature and essence of commerce to deal more or less upon credit. The merchant who sells upon trust, takes up money upon bills. His *real* capital supplies him with the means to raise, and authorises him to use a *fictitious* capital. He borrows money upon the strength of his stock : and if that stock be clearly responsible, and if his trade be extensive, his requisitions for a loan are almost sure of success. Former acts have deprived the Company of this necessary resource, of this resource which is open to every merchant. The Company cannot borrow but of Parliament. Let its stock be ever so large, let its commerce be ever so flourishing, let its assets be ever so demonstrably satisfactory, it is not permitted to avail itself of any or all of these advantages to procure an occasional supply of cash. This is the true foundation, Sir, of all the Company’s calamities. The goods in the warehouses must lie unsold, until the stated times of  
sale



sale bring together the customary purchasers: a glut of the market, or any other accidental cause, may occasion a temporary deficiency in the amount of the sales. But the export trade must in the mean time go on, the current demands must be discharged, the dividends must be regularly paid. Here *credit* would naturally step in to their relief. Goods are not *lost*, merely because they are not *sold*: though a man who does not want them, may not chuse to purchase them, it is not impossible but he may lend money at interest upon their security. Parliament has arbitrarily locked up that security, has annihilated that credit: which if it were to apply as a general law to the transactions of individual merchants, would most assuredly bring the whole city of London to bankruptcy in six months. Thus, then, in this first prohibition to borrow money, are contained the true seeds of the Company's present distresses, the destruction of their rights in a mercantile capacity. As the influenza of *experiment* is at this period particularly epidemic, I wish to my soul this absurd prohibition were suspended for a short time by way of trial. The afflux of cash which would come into the Treasury, would quickly convince you of the extent, of the stability of the Company's

pany's

pany's credit, and speak more forcibly to the real prosperity of their affairs, than a thousand unsupported assertions in a certain House can depreciate them. If this clog be destructive of the rights of trade, there are hardships no less grievous imposed upon the proprietary. In General Courts was originally, and by charter, lodged the whole power and authority of the Company; every holder of 500l. stock had a right to vote in this assembly, and its meetings were regulated only by expediency. Twenty-four persons were *yearly* chosen *from among themselves*, to manage the current business, subject at all times to the controul of the General Court. The Proprietor of 500l. stock has now *no* vote; *six* Directors are now elected yearly, instead of twenty-four, and for *four* years instead of one. No sooner has a Director carried his election, than he flies in the face of his constituents, holds up the act of 1773 as the bulwark of his quadrennial dictatorship, and perhaps negotiates with the Minister, behind the skreen, for the erection of a new and unconstitutional tyranny on the ruin of the Company's privileges. Your *present* edict, which is so *generously to model the charter*, will precisely effectuate this salutary purpose. The General Court will now have

no controul whatsoever. It will no longer elect its own managers; *they* will be no longer chosen from its own body; they will no longer be responsible to it. Even the *nine shadows*, the make-weights of the directorial office, will be alike indifferent to the Proprietors' censure and applause: They are removable only by their masters, THE MIGHTY SEVEN. The very books of accounts, so essential to the satisfaction of the Proprietor, so necessary to his security, are no more to be open to his inspection. The report of the Company's property is to be made by the *Commissioners*, (I cannot bring myself to call them *Directors*, till they have made their triumphal entry into Leadenhall-street) and from that report there is no appeal. The servile Proprietor may attend at the Quarterly General Court, like a starved Parisian at the Hotel-de-Ville, gaping for his annuity, to hear such a statement of the general affairs, as his high and mighty Lords the *Septemviri* shall be graciously pleased to honour him withal. But no questions—no whispering—no remonstrances.

“ Such, as we have laid before you, is the Com-  
 “ pany's actual situation; here are *our* accounts  
 “ according to act of Parliament, and here is *your*  
 “ dividend. Pass your vote of thanks to my Lords  
 “ Com-

“ Commissioners, *and dare no more approach this place, till this day three months.*” A very generous model this ; a very pleasant sound to the ears of an Englishman ! But it is at best a very accurate sketch of the substance of what will be uttered *ex cathedra* at the new General Courts. As the commercial and proprietorial rights of the Company have been thus essentially infringed by former acts of Parliament, their political power has been no less cautiously restricted. The original *Regulating Act* of 1773 enjoined the Directors of the East India Company to communicate to his Majesty’s Secretaries of State, all the information they should receive respecting the politics of India, and all the orders they meant to issue in consequence. The acts of their governments, the state and management of their revenues, their whole system of administration at large and in detail, have been regularly submitted to the inspection, and (as may be presumed from *two singular instances of disapprobation* to particular paragraphs in the Company’s proposed letters to Bengal) to *the controul* of his Majesty’s Ministers. The Court of Directors can neither have approved, nor censured any particular measure of their servants *abroad*, can neither have advised nor prohibited any plan of policy

or any act of government *from home*, but in conformity to ministerial sentiments, but with the implied approbation of the cabinet. It should seem then that we must admit one of the two following propositions; *Either*, that his Majesty's Ministers, in not correcting the errors, or reforming the plans of the Company's servants, as laid before them for examination, were no less *incompetent politicians* than the Court of Directors; *or*, that administration, by *purposely* concealing its lights and withholding its corrections, paved the way for its own violent assumption of the power and patronage of India, on a plea of the Company's imbecility. If the Ministry could suggest no better mode of action than that submitted to them by the present managers, they are alike *inadequate to the trust*. If their opinions were stifled, if their advice was dissembled, and their right of approbation infiduously prostituted to serve their own ends, they are *unworthy of it*.—You have taken upon you to prove, that the India Company have forfeited their charter, and *therefore* that the present bill, which is a modification, a *modelling* of that charter, is *lenient*, is *generous*, is *equitable*, *beyond parallel*. I will not ask you *how* the charter has been forfeited, because you will run over your black catalogue of rapine, plunder, robbery,

robbery, inhumanity, extortion, injustice, oppression, and murder—upon which I shall not join issue with you, until evidence be brought to the bar of the House. But I wish to know *when, at what specified time*, the charter was forfeited? If *previously* to the year 1773, all your eloquence at that period was thrown away: your abuse of the noble Lord now in office for his famous Regulating Act, will be deemed to have had no more connection with *truth* than with *decency*.\* your vociferous exclamations against the *violation of all chartered rights in general*, as included in the violation of this one charter of the Company, were not only daring and intemperate, but *false, scandalous, and seditious*: your defence of the Company's servants of *that day*, your pamphlets, your speeches in their behalf, and in that of the great body they served, were mere convenient, catch-penny contrivances, insidious baits to hook in popularity. “*Regulation*” you could then discover to be† “*injustice*” and “*reform*” “*robbery*.” Have words altered their quality, has negation taken the place of assertion, since that memorable æra?—I much suspect it. If you date the Company's forfeiture of their charter

\* See Mr. Burke's speeches in the year 1773, on the India Regulating Act—Published by Almon.

† Ditto.

*subsequently* to the year 1773, for what purpose did you go back into the annals of their first establishment in Asia, and to the treaty of Illahabad? Every thing, *upon your own principles*, was right and just and legal up to that year.\* “It was *necessity*, not “*choice*, that had involved the East-India Company “in war”—“They bore their own expences, *but they conquered for the state*,” (i. e. the present Ministry; and that part of your sentence has the merit of prophecy:) you cannot however deny, that the power of controul over all the politics of the Company’s territories abroad has virtually rested with his Majesty’s Ministers ever since 1773: so that *they* seem implicated in all the causes of forfeiture from thence up to the present day. But as a happy knack of reconciling inconsistent assertions may be one indispensable qualification to a ministerial appointment, I will admit the doctrine of necessity, in palliation of your palpable self-contradictions: wishing at the same time that they had been confined to objects of less national magnitude. In your allusion to the *Bank*, you stand, I think, alone, at least on the ministerial side of the House. Much has, no doubt, been said and felt without doors respecting the danger to which the character of that *soul of the state* would be exposed, if the present bill should afford so glaring a precedent for its vio-

\* See Mr. Burke’s speeches in 1783.—Published by Almon.

lation. But your happy facility of putting a question is to silence all our murmurs, and to calm all our apprehensions. "If the Governors, (says Woodfall for you) "if the clerks, or other servants of the Bank, had mis-  
 "applied the public money; if they had abused the  
 "trust reposed in them, if they had almost brought  
 "the nation to ruin, would it be unjust to use legis-  
 "lative interference for the public protection?"—No  
 surely; but then you should first bring *evidence* of  
 this misapplication and breach of trust to the bar of  
 the House: you should *prove* not only that the  
 Bank had done wrong, but that it had possessed  
 within itself the means of doing right; you should  
*prove* that its acts had been *all its own*, and not  
 liable to revision, to reformation, or suppression, by  
 any superior authority; you should *prove* the *fact*  
 both of the Bank's misbehaviour, and of the injury  
 sustained by the public; you should *prove* that your  
 legislative interference in behalf of the public would  
 more than counterbalance the damage that would  
 result to public credit by that very interference.  
 Now, Sir, permit me the indulgence of a question;  
 it shall be as short as your's. If the rioters in 1780  
 had succeeded in their attack on the Bank; if in  
 spite of all resistance made by the Directors, a mob  
 had broken in and carried off two or three millions  
 in



in hard cash, would the consequent distress of that body have justified the legislature in violating or annulling its charter? Such is exactly the distress of the East-India Company, arising principally from the losses of trade and heavy expences incidental to the late national war. It wants nothing but a little ready money, which the legislature will not suffer it to raise upon *its own credit*; it is, therefore, by this cruel act, laid at the mercy of Parliament, and Parliament now uses its power, acquired by a former stretch of power, in *most unmercifully* abridging the rights of the Proprietors, and new modelling (that is, annulling) the charter.—I am within bounds when I hint at the damage which will result to public credit by this bill. Damage has *already* resulted. India stock has fallen twenty per cent: Bank stock (the most solid and the most unfluctuating of all our funds) four per cent—the three per cents above two. Is not this a clear loss to the whole ~~monied~~ interest of the nation? a loss, which you can never make up from the revenues of India. I repeat what I have said in another place—that the produce of our territorial acquisitions in Asia can never be realized here but through the medium of the India trade. Until you can import more goods,

and

and *ensure their sale in Europe*, the country gentlemen may gape for a decrease of the land-tax, and the traders may petition for a recal of the stamps, but you will not be able to alleviate in the smallest degree the burthen of either. It is demonstrable, that the Company already import as much merchandize as they can possibly dispose of ; and that if more were brought to market, their price would so exceedingly diminish, as not only to absorb all the profits of the trade, but even the capital. *Twenty* acts upon the present plan will neither so much benefit the Proprietors nor the public, as one which would *decisively* and *effectually* eradicate the practice of smuggling. In the article of tea only, the Company is said to be defrauded of 1,000,000 per annum. Here is a subject for the display of patriotism, for the exercise of talents. Prevent this fraudulent occupation, and you will *then* have done somewhat towards deserving the wonderful salaries which yourself and your relations enjoy from the public purse.

You have been pleased to consider the opposition which has been made to the proposed India bill, as proceeding rather from an eager desire to overthrow the present Ministry, than from a conviction of the violence

lence

lence of the measure. “to effect their removal,” say you, (I quote from Woodfall) “no means, however unjustifiable, no acts, however unprecedented, have been scrupled to be practised, or left untried.” I most humbly conceive, Right honourable Sir, that it is very possible to oppose a ministerial bill in Parliament upon principle, upon conscience, upon conviction: that it is very decent, perfectly *justifiable*, and by no means *unprecedented*, to present an *account* at the bar, when a matter of account is to be argued: and that those persons who think their fortunes or privileges endangered by the operation of a new bill, are at liberty to publish their thoughts upon the subject, pending the discussion of the bill in either house. *Unjustifiable means*, and *unprecedented acts*, I take to be such as the *following*; an insidious advertisement promising 1000 guineas for a writer’s place at Bengal — The offer of 100l. for discovery of the writer of an incendiary letter, which most assuredly was never written — The industrious circulation of idle and groundless stories of the Governor General’s death, of his being crowned king of Bengal, or of his having involved the nation in a new war — An exclusion of impartial (or if you will, anti-ministerial) discussions on subjects

subjects of national importance, from the daily papers, by money. — By whom, and for what purpose, such acts have been applied (and the facts alluded to are of the most open and barefaced notoriety) it becomes not me to conjecture; but I will whisper in your ear, that they do not come from the opposers of the bill.

As it is perfectly understood, Sir, by the public, that in the present address I am not guilty of an unnecessary, voluntary, or officious presumption, that I now write merely in conformity to the known functions of my mission, and *from no personal motive whatever*, I cannot lay down my pen without advertising to a few circumstances, which, though not immediately contained in the *speech* I have just done myself the honour to discuss, are yet intimately connected with the subject before us, are of the utmost consequence to my *Principal*, and are generally allowed to *proceed from you*. A moment's reflection will inform you that I allude to the *eleventh Report from the Select Committee*. So criminatory a performance, so artfully interwoven with hints of mysterious concealment, with insinuations of guarded corruption, with mutilated extracts, and partial deduc-

F
tions,

tions, has not, I believe, been frequently exposed to public notice. It is not without concern, Sir, that I have perused this singular production, because, as you pointedly state in the work itself, “ *Mr. Scott* “ *professed himself perfectly uninstructed upon almost every part of the subject.*” I now again assure you in the most solemn manner, that I have never received the smallest instruction upon the transactions alluded to in your Eleventh Report, and that this total silence of Mr. Hastings to me on the several articles *there* exhibited, conveys to my mind an irresistible conviction of his perfect innocence. As you have obligingly *recorded my incapacity* to defend my Principal on points where he never expected an attack, it would have been worthy of Mr. Burke’s *known humanity* to have furnished the public with at least all those slender documents that *do subsist*, to have generously assisted my incapacity by the communication of those lights which enabled *him* to see his way so *clearly* through the mist of the present business, *to have published the Appendix together with the Report.* At such a critical moment to withhold so considerable and so necessary a part of the evidence, *for twelve days already*, and I know not how much longer the delay may endure, would in any other

other man have been deemed cruel, indelicate, and unfair. Of circumstances so insidiously arranged, so partially worked up, and so imperfectly displayed, men can hardly have the chance of forming a liberal, candid, and favourable opinion: that they are mysterious at best, that they are so unfortunately obscure, as to be incapable of satisfactory explanation in their present state, I readily acknowledge, and I have already acknowledged it to your Committee; but it is now incumbent on me to announce, *what in justice you ought to have announced in the Report*, that Mr. Hastings has informed the Court of Directors of his readiness to answer all questions respecting his receipt and disposal of presents “*upon his honour and upon his oath.*” It will be too late to read this six months hence in your Appendix; your turn will have been long served, and the prejudice you intended to raise will have had full time to operate. But such concerns of the Governor General as relate to money, are out of my department; I can only declare upon my conscience and before God, that I know his fortune in England to be quite incompetent to his rank in life, that I never knew him to have expended a shilling in the purchase of any corrupt influence either

ther here or abroad — that no grounds have ever been traced on which to found a plausible suspicion of any such transaction, and that I will stake my life upon his integrity.

I shall now, Sir, take my leave, with profound acknowledgements for the very polite and liberal manner in which you were pleased *yesterday* to turn me out of that most humane, impartial, just, and free assembly, *the Select Committee*. My intrusion proceeded from the mistaken notion that *Your's was an open Committee*.

I am, with all respect,

Right Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient,

Humble Servant,

**JOHN SCOTT.**

LONDON,

December 6, 1784.

# **NARRATIVE**

**OF THE**

**TRANSACTIONS**

**IN**

**BENGAL,**

**DURING THE**

**ADMINISTRATION**

**OF**

**MR. HASTINGS.**

**BY**

**MAJOR JOHN SCOTT.**

**LONDON;**

**Printed for J. DEBRET, opposite BURLINGTON  
House, PICCADILLY.**

**M.DCC.LXXXIV.**





# P R E F A C E

TO THE

F I R S T E D I T I O N.

**T**H E controul which the Supreme Council of Bengal holds over the other Presidencies, makes the members of that Government in some measure responsible for the peace of India. It will appear very clearly, upon enquiry, that the Governor General and Council exerted themselves to the extent of the powers vested in them by the Legislature, to avert those misfortunes which have been experienced upon the coast of Coromandel; but that a war with a country power should have been commenced with such circumstances of disgrace to our arms, was not apprehended, I will venture to say, either by the Supreme Council or by any man in India.

Much pains have been taken in India, and the same efforts will doubtless be used in England, to attribute every unfortunate event upon the coast, to the Mahratta war; which, by some in Bengal, and by most of the gentlemen in Madras, has been denominated Mr. Hastings's war. The Court of Directors, who, perfectly acquainted with the circumstances which led to the war, highly approved of the conduct which the Governor General took in it, will, doubtless, do him the justice to contradict this assertion.

In the following sketch I mean to relate the events which led to a war which, from the year 1778, uniformly successful on our part, must have produced an honourable and advantageous peace many months ago, if the invasion of the Carnatic, the destruction of a third part of our army, and the expectation of a French armament, had not given fresh spirits to a vanquished enemy.

Upon other articles the conduct of the Governor General has been grossly misrepresented: it may not therefore be unacceptable to his friends, to relate, as concisely as the importance of the subject will admit, the prin-

principal transactions in Bengal, from the period of his arrival in February, 1772, to the day of my departure from Bengal the 9th of January, 1781; first premising that I will not advance a single fact which I cannot prove, either from my own knowledge or from authentic documents now in my possession.

No man has more severely suffered from unjust and illiberal insinuations than Mr. Hastings; nor has any man less deserved them: since, even in his own justification, he has carefully avoided all personal reflections. It is much to be lamented, that the public has suffered as well as Mr. Hastings, by the impression which such insinuations did at the time make upon the Court of Directors; for to what other cause can it be owing, that, for so many years, they withheld their confidence from a man they once thought so worthy of it? Conscious of the rectitude of his own actions, he has been too little solicitous to stem that torrent of calumny and abuse which his opponents have so liberally bestowed upon him. It is now high time to refute these calumnies. I do not hesitate to declare, nor am I

appre-

apprehensive of committing myself too far by such a declaration, that to render our possession of Bengal of consequence to the British nation, Mr. Hastings must be supported, and with effect, both by Government and the East-India Company. The event will prove that my judgment has not been warped by my private affections.

FEBRUARY,  
1762.

JOHN SCOTT.

PREFACE

# P R E F A C E

TO THE

## S E C O N D E D I T I O N,

**I**N the present very critical and important situation of the affairs of the East-India Company, a re-publication of the following Narrative, which has long ago been out of print, may perhaps not be unacceptable to the Public, as I have studiously confined myself to a relation of such facts as are of public notoriety, or are capable of complete proof from the records at the India House. It has been, of late, too much the fashion to misrepresent the conduct of our countrymen in India, and to assert that Bengal is going fast to decay. — I conscientiously believe that the merits of the Governor General, and his Council, from the commencement of the war in the Carnatic, to the date of the last dispatches from India, will secure to them the  
applause

applause of the candid and dispassionate part of mankind, when the prejudices which have been industriously raised by artful and designing men shall cease to operate : — and from every observation I was capable of making in the course of fifteen years residence in Bengal, I am convinced that that country has very considerably increased in population and manufactures, from the year 1767 to 1781, although a famine in 1770 swept away a third of its inhabitants. Since that period the Company has been involved in a very hazardous and expensive war ; and for a considerable time our army in the Carnatic was fed as well as paid from Bengal. The astonishing resources of that country, and the abilities of the men who have governed it, are now generally known and acknowledged ; and however the calamities of war may have desolated the Carnatic, it is certain that at no period has Bengal enjoyed a greater degree of internal prosperity than during the government of Mr. Hastings. The Narrative is now continued to the period of the latest accounts we have received from India.

**JOHN SCOTT.**

QUEEN SQUARE,  
JAN. 4, 1784.

**A NARRATIVE.**

---

---

A  
N A R R A T I V E  
O F T H E  
T R A N S A C T I O N S  
I N  
B E N G A L.

**M**R. Hastings was appointed by the Court of Directors to succeed to the Government of Bengal, in the month of April, 1772, immediately after the great famine. They were also pleased to invest him with some extraordinary powers, not heretofore vested in a Governor, from a conviction, that if their affairs there were yet retrievable, Mr. Hastings, (whose perseverance, firmness, and integrity, both in Bengal and Madras had been remarkably conspicuous,) was the most proper person to be employed in so arduous an undertaking. It is well known that the Government of Bengal was from various causes at this time reduced to the greatest distress. The late Governor, though a most amiable and respectable character, possessed neither the vigour



or resolution which his public station required; and the Members of his Council submitted to the continuance of evils which they wanted either the power or the inclination to reform. The Company's annual 'expences' in Bengal considerably exceeded their revenues; and although bills had been drawn upon the Court of Directors for more than a million sterling in 1770, there still remained a bond debt of a million and a half sterling, due to individuals in Bengal. There was a prospect also of this bond debt being monthly increased to the degree, that the expences and the investment exceeded the actual revenues of the provinces.

So supine a Government must have sunk of itself in a few years. That this was the real state of public affairs at Bengal, when Mr. Hastings arrived there, is known to every man at that time in India. In April 1772, he succeeded to the chair, and, arduous as the task of reformation is in all countries, but more particularly in Bengal, he instantly began upon it. The excessive civil charges in Calcutta were retrenched, unnecessary appointments were abolished, and that spirit of extravagance and dissipation which had pervaded all orders of men, was suppressed, both by precept and example.

Notwithstanding opposition from many individuals, Mr. Hastings steadily pursued his plan of reformation, regardless of the personal obloquy which attended it, and in less than a month from his accession to the chair, the face of affairs was totally altered.

altered. Every resolution of Government was carried into effect with a promptitude and spirit which did honour to its executive members.

The Court of Directors at this time determined to stand forth themselves as Dewans of the provinces, through the agency of their own servants; and Mr. Hastings lost no time in carrying orders so beneficial to the Company into execution. He proceeded to Moorshedabad, the residence of the Nabob and the native officers of the Government, attended by three Members of the Board, with an intention to investigate the state of the revenues, to reduce the charges incurred in the collection of them, and to establish provincial Courts of Justice, which might prevent those acts of oppression and arbitrary power that had hitherto been so much complained of.\*

Unfortunately for the Company in this, as in many other instances, Mr. Hastings had not the power to carry his whole plan into execution; but those regulations which he did establish will ever remain as the strongest proofs of the extent of his genius, and of the laborious attention he paid to every point which could in the least degree contribute to secure the natives of Bengal in the possession of their property.

\* It was at this period, that Muny Begum was appointed the guardian of the young Nabob, and the Court of Directors, as soon as they heard of the appointment, expressed their approbation of it in very warm terms.

The same unremitting attention was paid to public business, on his return to Calcutta; and the Court of Directors were very early in their acknowledgements of Mr. Hastings's services, and of the benefits which were derived from them.

At the close of the year 1772, a new scene was opened in Bengal. To the spirited and decided part which Mr. Hastings then took in foreign politics, are the Company and the British nation indebted for the dominions and the extensive influence which they now enjoy in Indostan. To set this matter in its true point of view, and not with a design to reflect upon the political conduct of any person, it is necessary to revert to the period of Lord Clive's government.

The East-India Company's affairs were so thoroughly investigated by a Committee of the House of Commons in 1772, whose proceedings have since been made public, that it is needless to relate the steps by which we have arrived at our present power in India. The Company's agents in Bengal were inoffensive and reputable merchants when they were attacked without provocation, by that most despicable of tyrants, Surajah Dowlah, the grandson of an usurper: They were at first driven from their possessions, but had afterwards the good fortune to see their persecutor vanquished and deposed: His successor, Meer Jaffier, who owed his promotion entirely to us, beheld the increase of our power with a jealous eye, and concerted a scheme with the Dutch for our destruction. The  
firmness

firmness of Colonel Clive defeated the project, and in the succeeding Government it was necessary to depose the Nabob. A chain of well-known events brought on a war with the successor, and his restoration. In one campaign, Cossim Ally was driven from the provinces. Sujah Dowlah, Nabob of Oude and Vizier, unprovoked by us, invaded Bahar; he was defeated, and had thrown himself upon our mercy at the time that Lord Clive returned to Bengal in 1765; his Lordship dictated his own terms to the King, Sujah Dowlah, and the young Nabob of Bengal. We had certainly a right to retain the possession of countries which we had conquered in a just and necessary war, and Lord Clive undoubtedly gave the Princes of Indostan a conspicuous proof of his moderation, when he only required fifty lacks of rupees from the Vizier as a compensation for the restoration of his country, and the cession of Benares.

By the treaty which his Lordship concluded with the King, he guaranteed to him the possession of the provinces of Corah and Allahabad, and engaged to pay him twenty-six lacks of rupees annually from the provinces of Bengal. Perhaps all the objections to so fatal a drain of specie from Bengal did not then occur to his Lordship, or Patna or Monghier would have been fixed upon as the place of his Majesty's residence. In this case, the evils which have since befallen the unhappy monarch would have been prevented, and our provinces considerably benefited, by having the amount of the tribute annually circulated in them. Still the condition

dition implied in the treaty was undoubtedly, that his Majesty should reside under our immediate protection at Allahabad, which he quitted in June, 1771, at the instigation of the Marattas, who had engaged to conduct him to Delhy; a project this prince had much at heart.

By leaving Allahabad, he quitted our protection; and Mr. Hastings, who arrived in Bengal early in the next year, very justly concluded, that the first use which the Marattas would make of their royal guest, would be to extort from him the provinces of Corah and Allahabad. He had authentic intelligence soon after, that grants of these provinces were actually made to them and signed by the King; and if his Majesty's commands were at all events to be obeyed, we might be required in another year to evacuate Bengal. The danger that was to be apprehended from having the Marattas (not at that time broken by intestine divisions) so near us was early foreseen, and wisely guarded against, by an alliance with Sujah Dowlah, which being concluded on the firm basis of mutual interest, was in no danger of being violated.

It is well known that this Prince had been considered as a disaffected Ally during the governments of Mr. Verelst and Mr. Cartier. By his conduct in 1768 he had so far excited the suspicions of a majority of the Select Committee, that they deputed \* two of their members, and a gentleman of the Council, to expostulate and to treat

\* General Richard Smith, Mr. Cartier, and Mr. Russell.

.. ..

with

with him. In Mr. Hastings's administration he became a most useful and valuable ally.

When Mr. Hastings succeeded to the Government, the province of Bengal had been nearly exhausted of its circulating specie, by the annual tribute of twenty-six lacks of rupees to the King, by the remittances in silver to China, to Madras, to Bombay, and to Europe; not a rupee of which ever returned again; by the total stop which was put to the importation of bullion from Europe, in consequence of the great increase of our own investment, and the supplies which were afforded to foreign companies, by the servants of the Company, who had no other means of remitting their fortunes to Europe; the fatal effects of which Mr. Verelst had foreseen, and represented very fully to the Directors in a series of letters which do great honour to his abilities and foresight.

The regulations which were framed by Mr. Hastings on his accession to the chair, although they immediately contributed to the happiness of the natives, and would in time prove highly beneficial to the Company, were not efficacious to relieve their present wants. The distress of the Directors for cash at home was very great; they had been obliged to have recourse to Parliament for assistance, in consequence of the large drafts which had been made upon them from Bengal. Their chief dependance was upon Mr. Hastings to extricate the Company from their difficulties, both in Europe and in Asia. Their confidence  
was

was not misplaced, and their most sanguine expectations were fully answered. Foreign trade was encouraged to a greater degree than had before been known\*, and a new commerce, by the way of Suez, was opened in consequence of the encouragement given to it by Mr. Hastings, which promised a relief to the languid circulation in Bengal, opened a quick communication with Great Britain, and has since been of the most essential advantage to us. Dustucks were abolished in the provinces, and every species of undue influence suppressed as far as the authority of Government could suppress it.

The King, as I before observed, having ceded Corah and Allahabad to the Marattas, it became a question, whether we should tamely permit them to take possession of those provinces with the prospect of Bengal being invaded the following year, or instantly secure them. The latter resolution was taken, and a member of the Council was deputed to form an exact statement of their revenues in May, 1773. The King was at this time a prisoner at large at Dehly, slighted and despised by the Marattas, who proposed to invade the dominions of Sujah Dowlah, by the route of Rohilcund. To prevent this invasion, the first brigade, consisting of one regiment of Europeans, six battalions of Seapoys, and twenty pieces of cannon, had formed a junction

\* In 1773, Mr. Hastings deputed Mr. George Boyle to Thibet. He was very hospitably received by the Grand Lama, where he resided above a year : a communication has since been kept up between the two countries, which is highly advantageous to Bengal, and promises to be still more so in future.

with the troops of Sujah Dowlah and the Rohillas, and were advancing towards the banks of the Ganges, by forced marches. The Marattas, who had forded that river, recrossed it with precipitation, as we advanced, were pursued, and prevented from doing any other damage than the plundering and burning a few inconsiderable villages in Rohilcund. When the approach of the rains swelled the Ganges, our troops returned to Oude. This expedition laid the foundation of the Rohilla war, of which I shall speak more fully hereafter.

Sujah Dowlah had repeatedly and earnestly solicited a personal conference with Mr. Hastings, to which he consented, and met him at Benares, in September, 1773, a few months after we had taken possession of Corah and Allahabad.

It was at this time that Mr. Hastings concluded the treaty of Benares, which in its consequences was so extremely beneficial to the East India Company.

The principal articles were the cession of Corah and Allahabad to the Vizier, the increase of the subsidy, and our engagement to assist him in the conquest of Rohilcund.

The nominal revenues of Corah and Allahabad were twenty-five lacks of rupees per annum; but the actual collections fell greatly short of this sum: nor could any collections be made without the assistance of a strong military force. Several disaffected Zemindars were to be reduced; and these provinces were separated from our other possessions by the Zemindary of Cheyt Sing, the Raja of Benares,



at that time a tributary to Sujah Dowlah. Mr. Hastings, after the maturest reflection, consented to cede these countries to Sujah Dowlah, in consideration of his paying fifty lacks of rupees to the Company. This article of the treaty was highly approved of by the Court of Directors.

We were bound by Lord Clive's treaty with the Vizier to assist him with a military force, and he was to pay thirty thousand rupees\* a month for a complete brigade; which was supposed to be equivalent to the additional expence incurred in the field, though it was in fact very inadequate to it. Mr. Hastings thought, and with justice, that Sujah Dowlah should pay the whole expence of an army acting at his requisition, or a sum equivalent to it. This he consented to, and it was fixed at two lacks and ten thousand rupees a month.† This alteration was warmly approved by the Directors.

. The articles by which the Company were engaged to assist the Vizier in the conquest of Rohilcund, however severely attacked both in Bengal and in England, may certainly be defended on the strictest grounds of policy and justice.

The Rohillas‡ were a tribe of Afghan Tartars, who about twenty-six years before this time invaded and conquered a large and fertile tract of country lying to the eastward of the Ganges, bounded

\* 3000l. † 21,000l.

‡ Dow's History of the Decline of the Mogul Empire, published in 1768, p. 37, gives this account of the Rohillas: "In the year 1744, Ali Mahummud, a Patan of the Rohilla tribe, a soldier of fortune, and native of the mountains of Cabalistan, began to appear in

ded on one side by the north-east frontier of Oude, and on the other by what are called the Cachmere-hills, which are a continuation of those mountains that separate Bengal from Thibet. Some of the original invaders of this country are yet living. The fixed inhabitants are Hindoos. The Rohillas are Mussulmen and foldiers to a man. The revenues were regularly collected and divided amongst the different chiefs, of whom the most considerable were Fyzula Cawn and Hafeez Hamet. The Vizier had long beheld, with great mortification, the settlement of the Rohillas in a district which had formerly been dependant upon Oude; but as our

in arms. He had some years before come to Dehly, and was entertained in the service of Mahummud Shaw, and the command of a small district between Dehly and Lahore was conferred upon him; here he entertained all vagrants of his own clan, who came down in quest of military service from their native mountains; not paying his rent, Hernind, the Fogedar, to whom he was accountable, raised 15000 men to expel or chastise him; he was defeated with great slaughter, and thus Ali laid the foundation of the Rohilla government. Upon this defeat, the Vizier sent 30,000 men under his son against the rebels. Each side averse to a decision by battle, a treaty was concluded, whereby Ali was to keep the country before governed by Hirnind, upon paying the ancient revenues to the Crows: no payment was made, and Ali continued to strengthen himself, and ravaged the neighbouring country to subsist his army: at last the monarch himself was obliged to take the field. Ali shut himself up in Bangur, where he was obliged to capitulate. He was carried a prisoner to Dehly, where he remained six months; at the end of which the Patans not only obtained him his release, but the Feugedarship of Sirhind. There he maintained himself, and collecting his dispersed tribes, kept possession not only of Suhind, but several districts between the rivers, and beyond the Ganges, without remitting one rupee to court." This happened in 1747.

Government had entertained so strong a jealousy of his power, previous to Mr. Hastings's accession, and had kept up a correspondence with the Rohillas, he had been prevented from subduing them; and it is also probable that he did not think himself equal to the conquest of the country without our assistance.

A bare inspection of the map will prove of how much consequence it was, that the power in possession of Rohilkund should be in a strict alliance with us.

The soil is so fertile, that an army of Marattas might subsist in it for any length of time. It is full of strong forts for the security of plunder; and from hence, in the course of one season, their ravages might have been extended through the dominions of the Vizier into Bengal. When, therefore, the Marattas were masters of the King's person and of Dehly, and threatened to invade the country of an ally, whom by treaty, and from policy we were bound to defend, it was absolutely necessary either to conclude a defensive alliance with the Rohillas, or to take possession of their country.

Many small states in Europe have been precisely in the same situation. It was impossible that they could remain neuter in our approaching rupture with the Marattas; and they concluded an alliance with the Vizier and the Company, by which we engaged to protect their country from the ravages of the Marattas; they on their part were to join us with their forces, and at the conclusion of the campaign to pay forty lacks of rupees, as their proportion of the expences of the war.

The

• The Marattas, as I before observed, did invade Rohilcund, but we arrived so opportunely, that they were obliged to retreat very precipitately. The Rohillas, as we advanced, peremptorily refused to join us, and it was proposed to storm their camp; which they prevented, by forming a junction when we were upon the point of carrying this design into execution.\*

On the return of our troops to Oude, the Vizier demanded the stipulated payment of forty lacks, which at first was evaded, and afterwards absolutely refused.

Such was the state of this business when Mr. Hastings met the Vizier at Benares.

That the Rohillas would dread the Vizier's resentment, for this breach of faith cannot be doubted; and that, to guard themselves against the effects of it, they would apply to the Marattas for assistance was highly probable. In truth they did negotiate with them. I need not mention the many fatal consequences with which such an alliance would have been attended. Success in the Rohilla war extended and secured the frontier of an ally; and it was founded on their breach of a treaty, to which we were guarantees, and their alliance with his enemies.

The advantages which the East-India Company were to reap from the war, were great indeed: Our exhausted provinces were to be relieved from the pay

\* It was at this time that Sir Robert Barker denominated the Rohillas the most faithless and treacherous of men, and proposed that we should put the Vizier in possession of their country.

of a third part of our army during the service ; and we were to receive fifty lacks of rupees at the conclusion of it.

The danger apprehended from an increase of the Vizier's power was merely ideal, as the event has fully proved. Mr. Hastings, who had studied his character, knew it perfectly well ; but the gentlemen at home, who had for a long time been alarmed by accounts of the *dangerous ambition* and *high spirit* of Sujah Dowlah, deemed every addition which we might make to his power a measure founded upon *wrong policy* \*. Fortunately, however, for the Company and the British nation, the man who managed their political affairs in Bengal, clearly foresaw, and steadily pursued their true interest.

The Rohilla war commenced in 1774, the conquest of the country was effected in seven months, and an equitable peace was concluded with Fyzula Cawn, the principal Rohilla chief, which has continued from that period uninterrupted.

I should exceed the bounds which I have prescribed to myself, were I to enter into a detail of Mr. Hastings's public proceedings from his return to Calcutta in September 1773, to the commencement of the new Government in October 1774, when his authority was effectually annihilated. But

\* General Richard Smith's letters to the Select Committee of Fort William, when he commanded the army, contain strong expressions of suspicion against Sujah Dowlah. It has since been fully proved, that the General had entirely mistaken the Vizier's real character.

the concurrent testimony of the English gentlemen then in Bengal, the flourishing state of the Company's affairs, the increase of wealth, and the affection shewn by the natives to our Government, are ample proofs that every moment of his time was employed in pursuing the true interests of his constituents.

In the year 1767, I have travelled four hundred miles through a country very thinly inhabited; the appearance of an European with his attendants excited distrust and apprehension. I have travelled the same road since that period; I then found it in high cultivation. The natives, secure under the protection of humane and equal laws, were encreasing in numbers, and no longer looked upon Englishmen as enemies.

It is certain, however clamour may have obscured the truth, that the lower ranks of people in no part of the world live more happily, or are less oppressed than the natives of Bengal and Bahar. The abuses which existed after our accession to the Dewanne, are more to be attributed to a defective system of Government, than to the want of inclination to correct them in the members of administration; nor could these abuses be corrected until the Governor and Council were authorised to break through the forms of a double Government.

At Mr. Hastings's accession to the chair, he entirely new modelled the public offices, and allotted to each its distinct business. The mode of collecting the revenues, as well as the quantum to be collected,

lected, had heretofore been regulated by the Resident of the Durbar and Mahomed Reza Cawn; and even after the establishment of provincial councils, Moorshedabad continued the seat of Government. But when the double Government, as it has been properly called, was abolished, Mr. Hastings removed all the native officers of it to Calcutta, and brought every department of finance immediately before the Council.

His regulations of the public offices, of the collections, and the various economical reforms, which, notwithstanding the difficulties preventing, and the odium consequent, he had effected in the short space of thirty months, added to the supply of treasure, which the treaty of Bengal afforded, had raised the reputation of the government of Bengal to the highest pitch, and the Company's affairs, which, when he succeeded to the chair, were thought to be irretrievable, bore the strongest aspect of affluence and prosperity. The time however was now come, when the abilities of the man who had done so much for the Company were to be decried, and his character exposed as a subject for public derision.

On the 19th of October, General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, arrived in Calcutta; and with the Governor General and Mr. Barwell, composed the Supreme Council of India. The Government could have commenced under more favourable circumstances. Our treasury was full; foreign trade flourished to a greater degree than had ever been known in Bengal; and inland commerce was freed from

from every impolitic restriction. The reputation of our arms was great, and the supply of wealth to Great Britain by the investment (the only proper mode of enriching our native country from India) had increased every year since Mr. Hastings came to the Government. The Gentlemen who then arrived from England, had no personal connections to gratify; they had not been bred up in the Company's service; nor had they formed friendships, to which a small portion of their constituents's interests might have sometimes been sacrificed; (human nature will still be the same!) and their own appointments were so ample as to preclude even the temptation to act from interested motives. With such advantages, why has it happened that the British nation has not experienced all those good effects which the wisdom of the Legislature predicted when the Supreme Council of India was established? I shall relate facts as they happened, without a wish to reflect in the smallest degree upon two gentlemen of great honour and undoubted integrity, who are now no more; and who, I think, would have heartily co-operated with Mr. Hastings, if much pains had not been taken to deceive them by designing men, who unfortunately were but too successful in so pernicious an undertaking.

Although Mr. Hastings received an addition to his former title by the act which constituted the Supreme Council, his powers were considerably curtailed by the instructions of the Court of Directors. Under these circumstances, he was at first under-



mined, whether to resign or to retain the Government; but the violent conduct of a decided majority determined him to remain in the chair at all events.

The flame of opposition broke out with great violence at the second meeting of the Supreme Council. The Governor General, for the information of his colleagues, drew up a clear and distinct statement of our political situation. Our alliance with the Vizier, the advantages which we had already received, and might in future expect to receive from it. Our alliances or connections with the native powers in Indostan, and every other particular which it was necessary to communicate to gentlemen vested with so high a public trust, and who at the same time were so intirely uninformed with respect to a country, which from that moment they were to govern. To elucidate some part of his minutes, Mr. Hastings delivered into the Board several extracts from Mr. Middleton's letters, who had resided for some months by his appointment at the Court of Sujah Dowlah.

A member of the Board immediately proposed that the Governor General should lay before them the whole correspondence of Mr. Middleton. This was so direct an attack upon the honour of Mr. Hastings, that he absolutely refused to comply with the requisition; and from this moment commenced the attack upon his former administration.

They began with the Rohilla war. It was a war, they said, which would bring dishonour upon the nation. The money to be received, which they de-  
clared

claimed would never be paid, was the price of blood. Our army was exposed, in the dominions of a treacherous ally, to the most imminent dangers, and the majority determined to recall it immediately, provided the retreat could be effected with security to our own troops, though at that time Fyz Ulla still stood out; and by abandoning the Vizier, the fifty lacs which we were to receive from him would not have been demandable.

By proceedings thus violent and unjustifiable, the great advantages which have since accrued to the Company had nearly been forfeited; but the earnestness of the Governor General for a short delay in the execution of these intemperate orders had fortunately some effect. The non-payment of the subsidy due from the Vizier to the Company, was the principal cause assigned for the recall of our army, although the bad policy of advancing our troops beyond the Carumnassa \* was warmly insisted upon at the same time. A part of the money due by the treaty was soon after paid by the Vizier; this payment, as well as that of the remainder, was represented as the recovery of a desperate debt; and it was confidently asserted, that the recovery of so large a sum was owing to the firmness and resolution of the majority, though it had never been conceived that he meant to deduct any part of the payment.

Mr. Middleton was immediately recalled from his station; and Mr. Brallow, the confidential friend of

\* That river divides the province of Bahar from the province of Benares.

Mr. Francis, appointed Resident at the Vizier's court in his room.

The Governor-General's conduct, in points which had already been referred to the judgment of the Court of Directors, was severely attacked; a most melancholy picture was drawn of the distressed state of the provinces; the natives were said to groan under every species of oppression, and even murders to have been committed with impunity in our most populous cities.

To those, who for more than two years had lived under a Government, vigorous far beyond what had ever been known in India, such a representation appeared extraordinary indeed.—On Mr. Hastings's arrival, our dominions and our influence were bounded by the banks of the Carumnassa. The Company was sinking under the weight of a heavy bond debt, an expensive civil establishment, and an army which cost more than a million sterling annually, and which could not with prudence have been considerably reformed. When the majority of the Supreme Council assumed the Government, the bond debt was reduced, and funds provided for paying off the remainder; the public disbursements were regulated; the pay of a third of our army was furnished by Sujah Dowlah; and by its remaining in Oude we had a prospect of still farther advantages, which were afterward realized.

Mr. Hastings, sensible of these advantages, and of the falshood of the gloomy presages of the majority, in his separate letters to the Directors, assured them,

them; that their affairs were at no former period in so flourishing a situation; that they would receive a large investment; the bond debt would be paid off, and a large sum retained in the treasury for emergencies in the course of the following season.

3. The majority contradicted and ridiculed this representation; but the event has proved that it was not made without full consideration; nor can it be denied that Mr. Hastings alone is entitled to the merit of paying off a debt of a million and a half, of reserving an equal sum in the treasury of Bengal, of supplying Madras, Bombay, and China with cash, and adding very considerably to the annual investment. His civil regulations in 1772, and his negotiations with Sujah Dowlah in 1773, have, in their consequences, fixed us so securely in the possession of Indostan, from the source of the Ganges to the Ocean, notwithstanding the temporary distress under which we now labour, from Hyder Ally Cawn's successes in the Carnatic, that we are in no danger of a reverse of fortune, except from internal dissensions.

In the condemnation of past measures; no public act of the Governor General's was passed over without a comment. By giving up Corah and Allahabad to the Vizier, he sold what was the property of another; by withholding the tribute which we were by treaty engaged to pay to the King, he forfeited the national faith; and even admitting that it would have been imprudent to furnish his Majesty with so large a sum, when he was a prisoner with the Marattas, it  
ought

ought at least to have been reserved as a deposit in Calcutta: Probably the consequences of withholding such a sum as a crore of rupees from circulation, when we could hardly find money for our necessary expences, was not considered by the majority. However, as the Court of Directors in the first letter which was received from them in 1775, very highly approved of the sale of Corah, and the non-payment of the tribute, no farther remarks were made on Mr. Hastings's conduct in these points.

I now enter, and I confess with much regret, upon the conduct of the majority towards Mr. Hastings as a private gentleman, in which his reputation was principally concerned. I lament sincerely that gentlemen of high honour and unblemished characters should have been so warped by their prejudices. But such are the fatal effects of party spirit.

This attack was authorised by a very impolitic though well-meaning order of the Court of Directors; "That the Supreme Council should enquire into past abuses." A similar order had been given to Mr. Hastings on his accession to the Government, and it is now needless to lament the fatal consequences which were occasioned by an inattention to his opinion upon it. Mr. Hastings had found it impossible to detect or to punish those who had abused the confidence reposed in them. Much valuable time was lost, and much odium incurred by the attempt.

Mr. Verelst and Mr. Cartier were men of honour, whose public virtue could not be better proved than by the very moderate amount of the fortunes which they brought home with them. From various causes, however, the Company's affairs were in great confusion; and the Directors attributing it to the bad management of their servants in Bengal, were, with reason, anxious to detect those who were guilty, and therefore earnestly pressed Mr. Hastings to commence a retrospect of their conduct. But when the Supreme Council arrived in Bengal, our affairs were in so flourishing a state, that such an order was surely unnecessary.

I will quote Mr. Hastings's opinion upon this subject; it reflects the greatest honour upon him. The letter from which I have taken the following extract, is dated the 11th of November, 1773; and if not received in London before the departure of the majority of the Supreme Council, might have been transmitted to them very shortly after.

“ All my letters addressed to your honourable  
 “ Court, and to the Select Committee, repeat the  
 “ strongest promises of prosecuting the inquiries into  
 “ the conduct of your servants, which you had been  
 “ pleased to commit particularly to my charge.  
 “ You will readily believe that I must have been  
 “ sincere in those declarations, since it would have  
 “ argued great indiscretion to have made them, had  
 “ I foreseen my inability to perform them. I find  
 “ myself now under the disagreeable necessity of  
 “ avowing that inability; at the same time that I will  
 “ boldly

“ boldly take upon me to affirm, that on whomso-  
 “ ever you might have delegated that charge, it would  
 “ have been sufficient to occupy the entire attention  
 “ of those who were entrusted with it, and even  
 “ with all the aids of leisure and authority, would  
 “ have proved ineffectual. I dare appeal to the  
 “ public records, to the testimony of those who  
 “ have opportunities of knowing me, and even to  
 “ the detail which the public voice can repeat of the  
 “ past acts of this government, that my time has  
 “ been neither idly nor uselessly employed. Yet such  
 “ are the cares and embarrassments of this various  
 “ state, that although much may be done, much  
 “ more, even in matters of moment, must remain  
 “ neglected. To select from the miscellaneous heap  
 “ which each day’s exigencies presents to our choice,  
 “ those points on which the general welfare of your  
 “ affairs most essentially depends, to provide expe-  
 “ dients for future advantages, and guard against  
 “ probable evils, are all that your administration can  
 “ faithfully promise to perform for your service, with  
 “ their united labours most diligently exerted. They  
 “ cannot look back without sacrificing the objects  
 “ of their immediate duty, which are those of your  
 “ interests, to useless researches, which can produce  
 “ no real good, and may expose your affairs to all  
 “ the ruinous consequences of personal malevolence  
 “ both here and at home.

“ May I be permitted to offer it, in all deference  
 “ and submission to your commands, as my opinion,  
 “ that whatever may have been the conduct of indi-  
 “ viduals,

“ individuals, or even of the collective members of  
 “ your former administrations, the blame is not so  
 “ much imputable to them as to a want of a princi-  
 “ ple of government adequate to its substance, and  
 “ a coercive power to enforce it. The extent of  
 “ Bengal and its possible resources are equal to those  
 “ of most states in Europe. Its difficulties are greater  
 “ than those of any, because it wants both an esta-  
 “ blished form and powers of government; deriving  
 “ its actual support from the unremitted labours  
 “ and personal exertions of individuals in power,  
 “ instead of the vital influence which flows through  
 “ the channels of a regular constitution, and impercep-  
 “ tibly animates every part of it. Our constitution  
 “ is no where to be traced but in the ancient char-  
 “ ters which were framed for the jurisdiction of your  
 “ trading settlements, the sales of your exports, and  
 “ the provision of your annual investments. I need  
 “ not observe how incompatible these must prove to  
 “ the government of a great kingdom, and for the  
 “ preservation of its riches from private violence, and  
 “ embezzlement.

“ Among your servants, who for a course of years  
 “ have been left at large, in possession of so tempt-  
 “ ing a deposit, it is not to be wondered at, that  
 “ many have applied it to the advancement of their  
 “ own fortunes; or that those who were possessed of  
 “ abilities to introduce a system of order, should  
 “ have been drawn along by the general current;  
 “ since few men are formed with so large a share of  
 “ public virtue as to sacrifice their interest, peace,



“ and social feelings to it, and to begin the work of  
 “ reformation on themselves. . . .”

“ I should not have presumed to expatiate on a  
 “ subject of this nature, although my own justification  
 “ has made it in some measure necessary; but  
 “ that your late advice has given hopes that we  
 “ shall speedily be furnished with your instructions  
 “ for establishing a system of law and polity, which  
 “ we hitherto want. Whenever this work shall be  
 “ accomplished on a foundation of consistency and  
 “ permanency, I will venture to foretel, from the  
 “ knowledge which I have of the general habits and  
 “ manners of your servants, that you will have as  
 “ few instances of licentiousness amongst your ser-  
 “ vants as amongst the members of any community  
 “ in the British empire.”

What impression this solid and conclusive reason-  
 ing of the Governor General made upon the Court  
 of Directors is not known; but the East-India Com-  
 pany would have felt the good effects of it most sen-  
 sibly, if, in consequence of this opinion, the Court  
 of Directors had new-modelled their instructions.

The disagreement in the Supreme Council became  
 the general subjects of conversation in India. New  
 hopes and fears were excited in all—every former  
 transaction of Government was harshly censured—  
 and the majority publicly declared, that they expected  
 Mr. Hastings would be dismissed with disgrace from  
 his station, as soon as their representations arrived in

When every act of Government which could be  
 attributed to Mr. Hastings had been canvassed, his  
 private

private character was attacked, and the man who had filled the most important stations in India with an unblemished reputation, who might with ease have accumulated a fortune of two hundred thousand pounds, during the many years that he was resident at the Court of Meer Jaffier, but who, it is well known, returned to his native country without a competency, was publicly accused of the most flagrant acts of rapacity and extortion, and of having amassed a fortune of four hundred thousand pounds in little more than two years.

To those who are acquainted with the moderation of Mr. Hastings's character, with his neglect of his private interest, this accusation appeared as absurd as it was ill founded; but the proof was at hand, and Nundcomar stepped forth to support what they had advanced. It would indeed have been a cruel circumstance if the oath of Nundcomar had operated to the disadvantage even of a man as bad as himself; but that it should have had the least weight in the accusation of a character so respectable, and so firmly established as the Governor General's, will hardly be credited when the spirit of party has subsided: yet certain it is, that upon the assertion of this wretch, the majority fixed Mr. Hastings's fortune at forty lacks of rupees.

To gentlemen at all conversant in the affairs of Bengal, the character of Nundcomar was well known. Mr. Hastings had employed him on his first arrival by the express order of the Directors, to whom he had explained his sentiments of the man very freely.

He in fact foretold to them the part Nundcomar would act, if ever he had an opportunity. Captain Swinton, in his evidence before a Committee of the House of Commons, declared that Nundcomar had been repeatedly guilty of forgery; and for this crime he suffered death in August 1775; whether strictly legally has been questioned, but there never was a doubt of the fact of his being perjured, nor of the majority knowing he was so, when they accepted his service in accusing Mr. Hastings.

This man, before he was committed to custody, had opened what may properly be called an information office in Calcutta. It was well known, that he was countenanced by the majority. I am very clear that neither General Clavering nor Colonel Monson were aware of the dangerous use to which he would apply the power which he had acquired; but certain it is that the most liberal encouragement was given to informers of every denomination by the majority. Accusations as absurd as improbable were hourly received against the Governor General; but although divested of all power, although Nundcomar was possessed of the means of proving his guilt, had he really been guilty, after the fullest inquiry; with rewards offered on the one hand and punishments denounced on the other, in order to procure the evidence which he wanted to criminate the Governor General, nothing appeared that reflected either upon his honour or his integrity; unless it could be deemed a crime to receive from the Nabob a certain fixed sum for his expences during his residence at Moorshedabad, in conformity to the customs of the country, and

and to the examples which had been set him by his predecessors, Lord Clive, Mr. Verelst, and Mr. Cartier. It was acknowledged by Sir George Wombwell in the General Court in 1776, that the allowance was to be taken, and that if he had given the Company credit for it, he might have charged them the expences of his progress : this allowance had been settled by Lord Clive in lieu of purveyance. \*

Let it for a moment be supposed that Mr. Hastings had accumulated the large fortune which the majority supposed him to be possessed of. Was it made at the expence of the East-India Company—had he added to the weight of their bonded debt—had he involved them in dangerous or expensive alliances—had he neglected to make the necessary remittances of cash to our other Presidencies, or to China—or had he diminished the annual investment to Europe—there might have been some excuse for inquiring into the amount of his private fortune, and how he amassed it. But when this inquiry commenced, the Company's bond debt of a million and an half was paying off ; supplies had been sent to China, Fort St. George, and Bombay ; two additional ships, the *Anson*, and the *Northumberland*, had been taken up in Calcutta. So much was the investment increased ; and the death of Sujah Dowlah gave us a prospect of a still farther addition to our power, our influence, and our resources.

\* General Smith must know this state of the fact to be correct ; and he knows that he himself never passed through Moorshedabad without receiving a complimentary present, agreeable to the custom of the country.

However,

However, I will take upon me to affirm, that when the amount of the Governor General's private fortune is known, it will appear to the most moderate man in England to be greatly inadequate either to the length or to the importance of his services.

During these violent attacks upon the character of Mr. Hastings, all public business was suspended. The inferior servants of the Company were divided into parties, and after the example of the Presidency, each Provincial Council had its majority, and minority. Expensive prosecutions were commenced in the Supreme Courts of Judicature against the Governor General of India, who was reluctantly obliged, in vindication of his own honour, to bear a part in this disgraceful scene. At a time when our dominions and our influence were so greatly increased, at a time when the gentlemen of Bombay had commenced a war against the Marattas, at a time when the attention of every member of the Board should have been entirely employed in the consideration of the great political questions which were before them—at this time, the Governor General and Council were attending as evidences or parties in a Court of law; Mr. Hastings in his own defence, and the gentlemen of the majority, as guardians of the interests of the East-India Company, to criminate the man who had so essentially served his constituents.

So salutary were the regulations which Mr. Hastings had established, so firmly was the government fixed in all its parts, that notwithstanding these

these unhappy dissensions, our affairs were at no former period in so flourishing a situation; and in the course of the years 1775 and 1776, every promise which the Governor General had made to the Court of Directors was amply fulfilled. Whether this prosperity was owing to Mr. Hastings's regulations, and the political connections which he formed previous to the 19th of October 1774, or to the abilities and exertions of the Supreme Council since that period, can at once be determined by an examination of the Company's records.

A treaty highly advantageous to the Company was concluded with Asoph ul Dowlah, by which the sovereignty of Benares, with all the rights and powers annexed to it, was transferred to us, and a nett revenue of twenty-four lacks of rupees acquired. The continuance of a brigade in the Vizier's dominions was another article of the treaty, and the subsidy fixed at two lacks and sixty thousand rupees a month. Let not the Governor General be deprived of the merit of these important acquisitions. The majority would never have agreed to advance our troops beyond the bounds of the Carumnassa; they even were anxious to recal them immediately, and were only prevented from actually doing so, by the earnest opposition of Mr. Hastings. In either case, the death of Sujah Dowlah would have been attended with no advantages to the Company. The provinces of Oude, Corah, and Allahabad would have been torn by civil wars, and must, in the end, have been subdued, either by Nuzeph Cawn or the Marattas.

In September, 1776, Colonel Monson died. No man was more ready to do justice to that gentleman's abilities than Mr. Hastings, or more sincerely lamented the unhappy prejudices which he imbibed on his first arrival in Bengal. Bred a soldier, and having served with distinguished reputation in India, he was admirably calculated for the command of our army in Bengal; to which had he fortunately been appointed, and confined to his professional duties, the Company would have experienced the good effects of his return to India in a very sensible degree.

At this period too we received advice of the extraordinary revolution at Madras. The Supreme Council were unanimous in their opinion of the measures to be taken upon so critical an occasion, and of the powers which Lord Pigot claimed, as President of a Council in which he had only a casting voice when the numbers were equal. That the powers of a Governor in India are very inadequate to the dignity of his station, and to the responsibility annexed to it, is beyond a doubt. This was Mr. Hastings's opinion, and he expressed it very freely to the Court of Directors, in the letter of which I have already given an extract: but until those powers are enlarged, a Governor, with a majority against him, must be a meer cypher. The Governor General had only taken upon him to break up the Council, when the majority had called Nundcomar before them, for the extraordinary purpose of pre-

ferring a criminal accusation against their President, and the first British subject in India. For this small exertion of authority he was severely reprimanded by the Court of Directors, and plainly informed, that he had no distinct authority annexed to his station, but that all the powers of government were vested in a majority of the Board. Could the Governor General allow, that a law which was to bind him, was not of force when applied to the Governor of a subordinate presidency? The Court of Directors' sentiments on this subject were of sufficient force to determine the Supreme Council, had the reference made to them by the gentlemen of Fort. St. George been a point of difficulty.

It was necessary to mention this unhappy business, because Mr. Stratton has published some partial extracts of a private letter, which he received from the Governor General immediately after that revolution, from which it might appear that he was interested in the dispute, although he had not the smallest personal concern in it. To those who have seen the whole letter, this explanation is unnecessary.

By the orders of the Company, wisely framed with a view to comply with Asiatic customs, all political negotiations are conducted through the channel of the Governors of the different presidencies. A native of India can have no idea of a participation of power, and he very naturally concludes that a Governor is either absolute, or has no power in the state over which he presides.



When the connection of this government with Sujah Dowlah was more closely cemented, Mr. Hastings thought proper to appoint Mr. Nathaniel Middleton his private agent at the court of that prince. When the Supreme Council was divided into two distinct parties, Mr. Middleton was recalled, and Mr. Bristow, the confidential friend of Mr. Francis, appointed in his room.

By this step the annihilation of the Governor General's political influence was completely proclaimed to every power in Indostan. While Mr. Bristow remained at Lucknow, Mr. Hastings could only be looked upon as the constrained instrument of an authority raised upon the ruin of his own. This evident truth will not be disputed by any man who has served in India; from the period of Colonel Monson's death to the time of Mr. Middleton's re-appointment to the Vizier's court, the attention of every man from Calcutta to Dehly was fixed upon this single point, as the criterion by which he was to judge, whether Mr. Hastings meant to retain or to give up the government. I do not rest the propriety of this measure upon the obligation which Mr. Hastings lay under, of doing an act of justice to an individual who had suffered severely for his attachment to him. But I insist upon it, that the public service could not be carried on with effect, while an opinion prevailed in Oude, that Mr. Hastings was upon the point of quitting the chair; and such would have been the conclusion had Mr. Bristow been permitted to remain there. He was known to  
be

be the confidential friend of Mr. Francis; and however Mr. Hastings might have approved of his conduct, he could not give a person so situated his entire confidence, even admitting it possible to answer the other objections, which I will venture to affirm are not to be controverted.

The Governor General surely should not be expected to conduct the complicated affairs of an extensive empire, where our countrymen bear so very small a proportion in point of numbers to the natives, upon principles so different from those upon which all countries are regulated, and so totally different from those by which the late majority professedly acted. The late Mr. Playdell was deprived of the office of superintendant of the police (which was immediately given to the brother-in-law of Mr. Francis) for his activity in presenting an address to the chief justice that was obnoxious to the majority\*. Mr. Playdell complained bitterly of the ill usage which he had received, but it was observed in reply, that what had happened to him, was the chance of the worthiest men in England upon every change in administration, and that no wise government would ever employ men in offices of trust under them, of whose attachment they were not very well assured.

\* Writs had been attempted to be taken out, which would have reached every part of Bengal and brought natives to Calcutta; the Court refused them. This moderation and justice procured them an address of thanks from the different sets of inhabitants at Calcutta.

This reasoning, however, it may appear in the case of Mr. Playdell, whose appointment was of very little consequence to the state, is surely conclusive in that now before us.

The removal of Mr. Fowke from Benares was from the same motive.

Benares is one of the richest cities in India. It is the residence of learned men, and the center of all political business. Vackeels, or agents, from every prince in India reside here, and as the British government is confessedly now the most important in Indostan, it is absolutely necessary that the resident at Benares should be dependant upon the ruling party in the Supreme Council. Upon this principle was Mr. Fowke sent there by the majority, and upon the same principle was he recalled after Colonel Munson's death. It is sufficient to state these facts as they really are, and then the Governor General's conduct towards Mr. Bristow and Mr. Fowke will need neither a justification nor an apology. Whoever shall attribute these removals to a personal pique, or shall conceive Mr. Hastings capable of gratifying a private resentment at the expence of Mr. Bristow and Mr. Fowke, will be much deceived. He is too liberal to act from such narrow principles!

Every measure proposed by the Governor General, however salutary, was opposed by General Clavering, and supposed to be ultimately intended to answer some private view. The settlement of the lands, having been made for five years only, was on the point of expiring soon after Colonel Munson's death:

death: Mr. Hastings proposed to obtain the fullest information of the state of the country, that the revenues might be fixed upon an equitable scale: to assist him in the laborious task which he had imposed upon himself, he had fixed upon two gentlemen of distinguished abilities and irreproachable characters, whose proceedings were to have been laid before the Council at large, in whom was vested the power and decision upon every point. Much valuable information was procured and transmitted to the Court of Directors in consequence of this investigation, both as to the state of the country and its population and resources; but at that time it really appeared sufficient to blast every scheme, however beneficial, that it was proposed by Mr. Hastings: The minority questioned its legality; and General Clavering denominated it a trick to extort money from the Zemindars for the benefit of Mr. Hastings and his friends.

The last material act of Mr. Hastings's administration, previous to the death of General Clavering, was, the increase of our military establishment; a measure which has been attended with infinite advantages to the public and to individuals, and has effectually secured the continuance of our influence in the extensive dominions of the Vizier. To set this matter in a clear point of view, and to free it from the false lights which may be thrown upon it, I will briefly relate the steps which led to it.

Sujah Dowlah died in February 1775. His eldest son, Asolph ul Dowlah, was declared the heir of his father's

father's dominions; but he owed his peaceable succession to the Mūsṣud to the presence of our army. Intrigues were immediately formed against him; and in his troops, mutinous and disaffected, were many officers in the interest of his competitors. The Vizier, justly alarmed for his personal safety, which had frequently been endangered, disbanded the most turbulent of his battalions, and applied to the Supreme Council for British officers to discipline those which he retained in his service. In consequence of this requisition, nine captains and thirty subalterns were appointed to his service, and were to receive the pay of the rank next above that which they held in Bengal. No funds were fixed for the payment of these officers, or of the troops which they were to command; so that, in fact, this new establishment was subject to all those inconveniencies which it was meant to redress.

A General spirit of mutiny broke out amongst the Vizier's troops immediately after the arrival of our officers; this in some batalions was carried to the most alarming lengths. Many officers were seized, confined, and threatened to be put to death. The storm at length subsided. The principal mutineers were punished, and discipline was in some measure restored. Many however were the disadvantages which our service sustained by this establishment. The emoluments were so considerable to those who had the good fortune to be appointed to the Vizier's service, that it created a general spirit of discontent amongst our officers in Bengal; and trifling as the  
 establish-

establishment was in point of numbers, the expence of it so far exceeded all bounds, that the Vizier was unable to keep it up, and to discharge his debt to the Company. Certainly a service in which the emoluments to individuals so far exceeded those in our own, required some regulations. Mr. Hastings had seen the bad effects of a similar establishment in the Carnatic, and the Company at this moment most severely feel it: upon Colonel Monson's death he proposed a remedy for them.

On the principle that our interests and the Vizier's were thus closely connected, Mr. Hastings brought his plan before the Board, which was, that three regiments of horse, three companies of artillery, and nine battalions of Sepoys, should be added to our establishments, and with this addition of force we were to protect the Vizier's dominions. The disciplined corps in his service were to form this body; and to fix them more firmly in our service, they were to take their tour of duty in our provinces, and to be subject to the same regulations with respect to pay as the rest of our army. The Vizier was to appropriate certain fixed funds for the payment of these troops, so that this important addition to our army was made without the smallest expence to the East-India Company.

Beneficial as this plan must appear, and to which only one objection could be urged, the difficulty of procuring the Vizier's assent to it, it was vehemently opposed. Mr. Francis contended, that all military arrangements should originate with the Commander  
in

in Chief, although this was evidently a great political regulation of the highest consequence. The General's objections were numerous. The Vizier's consent was obtained through the agency of Mr. Middleton; the plan was soon after carried into execution, and has so completely answered every good end which was proposed by it, that even those gentlemen who lost considerably by the alteration, have been candid enough to declare, that no act of Mr. Hastings's administration redounds more to his honour or to the Company's advantage, than this establishment, formed against the opinion of the Commander in Chief, and the opposition of Mr. Francis.

The provinces of Oude, Corah, Allahabad, Rohilcund, and the Doab, have been protected, the revenues have been collected, and the troops have been regularly paid from the day this establishment took place; and in the year 1780, the general relief of the army was effected; by which these new battalions were brought into our provinces, and relieved by an equal number from Bengal.

In August 1777, General Clavering died. A man whose character must be always considered with respect, as his errors arose from a good principle, the hatred of corruption. He certainly brought with him to Bengal a rooted prejudice against the Company's servants in general, and a very unjust one against Mr. Hastings in particular. The Court of Directors by their instructions, in which, from the best motives, they authorised a review of past transactions,

actions, opened so wide a field for imposition, that the General's prejudices were still more confirmed by the improbable tales which were hourly brought to him. The violence of the majority absolutely created a party, where otherwise there would have been none.

Mr. Hastings, through the whole course of his public life, had given the strongest proofs of his integrity and disinterestedness; Sir John Clavering's has never been questioned; had some pains therefore been taken to unite such respectable characters, the intension of the Legislature in forming the Supreme Council would have been effectually answered; but as it was, the first impressions which the General received, from a certain perseverance in his temper, grew stronger every day, and the interest of the East India Company unhappily suffered by it.

I do not mean to infer that no abuses existed in Bengal when the Supreme Council arrived there. Let it be considered that Mr. Hastings was the President of a Council, in which he had a casting voice only when the numbers were equal, consequently that he would sometimes be obliged to accommodate his opinion to the sense of the majority of his Council; but it is a certain truth, that whilst he had the lead, he did more to reform abuses than any other man would have done or attempted: The establishment of the Supreme Council was calculated for completing his plans of reformation, a work in which he would most cordially have taken the lead; but unfortunately he was obliged to give up that time,

G

which



which might have been so valuably employed for the public service, to the justification of past, and successful measures, and even to the defence of his private character.

Passing over common occurrences, I come to that period in which arose the present expensive (though when Mr. Hastings's scheme prevailed, successful) war with the Marattas. It has been industriously endeavoured to impute the origin as well as the progress of this war to Mr. Hastings. The Court of Directors are possessed of the fullest evidence to the contrary ; and both living testimony, and authentic documents prove, that its origin is not owing to him, and that the continuation of it is the effect of necessity.

It will be proper to take up this important subject from the first connection of the Bombay Council with Ragonath Row, otherwise called Ragobah.

Although the nominal sovereignty of the Maratta state was in a Raja, the real administration of government, as well as the power inherent to it, was possessed by a Bramin family, under the title of Pashwa, or Chancellor ; and this authority was so fixed in them, that it became hereditary ; and in case of infancy, the State was governed by a Regent, who was generally the nearest in blood. Narrein Row, the last Pashwa, died, leaving no children ; and Ragobah, who was his uncle, became Pashwa. During an expedition, which carried him to a distance from his capital, the Council (consisting of Bramins) dispossessed him, giving out that the widow of Narrein was with child,

child, and accusing him of having assassinated his nephew. The first of these facts was doubtful, the latter most probably false, he having been in confinement for a long time before that event, without any communication with the conspirators. Soon after it was given out that the widow of Narrein was delivered of a son; and Nana, with Saccaram, and others of the Bramin Council, acting, as they alleged, in support of the infant, drove Ragobah from Poona, and reduced him to such distress, that he applied for assistance to the Presidency of Bombay.

Not relying solely on the justice of his cause, the more readily to obtain assistance, he offered to make some very valuable cessions of territory to the East-India Company. A treaty was concluded, by which we engaged to assist him with a military force; and an army from Bombay took the field under the command of Colonel Keating; whether our forces, in conjunction with Ragobah's would have conducted him in triumph to Poona is uncertain, but it can hardly be doubted that a few spirited operations would have been productive of an advantageous peace with the ministerial party, both for the Company and for Ragonaut Row.

Intelligence of the transactions at Bombay, was received at Calcutta a few months after the first meeting of the Supreme Council, whose authority having been totally disregarded, either from inadvertence or design, produced very serious consequences. The treaty with Ragobah having been concluded without the sanction of the Governo

General and Council, was disavowed; and an officer of rank (Lieutenant Colonel Upton) was deputed to Poona, with instructions to conclude a peace upon almost any terms, with the ministers who were denominated the ruling members of the Maratta state; and the English army was ordered to march back.

So glaring a condemnation of past measures, and so pointed an interference in their affairs, naturally tended to destroy the influence of the gentlemen of Bombay, upon the Malabar coast; while it provoked their passions and excited their resentments. Under these circumstances, a co-operation with Colonel Upton could not be expected. It had been fortunate if, from that moment, the Government of Bombay had been fixed upon a plan of the most rigid œconomy; and their troops had been confined to the defence of Bombay, the castle of Surat, and the island of Salsette.

Mr. Hastings, although he joined with the other members in disapproving the conduct of the Presidency of Bombay, thought that there might exist circumstances which should prevent the return of the army, but he was over-ruled, and the moderation of our demands was attributed very naturally, by the Marattas, to a want of ability to carry on the war. Colonel Upton was five months on his journey to Poona. He was treated with great disrespect by the Maratta Chiefs through whose countries he passed. The Ministers, on his arrival, complained bitterly of our interference in their family disputes; and were so high in their demands, insisting even upon the restoration of Salsette, that Colonel Upton broke off the nego-

negotiation; and by his first dispatches to Calcutta, it was supposed that the war would be continued. But this was a mere trick of the Ministers, who were anxious for an accommodation; and on the first of March, 1776, a treaty of peace was signed by Colonel Upton, on the part of our government; and on their side was authenticated, by the seal of the Pashwa, an infant of about two-years old, and by the signature of his two Ministers, Sacaram Bappoo and Nana Furnese. By one article of the treaty, a provision was made for the subsistence of Ragobah, their late competitor, on condition of his residing in the heart of the Maratta dominions, with a guard appointed by the Ministers themselves, for his state and security. This clause, as might reasonably be expected, defeated the intention of the treaty, since it left Ragobah at the mercy of his enemies, without any pledge or engagement for his safety. The consequence was, that he fled to Bombay, and claimed the protection of that Government for the security of his person.

The Ministers exclaimed against this protection; and mutual complaints of the violation of this treaty were made by them and the Bombay Council. About the Month of May, 1777, the Chevalier St. Lubin made his appearance at Poona, in the public character of a Minister from the Court of France. He was received with great honour, and in a little time written engagements were mutually interchanged between him and Nana Furnese, by which he promised to bring a regiment of Europeans, with military stores to Poona, for the service of the Maratta state. Intelligence of this treaty, at first doubted,

was

was soon confirmed by authorities of unquestionable credit, and by a series of facts of public notoriety. It had been always the Governor General's opinion, that this was the only way by which the French could hope to regain their consequence in India, or to affect ours; and he reasonably expected, that the Presidency of Bombay, which was more immediately interested in the effects of such a connection, would take some steps to render it abortive. This was by no means difficult. The Maratta army under Hurry Punt Furkia, was at that time engaged in an unequal war with Hyder Ally. The Ministers quarrelling among themselves, possessed little authority, and were dependent for that little upon their own vassals. The Presidency of Bombay had long shewn an impatience to revive the cause of Ragobah; and the slightest movements made by them in his favour would have proved sufficient to overthrow the feeble power which they had to contend with, and to establish their own influence in the Maratta state on its ruins. But Mr. Hastings, that he might leave no means untried to avoid a rupture with the Marattas, and to counteract the French influence at Poona, formed a treaty, which he meant should remedy all the defects of that concluded by Colonel Upton; every article of which, at that time remained unexecuted. This treaty was laid before the Board in Calcutta, with a very long explanatory minute, on the 23d of January, 1778, and will, if read with the attention it deserves, entirely exculpate the Governor General from the smallest suspicion of a desire to involve the East-India Company in a war with the

the Marattas. On the 29th of January, whilst this minute lay for consideration, a letter was received from Bombay, dated the 12th of December, 1777, informing the Supreme Council that a proposal had been secretly made to the Governor and Council, through their agent at Poona, by a party which had been formed against Nana Furnese, consisting of Sacaram Bappoo, who had signed the treaty, and other considerable men, with a potent Raja, Tuckajee Holkar, to assist them in the design of reinstating Ragobah in the chief administration of the Maratta state; and that they had agreed to join in it, requiring only, as a preliminary condition, a written application to the same effect, under the hands and seals of the confederates. They excused themselves for having so far engaged, without the previous authority of the Supreme Council, by the obvious necessity of an immediate decision; and they requested their acquiescence and assistance in it. On the receipt of this letter, the Governor General and Council resolved to ratify what they had done, to authorize them to proceed, and to send them an extraordinary supply of ten lacks of rupees for the undertaking. It was also resolved, to assist them in the execution of their plan with a military force.

In forming these resolutions the majority of the Supreme Council were swayed by the following considerations.

1st. In the event of a rupture with France, which was daily apprehended, the connection formed by Nana Furnese with St. Lubin, and the engagement which he had entered into to land a regiment of Europeans

Europeans with military stores at Poona, might, if carried into effect, be productive of the most dangerous consequences to the Company's influence, and their possessions in India. This could be prevented only by the removal of the party so closely connected with our natural enemy, and therefore this was an object of the first importance; and Ragonaut Row was the instrument for this purpose. Mr. Hastings had no predilection for this Chief, nor is it possible to attribute his conduct to any interested view.

2dly, Authorising the gentlemen of Bombay to take part with Ragobah, was a strict compliance with the orders of the Court of Directors contained in the following paragraph of their general letter of the 5th of February 1777.

“ His (Ragobah's) pretensions to the supreme  
 “ authority, either in his own right, or as guardian  
 “ to the infant Pashwa, appear to us better founded  
 “ than those of his competitors; and therefore, if  
 “ the conditions of the treaty of Poona have not  
 “ been strictly fulfilled on the part of the Marat-  
 “ tas, and if, from any circumstances, you shall  
 “ deem it expedient, we shall have no objection to  
 “ an alliance with Ragobah, on the terms agreed  
 “ upon between him and the Governor and Council  
 “ of Bombay.”

3dly, The restoration of Ragonaut Row would have been attended by an accession of territory upon the Malabar coast to the amount of the annual expences of the Presidency of Bombay; by which means no farther drains would have been made from our treasury in Bengal.

4thly,

4thly, The restoration of Ragobah was not a breach of the treaty of Poona, because that treaty was signed by Saccaram Bappoo and Nana Furnese only; and Saccaram, the first Minister in rank, with the principal officers of the Maratta state, joined in the proposal to the gentlemen of Bombay, for his return to Poona.

Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler, however, strenuously opposed the measure, on various grounds; and amongst others, because it was in disobedience to the order of the Court of Directors.

I must here interrupt my narrative, to observe in what view the Directors considered the conduct of the Governor General in this instance.

About the 29th of July, 1778, the Court of Directors received dispatches both from Bombay and Bengal, in which they were informed of the plan proposed to the Presidency of Bombay, by the opponents of Nana Furnese, of the sanction given to it by the Governor General and Council, and of their resolution to assist them with money and a considerable reinforcement, in order the more effectually to carry it into execution, and to support them in the consequences of it. These advices the Court of Directors thought of such great importance, that on the 29th of August 1778, Colonel Capper was applied to by the Select Committee of the Court of Directors, to carry a packet to Bombay, of the greatest national importance. He accordingly left London the 1st of September, and by the letters which he brought, both the gentlemen of Bengal and Bombay had the satisfaction to receive the fullest approbation of the

H

Directors,



Directors, who express very strong anxiety for Ragobah's restoration, and the overthrow of that party at Poona in alliance with the French. The first ship of the season brought out a complete approbation to Mr. Hastings, for the part which he had acted in this important business.\*

On the 23d of February, 1778, orders were issued for forming a detachment of six battalions of Sepoys, one company of native artillery, with a regular proportion of field artillery, to which were afterwards added the first regiment of cavalry and five hundred of the Vizier's Candahar horse. Colonel Leslie was appointed to command this force, and ordered to march directly to Bombay by the shortest route he should judge most practicable, and for the sequel of his operations, he was to obey the orders of the President and Council of Bombay. This detachment crossed the Jumma the latter end of May, with slight and ineffectual opposition from Ballajee Pundit, the chief of the Maratta territories dependent upon Culpee. In the mean time the design which had furnished the occasion of this expedition was suffered to sleep at Bombay, the violent ardour of that Presidency for the cause of Ragonaut Row ceasing with the removal of the bar which had been laid on the prosecution of it. It produced however the principal effects intended by the promoters of it. These suddenly assembling their forces on the 30th of March, deprived Nana Furnese of his authority, and invested Moraba Furnese with it in his stead. This easy revolution, without bloodshed or contest, proved

\* These letters were approved by his Majesty's Ministers. the

the extreme weakness of the Maratta government, and the great facility with which the plan, offered to the Presidency of Bombay, might have been executed in its full extent, had they immediately engaged in it. When the gentlemen of Bombay first heard of Colonel Leslie's march, they ordered him to halt; and a few days after, they sent him an order to prosecute his march, but without any object described, or plan of operations proposed, or thought on: thus abandoned by the Presidency of Bombay, Mr. Hastings had recourse to other means which were more within the compass of his own direction, and for which he had in some degree made a provision a considerable time before, on the presumption of the utility of which it might prove in the event of a rupture with the Marattas.

When the Supreme Council determined to send a detachment to the other side of India, the Governor General applied to the Raja of Benar to grant his permission for its free march through his territories, with such assistance as it might require on the way. He received an immediate answer to his application on such terms as he wished, and the Raja at the same time sent a person to the banks of the Nerbudda, which bounds his dominions to the north, with a store of grain for the subsistence of the detachment, and orders to attend it through his country, of which he advised Colonel Leslie, inviting him to take that route, and assuring him of his most friendly reception.

The nominal Sovereign of the Maratta state, who had languished in honourable confinement at Satarah,

Rajah Ram Rajah, died in December, 1777. He left no children, and Moodajee Bobsa, Rajah of Benar, had the fairest pretensions to the succession, being in direct lineal descent from the ancient stock, and the adopted son of Sahoo Rajah, the predecessor of Ram Rajah, though deprived of his right by the artifices of Ballajee, who was the Pashwa, when Sahoo Rajah died. Mr. Hastings judged Moodajee Bobsa to be a proper person to supply the place of Ragobah, in the plan offered to the Supreme Council for overturning the French influence at Poona. He possessed wealth, power, and a territory extending from the borders of Bengal almost to Poona. Ragobah had neither wealth nor power, nor had he influence to supply the want of these requisites, except what might arise from the Presidency of Bombay taking an active part in his favour, and it did not then appear that they took any. Mr. Hastings wished and expected the proposal of an alliance to come from Moodajee, and he had deputed his Vackeel to him for that purpose, a man of understanding, and well instructed; but it now became necessary to take a more active and determined part.

On the 7th of July, 1778, advices, deemed worthy of credit, were received from Cairo that war had been declared between Great Britain and France; at Paris on the 18th, and in London on the 30th of March. The destination of Count d'Estaing's fleet was not then known. It was very naturally supposed to be intended against Bombay, and the first advices which were received from England tended still more strongly to confirm this supposition.

The

The Chevalier St. Lubin was known to be still at Poona, and to hold frequent conferences with the ministers of the Pashwa. The Supreme Council, regardless of all personal consequences, determined instantly to take possession of all the French settlements in Bengal, and of the ships in the river.\* At the same time, they earnestly recommended to the Presidency of Fort St. George, to commence the siege of Pondicherry immediately, and if possible to secure the friendship of Hyder Ally Cawn. It was also resolved to enter into a negociation with Moodajee, on the grounds which I have mentioned above. Mr. Elliot was deputed on this service. At Cuttack he overtook Mr. Chevalier, the Governor of Chandernagore, who had escaped from that place, and was so far in his way to Pondicherry. Mr. Elliot had the address to persuade Moodajee's Deputy at that place, to consent to his apprehending Mr. Chevalier; which he did, and sent him a prisoner to Fort William. By his papers, the reality of the French scheme against us was fully evinced. He then proceeded towards Naigpore, the capital of Berar: the whole service could not have afforded an agent more proper for such an embassy, and Mr. Hastings's hopes were proportionably raised, but as suddenly blasted by the untimely death of that very valuable young man, about a fortnight after he had left Cuttack. It is more than probable

\* The Governor General and Council took possession of all the French settlements and their ships in the river of Bengal, in consequence of the private advices transmitted to them from Cairo by Mr. Baldwin.

that if Mr. Elliot had arrived at Naigpore, an alliance of the most beneficial consequence to the East-India Company would have been concluded with the Rajah of Berar.

Colonel Leslie, when Mr. Elliot died, had advanced but 120 miles from Calpee, having employed so much of his time in settling the family disputes of the Bundella Chiefs. He was recalled from his command on the 7th of October ; but by his death, Colonel Goddard had succeeded to it before the letter reached the camp.

Colonel Goddard immediately prosecuted his march to the banks of the Nerbudda, and was empowered, on his arrival there, to treat with Moodajee. He deputed his interpreter to the Court of that Prince ; who, in his letter to Mr. Hastings, after the death of Mr. Elliot, had desired the negotiation might be transferred to his secretary ; and had expressed the strongest inclination to bring it to a conclusion.

A second, and unexpected revolution was effected at Poona on the 16th of June, and Moraba Furnese was imprisoned, with his principal adherents. Moraba, before his imprisonment, had made proposals to the Presidency of Bombay, who had resolved to conduct Ragobah with an army to Poona ; a circumstance well known to Moodajee, who, in consequence of it, declined the alliance which was proposed to him, deeming Ragobah's interests incompatible with his own : but with very cordial professions of friendship for the English nation, which he evinced,

evinced, by furnishing Colonel Goddard with cash, provisions, and draft cattle for his artillery. Colonel Goddard advanced towards Poona by quick marches.

I have already observed that the Bombay gentlemen had reassumed their design in favour of Ragobah. The period at which they reassumed it was unfavourable; Ragobah's principal adherents were confined, and Colonel Goddard, whose army would by its presence have insured success, was at a considerable distance. I wish to relate facts, and not to comment upon them. On the 23d of November the Bombay army, consisting of one hundred and forty-three artillery, five hundred and forty-eight European infantry, two thousand two hundred and seventy Sepoys, and five hundred Lascars, was transported to the Continent. On the 23d of December, they ascended the Gauts, and marched towards Poona, and on the 9th of January it was determined to retreat, on account of a scarcity of provisions, although they had a supply for eighteen days, and there was but one short day's march to Poona. So much alarmed had the ministers been for the event, that, by their agent at Bombay, they had offered fresh terms to the Governor before the army advanced. The commanding officer, Colonel Cockburn, when consulted, said, that he had not a doubt of the army's marching to Poona, but that our troops had not been used to retreat. However, the resolution was not to be altered. The army was formed into three divisions, encumbered with baggage,

gage, and moved off by night. They were attacked by numerous bodies of Marattas, but defended themselves with the utmost bravery, and sustained a loss comparatively small, if the length of the action and the numbers of the foe are considered. In the evening of that day, application was made to Nana and Sindia, for an undisturbed retreat of the army to Bombay; this was granted, upon the humiliating terms, that Salcot, and every other acquisition by the Bombay Government since the time of Mahderow, should be given up, and that orders should be sent to Colonel Goddard, to return with his army to Bengal. It is true the Committee \* who governed that army, gave an express declaration, in writing, that they had not the power to bind the Supreme Council to the observance of these terms, and the Maratta Chiefs know it was so.

By this fatal check the honour of the British arms was tarnished, the cause of Ragobah Row given up; and, had the treaty been valid, all our conquests upon the Malabar coasts ceded to the Marattas. That the corps which took the field from Bombay, was strong enough to resist the united force of the Maratta empire, is beyond a doubt; that it was able to surmount every obstruction which the suddenly-collected army of the Marattas could have thrown in its way, is highly probable, (since two of our

\* The Council of Bombay, on the 4th of November, appointed Mr. Carac, Colonel Egerton, and Mr. Mofyn, a Committee to carry their plan into execution; this was called the Peace Committee. Mr. Mofyn died during the expedition.

battalions, with four field pieces, in February, 1780, put twenty thousand of their best troops under Madajee Sindia to the rout) but that by waiting for the junction of General Goddard's army, every possibility of a failure would have been avoided, cannot be disputed.

Colonel Goddard, when he was about three hundred miles from Surat, and the same distance from Poona, received an order from the Poona Committee to return to Bengal, without any notice being taken of the disaster, and retreat of the Bombay army; after mature reflection, he determined, notwithstanding this order, to advance towards Surat. On his march, a Vackeel from the Maratta ministers arrived in his camp, with a copy of the convention. Colonel Goddard denied that the Committee had any authority over him, and said that he was directed to march to Bombay for the security of the Company's possessions against the designs of the French, and that he should prosecute his march. He effected his arrival at Surat on the 18th of February, 1779.

Sir Eyre Coote arrived in Bengal on the 27th of March, 1779; the Supreme Council was then complete, and the Governor General at the first assembly of the Board, although they had not received a full account of the transactions at Bombay, proposed that we should, if possible, conclude a lasting peace with the Marattas, upon the terms of Colonel Upton's treaty. His proposal was unanimously agreed to, and Colonel Goddard appointed the minister of this Government.



The Supreme Council were, as unanimous in disavowing the convention of Worgaum, concluded by the Poona Committee; but, anxious for peace with the Marattas, and on a supposition that the gentlemen of Bombay might not heartily co operate with them, Colonel Goddard was instructed to use his utmost endeavours to effect a reconciliation. All these resolutions were moved by the Governor General; no member of the Board proposed to avow the convention of Worgaum; upon what grounds therefore hath Mr. Hastings singly been charged as the author of the second Maratta war?

Colonel, now General, Goddard, when he had received his instructions, communicated his appointment to the ministers at Poona; and they deputed a Vackeel to negotiate a treaty of peace with him. Before this Vackeel arrived at Surat, Ragobah had made his escape from the officers of Sindia, who had charge of his person, and were conveying him to a place of confinement. He fled to Surat, and General Goddard agreed to give him personal protection; informing the ministers at Poona of this unexpected event. The Vackeel arrived at Surat—received our proposals—returned to Poona, and promised to forward a categorical answer in three weeks. After some delays, during which time General Goddard received intelligence that the ministers were negotiating a treaty with Hyder Ally, and making every preparation for war, the Vackeel returned to Surat, with the only terms on which the Marattas would consent to a peace. These were, that we should cede  
Salfette

Salfette to them, and deliver up the person of Rago-  
bah Kow; Thus were the efforts of the Supreme  
Council disappointed. Can this disappointment be  
attributed to a want of zeal for an accommodation,  
either in the Governor General or General God-  
dard?

General Goddard at the same time received intel-  
ligence, that an alliance had been concluded at  
Poona, between Hyder Ally, the Marattas, Nizam  
Ally Cawn, and Moodajee Boosla. By the principal  
article of it, the Marattas, under Madajee Sindia  
and Tukajee Holkar, were to act against General  
Goddard in Guzzerat; Hyder Ally was to invade  
the Carnatic; the Nizam the Northern Circars, and  
Moodajee Boosla, Bengal. The truth of this intel-  
ligence has since been fatally confirmed. The Ni-  
zam, the projector of the treaty, acted the part  
which he did, in revenge; for the Presidency of Fort  
St. George having concluded an alliance with his  
brother, Bazalet Jung, by which they acquired pos-  
session of the Guntoor Circar; and Hyder Ally  
Cawn very strongly expressed his disgust at our ac-  
quisition of that Circar. This business will doubt-  
less be fully investigated; and it is foreign from my  
subject to take any farther notice of it here. Moo-  
dajee Boosla was very unwillingly drawn in to take a  
part against us. Of this there cannot be a doubt,  
as he regularly kept the Governor General informed  
of the designs which were formed against us, and  
purposely delayed the march of his army until the  
season of action should be past, with the hope that

in the last rains our differences with the Marattas would have been accommodated. The Nizam has hitherto been inactive, though the original projector of the confederacy.

The army at Surat was strengthened by detachments from Bombay and Fort St. George, and General Goddard was furnished with discretionary orders, should the treaty with the Marattas prove abortive. He took the field in December, 1779; and soon after concluded a treaty with Futy Sing Guicawar, by which the extensive province of Guzzerat was equally divided between the East-India Company and him. He immediately advanced towards Ahmedabad, the capital of that part of Guzzerat which was in the possession of the Marattas. This place our troops took by storm; a conquest which added greatly to the splendour of our arms. In three months he entirely subdued the whole province. Madajee Sindia, who had assembled the Maratta forces, was marching with an intent to relieve Ahmedabad, not supposing that we should so soon be in possession of it. General Goddard, leaving a garrison in this place, advanced towards the Maratta army to offer them battle; which, notwithstanding their great superiority of numbers, and the unfortunate event of the Bombay expedition, which must naturally have elated them, their General declined upon every occasion.

So anxious was General Goddard, knowing the good consequence of engaging the Maratta army, that on the 2d of April, 1780, he left his army on  
their

their ground, and advanced to storm the enemy's camp at the head of two hundred Europeans, ten companies of grenadier Sepoys, three battalions of Sepoys, two twelve and ten six-pounders, with the first regiment of Cavalry and the Candahar horse; with this force, so greatly inferior to the troops that retreated before the Maratta army the preceding year, he advanced, passed their principal guards, and instantly attacked the main body drawn up ready to receive him. Our artillery did great execution amongst their numerous cavalry, and in an hour from the commencement of the action they retreated, after a considerable loss; nor did a single horseman appear to molest our army in its return to camp. Every action of this campaign was equally glorious to our arms. Captain John Campbell, of the Bengal establishment, was detached with a foraging party to a considerable distance from their camp; and on his return with a large convoy of provisions, he was attacked by Sindia at the head of twenty thousand men, the flower of the Maratta army. Captain Campbell formed his detachment, consisting of two battalions of Sepoys, and four field pieces, to the best advantage, repulsed the Marattas, who lost between five and six hundred men, many of whom were killed by the fire of the flank companies of our line. Captain Campbell, after this remarkable action, joined General Goddard without the loss of a man, or of any part of his convoy. Lieutenant Welsh, of the Bengal establishment, was detached by General Goddard on the 3d of May,

May, to surprize a body of six thousand Marattas ; His force consisted of the first regiment of cavalry and a battalion of Sepoys. Lieutenant Welch, when he had performed half his march, found, by calculating the time which remained, that if he waited for his infantry, he should not arrive before day break in the enemy's camp. He therefore came to the spirited resolution of advancing at the head of the cavalry only ; with this force he entered the Maratta camp, and seized the enemy's cannon, which he turned upon them in their flight. The rout was general. The commanding officer and a great number of the Marattas were killed ; and the artillery, bazar, ammunition, &c. fell into our hands. No victory could be more decisive ; and this officer had the good fortune soon after to get possession of two forts, which intirely completed the conquest of Guzzerat.

Major Forbes, of the Bengal establishment, at the head of two battalions of Sepoys, effectually surprized and routed a body of 7000 Marattas, and with this action closed the campaign of 1780, both parties retiring to winter quarters for the rainy season. General Goddard commenced the present campaign by the conquest of the important fort of Bassin, and by a decisive victory over the Maratta army, which had been sent to relieve the place. The Marattas themselves deeply feel the loss of this important fortress, which they had taken from the Portuguese after a siege of two years.

I now return to the transactions in Bengal, where the measures proposed by Mr. Hastings were attended with the most brilliant advantages.

When

When the Governor General found, by General Goddard's dispatches, that we had no hopes of an accommodation with the Marattas, he concluded that the only mode of bringing them in one campaign to reasonable terms would be by attacking them in every quarter; for this purpose he entered into a treaty with the Rana of Gohid, an independent prince, whose country had been invaded by them. Mr. Hastings's motives for entering into this alliance were, to distress the Marattas, by making a considerable diversion in one of their best provinces, in conjunction with the Rana's forces, and, if possible, to acquire possession of the important fortrefs of Guzlier. But he had another view, which would effectually have humbled the Marattas, and in which he must have succeeded, if the distracted state of our Government, and the continual reports of his dismissal from his station, had not deterred the Rajahs dependent upon them from entering into a closer connection with us.

The principal revenues and resources of the Marattas arise from the annual tribute paid to them by the Rajahs of Oudepore, Joudpore, Zeynagur, Bopaul, Narva, Bundelcund, &c. &c. These Princes, who take every opportunity of evading their payments, had now a fair opportunity of shaking off their dependance. And had the Government of Bengal been at liberty to have exerted itself at this time, or had not an idea of a change of men and measures unhappily been industriously propagated throughout  
Indostan,

Indostan, the Maratta war would have been concluded upon our own terms many months ago.

I will now proceed to relate the important consequences, which were produced by our alliance with the Rana of Gohid, small as his dominions may be. When the treaty was concluded, the Marattas were in possession of the best part of his country. Major Popham, at the head of 2000 Sepoys, 40 European artillery, a body of 120 horse, and 4 field pieces, six-pounders, marched to his assistance. With this little army, he in a few months drove the Marattas out of the Rana's country, pursued them, and entirely conquered one of their provinces, producing an annual revenue of six lacks of rupees. In the course of this service he took several forts, beat up the Maratta camp; nor were all the efforts of above 15,000 Marattas able to oppose the success of his gallant little army. The most important action still remains to be related. When Major Popham's detachment had cantoned for the rains, Mr. Hastings proposed to him to make an attempt upon Gualier. He knew this place to be so strong, that it never could be taken by regular approaches; and he knew too, that the enemy, confident in the natural strength of the place, would be more liable to be surprized. The importance of the conquest may be well conceived when it is known, that by all ranks of men in all ages, this place has been denominated, The impregnable Fortress of Gualier. As such, Colonel Dew speaks of it in several parts of his History of Indostan.

In a country where we retain our authority, by an opinion which the natives have, not only of our superior genius for war, but also our good fortune, such a conquest, at such a time, would be equal to the most decisive victory in the field. I believe there was not a man in Bengal who differed in opinion with Mr. Hastings as to the importance of this place; but I well remember when the treaty with the Rana of Gohid was concluded, the impossibility of our getting possession of Gualier was frequently mentioned. Major Popham, who by the surprize of this place, has acquired immortal honour in India, had the good fortune to receive some important information from a party of Mewattes, who had found means to enter the place by night at different times.

He employed spies to examine the place where these men had entered, and from their report conceived the design to be possible. In compliance with Mr. Hastings's repeated solicitations, and guided by his own judgment, he made every preparation for the attempt with the utmost secrecy, only two persons being privy to it. The night before the execution of it, he wrote to the Governor General, informed him that the attempt was to be made early the next morning, and he hoped in case of failure, that Mr. Hastings would do him the justice to say, it was at his desire that he had undertaken an enterprize, which, if it failed, would be denominated rash and impracticable; if it succeeded, would redound as much to the honour of the Governor General, by



whose advice it was undertaken, as of those by whom it was executed. The success was equal to the spirit and prudence of the action; it was taken on the 4th of August, 1780, and that with the trifling loss of 20 Sepoys wounded.

It is impossible to describe the dependency of the Marattas upon this important event. The whole country adjoining to Gualier was immediately evacuated by their troops, and our military reputation proportionably raised. This was the favourable moment for us, and if Mr. Hastings could have profited by it, as he wished to have done, the power of the Marattas in India would have sunk at once. Mr. Hastings, previous to the capture of Gualier, had proposed to form a strong detachment in Gohid, for the purpose of advancing into the province of Malwa, the country of Sindia, the Maratta general. In this the Governor General was over ruled; although he had every reason to believe, that in the conduct of that branch of administration he was to meet with no opposition. If the detachment had been formed, as Mr. Hastings had proposed, the capture of Gualier ensured us the utmost success in its operations.

General Goddard had earnestly pressed the Governor General and Council to invade the province of Malwa, which would have diverted the attention of Sindia from Guzerat; and one campaign would have finished the war with honour and advantage on our side. An event which no Member of the Board more earnestly wished to see accomplished than

Mr.

Mr. Hastings; particularly as Hyder Ally Cawn had, in July, 1780, invaded the Carnatic, where our forces were utterly unprepared to receive him.

On the 19th of September an express arrived in Calcutta from the Secret Committee of Fort St. George, informing the Supreme Council that the flower of their army had been cut off or taken prisoners by Hyder Ally, and that Sir Hector Munro, with the part of the forces under his command, had retreated to the mount with the loss of his baggage and part of his artillery. This intelligence was accompanied by advice that a considerable French fleet, with land forces on board, were on their way to India.

This important intelligence left little room for deliberation, and at the first meeting of the Board, the Governor General proposed that Sir Eyre Coote should be requested to take the command of the army at Madras. That a reinforcement of Europeans should be sent to the coast by sea, with a supply of fifteen lacks of rupees; and that a large detachment of Sepoys should be formed to march to the Carnatic as soon as the season would permit. That an instant offer of peace should be made to the Marattas upon terms so advantageous to them, as almost to ensure their acceptance of them. The season was so far advanced that the embarkation of troops would be attended with difficulty and danger. But the Governor General, justly considering that every

risque was to be run, when probably the very existence of the Company would depend upon their arrival, despised every inferior consideration. Mr. Francis opposed the embarkation of the troops, and would only agree to seven lack of rupees being sent from Bengal. However, all these motions were carried by the majority: and Sir Eyre Coote, with six hundred and forty Europeans, fifteen lacks of rupees, and a great supply of provisions arrived at Madras, in less than two months, computed from the return of the army under Sir Hector Munro, at the mount on the 14th of September, to the arrival of the last ship of the fleet, the Duke of Kingston, at Fort St. George, on the 5th of November. It will undoubtedly reflect great honour upon Mr. Hastings and Sir Eyre Coote, that they had spirit enough to afford such extraordinary aids to the Presidency of Fort St. George, at a season in which the navigation from Bengal to Madras had hitherto been interdicted on account of the dangers which attended it.

I have related as briefly and as clearly as I was able, the rise and progress of the Maratta war, from the 12th of December, 1777, to the close of the year 1780. Upon what ground or suggestion this war can be attributed to Mr. Hastings, let every man judge who reads this account.

The occasion of the war was planned and executed without the knowledge or previous consent of the Governor General, who had another participation in

It than by providing, by an extraordinary exertion, for the support of the measures undertaken by the Presidency of Bombay if they succeeded, and for its preservation if they failed. The Court of Directors have warmly approved of the exertions made by the Government of Bengal. Colonel Goddard arrived seasonably for the preservation of Bombay, and for the redemption of the national honour, which had without it been irretrievably lost. Our successes in every part, after the Marattas had rejected all reasonable terms of accommodation, gave the Governor General the strongest hopes of speedily terminating it by such advantages as should have amply recompensed the Company for the expences which had attended it, and the calamities with which it had commenced. In the midst of our successes, another and more interesting occasion called for the exertion of the Government of Bengal. The preservation of Fort St. George depended upon their resolutions. The misfortunes upon the coast cannot be attributed to Mr. Hastings. If the general opinion is to have weight, the invasion of the Carnatic might have been prevented by the assembly of our army in the month of June. If the confession of the Nizam to Mr. Holland may be credited, (and it is confirmed by the evidence of the most public notoriety) that invasion was the sole effect of a confederacy formed at his instigation, and dictated by his resentments of the infringements made by the Select Committee of Fort St. George on his rights obtained by the treaty

treaty subsisting between him and the Company, and his natural apprehension of hostilities, intended by that government against him.

When Mr. Hastings proposed to conclude a treaty of peace with the Marattas, he recommended to the Board to form the treaty in Calcutta, to send it executed by the Supreme Council, to Moodajee Boodee, the Rajah of Berar, who had repeatedly offered himself as mediator between our Government and the Marattas. This treaty was rejected, and the reason was obvious; Hyder Ally Cawn had cut off a third of our army. He had taken Arcot, when he was proclaimed Nabob of the Carnatic. He had boasted, that he would prevent the English army from moving from the Mount, and that he was to be joined in a month by 3000 French regulars from the Islands, when he would commence the siege of Fort St. George. The French fleet, six sail of the line and five frigates, appeared on the coast of Coromandel. Under these circumstances, the Marattas deeming our situation a desperate one, rejected all treaty, except upon the most disgraceful terms to us.

Sir Eyre Coote took the field on the 2d of January, 1781. On his march to Pondicherry, he repeatedly offered battle to Hyder Ally Cawn.

His detachments were upon all occasions successful, against every superiority of numbers. The army under his command was the finest that ever took the field in India; in point of discipline and numbers, and completely provided with artillery and military stores. The men were eager to revenge the late de-  
feat

feat and destruction of their companions. The French fleet, after appearing off Madras, on the 29th of January, went off without even making an attempt to destroy the ships in that road, in which they must have succeeded. The fleet had not a single soldier on board, except their marines, and on a report that Sir Edward Hughes was returning from Bombay to the coast of Coromandel, quitted the coast on the 16th of February, and returned to the islands. In addition to the army under the command of Sir Eyre Coote, Colonel Pearle was advancing from Bengal with ten battalions of Sepoys and twenty pieces of cannon. This force would arrive in the neighbourhood of Madras in the month of June.

The Marattas at the commencement of this campaign, had been defeated in a general action by General Goddard, who the day after took the fort of Bassin. Lieutenant Colonel Camac, advancing at the head of twelve battalions of Sepoys to the province of Malwa, has had the good fortune to gain a complete victory against an army of 30,000 men, commanded by Sindia in person, the effect of which must be greatly beneficial to General Goddard's designs. Gualier was garrisoned by our troops, and by that means a safe communication was preserved with the dominions of our ally the Vizier. Our forces in Bengal were so stationed, as to prevent all danger from an invasion, should it be attempted. These favourable circumstances make an honourable peace with the Marattas a probable event.

In this review of the rise and progress of the Maratta war, let it be remembered, that the main design of marching an army across India, was not to assist the Presidency of Bombay in the execution of their original plan, but to support them in the consequences of it to us, and to protect the interests of the East-India Company from the effects of a connection well known to be formed between the ruling member of the Maratta state and the avowed agent of the King of France. General Goddard very opportunely arrived at Surat for the preservation of Bombay. The Governor General, who saw in as strong a light as any other member of the Board, the disadvantages even of a successful war with the Marattas, (however great the necessity might be of relieving our military reputation) should the operations be continued beyond one campaign, proposed to them the most equitable terms of peace; and in a letter which he himself drew up to the Committee at Bombay, the Supreme Council observe, " Having given full powers to Colonel Goddard to negotiate and conclude a peace with the Marattas, we have only to repeat, that we look to the issue of that commission as our primary object, and the termination of all our political views on your side of India, if it prove successful." To Colonel Goddard, the Board observe, " Our first desire is to obtain peace."

When Ragonaut Row had escaped from Madajee Sindia, and had joined General Goddard, who consented to give him personal protection, the Supreme Council

Council approve of its being continued to him, provided he shall "not attempt to defeat the effect of your negotiations, to which you are to give your entire attention without regard to any other consideration." With such proofs of Mr. Hastings's sincere disposition to accommodate our differences with the Marattas, what are the grounds to suppose he was less inclined to a pacification than Mr. Francis, or any other member of the Board? The Governor General was not at all involved in the disgrace which the gentlemen of Bombay had incurred by their ill-timed expedition; on the contrary, the Court of Directors had conveyed to him, by an express over land, their approbation of the part which he had taken in their affairs. The answer of the Poona Durbar to our proposals was conveyed in few words. "They would only consent to a peace on these conditions: That we should give up the person of Ragobah, and cede the island of Salsette to them." Was it even proposed by any member of the Supreme Council to purchase a peace by such concessions? It was not. The war was therefore a war of necessity on our part; and from this moment it ought to have been prosecuted with the utmost vigour. Thwarted and opposed as the Governor General was, the brilliant successes which have attended our arms will fully prove what our Government when united may be capable of.

That I might not break in upon the narrative of the Maratta war, I have passed over the other transactions of Government during that period. The



resolution to commence hostilities against the French, on the 7th of July, 1778, before any regular advices of a rupture had been received from England, reflects honour upon every member of the Supreme Council in proportion to the responsibility which each incurred by so spirited a measure. The celerity with which two ships of 40 guns each were fitted out, and joined Sir Edward Vernon before Pondicherry, arriving there against the monsoon, in less than two months from the day when they were ordered to be equipped, the plan formed for the defence of the river, when the destination of the Toulon fleet was unknown, the reinforcements ordered to be raised for the army, the disposition of our forces, and the assembly of the militia, are substantial proofs of the attention of the Governor General and Council to the preservation of the valuable empire committed to their charge, and the spirit which animated all ranks of men living under their Government.

Why the French missed so favourable an opportunity of attacking us on the Malabar coast we know not, but it would have been a very poor satisfaction to his country if Mr. Hastings had stopped the march of the army destined for the preservation of Bombay, at so critical a period, either on account of the expence attending it, or to add still more to the security of Bengal, already well secured, if that place had been attacked the following year. The majority of the Supreme Council therefore determined at this time, that their army should advance; and the Governor General had the strongest and best  
founde

founder expectations of carrying the projected alliance with Moodajee Boosla into execution ; which was intended effectually to preclude the French nation from territorial possessions in every part of India.

The temporary agreement between the Governor General and Mr. Francis, and the extraordinary event it produced, are facts, the elucidation of which is disagreeable. Certain it is some agreement was made as to the conduct of the war, as certain that Mr. Hastings, as well before as in the meetings which he had with Mr. Francis, insisted, that as the whole responsibility of the war with the Marattas was, by Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler, thrown upon him, he should have the entire conduct of it, and as certain that the persons in Mr. Hastings's confidence understood that was agreed to.

The Governor General's plan for carrying on the war was confessedly the best that could have been proposed. The operations of a small army the last campaign had put us in possession of an extensive country, had considerably added to our military reputation ; and during the rains, that very season in which Mr. Francis contended nothing could be done, Major Bopham took the important fortress of Gualier. By Mr. Francis's opposition to the Governor General's plan, our army, which was formed the last campaign, was distressed for pay, and continued inactive, when it might have moved with great effect : that army which must have so completely divided the forces and the attention of the Marattas, and made us successful in every quarter.

The plan which Mr. Hastings proposed for carrying on the Maratta war exactly corresponded with one drawn up by an excellent officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Upton, of whom Mr. Francis himself had the highest opinion. This gentleman had travelled to Poona by land, and his sentiments were certainly a strong confirmation of the propriety of the Governor General's propositions. The great expences of the war are doubtless to be lamented; but there are seasons when great expences are absolutely necessary; nor can a Government, like ours, hope to be secure, if in time of war we are contented to guard our frontier only. This we must do at a considerable expence, and with the loss of reputation; but by invading the dominions of our enemies, we have kept them at home, we have deprived them of resources for carrying on the war, we have infused such a degree of spirit into the native troops in our service, that they look upon themselves as invincible when headed by British officers; and the conquests which we have made would have amply repaid us for all our expences, had the invasion of the Carnatic not taken place.

The Governor General would have had no difficulty in extending the influence of the Company through all the countries now dependent upon the Marattas, if the native powers of India had had the same opinion of the continuance of his authority, as was universally entertained of his superior abilities and good fortune. But unfortunately, Mr. Hastings notwithstanding his utmost efforts, could ne-

nor efface those ideas which had so generally been conceived from Benares to Dehly, and in the Decan, of his speedy removal from the Government of Bengal.

Before Sir Eyre Coote's arrival, it was universally given out by the friends of Mr. Francis, that he would undoubtedly take a decided part against Mr. Hastings. These declarations so often repeated, made a deep impression upon our allies, and were attended with very serious consequences. I will mention one that immediately occurs to me.

When our military establishment was considerably increased, in consequence of the war with France, Mr. Hastings thought it reasonable that Cheyt Sing, the Raja of Benares, and a vassal of the Company, should pay a proportion of an expence incurred for our common defence. This he fixed at five lacks of rupees per annum, and the Raja was with some difficulty prevailed upon to advance this sum, but he positively refused to continue the payment beyond the first year; and in this resolution he was confirmed by a knowledge of Mr. Francis's sentiments, who disapproved of any compulsion being used for the continuance of the payment. The intrigues of the Raja's Vackeel in Calcutta, previous to the General's arrival, were very well known; but as Sir Eyre Coote supported the authority of the Governor General, the Raja was obliged, not only to pay five lacks of rupees for another year, but in addition to it, the expences incurred by the march of two battalions to Benares, for the purpose of enforcing the payment.

payment, if he should continue obstinate. If the Rajah had not received the most positive assurances from his agent at Calcutta, that Mr. Francis was on the point of succeeding to the Government, he never would have reduced Mr. Hastings to the necessity of taking so violent a measure, for the support of his own authority and the Company's interests.

If the expectation of a change in Bengal had been productive of no effects more detrimental to the public service than the contemptible opposition of the Raja of Benares, it had been fortunate; but independent of the great relaxation of Government in our own provinces, which was, and always must be the consequence of it, such an expectation very essentially interfered with the only plan by which the Maratta war could be brought to a speedy and successful termination. The Rajas of Jaynagar, Narva, Bundelcund, &c. were all, I can affirm from the best authority, eager to throw off their dependence upon the Marattas; the slightest assistance from us would have enabled them to do it. The successful operations of Major Popham's little army has very probably produced this effect, if a peace is not yet concluded.

Our political influence was extended immediately upon Mr. Hastings's accession to the chair. Every power in India has an agent in Calcutta; and these men regularly transmit to their principals the intelligence of the day. Influenced by the intelligence thus received, they have universally dreaded, and expected Mr. Hastings's removal, and have been  
deterred

deterred from taking part with so unsteady a Government.

Mr. Francis will excuse me for observing that he is responsible for the fatal consequence which followed, from the opinion of a change in the Government being so universal. The paragraphs of the general letters, from the direction which reflected most severely upon Mr. Hastings, were industriously circulated; Mr. Francis, in the most unreserved manner, expressed his certainty of succeeding him in a few months, nor could all the efforts of Mr. Middleton at Lucknow, or Mr. Graham at Benares, obviate the bad effects which such positive declarations produced throughout Indostan. I affirm, nothing can be so detrimental to the interests of the British nation in India, as a divided or unsettled administration in Bengal; and whatever system the Court of Directors may adopt in future, or whomsoever they may think proper to employ, they ought to give the ruling members every public support in their power. The hands of Government should be strengthened by every possible means. Prosperity attended the confidence which they placed in Mr. Hastings; and reverse of fortune, the diminution, or more properly the annihilation of his authority.

I now beg leave to offer a few remarks upon the state of our affairs in India.

Our situation is indeed so very alarming, that there are many men who will believe, and many more who will affect to believe them irretrievable; I must confess that it will require all the abilities, the integrity, and the firmness of the Governor General, with

with every possible degree of support that can be given from home, to restore Bengal to its former prosperity; but that Mr. Hastings will effect this, if he is treated with that confidence which his great and important services entitle him to expect, I have not the smallest doubt.

What was our situation in Bengal, when Mr. Hastings arrived there in 1772; and what is it at this time? To bring this subject to one point of view, I must recapitulate what I have already observed. At the former period, the Company's debt at interest was above one hundred and twenty lacks. The Court of Directors the season before had been drawn upon for one hundred and twenty lacks. There was no prospect of providing future investments but by an increase of the bond debt, as our civil and military expences were barely defrayed by the annual revenues. In one year only what a change was effected. The alliance with Sujah Dowlah brought such an ample supply of treasure into Bengal, that every service was fully provided for, and the bond-debt reduced. Until this period, our foreign connections only served to accelerate the ruin of our provinces, by draining them of the little specie that remained in them.

No one good effect was experienced from our alliance with Sujah Dowlah, before Mr. Hastings's accession to the chair; an entire brigade kept at Allahabad, which was paid by the exportation of silver from Bengal, was a ruin.

A very considerable sum was saved by the reduction of the stipends paid to the Nabob and his ministers.

ministers. In this particular, where the interest of the Company was concerned, Mr. Hastings paid a particular attention to the orders of the Court of Directors. At the season when the Supreme Council arrived, our investment was so considerably increased, that two extra ships, the *Araon* and the *Northumberland*, were sent home. The following year we obtained a clear additional revenue of twenty-four lacs from Benares, and the expence of at least a third of our army was defrayed by the Vizier. These beneficial advantages are the result of Mr. Hastings's treaty of 1773; a treaty which the majority of the Supreme Council decried in all its parts the first month of their arrival. China, Bombay, and Madras, have been supplied with treasure to a very considerable amount; and the annual investment from 1774 to 1779, was considerably above a million sterling each year. The bond-debt was entirely paid off, and a large balance of cash in our treasury. I had forgot to mention the erection of public granaries, by which the return of famine, which so depopulated that country, is totally prevented.

A series of events which I have already related brought on the Maratta war; a war in Europe obliged us to increase our military establishment very considerably, to provide a marine force, to reinforce Sir Edward Vernon, and for the defence of the river. These exertions were attended with additional expence, but they were absolutely necessary, and have been fully approved of at home. The French, contrary to their usual policy, missed the



fairest opportunity which they ever could have had to regain their influence in India. Why they were so remiss we know not; but what would Mr. Hastings have deserved, had he taken no steps to counteract their intrigues at Poona, and in consequence of them, two regiments and a hundred French officers had landed at Choule. When our successes against the Marattas gave us every reason to expect an honourable peace, the Carnatic was invaded. This was a fresh demand upon Bengal for men, money, and provisions. The exertions of the Governor General and Sir Eyre Coote, have saved Fort St. George. After so many great drains from our treasury, after supporting an expensive war against the Marattas, and affording Bombay such effectual assistance in cash, provisions, and stores, after doubling our investment for many years, that debt which, when Mr. Hastings came to the chair, was above one hundred and twenty lacks, was, on the 15th of December last, only sixty-six lacks of current rupees, and we had eighty-eight lacks of goods in the Company's warehouses.

I have already stated my reasons for supposing that we are now at peace with the Marattas. An accommodation with Hyder Ally, or his entire overthrow, must soon follow. When these events have taken place, our military establishment may be considerably reduced; the Presidency of Bombay must support its expences from the revenues arising from their late acquisitions. The Carnatic cannot recover itself for many years. Before its invasion, the country was almost ruined, and the Nabob either  
wanted,

wanted, or pretended to want, money for his private expences.

The Government of Bengal must supply Bombay and Madras with cash, as it has constantly done, if their own resources are inadequate to their disbursements. And from the revenues of Bengal must the interest of their bond debts be paid. This I contend can easily be done, if some care is taken to prevent Bengal from being unnecessarily drained of its specie, and if foreign trade is properly encouraged. To effect these points, the Court of Directors must fix upon some equitable mode, by which the private fortunes of their servants can be remitted to England. At present they are under an absolute necessity either of sending their fortunes home in cash, which is ruinous to Bengal, or of lending their money to foreigners, by which means the Company's sales in England must be essentially injured.

If foreigners should once be under the necessity of bringing bullion to Bengal to purchase cargoes, such a flow of treasure to our exhausted provinces would amply compensate for a trifling diminution of the public sales in England; and if the Company's servants are restricted from lending money to foreigners, they must either bring bullion to Bengal, or relinquish the trade altogether. I can say, from my own knowledge, that it is from necessity, not choice, the Company's servants supply them with cash. But an equitable mode of remittance once fixed by the Directors, dismissal from the service should be the punishment of any man who should lend money to foreigners or to foreign companies.

Perhaps the Court of Directors do not know the extent to which this trade is carried on. Four Portuguese ships have sailed from Bengal this year. I came to Lisbon in one of them. Her cargo was valued at five lacks of rupees. The others were still more valuable. Some of these ships were taken up in India; the captains and owners borrowed as much money as they wanted to purchase both ships and cargoes, on the following terms:—The lenders to receive 12 per cent. interest, and two shillings for each current rupée at Lisbon, three months after the arrival of the ship. Prejudicial as this trade may appear to the Directors, it is not half so ruinous to Bengal as the remittance of fortunes in silver would be. The Dutch and Danish Companies, as well as individuals of both nations, have borrowed large sums last year, and the season preceding, upon the terms above mentioned.

The trade to Suez should, if possible, be again opened; it is advantageous to Bengal in every point of view, and can never interfere with the Company's sales in England. Mr. Hastings deserves the highest credit for his encouragement of this trade, and for his attempts to establish a regular communication with our native country by this route. We owe the early capture of Pondicherry entirely to it.

I own I depart from the line of my profession when I presume to hazard opinions upon commercial subjects; but as I have been fifteen years in Bengal, and have not been an unconcerned spectator of the various changes which have happened in that time,  
I may

I may be excused for declaring my sentiments upon a subject of such importance.

Arts, agriculture, and commerce, have greatly increased since my first arrival in India. The riches of Bengal are its manufactures. For them there will always be a market; and while we increase in population, we must increase our manufactures. Mr. Hastings, it must be recollected, succeeded to the Government at a most unfavourable period. The loss by the dreadful famine of 1770 has been estimated at four millions of people; and from my own observations in various parts of Bengal, I do not think this an exaggerated account.

However I may be mistaken when I speak of trade, I will venture to affirm, that our affairs in Bengal are much more alarming in appearance than in reality.

Let us suppose that by the time the war in India is at an end, and a general peace has been established in Europe, the bond debt in Bengal amounts to 200 lacks of rupees \*. This is not so large a sum as was in fact owing when Mr. Hastings came to the chair. The bond debt was then 120, and the Directors had been drawn upon for above 100 lacks of rupees only the season before. I hope it will be recollected that this great debt was contracted in times of the *most profound peace*; and the greatest part of it even before

\* I cannot avoid desiring the attention of the public to this part of my Narrative. It was written on my passage from Bengal to Lisbon in 1781. What I have ventured to foretell, has in a great measure happened — We have peace in India, and our bond debt in Bengal is 200 lacks.

the famine. Dreadful as was that calamity, its effects were more severely felt after Mr. Hastings's accession to the Government than at the time it happened. It is a fact that the collections in the year of the famine, and the year after, were higher than in either of the two preceding ones.

The interest of 200 lacks of rupees will be 16 lacks a year. All our establishments upon a peace will be considerably reduced; and if the Governor General is properly supported, the Government of Bengal will acquire a vigour, to the want of which, and not to the Maratta war, we owe our present misfortunes.

To pay the interest of this debt, let us examine our funds, and compare them with those of 1772. I will suppose the actual collections from Bengal, Bahar, and Orixas, to be only what they were at that period.

The savings under the different heads of tribute to the King, stipends to the Nabob, his ministers and dependants, are at least 50 lacks of rupees a year.

The Vizier pays 70 lacks of rupees annually towards our military expences.

We shall receive annually from Cheyt Sing, 24 lacks of rupees.

When our dominions and our influence, at least an influence advantageous to the Company, were bounded by the banks of the Carumnassa, our military expences were 105 lacks of rupees a year.

Our connection with Oude, now so profitable, was a most disadvantageous one before Mr. Hastings arrived in Bengal. To the Company it was ruinous, although

although it answered the interested purposes of certain individuals perfectly well.

Can one good reason be given for the very curious deputation to Sujah Dowlah in 1768, against the opinion of Mr. Verelst, at that time the Governor of Bengal? or for keeping the third brigade at Allahabad until the middle of the year 1769, at the Company's expence?

The transactions of that period are worthy the public attention — I may enlarge upon them hereafter.

At a peace our military expences can and will be reduced to 110 lacks of rupees a year.

The interest of our debt, supposing it 200 lacks, will be 16 lacks a year.

When Mr. Hastings came to the Government, the Company owed something more than 120 lacks.

Upon comparing the accounts of 1771, and they are applicable to a former period, with those at a so-much-wished-for peace, the balance will be 133 lacks a year in favour of the Company, as appears by the following statement :

EXPENCES in 1771.						Rupees.
Military,	—	—	—	—	—	105
Interest of bond debt,		—	—	—	—	10
Paid in tribute, stipends, &c. but retrenched	}					50
by Mr. Hastings,						
Total					—	165
<hr/>						
EXPENCES						

## EXPENCES at A. P. R. C.

	Rupces.
Military, — — — —	110
Interest of debt, — — — —	16
Total, — — — —	126

## Credit in favour of the Company.

Difference of disbursements, — — — —	39
Paid by the Vizier, — — — —	70
By the Raja of Benares, — — — —	24
Total, — — — —	133

While arts, manufactures, and commerce, are encouraged in Bengal; while the natives continue happy under our Government, and attached to it as the great body of the people are; while population increases, as it has done the last seven years, Bengal must be a most valuable country to Great Britain; but it can only yield its tribute by the increase of the annual investment.

Mr. Hastings has been very severely charged with disobedience of orders—Upon this subject I must add a few words. I do not mean to justify the Governor General's conduct by pleading precedent for it, yet I am reduced to the disagreeable necessity of contrasting it with the conduct of his predecessors in power in Bengal.

I affirm

I affirm that it had long been reported, Mr. Hastings was to be dismissed the service, that Mr. Francis was to succeed him; and the reinstatement of Messrs. Bristow, Fowke, and Mahomed Reza Cawn, were connected with Mr. Francis's accession to the Government. This report, circulated for months throughout Indostan, obliged Mr. Hastings to adopt measures which were by no means agreeable to the natural humanity of his temper, or to that regard to the just claims of individuals which he is known to possess. He assigned his reasons to the Directors for keeping them out of office, and if they were not approved, he of course expected to be dismissed from the service. To those who served in India I appeal, whether it is not absolutely necessary to strengthen the hands of Government by every possible means, and to impress the natives with an idea of its stability; That the reinstatement of Mr. Bristow, Mr. Fowke, and Mahomed Reza Cawn, would have had a contrary effect is universally known.

When General Richard Smith was Commander in Chief of the Company's forces in Bengal, and third member of the Secret Committee and the Council, he wrote the following letter to the Secret Committee, 24th November 1767, and forced Mr. Verelst to do an act of greater severity than Mr. Hastings was ever guilty of in the whole course of his political life. I must affirm here, that the East-India Company was saddled with the expence of an establishment of a Supreme Court of Judicature, in consequence of the discussions which this famous letter produced.



" The nature of the intelligence transmitted from  
 " Calcutta to Sujah Dowlah is without limits. The  
 " Nabob is almost as well acquainted with the Par-  
 " liamentary proceedings as I am; how far the im-  
 " portance and dignity of the Company, and the  
 " weight and influence of administration is lessened  
 " in his esteem by such communication, may be easily  
 " conceived. Whilst a Vackeel is so ready and so  
 " sure a channel to communicate intelligence, few  
 " men will be found so hardy as to maintain a direct  
 " correspondence with the Nabob; but there is a  
 " man who has obliquely offered so great an insult  
 " to *our President*, that was I present at the Board, I  
 " would move for the exertion of our authority to  
 " its utmost extent to free the settlement from so  
 " dangerous an inhabitant; I mean Mr. Bolts; and  
 " the inclosed copy of a letter to Mr. Zentil, where  
 " he asserts an absolute falsehood, which tends to  
 " lessen *that essential dignity and necessary influence of*  
 " *our President*, is surely deserving of your severest  
 " resentment."

I approve highly of General Richard Smith's ar-  
 guments; if he had known how *the essential dignity*  
*and necessary influence of Mr. Hastings*, would have  
 been affected by carrying the Director's orders into  
 execution respecting Mr. Bristow, he would upon  
 his own principles have concurred in the disobedience  
 of them, had he been a member of the Supreme  
 Council in December, 1779.

Three poor Armenians, the trading agents of Mr.  
 Bolts, a keen trader himself, who perhaps wanted  
 to

to come in for some share of the plunder of Oudé and Benares, were afterwards seized, and treated with too much rigour. Most men in Bengal attributed General Smith's conduct to private motives. It is strictly justifiable upon public grounds; however I must add in this place, and I can prove it, that our connection with Sujah Dowlah at that time was ruinous to the East-India Company, in as great a degree as it was advantageous to a few individuals in power.

The Directors' most positive orders have been repeatedly disobeyed or evaded during my residence in Bengal. Two very particular instances I will now mention.

As soon as the Court of Directors were informed of the salt monopoly of 1765, they sent positive orders to Bengal to abolish it immediately on the receipt of their letter. In defiance of this order, the monopoly was continued almost two years longer, and the profits arising from it were divided amongst the members of the Council, General Richard Smith (Commander in Chief at that time) and the principal civil and military servants in Bengal.

The Directors had positively prohibited their servants in Bengal from drawing upon them except for a certain amount, and a rate of exchange much more favourable than the present. Yet by a resolution of the Council, in October, 1769, bills were drawn upon them at a very unfavourable exchange for the Company, to the amount of one million and sixty thousand pounds sterling. I affirm that three-

fourths of the money paid into the treasury in Calcutta might have been borrowed upon bond until the Directors' pleasure was known.

Let these instances of disobedience be compared with the charges brought against Mr. Hastings.

I will here quote General Richard Smith's sentiments upon the subject of disobedience of orders.

In his minute of the 25th of September, 1769, when he proposed opening the Company's treasury, and to grant bills upon the Directors, he says, "Although the Court of Directors' orders are strong  
" in prohibition, yet I think we shall be *fully warranted* to deviate from those orders, and I do not  
" think I should perform my duty to the Company  
" as a member of their administration, if I did not  
" enter this my opinion upon the public records,"

Upon another occasion, 24th November, 1767, General Richard Smith writes to the Secret Committee, whose orders he was bound to obey in the same degree as Mr. Hastings is those of the Directors. "My zeal for the welfare of the state I serve  
" would, on occasions of great emergency, induce  
" me not only to hazard my commission, but even  
" subject my life and honour to the sentence of a  
" general court-martial, rather than the *public service*  
" should suffer by delay. Whenever I *act contrary*  
" to their orders, it is not that I entertain the most  
" distant idea of disobedience or *independence*, but  
" from a conviction that *at this distance from the Presidency, their orders and the welfare of the state may*  
" *happen, they have happened, to be incompatible; and*  
" *whenever*

“ *whenever I take upon me to deviate from their orders,*  
 “ *it is not from independent authority I presume, because*  
 “ *I know I am totally responsible to them for such a*  
 “ *deviation.*”

This is the language of a sensible man. It is manly language. It is the language of Mr. Hastings; but in the Governor General's case, the arguments operate with ten-fold force, when we consider the situations of Mr. Hastings and General Richard Smith; the former could only receive answers from *his superiors* in fifteen or eighteen months, the latter in as many days.

I will now mention a few essential points in which Mr. Hastings pointedly obeyed the orders of the Directors. He employed Nundcomar by their orders.

He reduced the Nabob's stipend from thirty-two to sixteen lacks of rupees. He abolished nominal pensions to a large amount. He suspended Mahomed Reza Cawn from his office; he brought him to a trial before the Council for his former conduct; and to the justice, the impartiality, and the attention of Mr. Hastings, Mahomed Reza Cawn has always declared, he was indebted for his life, which the villany of Nundcomar would have deprived him of. In November, 1773, Mr. Hastings received the thanks of the Directors for his great attention to their orders, and for his other eminent services.

Soon after the majority of the Supreme Council arrived in Bengal, they asserted that Mr. Hastings had made 40 lacks of rupees, or 400,000*l.* from the  
 revenues

revenues of Bengal, in less than three years. The despicable character of the man on whose information this declaration was grounded; the well-known moderation of Mr. Hastings, his active and vigorous administration, the state of his private fortune at that time, or at present, which any man may know that chooses to inquire, are solid proofs of the falsity and the folly of this assertion. Are the great servants of the Company who preceded Mr. Hastings in high stations, although not in the chair, willing to put their integrity to this test; will they declare the amount of their private fortunes?

I do affirm, that if public and repeatedly asserted declarations have any weight, the amount of the private fortunes of three gentlemen, of high station, who left Bengal in the course of the year 1769, or in January 1770, equalled the amount of all the private fortunes that have been accumulated during Mr. Hastings's government of ten years, from the revenues of Bengal, Bahar, and Orixá, by the civil and military servants of the Company.

If we were to judge from vague reports, what character could be sheltered from calumny. I can recollect perfectly well, that in the year 1768 and 1769, it was universally said in Bengal, that a mint was established at Allahabad; that the good rupees, which were so absurdly sent from Bengal and Bahar to that place, were all recoined into base rupees; called Vizieri; that our troops sustained a very heavy loss by being obliged to receive their pay in this base money. 'That twenty-six lacks of sicca rupees were annually

annually sent from Bengal, for the payment of the King's tribute, but that his Majesty actually received it in silver rupees; and that a very considerable share of the profits arising from this coinage, which was said to be unauthorized by the Governor and Council, centered in the Commander in Chief, General Richard Smith. It does not, however, follow, that this was the fact. I have been long enough in India to know, that men who are deprived of the opportunity of making money themselves, are very apt to exaggerate when they state the advantages of their superiors. It is very possible to investigate this matter thoroughly; and I must observe, that Mr. Hastings has been accused of peculation upon much more slender ground.

Upon the subject of presents received, which was one of the modes by which Mr. Hastings was accused of having made the enormous sum of 400,000*l*. I shall make but one observation:—That, upon a reference to the Governor General's Durbar charges, it will be found he has brought to the Company's credit the sums which he received, and has drawn the amount of the presents he made from the Treasury. This rule was observed, I believe, by his predecessors. In the Consultations of the 8th of December, 1769, and since printed in the Reports of the Secret Committee of 1773, I find, that General Richard Smith made the Mogul, Shaw Allum, a present to the amount of 2000*l*. sterling, *when his Majesty honoured him with a visit* to Sujah Dowlah, Bulwant Sing, and a string of et ceteras. Presents,  
for

for which he received from the Company one lakh, twenty-four thousand six hundred and six Square rupees, or 16,000l. sterling. I do not see the presents which he received in return, brought to account; but if the invariable custom and usage of the country at that time to men of high rank and station was dispensed with, out of delicacy to his feelings, and he received no presents from the King, Sujah Dowlah, &c. his liberality was a very unnecessary waste of the public money.

The execution of Nundcomar has been again brought forward. The ingenious *English* writer of A Letter from Calcutta has, without any foundation, quoted the most respectable authority for calling his death a murder. My observations upon it will be very short.

Nundcomar was employed by Mr. Hastings, on his first arrival in Bengal, at the express desire of the Court of Directors. Mr. Hastings's choice of the man excited very general surprise, as the cause was not known. Nundcomar's villany was detected in the affair of Mahomed Reza Cawn, and Mr. Hastings ceased to employ him. On the arrival of the Supreme Council he gave in the curious information which I have already mentioned. It is remarkable, that when Lord Clive and the Secret Committee of 1765, were invested with all inquisitorial powers, Nundcomar gave in an information against Mr. John Johnston and other servants of the Company, similar to that which he afterwards gave in against Mr. Hastings, and upon a full enquiry, the information

was

was found to be void of the smallest foundation. Mr. Hallings commenced a prosecution against him. The majority, and Mr. Joseph Fowke, visited him in confinement; an attention which, of course, attracted the notice of every man in Indostan, and induced Nundcomar to suppose that he should be protected at all events by the Supreme Council.

I now come to the forgery. In 1762, a Gentoo was condemned to be hanged for this crime. The sentence was respited; and his Majesty was pleased to pardon the criminal; but I believe it was understood that the royal mercy would never again be extended to a similar offender. Be that as it may, Nudcomar, when he committed a forgery many years after this period, accompanied with the most aggravating circumstances, well knew the consequence if he should be detected. A lawyer, in 1772, was said, and truly, I believe, to have received ten thousand rupees for suppressing his knowledge of the affair. Nundcomar was well acquainted with the nature of our laws. He had had a hundred causes before the Mayor's Court at different times. Before his prosecutor complained, he offered to settle the affair for fifty thousand rupees. He repeated the offer after Nundcomar was in jail. Was Nundcomar's refusal supposed to be the result of conscious innocence? Was there a man in Bengal questioned the fairness of his trial, or the characters of the jurymen who found him guilty? Was he not universally deemed the most unprincipled of all the intriguing natives of Bengal? I am not an advocate for the judges; but as a most illiberal and unjust

O

motive



motive has been assigned for their conduct, and their desire to screen Mr. Hastings from the effects of his information, I must assert, and I do it in the most solemn manner, that Mr. Hastings was not concerned, either directly or indirectly, in the apprehension, the trial, or the execution, of Nundcomar.

The judges might have respited the execution of the sentence; I wish with all my heart they had; but something may be urged in their favour upon this head. It was the first grand cause that came before them. I was at Berhampore, about 100 miles from Calcutta, at the time of Nundcomar's trial and execution. It was the common subject of conversation amongst men of all ranks. I have heard the sentiments of several natives, then, and since upon it. At the time, they very generally observed, that Nundcomar, though he was undoubtedly guilty, was too rich a man to be hanged; and since his death, it was said, he depended upon the interference of the Supreme Council, or he would have compromised the affair before his trial. Might not the judges be supposed to have acted as they did, from a desire to impress the natives with an idea of the justice and the impartiality of the Supreme Court? Would not the same set of men, who think Mr. Hastings capable of so villainous an action as influencing the judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature, or those judges of being influenced upon such an occasion; would they not have concluded that Nundcomar, if his execution had been respited, had obtained that favour by improper means?

In

In this review of the transactions in Bengal, I have avoided as much as possible every expression which may be supposed to convey a personal reflection. It is from necessity, not from inclination, that I have been obliged to contrast his conduct with any man's. However strong the provocation may have been, Mr. Hastings has upon all occasions attended solely to his own justification. It has been the fate of the Governor General, whose liberality of sentiment can only be equalled by his moderation, or rather by his contempt of money, to be engaged in a perpetual course of party contention. No man could less merit such a fate. With integrity that has defended him against the most tempting offers of private advantage, with abilities and application that have surmounted greatest difficulties, he has been reduced to the painful necessity of defending himself from the extraordinary charges of private rapacity, and a want of zeal for the interest of his employers. To the first I shall only observe, that he has now been almost ten years at the head of the administration in Bengal, a period much more than sufficient to answer the private views of any man, if to accumulate money was his object. To the last, I shall oppose the very flourishing state in which the Supreme Council found Bengal, and in which it continued, until foreign wars, and what is still worse, a continued opposition to the Governor General, exhausted our treasury, and diminished or almost annihilated the necessary power of Government.

## P O S T S C R I P T.

**T**HE arrival of the Belmont enables me to carry on this review to the 31st of May last,

The Nizam remained inactive. In the latter end of April he expressed his wishes to join us in an alliance against Hyder Ally Cawn. On this account Mr. Holland remained at Hyderabad, although he had intended to quit it on account of his health. The Nizam's conduct is politic. Hyder aspired to the subaship of the Decan, and had applied to the King for sunnuds, through Nuzeph Cawn.

The engagement with the Rajah of Berar promises to be followed with the most important and beneficial effects. Colonel Pearse, in his march through Cuttac, received every assistance he stood in need of from the Naib of that province, and his camp was amply supplied with provisions. It is supposed he would be joined at Ellore by 2000 of the Berar horse; the remainder of that army was on its return to Naigpoore, except that part of it which was to act in conjunction with our forces against Guramundela. It is impossible to detail the negotiation which brought on this agreement, but it reflects great honour upon Mr. Hastings, Mr. Wheeler, who entirely concurred in opinion with him, and Mr. Anderson, through whose agency it was concluded. No chout, as has been represented,

was either given or promised, and our superiority appeared through the whole course of the negotiation.\*

On the same day, the 2d of April, an agreement was signed between the ambassador of the Nabob of Arcot, and the Supreme Council on the part of the Company. By this agreement, the whole revenues of the Carnatic are appropriated for the services of the war. Credit being given to the Nabob's creditors for the actual collections from those districts which had been previously assigned to them. The utility of this agreement will forcibly strike every impartial person.

Lieutenant-colonel Camac's night attack on the camp of Madjee Sindia, was attended with very favourable consequences. Many of the chiefs who were compelled to join him, had come over to us; and an overture for a pacification had secretly been made by Sindia himself. His army was dispersed, except about 7000 horse under Ambajee Punt, which were surprised and totally defeated by Captain Bruce, the officer who had so great a share in taking the fortress of Gualier. These successes and the alliance with Moodajee Boosla gave us the fairest hopes of a speedy accommodation with the Marattas, and their junction with us against Hyder Ally Cawn; events

\* Many severe strictures have been passed upon Mr. Hastings for this agreement: but the men best acquainted with Indian affairs, who have no interest in traducing his character, give him great credit for breaking the grand confederacy formed against us, and securing Colonel Pearse's march, at the trifling expence of sixteen lacks of rupees.

which

which Mr. Hastings most anxiously wishes to accomplish.

Provincial courts of justice had been established, agreeably to the Governor General's plan, and a controul vested in the chief justice. The Company and the natives, after six months experience, have sensibly felt the good effects of this regulation. To the former it is a very considerable saving; to the latter it has insured an impartial, and not an expensive distribution of justice.

The former mode of collecting the revenues has been abolished. An increase of 39 lacks or 390,000*l.* is expected from this regulation, which is Mr. Hastings's plan, formed in 1773, and the propriety of it confirmed by eight years experience of the former defective system.\*

The revenue from salt will be 30 lacks of rupees or 300,000*l.* sterling this year.† The gentleman Mr. Hastings has placed at the head of this business, whose abilities and integrity have never been exceeded in Bengal, has made this declaration, and the authority is incontestible; so that the additional resources from the revenues of Bengal may fairly be estimated for this year at 690,000*l.*

The cargo of the Belmont is valued at 16½ lacks, or 165,000*l.* prime cost; the Neptune, which was obliged to return to Bengal, had 14½ lacks, or 145,000*l.* on board; and there remained in the Company's warehouses in Bengal, goods to the amount of 59 lacks, or 590,000*l.*

\* The latest advices confirm the truth of this estimate.

† Increased to 590,000*l.* in 1782.

The investment for 1781-2 is fixed at 90 lacks, or 900,000*l.* and was providing when the Belmont failed; so that for the ships of this season there will be goods to the amount of 1,600,000*l.* in Bengal.

The Company's dispatches by the Belmont will prove what exertions the government of Bengal is capable of when unanimity reigns in its councils.

On the 6th of July, Sir Eyre Coote gained a decisive victory over the army of Hyder Ally Cawn, and in the following month he was joined by the Bengal detachment, under the command of Colonel Pearse.

#### C O N T I N U A T I O N.

The campaign of 1781, upon the coast of Coromandel was uniformly successful on our part. Hyder Ally was defeated by Sir Eyre Coote in August and September, the important fortress of Negapatnam was taken in November, and Trincomale in the following month. It is no part of my present plan to enter into a particular detail of the operations of our army in the Carnatic. — Sir Eyre Coote received in the course of the campaign the most ample supplies of money and provisions from Bengal, and he attributed his success, in a great measure, to the unwearied exertions of the Governor General and Council, for the support of the Presidency of Fort St. George, and the army under his command.

In the month of April 1781, Mr. Hastings carried into effect a plan which he had projected some time before, for collecting the revenues of Bengal and Bahar. The interference of Europeans in the interior parts of Bengal, and the various abuses heretofore

tofore alledged to have been committed by natives in the service of English gentlemen were effectually prevented. Every encouragement was held out to the Zemindars and farmers to induce them to attend to the cultivation and improvement of their several Zemindaries and farms; and a deduction was allowed to such of them as should pay their rents at Calcutta, (the Sudder.) The plan itself is in fact merely reverting to the system of collecting the revenues as established and practised when the Mogul empire was in its vigour. The three great points which Mr. Hastings had in view, have been most completely answered by the new system. — First, The ease and happiness of the native landholders and farmers: — Second, A retrenchment in the expence of collecting the revenues: — And third, An increase in the amount collected. The actual receipts for the year 1781 exceeded the receipts of the preceding year in the sum of three hundred thousand pounds.\* Another very considerable branch of the Company's revenue in Bengal, was increased by Mr. Hastings to the sum of five hundred and seventy thousand

\* The Select Committee made a report upon this plan in the month of May 1782, before it was possible that its effects could be known. It is something singular that they should condemn Mr. Hastings in the report alluded to, for taking the collections from Europeans, and putting them into the hands of the natives, but in the celebrated Ninth Report of the Select Committee, published the following year, the Government of Bengal is blamed for depriving the natives of every office of honour and emolument, which are stated to be vested in the hands of Europeans.

pounds, and in his opinion is capable of still farther improvement. In order to make this part of my narrative perfectly intelligible, I will state the different alterations which have taken place in the management of the salt revenue. It has been proved by incontrovertible evidence on a former occasion, that the manufacture of salt has invariably been a monopoly, either for the advantage of the state, or for that of individuals. This was the case long before the English possessed power in Bengal. Lord Clive established the monopoly for the benefit of the Company's servants, reserving a duty to the Company producing about one hundred and twenty thousand pounds a year. This scheme was disapproved of in England, and perhaps with reason. The trade in salt was ordered to be laid open, and a trifling duty to be collected upon it. The consequence of this scheme was, that this trade fell into the hands of wealthy individuals, and the duties fell considerably short of the moderate sum the Court of Directors had ordered to be collected. When Mr. Hastings succeeded to the government, he proposed, and it was determined to secure the manufacture of salt for the use of the Company. The scheme answered in some degree ; but after the establishment of the Supreme Council and the unfortunate dissensions which divided the Members, this branch of the revenue had dwindled to a mere trifle.

. In 1780 Mr. Hastings brought forward a scheme for managing the salt revenue, which was adopted at his separate responsibility, and it has answered most



completely. It is a well known fact, that the natives do not pay more for the salt they eat now, than they did in former years, and prohibiting the importation of foreign salt into Bengal, is universally allowed to be a salutary and a wise regulation ; and to this too, in some degree, it is owing that the revenue upon salt has been so exceedingly productive in the two last years. When the importation of salt was permitted, it occasioned a considerable drain of specie from Bengal. The most accurate and authentic accounts that I have been able to procure of the returns made from Bengal by the importers of foreign salt are, that every native merchant bringing foreign salt to Calcutta, expended a fourth part of the produce of his cargo in coarse piece goods, and that the remaining three parts were actually carried from Bengal in specie \*. As it is certain the Company may manufacture salt to a much greater extent than they now do, if there was an increased demand for it, it was surely a politic and a wise measure to prohibit the importation of salt from the Maratta countries, or the Northern Circars. Many People, uninformed upon this subject, may suppose that the monopoly of salt is carried to a much greater length than it really is ; but it is a monopoly only in the first instance, for the monopoly of the salt is limited to the manufacture, and the native merchants, who purchase it from the Company on the spot where it is manufactured, may dispose of it as they please

\* This drain may be fairly computed at ten lacs of rupees a year, through-

throughout the provinces, without being subject to any exactions whatever. The present plan differs most essentially from that established by Lord Clive. There are no European agents dispersed through the interior parts of Bengal, to dispose of salt, either on the Company's account or for the benefit of individuals. The operation is simple and easy. The advantage arises to the Company from the sale of the salt in the first instance, they do not interfere with the fair commercial profit of the merchant, who buys it from them; and it is undoubtedly true, that although the Company clears five hundred and seventy thousand pounds by the plan, the mechanic and husbandman pays no more now for the salt he consumes than he did in former years. The resources of Bengal were increased *above one million sterling* in the year 1782, from this scheme, the new mode of collecting the revenues, and the reduction in the first cost of the investment.

Another branch of revenue, for which the Company is indebted to Mr. Hastings, arises from the monopoly of opium; and this revenue will be considerably encreased in consequence of the late treaty with Holland, which secures to us a free trade to the eastward of Bengal. Opium has always been a monopoly in the first instance; that is, a considerable sum of money must be advanced to the cultivator of the land which produces the poppy; and it requires, on the part of the person who makes the advances, the utmost attention, to prevent the opium being debased before it is packed up for sale. When the country government was in its vigour,

opium was a monopoly in the hands of some one of the most capital native merchants, whose interest it was to send it good and unadulterated to the sea ports of Bengal, for the foreign markets. It often happened, that the monopolist warranted it not only good, but that it should keep for a certain time; under this sanction the trade was carried on formerly, and produced rich returns in gold, and other articles of merchandize, into Bengal.

When the English acquired possession of the Duannee, the trade in opium was nominally laid open, though in fact the monopoly was, in a great measure, confined to our factory at Patna. The opium, however, was much debased from 1765 to 1773, and the trade considerably diminished in consequence. In 1772, when Mr. Hastings came to the government of Bengal, he secured a proportion of this trade for the Company. In 1773, the monopoly was taken into the Company's hands, and became a branch of their revenues. In 1775, it was debated by the Supreme Council, whether the trade should be laid open or not? General Clavering concurred in opinion with Mr. Hastings, that the manufacture of opium must be, what it ever had been, a monopoly.\* All British subjects and natives were invited

to

\* The reflection of the Select Committee on this declaration of General Clavering, is unfounded and unjust. They say it shews the General's opinion of the wretched state of the country. By no means, it was to prevent adulteration, and the loss of a valuable branch of export trade that opium had been a monopoly under the native

to send in proposals for furnishing the Company with opium ; and Mr. Richard Griffith, whose terms were the lowest, obtained the contract. Mr. Mackenzie succeeded Mr. Griffith in 1777, and held the contract till 1781, on terms something more favourable for the Company than the former gentleman had agreed to ; and upon the same terms that it had been granted to Mr. Mackenzie in 1777, it was granted to Mr. Sullivan in 1781. This is the plain and simple state of a transaction which has been most shamefully and indecently misrepresented. The Supreme Council, who had every means of information before them, determined, in 1775, that opium must be a monopoly as it always had been ; Mr. Francis thought very properly, that it would be impolitic to give this contract on too low terms, because it was liable to abuses ; and on the equitable terms settled by Mr. Hastings, General Clavering, Colonel Monson, Mr. Barwell, and Mr. Francis, has it continued from 1775 to the present time. It produces to the Company about eighty thousand pounds a year, and will certainly be much more productive, as the demand for opium will increase considerably, which

Subadars ; and it would not have been in the power of any government whatever to have prevented adulteration, had the monopoly been abolished. The opium of Ghauzipore being manufactured with less care than the Patna opium, fetches an inferior price in all foreign markets. It is the duty of Government to see that the cultivator of the poppy gets a fair and equitable price for his labour ; and this was a sound argument urged by Mr. Francis against vesting the contract in the hands of the Company's servants at Patna, who were the proper checks upon the contractor.

must

must of course increase the price of it. I know of no monopolies in Bengal but those of salt and opium; if they are abolished, the Company will lose a revenue of seven hundred thousand pounds a year, which in all probability is by this time increased to a million; and I defy any man living to assign a single reason for the abolition of these monopolies, or to prove that salt and opium can be manufactured, except by the Company, or by individuals who are able to make very large advances of cash to the manufacturers, and who consequently will divide that profit amongst themselves, which is now secured to the Company, and makes a very considerable branch of their revenues.\*

In the month of July 1781, Mr. Hastings left Calcutta; in order to visit the dominions of the Nabob Vizier of Oude. The insurrection at Benares,

\* I will suppose for a moment, that the ungenerous and the unworthy modes practised by the enemies of Mr. Hastings to decry his character, were retorted by him upon his opponents, what would then be his reflections, or the reflections of his friends, upon the following transaction, I leave the world to guess. When the trade in opium was nominally laid open, it was undoubtedly a monopoly in the hands of the *Chief and Council* of Patna. In the month of July, 1782, when Mr. Robert Gregory was chairman of the Court of Directors, a letter was written by the Court to the Governor General and Council, in which they expressed their displeasure at their conduct, in granting the opium contract to Mr. Sullivan; they expressed their wishes that that, and all other monopolies, might be abolished; and they directed, that Mr. Robert Gregory's son should succeed to the *Chiefship of Patna*, though he was a younger servant than any one of the gentlemen who composed the Council at that place.

seems

seems now so generally understood, that I shall say very little upon the subject. But I desire to submit the following striking facts to the consideration of the public:

1st, That Bulwant Sing, the father of Cheyt Sing, had behaved so treacherously to us in the war with Sujah Dowlah, that the Governor and Council ordered him to be dispossessed of the Zemindary of Benares in 1765, though it was afterwards judged prudent to continue him in the management of that country.

2d, That no instance has ever yet been produced of services rendered to our nation by Bulwant Sing.

3d, That Lord Clive protected him from the vengeance of Sujah Dowlah, and secured to him a degree of independence which he never before possessed.

4th, That upon the death of Bulwant Sing, Cheyt Sing, his son, by a woman of a very low cast, was continued in the Zemindary, through our influence with the Vizier, although by Colonel Harper's account it appears, that Mehipnarain, the present Zemindar, ought by the Hindoo laws to have succeeded Bulwant Sing.

5th, That Mr. Hastings in 1773, procured from the Vizier a confirmation of Cheyt Sing and his posterity in the Zemindary of Benares, of which Bulwant Sing had only been the aumli, or collector.

6th, That

6th, That by the treaty of Lucknow, concluded in 1775, the *sovereignty* of Benares and Ghauzipore, with all the *powers and rights* annexed to it, was transferred from the Vizier to the East-India Company.

7th, That the Supreme Council yielded to Cheyt Sing the Cutwallce and the Mint, and treated him with the utmost indulgence, and stipulated that no demands should be made upon him on account of his annual revenue beyond the sum stipulated.

8th, That when the war with France broke out, Cheyt Sing was called upon to contribute his proportion to the additional expence which the Company, *his Sovereign*, would incur. That he was ordered to maintain three battalions of Sepoys, and the expence fixed at five lacks of rupees a year.

9th, That the propriety of this demand was debated in the Supreme Council, and that Mr. Hastings insisted upon it we had never yielded to Cheyt Sing, *that right, which every government inherently possesses, to compel all its dependencies to contribute by extraordinary supplies, to the relief of extraordinary emergencies.*

10th, That Colonel Harper has proved it to have been the custom of the Zemindar of Benares, to furnish his *quota of troops* to *his Sovereign*, when he was at war. That he gave this in evidence to the Select Committee in 1781, long after it was known in England, that the Supreme Council, as represented in *the Sovereign*, had compelled Cheyt Sing, by *military*

military force, to furnish his *quota* of troops during the war.

11th, That in 1779, and 1780, the Supreme Council compelled Cheyt Sing to pay five lacks each year—that the attention of the Court of Directors and his Majesty's Ministers was particularly called to the subject, because it was mentioned in the general letters of three successive years, but that no mark of disapprobation whatever was expressed, either by his Majesty's Ministers, or the Court of Directors.

12th, That when Sir Eyre Coote was on the point of embarking for the coast, in October 1780, when it was uncertain whether or not Bengal would be invaded by the Marattas, and every exertion on our part was necessary, to preserve the sinking interests of the Company, he laid before the Supreme Council, his plan for covering Bengal and its dependencies from the expected attack of our enemies.

13th, That for the general defence, he proposed Cheyt Sing's cavalry should in this critical hour be put under our orders, to which the Board unanimously agreed.

14th, That Cheyt Sing evaded this demand after promising compliance, precisely in the same manner as he had evaded the payment of the money, after positively promising to pay it.

15th, That Cheyt Sing never disputed the right of his Sovereign to demand military aid from him, but that he sheltered himself under the plea of poverty, which was notoriously untrue.

Q

16th, That



16th, That the disaffection of Cheyt Sing was apparent to every gentleman who passed through Benares and Ghauzipore for two years before his revolt. That the insolence of his people was a perpetual source of complaint, and that Mr. Fowke, when resident, professed his inability to procure redress from Cheyt Sing, for injuries offered by his men to English gentlemen passing through the country to Oude.

17th, That Cheyt Sing had laid in a very great supply of military stores of all kinds; that he kept up a communication with the different discontented Zemindars of Bahar and Oude, and had determined to throw off his allegiance to the Company, on the first favourable opportunity.

18th, That Mr. Hastings never did communicate to Cheyt Sing his design of fining him forty or fifty lacks of rupees. That the answer returned by Cheyt Sing to the Governor General's letter, was insolent and unsatisfactory, and will be pronounced so by every man conversant in the Persian language.

19th, That Mr. Hastings, by securing the person of the Raja, acted in perfect conformity to the customs of Indostan, and that every thing which subsequently happened, is chiefly imputable to the inhuman massacres of our troops.

20th, That Cheyt Sing was a weak, headstrong, and violent young man. That he kept very low company, was addicted to liquor and those pleasures in which the most abandoned people of Indostan  
only

only indulge themselves, and to dissipation of every kind. That he was not esteemed by the reputable inhabitants of Benares, and was undoubtedly both avaricious and rapacious.

21st, That the very great additional ease and security which he enjoyed as the subject of the East India Company, from what he or his father had known under Sujah Dowlah, instead of inspiring him with sentiments of gratitude, induced him to wish to throw off his dependence altogether, and in this he was undoubtedly encouraged by the means of vulgar men, who were his constant companions.

I believe the facts which I have stated will be very generally admitted, and I certainly mean to appeal to the knowledge of gentlemen of all descriptions, who have been of late years either in Oude or Benares, whether what I have said of Cheyt Sing, is not agreeable to the generally received opinion of his character in those countries. The other facts can be proved from the records at the India House.

A few days after Mr. Hastings retreated from Benares to Chanar, he was joined by the Vizier, and to the unmeaning declamation which I have heard of late, I shall merely reply, that if the Vizier had felt the British influence so exceedingly distressing and even intolerable, he had the fairest opportunity in the world of emancipating himself from it for ever, and at least of totally annihilating our power in Oude. He might have joined Cheyt Sing, and our destruction would have been almost inevitable.

So far, however, from doing this, he performed the most essential services, and after concluding a new treaty with the Governor General, he returned to Lucknow, perfectly satisfied with the interview. The rebellion of Cheyt Sing was effectually quelled in the month of October, and Mr. Hastings remained at Chanar with a view of settling with the Vizier's Minister the disordered state of the government of Oude. A plain relation of the events which reduced the dominion of the Vizier to the distress from which they are now recovered, will effectually clear Mr. Hastings from the charge of being the author of those distresses.

When Sujah Dowlah died, in February 1775, the Majority of the Supreme Council determined, contrary to the opinion of Mr. Hastings, that we should enter into a new treaty with his successor, which was concluded the following May. By this treaty, the Vizier, in a great measure, forfeited his independence. He ceded Benares to the English, and he agreed to an increase of subsidy for their troops stationed in his country. Mr. Hastings, at the time, acknowledged the importance of these advantages to the East India Company, but foretold, that in their consequences they would reduce the Vizier to a state of distress and insignificance. In the month of December following, the Vizier applied for British officers to command his troops. These were sent by the Supreme Council, and various appointments to offices in Oude were made in the course of the next year, by the Supreme Council, so that in fact, the govern-

government of Oude, may with some propriety, be said to have been conducted by the English Gentlemen, from the time the British officers were dispersed through his country, and a civil establishment fixed at his capital. In July 1777, Mr. Hastings regulated the military establishment of the Vizier, by putting the battalions under British officers upon the same footing as to pay and allowances with those in Bengal, and this was undoubtedly a very great relief to the Vizier, and a very necessary regulation for our own service. In November 1779, the Vizier found the establishment of English officers, which he had solicited himself, intolerably burthen some to him; and he wrote that very pathetic letter which Lord Sandwich quoted in one House, Mr. Fox in another, the Select Committee in the 11th Report, Mr. Debrett in the publication he calls a Report, and every news-paper editor in England, to his readers, on account, I suppose, of the figurative expression "When the knife has penetrated to the bone."

It was absolutely impossible at that time to recall the officers, and to disband the battalions serving in Oude. The country must and would have been invaded by the Seiks, Nuzeph Cawn, and the Marattas; but Mr. Hastings very readily allowed the justice of the Vizier's complaints, and with truth observed, that he was not responsible for the distressed state of Oude. The treaty of Benares was his treaty; *that* left the Vizier's father in perfect possession of independence, and *he* was against any infringement of that treaty, when Sujah Dowlah died. One of the  
first

last article of the treaty concluded between Mr. Hastings and the Vizier was, that all the British officers in his Excellency's service, should be recalled, and ~~that one~~ of our brigades only, as settled by the treaty, with his father, should be stationed in his country, and paid by him. If the Vizier should in future apply for farther military assistance, it was to be granted to him. Every cause of discontent being removed by this arrangement, the Vizier returned to his capital; but as that part of the treaty which respected the Nabob Fyzulla Cawn, has been the subject of much enquiry here, as well as the case of the Begums, I shall relate the facts as they really exist, being convinced that Mr. Hastings's conduct will need no farther justification. The late Vizier concluded an agreement with Fyzulla Cawn, in October 1774, by which the latter was secured in the possession of a Jaghire producing about fourteen lacks of rupees a year. He was to be obedient to the Vizier, and to join him with 2 or 3000 horse and foot when he called upon him. Colonel Champion sanctioned this agreement by his signature. In 1778, the Vizier made great complaints of the conduct of Fyzulla Cawn. A gentleman was deputed to enquire into the truth of these complaints, and his report was highly favourable to Fyzulla Cawn, by whose express desire the Company became guaranties of the treaty. In October 1780, after the invasion of the Carnatic, when Sir Eyre Coote formed his plan for the defence of Bengal and Oude, he proposed that Fyzulla Cawn should furnish a body of 3000 horse, agree-

agreeably to treaty, to join the Vizier's army. This request was not complied with by Fyzulla Cawn, and there were other complaints against him preferred by the Vizier. Mr. Hastings consented to withdraw the guarantee in September 1781, but expressly provided that no injury should be offered to Fyzulla Cawn, and he actually refused every solicitation in the following year from the Vizier, to permit him to resume Fyzulla Cawn's Jaghire, and to pay the amount in money. The reports relative to Fyzulla Cawn being very different, the Vizier, at the desire of the Governor General, deputed Major Palmer to him in January 1783, who concluded an agreement with him on the part of the Vizier, in the following month, by which every possibility of future dispute was avoided, as the Vizier agreed, under the guarantee of the Company, to the execution of a new treaty, which freed Fyzulla Cawn from every obligation to furnish military assistance, or any other aid whatever to the Vizier.

The following facts, authenticated as well as the foregoing, from the records of the East India Company, will fully justify Mr. Hastings for not interfering in the case of the Begum.

1st. That on the death of Sujah Dowlah, the Begum, his wife became possessed of all his treasures.

2d. That Mr. Bristow the English resident in Oude, represented to her that these treasures were the treasures of the State; and the property of the Sovereign her son.

3d. That

3d, That he complained to the Board of the conduct of the Begum and *her eunuchs*, who denied to submit to the Vizier's authority, and beat and abused the officers of his government.

4th, That the Begum consented to pay thirty lacks of rupees to her son, to be secured in the quiet possession of all the treasures of his father, and that the Vizier was compelled to submit to this agreement, Mr. Bristow being the guarantee of it.

5th, That Mr. Bristow observed to the Supreme Council in July 1776, that the Begum could claim no protection from this guarantee, having herself infringed the conditions of the treaty.

6th, That Mr. Bristow made repeated complaints to the Begum of the *rebellious conduct* of the eunuchs, that he pressed her on the part of the Vizier, to surrender her jaghires, and to receive the amount in money, observing that two rulers were too many for one country.

7th, That the extraordinary conduct of the Begum, was noticed by the Members of the Supreme Council, and in particular by Mr. Francis.

8th, That the Begum and her eunuchs excited a revolt in Oude, when the insurrection happened at Benares, is proved beyond a doubt.

9th, That Mr. Hastings consented to allow the Vizier to reclaim the treasures of his father, and to pay his mother the amount of her jaghire in future in money, as Mr. Bristow had proposed he should do in 1776.

10th, That

10th, That no violence of any kind was ever offered to the Begum or her servants, or any one man put to death. That she surrendered the treasures of the state by agreement, and has remained unmolested at Fyzabad, treated with every mark of respect.

11th, That these treasures were paid by the Vizier in liquidation of the debts of the East-India Company, and that no bad consequence whatever has or can result to the British interests in India, from the conduct of the Governor General and Council upon this occasion.

I have been more particular in stating those occurrences, because much pains have been taken in this country to impress the public with an opinion, that Mr. Hastings has forfeited our national character for moderation, justice, and good faith, in these instances, and that he had encouraged a son to plunder his mother in a most inhuman manner. I am positive I have stated the facts correctly; and I am not at all apprehensive that Mr. Hastings's character will suffer in the opinion of any unprejudiced man for the part he has taken, in compelling the Begum to relinquish the treasures of the state.

These are the most material occurrences of 1781, in India — but I cannot avoid joining with General Richard Smith, in applauding the wise and spirited conduct of Lord North, and his Majesty's Ministers of that day, who at a time of general distress, equipped so very considerable a reinforcement for the preservation of our possessions in the East Indies. In justice to Mr. Sulivan, and the late Sir William James, their great exertions at this period ought



also to be mentioned; the wise policy of writing such letters to Bengal, as tended to impress the different powers of India with an idea of the stability of the men who were to save India, if it could be saved, appears in a very strong point of view, when contrasted with the miserable policy which obtained when Mr. Gregory and Sir Henry Fletcher came into office.

It is impossible to continue this narrative without stating the effect which the change of Ministers, in 1782, had upon our affairs in India in the course of that year. Whatever part Lord North may have formerly or latterly taken with respect to Mr. Hastings, it is certain, that from 1780 to the time his Lordship resigned, he gave him very cordial support. For my part, I do not see how the Carnatic could have been relieved, or the operations of Government in India carried on at that most critical period, if Mr. Hastings's removal had been hourly expected. Lord North was undoubtedly convinced that a stable government was necessary, and that factions in our councils abroad had been as destructive there, as he at that time contended, they had been in England. I believe the administration of this country had not been changed many days, before Mr. Burke very publicly declared, that Mr. Hastings and Mr. Macpherson were to be removed:—and a resolution that the Directors ought to remove the Governor General, passed in May 1782. A majority of three in the Court of Directors did, in October, agree to Mr. Hastings's removal; but a majority of six to one in a General Court prevented

vented it. The first business attended to at the India House, after Mr. Gregory and Sir Henry Fletcher became the leading men, was to examine every act of Mr. Hastings's government; not so much with an intention of correcting evils, according to my judgment, as with a view of finding some transaction to condemn. I have seen many of the letters written at that period, in the Reports of the Select Committee, and upon my word, the fact appears to be perfectly as I have stated it. The advices received from India at this time were, that a French armament had arrived, that the Carnatic was in the utmost danger, that every effort that possibly could be made for its relief from Bengal had been made, and that prodigious supplies were daily going round. Advices were also received at this time, that the plan formed by Mr. Hastings for detaching Madajee Sindia from Guzerat, by invading his dominions, had effectually answered. That a separate peace with Sindia, and a total cessation of hostilities with the Marattas had been the consequences of it. A reasonable man would have supposed, that Mr. Gregory and Sir Henry Fletcher, with these facts before them, might have followed the example set them by Mr. Sullivan and Sir William James, that they might have commended the zeal and exertions of the Governor General and Council in these instances at least: — but I have never been able to discover a single line of approbation conveyed to Mr. Hastings, for any one act, from the day Mr. Gregory became Chairman to the day of Sir Henry Fletcher's resignation.

Intelligence of the change of Administration in

England arrived at Bombay in August, and at Madras and Bengal in September 1782. This was accompanied with positive assurances, that Mr. Hastings would be immediately removed, and the effects of such assurances were instantly perceived. The Maratta negotiation remained suspended, and the government of India lost half its vigour. Fortunately, however, early in the month of December, Mr. Hastings was informed of the cordial support which he had received from his generous and independent constituents; the Maratta peace was very soon after fully and finally concluded, and the government of Bengal again acquired a degree of vigour and stability. I hope I shall not be thought to affirm too much, when I declare it to be my opinion, that Great Britain owes its preservation of India to the interference of the Court of Proprietors in favour of Mr. Hastings; because, though very worthy men may differ as to the degree of merit to which he is fairly entitled; it will hardly be said by any man who is acquainted with the genius and temper of the natives of India, that a new Governor General, arriving in Bengal when the Maratta treaty was so far advanced, could have concluded that treaty at the time it was concluded, or have raised the supplies for supporting the war in the Carnatic.

The principal events of 1782, in India, were, continuing the most liberal and effectual supplies in money and provisions from Bengal, to the Carnatic and to Bombay, securing a very large investment at a reduced price from Bengal for the English market, supplying China with the means of loading the Company's

Company's ships, by consigning opium to the supercargoes, relieving Fort Marlborough, increasing the revenues of Bengal without oppression, and preserving our own revenues in perfect tranquillity.

In the month of March, 1783, the Greyhound packet arrived in Bengal from England. The General letter contained the sentiments of a majority of the Court of Directors on Mr. Hastings's conduct at Benares, with a declaration that such further resolutions as the Directors might come to, would be sent by a future dispatch to Bengal. This letter naturally tended to weaken the authority of the Supreme Council. The subject was so violently agitated in this country, that the private letters sent by the Greyhound, generally predicted the recall and the disgrace of the Governor General and Mr. Wheeler. But I forbear to dwell upon this subject, because I trust it is now perfectly understood by all descriptions of men, that the Supreme Council ought to be supported from home, or the members who compose it immediately recalled. Lord North will do Mr. Hastings the justice to declare, that he has invariably held this language.

I have now given a summary account of the transactions in Bengal, to the period of our latest dispatches from Calcutta. It has been asserted by the author of the Ninth Report of the Select Committee, that the natives of Bengal are reduced to the lowest degree of destraction and misery. A very long dissertation upon the trade of Bengal is also contained in the same Report. However respectable that authority may be deemed, I have not the least scruple of committing

mitting myself to prove, that since Bengal was under the British government, it never enjoyed so great a degree of internal prosperity as it does at the present moment. That Bengal has increased its population very considerably in every year since Mr. Hastings came to the government. That the manufactures have been greatly increased in point of quantity, and are still more improved in quality, in the ten last years, and in particular, the investments for the last three years are of a very superior quality to any since the Company acquired the Duannee. I have taken pains to ascertain these facts from the first authorities in London; and from these authorities I can also affirm, that raw silk is now provided in such quantities in Bengal, and so excellent in its kind, and in the improved mode of winding it, that the importation of raw silk from Italy has decreased very considerably in the two last years; and, in all probability, Bengal will in future entirely supply this valuable material for our manufactures in Great Britain. The culture of indigo is now carried to a considerable extent in Bengal, and will increase every year as the demand for it increases.\* It has been asserted in the Ninth Report, that there is, in fact, no trade in Bengal, except that of the Company's investment from revenue. No assertion can be more untrue. The fact is, that for the last three years, a number of ships

\* This is a new article of commerce from Bengal, and the indigo imported from thence, is of the very first quality. Let Mr. Burke examine some of the first merchants in London as to the increase and improvement of our Bengal trade. Rum and fine sugar were formerly imported into Bengal; we now export both articles in great quantities,

have arrived in Bengal from Denmark and Portugal. These ships have procured very rich cargoes, without the smallest difficulty ; and their whole amount may be estimated at one million sterling in each year, at the least. This fact is capable of proof. If the inland trade and the exports to the Gulphs have fallen off of late years, nothing can be more unjust than to impute this decline to the oppressions of the English. Are we accountable for the confusions which have prevailed for many years in Persia, for the depredations committed by Nadir Shaw in Indostan, or the total destruction of the Mogul Empire ? All these events happened before we were known in India, except in the character of merchants. At what period of the history of Bengal has that country enjoyed so long a peace as since we acquired possession of the Duannee ? Under the dominion of the native princes, scarcely a year passed without an invasion of some part of the province, or in which several were not put to death, either for being engaged in actual rebellion, or from an apprehension of their disaffection to the despot in office. I do not know a single instance of a native of India being put to death, except by a regular and legal sentence, since we became the sovereigns of Bengal. Let the mild conduct of the English be compared with the inhuman cruelties perpetrated by the Dutch and the Portuguese, in their progress to empire in Asia, and we shall be less inclined to vilify those of our countrymen who have distinguished themselves in Indostan. When I heard a celebrated and illustrious officer declaim, in general terms,

terms, without specifying the murders, massacres, monopolies, and oppressions which have been committed in India, I was inclined to believe that he meant, as in his American manifesto, "to speak daggers, but to use none." I declare again, most solemnly, that neither murders nor massacres have been committed by the English in Bengal: oppressions may have been exercised in that country as in every other, but these have been greatly exaggerated indeed; and the only monopolies existing are those of sale and opium, which, without oppression, produce an immense revenue to the East-India Company. A very ingenious member of the House of Commons has fixed the number of people who groan under every species of misery and oppression in India, at thirty millions;\* and this misery he states to be brought upon them by the English. As to the number of inhabitants in Bengal, Bahar, and our part of Orissa, they may be estimated, I think, at twelve millions, because these countries may now be fairly supposed to have recovered from the depopulation occasioned by the famine of 1770. I have not a doubt myself, but that the inhabitants of Bengal will be doubled in a very few years, so firmly convinced am I that the people of our provinces suffer neither depression nor misery.

\* The late Attorney General was unquestionably right in stating that a charter was wax and parchment, when compared to the happiness of thirty millions of people. But the East-India Company have a right to expect that Mr. Lee will not, without enquiry, adopt the opinions of Mr. Burke, in order to violate property. Can he seriously consider and oppose thirty millions of people?

The inhabitants of Benares and Ghauzipore, under the sovereignty of the Company, may be estimated at two millions of people. They are neither rack-rented, nor disturbed in their possessions. The whole country has worn the face of tranquillity and prosperity from the time of Cheyt Sing's expulsion. The provinces of Oude, Corah, Allahabad, and Rohilcund, contain, I imagine, about eight millions of people. We have so far interfered in the government of these countries, since the accession of the present sovereign, that we should undoubtedly be responsible for the happiness of the natives; and I have never yet heard that they were reduced to a state of depression and misery. The personal distress of the Vizier arose, as Mr. Hastings foretold, from our exacting very great concessions in territory and money from him in 1775. However it will hardly be disputed, that on the death of his father, the Vizier owed his life to the presence of our army; and that we have preserved his dominions from falling into that state of confusion, anarchy, and distress to which the fine countries about Lahore and Dehly have been subject for the last thirty years. Admitting that our provinces, and those of our ally, contain twenty-two millions of people, I am confident that by far the greatest number would lament any revolution, by which they would revert to the state they were in before we acquired an influence in India. I am equally confident too, that the bulk of the inhabitants of no country upon earth, enjoy a greater degree of ease and happiness, than the lower ranks of



men in Bengal. The Northern Circars, which are under the government of Fort St. George, have been uninvaded during the late war; nor have I heard it asserted, that complaints of oppression have been received from the Zemindars of those districts. The balances due to the Company are doubtless very considerable; but we have not the least reason to suppose that inhuman means will be resorted to in order to recover them. The Carnatic has been desolated by a long and cruel war. Some parts of it, however, were in such a state as to afford a revenue to the Company; and as there was not an enemy in the country when the last accounts left India, we may reasonably hope that the distresses of the natives have been considerably alleviated. The countries to the southward of the Coleroon, were completely protected; and, as well as Tanjore, entirely exempted from the calamities of war, as appears by Lord Macartney's letter of March\*; so that the number of inhabitants in the Circars, the Carnatic, and Tanjore, amount to seven millions. I do not know what authority Mr. Burke has to pronounce, that the thirty millions I have enumerated, groan under every species of oppression and misery. I have the utmost respect for the abilities, the ingenuity, and the invention of that gentleman; but I can now and then oppose a fact to a flourish.

\* We have received advices from Malras of the 8th of September, and from Bengal of the 6th of August, since this Narrative went to the press. All was peace in India, except with Tippoo Saib, and we were negotiating a treaty with him. In the mean time we had three armies ready to act against different parts of his dominions, should he refuse to accede to reasonable terms; and all the French troops had quitted his standard.

Having

Having concisely related the principal events which have occurred in India during Mr. Hastings's administration, I cannot conclude this narrative without taking notice of the late extraordinary proceedings in this country relative to the Governor General and the East India Company.

Some time before the rise of the last session of Parliament, a Committee of Proprietors waited upon Lord North and Mr. Fox, the Ministers of that day, in order to explain their sentiments of the conduct of Mr. Hastings, who had in the most explicit and manly terms, called upon the Court of Directors, and his Majesty's Ministers, either to support or to remove him. The Ministers, though thus earnestly called upon, suffered the session to pass over without bringing any proposition before Parliament. Mr. Hastings had informed his constituents, that the revenues of Bengal were increased a million sterling, and that peace would be shortly concluded with the Marattas. Perhaps his Majesty's Ministers confiding in this declaration, were less anxious to push forward the violent measures which they have since produced ; but they were willing, at the same time, that the actual government of India should be as much degraded as possible ; for on the last day of the last session, Mr. Burke moved, (and Lord North seconded the motion,) for certain papers to be laid before the House at their meeting, relative to transactions of the year 1775. What renders this matter the more curious is, that the papers moved for had all been perused in 1776 by Lord North, who then wished to remove Mr. Hastings, because certain charges

were exhibited against him which were never attempted to be proved ; and at that time too, Mr. Burke's friends and patrons were his most strenuous defenders. In the course of the summer, two packets arrived from India ; they brought a confirmation of the Maratta peace, and the most satisfactory accounts of our affairs in Bengal and its dependencies. It appeared also that, that every effort had been made by the Supreme Council for the support of the British interest in every other quarter of India. A few days previous to the meeting of Parliament, the Court of Proprietors, assembled, and voted, with one dissenting voice, the thanks of the Company to Mr. Hastings and his Council, for their great exertions in the public service, and a request that Mr. Hastings would not quit his government until peace was fully restored.

Mr. Fox, on the first day of the session, 'gave notice, that in a week he would move for leave to bring in a bill to regulate our Governments in India. His speech on the day he opened his plan, was indeed a most extraordinary one. — It will be sufficient to say, that every charge brought against Mr. Hastings on that day, has been often refuted. Lord North was not then present, or he would have corrected several of his honourable colleague's misrepresentations. I forbear to detail the progress of a bill which, I believe, is now universally reprobated without doors : — Suffice it to say, that in so far as Mr. Hastings is concerned, Mr. Fox adopted all the prejudices of his most inveterate enemies. Some mistakes perhaps he was led into by misinformation. In particular, Sir  
Henry

Henry Fletcher hazarded an assertion, for which there was not the smallest foundation in fact. The honourable Baronet surely could not do it in order to give Mr. Fox an opportunity of founding the praises of Lord Macartney, or of going out of his way to gratify the friends of the late Lord Pigot, by wantonly traducing the character of Mr. Hastings. The fallacy of Mr. Fox's reasoning becomes more and more apparent to the public every hour. He pretends to adopt Mr. Burke's pretended idea, that thirty millions of people are oppressed by the English in India. This cannot be his real opinion; if it was, would he have suffered the last session to pass over, though called upon by Mr. Hastings, without doing or attempting any thing? Mr. Fox has never ventured to argue upon the actual state of India, when the latest advices came from thence: on the contrary, he dwelt upon transactions which happened fourteen, twelve, and ten years ago. Mr. Burke acted with less consistency; for he opposed the Regulating Act of 1773, and was then the asserter of the Company's rights, and the defender of the characters of the Company's servants.

Perhaps it will not be very becoming in me to make any observations on the capacity of the Director, nominated by Mr. Fox for the future Government of India. The noble Lord at the head of the Seven, is universally allowed to be a most amiable and virtuous character. But to be at the head of such a commission, requires a thorough knowledge of India, and the strictest impartiality. That the noble Lord is totally deficient in these requisites, must

must be clear to every one who heard his Lordship read one letter, dated in Bengal in 1769, and another in 1775, stating abuses or oppressions in the collection of the revenues, and arguing from those documents in favour of Mr. Fox's bill. The mode of collecting the revenues has been totally altered since those periods. I should scarcely suppose that the four Directors, whose names are inserted after the noble Earl's, have had either opportunity or inclination to study the affairs of India, as they must be studied by any man or body of men who mean to govern that country for the advantage of this. Mr. Gregory and Sir Henry Fletcher have been concerned undoubtedly for some years in the affairs of India. The former was many years a free merchant in Calcutta; the latter has been several voyages as a Mate or a Captain of an Indiaman; yet, with all due deference to the splendid abilities of both these gentlemen, I am yet to learn what particular services were performed by either of them, as Chairman of the Court of Directors. India has, undoubtedly, been saved by the exertions of Mr. Hastings, the Supreme Council, Sir Eyre Coote, &c. abroad; and by the assistance afforded to them from home in Lord North's administration, at the requisition of Mr. Sullivan and Sir William James, not merely in the reinforcements sent to India, but in that cordial and steady support and confidence, which should subsist between the government of Great Britain and its dependencies in India at all times, but more particularly in the hour of difficulty and distress.

It would lead me from the proper subject of this review,

review, was I to insert the remarks that must naturally occur to every man, who reflects upon the mean and unworthy acts which have been practised for some time past, to injure Mr. Hastings in the public opinion. The Reports of a Committee have been sold as pamphlets, unaccompanied by vouchers or explanations. What is called the Eleventh Report of the Select Committee, was sent under a blank cover to several noble Lords, while the bill was depending. This Report contained several strictures on these letters which Mr. Hastings had written to the Court of Directors. In one of them he had inclosed an account of sums received by him as presents, amounting to two hundred thousand pounds, and carried to the Company's credit. The Eleventh Report does not contain any copy of these letters, or of this account, though wonderful ingenuity is displayed by the compiler of it, in pointing out certain inconsistencies, which must remain unexplained for the present; but I am sure no man living, who reads the Eleventh Report, will conceive that the following paragraph was contained in Mr. Hastings's letter to the Directors of the 16th of December, 1782: "If I appear in any unfavourable light by these transactions, I resign the common and legal security of those who commit crimes or errors. I am ready to answer any particular question that may be put against myself upon honour, or upon oath." I am so confident that Mr. Hastings will be able to explain fully and satisfactorily his reasons for concealing for a time,

from

from whom the several sums alluded to were received, that I earnestly wish he may be publicly called upon to relate every minute circumstance attending the receipt of each separate article in the account; such an order, I trust, has already been sent to him. It would have been candid, therefore, in the compiler of the pamphlet, entitled the Eleventh Report, if he had waited for the arrival of the explanation; but if he really thought he had caught the Governor General at a disadvantage, it would have been just and honest in him, when he was commenting upon letter, to have inserted either the letter entire, or at least the very material paragraphs which I have quoted.

A man of plain understanding might be led to suppose, from the ungenerous, paltry, and unfair practices, which all men have noticed for these two years past, that to a party in this country, the removal of Mr. Hastings from the government of Bengal, was of infinitely more consequence than the preservation of our Indian empire. Whether to the public measures of one set of men, or to the intemperate opposition of another set of men, we may attribute the loss of America, I cannot determine; but I believe upon my conscience, that the violent bill, proposed and supported by parties formerly so hostile to each other, would have deprived us of our possessions in Indostan, had it passed into a law.

A  
R E P L Y  
T O  
Mr. BURKE'S SPEECH  
O F T H E  
F I R S T O F D E C E M B E R, 1783,  
O N  
Mr. F O X ' s  
E A S T - I N D I A B I L L.  
B Y  
M A J O R J O H N S C O T T.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. DEBRET, opposite BURLINGTON  
HOUSE, PICCADILLY.

M.DCC.LXXXIV.





TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

EDMUND BURKE.

SIR,

**W**HEN I did myself the honour to address you, in reply to your speech of the 1st of December, I could not venture to make use of any other authority than Mr. Woodfall, who, as far as he went, was a faithful reporter. Your publisher, Mr. Doddsley, has now favoured the world with a corrected copy of what fell from you on that day, in the House of Commons. You will not, I am sure, Sir, contend, that the speech as it is now

B

pub-

published is precisely the same as you delivered. I was one of the very few who paid the utmost attention to you, and I do not scruple to assert, that in your closet you have omitted some, and embellished other parts of your declamatory harangue. I take it, however, as it stands; nor do I hesitate to pronounce it to be, an artful, though a gross and glaring misrepresentation of all the events that have happened in India from the year 1756 to the present time.

I sincerely believe the public to be most heartily tired of us both. Perhaps, neither your Speech, nor my Answer to it, may be read by twenty Members of either House of Parliament: but if it should be my good fortune, by a plain recital of facts, to remove prejudices which your speech is expressly calculated to raise, from the obscurest individual in England, I shall think myself amply repaid for the trouble and expense attending this letter.

You set out with declaring, that the Company's servants have sold or ruined every Prince in India  
with

with whom they have been connected; and you say, "In Bengal, Surajah Dowlah was sold to Meer Jaffier." Upon my word, Sir, desirous as I am to avoid every harsh and offensive expression, and to confine myself strictly to facts, I can scarcely restrain myself within the bounds of decency, when I comment upon this part of your publication. Are you, or your party, really desirous of incurring the odium you formerly attempted to throw upon Lord North and his Adherents? Are you willing to have it said, that it is your practice to "eat your words, and to renounce your principles?" Why, Sir, did you not bring this charge forward when the late Lord Clive was living? If Surajah Dowlah was sold to Meer Jaffier, Lord Clive was the salesman; and General Burgoyne, in the year 1773, did prefer a charge something similar to this against that Great Man. Were your flashes of oratory, your bursts of indignation *then*, the mere effects of party spirit? Can you forget the terms you used at that period; how you accused Lord North of Robbery and Injustice; how eloquently you defended the cause of the Company, and the characters of their injured

servants? Take care, Sir, that the people of England, gulled, deceived, and cheated as they have been, do not turn with disgust and abhorrence from men, who squabble, or unite, who abuse or flatter, who prosecute or defend, who threaten to impeach, or condescend to coalesce, as expediency and self-interest may dictate. To all that you have said of the abuses existing in India, previous to the year 1773, I shall merely refer my readers to the debates of that year, and leave them to form their own opinion of your patriotism, your justice, or your consistency.

I shall now, Sir, proceed to reply to such parts of your declamation, as relate to occurrences which have happened since the year 1773; and the first charge is, Mr. Hastings's treatment of Shaw Allum. To this I shall oppose a bare relation of facts. The Mogul empire was totally destroyed very long indeed before we acquired any power in India. Soon after the death of Aurungezebe, the Nabobs of the distant provinces threw off all dependance upon the Mogul. The<sup>1</sup> invasion of Nadir Shah, totally destroyed the  
 • small

small remnant of authority and power which the sovereign of Dehly possessed. So weak and feeble was the force of the Mogul in the year 1747, that his Vizier had not strength enough to expel the nation of the Rohillas, as you call them, but a tribe of Afghan Tartars, or Freebooters, as they undoubtedly were, from the country called Rohilkund. The father and grandfather of the present Mogul were inhumanly murdered, and *his life* was preserved only by flight. He wandered for several years through the upper parts of Indostan, in a state of indigence and obscurity, and in the year 1760, at the head of a banditti, he invaded Bengal, being then called the Shah Zada or Prince. Sujah Dowlah, after he had protected Cossim Ally Cawn in 1764, promised to support Shaw Allum: he made use of his authority to forward his own views; but being defeated, and having lost his own country, the Mogul applied to us for protection, and in 1765, when his cause was absolutely desperate, Lord Clive assigned to him the countries of Corah and Allahabad for his support; to which he added twenty-six lacks of Sicea rupees from the revenues of Bengal. I ask  
you

you seriously, Sir, whether our conduct to the Mogul was not generous beyond example, as well as to Sujah Dowlah? I refer you to the letters of your friend, General Smith, written after he came to the command of the army in Bengal, for his opinion of the cessions we made, and the little benefit we received in return. From 1765 to 1770 the Mogul continued at Allahabad. His tribute was fairly and honourably paid by the Company. For three years, I believe, it passed to the Mogul through the hands of General Smith; and he will reply to the rumour which was circulated in India, that in his mint he recoined the rupees sent from Bengal, before they were paid into the Mogul's exchequer.

Shaw Allum had quitted Allahabad, and thrown himself into the arms of the Marattas, nearly a year before Mr. Hastings arrived in Bengal. He was in fact a prisoner with them, and has continued a prisoner ever since. To the Marattas he consigned over the provinces of Cōrah and Allahabad. Would you, Sir, as a politician, under the circumstances which I have mentioned,

either

either have remitted a tribute from the revenues of Bengal, or have permitted the Marattas to take possession of Corah and Allahabad, which we had expressly assigned over to the Mogul for the support of his dignity? As well may you accuse the British nation of injustice, or our most gracious Sovereign of usurpation, because the descendants of James the Second do not enjoy the imperial crown of Great Britain, as set up the right of the Mogul to the Empire of Indostan at this moment. I avow, that the Mogul Empire did not exist for years before we acquired power in India, and that to agitate the subject of the right by which we possess Bengal, is the grossest absurdity. I most sincerely pity the misfortunes of the Mogul; but we have nothing to answer for on that head. I lament that Patna or Monghier was not fixed upon as the place of his residence: but read the opinion of Lord Clive, General Carnac, or General Smith, on the character of the Mogul, and see how widely different their sentiments are from yours. They have described him as a man whom gratitude could not bind; that his heart was set upon a foolish project of going



going to Dehly, in which neither from prudence nor policy could the Company support him. Of so little avail did the Marattas deem the royal grant of the provinces of Corah and Allahabad, that by the late treaty of peace, the Vizier is secured in the quiet possession of them. Your apostrophe to the Speaker was ill placed. This is, indeed, an age of wonders, in which the Ministry you opposed, or, as Lord North said, your intemperate Opposition, dismembered and ruined the British empire. But though the Mogul Empire was ruined before you or the Speaker were born, the ruin of the British Empire may be dated from the period when you commenced the advocate of one of our contending factions.

The next charge is, that the grand falsification, Mr. Hastings, without a pretence of quarrel, sold the whole nation of the Rohillas. This is in every particular untrue. There was a pretence of quarrel. Sir Robert Barker thought so. From him came the first proposition for the Rohilla war; and the cause was, a direct breach of a treaty

treaty, to which he, on the part of the English, was guarantee. The Rohillas were not a nation, but a tribe of Freebooters, whom the descendants of Tamerlane wished to expel from the country they had conquered in 1747, but had not force enough to accomplish it. Every circumstance attending the Rohilla war, was known in England in 1775, and every fact which happened in the course of it, most grossly exaggerated. When the facts were fresh in the minds of men, the subject was agitated here; every power of the government was then used to remove Mr. Hastings, for his share in that war; but your friends assisted to preserve him from the vengeance of Lord North, and the ministers of that day: and shall your Oratory be now employed to revive Accusations long since refuted, and long since forgotten?

Your observations on the late treaty with the Marattas are most extraordinary indeed, and display either a total ignorance of the various events which happened in India previous to it, or what is worse, an absolute intention to deceive and mislead.

Your objections to the Maratta treaty are, first, that we gave up our allies, Futtý Sing, Guisowar, and the Rana of Gohud; secondly, that we forsook Ragonaut Row, and delivered him over to his enemies; thirdly, that we agreed in future not to protect the subjects of the Marattas; and fourthly, that we wished to conclude an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Marattas, against Hyder Ally, on very unjustifiable terms. Will you be pleased to recollect, Sir, that your honourable friend's intimate acquaintance, Lord Macartney, and his Council, had applied to the Marattas for peace upon any terms; that the Court of Directors had shewn an equal degree of anxiety upon the subject; that the proceedings in England tended in like manner to convince the Marattas we must accept of their terms; and that Mr. Hastings, who had to negotiate under all these disadvantages, has concluded a peace which is honourable and advantageous in every point of view. I avow, that your objections are frivolous and absurd in the highest degree. No peace could have been concluded, unless we would have consented to place Futtý Sing and

Rago-

Ragonaut Row in the situation they were in previous to the commencement of hostilities. Fatty Sing is satisfied; Ragonaut Row's person is perfectly secure, and an honourable provision is made for his subsistence. I attribute the second Maratta war to Ragonaut Row's residing in Bombay after the treaty of Poorunder; and if the English continued to protect him, this peace, like the last, would be a truce for a few months only. Another cause of dispute with the Marattas is effectually removed by our consenting not to afford shelter to their renters or subjects, who should fly to us for protection against their government. The Maratta states contain various pretenders to offices of trust and power. Is it the interest of the English to preserve peace with the Marattas, or to interfere in all their domestic squabbles? If the former, this article was both wise and necessary.

I must beg, Sir, to describe particularly the treatment which the Rana of Gohud has received from us. He is one of very many independent Rajahs, whose countries border upon the Ma-

ratta dominions; and in the year 1779, the Ma-  
 rattas had invaded the province of Gohud. The  
 Rana applied to Mr. Hastings for support; and  
 as the Governor General conceived that a diver-  
 sion in the neighbourhood of Malwa, might draw  
 Madajee Sindia from Guzzerat, he concluded  
 a treaty with him upon certain conditions.  
 In consequence of this treaty, Major Popham  
 marched to the Rana's assistance, whose country  
 was almost entirely in the possession of the Ma-  
 rattas. He drove them out in a few months,  
 and conquered from them a district, producing  
 six lacks of rupees a year. In August, 1780, he  
 took what, till that moment, was called the im-  
 pregnable fortress of Gualier. On our part, every  
 condition of the treaty with the Rana was most  
 scrupulously fulfilled: but we neither received  
 the money, provisions, nor troops, which he had  
 stipulated to furnish. There was not the smallest  
 cause of complaint from him of a breach of trea-  
 ty, till after the taking of Gualier. This was to  
 be given up to him. Sir Eyre Coote thought it  
 would be prudent to reserve it for some time in  
 our hands, lest the Rana of Gohud should not  
 have

have strength enough to keep it. The Rana applied for the fort again and again, claimed the strict performance of this article, and promised, on his part, to furnish his quota of troops, provisions, and money, if the fort was delivered to him. Mr. Hastings and the Supreme Council did deliver it to him in March, 1781, and thus was every stipulation on our part most faithfully performed. What return did we meet? Not only were we disappointed in the supplies which we were actually to receive by treaty, but the Rana was detected in holding a secret correspondence with Madajee Sindia. His breach of treaty, duplicity, and treachery, were proved beyond the possibility of a doubt. On the other hand, we performed every engagement we had entered into with a rigid exactness. Let me ask you, right honourable Sir, whether, under these circumstances, Mr. Hastings's conduct was not justifiable? For proof of the facts I have stated, I refer you to the records at the India House, and to Colonel Muir's correspondence with the Governor General and Council, from April to October,

1781. I declare most solemnly, that I could not have conceived it possible for any man to have made the remarks which you have made upon the late Maratta peace, if I had not myself heard your consistent friend, Mr. Fox, assert, in the month of May, 1782; that no peace could be a bad one for this country; and, in seven months after, was a witness of his juncture with your old enemy, Lord North, for the express purpose of turning out the men who preserved all that remains of our Empire. Mr. Hastings, an unconnected individual, cannot expect justice or common decency from such men. Was it dishonourable in the king of France to refuse the Pretender an asylum in his dominions? Yet, Lewis XIV. acknowledged the Pretender as King of Great Britain, upon the death of James II. We have not deserted Ragonsaut Row. We have stipulated for an honourable provision for him, if he chuses to accept it; of which there is no doubt; if he does not, we are engaged, not to permit him to remain in any of our settlements. Fussy Sing is placed in the same situation he was in at the treaty of Poor under.

under. Upon the whole, Sir, the more the terms of the late Maratta treaty are considered, the more will Mr. Hastings appear entitled to the thanks of his constituents and his country for having concluded it. I wonder you omitted Sir Henry Fletcher's objection. The worthy baronet lamented the cession of Broach, and increased the value of that place from three, to sixteen lacks of rupees. Mr. Doddsley will profit by this hint, I hope, in the next edition of your speech.

In my last letter to you I have fully refuted your assertion, as to the rapid succession of boys who govern India. In the civil and military service of the Company in Bengal, there are some who have served above thirty years, some from twenty-five to thirty, more from twenty to twenty-five: The eldest major in Bengal has been twenty years; the eldest captain sixteen years in the service; and in the civil line, the gentleman who will succeed to the first vacancy in the Board of Trade went out a writer in 1763, just one and twenty years ago.



ago. At Calcutta and Bombay the rise is ~~only~~ lower; and this is sufficient to prove your assertion not to have the smallest foundation in truth. I wish to ~~deft~~ in facts, to pledge my character and my honour for the truth of my assertions, leaving the credit of fine writing to the flowery Mr. Burke.

Equally unjust and untrue is your assertion, that "Our conquest, after twenty years, is as crude as it was the first day." *We have erected schools, we have built bridges, we have made high roads, and we have cut new navigations.* Here, Sir, I oppose facts to assertions. The foundation in Calcutta, so far from being a paltry one, has raised the English name throughout Indostan, and was an undertaking worthy the man to whom we owe a translation of the code of Gentoo laws, and the publication of a Bengal grammar. The high road from Calcutta to Chunar, 450 miles, through the hills which bound Bengal to the Westward, was a most beneficial work, and is completely executed. The cut from Calcutta to the Salt

Wier's Lake has facilitated the inland navigation, has increased the trade of Calcutta, and has reduced the price of fuel above twenty per cent. These, Sir, are some of the many improvements which have taken place in Mr. Hastings's administration. Lands have been cleared, new manufactures have been established, and old ones improved to a great degree since he succeeded to the government, and I beg to ask you, Sir, if any man living could have taken more pains to encourage trade than Mr. Hastings has done? To him we owe it, that the communication by the way of Suez with Europe was opened, and to the short-sighted policy of some of your friends, that it is now stopped up. To him we owe a communication being established with Thibet, highly advantageous to Bengal.

No place upon the globe has been so greatly improved in the last ten years as Calcutta, and the country about it; the trade of Bengal in general has increased, and is increasing; parts of the country which it was formerly unsafe to

pass through, are now in high cultivation, and the inhabitants in a state of civilization very different indeed from what they were when your friend General Smith was in Bengal, who from the very short time he remained there, and the very large fortune he brought away, may answer the animated description you have given, “ of rapid succession, “ enormous fortunes, birds of prey and passage,” &c. &c. &c.

For Heaven’s sake, Sir, point out the wretch, “ who has torn the cloth from the loom, or “ wrested the scanty portion of rice and salt from “ the peasant of Bengal, or wrung from him the “ opium in which he forgot his oppressions and “ his oppressor.” I thank my God I know no Englishman who has been guilty of such atrocious acts. It was my unhappy lot to be in Bengal in 1770, when a third of its inhabitants were swept away by a dreadful famine; but collectively, and individually, by voluntary subscriptions from all ranks of Europeans, we did our utmost to avert the miserable effects which attended that fatal calamity: thousands were fed every day

day in the garrison of Monghier, where I was then doing duty, by the officers and soldiers. The same at Patna, Moorshedabad, and Calcutta. It was to the impossibility of procuring rice, and not to an insensibility to the distresses of our fellow-creatures, that we must attribute the loss of so many lives. The Abbe Raynal can hardly dispute the palm of invention with you, but in the pathetic you have no equal.

You have said, Sir, that “our Indian Government is, in its best state, a grievance.” If you mean to apply this to its influence over, or oppression of the natives of India, I totally differ with you. If you mean to apply it to this country, the assertion is absurd. Since the acquisition of Bengal, the customs, &c. paid by the Company to the State, have increased from seven to thirteen hundred thousand pounds a year. Our exports to India have increased in the same proportion; and instead of sending from three to five hundred thousand pounds in bullion annually from this country to Asia, we have actually brought above three millions sterling into the kingdom in the last twenty

D 2
years.

years. I agree most heartily with you and Mr. Fox, that the sudden acquisition of wealth in India is highly improper; but the evil does not exist at present. Mr. Hastings has been Governor or Governor General of Bengal for twelve years; will you, right honourable Sir, be so good to point out six persons who have returned to this country in that period, with fortunes suddenly acquired? I know but of two, the one, Mr. Farrer, a gentleman of the law; the other, Major Webber, the aid-de-camp of Sir John Clavering, who was appointed to the command of a regiment of horse in the Vizier's service, and commandant of the garrison of Allahabad, where he had a fair and an honourable opportunity of acquiring a handsome independence in two years. A gentleman who deals so much in exaggeration as you do, can only be refuted by an appeal to facts. You say, fortunes have been suddenly acquired in Bengal; I assert that it is not true, that the fact has been notoriously otherwise since Mr. Hastings succeeded to the government. If you will go farther back, indeed, I readily grant you that some very glaring instances are to be found

found, of men who acquired large fortunes in a short time, and no one more glaring than the case of your friend, General Smith, who arrived in Bengal in May 1765, quitted it in December 1769; and since his return to England, has been eminently conspicuous as a man of the very first world. A few, and a very few more of us, have been ambitious to get into Parliament *upon any terms*, or to become members of the gambling clubs in St. James's-street; but in general, Sir, the gentlemen who have served their country in India, are men of as strict honour, and as exemplary characters in every respect, as any set of men whatever. Let me repeat it again, that the people of England who have been so gulled, deceived, and cheated by pretended patriots, and political adventurers, will not suppose us to be the infernal monsters you represent us, without full enquiry; and no man wishes more earnestly than I do for such an enquiry. Hitherto Mr. Hastings has not been treated with common justice, common decency, or common honesty, by his disappointed opponents.

I would

I would beg leave to refer you, and any gentleman who may do me the honour to read this letter, to the narrative which I have lately published for a full, and complete answer to every thing you have said relative to the Begums, of Oude, Cheyt Sing, and Fyzulla Cawn. The India Bill was undoubtedly an object of the utmost importance to your party; if it had passed, Lord North and Mr. Fox would have been, what some of you say they ought to be, 'The sole Rulers of this Country.' No wonder, therefore, that you hazarded a few bold assertions in order to carry so great a point; but that you should deliberately sit down in your closet to prepare for the press, much that you did say, and much that I avow, you did not say, does, I confess, astonish me. Perhaps, after all, Mr. Dodgley has published without your authority; if so, I hope you will call him to an account for circulating so gross a libel in your name. Is your character so very high in the world, that Mr. Dodgley can expect it to bear down truth, reason, and common sense by mere words? Or, can he suppose that I will suffer such gross misrepresentations to remain uncontradicted?

The

The revenue of Benares was paid up to the month of February 1783, when the Surprise packet failed in April last, and there was no reason to believe it would fall in arrears in future: The country has not been in confusion, nor are the people undone; and your remarks that no Mussulman magistrate ever entered Benares under the Persian or Tartar conquerors, is most assuredly unfounded. The Cutwallee of Benares was ever possessed by Sujah Dowlah, and the magistrate was a Mussulman. Nay more; when we yielded the Cutwallee to Cheyt Sing, he actually continued a Mussulman chief magistrate in the city of Benares. I will tell you farther, Sir, that almost all Cheyt Sing's favorites, and the companions of his looser hours, were Mussulmen, and in many of the contumacious acts which brought on his ruin, he was directed by the advice of a Mussulman, Goolam Houssein Cawn. So far from the people being undone, we know that the country never was in a higher state of cultivation than in three months after the expulsion of Cheyt Sing; and the accounts from Bengal as late as the 9th of August last, not only prove the provinces of Bengal,



Bengal, Bahar, Benares, Oude, and Rohiltund, to be in perfect tranquillity, but they actually convey to us the most unequivocal proof of the opinion which the Governor General and Council entertain of the stability of the government, and the continuance of the Maratta peace. Some regiments have been disbanded, and all the regiments in our service are reduced from one thousand to seven hundred and eighty, rank and file.

You say, Sir, that Lieutenant-colonel Hannay, Mr. Middleton, and Mr. Johnson, were accused of the grossest peculations. Upon my word, I cannot find upon any records of the Company, or from private advices, that there is the smallest foundation for this assertion. Lieutenant-colonel Hannay entered into the service of the East-India Company with the rank of Captain in 1764. He had distinguished himself during the last war in Germany, and was much esteemed by the late Marquis of Granby. He was eighteen years in the Company's service, and having commanded a very strong detachment in Oude, from 1777

to 1782, it may be supposed without any reflection upon the character of Lieutenant-colonel Hannay, that, as well as Major Webber, he had honourably acquired a handsome fortune. I never heard it surmised, that he was accused of speculation. The corps which he commanded, with all the native corps, serving under British officers in Oude, were reformed by the Vizier's desire; but the Vizier himself, seeing the absolute necessity of keeping up a strong military force in Ghauzipore, again applied to the Supreme Council for assistance; and Colonel Hannay would have returned there, but, as you observe, in this instance with truth, "he was prevented by death." Mr. Middieton and Mr. Johnson were recalled, because the Supreme Council thought they had not exerted themselves to receive the ballances due to the Company from the Vizier, and Mr. Johnson's transactions with Gopaul Dois, a Benares banker, were also disapproved of; but I cannot find a shadow of evidence to prove, that they have ever been accused of the "grossest peculations."\*

E

You

\* Is it possible, Sir, for any man to read that part of your speech in which you so politely mention "Hannay, Middleton, and

You have the means to be well informed of the actual state of the Carnatic, and of Tanjore. I shall not venture to dispute any thing you may assert relative to the differences which have unhappily subsisted between the Nabob of Arcot, and the Raja of Tanjore; but I will presume to assert, Sir, that standing as you do, so connected as you are, with the professed agent of the Raja of Tanjore, the public ought to receive any thing you may say relative to him, with doubt, and distrust. Is it not true, that you have yourself applied to a late chairman of the Court of Directors (Mr. Sullivan) on the business of the Raja of

and Johnson," without adverting to your own character as a public man, and comparing it with the conduct of Mr. Hastings. The Governor General appointed two gentlemen to Oude, in whom he had a confidence. He thought they had been deficient in their public duty, and he recalled them. (Lieutenant-colonel Hannay was removed because his corps was disbanded.) You came into office, and found two of the clerks removed on strong suspicion of delinquency. Without previous concert with any one, you took upon yourself to restore those men to their offices. After such an instance of folly and imprudence, (to give it no harsher epithets) shall you stand forth, and accuse Mr. Hastings of an intention to screen delinquents? Well, indeed, may I exclaim with my countryman, Sir Richard Hill,—*Mutate Nomine, de te Fabula narratur.*

Tanjore ;

Tanjore ; and is it not fair to suppose, that in the absence of your cousin, the Pay Master of his Majesty's Forces in India, you are the Raja's agent in England ?

Your remarks upon the mode of letting the lands in Bengal are so curious, that I must beg leave to call the attention of the public to the subject. In 1772, Mr. Hastings and his Council farmed out the lands in Bengal upon leases for five years. The Court of Directors approved the plan. Lord North, the Minister of the country, and an active member of a Secret Committee, (which you then abused, though you now call their Reports ample and instructive) reported this plan, and one for the administration of justice, to the House of Commons. Many encomiums were passed upon Mr. Hastings *then* for the adoption of these measures, and he was appointed the Governor General of Bengal by Parliament ; yet, in the year 1784, you come gravely forward, and ask the House of Commons, if you shall “ be believed in relating ”—what was a matter of public notoriety in 1773. For shame, Sir ; do

not attempt to mislead the nation so grossly ; be assured, I will follow you step by step ; and I trust, that the justice, the honour, and the good sense of my countrymen, will distinguish between truth, and falsehood.

Mr. Hastings's banian did rent several farms, and was a considerable loser by them. This has been fully proved ; and it is well known that he was a man of very considerable property, and a considerable renter, long before Mr. Hastings himself arrived in Bengal.

I shall not follow you, Sir, through a rhapsody of six pages upon the miserable state of the natives of Bengal, the decay of commerce, and the bad, and corrupt management of Mr. Hastings and his Council. The care which Mr. Hastings has taken to preserve that part of the British empire, entrusted to him, is as conspicuous as the factious attempts of a set of desperate, and abandoned mock patriots in this country, to tarnish the glory of Great Britain, and to abuse every man of merit, in every department, civil and military. It  
will

will be a sufficient answer to all your illiberal reflections, to assert, that from the year 1778, to the month of December 1782, above six millions sterling has been remitted from Bengal, to Madras, and Bombay, in money, provisions, and military stores. That a peace was concluded with the Marattas at a most critical moment, upon honourable and advantageous terms; that in this time of general distress, the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and its dependencies, were kept in perfect tranquillity; the investment continued, and our resources increased above a million sterling. Examine any gentleman, of any party, who has returned from India in the last two years, and he will tell you, that the exertions of the Supreme Council have been wonderful; and that if a man of inferior genius, intrepidity, or resource to Mr. Hastings, had presided in Bengal, India would have been lost.

I now come to a part of your publication which I am sure is foisted in by yourself, or Mr. Doddsley. You never spoke the following words in the House of Commons: “attend, I pray you,  
“to

“ to the prosperity of Benfield, Hastings, and  
 “ others of that sort.” For shame, Sir, pre-  
 serve a little decency; Benfield, as you call  
 him, and Mr. William Burke (for I will not fol-  
 low your example) have taken opposite sides in  
 the disputes of the Carnatic. The one is said to  
 be deeply involved with the Nabob Mahomed  
 Ally; the other avowedly possesses the Tanjore  
 agency. I never saw Mr. Benfield; I know no-  
 thing of his cause. Mr. Hastings is ‘as uncon-  
 nected with him, as he is with Mr. William Burke.  
 Both parties may be men of honour; but as you  
 have an interested enmity to Mr. Benfield, why  
 would you introduce his name with Mr. Hastings?  
 Your noble friend, Lord North, patronized Mr.  
 Benfield openly, and avowedly. He is said, God  
 knows with what truth, to have given his Lord-  
 ship seven votes in this “ best House of Com-  
 mons,” as you now call it; though two years  
 ago you declared, that it would support Lord  
 North, as long as his Lordship “ could find  
 “ money to bribe gentlemen to say they believed  
 “ him.” And what, Sir, is the prosperity of Mr.  
 Hastings? He is at this moment the legal Gover-  
 nor General of Bengal; and he will treat with  
 contempt

contempt your poor attempts to injure him in the public opinion. If he “ has had opportunities “ of heaping up immense wealth, he has been less prudent than your friend, Mr. Dowell, or his late master, Lord Holland; for his fortune is moderate indeed, and it is using too strong an expression to say, “ that the fortunes of hundreds “ have depended upon his smiles or his frowns,” because not *One Hundred* gentlemen in the civil and military service have acquired fortunes in Bengal during his long administration. The rest of this paragraph is indecent, beyond any thing I ever read in my life. Mr. Hastings is not loaded with the execrations of the natives of India; the Directors have ceased to censure him, and so far from being struck or blasted with a resolution of the House Commons, he knows, in common with every loyal subject of England, that a resolution of the House of Commons is not the law of the land, though, perhaps, he may deem it of more consequence, than he would the resolution of a set of drunken porters, which was the constitutional expression of your last Speaker.\*

I observe

\* That my readers may form a proper idea how far Mr. Burke is calculated to be one of Mr. Hastings's judges, I shall copy what



I observe, Sir, that you are in the habit of asserting what is not strictly true, and then you argue from your assertion as if it were matter of fact. For instance, you make Mr. Hastings say, "that he is incumbered with two hundred and fifty young gentlemen, some of them of the best families," and you add, "He has

what he has given to the public, calmly and deliberately, as his own words, unless the speech itself is a forgery of Mr. Douglas's. Page 79 and 80, "Attend, I pray you, to the situation and propriety of Benfield, Hastings, and others of that sort. The last of these has been treated by the Company with an asperity of reprehension which has no parallel. They lament 'that the power of disposing of their property, in perpetuity, should fall into such hands.' Yet for fourteen years, with little interruption, he has governed all their affairs, of every description, with an absolute sway. He has had, himself, the means of heaping up immense wealth, and during that whole period, the fortunes of hundreds have depended on his smiles and frowns. He himself tells you, he is incumbered with two hundred and fifty young gentlemen, some of them of the best families in England, all of whom, aim at returning with vast fortunes to Europe as the prime of life. He has, then, two hundred and fifty of your children, as his hostages, for your good behaviour; and loaded for years, as he has been, with the exactions of the natives, with the censures of the Court of Directors, and struck and blasted with resolutions of this House, he still maintains the most despotic power ever known in India. He domineers with an overbearing sway in the assemblies of his pretended masters; and it is thought, in a degree, rash to venture to name his offences in this House, even as grounds of a legislative remedy."

"then,

“ then, two hundred and fifty of your children,  
 “ as his hostages for your good behaviour :” but  
 attend, I pray you, to the true and undisguised  
 fact. Mr. Hastings and his Council informed  
 the Court of Directors, in the month of May,  
 1784, that they had abolished the Provincial  
 Councils, and recalled the several members to  
 Calcutta. Upon this occasion they state, “ that  
 “ the civil service is overloaded, that the civil  
 “ offices might be reduced to a very scanty  
 “ number, were their exigency alone to deter-  
 “ mine the list of covenanted servants, which  
 “ consists of two hundred and fifty two, and  
 “ many of them of the best families in En-  
 “ gland, who aspire to the sudden acquisition of  
 “ fortunes, that they may return, and pass the  
 “ prime of their lives in England, as multi-  
 “ tudes have done before them, (General Smith,  
 “ Mr. Farrer, and Mr. Francis, for instance.)”

Was not this remonstrance, if I may so call  
 it, a proper one ? What, Sir, did it tend to  
 prove ? That the Ministers and Directors at home  
 had so overloaded the civil service in Bengal,

it would be necessary to make no farther appointments, till some of those in Bengal returned to Europe, or fell a sacrifice to the execution of their duty in India. Mr. Hastings does not state, that he is encumbered with two hundred and fifty-two young gentlemen," but, "that there are two hundred and fifty-two civil servants, including every rank of them, in Bengal, and that a much less number would suffice for conducting the public business." But, if you will be so good to examine the printed lists of the Company's servants, you will find, that above one hundred and sixty of this number have been more than ten years in Bengal.\* So much, Sir, for your rapid succession of boys.

I cannot

\* In order fully to disprove Mr. Burke's assertion "of the rapid succession of boys in India, I have copied, from the Company's printed lists of covenanted servants, the standing of one hundred and sixty-seven gentlemen, who rank next below the Board of Trade, and have been from twenty-one to eleven years in the service.

I cannot quit this subject without relating to you what was the consequence of the Governor General's letter. Mr. Sullivan was the chairman of the Court of Directors when it was received in Leadenhall-street. The Directors were just upon the point of sending several writers to Bengal; but, with positive information before them, that the establishment was so overloaded, they made no appointments that year. Mark the difference, I pray you, between theory and practice, between your friends when in, and when out of office; for, overloaded as every establishment in India was, the very next year there were no less than sixty writers appointed;

Of twenty-one years rank in the service	_____	2
Of twenty years	_____	9
Of nineteen years	_____	9
Of eighteen years	_____	11
Of seventeen years	_____	8
No writers appointed in 1768.		
Of fifteen years	_____	23
Of fourteen years	_____	31
Of thirteen years	_____	19
Of twelve years	_____	22
Of eleven years	_____	35
		<b>Total 167</b>

and with your honourable friend, Mr. Fox, tell me how many writers, the sons of members of Parliament, he recommended that year, and how many Sir Henry Fletcher appointed. I know myself, that two sons of one member went to Bengal, as writers, in the last season. With so notorious, and, I will add, so scandalous an abuse of the power of patronage before my eyes, have I not reason to rejoice that the infamous bill which was to give Sir Henry Fletcher so great a share of power, has been lost? How different was the conduct of Mr. Pitt? He advised, and truly too, what would be of more consequence than all the flowery speeches of all the orators in this kingdom. Reduce your establishments as low as possible, and make no unnecessary appointments, with a view of securing a majority in Parliament.

Why are the names of Sir John Clavering and Colonel Monson again brought forward? Be assured, Sir, they were highly esteemed by every man of honour in India; but that their prejudices were invincible, every man of honour lamented.

mented. "Mr. Francis's plans of policy," you say, "make the most shining parts of your report;" but that gentleman will content himself with the degree of merit to which he is entitled. He dressed the materials which Mr. Ducarell furnished him with. Will you attempt to persuade me, Sir, that Mr. Francis, who, when he left Bengal, could do little more than call for a glass of wine without an interpreter, could have formed a plan for collecting the revenues of Bengal, in less than two years, after his arrival? I allow Mr. Francis great merit; but he will be well content to rank in a class far below Mr. Hastings, and Mr. Ducarell. You say, Mr. Francis "escaped with life;" and, in your speech, you made a much stronger allusion to the duel he fought in Bengal; but I most heartily agree with your friend, Mr. Fox, that such a subject should never be brought up at a distant period, by a third person.

I am really at a loss to know what you mean, when you assert, that every British subject "active in the discovery of peculations, has  
"been

"been ruined,—driven from India,—not heard  
 "here,—stopped from returning;——witness, of  
 "power, and violence of fraud, employed to de-  
 "stroy them, in character as well as fortune."  
 To this accusation Mr. Gregory, Sir Henry  
 Pletcher, and the Directors, must answer; but  
 I declare to you, upon my honour, that I have  
 never interfered, directly or indirectly, to pre-  
 vent the return of any man to India. Mr.  
 Hastings would never forgive me, was I to have  
 recourse to such despicable, and unworthy acts;  
 nor can it be a matter of the smallest conse-  
 quence to him, in any respect, whether Mr.  
 Goring, or Mr. Grant, the gentlemen to whom,  
 as I suppose, you allude, are restored to the  
 service with their rank; or not. The part that  
 I have acted will, I trust, shield me from the  
 suspicion of descending to the practice of mean  
 and infamous acts, in order to ruin the charac-  
 ter of any man. I have never received an in-  
 jury from Mr. Goring or Mr. Grant; and I can  
 assure you, Sir, as I never have, so I never  
 will attempt to interfere with their prospects of  
 regaining the service of the Company; deserv-

to myself the liberty of fully and fairly considering the propriety or impropriety of their return to Bengal, if it should be left to the determination of a General Court, where, until you carry your favourite scheme of "Robbery, and Injustice," I shall continue to exercise the privileges of an Englishman.

I am at a loss how to answer your assertion relative to the natives of Bengal. I am informed that the situation of the Rannies of Burdwan, Rageshai, and Amboa, are flourishing at this moment. That they are neither ruined nor beggared, nor asking alms, I can avow from undoubted authority. If you meant to give the House accurate information, you would have quoted what Mahomed Reza Cawn has repeatedly declared, that he owed his life to the justice, the impartiality, and the patient attention of Mr. Hastings, at a time when Nundcomar had suborned evidence enough to have ruined an hundred men. I hope and trust that Sir Elijah Impey will demand public reparation for the indecent reflections which have been cast upon him. But I tell you, Sir,

once



once more, that whether Nundcomar ought to have been hanged or not, the following facts are indisputable: that he knew forgery to be a capital crime by that law to which he was amenable; so far back as the year 1764, that no man in India, of any party, ever doubted of his guilt; and that Mr. Hastings was not concerned, directly or indirectly, in his commitment, his trial, or his execution.

As you were foiled in the shameful attempt (for I cannot give it a gentler term) to keep Mr. Sullivan out of the direction, you can never miss an opportunity of alluding to the opium contract which his son enjoys: but here, Sir, I tell you again, that you have yet to prove its having been sold at all by him; and I have proved beyond contradiction, that he enjoys it upon the fair and equitable terms at which it was fixed in 1775 by Mr. Hastings, General Clavering, Colonel Monson, Mr. Barwell, and Mr. Francis.

You have given us a very false description of the Court of Proprietors; and you say, “ that  
“ the

“ the agents of the delinquent servants are seen,  
 “ marshalling, and disciplining their forces in  
 “ Leadenhall street, and the prime spokesmen in  
 “ all their assemblies.”

As you have pronounced Mr. Hastings to be the greatest delinquent India ever saw, and as I have been examined by you as that gentleman's avowed agent, I must be free enough to tell you, Sir, that I have never descended to use any unjustifiable means whatever, in order to procure a single vote. If ever man received that independent support, from a public assembly, which he might glory in, Mr. Hastings has received it from his constituents. I declare, upon my honour, that I have never, either directly or indirectly, expended a single shilling in procuring a vote; that I have never promised even a letter of recommendation, by way of inducing any gentleman to support Mr. Hastings; and you will find, Sir, that as Mr. Hastings's popularity has not been acquired by bribery, corruption, ministerial influence, or misrepresentation, it will not be in the power of any political adventurer, or any faction, to injure him in the opinion of his fellow  
 G subjects.

subjects. As for myself, as I am conscious that I have executed with fidelity the trust with which I was honoured, by a man of whose friendship it is my pride to boast, I shall treat with the contempt it deserves every illiberal reflection which may be thrown upon me, in a place where I have not the privilege of making a reply.

Your account of the “ incorrigible condition of the Company,” may be ingenious, though it has not novelty to recommend it: but I will take upon me to assert, that nothing can be more remote from truth than the description is. Let the world judge between your relation and mine.

Two committees of the House of Commons were appointed; the one in 1780, for one purpose only, to enquire into the state of the judicature in Bengal; the other in 1781, to enquire into the cause of the war in the Carnatic. The first committee procured an extension of its powers in the following sessions; and under that extension it has produced no less than eleven reports. I cannot presume to speak what I think  
of

of nine of these reports : but the pamphlets which Mr. Debrett has published, under the title of the Ninth, and Eleventh Reports of the Select Committee, are the most infamous, and execrable libels, that were ever imposed upon a deluded public ; and as Lord Thurlow well observed, they have been circulated in a manner disgraceful to the dignity, the justice, and the honour of the British nation. The other committee made six reports ; two of them on the political transactions of the Supreme Council. In consequence of these reports, various resolutions were proposed and carried in a committee of the House of Commons when twenty-six members were present. One of these resolutions was, “ that it was the duty of  
 “ the Court of Directors to dismiss those servants  
 “ whom the House of Commons had censured.” On the 28th of May, this resolution, not having been reported, was rescinded, and the following substituted in its room ; “ That it was the duty of  
 “ the Court of Directors to remove Mr. Hastings  
 “ and Mr. Hornby.” Forty-two members were then in the House ; and surely, Sir, this will be a sufficient answer to every insinuation of Mr. Haf-

tings's influence in the House of Commons. Not a single member offered to divide the House. Not a single Member spoke in his favour. For God's sake, then, let us hear no more of the corrupt influence of the Governor General in the House of Commons. This resolution was sent the following day to the India House, where your party had many friends. The chairman, Mr. Gregory, co-operated in bringing forward this very resolution; and the deputy, Sir Henry Fletcher, a professed party man, was the mouth-piece of the Rockingham party at the India House. On the 18th of June, the Court of Proprietors came unanimously to two resolutions, strictly legal, and founded in reason, as well as in justice: that to remove Mr. Hastings, *merely* in compliance with a vote of the House of Commons, would be improper; and, that whatever resolution the Directors might come to, on a point of such importance, should be communicated to the Court of Proprietors before it was carried into effect. I beg to ask you, Sir, if there is any thing illegal or absurd in this proceeding? The Directors commenced an enquiry into

into the conduct of Mr. Hastings, and on the 23d of October, thirteen of them determined he should be removed, for acts which originated in their own Court, and had received the approbation of his Majesty's Ministers. The resolution for Mr. Hastings's removal was laid before a General Court. It was ably and fully debated. Your honourable friend, General Smith, spoke for an hour in support of it. The proceedings have been printed; and I am sure, you will not get another man in the kingdom to say, that the resolution was rescinded without complete examination. I am weary of refuting such palpable absurdities. Can you conceive, Sir, that men will so far shut their ears, and their eyes, as to believe, that Mr. Hastings was saved by the Proprietors, who were formerly in the service of the Company? Consider, I beseech you, what the facts are. Some of the Directors wished that the question should go to a ballot. It was agreed to instantly; and several gentlemen, who spoke in favour of Mr. Hastings, signed the requisition for the ballot. It was taken at the end of seven days. Opposed to Mr. Hastings, were thir-

thirteen Directors, the Rockingham party, ministerial influence, your friend General Smith, and many others, who were gaping for appointments to India; yet with every exertion, they ballotted Seventy-five. In his favour, I may perhaps count upon the good offices of your friend Lord North, who, I believe, thought the removal of Mr. Hastings at that moment would have been an act of madness. He was also supported by the influence of public opinion, and by the industry of his friends, who were active in refuting the infamous falsehoods hourly circulated to blast his character. In this they were so successful, that no less a number than Four Hundred and Twenty-eight ballotted in his favour; many of them, men of the first distinction in this kingdom; and a very large majority of them independent in their fortunes, and totally unconnected with the politics of India. It would be impertinent in me to mention the names of several gentlemen who appeared on that day, and balloted openly for Mr. Hastings; but you may rely upon this fact, that a greater number of Members of Parliament voted for Mr. Hastings's

ings's continuance, than were present when the House passed the resolution, which was to effect his recal: amongst them were some of the most respectable and independent members of both Houses, and some of the first characters in the kingdom not in Parliament, amongst whom I have a pride in including Sir Joseph Yorke.

You say farther, that "even since the beginning of this session, the same act of audacity was repeated." Good God, Sir, is this a language to hold in this free country? Does your being honoured with a seat in his Majesty's Privy Council, entitle you to abuse your fellow-subjects, for exercising their rights and privileges, because they do not square with your prejudices, or your interest? We were joined, Sir, in this "act of audacity," by one of the wonders of the age, General Oglethorpe, who took an active, unsolicited part, in support of an absent, and an injured man. Never was there a fuller, or a more respectable court assembled, than on this occasion. The motion of thanks was opposed; and your friend, Sir Henry Fletcher, stated the cession of

Broach



Broach (which he estimated at 200,000l. a year), as of force enough to counterbalance the merit of the Maratta peace. The proceedings of that day have been printed, and the public is satisfied that Mr. Hastings and the Supreme Council were fairly and justly entitled to the thanks of their constituents.

In a former part of my letter, I have proved how totally void of foundation your assertion is, "that India is governed by a rapid succession of boys." In your 94th page, you suppose one of these boys to return to this country loaded with "odium and with riches," "half a million perhaps." As I wish, if possible, to confine you to facts, I desire you will point out a single man to me, who has ever returned from India with half a million, except Lord Clive? I have heard that your friend, General Smith, brought what I call an immense fortune home with him, two hundred and fifty thousand pounds; perhaps he never possessed half the money. Two or three gentlemen who held very high and advantageous offices in Bengal, on the first acquisition of the Dewannee, are supposed

to

to have acquired very handsome fortunes ; but they have been so long in England, and the system is so totally changed since they were abroad, that we cannot mention them, or their fortunes, as applicable to the present times, with any more propriety, than the noble Earl at the head of your proposed commission displayed, when he read a letter from the interior parts of Bengal, dated 1769, in order to prove how oppressively the revenues were collected in 1783. Since the departure of Lord Clive from Bengal in 1767, there have been three Governors, Mr. Verelst, Mr. Cartier, and Mr. Hastings. It is remarkable that the two former gentlemen were poorer when they quitted, than when they succeeded to the government. Neither of them ever possessed one hundred thousand pounds, nor any thing like it ; and they are both highly esteemed for every amiable and praise-worthy quality : the latter is generally known by the title of the man of Kent, nor do I believe he has an enemy in the world. Mr. Hastings, I assure you, Sir, will be a fortunate man, if, after filling the government of Bengal above twelve years, he can realize one hundred

thousand pounds; and yet I have not lessened his fortune by "bribing gentlemen" to say he was an honest man, or a good Governor. I have, it is true, been at a considerable expence in sending him early intelligence of every material public event; and of the pitiful arts made use of to blast his reputation. But as the expence of sending dispatches to India has been borne by Mr. Hastings, and as they were sent by his directions, I have a particular pleasure in asserting, that he has been the means of putting an early stop to the calamities of war, and to the effusion of blood, in India. I sent an account of the peace to India over land. Mr. Wrexall wrote to Madras at the same time: but as I paid the expence of the express from Vienna to Constantinople, as the Tartars who conveyed the letters from Constantinople to Aleppo, and the Arabs who carried them from thence across the Desert to Bufforah, were employed by my correspondents, and their drafts for this service, about 200*l.* were discharged by me on Mr. Hastings's account, and by his directions, I think it but fair that he should have the credit of so meritorious an act.

With

With a view, I suppose, of affixing, in some degree, the charge of inconsistency upon Mr. Dundas, you say, "We have not forgot," and I hope he has not forgot, "the clear and forcible manner in which he stated that universal systematic breach of treaties, which has made the British faith proverbial in the East." No man, Sir, attended more diligently to every proceeding of Parliament, in which Mr. Hastings was concerned, than I have done. I think the Fifth and Sixth Reports of the Secret Committee are fairly and impartially drawn, (very different indeed from the infamous libels Mr. Debrett has published;) but I am free to say, that in the opinion of much wiser men than myself, the resolutions which passed the House of Commons cannot be fairly justified by any thing contained in those Reports. Upon political points very honourable and honest men may differ. Mr. Dundas had certainly conceived unfavourable impressions of the public conduct of Mr. Hastings in some instances: in others, however, he gave him great credit, in particular for his seasonable, wise, and spirited conduct on the first invasion of the Carnatic, and

in his negotiations with the Subah of the Deccan. Mr. Douglas finds now, that Mr. Hastings has not lost the confidence of the natives: he gives to him the credit of concluding the Maratta peace, and of furnishing supplies for supporting the war in the Carnatic. Will you be pleased, Sir, to make the wide distinction between your conduct and Mr. Douglas's: — He never pledged himself to God, the House of Commons, and his country, to prove Mr. Hastings the most notorious delinquent India ever saw — He never questioned his integrity — He disavowed, in the most solemn and public manner, every idea of removing Mr. Hastings upon any other ground than that of expediency — He professed a very high opinion of his abilities, and asserted, that, in many instances, he was a great and meritorious servant of the Company, though he conceived (erroneously I avow) that Mr. Hastings wished to extend the British dominions in India, which he wisely deemed to be improper policy. Whether the resolution which Mr. Douglas proposed in 1782, for the removal of Mr. Hastings, was wise, or unwise, proper, or improper, is not now of any consequence.

misdeeds have arisen in India; and every disaster from that country tends to convince every man, who is open to conviction, that the removal of Mr. Hastings in 1782 would have been highly politic, and might have been attended with the loss of India.

Solemnly as you are pledged to prove Mr. Hastings a most notorious delinquent, you and your friend, Mr. Fox, were as solemnly engaged to bring Lord North to punishment for the calamities he has brought upon this country. Let us, for God's sake, Sir, hear no more of these solemn pledges. The nation is disgusted with them. If you can bring a charge against Mr. Hastings, do it at once; and do not (to use your own words) treat him with unworthy and illiberal language, beyond all example of parliamentary liberty.

You have said, Sir, that Mr. Hastings domineers with an overbearing sway in the assemblies of his pretended masters; and, it is thought, in a degree, rash to venture to name his offences in the House of Commons. The first assertion, I positively

cively declare to be totally void of foundation. With regard to the second, I anxiously wish to hear his offences stated; but you well know, Sir, that his character has been infamously and shamefully traduced in the assembly you mention. I believe, indeed, some of his traducers have repented of *their rashness*; but that Mr. Hastings has a corrupt influence in Parliament, that he has brought in a single member, that he is supported by any means whatever except such as are strictly honourable, by the suffrages of honest and independent men, I solemnly deny. Sir Thomas Rumbold was present to plead his own cause, and I have heard him speak to the good sense and feeling of the House with great effect. But who have been the advocates of Mr. Hastings? Men entirely unconnected with him. Men who have no favours to ask from him, who are actuated wholly by pure and patriotic principles, and who observe, with indignation and regret, the continued, though unavailing, efforts of interested men to blast his well-earned fame, and to remove him from his station. Will you avow, Sir, that you are qualified to determine upon Mr. Hastings's

Hastings's offences, as you call them? Can any man be more interested in the removal and the ruin of Mr. Hastings than you are—solemnly pledged to prove his delinquency, and your family possessing the Tanjore Agency? Can General Smith be deemed a proper judge upon the question? Is it not a matter of public notoriety, that had Mr. Fox's bill passed, he was to have gone in a high station to India? Shall I prove the truth of this assertion? Will the General say his baggage was not packed up; or, will he deny, that he has talked of his speedy departure from England, not as a secret, but as a matter of public notoriety? If these facts are true, shall General Smith be deemed an impartial judge upon the question of Mr. Hastings's removal?

Speaking of Mr. Hastings, you say, "Observe, " Sir, the spirit of this man, (which if it were " not made manifest by a thousand things, and " particularly by his proceedings with regard to " Lord Macartney," &c. &c.) Indeed, Sir, it is rather unfair to offer insinuations of this kind. What do you mean by Mr. Hastings's proceedings with



with regard to Lord Macartney? Is it, that he disapproved of the cession of a part of the Carnatic to Tippoo Saib? Is it, that he opposed his Lordship's treatment of the Nabob? or what do you allude to? Mr. Hastings and Lord Macartney have had public differences. The representations of both parties are at the India House. Let them be fairly examined; but for God's sake, Sir, let neither be condemned by implication. The contemptuous expressions of "this man," falling from so violent a Party Man as Mr. Burke, will never injure Mr. Hastings.

In my Letter to Mr. Fox, I have fully explained Mr. Hastings's motives and wishes, for entering into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Marattas against Hyder Ally Cawn. You say, "that evasion and fraud were the declared basis of the Maratta treaty." Attend, I pray you, to the matter of fact. In consequence of the treaty Madajee Sindia wrote to Tippoo Saib, requiring him to accede to the terms of it. A general peace in India was earnestly wished for; but if Tippoo Saib determined, in conjunction with his French

French allies, to continue the war, was it not wise policy in the Supreme Council to multiply his enemies, and to attack him in every part. Your remarks on the proposed partition treaty are not warranted from the actual state of facts. We propose a treaty of partition—before it is concluded, we conquer a province. We reasonably suppose, that we have an exclusive right to this conquest; and we are not fully informed of the terms on which it was surrendered to our arms. We contend very reasonably, that we have an exclusive right to this province; but of so much importance do we deem the treaty of partition to our existence in India, that, to secure the execution of it, we are willing to divide this conquest with the Marattas. The half of Biddnore would have remained in our hands; and surely, Sir, this would have enabled us to offer an equivalent to Hyet Saib, for any deviation from the actual terms of the surrender. I am ashamed to reply to such palpable puerilities. Not having the most distant idea of the pacification in Europe, seeing that the French were pouring troops every day into the Carnatic, having authentic intelligence

I

that

that several French and Dutch ships were coming out to reinforce Mons. Suffrein, was Mr. Hastings, or was he not, to take every possible means to counteract so powerful a combination? Your profession, Sir, is talking—Mr. Hastings is the preserver of an empire.

I solemnly deny that the “Governor General” admits he has not been very delicate with regard “to public faith.” The letter to which you allude for proof of this assertion, is now before me; but will any other man say it can bear such a construction? General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, had censured the sale of Corah, the stoppage of the Mogul’s tribute, and the Rohilla war. Mr. Hastings having formerly answered each of these objections separately, stated in this letter the pecuniary advantages to the Company from these transactions; but, that in any one of them he violated a treaty, or made such an admission, I deny. You reason still more unfairly than Mr. Francis. That gentleman said, in a pamphlet he published soon after his arrival in England, that the bond debt, in Bengal, of a million

million sterling, and upwards, was paid off within a year after the arrival of General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis. Now, Sir, it is rather hard to abuse Mr. Hastings for providing the funds by which the debt was liquidated, and then modestly to assume the merit of paying it off. You say “as to the Marattas, they had “so many cross treaties with the States General of “that nation, and with each of the Chiefs, that it “was notorious, that no one of these agreements “could be kept without grossly violating the rest.” Will you be so good, Sir, to enlighten my understanding, by informing me, with whom these *cross treaties* were made? We concluded one treaty with Futty Sing; another with the Rana of Gohud; but I cannot conceive how these can be termed cross treaties. In the late war with the Marattas, we were principals, and not auxiliaries to Ragnaut Row. Mr. Hastings drew Madajee Sindia from Guzzerat, by invading Malwa, and by supporting the Rana of Gohud. From an enemy, Sindia became our instrument in concluding a general peace. You add, “It was observed that

“if the terms of the several treaties had been kept, two British armies would, at one and the same time, have met in the field to cut each others throats.” Do you assent to the truth of this remark? Never was an assertion more unfounded; and I believe it is now made for the first time. Mr. Dundas (if he is your authority) said, that had the treaty with Moodajee Boosla *been concluded* by the Supreme Council, in opposition to the treaty actually concluded at Bombay, with Ragenaut Row, two British armies might have met as enemies.

I am very unwilling to follow you again through the Benares business. If ever a subject was fully investigated, it is this. If ever the fallacious reasoning of your committee, and of your late faction in Leadenhall-street, was exposed, the writers of the letters signed “DETECTOR,” has fully refuted every thing you have asserted;—at present you have said nothing new. I ask you plainly, Sir, if Chéyt Sing did not owe his share of independence, his rank, and his possessions to the favour of the English. His father was, as  
Mr.

Mr. Hastings has stated in his Narrative, a mere aumil, or collector. If you discredit Mr. Hastings, you will believe Rajah Bulwant Sing. His own words, on the 21st of November 1764, to the Commander in Chief of our army, were, “ If “ you, gentlemen, choose to possess yourselves of “ Sujah Dowlah’s country, I will agree to hold “ the Sircars of Benares and Ghauzipore *on the same “ terms I hold them from Sujah Dowlah.*” This is not the proposal of a Zemindar, but of an aumil or collector. In another proposal he states, that these districts “ have been long under his jurisdiction.” And the fact is, that the father of Cheyt Sing was merely a collector, removeable at the pleasure of his master.

It is rather an unfortunate circumstance for your honourable friend Mr. Fox, that every thing he ventured to assert, in order to deceive and mislead the world, during the progress of his India Bill, is totally unfounded. We have advices from Madras of the 8th of September. Lord Macartney is not suspended, nor is he in any danger of sharing the fate of Lord Pigot. There is not an enemy in  
the

the Carnatic, Tanjore or the northern Circars. Tippoo Saib has expressed a sincere wish for peace, and *he has sent a Vackeel to Mr. Hastings in Calcutta*, to negotiate and settle the terms of it. He has written to Madajee Sindia on the same subject. We have advices from Bengal of the 9th of August. Peace and tranquillity reigned there, and in Oude. The army was reduced to a peace establishment; and retrenchments had been effected in every department of the government. How different the picture of your honourable friend! How calculated to deceive is Mr. Burke's Speech! as Mr. Doddsley is pleased to call it.

I hope and trust (and here again I use your own words) you, and the public, will give me credit, when I faithfully assure you that, in this reply, I have not refuted one fourth part of what I am able to refute. I am, in truth, afraid of fatiguing my readers; and I know very well, that orators by profession, have talked so often and so long, they are very ill attended to in the House, and scarcely thought of out of it. You have  
not

not been more injurious and unjust in your reflections upon Mr. Hastings, than you were fulsome in your panegyric upon Mr. Fox. Good God! to talk of Mr. Fox being a sufferer by popular delusions! Whether that gentleman authorized the delusions which were practised upon the public during the progress of his bill through the House of Commons, or not, you must know better than I do; but read, I pray you, the newspapers for November and December; read the ministerial speeches of those months, and then tell me who had recourse to popular delusions. Was the publication of the 11th Report of the Select Committee, without an appendix, done with an intent to delude the public or not? Was the publication of a letter from the Vizier to Mr. Hastings, in every newspaper in England, with an omission of the date (1779) done with an intent to delude the public or not? Was a fallacious statement of the Company's affairs, made to delude the public or not? Was Sir Henry Fletcher's assertion, that Mr. Hastings had proposed the suspension of Lord Macartney, intended to delude the public or not? Was his



false statement of the value of Broach, intended to delude the public, or not? I could mention a hundred other instances of arts practised to blind the public, and to hurry the India Bill through the several branches of the Legislature, before its fatal tendency could be fully discovered. This cannot now happen. The East-India Company and Mr. Hastings have a common cause with the people of England. As robbery and injustice were said by you to be the motive and end of Lord North's bill of 1773, what will the nation think of the scheme of 1783? The British nation is roused from its lethargy; and however your friends may fare in the general struggle for offices, the India Bill is happily lost for ever.

A stranger reading your speech, would conclude, from the contemptuous manner in which you mention the name of the Governor General, when you speak of the prosperity of "Benfield, Hastings, and others of that sort," that he was some low fellow, who, by a strange and whimsical turn of fortune, had got possession of a very high office in the state. If any of your own particular friends come under such a descrip-

description, Mr. Hastings certainly does not. He is descended from one of the most ancient, and honourable families in this kingdom. He received the best of educations at Westminster, is cotemporary with Lord Stormont, and many other very honorable characters in the kingdom. He became a civil servant of the Company above thirty-four years ago ; has filled several very high and important stations in India ; and has enjoyed the first office in the gift of this country nearly twelve years. Is it decent, Sir, is it proper, to speak so contemptuously of such a man ? Or, admitting, that, in the heat of debate, you had forgot yourself, surely you cannot justify your conduct, in coolly and deliberately composing such contemptible reflections, for the perusal of the public.

The opening of your speech is grave and solemn. " We are on a conspicuous stage, and " the world marks our demeanour." I readily allow it. The European world has beheld, with astonishment, the treatment which Mr. Hastings has received, and the pains which a Faction in

this country has taken to lose India. The absurdity of our conduct cannot escape the observation of any man of common sense, in any quarter of the globe. I copy, for your instruction, the following paragraphs of two letters which I received from Fort St. George, by the Medea. The letters are dated the 2d and 6th of September, and were written by an officer who has served the Company sixteen years. He had the honour to be distinguished by that gallant old general, Sir Eyre Coote, under whose command he served, upon the coast, at the head of one of the Bengal regiments ; and I can assure you, Sir, that the writer of the letters never received a favour from Mr. Hastings in his life.

“ Camp at the Mount, September 2, 1782.

“ WE now hear that Mr. Hastings will be  
 “ succeeded, or superseded, by Lord Carlisle.  
 “ If I judge aright, Mr. Hastings was not so  
 “ anxious to remain Governor General, as to pre-  
 “ vent his enemies from driving him from the  
 “ chair in disgrace, which, I judge, has been  
 “ accomplished, and that he may now return  
 “ to

“ to England, without being reproached with  
 “ criminality; and, as for the success of his  
 “ measures, they will appear in a more favour-  
 “ able point of view than was expected, as there  
 “ is a prospect of a speedy and general peace in  
 “ India, in the accomplishment of which he has  
 “ certainly a very great share of merit. I believe  
 “ the people at home were so infatuated as to sup-  
 “ pose that the wars in this country were kept up,  
 “ merely from the arbitrary and base measures of  
 “ our rulers in India, and that a few invectives  
 “ thrown out in the House of Commons, and a  
 “ disavowal of the conduct of the Company’s  
 “ servants, would at once bring about a peace;  
 “ but surely they mistake these matters. The  
 “ same over-grown power which attracted the  
 “ notice, and inspired the jealousy, of the Euro-  
 “ pean nations, had the same effect in India.  
 “ Moderation and justice are amiable qualities,  
 “ and should never be forgotten either in private  
 “ or public life; but they almost cease to be vir-  
 “ tues when exercised or professed in the hour of  
 “ misfortune only. Let us retrieve the honour of  
 “ our arms, whatever may be the opinion of men  
 “ respect-

“ respecting the cause of our present troubles ;  
 “ and when we have nothing to fear, let us be  
 “ just, and even generous.”

(The Crocodile frigate arrived at Madras the  
 9th of September. She carried an account of  
 your coalition with Lord North, and that Mr.  
 Fox meant to bring forward India affairs last  
 year, and to send out new men to Bengal.)

“ 6th September, 1783.

“ We are confounded by a variety of regula-  
 “ tions, both here and at home. The whole  
 “ system is enervated by such unsteady mea-  
 “ sures. The minds of black and white are kept  
 “ in a continual state of suspense ; and the bands,  
 “ which formerly united them, are quite unstrung.  
 “ A most unfortunate period has been chosen for  
 “ new modeling the affairs of India. The news  
 “ flies about, and contending powers, with great  
 “ reason, fear to negotiate with a Government  
 “ on the eve of its decease.”

If you were to call any gentlemen before you, who have lately arrived from India, I fancy, Sir, they would subscribe to the justice of the writer's sentiments. How repeatedly has Mr. Hastings called upon the Government of this country either to remove or to support him ! Does any man living wish more sincerely for a decision than he does ? Give him but a fair trial, if you mean to remove him on the ground of delinquency, and I ask no more. Prove the expediency of removing him, and appoint a successor, without the loss of a moment ; — but do not continue him in possession of the first office under the British empire, and rail at him in terms which would disgrace an inhabitant of Billingsgate.

I have now lying before me a large octavo, marked “ Burke's Tracts,” and printed by Mr. Doddsley. I find in some of these tracts, sentiments so exceedingly different from many parts of the present speech, that I am half inclined to think Mr. Doddsley has borrowed your name to aid the sale of the rhapsody I have been commenting upon. If so, you will pardon the freedom

dom of my remarks: but if you have really authorised Mr. Doddsley to print the speech, if you avow it to be your own composition, I take upon me to say, in the words of Mr. Dallas, that from the first page to the last I can detect "insinuation without ground, assertion without proof, facts without evidence; language unwarrantably construed; unjust inferences, and unfair conclusions."

I have the honour to be,

S I R,

Your most obedient

And most humble Servant,

**JOHN SCOTT.**

---

QUEEN'S SQUARE,  
11th January, 1784.

**BOOKS** printed for J. DEBRETT, opposite Burlington-House, in Piccadilly.

*This Day is published, Price One Shilling,*

Being the Fourth Number of the present Session,

**C**ontaining the Debates in the HOUSE of LORDS on the East-India Bill; including the Speeches of the LORD CHANCELLOR, the DUKE of RICHMOND, and LORD LOUGHBOROUGH, the EARLS FITZWILLIAM, DERBY, ABINGDON, and TEMPLE, LORDS SYDNEY and GRANTLEY, &c. together with the celebrated Protests of 1773, which were alluded to by the DUKE of RICHMOND, also the Petitions from the CITY of LONDON and the East-India Company to the House of Lords, of

The PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER.

Number LXXXIV. from the last General Election, and Number IV. of the present Session.

*Of whom may be had,*

The PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER of the last Parliament, from the General Election in 1774 to the Dissolution in 1780, in Seventeen Volumes, price Six Guineas.

The First and Second Session of the present Parliament, in Eight Volumes, Price Three Guineas.

The Third (or last) Session of the present Parliament, in Three Volumes, Price 1l 4s. All half-bound and lettered.

The three preceding Numbers of the present Session, Price 1s. each.

\* \* Those Gentlemen who want any particular Numbers to compleat their Setts, are earnestly desired to order them as speedily as possible.

*This Day is published,*

Neatly printed in Six Volumes, Price 18s. sewed,  
[A NEW EDITION, considerably improved and enlarged, in which is inserted several curious Pieces, by Lady Craven, the Marquis of Carmarthen, the Earls of Carlisle, Buchan, Nugent; the Lords Palmerstone, Mulgrave, Holland; Sir J. Moore, Right Hon. C. J. Fox, Right Hon. R. Fitzpatrick, Hon. Temple Luttrell, Sir W. Jones, Dr. B. Franklin, J. Wilkes, D. Garrick, R. B. Sheridan, J. Courtney, W. Hayley, J. S. Hall, C. Anstey, C. Whitfoord, Sir Charles Hanbury Williams, Mr. Gray, Mr. Mason, G. Ellis, R. Cumberland, B. Edwards, Capt. E. Thomson, &c. &c. which were not in a former Edition; together with  
several



## 2 BOOKS PRINTED FOR J. DEBRET.

several Pieces, now first printed from the Authors' Manuscripts; the whole carefully revised, arranged, and corrected] of  
**THE NEW FOUNDLING HOSPITAL FOR WIT.**  
 Being a Collection of Fugitive Pieces in Prose and Verse, not in any other Collection.

*This Day are published, in two large Volumes, 8mo. Price 6s. in boards,*

[Written by JOHN ABERCROMBIE; Author of EVERY MAN HIS OWN GARDENER, and ornamented with an Head of the Author, engraved, by WALKER,]

**THE PROPAGATION and BOTANICAL ARRANGEMENTS of PLANTS and TREES**, useful and ornamental, proper for Cultivation in every Department of Gardening; Nurseries, Plantations, and Agriculture. Containing the fullest Practical Directions for raising all Plants, Trees, Flowers, Fruits, &c. now first thoroughly explained. Together with the completest systematic display of all the cultivated species, and varieties of plants, &c. &c. Both herbaceous and woody kind, hardy and tender; all arranged in their proper genera, or families; with their Botanic, Latin, and English names; and, in the greater part, specific descriptions, and the native places of growth; comprised in eight divisions, viz.

Kitchen Garden Plants,

Fruit Trees,

Forest and Ornamental Trees and Shrubs,

Perennial & Biennial Flower Plants,

Annual Flower Plants,

Green-House Plants,

Hot-House Plants,

Plants belonging to Agriculture.

And under each division, general observations on the nature of growth, methods of propagation, culture, &c. of the respective Plants.

The whole forming a very necessary and useful Companion to all Gardeners, Nurserymen, Florists, Botanists, Planters, Seedsmen, Farmers; and every one in any way concerned, either in the cultivation or economical uses, &c. of the Vegetable Kingdom.

**A NARRATIVE of the TRANSACTIONS in Bengal during the Administration of Mr. HASTINGS.** By Major JOHN SCOTT. Second Edition, with considerable Additions. Price 2s. 6d.

**Proceedings at a General Court of Proprietors of East-India Stock,** respecting the Hon. WARREN HASTINGS, Governor General. Price 3s.

**An authentic Account of the Debates in the House of Lords on the East-India Bill,** on the 9th, 15th, and 17th of December; to which are added, accurate Lists of the Divisions. Price 2s. 6d.

The





