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CHAPTERS

MODERN HISTORY

BRITISH INDIA.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE following Chapters are designed to furnish an account of the most interesting events in the History of British India, during a period of nearly thirty years, which elapsed between the close of the administration of the Marquess Wellesley and the relinquishment of trade by the East-India Company.

Nothing need be said in vindication of the design. The period chosen for illustration is one fraught with much calculated to excite the feelings, and to give exercise to the powers of reflection. With regard to the execution, the Author would only observe, that he has laboured assiduously to ensure accuracy as to facts; and that the opinions interspersed, whatever their value, are in every instance the honest result of careful and unbiassed consideration. His

sole objects have been to relate the truth, and to render justice to all. In some of the chapters comments will be found more sparingly interspersed than in others; the reason is, that the Author was anxious to offer no opinions of the soundness of which he did not feel entirely convinced; and where he has been unable to divest his mind of doubt, he has abstained from any attempt to influence the judgment of the Reader.

The arrangement differs from that usually adopted in historical works. Each chapter, instead of comprehending all the events which took place within a given period of time, is devoted to a particular series of events connected with each other by succession, and by their relation to a common object. The presumed advantages of this plan are, that it allows of the exclusion of occurrences comparatively trifling and unimportant, while it gives to each narrative a unity and distinctness which could not otherwise be secured. Whether these advantages are sufficient to warrant the deviation from ordinary practice, is a question which the Author will not discuss. He is satisfied with stating the motives and reasons which have led to the departure.

It is proper to observe, that the volume now submitted does not profess to contain a complete History of British India during the period chosen, but only portions of its history. It will be manifest, also, that the events selected as subject for the various chapters are apparently of very un-

equal degrees of importance. Those, however, which seem to possess the humblest pretensions, have not been taken up without reference to the illustration of some great principle of legislation or government—a purpose which, if effected, confers both dignity and interest upon events which, in themselves, are but of secondary importance.

CHAPTER I.

THE MUTINY OF VELLORE.

THE extraordinary fact, that England maintains her empire in the East principally by means of a native army, renders the connexion between the ruling powers and the military, one of extreme delicacy. One great point of reliance, which is afforded by almost every other army, is wanting in that of India. The pride of country offers one of the best securities for the fidelity of the soldier, and all judicious commanders are well aware of the importance of preserving it unimpaired. In India, the case is different. The national feeling of the troops can afford no ground of confidence; whatever portion of this quality they may happen to possess, must operate to the prejudice of their rulers. The men who govern India are not natives of India; strangers to the soil command the obedience of its sons, and if national pride entered largely into the

character of the natives, that obedience, if yielded at all, would be yielded reluctantly. Generally, in India, this feeling is any thing but strong; and its place is occupied by a sense of the benefits derived by the individual from the maintenance of the European supremacy, combined with a somewhat indefinite, and perhaps almost superstitious feeling of respect for the people who, within the compass of a very brief period, have, as if by enchantment, become masters of an empire splendid beyond comparison with any other ever held in a condition of dependency by a foreign state. Yet, with all the allowances that must be made on the grounds of selfishness, and admiration, and fear, it must not be supposed that natives always look on the existing state of things with entire satisfaction. It is not easy for the Mahomedan to forget that, very recently, men of his own race and creed wielded the sceptre which is now transferred to Europeans; and though the passive character of the Hindoo, and the estrangement from political power consequent upon the previous subjugation of his country, may generally be sufficient to preclude him from meditating schemes of conquest and reprisal, he is under the influence of other feelings little calculated to promote military subordination or secure military fidelity. The pride of caste, and the bigotted attachment with which the Hindoo clings to an unsocial superstition, which interferes with almost

every action of daily life, have a direct tendency to foster habits which in Europe must be regarded as altogether inconsistent with the character of a soldier. Between an army composed of Hindoos and Mahomedans, and the Europeans who command them, there can be but little community of feeling. Differing, as they do, in country, in religious belief, in habits of life, in form and complexion, they have not even the bond of a common tongue; the European officers generally possessing but a slender knowledge of the languages of the men under their command, and the men no knowledge at all of the language of their officers. The elements of discontent are, therefore, sufficiently powerful, while the means of allaying it are small; and it is obvious that, in an army so constituted, vigilance must never for a moment be permitted to slumber. This important truth can never be lost sight of without endangering the safety of the British dominion in India, and, by consequence, the well-being of the people committed to its care.

The event which forms the subject of this chapter occurred shortly after the retirement of the Marquess Wellesley from the scene where he had acted so brilliant a part. His splendid career in India had closed too soon for the interests of his country,*

* The period at which these recollections commence precludes the possibility of any attempt to do justice to the matchless union of genius, judgment, and energy displayed by the Marquess Wellesley in his administration of the government of

and the appointment of governor-general was provisionally held by Sir George Barlow. A later governor-general, Lord William Bentinck, administered the affairs of Fort St. George. It was at a station under that presidency that those disastrous occurrences took place, which at the time excited no inconsiderable alarm both in India and at home, and which are recorded in characters of blood.

India. Happily it is rendered unnecessary by the recent publication of his important and valuable Official Papers, which have admitted the reader into the council-chamber and the closet of the most distinguished statesman of modern times, and which will expound to future generations, not his actions merely, but the motives and views under which they were performed. The singular lot of this eminent servant of his country may be regarded as truly enviable. The advanced age which he has attained has enabled him to receive in person that tardy justice, which is seldom meted out to the truly great until they have been removed from the scene of their labours. The feeling called forth by this extraordinary circumstance may best be described in his own beautiful language, in acknowledging an honorary grant from the East-India Company, in testimony of their mature estimation of the value of his services:—"To such an extent have my days been prolonged, that I have seen my Indian administration tried by the unerring test of time, and subjected to the ordeal of a new age and of a new generation. After the lapse of thirty years—after all my principles, motives, and views, have been fully disclosed, and all their results and consequences fully ascertained and proved, the Company has awarded to me a meed of fame which gives to living honour all the weight and authority of a judgment of posterity."—*Letter to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the East-India Company, 18th Nov.* 1837.

In the spring of 1806, symptoms of insubordination were manifested by a part of the troops under the presidency. They seem scarcely to have excited the degree of attention which they called for: and at the very moment when the authorities were congratulating themselves upon their entire suppression, Vellore became the scene of open mutiny and ferocious massacre.

The ostensible cause of the disturbance was a partial change in the dress of the troops. The old turban had been thought inconvenient, and it was proposed to replace it by one lighter, and better adapted to the military character. The alteration was recommended by two officers of long experience in the Company's service, was sanctioned by the commander-in-chief, Sir John Cradock, and finally was submitted to the governor, Lord William Bentinck, who approved it, and ordered the new turban to be adopted by a corps of fencibles under his own especial command. The use of this turban, however, either actually violated the prejudices of the men, or was seized upon by designing agitators as affording the means of exciting disaffection to the European authorities. Acts of insubordination occurred connected with an alleged reluctance to the adoption of the new turban. Neglected for a time, it at length became impossible to avoid noticing them. They were confined principally to two battalions of different regiments;—one of them stationed at

Vellore, the other at Wallajahbad. The irregularities were more general, as well as more marked, in the battalion stationed in the former place, and when they attracted attention, it was deemed inexpedient to suffer the battalion to remain there. It was accordingly ordered to proceed to the presidency, where a court-martial was assembled for the trial of two men, whose conduct had been especially reprehensible. They were convicted, and sentenced to corporal punishment. At Wallajahbad, a native subahdar, who had been guilty of apparent connivance at the disorderly proceedings which had taken place, was summarily dismissed from the service, and, on the recommendation of the commander at that station, three companies of European troops were marched thither from Poonamallee. The intimations of disorder now appeared to subside at both places. The commanding officer of the battalion stationed at Vellore reported it to be in as perfect a state of discipline as any other native corps on the establishment. At Wallajahbad subordination appeared to be entirely restored. A general order had been prepared, for the purpose of removing any apprehensions which the native troops might entertain as to future interference with their religious prejudices; but the apparent calm lulled the authorities into a persuasion of security, and it was deemed judicious to suspend the publication of the order.

The seeming tranquillity was deceitful. The assurance of the re-establishment of discipline at Vellore, conveyed from that station to the commander-in-chief, and by him forwarded to the Government, reached the presidency on the 10th of July, and, on the same day, the smouldering embers of sedition and mutiny burst into a flame. Early in the morning of that day, the native troops rose against the European part of the garrison, consisting of two companies of his Majesty's 69th regiment, whom, with every other European within their reach, they doomed to indiscriminate slaughter. The attack was totally unexpected, and consequently no preparations had been made for resisting it. The hour chosen by the conspirators, two o'clock in the morning, was well adapted to their murderous intentions, the execution of them being aided by darkness, and by the fact of a considerable portion of their destined victims being asleep. But, notwithstanding all these unfavourable circumstances, the British troops did not dishonour their country. For a considerable time they maintained possession of the barracks, exposed to a heavy fire from their assailants. When this position became no longer tenable, a part of the garrison effected their escape to the ramparts of the fortress, where they established themselves, and of which they retained possession for several hours after all the officers of the corps had been killed or disabled, and

after their ammunition had been entirely ex-

About four hours after the commencement of the attack, intelligence of it was received by Colonel Gillespie, at the cantonment of Arcot, a distance of about sixteen miles, and that officer immediately put in motion the greater part of the troops at his disposal, consisting of the 19th regiment of Dragoons and some Native Cavalry, of the strength of about 450 men. Putting himself at the head of one squadron of dragoons and a troop of native cavalry, he proceeded with the greatest celerity to Vellore, leaving the remainder of the troops to follow with the guns under Lieut.-Colonel Kennedy. On his arrival Colonel Gillespie effected a junction with the gallant residue of the 69th; but it was found impracticable to obtain any decisive advantage over the insurgents until the arrival of the remainder of the detachment, which reached Vellore about ten o'clock. The main object then was to reduce the fort. The mutineers directed their powerful force to the defence of the interior gate, and, on the arrival of the guns, it was resolved that they should be directed to blowing it open, preparatory to a charge of the cavalry, to be aided by a charge of the remnant of the 69th, under the personal command of Colonel Gillespie. These measures were executed with great precision and bravery. The gate was forced open by the fire of the guns;—a combined attack by the

European troops and the native cavalry followed, which, though made in the face of a severe fire, ended in the complete dispersion of the insurgents, and the restoration of the fort to the legitimate authorities. About 350 of the mutineers fell in the attack, and about 500 were made prisoners in Vellore and in various other places to which they had fled.

The number of Europeans massacred by the insurgents amounted to 113. Among them were Colonel Fancourt and thirteen other officers. Vellore was the only station disgraced by open revolt and massacre; the symptoms of disaffection manifested at Wallajahbad, Hyderabad, and other places, were by seasonable and salutary precautions suppressed. In some instances, the murderous proceedings at Vellore impressed the commanding officers at other stations with such an undue degree of apprehension, as to lead them to disarm their native troops without sufficient cause—an unreasonable suspicion thus succeeding to an unreasonable confidence. Indeed, the European officers seem generally to have taken but small pains to inform themselves of the feelings and dispositions of the native troops. Looking at the events which preceded the unhappy affair at Vellore, it seems impossible to avoid feeling surprise at the unconsciousness and security displayed by the European authorities up to the moment of the frightful explosion. No apprehension appears

to have been entertained, although the massacre was preceded by circumstances abundantly sufficient to justify it; and though the approaching danger was not left to be inferred from circumstances. Positive testimony as to the treacherous intentions of the native troops was tendered, but, unfortunately, treated with disregard and contempt.

Amidst the disgusting exhibition of almost universal treachery, a solitary instance of fidelity to the ruling powers occurred, and the name of Mustapha Beg deserves on this account to be recorded. This man, who had become acquainted with a part, if not the whole, of the designs of the conspirators, proceeded on the night of the 16th of June to the house of one of the officers of the garrison, and there stated that the Mussulmans of the battalion had united to attack the barracks, and kill all the Europeans, on account of the turban. The course taken upon this occasion by the officer to whom the communication was made, was certainly, under the circumstances, an extraordinary one: he referred the matter to the native officers, and they reported that no objection existed to the use of the turban. One of the parties implicated admitted having used certain expressions attributed to him, but gave them an interpretation which rendered them harmless; and the evidence of the informant was alleged to be unworthy of credit—first, on the ground of general bad character; and secondly,

because he laboured under the infirmity of madness. The charge of habitual drunkenness, which was brought against Mustapha Beg, was certainly not sufficient to warrant the rejection of his evidence without further inquiry; and the imputation of madness appears never to have been thought of before, but to have been fabricated at the moment for the especial purpose of destroying the force of his testimony. That it should have obtained the implicit belief and acquiescence of the European officer in command is inexplicable upon any reasonable grounds. The men who made the charge had a direct interest in establishing it—something more, therefore, than mere assertion was requisite before it could reasonably be credited; yet no evidence that Mustapha Beg had ever previously displayed symptoms of insanity seem to have been afforded, or even required. His story was at once rejected as the effusion of a distempered mind, and thus success was ensured to the atrocious design, which a rational caution might have frustrated. The degree of information possessed by Mustapha Beg has been the subject of question. It has been said that he knew much more than he avowed; that he was, in fact, acquainted with the entire plans and objects of the conspirators, and studiously concealed a part of them. This may be true, inasmuch as, in most cases, it is nearly impossible for any degree of labour or ingenuity to draw from a native

witness "the whole truth;" but it must be remembered that this charge rests upon testimony in no way preferable to that of Mustapha Beg himself; and, if well-founded, the fact of the informer concealing a part of what he knew, cannot justify the unaccountable inattention displayed towards that which he revealed.

The communication made by Mustapha Beg was disregarded, and the massacre of Vellore followed. This event, in connexion with the insubordination displayed at other stations, demanded careful and minute inquiry as to the cause. The greatest confidence had been reposed in the native troops; that confidence had been continued even after much had occurred which ought to have shaken it; but the disaffection of a part of the troops was no longer matter of mere report or mere suspicion—it had been manifested too plainly and too terribly to admit of denial or of doubt. The Government, therefore, now commenced the business of inquiry in earnest.

From the national characteristics of the native troops, it must be always a work of some difficulty to trace their actions and impressions to their genuine origin. The obnoxious turban was put forward as the main ground of dissatisfaction, combined with some orders which had been recently issued, by which the men, when on duty, were forbidden to wear on their faces certain marks of caste, and were required to trim their

beards in a uniform manner. It appears that the latter regulations were not altogether new: they had been enforced in certain regiments and neglected in others, and the orders only required a general conformity to practices which had for some time been partially adopted. The objection to the new turban (as far as any sincere objection was felt at all) lay principally with the Mahomedans, who thought themselves degraded by being required to wear any thing approaching in appearance to an European hat. The restrictions in regard to marks of caste were applicable to the Hindoos; but the regulations relating to the beard seem to have been obnoxious to both classes. As the two officers, by whose recommendation the regulations were adopted, had been long in the Company's service, it may seem that they ought to have been better acquainted with the feelings and prejudices of the native troops than to have risked the affections of the army, and the consequent safety of the British dominion, upon a point so perfectly trifling as a change of dress. As far, however, as the turban is concerned, it is but justice to those officers to state, that they appear to have had little reason to apprehend any opposition to its introduction, and still less to anticipate the criminal excesses for which it afforded a pretext. The proposed change was long a matter of publicity. In the first instance, three turbans were made, and three men—a Mahomedan,

a Rajpoot, and a Gentoo—wore them at the presidency for inspection. These men declared that they preferred them to the old ones. The pattern turbans were afterwards publicly exhibited at the adjutant-general's office, where they were seen by officers and men of all ranks and classes. The new turban bore a near resemblance to that which had been long worn by one of the battalions of Native Infantry; in another regiment, one of the battalions wore a turban little differing from a Scottish bonnet, and turbans not very dissimilar were in use in various regiments. With such precedents, it might have been presumed that no resistance would have been offered to an innovation calculated materially to promote the comfort of the men. On the other points, it is not perhaps easy to acquit the framers of the regulation of having somewhat rashly impaired the real efficiency of the army, from an over-anxious desire to improve its appearance. The Hindoos are, of all people upon the earth, the most alive to any interference with their superstitious observances. This fact must have been familiar to officers of so much experience as those who proposed the offensive orders, and to outrage the feelings of the troops for no better purpose than to render their appearance more agreeable to the eye of military taste, was ill-advised and imprudent. Yet, though this gave considerable offence —and, if the prejudices of the Hindoos are to be

respected, the feeling of offence was not unwarranted—it was not the main cause of the mutiny; for it appears that few of the Hindoos joined in it except by the instigation of the Mahomedans. The latter class were every where the promoters of the disturbances, and it remains to be seen by what motives they were actuated.

The Mahomedans objected to the new turban, and this led the Hindoos to dwell upon their own grievances; but the turban itself was but a pretext, artfully used by the emissaries of those hostile to the British sway, to excite discontent and rebellion. The native officers, both before and after the occurrences at Vellore, declared that there was nothing in the new turban inconsistent with the laws and usages of their religion, or in any way degrading to those who were required to wear it; and the chief conspirator at Vellore, a few days previously to the insurrection, being questioned by his commanding officer as to the existence of dissatisfaction, offered, in the presence of the other native officers, to place the *Koran* on his head and swear that there was none, and that the whole corps were prepared to wear the turban. The feeling against it was certainly far from universal; for, in many instances, much alacrity was shewn in adopting it; and, after the mutiny, some corps requested permission to wear it as a testimony of their unshaken fidelity. Something, indeed, must be allowed for the habitual dissimu-

lation which is one of the national characteristics; but all the evidence tends to show that, had no political causes intervened, the change would have been effected as quietly as others had been, which in themselves were more likely to give offence. But Vellore was, at that time, the seat of deep and dark intrigues, directed to the destruction of the British Government, and the elevation of a Mahomedan sovereignty upon its ruins. The fortress of Vellore was the residence of the sons of Tippoo Sultan, and the whole neighbourhood swarmed with the creatures of the deposed family. The choice of this place for their abode was an injudicious one, and the circumstances under which they were permitted to reside there enhanced the dangers arising from their situation. An extravagant revenue had been placed at their disposal, which enabled them to purchase the services of a host of retainers—an advantage which they did not neglect. Many were to be found who, from old associations, possessed a feeling of attachment to the family of Tippoo; many more who, from religious bigotry, or other motives, were willing to engage in any scheme having for its object the destruction of a European and Christian power; and a still greater number ready to sell themselves to the best bidder, and to lend their assistance to any cause in the prosperity of which they hoped to participate. The Mahomedan power had declined with extraordinary rapidity, and the number

of those whose fortunes had declined with it was considerable. Many of these persons had entered the army of the conquerors; and our own ranks thus comprehended a body of men, whose feelings and whose interests were arrayed against us. Over every class of those who cherished sentiments of discontent, or hopes of advantage from change, the sons of Tippoo were imprudently allowed the means of establishing and retaining unbounded influence. The place chosen for their residence was in the immediate neighbourhood of their former grandeur—the restraint under which they were placed, of the mildest character—the accommodation provided for them, of the most splendid description—their allowances on a scale of Oriental magnificence. The imprudent bounty of the British Government thus furnished them with an almost unlimited command of the means of corruption, and enabled them to add to the stimulus of hope, the more powerful temptation of immediate reward. These opportunities and advantages they abundantly improved, and the consequence was, that, in the town and garrison of Vellore, their numerical strength was greater than that of the Government which held them in captivity.

It appears that not fewer than 3,000 Mysoreans settled in Vellore and its vicinity subsequently to its becoming the abode of the princes; that the number of their servants and adherents in the Pettah amounted to about 1,800; that the general

population of the place had astonishingly increased, and that some hundreds of persons were destitute of any visible means of subsistence. These were circumstances which ought to have excited suspicion—which ought to have called forth vigour: unfortunately, they were regarded with apathy. Instead of the strict and vigilant superintendence which ought to have been exercised over such a population in such a place, there is the strongest ground for concluding that the utmost laxity prevailed. It is clear that, for the purposes of security, the military power ought to have been paramount; but authority was at Vellore so much divided as to destroy all unity of purpose, all energy, and nearly all responsibility. The commanding officer, of course, controlled the troops—the collector was charged with the care of the police—and the paymaster of stipends with the custody of the princes. This was a departure from the original plan by which the whole of those duties had been entrusted to the military commander, and the change was far from judicious.

With so many chances in their favour, the sons of Tippoo were not likely to be very scrupulous in availing themselves of the opportunities which fortune had thrown in their way; and that, at least, two of them were implicated in the atrocities, is beyond question. The connexion of those events with simultaneous disturbances at Hyderabad, and other places, was not distinctly traced; but there

can be little doubt of their having originated in the same cause, and little danger of error in treating them all as ramifications of the same conspiracy. The means resorted to of exciting disaffection were invariably the same. The changes of dress, which, but for the sinister arts employed to pervert them, would have attracted no more attention than matters so trivial demanded, were declared to be part of an organized plan for forcing Christianity *on the troops* and the people. The turban was held up to their hatred as a Christian hat, as the turnscrew attached to the forepart of the uniform was converted into a cross, the symbol of the Christian faith. Even the practice of vaccination, which had been for some time introduced, was represented as intended to advance the cause of Christianity. The reports, circulated for the purpose of inflaming the minds of the people, differed only in the greater or less extent of their demands upon popular credulity. At Hyderabad, the most outrageous rumours were propagated and believed. Among other extravagances, it was currently reported that the Europeans were about to make a human sacrifice, in the person of a native; that a hundred bodies without heads were lying along the banks of the Moose river; that the Europeans had built a church, which it required a sacrifice of human heads to sanctify; and that they designed to massacre all the natives except those who should erect the sign of the cross on the

doors of their dwellings. Superstitious feeling was assailed in every practicable way. Fanatical mendicants prowled about, scattering the seeds of sedition and revolt, and astrology was called in to predict the downfal of the Europeans and the ascendancy of Mussulman power.

Such means could not fail to operate powerfully upon the minds of an ignorant and bigoted people, accessible to the belief of any reports, however improbable or absurd, if addressed to their religious prejudices: and the effects of the poison attested the skill with which it had been prepared. To an European, the very imputation of an intention on the part of the Government to interfere with the religion of the people of India, excluding all consideration of the means by which it was supported, can appear only ridiculous. No government has ever exercised such perfect toleration, or displayed so much tenderness towards religions differing from those of the governors, as that of the British in India. Indulgence has been pushed even to excess—the most horrible atrocities were long allowed to be perpetrated with impunity, from a fear of giving offence to the votaries of the gloomy creed in which they originated. Impartial observers have sometimes complained of the indifference of the ruling powers to the cause of Christianity; but never has there been a shadow of reason for ascribing to them an indiscreet zeal to accelerate its progress. Towards the

native troops, especially, the greatest forbearance has been uniformly manifested, and the strictness of military discipline has been in various points relaxed, in order to avoid offence to the prevailing superstitions. The European servants of the Company have rigidly pursued the course prescribed by the supreme authority. Their own religious observances, when attended to, have been unmarked by ostentation, and unmixed with any spirit of proselytism. At the time of the unfortunate disturbances, no missionary of the English nation had exercised his office in that part of the Indian empire where they occurred. In the interior there was no provision whatever for Christian worship; and the Commander-in-chief stated it to be a melancholy truth, that so unfrequent were the religious observances of the officers doing duty with battalions, that the sepoys had not long discovered the nature of the religion professed by the English. These circumstances did not, however, secure the Government from a suspicion of intending to force the profession of Christianity upon the natives; for, though the originators and leaders of the conspiracy well knew the falsehood of the imputation, it was, no doubt, believed by many who were induced to unite with them. The undeviating policy of the Government ought to have exempted it from such suspicion—the absurdity of the means by which it was alleged to be intended to effect the

object, was sufficient to discredit the charge, had it been sanctioned by probability; but fanaticism does not reason: any report that falls in with its prejudices is eagerly received and implicitly credited.

The mutiny at Vellore may be regarded, indeed, as conveying a lesson of caution as to the adoption of any measures that may be construed by the people as an invasion of their religious feelings. But the means by which it was produced offer a lesson of another kind—they prove that it is utterly impossible for a Government, however scrupulous, to escape calumny—that bigots, and designing men who appeal to the bigotry of others in behalf of personal objects, will misrepresent and pervert the most harmless and best-intentioned acts—that all undue concession, all surrender of principle, is as useless as it is weak and humiliating—that the proper course to pursue is to "be just and fear not"—to do what is right, and trust with confidence to the result.

The mutineers were quickly overcome, and order was re-established in the fortress. But the difficulties of Government did not end with the suppression of the external indications of dissatisfaction. The Regulations which had furnished a pretext for the perpetration of so much crime and mischief, were still in force, and it was a matter of some delicacy to determine how to deal with them. Every course that could be suggested was

open to serious objections, and great calmness and great sagacity were required in making a selection. To discuss at length the wisdom of the chosen line of policy would occupy too much space. It may suffice to say that, conciliation being thought expedient, the Regulations were abandoned: and though it may be urged that this was almost a matter of necessity, under the circumstances which existed, still it was not unattended with danger, from the evil precedent which it afforded of a concession extorted by mutiny and massacre. Mutiny is a crime which, by the severity of military law, is deemed deserving of death; but the insurrection of Vellore was not an ordinary case of mutiny, grave as is that offence in itself. The baseness, treachery, and murderous cruelty with which it was marked, gives it a frightful pre-eminence over the generality of military revolts, and it is painful to think that so detestable a project should have been so far attended with success as to procure the abolition of the orders which had been made the pretext for it. The fatal Regulations being disposed of, another question arose as to the manner of disposing of the culprits—and conciliation again triumphed.

On this subject great difference of opinion existed, and much discussion took place. The governor, Lord William Bentinck, advised a very mild course, Sir John Cradock, the commander-in-chief, recommended one somewhat more severe.

The other members of Council coincided in opinion with the Governor; while the Governor-general in Council, who interfered on the occasion, adopted the views of Sir John Cradock. Ultimately, the greater part of the disaffected troops escaped with very slight punishment, and some may almost be said to have been rewarded for their crimes. A few only of the most culpable suffered the punishment of death; the remainder were merely dismissed the service, and declared incapable of being re-admitted to it; and some of the officers, whose guilt was thought to be attended by circumstances of extenuation, received small pensions. The propriety of this last favour is something more than questionable. To confine within very narrow limits the instances of great severity, might be wise as well as humane; but where was either the justice or the policy of placing men, like the conspirators of Vellore, upon a level with the worn-out but faithful veteran? What claim had they upon the bounty of the Government? The only apparent one consists in their having either actively promoted, or quietly connived at, the progress of a conspiracy intended to destroy the power which they served, and to which they were under the most solemn obligations of fidelity. If they were morally unfit to remain in the service, they were unfit objects of even the smallest favour. It was said that their condition, if dis-

missed without some provision, would be desperate; but it would not be more so than the condition of many men of unimpeachable honour and propriety of conduct. What right has disgraced treachery to demand a provision for future subsistence? To break down, in any degree, the distinctions between guilt and innocence, is one of the greatest errors into which any government can fall, and this error was certainly committed when the faithless officers of the insurgent battalions at Vellore were deemed proper objects for the exercise of the generosity of the State. To the army, the example was any thing but salutary. By the people at large, whom this act of liberality was doubtless meant to conciliate, it was in danger of being misunderstood, and was quite as likely to be attributed to the operation of fear as to the spirit of magnanimous forgiveness. It was a proceeding which can on no ground be justified, and which, it is to be hoped, will never furnish a rule for the guidance of any future government.

On another point, a collision of opinion took place; Sir John Cradock advised that the regiments, which were implicated in the mutiny, should be expunged from the list of the army. Lord William Bentinck took a different view: but, on this question, the other members in Council agreed with the Commander-in-chief. The former, however, attached so much importance to his own

view of the question, as to determine to act on his own judgment and responsibility, in opposition to the opinion of the majority in Council. It would appear incredible that a question, regarding no higher or more momentous matter than the retention of the names of two regiments upon the army list, or their expulsion from it, could have been regarded as justifying the exercise of that extraordinary power vested in the Governor for extraordinary occasion, and for extraordinary occasions only, were not the fact authenticated beyond the possibility of doubt. On his own responsibility, Lord William Bentinck set aside the decision of the majority of the Council, and determined that the regiments in which the mutiny had occurred should remain on the list. In turn, the act by which the Governor of Fort St. George had set aside the opinion of his Council was as unceremoniously annulled by the Supreme Government, who directed that the names of the guilty regiments should be struck out. The conduct of the Governor, in thus indiscreetly exercising the extraordinary power vested in him, was also disapproved at home. On some former occasion, his policy had not commanded the entire approbation of the Court of Directors, and this act was followed by his lordship's recal. It was at the same time deemed no longer advisable that Sir John Cradock should retain the command of the army, and he was accordingly removed from it. A calm

inquiry into the course pursued by Sir John Cradock will perhaps lead to the conclusion that he did not merit very severe reprehension. He seems, in the commencement of the disturbances, to have been guided by the opinions of others whom he thought better informed than himself. On finding that the line of conduct which he had been advised to pursue was fomenting discontent among the troops, he stated the fact to the Governor, by whose encouragement he was led to persevere. The disastrous results, however, which followed, showed but too plainly the impolicy of doing so, and the Commander-in-chief must, undoubtedly, be held responsible for the conduct of the army; but the errors into which Sir John Cradock was led, admit of the extenuation arising from the fact of his being nearly a stranger at the presidency. It was thought, however, and perhaps justly, that, after what had occurred, there was little hope of his being able to exercise his authority beneficially to the army or the British Government. Still, the case of Sir John Cradock appears to have been attended with some hardship, and it is to be lamented that a course could not have been devised which might have spared the feelings of the gallant officer, without compromising the interests of his country, or the spirit and efficiency of the army of Madras. The adjutant-general and deputy adjutant-general were ordered to return to Europe, but the former officer

was subsequently restored. These two officers were better acquainted with India than the Commander-in-chief, but there was much to extenuate their error, and few men, perhaps, in their circumstances would have acted with more discretion.

One change consequent upon the mutiny of Vellore, was a very proper and necessary one: the family of Tippoo Sultan was removed to Bengal, and thus separated from the spot where they could most effectually intrigue against British power and influence. The extravagant allowances, also, which they had previously enjoyed, were subjected to judicious retrenchment.

One of the most remarkable and lamentable circumstances brought to light by the transactions which have been narrated, was the want of cordiality and confidence between the British and native officers. A spirit of estrangement seems to have existed between them, altogether inconsistent with the interests of the service to which both belonged. Whether any thing in the conduct or deportment of one class was calculated to give reasonable cause of offence to the other, it might not be easy now to determine; but certain it is, that the interests of the Government imperiously require that courtesy and urbanity should invariably mark the habits and demeanour of the British towards the native officers and troops. These virtues must not, indeed, be carried to such an excess, as to tend to the sacrifice of any moral

principle, or to the surrender of one tittle of the great duty of military obedience; but, short of these, it is impossible that they can be carried too far, and a systematic neglect of them by any British officer is, in fact, a breach of his duty to his country.

The clamour raised against the new turban was instigated in a great degree by political emissaries, assuming the guise of religious devotees, and who thus were enabled to exercise a powerful influence over a bigotted and superstitious people. But the mischievous labours of these persons were by no means distasteful to the native officers, though a majority of them were convinced that there was nothing in the turban inconsistent with the dictates of their religious belief, and that the reports of the designs of the British to make a forcible change in the religion of the people were ridiculous and unfounded. The conduct of the native officers at Vellore needs neither illustration nor remark. At other places, they were found not exempt from the taint of sedition, which had infected the privates. At Nandydroog an inquiry was instituted, and it was proved that very offensive expressions had been uttered, and various attempts had been made to excite insubordination. Seventeen persons* were dismissed the service, and among them several officers. No doubt was entertained as to the existence of a similar spirit at Bangalore, but the fact could not be established

by legal evidence. At Palmacotta, where a body of Mussulman troops had been disarmed somewhat abruptly by the commanding officer, it was deemed expedient, on re-arming them, to except some of the native commissioned officers, and, after an inquiry, several were dismissed. There, as at Nandydroog, language had been used sufficiently significant and highly reprehensible. Criminality of a similar character was established against several persons at Wallajahbad, and several dismissals took place there. At Bellary, a subadar was convicted, on the clearest evidence, of having, in connexion with two sepoys, aided two religious mendicants in propagating doctrines of the most atrocious description, and he was in consequence dismissed. So striking and conspicuous was this unworthy conduct in the native officers, and so alarming their abuse of the influence which they naturally possessed over the minds of the men, that it was deemed necessary to publish a general order especially addressed to them, calling to their recollection the principles upon which they had been employed in the Company's service, and warning them of the consequences which would attend a departure from their duty.

The storm happily passed over, but it affords abundant materials for speculation as to futurity. The safety of the empire demands that the bond of connexion between the native army and their British officers should be confirmed and strength-

ened. For this purpose, the more the means of intercourse between the several classes are facilitated the better. A common language is a great instrument for avoiding misunderstanding and promoting good-will, and it is to be feared that the native tongues have not always received that degree of attention from British officers to which they were entitled. Some additional encouragements to their study seem requisite, as the mastering of them so materially tends to promote that harmony and mutual good understanding, which it is so important to establish. A mere smattering of a language may be sufficient for conveying and understanding the dry details of regimental duty; but it is not sufficient for establishing and maintaining that degree of influence over the natives, which every well-wisher to the permanence of the British dominion must be desirous should exist.

Another point, of vital importance, will be to raise the character of the native troops, and especially of the native officers, as far as may be, to a British standard—to imbue them with a portion of those noble principles which the European world derives from the age of chivalry, and to give them the habits and the feeling of gentlemen. The principle of honour which feels "a stain like a wound," should be sedulously inculcated and encouraged. By advancing the character of the native soldiery in the scale of moral dignity, we are adding to the security of our own dominion in the East; by de-

grading it, or suffering it to sink—nay, by permitting it to remain stationary, we are co-operating with the designs of our enemies, and undermining the safety of our Government. Where the soldier is actuated exclusive by the lower and more selfish motives, his services will always be at the command of him who can hold out the strongest temptations to his ambition or cupidity.

CHAPTER II.

THE APPOINTMENT OF A GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN 1806.

THE mode of administering the government of India is one altogether without precedent and without parallel. The consent of two independent bodies is, in ordinary cases, required to give validity to the instructions which are to guide the local rulers; a system having no claim to novelty or originality in regard to the exercise of the legislative power, but never applied to the executive, except in the single instance of India. In legislation, if one of two bodies, having an equal voice, reject a measure which has the sanction of the other, the only result is, that the state of things remains precisely as it was before. There is no probability of a suspension of the functions of the government; the old law continues to be administered instead of the new, and, if any inconvenience be felt, it can only be one which previously

existed, and which the new enactment was intended to remedy. But it is obvious that the subjection of the executive functions to a two-fold authority may produce consequences very different. The obstinate resistance of one to the views of the other might be the cause of incalculable mischief and confusion. In the course of the half-century during which India has been thus governed, collision has, indeed, very rarely taken place; it has been generally averted by discretion and mutual forbearance. Still, it has sometimes arisen, and one remarkable occasion occurred in the year 1806, when the Whigs, having formed a coalition with the party of which Lord Grenville was the head, returned to office after a long exclusion from it: an exclusion originating, in the first instance, in the plan which they had proposed and endeavoured to carry through Parliament, for the administration of the affairs of India, in 1784.

The Marquess Cornwallis had a second time proceeded to India as governor-general, at a very advanced age, and his government met an early termination by his death. Intelligence of this event became known in England almost simultaneously with the accession of the new ministers to office. It was deemed expedient to make immediate provision for the exercise of the full powers of the governor-general, and Sir George Barlow, at that time possessing the entire confidence of the Court of Directors, was appointed with the

approbation of the new President of the Board of Control. That functionary, indeed, stated that the appointment must be regarded as temporary; but he added, that no immediate change was in contemplation.

After such an announcement, it must have been concluded that the new governor-general would be permitted to enjoy his appointment for a period of some moderate duration; and few speculators upon political probabilities would have assigned to Sir George Barlow's tenure of office a shorter existence than that of a few months. No one, at least, could have expected that the acquiescence of his Majesty's ministers was to expire in ten days, and that, at the end of that period, a communication would be made of their desire that the appointment which they had so recently sanctioned should be superseded, and another governor-general named—yet such was the fact.

The person selected for this high office by the servants of the Crown was the Earl of Lauderdale; but it being found that the claims of this nobleman were very unfavourably regarded by the Court, the proposal was withdrawn, not however without an intimation that it would be revived at a future period. The first correspondence on the subject took place in March. In May (a change in the Chairs having occurred in the interval,) the subject was again brought forward by ministers, but without success. The Court of Directors re-

fused to revoke the appointment of Sir George Barlow, and, of course, unless their resolution could be changed or their authority overcome, the case of the nominee of ministers was hopeless. But the Cabinet was not prepared to yield. The death of Mr. Pitt had shattered the administration, of which he was the head, into fragments, which no one appeared to have either the capacity or the confidence to reunite. The coadjutors of that statesman had, in the language of Mr. Tierney, "stultified themselves" by the tender of their resignations on the death of their leader. The new ministers, in consequence, felt strong in the weakness of their opponents.

It was at that period almost universally held to be impossible to form any other administration than that which, under Lord Grenville, swayed the councils of the state; and though a very few months dissipated this illusion, the ministry of 1806 claimed possession of "all the talents" of the country, and on this ground placed opposition at defiance. Flushed with confidence in their own strength, the ministers were not inclined to be very delicate as to the means by which they accomplished their object; and, finding their recommendation without weight, they resolved to call into exercise an extraordinary power vested in the Crown by the Act of 1784, but which had never been exerted. That Act enabled the Sovereign, by an instrument under his sign manual, to vacate any

appointment in British India without the consent of the Court. The right was unquestionable—so is the right to withhold the assent of the Crown from bills which have passed both Houses of Parliament—and the exercise of the latter prerogative was almost as much to be expected as that of the former, after it had been allowed for so many years to sleep. But, unprecedented as its exercise was, ministers did not shrink from advising it; and the commission by which Sir George Barlow had been appointed governor-general was vacated by the royal authority.

So remarkable an exercise of prerogative did not, of course, pass without notice. On the 8th of July, the subject was brought before the Upper House of Parliament by Lord Melville. After adverting to the principal facts connected with the transaction, his lordship called the attention of the House to the Act of 1784, by which the power of recall was given to the Crown; and contended that the clause in question, if construed so as to warrant the proceedings of his Majesty's ministers with regard to Sir George Barlow, would be altogether at variance with the spirit and intent of the Act of which it formed part. He stated that, at the period when the Act was passed, the whole country was convulsed with conflicting opinions on the best mode of governing India, and that the two principal plans were embodied in two bills, which were known by the names of the leaders of

the two parties by whom they were respectively introduced, one being called Mr. Fox's bill, the other, Mr. Pitt's. It must, he said, be recollected, that these two bills were universally understood to be framed in accordance with the different views of the two parties in the great struggle upon the question, whether the patronage of India should be vested in the hands of the Crown or of the Company.

The bill of Mr. Pitt, which passed into a law, disclaimed the patronage on the part of the Crown, and was based on the assumption that it might be more beneficially exercised by the Company; and it could not be supposed that the Legislature intended that the bill should convey a power inconsistent with the spirit in which it was framed and passed: it could not be supposed that it intended to enable his Majesty's ministers, at any future time, by exercising at pleasure the power of recall, to appropriate to themselves the patronage of India. The design of the clause was obvious. It was intended as a check upon the Court of Directors, in the event of their being led by partiality to make an improper appointment: it also enabled Government to interfere in differences between the Court of Directors and the Court of Proprietors—a case, not merely hypothetical, a remarkable instance having occurred not long before the passing of the Act, where the Court of Proprietors refused to acquiesce in the

recall of Mr. Hastings, when proposed by the Court of Directors. He urged that the power thus entrusted to the Crown would be grossly abused if applied to any other purposes than those contemplated by the law — if exercised merely with a view to enforce the appointment of a particular individual whom his Majesty's ministers wished to see governor-general. This was the first instance in which the power had been exercised, and those who advised its exercise, were bound to shew good cause for it.

Lord Melville pronounced a high panegyric upon the character and public services of Sir George Barlow, and animadverted with great severity upon the conduct of the ministers, which, he said, if the result of mere caprice, was highly blameable, but if originating in an intention to seize the patronage of India, was a direct violation of the spirit and meaning of an Act of Parliament. After dwelling upon the inconveniences likely to arise to the public service, from the extraordinary course pursued by ministers, Lord Melville concluded by moving for certain papers connected with the removal of Sir George Barlow, and with the financial affairs of the Company.

The exercise of the royal prerogative was defended by the premier, Lord Grenville, who contended that the law must be taken in its plain meaning, not according to any fanciful interpretation, and that the Act of 1784 clearly gave a power

of recall. That power had been objected to, at the time of passing the Act, on one of the grounds now taken by Lord Melville, namely, that it might virtually give to ministers the patronage of India; but it was answered then, as it might be answered now, that because the Crown had the power of negativing an Act of Parliament, it could not be said that it had the power of directing the legislature; and, by parity of reasoning, it could not reasonably be contended that, because a particular appointment in India was reversed, the whole of the appointments must fall under the control of his Majesty's ministers. He admitted; however, that if it could be shewn that the power had been exercised merely for the purpose of procuring the appointment of a particular person, it would be a violation of the law; but he called upon Lord Melville to recollect, that from the passing of the Act in 1784 to 1801, there had not been a single governor appointed who had not been recommended by that nobleman himself: and as the same system had prevailed from 1801 downward, there did not appear much to justify the surprise expressed on this occasion.

His lordship then reminded the House, that Sir George Barlow had been appointed to succeed the Marquess Wellesley, and had almost immediately been superseded in favour of the Marquess Cornwallis. In connection with the latter appointment, Lord Grenville passed a censure upon the

late administration, for a neglect which had placed their successors in some difficulty. Possessed of every other qualification for the high office to which he was called, the Marquess Cornwallis wanted youth and health. It was generally supposed in London that he would be unable to bear the voyage, and that if he arrived in India he would survive only a short time: yet his Majesty's late advisers made no provision for an event which must have been expected, and from their criminal neglect, his Majesty's present ministers were called upon, within twenty-four hours of their acceptance of office, to provide for the government of India, in consequence of the communication of the death of the Marquess Cornwallis. In this emergency, they recommended the Court of Directors to appoint Sir George Barlow; but they never regarded this appointment as being any thing more than temporary. For these reasons, and on the grounds of the inconvenience that would result from acceding to the motion, he opposed the production of the correspondence.

Several other peers took part in the discussion: among them Lord Hawkesbury, who, as a member of the late government, denied that it was necessary to take more than ordinary precaution against the decease of the Marquess Cornwallis. Considering the advanced age of the marquess, he had never known a man more likely to live; and such was the opinion of his friends who had

last seen him at Portsmouth. The arguments used by the other speakers were little more than repetitions of those brought forward by Lords Melville and Grenville, and, on the question being put, both motions were lost without a division.

Three days afterwards, the subject underwent some discussion in the House of Commons. In a committee of the whole House on the India Budget, Mr. Johnstone, after taking a review of the conduct of Sir George Barlow, and passing on it a high eulogy, condemned the conduct of ministers in nullifying their original appointment. He said, he had heard that Sir George Barlow was recalled because he did not possess the confidence of ministers; but he believed that two noble lords, under whose administrations the British interests in India had flourished in an extraordinary degree,—he meant Lord Macartney and Lord Cornwallis (the latter as governor-general and the former as the head of one of the other presidencies), —he believed that those noble persons possessed little of the confidence of those who, during the period of their respective administrations, held the reins of government in England. Lord Castlereagh joined in reprehension of the conduct of ministers, and stated that he was able to furnish a testimony to the merits of Sir George Barlow, which was not generally known. It was the express wish of Lord Cornwallis,

before he went to India, that when he should have completed the object of his mission, Sir George Barlow should be appointed to succeed him in the government. The chancellor of the exchequer, Lord Henry Petty, defended the course taken by ministers; and Mr. Francis, who disclaimed offering an opinion of his own, alleged that, on former occasions, Sir George Barlow had incurred the displeasure of the Court of Directors, who now supported him. Sir Arthur Wellesley defended the conduct of Sir George Barlow throughout the negociations for peace, as did also Mr. Grant on the 15th July, when the committee sat again. Mr. Paul justified the removal; he maintained that, to secure the respect of the native courts, the governor-general should be a man of high rank; and that, though Sir George Barlow was an excellent revenue officer, he had none of the qualities necessary for a governor-general.

The ministerial speakers in the House of Commons seem rather to have evaded discussion; either because no specific motion was made on the subject, or from a conviction that the course which they had advised was an unpopular one. The ministry had, however, one advantage, which probably most cabinets value more than any powers of reason or eloquence:—they had majorities in Parliament, and these enabled them to submit with great philosophy to charges which it might

have been troublesome to answer. The knowledge that the ministers had the means of triumphing in the division, though they might be vanquished in the argument, probably withheld those members of the House of Commons who especially represented East-Indian interests, from the steps which might have been expected from them. The novelty of their situation might also have some effect in diminishing the vigour of their efforts. The Company had enjoyed the countenance and protection of the ministers, to whom they regarded themselves as mainly indebted for the preservation of their chartered rights, during a period of twenty-two years, with the exception of the short administration of Lord Sidmouth; and the policy of his administration differed, indeed, little from that of Mr. Pitt, whom he had succeeded. Accustomed for so long a time to act in concert with the ministers of the Crown, those Directors who had seats in Parliament, seem to have felt as though there would be something indecorous in any very decided public opposition, even when the former enemies of the privileges of the Company had obtained the reins of power. This feeling, combined with a conviction of the hopelessness of struggling in a contest where the victory was already adjudged, may account for the feebleness of the efforts made within the walls of Parliament, to justify the conduct of the Court of Directors in opposition to that of the ministers of the Crown. But, though appa-

rently declining any public appeal against the dictation to which it was sought to subject them, they steadily persevered in resisting it; and it being ultimately found impossible to overcome the objections of the Court of Directors to the Earl of Lauderdale, that nobleman withdrew his claim to the office of governor-general; the Court consented to nominate the President of the Board of Control, Lord Minto, and thus the differences between the Court of Directors and his Majesty's Government were terminated.

The dispute opens a variety of questions, all of them possessing a certain degree of interest. The first that naturally occurs relates to the character of the person who for ten days enjoyed the full sunshine of ministerial favour; at the end of which time, with a fickleness unusual even in courts and cabinets, it was deemed expedient to relieve him from the greatness which had been so suddenly thrust upon him, and to provide, at his expense, for some adherent of the ruling party. But the merits of Sir George Barlow seem to have formed but a small part of the subject. He was certainly not removed by the ministers of the day because he was unfit for the station to which they had appointed him, but because, when they found leisure to survey the circle of their noble friends, they met with many to whom a splendid provision in the East was an object of desire, and one of these they determined should be governor-general.

Their political opponents might be tempted to go so far as to say that, in the desire to grasp at patronage, the fitness or unfitness of the person to be appointed was evidently regarded as of little importance, and even the unprejudiced observer must feel a suspicion that the fitness or unfitness of the person to be removed was deemed of no importance at all.

If, separate from all party considerations, we enquire whether Sir George Barlow was altogether fitted for the high office of governor-general, the answer must depend upon the standard of qualification which is set up. If the office demand a mind of the highest order, enlarged by extensive information, and cultivated by assiduous study, the claims of Sir George Barlow are at once negatived; but if it be fair to found the standard upon the average amount of ability, knowledge, and good sense, possessed by the occupants of the office, the advocates of Sir George Barlow need not shrink from the test. It is beyond all doubt, that he was at least as well qualified as some who preceded, and as some others who have followed him. His precise views on the great questions of Indian policy it is not very easy to gather, and perhaps he might have found some difficulty in expounding them for himself. It has often been urged against him, and not without plausibility, that after warmly co-operating in the promotion of the policy of the Marquess Wellesley, he entered with apparent equal

cordiality into the widely different views of the Marquess Cornwallis; and, indeed, the vindication of his consistency is the hardest task which his friends have to encounter.

The best apology that can be offered for changes which cannot be denied, is to suppose that at both periods he regarded himself as acting only ministerially — as merely fulfilling the designs of others, whom he felt it his duty to obey. During the time that he exercised the functions of governor-general, he appears to have adhered very strictly to what he believed to be the wishes of the home authorities; and had the period of his rule been extended, he would, in all probability, have persevered in the same course. Excluding, then, the question of ability, the fitness of Sir George Barlow for the exercise of the supreme authority in India will be differently determined, according to the view taken of the precise duties of a governor-general. Those who think that there is little room for the exercise of discretion, and that a rigid obedience should be yielded to the positive instructions and implied wishes of the controlling powers, may regard the conduct of Sir George Barlow with entire approbation. Those, on the contrary, who think that the peculiar advantages of local observation enjoyed by our Indian functionaries justify them in the use of a large discretion in the discharge of their duties, will very materially qualify their approval.

governments with whom he would have to maintain the accustomed relations, would receive no shock. When invested with the pomp and state, and power of his office, their feelings towards him would be just the same as if he could trace his pedigree to Charlemagne. Actual power and actual wealth they can understand; but their imaginations are too cold as well as too coarse to have any reverence for those ideal sources of distinction which among a more refined and imaginative people are of such high value. The opponents of Sir George Barlow must have been hardly pushed for an argument, when they stumbled upon one so untenable as this; and it is most remarkable that it should have been taken up by such a person as the notorious James Paul, the libeller of the Marquis Wellesley, and the ultra-democratic candidate for the city of Westminster.

But what must be thought of the policy or the equity of a rule, which should utterly and peremptorily exclude the regular servants of the Company from all chance of arriving at the highest reward which the Company has to bestow? What must be thought of the wisdom which should place under a ban of prohibition the highest intellect and most extensive knowledge if found in the service of the Company, that intellect, too, having been exercised and that knowledge matured, in the very place and under the very circumstances most likely to fit the possessor for the very office

to which he is forbidden to aspire? What an outrage would it be to the feelings of those whose lives have been devoted to the promotion of the welfare of India and the protection of the country, if they were to be told that under no circumstances should they be permitted to attain the highest place in the government—that the veriest idler that walks St. James's-street shall be preferred before them, because they do not possess a recommendation which, in India, is perfectly useless!

It is true that the admission of the servants of the Company to the competition for the prize may be regarded as a very small boon. Even if it were always bestowed upon one of them, the number who could attain it would be small; and as such an arrangement is neither to be expected nor desired, the chance of any individual servant must be trifling indeed. But this affects not the question. The advantage given by admission may be little, but the insult conveyed by exclusion is great; and slender as must be the hope which any one can cherish of gaining this bright object of ambitious desire, who shall say that it will be ineffective? In every profession, the great prizes can fall to the lot of only a very small number of those who engage in it—few clergymen can hope to attain the primacy, and few lawyers the custody of the great seal—but it would justly be regarded as a great discouragement to rising talent, as a withering blight upon honest ambition, as a gross

affront to merit of humble origin, if a rule existed which restricted the attainment of those high stations exclusively to men of rank.

It is held to be at once highly creditable to our country, and beneficial to its interests, that the highest offices, both in the church and the state, may be attained independently of any claims derived from rank—that they are open to the competition of all who can shew the necessary qualifications. Why should that which is so beneficial in England be injurious in India?

No one has ever proposed to exclude the aristocracy of Great Britain from the field—they may and ought to be fairly admitted to it. For the purpose of binding India more closely to the British Government, it may be desirable that the representative of the Crown in India should frequently be chosen from the nobility of the protecting country. Among other good results, this may have the effect of attracting some small degree of attention to interests which have been almost systematically neglected by British statesmen and legislators. But an occasional deviation from the established practice in favour of pre-eminent talents and acquirements in a servant of the Company, would be likely to operate most beneficially both on the service and on the interests of India. No set of ministers have, indeed, ever avowed that they acted upon the principle of excluding servants of the Company from any but a provisional enjoy-

ment of the highest post, both in point of honour and emolument; but without avowing it, they have too often made it clear that such was the fact, and that they regarded the office of governor-general of India as existing for the sake of providing for some friend of the ruling party, whose rent-roll did not harmonize with his position in the state.

Another ground taken by the Ministers of 1806 and their advocates, was somewhat more plausible,—the alleged necessity for the governor-general of India possessing the confidence of the advisers of the Crown: but even this plea cannot be admitted without considerable qualifications. That confidence which results from the character of the individual holding this high office for talent, integrity, discretion, and devotedness to the duties of his station, cannot, indeed, be dispensed with; but the confidence depending upon conformity of political opinion is, under the circumstances, unnecessary, and has, in practice, been almost constantly disregarded.

To the instances which were adduced at the time of the discussion, the experience of the last thirty years has made several additions. Lord Minto, the choice of the Whig administration of 1806, was permitted to retain his office during the successive Tory administrations of the Duke of Portland, Mr. Perceval, and the Earl of Liverpool. The Marquess of Hastings was actually recommend-

ed to office by the political party of which he had all his life been the steady opponent; and the appointment of Lord William Bentinck, made under an administration composed of his own personal and political friends, was sanctioned by a subsequent one with which he had no connection.

The liberality displayed in the last of these instances may perhaps be regarded as matter of regret, but they all tend to invalidate the principle that the governor-general of India must be a political friend of the ministers of the day. The principle, indeed, will find few defenders, except among those who have an interest in maintaining it. Removed altogether from the influence of most of the questions which here divide men into factions, can there be any valid reason why India and its government should be involved in the vortex of European politics?

The inconveniences of such a course are obvious; and they are so great, that a single glance at them will be sufficient to shew, that if the happiness of India, or its retention by this country, be worth a thought, we must have the forbearance to exempt her from the influence of our own party disputes. If it be necessary, in any one instance, that the governor-general of India should be a member of that political party which happens at a given time to direct the counsels of the state, it must be necessary in every other instance. If one party may demand this, it

must be conceded to all parties. Grant the principle, then, that there must be a perfect sympathy of feeling between the governors of India and the cabinet at home, and it follows, that the governor-general of India, like the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, must be changed with every change of administration. Let this principle be once recognized and acted upon to its full extent, and all hope of effecting improvement in the vast and important empire subjected to our rule, will be at an end.

But, in truth, on this point we need give ourselves little concern, for we should soon be relieved from the trouble of governing India; nor could such an event be regretted by any friend to justice, seeing how grossly we should have betrayed a sacred trust, by prostituting it to the purposes of party. Our position in India, though on the whole a subject of pride and congratulation, is not such as to permit us to despise ordinary precautions. Not only have we active and insidious enemies around, but even within our own territories, and with a government veering about with every change in the political atmosphere, what would the chance for the continuance of our dominion be worth? All hope of a vigorous government,—of such a government as India demands, and must possess, or she is lost,—would be at an end. Hesitation and uncertainty would characterize all the proceedings of those who would still be called the

governors of India, though they would be only the puppets of political gamblers at home.

Without the means of being informed of what was passing in the protecting country until some months after the occurrence of the events which would determine the destinies of India as well as of England, no rational opinion could be formed of the probable stability of the existing state of things. In this uncertainty, a governor-general, unless, like some that we have seen, he happened to be of a remarkably active temperament, would most probably do nothing but pocket his magnificent income, and on the receipt of every instalment congratulate himself on his good fortune. Or if, impelled by that restless spirit which leads some men into perpetual action without adequate end or object, he should endeavour to carry out his own opinions or that of his party into actual practice, he would have the satisfaction of knowing, that whatever he might do, his successor would amuse himself with undoing. How soon that successor might arrive, it would be utterly impossible to guess. At the moment when a governor-general was debarking at Calcutta, the instrument of his recall might be signed, and on its way to put an end to his authority. Nay, before he reached his destination—while on his voyage, luxuriating in the splendid visions in which, it may be presumed, outgoing governors-general indulge, his successor might be on the sea in full chase of him, with a *supersedeas* in his pocket.

Let us look back only twelve years to the rapid succession of the administrations of Lord Liverpool, Mr. Canning, Lord Goderich, and the Duke of Wellington—let us look back only four years, and find Lord Melbourne suddenly displaced in favour of Sir Robert Peel, and he, after a very brief possession of office, giving way to Lord Melbourne again. Let us suppose a case when, from the nicely balanced state of parties, or from any other cause, changes take place with the like rapidity. During the rule of a Whig ministry, it becomes necessary to provide for an approaching vacancy in the office of governor-general, and the Court, with the approbation of the advisers of the Crown, make an appointment. The successful and happy candidate sails: but before he has gained any experience of a southern latitude, the ever-shifting elements of political change at home has displaced his patrons, and given to Tory rulers possession of the councils of the state.

If the principle be established that the governor-general must agree in the political opinions of those who rule at home, one of the first acts of the new ministry will of course be the recommendation of a new governor-general, who, after his appointment, would be posted off with the least possible delay. But the new administration are beaten in Parliament—the Whigs are again in office, and they immediately procure the recall of the last-named governor-general, who may, perhaps, be at Ma-

deira, and the restoration of their own nominee, who, if he has been fortunate, may be just receiving his first impressions of the City of Palaces. Those impressions being interrupted by the arrival of his Tory successor, the Whig departs in ill-humour with himself and every body else. If, by great good fortune, he should encounter the vessel which bears his reprieve, he may turn back if he think it worth while, though, if he be a man of sense, he most likely will not; but the most probable chance is that the old governor and his new commission will cross each other, and that the former will arrive in England, either to be bandied back again, or sullenly to decline the proffered honour.

Would not this be an admirable method of governing a great empire? How stable must be our sway under such a system! how conducive to the happiness of the people of India! how well calculated to uphold the honour of the British nation! But such rapid changes, it might be said, are not of constant occurrence—a ministry in ordinary circumstances may be expected to endure more than two or three months. Perhaps it may, although the political barometer at the present period does not promise any very settled weather. But let it be conceded that a ministry may generally calculate upon a longer duration than was enjoyed by those of Lord Goderich and Sir Robert Peel—let us allow an average of three

years, and if we look at the administrations of the last century, with the exception of that of Mr. Pitt, this will not be found an unfair allowance—then every three years there will not only be a change of the man, but, it must be presumed, a corresponding change of measures.

We must not suppose that British statesmen are actuated by factious or selfish motives—we must give them the credit of seeking the appointment of their own friends solely for the sake of extending the influence of those opinions and principles which they believe to be right. What then must be the effect upon India of a rapid succession of rulers, selected under the influence of every varying shade of party opinion? What but an unsteady and vacillating policy,—a series of experiments, immature and ill-executed, succeeding each other like a phantasmagoria, and leaving as few traces behind them.

India is not in a condition to be suffered to remain stationary, but still less is she in a condition to be made the subject of indiscreet experiment. To accelerate her career of improvement is at once our interest and our duty; but our plans of improvement must be well devised and steadily pursued, or they will end in our expulsion, and the surrender of the people of India to a long and dreary night of barbarism and misrule. If Englishmen should ever learn to feel justly the value of our Indian possessions—and they have never

yet felt it—they will become sensible that they form too precious a deposit to be tampered with, or to be thrown heedlessly into the scramble of party.

But the evils of eternal change would not be confined to the entail upon India of a weak and wavering policy, injurious to the people governed and dishonourable to those who govern them—the general character of the individuals who would fill the office of governor-general would be lower than it has hitherto been. High-minded men would hesitate to accept an appointment which, with all its splendour, is attended with many inconveniences and privations, if the tenure were understood to depend upon a point so utterly beyond calculation, as the continuance in office of a particular party. And who would occupy the place which has hitherto been filled by those who, whatever their pretensions in other respects, were at least gentlemen and men of honour? For the most part, persons of desperate fortunes, who would speculate on the enjoyment of the salary of the governor-general for a few months—men without character, or property, obsequiously waiting, hat in hand, upon the party to which they happened to be attached, for any casual donation which it might have to bestow, and ready for an eleemosynary fee to run on any errand, although it should carry them half across the globe. Now and then, the monotony might be relieved by the

despatch of some political quack—some legislative nostrum-monger, panting for an opportunity of trying the effects of his grand state panacea, and delighted to find in India a field where he might freely practice without any fear of the fate that awaits the vendors of Morison's pills. If any man of better class could be prevailed upon to accept the office, it would not be until he had secured a snug pension or comfortable sinecure to fall back upon in case of need.

These evils are not, indeed, likely to result from the occasional supercession on an Indian functionary by the ministers of the Crown, for an insufficient reason or for no reason at all; but they are consequences resulting from carrying out to its full extent the principle that the governor-general of India must possess the full confidence of the existing ministry. Unless, therefore, any one set of ministers can convert their Cabinet appointments into patent situations, or unless any one political party can shew that the privilege of removing a governor-general who is displeasing to the ministry, is one to be exercised only by themselves, those consequences must ensue or the principle must be given up. It is certainly not that upon which the laws regulating the government of India have been framed. The Legislature which, amid so many changes, has steadily adhered to the principle of vesting the patronage of India in the Company, evidently intended to disconnect that country as

much as possible from the turmoil of party contentions at home. The minister, therefore, who grasps at the patronage of India, though he may not violate the letter of the law, evidently outrages its spirit. He seeks to acquire that which the Legislature has determined he ought not to

The Act of 1784 undoubtedly gives to the Crown the power of recall, without imposing any conditions upon its exercise. It would, indeed, be extraordinary if such a power had been withheld, but it is quite clear that it was not intended to be used as an instrument for enabling the ministers of the Crown to force into the government of India any particular individual. The patronage of India was probably vested in the East-India Company, partly from the consideration that the local and peculiar information which they possessed would enable them to estimate the wants of the country more accurately, and to provide for them more judiciously, than a ministry whose attention was distracted by a variety of subjects; partly because the Court of Directors being comparatively a permanent body, the delicate connection between India and Great Britian would, while the government was in their hands, be in a great measure secured from the shocks which it would be liable to encounter in the fierce struggles of political party; and partly from a reluctance to increase the influence of the Crown.

If these reasons have any validity, the Court of Directors should be permitted to exercise the power delegated to them by the Legislature, as freely and independently as possible; subject to no control but such as is absolutely necessary to the safety of the state. It was certainly not intended to give to the ministry the right of nomination to official station in India, and the power of governing that country in the name of the Court of Directors, who were merely to register the decisions of the Cabinet. Extraordinary powers should be reserved for extraordinary occasions, and it seems quite impossible for any impartial person to consider the difference of opinion between the Court of Directors and his Majesty's ministers in 1806, as one of those extraordinary occasions in contemplation of which the power was granted, and the actual rise of which alone can justify its exercise.

The causes which led to the capricious course pursued by the ministers of the Crown, prove the inconvenience of interfering with Indian patronage beyond their duty; and that duty is simply to protect the interests of the two countries from the injury that might result from the occupation of office by an improper person.

When the change of ministry was in progress, the vacancy occasioned by the death of the Marquess Cornwallis was not expected, and the new servants of the Crown were not prepared

to recommend any one in his place. A few days were sufficient to remove this impediment, and it would have evinced more respect to the Court of Directors, and more regard to the feelings of Sir George Barlow, as well as more consistency and dignity in their own conduct, had the ministers determined to suspend proceeding for those few days, instead of hastily ratifying an appointment almost immediately to be revoked.

When they had decided upon the person whose pretensions to the office they intended to support, they communicated their wishes to the Directors, who were naturally surprised by a communication so unlooked-for. They were unwilling to participate in the levity displayed by ministers with regard to Sir George Barlow, whom they moreover regarded as the fittest person to conclude those negociations on which he had entered; and they had insuperable objections to the nobleman recommended as his successor.

Into the nature of those objections it is, perhaps, useless at this distance of time to inquire; but there were undoubtedly some circumstances in the early political career of the Earl of Lauderdale, that might lead prudent men to hesitate as to the propriety of selecting him to wield the mighty, and, in indiscreet hands, the dangerous power of governor-general of India. Whether, however, the objections of the Directors were well or ill-founded, the ministry had no right to judge; and

when they perceived the little probability which existed of overcoming them, both duty and policy should have forbidden them to persevere.

By calling into exercise, for the first time, the prerogative of the crown, and revoking the appointment of Sir George Barlow, not because he was unfit to retain it, but solely to make way for their own nominee, they shewed an extraordinary disregard to the rights of the Court of Directors, as well as to the welfare of India, and a reprehensible desire of engrossing the patronage of the most valuable appointments there. Had the Directors been actuated by similar motives, the government of India would have been placed in abeyance, and a contest must have resulted, as little calculated to advance the dignity of the contending parties, as to promote the interests of the two divisions of the empire. But the Court of Directors, though firm, were not factious; they steadily resisted the appointment of the Earl of Lauderdale, but they did not retaliate upon ministers, by naming for the office a person disagreeable to the cabinet and hostile to its policy. When a nobleman was suggested in whose appointment they could conscientiously acquiesce, no remains of ill-feeling prompted them to keep alive differences between two bodies which the best interests of the state require to agree, and they cheerfully consented to appoint Lord Minto as the successor to Sir George Barlow. It would be well if their example were

more generally followed by the ministers of the crown; if party connection were less regarded, and personal qualification somewhat more. India is not like Ireland, essentially mixed up with party opinion and feelings; she has no natural connection with them, and to drag her into conflicts which do not and cannot concern her, is doing gross wrong, and frustrating to a great extent the intention of the Legislature, in bestowing the patronage on a body of men who, for the most part, are not likely to be actuated by party motives. India should be governed with a strict regard to her own benefit, as well as to that of England, and should not be unnaturally converted into a stage for the gladiatorial combats of political partizans.

CHAPTER III.

AFFAIRS OF TRAVANCORE.

The connection between Travancore and the East-India Company has been of considerable duration, and the Government of the latter has, on various occasions, rendered good service to the former. In 1790, Tippoo Saib attacked Travancore, and penetrated to Virapelly; but Lord Cornwallis, then governor-general, promptly interposed to rescue the country from an invader who threatened in a very brief period to overrun it. This timely aid was not afforded without some sacrifice on the part of the British Government; and it led ostensibly to the war which succeeded between that power and the ruler of Mysore. In 1795, a subsidiary treaty was concluded between the British Government and the Rajah of Travancore; and ten years after, in 1805, a second treaty. By the former treaty, the rajah engaged to assist the East-India Company in time of war with troops

to the extent of his ability. By a clause in the latter this aid was commuted for an annual tribute.

Travancore was among the most scandalously misgoverned of Indian states. Retrenchment and reform were indispensably necessary, and the treaty provided for their being commenced and conducted under the auspices of the British Government. To afford time for effecting the necessary changes, the payment of half the additional subsidy stipulated for by the second treaty was remitted for two years, but the end of that period found the rajah no better disposed to pay the entire amount of subsidy than the beginning. One heavy source of his expense was a military body, called the Carnatic Brigade, which, though unnecessary as well as burthensome, the rajah insisted upon retaining, in spite of the remonstrances of the British representative at his court. This gave rise to much angry feeling. The resident, Colonel Macaulay, pressed for the required payment of subsidy, and after a while a part of the amount was liquidated, but a very large portion still remained undischarged.

The resident having to perform a most ungracious duty in urging the demands of his Government, became an object of aversion to the Dewan, in whose hands the Rajah had suffered the whole power of the state to fall. That officer while ruling his master was himself under influence unfavourable to the interests of the British Govern-

ment. His conduct had long been evasive and unsatisfactory, and towards the close of the year 1808, it became suspected that he entertained views of direct hostility. It had been ascertained that communications had taken place between the Dewan and some Americans, who had recently arrived from Persia. The nature of these communications was kept secret, but they were followed by overtures from an agent of the Dewan to the Rajah of Cochin, for entering into joint measures in opposition to the British power. It was reported that a French force would land on the coast of Malabar in the course of January, and in anticipation of this event, the Dewan urged the Rajah of Cochin to prepare to unite himself with the Travancorians and French, for the purpose of expelling the English from the country.

The Dewan was not one of those who content themselves with merely giving advice. He enforced his recommendation by example. Extensive military preparations were entered into; the people were trained to warlike exercises, and large supplies of arms were obtained. The object of these proceedings was all but avowed, and it was currently reported, that emissaries had been sent to the Isle of France to solicit a reinforcement of artillery. The Government of Fort St. George considered these circumstances as calling for immediate and active measures. Troops were ordered to march from Trichinopoly, and others

were embarked from Malabar for Quilon; but these movements were suddenly countermanded, and a determination taken to try further the effects of a conciliatory policy.

The experiment met with that species of success which usually attends attempts at conciliation under such circumstances. The Dewan professed great alarm at the military preparations which had been made by the British Government, and entreated permission to throw himself upon the generosity of the power which he had provoked. A succession of messages followed, and this portion of the drama ended in the Dewan, on the ground that his person was not safe in Travancore, expressing a desire to resign his office and retire within the territories of the Company. The resident agreed to indulge him, and on the 28th of December, every thing was prepared for his journey from Aleppi to Calicut; a sum of money was advanced for his expenses, and as the alleged fears of the Dewan led him to demand a large escort of troops, the force attached to the resident was weakened for the purpose of affording it.

A little after midnight the sleep of the resident was broken by a loud noise in the vicinity of his house. He rose and proceeded to the window, whence he perceived that the building was apparently surrounded by armed men. Hearing his own name mentioned, he opened the lattice and demanded who was there, upon which severa

voices exclaimed at once that it was the colonel, and several pieces were simultaneously discharged at the window, but happily without producing the intended effect. The object of the assailants being now manifest, the resident seized his sword, and was rushing down stairs to oppose the entrance of the assassins, when he was interrupted by a clerk in his service, who pointing out the hopelessness of contending with a numerous body of armed men, suggested that his master and himself should conceal themselves in a recess in a lower apartment, the door of which was scarcely discernible from the wainscot in which it was inserted. This retreat Colonel Macaulay was reluctantly induced to enter just at the moment when the assailants, having disarmed the guard, were forcing their way into the house. Having entered, every part of it, except the concealed recess, was carefully searched for the intended victim. Disappointed of finding him, they spent the night in plundering the house. At day-break a vessel, with British troops traversing the deck, appeared in sight, and the ruffians becoming alarmed, made a precipitate retreat. This afforded the resident the opportunity of escape; a boat was procured, and he was shortly on board a British ship.

The vessel which had appeared in sight so opportunely for the resident, was one of several which were conveying reinforcements to the British strength in Travancore. All of these

arrived in safety except one, having on board a surgeon and thirty-three privates of his Majesty's 12th Regiment. This vessel being detained by some accidents, put into Aleppi for a supply of water, and other necessaries. Two or three of the soldiers landing immediately on the vessel arriving at her anchorage, were told by some servants of the Rajah, that a large body of British troops were in the neighbourhood, and that if they were disposed to join them every requisite aid would be afforded for the purpose. The whole party were thus induced to disembark, when they were surrounded and overpowered, tied in couples back to back, and in that state, with a heavy stone fastened to their necks, thrown into the back water of the port. The ferocity of this deed would almost seem to justify the opinion avowed by some Europeans who have enjoyed the best means of judging of the state of Travancore, that in turpitude and moral degradation its people transcend every nation upon the face of the earth.

Two days after the outrage on the resident's house, the officer commanding the subsidiary force at Quilon received intelligence, that a large body of armed men had assembled in the enclosure round the Dewan's abode. This being an unusual occurrence Colonel Chalmers ordered his men to sleep, that night, on their arms. Immediately afterwards he was informed, that a body of armed nairs had been collected at Paroor, a few miles

to the southward of the cantonment, for the purpose of advancing upon his force. To avert an attack from two bodies of troops at the same time, a party, under Captain Clapham, was dispatched with a gun, to take post on a height, commanding the Dewan's house, so as to keep the troops collected there in check. The detachment had scarcely arrived at the point assigned for it, when it was discovered that a small hill, immediately on the flank of the post, was occupied by the Travancore troops, whose numbers appeared to be rapidly augmenting. The eminence on which Captain Clapham's party was posted was evidently a military object to the enemy, and it became necessary to prepare for defending it. A column of Nairs was soon seen advancing, which was challenged and requested to halt. The challenge and request were disregarded, and the column continued to advance, obviously for the purpose of charging the British detachment. When within ten paces, Captain Clapham gave orders to fire. The fire was returned, but it was followed up, on the part of the British force, with so much quickness and precision, that after several ineffectual attempts to gain the height, the enemy was obliged to retire.

On the following morning, Major Hamilton proceeded, at the head of a body of British troops, to take possession of the battery at the Dewan's house, a service which was effected without loss,

and the guns conveyed within the British lines. These guns had been ordinarily used for firing salutes, but on examination, after they came into the hands of Colonel Chalmers, they were all found loaded and double-shotted; and it is also worthy of remark, that they were taken not in the situation where they were usually placed, but on a spot having the command of the only road leading to the Dewan's house.

Before Major Hamilton could return to his position, he was required to push on with his party to Anjuvicha, to intercept the enemy, who, in great numbers, were crossing the river in that direction. He arrived just as a numerous body were crossing in boats, while another party was drawn up on shore to cover their landing. The British commander immediately attacked the party on shore, who were dispersed forthwith, pursued to the bar, and driven into the water. A battalion, on the opposite side, witnessed the defeat and destruction of their countrymen, without attempting to assist them, further than by a few discharges of small arms at a distance, from which they could do no execution. On the dispersion of the enemy on the nearer side of the river, Major Hamilton directed his artillery to open on the battalion on the opposite shore, and almost the first shot put them to flight. They subsequently returned with reinforcements, and an attempt was made to surround Major Hamil-

ton's force, but prevented by his retiring within the lines of the cantonment.

Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the news of these events at Fort St. George, the government of that presidency received from the collector in Malabar the translation of a letter, addressed by the Dewan of Travancore to the Zamorin Rajah in Malabar, and which had been confidentially communicated by the Zamorin's minister. It was an extraordinary composition, appealing to the attachment felt by the natives to their ancient superstitions, and expressing violent apprehension of the extension of the Christian faith. To resist this, the Zamorin was exhorted to rise against the British, who were to be forthwith expelled, and no amity thenceforward maintained with them. The Zamorin was informed that hostilities had begun on the 28th, and that within eight days the Company's battalions should be compelled to evacuate Quilon.

Some further communications with the Zamorin's minister took place, through a confidential agent, whom the Dewan deputed to hold a conference with him, and it was not undeserving of notice. On the Zamorin's minister suggesting the imprudence of a small state rising in hostility against so vast a power as the British, the Dewan's agent, after adverting to the application made to the Isle of France for assistance, said that it was well known that the greater proportion of the Company's forces

would soon be engaged in a Mahratta war, and in the defence of their northern frontier, against an invasion of the French. Thus did the accessibility to invasion of our northern frontier give confidence to those hostile to our power, and thus early were our enemies aware of the existence of that Mahratta combination, which it took several years to mature for action. Yet then, as under similar circumstances, before and since, there were doubtless many who saw nothing but uninterrupted peace and unassailable security.

Further projects of conciliation had been meditated, even after the attempt upon the life of the British resident; and to gratify the parties by whom that atrocity was contrived and executed, the temporary suspension of Colonel Macaulay was determined on. The news of the attack upon the troops at Quilon, however, put an end to these conciliatory movements, and negociation was abandoned for arms. It was now thought important to secure the continued services of Colonel Macaulay, and that officer was requested, in language almost apologetic, to resume the duties of resident, until the contemplated proceedings connected with the station should have been carried into complete effect. A letter was addressed to the Rajah of Travancore, explaining the circumstances under which the advance of troops into his country had become necessary; and a proclamation addressed to the

inhabitants, assuring them that the peaceable and well affected had no cause for apprehension, was issued with similar views.

The troops destined for service in Travancore were to advance in various directions. Lieutenant-colonel St. Leger was appointed to conduct the operations on the eastern side; Lieutenant-colonel Cuppage, with another body of troops, was to enter by the northern frontier; while Colonel Wilkinson commanded a detachment, assembled in the south country, for the preservation of tranquillity in that quarter, and for the purpose of reinforcing the army in Travancore, if found necessary. The troops assembled at Quilon remained under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Chalmers.

The last-named officer was soon required to employ the force at his disposal. At six o'clock on the morning of the 15th January, he was informed that the Dewan's troops were advancing in different directions. On reconnoitering, in front of the British lines to the left, a large body of infantry drawn up with guns were perceived, on which Colonel Chalmers, without delay, ordered his line to advance in two columns to receive the enemy. The action that ensued lasted five hours, and ended in the flight of the Dewan's troops and the capture of several of their guns by the British force. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was great, that of the British very

trifling. Ten days afterwards, an attack made by three columns of the enemy on three different points of a detachment in Cochin, commanded by Major Hewitt, was repulsed with the most decisive success, although the British force was greatly inferior, in point of numbers, to their assailants, and were unprotected by either walls or batteries.

The share in the operations entrusted to Lieutenant-colonel St. Leger was conducted with remarkable spirit and brilliancy. The corps forming his detachment reached Palamcottah, after a very rapid march from Trichinopoly, and proceeded from thence to the lines of Arumbooly, which they reached on the 3d February. These lines were of great natural and artificial strength, but, after some short time spent in reconnoitering, it was determined to attack them by storm. The storming party, under Major Welsh, left the British encampment on the evening of the 9th, and, after encountering all the difficulties presented by thick jungles, abrupt ascents, rocky fissures, and deep ravines, arrived at the foot of the walls on the top of the hill, which they immediately surprised and carried, driving the enemy down the hill before them. The batteries in their possession were now opened and directed against the main line of the enemy's defences. A reinforcement arriving, at break of day Major Welsh proceeded to storm the main lines, and these also were carried in spite of a more severe resistance

than had previously been offered. The enemy appalled by the approach of the main body of the troops, to maintain the advantages which had thus been gained, precipitately fled; and, at an early hour of the day, Colonel St. Leger had the happiness of reporting to his Government that the British flag was flying on every part of the Arumbooly lines, as well as on the commanding redoubts to the north and south.

Having established a secure post within the lines, Colonel St. Leger pursued his success. A large body of the enemy had taken post in the villages of Colar and Nagrecoil, and the task of dislodging them was entrusted to a detachment under Lieutenant-colonel Macleod of the King's service. The country through which the detachment had to march was unfavourable, and the position which the enemy had chosen strong and advantageous. Protected in front by a battery, commanding the only point by which an assailant could approach, this defence was aided by a river, while in the rear were thick impassable woods. These advantages however were unavailing. The lines were attacked and carried after a sharp action, and the enemy forced to retreat in great confusion.

At this place the enemy had intended to make a determined stand. The Dewan himself had taken refuge there, and only fled on the approach of the British troops, whose proximity he naturally regarded with dislike. This success was a severe

blow to the fortunes of the Dewan. The forts of Woodagherry and Papanaveram (the latter one of the strongest places in Travancore) surrendered without the firing of a shot.

The fatal blow thus struck at the power of the Dewan was aided by the western division of the British troops. On the 20th of February a detachment from this force assailed, and most gallantly carried, some batteries erected by the enemy at Killianore; captured seven guns, and defeated a body of troops, consisting of about five thousand men. In the beginning of March, Colonel Chalmers advanced with the western division, to effect a junction with Colonel St. Leger, and encamped about twelve miles north of the rajah's capital. About the same period, the force on the northern frontier, under Colonel Cuppage, entered without opposition, and took up the strong position of Paroor, while the troops from the southern division of the army, under the command of Colonel Wilkinson, took possession of the defile of Armagawal, and proceeded to occupy the passes of Shincottee and Achincote. The Dewan now fled towards the mountains on the northern frontier, and being abandoned by his master, whom he had misled, parties were despatched in all directions to endeavour to apprehend him. Negociations commenced for the restoration of relations of amity between Travancore and the Company, and in a very short period affairs returned to their former state. The Dewan

wandered in the mountains, till compelled to retire by the difficulty of procuring food among rocks and jungles; a difficulty increased by the seizure of some of his followers, by whom he had been previously supplied. In this situation he came to the resolution of repairing to a pagoda, named Bhagwady, where he put an end to his life, by stabbing himself in various places. His brother was apprehended, and as he had participated in the atrocious murder of the thirty-four unhappy persons belonging to his Majesty's 12th Regiment, he was, by the orders of the rajah, most justly executed in sight of that regiment.

The occurrences which have been related illustrate a state of things too common in India—a sovereign abandoning himself and his territories to the guidance of a favourite minister, who soon becomes more powerful than the sovereign himself. In former times, indeed, the mayor of the palace in certain European states reduced the king to a cipher, and while ruling without check or control, suffered the odium of his bad government to attach to the unfortunate person who bore the royal dignity. In India that system is still in active operation; the indolence and the vices of native princes, aided sometimes by their peculiar circumstances, throw them into the custody of the bold or the designing; and from the thraldom which thus involves them, they rarely escape, but by the death of their keeper. Their people, in the

mean time, are generally exposed to the most dreadful oppression, and king and country have alike cause to rue the lamentable weakness which has invested a subject with the power of sovereignty, divested of the name.

Another and more gratifying subject of reflection is afforded by the evidence supplied of the great superiority of the army of British India over those with which it is ordinarily brought into action. The British force employed in Travancore was trifling, in point of number, when compared with the vast levies opposed to it; but the military skill of its commanders, and the high discipline of their troops, enabled it to subdue the entire country almost as rapidly as it could be put in motion. Such has ordinarily been the course of British warfare in India.

CHAPTER IV.

CAPTURE OF BOURBON AND MAURITIUS.

DURING the wars which followed the French Revolution, the injuries sustained by our commerce, from the enemy's settlements in the Indian seas, were severely felt. The principal seats of annoyance were the Mascarenha Isles, comprising the Isle of Bourbon, or Mascarenha, properly so called; Mauritius, or the Isle of France; the small Island of Rodriguez; and another of inferior note.

Such a group, lying on the very highway of the commerce between India and England, could not be left in the hands of an active and insidious foe with impunity, and the actual results fully realized all that might have been anticipated. From the Mauritius especially, French cruizers issued in vast numbers, to prowl over the Indian seas, and the consequent loss was immense. It has been said that previously to the fall of this island, the insurance offices of Bengal alone were losers to the

amount of three millions sterling from captures. The amount may be exaggerated, but there can be no doubt of it having been very great.

That such a course of things should have been allowed to proceed so long unchecked, argues little either for the wisdom or the activity of the British Government: but its toleration was in perfect harmony with the indifference usually manifested on such occasions. A persuasion had indeed long prevailed, that the Mauritius could not be successfully assailed by a hostile force, and this persuasion the French naturally used their best endeavours to encourage. A plausible error, once established, is hard to be shaken, and the currency of a belief that the island was impregnable, combined with the imperturbable apathy with which British statesmen have generally regarded the interests of our Indian possessions, must account for the supineness which so long left a valuable branch of commerce at the mercy of the enemy.

The enormous extent of the evil at length roused the British cabinet to some exertions. Admiral Bertie, who commanded on the Cape of Good Hope station, was ordered to enforce a rigorous blockade. The service was entrusted to Captain Rowley; and, to assist the contemplated operations, Lieut.-Col. Keating was, in 1809, despatched from India, with a small force, to occupy the Island of Rodriguez, about one hundred miles distant from the Mauritius.

On his arrival, he found only two families on the island, and of course took possession of it without difficulty. After some time spent in acquiring a perfect knowledge of the coast, Commodore Rowley resolved to make an attack upon the town of St. Paul's, the chief port of the Isle of Bourbon, and for this purpose requested the co-operation of Colonel Keating. A detachment was forthwith embarked from Rodriguez to join Commodore Rowley off Port Louis, the capital of the Mauritius.

On the evening of the 19th of September, the force destined for the attack stood for the Isle of Bourbon, and, on the following morning, disembarked to the southward of Pont de Gallotte, seven miles from St. Paul's. The landing was effected with great dexterity, and the troops immediately commenced a forced march, in order, if possible, to cross the causeways extending over the lake or pond of St. Paul's, before the enemy discovered their debarkation. In this they succeeded; and they had the further good fortune of passing the strongest position of the enemy before the French had time to form in sufficient force. By seven o'clock, the assailants were in possession of the first two batteries, Lambousiere and la Centiere, and the guns were forthwith turned against the enemy's shipping, whose well-directed fire of grape, from within pistol-shot of the shore, had greatly annoyed the British force.

A detachment, consisting of the second column,

under Captain Inbeck, was now dispatched to take possession of the third battery, La Neuve, which the enemy had abandoned; but, on its way, it fell in with the main force of the enemy, strongly posted within stone walls, with eight six-pounders on its flanks. They were charged in gallant style, but without driving them from their position. Captain Harvey, with the third column, then moved to support Captain Inbeck, and succeeded in taking two of the enemy's guns The action now became warm and general. The French were reinforced from the hills, and from the ships in the harbour—the British by the advance of the reserve, which had previously covered the batteries. The guns of the first and second batteries were spiked, and the third was occupied by seamen under the command of Captain Willoughby, who soon opened its fire upon the shipping. The enemy now gave way, the fourth and fifth batteries were won without resistance, and at half-past eight the town of St. Paul's was in the possession of the British.

Till this period the naval force had been compelled to remain inactive, as they could not venture to attack the enemy's ships, lest they should annoy the British troops, who were within range. They now stood in, Captain Pym taking the lead, and opened their fire upon the enemy's ships, all of which cut their cables and drifted on shore. The seamen, however, succeeded in heaving them off without any material injury.

The force by which this brilliant exploit was

achieved was inconsiderable. The detachment embarked from Rodriguez consisted of only 368 officers and men. It was strengthened by 100 seamen and 136 marines from the blockading squadron; thus making a total of 604. The victory was gained with the comparatively trifling loss of 15 killed, 58 wounded, and 3 missing.

The success which attended the attempt seems to have paralyzed the enemy. General des Brusles, the commander of the island, marched from the capital, St. Denis, to repel the invaders, and on the evening of the 22d appeared with considerable force on the hills above St. Paul's; but, either from overrating the numbers of the British, or from some other cause, at which it were vain to guess, he retreated, and terminated his career by shooting himself. He left behind him a paper, which sufficiently illustrates the state of his feelings, though it but imperfectly accounts for his despair of success. It was to this effect: "I will not be a traitor to my country. I will not, in consequence of what I foresee from the hatred and ambition of some individuals, who are attached to a revolutionary sect, sacrifice the inhabitants in the useless defence of an open colony. Death awaits me on the scaffold. I prefer giving it myself: and I recommend my wife and children to Providence, and to those who can feel for them."

Judging from the temper with which Buonaparte was accustomed to regard unsuccessful com-

manders, the apprehensions of General des Brusles cannot be considered unreasonable. It is gratifying to know that his wishes, with regard to his family, were not disappointed; they found in the British commander those humane and generous feelings which their deceased protector had invoked on their behalf. The widow of the general having expressed a wish to go to her own family at the Mauritius, Commodore Rowley immediately appointed a vessel, with a cartel flag, to convey her thither, with her children, servants, and effects.

The career of the British force had been highly brilliant, and, in addition to its actual achievements, it had obviously inspired a degree of terror altogether disproportioned to its extent; but it was quite unequal to undertake the conquest of the island; and this result formed no part of the plan of those who projected the attack. In the destruction of the batteries and the capture of the shipping in the harbour, a part of which were prizes which had been recently taken by the enemy, all that was sought for was attained. As much public property as could be carried away was embarked, the remainder was destoyed, and the island for awhile abandoned; the squadron resuming its usual occupation, and Colonel Keating, with his troops, returning to Rodriguez.

In the following year, preparations were made for a serious attempt to annihilate the French

power in the Indian seas; an attempt encouraged by the success of a desultory but brilliant exploit achieved by Captain Willoughby, who, at the head of about a hundred of the crew of the *Nereide*, which he commanded, landed at Jacolet in the Mauritius. The landing was effected under the fire of two batteries, and, as the assailants formed on the beach, they became exposed to a heavy discharge of musketry; but in ten minutes the first battery was in their possession, and having spiked the guns, they marched to the guard-house, which was protected by ten field-pieces, some regular troops, and a strong detachment of artillery. They were charged by Captain Willoughby and his little band, and immediately gave way, abandoning their guns and their commanding officer, who was made prisoner in the act of spiking them.

The British then pushed on to the second and stronger battery, to gain which they had to pass the river Le Gulet, swollen and greatly increased in rapidity by heavy rains. The difficulty of crossing the river having been conquered, the battery was immediately carried, and the commander taken. Here, as before, the guns were spiked, and the party were about to return to their first ship, when the troops which had fled from the battery again appeared, strongly reinforced by militia and irregulars. Captain Willoughby advanced towards them, and on his coming within

musket-shot, they opened their fire. Suspecting that they would again have recourse to flight, the British commander made an oblique movement, with the intention of getting into their rear, but the moment this was discovered by the militia, they fled, followed by the regulars, with a celerity that defied pursuit. Finally, Captain Willoughby burnt the signal-house and flag-staff, and, carrying with him some field pieces and stores, re-embarked with all his men except one, who was killed.

The organized system of operations against the French islands was not acted upon until later in the year. The first step was to renew the attempt against the Isle of Bourbon, with sufficient strength to take and retain possession of that colony. For this purpose, the force at Rodriguez, under command of Colonel Keating, was augmented from the three presidencies to the number of 3,650 rank and file, of whom about one-half were Europeans. Colonel Keating had been long occupied in training his troops, at Rodriguez, to the service to which they were destined, accustoming them to a country intersected with ravines and precipices, like that in which they were about to act. The transports, which conveyed the reinforcements, arrived off Rodriguez on the 20th of June; but the unfavourable state of the weather detained the expedition from proceeding until the 3d of July. Before it sailed, Colonel Keating

communicated to the commanders of brigades the information he had acquired as to the enemy's strength and position, and his own determination as to the mode of operations. This, in his own words, was "to strike the first blow at the heart of the enemy," to gain possession of the capital, and let further proceedings be guided by circumstances. Every thing during the night, or before daylight, was to be carried by the bayonet, Colonel Keating judiciously concluding that the French island force, trained in a system of firing from behind walls and houses, and from the opposite side of impassable ravines, would never be brought to stand against English bayonets.

On the 6th, the whole of the expedition came to a rendezvous about fifty miles to the windward of the Isle of Bourbon, when part of the troops were removed from the transports on board his Majesty's squadron, consisting of the *Boadicea*, the *Sirius*, the *Iphigenia*, the *Magicienne*, and the *Nereide*, under the command of Commodore Rowley, which immediately stood for the different points of debarkation.. On the afternoon of the 7th, most of the ships had arrived at their destined stations off the island, and preparations were made for landing the troops. This was effected to some extent. Captain Pym landed the whole of the troops on board his frigate, the *Sirius*, at Grande Chaloupe, a part of the beach, about six miles to the westward of St. Denis, the capital of

the island; and Lieutenant Watling, of that frigate, with his men, took possession of a neighbouring height, thereby preventing reinforcements being sent to St. Denis from the neighbouring town of St. Paul's.

The other point of descent was the River de Pluies, about three miles to the eastward of St. Denis. The beach on that side of the island is composed of large shingles, steep, and difficult of access, and the wind, which is very uncertain in these latitudes, suddenly and violently increasing, the surf rose to an unexpected height. Captain Willoughby, ever the first at the post of danger, pushed off, with a party of seamen and a detachment of troops, in the *Estafette*, prize schooner. A few boats followed, and the men were landed with the loss of only four; but the schooner and several of the boats were dashed to pieces in the surf. Another small body of troops effected a landing somewhat more to the right, under Lieutenant-colonel Macleod. A small transport was placed upon the beach to act as a breakwater, in the hope that the men might be enabled to land over her stern or under her lee; this was ably performed by Lieutenant Lloyd, of the *Boadicea*, but the violence of the weather, and the natural difficulties of the situation, frustrated the success of the attempt, and it was found impossible to land any more troops that evening. Those who had succeeded in landing had lost a considerable part

of their arms, and all their ammunition was damaged.

It now became an object of importance to communicate with the detachment on shore, but all hope of doing so seemed cut off by the circumstances which suspended the landing of the troops. In this emergency the desired means of communication were furnished by that unconquerable spirit which our countrymen have so often displayed under circumstances which almost justify despair. Lieutenant Foulstone, of the 69th Regiment, volunteered to swim to shore;—his offer was accepted; he made the attempt, and succeeded, by diving under the surf, from whence he was dragged by a boat-hook. By the gallantry of this high-spirited officer, orders were conveyed to Colonel Macleod, the senior officer of the detachment on shore, to take possession of St. Marie for the night. That officer immediately marched with his slender force, and carried the fort at the point of the bayonet.

The impracticability of disembarking any more troops to the windward during the existing state of the weather being apparent, it was resolved to despatch the remainder to Grande Chaloupe,* where the landing was successfully effected.

* St. Pierre, who visited this spot in 1770, says, "We descended and came to the Grande Chaloupe. It is a frightful valley, formed by two mountains that are very steep. We walked part of the way, which the rain had rendered dangerous, and at

In the meantime, the brigade under Lieutenant-colonel Fraser, which had previously landed at Grande Chaloupe, had pushed forward a party, the commanding officer leading the way, to dislodge a body of riflemen, who occupied the heights and kept up a harassing fire. This was soon accomplished, and the brigade moved rapidly over the mountains towards St. Denis. They halted there during the night, then began to descend at four o'clock on the following morning, having in the interval been joined by sepoys, pioneers, and artillery. They found the enemy drawn up on the plain, in two columns, each with a field piece at its head, supported by some heavy cannon on the redoubt. A severe fire of ordnance and musketry was opened upon the British force, who, however, advanced in admirable order. On reaching the plain, orders were given to charge. The French remained steadily at their guns until the British grenadiers came in contact with them, when, finding that the thunder of their ordnance was to be met with the silent but deadly thrust of the bayonet, they retired and attempted to form behind the parapet of the redoubt. From this

the bottom we found ourselves between the two mountains in the strangest solitude I had ever seen; we were, in a manner, between two walls, the heavens only hanging over our heads: we crossed the rivulet, and came at length to the shore opposite the Chaloupe. At the bottom of this abyss there reigns an eternal calm, however the winds blow on the mountains."

they were speedily driven by the weapon they so much dreaded; the British colours were hoisted on the top of the redoubt, two guns which had been spiked were rendered serviceable and turned against the enemy, and the batteries to the west of the river St. Denis were stormed and demolished. Thus the main force of the island was totally defeated by a body of troops not amounting to six hundred men. The commandant, Colonel St. Susanne, escaped with difficulty, and the officer second in command was wounded and made prisoner.

About two o'clock in the afternoon, a brigade under Lieutenant-colonel Drummond, which had been landed that morning at Grande Chaloupe, arrived in sight of St. Denis, after a severe march over the mountains, harassed by the enemy's chasseurs, who hung upon their flanks. As they approached, they were exposed to a heavy fire of cannon, grape, shells, and musketry from the town, without a possibility of either returning or avoiding it. Colonel Fraser, however, kept up a brisk fire upon the town from the redoubt. About four o'clock, he was joined by Lieutenant-colonel Drummond's brigade; and Colonel Keating, who had landed at noon with the rest of the troops, appeared on the heights. Preparations were now made for a simultaneous attack upon the place, when, at the very moment of advance, a flag of truce arrived to treat for the surrender of the island,

Colonel Fraser having refused to negociate on any other terms.

The articles of capitulation stipulated for the immediate evacuation of all the military posts and the surrender of all public stores; the troops of the line and *Garde Nationale* to march out with the honours of war; the former to surrender as prisoners, the officers being allowed to retain their swords and military decorations, and embarked, as well as the troops, either for England or the Cape, with the exception of the commandant, St. Susanne, who was to be allowed to depart either to France or the Mauritius on his parole of honour. To these a provision of an unusual kind was added, —that funeral honours should be paid to the French officers who had fallen, according to their respective rank.* The laws, customs, and religion

* If Shakspeare be admitted as authority, a similar feeling was manifested by the French centuries ago. In Henry V., he introduces a herald from the French king, preferring this petition to Henry, after the battle of Agincourt:

"I come to thee for charitable licence—
That we may wander o'er this bloody field,
To book our dead, and then to bury them:—
To sort our nobles from our common men.
For many of our princes (woe the while!)
Lie drown'd and soak'd in mercenary blood.
So do our vulgar drench their peasant limbs
In blood of princes: and their wounded steeds
Fret, fetlock deep in gore, and wild with rage,
Yerk out their armed heels at their dead masters,
Killing them twice.—O, give us leave, great king,
To view the field in safety, and dispose
Of their dead bodies."—*Henry V.*, Act iv, Scene vii.

of the inhabitants, as well as their private property, were to be respected.

The ordnance found at St. Paul's and St. Denis amounted to 145 pieces of heavy artillery. The loss sustained in making the conquest was slight; eighteen killed, seventy-nine wounded, and four drowned in landing. That of the enemy was never precisely ascertained, but it was very considerable.

The capture of the island of Bourbon was principally desired as a preliminary to that of the still more important settlement of the Mauritius; and in anticipation of our attempts upon that island Mr. Farquhar, the English governor of the Isle of Bourbon, published an address to the inhabitants of the Mauritius, the distribution of which he found means of effecting from the little island of Passe, which had been taken possession of by a party from his Majesty's cruisers. This acquisition was made in a very brilliant manner. Five boats from the *Sirius* and the *Iphigenia* proceeded on the night of the 13th August to the landing-place on the north-west side of the island, which was defended by a *chevaux-de-frise* and two howitzers. To gain this spot, it was necessary to pass a battery of several guns, and fortunately, the attempt was favoured by a heavy cloud suddenly obscuring the moon, which had previously been shining with great brightness. Before, however, the boats reached the landing-place, the enemy discovered and commenced firing upon them; two men were

killed and several wounded, but, nothing daunted, the assailants advanced and landed. Lieutenant Norman, in attempting to scale the works, was shot through the heart by a sentinel overhead: he was immediately shot by one of the seamen, who, headed by Lieutenant Watling, speedily ascended the walls. A brief but warm encounter followed, in which the British had seven men killed and eighteen wounded; but they succeeded in obtaining possession of the walls. Lieutenant Watling then proceeded to attack the batteries on the south-east side, where he was met by Lieutenant Chads, who had landed at another point and stormed and carried the works there, without the loss of a man. The two parties being united, the French commandant offered no further resistance, but surrendered at discretion.

The island was entrusted to the charge of Captain Willoughby, who availed himself of its proximity to the Mauritius to pay visits to the coasts of the latter island. His first attack was upon Pont du Diable, which was stormed and carried; the French commander and three of his men killed, and three gunners made prisoners. The guns were spiked, the carriages burnt, and the magazine blown up; after which, Captain Willoughby moved on to Grand Port, a distance of twelve miles. He remained on the island until sunset, and a strong party of the enemy, which attacked him, were put to the rout with the loss of six

men. On another occasion he destroyed the signal-house and staff at Grand Riviere, blew up the remaining works at Pont du Diable, and retired without molestation.

The British arms had hitherto been eminently successful, but the flattering hopes which their success had called forth, now sustained a severe check by a series of disasters, which for a time gave the enemy the dominion of the Indian seas. Among other prizes they succeeded in capturing the *Windham* and *Ceylon*, East-Indiamen. These ships, with another Company's ship, the *Astell*, were sailing for Madras, when they were attacked by a French squadron, under Commodore Duperne. The Indiamen maintained a very gallant and hard-fought contest with a very superior force for several hours; when the *Windham* and the *Ceylon*, having sustained serious loss in killed and wounded, and much injury in their hull, masts, and rigging, were compelled to strike. The *Astell*, after taking its share in the unequal struggle, effected its escape under cover of the darkness of the night. The French account of this transaction was marked with that bad faith which has too often characterized the official statements of our neighbours, and which was almost universal during the reign of Buonaparte; it asserted that the *Astell* had struck her colours previously to her escape,—an accusation which the captain and his officers publicly refuted.

The success of the enemy was not restrained to encounters with merchant ships. The French squadron, with the two Indiamen, their prizes, ran for Port Sud-Est, in the Mauritius, at the entrance of which lay the Isle of Passe, which the English had occupied and garrisoned. Four British frigates were also cruzing off the station, and in the attempt to make the port, the *Windham* East-Indiaman was turned and re-captured by the *Sirius*, Captain Pym. Having dispatched his prize to Bourbon, that officer formed the design of attacking the French squadron in the harbour; but, not being sufficiently aware of the difficulties of the navigation, the attempt terminated in defeat and serious loss. Three of the ships took the ground, and the fourth was prevented from closing with the enemy. These unfortunate occurrences enabled the foe to open all their guns upon a single vessel, the *Nereid*, commanded by Captain Willoughby. The fortitude and courage displayed by this officer and his crew were beyond all praise, and probably have never been surpassed. Deprived of all efficient assistance from the other frigates, the *Nereid* singly maintained the contest for the almost incredible space of ten hours. Captain Willoughby lost an eye, and was otherwise dreadfully injured in the head. A boat was sent from the *Sirius* to bring him off, but he declared he would neither abandon his men, nor strike the British flag while there was a single man on board

able to support it He kept his word—he fought the ship till every man of her whole crew, consisting of two hundred and eighty, was either killed or wounded; and when the enemy took possession of their dearly purchased prize, they found only a miserable wreck, peopled with the maimed, the dying, and the dead.

Of the remaining vessels, two, the *Sirius* and *Magicienne*, were so situated, that their abandonment became necessary, and after setting fire to them, their respective crews were landed on the Isle of Passe; the fourth, the *Iphigenia*, was with some difficulty warped up to that anchorage, the enemy making no attempt to prevent her. In this situation she lay, without the power of removing from it, while the state of the little garrison at the isle became every day more forlorn: their stock, both of provisions and water, was low, and they had no prospect of receiving succour. To complete their distress, they were blockaded by a French force; and as their means of subsistence were almost at an end, and escape was impossible, they were compelled to surrender.

No one object of this unfortunate attempt was achieved; its disastrous issue was complete: all the vessels engaged in it were either destroyed, or fell into the hands of the enemy. But though, as it subsequently appeared, the undertaking was ill-judged, the conduct of those engaged in it was such as to enable their countrymen to call up the

recollection, even of discomfiture, without a blush. Heroism like that displayed by Captain Willoughby and his intrepid comrades, sheds over defeat the lustre of victory. Amid scenes of blood and suffering far surpassing the ordinary horrors of warfare, these gallant spirits were insensible to every thing but their own duty and their country's honour. Never was duty more devotedly performed, never was honour more completely sustained.

The record of disaster, though drawing to a close, is not yet entirely complete. The *Africain* frigate was taken by the enemy, after a severe action, in which her commander fell; and another frigate, the *Ceylon*, shared the same fate. This vessel, having on board General Abercrombie, appointed by the governor-general to take the command of the troops destined for the reduction of the Mauritius, fell in with some French cruziers off the island of Bourbon. An action ensued, which was gallantly maintained for five hours, when the *Ceylon*, being dismasted and rendered ungovernable by this and other causes, was compelled to yield to adverse fortune and overwhelming force. It is said that the French commander observed, that he should have the honour of introducing General Abercrombie to the governor of the Isle of France sooner than he had expected. But this honour he was not destined to enjoy. In a few hours, the *Ceylon* was re-taken by the

English, when the general, thanking M. Hamlen for his kind intention, said he felt extremely happy in being able to return the compliment, by introducing him to Commodore Rowley.

The necessity of wresting the Mauritius from the enemy now became more than ever apparent, and preparations for the attempt were carried on with renewed vigour. On the 14th of October, Commodore Rowley sailed with a gallant squadron from the harbour of St. Paul's, to resume the blockade of the Mauritius, taking with him Major-general Abercrombie, to reconnoitre the situation of the French colony, and concert the necessary measures for its reduction. He arrived off Port Louis on the 19th, where he found the whole of the enemy's naval force at anchor in the port, two only of the ships being in a state of apparent readiness for sea.

Having left a sufficient force to watch the enemy's movements and blockade the port, he proceeded to Rodriguez, where the different divisions destined for the attack on the Mauritius were appointed to assemble. He found that the troops from Bombay had already reached their destination. They were soon followed by those from Madras: but the non-arrival of the divisions from Bengal and the Cape at the expected time was a source of great disappointment and anxiety, as the stormy season was approaching, and in the event of unfavourable weather,

the danger to the fleet would be extreme. He therefore suggested to the general the propriety of standing out to sea with the troops already assembled, and cruizing to the windward of the French island, to await the junction of one or both of the divisions so anxiously looked for. To this suggestion the general assented, and the 22d November was fixed for the departure of the fleet from Rodriguez. Every thing was in readiness on the previous evening, when the welcome intelligence was received that the Bengal division was seen in the offing.

That not a moment might be lost, it was resolved that the convoys just arrived should be supplied with the requisite provisions from the beach and shipping, and, without dropping anchor, be ordered to accompany the fleet then getting under weigh; and soon after the fleet, consisting of nearly seventy sail, stood from the anchorage of Rodriguez to the selected point of debarkation.

The coasts of the Mauritius are beset by dangerous reefs, and the island has only two good harbours. That called Port Sud-Est, which was principally used by the Dutch, is the more capacious, and being on the windward side of the island it is the easier of entrance, as well as the more healthy; but the wind almost perpetually blowing in, the difficulty of getting ships out counterbalances the advantage offered by the facility with which

they can enter. For this reason, Port Nord-Ouest was preferred by the French when the Mauritius came into their possession, and there, during the administration of Mahé de la Bourdonnais, who was governor from 1734 to 1766, the only town in the island was erected, in a narrow valley at the head of the harbour. This henceforward was the seat of government, and the port and town were denominated Port Louis.

The Portuguese, by whom the island was discovered, do not appear ever to have taken possession of it. It was first occupied by the Dutch, in the seventeenth century, who gave it the name of Mauritius, in honour of Prince Maurice of Nassau. These indefatigable traders are said to have been driven out of the island by the swarms of rats with which it was infested, and it is certain that they abandoned it about the year 1710. Whether the French had less dread of the disagreeable quadrupeds which had conquered their predecessors, or possessed better means of contending with them, is not recorded; but they took possession of the island after it was forsaken by the Dutch, and always attached great importance to it. Raynal dwells enthusiastically upon its political and commercial advantages, and especially on its value as the means of annoying the commerce of Great Britain.* The statesmen of

* This writer, after adverting to certain plans for securing the resources of the Mauritius, exclaims, "Then this island will be what it should, the bulwark of all the settlements which

that country had participated in this feeling, and much labour had been employed to place Port Louis in a posture of defence. They seem, however, to have relied too implicitly upon the reef which surrounds the island, and to have concluded too hastily, that the town would only be attacked by sea. To guard against such an attack works of considerable strength were constructed. As the approach of the English was not unexpected, additional means of defence were resorted to, and the fortifications on the sea-side placed in such a state, as to render an attack an act of extreme temerity. But the governor seems to have relied entirely upon his sea-works, and in a

France possesses, or may one day acquire, in the Indies; the centre of all military operations, offensive or defensive, which her interest will oblige her to undertake or to sustain in those distant regions. It is situated in the African seas, just at the entrance of the Indian ocean. Though raised as high as arid or burning coasts, it is temperate and wholesome. As it lies a little out of the common track, its expeditions can be carried on with greater secrecy. Those who wish it was nearer to our continent do not consider, that if it were so, it would be impossible to pass in so short a time from its road to the gulphs, in the most distant of those regions, which is an invaluable advantage to a nation that has no sea-port in India. Great Britain sees with a jealous eye, her rivals possessed of a settlement where the ruin of her property in Asia may be prepared. At the breaking out of a war, her utmost efforts will certainly be exerted against a colony which threatens her richest treasure. What a misfortune for France, should she suffer herself basely to be deprived of it!"

great degree to have neglected the means of defence on the land side.

The advantages of superior knowledge of the coast were now manifest. The French had supposed that the reefs which surround the island rendered it impregnable, and that the depth of water without the reef rendered it impossible for a fleet of transports to find anchorage. These impressions were not unknown to the British commanders; but, instead of supinely acquiescing in the popular belief, they took measures for ascertaining its accuracy. Every part of the leeward side was examined, and sounded with the most minute and scrupulous attention. This service was performed by Captain Paterson, of his Majesty's ship *Hesper*, and Lieutenant Street, commanding the government armed ship *Emma*. The soundings were taken in the night, to avoid observation; and it was by these means discovered, that a fleet might safely anchor in a narrow strait, between an islet called the Gunner's Coin and the main land, and that there were also openings in the reef here, through which several boats might enter abreast. The only objection to this place of debarkation was its distance from Port Louis; but this was not to be placed in competition with its manifold advantages.

On the morning of the 29th, the English fleet came to anchor in the strait. Two brigs, which drew but little water, anchored on the reef, within

a hundred yards of the beach, to cover the landing; the conduct of which was entrusted to Captain Philip Beaver, of the *Nisus* frigate. Soon after one o'clock, the debarkation commenced, and in three hours, ten thousand men, with their guns, stores, ammunition, and three days' provisions, were landed, without the slightest loss, or even a single accident. The enemy appear to have been astonished by the boldness and novelty of the attempt. On the first appearance of the British fleet, they abandoned a fort called Malastrie, the only fortified place in the vicinity. The landing having been thus happily effected, no time was lost in following up the success which had attended it. The troops were instantly put in motion, to prevent the enemy from gaining possession of a thick wood which lay on the road, and using the means which it afforded of harassing the flanks of the invading army. On reaching it, the advanced guard fell in with a picquet of the retreating corps, which, after a feeble attempt to dispute the passage, was driven from its position. This was the only opposition encountered till the columns reached the more open country. About midnight, they halted, and before day-break resumed their march. It was the intention of General Abercrombie not to halt again till he was before Port Louis, but the march of the preceding day, though short, had been so extremely harassing, that his intention could not be persevered in. The men

were greatly exhausted by their previous exertions, their way having lain for four miles among thick brushwood, through which the artillery and stores had to be dragged, with a degree of labour almost intolerable.

The inconvenience arising from the heat of the weather was increased by a deficiency of water. Several men and two officers had sunk under their exertions, and were left dead on the march. It was fortunate that these harassing circumstances were not aggravated by any operations of the enemy; but the condition of the troops rendered it obviously imprudent to attempt to reach Port Louis without rest. About noon, therefore a position was taken up at Moulin-à-Poudre, on a gentle elevation, a wood stretching along its front, and extending with some intervals to Port Louis, five miles distant. In the afternoon, the French General de Caen, with a party of cavalry and riflemen, approached the British lines to reconnoitre, and surprised a small picquet. They were driven back and pursued by some light companies. A few men were killed, and the general himself received a contusion from a ball.

Before daylight, on the following day a brigade under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Macleod, was detached to attack some batteries, the possession of which was necessary to enable the troops to draw their supplies from the fleet. Some of the batteries had already yielded to our seamen;

the remainder were evacuated as the troops approached. At five o'clock, the main body of the troops was put in motion. It shortly afterwards encountered a corps of the enemy, who, with several field-pieces, had taken up a strong position, very favourable for making an attack on the head of the column. The march of the British troops lay along a narrow road, with a thick wood on each flank. On meeting the enemy, the European flank battalion, which composed the advanced guard, formed with as much regularity as the bad and broken ground would admit, and charged the enemy with such spirit, as compelled them to retire with the loss of their guns, and many killed and wounded; but this advantage was obtained by the fall of Colonel Campbell and Major O'Keefe, two officers of distinguished ability. There was a signal-post on a hill, called the Vivebot, from whence every moment of the enemy could be discerned. The French being driven from their position, a corps ascended this eminence, removed the enemy's flag, and hoisted the British ensign in its place; which was then, for the first time, planted in the Mauritius.

The weather still continued oppressive, and the troops were greatly exhausted. These circumstances, combined with the lateness of the day, rendered desirable a suspension of active operations until the morning, when a general attack was determined upon. During the night, a mistake

occurred, which was productive of unfortunate results. A party of marines arrived to join the British force; they were dressed, as customary in India, in white and blue, and in the darkness were unhappily mistaken for French soldiers. An alarm was given, several corps stood to their arms, some gave fire, and the consequence was that many were wounded, and a few killed. But misapprehension was not confined to the British: the enemy were likewise disturbed by a false alarm, during which, it has been said, the National Guards betrayed such a degree of irresolution, as had considerable effect in determining the events of the following day.

On the approach of morning, preparations were made for the intended attack; but they were interrupted by the arrival of a flag of truce from General de Caen, offering to capitulate upon conditions. Three of the conditions were, that the troops and seamen should be sent to France; that the four frigates and two corvettes in the harbour should be retained by the French; and that inventories should be taken of all the articles belonging to the French emperor, and such articles restored to him at the conclusion of peace. General de Caen did not then foresee that this last article, had it been complied with, would produce no benefit to the individual in whose favour it was framed; it was not then anticipated that peace never would be made with the French emperor, nor that he was to end his days on an island in the Southern Ocean

immeasurably inferior in every respect to that for the surrender of which, General de Caen was negociating; that even over that narrow and barren rock he should hold no sovereignty, but should sojourn there a prisoner to the power from whose victorious forces such insolent terms were now demanded.

The articles which stipulated for the retention of the shipping, and the property of the French emperor, were rejected; that which claimed for the enemy's troops and seamen immunity from the ordinary fate of the vanquished, was assented to;—a fact which could not fail to create surprise in all acquainted with the relative situations of the invading and defending forces; while it was equally calculated to excite regret, not unmixed with indignation, in all who valued the honour of the British arms. That such a condition should have been demanded was nothing remarkable; it was but a fresh instance of that insolent pride, which, in modern times, had invariably marked the conduct and demeanour of the "great nation," and which, under Napoleon and his captains, attained its climax; but that a British officer should have been found to yield to the demand, is one of those rare instances in the military history of his country, which call up on the cheek of an Englishman the hue of shame. There was not the slightest pretext for the indulgence thus unreasonably asked, and thus unreasonably con-

ceded. We were in a condition to dictate our own terms. We had reduced the enemy to an offer of surrender, with only a part of the army destined to the undertaking; and, during the progress of the negociation, the Cape squadron arrived with the remaining force, amounting to two thousand men. To the British army, without this addition, the French could have offered no effectual resistance; thus re-inforced, all pretext for hesitation was removed; the duty of the British general was clear, and his compliance with a demand quite unusual, and almost unprecedented, cannot be regarded otherwise than as a surrender of a portion of the national honour, and consequently of national interest—for the loss of the one involves that of the other. At this time, it was more important than at any previous period, that no portion of either should be sacrificed. The French were masters of the entire continent, and England stood alone in arms against the people who had enslaved all Europe. The superiority of the French over other nations in the arts of war had been loudly proclaimed by themselves, and implicitly admitted by almost all the world; and to this universal belief in the omnipotence of French tactics, and the immutability of French fortune, much of their success was to be attributed. It was, therefore, of immeasurable importance to break the charm which hung over these alleged invincibles, and to exhibit them as

ordinary men. To beat them, and then, as if alarmed at what we had done—as if glad to be rid of them at any terms—to give them safe-conduct to their own shores, was to confirm the prejudices from which such fearful consequences had flowed—to sign and seal a certificate of our own weakness and the enemy's strength, and to send him forth, bearing, under the hand of the British commanders, a testimonial of the homage of England to the great idol before whom all Europe bowed.

The pretence for such acts of discreditable submission is always that of humanity—a desire to curtail the horrors of war; but here the hope of offering successful resistance to the invaders was beyond the reach of even the sanguine mind of a French general; and there is no reason for believing that, had the British commanders been stedfast in rejecting the obnoxious article, the negociation would have come to an end, or even that its progress would have been greatly impeded. But, if it had—if the insane confidence of the French commander in the good star of his country had led him to protract the surrender of the island, and if hostile operations had, in consequence, been renewed, on his head would have rested the guilt of the additional bloodshed. The British general would only have discharged his duty, in refusing to assent to terms unsanctioned by the usages of war.

With the enemy prostrate and powerless at his feet, there was but one safe and honourable course, and, in departing from it, he committed an error, which judged upon military and national principles, must be pronounced unpardonable. His own feelings doubtless prompted him to treat a vanquished enemy humanely and generously, and the honour of his country demanded this; but those estimable feelings were indulged to an undue extent, when he forgot the distinction between a victorious and a beaten army, and suffered the one to usurp the privileges of the other. Conventions were in fashion about the time of the capture of the Mauritius, and this may, in some degree, account for the course taken there, though it cannot excuse it. Such temporizing expedients cannot be too severely reprobated; they are, in truth, no more beneficial to the general interests of humanity, than they are creditable to the nation which submits to them. War is a fertile source of evil and misery, but no rational man expects to see the necessity for it banished from the world. While the nature of man remains unchanged, war will occasionally be inevitable; and, if it must arise, to pursue it with vigour and decision is the most effectual way to shorten its duration, and thus to diminish the mischief of which it is the cause. To cripple the resources of an enemy, is to lead him to desire peace—to restore to him the men we have vanquished, to be again employed in

active hostility against those whose weakness has released them, is but to feed the flames of war, and to assist in perpetuating their ravages.

The prize was gained at a comparatively small cost. Our loss amounted to only twenty-nine killed, ninety-nine wounded, and forty-five missing. The conquest placed in our possession a large quantity of ordnance and shipping—some of the latter of great value, the island having long been the depôt for the prizes made by the French privateers in the Indian seas. At home, the island was justly regarded as a most valuable acquisition, but the terms upon which it was obtained excited general disgust, and became the subject both of private and public reprobation.

The Mauritius is still ours, but the Island of Bourbon was, at the peace of 1814, restored to the French. This has been the usual course of events —what we have gained by our arms, we have lost by our diplomacy; our soldiers and seamen having poured out their blood in the purchase of conquests, to be calmly yielded up by the liberality or the incompetence of our statesmen. The Island of Bourbon is, from its position, of less importance than the Mauritius, but the possession of both is necessary to the security of our Eastern possessions and commerce; and, by surrendering one, we have compromised our power of retaining the other. In the event of a war, it will be a question, whether the French shall recover the Mauritius,

or the English the Isle of Bourbon. The dominion of the Indian seas we ought never to have surrendered; it is an essential appendage to our commercial greatness, and to the safety of our Asiatic empire. Never was a more mistaken policy, than to settle a probable enemy upon the road to our most valuable possessions, and in the immediate neighbourhood of the colony which is the key were to them.

CHAPTER V.

CONQUEST OF THE DUTCH SETTLEMENTS.

WHILE Lord Minto held the office of governor-general, his attention was directed, with laudable perseverance, to the reduction of the power of the enemy in the East. He understood the value of our Indian possessions, and he felt the necessity of securing them. The subjection of the Republic of the United Provinces to the dominion of France, had placed the colonial possessions of the Dutch in the hands of England's most inveterate foe. Among the most important of these were the Molucca Islands and the settlements in Java. The British cabinet suggested the blockading of those islands; the more vigorous policy of Lord Minto planned and directed their conquest. They were, in succession, attacked with the same spirit that was displayed in the movements against the French Islands, and the expedition was followed by the same results.

The first attack was on the Island of Amboyna, a place which has attained an infamous celebrity, from the atrocities of which it was once the scene. The island had been taken by the British during the first war with revolutionary France, but was restored at the peace of Amiens: since that period, it was understood that the means of defence had been greatly augmented, and that several additional works had been raised at considerable labour and cost. The principal fortress had, however, the radical defect of being overlooked and commanded by eminences of superior height. The naval part of the expedition designed for the reduction of Amboyna, consisted of the *Dover*, Captain Tucker, the *Cornwallis*, Captain Montague, and a sloop commanded by Captain Spencer: the chief command was entrusted to the first-named officer. The military force, composed of a part of the Company's Madras European Regiment, and a small body of artillery, was placed under the command of Captain Court.

On the morning of the 16th February 1810, the plan of attack was arranged by the commanders, and on the afternoon of that day the expedition was in motion. By a series of very skilful and well-executed manœuvres, the attack was kept concealed from the enemy till it was too late to offer any successful resistance to the landing of the British force. When the vessels got under weigh, they stood across the bay, as if intending

to work out to sea; but, by a dexterous management of the sails, they were kept drifting towards the landing-place: the boats in the meantime were all out, with the men in them, but were kept on that side of the ships which was out of the enemy's sight. On approaching within a short distance of the shore, the ships, according to signal, bore up together; and when within about a cable's length of the landing-place, the boats were all slipped at the same moment: the ships immediately opened their fire upon the batteries, and the party in the boats proceeded to land without opposition. The entire force of the British did not much exceed four hundred men. It was immediately on its landing formed into two divisions; the first, under Captain Phillips, proceeded to attack one of the batteries, which though defended with obstinate bravery, was finally carried, and three of the guns brought to bear upon the enemy in his retreat.

With the other division of the British force, Captain Court had advanced to dislodge the enemy from the principal fort. It being inexpedient to make the attack in front, it was necessary to take a circuitous and most fatiguing line of march. Vast steeps had to be ascended and descended successively, for five hours, and it was frequently necessary for the men to use their hands to assist their progress, and to trust for safety to the hold which they were able to gain upon the slight and thinly

scattered shrubs. These difficulties being surmounted, the British reached an eminence which commanded the enemy's position. The perseverance which had been displayed seems to have struck the garrison with panic, for they immediately spiked their guns and retreated. On the following day the island was surrendered to the British force, the number of which has already been mentioned. That of the enemy amounted to above thirteen hundred men, and was supported by two hundred and thirty pieces of ordnance. The surrender of Amboyna was followed by that of the subordinate islands, five in number.

Another brilliant exploit was the capture of Banda Neira, the principal of the spice islands: this took place in August of the same year. The service was performed by Captain Cole, who had been despatched from India with the *Caroline*, *Piedmontaise*, and *Baracouta*, to the relief of the division off Amboyna. Captain Cole had requested from Admiral Davy permission to attack some of the enemy's settlements, which lay in his way, and it was granted; but not without a cautionary intimation of the disproportionate strength of Banda Neira to the means at his disposal. Not dismayed by this warning, Captain Cole departed on his course, and, having obtained from the government of Penang twenty artillery-men, two field-pieces, and some scaling-ladders, he proceeded into the Java sea, against the south-east

monsoon. During the passage, which occupied six weeks, the ship's company were daily exercised in the use of the pike, sword, and small arms, and in mounting the scaling-ladders placed against the masts, as a preparatory exercise for any attempt at escalade. On the evening of the 8th of August, the Banda Islands became visible, and preparations were made for an attack. It was intended to run the ships into the harbour before daylight in the morning, but, about ten o'clock, they were suddenly fired upon from the Island of Rosigen; an occurrence perfectly unexpected, as the British commander was not aware that the island was fortified. The attempt to take Banda Neira by surprise was thus, for the time, frustrated; but, on the following night, it was renewed with signal courage and good fortune.

The party destined for the service was about 390 strong, but those actually engaged did not exceed 200. While the ships were standing towards the land, the men rested with their arms by their sides. At eleven o'clock they were ordered into their boats, and directed to rendezvous close under the lee of the point of Great Banda. The night, however, was dark and stormy, and, at three o'clock, only a few boats had reached the place appointed, the rest having been driven to leeward. As the success of the attack depended upon its taking place under cover of darkness,

Captain Cole determined not to wait for the arrival of the remainder of the boats, but to make the attempt without delay. They, accordingly, pulled for the shore, but, within a short distance of it, the boats grounded on a coral reef; and, after labouring through a boisterous night, the men had to wade up to their waists in water. The landing was effected close to a battery of ten guns. This was immediately attacked and carried by the pikemen, the officer and his guard being made prisoners without the firing of a single shot, although the enemy were at their guns, with matches lighted.

Though success had crowned their daring, the situation of the British force was now most critical. Daylight was approaching, and the bugles of the enemy were spreading alarm throughout the island. A rapid movement was made towards Fort Belgica, and in twenty minutes the scaling-ladders were placed against the walls. So silent was the march of the British, that the garrison were not aware of their approach till they were within a hundred yards of them. The out-works were speedily carried, and the ladders hauled up, under a sharp fire from the garrison; but they were found too short for the escalade of the inner walls. A rush was then made for the gateway, which, at that instant, was opened to admit the colonel-commandant and three other officers, who lived in houses at the foot of the hill. The enemy fired a few guns

and kept up a discharge of musketry for about ten or fifteen minutes; they then fled in all directions. A few were killed, and among them the colonel-commandant, who refused to receive quarter, and fell in the gateway sword in hand: some threw themselves from the walls, but the greater part escaped.

A flag of truce was forthwith despatched to Fort Nassa, demanding its surrender. It was answered by the verbal submission of the governor; but the Dutch colours continuing hoisted, Captain Cole despatched a second flag, announcing his determination to lay the place in ashes if they were not immediately struck. This threat, aided by a well-placed shot from Fort Belgica, produced the desired effect, and the handful of Englishmen, who had been engaged in this gallant enterprize, were then undisputed masters of the island, with its two forts and various batteries, mounting nearly 120 pieces of cannon, and which had been defended by 700 disciplined troops besides the militia.

The only possessions now remaining to the enemy, in the East, were Batavia, in the Island of Java, and its dependencies. An extraordinary value had been placed upon these settlements by the Dutch, who used to call Java the most precious jewel in the diadem of the Company, and Batavia the Queen of the East. Unfortunately, like most other Eastern potentates, Batavia was regardless of the lives of her people; for though

soon after its foundation, this settlement had been pronounced as healthy as any part of the Indies, experience hath shewn that it was, beyond all places in the world, destructive to the lives of Europeans. This circumstance was regarded by the Dutch as an advantage, the terror of the climate affording as they supposed, a sufficient defence against any hostile attempt. But such a defence was no longer relied on when its sovereignty was transferred from the Dutch to the French. The skill which the latter so eminently possessed in the art of war was called into operation at Batavia, and a considerable body of French troops, officers, and engineers, were sent out for its defence.

The reduction of the Dutch settlements was first suggested to Lord Minto by Mr. Raffles, and his lordship was induced, by the information brought to his notice, to determine on the attempt upon his own responsibility. This was previous to the capture of the French islands. In the meantime, the governor-general received from home a qualified approval of his meditated operations against Batavia. The views of the home authorities, however, extended no further than to the expulsion of the Dutch, the destruction of their fortifications, and the distribution of their arms and stores; after which it was proposed that we should evacuate the island, resigning possession to the natives. Such a termination of the expedi-

tion would have been singularly ill-judged and mischievous. There is not, perhaps, a more dissolute place in the world than Batavia, nor one which contains a larger proportion of the elements of crime and disorder. The Malays are sufficiently notorious for perfidy and cruelty. The Chinese, forming another large proportion of the population, less ferocious and blood-thirsty, are generally distinguished by dishonesty and want of principle, and could scarcely be expected to have forgotten the atrocious murder of so many of their countrymen by the Dutch, in 1740. The number of slaves, too, was enormous; many of them having been reduced to captivity by violence and fraud, and almost all treated with great cruelty. These, maddened by their wrongs and sufferings, would eagerly have embraced any opportunity that might have offered for revenge. To withdraw from such a population the European control, by which they had been so long coerced, without substituting in its place any other, would have been to abandon the colony to all the horrors of insurrection and massacre; to invite in another quarter of the world, a repetition of the scenes which had been acted at St. Domingo, or, if possible, something still more frightful and appalling. Lord Minto, therefore, declined acting upon these instructions, and determined, in the event of success, upon establishing such a government as should be sufficient for the preservation of public order.

The preparations for the reduction of this last relic of the colonial dominion of the Hollanders, were upon a scale commensurate with the object to be attained. The armament sailed from Malacca, and the governor-general himself accompanied it. It had been objected, that so much time had been consumed in preparation, that the favourable season for its departure had been suffered to pass, and that it would have to contend against the adverse monsoon. This danger was obviated by the route chosen for the expedition. On leaving the straits of Singapore, it stood across to the western coast of Borneo; then, under the shelter of the land, and with the assistance of the land-wind, made good its course to Sambdar, and from thence striking across to Java, made the coast of Point Indremergan. The merit of ascertaining the practicability of this passage was attributable to Captain Greigh. On the 4th of August 1811, the expedition arrived in the Batavia roads. The army, which was under the command of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, was divided into four brigades, one forming the advance, two the line, and one the reserve. Nominally, the force employed on this expedition consisted of 5,344 Europeans and 5,777 Native troops, making a total of 11,960; but of these about 1,200 were left sick at Malacca, and about 1,500 more became so at Java.

The place of landing was a spot similar, in some respects, to that selected for the purpose at Mauritius; the natural obstacles which it pre-

sented having been considered sufficient to deter an invading army. In consequence of this belief, it was left unguarded, and the debarkation of the troops took place without resistance. The different corps had ground allotted to them, as they landed, on which to form, and as soon as the principal part of each battalion was on shore, it proceeded to the position which it was to occupy. The advanced posts were pushed on, and the troops were formed in two lines, one fronting Batavia, and the other Corsellis. In the course of the night, a patrol of the enemy's cavalry, accompanied by an aid-de-camp of General Janssens, galloped into the advanced posts on the Batavia road, where they received the fire of two six-pounders, and that of a picquet of infantry, and retired with the loss of an officer, and two or three men.

On the following day, the horse-artillery and cavalry were landed, and the position of the army was advanced towards Batavia. On the 6th, the roads to the city, and the country all along the coast, were reconnoitered. From some symptoms manifested in Batavia, the general judged it to be the intention of the enemy to evacuate the city. On the 7th, the infantry attached to the advance pushed forward, the only serious impediment to their progress arising from the destruction of the bridge over the river Aujol. A bridge of boats was constructed, by which a passage was effected

late at night; but, as the troops could only pass over in single file, considerable delay took place. On the following day, the burghers of Batavia surrendered the city without opposition, the garrison having retreated to Weelsbudin. Though the enemy had declined an engagement, he had made ample preparations for what may be called passive resistance. The houses were deserted, the bridges broken down, and the conduits which supplied the city with water destroyed. The public storehouses had been burned, and considerable efforts had been made to destroy every species of public property. Happily, some public granaries were preserved, and provisions were abundant.

Only a small part of the British force entered the town, in the first instance. Their arrival afforded a timely check to the system of depredation and destruction which the Malays had commenced, and they succeeded in rescuing several large stores of colonial goods from plunder.

Many circumstances combined to excite in the minds of the British authorities a suspicion that the enemy meditated an attack, and this was confirmed by the report of Captain Roberts, aid-de-camp to Lord Minto, who had been despatched with a summons to General Janssens to surrender the island. He was conducted blindfolded through the lines, but, as he passed along, he heard a considerable movement of men, horses, and artillery-carriages. The answer which he

brought back was in the style of gasconade which characterized the military school of revolutionary France. It was to the effect, that the commander-in-chief was a French general, and would defend his charge to the last extremity. Soon after the receipt of the French commander's answer, the troops were silently called out, and ordered to lie on their arms in the great square in front of the town-house. They had scarcely reached it, when the head of the enemy's column appeared, and opened a fire of musketry. Colonel Gillespie sallied out, at the head of a party, from a gateway on the west side of the city, with the intention of charging the assailants in flank. The firing immediately ceased, and no more was seen or heard of the enemy during the night. It appears that they had calculated upon the British force in the city being less numerous than it really was, and they had also relied on the expectation of disabling our men by means not recognized among the ordinary instruments of warfare.

A large quantity of deleterious spirit was stored up in the town, and this the Chinese, in compliance, it was understood, with instructions from the enemy, pressed upon our soldiers instead of water, which was extremely scarce—a proclamation having been issued by the French general, forbidding any family to possess more than one jar of water for their own use. By the judicious and decisive measures of Colonel Gillespie, their

designs were frustrated, and the British force was preserved from surprise and destruction.

Early on the morning of the 10th, the troops, together with the inhabitants, had a narrow escape. A Malay was discovered, with a fireband in his hand, in the act of setting light to some wooden magazines, containing a considerable quantity of gunpowder. He was taken, and, on the following day, in a spirit of summary justice, hanged. These were not the only acts of similar character which occurred. The commanding officer's quarters were kept by a Frenchman, and, as an honourable way of serving his country, this man poisoned the coffee prepared for the breakfast of Colonel Gillespie and his staff: the atrocious attempt was unsuccessful, the effects of the poison having manifested themselves before sufficient of the adulterated beverage had been taken to produce the intended effect. In the hurry of the moment, it is to be lamented, that the author of this abominable act escaped.

On the 10th, Colonel Gillespie advanced with his corps towards the enemy's cantonment at Weellerneeder, supported by two brigades of infantry. They found the cantonment abandoned, but the enemy was in force at a short distance beyond. Their position was strongly defended by an *abbatis*, occupied by three thousand of their best troops and four guns, horse artillery. It was promptly attacked by Colonel Gillespie; and

after an obstinate resistance, carried at the point of the bayonet, the enemy's force driven to the shelter of their batteries, and their guns taken.

But, though vanquished, the enemy were not entirely subdued. They were greatly superior in numbers to the invading force, and they entrenched themselves in a strong position, between a large river and an artificial watercourse, neither of which was fordable. Their position was further defended by a deep trench strongly palisadoed, seven redoubts, and many batteries. The fort of Corsellis was in the centre, and the whole of the works were defended by a numerous and well-organised artillery. The season was far advanced and the heat violent; and these reasons, combined with the insufficient number of the British troops, determined the general to decline attempting the reduction of the position by regular approaches, and to endeavour to carry the works by assault. Some batteries were erected with a view of disabling the principal redoubts, and a heavy fire was kept up for two days with great effect; and, though answered by a far more numerous artillery, it succeeded in silencing the nearer batteries of the enemy, and considerably disturbing their entire position.

At dawn of day, on the 26th, the assault was made. It was proposed to surprise one of the redoubts constructed by the enemy beyond the Salken, to endeavour to cross the bridge over that

stream with the fugitives, and then to assault the redoubts within the lines. The enemy was under arms and prepared for the combat, and General Janssens, the commander-in-chief, was in the advanced redoubt when the attack commenced.

Colonel Gillespie, after a long *detour* through a close and intricate country, came on their advance, which he routed almost instantly, and with extraordinary rapidity proceeded, under a heavy fire of grape and musketry, to the advanced redoubt, of which he was soon in possession. He then, in accordance with the proposed plan, passed the bridge, and, after an obstinate resistance, carried with the bayonet a second redoubt. The operations of other columns were directed with equal success against different parts of the works; but the explosion, either by accident or design, of the magazine of one of the redoubts, destroyed a number of brave officers and men, who were crowded on its ramparts, which the enemy had just abandoned. The park of artillery was attacked and carried in a masterly manner, and a body of cavalry, which had formed to defend it, speedily put to flight. A strong body of the enemy, which had taken their position in the lines in front of Fort Corsellis, were attacked and driven from them, and the fort taken. The enemy was now completely put to flight; a vigorous pursuit followed, and the whole of the army was either killed, taken, or dispersed. So close was the

combat, that in the course of the day almost every officer was engaged hand to hand. Colonel Gillespie in person took prisoners two generals and a colonel, and another colonel fell by his hand. General Janssens, the commander-in-chief, succeeded with some difficulty in reaching Buitzenzorg, a distance of thirty miles, with a few cavalry, the sole remains of an army of ten thousand men.

The loss on the part of the British was severe, that of the enemy still more so. About a thousand bodies were buried in the works, many perished in the river, and many in the flight. Nearly five thousand were made prisoners, among whom were three general officers, thirty-four field officers, seventy captains, and one hundred and fifty subalterns. In the British army, about one hundred and fifty men, European and Native, were killed or missing, and upwards of seven hundred wounded.

The conquest of the island might now be considered as achieved: but as General Janssens shewed no intention of giving up the contest, Sir Samuel Achmuty prepared to push his success with vigour. Captain Bean was despatched with a detachment to Cheribon, and, on arriving there, proceeded in the exercise of his duty with great spirit, by summoning the French commander to surrender, allowing him five minutes for decision. The terms he proposed were, that the garrison should be prisoners of war, all public property

surrendered, but all private property respected. Immediately after the flag of truce had been despatched, Captain Bean stood in with the frigates towards the fort. The result was, that the terms were submitted to, the French colours hauled down, the marines landed, and placed in possession of the fort.

At this moment, the French general, Jamelle, and two other officers, one of them an aid-de-camp of the commander-in-chief, arrived with tidings that detachments to succour Cheribon were on their way, and that three hundred infantry and two hundred and fifty cavalry might be hourly expected. But it was too late—the officers were made prisoners, and Captain Bean, who had not waited for the ship which had the troops on board, landed one hundred and fifty seamen to garrison the fort, leaving the marines to act offensively in the field if requisite. The prisoners, being all natives, except one or two officers, were dismissed to their homes, with an intimation that if afterwards found acting against the British they would be hanged. It was said, that this caution did not appear at all to diminish their gratitude for their deliverance.

The marines were then marched to Cavang Sambig, thirty-five miles inland, where nine waggon-loads of silver and copper money, with stores to a great amount, were deposited. Seven hundred prisoners, including a very large proportion

of officers, were taken, without the loss of a single man, killed or wounded, during these operations.

Sir S. Achmuty having proceeded to Samarang, and being joined there by Admiral Stopford and a few of the troop ships, called upon General Janssens to surrender the island on terms of capitulation. This was refused, and the French general succeeded in making such a show of strength, as led Sir Samuel Achmuty to conclude that it was not advisable to assault the fort until further reinforced. Some fishermen, however, having reported that Janssens was withdrawing his troops into the interior, and had fortified a position a few miles on the road towards Kirta Sterer, Sir Samuel Achmuty, on the 12th, prepared to attack the town, when it was immediately surrendered.

Janssens had retired to the position which he had chosen, where he was completing batteries and entrenchments, and where he had succeeded, with the assistance of the native princes, in drawing together a large force. The British commander, having waited in vain two days for reinforcements, determined upon hazarding an attack, which he entrusted to Colonel Gibbs. In the course of the night, one ship arrived, which enabled the European garrison from the fort to join the field force, which was further strengthened by a company of sepoys. But with these additions it only amounted to about eleven hundred infantry,

was totally deficient in cavalry, and almost without artillery.

At two in the morning, on the 16th, the troops marched from Samarang; and, after advancing about six miles, discovered the enemy's force. They were attacked without delay, their flank soon turned, and they took to flight in the utmost disorder. But the British force was too much fatigued to pursue them, and in the night General Janssens made an offer of capitulation. The negociations were conducted on the part of Sir Samuel Achmuty with much firmness, and ended in the surrender of the island, as well as that of the French general, with all that remained of his army, as prisoners of war.

The naval operations were conducted with equal success. Captain Harris and Captain Pellew succeeded in reducing the French fortress in the island of Madura, and detaching the sultan from the interests of the enemy. This service was performed with extraordinary brilliancy. Leaving their ships at anchor under the isle of Pondrik, these officers landed about two miles from Fort Samarap, and forming their men into columns of sixty bayonets and thirty pikemen each, flanked by two or three pieces of artillery, and with a body of marines for their reserve, they marched with such perfect silence towards the fort, that, though the boats had been seen standing in for

shore, the men were not discovered till they were through the outer gate. In ten minutes, the fort was carried by storm, and several hundred Madura pikemen were made prisoners. At day-break, the natives began to assemble in great numbers, when Captain Harris called on the governor to surrender in ten minutes. In reply, he was required to evacuate the fort within three hours, on peril of having it stormed.

The governor commanded three thousand muskets, sixty artillery-men, and about fifteen hundred armed with pike and pistol, and he had four field pieces planted on a bridge, commanding a straight road of a quarter of a mile in length, along which the British must pass before they could reach the bridge. Captain Harris, however, determined to attack them. Leaving about fifty men in the fort, he led a body of ninety to turn the left flank of the enemy, and to make a diversion in favour of Captain Pellew's party, which was to advance as soon as this column should fire the first gun. This bold attempt was entirely successful. Some sharp firing took place while the British columns were advancing, but as soon as they were near enough to charge, the contest was at an end. The governor was made prisoner, and the colours and guns taken. Friendship always follows success: the sultan of Madura forthwith joined the conquerors, and offered four thousand men to assist in attacking Sourabaya. But this

aid was not needed, in consequence of the surrender of the whole island. The appointment of lieutenant governor was conferred by Lord Minto upon Mr. Raffles, who had preceded the expedition for the purpose of collecting information, and to whose judicious advice its success may in a great degree be attributed.

The fall of Batavia was followed by an event so remarkable as to deserve notice.

The sultan of Palambang, a petty chief in the south-eastern part of Sumatra, no sooner received intelligence of the success of the British arms, than he formed the atrocious resolution of destroying the Dutch resident, and every male person belonging to the factory at Palambang, not excepting even children, and of razing the fort to the ground. This horrible scheme he executed, in spite of the remonstrances of some Malay agents of the British Government, who represented that the destruction of the fort would be an act of hostility against those to whom the Dutch establishments had been transferred by right of conquest. The number of persons thus wantonly massacred was nearly a hundred, thirty of whom were European born.

The motives which led to this barbarous policy were probably twofold. The Dutch are regarded throughout the Malay states with inveterate hatred, and the feeling is not altogether without cause. The sultan perhaps rejoiced in an opportunity of

taking signal revenge upon a people, towards whom the feeling of hostility was universal and long cherished. He might further think that the circumstances which had occurred presented a favourable opportunity for dissolving all connections with European powers. The entire proceeding appears to have been marked by that sinister policy unfortunately so common among the chieftains of the East. The Malay agents alleged that, in the first instance, the sultan compelled them to sign a false report of the transactions, and afterwards, with a view of preventing a disclosure of the real facts, endeavoured to add them to the number of his victims.

Previously to these facts becoming known to the government of Java, a mission had been despatched for the purpose of taking charge of the factory at Palambang, and of making arrangements for the preservation to the British of a monopoly of tin, produced in the island of Baneim, but on terms far more advantageous to the sultan than those existing under the Dutch government. The mission was received in the most contemptuous manner; the claims of the English to succeed to the rights and privileges of the Dutch were denied, and the sultan even ventured to assert, that he had completed his hostile proceedings against the Dutch before the conquest of Java had been achieved. The real character of those proceedings he did not avow; but represented them to

be confined to the destruction of the fort and the expulsion of the garrison. This mission, therefore, returned without accomplishing its object. Its arrival was soon followed by that of ambassadors from the sultan, who repeated the statements of their master; but by this time the truth was known, and vigorous measures were determined on, to assert the rights of the British Government, and punish the faithlessness and cruelties of the sultan.

For this purpose, a force, consisting of nearly a thousand men, was put in motion, under the command of Colonel Gillespie: it sailed from Balasore on the 20th March 1812, but its progress was considerably retarded by contrary winds and currents. On the 3d of April the fleet reached Hawk's Island, and continued a week at anchor. Tents were pitched on shore, and a number of artificers employed in the completion of the boats intended for the passage of the Palambang river, in constructing platforms for the field-pieces, and in providing shelter for the troops from the oppressive heat of the day, and the noxious air of the night. On the 10th, the fleet got under weigh, and came to anchor on the 15th, opposite the west channel of the Palambang river. On the arrival of the British force, the sultan attempted to negotiate, transmitting messages to the commander filled with expressions of the most profound respect, and the warmest attachment to the English

nation; but his treacherous character was too well known to allow of any one being deceived by such professions. Colonel Gillespie refused to treat except with the sultan in person at Palambang. The expedition accordingly advanced and took possession of the works at Borang; on learning which the sultan fled, leaving the fort, palace, and city, in a state of inconceivable disorder. He had previously removed his treasures and his women into the interior.

After the occupation of the works at Borang, the troops had been re-embarked: but, on learning the state of the capital, Colonel Gillespie determined to push on with the light boats, and endeavour to stop the scenes of confusion and carnage which were taking place there. The city, which stretched along the banks of the river for upwards of seven miles, presented to the view of the British an awful scene of murder and pillage. The most dreadful shrieks and yells were heard in all directions, and conflagrations appeared in various places. An eye-witness declares, that "romance never described any thing half so hideous, nor has the invention of the imagination ever given representations, equally appalling." Amid these horrors, Colonel Gillespie stepped on shore, accompanied by only seven grenadiers, and proceeded into the city, surrounded by the glittering weapons of ferocious Arabs and treacherous Malays. One of the latter nation

pressed through the crowd, approached the colonel, and was walking by his side, when a large double-edged knife was silently put into his hands by one of his countrymen. He received the instrument, and was in the act of concealing it in his long loose sleeve, when a sudden flash of lightning discovered it. The man was instantly disarmed, and his murderous design thus frustrated: but amid the confusion that prevailed at the moment, he found means to mix in the crowd and escape.

On approaching the palace, the horrors of the spectacle were aggravated. The apartments had been ransacked; the pavements and floors were flowing with blood; the flames were rapidly consuming all that plunder had spared, and while they were pursuing their devastating career, the crackling of the bamboos is said to have resembled the discharge of musquetry. At intervals, the roofs of the various buildings fell with tremendous crash, and notwithstanding the torrents of rain, the fire continued to spread, and threatened even that part of the palace where the British forces were compelled to take up their temporary abode. This force consisted only of a few grenadiers and seamen, and they were surrounded on all sides by hordes of assassins. The best means of defence were adopted by the little band; at midnight, they were joined by a small reinforcement under Major French, and in the morning by

another under Colonel M'Leod. Resistance was now no longer thought of, and the resolution of Colonel Gillespie had thus, without the loss of a man, placed in the possession of the British the city, fort, and batteries, defended by two hundred and forty-two pieces of cannon.

Notwithstanding the subjugation of the Dutch and French power, parts of Java remained in a disturbed state. The sultan of Djoejyocarta, one of the most turbulent and intriguing of the native princes, manifested a hostile disposition to the British Government; in consequence of which, Mr. Raffles, the lieut.-governor, proceeded in person to his court, in December 1811, with the hope of definitively fixing by treaty the relations between the two governments. His visit was attended with some danger, and it seems not easy to acquit the lieut.-governor of the charge of rashness in undertaking it. His escort consisted only of a small part of the 14th Regiment, a troop of the 22d Light Dragoons, and the ordinary garrison of Bengal sepoys in the fort and at the Residency-house. The sultan received Mr. Raffles surrounded by several thousands of his armed followers, whose deportment was marked by extraordinary violence. Creesses were unsheathed, and it was plain that those who brandished them, only waited for the command to put all the English to the sword. The command did not issue, and the lieut.-governor and his retinue retired

in safety; but they certainly had as much reason to congratulate themselves on their good fortune as the stork when he withdrew his head in safety from the throat of the wolf. Negociations with native princes, especially until they are considerably tamed, should be carried on at the head of a commanding military force.

A treaty was concluded, by which the sovereignty of the British over the island of Java was acknowledged by the sultan, and the English East-India Company were confirmed in all the privileges, advantages, and prerogatives which had been possessed by the Dutch and French Governments. To the Company also were transferred the sole regulation of the duties, and the collection of tribute within the dominions of the sultan, as well as the general administration of justice in all cases where the British interests were concerned.

This treaty was concluded before the expedition against Palambang. The occupation of the troops, which had been despatched thither, seemed to afford the sultan of Djoejyocarta a favourable opportunity of breaking the treaty into which he had so recently entered, and this, in the true spirit of native policy, he eagerly embraced. By his agency, a confederacy was formed of all the native courts, the object of which was to expel all European settlers of every country, and to sweep from the island every

vestige of European power. As soon as the design became apparent, preparations were made for resisting it by such means as were at the disposal of government, and in the emergency Colonel Gillespie opportunely arrived from Palambang. The lieut.-governor and the commander of the forces immediately proceeded to Djoejyocarta with such military force as could be collected, and hostilities were precipitated by Colonel Gillespie, arriving with a reconnoitering party, unexpectedly falling in with a large body of the Sultan's horse.

As offensive measures had not been determined on, Colonel Gillespie refrained from attacking them, and endeavoured, through Mr. Crawford, the resident, to prevail upon them to return to the palace. They for a-while refused, and some stones were thrown at the English party. This outrage was not repelled, and at length the sultan's troops consented to retire; but, taking advantage of the growing darkness, they again threw stones at our men, and a serjeant and four dragoons were wounded. This attack was followed by several others, and our dragoons were ultimately obliged to cut their way out sword in hand.

On the following day, an attempt was made to negociate, but without success, and it was clear that nothing was left but an appeal to force. The residence of the sultan was about three miles in circumference, surrounded by a broad ditch with

drawbridges, a strong high rampart with bastions, and defended by nearly one hundred pieces of cannon. In the interior were numerous squares and court-yards, enclosed with high walls, and all defensible. The principal entrance, or square, in front, had a double row of cannon facing the gate, and was flanked with newly-erected batteries, right and left. Seventeen thousand regular troops manned the works, and an armed population of more than a hundred thousand surrounded the palace for miles, and occupied the walls and fastnesses along the sides of the various roads. The Dutch had erected a fort close to the palace, and this was now occupied by the British. Their force was small, not exceeding six hundred firelocks; but what was wanting in number was made up by intrepidity. They forthwith commenced cannonading the palace; the fire was immediately returned, and in the evening the sultan sent a message demanding an unconditional surrender.

In the course of the night, Major Dalton, who with a party of the Bengal light infantry, occupied part of the Dutch town, between the fort and the palace, was attacked four times in succession, but on every occasion repulsed the enemy with great steadiness. Various skirmishing took place between parties of the enemy and others of our dragoons, in which the latter displayed remarkable gallantry. The day after, a detachment under Colonel McLeod, whose arrival had been anxiously

expected, reached head-quarters, but their long march and exposure to a burning sun rendered some repose necessary. In the evening, Colonel Gillespie ordered all the troops, both cavalry and infantry, into the fort, and this measure fully persuaded the sultan that he had struck the British commander with terror.

He was mistaken. No symptom of concession having been evinced by the enemy, Colonel Gillespie had determined on an assault. Two hours before day, the leaders of columns received their orders, and instantly proceeded to execute them. The assault was made by escalade, and was completely successful. The British force quickly occupied the ramparts, and turned the guns of the enemy upon themselves. The word was "Death or Victory," and no other thought seems to have occupied the minds of those engaged. The sultan was taken in his strong-hold. He was subsequently deposed, and the hereditary prince raised to the throne. The other confederated princes readily acceded to the terms proposed to them. The conquest of Java was thus complete, and the British power was paramount throughout the island.

The general peace restored Java to its former possessors; and it may, therefore, be deemed a task of little utility to record the circumstances by which it became a temporary appendage of the British crown. But it is not an unimportant matter

that Englishmen should bear in mind what their fellow-countrymen have achieved, although diplomatists may compliment away the possessions which have been so dearly earned. The magnanimity of Great Britain in restoring Java has been much praised. She has too frequently been magnanimous to her own cost, and her sacrifices have never been paid by any thing but praise. Java unquestionably ought to have been retained. One great power must predominate in the East, and it is not for us to raise a question what power that should be. The acquisition of territory by any other European nation ought especially to be guarded against, as far as we possess the means. We ought not, indeed to wage a war of ambition or aggression—we ought not to draw the sword for the sake of conquest; but when hostile operations become justifiable, as they undoubtedly were at the period of our conquests in the Indian seas, we ought not to throw away their results. We should have the firmness to insist upon retaining what we have had the courage to win. Java was important, not only in itself, but also from its proximity to other islands, over which the British authority ought at fitting opportunities to have been extended; but England has always been afraid of her own good fortune in the East.

The transfer of Java was to be lamented, perhaps, even more on account of the inhabitants than on our own. The Dutch government had never

been strong, and it had on many occasions resorted to the usual expedients of conscious weakness—oppression and cruelty. Under the dominion and influence of the English, various beneficial changes were introduced, and the country was in a progressive state of improvement. This was checked by its surrender to the Dutch, and since that event there has been no lack of discontent and disturbance.

The establishment of the British power in the East, without an European rival, was the crowning act of Lord Minto's administration, and it was one of which he had reason to be proud. Having completed the usual period of residence, he resigned his office and proceeded to England. But he was not destined to enjoy that period of repose to which men look as the termination and reward of public services, his death having taken place within a few weeks after his arrival in this country.

The administration of Lord Minto was distinguished by great moderation, but it was marked also by very considerable ability. The line of policy pressed upon him from home was that of peace, and he laboured assiduously to preserve it. But he was not insensible to the peculiarities of our situation in India, surrounded by those who regarded us as hostile intruders: he was conscious that a pacific policy might be carried too far for national interest no less than for national honour, and his views on subjects which, soon after his re-

tirement, became of vital importance, were probably not very dissimilar to those of his successor. He was fully conscious of the inapplicability to our situation in India, of that timid and indecisive policy which was fashionable in England, and the expression of his opinions was not without effect in the most influential quarters. His mistakes and failures may fairly be attributed less to himself than to public opinion in England, which overawed and controlled him. The outrages of the Pindarries, the encroachments of the Ghoorkas, and the insolence of the Burmese, attracted his attention; but he waited for encouragement from home to determine him to grapple with them. This was the most exceptionable part of his policy, and it must be attributed to constitutional caution. The most brilliant, as well as valuable, acts of his government, were the well-planned and successful expeditions against the enemy's possessions in the East. He here showed that he understood his country's interests, and he acted upon his convictions with vigour and decision. Upon the whole, though a few of those who have occupied the same high station with himself have left behind them a reputation more brilliant and dazzling, that of Lord Minto rests on a basis of substantial service, and he well deserves to be held in remembrance as one of the eminent statesmen of India.

CHAPTER VI.

RENEWAL OF THE COMPANY'S CHARTER, IN 1813.

From a feeble and obscure association of traders, the East-India Company had, in the eighteenth century, become the lords of a large portion of Hindostan, and the dominant power in the field of Indian politics. They had attained this high position under the license of the British Crown; but beyond this, their obligations to the government of their country were few. It was to the talents and intrepidity of their own servants, that they were indebted for the commanding situation which they held; and the extraordinary ability displayed by men educated upon ordinary principles, and taken from the ordinary walks of life, may be received as evidence, that the native vigour of the English character will manifest itself under any circumstances which afford room for its display.

The Company struggled long, but finally triumphed; and the acquisitions of these "Royal

Merchants" became so extensive and important, as to render it necessary, in the opinion of Parliament, to place them under the especial supervision of the Crown. Thus shorn of some portion of its regal state, the Company still retained its commercial privileges with little diminution; but these, together with the right to administer the government of India, were to terminate in the year 1814, and that period was, consequently, looked to with no ordinary anxiety.

The renewal of the bargain between the Crown and the Company, always a subject of great interest and keen contention, was now unusually so, from the progress which the principles of free trade had made, and the influence which they possessed in the high quarters where the matter was ultimately to be decided. Those principles had made their way languidly and slowly; but still they had gained ground. The reputation of having first maintained them is usually bestowed on Adam Smith: they are, however, to be found in earlier writers; and whatever be the degree of estimation in which they are entitled to be held—whether they are to be received as fixed and perfect rules, never to be departed from on any occasion—or whether they are to be admitted in a more guarded form—to be qualified by reference to what a modern political economist has not infelicitously called "disturbing forces," and to the peculiar circumstances of the state to which it is

proposed to apply them—the honour of their discovery, be it what it may, does not belong to Adam Smith—they had been enunciated by writers who long preceded him. Nor can this be allowed to detract very greatly from his fame; for the principles themselves lying at the very surface of inquiry, little honour can be gained by their discovery; and the merit of having given a clear and lucid exposition of such opinions, is almost equal to that of having been the first to propound them.

Previously to the time when the Scottish professor converted a chair of moral philosophy into one of political economy, the advocates of free trade were few; and among practical men of business, they made scarcely any converts. Statesmen and legislators, even in despotic states, are, to a certain extent, guided by the popular will. In a free country, those who undertake to be the exponents of that will, if persevering and unresisted, must ultimately be victorious. In such a country, whatever men possess, they hold by the tenure of the public voice, and they grossly and foolishly betray their own interests, if they neglect the use of any of the means which they command for shewing to the public that their claims to retain what they have acquired are reasonable and right. They should be active and unremitting in rendering themselves this justice—they should also be early. When the flood of opinion has been

suffered to roll on and gather strength, it will require increased efforts to turn it, if even any efforts should be availing. The majority of men decline the trouble of judging for themselves. They follow with their neighbours the prevailing opinions of the day, and those who wish to keep possession of their influence over the public mind, must commence early, and proceed vigorously in their exertions, to give it the desired direction.

On every occasion, when the East-India Company had sought a renewal of their privileges, their claims had been resisted; but the grounds of resistance were different from those taken in later times. Men will always be anxious to participate in a trade which they believe to be profitable, and they will never be unable to suggest plausible reasons for acceding to their wishes. But the principles of which Adam Smith, though not the author, was the great disseminator, furnished new weapons for combating all exclusive privileges of trade, and afforded the means of concealing the interested motives of the opponents, under the guise of science.

This new sign of the times ought to have been carefully watched by all who were desirous of retaining such privileges; but such precaution was neglected, and the very slow progress of the free trade doctrines afforded a ready, though an insufficient, excuse for the neglect. While the promulgation of these doctrines was confined to the

moral philosophy class at Glasgow, those who were hostile to them, might suppose that there was little cause for alarm. But they ought to have recollected that these opinions were propounded in the heart of a great commercial city, by a man of acknowledged talent, and that no inconsiderable number of young men annually quitted the university imbued with the principles of their teacher. The last fact was especially important. No error can be more fatal, than to disregard what are contemptuously called the opinions of boys. It is true that the real value of such opinions is small—they are the result of circumstances—they are taken up on trust, without any exercise of the judgment, and at a time, indeed, when the judgment is altogether unformed; but they enable us to cast the horoscope of the coming age: from the minds of the youth of the present generation are to be traced the spirit and destiny of the next. In the disregard of this truth lay a great error, and it was not the only one. The appearance of the book, on which the great advocate of free trade expended his strength, ought to have called forth, from those who opposed him, either a manly defence of their opinions, or a candid renunciation of them. It produced neither. The advocates of regulated trade seemed to shrink from the discussion of their own principles; and though what is called the mercantile system, for a while, retained the

influence which habit had given it, and was the creed alike of the counting-house and the cabinet, intelligent observers could not fail to see that it was undermined, and that the period was rapidly advancing, when the influence of the school of Adam Smith would predominate, both in the commercial world and in the councils of the nation. One party slept while the other was at work, and the result was, the slow, but gradual and steady, advance of opinions, which have now attained such an ascendancy, that few have the hardihood to impugn them. Every new battle, therefore, in behalf of regulated trade, was fought under increased disadvantages, and, at last, there was little left for its advocates but to yield to the "pressure from without," and surrender a portion of what they possessed, as the price of a temporary retention of the remainder. Those interested in maintaining it, had despised public opinion, and they paid the penalty. They preferred relying on the ministers of the day, and those ministers invariably deserted them whenever it suited their purposes.

The terms upon which the government and trade of India were to be continued in the Company, gave rise to inquiry and discussion for several years before the expiration of the old Act. In 1808 some correspondence took place on the subject, between the Board of Control and the Court of Directors; and very early in the following

year, it was intimated that his Majesty's ministers were not prepared to concur in an application to Parliament for a renewal of those restrictions by which the trade with India had been hitherto limited. This intimation was, of course, little agreeable to the Company. A variety of arguments were adduced in opposition to the proposed innovation; and it was alleged, not without an appearance of probability, that "the loss of the Indian monopoly, such as it was left by the Act of 1793, would lead, by no slow process, to the entire subversion of the Company both in their commercial and political capacity; and of that system which the Legislature had appointed for the government of British India: of which system the Company formed an integral and essential part."

During these discussions a parliamentary committee was engaged in an elaborate investigation of all the great branches of the Company's affairs; and upon the ground that it was desirable that the reports of the committee should be submitted to Parliament, before the question of renewal was brought forward, the correspondence on the subject was suspended for a considerable period. At the close of the year 1811, it was resumed. The opening of the trade with India, generally, to British merchants and British ships, was again laid down by ministers, as the only ground upon which the negociation for continuing

to the Company any portion of its powers could be conducted. The clamour from without seemed to excuse the pertinacy of ministers; a large proportion of the mercantile and manufacturing world appeared to look upon the East in the light in which it had been represented by the writers of fable, and to regard an introduction to it as a passport to the possession of unmeasured wealth. Though the sober habits of men of business would lead us to a different belief, experience shews that no class of men are more open to the influence of such delusions.*

* A petition presented from Sheffield was so remarably eloquent, that it is impossible to resist the temptation to transcribe part of it. Among other things, the petitioners declared themselves to be "fully persuaded," that "if the trade to the East-Indies were thrown open to all his Majesty's subjects, such new and abundant markets would be discovered and established, as would enable them to set at defiance every effort to injure them by that sworn enemy to their prosperity and the peace of Europe, the present unprincipled ruler France; and that the petitioners doubt not, if the trade of this United Kingdom were permitted to flow, unimpeded, over those extensive, luxuriant, and opulent regions, though it might, in the outset, like a torrent repressed and swoln by obstructions when its slucies were first opened, break forth with uncontrollable impetuosity, deluging, instead of supplying, the district before it; yet that very violence which, at the beginning, might be partially injurious, would, in the issue, prove highly and permanently beneficial; no part being unvisited, the waters of commerce that spread over the face of the land, as they subsided, would wear themselves channels, through which they might continue to flow ever afterwards, in regular and fertilizing streams; and that

The denunciation of monopoly formed the principal ground of attack upon the commercial privileges of the Company; and on this point no

that, to the wealthy, enterprizing, honourable, and indefatigable British merchant, conducting in person his own concerns, no obstacle would prove insurmountable, no prejudice invincible, no difficulty disheartening; wants, where he found them, he would supply; where they did not exist, he would create them, by affording the means of gratification."

Such was the glowing picture presented to parliament by the active imaginations of the good people of Sheffield. At a later period, we might have supposed it to be drawn by a gentleman who for some time represented that borough in parliament, and who, on his first appearance as a candidate there, announced to his supporters, the approach of a universal cry for cutlery, extending from Jaffa to Japan. It is unfortunate for both prophecies, that, like those of Johanna Southcote, they have not been fulfilled. There is, as yet, no large export of razors to Tibet; and though the trade with India has been open for twenty-five years, and the "unprincipled ruler of France" occupies a few feet of earth on the road thither, England has, during that time, passed through a period of commercial distress altogether without parallel, while to India "the waters of commerce" have certainly not operated as "fertilizing streams"—to that country they have been the "waters of Marah"—her manufactures have perished—her agriculture has declined, and her people been subjected to intense suffering. "The wealthy, enterprizing, honourable, and indefatigable British merchant" may have found wants, and where he did not find, he may have created them, by "affording," or rather by offering, "the means of gratification;" but something is yet deficient. All men desire to possess "the means of gratification;" but to this end, it is necessary that they should have "the means" of purchasing and paying for them. What has India had to export? Her cotton and silk goods have been driven out of

almost

defence was offered. Monopolies generally were given up; but some attempts were made to shew that they might be tolerated under certain circumstances, and for definite periods of time; and, further, that as the trade was then carried on, the monopoly of the Company was not a very close one. The principle that all monopolies are injurious, was fortified by allegations of particular evils, supposed to result from that of the East-India Company. Manufacturers of various articles declared themselves, as well as the country, wronged, by being restrained from pouring an unlimited supply of their various commodities into India; and such restraint being pronounced "humiliating to individuals, and degrading to the national character," there could be no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion, that it was "a national grievance."*

almost every market in the world—to a great extent even out of her own; her sugar, which when brought to this country, is necessarily subjected to the disadvantages resulting from a long voyage, and consequent increase of freight, was until lately (lest the producers should grow rich too fast) saddled with a duty greatly exceeding that levied upon the sugar of other British possessions. When this gross injustice could no longer be maintained in its full extent the repeal was ungraciously confined to a part of British India—and that the most flourishing part—to the exclusion of the less prosperous districts, which more especially call for encouragement and support. Thus do our statesmen legislate for the good of the people of India.

* Papers respecting the Negociation for a Renewal of the East-India Company's Exclusive Privileges.

But one of the most remarkable, not to say one of the most amusing, charges against the monopoly was, that "it cooled the ardour of generous and liberal competition."* Self-interest has a wonderful effect upon the mental powers, and enables men to discern generosity and liberality, where those not enlightened by the same influence, can perceive nothing but selfishness and baseness, and reckless disregard of right. The generosity and liberality of commercial competion, gave rise to those sanguinary scenes in the East, in which the Portuguese and Dutch were such distinguished actors. The generosity and liberality of commercial competition, as manifested in the slave trade, deluged Africa with blood and covered Europe with guilt. And the generosity and liberality of commercial competition are now strikingly set forth in the factory system of England, under which the happiness of myriads of human beings, through time and eternity, is sacrificed to the Moloch of manufactures; the wages doled out to the wretched victims, during their brief career of life, being, in fact, not the reward of labour, but the price of blood. Such are a few of the triumphs of a generous and liberal commercial competition; and it must be admitted, that they are fully sufficient to justify the call of the wollen manufacturers, in 1813, for an exten-

* Papers respecting the Negociation for a Renewal of the East-India Company's Exclusive Privileges.

sion of its principles to the whole world. Yet it is only fair to add, that the generosity and liberality, which mark commercial competition, are generally so little observable, that the advocates of unlimited freedom of trade deserved great credit for the discovery.

The Company replied by affirming, that the paramount object of any new arrangement for India ought not to be commercial, but political; and that the commercial monopoly was to be regarded as an instrument in the hands of the Company for the government of India; that the Company's territorial rights could only be enjoyed through the medium of commercial privileges; and that no provision made for securing them could be compatible with the entire opening of the Eastern trade. These assertions were clearly erroneous; the territorial claims of the Company were quite distinct from their commercial privileges; and there could be nothing to prevent the retention of the one, after the other had been relinquished. Experience, too, has shewn, that the commercial privileges of the Company are not indispensable to the maintenance of its authority in India.

They were more fortunate in referring to their own exertions to effect the introduction and consumption of European commodities—exertions made through a long series of years, with great perseverance, and at extraordinary cost; to their

labours in upholding our interests in India, against European rivalship and native jealousy; to the magnificent empire which they had added to the British dominions; and to the great wealth which flowed into this country, in consequence of their spirited and judicious policy. After enumerating some of these advantages, in one of their official papers, they emphatically and justly added, "Such are the injuries, the grievances, the evils —such the degradation, which the East-India Company have brought on the country."

The debts and embarrassments of the Company afforded a ground of accusation peculiarly calculated to render them unpopular, and of course they were not forgotten. The answer of the Company was to the effect, that they had never had occasion to apply to Parliament for aid to support their own establishments; but that their applications had been in consequence of levies made by Government, on the score of a right to participate in the territorial revenues; or for the purpose of obtaining reimbursement of immense sums, disbursed for the state in military expeditions—sums very tardily acknowledged, and not then fully paid; or to enable the Company to meet the transfer to this country of Indian territorial debt, the increase of which was not to be attributed to the Company, but to his Majesty's Government and to Parliament. There was much in these statements that deserved consideration; but when

either individuals or societies expend their funds for the public benefit, they rarely meet with much gratitude in return.

Political economy did not furnish the whole of the arguments by which the privileges of the Company were assailed: the higher science of natural law was invoked to the same end. A full and free right to trade with all countries and people in amity with the British crown, was asserted to be "the natural birthright and inheritance of the people of this empire, of every subject of it, and of every port in it." What may be "the natural birth-right and inheritance" of a "port," it would not be very easy to determine; and if the assertion be taken in the sense in which it was probably meant, it may reasonably be doubted whether a position so wild, merited any answer at all. If it did, the Company gave it a very proper one by observing, that men living in society must submit to the laws of society, and to restraints upon what is called their natural liberty, when, in the opinion of the Legislature, the public interest demands it; that the Indian monopoly was established because it was thought beneficial; that it had been continued on the same principle, and that its abolition, or further retention, must be a question purely prudential. In urging their plea of natural right, some of the opponents of the Company endeavoured to make a special case. Their principle, it was alleged, became strength-

ened by its application to countries acquired and maintained by the efforts and valour of the forces of his Majesty. The countries, however, with which they wished to trade, had been, for the most part, acquired and maintained by the efforts of the Company and the valour of their servants, and altogether under the exclusive powers and privileges which it was now desired to abrogate.

A plausible, and not altogether an unreasonable objection to the continuance of the Company's privileges, was founded on the fact, that the existing system gave advantages to foreigners, which were denied to British merchants, and that the Americans, especially, had availed themselves of these advantages to secure the markets of Europe, South America, and the West-Indies. From this latter circumstance, also, an inference was drawn in favour of general freedom of trade. The Company answered, that the connexion of the Americans with the Indian seas was formed under peculiar circumstances, and that their success in the market of Europe was to be ascribed to the political state of that part of the world.

The necessity for the claimants finding new channels of enterprize; the misery of the manufacturers, occasioned by their exclusion from the continent of Europe; the certainty of finding a remedy in the unbounded field which the trade to the East would open to manufacturing and mercantile industry—these, and similar topics, fur-

nished another class of arguments, which were pressed with extraordinary pertinacity by those who conceived they had interests hostile to those of the Company. It was answered, with much calmness and moderation, that any great extension of the trade with India must take place very gradually; that consequently the benefits to be derived from it must be very distant, and that, though it might be very easy to send out to India large quantities of goods, it might not be equally easy to obtain returns.

Experience has shewn that these opinions were correct. The trade which succeeded the Act of 1813 has been little beneficial to England, while to India it has been positively injurious. The petitioners for an open trade had, however, made up their minds to its advantages, and, further, that they were destined to enjoy them—for it was urged, as a reason for extending the trade to the outports, that at Bristol and Liverpool the docks had been enlarged in anticipation of the concession. This specimen of commercial confidence is, perhaps, without parallel: it calls up the recollection of the married lady named Simpkins, who bought a brass plate with the name of Jones upon it, because, if she should happen to become a widow, and marry a gentleman of the latter name, it would come into use.

Such were the principal arguments, by which the advocates of free and of regulated trade res-

pectively supported their opinions. But the question was virtually decided before the discussion commenced. The principles of free trade had made too great progress for ministers to venture to resist them without exercising a degree of magnanimity, seldom acquired or retained amid the haunts of office. The efforts of the Company to retain the China trade were permitted to succeed, but that to India it was determined to throw open.

On the 22d of March 1813, the House of Commons resolved itself into a committee of the whole house, to consider of the affairs of the East-India Company; and the various petitions which had been presented having been ordered to be referred to the committee, Lord Castlereagh proceeded to expound the plan which he had to propose on the part of the ministers of the crown. The term for which the Charter was to be renewed was twenty years. The Company were to retain for that term the exclusive trade to China, but the trade with India was to be thrown open on certain conditions. It was to be confined to ships of a certain amount of tonnage; the trade outward was to be open to all the ports of the empire, but the homeward-bound trade to be restricted to certain ports, to be hereafter named. The Company were to be left in full possession of the power of deportation, to enable them to remove from India individuals whose conduct or intentions they might find or suspect to be dangerous: and this power his lord-

ship held to be sufficient to calm any apprehension that might be excited by the facility of commercial intercourse about to be established. It was also proposed to continue to them the command of the native army, as, after mature consideration, ministers were of opinion that to separate the command of the army from the civil administration of India, would be to sap the foundations of the Government. Another revised arrangement related to the number of king's troops in India. This had fluctuated with the necessities of the times; but it was proposed, that in future there should always be a stated number of troops, to form, as it were, the garrison of India; and when more became necessary, they should be paid by this country, as it was unjust that the Company should defray the whole expense of a system of defence which was called for by the general interests of the empire.

At every recent renewal of the Charter, the Company had been called upon to sacrifice some portion of their authority to the ministers of the crown, and of course the present could not be suffered to form an exception. The crown previously possessed the power of recal; but under the pretence that this was an invidious exercise of prerogative, it was proposed to render the sign-manual of the crown necessary to the validity of certain appointments. One of the most important and most beneficial of the contemplated changes

applied to the defects of the ecclesiastical establishment. The members of the Church of England in India had hitherto been deprived of those rites of the church, the administration of which appertain exclusively to the episcopal function, including among them the rite of confirmation. To remedy this grievance, it was proposed to appoint a bishop for India, and three archdeacons were to superintend the chaplains of the different settlements. Lord Castlereagh embodied the principal points of his speech in a series of resolutions, and concluded by moving them.

He was followed by Mr. Robert Thornton, the Deputy Chairman of the East-India Company; who, after reminding the committee that the Company had the sanction of sixteen Acts of Parliament, passed under various sovereigns; that it had existed for 213 years; and that eminent statesmen, of different and adverse parties, had agreed in supporting the monopoly, proceeded to animadvert upon the speech of the minister. Many of the petitions lying on the table he regarded as undeserving of attention, several of them being from places which could derive no benefit from any possible change in the East-India trade—and he instanced one, from a district in Scotland, which had nothing to export but horned cattle. He expatiated upon the attempt made to mislead the public, and the credulity with which they suffered themselves to be misled. The alleged advan-

tages of America arose, he said, out of a treaty, in which the interests of the East-India Company were too little considered; and surely the Company ought not to be sacrificed on that account. He warned the House to pause before they surrendered experience to theory, and claimed the fullest consideration of the subject before final decision.

Mr. Whitshed Keene suggested that evidence should be heard at the bar of the house; a proposal to which Lord Castlereagh appeared inclined to demur. The proposal, however, found a supporter in Mr. Tierney. That gentleman expressed a wish to have the opinion of competent persons, on the probable effects of an influx of all descriptions of persons to India. He knew the noble lord said he had checks; but then he did not see how that could be called a free trade, in which an inhabitant of Liverpool might be allowed, indeed, to go to India, but when there, was to be subjected to the government of his competitors and rivals, who might send him home without assigning any reason for so doing. With regard to the advantages of an open trade, he had not as yet met with any thing beyond mere assertion; and after the blunders committed in South America, he was not disposed to place much reliance upon the opinions of manufacturers. The question, he said, was now narrowed to this point—having an empire well governed, are we to hazard this empire for an increase of trade? Was it too much to wish to know

where the trade was to come from? If they instituted such an inquiry, and it should turn out that the probable increase would be very small, it certainly would become a question, whether it would be worth while to risk what we possessed for the expectation of a trifling improvement. All he wanted was, for the House, before it argued the question, to have something to argue upon. He was, therefore, for hearing evidence, and the calling for it would involve no sacrifice of time; for what was consumed in evidence would be saved in speeches. He wished to have the opinions of such men as Lord Teignmouth, the Marquess Wellesley, and Mr. Hastings.

Mr. Canning supported the resolutions generally, but seemed disposed to go further, and throw open the China trade—if not immediately, at an earlier period than the expiration of the proposed Act. He deemed it unnecessary to call evidence to support the proposal of free trade. Mr. Canning at this time represented the great trading town of Liverpool, in which the strongest desire prevailed for the opening of the eastern trade.

Mr. Grant was unfriendly to the contemplated change. He repeated what had been said by Mr. Thornton, that the argument derived from the opening of the trade to the Americans was of no force, as it was the act of the British Government, and not of the Company. But he went beyond him, by suggesting that the remedy was easy

—it was only to shut out the Americans. He quoted the authority of Lord Cornwallis as hostile to colonization; avowed his dislike to the scheme of ministers, because it went to throw down the whole fabric of the East-India Company; protested against undue haste; and wished that evidence should be heard on certain points. Lord Castlereagh, finding the sense of the house strong on this point, ultimately consented to hear evidence.

On the 30th, the committee was resumed, and evidence called. The first witness was a man rendered eminent by his career in India, and no less so by the long and harassing judicial proceedings which awaited him at home. It was Warren Hastings, then in the eightieth year of his age. His examination was of some length, and related to various subjects—the settlement of Europeans, the demand for British commodities, and the propagation of the Christian religion. To the first he expressed himself strongly opposed: he apprehended great injury and oppression to the natives, and regarded the indiscriminate admission of Europeans as fraught with danger to the peace of the country and the safety of the Company. This opinion, he averred, he had long maintained, and he expressed himself anxious to vindicate himself from the suspicion of being biassed by his obligations to the Company. With this view, he stated that, twenty years before, when the privileges of the East-India Company were under discussion,

he spontaneously addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Court of Directors, in which he strongly urged the necessity of providing against the irruption of British adventurers into India. A clause having been inserted in the Act, permitting strangers to reside by license, he addressed a second letter to the Chairs, remonstrating against it, as likely to produce greater mischiefs than even the permission of indiscriminate residence; because the favoured parties would appear to have the sanction of the Company, and would thereby possess an influence which no man would dare to resist; while a body of adventurers without privilege, would be under the jealous eye of Government, and naturally excite its attention. In a still more recent letter, he had repeated these opinions.

On the question as to the probable demand for British commodities, Mr. Hastings was less decided, but he thought it would be inconsiderable. It was his opinion, that the trade between India and England, as then regulated, was far more beneficial to both countries than if perfectly free. Being reminded that, in a review of the state of Bengal, which he had written some years before, he had said, "that although we had been so long in possession of the sovereignty of Bengal, yet we had not been able so far to change our ideas with our situation as to quit the contracted views of *monopolists*," and that in the same work he had insisted upon it, as a fixed and incontrovertible

principle, that commerce could only flourish when free and equal, he professed not to recollect the words alluded to, but to have no doubt of their being correctly quoted; and added, that he did not come there to defend his own inconsistencies, —that if he had ever expressed such opinions, he then abjured them,—that his present sentiments were widely different,—and that he could not say when he changed them.

On the subject of the propagation of Christianity in India, the opinions delivered by Mr. Hastings were singularly vague and undecided. On the proposed episcopal establishment, he expressed himself with an equal degree of oracular darkness; and, for the son of a clergyman, he certainly evinced a most philosophic indifference, both to the general interests of Christianity and the welfare of the Protestant Episcopal Church. On the whole, he did little for the elucidation of the various questions before the house, and his answers were distinguished by nothing so much as the pompous and inflated language in which they were conveyed. Looking at the exhibition which he had made on this occasion, it is impossible to avoid concluding, either that age had materially impaired a once vigorous mind, or that Warren Hastings was a greatly overrated man.

Lord Teignmouth was the next witness examined. His lordship appeared to apprehend that an unrestrained influx of Europeans into India

might be prejudicial; but thought, that though great numbers might be led by the first opening of the country to rush into commercial speculation, the disappointment which would follow would soon mitigate the evil. He conceived there would be little difficulty, in the existing state of the police, in confining strangers within due limits. The consumption of any great quantity of European goods, he regarded as improbable; the natives, according to his experience, having neither the taste for such articles, nor, for the most part, the means of purchasing them. He saw no danger in discreet and well-regulated efforts for the introduction of Christianity, and did not believe that the natives entertained any alarm on the subject.

The examination of witnesses was resumed on future days, and several distinguished servants of the Company were examined. Among them was Sir John Malcolm. It was his opinion that, of all the powers vested in the local government, none was more essential to its existence in full vigour and force, than that which enabled them to restrain the residence of Europeans. He expected little increase in the consumption of European commodities among the natives. Sir Thomas Munro, who was also examined, thought that the habits of the Hindoos were too unchangeable to admit of the hope of a large demand for English goods. He participated, also, in the apprehension felt by some witnesses, as to the probable conse-

quences of an unrestrained access of Europeans; but saw no evil in an open trade, if confined to the principal settlements.

After being persevered in for some time, the mode of investigation originally adopted was suddenly abandoned. Ministers either found, as they alleged, that the time of the house was too much occupied, or the affair was taking a tendency opposed to that which they desired. On the 13th of April, Lord Castlereagh, after complaining of delay and inconvenience, and referring to a precedent to authorize the course that he was about to recommend, moved for the appointment of a select committee, to examine witnesses, and report the minutes to the house. Mr. Robert Thornton opposed the motion, on behalf of the Company, as did also Mr. Grant and Mr. Astell, the last-named gentleman denouncing the proposal as an attempt to smother the remainder of the Company's case. Mr. Canning, the representative of one of the towns most interested in destroying the Company's privileges, supported the motion. It was resisted by Mr. Tierney and Mr. Ponsonby, leading members of the opposition; the former of whom insinuated a charge of unfairness against the ministry. On a division, the motion was carried, and the select committee met on the 15th, and continued to sit, notwithstanding the house adjourned for the Easter holidays.

In the mean time, the question of the renewal

of the Charter had been introduced into the Upper House. On the 30th of March, the Earl of Buckinghamshire announced, that though a different course had formerly been adopted, it had been deemed advisable, in the present instance, that the resolutions, which had been laid before the Commons, should also be presented to their lordships, and that a committee of the whole house should, with all the documents before it, proceed to the hearing of any evidence which might be offered. Lord Grenville having suggested a select committee, as more advisable, Lord Liverpool, the premier, immediately assented, and a motion for the appointment of such committee having been made, it was carried without a division. On the 5th, the select committee of the Lords met, and proceeded to hear evidence. As in the Commons, the first witness called was Warren Hastings. His answers to the questions put to him were of extraordinary length, but added little or nothing in substance to the evidence which he had given before the Lower House. Some further evidence was heard, and on the 9th, an animated debate took place, on a motion, made by the Marquess Wellesley, for the production of certain papers connected with the inquiry in which the house was engaged. The noble marquess introduced the motion by a very long and elaborate speech, in which he lamented the delay which had taken place with regard to the question

—a delay which he viewed as prejudicial, inasmuch as it gave time for the propagation of notions respecting freedom of trade, which his lordship considered wild and even frantic. He equally condemned the mode in which ministers had ultimately submitted the question to the Upper House, by throwing on the table a set of resolutions unexplained, unconsidered, undebated, and almost unread. He argued, that to apply abstract principles to the present case, without due regard to its peculiar circumstances, was absurd. The origin and progress of our empire in India was altogether singular. A portion of it had fallen into our hands through the medium of commercial enterprize; it had been completed by the combined operation of commerce and military skill; and his object was to shew the impolicy and danger of legislating upon principles which did not arise out of the nature of the case. This was a complex question, and was not to be determined upon the ordinary principles of political economy. He protested against any attempt to decide it upon the pretence that it was an anomalous state of things when the same person was merchant and sovereign. If it were an anomaly, still if it worked well in practice, he held that it ought not to be disturbed. The objection, that the Company lost by some branches of their trade, he considered no reason why they should be called upon to surrender it. It did not follow that they could be deprived of

this without sustaining even a greater loss. A merchant's books might show that his trade in a particular article was attended with loss, and yet it might be possible, that to discontinue this particular branch of trade might disarrange his entire system of commerce, and bring the whole to ruin. There might be such intermixture and connexion in various parts of a large establishment, that to touch one was to expose every part to danger;—thus it was with the Company. The exclusive trade, under proper modifications, was an important ingredient in their character; and he declared most solemnly, speaking, he might venture to say, with some knowledge of the subject, that, in his opinion, to deprive the Company of the trade to India, would most materially and essentially affect their ability to carry on their political functions. If it were objected that they conducted their trade in a more expensive manner than private merchants, it behoved their lordships to recollect why they did so. It was their mixed political and commercial character which rendered this necessary and expedient.

The testimony of the marquess, founded on personal experience, was obviously entitled to great respect, and it was given most unequivocally in favour of the East-India Company, as an instrument of government. He supported this testimony, by appealing to their banishment of foreign influence and intrigue,—to the consolida-

tion of institutions and authorities,—to the amelioration of the condition of the natives, and especially to the state of tranquillity in which those countries had been placed—the Deccan, for instance, and the provinces north of the Mysore—which, in all previous times, had been constantly exposed to war and devastation. These were the fruits of the government of the East-India Company, and he anticipated still further improvements. The noble marquess denied that the customs, manners, feelings, and habits of the people of India were so immutable as they had been sometimes represented. He asked what it was that made the difference between the native armies that we employed in India, and those raised by the native powers? It was the fact, that our sepoys had departed from many of their original habits and prejudices, and this was the whole substantial difference between our armies and those of native chieftains. Could it be said, then, that such a people were incapable of improvement? They clearly were not; but, at the same time, change must be gradual and voluntary; not crude, precipitate, and forced.

The restrictions upon the residence of Europeans, the marquess regarded as necessary for the benefit of the natives; but he did not see how those restrictions could be maintained after the establishment of a free trade. A free trade to India, and a virtual prohibition to the trader from

residing there, was a contradiction too glaring to be admitted for an instant. Some inferior points of the ministerial plan, such as the extension of the trade to the outports, also met his lordship's disapprobation. He reiterated his principal objection, that to divest the Company of its commercial character, would incapacitate it as an efficient organ of government, and concluded by moving for copies of various papers illustrative of the subjects to which his speech had been directed.

After Lord Buckinghamshire had spoken in defence of the conduct of ministers, Lord Grenville delivered his opinions in a very long and elaborate speech. He considered all former arrangements relating to the government and commerce of India only as experiments, and not always successful ones; at best only calculated for a limited duration, never permanent, nor even meant for permanence. He wished not to perpetuate these anomalous and imperfect arrangements, but he believed the time had not arrived when any final regulation could be safely established. Whatever was now done, should be temporary, and he objected to the part of the ministerial plan which proposed that the arrangements now entered into should be for so long a period as twenty years. He regarded the claims of the East-India Company as nothing, and argued that the first duty of the British Parliament was to consult the welfare of the country for

which it was called upon to legislate. Next to this object in importance, was the interest of our own country, which was deeply implicated in the discussion. Taking his stand upon these principles, he considered both the plan of the Marquess Wellesley, for re-investing the Company with all their privileges, and that of ministers, for divesting them of a portion, as highly questionable. He was friendly to a free trade, but he could not hope that a competition, in which the whole influence of the government, territory, and revenue of India would be arrayed against the unprotected enterprize of individual adventurers, could either deserve the name of free trade, or ensure its advantages.

His lordship reprobated the union of the characters of merchant and sovereign, which he alleged to be opposed to all authority, and condemned by all experience. For nearly fifty years, the East-India Company had exercised dominion in India, and the results of their trade, in a country whose government they administered, and whose commerce they monopolized, was a serious loss. If they derived a profit from any part of their trade, it was that with China, where they enjoyed no sovereignty, but, on the contrary, were banished, like outcasts, to a remote and narrow corner of the empire, there to reside under a perpetual quarantine. He would not admit that the improved condition of India was to

be attributed to the Company, but claimed the praise for the wisdom and justice of the public councils of the state. For twenty years after the Company acquired the dewannee, India was so constantly ill-governed, as to compel the forcible interposition of Parliament; and good government commenced only in the year 1784, when the power of controlling the Company was vested in commissioners appointed by the Crown. It is observable, that this was the precise period at which Lord Grenville, and the party with which he then acted, commenced a long official career.

His lordship proceeded to say, that he was for transferring the government to the Crown altogether. He thought that arrangements might easily be made with regard to the patronage, by which all danger of unduly increasing the influence of ministers might be avoided; but he did not state that he had not thought so in 1784, when he opposed, and succeeded in throwing out, the far-famed India Bill of the coalition ministry, because it deprived the Company of its patronage. The plan of which his lordship was the advocate, went to put up the civil appointments for competition among certain public schools, and to appropriate the military appointments to the sons of deceased officers. Lord Grenville, adverting to the China trade, condemned the intention of ministers to continue the monopoly to the Company. He apprehended, that when

the India trade was thrown open, it would be, in fact, impracticable to preserve the Chinese monopoly, as the productions of China would be brought down in country vessels to any of the ports of the Eastern Archipelago that our merchants might choose.

Lord Grenville made some observations on minor topics connected with the renewal of the Charter, and the debate was closed by Lord Liverpool, who briefly defended the line taken by ministers. The motion for papers not being resisted, was, of course, carried without a division; and it seems, indeed, only to have been made for the purpose of enabling the peers to deliver their opinions on the principal question.

The speech of Lord Grenville was, undoubtedly, the most remarkable that was made. The sweeping doctrines which he avowed were, perhaps, at that time, little to be expected from any member of the House of Peers; but, of all men, they were least to be expected from the noble baron who gave them the weight of his authority. Lord Grenville had been long on the political stage, and his conduct on this occasion must alike have astonished his friends and his foes. His political course had hitherto been guided by expediency, not by abstract principle. No one had ever suspected him of being a theorist, and the robe of the philosopher was assumed too late in life, to be worn with either ease or grace. It was an

incongruous covering for a man who had become grey in habits of official intrigue, and whose political life and liberal doctrines were bitter satires on each other.

Independently of his general character, there were some particular incidents in Lord Grenville's career, which certainly did not lend any weight to his advocacy of the destruction of the East-India Company. He had, as has already been mentioned, been one of the most active and zealous of that party which, with Mr. Pitt at their head, had succeeded, in 1784, in displacing the coalition ministry, solely on the ground of their contemplated violation of the chartered rights of the East-India Company. Some years afterwards, he had, as a cabinet minister, given his consent to an Act which continued to the Company that monopoly and that power which he now professed to regard as so dangerous. It was unfortunate that political philosophy should have deferred her visit to this statesman until a period when both his mind and body were enfeebled by age, and his moral vision clouded by those feelings which must attend a man who, after passing a long life in office, finds himself doomed to linger out his declining years in the cold atmosphere of the opposition benches.

It is possible, indeed, that there was another cause for Lord Grenville's altered views. The East-India Company had strenuously and effec-

tually resisted the appointment of a governor-general, recommended by the ministry of which Lord Grenville was the head. It is not easy to determine what influence this might have had in effecting his lordship's conversion into a philosopher; but, in endeavouring to account for so extraordinary an event, it is not unreasonable to seek for an extraordinary cause.

In the House of Commons, the select committee continued the examination of witnesses which had been commenced in the committee of the whole house. This labour lasted much longer than had been expected; but, having been at length concluded, the Commons, on the 31st May, once more resolved themselves into a committee of the whole house, in which Lord Castlereagh proceeded to submit an amended series of resolutions. The first, declaring that the privileges should continue for a limited period, with the exception of such as might be subsequently modified or repealed, having been moved, Mr. Bruce entered into a long and laboured history of the Company, from its incorporation by Elizabeth, and condemned any deviation from the existing system, as replete with danger.

He was followed, on the same side, by a far more brilliant speaker—Mr. Charles Grant, junior, now Lord Glenelg. That gentleman glanced at the speech of Lord Grenville in the Upper House, and argued that the improvement, which was ad-

mitted on all hands to have taken place in India, was attributable to the Company. He denied that the year 1784 constituted the epoch of the commencement of a new order of things. The foundations of improvement were laid earlier; and it was not until much had been done, that the Legislature interfered. The King's Government had, indeed, subsequently co-operated with the Company; but it did not follow that because certain results were produced by the operation of a complex system, the same results would follow if one part of the system were removed.

Mr. Grant's opinion of Lord Grenville's plan for the distribution of the patronage of India, was delivered with much freedom. He viewed it as altogether inefficient; and contended that, if adopted, it would ultimately be the means of effecting that which it professed to guard against, by placing the patronage at the disposal of the minister of the Crown. He maintained, that the efficiency of the existing system for the government of India consisted, in a great degree, in its publicity—every man engaged in it acted on a conspicuous theatre. He could hardly hope that the rules of the service would survive the existence of the Company; and if they did, their vigour and efficiency might be entirely superseded. He objected, further, to the suggested plan of patronage, on the ground of its exclusiveness; and thought it remarkable, that a plan, professing to proceed

upon hostility to all exclusion, should in itself involve a system of exclusion the most cruel and unjust. To confine the civil services of India to the highest classes of the public schools, and the military service to the sons of officers who had fallen in battle, was cutting off the larger portion of the British community from a wide and honourable field of exertion.

Proceeding to the question of the union of the political and commercial functions, the objection to it, Mr. Grant said, rested upon the authority of a great master of political economy, Dr. Smith. But it was curious to observe how the charge had shifted its ground since it was first made. Dr. Smith objected to the union, because he thought the interests of the Company, as merchants, would interfere with their duty as sovereigns; his disciples take precisely the opposite ground. The merits of the Company, as rulers, are admitted; but it is alleged that they sacrifice their interests, as merchants, to their duties as sovereigns. But, after all, the charge rested upon assumption. It pronounced the junction of the sovereign and mercantile capacities to be ruinous; but the only instance upon record of such a junction, is that of the East-India Company, and it seemed like begging the question to begin with laying down a theory, and then to reason from this theory, and pronounce *à priori* upon the only fact in history to which it can be applied. To

argue that such a mixture of functions must upon theory be bad—that the system of the East-India Company is an example of such a mixture, and therefore is a pernicious system—such a mode of arguing was assuming the very point to be ascertained. "Political science," said Mr. Grant, "depends upon an induction of facts. In no case, therefore, can it be allowed to close the series of experiments, and to declare definitively that for the future no practical results whatever shall shake an established doctrine. Least of all is this allowable, when the doctrine can by possibility refer only to a single fact, and when that single fact is at war with the doctrine."

The expectation of a great increase of commerce, flowing from an unrestrained intercourse with India, Mr. Grant considered a delusion—a delusion, however, which the evidence which had been heard ought to be sufficient to dissipate. The manufacturers had been duped by misrepresentations which had been industriously circulated among them, in some degree, he believed, from ignorance, but in some degree also, he feared, from motives less excusable.

To the happiness of the people of India, Mr. Grant apprehended great danger from the influx of Europeans. With the solitary exception of Asia, British adventure had not been favourable to the happiness of the countries visited. He appealed to our intercourse with the native tribes

of North America, and especially to the effects of free trade in Africa. In speaking to this part of the subject, Mr. Grant expressed himself with great severity respecting those who, having participated largely in the slave-trade as long as it existed, were now the advocates of free trade in India. These remarks were especially directed against Liverpool.

The peroration of Mr. Grant's speech was remarkably bold and striking. Having announced himself the advocate of the natives of India, he thus continued :—" On their behalf, in their name, I venture to intrude myself upon the house. Through me they give utterance to their prayers. It is not my voice which you hear, it is the voice of sixty millions of your fellow-creatures, abandoned to your disposal, and imploring your commiseration. They conjure you by every sacred consideration to compassionate their condition ; to pay due regard to *their* situation and your own ; to remember what contingencies are suspended on the issue of your vote. They conjure you not to make them the objects of perilous speculation, nor to barter away their happiness for the sake of some insignificant local interests. It is a noble position in which this house is now placed. There is something irresistibly imposing in the idea, that, at so vast a distance, and across a waste of ocean, we are assembled to decide upon the fate of so many

millions of human beings; that we are to them as another Providence; that our sentence is to stamp the colour of their future years, and spread over the face of ages to come, either misery or happiness. This is, indeed, a glorious destiny for this country; but it is one of overwhelming responsibility. I trust that the question will be decided, not upon party principles, not upon trust, not upon vague theories, but upon sound practical policy, and with a view to the prosperity and preservation of our Indian empire." After some remarks on the danger of a system of speculation and experiment, and the impolicy of breaking down ramparts which could never be re-constructed, Mr. Grant concluded with the following sentence:—"In maintaining the system which has been the parent of so many blessings to India, we shall find our recompense in the gratitude of the people, and if that recompense should be denied us, yet, when we look on the moral cultivation and progressive felicity of those regions, and when we reflect that these are the fruits of our wise and disinterested policy, we shall enjoy a triumph still more glorious and elevated, a delight infinitely surpassing the golden dreams of commercial profit, or the wildest elysium ever struck out by the ravings of distempered avarice."

Such were the views of free trade, of experimental legislation, and of the interests of India, which were then avowed by Lord Glenelg.

On the 2d June, the matter was again resumed in committee. The third resolution was in favour of free trade to India, subject to certain regulations. Mr. Rickards spoke at length, in support of it. Mr. Charles Grant, senior, followed on the other side. Mr. Tierney delivered a powerful speech in behalf of the Company. He condemned altogether the plan of ministers, which he declared had neither the support of practice nor theory. He denied that the system of 1793 could be regarded as a mere experiment. Lord Grenville had not so regarded it, but had expressed his determination to maintain a regulated monopoly. But if it were an experiment, it was entitled to be examined as to its success.. If the happiness of sixty millions of people were the object, was not that obtained? If the extension of dominion were the object, had not the British dominions been extended beyond the expectation of the most sanguine? It had been said that the Company had not traded advantageously; but if that had been proved, which it had not, it mattered not if they beneficially carried on the government. There was no reason, therefore, for saying that the experiment had failed, if experiment it were.

Some of Mr. Tierney's observations evinced a perfect acquaintance with the objects of those seeking the abolition of the Company's privileges. He had not heard, he said, that the persons who talked so much of the happiness of India had ever

proposed to allow its manufactures to be freely imported into this country. The general principle was to be, that England was to force all her manufactures upon India, and not to take a single manufacture of India in return. It was true, they would allow cotton to be brought; but then, having found out that they could weave, by means of machinery, cheaper than the people of India, they would say, leave off weaving—supply us with the raw material, and we will weave for you. This, Mr. Tierney said, might be a very natural principle for merchants and manufacturers to go upon; but it was rather too much to talk of the philosophy of it, or to rank the supporters of it as in a peculiar degree the friends of India. If, instead of calling themselves the friends of India, they had professed themselves its enemies, what more could they do than advise the destruction of all Indian manufactures? It appeared to him that these alterations had been proposed for no other purpose but to appease the clamour of the merchants; and he would defy any man to point out any thing like the good of India as being the object of any of the resolutions.

On the following day, the proceedings in committee were continued, and the speakers were numerous; but the arguments were for the most part the same that had been previously urged. The House then resumed, and the chairman reported the resolutions. On the 11th they were

taken into consideration. On this occasion, Sir John Newport recommended delay, for the purpose of framing a more comprehensive measure of freedom, and he therefore moved that the consideration of the report be postponed to that day three months. This was opposed by Lord Castlereagh. Mr. Whitbread delivered a speech hostile to the Company and friendly to delay. Ultimately, the amendment was lost by a majority of above eight to one, and the report was ordered to be again taken into consideration on the 14th. On that day, Mr. Howarth suggested the propriety of making the preamble of the bill declare in whom the sovereignty of India was vested, but declined making any motion. Sir John Newport coincided in the suggestion, and proposed a declaratory resolution, asserting the sovereignty of the Crown, and affirming that the first duty of Parliament in legislating for India was to promote its happiness. The motion was resisted by ministers, and supported by Mr. William Smith, Mr. Horner, and other members of the opposition: Mr. Tierney differed from his friends, with regard to the first part of the resolution, but expressed himself ready to vote for the other part, which laid down the moral duties of the Indian government. The amendment was negatived.

The next point of discussion was raised with regard to the term for which the charter of the Company should be renewed. Lord Castlereagh

proposed twenty years; Mr. Ponsonby moved as an amendment, that the term should be only ten. Two divisions followed, one on the amendment, and a second on the original resolution, which gave a vast majority in favour of the longer term. Another amendment was proposed, limiting the China monopoly to ten years; on this also a division took place, when it was lost by a majority of seventy-five. On the 16th, the House having again resumed the committee, Mr. Baring moved an amendment, confining the return of vessels from India to the port of London for a limited period. This motion was warmly opposed by the members for the outports. It was supported by Mr. Grant and Sir William Curtis. Mr. Astell, in taking the same side, remarked with much acuteness, that however those who opposed the Company might exclaim against monopoly, the question was only as to the extent to which monopoly should be carried. The plan supported by ministers recognized the principle of monopoly, as the trade was to be thrown open only to a few favoured ports.* On a division the amendment shared the fate of previous ones, being lost by a large majo-

* This remark deserves attention, as opening a view of the discordancy between the theory and practice of free trade advocates which is rarely adverted to. The principles of free trade are not fully carried out in any country in the world, and never will be. Where any custom-house regulations are established, free trade cannot in strictness be said to exist.

rity. Another amendment, moved by Sir John Newport, to the effect that the outports to be hereafter admitted to the privileges of the trade should be determined by Parliament, was negatived without a division. Lord Castlereagh then proposed, that, with respect to places not immediately within the Company's charter, applications should be made for licenses only to the Board of Control, who might consult the Court of Directors if they thought proper. This motion, after some discussion and a division, was carried. An amendment, proposed by Mr. Baring, taking from the Board of Control the power of obliging the Company to grant licenses to persons going to India, was negatived without a division; and, after a desultory conversation, the whole of the resolutions were agreed to, except one, asserting the duty of this country to extend to India useful knowledge, and moral and religious improvement, and recommending facilities to be given to persons desirous of going to or remaining in India, for the purpose of accomplishing such objects. This it was determined to postpone, and transmit the other resolutions to the Lords.

On the 18th of June, some conversation took place on the resolutions; and on the 21st, the House of Lords went into committee on them. They were agreed to almost unanimously; the Earl of Lauderdale alone saying "not content" to the first, and stating generally that he objected to

them all, but declined at that time discussing them. On the motion that the report should be received on the following day, the Marquess of Lansdowne moved that it be received that day three months. The amendment gave rise to some debate. Lord Melville supported the views of ministers. The Earl of Lauderdale made a violent speech on the other side. He condemned the conduct of the Directors in the severest terms, and declared them unfit for the civil and military control of India. He alleged, that to say that the Court of Directors afforded the best form of government for India, was to give the lie to all experience. If the position were just, the British constitution of King, Lords, and Commons, ought to give way to a body of twenty-four Directors—for if twenty-four Directors residing in England formed the best government for India, twenty-four Directors residing in India would be the best government for Great Britain. This position of the noble lord's it is, perhaps, unnecessary to discuss; but it is remarkable that Lord Lauderdale was, a few years earlier, very desirous of becoming the instrument through which the twenty-four Directors, whom he now denounced, were to exercise the powers of government. Lord Grenville repeated some of his former arguments as reasons for delay; and two or three of the ministerial peers having spoken on the opposite side, the amendment was lost on a division, by a majority of

thirty-five. The bringing up the report, on the following day, gave rise to scarcely any observation.

On the 22d, an important discussion took place in the Commons on the resolution which had been postponed. Lord Castlereagh delivered a guarded speech in favour of a regulated toleration of missionary exertions. Sir Henry Montgomery opposed it—declared the religion of the Hindoos pure and unexceptionable—denied both the practicability and the necessity of converting the Hindoos to Christianity, and represnted their moral character as much superior to that of the people of this country. He treated the missionaries generally with little respect, and threw out some insinuations against the character and labours of Swartz, who, he said, was a politician as well as a preacher.

He was answered by Mr. Wilberforce in a speech of great length and power. Mr. Wilberforce argued from experience for the practicability of the conversion of the Hindoos. He refuted the aspersions cast upon the character of Swartz, and adverting to the charge that he was a politician, he said: "I thank the honourable Baronet for reminding me of it. Swartz was a politician, but not a volunteer in that service. He became a politician at the earnest and importunate intreaty of the East-India Government; because, having to negociate with Hyder Ally, they could find no one on whose integrity and veracity that chieftain

would confide but Swartz the missionary. He therefore became a politician and an accredited envoy; because, as a missionary, he had secured to himself the universal confidence both of the Mahometans and the Hindoos." Mr. Wilberforce proceeded to show the degraded moral state of the people of India, and the necessity and duty of permitting the Christian religion to be freely imparted to them. His speech was throughout able, eloquent, and convincing: it must be hoped that a large portion of it would in the present day be unnecessary. The resolution was carried.

On the 28th, the House resolved itself into a committee upon the bill. An extended discussion took place, but little additional light was thrown upon the various questions. The most remarkable speeches were those of Mr. Lushington and Mr. William Smith; the former against the conversion of the Hindoos to Christianity; the latter in its favour. "If," said Mr. Smith, "I did not believe one iota of the divine origin of that religion, yet, as a philosopher, I should admire it for the pure principles of morality which it inculcates; and I should be anxious to introduce it among the Hindoos, for the purpose of driving from the shores of India that cruel and bloody superstition which disgraces them." Mr. Tierney repeated his former arguments against the proposed changes. Finally the report was received, and ordered to be taken into further consideration on the 1st of July.

On that day, various amendments were proposed and lost. Among them was one against the clause respecting the propagation of Christianity in India. Mr. Marsh made a violent speech against the missionaries, and was answered by Mr. Wilberforce. On the following day the committee was resumed, and some discussion took place, but it proceeded languidly. A motion for an establishment of the Scottish church in India, was lost.

On the 12th, the report was brought up, when Mr. Howarth opposed its reception, in a speech of much power. In the course of it he said: "The monopoly of the Company was originally granted them for the public benefit, and it is but fair to ask whether it has produced it. Through all the varied vicissitudes of two centuries, they were, undoubtedly, monopolists; nobody was found to claim a participation with them in the drenchings at Amboyna; they were left in undisturbed possession of the Black Hole in Calcutta; they had the exclusive privilege of fighting, single-handed, against all the powers of Europe who had got a footing on the peninsula of India. But now that they have, with a valour almost unexampled, driven every hostile European from the continent of India; now that they have acquired an extent of territory of nearly 4,000 square miles; brought under the government and control of this country a population of sixty millions; realized a revenue of sixteen millions; raised an army of 150,000 men;

erected fortresses; established factories; swept the Indian seas of every hostile flag, and possessed themselves of a sea-coast of 3,000 miles in extent, with all the facilities of commerce; *now* it is that the *liberality* of the British merchant claims an unqualified participation of a free trade to India; *now*, the wisdom of the Legislature interferes to render inefficient that instrument by which these acquisitions have allowed; and its equity is *now* about to refuse to secure even the dividends of that capital stock which has been sunk in the public service. *Now*, it is discovered that twenty-four merchants are very unfit persons—not to manage the government—for that, they are admitted to be eminently qualified—but to manage the commerce of their dominions."

There was certainly much truth in this; but it was of little avail to press the former services of the Company against the claims of numbers urged on by an avaricious desire to participate in the presumed advantages of Oriental commerce, and fortified, as they now were, by the iron doctrines of modern political economy. It could scarcely have been expected, indeed, that the exclusive right to the trade of so vast a territory as British India had become under the government of the Company should endure for ever; and it were idle now to discuss the means of reconciling the just expectations of those who had gained and secured this mighty empire, with the interests

of other classes of their countrymen. The fashion of carrying great questions by clamour,—of overawing the Legislature by violence—of getting up meetings of interested or fanatical partizans, and calling their resolutions the expression of public opinion—this system was just beginning to prevail. Ninety-nine hundredths of the people of Great Britain were perfectly indifferent to the questions connected with the trade and government of India, which were agitated so warmly in Parliament. The Company required things to remain as they were. A small but noisy knot of agitators yelled for unrestricted trade, and the ministry had neither the information nor the moral courage to enable them to determine aright what should be conceded and what refused.

On the 13th, the bill was read a third time and passed. In the House of Lords it passed almost *sub silentio*, the Earl of Lauderdale alone opposing it, because it did not go far enough; and *his* hostility evaporated in an angry protest.

Thus was inserted the narrow end of the wedge, which was to shatter the mercantile privileges of the East-India Company. It has since been driven home; and the commercial grandeur of the Company is among the things that have passed away.

CHAPTER VII.

THE NEPAUL WAR.

In October 1813, the Earl of Moira arrived in India, as the successor of Earl Minto. Lord Moira possessed considerable military reputation; to this he had added the character of an accomplished statesman. He was a man of mature age and great experience; he, moreover, enjoyed the personal friendship of the Sovereign of Great Britain, and was universally regarded as under the guidance of the highest and most honourable feelings. A wise and high-minded course of policy was, therefore, expected from him, and India was esteemed fortunate in having received from Britain such a ruler.

According to his own statement, the prospect of affairs, on Lord Moira's arrival in Calcutta, was far from gratifying. He represented the finances as in a dilapidated condition, and the

military force inefficient and discontented, in consequence of the severe and unremitting duty, rendered necessary by the reductions which financial embarrassment had pressed upon the Government. He found also the external relations of the country in an unsettled and precarious condition. The new governor-general succeeded to not less than six hostile discussions with different native powers, and to the necessity of devising measures for curbing the Pindarees, who had long committed the most horrible ravages with impunity. Among the more important and urgent of these disputes, was that with the state of Nepaul, where the Goorkha tribe had, in a comparatively short period, established a very formidable power.

The origin and early history of this tribe does not fall within the province of these chapters. It will be sufficient to say that, for a series of years, the Goorkhas had pursued an aggressive course of policy, and with no inconsiderable success. The dissentions of the rajahs afforded ample opportunities for its prosecution, and there was no deficiency of promptitude in embracing them. In every quarrel, the Goorkha prince appeared as umpire and mediator, and these functions he invariably rendered subsidiary to the aggrandizement of the house of which he was chief. The Goorkhas thus acquired an extent of dominion and a degree of power which, combined with the disposition they had manifested, rendered them

dangerous neighbours to the British, whose frontier they bordered for about eight hundred miles.

Some attempts had been made to establish relations of amity with Nepaul; but the overtures for this purpose were not met, by the ruling party in that state, in the spirit which had led the British authorities to make them. A treaty was indeed concluded, but the conduct of the Nepaulese government, after a very short period, compelled the Governor-general in council to declare the treaty dissolved. This occurred during the administration of the Marquess Wellesley; and, from that period, no intercourse took place between the two governments, until the encroachments of the Nepaulese compelled the British to renew it.

These encroachments were extended into almost every district of the Company's dominions which abutted on the frontier, as well as into the territories of native rulers, under the protection of the British Government. Among their victims was Perthee Saul Sing, the hereditary Rajah of Palpa, and the Zemindar of Bootwul. Driven from the hills, he retained possession of the zemindary, for which he engaged to pay to the British the same annual assessment he had formerly paid to the Oude government, to whom they had succeeded. He thus became entitled to the special protection of the Company. This arrangement, however, conduced nothing to his safety; for the

Goorkhas, shortly afterwards, found means to entice him to Katmandoo, where they first imprisoned, and finally put him to death. The family of the murdered rajah, despairing of preserving their remaining possessions from the grasp of the enemy, surrendered the lands to the Company, and retired into Goruckpore, where they subsisted on provision allowed them by the British Government. But this did not deter the Nepaulese sovereign from prosecuting his course of aggression. He subsequently claimed the management of Bootwul, as the representative of the Rajah of Palpa: the establishment of his authority was formally proclaimed, and his pretensions were supported by the assemblage of a considerable body of troops on the frontier. The proper mode of noticing these acts would have been, by the despatch of a British force sufficient to compel the retirement of the invaders; but Government preferred negociation to arms, and the result of the preference was, that the Goorkhas succeeded in occupying two-thirds of the district of Bootwul, west of the Terraie, the revenues of which they collected and appropriated.

On the accession of Sir George Barlow to the government, he deemed it necessary to rescue the question from the oblivion into which it had fallen; but the temporizing course which he adopted, was little calculated to sustain either the honour or interests of the British, in a dispute

with antagonists bold, acute, and enterprizing as the Goorkhas. He required them, indeed, to evacuate Bootwul; but the demand was coupled with an offer of relinquishing, on the part of the British authorities, all claim to the sovereignty of Sheoraj. Sheoraj was included in the territory ceded by Oude to the Company, but it had, previously to the cession, been subjugated by the Goorkhas. This was assumed as the justification of the concession, but very unreasonably so. The right set up, on the part of Nepaul, was founded in usurpation, and, though exercised for a somewhat longer period of time, was in no respect better than that which they asserted to Bootwul. The proposed concession was, however, without effect. The Goorkha prince rejected the offer, and refused to depart from his own proposal of farming Bootwul as a zemindary. Sir George Barlow shortly afterwards went to Madras, and after his departure, the matter for a time rested in such perfect tranquillity, as might almost warrant a suspicion that it was forgotten.

At length, Lord Minto directed the magistrate of Goruckpore to report on the Nepaulese encroachments; and, soon afterwards, he addressed a letter to the Rajah, requiring him to withdraw from Bootwul, and acquiesce in the re-establishment of the British authority. So far from complying, the Rajah asserted his right to a further extension of territory, and alleged his respect for

the British Government as the cause of his forbearing to take possession of it. He proposed, however, an investigation by officers appointed by the two governments, with a view to the settlement of the differences between them. Here the negociation again rested for a considerable period, till the rajah's respect for the British became so weakened, as to prove insufficient to restrain him any longer from the occupation of the districts, on which he had previously set his desire. The Nepaulese crossed the Terraie, which had hitherto been their limit, into the district of Palee, and at the same time extended their inroads from Sheoraj into the adjoining tuppah of Debrooah.

These new aggressions it was impossible to bear with the philosophical indifference which the British authorities had hitherto displayed with regard to the encroachments of the Nepaulese. They were roused, not indeed to action, but to threats, qualified, as usual, by the display of a spirit of concession. It was intimated that the rajah's proposal of an inquiry by commissioners would be accepted; Colonel Bradshaw was accordingly appointed by the British Government, and proceeded to Bootwul, where he was met by the Nepaulese commissioners. The appointment of a commissioner to inquire into rights which were perfectly clear, cannot be regarded as either a wise or a dignified proceeding. Lord Minto, indeed, seems to have felt that to such a course of

policy it was necessary to fix a limit; and although he had previously been willing to adhere to the proposal of Sir George Barlow, and sacrifice Sheoraj to gain possession of Bootwul, he determined, on the appointment of the commissioner, to insist on the restitution of both, if the right to them should be established by the investigation. It was established—and then, as might have been anticipated, the Nepaulese commissioners turned their minds to the discovery of expedients for procrastination. An offer of compromise was made, and referred by Major Bradshaw to the Governor-General, by whom it was very properly rejected, and the rajah of Nepaul was called upon to surrender that which he had clearly no right to retain. This was the state of things when Lord Minto resigned the government to the Earl of Moira.

The encroachments already related, though they may be regarded as the more important, were by no means the only acts of aggression perpetrated by the Nepaulese against the British, and the chiefs under their protection. In Sarun, some serious disturbances had taken place, from the same cause. A Nepaulese soobah, having passed the frontier, seized, plundered, and burnt some villages. At the very time when an inquiry into the transaction was pending, under the sanction of both governments, the Nepaulese took possession of the remaining villages of the tuppah; the total number seized being twenty-two. These vil-

lages had been in the possession of the British for thirty years, and the attack was made without any previous demand or notice. When Colonel Bradshaw had concluded the Bootwul investigation, he was instructed to proceed to the Sarun frontier, for the purpose of adjusting the differences existing there. This appears to have been both unnecessary and injudicious. The Nepaulese had not the shadow of right; and there was consequently nothing to discuss.

The government appears to have subsequently found itself embarrassed by the character in which it had permitted Colonel Bradshaw to proceed to the Sarun frontier. The villages had been restored, subject to the result of the investigation: with this investigation the British Government declined to proceed. They would have been perfectly justified in this had they taken the determination earlier; but, having permitted the Nepaulese diplomatists to lead them thus far, it is not easy to defend their sudden departure from a course to which the other party must have considered them pledged. It is true that the proceedings at Bootwul were not calculated to inspire the British with much confidence in the good faith of their opponents: this, it may be presumed, was the impression of the Government; and Colonel Bradshaw was accordingly instructed to invite the Nepaulese commissioners to meet him, for the purpose of reviewing the proceedings already

taken, and, nothing appearing to give a different complexion to the transactions, to demand a renunciation of all pretensions to the twenty-two villages, and a surrender of the lands on the Sarun frontier, which were still withheld.

In pursuance of these instructions Colonel Bradshaw addressed a note to the commissioners, proposing a meeting. To this the commissioners replied by a very long letter, declaring that they would not meet Colonel Bradshaw, nor hold any communication with him, revoking the conditional transfer of the twenty-two villages, and requiring the British commissioner instantly to quit the frontier. It is to be lamented that any pretext was afforded to the Nepaulese for thus abruptly terminating the negociations; but it is admitted that the communications of Colonel Bradshaw with the commissioners had countenanced the belief, that an investigation similar to that in Bootwul, was to be instituted in Sarun. It has been alleged, that Colonel Bradshaw was not authorized to give any positive assurances to that effect. A faithless government may always avail itself of this excuse to disavow the acts of its agents: and it is unfortunate when an upright and honourable one is compelled to have recourse to it. But while the position in which the British Government was thus placed was somewhat embarrassing, and its decision, perhaps, rather hasty, two points are perfectly clear,—that its claims were founded

on substantial justice, and that the objects of the Nepaulese were only evasion and delay. Although, therefore, we cannot but wish, either that no such expectations had been held out, or that they had been gratified, it is because the course taken seems to cast some slight shadow on the honour of the British nation, and not because the territorial rights of the Nepaulese were in any degree disregarded. Their claims they knew to be untenable, and chichanery afforded the only means of defending them; but it would have been better to submit to some further delay, than to place the character of the British Government in a questionable light.

The Earl of Moira now addressed a letter to the rajah of Nepaul, threatening immediate resort to hostile measures, unless the rights of the British were conceded; and, not resting on idle threats, Colonel Bradshaw was instructed, in the event of refusal or evasion on the part of the rajah, to resume possession of the usurped lands. The answer of the rajah being unsatisfactory, Colonel Bradshaw proceeded to execute the orders which he had received, and the resumption of the disputed lands was effected without opposition.

A similar course was adopted with regard to Bootwul and Sheoraj. Their restitution was demanded within a given time, and on failure, the magistrate of Goruckpore was ordered to take possession of them. The period having expired, without any

intimation on the part of the Nepaulese, of a disposition to comply with the dictates of justice, the magistrates directed his police officers to advance, and establish stations at certain fixed places. Being resisted by the Nepaulese officers, they retired, when a body of troops marched in, and occupied the disputed lands without impediment.

But the course of events was not to continue thus smooth. In consequence of the approach of the sickly season, it was deemed necessary to withdraw the troops from the Terraie, and their departure was the signal for the revival of aggression on the part of the Nepaulese, attended, too, by circumstances of peculiar atrocity. On the morning of the 29th of May, 1814, three of the police stations in Bootwul were attacked by a large force, the officers driven out, and eighteen of them killed. Among the slain was the tannahdar of Chilwan, who, after having surrendered himself prisoner, was murdered, in cold blood, by the Nepaulese commander. The whole of the lands of Bootwul were forthwith re-occupied by the usurping power; and Sheoraj, from the want of regular troops to defend it, was abandoned. The insalubrity of the season, which had dictated the withdrawal of the troops, precluded their return, except at great risk. The Government, therefore, confined its measures to the defence of the existing frontier, and the prohibition of all commercial intercourse between the British provinces and Nepaul.

The last outrage committed by the Nepaulese government might have been expected to put an end to negociation; but the Earl of Moira made one further attempt to effect a settlement of the existing differences, without an appeal to the sword. A letter addressed by him to the rajah of Nepaul, complaining especially of the treacherous attack upon Bootwul, and the murder of the police officers, was answered by one in which no notice whatever was taken of those subjects, but which was filled with reiterations of refuted claims, groundless accusations of the agents of the British Government, and menaces of hostility, if events should render it necessary. With the receipt of this letter, the system of fruitless communication came to an end; the Governor-general, very properly, suffering it to pass without reply.

War being now inevitable, the Earl of Moira took immediate measures for commencing it with activity and vigour; and a plan was laid down for invading the Nepaulese territory at four different points. For this purpose, four separate divisions of troops were assembled; one to act directly against the enemy's capital, by the route of Macwanpore; a second intended to resume the usurped lands of Bootwul and Sheoraj, and afterwards menace the province of Palpa; a third with the design of penetrating the passes of the Deyra Dhoon, occupying that valley and other positions in Gurhwal, and seizing the passes of the Jumna and

Ganges; and a fourth to act against the western provinces and the western army of the Goorkhas, which was understood to be composed of the flower of their troops. The last division, which was placed under the command of Colonel Ochterlony, consisted originally of about 6,000 men, with sixteen pieces of ordnance. Its strength was subsequently increased to 7,000 men, and the number of pieces of ordnance to twenty-two. Attached to this division was a body of irregular troops, which, in the course of the campaign, amounted to about 4,500 men. Part of these were auxiliaries furnished by the Seikh chiefs, and the expelled rajah of Hindore. In the progress of the operations, a corps was also formed of deserters from the Goorkha army.

The Earl of Moira proposed, in aid of his military operations, a series of political arrangements, the object of which was to engage in the British cause the chieftains of the ancient hill principalities, who had been driven out by the Goorkhas, and through them to draw over their former subjects, who were represented as retaining a strong attachment to the families of their exiled rulers, and holding their conquerors in the greatest detestation. The expediency of this plan seems to have been doubted by Colonel Ochterlony, who urged the embarrassment, inconvenience, and expense likely to result from the restoration of the hill chieftains under the protection and guarantee of the British Government, and especially pointed

out the necessity which would constantly arise for its interposition to settle the differences which it might be foreseen would occur among them. This obligation, however, Lord Moira did not appear to contemplate as necessarily falling within the province of the protecting power, and his opinion of the military and political advantages of the plan remained unshaken. Colonel Ochterlony was, therefore, furnished with a draft of a proclamation, declaring the intention of the British Government to expel the Goorkhas, and restore the ancient chiefs; disclaiming all pecuniary indemnification, and requiring only a zealous and cordial co-operation against the Goorkhas, then or at any future period, when it might again be necessary. The time for issuing this proclamation was left to the discretion of Colonel Ochterlony, and that officer, having completed his preparations, proceeded to Rooper, where he was to commence his march into the hills.

The third division, destined for Gurhwal, was placed under the command of Major-General Gillespie. Its original strength of 3,500 men, and fourteen pieces of ordnance, was afterwards augmented to about 10,500 men, and twenty pieces of ordnance. Attached to this division were between 6,000 and 7,000 irregulars, of various descriptions, raised by Mr. Fraser, first assistant to the resident at Delhi, and, when embodied, placed under the command of Lieutenant Young,

to whose peculiar fitness for the charge the governor-general afforded his personal testimony. To Major Stevenson was allotted the duty of obtaining intelligence and guides. The force under the command of Major-General Gillespie was assembled at Seharunpore by the middle of October, and marched towards the Dhoon shortly after. The movements of this division, as well as those of the last, were intended to be assisted by a course of negociations, which were entrusted to Mr. Fraser and Mr. Gardner.

The second division, which was destined to clear the Terraie and re-establish the British authority in the usurped lands, consisted of nearly 5,000 troops, with a body of irregulars, amounting to 900. Twelve pieces of ordnance were originally allotted to it, but, by after arrangements, some of them were replaced by others of superior power, and the number was increased to fifteen. This division was placed under the command of Major General Wood, to whom was also committed the management of the political negociations, that were to be combined with the operations of his division. He arrived at Goruckpore on the 15th of November, the climate of the Terraie, antecedently to that period, being regarded as unfavourable to the health of the troops.

The division which was intended to advance directly against Katmandoo, remains to be noticed. Of the operations of this division the high-

est expectations were formed, and the commander-in-chief was anxious to place it in the very highest state of efficiency. It comprehended 8,000 troops and twenty-six pieces of ordnance, which were placed under the command of Major-General Marley. The political arrangements connected with this division were entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Bradshaw.

Subsidiary in some degree to the duties assigned to this division of the invading army, was a force placed under the command of Captain Latter, designed to act principally, though not exclusively, on the defensive. To that officer was intrusted the defence of the British frontier, from the river Koosi eastward to Juggergobath, on the Burhampooter; and his attention was more especially called to that part comprehended between the Koosi and the Seistah, which latter river formed the eastern limit to the Nepaulese territories. The force, regular and irregular, placed at the disposal of Captain Latter, amounted to about 2,700 men.

While these preparations were in progress, the Nepaulese continued to repeat those mock overtures for an amicable adjustment of the pending differences in which they had so long persevered. Frequent communications were made to Colonel Ochterlony, by Ummer Sing Thappa, who commanded the western force of the Goorkhas; but these appear to have been ascribed to motives less honourable to that officer than those which he avowed. Some information, which had reached

the British Government, induced a belief that Ummer Sing Thappa, notwithstanding his apparent attachment to the Goorkha cause, was secretly disaffected to the Nepaulese government, and might be induced to betray the army he commanded, and the country he occupied, into the hands of the English, in consideration of his personal interests being adequately provided for. Acting upon this information, the British Government gave secret instructions to Colonel Ochterlony and to the resident at Delhi, to meet with encouragement any advance which Ummer Sing Thappa might make towards effecting such a bargain.

Before the result of these instructions could be known, the agent at Benares announced that a brahmin, who declared himself authorized by Rundoz Sing Thappa, son of Ummer Sing Thappa, and minister of civil affairs to the Goorkha sovereign, had proposed, on behalf of that functionary and his father, to put the British troops in possession of Nepaul, on conditions, the objects of which were to confirm the rajah in the government, and secure to the negociators certain advantages as the reward of their services. A favourable answer was returned, and Rundoz Sing Thappa was recommended to put himself in communication with Colonel Bradshaw, to whom, as well as Colonel Ochterlony, notice of the proposal, and instructions as to their own course, were forthwith transmitted. The brahmin returned

to Katmandoo, avowedly to communicate to his employers the result of his mission, and not long afterwards re-appeared at Benares, with another person of the same order with himself. But the new mission professed different objects from the old one. The two brahmins were the bearers of letters from the rajah and his ministers, intimating a desire to open a negociation for peace, and the prospect of overcoming the Nepaulese by intrigue, instead of force, was in this quarter at an end.

It seems not improbable that the overture was only a piece of that tortuous policy which characterized all the proceedings of the Goorkha statesmen. That policy appears, on this occasion, to have attracted the favour and excited the imitation of their rivals, who were determined, if possible, to shake the integrity of Ummer Sing Thappa. But the coyness of the Nepaulese general surprised and disappointed them, and Colonel Ochterlony was instructed to spare him the confusion of an unsolicited confession of attachment, by hinting that his advances would be entirely agreeable. The British commander accordingly took advantage of some partial successes, on his own part, to address a letter to Ummer Sing Thappa, intimating that he had received the authority of the governor-general to communicate with him on any proposal that he might have to offer. But though thus assiduously wooed, the Goorkha chief was not won. His answer was a decided and some-

what scornful rejection of the suit. This, however, did not prevent its renewal. Fresh communications with Ummer Sing were subsequently opened, and kept on foot through his son, in the hope that the private interests of the minister and the general might be made the instruments of overcoming their public duty; but they ended like the former. Either the honesty of these officers was impregnable, or their expectations of the ultimate success of the British arms were not high.

The endeavours made to corrupt the fidelity of the servants of the Nepaulese government are undoubtedly sanctioned by the usages of war; but it is certain that such practices cannot be reconciled with the great moral principles, by which states no less than individuals ought to be governed. If it were right for the British authorities to tempt the Nepaulese general into the course they desired, it could not be wrong for him to yield to their overtures; and if Ummer Sing might innocently have surrendered the army intrusted to him, and the country which it defended, then might Colonel Ochterlony, with equal innocence, have gone over with his division to the Nepaulese, or the Earl of Moira have made his bargain with the numerous parties who look with envy on the British possessions in India, for partitioning among them the golden empire committed to his care. But the rule of morals is too clear to need the support of either reasoning or illustration. To pro-

cure by a bribe the commission of an atrocious crime, is obviously to participate in the guilt of it. No casuistry can evade this conclusion: yet high-minded men will deliberately and zealously seek to tempt others into the perpetration of acts of the grossest treachery—acts from which, if proposed to themselves, they would recoil with equal indignation and horror, and to the performance of which they would unhesitatingly prefer to encounter death. Upon what principles they establish for others a standard of morals lower than their own, or by what sophistry they persuade themselves that treachery is a fair subject of purchase, it were vain to inquire; but it may be hoped that the time will arrive when civilized nations shall no longer recognise, as legitimate, any mode of warfare from which honour is excluded. The attempt to shake the allegiance of Ummer Sing happily failed, and the British nation escaped the discredit of a triumph which, as it would have been owing neither to valour nor to military skill, but to the operation of the basest motives upon the basest natures, would have detracted far more from the national honour than it would have added to the national power.

The progress of events has been somewhat anticipated, in order to throw together all the incidents connected with this process of Machiavellian policy. It will now be necessary to take up the detail of the military operations. The campaign

commenced by the seizure of the Tinley pass, in the Deyra Dhoon, on the 20th of October, by Lieut.-Colonel Carpenter, who had been detached for that purpose by Major-General Gillespie. The latter officer entered the Dhoon on the 24th, by the Kerree pass, and immediately marched upon Kalunga, while detachments occupied the passes and ferries of the Jumna. On the 29th, preparations were made for an attack upon Kalunga; the army under General Gillespie being formed into four columns, commanded respectively by Lieut.-Colonel Carpenter, Captain Fast, Major Kelly, and Captain Campbell, with a column of reserve under Major Ludlow. At half-past three o'clock, on the afternoon of the 30th, the columns under Colonel Carpenter and Major Ludlow marched from their encampment, without any resistance from the enemy, and took possession of the table-land, where they established themselves so as to cover the working party, which was to be employed during the night in constructing batteries. The three remaining columns moved at an early hour the next morning, to be in readiness to attack simultaneously with that from the table-land; Major Kelly, on Kursulle, by the Jagherkeena road; Captain Fast, towards the stockade, by the village of Luckhound; and Captain Campbell, by the village of Ustall. Shortly after daylight, the batteries opened on the fort, with ten pieces of ordnance.

The signal for the columns moving to the assault was to be given from the batteries, two hours previously to the moment of attack, and repeated from the camp below; but the arrangements appear to have been ill-concerted; at all events they were inefficient. The signal was fired about eight o'clock, but it was not heard by either Major Kelly, Captain Fast, or Captain Campbell; and, consequently, only the columns under Colonel Carpenter and Major Ludlow moved. These advanced and carried the stockade thrown across the road leading to the fort; they then pushed on close under the walls, which were stockaded all round. Here their progress was stopped. The fire of the batteries had been ineffective; a small opening only was visible, and that was defended by stockades within stockades. The British force was consequently obliged to retire, after sustaining a frightful loss in officers and men.

Soon after the columns moved, three additional companies had been ordered from the camp; but, by the time they arrived on the table-land, the columns in advance had been forced to fall back. An attack by so small a force had obviously little chance of success; but Gen. Gillespie was, no doubt, apprehensive of the unhappy effects likely to follow a repulse at so early a period of the war, and this, in addition to the impulses of his personal bravery, probably induced him to head an assault made by this little band, assisted by two six-pounders.

The assault was made and failed; a second met with no better success; a third was still more unfortunate in its results, for, when within thirty yards of the gateway, the gallant general was mortally wounded while in the act of cheering on his men. Thus terminated the proceedings of this ill-fated day, with the loss of an officer who had rendered good service to his country in the East; and whose career had been marked by a courage which deserves the epithet of heroic. The memory of General Gillespie received from the public authorities the honours which it so well deserved.

Kalunga was yet to be the scene of fresh misfortune and discomfiture to the British force. The failure of the former attack had suggested the necessity of procuring a battering-train. It arrived, and was forthwith brought into operation. At one o'clock, in the afternoon of the 24th of November, the breach was reported to be completely practicable, and Colonel Mawbey, on whom the command had devolved by the death of General Gillespie, ordered a storming-party to advance. But this renewed attempt to gain possession of the fort was not more fortunate than the preceding one. The enemy defended the place with desperate valour, and, after a contest of two hours, Colonel Mawbey withdrew his troops with severe loss. The storming-party had succeeded in gaining the top of the breach, when a momentary hesitation proved fatal to them, and a large

proportion were swept away. The failure was ascribed by Colonel Mawbey, partly to the bold resistance of the enemy, who, in spite of repeated discharges from all the guns, mortars, and howitzers, of the battery covering the advance, persisted in manning the breach, and bidding defiance to the assailants; and partly to the difficulties of the service which the British troops were called upon to perform. The descent from the top of the breach is represented as having been so deep and rapid, that the most daring of the assailants would not venture to leap down; and, it is added, that had they done so, the attempt would have involved the certain destruction of those who made it, from a number of pointed stakes and bamboos which had been placed at the bottom, and which it would have been impossible to avoid. Such was the representation of the officer in command. But the explanation was by no means satisfactory to the Earl of Moira, who expressed some discontent and surprise at this second failure to carry a place (to use his own words), "certainly of no great strength or extent, destitute of a ditch, and defended by a garrison whose only means of resistance consisted in their personal gallantry." While some weight must be allowed to the circumstances enumerated by Lord Moira, candour must attribute a portion of his implied censure to the feeling of disappointment at the repeated re-

verses which thus marked the commencement of a campaign, on the plan of which he had bestowed so much thought, and in the success of which his own reputation was essentially committed.

But the repeated assaults upon Kalunga, though unsuccessful when made, were not without effect. Though retaining possession of the fort, the garrison had suffered dreadfully from the fire of the British artillery, and greatly reduced in numbers, deprived of their officers, in want of provisions and water, and in danger of pestilence from the accumulation of the dead, they on the morning of the 30th of November evacuated the place, which was immediately taken possession of by Colonel Mawbey. The scene within the fort was of the most appalling description, and bore ample testimony to the desperate spirit which had animated its defenders. Their fortune without the walls was not happier than it had been within, their flight being intercepted by detachments of the British force, and the greater part of the fugitives either killed, wounded, or made prisoners. In this service, Major Ludlow greatly distinguished himself, especially by attacking and dislodging from a very advantageous position, a force composed of the few followers who had accompanied the killadar, Bulbudder Sing, in his escape, strengthened by a body of about 300 Goorkhas, who had been despatched to reinforce the garrison of Kalunga,

but had vainly hovered about the hills, waiting an opportunity to enter the place. The fort was ordered to be destroyed.

The fall of Kalunga was followed by some other advantages, which, though trifling in themselves, were necessary to the success of the general plan of operations. A strongly stockaded position, which the enemy occupied on the heights above the town of Calsie, was abandoned after a feeble resistance; and the strong fort of Baraut, situated in the mountains, forming the north-eastern boundary of the valley of Deyra, was evacuated by the garrison and forthwith occupied by the British. The precipitate abandonment of this place was occasioned by the defection of the chief zemindars and inhabitants, whose zeal for the British cause appears, however, to have been stimulated by the promise of a native officer, that their services should be requited by a small gratuity. In addition to these acquisitions, the post of Luckergaut, on the Ganges, where it forms the eastern limit of the Dhoon, was in the possession of a British detachment; thus completing the occupation of the valley and of the principal passes leading to it. But Gurhwal, to the east of the Bageruttee, still remained in the possession of the enemy; and this tract included several strong and commanding positions.

A force deemed sufficient for the occupation of the Dhoon having been left under the command

of Colonel Carpenter, the rest of the division marched for Nahun; and, during its progress, the command was assumed by Major-General Martindell, who had been appointed successor of Gen. Gillespie. Nahun fell without an effort, the enemy abandoning it on the approach of the invading force, and withdrawing to Jyetuck, a fort erected on the summit of a mountain of great elevation, bearing the same name. Upon this point a force was concentrated, amounting to about 2,200 men, commanded by Runjore Sing Thappa, son of Ummer Sing Thappa.

The operations for the reduction of Jyetuck were multiform and long-protracted, and their commencement was marked by misfortune and defeat. With the double view of dispossessing the enemy of a strong position and cutting off the supply of water, a combined attack was planned upon a stockade, about a mile west of the fort, and on the morning of 27th of December was put into execution. One column, 1,000 strong, was commanded by Major Ludlow, who was directed to proceed to the left of the fort of Jumpta, while Major Richards, with another column comprizing about 700 men, was to make a detour to the right, and take up a position on the other side. It was calculated that both columns would reach the respective points of attack before day-break; but, unfortunately, Major Ludlow did not arrive till long after. He was, of course, perceived, and the

anticipated advantage was lost. Notwithstanding this unfavourable circumstance, the first encounter was encouraging to the hopes of the assailants, the enemy being driven from his advanced position, and compelled to retire into his stockade. But here the tide of success turned. A gallant, but under the circumstances, an inconsiderate and imprudent charge, made by the grenadiers, in opposition to the judgment of the commander, was repulsed, and the assailants were driven back in confusion. The ground, thus rashly lost, might, perhaps, yet have been recovered, had the rest of the detachment performed its duty; but the backwardness of the native infantry completed the disaster which the undue ardour of the grenadiers had brought on. They appeared panic-struck, and all efforts to form them proved ineffectual. From the character of the Bengal army this defection was unlooked for, and should be attributed to the reverses so lately and unexpectedly encountered by men who, under British command, had long been accustomed to uninterrupted success. The column under Major Richards displayed a better spirit, and met with better fortune. They carried the position which they had been despatched to occupy, and maintained it against repeated and vigorous assaults of the enemy, who, after Major Ludlow's defeat, were enabled to turn their whole force against the division of Major Richards.

Their mode of attack was peculiarly harassing; entrenching themselves behind jutting points of rock and other situations affording shelter, they kept up an irregular fire, charging occasionally and then retiring to their coverts. From the nature of the ground, it was almost impossible to dislodge them from their retreats, and the British troops were, therefore, compelled to sustain their attacks without the advantage of shelter enjoyed by their opponents; they, however, nobly maintained their post through the whole day, and with but small loss, until they were withdrawn from their arduous duty, by orders from General Martindell, to return to camp. These orders did not arrive until the whole of the ammunition was expended, and the troops had been compelled to employ stones in their defence. The retreat was far more disastrous than the conflict. It was effected under cover of a very gallant charge, headed by Lieut. Thackeray, in which that officer and nearly his whole company fell. The sacrifice of these brave men probably saved the entire detachment from destruction. Still a retreat by night through a country beset by difficulties, and in the possession of an enemy, active by nature and habit, and elated by success, was not to be effected without confusion and serious loss.

The unfortunate result of this attack seems to have been produced by the operation of various errors on the part of the British, all combining to ensure the

success of the enemy. The delay, which deprived Major Ludlow's division of the advantage of approaching the enemy under cover of darkness, and the unfortunate impetuosity of a part of the troops, have been already mentioned. In addition, Major Ludlow was embarrassed by the non-arrival of his artillery. He was instructed, on attaining the summit of the hill, to fire shot and shells into the stockade, and, having succeeded in driving the enemy out, to make a lodgment there; but he was unprovided with the means of acting upon these instructions, the guns having been left much in the rear; and it appears that neither they nor the spare-ammunition were ready to move at the appointed hour. Of this circumstance, General Martindell was not apprized, and he subsequently alleged that the knowledge of it would have led him to countermand the march of the troops. It seems extraordinary that no report of so serious an impediment to the success of his plan should have reached him, and there must undoubtedly have been neglect somewhere.

The continued ill-success of the operations of this division was a source of great disappointment to the governor-general, and he regarded the conduct of the officer in command with much dissatisfaction. Approving the project of seizing two points, each important to the conduct of a siege, he condemned the withdrawal of Major Richards, who had succeeded, for no better

reason than because the attack under Major Ludlow had failed. He argued that the unfavourable issue of the enterprize in the one quarter, furnished additional cause for improving our success in the other, and that the despatch of a reinforcement, with due supplies of provisions and ammunition, would have been a far more judicious proceeding than that which was adopted, of ordering the detachment to retreat, without knowing the extent of peril to which such an operation might expose it. The opinion of the governor-general appears sound; but General Martindell must not be blamed with too great severity, for his situation was far from being easy or enviable. The necessity of caution had been impressed upon him from the highest quarter, and the commander-in-chief had expressed an especial desire, upon the general assuming the command, that, while the spirit of the troops was depressed by their recent misfortunes, an assault upon Nahun should be avoided, and more patient measures adopted for its reduction. Nahun fell into our hands without an effort; as far, therefore, as that place was concerned, the advice was not needed, and the different circumstances of Jyetuck, rendered it there in a great degree inapplicable. This was felt by Major-General Martindell, and he consequently resorted to a more daring course than that which had been prescribed to him at Nahun. The partial failure of his attempt led him, somewhat

too hastily, to despair of it altogether, and to abandon the success which was within his grasp. The fatal consequences which, before Kalunga, had resulted from indiscreet daring, probably occurred to his mind, and led him into the opposite extreme of over-much caution. This effect would be aided by the instructions he had received, and the consequent apprehension that unsuccessful enterprize would be regarded as a violation of them. It is possible also that, looking at the unhappy and unexpected failure of a part of the native troops in Major Ludlow's division, he might have been apprehensive of similar occurrences in that of Major Richards. It is true that nothing of the kind took place, the whole of that division having manifested the most perfect fidelity and intrepidity; but of this General Martindell could not have been aware, when he despatched the orders for retreating. These orders were certainly injudicious; but sufficient allowance seems scarcely to have been made for the difficulties under which they were dictated.

It will now be proper to advert to the movements of the other divisions of the army, destined for the invasion of the Nepaulese territories; and these will form the subject of the succeeding chapter.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE NEPAUL WAR.

THE division of the British army, under Colonel Ochterlony, penetrated the hills, in the direction of Nalagurh, within a few days after General Gillespie entered the Dhoon; and the commencement of its operations was not inauspicious. Batteries were opened against Nalagurh, and, on the 5th of November, 1814, the fort surrendered. The capture of Taoragurh, a small hill-fort in the neighbourhood, followed. The two places were garrisoned by small parties of troops, and a depôt was established at Nalagurh, which thus afforded the means of an undisturbed communication with the plains.

An apprehension appears to have existed, in certain quarters, of a design, on the part of Ummer Sing, to retreat with his army to the eastward, and the necessity of precautionary measures, for frustrating such an attempt, was impressed upon the commanders within the field of whose operations the movement, if made, would have fallen.

Colonel Ochterlony maintained that the expectation was utterly unwarranted by probability, and, further, that if Ummer Sing did retreat, as he would without a contest relinquish the country he had occupied to the protection of the British Government, that alone would be an honourable issue of the war in one quarter, while his great distance from the eastern districts, compared with that of our attacking forces, rendered the chance but small of his coming in sufficient time to have much influence there. The result proved that the judgment of Colonel Ochterlony was correct; and it further attested the soundness of the opinions entertained and expressed by that able officer, at a very early period after the commencement of hostilities, as to the nature and character of the war in which the British had become involved. He predicted that the Goorkhas would defend to the utmost every place which they thought defensible, and resist as long as possible in those they thought weakest. This opinion, however, was not that which prevailed at Durbar, where a very insufficient estimate appears to have been formed of the courage and determination of the troops by whom the British force was to be opposed. Their warlike qualities were greatly underrated, and victory was anticipated upon terms as easy as those on which it had been attained over tribes of less hardihood and activity. The stockades of the Goorkas had been universally regarded with contempt. Colonel

Ochterlony viewed them with very different feelings. He pronounced them extremely formidable, and the experience of the British troops, on several occasions, afforded but too convincing evidence that he was right. We learned, at length, that we were contending with an enemy who was not to be despised; but the lesson was not acquired without severe suffering and loss.

Instead of retiring on the Eastern Provinces, Ummer Sing, leaving garrisons in Irkee, Subbatoo, and other forts in the interior, concentrated his force on the heights of Ramgurh, to the number of three thousand. The ridge on which he was posted was defended by several forts of considerable strength. In the rear of this, and running in a direction nearly parallel, was another range of lofty and rugged hills, defended like the former by forts. Between the two ridges flowed the river Gumber, in its progress to the Sutleje. Here Ummer Sing was enabled to draw supplies from the rajah of Belaspore, a prince devotedly attached to him, who had lands on both sides of the Sutleje; and this advantage was peculiarly valuable at a time when his communication with other quarters was cut off.

Colonel Ochterlony, having established his depôts in Nalagurh, advanced on the enemy, and from the heights of Golah gained a full view of his stockade. The position which Ummer Sing had taken up was of extraordinary strength.

His right was covered and commanded by the fort of Ramgurh, his left by a high and nearly inaccessible hill, called Kote, on which a strong party was posted. On a first view, however, the left stockade appeared to Colonel Ochterlony to be assailable, and in the hope of being able to turn it, and take the enemy in flank, he made preparations for an attack. Better information induced him to hesitate, and it was deemed necessary to reconnoitre more particularly. This duty was committed to Lieutenant Lawtie, by whom it was performed with extraordinary zeal and ability, and the result was a conviction that a successful attack on the enemy's front was almost impossible, and that the attempt would involve a loss of men both certain and severe. The reports of the country people induced a belief that the hills were more accessible in the rear of the enemy, and these were confirmed by the observations of Lieut. Lawtie; but the road, by which alone the rear could be gained, was declared impassable for cattle, and consequently for the guns. This difficulty was overcome by efforts almost incredible. The docility of the elephant was relied upon for effecting a passage impracticable by other beasts, and six of these animals became the bearers of as many pieces of ordnance, while seven hundred coolies, or porters, were put in requisition, to carry the necessary ammunition and equipments. In this manner, a road, characterized by Colonel Och-

terlony as "indescribably bad," was successfully traversed, the wild and rugged hills passed in safety, and a descent effected into the plain in the enemy's rear.

A battery was immediately erected, and began to play at an early hour in the morning of the 26th November; but it was found to be too distant, and that the elevation of the work against which it was directed was too great to admit of its producing any material effect. The firing was in consequence discontinued, and Lieutenant Lawtie was instructed to reconnoitre the ground, with a view to the choice of a more favourable position. While in the performance of this duty, the officer and his escort were suddenly attacked by a party of the enemy, whom, however, they drove back towards his stockade, and, pushing their advantage, took up a post within three hundred yards of the work. As soon as their situation was perceived at the battery, the whole of the men there were despatched to their assistance; but the enemy threw out from the different stockades and from Ramgurh such numbers, that the party was compelled to relinquish the ground they had gained before the reinforcement could arrive. The affair was altogether a trifling one, but it was injurious to the British cause, by sustaining the hope of the Goorkhas, and dispiriting those who were opposed to them. No blame can be attached to any party in the transaction; but

it cast over the commencement of operations by this division of the army, a portion of the gloom in which the unfortunate events before Kalunga had involved those entrusted to General Gillespie.

The establishment of a battery at a more advanced point was still the object to which the commander of the division directed his attention. One position only presented itself, where the artillery could be used with any prospect of success, and to gain this, a considerable space of ground was to be traversed by the column of attack, exposed to the fire of the enemy from the other stockades as well as from that against which their operations were directed. On the expediency of risking this, Colonel Ochterlony consulted the field-officers with the detachment. The general impression appeared to be unfavourable, and it was observed that it was an acknowledged principle, that all attacks of such a nature should be sustained by great superiority of numbers; whereas, in the instance under discussion, the force of the enemy far exceeded that of the whole detachment opposed to them. The intelligence of the disastrous result of the second attack upon Kalunga, seems to have determined Colonel Ochterlony not to make an attempt attended by so many chances of failure, and he forthwith avowed his conviction, that the enemy's rear was unassailable with his present means. In fact, the force at the disposal of Colonel Ochterlony was inadequate to the purpose for

which it was destined; and that commander, who united with a more than ordinary portion of courage and perseverance, the soundest judgment and the most consummate prudence, determined to wait for reinforcements, and not to risk the efficiency and safety of the army at his disposal by precipitate and ill-judged movements. This determination could scarcely be acceptable to his superiors, but it incurred no reproach. The long experience and high character of Colonel Ochterlony probably averted the censure which would have been bestowed upon an officer who had numbered fewer years, and whose reputation was less firmly established. Conscious that he did all that he ought, Colonel Ochterlony appears, at the same time, to have been aware that he did not attempt all that was expected from him. In a letter to the adjutant-general, dated the 2d December, he wrote that he "did not blush to acknowledge that he felt his mind inadequate to a command requiring great powers of genius, and so novel in its nature, and in all its circumstances." Graceful as was in him this modest estimate of his powers, no other individual would have been justified in adopting it. Colonel Ochterlony possessed military talents of a very high order, and to their judicious exercise must in a great degree be ascribed the ultimate success of our hostile proceedings against the Goorkhas.

It was about this period that the large irregular

force, in aid of Colonel Ochterlony's division, was raised and embodied. The division was also strengthened by the accession of an additional battalion of Native Infantry and some artillery. These arrived on the 27th December, and on the evening of that day, as soon as it was dark, the reserve under Lieut. Col. Thomson moved to attack a chosen point of the enemy, with the view of cutting off his communication with Belaspore, the principal source of his supplies. The march was one of great fatigue and difficulty; but Colonel Thomson succeeded in reaching the point of attack in the morning. The field-pieces were forthwith brought into operation against the enemy's position, and continued firing through the day, but with little effect. A very bold and spirited attack upon the British position, made on the following morning, was repulsed with great gallantry, and the enemy driven to a distance. Perceiving the purpose with which the movements of the reserve had been made, the enemy now suddenly abandoned all his positions on the left of Ramgurh, and took up a new one on the opposite side of the fort, which, by a change of his front, he still kept on his right. The object of the movement was thus defeated, yet the attempt was not unattended by beneficial consequences. The enemy was compelled to contract his limits. By the establishment of the reserve on the ridge, some advantage was secured for further operations; and what was,

perhaps, not of less importance, the repulse of the enemy was calculated alike to diminish the confidence of the Goorkha troops, and to remove the despondency which repeated reverses had diffused among our own.

Disappointed in the immediate attainment of his object, Colonel Ochterlony continued to pursue it with his usual perseverance, and a series of operations followed, distinguished alike for the judgment with which they were planned, and the energy and precision with which they were executed. Their object was to compel Ummer Sing either to quit his position, or to risk an engagement. A considerable body of irregulars, under Lieutenant Ross, was despatched by a circuitous route to take up a position on the heights above Belaspore; and on the 16th of January, 1815, Colonel Ochterlony passed the river Gumber to a position on the road to Irkee, near the southern extremity of the Malown range of mountains, leaving Lieut. Colonel Cooper, with a battalion and the battering-guns, at the former position, at Nehr, strongly stockaded. It had been anticipated that this movement would cause Ummer Sing to quit his position, and move in a direction to cover his supplies, and the result corresponded with the expectation. Ummer Sing marched to Malown, leaving small garrisons in Ramgurh and the other forts in that range. The principal stockades evacuated by the enemy were immedi-

ately occupied by Colonel Arnold, who was ordered, after performing this duty, to follow the march of the enemy, and take up a position in the vicinity of Belaspore. This was not effected without some delay, and considerable difficulty, occasioned by the inclemency of the weather and the mountainous nature of the country. It was, however, at length successfully accomplished. Colonel Arnold took up a very advantageous position at Ruttengurh, directly between Malown and Belaspore, and commanding the principal line of communication. The irregulars, under Lieut. Ross, had previously gained possession of the heights above Belaspore, after defeating a considerable body of Kuhloora troops, who attempted to maintain them. These movements being completed, Colonel Ochterlony, with the reserve, took up a position on the right bank of the Gumrora, which at once afforded the means of watching the movements of the enemy, and facilities for cutting off his communications.

The progress of the British arms in this quarter was now steady and satisfactory. On the 11th of February, the heights of Ramburgh were taken possession of without opposition. The surrender of the fort of Ramburgh followed, after a resistance rendered brief by the opening upon the place of some eighteen-pounders, which had been carried up to the ridge with almost incredible labour. The garrison of Jhoojooroo surrendered to a detachment of irregulars.

Taragurch was evacuated by the enemy on the 11th of March. The fort of Chumbull subsequently surrendered, and the garrison were made prisoners of war. These services were performed by Colonel Cooper, and the force left at Nehr. They occupied a period of about six weeks of unremitted exertion. When completed, Ramburgh was converted into a princpal depôt, and Col. Cooper's detachment became at liberty to aid in investing the enemy's position.

In the mean time, a negociation had been opened with the Rajah of Belaspore, whose territory had been left entirely at our mercy by the retirement of Ummer Sing, which ended in the transfer of the rajah's allegiance from the Goorkha to the British Government, and on this condition his possessions on the left bank of the Sutleje were guaranteed to him, without tribute or pecuniary payment of any kind.

The proceedings of the division of the invading army under General Wood now require to be noticed. Its march was, in the first instance, retarded by the want of means for transporting the stores and supplies. This difficulty was removed by obtaining bearers from Lucknow, as well as a number of elephants furnished by the nabob vizier; but, in consequence of the delay thus occasioned, General Wood was not prepared to move till the middle of December. He at length advanced, and occupied the Terraie; but his operations were still impeded by the delays in the

commissariat department. As the obstacles arising from this cause were removed, the hesitation of the general in the choice of a route, interposed fresh ones. His information as to the country, the force of the enemy, and every other point by which his determination was to be influenced, appears to have been miserably defective, and harassed by a multiplicity of discordant reports, the movements of this division were, from the first, characterized by feebleness and indecision.

The first intention appears to have been to leave Bootwul on the right, and attack Nyacote, a fort situated on the hills to the west of the town. Various plans of operation were in succession adopted and abandoned. At last, the general was led by the advice of a brahmin, named Knuckunuddee Sewaree, into a course singularly imprudent and unfortunate. This man was a native of the hills, but for many years resident in Goruckpore, attached to the rajah. Having obtained the confidence of General Wood, he proceeded to insist upon the difficulties presented by the Mahapore hills, which it had been proposed to pass, and suggested that the detachment should cross the Tenavee, occupy Bussuntpore, about ten miles from Simlar, and leaving there the supplies and baggage, push on to Palpa, where an abundance of provisions might be secured, and from whence Nyacote might be attacked on the side where the well that supplied the garrison was

situated; but, preparatory to this movement, he recommended that a redoubt at Jeetgurh, which had been thrown up across the foot of the hill of Mujcote, one mile west of Bootwul, should be carried, and the deserted town of Bootwul burnt. The success of this scheme was represented as certain, and the advantages of possessing the fort to be first attacked, as of the highest importance. The brahmin professed to be well acquainted with the country—in recommending the proposed plan of operations, he felt, or counterfeited, the greatest enthusiasm—a feeling which he succeeded in communicating to the general, who, at once, captivated by its apparent practicability and advantage, resolved to carry it into effect without delay.

The morning of January the 3d was fixed for the attack upon Jeetgurh, in front of which, according to the brahmin's report, was an open plain. The morning came, and the movement to attack took place. Between the British camp and the redoubt lay the Sil forest; but, instead of debouching upon an open plain, as was expected, General Wood, with his staff and the foremost of the advanced guard, on approaching to reconnoitre, found themselves, greatly to their astonishment, within fifty paces of the work. A heavy fire was immediately commenced from the redoubt, which for some time could be returned only by the few men who had accompanied the general and his staff. On the arrival of the troops forming the head of the column,

they advanced under Colonel Hardyman, to attack the work, while a party led by Captain Croker, driving the enemy before them up a hill on the right of the redoubt, succeeding in gaining its summit. The post seemed now in the power of the British troops; but, deterred by the apparent force of the enemy on the hill behind it, the possession of which was necessary to the retention of Jeetgurh, General Wood refrained from pushing his advantage, and ordered a retreat. Considerable loss was sustained on both sides, but that of the enemy was the most severe. The brahmin, who was the cause of the mischief, disappeared as soon as the fort was in sight. General Wood closed his despatch, giving an account of this affair, by observing with great *naiveté* of his deceitful guide, "if he is with the enemy, I can have no doubt of his treachery:" a conclusion from which few will be found to dissent.

The proceedings before Jeetgurh seem to have been marked throughout by no inconsiderable degree of levity, and to have been undertaken and abandoned alike inconsiderately. The information upon which the general acted was not merely imperfect, but false, and it is strange that no attempt was made to test the correctness of the brahmin's report before advancing. Undertaken, as circumstances shewed, in perfect ignorance of the ground, the attack was yet to a certain extent successful, and it was the apprehensions alone of

the commander that kept the fort out of his hands. But his astonishment and distrust at finding the height covered with troops, was a clear indication that he was not better informed as to the force of the enemy, than he had been as to the nature of their position. He advanced upon the foe, ignorant whither he was going—this was a great error; but his good fortune saved him from its probable consequence, and he was on the point of achieving the very object so imprudently sought. He then first began to doubt his power of retaining that for which he had incurred such risk, and, deterred by circumstances which he ought previously to have known and weighed, he retired, consigning the men under his command to the dispiriting consequences of defeat, after paying, in killed and wounded, the price of victory. Measures more ill-judged and dangerous have rarely occurred in any course of warfare.

Little more was attempted by this division, and nothing important effected. After disposing of his wounded, and making some provision for the defence of the eastern part of the district, General Wood proceeded in a westerly direction, with the view of effecting one of the objects assigned to his division, that of creating a diversion of the enemy's force, as well as with the intention of penetrating, if possible, into the hills by the passes of Toolsepore. But his progress was

arrested by the movements of the enemy, who, encouraged by the failure at Jeetgurh, and being, it was alleged, reinforced from Katmandoo, advanced into the country, burning the villages and committing horrible devastations in their route. On the 24th January, General Wood, in communicating these facts, avowed his utter inability, with the small force at his disposal, to carry on any offensive operations, and solicited instructions for his guidance. The answer, dated the 30th of the same month, attributes the embarrassed situation of General Wood to the delays which occurred in the advance of his detachment, and to his having pursued a system purely defensive. The impractability of furnishing precise instructions for the guidance of an officer holding a distant command, under circumstances liable to daily change, was pointed out; but some suggestions were offered, and a more active system of operations strongly urged.

Towards the close of the season, General Wood again marched upon Bootwul, but without producing any effect. The approach of the rainy season now indicated the necessity of suspending all offensive operations, and General Wood retired towards Goruckpore, and proceeded to make the necessary arrangements for the defence of the frontier. These measures were in accordance with the views entertained at headquarters; but the division being attacked by sick-

ness to an alarming extent (twelve hundred men being at one time in the hospital), it became expedient to break up before the final orders for that purpose arrived. The division separated without attaining a single object for which it had been brought together, and the corps not destined to the defence of the frontier returned to their ordinary cantonments.

Previously to this, it was deemed necessary to incapacitate the Terraie of Bootwul and Shiraz from furnishing supplies to the enemy in a future campaign, by destroying the crops on the ground, and preventing the cultivation of the country for the following season. Such a mode of warfare is revolting to the better feelings of our nature—it has the appearance of wanton and vindictive violence. War is here stripped of all the brilliant colouring shed over it by the masterly combination of means to attain a given end—the penetration which discerns the intentions of an enemy through the veil in which chance and design enwrap them—the patient endurance which no labour can weary—and the daring courage which no danger can appal: it stands forth in all its horrors, unrelieved by any of the circumstances which give it dignity or interest. Lord Moira declared that he adopted this policy with reluctance, and it is but justice to add, that nothing was neglected that could soften such an infliction. The inhabitants were not abandoned to famine. They were

invited to remove to a more southern tract, where lands were assigned to those who accepted the offer.

The operations of the division of the army destined to march through Muckwanpore, direct upon the Nepaulese capital, yet remain to be noticed. It was that upon which the Governor-general had fixed his strongest hopes, and on the equipment of which the greatest care and expense had been bestowed. The corps assembled at Dinapore, which was destined to form this division, and crossed the Ganges before the end of November. Six companies had previously been despatched, under Major Roughsedge, to reinforce Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw. The former officer moved forward with his detatchment to occupy the Terraie of Tirhoot, while the latter proceeded, with the troops under his immediate command, to attack a position at Burhurwa, occupied by Pursaram Thappa, the Nepaulese soobah of the Terraie, with about 400 men. This enterprize was successfully executed. The enemy was taken by surprise, and, after a short conflict, put to the rout. Being cut off from a retreat to the north, the fugitives fled southward, to Kurrurbunna Gurhee, three miles from the scene of attack. Being pursued to that place, they abandoned it, and were chased across the Baugmutty, where many were drowned, and those who escaped death threw down their arms. Two standards fell into the hands of the victors, and Pursaram Thappa himself was killed

in a personal encounter with Lieut. Bolieau. This brilliant affair, which took place on the 25th November, secured the immediate possession of the Terraie of Sarun. About the same time, Major Roughsedge occupied the Terraie of Tirhoot, without opposition, the enemy withdrawing as he advanced.

General Marley did not arrive on the frontier until the 11th December, and by this delay, the opportunity of depressing the spirits of the enemy, and sustaining those of our own troops, by immediately and vigorously following up the success of Colonel Bradshaw, was lost. This loss was not repaired by any subsequent activity. General Marley deemed it necessary to wait for a battering train, which could not arrive for a considerable time, and this postponement of all offensive operations, on the part of the British, seems to have emboldened the Goorkhas, and led to the assumption by them of the course which their adversaries declined. The torpor of this division of the British force was, on the 1st January, very inauspiciously disturbed by a simultaneous attack on two of their advanced posts, situated at Pursah and Summundpore. These posts were about forty miles asunder, and about twenty-five miles from the position which General Marley had taken up at Lowtun. They had been established by Colonel Bradshaw, together with a third, at Barra Gurry, nearly equidistant from the two, but somewhat more retired. The

Goorkhas were so greatly superior in numbers, that the British force was compelled, in each instance, to retire with severe loss, including that of the two commanding officers. The posts, however, were not yielded without hard fighting. At Pursah, Lieutenant Matheson, of the artillery, remained at his post, and continued to work a gun after every man under his command was either killed or wounded.

But, though relieved by this and other instances of individual bravery, the tendency of these events was to cast a gloom over the prospects of the campaign. They occasioned great anxiety in the highest quarters, and drew from the Earl of Moira expressions of marked displeasure. The Governor-General condemned the disposition of these posts; but the disposition was that of Colonel Bradshaw, not of General Marley. A charge, bearing more directly against the latter officer, was grounded on the fact that, although reports of the intended attacks had been prevalent, no effectual means had been taken to strengthen the posts against which they were directed. These reports do not, indeed, appear to have called forth all the vigilance that was to be expected; but a party of two hundred men had been despatched to Pursah, and might have arrived in time to change the fortune of the day at that post; unfortunately, they halted at a distance of several miles. It must be acknow-

ledged, however, that they were not aware of any urgent necessity for their advance, and so little was this felt by Captain Sibley, who commanded at Pursah, that, on being informed, the day before, of the approach of the party, he took no steps to hasten their movement, and did not even think it requisite to reply to the communication. These circumstances show that the feeling of security was not confined to General Marley, but extended to other officers of his division.

It was, indeed, as urged by the Commander-in-chief, an obvious and indispensable precaution, not to continue the posts advanced and exposed during a period of inactivity, which allowed the enemy ample leisure to contrive and mature plans of attack. General Marley was persuaded that he was not in a condition to advance with safety, and in this belief, a concentration of his force would undoubtedly have been more judicious than the continuance of the arrangement adopted by his predecessor. But he was placed in circumstances where a man must possess extraordinary firmness, to act resolutely upon his own convictions. He knew that he was expected to advance, and he felt that this expectation could not be fulfilled. He knew also, that, by withdrawing the parties in advance, he should occasion great disappointment to the distinguished projector of the campaign, and draw down no ordinary degree of censure upon himself. A lover of reckless enterprize would have

executed his orders, or at least would have tried to execute them. A man of high confidence in his own judgment would have shaped his course according to its suggestion. General Marley did neither; hesitating between his instructions and the conclusions of his own mind, he followed neither completely nor vigorously, but, balancing between them, his proceedings exhibited the usual characteristic of middle courses, by uniting the disadvantages and excluding the probable benefits of both plans.

With regard to the advanced posts, further blame was cast upon General Marley, for not protecting them by stockades. Such a proceeding, however, was altogether new in Indian warfare. It was adopted by Colonel Ochterlony, much to the credit of his sagacity and discrimination. That able commander saw that the war with Nepaul was altogether different from any in which the British had previously engaged, and that the peculiarities of the country, and the character of the enemy, called for important changes in our modes of operation. But it would be unfair to pass sentence of reprehension upon any commander upon grounds merely comparative, and to condemn him, not for absolute deficiency, but because he manifested less skill than another officer. The difficulties of the Nepaul war were great; they were seen to be great by the commanders of all the divisions, and Colonel Ochterlony, with all his talents and all

his firmness, avowed that he felt them to be almost overwhelming. With such a testimony from such a man, we must not blame too hastily or too severely the conduct of those officers who were less fortunate in their operations.

But whether attributable, according to the view of General Marley, to the inadequacy of the force at his disposal, or, according to that of the Governor-general, to the incompetence of the commander, it is certain that the course of events was productive of the most lamentable consequences to the interests of the British Government. General Marley, on the 6th, made a forward movement towards Pursah, and encamped about a mile and a half to the south of that place. But this position he almost immediately abandoned, alarmed by reports of the designs of the enemy, and by some very unpleasant symptoms manifested by a part of the native troops. The dissatisfaction displayed itself only in words, and in a number of desertions; but these were indications that could not with safety be disregarded. General Marley, under the circumstances, deemed it advisable to retrograde, for the purpose of covering the depôt at Betteah, and favouring the junction of the long-expected battering-train. This being effected, some other movements were made, but without effecting any thing for the British cause.

In the mean time, the enemy ravaged the Terraie, the whole of which, with the exception of the

country immediately protected by our posts, again fell into their hands: their incursions were extended even beyond it. Their confidence attained a most extravagant height, and they threatened to attack Barra Gurry, though a thousand men were there in garrison. They actually threw up a stockade at Sooffre, a short distance from that post. The prudence of the Nepaulese commander, Bhagut Singh, withheld him, however, from attacking it; but his caution did not find greater favour in the eyes of his government, than that of some of the British commanders had met from theirs. Being the subject of a semi-barbarous state, his fate was even worse. He was not only recalled, but disgraced by being publicly exhibited in woman's attire, as one unworthy to wear the habiliments of man.

Some attempts were made, by hasty levies of irregulars, to provide for the protection of the frontier, and restrain the aggressions of the Goorkhas; but they were attended with little success. The despondency of General Marley appeared to increase, as did also the dissatisfaction of the Commander-in-chief at his inactivity. The conviction of the general, that his means were inadequate to the fulfilment of his instructions, not only remained undiminished, but seemed to gather strength, and that conviction was sanctioned by the judgment of Lieut.-Colonel Dick and Lieut.-Colonel Chamberlain. The opinions of those officers, together with

his own, having been transmitted by General Marley to the Commander-in-chief, the representation was answered by his recall, and the appointment of Major-General George Wood to succeed him.

In a communication from the adjutant-general, a few days afterwards, General Marley was accused of misconstruing his instructions with regard to the defence of the frontier. It is remarkable, however, that Colonel Dick and Colonel Chamberlain appear to have put the same interpretation upon the instructions as General Marley. The question was, what part of the force should be devoted to the protection of the frontier, and the Commander-in-chief contended, that it was specifically determined in General Marley's instructions. This, however, is not perfectly clear. A certain part of the force is referred to, as being "exclusively reserved" for the defence of the country—by which, of course, it must be understood, that General Marley was not to employ this portion in any other duty; but it may be doubted whether the words precluded him from employing other parts of his force in the same duty. The exclusion of a particular battalion, or parts of a battalion, from all service but one, does not of necessity exclude the rest of the army from that specific service. The exclusion might be inferred from other parts of the paragraph, but a matter so important should not have been left to mere inference. General Marley's view was counte-

nanced by the necessity, which every one must have perceived, of effectually providing for the safety of the territory in some way. The risk of incursion was obvious, and though it was subsequently stated that this risk was foreseen and determinately incurred, no such communication appears to have been made to General Marley until it was too late to profit by it. The general of a division, too, must be left, in a great degree, to the exercise of his own discretion, because circumstances are continually varying. This principle was repeatedly enunciated by the Commander-in-chief, when advice was solicited. General Marley exercised his discretion, and he might be on some points wrong; but in the belief that his force was unequal to the execution of his orders, there is no reason for supposing that he was not in the right.

The embarrassments of his situation, acting upon a mind, perhaps, little adapted to encounter them, led at length to a most extraordinary proceeding on the part of the general. On the 10th February (his successor not having arrived), he quitted the camp, before daylight in the morning, without any previous intimation of his intention, and without making any provision for the command after his departure. Such a step is of a nature to forbid comment. It indicates the existence of a state of nervous excitement, during

which a man is not the master of his own actions, and which consequently shields them from remark.

The interval that elapsed between the departure of General Marley and the arrival of his successor, was distinguished by an affair of some brilliancy, which tended in no inconsiderable degree to abate the presumptuous confidence of the Goorkhas, and revive the exhausted hopes of the British force. Lieut. Pickersgill, while reconnoitring, discovered, at no great distance from the camp, a party of the enemy, about five hundred strong. The discovery was immediately communicated to Colonel Dick, the senior officer in the camp, who, under the extraordinary circumstances that had occurred, had, as a matter of course, assumed the command. A party of irregular horse was, in consequence, despatched to strengthen Lieut. Pickersgill, and Colonel Dick followed, with all the picquets. The Goorkhas, encouraged by the small number of Lieut. Pickergill's force, resolved to attack him; but on emerging from a hollow, where they were posted, they perceived the force that was advancing to his assistance. This discovery appears to have struck the enemy with a panic. They made an immediate and precipitate retreat, pursued by Lieut. Pickersgill, who had waited only for the junction of the cavalry. The entire detachment was cut to pieces, and so great was the terror inspired by this encounter, that the

Goorkhas hastily retreated into the hills, abandoning every position which they had established in the forest and Terraie.

Major-General George Wood joined the division, to the command of which he had been appointed, on the 20th February, ten days after the departure of his predecessor. The force at his disposal had been greatly augmented, and he found himself at the head of upwards of thirteen thousand regular troops. He had, in every respect, the advantage of his predecessor in the command. His force was not only considerably larger, but the tone of their spirits was greatly raised by the successful affair which took place only the day before General Wood's arrival. Nevertheless, the new commander determined that he could do nothing to redeem the alleged errors of General Marley. He apprehended, that the efficiency of his army might be impaired by sickness, if he attempted to penetrate into the forest, and, after a long march eastward to Goruckpore and back again, which was performed without seeing an enemy, all operations were suspended for the season. The change of generals thus failed of accomplishing the object which the Commander-in-chief most ardently desired. The division did not march to Katmandoo, nor make an attempt to do so.

The occupation of Kumaon was an object highly desirable, but, owing to the unpropituous progress of the campaign, apparently little likely to be at-

tained by any portion of the regular force. A correspondence had, however, been opened with the leading men of the country, and their wishes were ascertained to be decidedly favourable to the British, whose success they promised to promote, by all the means in their power, if they would invade the territory, and rescue them from the rule of the Goorkhas. But they expressly stipulated, that their ancient rajahs should not be restored, and desired that the country should be placed under the direct government of the Company. The way was thus prepared for a successful irruption into Kumaon; but the means of effecting it were wanting. The army under General Martindell remained before Jyetuck, and no portion of it could be spared for any other service. The season of operation was rapidly passing away, and the British party in Kumaon, becoming alarmed lest their correspondence should be discovered, were pressing in their representations of the necessity of immediate action. In this emergency, it was determined to try what could be effected by a body of irregulars, accompanied by a few guns, and aided by the co-operation of the inhabitants. The duty of raising this force was assigned to Lieut. Colonel Gardner, to whom also was entrusted its subsequent command. It amounted, in the first instance, to about three thousand men. It was increased by a corps raised and formed by Captain Hearsey. Four six-pounders were placed at the

disposal of Colonel Gardner, and he was ordered to act under the direction of his relative, the Honourable Edward Gardner, who was to proceed to Kumaon in a political character.

The levying of this force was, however, a work of time, and after it was ready, a succession of bad weather prevented its being put in motion. By these causes, its advance into the hill country was delayed until the 17th February. Having occupied the Chilkeeah Pass, Colonel Gardner proceeded by a route lying chiefly along the bed of the Cossillas river. This route, not the most direct one to Almorah, was chosen as offering the fewest impediments to an invading force, as being in a great degree unguarded, and likely to afford opportunities for turning the positions of the enemy. The Goorkhas withdrew as the British force approached, and Colonel Gardner's movements were characterized by an energy and rapidity which suffered no advantage to be lost. Having anticipated the Goorkhas in the occupation of an important post, he availed himself of it to collect his force and bring up his guns and baggage, which, by the rapidity of his progress, had been left in the rear. He then pursued his march, and took up a commanding position on a hill called Kompore, in front of which the enemy's force, reinforced by a large proportion of the garrison from Almorah, was strongly stockaded. In the course of the march, several skirmishes took place,

the results of which were invariably favourable to the British.

The success which had marked the progress of Colonel Gardner was most encouraging, but it did not seduce him into attempts which might not only have thrown away the advantages already gained, but have frustrated the objects of the enterprize altogether. The enemy were too strongly posted to justify an attack in front, by a force composed entirely of hastily-levied and irregular troops, and Colonel Gardner, therefore, judiciously determined to turn his position, and by the sudden movement of a part of his corps, combined with a demonstration of attack, either to place himself between the enemy and his capital, or compel him to retire to prevent it. But even for the performance of this manœuvre, Col. Gardner felt that he was not yet sufficiently strong. He, accordingly, waited the junction of an additional body of irregulars, amounting to one-thousand, which has been raised in the Dooah, and were proceeding to Kamaon. On the arrival of this reinforcement, he executed his intention, almost without opposition. The enemy withdrew with so much precipitation, as to leave part of his arms and baggage behind him, and being closely followed by the force under Colonel Gardner, he abandoned the position in front of Almorah, to which he had retired, and posted himself on the ridge on which the town stands. On the 28th of

March, the British force occupied the position which the enemy had deserted.

While Colonel Gardner was thus triumphantly advancing, Captain Hearsey, with his followers, was endeavouring to create a diversion in another quarter, but with very different success. Having secured the Timley Pass, and the forts which commanded it, he had advanced and occupied Chumpawut, the capital of Kali Kamaon, and laid siege to a strong fortress near it, called Kutoolgurh. While thus engaged, a Goorkha force crossed the Sardah, and attacked one of his posts; but it was forced to recross the river with some loss. The attack was speedily succeeded by another. On this occasion, the enemy appeared with increased strength, and crossed the river at a point somewhat above Captain Hearsey's division. On learning this movement, the British commander advanced to attack the enemy, with all the force that could be collected, leaving his adjutant to prosecute the siege of Kutoolgurh. The issue was disastrous. The troops under Captain Hearsey shrunk from their duty, and he was wounded and taken prisoner. The Goorkha commander then attacked the party left before Kutoolgurh, whom he quickly dispersed. The remainder of Captain Hearsey's battalion unceremoniously abandoned their posts, and fled into the plains.

Though Colonel Gardner's success was very flattering, it was a matter of great doubt whether, with a force altogether irregular, he would be

able to reduce Almorah. Some attempts had been made to tamper with the Nepaulese commander, who held possession of it, by suggesting to him that an arrangement might be made for his benefit, if he would retire with his troops across the Kali. This mode of crippling an enemy, by corrupting his officers, appears, from its frequent recurrence, to have been a favourite engine in the policy of Lord Moira. On this occasion, as on others, however, it failed; the Nepaulese commander giving no encouragement to a proposal, which implied a belief that he was a miscreant of the lowest description. As, therefore, his fidelity was not to be shaken, and it was deemed imprudent to rely entirely upon an irregular force, a detachment of regular troops, two thousand strong, was devoted to the operations in Kumaon, and the entire force was placed under the command of Colonel Nicolls.* That officer arrived at Kattar Mull on the 8th of April, and, as soon as his regular force was assembled, sent a detachment, under Major Patton, to a position to the north-west of Almorah, in which direction a body of the enemy had proceeded. They were attacked by Major Patton, and completely routed. The Goorkha commander was killed, as was also the second in command, and several other officers. This success was gained on the 23d April. On the 25th, Col. Nicolls proceeded to attack the heights and town of Almorah, with a success more

* Now Major-general Sir Jasper Nicolls, commander-in-chief of the army of India.

rapid, if not more decisive, than he had anticipated. Two of the enemy's breast-works, on the Sittolee ridge, were carried by a part of the regular infantry, led by Captain Faithful, while the irregular troops, ever the devout worshippers of fortune, were worked upon, by the auspicious appearance of events and the energy of Colonel Gardner, to attack and carry the remaining three. The enemy retreated by five roads, on each of which they were pursued; some important positions were taken, and the British gained possession of about one-third of the town.

During the night, an attempt was made to dispossess the victors of their advantage; but it was met with judgment and gallantry, and defeated. In the morning, measures were taken for attacking the fort, and at nine o'clock in the evening a flag of truce arrived, bearing a letter from the Goorkha commander, requesting a suspension of arms, preparatory to a termination of hostilities in the province. Another letter to the same effect was written by Captain Hearsey, then a prisoner in the fort. On the 27th, a convention was framed, by virtue of which, all the forts were to be surrendered to the British, and the whole province of Kumaon evacuated in their favour, the Goorkhas being permitted to retire unmolested across the Kali, with their public and private property and arms. A proclamation was forthwith issued, declaring the province to be permanently annexed to the British dominions.

CHAPTER IX.

THE NEPAUL WAR.

During the progress of events in Kumaon, Major-General Ochterlony was prosecuting a career of success at once substantial and brilliant. His operations against Ummer Sing sustained, indeed, a momentary interruption in the result of a sally made by the enemy upon a party of irregulars, occupying a stockaded post. This party, being taken off its guard, suffered severely, but no permanent advantage was secured, or apparently sought, by the enemy, as, after destroying the stockade, they returned to their position.

The wary progress of General Ochterlony had enabled him, by the middle of April, to obtain an accurate knowledge of the ground occupied by the enemy, and to ascertain the points at which their positions could be more easily penetrated. Of this information he availed himself, by forming and carrying into effect a plan of combined

attack, distinguished not less by its masterly contrivance than by its fortunate results.

The movements of the British force commenced on the night of the 14th. A detachment, destined to occupy a post between Dooab and the first Deouthal, gained it without opposition. Columns, under Lieut.-Col. Thomson and Major Lawrie, attained the heights of the second Deouthal almost at the same moment, and were proceeding along the ridge, to possess themselves of an advanced post, when the head of the column, consisting of light infantry, received a check by a charge from the enemy sword in hand, which compelled them to fall back on the main body, by this time posted in the second Deouthal. Here they were greatly annoyed by their opponents, from the cover afforded by the jungle and the rocks. In the course of the night, they were further harassed by false alarms; and at the first dawn of day, a daring attack was made by nearly two thousand of the enemy, who almost surrounded the post. A desperate conflict ensued, and continued for above two hours. The Nepaulese fought with a courage at once steady and impetuous; but they were encountered with at least equal courage and with better fortune. They were finally repulsed and totally defeated with very severe loss, Bughtee Thappa, who led the attack, being left among the dead. This action was distinguished by some splendid instances of individual exertion

and bravery, as well as by the intrepidity displayed generally by the troops engaged. The result was, that the enemy's continuous chain of posts was broken, and the Nepaulese commander was compelled to withdraw, concentrating his force in Malown and its immediate outworks. The spirits of the enemy fell with their fortunes, the want of provisions became seriously felt, and desertions were numerous.

Cautious, but not timid, enterprizing but not rash, General Ochterlony pushed his success vigorously now that he saw that it could be pursued with effect. A series of positions were taken up for the purpose of completely investing the enemy, and a battery was erected against one of his redoubts. His distress for want of provisions became extreme. Desertions, both of individuals and of small parties, were of daily occurrence, and these were facilitated by the fondness, which seems to have prevailed throughout the Indian army, for advancing the operations of war by the refinements of diplomatic intrigue. It is no pleasing task to relate the adoption of such a mode of warfare by British officers, but the first duty of an historical writer is to speak the truth, regardless of consequences. Lieutenant Ross (of course with the concurrence of his superiors) made proposals to three sirdars, commanding in and near the battered redoubt. Other communications followed, and when Lieut. Ross determined to ascend the

heights, it was in the conviction that he should meet with no resistance The event justified his confidence. He attained the summit without opposition, the enemy retiring and remaining on a spot to the rearward. The redoubt being occupied, Lieut. Ross invited the enemy's troops to pass into *his* rear, intimating that they would be unmolested. After a little hesitation, the movement recommended by the English commander was performed—other parties of the enemy followed this example, and the second redoubt was gained with as little difficulty as the first.

It appears that the sirdars in a body had waited upon the Goorkha commander, insisting that he should either give them and their men food from the fort, or adopt some decisive line of conduct. It is said that he refused either, but urged them to endure a short time longer, and wait the progress of events. Such advice was calculated to have little effect upon men not influenced by any rigid principles of duty, or any refined sense of honour, and who, pressed by famine on the one hand and allured by promises on the other, were already more than wavering in their fidelity. The result was, that the whole of the outworks were abandoned to the British troops, and the Goorkhas came over almost universally to General Ochterlony's camp, leaving Ummer Sing shut up in the body of the fort, with a garrison reduced to about two hundred men. Escape and the receipt of succour

were alike impossible, and on the 8th of May, the Goorkha commander wrote to General Ochterlony, desiring to be informed of his wishes. The general's reply was, that, agreeably to usage, proposals must come from the other side. Up to the 10th, no farther communication was made. The interval was employed by the British commander in forming batteries, and making other preparations for attack. These being completed, firing commenced, and continued during the greater part of the 10th. On the morning of the 11th, Ram Dos, son of the Goorkha general, came out, and intimated his father's desire to negotiate. The firing was consequently discontinued, but the blockade was rigidly kept up.

From the 11th to the 15th was occupied in negociations, which were protracted in consequence of their being extended to other objects, as well as the surrender of Malown. A convention was finally signed, by which it was agreed, that all the forts between the Jumna and the Sutleje should be delivered up to the British; that all the troops, except those granted to the personal honour of Ummer Sing and Runjore Sing, should be at liberty to enter the British service, and that those not employed should be maintained by the British Government, on a specific allowance, till the conclusion of peace; that Gurhwal should be forthwith evacuated, the garrison having permission to return to Nepaul by the Kumaon route, carrying

with them all public and private property, including warlike stores: Ummer Sing was to be permitted to retire across the Kali, with the remaining garrison of Malown, retaining their arms, accoutrements, baggage, and waggons; and Runjore Sing, the commander of Jyetuck, in the same manner, with two hundred men of that garrison, three hundred unarmed followers, and one gun. All private property was to be respected, and eighty-three persons in the various garrisons, who were related by blood or marriage to Ummer Sing, were to retain their arms and accoutrements.

Of these arrangements neither party had much reason to feel proud. The Goorkhas made great sacrifices, and they received great indulgence. General Ochterlony spoke of the terms granted with the modesty which always marked his official communications—regarding the arrangement not as positively good, but as the best that could be made under the circumstances existing. The rainy season was approaching, and the campaign could not have been protracted much longer. During the period of inaction it would have been necessary to maintain expensive establishments, a burden which was averted by the convention, and this circumstance, combined with the possession of the strong-holds of the enemy, sufficed to attest its expediency. In concluding it, as well as in all his military operations, General Ochterlony displayed the most consummate judgment.

It will now be necessary to return to the division under General Martindell. After the unfortunate termination of the double attack upon Jyetuck, that officer determined to attempt nothing farther until the arrival of reinforcements. These were not granted in the most gracious manner, and the communications addressed at this period to General Martindell, from the department of the Commander-in-chief, were couched in the language of blame and reproach. On General Martindell instituting a comparison between his force and that of the enemy, he was told that "hitherto it had not been the habit of the Company's officers to calculate whether they had a numerical superiority to the enemy," and the introduction of such a principle was pronounced to be "novel, and infallibly destructive to our empire." This lofty language is, no doubt, very imposing; but the number of an enemy's force is, after all, an element that cannot be excluded from the calculations of a prudent general, and the war with the Nepaulese certainly did not form an exception to the general rule. It may be admitted, that the strength of the Goorkha force had been somewhat exaggerated, and it is undeniable that we had been accustomed to gain easy victories over vastly superior numbers of the feeble troops to which we had heretofore been opposed. But in the Goorkhas we had an enemy surpassing in energy, as well as in military skill,

any with which we had previously contended in India, and a corresponding degree of caution was called for. The want of it had been severely felt in more instances than one. The irregular troops, to whom so much importance was attached, proved very generally worthless. It has been seen how Captain Hearsey's irregulars behaved in Kumaon, and those attached to General Martindell's division appear to have been little better. Intelligence having been received that a reinforcement was on its way to join the garrison of Jyetuck, Lieutenant Young marched with 1,400 irregulars to intercept them. He was joined by several hundreds more, forming altogether a very considerable force: it is stated in one report to have amounted to nearly 3,000 men, and it certainly very considerably exceeded 2,000. A party of these being attacked and put to flight by the enemy, the whole body fell under the operation of panic, and were completely routed by a force which did not exceed 500 fighting men. Such was the value of the irregular troops, though commanded by an excellent officer, whose personal exertions were strenuously but vainly used to induce them to keep their ground, against an enemy greatly inferior in numbers.

The defeat materially abated the taste of the irregulars for a military life. Many deserted; many applied for their discharge; and the strength of the corps was reduced from between two and three thousand to about 1,200, exclusive of those

on detached duty. This defection increased the difficulties of General Martindell. He had to contend, also, with weather of extreme inclemency, which his troops were very little calculated to support. He complained heavily of the want of correct intelligence, and, oppressed by all these difficulties, he signified a wish to be relieved from a command, which he could no longer exercise with pleasure to himself or satisfaction to his superiors. This need excite little surprise—General Marley had been unable to contend with the difficulties of his situation, and General Ochterlony had expressed a diffidence of the adequacy of his own powers to meet the exigencies of the mountain warfare. But the Commander-in-chief was impressed with a belief that Jyetuck might be reduced, and with the force under General Martindell's command. After a long continued and somewhat angry communication of opinion, General Ochterlony was ordered, immediately on the fall of Malown, to take the command of the division before Jyetuck. This arrangement was rendered unnecessary by the convention concluded with Ummer Sing, Jyetuck being one of the fortresses which were by that instrument surrendered to the British.

On the reduction of Almorah, the Goorkha commander, Bum Sah, expressed a wish to become an agent for the restoration of peace, and proposed to address letters to Ummer Sing Thappa and Runjore Sing, recommending them to withdraw *their troops across the Kali, preparatory to*

the commencement of negociations. The proposal was assented to by Colonel Nicolls and Mr. Gardner; the letters were written and forwarded. The success of General Ochterlony had, however, precluded their necessity. That addressed to Ummer Sing Thappa was received by him as he was on the point of executing the capitulation; and though too late to have any effect on his decision, it was in time to afford him an apology for the course which he had previously determined to pursue. With true Oriental *finesse*, he availed himself of its arrival to insert an article, stating that he had surrendered at the instance of Bum Sah and the other chiefs of Kumaon; thus throwing on them the odium and the danger which he apprehended to himself.

Bum Sah and Ummer Sing belonged to opposite factions, and the former had no sooner transmitted his recommendation of retreat, than became alarmed at the probable consequences what he had done. Though nearly related to the rajah, who was also much attached to him, the influence of his enemies, the Kusseas or Thappas preponderated at court. The situation of Bum Sah was, therefore, extremely critical—his character was timid and vacillating, and being apprehensive that his head would pay the forfeit of the discretion which he had exercised, he solicited from Colonel Gardner, who had accompanied him on his march homeward, permission to remain in

Kumaon till the arrival of the communication from Nepaul. This, of course, could not be permitted; but Bum Shah, throwing himself upon the confidence of the British officer, declaring that his sole dependence was upon the government to which that gentleman belonged, and imploring at his hands counsel and instruction, Colonel Gardner, after apprising him that, as a servant of the British Government, his authority extended no further than to seeing the terms of the convention fulfilled, suggested, as a private individual, that he should forthwith take possession of the province of Dootee, garrison the forts and places of strength with troops upon whom he could rely, dismissing all the rest, and having established himself there in independence, assume a high tone, and insist upon the adoption of the measures which he thought necessary for the good of his country.

After some deliberation, Bum Sah acquiesced, and an astrologer having been consulted, a fortunate day was chosen for crossing the river. It was clearly for the interest of Bum Sah to procure, if possible, the power of negociating with the British Government, and it was equally to be desired by the latter. The general views of Bum Sah and his party were far more favourable to the maintenance of peace and good understanding than those of their opponents—their hopes of escaping the probable consequences of their recent conduct,

depended upon their obtaining an ascendancy in the state—that ascendancy, again, being dependent upon their pursuing a course of policy different from that of the party by whom they were opposed. The governor-general, therefore, was particularly desirous that the conduct of the negociation should be placed in the hands of Bum Sah; but as an indiscreet publication of such a wish would have frustrated its fulfilment, and probably have involved Bum Sah and his partisans in serious difficulties, the expression of it was confided to him alone, accompanied by an intimation, that he might use it in any manner likely to promote the object sought in common by himself and the British Government. With regard to the seizure of Dootee, Bum Sah was assured of the support of the British Government, if, on mature consideration, he would be satisfied that such a proceeding would tend to the promotion of his interest.

The Earl of Moira, in his narrative of the negociations, seems to have argued the questions of the justice and policy of this arrangement somewhat unnecessarily. There can be no doubt as to either, with relation to the existing state of circumstances. As the course of the negociations took another turn, the perseverance of Bum Sah in the project of occupying Dootee might, however, have occasioned some inconvenience, which Lord Moira very properly avowed himself ready to incur rather than commit a breach of faith.

The difficulty, however, was removed by Bum Sah subsequently declining the occupation of Dootee, from apprehensions for the safety of his family in Nepaul.

Whilst these matters were in progress, an attempt was made to open a negociation through the Gooroo, Gujraj Misser. This person had already been concerned in the negociations with Major-General Fitzpatrick, and in those with Colonel Knox. He had resided some time at Benares, and was believed to be friendly to the British interests; he was also understood to entertain a strong personal attachment to the Rajah of Nepaul, and to be anxious to save him from the evils which might be apprehended from the protraction of the war. Having solicited permission to go to the frontier, he placed himself in communication with the rajah; and the result was, an earnest invitation to proceed to Katmandoo. On the point of his departure, the overtures of Bum Sah became known to the governor-general; but it not being deemed advisable on that account to discourage this mission of Gujraj Misser, he was permitted to proceed without interruption.

He returned, with a paper under the rajah's red seal, empowering him to bring to an adjustment all matters in difference between the two states, and declaring that whatever he engaged for should be confirmed. He brought also letters from the

rajah to the governor-general and to Colonel Bradshaw. The powers with which Gujraj Misser was invested appeared sufficiently ample; but his language, as well as that of the letters, was vague and indefinite. He declared that he had no instructions to propose anything; but that the rajah relied on the generosity of the British Government. The wisdom of negociating with a person whose commission appeared thus unsatisfactory, may, perhaps, be doubted; but the governor-general determined upon the attempt, and instructions were forwarded to Colonel Bradshaw for his guidance. On receiving them, Colonel Bradshaw proceeded to open the subject of compensation for the expenses of the war; and having intimated, in general terms, the extent of the demand on this ground, he was informed by Gujraj Misser that he had no authority to make such sacrifices, and that they were not contemplated by any party at Katmandoo. The attempt to treat was consequently suspended; but Gujraj Misser remained in Colonel Bradshaw's camp.

Negociations were now renewed with Bum Sah and his brother, Roodber Beer Sah, but with the same success which had attended the proceedings with Gujraj Misser. The result of these endeavours was little calculated to invite a perseverance in them. In every instance the conduct of the enemy was marked by that evasion and duplicity which so eminently distinguish Ne-

paulese diplomacy. The governor-genèral, however, was weary of the war, and not without cause: another effort to restore the relations of peace was, therefore, resolved on. Availing himself of the opportunity afforded of communicating with the rajah, by addressing a letter in reply to that transmitted from him to the governor-general by Gujraj Misser, the Earl of Moira determined to honour it with an answer. This communication differed little in substance from those made to the rajah at an earlier period. Its transmission to Katmandoo was entrusted to Gujruj Misser, who was apprized of its contents, and upon whose mind Colonel Bradshaw was instructed to impress the fearful consequences which must ensue to the Goorkha state, if the communication were disregarded. The result was, an enlargement of the Gooroo's powers, and a renewal of the negociation with him; which, after several fruitless conferences, ended, like the former, in an avowal on the part of the Goorkha agent, that he had no authority to make such sacrifices of territory as the British minister required.

The governor-general's disappointment at the miscarriage of this attempt appears to have been extreme, and to have rendered him insensible to every other feeling. He ascribed the failure, in a great degree, to a deficiency of address on the part of the British agent, and an inattention to the spirit and principles of his instructions. There

seems, however, little ground for such an imputation. The universal character of Goorkha diplomacy is quite sufficient to account for the miscarriage of the negociation, and may supersede the necessity of seeking for any other cause; nor is the failure of Colonel Bradshaw more remarkable than that of others, who also failed under similar circumstances.

It was objected to Colonel Bradshaw, that his conduct towards the Goorkha negociator was deficient in frankness. Frankness is rarely the virtue of diplomatists, and the want of it is, perhaps, not attended with much inconvenience: at all events, in treating with Goorkha agents, frankness would be altogether out of place, and the attempt to fix upon Colonel Bradshaw the blame of having frustrated the success of the negociation by the want of such a quality, appears rather the angry emanation of disappointment, than the dictate of a sound and statesman-like judgment. The Earl of Moira had repeatedly dwelt, in his communications to the authorities at home, on the insincere and deceitful character of the proceedings of the Nepaulese. How, then, could he reasonably condemn a political agent for being in some degree on his guard against a people thus invariably deceitful, or how could he consider frankness an indispensable ingredient for a successful negociation with them? Lord Moira's course of policy, moreover, was not always cha-

racterized by a profusion of that quality which now stood so high in his esteem; nor can much of frank and straightforward bearing be discovered in his numerous schemes to vanquish his opponents by means of the treachery of their servants.

His lordship was, in truth, at this time, suffering great mortification. On arriving in India he appears to have pictured to himself a career of extraordinary brilliancy. Its commencement was shadowed by clouds, which he had not anticipated. Disappointed, in a great degree, in the result of the Nepaulese campaign, fresh disappointment awaited him in the failure of the negociations; and this seems to have given rise to ebullitions of ill-temper not warranted by anything that had occurred. Lord Moira, however, having convinced himself that a want of frankness was the great impediment to peace, determined to remove it by a distinct and explicit communication of the terms to which he was ready to agree. A project of a treaty was prepared, and transmitted to Colonel Bradshaw, together with the draft of a note, to be signed by the British agent, and delivered with the former document to Gujraj Misser. To aid the effect of these proceedings, Lord Moira, who appears to have thought extremely well of his own powers of persuasion and conciliation, addressed another letter to the Rajah of Nepaul. The tone of the letter was somewhat subdued from that of former ones, and the condi-

tions of the proposed treaty somewhat relaxed in favour of the Nepaulese. Altogether, the confidence of the governor-general seems to have been greatly shaken; and the experience of one campaign had disposed him to make some sacrifices to avoid another.

The proceedings which have just been related were widely different from those which might have been expected, and indicate a remarkable change of purpose in the course of a few weeks. On the 5th August, the governor-general, in a despatch home, declared his intention not to make any attempt to renew negociations, and his determination that any fresh overtures for that purpose should come from the enemy. On the 23d of September, we find him instructing his agent to re-open a negociation, which was suspended, though not absolutely terminated; for Gujraj Misser had proposed to refer the question of territorial cession to Katmandoo, and promised an answer in twenty-one days; but so impatient had the governor-general become for a conclusion of hostilities, that he could not prevail upon himself to wait the result of the reference to Katmandoo, but voluntarily made an offer of concessions, which his previous tone had given the enemy no reason to expect. The answer did not arrive within the stipulated time, and when the new project was communicated to the Goorkha negociators, they declared, as they had previously

done, that to assent to such terms was beyond their power. The frankness of the governor-general succeeded no better than the reserve of Colonel Bradshaw. The Goorkha agents again made their favourite offer of a reference to their court, promising, on this occasion, an answer in fifteen days, and apologizing for the delay in answering the former reference. Before the expiration of the fifteen days, an answer to the first reference arrived, couched in the most vague and indefinite language (the unvarying style of Nepaulese state papers), and referring to more detailed advices to follow. The period fixed for an answer to the second reference expired, and none was received. At the solicitation of Gujraj Misser, Colonel Bradshaw consented to wait a few days longer. An answer at length arrived, but it was neither favourable nor explicit: the Goorkha negociators were not empowered to sign a treaty on the terms proposed. A further delay requested by them was refused by the British agent, and the Goorkha diplomatists then departed, expressing a belief that they should return in a few days authorised to execute the treaty.

The anxiety for peace felt by the governor-general amounted almost to weakness, and permission was conveyed to Colonel Bradshaw to make still further relaxations in his terms, if the Goorkha negociators should return. But the permission was unnecessary; at the expiration of a

month, Gujraj Misser re-appeared, alleging that he had been detained at Katmandoo by illness. This might be true; but a far more probable cause for his detention may be found in the struggles of contending parties at the Goorkha court. The negociation was forthwith resumed, and, after some delay, a treaty was signed, corresponding entirely with the project delivered on the part of the British Government.

By this treaty, it was stipulated, that the Rajah of Nepaul should renounce all claim to the lands which had been the subject of dispute, and should further cede the whole of the low-lands between the rivers Kali and Rapti, those between the Rapti and the Gunduck, with the exception of Bootwul Khass, those between the Gunduck and the Koosi, in which the authority of the British Government had been introduced, or was in the course of introduction, and those between the Mitchie and the Teistah, together with all the territories within the hills eastward of the Mitchie, including the fort and lands at Naggree, the pass of Naggarcote, leading from Morung into the hills, and the territory lying between that pass and Naggree. The chieftains whose interests would suffer by these cessions, were to be remunerated by pensions to the aggregate amount of two lacs of rupees; the chiefs to be named, and the proportions fixed, by the Nepaulese Government. By other articles, the Rajah of Nepaul

was bound not to interfere with the countries west of the Kali; not to disturb the Rajah of Siccim in his possessions, but, in the event of any differences arising with that prince, to submit them to the arbitration of the British Government, and abide by its award; and not to take into his service any subject of any European or American state, without the consent of the British Government. To secure and improve the relations of amity, accredited ministers from each state were to reside at the court of the other.

The treaty was ratified as soon as received at Fort William, and this event was distinguished by some very remarkable circumstances. At the very moment of ratification, the British authorities prepared to make the concessions which they had previously contemplated, but which the unlooked-for facility of the Nepaulese minister had rendered apparently unnecessary. So extraordinary a circumstance as that of a government deliberating how much of territory shall be surrendered to a hostile state which asks nothing, is, perhaps, without parallel. These concessions were, it was alleged, intended to mark the liberal spirit of the British Government. Liberality may be an admirable quality in individuals, but it would be difficult to shew that a nation is ever likely to be benefited by acting upon the principles avowed by the British Government of India at this period. At all events, that Government was without any

extensive experience to justify such a policy, for from the creation of the world until the time of the Nepaulese negociations, it was probably never exercised by any state in even a single instance. A treaty had been signed by the agents of the two powers—the ratification of one had been affixed to the instrument, and that of the other was expected; in the meantime, the power which had been goaded into hostile measures by a long succession of insult and injury—the power which, after a harassing and expensive war, stood upon the 'vantage ground, having driven the enemy from some of his own provinces, and taken military occupation of them—the power which had dictated its own terms of peace and found its terms accepted—the power which finally had affixed its solemn ratification to a treaty constructed upon those terms, suddenly, and seemingly without cause, turned round upon its own measures, and proposed to cancel some of the conditions of the treaty! Why? Because they were not sufficiently favourable to itself?—Not so. Though dishonourable, this would have been intelligible; but the reason for this capricious course was, that the treaty was not sufficiently favourable to the enemy!

If the fact of any concession being meditated under such circumstances, be calculated to excite surprise, an explanation of the nature of the concession which the British Government resolved upon making, must raise that feeling almost to

bewilderment. The most romantic imagination could not have conceived that, among the points to be conceded, was the possession of those very portions of territory which had given rise to the war. Yet so it was; the British Government expressed itself willing to yield a part, or even the whole, of the lands of Bootwul and Sheoraj, which before the war had been usurped by the Nepaulese. In reference to this decision, it is impossible to avoid asking, why was the war undertaken?

It was said, in extenuation of the sacrifice, that those territories were unhealthy, and of small value in point of revenue. But these circumstances were as well known before as after the war; and if it were desirable to rid the British Government of the care of them, that object might certainly have been effected in a less costly manner. The vast expenditure of blood and treasure which had been incurred, the peril in which the honour of the British nation, and the safety of its Eastern dominions, had been placed by a war commenced without adequate preparation—all might have been spared. Some accession of territory had indeed been gained, but this was not the purpose for which the war was avowedly undertaken. We drew the sword ostensibly for our own protection, not to commit aggressions upon our neighbours: we were justified, indeed, in availing ourselves of the advantages we had gained, and the portions of territory annexed

to our former possessions contributed to the security of our frontier; but the attainment of incidental advantages could not afford a valid reason for relinquishing the main object of the war.

At the close of his own narrative, the Earl of Moira distinctly lays down that which it was one main object of the paper to shew, that the war with the Goorkhas was unavoidable. The soundness of that opinion may be readily admitted, but the conduct of the Earl of Moira, at the close of the negociations, was altogether inconsistent with a sincere belief in it. If the possession of the disputed lands, so far from being valuable, was actually inconvenient, the war was not unavoidable. Our claims might have been withdrawn, or they might have been suffered to slumber, as they had been for so many years; or, if it had been deemed dangerous to acquiesce in usurpation, some decent means might have been devised for transferring the lands in question, without making war to wrest them from the usurping power for the sole purpose of giving them back again. If the intention of restoring them had not been recorded in the official despatches of the Government, it could not have been believed that it had been entertained. States are often obliged to surrender that which they would fain possess; but here, a voluntary tender of the thing in dispute was proposed to be made by the victorious party to the defeated one. If the disputed lands were so valueless as, at the end

of the campaign, they were represented to be, but one opinion can exist as to the expediency of commencing it—that the governor-general, being anxious to display his military talents, stood in need of a pretext for war, and that the disputed districts afforded that which he wanted.

The extraordinary spectacle of a state, after engaging in an expensive war for the defence of certain possessions, voluntarily relinquishing those possessions to the enemy, was, however, lost to the world by a fresh instance of the obstinacy and bad faith of the court of Katmandoo, in refusing to ratify the treaty which its agent had been empowered to conclude. The usual exhibition of delay and chicanery took place; restitutions were required, which could not be granted, and, finally, negociations gave place to a renewal of hostilities.

The new campaign commenced by the advance of a portion of the force under Sir David Ochterlony, whose eminent services had been rewarded by his sovereign with the grand cross of the order of the Bath. Colonel Bradshaw, who appears to have been little in favour with his superiors, was divested of his diplomatic functions, which were transferred to Sir David Ochterlony, and that officer thus united with his military command the entire political authority. In the exercise of the latter function, he held some communication with Gujraj Misser, but it led to no satisfactory result.

On the 9th of February 1815, Sir David Ochterlony advanced through the great Saul forest, towards the passes leading into the valley of Muckwanpore. The road was a mere pathway through an excessively thick jungle; but, though the enemy possessed ample means of annoying the British force and disputing its progress, it was permitted to advance unmolested. On the 14th, the general was informed that there was a pass over the Cheereah Gautie range of mountains, unguarded and practicable; and on the 17th, after a harassing march and very severe labour, the passage was effected.

Sir David Ochterlony continued to advance, and encamped near Muckwanpore. The enemy occupied two positions on a ridge near that place, one of which they abandoned on the approach of the British force, who immediately took possession of it. They shortly, however, returned in great numbers, and a severe conflict ensued. The positions of the British force were repeatedly assaulted; but they were gallantly defended, and the enemy finally retired in confusion, abandoning a gun and a large quantity of ammunition.

A few days afterwards, Colonel Kelly dispossessed the enemy of a position on the Shurryhurpore hills. Two days after the latter event, negociation was renewed, in consequence of a letter addressed to Sir David Ochterlony by a Goorkha vakeel, named Burtāwar Sing, stating

that he was in possession of the ratification of the treaty formerly concluded, and intended to depute a person, whom he named, to convey it to the British Government. This individual accordingly repaired to the British camp, with the treaty duly ratified, and after some discussion, Sir David Ochterlony agreed to accept it, on the execution, by the vakeel, of a declaration that the Rajah of Nepaul relinquished all expectation of that relaxation of the conditions of the treaty which Colonel Bradshaw had been instructed to hold out to him. This stipulation was readily agreed to; the required declaration was given by the vakeel, and afterwards explicitly confirmed by the rajah himself.

After so prosperous a commencement of the second campaign, better terms might, perhaps, have been insisted on; but the sickly season was approaching—the British commissariat was in an impaired state, and the difficulty of getting supplies would have been considerable. These considerations suggested the inexpediency of perseverance in hostilities, and if the treaty, as originally ratified by the British authorities, satisfied the claims of justice and secured the safety of the British dominions, it would have been neither right nor reputable to demand more. It may be concluded, therefore, that Sir David Ochterlony exercised a sound discretion in determining in favour of peace upon the original basis.

In looking back to the origin and operations of the war with Nepaul, it is impossible to avoid being struck by the very remarkable features which it discloses. The aggressive spirit of the Nepaulese, the jealousy entertained by the Goorkhas of British ascendancy, and their aversion to the establishment of any relations of amity with the British Government, though manifested through a long series of years, failed of exciting that vigilance which the exhibition of such feelings by a powerful neighbour ought to have called forth. It has been said, that the attention of the rulers of India was so entirely occupied by other and more pressing matters, that no portion of it could be spared to our relations with the Nepaulese. This is a very insufficient apology: if the rulers of a state have not time to secure their frontier, there must be some great defect either in the constitution or the administration of the Government. It is creditable to the Earl of Moira that he not only found time to assert the rights of the state which he represented, but that he had the spirit to maintain them in the only way likely to be effectual with such a neighbour as the Goorkha. It has been seen that the frontier was, for a long period, the theatre of a course of encroachment on the one hand, and of almost passive submission on the other. Had this been suffered to continue, it is impossible to say how large a portion of the British territory might have become absorbed in the

Goorkha dominions. The war then was necessary, unless we are to abandon our Indian possessions to any encroaching neighbour who may choose to intrude upon them; and Lord Moira consulted his country's honour and his own, in determining on an appeal to arms. Personal ambition might mix in the determination, but it has entered too largely into all the great transactions of states and empires, to make it a reproach to Lord Moira, that he was influenced by a passion from which an active mind is rarely free. If public measures are wise and beneficial, we must not too nicely scrutinize the motives of the actors in them, or we shall be in danger of divesting even the brightest deeds of the greater part of their splendour. The conduct of Lord Moira was variously judged at the time, but it must now be apparent to every impartial mind, that a perseverance in the supine policy of his predecessors must have gradually frittered away our empire in India until we had been reduced to the condition in which we first appeared in that country—that of humble traders, enjoying by the permission of the native princes a few obscure factories, if, indeed, we should have been so fortunate as to retain even this privilege.

In speaking of the manner in which Lord Moira conducted the war, the praise must be far more qualified than that which is awarded to his policy in commencing it. The plan of the campaign, though it might present a very imposing appear-

ance in the office of the adjutant-general, was evidently formed in almost entire ignorance of the nature of the country and the character of the enemy. The force was, in every instance, inadequate to the duties assigned to it; and the arrangements altogether were such as might have been supposed to emanate from the rashness of impetuous youth, rather than from the well-matured experience of a veteran soldier. His lordship's sanguine temperament led him into expectations which could not be sanctioned by a cool view of the difficulties with which he had to contend; and on one occasion he hazarded an opinion, in which, perhaps, no other military man could be found to agree: he affirmed, that a mountainous country is more readily attacked than defended. If this were his serious opinion, it is impossible to acquit him of want of judgment. The reverses, however, which he experienced in the contest with the Goorkhas, must, at a very early period, have convinced him of this error, as well as of some others into which his sanguine mind had been led.

The fatal mistakes which characterized the commencement of the war, and the very imperfect preparation which had been made for carrying it on successfully, were fertile in embarrassment and mortification; and it must be admitted even by his warmest friends, that Lord Moira bore his disappointments with little either of equanimity or of dignity. The blame of failure, a large portion of

which was due to his own arrangements, was cast altogether upon the officers who commanded the unfortunate divisions of the army; and the expression of his feelings was marked by much both of pettiness and ill-temper. The commanders who incurred his censure, might not always have displayed as much activity and decision as was desirable; but they were embarrassed by the vast disproportion between their means and the expectations of the governor-general, and consequently, as frequently occurs where men know not how to do any thing effectually, they attempted little or nothing. General Gillespie had taken a more daring course, and he perished, with no inconsiderable portion of his troops; thus furnishing a warning, rather than an example for imitation. In Sir David Ochterlony, indeed, the governor-general found a man, whose profound military talents almost enabled him to effect his objects without regard to the amount of his means; but such men are, and ever must be, rare. To expect to find in any army, however large, four such men, would be absurd; yet, four such men were necessary to carry out Lord Moira's plans; and even had they been found, success could not have been calculated upon in each of the four courses of operation, since accident may defeat the best and wisest arrangements; and where the force employed is greatly inadequate to its purpose, a general and his army are more especially at the

mercy of accident. The brilliant success of Sir David Ochterlony saved the credit of Lord Moira's plans, and relieved him from the censure which he would undoubtedly have incurred had the campaign ended in total failure; but that success was altogether extraordinary, and even Sir David Ochterlony himself did not venture to anticipate it.

In the conduct of the negociations, the same deficiency of sound judgment seems to have been displayed. The eager confidence in which Lord Moira commenced the war, was succeeded by a nervous anxiety for the conclusion of peace. His previous lofty bearing gave way to a demeanour scarcely consistent with the character of the representative of Great Britain in India; and if the Goorkha prince could have prevailed upon himself to make so precious a sacrifice as that of his duplicity to his interest, he might, to all appearance, have obtained more favourable terms. Lord Moira was not a man to contend with difficulties; and when they arose, he neither met them firmly, nor yielded to them gracefully. The failure of some of his diplomatic agents in bringing the Goorkha negociators to terms as easily as he wished, produced explosions of irritated feeling, similar to those which had been called forth by the ill success of some of his military commanders. His numerous attempts to corrupt the servants of his opponent indicate a deficiency in his moral constitution; and

another failing is too prominent to be passed over. Without wishing to deal severely with a character gifted with many estimable qualities, it cannot fail to be observed, that Lord Moira wooed reputation somewhat more fervently than was consistent with its lasting adherence to him. He was not a man who reposed in proud tranquillity upon his own consciousness of desert, and suffered fame to follow him or not, according to the pleasure of the multitude. He was anxious to leave behind him in India a high military reputation. He was as anxious to shew that, with the sterner qualities of the warrior, he united the more graceful attribute of clemency. Hence his proposal voluntarily to surrender the districts which had given rise to the war, and to recover which so much expense had been incurred, and so much European and native blood poured out. Vanity, in private life, may be a comparatively harmless quality, but in a statesman, it can scarcely fail of being at once injurious to his country and discreditable to himself. It was the original source of all the errors of Lord Moira, in connection with the Nepaul war; for it caused him to rush heedlessly into it, without considering the cost; and it most characteristically re-appeared at the close of the campaign, in his notable project of giving the disputed lands back to the Nepaulese—by which, though it set at nought all the principles of common sense,

and converted the war into an idle but dismal farce, he hoped to secure the reputation of being magnanimous and liberal.

Amiable and good-natured as Lord Moira undoubtedly was in private life, his public career was marked by much of a contrary character. His overweening confidence in his own plans, and oversanguine anticipations of their success, led him not only to endanger the safety of that which he had at heart, but also frequently to act unjustly towards those entrused with military and diplomatic duties. It is always painful to advert to the errors of an eminent man; but, in the present instance, it would be unfair to others to pass them over in silence.

The errors of Lord Moira must not, however, render us insensible to the propriety of the great principle of his policy with regard to Nepaul. The war was undertaken without sufficient preparation, but it was not only justifiable, but positively necessary. Its progress was clouded by reverses, but its termination did not dishonour the British name, while it conferred security on the British frontier. Nor were the effects of its satisfactory termination thus limited. We should take a very imperfect view of the subject, were we to overlook the political state of India generally at that period. The early successes of the Nepaulese aroused in various quarters the slumbering spirit of hostility to the British Government. That

spirit pervaded the Mahratta states, then ostensibly our allies; and the Burmese sovereign acquired confidence to insult us. Hence may be traced the subsequent wars with those powers, which happily terminated in establishing the complete supremacy of the British dominion in India. Much of the forbearance which was displayed by the British may probably be referred to considerations of policy, originating in the circumstances of the times.

CHAPTER X.

DISPUTES BETWEEN THE PEISHWA AND THE GUICOWAR.

When Lord Moira undertook the reins of government in India, the elements of commotion were almost every where prepared, and some favourable opportunity, or casual act of provocation, was only wanting to call them into operation. Among the causes which were likely to disturb the peace of the country, were certain differences between the Peishwa and the Guicowar, for the settlement of which the former prince manifested a most extraordinary anxiety. This, however, was in perfect correspondence with the usual practices of native states, of taking advantage of any change in the British Government to press, with unwonted earnestness and pertinacity, every claim which they possess, or pretend to possess, either upon that government or upon the native states under its protection.

The discussions between the Peishwa and the Guicowar arose partly out of the former connexion between those states; and the British Government, by the treaties concluded with both, was bound to arbitrate upon their claims. A further ground of dispute was furnished by the circumstances of Ahmedabad. This district was divided between the Peishwa and Guicowar; the former prince had granted a lease of his share to the latter, and arrangements had been made, under the sanction and influence of the British Government, calculated to promote the advancement of the country in prosperity and happiness. The success of those arrangements was, however, endangered by a desire expressed by the Peishwa to resume his portion of the territory. This was a result alike to be deprecated by the Guicowar, the British Government, and the inhabitants of the district in question; and it became necessary that endeavours should be made to avert it.

With these questions were mixed up others, connected with the Peishwa's interest in Kattywar; and altogether, the disputes were involved in great intricacy, while the objects to which they related were of great delicacy and importance. At this critical period, it was fortunate that the representatives of the British Government at the two hostile courts were men qualified alike by talent, firmness, and local knowledge, to meet the difficulties of their situation. At Poona, the Hon.

Mr. Elphinstone was the resident. That post at Baroda was filled by Captain Carnac, now Sir James Carnac, governor of Bombay.

Although the British Government possessed the power of arbitration, it was obviously desirable that this authority should not be exercised except in case of absolute necessity; and that, before calling it into operation, every opportunity should be afforded to the native powers of settling their differences by negociations between themselves. Some attempts to effect this object were made by the Guicowar's vakeel at Poona, but they were counteracted by the intrigues of a person named Trimbuckjee Dainglia, who enjoyed the confidence of the Peishwa, and had a personal interest in the determination of one of the questions at issue,—the resumption of the Peishwa's direct authority in Ahmedabad.

Trimbuckjee Dainglia was one of those intriguing and fortunate adventurers, always generated in the atmosphere of a despotic court. His origin was low, and his earliest employment under the Peishwa was that of a menial servant. His disposition, however, led him to watch for opportunities of raising his fortune, and he found them. On some occasions, the means fell in his way of rendering services desired by his master, and he was not slow to improve the advantages he thus gained. He rose rapidly in his sovereign's favour, and so successfully advanced his own influence,

that at length, though the office of first minister was nominally held by another, all substantial power was actually in the hands of Trimbuckjee Dainglia. The British resident at Poona formed and expressed a most unfavourable opinion of this man, and the progress of events proved that it was just.

The efforts of the Guicowar's agent at Poona, to effect an amicable arrangement, being constantly frustrated by the machinations of the Peishwa's unprincipled favourite, it was deemed advisable to make a change in the person by whom the negociation was to be conducted. Gungadhur Shastry, the Guicowar's principal minister, was a man of extraordinary talent and judgment. The services which he had rendered to the Guicowar state were pre-eminent. He had laboured strenuously to eradicate abuse from every department of the government, and to his exertions the rescue of the state from bankruptcy and ruin was mainly attributable. The talents, rank, and character of this individual seemed to point him out as the fittest person to conduct the negociations with the Peishwa, and by the advice of Captain Carnac, who discerned and duly appreciated his merits, he was nominated to the performance of that duty.

His appointment was regarded by the prevailing party at Poona with dislike and apprehension, and previously to his arrival some frivolous objections were raised by the Peishwa to receiving him. These were removed by the British resident, and

Gungadhur Shastry proceeded to the seat of his mission. Here intrigue and counteraction awaited his proceedings. A servant of a former dewan of the Guicowar government, named Bundojee, was engaged in active attempts to frustrate the Shastry's endeavours: he had frequent interviews with the minister, and even went so far as to produce a letter, purporting to be from Futteh Sing, the ruler of the Guicowar state, disavowing the mission. These proceedings, being communicated to Captain Carnac, were by him laid before Futteh Sing. The Guicowar prince explicitly and entirely disavowed them, and, in proof of his sincerity, entreated that an application might be made by the resident at Poona for the surrender of the person of the individual who had thus abused his name. The application, however, was not made; the principal reason for refraining being the difficulty of adducing sufficient evidence to justify such a demand.

Another active agent of intrigue was Bhugwant Row Guicowar, a relation of the sovereign whom Gungadhur Shastry represented. He had visited the Peishwa's territories, under pretence of a pilgrimage, and, being there, sought an interview with the sovereign on the ground of being the bearer of letters to him. Against this, the British resident remonstrated, and at length obtained a promise from the Peishwa, that he would not see

Bhugwunt Row without a previous communication of his intention.

The designs of this promoter of intrigue and division had been penetrated by Captain Carnac, who forthwith was commissioned by Futteh Sing Guicowar to request that the British Government would take effectual means of averting the mischievous consequences to be apprehended. In the meantime, however, the Peishwa had violated the promise which he had given to the British resident, by receiving Bhugwunt Row at a very full durbar, in the presence of the accredited ministers of the Guicowar. This breach of his word he endeavoured to excuse, by alleging that the appearance of Bhugwunt Row at durbar had not been sanctioned by him. The habitual conduct and feelings of the Peishwa, however, render it almost certain that this statement was false.

With the view of testing the sincerity of the Guicowar prince, and at the same time of enabling the British resident at Poona to encounter, with better effect, the mass of intrigue with which he was surrounded, Captain Carnac had been instructed to communicate to Futteh Sing the facts reported from Poona by the resident, and to submit to his highness the propriety of meeting the proceedings in which his name had been surreptitiously used, by a disclaimer, framed in such a formal and authoritative manner, that it could be

officially used at the durbar of Poona. Some reluctance was at first manifested to this; but the objections of the prince were ultimately overcome by the address of the resident: the required document was given, and forwarded by the Bombay government to Poona.

Gungadhur Shastry had hitherto received few marks of favour from the Peishwa or his minister; and his endeavours to arrange the matters in dispute had been abortive. The Peishwa refused to renew the lease of Ahmedabad—on this point he was explicit—on others, every art of evasion, chicanery, and delay was employed to postpone the conclusion of the negociation. Gungadhur Shastry was at length about to take his departure from Poona, relinquishing to the British Government the task which he had laboured assiduously but vainly to perform, when a sudden change took place in the conduct of the Peishwa and his minister, which induced him to suspend the execution of his intention. Both the master and the servant began to make an ostentatious display of kindly feelings towards the Shastry, and to appear anxious to atone for their former hostility by the most extraordinary marks of esteem and confidence. Prospects of a settlement of the disputed questions, upon terms consistent with the interest of the Guicowar, were held out, and the greatest apparent cordiality was established between the Shastry and his former enemy, Trim-

buckjee. As a crowning mark of the Peishwa's favour, he actually proposed a marriage between a female of his own family and the Shastry's son, and preparations were made for its celebration.

The Peishwa and his minister proceeded on a pilgrimage to Nassuck, and the Shastry accompanied them. During the journey, reports that the Shastry had been seized by Trimbuckjee were extensively circulated at Poona. They were disbelieved by the British resident, but so much pains were taken to convince him that they had no foundation, as to excite in his mind considerable surprise. It has been stated that, at the period when Gungadhur Shastry and Trimbuckjee were associated on friendly terms, the latter avowed to the former that, before their reconciliation, he had been engaged in plans for his assassination. This avowal seems scarcely credible, and if made, it is not easily traced to any rational motive. If intended as a parade of entire confidence, it was certainly a clumsy expedient, and would seem quite as likely to put the Shastry on his guard, as to command his dependence on the good faith of one who did not hesitate to acknowledge having entertained such abominable designs.

The Shastry, though he had formerly felt some apprehensions of treachery and violence, appears to have been divested, by the smoothness of the minister, of every relic of such feelings: they

were again indeed roused, but it was when too late. Another devotional journey was proposed, and the Shastry invited to accompany the Peishwa and the minister to Punderpore. On this occasion, the Shastry's colleague, Bappoo Mryaul, a man of wary and circumspect character, was not permitted to accompany him, and his exclusion was attributed to the influence of Trimbuckjee. At his desire, also, the Shastry consented to leave most of his attendants at Poona.

The visit to Punderpore took place in July 1815. On the 14th of that month, the Shastry went to an entertainment; on his return, he complained of fever, and desired that if any persons came to request his presence at the temple, they might be told that he was ill. In about half an hour after his return, a messenger from Trimbuckjee came, to request him to join that person in his devotions; but was told that the Shastry was unwell, and would not go out. A second messenger arrived, shortly after, to acquaint the Shastry that the Peishwa was to go to the temple the next morning, and that he ought to take advantage of the interval, and attend prayers; but not to bring many attendants with him. He still declined. Soon after the receipt of the second message, two of his friends left him, and proceeded to the great temple. Here they met Trimbuckjee, who lamented the refusal of the Shastry to come to prayers, and entreated them to use their influence to change his determi-

nation. One of them returned, and told the Shastry what had occurred; but he still pleaded illness as a reason for non-compliance. Reflecting, however, that his refusal to join in the devotions of the temple, after these various messages, might appear strange in the eyes of Trimbuckjee, he at length agreed to go.

As he passed along, one of his attendants heard a man in the crowd ask, "Which is the Shastry?" and another reply, "He who wears the necklace;" but not thinking the inquiry of any importance, he paid no attention either to the person asking the question, or to him who made the answer. The Shastry entered the temple, performed his devotions, and after remaining a few minutes in conversation with Trimbuckjee Dainglia, returned towards the house which he occupied. He advanced but a short distance from the temple, when three men came running behind him, and as if clearing the road for some person of distinction, calling out, "make way! make way!" Their left hands were folded up in cloths, and each of them, in his right hand, bore what seemed to be a twisted cloth, such as appears to be commonly used for striking persons in a crowd, to make them stand aside. One of them struck the Shastry a violent blow with the cloth, and it was then discovered that he had a sword in his hand; another seized him by the hair, and threw him down; and, whilst in the act of falling, a third

ruffian cut him on the head. Three of the Shastry's attendants remained with their master; but two more assassins rushing from the front, the whole of them were wounded and disabled. The rest of the Shastry's friends and followers, who do not appear to have been blest with any large share of personal intrepidity, ran away, leaving him in the hands of his murderers. Being thus at liberty to complete their bloody work, they mangled the unhappy man in a dreadful manner, and then departed; one of them exclaiming, in the Mahratta language, "We have now finished him."

Three of the Shastry's people had remained at the temple, in attendance upon an old man, who formed-part of his suite. As they approached the spot where the murder had been committed, they saw five men, with naked swords, running towards the temple. This alarmed them, but not being aware of what had happened, they made their way as quietly as possible to the Shastry's house; not finding him there, they returned to the road, where they discovered his body, cut to pieces.

The British resident had accompanied the Peishwa to Nassuck, but, understanding that his attendance at Punderpore would not be acceptable, he had, on the departure of the devotees for that place, proceeded to Ellora. There he learned the horrible events which had marked the devotional expedition of the Peishwa, to whom he forthwith communicated his intention of imme-

diately returning to Poona, calling on him, at the same time, to take measures for discovering and bringing to justice the murderers of the Shastry. Captain Pottinger, the assistant, who had been left at Poona, was instructed to provide for the safety of the surviving parties connected with the Baroda mission; and in case of necessity, he was to invite them to encamp in the neighbourhood of the British residency.

The demands of Mr. Elphinstone were unheeded; and the representations of the Shastry's followers, of course, met with no better success. The day after the murder, some of the Shastry's carcoons waited on Trimbuckjee, and urged that it behoved him, alike as the friend of the deceased and minister of the Peishwa, to institute an active inquiry. He received them with great civility, but said that he had no clue to guide him in tracing the criminals, and that the Shastry was wrong to venture abroad without fifty or a hundred attendants. The carcoons replied, that the Shastry considered himself among friends; that it was not usual to bring many people on such occasions; and, with regard to the want of marks by which to trace the perpetrators of the crime, they observed, that the assassins wore the dress of the Carnatic, and that Trimbuckjee well knew who were the Shastry's enemies. To this the minister replied by an appeal to that power, whose agency is so universally recognized in the East. He asked, "How could I avert what fate has decreed?" And, having thus

removed the transaction beyond the sphere of human responsibility, he consoled the Shastry's followers by assuring them that, now their protector was gone, they must depend upon themselves; graciously adding, however, that he would do what he could for them. On the following day, the Shastry's followers obtained permission to return to Poona; but it was intimated to them, that they need not trouble themselves to attend any more, either upon Trimbuckjee or the Peishwa.

Although the remonstrances of the British resident did not produce any serious investigation into the circumstances of the murder, they were sufficient to induce Trimbuckjee and his sovereign to take extraordinary measures for their own safety. Before the murder, indeed the Peishwa had adopted unusual precautions. New troops were raised, additional guards were posted round his house, and, contrary to his usual practice, his progress was attended by a large body of armed men. After the murder, these precautions were redoubled.

The Peishwa returned to Poona, but his entry was marked by symptoms of anxiety and fear. His approach was not preceded by any notice: he arrived in a close palanquin, and was not met by any of his chiefs. The day of his arrival was a great festival, on which thousands of brahmins were accustomed to attend, to receive his alms.

He never before failed to be present at the dispensation; but, on this occasion, he did not appear. At night, strong guards were posted, not only at the palace, but at the house of Trimbuckjee. Subsequently, the levies of new troops, and the concentration of military force in the vicinity of Poona, continued; and every movement manifested distrust and alarm.

Soon after the Peishwa's return to Poona, the British resident requested an audience; this, on various pretexts, was evaded. After much difficulty, Mr. Elphinstone succeeded in conveying to the Peishwa a paper, containing a direct charge against Trimbuckjee, and demanding his arrest, as well as that of Bhugwunt Row and Bundojee, the two persons who had so anxiously endeavoured to undermine and counteract the labours of Gungadhur Shastry. In this paper, the resident, after stating the anxiety he had felt for an interview, expressed his surprise that no inquiry had been made into the circumstances of the Shastry's assassination. The Peishwa's pride and feelings were, however, respected, by averting the *onus* of neglect and guilt from him, and casting it upon those whose duty it was to have informed his highness of the facts; a duty which, it was assumed, they had omitted to perform; and to this omission was attributed the forbearance of his highness from those measures, which were necessary to uphold the character of his government, and which, the

resident took for granted, were no less conformable to his own inclinations. The Peishwa was informed that the public voice had been unanimous in accusing Trimbuckjee as the instigator of the crime; the facts of the murder, and of the minister's conduct after its perpetration, were recapitulated; the necessity of the arrest of Trimbuckjee, in order that witnesses might not be deterred from coming forward by the terror of his power and influence, was urged; and the paper terminated by distinctly apprizing the Peishwa, that all communication with the British Government must be suspended until its demand upon this point should be satisfied.

The propriety of this remonstrance, and of the tone which it assumed, is unquestionable. An atrocious crime had been committed, and its victim was the chief minister of a state in alliance with the British Government; he had, moreover, entered the Peishwa's dominions at the request of that government, and under the shield of its protection and guarantee. This circumstance rendered it imperative upon the British authorities to take the most decisive measures to secure the detection and punishment of the criminals. It was demanded in vindication of the national honour, which would have been tarnished by abstinence from the performance of so obvious a duty, or even by delay or hesitation in undertaking it.

The Peishwa now felt, that to preserve appear-

ances, it was necessary to do something; but appearance being his only object, he resolved that it should be as little as possible. A day or two after the delivery of the paper, the resident received a message, assuring him that it had been perused with the fullest attention, and that the Peishwa had taken certain proceedings in consequence. These steps were, however, very unsatisfactory. The two minor agents, Bhugwunt Row and Bundojee, had been placed under restraint, but the grand conspirator, Trimbuckjee, remained at large, and had actually the custody of his alleged coadjutors in crime; the guards placed over their houses belonged to Trimbuckjee. Further evidence was afforded of the insincere and deceptive character of these proceedings, by the fact of an interview having taken place between Trimbuckjee and Bundojee on the preceding night.

The charge against Trimbuckjee could not be altogether passed over in the Peishwa's message; but nothing explicit was stated with regard to it; an explanation being promised through a certain native agent, whom the minister requested to be sent to him. This agent was incapacitated by age and infirmities, and another was consequently sent. To him a long message was delivered, compounded of professions of attachment to the British Government and a denial of the guilt of Trimbuckjee; the latter being accompanied by an offer to arrest him immediately if his guilt were proved (which,

while he remained at large, was obviously next to impossible); and, a promise to consider the establishment of the truth of his having sent invitations to the Shastry to come to the temple with few attendants, as sufficient evidence of guilt. To this Mr. Elphinstone replied, by repeating that he was prepared to make good his charges; by reiterating his call for the arrest of Trimbuckjee; and by warning the Peishwa of the danger in which he placed his alliance with the British Government, by a perseverance in the course which he had hitherto adopted.

The grounds of suspicion against Trimbuckjee were, indeed, too strong to be overlooked. His anxiety for the Shastry's attendance in the temple on the night of the murder, and the pains he took to induce his victim to overcome the reluctance which he felt to leaving his house—his expressed desire that the Shastry should be accompanied by few attendants, and the blame which, after the murder, he cast upon him, for not being provided with a greater number—the impunity of the murderers, in a place surrounded by the Peishwa's guards, and the omission of all endeavours to trace them, or to ascertain their persons and motives—the fact, especially, of no measures being taken to arrest Bhugwunt Row and Bundojee, on whom strong suspicion alighted—these with many other minor circumstances, combined with the profligate character of Trimbuckjee, and his former notorious

hostility to the Shastry, tended to fix upon the minister, if not upon his master, the guilt of the atrocious crime, by which the Peishwa's territories had been disgraced and the British Government insulted. The suspicion, indeed, extended further and higher; it ascended through the servant to the sovereign; but as it was impossible to reach the latter criminal without measures of positive hostility, the effect of which might not be confined to Poona, but might possibly light up the flames of war through a large portion of India, it was deemed advisable, on the principles of expediency, to suffer the guilty sovereign to escape the doom he merited, and to be content with the surrender of his instrument.

The Peishwa, however, continued to refuse this act of justice. He required the arrest of Trimbuckjee to be preceded by an investigation into the charges; a mode of proceeding no where adopted, where the grounds of suspicion are so strong and the imputed crime of so deep a dye; and one which he knew must be ineffectual, from the ample means which the minister of a despotic sovereign must possess, while he continues in the enjoyment of freedom and power, to silence the voices of all who may be disposed to accuse him. The arrest of Trimbuckjee was, therefore, an indispensable preliminary to a fair or effectual investigation, and by consenting to enter on an enquiry without it, the resident would only have ensured

to an atrocious criminal the benefit of a public exculpation. The Peishwa would not admit this; he appeared determined to make common cause with his favourite, and to stand or fall with him.

Trimbuckjee had not only been a supple agent in the political intrigues of the Peishwa, but also the active and ready promoter of the licentious and degrading pleasures in which a large portion of his life was spent. He had been found a useful instrument for effecting any purpose, however base or wicked, to which his master called him. Nothing disgusted him by its vileness; nothing deterred him by its atrocity: whether as the experienced purveyor to sensual indulgence, the adept in intrigue and chicanery, or, lastly, the unscrupulous villain, to whom murder was but one among various means of accomplishing a desired end, he could not be spared; and the Peishwa might moreover apprehend danger to himself from the discoveries which hope or fear might induce Trimbuckjee to make. The wildest and most dangerous schemes were, therefore, sought to secure impunity to the favourite. It was even proposed that he should quit Poona, and excite a feigned rebellion, in which, while ostensibly assailing the authority of the Peishwa, he was to receive his secret support. Insane as was this scheme, some preparations were made for carrying it into effect. At other times, various modes of compromise were offered; but all these the resident, with proper firmness

and a just sense of what was due to his country, rejected.

Some commotions at Hyderabad inspired the authorities at Poona with still greater confidence. Subterfuge and compromise then gave way to language and conduct approaching to defiance. It was determined that no concession should be made to the representations of the British resident; that Trimbuckjee should remain at liberty, at court, and in office, and that all demands for his punishment should be resisted. The tone assumed was that of menace and hostility, and the proceedings of the court corresponded with its language.

The resident had some time previously remonstrated against the concentration of the troops at Poona; but the sole effect was to remove the rendezvous to twenty or twenty-five miles from the city. Recruiting still went on, and the assemblage of troops, combined with the altered tone of the durbar, at length rendered it necessary for the resident to take corresponding measures. The sanction of the governor-general to the course to which his own conviction led, enabled him to pursue it with the greater confidence. On the 4th of September, he once more warned the Peishwa of the precipice on which he stood, and, pointing out the inevitable consequences of the continuance of his blind protection of his guilty minister, assured him that the British Government would not desist from demanding his surren-

der. The firm and decisive conduct of the resident diffused some alarm among those opposed to him. A long consultation ensued between the Peishwa and some of his more powerful followers, and the result was communicated in a message to Mr. Elphinstone. The proposal which emanated from the deliberations of this conclave was, that Trimbuckjee should be imprisoned on certain conditions. The number of these conditions was three:—the British Government was not to demand the capital punishment of Trimbuckjee, nor his surrender to its own officers, nor any further enquiry into the transaction. In the meantime, Trimbuckjee, after an interview with the Peishwa, said to be of a very friendly character, was sent off to Wassuntghur, a hill-fort near Sattarah.

The conditions attempted to be forced on the resident were of course rejected, and an unqualified surrender of Trimbuckjee to the British Government insisted on; but a private intimation was conveyed to the acting minister of the Peishwa that, after the prisoner was in British custody, no further enquiry would take place. The propriety of this promise seems open to question. It had the appearance of a relaxation in the terms which the British resident had laid down, and to which he professed tenaciously to adhere. If the British Government, satisfied with the possession of the person of Trimbuckjee, was willing to forego inquiry, still it could scarcely be prudent to bind itself

to this course by a promise. The dread of such an enquiry might have had a salutary effect upon the councils and conduct of the Peishwa, if it were lawful in such a case to abstain from following out the demands of justice; but it may be doubted whether it was either right or expedient to suffer so atrocious a criminal to escape with no severer punishment than personal restraint. The fear of inculpating the Peishwa, whom it was thought advisable to excuse, might be one motive for refraining from enquiry; but it is not likely that any very decisive marks of guilt would have been affixed to the person of a powerful prince, and, at all events, the common rule, which exempts sovereigns from personal responsibility, but punishes their agents and instruments, might have been his protection. The Guicowar prince, too, had, under the circumstances, an undoubted right to expect inquiry, and, on conviction, the severest punishment of the criminal. Public justice and public decency urged the same demands. If Trimbuckjee was innocent, he ought not to have been condemned to perpetual confinement; he ought not to have been subjected to restraint for any longer period than was necessary to establish *the fact of his innocence*. On the other hand, if he were guilty, he had no claim to escape the fearful sentence which heaven, and natural feeling, and human law, have alike passed upon the shedder of innocent blood. Such a compromise

bore the character of a sacrifice of right to expediency—the expediency itself being doubtful.

Passing over this error, the conduct of the resident was most firm and judicious. He continued to enforce the claims of the British Government to the custody of Trimbuckjee, and the fears of the Peishwa at length yielded what the sense of justice would never have extorted from him. The prisoner was removed from Wassuntghur to Poona, and there delivered over to a detachment of British troops; from thence he was conducted to Bombay with Bhugwunt Row and Bundojee, who were to be given up to the Guicowar government. On his arrival, Trimbuckjee was placed in strict confinement in the fort of Tannah.

At Baroda, the intelligence of the murder of the Shastry excited astonishment and dismay. It was communicated by the Government of Bombay to the British resident, and by him imparted to Futteh Sing. The effect upon the prince was petrific: he appeared for some moments unconscious of what he had heard, and then burst into denunciations of the treachery of the Peishwa, whom he accused of participation in the crime. Captain Carnac endeavoured to calm the irritation of his feelings, by representing the impossibility of then ascertaining how the catastrophe had been occasioned, and assuring him of the determination of the British Government to institute full enquiry. But these points were urged with little

effect, the prince remaining under the influence of the most violent passion, and conjuring the resident to interpose no objection to his attacking the Peishwa's authority in Ahmedabad, and expelling him from that district.

On the following day, his rage seemed in some degree to have given way to depression; a result aided by his having during the interval abstained from food. He still, however, breathed revenge against the Peishwa, and asserted that nothing less than the concession by that sovereign of all the points in dispute could be accepted as satisfaction by him; the surrender of all the perpetrators of the crime, including Trimbuckjee Dainglia, he alleged, would be insufficient, as if the disputes still remained open, the Peishwa would have the benefit of the murder, the Guicowar state being deprived of its most able and intelligent negociator. Nothing, he said, could ever repair the loss which he had sustained by the murder of the Shastry. He considered him as the guardian of his welfare, the guide of his conduct, the best and most faithful servant his government ever possessed, and he pathetically lamented that he had now no better means of testifying his regard for the Shastry, than by appointing his eldest son to the situation held by his father under the Guicowar government.

To divert the prince from unwise and dangerous acts of violence and aggression, was a task of no

small delicacy and difficulty; but it was one to which the talents of the resident were fully equal, and he acquitted himself with great address, and in a manner perfectly satisfactory to the government which he represented. On one point, there was happily an entire concurrence of opinion and feeling between the Guicowar prince and the resident. They both entertained the warmest sense of the deceased Shastry's merits, and felt the deepest regret for his loss.

The intentions of the Guicowar prince, with regard to the Shastry's son, were announced by himself in a letter of condolence addressed to the object of his favour, and on the arrival of the young man at Baroda, the prince solemnly invested him in the office, with many marks of respect and affection.

The murder of Gungadhur Shastry and its attendant circumstances have been related somewhat in detail, because the crime was not an isolated act of villainy, atrocious in its character, but unimportant in its effects; on the contrary, it was the source and origin of some of the greatest political changes which the modern history of India presents to notice, the relation of which is reserved for future chapters; and it will then appear that the perfidious conduct of the Peishwa was the opening of the fountains of strife and bitterness, the waters of which flowed forth in a deluge of

ruin over his own dominions and those of his associates.

The art of government, as practised in the native states of the East, consists of little more than a series of efforts to compass selfish schemes of aggrandizement, and to evade the satisfaction of just claims—intrigue and artifice for the most part furnishing the means, varied, however, when deemed necessary, by acts of open violence. No native rulers ever appear to esteem the fulfilment of their contracts a thing even to be thought of, except as a reluctant concession to stern necessity: obligations are annulled, by those who have consented to incur them, with a levity altogether astonishing to those accustomed only to European modes of thought. The limits of power are regarded as the limits alike of demand and of retention. Nowhere is more universally prevalent that standard of morality, as convenient as it is venerable, which declares—

> "That they should take who have the power,
> And they should keep who can."

Whatever is coveted, is taken, if the means of capture be sufficient; whatever is possessed, is parted with only to superior force or superior cunning; and it seems a recognized principle, that contracts are to be observed but just so long as the observance is convenient. The family of Gungadhur Shastry were destined to afford an exemplification of this,

as well as of the evanescent character of courtly gratitude.

In consideration of the services of Gungadhur Shastry,—services recognized alike by British and native testimony,—a *nemnook*, or provision, was made for his family, to the amount of Rs. 60,000 annually. This was the act of the durbar of Baroda, and it was successively approved by the British resident, by the Bombay Government, and by the authorities at home. It was beyond all doubt that the Company's Government intended to guarantee this allowance; but, from some cause, this intention was not ratified by any formal instrument, and the opportunity this afforded of evading an engagement was too tempting for native cupidity to resist. Next to the almost invariable accompaniment of bad faith, one of the most characteristic distinctions of a native government is the prevalence of pecuniary embarrassment. This mark of caste was possessed by the Guicowar states, and in seeking not unwisely to reduce its expenditure, it occurred to those on whom the work of retrenchment devolved, that the allowances to the family of Gungadhur Shastry would bear the operation of paring down. That useful and valued servant of the state had been dead several years, and the memory of his services was, it appears, rapidly following him. Another prince had succeeded; retrenchment was called for, and

a portion of the *nemnook* of the Shastry's family was withdrawn, for such alleged reasons as men always have at hand, for justifying that course to which their wishes incline. It was pretended that the Guicowar state was not bound to pay anything beyond what its rulers might deem due to the merits of the claimants; that the British Government had not guaranteed the payment; and, further, that the sons of the Shastry had been guilty of acts which incurred the just displeasure of their sovereign. The charges upon which the latter allegation was founded were altogether frivolous; and the intention of both the British and the Guicowar governments was too well known to enable the other grounds of defence to be successfully maintained. The aggrieved parties appealed to the justice of the Bombay Government, and its opinion was expressed in their favour. The deductions were, however, still persisted in, and the arrears at length amounted to a large sum. The Earl of Clare, while at the head of the Bombay Government, interfered, with that straightforwardness and decision which marked his public character, but his interference was met by the Guicowar with Oriental obstinacy. This state of things could not be suffered to continue without a compromise of the national character, and it is understood that it has been, at length, determined imperatively to demand both the payment of the

arrears, and the punctual discharge, in future, of the full amount of the stipulated *nemnook*. This arrangement the Bombay Government will have the means of enforcing, in consequence of their collecting certain tributes on account of the Guicowar.

CHAPTER XI.

EVENTS AT POONA.

When the guilty favourite of the Peishwa was surrendered to the British Government, the fortress of Tannah, in the island of Salsette, was selected as, in the first instance, the most convenient place of confinement. This arrangement, however, was not regarded as permanent, his removal into some of the territories subject to the presidency of Fort St. George having been contemplated by the Supreme Government. Some difficulty, however, appears to have arisen in finding a proper situation, and the consequence was, that the prisoner remained at Tannah. But the period of his captivity was brief. Trimbuckjee Dainglia had been given up to the British authorities in September 1815; on the evening of the 12th September 1816, he effected his escape from Tannah, again to become an engine of disorder

and mischief. There appears to have been some deficiency of vigilance in the custody of the prisoner. Little attention was paid to his personal movements, and in fact little was known of them. A habit, which it was subsequently ascertained he had for some time practised, of resorting every evening after dusk to a particular part of the fort, excited neither suspicion nor increased watchfulness, and natives were suffered to pass the gate without examination at hours when peculiar circumspection was called for. As soon as the escape was discovered, the different ferries were secured, with a view to prevent any person quitting the island; but the precaution was too late; Trimbuckjee Dainglia was beyond the reach of his pursuers.*

* Bishop Heber gives the following version of the circumstances of Trimbuckjee Danglia's escape, which he received in his progress through some of the Upper Provinces of India.

"He was kept in custody at Tannah, near Bombay, and while there, a common looking Mahratta groom with a good character in his hand, came to offer his services to the commanding officer. He was accepted, and had to keep his horse under the window of Trimbuckjee's prison. Nothing remarkable was observed, except a more than usual attention to his horse, and a habit, while currying and cleaning him, of singing verses from Mahratta songs, all apparently relating to his trade. At length, Trimbuckjee disappeared, and the groom followed him; on which it was recollected that his singing had been made up of verses like the following:—

The escape of this miscreant was believed to have been contrived and carried into effect with the full concurrence of the Peishwa, but no substantial proof of this existed. That the prince, after the escape of his unworthy favourite, concealed and protected him, was also a belief sanctioned by the strongest presumption, although the sovereign gave the most solemn assurances to the contrary. In the absence of proof, there was no course for the British Government to pursue, but to yield apparent credence to the protestations of the Peishwa, and keep a vigilant eye on his future proceedings.

There was, indeed, abundant reason to be convinced that the Peishwa was exercising, and had long been employing, all his influence to undermine the British power in India. His intrigues extended far and wide, and the malignity of his hostile feelings was attested by his activity in

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"Behind the bush the bowmen hide,
The horse beneath the tree,
Where shall I find a knight will ride
The jungle paths with me.

"There are five and fifty coursers there,
And four and fifty men,
When the fifty-fifth shall mount his steed,
The Deccan thrives again."

Heber's Narrative, vol. i. page 585.

This, the Bishop remarks, might have been the stratagem of a Scottish borderer.

diffusing them. From Baroda, the government were apprized by Captain Carnac of some proceedings, on the part of the Peishwa and his agents, sufficiently indicative of that prince's insincerity and hostility. Similar information was communicated from other quarters: every circumstance was calculated to inspire the British Government with distrust, and there can be no doubt that this was their feeling.

There was reason for concluding, that Trimbuckjee was concealed at no great distance from Poona; and suspicion was excited by intelligence of the assemblage of small parties of armed men in the neighbourhood of Mahadee, about fifty miles distant from the former place. It was subsequently ascertained that considerable bodies of horse and foot were collecting in the same direction; that recruiting was actively going on throughout the Peishwa's dominions, and that even in the city of Poona, under the very eye of the sovereign, the process was in full operation. Public opinion unanimously pointed out Trimbuckjee as the prime agent in these proceedings, and there was scarcely more hesitation in attributing to him the direct countenance and support of the Peishwa.

The resident, of course, remonstrated; he urged the importance of adopting vigorous measures for dispersing the armed parties, and thus crushing the insurrection in its commencement; a contrary

line of conduct, it was pointed out, would lead to the most unfavourable impressions as to the intentions of the Peishwa, and the necessity of prompt and active measures, to relieve himself from the imputation of participating in the designs of Trimbuckjee, was enforced by the fact, that it was commonly believed and reported, throughout the country, that the Peishwa approved and sanctioned them. The suppression of the rebel movements, and the capture and surrender of their guilty contriver, were represented as being the only means by which the British Government could be convinced of the falsehood of such reports and the fidelity of the Peishwa to his engagements.

The Peishwa, however, was not to be roused; and, in addition to this apathy to military preparations, which, if not sanctioned by his authority, were calculated to place that authority in danger, there were circumstances in his conduct still more suspicious. It was indeed reported that he was in constant communication with Trimbuckjee; that he had even had more than one secret interview with the arch-conspirator himself; and that he had provided considerable sums of money in gold, as if for some expected emergency. These were but rumours; but there were facts beyond all doubt, which placed the Peishwa's character for sincerity in a most unfavourable position. He affected ignorance of proceedings to which no one

in the country was or could be a stranger: Trimbuckjee's friends and family remained in high favour, and constantly made excursions into the country, said (and doubtlessly with truth) to be for the purpose of consulting with their chief; one of Trimbuckjee's principal officers, after repeated visits of this kind, finally disappeared, and the Peishwa declared himself unable to account for him. Some changes took place in the prince's habits so extraordinary as to excite general surprise. He made a journey to Joonere, while Trimbuckjee was supposed to be in that part of the country, which was alleged to be in discharge of an obligation of piety. He stated that, when in prison, he had made a vow of an annual pilgrimage to Joonere; but it was remarkable that for twenty years he had neglected to perform it—a fact exceedingly discreditable either to the activity of his memory or the stedfastness of his devotion. He chose also to seclude himself from observation at Phoolesehr, taking great pains to induce the British resident to believe that he was detained there much against his desire by an injury to his arm, the injury being only a slight bruise, and the distance which he had to travel but sixteen miles. He had been accustomed, from the time of his restoration, to make annual journeys to Goagur and Copergaum; but these places, not possessing the attraction of Joonere,

were now neglected, even when the state of his arm no longer afforded an excuse.

The suspicious conduct of the Peishwa, in other respects, was corroborated by the warlike preparations which were evidently in progress. Troops were raised, forts repaired, and every thing seemed to announce impending hostility. Finding it useless to persevere in his former course, Mr. Elphinstone at length assumed a higher tone, and resolved upon more decisive measures. The British troops at Poona were put in motion, and by them the insurgents were driven from their haunts, near Mahadee, to the northern part of the Peishwa's territories. This being performed, and the Peishwa's preparations continuing, Mr. Elphinstone determined on drawing the light division of the troops at his disposal to Poona, to be there ready for any emergency that might arise. The impressions which the Peishwa's conduct had made on the resident were distinctly announced, and it was intimated that the latter abstained from measures even more active, only till he received the instructions of his own government.

By the time the purposed disposition of the British troops was completed, Mr. Elphinstone received such an intimation of the views of the Supreme Government, as enabled him to go on without hesitation. His first intention was to surround the city, demand from the Peishwa

hostages for the surrender of Trimbuckjee within a fixed time, and in the event of non-compliance, to force the palace and seize the person of the sovereign. The justice of such a proceeding could scarcely be dubious, considering the provocation we had received and the reasonable nature of our demand; but it was abandoned from two motives, highly creditable to the resident—a nice sense of honour, and a laudable feeling of humanity. Notwithstanding his repeated declarations, that decided measures would be resorted to if the conduct of the Peishwa continued to render them necessary, after the arrival of the sanction of the British Government, it was thought that, as intercourse with the resident had never been entirely broken off, the Peishwa had some reason to expect a more formal notice before proceeding to extremities. The nature of the connexion existing between the states, and the means by which we obtained a footing in the Peishwa's territory, were also justly regarded by Mr. Elphinstone as entitling that prince to be treated with more delicacy than an ordinary belligerent. The second ground of forbearance was a consideration of the probable fate of the city. The people had been accustomed to regard the British force as a friendly one: its approach and subsequent preparations had excited no more alarm among the inhabitants than the arrival of so many fellow-citizens. It was felt by the resident to be cruel

to expose them to injury from those whom they regarded as their friends; and, as the prince had upwards of seven thousand infantry in Poona, besides a body of cavalry, and a fortified palace in the centre of the city, it was obvious that he could not be expected to yield without a struggle, and that, in the event of a contest, it was impossible but that the inhabitants should suffer severely. From the influence of these considerations, Mr. Elphinstone was withheld from acting on his first feelings, and a further season of repentance was afforded to the Peishwa, if he were disposed to embrace it.

In the mean time the insurgents continued their progress, began to unite their forces from distant places, and took possession of one of the Peishwa's forts. They were represented as having obtained entrance by personating countrymen, carrying bundles of grass, in which they had concealed arms. This stratagem had been sometimes practised in towns where there was a considerable influx of country people, carrying their goods to the market, and under such circumstances the disguised persons might pass unsuspected; but it was little adapted to a hill fort, where there was only a small garrison, no market, and no great consumption of grass. The gross improbability of the story was pointed out to the person who related it to Mr. Elphinstone, and he was very clearly given to understand that the resident was

not imposed upon by the idle tale with which it had been attempted to abuse his judgment.

The stoppage of the post by the insurgents in Cuttack, in the early part of May 1817, rendered the receipt of the further instructions from his Government, for which Mr. Elphinstone was looking, a matter of great uncertainty. He was thus left in a great degree to the uncontrolled exercise of his own judgment. Every thing seemed to call for prompt and vigorous action. It was impossible to suppose that the British Government would be satisfied without the surrender of Trimbuckjee, and it was the universal opinion that the Peishwa would not give him up. In an extreme emergency, the probability was, that the Peishwa would fly to Ryeghur, in the Concan, where it would be impossible to carry on operations after the setting in of the monsoon, which might be expected to take place early in June. A lengthened contest was above all things to be avoided; the position of the Peishwa, as the nominal head of the Mahrattas, rendering a junction of all the Mahratta states against the British highly probable.

Feeling the pressure of these circumstances, Mr. Elphinstone sent a message to the minister, to the effect that he had a communication to make which must bring the question of peace or war to a decision, and that he should forward it on the following morning. The actual transmission of the communication referred to was delayed by a

message from the Peishwa, inviting the resident to a conference, which accordingly took place. Mr. Elphinstone then demanded the surrender of Trimbuckjee, as an indispensable condition of adjustment. The Peishwa, though informed that the consequence would be immediate war, still sought to evade compliance, and refused to be bound by any engagement. On the following day, the threatened communication was made to the Peishwa's minister. Its purport was, to demand that the Peishwa should engage within twenty-four hours to deliver up Trimbuckjee, within a month from that day, and should give up his forts of Singhur, Poorandur, and Ryeghur, as pledges for the fulfilment of his engagement.

The minister received the paper with extraordinary indifference. Before the expiration of the prescribed time, however, some attempts were made to procure a mitigation of the terms. This was refused, and the city was ultimately surrounded by the British forces. The people now manifested some alarm, but it was speedily allayed by the withdrawal of the troops, in consequence of a communication to the resident, accepting the proffered conditions. The forts were forthwith placed in possession of the British.

But, though the Peishwa yielded to difficulties, which he was not in a condition to overcome, he was still anxious to find some means of escaping the consequences of his engagement. He appears

to have courted the advice of counsellors of the most opposite sentiments, and to have vacillated between their conflicting opinions, as his inclinations or his fears preponderated. Terrified at the prospect of the precipice upon which he stood, and swayed in some degree by the judgment of the more moderate part of his advisers, he at length issued a proclamation, offering a large reward for the apprehension of Trimbuckjee, dead or alive, and smaller rewards for any information concerning his adherents; a pardon was at the same time promised to all who should desert him, with the exception of twelve individuals, and those who should still refuse to come in, against whom severe penalties were denounced: the property of the twelve excepted persons, as well as that of Trimbuckjee, was confiscated. Negociations then commenced for the purpose of fixing the future relations of the Peishwa state, and a treaty was finally concluded on the 13th June, containing some provisions of great importance.

By the first article of this treaty, the guilt of Trimbuckjee Dainglia, and the obligation to punish him, were admitted; the Peishwa engaged to use his utmost efforts to seize and deliver him up to the East-India Company; the family of the criminal were to remain as hostages with the British Government, and all who sided in his rebellion, and who had not surrendered to the proclamation, were to be punished. The second article confirmed

the treaty of Bassein in all points not varied by the new treaty. The third article extended one in the treaty of Bassein, by which the Peishwa engaged to dismiss all Europeans, natives of states at war with Great Britain. He was now bound never to admit into his territories any subject of either European or American powers, without the consent of the British Government. By the fourth, the Peishwa bound himself not to open a negociation with any other power, except in concert with the Company's Government, nor to admit the residence of vakeels or agents at his court. The great Mahratta confederacy was by this article dissolved, the Peishwa renouncing all connexion with the other Mahratta powers, and consequently his station, as their head, with certain exceptions.

The fifth article related to the matters in dispute between the Peishwa and the Guicowar; the former renouncing all right of supremacy over the latter, but with a reserve for his existing pecuniary claims, which, in accordance with the treaty of Bassein, were to be referred to the arbitration of the Company, unless the Guicowar should consent to the annual payment of four lacs of rupees, in which case the reference was not to take place. The sixth article annulled one of the articles of the treaty of Bassein, by which the Peishwa consented to furnish to the British Government, in time of war, a certain number of troops, with a due proportion of ordnance and military stores, and substituted

in its place one, by which he was required to provide funds for the payment of a force of similar strength, to place the British Government in possession of the means of providing this contingent.

The seventh article transferred to the British Government, in perpetuity, certain territories and rights, which were enumerated in an accompanying schedule. The eighth article provided for the convenient execution of the seventh; and the ninth, tenth, and eleventh, had the same object. By the twelfth, the fort of Ahmednugger was surrendered to the Company. The thirteenth and fourteenth extinguished the Peishwa's rights in Bundelcund and Hindostan. The fifteenth provided for an object very desirable to the British Government and the Guicowar state, the renewal of the lease of the farm of Ahmedabad. The sixteenth article related to the settlement of the southern jaghiredars, and the seventeenth to the evacuation of the fort and territory of Mailgaut. The eighteenth related to the authentication and confirmation of the treaty. With the efforts of Mr. Elphinstone, in conducting the negociation to such a conclusion, the British authorities had every reason to be satisfied; and the treaty, while it provided for the just expectations of the more powerful party, was not inequitable nor unreasonably harsh as concerned the vanquished.

The Peishwa, however, was dissatisfied, and though unreasonably, not unnaturally. It was

impossible that he could forbear contrasting his present humiliated condition with his former lofty pretensions, as the head of a people who had spread the terror of their arms over a large portion of India. It had now been shewn to him that he held his dominions at the mercy of the British Government, and though the discovery was unavoidable, it was necessarily far from pleasing. The obstinacy of the Peishwa had accelerated a crisis, which the prudence of the Company's Government would have postponed indefinitely; and notwithstanding they were blameless, he was indignant.

A few months only elapsed before it became evident that the Peishwa was again preparing for some hostile proceedings. Levies of troops took place unremittingly throughout his dominions, and by the 1st of October (the treaty having been concluded on the 13th of June previously), there was not a single horseman in the country out of employ. The quality neither of the horses nor men was regarded; number seemed the only thing kept in view. The ostensible motive for these preparations was a desire to comply with the wish of the British Government for co-operation against the Pindarrees. This disguise was, however, worn too loosely to deceive. In an interview with the British resident, in which the intended movements of our armies against the Pindarrees were explained, the Peishwa did not

think it necessary even to affect any interest in the suppression of the marauders; his conversation being entirely confined to complaints of his own degradation. From various circumstances, it was inferred that he was about to aim a blow at the British power, and though an appearance of confidence was maintained on both sides, it was formal and hollow.

Among other indications of the spirit by which the government of the Peishwa was actuated, were numerous attempts to corrupt the native troops in the British service. It was in consequence deemed necessary to remove them from the town to a new position. The Peishwa then, as if in defiance, pushed forward his own troops, and it was announced that he intended to form a camp between the old cantonments of the British army and the new. At last, on the 5th November, hostilities actually commenced, by the Peishwa's troops moving so as to cut off the residency from the British camp. The residency was forthwith plundered and burned, but by the prompt advance of Lieut.-Colonel Burr, the enemy, after a severe action, was repulsed, and retired. The resident was on the field throughout the action, animating the zeal of the troops, and aiding the commanding officer by the suggestions which his local knowledge enabled him to offer. The strength of the British force was about 2,800; the Peishwa's army was composed of not less than 25,000 men.

It now became necessary to obtain possession of Poona; but this could not be effected by the small force in the neighbourhood. On the indication of approaching hostilities, Brigadier-general Lionel Smith, with the force under his command, had been summoned by Mr. Elphinstone from the south bank of the Godavery. That officer arrived at Poona on the evening of the 13th of November. On the 14th, arrangements were made for attacking the enemy, who were encamped on the opposite side of the river; but the design was abandoned, in consequence of the occurrence of unexpected difficulties. On the 16th, all the disposable corps, after providing for the camp, and for the position of Kirting, were formed in divisions of attack. The passage of one of the divisions over the ford was obstinately resisted by the Peishwa's troops, but the ill success of this resistance seems to have perfected the panic to which the previous defeat received from Colonel Burr had given rise. At two o'clock in the morning of the 17th, the Peishwa fled, and the enemy having thus disappeared, the British force recrossed the river to take the most favourable ground for bombarding the city; but this dreadful measure was happily unnecessary, the defence of the place having been left to a few hundred Arabs who were prevailed upon to withdraw.

The flight of the Peishwa was, in the first instance, directed to the southward. The advance

of a British force under Brigadier-general Pritzler obliged him to change his course, and he took an easterly direction to Punderpore, whence he struck off to the north-west, followed by General Smith, who had by this time been able to make the necessary arrangements for pursuit. Passing between Poona and Seroor, the Peishwa then advanced as far as Wrilloon, having been joined on the route by Trimbuckjee Dainglia with a considerable reinforcement. Finding that General Smith, who had moved to the northward, on a line east of that taken by the Peishwa, was in a position to intercept his retreat in that direction, he suddenly turned again to the south, taking the straight route for Poona, and still pursued.

On New Year's Day, he encountered a British detachment, consisting of about six hundred infantry, with about three hundred auxiliary horse, and a detail of artillery, commanded by Captain Stanton. The detachment had marched on the previous day from Seroor, and were proceeding to Poona. On reaching the heights overlooking Coregaum, they discovered in the plain the whole of the Peishwa's army, estimated at twenty thousand horse, and several thousand infantry. Capt. Stanton immediately moved upon the village of Coregaum, and on reaching it was attacked by three divisions of the Peishwa's choicest infantry, supported by immense bodies of horse, and two pieces of artillery. The enemy obtained immediate

possession of the strongest posts of the village; the possession of the remaining part was most obstinately contested from noon till nine at night. During this period almost every building in the place was repeatedly taken and re-taken; nearly the whole of the artillerymen were either killed or wounded, and about one-third of the infantry and auxiliary horse. Nearly all the officers were killed or disabled, while the men suffered dreadfully from want of water, amidst the unparalleled exertions which they had been called upon to make after a fatiguing march of twenty-eight miles. The result, however, was most honourable to the British arms, the enemy being compelled to abandon the village after sustaining an immense loss in killed and wounded.

On the following day, the enemy, though in sight, did not renew the attack, and in the evening Captain Stanton returned to Seroor, carrying away his numerous wounded; the whole detachment having suffered under an almost total privation of refreshment for two days. In this brilliant affair, the medical officers, having no opportunity for the exercise of their proper duties, aided their brother officers in leading on the sepoys to charges with the bayonet, and one of them was killed.* In such a struggle the example

* Assistant-Surgeon Wingate. Another medical officer, Mr. Wyldie, took a leading part in the conflict.

of even one European was of almost incalculable importance, from the confidence with which it inspired the native soldiers.

The Peishwa continued to vary his course as the approach of his pursuers warned him to escape them. After many changes of route, he arrived at Sholupore; but instead of pursuing him in that direction, General Smith resolved upon reducing Sattara, and effecting a junction with General Pritzler. These objects were accomplished. Sattara surrendered on the opening of the mortar batteries, and the desired junction of the forces under General Smith and General Pritzler was effected. Its object was to enable the entire force at disposal for field service to be formed into two divisions, one to be composed wholly of cavalry and light troops, to keep up an active pursuit of the enemy; the other of infantry, with an ample battering train to reduce forts, and gradually occupy the country. These arrangements being made, General Smith resumed the pursuit of the Peishwa, and General Pritzler proceeded to reduce the forts and strong holds in the neighbourhood of Poona. On the 19th of February, the former officer surprised the Peishwa's army at Ashta, and completely defeated it. The Rajah of Salmuh and part of his family, who were in the Peishwa's camp, fell into the hands of the victors; and Gokla, the

Peishwa's ablest general, as well as his chief counsellor, was killed.

In the mean time General Pritzler proceeded with the reduction of the forts south of Poona. Singhur alone offered very strong resistance, and there it was not protracted. Lieut.-Colonel Deacon was equally successful in the same species of service in the north. Other detachments were employed in the Concan, and Brigadier-General Munro was occupied in the reduction of the country south of the Kistna.

Little resistance was offered to the establishment of the British authority, excepting in Kandeish. Here a body of Arabs had established themselves, and were resolved to maintain their possession to the last. They had concentrated their force at Mulagâon, and against this fort Lieut. Col. M'Dowall moved, with a considerable body of troops. The construction of the works for the reduction of the place was interrupted by a sally from the garrison; and though the enemy was beaten back, it was not without loss to the besiegers. Further loss was sustained in an attempt to carry the place by assault a few days afterwards. In a short time reinforcements were obtained, and a battery was opened, some of the shells from which falling on the principal magazine, it exploded, blowing about thirty feet of the curtain outward into the ditch. The Arabs then offered

to surrender on receiving a written assurance that their lives should be spared. This was readily conceded; but the Mahratta moonshee, who drew the paper, employed words, either by mistake or design, which promised indulgences never intended. These, of course, were claimed, and the point was referred to Mr. Elphinstone, who, in an honourable and liberal spirit, decided that the Arabs must be admitted to the advantages which they had been led to expect.

It would be tedious to follow the tortuous flight of the Peishwa after the battle of Ashta. He wandered in almost every direction, in continual dread of some portion of the British force, which was gradually surrounding him. On the 17th of April, Colonel Adams came suddenly upon him, after a march over a most difficult country. The Peishwa was completely routed, with the loss of several hundred men, four brass guns, three elephants, nearly two hundred camels, and a variety of valuable property. The Peishwa himself had a narrow escape—the palanquin in which he had been borne having been taken immediately after he had left it to seek safety by flight on horseback. Hotly pursued by General Doveton, the Peishwa arrived at Ormekaü, where, overcome by fatigue, privation, and terror, his army broke up, and the fugitive prince was abandoned by most of his sirdars.

The sudden dispersion of the several sirdars and

their followers, in various directions, rendered it difficult to ascertain the course of the Peishwa himself, and both Generals Smith and Doveton were led into wrong tracks. But the meshes were closely drawn around him, and escape being impossible, he made overtures of submission to Sir John Malcolm. That officer, having asked the vakeel by whom the message was conveyed, whether he thought the Peishwa was sincere in the proceeding, received an answer highly expressive of the opinion entertained of the fallen prince by one who may be supposed to have enjoyed opportunities of knowing him well. "I should imagine," said the judicious officer, "that he must be sincere, for I cannot guess what possible illusive project he can now have left." His situation was indeed desperate, and was so felt by himself. In an interview with Sir John Malcolm, which followed, the Peishwa exclaimed, "How can I resist now? I am surrounded! General Doveton is at Berhampore; you are at Metowla; Colonel Russell at Burgham—I am enclosed." After some ineffectual attempts to obtain delay, in the hope of making better terms, he yielded to the force of the circumstances in which he was placed, and surrendered to the British Government.

Long before this event it had been determined to deprive him of all sovereignty, and of this he was apprized by Sir John Malcolm previously to his surrender. The determination was

just and wise. The perfidy which had marked his conduct, and the inveterate hatred which he had displayed towards the British power, rendered this course the only one consistent with prudence. If, indeed, additional grounds of justification were required, they would be found in the atrocious proceedings in which he had been implicated subsequently to his attack upon the British residency. His flight had been a career of crime, as well as of misfortune and suffering. He had put to death two British travellers in cold blood, and committed other acts at variance with the usages of even semi-civilized nations. None but himself and his coadjutors in crime could lament his fall.

The Governor-general had resolved upon restoring the house of Sattarah to sovereignty.* A portion of territory was assigned for that purpose, and the prince publicly installed with much ceremony. With the exception of the tract of land thus appropriated, the Peishwa's dominions were annexed to the British territories, and he became a pensioner upon the British Government. In

* The reason for this proceeding was, that the Sattarah rajah was the descendant and representative of Sevajee, the founder of the Mahratta empire, of which Sattarah was regarded as the capital. The Peishwa was nominally but the vicegerent of the rajah of Sattarah; he received the dress of investiture from his hands, and rendered some other acknowledgments of dependency; but, practically, the superior was the slave and prisoner of his lieutenant.

these few words is recounted the end of a state and dynasty, which had been regarded as the key-stone of Mahratta power.

The life of Bajee Row, its last head, had been eventful. On the death of his father, his brother and himself were alternately raised to the musnud and dethroned, as rival parties gained or lost the ascendancy. Bajee Row was at last apparently fixed on the throne by the assistance of Scindia, but, shortly afterwards, he and his ally were defeated by Holkar, and Bajee Row arrived at Bassein a fugitive and a wanderer. Here he formed an alliance with the British Government, by whose assistance he was restored to a throne of somewhat diminished splendour; its federal grandeur being destroyed by the acknowledged independence of several of its former feudatories. This restoration, however, he owed entirely to the British Government, and the favour might have been expected to attach him to its interests. The general characteristic of Oriental potentates is, however, intense and unalloyed selfishness, and the Peishwa's afforded an instance, not an exception. His character was marked by timidity, his habits were those of the grossest sensuality, and he manifested an utter destitution of all honourable principle. His cowardice probably led him to suspect the intentions of the British Government to be less friendly towards him than they originally

were; his debasing sensuality led to the encouragement of despicable parasites, who at once flattered and ministered to his vices; and his total insensibility to those principles, which impose restraint on better natures, made him unscrupulous as to the means employed for accomplishing his ends. From the time of the murder of Gungadhur Shastry, his course was that of a man predestined to destruction. In addition to the qualities already mentioned, he possessed an unusual portion of blind obstinacy, which was eminently displayed in the tenacity with which he clung to his wretched favourite Trimbuckjee Dainglia, in the hope of rendering him as serviceable a minister to his ambition and revenge, as he had already been to vices of a different character. By this mad adhesion to a connexion as dishonourable as its object was hopeless, he involved himself in a dispute with the British Government, from which he escaped, not indeed unharmed, but still in a better condition than he had reason to expect. Although the result of this attempt might have shown him the folly of his course, he repeated the error which had deprived his throne of a portion both of solidity and splendour, and he lost all. He descended from the rank of a sovereign to that of a dependent on the bounty of foreigners. The justifiableness of his deprivation can scarcely be questioned by any but those who deny the lawfulness of war. If men have a right to repel

wrong by an appeal to arms, and to deprive their enemy of the means of inflicting injury, the moral part of the question, as regards the Peishwa, is decided. The expediency of the proceeding is equally clear, and all that remains questionable is the propriety of annexing the forfeited dominions to the British territories.

There are persons who entertain great apprehensions of the evils likely to result from the extension of our empire in the East; but those evils are never very clearly defined. If the territory be tolerably compact, it is not easy to perceive why a dominion extending through twenty or thirty degrees may not be as secure and as well-governed, as one of a hundred miles. The probability, indeed, is that it will be better governed, for all small settlements at a distance from the parent country, are notoriously the seats of the most scandalous abuses. When the peace of India, and the safety of the British empire there, rendered it necessary that the Peishwa should cease to reign, three courses only were open to the victors,—to place on the throne one of the royal blood, — to place a stranger there, — or to incorporate the territories of the dethroned prince with those of the state by whom he had been conquered. In choosing between them, the conquerors cannot fairly be expected to lose sight altogether of their own interest; at the same time, they ought to pay due attention

to a subject rarely thought of by native sovereigns,—the interests of the people to be governed. Had the British elevated to the musnud some member of the subdued Peishwa's family, all the evils of the Mahratta confederacy would have been perpetuated, and Poona would always have been a focus of anti-British intrigue. "We have had full and most serious proof," said the Marquis of Hastings, "that no distinctness of obligation will prevent a Peishwa from secretly claiming the allegiance of the other Mahratta sovereigns; and irrefragable evidence has shown that the implicit obedience recognized as due to the mandates of such a head of the Mahratta empire will operate in violation of every solemnity of pledge to us—nay, in despite of the individual's feelings of attachment to us. There must, then, be no Peishwa. But our abrogation of the title would be nugatory were we to raise to the musnud a person whose indefeasible right by blood to claim the prerogatives of the Peishwaship would be acknowledged by every Mahratta."

Such were the views of the Marquis of Hastings, and they were sound and just. The gratitude to be expected from a prince elevated to the throne by the favour of the British Government was exemplified in the case of Bajee Row. Had the second course been taken, and a stranger been installed in the sovereignty, he must have been

maintained there by British force, and the only difference between this and the actual assumption of dominion would have been, that in the former case the government would be much weaker and infinitely more corrupt. To the third course no objection appears but the vague one, which is derived from the belief that all increase of territory is an evil. This may suffice to settle the question with regard to the interests of the conquerors. As to the interests of the people to be governed, the question is still more easy of answer. Whoever knows what even the best native government is, must be aware that an exchange for British rule must ever be for the benefit of the people. Abuses may be perpetrated under the British Government, but they are mostly traceable to the native officers employed; and if they take place under all the checks imposed by European principles, what must be their extent when the higher functionaries of the state are as ready as the lower to participate in and profit by them? The truth, that in a native state the government itself is but one vast abuse from the monarch to the pettiest retainer of office—no one even supposes that it exists for the public benefit—it is regarded as an engine to enable those who can get possession of it to gratify their own avarice and ambition. It will require a long period to establish sounder views, and for years

to come no native government can be a good government. The elements of good government do not exist.

The wretched person whose guilty subservience to a profligate master had reduced that master from a sovereign to a captive, was rendered too important by the extensive mischief which he caused for his fate to be a matter of indifference. When the army of the Peishwa broke up, Trimbuckjee Dainglia retired to the neighbourhood of Nassick, where he for some time remained concealed. After an attempt to make terms through Sir John Malcolm, which ended in nothing, a body of horse under Capt. Swanston was detached from a distant station, the selection being made with a view to avert suspicion. The detachment marched with so much rapidity that no intelligence of their approach preceded them, and they were, consequently, enabled to surround the village of Ahirgaum, where the fugitive lay. Trimbuckjee was reclining on a cot when the gates of the house were forced, and the British troops entered. He had just time to fly to the upper part of the house and conceal himself among some straw. From this covert he was taken without any resistance, and sent to Tannah, the place of his former confinement. He was shortly afterwards sent round to Bengal, and lodged in the fort of Chunar.*

* It was here that he was visited by Bishop Heber, whose account of his escape is quoted in a note on pages 335-6.

CHAPTER XII.

EVENTS AT NAGPORE.

On the 1st of February 1817, Appa Sahib succeeded to the musnud of Nagpore, by the death of Pursajee Bhooslah; having for some time previously exercised the sovereign power as regent.

Nagpore was one of the states with which a subsidiary treaty existed. There had been considerable irregularity as to the organization and maintenance of the stipulated contingent, which had subjected the British Government to additional expense. Discussion, of course, arose; but native evasion contrived for a while to postpone the fulfilment of engagements which could not be denied. Procrastination is of too common occurrence in the proceedings of Oriental courts to excite much surprise, and the disposition of Appa Sahib was regarded as not unfriendly to the English. Circumstances, however, soon occurred, and especially a change with regard to his minis-

ters, which convinced the British authorities that his professions of friendship were hollow and insincere.

At this period, indeed, the seeds of hatred to British influence were scattered throughout India with an unsparing hand, and the Peishwa was the prime instigator and fomenter of the hostile feeling. Habits of ancient standing gave him considerable influence with the native princes. The Mahratta states might also be supposed to feel their pride in some degree wounded by the humiliation of their chief, and some suspicion may be supposed to have existed as to the probable aim of the British Government, and the extent to which it proposed to carry its acquisitions. There might be an apprehension that England was looking to the entire dominion of India; and though this consummation would be devoutly wished by the people, if they understood their own welfare, the prospect of it could, under no circumstances, be very acceptable to those whose thrones were to fall before the march of the victors.

It is certain that the plans of the governor-general for the extirpation of the Pindarrees were regarded with great suspicion. This must, in most instances, have arisen from the apprehension of ulterior measures, for, with the exception of Scindia and Holkar, who entertained bodies of the Pindarrees in a sort of feudal dependence, no prince would appear to have had any interest in supporting

them. The interest of the Rajah of Nagpore, indeed, lay quite the other way; for his dominions had suffered most severely from the devastations of these marauding adventurers; and by an express article of the subsidiary treaty, the British Government was required to defend the state of Nagpore against their incursions.

It was probably to some of the causes which have been mentioned, or to a combination of them, that the mad hostility of the Rajah of Nagpore to the British is to be ascribed, aided, no doubt, by that uneasy feeling, which must ever operate upon the mind of a prince fettered by such engagements as are imposed by the subsidiary treaties of the East. Unless, like many of his brethren, he is content to forget that a ruler has any thing to do but to collect treasure and dissipate it in a career of sensual indulgence, he must be annoyed by the consciousness that, though he enjoys the name of sovereign, his office is but a pageant, all substantial power resting with another. He who promises deliverance from this thraldom, generally, therefore, finds an advocate in the party whom he seeks to win to his purposes. Fear will frequently impose a restraint; "I dare not" will wait upon "I would;" but the heart of the person assailed will generally be with the tempter; and if he resist effectually, it will seldom be without a struggle.

The motives by which the Rajah of Nagpore

might have been actuated upon have been suggested—and this is all that is now possible. Perhaps, even at the time, the most sagacious and best informed observer could not have satisfactorily determined by which, or by how many, of them he was really impelled, nor to what extent they respectively operated. His conduct seemed to partake in an extraordinary degree of blind wilfulness;—he followed the example of the Peishwa, and he shared his fate. He affected to owe a certain homage to that sovereign,—the Rajah of Nagpore enjoying hereditarily the nominal office of commander-in-chief of the forces of the Mahratta empire, as the Peishwa held the nominal viceroyalty. What degree of importance he attached to the connexion, may admit of question, but it is certain that he most dutifully followed his leader to ruin.

The slenderness of the thread which binds to us our subsidiary allies, renders imperative the greatest circumspection in selecting the representatives of the British Government at their courts. The resident at Nagpore, at this time, was fortunately a gentleman whose sagacity and prudence were not to be overcome even by Mahratta dissimulation. Mr. Jenkins* distinctly perceived the tendency which events were taking, and if the British con-

* Now Sir Richard Jenkins, C.C.B., Chairman of the East-India Company.

nexion could have been preserved by judgment, firmness and caution, combined with suavity, that connexion would not have been severed, nor the rajah divested of his power.

The resident was apprized that the rajah was engaged in intrigues with the Peishwa. Conferences were held with an agent of that sovereign, who received letters almost daily from Poona, which he immediately carried to the Rajah. Such proceedings at such a period were calculated to excite suspicion and alarm. Mr. Jenkins accordingly remonstrated against them, reminding the Rajah that all communications similar to those with the Peishwa, ought in conformity with the treaty to be immediately communicated to the British Government, and that the observance of this provision, at all times incumbent, was of peculiar importance at a period when it was notorious that measures of hostility were in progress at the court of Poona. The reply of the rajah was unsatisfactory. He admitted that he had received overtures from Poona, but observed, that it did not consist with his dignity to repeat them, and this with general expressions of unceasing attachment to his English connexion, constituted his answer. The objectionable communications continued, and the renewed representation of the resident on the subject produced no change of conduct.

The period was evidently approaching when the

Rajah was to throw off the mask of friendship, and, in anticipation of it, Mr. Jenkins apprized the military authorities of the prospect of their being speedily called into action, and urged the march of troops towards Nagpore to uphold the British interests. The rajah had dismissed the Peishwa's vakeel, but he still retained at his court the brother of that functionary, and through him, as well as other channels, the intercourse with Poona continued to be carried on. The assemblage of troops at Poona was accompanied by a simultaneous collection of force at Nagpore. The completion of the contingent was delayed, and when troops were assigned for the purpose, they consisted mostly of new levies, evidencing that the rajah had no mind to part with his good troops. In addition to their being raw and undisciplined, the fidelity of the recruits to the British cause was more than suspected. The levies extended beyond Nagpore, and were conducted with great secrecy. This infatuated prince even entered into negociations with the Pindarries, who were invited to bring down a force to attack the British. The Pindarries were also made useful in another way, by assigning the fact of their ravages as an excuse for keeping up an extraordinary number of troops.

In the midst of these warning circumstances, a khelaut arrived from the Peishwa, and the rajah sent to inform the resident of his intention to receive it with all the usual ceremonies indicative

of his being invested with the character of commander-in-chief of the Mahratta armies. The principal ceremony consisted in going out to his camp, and remaining three days at the head of his troops. The communication was accompanied by a request that the resident, or some gentlemen of the service, would attend the ceremony, and that a salute might be ordered. As the British Government was then in a state of actual warfare with the Peishwa, it was quite obvious that such a request could not be complied with; and this public acknowledgment by Appa Sahib of a community of interest with the declared enemy of his protectors, would seem to amount almost to insanity. Mr. Jenkins, of course, refused any participation in the ceremony. On the following day, all communication between the residency and the city was interdicted. The palaces were stripped of every thing of value, and the families of the rajah and principal ministers left the city. These movements were followed by an order for the contingent to remove to the city, the old cry of the Pindarries being set up as a pretext. Upon this, Mr. Jenkins lost no time in sending for the troops from their cantonments.

An attempt was now made, on the part of the rajah, to open a negociation; but the hostile manifestations which were contemporaneous shewed it to be altogether delusive. The 26th of November placed the matter beyond question, by a repeti-

tion of the treacheries of Poona. An interview between the British resident and two of the rajah's ministers was interrupted by the commencement of firing. The strife of words was now to give way to the combat of more deadly weapons. The conference was dissolved abruptly, and Mr. Jenkins repaired to the scene of action.

Reinforcements had been sent for, but they had not arrived. The duty of repelling the attack consequently devolved upon a very small body of troops, under Lieut. Col. Scott, who had to resist a force of about eight thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry, supported by thirty-five guns.

When these troops had, at the request of the resident, marched from their cantonments, they took post on the hill of Seetabuldee, overlooking the residency and the city; at the same time taking possession of another hill, about three hundred yards distant, the occupation of which was necessary to their retention of the former. In the course of the day, large bodies of Arabs, with five guns, were observed to enter a village at the foot of the hill, where a strong body of the rajah's infantry had previously been posted; and at six o'clock in the evening, while Col. Scott was engaged with Capt. Bayley in posting sentries on the face of the hill, the Arabs in the village opened a fire. This was entirely unexpected, as no overt act of hostility had yet taken place on either side, and the rajah's troops were aware that the posting of the

sentries by the British was only a customary act of military precaution, and that no intention existed of attacking them. The small party of British troops, who found themselves thus suddenly engaged in action, returned a volley upon their assailants, and then retreated to the top of the hill, under the fire of all the troops in the village.

The action now became general, and continued without intermission for eighteen hours. A part of the troops being entirely exhausted, it was found necessary to confine the defence of the inferior hill to its summit. At eight o'clock on the morning of the 27th, a body of Arabs, by charging up the face of the hill with an overwhelming force, succeeded in gaining possession of the British post. The vast disproportion between the numbers of the contending bodies now appeared to give a fearful preponderance to the rajah's party, when the current of fortune was turned by one of those acts of romantic valour, which have so often changed the face of the battle-field, struck panic into the hearts of a powerful enemy, and secured the victory to the weaker side. At the moment when there seemed most cause for despondency, Capt. Fitzgerald, commanding a detachment of Bengal cavalry, reinforced by a native officer and about twenty-five troopers of the Madras body guard, charged an immense body of the enemy's best horse, and having taken their guns and turned them against their late possessors, stood master

of the plain, which was covered in every direction by the flying foe. Accident aided the advantage which daring courage had secured. While preparations were making for an attack upon the Arabs, who had obtained possession of the smaller hill, an explosion was observed to take place in the midst of them. No sooner was this perceived than the British troops made a rush towards the spot, and it was with great difficulty that Col. Scott could prevent the hill which he occupied from being deserted, or even prevail upon the infantry to wait the arrival of the cavalry who were to support them. Their impatience for action would doubtless have been justified by their bearing through its dangers; but the trial was not afforded. On their approach, the enemy abandoned the guns and fled. Shortly after, the Arabs beginning to collect in considerable numbers in front of the hill, a troop of cavalry, led by Cornet Smith, charged round its base, and numbers of the enemy were cut to pieces. All hope now seemed to be extinct with the defeated party; the attack slackened in every quarter, and by noon it had entirely ceased.

Courage and military conduct, like other meritorious qualities, are not always appreciated according to their deserts. The magnitude of the stake contended for, the proximity or distance of the scene of action, the numbers engaged, and various other accidents, influence the judgment of mankind

with regard to them. Little is recollected of the heroic band who, on this occasion, illustrated the triumphant supremacy of living burning courage over the dead force of mere numbers. Yet the prodigies of valour, which they performed, have rarely been equalled either in ancient or modern times. If glory were to be proportioned to difficulty and danger, the memory of such men would be imperishable. The noble spirit by which they were animated, extended even to the civil servants of the Company. The resident, Mr. Jenkins, was present throughout the action, and, on the testimony of Colonel Scott, it is established, that his animated conduct tended in a very considerable degree to excite the troops to their duty. His first assistant, Mr. Sotheby, exhibited the same contempt of danger, and the same generous ardour, not merely to satisfy the claims of duty, but to surpass them. The latter gentleman met an honourable death on the field which he contributed to win; the former still lives, to enjoy the approbation of his conscience and his country. Such are the men which the Company's service has from its commencement never ceased to produce, and their best eulogium is to be found in the magnificent empire acquired by their exertions.

Dismayed by the result of the first attempt in hostility, Appa Sahib sought refuge in negociation, and the resident consented to a suspension

of arms, on condition of the rajah's troops being withdrawn from the positions which they then held to those which they had formerly occupied. Any final arrangements he professed himself unable to make, until he received further instructions from his Government. Appa Sahib, in the mean time, remained still, but continued to increase his army, and render his artillery more efficient; and as no instructions arrived for the guidance of the resident, that gentleman determined, on the 14th of December, to offer terms for the rajah's acceptance. Terms were accordingly tendered, and four o'clock on the morning of the 16th fixed as the latest period for accepting them. If the rajah then consented to the proposal made by the British resident, the troops of the former were to be withdrawn from their positions, and the city occupied by British troops, not later than seven o'clock on the same morning. The rajah was to repair to the British camp, and to remain there until every thing was settled.

On these terms being submitted, the rajah at first required further time to consider of them, and to suggest some modification. This being refused, he sent a message on the evening of the 15th, signifying his assent to the terms, but requesting their execution to be deferred till noon on the following day. Subsequently he sent another message, intimating that he would proceed to the residency either that night or early in the morning.

The morning brought to the residency, not the rajah, but a message announcing that the Arabs would not allow him to come in. The resident, however, was prepared for this; reinforcements having a few days before arrived, and among them a division under the command of Brigadier-General Doveton. The troops were now drawn out, and three hours allowed to the rajah to come in; his refusal or neglect involving an immediate attack by the British force. This demonstration was successful, and the rajah proceeded to the residency.

The British authorities were thus relieved from further anxiety on that head; but the surrender of the guns, and the evacuation of the city by the rajah's troops, which were also among the stipulated conditions, still remained to be carried into effect. An agent from the rajah, with instructions for the surrender of the whole of the artillery, proceeded according to promise to General Doveton's camp, and, accompanied by him, the whole force moved forward to take possession of it.

On reaching the first battery, symptoms of resistance were manifested; but the approach of the British force being rather unexpected, the enemy quitted the guns, and retired. Having taken possession of them, and left them in charge of a division, General Doveton advanced, when a heavy fire was opened upon him from a large body of troops, which was followed by a general dis-

charge from the batteries. The infantry, however, continued to advance until the ground admitted of formation in line, when the batteries in front were carried in a gallant manner at the point of the bayonet. The horse artillery and cavalry, supported by a reserve, having made a *detour*, charged, and carried the remainder of the batteries with equal gallantry, driving, at the same time, before them an immense mass of the enemy's cavalry, which having routed, they pursued as long as a chance remained of doing them any mischief. A few of the enemy's guns which had been charged by the British cavalry, but had been re-opened upon that body, when it advanced in pursuit of the cavalry of the enemy, were again charged, and again carried; and the whole of the enemy's guns and camp equipage fell into the hands of the victors, together with upwards of forty elephants.

The two succeeding days were fixed for the evacuation of the city by the Arabs; but difficulty attended every step taken towards carrying the terms of the surrender into execution. Though all arrears had been paid, these troops refused to depart, and an attack upon the part of the city which they occupied became unavoidable. It was conducted by General Doveton, who having occupied a commanding position within two hundred and fifty yards of one of the gates of the town, erected a battery, which was opened on the morning of the 21st, with the view of effecting a

breach in the old palace wall. This, however, being found unattainable, the firing was directed to another point; and on the 23d it was reported, that such an effect had been produced as would render an advance practicable with little or no loss. An attack on three different points was determined; and at half-past eight o'clock the troops, on a preconcerted signal, rushed to their various destinations. The principal attack was conducted by General Doveton; but the breach not being sufficiently wide to admit of a section entering at once, and the troops being exposed to the fire of the Arabs sheltered within the houses, it failed. The other attacks, which were conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Scott and Major Pitman, were more fortunate; but the failure of the main attack rendered it necessary, in the opinion of General Doveton, that both officers should resume their original positions. These attempts, though unsuccessful, were sufficient to deter the Arabs from offering a protracted resistance, and on the following day they signified their desire to surrender on conditions. The conditions were few and simple: the Arabs asked only personal safety, and a British officer, with a small escort, to give them and their families safe conduct to Muleápore. Immediate possession being highly desirable, and if possible without injury to the city, the request was granted, and on the morning of the 30th the Arabs marched out.

The evacuation of the city was followed by the conclusion of a provisional engagement, under which the rajah returned to his palace. The conditions were, that certain territory should be ceded to the British Government in place of the former subsidy and contingent aid; that the civil and military affairs of the government should be conducted by ministers in the confidence of the British authorities, and according to the advice of the resident; that the rajah and his family should reside in the palace at Nagpore, under the protection of British troops; that the arrears of subsidy should be paid up, and the subsidy itself should continue to be paid until the final transfer of the territory stipulated to be surrendered; that any forts in the territory, which it might be necessary for the British to occupy, should immediately be given up; that the persons alleged to have been concerned in originating the recent disagreements should be discountenanced, and if possible be delivered up; and that the two hills of Seetabuldee, with the bazaars, and an adequate portion of land adjoining, should be ceded to the British Government, which should be at liberty to erect on them such military works as might be requisite. This engagement was confirmed by the governor-general, who instructed the resident to conclude a definitive treaty on its basis.

This was suspended by a proposal from Appa Sahib, intended to supersede the proposed treaty.

The purport of the proposal was, that the rajah should transfer to the British Government the whole of the possessions of the state of Nagpore, he retaining only the name and form of sovereignty, and receiving a certain share of the revenues. The proposal was rejected by the governor-general, and the original plan ordered to be carried into effect. But before the despatch conveying the final instructions of the Government was received by the resident, the state of circumstances again forced him to act upon the dictates of his own sound and vigorous judgment.

The delivery of certain fortresses stipulated to be surrendered was refused or evaded. Mundela was one of these. When the order for its surrender arrived from Nagpore, the rajah's ministers requested that a little time might be allowed for the evacuation of the fort, in order that persons might be sent to settle with the garrison, and thus prevent any demur to the delivery of the fort, under the pretence of arrears being due. A person deputed from Nagpore ostensibly for this purpose arrived at Mundela; but the surrender was still deferred, under the plea that an order had been received to make the collections for the year from the pergunnahs dependent upon Mundela, and to pay the garrison with the produce. The resident having brought the subject to the notice of the rajah's ministers, they stated the order in question to be, that payment should

be made from the revenue already collected, and sufficient for the purpose. As a part of the territory from which the revenue was to be drawn was actually occupied by the British troops, and nothing could be obtained from the remainder but by gross extortion and oppression, the resident authorized the payment of the garrison from the British treasury, and Major O'Brien proceeded with a small escort to Mundela to make the necessary arrangements. On the arrival of this officer, various communications passed between him, the killadar of the fort, and the person deputed from Nagpore, professedly for the purpose of settling the arrears. These communications appeared to promise a satisfactory adjustment, and Major O'Brien was in expectation of being put in immediate possession of the fort. Instead of this result, Major O'Brien, on the third morning after his arrival, while riding near the fort, found that the garrison during the night had sent over the Nerbudda about four hundred cavalry, with four thousand infantry, and four guns. The cavalry advanced upon him, and the guns opened; but he was enabled, with his small escort, to reach his camp in safety; the enemy, whenever they approached, being successfully repelled.

In consequence of this treacherous proceeding on the part of the killadar of the fort, Major-Gen. Marshall, with a considerable force, was ordered to advance upon Mundela. Having arrived be-

fore it, he proceeded to erect batteries, which, being completed, were opened by daylight on the 26th April. They were answered by a spirited fire from the whole of the enemy's works. After several hours' battering, Lieutenant Pickersgill, with extraordinary gallantry, proceeded to ascertain by personal inspection the effect produced, mounting, with the assistance of his hircarahs, to the top of the breach; from which, after making his observations, he returned with so favourable a report, as induced General Marshall to make immediate preparations for storming the works. The necessary dispositions having been made, Captain Tickell, field engineer, examined the breach, and at half-past five o'clock the signal was given to advance. The storming and supporting columns, both under the direction of Brigadier-General Watson, moved forward, the breach was instantly mounted and carried, and in a very short time the town was in the possession of the assailants. The troops were immediately pushed forward to the fort, and at daybreak on the 27th the garrison came out unarmed, and quietly surrendered themselves. At midnight, a small boat had been observed crossing the river, with four persons: by good management on the part of one of the advanced posts they were secured on landing, and one of them turned out to be the killadar of the fort. The governor-general had given orders that, if taken, the killadar and other principal

officers should be immediately brought to a drum-head court-martial, and that any punishment that might be awarded by such tribunal, whether death or imprisonment with hard labour, might immediately be carried into effect.

It would be difficult to shew that these orders were consistent either with discretion or with a regard to the usages of war. They appear to have been an ebullition of that infirmity of temper which shadowed the high character of the Marquis of Hastings. The orders were so far followed, that the killadar was brought to a court-martial, charged with rebellion and treachery. He was acquitted of the charge of rebellion, on the proper ground of his having acted under the orders of the Nagpore government. The charge of treachery arose out of the attack on Major O'Brien. Of this the killadar was also acquitted, the major declaring his belief that the prisoner was not concerned in the attack upon him. This appears a somewhat refined view of the matter. If the attack was an offence against military law, it could be of little importance whether the killadar was personally engaged in it or not; as it must be quite certain that the movement of the garrison must have taken place with his cognizance and sanction; but the court must have been aware that they had no proper jurisdiction in the case, and that conviction and punishment under such circumstances could not be justified. Another

officer was put on trial, charged with abetting his superior; but he, of course, shared the impunity of his principal.

The surrender of Chouragurh, another fortress which was to be ceded to the British Government, was postponed by the same bad faith which had delayed the delivery of Mundela, and the pretence was the same —time was asked to settle the arrears of pay due to the garrison; but the killadar soon assumed a posture of direct hostility. A body of men armed with matchlocks sallied from the fort, and attacked a British force under Colonel Mac Morine, and the garrison systematically plundered the villages which had been placed under the British Government. A body of about five hundred, employed in the latter occupation, were attacked and put to flight by a small detachment under Major Richards. After the reduction of Mundela, the division under Gen. Watson was ordered to march to Chouragurh, but before their arrival the fort and adjoining town were evacuated, and possession taken by Colonel MacMorine.

The possession of Chanda, a strongly fortified city, situate about a hundred miles southward of the capital of the Nagpore state, was an important point for the security of British interests; and after various attempts at negociation had failed, its reduction was effected on the 20th May, by Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, in command of the

Nagpore subsidiary force. Batteries had been at work for three previous days, and, on the evening of the 19th, a practicable breach was effected. It was deemed expedient to defer the attack till the following morning, when an assault was made, and in little more than an hour the whole city was in possession of the British force.

It has been seen that the fortresses of Mundela and Chouragurh were withheld from the British authorities in defiance of the provisions under which they were to be surrendered, and notwithstanding public orders had been given for their delivery. The effect of those orders was counteracted by secret orders of a contrary purport—a fact suspected at an early period by the resident, and ultimately placed beyond the possibility of doubt. In addition to these circumstances, Mr. Jenkins received reports that an intercourse was kept up with the Peishwa, and that the rajah held secret conferences with persons hostile to the influence of the British Government, while those who entertained friendly feelings towards it were regarded with aversion. Rumours of the rajah meditating an escape were general; it was understood that one of the disaffected chiefs had received a sum of money for the levy of troops; and attempts were made to intercept the progress of supplies intended for the British force. Every thing conspired to shew that Appa Sahib was

irretrievably leagued with the enemies of the British power. New and incontestable proofs of the rajah's treachery continually occurred, and were multiplied, till it became evident that extreme measures could no longer be postponed without compromising the honour and safety of the British Government. The resident now acted with his usual vigour, and arrested both the rajah and his confidential ministers. This bold step was accellerated by the discovery of facts which impressed Mr. Jenkins with a conviction that Appa Sahib had been the murderer of his kinsman and sovereign, Baba Sahib, formerly rajah of Nagpore. At the time of Baba Sahib's death, Mr. Jenkins had been led to suspect this; but circumstances having induced him in some degree to moderate his suspicions, and the difficulty of obtaining satisfactory proof of the suspected fact being apparently insurmountable, no measures were taken in consequence. Such additional information was now acquired as led to a conviction of Appa Sahib's guilt. His arrest took place on the 15th March. Subsequently he was declared to be dethroned, and this step was followed by the elevation to the musnud of a descendant of a former rajah by the female line.

As soon as a sufficient escort could be obtained, Appa Sahib was sent off to the British provinces, and provision was made at Allahabad for his re-

ception and custody. He contrived, however, on the road, to effect his escape, and was accompanied by six sepoys in the British service. Being joined by a band of adherents who anticipated his escape, and relying upon finding a party in Nagpore disposed to support him, he, after a short period, proceeded to Chouragurh, and the garrison being very weak, he obtained possession of the fort. He also maintained a correspondence with his connexions in the capital of his former dominions. These laboured indefatigably to enrol and organize bodies of armed adherents in the interior, while they supplied Appa Sahib with money for the collection and payment of troops on the frontier. Their exertions were further directed to undermine the fidelity of the British troops, and to a certain extent they were successful. So alarming were the various indications of active hostility, that the resident felt it to be necessary to apply to General Doveton and Colonel Adams for reinforcements. The latter officer, towards the latter end of October, projected a combined irruption of different columns into the Mahadoo hills, for the purpose of surrounding Appa Sahib, and he moved accordingly. Appa Sahib then fled, closely pursued. He was overtaken near Asseergurh, a fortress belonging to Scindia, and would probably have been captured, had not a part of the garrison sallied out to his assistance.

From Asseergurh, Appa Sahib escaped in the disguise of a fakeer to Boorhampore, and from thence he proceeded to Lahore, where he took up his residence, receiving a trifling allowance from Runjeet Singh.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE PINDARRIES.

In every country, at whatever point of civilisation it may have arrived, some are found who, impelled either by want or depravity, seek a subsistence from sources less painful and less honourable than labour. In every country, at some period of its history, a vast number of persons have supported themselves by open plunder—have followed no other occupation, and have not even pretended to follow any other. The time during which this state of things prevails may be longer or shorter, and its duration will be determined by a great variety of circumstances; but, in a certain stage of society, it will as inevitably occur as storms or earthquakes under certain conditions of the natural elements. A great deal of very excellent wonder has been thrown away upon the character and conduct of the Pindarries: there seems, however, little ground for any very copious display of such a feeling, and a large portion of it is

probably to be ascribed to the unusual name by which these adventurers were described.

Much of the wonder commonly exhibited upon Indian subjects may be traced to our want of familiarity with the terms used in speaking of them. Those who would hear of the cultivators of the soil without any extraordinary sensation, imagine that there is something mysterious in the character of persons designated *Ryots;* and *Durbar* and *Musnud* seem to indicate something far more magnificent than is expressed by our humbler monosyllables *Court* and *Throne*. From the same cause, the Pindarries have in the eyes of English readers, and perhaps sometimes of English statesmen, acquired a grandeur to which they had but slender claims.

They were, in truth, except on account of their numbers, a very contemptible set of miscreants. Active and enterprising almost beyond belief, and wicked to the full measure which the most ardent lover of horror could desire, their adventures and their crimes were undignified by any of those nobler characteristics of our nature, which have sometimes shed a deceptive glory over actions of great atrocity, and averted from their perpetrators the penalty of unmitigated disgust. No redeeming virtue marked the character of the Pindarrie. Even animal courage, often the sole ennobling quality of his profession, he possessed not. The Pindarrie marched, or rather darted,

upon his victims with a rapidity certainly never equalled by any regular force; but, unfortunately for the romantic colouring of his character, he manifested equal or even greater alacrity in flight. No troops in the history of the world ever displayed such proficiency in the art of running away; and to this, their strong point, they invariably resorted if attacked. Other combatants seek to overcome their adversary; the Pindarries were only anxious to get out of his way. Call these persons freebooters, banditti, or by any name to which the ear is accustomed, and the mystery which has been attached to them vanishes. They were mean and cowardly thieves, engendered by a vicious and diseased state of society. To repress them was a duty imperative upon the British Government, and it was no less so to take effectual measures to guard against a new race of robbers being called forth in their place.

The etymology of the term *Pindarrie* has given rise to much and fruitless discussion. By some it has been traced to an ancient Hindee word, meaning 'plunder;' and if this be not a just derivation, it is at least a very appropriate one. The first mention of these persons in history has been sometimes said to occur in the latter part of the seventeenth century; at others, in the beginning of the eighteenth;—a point of little moment, since it relates merely to a name, as it cannot be doubted that Hindostan contained within its ample boun-

daries a very plentiful supply of thieves even at periods much earlier than either of the dates which have been mentioned.

The mode of warfare adopted by these bandits, if warfare it might be called, was distinguished by the precision with which it was directed to one object,—plunder. They brought little with them, and their only object was to carry as much as possible away.

The native princes of India have never been very scrupulous as to the means of accomplishing their purposes, and though high feeling and even sound policy would have led to the rejection of the services of the Pindarries, they were, in various instances, retained by regular governments. These marauders received especial marks of favour and encouragement from Holkar and Scindia. Mulhar Row Holkar bestowed upon one of their chiefs a golden flag. This gave the Pindarries a sort of rank among the Mahrattas, but effected no change in their habits or character. Gurdee Khan, the fortunate receiver of this distinction, remained during his life attached to the armies of his patron: and notwithstanding the command subsequently passed from his family, that body of Pindarries continued faithful to Holkar. But, though entertained and encouraged, they were regarded with contempt. They always encamped apart from the rest of the army, and their chiefs were never allowed to sit in the presence of the prince.

A younger brother of Gurdee Khan, named Shah Bay Khan, attached himself to the service of Scindia. He left two sons, Hera and Burrun, each of whom attained as much celebrity as can be supposed to surround the character of a robber chieftain. Quitting the service of Scindia, these adventurous persons proceeded to Malwa, and, having encamped at Berniah, with about five thousand followers, they made an overture to the government of Bhopal to invade and lay waste the territories of Nagpore, with which state it was at war. The offer was declined, an act of forbearance which has been ascribed to fear. Nothing dishcartened by the refusal, the Pindarrie leaders proceeded to Nagpore, where they were graciously received. Their visit was a matter of business. Their offer, to accommodate the state of Bhopal by the plunder of Nagpore, having been rejected, they now made to Nagpore a polite tender of their services for ravaging Bhopal. They found the ruler of Nagpore nothing loth; and, being able and experienced workmen, they executed his order so effectually that, at the distance of twenty-five years, Sir John Malcolm represents Bhopal as not then recovered from the effects of their visitation. Their zeal and efficiency, however, met with a most ungrateful return. The rajah of Nagpore, though glad of an opportunity of inflicting a vital injury upon an enemy, was too conscientious to allow such unprincipled persons as

the Pindarries to retain the fruits of their labours. On the return of these faithful instruments of his will to his capital, he very unceremoniously surrounded their camp, plundered them of all the moveables of which *they* had plundered the unhappy inhabitants of Bhopal, and seized Burrun, one of their chiefs: Hera, the other commander, fled.

A noted leader among the Pindarries was Kurreem Khan. He was, at one period, an humble follower of Burrun and Herra, with a force of five or six hundred men. On the apprehension of Burrun, he fled from Nagpore, and joined Dowlut Row Scindia. who was then preparing to attack the Nizam. In the campaign which followed, he gained an immense booty, and his experience at Nagpore warned him to take care of it. To secure this end, a retreat appeared to him advisable: he, accordingly, abandoned Scindia's army in the Deccan, and went to Central India, to offer his services to Jeswunt Row Holkar. This prince showed no reluctance to receive and employ the fugitive, but the mind of the latter was still uneasy on account of his much-valued wealth; and not feeling it quite safe in the custody of Jeswunt Row, he at once withdrew his followers and himself, and opened a double negociation with his former master, Scindia, and with an extraordinary person named Ameer Khan, whose character was about on a level with his own in point of

respectability, while his place in society was little less questionable. Both negociations succeeded. Ameer Khan offered him an asylum, and when that adventurer was afterwards engaged in hostilities with Scindia, Kurreem Khan repaid the kindness by making himself master of certain districts at the expense of his benefactor, and obtaining a confirmation of his possession of them from Scindia. By that prince, Kurreem Khan was created a nawab, and his ambition was further gratified by a marriage with a lady of rank.

The contemporaneous absence of Scindia and Holkar tempted this indefatigable person to make further additions to his territory. He now evidently contemplated the establishment of a regular state, and the jealousy of Scindia was excited. Scindia advanced from his capital, with the full determination of destroying a man who was becoming far too formidable for a dependant, but he was withheld by policy from resorting to force. Kurreem Khan, being invited to attend him, proceeded with a degree of ostentatious splendour scarcely inferior to that of the sovereign to whom he professed allegiance. On occasion of receiving a visit from Scindia, Kurreem Khan prepared a musnud of extraordinary materials. It was composed of one hundred and twenty-five thousand rupees, covered with a rich cloth. On this Scindia was seated, and the whole formed a present from the vassal to his liege lord.

The success of Kurreem Khan seemed worthy of his munificence. Scindia expressed himself enchanted with the extraordinary talents of Kurreem, both as a soldier and a statesman. His compliments far exceeded the usual extent of eastern hyperbole, and Kurreem had reason to rejoice that the deep shade of his complexion rescued him from betraying the infirmity of blushing. He had still further reason to be pleased that the flattering attentions of the prince promised some better results than empty praise. The Pindarrie chief was emboldened to solicit the transfer of several valuable districts, and tendered security for an advance of four lacs and a-half of rupees, if his desire were granted. The sovereign seemed as ready to bestow as the dependant was bold to ask. Every boon was graciously accorded. No prince ever appeared more sensible of the merits of a servant; no servant more enthusiastically attached to his prince. The transfer of the districts was ordered to take place forthwith, and a rich dress of investiture to be prepared.

In the midst of this seeming cordiality, some of the elder and more wary of the Pindarrie followers entertained doubts. They had before witnessed scenes somewhat resembling that which they now beheld, and they recollected how they had terminated. Kurreem himself was not a novice in these matters, and heretofore he had rather exceeded than fallen short of a due mea-

sure of caution. His temper, his experience, and the warnings of his followers, might have been deemed sufficient to excite some degree of suspicion as to the probable termination of the superabundant grace and condescension of Scindia; but such was not the case: Kurreem saw nothing but his own good fortune, and already in idea possessed all that was promised.

The interchange of compliments and presents having continued as long as was thought expedient, the day arrived for making the final arrangements for the transfer of the coveted districts, and formally installing Kurreem in the possession of them. He was then, after taking leave of his chieftain and benefactor, to proceed immediately to the exercise of his new authority.

Every thing bore the most auspicious appearance. Kurreem advanced to receive his expected donation, with but a slender train of attendants, probably from a desire to show respect to his superior, and in the belief that now his ends were gained, it was more politic to flatter the pride of his chief than to appeal to his fears. Scindia received his visitor with the same benignity which he had manifested throughout—to show more was impossible. The sunnuds were called for—the dresses were produced—and Kurreem could see nothing between himself and the fulfilment of his hopes. Scindia, however, made some pretext for retiring, not thinking it proper to give his

personal countenance to the scene which was to follow. This was an act of decorum very creditable to the taste of the prince, for his continued presence could hardly have been reconciled with his previous bearing, and his departure rendered explanation impracticable, though probably in the opinion of Kurreem not unnecessary.

The expectant Pindarrie was not kept long in the pangs of anxious hope. Scindia had scarcely quitted the tent, when armed men rushed from the sides, and seized Kurreem, with some of his principal adherents. A cannon was now fired as a signal that this feat had been accomplished; and the troops which had been drawn out to do honour to Kurreem carried the compliment so far as to extend their care to all his followers, by advancing upon the Pindarrie camp. Suspicion is one of the strongest characteristics of the Pindarrie; this was soon excited in the camp, and as many as were able, hastily declined the proffered attentions of Scindia's troops. A few only were killed, but, though the loss of life was small, the loss of that which, in Shylock's estimation, is scarcely of less value, was considerable. The army of Scindia obtained an immense booty, an occurrence which never fails to put men in good humour. But the value of the triumph was greatly enhanced in the eyes of the soldiery by the means which had led to it. It was the result neither of valour, nor of military talent, nor of

far-seeing wisdom ; but solely of that sinister art, in which the natives of the East are generally such adepts, and which, in the eyes of a Mahratta especially, is the first and most venerated of all human accomplishments.

Kurreem was four years a captive. The treasure, which he had lost through the prudent arrangements of Scindia, though not inconsiderable, formed but a small part of what he could command, the mass of which was deposited at Shujahalpoor. On the news of his arrest reaching that place, his mother packed up all that was portable, and fled towards the jungles of Baglee, from which place the fear of Scindia drove her further to the westward.

In the mean time, Kurreem was not idle. He found opportunities of corresponding with his followers, and he enjoined them, with paternal authority, to plunder everywhere, but especially the territories of Scindia. These commands were too pleasant to be neglected, and Kurreem had the high satisfaction of knowing that he was implicitly obeyed.

While the professional duties of the Pindarries were thus discharged, without suspension or impediment, some attempts were made to effect a negociation for the release of Kurreem. These were long resisted by Scindia, but a door was at last opened for the exercise of his clemency, by an appeal to one of the passions most predominant

in the heart of an Eastern potentate. Six lacs of rupees to the sovereign was regarded as a tempting offer, and the proposed distribution of one lac more among the officers of the court, by whom the treaty was negociated, had a wonderful effect in facilitating their perception of the advantages of the plan to the interests of their master, and the claims of Kurreem to the indulgence which he sought. Security was given for the payment of these sums, and the prisoner was released. His former keepers were, however, not quite satisfied of the safety of the experiment, and endeavours were made to conciliate him by the accumulation of presents and marks of honour. But Kurreem had received such things before, and knew what had followed. He determined, therefore, to trust to his own resources, and assembling his Pindarries from every quarter, he was soon in possession of territories more extensive than he had enjoyed before his misfortune.

Under these circumstances, he was joined by another Pindarrie chief, named Cheetoo, who, it is said, had in early life been much indebted to him. This man was considered one of the ablest of the Pindarrie leaders, and his junction with Kurreem was therefore regarded with apprehension. It was, however, of brief duration. The excesses which revenge led Kurreem to perpetrate in the territories of Scindia caused that prince bitterly to repent the bargain which his avarice

had led him to conclude; and he resolved to make every effort to annihilate the power of Kurreem. In this labour he found a willing ally in the faithful Cheetoo, whose obligations to Kurreem offered no obstacle to his engaging in the destruction of his friend and patron. The result was, that Kurreem's camp was attacked and dispersed, and himself obliged to seek safety in flight.

He now sought the protection of Ameer Khan, and this worthy person, under pretence of recommending him to the good graces of Toolsee Bhye, the profligate favourite of Jeswunt Row Holkar, transferred him to the care of Ghuffoor Khan, a near relation of Ameer Khan, and his representative and creature at the court of Holkar. By him Kurreem was placed under restraint. This durance lasted three years, during which his followers were actively and vigorously occupied. At last, he effected his escape, and joined his adherents at Berniah, encouraged to take this step, it has been said, by the overtures of Scindia to forgive the past and provide for the future. A man rarely needs much encouragement to escape from captivity, if he thinks the object can be effected; and Kurreem could hardly attach much value to the promises of Scindia. He did, however, escape, and prepared to act under Scindia's orders.

Cheetoo, who has already been honourably mentioned, first as the friend, and, secondly, as the betrayer of Kurreem, profited by the captivity of the latter so far as to gain the rank of chief leader among the Pindarries. The value of this distinction may be differently estimated by different minds; but whatever it might be, Cheetoo sought and obtained it. He fixed his abode amid the hills and forests situated between the north bank of the Nerbubba and the Vindyha mountains. His cantonments were near the village of Nimar, and he resided either there or at Sattrass. During the latter part of his career, he seldom made long excursions, but his troops were dispersed on duty at various points, and patrolled the country in every direction. He acknowledged a sort of allegiance to Scindia, but this did not restrain his followers from occasional inroads upon the territories of that prince, as evidences of their independence and impartiality.

Movements were sometimes made, with the ostensible purpose of putting the marauders down, but nothing was effected. A treaty was at length entered into, by which the Pindarries agreed to exempt the territories of Scindia from plunder, on condition of his bestowing on them certain lands. There were, however, some difficulties in the way of carrying this treaty into effect. Some of the lands conveyed belonged not to Scindia, but to other states, and though he had

not the smallest objection to bestowing on the Pindarries the property of Holkar and the Peishwa, it was not perfectly convenient to assume the power of making such donations. The alleged necessity, however, of protecting his territories finally led him to comply. Sunnuds were granted to different chiefs, and Cheetoo received five districts. Here again was a foundation laid for the conversion of a robber confederacy into a regular state.

Such were the characters of some of the leaders of the Pindarrie hordes, and though it would be unjust to say that they were much worse than those of most of their neighbours, the unsettled and predatory habits of their followers rendered it impossible for them to be recognized by any European government which had the slightest value for its reputation.

The settlements of these persons being to the north of the Nerbudda, their practice was to cross the river, as soon as it was fordable, generally in November, and indiscriminately plunder friends and foes. Before the year 1812, though they continually visited our allies, they respected the British dominions. Subsequently, the latter partook of their visitations, and shared in all the horrors with which their progress was attended.

The Pindarries were not composed of any peculiar people or tribe, but of a variety—of the refuse of all tribes, denominations, and creeds. They

were generally armed with spears, in the use of which they were very expert; a proportion of them were provided with matchlocks; and all were mounted. A party generally consisted of two or three thousand. Each man provided himself with a few cakes for his subsistence, and a few feeds of grain for his horse, trusting much to the chance of plunder for the means of supplying the wants of both. They frequently marched thirty or forty miles a day, and, in cases of extraordinary emergency, they were capable of accomplishing fifty miles in that period. To effect these extraordinary exertions, they were accustomed to sustain the vigour of their horses by spices and stimulants.

The celerity of their marches was not more remarkable than their secresy. It was scarcely possible to gain information of their movements till they had completed them. They proceeded at once to the place of their destination, and, unencumbered with tents and baggage, they soon reached it. Here they divided into smaller parties, and commenced their career of plunder and devastation. Articles of the greatest value were disposed about their persons; cattle afforded the means of their own transport. But the atrocious propensities of these ruffians were not to be satisfied by what they could carry away. What was not removed they destroyed, and wherever they marched, villages were seen in flames, with the

houseless and often wounded inhabitants flying in dismay to seek a shelter, which not unfrequently they were unable to attain. When they had laid the country completely waste, they approached a point of the frontier distant from that by which they had entered, and uniting again into a compact body, returned home.

The horrors attending these visitations were such as could not be credited, were the evidence less complete and conclusive. Despatch being indispensable, every variety of torture was resorted to for the purpose of extracting from the unhappy victims information of the treasures they were supposed to have concealed. Red-hot irons were applied to the soles of their feet; a bag filled with hot ashes was tied over the mouth and nostrils of the victim, who was then beaten on the back, to make him inhale the ingredients; large stones were placed on the head or chest, or the sufferer being laid on his back, a plank or beam was placed across his chest, on which two men pressed with their whole weight; oil was thrown on the clothes, which were then set on fire—these, with many other modes of torture equally frightful, were resorted to. Neither sex nor age afforded immunity. The hands of children would frequently be cut off, as the shortest way of obtaining the bracelets which adorned them; while women were subjected to outrages, com-

pared with which torture and death were mercy. To escape these, numbers rushed upon self-destruction. It is not one of the least revolting features in the economy of these murderous adventurers, that their women frequently accompanied their male associates in their excursions. They were mounted on small horses or camels, and are said to have exceeded the other sex in rapacity and cruelty. This may readily be believed, for when woman has once overcome the restraints which nature and universal feeling have imposed upon her, her progress downward is made with fearful rapidity.

When the work of ruin was completed, the Pindarries withdrew, like wild beasts, to their lairs. Then a change of scene took place; the operation of plunder was exchanged for that of huckstering. The claim of the chief had first to be satisfied; but it is not very clear how far this claim extended. By some, his share has been fixed at a fourth part of the entire booty. By others, it has been alleged that the mode of apportionment was uncertain, but that elephants, palanquins, and umbrellas, were heriots appertaining to the lord. After his claim was satisfied came that of the *Lubharee*, or actual leader of the expedition; then the payment of advances made by merchants—for, like more civilized nations, these people occasionally contracted a national

debt. The fact of such a confederacy being able to borrow money is remarkable.

These preliminaries being disposed of, the scene that followed resembled a fair. Every man's share of the plunder was exposed for sale; purchasers flocked from all quarters, proximate and remote, the business of sale being principally conducted by the women. Whether this arose from the indolence of the men, or that the women had the reputation of making better bargains, does not appear, but such was the custom. In the mean time, the men gave themselves up to amusement, of which intoxication constituted a considerable portion. The remainder was worthy of the association in which it was found. This lasted until the produce of the expedition was exhausted, and it became necessary to seek in fresh outrages renewed means of gratification. Thus passed the life of the Pindarrie robber, in an alternation of brutal exertion and sensual abandonment.

The Marquess of Hastings, at an early period of his government, manifested a desire to put an end to the ravages of these marauders; but it was deemed fitting to refrain from any offensive operations until the receipt of orders from home. During the season of 1816-17, however, the ravages of the Pindarries extended over a wider expanse of territory than had ever before been attempted. But these enlarged operations were not effected without considerable checks.

Major Lushington,* while on his route to the northward with the 4th Madras Native Cavalry, having obtained intelligence that a party of these plunderers was employed to the south-east of Poona, resolved to make an effort to attack them. After an unremitting march of upwards of fifty miles, he succeeded in coming up with them while engaged in cooking and eating. They immediately fled, but were vigorously pursued, and between seven and eight hundred left dead on the field.

About the same time a party, which had proceeded to ravage Ganjam, was dispersed with severe loss by Lieut. Borthwick. The fugitives subsequently suffered severely from falling in with bodies of British troops under Captain Caulfield and Major Clarke. Another large body was surprised about thirty miles west of Bidur by a light force detached from Hyderabad under Major M'Dowall, the approach of which was so sudden that the infantry were close upon the tents of the chiefs before they were discovered, and scarcely a man of the party was mounted when the first volley was fired. The surprised party of course fled, and the greater part of their horses and booty was abandoned.

It was now the unanimous opinion of the Go-

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* Now Sir James Law Lushington, C.C.B., a Director of the East-India Company.

vernor-general and members of council, that the adoption of vigorous measures for the early suppression of the Pindarries had become an indispensable obligation of public duty. But it was a question whether the attempt should be made during the current season, or suspended until the ensuing year, the interval being devoted to making such arrangements as might enable the government to act with the greatest possible effect. The result of deliberation was a resolution to adopt the latter course, and the commencement of operations was consequently deferred. The preparations which were to be made, during the period of postponement, it was necessary to conduct with as much privacy as possible, in order to avoid giving alarm to those against whom they were directed, or to other powers who, from various motives, might be expected to make common cause with the Pindarries, and offer obstructions to any measures designed for their suppression.

A body of troops, under Sir Thomas Hislop, was to advance from the Deccan to the Nerbudda, where they were to be joined by other divisions from Bengal. From various causes, the arrival of the troops from the Deccan was considerably delayed. In consequence, the march of the Bengal divisions was postponed. On the 16th of October 1817, however, the Marquess of Hastings commenced his march from Cawnpore, and having joined the central division at Secundra, crossed the Jumna

on the 26th, and reached his destined position, on the Scind, on the 6th November. The left division, under the command of Major-general Marshall, had previously assembled in Bundelcund, and was prepared to advance towards Saugor, with a view to co-operate with the right of Sir Thomas Hislop's army against the Pindarrie posts. The right division of the Bengal army assembled at the same period, ready to advance to Dheolpore, on the Chumbul, as soon as circumstances should render it necessary; while the reserve, commanded by Sir David Ochterlony, was assembled near Rewaree. This part of the British force was destined to cover Delhi, to support our negociations with the Rajpoot states (for in the East a negociator never succeeds so well as when he has an army at his back), to perform the same office with regard to Ameer Khan, and eventually to attack the latter, or interpose between him and Holkar, if they should manifest any perverse or hostile feeling.

These were the principal divisions of the British force destined for active operations. Two smaller detachments were formed, which were intended principally for purposes of defence, but were capable of acting offensively if necessary. One of these, under Brigadier-general Toone, was posted near Ooutaree, on the frontier of Behar. The other, under Brigadier-general Hardyman, was formed at Mirzapore, and thence advanced to

Rewa, for the purpose of securing the passes in that country, and the adjacent districts, in order to defeat any attempt of the Pindarries to penetrate into the British territories in that direction; while the principal part of the force was in advance. A force was also stationed in Cuttack, sufficient to guard that frontier from the entrance of the Pindarries through Nagpore.

The objects kept simultaneously in view in these arrangements were, to effect the extirpation of the Pindarries, to overawe all who might be disposed to assist them, and to protect the British provinces from invasion.

The first division of the troops from the Deccan was commanded by Sir Thomas Hislop in person, and this, in conjunction with the third, under Sir John Malcolm, was to cross the Nerbudda, in the direction of Hindia. But this arrangement was frustrated by the detention of Sir Thomas Hislop at Hyderabad. The division of Sir John Malcolm crossed alone, about the middle of November, and that of Sir Thomas Hislop at a later date. The fifth division, consisting of the Nagpore subsidiary horse, under Lieutenant-colonel Adam, was to cross the river at Hoosingabad, at the same time with the other divisions destined to act in advance. Two divisions, the fourth and sixth, still remain to be accounted for. Of these, the latter, under Brigadier-general Doveton, was posted in the neighbourhood of Akolee, on the

Nizam's frontier, to protect that line from attack, to support if required the troops, and to sustain the British interests at Nagpore; the former, under Brigadier-general Smith, was intended to perform the like service with regard to the Peishwa's territory, and at the same time to keep Holkar in check. Bodies of troops were also maintained at Hyderabad, at Poona, and at Nagpore, as none of those governments could be relied upon. Events shewed that such precaution was not superfluous. A corps of reserve was assembled on the frontier of the ceded districts, and was subsequently advanced to a position on the Krishna, from which point it could support the troops either at Hyderabad or at Poona: a separate detachment occupied the southern country recently ceded by the Peishwa. The Guzerat field force, under Sir William Keir, was also assembled in advance of Baroda, ready to move into Malwa.

The advance of the troops from the Deccan of course excited some attention, but in a degree quite disproportioned to the importance of the movement. Scindia was especially interested in the matter, and the passage of a division of the army of the Deccan through his territories, rendered it necessary to inform him of the purpose of its being put in motion. The necessary communication was made by the resident, Capt. Close, and was met, as every thing is met at a native durbar, by an attempt to gain time. This being

resisted, a tardy, and without doubt a reluctant, assent was given to the passage of the troops.

This, however, was not sufficient. It was necessary to obtain either Scindia's active co-operation against the Pindarries, or at least his neutrality, and the exertions of the resident were directed accordingly. While the negociations were pending, an extraordinary circumstance occurred, illustrative of the feeling entertained by Scindia. This was the arrest of two messengers conveying letters from Scindia's court to Catmandoo. As there was no customary intercourse between the two courts, its occurrence could not fail to excite strong suspicion. A part of the letters were open and part sealed. The former were read, and though the language was obscure, they evidently related to some project for a combination against the British Government. The sealed letters were delivered to Scindia by the resident in the state in which they were found. Scindia made no attempt to explain his conduct, but the discovery was not without effect upon the progress of the negociation.

A treaty, comprising twelve articles, was forthwith concluded with Scindia; by the first of which, the contracting parties engaged to employ the forces of their respective governments, and of their allies and dependents, in prosecuting operations against the Pindarries, and other hordes of associated freebooters, to expel them from their haunts,

and to adopt the most effectual measures to disperse and prevent them from re-assembling. The forces of the two governments and their allies were immediately to attack the robbers and their associates, according to a concerted plan of operations, and not to desist until the objects of their engagement were entirely accomplished; and Scindia, on his part, promised his utmost efforts to seize the persons of the Pindarrie leaders and their families, and deliver them up to the British Government.

The second article referred to the settlements which the Pindarries had gained in the territories of Scindia, and in those of other states. With regard to the former, the lands were to be immediately secured by the maharajah, who engaged never again to admit the plunderers to possession. The other lands were to be restored to their respective owners, provided they exerted themselves to the required extent in expelling the Pindarries, and entered into similar engagements never to readmit them, or to become concerned with them in any way whatever. In default of these conditions being complied with, the lands were to be delivered to Scindia, and held by him on the stipulated terms.

The third article extended and completed the first, and the former part of the second. By it Scindiah engaged never to admit the Pindarries, or any other predatory bodies, into his territories,

to give them the smallest countenance or support, or to permit his officers to do so. On the contrary, he promised to issue the most positive orders to all his officers, civil and military, enforced by the severest penalties, to employ their utmost efforts to expel or destroy any body of plunderers who might attempt to take refuge in his territories; and all officers disregarding these orders were to be dealt with as rebels to the maharajah, and enemies to the British Government.

The fourth article commenced by formally announcing, that the Maharajah Dowlut Row Scindia was the undisputed master of his own troops and resources. This sounding overture was precursory to a stipulation for placing the troops and resources, of which he was the undoubted master, at the disposal of the British Government, for which he certainly entertained no warm affection. The article proceeds to declare, that for the more effectual accomplishment of the objects of the treaty, the divisions of the maharajah's troops (amounting to five thousand horse), employed in active operations against the Pindarries or other freebooters, should act in concert with the British troops, and in conformity to the plan that might be counselled by the officer commanding the British divisions, with which they might be appointed to act—that a British officer should be stationed with each division of the maharajah's troops, to be the channel of communication be-

tween them and the British commanding officer; and in order farther to forward the other purposes of their conjoint operations, the maharajah engaged that all his officers, civil and military, should afford every degree of support and assistance in their power to the British, in procuring supplies or otherwise to the British troops operating in his territories; and all who should neglect this duty, were subject to the same appalling denunciation with which the third article closed.

The fifth article commenced with a very important stipulation—that the divisions of Scindia's army appointed to act with the British troops, should be marched in a state of complete equipment, both men and horses, and regularly paid. To make provision for these vital objects, and, as the framers of the treaty considerately express it, to "prevent all future discussions or disputes," Scindia consented to renounce for three years the payments made by the British Government to him, to certain members of his family, and to ministers of his government. These sums were to be appropriated to the payment of his troops, through the British officers stationed with them; the British Government engaging that, at the termination of the war, and after the satisfaction of the claims of the troops, any balance that might remain due should be paid to the maharajah. For the same purpose as that for which the above payments were relinquished, Scindia agreed to surrender

for two years the tribute to which he was entitled from the states of Joudpore, Boondee, and Kotah. These two articles, as well as the succeeding one, were directed to the removal of a difficulty which the Marquess of Hastings had foreseen, and was anxious to guard against. "It was manifest," he observes, in one of his despatches, "that no active or useful aid was to be expected from Scindia's troops, if left to the direction of his own officers."

By the sixth article, it was agreed that the troops of Scindia, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, should during the war occupy such positions as might be assigned by the British Government, and should not change them without the express concurrence of that government. The necessity of giving a reason for this stipulation, rather than for any other in the treaty, is not apparent; but one is given, namely, that unconnected movements are calculated to derange the joint operations of the two states, and to give undue advantage to the enemy. For the due execution of the stipulation in this article, the British Government was to be at liberty to station an officer in each division of the maharajah's army.

The seventh article assumes that the force to be put in motion by the British Government, combined with that actually in the service of India, would be fully sufficient to chastise the Pindarries, and effect the objects of the treaty; and, in consequence, proceeds to provide that, to

prevent the possibility of collusion between the maharajah's officers and the Pindarries, the forces of the former should not be increased during the war without the approval of the British Government. His officers were also prohibited from admitting into the ranks of his army, or otherwise harbouring or protecting, any of the Pindarries, or other freebooters. This article, like two former ones, concludes by denouncing those who may break it, as rebels to Scindia, and enemies of the British Government.

The eighth article was not an unimportant one. It declares that, with a view to the more effectual prosecution of the joint operations of the two governments, and to the facility and security of the communication of the British troops with their supplies, the maharajah, reposing entire confidence in the friendship and good faith of the British Government (which was assuredly far more than the British Government could repose in his), agrees that British garrisons should be admitted into the forts of Hindia and Asseergurh, and should be charged with the care and defence of them during the war, with the liberty of establishing depôts in them. The flag of Scindia was, however, to continue to fly at Asseergurh, and he was at liberty to station a killadar, with a personal guard of fifty men there; but the actual command of the place, as well as of Hindia, and the disposal of the warlike stores in both, were to be exclu-

sively in the British. Some minor regulations followed, with respect to stores, and the movements of the garrisons; and it was stipulated that the territories dependent on the forts should continue to be managed by the officers of the maharajah, who were to receive every support from the British Government and its officers. The whole of the resources, or such part as might be necessary, were to be appropriated to the payment of the troops, as stipulated in the fifth article: an account to be rendered at the conclusion of the war. At the same period, the forts were to be restored in the condition in which they had been received—all private property was to be respected, and the inhabitants of the dependent towns and villages were to enjoy the protection of the British Government, and to be permitted to depart with their property, if they should think proper.

The ninth article provided for an object which the Marquess of Hastings deemed necessary for the attainment of the purposes which he had in view. By a former treaty, the British Government was restrained from entering into any treaty with the rajahs of Oudepore, Joudpore, and Kotah, or other chief tributaries of Dowlut Row Scindia, situated in Malwa, Mewar, or Marwar. Of this provision the governor-general was desirous to procure the abrogation, an alliance with those states being indispensable to the contemplated arrangements for preventing the renewal of the

predatory system; it was accordingly abrogated by the ninth article of the new treaty, upon the ground that the main object of the contracting parties was to prevent for ever the revival of the predatory system in any form, and that both governments were satisfied that to accomplish this wise and just end, it might be necessary for the British Government to form engagements of friendship and alliance with the several states of Hindostan. Full liberty was therefore given to form engagements with the states of Oudepore, Joudpore, and Kotah, with the state of Boondee, and with other substantive states on the left bank of the Chumbul. But the article was not to be construed as giving that government any right to interfere with states or chiefs in Malwa or Guzerat, clearly and indisputably dependent on or tributary to the maharajah, whose authority over those states or chiefs was to continue on the same footing as before. The British Government bound itself, in the event of concluding any engagements with the states of Oudepore, Joudpore, Kotah, Boondee, or any others on the left bank of the Chumbul, to secure to Scindia his ascertained tribute, and to guarantee its payment in perpetuity; Scindia engaging, on no account or pretence, to interfere, in any shape, in the affairs of those states without the concurrence of the British Government.

The tenth article referred to a contingency not

very improbable, the occurrence of which is deprecated with a degree of solemnity which charity must hope to have been sincere. The article is far too good to be abstracted or abridged; it must be given at length, and in its original energy, without alteration or dilution. It runs thus:—"If (which GOD FORBID!) the British Government and the Maharajah shall be compelled to wage war with any other state, on account of such state attacking either of the contracting parties, or aiding or protecting the Pindarries, or other freebooters, the British Government, having at heart the welfare of Dowlut Row Scindia, will, in the event of success, and of his highness's zealous performance of his engagements, make the most liberal arrangements for the consolidation and increase of his territories!!!" The moderation of Dowlut Row Scindia is here as conspicuous as his piety. He prays that Heaven may avert a particular event; but if, notwithstanding, it should take place, he is ready patiently to acquiesce in any advantage it may bring to himself. No one, after reading this, can doubt that Dowlut Row Scindia was a most religious, peaceable, and disinterested person, free from the besetting sins of too many of his fellows—ambition and covetousness; and though willing, as a prudent man ought to be, to take what might honourably fall in his way, desirous, as a good man ought to be, to avoid aggrandizing himself at the expense of his neighbour.

After so rich a display of pious and virtuous feeling, the descent to ordinary language is somewhat painful. It is proper, however, to mention, that the eleventh article provides for the continuance of such objects of the treaty of 1805 as were not affected by the new one, and the twelfth engages for the exchange of ratifications.

Such was the treaty concluded with Scindia by Captain Close, and which provided for all the objects which the Governor-general had in view. It was ratified early in November 1807, and shortly afterwards the ninth article was rendered operative by the conclusion of peace with the Rajpoot states. A treaty with Ameer Khan was also concluded. This person, who has been characterized, and, it is believed, not unjustly, as "one of the most atrocious villains that India ever produced," was, on the whole, fortunate. The British Government agreed to protect him in his possessions on condition of his disbanding his army, surrendering his guns, relinquishing his demi-Pindarrie habits, dissolving his connexion with those plunderers, and keeping better company. Seeing that he was at best but one shade better than those whom the English sought to extirpate, Ameer Khan had certainly reason to felicitate himself upon his good luck.*

* Ameer Khan was a native of Sumbull, in the province of Mooradabad. In early life he, with some followers, were en-

The accession of Scindia to the object upon which the British Government was intent, was a

gaged as Sebundy or local militia, for the collection of the revenue in Malwa. He afterwards became engaged with the Rajpoots against the Mahrattas, from which service he passed into that of a Mahratta chief who was involved in disputes with Bhopal. He then transferred his troops to the service of Holkar, but so feeble was the respect felt for the general, that for half the year his Patna followers were usually in a state of mutiny, and their leader held in restraint by them. After a time he left Holkar and entered the service of the Rajah of Jeypore, who engaged his aid in an approaching contest with the Rajah of Joudpore. The grounds were the following:—The daughter of the Rana of Oudeypore, represented as being distinguished for her beauty no less than her high birth, was betrothed to a Rajah of Joudpore, who died before the marriage could take place. The Rajah of Jeypore then aspired to the hand of the beautiful princess, and would have succeeded but for the interference of the new Rajah of Joudpore, a distant relation of his predecessor. War ensued, and the result was unfavourable to the latter prince: his country was overrun by his enemies, and a supposed son of the late Rajah was proclaimed sovereign. This youth, the validity of whose pretensions was never properly determined, was supported by a chief named Sevai Singh, whom the rival candidate for the throne on this account was anxious to remove: in executing this design he found an instrument in Ameer Khan, whom he had succeeded in detaching from the opposite party. Having received two lacs of rupees in hand, and many promises of future favours, Ameer Khan undertook the desired service; and pretending to be dissatisfied with the ally he had so lately joined, he made overtures of friendship to the minister and protector of the pretender to the throne of Joudpore. The latter was distrustful, but a retainer of Ameer Khan pledged himself for

fatal blow to the hopes of the Pindarries. But Scindia had engaged in the cause much against

the fidelity of his chief, and obtained a promise of a visit. As the time for fulfilling it approached, however, the fears of the expected visitor revived. Ameer Khan, upon learning this, mounted his horse, and proceeded with a few followers to the shrine of a Mahometan saint, close to the walls of Nagpore, where Sevai Singh resided. He was here joined by his intended victim, whom he mildly chid for want of confidence, appealing to the smallness of his retinue as evidence of the honesty of his intentions. Sevai Sing acknowledged himself in error—pledges of friendship and good faith were exchanged, and Ameer Khan, at the tomb of the saint, swore fidelity to his new ally. The next day Sevai Singh visited his friend, by whom he was magnificently received, and with his principal adherents, to the number of two hundred, seated under a large tent. At a given signal the tent fell, and showers of grape and musketry from every direction were poured on those beneath it. Seven hundred horsemen had accompanied Sevai Singh, and remained mounted near the tent. They were attacked, and not more than two hundred escaped. This service was so acceptable to the party for whose benefit it was undertaken, that it is said he actually performed his previous promises to Ameer Khan—a remarkable event in the history of Oriental politics.

After sacking Nagpore, and executing a series of plundering expeditions into various territories, Ameer Khan returned to the court of Holkar, which he assisted in relieving of a man whose ambition threatened to be fatal to the authority of those who, on the insanity of Jeswunt Row, had obtained the reins of power. He then returned to take part in a reconciliaton which had been effected between the rival candidates for the hand of the beautiful Princess of Oudeypore, to complete which it was necessary that the unfortunate cause of the war should cease to

his inclination, and he would have rejoiced in an opportunity of withdrawing from it. The unsettled state of affairs in the Deccan materially affected his zeal, and there is no reason to doubt that, at this period, he extended to certain bodies of the Pindarries a degree of countenance and support. The success of the British arms at Poona and Nagpore, however, turned the scale, and Scindia thought it best to remain faithful to his engagements. The Marquess of Hastings was sanguine enough to believe, or at least to profess to believe, that "former estrangement had given place to entire cordiality and friendship." The "entire cordiality and friendship" entertained by Scindia, must have been qualities very different from what are usually understood by those terms. He was not capable of feeling them towards any state or any individual, and least of all could he feel them in relation to the British, whom he hated as much as he feared them.

It has been seen that the military preparations against the Pindarries were on a great scale; but, in truth, those lawless hordes were beaten rather

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live. Ameer Khan urged upon her father the necessity of putting her to death, but in vain. Her aunt was less scrupulous; she presented to the victim a poisoned chalice, which was received and the contents swallowed. Ameer Khan then resumed his old habits of indiscriminate pillage, which he continued till the clemency of the British Government saved him from destruction.

in the cabinet than in the field, and the history of their suppression is rather a detail of negociations than of war. When the British troops crossed the Nerbudda, a special and confidential Bramin was despatched by Scindia to some of the principal chiefs, warning them to keep at a distance, as he was so situated as to be unable to protect them. The operations of Sir John Malcolm were principally directed against Cheetoo, whose name and character are already known to the reader. But Cheetoo had no desire to await the British force, and he fled with Pindarrie precipitation. Sir John Malcolm was prepared for a conflict, but in running he was no match for the agile freebooters, who consequently escaped. About the same time, Lieut.-col. Adams approached the camp of Kurreem Khan, and Major-general Maitland advanced on that of Wassil Mahomed, another chief, but both deemed it prudent to retire. This was the case whenever an attempt was made to attack the Pindarries; their aptitude for flying rendered conflict impossible, and pursuit ineffectual.

It will now be necessary to advert to a power once very important, but, at this period, sunk almost beneath contempt. When it became a fashion to tender adhesions to the British cause, a secret message was received from the notorious Toolsee Bhye, expressing a desire to place the young Holkar, his family and court, under British protection. Subsequently to the insanity of Jes-

wunt Row Holkar, the state had fallen into a degree of ruin barely short of dissolution. The government, such as it was, appeared well-disposed towards the British, and the principal apparent difficulty was interposed by a licentious soldiery, who preyed upon a country which they ought to have protected. A change, however, took place in the feeling of the government, arising, it was understood, out of the altered relations between the British and the Peishwa; and Holkar's army commenced its march to the southward, with the avowed intention of supporting that prince. Sir John Malcolm, abandoning the pursuit of Cheetoo, drew towards Oojein, near which place Holkar's force had arrived; Sir Thomas Hislop, rapidly advancing on the same point, effected a junction with Sir John Malcolm, and this occasioned the renewal of negociations. These, however, proceeded languidly and unsatisfactorily, and were ended by a sudden revolution, in which the regent, Toolsee Bhye, perished, a life of profligacy being terminated by a violent death.* All power was now in the hands of the

* Toolsee Bhye was a *protége* of a sectarian priest, whose reputed sanctity obtained him a local celebrity; and but that the priesthood of the sect to which the holy father belonged were subjected to the obligation of celibacy, she would have been believed to be his daughter. She was possessed of extraordinary beauty, and a Mahratta adventurer, named Shamrow Madik, conceived the design of advancing his own fortunes by

Patan chiefs, whose first exercise of it was to plunder the foraging parties of the British.

Sir Thomas Hislop advanced upon the enemy, whom he found advantageously posted on the left bank of the Soopra, nearly opposite to Mahidpore, their left flank protected by the bed of the river, and their right by a difficult ravine. Their line, which could be approached only by one ford, practicable for guns, was protected by several ruined

bringing her to the notice of Jeswunt Row Holkar. It is true that the lady was already married, but this was regarded as a very slight impediment to the plan. Toolsee Bhye was thrown in the way of Holkar, who was instantly captivated: in a few days she was conducted to his zenana, and her liege lord to a prison. The lingering tenderness of the wife, however, was exercised to effect the release of the husband, and he was dismissed with a horse, a dress, and a small sum of money, to console him for his loss. Toolsee Bhye henceforward ruled the fate of Jeswunt Row, and on that potentate becoming insane, she succeeded to the regency. On his death, Toolsee Bhye, having no child, adopted Mulhar Row Holkar, the son of Jeswunt Row by another woman. Her career was marked by gross licentiousness and great cruelty. A conspiracy having been formed to destroy her, the young prince was enticed from a tent where he was playing, and Toolsee Bhye was arrested. All access to her was prohibited, and, finally, she was conducted to the bank of a river, where she was beheaded, and her body thrown into the water. The tragedy took place at dawn of day, and though her piercing cries awakened many from their sleep, no one moved hand or foot, or raised a voice to save her. At the time of the catastrophe Toolsee Bhye was under thirty years of age.

villages. Perceiving that the bed of the river would afford considerable cover to the troops while forming, Sir Thomas Hislop determined to attack the enemy in front, and ordered the advance of the columns to the ford. The light troops immediately formed, and were followed by the horse artillery, which opened on the enemy's guns. Another battery of the foot artillery played from the right bank of the river in a direction which enfiladed some troops which the enemy had placed upon the left. The troops, as they arrived, were successively formed in the bed of the river, and took up the stations assigned them. A brigade of infantry having advanced to storm the enemy's batteries, a general attack ensued. The fire was destructive, but the troops pressed forward, regardless of it. The enemy maintained their post with great resolution, and continued to serve their guns till disabled by the bayonet from performing that duty. Their whole line was, however, forced at every point, and a brillant charge by two brigades of cavalry, led by Lieutenant-colonel Russell and Major Lushington, completed the rout. The action lasted three hours, and terminated in the capture of the enemy's artillery, amounting to seventy pieces of ordnance, and the complete defeat and dispersion of their army, with a loss of three thousand men. The loss of the British was severe, but the victory was decisive as it was brilliant. The prostrate govern-

ment of Holkar sued for peace, and it was granted on conditions not severe.*

* By one of the conditions the cession to the British Government of certain possessions in Kandeish was stipulated for. In the reduction of one of these, Talneir, an event occurred which seems to cast some degree of discredit on the British name. The killadar was summoned to surrender, but took no notice of the message. Preparations were accordingly made for an attack. The killadar then sent to solicit terms. He was desired to open his gates, and surrender unconditionally, which he promised to do; but, some delay taking place, the guns and a party of Europeans were brought to the first gate, which, however, was entered by a wicket without opposition. The next gate was forced open, and at the third the killadar came out and surrendered himself. The European party then passed through another gate, and proceeded to a fifth, which led into the body of the place. This was shut, and the Arabs within demanded terms. After a time the wicket was opened, and a few officers and grenadiers entering were immediately attacked, and several of them killed. This being perceived by the British force without, the main gate was blown open, and the operation of storming commenced. The garrison, consisting of about three hundred men, sheltered themselves for a time in the houses, but were ultimately all put to the sword—"a severe example, indeed," said Sir Thomas Hislop, under whose command the proceedings took place; "but absolutely necessary, and one which I have no doubt will produce the most salutary effect on the future operations in this province."

This part of the affair seems to have been marked by a degree of ferocity not usual where British feelings prevail; but it may not be just to scrutinize too nicely the conduct of men in the heat of action when impressed with a belief that treachery has been employed against them. The worst part

Under the provisions of the treaty with Scindia, Jeswunt Rao Bho, one of the most turbulent of his sirdars, had been committed to the counsel of

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of the proceedings remains to be told. Immediately after the place fell the killadar was hanged by order of the general in command, who, in the despatch in which he reported the transaction, expressed a doubt whether he was accessory to the treachery of his men. It might have been well to remove this doubt before having recourse to so violent a measure. The general, indeed, consoled himself by the conclusion that, if innocent of the treachery, the hanging of the killadar was justifiable on account of his resistance in the first instance—a point, however, which is by no means clear.

But, whatever the guilt of the killadar, the right of punishment (did it ever exist) had been waved by accepting his surrender. There was no evidence of his participation in the alleged treachery of the garrison which he had abandoned, and not only so, but it is not certain that anything deserving the name of treachery was perpetrated. The Arabs had asked for terms, but none had been granted or offered them; and it does not appear that they had ever proposed an unconditional surrender. The fact of a wicket being open cannot be construed to imply such a proposal. Unattended by any intimation of submission, it can be regarded only as a *ruse*, which, unfortunately, was too successful. We cannot but lament the loss of the brave men who were its victims; but the character of the transaction must not be determined by the measure of mischief which it produced to the British. The Arabs, it is true, were not justified in resisting after the surrender of the place by the killadar, but they were a set of men unacquainted with the ordinary usages of war, and retaining the wild notions of the race to which they belonged.

With respect to the killadar, it may further be observed, that had he been cognizant of the intentions of his men, the

Capt. Caulfield, who was to reside at his head-quarters at Jawud. This circumstance, however, did not prevent Jeswunt from encouraging and harbouring the Pindarries, and the remonstrances of Capt. Caulfield were without effect. Major-general Brown, in consequence, moved to support Capt. Caulfield's representations by the presence of an armed force. A squadron of British cavalry attempting to intercept the flight of a body of Pindarries, were fired at both from the town and the camp; upon which the general ordered out his whole line, and determined on the immediate assault of all Jeswunt's posts. They were carried in succession, and the town taken by storm, while Jeswunt himself narrowly escaped being made prisoner.

Wherever the British arms were turned they were successful; and the Pindarries, who had received protection principally from Scindia and Holkar, were left without resource. Driven from the lands which they had acquired, either by force or concession, they sought in vain for a place of security for their families and effects. Pressed on every quarter by the British detachments, a large portion abandoned themselves to despair; numbers relinquished their

probability is that he would not have placed himself in the power of the British. The authority of a native commander of native troops usually presses but lightly, and misfortune or fear dissipate it altogether.

homes, fled into the jungles, and there perished miserably. Many died by the hands of the village population, whose vengeance was every where roused by the remembrance of their former cruelties. Others fell in rencontres with regular troops. Some of the leaders sought the mercy of the conquerors, and among them Kurreem Khan. Cheetoo's horde survived rather longer than the rest, but it suffered severely in several abortive attempts to penetrate into Guzzerat, and was completely broken up in trying to gain its old lodgment on the Nerbudda. Cheetoo and his son then went to Bhopal, with the intention of submitting; but, from some unexplained cause, abandoned their design, and fled to the Mahadeo hills, where they joined Appa Sahib. They proceeded together to Asseer, and there separating, Cheetoo soon met a most appropriate end, being slain in the jungles by a tiger. His son fell into the hands of the British Government, and was indebted to its bounty for the means of life.

The annihilation of these miscreants, as a distinct and recognized body, was complete. A large portion perished, and those who preserved life, settled down into more lawful occupations. The sound policy of their suppression is unquestionable, and it was the more meritorious in those who undertook it, because in such a contest no glory could be obtained.

CHAPTER XIV.

DISTURBANCES AT BAREILLY.

THE reader who has merely a general knowledge of India, is apt to think of its people in the same way as of the Dutch or the Portuguese: he considers them as marked by strong national peculiarities, which extend with perfect uniformity over the vast tract of country known by the name of India. In the former part of this judgment he is right—the latter is at variance with truth. There are certain leading traits of character which not only distinguish the people of India, but which appertain to all the inhabitants of the East; but the slightest reflection upon the extent of the country, upon the numerous races of which its people are composed, and of the varied circumstances in which they have been placed, might induce a suspicion that great diversity of character might be expected, and local observation would

shew that such diversity actually prevails. Timidity is generally believed to be one main feature in the native character, and, to a great extent, the belief is well founded. Nevertheless, there are exceptions to be made and degrees to be noted. The Mahometans, for the most part, are less timid than the Hindoos; and many tribes of each class evince far less of this quality than the majority of their fellows. In certain spots, entire communities are met with, whose activity and daring would seem to characterize them as rather of European than Asiatic origin. These are the men with whom it is most difficult for a foreign Government to deal. An excess of rigour may provoke resistance—an excess of indulgence, by exciting a belief of the weakness of the ruling power, may readily lead to the same result. An union of moderation with firmness is the only policy upon which a Government so circumstanced can be entitled to rely, and a very slight failing in the due admixture of these wholesome ingredients may be fatal.

Of the description of natives last adverted to are a large proportion of the inhabitants of Rohilcund. In this province the number of Mahometans, in proportion to that of Hindoos, far exceeds what is usually found in other parts of India. By some, the Mahometans have been supposed to constitute nearly half the population, and if this estimate be exaggerated, its existence is sufficient

to shew that the proportion must be large to have given rise to such a calculation. These Mahometans were of Afghan race, and emigrated about the beginning of the eighteenth century. They are represented as high-spirited, sanguinary, and revengeful—strongly attached to a military life, but impatient of the restraints of European discipline. Great numbers of them had served under Holkar, and at the period under consideration, many found a refuge in the service of their countryman Ameer Khan. A numerous body, however, remained unemployed and in great distress: they consequently were ready to embrace any chance that appeared to promise subsistence and distinction, and even to accelerate the tardy career of fortune by fomenting discontent and disturbance.

Some curious particulars of the state of society existing in Rohilcund are related in two papers submitted by Mr. Strachey to the Court of Nizamut Adawlut. These papers were drawn up eleven years before the occurrence of the transactions about to be related, but the changes wrought in the intermediate period were not sufficient to render Mr. Strachey's statements inapplicable. It appears that robberies were much less frequent throughout the ceded provinces than in the lower provinces, and the reason assigned by Mr. Strachey for this fact is, not the supremacy of the law, but *the reliance of the natives upon their own prowess,*

and their habit of standing by each other in the event of being attacked. "The grand object of law and police," says the writer, "security of person and property, is better accomplished here by the spirit of the people than in Bengal by the Regulations." The number of crimes reported, it appears, was small, and the number of offenders taken and brought to justice, when compared with the number of cases reported, was larger than might have been expected.

One remarkable and characteristic feature in the criminal statistics of Rohilcund was, that while offences against property were few, cases of homicide in all its gradations of guilt were comparatively of frequent occurrence. They were mostly the acts of individuals proceeding upon their own impulses, without concert or confederacy with others. They rarely originated in a desire for plunder, but generally had their rise in revenge, jealousy, wounded pride, or the sudden impulse of anger; but there was an exception of an extraordinary character, and which was not less detestable than anomalous. The murder of children, for the sake of the ornaments which they wore, was one of the most common crimes, and this horrible fact tends very much to lower our estimation of a people, who, with many of the vices of half-civilized nations, were supposed to possess many of the sterner and ruder virtues. That the *really brave should, under any circumstances,*

imbue their hands in the blood of childhood, seems almost impossible: the fact that this cowardly crime was perpetrated in furtherance of petty robbery, is calculated to increase the disgust with which it must be regarded by all who retain the slightest tinge of humanity; and the alleged security of property in Rohilcund loses half its value in the well constituted mind, when it thus appears to have arisen from no better motive than fear. Property was safe in the hands of those who had the strength to protect it; but weakness afforded lawful prey: the property which had no better guardian than infant innocence was seized without scruple, and the blood of its bearer shed without remorse. It is the disclosure of facts like these which reduces uncivilized and semi-civilized life to their true dimensions; and it is the concealment of them which has led to the absurd belief of the superior excellence of the savage, and the gradual deterioration of man by civilization. If any virtue is of such hardy nature as to flourish best when deprived of the fostering hand of cultivation—a point more than doubtful —it is certain that, in a state of lawlessness, all the vices shoot out and fructify in wild and rank luxuriance. Man, untaught and unrestrained, may, for a time, and under favourable circumstances, manifest certain attractive qualities, and appear to be actuated by pure and *elevated* motives; but the appearance is fallacious; when

his passions are roused and his fears at rest, his real character will become apparent, to the confusion of those theories which place the excellence of human nature in the nearest possible approach to the state of the brutes which prowl the jungle.*

The crimes by which Rohilcund was distinguished found a ready excuse in the prevalence among the Mahometans of the doctrine of fatalism: and the same convenient belief afforded consolation under the consequent punishment. Mr. Strachey represents the following confession as a fair sample of those which were usually made: "I was provoked—I was impelled by fate to kill the deceased—all must die at the hour appointed—no one can struggle against destiny—it was written, his time was come." Thus the assassin

* The extraordinary crime which has given rise to the above remarks, suggested to Mr. Strachey a very extraordinary remedy. He seriously proposed to prohibit the wearing of gold and silver ornaments by children, and to enforce the prohibition by the forfeiture of the ornaments or some other penalty. This fancy of depriving persons of their property because that property is liable to be invaded by lawless men, is about as rational as it would be to forbid men to eat in order to secure them from the inconveniences of indigestion, or to sleep lest they should be murdered while in a state of unconsciousness. But law projectors have indulged in strange flights. An amusing book might be written on the "*Freaks of Legislators*," from Draco to Jeremy Bentham.

convinced himself that he was but a cog in the wheel of fate, performing his appointed part in the revolution of human events; and in the sentiments he avowed, he spoke those of his countrymen generally. Exertions, they said, were ineffectual to contend with a power in whose hands man is but a mere instrument—it was the part of mortals to resign themselves, and abstain from useless attempts to alter the established course of things. It is plain that, where the doctrines of fatalism are received, a door is opened for the wildest indulgence of the passions. The restraints of prudence as well as those of principle are removed, the fatalist arguing, "if it is decreed that I am to suffer, suffer I must; on the other hand, if fate has awarded me impunity, nothing can assail me or endanger my safety." It is an error to suppose that men's opinions exercise little influence over their actions. If, unfortunately, they are too often unavailing for good, it is beyond doubt that they are found powerfully efficient for evil.

Among such a people, neither the British Government, nor any regular government, could be popular. The country had been separated at no remote period from the dominion of Oude, one of the worst governed states in the world. Its zemindars had been accustomed to exercise a degree of power which, under the British Government, it was found necessary to control, by sub-

jecting all classes to the operation of the law. This was regarded as an insufferable grievance by the zemindars, and though the condition of the ryots was decidedly improved, the feeling of habitual dependance upon their chief was so strong, that it was difficult either to shake it, or to excite a counteracting feeling among the people in favour of their own rights. This state of things is depicted by Mr. Strachey with some force. He says, "deprive the ryots of a necessary of life, and they sit silent; nobody cares for them, and they cannot help themselves. But take from their chief the management of the police, which he exercised only to oppress them; restrain him from disturbing the peace of the country, and he will prevail upon them to take up arms in his cause, and contend in a hopeless desperate enterprize against all the powers of government civil and military. Such are our subjects—they resist authority without pretence of right or hope of success. Their disorders afford no signs of grievance or even of discontent."

The upper classes disliked the regular administration of law, and when the cause of their dislike is traced, it will increase the surprise felt at their having been able to induce the inferior classes to support them. According to Mr. Strachey, when a native of rank was asked what part of the established system was obnoxious to him, he would answer, "that which reduces me to a level with

my domestics and labourers." By the same authority it is stated, that "a man of high caste and wealth, conceiving that he possesses superior rights and privileges, thinks himself disgraced by being called into court on any occasion." He had an aversion also to be examined publicly as a witness. "Is my testimony," says he, "rated no higher than that of my servants and coolies, and am I to stand on an equality with them, and reply as a criminal to their petty complaints for an assault or abusive language?" The dissatisfaction, therefore, originated in that which has generally been esteemed the perfection and glory of law—its impartiality and non-respect for persons.

Some auxiliary grounds of complaint were resorted to, as is usual in such cases, and the never-failing ones of the expense and delay of judicial proceedings were not forgotten. Upon this part of the subject, the observations of Mr. Strachey appear very just. "Supposing it," he says, "to be true that these evils exist to a great degree, such evils should not be charged to the introduction of our system as its most characteristic marks. Let not the present be compared to a state of things never known here, when justice was cheap and expeditious, but with that which certainly did heretofore exist, *viz.* one in which there was no justice at all to be got; where the important sacred duty of redressing injuries and punishing crimes depended upon the tyranny and caprices

of a revenue officer, who either entirely disregarded the duty, or by corruption and abuse made it a source of profit." After thus pointing out the real objects to be compared, Mr. Strachey might well say: "It is, indeed, extraordinary that it should, with any one, ever become doubtful whether the country actually derives benefit from such a change as has taken place; when for rapacity and injustice is substituted a system of mildness, humanity, liberality,—in a word, of justice—of justice, the acknowledged source of moral relations, the only solid basis of legitimate government. Is it to no purpose that our government, at an immense expense, maintains its judicial establishments, that so large a portion of its servants is occupied, in diligently and conscientiously inquiring into and redressing the wrongs of individuals? The same people, heretofore accustomed to look for extortion and violence at the hands of their rulers, without appeal or hope of remedy, may now see public officers the most respectable for rank and station and connexions, if accused of malversation, undergo a strict impartial open trial. When they see such things, I cannot but believe they acknowledge the blessings conferred upon them by their new rulers. They will not at least deny that our intentions are good, and that we appear to be guided by principles of equity and justice, and to have their welfare at heart more than their old rulers had.

It is scarcely possible for an unprejudiced mind to doubt the superiority of our government, when firmly established, to the native governments. To do so is to compare anarchy, oppression, and wretchedness, with justice, moderation, peace, and security."

From these opinions few persons of sound judgment will dissent, nor from the mode in which Mr. Strachey accounts for the hostility of some of the zemindars. "They seem," he says, "to forget or to value not the advantages they derive from our system of justice and general security. They remember only the power which most of them made a bad use of. To protect the ryots from violence and extortion within, and from the depredations of barbarous enemies from without, gains us the good-will of the weak and helpless only—of those whose voice is not heard—of those who have been ever led or driven by a master."

The views of Mr. Strachey are, to a certain extent, confirmed by the report of the commissioners appointed to inquire into the disturbances at Bareilly in 1816. They represent our courts of justice to be viewed as a grievance by the upper classes, and not as a blessing by the lower. With regard to the majority of the latter, the commissioners add, that the expense of our courts rendered them scarcely accessible, and their delay nearly useless. This charge had been answered by anticipation by Mr. Strachey. In comparing

the previous state of Rohilcund with that which then existed, the comparison was not between a good system of law and a badone, or between two systems of law, both good or both bad—it was between law and no law. The habits of the people of Rohilcund might lead them to prefer the latter half of the alternative; but it does not follow that their preference was just, or that it was a choice worthy of encouragement or even of indulgence: and when it was added that the personal punishments, to which men were liable in the criminal courts, rendered them more an object of terror than of gratitude for the protection of life and property, it may be asked, to whom were the criminal courts objects of terror? If to evil-doers, this was precisely what was intended, and the system worked well. If to the people at large, may not a further question be put? May it not be asked whether the opinions of a large proportion of the population on the subject of government were not rather loose, and their estimate of the value of human life but moderate? By such persons all restraint is felt as a grievance. An institution for the promotion of chastity would be unpopular in a community of debauchees. An institution for the preservation of life and property must also be unpopular with a people who regarded both as the lawful prize of the stronger. The freebooter and the pirate thank you not for the most perfect system of law that can be de-

vised. Exactly in proportion to the degree in which it approaches perfection, will be their hatred of it. True, that they are protected in their lawful rights as well as others, but they will readily forego this boon for the pleasure of preying upon their neighbours. To such men, a court of justice is a trap, and a judge a common enemy. Even with better disposed persons, the expectation entertained by the Commissioners, of finding gratitude the return of good government, was somewhat utopian. Gratitude towards individuals is not so common as the lover of our species could wish; gratitude to the state is still less frequent; the share which falls even to the wisest and most beneficent governors is small indeed.

Some minor sources of complaint, adverted to by the commissioners, might rest on a more solid basis of grievance. The indiscriminate and officious zeal of the officers of the courts, the agency of common informers, the practice of summary arrests and of domiciliary visits, were alleged to have produced an injurious effect upon the public mind, extending far beyond the sphere of their occurrence. In all these reprehensible transactions, however, it may be observed that the instruments were natives, and the practices complained of were clearly also of native origin. The law retainers of the courts, the informers and barrators, were the countrymen of those whom they injured or annoyed; and summary arrests and domiciliary

visitations are certainly not processes of English growth. The European functionaries may have consented to adopt them, but there can be little doubt that the modes of proceeding, as well as the accusations, were suggested by those who hoped to profit by them. This will not, indeed, excuse the English authorities who incautiously lent themselves to such acts and such agents, but it removes from them the infamy of having planned the one or created the other. The tools of despotism were ready to their hands, and they can only be charged with a deficiency of moral determination in not having indignantly cast them away. Under the native rule, tyranny, extortion, and outrage were universal. A better system was introduced by the British, but those who administered it had recourse to such agency as native materials afforded. If this were not of the best description—and it would perhaps be no exaggeration to affirm that it was of the very worst—the misfortune was great, but the British Government is not to be condemned for it. In countries which stand the highest in civilization and morals, and under the purest administration of law, the lower emissaries of the courts are among the dregs and refuse of society. In India, this class of persons has always been pre-eminent in all that is base and vile, and it would be strange indeed if Rohilcund had formed an exception.

Upon the whole, the truth will be found to be,

that there was some small share of grievance, and a very large amount of discontent—that discontent arising from the lawless propensities of the people generally, from the mortified ambition of the upper classes, and the miserable poverty of the lower. Previously to its cession to the British, the country had, by misgovernment, been reduced to a state almost of desolation; and though it had subsequently improved, yet it must be remembered, that fourteen years is but a short period for raising a country from ruin to prosperity. The misery of the people, and the turbulence of their leaders, were elements powerfully adapted to coalesce in the production of an explosion. The privations and sufferings of the lower classes were borne by them with sullen indifference, if not with patience—and little danger to the state might have arisen from this source; but the people of Rohilcund were actuated by a fanatical attachment to their chiefs, which induced them to follow wherever their superior would lead them. This feeling was altogether independent of the popularity of the chieftain, or of any claim which he might have upon the affections of his followers. It had nothing to do with the justice of his cause, and was even uninfluenced by his good or ill fortune. Men are always found in abundance to gather round the standard of a tyrant, so long as his career is one of victory; but the adherence of the people of Rohilcund to their oppressors seems

to have had no reference to their success. The followers of a proscribed robber remained attached to him when misfortune had deprived him of all power of rewarding their services, and when hope itself was lost. Their fidelity was the effect of mere habit; but it afforded the chiefs a powerful instrument for thwarting and annoying the government, whenever their caprice or calculation led them to employ it. The country was prepared for change of any sort, and by applying a very small portion of the principle of fermentation, the entire mass might be put in motion.

In the district of Bareilly, this was found in the attempt to introduce certain police regulations, which had been carried into effect without difficulty through the greater part of the territories subject to the presidency of Bengal. These arrangements, however, involved certain fiscal regulations which were eagerly seized, at Bareilly, as a ground for dissatisfaction and resistance.—A new tax is not a very popular thing any where. In India, the amount of reluctance which most men feel at parting with their money, is increased by the rooted aversion to change. In the East, the land has been regarded as the legitimate object of taxation, almost as exclusively and scrupulously as by Turgot and his brother economists. However oppressive the burdens imposed upon the soil may be, they rarely give rise to resistance; but any thing resembling a personal

tax has always been regarded by the people of India with great dislike, and the attempt to levy an impost of such a nature has generally been unsuccessful, often dangerous. There was, in the present instance, some encouragement to resistance afforded by the success which had attended earlier experiments in the art of agitation. A police-tax and a house-tax, previously imposed, had both been surrendered to popular disapprobation, and the people were, it appears, sufficiently versed in philosophy to expect the recurrence of similar effects from the operation of similar causes.

It seems also that the inhabitants of Bareilly were decided advocates for "the voluntary principle." A sort of police establishment had previously existed, the expense of which was defrayed by voluntary contributions. The persons retained on this service received generally the magnificent allowance of one rupee per month, and in no case more than two. The number of these well-paid supporters of the social system was determined by the amount of contributions which could be obtained from any particular street or portion of a street; and in making the new arrangements, the Government consulted the Indian love of unchanging continuity, by making the assessment with reference to the number of chokeedars formerly retained by voluntary contributions. As, however, the new chokeedars were to have a salary

of three rupees per month, the amount of contribution was increased, as well as its character changed from a voluntary to a compulsory payment.

The wish of Government, of course, was to carry its object quietly and securely, and the magistrate appears to have been desirous, in this respect, of forwarding the views of his superiors; but no one acquainted with Indian affairs can be ignorant how frequently the good intentions of the European authorities have been frustrated by the perverseness or treachery of native servants; and a fresh example was here afforded.

A native agent, to whom fell the duty of collecting the assessment, discharged his duty in a manner the most overbearing and offensive. The official insolence of a functionary of humble rank, and of very low origin, could not fail to provoke the higher classes of a people like those of Rohilcund. But this man, it was said—and the charge was credited by the commissioners appointed to inquire into the transaction—not content with demanding in an offensive manner that which he was entitled to collect, demanded in some instances rates far exceeding those which his authority warranted him to receive. Thinking, too, with one of the heroes in the history of John Bull, that punishment is of the very essence of law, this functionary was determined that the means of inflicting it should not be wanting. For the benefit of the lower classes, an additional number of

stocks was erected at each police chokee, while the higher order of the inhabitants were consoled by the assurance, that an adequate quantity of fetters was in preparation for their use. To convince the people of the folly of resisting the law, the kotwul is represented as having adopted a very extraordinary method, by telling them that the present was only the commencement of a series of imposts, all which were to follow in due order, to the amount of sixteen or eighteen. Whether this assertion originated with the kotwul, or in some quarter more avowedly hostile to the British influence, has been made matter of doubt; but it has also been questioned, and with much appearance of reason, whether the kotwul, while thus exerting a "vigour beyond the law," in the ostensible service of the British Government, was not actually in the interest of the opposite party, and labouring assiduously to undermine that which, in appearance, he was so officiously zealous to support.

It was currently reported, that the kotwul connived at the first indications of tumult, and even assisted in the councils which led to them; that, like many patriots everywhere, and all disturbers in the East, he had a nice perception of the propriety of an alliance between the public good and his own private interest; that he commanded certain parties to inform the shopkeepers, that if they would raise a sum of money for his benefit,

the tax should be relinquished; that, in consequence, a douceur of four thousand rupees was tendered, and that the consideration for this fee afforded by the kotwul was, his advice to the subscribers to pursue a plan which had been tried in other places, that of deserting their houses and encamping round the magistrate's residence.

It seems, for various reasons, extraordinary that this person should have been selected for the discharge of duties requiring, under the circumstances, no small portion of address, and the efficient performance of which would have been materially aided by the employment of a popular agent. Previously to the occurrence of the disturbances, the kotwul was highly unpopular, and there is reason to believe most deservedly so. He was accused of various acts of extortion and oppression: the truth of these charges was not, indeed, inquired into, but the evil reputation of the man would have well justified the selection of an agent more acceptable to the community. To the upper classes, he was peculiarly offensive. It is admitted that he was a vulgar and illiterate villager, of overbearing temper and coarse manners. His claims to the confidence of Government appear to have been small: he might have rendered some service in the lower and muddier details of fiscal operation, but he was himself in the position of a violator of the law, and a defaulter with regard to the just claims of the state.

It was observed by Mr. Colebrooke, that the records of the Board of Revenue shewed many instances of his official authority having been exerted to the detriment of Government, both directly in the assessment of the estates belonging to his own family, and indirectly, by encroachments on the estates of his neighbours. The latter system of operations was facilitated by the summary powers vested in his office, every department of which he had taken care to fill with his own relations and connexions. The consequence was, that no aggrieved person would venture to prosecute him, and no vakeel would take part against him. His own estates he had managed to exonerate altogether from the payment of rent or assessment. Confiscation he despised, for no one dared to make an offer for the property which was protected by his name: he was thus enabled for four years to set the collectors at defiance, and to hold his property free from the demands of the state. Such was the man who was the prime agent in producing the mischief at Bareilly.

What effect might have been produced by the presence of a larger number of European civil servants, it is impossible to conjecture; but it happened, at the period of the insurrection, that few of them were in the town. The senior and third judges of the Courts of Appeal were absent on circuit; the fourth judge had proceeded to Benares, and the collector of the revenue was engaged in

the interior of the district. The entire weight of responsibility, therefore, rested on the magistrate.

Among those who played the most conspicuous parts in the drama acted at Bareilly, was mooftee Mahomed Ewery, a person of great influence among the Mahometans. His first public appearance on the scene was on the 27th March, when he became the channel of transmitting to the magistrate a petition, alleged to emanate from the inhabitants at large. This office he professed to have undertaken with reluctance. The truth of this was not, however, ascertained, nor was it known whether he had previously exerted any influence, direct or indirect, either in aid of the government, or in opposition to their measures; or whether he had remained altogether neuter. In the absence of all evidence to the contrary, he must, therefore, enjoy the benefit of having done nothing to thwart the proceedings of an authority he professed to respect.

The petition itself was confined to generalities. The exactions and extortions, which were believed to have been committed in carrying the new measure into operation, were not even noticed. The tax was simply denounced as a public grievance, and the same tone was preserved in numerous placards published in the town. The resistance to the tax, was one of those movements not altogether unknown in more

western countries, but little expected in the East. A common spirit pervaded the whole people. As in similar movements in countries boasting a higher degree of knowledge and civilization, the larger portion of those engaged knew not why they resisted; it was sufficient for them that their neighbours set the example. Every man was ready to submit, if submission became general; but every man was determined to resist, so long as resistance was the fashion. They were embarked in a common struggle, for a common object; and though the sense of individual grievance might refresh the energy of some, it was the force of habit and association which gave to their opposition coherence and steadiness.

The period of the presentation of the petition was marked by a tumultuous assemblage of the people; in consequence of which, some of the parties engaged in it were apprehended; but it was not until the 16th April that the insurrection assumed the formidable character which it ultimately bore. On that day, the kotwulee peons were actively engaged in enforcing the levy of the chokeedaree assessment, and in the course of their progress, they broke forcibly into the house of a woman, for the purpose of distraining property to realize her proportion of the contribution. A scuffle ensued, in which the owner of the house was wounded; this was a fortunate circumstance for the cause of the opposers of

the tax. The suffering female was a martyr in the cause of liberty, and was treated with all the honours due to such a character. She was placed upon a bed, and carried to the mooftee; the mooftee advised the bearers to take her to the magistrate, which they did, and the magistrate referred the woman for redress to the Adawlut. This course was certainly neither humane nor judicious. Whenever it is necessary to enforce the law by extreme measures, the greatest caution and forbearance should be employed. Both prudence and good feeling call for these qualities; and as they are seldom possessed by the lower emissaries of the law, it is the especial duty of their superiors to enforce them. This is, however, a duty rarely attended to in any country. The lower class of legal functionaries, who, as as a matter of necessity, must be in a great degree destitute of all the better qualities of man, are almost invariably left to riot uncontrolled in the display of vulgar insolence and brutal inhumanity. Since such is the case in countries where rational law and well-defined liberty have long been established, we need not be surprised if it was the same in Rohilcund; and though it is impossible to approve the apathy of the magistrate, we must not condemn him too severely, recollecting that he is kept in countenance by the practice of all his brethren throughout the world. A petty officer of the law is always to be sus-

pected. Unfortunately, magistrates and judges act upon the opposite presumption, that he is always to be trusted. It is a fatal mistake for the well-being of society, for the cause of public morality, and for the character of the law.

The advice of the magistrate was as little acceptable to the people as might be expected. Disappointed in obtaining summary justice, the procession returned to the mooftee, and declared the result of their application. If the conduct of the magistrate was marked by indifference, that of the mooftee was certainly characterized by an ample degree of warmth. The story of the populace not only roused his indignation, and awoke all the energy of his patriotism, but, according to his own representation, excited his personal fears. On hearing the relation of what had passed before the magistrate, he exclaimed that, if such were the magistrate's justice, no person's life or honour was safe within the town, and that, therefore, it was high time for him to leave it. It is not likely that the mooftee then felt any apprehension for his personal safety; but a circumstance which occurred immediately afterwards might perhaps give rise to a feeling, which previously he thought it expedient to simulate. The continuance of the tumult necessarily called for the interposition of the magistrate. He proceeded in person, with a lieutenant and a party of sepoys, for the purpose of putting an end to the tumult and dispers-

ing the mob. The mooftee had quitted his house, either under the influence of the impressions which he had avowed, or from some other cause, and the fact of his meeting the magistrate with an armed force was calculated to strengthen any fears he might previously have entertained, or to excite apprehension if it had not before existed. Conscious of the part he had acted, he might not unnaturally suppose that the magistrate meditated his arrest. It is true that the force was small, but it was sufficient for this purpose, and consequently not to be despised.

In cases of petty riot, the sight of troops generally operates as a complete sedative. In the instance before us, this was not the case. The Government force, being assailed by the mob and by the servants of the mooftee, was compelled to act in its own defence. It has been questioned whether the attacks were made in a serious spirit of resistance, or whether they were only intended to facilitate the escape of the mooftee. Whatever the motive, the result was lamentable; for several of the rioters were killed. Among those who fell were two persons connected with the mooftee. This sacrifice of human life was rendered unavoidable by the proceedings of the insurgents, and neither the magistrate nor the military can be blamed for it. It was, however, little calculated to calm the irritation which existed, or to render the new levy popular. The

life of man, indeed, is not highly estimated in the East, and the people of Rohilcund were by no means remarkable for tenderness with regard to it. But it must be remembered, that two of the slain were adherents of the mooftee—this was a heinous scandal; but what was still worse, it unfortunately happened that, in the confusion the respected eyebrow of the mooftee himself received the indignity of a scratch. This outrage was more than Mahometan patience could bear. Sacrilege was now added to exaction, and the enthusiasm of the votaries of the prophet was raised to boiling heat. The old tale—threadbare and ridiculous as it was—of the intention of the British to force Christianity on India, was revived, and since fanaticism sees all that it chooses to see, and nothing besides, it need not be doubted that the charge was believed. The never-extinguished hope of once more beholding the standard of the prophet wave in triumph over every spot formerly subjected to Mahometan rule, revived, as it never *fails to revive*, whenever circumstances present the slightest symptoms of encouragement. The object was no longer resistance to an unpopular tax, nor contention for a civil right; the dispute had assumed the lofty character and the deadly hue of a religious quarrel. The faith was in danger, and all good Mussulmans were bound to defend it.

The mooftee, notwithstanding the accident to

his eyebrow, effected his escape; and his subsequent conduct was well calculated to keep alive the fanatical spirit of the people. He repaired to a mosque on the skirts of the town, and hoisted the green or holy flag, with the declared view of assembling his friends and followers to protect him from the presumed violence of the magistrate. This was obviously a course which the European authorities could not view without apprehension, and they would have been guilty of a dereliction of duty had they neglected taking the precautions so imperiously called for. The magistrate did not commit this error. On the morning after the mooftee had taken his post at the mosque, a detachment of two companies of sepoys, with a brigade of six-pounders, was placed immediately in front of him. The commissioners, appointed to inquire into these transactions, seem, in their report, to have cast some blame upon the magistrate for the course which he took in this emergency. They urged that the arrival of a military force in the immediate vicinity of the sanctuary where the mooftee had taken refuge, was calculated to keep up the impression, that the seizure of his person was the object designed. They added, that the intention of the magistrate, in thus placing the party within a few yards of the mooftee's retreat, was not clear; and in proof of this, they proceeded to argue, that the magistrate could not

suspect the mooftee of designing to plunder the town, and that if such an attempt had been made, there was sufficient force to render it abortive.

The judgment thus passed on the conduct of the magistrate appears somewhat harsh, if not unjust. His object, in placing the troops, is sufficiently evident; it was to keep in check those who had substantially raised the standard of revolt, and arrayed themselves against the Government. Neither the mooftee nor his friends might intend to plunder the town, but if they intended to eject the British from the possession of it, this was as legitimate a cause of resistance as the former. If the mooftee really thought that the magistrate intended to seize his person, it was his duty, as a peaceable subject, according to strictly legal construction, to surrender himself to the ruling power, and seek his deliverance in due course of law. It might be too much, perhaps, to expect this; but if allowances are to be made for his resistance to the magistrate's authority, surely some liberality should enter into our judgment of the magistrate's endeavours to support it. He had seen the authority of Government defied by a man of extraordinary influence, who had now entrenched himself within walls, whose reputed sanctity was considered a protection, where he had unfurled the flag round which the faithful are bound to rally, and invited his well-wishers to join him. To see

these events, and to neglect to guard against their consequences, would have been either fatuity or culpable indifference.

It was said, indeed, that the course which the magistrate adopted was the most injudicious that could have been chosen, and that it would have been better at once to have employed the force he had called out, instead of merely posting it to overawe the insurgents. This objection, strongly urged by the same parties who condemn the magistrate for too much energy, is obviously inconsistent with the former. The magistrate's situation was one of difficulty, and if he were somewhat tardy in his endeavours to appease the ferment, he acted ultimately with energy, courage, and self-possession.

The mooftee was not idle in his retirement, and he showed himself no unworthy follower of the prophet, who claimed the right to propagate his religion by the sword. He appears to have forwarded communications to the principal Mussulman towns in Rohilcund, calling on the followers of Mahomet to stand forth in defence of their insulted religion. The greater part of them, like the actors in another religious tumult, "knew not wherefore they were brought together;" but as the craftsmen were not the less ready on that account to cry "great is Diana of the Ephesians!" so the Mussulmans of Rohilcund, know-

ing nothing but that the mooftee had raised the holy flag, were fully prepared to shout "blessed be the prophet!" and to second their exclamations by the sword. How their religion was endangered by the tax, they felt it no part of their duty to inquire; they were told that it was endangered, and that was enough. It is in this way that the objects of riot are completely and rapidly changed, as the progress of insurrection rolls on. A tax of a few miserable annas gave rise to the disturbances at Bareilly; but they soon acquired a more elevated character. The superstition, which holds so large a portion of the human race in chains, came in aid of fiscal grievance—it quickly absorbed every other consideration, and the police-tax was forgotten in the danger which was supposed to threaten the religion of the warrior prophet.

Prudently reluctant to proceed to extremities, the magistrate attempted to negociate, and Major Hearsey and Lieut. Roberts were despatched to confer with the mooftee: the nazir of the collector was also commanded by that officer to perform the same duty. The fanatical spirit of the people was strongly manifested during these conferences. They were constantly interrupted by persons, who declared that they had come in express search of martyrdom, and as negociation, if successful, would deprive them of the anticipated pleasure,

they viewed the process which was going forward with great fear, and the most unrestrained disapprobation.

Such were the feelings of a large portion of the people. Their leader had evidently no appetite for martyrdom, and he had taken considerable pains to avert such a fate from himself. In the conferences with him, religion seems to have occupied a very small share of attention. It was well to parade it before the people, but in meetings of business, the mooftee was willing to let it sleep, and confine the discussion to temporalities. The chief complaint related to the conduct of the kotwul, which, without doubt, had been bad enough. His dismissal from office was peremptorily demanded, and as "revenge is sweet, especially" in the East, the surrender of his person to the mercy of the insurgents was declared the first condition of their obedience to the law. The further points contended for were, the abolition of the tax, the pardon of the mooftee,—a matter too interesting to the chief negociator to be overlooked, —and a provision for the families of the persons killed in the previous affray.

The negociations did not, however, advance satisfactorily. The mooftee probably thought that resistance had gone far enough, but this was by no means the belief of his adherents. The interruptions, which the negociations received from the

burning zeal of the people to enjoy the company of the *houris*, have been already mentioned. The invitations to arms, which had been forwarded by the mooftee, now too began to manifest their full effect. Hordes of fanatical and armed Mussulmans, anxious for the blood of the infidel, flocked in from other towns of Rohilcund. A more temperate zeal would have better suited the purposes of the mooftee; but, like Frankenstein, he had no power of controlling the monster he had called into existence. If he declined extreme measures, there were others prepared to undertake them. The timidity of age might paralyze his resolution, but in a person named Mahomed Esa, the mob found an unscrupulous and vigorous leader. He was young and reckless; he had obtained great influence over the insurgents, and he availed himself to the full of the state of circumstances to inflame the popular frenzy.

The anxiety of the malcontents for action became almost uncontrollable: one party proposed an attack by night upon the small force which the magistrate had placed to watch the movements of the mooftee. Happily, this was opposed, or its destruction would have been almost inevitable. The intention, however, was only postponed; and on the morning of the 25th, after murdering an English gentleman, under circumstances of wanton atrocity, the attack was made. The insur-

gents were met by the British detachment, which was commanded by Captain Boscawen, with the greatest firmness and gallantry. Its number was small, and the circumstances in which it was placed difficult; but spirit supplied the want of the one, and overcame the embarrassments presented by the other. The insurgents were defeated with considerable loss, and this result led necessarily to their dispersion, and to the re-establishment of order. Resistance to authority is seldom long protracted, if attended by ill-success; the motley materials of which an insurrectionary force is composed can with difficulty be kept together for an up-hill contest; the stimulus of success being wanting, the mass falls to pieces of itself. So it proved with the disturbers of the peace at Bareilly; the leaders were appalled, and the populace, on this as on all other occasions, scrupulously conformed to their example.

Riots like these, when they meet with such a termination, are usually regarded by historical writers as of small importance. But this is an error. They afford indices to the state of public feeling, and, if maturely considered, bestow important lessons on rulers and statesmen. From occurrences not more important than those at Bareilly, mighty empires have had to date their ruin, and new dynasties their accession to power. Such transactions shew the tendency of public feeling;

they disclose the possible sources of danger, and teach the legislator what he may do—what he should refrain from doing. The instruction, indeed, is lost upon mere closet-politicians—upon those who sit and frame constitutions and laws for all the nations of the earth, without any reference to the peculiar habits, feelings, and opinions prevailing among those who are to be governed by them.

The tax imposed at Bareilly was of small amount, and it had been introduced without much difficulty throughout a considerable portion of India. But it was at variance with the habits of the people upon whom it was attempted to be levied, and it offended many prejudices. It levelled certain aristocratic distinctions, and, of course, excited the displeasure of those who had been accustomed to profit by their existence. But the opposition was not confined to them—it pervaded the multitude, and though the unpopularity of the impost was increased by the ill-conduct of those engaged in the collection of it, there can be no doubt that it was greatly disliked, independently of all aggravating circumstances. It was a change—this in India is always regarded as an evil. It might be a beneficial change, but it is useless and dangerous to insist upon benefiting men against their will. The Emperor Joseph thought to gratify the peasants of Hungary by depriving the nobles of the power

of inflicting corporal punishment upon their serfs. This, to common observers, looks like a boon. By those for whose benefit it was intended, it was regarded as a grievance. The Hungarian peasantry stood up to a man for the liberty of the lash, and were ready to make war to the knife in defence of the privilege of being whipt. The sovereign who attempted this innovation, and whose whole reign was an unsuccessful struggle for unattainable improvement, affords a warning to all rash and bigotted reformers, which they would do well to study.

In India, no subject is of greater delicacy than that of revenue. The people have submitted to many changes in the laws by which they have been governed, but the main features of the revenue system have always been the same. The land has always been the great resource of the Exchequer, and almost every impost has been connected with the land, in some way or other. Assessments have frequently been oppressive, and though it would be too much to affirm that they have been paid cheerfully, it is certain that they usually have been paid quietly, so long as there was the power of paying them at all. The land must for ages to come be the main dependence of those who rule over India. New taxes, though less burdensome than the old, will not be submitted to; and he must be very far gone in the fanaticism

of economical science, who would risk an empire for a fiscal experiment.

One point, in connexion with the disturbances at Bareilly, is remarkable. The police arrangements at that place were taken out of the hands of the people themselves, and assumed by the Government. By this change, a small additional charge was incurred. This took place in a state of society not far advanced either in knowledge or freedom, and where whatever of government existed, had always partaken of an arbitrary character. In England, which has the reputation of being the most enlightened country in the world, and which has long boasted of being one of the most free,—at a period which some believe to be the most enlightened which even England ever saw,—a measure precisely similar in all its parts was introduced by the Government. The police of a large part of the metropolis, where, from various causes, the spirit of resistance is more alive than in the provinces, was withdrawn from the management of the citizens, and undertaken by the Government The change not only invaded the right of self-government, of which in these days so much is said and written, but, as in the former case, it was attended by increased expense. At Bareilly, the experiment gave rise to insurrection and bloodshed. In London, it was effected, not, indeed, without murmurs, but with resis-

tance so feeble as scarcely to deserve the name. Here is a problem for solution by political philosophy; but one which, perhaps, like many others, political philosophy will find too hard for its powers.

CHAPTER XV.

THE BURMESE WAR.

THE Burman empire was formed by the union of several states, which at no distant period had a distinct political existence. One of them, Ava, appears to have been a dependency of the neighbouring country, Pegu. This relation was after a time inverted. The Burmans, who inhabited Ava, revolted, and subsequently subjected Pegu to their dominion. This state of things, however, was not permanent. About the middle of the last century, the scale was again turned. After a war, attended by much bloodshed, and marked by acts of great ferocity, the Peguers followed up a series of successes, by obtaining possession of Ava, the Burman capital, with its sovereign, and the greater part of his family. The entire subjugation of the country succeeded.

The duration of the Peguer dominion was short. A man, named Alompra, of obscure birth, and who commenced warfare, it is said, at the head of only one hundred followers, roused his countrymen to resist the invaders, and, after defeating bodies of the Pegu force in several actions, marched suddenly upon the capital, the inhabitants of which, upon his approach, rose, and expelled the strangers. This happened towards the close of the year 1753. In the following year, an army and a fleet of boats sent by the Peguers against Ava, were totally defeated by Alompra. The war continued for some years, and the Peguers were assisted by the French from Pondicherry; but victory continued to follow the standard of Alompra. The capital of Pegu surrendered to his arms, and though, in a revolt which followed, the Burman viceroy was expelled, the presence of Alompra speedily put an end to the insurrection, and gave increased stability to his rule. Alompra reigned but eight years, but in that time he laid the basis of a great power, enlarged at later periods by the acquisition of considerable territory on the Tenasserim coast at the expense of Siam, by the subjugation of Arracan, previously an independent state, the annexation of Manipur, and the transfer of Assam to a Burman chief.

Although the British Government had given the rising power of the Burmese no cause for offence, it was invariably treated by them with

great haughtiness and injustice. As early as the reign of Alompra, acts of violence were perpetrated on the Company's servants, and appear to have passed unresented. In 1794, some robbers from Arracan, having taken refuge in the British district of Chittagong, the Burman prince, without any demand of the surrender of the fugitives, or any previous notice, marched a body of five thousand men into the Company's territories, supported by a reserve of twenty thousand on the border. On his arrival, the Burman general sent a letter to the British judge and magistrate, declaring that he should not withdraw until the delinquents, in pursuit of whom he had entered the British territories, were given up to him; and he proceeded to fortify his position by stockades. A military force, under General Erskine, being despatched from Calcutta, some communication took place between the commanders of the two armies; the result of which was, that the Burmese should withdraw, upon an understanding that the subject of complaint should be subsequently investigated. The alleged robbers were given over to the Burmese for punishment—a fate which they probably deserved. But the concession, after so atrocious a violation of national rights, was neither dignified nor wise; it served only to feed the arrogance of the Burmese authorities, and to induce a belief that the surrender of the criminals was to be attributed to fear

of the consequences of a refusal. A mission to Ava followed, but it did not assist the British Government in making any progress in the favour or confidence of the Burmese.

The ill feeling which existed was kept alive by the excursions of a considerable body of refugees from Arracan, who, on the subjugation of that country by the Burman power, had fled into Chittagong. These persons made occasional sallies into the Burmese territories for purposes of plunder or revenge. In 1811, a more regular and formidable movement was directed against the usurping authority in Arracan, but it ended in the defeat of those by whom it was undertaken, and their return to their retreat in the British dominions. To exonerate the British Government from the suspicion of participating in these attempts, or of affording them any degree of encouragement, another mission was determined on, and Captain Canning was despatched to Ava, to afford explanation. The British envoy, however, did not reach the place of his destined duties. He was unable to proceed beyond Rangoon, and, after being exposed to much both of insult and danger, he returned to Bengal. The British Government then took active measures for preventing a recurrence of any hostile excursions from its territories into those occupied by the Burmese; but the refusal to give up the parties who had been engaged in those which had previously taken

place was regarded by the court of Ava as an unpardonable offence. After an interval of two years' tranquillity on the frontier, the surrender of these persons was formally demanded. The Marquess of Hastings properly replied, that the British Government could not without a violation of the principles of justice deliver up those who had sought its protection; that the existing tranquillity, and the improbability of the renewal of disturbances, rendered the demand particularly unseasonable; and that whilst the vigilance of the British officers should be directed to prevent and punish any enterprize against the province of Arracan, it could lead to no advantageous result to either state to agitate the question of the delivery of the insurgents any further. No further representations on the subject was made by the Burmese Government, and the consequence of this silence was, to lead the Governor-general somewhat injudiciously to conclude that there was no reason for suspecting the existence or contemplation of any hostile design on the part of that government.

A few months dissolved this illusion. Towards the close of the Mahratta war, a letter was received from the rajah of Ramree, demanding from the British Government, on the part of the Burmese sovereign, the cession of Ramoo, Chittagong, Moorshedabad, and Dacca, on the ground of their being ancient dependencies of Arracan,

then part of the Burmese dominions, and threatening hostilities in case of refusal. The answer of the Governor-general was to the effect that, if the letter were written by order of the king, it was to be lamented that persons utterly incompetent to form a just opinion of the British power in India, had ventured to practise on the judgment of so dignified a sovereign; but that the Governor-general's, respect for his Majesty, induced him to adopt the belief that the rajah of Ramree had, for some unworthy purpose of his own, assumed the tone of insolence and menace adopted in the letter, without authority from the King, and that the proceeding would experience his Majesty's just displeasure. Here the matter rested. No notice was taken of the answer of the Governor-general, and whether the letter was a mere idle menace never intended to be followed up, or that the splendid successes of the British arms in Central India was thought to render silence the most expedient course, or that the Burmese Government found sufficient employment in the reduction of Assam, and the conflict of domestic politics, must be matter for conjecture.

But though ceasing to threaten war, the emissaries of the Burmese government did not abstain from acts calculated to provoke it. In 1821, and again in 1822, they seized and carried off parties of elephant hunters in the Company's employ, under the pretext that they were within the Burmese territories. An outrage committed on a boat

laden with rice, entering the nullah on the British side of the Naf, led to more vigorous measures of resistance than had previously been resorted to. The military guard was increased, and a few men were placed upon an island called Shapooree. These an agent of the viceroy of Arracan required to be withdrawn, on the plea that the island belonged to the Burmese sovereign; the requisition being accompanied by an intimation that war would be the consequence of refusal. This took place in January 1823.

It is here necessary to pause, for the purpose of noticing a change in the high and important office of governor-general. The Marquess of Hastings, who in the previous year had expressed a wish to be relieved from his duties, left Calcutta in the beginning of 1823, after an administration distinguished by its unusual length, but far more by the brilliant success of the extensive military operations which had been undertaken and brought to a prosperous conclusion—by the additions made to the strength and solidity of the British empire in the East—the increased respect secured to our power and authority—and the benefits conferred upon the people of India, in dispersing the hordes of marauders and murderers by which the country was overrun, and strengthening the bonds of peace, order, and good government. In narrating the proceedings of the Marquess of Hastings, his errors have neither been concealed nor palliated; but it has been shewn, that in all the great

questions that occupied his attention, he well understood the interests of his country, and was not slow to pursue them under circumstances of no ordinary discouragement. He followed the policy of his great predecessor, the Marquess Wellesley—higher praise cannot be awarded to an occupant of the same elevated station than this—and it may be affirmed, without hesitation, that, excepting the Marquess Wellesley, no governor-general of India did so much for the consolidation of the British empire, or for the glory of the British name there: his services must ever be remembered with gratitude, and his achievements recorded with pride. He survived his retirement but a few years, and, it is feared, not in circumstances of pecuniary ease. The East-India Company, however, were not forgetful of his claims; and, in addition to a grant of £60,000 for the purchase of an estate, made at the termination of the wars in which he had been engaged, £20,000 was, in 1827, placed in the hands of trustees for the benefit of the Marquess's son.

On the desire of the Marquess of Hastings to retire being made known, Mr. Canning, who was then at the height of his sparkling reputation, was appointed to succeed him; but the death of Lord Londonderry having opened the Foreign Office to his aspirations, he declined the dignity to which he had been called, and Lord Amherst was se-

lected as the successor of the Marquess of Hastings. To avoid any further interruption of the course of events, it may here be mentioned, that, having accepted the appointment, his lordship arrived at Calcutta in August 1823, some months after the Marquess of Hastings had quitted the seat of Government.

Returning now to the proceedings with the Burmese, it is to be mentioned, that the rajah of Arracan having been addressed on the subject of the occupation of Shapooree, reiterated the demand for its surrender. This was followed by active measures to oppose the pretensions set up. On the 24th September, a body of Burmese, under the rajah of Ramree, landed on the island, killed three, and wounded four of the British sepoys, and drove off the rest. This feat was not attended with much difficulty, seeing that the British guard on the island consisted of only thirteen men, while the Burmese force comprised a thousand. Having accomplished the object which they had proposed, they returned to the main land. The rajah of Arracan was so proud of what he had done, that he reported it himself to the British Government, intimating at the same time, that in the event of the resumption of the island, he would take by force of arms the cities of Dacca and Moorshedabad, which originally belonged to Arracan.

The island of Shapooree was of small extent

and value; it was, indeed, little more than a sand-bank, affording pasturage for a few cattle. With regard to the title to its possession, the pretensions of either party do not appear to have been very clearly made out, but the weight of probability inclined to the claim of the English. It is observable, also, that the British Government was willing to accede to an inquiry, and even proposed that commissioners should be appointed on the part of each government to make an investigation. In the mean time, however, it was deemed necessary to re-occupy the island, and a force sufficient for the purpose was landed and stockaded. To give the Burmese Government room for repentance and explanation, a despatch was forwarded, in which it was assumed that the occupation of Shapooree was the unauthorized act of the local authorities, which would be disavowed by the Burmese monarch, and exemplary punishment inflicted upon the perpetrators. Had it suited the Burmese prince to have acted upon this suggestion, the sacrifice of his agents would have proved no impediment to its adoption; but the overweening pride of the Court of Ava interpreted the despatch into an acknowledgment of conscious weakness, and ascribed its transmission to fear.

In January, about four thousand Burmese troops advanced from Assam into the province of Cachar, which was under British protection. Other bodies of troops were reported to be advancing in

different directions; and Major Newton, the officer commanding on the Sylhet frontier, consequently resolved to advance against the party from Assam, before they should have time to complete their intrenchments. He accordingly marched on the 17th January, and at daybreak came in sight of the stockade of the adverse troops. An attack was instantly commenced in two divisions; one, commanded by Capt. Johnstone, upon the stockade; the other, under Capt. Bowe, upon an adjoining village. The troops in the village fled almost immediately; those in the stockade made a vigorous resistance, but at length yielded. The Burmans lost about a hundred men, the English only six.

Some communications between the Burmese generals and the English local authorities followed; but, as they shared the ordinary lot of Burmese diplomacy, by ending in nothing, it is unnecessary to dwell upon them. Major Newton withdrew his troops from Cachar, and the Burmese advanced to Jatrapore, where the party from Assam effected a junction with another which had advanced from Manipur, and erected stockades on both sides of the river Soorma. They proceeded to push those on the north side to within a thousand yards of the British post at Bhuderpoor, when, being attacked by Captain Johnstone, they were driven from their unfinished works at the point of the bayonet. The Assam division fell back upon Bhurtekee, the other stockaded itself at Doodpatlee. The former

were dislodged with some difficulty by Lieut.-Col. Bowen, who had arrived to take the command; the latter were attacked by the same officer, but unsuccessfully; the party, however, subsequently withdrew into Manipur.

The British detachment which occupied the island of Shapooree had been withdrawn, in consequence of its extreme unhealthiness; but, in conformity with previous advances towards an amicable arrangement, two officers were deputed by the British Government to meet any persons similarly accredited by the Burman authorities. The overture was met to the extent of sending four persons bearing a letter to the British commissioners; but an unconditional surrender of the island, or, at least, an admission of its being neutral ground, was demanded, as an indispensable preliminary to any discussion respecting boundary. The demand was not acceded to, and the Burmese negociators returned to Arracan.

The breaking off of the negociation, or rather the refusal of the Burmese agents to enter upon it, was followed by an act of wanton treachery. When the British troops were withdrawn from Shapooree, a pilot vessel, named the Sophia, was stationed off the island. The commander, Mr. Chew, was invited on shore by some officers of the Burmese Government, and having accepted the invitation, was seized, with an English officer and a native seaman who had accompanied him,

and sent to Arracan, where they were detained three weeks.

These events were followed by a declaration of war on the part of the British Government. In acting upon this declaration, it was resolved that the frontier operations should be in a great measure defensive, but not so exclusively as to prevent the expulsion of the Burmese from territories in which they had recently established themselves by usurpation. The main attack, however, was to be made on such parts of the maritime possessions of the Burmese as should offer the best prospects of success. For the latter service extensive preparations were made at Bengal and Madras, and more especially at the latter presidency. The Madras force, in two divisions, amounted to 9,500 men, that from Bengal to 2,175, making a total of 11,675. The Bengal force was also accompanied by twenty gun-brigs and schooners, each armed with two twelve-pounder carronades, and four swivels on their bows and quarters, and twenty row-boats, carrying one eighteen-pounder each; by two King's sloops, several of the Company's cruizers, and the Diana steam-boat—the first ever employed in war. Major-general Sir Alexander Campbell was appointed to the chief command. The Madras force was placed under Colonel Macbean, and Captain Canning accompanied the expedition as political agent and joint commissioner with the commander-in-chief.

The place of rendezvous was Port Cornwallis, in the Great Andamans, for which place the Bengal expedition sailed in the beginning of April, and reached it at the latter end of that month. There it was joined by the first division of the Madras force; the second, which sailed on the 23d of May, arriving in June. Two additional King's ships, one of them, the Liffey, bearing the broad pendent of Commodore Grant, joined the expedition at Port Cornwallis. On the 9th May the expedition arrived off the mouth of the Rangoon river, on the 10th came to anchor within the bar, on the morning of the 11th stood up the river, and about one o'clock on that day came too off Rangoon, opposite a landing-place, called the King's wharf, the seat of a battery. A fire was opened on the fleet, but was returned from the Liffey with such effect, that several of the enemy's guns were split or dismounted, and, at the third broadside, the Burmese authorities left the town. At three, the troops proceeded to land, in three divisions—above, below, and in the centre of the town. Opposition had been anticipated, but none was offered: the town was found deserted by the inhabitants; and at three o'clock the British colours were flying on the Burman staff.

In making the requisite disposition of the troops on shore, and in excursions by the boats to scour the river and destroy any armed boats or fire-rafts which the enemy might have prepared, several

brilliant instances of valour and enterprize occurred. A stockade having been observed in course of erection at the village of Kemendine, only four miles from the shipping, was attacked by a grenadier company of the 38th regiment and the boats of the Liffey, stormed with great intrepidity, and, though defended with great obstinacy by four hundred men, carried. Lieut. Kerr, of the 38th, was killed, and Lieut. Wilkinson, of the Liffey, dangerously wounded; but the enemy suffered still more severely, and left sixty of their number dead. In this affair, the seamen of the Liffey commenced the attack without waiting for the soldiers, who were delayed by some mismanagement of the boats which conveyed them. At first, the enemy was inclined to treat the rusty blue jackets of the tars with contempt; but an encounter with them hand to hand induced a very different feeling.

Some days afterwards, Capt. Snodgrass, having observed a party of the enemy apparently employed in making observations on the British line, advanced with a small patrol for the purpose of ascertaining their strength and intentions. They found sentries and posts regularly established, which having driven before them for some distance, they were suddenly fired on from a stockade; but an entrance being observed in an angle of the work, which the enemy had neglected to shut, an immediate charge was ordered, and the

British party, consisting of only eighteen men, drove from the stockade at least two hundred, with the loss of only three wounded.

The stockade thus gallantly carried was situated at the juncture of a pathway with a main road, and from the precautions taken for its defence, Sir Archibald Campbell conceived that the road must lead to some place from which it was important to keep the invading force. On the following morning, therefore, he proceeded with four companies of Europeans, a body of native infantry, a gun, and a howitzer towards the stockade, which was found re-occupied, but only a few shots were fired from it. Advancing, they found other stockades, which they destroyed; but, from the nature of the country, and the fatigue incident upon traversing it, it became necessary to send back the guns, escorted by the native infantry. After proceeding some distance further, the general with the European companies arrived in an extensive valley of paddy fields, whence the enemy could be perceived drawn out in a long line, with an impenetrable jungle in the rear. Suddenly, a heavy fire was opened upon the British troops from two stockades, so well masked as not to be discernible, from a garden fence at sixty yards distance. Colonel Macbean kept the plain with a light company, while an assault was made on the stockades by the rest of the force under Major Evans and Major Dennie. The first stockade was carried in

ten minutes; the second in a very short time after, the garrison within fighting man to man, being put to the bayonet. The enemy suffered severely; and the victors did not escape, the loss on their part including some valuable and meritorious officers.

An attempt was now made by the Burmese to gain time by mock negociation, but without effect. At the end of May, Commodore Grant was compelled by ill health to withdraw to Penang, leaving Captain Marryat the senior naval officer.

An attack, made on the 3d of June, upon a strong position of the Burmans at Kemendine, about two miles distant from the post from which the enemy had a few days previously been driven, partially failed, in consequence, it is said, of some British columns having been fired on from the river, either from their being mistaken for Burmans, or from the shot having too great a range. This mischance was repaired a few days afterwards. On the 16th, Sir Archibald Campbell moved upon the fortified camp and stockades at Kemendine, with about three thousand men, four eighteen-pounders, four mortars, and seven field pieces, at the same time sending two divisions of vessels up the river. About two miles from the town the head of the column was stopped by a stockade apparently of great strength, and filled with men. Two heavy guns, and some field pieces, having been opened on it, in less than half an hour a considerable gap became apparent. A

part of the Madras European regiment, supported by a part of the 41st, then moved on to assault. At the same time, an attack by escalade was made on the other side by a party formed from the 13th and 38th regiments, who by helping each other up the face of the stockade, which was at least ten feet high, succeeded in entering about the same time as the party at the breach. The enemy left above a hundred and fifty dead—among them the Burmese commander. This point being gained, the British force moved on to invest the chief stockade. Batteries were erected during the night, and opened on the morning of the 11th. After a cannonade of two hours a party, advancing to observe the breach, found that the enemy had evacuated the stockade, carrying with them their dead and wounded.

A pause in the progress of these operations affords an opportunity of adverting to the circumstances in which the expedition was placed. It was unfortunately undertaken with very imperfect knowledge of the country, and without any adequate provision for securing supplies. These, it had been calculated, would be found on the spot; but the care with which the enemy removed every article of sustenance frustrated the expectation. In addition to these difficulties, others existed, seriously affecting the efficiency of the force, and threatening the success of the expedition. With a tropical sun above, thick jungle around, and swamp beneath the feet, these sources of pesti-

lence were aided by frequent deluges of rain. Almost every cause of disease and debility being thus actively at work, the health of the men rapidly declined, and fever and dysentery began fearfully to thin their ranks. Such was the cheerless and almost hopeless condition of the British force at the commencement of the Burmese war. Advance was impossible, and even to maintain the position which they had gained appeared almost hopeless.

While the invaders had every thing but defeat to dispirit and discourage them, the Burmese appeared to have lost nothing of that consolatory self confidence, which had led them to brave the vengeance of the British power. Reinforcements and supplies of warlike stores were provided, and Thakia Woongyee, one of the chief ministers of state, was dispatched to take the chief command, with distinct orders from his master to attack the British, and drive them at once out of the country; a result, which, looking at their condition, might have seemed practicable even to persons whose powers of judgment were not distorted by Burmese arrogance. The havoc which disease and death had worked was however in some degree repaired by the arrival, during the month of June, of the second division from Madras, and by the return of two detachments which had been dispatched to Negrais and Cheduba. The former under Major Wahab had destroyed a stockade, and brought away the guns and ammunition found in it. The

island being found utterly worthless in every respect, was summarily abandoned. The expedition against Cheduba was conducted by Brigadier McCreagh, who having effected a landing in the face of considerable opposition, found a body of the enemy stockaded. A battery was erected and the stockade carried. The island was defended by six hundred Burmese, of whom about three hundred fell, and the remainder escaped to the main land. The Rajah of Cheduba was taken in a jungle. Leaving a small force in possession of the island, the commander with the rest joined the main body of the British army.

The time approached when it became necessary for the Burmese general to begin to act upon the orders of his sovereign; and the bustle of preparation which marked the concluding days of the month of June, shewed that he was about to make the trial. The morning of the 1st of July was selected for the first attempt. Three columns of the enemy, estimated at a thousand men each, were observed marching to the right of the British position; a large force also occupied the left. The attack commenced on the right, a large number of the enemy having penetrated between two of the British picquets formed on a hill, and begun firing from some swivels. The firing having been returned from two field-pieces, Captain Jones advanced at the head of three companies of native infantry, and drove the enemy at the point of the bayonet, from the hill into the jungle. Thus

ended the first exploit of the new general; and his immediate supercession deprived him of opportunity for attempting a second. The result seems to have induced his successor to conclude that the military genius of the Burmese lay rather for the defensive, and he stockaded his army in the most difficult part of the forest, whence desultory attacks were made almost nightly upon some part of the British lines.

The British commander, however, determined upon affording him opportunity for the display of his talents in a general action, and on the 8th two columns of attack were formed. One proceeded by land under the command of General McBean; the other advanced by the river, and with it the commander-in-chief embarked. The enemy's principal stockade was erected on a broad and projecting point of land, where the river divides into two branches. On the opposite bank of both branches, stockades and other works were erected, enfilading the approach to the principal work, and thus all protecting each other. Fourteen pieces of artillery were silenced by the fire from the shipping conducted by Capt. Marryat, and at the end of an hour the signal of 'breach practicable' being made from the mainmast head, the troops destined for the assault entered the boats. Major Wahab, with a party of native infantry, immediately made for the breach. Lieut. Col. Gordon, with a body of European troops, pushed ashore at a little distance above, and en-

tered the work by escalade, and the first stockade was carried with comparatively small loss. Col. Gordon then re-embarked to attack the second stockade which was carried, and the third was evacuated by the enemy.

The operations of the land column were equally successful. On arriving, General MacBean found himself surrounded by stockades, the extent or strength of which he had very imperfect means of ascertaining, destitute of guns, and with a force which as to mere numbers was contemptible, when compared with that opposed to him. Nothing daunted by his perilous situation, he determined to trust to the courage of his men to supply the deficiencies of the means at his disposal. The scaling ladders were ordered to the front, and preparations made for storming. The principal work, in the centre of the enemy's line, was composed of three distant stockades one within another. In the main one Soomba Wongee, the new commander-in-chief, had established his head-quarters as he imagined in perfect security. He was proceeding to dinner when the approach of the British troops was announced to him, and merely ordering his chiefs to their posts, to drive the audacious strangers away, he entered upon the work of refreshment. But the continued firing disturbed the quiet of his repast, and he found it expedient to leave his meal unfinished, and repair to the scene of action. He found that the capture

of his first stockade had been the work of only ten minutes; that the second after a stronger resistance had yielded to the overwhelming courage of the assailants,—that the third was now attacked by men whose energy would not suffer them to wait for the ordinary assistance of ladders, but who were raised to the work on the shoulders of their comrades. The contest now was hand to hand. Major Sale, of the 18th light infantry, singled out the Burmese commander for his opponent, and that haughty chief fell by the sword of his English adversary. Four other stockades were captured in succession, being seven within the space of half an hour, and without the firing of a gun on the part of the British, all having been taken by escalade. Thus, in one day the British army captured ten stockades provided with thirty pieces of artillery, and garrisoned by numbers incomparably superior to those by which they were assailed. The enemy lost from eight hundred to a thousand men, their commander-in-chief, and three other men of distinction.

Shortly after this heroic achievement, the prospects of the British force were clouded by disappointment. An expedition, combining operations both by land and water, against a force stationed at Kyloo, was compelled to return without effecting, or indeed attempting to effect its object. The land column was unable to advance, from the inundated state of the country,

and the sea column was unable to act from the want of co-operation inland. Other operations were more fortunate. At Syriam, a body of troops were dislodged from a post with little difficulty, beyond that arising from access to the place being prevented by a deep and impassable creek. This was overcome by a party of sailors under Captain Marryat, who in a very short time constructed a bridge, which enabled the column to pass over. A successful attack was also made by a detachment under Lieut. Col. Kelly, upon two stockades on opposite sides of a creek near Dalla: great spirit and perseverance were displayed in this attack. The officers being less encumbered than the men, formed line breast-deep in mud and water, and thus passed from one to another the scaling ladders to be placed against the walls of the stockade first attacked. It was immediately carried. Part of the troops being then re embarked, took possession of the opposite stockade.*

* The loss of the British was severe. Among the wounded was Lieut. Maw, of the Liffey; author of a memoir of the early operations of the Burmese war. His own account of the misfortune is a characteristic specimen of nautical liveliness and *nonchalance*:—"I was looking towards an angle of the stockade that appeared to me not to be entirely finished, and where I was thinking we might possibly get in, when I was knocked down. I had not thought of being shot—for what will not use do? And I had really seen so many knocked down, that I had began to think I never should be hit. My first impression

The stockades were not destroyed, and as the enemy raised several additional works, and thence sallied on predatory excursions, it became necessary again to expel them. This was effected, and in performing the service the gun-boats, under the orders of Captain Marryat, were eminently useful.

But misfortune was again to attend the British army. Early in October, Lieut.-Col. Smith marched with a detachment of native infantry to attack a part of the enemy's force, which had taken up a position in the neighbourhood of Aunauben, and the pagoda of Kyloo, about fourteen miles from the British head-quarters. After succeeding in some minor affairs the pagoda was attacked, but a tremendous fire from within knocked down the

was, surprise; and next, that I was killed; for I could not move even a finger, although my senses were clear. I heard the bargemen exclaim, some that I was killed, others that I was shot; but one and all they rushed forward to save me. By this time the troops were beginning to land, and Lieut. Fraser, coming over, and supposing that I was killed, ordered the bargemen to leave me, and go to the stockade. Their answer I believe was, that they had brought me on shore, and dead or alive they would carry me off. I was nearly suffocated with blood, and my tongue was split into three pieces; but I made them understand to keep up my head, and to get the sword that had fallen from my hand, which they did, and having carried me to a boat, returned to the works. Had the troops marched over me, it is more than probable that instant death would have been the consequence."—*Memoir*, pp. 78-79.

principal officers, and spread such panic through the troops, that retreat was the only course left: this disatrous result appears to have been aided by the treachery of the guides, whose instructions were followed. Panic, on this occasion, was not confined to the assailants; for on General M'Creagh advancing a few days afterwards, he found the stockades deserted, and the enemy in disorderly flight; all efforts to overtake them were unavailing. About the same time, an expedition directed against a post at Thautubain was completely successful: the works, though of great strength, were carried almost without resistance, and the British did not lose a single man. At Martebaṇ, against which an expedition under Col. Godwin had been despatched, some resistance was at first offered; but the place was stormed, and carried under a heavy fire of musketry, the enemy escaping in great numbers by the water and into the jungle.

A period of comparative repose which followed allows space for turning to the progress of the British arms in quarters remote from the principal scene of operations. In August, a small expedition, under Lieut.-Col. Miles, was despatched by Sir Archibald Campbell to the coast of Tenasserin. It arrived on the 1st of September at the mouth of the river leading to Tavoy, but from some impediments to its progress, did not reach the fort until the 8th. The capture of this fort was not a work of

difficulty; for the second in command sent a message to Colonel Miles, offering to arrest his superior and surrender the place. The offer was accepted, and the fort, pettah, and all the defences were occupied without opposition. Colonel Miles then moved forward to attack Mergui. Here, after about an hour's firing, the batteries were silenced by the Company's cruizers, and the troops proceeded to land. Their advance was made through deep mud and water, under a torrent of rain, and a heavy fire from the enemy. Discouraging as these circumstances were, an escalade was undertaken, and the place immediately carried. These services being performed, Colonel Miles, leaving sufficient garrisons, with part of the flotilla to protect the conquests on the coast, returned to join the main force at Rangoon.

The operations on the frontier, it will be remembered, were undertaken principally with a view to defence. To a certain extent they were successful, and the British authority was established over a considerable portion of Assam. In Arracan, its interests were less prosperous. A British detachment, under Capt. Noton, was defeated with great loss, and, in a disastrous retreat, completely dispersed, the officer in command, with many others, being killed.

This success might have been expected to lead the Burmese to push their fortune in the quarter where they had been victorious, and some appre-

hensions were entertained on this account. This apparently natural consequence did not follow; but the prowess of the army of Arracan, and of Maha Mendgee Mundoola, who commanded it, made so deep an impression on the Court of Ava, that it was thought their warlike capabilities might be advantageously employed in repelling the invading force, which, under Sir Archibald Campbell, had entered the Burmese territories. They were consequently withdrawn from Arracan, and the general, after visiting Ava to receive congratulations on the past and instructions for the future, proceeded at the head of an army, formidable in point of numbers at least, to attack the invaders.

On the 1st December, after various indications of its approach, the Burmese army presented itself in front of the British position, with the obvious intention of surrounding it. Entrenchments were thrown up with extraordinary rapidity.* In the

* Major Snodgrass gives the following account of this operation:—"In the course of a few hours we found ourselves completely surrounded, with the narrow channel of the Rangoon river alone unoccupied in our rear, and with only the limited space within our lines that we could call our own. The line of circumvallation taken up by the enemy obviously extended a very considerable distance, and, divided as it was by the river, injudiciously weakened his means of assailing us on any particular point; but as far as celerity, order, and regularity are concerned, the style in which the different

afternoon, this labour was interrupted by a visit from a detachment of the British army under Major

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corps took up their stations in the line, reflected much credit on the arrangements of the Burmese commander. When this singular and presumptuous formation was completed, the soldiers of the left column, also laying aside their spears and muskets, commenced operations with their entrenching tools with such activity and good will, that in the course of a couple of hours their line had wholly disappeared, and could only be traced by a parapet of new earth gradually increasing in height, and assuming such forms as the skill and science of the engineer suggested. The moving masses which had so very lately attracted our anxious attention had sunk into the ground; and by any one who had not witnessed the whole scene, the existence of these subterraneous legions would not have been credited: the occasional movement of a chief, with his gilt chattah (umbrella), from place to place, superintending the progress of their labour, was the only thing that now attracted notice. By a distant observer, the hills, covered with mounds of earth, would have been taken for any thing rather than the approaches of an attacking army; but to us, who had watched the whole strange proceeding, it seemed the work of magic or enchantment..... The trenches were found to be a succession of holes capable of containing two men each, and excavated so as to afford shelter both from the weather and the fire of an enemy; even a shell lighting in the trench could at most kill but two men. As it is not the Burmese system to relieve their troops in making these approaches, each hole contained a sufficient supply of rice, water, and even fuel, for its inmates; and under the excavated bank a bed of straw or brushwood was prepared, in which one man could sleep while his comrade watched. When one line of trench is completed, its occupiers, taking advantage of the night, push forward to where the second line is to be opened, their place being immediately taken

Sale, which was so totally unexpected, that the approach of the party was not perceived till it was too late to do any thing effectual towards repelling them. Having burst through the entrenchments, and slain great numbers of the enemy, the detachment returned, loaded with the arms, standards, and tools of the enemy. In the evening, a mass of skirmishers who had been pushed forward by the enemy were driven back by two companies of the 38th regiment, under Capt. Piper. Various attacks were made during the day upon the British post at Kemmedine, and attempts to drive the British vessels from their stations by the despatch of fire-rafts, but these were met and frustrated by the British force under Major Yates and Captain Ryves.

Between the 1st and the 4th, the enemy continued their approaches, and the British posts were annoyed by frequent attacks. Sir Archibald Campbell determined to become the assailant on the 5th. The left wing of the enemy was chosen for the intended attack; and, in aid of it, Captain Chads was ordered to move up the Puzendoor creek during the night with the flotilla, and commence

up by fresh troops from the rear, and so on progressively; the number of trenches occupied varying according to the force of the besiegers, to the plans of the general, or to the nature of the ground."—*Snodgrass's Narrative of the Burmese War*, pp. 101—104.

a cannonade on the enemy's rear at daylight. These orders were executed with great precision and effect. The enemy were thus kept employed by the naval force, until two columns of attack which had been formed advanced upon them. One, under Major Sale, was directed to penetrate their centre; the other, under Major Walker, to be directed against their left, which had approached within a few hundred yards of Rangoon. Both attacks were successful; the enemy fled in great confusion, and suffered dreadful loss. The loss of the English was not great; but among the killed was Major Walker, the leader of one of the columns.

On the 7th, the contest was renewed. Four columns of attack were formed under the superintendence of Col. Miles, and under the immediate command respectively of Lieut.-Col. Mallet, Lieut.-Col. Parlby, Lieut.-Col. Brodie, and Captain Wilson. The approach of the troops was preceded by a heavy cannonade, after which the columns advanced in the directions assigned to them—Col. Mallet's on the enemies' right, Col. Brodie's on their left, Col. Parlby's and Captain Wilson's in their centre. An attack upon so many points at once gave a momentary shock to the enemy, which for a brief period seemed to paralyze them; but they soon recovered, and made a brave though unsuccessful defence. They were totally put to the route, and flying into the jungle,

left the British masters of their entrenchments. A body of the enemy, which lingered on the Dalla side of the river, was subsequently dispersed with little either of trouble or loss.

The Maha Bundoola having collected his scattered army, and obtained considerable reinforcements, determined to make an effort to turn the tide of fortune, and retrieve the disgrace of defeat. He returned to Kokeen, distant only a few miles from his former position, where he proceeded to defend himself by intrenchments and stockades.

His first exploit was to set fire to the town of Rangoon. The exertions of the garrison succeeded after a time in stopping the progress of the conflagration, but not until half the town had been destroyed. This took place on the 14th of December. On the following day, the Burmese general was attacked by the British army. The attempt was marked by a degree of daring almost amounting to temerity, and, perhaps, had any other course been open, Sir Archibald Campbell would not have resorted to this. The position of the enemy was so formidable that the British commander declared that, but for the confidence which he felt in his troops, he should have hesitated to attack it with less than ten thousand men. The Burmese force consisted of at least twenty thousand; that which could be spared for attacking them amounted to only fifteen hundred—the remainder being necessarliy left to guard the lines.

A column under Brigadier-general Cotton was ordered to make a detour round the enemy's left, for the purpose of gaining his rear. Another, which Sir Archibald Campbell accompanied, was destined to attack in front. Of this column, two divisions were formed, one commanded by Col. Miles, the other by Major Evans. A signal-gun from General Cotton announced that he had gained the desired position. The artillery then opened, and the troops, with their scaling ladders, moved forwards. Their advance was treated with contempt by the Burmese, who looked on their apparent presumption as little short of madness. They persevered, however, and, entering by escalade, drove the Burmese from the ramparts at the point of the bayonet. Fifteen minutes sufficed to put the British in possession of that which Sir Archibald Campbell pronounced "the most formidable intrenched and stockaded works" which he ever saw—those works being defended by men whose thousands outnumbered the hundreds of those by whom they were attacked and beaten. The Maha Bundoola did not command in person on this occasion, having retired to some distance, and left the command to another chief.

The enemy retreated upon Donobew, and the British force returned to its cantonments. Reinforcements, consisting of his Majesty's 47th regiment, some cavalry, and artillery arriving, Sir Archibald Campbell determined to advance upon

upon Prome the second city of the Burman Emperor. Before taking this step, it was necessary to dislodge an advanced division of the Burmese force stockaded at Thantabain on the Lyne river. This task, which was allotted to a detachment under Col. Godwin, assisted by a naval force under Captain Chads, was performed effectively, and almost without loss on the part of the assailants.

The force which the General was enabled to equip for the purpose of advancing upon Prome was of very moderate amount. The land column was composed of fifteen hundred European infantry, a thousand sepoys, two squadrons of dragoons, and a rocket troop. This, which was under the immediate command of Sir Archibald Campbell, was to proceed in a direction parallel with the Lyne river, and to join the Irawaddy at the nearest practicable point to co-operate with the marine column. That column consisted of eight hundred European infantry, a battalion of sepoys, and a powerful train of artillery. It was commanded by Brigadier-general Cotton. The men were embarked in the flotilla, which comprised sixty boats, some carrying one, and some two pieces of artillery. The flotilla was commanded by Captain Alexander, and escorted by the boats of the men-of-war lying at Rangoon, containing upwards of a hundred seamen. Another force, consisting of between seven and eight hundred European and Madras infantry, commanded by

Major Sale, was embarked in transports for the purpose of occupying Bassein. It may be here noticed that this duty was performed without much difficulty, and Major Sale with the chief part of his force rejoined the main army. After the departure of the bodies of troops commanded respectively by Sir Archibald Campbell, Brigadier Cotton and Major Sale, four thousand effective men were left in Rangoon, under Brigadier-general M'Creagh, to form a reserve column, and as soon as means of transport could be obtained, to follow the advance of the Commander-in-chief.

These arrangements being completed, Sir Archibald Campbell commenced his march on the 13th of February, which he continued till the 11th of March, when intelligence, which met him at U-audeet, induced him to suspend his advance.

The water column for a time proceeded not unprosperously, attacking and destroying a number of stockades on its progress. On the 8th of March it took up a position about two miles below Donobew, and a flag of truce was despatched with a summons to surrender. This being refused, an attack by two columns, commanded by Lieut.-Col. O'Donoghue and Major Basden, was commenced on the pagoda stockade, which was carried, the enemy sustaining dreadful loss. The second defence, about five hundred yards distant, was then attacked, but the attempt failed, apparently from some deficiency of steadiness in

the assaulting party;* and General Cotton felt it advisable to re-embark his troops. On receiving the news of this failure. Sir Archibald Campbell resolved to return with his column to assist in the reduction of Donobew, and, after a most fatiguing march, he arrived before that place on the 25th. He found the fort much too extensive to be surrounded by the force at his disposal; and, although anxious for the immediate fall of the place, he preferred (using his own words) "loss of time to loss of lives," and took his measures with great caution and deliberation. Some heavy guns and mortars were brought up and landed, and, after much laborious exertion, mortars and enfilading batteries were opened on

* The following extract from the official account of the unfortunate affair seems to afford countenance to this view:— "When it was presumed that a sufficient impression had been made from the batteries, two hundred men, under the command of Captain Rose, of his Majesty's 89th regiment, advanced in two parties to the storm. A destructive fire was immediately commenced from all parts of the face of the work, which caused the columns to diverge to the right of the point of attack, and get into a ditch described to be filled with spikes, and scarped so as to expose it to the fire of the work. All who presented themselves were knocked down: and here I regret to say that Captain Rose, who had received one wound, fell by a second shot while persevering in the attack, and showing a gallant example to his troops."—*Despatch from Brigadier General Cotton to Sir Archibald Campbell*, March 9, 1825.

the 1st of April. On that day, Bandoola was killed by a rocket, after which neither threats nor entreaties on the part of the other chiefs could prevail upon the garrison to remain. They all fled in the course of the night, and in the morning the British took possession of the place. The flight of the garrison had been so hurried that no measures had been taken for the destruction of that which could not be removed, and one of the most welcome prizes secured by the English was a store of grain equal to supply the wants of the garrison for several months.

Immediately after the capture of Donobew, Sir Alexander Campbell resumed his march in the direction from which the ill tidings from that place had withdrawn him. On the 14th, he was again at U-au-deet, from whence he had retrograded a month before, having been joined on his route by the column of reserve from Rangoon, and a supply of elephants, which were much wanted for the use of the commissariat department. On the 24th, he was within sight of Prome, of which place he took possession on the 25th without firing a shot; the enemy having deserted it in the night, leaving in the works above a hundred pieces of artillery and extensive supplies of grain. The town was on fire, and one entire quarter was destroyed. A number of war-boats, with a large quantity of arms, were a few days afterwards captured by a division of the flo-

tilla under Lieut. Wilkinson, which had been sent up the river for the purpose.

But for the cowardice of the enemy, Prome must have presented an almost impassable barrier to the progress of the British army. By nature and art it was rendered so formidable that, in the judgment of Sir Alexander Campbell, ten thousand steady soldiers might have defended it against ten times that force.

At Prome, several months were spent in inactivity, in consequence of the setting in of the rains, and the prevalence of inundations; but the troops were in comfortable cantonments—an important consideration at such a season. Sickness returned, but not to the same extent as at Rangoon, and the loss of life was comparatively small.

We must now return to the frontier. On resuming operations in October 1824, the first object was to clear Assam of the Burmese, who had been only partially expelled, and who, on the retirement of the British troops to their cantonments, had re-occupied some of the stations from which they had previously been driven. This duty was assigned to a force under Lieut.-Colonel Richards. It was performed with great spirit and activity; but as the Burmese generally fled on the approach of the British troops, could be brought to action only by stratagem, and when thus entrapped took the earliest opportunity of flying, a minute recital of the operations would be destitute of

interest. In movements of this description, the efficiency of the intelligence department is of the highest importance, and this was admirably conducted by Lieutenant Neufville.

In January, Colonel Richards was enabled to advance upon Rungpore; and on the 25th, his head-quarters were only eight miles distant from it. On the 27th, the garrison made an attack upon the advanced post of the encampment. On hearing the firing, Colonel Richards moved forward, and found the enemy threatening to surround the party defending the post. To encourage the Burmese to advance, Colonel Richards withdrew the party from the post, and suspended firing. This had the desired effect; and as soon as the enemy shewed a sufficient front, the British commander ordered a charge: the Burmans, however, declined waiting for it, and fled with great precipitation.

Having received some reinforcements, Colonel Richards proceeded towards Rungpore. A stockade which had been erected across the road was carried by escalade; a fortified bank on the right, and two temples, one on the right, and one on the left, were also occupied. These successes had the effect of producing an offer to surrender Rungpore on terms, which was accepted. The terms were highly favourable to the garrison: those who chose were permitted to retire into the Burman territory, on an understanding that they were to abstain from any act of aggression on

their retreat: the value of this understanding may be determined by acute casuists. Those who were inclined to place confidence in the British authorities were to await the Governor-general's orders for their disposal, but in no case were they to be given up to the Burmese government. To justify the guarantee to a part of the garrison of permission to escape, Colonel Richards represented that he was without the means of effectually pursuing them; that he was dependent for supplies upon the fleet, lying twenty miles down a river which was not navigable above; that the acquisition of Rungpore was of great importance; and that regard was to be had to the captive Assamese inhabitants, who would have been sacrificed by a different course: these reasons were certainly not without weight. The possession of Rungpore involved the virtual occupation of the whole of Assam. The Burmans made some border irruptions in May and June, and erected stockades; but they were driven out by parties of the British force, not without fatiguing marches, but almost without fighting.

From Sylhet it was proposed to march a large force through Cachar and Manipur; and for this purpose about seven thousand men were collected, and placed under the command of Brigadier-Gen. Shuldham. The attempt was made, but abandoned, from the difficulties presented by the country and the state of the weather. The beasts,

employed to convey stores and supplies perished in vast numbers; some dying of fatigue, some from dislocating their limbs as they laboured through the plashy soil, and others from being so deeply fixed in the mire that no efforts could extricate them. The loss of bullocks, camels, and elephants was enormous.

The difficulties which had been insurmountable by a regular force were, however, overcome by an undisciplined body of about five hundred men, under Gumber Singh, a son of a former rajah of Manipur. This force, which was accompanied by a British officer, Lieut. Pemberton, succeeded, by the middle of June, in reaching the western boundary of Manipur. The Burmans were posted in the principal town, but they fled on the approach of Gumber Singh's party, and in a short time completely evacuated the district. Having left a division of his force for defence, the adventurous leader of the expedition returned with Lieutenant Pemberton to Sylhet.

But the grand blow to the Burmese power from this quarter was to be directed against Arracan. The primary object was to occupy that province, and this being accomplished, it was believed that the force might be enabled to co-operate with the army on the Irawaddy. An army of eleven thousand men was assembled in Chittagong, under the command of Brigadier-general Morrison. A flotilla, under Commodore Hayes, was attached

to it, consisting of several pilot vessels and armed brigs, ten gun-pinnaces, and a vast number of gun-boats, each carrying a twelve-pounder carronade. General Morrison arrived at Chittagong in September 1824; but, in consequence of insuperable impediments, did not move until January. The coast was thought to offer the most eligible line of march, and part of the troops proceeded by sea, while the remainder moved by land. The arrival of the former was delayed by adverse weather; and an unsuccessful attack on some stockades, by part of the flotilla, was attended by serious loss. A junction of the two branches of the force was, however, effected; and the expedition advanced in the direction of the capital of the province. As it was approached, some fighting occurred, in which the character of the British arms was well maintained.

At day-break on the 29th, the army moved forward to attack the defences of Arracan. These consisted of a range of connected hills, from three hundred and fifty to four hundred and fifty feet in height, strong by nature, and rendered more strong by art—escarpment, abbatis, and masonry having been resorted to wherever they could be advantageously employed. A single pass led to the capital, and that was defended by several pieces of artillery and about three thousand muskets.

The first attempt of the assailants was directed

to gaining possession of the principal hills at the commencement of the pass. The ascent was steep, and in some places nearly perpendicular, and the assault was made in the face of a well-directed fire. Notwithstanding these circumstances, many gained the summit, and Lieutenant Clarke, with several of the light infantry company of the 54th regiment, got their hands upon the trench; but even with this assistance, they were unable to maintain their ground. Large stones were rolled on them, smaller ones were discharged from bows, and the effect was, that those who had thus fearfully ascended were violently hurled down again. But the attempt was not lightly abandoned. In despite of the difficulties which opposed them, the assaulting party persevered until every officer was wounded; while the troops engaged, both European and native, displayed the same gallant and unyielding spirit which animated those who led them.

It was now determined to change the point of attack. The right of the defences appeared to be the key of the enemy's position, and though the obstacles were great, it was resolved to attempt it. To divert attention from this point, a battery was constructed, and in the morning a vigorous cannonade opened upon the works at the pass. The meditated attack upon the enemy's right was entrusted to Brigadier-general Richards. It took place under cover of the night, and succeeded

without the loss of a man. On the following morning, preparations were made for pushing the success of the night, but the enemy abandoned the hills after a very feeble resistance, and no impediment remained to the occupation of the capital of Arracan. The naval force participated in these gallant deeds. A party of seamen accompanied the force under General Richards, which gained the hills. Indeed the zeal which that force displayed throughout the operations of the Burmese war was exemplary. One instance of it, immediately connected with the attack upon Arracan, may be mentioned. Commodore Hayes, finding that his boats could not be brought to the scene of action, landed two twenty-four pounders, and, with the British seamen, dragged them and their appurtenances five miles to the encampment before Arracan, rendering them available there for any service for which they might be required.

The loss of the capital caused the enemy to withdraw from all their positions in Arracan. The principal object of the expedition was thus attained; but the ulterior design, of marching Gen. Morrison's army across the mountains to join that of Sir Archibald Campbell, was found to be impracticable. This disappointment was not the worst misfortune which befel the army of Arracan. The enemy had been vanquished, but a very large portion of the victors were doomed to perish under the visitations

of disease. The rainy season brought with it fever and dysentery, and their ravages carried away vast numbers which the sword had spared and fatigue had left unsubdued. The prevalence of disease was all but universal; and it was at last deemed expedient to withdraw the troops altogether, leaving divisions of them on the islands of Cheduba and Ramee, and on the opposite coast of Sandowy.

The army under Sir Archibald Campbell was left at Prome, waiting the abatement of the rains and inundations. On the return of the season for active operations, intelligence was received of the approach of a large Burmese force. Immediate hostilities, however, were averted by the arrival of an answer not unfavourable to an overture for negociation which the British general had made to the Burmese Government not long before. The result was, the conclusion of an armistice till the 17th of October. Commissioners were appointed on both sides, and a conference ensued, in which, on the part of the British, it was required that the Court of Ava should abstain from interference with Cachar, Manipur, and Assam; should cede Arracan to the British Government, and pay two crores of rupees as an indemnification for the expenses of the war—one immediately, the other at a future period, the Tenasserim provinces being retained until its liquidation. The Burmese commissioners were not prepared

to assent to these terms; and, to enable them to apply for instructions from their government, the armistice was prolonged until the 2d of November. The Court of Ava, however, would concede neither money nor territory; and, at the expiration of the armistice, hostilities were resumed.

The first movement of any importance was disastrous to the English. The Burmese having pushed forward a division to Watty-goon, a few miles from Prome, a body of native infantry, with the view of dislodging them, was despatched to act on the left, while another body was to attack them in front. Both parties were unsuccessful; and Col. Macdonell, who led one of them, was shot through the head. A third body, which had been dispatched by way of Saagie, to afford support if required, fell in with part of the Burmese army, then in pursuit of Col. M'Dowell's force, who immediately fled; but the British party, being unable to learn any thing of the troops which they had been sent to support, marched back to Prome without effecting any thing further. This disaster, occurring immediately after the interruption of the negociations, contributed to support the confidence of the enemy, and encouraged him to persevere.

The Burmese army continued to advance towards the British lines, throwing up entrenchments and stockades as it proceeded. But its slowness to attack disappointed the British gene-

ral, who consequently determined to become the assailant. On the 30th of November preparations were made for a general attack upon every part of the enemy's line, and on the 1st of December it took place, the operations by land being aided by the flotilla under Sir James Brisbane. Two columns of attack were formed; one under Brigadier-general Cotton, the other accompanied by Sir Archibald Campbell. As soon as they were in motion, the naval force commenced a cannonade, and this so disconcerted the enemy, that the picquets of his left were withdrawn, and his position left exposed in that quarter to any sudden attack. General Cotton's column first reached the enemy's line, which consisted of a series of stockades, which he at once assaulted, and in less than ten minutes carried. Panic and confusion then seized the masses within the works, and great slaughter followed. Sir Archibald Campbell's column, pushing rapidly forward in the rear, met the flying masses endeavouring to cross the river, and opening the horse artillery upon them, did dreadful execution. Among those who fell within the works was the aged commander, Maha Nemion, who, under the burden of seventy-five years, had been carried in a litter from point to point, to endeavour by his presence and encouragement to sustain the energy of his men.

On the 2d, the British force was again in motion. The object of attach was the enemy's

centre, which was strongly entrenched amid hills inaccessible by land, except by one narrow pathway, defended by seven pieces of artillery, while the river was commanded by several batteries of heavy ordnance. Sir James Brisbane moved forward with the flotilla and cannonaded the works from the river. On the land side, after sufficient impression had been made on the works by artillery and rockets, a brigade, under Lieut.-Colonel Sale, advanced to storm, and, driving the enemy from hill to hill, secured to the British the whole of the position, which was nearly three miles in extent. During the attack the flotilla pushing past the works, succeeded in capturing all the boats and stores which had been brought down for the use of the Burmese army.

The right corps of that army still maintained its position. On the 5th it was attacked in flank and rear, while the batteries and boats of the British force cannonaded in front, and after a feeble resistance the position was evacuated, the enemy retiring to a second line of stockades, from which they were quickly dislodged; when, disheartened, dispersed, and broken, the troops fled in all directions through the woods.

The British army now advanced, the enemy flying before them and abandoning without an effort, defences which could not have been taken without severe loss. But the success of the victors was not unattended by circumstances of

discouragement. Their march was sometimes arrested by heavy rains, rendering the country impassable; sickness, in the awful form of spasmodic cholera, made its appearance; and on one occasion the European troops were compelled to halt from the total failure of the supply of animal food. The expected co-operation of the army of Arracan was not obtained, and though every where triumphant, the British general could not be free from anxiety. At the latter end of December, the Burmese proposed to treat for peace, an event which it was to be presumed could not be disagreeable to either party. The proposal was entertained, but the army continued its march to Patanagoh, opposite the Burmese entrenchments of Melloon. Continued communications having reference to the proposed peace were here carried on, Sir Archibald Campbell being assisted by Mr. Robertson, who had been appointed civil commissioner in Pegu and Ava, and also by Sir James Brisbane. After much discussion a treaty was agreed to, upon the terms formerly proposed by the British authorities, excepting that the provinces of Ye, Tavai, and Mergui were added to the territorial cessions, and the pecuniary payment reduced from two crores to one. The English copy of the treaty was signed on the 2d of January, the Burmese copy on the 3d, and an armistice was concluded till the 18th, to allow time for obtaining the ratification of the King.

The ratification was not received by the appointed time, and the Burmese commissioners then offered to pay an instalment of five lacs of rupees, and to give hostages for the safe return of the English prisoners from Ava, provided the British force would return to Prome, or at least agree to a further suspension of hostilities for a few days. The British commissioners peremptorily refused to retreat, and declined undertaking to abstain from hostilities, except on conditions of the Burmese evacuating Melloon within thirty-six hours, and retiring upon Ava; the march of the British army, however, not to be suspended until the receipt of the ratified treaty. This proposal was in return rejected by the Burmese, and hostilities recommenced. Batteries were erected opposite the selected parts of attack in the stockade, the heavy ordnance was landed from the flotilla, and by ten o'clock on the morning of the 19th, twenty-eight pieces of artillery where ready to open upon the enemy's defences.

After two hours cannonading, the troops intended for the assault, who had been previously embarked in boats under the superintendence of Capt. Chads, began to move. A brigade, under Col. Sale, was ordered to land below the stockade, and attack it by the south-west angle, while three other brigades were to land above the place to attack it by the northern face. The boats pushed

off together, but the current, aided by a strong wind, carried the brigade, under Col. Sale, to its destined point of attack before the remaining brigades could reach the shore. The troops landed, and immediately formed under Major Frith, Col. Sale having been wounded in the boats. This being effected, without waiting for the landing of the other brigades, they rushed on to the assault, entered by escalade, and established themselves in the works, in the face of ten or fifteen thousand men. The other brigades took the flying enemy, and completed the victory. A quantity of ordnance and military stores was taken, a magazine of grain, and specie to a large amount.*

The army on its advance was met by Mr. Price, an American missionary, and Mr. Sanford, an English surgeon that had been made prisoner, who were commissioned from Ava to ascertain the

* The treaty signed by the British and Burmese commanders was also found in the lines of Melloon. This Sir Archibald Campbell despatched by a messenger to the Kee Woongee, accompanying it by a note, stating that in the hurry of departure from Melloon, it appeared to have been forgotten. The Woongee and his colleague politely returned thanks, but observed, that the same hurry which had caused the loss of the treaty, had compelled them to leave behind a large sum of money, which they were sure the British General only waited an opportunity of returning.

terms of peace. They were informed that the terms tendered before the capture of Melloon were quite open for acceptance, and that with respect to the pecuniary indemnification, the army would retire to Rangoon on the payment of twenty-five lacs of rupees, and would evacuate the Burmese territory upon the discharge of a second instalment of the same amount. With this answer the delegates returned.

Upon the 8th of February, it was ascertained that the enemy were about five miles in advance on the road to the city of Pagahm, and on the 9th the British column moved forward to attack. The Burmese force amounted to about eighteen thousand men, the British fell short of two thousand. Notwithstanding this great disparity of numbers, the result was a decisive victory to the weaker party, the enemy abandoning Pagahm to the British, with all the stores, ordnance, arms, and ammunition, which it contained. The Burmese on this occasion departed from their usual course of fighting within barriers, and, for the first time, ventured to dispute for victory in the open field.*

* At one period of the contest, the British commander-in-chief was placed in imminent personal danger. In consequence of a party of troops who preceded them having advanced to skirmish, the general and his staff were left upon a plain with

The contest was now drawing to a close, but previously to recording its actual conclusion, it will be necessary to direct attention for a moment to some proceedings in Pegu.

A force had been stationed there under Colonel Pepper, to protect the province from the irruptions of Burman detachments. To check a series of incursions which took place under the command of the former governor of Marteban, Colonel Pepper, late in the year 1825, marched to Shoe-gein on the left bank of the Sitang, which he occupied without resistance. From there he despatched Lieut.-

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a mere handful of men, and two or three guns. About sixteen men who were foremost, were suddenly charged by a mass of Munypore horse. The bugle sounded to close, but the men were too few to make head against the cavalry, and they retired upon the guns. In this, however, they would scarcely have succeeded, if the subahdar major of the body-guard, with the jemadar and seven troopers, the personal escort of the commander-in-chief, had not interposed to cover their retreat. Dashing past the retreating men to the right and left, the troopers deployed in their rear, and with extraordinary coolness kept the Munypore force in check, falling back gradually till within range of the guns. They then filed off to make way for the guns to open, which they did with grape and sharpnell most effectively. This anecdote, so honourable to those who form the subject of it, was related in a private communication to the Calcutta Gazette, and is preserved in the valuable collection of papers appended to the Historical Sketch of the Burmese War, published by that distinguished Oriental scholar, Mr. Horace Hayman Wilson, Boden Professor of Sanscrit in the University of Oxford.

Col. Conry, with a body of light infantry, to reduce a Burman post bearing the name of the river, and situate between Tongo and Marteban. The attempt failed, and the commanding officer was killed. Colonel Pepper, then proceeded against the place with a stronger force, which he divided into three columns of attack. They advanced simultaneously, and succeeded in carrying the works, which were subsequently destroyed. This conflict was attended by severe loss on both sides. The enemy, however, continued troublesome; and shortly after the capture of the stockade of Sitang made a vigorous attack upon a British post at Mikow, which maintained the communication between Pegu and Shoe-gein, but the attempt was gallantly repulsed by the young officer in command, Ensign Clarke, with a small detachment of native infantry.

Sir Archibald Campbell was in full march towards the capital of the Burmese empire, when he was again met by Mr. Price, and Mr. Sanford, announcing the accession of the Burman sovereign to the proposed terms; but as no formal ratification of the treaty was received, the advance of the British army was not interrupted. Mr. Price returned to Ava to procure the necessary ratification, and again met the army (being then accompanied by the Burmese commissioners) at Yandabo, within four days' march of the capital.

Thus terminated the Burmese war, in which

the honour of the British arms was abundantly maintained, but which entailed upon the British Government a vast amount of expense, and subjected those engaged in its operations to an incalculable measure of privation and suffering.

A heavy expenditure was, perhaps under any circumstances, unavoidable, but much of the misery which overtook and subdued so many gallant spirits might have been averted by better information as to the country to be traversed, and better provision for the security of due supplies. Weighty and durable ought to be the advantages derived to the British Empire from the Burmese war, for great was the price at which they were purchased. One advantage, undoubtedly, was gained, in removing the frontier of a restless and dangerous neighbour to a greater distance from the principal seat of British power.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE SIEGE OF BHURTPORE.

THE far-famed fortress of Bhurtpore was erected at the expense of Aurengzebe, though not under the instructions of that warrior, nor for his own benefit. During the last march of Aurengzebe towards the Deccan, the Jauts pillaged his baggage, and with the result of the spoil raised the fortress, so long deemed impregnable.

In 1803, the Rajah of Bhurtpore first became connected with the British by the conclusion of a treaty of alliance with that power. But the duration of friendly relations was short. In 1804, the prince joined the falling fortunes of Holkar. The consequence was, that in the beginning of the following year Bhurtpore was besieged by the British force commanded by Lord Lake. After several days' cannonading a practicable breach was reported, and on the 9th of January an

attempt was made to storm. Embarrassment attended its very outset. The ground over which the columns had to advance was so irregular and bad, that it obliged the troops to open out; confusion was the result, the men losing their way, some following one column, some another, without reference to their original destination. Notwithstanding this, and a heavy fire from the enemy, about 150 men succeeded in getting across the ditch; but Colonel Maitland, who led the attack, receiving a mortal wound, and the mass of the force employed shrinking from the attempt to cross, the courageous and persevering men who had passed were compelled to return without effecting anything. The batteries were again set to work, and on the 21st another attempt to carry the place by storm was made, but without success. A bridge which had been prepared, when launched into the water was found to be one-third too short to answer its purpose. One of the scaling ladders was thrown on to lengthen it, but it got entangled, and instead of connecting the bridge with the scarp, it fell over one side and overset the bridge. A daring attempt was then made by Lieut. Morris and a few men, who swam over the ditch and ascended the breach. Lieut. Morris got on the rampart, and there received a severe wound, which compelled him to return, and while swimming back he was again wounded. It being im-

possible to pass a sufficient number of men for the service, a retreat was ordered, and effected amid great confusion, the bridge and scaling-ladders being left behind, and taken by the enemy.

A third attempt to storm the fort was made on the 20th of February, but the difficulties and discouragements which had been previously encountered combined with those in prospect to throw such a damp over the spirits of the men, that, with some exceptions, it was found impossible to lead them to their duty. A few shewed the possession of better feelings, but for want of support they were compelled to retire. A fourth and last attempt was made on the following day. It was sustained with great courage and firmness for two hours, against the most grievous impediment, when the hopelessness of perseverance became apparent, and the troops returned to the trenches. In these two days (20th and 21st of February), the British lost, in killed and wounded, 96 officers, European and Native, and 1,768 rank and file.

The seige had been undertaken with means altogether inadequate to afford even a chance of success.* But the attempts which had been

* Our contests in India have usually been maintained with an amount of force greatly disproportioned to that opposed to us; but it would be unwise voluntarily to incur the same degree of

made, though unavailing to the reduction of the place, had not been without effect upon those by whom it was defended. In April a new treaty of alliance with Bhurtpore was signed. By this treaty the British government guaranteed to the Rajah the possession of his territories against all external and internal enemies.

About the month of August 1824, the Rajah Buldeo Singh, apprehending that his death was not far distant, expressed a wish that a khelât of investiture should be granted to his infant son, with the view of securing his peaceable succession. The desire of the prince was strenuously supported by Sir David Ochterlony, the political resident of the British government, and the ceremony took place. Shortly afterwards the Rajah died.

In May 1825, Sir David Ochterlony received intelligence of a revolutionary movement in the state of Bhurtpore. The rights of the infant Rajah had been assailed by his cousin Doorjun Sal, the regent mother attacked, the uncle of the rightful prince murdered, and the boy seized by the usurper. Under such circumstances, Sir David Ochterlony felt that no time was to be lost,

risk in future. We have taught the natives of India our discipline, and this gift may be turned against us. For such an event we ought to be prepared. To lose India through a miserable and short-sighted parsimony, would be a melancholy conclusion of our brilliant career.

nor any thing sacrificed to regularity of proceeding. He accordingly directed a force to be immediately collected under Major-General Reynell, and issued a proclamation calculated to confirm the allegiance of the subjects of the Bhurtpore state to their lawful sovereign. The usurper attempted to negociate. He denied that the rebel movement had originated with him, but, notwithstanding set up a claim, founded on a pretended testamentary disposition of the deceased Rajah. Having endeavoured to obtain from Sir David Ochterlony a recognition of his right at least to the regency, and, on failure of this, having sought delay, upon the plea of affording time for inquiry, which was also refused, he offered on receiving a promise of safety to come to the camp of the British agent, bringing with him the infant Rajah. The possession of the person of the Rajah was an important point, and an answer was returned, assuring Doorjun Sal of personal safety. While Sir David Ochterlony was thus engaged, orders arrived from the Governor-general which led to the recal of the assembled force, and the cessation of hostile indications on the part of the British authorities. The grounds upon which these orders were issued, were that nothing but a case of extreme emergency would justify ordering into the field the small force at that time available in Upper India; that the occurrences at Bhurtpore did not constitute such an emer-

gency, and that the British government was not bound by any engagement to support the succession of the rightful heir by arms, without reference to time, circumstances, and general expediency. It was further alleged that Sir David Ochterlony had acted on most imperfect and unsatisfactory information, and that the government was ignorant what plea Doorjun Sal might have to offer in justification of his proceedings, and what object he professed in exciting disturbances.

Sir David Ochterlony felt this disapproval of his proceedings most deeply. He declared, that he considered every moment's delay as "submission to disgrace," and his belief, that if the orders of the Governor-general had been postponed but a short time, matters would have been brought to an amicable and honourable conclusion. Entertaining these views, he tendered his resignation of the office of political resident in Malwa and Rajpootana, which he had held with high reputation for twenty years. His retirement was shortly followed by his death.*

* This distinguished soldier passed fifty years in the service of the East-India Company, of which he was one of the brightest ornaments. With the more striking qualities of the military character, he united another equally necessary for high command—a sound and cautious judgment. He was engaged in most of the wars of India, from those with Hyder Ali downwards. In the operations against Nepaul, his was the genius which averted the natural consequences of disaster, and led

By the course taken by the Governor-General hostilities were delayed, but not averted. On

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to the happy termination of the war. Any attempt to render justice to his merits and labours within the compass of a note, would be vain, and even ridiculous, but they were noticed neither coldly nor ungracefully in the following general order issued by the Indian government on the melancholy occasion of his death :—

"The Right Hon. the Governor-General in Council has learnt, with great sorrow, the demise of Major-General Sir David Ochterlony, resident in Malwa and Rajpootana. This melancholy event took place on the morning of the 15th instant at Meerut, whither he had proceeded for the benefit of change of air.

"On the eminent military services of Major-General Sir David Ochterlony it would be superfluous to dilate: they have been acknowledged in terms of the highest praise by successive governments; they justly earned a special and substantial reward from the Hon. East-India Company; they have been recognized with expressions of admiration and applause by the British Parliament; and they have been honoured with signal marks of the approbation of his sovereign.

"With the name of Sir David Ochterlony are associated many of the proudest recollections of the Bengal army, and to the renown of splendid achievements he added, by the attainment of the highest honours of the Military Order of the Bath, the singular felicity of opening to his gallant companions an access to those tokens of royal favour which are the dearest objects of a soldier's ambition.

"The diplomatic qualifications of Sir David Ochterlony were not less conspicuous than his military talents. To an admirably vigorous intellect, and consummate address, he united the essential requisites of an intimate knowledge of the native character, language, and manners. The confidence which the government reposed in an individual gifted with such rare

the 25th of November, a proclamation was issued by Sir Charles Metcalf, resident at Delhi, denouncing the pretensions of Doorjun Sal, and declaring the intentions of the British Government to support the interests of the rightful prince by arms. A large force had been assembled to support this declaration; Lord Combermere, Commander-in-Chief of the army of India, arrived to superintend the military operations; and on the 10th of December his head-quarters were before Bhurtpore. The force at his disposal amounted to upwards of twenty thousand men, with a field of more than a hundred pieces of artillery. The humanity of the Commander-in-Chief was manifested by a proposal to allow the women and children to withdraw from the town before the commencement of the bombardment. An evasive answer being returned, the offer was repeated but without effect.

endowments was evinced by the high and responsible situations which he successively filled, and the duties of which he discharged with eminent ability and advantage to the public interest.

"As an especial testimony of the high respect in which the character and services of Major-General Sir David Ochterlony are held, and as a public demonstration of sorrow for his demise, the Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct that minute guns, to the number of sixty-eight, corresponding with his age, be fired this evening at sunset from the ramparts of Fort William."

Several days were occupied in the construction of works. During the progress of these operations a party of about two hundred of the enemy's horse attempted to make their escape; they were intercepted, thirty or forty killed, and upwards of a hundred made prisoners. On the 28th, the advanced batteries opened. Others were brought into work as they were completed, and by the 4th of January they had produced visible effect. Still they were insufficient effectually to breach the walls, and on the evening of the 6th, a mine was commenced in the escarp of the ditch on the northern face; but unfortunately the work not being sufficiently advanced by day-break, and the engineers apprehending discovery if their operations were continued, it was prematurely exploded, and produced no material effect. A second attempt to mine was made, but those employed in it were countermined from the interior before they had entered many feet. The gallery was subsequently blown in, it having been discovered that the enemy were keeping watch in it.

A serious accident occurred on the 8th, a shot from the fort set fire to a tumbril, and in consequence about twenty thousand pounds weight of ammunition was destroyed.

On the 14th a mine under one of the bastions was exploded with little effect. Two others were then driven into the same wall, which were blown

on the 16th, with such effect that, with the aid of a day's battering, a sufficient breach was made.

The morning of the 18th was fixed for the assault, which was to be made by two columns, the right commanded by Major-General Reynell, and the left by Major-General Nicolls. The signal was the explosion of a mine, in the north east angle, which took place at eight o'clock with terrible effect. Unfortunately, however, the explosion being in an unexpected direction, several men of General Reynell's column were killed, and three officers wounded. This created a momentary hesitation, but General Reynell giving the word "forward," the whole advanced with perfect steadiness. The enemy made a vigorous resistance, but the British troops advanced, overcoming all opposition, until they united at the Kombheer gate with the troops of General Nicoll's division. That division had advanced to the left breach, and carried it, although the ascent was excessively steep, and the troops in their progress were annoyed by the guns of the ramparts, which, whenever moveable, the enemy turned upon them. The citadel surrendered about four o'clock. Doorjun Sal attempted to escape with his family, but was intercepted and secured by General Sleigh, commanding the cavalry.

Thus terminated the attempt to interfere with the rightful order of succession in the State of

Bhurtpore, and thus was annihilated the boasted pretensions to impregnability of the fortress bearing that name. Those pretensions had been greatly strengthened by the failure of Lord Lake in 1805. Twenty years afterwards, they with the fortress itself were levelled with the dust.

CHAPTER XVII.

CHANGES OF 1833.

THE exclusive privileges continued to the East-India Company by the Act of 1813 expired in 1834. During the preceding twenty years, the doctrines of free trade had been establishing themselves in every quarter: their reign was now in its zenith. The servants of the Crown had unreservedly avowed a conviction of their abstract truth, and much had been done towards carrying them into practical effect. The protection heretofore afforded to various branches of trade and manufactures had in many instances been withdrawn; and even the old navigation laws of England, which had been regarded as the foundation of its maritime strength, and which had commanded the approbation of Adam Smith, had fallen before the triumphant march of liberal opinions. An attack of more than ordinary vigour

upon the privileges which the East-India Company yet retained was therefore to be anticipated, whenever those privileges again came before Parliament.

Indistinct murmurings preceded the coming storm; and at length those anxious to participate in the restricted trade began to speak out. On the 12th May 1829, the House of Lords was enlightened by a petition from Manchester, presented by the Marquis of Lansdown. The petition, according to the statement of the noble Marquis, prayed that the Lords would take into their early consideration the expediency of opening the trade to the East-Indies. It must be remembered, that the trade was already open. The form of obtaining a license was required, and there was some limitation as to the ports to which ships were to proceed: such limitations, however, exist almost every where; and it must not be supposed that the petitioners sought unrestricted freedom of commerce. On the contrary, they modified their application for a consideration of the expediency of opening the trade to the East-Indies, by adding, "and of imposing such limitations upon that trade as might be consistent with the commercial and manufacturing interests of this country." The commercial and manufacturing interests of India were not deemed worth a thought. After some very general remarks in favour of the prayer of the petition, the Marquis

of Lansdowne said, "he was well aware that the most extravagant expectations had been raised. Those expectations had arisen out of the depressed circumstances of the country, which induced persons to look out anxiously for any opening in which to employ their capital. The petitioners stated that the opening of the trade to India"—it being already open—"would be calculated more than any thing else to raise the manufactures and trade of this country to that prosperity from which they had fallen; and he was sure that, under such circumstances, the petition would meet with their lordships' attentive consideration."

Lord Calthorp presented a similar petition from Birmingham. Lord Ellenborough, president of the Board of Control, expressed his conviction of the great importance of the subject, but declined giving any intimation of the course which ministers intended to pursue.

On the same day the note of preparation was sounded in the House of Commons by Mr. Huskisson. When Mr. Canning thought fit to relinquish his seat for Liverpool, on the ground that the representation of a great commercial town was inconsistent with the duties of an adviser of the Crown, he made over the borough to Mr. Huskisson, who did not participate in the scruples of his chieftain. As the representative of Liverpool, Mr. Huskisson was, of course, the enemy of the East-India Company; and in presenting a peti-

tion, praying for the abolition of such exclusive privileges as that body yet retained, he felt it necessary, with a view to the success of future appeals to his constituents, to enlarge upon the subject to which the petition related. He entered into a long and laboured statement, for the purpose of shewing the great extension of trade which had taken place since the cessation of the Company's exclusive privileges with regard to India in 1813. It appeared, however, from a counter statement made by Mr. Astell, chairman of the Company, that the accuracy of the alleged facts with which Mr. Huskisson had been provided was by no means equal to the vivacity of the expectations which he had been instructed to profess. With regard to the comparative prices and qualities of tea, one of the points at issue, Mr. Huskisson subsequently declared that he knew nothing, except what had been told him, and what he learnt from price currents. On another point, which related to the amount of tonnage employed in the India trade at different periods, Mr. Huskisson did not venture any explanation or defence.

On Thursday the 14th, Mr. Whitmore submitted a motion for inquiry, which was negatived without a division: it, however, furnished occasion for a very long speech from the mover, and some shorter ones from other members. Mr. Whitmore divided his subject into three heads, Great Britain, India, and China. Under the first,

Mr. Whitmore argued that a great opening might be obtained for the produce of our vast manufacturing power, and referred to the great increase which had taken place in the exportation of goods, and especially cotton, since 1813.* He appeared to feel disappointed at not finding a corresponding increase of imports, but attributed the deficiency, as usual, to the Company's monopoly of the China trade. In speaking of the interests of the Indian people, Mr. Whitmore poured forth a torrent of vague declamation;† and on China, he contented

* Mr. Whitmore stated that, in 1814, the total amount of manufactured cotton exported was 818,203 yards, and that in 1828 it was 43,500,000 yards; that the value in 1814 was £90,000 — in 1828, notwithstanding a great fall in price, £1,900,000. He did not state that this increased exportation had driven the manufacturers of India to starvation, and brought to ruin districts and cities previously flourishing and happy; nor did he state that the difference in the quality of English and Indian cotton goods vastly exceeded the difference in price.

† One or two extracts from Mr. Whitmore's printed speech (published by himself) may be sufficient to illustrate its tone and taste:—

"The monopolist, stripped of all his gorgeous but borrowed plumes, stands forth in his true character—an enemy to justice, a spoiler of other men's wealth, a destroyer of national resources, a contemner of the rights and liberties of the people."

"If I were a friend to monopoly, instead of being its most inveterate enemy, I should say, banish every free trader from the limits of your charter, burn his ships, rifle his property, ruin his family; you would thus only follow out your own principles, and act consistently, if not justly."

himself with repeating such statements as he found suitable to his purpose in Mr. Crawford's work on the Eastern Archipelago.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Goulburn, thought the session too far advanced to admit of inquiry, and suggested its postponement until the next. Mr. Huskisson was for entering upon inquiry at once, as was also Mr. Hume. Mr. Vesey Fitzgerald and Mr. Robinson supported the views of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Mr. Wynne lamented the continuance of the China trade for so long a period in the hands of the Company. Mr. Baring took an intermediate view between the opinions that had been advanced by other speakers, and appeared to have equal doubts as to the advantages and disadvantages of any course. Sir Charles Forbes thought the union of sovereign and merchant in the Company disadvantageous; but added, that, objectionable and faulty as the Company's government might be, it was preferable to that of our colonial governments; and he congratulated the natives of India on being placed under the government of the Company instead of the Crown. With regard to the China trade, it was his opinion that the expectations formed of the advantages to be derived from opening it would be disappointed: that country was hermetically sealed against foreign commerce. The trade at Canton was carried on by a monopoly; the whole empire was managed

by monopolies. The Hong merchants fixed the prices of the commodities, and the markets of Canton had maintained such a uniformity of prices for twenty years, that the article of cotton had seldom varied beyond eight or ten tales per pecul. Trade was interdicted at every other port in China; and it was within his own knowledge, that an enterprising individual had fitted out a vessel for the purpose of forcing a trade in other ports of the empire, who had not only been unable to effect his object, but had been obliged to purchase provisions by stealth and with hard dollars. As to the trade with India, that, he contended, was to be increased only by that House. Let ministers begin by reducing the duties upon the commodities of India. A small duty was imposed upon English manufactures, and a heavy one upon Indian commodities. He asked, Was that reciprocity? Was that free trade? He hoped that the inquiry proposed would embrace, not our own interests merely, but that of the people of India.

These statements and opinions, from one distinguished alike by his position in the commercial world, by his knowledge of India, and by his devotion to the interests of the people of that country, ought to have commanded deep attention.

Mr. Astell afterwards addressed the house, in a speech marked by great ability as well as by great moderation. He said he had abstained from refuting the arguments, and exposing the errors of

the mover in the belief, that the proposal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to enter upon inquiry in the next session would have been satisfactory. He was a friend to inquiry, because he deplored the ignorance which pervaded the country with respect to India, to which he attributed the prevailing prejudice against the Company; prejudice which, he was persuaded, full and impartial investigation would disperse. Referring to the alleged increase of exports to India, he denied that it was by itself a proof of increased prosperity. To be satisfactory upon this point, the increased export should be accompanied by an increase of import from India. The Company had long been alive to the necessity of encouraging production in India. The article of cotton had received especial attention. But the muslins of India, once so famous, had been supplanted by the manufactures of Manchester and Glasgow. European articles, he said, were to be obtained at the presidencies as cheap as in England. He should be glad to have an opportunity of examining the whole subject in the next session, but in the meantime he must maintain that the Company had not been inattentive to the prosperity and happiness of the people of India. The more the institutions which we had introduced became known, the more would the benefit of our dominion be acknowledged. The country was improving under our government. Experiments ought to be undertaken cautiously, and conducted

temperately. Most especially should we bear in mind, that we were not to look merely to the extension of the commercial resources of our own country, but that our first duty was to look to the advancement of the happiness of the millions in the East subjected to our rule.

Mr. Warburton complained of the impediments thrown in the way of Europeans desirous of visiting India, at the same time that he complained of the want of sufficient protection for the natives against injuries inflicted by such persons. Against one part of the existing system for the government of India, he was singularly bitter. The constitution of the Board of Control he thought highly objectionable. With respect to the persons who composed that board, no doubt they had the interests of our Indian possessions sincerely at heart, but how was it possible, he asked, that they could do any good when they held office only by the tenure of a day? The moment they had learned to do their duty they were removed to some other office, and new persons were introduced, just as ignorant of the state of India as their predecessors when they first became members of the board. This subject required the serious attention of the house.

Lord Ashley denied the correctness of Mr. Warburton's statements, respecting the refusal of licenses to proceed to India. He was followed by Mr. Brougham, whose speech was devoted prin-

cipally to pointing out the difficulties of the subject. He wished the abolition of the commercial monopoly, and the difficulty was how to effect this object with safety to the essential interests of the immense country governed by the Company, and with safety also to its long-established government. It would be at once conceived, that he did not wish to transfer that government to this country, because, though an anomaly, yet the government of India, as regarded the interests of the people and the maintenance of due and legal subordination, could not, he thought, be placed so safely in other hands, even if they lived to see the Company cease to be traders, and aspire only to be governors of a mighty empire. Taking into view every thing connected with the subject, he thought it better to defer inquiry until an early period of the next session. A short reply from Mr. Whitmore closed the debate. The result has been already mentioned.

Early in the session of 1830, the agitation of the question on the renewal of the privileges of the East-India Company was recommenced in both houses. In the House of Lords, on the 9th February, Lord Ellenborough moved for a Select Committee "to inquire into the present state of the affairs of the East-India Company, and the trade between the East-Indies, Great Britain, and China." In his speech introducing this motion, Lord Ellenborough alluded to the increased

consumption of tea; to economical reform then becoming a populart opic from the turn of mind of the governor-general, Lord William Bentinck; to the substitution of native service for that of Europeans; and to the reduction of duties upon British manufactures imported into India. No corresponding reduction, however, of duties upon Indian goods imported into this country was announced. The Marquess of Lansdowne having signified his approbation of the motion, and expatiated on the importance of the duty which the House was called upon to perform, the debate diverged into a discussion of the merits of a letter addressed by Lord Ellenborough to Sir John Malcolm, which at the time was exciting much attention.

On the same day, in the House of Commons, Mr. Peel (now Sir Robert Peel) moved for the appointment of a Select Committee. Having stated his reasons for referring the whole subject to one committee, he proceeded to speak of the conduct of the East-India Company. Looking to the representations of which he was in possession; viewing the documents that were in his hands, he was bound to say, that any investigation into the conduct of that body would, he believed, tend to their credit. Contrasting the administration of the Company with that of any other colonial establishment that ever existed, he was convinced that their conduct had redounded greatly to their honour. On the commercial part of the question

he refrained from giving any opinion, while on that which he admitted to be the most important of all, the welfare of the people of India, he urged the propriety of endeavouring, while keeping them under British rule, "to atone to them for the sufferings they endured, and the wrongs to which they were exposed in being reduced to that rule; and to afford them such advantages, and confer on them such benefits, as may in some degree console them for the loss of their independence."

Here are admissions which are altogether unwarranted by facts. There is scarcely an instance in which any portion of the people of India have suffered wrong by being brought under British rule; and as to consoling them for the loss of their independence, the slightest knowledge of the practice of native governments is sufficient to shew, that under them no portion of individual independence subsists—that personal liberty and property are both held at the caprice not of the sovereign merely, but also of his minions; that to possess wealth is only to possess a title to the privilege of being plundered, and that the administration of what is called law, has nothing to do with the maintenance of right, but that a judge under such a government stands towards a similar functionary in a well-regulated state, in the same relation in which a professional poisoner stands to a physician. So far from needing consolation for

having been emancipated from the curse of being governed by their own countrymen, the subjection of India to the mild yoke of Britain must be regarded by all impartial men as a subject for congratulation.

After some remarks from Mr. Whitmore, Mr. Peel submitted a list of the proposed committee. Sir James Mackintosh and Mr. Hume objected to the introduction of the names of two or three East-India Directors, and General Gascoyne (member for Liverpool) took the same course, because one of the members named had written a pamphlet in favour of the East-India Company. The members, who were either led by their inclinations, or compelled by their position, to oppose the renewal of the Company's charter, seemed to think that no committee could be a fair one unless composed entirely of persons devoted to one side of the question into which they were to inquire.

This was noticed by Mr. Astell, who observed that he knew not why the defenders of the East-India Company were not to be heard in the house, or in the committee, as well as its professed opposers; nor why a gentleman who had been the public advocate of opinions hostile to the renewal of the Company's charter, and because he had presented petitions to the same effect, was on that ground to be appointed a member of the committee, while Directors were to be

excluded because their leanings were presumed to be the other way. "He had hesitated," he said, "about making these remarks, but they had been drawn from him, and he called upon the House to say whether his connection with the Company was, under the circumstances, a fitting ground for his exclusion."

These observations called up Mr. Huskisson, who maintained that there was a difference between the Directors and persons who had not the same degree of interest in the concerns of the Company. The applicability of this remark it is not easy to perceive. If a man entertain a strong feeling on any subject, it matters not by what motives that feeling is produced. The Directors were naturally supposed to be favourable to the retention of the Company's privileges: many members of the House entertained, and had expressed strong opinions in opposition to them. Why are one set of partizans less eligible members of a committee of inquiry than another? Both may be excluded without unfairness, but to exclude one party, and admit the other, would be monstrous. The fact, if true, that the assailants of the Company were perfectly independent in their hostility, would avail nothing. But it was not true. Can any one say that the representatives of Liverpool and Bristol, pushed on by whip and spur to break down an exclusive trade, of which their constituents wished to partake, were more independent than the Directors of the East-

India Company? Mr. Huskisson, indeed, for a short period of the latter part of his parliamentary career maintained free trade doctrines with an earnestness which, if not the effect of conviction, must have originated in the less worthy sources of vanity or vengeance.* But his colleague, General Gascoyne, was not supposed to be deeply read in abstract doctrines of any kind, nor had he ever claimed the distinction to be derived from their advocacy.†

* Mr. Huskisson's illumination on the subject of Free Trade came late. When his youthful admiration of the French revolution had been either removed by reflection, or stifled by prudence, he obtained employment under the Anti-Jacobin Administration of Mr. Pitt, by whom political theories were not tolerated. With the party of which that statesman was the head, Mr. Huskisson continued to hold office for about twenty years, without breathing a whisper of Free Trade. Times changed, and Mr. Huskisson entered upon a mission for the dissemination of Free Trade doctrines with all the enthusiasm of a new convert, reserving only one important branch of trade from that perfect freedom which he claimed for all others, Mr. H. at that time representing a constituency (Chichester) whose welfare depended on the prosperity of agriculture. Not satisfied with upholding this exception in his place in parliament, he wrote a pamphlet for the purpose. Subsequently, when he became the member for a great commercial town, his zeal in the cause of his one favoured exception experienced a perceptible decline.

† For unlimited freedom in one branch of trade—that in African flesh — General Gascoyne had indeed fought many a battle in the House of Commons, but whether in this cause he followed his own wishes, or those of his constituents, he alone could determine.

Mr. Baring, who followed Mr. Astell, balanced the advantages and disadvantages of admitting East-India Directors to the committee until it appeared almost impossible to determine in which direction he meant to turn the scale. On the whole, he seemed to conclude that it was preferable to have them. He thought the choice of the committee fair, but he said that he should go into the discussion with a strong impression that the task imposed upon them was beyond their power.

These views seemed to be adopted by Mr. Bright. Mr. P. Thomson defended the course taken; and after Mr. Huskisson had objected to so many county members being placed on the committee, and General Gascoyne had given notice of an intention to move an instruction to the committee to take into consideration the trade with China, and the propriety of removing impediments in the way of a free trade with India, the committee was finally agreed upon.

Nothing worthy of remark occurred in either House of Parliament until the bringing up the seventh portion of the Report of the Commons committee, on the 8th July. On this occasion, Mr. Trant expressed a hope that in the following session the committee which might be appointed would especially consider Indian affairs with reference to the interests of the natives of India. General Gascoyne reiterated his former complaints of the construction of the committee, and

condemned the reports as betraying a partiality to the cause of the East-India Company. Mr. Stuart Wortley defended the reports, and Mr. Ward, chairman of the committee, observed that the report was confined solely to a summary of the evidence, and that those members who were most opposed to the claims of the East-India Company expressed the highest opinion of its impartiality. He pithily added, that if the result of the evidence was favourable to the Company, it must be recollected that the committee had no power to constrain witnesses in their answers. Mr. John Stewart, a gentleman whose name was placed on the committee at the suggestion of Mr. Hume, added his testimony to the fairness of the Report.

In October, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Company were invited to an interview with the Duke of Wellington, prime minister, and Lord Ellenborough, president of the Board of Control. The Duke of Wellington, on opening the business, suggested the probability of the Company being permitted to retain the government of India, but deprived of the monopoly of the China trade. The chairman, Mr. Astell, pointed out the financial difficulties which would arise from such a course; the advantages which resulted both to India and this country from the continuance of the Company's trade with China, and the necessity that the security of the Company's capital should be guaranteed

in the event of any change. It was observed in reply, that the Company would have the security of their fixed property in India, and with regard to the assistance afforded to India from the China trade, it was hoped that the reductions of Indian expenditure which had been, and might hereafter be made, would bring the charges within the revenue—that if not, the deficit must be made good by loans, or otherwise, as Parliament might direct; but that, on the supposition of the revenues of India being no longer assisted by the profits of the China trade, it would be necessary to subject the expenditure to general and efficient control.

The communication of the King's ministers having been submitted to a committee of correspondence, a minute was recorded by that body, declaring that they could not recommend the Company to be a party to such an arrangement as that suggested by the minister of the crown. It was remarked, that this was the first occasion, since the existence of the present system, on which a proposal had been submitted which, while it conferred no one advantage on the Company, put their commercial capital in hazard, leaving them without any security for the large sums which they had embarked in the government of India, except that which might be afforded by the property which they held in their own right, and which could not properly be taken from them.

The advantage derived to India from the surplus profits of the China trade beyond ten-and-a-half per cent. (the amount to which the proprietors' dividends were limited) was pointed out, as well as the financial danger to be apprehended from the proposed change. These views, on being submitted at a later period to a Court of Directors, were approved and adopted by them.

Within a very short period of the interview which gave rise to the minute above-mentioned, an important change in the King's councils took place. The administration, of which the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel were the chief members, resigned, and a new one was formed under Earl Grey. It was composed of Whigs of various shades of liberality, with the intermixture of three or four members of the party of Mr. Canning. Among the latter was Mr. Charles Grant, the new president of the Board of Control.

One topic of absorbing interest occupied the principal share of attention, both in the cabinet and in parliament; but in this place, it is proper to advert only to such proceedings as were connected with the Company's tenure of government in India. On the 4th February 1831, Mr. Grant moved the re-appointment of the Committee of Inquiry. Mr. Whitmore thereupon took occasion to express an opinion, that enough was already known to enable the House to take steps towards laying open the China trade. Mr. Hume con-

curred; while Mr. Cutlar Fergusson and Mr. Astell dissented from the views of Mr. Whitmore. On the 17th April, Mr. Grant moved a resolution regarding the payment of the debt due by the public to the Company, preparatory to the cessation of the charter. On the 21st April, on occasion of the Marquess of Lansdowne presenting a petition to the House of Lords from Glasgow, praying for a free-trade to China, free-trade to India, and permission freely to settle in India, Lord Ellenborough avowed, that it was the intention of the Government of which he was a member to open the trade to China, and that, to enable them to effect that object, their efforts had been devoted to reducing the expenditure of India.

A dissolution of parliament having taken place, it became necessary on the meeting of the new one to re-appoint the Committee on East-India Affairs, and a motion to that effect was made by Mr. C. Grant on the 28th June. Mr. Whitmore complained that the Directors of the Company had thrown impediments in the way of obtaining information. The charge was indignantly repelled by Mr. Astell, who maintained that the course pursued in the committee was strictly in accordance with the terms of its appointment. Mr. Cutlar Fergusson averred, that the Directors had given every facility for inquiry by allowing access to their records, and charged Mr. Whitmore with having thrown everything into confusion by the

method, or rather want of method, with which he had conducted his inquiries in the committee. Mr. C. Grant also vindicated the Directors from the suspicion of throwing any obstruction in the way of the inquiries which the committee had considered it their duty to institute. Mr. Hume agreed in the observations of Mr. Astell, who he said had clearly stated that, till the Company petitioned, the matter was in the hands of Government; and Mr. Hume thought Government should suggest some mode of conducting the business. Sir John Malcolm recommended that the various subjects before the committee should be looked upon as forming parts of an entire system; and Sir Charles Forbes, after reproving some members of the former committee for non-attendance, said that he hoped the interests of the East-India Company would be duly attended to, as the country owed to that Company a debt of gratitude. Sir James Macdonald thought inconvenience arose from their being two parties in the committee strongly opposed to each other; and Mr. Robinson attributed the difficulty to members going into the committee with pre-conceived opinions. The committee was re-appointed.

Notwithstanding the general feeling of satisfaction which had been expressed in the house, with the conduct of the Directors of the East-India Company in the inquiry, a feeling in which Mr. Whitmore appeared to be almost the only member

who did not partake, and in which Mr. Grant had distinctly avowed that he participated, that gentleman, on the following day, complained to the Chairman and Deputy, that the opponents of the Company charged the Directors with a disposition to withhold information; that this notion was very prevalent, and that it was countenanced by the Directors contending that the Company not being before the House, were not called upon in their corporate capacity, either to produce evidence in support of their own pretensions, or to expose the errors and mis-statements of their opponents. He added, that the public were impressed with notions unfavourable to the Company, and that they were expected to come forward. In reply, the chairman, Sir Robert Campbell, pointed to the progress that had been made by the committee; to the facility with which any further information might be obtained, either from the records of the Company, to which the Court were at all times ready to furnish access, or, from the testimony of well-informed men; to the impracticability of convening a Court of Proprietors in time to render anything they might do available during the current session, and to the inconvenience and inexpediency of the Company petitioning without some communications of the views of ministers, similar to that made by the First Lord of the Treasury and President of the India Board, during the late administration. The Court of

Directors, it was added, might be disposed to meet the views of the Ministers of the Crown, as far as could be done without compromising the interests of their constituents, or their own character, but the Court would not recommend to the Proprietors either to petition for a charter, or to receive one, unless the interests of the Proprietors were thereby secured, and the Company at the same time enabled to discharge all the obligations which might be imposed on them with advantage to the state and credit to themselves.

Mr. Grant did not dispute the propriety of the conditions contended for by the chairs, but, he said, the opponents of the Company complained that, from the difficulties and obstacles to which he had alluded, they were unable to make out their case, and could not therefore continue to take the lead. He thought, therefore, that it devolved upon the Company to come forward and shew grounds for the renewal of the charter. It was properly answered, that in reality the case of the Company was established by the failure of their opponents, and that when the Company petitioned Parliament, they would be prepared to shew the expediency of maintaining the present system. Finally, the necessity, in reference to the numerous engagements of the Company at home and abroad, of an early communication of the views of Government, was pressed upon the President of the Board. Mr. Grant then said, that as it would not be

possible to accomplish the presentation of a petition from the Company during the session, there was no alternative but for himself to take a more direct and leading part in the proceedings of the Committee, than under ordinary circumstances he should have deemed it expedient for a minister in his situation to adopt. This, it will be recollected, was the very course recommended by Mr. Hume, and by him alone in the House of Commons on the preceding day.

Mr. Whitmore on the 20th July presented a petition from certain British and Native inhabitants of Calcutta, praying the abolition of the East-India Company's monopoly.* This gave rise

* In reference to the views of the mercantile community of India, and the mode by which they were supported, a writer in the *Asiatic Journal* for June 1833 notices several remarkable facts. He says, "We are in a condition to prove, that although the press of India is acknowledged, even by the loudest advocates of its liberty, to be, as regards the measures of the government, practically quite as free as the press of this country, it is or has been labouring under a thraldom, as respects the East-India question, of the very worst kind. It appears that a large portion of the Calcutta newspapers, which to a certain extent supply those of England and the rest of India with facts and notions concerning the subsidiary parts of the East-India question, have been under the direct influence and control of the mercantile interest at Calcutta, which influence and control, if we can trust to a Mofussil paper, have been abused. The fact that most of the papers of that presidency were influenced by the mercantile interest, and had no voice in opposition to that interest, was sometime back pro-

to some conversation in which Mr. Cutlar Fergusson and Sir John Malcolm took part, but the result possessed little of interest, and nothing of

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claimed by the *Calcutta Courier*. More recently the *Meerut Observer* has directly connected several of the Calcutta journals with the houses of agency which have failed, and has charged them pretty plainly with guilty subserviency to their views. 'We can no longer forbear,' it observes, 'noticing the secret influence that is exerted over a portion of the Calcutta press, and tends to give security to dubious mercantile transactions, and to screen popular individuals from the scrutiny of public opinion.' As far as we can find out, it does not appear that more than one paper has noticed the imputation, and that paper is the *Bengal Hurkaru*. The other journals seem to have suffered judgment to go by default. The *Bengal Hurkaru* admits a connection with two agency houses, one of them that of Alexander & Co., which has lately failed. Amongst the statement of assets belonging to the other insolvent firm, of Mackintosh and Co., we observe included, 'Share in the *India Gazette*.' Having shown the fact of connection, and, consequently, that of control, we may, without at once adopting all the accusations levelled at this part of the Calcutta press by the *Meerut Observer*, surely draw some inference from the 'ominous and disgraceful silence' observed by the papers in question with regard to facts which no one can believe were not within the knowledge of their conductors, or at least of their proprietors. The mercantile community of Calcutta being immediately interested in the overthrow of the existing system of Indian administration, may therefore be said to have been the chief instruments of betraying the people of England for selfish objects into their present state of morbid excitement upon the East-India question, by means of their salaried partizans in England, and their influence over the press in Calcutta."

novelty. The session closed without any further discussion of the subject, without any intimation of the intention of ministers, and without any result flowing from the evidence obtained by the Committee, the tendency of which was decidedly in favour of a renewal of the Company's privileges.

Parliament again assembled on the 6th December. On the 8th, Lord Ellenborough in moving for certain returns connected with India, adverted to the omission of any notice of the subject in the King's speech, and inferred from thence that it was not the intention of members to bring the question before Parliament during that session. He disapproved of the postponement, expressed his belief that the Act of 1813 had been passed without proper consideration, and referred to an opinion to that effect, delivered by those who had since become the King's advisers. He thought the re-appointment of the Committee indispensable, and if not revived he would submit a motion on the subject. A full inquiry into the financial affairs of India, he said, was called for, as upon that would depend the question, whether the Company would be able to carry on the government without assistance from this country. Earl Grey admitted, that ministers did not intend to bring on any measure on the subject of the East-India Company's Charter during that session; pledged himself that

ample time should be given for discussion, and intimated, that he considered great part of the difficulty and responsibility attending the settlement of the question to have been obviated, by the extensive inquiries which had taken place through the Committees of the two Houses.

On the 27th January 1832, Mr. Charles Grant moved once more for the appointment of a Committee. Mr. Courtney and Sir James Macdonald supported the motion.

Mr. Goulburn wished to know, whether the Committee were to report opinions, or only to collect evidence, and put it in form. In reference to a suggestion of Mr. Grant, for dividing the Committee into a number of Sub-committees, Mr. Goulbourn also inquired whether, if the suggestion were adopted, such Sub-committees were to report to the house, as to the particular topics of investigation submitted to them. Mr. Stuart Wortley also proposed a question as to the functions of the Sub-committees. In answer, Mr. Grant said, the words of his resolution were the same as those used on a former occasion; that the precise duties of the Sub-committees would be best regulated in the Committee, and that the General Committee only would report to the House.

The Committee met, and in the course of their labour collected a mass of evidence, which forms one of the most valuable sources of information

on Indian affairs extant.* On the 16th of August they reported to the house. Though not entirely free from the expression of opinion, the report is for the most part an abstract of portions of the evidence with references to the minutes and appendices on which it is founded. The close of the session prevented any discussion in parliament, and the usual repose of a vacation suspended all reference to the subject until the end of the year.

In December, the Chairman received a communication of the views of Government as to the conditions upon which the charter should be renewed. One of the most important among the proposed changes was, that the China monopoly should cease. The Company were to retain their political functions; but their assets, commercial and territorial, were to be assigned to the Crown, on behalf of the territorial Government of India. In return, an annuity of £630,000 was to be granted, to be paid in England by half-yearly instalments, to be charged upon the territorial revenues of India exclusively, and to form part of the territorial debt of that country,—to be unredeemable for a limited period, after which it might be redeemed at the option of Parliament, by the payment of one hun-

* It was intended to give a synopsis of the evidence, by way of note or appendix to this chapter, but it was found to be impracticable to compress the matter within the limits which necessity prescribed.

dred pounds for every five guineas of annuity. The new annuitants were to retain the character of a joint-stock company. Some changes were suggested in the arrangements for the education of civil servants, with a view to create competition. Every British subject was to have the right of proceeding to the principal seats of Government in India without license; but the right of visiting the interior, or of residing there, and of acquiring and holding property, was to be subject to regulation and restraint by the local Government. It was further proposed to add to the power of the Board of Control, by the following modifications of the system previously in operation:—That the receipt of a final and conclusive order from the Board for the transmission to India of any despatch, should bind the Court to send such despatch by the first ship; that in case of the refusal of the Court to prepare a despatch when directed by the Board, or to send out one altered by the Board, the Board should have power to send it out themselves; that the power of the Court to recal a governor or commander of the forces should not be exercised without the veto of the Board; that the Board should exercise the same control over the grant of pensions and salaries below two hundred pounds per annum, and gratuities below six hundred pounds, which they had previously exercised over those of larger amounts; and that the home establishment and

expenditure should be placed under the control of the Board.

These suggestions gave rise to a correspondence, in which numerous objections were taken to them on the part of the Company. The abolition of the exclusive privilege of trading to China was especially noticed. It was denied that the China trade in the hands of the Company was productive of the usual effects of monopoly, inasmuch as they were compelled by law to bring forward a supply adequate to the demand, and to put up their teas for sale at the value of the prime cost and charges. The advantages of the China trade to India, both as affording a mode of remittance, and in the way of direct pecuniary benefit, were pointed out, as well as the risk in which opening the trade would place the continuance of our amicable relations with China, the probability of a deterioration in the quality of the tea imported under a free trade, and the danger to the revenue of Great Britain from an altered mode of levying the duties. The expectation that an open trade would extend the demand for British manufactures was alleged to be in opposition to facts elicited during the late parliamentary inquiry—namely, that the Americans took dollars and bills to China, in preference to British manufactures; that such manufactures were not taken to any considerable extent by the commanders and officers of the Company's ships, who had the privilege of

taking them free of freight; and that although large quantities had been sent by the private trade to India and the Eastern archipelago, they very rarely found their way from thence to Canton. The financial part of the proposed bargain was not considered satisfactory or secure. The Company claimed, if deprived of their trade, full security for their dividends, and for the eventual payment of the principal, together with the means of making suitable provision for their many servants, whose interests would be seriously affected by a change of system; and these claims were pressed on the ground that the Company possessed a vast amount of property to which their title was indisputable.

A very long letter was addressed to the Chairman and Deputy by the President of the Board of Control in answer to these representations.

In this document, Mr. Grant argued that the opening of the China trade could never be regarded, except as a question of time and circumstance—that the exclusive privilege of the Company was only a means to an end, and that with reference to this view Parliament, by renewing it for a term of years only, provided for a periodical revision of the arrangements adopted—that at various times the exclusive privileges of the Company had been greatly diminished—that an expectation existed that, on the expiration of the term granted by the Act of 1813, a further re-

laxation would take place—that Great Britain had to contend with many commercial competitors—that as the opening of the trade to India had caused an increased introduction of British manufactures into that country, so under similar circumstances might an augmented demand for the same commodities be created in China—that if the quality of the tea imported into England were in the first instance deteriorated by competition, competition would correct the evil— that the question of the comparative security of the revenue derived from tea was for the consideration of the State, not of the Company, and that the revenue was not likely to suffer unless it could be shown that an open trade would produce less of surplus profit than a trade managed under exclusive privileges—that opening the trade between England and China would, in the opinion of well-informed men, tend to increase the trade between China and British India—that the apprehended dangers to our relations with the Chinese might be averted by judicious regulations, and that the prevailing system was rendered insecure by the increase of the country trade—that with regard to the advantage derived to India from the Company's exclusive China trade, his Majesty's ministers could not consent that India should habitually lean on England for financial aid—and that the Government plan was not disadvantageous to India, as it proposed to apply

the commercial funds of the Company to the use of territory.

On the question of security to the proprietors of India stock, Mr. Grant explained that, in placing it upon the territory of India, it was not intended that the payments of their annual dividends should be postponed to the claims of other territorial creditors. The claims of the Company, he thought, could not be extended beyond the property and revenues which they had previously administered—they had no right to a continuance of the monopoly of the China trade, nor to a share in any tax to which the consumers of tea might be subjected, nor to a security upon the revenues of England. While the proposed plan was regarded by Mr. Grant as unobjectionable with respect to England, and beneficial to India, by the arrangements which it would facilitate for the purchase of the remittable debt, he urged that it was favourable to the Company by securing to them their dividends; by preserving and knitting together more closely the connection between the Directors and their constituency, identifying their interests with those of India, and thus increasing their qualifications for the duties assigned to them in the system of Indian administration; and by relieving the Directors from avocations inconsistent with their duties as rulers of a vast empire. Both the China monopoly and the right to govern India might,

it was alleged, be withdrawn at the pleasure of the State; the pursuit of trade by the Company, when deprived of their exclusive privileges, it was thought, could not be beneficial even to themselves, and the interest of the Company in the property which they required as exclusively commercial was, it was stated, involved in a multiplicity of doubts very difficult to be escaped, except by such a compromise as was offered by the ministerial plan. The mere institution of inquiry, it was said, would be fatal to the Company—time would be required for such an inquiry—in the meanwhile the charter would expire, and the China monopoly terminate. In such an event, from what funds, it was asked, were the dividends to be paid?

Much discussion of financial questions followed, but these it would not be possible to render intelligible without such explanation as would greatly exceed the space that could be allotted to it. This was succeeded by the expression of a conviction that India would be capable of meeting the claims upon it,—by some remarks on the insecurity of the China trade,—by some general observations on the advantages of the ministerial plan to all parties,—and by a threat of proposing to Parliament a plan for the government of India without the intervention of the Company, if the terms of the compromise were rejected.

On receiving this communication, three ques-

tions were put by the Chairman and Deputy of the Company to the President—first, whether the continuance to the Company of the government of India was to be subject to the condition of relinquishing their trade in perpetuity? secondly, whether it was intended to include in the proposed assignment to the Crown of the Company's assets that part of the commercial property which consisted of money actually subscribed by authority of Parliament as capital for conducting the Company's trade? and, thirdly, for what term it was meant that the annuity of £630,000 should be irredeemable? Mr. Grant answered that the dissolution of the Company formed no part of the government plan, but that their right to trade must remain in abeyance, while the Company exercised political power under the new arrangement—that the proposed arrangement must include the whole of the Company's commercial capital in whatever shape—and that the term during which the annuity should be irredeemable was open to discussion.

This was followed by a letter to Mr. Grant, in which the views of the Court of Directors on the principal points adverted to in Mr. Grant's letter, and in the communications previously forwarded, were stated, and enforced at considerable length. The primary question was regarded to be this—whether the plan of the ministers were such as would enable the Company efficiently to admi-

nister the government of India. Referring to the opinion of ministers in favour of continuing the government of India with the Company as founded upon experience, it was observed that the experience, which was possessed, was that of a system which it was proposed essentially to alter; and while it was admitted that it might be desirable for the Company to relinquish all connection with the trade of India, if the requisite remittances could be effected satisfactorily without it; the contemplated cessation of its trade with China was regarded as fraught with serious objections—as calculated to diminish the influence, character, and independence of the Company, and thus to incur the risk of converting it into a mere instrument for giving effect to the views of the Indian minister of the crown, whose sway, it was apprehended, would be almost absolute, and little restricted by the vigilance of Parliament, in consequence of the appearance of a check in the Company, which, it was feared, would be but illusory. In reference to this last point, the Court objected to that part of the ministerial plan which proposed to increase the powers of the Board, and restrain those of the Company. Especial notice was taken of the intention to bestow on the Board the authority of sending out despatches disapproved by the Court, without allowing any appeal, and the Court earnestly pressed the expediency with a view to the

security of India, as well as to the constitutional principles of this country, of allowing an appeal on the merits of important cases, on which the Court and the Board might differ, or at least of providing for publicity by the communication to Parliament of such cases of difference between the two authorities.

Other points, in respect to which it was designed to increase the powers of the Board, were noticed, and the Court then passed to the effect of the proposed changes in a financial point of view. The necessity of retaining the China trade, as an aid to the revenues of India, was strongly urged, and the claims of the latter country to the advantages resulting from the Company's trade powerfully maintained. The Company, it was alleged, had only derived a fair mercantile profit from their trade, and the merchants who might succeed it would expect to do the same. Some apprehension was expressed as to the power of effecting remittances, and it was anticipated that it would be necessary to raise the requisite funds by means of drafts upon India negociated here, or to take the security in India and in China of a lien upon cargo. Doubts were thrown out as to the extent of any increased demand for British manufactures in China, and the facts previously brought to the notice of the Board were again briefly referred to. These facts had been met only by an exposition of the principles of free trade,

and by a reference to the necessity of opening the trade to India. It was answered that, setting aside the privileges of the Company, a great check to commercial enterprize was offered by the conduct and policy of the Chinese, and that the results of opening the trade to India had not been precisely those which were supposed—that the amount of exports from this country to India during the Company's last term, namely, from 1793 to 1814, was greater both in value and quantity than the amount from the time of opening the trade, if cotton manufactures were excluded; and that these were altogether a new article of export since 1814, sent into the markets of India, not as the consequence of free trade, but of the improvement of machinery and of other causes affecting trade generally. But, even were the fact otherwise, it was asked, what analogy is there between China, where an Englishman can plant his foot on one spot only, and that merely by sufferance, and where a jealous government imposes whatever regulations it thinks proper for the protection of its own manufactures, and India, where there is resident a large and increasing body of Europeans, and where the British Government may provide, as it has done, by fiscal regulations for the encouragement of the manufactures of Great Britain to the prejudice, if not to the entire destruction of those of India?

In reference to the trade between India and

China, the Court made the following important remarks :—"The Court must beg to remind you, that the cause of the large increase of the private-trade from India to China since 1813-14, is to be traced to the rapid growth of the *smuggled* trade in opium. Out of the total value of private imports into Canton from India, amounting in 1829-30 to dollars 18,447,147, no less a proportion than 13,468,924 dollars was the value of opium. The trade in this article is prohibited by the laws of China, and it is consequently one in which the Company have never engaged. Had they done so, the comparative statements of the Company's and the private-trade, to which you have referred, would have exhibited very different results. This explanation, the Court think, goes very far to deprive any arguments, founded upon the growth of the private-trade, of the weight which might otherwise have attached to them. And here the Court cannot refrain from expressing their apprehension of what may probably be one consequence of an alteration of the existing system of our commerce with China. At present the Chinese Government receive regularly a large revenue from the Company's trade; and secured in the possession of this income, it is not very strict in enforcing its own laws against the trade in opium, which is so important to the Indian revenues. But if the general trade with China, instead of being under the management of one

body answerable for, and controlling the whole, were transferred to the hands of private individuals, each pursuing his course according to his view of his particular interests at the time, there cannot be much doubt that the high notions of the free traders to which you have alluded, so utterly at variance with the jealous policy of the Chinese Government, would not long be confined within the bounds which that policy has prescribed. Hence a danger, by no means improbable, that the *whole* of the British trade would gradually become a smuggled one; and that, in such an event, the Government of that country, finding their revenue from the trade no longer secure, might put an end to it altogether."*

In the tea trade, it was pointed out that competition must be imperfect; because, though it might be thrown open as far as England was concerned, it would still in China be confined to the Hong, to which a Committee of the House of Lords in 1830 reported the Company's influence to be a necessary and efficient counterpoise. The danger to the revenue of England from opening the trade was again glanced at, notwithstanding the rebuke with which its previous introduction had been visited, and the probable inefficiency of any officer

* It is remarkable that, at this time (September 1839), it appears the conduct of the private traders has gone far to justify the apprehension expressed in the passage above cited.

of the crown stationed at Canton, compared with that of persons who were the sole managers of an extensive and valuable trade, was suggested.

On the question of accounts, it was thought strange that, after the accounts of the Company had been submitted to the most searching scrutiny for three years,* their accuracy should be again

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* These accounts had been sifted with a degree of care rarely bestowed, and their accuracy impugned in a spirit of bitter and unscrupulous hostility, which, it may be hoped, is of equally unfrequent occurrence. They were most ably defended by Mr. Melvill, then auditor, now secretary, of the East-India Company, whose lucid, masterly, and convincing evidence before the Parliamentary Committee, exposed the errors and misrepresentations of the Company's adversaries, and triumphantly disposed of the question, whether territory had been gained at the expense of commerce, or commerce at the expense of territory. Notwithstanding this, however, the accounts, at the suggestion of one of the leading opponents of the Company, were submitted to a professionalaccountant, selected by the Board of Control. This gentleman (Mr. Pennington), after seven months' investigation, reported, that in the fifteen years commencing 1814-15, when the separation of territory and commerce took place, in conformity with the provisions of an Act of Parliament, territory had gained from commerce, exclusive of interest, £3,507,423, by the use of the Board's rate of exchange in repaying the sums advanced by commerce to territory; that the average annual profit of the India and China trade during that period was £1,009,047; and that of the commercial profits during the fifteen years a sum of £4,923,021 had been directly applied to territorial purposes, to the liquidation of Indian debt, or in a manner that operated to prevent its increase.

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challenged within a few weeks of offering a proposal to Parliament for dissolving the connexion between territory and trade; and the threat of

The debts of India were incurred in defence of the country, and this the Legislature, in repeated Acts of Parliament, had solemnly recognized. At the close of Mr. Pennington's report, he refers to a table framed by an opponent of the Company, by which it was shown that the territorial payments, including interest, between 1808-9 and 1827-28, exceeded the receipts by £16,576,570, while the increase of debt within that period was £16,947,711. "Upon this showing," Mr. Pennington observes, "it cannot be alleged that commerce received any assistance from territory during those nineteen years. The mischief must have been done before, and the wrong committed between 1794 and 1809." He adds, "If it could be conceded that the loss of interest occurred by the necessity of keeping, as well before as after the separation of accounts in 1814, a large balance of cash in the *territorial* treasuries of India, ought to be sustained by the commercial branch, in addition to the loss resulting from the dormant balances in the *commercial* treasuries of India and the treasury at home; if it be further conceded, that the advances for the capture of Ceylon and the Eastern Islands, the payment to the creditors of the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore, the increase of dead stock in India, and the differences of accounts between the different presidencies, amounting altogether to between four and five millions, were a charge upon the Company's trade, it might be admitted that, though there are mistakes and omissions in his statements [those of the framer of the table], he has succeeded in making out his main position, namely, that the debt of India has been invariably incurred in support of the Company's commerce. But these concessions cannot be made. The payments above-mentioned, and the necessity of having

leaving the proprietors without dividends was met by stating that the dividends must be paid from the proceeds of the Company's sales, which would continue until 1836, by which time it might be hoped, the scrutiny of the accounts would be terminated. But, on the other hand, it was asked what would the territorial branch do for funds, as it could have no right to anything from the home treasury after April 1834? The legal right of the Company to its commercial property was distinctly asserted, and the claim upon that property, on account of engagements made in the Company's name for political or territorial purposes, denied. Finally, the Court objected to the proposed annuity being secured on the Indian territory exclusively, and demanded some further protection of the interests of the proprietors by an effective sinking fund, based upon an investment in the national stocks of some portion of the commercial assets—suggested that, at the ex-

constantly a floating balance of six or eight crores in the territorial treasuries of India, originated in territorial and political causes, and not in the wants of commerce. These payments and that necessity are quite sufficient to account for the increase of the Indian debt since 1793, without supposing that any part of its produce has been applied to the augmentation of the Company's commercial property. The augmentation of that property since 1793 appears to have resulted from the gradual accumulation of commercial profit, together with the increase of subscribed capital at that time authorized."

piration of the term of the annuity, the proprietors should receive as much principal as was proposed to be applied out of their property to the discharge of territorial debt—and pointed out the propriety of fixing the commencement of the open trade at the completion of the period that might be allowed for winding up the concerns of the Company, and of making provision out of the Company's property for outstanding commercial obligations, as well as for suitable compensation to servants of the Company whose interests might be affected by a change of system.

Mr. Grant confined his reply to a few of the topics previously discussed which appeared to him to be the more important. In reference to the increase of the powers of the Board, he observed that, now that the Company's commerce was about to cease, one source of difference between the Board and Court, namely, that arising from a doubt whether a despatch were commercial or not, would be removed, and that if the legality of the Board's instructions were questioned, some mode of bringing the question to a final decision might be found. He further suggested, that despatches, in future, should not be signed by the Directors, or any of them, but by an officer of the Court, to whom, in case of necessity, the Board could address its orders, and who was to be liable to the forfeiture of his office if he disobeyed the directions which he might receive. It is not easy to

see how this proposal affected the objection to the proposed change, which was substantially that it would reduce the Court into a Government Board. If the objection were well founded, the suggested remedy would be found worse than the evil complained of.

The Court's request for publicity, in cases of difference, was distinctly rejected. The right to control the application of the whole of the revenues of India was claimed on behalf of the Board; but it was suggested that, with regard to the charges of the Home establishment, a specified sum might be agreed upon, thus exempting the details from interference. The necessity of securing the annuity of the Company upon India exclusively was maintained, and this principle, it was alleged, would be infringed by any large investment in the national stocks by way of guarantee. To a small investment the same objection was not believed to exist; and it was, therefore, proposed to begin with a sum of £1,200,000, which, with its accumulated interest to the aggregate amount of twelve millions, was to form a collateral security for the capital stock of the Company, and to be applicable to its future redemption; any interest, after the attainment of this maximum of twelve millions, to be applied to the benefit of the territory of India by the Court and Board. An arrangement was proposed with regard to the debt from the public to the Com-

pany, which nearly corresponded in amount with that proposed for beginning the guarantee fund. It is most probable, indeed, that the amount of the former afforded the motive for fixing that of the latter. The transfer of the property of the Company to the Crown, Mr. Grant observed, involved the transfer of the obligations, upon legal, equitable, and liberal grounds. The subject of education for the civil service was also briefly adverted to, and an opinion expressed that the provision in the original communication should be carried to even a greater extent than was there suggested.

A further letter was addressed by the Chairman and Deputy, on behalf of the Court of Directors, to the Government, in which, after enumerating the sacrifices which the Company were called upon to make,* they urged that the Company's dividends, as well as capital, should be secured;

* It was observed, that "the Court must keep prominently in view what it is that the Company are called upon to surrender, and what they are to receive as an equivalent. They are asked to surrender every thing which they possess as a corporation; their capital, computed at more than twenty-one millions sterling, every item of which is commercial in its origin, and in the character which it now bears;—their right to trade, most valuable when considered in connexion with that capital, and with the position and influence which the Company have established here and abroad; and which right, if they chose to exercise it, must greatly interfere with, if not altogether prevent, the advantages which private

and proposed that a sum in the Three per Cents., standing in the Company's name, should be added to the guarantee fund. The question of the term during which the annuity was to be irredeemable was revived, and it was presumed that the Company were to be secured in the government of India for that period. The necessity of publicity in differences between the Court and the Board was again urged, and the conviction of the Court was avowed, that publicity should be the rule, and not the exception. The expediency of continuing to the Court the uncontrolled power of making small pecuniary grants was touched upon; but the proposed arrangement for the Home establishment was assented to, on the understanding that the sum fixed upon by the Board as a maximum was not to be varied at pleasure, but only in consequence of altered circumstances. The independent exercise of the power of recalling governors-general, governors, and commanders, was contended for as more important than ever; and the plan for transferring all the property of

merchants expect to reap from a free trade with China;—their pecuniary claims, some sanctioned by a Committee of Parliament, both in principal and amount, and all recognized either by Parliament or in Parliament by ministerial statements; their lands, forts, and factories in India, for which they have as good a title as that by which any private property is held;—and, finally, their claims in respect of the territory at large, which up to the present time Parliament has always reserved."

the Company to the Crown was objected to on various grounds, but more especially because the Court believed that the Proprietors would feel a strong reluctance to abandoning the interests of men who had served the Company with zeal and fidelity, to the care of others, who, having had no opportunity of witnessing their services, must be unable to appreciate them; and, with a view to relieve the Indian revenues from charge, as well as for the accommodation of the merchants of London, and for the benefit of the persons employed, it was suggested that, for a time, the Company might continue the management of goods imported in the free trade, as the amount received for agency defrayed a large portion of the expense of the commercial establishment.

Previously to the transmission of this letter in answer to Mr. Grant's, that gentleman had addressed another to the Chairman and Deputy, intimating his opinion, that the payment of the annuity should be fixed for a period when, according to probable calculation, the guarantee fund should amount to six millions; that the renewed term of the Company's political functions should be about fifteen years, although he thought it worth consideration whether the Company would not stand firmer and better if the Act contained no provision as to time; and that the number of Directors might be reduced. This communication was followed, five days afterwards, by one of greater length, being an answer

to the letter of the Court. In this document, the President of the Board declared himself irrevocally opposed to any change in the amount or application of the guarantee fund. The period of forty years was suggested as that during which the annuity should not be redeemable; but it was intimated that the term of the annuity, and that of the duration of the Company's political functions, were questions to be kept entirely distinct. The suggestion that the renewal of the Company's political functions for an indefinite period would be preferable to fixing a term, was repeated. An intention was expressed of referring all pecuniary claims of old date, respecting which the Court and Board might differ, to some independent authority; and a desire avowed of co-operating with the Court in fulfilling the obligations of justice and liberality towards the servants of the Company. A very brief answer was made to this letter, the Court merely stating that they had convened a Special General Court for the purpose of communicating to it the correspondence that had taken place, but that they declined making any recommendation to their constituents on the subject; and adding, that they feared it might be impossible for them at any time to lend their sanction to the proposed scheme, as, independently of other considerations, the condition of binding up the interests of the Proprietors with India would not be carried out, unless the Company retained the administration of the country for the whole time

during which their interests were identified with it. Mr. Grant replied, vindicating the views of ministers.

The correspondence between the Court and the President of the Board was submitted to a General Court of the Proprietors of the East-India Company on the 25th March. The chairman, Mr. Ravenshaw, introduced the subject in a clear and forcible speech, touching on the principal points in discussion, but abstaining from any decisive expression of opinion. The papers were then read; and this operation occupying five hours, the consideration of the subject was postponed till the 15th of April, after a motion for printing the correspondence had been made by the Chairman and carried.

On the 15th of April the Court again met, and the discussion of the question before it was protracted, by repeated adjournments, to seven days. After the reading of a dissent, recorded by Mr. Tucker, from certain parts of the letters addressed to the President of the Board by order of the Court of Directors, Sir John Malcolm moved a series of resolutions expressive of a disposition on the part of the Company to accept generally of the bargain proposed by the Ministers of the Crown, but with certain modifications of the terms. The alterations suggested were, that the guarantee fund should be extended to such an amount as would, with the probable accumulations, be sufficient to re-

deem the annuity in forty years, and that it should be a security for the dividends as well as for the capital; that the Company should retain the government of India for a defined period, not less than twenty years, and if deprived of the government at or after the expiration of that term, should be allowed to demand the redemption of the annuity, retaining the liberty of resuming their undoubted right to trade; that all measures involving direct or contingent expenditure, should originate with the Court of Directors, and that a system of publicity should be secured, applicable to important causes of difference between the Court and the Board; and that sufficient power should be retained over the commercial assets, to enable the Court of Directors to propose a plan for providing for outstanding commercial obligations, and for such commercial officers and servants of the Company as might be affected by the new arrangements. An amendment, reprobating the denial of the right of the Company to invest their own undeniable property in the public funds, in place of drawing £630,000 per annum from the revenues of India, was moved, but withdrawn, as were also one for excluding from the resolution the words requiring that the Company's Government should be renewed for a prescribed period of not less than twenty years, and one to the effect that the Company should, for the purpose of remittance, continue to carry on the China trade in com-

mon with the public. Another amendment, for leaving the whole negociation in the hands of the Directors, and in the event of their not speedily obtaining a just compromise, directing that they should apply to the Legislature, was put and negatived. Another, proposed as a substitute for the original resolution, and the principal variation from which resolution consisted in an acknowledgment that the time had arrived for surrendering the exclusive trade with China, shared the same fate. This was followed by a further motion for an amendment, expressing apprehension from the indiscriminate access of Europeans to India; denouncing the opening of the China trade as perilous; claiming for the Proprietors the power of investing their own property for their own security, or a guarantee if this power was withheld; objecting to the annuity of £630,000 per annum being made a burden upon the people of India; anticipating for the Company a successful trade with China, though deprived of all exclusive privileges and of the government of India; in the event of the Company retaining that government, calling for undiminished authority for the Directors, and the right of submitting at all times any differences with the Board to the decision of Parliament, and expressing sympathy with the commercial servants who would be deprived of employment. This amendment was lost on a division. Another amendment, proposing to leave out the

words fixing the rate at which the annuity was to be redeemed, was also lost; as was another, proposing to exclude the words "exercising the same powers as they do under the statute," from that part of the original motion which referred to the continuance of the Company's authority for a defined period. An amendment, approving of the abolition of the exclusive China trade, but impugning the security offered for the annuity, followed. This too was lost. Another, suggesting the abolition of the Board of Control, an increase of the powers of the Court of Proprietors, and the continuance to the Company, for a limited period, of the right to trade to China in common with the private trader, was moved and lost; and the question was then formally put on the original resolutions, which were carried, on a ballot, by a very large majority.

These resolutions being communicated to the President of the Board of Control, were laid by him before the Cabinet, and the result communicated to the Court. Ministers agreed to fix the amount of the guarantee fund at two millions, but refused to increase it beyond that sum; they agreed that the fund should form a security for the dividends as well as the principal, to the extent of raising money upon its credit if necessary—to fix at twenty years the renewed term of the Company's government, and to withdraw the suggestion that the Board should have a veto on

the recal by the Court of Governors and military commanders in India—to give the Proprietors the option of having their annuity paid off, on three years' notice, at the expiration of the term for which the Company were to continue to administer the government of India, or at any subsequent period when their government might terminate, and to confirm their right to resume trade, if they thought fit—to maintain the principle previously existing with regard to expenditure, excepting only in future that no expense should be incurred without the previous sanction of the Board; and they offered no objection to the suggestion that sufficient power should be retained over the commercial assets to enable the Court to provide for outstanding obligations and for the claims of commercial officers and servants, reserving only the full power of the Board to act as might be thought fit; but they refused to sanction the establishment of any means of publicity in cases of difference between the Court and the Board, and intimated a belief that no practicable means could be devised.

The concessions made by the ministers were neither few nor unimportant; but the Court of Directors still thought it necessary to press two points claimed in the resolution of the General Court, but refused by ministers. They urged, that when it had been proposed that the sum set apart for the guarantee fund should be about two mil-

lions, the term of the annuity had not been fixed, and that as forty years had since been determined on, the guarantee fund, with its accumulations, at the end of that term, ought to be equal to the amount of capital to be discharged. To act upon this suggestion required about three millions to be set apart for the commencement of the guarantee fund, instead of two millions. The other point which the Court never ceased to press upon ministers whenever an opportunity occurred was, the necessity of publicity. By this, it was explained, they did not mean the establishment of any tribunal of appeal, productive of delay and expense, but only an enactment requiring that whenever the Court should, after previous remonstrance, pass a resolution of protest against the orders or instructions of the Board, such resolution should be laid before both houses of Parliament. This, it was contended, could have no prejudicial effect; it would interpose no difficulty to giving full effect to the final orders of the Board, inasmuch as the communication to Parliament would not be made until after the orders had been despatched. On both points the answer of the minister was a peremptory refusal of compliance.*

* The entire reasoning by which the refusal of publicity was supported will be found in the following extract from Mr. Grant's letter, dated 4th June 1833:—

"I now proceed to the second of the two points on which

The decision of the Government upon these questions having been laid before the Court of

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the Court are solicitous for farther concession. I allude to the proposition that, in any case in which orders dispatched to India by the overruling authority of the Board, shall have been protested against by the Directors, it shall be competent to the Directors, after the transmission of such orders, to lay their resolution of protest before both houses of Parliament. This proposition has engaged the renewed attention of his Majesty's ministers; and, notwithstanding the explanations of the Court, the ministers cannot precisely comprehend the grounds on which the proposition is so strongly prest. If the Court mean only that they ought to have the power of inviting the attention of Parliament to any matter of public policy which has placed them in collision with the Board, and which is, in their opinion, of a nature to call for such a proceeding, it is plain that this power already belongs to the Court, in the constitutional privilege which, in common with all other subjects of the realm, they undoubtedly enjoy, of approaching either house of Parliament by petition. Of this privilege, and of all that right of appeal which it necessarily involves, to the judgment of the Legislature and to the arbitration of public opinion, and of the means with which they are thus provided of checking any illegal or unconstitutional proceedings on the part of the other branch of the Home Government, they are already in secure possession. No new recognition of the existence of such a power can be necessary; and probably the exercise of it would be rather embarrassed than assisted, by any attempt to prescribe the mode, or to define the occasions, of putting it in action. But if any power materially different from this be contemplated, his Majesty's ministers must declare themselves unable to accede to the suggestion. It might, indeed, be enough for them to observe, that the proposition is too indistinct to be accepted in its present form; but they object to it

Directors, a resolution was proposed by the Chairman, declining to recommend to the Proprietors to consent to a departure from the required amount

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on independent grounds. They are satisfied that, for all practical purposes, the Court are already invested with sufficient powers; and they cannot but object to the introduction into the system of the Home Government of any principle of which they cannot admit the necessity, and which, whatever be the precise shape that it may assume, cannot fail to operate, as they apprehend, very prejudicially to the purposes of good government."

On this passage it may be remarked, that the power of approaching Parliament by petition does not answer the purpose which the Court had in view. Such a measure could never be resorted to but on occasions of overwhelming importance, and when some intolerable grievance pressed too heavily to be borne in silence. Such a proceeding would be a declaration of war by one authority against the other, and all possibility of subsequent co-operation for the public good would be precluded. By the plan suggested by the Court no such effect would be produced. Certain papers would be laid before Parliament as a matter of course, and the degree of attention which they received there might be expected to be proportioned to their importance.

It would be difficult to discover, in the proposal of the Court, any thing to justify the charge of indistinctness. So far from being indistinct, it is remarkably precise. The imputation of indistinctness does, indeed, lie against the apprehensions that the plan would operate "very prejudicially to good government." No attempt is made to explain the nature or mode of the apprehended operation, and we may in vain draw upon imagination to supply the deficiency. The President of the Board was clearly not a disciple of Jeremy Bentham, to the extent of holding that "Publicity is the soul of justice."

of guarantee, or to surrender their views on the influence of publicity. The resolution was lost, and another, expressing continued adherence to the views of the General Court, but recommending compliance with those of ministers, was carried. From this, the chairman, Mr. Marjoribanks, and the deputy, Mr. Wigram, dissented.* The result of the decision of the Court of Directors was a reference of the subject to a General Court, which met on the 10th, when the views of the majority of the Court of Directors were adopted, and confirmed.

On the 13th of June, Mr. Grant in his place in Parliament moved for the House to resolve itself into a Committee on Indian affairs.† On the

* Their dissent related to both points in dispute. The question of publicity was argued very strongly and fully. It was contended, that "some legislative provision for giving publicity in certain cases of difference between the Board of Commissioners and the Court of Directors is indispensable for maintaining the independence of the Court, and, consequently, for the good government of India;" as "unless it is known that the two co-ordinate authorities act under a positive responsibility to Parliament, the paramount authority may enforce their views and opinions, however contrary to good government or wholesome rule, without the possibility of the Legislature becoming acquainted with the facts, by the ministers refusing the production of papers connected therewith to Parliament." This position was supported by an appeal to certain questions on which difference of opinion had arisen.

† The House was miserably thin, and on a subsequent day (July 10) Mr. Macaulay thus adverted to that fact. "The House,"

question that the Speaker do leave the chair, Sir George Staunton moved, by way of amendment, a string of resolutions relating to the conduct of the China trade, which having been negatived without a division, the House went into committee. Mr. Grant's speech, introductory of the resolutions which he was about to propose, was extremely long, but most of the topics had been discussed until no fertility of invention could impart to them any novelty of illustration. He panegyrized the Company's government, com-

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said he, "had neither the time, nor the knowledge, nor the inclination to attend to an Indian budget, or to the statement of Indian extravagance, or the discussion of Indian local grievances. A broken head in Cold-Bath Fields excited greater interest in that House than three pitched battles in India. This was not a figure of speech, but a literal description of fact, and if he were called upon for proof of it he would refer to a circumstance which must still be in the recollection of the House—namely, that when his right honourable friend Mr. C. Grant brought forward his important propositions for the future government of India, there were not as many members present as generally attended upon an ordinary turnpike bill."

In reference to this, the following note appears in the *Asiatic Journal* for August 1833:—"We have the best authority for stating, in confirmation of the above remark, that there were rarely more members present than sufficed to 'make a house,' and many times less than that number"—less than forty!—"that several of the members present were asleep, or appeared to be so, and that the discussions upon the most important details of this tremendous measure were principally between Mr. C. Grant, Mr. R. Grant, and Mr. Macaulay, on the one side, and Mr. Wynne, Mr. Hume, and Mr. Buckingham on the other."

paring it with the government of native princes in India, and with the government of the colonies of Great Britain and other European nations. One point in its favour, advanced by the President of the Board, was, that by the interposition of the Company between the Government and the people of India, that country had been preserved from being agitated by those constant fluctuations of party and political feelings, which were so powerful here, and which would have opposed so formidable a barrier to improvement. Mr. Grant, however, objected to the union of trade with the East-India Company's government — a union, which marred its efficiency, and this he thought was a generally-admitted principle until he found two members of that house taking a different view.* He objected to it, not on the ground of theory merely, but of practical inconvenience. Another evil, he thought, in the existing system was the want of a proper check on the expenditure of the subordinate presidencies; and a further evil was found in too much interference from home. Adverting to the question of the continuance of the China monopoly, he said, it was one on which the nation had made up its mind; but he admitted that, if as a minister of the crown he felt that the decision of the nation was not founded

* Sir George Staunton and Mr. Charles Marjoribanks. For Mr. Grant's opinions on this subject in 1813, see page 189 of this volume.

in justice, it would not become him to come forward to propose a change in conformity with it. He then pronounced a panegyric upon free trade, and its results, and expressed his conviction that the time for the natural termination of the China monopoly had arrived. The profits of the China trade, he said, were declining; (which was an extraordinary reason for the clamour raised by the mercantile interests for permission to participate in it.) The jealousy and caprice of the Chinese character Mr. Grant considered as forming other grounds for discontinuing the monopoly. (They might rather have been adduced as reasons for maintaining it.) Having noticed the plans suggested for levying the duties on teas, and the intention that the Company should not suddenly discontinue its establishments for the fabrication of silk, Mr. Grant came to the financial arrangements, by which the Company were to give up the whole of their privileges and property for an annuity secured on the territory of India. After some observations intended to show that India was capable of bearing this additional burden, he proceeded to notice the intended extension of the power of the Governor-general over the subordinate presidencies—the change proposed to be made in the state of the law, by subjecting Europeans to the same jurisdiction with natives,—the removal of all disabilities for office on account of birth or religion,—the issuing of a Law Commission,—

and the appointment of two Suffragan Bishops for Madras and Bombay. He then moved three resolutions, the effect of them being to approve of the opening of the China trade,—of the surrender of the property of the Company to the Crown on condition of receiving a stipulated sum from the territorial revenues,—and of the continuance of India under the government of the Company.

Mr. Wynne approved of the opening of the China trade, but he wished some further changes in the mode of governing India. He required that the number of Directors should be reduced to six or eight; that they should be nominated by the Crown, and that each of them should have been resident in India twelve years. He remembered, he said, that during the time he was officially connected with the Board of Control, out of seven gentlemen with whom he had sucessively to communicate as chairmen of the Court of Directors, four had never been in India.* Mr. Wynne, however, seemed aware that serious objections lay against his plan of transferring to the Crown the entire government of India. He pro-

* It did not seem to occur to the honourable member, that though he had accepted, and for several years exercised the powers of the highest functionary in the India department of the King's government, he was himself labouring under the same disqualification which he thought so fatal to the usefulness of four chairmen out of seven with whom he had officially communicated. Mr. Wynne, it is believed, was never in India.

tested against any comparison between the government of India and the government of their colonies by European nations, because India was not a colony, but a mighty empire. This may be admitted; but the point sought to be established by those who made the comparison* is unshaken. India is a dependency of Great Britain, deriving her government from that country; so also are various colonial possessions in the West-Indies and elsewhere. Here, then, is a similarity of situation. But India, which has been ruled through the intervention of the East-India Company, has been governed far better than those outlying portions of the British dominions which have been subjected immediately to the Crown. The analogy is sufficient to warrant the conclusion, and the result is most honourable to the East-India Company. Mr. Wynne thought many better ways of disposing of the patronage of India might be found than that of continuing it with the Directors; and he referred to Lord Grenville's plan, proposed in 1813, and then torn to pieces by Mr. Grant.† The absence of responsibility, Mr. Wynne

* Sir Charles Forbes, Sir Robt. Peel, Mr. Grant, and others.

† The plan, Mr. Wynne said, of putting up a certain number of appointments for competition at the universities and public schools, had, since its original suggestion, been carried into execution, alluding, it is presumed, to his own proceedings in that way. With regard to the competition plan, one question has never been answered—Why is it necessary for the civil

thought a great evil; and this arose from the Court of Directors and the Board of Control acting together. Mr. Wynne might have learned from the papers printed by order of the Company, that the Directors had strenuously contended for giving publicity to the differences, when any might arise, between themselves and the Board. Mr. Wynne, after some remarks on the change contemplated in the relative positions of the Government of India and the subordinate presidencies, concluded by saying that he disliked delay, but recommended that the subject should be suffered to stand over to the next session.

After some remarks from various speakers, Mr. James Silk Buckingham proceeded to attack the East-India Company, and all connected with it, in a speech, the malevolence of which scarcely equalled its feebleness. Mr. Cutlar Fergusson followed, and appealed to the comparative condition of the Company's territories and those of native princes, as evidence of the good government of the former. He testified, from personal knowledge, to the feeling entertained by the Indian Government towards natives; and said, that

service of India, and no where else? Mr. Wynne did not attain the office of President of the Board of Control by public competition, any more than he secured his seat in Parliament by the mode which he suggested for the appointment of India Directors—namely, by nomination of the Crown.

if he were to point out a fault in this respect, it was that the leaning was towards the natives rather than towards Europeans. Mr. Fergusson defended the exercise of the patronage of the Company, as having been performed with a degree of good faith, honour, and integrity, never surpassed; paid some rather unnecessary compliments to Mr. Buckingham, and concluded with pointing out the difficulties of improving the state of the law in India. The discussion, if discussion it might be called, was cold, meagre, and purposeless. The resolutions were, of course, carried.

On the 17th they were carried up to the Lords, where some conversation took place on the propriety of laying before the House some additional information. On the 28th, Mr. Grant, in the Commons, presented a bill, founded on the ministerial plan of compromise with the East-India Company, which was read a first time.

The great outlines of the bargain between the Government and the Company were now settled; but there remained many points connected with the administration of the government of India to be arranged. The most important of those were, the proposed separation of the north-western province from the Bengal presidency, for the purpose of forming a separate government; the determination of the powers of the Governor-general in council; and the constitution and functions of the subordinate governments. The proposal to

deprive the latter governments of the power of legislation, as well as to take away the councils by which the governors had heretofore been assisted, were strenuously opposed, not only by the Court of Directors, but also, as will be seen, in Parliament.

On the 5th of July, in the House of Lords, the Marquess of Lansdown moved the concurrence of their lordships in the resolutions sent up from the Commons. In introducing this motion, the noble marquess first addressed himself to the China trade. He affirmed, that the trade of the Company was a losing trade—but this the figures which he adduced did not establish; they only shewed that the profits of the trade had undergone some diminution. In answer to the position, that the character of the government of China is inconsistent with the admission of individual enterprise and private speculation, he asserted that the Chinese Government, despotic as it is, could not oppose itself to the wishes, the feelings, and the interests of the Chinese people. He illustrated this by referring to the opium trade from India to China—a reference from which he would certainly have abstained had he spoken a few years later. To the mode in which the Company had exercised the administration of the government of India, his lordship did justice. After a variety of financial details, he adverted to the intention to render natives of India universally admissible to

office; to the state of the law in India, and the necessity of compiling a code; and to the more free admission of Europeans to India—on all which points he, of course, justified the means proposed to be taken in the ministerial measure.

Lord Ellenborough, who followed, after speaking to the financial part of the question, admitted that some compromise similar to that submitted to the House would have taken place, under the administration with which he was connected, but he said it was not intended to restrain the Company from trading. He expressed an apprehension that the character of the constituent body, the proprietors of India stock, would be deteriorated by the changes, and contrasted the position of the Company with respect to India before and after those changes. "Hitherto," said his lordship, "they have derived their dividends from the profits of commerce. Those profits have relieved the revenues of India. Then they appeared as beneficent conquerors, deriving no other advantage from their conquest than what a generous system of commercial intercourse with the conquered realized: what will be their condition now? They will appear in the very undignified and not very popular character of mortgagees in possession, all their profits being derived from sums drawn from the Indian people." Other parts of the ministerial plan his lordship considered still more injurious. His hostility was

especially directed against the proposal that Indian governors should be relieved from the restraint of councils, and that the Supreme Government should legislate for all India. In reference to the first he said, "When a man comes to be acquainted with the workings of the Indian Government, I admit that his first impression is, that it would be convenient that the governors should not be embarrassed by councillors. There is hardly a circumstance which would not at first sight induce him to pronounce that opinion. There is delay, embarrassment, and annoyance in having a proposition discussed in council,—in writing minutes, and going through all those operations in a small room which are gone through by the ministers here in the two houses of Parliament. It is, my lords, in truth very inconvenient, but it makes the government of India, a government of record ; it makes the government here a judge of the propriety of those acts done in India —but more than that, it controls the passions of the Governor—it requires from him reflection as a preliminary to action—it leads to that constant record of proceedings which again establishes a certain, an ultimate, and not distant responsibility; it is a true security against the abuse of absolute power. In taking the councils from the Governors of India, you take from the people the best security for good government. I care not what theorists may advance—you may talk to

'persons acquainted with the philosophy of man and of government,' as one of the witnesses before the House of Commons expresses himself; but you know not man, nor the nature of man, if you suppose that absolute power can be exercised beneficially for a people, without placing that absolute power under responsibility, and requiring from it reflection before it acts. But you propose in this case to take away this responsibility, and this necessity for reflection; nay more than this—for what are the future powers of this Governor to be? Will any respectable man take the office? he is to be deprived of the power of legislation!—of the power of expending a single shilling! And yet to this man, so degraded by your jealousy, you leave the whole executive power of the government, without that control with which the prudence and wisdom of former parliaments have surrounded it." In reference to the proposal, to place with the Governor-General in Council the sole power of legislation for India, his lordship asked, "Can they legislate for distant places as well as if they were on the spot? Is it possible for them to legislate for the whole of India, fixed as they will be at Calcutta, so satisfactorily as a council being in the country where the laws are to applied? It is evident they cannot. Legislation will be much better performed, as it has been, by a local than by a distant government." To profess to open all offices to natives, Lord

Ellenborough regarded as "a mockery." "The very existence of our government in India," said he, "depends upon the exclusion of the natives from military and political power in that country. They should be eligible to hold every office which could be held by them with safety to the state. But we are there in a position not of our own seeking, a position from which we cannot recede without producing bloodshed, from one end of India to the other. We won our empire by the sword, and by the sword we must preserve it. It is the condition of our existence there; but consistently with that condition let us do every thing to benefit the people and *for* them, although at present, perhaps, it is not possible to do much *by* the people. I confess, when I look at all the great achievements of our predecessors in that country—when I look at all they have done both in war and in peace—when I look at the glory which first dawned upon our opening career, and at the real benefits which successive great men and wise statesmen have conferred upon the natives of that great empire—I do contemplate with dismay this crude undigested mass of ignorant theories, formed by persons who know nothing of India, and who *will* know nothing of India; who imagine that men possessing all the passions, and all the prejudices which we ourselves possess, can be governed as if they were cyphers; and who place at the head of an absolute government, contrary to all experi-

ence, and contrary to the recorded wisdom of former governments, men possessing great and unlimited powers, but from whom reflection before action will not be hereafter required, and who will be placed in a position from which all real, ultimate responsibility will be taken away, because the records of their actions and the reasons for them will be altogether lost."

The Earl of Ripon defended the ministerial bill, and, in answer to Lord Ellenborough's remarks upon the intended abolition of councils, said this part of the subject had been misapprehended. It was not meant that councils should be wholly abolished, but that the subordinate governments should be more directly than before under the control of the Governor-General, and that he with the consent of the Government at home, might appoint a council for each government. The noble Earl also adverted briefly to some other points of the ministerial measure.

The Duke of Wellington spoke with much feeling and felicity of expression. He said: "Having been so long a servant of the East-India Company, whose interests you are discussing—having served for so many years of my life in India—having had such opportunities of personally watching the operations of the government of that country, and having had reason to believe, both from what I saw at that time and from what I have seen since, that the government of India

was at that time one of the best and most purely administered governments that ever existed, and one which has provided most effectually for the happiness of the people over which it is placed, it is impossible that I should be present when a question of this description is discussed, without asking your lordship's attention for a very short time, while I deliver my opinion upon the plan which his Majesty's ministers have brought forward. I will not follow the noble marquess who opened the debate into the consideration, whether a chartered company be the best calculated or not to carry on the government or the trade of an empire like India. That is not the question to which I wish now to apply myself. But whenever I hear of such discussions as this, I recal to my memory what I have seen in that country. I recal to my memory the history of that country for the last fifty or sixty years. I remember its days of misfortune, and its days of glory, and call to mind the situation in which it now stands. I remember that the government have conducted the affairs of—I will not pretend to say how many millions of people (they have been calculated at 70,000,000, 80,000,000, 90,000,000, and 100,000,000), but certainly of an immense population—a population returning an annual revenue of £20,000,000 sterling; and that, notwithstanding all the wars in which the empire has been engaged, its debt at this moment amounts only to

£40,000,000, being not more than two years' revenue. I do not say that such a debt is desirable, but, at the same time, I do contend that it is a delusion on the people of this country, to tell them that it is a body unfit for government, and unfit for trade, which has administered the affairs of India with so much success for so many years, and which is at length to be put down, (for I can use no other term,) upon the ground that it is an institution calculated for the purposes neither of government nor trade." His grace then proceeded to condemn the ministerial arrangements, as being framed without regard to the situation of the Company, without regard to the relation in which its trade stood, not only with the East-Indies, and the finances and general interests of that country, but also with the interests of England, and of the metropolis in particular. He alluded especially to the misery and ruin which would arise to those deriving their subsistence from the commerce of the Company, declared his hostility to the proposed arrangements for the local governments, expressed his conviction that no influx of European capital into India would take place, and concluded by urging the necessity of upholding the power and influence of the Company. "Depend upon it, my lords," said his grace, "that upon the basis of their authority rests the good government of India."

Some dispute took place as to the intentions of ministers with respect to the continuance of coun-

cils at the subordinate presidencies. Lord Ellenborough had assumed that they were to be abolished. The Marquess of Lansdowne, referring to the Bill which had been prepared, affirmed that they were to be retained. Lord Ellenborough, in explanation, said, that unless the speech of the President of the Board of Control had been strangely misrepresented in the ordinary vehicles of intelligence, he had declared it to be the intention of Government to dispense with the subordinate councils. The Marquess of Lansdowne, in answer, said that, without consulting the President of the Board, he would take upon himself to state that the report of his speech must be incorrect, as it had always been intended that the Court of Directors should have power to appoint members of council.

This statement, however, must have been made under misinformation. The intentions of Government were not left to be ascertained from a speech in the House of Commons, whether correctly reported or not. The point at issue had been the subject of correspondence between the Board of Control and the Court of Directors, the Court upholding the continuance of councils at the subordinate presidencies, the Board opposing it.*

* *Vide* Papers respecting the East-India Company's Charter, 1833. Summary of principal provisions of proposed bill,

After a reply from the Marquess of Lansdowne, the resolutions were carried.

On the 10th of July the Bill was read a second time in the House of Commons. Mr. Buckingham protested against the principle of the Bill, and made a long speech in support of his views. Mr. Hume gave a qualified assent to the Bill. Mr. Whitmore took objections to several parts of it. Mr. Macaulay defended both its principle and details. Mr. Wynne gave a synopsis of his formerly expressed views. Mr. O'Connell made some remarks on the landed tenures of India. Mr. Todd found fault with some of the provisions of the Bill. Mr. Robert Wallace thought that the Bill gave universal satisfaction, and reviled

transmitted by Mr. Charles Grant, June 24th 1833, p. 260—Letter of Mr. Grant, 27th June, p. 266—Letter from the Court of Directors to Mr. Grant, 2d July, 310—Petition of East-India Company to House of Commons, p. 404—Petition to the House of Lords, p. 450—Mr. Tucker's Dissent, p. 342—Mr. Jenkins's Dissent, p. 858. It is observable also, that while the bill as passed by the House of Commons (27th July 1833) contained a clause (54), giving the Court of Directors power to appoint councils at the subordinate presidencies (with the approbation of the board), another clause (56), declared that Governors where *no councils might be appointed*, should "have all the rights, powers, duties, functions and immunities whatsoever, not in anywise repugnant to this act, which the Governors of Fort St. George and Bombay, *in their respective councils* now have within their respective presidencies."

the company of Merchant Tailors.* Mr. Ewart said India wanted skill more than capital, and glanced at the salt and opium monopolies. Mr. Charles Grant replied. On the whole, the debate produced little to elucidate the questions agitated, or to affect their decision.

On the 12th, after some preliminary discussion, the House went into Committee on the Bill. Mr. Hume proposed that the tenure of the Company should be determinable at the expiration of ten years. Mr. Lyall urged the impossibility of supposing that the Company would suspend their right of trading for the sake of having their charter renewed for so short a term as ten years. The amendment was lost. Some discussion took place on the question of relinquishing or abolishing councils in the subordinate presidencies; on the controlling power of the Governor-general; on the establishment of a new subordinate government at Agra, and other topics, in the course of which Mr. C. F. Russell recommended the removal of the seat of the Supreme Government from Calcutta to Bombay, a suggestion which was noticed with approbation by Sir Robert Inglis.

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* It may not be easy to conjecture how this could have been effected in connexion with any thing before the Committee. The attack on the Merchant Tailors was based on the casual mention of that body, among other public companies, by Mr. Macaulay.

The proceedings of the Committee were resumed on the 15th. After much discussion on the legislative powers proposed to be entrusted to the Governor-general in Council, Mr. Cutlar Fergusson moved an amendment, excepting the local limits of the settlements of Fort William, Madras, and Bombay, from its operation, which was lost. On the 16th Mr. Fergusson moved another amendment, the effect of which was to withdraw any discretionary power as to the existence of councils at Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, and to make the continuance of councils imperative. The amendment was supported by Mr. Hume, Sir Robert Inglis, Mr. Wynne, Sir Harry Verney, Mr. Charles Marjoribanks, Colonel Evans, and Lord Ashley, and opposed by Mr. Charles Grant, Mr. Robert Grant, Mr. Charles Buller, and Mr. Strutt. It was lost on a division. An amendment, moved by Sir Harry Verney, appointing the Governor-general Governor of the whole province of Bengal, with two Lieutenant-governors to carry on the duties of the administration, one residing at Agra and the other at Calcutta, was withdrawn. Mr. Buller proposed an amendment, excluding the Governor-general from the governorship of any particular presidency, which was supported by Mr. Strutt and Mr. Hume, but lost on a division. On the 17th, Mr. Hume moved that a clause, declaring it unlawful for persons to reside in certain parts of India without license, should

be omitted. The amendment was lost by a large majority. A clause respecting slavery was added, on the motion of Mr. Charles Grant. A rather stormy discussion on the proposed establishment of two new bishoprics in India followed, and after two divisions, the motion that the Chairman report progress was agreed to without opposition.

On the 19th, the discussion of the subject was resumed. Mr. O'Connell pleaded for a Catholic establishment in addition to a Protestant one. Mr. Grant took a conciliatory tone, and proposed that Catholic priests should be paid. Mr. Wynne approved of this course. Mr. Shiel opposed the payment of any religious teachers. The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Lord Althorp) said Government were as willing to sanction other churches as the church of England; and Mr. O'Connell declared himself satisfied. Sir Robert Inglis supported the establishment of the new bishoprics; Mr. Hume opposed it altogether. Mr. C. Buller took the same course, while Major Cumming Bruce, avowing himself to be a member of the church of Scotland, entreated the ministers to persevere in carrying the clause, which he believed would give great satisfaction in the country. Mr. Finch, Sir Matthew White Ridley, Lord Morpeth, Sir John Maxwell, and Mr. Cutlar Fergusson having spoken in favour of the clause, and Mr. O'Dwyer, Mr. Ruthven, Mr. Halcombe, and Mr. G. F. Young against it, a

division took place, and the clause was carried. The various clauses relating to the allowances of the new bishops gave rise to some discussion, as did also the provisions relating to the education of civil servants at Haileybury, and the mode of selecting them. On the latter point, Mr. Wynne took the opportunity of re-publishing the opinions which he had so often advanced, in favour of distributing writerships by competition among candidates in the universities and public schools. To the ministerial plan, by which candidates were to be nominated in a four-fold proportion to the number of appointments, and the requisite number selected for Haileybury from among them, Mr. Lyall took a very powerful objection, that it made the conduct of the boy, instead of the young man, the rule of promotion. An amendment moved by Mr. Hume, reducing the salary of the Governor-general, was lost, and an additional clause, moved by Colonel Leith Hay, making it imperative to retain at each presidency two clergymen of the church of Scotland, which was opposed by Mr. Hume and Mr. Warburton, was carried on a division.

The report being brought up on the 22d July, Mr. Wilbraham (Member for Cheshire) submitted a motion in favour of abolishing the salt monopoly, which was seconded by Mr. Ewart (Member for Liverpool). Mr. Buckingham and Mr. Hume supported the views of those gentlemen. Mr.

Grant and Mr. Cutlar Fergusson craved time for the termination of the monopoly.* The motion was not pressed to a division. Mr. C. Buller moved an amendment, reducing the period of attendance at the college at Haileybury, which was withdrawn; and Mr. Hume renewed his motion for a clause to admit of putting an end to the Company's government after the expiration of ten years, which was lost.

On the 26th July, a General Court of Proprietors was held, and a petition to the House of Commons against the bill agreed upon. The petitioners complained of the want of any provision for reporting to Parliament cases, where the Board of Control and the Court of Directors might finally

* The concluding remarks of Mr. Cutlar Fergusson were very important, but they do not appear to have fixed the attention of the House. "I will take this opportunity of expressing a hope, that while such active endeavours are made to extend the manufactures of England, we should also do something for the manufactures of India. At present our cottons and woollens are imported into India on payment of a duty of two-and-a-half per cent., while at the same time a duty of ten per cent. is charged upon the cottons of India. A few years ago in Dacca alone 50,000 families obtained the means of subsistence by the cotton manufactures, but from the commercial policy this country has pursued with regard to India, not one-tenth of the number are now employed in this branch of industry. I trust that this system will be abandoned, and that articles produced by the natives of India will be admitted into England on payment of a small duty."

differ,—of the increase given to the power of the Governor-general, and the diminution of that of the subordinate governments,—of the institution of a fourth Presidency for the north-western provinces,—of the proposal to withdraw councils from the Government of Madras and Bombay,—of the increase of expense which would be occasioned by the creation of new offices,—of the increase of the ecclesiastical establishment,—and of the retention of the college at Haileybury. The petition was presented the same evening by Mr. Cutlar Fergusson, who moved, that the petitioners be heard by counsel at the bar of the House on the third reading of the bill. The motion was seconded by Mr. Hume, supported by Mr. Wilkes, Mr. Buckingham, and Sir Richard Vivian; opposed by Mr. Robert Grant, Mr. Macaulay, and the Solicitor-general, and lost on a division by a hundred to thirty-three. It was objected, that the petitioners ought to have come sooner. To this Mr. Fergusson answered, that they had not the opportunity; that the Court of Proprietors could not be summoned without giving several days' notice, and that the Court of Directors had delayed calling them together, in expectation of receiving communications from the President of the Board of Control, which, however, he had not thought fit to give.*

* Mr. Fergusson had occasion, of which he availed himself,

This refusal of a hearing to the East-India Company, who were about to be deprived of privileges and power, the growth of centuries, was followed by a desultory debate, each member selecting for his topic any point of Indian policy on which it suited him to expatiate. Mr. Buckingham declaimed against the limited right of settlement, and the church establishment; Mr. Wynne gave

of rebuking the proverbial impatience of the House with respect to Indian affairs. While calling attention to the petition, he was interrupted by noise, on which he said, "I give the House full credit for the most perfect indifference to the statements of these petitioners, but I do think they are bound to preserve something like silence, instead of the incessant conversation and confusion which now prevails." And in his reply, after dwelling upon the deep interest which he felt in the bill, he said, "Have the Company, I ask, been heard upon this subject? I deny it. If a member has ventured to open his mouth in their favour, he has scarcely been able to obtain a hearing." Sir Robert Inglis on the same evening adverted to the subject. He said, "I know how little interest is excited by India, how much less by China. Adam Smith, in his 'Theory of Moral Sentiment,' has said that it would give a man of tolerable humanity more distress to be told that his own little finger was to be cut off to-morrow morning, than to hear that the whole empire of China had been swallowed up by an earthquake. In the one case, he would perhaps lie awake, in the other he would only think that he would lose his tea." Mr. Wynne, in reference to the bill then before the House, observed that he "did not remember any bill occupying so much time, and on so important a subject, which had excited so little attention and created so little interest."

utterance to his never-sleeping wish to reduce the number of Directors; Mr. Poulett Thomson defended the burdensome and unequal duties imposed in this country on India productions. Several other members speculated on futurity; after which Mr. Grant made a short and very unnecessary reply, seeing that the fate of the bill was as certain as though it had become law. It was read a third time, when Mr. Wynne moved, by way of rider, a clause embodying one of his favourite views as to patronage, by setting aside a certain number of military appointments, to be bestowed on the sons of officers. The clause was negatived without a division. Mr. Shiel, who had previously contended that no form of Christianity should be supported in India, then moved a clause for extending support to the Roman Catholic church "and others differing" from the established churches of England and Scotland; but, on a promise from Mr. Grant to add to a future clause a proviso, leaving the Governor-general at liberty to grant sums of money to any sect or community of Christians, Mr. Shiel withdrew his clause. Sir Richard Vivian then proposed a clause, restraining the Governor-general in council from making laws affecting the inhabitants of the presidencies, without registration in the European courts. It was lost: when Mr. Cutlar Fergusson moved the omission of the clause, vesting the governments of the presidencies in a gover-

nor irrespective of a council.* This motion was pressed to a division, and the retention of the clause carried by a majority. After various additions, which excited little or no discussion, Mr. Grant proposed his proviso (promised to Mr. Shiel), allowing the Governor-general in council, with the sanction of the Court of Directors, to grant money to societies of Christians not belonging to either of the established churches of Great Britain. This was strenuously opposed by Mr. Andrew Johnstone, who said he felt bound to the course he was adopting, by a sense of his duty as an elder of the church of Scotland. Mr. Sinclair, Mr. Pease, and Mr. Plumtree agreed in the objections of Mr. Johnstone; but, on a division, the proviso was adopted by a great majority. Mr. Wynne moved an amendment, the effect of which was to dispense with the necessity of candidates or writerships passing through Haileybury. Mr. Lyall took occasion to avow his conviction, that the four-fold plan of nomination could never be brought into effect.† Several members attacked the college: its solitary defender was Mr. Robert Grant, but the amendment was lost. The bill then passed the Commons. On the 29th July, it was

* These discussions, both in Committee and in the House, prove the accuracy of the remark made at page 611.

† The result has shown this belief to have been well-founded. By the 1 Vict. c. 70, the operation of the plan was suspended.

read a first time in the Lords; and again on the 2d of August *sub silentio*.

A General Court of Proprietors of the East-India Company had been held on the 31st of July, when a petition to the House of Lords, similar to that presented to the Commons, was agreed upon. This petition was presented on the 2d of August by the Earl of Shaftesbury, who proposed to move that the petitioners be heard by counsel, if not contrary to the sense of the House; but, as some Peers opposed this proceeding, and none supported it, the noble Earl took for granted that his intended motion was contrary to the sense of the House, and abstained from making it. The Marquess of Lansdowne then moved the third reading of the bill without a single remark in its favour, alleging that as Lord Ellenborough intended to move an amendment, he reserved his observations to a future period of the debate. Lord Ellenborough thereupon claimed a right of reply, if he should deem it necessary, which the Marquess of Lansdowne instantly conceded. It was certainly a novel mode of proceeding, to allot the opening and reply in a discussion on a ministerial bill to a member of the opposition. Lord Ellenborough, to whose care a bill, brought in by his opponents, was thus suddenly surrendered, then moved, "that it be an instruction to the Committee to omit all such clauses in the bill as relate to alterations in the constitution and powers

of the governments of the several Presidencies of India." The Marquess of Lansdowne made some observations in defence of the ministerial measure. The Duke of Wellington followed, arguing against the total discontinuance of trade by the Company, and pointing out some difficulties in the proposed constitution of the Governments of India.* Lord Ellenborough's amendment was lost, and the House then went into Committee on the bill. The different clauses were dispatched with great rapidity. Lord Ellenborough took some objection to the clauses, directing a reference to the Court of King's Bench, when the Court thought the orders of the Board contrary to law. His lordship appeared to desire to limit the power of the Court of Directors more closely than had ever before been deemed necessary, and to suspect that the contents of secret despatches were communicated to Directors not members of the Secret Committee. Lord Auckland answered that, as the members of the Committee were sworn to secresy, it was highly unlikely that such circum-

* With regard to the Governor-general, the Duke observed that, "he would not only have augmented duties to perform with the assistance of an augmented council, but also to attend to the business of Bengal without any council." The Marquess of Lansdowne immediately exclaimed, "Not so; he will have the assistance of a council." This, however, appears to have been incorrect. The governor of Bengal has no council.

stances should take place. On the 7th the remaining clauses of the bill were proceeded through with equal celerity. On the 8th of August the amendments were reported, and on the 9th, after some discussion on the claims of various classes of creditors whose interests might be affected, the report was taken into consideration. Some amendments of a financial character were moved, and negatived; after which the Marquess of Lansdowne moved that the fifth member of the Council of India, who was to be a person not in the service of the East-India Company, should be excluded from sitting or voting, except when making laws or regulations, which was agreed to; as was also a modification of the clause respecting slavery, submitted by the same nobleman.

The fate of the bill and of the Company in connection with the government of India, were now approaching to a crisis. A General Court was summoned for the 13th of August by the Chairman and Deputy-Chairman at the request of the President of the Board of Control. On the previous day a Court of Directors was held, when a motion was submitted (it is presumed from the Chair), declining to recommend the acceptance of the bill by the proprietors, and referring the question altogether to the discretion of that body. An amendment was moved, which, while lamenting the cessation of the Company's trade,—disapproving

of the increased power of the Board,—regretting the refusal of Parliament to provide a rule of publicity,—and avowing apprehension as to the effects of the intended changes of the finances of India, —yet in the conviction that the powers of the Board would be exercised so as not to interfere with the independence of the Company as a body acting intermediately between the King's Government and the government of India, which independence all parties had admitted it to be of vital importance to maintain,—and, in the belief that Parliament would interfere for the relief of financial difficulties, if any should arise in consequence of the changes, to recommend to the proprietors to consent to place their trade in abeyance, in order to undertake the exercise of the government of India for twenty years, under the conditions and arrangements of the bill. The amendment was carried, and the Chairman and Deputy (Mr. Marjoribanks and Mr. Wigram) immediately delivered in a dissent.*

* The following is the paper referred to in the text:—

"Differing from the majority of the Court of Directors who have this day passed a resolution recommending the proprietors to place their charter in abeyance, we record our dissent from that proceeding, and shall briefly state our reasons for doing so.

"It is impossible for us to contemplate the annihilation of the basis upon which the East-India Company was originally incorporated, without reflecting that Great Britain owes to their exertions the valuable trade with India and China, as well as

At the General Court on the 13th, various papers were read—the minutes of the Court of Directors

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its maintenance during two centuries, amidst great embarrassment at home and the powerful opposition of European and native enemies abroad, and that in its prosecution the Company laid the foundation of the British empire in India.

"The extension of the Company's territorial possessions became matter of great national interest, and led to political power, under Parliamentary regulation, being engrafted upon their commercial character.

"The union of government and trade being thus considered the system best calculated to preserve the stability of our rule in India, and at the same time to secure the greatest benefits to that country and to England.

"The opinion of those statesmen who took the leading part in the proceedings of 1793 and 1813, prove that they were governed by the same principles in proposing the arrangements concluded at each of those periods, between the public and the Company; and the following extracts from the last Report of the Parliamentary Committee, printed in August 1832, appear to us to establish the fact that these joint functions have hitherto produced the most beneficial effects:—

"'That the British sway has conferred very considerable benefits on India can hardly be doubted, since under our government the people enjoy advantages which all history shows they never possessed under their own princes—protection from external invasion, and the security of life and property.' *(a)*

"Again,

"'The finances of India have derived advantage from their existing connection with the commerce of the Company,

"'1st. Through the direct application of surplus commercial profit;

(a) Vide p. 19 of the Report of the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East-India Company.

held the previous day; the dissent of the Chairman and Deputy-chairman; a letter from Mr. Tucker, stating some objections to the bill, but recommend-

"'2d. By the rates of exchange at which the territorial advances from commerce in England have been repaid to commerce in India;

"'3d. In consequence, as is alleged, of the remittances from India annually required for the payment of those territorial charges defrayed in England, having been made through the Company's commerce.' *(a)*

"With these admitted results, we consider that, although deprived of their monopoly of the China trade, but at the same time relieved from all the legal obligations by which their transactions have hitherto been fettered, the Company might have continued to trade with great advantage, especially as regards the question of remittance.

"It was, therefore, with much surprise that we first perused the Hints submitted by his Majesty's Government, containing the proposition that the Company should henceforth abandon all commercial operations, and transfer to territory the whole of their assets at home and in India.

"We, nevertheless, felt it to be our duty to give our best consideration to the proposed scheme; we did so with an anxious desire that the Company, who had already secured such great advantages to their country, should not disappoint even its further expectations, but consent to waive the exercise of the commercial rights which they possess in perpetuity, if the proprietors were fully secured in the regular receipt of their present dividend, and in the ultimate payment of their capital, and provided that such a plan were devised as would enable the Company 'efficiently to administer the government of India for a further term with credit to themselves and with advantage to that empire.'

(a) Page 47 of the same Report.

ing that with all its defects it should be accepted; a paper signed by Mr. Thornhill, concurring with

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"It is with these views that we became parties to the resolution, passed by the proprietors at the ballot on the 3d May last, which formed the basis of the proposed compromise.

"Two of the points contended for in that resolution were the extension of the guarantee fund to three millions, and the provision for publicity as a rule.

"To the first we still consider the proprietors entitled, both in justice and in equity, from the proceeds of their commercial assets.

"The latter provision we deem indispensable to the independence of the Court of Directors.

"Neither point has been conceded, whilst other provisions have been introduced into the bill which render the scheme, in our judgment, still more objectionable.

"We consider that, although some important modifications have been made in the bill introduced into Parliament subsequently to the resolution of the Court of Proprietors of the 3d May, particularly as regards the retention of councils at the subordinate presidencies, the measure as it stands involves an unnecessary departure from the principles upon which the governments of those presidencies have hitherto been conducted, and by which they were made directly responsible to the authorities at home.

"This change, so far from preventing the recurrence of the delay, upon which much stress was laid in the late Parliamentary inquiry, will, in point of fact, increase the evil, and instead of relieving the Governor-general from a portion of those duties which are now complained of as too multifarious, it will impose upon him additional labour and responsibility. It will, moreover, admit of the existence at the same time of six distinct executive authorities, which may lead to much embarrassment.

"We think the provisions of the bill will create a considerable additional charge upon India without conferring any adequate

Mr. Tucker both in his objections and recommendation, and a letter signed by Mr. Astell and thir-

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benefit, whilst that country will by the same measure be deprived of those resources, without which her financial means, as regards both income and remittance, will be put to great hazard.

"Upon the point of remittance, we are at a loss to imagine how the same is to be effected to the requisite extent, and, if effected, we fear it will be at a very unfavourable rate of exchange, and, consequently, at a great loss to the Indian finances.

"We are likewise of opinion that the bill leaves the assets transferred to territory to be applied and disposed of in a manner which we much fear will occasion not only a serious deterioration of property, but great disappointment and distrust; and, lastly,

"We consider that the Court of Directors, instead of being placed by the present bill in the position in which alone they can independently, and, consequently, advantageously discharge their duties, will be converted into little else than a mere instrument for the purpose of giving effect to the acts of the controlling Board, and it would consequently have been far better that his Majesty's Government should have openly and avowedly assumed the direct administration of India, than have attempted to maintain an intermediate body in deference to those constitutional principles which led to its original formation under Parliamentary regulation, but deprived of its authority and rendered inefficient by the present measure, and which will become, in our opinion, a mere useless charge upon the revenues of India.

"In thus stating our sentiments we discharge a painful, but at the same time what we feel to be an imperative duty, and with this feeling we cannot consent to incur the responsibility of recommending to our constituents to confirm the compromise, by consenting to place their chartered rights in abeyance under the provisions of the present bill."

teen other Directors.* A motion was then made similar in spirit to the amendment carried on the

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* The letter follows. The Directors who signed it, besides William Astell, Esq., were William Stanley Clarke, Esq., George Raikes, Esq., Henry Shank, Esq., Sir William Young, Bart., Russell Ellice, Esq., William Butterworth Bayley, Esq., Sir Richard Jenkins, George Lyall, Esq., John Cotton, Esq., J. P. Muspratt, Esq., Henry Alexander, Esq., John Masterman, Esq., and Sir James Law Lushington.

"We feel called upon, in consequence of the dissent of the Chairs, to state the general grounds which induced us to support the resolution adopted by the majority of this Court yesterday.

"It is at all times matter of regret to us, when we find ourselves on any measure opposed to the opinion of the Chairs; and that regret is much increased when the difference arises on a question of such moment as that which at present divides us. We feel it the more, because we think the Chairs have succeeded, since the opening of the present negotiation, in obtaining important modifications in the plan as originally proposed, as well as in the bill now before Parliament.

"We concur in many of the views entertained by the Chairs; and were we to consult only our personal feelings, we might possibly arrive at the same conclusion: but in deciding on a question involving such various interests, and encompassed on all sides with much difficulty, we feel bound to pursue that course which, upon the whole, appears to us to be most conducive to the interest of the Proprietors and to the welfare of India.

"We sincerely wish that the scheme proposed by his Majesty's Ministers had been based on established principles, the soundness of which had been proved by the result of long experience, rather than upon untried theories; but we cannot forget that the basis of the present compromise was agreed to

preceding day in the Court of Directors, disapproving the change, but accepting the government of

by the Company on the motion of the late Sir John Malcolm, not hastily, but after seven days' discussion; not by a show of hands, but by the ballot on the 3d May last, and by a majority of 425 proprietors out of 477. (*a*)

"On that occasion the Company adverted to the long and intimate connexion which had existed between them and India, and declared 'that, if Parliament in its wisdom should consider, as his Majesty's Ministers have declared, that the advancement of the happiness and prosperity of our native subjects may be best promoted by the administration being continued in the hands of the Company, but divested of their commercial character, the Court of Directors having suggested, as it was their duty to do, the difficulties and dangers, political as well as financial, which beset the dissolution of the connexion between the territorial and the commercial branches of their affairs, will not shrink from the undertaking even at the sacrifices required, provided that powers be reserved to enable the Company efficiently to administer the government, and that their pecuniary rights and claims be adjusted upon the principle of fair and liberal compromise.' (*b*)

"Power was also claimed to enable the Company to make suitable provision for outstanding commercial obligations, and for such of the commercial officers and servants of the Company as may be affected by the proposed arrangements.

"The resolution having been communicated to Mr. Grant, that gentleman, in his letter of 27th May, declared it to be the anxious wish of his Majesty's Government 'to accommodate themselves, as far as it be practicable, to the views and feelings of the

(*a*) *Vide* page 181, Negotiation Papers.
(*b*) Page 183, printed Charter Papers.

India under the bill. An amendment was then submitted, declining to accept the bill, and con-

Company,' (*a*) and pointed out the modifications which had been made.

"The Court of Directors, on the 29th May, (*b*) acknowledged with much satisfaction the several modifications of the plan of Government which that letter announced, and were persuaded that their constituents, equally with themselves, would appreciate the spirit of frankness and conciliation in which those modifications had been conceded. They expressed themselves satisfied with the manner in which the dividends were to be regularly paid, (*c*) but re-urged the fair claim of the proprietors to an increase of the guarantee fund, and likewise provision for a rule of publicity to Parliament.

"Upon the reply from his Majesty's Ministers of the 4th June, in which explanations were made as to the guarantee fund, and the redemption of the annuities, and reasons assigned for withholding concurrence in the establishment of a rule for publicity before Parliament, the Court of Directors came to a resolution, 'that they were prepared to recommend, that if it should be the pleasure of Parliament to limit the sum to be set apart to two millions, the proprietors should defer thereto;' (*d*) and that the question of publicity should be left to the decision of Parliament, the Court confidently expecting that Parliament would view the importance of such a provision in the same light as the Court.

"The General Court of Proprietors, on the 10th June, concurred in opinion with the Court, and adopted their recommendation. (*e*)

(*a*) Printed Charter Papers, page 185.
(*b*) Ibid. page 191.
(*c*) Ibid. page 193.
(*d*) Ibid. page 203.
(*e*) Ibid. page 213.

demning its provisions, as well on financial grounds as on that of placing despotic power in the hands

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"The principles of the basis of the compromise were thus virtually ratified by the Company, leaving the two points, as to the increase of the guarantee fund, and the enacting a rule of publicity, to the pleasure of Parliament.

"On the 25th June, Mr. Grant transmitted to the Court a summary, containing the main provisions of the intended bill, and on the 29th a copy of the bill as it had been introduced into the House of Commons.

"It is unnecessary for us to enter at length into a review of its provisions.

"The Court's objections to the measure have been fully stated in their Correspondence with his Majesty's Government, and some of the principal points have been urged in the Company's petition to the House of Commons, and subsequently to the House of Lords, and both Houses have had before them the whole of the Papers connected with the present negotiation.

"In the petition to the House of Lords, presented so late as the 5th instant, it is declared, that 'Your petitioners are seriously desirous that no obstacle should arise on their part to the arrangement which Parliament in its wisdom shall deem to be best calculated to promote the welfare of India and the commercial prosperity of the United Kingdom;' but the Court prayed to be heard by counsel on the following points:

"For establishing a rule of publicity;

"Against the establishment of a fourth presidency instead of a lieutenant-governor at Agra;

"Against the abolition of councils at Madras and Bombay;

"Against the maintenance of Haileybury College; and

"On the increase of expense likely to arise from an extension of the ecclesiastical establishment.

of the Governor-general "over a hundred millions of British subjects, over every authority in India,

"Both Houses have declined to entertain the question of publicity, and both have resolved to maintain Haileybury College and to increase the ecclesiastical establishment, as well as to authorize a government at Agra; but, at the same time, concessions had been made in the import and provisions regarding the councils, which are to be maintained as at present, reserving power to the Company to abolish them at a future period, should it be thought expedient.

"A very important alteration has likewise been made in the clause as to slavery, and the declaration that it should cease throughout the Indian territory is omitted.

"The question therefore was, whether the points which have not been conceded form sufficient grounds to induce us to withhold a recommendation to the General Court, or whether, under all circumstances, we should not best discharge our duty to the proprietors and to India by recommending the General Court to confirm the compromise, and to place their chartered right of trade in abeyance under the provisions of the present bill.

"It should be recollected, that immediately before the acceptance of the charter of 1813, a committee of the whole Court recorded it as their opinion, that the general powers of superintendence and control of the Board were, even at that time, such that, if 'exercised illiberally or vexatiously, it would be difficult for the Court of Directors to perform their functions.' Much, therefore, must depend upon the spirit in which those powers are in future administered. If, as was then observed, liberally, it may be practicable for the Court of Directors to carry on the trust reposed in them satisfactorily; but if otherwise, then it is impossible to expect that men of

not excepting his Majesty's courts of justice." The amendment was lost.* A ballot having been demanded on the main question, it took place on the 16th, when the original motion was carried by a considerable majority.† On the same evening the bill was read a second time in the House of Lords, the Marquess of Lansdowne positively refusing to enter into any discussion upon its merits. The formal motion that the bill do pass was postponed until the 19th, when it was made

character and liberal feelings will retain their seats in the direction.

"With this explanation of our sentiments, and with reference to the declaration of Mr. Grant, that it is the intention of his Majesty's Government that the Company, in their political capacity, 'shall commence the exercise of their resumed functions in the utmost possible state of efficiency,' (*a*) we have resolved to recommend to the proprietors to make a fair trial of the proposed charter; and should obstacles arise, or unforeseen causes prevent or impede the execution of it by the Company, after their best endeavours have been used for the purpose, the responsibility of the failure will not attach to them."

* From the division it would seem as though the apathy of the Legislature had extended to the proprietors of East-India stock. A question, involving little short of the very existence of the Company, brought only forty-nine proprietors into Court: of them, ten voted for the amendment (rejection of the bill), and thirty-nine against it (acceptance of the bill).

† For acceptance, 173; rejection, 64.

(*a*) Printed Charter Papers, page 36.

and carried without remark. The Lords' amendments were concurred in by the Commons, and the bill received the Royal assent.

The history of the East-India Company from its commencement has been extraordinary; and the suspension of its commerce, the sole purpose for which it was formed, is not the least extraordinary part of that history. There was some plausibility in the principal objection taken to the continuance of the Company's trade with India, that the characters of merchant and sovereign were incompatible; but that objection did not apply to its trade with China, the sacrifice of which was a tribute to ignorant and interested clamour. The Company's exclusive privileges were eminently useful in extending and maintaining our commercial relations with a country with which it is difficult to maintain intercourse at all, and those privileges were so carefully guarded that they could not be abused. No impartial person, whatever his opinions on freedom of trade, can read the evidence on the China trade given before the parliamentary committees, without feeling convinced that the Company's exclusive rights ought to have been maintained. Government determined otherwise, and the reproach of having thus determined is not peculiar to the party which happened to be then in power: Whig and Tory were alike ready to surrender the trade of the Company to those who clamoured for its destruction. No rights,

however well established, no interests, however important, are safe, where statesmen, abandoning their true position, are content to follow, instead of leading the public voice.*

* Some of the "disturbing forces" which interfere with the practical application of the doctrines of free trade are ably pointed out in the following passage from a dissent recorded by Mr. Tucker, during the negociations of the Company with the Government:—

"I do not ask his Majesty's Ministers to abandon the doctrine of free trade as an abstract proposition; but I submit, that it cannot be received for practical purposes as a rule of commercial policy without certain conditions and limitations.

"First. The parties dealing together must act upon the principle of perfect reciprocity. This is not likely to be the case in China.

Second. There must be on both sides security for person and property. This is not the case in Japan, nor indeed in China, at all times.

Third. There must not be a great inequality between the quantity of labour brought into action in the course of producing the commodities interchanged, or the benefit will not be equal. Fifty years ago labour was held to be the source of national wealth; but we have now a redundancy of manual labour, creating individual poverty and distress; and it is one great and most difficult part of the business of legislation and government, to find the means of employing labour innocently if not usefully, and to make it applicable to the purpose of distributing the general produce. If this distribution cannot be effected in such manner as to admit that labour can command food, the people will take by violence that which is necessary to their subsistence.

The China trade of the Company was a positive benefit to India, that country being relieved thereby to the extent of the surplus profits of the trade.

" Fourth. There is something in *distance,* or the remoteness of countries trading together, which may produce some disturbance in applying the doctrine of free trade.

" In a very few days we learn the variations in the principal commercial markets of the Continent, and the supply may be adjusted to the demand with a great degree of accuracy, so as to prevent any material loss from the violent fluctuation of prices; but six months, or twelve months, may elapse before we obtain certain information of what is passing in China, and different merchants, proceeding in ignorance and without concert, may engage in the most hazardous speculations.

" This happened to the inconsiderate adventurers who first embarked in the trade to Buenos Ayres, although the distance was comparatively small!

" This happened to the free-traders who have prosecuted the commerce with India since 1813; and to an extent which has spread ruin throughout the Indian community, as well as in some of the manufacturing districts of this country!

" An attempt was made by us to open a trade with Japan while we held possession of Java, and it ended in total disappointment, entailing upon the Government a heavy loss. This was not to be referred to *distance* alone, but to the jealous feeling of an arbitrary government. And does not the government of China act in that arbitrary, capricious, and unsteady manner, which is calculated to create uncertainty in the management of commercial operations? The trade in that country exists only by sufferance from day to day.

" I contend, that sufficient allowance is not made for the disadvantage of distance and uncertainty in applying the doctrine of free trade to China. It was the risk and uncertainty attending long voyages, and the necessity for a large capital, which first led to the incorporation of our own and other public com-

It was determined that India should no longer enjoy this benefit, but that the profit (or the loss, as the case might be) should be allotted to England. It is remarkable that the interests of India should be invariably sacrificed whenever they are the subject of British legislation. India has sustained pecuniary loss by the withdrawal of the China trade from the Company. The Company sustained some diminution of influence, and various classes of their servants were deprived of employment, which they had calculated would continue as long as they were able to follow it. Amidst this mass of loss and inconvenience, who has gained? It is very doubtful whether either the successors of the Company in the China trade, or their customers, the purchasers and consumers of tea, can give a satisfactory answer to the question*

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panies. Exclusive privileges were necessary for their encouragement; but with these privileges they were enabled to supply remote markets, whose wants they could generally estimate with a great degree of certainty, and supply with regularity and without extraordinary risk; but individuals, who run a race of competition, cannot guard themselves against the imprudence of each other."

* The effect of similar changes is frequently unmitigated evil. The following remarks on the effects of violent pecuniary reforms are not inapplicable to them, and in certain quarters they may have the greater weight, as coming from the pen of an advocate of ultra liberal principles in politics and trade, Jeremy Bentham:—

"Shall it be said, that the immediate abolition of places is

Next to the abolition of the Company's China trade, the most objectionable parts of the new

a gain to the public? This is a sophism. The sum in question would no doubt be a gain if it came from any other source, if it were rechanged by commerce or in any other just way; but it is no gain to the public, when it is wrung from individuals, who form a part of that very public. Would a family be the richer, because a father took from one of his children his portion in order to increase the fortunes of the others? The profit of an abolished place is divided among the whole public, but the loss presses on an individual; the gain is not perceptible, but the loss causes destruction. If we abolish all useless places and make no compensation to the holders, what is the consequence? The streets are crowded with the despoiled citizens, exhibiting marks of indigence, while we scarcely see an individual whose condition the change has benefited. The groans of sorrow, and the cries of despair, resound from every quarter, while the benefit, being so minutely divided, is hardly perceived. If joy is possessed, it arises not from the sense of good effected, but is a malignant satisfaction occasioned by surrounding misery.

"What is done in order to deceive the people on the occasion of these acts of flagrant injustice? Recourse is had to pompous maxims, which have a mixture of truth and falsehood, and give to a question which is extremely simple in itself, an air of profundity and mystery. The interest of individuals, say the advocates for this inhuman reformation, ought to yield to that of the public; but is not one individual as much a part of the public as another? What is this public interest? is it not made up of the mass of private interests? All these private interests ought to be considered, instead of regarding, as these unfeeling reformers do, a part of these as the whole, and another part of them as nothing. The interest of each individual is sacred, and not to be touched, or the interest of no one is thus to be regarded. Individual interests are the sole

measure appear to be the refusal of the rule of publicity, and the transfer of so large a portion of the power formerly enjoyed by the subordinate governments, to the Governor-general. As to the first, it is certain that both individuals and bodies of men may conscientiously differ, and that their differences may be irreconcilable; but in such

real interests. Have a care of individuals—do not disturb them, nor suffer their rights on any account to be invaded, and you will have done enough for the public. On a multitude of occasions, men who have suffered by the operation of certain laws, have not dared to assert what their rights were, or have been refused a hearing, on account of this false and pernicious construction of the maxim, that private good ought to yield to public good. Treat it as a question of generosity, whom does it become to exercise it? All towards one, or one towards all? Who is the more selfish—he who desires to keep what he has, or he who would seize by force what another possesses? An evil felt, and a benefit not felt——behold the result of those boasted operations, which sacrifice individuals to the public."

These remarks are obviously applicable to corporations, as well as to individuals. It may seem extraordinary that when the privileges of the East-India Company were attacked, the occurrence should not have called forth the sympathy and support of other corporate bodies. It failed, however, of producing this effect, and some of those who either stood by in silence or were active in the attack, have since found that the East-India Company was not the only victim called for. The hand of innovation has been at work elsewhere, and even with more sweeping effect.

cases no ground for concealment seems to exist. Neither party need feel shame in avowing opinions which are the result of honest conviction. With regard to the second, it cannot but excite surprise that it should have been deemed either necessary or prudent to concentrate nearly all power in the chief government. The motives to this course were never adequately explained.*

Although deprived of some advantages which they had previously enjoyed under the Company's rule, the people of India had reason to rejoice that the Company was still preserved as an instrument for the government of their country. That

* Mr. Jenkins (now Sir Richard Jenkins) has concisely and forcibly laid down the true policy on this question, in a dissent, dated 5th July, 1833. He says:—

"In matters of war and politics it is essential, in my opinion, that all local authority should be concentrated in the hands of the supreme government. I confess I am not aware of any great evils that have arisen from any want of control in the supreme over the subordinate governments in these or other respects; and if any have arisen, *the existing law*(*a*) does not seem to have been in fault, as it confers upon the Governor-general in Council ample authority for interference in every conceivable case. The policy hitherto pursued, however, has been, to have *one controlling power* for emergencies, but separate authorities for *ordinary circumstances;* and being satisfied that

(*a*) 33 Geo. III. cap. 52, sec. 40, 41, 44, 64.

portion of the people of England, who do not desire to see the combatants for political power every thing and the rest of the people nothing, have equal reason to be satisfied with this result.* That the Company agreed to accept the important trust, under conditions to which strong objections were entertained, may be attributed to the recommendation of the majority of the Directors, headed by Mr. Astell, a gentleman, whose experience, sound judgment, and high character, were eminently calculated to inspire confidence in his views, and give weight to his advice. Happily this advice was successful, and India has yet to boast of being incomparably the best governed of the dependent possessions of Great Britain.

It does not fall within the limits of this work to speak of the events which have followed the

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this is the true system of administration for a country of such vast extent, and so distant from the paramount state as India is, I should be sorry to see it materially infringed."

* The Court of Directors usually contains members of various shades of political opinion, and some having no strong political predilections at all. The patronage, therefore, is not distributed in one political channel, as it would be if transferred to the Government, where the friends of the ruling party would enjoy a monopoly of it, and where (a consideration once thought important) it would generally be bestowed, as the purchase or the reward of political services. The charlatan plan for tendering appointments to competition, and other fancies of the like nature, do not deserve a moment's discussion.

changes now related; but it may be observed, in closing this chapter, that, during the few years that have since elapsed, the British dominion in India has lost nothing of its grandeur or solidity, but that both have been maintained with spirit and success!

THE END.

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