AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA SINCE 1917

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A Study of Diplomatic History International Law & Public Opinion

by

FREDERICK LEWIS SCHUMAN, PH. D.
Instructor in Political Science
University of Chicago



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PREFACE

In the present volume an attempt has been made, I think for the first time, to tell with a fair degree of completeness the story of Russian-American relations since the Revolution. The study is based primarily upon American sources, including certain hitherto unpublished diplomatic correspondence in the archives of the Department of State, official documents, books, articles, and miscellaneous newspaper and periodical material. A chronological survey of the development of the American policy from March of 1917 to the time of writing is followed by a detailed analysis and critical evaluation of the grounds upon which diplomatic recognition of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is withheld by the Government of the United States. The result is, I hope, not merely a useful treatment of an important phase of diplomatic history but a study of public opinion and of the control of American foreign policy as well.

Since limitations of space make it impossible for me to express my gratitude individually to all those who have so kindly aided me in my work, I must voice my appreciation to them collectively for their valuable assistance in the preparation of the study. Justice requires that I acknowledge my indebtedness specifically, however, to Mr. Tyler Dennett of the Division of Publications of the Department of State for permission to secure access to certain diplomatic correspondence of the intervention period; to Mr. Robert F. Kelley of the Division of Eastern European Affairs for giving me so generously of his time and energy in going through such correspondence; to Mr. E. C. Ropes of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce of the Department of Commerce for customs house statistics on Russian-American trade; to Professor Quincy Wright and Professor Samuel N. Harper of the University of Chicago for their painstaking reading of the original draft of the manuscript and for their invaluable criticisms; to Mr. Arthur Fisher of Chicago for suggestions leading to its publication; and to International Publishers for numerous proposals for additions and revisions which have served to make the book much more accurate and complete than it might otherwise have been.

In view of the extremely controversial nature of the subject matter, it is particularly important to emphasize that none of the persons named is in any way responsible for the method of treatment adopted or the conclusions reached. The narrative of the Allied and American interventions in Russia from 1918 to 1920 may be amplified in later years when all of the diplomatic correspondence of the period becomes available to scholars. The author believes, however, that no substantial alterations of the story will be necessitated by such additional material. The discussion of such topics as the legality of intervention, the validity of the Soviet counterclaims against the United States, the expediency of non-recognition of the Soviet Government as a means of achieving the goals of American diplomacy in dealing with Russia, the significance of Communist propaganda and the relationship between non-recognition and the development of trade is admittedly at variance with the views of many who have read the manuscript. The conclusions reached on these and other topics are peculiarly the author's own and must stand or fall on their own merits. Those who have offered assistance and suggestions have unquestionably contributed to whatever degree of completeness and accuracy the work may possess. But the author must accept sole responsibility for all errors of fact and mistakes of interpretation that may be found in the pages that follow.

It is the author's sincere hope that this volume may make some small contribution to a better understanding of a much-muddled issue of contemporary statecraft and to the attainment of clearer thinking and more sympathetic appreciation in the relations between the two largest and most populous white nations of the earth.

FREDERICK LEWIS SCHUMAN.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
May 2, 1928.

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To
MY MOTHER

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA SINCE 1917

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CHAPTER ONE

THE TRADITION OF RUSSIAN-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP

1. Early Relations to 1861

In the formulation of foreign policy the influence of the past always plays an important rôle. Relatively constant conditions of geographical situation, economic intercourse, and political relationships have established in every modern State certain enduring traditions and patterns of action toward other members of the family of nations which are modified but slowly by the changing complexion of domestic politics. Among the principles of American foreign policy that developed early in the country's history the tradition of friendship toward Russia holds a prominent position. The significance of many features of the policies which the United States has pursued toward Russia since the Revolution can be appreciated only in the light of the past contacts of the two countries. A general survey of Russian-American relations from their beginning should reveal not only the origin and evolution of the tradition of friendship, but other historical factors as well which have shaped the course of recent events.

It is one of the singular coincidences of history that in the early years of American national existence Russia was the last of the Great Powers to recognize the new revolutionary government of the United States, just as the United States, a century and a half later, was to be the last of the Great Powers to recognize the new revolutionary government of Russia. In their search for friends on the European continent in the anxious years following 1776 the rebellious subjects of King George III entertained little hope of aid or sympathy from the realm of the Tsars.[1] The "armed neutrality" proclaimed by the Empress Catherine in March, 1780, in championship of the liberal principles of neutral rights, was, to be sure, of indirect benefit to the American cause. It encouraged the Continental

Congress to appoint as Minister to Russia Francis Dana of Massachusetts, with instructions to "engage her Imperial Majesty to favor and support the sovereignty and independence of the United States" and to propose a treaty of amity and commerce which should be "founded on principles of equality and reciprocity and for the mutual advantage of both nations and agreeable to the spirit of the treaties existing between the United States and France." [2]

But in consequence of French intrigues and of the desire of the Russian Government to retain English friendship, Dana was refused a reception and returned home in disgust after cooling his heels for two years at St. Petersburg.[3] Despite various informal contacts, official diplomatic relations were not entered into by the two governments until 1809, thirty-three years after the Declaration of Independence. In June of that year André Daschkoff, Russian Consul General at Philadelphia, was received by President Madison, who in turn appointed John Quincy Adams as the American representative at the Russian capital.[4] Adams was well received and at once began negotiations over the limit of the Russian possessions on the northwest coast of North America as well as over the projected commercial treaty.[5]

In June of 1812 the United States declared war upon England and Napoleon declared war upon Russia. That the United States should thus become involved in hostilities with Russia's new ally in the struggle against France was a source of great regret and apprehension to the Russian Government. In September Romanzoff, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, asked Adams whether the United States would object to an offer of Russian mediation to end the Anglo-American conflict. Adams said he believed not and after further conversations Secretary of State Monroe informed Daschkoff that the offer would be accepted. In the following April President Madison named Albert Gallatin, J. Q. Adams and J. A. Bayard as envoys to conclude a treaty of peace with England under Russian mediation and to negotiate a treaty of commerce with Russia. But again the American action was premature. England rejected the Russian offer in July and the American commissioners in St. Petersburg found themselves as embarrassed as Dana had been long before. The Russian Government refused to accept the British rejection as final and encouraged the Americans to remain in the hope of eventual success. With the fall of Napoleon in 1814, however, Russian interest in Anglo-American peace waned and the War of 1812 was brought to a close by direct negotiations in which Russia played no

part. "The Russian project of mediation had turned out to be a bitter disappointment for the American Government. Its policy of looking to Russia to protect the interests of the United States had proved a failure." [6]

But the government at Washington concealed its chagrin and continued to regard Russia as a friend. In the spring of 1815 Daschkoff intimated that he had at last been authorized to conclude a commercial treaty. But with strange fatality misfortune still pursued the plan. The arrest of Kosloff, Russian Consul General in Philadelphia, on a charge of rape, precipitated an acrimonious controversy over consular immunity which led Daschkoff to take the extreme step of severing diplomatic relations in October, 1816. The offending consul was released, but Russia contended that reparation was due for the alleged breach of international law in his arrest. The United States argued that a consul was not entitled to diplomatic immunity in the case of offenses against local laws. The dispute was finally settled in November by an exchange of notes, Russia accepting the American view.[7]

The incident had little effect on Russian-American friendship, and William Pinkney, the new American Minister, was warmly received the following year. But hope of a commercial treaty was for a time abandoned. The diplomatic problems of the period centered rather about Russian encroachments southward on the Pacific coast and the revolting Spanish colonies of Latin America. Russia had recently sold a squadron to Spain and was determined to prevent the adoption by Great Britain and the United States of a common policy toward Latin America in opposition to the Holy Alliance. In June, 1819, Daschkoff's successor, Poletica, went so far as to suggest that the Tsar wished the United States to join the Holy Alliance. But both Secretary of State Adams and President Monroe were of the opinion that the United States could contribute more effectively to its great and sublime objects by refraining from direct participation. The invitation was not pressed.[8] In the following year, in response to an American request, the Tsar settled by arbitration, in favor of the United States, a dispute with Great Britain over the meaning of Article I of the Treaty of Ghent, which had concluded the War of 1812. The article provided for the reciprocal return of all territory occupied during hostilities, including all slaves and other property found thereon. Great Britain resisted the American claims to compensation for slaves carried off by British troops during the war. The Tsar's award, given in April, 1822, was entirely favorable

to the United States. Increasing friction with England led the Russian Government to cultivate American friendship once more. In September, 1821, the American Minister, Middleton, was approached with the renewed suggestion of a commercial treaty, and with hints of the desirability of the United States maintaining naval forces in the Mediterranean and the Baltic Seas. Monroe was receptive, but Adams opposed the bargain and the proposal was dropped once more.[9]

Meanwhile the controversy over the Russian possessions in the northwest approached a crisis. In 1821 the Tsar renewed the charter of the Russian-American Company and granted Russian subjects exclusive fishing and trading rights along the American coast as far south as 51° North Latitude, foreign vessels being forbidden to approach within 100 Italian miles of the shore. Adams at once protested, but Poletica replied that the Russian claims were modest, since earlier explorations gave Russia jurisdiction down to 49° and the North Pacific Ocean might be regarded as a closed Russian sea in view of the Russian territory on both shores north of the fifty-first parallel. Adams rejoined that the United States could grant neither of these contentions; Russian territory did not extend to 51° and the North Pacific Ocean was open sea with the shores 4,000 miles apart at the 51° line.[10] His purpose was to keep the region open to American traders in the face of Russian attempts to enforce the monopoly granted to the Russian-American Company. Great Britain had also protested and the Tsar's government seemed disposed to yield. This dispute, coupled with the continued threat of European intervention in Latin America, led to Monroe's memorable message of December 2, 1823, in which he asserted that the American continents were no longer to be considered subject to European colonization and expressed the opposition of the United States to attempts at European "interposition" or extension of the European "political system" in the New World. The American Minister, Middleton, finally concluded with the Russian Foreign Minister, Nesselrode, a "Convention as to the Pacific Ocean and Northwest Coast of North America," signed on April 17, 1824.

This convention, the first formal agreement concluded between the two nations, represented a diplomatic victory for the United States. It provided for reciprocal freedom of navigation, fishing and trading with the natives inhabiting the coasts of the Pacific Ocean and fixed the line of 54° 40′ as the northern limit of American colonization.[11] It thus brought to an amicable conclusion a dispute

that might easily have become very serious. Adams had been unyielding in his opposition both to the project of a reconquest of the Spanish colonies by the Holy Alliance and to Russian claims in the northwest. The controversy had given rise to one of the most significant declarations in the history of American foreign policy. Complete success was achieved, due in part to the fact that Great Britain was pursuing the same objectives.

A few years later there took place what had seemed almost impossible in view of fifty years of failure in the past—the signature of a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. This agreement was signed on December 18, 1832, and ratified early in the following year.

In the name of the Most Holy and indivisible Trinity:

The United States of America and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, equally animated with the desire of maintaining the relations of good understanding, which have hitherto so happily subsisted between their respective States, and of extending and consolidating the commercial intercourse between them, have agreed to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty of navigation and commerce. For which purpose the President of the United States has conferred full powers on James Buchanan their Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary near His Imperial Majesty; and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias has conferred like powers on the Sieur Charles Robert Count de Nesselrode, His Vice-Chancellor, Knight of the Orders of Russia, and of many others, etc.; and the said Plenipotentiaries, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have concluded and signed the following articles:

Article I

There shall be between the territories of the high contracting parties, a reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation. The inhabitants of their respective States shall mutually have liberty to enter the ports, places, and rivers of the territories of each party, wherever foreign commerce is permitted. They shall be at liberty to sojourn and reside in all parts whatsoever of said territories, in order to attend to their affairs, and they shall enjoy, to that effect, the same security and protection as natives of the country wherein they reside, on condition of their submitting to the laws and ordinances there prevailing, and particularly to the regulations in force concerning commerce.

This first article of the treaty was the only one which later gave rise to serious controversy. The treaty as a whole was not unlike the usual type of commercial treaty concluded by the United States at this period. Vessels were to be treated as national vessels as regards tonnage duties and on a most favored nation basis as regards all other charges (Article II). No "other or higher duties or

charges" were to be imposed by either country on imports or exports conveyed in vessels of the other than on the same goods conveyed in its own vessels (Articles III-V). No other or higher duty was to be imposed by either party on imports coming from the other than was payable on like imports from other foreign countries (Article VI). Provisions were made for the maintenance of consuls, vice-consuls and commercial agents who were to be given the customary authority over disputes on their national vessels (Articles VIII-IX). The rights of the nationals of each country to dispose of property in the other were guaranteed (Article X). Article XI contained the usual conditional most-favored-nation clause. Article XII extended the treaty to the Kingdom of Poland, provided that it was to be operative until January 1, 1839, and allowed termination thereafter by one year's notification. An additional separate article recognized that the special commercial arrangements between Russia on the one hand and Prussia, Sweden and Norway on the other would not constitute a basis for claims of equivalent privileges between the contracting parties.[12]

The treaty of 1832 long remained satisfactory to both nations. Under its provisions commerce flourished and cordial relations were uninterrupted. There were, in fact, almost no causes for friction between the two countries. They were geographically isolated and trod divergent paths in the jungle of *Weltpolitik* which nowhere brought them into opposition. Russian expansionist ambitions in the Near East inflamed anew the conflict with Great Britain and in so far as Anglo-phobia remained a factor of importance in American foreign policy this tended to strengthen the ties between Russia and the United States. Common hostility toward Great Britain must indeed be regarded as the determining consideration in the perpetuation of the somewhat curious cordiality between two nations so distant and so different in all respects. When the clash of rival imperialisms flamed into open hostilities in 1854, with Great Britain, France and Sardinia coming to the assistance of Turkey against Russian aggression, American sympathies inclined toward the Slav cause. The Crimean War furnished the occasion for the conclusion of a third formal agreement between the two countries, a "Convention as to the Rights of Neutrals at Sea," signed at Washington, July 22, 1854, by Secretary of State Marcy and the Russian chargé, Stoekl. It briefly recognized as "permanent and immutable" the principles that "free ships make free goods" and that "the property of neutrals on board an enemy's vessel is not subject to confiscation

unless the same be contraband of war."[13] It thus anticipated by two years the Declaration of Paris, though it contained no provisions regarding privateers or blockade. The Declaration drawn up by the Plenipotentiaries who signed the Treaty of Paris closing the war was not adhered to by the United States because it failed to exempt all private property at sea from capture, but in 1898 the United States announced that it would follow the rules which the Declaration prescribed.

2. The Civil War and the Alaska Purchase

By 1860, then, the threads of the tradition of friendship had been spun. The events of the next decade were to weave them firmly into the fabric of American foreign policy. That Russia, still smarting from the wounds of the recent combat, should sympathize with the cause of the Union in the American Civil War in proportion as Great Britain and France sympathized with the Confederacy was a natural consequence of the relationships of the past. Tsar Alexander II made his sentiments known at once and never wavered from them during the struggle.[14] In November, 1862, Napoleon III proposed to Great Britain and Russia that a joint tender of good offices be made to the belligerents. Both the British and the Russian Governments rejected the suggestion.[15] The former, however, had aroused a new wave of resentment throughout the North by its recognition of southern belligerency and by the evident sympathy of the English ruling classes for the South. Hostility was increased by dark hints of intervention, by the *Trent* affair and by the destruction of northern commerce at the hands of Confederate war vessels, like the *Alabama,* constructed in Great Britain.[16] At St. Petersburg the loss of American commerce was lamented. The emancipation of the Russian serfs in 1863 may perhaps have produced some sympathy for the anti-slavery cause in America. The Russian Government chafed under the irksome bonds imposed by the Treaty of Paris and feared possible British, French and Austrian intervention in favor of its own rebels, the Poles, in 1863. Secretary of State Seward's refusal to join in the international protests against Russian atrocities in Poland doubtless was appreciated in the Russian capital. In any case, Russia definitely aligned herself with the North and throughout 1862 repeatedly expressed her friendship for the Union.[17]

In September, 1863, when the future seemed dark and it was felt that the threats of European intervention would soon materialize,

Russian friendship was manifested in so dramatic a manner that it lingered long in American memory. On September 11 a Russian squadron under Admiral Popoff appeared in San Francisco and on the 24th another under Admiral Lessoffsky put in at New York with alleged "sealed instructions" to assist the Union should Great Britain and France take hostile action.[18] The fleets may have come to find a safe winter haven in neutral ports to escape being bottled up at home in the event of a recrudescence of Anglo-Russian conflict. The content, and even the existence, of the "sealed instructions" remains doubtful. But in the United States the visits were hailed with grateful rejoicing as a clear indication that at least one Power of Europe, and that one an old friend, was prepared to stand by the Union. Lessoffsky and his colleagues were wined and dined far into the following year and expressions of appreciation and of eternal affection between the two nations were profuse.[19] The legend which grew up about this incident was no less potent for being somewhat at variance with the facts. Henceforth the earlier ties of friendship were to be reinforced with the bond of gratitude.[20] In 1866 the escape of Alexander II from assassination by a revolutionist furnished the occasion for a return visit. Congress passed a resolution of congratulation which was dispatched to Russia in one of the nation's new war vessels, the monitor *Miantonomah*. The mission was headed by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Gustavus Vasa Fox, who spent August and early September traveling through the Tsar's domains and encountering everywhere evidence of warm regard for the United States in the form of banquets, receptions and rich gifts and honors of all kinds.[21]

The Alaska purchase closely followed these events. The transaction had been proposed as long ago as the outbreak of the Crimean War as a means of preventing the territory from falling to Great Britain. In 1859 the Russian Minister, Stoekl, had been approached by Senator Gwin of California and the Assistant Secretary of State with an offer of $5,000,000.[22] The Russian Government had been reluctant to sell, but the impending bankruptcy of the Russian-American Company and the needs of the State Treasury, as well as a possible desire to embarrass Great Britain, led to a favorable decision. Stoekl was instructed to effect the sale and so informed Seward on the evening of March 29, 1867. The Secretary of State at once put aside his whist game and insisted that the treaty be negotiated immediately. At 4 o'clock on the following morning the convention was signed and sealed.[23]

By its terms the Emperor agreed to cede to the United States "all the territory and dominion now possessed by his said Majesty on the continent of America and in the adjacent islands," as defined in Article I. "In consideration of the cession aforesaid, the United States agree to pay at the Treasury in Washington, within ten months after the exchange of the ratifications of this convention, to the diplomatic representative or other agent of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, duly authorized to receive the same, seven million two hundred thousand dollars in gold." (Article VI.) [24]

Numerous theories have been advanced concerning the determining motives on both sides in this transaction. The old bond of friendship—common hostility toward England—was certainly one consideration. Seward believed that Russia, like the first Napoleon, was stripping for a new war with Great Britain.[25] He spoke of the purchase as the first step toward the acquisition of Canada, as well as of the Hawaiian Islands and of naval bases on the Asiatic coast, and the Russian Government was not indisposed to look at the matter in this light.[26] Many Americans regarded the territory as worthless, but were won over to its purchase by the reflection that the price was payment for the friendship Russia had displayed during the Civil War. There is, in fact, some evidence to indicate that the transaction may have been part of a definite bargain and that $5,800,000 of the purchase price was a quid pro quo for the naval demonstration of 1863.[27] Whether such was the case or not, the Russian Government was well pleased with its bargain and Seward was not the man to turn a deaf ear to the call of "manifest destiny." [28]

3. Routine Negotiations; the Russo-Japanese War

From 1868 to 1914 no less than nine Russian-American treaties or conventions were concluded, as compared with a total of four prior to that date. This number is smaller than the number of agreements entered into with most of the nations of western Europe, but it is significant of the growing contacts between the two nations during the period. Five of the agreements related to commercial problems and had little or no political significance. Of these, three were designed to protect trade marks. In 1868 Stoekl and Seward signed an additional article to the treaty of 1832 for the purpose of prohibiting the counterfeiting in each country trade marks issued in the other.[29] This article was rendered more effective by a further

declaration of 1874 by which each government pledged itself to accord the same trade mark protection to citizens of the other as it accorded to its own.[80] An exchange of notes in 1900 extended these provisions to the consular courts of the two powers in China.[81] A declaration of 1884 regulated the admeasurement of vessels for the purpose of levying navigation dues.[82] Finally, in 1904, an agreement was concluded by which the legal existence of corporations and stock companies organized in one country was recognized in the courts of the other.[83] The Extradition Convention of 1887 was not unlike most extradition treaties, providing for the reciprocal surrender of persons convicted of, or charged with, specified crimes. Political offenses were declared non-extraditable, with the exception of attempts against the life of the head of either government, comprising murder, assassination or poisoning.[84]

The three remaining agreements of the period related to the fur-seal fisheries in the Behring Sea, around which revolved a long international controversy. The United States had early attempted to extend its legislation, designed to protect the fisheries, to all of the Behring Sea east of the line described in the Alaska purchase convention. When Great Britain protested at the seizure of Canadian vessels beyond the three-mile limit, Secretary of State Blaine contended that Russia had previously exercised jurisdiction over the entire sea and that it constituted part of the territorial waters of Alaska.[85] In reply Lord Salisbury simply cited Adam's successful protest at the Russian ukase of 1821. A modus vivendi was at length reached in 1891 by which seal fishing in the Behring Sea east of the 1867 line was prohibited by both governments.[86] The award of the arbitration tribunal, set up to pass upon the British claims for damages, was entirely favorable to the British view, but recommended articles of regulation for the protection of the seal herds which both governments accepted and enforced.[87]

Meanwhile Russia had been treating American vessels encountered in the western portion of the Behring Sea much as the United States had treated Canadian vessels in the eastern portion. The resulting dispute led to the signature of a modus vivendi in 1894 by which the United States agreed to prohibit its citizens from hunting fur-seals within a zone of ten nautical miles along the Russian coasts and within a zone of thirty nautical miles around Tulienew Island and the Komandorsky Islands. In return Russia agreed to limit the number of seals to be taken in 1894 on the coasts of the islands named to 300,000.[88] By the terms of the claims protocol signed at

St. Petersburg in August, 1900, the American claims for damages arising out of the Russian seizures of 1892 and 1893 were submitted to the arbitration of Mr. T. M. C. Asser, a member of the Council of State of the Netherlands. The award, handed down in 1900, granted over $100,000 to the various claimants.[39]

No satisfactory solution of the problem was reached until 1911, by which time most of the seals had been exterminated. In that year a joint convention was signed at Washington by representatives of the United States, Great Britain, Russia and Japan which bound all of the Powers to prohibit their citizens or subjects from engaging in pelagic sealing in any portion of the North Pacific Ocean north of 30° North Latitude. Various detailed provisions for the protection of the fisheries followed, including the payment by each of the powers to the others of stipulated percentages of the annual yield of the fisheries within its own jurisdiction.[40]

It is obvious that all of these agreements grew out of problems in the contacts between Russia and the United States which involved few of the larger stakes of diplomacy. They were without measurable significance in the realm of *realpolitik*. From the point of view of political relations in the narrower sense of the term, the course of developments in eastern Asia was of much greater importance. Here there seemed to be a growing danger of a clash of national interests between the traditional friends. The onward march of "the bear that walks like a man" was disturbing to Washington as it was to London and Tokio, though in lesser degree, since the United States, unlike Great Britain and Japan, had no imperial domain or spheres of influence to be menaced by Russian ambitions. The American Government, champion of the "open door" and of the territorial integrity and administrative entity of China, viewed with increasing apprehension the pressure of Russian imperialism upon the Celestial Empire. Repeated Russian promises to withdraw, which never materialized, contributed to the unfavorable impression created in the United States.[41] As a consequence, American sympathies were almost wholly with Japan when the latter country challenged the Russian giant to combat in Manchuria.

At the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War early in 1904, American representatives in Russia, at the request of Japan and with the consent of the Russian Government, undertook to protect Japan's interests there after she had withdrawn her own diplomatic and consular agents.[42] The American Government issued a declaration of neutrality soon after the commencement of hostilities, but Japan felt

assured that it would be a "benevolent neutrality." [43] President Roosevelt was especially anxious that the occasion should not be used by the European powers for the long-expected partition of China. The German Kaiser scented from afar an Anglo-French conspiracy to bring about this result through intervention in favor of Russia and it was apparently at his suggestion that Roosevelt took preventive action.[44] In February, 1904, Secretary of State Hay invited Germany, Great Britain and France to join the United States in urging both belligerents to recognize Chinese neutrality.[45] Japan assented, but Russia excepted Manchuria, which was in fact the scene of hostilities. In January, 1905, Russia informed the United States that she would be compelled to consider Chinese neutrality "from the standpoint of her own interests" since China was not actually neutral. But Hay warned her against any rash action and in a circular note expressed the hope that the war would not eventuate in any "concession of Chinese territory to neutral powers." Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy and Great Britain agreed to this principle and the danger seemed past.[46] Roosevelt would evidently have been willing to give Japan his full support in the event of European intervention on the side of Russia.[47]

Since the war was proving very costly to Japan and utterly disastrous to Russia, Roosevelt extended his good offices to both governments in June, 1905, in an effort to secure peace.[48] This action was taken at the request of Japan.[49] The Kaiser had informed Roosevelt that he feared for the life of the Tsar if the revolutionary movement in Russia should develop further as a result of the continuation of the war, and that he had urged his fellow sovereign to appeal for peace through the President of the United States.[50] The danger of revolution in Russia, however, was not an important consideration in Roosevelt's mind, though it is clear that he had no sympathy toward the rebels. The assassination of the Grand Duke Sergius, Governor-General of Moscow, evoked an expression of condolence and abhorrence from the United States.[51] Roosevelt felt that Russia was "cursed almost as much by her reformers as by her oppressors." [52] His mediation in the war was motivated primarily by a desire to preserve the balance of power in the Far East. His object was to end hostilities before Japan had driven Russia entirely out of eastern Asia.[53]

Both belligerents accepted the American offer and on August 10 negotiations were opened at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, between Count Witte and Baron Rosen, the Russian Ambassador at Wash-

ington, on the one hand, and Baron Komura and Mr. Takahira, the Japanese Minister, on the other. Japan, flushed with victory, demanded cessions of territory and an indemnity which Russia was little disposed to yield. The problem of peace, therefore, was to secure a diminution of the Japanese claims. As difficulties multiplied, Roosevelt took a hand himself, appealing to Japan, "in the name of all that is noble and lofty," not to demand a seven-billion-dollar indemnity and not to renew the war for money.[54] He urged the Tsar to cede the southern half of the island of Sakhalin to Japan and to make a money payment in lieu of an indemnity for retaining the northern half. Witte, however, refused to hear of a money payment of any kind and a crisis was reached on August 29. But since Japan was in no financial position to continue to conflict, Komura at length yielded.[55] By the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed September 5, 1905, Japan gained southern Sakhalin and the Liaotung leases, including Port Arthur, and secured recognition of her dominant position in Korea. Both parties agreed to evacuate Manchuria and to recognize the "open door" in China. Russia retained northern Sakhalin and paid no indemnity.

Roosevelt's diplomacy thus achieved its objects. The terms of the peace caused great disappointment in Japan and aroused considerable resentment against the United States. The Russians accepted them as the best way out of a bad situation. At the beginning of the struggle American sympathies had been with Russia's enemy and it seemed that the tradition might be destroyed. At its close Russian-American relations were once more cordial and the Tsar's Government felt quite grateful to the American President. This new friendship might have continued long had it not been for another and very different source of controversy, seemingly trivial in itself but significant of a growing gulf between the nations.

4. The Tradition in Difficulties

In the latter part of 1867 the Russian Government had rejected the draft of a naturalization convention proposed by Seward on the ground that it was its policy to forbid the return of such of its subjects as chose to abandon its protection and escape from their allegiance by becoming naturalized abroad. Russia thus denied the right of her subjects to expatriate themselves and Seward's arguments were unavailing. She also refused to waive her claim to military service from subjects who had emigrated and held them

liable on their return. American citizens of Russian origin revisiting their native land thus frequently found themselves detained and proceeded against. Russian laws forbidding Jews to enter Russia without permission caused additional difficulties. Repeated American protests were disregarded. In the '80's Russian official oppression of the Jews caused much concern in the United States, reflected in new diplomatic representations.[56] In 1887 the United States definitely challenged Russia's right to punish, for the mere act of expatriation, returning subjects who had become American citizens, contending that this was a violation of the treaty of 1832, but the government at St. Petersburg persistently adhered to its illiberal position.[57]

By 1900 these disputes, coupled with the growing influx of Jewish immigrants and exiled revolutionists, all hating the autocracy from which they had fled, had done much to produce in the United States a widespread unfavorable opinion of Russian political institutions and ideals. The books and articles of such observers as George Kennan had revealed the brutalities of tyrannical oppression systematized in the Siberian exile system. The million and a half Russian immigrants who entered the United States between 1900 and 1910 brought further enlightenment as to the character of the Tsarist régime. Many of these were prevented from ever revisiting their kinsmen in the fatherland by virtue of their being Jews. American protests and proposals to amend the treaty of 1832 were alike in vain, for anti-Semitism was the handmaiden of Russian autocracy and not to be lightly cast aside to suit foreign fancies. The Kishenev pogrom of 1903 horrified many Americans. The government at Washington went so far as to ask publicly whether financial aid and supplies from American Jews would be permitted to reach the suffering survivors of the massacre. The offer was curtly declined and the Russian press fumed with indignation.[58]

In the United States, moreover, Jewish citizens in increasing numbers began to demand the abrogation of the treaty of 1832 on the ground that the discrimination practiced against members of their faith by the Russian Government was a direct violation of its first article. This discrimination took the form of the refusal of Russian agents in the United States to visé American passports for Jewish citizens desiring to visit Russia. Public agitation over "the passport question" grew rapidly. The State Department for the most part continued to protest at the Russian position, though in 1907 Secretary of State Elihu Root displayed a disposition to acquiesce in the

discrimination. His attitude produced such a storm of criticism that he felt obliged to modify it the following year. At the same time the American Jewish Committee petitioned President Roosevelt for the abrogation of the treaty. Numerous petitions, mass meetings and resolutions in state legislatures and in Congress showed plainly the wide extent to which public feeling had been aroused by the issue.[59]

Early in 1911 a number of resolutions were introduced in Congress calling upon the President to denounce the treaty on the ground that Russia had violated it by discriminating against one category of American citizens. When Congress reassembled in December the House of Representatives passed such a resolution by a vote of 301 to 1. The debates of the period reviewed the arguments which had been current for thirty years. It was contended that Article I of the treaty was general in terms and admitted of no discriminations of any kind. The compact, it was insisted, was no longer responsive to the needs and principles of the two countries. The Russian doctrine of indefeasible allegiance was declared an anachronism, long repudiated by the United States. It was argued, moreover, that the United States could not constitutionally acquiesce in a treaty permitting a foreign power to make religious or racial discriminations between its citizens which it had no power to make itself.[60] The report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to accompany the resolution was couched in much the same terms. The question was declared to be not a Jewish one, but an "American" one. Since all protests had been in vain, no course remained but to abrogate the treaty.[61] In the course of the hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Louis Marshall, Meyer Sulzberger and Oscar S. Straus urged that public opinion, as well as every consideration of national honor and human right, demanded abrogation.[62]

From the legal point of view it seems clear that a nation cannot be held to have surrendered its sovereign right to exclude whom it will by an implication from a treaty article. Russia cited American exclusion of Mongolians, polygamists and anarchists as an analogy to her own exclusion of Jews and contended that the treaty did not entitle Americans to treatment any different from that which Russia accorded to her own subjects. But it was equally clear that Congress was determined that the treaty must go. President Taft desired that the method of abrogation should give no offense to the Russian Government. He consequently abrogated the compact politely after an offensive resolution had passed the House and was on the point of passing the Senate.[63] On December 15 the Secretary

of State telegraphed to the American ambassador at St. Petersburg the text of a note to be handed to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs which informed him that in accordance with Article XII of the treaty it should cease to be operative after January 1, 1913:

> Under instructions from my Government and in pursuance of conversations held by the Secretary of State with the Russian ambassador at Washington, I have now the honor to give to the Imperial Russian Government, on behalf of the United States, the official notification contemplated by Article XII of the treaty of 1832, whereby the operation of the said treaty will terminate in accordance with its terms on January 1, 1913.
>
> Your excellency will recall that pourparlers between the two Governments during the last three years have fully recognized the fact that this ancient treaty, as is quite natural, is no longer fully responsive in various respects to the needs of the political and material relations of the two countries, which grow constantly more important. The treaty has also given rise from time to time to certain controversies equally regretted by both Governments.
>
> In conveying the present formal notification to your excellency I am instructed to express the desire of my Government, meanwhile, to renew the effort to negotiate a modern treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation upon bases more perfectly responsive to the interests of both Governments. I am directed by the President at the same time to emphasize the great value attached by the Government of the United States to the historic relations between the two countries, and the desire of my Government to spare no effort to make the outcome of the proposed negotiations contribute still further to the strength and cordiality of these relations.[64]


This note was presented to Sazonoff on December 17. The joint resolution finally passed by Congress on December 21 simply "adopted and ratified" the notice of termination already given.[65] The Russian Government, while not perhaps very greatly displeased at the termination of the treaty,[66] attributed the abrogation to Jewish influence and keenly resented the hostility displayed toward it in the American press and in Congress.[67]

In the face of such a conflict as this the continued vitality of the traditional friendship of the nations was obviously endangered. In the course of the agitation preceding abrogation attempts had been made to show that the commonly accepted idea of Russian friendship for the United States had no historical foundation. In so far as the events of 1911 were an expression of widely held sentiments in the United States they clearly showed that American public opinion regarded the Russian Government no longer with gratitude and cordiality but with indifference and dislike. The Chief Executive and

the Department of State, under both the Taft and the Wilson Administrations, showed no disposition to truckle to this feeling. But the damage was done and the pained surprise and anger which had greeted the abrogation in Russian official circles remained a barrier to the conclusion of a new treaty and the restoration of amicable relations.

It appears probable that such a break must inevitably have come sooner or later as a consequence of the antagonistic political philosophies of the two countries. Conflicting theories and practices of government have not, it is true, been an obstacle to international friendships where powerful political and economic forces have drawn nations together for common purposes, as is shown by the long alliance of Tsarist Russia and republican France. But Russian-American friendship was no longer dictated by the exigencies of world politics. In its origin it had been in a large measure due to common hostility toward Great Britain. But in both countries that hostility had waned and the early bond of union disappeared. Continued cordiality was rendered difficult by the complete dissimilarity of the culture and institutions of the two nations. Alike in the possession of huge area and population, as well as of vast resources, the two largest white nations were politically and socially at opposite poles and quite incapable of mutual understanding and sympathetic insight. When this estrangement became an open breach, the hollowness of the old tradition was revealed and friendship gave way to acrimonious criticism and recriminations.

A firmly grounded tradition, however, frequently possesses a vitality which endures long after its raison d'être has vanished. In the coming years of war and revolution the tradition of Russian-American friendship was to reveal itself as a still powerful force in the control of American foreign policy. In the storm and stress of unprecedented friction and conflict it remained, if not a beacon light, at least a lantern in the darkness. But these are anticipations.



CHAPTER TWO

THE MARCH REVOLUTION; RELATIONS WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

1. The Great War and the Fall of the Romanoffs

WHEN war broke out in the early days of August, 1914, between the Triple Entente and the Central Powers, the government of Nicholas II found the United States not only officially neutral but generally indifferent to its cause. The American nation gazed upon the titanic conflict with surprise and fascinated horror, but it knew little of the forces which had produced the catastrophe. Neither did it observe anything in the war aims of the Tsar to enlist its sympathy or support. The friendly sentiments toward the Entente which soon manifested themselves were directed toward Belgium, France and Great Britain rather than toward autocratic Russia.

Official negotiations between the two governments during the period of American neutrality were of little importance. The Allied blockade of the Central Powers and the German submarine campaign gravely affected American commerce and gave rise to long controversies with Great Britain and Germany. But Russia, by virtue of her geographical position and naval weakness, found her two western "windows," the Baltic and Black Seas, closed by the enemy. Since she was thus shut off from the customary channels of commerce, there was little occasion for disputes with the United States or other neutrals. Two new agreements with the United States were concluded during the period, however. The first, with unconscious irony, was a "Treaty for the Advancement of Peace," signed at Washington on October 1, 1914, by Secretary of State Bryan and the last ambassador of the Tsars to the United States, George Bakhmeteff. In form and substance this was identical with the numerous treaties concluded by the United States in the same year, providing for the submission of all disputes not amicably settled by diplomacy to a Permanent International Commission set up by the contracting parties.[1] The second agreement, signed September 23, 1915, established a system of applications and licenses to insure that only such importations from Russia to the United States could take place as the Russian Government approved.[2]

Russia, like the other belligerents, turned to American finance and industry to supply her war needs. In view of the blockade of her western ports, much of the goods which Russia purchased in the United States had to be sent across the Pacific to Vladivostok. This commerce attained a considerable volume, though it was never comparable to the enormous flow of foodstuffs and war supplies which poured across the Atlantic to the western Allies. The following figures show the growth in the volume of Russian-American trade during the war years.[3]

	American Exports to Russia	*American Imports from Russia*
1913.....	$26,909,707	$24,377,070
1914.....	27,956,337	14,569,397
1915.....	169,933,904	3,086,595
1916.....	470,508,254	8,618,695

The Russian Government also followed the example of its allies in turning to American money markets for funds. On May 1, 1915, it offered a bond issue of $10,200,000 at 5 per cent to mature in one year, through the National City Bank of New York. These bonds were renewed for one year and redeemed. A second issue, appearing on February 14, 1916, to run for ten years at 5½ per cent, was part of a two-billion-ruble loan. Of this amount, approximately eleven million dollars' worth of bonds was purchased in the United States. In April, 1916, an issue of $11,000,000 was offered, identical in terms with the first. This issue was likewise renewed for one year and was redeemed to the amount of $10,200,000. The largest issue was that offered June 18, 1916, by J. P. Morgan and Company and the National City Bank. It ran for three years at 6½ per cent and totalled $50,000,000. A final loan of $50,000,000 was offered December 1, 1916, for five years at 5½ per cent by the same syndicate, but of this issue only $25,000,000 was purchased, the syndicate retaining the option on the remainder.[4] American investors therefore held about $86,000,000 worth of unredeemed Russian Government war bonds when the old régime came to an end.

Meanwhile fresh attempts were made to negotiate a new commercial treaty. David R. Francis (1850-1927), last American ambassador to the Tsar of all the Russias, was appointed in March, 1916, with instructions to conclude an agreement to replace the abrogated instrument of 1832.[5] Francis's public career had followed his establishment as a successful grain merchant and banker in

St. Louis, Missouri. He had served as mayor of that city from 1885 to 1889, as Governor of Missouri from 1889 to 1893, as Secretary of the Interior in Cleveland's cabinet in 1896 and 1897 and as President of the International Exposition held at St. Louis in 1903.[6] To his great disappointment, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonoff, took the position that no more treaties could be concluded until Russia's relations with her allies were more clearly defined and determined.[7] But as a good business man Francis resolved to do all in his power to stimulate Russian-American commerce without a treaty. So assiduous were his efforts in this direction that the Secretary of State felt obliged to warn him, as he expressed it, that he "had too keen a scent for commerce to make an ideal diplomat." But such insinuations only amused him and had no effect upon his plans.[8]

While Ambassador Francis pursued the will-o-the-wisp of trade the last troubled days of the Romanoff dynasty drew to a close. The crushing military defeats of 1915 and 1916 shattered the morale of the nation and dissipated the apparent patriotic unity of the early days of the Great War. Criticism of the incompetence and disloyalty of the bureaucracy was answered by stern repression. The assassination of the sinister monk, Rasputin, tool of the reactionary and perhaps pro-German "dark forces" at work in the Court, effected little change. Beaten, bleeding and stunned by its appalling losses, the country groaned under its burdens. The breakdown of the railroads in the winter of 1916-1917 created famine in the cities, which led to food riots, strikes and bitter popular resentment. When the government, on March 11, 1917, prorogued the Duma and ordered the striking workers of Petrograd back to work, it met with defiance which its own troops refused to suppress. While the revolutionary masses of the capital made short work of the agents of the old order, the local Council or Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, organized by the Socialist leaders of the toilers and troops of the garrison, conferred with a committee of the Duma. On March 15 Nicholas II announced the abdication of his throne to an astonished world and a "Provisional Government" was created, pending the summoning of a Constituent Assembly. The new cabinet was headed by Prince Lvoff and was composed largely of the leaders of the middle class, liberal party groups, with one representative of the more moderate Socialists in the person of Alexander Kerensky, Minister of Justice.

2. *Recognition of the Provisional Government; War Aims*

The news of this sudden and almost bloodless collapse of the autocracy was greeted in the Allied capitals with some misgivings lest Russia's fighting capacity be weakened by internal dissension, but in Washington great satisfaction was expressed. Ambassador Francis was much impressed by the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul Miliukoff, leader of the Constitutional Democrats or "Cadets," and felt confident that the control of affairs was in safe hands.[9] He informed the Department of State of the revolution in a telegram of March 17[10] and on the following day asked authority to extend formal recognition to the Provisional Government:

> I request respectfully that you promptly give me authority to recognize Provisional Government as first recognition is desirable from every viewpoint. This revolution is the practical realization of that principle of government which we have championed and advocated. I mean government by the consent of the governed. Our recognition will have a stupendous moral effect especially if given first.[11]

At the same time Miliukoff cabled a communication for the Allies to all Russian diplomats abroad in which he announced the recent happy events and stated his own foreign policy. This message was transmitted to Secretary of State Lansing by Ambassador George Bakhmeteff on the same day.[12] It declared, in part, that Russia would "remain mindful of the international engagements entered into by the fallen régime, and will honor Russia's word."[13]

Two days later Lansing authorized Francis to recognize the new government on behalf of the United States.[14] At 11 A.M. March 22 Francis called on Miliukoff for this purpose and at 4:30 the same afternoon he was received, along with the Embassy suite, by Prince Lvoff and the Council of Ministers. The British and French Ambassadors had apparently expressed their intention of recognizing the new government in a note sent at 3 o'clock, but the American recognition was the first to be extended formally.[15] Miliukoff was much pleased at securing first the recognition of a country whose ideals he declared were identical with those of his own government, and he expressed the hope that the revolution would bring the two countries closer together than ever before.[16]

This prompt recognition was dictated as much by the imminence of American entrance into the Great War as by considerations of the stability of the new government and of its ability to fulfil its international obligations. The United States had severed diplomatic

relations with Germany on February 3 and war was a matter of weeks. American participation in the conflict was, officially at least, a result of grievances against Germany rather than of any desire to aid her enemies. But war clearly meant the closest possible co-operation with the Allies, and the character of the prospective co-belligerents of the United States was a factor to be considered in mobilizing public opinion to support the step soon to be taken. To fight side by side with the autocrat of all the Russias would have made difficult, if not impossible, the general acceptance of the Wilsonian thesis that the war was being fought to "make the world safe for democracy." The advent of an apparently democratic régime in Russia removed a most embarrassing obstacle to the successful operation of the machinery of war propaganda. Francis himself was fully cognizant of this aspect of the situation. In his request for authority to extend recognition he emphasized the intention of the new government to prosecute the war vigorously.[17] After his request was granted, he commented:

> This recognition undoubtedly had a powerful influence in placing America in a position to enter the war backed by a practically unanimous public opinion. There can be no doubt that there would have been serious opposition to our allying ourselves with an absolute monarchy to make war no matter in what cause.[18]

Fifteen days after recognition was extended Congress, on the President's recommendation, declared war on Germany. In his war message of April 2 President Wilson clearly defined his attitude toward the Russian Revolution:

> Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia? Russia was known by those who knew it best to have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought, in all the intimate relationships of her people that spoke their natural instinct, their habitual attitude toward life. The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political structure, long as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact Russian in origin, character or purpose; and now it has been shaken off and the great, generous Russian people have been added in all their naïve majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a League of Honor.[19]

American entrance into the war served in turn to give much needed prestige and moral support to the Provisional Government, whose members were overjoyed at the event.[20] Already there was

apparent to discerning observers, however, a fatal division of authority in the new order which boded ill. Consul North Winship, in his communication from Petrograd to the Secretary of State of March 20, had foreseen the possibility of friction between the workers' councils or soviets and the Lvoff cabinet, and the danger of "new revolutionary movements with greater socialistic tendencies than heretofore." [21] Ambassador Francis and the Allied representatives were disposed to minimize these difficulties, for their official posts of observation, as well as their general social position and outlook, gave them little opportunity to observe or comprehend the ferment going on in the lower levels of Russian society. That the Petrograd Soviet was exercising powers as great as any possessed by the Provisional Government was evident. That the workers, as represented by their soviets, were overwhelmingly Socialists was equally apparent. Their party, the Social-Democratic Labor Party, had been split since 1903 into a moderate minority or Menshevik wing and a radical majority or Bolshevik wing. While the one-time majority had become a minority and the workers continued to elect to their soviets more Menshevik leaders than Bolsheviks, the latter were diligently conducting a skillful and effective propaganda which was soon to bear fruits. But few of the foreign observers in Russia had any conception of what those fruits would be.

Controversy between the government and the soviets revolved from the beginning about questions of foreign policy. The soviet leaders, Menshevik as well as Bolshevik, insisted that no stone be left unturned to secure an early and general peace. All that savored of imperialism they bitterly opposed. As good Marxians, they looked to the working masses of the other belligerent countries for co-operation. In a "Proclamation to the Peoples of the World" of March 27, 1917, the Petrograd Soviet declared:

> . . . The Russian people now possess full political liberty. They can now assert their mighty power in the internal affairs of the country and in its foreign policy. And, appealing to all the peoples, who are being destroyed and ruined in the monstrous war, we announce that the time has come to start a decisive struggle against the intentions of conquest on the part of the governments of all countries; the time has come for all peoples to take into their own hands the decision of the question of war and peace.
>
> Conscious of its revolutionary power the Russian democracy announces that it will, by every means, resist the policy of conquest of its ruling classes, and it calls upon the peoples of Europe for concerted, decisive action in favor of peace. . . .
>
> Laboring people of all countries: We are stretching out in a brotherly

fashion our hands to you over the mountains of corpses of our brothers, across rivers of innocent blood and tears, over the smoking ruins of cities and villages, over the wreckage of the treasures of culture,—we appeal to you for the re-establishing and strengthening of international unity. That will be the security for our future victories and the complete liberation of humanity. Proletarians of all countries, unite.[22]

Foreign Minister Miliukoff sought to allay the apprehension which such pronouncements naturally aroused in Allied countries by a note of May 1, in which he asserted that democratic Russia was fighting for the objectives indicated by President Wilson, that she was more determined than ever to "bring the world war to a decisive victory," and that she would "maintain a strict regard" for her agreements with the Allies.[23] This note created a storm of protest from the soviets so strong as to oblige Miliukoff and his colleague, Goutchkoff, Minister of War, to resign from the cabinet.[24] Francis attempted to find Goutchkoff for the purpose of dissuading him, but was unsuccessful in his quest.[25] Goutchkoff's place was filled by the former Minister of Justice, Alexander Kerensky, a leader of the radical peasants' party, the Socialist Revolutionaries. Miliukoff was replaced by Tereshchenko. The reorganized Provisional Government issued a new statement of policy on May 18 very different from that of May 1. While expressing its determination to continue its military efforts, it now proclaimed "openly that it is its aim to bring about, at the earliest possible date, a general peace without the object of either imposing its rule over any nation, or taking away any nation's possessions, or forcibly annexing foreign territory, i.e., we wish peace without annexations, without indemnities and on the basis of self-determination of peoples." [26]

The Petrograd Soviet, however, was far from mollified. It was still, it should be noted, dominated by the Mensheviks, with the Bolshevik faction in the minority and in opposition. At the session of May 14 M. I. Skobeleff, later Minister of Labor in the Provisional Government, emphasized the international significance of the revolution and the need of "revolutionary armies in the other countries." But he opposed all thought of a separate peace, suggesting instead a call for an international socialist conference to work for a general peace.[27] This proposal was well received and led to an appeal "To the Socialists of All Countries" by the Petrograd Soviet on May 15, 1917. Its language is significant:

The Russian Revolution was born in the fire of the world war. This war is a monstrous crime on the part of the imperialists of all countries,

who, by their lust for annexations, by their mad race of armaments, have prepared and made inevitable the world conflagration. . . .

The Russian Revolution, the revolution of the toilers, workingmen and soldiers, is not only a revolt against Tsardom, but also against the horrors of the world war. It is the first outcry of indignation of one of the detachments of the international army of labor against the crimes of international imperialism. It is not only a national revolution,—it is the first stage of the world revolution, which will end the baseness of war and will bring peace to mankind. . . .

The Russian Revolutionary Democracy desires a general peace on a basis acceptable to the workers of all countries, who do not seek annexations, who do not stand for robberies, who are equally interested in the free expression of the will of all nations and the crushing of the might of international imperialism. Peace without annexations or indemnities on the basis of self-determination of peoples is the formula adopted unreservedly by the proletarian mind and heart. It furnishes a platform on which the toiling masses of all countries—belligerent and neutral—could and should come to an understanding in order to establish a lasting peace and with concerted effort heal the wounds caused by the bloody war. . . .

In order to unite these efforts, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has decided to take the initiative in calling for an international conference of all the Socialist parties and factions in every country. Whatever the differences of opinion which have disrupted Socialism for a period of three years of war may be, not a single section of the Proletariat should refuse to participate in the general struggle for peace, which now confronts the Russian Revolution.

We believe, comrades, that all Socialistic groups will be represented at this conference. A unanimous decision by the Proletarian Internationale will be the first victory of the toilers over the Internationale of the Imperialists. Proletarians of the world, unite! [28]

The chief effect of these fulminations abroad was to increase Allied apprehensions concerning Russia's loyalty to the cause. But Francis's dispatches to Washington were reassuring. Confidence was felt in the Provisional Government and it was clear to the official mind that "the Socialist movement is entirely influenced by the German Government." [29] The valiant efforts of Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, to establish contacts with the Russian working class and to convince its leaders of the justice of the Allied cause are illustrative of the complete inability of even an American labor leader to understand the psychology of a revolutionary proletarian movement thoroughly committed to the philosophy of Marxism. The Russian radicals were not to be quieted by glib phrases concerning Democracy, Justice, Freedom and Humanity.[30]

So long as the Allied Governments appeared reluctant to state

their war aims clearly, the soviets, and more particularly the growing Bolshevist element within the soviets, felt their worst suspicions confirmed. Lord Robert Cecil's response in the British Parliament to an inquiry from Mr. Philip Snowden in the middle of May was not reassuring. Peace must indeed be founded upon "justice, chivalry, respect for obligations, and respect for the weak," but self-determination and no annexations could under no circumstances mean that Armenia, Syria, Palestine and the German African colonies were to be retained by Germany. "No indemnities" was also a false cry. Were not Belgium, France and Serbia to be restored?[81]

On May 26, however, President Wilson addressed a note to the Provisional Government designed to dispel their fears:

> The position of America in this war is so clearly avowed that no man can be excused for mistaking it. She seeks no material profit or aggrandizement of any kind. She is fighting for no advantage or selfish object of her own, but for the liberation of peoples everywhere from the aggressions of autocratic force. . . .
>
> We are fighting for the liberty, the self-government, and the undictated development of all peoples, and every feature of the settlement that concludes this war must be conceived and executed for that purpose. Wrongs must first be righted and then adequate safeguards must be created to prevent their being committed again. We ought not to consider remedies merely because they have a pleasing and sonorous sound. Practical questions can be settled only by practical means. Phrases will not accomplish the result. Effective readjustments will; and whatever readjustments are necessary must be made.
>
> But they must follow a principle, and that principle is plain. No people must be forced under sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples.
>
> And then the free peoples of the world must draw together in some common covenant, some genuine and practical co-operation that will in effect combine their force to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another. The brotherhood of mankind must no longer be a fair but empty phrase; it must be a structure of force and reality. The nations must realize their common life and effect a workable partnership to secure that life against the aggressions of autocratic and self-seeking power.[82]

But even these fair phrases did not accomplish the result desired. Baron Rosen, former Russian ambassador to the United States, poured cold water on official optimism by hinting that peace might

be Russia's only exit from chaos.[33] In Petrograd Ambassador Francis did all in his power to keep the Russian army fighting on the eastern front.[34] Such also was the honest intention of the Provisional Government. But it was a poor spokesman for the war-weary masses. Its powerful rival, the Petrograd Soviet, pursued its own plans and on June 2 issued a formal call for an International Socialist Conference to meet at Stockholm on July 8 as "the quickest way of ending the war" and uniting the international proletariat "in an energetic and stubborn struggle against the world butchery." [35] Even the Bolshevists still opposed a separate peace, though one of their leaders, Kameneff, declared at the first All-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, the national organization of the thousands of local soviets, that their opposition was not motivated by any consideration for past Russian agreements with the Allies.[36] Tereshchenko felt obliged in June to address a note to the Allies formally requesting a conference for "a reconsideration of the agreements concerning the ultimate aims of the war." [37] Premier Ribot of France referred to justice, liberty and Alsace-Lorraine. The Italian Government grew more apprehensive. Great Britain, in a formal reply of June 11, cited the principles laid down by President Wilson and expressed the opinion that the various agreements among the Allies were, "broadly speaking," in conformity with those principles. But it declared its willingness to examine them, and, if need be, to revise them.[38] *Izvestia,* official organ of the Petrograd Soviet, opined correctly that such notes would "undoubtedly not call forth enthusiasm among the revolutionary masses." [39]

Meanwhile preparations proceeded for the abortive Stockholm Conference. The American Socialist Party named Victor Berger, Morris Hillquit and Algernon Lee as its delegates, but the State Department refused to grant them passports.[40] Delegates from other countries faced similar obstacles and the efforts of the Dutch and Scandinavian organizing committee were frustrated. The summer passed with little prospect of success. Memoranda were submitted by representatives of thirty-one national groups, including one from the American Socialist Party assailing the war and attacking the members of the Root mission as reactionary agents of Wall Street, but no joint discussion was possible.[41] The final declaration of the organizing committee, issued September 15, reiterated the demand that a conference be held without delay.[42] But it was quite clear that the Russian soviets were not destined to bring peace to the world by such a scheme as this.

3. The Root Mission

All of these confused gropings toward a cessation of slaughter and suffering that had become unendurable were little more than annoying incidents to the Allied and American Governments, disturbing but not significant enough to be alarming. Foreign diplomatic representatives in Russia reported what they observed to their home governments, but they observed little of the great social and political forces at work among the masses. Their reports were generally hopeful and optimistic in tone, and said little about the distressing elements in the situation which it was easy not to see. The straws in the revolutionary stream which pointed toward an irresistible mass movement toward peace at any price and toward the replacement of the Provisional Government by a government of soviets were observed much more keenly by the shrewdly calculating Bolshevist propagandists who had returned from foreign exile to seize the great opportunity they perceived before them.

It was hoped in Washington, however, that the project of sending a special American diplomatic mission to Russia would do much to clarify the atmosphere and to lead to a better understanding of Russian problems. This proposal was discussed by President Wilson with his cabinet early in April. The final choice for chairman rested upon the distinguished Republican ex-Secretary of State, Elihu Root. His appointment as Ambassador Extraordinary of the United States on Special Mission was announced on May 15 by the State Department. His associates, with the rank of Minister, comprised one representative of the army, Major General Hugh L. Scott; another of the navy, Rear Admiral James H. Glennon; one Y.M.C.A. worker, John R. Mott; three bankers or industrialists, Charles R. Crane, Cyrus H. McCormick and Samuel R. Bertron; one Socialist writer, Charles Edward Russell, and one labor leader, James Duncan. It was announced at the same time that the mission would strive to counteract the sinister efforts of Germany in Russia to secure a separate peace and that the United States had opened a credit of $100,000,000 upon which the Russian Government could draw for the purchase of supplies in the United States.[43]

The personnel of the mission was subjected to hostile criticism as soon as it became known. Mr. Root, in particular, was assailed in Jewish and Socialist circles as wholly unfitted for such a post in view of his past career and his well-known conservatism. This criticism led the Russian Professor Alexander Petrunkevitch of Yale

University to assert that Root would inevitably be distrusted by Russian Socialists. He gave warning of the danger of a separate peace and pleaded for men on the mission that would be acceptable to the Russian Social Democrats.[44]

The presence of Russell and Duncan on the mission did not allay the unfavorable comment. The former was a member of the pro-war faction of the Socialist Party who was expelled from the organization when he refused to heed a request that he decline the appointment.[45] Only the very mildest of Russian Socialists could regard him as a "comrade." The novelist, Maxim Gorky, declared that neither Duncan nor Russell were representative of American labor.[46] Duncan, however, was First Vice-President of the American Federation of Labor and President of the International Granite Cutters' Association of America and was given credentials as the official spokesman of the American labor movement by Samuel Gompers and the Executive Council of the A. F. of L.[47] But the Russian Socialists heard only the tiny radical minority of American toilers and could not bring themselves to believe that men of Duncan's type were representative of the conservative majority.

Whether a mission differently constituted would have achieved more satisfactory results must ever remain an unanswered question, since no attention was paid to any of the criticism offered. Certainly a closer acquaintance with the Russian situation might well have led to the conclusion that some one not quite so conservatively "bourgeois" in political and social outlook as Mr. Root would have been more sympathetically received. In any case, the attacks made on the mission in the United States did actually lead to distrust in Russia and surrounded the whole undertaking with an atmosphere that promised little in the way of fruitful results.

President Wilson met the members of the mission in conference on May 14 and gave it broad authority to deal with any de facto power in Petrograd on its arrival for the purpose of saving Russia for the Entente.[48] "Democracy" was the keynote of its message.[49]

Lansing's note to the Russian Government declared:

> The High Commission now on its way from this country to Russia is sent primarily to manifest to the Russian Government and people the deep sympathetic feeling which exists among all classes in America for the adherence of Russia to the principles of democracy, which has been the foundation of the progress and prosperity of this country. The High Commissioners go to convey the greetings of this Republic to the new and powerful member which has joined the great family of democratic nations. . . .

To the common cause of humanity which Russia has so courageously and unflinchingly supported for nearly three years, the United States is pledged. To co-operate and aid Russia in the accomplishment of the task, which as a great democracy is more truly hers today than ever before, is the desire of the United States. To stand side by side, shoulder to shoulder against autocracy, will unite the American and Russian peoples in a friendship for the ages.[50]

When the mission reached Vladivostok, it was greeted with a hostile demonstration which Ambassador Francis declared was instigated by "Russians living on the East Side of New York City," [51] but its long six-thousand-mile journey to Petrograd was uneventful. It reached the Russian Capital on June 13 and was escorted by Francis to the Winter Palace, where its members were comfortably lodged during their stay as the guests of the Provisional Government.[52] On the 16th the American ambassador presented the mission to the Council of Ministers and felicitations were exchanged. Mr. Root informed the Ministers that he had been commissioned by the President of over one hundred million free people, holding office by virtue of a popular election "at which more than eighteen million votes were freely cast and fairly counted, pursuant to law, by universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage." He asserted that, "The American Democracy sends to the democracy of Russia, greetings, sympathy, friendship, brotherhood and God-speed," and that "we are going to fight, and have already begun to fight, for your freedom equally with our own, and we ask you to fight for our freedom equally with yours. We would make your cause ours, and our cause yours, and with common purpose and the mutual helpfulness of firm alliance, make sure the victory over our common foe." [53] Tereshchenko, in reply, declared that the Russian Revolution was based on the principles of the American Declaration of Independence and expressed Russia's resolve to fight for the end of militarism, a durable peace and self-determination of nations.[54]

The members of the mission at once began conferring with the proper authorities on various aspects of Russian-American co-operation and on June 22 the entire group proceeded to Moscow. Mr. Root's speeches before the many audiences which he addressed were all variations of one theme. The Americans in Petrograd were urged to teach the Russians faith in democracy.[55] The representatives of the Zemstvos and Municipal Unions and the local soviet of Moscow were told that "the people of America are all a working people; they work hard, early and late; they love liberty and they

work for it; and their hearts go out to you, because they recognize you as brothers in a common cause. Long live Free Russia and Free America!" [56] The Moscow Duma was assured of the great faith entertained in America in Russia's capacity for self-government.[57] Russia, a new democracy, has much to learn from America, an old one. Let Russia follow America's example and all will be well. America has faith in Russia. Democracy will save the world. Such was the message of Mr. Root and his colleagues.[58] Such were their views of the Russian situation.

In the light of subsequent events it is difficult to resist the temptation to condemn the triviality and futility of these activities. But to accuse the members of the mission, individually or collectively, of blindness or lack of insight would be an injustice. The circumstances were such that they could scarcely have avoided the errors of judgment into which they fell. Strangers in a strange land, living and traveling comfortably amid misery which they could not see, they were enabled to perceive only such surface indications of the political and social situation as served to conceal, rather than to illuminate, the powerful forces at work below.[59] They were quite unaware that the Russian liberal press was apathetic and the radical press hostile toward their efforts, or that they were often the target of bitter words which became polite compliments in translation.[60] They looked at the scene about them through the glasses of American war propaganda. They were spokesmen for a society where democracy, patriotism and the protection of property rights were the pillars of national existence. They thought and talked in terms of political formulæ which were tremendously effective in arousing war fervor in the United States, but which aroused only cynical contempt among those who were to be Russia's future masters. And for the most part they brought their message to men who thought and talked as they did and who needed none of their persuasion—the moderate, democratic, bourgeois liberals who controlled the Provisional Government. Nothing was then more natural than that they should have been quite blind to the grievances and aspirations of the soldiers, workers and peasants who followed Socialist leaders, or that they should have failed to establish contacts with those leaders, or that they should have comprehended little of the great class conflict and social revolution germinating in the depths of Russian society. When they turned their backs on Russia after a month's sojourn their views were little different from what they had been before their arrival.

On July 10, the day of departure, Mr. Root declared:

> The Mission has accomplished what it came here to do, and we are greatly encouraged. We found no incurable or organic malady in the Russian Democracy. Democracies are always in trouble and we have seen days just as dark in the progress of our own.[61]

The entire mission was filled with a spirit of optimism, of confidence in the Provisional Government, of faith in Russia's determination and ability vigorously to prosecute the war against the Central Powers. On their return to America they hastened to reassure the country of Russia's loyalty to the Allied cause and of the bright future of Russian democracy.[62] On the afternoon of August 8 the mission called at the White House and reported their conclusions to President Wilson. Optimism was unanimous, though the need for American aid was emphasized.[63]

Meanwhile another American mission had entered Russia and was doing work of a less spectacular but perhaps more substantial character. This was a railroad commission which left Washington May 9 to study the problems involved in the rehabilitation of Russia's transportation system. The head of this mission, John F. Stevens of New York, formerly Chief Engineer of the Panama Canal, was given the rank of minister. The other members were W. L. Darling of St. Paul, Chief Engineer of the Northern Pacific Railroad; Henry Miller of St. Louis, former Operating Vice-President of the Wabash Railroad; George Gibbs of Philadelphia, former Chief Mechanical Engineer of the Pennsylvania Railroad; and J. P. Griner of Baltimore, Chief Consulting Engineer of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.[64] The commission's first task was to attempt to relieve the traffic congestion at Vladivostok, but Ambassador Francis, who had recommended the project, hoped later to extend its control over the entire Trans-Siberian Railroad. After beginning the erection of an assembly plant at Vladivostok and inspecting the Trans-Siberian, the commission proceeded to Petrograd. Darling and Griner soon left for America via Sweden, while Gibbs presently followed them via Siberia and the Pacific. Mr. Stevens was detained in Petrograd by illness and, with Miller, was still in Russia in November.[65]

On July 7 Premier Lvoff made a public statement at Petrograd, voicing the hopes placed by the Provisional Government in the Stevens Commission and its desire for American help of all kinds. His optimism, real or pretended, was quite as great as that of Mr. Root himself.

For decades of darkness and oppression America has been our ideal of freedom and intellectual and material development; rather, not our ideal, for we had considered it unattainable, but a remote fairy tale of happiness. Now we have in one jump reached America's condition of freedom. There remains the slower but not impossible task to overtake her in education, material progress, culture and respect for order. We are on the right track. The spirit of the new Russia is closely akin to the immemorial spirit of free America. . . . The war's mission is to spread throughout the world all that is vital and abiding in our revolution. That is why as a citizen of the world I desire victory. I regard the growing friendship between Russia and America as a Providential instrument in this world process. Therefore I consider that all the help, sympathy, and encouragement we get from your people beyond the seas constitute not merely a local, temporary benefit, but a permanent contribution toward the regeneration of the world.[66]

4. The Coming of Bakhmeteff; War Loans

While the Root and Stevens missions were visiting Russia, a Russian mission was received in the United States. The last Tsarist ambassador, George Bakhmeteff, felt himself too loyal a monarchist to serve the new authorities and resigned his post in April.[67] The Provisional Government named as his successor Professor Boris Bakhmeteff, unrelated to his predecessor despite the identity of surnames. He was accompanied to the United States by a large mission, the leading members of which were Lieutenant-General V. Roop, representative of the Russian army; Professor J. V. Lomonosoff, representative of the Ministry of Means of Communication; Professor N. A. Borodine, of the Ministry of Agriculture; J. J. Soukine, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; E. I. Omelchenko, of the Ministry of Trade and Industry; and V. J. Novitsky, of the Ministry of Finance.[68] The mission reached Seattle June 13 and Washington six days later, where it was received by Secretary of State Lansing. On the following day the new ambassador was presented to President Wilson, while General Roop called on Secretary of War Baker.[69] On his arrival in the Capital Ambassador Bakhmeteff issued an optimistic statement to the press, expressing his confidence that the participation of the soviet leaders in the new government "had secured full support from the democratic masses."

In behalf of the Russian Provisional Government and in behalf of all the people of new Russia, I have been first of all sent here to express their gratitude to the Government of the United States for the prompt recognition of the new political order in Russia. This noble action of the world's greatest democracy has afforded us strong moral support and

has created among our people a general feeling of profound appreciation. Close and active relationship between the two nations based upon complete and sincere understanding encountered inevitable obstacles during the old régime because of its very nature. The situation is now radically changed with free Russia starting a new era in her national life. . . . New Russia, in full accord with the motives which impelled the United States to enter the war, is striving to destroy tyranny, to establish peace on a secure and permanent foundation and to make the world safe for democracy.[70]

On June 23 the mission was formally received by the House of Representatives. Speaker Champ Clark hailed it as representing the twenty-seventh republic established since 1776 and the ambassador delivered an eloquent address in which he declared that his government was reorganizing Russia on the basis of freedom, equality and self-government and that it had the support of all classes with the exception of the reactionaries and "comparatively small groups of extremists and internationalists."

The applause and enthusiasm which these words evoked were equaled three days later when the mission was presented to the Senate. Vice-President Marshall extended a warm welcome and struck the note of the old tradition of friendship. Bakhmeteff's address here was similar in tone to the one given in the lower chamber, expressing the fullest confidence in the ability of his government to cope successfully with the problems before it, in its support by the people and in its firm rejection of all thought of a separate peace.[71] By unanimous consent the Senate adopted the resolution submitted by Senator Gore of Oklahoma; expressing its "profound satisfaction" at Bahkmeteff's assurances and its hope that "democracy and self-government may bring to the people of Russia that large measure of prosperity, progress, and freedom which they have brought to the people of America, and that Russia may be entirely successful in her concerted efforts to secure the unequaled blessings of an honorable and enduring peace." [72]

On July 5 Bakhmeteff formally presented his credentials to President Wilson. He again expressed the gratitude of his country for the prompt American recognition and declared that the war aims of the two nations were identical. He felt that Russia's task required American aid and co-operation.

Confident that the natural sympathy of the two nations will grow into bonds of solid friendship, I look forward with the greatest hopes to the results of the united efforts of the two great Democracies, based on mutual understanding and common aims.[73]

Wilson's reply expressed his keen satisfaction:

For the people of Russia the people of the United States have ever entertained friendly feelings, which have now been greatly deepened by the knowledge that, actuated by the same lofty motives, the two Governments and peoples are co-operating to bring to a successful termination the conflict now raging for human liberty and a universal acknowledgment of those principles of right and justice which should direct all governments. I feel convinced that when this happy day shall come no small share of the credit will be due to the devoted people of Russia, who, overcoming disloyalty from within and intrigue from without, remain steadfast to the cause.

The Mission which it was my pleasure to send to Russia has already assured the Provisional Government that in this momentous struggle and in the problems that confront and will confront the free Government of Russia, that Government may count on the steadfast friendship of the Government of the United States and its constant co-operation in all desired appropriate directions.

It only remains for me to give expression to my admiration of the way in which the Provisional Government of Russia are meeting all requirements, to my entire sympathy with them in their noble object to insure to the people of Russia the blessings of freedom and of equal rights and opportunity, and to my faith that through their efforts Russia will assume her rightful place among the great free nations of the world.[74]

With the conclusion of these diplomatic amenities the mission proceeded to New York, where it was enthusiastically hailed by large crowds with the red flag much in evidence. Numerous optimistic addresses were made by the ambassador and the city was assured that Russia would stand side by side with America in fighting for liberty and democracy.[75] At length the mission scattered to take up the numerous tasks which fell upon its members as a consequence of the extension of economic assistance to Russia for war purposes.

Under the terms of the War Loans Acts, a credit of $100,000,000 had already been extended to Russia by the American Government on May 16, in accordance with the recommendations of Ambassador Francis. Of this sum, again on the recommendation of the ambassador, coupled with that of Mr. Root, $15,000,000 was set aside for paying the salaries of Russian soldiers in Finland to prevent a threatened mutiny.[76] On July 17 an additional credit of $75,000,000 was granted and on August 23 and October 12 further grants of $100,000,000 and $50,000,000, respectively, were made, bringing the total to $325,000,000. A final credit of $125,000,000 was established on November 1, but was subsequently withdrawn. Against these credits the following cash advances were made in 1917:[77]

July 6	$ 35,000,000
July 13	10,000,000
August 1	2,500,000
August 22	2,500,000
August 24	37,500,000
August 30	10,000,000
September 25	15,000,000
October 2	22,200,000
October 11	20,000,000
October 24	5,000,000*
November 1	31,700,000
November 13	1,329,750
	$192,729,750
	—5,000,000
	$187,729,750

* Conditional advance not availed of and returned.

On March 31, 1919, the unexpended credit balance of $37,270,250 was withdrawn, leaving the principal of the Russian war debt to the United States Government at $187,729,750. The work of Ambassador Bakhmeteff and his staff consisted chiefly of making purchases of war supplies of all kinds for Russia with the money thus loaned. The problems to which these war contracts gave rise after the November Revolution put an end to further American assistance will be dealt with below.

It is very clear that Ambassador Bakhmeteff and his associates brought to the American Government and people a message identical in all its essential conclusions with that of the Root Mission. The views entertained by the democratic liberals at the head of the Provisional Government and those current in the United States regarding the meaning of the Russian Revolution and the aims of the war were in complete harmony. A new breath of life was breathed into the old tradition of Russian-American friendship, for Russia had now begun to march along paths of political development long followed by the United States. From America would come much needed advice, encouragement and assistance. The Provisional Government faced difficulties, but it was assumed to be firmly grounded in the support of the masses and would successfully accomplish its two-fold task of waging war and calling a Constituent Assembly to lay the democratic foundations of the future Russian state. Such were the views of the ministers of that government, of the Constitutional Democrats, of many of the moderate

Socialists, of the liberal intelligentsia and of their spokesmen abroad. Such, too, were the views of President Wilson, Mr. Root, Ambassador Francis and the vast majority of American legislators, editors and public men generally. And these reflections were most pleasant to entertain. The prospects they opened out were hopeful, cheering and altogether desirable. They corresponded exactly to the preconceived notions and the political and social prejudices of those who held them. That they failed to correspond to the facts of the Russian situation was small reason for abandoning them. They were to remain firmly fixed in American minds for many years, with results as tragic as they were absurd.

5. *The Decline of the Provisional Government*

From the very beginning, however, certain of the symptoms of failure and dissolution were so obvious that they could not be wholly overlooked even by those least desirous of seeing them. As early as March 15 Ambassador Francis, in a letter to Madden Summers, American Consul General at Moscow, commented upon the fatal division of authority between the Provisional Government and the soviets:

> The workingmen's party have been joined by some soldiers, I don't know how many, and they have a committee called "Committee of Workingmen's Party and Soldiers' Deputies"; this committee has issued a number of proclamations—I think several daily—and these pronunciamentos have been filled with rot. That organization demands a republic. . . . The Duma party favors a vigorous prosecution of the war, but the utterances of the Workingmen and Soldiers' Deputies Committee declare in favor of concerted action on the part of the proletariat of the belligerent countries in putting an end to a war which they say is waged in the interest of capital at the expense of labor and the laboring class.[78]

In his cables to the State Department Francis kept the American Government informed of the situation, though the early domination of the soviets by the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, and their apparent determination to support the war program of the government, caused him to minimize the dangers of a possible conflict.[79] He felt, however, that the government was making a serious mistake in not putting an end to the agitation of Nikolai Lenin and the other leaders of the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic party, who had returned from exile abroad to sow the seeds of social revolution. Lenin, he believed, was a German agent

and was largely responsible for the growing misery and unrest throughout the country.[80]

The British ambassador, George Buchanan, also sought to impress upon Miliukoff the danger of allowing Lenin "to go on inciting soldiers to desert, to seize land and to murder."[81] After the uproar which followed Miliukoff's declaration of war aims of May 3, Francis went so far as to warn the government that, inasmuch as he had risked his judgment in advising Washington to extend recognition, he felt considerable responsibility concerning a stable government in Russia and that if more evidences of stability were not forthcoming he should feel obliged to advise the American State Department not to extend the aid he had been recommending.[82] Such warnings caused the government to stiffen its attitude somewhat toward the extremists.

But the war weariness of the masses and the general dissatisfaction of the workers of the Capital and other urban centers furnished rich soil for the Bolshevist propagandists. Their followers multiplied rapidly. Within a week after the departure of the Root Mission an armed clash occurred in Petrograd which might have done much to temper its optimism had it remained longer. On July 17 the government ordered its Cossacks to suppress the noisy demonstrations of soldiers and armed workmen who were shouting the Bolshevist slogan, "All power to the soviet!", and menacing the still moderate Central Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet for its hesitancy. The resistance of the ultra-radical sailors from Kronstadt precipitated a street battle in which several hundred persons lost their lives. The government's forces triumphed, but its prestige was sadly shaken.[83] Lenin went into hiding for a time. His able colleague, Leon Trotsky, was arrested but soon released. This easy escape of the Bolshevist leaders caused Francis once more to overstep the proper bounds of his office by protesting to Tereshchenko. After the July "revolution" Francis felt very certain that the only logical course for the government to pursue was to execute Lenin and Trotsky for treason, and he had no reluctance in expressing his views.[84]

The disturbances of July resulted in another revision of the government toward the left. Prince Lvoff resigned the premiership and Alexander Kerensky took his place. Lvoff and the Constitutional Democrats felt that if repression must be resorted to it would be accepted with better grace from Kerensky than from his more conservative colleagues. The principle of coalition was still adhered

to as a last straw in a situation that was becoming impossible. Francis regarded Kerensky as able and patriotic, but "weak" and blundering.[85] As Minister of War he had exerted himself mightily to prevent the disintegration of the army with the result that the long-heralded offensive against the German-Austrian lines in Galicia had been undertaken early in July. Some initial successes were achieved, but heavy rains and German reinforcements brought the forward movement to a halt by July 10, and disastrous desertion and defections soon revealed the unwillingness of the Russian soldier to fight longer in a war in which he had already suffered all he could endure. These misfortunes led the Provisional Government on August 1 to issue a somewhat pathetically hopeful statement to the Allied Powers, reaffirming its determination to carry on the struggle regardless of "new trials, brought about by treachery and crime," but the direction of the trend of events was unmistakable.[86]

Several days later Francis learned of the possibility of Kerensky's resigning in despair. He at once summoned Miliukoff, received his assurances that Kerensky was the only man capable of saving Russia from a Bolshevist government, and urged him to use what influence he possessed to keep Kerensky in office. The Council of Ministers prevailed upon Kerensky to reconsider his decision and to form a new ministry on August 6.[87] In the hope of increasing its waning authority and affording the liberal and moderate Socialist leaders an opportunity to compose their differences, the new ministry assembled an advisory National Conference of party leaders, duma, soviet and zemstvo representatives, co-operatives and trade union organizers and the like in Moscow late in August. President Wilson dispatched the following message to the Conference on August 26:

> I take the liberty to send to the members of the great council now meeting in Moscow the cordial greetings of their friends, the people of the United States, to express their confidence in the ultimate triumph of ideals of democracy and self-government against all enemies within and without, and to give their renewed assurance of every material and moral assistance they can extend to the Government of Russia in the promotion of the common cause in which the two nations are unselfishly united.[88]

But the Conference, like other attempts of a similar nature, had no effect save to widen the liberal-Socialist breach still further, while reactionary and monarchist groups raised their heads to take advantage of the growing chaos. In September came the Korniloff "revolt." It was at this time that Kerensky was led to believe that General Korniloff, who sought to eliminate soviet influence in

Petrograd, was desirous of displacing him at the head of the government. When he ordered his arrest the enraged general proceeded to march with his troops upon the Capital, which Kerensky attempted to defend by the dubious expedient of arming the working population—a measure which he himself had just recently forbidden. Bloodshed was only avoided by the refusal of Korniloff's troops to obey his orders.[89]

These events greatly increased the apprehensions of Ambassador Francis and the Diplomatic Corps generally. Since communication with Washington was uncertain and subject to frequent interruptions, he was often compelled to act at his own discretion. His efforts and those of his colleagues were directed toward suggesting ways and means of bolstering up the tottering Provisional Government. Francis on the one hand kept a wary eye on such visiting American radicals as John Reed, contributor to the *New York Call,* [90] and on the other sought to allay the alarm and disgust of his fellow diplomats at the weakness of the Provisional Government. In the Kerensky-Korniloff imbroglio he succeeded in persuading them to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality.[91] Shortly afterwards the British, French and Italian ambassadors proposed that a collective note be sent to the government, emphasizing the necessity of prosecuting the war more vigorously, but Francis declined to act with them when they presented the note on October 9. Kerensky was much annoyed and hurriedly departed with the curt statement that the government was doing all in its power. He afterward thanked the American ambassador for having taken no part in the complaint.[92]

Such a futile gesture as this was indicative of the inability of the Allied representatives in Russia to comprehend the meaning of what was going on about them. Much more blind were their governments in London, Paris, Rome and Washington. The rising tide of social revolution could be perceived but dimly from the Embassies. Land-hungry peasants seizing and dividing the great estates of the nobility; war-weary soldiers deserting by the thousands to share in the division; disgruntled workmen striking, occupying factories and dreaming dreams of power; skillful Bolshevist agitators winning multitudes of converts with their catch-words of "Peace, Land, Bread" and "All Power to the Soviets!"—these were phenomena almost beyond the range of diplomatic visibility. Such unpleasant news as filtered through the network of minds unwilling to give it credence was diluted to the point of tastelessness by the time it reached its destination abroad.[93] What ought not to be could not be.

Hypnotized by their own class psychology, blinded by their own notions of what was politically and socially permissible, spell-bound by the hackneyed formulæ of Allied war propaganda and the glittering phrases of Wilsonian idealism, the Allied and American Governments and their representatives in Petrograd had eyes that saw not and ears that heard not.

On October 8 the Provisional Government issued a statement that sounded much like a cry of despair.

> Great confusion has once more been brought into the life of our country. In spite of the swift suppression of the revolts of General Korniloff, the shocks caused by it are threatening the very existence of the Russian Republic.
>
> Waves of anarchy are sweeping over the land, the pressure of the foreign enemy is increasing, counter-revolutionary elements are raising their heads, hoping that the prolonged governmental crisis, coupled with the weariness which has seized the entire nation, will enable them to murder the freedom of the Russian people.[94]

The government conceded the need of a general peace and looked forward hopefully to the coming Allied conference. Meanwhile the war must go on for the defense of the fatherland and the common Allied cause. To secure "close contact with the organized public forces and impart to the Government the necessary stability and power," a Provisional Council of the Republic (better known as the Preliminary Parliament) was promised, with "the right of addressing questions to the Government and of securing replies to them in a definite period of time" and of discussing legislative acts and public problems. This program, the government hoped, would rally all the citizens of Russia to its support, restore law and order and lead the country to the sovereign Constituent Assembly.

But the tempest was not to be lulled with fair words. When Bonar Law announced that the Allied conference would discuss not the aims of the war but only the methods of conducting it, the Bolshevist press exulted. From their Petrograd headquarters in Smolny Institute the Bolsheviks redoubled their propaganda efforts and soon won controlling influence in the soviets. They summoned the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets to meet on November 7 and won a majority of the delegates in the elections to it. Trotsky, now President of the Petrograd Soviet, made ominous preparations for armed insurrection by organizing the garrison and the armed workers of the Capital into a Red Guard directed by a Military Revolutionary Committee. On the front the menacing advance of the German

armies led the Provisional Government to consider the evacuation of the city. But the Provisional Government was now a shadow. Its days were literally numbered and their number was very few.

On November 1 Kerensky, in an interview granted to the Associated Press, denied the rumors that Russia was out of the war, but admitted that her Allies must now bear the brunt of the struggle against the Central Powers. Russia, he asserted, was worn out. The masses were disappointed. The future was unpredictable.[95] The reports of this interview first appeared in American newspapers in abbreviated form with scare headlines which led the State Department to issue the following statement:

> There has been absolutely nothing in the dispatches received by the Department of State from Russia nor in information derived from any other sources whatever, to justify the impression created by the *Washington Post* to-day, principally by the headline "Russia Quits War," that Russia is out of the conflict. A reading of the full interview with Premier Kerensky, of which the paper published only an abbreviated and preliminary account, itself shows that the headline is entirely unwarranted.
>
> Our own advices show that the Provisional Government in Petrograd is attacking with great energy the problems confronting it. Reports received from Petrograd by mail and telegraph show that Premier Kerensky and his Government, far from yielding to discouragement, are still animated by a strong determination to organize all Russia's resources in a whole-hearted resistance and carry the war through to a victorious conclusion. At the same time this Government, like those of the Allies, is rendering all possible assistance.[96]

The Russian Embassy in Washington also repudiated the suggestion of a separate peace and insisted that Russia's military efforts were still a factor to be reckoned with.[97] Such optimism was a poor preparation for the shock of coming events. Within a week the final curtain was to fall and Kerensky's Government was to become only a memory.

CHAPTER THREE

THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTION

1. First Reactions to the Soviet Government; the Peace Issue

In the early morning hours of November 7,[1] the day set for the meeting of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the Red Guards of Petrograd were called out by the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and began the seizure of public buildings.[2] Kerensky, finding all the troops in the Capital under Bolshevist control, decided to seek safety in flight. Since all his own motor cars had been disabled, he asked the use of the car of the secretary of the American Embassy and fled to the front under the protection of the American flag. Francis later approved of his secretary's action, but strove to conceal the incident.[3] While the Congress of Soviets assembled the Bolshevist forces bombarded the last defenders of the Provisional Government in the Winter Palace. After a group of Menshevist and Socialist Revolutionary representatives departed in indignation, the Congress unanimously approved the decrees on land and peace read by Lenin and created a Council of People's Commissars with Lenin as President, Trotsky as Minister of Foreign Affairs and the other Bolshevist leaders occupying the remaining posts in the new cabinet. The Congress then dissolved. The Soviet régime had begun.

A brief period of civil war consolidated the control of Russia's new rulers. In Moscow the Red Guards captured the Kremlin after a week of severe street fighting. In other urban centers the transition was generally effected without bloodshed, the Bolshevized soviets replacing the feeble authority of the thoroughly discredited Provisional Government without resistance. Kerensky sought to rally a force of Cossacks to his support, but his troops were decisively beaten at Tsarkoye Selo by the Red Guards and he went into hiding and later fled the country.[4] Sporadic outbreaks and widespread sabotage against the Red dictatorship were encountered, but by the end of the month the new régime had established its power throughout most of central Russia.[5]

The first reaction in the United States and the Allied nations to the news of these dramatic events was one of doubt and incredulity. Before full reports were received it was believed that the coup d'état in Petrograd had only local significance. Ambassador Bakhmeteff, then in Memphis, Tennessee, asserted that the "Maximalists" were powerful only in Petrograd and would soon be repudiated by the rest of the country. The opinion was widespread that the new authorities in no sense represented the nation and that Russia would continue fighting on the side of the Allies.[6] On November 9 the Department of State and the Russian Embassy agreed that the new régime could not endure. The cabinet discussed the situation and concluded that hope need not be abandoned. All commentators, from the Department of the Treasury in Washington to Admiral Kolchak, visiting the Pacific coast at the head of a Russian naval commission, were certain that the rule of the Bolsheviks would come to a speedy end.[7] On November 10 Ambassador Bakhmeteff repudiated the new government:

> The Petrograd events are a revolt of a party against a national government. The Maximalists are in no way representative of the whole of Russia. If they have succeeded in seizing power and formed a "Maximalist Government," such a Government cannot express the will of the nation. Consequently, the Russian Embassy in Washington will refuse to accept its authority.[8]

On the 24th Bakhmeteff was assured by Lansing that the United States would ignore the Soviet Government and would continue to recognize him as Russian ambassador. Bakhmeteff declared that he would remain at his post "to uphold firmly the dignity of national and loyal Russia, and to maintain the responsibility of all engagements and commitments of the legal Government of Russia which has been intrusted to me. I will continue to carry such duties unless another legal representative, recognized as such by the United States Government, would take charge of the representation of Russia after a formal acceptance of the whole of its functions, duties and liabilities." [9]

In Russia itself the Allied and American representatives displayed no disposition to recognize the Soviet régime. On November 8 Ambassador Francis wrote to Consul General Summers in Moscow:

> It is reported that the Petrograd Council of Workmen and Soldiers has named a cabinet with Lenin as Premier, Trotsky as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Madame or Mlle. Kollontai as Minister of Education. Disgusting!—but I hope such effort will be made as the more ridiculous the situation the sooner the remedy.[10]

When Francis learned that the British, French and American Military Attachés had called upon Col. Mouravieff, the new Red commander of the Petrograd district, to ask protection for the Embassies and Legations, he expressed his disapproval and ordered that none of his staff should take any action that might be construed as recognition of the new government. He declined all offers of military protection from the Bolshevist authorities.[11] Consul General Summers joined the consular corps in Moscow in appealing to the new rulers for the protection of foreign citizens, making it clear, however, that this did not constitute recognition.[12] The British Ambassador agreed with his colleagues on the impossibility of recognition, but believed that certain informal contacts with the new powers through the medium of consuls were very desirable.[13]

On the 19th of November Francis addressed a message "To the People of Russia" in which he reviewed the course of Russian-American relations since the March Revolution, dwelling upon the prompt recognition extended to the Provisional Government by the United States, the economic aid extended, the good will and encouragement expressed by the Root Mission, the work of the railroad commission, and the unselfish war aims of the United States set forth by President Wilson. He continued:

If reports received daily are to be credited, even partially, the Russian people are engaged in fratricidal strife and are paying no attention to the approach of a powerful enemy who is already on Russian soil. There is no power whose authority is recognized throughout Russia; your industries are neglected and many of your people are crying for food. This need can be supplied if you will permit the American railway commission to continue its helpful work, as there is sufficient food in Russia to feed all her people if properly distributed. An able and experienced railroad operator is clearing from America today with three hundred and forty engineers, skilled mechanics, and operatives for Vladivostok in accordance with an agreement between the Department of Ways and Communications and the American Railway Commission. I have cabled my Government urging that your internal conditions be not permitted to prevent the coming of this assistance.*

I have not lost faith in the ability of the Russian people to solve their own problems. On the contrary, I believe that your patriotism, your pride, your sense of right, and your love of justice will remove the dif-

* This party, under the command of George Emerson, had been assembled at the joint request of the railway commission and Ambassador Francis, and planned to leave Seattle November 19. Francis cabled the State Department that it should be permitted to depart, since he had no confidence in the survival of the Soviet Government and that its assistance would be welcomed in any case. The party met Stevens at Vladivostok, but soon proceeded to Japan where it remained many months.[14]

ficulties that beset your pathway. But the time you have therefore is extremely limited. A powerful enemy is at your gates. A desperate foe is sowing the seeds of dissension in your midst. . . . I appeal to you to be watchful of your true interests, and I make this appeal on behalf of my Government and my people, with whom you have ever borne friendly relations, and who cherish a sincere, deep interest in your welfare. I make this appeal also for myself. I have lived in your midst for more than a year and a half. I have studied your character and admire your many excellent traits. I think if you are now mindful of your true interests your future will be more glorious than your most sanguine expectations.[15]

On the following day American newspapers carried a dispatch from Washington to the effect that the government would permit no more supplies to be sent from the United States to Russia pending the establishment of a "stable government." The embargo, it was said, would be permanent if the Bolsheviks retained control and pursued their program of peace with Germany. Ships already loaded would be denied bunker coal. General Kaledin, the Cossack leader resisting the Bolsheviks in the south, was hailed as "the man of the hour."[16] On the 25th, Brigadier General William V. Judson, Military Attaché to the American Embassy, informed the Chief of the Russian General Staff at Petrograd of the embargo by letter:

It occurs to me that it is but fair to convey to your Excellency the circumstance that neither I nor the American Ambassador has as yet received from the United States of America instructions or information similar to that contained in the press report quoted above. Nevertheless, it seems but fair to express to your Excellency the opinion that the press report correctly states the attitude of the Government of the United States. We are in daily expectation of receiving information similar to that conveyed by the above-mentioned press report.

Before sending you this communication I have submitted it to the American Ambassador who concurs in the expressions contained in it.[17]

Two days later Lieut. Col. William Boyce Thompson, successor to Col. Frank Billings at the head of the American Red Cross Mission to Russia, made a public statement that he had no intimation of a discontinuance of the shipment of Red Cross supplies and no anticipation of any such action.[18] On the 28th it was officially denied in Washington that any embargo had been imposed.[19] But concurrently with the suspension of further cash advances to Russia by the Treasury Department, shipments of supplies contracted for by Ambassador Bakhmeteff and his agents were stopped by the Russian Supply Committee in the United States when it became clear that they would fall into the hands of the Bolshevist authorities on their

arrival. That his course received the tacit approval of the State Department is not open to question, since the general uncertainty of the situation and the already prevalent view that the Bolsheviks were German agents dictated a cessation of shipments until it could be known that supplies sent would not ultimately fall into the hands of the Central Powers.

The expressed determination of the Bolsheviks to bring the war to an end was the cause of much of the anxiety and contempt with which their rule was regarded in the Allied countries. An immediate, general, democratic peace was one of the cardinal points in the Bolshevists' program and they had no intention of continuing Russia's participation in a "capitalist" and "imperialist" war. On November 21 Trotsky addressed his first formal note to Francis and the Allied ambassadors:

> I herewith have the honor to inform you, Mr. Ambassador, that the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies organized on the 8th of November a new Government of the Russian Republic, the Council of People's Commissaries. The chairman of this government is Vladimir Ilitch Lenin, and the direction of foreign policy is intrusted to me as People's Commissary of Foreign Affairs.
>
> Calling your attention to the text of the proposed armistice and democratic peace without annexations and indemnities, and on the basis of self-determination of nations which was approved by the All-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, I have the honor to request you to consider the above-mentioned document as a formal proposal for an immediate armistice on all fronts and the immediate opening of peace negotiations, with which proposal the plenipotentiary Government of the Russian Republic appeals simultaneously to all the warring peoples and their governments.
>
> Accept assurances, Mr. Ambassador, of the sincere respect of the Soviet Government for the people of the United States, who like all other people are worn out by this unexampled butchery and who cannot but aim for peace.[20]

The note to the Allied "peoples and their governments" received no response. Allied indifference and contempt was soon turned to indignation when Trotsky began the publication of the secret treaties which he found in the Russian Foreign Office archives.[21] Hasty protests and allegations of forgery concealed but poorly the anger and dismay which greeted this unceremonious dragging forth of the skeletons in the Allied closet.

The Russian commanders had already received orders to begin negotiations with the enemy for an armistice when the Allied ambassadors received the peace note of November 21.[22] The Allied

Military Attachés (not including General Judson, however) proceeded on the 23rd to address General Dukhonin over the head of the Soviet Government, threatening "most serious consequences" if Russia should make a separate peace in violation of the inter-Allied agreement of September 5, 1914.[23] This warning was followed by another from General Berthelot, chief of the French Military Mission, who informed Dukhonin that France would not recognize the Soviet Government or "any government capable of entering into an agreement with the enemy" and expected that he would "categorically repudiate all criminal negotiations, and hold the Russian army at the front facing the common enemy." [24]

On the 22nd the Soviet Government had removed Dukhonin for insubordination and appointed Krylenko as his successor. This Allied appeal to the deposed commander to defy the orders of the Council of People's Commissars naturally incensed Trotsky. The warning of "serious consequences" was interpreted as a threat to call upon Japan to attack Russia. The Commissar of Foreign Affairs waxed eloquent over this attempt on the part of the "imperialistic" Allied Governments to whip the Russian workers and peasants back to the shambles. Even the British ambassador was obliged to admit that the warning to Dukhonin was "an ill-advised step that has done us any amount of harm." [25] Buchanan, in fact, already felt that Allied pressure to keep Russia in the war was a mistaken policy and urged his government to release Russia from the obligations of the 1914 treaty.[26]

Francis had held himself aloof from this controversy, but on the 27th Lieut. Col. Kerth, of the American Military Mission at the front, addressed Dukhonin in turn:

> In accordance with definite instructions from my Government transmitted to me by the Ambassador of the United States of America in Petrograd, I have the honor to inform you that in view of the fact that the Republic of the United States is carrying on a war in alliance with Russia, which war has as its basis the struggle of democracy against autocracy, my Government categorically and energetically protests against any separate armistice which may be made by Russia.[27]

This action evoked a strong protest from Trotsky:

> Such a state of affairs cannot be tolerated. Nobody demands from the present Allied diplomats the recognition of the Soviet Government. But at the same time the Soviet Government, which is responsible for the fate of the country, cannot allow Allied diplomatic and military agents for any purpose to interfere in the internal life of our country and at-

tempt to fan civil wars. Further steps in the same direction will immediately provoke the most serious complications, the responsibility for which the Council of People's Commissaries refuses beforehand to accept.[28]

Kerth's action was apparently ordered by Francis without authorization from Washington. Indeed, the American Government was so incredulous of the news of the Allied protest to Dukhonin that it pronounced it German propaganda.[29] When the report of Kerth's protest was confirmed, it was declared that Francis had acted on his own initiative. The State Department at the time was disturbed by reports that German staff officers were in Petrograd acting as military advisers of Lenin, but the Russian Embassy feared that any hostile treatment of Russia might "drive her into the hands of the enemy." [30] Early in December it was said that the government had no intention of "abandoning" Russia, but would do all in its power to save the country from the clutches of Germany. It was further stated that shipments of supplies had not been stopped except where they were controlled by the Russian Embassy.[31]

On November 28, General Judson addressed a second letter to the chief of the Russian General Staff, explaining that nothing in his first "should be construed as indicating that my government has or may be expected to express preference for the success in Russia of any one political party or element over another." He expressed confidence that "no important fraction of the Russian people desires an immediate separate peace or armistice," but conceded that Russia had a right to bring up the question of a general peace. "There is no reason why the attitude of her Allies toward Russia or toward any important elements in Russia should be upon anything but a most friendly foundation." [32] On the same day Trotsky asked the Allied representatives whether their governments wished to participate in the armistice and peace negotiations to be opened with the German Supreme Command on December 3.[33]

On December 1 General Judson paid a visit to Trotsky at Smolny Institute for the purpose of entering into informal relations and clearing up misunderstandings. He declared that the Allies could scarcely be expected to participate in the coming negotiations. Trotsky rejoined that they might join the discussions at a later stage since they were to have full publicity. Judson asked leave to transmit this reply to the American Government and asserted that "the time of protests and threats addressed to the Soviet Government has passed, if that time ever existed." As for the Kerth protest,

Trotsky declared that it might be considered a closed incident in view of this statement.[84]

This visit constituted the first direct intercourse between a member of the Embassy Staff and a high official of the Soviet Government. Francis explained that it was entirely unofficial and Judson himself stated that he had no right to speak in the name of the American Government. Trotsky, however, was highly gratified and saw hope of recognition in the event.[85] One month later General Judson was recalled to Washington.* No reason for this action was indicated, but the allegation of Raymond Robins, that the recall was due to official disapproval of the visit to Smolny, seems not unplausible.[87]

The end of the first month of the Soviet régime thus found Russian-American relations and Russian-Allied relations in a quite undefined and uncertain state. Apart from the war situation the character of the new government caused it to be viewed with great alarm and dislike. The first reactions in Washington and the western European capitals to the Bolshevist experiment showed that it was regarded much as conservative statesmen of earlier days had regarded the French "Red Republic" of 1848 and the Paris Commune of 1871. As the lineal descendant of these previous attempts at social revolution, it could expect to share their fate—suppression by force at the hands of its enemies at home and abroad. As a régime of international revolutionists, ruling in the name of the working class and dedicated to the Marxian ideals of class war and world-wide proletarian revolt to overthrow capitalism and the supremacy of the bourgeoisie, it could arouse feelings only of fear and abhorrence among those whose political philosophy and material interests were menaced by the Bolshevist dreamers. Their only consolation was the hope that the Red nightmare would be of brief duration. Somewhere, somehow, a great leader would arise to "save" Russia. Dukhonin was lynched by his own soldiers early in December. Kaledin was presently to blow out his brains in despair. But the faith of the western governments was unshaken. Other leaders would arise around whom the "sane" elements could rally for the rescue of the stricken nation.

The whole problem was colored and complicated, however, by the war situation. The prospective consequences to the Allies of Russia's retiring from the conflict were so terrifying to contemplate

* "Judson received Jan. 1st cable ordering him to report to Washington. . . Order recalling Judson directed Kerth to remain here temporarily." The State Department files indicate no reason for the recall.[86]

that few Allied leaders could calmly face such a possibility. The announced intention of the Bolsheviks to make peace, coupled with their attacks on Allied "imperialism" and their revelations of the secret treaties, aroused as much alarm and disgust as the political theories which they sought to put into practice in Russia. That their aim was a general peace rather than a separate one brought small solace, for peace at the end of 1917, after the recent disasters of Caporetto and Chemin Des Dames, would be a "peace without victory" for the Allies. With America's huge resources slowly tipping the scales against the Central Powers, such a settlement was not to be contemplated. Yet to ignore the possible effect of the Soviet peace pronunciamentos on the war-weary populations of the Allied nations would be folly. Much ignorance, confusion and dissension prevailed as to the course the Allied Governments should pursue toward the Bolshevist régime.[38] But the challenge of the Russian peace formulæ had somehow to be met. And President Wilson, in his message to Congress of December 4, 1917, recommending a declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, plainly showed that he was giving serious thought to the problem.

> You catch, with me, the voices of humanity that are in the air. They grow daily more audible, more articulate, more persuasive and they come from the hearts of men everywhere. They insist that the war shall not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation or people shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have themselves done deep and abominable wrong. It is this thought that has been expressed in the formula "No annexations, no contributions, no punitive indemnities." Just because this crude formula expresses the instinctive judgment as to right of plain men everywhere it has been made diligent use of by the masters of German intrigue to lead the people of Russia astray—and the people of every other country their agents could reach, in order that a premature peace might be brought about before autocracy has been taught its final and convincing lesson, and the people of the world put in control of their own destinies.
>
> But the fact that a wrong use has been made of a just idea is no reason why a right use should not be made of it. It ought to be brought under the patronage of its real friends. . . .[39]

And he further recognized that an earlier statement of war aims might have been of value in keeping Russia in the war:

> I cannot help thinking that if they had been made plain at the very outset the sympathy and enthusiasm of the Russian people might have been once for all enlisted on the side of the Allies, suspicion and distrust swept away, and a real and lasting union of purpose effected. Had they believed these things at the very moment of their revolution and had

they been confirmed in that belief since, the sad reverses which have recently marked the progress of their affairs toward an ordered and stable government of free men might have been avoided. The Russian people have been poisoned by the very same falsehoods that have kept the German people in the dark, and the poison has been administered by the very same hands. The only possible antidote is the truth. It cannot be uttered too plainly or too often.[40]

2. Raymond Robins; the Kalpaschnikoff Affair

The American Red Cross Mission which reached Petrograd early in August, 1917, included among its members Col. William Boyce Thompson and Col. Raymond Robins, the former a wealthy manufacturer and banker from New York and the latter a business man and social worker from Chicago. With the departure of Col. Frank G. Billings, Thompson became head of the mission and when he left in turn at the end of November the post fell to Robins. Both men were brought into contact with people from all levels of society and took a keen interest in the political situation, striving to learn the programs of each party group and to understand the significance of each new change in the government.[41] So active was this interest and so assiduous were their efforts to attend political gatherings and to meet the leaders of all groups, including the Bolsheviks, that they were criticized in conservative Russian circles for "mixing in politics" to the neglect of their relief work.[42] Even Tereshchenko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs under Kerensky, seems to have shared these suspicions.[43]

But the activities of both men were motivated by a perfectly natural interest in the great human drama going on about them. Being limited by none of the legal or psychological restrictions which hedge the outlook and actions of diplomatic representatives, they felt free to discover what they could of the realities of the complex situation into which they were thrust. Robins, in particular, had little patience with what he termed "the indoor mind" of the drawing-rooms, dinner parties, tea tables and palaces as a tool of understanding mass revolutionary movements.[44] He claimed that his work in Russia, as in America, took him "outdoors" among all classes.[45] He was at once impressed by the fact that outside of Petrograd the Kerensky Government was a myth and that all effective power was everywhere exercised by the local soviets.[46] Both Thompson and Robins perceived that the Korniloff "revolt" was foredoomed to failure by soviet resistance.[47] Both men believed that the peace movement was

due not to German or Bolshevist propaganda, but to the exhaustion and despair of all classes of the war-tortured population. Col. Thompson gave approximately a million dollars of his own money for the purpose of disseminating the American view of the issues involved in the war and inspiring renewed exertions in resisting the Central Powers, but he received little encouragement or support from Washington.[48] Both Thompson and Robins sought practical ways and means of keeping Russia in the war while Allied diplomatic and military circles petulantly criticized the weakness of Kerensky and failed completely to foresee his inevitable disappearance from the scene.[49]

Shortly after the November Revolution, Robins called upon Trotsky. He informed the new Minister of Foreign Affairs that he had favored Kerensky and had done all in his power to prevent the Bolshevist triumph, but that he believed the thing to do with a corpse is "to bury it, not sit up with it" and he would deal with any authorities in actual control. Robins's purpose was to discover the possibility and desirability of continuing the work of his Red Cross mission under the new régime. He desired to dispatch thirty-two cars of Red Cross supplies from Petrograd to the American Red Cross Mission under Col. Anderson in Jassy, Rumania, and requested assistance and protection from Trotsky in order to test the power of the new government and its willingness to co-operate. Trotsky assented and the cars arrived in Jassy safely and on time. Similarly Robins found, when he sought to move some 400,000 cans of condensed milk from Murmansk to Petrograd for relief work, that Trotsky's orders were honored everywhere and all needed aid and protection was extended by the soviets.[50]

These contacts, being quite unofficial, were at first acquiesced in and later encouraged by Ambassador Francis. The latter soon perceived that his continued presence in Russia would require the establishment of communication of some kind with the de facto authorities if he were to secure the facilities essential for carrying on the work of the Embassy. Since any direct or formal contacts would savor of diplomatic recognition, Francis welcomed the opportunity to use Robins as a liaison between the Embassy and the Soviet Foreign Office. Though the two men were far apart in social outlook, in American political affiliations, and in their attitudes toward the revolution, they co-operated constantly and successfully for over six months.[51] When the State Department, at the end of December, began to have doubts concerning the wisdom of these informal rela-

tions, Francis joined Robins in urging the necessity of continued intercourse with the Soviet Government, and no further efforts were made to sever the connections which Robins maintained.[52]

Indeed, it appeared at this time that the relations between the Bolshevist régime and American representatives were steadily improving and that co-operation was destined to increase. The American Railway Commission continued its work in Siberia and kept in close touch with the Department of Communications at Petrograd.[53] The Red Cross Mission continued its relief activities. Basil Miles, Chief of the Division of Russian Affairs in the State Department, was of the opinion that large expenditures should be made by the United States for propaganda and relief work in Russia and that food supplies should be forwarded without delay.[54] Even the Bolshevist propaganda of world-wide social revolution, later to cause such alarm and resentment in the United States, was not only tolerated but encouraged in December of 1917. While it was aimed at all other governments, its immediate target was Germany, and both Robins and Edgar Sisson, representative in Russia of the Committee on Public Information, felt that it might be made to serve a purpose useful to the Allied cause in undermining German morale. Sisson, in fact, paid Robins a considerable sum of money to further the propaganda activities of the Bolsheviks.[55]

These instances of co-operation, however, constituted but one aspect of the situation. There were, on the other hand, sufficient evidences of mutual suspicion and hostility to make future amicable relations a matter of serious doubt. Numerous Allied and American officials continued to hope for the speedy downfall of the Soviet Government. It was even suggested that the National City Bank of New York, depository of the funds of the Russian Embassy, be permitted to pay $500,000 out of these funds for the purchase of silver to be transmitted through British agents to Kaledin, the anti-Bolshevist commander in south Russia.[56] So far as can be ascertained, no such aid was granted, due perhaps to the sudden dissolution of Kaledin's army and his own death. But while he retained forces which were a potential threat to the Soviet Government, the Bolshevist leaders kept a suspicious eye open for evidences of Allied or American assistance to the counter-revolutionary cause. This suspicion led to an incident which is worth recounting briefly for the light which it throws on the true character of Russian-American relations at the time.

At the center of the affair was one Col. Andrew Kalpaschnikoff,

who had been a secretary in the Russian Embassy in the United States from 1910 to 1914 and who by a lecture tour in 1916 had secured subscriptions in the United States to pay for a large number of motor ambulances. He was at this time in the employ of Col. Anderson, chief of the American Red Cross Mission in Rumania. In December, 1917, he was in Petrograd with some seventy-five Ford motor cars which he had been ordered by Col. Anderson to send to Jassy, Rumania. Fearing their seizure by the Soviet authorities he was anxious to have them sent with all possible dispatch.[57] On December 7 Ambassador Francis received a telegram from Col. Anderson for Kalpaschnikoff, sent through Charles J. Vopicka, American Minister to Rumania, in the diplomatic code, ordering the shipment of all available motor cars as soon as possible to Rostov on the Don and informing Kalpaschnikoff that Francis would provide him with necessary financial aid up to 100,000 rubles out of American Red Cross funds.[58] Francis at the same time received a telegram from Anderson through Vopicka requesting that he facilitate Kalpaschnikoff's mission and supply the money required. Kalpaschnikoff and the American Red Cross Mission each received a paraphrase of the former telegram some days later.

Francis was disposed to lend his aid, but Robins had grave misgivings. Rostov was the headquarters of Kaledin, and Robins had no desire to become a party to what he suspected was a scheme to send supplies to the counter-revolutionary leader.[59] Anderson's motives seemed very obscure at the time. Subsequently it appeared that he feared the fall of Jassy to the Germans and wished to save the supplies from falling into their hands by taking them via Rostov across the Caucasus and through Mesopotamia to the British Army.[60] Robins later declared that the motive was to rescue the Queen of Rumania by the same route.[61] In any case, it seems established that Anderson and Francis at least, whatever may have been Kalpaschnikoff's purposes, had no intention of aiding counter-revolution. But at the time both Robins and the Soviet Government were very suspicious of the project. Robins accordingly displayed no marked enthusiasm for expediting the shipment, greatly to Kalpaschnikoff's chagrin.[62] While the Colonel expostulated to Francis over the obstruction he was encountering, the well-informed Bolshevist authorities prepared to close their net.

At 2 A.M., December 21, Kalpaschnikoff was arrested and incarcerated in the prison fortress of SS. Peter and Paul.[63] His apartment

was ransacked and he was accused of conniving with the American Embassy to send assistance to Kaledin and of instigating a counter-revolutionary plot.[64] Trotsky was in great glee at the opportunity which the occasion presented to assail Francis and refused to listen to Robins's attempted explanations.[65] His chief piece of evidence was Anderson's telegram transmitted through the American Ambassador. This was presumably found among Kalpaschnikoff's personal effects, but he later told Francis that his copy had been carefully concealed and was not discovered. This led Francis, three years later, when old friendships had waned, to allege that Robins or one of his aids must have supplied the tell-tale paraphrase to the Commissar of Foreign Affairs,[66] a charge which Robins declared a "false and cowardly slur." [67] Whatever the source of his evidence, Trotsky proceeded to make use of it at once. On the evening of December 21 he addressed a huge mass-meeting and waxed eloquent over the lurid details, real and imagined, of the "American plot." "The Ambassador," he cried, "will now have to break his golden silence. An Ambassador who does such is no more an Ambassador, but an adventurer, and the heavy hand of the revolution will deal with him." [68] On the following day *Izvestia* carried scare headlines and reproduced much of the evidence for the charges against the American Embassy.[69]

In view of the furor which these charges aroused, Francis made a public explanation to the press:

> Instructions of my Government are very definite and positive prohibiting any interference by any American representative in Russia in the internal affairs of this country. I have observed these instructions scrupulously and, so far as my authority extends, have directed their strict observance by all connected with the American Embassy or under its control. The charge or insinuation that I was aiding Kaledin or any other of the numerous and varied factions in Russia is absolutely without foundation and my statement to this effect should be sufficient to convince all of its truth and correctness. . . .
>
> It is inconceivable that further documentary evidence or statements are needed to disprove the incendiary allegations intended to arouse animosity toward the American Government, this Embassy or the American people, or to attribute to the American Government or its representatives an act so wholly contrary to its traditional policy.[70]

Francis furnished the texts of later telegrams and letters from Anderson canceling the Rostov order and showing that the charge of aiding Kaledin was wholly without foundation. Trotsky and the Soviet press seemed not entirely convinced.[71] Kalpaschnikoff was

kept in prison some five months.[72] But either from lack of evidence or from considerations of expediency, the Soviet authorities took no further action. Robins was soon restored to their good graces and continued to serve Francis as before.

The incident shows clearly the fear and distrust with which the Bolshevist leaders regarded Allied and American agents in Russia. Knowing that these agents, for the most part, were bitterly hostile to the Soviet Government and looked eagerly for its overthrow, they naturally anticipated that diplomatic proprieties would not long stand in the way of their giving what assistance they could to counter-revolutionary elements. But it was not yet the policy of the American Government to take sides in Russian disputes. Even before the tea-pot tempest of the Kalpaschnikoff affair, the American Military Mission disclaimed all connection with Kaledin,[73] and on December 26 it was announced in Washington that "American representatives in Russia, diplomatic, economic and others, would carefully avoid any interference with the internal politics of the country and be guided in their conduct by the strictest rules of neutrality as between the Russian factions. It is the purpose to permit the Russian people themselves to work out their own salvation, free from any American interference." [74] This policy, it was indicated, was dictated primarily by the realization that an attitude of hostility would further the plans of Germany to produce a definite Russian-Allied break.

CHAPTER FOUR

BREST-LITOVSK AND ITS AFTERMATH

1. The Peace of Brest-Litovsk

RUSSIA's relations with the Central Powers were, in fact, the most important single consideration in determining the policy which the Allied and American Governments were to pursue toward her during the months to come. The Bolshevist leaders continued to hope that the Allies would participate in the impending peace negotiations. On December 6 Trotsky addressed a note to the Allied ambassadors, informing them that the armistice negotiations which had been opened at Brest-Litovsk three days previously had been suspended for one week "to give an opportunity to the governments of the Allied countries to define their attitude to the peace negotiations:—that is, to express their readiness or their refusal to participate in the negotiations for an armistice and peace, and in the case of a refusal to openly state before the world, clearly, definitely and correctly, in the name of what purpose must the people of Europe bleed during the fourth year of war."[1]

Since no reply was received, the pourparlers were resumed and on December 15 a formal armistice was concluded.[2] Hostilities had long since ceased on the eastern front and the determination of the Soviet Government to conclude a separate peace if a general peace could not be obtained could no longer be doubted.

The Bolshevist publication of the Allied secret treaties and their continued denunciation of the war aims of the Entente were causing considerable concern in the Allied Foreign Offices. On January 5, 1918, Foreign Secretary Balfour addressed a secret telegram to the American State Department reviewing the negotiations of Lloyd George with the British trade unions and expressing the need of a restatement of war aims. He concluded:

> Should the President himself make a statement of his own views which in view of the appeal made to the peoples of the world by the Bolsheviki might appear a desirable course, the Prime Minister is confident that such a statement would also be in general accordance with the lines of the President's previous speeches, which in England as well as in other

countries have been so warmly received by public opinion. Such a further statement would naturally receive an equally warm welcome.[3]

Two days previously Edgar Sisson had cabled George Creel from Petrograd to the effect that he could "feed into Germany in great quantities" and use in Russia as well a presidential restatement of "anti-imperialistic war aims and democratic peace requisites of America, thousand words or less, short almost placard paragraphs, short sentences."[4]

On January 8 President Wilson issued his memorable peace program in an address before both houses of Congress. He opened his message by referring directly to the parleys at Brest-Litovsk, where, he declared, the Russian representatives were "sincere and earnest" and had insisted "very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit of modern democracy" on full publicity in the negotiations, but found themselves dealing with agents of the Central Powers who seemed to represent not their parliaments or peoples but "that military and imperialistic minority which has so far dominated their whole policy." But the challenge must be responded to. Lloyd George had spoken "with admirable candor and in admirable spirit for the people and Government of Great Britain."

> There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. . . . They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in what if in anything our purpose and our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe the people of the United States would wish me to respond, with utter simplicity and frankness. Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.

The historic "fourteen points" followed. They are too familiar to require repetition here, but the sixth, relating to Russia, is of special interest:

> VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their

good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.[5]

The attitude and policy of the American Government toward Russia at this period seem too clearly stated in President Wilson's own words to be misunderstood or to require extended comment or interpretation. No desire is expressed for the downfall of the Soviet Government. The Bolshevist delegates at Brest-Litovsk are freely conceded to be the spokesmen of the Russian people. If the first reaction of fear and hostility toward the November Revolution has not disappeared, it has at least been completely concealed under the necessity of meeting the challenge of the Soviet peace program and the hope of carrying to the Russian masses a message of sympathy and good will. Edgar Sisson secured wide publicity for the speech in Russia and it was not without its intended effect.[6] Just as the address as a whole seemed to carry a great hope and promise of a just and permanent peace to the peoples of the world, so also it appeared to promise sympathy, helpfulness and amicable intercourse in future Russian-American relations.

And indeed the course of events in the early months of 1918 made it appear more than likely that this promise would be realized. The middle of January saw Ambassador Francis making a formal call on Lenin, for the first time, and, as it proved, for the last. The occasion, to be sure, was inauspicious. The Rumanian Minister, M. Diamandi, had been arrested. The Diplomatic Corps was outraged at this violation of its legal immunities and it marched in a body, with Francis at its head as Dean during Buchanan's absence, to make its protest to the Red Premier. The conference was friendly and the arrested minister was released.[7] The State Department made it clear, however, that this call was not to be regarded as a recognition of the Soviet Government. Recognition could not be accorded, it was said, until assurances were had that the new régime could actually control the country.[8]

On January 18 the long-heralded Constituent Assembly at last met. Francis sought to persuade the Diplomatic Corps to attend its sessions in a body, but, failing, refrained from going alone.[9] The Assembly was dominated by the Socialist Revolutionaries, who refused to recognize the legality of the Soviet Government. After a day and a night of wrangling it was brusquely dispersed and disappeared. Robins, with the approval of Sisson, cabled home to William Boyce Thompson on the 23rd that its dissolution was generally accepted without protest as final and that the Soviet

Government was stronger than ever. He further declared that he could not too strongly recommend recognition and the conclusion of a modus vivendi to make generous and sympathetic co-operation possible.[10] Even Francis at this period momentarily abandoned his inflexible attitude:

> . . . When I suggested a change of policy in regard to the Bolshevik government which it (the State Department) had not recognized in accordance with my advice, it declined to follow the suggestion, saying my course had met with approval of Department and it saw no occasion to change it. I suggested such a change because I was disgusted with all political parties and all capitalistic interests in Russia for not organizing and deposing the Bolshevik government, whose principles were so reprehensible.[11]

But the Soviet decree of February 8, 1918, repudiating Russia's state debts, had an immediately chilling effect on prospects of American and Allied recognition. Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo had already suggested to Lansing that no Russian government be recognized which did not assume the obligations of the Provisional Government. The Secretary of State readily assented and the Interallied Financial Council took the same view.[12] The Diplomatic Corps informed the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs that it regarded all such decrees as non-existent and that foreign governments reserved the right to demand satisfaction for all losses occasioned by them.[13] The French Government, as Russia's largest creditor, was particularly perturbed. This open repudiation of national obligations was long to remain an obstacle to the restoration of normal relations between Russia and the rest of the world. All these matters, however, were subordinate to the supremely important issues being decided at Brest-Litovsk. At the end of December the negotiations were again suspended for ten days to give the Allied Powers a last opportunity to participate. On the 29th Trotsky addressed a long, bitter and threatening note to the peoples and governments of the Allied countries, assailing the Allied refusal to join the negotiations "for reasons which they stubbornly refuse to state" and giving warning that Russia must make a separate peace if the Allies persisted in making a general peace impossible.[14]

> If the Allied Governments in the blind stubbornness which characterizes decadent and perishing classes, once more refuse to participate in the negotiations, then the working class will be confronted by the iron necessity of taking the power out of the hands of those who cannot or will not give the people peace. . . .
>
> Addressing to the Governments the last proposal to participate in the

peace negotiations, we at the same time promise full support to the working class of each country which will rise against its national imperialists, against chauvinists, against militarists, under the banner of peace, brotherhood of peoples, and socialistic reconstruction of society.[15]

But Allied "stubbornness" remained unmoved by such appeals. Allied official circles were much impressed with the possibilities of disaster which a separate peace in the east presented, but perceived no means of averting the calamity. In Washington the view prevailed that the demand for peace on the part of the Russian masses was so imperative that a separate peace must be accepted as inevitable.[16] Lenin himself believed Russia incapable of further resistance and made a carefully reasoned plea for "peace at any price" to his colleagues as early as January 8.[17] The chief accomplishment of the one brief session of the Constituent Assembly was the adoption of a resolution expressing "the firm will of the people to immediately discontinue the war and conclude a just and general peace."[18] To keep Russia in the war seemed an impossible task.

But Francis and Robins, in common with other Allied representatives in Russia, did not yet despair. Trotsky, they knew, was in favor of continuing the struggle if the Central Powers refused to accept the Russian peace formulæ. A German attempt to impose a peace of conquest would certainly arouse a new spirit of resistance, which, with proper encouragement and material assistance, might prevent the complete disappearance of the eastern front. The American Ambassador and his unofficial colleague were much impressed with this possibility and bestirred themselves to make it a reality. On January 2 Francis presented Robins with two documents. One was a "Suggested Communication to the Commissaire for Foreign Affairs" in which he pledged himself to recommend the fullest possible assistance to Russia and the recognition of the Soviet Government in the event of a renewal of the war with Germany.[19] The second document was a suggested cable to the State Department, to be sent in case the peace negotiations were discontinued and the war resumed, urging assistance and the establishment of informal relations with the Bolshevik Government.[20]

Neither of these documents was ever sent. The parleys at Brest-Litovsk did indeed break down because of the nature of the German demands, but the prospects of Russia's renewing the war remained uncertain. On February 10 the Russian delegates announced that they would never sign an annexationist peace. Yet they declared the war at an end.[21] When the German armies once more moved

forward, the Soviet Government had no alternative but surrender. Germany offered new and more drastic terms on February 23 in a forty-eight-hour ultimatum. Lenin, scorning those "intoxicated with revolutionary phrases," saw that the terms must be accepted. On March 3 Russia bowed to force majeure and signed away, in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Erivan, Kars, Batum, the Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic Provinces and Finland.[22] At the moment of signing, the Russian Peace Delegation issued a public protest against the "annexationist and imperialistic peace" which was accepted only under compulsion.

> We declare openly before the workmen, peasants, and soldiers of Russia and Germany, and before the laboring and exploited masses of the whole world, that we are forced to accept the peace dictated by those who, at the moment, are the more powerful, and that we are going to sign immediately the treaty presented to us as an ultimatum, but that at the same time we refuse to enter into any discussion of its terms.[23]

During the German advance, and particularly during the period between the signature and ratification of the treaty, many Allied and American representatives in Russia believed that the bitter resentment which the German attitude had provoked among all classes of the population presented a great opportunity for preventing the final acceptance of the peace and reviving Russian resistance to the Central Powers. Whether the United States and the Allies would take advantage of this opportunity remained to be seen. Robins had little doubt on this point after the assurances he had received from Francis. He kept in constant contact with Trotsky and found him eager for the American aid which Robins promised in the event of a renewal of the war. The Commissar of Foreign Affairs had complied with Robins's requests that he keep raw materials and military supplies from falling into the hands of the Germans and had even proposed that Allied and American officers undertake the task of enforcing the embargo against the export of goods to Germany.[24] He further proposed that the American Railway Mission at Nagasaki, Japan, return to Russia to help restore the railroad system and save the war supplies along the front from the German advance. But Robins found Allied diplomatic and military circles coldly indifferent to such projects and still hopeful of the early downfall of the Soviet Government.[25] Robins persisted in his efforts, but Trotsky became increasingly skeptical. One day he declared:

> Col. Robins, your embassy sends you here with a big bag marked "American help." You arrive every day, and you bring the bag into

my room, and you set it down beside your chair, and you keep reaching into it as you talk, and it is a powerful bag. But nothing comes out.[26]

On March 5, two days after the signing of the treaty, Trotsky made his memorable proposal to Robins to defeat the ratification of the peace in return for American and Allied aid against Germany. The document which he presented to Robins, in the presence of Lenin, for transmission to the American Government was an inquiry into the nature and extent of the aid and support which the United States and the Allies would extend to Russia if the war with Germany were resumed. It also asked what steps would be taken to prevent a possible Japanese landing in Siberia and to extend aid from Great Britain through Archangel and Murmansk. It concluded:

All these questions are conditioned with the self-understood assumption that the internal and foreign policies of the Soviet government will continue to be directed in accord with the principles of international socialism and that the Soviet government retains its complete independence of all non-socialist governments.[27]

Lenin agreed to oppose the ratification of peace at the forthcoming Congress of Soviets if the United States should return an encouraging reply. Robins at once hastened with the proposal to R. H. Bruce Lockhart, British representative since Buchanan's departure, who immediately cabled to Lloyd George, asking authority to inform Lenin that Japanese intervention had been shelved and that aid would be extended to the Soviet Government to fight Germany. Both Robins and Francis endeavored to send the proposal to Washington at once,[28] but owing to unavoidable delays it was not cabled from Vologda until 5 P.M. of March 12. In his accompanying message, Francis declared: "If Department thinks above questions require reply in addition to President's message (of March 11), shall transmit same to Trotsky through Robins when received."[29] Francis was as anxious as Robins to prevent the ratification of the peace, but he did not share the latter's confidence in the sincerity of Trotsky's offer and his misgivings undoubtedly influenced the reception accorded the offer at Washington. In his cable to the Department of March 9, 1918, Francis reiterated his conviction that Lenin and Trotsky were German agents. This opinion was expressed in the third paragraph of the cable, which is not included in the version contained in *Russian-American Relations*, pp. 85-86, and which was likewise omitted in the copy of the cable transmitted by Francis to Robins.

There thus seemed to be presented a last possibility of averting, or at least of mitigating in some measure, the disaster which Russia's defection represented for the Allied cause. The Soviet leaders, both before and after the ratification of the peace, seemed to believe that American aid would be forthcoming.[30] The fly in the ointment, from their point of view, was the persistent rumor of Japanese intervention in the Russian Far East. Lockhart had interviewed Trotsky on the morning of March 5 and in his telegram to the British Foreign Office of that date had emphatically asserted that Trotsky's offer was "our last chance" and that all possibilities for good in the situation would be nullified by Japanese intervention.[31] The action of the Allied and American Consuls in Vladivostok in attempting to prevent the establishment of Soviet authority in that city led the Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs, George Chicherin, to lodge with Robins on the same day a friendly protest against "this unpardonable interference in our internal affairs." [32] In his cables to the State Department of March 9 Francis likewise emphasized the unwisdom of Japanese intervention and recommended that the United States exert its influence to prevent it.[33]

On March 11 President Wilson addressed a message to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets to counteract the suspicions which the rumors of Japanese intervention had aroused.[34] The message was not a reply to Trotsky's offer, the full text of which had not yet been received in Washington, but was simply an expression of friendship and sympathy, regretting that the United States was "not now in a position" to extend direct and effective aid, but expressing determination to use every opportunity to secure for Russia complete sovereignty and independence.* The resolution which the Congress later adopted in response to Wilson's message was declared by Zinovieff to be a "slap in the face," and is not without interest as a sample of Bolshevist psychology:

> The congress expresses its gratitude to the American people, above all to the laboring and exploited classes of the United States, for the sympathy expressed to the Russian people by President Wilson through the Congress of Soviets in the days of severe trials.
>
> The Russian Socialist Federative Republic of Soviets takes advantage of President Wilson's communication to express to all peoples perishing and suffering from the horrors of imperialistic war its warm sympathy and firm belief that the happy time is not far distant when the laboring masses of all countries will throw off the yoke of capitalism and will establish a socialist state of society, which alone is capable of securing just

* *Cf.* Appendix I for full text.

and lasting peace, as well as the culture and well-being of all laboring people.[35]

On March 10 Robins, with Francis's approval, had proceeded to Moscow, where the All-Russian Congress was to meet.[36] He felt confident that he would soon receive a definite and favorable reply to the inquiries of the 5th, though the short time available for their consideration and the statement in Wilson's message that no immediate aid could be extended furnished little basis for optimism. He met Lenin on the afternoon of the 13th, but was obliged to say that he had not yet heard from his government.[37] On the same day the State Department sent its reply to Francis's cable of March 9. The reply dealt chiefly with the activities of the anti-Bolshevist Cossack ataman in Siberia, Gregory Semenoff, and briefly referred the ambassador to Wilson's message to the Congress of Soviets for a general statement of American policy: "President's message to Russian people and Department's telegrams of March 11 and 12 indicate clear purpose of this Government to assist Russia to restore her integrity and freedom." [38] No specific reference to Trotsky's offer was made. In a subsequent cable of March 19, in response to Francis's inquiry of the 12th, the Department declared that it "considers President's message to Russian people and address to Congress adequate answer." [39] Official Washington apparently attached little importance to the proposal of March 5 and looked forward to the ratification of the peace as a matter of course and to Japanese intervention as the logical result.[40]

In Moscow Robins waited in vain for some response to Trotsky's offer. The Congress of Soviets, postponed from the 12th as a consequence of Robins's appeal to Lenin, finally met on the 14th. The debate on the treaty commenced on the following day and lasted through the evening of the 16th. Much was said against the peace. Lenin spoke last.

At 11:20 he was sitting in a chair on the platform. Robins was sitting on the steps of the platform. Lenin waved to Robins to come to speak to him. Robins came. Lenin said: "What have you heard from your government?"

Robins said: "Nothing . . . What has Lockhart heard from London?"

Lenin said: "Nothing."

Then Lenin said: "I shall now speak for the peace. It will be ratified . . ."

He spoke for a necessary peace, a preparatory peace, a peace of respite and return. Red cards rose up in hands all over the house to approve. Red cards rose up to disapprove. The count was had.

Not voting, 204.
Voting against ratification, 276.
Voting in favor of ratification, 724.[41]

Russia was at peace with the Central Powers. In the opinion of Robins, a golden opportunity to bring about a resumption of the war on the eastern front had been lost. Speculation after the event as to the possible consequences of a different policy toward the Soviet régime on the part of the Allied and American Governments in the decisive days of early March can now be little more than an academic exercise. It may well be urged that Russia's fighting power had been so disintegrated that to send the aid asked for would have been pouring water into a sieve and would have had no appreciable effect in bringing the war in the west to an earlier close. Or it may be contended that the de facto acknowledgment and perhaps formal recognition of the Soviet Government which a favorable reply would have involved was too high a price to pay for a dubious return. Or, finally, it may be argued that the whole proposal of March 5 was insincere and that the Bolshevist leaders had long ago resolved upon peace with Germany at any cost. None of these hypotheses are subject to conclusive proof. All of them were considerations behind the policy adopted by the Allied and American Governments. The "offer," after all, was only a tentative and conditional inquiry which presented no assurance of any quid pro quo for the assistance asked. It reached Washington so late, moreover, that no adequate consideration could be given to it before the ratification of the peace, even had there been a disposition to regard it in a favorable light. Views will doubtless always differ concerning the sincerity of Trotsky's offer, the extent to which it presented a real possibility of undoing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the wisdom of the course followed by the western governments in ignoring it. But in any case the door was closed by the action of the Congress and Soviet Russia believed herself out of the war.

The United States and the Entente were of a very different opinion, however. Shortly after the acceptance of the treaty, Ambassador Francis issued a public declaration that he would remain in Russia and that American friendship for Russia was unbroken. He appealed to the nation to defy the treaty just concluded and, somewhat curiously, promised assistance for that purpose.[42] His statement was subsequently approved by the State Department,[43] which fully accepted the view of the treaty which Ambassador Bakhmeteff entertained. In a statement of March 18 he asserted that "the people of

Russia cannot accept as a definite solution of their struggle for liberty this settlement of violence brought forth by conquest, anarchy, and despair." The Embassy, he declared, would devote itself to the new task of national redemption and liberation, "conceivable only with the co-operation and direct support of the Allies." [44] The Allied Governments also took note of "the political crimes which have been committed against the Russian people" and proclaimed their refusal to acknowledge the peace.[45] President Wilson cited the treaty as evidence of the nefarious designs of Germany and accepted its challenge with the promise of force to the utmost.[46] In all the months that followed until the treaty was formally abrogated at the close of the Great War, the Allied and American Governments based all their policies toward Russia upon the assumption that the peace of Brest-Litovsk had no legal validity. In response to an inquiry from Japan, Acting Secretary of State Polk stated the American attitude as follows:

> In the view of the Government of the United States recent events have in no way altered the relations and obligation of this Government toward Russia. It does not feel justified in regarding Russia either as a neutral or as an enemy but continues to regard her as an ally. There is in fact no Russian government to deal with. The so-called Soviet government upon which Germany has just forced or tried to force peace was never recognized by the Government of the United States as even a government de facto. None of its acts therefore need be officially recognized by this Government, and the Government feels that it is of the utmost importance as affecting the whole public opinion of the world and giving proof of the utter good faith of all the Governments associated against Germany, that we should continue to treat the Russians as in all respects our friends and allies against the common enemy.[47]

2. Rumors of Intervention

As has already been observed, the Soviet Government was very apprehensive of Japanese and Allied armed intervention in Russia even before the ratification of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This anxiety was no mere figment of the Bolshevist imagination, but the result of definite indications that such a move was being contemplated in certain Allied quarters. The eager haste with which the British and French Governments had recognized the independence of the Ukraine and Finland seemed an unpropitious augury. The fact that the anti-Bolshevist governments of both of these new states threw themselves into the arms of Germany soon after the Allies had extended recognition and support to them would not prevent future

moves of a similar character designed to limit the area of Soviet control.[48] The chief danger point was the Russian Far East. Great Britain had considered the possibility of intervention in Siberia as early as November, 1917. In that month the 25th Middlesex Regiment stationed at Hong-Kong received orders to proceed to an unknown destination understood to be Vladivostok, but in January the project was abandoned.[49] In December a joint inter-Allied expedition was proposed but never undertaken, apparently as a result of Japanese opposition.[50] In February and March the Allied Consular Corps in Vladivostok did all in its power to prevent the local soviet from taking over the government, even going so far as to shut off the city's food supply by prevailing upon China to close the Manchurian border.[51]

It was from Japan, however, that most was to be feared. Russians perceived evidences of Japanese schemes of aggression early in 1917 in the increase of Japanese garrisons in Korea and Manchuria.[52] They alleged that Japan had on several occasions offered to send half a million soldiers to reconstitute the eastern front in return for special concessions in China and Siberia.[53] On December 30 a Japanese war vessel unexpectedly appeared in the harbor of Vladivostok and created a panic among the local population.[54] Japan at this time made a proposal to send her troops to Siberia on condition that the intervention be exclusively Japanese, that Japan's paramount interest in China be recognized and that she receive exclusive mining, timber and fishing concessions in Siberia in compensation.[55] This plan was not addressed to the United States in a formal note, but was suggested to the Allied Governments. The French and British Governments were favorably disposed. M. Pichon, in his first speech before the French Chamber of Deputies as Foreign Minister, had expressed himself in favor of intervention in conjunction with the "sane" Russian elements.[56] Had the United States given its consent, it seems certain that military action would have been embarked upon early in 1918. But Washington was cool toward the plan.[57]

At the end of February new hints and rumors began to emerge from Tokio. The situation in Siberia, it was said, was considered "extremely grave" because of the inability of the anti-Bolshevist Cossack ataman, Gregory Semenoff, to secure Allied support. The ataman had established himself at Harbin, Manchuria, from which base he planned, with Japanese assistance, to launch an attack into Siberian territory. Japan was not slow to take advantage of such

an opportunity. At the same time the rumor which was later to play such an important rôle made its first appearance: "Two thousand Germans have been armed and are drilling at Irkutsk, capital of the Government of Irkutsk, in Eastern Siberia, and according to an official report received from a foreign consul the Germans are making all preparations to bring a much larger force there." [58] Marshal Foch expressed it as his opinion that the United States and Japan should act at once to save Siberia from Germany.[59]

A few days later Japan once more addressed inquiries to the United States and the Allies, this time proposing joint military operations to save the war supplies stored at Vladivostok and along the Trans-Siberian Railway from the Germans. The Russian Embassy in Washington expressed its strong disapproval of the plan, declaring that there was little or no possibility of the Germans' securing possession of the goods in question.[60] But on the 1st of March it was announced that the United States would interpose no objection to Japanese action.[61] On the following day it was asserted that negotiations had reached a "delicate phase." Japan apparently had not approached the United States directly but had made her views known through British and French representatives. The American Government remained non-committal, while Ambassador Bakhmeteff and other Russian officials displayed increased anxiety, and Russian and American Socialists publicly denounced the project. By March 4, Japanese intervention seemed a certainty. Great Britain, France and Italy gave their full approval. The United States would refrain from protest. No guarantees would be asked, since the Japanese Government would regard these as "a reflection on its good faith." A few dissenting voices were raised in Congress, but, despite protests and objections, the moment for action seemed to have arrived.[62] The Ides of March had come.

And then quite unexpectedly the United States drew back. The decision was reached not as a result of Francis's cables advising against intervention, for these were sent later, but probably as a consequence of President Wilson's personal interposition in the situation. On the 5th of March Acting Secretary of State Frank Polk cabled to Francis that an oral communication had been addressed to the Japanese Government on the 3rd, expressing the view that intervention was unwise and might lead to the charge that Japan was doing in the east exactly what Germany was doing in the west. Intervention must be accompanied by the most explicit assurances that it was being undertaken as Russia's ally and in Russia's interests

and all territory occupied must be held at the absolute disposition of the final peace conference. But even with such assurances, "a hot resentment would be generated in Russia" by such a measure.[63] This message was received by Francis in somewhat garbled form and transmitted by him to Robins on March 15 with the suggestion that he should "discreetly impart the substance of same to the proper parties." [64]

It was explained in Washington that American dissent was due to the belief that Japanese intervention in Siberia would be contrary to the war aims enunciated by President Wilson, would be of no assistance in winning the war, and would arouse animosity in Russia against the Allies.[65] The Allied Governments were clearly disappointed and continued to voice their alarm over the menace of the German war prisoners and their hope that the Soviet Government would presently be overthrown. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Motono, while denying that Japan had suggested military action in Siberia, viewed "with gravest apprehension the eastward movement of Germany" and declared that his government would not hesitate to "take prompt and adequate measures in a whole-hearted fashion" in case the situation should demand decisive steps to safeguard Allied interests.[66]

Meanwhile Soviet authority had been extended throughout Siberia and the émigrés and other anti-Bolshevist elements had gathered themselves together in Manchuria and Mongolia, awaiting an opportunity for a revanche. These little groups of desperate men furnished most convenient tools for those who were intent on intervention. Early in April General Horvath at Harbin received a conditional offer of assistance from Japan.[67] But the time was not yet ripe for action in this quarter and the offer had no immediate result. A new opportunity soon presented itself, however. On the evening of April 3, several Japanese were killed in a street brawl in Vladivostok. On the following day Japanese troops landed from the vessels in the harbor and the Japanese consul informed the local government that he was obliged to ask Admiral Kato to take suitable steps for the protection of the lives and property of foreign subjects. Soon afterwards a British landing party appeared. Despite reassurances, Russian suspicions were aroused and they were not allayed by the action of Japanese sailors in searching pedestrians in the streets.[68] The cables sent to Ambassador Francis by the State Department informed him that the landings were not the result of any Allied agreement, but had been made on the initiative of the

British and Japanese separately, and that the American consul had not yet considered a guard necessary.[69]

To the Soviet Government it seemed that the long-impending intervention had at last come. The official *Izvestia* on April 6 sounded the tocsin over the Japanese "robbers' raid." "The Imperialists of Japan wish to strangle the Soviet revolution, wish to cut off Russia from the Pacific Ocean, wish to seize the rich territories of Siberia and to enslave Siberian workers and peasants. . . . The American Government, it seems, was against the Japanese invasion. But at present the situation cannot remain indefinite any longer. England intends to go hand-in-hand with Japan in working Russia's ruin." Workers, Peasants and Honest Citizens were warned that bourgeois counter-revolutionary elements had welcomed the Japanese invasion and that a "merciless struggle with Japan's agents and assistants within the country is a matter of life and death for the Soviet Republic, for the laboring masses of all Russia."[70] While fresh reports from Tokio told of the mobilization of 60,000 German prisoners at Tomsk, Lenin discussed the advisability of a declaration of war on Japan.[71] On the 16th Ambassador Francis publicly declared that the Soviet Government was attaching too much importance to an act which was merely a police precaution and without political significance.[72] But the anxiety of the Bolshevist leaders was not to be so readily dispelled. They looked to the future with forebodings of evil.

3. Francis and Robins

In the meantime Raymond Robins had maintained his close contacts with the Soviet authorities and had continued to serve as Ambassador Francis's unofficial observer. Early in the year the American Ambassador found himself the victim of a series of rather annoying incidents which are worth passing notice. They arose out of the trial of Thomas J. Mooney in far-away San Francisco.* Francis had never heard of the California labor leader whose sentence to death caused international reverberations as extensive as those aroused by the more recent case of Sacco and Vanzetti in Massachusetts, but the Petrograd proletariat was moved by deep sympathy

* Mooney was sentenced to death in February, 1917, for complicity in the San Francisco bomb outrage of July 22, 1916, in which ten persons were killed. A subsequent federal investigation revealed that his case was "framed" by a dishonest district attorney, serving as the tool of powerful business interests. His sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. *Cf.* 66th Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 157.

for their "comrade" abroad and began making demonstrations against the American Embassy as early as April, 1917.[73] Late in the year the reiterated threats against the ambassador became particularly troublesome, the release of the American anarchist leaders, Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman, being demanded as well.[74] In January, 1918, Francis was openly menaced with assassination by local anarchist groups and at length permitted General Judson to send for ten Red Guards to protect the Embassy.[75] Robins believed that the danger was much exaggerated and was inspired from German sources to frighten the ambassador into leaving the country, but he secured the suppression of the Petrograd anarchists.[76] When he followed the Soviet Government in its transfer to Moscow, he found the local anarchists even more powerful than they had been in the old capital. When they undertook to "requisition" Robins's automobile, he protested to Djerjinski, head of the Extraordinary Commission for the Suppression of Counter-revolution and Sabotage, to Trotsky, and to Lenin himself. And on April 13 the Soviet troops moved against the anarchist centers and destroyed them.

Francis's decision to leave Petrograd in February, however, was inspired by apprehension over the continued advance of the German armies rather than by fear of anarchist threats. On February 23 he wrote a letter to his son which throws much light upon his attitude toward the impending peace and toward his future work.

> . . . My plan is to stay in Russia as long as I can. If a separate peace is concluded, as I believe it will be, there will be no danger of my being captured by the Germans. Such a separate peace, however, will be a severe blow to the Allies, and if any section of Russia refuses to recognize the authority of the Bolshevik Government to conclude such a peace, I shall endeavor to locate in that section and encourage the rebellion. If no section is opposed to same, I shall go to Vladivostok and endeavor from there to prevent supplies from falling into the hands of the Germans, and if there are any people organizing in Russia for armed resistance to Germany, I shall encourage them and recommend our Government to assist them. You may not conclude, therefore, that I am planning to return to America.[77]

He left Petrograd on February 27 and was received in Vologda, the junction point of the Trans-Siberian Railway with the cross lines to Archangel and Moscow, with all honors and courtesies, being given the largest club-house in the city for the use of the Embassy.[78] Robins appealed to him not to "desert" Russia and he decided to remain for a time in Vologda. The British, French and Italian representatives who accompanied Francis attempted, for the most part

unsuccessfully, to leave by way of Finland. The Chinese and Japanese representatives refused to stop at Vologda, but continued their journey eastward. For a time, therefore, Francis found himself quite alone in his new headquarters except for the chargé d'affaires of Brazil and the Minister of Siam, with whom he played pool.[79] It was from Vologda that Francis issued his appeal of March 15, expressing his determination to remain in Russia and to encourage the Russian people to fight Germany.

The ratification of the peace was not followed, as might have been expected, by any immediate break in Russian-American or Russian-Allied relations. Indeed it seemed for a time that contacts were increasing and co-operation growing rather than otherwise. This is clearly evidenced in the extensive correspondence between Francis in Vologda and Robins in Moscow during the next two months. Two days after the treaty was ratified Trotsky asked Robins to secure the services of five American army officers to act as inspectors of the new Soviet army, and requested that railway men and equipment be sent from the east.[80] Many indications pointed to a definite rapprochement, inspired chiefly by the circumstance that the German armies had not ceased their movements with the conclusion of peace, but continued to advance slowly on various parts of the vanished front.[81] Trotsky soon afterwards authorized the Murmansk Soviet to accept the assistance of British and French officers and troops in opposing the Finnish White Guards who, with German aid, were menacing the Kola Railway and the coast.[82] Robins believed that the Soviet Government was sincerely desirous of reconstructing its forces with Allied and American aid and that it should be encouraged in its efforts to resist further German encroachment.[83] Francis in part accepted this view, advising Stevens and the State Department that one hundred American railway men should be sent to Vologda [84] and authorizing American assistance in the organization of the Red Army.[85] The extension of this assistance was delayed by the suspicions of the State Department and by the general uncertainty following the Japanese landing of April 4. But the Department was quite willing to purchase platinum for war purposes from the Soviet Government.[86] All of the Allied Governments and their representatives in Russia, in fact, seemed disposed to assist the Soviet Government and to co-operate with it.[87]

As before, however, there were counter-forces at work—suspicions and apprehensions, intensified by wild rumors, misunderstandings and controversies, and a gradual but now decided movement toward

a break. The character of the sources of friction is again clearly revealed in the correspondence between Francis and Robins.[88] The American Ambassador almost always accepts the views and recommendations of his observer in the Soviet capital, but he is constantly and increasingly beset with grave doubts and misgivings. Now he is concerned with reports that the war supplies purchased from the Allies and stored at Archangel are being shipped into the interior of the country. Again he hears that similar stores at Vladivostok are to be sent to European Russia. Later in April he is told by the Italian Ambassador and by the American Legation in Copenhagen that a German Commission for the exchange of prisoners is to arrive in Petrograd with an ultimatum, threatening to occupy the city. And he is constantly worried about repeated rumors that liberated German and Austrian war prisoners in Siberia are being organized and armed for mysterious and nefarious purposes. Robins, in reply, makes light of these matters and ridicules as absurd many of the stories that seem to be given credence in Vologda and Washington. He is interested in the problem of facilitating co-operation between the Allied Missions and the Soviet authorities, but toward the end of April becomes very critical of the "Micawber policy" of the other American and Allied representatives.

Of all the rumors which alarmed Francis and the Government at Washington, none was more persistent than the oft-reiterated tale that the Teutonic prisoners in Siberia were being liberated, armed and drilled by the Bolsheviks under the direction of German officers for the purpose of making Siberia a German province. On March 15 Francis received a cipher message from American Consul MacGowan at Irkutsk declaring that every prisoner had a rifle and that the streets were filled with German, Austrian and Turkish officers sent to direct the destruction of bridges and tunnels and to plan a defense against the expected Allied advance from Vladivostok.[89] When such stories reached Moscow Trotsky suggested to Robins that he immediately send a responsible investigator to Irkutsk with full authority to make a report. Robins assented and at once dispatched Captain William B. Webster, attaché of the American Red Cross Mission, and Captain W. L. Hicks of the British Mission in Moscow for the purpose.[90] Francis showed great anxiety, but appeared to think a further inquiry unnecessary. He now learned that Moscow and Vologda, as well as Petrograd, were to be placed under the control of a German Commission.[91] While Robins branded such rumors as fabrications of German propagandists and trans-

mitted the official denials of Chicherin and Trotsky, who were much more interested in the possibility of sending a Russian economic commission to the United States, Francis continued to receive fresh reports from MacGowan and Summers that were more alarming than ever.[92] While the State Department showed little anxiety over the Siberian war prisoners, it wired Francis on March 23 that it suspected that the Soviet leaders had asked assistance from the German General Staff.[93] A week later the War Department reported that 20,000 German prisoners had captured Irkutsk.[94] In such a maze of ignorance, misinformation and fantastic rumor the mission of Webster and Hicks seemed a vital necessity.

The two investigators kept Robins and Lockhart informed of their observations by wire and telegram as they proceeded across Siberia. The first armed prisoners they encountered were a few Hungarian deserters who had joined the Red Army to fight Semenoff. As for the remainder, all were unarmed and well-guarded. In all Siberia they discovered only 1,200 armed prisoners, all Socialists and internationalists who had become Russian citizens and given up all hope of returning home. The Soviet authorities welcomed the investigation and gave their official guarantee that not more than 1,500 prisoners in all would be armed. Semenoff, they learned, had taken refuge in Chinese territory, where he remained safe with Allied protection.[95] The final report of the mission, submitted April 26, stated that at Omsk 434 Hungarians, 300 Czechs and 197 South Slavs had been incorporated in the Soviet forces and sent to guard the Manchurian frontier against Semenoff. All of these had renounced their old allegiance. At other points only a few score of prisoners had been released. The Central Executive Committee of the Siberian Soviets gave Webster and Hicks a memorandum on April 2, enclosed with their report, to the effect that not more than 1,500 prisoners would be armed, "because the number of absolutely reliable party Socialists, who are ready to come out openly in the defense of labor revolution against the Imperialism of any country, is naturally limited." [96]

This report might have been expected to put an end to wild stories, but it did not. No attempt was made to discredit the report or to challenge its accuracy. All evidence points to the validity of its conclusions. Allied and American officials, however, had long since ceased to be capable of objective observation of affairs in Russia. Everywhere they perceived the hand of Germany and no tale was too fantastic or absurd to be believed so long as it supported

their preconceived ideas. The Webster-Hicks report was quite incapable of shaking their convictions. The alarming rumors that gathered in Vologda and Washington and the Allied capitals thrived and multiplied like the heads of the Hydra, despite all attempts to slay them.

In such a situation it was clear to Robins that his usefulness in Russia would soon end. The Soviet Government was most desirous of having the Red Cross Mission remain and continue its activities, but Robins as early as April 5 telegraphed to H. P. Davison that all work would be concluded by May 1 unless the United States supported a policy of economic co-operation.[97] On the 25th he reported to Davison that he planned to depart about May 15.[98] On the same day he received a letter from Chicherin with documentary proof enclosed, alleging a conspiracy against Soviet rule in Siberia by the American, British and French consuls in Vladivostok, requesting an investigation and the immediate recall of the American consul, and asking a definition of the attitude of the Government of the United States toward the Government of the Russian Federated Soviet Republic and toward "all attempts of the various representatives of America to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia."[99] These charges were received by the State Department on May 6 and met by a general denial three days later.[100]

Ambassador Francis had already reached his own conclusions. On May 2 he addressed a long cable to the State Department recommending intervention on the ground that Germany, through her ambassador, Mirbach, was "dominating and controlling" the Bolshevist Government. He believed that the Soviet régime would approve intervention "when it knows the same is inevitable."

> Russia is passing through a dream or orgy from which it may awaken any day, but the longer awakening is delayed the stronger foothold will Germany acquire. Robins and probably Lockhart also have advocated recognition but the Department and all Allies have persistently declined to recommend it and I now feel that no error has been committed. . . . I doubt the policy of the Allies longer temporizing with a Government advocating the principles of Bolshevism and guilty of the outrages the Soviet Government has practiced.[101]

Francis received no reply to this curious document.[102] Robins apparently was not informed at the time that it had been sent. But both he and Lockhart[103] thought of Russian problems in terms so diametrically opposed to the views of the American Ambassador that any further attempt on Robins's part to act as Francis's agent

in Moscow was futile. On May 9 Secretary Lansing cabled Robins: "Under all circumstances consider desirable that you come home for consultation." [104] On the 14th, on the very eve of Robins's departure from Moscow, Lenin presented him with an elaborate plan, accompanied by statistical tables and detailed recommendations, for the development of Russian-American commercial relations.[105] On the following day Robins saw Francis for a few minutes at Vologda and assured him that an hour's conference with President Wilson would be sufficient for him to persuade the President to recognize the Soviet Government.[106] Robins then proceeded across Siberia with a Soviet pass signed by Lenin and with five rifles and 150 rounds of ammunition for protection in his private car. He was assured in diplomatic circles that his life in Siberia would be quite unsafe, since Lenin had no authority there and the country was overrun by brigands. He reached Vladivostok with little delay and no interference of any kind en route. Everywhere, from the Volga to the Amur in furthest Asia, Lenin's pass was honored. The rifles were quite unnecessary. Siberia was completely under Soviet control and at peace.[107]

At Vladivostok and at Tokio and at Seattle, Robins received messages from the State Department requesting him not to talk for publication.[108] He obeyed and proceeded to Washington, where, on July 1, he presented a report to the Secretary of State on "American Economic Co-operation with Russia" in which he declared that forcible Allied military intervention against the will of the Russian people was inconceivable and that the express invitation of the Soviet Government offered an opportunity for complete economic and military co-operation in creating an effective eastern front. He outlined in detail the future work of a proposed Economic Commission to be sent to Russia to restore friendly commercial intercourse.[109] Robins was unsuccessful in his efforts to secure an interview with President Wilson and he remained silent until summoned to speak before the Overman Committee in the spring of 1919. The events of the intervening months did not alter his views. He still contended that intervention was criminal folly and recommended commercial intercourse with Russia as the only effective and humane method of combating Bolshevism.[110]

But in the crucial months of 1918, when the great decision was made and when "the good will and understanding and intelligent and unselfish sympathy" of the United States and the Allied nations in their dealings with Russia were put to "the acid test," the single

American who had been in closest contact with the Soviet Government and who knew more of the realities of the Russian situation than any other found himself ignored and silenced. Of his honesty and sincerity of purpose there can be no doubt. Of the wisdom of his conclusions and recommendations opinions will always differ. But the developments of the future were to vindicate nearly all of Robins's contentions. In the spring and summer of 1918, however, his program had passed beyond all possibility of serious consideration. Henceforth the "indoor mind" was to dictate American and Allied policy toward Russia.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE BEGINNING OF INTERVENTION

1. The Prelude; the Czecho-Slovaks

DESPITE numerous indications pointing toward a break in the relations between Soviet Russia and the Powers at war with Germany, the extreme step of military intervention might have been indefinitely postponed had it not been for a new and unforeseen factor which entered into the situation in the spring of 1918. This factor was a group of some 45,000 Czecho-Slovak deserters from the Austrian Army, who had fought with the Russian armies against the Central Powers in order to liberate their country from the Austrian yoke and who now found themselves stranded in the Ukraine by the peace of Brest-Litovsk.[1] The early relations between these troops and the Soviet Government were of a most friendly character, for they had at once adopted a policy of strict neutrality toward all Russian domestic disputes. Early in 1918 they were declared a part of the autonomous Czecho-Slovak army in France by the Czecho-Slovak National Council and plans were laid to bring them to the western front. Despite the extreme length of the journey required, it was believed that the safest route, and indeed the only route, in view of the closing of the White Sea by ice, and of the Black and Baltic Seas by the Central Powers, would be by way of Siberia, the Pacific, the United States and the Atlantic. In March the Czechs began their circumnavigation of the globe by withdrawing from the Ukraine to the eastward in agreement with the Soviet authorities.[2]

But the transport of such a large body of heavily armed foreign troops across the 5,000 miles of Russian territory between the Ukraine and the Pacific was a delicate task, even with the best of intentions on both sides. The Czechs submitted to the Soviet demand that they give up a portion of their arms and the first contingent reached Vladivostok without incident. Finding no vessels awaiting them, they settled down near the city. But their comrades behind them soon were in difficulties. The local soviets of western Siberia were apprehensive lest the Czechs should grant assistance to the

counter-revolutionary bands of Semenoff and Horvath operating along the Chinese border. Their suspicions took the form of obstructing the progress of the Czechs and insisting that they surrender more of their military equipment, despite the appeal of the first contingent and of the Vladivostok Soviet that they be granted a free passage.[3] At length they demanded that the eastward movement of the Czechs cease completely and that they be sent out by way of Archangel.[4] The irritation which this situation naturally gave rise to was greatly increased by the events which occurred at Cheliabinsk on May 14, 1918. The Czechs there encountered several trains loaded with German and Austrian prisoners on their way home to fight once more for the Central Empires.[5] According to the Czech version of the story, one of the prisoners hurled a missile at a group of Czech soldiers, who promptly proceeded to drag him from the train and kill him for his impudence. When the soviet authorities arrested the culprits, as well as the Czech station guards, their comrades took matters into their own hands and forcibly released the offenders.*

The report of this "revolt" spread rapidly and so alarmed the officials at Moscow that they ordered the complete disarmament of the Czecho-Slovaks immediately in violation of the original agreement with them. By the end of the month sporadic clashes were occurring in many places between the Czechs and the soviets, the latter now feeling certain that the aims of the Czechs were distinctly counter-revolutionary, while the former felt equally certain that they were being attacked by order of the German Ambassador at Moscow and that their only salvation lay in fighting their way through the weakly guarded territory to the east.[6] When Trotsky learned from the investigator whom he dispatched to the scene that the local soviet troops were insufficient to disarm the Czechs forcibly, he redoubled his efforts to render the Czechs harmless without further delay, on the one hand offering to treat as "brothers" all Czechs who laid down their arms and on the other hand threatening execution to those who refused.[7] The conflict which ensued led the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris on May 21 to order all the Czech echelons to deliver all their arms without exception to the local soviets on pain of being considered mutineers and outlaws.[8] But the Czechs by this time were too exasperated to heed such counsels and the Soviet military authorities, with more zeal than discretion,

* The number of war prisoners in Siberia at this time was considerable, though very few were armed and organized.

were determined that these "enemies of the Republic" who had "insolently raised a mutiny" must be compelled to return to reason.[9] The result was war—the small beginning of a war between Soviet Russia and the world.

The Czechs apparently had, at first at least, no ulterior motives for their actions, being moved only by the fear that they were to be made the victims of some mysterious German-Bolshevist conspiracy. As deserters they could expect no mercy from the Central Powers. It is doubtful whether, as Robins charged, the Czechs were sent toward Vladivostok by French orders with the deliberate purpose of using them to overturn the Soviet Government.[10] But it is certain that no shipping was provided for them and that this circumstance aroused not unreasonable suspicions in Moscow.[11] And it is also certain that various British and French representatives in Russia played upon the fears of the Czechs and later seized eagerly upon the opportunity which their conflict with the soviets presented.[12] On June 22 Major Guinet received a message from the French Ambassador to Russia authorizing him to thank the Czecho-Slovaks for their action in the name of all the Allies "who have decided to intervene the end of June," using the Czechs as their advance guard.[13]

The month of June saw the Czechs in revolt all over western Siberia. Everywhere that they gained control the local soviets were overthrown and the anti-Bolshevist elements were intrusted with the reins of government.[14] Whatever had been the earlier Czech pretensions of neutrality as between conflicting Russian groups, it was now evident to all that the complete destruction of soviet rule followed in their wake. Late in June the contingent at Vladivostok, with the approval of the Allied representatives, overturned the city soviet and made itself master of the situation. All plans of going to France were abandoned. Instead the Czechs in eastern Siberia began moving westward to aid their comrades fighting the Red Guards along the Volga.[15] Since the soviet military forces in Siberia were so weak as to be negligible, it was a simple task for the Czech warriors to seize the railroad and drive all Bolshevist adherents under cover. By the middle of summer the authority of Moscow in Siberia and the Ural area had vanished and new anti-Bolshevist governments, under the protection of Czech arms, had assumed power and were making preparations to extend their control to European Russia.[16]

Ambassador Francis, meanwhile, remained at Vologda awaiting developments. On May 31 the Committee on Public Information

gave out two statements defining American policy which were of considerable significance. One was a cable from Secretary Lansing to Ambassador Francis declaring that representatives of the United States "have not assisted any of the internal movements in Russia" and that the friendly intentions of the United States toward Russia would not be changed, "until the time when Russia voluntarily submits to the autocratic rule of the Central Powers." Semenoff's appeals for aid had been rejected and Colonel Emerson and three assistants had left Harbin for Vologda May 3 to consider the possibility of helping the people of European Russia to resist German encroachment by rehabilitating the railway system.[17] The second statement was a declaration from the American Ambassador himself. He affirmed the policy of his government not to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, its determination to "stand by" Russia at all costs, and his own intention to remain in the country until forced out.[18] On June 1 he made an additional statement, denying that any offer had been made to the Soviet Government by the United States and reaffirming American refusal to recognize the Brest-Litovsk peace. "The policy of my Government consists in non-intervention in the internal affairs of Russia and in giving the opportunity to the people of this great country to select their own form of government, make their own laws and elect their own officials." [19]

While Francis was thus obliged to disclaim all intention of intervention on the part of his government, his personal views on the subject, as already shown by his cable of May 2, were very different from his official statements. He felt, and rightly so, that time was on his side and that he was justified in continuing to work discreetly to bring about intervention. As for the Czechs, he felt the greatest sympathy for them and desired to aid their cause. In a letter to his son on June 4, he asserted:

> I am now planning to prevent if possible the disarming of 40,000 or more Czecho-Slovak soldiers, whom the Soviet Government has ordered to give up their arms on penalty of death, and has prohibited their transportation by every railroad line and threatened to penalize every railroad official who violates such instructions. . . . I have no instructions or authority from Washington to encourage these men to disobey the orders of the Soviet Government, except an expression of sympathy sent out by the Department of State. I have taken chances before, however.[20]

On the same day representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States handed a statement to the Soviet authorities

asserting that their respective governments would regard the disarming of the Czecho-Slovaks as a hostile act directed against them, since the Czech soldiers were Allied troops and under Entente protection. Chicherin replied to this note on the 13th, expressing the opinion that "the disarming of the Czecho-Slovaks cannot be considered in any way as an act of hostility to the powers of the Entente. It was due first of all to the fact that Russia as a neutral country cannot tolerate on its territory armed troops that do not belong to the army of the Soviet Republic." He cited the defiance of the Czechs, their acts of violence and their co-operation everywhere with White Guards and counter-revolutionary officers, and asserted that the Soviet Government was pursuing toward them the only course possible. He hoped that the powers of the Entente "will recognize the necessity and propriety of the action undertaken by the Soviet Government against the rebels" and "will not hesitate to express censure of the Czecho-Slovak troops who are considered to be under their protection for their counter-revolutionary armed rebellion, which is a most brazen and unmistakable interference in the internal affairs of Russia." [21]

The month of July was a month of crises and decisions which made war between Soviet Russia and the western Powers inevitable. At the beginning of the month the Czecho-Slovaks were still uncertain as to the course they should pursue. On July 3 Captain Vladimir S. Hurban, on behalf of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, informed the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Goto, as well as the ambassadors at Tokio, that the conflict arising from German, Bolshevist and anti-Bolshevist attacks on the Czech legionaires must not result in involving them in Russian internal affairs. Russia's problems could be solved only by force, but it was not for the Czechs to play policemen. They must continue their journey to France.[22] The messages of friendship and gratitude which the Czech command at Omsk sent to President Wilson on July 4 also reflect their desire to extricate themselves from their difficulties and to proceed to the western front where they believed their services would be more useful in inducing the Allies to recognize the independence of their nation after the war.[23]

As has already been noted, however, the Allied Governments did not hold this view. The French, in particular, perceived quite different possibilities in the situation. American representatives were not slow to follow their lead. The American Consul, Gray, at Omsk received a cipher message from the American Consulate at Samara

dated July 22 which transmitted a communication from Consul General Poole in Moscow under date of June 18:

> You may inform the Czecho-Slovak leaders, confidentially, that pending further notice the Allies will be glad from a political point of view to have them hold their present position. On the other hand they should not be hampered in meeting the military exigency of the situation. It is desirable first of all that they should secure the control of the Trans-Siberian Railway and second, if this is assumed, at the same time possible (possibly?) retain control over the territory which they now dominate. Inform the French representative that the French consul general joins in these instructions.[24]

Shortly afterwards Consul General Harris at Irkutsk telegraphed to Omsk that he considered this wise in view of the fact that "the Allies wish the Czechs to be the main back-bone and support of Allied action in Siberia and Russia against Germany." [25]

Such intimations to the Czechs inevitably created a false impression among them as to the attitude of the United States and led them to suppose that they would be supported in remaining in Siberia to combat Bolshevism. But President Wilson and the Department of State were still opposed to armed intervention and were ignorant of the commitments which their representatives were making. Harris and Poole apparently received their instructions from Francis, who had acted entirely on his own initiative.[26] He had taken chances before, however. He was little concerned if the Czechs concluded that the United States was prepared to send an army to the Urals to assist them. His purpose was to provoke intervention by whatever means seemed most expedient.

In consequence of these and other assurances from Allied sources, the Czechs continued their military operations. France and Italy recognized the Czecho-Slovak Republic on June 30. Great Britain did the same on August 13 and the United States and Japan were presently to follow suit.[27] On July 10 the Czechs and the so-called "People's Army" captured Syzran. Soon afterwards Major Guinet instructed the Czechs to create and hold a front along the Volga pending the arrival of Allied representatives. He further urged the immediate occupation of Simbirsk, Kazan and Saratov, while other Allied agents advised the anti-Bolshevist officers' organizations to revolt in Vladimir, Yaroslav, Ribinsk and Murom. Simbirsk was taken on July 22 and on August 7 Kazan fell to the Czechs and White Guards, with large supplies and great quantities of gold and platinum which were at once forwarded to Samara and Omsk. Both

the Czechs and their Russian allies confidently looked forward to military assistance from the Allies and the United States.[28]

On July 27 the Czecho-Slovak National Council at Washington issued a statement which reflected the changed point of view now prevailing. They continued to ascribe the original break to Trotsky's attempt, "under the pressure of Austrian and German demands," to disarm the Czechs and place them in prison camps to turn them over to the Austrian authorities. They had desired to withdraw, but "the unparalleled strategic opportunities which their position gave them made a strong appeal to their imagination. This seems evident from the fact that, instead of withdrawing from European Russia, they occupied more cities on the Volga, stretching out their detachments in the direction of the Murman coast." They now thought it possible and desirable to reconstruct the eastern front. They were ready to remain in Russia and held themselves at the orders of the Allies.[29]

In the meantime Russian-American and Russian-Allied relations had reached the breaking point. The Allied troops which had landed at Murmansk in April with the consent of the Soviet Government were now reinforced by new contingents, including a small number of American marines, and extended their control along the coast and railway, despite Chicherin's emphatic protests at "the invasion, unprovoked by any aggressive measure on the part of Russia." [30] While the Soviet Government sought to ascertain the intentions of the Allies regarding intervention,[31] Ambassador Francis issued another address to the Russian people on the 4th of July, once again repudiating the Brest-Litovsk peace, expressing deep sympathy and friendship, and calling upon Russia to fight Germany.[32] He frankly hoped for immediate Allied intervention.[33] Germany protested to the Soviet Government at his violation of Russian neutrality and demanded his deportation, but Chicherin continued to cling to the hope that Russian-American co-operation and friendship were still possible.[34] But with British and American military forces seizing the Murman coast, declaring it under Entente protection and concluding an agreement with the local authorities "for the defense of the Murman region against the Powers of the German coalition"; [35] with Washington regarding the Soviet protests against this behavior as a "mere formality" unworthy of notice [36]; and with the Allied Governments at the same time promising assistance to the Czechs and White Guards fighting the Red Army in the east, a continuation of even quasi-friendly relations was rapidly becoming impossible.

On July 10 Chicherin had requested the Allied Ambassadors at

Vologda to come to Moscow. His stated reason was the danger which the foreign representatives might be exposed to in the event of fighting in the city between the Soviet troops and counter-revolutionary forces.[37] Francis replied that the only possible menace was the Germans who were much more likely to take Moscow than Vologda.[38] On the 23rd an urgent message came from Chicherin entreating Francis most earnestly to leave Vologda for Moscow in view of the imminence of approaching danger. Francis and his colleagues were of the unanimous opinion that the Bolsheviks intended to make them prisoners. He assured the Commissar of Foreign Affairs that he would quit Vologda, keeping secret his destination—Archangel, which British military forces were about to occupy. But he discovered that no trains were to be had without the revealing of his plans to Moscow. Chicherin expressed great regret on learning of his decision, but evoked no further comment from Francis except a protest on the 25th at the treatment he was receiving, accompanied by new expressions of defiance at the Brest-Litovsk treaty and fresh hopes that the Russian people would presently rise to cast off the German yoke.[39]

On the 24th Chicherin had informed Francis that a locomotive would be placed at his disposal at Vologda and a ship at Archangel, but that he did not attach any political meaning to the departure.[40] Consul General Poole in Moscow had, in fact, assured him that "there is no need to suppose that the political situation has been affected seriously by the departure of the ambassadors from Vologda."[41] Francis and his colleagues took their leave on the 25th. Since the boat at Archangel was too small for the party, a short delay ensued which Francis was convinced was inspired by the desire of the Soviet Government to hold him as a hostage. Learning of an impending anti-Bolshevist revolution at Archangel, the American Ambassador and his party determined to proceed to Kandalaska, which the Allied troops had already occupied. On the 29th they departed for the north, but not before Francis had received a final farewell message from Chicherin:

> I take the opportunity of this last moment before your departure to express once more my profound regret and sorrow at the unfortunate circumstances which have had as a result your present journey across the sea and also my best thanks for your kindness and courtesy and for your good feeling toward the Russian popular masses whose most adequate and faithful representatives are the Soviets, the councils of the poor and of the toiling. Please convey our affection and admiration in the messages you will send across the ocean to the great people of pioneers on the new

continent and to the posterity of Cromwell's revolutionaries and of Washington's brothers-in-arms.[42]

"This telegram," explains Francis, "was evidently meant for consumption by American pacifists, and fearing it would be given to the American people by the Department of State, I failed to transmit it." [43]

2. *The Decision*

While the American Ambassador and the other Allied representatives in Russia were thus severing their last connections with the Soviet Government, the situation in Washington was slowly shaping itself to produce the result which Francis had been working for during the past three months. But it was only very gradually and very reluctantly that President Wilson reached the conclusion that the dispatch of armed forces to Russia was a course of wisdom. It was the opposition of the United States, it will be recalled, which had prevented intervention in March. The processes by which opposition in March was transformed into conditional acquiescence in July are still shrouded in much obscurity and it will doubtless be many years before the diplomatic correspondence and private papers which will reveal fully the determining factors will become accessible. From the sources at present available, however, it is possible to sketch the course of developments from April to July with a moderate degree of completeness and accuracy.

One factor of considerable significance in preparing public opinion for the step finally taken was the absence of any official spokesman of the Soviet Government in the United States and the abundant representation of its enemies. The Russian Embassy under Ambassador Bakhmeteff and numerous Russian organizations strove earnestly to bring about intervention. On May 4 A. J. Sack, later director of the (anti-Bolshevist) Russian Information Bureau, issued an appeal to the American people for aid to Russia, to take the form of supplies to be sent to Vladivostok with a guard of troops who should advance westward, rallying the "sound" Russian elements to overthrow the Bolsheviks.[44] Later in the month a group of prominent Russians, including various leaders of the federation of Russian associations in the United States, presented to Ambassador Bakhmeteff a scheme for raising a volunteer army in America to overthrow the Soviet Government. They conferred with the Department of State and other officials and departed highly encouraged.[45]

On June 11 Bakhmeteff, at the request of V. A. Maklakoff, Russian Ambassador to France, transmitted to the State Department a resolution adopted by the Central Committee of the Russian Constitutional Democratic Party urging Allied intervention with proper guarantees of the inviolability of the rights and interests of Russia.[46] Two days later two prominent Russians, L. M. Wourgaft and Leo Pasvolsky, speaking in New York, urged the sending of Allied and American troops to Siberia to reunite Russia against Germany and the Bolsheviks.[47] From London and Paris came the voice of Kerensky denouncing the Soviet leaders as tools of Prussian militarism and calling upon the Allies to assist in carrying on the struggle against Germany.[48] Menshevists and Socialist Revolutionaries were as desirous of aid in overthrowing the Bolsheviks as were liberals, conservatives and reactionaries.[49] In Russia their leaders were in secret communication with Allied representatives, while in the capitals of western Europe and in Washington the diplomatic agents of the Tsar or of the Provisional Government co-operated with émigré nobles, army officers, merchants, bankers and politicians in pleading for help for their cause.

In June and July there was manifested in the press and in Congress a growing sentiment in favor of Allied and American military action to "assist" Russia against Germany.[50] Already in May the *New York Times* was referring editorially to the Bolsheviks as "our most malignant enemies" and urging aid to Russia to prevent Germany from making herself invincible in the next war. In June Senator Poindexter declared that an army of 2,000,000 Japanese in Siberia, accompanied by British, French and American troops and officials, would shatter German morale and enable such loyal Russian leaders as General Semenoff to overthrow the vicious scoundrels, Lenin and Trotsky.[51] On June 10 Senator King of Utah introduced a resolution recommending a military expedition to aid the Russian people in combating Germany.[52] While this resolution was not adopted by the Senate, an amendment which he offered to the army appropriation bill two weeks later for the creation of a Russian Legion in the United States was accepted, though it led to no results of consequence.[53] In mid-July Mme. Botchkarova, commander of the Russian women's "Battalion of Death," pleaded for an hour with the Senators for immediate intervention by 100,000 Allied troops.[54] In the House, as well as in the Senate, voices were raised in increasing number in favor of "saving" Russia from Germany and the pro-German Bolsheviks by means of military action.[55]

Public and official opinion in the Allied countries was much more definitely insistent on action. At the time of writing it is impossible to determine the extent to which the views entertained by the Allied Governments were reflected in specific proposals to the United States. It is very evident, however, that such Allied influence as was exerted overcame American resistance to intervention only very slowly. The earlier American view that the sending of armed forces to Russia would alienate the Russian people and be detrimental rather than advantageous to the Allied cause persisted.[56] Francis's intervention plea of May 2 failed to modify this position. The Administration continued to look upon the Russian problem as one to be dealt with by sympathetic encouragement and economic assistance rather than by military force.[57] This had been the view of Robins from the beginning and had, at times, found favor even with Francis. The German war prisoner scare was not without effect in Washington,[58] but it did not induce Wilson to change his opinions. Late in June he began to formulate plans for extending non-military aid to Russia through definite arrangements for economic co-operation. A commission of distinguished civilians, bearing offers of assistance, was contemplated. Exports of commodities and the dispatch of abundant relief supplies by the Red Cross were spoken of, the whole scheme to be facilitated by the American consuls still in Russia.[59] As late as the 16th of July this project was still under consideration, Daniel Willard being mentioned as the probable head of the commission, with Frank A. Vanderlip of the National City Bank as its chief financial member.[60]

July saw the President and his advisers conferring with people of many views. In May Professor Masaryk, head of the Czecho-Slovak National Council,[61] still regarded military intervention as folly, but he began to think better of it a month later. The Russian Embassy and other anti-Bolshevist Russian groups regarded it as Russia's only salvation.[62] Wilson also consulted with Justice Louis D. Brandeis and with his personal friend and adviser, Col. E. M. House, as well as with the diplomatic representatives of the Allied nations.[63] The diplomatic exchanges seemed to foreshadow a compromise between the Allied and American projects in the form of a civilian commission accompanied by a military guard.[64] But President Wilson's continued hesitancy caused much apprehension, which, in turn, aroused anxiety in Washington lest Japan and the European Allies embark upon armed intervention on their own initiative without waiting for the consent or co-operation of the United States.[65] Wilson

doubtless felt that if intervention was in any case inevitable American participation would be a wiser course than abstention, if for no other reason than to give the United States some voice in determining its purposes and methods. There is, in fact, much reason for supposing that this reflection was the decisive consideration in the formulation of the policy finally adopted.

The diplomatic exchanges which had been going on at length culminated in the dispatch of an aide memoire by the United States to Japan, which was substantially identical with the subsequent public statement of August 3. On July 17 copies were sent to Great Britain, France and Italy. This constituted a definite proposal by the United States for limited military intervention, not so extensive as the Allies desired, but still involving the dispatch of armed forces to Russian territory, thus representing an abandonment of earlier opposition. Further exchanges of views on the basis of the proposal of July 17 looked toward the occupation of Vladivostok, as a base of operations for the Czechs, by a number of American and Japanese troops so small as to arouse no apprehensions among Russians as to their purposes.[66] The end of the month found Japan inquiring into the details of the projected move and Allied military preparations actively under way at various points in the Far East as well as on the Murman coast.[67]

Early in August the final Japanese response was received and found to be entirely satisfactory. The British, French and Italian Governments gave their approval and agreed to send a few troops to Vladivostok.[68] It should be borne in mind that the details of the plan were embodied in no single formal document to which all the Allied and Associated Governments subscribed. Agreement was reached by exchanges of notes and, as events were to show, much was left uncertain that might have better been carefully defined at the outset. But few perceived the difficulties that were to develop. As the official announcement testified, the American Government had not overcome its doubts and scruples, but had agreed to a project, the aims, methods and consequences of which remained hidden in vagueness. The announcement, written by President Wilson, was issued by Frank L. Polk, Acting Secretary of State, on the night of August 3 and appeared in the press on the 4th.*

The opening paragraph reiterated the view that military intervention would be unwise and more likely to injure Russia than to benefit her. Military action seemed permissible "only to render such

* The text of the announcement will be found in Appendix II.

protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense." With these objects in view the United States was co-operating with Great Britain and France at Archangel and had proposed to Japan "that each of the two governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok, with the purpose of co-operating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding, as far as it may be, the country to the rear of the westward-moving Czecho-Slovaks." All of which, it was asserted "in the most public and solemn manner," contemplated no intervention or interference of any kind in Russian internal affairs. An economic and humanitarian commission would follow the military assistance rendered to the Czechs to extend aid to the people of Siberia.

The statement issued simultaneously by the Japanese Government was in general accord with these views. It placed greater emphasis, however, upon German penetration of Russia and German and Austrian attacks on the Czechs. It asserted that some Allied troops had already been dispatched to Vladivostok to aid the Czechs and that Japan, "being anxious to fall in with the desire of the American Government," had accepted the proposed plan and would send additional forces to Vladivostok. In closing, the Japanese Government affirmed its friendship for Russia and its "avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia, and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics." As soon as the objects indicated were attained, all Japanese troops would be withdrawn.[69]

Deferring to a later section a consideration of the legality of the intervention thus undertaken, we may examine briefly at this point its justifiability on the basis of the grounds stated. The admittedly "westward-moving" Czecho-Slovaks clearly required and expected assistance. But to speak of "the armed German and Austrian prisoners who are attacking them" was either a deliberate misrepresentation or the result of ignorance of the situation. The Czechs were fighting the military forces of the Soviet Government, whose authority they were destroying in all the areas under their

control. The small number of war prisoners who had joined the Red Army was negligible, though the Czechs did encounter some of them and exaggerated their importance. These men were in no sense agents of the Central Powers.* Aid to the Czechs could have no meaning except war on Soviet Russia. As to the "military stores" to be guarded, those at Archangel had already been removed into the interior of Russia and those at Vladivostok were well protected by the Czechs who had seized the city. The third stated purpose, to aid the efforts of the Russian people at "self-government and self-defense," was simply another expression of the prevailing view, quite unfounded as events proved, that the Russian masses were seeking foreign aid to overturn the Soviet Government and renew the war with Germany. Whither would lead a military adventure with objectives so muddled and obscure as these the developments of the next few months were to demonstrate abundantly.

That the Allied and American Governments clearly appreciated the belligerent character of the policy they had now embarked upon was shown by their anticipation of a declaration of war from the Soviet Government.[70] War was never formally declared by either side, but its existence in fact was indisputable. On August 6 Chicherin informed Consul General Poole that Allied nationals of the propertied classes had been interned and protested bitterly at the "unjustifiable Anglo-French invasion," "the predatory acts" and the "barefaced robbery" of the Entente.[71] Two days later the British Government issued a declaration professing its friendship for the Russian people and its determination to save them "from dismemberment and destruction at the hands of Germany.[72] And on the 9th Francis issued another of his perennial addresses to the Russian people, repeating again that his government had no intention of interfering in Russian internal affairs, still regarded Russia as an ally against the common enemy, and was animated by the greatest sympathy and friendship.[73] Shortly afterwards Chicherin issued a statement in reply to the American and Japanese declarations of August 3, asserting that they were based upon misinformation but asking the American and Japanese Governments to formulate their demands.[74] While Allied citizens began fleeing the country and the Soviet Government promised Germany to "employ all the means at her disposal" to expel the Entente forces from North Russian territory in ob-

* On August 23, Trotsky, referring back to the report of the Webster-Hicks mission, called this "American lie" a "monstrous invention" since the war prisoners in the Soviet army constituted only 1/25 of the whole and had all become Russian citizens.

servance of her neutrality,"[75] the sounds of battle from the north and the east brought tidings of war.

3. *War in North Russia, August–December, 1918*

The military history of the Allied expeditions and of the Russian civil war do not properly constitute a part of the present narrative. But the political effects of intervention must be considered along with the more important military developments upon which they were dependent. The present section will deal with the internal crisis in Russia in the summer of 1918 and with the situation in North Russia following the landing of the Allied forces, while the following one will consider the course of intervention in Siberia from August to the close of the year.

During July and August the Soviet Government was confronted with numerous acts of terrorism and rebellion committed by its domestic enemies, who, it believed, were being actively aided and abetted by the Allied representatives who remained in Russia. In July certain Socialist Revolutionary and Menshevist groups opened a campaign against the Central Powers, marked by the assassination of the German Ambassador Mirbach in Moscow on July 6, the murder of Field Marshal Von Eichhorn, German commander at Kiev, on July 30, and the instigation of strikes, peasant uprisings and general disorder in the Ukraine.[76] Once intervention was begun, the Entente agents in Russia proceeded to do all in their power to encourage these anti-Bolshevist and anti-German elements.[77] Their schemes ranged from simple plans for the blowing up of bridges and railroads to grandiose plots for the overthrow of the Soviet Government. So far as can be ascertained, no American representatives were directly implicated in these conspiracies, though certain of them were discussed by British and French agents at the consulate of the United States in Moscow.[78] Consul General Poole, however, professed ignorance of these activities and presently quit the Soviet capital, declaring that Bolshevist "bad faith" in arresting Allied agents and citizens, contrary to Chicherin's assurances that diplomatic immunities would be respected, made his departure imperative.[79]

At the end of August the Bolshevist régime faced the most serious crisis of its existence. The Left Socialist-Revolutionists, who had hitherto co-operated with the Communists, now broke with them. On August 30 Lenin was wounded by a Right Socialist-Revolutionist,

Dora Kaplan, and on the 31st the Commissar of Justice, Uritsky, was assassinated.[80] With Siberia already lost, the Czechs and White Guards advancing toward Nijni Novgorod and the Allied troops from Archangel pushing southward, the Soviet Government's darkest hour seemed to have come.[81] On September 2 there was unearthed the most extensive and alarming Allied plot yet discovered. According to the Soviet accusations, the British agent, Lockhart, the French Consul General, Grenard, and lesser Entente agents had conspired, by means of wholesale bribes to various Red Guard officers, to arrest and perhaps execute the chief Bolshevist leaders by a sudden coup, to paralyze all resistance by the destruction of strategic points, and to summon the British troops from Archangel to complete the work of overturning the Soviet Government.[82] On August 31, in the course of gathering evidence against the conspirators, the Soviet police raided the British Embassy in Petrograd and killed the naval attaché, Captain Cromie, who offered resistance.[83] This attack evoked a bitter and threatening protest from the British Government, which denied all the charges of conspiracy and temporarily arrested the Soviet agent in England, Maxim Litvinoff, as a reprisal.[84] Lockhart himself had been arrested, but was released when his identity was established.

This crisis was at once followed by the beginning of the Red Terror. Wholesale arrests and mass executions designed to intimidate the bourgeoisie and counter-revolutionary elements were commenced by the Soviet Government in Petrograd, Moscow and other urban centers. On September 3 the neutral diplomats at Moscow protested most energetically in the name of humanity at the deeds "which call forth the indignation of the whole civilized world." In reply the Soviet Government informed "the gentlemen representing the capitalist neutral nations" that they "were not sent to Russia to defend the principles of humanity, but to preserve the interests of the capitalist state" and that "the Russian working class will crush without mercy the counter-revolutionary clique that is trying to lay the noose around the neck of the Russian working class with the help of foreign capital and the Russian bourgeoisie." [85] In Washington the Soviet "decree on mass terror" had produced a profound impression. On September 21 the United States addressed a note to its diplomatic representatives abroad, citing the "openly avowed campaign of mass terrorism" being carried on in Russia, the friendship of the American Government for the Russian people, and its horror at "the indiscriminate slaughter of Russian citizens." [86] No

concerted action followed this note, but the Red Terror, like the terror of the French Revolution, soon became the object of universal condemnation throughout the world, and furnished a most convenient moral support for the policy of intervention.[87]

In northern Russia, meanwhile, war had definitely commenced. On August 2 General Poole, with 2,000 Allied troops from Murmansk, appeared before Archangel. In response to the urgent appeals of the anti-Bolshevist elements which had just seized control of the city, the troops were landed at once.[88] Ambassador Francis, who had gone with the Allied missions from Kandalaska to Murmansk, returned to Archangel on August 7.[89] He found the new local government in power, styling itself the "Provisional Government of the Country of the North" and composed of nine members of the Constituent Assembly, with the venerable Nicholas Tchaikovsky at its head. Its declared purpose was to overthrow the Soviet Government with the aid of Allied troops.[90]

No considerable number of American soldiers reached Archangel until early September. The 339th American Infantry left England August 27 and arrived at the White Sea port on September 4.[91] Ambassador Francis at once summoned Colonel Stewart, commander of the 4,700 men who were disembarked, and inquired concerning his instructions. He learned that the whole force was subject to the orders of the British General Poole, who was in supreme command of all the Allied troops of North Russia. Francis responded that since he was interpreting American policy at Archangel, he desired Stewart to keep in close contact with him, even to the extent of obeying his orders as against Poole's if necessary. The Colonel assented, for the State Department and the President, despite the opposition of General March, had acceded to Francis's earlier request that he be put in close touch with the American contingent.[92] Francis never found it necessary to exert his power, but this division of authority and the suspicion and friction which lay behind it were evil omens. The local government, despite its realization that it owed its life to the Allied forces, had little faith in the sincerity of the motives which brought foreign armies to Russian soil. The American troops were objected to least, but Francis found that "reconciling their presence with our Government's declaration of Russian policy is a delicate task."[93]

On the day following the landing of the American soldiers Russian efforts at self-government suffered a severe set-back through a conspiracy of a group of reactionary officers, headed by one Colonel

Chaplin, a Russian naval officer attached to the staff of General Poole. In the confusion following the hasty evacuation of the Soviet authorities, they had secured some 4,000,000 rubles which they had discreetly distributed to various officials to smooth the way for their designs.[94] On the evening of September 5 Chaplin and his aides quietly surrounded the homes of Tchaikovsky and the other ministers, conveyed them to a steamer, and transported them unobserved to Solovetsky Monastery on an island off the mouth of the Dvina River.[95] The manner in which Francis learned of the event is of some interest.

On the morning of the 5th (6th?) of September, following the kidnapping, I was reviewing a battalion of American troops. Three American battalions had been landed, one of them had been sent down the railroad toward Vologda, one was up the Dvina River, toward Kotlas, and the other one was held at Archangel. I had just finished reviewing this battalion that was left in Archangel when General Poole, who was with me on the Government steps, turned to me and said: "There was a revolution here last night." I said: "The hell you say! Who pulled it off?" He replied: "Chaplin." . . . I said: "There is Chaplin over there now." I motioned for him to come over and join us. General Poole remarked, "Chaplin is going to issue a proclamation at 11 o'clock." It was then 10:45. I said: "Chaplin, who pulled off this revolution here last night?" He said: "I did."

Chaplin had done very good work against the Bolsheviks, getting them deposed and out of Archangel. He went on to say: "I drove the Bolsheviks out of Archangel. I established this Government"—meaning the Tchaikovsky Government. "The Ministers were in General Poole's way, and were hampering Colonel Donop," who was the French Provost Marshal. "I see no use for any Government here anyway."


I replied: "I think this is the most flagrant usurpation of power I ever knew, and don't you circulate that proclamation that General Poole tells me you have written until I can see it and show it to my colleagues.[96]

When the news leaked out the city was in an uproar. Chaplin was called a monarchist by the two ministers who had escaped the kidnappers and Francis, as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, received petitions and telegrams from all sides demanding the restoration of the deposed government. The general strike which was called led to the use of American soldiers to operate the street railways and caused Francis, his colleagues and General Poole to prepare a joint proclamation, announcing their intention of taking over the government. But since the printers remained on strike, it was never published.[97]

It was largely due to the vigorous efforts of Francis that the crisis was passed without more serious consequences. He at once

assembled the Diplomatic Corps and induced it to accept his view that the deposed ministers should be brought back without delay. On the 7th Francis and his colleagues, Noulens, the French Ambassador, Terreti, the Italian Ambassador, and Lindley, the British Commissioner, issued a declaration disclaiming all responsibility for the kidnapping and disapproving of violence from every side. They asserted that since the act was one by Russians against Russians, it was no concern of the Allies, but that the latter nevertheless felt constrained to see that the arrested ministers were brought back to Archangel.[98] Francis faced much opposition to his policy, but was fully supported by the State Department. The exiled ministers were returned on the evening of September 8 and conferred with the Ambassadors on the next day.[99] They were reinstated and the strikes called off. Their desire to court-martial Chaplin was opposed by the Allied representatives and he escaped punishment. Francis felt certain that British and French officers were implicated in the plot which he had taken the initiative in frustrating.[100]

This crisis was at once followed by another. On September 11 the restored ministers informed the Ambassadors of their firm determination to resign and to hand over their power to a Military Governor, reporting directly to the new anti-Bolshevist government at Samara. All endeavors to dissuade the disillusioned and disheartened ministers seemed unavailing.[101] They felt that their power was a shadow and their presence a nuisance barely tolerated by the British and French officers. Francis was well aware of the friction prevailing and had described the situation as "anomalous, unprecedented, difficult and delicate."[102] He once more took upon himself the task of preserving some semblance of Russian self-government, fearing that a purely military rule by the Allies would arouse still greater opposition among the local population.[103] Three of the ministers left for Omsk and the aged Tchaikovsky told Francis that he could never co-operate with General Poole and much preferred to leave the country. But at length he yielded to argument. Francis's gratification at his reluctant consent on September 25 to remain in office was only marred by the observation that his Allied colleagues were disappointed.[104] Francis, in fact, found the attitude of the British authorities so out of harmony with the professed purposes of intervention that he made repeated complaints to the State Department. The departure of General Poole in October, however, and his replacement by General Ironsides, eased the tension and facilitated co-operation.[105]



SCENE OF INTERVENTION IN NORTH RUSSIA
Region of American and Allied Military Operations, August 1918 – October 1919.
ARROWS SHOW LINES OF ADVANCE OF INVADING TROOPS.

During all these events, a brisk warfare was going on further south between the Allied troops and the Soviet forces. Whatever may have been the intentions of the Allied Governments, nothing in the statements of President Wilson had seemed to contemplate hostilities between the American army and any Russian armed groups. But all the incidents of war at once followed intervention, since the Allied troops pushed southward and the Soviet Government proceeded to resist this unprovoked invasion of its territory. The "stores" at Archangel which the Allied soldiers were to protect had been removed into the interior by the retiring Bolshevist forces.[106] The invaders were immediately sent in pursuit, whether to discover the whereabouts of the stores or for other purposes neither officers nor men seemed to have the slightest idea. The military objective of the original Allied advance appears to have been Vologda, from which point contacts might perhaps be established with the Czecho-Slovaks and the White Guards operating to the southeast. By the end of August the Allied contingents had advanced seventy-five miles south of Archangel. On September 17 American troops occupied Shenkursk, a town of some 4,000 inhabitants and the second largest in the province.[107] The Red Army continued its retirement along the Dvina in the direction of Kotlas, fighting guerrilla rear-guard actions with few important engagements between large bodies of men. In October the Allies encountered more serious resistance along the Dvina, but they advanced in other directions, clearing South Karelia of the Bolsheviks and continuing their forward movement along the railway in the direction of Petrograd.[108]

Francis had favored the dispatch of a much larger American force than was actually sent. On October 4 he reported to Washington that it was only the presence of the American troops that had saved the small British and French contingents from disaster, prevented the overthrow of the Archangel Government and enabled him to remain in Russia.[109] But, despite his appeals, he was informed on September 20 that no more American troops would be sent to Russia.[110] A month later he was still lamenting that "10,000 soldiers could have taken Vologda and possibly overturned Soviet Government."[111] In a cable of October 11 Secretary Lansing had commended his devotion to duty, but suggested, in view of the long illness which had kept him confined to his apartment, that he proceed to London for surgical assistance, leaving Consul General D. C. Poole in charge of the Embassy.[112] On November 6 he was carried aboard the cruiser *Olympia* and took his final leave of Russia, after

a farewell message to the American soldiers, in which he lauded their efforts and emphasized the importance of their services.[113] In London he underwent an operation and slowly recovered his health. He remained in western Europe until February, 1919, adhering firmly to the views which he had already formed regarding the Russian problem and urging more extensive military intervention to overthrow the Soviet Government.

On November 11 came the armistice and the end of the war in the west.* Premature rumors of peace in October had already resulted in the mutiny of a French company fighting in North Russia and had led to serious unrest and disaffection among the American troops as well.[114] The actual close of hostilities in France and Italy further lowered the morale of the Allied soldiers. No move for their withdrawal was made, however. The reasons for their retention are well stated by Henry Wilson, Chief of the (British) Imperial General Staff:

> Having been initiated as an anti-German measure the signature of the German armistice robbed the campaign of its original purpose. It may then be asked why we did not immediately withdraw our troops from North Russia in November, 1918. There were two main obstacles in the way of doing this. In the first place, owing to climatic conditions, we could not be sure of being able to remove the whole force from Archangel before the Port was closed by ice. In the second place, the prosecution of our anti-German policy had involved us in obligations to those loyal Russians who had remained true to the Allied cause and had thereby compromised themselves with the Soviet Government. We could not precipitately abandon these without doing our utmost to ensure their subsequent safety.
>
> The Allied Governments consequently found themselves committed to the retention of their contingents at Archangel throughout the winter, although they had not decided on any definite policy with regard to the Bolsheviks.[115]

The situation at the end of the year may be briefly characterized. At Archangel the political chaos of the first two months had been replaced by comparative calm, with the Allied authorities and the

*The armistice itself, it may be noted in passing, effected significant changes in the Russian situation. Article 12 required the German troops to retire from Russia, but only when the Allies should deem such retirement expedient. Article 13, somewhat inconsistently, required the evacuation to begin at once. Article 15 annulled the Treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk. Article 19 required Germany to deliver all seized Russian and Rumanian gold to the Allies, to be held by them in trust. Article 29 required Germany to evacuate all Black Sea ports and deliver all seized Russian warships to the Allies and the United States. (H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference*, pp. 463-464.)

local government co-operating as well as circumstances permitted, but with a marked lack of enthusiasm for the war on the part of the population in the occupied territory. Since the region was cut off from its normal source of food supply the Allied and American Governments were obliged to sustain it out of their own resources. President Wilson allotted some $5,000,000 of the funds at his disposal for war purposes to send winter supplies to the civilian population.[116] The military situation was becoming increasingly unfavorable for the Allied forces, consisting of about 6,000 British, 4,500 Americans, 1,500 Frenchmen and smaller contingents of Russians and other nationalities. These troops were widely scattered in the forests and tundras, having advanced from Archangel and Murmansk with little plan until their outposts, in the words of one observer, resembled "a seven-fingered hand, with one finger 300 miles long and with no lateral communication between the fingers." [117] These isolated "fronts" were defended by block houses and simple trench fortifications against growing Soviet armies. Vologda remained the objective, but hopes of reaching it were fading.[118] What the outcome would be clearly depended not only upon the decisions to be made at Washington, London and Paris, but upon the results of intervention in Siberia and of the civil war of Whites and Reds going on in other parts of Russia.

4. Intervention in Siberia

Early in August, 1918, General William S. Graves was appointed to command the American Expeditionary Force of 7,000 men to be sent to Vladivostok.[119] It was generally understood that Japan would send an equivalent number of troops and Great Britain and France smaller contingents. While there was no formal agreement as to the size of the forces of each of the powers participating in the intervention, the United States had opposed a large expedition and Baron Goto had assured Ambassador Morris on August 5 that Japan would send not more than 12,000 troops. With the road already paved by the Czechs and by the Allied military and naval representatives who placed the city of Vladivostok under Allied "protection" on July 6,[120] the movement of the expeditionary forces into Siberia proceeded without delay. British and French contingents from Hong-Kong and Indo-China arrived first, followed by the Japanese on August 12 and by two American regiments from the Philippine Islands on the 15th and 16th. General Graves reached

Vladivostok on September 4.[121] The British and Japanese forces at once went to the assistance of the Czechs fighting the Bolshevist partisans along the Ussuri River and defeated the "enemy" in a decisive engagement on August 24.[122] With the capture of Chita on September 6 and the dispersal of the Red detachments along the Amur all organized opposition disappeared.[123]

From the point of view of the Japanese Government, however, the situation required the presence of a powerful army. President Wilson's hope that the Japanese forces would be no larger than was compatible with the limited objectives he had set for intervention was speedily submerged in the flood of Nipponese soldiery that poured into Manchuria and the Russian Far East.[124] In addition to the troops landed at Vladivostok Japan landed forces at Nikolaevsk, at the mouth of the Amur, 800 miles to the north.[125] The Japanese plan was apparently to secure effective military control of all of Siberia east of Lake Baikal. Instead of sending 7,000 or 12,000 men, the Japanese Government dispatched three full divisions with auxiliary troops to the continent, totaling over 70,000 men. The troops were followed by merchants who proceeded to make the most of the opportunities for profit which the situation presented.[126] Within a few weeks all the strategic centers of eastern Siberia were in Japanese control, save for the few points held by the small American and British forces, whose presence the Japanese authorities seemed to resent.[127]

Approximately half of the American contingent remained in Vladivostok, the remainder being sent north along the Amur railway.[128] In the middle of September American forces co-operated with the Japanese, British and French in destroying the Red Army operating in the Amur Valley near Khabarovsk and Blagovestchensk.[129] General Graves, however, had received no instructions to treat any Russian faction as an enemy and he strove to preserve a position of neutrality. As at Archangel, hostilities between the Allied and Soviet forces were the immediate consequence of intervention, but the American troops in Siberia, while theoretically under Japanese command, preserved a considerable degree of independence and refrained from fighting as far as possible. Though some of his subordinates not unreasonably supposed that they had been sent to do battle with the Bolsheviks, General Graves adhered strictly to his orders and permitted no hostilities save what was necessary to guard the railway.[130]

Such behavior, disconcerting to all the Allied Governments, was

particularly distressing to the Czecho-Slovaks, whose main force was hard pressed in eastern Russia, 4,000 miles west of Vladivostok. Confronted with a serious emergency, the Soviet army had rallied and recaptured Kazan from the Czechs on September 17. Simbirsk and Samara fell in turn and the Red Guards entered Samara on October 9.[181] Early in September Secretary Lansing had announced that the Government of the United States "recognizes that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks . . . and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires."[182] This action was shortly followed by the extension of material aid to the Czecho-Slovak troops. According to General March, President Wilson on one occasion turned over $5,000,000 from his personal fund to the Czechs.[183] An additional $3,000,000 seems to have been advanced on another occasion, besides $5,000,000 by the War Trade Board for Russian economic relief.[184] On October 15 the War Trade Board opened an office at Vladivostok and on the same day the first consignment of supplies for the Czecho-Slovak army, sent through the Red Cross, arrived at that port.[185]

The Czechs, however, had been led to expect more than merely economic assistance. Their front west of the Urals could not be defended without aid from Allied troops and they constantly pleaded for reinforcements. In October General Graves, Ambassador Morris and Admiral Knight joined in a recommendation that a small American force be sent to the Urals, along with other Allied detachments, for its moral effect.[186] This report has never been made public, but it was said that President Wilson declared it "the most convincing document" he had yet read on the Russian problem.[187] The War Department and the General Staff, however, were convinced that the war was to be won on the western front and opposed more extensive intervention in Russia. Nothing ever came of the project. The Czechs continued to fight against heavy odds and to hope, not without bitterness, for the promised help that never came.[188]

American friction with Japan had meanwhile reached a dangerous crisis. Having accepted the American invitation to intervene, the Japanese Government was evidently prepared to make the best possible use of a long-awaited opportunity to extend its control on the Asiatic mainland. In Siberia the Japanese military forces assumed an attitude of swash-buckling arrogance which irritated the American and Allied troops almost as much as it did the Russian population.[189] The Japanese clearly regarded the Americans and British as inter-

lopers and they apparently fostered a widespread propaganda in eastern Siberia to discredit the United States.[140] A most serious bone of contention was the Chinese Eastern Railway. Great Britain, France, Italy and China consented to the American proposals for its operation, but Japan made counter-proposals which would have given her effective control. The entire Japanese policy, in fact, seemed to be so at variance with expressed intentions, and particularly with the views of the American Government concerning the objectives of intervention, that it gave rise to rumors of a secret understanding with Germany, in whose triumph in the Great War the Japanese military group were said to have retained complete confidence until the end.[141]

Until more authentic sources of information are made available, the seriousness of the crisis cannot be known. But it appears beyond question that American-Japanese relations had reached a somewhat critical stage in the early days of November, 1918. Secretary Lansing discussed very earnestly with the Japanese Ambassador, Viscount Ishii, the possible consequences of the Japanese policy in Siberia.[142] In Japan the military party urged defiance of the United States, while the business world urged concessions. After some days of doubt the advocates of peace triumphed. The prestige of the militarists was badly shattered soon afterwards by Germany's surrender. The Japanese Government yielded and sought to give proof of its sincerity. The 73,400 Japanese troops in Siberia were gradually reduced to about 25,000 by the following spring.[143] General Graves in Vladivostok received expressions of regret and assurances of future harmonious co-operation.[144] The crisis had passed. Whether concord would be preserved in the future remained to be seen.

While intervention thus pursued its troubled and uncertain course, the anti-Bolshevist elements who had displaced the soviets in western Siberia had gathered themselves into some semblance of a government. The new authorities expressed their intention of creating a well-disciplined army, re-establishing a battle front against Germany with Allied assistance and beginning the reconstruction of a united Russia.[145] Late in September a "national convention" met in Ufa which created a new Provisional Government, headed by Nicholas Avksentieff, Nicholas Astroff, Lieutenant General Vassili Boldyreff, Peter Vologodski and Nicholas Tchaikovsky.[146] Tchaikovsky, it will be recalled, was also head of the anti-Bolshevist government at Archangel. Avksentieff was a Socialist Revolutionary leader and

Minister of the Interior in the Kerensky Cabinet. On October 10 Kerensky appealed to Great Britain to recognize the new government, but the Allies decided to await further developments.[147] The Ufa or "All-Russian" Directorate at Omsk soon found a rival in the "Temporary Government of Siberia" at Tomsk, with which it began negotiations. Friction with the Czechs, internal political dissension, and serious labor disturbances, which were suppressed by force, added to the complexities of the situation, but the appeals of the Allied and American consuls led to a compromise between the two groups by which a joint cabinet was created with Vologodski as Chairman and Admiral Alexander Kolchak as Minister of War.[148]

This new All-Russian Provisional Government issued an appeal to President Wilson on November 7, through Ambassador Bakhmeteff, containing a lengthy and heated denunciation of the Bolsheviks and calling for aid.[149] Two weeks later Senator King of Utah introduced a resolution into the United States Senate declaring that "the republican Government at Omsk should be recognized as the de facto Government of Russia" and that "the Government of the United States and the Governments of the Entente Powers should take immediate measures to render financial and military aid to Russia, to overthrow the bolshevist tyranny and anarchy, to provide food and other material assistance for the people, and to assist the Russian people in bringing their country into economic order and progress as a sound basis for the prosperity and independence of the new federal republic of Russia."[150] The resolution never came to a vote. The government it referred to had been overthrown three days previously.

The All-Russian Government had faced its "Chaplin kidnapping" and, having no Ambassador Francis on the scene to come to the rescue, had succumbed. The Siberian Chaplin was Admiral Kolchak, former commander of the Russian Black Sea fleet. He had joined the British service after the November Revolution and had been sent to Siberia on the recommendation of General Horvath.[151] Despite the suspicion aroused by his reactionary political views, he was accepted in the All-Russian Government to placate the British High Commissioner, Sir Charles Eliot; General Knox, Chief of the British Military Mission, and Colonel Ward, who had reached Omsk on October 18 with 800 British soldiers.[152] As at Archangel the friction between the Socialist members of the government and the officers and adherents of the old régime soon reached the breaking point. And, as at Archangel, the British and other Allied representatives

regarded the Socialist government as a failure and looked to Kolchak to restore order and discipline.[153] On the morning of November 18 the ministers were arrested and Kolchak was asked to become dictator. British troops "preserved order" while the assent of the British representatives and of the Czech General Gaida was secured.[154] Kolchak accepted office as "Supreme Governor" and was cordially received by M. Renault, the French commissioner, and by Colonel Ward. The latter fully approved of the coup d'état, but bestirred himself to prevent the impending execution of the arrested ministers. Quite a number of prisoners suffered death, but the ministers safely reached Harbin under the protection of British soldiers.[155]

The new dictator hastened to reassure the people of Siberia and the Allied Governments of his good intentions. In his proclamation of November 18 he declared that he would "not enter the path of reaction nor the fatal path of party strife. My principal aim will be: the formation of a disciplined army, victory over Bolshevism and the re-establishment of law and order so that the people can freely choose the form of Government they desire and so realize the great ideas of liberty which are to-day spread over the whole of the Universe." [156] His Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the Russian Embassy in Washington that he proposed to fulfil all the obligations of previous Russian Governments and that all the financial acts of the Soviet authorities were illegal.[157] A few weeks later the new government again addressed the Russian Embassy, expressing satisfaction at Allied victory in the war, hoping for a voice at the Peace Conference and pleading for assistance from the United States and the Allies.[158]

The coup d'état was regarded with very mixed feelings in Russian and Allied circles. The British representatives were most enthusiastic in their approval, with the French of the same view.[159] Americans in Siberia were more dubious, but in official Washington gratification was expressed at the change. Prince Lvoff and Ambassador Bakhmeteff voiced their pleasure to President Wilson.[160] The Japanese Government was clearly disappointed. It had reached an understanding with the Directorate a few days before its overthrow to advance its forces to the Urals, but Kolchak, apparently on British advice, now ordered the Japanese forces to remain at Chita.[161] Japan's henchman, Ataman Semenoff, defied the new ruler, demanded his resignation, and cut communications between Omsk and Vladivostok, a procedure which left official Washington "puzzled." [162]

In Omsk many people regarded the new régime as a step toward autocratic reaction and gave it little support.[163] Late in December a widespread mutiny and revolt swept the city, which was suppressed with heavy casualties by Czech troops that had been persuaded that the rebels were Tsarist sympathizers and by the British soldiers under Colonel Ward, who frankly disregarded his orders not to interfere in internal affairs.[164]

Most of the Czechs were bitterly disillusioned and saw in the coup fresh proof that they had been duped. General Gaida supported Kolchak, but he found himself alone.[165] Many of the Czech soldiers were Socialists themselves and they now lost all heart for further fighting. They had waited in vain for four months for the Allied help that had been promised them, and now expressed their desire to return home if the Allies had no Russian policy.[166] Many at the front abandoned the struggle and withdrew. Kolchak, fearing the effect of their conduct on his own troops, ordered General Gaida to arrest certain of their leaders. He did so, but the Czechs soon released them and compelled him to resign his post in the Czecho-Slovak army.[167] He joined Kolchak's White Army, but his compatriots were done with fighting Russian battles. The advance guards of Allied intervention were henceforth to remain passive and disgruntled spectators of the Siberian tragedy.

The political and military situation in Siberia at the close of the year remained complex and uncertain. In the region east of Lake Baikal the American troops remained in more or less peaceful occupation of certain sections of the railway, while the Japanese found themselves menaced by guerrilla attacks and sporadic uprisings of "Bolshevist" partisans.[168] Further west General Knox and his British aides were striving to raise and train an army for the Omsk Government. The French General Janin had been dispatched to Siberia for the same purpose, but by agreement with General Knox he confined his activities to the area between Vladivostok and Lake Baikal.[169] The desultory warfare west of the Urals went on without decisive result, but late in December the Soviet forces at Perm were badly defeated by the White Army and compelled to quit the city.[170] The American Government continued to think of the Russian problem in terms of economic relief,[171] while the British and French endeavored half-heartedly and in the face of Czech and Japanese indifference to enable the Kolchak régime to raise sufficient forces to advance into European Russia to overthrow the Bolsheviks. As at Archangel, intervention had produced unanticipated and undesired

results. What would emerge from the tangle of misunderstandings, conflicting policies and subsidized civil war no one could foresee.

The Soviet authorities at Moscow had meanwhile continued to seek peace with the western Powers, despite the bitterness which intervention had naturally produced. On October 24 Chicherin addressed a communication to President Wilson, complaining of the discrepancy between Wilson's friendly statement of January 8 and the policy pursued by the Allied and American Governments in the past six months. "Mr. President, the acid test of the relations between the United States and Russia gave quite different results from those that might have been expected from your message to the Congress. But we have reason not to be altogether dissatisfied with even these results, since the outrages of the counter-revolution in the East and North have shown the workers and peasants of Russia the aims of the Russian counter-revolution, and of its foreign supporters, thereby creating among the Russian people an iron will to defend their liberty and the conquests of the revolution, to defend the land that it has given to the peasants and the factories that it has given to the workers." He expressed the willingness of the Soviet Government to conclude an armistice on the condition of the evacuation of occupied territories and suggested the liberation of Ireland, Egypt, India and the Philippine Islands, the annulment of all war loans, and the expropriation of the capitalists of all countries as steps toward world peace.[172]

This appeal was closely followed by an offer of peace to the Czecho-Slovaks,[173] a solemn protest to the Allied and American Governments against their acts of "wanton aggression," "sheer violence and brutal force," [174] and a new offer to President Wilson from Litvinoff to negotiate regarding peace.[175] But all these statements fell upon deaf ears. The French premier, Clemenceau, defined Allied policy in terms cutting off the Ukraine, the Caucasus and western Siberia from the Bolsheviks and of aiding the "sound" Russian elements to restore order.[176] Lord Milner, in the British Parliament, declared that the consequence of withdrawal from Russia would be "that the barbarism which at present reigns in a part only of that country would spread over the whole of it, including the vast regions of northern and central Asia, which were included in the domain of the Tsars. The ultimate consequences of such a disaster cannot be foreseen." [177] On the eve of the assembling of the Peace Conference at Versailles, anti-Bolshevist leaders, including Ambassador Bakhmeteff, Maklakoff, Lvoff and Miliukoff,

flocked to Paris to plead for Allied aid to Kolchak and Denikin, the new White General in South Russia.[178] They were received very sympathetically, but the Allied and American Governments were still unwilling to dispatch sufficiently large forces to Russia to make the overthrow of the Soviet Government a practical possibility.[179] But they were equally unwilling to respond to the Soviet peace overtures. The Russian riddle remained unsolved.

5. *Congressional Reactions to Intervention*

Until the signing of the armistice removed the pressures and inhibitions of the war period, the American Congress displayed little disposition to criticize the policy of intervention embarked upon by the chief executive. President Wilson, in the exercise of his constitutional power as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, had dispatched American forces to Russia without Congressional consent or authorization of any kind. The magnitude of the war with Germany, of which the operations in Russia appeared to be a part, silenced all legislative or public criticism of his actions. Patriotic sentiment, official pressure and partisan loyalty combined with public ignorance of, and indifference toward, events in Russia to give the President a free hand. But the end of the Great War and the rather inexplicable continuation of the little war in Russia stimulated more active interest in the nation's Russian relations and led to doubts and questionings in Congress.

An analysis of the debates of the period reveals three main sources of criticism of the executive's Russian policy. One observes first the large rôle played by political partisanship, Republicans taking the initiative in assailing intervention and Democrats coming to its defense. A second easily discernible element in the situation is the desire of Senators and Representatives to satisfy the demands of constituents for the withdrawal of American soldiers from Russia. These demands came chiefly from Michigan, Wisconsin and Illinois, the home states of many of the men serving in Siberia and North Russia. They grew in volume and extent throughout 1919 and were strongly reinforced by the third source of dissatisfaction, the reaction toward isolationism and aloofness from world politics. Fighting battles south of Archangel and guarding railroads in northeastern Asia for purposes that were wholly obscure and seemed to have no vital relation of any kind to the welfare or interests of the country appeared to be as incompatible with the principle of "no

foreign entanglements" as participation in the League of Nations. Even the widespread fear and abhorrence of Bolshevism which swept through the United States failed to silence the voices of the isolationists demanding an end of military adventures in Russia.

During December and January Senators Johnson (California), LaFollette, Townsend and Borah vigorously assailed the policy of intervention, which was weakly defended by the supporters of the Administration. These debates resulted in no definite action, but they were not wholly without effect on the course of events. Secretary of War Baker, in a letter of February 17 to Senator Chamberlain, announced the withdrawal of American troops from North Russia at the earliest possible moment.[180] Senator Hitchcock intimated that this course, which was demanded by most Republicans, had been decided upon by the President. Senator McCumber, however, expressed strong opposition to such a policy. He declared himself in favor of "maintaining war against Lenin and Trotsky, and . . . fighting the battles of the poor, innocent Russian people, who are in the grasp of these damnable beasts." He recited a long list of Bolshevist atrocities and inserted into the Record the famous "Decree of the Saratov Soviet" of March 15, 1918, instituting the "nationalization of women," which, he asserted, was "so filthy, so brutal, that I am surprised that the whole country does not awaken in indignation and declare that the civilization of the world demands the extermination of such beasts." [181]

By the spring of 1919 the views here set forth by the Senator from North Dakota had secured very widespread acceptance throughout the United States and the Allied countries generally. The origin and nature of the "evidence" upon which they were based will be considered below. Here it will be sufficient to note that the most powerful support which the intervention policy of President Wilson received in Congress and in the nation at large came from those whose mental picture of things Russian corresponded to that of Senator McCumber. As early as January 14 Senator Thomas had averred that Bolshevism had simply been "one long agony of murder, of pillage, of destruction." He added certain information that would undoubtedly have been of great interest to the Communist leaders in Moscow. This was to the effect that two soviets had already been formed in New York and that "nearly all of the prominent leaders of bolshevism, Lenin excepted, graduated from eastern New York, from Chicago, from Philadelphia, and from Buffalo, and every mother's son of them were members of the

Industrial Workers of the World." [182] On the 24th Senator Sherman of Illinois, in the course of a long denunciation of radicalism in the United States, read and inserted into the Record documentary "proof" of the nationalization of women in Russia, all without question or protest, save an inquiry as to his sources from Senator Borah.[183]

On February 4, Senator Myers of Montana informed the Senate that he was "inexpressibly shocked and horrified to read in the Washington *Post* of Monday morning (February 3) this article: 'Urge "Red" America—Bolshevik Speakers Stir Huge Audience at Poli's Theatre—City's Radicals in Throngs.' " [184] That such things could be tolerated in the national capital seemed almost incredible. An immediate investigation by the Department of Justice and prompt action by Congress was called for. Senator Kellogg of Minnesota, destined six years later to become Secretary of State, was equally shocked. "Knowing, as we do, the trail of crime and tyranny in the wake of bolshevism, unparalleled in history, it would seem that no one of sound mind would stand up in the city of Washington and advocate such a change." Senator Weeks joined the chorus and inserted into the Record the text of the Soviet land law of September, 1918, as a horrible example of confiscation of property. Senator Walsh's resolution, extending the authority of the subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee then engaged in investigating German propaganda to cover Russian propaganda as well, was at once accepted by unanimous consent.[185] Senator Poindexter's resolution calling upon the Attorney General to report what steps had been taken to investigate the meeting of February 2 at Poli's Theatre, "at which speakers advocated the cause of the present Bolsheviki Government of Russia, which is now at war with the United States," was accepted with equal alacrity on the following day.*

The subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, composed of Senators King, Wolcott, Nelson and Sterling, with Senator Overman as chairman, began taking testimony on February 11 and continued its work until March 10. Its labors, and the conclusions to which they led, were of such an extraordinary character as to justify a brief résumé. Some 1,200 pages of "evidence" were

* On the 7th Senator Lenroot inserted into the *Record* a letter from Mr. Judson King, chairman of the meeting at Poli's Theatre, declaring the Washington *Post's* article "an absurd perversion of the truth and a gross violation of journalistic ethics." The meeting was addressed by speakers who did not advocate a "Red America," but simply told of their observations in Russia. This protest was, of course, wholly without effect.[186]

gathered from two dozen witnesses. Over half of these were violently anti-Bolshevik in sentiment and, with a few rare exceptions, told tales that did more credit to their gullibility and their imagination than to their reason and judgment. W. C. Huntington, Commercial Attaché at Moscow until August 16, 1918, asserted that only eight per cent of the Russian people were in favor of the Bolsheviks, and that the remainder were held in submission by the terrorism of Lettish and Chinese mercenaries. Catherine Breshkovskaya, "little grandmother of the Russian Revolution," assured the committee that more people had been killed in one year of Bolshevist rule than in three years of war. Roger E. Simmons, of the Department of Commerce, retailed blood-curdling tales of butchery and horror. Withdrawal from Archangel, he said, would mean the murder of every man, woman and child in the evacuated territory. Documents proving the nationalization of women were solemnly read and accepted. Other witnesses followed in similar vein. Those who were more favorably disposed toward the Soviet Government, such as Mr. and Mrs. John Reed, Bessie Beatty, Albert Rhys Williams and Frank Kiddie, received a very cool reception and failed to move the committee. Raymond Robins, here presented with his first opportunity to tell his story, denounced Bolshevism as a world menace, but told in full of his own activities in Russia, condemning falsification and misrepresentation as well as intervention as methods of treating the disease and urging an investigating commission. Ambassador Francis also presented his views, which remained unchanged.[187]

The net result of these hearings before the Overman Committee was to picture Soviet Russia as a kind of bedlam inhabited by abject slaves completely at the mercy of an organization of homicidal maniacs whose purpose was to destroy all traces of civilization and carry the nation back to barbarism. The summarized report of the committee frankly expressed this view.[188] When a responsible group of men, composed of representative members of the United States Senate, could suffer such a complete paralysis of its critical faculties and permit its vision to be so distorted by fear and hatred, little hope remained for a better understanding of Russia's problems or for a more pragmatic and constructive approach to the Russian policy of the American Government. The problem continued to rest in the hands of President Wilson. His position of world leadership at the Peace Conference made the hope of peace with Russia depend in large measure upon his insight, imagination and political sagacity.

CHAPTER SIX

THE ACID TEST

1. Peace Efforts; Wilson at Paris

In January, 1919, all eyes turned toward Paris and Versailles. All factions in war-torn Russia looked eagerly to the west to discover what message of hope or despair would emerge from the deliberations of the Allied statesmen. The White leaders came in an optimistic mood, and not without reason, for their cause had won the respect and sympathy of the western governments, while their enemies were isolated, feared and despised. From every corner of the globe the scattered anti-Bolshevist leaders flocked to France to present their pleas for aid. The Russian ambassador in the United States soon joined the procession to Paris. With the full approval of the State Department, which authorized him to expend $100,000 of the balance of the American war loans still at his disposal for this purpose,[1] Bakhmeteff hastened abroad, rejoicing in Kolchak's recent victories and anticipating Allied aid to the White dictator.[2] He and his colleagues were overjoyed at the early decision of the Allied Governments to admit no Bolshevist representatives and congratulated themselves that Russia's voice at the Peace Conference would be their own.[3]

While the Soviet Government was thus deprived of all opportunity of a direct hearing, it did not despair of using the occasion to bring about the end of intervention. On January 10 Litvinoff and Vorovsky expressed the opinion that further peace offers from Moscow would be futile, since all past overtures had been ignored,[4] but two days later Chicherin addressed a communication to the American State Department, requesting that the American Government "kindly name a place and time for opening of peace negotiations with our representatives." He undertook to refute the reasons advanced for intervention by Senator Hitchcock, which had come to his notice through a radio telegram from Washington via Lyons.

Judging from statements contained in the above-mentioned radio telegram, some prominent members of the principal political party in the United States could not quite understand the reasons of Senator Hitch-

cock. They expressed their wish that American troops in Russia should be withdrawn as soon as possible. We share their wish to re-establish normal relations between the two countries, and we are ready to eliminate everything which may be an obstacle to such relations.[5]

Acting Secretary of State Polk transmitted this note to Ambassador Francis, then in a London hospital, asking his comments upon it.[6] On January 22 Francis sent his views to the American Peace Commissioners in Paris. He declared that Chicherin's message was "absolutely false in its claim that it represented the Russian people." He dubbed Lenin a fanatic and Trotsky an adventurer, whose object was world-wide social revolution. He then undertook to refute Chicherin's refutations, reiterating his conclusions regarding Soviet hypocrisy and bad faith. He concluded that Bolshevism was a disgrace to civilization which must be exterminated, not negotiated with.[7] Three days later Dewitt C. Poole, whom Francis had left in charge of the Embassy at Archangel, forwarded his own comments on Chicherin's message, declaring it futile because of "the entire absence of good faith on the part of the Bolsheviki." [8] The voices of those who were supposedly best informed about the situation in Russia were thus raised at the outset of the Peace Conference in opposition to any peace agreement with the Soviet Government. Francis's attitude toward Bolshevism was typical of almost all the foreign diplomatic representatives who had fled from it.[9]

These views commended themselves to the French Government, but the British Government had occasional doubts. On January 5 it had dispatched notes to Paris, Rome, Washington and Tokio, suggesting that the Allies propose a truce to Admiral Kolchak, General Denikin, Nicholas Tchaikovsky and the Soviet authorities for the duration of the Peace Conference and invite them to send delegates to Paris. But the French Foreign Minister, M. Pichon, refused to consider such an outrageous proposition. The French Government would "make no contract with crime," and would continue to treat "the bloody and disorderly tyranny of the Bolsheviks" as an enemy.[10]

On January 16 a conversation took place in Pichon's office at the Quai d'Orsay between the representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States. Lloyd George presented his views for discussion, declaring that the French Government had misunderstood the British proposal. No recognition of the Soviet régime was contemplated. The British Government had merely suggested a "truce of God," during which the warring Russian

factions could give an account of themselves to the Great Powers, which could then seek a solution. The idea of crushing Bolshevism by military force he thought "pure madness," both because of its inherent impossibility and because any Allied troops sent to execute such a policy would mutiny. The project of a "cordon sanitaire" was too inhumane for consideration, since it would mean the starvation of millions. The British proposal was the only reasonable alternative.

M. Pichon suggested that the French Ambassador to Russia, M. Noulens, should be heard the following morning, but President Wilson asserted that Mr. Lloyd George's statement seemed incontrovertible. He, too, felt that British and American troops would refuse to enter Russia to fight the Bolsheviks. Russia should be left free to work out her destiny and the British proposal should be adopted at least to see where it would lead.[11] The report which W. H. Buckler, attaché of the American Embassy in London, brought back from Stockholm, where he had been sent to confer with M. Litvinoff, confirmed President Wilson in his position. The Soviet representative had declared that his government would agree to an armistice at any time on the Archangel front and would pledge itself not to injure in any way the Russians who had co-operated with the Allies.[12]

On January 20 M. Noulens informed the Supreme Council that "the Bolshevist power is the enemy of the Entente" and that its tyranny and terror should place "the bloody chiefs at Moscow and Petrograd outside the pale of humanity," [13] but on the morning of the following day President Wilson presented Litvinoff's proposals and continued to urge some attempt to secure peace in Russia. In the afternoon, in deference to Clemenceau, he suggested that the British proposal be modified to permit the Russian representatives to assemble at some place other than Paris, such as Salonika. Baron Sonnino, of the Italian delegation, favored the suppression of Bolshevism by military force, but was obliged to concede that no reliable troops for the purpose were available. His colleague, Orlando, was of the same opinion, but said he would support the British proposal as modified by Wilson and Clemenceau. The French premier thought Litvinoff's offer a "clever trap" and was very reluctant to have any dealings with the Bolsheviks, but he believed that a public statement of the Allied position drawn up by President Wilson would do much to clarify the situation. Baron Makino, for Japan, took much the same view and it was finally agreed that

President Wilson should draft a proclamation, to be considered at the next meeting, inviting all Russian factions to attend a conference to be held at some selected place, as Salonika or Lemnos, to discuss with representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers means of restoring order and peace in Russia.[14]

On the 22nd President Wilson presented the ill-fated Prinkipo plan and secured its acceptance. Prinkipo or Prince's Islands in the Sea of Marmora was designated as the place of the proposed conference. The invitation expressed the desire of the Associated Powers to befriend and assist the Russian people without any thought of interfering in their internal affairs or assisting counter-revolution. "Every organized group that is now exercising or attempting to exercise political authority or military control anywhere in Siberia, or within the boundaries of European Russia" was asked to send not more than three representatives to the Prince's Islands to confer with representatives of the Allies, on condition of a truce of arms among the parties invited. The delegates would be furnished with transportation facilities by the Allies and would be expected to be present at the place designated by February 15.[15]

But the Peace Conference had reckoned without its guests. Filled with the implacable hatred of a dispossessed ruling class for its dispossessors, dreaming of the complete destruction of their enemies and their own restoration to power, and hoping for Allied assistance in realizing their dreams, the various anti-Bolshevist groups were in no mood to accept such advice as this. Sazonoff and Lvoff asserted positively that they would not sit at the same table with assassins. From Washington to Omsk and beyond, voices were raised criticizing Wilson and condemning any plan that proposed dealings with criminals.[16] From Archangel came a lengthy lament and protest from Poole, coupled with an offer to resign.[17] Francis sought to reassure him and seemed to think the plan not wholly without merit, but he had no enthusiasm for it.[18]

On February 4 the Soviet Government replied to the invitation, which it had learned of through indirect sources. It declared itself anxious to secure an agreement to end hostilities and willing to enter into negotiations at once. It further expressed its willingness to make concessions in the matter of Russia's financial obligations and to make territorial and economic concessions as well, their extent, however, to depend upon the political and military situation of Soviet Russia, which was constantly improving. As for revolutionary propaganda, it would pledge itself not to interfere in the internal

affairs of the Entente Powers, though it could not "limit the freedom of the revolutionary press." "On the above-mentioned basis the Russian Soviet Government is ready to enter into immediate negotiations on Prince's Island or at any other place with all the Entente Powers or with individual powers of their number or with certain Russian political groups, according to the wish of the Entente Powers. The Russian Soviet Government requests the Entente Powers to make known to it without delay the place to which it should send its representatives, as well as the time and the route." [19]

On the receipt of this reply the Supreme Council at once prepared to send a joint commission of two representatives of each of the five Great Powers to Prinkipo.[20] On February 7 Wilson appointed William Allen White and George Davis Herron for this purpose.[21] A week later the replies of the Esthonian and Lettish Governments were received. Both announced their independence of Russia, but expressed their readiness to participate.[22] Herron and White met representatives of various anti-Bolshevist groups in Paris and strove to gain their assent as well.[23]

But the final replies of the anti-Bolshevist governments of Archangel, Siberia and South Russia destroyed all hope of peace. They declared that no concilation or exchange of views was possible with "traitors" and "criminal usurpers." [24] Had the Allied Governments threatened these groups with a withdrawal of all further support, a different answer might have been forthcoming. But no such pressure was threatened or contemplated. The various White Governments were confident that the Allies would continue to extend them material aid in their war on Soviet Russia and they perceived no reason for negotiating with enemies they expected soon to destroy.

The frustration of the Prinkipo plan coincided with President Wilson's first return to the United States.* He did not, however, abandon his efforts to find a solution for the Russian enigma. The next device resorted to was that of sending a special emissary to the Soviet Government. On February 18 Secretary of State Lansing ordered William C. Bullitt, a member of the staff of the American delegation to Paris, to proceed to Russia to make a study of political and economic conditions for the benefit of the American Peace

*He sailed on February 15. Ambassador Francis returned on the same vessel and proposed to the President that he be sent back to Petrograd with the protection of 100,000 Allied troops to enable the Russian people to hold a free election for a Constituent Assembly. Wilson referred to the probable unpopularity of such a measure and the danger of mutiny, and took no action on the proposal.[25]

Commissioners.[26] The mission was to be a secret from all except the British delegation. On the advice of Colonel House Bullitt informed Mr. Philip Kerr, secretary to Lloyd George, of his task and asked to learn the British point of view on the problem. On the 21st, Kerr, in a private and confidential letter purporting to reflect the views of Lloyd George and Balfour, outlined the terms of peace with the Soviet Government which Great Britain would accept. They included the retention by all de facto Russian Governments of the territory they then controlled, free right of entry into Soviet Russia for Allied subjects, general amnesty to all political prisoners on both sides, the restoration of trade relations, and the withdrawal of the Allied troops "as soon as Russian armies above quota to be defined have been demobilized and their surplus arms surrendered or destroyed." [27] The American position, as explained to Bullitt by Colonel House, was in general harmony with these terms. He said that the American Government was prepared to press the Allies for a joint statement that all troops would be withdrawn as soon as practicable on condition that the Bolsheviks gave explicit assurances that they would not retaliate against persons who had co-operated with the Allied forces. He further declared that a promise to pay Russia's debts was not a necessity, but would be desirable to placate France.[28]

Apparently the original objective of the mission in the minds of Lloyd George and Colonel House was to pave the way for a renewal of the Prinkipo invitation. Bullitt declared: "I was instructed to go and bring back as quickly as possible a definite statement of exactly the terms the Soviet Government was ready to accept. The idea in the minds of the British and the American delegation was that if the Allies made another proposal it should be a proposal which we would know in advance would be accepted, so that there would be no chance of another Prinkipo proposal miscarrying." [29] In view of the fact that the first proposal had been rejected not by the Soviet Government, but by its enemies, the project of seeking information on the basis of which new terms could be offered to the Bolshevist leaders seems somewhat pointless, except on the assumption that the Allies were prepared to abandon the Russian Whites and attempt a fresh settlement with the Soviet Government alone. Since this was certainly not the case, the Bullitt Mission was surrounded from its inception with an atmosphere of uncertainty and obscurity of purpose which made its success problematical.

Bullitt, however, believed that he knew what was desired and

proceeded with his work. He left Paris February 22 and reached Petrograd March 8 in the company of Captain Walter Pettit of the Military Intelligence Division and of Mr. Lincoln Steffens. He spent a week in Russia and then emerged with a document containing the text of the terms of peace which the Soviet Government pledged itself to accept if proposed by the Allies not later than April 10, 1919. These terms came remarkably close to those suggested to Bullitt by Kerr. In fact they differed from the British terms in only a few particulars. The Soviet Government asked that it be given unhindered access to all ports and railways of the old Russian Empire. It asked further that Soviet citizens be given the same rights of entry, sojourn and circulation in the Allied countries as their citizens would enjoy in Russia, "provided they do not interfere in the domestic politics of these countries." It proposed an exchange of official representatives and demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops and the cessation of foreign military aid to the anti-Soviet forces immediately after the signing of the agreement. Finally, it proposed "as an integral part of this agreement that the Soviet Government and the other governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland shall recognize their responsibility for the financial obligations of the former Russian Empire, to foreign States parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such States." [80]

Bullitt believed that these terms constituted a practicable basis for peace between the Soviet Government and the Allied Powers. In his supplementary report to President Wilson he declared, in part, that acute economic distress prevailed in Soviet Russia, but that the terror had ceased and that the energies of the government, so far as intervention and civil strife permitted, were turned to constructive work. He thought the Soviet régime firmly in power, the blockade and the intervention having caused the Right Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks to support the Communists. He concluded: "No government save a socialist government can be set up in Russia to-day except by foreign bayonets, and any government so set up will fall the moment such support is withdrawn. . . . No real peace can be established in Europe or the world until peace is made with the revolution. This proposal of the Soviet Government presents an opportunity to make peace with the revolution on a just and reasonable basis—perhaps a unique opportunity. . . . It is, therefore, respectfully recommended that a proposal following the general lines of the suggestions of the Soviet Government should be made at the

earliest possible moment, such changes being made . . . as will make the proposal acceptable to conservative opinion in the allied and associated countries." [81]

The American Peace Commissioners, as well as Lloyd George and Orlando, appeared to be favorably impressed, and Bullitt proceeded, under instruction from Colonel House, to draw up a proposal to the Soviet Government substantially identical with the terms it had suggested.[82] Wilson, now back in Paris, did not confer personally with Bullitt. He told Colonel House that since he himself had a one-track mind and was at present occupied with Germany he would leave the Russian problem entirely in House's hands.[83] Bullitt continued to deal with the Colonel, constantly urging upon him the desirability of action before April 10. But on April 3 Dr. Fridjof Nansen addressed a letter to Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando, proposing a non-political humanitarian commission from the neutral countries for sending food relief into Russia and asking the conditions under which such an enterprise would be approved and supported.[84] Colonel House at once seized upon this new project as an easier approach to a solution and requested Bullitt to prepare a reply to the Nansen letter. Bullitt's reply simply repeated the peace terms he had already prepared in the form of conditions under which the relief plan would be approved, suggesting an armistice on April 20 and a peace conference at Christiania for April 25.[85]

When the Colonel, however, turned over this proposed reply to his aides, Messrs. Auchincloss and Miller, for revision of its legal language, they proceeded to make such extensive alterations in its terms that Bullitt informed them that he regarded their new offer as unfair and quite unacceptable to the Soviet Government.[86] But Colonel House thought their modifications preferable to the original proposals and told Bullitt to make no radical changes in rewriting the Auchincloss-Miller note. Bullitt complied under protest. The reply to Dr. Nansen which the "big four" finally sent was, with a few insignificant changes of phraseology, identical with Bullitt's redraft.[87] It was, as Bullitt declared, "in no sense a reply to the proposal of the Soviet Government," but merely promised cooperation in relief on condition of the cessation of hostilities and of transfers of troops and war materials to and within Russian territory.[88] Even this innocuous proposition was opposed by Clemenceau until April 17. The time-limit set by the Soviet Government for the acceptance of its suggestions had come and gone. Chicherin's

reply to Dr. Nansen on May 7 expressed gratitude for his humanitarian intentions, but asserted that the political conditions attached by the Allies to his proposal had rendered it futile. A cessation of hostilities would be possible only when the Allied and American Governments discontinued their intervention and their active support of the Tsarist and counter-revolutionary White Armies and manifested their willingness to discuss peace terms at a general conference.[39] While Lloyd George assured Parliament that he knew nothing of any peace overtures from the Soviet Government, Bullitt resigned in disgust, bitterly criticizing President Wilson, the Peace Conference and all their works.[40] Both Lloyd George and Kerr subsequently denounced Bullitt's accusations of duplicity on their part as a tissue of lies, but offered no explanation of their own. The story of Prinkipo had repeated itself in a new form.

The reasons for this cavalier treatment of the Bullitt proposal and the final defeat of all efforts to bring peace to Russia are not difficult to perceive. Bullitt's contention that the rapid progress of Kolchak's offensive toward the Volga in April and May was the primary cause of the rejection of his recommendations seems entirely correct.[41] The French Government and press were particularly elated at the victories of the White Army and gleefully predicted the early destruction of the Soviet Government. Their enthusiasm affected all the delegates at the Peace Conference and was unquestionably a determining factor in frustrating all schemes for a cessation of intervention and subsidized civil war. As early as April 16 Lloyd George, in addressing Parliament, had dwelt upon the moral duty of the Allies to support Kolchak and Denikin, since "they raised arms at our instigation, and largely at our expense." To send them munitions, he said, was in no sense a departure from the policy of not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.[42] Two days later it was intimated that the Entente Powers and the United States were prepared simultaneously to recognize the Kolchak Government as the de facto government of Russia immediately after the conclusion of the Peace Conference.[43] President Wilson, however, remained somewhat skeptical and the Supreme Council did not formally reach a decision to extend recognition to the White dictator until May 26.[44] Despite the demands of the leading anti-Bolshevist Russians in Paris for unconditional recognition, and the readiness which the British and French Governments displayed to take such a step, Wilson moved cautiously.[45] Kolchak's inability to follow up his earlier military successes led to hesitation. He still remained

unrecognized when the Peace Conference closed in June, but he had secured a definite promise of support and material assistance.[46]

2. *The Failure and Withdrawal of the North Russia Expedition*

At the opening of the Peace Conference the Allied and American troops in North Russia found themselves widely scattered and exposed to increasingly frequent attacks by superior enemy forces. In a memorandum of January 30, 1919, Bullitt had suggested their withdrawal to Colonel House as an evidence of the good faith of the Prinkipo invitation.[47] But the statesmen at Versailles were not yet ready to concede that the North Russia expedition was no longer serving a useful purpose. The political and military developments of the next few months were destined to produce a change of views.

The 15,000 Allied troops operating south of Archangel against some 25,000 well-equipped Soviet soldiers suffered from inadequate military supplies and a lack of heavy artillery.[48] Their efforts were further hampered by the absence of a definite objective, by friction among the various national contingents, and by the apathy of the Russian population in their rear.[49] In January, 1919, the guerrilla warfare of the previous months gave way to more vigorous fighting as a consequence of the decision of the Bolshevist commanders to undertake a general offensive against the invaders. A bombardment of the Allied outposts was followed by systematic attacks beginning January 18. The American forces holding the villages of Ust Padenga and Nijni Gora south of Shenkursk were soon overwhelmed and obliged to retire.[50] Since Shenkursk itself was almost surrounded and reduced to ruins by the enemy's artillery, its evacuation became imperative on the 25th. With the thermometer registering 30 degrees below zero, the hard-pressed Americans and Canadians dragged themselves by night along an unused forest trail and were far away by the next morning, when the Red forces captured the town and the large military supplies which the Allied troops had been compelled to leave behind them.[51]

The loss of Shenkursk was only the first of a series of reverses which the Allies were to suffer. The retiring Americans and Canadians reached Shagavari by the night of the 26th, but were hotly pursued and obliged to quit their new quarters on the 27th.[52] Though they had already retreated over seventy-five miles, the end was not yet. Taresevo was made untenable by a gas attack on the 30th. Fresh enemy assaults on the Dvina front followed, but were

unsuccessful. The first three weeks of February saw a lull in the storm of battle, followed by a new Bolshevist offensive. Tulgas was vigorously bombarded and an attempt made to cut off the American detachments on the Dvina. Early in March the Americans abandoned the half-destroyed village of Kodish, while Vistavka, on the new front north of Shenkursk, was surrounded, destroyed and captured, its defenders again narrowly escaping the clutches of the foe.[53] These Soviet victories, coupled with the sudden realization that the Red Army was probably in a position to annihilate the Allied forces if it so desired, led to great alarm lest the expedition become another Khartoum or Gallipoli. British reinforcements were rushed to Archangel, but the issue remained in doubt.

The morale of the Allied soldiers, meanwhile, began to suffer very serious impairment, chiefly as a result of their complete inability to comprehend the purposes of the war in which they were engaged. The British command strove valiantly to remedy the situation, but its methods were not particularly original or effective. General Poole had explained: "There seems to be among the troops a very indistinct idea of what we are fighting for here in North Russia. This can be explained in a very few words. We are up against Bolshevism, which means anarchy pure and simple." [54] The soldiers were informed that all of the Bolsheviks were Jews who tortured their prisoners to death, but even this knowledge had no effect except to cause a French company on one occasion to take mercy on all their wounded by killing them before a sudden retreat.[55] The atrocity stories that were freely circulated had results quite different from those intended when the soldiers discovered their falsity. The few Americans who were taken prisoners were transported to Moscow, given the freedom of the city, pampered, propagandized and lectured at and very soon released.[56] The soldiers of the Red Army appear to have been the victims, rather than the perpetrators, of such atrocities as were not fictitious.[57] Their retaliation took the form of propaganda appeals to their foes, carrying the gospel of world revolution to the bewildered invaders by means of pamphlets, bulletin boards and lectures at convenient points along the front.[58]

These circumstances, coupled with continued friction between the American troops and their British commanders and the hardships inevitable in waging war in mid-winter just below the Arctic circle, led to the "mutiny" of March 30. On that day Company I of the 339th United States Infantry refused to obey orders to proceed to the front from Archangel. The men soon yielded to appeals and

threats and agreed to advance on condition that one of their number who had been arrested be released.[59] The incident was insignificant in itself, but it was symptomatic of increasing unrest which created considerable apprehension in Washington. Fear of a general mutiny was expressed and General March, Chief of Staff, pledged the withdrawal of the American forces by June.[60] The dissatisfaction of the soldiers was ascribed to Bolshevist propaganda, but it was felt to be not entirely without justification.[61]

Since President Wilson had decided that no additional American troops should be sent to Russia, and since those already there were doing nothing except to invite their own destruction, steps were presently taken to bring them home. Brigadier-General Wilds P. Richardson was instructed by the President to arrange the evacuation as soon as practicable and he proceeded early in April from France to Archangel, where he reported to General Ironsides.[62] He found the military situation less serious than it had been earlier in the year, for the advance of Kolchak's forces from Siberia had drawn off some of the Soviet troops from the northern front, but the withdrawal of the American contingent was nevertheless undertaken without delay. On May 26 the United States cruiser *Des Moines* arrived at Archangel simultaneously with British reinforcements to replace the departing Americans. The evacuation proceeded throughout June, while fresh British troops poured in, and British naval forces in the Gulf of Finland bombarded Kronstadt, fought the Soviet squadron, and aided the Finnish and Esthonian White Guards operating against Petrograd.[63] The last of the Americans took their leave on June 30, carrying with them the contempt of their British comrades who despised them as "quitters."[64]

Thus ended ingloriously American participation in the intervention in North Russia. The expedition had cost the United States over $3,000,000.[65] Two hundred American soldiers had lost their lives.[66] Over three hundred more had been wounded.* In November the bodies of the slain were brought to New York, where they were claimed by relatives after appropriate funeral ceremonies.[68] What had been achieved by their sacrifice remained a mystery, not only to their comrades and relations but also to those who had sent them to their death amid the dark forests and bleak tundras of Archangel province.

The rest of the story of Archangel is soon told. The British

*According to final War Department figures, 244 were killed and 305 wounded.[67]

troops who replaced the Americans were numerous and well-equipped and felt confident of advancing rapidly southward toward Vologda and Petrograd.[69] On July 7 the Supreme Council at Paris instructed the military attachés of Great Britain, the United States, France and Italy at Helsingfors to support the Finnish Government if it decided to accede to the request of Admiral Kolchak to assist his campaign by an attack on Petrograd.[70] A powerful thrust southward from Archangel against the old Russian capital would have been entirely feasible, had it not been for the peculiar relations prevailing between the British authorities and the local population in the occupied territory. Mutual suspicion, distrust and resentment led to constant friction which made any effective co-operation impossible.[71] Instead of volunteering to fight for the Allied cause, the Russians looked upon the British as invaders and became increasingly sympathetic toward the Bolsheviks. The British resorted to conscription of soldiers, and later to conscription of laborers. This led to such extensive popular disaffection that the British presently felt obliged to arrest and execute suspects on a wholesale scale. The account of one observer is illuminating:

> When night after night the firing squad took out its batches of victims it mattered not that no civilians were permitted on the streets. There were thousands of listening ears to hear the rat-tat-tat of the machine guns, and no morning paper could have given all the gruesome details more complete circulation than they received in the regular process of universal news gossip by which Archangel keeps itself in up-to-the-minute touch with all local affairs. . . . Every victim had friends. These friends and their friends rapidly were made enemies of the Military Intervention. And this enmity naturally spelled Bolshevism, as far as the Military Intervention was concerned.
>
> I witnessed the anguish of one woman whose husband and father were both in prison as suspects. They had both won honor in the war against Germany. The husband had been wounded. The charges of Bolshevist sympathy on which they were arrested were based on slight evidence. She could not visit them. Only through the underground methods of the native Russians could she learn anything about them. She, too, listened every night for the rat-tat-tat until she could bear it no longer. So she was arrested a few days before I left Archangel for having said something for which the Military Intervention could not stand. Another Bolshevik.[72]

Such a situation could lead to but one result. On July 27 a battalion of conscripted Russian soldiers murdered its English and Russian officers and went over to the Red Army. Later in the month another Russian company deserted and turned the town of

Onega over to the Bolsheviks. Mutinies broke out at many points, followed by savage repressions and increased hatred for the British.[73] By the end of July the situation had become so intolerable as to menace the safety of the entire expedition. The British War Office therefore announced that preparations were under way for its evacuation.[74] Despite the appeals of the local puppet government, the British War Secretary, Winston Churchill, asserted that the reverses suffered by Admiral Kolchak and the abandonment of all hope of effecting a junction with his forces compelled the British Government to return to the "difficult and painful alternative" of withdrawal.[75] Major General Sir Frederick B. Maurice frankly confessed the complete futility of the whole sorry adventure.[76] After a sharp attack on the Dvina front in August to check pursuit, the retirement proceeded rapidly. By the middle of October the evacuation was completed. The British forces had suffered nearly a thousand casualties, including over three hundred deaths.[77] The preoccupation of the Soviet armies on other fronts enabled the Tchaikovsky government to maintain its precarious existence for some months unaided, but in February, 1920, the Red forces took Murmansk and Archangel and brought the tragedy to a close.

3. Siberia in 1919; the Supreme White Effort

In Siberia, meanwhile, the withdrawal of the Allied and American forces engaged in intervention was not contemplated either by the United States or by its co-belligerents. From the point of view of the American Government the immediate task of the intervening Powers was the rehabilitation and protection of the Trans-Siberian Railway. It will be recalled that the survey made by the Stevens Mission in the summer of 1917 was followed by the dispatch to Vladivostok of a corps of American railway engineers known as the Russian Railway Service Corps to give advice and assistance in the management of the Trans-Siberian line. The November Revolution led to the retention of these men in Japan, until March, 1918, when part of them were sent to Harbin, Manchuria, headquarters of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The remainder reached Vladivostok somewhat later.[78] The chaos prevailing in Siberia after the overthrow of Soviet rule and the Kolchak coup d'état made the projected business of these engineers one of great difficulty and delicacy, but the Government at Washington had no intention of recalling them or of delaying further the commencement of their work.

Early in September, 1919, the American Ambassador at Tokio had been instructed to propose to the Japanese Government that the Russian Railway Service Corps, under the direction of Mr. Stevens and in co-operation with the Russian railway officials and personnel, should undertake the effective operation of the Trans-Siberian Railway.

In making such a suggestion the Government of the United States is simply carrying out its original purpose to assist the Russian people in the vital matter of transportation when it sent the Railway Advisory Commission to Russia in June, 1917, and, at the request of the Provisional Government of Russia, organized the Russian Railway Service Corps in September, 1917. It does not consider that either the Bolshevik movement or the presence of international military assistance in Siberia or in Manchuria has modified the previously existing rights of Russia or of China. At the same time it is evident that, at least for the present, military operations must be facilitated and that the actual movement of trains must be governed accordingly. . . . Mr. Stevens and his associates are the agents of the Russian people. The Russian Railway Service Corps will continue to be maintained from Russian funds at the disposal of the Russian Ambassador until such time as their service may be either continued or concluded by established authorities in Russia.[79]

While Mr. Stevens drafted an agreement to carry out this proposal, and the American engineers remained in enforced idleness at Harbin and Vladivostok, tedious and prolonged negotiations proceeded between Washington and Tokio. The Allied Governments and the Czecho-Slovak National Council readily assented to the American proposal, but Japan made objections and counter-suggestions. Here again the obscure machinations of the Japanese military group constituted an obstacle to co-operation.[80] The persistence of the Japanese puppet, Semenoff, in defying Kolchak and interfering with the transport of supplies to the Czechs made the problem doubly serious.[81] Finally, however, an agreement was reached. On January 15, 1919, Ambassador Ishii, in accordance with the terms of a memorandum concluded on January 9 between the American Ambassador at Tokio and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, submitted to the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Polk, a plan for the supervision of the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways in the zone in which the Allied military forces were operating. An inter-Allied committee was to be created, composed of one representative each from the governments of China, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the United States and Russia. Under its control there would be a technical board, made up of one railway expert named by

each of the governments mentioned, and an allied military transportation board "for the purpose of co-ordinating military transportation under instructions of the proper military authorities." The preliminary memorandum preceding the submission of this plan designated Mr. Stevens as president of the technical board. It further declared "that this plan shall be interpreted as a sincere effort temporarily to operate the Chinese-Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways in the interest of the Russian people, with a view to their ultimate return to those in interest, without the impairing of any existing rights" and that "in trusting to Mr. Stevens, as president, the technical operation of these railways it is understood the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States are both prepared to give him the authority and support which will be necessary to make his efforts effective." [82]

In view of the criticisms in Congress of the Administration's Russian policy, Mr. Polk was somewhat dubious of the wisdom of these commitments and felt quite certain that the money needed could not be secured through an appropriation, but would have to come from the President's private fund.[83] President Wilson, however, had no intention of abandoning the project. Polk was instructed to accede to the Japanese proposals. On February 10 he informed the Japanese Ambassador of the acceptance of the plan by the United States. But he made it clear that the United States understood by the phrase "interests of the respective Allied Powers," as used in the text of the plan, not "any political or territorial rights or spheres of influence," but merely "the convenience of the respective Allied Powers and the United States." [84] He further declared that "the plan is to be interpreted as a sincere effort to operate the Siberian railway system in the interest of the Russian people, and I am already aware of the sincere and friendly purpose which your Government has in furthering this intention." This definition of terms was doubtless due to the desire of President Wilson to leave no loop-holes through which the Japanese military party could find an opportunity for the realization of its expansionist ambitions. The crisis of the previous November had been weathered, but cause for anxiety concerning Japanese intentions had not disappeared. New crises were in the offing.

The organization of the committee and boards provided for in the agreement proceeded without further delay. M. Oustrougoff, Minister of Communications in the Omsk Government, was named chairman of the interallied committee, while Mr. Stevens, as already

provided, became president of the technical board. The United States was represented on the committee by Mr. C. H. Smith and on the military transportation board by Colonel Gallagher, Quartermaster of the American Expeditionary Force.[85] On March 22 Serge Ughet, Russian chargé d'affaires at Washington, in charge of the Russian Embassy during Bakhmeteff's absence at Paris, informed Polk that he had learned from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Omsk that an agreement had been concluded on March 14 whereby the Kolchak Government gave its complete approval to the plan of railway supervision.[86] Bakhmeteff had been previously consulted regarding the project by the Acting Secretary of State and had expressed himself in favor of it. He clearly considered the Russian Embassy in the United States as an agency of the Omsk Government and it was so treated by the State Department, though this relationship was never regarded as constituting recognition of the Kolchak régime.

Once the railway agreement had been concluded, the task of the American troops in Siberia reduced itself to the apparently simple function of protecting those sections of the road assigned to them and insuring an uninterrupted flow of traffic. General Graves had insisted from the beginning, in accordance with his instructions, that it was no part of the work of the soldiers under his command to take sides in the domestic disputes of Russian political factions. From time to time he repeated his orders that there must be no interference of any kind by the American forces in internal Russian affairs.[87] Yet the situation in which the Americans found themselves made this ideal of complete non-partisanship so difficult, if not impossible, of attainment, that continued insistence upon its observance led to constant misunderstanding and confusion. The American troops, along with the other Allied forces in eastern Siberia, were assisting the interallied committee in operating the railway for the ostensible benefit of the people of Siberia, regardless of their political complexion. But the chief beneficiaries of their services were the particular sections of the "people" supporting the government of Kolchak. By keeping the road open for military supplies they were enabling him to wage war upon the Soviet Government and to maintain a régime which many of the "people" of Siberia regarded as an intolerable tyranny. The task of "protecting" the road, moreover, assumed the form of waging war upon the numerous bands of "Bolshevist" partisans who sought to interrupt communications with the west and thereby to cut off the source of supplies of the hated

dictator at Omsk. Guerrilla fighting and skirmishes with armed peasants were of constant occurrence.[88]

Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the Soviet Government and its supporters throughout Siberia to look somewhat askance at American professions of non-partisanship. But its enemies were equally disgruntled with the American policy. The dubious and hesitant character of American intervention, the failure to extend in full measure the anticipated assistance to Kolchak, and the general attitude of disinterested aloofness assumed by General Graves made the name of the United States anathema to many of the foes of Bolshevism in Siberia. All had hoped that the American and Allied troops would advance from Vladivostok to the Volga to co-operate with the White Army in battling the Soviet forces.[89] The keen disappointment occasioned by the frustration of this hope led to accusations of sympathy for the Bolsheviks.[90] Increasingly bitter anti-American propaganda began to fill the Siberian press, growing in virulency from month to month as General Graves adhered steadily to his policy of strict neutrality.[91] The net result, therefore, of American intervention in Siberia was to earn for the United States the universal hatred of all political groups, White and Red.[92]

The behavior of the American troops was no less distasteful to the Japanese than to the local population. The withdrawal of a considerable number of Japanese soldiers and the conclusion of the railway agreement diminished the friction between the Japanese and American Governments, but between their armies in Siberia suspicion and hostility continued. The Japanese keenly resented American protests against their execution of prisoners and terrorization of the inhabitants.[93] Numerous incidents seemed to confirm the American suspicions that Japan was fishing in troubled waters and seeking, for her own benefit, to create a maximum amount of disorder, for her protégé, Kalmikoff, like his colleague, Semenoff, had defied Kolchak and apparently had no goal beyond wholesale robbery and murder.[94] The Japanese, on the other hand, felt that the Americans constituted an obstacle to the realization of their plans and gave their encouragement to the anti-American propaganda sweeping Siberia.[95]

Meanwhile the military successes of the White Army operating in western Siberia had confronted the Allied and American Governments with the problem of defining their attitude toward the Kolchak Government. As has already been noted, the news of Kolchak's continued advance westward, and the acknowledgments of allegiance

which he received from the government at Archangel and from General Denikin in South Russia,[96] reinforced the efforts of those who sought to induce the Supreme Council to grant him recognition and material aid. In May, 1919, an agreement was reached to loan the interallied committee administering the Trans-Siberian Railway $20,000,000 for operation purposes, the United States, France, Great Britain and Japan each to furnish $5,000,000.[97] On the 26th the Supreme Council addressed a formal note to Admiral Kolchak, explaining Allied policy and making a conditional offer of further assistance. Non-interference in internal Russian affairs was declared to be "a cardinal axiom of the Allied and Associated Powers" and the Soviet Government was blamed for the failure of the efforts of the Peace Conference to bring peace and food relief to Russia.

> The Allied and Associated Governments now wish to declare formally that the object of their policy is to restore peace within Russia by enabling the Russian people to resume control of their own affairs through the instrumentality of a freely elected constituent assembly, and to restore peace along its frontiers by arranging for the settlement of disputes in regard to the boundaries of the Russian State and its relations with its neighbors through the peaceful arbitration of the League of Nations.
>
> They are convinced by their experience of the last twelve months that it is not possible to attain these ends by dealing with the Soviet Government of Moscow. They are therefore disposed to assist the government of Admiral Kolchak and his associates with munitions, supplies, and food to establish themselves as the government of all Russia, provided they receive from them definite guarantees that their policy has the same object in view as the Allied and Associated Powers.

Assurances were asked that a freely elected constituent assembly would be convoked as soon as Kolchak reached Moscow, that no attempt would be made to restore the special class privileges of the old régime, that the independence of Poland and Finland would be recognized, that the right of the Peace Conference to determine the status of the Rumanian part of Bessarabia be conceded, that Russia's debts be recognized, and that the new democratic government of Russia would join the League of Nations and co-operate with it in the settlement of Russia's relations with the border states and the limitation of armaments.[98]

In his carefully qualified affirmative answer of June 4, Kolchak endeavored to comply with the conditions laid down without committing himself definitely to their acceptance. The obligation of the national debt was again acknowledged and all desire to return to the old régime disclaimed. The other conditions were accepted in prin-

ciple, but with the proviso that only the constituent assembly could finally bind the Russian State to a definitive solution of the problems involved. "It is through the legally elected constituent assembly alone which my government will do its utmost to convoke properly, that there would belong the sovereign right of deciding the problems of the Russian State." [99]

On June 12 Lloyd George, Wilson, Clemenceau, and Makino sent their reply:

> The Allied and Associated Powers wish to acknowledge the receipt of Admiral Kolchak's reply to their note of May 26. They welcome the terms of that reply, which seem to them to be in substantial agreement with the propositions they had made and to contain satisfactory assurances for the freedom and self-government of the Russian People and their neighbors. They are therefore willing to extend to Admiral Kolchak and his associates the support set forth in their original letter.[100]


The aid promised was dispatched without delay. General Denikin in South Russia was soon receiving ample quantities of rifles, machine guns, light and heavy artillery, aeroplanes and tanks from Great Britain and France. British uniforms, rifles and ammunition were also rushed to Kolchak's forces.[101] Most of the material assistance which he received, however, came from the United States. Red Cross supplies, railway equipment and war stores previously manufactured for Russia by order of Bakhmeteff were now forwarded to Siberia. Mr. Ughet suggested that the Treasury Department establish credits in favor of the Omsk Government, on the ground that Kolchak, never having made peace, was still at war with Germany.[102] Though this proposal was not acted upon, the Kolchak Government nevertheless prepared to make extensive purchases of war supplies in the United States.[103] On July 31 it contracted with the War Department for the purchase of rifles and ammunition and subsequently sent $1,000,000 in gold to San Francisco to be deposited in the United States Treasury as security.[104] At the same time negotiations were begun for a $5,000,000 loan with a syndicate of New York financiers for further purchases in the United States, with security in the form of a deposit of gold at Hong Kong.[105] Later in the year a loan of $38,000,000 was obtained from a syndicate of American and British bankers, Baring Brothers of London furnishing $15,000,000 and Kidder, Peabody and Company, the Guaranty Trust Company, and the National City Bank of New York supplying the balance. This loan was secured by a deposit of $40,000,000 in gold at Hong Kong.[106] The authorities at Washington did all in

their power to facilitate shipments in the hope of halting the retreat which followed Kolchak's reverses in June and July. Some 260,000 rifles, with large quantities of ammunition, all manufactured for the Provisional Government but retained or repurchased by the War Department from the Russian Embassy after the November Revolution, were rushed to the Pacific Coast and transported on United States Shipping Board vessels to Vladivostok.[107]

Despite this liberal assistance the fortunes of the Omsk Government remained uncertain. Its forces had reached Kazan on the Volga in May, but there had met defeat at the hands of the Red Army and had been compelled to withdraw.[108] In the rear, moreover, disorganization and confusion appeared to be increasing. Though the interallied committee, with the aid of the military forces at its disposal, had done much to restore trans-Siberian transportation, roving bands of Bolshevist partisans frequently succeeded in wrecking trains, tearing up track and demoralizing traffic.[109] The ataman Semenoff, operating in Transbaikalia, was almost as great a disturber of the peace, though he now acknowledged allegiance to Kolchak. On July 18 the interallied committee protested to the Omsk Government that he was violating the railway agreement and assuming the functions assigned to the technical board. A second and stronger protest followed on the 26th, accompanied by the withdrawal of all American inspectors on the Japanese-guarded sector of the road on order of Mr. Stevens until adequate protection could be guaranteed.[110] In reply the Omsk Government stopped all supplies to Semenoff and expressed its desire to co-operate with the committee.[111] But its inability to control the situation was plain.

In view of the prevailing uncertainty and the lack of authentic information in the west concerning the course of developments in Siberia, President Wilson had dispatched the American ambassador at Tokio, Roland S. Morris, to Omsk on a special mission of investigation. The Allied Governments were apparently prepared to extend formal recognition to Kolchak, but were deterred by Wilson's hesitancy. The denunciation of the Admiral as a monarchist by Kerensky and other Russian liberals in Paris was doubtless a cause for caution.[112] Paul S. Reinsch, American Minister to China, had also criticized Kolchak as a reactionary in his reports to the State Department.[113] It was hoped that Ambassador Morris, by a personal study of conditions, could resolve these doubts and supply the information needed to decide the question of recognition.

The ambassador, accompanied by General Graves, reached Omsk



SCENE OF INTERVENTION IN SIBERIA

Region of Military Operations of Czecho-Slovaks, Allies and Kolchak, 1918-1920.

INDICATES TERRITORY OF THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC, 1920-1922.

ARROWS SHOW LINES OF CZECHO-SLOVAK MOVEMENTS, MARCH-NOVEMBER 1918

CROSSES INDICATE LOCATION OF AMERICAN TROOPS GUARDING RAILWAY-SEPTEMBER 1918-APRIL 1920

on July 21 and spent three weeks in careful investigation. His reports have unfortunately not been made public at the time of writing, but the general character of his observations is clear from secondary accounts. He first reported that he found many disintegrating influences at work,[114] but his final conclusions, submitted at the end of August, favored recognition. Despite the dissatisfaction of the Siberian population with the dictator's régime, he presented the only alternative to the rule of the Bolsheviks. Since his government would be faced with a serious crisis within thirty days, it would be greatly benefited by the moral and material effects of recognition and financial assistance. Immediate recognition and financial aid, in accordance with the plans drawn up at Omsk in conjunction with the Allied representatives, were urgently recommended by Morris to save Kolchak from destruction.[115] These proposals reached the State Department on the eve of President Wilson's nation-wide speaking tour in favor of ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and at a time when almost every news dispatch from Siberia brought tidings of Soviet victories. Recognition was therefore postponed once more. Although Bakhmeteff, just returned from Paris, continued his pleas and spoke in glowing terms of Kolchak's prospects of success,[116] the Red Army was destined presently to remove the issue from the sphere of practical consideration.

Kolchak's misfortunes, however, did not oblige the Allied and American Governments to abandon hope of overthrowing the Soviet Government. Red victories in Siberia were more than overbalanced by defeats on other fronts and by the slow strangulation of the Allied blockade. Notwithstanding the earlier humanitarian scruples of Lloyd George, neither he nor President Wilson objected to the "cordon sanitaire" as a means of undermining the Bolshevist régime. At the close of the Peace Conference the blockade of Germany was lifted, but the restriction on trade with Soviet Russia and Soviet Hungary which the Allied and American Governments had imposed was continued.[117] The British and French Governments, moreover, not trusting in the efficacy of their own embargoes, now undertook to cut off "neutral" trade with Russia by dispatching naval squadrons to intercept all vessels bound for Bolshevist ports. Dutch, Danish and Swedish vessels were turned back and compelled to return.[118] The United States declined to participate to the extent of sending its war vessels to assist the British and French squadrons, but the embargo on American trade with Soviet Russia was maintained. In November, 1917, all unlicensed trade with Russia was forbidden,

and after February, 1918, licenses were no longer granted without permission from the State Department.[119] A year later the State Department made the prohibition complete by refusing all requests for export licenses.[120]

The refusal of the American Government to participate directly in the blockade was due to its traditional attitude in such instances. In the past the United States had never recognized the right of war vessels enforcing a pacific blockade to interfere with the ships of third states.[121] Though all the incidents of open warfare existed between Soviet Russia and the western powers, no declaration of war had taken place on either side and the Allies never admitted that a state of war prevailed. The blockade therefore remained "pacific," as distinguished from a war blockade which would justify the interception of neutral vessels. Since the Allied cruisers, in interfering with Dutch and Scandinavian ships, were applying a conception of pacific blockade so diametrically opposed to that of the United States, the American Government declined to co-operate. Its representatives on the Supreme Council simply refrained from voting on the matter. They did not, however, express their disapproval, or protest in any way at the policy followed by the Allies.

The latter, however, presently bestirred themselves to give a greater semblance of legality to the blockade and to remove all grounds for complaint. In September they addressed a note to Germany, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Spain, Switzerland, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela, inviting them voluntarily to join in imposing an embargo on trade with Soviet Russia.[122] The governments addressed were requested, in view of "the avowed hostility of the Bolsheviks toward all Governments and their international program of revolution," "to prevent their nationals from engaging in any commerce with Bolshevist Russia and to assure that this policy will be rigorously executed."[123] Clearance papers, passports, telegraph, postal and wireless facilities were all to be refused to persons desiring to communicate with the territory under Soviet control. Nearly all of the neutrals acceded to this request.[124] Germany dissented, contending that the blockade was both unjustified under the covenant of the League of Nations and incapable of achieving the object sought.[125] The Allies, however, continued to prevent all vessels from reaching Bolshevist ports and held Soviet Russia in an iron vise from which escape seemed impossible.

The blockade was supplemented by assistance to the White Armies

operating before Petrograd and in South Russia. Denikin's advance from the Caucasus and the Ukraine brought him ever closer to Moscow, while the fall of Petrograd seemed a matter of weeks. With British advice and aid, General Yudenitch had organized his White Guards in Esthonia and advanced upon the old Russian capital.[126] Though the Finns hesitated to co-operate, he felt equal to the task alone, since the British sent war equipment of all kinds, and food for his army and for the civilian population liberated from the Bolsheviks arrived in abundance from the United States.[127] During August and September British tanks and munitions poured into Reval and British naval forces bombarded Kronstadt, the island fortress defending the city, and engaged the Soviet squadron in combat. Early in October the White Army began a great offensive which carried it to the gates of Petrograd and made its capture appear a foregone conclusion.[128]

The progress of Denikin's "Volunteer Army" in the south was equally encouraging. In the spring, to be sure, certain disconcerting events had taken place. Odessa, firmly held by 50,000 Allied troops, had fallen to the Soviet forces in April because of the refusal of the sailors of the French fleet to fire on their Russian "comrades." On Easter morning, following the hurried evacuation of the forces of occupation, they had run up the Red Flag beside the tri-color, sung the "International" and compelled their admiral to return to France.[129] The Red tide swept southward, but it soon ebbed again as troops were withdrawn in May and June to meet the menace of Kolchak. By mid-summer, Denikin's Cossacks, in British uniforms and using British guns, ammunition, aeroplanes and tanks, had swept through the Ukraine once more with fire and sword and were advancing upon the Soviet Capital.[130] In their rear the American Committee for Relief in the Near East helped to finance an exchange of products with the United States,[131] while the American Red Cross brought generous aid to soldiers and civilians within the White lines.[132] By the middle of October Red Russia's sun was rapidly setting. With Kolchak rallying from his defeats, Yudenitch hammering at the defenses of Petrograd and the outposts of Denikin within 200 miles of Moscow, the end seemed near. Intervention seemed destined to accomplish its object. Encircled and blockaded on all sides, fighting a losing war on many fronts, and torn by internal plots and insurrections, the Soviet Republic appeared doomed to destruction.[133]

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE FRUITS OF INTERVENTION

1. The Poisoning of Public Opinion

BEFORE discussing the final outcome of the storm of battle which swept over the Russian steppes in 1919, it will be convenient to turn to a consideration of the results of intervention within the United States. Here, as in the Allied countries, the undeclared war on Soviet Russia affected public opinion in much the same way as had the conflict with Germany. The same simple faith in the moral justification of the Allied policies, the same universal hatred for the enemy, the same disposition to accept at face value every statement casting discredit on the foe and glory on the champions of righteousness were manifested in abundance. Indeed the whole moral façade of the anti-Bolshevist cause was built of much the same material as had already been used in the Great War. The struggle was again one between democracy and autocracy, between civilization and savagery, between great ethical principles and unmitigated lust for power. There were, however, certain new departures in the technique of propaganda which are significant not only as illustrative data for the study of mass psychology but as factors influencing American policy toward Russia as well.

One respect in which the anti-Soviet propaganda differed from the anti-German propaganda of the previous period was in the source of its raw material. While the war propaganda was primarily official and governmental, the ingredients of the poison gas attack on Soviet Russia came in most instances from private and unofficial sources. The State Department and the Committee on Public Information, to be sure, made contributions which were by no means negligible, but the original fountain heads were not in Washington, but in Helsingfors, Reval, Warsaw, Bucharest and Constantinople. Here were gathered colonies of Russian émigrés, impecunious noblemen, expropriated bourgeoisie, conservative and liberal intellectuals and exiled party leaders, all fugitives from the Red Terror, all people who had lost everything in the social cataclysm of the November Revolution, all filled with the intense hatred and resentment which

has ever characterized the attitude of dispossessed ruling classes toward their dispossessors. From these groups came most of the information which the outside world received concerning conditions and events within blockaded and isolated Soviet Russia.[1] During 1918 and 1919, and for years thereafter, these exiled Russians poured into the press of the western world a flood of concocted tales and fabrications wilder and more preposterous than anything the Allied and American Governments had ever devised against the Central Powers in the darkest days of the war. Since the gullibility of western press correspondents, editors, legislators and statesmen seemed to increase in direct ratio with the absurdity and improbability of the stories with which they were stuffed, the White propagandists soon gave free rein to their imaginations.

But even before the émigré propaganda factories had begun to produce at full capacity, the task of discrediting and reviling the Soviet Government had been begun by the United States Committee on Public Information. In the middle of September, 1918, this body released the famous Sisson Documents, purporting to show that the leaders of the Russian Communists were in the pay of Germany, that the November Revolution was planned by the German General Staff and financed by the German Imperial Bank, and that the entire Bolshevist régime was simply a thinly disguised tool for betraying the Russian people and serving the interests of the Central Powers.[2] These documents had been acquired in Russia, apparently in good faith, by Edgar Sisson during the previous winter. They constituted not only a damning indictment of the Soviet Government, but were additional proof of the nefarious schemes of Germany as well, and were consequently doubly effective for propaganda purposes. They were pronounced forgeries by Soviet representatives soon after their appearance and have been regarded as such since, even in many anti-Bolshevist circles.[3] An examination of their authenticity obviously cannot be undertaken here. While perhaps not entirely spurious, they show many evidences of crude fabrication and their genuineness is most questionable. Suffice it to say that, whatever elements of truth were contained in their details, the general impression which they were used to create was not in accordance with the facts and served to give the American public a picture of the rulers of Russia as selfish, insincere and wholly dishonest catspaws of Germany.

The acceptance of this hypothesis was facilitated by the very manifest fact that the Soviet Government had made a separate peace with Germany. To the Allied and Associated Powers the Treaty of Brest-

Litovsk was little short of disastrous. In their view, Russia's defection had prolonged the war, cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and required the expenditure of billions of dollars that might otherwise have been saved. Regardless of the incapacity of the Russian nation for further participation in hostilities, the peoples and governments of the United States and the Allied countries inevitably laid the responsibility for their woes upon the shoulders of the Bolsheviks, who had "betrayed" them for German gold. This circumstance predisposed them to hostility toward the Soviet Government and made them ready to believe almost anything to its discredit. The soil was thus well prepared for propagandist attacks of all kinds against the Communist régime by its enemies.

While the Committee on Public Information may have felt that it had done its duty in branding the Soviet leaders as agents of the Central Powers, the Russian émigrés were satisfied with nothing less than demonstrating that they were moral degenerates, blood-drinking monsters and inhuman fiends. Some of the "evidence" which they adduced in support of this hypothesis has already been considered in connection with the hearings before the Overman Committee. A vast quantity of similar material flooded the newspapers and periodicals of the nation throughout 1919 and 1920. The public at large was, of course, even less critical than its representatives in the Senate and swallowed whole almost all that was presented to it. To summarize and analyze this material in detail would be a futile and thankless task. A few samples will suffice to reveal the character of the whole.

Few of the yarns which emerged from the propaganda factories were more persistent or aroused more impassioned indignation than that of the "nationalization of women." It had its origin in a few slender fragments of fact. A Russian press report in April, 1918, told of a wild scheme proposed by an obscure lady in a little provincial town, which was taken up and passed on as a humorous story.[4] An imaginary decree of the soviet of Vladimir was published as a joke in a comic paper of Moscow.[5] In Saratov the Bolsheviks sought to discredit the powerful and menacing local Association of Anarchists by attributing to them a fantastic decree for the establishment of a Bureau of Free Love, which the anarchists assailed as a "vicious slander" and "a gross, absurd fabrication."[6] From such beginnings as these the shocking story began to spread through the western nations. In February, 1919, the State Department announced: "The rumor as to the nationalization of women is

not true."[7] In March *New Europe,* the English periodical which had published the decrees as authentic in the first instance admitted its mistake and made a public apology.[8] But the circulation of a tale so admirably adapted to the purposes of the enemies of the Soviet Government was not thus easily to be stopped. The credulous world was informed, in all seriousness and with documentary proof, that the soviet of Vladimir had made all girls over eighteen years of age the property of the state and had instituted a system of compulsory marriages.[9] From this to the nationalization of all the women of Russia by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets was but a step. An imaginative motion picture producer actually depicted the passage of such legislation in Moscow as an historical occurrence. When *New Europe* made its denial and apology, the usually impartial and reliable *Current History* countered with photographic evidence gathered by the "Commission for the Investigation of the Crimes of the Bolsheviki" and with harrowing descriptions by "eye-witnesses" of the mistreatment of the victims of the decrees.[10] The tale was broadcasted over the country through a thousand channels and perhaps did more than anything else to stamp the Russian Communists in the minds of most American citizens as criminal perverts.

Scarcely less horrifying were the constant reports of wholesale murder and massacre perpetrated by the Bolsheviks. On October 31, 1918, the *New York Times* announced in capitals on its front page: "GREAT MASSACRE PLANNED BY REDS—NIGHT OF NOVEMBER 10 FIXED FOR A ST. BARTHOLOMEW OF THE RUSSIAN BOURGEOISIE—WILD PANIC IN PETROGRAD." On November 1 its editorial columns described the Bolsheviks as "ravening beasts of prey, a large part of them actual criminals, all of them mad with the raging passions of the class struggle." Indignant and excited protests at the impending slaughter rose from many quarters, Ambassador Bakhmeteff going so far as to propose to the State Department that the Bolsheviks and German agents be held personally responsible for the crime before an international court.[11] On November 11 only one New York paper contained any reference to the "massacre." On that date the *World* reported the threat a fiction and announced that the Soviet Government had granted amnesty to all political prisoners. Blood-curdling stories of atrocities and outrages of all kinds continued to shock the nation. Now the American Consul at Omsk would describe the nauseating horrors uncovered by the advancing armies of Kolchak.[12] Again a British chaplain would depict in vivid language the unspeakable crimes committed by the Bolsheviks in Odessa, vic-

tims being roasted to death inch by inch in furnaces, or scalded with hot steam, or torn to piece on wheels, or drowned in rivers, or hacked to bits with axes. Beyond his descriptive powers was "the ghastly persecution of the Christians, carried out with the utmost ferocity."[13] Later a newspaper correspondent would wax eloquent over the putrified corpses, the slaughter houses and the evidences of rape, crucifixion and massacre encountered in Kiev.[14] All sources of information, from the British Parliamentary White Paper[15] to the letters of the Archbishop of Omsk[16] agreed that Soviet rule was a hideous saturnalia of lust and bestiality, marked by the persecution of Christianity, the butchery of all respectable citizens in wild orgies of mass murder and the daily perpetration of unspeakable outrages and crimes. Small wonder that the American Association for International Conciliation should describe Lenin and Trotsky as "sentimental and somewhat feeble-minded visionaries" and their followers as drunkards, sex perverts and degenerates.[17] And small wonder that Mr. Root should urge the extension of American aid to the forces fighting Bolshevism in order to destroy the "horrid group of cut-throats and assassins" controlling Russia.[18]

Some of these allegations, for all their wild exaggeration, had, of course, considerable foundation in fact. Terrorism was openly employed by the Bolsheviks as a means of cowing the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie into submission to the proletarian dictatorship. That mass executions and atrocities were perpetrated by the Red Terrorists is not open to question.[19] The Russian civil war was not a conflict of political parties or geographical areas, but a life and death struggle of social classes, characterized by all the ferocity and brutality which have ever marked such combats. Since all customary laws of warfare were thrown to the winds, outrages and reprisals on both sides were of constant occurrence. The pernicious effects of the tales of blood and horror which filled the American press were not due so much to their falsity as to their incompleteness. As in the Great War only one side received a hearing. Whether the atrocities of the White Armies were any less horrible or culpable than those of their enemies is at least open to debate. But the information upon the basis of which public opinion was formulated was wholly oblivious to the existence of the White Terror. In the American press the Bolsheviks possessed a monopoly of brutishness and criminality while their opponents were pure crusaders in the holy cause of righteousness. Editors felt perfectly justified in referring to the "Reds" as "assassins and madmen" or "human

scum";[20] or as perpetrators of "an atrocious campaign that shamed even the Germans and made the tyranny of Ivan the Terrible seem benevolent";[21] or as "crime-mad leaders" for whom the noose yearned;[22] or as "beasts," "drunk from their saturnalia of crime in Russia" and intent upon the destruction of civilization.[23] The "Huns" of 1917 and 1918 became benefactors to humanity in comparison with such monsters as these.

Fortunately, however, the American newspaper reader was not left without consolation. He was constantly assured that the end of this bestial orgy of criminality was in sight. The days of the Bolsheviks were numbered. The fall of the Soviet Government was perpetually imminent. With a few honorable exceptions, the daily papers throughout 1919 and much of 1920 announced almost every week, with the most indomitable optimism, that the Soviet Government had collapsed or was collapsing or would presently collapse from its own inherent rottenness and the blows of the White Armies. Indeed, its continued existence was unthinkable, for it had, according to the *New York Times,* turned Russia into a "Gigantic Bedlam," where "Maniacs Stalked Raving Through the Streets" and the populace amused itself by fighting with dogs for carrion and devouring the raw flesh of dead horses.[24] But the *Times* left its readers in no doubt as to the outcome.[25] As early as May 10, 1917, Lenin was missing from Petrograd. On January 17, 1918, he was the target of assassins. A month later he had fled and his rule was overthrown. On June 23 he was preparing to resign, while six days later Moscow was captured and the Bolshevist leaders were seeking safety in flight. On August 12 Lenin was preparing to flee to Berlin. On the 13th he had reached Kronstadt. On the 16th he had again fled. On the 18th Kronstadt was taken by the Germans and Lenin fled with Trotsky on a warship. On the 27th the Bolshevist leaders abandoned Petrograd and Moscow. During September Lenin died several times and in October he was placed in captivity and escaped. All these harrowing experiences, however, were as nothing compared with the events of 1919. In the single month of January Lenin was successively arrested by Trotsky, confined in the Kremlin, discovered in Barcelona, almost captured by the Czechs, and found hiding near Narva. Later in the year he was perpetually being killed, arrested or driven from Russia, while Trotsky was alternately arresting Lenin, making himself Tsar, and fighting Djerjinsky. On nineteen separate occasions Petrograd was either in rebellion, in process of evacuation, on the point of falling, or

definitely captured by the White Armies. Moscow fared scarcely better, and the collapses and downfalls of the Soviet Government were innumerable.[26]

Since the *New York Times* is generally conceded to be a more accurate and authoritative source of foreign news than any other American newspaper, the character of the information conveyed in less scrupulous sections of the press requires no comment. Everywhere the figments of émigré hopes and imaginations were accepted as statements of fact.[27] Everywhere the impression was assiduously cultivated that Soviet Russia was a kind of vast, chaotic lunatic asylum, constantly on the eve of dissolution, where the keepers had been murdered and insane fanatics vied with criminal maniacs in creating a bedlam of anarchy, bloodshed and horror. So deeply was this conception of the situation in Russia implanted in the minds of Americans of all groups and classes that it not only allayed criticism of the policy pursued by the Administration in 1919 and 1920, but also poisoned public sentiment against Russia for many years and contributed to the support of the later policy of the United States. The feeble voice of traditional friendship for Russia was lost in a hymn of hate for its present rulers.

2. Intervention Attacked and Defended

The anathemas hurled against the Bolsheviks throughout the United States in 1919 naturally redounded to the benefit of their White opponents and added prestige and respectability to the anti-Bolshevist cause. The purposes of the anti-Bolshevist agents in the United States were to secure more effective Allied and American intervention, the extension of greater assistance to the White Armies, and the recognition of the Omsk Government. Ambassador Bakhmeteff's Russian Embassy, the "Russian Information Bureau" in New York, headed by A. J. Sack, editor of *Struggling Russia,* and other groups of American and Russian anti-Bolsheviks co-operated in conducting a persistent and well-financed propaganda to achieve these aims. In April, 1919, a committee of prominent New Yorkers issued an appeal to "all Americans who are not Bolsheviks, anarchists, I.W.W.'s, Non-Partisan Leaguers, nor Socialists" for military aid to Kolchak and Denikin: "Bolshevism is the assault of greed, ignorance and brute force upon everything that Americans have learned to hold most sacred. It destroys liberty, property rights, law, order, marriage, the home and edu-

cation. It is the murderer of peace, enlightenment and progress. Its loot enriches a few black-hearted and red-handed leaders and beggars everybody else." [28] In May Mr. Ughet paid a glowing tribute to Kolchak's democratic liberalism and expressed complete confidence in the certainty of his triumph.[29] In June many of the great metropolitan papers of the country carried full-page advertisements, inserted by the Russian Information Bureau, proclaiming the duty of the Allied Democracies to RECOGNIZE THE OMSK GOVERNMENT.[30]

These appeals, made to a public opinion already favorably disposed to the cause which they represented, were unquestionably effective in enlisting sympathy for the armed enemies of the Soviet régime. In May Senator King of Utah introduced a resolution into the Senate calling upon the United States to recognize the Omsk Government as the de facto government of Russia and to advance credits, war supplies and economic assistance "for the overthrow of the Bolshevist tyranny and anarchy." [31] The resolution was buried in the Committee on Foreign Relations and no official action followed, aside from the material support extended to Kolchak during the summer and fall. But, what was perhaps equally important as a preparatory step, many influential leaders throughout the country were won over to complete confidence in the anti-Bolshevist cause. So unanimous was this response that *Struggling Russia* was enabled in November to print expressions of sympathy from twenty-seven prominent men, including Elihu Root, Ambassador Francis, Nicholas Murray Butler, Samuel Gompers, George Kennan, Stephen S. Wise, John Spargo, Prof. A. L. Frothingham, and Senators King, Sherman, Harding, Owen, Overman and Johnson (Edwin S.). All were agreed that Bolshevism must be destroyed and that Kolchak and his colleagues were Russia's saviors. These testimonials were followed by even more effusive statements by a very large number of American editors.[32] Had this powerful and widespread sentiment in favor of the Russian Whites not been counterbalanced by other forces operating in the opposite direction, it might readily have led to a further entanglement of the United States in the Russian civil war.

But the rising tide of isolationism, already noted as a factor in Congressional criticism of the Archangel expedition, would tolerate no continuation or extension of American intervention in Russia. It was too powerfully supported by popular feeling and ancient tradition to be overcome even by the universal fear and hatred of Bolshevism which was sweeping the nation at the same time. Senator

Hiram Johnson of California again opened the battle in the Senate by offering a resolution of inquiry on May 20, 1919, directing the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War to inform the Senate immediately of the reasons for sending American troops to Siberia.[33] On the same day Senator Poindexter addressed a similar inquiry to the President,[34] and Senator La Follette presented a petition adopted by the legislature of Wisconsin asking Congress to "take such action as it shall deem necessary for the speedy return of all American troops from Russia." [35] Two days later Representative Mason of Illinois introduced a resolution into the lower house for the withdrawal of all American troops from Russia.[36] On June 27 the Senate, by unanimous consent, finally approved Senator Johnson's resolution, with amendments addressing the inquiry to the President "if not incompatible with the public interest." [37]

While President Wilson prepared his reply to this query, other aspects of his Russian policy came under fire in the House. The Sundry Civil Act, as originally drafted, contained a provision requiring the return to the general funds of the Treasury of the unexpended portion of the $5,000,000 allotted by the President out of the appropriation for national security and defense to the War Trade Board for the improvement of economic conditions in Russia. This proposal conflicted with the plans of the War Trade Board to return the balance to its source in order that it might be used in paying the American share of the $20,000,000 which Great Britain, France, Japan and the United States had agreed in May to advance to the interallied committee for the operation of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Congressional opposition which Acting Secretary of State Polk had anticipated in the previous January had materialized. In June the Assistant Secretary of State, William Phillips, wrote a letter to James W. Good, Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, protesting at the provision as making it impossible for the United States to fulfil a solemn and unequivocal international obligation.* He urged that the expenditure would benefit American commerce and was for the entirely legitimate purpose of combating Bolshevism.

> The success of the present forces of law and order in Siberia which are successfully opposing Bolshevism is wholly dependent upon the maintenance of transportation facilities, and a failure at this time to

* The agreement was not, of course, a treaty which had been ratified by the Senate, but an executive agreement negotiated at the direction of President Wilson without the approval of either house of Congress.

maintain the Chinese-Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railways would naturally lessen the prospect for the return of order in those portions of Russia which are now so successfully resisting the further advance of anarchy. . . . The effect of our program is such that I am entirely convinced that the use to which this money is to be put is entirely germane to the purposes intended by the act from which it is derived, as the restoration of normal conditions in Russia and the opposition to the tide of Bolshevism is an integral part of our program of national defense, and this is the very purpose for which these funds are appropriated by the Congress.[38]

Representative Good yielded to this plea. His motion to strike out the objectionable provision was finally passed, but not without considerable criticism of the policy of "pouring good money after bad" into Russia with no prospect of ever recovering it.[39] On the following day Representative Wood of Indiana charged that this expenditure and the retention of American troops in Siberia were designed solely for the benefit of American investors in the Trans-Siberian Railway, and expressed the view, amid applause, that "it is high time that the American people should know something of the extent of our foreign operations upon which we are going thus so afield."[40] But the debate closed without result. Some days later Representative Mason sought to have presented to the President a petition signed by 75,000 of his constituents, praying for the return of the American troops in Russia,[41] but he was twice ruled out of order and later withdrew the petition from the files of the House.[42]

On July 22 President Wilson replied to Senator Johnson's resolution of inquiry.* For a statement of the reasons for the dispatch of American troops to Siberia he referred back to the declaration of August 3, 1918. In order to save the Czecho-Slovaks from destruction at the hands of "hostile armies apparently organized by, and often largely composed of, enemies' prisoners of war" and to steady the efforts of the Russians at self-defense and the establishment of law and order, some 10,000 soldiers had been dispatched to Vladivostok and had, with the aid of other Allied troops, successfully accomplished the reunion of the separated Czecho-Slovak armies. The following months, marked by the overthrow of the directorate at Omsk, the establishment of the Kolchak dictatorship, the disaffection of the Czecho-Slovaks, the rise of raiding bands of Bolshevist partisans throughout Siberia, and constant battles between the Red and White Armies in the Urals, he described as a "period of relative quiet." He next referred to the American acceptance of the

* The complete text of his reply will be found in Appendix III.

Japanese railway plan and the need of extending military protection to the engineers operating the railway. The American forces, he believed, were protecting parts of the line near Vladivostok and also near Verkhne Udinsk, while a small body was stationed at Harbin. "The instructions to General Graves direct him not to interfere in Russian affairs, but to support Mr. Stevens wherever necessary." Since the line was constantly menaced by partisans, this protection was necessary for the extension of economic assistance to the people of Siberia and to the forces of Admiral Kolchak. Russian authorities in the United States were co-operating with the Secretary of War and the American Red Cross in extending this aid, which was "indispensable under the conditions which have followed the prolonged and exhausting participation by Russia in the war against the Central Powers."

While this explanation received little hostile criticism at the time and was generally accepted as adequate, a few observations regarding it seem appropriate at this point. Emphasis is placed by the President upon the extension of economic assistance to Russia. The forces of General Graves are not intervening in Russian affairs, but are simply supporting Mr. Stevens. Their purpose is to assist the Russian people in the economic rehabilitation of their country. In fact, no admission is made that intervention, in the technical sense of the word, has been undertaken. Yet the railway engineers and the troops protecting them were obviously engaged in making the areas under their control a base of military operations against the Bolsheviks and in facilitating the transport of war supplies to the White Armies endeavoring to destroy the Soviet Government. Despite professions of neutrality and attempts to avoid the appearance of interference in Russian internal affairs, the net result of the policy pursued was not to contribute to the economic rehabilitation of Siberia, but to assist one section of the Russian people to wage civil war against another section. The objective of the enterprise, stripped of all disguise and pretense, was to overturn the Soviet régime. The very substantial support openly rendered to Kolchak in his effort to achieve this goal makes it impossible to assume that President Wilson and his aides were ignorant of the character and consequences of their policy.

Was the President, then, deliberately concealing his real purposes and indulging in dissimulation? The fact that the actual effects of his Russian policy were wholly at variance with his statement of its intended effects makes it easy to challenge his sincerity. But in one

sense his declaration of aims was an honest confession of faith. He had been solicitous from the beginning over Russia's economic problems and his desire to aid in their solution doubtless remained a guiding motive in his mind. His continued emphasis upon it was not, therefore, necessarily hypocritical. Yet he refused to admit frankly that the means adopted for Russia's economic salvation was the forcible suppression of Bolshevism and the substitution of a régime with political and economic principles less reprehensible from the Allied and American point of view. Perhaps it can be argued that the means to the end was not consciously adopted, but rather blundered into as a result of unforeseen circumstances. Or it may be contended, on the other hand, that the means had become the end by the summer of 1919, and that the stated end was a mere pretext. In any case President Wilson preferred to say as little as possible about the immediate goal of intervention. In view of the state of public opinion already described, an open admission of aims might not have led to any widespread protest, though it doubtless would have inflamed isolationist opposition even more than the atmosphere of obscurity and subterfuge which continued to surround the Administration's Russian policy. In the President's opinion, it was much more expedient to dwell only upon general and ultimate purposes. The means thereto might conveniently be left to the blockade and to the rifles, machine guns and artillery of Kolchak and Denikin.

But these subtleties of interventionist logic played little part in the controversy which went on in Congress. Much more important were the protests of the parents of the soldiers serving in Siberia, who were unable to comprehend why their sons, drafted for the war against Germany, were still retained in the wilds of Northern Asia almost a year after the armistice, fighting unknown enemies for reasons which no layman could comprehend. In the latter part of August a delegation of nine Chicago parents called upon the President and upon the House Committee on Military Affairs to urge the immediate recall of the drafted men.[43] Several days later President Wilson addressed a letter to one of the petitioners, assuring him that the 6,500 drafted men in Siberia would be afforded "substantial relief" before winter, since the War Department was enlisting new volunteers as rapidly as possible to take their place.[44] Simultaneously a number of resolutions were introduced in the House of Representatives asking information from the War Department regarding the troops in Siberia and requesting their immediate withdrawal.[45]

On September 5 Senator Borah renewed the assault in the Senate:

Mr. President, we are not at war with Russia; Congress has not declared war against the Russian Government or the Russian people. The people of the United States do not desire to be at war with Russia. If the question were submitted to the people of this country, there would be a practically unanimous voice against war with Russia or any part or faction or division of the Russian people. Yet, while we are not at war with Russia, while Congress has not declared war, we are carrying on war with the Russian people. We have an army in Russia; we are furnishing munitions and supplies to other armed forces in that country, and we are just as thoroughly engaged in conflict as though constitutional authority had been evoked, a declaration of war had been had, and the Nation had been called to arms for that purpose. . . . Whatever is being done in that country in the way of armed intervention is without constitutional authority. In other words, it is, to speak frankly and plainly, a plain usurpation of power to maintain troops in Russia at this time. There is neither legal nor moral justification for sacrificing these lives. It is in violation of the plain principles of free government.[46]

These and similar criticisms did not eventuate in the passage of any further resolutions of censure or inquiry by Congress, nor evoke any additional explanatory statements from the President. On November 4, however, Assistant Secretary of State Phillips, in a letter to Senator Wadsworth of New York, presented a defense of the blockade of Soviet Russia which is significant as placing greater emphasis upon the world-revolutionary purposes of the Bolsheviks as a determining consideration in American policy than had been done hitherto. He declared "that so far as the United States is concerned, no blockade exists. It is the present policy of this Government, however, to refuse export licenses for shipments to Russian territory under Bolshevik control and to refuse clearance papers to American vessels seeking to depart for Petrograd, the only remaining Bolshevik port." This policy of non-intercourse, he said, was based upon two considerations. First, "it is the declared purpose of the Bolsheviks in Russia to carry revolution throughout the world. They have availed themselves of every opportunity to initiate in the United States a propaganda aimed to bring about the forcible overthrow of our present form of Government." Commercial transactions would enable the Bolsheviks to bring part of their large gold reserve to the United States "where it could be used to sustain their propaganda of violence and unreason." Secondly, the Bolshevist authorities have nationalized foreign trade and in their control of food distribution practice discriminations in favor of the Red Army, with a view toward keeping themselves in power. "It has seemed altogether inadmissible that food and other

necessities of American origin should be allowed to become the means of sustaining such a program of political oppression." The Government had not been unmindful, however, of the distress caused to many innocent people within the Bolshevik lines. It had sought, through the Nansen relief project, to aid them, but the plan failed "because the Bolsheviks declined to agree to the cessation of hostilities which was considered an indispensable prerequisite." While no feasible project for relief had been discovered, "the problem continues to receive attention," and preparations were meanwhile being made to feed the people in the areas liberated from the Bolsheviks and to provision Petrograd "whenever that city may come under the control of authorities with whom it is possible to deal." [47]

President Wilson, in the meantime, had fought and lost his last great political battle in his attempt to induce the Senate to accept the Treaty of Versailles. The nation-wide speaking tour which he commenced in September, 1919, in defense of the treaty and the League of Nations led to his physical breakdown and left him so incapacitated for the remainder of his term that the control of executive policies tended to pass into the hands of his subordinates. His addresses on his last tour dealt only incidentally with Russia and he made no effort to give any extended exposition or defense of his Russian policy. But it is not without significance that the casual references which he made to the subject displayed for the first time an openly confessed hostility toward the Soviet Government and a disposition to accept many of the current charges against it. Russia, he declared, was in the grip of "a little group of men just as selfish, just as ruthless, just as pitiless, as the agents of the Tsar himself." Their propaganda of "disorder and discontent and dissolution" would continue to spread until "even this beloved land of ours will be distracted and distorted by it," if the Treaty of Versailles were not accepted.[48] The rulers of Russia represent nobody but themselves.[49] Bolshevism is the equivalent of destructive opposition and blind obstruction which leads nowhere.[50] The Bolshevist leaders "maintain their power by the sword." [51] They, too, one reads between the lines, must be dealt with by "force to the utmost." Between them and the West only the sword can decide the issue.

3. *Red Victory and the End of Intervention*

The fortunes of war, which pointed in mid-October, 1919, toward the imminent collapse of the Soviet Government before the on-

slaughts of the White Armies, once more shifted in favor of the Red forces at the end of the month. General Yudenitch's troops came within seven miles of Petrograd when they were thrown back in confusion by a Bolshevist counter-offensive which not only relieved the immediate threat to the city but caused the hesitating Finnish Government finally to decide against participating in the attack. Despite British support, the retreat of the White Guards presently became a rout. The broken remnants of soldiery which straggled back into Esthonia were so completely demoralized as to be incapable of further fighting. The cradle of the November Revolution was saved.[52]

At the same time Denikin's movement from the south toward Moscow suffered a similar reverse. His advance was checked by the Red Army at Orel and Voronezh, while revolt in the rear contributed toward his downfall. The earlier progress of the Volunteer Army had met with little resistance from the civilian population, but a few months of White rule made the entire countryside ready to rise in rebellion and welcome the Red troops as liberators. In Denikin and his followers the peasantry perceived the agents of the hated landlords whom they had dispossessed of their estates. The White General had proclaimed in March that the rights of private owners must be maintained and that the land question could be settled only by a national legislative body.[53] In June he felt obliged to issue a warning against acts of violence committed by the land-owning nobles, who followed the advancing troops to reclaim their property and wreak vengeance on their enemies.[54] While the peasants had little interest in Communism or the proletarian dictatorship, they were prepared to fight to the death for their land. Their armed bands of "Green Guards" cut the communications of Denikin's troops and completely disorganized his rear.[55] Other factors contributing toward his defeat were the unreliability of many of his Cossacks, who preferred orgies of drunkenness and theft to fighting at the front, the spread of typhus among his troops, and the massacres, atrocities and pogroms which embittered all classes against his régime.[56]

With all South Russia and the Ukraine torn by revolt against the White Terror, the Volunteer Army was ill-prepared to withstand the powerful blows of Trotsky's battalions. November saw Denikin's forces in panic-stricken flight, hotly pursued by the Red Army.[57] Towns and provinces were lost in rapid succession as the Ukraine was abandoned and the retreating White Guards streamed

back toward the Caucasus. The Soviet forces pressed their advantage, taking Kiev, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav and Odessa and pushing the foe into the Crimea by the end of the year. Denikin's last stand on the mainland at Novorossisk resulted in his complete defeat and left him no refuge but flight.[58] Early in April he reached Constantinople. When his chief aide, Colonel Romanovsky, was there assassinated, the General hastily boarded a British warship and departed for Malta.[59]

In Siberia, likewise, disaster continued to pursue the White cause, despite the best efforts of the Allied and American Governments to encourage "self-government" and the establishment of "law and order." In view of the direct participation of the United States in these efforts, their results, as exemplified by the Kolchak régime, are worthy of brief notice. Here, as in South Russia, the reactionary and despotic character of the dictator's rule led to rebellion in the rear. The declaration of the Omsk Government on the land question was no more reassuring to the peasants than were Denikin's pronouncements. Eventually the land would be transferred to the laboring population, but all further arbitrary seizures were declared illegal and the final solution of the agrarian problem was left to the National Assembly.[60] The reactionary nobles and Tsarist officers, moreover, who dominated the White Government, inaugurated a reign of terror which completely alienated the sympathies of the Siberian people.[61] According to the account of Charles H. Smith, American representative on the interallied committee, the simple townsmen and peasants were quite bewildered by the aid which the brutal, monarchistic tyranny oppressing them was receiving from the United States, champion of democracy throughout the world. He says:

> At this period, those two butchers, Ivanoff-Rinoff and Rosanoff, were in the full power of their activity, and, on a larger scale, Kalmikoff and Semenoff. These men permitted their followers to torture their enemies, to brand them, gouge out their eyes, and whip them to death. Conscription of peasants was declared, but the peasants took to the hills, for they hated the Kolchak régime violently for its outrages. For revenge those who did not escape and the relatives of those who did were taken, tortured and murdered. I have pictures and records of the bodies of victims, many pictures of corpses lying near the charred ruins of their homes. Undoubtedly such pictures are contained in the official files at Washington, and were there at that time—at the very time when we were working ourselves into a fury over Bolshevist atrocities and acclaiming Kolchak as the savior of Russia from the red demon.[62]

Many other trustworthy observers corroborate this estimate of the Kolchak régime. Oppression, lawlessness and anarchy, marked by brutalities and atrocities as harrowing as any ever attributed to the Bolsheviks, prevailed in many of the regions under the nominal control of the Omsk Government.[63] When resistance was met with, villages were burned, hostages shot and Socialist leaders tortured and murdered wherever encountered. The orders issued by Kolchak's aid, General Rosanoff, speak for themselves. All active agents of Bolshevism are to be immediately executed, their property destroyed and their houses razed to the ground. Hostages are to be taken among Bolshevist sympathizers. Ten are to be shot for every new act of terrorism directed against the Omsk Government. All convinced adherents of Bolshevism found in prison or captured from the Soviet forces are to be executed. All villages offering resistance are to be burned to the ground and the adult male population shot to the last man.[64] East of Lake Baikal the excesses committed by the followers of Kalmikoff and Semenoff led to serious friction with the American troops and caused General Graves to describe the two Cossack atamans as early as February, 1919, as bandits and murderers.[65] His son, Major Sidney C. Graves, Assistant Chief of Staff, attributed Kolchak's failure not to the lack of Allied support but to the pogroms, atrocities and terrorism indulged in by his followers. He concluded that nothing could save the Admiral from destruction save a powerful Allied army in central Siberia prepared to fight the whole population.* Kolchak's belated pretense of liberalism [67] was as futile as the apologetics of the Russian Embassy in Washington [68] to avert the doom which the conduct of his followers called down upon his head.

The outrageous behavior of Kalmikoff and Semenoff led to serious friction with the American troops stationed in the areas under their control. The favor of the local American commanders was courted both by the Cossack freebooters and by the terrorized villagers who were their victims. The sympathies of the soldiers not unnaturally leaned toward the latter, much to the disgust of the two atamans. When Kalmikoff, early in September, 1919, took two American prisoners, a body of American troops surrounded the town of Iman and threatened to open fire in two minutes if the men were not released. The Japanese on the scene expostulated and indicated

* "It is regrettable that American troops should have been forced to take the field in defense of the interallied railway agreement, and that such of our soldiers who lost their lives did so indirectly in defense of the Kolchak Government—a Government representing nothing for which America stands." [66]

that they would aid the Cossacks in case of a clash. A truce was fortunately arranged and the prisoners freed, but friendly relations were not improved by the discovery that one of them had been horse-whipped into unconsciousness before his release.[69] The strained situation was relieved when Ambassador Bakhmeteff informed the State Department that General Romanzoff, Kalmikoff's nominal superior, had tendered apologies and promised to punish the offenders.[70] But General Graves, in retaliation for this and similar incidents and for the scurrilous attacks on the United States published in the Vladivostok newspapers, held up a shipment of 14,000 American rifles destined for Kolchak's armies. On October 2, following a protest from Omsk, the State Department ordered the shipment to proceed and announced that efforts were being made to induce the Omsk Government to remove the causes of dissension.[71] The authority of Omsk east of Lake Baikal, however, was largely mythical, as shown by the action of Semenoff at Chita late in October in holding up a shipment of 68,000 rifles and demanding 15,000 for his own forces.[72] Though he menaced the American guards with his armored train, he failed to force compliance with his orders.

The support which the Japanese forces gave to the Cossack leaders and the persistence of the Japanese Government in pursuing what appeared to be a policy of obstruction led to strained relations with the United States.[73] While the diplomatic exchanges here again remain secret, it seems certain that the United States addressed a note to Japan in September complaining of the lack of Japanese co-operation in the operation of the railway.[74] When no reply was forthcoming a second and sharper note was sent, which evoked a conciliatory response, denying that the Japanese troops had declined to protect the lives and property of the Allied railway inspectors in the region controlled by Semenoff and declining to subject the Japanese forces to the order of the interallied committee or the technical board, but expressing a complete willingness to co-operate and remove misunderstandings.[75] The exchange of notes continued without definite result, though the Japanese Government announced early in December that an agreement had been reached with the United States.[76]

The Czecho-Slovaks, meanwhile, had reached the point of open revolt against the Kolchak régime. On November 15, 1919, they delivered a memorandum to the Allied representatives at Vladivostok which throws additional light on the character of the Omsk rulers:

By guarding and maintaining order, our army has been forced against its convictions to support a state of absolute despotism and unlawfulness which had its beginning here under the defense of Czech arms.

The military authorities of the Government of Omsk are permitting criminal actions that will stagger the entire world. The burning of villages, the murder of masses of peaceful inhabitants, and the shooting of hundreds of persons of democratic convictions and also those only suspected of political disloyalty occurs daily. The responsibility for this before the peoples of the world will fall on us, inasmuch as we, possessing sufficient strength, do not prevent this lawlessness.[77]

Two days later General Gaida, who had long since ceased to serve Kolchak, led a revolt against the dictator's authority in Vladivostok.[78] He was wounded and arrested and the revolt suppressed, but the attempt was symptomatic of the growing chaos and disorder throughout Siberia, foreshadowing the early downfall of the Omsk Government.

In fact the situation had become so intolerable that the Red Armies approaching from the west were hailed as saviors by the population and enabled by the disaffection in Kolchak's rear to make a rapid and spectacular advance which swept all opposition before it. While Kolchak appealed frantically for Allied and American aid, his capital at Omsk was taken by the enemy on November 15. The booty of the victors included 11 generals, 1,000 other officers, 39,000 troops, 2,000 machine-guns, 30,000 uniforms, 4,000,000 rounds of ammunition, 75 locomotives and 75 loaded cars.[79] A month later Kolchak's new headquarters at Novo Nikolaevsk, 400 miles to the east, also fell before the conquerors. Kolchak now announced a reform program and appointed the Constitutional Democrat, M. Pepelaiev, as premier of his new cabinet. But the dénouement of the tragedy was swift and inexorable. While Socialist Revolutionary insurgents seized control of Irkutsk, the White Army dissolved into disorderly fragments of beaten and panic-stricken troops, deserting to the enemy or fleeing for their lives before his wrath. Tomsk fell on December 16 and on the 25th Kolchak relinquished his command to Semenoff.[80] By the middle of January all eastern Siberia had raised the red flag of revolt. Early in February the Czechs at Irkutsk were compelled to surrender Kolchak and Pepelaiev to the rebels. On February 7, 1920, the White dictator and his premier were executed at sunrise by a firing squad.[81] Over their graves echoed the tramp of Trotsky's legions, marching toward the sea. Russia's civil war had ended.

Under these circumstances the wisdom of continued intervention

in Russia began to be questioned even by those who had been its warmest advocates. In mid-November, Lloyd George informed the House of Commons that "We have contributed more to anti-Bolshevist elements in Russia than France, Japan and America put together. I boast of that because it was an obligation of honor." But he believed that the British Government could not go on financing civil war in Russia indefinitely. It must withhold further assistance and relinquish the responsibility of restoring order in Russia.[82] Clemenceau, however, asserted that the Allies would continue to maintain a barbed wire fence around Russia by supporting Poland and Rumania against the Soviets.[83] The Japanese in particular were alarmed by Kolchak's collapse and by the onrushing tide of Bolshevism sweeping across Siberia. In January the Japanese troops at Lake Baikal were ordered to resist any attempt of the Red Army to advance beyond that point.[84] Ambassador Shidehara meanwhile conferred with Secretary Lansing at Washington and on December 8 presented an inquiry concerning the necessity of dispatching additional military forces to Siberia or of withdrawing entirely the forces already there.[85]

President Wilson preferred the latter alternative and advised the Japanese and Allied Governments accordingly. "The Government of the United States agrees that for it to send a reinforcement of sufficient strength and to act on the offensive in co-operation with anti-Bolshevist forces is impracticable." In view of the impending evacuation of the Czechs, "the first purpose for which American soldiers were sent to Siberia may be regarded as accomplished." As to the second purpose, namely, "the steadying of efforts at self-government or self-defense on the part of the Russians," it was felt that it could no longer be served by the presence of American troops in Russia. Preparations were being made for their evacuation about February 1. In view of "the experience of recent months in the operation of the railways under conditions of unstable civil authority and frequent local military interference," the American railway experts would be withdrawn simultaneously with the departure of the military forces.[86]

The liquidation of the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia proceeded without delay. The Government of Czecho-Slovakia had requested the United States to undertake the evacuation of 32,000 of the Czecho-Slovak troops,[87] while Great Britain agreed to remove the remainder. Major General Frank L. Hines, Director of Army Transportation, was placed in charge of the operations and Ameri-

can transports were dispatched to Vladivostok for the purpose.[88] On January 10 a detachment of retiring Americans was attacked by one of Semenoff's armored cars. The clash which ensued resulted in casualties on both sides and the capture of the car by the Americans.[89] At the end of the month the evacuation was further enlivened by the outbreak of a revolution in Vladivostok. The new pro-Bolshevist authorities, however, were friendly toward the Americans and grateful to General Graves for his attitude of neutrality.[90] On April 1, 1920, the last American contingent left Siberia.[91] Three days later the Japanese, in "self-defense," launched a surprise attack along the whole coast of the maritime province, terrorizing the population by the indiscriminate slaughter of non-combatants, overthrowing the new government, and seizing control of Vladivostok.[92] This disquieting aftermath evoked no immediate protest from Washington, but it promised serious complications for the future.

The American expedition to Siberia thus failed as completely and ingloriously as the force sent to Archangel to achieve the purpose for which it was intended. Military intervention had been undertaken under the guise of rescuing Czecho-Slovaks and assisting Russian efforts at self-government. War had been waged under the pretext of showing the Russian people the path to peace and democracy. An attempt had been made to overthrow the Soviet Republic under the appearance of guarding railways and extending economic assistance to Siberia. Money and lives had been freely sacrificed. Russia had been invaded, blockaded and disrupted with subsidized civil strife that wrought ruin and destruction to her cities and farms and carried suffering and death to thousands of her people. Beyond this intervention had achieved nothing, save to place the Soviet Government in a position of triumphantly militant supremacy. A more complete and tragic débâcle would be difficult to imagine. The United States, henceforth, would cease to deal with the Russian problem by military force. Certain of its late co-belligerents, however, demanded a further demonstration of the futility of violence.

CHAPTER EIGHT

WAR AND PEACE, 1920-1921

1. Peace Moves

THE victories of the Red Army and the failure of intervention caused the Soviet Government to renew its hopes for peace with the western powers. On December 5, 1919, the seventh Congress of Soviets at Moscow passed a resolution declaring its desire "to live at peace with all people, and to devote all its strength to internal constructive work, in order to perfect the production, transport, and public administration on the basis of a Soviet régime, to the work which has hitherto been hindered by the pressure of German imperialism and subsequently by the Entente intervention and the starvation blockade." The resolution reviewed the nine peace offers that had been made since August 5, 1918, and again confirmed "its unchanging desire for peace by proposing once more to all the Entente Powers—to Great Britain, France, the United States of America, Italy, and Japan, to all together and to each separately—immediately to commence peace negotiations." [1]

This proposal received no express replies from any of the Allied Governments, but the Supreme Council took the first step toward re-establishing peaceful relations by announcing the end of the blockade in January, 1920. Lloyd George and Nitti took the initiative and overcame the opposition of Clemenceau by appending a statement that "these arrangements imply no change in the policies of the Allied Governments toward the Soviet Government." The schemes of Marshal Foch and other military leaders for an international army to wage war on Soviet Russia were rejected as impracticable, in part, apparently, as a result of the refusal of the American representatives to agree to finance such projects.[2] The announcement of January 16 declared that the Supreme Council, "with a view to remedying the unhappy situation of the population in the interior of Russia, which is now deprived of all manufactured products from outside Russia," "has decided that it would permit the exchange of goods on the basis of reciprocity between the Russian people and the allied and neutral countries." Facilities would be extended to the

co-operative organizations "so that they may arrange for the import into Russia of clothing, medicines, agricultural machinery and the other necessaries of which the Russian people are in sore need in exchange for grain, flax, etc., of which there is a surplus supply." [3] Ten days later the Supreme Council addressed the representatives of the Russian Central Co-operative Union, inviting it to export from Russia the surplus of its foodstuffs and raw materials in exchange for manufactured products.[4] The Soviet Government hastened to authorize the co-operatives to engage in such trade and welcomed the prospective restoration of economic relations between Russia and the western nations.[5]

It insisted, however, that trade must be preceded by peace and it assumed such a large measure of control over the co-operatives that the Allies were compelled to face the alternatives of making peace with the Soviet authorities or abandoning plans for commercial intercourse. The Allied statesmen were not yet prepared to recognize or make peace with the régime they had so recently exerted themselves to destroy. Lloyd George informed the House of Commons on February 10 that no civilized community in the world was prepared to make peace with the Bolsheviks until they "have dropped the methods of barbarism in favor of civilized government." He suggested that trade might be a more potent weapon than force in restoring Russia to sanity. "Commerce has a sobering influence. . . . I believe that trading will bring to an end the ferocity, rapine, and cruelties of Bolshevism more surely than any other method." [6] In a statement of February 24th, the Supreme Council declared that it could not accept the responsibility for advising the states bordering on Russia to continue war or to adopt a policy of aggression toward her. Diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government remained impossible, but commerce would be encouraged.[7]

The new Allied policy produced mingled reactions of condemnation and praise in the United States. The Russian Embassy at Washington declared its unqualified opposition to the lifting of the blockade, assailing it as a virtual recognition of the Soviet Government and an encouragement to a Soviet invasion of the west.[8] The State Department declined to modify its policy of refusing clearance papers to vessels bound for Bolshevist ports,[9] despite the efforts of a group of business men interested in Russian trade to bring about a change in attitude. This group organized the "American Commercial Association to Promote Trade with Russia," which endeavored to bring pressure to bear for re-opening trade relations,[10]

but the State Department announced that it would not be "stampeded" by such propaganda.[11] The American Defense Society at once came to the rescue by pledging all its resources to oppose this "sordid campaign" to trade with the "enemies of civilization."[12] Herbert Hoover, Director of the American Relief Administration, viewed the matter in quite another light. He favored the lifting of the blockade in order to reveal the "complete foolishness" of the Soviet industrial system to the Russian people.[13] The American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, however, believed that the economic restoration of Russia "can only be accomplished by the overthrow of the forces of destruction which now have her in their grip" and the restoration of the forces of "law, order, and property."[14] The American Manufacturers Export Association took much the same position.[15]

In February 24 the Soviet Government addressed a plea to the State Department for American participation in the economic reconstruction of Russia and for the opening of peace negotiations.[16] The State Department declined to give this proposal any consideration and refused to make it public because of its alleged propagandist character.[17] On February 27 Senator France of Maryland introduced a resolution into the Senate calling upon the President "to communicate at once, through the Department of State, with the Government of Russia, assuring the people of Russia of our friendship, sympathy, and desire to co-operate with them and to re-establish with them full and cordial relationships of friendly intercourse, trade, and commerce."[18] The business men who had been persuaded by the Soviet "ambassador," Mr. Martens, that Russian trade offered a lucrative field for profit meanwhile continued their pressure for a change in policy,[19] while the National Civic Federation protested against any recognition of the Soviet régime as "a repudiation of all that our national life has represented for 150 years" and condemned the Soviet Government as "an enemy more dangerous and with objects infinitely more far-reaching and inimical than was Imperial Germany with her host of agents and spies."[20]

Early in March, 1920, President Wilson replied to the invitation of the Supreme Council to appoint an American delegate to the projected League of Nations commission to investigate Russia by making a counter-proposal.[21] He declared that though the United States recognized the necessity of restoring trade relations and regarded diplomatic recognition as a natural prelude to such a step, past experience had shown the difficulties of dealing with the Soviet Government to be insuperable. The American Government never-

theless proposed to abolish all war-time restrictions on trade and suggested a conference with Great Britain, France and Italy on March 20 to discuss the adoption of a common policy.[23] The Allied Governments, however, thought the date set too early and negotiations continued for some weeks without result.[23] The possibility of maintaining a common Allied front toward Russia seemed to be waning. The British Government prepared to open negotiations with Leonid Krassin, head of the Soviet Trade Delegation at Copenhagen, while the French Government displayed alarm lest the gold possessed by the Soviet Government be used for purposes of foreign trade instead of being paid to France in payment of the Russian debt.[24] Premier Nitti of Italy favored the removal of all trade restriction and the recognition of the Soviet Government.[25] The State Department at Washington adhered to the position it had already taken. Export licenses to Russia were still refused. Mr. Bakhmeteff remained Russian Ambassador and Mr. Martens was kept busy on the one hand dodging agents of the Department of Justice and on the other conferring with representatives of the War Department regarding prospective business transactions between the Department and the Soviet Bureau in New York.[26] By the end of May State Department circles had dropped all talk of re-opening Russian trade and had returned to the hopeful days of November, 1917. The imminent overthrow of the Soviet Government had again become a certainty.[27] The London negotiations were viewed with disapproval and amazement. The doom of the Bolshevist régime was once more sealed by Washington officialdom, according to newspaper reports of the views prevailing in the Capital.

The early months of 1920 thus constituted a period of uncertainty and hesitation, a time of oscillation between vague gropings toward peace and reactionary relapses into the psychology of war and intervention. In Washington, as in Paris, the spirit of hostility toward the Soviet Government successfully resisted the pressure for the re-establishment of economic and political relations. The policy of the future remained doubtful. Much depended upon the outcome of the new war that had broken out along Russia's eastern frontier.

2. The Polish War

Throughout 1919, while Russia was torn by civil war, the new state of Poland was occupied in pulling itself together into a semblance of national unity. The American and Allied Governments,

as well as the Soviet Government in Moscow, had already pledged themselves to recognize its independence. As early as November 4, 1918, Secretary of State Lansing, following the example of the British, French and Italian Governments, recognized the Polish Army, under the authority of the Polish National Committee in Paris, an autonomous and co-belligerent.[28] On January 30, 1919, he extended formal diplomatic recognition to the new republic by sending his greetings to Paderewski, Prime Minister and Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Polish Government.[29] The intense nationalism of the Poles, exulting in their independence after a century and a quarter under foreign rule, combined with the political chaos prevailing in eastern Europe to embroil the new state in conflicts with all its neighbors. The new Polish Army advanced far to the east of the ethnographic frontiers of Poland and engaged in desultory warfare with the Soviet forces, never co-operating with the White armies, whose leaders the Poles suspected of being none too friendly toward Polish independence, but endeavoring to wrest from Russian control as much territory as possible.

With the triumph of the Soviet Government over its domestic and foreign foes, it was anticipated in the west that the Red Army would be hurled against Poland, last bulwark between Bolshevism and Central Europe. The United States, along with the Allied Governments, dispatched food and war supplies to enable the Poles to withstand the expected Bolshevist offensive. General Tasker H. Bliss and Secretary of War Baker insisted that such aid was essential to check the spread of Bolshevism and save civilization.[30] On February 1, 100 car loads of American war material reached Poland. Secretary Baker had declared that such assistance was conditioned on the non-aggressive attitude of the Polish Government. No guarantees were asked, however, and it remained to be seen whether the condition would be observed.

But the Soviet Government preferred the olive branch to the bayonet. At the end of January it addressed a peace proposal to the Polish Government, declaring that it had recognized Poland's sovereignty and independence from the beginning and that all questions at issue between the two countries could be settled amicably through negotiations and mutual concessions.[31] The Polish Government seemed favorably disposed and appointed a Peace Commission with the consent of the Allies. On February 24, however, the Committee of Foreign Affairs in the Polish Diet framed terms that were so exorbitant and impossible from the Russian point of view as to

make the prospects of peace very dubious. Guarantees against propaganda, the recognition of the independence of the Baltic States, and the payment of an indemnity the Soviet Government might perhaps have agreed to. But the first demand, i.e., that Russia give up all territory west of the frontier of 1772 so that the inhabitants might freely choose their political future, was clearly unacceptable.[32] On February 28 the Council of Ambassadors at Paris drafted a note to Poland calling attention to the fact that Poland's eastern boundary, as laid down by the Supreme Council on November 25, 1919, lay far to the west of the districts which Polish forces had already occupied and which she now claimed.[33] But the Poles relinquished none of their pretensions.

At the end of March, the Polish Government restated its peace terms. The new demands, far from mitigating the original ones, were even more extravagant. Russia was now asked to renounce sovereignty over all territory west of the 1772 line and to recognize a Polish protectorate over the lost provinces. She was further asked to pay a substantial indemnity and to permit the Polish Army to occupy Smolensk as a guarantee of its payment.[34] The Allied and American Governments now became seriously alarmed at the possible consequences of these annexationist ambitions.[35] The French Government, however, which not only remained implacably hostile toward the Soviet régime but also regarded Poland as its special protégé, showed no disposition to bring pressure to bear on the Poles to induce them to modify their demands. With the strongest military power of Europe behind them, the Poles proceeded to make the most of their opportunities.

On April 28, 1920, the storm of war once more swept into the Ukraine. The anti-Bolshevist guerrilla chief, Petlura, who had been driven into Poland by the Red Army, now concluded an agreement with the Polish Government by which he gave up his claims to eastern Galicia and the Poles in return undertook to assist him in the conquest of Podolia, Volhynia and Kiev. Suddenly Pilsudski's troops launched a whirlwind offensive against the Russian lines. Early in May Kiev fell to the invaders, who then turned southward toward Odessa.[36] The Soviet Government, which had continued to hope for peace, was now confronted with the necessity of fighting this new incursion into its territory. On May 25 it addressed a wireless message to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States, protesting against this unprovoked attack and against the military aid which the French were giving the Poles.[37]

The attitude of the American Government toward this new international conflict was officially one of neutrality. Considerable disapprobation was expressed of the imperialistic motives of the aggressors, but the universal hatred of the Soviet régime made the task of Polish sympathizers an easy one. Hugh Gibson, first American Minister to Poland, then in the United States, sought to refute the charge of imperialism and emphasized the warm friendship of the United States for the Poles.[38] Prince Casimir Lubomirski, Polish Minister to the United States, informed the nation that "the war which Poland is carrying on is not one of conquest, but exclusively one of defense. . . . We have not even asked for the territory which belonged to us before 1772." [39] A Polish loan of $50,000,000 was soon floated successfully with the approval of the State Department.[40] In mid-summer, when the Poles were hard-pressed by their foes, Lubomirski appealed directly to the Secretary of State for permission to purchase military supplies from the War Department. Though the Polish Government already owed almost $72,000,000 to the United States for supplies previously purchased from the War Department, the State Department was sympathetic toward the request. It refused to comply, however, since such aid would clearly be an infringement of neutrality.[41] Despite the desire to save Poland from the Bolshevist clutches, there seems to have been no technical violation of neutral obligations on the part of the United States, unless the skirmishing along the frontier which preceded the Polish invasion of April be regarded as a state of war, in which case the American Government, as a neutral, would have had no right to sell war supplies to Poland at that time.

The summer, however, brought a military crisis which filled the western governments with the greatest anxiety. In the middle of May, the Red Army, regrouped and concentrated to meet the invaders, launched a powerful offensive against their lines. Kiev was retaken early in June by Budenny's cavalry and the whole Polish front was soon crushed by the superior Soviet forces. With the Bolshevist troops sweeping steadily westward, the Soviet leaders were little disposed to heed the armistice proposals which the Allied Governments addressed to them.[42] Minsk fell to the Red Army on July 9, Vilna on the 14th and Grodno on the 22nd. The invaders reached Brest-Litovsk on the 31st, this time not as vanquished suppliants for peace, but as victors. While the northern wing of the Polish Army crumbled under the enemy's blows and the Polish Government frantically called every available man and boy to the colors, Great

Britain rushed munitions to Danzig and France dispatched officers to supervise the defense of Warsaw.[43] Following the rejection of the Allied proposals by the Soviet Government, Poland, on Allied advice, applied directly to Moscow for an armistice, but the Bolshevist authorities displayed no anxiety to halt the triumphal march of their armies on the Polish capital.[44]

This situation, opening up alarming prospects of the destruction of Poland and a Bolshevist incursion into Central Europe, furnished the occasion for the first extended and clearly defined statement of American policy toward the Soviet Government, in the Colby note of August 10. This declaration laid down the principles which the American Government, under the Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge Administrations, followed subsequently in its treatment of Soviet Russia. These principles had been acted upon in the preceding period as well, but they were now for the first time expressly formulated in unequivocal language and presented as the basis upon which the future Russian policy of the United States would rest. A close examination of the content and consequences of the note is therefore in order.

The note was drawn up by Lansing's successor, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, and sent in the first instance to the Italian Ambassador at Washington, Baron Camillo Avezzano. The Italian Government had already entered into informal negotiations with the Soviet Government and had expressed its determination under no circumstances to go to war with Russia, regardless of the outcome of the conflict in Poland.[45] Since this represented a departure from the policy of the British and French Governments, which were prepared to support Poland to the limit, Italy turned to the United States to learn its attitude. The Colby note was a reply to an intimation from Baron Avezzano that the Italian Government would welcome a statement of the views of the United States on the situation presented by the advance of the Red Army into Poland.[46] The American Secretary of State seized upon the opportunity thus presented to broadcast a lengthy indictment of the Soviet régime, with an eye not only to the immediate effects of his declaration on the Polish war, but also to its possible consequences in affecting the policy of other governments toward Russia.*


The Secretary of State first reaffirmed the desire of the United States to maintain the political independence and territorial integrity of a united, free, and autonomous Polish state. The efforts being

* The full text of the note will be found in Appendix IV.

made to arrange an armistice between Poland and Russia were approved, but the American Government would not participate in any plan to expand the negotiations into a general European conference, "which would in all probability involve two results, from both of which this country strongly recoils, viz., the recognition of the Bolshevist régime and a settlement of the Russian problem almost inevitably upon the basis of the dismemberment of Russia." He next referred to the traditional friendship of the United States toward the Russian people, its efforts to assist them, and its confidence in their future. Friendship and honor required that Russia's interests should be protected, particularly as regards its sovereignty over the territory of the former Russian Empire. In refusing to recognize the independence of the Baltic States and of Georgia and Azerbaijan, the United States had been guided by "this feeling of friendship and honorable obligation" to the great nation which had befriended the United States in time of need. The boundaries of Russia should include the whole of the former Empire "with the exception of Finland proper, ethnic Poland, and such territory as may by agreement form a part of the Armenian State."

Recognition of the Soviet Government, however, would not, in the opinion of the American Government, promote the solution of existing problems. The present rulers of Russia, constituting only an inconsiderable minority of her people, had seized control by force and cunning and sustained themselves in power by savage oppression. The United States could not recognize them as a government with which the relations common to friendly governments could be maintained, for their régime was "based upon the negation of every principle of honor and good faith and every usage and convention underlying the whole structure of international law—the negation, in short, of every principle upon which it is possible to base harmonious or trustful relations, whether of nations or of individuals." Agreements concluded with such a régime were worthless, for its leaders openly boasted that they had no intention of executing them.

Assurances and guarantees that diplomatic agents would not be used to stir up revolution abroad could not be seriously considered, in view of the declarations referred to. The Third International, which had for its object the promotion of Bolshevist revolutions throughout the world, was heavily subsidized by the Soviet Government and not bound by any of its promises. Its agents undoubtedly received the support and protection of Soviet diplomatic agencies in other countries. "We cannot recognize, hold official relations



RUSSIAN WAR FRONTS 1919-1920

① FARTHEST SOUTHERN ADVANCE OF ALLIED TROOPS IN NORTH RUSSIA, JAN. 1919.
② FARTHEST WESTWARD ADVANCE OF WHITE ARMY OF KOLCHAK, MAY. 1919.
③ FARTHEST NORTHWARD ADVANCE OF WHITE ARMY OF DENIKIN, OCT. 1919.
④ FARTHEST EASTWARD ADVANCE OF WHITE ARMY OF YUDENITCH, OCT. 1919.
⑤ FARTHEST EASTWARD ADVANCE OF POLISH ARMY, JUNE 1920.
⑥ FARTHEST WESTWARD ADVANCE OF RED ARMY INTO POLAND, AUG. 1920.
⑦ FARTHEST NORTHWARD ADVANCE OF WHITE ARMY OF WRANGEL, NOV. 1920.

with, or give friendly reception to the agents of a Government which is determined and bound to conspire against our institutions; whose diplomats will be the agitators of dangerous revolt; whose spokesmen say they sign agreements with no intention of keeping them." All foreign troops, however, should be withdrawn from Russia. "Thus only can the Bolshevist régime be deprived of its false but effective appeal to Russian nationalism and compelled to meet the inevitable challenge of reason and self-respect which the Russian people, secure from invasion and territorial violation, are sure to address to a social philosophy that degrades them and a tyranny that oppresses them."

The Colby note was widely distributed among foreign governments and aroused world-wide comment. The French Government was particularly elated. In a note to the Secretary of State of August 14, it expressed its unalterable determination to uphold "the principles so clearly formulated by the United States." It was greatly pleased at this "further assurance of the close harmony of feeling which animates the French and American peoples when the future of civilization is at stake." "It is in this spirit, also, that, after mature deliberation, it has in fact recognized a Russian Government which declares that it accepts the same principles."[47] This referred to its recent recognition of the new anti-Bolshevist government of Baron Wrangel in the Crimea. Secretary Colby was highly gratified at this support of the American policy. While the United States was not prepared to recognize Wrangel, it approved his aims and regarded this divergence of means as less important than the common objective of the French and American Governments.[48] The Polish Government thanked the United States for this "valuable moral support" and added that "This war, which was forced upon us by the attack made on Polish cities, is a defensive war and is waged against Bolshevism and not against the Russian people."[49] The British and Italian Governments, however, showed little enthusiasm and the hope apparently entertained of uniting the Western Powers in a common policy toward Russia was frustrated.

But the immediate problem of the hour was to save Poland from annihilation. The State Department made it quite clear to Poland that it looked with disfavor upon its desire to annex large areas of ethnically Russian territory. Secretary Colby replied to a Polish note of August 1 on the 21st. He urged the exertion of every reasonable effort to terminate hostilities and asserted that the American Government "could not approve the adoption of an offensive war

program against Russia by the Polish Government." He advocated the issuance by the Polish Government of a declaration asserting that it would abstain from any aggressions against Russian territorial integrity and would remain within the boundaries laid down by the Peace Conference.[50] The Polish rejoinder of August 31 demurred, insisting that the Bolsheviks had not observed the boundaries laid down by the Peace Conference and that military operations necessitated their crossing.[51] The State Department, however, continued to urge that Poland give assurances that her forces would permanently withdraw within the boundaries laid down by the Allies.[52]

Meanwhile, the Polish war had entered upon its third and final phase. By mid-August the Red Army had reached the outer fortifications of Warsaw and seemed about to encircle the city. In desperation the Poles intrusted its defense to the French General Weygand, who directed a counter-attack which averted the danger. The Russian advance guards had pushed forward so rapidly that they now found themselves without support and were compelled to withdraw.[53] The Polish forces rallied and pressed their advantage with the result that the invaders were obliged to draw back their entire right wing and to undertake the evacuation of northwestern Poland. The Polish Government now insisted that the negotiations which had finally been begun at Minsk should be transferred to Riga on an entirely new basis, while a spirited exchange of notes took place between London and Moscow regarding the prospective terms of peace.[54] On October 11, following further Polish successes, an armistice agreement and preliminaries of peace were concluded at Riga.[55] The terms, which were finally embodied in the Treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, drew the new frontier from 150 to 200 miles east of the line indicated by the Peace Conference as the proper ethnographic boundary of Poland. Some 4,000,000 Russians were thus transferred to Polish sovereignty. Since this violation of Russian territorial integrity was contrary to the recommendations of the American Government, the State Department expressed its disapproval and indicated that the United States, while not contemplating any action to vitiate the agreement, would not recognize its validity.[56] No settlement disposing of Russian territory without the consent of the Russian people, as expressed through such a representative government as the United States could recognize, would be considered binding.

While the American State Department looked to internal peasant opposition to bring about the downfall of the Bolshevist régime, the

French Government staked its hopes on the last of the White Generals, Baron Peter Wrangel, who had been enabled by the preoccupation of the Soviet armies in Poland to gather together the remnants of Denikin's forces and establish a new base of operations in the Crimea. In June a new White Army of 70,000 men advanced northward into the Ukraine. As already noted, Wrangel was recognized as the de facto government of Russia by France on August 11, following the receipt of the Colby note in Paris.[57] Although his military successes were ephemeral and the territory he controlled much smaller than that formerly held by his predecessors, Denikin and Kolchak, the French Government took the extreme step of according him diplomatic recognition as well as military assistance, apparently in a last vain hope of destroying the Soviet régime.

The announcement created a furor of amazement in London, where it was supposed that France would continue to consult with her allies in formulating her Russian policy and would participate in the negotiations already undertaken with Soviet representatives.[58] Encouraged by the American diplomatic support embodied in the Colby note, the French Government felt free to break with Great Britain and to pursue a policy of its own in accordance with the principles enunciated by the United States.[59] In Washington much satisfaction was felt at the French action. The American Government did not, of course, follow suit in extending recognition to Wrangel, nor did it send him material assistance, but much sympathy was felt toward his cause.[60] A naval and diplomatic mission under Rear Admiral N. A. McCully was sent to Sebastopol and an American Red Cross Mission accompanied Wrangel's army.[61] Had there been any prospect of his success, he doubtless would have received the same degree of support that had been extended to Kolchak.

The peace with Poland, however, enabled the Red Army to make short work of the last White hope. His forces were permeated with Bolshevist sympathizers and weakened by the resentment which some of his reactionary generals felt toward his own real or pretended liberalism. Early in November his front in the Ukraine was crushed by overwhelming Soviet forces, which took the Isthmus of Perekop by storm and overran the Crimea. Sebastopol fell on November 14 amid scenes of indescribable panic and confusion, as the fragments of Wrangel's army, along with thousands of civilians, made a desperate attempt to escape the Red troops. British, French and American vessels dashed to the site of the disaster and endeavored to rescue the survivors.[62] The U. S. cruiser *St. Louis*,

aided by a number of destroyers, assisted in the evacuation, while the American Red Cross appropriated $400,000 (to which the Russian Embassy in Washington added $300,000) for the relief of the 140,000 fugitives who crowded into Constantinople.[63] With the elimination of Wrangel, even the most incorrigible of French interventionalists were obliged to admit defeat and to consider the expediency of a new approach to the problem.

The Colby note had meanwhile called forth a response from the Soviet Government. On October 4 Mr. L. C. A. K. Martens, unrecognized Soviet representative in the United States, transmitted to Baron Avezzano in Washington a communication from Chicherin. The Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs declared that "Soviet Russia cannot leave unheeded these false and malicious accusations of a character quite unusual in diplomacy and desires to bring them before the bar of public opinion." He alleged that the American policy was designed to bring about the overthrow of the Soviet Government in order to facilitate the domination of Russia by American financiers. To the principle of territorial integrity he opposed the principle of self-determination for the border peoples. He then undertook a reasoned defense of the Soviet régime against Colby's allegations. He insisted that not a single fact could be adduced to support the charge that the Soviet Government had violated its agreements. He closed:

> That the elementary economic needs of the peoples of Russia and of other countries demand normal relations and an exchange of goods between them, is quite clear to the Russian Government, and the first condition of such relations is mutual good faith and non-intervention on both parts. Mr. Colby is profoundly mistaken when he thinks that normal relations between Russia and the United States of America are possible only if capitalism prevails in Russia. On the contrary we deem it necessary in the interests of both nations and despite the differences of their political and social structure, to establish proper, peaceful and friendly relations between them. The Russian Soviet Government is convinced that not only the working masses but likewise the far-sighted business men of the United States of America will repudiate the policy which is expressed in Mr. Colby's note and is harmful to American interests, and that in the near future normal relations will be established between Russia and the United States.[64]

3. The Martens Mission, 1919-1921

Before turning to a consideration of the further development of American policy in the last months of the Wilson Administration,

it seems appropriate at this point to discuss the attempt made by the Soviet Government to enter into diplomatic and commercial relations with the United States through the agency of Mr. Ludwig C. A. K. Martens. The Soviet emissary, born in Russia of German parents in 1874, had been deported to Germany for revolutionary activities in 1899 and had arrived in the United States from England in 1916.[65] Since he had been associated with the Bolshevist leaders in Switzerland before the war and had contributed to the New York Russian Socialist paper, *Novy Mir,* of which Trotsky had been editor during his brief sojourn in the United States in 1917, he was fully trusted by the Soviet authorities, though not himself a member of the Communist Party. On March 19, 1919, he sent to the State Department his official credentials from Chicherin, dated January 2, 1919, certifying that he had been appointed the representative of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in the United States.[66] This document was accompanied by a long memorandum which emphasized the democratic origin and popular support of the Soviet Government, its military strength, its stability, permanence, and constructive ability, and its desire to "negotiate for the speedy opening of commercial relations for the mutual benefit of Russia and America."[67] Though these communications were ignored by the State Department, Martens, under instructions, continued his efforts.[68] Since he was authorized by Chicherin to take charge of the Russian Embassy in the United States, he addressed a letter to Bakhmeteff peremptorily demanding that he surrender all the property of the Russian Government in his possession.[69] Bakhmeteff paid no attention to his warnings and continued to be recognized by the United States as the Russian Ambassador.

Martens meanwhile opened offices in the World Tower Building, 110 West 40 Street, New York City, and announced that he was prepared to open trade relations with the United States on behalf of the Soviet Government, guaranteed by a deposit of $200,000,000 in gold.[70] His Bureau consisted of a staff of about thirty-five persons.[71] Its expenses, totaling about $15,000 a month, were paid entirely by the Soviet Government.[72] Its functions were to spread information about Soviet Russia, chiefly through the magazine of that title, and to foster Russian-American trade by making contracts with American business establishments. In April, 1919, the State Department issued a statement that since "the Government of the United States has never recognized the Bolshevist régime at Moscow, it is deemed proper to warn American business

men that any concessions from the Bolshevist authorities probably could not be recognized as binding on future Russian Governments." [73] Though the Commercial Department was the largest section of the Russian Soviet Government Bureau, it was unable to transact any actual business because of the embargo. A considerable number of tentative contracts were made, amounting to about $30,000,000, but none were executed because, in Martens's words, the American Government "did not allow us to transfer funds from Russia and we never got export licenses for American goods." [74]

While the commercial activities of Martens and his subordinates, being wholly futile because of the policy of the authorities at Washington, aroused no general comment, his political activities, real or fancied, soon began to cause apprehension in conservative circles. He strove to refrain from anything that would savor of Bolshevist propaganda, but his cordial relations with radical groups in New York and his efforts to disseminate information regarding Soviet Russia inevitably led to alarm on the part of those who were haunted by the Red spectre of Communism. He received warm greetings from various local Socialist organizations and he replied to the American "comrades" with equal warmth.[75] His public speeches soon led to the charge by the Union League Club of New York and other conservative bodies that he was preaching Bolshevism.

On June 12 Martens's offices in New York were raided by the state constabulary, assisted by private detectives and by agents of the legislative committee, under the chairmanship of Clayton R. Lusk, investigating revolutionary radicalism. The search warrants were procured from the Hon. Alexander Brough, city magistrate, by Archibald E. Stevenson, secretary of the Union League Club, who accompanied the raiders. The alleged purpose of the raid was to gather evidence to assist in prosecuting cases under the New York criminal anarchy statute. The office of the Bureau was closely searched and Martens, Heller, and others of the staff were escorted to the City Hall under a heavy guard of state troopers in plain clothes, where they were examined behind closed doors by Attorney General Charles D. Newton.[76] Martens at once protested to the Secretary of State at this treatment and insisted that his activity as a representative of a foreign government, "even though not officially recognized by the Government of the United States, is a matter within the cognizance of the State Department at Washington and not of the constabulary of the State of New York." [77] When Chicherin learned of the event, he protested energetically to the

State Department at Martens's "arrest," demanding "the cessation of such persecutions and the immediate release of Mr. Martens" and threatening reprisals against American citizens in Russia.[78] The State Department's reply, cabled by Assistant Secretary of State Phillips to the American Legation in Stockholm, declared Chicherin's statement "wholly untrue." It denied that Martens had been arrested, asserted that he was a German citizen, cited the unwarranted arrest and detention of Consul Tredwell and other American representatives in Russia, and warned that reprisals would "arouse in the United States an overwhelming public sentiment of indignation against the authorities at Moscow responsible for such acts." [79]

Since the State Department declined to interfere, the interrogation of Martens by the Lusk Committee proceeded.[80] Martens failed in his attempt to have the subpoena served on him vacated and he was obliged in November to appear to answer the questions put to him. He refused, however, to produce "all documents, letters, and other papers" received from his government, contending that "under the rules of international law, the communications between my government and myself are privileged, and not subject to examination by the government of any other nation or state." [81] He also refused to reveal the identity of the couriers who brought his funds from Russia. His refusal led the chairman of the committee to declare him in contempt and to make application to the Attorney General for an order requiring Martens to show cause why he should not be committed to the county jail until he should answer the questions put to him. The order was issued by Justice Greenbaum of the New York Supreme Court, but before it could be served, Martens had left the jurisdiction for Washington.[82]

Though the Lusk Committee was unable to find any evidence that Martens had violated American law in any way, it made the most of the situation. Its report declared in part that since "one of the objects of the régime which he represents in this country is the overthrow of the system of government now existing here, every act which he commits in this country, which is beneficial to the Bolshevist régime, whether a direct violation of any existing statute in this country or not, is unquestionably an act of hostility against the government and the people of the United States." [83] During the course of the inquiry, various statements were broadcasted by the committee and by the press which had no foundation in fact and which led Martens to protest once more to the State Department. On November 18, 1919, the *New York Tribune* carried the eight-

column front page headline: "MARTENS ADMITS LENIN SENT HIM TO OVERTHROW U. S." In his telegram to Secretary Lansing Martens asserted: "I have made no such admission and I could not have made such admission in view of the simple fact that I am not and my Government is not in any manner whatsoever interfering with the affairs of the United States Government and I protest against the indecent attempts by perversions of the truth to create false impressions in this respect." [84] Several days later Martens began libel suits for $1,000,000 damages against the *New York Tribune* and the *New York World*,[85] but his suits were unsuccessful and were no more effective than his protests to the State Department in dispelling the general impression that he was a dangerous revolutionary agitator.

His position became increasingly precarious as the tide of alarm at the Red menace which swept the nation in 1919 and 1920 rose ever higher. In a burst of hysterical fear, which the Assistant Secretary of Labor, Louis Freeland Post, not inaptly characterized as "The Deportations Delirium of 1920," thousands of aliens of alleged radical views were seized throughout the country and railroaded to New York for deportation. On November 15, 1919, Martens vainly protested to the Secretary of State at the "unwarranted persecution and cruel treatment by Federal and State officers, as well as by violent mobs acting without any authority" directed against Russian citizens throughout the United States.[86] Attorney General Palmer now proceeded to organize nation-wide raiding campaigns against radicalism. On November 13 the Socialist *New York Call* was excluded from the mails by the Postmaster General. On December 22 the transport *Buford*, dubbed "the Soviet ark," sailed from New York for Finland with 249 deported Russian radicals on board, including Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman. On New Year's Day raids and wholesale arrests were made in thirty-three cities, netting 2,000 victims. Over 5,000 arrests were made in all and Ellis Island was soon overcrowded with prospective deportees. Symptomatic of the spirit of the times was the exclusion of five Socialist members from the New York Legislature later in the month.[87]

Martens could not hope to escape the net closing about him. Late in December the Department of Justice applied to the Department of Labor for a warrant of arrest for the Soviet "ambassador." Since the State Department gave assurances that it would be in no way embarrassed by Martens's deportation, the warrant was issued

on January 2,[88] and ordered executed by agents of the Department of Justice.[89] Martens had come to the Capital in response to a summons to appear before a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, which had undertaken to investigate his activities. The agents of the Department of Justice made preparations for a sensational arrest, but Martens succeeded in evading them until he was called before the subcommittee and received the protection of its parole pending his examination.[90] Martens denied, however, that he had gone into hiding and he found the stories of action to be taken against him as an enemy alien "amusingly incredible." [91]

The hearings before the Senate subcommittee, composed of Senators Pomerene, Brandegee and Borah, and presided over by Senator Moses, began on January 19, 1920. Martens's counsel, Mr. Thomas W. Hardwick, formerly Senator from Georgia, declared at the outset that his client was wholly innocent "of having propagated or instigated, or even participated in any way, in any political activity in this country, or in any attempt to overthrow its government." [92] In his testimony, Martens insisted that he had at all times adhered strictly to his instructions from Moscow, which forbade him to use any of the funds at his disposal for interference in the internal affairs of the United States. He denied engaging in propaganda of any objectionable character and asserted that the sole object of his mission was to restore commercial intercourse between Russia and the United States. He had, indeed, endeavored to dispel prevailing ignorance of, and prejudice against, his government, since these things constituted an obstacle to the achievement of his aim. But "all these activities being strictly confined to the presentation of facts about Russia, they could not be regarded as improper or objectionable, inasmuch as the United States has not declared war against Russia; but, on the contrary, has on several occasions given assurances of its good will to the Russian people, the overwhelming majority of whom is represented by my government." [93] He further contended that all revolutionary propaganda emanating from Moscow was purely defensive in character and a legitimate weapon against intervention.

In reply, the counsel for the committee, Mr. Wade H. Ellis, cited Lenin's inflammatory "letters to American workingmen" of August 20, 1918, and January 21, 1919, and dwelt upon the manifesto of the Third International of March, 1919. Martens argued that what Lenin wrote as a member of the Communist Party and of the Third International was of no concern to him as a representative of the Soviet Government. Much acrimonious altercation followed, Ellis

citing evidence of revolutionary propaganda and Martens dissenting, denying and explaining. The examination revealed clearly that Martens was, by conviction, an international revolutionist and that he had spoken at meetings where other speakers had advocated the overthrow of the American Government, but it failed to show that Martens was technically guilty of seditious activities himself. When the hearings closed on March 29, the members of the subcommittee were divided in their views, Senator Moses being of the opinion that the evidence supported the contention of Attorney General Palmer that Martens was subject to deportation, while his colleagues took the opposite position.[94]

On March 31 Martens addressed a letter to Secretary of State Colby, requesting a statement of the attitude of the government toward his presence in the United States and offering to depart if the Department of State "does not desire my presence here and does not consider favorably the establishment of friendly relations with the Government of Russia."[95] Receiving no response, he decided to remain, despite the demands of Senator Myers of Montana that he be imprisoned at hard labor for life.[96] The agents of the Department of Justice, however, were prepared to make a sensational public seizure of Martens as soon as the Senate hearings were concluded, under the Department of Labor warrant. Mr. Post asserted that his information indicated that the arrest "was to be a species of public entertainment for which the Department of Labor could not decently allow itself to be responsible. I therefore took steps to frustrate, not the arrest, but an abusive, lawless, indecent and scandalous method of making it."[97] He ordered the warrant of arrest returned to the Department of Labor and proposed to Senator Moses and Mr. Hardwick that Martens come to his office at once at the close of the hearings. "When they arrived, I made the arrest myself in legal form under the Department of Labor warrant which I had kept in my possession ever since withdrawing it from the Department of Justice; and, having made the arrest, I forthwith heard and granted Mr. Hardwick's application for parole of his client to himself, pending decision of the case. The terms of the parole required Mr. Hardwick to produce Mr. Martens at any time in the future upon demand of the Secretary of Labor.[98]

Under this arrangement Martens retained full liberty of action and continued his work unmolested, signing contracts with business men and making actual purchases of shoes from the War Department,[99] while the Department of Labor investigated his case. The charges

against him were that he was an alien in the United States in violation of the Immigration Acts of February 5, 1917, and October 16, 1918, since he was alleged to be a "member of or affiliated with an organization that entertains a belief in the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States." [100] In the course of the extended hearings on the case, Martens's attorney, Mr. Charles Recht, argued that the acts in question specifically exempted accredited representatives of foreign governments from their application, and that the evidence produced in support of the charges was incompetent.[101] He showed that Martens was not a member of the Russian Communist Party and had not engaged in revolutionary activity in the United States.

On December 15, 1920, Secretary of Labor W. B. Wilson handed down his decision. He demonstrated first that representatives of unrecognized foreign governments enjoyed no exemption from the terms of the acts. Mere belief in, or advocacy of, Socialism, Communism, Sovietism, etc., however, was no ground for deportation. "The essence of the deportation provisions of the Immigration Laws in their application to this class of cases is the belief in, teaching or advocacy of the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States." But "the Soviet Government of Russia believes in, teaches and advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by the use of force and violence, not by the process of military invasion, but by conducting propaganda to stir up insurrection." "In view of these facts, it seems to me that the questions to be decided are: first, does Martens believe in, teach, or advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States by the use of force or violence? Second, is Martens a member of the Communist Party of Russia or the Third International? Third, does his appointment as an official of the unrecognized Soviet Government constitute membership in or affiliation with an organization that believes in, teaches, or advocates the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States, it being determined that the Soviet Government, the Communist Party of Russia, and the Third International are organizations of this character." The first and second questions were answered in the negative, and the third in the affirmative. "It is therefore decided that Ludwig C. A. K. Martens is an alien, a citizen of Russia, and that he entertains a belief in and is a member of or affiliated with an organization that entertains a belief in, teaches, or advocates the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States, and the Com-

missioner General of Immigration is directed to take the said Ludwig C. A. K. Martens into custody and deport him at the expense of the Government of the United States." [102]

This decision, Martens declared, was "plainly a political decision, dictated by the policy of the present Administration toward the Soviet Government." [103] Despite the best efforts of the Department of Justice, it could not be shown that Martens as an individual had in any way violated American laws or subjected himself to deportation, except by virtue of his being an agent of the Soviet Government. As the Assistant Secretary of Labor asserted, "If he had not been an official of the unrecognized government of Russia, he could not have been deported under any law of ours." [104] When Chicherin learned of the decision, he ordered Martens to return to Russia without delay and to cancel all his orders.[105] This action was described in Washington as "a typical example of the shrewd intrigue which characterized Moscow's present foreign policy." [106]

The Secretary of Labor decided to permit Martens to take his leave without the indignity of formal deportation.[107] Those familiar with the incident believe that this was done, as the Assistant Secretary of Labor declared, to avoid possible future diplomatic embarrassment due to the circumstance that Martens once deported could never have lawfully returned to the United States.[108] On January 22, 1921, Martens, with his family, his secretary, Gregory Weinstein, and a group of workers in the Soviet Bureau sailed from New York on the liner *Stockholm*, called the "second Soviet ark" because of the seventy-five deportees on board.[109] On February 21 Mr. Recht received a cable from Martens in Moscow and at once informed the Department of Labor that the Soviet Ambassador had reached his destination. Three days later the Department announced that the deportation warrant had been canceled.[110]

The diplomatic "slap in the face" which the expulsion of Martens represented was accepted by the Soviet Government as final proof that the hostile attitude of the United States toward the Bolshevist régime would not be modified, at least during the remainder of the Wilson Administration. It constituted, in fact, a further development of the policy laid down in the Colby note of August 10, 1920. From the viewpoint of the State Department the world revolutionary designs of the Communists not only made recognition of the régime which they had set up in Russia impossible, but rendered the presence of any emissaries of that régime in the United States intolerable. Martens's deportation, on the narrow grounds of his being an agent

of the Soviet Government, was due to the deep-seated conviction that his Government, for all its professions of friendship, represented and served the interests of an international revolutionary movement aimed at the destruction of the existing social and political order in the United States. It could not therefore be recognized as the national government of Russia, nor could its agents be permitted to remain in America.

4. The Issues of Peace and Trade

Despite the futility of Mr. Martens's efforts to develop commercial intercourse between the United States and Soviet Russia, the question of Russian trade aroused increasing interest. As has already been observed, the lifting of the blockade by the Supreme Council in January, 1920, had not led to any modification of the policy pursued by the United States throughout 1919. President Wilson's attempt to secure united action by all the Allied Governments had failed and each of the powers had pursued an independent policy. The negotiations in London were but one of a series of conversations entered into early in 1920 between the western European governments and Soviet representatives. In April an agreement between the Russian and Italian Co-operatives was concluded at Milan. In Denmark active preparations for trade were commenced. In June the Belgian Cabinet, accepting the British as opposed to the French view, decided in favor of resuming economic relations with Russia. The Canadian Government likewise removed its restrictions on Russia trade in June.[111]

On the 7th of July, 1920, the United States followed suit. The announcement issued by the State Department declared: "The restrictions which have heretofore stood in the way of trade and communication with Soviet Russia were today removed by action of the Department of State. Such of these restrictions, however, as pertain to the shipment of materials susceptible of immediate use for war purposes will, for the present at least, be maintained." It added, however, that political recognition was neither granted nor implied by such action and that individuals and corporations engaging in Russian trade would do so at their own risk, since "the assistance which the United States can extend to its citizens who engage in trade or travel in some foreign country whose Government is recognized by the United States cannot be looked for in the present case." "American citizens availing themselves of the present relaxation of

restrictions are warned against the risks incident to the acceptance of commodities or other values, the title to which may later be brought into question." Passports for travel could not be issued and mail to or from Soviet Russia could not be accepted "since it is not desirable at this time to undertake negotiations with the Soviet postal authorities." [112]

While this action constituted a lifting of the embargo which had been maintained since February, 1918, through the refusal to issue export licenses, the State Department appeared to attach less importance to this aspect of its declaration than to the expression of its refusal to extend political recognition to the Soviet Government.[113] The latter policy, however, was in line with the past, while the former was a new departure. As such it was welcomed by the Soviet Bureau in New York, though with reservations. Martens asserted at the time:

> I must say frankly . . . that the statement published this morning, as it stands, does not at all dispose of the problem of establishing trade between Russia and the United States. There is no indication in the statement as to how or whether Russia is to be permitted to pay American business men for goods purchased in this country. We have long been prepared and willing to establish credits in favor of American manufacturers in Esthonia. The Federal Reserve Board, however, some time ago issued a warning to all American banks advising them against honoring any drafts drawn upon Esthonian banks. In this manner all plans for the payment of American goods by drafts on Esthonian banks were effectively checked. We cannot establish credits by the deposit of Russian gold in American banks so long as there is danger that these deposits may be molested. The statement published this morning gives no assurance that any practical credit arrangements may be effected.[114]

It was not until December 20, 1920, that further steps were taken to facilitate Russian-American commerce. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board then announced "that with the approval of the Department of State and in order to give force and effect to the action of that Department in removing restrictions in the way of trade and communication with Soviet Russia as announced by that Department on July 7, 1920, all rules and regulations restricting the exportation of coin, bullion and currency to that part of Russia now under the control of the so-called Bolshevist Government, or restricting dealings or exchange transactions in Russian rubles, or restricting transfers of credit or exchange transactions with that part of Russia now in the control of the so-called Bolshevist Government, have been suspended, effective December 18, 1920, until

further notice." [115] It was explained that no appreciable results in the way of trade were expected to follow, but that the action was taken to remove one of the most effective Bolshevist propaganda arguments.

On January 8, 1921, Acting Secretary of State Norman H. Davis, in a public letter to Judge Alton B. Parker, issued a restatement of the Government's general position regarding Russia. The State Department did not forbid the export of commodities to Russia nor the entrance of American relief workers, but it could not encourage such ventures as long as American citizens were still held as hostages by the Soviet authorities. Passports could obviously not be issued in the absence of diplomatic relations, and postal service could not be instituted without treaty negotiations which would constitute recognition. It was denied that the United States proposed to restore Russian control over the Baltic States, but the principle of territorial integrity was reiterated. The American Government "could not be considered as indorsing territorial settlements affecting the welfare of the Russian people unless a government generally recognized as representing them were a party to the adjustment." That the United States "has at various times helped armed intervention in Russia with money, men and munitions" was admitted, but it was asserted that the Government was now opposed to all further military interference of any kind in Russian affairs. The charge that a blockade was still being maintained against Soviet Russia was denied.[116]

As regards trade, then, the situation at the beginning of 1921 was as follows: All formal legal restrictions on the exchange of commodities between Russia and the United States were removed, with the exception of the requirement of a license from the War Trade Board section of the State Department for the export of war supplies. The Soviet monopoly of foreign trade, however, compelled American business men to deal directly with the Soviet Government. When they sought assurances from the State Department of the safety of such transactions, they were informed that "we have not considered that government safe enough for us to extend recognition to it, but if you wish to trade with them we have no objection whatever." [117] The Soviet Government, however, at least in the opinion of the State Department, had no commodities to export except gold. Since the non-recognition of the Government holding it left the title to this gold in question, it was not accepted by the Federal Reserve Banks or the Mint and in consequence could not serve as a basis of com-

merce.[118] In actual quantity, Russian-American trade at this time remained negligible, due more to Russian economic conditions than to the difficulties in the way of conducting business.

But Russia's enormous natural resources and the potential value of Russian trade impressed themselves upon the minds of many Americans and kept the question in the forefront of public discussion. In Congress, the former spirit of uncompromising hostility toward the Soviet régime * was now mitigated by a new interest in trade prospects and by a less implacable attitude of opposition toward suggestions of a resumption of economic and political relations with Russia. The discussions of the period reveal no widespread sentiment in favor of recognition but rather a feeling of doubt and hesitancy, mingled with a desire for fuller information on Russian conditions. In the upper chamber Senator France of Maryland took the initiative in urging a restoration of trade relations. Senators Poindexter, Moses, and King dissented, while Senator Borah came to the defense, contending that the Soviet Government would "prove the foundation upon which a sane, free form of government may be established" and that the willingness of the United States to trade with the Tsar's Government and to accept his gold was a precedent for trade with Russia under the new régime.[120]

At the same time the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs were both conducting hearings on the question. The former, acting under the terms of Senator France's resolution of February 27, 1920, heard testimony presented by a number of labor leaders, members of the "American Labor Alliance for Trade Relations with Russia," who urged trade with the Soviets as a means of relieving American unemployment and emphasized the widespread demand among American workers for a resumption of trade relations.[121] It should be noted, however, that the American Federation of Labor remained bitterly hostile toward the Soviet régime and refused to approve even the lifting of the blockade.[122] The hearings before the House Committee, under a resolution of inquiry introduced by Representative F. W. Dallinger of Massachusetts on January 6, were more extended and covered the general topic of "Conditions in Russia." Under-Secretary of State Norman H. Davis and Arthur Bullard, Chief of the Division of Russian Affairs in the State Department, explained and defended the

* On December 20, 1920, Senator King launched a new attack on the Soviet régime and introduced a resolution opposing its recognition, but the earlier attitude of blind condemnation had passed.[119]

policy of the Administration, while Mr. B. L. Bobroff, a Milwaukee business man, urged the restoration of trade relations through the removal of the Treasury restriction on the minting of Soviet gold. The general tone of the testimony was on a much higher level than that presented two years previously before the Overman Committee and represented a saner approach to the entire problem.[123] The hearings, however, were without effect in bringing about any change of policy or even in leading to Congressional action looking toward such a result.

President Wilson, meanwhile, had closed his Administration by reaffirming his opposition to military intervention as a solution of the Russian problem. He had been asked by the Supreme Council to fix the boundaries of Armenia and was also invited by Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the League of Nations, to mediate between Armenia on the one hand and Mustapha Kemal, leader of the Turkish nationalists, and the Soviet Government on the other. He accepted both tasks, but before he could take action a Bolshevist coup d'état set up a Soviet Government at Erivan, Armenia, which at once concluded an agreement with Moscow, annulled foreign loans, abolished private property, and sent a special envoy to Angora to settle all frontier disputes with the Turkish authorities. Wilson now took the opportunity to issue a general declaration of policy toward Russia and to require, as a condition of his continuing his efforts as mediator, that the Allied Governments pledge themselves to abstain from all future armed interference in Russian affairs.[124]

The attitude of the President toward those now in power in Russia has been frequently and clearly expressed. He regards the Bolsheviki as a violent and tyrannical minority, by no means representing the real desire and purposes of the Russian people. But he has never believed that the problems raised by this coup d'état could be solved by military action from outside. He now hopes that the recent tragical events on the Polish front and in the Crimea have convinced all the world that armed invasion is not the way to bring peace to the people of Russia. . . .

It is, therefore, the thought of the President that the present moment offers a peculiarly pressing challenge to an attempt at general pacification on the Russian borders along these lines. Such an attempt seems to the President the logical outgrowth—in fact, the only logical development—of the request to mediate in the Armenian conflict, and he feels bound in conscience once more to call this matter to the attention of the associated nations.

It is obvious to all that the small struggling border States will not attack great Russia unless encouraged by the promise of support from the stronger powers. The President therefore believes that the sine qua

non of an attempt at pacification must be a public and solemn engagement among the great powers not to take advantage of Russia's stricken condition and not to violate the territorial integrity of Russia, nor to undertake themselves any further invasions of Russia, nor to tolerate such invasions by others.

Such a public agreement would in effect say to those now in power in Russia:

"You are not menaced from outside. The great powers have voluntarily guaranteed you from attack. You can have peace if you want it."

The responsibility for any new war which might break out on the Russian border would then be clearly placed.

If the principal powers represented on the Council of the League find themselves in accord with the President in this matter and will assure him of their moral and diplomatic support, he will instruct his personal representative, Mr. Morgenthau, to proceed at once on his mission.[125]

This proposition was very coldly received by the Allied Governments.[126] Though they had gone much further than the United States in negotiating with Soviet representatives and in seeking to restore commercial relations, they were apparently not prepared to pledge themselves against further intervention in Russia and did not accept the American principle of safeguarding Russian territorial integrity. While the note failed to elicit the desired guarantees, it was significant as a reaffirmation of the intention of the United States to refrain from all future armed interference in Russian affairs. With this principle, as well as the corollaries of maintenance of Russian territorial integrity and non-recognition of the Soviet Government, left as a heritage to the Republicans as the basis of American policy toward Russia, the Wilson Administration closed, leaving further attempts at a solution of the Russian enigma to its successor.

CHAPTER NINE

THE POLICY OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION

1. Soviet Overtures Rejected, 1921

WHILE the election of 1920 turned to a considerable degree on questions of foreign policy, the problems of Russian-American relations received little or no attention and could in no sense be regarded as issues of the campaign. The Democratic platform contained no reference to Russia, while the Republican platform, although containing no direct reference to Russia, pledged "an immediate resumption of trade relations with every nation with which we are at peace." * The rival candidates, Warren G. Harding and James M. Cox, refrained from discussing the question. While military intervention had earlier been subjected to partisan Republican criticism in Congress, the subsequent Russian policy of the Wilson Administration was accepted as wise and expedient by both Democrats and Republicans, and neither party in its pre-election statements recommended any departure from it.

The issue was not long left in doubt after the inauguration of the new President. On March 21, 1921, Maxim Litvinoff, Soviet representative in Esthonia, transmitted to "the Congress of the United States and His Excellency, President Harding" an adroitly-timed appeal for a reversal of American policy from M. Kalinin, President of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The Soviet Government, it declared, had made repeated efforts to establish friendly relations with the United States, but "President Wilson, who, without cause and without any declaration of war, had attacked the Russian Republic, showed during his whole Administration a growing hostility toward the Russian Republic. Soviet Russia hopes that the American Republic will not persist in obdurately following this path and that the new American Government will clearly see the great advantage for the two republics of the re-establishment of business relations and will consider the interests of both peoples which imperatively demand that the wall existing between them should be removed." [1]

* The Socialist platform called for the reopening of commercial relations with Russia under the Soviet Government.

On the same day that this communication was received the new Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, issued a statement regarding Russian trade which foreshadowed the policy to be adopted. He declared: "The question of trade with Russia is far more a political question than an economic one so long as Russia is under the control of the Bolsheviki. Under their economic system, no matter how much they moderate it in name, there can be no real return to production in Russia, and therefore Russia will have no considerable commodities to export and, consequently, no great ability to obtain imports. . . . That requires the abandonment of their present economic system." [2]

On March 25 the new Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, sent to the American consul at Reval for transmission to Litvinoff the response of the American Government to the Russian proposal.

> The Government of the United States views with deep sympathy and grave concern the plight of the people of Russia and desires to aid by every appropriate means in promoting proper opportunities through which commerce can be established upon a sound basis. It is manifest to this Government that in existing circumstances there is no assurance for the development of trade, as the supplies which Russia might now be able to obtain would be wholly inadequate to meet her needs, and no lasting good can result so long as the present causes of progressive impoverishment continue to operate. It is only in the productivity of Russia that there is any hope for the Russian people and it is idle to expect resumption of trade until the economic bases of production are securely established. Production is conditioned upon the safety of life, the recognition of firm guarantees of private property, the sanctity of contracts and the rights of free labor.
>
> If fundamental changes are contemplated, involving due regard for the protection of persons and property and the establishment of conditions essential to the maintenance of commerce, this Government will be glad to have convincing evidence of the consummation of such changes, and until this evidence is supplied this Government is unable to perceive that there is any proper basis for considering trade relations.[3]

This rebuff made it quite clear that the Republican Administration would in general continue the Russian policy of its predecessor. Recognition of the Soviet Government was not to be contemplated. Russian gold would continue to be refused by the United States Mint. Trade in any case would remain insignificant, in the view of the American Government, so long as the Bolsheviks sought to apply the principles of Communism to the economic life of Russia.*

* The "new economic policy," representing a departure from military Communism and a "strategic retreat" toward capitalism and private trade, had already been adopted by the Soviet Government, but as long as fundamental

This emphasis upon Russian economic rehabilitation was not a new departure, since President Wilson had stressed this problem from the beginning, but it had not previously been so clearly set forth as a controlling consideration behind the American policy. The implication in the statements of Hoover and Hughes was that recognition and the negotiation of a trade agreement were futile until the Russian Government adopted the economic principles accepted in the United States as prerequisites to the restoration of productivity.

This point of view was explained at greater length by Secretary Hughes in a letter to Samuel Gompers, replying to an inquiry of March 25 requesting information regarding Russian trade prospects.[5] The Secretary of State asserted that Russia's economic condition made trade impossible. "In fact, the devastation of industry in Russia has been so complete, the poverty of the country is so acute, the people are so hungry and the demand for commodities is so great that at present Russia represents a gigantic economic vacuum and no evidence exists that the unfortunate situation above described is likely to be alleviated so long as the present political and economic system continues." He dwelt upon the industrial decay of Russia under the Communist régime and insisted that no commodities were available for export.

"In response to your question regarding the transfer of funds from Russia to the United States it may be stated that there are no restrictions on the importation of Russian gold into the United States, and since December 18, 1920, there have been no restrictions on the exportation of coin, bullion and currency to Soviet Russia or on dealings or exchange transactions in Russian roubles or on transfers of credit or exchange transactions with Soviet Russia. It is true that no assurances can be given that Russian gold will be accepted by the Federal Reserve Banks or the Mint, in view of the fact that these public institutions must be fully assured that the legal title to the gold accepted by them is not open to question."[6]

The American policy throughout 1921 continued to be couched in these terms. The primary object of the American Government in its treatment of Russia was apparently to bring about the economic rehabilitation of that country. This goal could not be achieved as long as Russia remained in the control of a régime dedicated to subversive and unworkable economic principles. Diplomatic recognition

principles remained unaltered, Secretaries Hughes and Hoover could perceive no proper basis for negotiations. *Izvestia* declared: "The essence of the Washington answer is that resumption of commerce with Russia will be possible only after we have returned to a bourgeois régime. This is pure nonsense.[4]

would encourage the continuation of that régime and consequently delay a return to sanity. Non-recognition might serve as a source of pressure for change. It might indeed contribute toward the long anticipated overthrow of the Soviet Government.[7] In any case, if this hoped-for consummation could not be achieved, it might induce the Soviet Government to reform. By the end of the year, in fact, present and prospective modifications of Moscow's economic policy led to renewed suggestions in Washington for a resumption of commercial and political relations. Postal service had been restored in May.[8] In December, Senator France, who had spent part of the summer in Russia, introduced a resolution in the Senate authorizing the President to send a commission to the Soviet Government and to receive a Russian commission in this country to discuss all outstanding differences between the nations.[9] While no action followed, it was indicated at the White House that such a step was no longer regarded as wholly beneath consideration.[10]

2. Famine Relief, 1921-1923

Meanwhile Russia had become the victim of a catastrophe so appalling as to appeal to the humanitarian sympathies of all the world, despite the dislike with which her political and economic institutions were still regarded. During the years of civil and foreign war, Russian agricultural production had declined to a dangerously low level. When the Volga valley and extensive adjacent areas in southeastern and southern Russian were afflicted with a drought in the spring and summer of 1921, resulting in a disastrous crop failure, the result was widespread starvation. In the absence of adequate reserves of food and of transportation facilities to carry what was available to the stricken regions, the Soviet Government was quite unable to cope with the situation. By the middle of summer famine was raging throughout the Volga valley and millions were threatened with death.[11]

In July the Russian author, Maxim Gorky, sent a plea for aid to Herbert Hoover, as Director General of the American Relief Administration. While this was theoretically an unofficial organization, it received much of its financial support from Congressional appropriations.* This circumstance, coupled with Mr. Hoover's position as Secretary of Commerce, made the problem of famine relief a

* Hoover was appointed Director General by President Wilson on February 24, 1919, following an appropriation of $100,000,000 for European relief.[12]

political problem from the outset. Mr. Hoover replied promptly, expressing his readiness to assist on two conditions. The Soviet Government must first release all Americans confined in Russian prisons. It must further give a direct official statement to an agent of the A.R.A. at Riga that relief was needed and desired, that relief workers would be given full liberty to carry on their activities in Russia without Soviet interference, and that they would be supplied with free transport and housing facilities. In return the A.R.A. would extend relief to all classes and sections impartially and would scrupulously refrain from anti-Soviet propaganda. Gorky gratefully acknowledged this reply and later forwarded a note signed by Kameneff, as chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee for Helping the Famine Stricken Populations, declaring that the Soviet Government found the proposals satisfactory. Hoover, with the approval of Secretary Hughes, thereupon ordered Walter L. Brown, European Director of the A.R.A., to proceed from London to Riga, but instructed him to see that "all American prisoners are out of Russia before negotiations for relief are begun with the Soviet authorities." [13]

In consequence of the Russian acceptance of the conditions imposed,[14] the negotiations at Riga proceeded between W. L. Brown and Maxim Litvinoff. The Soviet representative sought to have the distribution of food placed in the hands of the Soviet Government, but President Harding and his Cabinet, while refraining from any official participation, were agreed that the A.R.A. must have exclusive and unhampered control.[15] On August 19, 1921, the agreement was finally signed by which the Soviet Government bowed to the American terms. Though Litvinoff expressed the hope that the meeting would be a precedent for further Russian-American negotiations, it was insisted in Washington that the agreement was solely with the A.R.A. and was entirely non-political and in no sense represented a departure from the American policy followed hitherto.[16] On September 3 Colonel William N. Haskell sailed from New York with a large staff to take charge of the relief activities. Food was soon moving into Russia from western Europe and active preparations were begun in the United States for the launching of an energetic campaign to raise funds.[17] At the end of the year the Riga agreement was supplemented by another compact signed at London by Brown and Krassin, calling for the expenditure by the Soviet Government of $10,000,000 in gold in the United States for the purchase of foodstuffs.[18] The gold was received in due time in

New York and deposited on account of the A.R.A. with no question of its title being raised.[19]

Congress had in the meantime taken action to extend relief to the famine sufferers. On August 11, 1921, Senator King made the first pleas for aid, which he insisted was not inconsistent with uncompromising opposition to Bolshevism.[20] Resolutions for medical relief were introduced in both houses. On December 6, following the recommendation in President Harding's message to Congress that money be appropriated to supply the A.R.A. with 10,000,000 bushels of corn and 1,000,000 bushels of seed grain, the Senate engaged in a general debate on the question. Senator Watson of Georgia declared that to extend aid to the Russian people and at the same time to refuse to recognize the Russian Government was "an awkward, unprecedented, indefensible position."[21] Senator France argued in a similar vein, but pleaded for relief regardless of the non-recognition of the Russian Government. Senate bill 2708 was finally passed, authorizing the Secretary of War to transfer without charge certain surplus materials of the War Department to the A.R.A. in Russia.[22] On December 17 the House of Representatives passed House Resolution 9548 appropriating $20,000,000 for Russian relief.[23] The President was authorized to expend this sum out of the funds of the United States Grain Corporation for the purchase in the United States of corn, seed grain, and preserved milk, on condition that he submit a detailed and itemized report to Congress and that the commodities purchased be transported to their destination in American vessels.[24] In the Senate, as in the House, the constitutionality and wisdom of the measure were assailed and two irrelevant amendments were attached. Both were rejected by the House and on December 22 the Senate at length accepted the report of the Conference Committee adopting the resolution in its original form.[25] On January 16 the House passed Senate bill 2708, with amendments making the President instead of the Secretary of War responsible for the transfer of supplies to the A.R.A. and limiting to $4,000,000 original cost the quantity of material to be transferred.[26] The Senate concurred in these amendments and the bill was signed by the President on January 20, 1922.[27]

The actual work of feeding the famine victims had gotten well under way by the end of the year and continued without interruption throughout 1922. By the beginning of 1923 the famine was well under control.[28] Some friction had developed between the A.R.A. workers and the Soviet authorities, leading to charges on both sides of

breaking the Riga agreement,[29] but on the whole there was little cause for complaint. The withdrawal of the A.R.A. at the end of July [30] was due not to the failure of the Soviet Government to co-operate, but to the fact that the crisis had been met and was passed, as shown by the resumption of Russian grain exports. The Soviet Government itself had done all in its power to cope with the catastrophe, from making special efforts to collect the food tax in the unaffected regions to confiscating the treasures of the church.[31] The International Committee of the Russian Relief Funds, headed by Dr. Nansen, had, up to September, 1922, distributed 90,700 tons of foodstuffs and fed 734,000 children and 902,800 adults.[32] The chief credit for meeting the disaster, however, must rest with the A.R.A. It had furnished over 90 per cent of all relief going into Russia. It had collected from all sources over $66,300,000. It had shipped 912,121 short tons of food to Russia. Its staff of 200 Americans and 80,000 Russians had saved from death by starvation 10,491,297 people, comprising 6,317,958 adults and 4,173,339 children, fed at some 35,000 distributing centers. It had expended $1,455,861 in clothing relief.[33] Medical supplies had been furnished to 15,000 hospitals and institutions. 7,600,000 people had been vaccinated or inoculated against epidemics.[34] 8,000,000 acres of land had been sown with imported seed. In the words of Colonel Haskell:

> To America, this is a passing incident of national duty, undertaken, financed, and to be quickly forgotten. The story of it will be told lovingly in Russian households for generations. Through this service America has not only saved millions of lives, but has given impulse to the spiritual and economic recovery of a great nation, and on our own behalf we have created in the assurance of good will from the Slav races a great inheritance for our children.[35]

The immediate political consequences of this vast relief enterprise, however, were almost wholly negligible. Though directed by the Secretary of Commerce and in large part financed by Congressional appropriations, the entire project remained "unofficial." There were, of course, incidental contacts established between the Soviet authorities and the American State Department. In accordance with Article 27 of the Riga agreement, providing for release of all Americans detained in Russia, a Liaison Division of the A.R.A. was established which acted as the agent of the State Department in dealing with the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in considering the cases of American citizens seeking repatriation. Some 376 cases, involving 798 persons, most of them wives and minor children of Russian Jews

who had become American citizens, were handled in this way.[36] About 300 citizens came to the United States.[37] But these contacts, despite the hopes of the Soviet Government, did not lead to further negotiations or to any modification of the American policy. Colonel Haskell on his return emphasized the stability of the Soviet Government and its eagerness to secure American recognition and American capital, but he refrained from all political discussion.[38] The United States had reaffirmed its traditional gratitude and friendship toward the Russian nation by performing a great humanitarian service to its famine-stricken people.* But for the Soviet Government the United States had only the cold shoulder and the icy stare.

3. *The Principle of Territorial Integrity; the Baltic States and Siberia*

While American soup kitchens were busy filling empty Russian stomachs along the Volga, one of the basic principles of the Russian policy of the United States under the Wilson Administration, also adopted as an expression of American friendship toward Russia, was undergoing profound modifications at Washington. This was the principle of maintaining Russia's territorial integrity. As stated in the Colby note, the United States had refused to sanction the dismemberment of Russia or to recognize the independence of the regions that had separated from it. Poland, Finland, and Armenia were regarded as legitimate exceptions. The first was recognized January 29, 1919,[40] the second May 7, 1919,[41] and the third April 23, 1920.[42] But a deaf ear was turned to the appeals of the other border peoples seeking independence. The plea of Petlura's anti-Bolshevist Ukrainian Government for recognition received no response.[43] In October, 1919, Lithuania sent a similar appeal to Washington. Secretary Lansing's reply of October 15 was sympathetic, but declared that "it has been thought unwise and unfair to prejudice in advance of the establishment of orderly, constitutional government in Russia the principle of Russian unity as a whole."[44] On January 7, 1920, in response to a second appeal, this position was restated.[45] The same policy was pursued toward Latvia and Esthonia. The Colby note was a great disappointment to the governments of all the Baltic States, which ascribed it to the influence of Bakhmeteff, still recognized as Russian Ambassador at Washing-

* The number of actual deaths from starvation was apparently about 2,000,000.[39]

ton.[46] The Caucasian republic of Georgia was equally distressed by this blow at its aspirations toward independence.[47]

This departure from the principle of self-determination was persisted in until the end of the Wilson Administration. On January 27, 1921, the Allied Governments announced their intention of recognizing the independence of Esthonia and Latvia.[48] This decision, coming so soon after Wilson's last plea for the preservation of Russia's territorial integrity, was received with keen regret in Washington, where it was feared it would encourage Japanese expansionist ambitions in the Far East.[49] The Allied recognition of Georgia on January 29 was equally disappointing, but the Red Army soon settled this problem by occupying the country and setting up a Soviet government.[50] The Moscow authorities, however, had themselves recognized the independence of the Baltic States and viewed the American policy only as fresh evidence of the disposition of the United States to heed the voice of Ambassador Bakhmeteff, representing the long defunct Provisional Government, as the voice of the Russian nation.

The Harding Administration continued this policy for over a year, but at length, in July, 1922, a new attitude was adopted. On June 30, the Allied Powers, through the Council of Ambassadors, decided to recognize the independence of Lithuania.[51] On July 27 the State Department announced:

> The Governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been recognized either de jure or de facto by the principal Governments of Europe and have entered into treaty relations with their neighbors. In extending to them recognition on its part, the Government of the United States takes cognizance of the actual existence of these Governments during a considerable period of time and of the successful maintenance within their borders of political and economic stability.
>
> The United States has consistently maintained that the disturbed condition of Russian affairs may not be made the occasion for the alienation of Russian territory, and this principle is not deemed to be infringed by the recognition at this time of the Governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which have been set up and maintained by an indigenous population.[52]

The old principle was thus reaffirmed, but its application to the Baltic States was discontinued. The American Commissioner in this region, Evan E. Young, was made a Minister and was received with great rejoicing.[53]

The American Government, however, had no intention of abandoning the application of the principle to eastern Siberia. The situation here had remained in a dangerous state of tension ever since the

withdrawal of the American Expeditionary Forces and the Japanese attack of April 4-5, 1920.[54] The Japanese appeared determined to retain control of the maritime provinces at all costs and to prevent the spread of Bolshevism to the sea. Had the Soviet Government been equally determined to extend its authority to Vladivostok once more, the only consequence could have been war. The Moscow authorities, however, were in no mood to seek new conflicts. They preferred to halt the Red Army at Lake Baikal and to await developments, trusting in diplomacy rather than in force to secure the eventual liberation of eastern Siberia from Japanese domination.[55]

The "Nikolaevsk massacre" of March, 1920, supplied Japan with a convenient justification for strengthening her grip on the coast. At Nikolaevsk, 800 miles to the north of Vladivostok, the collapse of Kolchak's power had been followed by the capture of the city from the Whites and their Japanese supporters by local Red partisans under the command of a freebooter named Triapitzin. On the night of March 12 a detachment of Japanese troops made a surprise attack on the partisan headquarters which resulted in two days of bloody street fighting and the slaughter of many of the local Japanese. When the victors learned that Japanese reinforcements were approaching from Sakhalin, they killed the 130 survivors whom they had imprisoned, burned the town, and withdrew. Triapitzin was later tried and executed by his own soldiers. The news of these events aroused great indignation in Japan and led the Japanese Government to announce that, in view of the death of its consul and 700 of its subjects and the absence of a government with which to negotiate, its forces would remain in control of the maritime provinces and would likewise occupy the northern, or Russian, half of the island of Sakhalin, pending the establishment of a legitimate Russian Government and a satisfactory settlement for the massacre.[56]

On the 28th of July, 1920, the Japanese Government received a note from the United States, indicating that the American Government approved the Japanese decision to evacuate Trans-Baikalia and reserved its opinion regarding Vladivostok because of lack of information concerning the situation there, but failed completely to understand the occupation of northern Sakhalin.[57] This note produced an unfavorable impression in Japan. While it may have been of some influence in checking the ambitions of the militarists, the Japanese decision to retain control of Sakhalin and the maritime provinces remained unshaken.[58] Ambassador Shidehara called at the State Department on August 14 and presented the Japanese reply

to Secretary Colby. It declared that the occupation was required by national honor and prestige and would be only temporary.[59] Discussion continued for some time without result, the Japanese army remaining in control of the areas in question and the United States, in the name of Russian territorial integrity, challenging its right. In May, 1921, Secretary Hughes made a fresh protest and received fresh assurances of eventual Japanese withdrawal, but no action followed the promises given.

Japanese policy in Siberia in 1920 and 1921 continued to be characterized by the obscure machinations and intrigues which intensified the suspicions aroused in 1918 and 1919. The ataman Semenoff still received encouragement and support from Japan and pleaded for the perpetuation of the Japanese occupation.[60] It was alleged that negotiations were begun with the French Government in January, 1921, for the purpose of transporting Wrangel's defeated troops to Vladivostok to set up a new government there which would be more favorably disposed toward Japan's territorial ambitions.* While this project never materialized, it was clear that Japan was still fishing in troubled waters and still hoping, by means of a buffer state if not by direct annexation, to retain effective control of the Russian Pacific coast.

Under these circumstances the future of the "Far Eastern Republic" of Siberia remained precarious. This new state had been proclaimed at Chita in October, 1920, dating back its independence to the previous April,[62] and was organized through a Constituent Assembly which met in February, 1921, and created a government, with M. Krasnoschekoff[63] as premier, claiming authority over all Siberia east of Lake Baikal. The new régime was not exclusively Communist, but it looked for guidance and support to the Soviet Government, which had recognized its independence. In April, 1921, it addressed a plea for recognition to the United States, accompanied by a protest at the continued presence of Japanese troops in Siberia and an appeal to put an end to the intervention which had been begun in August, 1918, on the invitation of the American Government.[64] In May the forces of Semenoff and his colleague, Kappell, seized the city of Vladivostok and, with Japanese consent, proclaimed a new "Pri-Amur Government" headed by M. Merkuloff and flying the old Tsarist flag.[65] Fearing a Japanese-White conspiracy aimed at its destruction,[66] the government of the Far Eastern

* In a note of protest over the killing of an American naval officer by a Japanese sentry in Vladivostok on January 8, 1921, the United States challenged the right of Japan to continue her occupation of the city.[61]

Republic at Chita appealed to Moscow for assistance. In June Chicherin dispatched protests to the British, French, and Italian Governments at this new attempt at intervention, while the Chita authorities protested to the United States, through the American Minister in Peking, and asked that it use its influence in inducing the Japanese to withdraw.[67] After the Japanese Government received President Harding's invitation to the Washington Conference for the limitation of armaments, it finally agreed to open negotiations with representatives of the Far Eastern Republic at Dairen, apparently hoping by this means to exclude its Siberian policy from discussion at the impending conference,[68]

While Soviet Russia was not invited to participate,* the Far Eastern Republic hoped that its representatives might be officially received at Washington and given an opportunity to press for a solution of the Siberian quesion. The United States had already in April, 1921, sent an investigating commission to Chita, headed by Major W. J. Davis and James F. Abbott, commercial attaché at Tokio, which had returned in mid-summer with a favorable report on the new state.[70] But diplomatic recognition had not followed and the reply of Secretary Hughes in September to the request of the Far Eastern Republic that its delegates be seated at the Washingon Conference indicated that such a step was not contemplated:

> In the absence of a single recognized Russian Government the protection of legitimate Russian interests must devolve as a moral trusteeship upon the whole conference. It is regrettable that the conference, for reasons quite beyond the control of the participating powers, is to be deprived of the advantage of Russian co-operation in its deliberations, but it is not to be conceived that the conference would make decisions prejudicial to legitimate Russian interests or which would in any manner violate Russian rights. It is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the conference will establish general principles of international action which will deserve and have the support of the people of Eastern Siberia and of all Russia by reason of their justice and efficacy in the settlement of outstanding difficulties.[71]

The Far Eastern Republic, however, was permitted to send unofficial "trade" representatives to Washington. Its delegation, the spokesman of which was Boris Skvirsky,† was denied an interview with the Secretary of State, but advised to establish contact with the

* The Soviet Republic repeatedly protested at its exclusion and reserved "full liberty of action" on all questions to be discussed by the conference.[69]

† The delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to the United States was composed of A. A. Yazikoff, chairman, and P. Karavaeff and Boris Skvirsky, members.

Eastern European Division of the State Department.[72] The reactionary Merkuloff government at Vladivostok also sent its observers, posing as true champions of Russian integrity and democracy.[73] From Paris came Avksentieff and Miliukoff, sent by the conference members of the Russian Constituent Assembly, also representing Russian democracy and predicting the inevitable collapse of the Soviet Government.[74] Agents of the "Russian Supreme Monarchical Council" appeared on the scene as well.[75] None of these Russian "delegations" were accorded any official status at the conference. All, with the possible exception of those representing the Merkuloff régime, were united in opposition to the continuation of Japanese intervention in Siberia. The American State Department, therefore, was not at all opposed to their presence in Washington, since it felt obligated to do all in its power to bring to an end the Japanese occupation of Russian territory which had been begun in cooperation with the United States.

At the outset of the conference the Japanese and Russian positions, as expounded respectively by Hanihara and Skvirsky, were as follows: The Japanese Government intended to retain northern Sakhalin as a guaranty for the payment of an indemnity for the Nikolaevsk massacre. It was prepared to discuss the question with a stable Russian Government recognized by the Powers, but it did not regard the Far Eastern Republic as such a government. It was willing to withdraw its troops from the mainland as soon as the Far Eastern Republic could guarantee the safety of Japanese residents, but Nikolaevsk it would retain as part of the administrative unit of Sakhalin.[76] The Far Eastern Republic, on the other hand, contended that both Nikolaevsk and Sakhalin were part of its territory which the Japanese were unlawfully occupying. It was willing to discuss the question of an indemnity, but it refused to comply with the Japanese demand that it accept full responsibility for the massacre as a basis of negotiations, since it was perpetrated by irregular partisans and was not without strong provocation. It regarded the entire Japanese policy as motivated by a desire for territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Russia.[77]

Early in January, 1922, the delegation of the Far Eastern Republic, fearing that the conference might close without any discussion of the Siberian question, threw a bombshell in the form of the publication of a series of documents purporting to show that France and Japan had reached an agreement in the spring of 1921 to transport Wrangel's army to Siberia and set up a new White Government

under Japanese control which would give preferential treatment to French economic interests. These documents created an immediate sensation. Ambassador Hanihara asserted: "There is not a word of truth in the whole story. I do not know that there is any need of going into details, for these documents do not deserve the slightest consideration.[78] M. Sarraut, head of the French delegation, not only called them "gross fabrications" and their publication an "illegal and malicious action," but sent a formal protest to Secretary Hughes.[79] The reply of the Secretary of State simply declared rather drily that he was gratified to learn of the denial and glad to accept the statements that the documents were not authentic.[80] Further "revelations" followed, however, and the French and Japanese representatives were kept busy making denials and allegations of forgery. The authenticity of the documents cannot be determined here, nor is it relevant. While their publication was a breach of diplomatic good manners and, for this reason, may have been regarded as an embarrassment rather than as an aid by Secretary Hughes, they served the purposes of the delegation of the Far Eastern Republic, and of the American State Department as well, in assuring that the Siberian problem would receive at least some discussion at the conference, despite the desire of the Japanese and their British allies to avoid bringing it up.[81]

When, on January 23, 1922, Secretary Hughes called up the question before the Far Eastern Committee, Baron Shidehara presented a statement on behalf of Japan. He asserted that ever since the withdrawal of the Czechs Japan had "been looking forward to an early moment for the withdrawal of her troops from Siberia." But the necessity of protecting the 9,000 Japanese residents there and of guarding the Korean border had compelled the adoption of a policy of caution. Japan, he admitted, had supported Semenoff, originally to save the munitions at Vladivostok from falling into the hands of the Germans and later because it felt reluctant to abandon a friend, even though it had no intention of interfering in internal Russian affairs. Negotiations were now proceeding at Dairen, looking toward complete evacuation. The occupation of Sakhalin was a reprisal for the Nikolaevsk massacre and was only temporary, pending the establishment of a stable Russian Government. "In conclusion, the Japanese Delegation is authorized to declare that it is the fixed and settled policy of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, and to observe the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity

for the commerce and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions." [82]

On the following day Secretary Hughes, on behalf of the American Delegation, stated the American position in language which left no further doubt concerning the attitude of the United States. The Japanese assurance, he said, was taken to mean that "Japan does not seek, through her military operations in Siberia, to impair the rights of the Russian people in any respect, or to obtain any unfair commercial advantages, or to absorb for her own use the Siberian fisheries, or to set up an exclusive exploitation either of the resources of Sakhalin or of the Maritime Province." He recalled the original objectives of the military expedition to Siberia and declared that no intervention, interference, or impairment of Russian territorial integrity had been contemplated. He further recalled the Japanese concurrence in the objectives outlined by the United States in August, 1918. The American forces had withdrawn in the spring of 1920, but the United States had since remained a close observer of events in eastern Siberia and had carried on an extensive correspondence with Japan which "had not always disclosed an identity of views between the two Governments." The United States had been strongly disposed to the belief that the assurances of August, 1918, required the complete evacuation of all Japanese troops. As to Sakhalin, the United States "has regretted that Japan should deem necessary the occupation of Russian territory as a means of assuring a suitable adjustment with a future Russian Government." On May 31, 1921, the United States had protested at the continued occupation and declared that it could not recognize the validity of any claims or titles arising out of it. The Japanese reply of July 21 had been identical in substance with Shidehara's present statement. Secretary Hughes concluded:

> While the discussion of these matters has been attended with the friendliest feeling, it has naturally been the constant and earnest hope of the American Government—and of Japan as well, I am sure—that this occasion for divergence of views between the two Governments might be removed with the least possible delay. It has been with a feeling of special gratification, therefore, that the American Delegation has listened to the assurances given by their Japanese colleague, and it is with the greatest friendliness that they reiterate the hope that Japan will find it possible to carry out within the near future her expressed intention of terminating finally the Siberian expedition and of restoring Sakhalin to the Russian people.*

* M. Sarraut also made a brief statement, expressing the friendship of France for Japan, the United States, and Russia, and its satisfaction at the assurances given.[83]

Following this declaration a resolution was passed by the committee that both statements should be reported to the conference at the next Plenary Session and spread on the records. This was done on February 4, 1922.[84] No further action on the subject was taken. Both Japan and the United States had clearly restated their positions. Japan had apparently emerged the victor, for no definite date for evacuation was set. She had simply reiterated assurances she had given many times before and had not obligated herself to terminate her occupation of Russian territory within any specific period of time. The efforts of the delegation of the Far Eastern Republic had apparently ended in failure.

The events of the next eight months, however, were to lead to a partial fulfillment of the Japanese promises. The long drawn out Dairen negotiations were accelerated by the outbreak of hostilities between the Japanese army of occupation and the forces of the Far Eastern Republic in April, 1922.[85] The recapture of Khabarovsk by the Chita troops from the White soldiers of the Merkuloff government at Vladivostok was followed by a clash with the Japanese.[86] Despite repeated reports of impending Japanese evacuation, no action was taken till June. Baron Kato then became premier with a non-party cabinet pledged to the fulfillment of the Washington agreements.[87] The United States was now assured that the Japanese Government had decided to withdraw its forces entirely from the Maritime Province before October 30.[88] A new conference at Chang Chung, Manchuria, in September, with Soviet delegates participating, broke up because of the refusal of the Japanese to quit Sakhalin, but the evacuation of the mainland proceeded without delay.[89] On October 26 the last of the Nipponese soldiers departed from Vladivostok and the forces of the Far Eastern Republic entered the city. The disorders accompanying the collapse of the Merkuloff puppet government necessitated the landing of British and American marines, but order was soon restored. The White refugees found a haven in the Philippine Islands and later came to San Francisco.[90] On November 17 the Far Eastern Republic, having served its purpose, voluntarily abolished itself and joined Soviet Russia.[91] Two and a half years later, on May 1, 1925, following Japanese recognition of the Soviet Government and the negotiation of agreements settling outstanding difficulties, the Japanese army finally evacuated northern Sakhalin, thus giving up its last foothold on Siberian territory.[92]

Russian territorial integrity in the Far East was thus restored. The obligation resting upon the United States to terminate foreign

intervention in Siberia was met. That American diplomatic pressure played a major rôle in bringing about this result is not open to question. Other considerations, of course, motivated the Japanese Government in making its decision—exigencies of internal politics, the manifest unprofitableness of the whole adventure, the realization that sooner or later continued occupation would be challenged in arms by the new Russia, and the like. Whether these factors in themselves would have been sufficient to bring the occupation to an end may be doubted. But the entire international situation at the close of the Washington conference left Japan no reasonable alternative. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was terminated. Japan had accepted the 5-5-3 naval ratio for capital ships. She had surrendered Shantung and abandoned the schemes of 1915 and 1916 to make China her protectorate. Except for the moral support of France, she found herself diplomatically isolated. To retain her grip on Siberia in opposition to the emphatically stated protests of the United States and in violation of her own repeated assurances would have been a policy with possible consequences which Japan could not risk facing. She therefore surrendered as gracefully as circumstances permitted.

With the final termination of all foreign intervention and occupation of Russian territory, the principle of maintaining Russian territorial integrity became obsolete. Russia was reunited—under a régime which the United States abhorred and refused to recognize—but still, reunited and well able to guard her own frontiers without further moral support from the American Government. The United States now accepted the independence of Poland, Finland and the Baltic States and even acquiesced in the frontiers drawn by the Treaty of Riga. The Rumanian annexation of Bessarabia it evidently did not approve, but its dissent was due rather to the general policy of refraining from participation in European quarrels than to any solicitude for Russian integrity. With this exception, the frontier disputes arising out of Russia's revolution and civil war were now settled. In favoring their settlement on a basis which would keep Russia a united nation, the American Government felt that it had in part repaid to the Russian state an old debt of friendship, even though Russia's new government was regarded as one with which amicable relations could not be maintained.

4. *Genoa and The Hague*

The Washington Conference was soon followed by another great international congress where the Russian problem, instead of being dealt with only incidentally, was the chief topic of discussion. In view of the success of the Washington negotiations, Lloyd George determined to seek a solution of European questions by similar means. On January 6 the Supreme Council meeting at Cannes adopted a resolution declaring that "The Allied Powers in conference are unanimously of the opinion that an Economic and Financial Conference should be summoned in February or early March, to which all the Powers of Europe, including Germany, Russia, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, should be invited to send representatives. They regard such a conference as an urgent and essential step toward the economic reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe, and they are strongly of the opinion that the Prime Ministers of every nation should, if possible, attend it in person, in order that action may be taken as promptly as possible upon its recommendations." [93] The date of the meeting was fixed at March 8 and the place, Genoa, Italy. The Soviet Government at once accepted the stipulated conditions of participation laid down at Cannes. An invitation was also sent to the United States, but the Washington government withheld its decision.

The general policy of refraining from participation in European conferences, which the Republican Administration had early adopted, predisposed the State Department to decline to send representatives to Genoa. Its consistent refusal to have any official dealings with the Soviet Government supported this position. The accomplishments of the Washington Conference for a time led President Harding and even Secretary Hughes to contemplate the possibility of taking a part in the negotiations at Genoa,[94] but the final decision was negative. The formal invitation of Ambassador Ricci of Italy was declined by the Secretary of State on March 8 on the ground that the proposed conference "is not merely an economic conference . . . but is rather a conference of a political character in which the Government of the United States could not helpfully participate."

It may be added, with respect to Russia, that this Government, anxious to do all in its power to promote the welfare of the Russian people, views with the most eager and friendly interest every step taken toward the restoration of economic conditions which will permit Russia to regain her productive power; but these conditions, in the view of this

Government, cannot be secured until adequate action is taken on the part of those who are chiefly responsible for Russia's present economic disorder.

It is also the view of this Government—and it trusts that view is shared by the Governments who have called the conference—that while awaiting the establishment of the essential basis of productivity in Russia, to which reference was made in the public declaration of this Government on March 25, 1921, and without which this Government believes all considerations of economic revival to be futile, nothing should be done looking to the obtaining of economic advantages in Russia which would impair the just opportunities of others, but that the resources of the Russian people should be free from such exploitation and that fair and equal economic opportunity in their interest, as well as in the interest of all the powers, should be preserved.[95]

The proceedings of the conference, which did not assemble until April 10, need be considered here only very briefly from the point of view of their effect upon American policy. Thirty-four nations participated, including Russia, which sent Commissar Chicherin as her representative. Except for some preliminary sparring between Chicherin and the French representative, Barthou, over the question of disarmament, which the French refused to discuss, the first week was uneventful. But on April 16 the conference was thrown into a furor by the startling news that Chicherin and Walter Rathenau, head of the German delegation, had signed a treaty at Rapallo whereby Germany renounced all claims against Russia arising out of the application of Soviet laws to her subjects, pledged an immediate restoration of diplomatic and consular relations, and agreed to the regulation of Russian-German commercial relations on the basis of the most-favored-nation principle.[96] This coup aroused great indignation in Allied, and particularly French, circles and led to the exclusion of the German delegates from further discussion of the Russian problem, but the conference managed to survive the shock and continued its labors.

It was soon apparent, however, that agreement between the Allied and the Russian representatives was impossible. The former insisted that Russia recognize her war and pre-war debts and compensate foreign nationals for their property which had been destroyed or confiscated. The latter insisted that the Allies must compensate Russia for the material damage caused by foreign intervention and subsidized civil war. In the words of Chicherin: "The British Premier tells me that if my neighbor has lent me money, I must pay him back. Well, I agree, in that particular case, in a desire for conciliation; but I must add that if this neighbor has broken into my

house, killed my children, destroyed my furniture, and burnt my house, he must at least begin by restoring to me what he has destroyed." [97] The Soviet Commissar opposed to the claims of all other countries against Russia, totaling sixty-five billion gold francs ($13,000,000,000), the sum of three hundred billion gold francs in counter-claims ($60,000,000,000). These were divided into four categories: direct property damages, $6,106,580,000; indirect losses due to deterioration and damage to railways, buildings, etc., plus pensions paid to the victims of the civil war, $5,635,745,000; losses in foreign trade due to the blockade and losses from reduced agricultural and industrial production, $7,780,110,000; all other indirect losses, which were declared incalculable.[98] Chicherin indicated that the Soviet Government would scale down its counter-claims to 125 billion gold francs ($25,000,000,000) and offered to settle on the basis of two billion francs plus a considerable loan for economic reconstruction.[99] The Allies, of course, refused to consider such a proposition, adhering to their original position that Russia must recognize her obligations and recognizing no liability on their own part to meet the Russian counter-claims. The nearest approach to an agreement was the Soviet offer to recognize Russia's debts if they were scaled down and to restore to foreign nationals the use of their property on condition of de jure recognition and adequate financial assistance to enable Russia to meet her obligations.[100]

The Allied Governments stated their position in final form in a Memorandum submitted to the Russian Delegation on May 3, offering to reduce their immediate claims on condition that Russia renounce all counter-claims and recognize its obligation to fulfil all financial engagements which it or its predecessors had contracted with foreign nationals and to "restore or compensate all foreign interests for loss or damage caused to them when property has been confiscated or withheld." [101] Chicherin's reply of May 11 to these proposals ended all hope of a settlement. Without credits for Russian economic reconstruction, he declared, all discussion was futile. The Memorandum of May 3, instead of considering the problem of credits, dealt entirely with the questions of intergovernmental debts and private claims. The Russian Delegation must "recall that principle of law according to which revolutions which are a violent rupture with the past carry with them new juridical relations in the foreign and domestic affairs of States. Governments and systems that spring from revolution are not bound to respect the obligations of fallen Governments." But "with the exception of the war debts,

which, having a specific origin, were extinguished by the very fact that Russia, having withdrawn from the war without participating in the division of its advantages, could not assume its costs—the Russian Delegation has declared itself ready to accept liability for the payment of public debts provided that the damages caused to Russia by the Allied intervention and blockade be recognized." Russia was still prepared to make important concession to the foreign Powers, but only in return for corresponding advantages. Agreement was possible only upon the basis of equality and reciprocity. The problems of claims and credits should perhaps be studied more carefully by a mixed commission of experts appointed by the conference. "Russia came to the conference with conciliatory intention, and she still hopes that her efforts in this direction will be crowned with success." [102]

After the presentation of this Memorandum, the delegates unanimously agreed that all hope of reaching a settlement at Genoa must be abandoned. In accordance with Chicherin's suggestion, Lloyd George proposed that a commission of experts meet at the Hague to consider the problems of debts, property claims, and credits. Despite French objections, an agreement was reached on May 15 to continue the attempt to find a solution at the Hague on June 15. On May 19 the Genoa conference adjourned sine die.[103]

The failure of the Genoa negotiations naturally confirmed the views already held by the American State Department. As early as March Lenin's declaration against any further "economic surrender to capitalism" was hailed as proof of his insincerity and of the wisdom of the American policy.[104] Satisfaction was later expressed that the Allied Delegations at Genoa were adhering to the principles laid down by the United States. Senator Borah, however, used the occasion to launch a general attack upon the State Department's attitude. On May 15 he introduced Senate Resolution 293: "Resolved, That the Senate of the United States favors the recognition of the present soviet government of Russia." [105] He argued that the only sensible course to pursue toward Russia was to recognize the de facto government that had ruled the country for five years. Senator Edge contended in rebuttal that the United States could not properly recognize any government which repudiated the fundamental American principle of protection of property rights. To encourage American merchants to trade in a country whose government had refused to meet its obligations and had abolished private property would be folly.[106] On May 31 Senator Borah renewed his

plea for recognition, but the debate was without result and showed that Congress as a whole continued to acquiesce in the Administration's Russian policy.[107]

On May 13 the French Delegation at Genoa submitted to Ambassador R. W. Child, unofficial American "observer" at the conference, an appeal for American participation in the commission to meet at the Hague.[108] On the following day Foreign Minister Schanzer of Italy presented a formal invitation to the American Ambassador which he at once forwarded to the State Department.[109] The Allied Governments had apparently misinterpreted certain of Ambassador Child's statements and anticipated a favorable response. Secretary Hughes, however, immediately declined the bid on the ground that the meeting at the Hague "would appear to be a continuance under a different nomenclature of the Genoa conference and destined to encounter the same difficulties if the attitude disclosed in the Russian memorandum of May 11 remains unchanged. The inescapable and ultimate question would appear to be the restoration of productivity in Russia, the essential conditions of which are still to be secured and must in the nature of things be provided within Russia herself."[110] American participation, it was indicated subsequently, was unthinkable unless the Russian memorandum of May 11 were withdrawn and the Soviet representatives were called before the proposed commission only as witnesses. The State Department, according to press reports, felt confident that the powers would find compromise with Communism impossible and would presently accept the American view, thus restoring a united front against the Soviet Government on the part of the western nations.[111]

The Hague Conference did indeed demonstrate that a collective settlement between Moscow and the western governments was impossible as long as each side adhered to its position. The conference consisted of two commissions of experts, one Russian and the other non-Russian. The latter was divided into three sub-commissions on debts, private property, and credits. Litvinoff flatly declared that any compensation for nationalized property would be undertaken not as a matter of right, but as a matter of expediency to secure a loan. He asserted that Russia required a credit of 3,200,000,000 gold rubles to restore her industry and commerce. Russia would pay none of her war debts and demanded a reduction and a moratorium on her prewar debts.[112] The deadlock remained unbroken. The final reports of the three sub-commissions regretted that no satisfactory solution could be recommended. The extension of credits depended upon

private capital, not upon any action that the Allied Governments could take. Private capital flowed only where there was confidence in the safety and security of investments. Confidence could be restored in Russia only by the fulfillment of past obligations. Russia must first recognize her debts and restore the property of foreign nationals before she could hope for credits.[113] On July 20, 1922, the Hague conference closed. At the final session the Non-Russian Commission passed the following resolution:

> The Conference recommends for the consideration of the Governments represented thereon the desirability of all Governments not assisting their nationals in attempting to acquire property in Russia which belonged to other foreign nationals and which was confiscated since November 1, 1917, without the consent of such foreign owners or concessionaires, provided that the same recommendation is subsequently made by Governments represented at The Hague Conference to all Governments not so represented and that no decision shall be come to except jointly with those Governments.[114]

The State Department had already communicated its views to the governments represented at The Hague and on the 20th it issued a public statement to the effect that "The Government of the United States does not countenance any arrangement by its citizens with the Soviet authorities that would jeopardize or prejudice the vested rights of the citizens of other countries in Russia and the United States has complete confidence that the other governments concerned will adhere to the same policy." [115]

Despite these declarations, the period which followed was one of individual bargaining over concessions between the Soviet Government and foreign nationals. This circumstance undoubtedly played a part in causing the State Department to take a step which was not only unusual in view of the support which the successive failures at Genoa and the Hague had given to the American contentions, but which even seemed to foreshadow a fundamental reversal of policy. On August 30 it was announced that Ambassador Houghton at Berlin had made inquiries regarding the possibility of sending an American technical commission to Russia to study the economic situation. This overture was made at an informal luncheon attended by the American Ambassador and by Leonid Krassin, Commissar of Foreign Trade, and George Chicherin. Krassin indicated that his government would receive a commission to negotiate for a resumption of relations at any time, or would be glad to send a delegation for this purpose to any place named. But if the commission was simply for

purposes of investigation, the project must be reciprocal. At Washington it was said that no Soviet commission could be received in the United States because of the danger of propaganda.[116] Chicherin and Houghton continued their informal conversations, which culminated on September 15 in the transmission by the Commissar to the American Ambassador of a definite reply to the inquiries that had been made. He declared that his government was particularly interested in the restoration of Russian-American economic relations on the basis of equality and reciprocity, but did not regard as exactly just a one-sided proposal for sending an investigating commission to Russia. It hoped that if the United States should find it necessary to change its policy, it would find some means of treating the Soviet Government as an equal.[117] But the State Department had no intention of doing anything of the kind and declared the incident closed. The American policy remained unchanged.

5. *The Passing of Bakhmeteff*

Meanwhile the curious phenomenon of the Russian Embassy in Washington had come to an end. Its peculiar status and its activities during the five years which had elapsed since the overthrow of the government which it represented deserve brief consideration not only because of the strange position which it occupied from the viewpoint of international law, but because they reflect an important phase of the Russian policy of the United States as well.

It will be recalled that Boris Bakhmeteff and his staff arrived in the United States in June, 1917, as representatives of the Provisional Government. After the November Revolution and the downfall of Kerensky, the Russian mission was placed in the position of an agent without a principal. Ordinarily a diplomatic mission is terminated by the disappearance of the government which it represents. But Mr. Bakhmeteff continued to be recognized and dealt with by the State Department as Russian Ambassador in the United States, though he was repudiated by the Soviet Government and represented no Russian political authority of any kind.* This policy was based,

* Amos S. Hershey, in applying the customary principles governing such situations, asked: "Does it not seem reasonably clear that his mission should have been regarded as at an end as soon as it was reasonably clear that the Kerensky régime which he represented was definitely overthrown, and that there was little or no prospect of its revival? . . . Of course, our Government is probably as much within its rights in continuing to recognize an ambassador from a government which has long ceased to exist as it would be in recognizing

on the one hand, on the constant anticipation of the overthrow of the Soviet régime and the creation of a Russian Government which Mr. Bakhmeteff could represent, and, on the other, on the advantage and convenience of permitting the ambassador to liquidate the extensive business transactions he had been conducting on behalf of the Kerensky Government.[119] Both of these considerations continued to operate month after month and year after year, with the result that Bakhmeteff continued to enjoy all the privileges and powers of Russia's diplomatic agent in the United States, with none of the troublesome responsibilities which he would have felt had he been representing a government which existed in reality instead of in the hopeful imagination of the American State Department. Both Bakhmeteff and his subordinates, with the exception of Professor Lomonosoff, who attached himself to Martens's staff,[120] were, of course, well pleased at being permitted to continue their activities.

By the end of November, 1917, the United States had advanced to Bakhmeteff, out of the credits established for Russian war loans, $187,729,750. On the basis of these advances Bakhmeteff and his agents had made contracts with American business men for munitions and other supplies totaling $131,251,801.[121] Since these contracts were in all stages of execution at the time when the government on whose behalf they were made was overturned, their fulfillment or cancellation presented many serious and complex problems for the Russian Embassy and for the American Government. By the terms of a memorandum entered into with Bakhmeteff, the State and Treasury Departments undertook to direct the liquidation of the claims of American manufacturers against the Russian Government growing out of these war contracts. In order to insure the payment of just claims and to prevent payments for purposes not approved by the American Government, it was agreed that no checks drawn on the fund of the Russian Embassy at the National City Bank of New York would be honored without the approval of the Treasury Department.[122] Bakhmeteff proceeded to amalgamate portions of his various funds into special "liquidation accounts" at the National City Bank, which were regarded as placed in trust for payments on contracts and loans, and for meeting other expenses of the Russian Embassy. These accounts originally amounted to $47,010,203. The total funds under the control of the Russian Embassy from December 1, 1917, to January 1, 1920, were $78,684,347 of which some

one purporting to come from the planet Jupiter or some island in the Pacific Ocean which had been destroyed by a volcano or an earthquake.[118]

$26,400,000 was derived not directly from American credits but from the sale of surplus supplies, the charter of steamers controlled by the Embassy, and other miscellaneous sources.[123]

With these resources at his disposal, subject to the general supervision of the Treasury Department, Ambassador Bakhmeteff and his Financial Attaché, Serge Ughet, proceeded to meet their obligations, totaling about $103,000,000, in November, 1917. By February 1, 1918, unpaid balances on war contracts had been reduced to $13,731,410. Some $20,000,000 had been paid in cash, $24,185,872 had been cancelled, and payments of the balance had been deferred.[124] By March 4, 1921, when the liquidation accounts were finally closed, total reported expenditures since April 6, 1917, reached $231,000,000. About $125,000,000 of the total loan of $187,729,750 had been transferred by Bakhmeteff to the account of the Russian Ministry of Finance in Petrograd before the November Revolution, and $62,000,000 had been retained for expenditure in the United States. $36,000,000 had been paid on war contracts for supplies. $10,000,000 was paid as interest on Russian Government loans. All contracts were settled by payment or cancellation without loss to American business men.[125] The financial resources of the Embassy had been swelled from time to time by sales of property in the United States. Bakhmeteff estimated that of the total expenditures of the Embassy between December 1, 1917, and January 1, 1920, i.e., $77,302,936, one-third was met out of funds derived from sources other than American credits. "Thus not only all expenses concerning the upkeep of Russian institutions but the total of interest paid to American bondholders is amply covered by funds which the Russian Government possessed or which have been received by the Embassy independently of the advances made by the Department of the Treasury.[126]

A detailed analysis of these financial transactions is neither possible nor necessary for present purposes. It was charged that the United States Government had advanced money to a non-existent government of Russia for purposes far removed from the usual purposes of war loans. In fact, the United States had simply permitted Bakhmeteff to use the advances already made before the November Revolution for the purpose of meeting his official obligations. But whatever impression to the contrary Bakhmeteff might seek to create, it was nevertheless true that the Russian Embassy in the United States was supported after November, 1917, by funds advanced directly or indirectly by the American Government.[127] Its resources not de-

rived from Treasury Department advances were derived for the most part from the sale of supplies originally purchased with American credits. Small sums were paid directly by the Navy Department and by the United States Shipping Board for the charter of Russian vessels owned by the Embassy.[128] The uses to which the resources of the Embassy were put (with the approval of the State Department) were not always above question. The salaries paid to individual members of its staff often ran over $1,000 a month.[129] The payment of interest on Russian Government bonds, issued under the Tsar and held by private owners, in preference to meeting interest payments on the loans advanced by the American Government aroused bitter criticism in Congress.[130] This policy, however, was adopted with the express approval of the State Department, which took the view that the Russian Embassy should continue to pay interest on Russian bonds held by private owners as long as possible. Such payments were made up to June, 1919,[131] while payments of interest to the United States were repeatedly deferred in order to save the Embassy from bankruptcy.[132] Expenditures were also made in support of the White Russian leaders, and particularly of Kolchak, whose government Bakhmeteff recognized as his own until its collapse. The precise character and amount of these expenditures obviously cannot be determined. But it is certain that ruble notes were printed in New York by order of Serge Ughet (and paid for out of credits advanced by the American Government) for shipment to the anti-Bolshevist forces in Siberia.[133] And it is equally clear that the supplies at the disposal of the Embassy were in part used to aid the White cause. "Shipments of supplies to Russia were resumed in the latter part of 1918 and continued in 1919. On January 1, 1920, practically the whole of the stocks, of which the greater part consisted of railway material, shoes, leather, and agricultural implements, had been shipped to Siberia, to the south and into the northern regions of Russia."[134]

The end of intervention and the triumph of the Soviet Government in Russia's civil war put an end to such shipments. Bakhmeteff had given his moral and material support to the efforts to destroy the Soviet régime. He had failed and the Soviet Government remained in undisputed control of the nation whose ambassador he purported to be. After 1920 he represented nothing but the broken hopes and shattered dreams of Russia's émigrés and exiles. Yet he remained "Russian Ambassador" in Washington and was still dealt with by the State Department as the diplomatic representative of the

Russian nation. The State Department was apparently prepared to continue this anomalous situation indefinitely, but Mr. Bakhmeteff himself, either as the result of a long maturing decision or of certain embarrassing events which occurred in the spring of 1922, finally terminated his curious rôle.

These events centered about the visit of the Ataman Gregory Semenoff to the United States. The ataman, it will be recalled, had been one of the Japanese-supported freebooters in eastern Siberia who had turned Kolchak's rule into a bloody night-mare of terrorism and rapine in 1919. His purpose in coming to the United States and to Europe was to seek support to begin a new counter-revolutionary movement in Siberia.[185] He received permission to enter the United States on March 21, 1922, despite numerous protests from the American Legion and other organizations, based upon his alleged mistreatment of American soldiers.[186] He reached Washington early in April, where he called upon the Russian Embassy and was received by the members of the Russian Division of the State Department. He declared that his aim was to organize a "peaceful revolution" in Siberia to free the country from the Bolsheviks and that "The attitude of the United States toward the Genoa Conference was splendid."[187] He then proceeded to New York, where he was promptly arrested as a consequence of a $500,000 damage suit brought against him by the Youraveta Trading Company, based on his alleged robbery of the company's stores in Siberia.[188] His $25,000 bond was cancelled by its donors for "patriotic reasons" and he was lodged in Ludlow Street jail, where he was besieged by a threatening East Side mob, calling him "bandit," "murderer," "cut-throat," and other unsavory epithets. He was released, however, by order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, which held that the evidence of conversion and fraud against him was insufficient, since he had acted under the authority of a de facto government.[189] But his unpopularity continued to increase.

These incidents stirred Senator Borah to a new interest in Russian-American relations. He began gathering information in April from American army officers regarding Semenoff's brutality and threatened to take steps to institute deportation proceedings. Presently he turned his fire on Bakhmeteff, accusing him of harboring a murderer, and casting reflections upon his honesty in the handling of the money loaned to Russia by the United States.[140] In mid-April the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, of which Senator Borah was chairman, conducted a hearing on Semenoff at which

General Graves, Lieutenant Morrow and others described his campaign of terrorism in which it was alleged 100,000 people had been slaughtered. Borah was determined to call Bakhmeteff before the Committee and had a Senate subpoena issued for him. Secretary Hughes, however, informed the Senator that Bakhmeteff, as Russian Ambassador, enjoyed all customary diplomatic privileges and immunities and could not be obliged to appear.[141] On May 4 Borah assailed Semenoff in the Senate, dwelling upon the atrocities perpetrated by him and his mistreatment of American soldiers. As for Bakhmeteff, he declared that his claim to be Russian Ambassador was "perfectly fraudulent." He accused him of dealing with a criminal and of embezzling American money.[142] Despite Bakhmeteff's denials, Borah continued his attacks and proposed a detailed investigation of his activities.

The Russian Ambassador, however, had already reached his decision to retire. On April 28 he wrote a letter to Secretary of State Hughes in which he declared that since his liquidation of war contracts was completed and his status as ambassador had been made the subject of renewed discussion, he questioned "whether my continuance as Ambassador of Russia will longer serve the best interests of my country and the convenience of the United States Government. I am prepared, if the United States Government so desires, to retire and terminate my official duties." He suggested that his Financial Attaché, Serge Ughet, assume the rôle of his agent and custodian of property, and, in closing, expressed eternal gratitude for "the deep and sympathetic understanding of Russia's process of transformation" which the United States had displayed and its "friendly effort in preserving for the Russian people the integrity of their national patrimony and in safeguarding their economic freedom."[143] The reply of the Secretary of State on the 29th agreed that it would be appropriate to have his status as Ambassador terminated, "inasmuch as the liquidation and final settlement of the business of the Russian Government in the United States for which you were responsible is now practically completed, and as your continuance as Ambassador under the existing circumstances may give rise to misunderstanding. . . . You will continue to be recognized as Ambassador till June 30 next. After this date the custody of the property of the Russian Government in this country, for which you have been responsible, will be considered to vest in Mr. Serge Ughet, the Financial Attaché of the Embassy. Mr. Ughet's diplomatic status with this Government will not be altered by the termi-

nation of your duties, and he will continue to enjoy the usual diplomatic privileges and immunities." [144]

This correspondence was not made public until early June. To the great relief of the Immigration authorities and of Senator Borah, Semenoff took his leave via Vancouver in the same month.[145] Borah continued his efforts to have the Senate subpoena served on Bakhmeteff as soon as he could be reached subsequent to June 30, but the ambassador sailed for Europe on the 20th, after a farewell luncheon given in his honor by the Lawyers' Club of New York and attended by Frank Polk, Norman Davis, John Spargo, Oscar Strauss, and other celebrities.[146] He subsequently returned to the United States and has resided since in New York as a private citizen.

With Bakhmeteff's retirement the Russian Embassy in Washington was at last closed and boarded up and Russia was left without representation of any kind in the United States except for Mr. Ughet, who continues to enjoy the recognition of the State Department. The Soviet Government, of course, was without a spokesman since the expulsion of Martens. There developed, however, out of the Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic to the Washington Conference, a semi-official Soviet agency in Washington which has remained there since 1922. The unofficial agent is Boris Skvirsky, who is in contact with the Department of State and other Government Departments. In September, 1923, he established in Washington, for purposes of information, a special bureau, the "Russian Information Bureau" (called the "Soviet Union Information Bureau" since January, 1927) located at 2819 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. The Bureau publishes the *Soviet Union Review* (formerly the *Russian Review*), issues special pamphlets and bulletins on Soviet trade, industries, and other subjects; it also supplies information on numerous inquiries received from all parts of the United States. The Bureau thus devotes itself to the study and encouragement of Russian-American relations. The information of the Bureau is regarded as useful and reliable and its presence is welcomed rather than objected to by the State Department and the Department of Commerce. But of official relations between the United States and Russia there are none.

CHAPTER TEN

RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS SINCE 1922

1. Watchful Waiting Continued

On March 21, 1923, Secretary Hughes received at the State Department a delegation representing the "Committee for Recognition of Russia" of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Through Miss Ella Boynton of Chicago the delegation presented a plea for a change of policy toward the Soviet Government, contending that the conditions of recognition which had been previously insisted upon had now been very largely met through recent innovations at Moscow. The public reply of the Secretary of State to this appeal was a reasoned restatement of American policy which emphasized and clarified the considerations underlying the official position.

Mr. Hughes first expressed deep sympathy for the difficulties of the Russian people and the desire of the American Government to assist in the solution of their economic problems. But he insisted that outside charity was no solution, nor, in fact, any form of outside pressure.

> Not only do we not desire to interfere with the internal concerns of Russia; not only do we recognize the right of the Russian people to develop their own institutions, but such interference would be futile. The salvation of Russia cannot be contrived outside and injected. Russia's hope lies in Russia's action. It is absolutely impossible to deal with matters which are in the control of the Russian people and which, until they are adequately dealt with, furnish no ground for helpfulness, no ground for Russian recuperation. . . . The conditions, which would invite the foreign assistance which you point out is so necessary, are in the control of the Russian authorities. They cannot in the nature of things be supplied from the outside.

Diplomatic recognition could have no influence on trade, which depended upon economic factors. Trade would remain insignificant as long as the essential bases of productivity in Russia were lacking. Recent changes had not supplied them nor removed the causes of progressive impoverishment. But Mr. Hughes recognized the dis-

tinction between economic and political questions. "The fundamental question in the recognition of a government is whether it shows ability and a disposition to discharge international obligations. Stability, of course, is important; stability is essential. Some speak as though stability was all that was necessary. What, however, would avail mere stability if it were stability in the prosecution of a policy of repudiation and confiscation? In the case of Russia we have a very easy test of a matter of fundamental importance, and that is of good faith in the discharge of international obligations. I say that good faith is a matter of fundamental importance because words are easily spoken. Of what avail is it to speak of assurances, if valid obligations are repudiated and property is confiscated?" The Secretary referred to the Soviet annulment of Russia's debts as a blow at the sincerity and good faith without which amicable international relations were impossible. In closing he dwelt upon the international revolutionary propaganda emanating from Moscow as a fatal obstacle in the way of recognition:

> Not only would it be a mistaken policy to give encouragement to repudiation and confiscation, but it is also important to remember that there should be no encouragement to those efforts of the Soviet authorities to visit upon other peoples the disasters that have overwhelmed the Russian people. I wish that I could believe that such efforts had been abandoned. Last November Zinoviev said: "The eternal in the Russian revolution is the fact that it is the beginning of the world revolution." Lenin, before the last Congress of the Third International last fall, said that "the revolutionists of all countries must learn the organization, the planning, the method and the substance of revolutionary work." . . .
>
> Now I desire to see evidences of the abandonment of that policy. I desire to see a basis for helpfulness. We want to help. We are just as anxious in this Department and in every branch of the Administration as you can possibly be to promote peace in the world, to get rid of hatred, to have a spirit of mutual understanding, but the world we desire is a world not threatened with the destructive propaganda of the Soviet authorities, and one in which there will be good faith and the recognition of obligations and a sound basis of international intercourse.[1]

On the political side this declaration was simply a statement that diplomatic recognition was out of the question so long as the Soviet Government persisted in its policies of repudiation, confiscation and encouragement of world revolution. On the economic side it asserted, in substance, that a restoration of productivity in Russia through internal reconstruction and through an influx of foreign capital required the abandonment of Communism.

During the first half of 1923 a number of incidents occurred which

served further to widen the breach between the United States and Soviet Russia. At the end of January Litvinoff addressed two notes of protest to Secretary Hughes. One complained that marauders and counter-revolutionary bands crossing the Bering Straits with furs and looted public property of the Soviet Republic were freely admitted to Alaska and asked that the United States bar from the territory all Russian citizens not in possession of Soviet credentials.[2] The other reserved the rights of the Soviet Government to the "stolen" ships of the Merkuloff Whites from Vladivostok which Admiral Stark had escorted to Manila.[3] Both notes were ignored. In March the death sentence passed by the Soviet courts upon Archbishop Zepliak and other Roman Catholic ecclesiastics for counter-revolutionary activities [4] was made the occasion for a protest from the State Department to the Soviet Government transmitted through the American Ambassador in Berlin.[5] The sentence of the Archbishop was commuted to ten years' imprisonment, but the Vicar General of the Roman Catholic Church in Russia, Mgr. Constantine Butchkavitch, was executed despite world-wide protests and appeals for mercy.[6] In retaliation for this act the State Department cancelled the visa of Mme. Kalinin, who had planned to make a two months' tour of the United States on the invitation of the American Committee for Relief of Russian Children, appealing for aid to the famine orphans. Mme. Kalinin was the wife of the President of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, who had signed the Butchkavitch death warrant, and it was made clear in Washington that her exclusion was a protest against the execution.* In the following months a new source of friction appeared in the Soviet order for the nationalization of all unclaimed goods in Vladivostok warehouses. This action, though apparently not resulting in the direct confiscation of any American property, led the State Department to recall the American consul who still remained in the city.[8] His relations with the Soviet authorities who assumed control of the port in the previous fall had not been satisfactory and his withdrawal left the United States as completely unrepresented in Russia as the Soviet Government was in the United States.

These developments naturally intensified rather than weakened the determination of Secretary Hughes to continue to withhold recognition from the Soviet Government. The bases of this policy remained unchanged. Diplomatic intercourse with a régime pursuing

* This action followed extensive protests against her admission by numerous Catholic and patriotic organizations in the United States.[7]

policies of repudiation, confiscation and instigation of world revolution was regarded as futile and dangerous. With the purely domestic affairs of Russia the State Department professed to have no concern. The undemocratic character of the Soviet Government was regretted and it was said that "nothing should be done to place the seal of approval on the tyrannical measures that have been adopted in Russia," but it was urged that the American Government "has never insisted that the will of the people of a foreign State may not be manifested by long continued acquiescence in a régime actually functioning as a government." Recognition was withheld because the Soviet régime refused to fulfil the obligations of intercourse, i.e., "the protection of the persons and property of the citizens of one country lawfully pursuing their business in the territory of the other and abstention from hostile propaganda by one country in the territory of the other." The question of the submission or acquiescence of the Russian people to this régime remained an "open one," but the fundamental consideration was the failure of the Soviet Government to observe the conditions essential for friendly international intercourse.*

The views of President Harding, who, unlike his predecessor, accepted rather than dictated the policies of his Secretary of State, were in general accord with this position. In his public statements, however, he seemed to place somewhat less emphasis upon revolutionary propaganda as an obstacle to recognition than did Mr. Hughes and more upon Soviet violations of the rights of private property. In his last address, undelivered because of illness, he said:

> The problem of Russian recognition is complicated by a fundamental difficulty, because of a government régime there whose very existence is predicated upon a policy of confiscation and repudiation. No one much questions the continuation of the present government or wishes to direct the expression of Russian preference. . . . It has been urged that we ought to grant political recognition to the present Russian régime because the destitution of the Russian people would thereby be put in the way of alleviation, and that this humane appeal is so urgent that all other considerations should be put aside, but the fact remains that the establishment of a basis of permanent improvement in Russia lies solely within the power of those who govern the destinies of that country, and political recognition prior to correcting fundamental error tends only to perpetuate the ills from which the Russian people are suffering.
>
> International good faith forbids any sort of sanction of the Bolshevist

* Secretary Hughes to Samuel Gompers, July 19, 1923, in reply to a request for a statement supporting "the consistent contention of the American Federation of Labor that the soviet power cannot be recognized because it is an autocracy."

policy. The property of American citizens in Russia, honestly acquired under the laws then existing, has been taken without the color of compensation, without process of law, by the mere emission of countless decrees. . . .

If the fundamentals of our boasted civilization are based on twenty centuries of maintained error, if the Russian conception of the social fabric is the true revelation, tardily conceived after forty centuries of evolution and development, the truth will ultimately assert itself in the great experiment.

I can see Russia only as the supreme tragedy, and a world warning, the dangers of which we must avoid if our heritage is to be preserved. If the revolutionary order is the way to higher attainment and greater human happiness, Russia will command our ultimate sanction.

Meanwhile, I prefer to safeguard our interests and hold unsullied the seemingly proven principles under which human rights and property rights are blended in the supreme inspiration to human endeavor. If there are no property rights, there is little, if any, foundation for national rights, which we are ever being called upon to safeguard. The whole fabric of international commerce and righteous international relationship will fall if any great nation like ours will abandon the underlying principles relating to sanctity of contract and the honor involved in respected rights.[9]

2. The Issue of Recognition, 1923-1928

The untimely death of President Harding in San Francisco on August 2, 1923, brought to the Presidential chair in the person of Calvin Coolidge a man who was no less conservative and solicitous for the protection of property rights than his predecessor. Mr. Hughes remained Secretary of State and the Russian policy of the Administration was unchanged. It was indicated at the end of August that a resumption of diplomatic relations with Moscow was not contemplated until Russia discarded Communism and showed evidence of a disposition to live up to her international obligations.[10] In his first message to Congress, on December 6, however, President Coolidge intimated that changing conditions in Russia might soon make a change of American policy possible:

Our diplomatic relations, lately so largely interrupted, are now being resumed, but Russia presents notable difficulties. We have every desire to see that great people, who are our traditional friends, restored to their position among the nations of the earth. We have relieved their pitiable destitution with an enormous charity. Our Government offers no objection to the carrying on of commerce by our citizens with the people of Russia. Our Government does not propose, however, to enter into relations with another régime which refuses to recognize the sanctity of international obligations. I do not propose to barter away for the privilege of trade any of the cherished rights of humanity. I do not propose

to make merchandise of any American principles. These rights and principles must go wherever the sanctions of our Government go.

But while the favor of America is not for sale, I am willing to make very large concessions for the purpose of rescuing the people of Russia. Already encouraging evidences of returning to the ancient ways of society can be detected. But more are needed. Whenever there appears any disposition to compensate our citizens who were despoiled, and to recognize that debt contracted with our Government, not by the Tsar, but by the newly formed Republic of Russia; whenever the active spirit of enmity to our institutions is abated; whenever there appear works meet for repentance; our country ought to be the first to go to the economic and moral rescue of Russia. We have every desire to help and no desire to injure. We hope the time is near at hand when we can act.[11]

This hope was shared by the Soviet Government. On December 16, Commissar Chicherin, perceiving in the message a gesture in the direction of a more friendly attitude, addressed a cablegram to President Coolidge * in which he informed him of the complete readiness of the Soviet Government "to discuss with your Government all problems mentioned in your message, these negotiations being based upon the principle of mutual non-intervention in internal affairs. The Soviet Government will continue whole-heartedly to adhere to this principle, expecting the same attitude from the American Government. As to the question of claims mentioned in your message, the Soviet Government is fully prepared to negotiate with a view toward its satisfactory settlement on the assumption that the principle of reciprocity will be recognized all around. On its part, the Soviet Government is ready to do all in its power so far as the dignity and interests of its country permit to bring about the desired end of renewal of friendship with the United States of America."[12]

The reply which Secretary Hughes made to this proposal on the 18th was so curt and frank as to dispel completely all the illusory hopes entertained in Moscow:

There would seem to be at this time no reason for negotiations. The American Government, as the President said in his message to the Congress, is not proposing to barter away its principles. If the soviet authorities are ready to restore the confiscated property of American citizens or make effective compensation, they can do so. If the soviet authorities are ready to repeal their decree repudiating Russia's obligations to this country and appropriately recognize them they can do so. It requires no conference or negotiations to accomplish these results, which can and should be achieved at Moscow as evidence of good faith. The American Government has not incurred liabilities to Russia or repudiated obliga-

* Appendix V.

tions. Most serious is the continued propaganda to overthrow the institutions of this country. This Government can enter into no negotiations until these efforts directed from Moscow are abandoned.*

This aroused a new interest in Congress in the Russian policy of the Administration. On December 11 Senator Borah had once more introduced a resolution (S.Res. 50) declaring that "the Senate of the United States favors the recognition of the present Soviet Government of Russia."[14] On the 20th this resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, while Senator Norris launched an attack upon Hughes's note of December 18, condemning it as "bluntly discourteous." Senator Borah insisted that the Soviet Government and the Communist International were separate and distinct organizations. Senator Lodge, with whom he had already crossed swords on the issue of Russian recognition,[15] challenged his contentions, but agreed on the need of a thorough investigation before the Committee on Foreign Relations.[16] On January 7, 1924, the Senator from Massachusetts presented an extended exposition of his views, presenting "evidence" of revolutionary propaganda carried on in the United States under the direction of the Moscow leaders and arguing against the recognition of the Soviet régime. In reply Senator Borah minimized the importance of propaganda and declared that recognition would be the most effective remedy against it.[17]

The discussions of the period in the Senate and House of Representatives still revealed no general sentiment in favor of recognition of the Soviet Government, but the old spirit of hysterical fear and unreasoning hatred had passed. A number of Congressmen had visited Soviet Russia and had tempered their earlier views with observation and reflection. Those who opposed recognition of the Soviet régime did so now on the well-reasoned grounds advanced by the State Department.[18] Others, including such former irreconcilable foes of Bolshevism as Senator King, were now disposed to look with some degree of favor upon the possibility of a trade agreement with the Soviet Government.[19] The re-entrance of Russia into the American market as a purchaser of cotton and other products played its part in mitigating dislike for its government.[20] In the hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Senator Borah's resolution, the State Department rested its case almost entirely upon the propaganda argument, presenting a voluminous

* Chicherin, in commenting on this reply, said that the Soviet Government, on its part, might with equal justification insist on American recognition of the Russian counter-claims as a condition of negotiations. He denied that the Soviet Government supported Communist propaganda in the United States.[18]

mass of detailed evidence regarding the control and direction of subversive activities in the United States from Moscow.[21] But the hearings, as well as the discussions in Congress, were abruptly terminated before any action could be taken by the revelations of the "oil scandals" of the Harding Cabinet, which diverted all attention from the problem of Russian relations.

Though the year 1924 saw de jure recognition extended to the Soviet Government by many nations, the American policy remained unchanged. Nor were the results of the election of 1924 encouraging to the advocates of recognition. During the campaign the issue had received almost no attention, even from the La Follette Progressives. The election of Mr. Coolidge by an overwhelming majority spelled adherence to the policy already adopted. The Moscow leaders derived great comfort from Secretary Hughes's retirement in January, 1925, to become effective March 4, but their hopes were again doomed.[22] Despite increased pressure in Washington from the advocates of recognition, due to the growth of Russian-American trade and to the rapprochement between Russia and Japan, the Administration remained adamant.[23] The new Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg of Minnesota, was no less devoted to the principles upon which the American policy was based than Mr. Hughes and he lost no time in making it clear that there would be no modification in the Government's attitude until the Soviet authorities had met the conditions laid down.[24] The death on January 21, 1924, of Soviet Russia's great leader, Lenin, had no effect upon the situation, except to cause a brief flurry of renewed hope in certain quarters that the Soviet Government was once more on the verge of collapse. The Communist Party retained an unshaken hold upon the country and adhered as firmly as ever to the doctrines which made American recognition impossible.

Throughout 1925 and 1926 the policy of the United States which had crystallized in the preceding years remained the same. Except for occasional statements to this effect, no further declarations of policy were issued. The pronouncements of Secretary Hughes continued to represent the attitude of the American Government. The extensive development of Russian-American commerce stirred new interest in the problem, but left the State Department and the President unmoved from the position of 1923.[25] Glowing reports of improved Russian conditions by such observers as Sherwood Eddy[26] and reasoned appeals for a change of policy from liberals or business men were alike unsuccessful in producing any modification

in the Administration's policy.[27] Veiled hints and suggestions from Soviet representatives—all "unofficial" now, since the Soviet Government was not seeking further rebukes—were received in silence. When, in November, 1926, Mme. Alexandra Kollontai, Soviet Minister to Mexico, sought to pass through the United States on the way to her post, she was barred by the State Department as an inadmissible alien, "actively associated with the international Communist subversive movement." [28] The deadlock between Moscow and Washington remained unbroken and seemingly unbreakable. The end of the tenth year of the Soviet régime found the governments of the two largest white nations further apart than they had been when the news of the November Revolution first startled the world. The American State Department adhered to the new tradition of non-recognition as persistently as it had ever adhered to the old and now quite obsolete tradition of friendship. Russia and the United States had reached an impasse from which no escape seemed possible.

On April 14, 1928, Secretary of State Kellogg issued his first extended pronouncement on Russian-American relations in a statement to the Republican National Committee.* He added very little to earlier declarations, but simply reaffirmed the policy of non-recognition on the grounds already given. Again great emphasis was placed upon the propaganda of world revolution as an insuperable barrier to the resumption of diplomatic relations. Friendly relations could not be established "with a governmental entity which is the agency of a group who hold it as their mission to bring about the overthrow of the existing political, economic and social order throughout the world and who regulate their conduct toward other nations accordingly." European experience had "demonstrated conclusively" the wisdom of the American policy. In no case had the Soviet authorities paid the past debts of Russia or compensated owners of confiscated property. Their primary interest was in world revolution. In addition to the seditious activities carried on in the United States under the direction and control of Moscow, anti-American sentiment had been stirred up in Latin America and the Far East. Nothing could be gained by entering into relations with the Soviet régime "so long as the present rulers of Russia have not abandoned those avowed aims and known practices which are inconsistent with international friendship." But the government and people of the United States were animated by a sincere friendship for the Russian

* Full text in Appendix VII.

people. No obstacles to commercial relations were imposed save the ban on the flotation of Soviet securities in the United States. Trade had prospered in the absence of recognition.

This declaration held out no hope of an early change of policy. The tradition of non-recognition was reaffirmed without qualification. The tone of the accusations hurled against the Soviet Government is, to be sure, somewhat more moderate than that found in certain earlier statements. The Soviet leaders are no longer accused of fomenting revolutions abroad directly. But diplomatic intercourse with them is inexpedient so long as the propaganda of world revolution is directed and controlled from Moscow and they persist in policies of repudiation and confiscation. The statements denying the existence of official barriers to trade were not, as will be shown, strictly accurate and the figures showing the growth of commerce were incomplete and confused. But no doubt was left concerning the "impossibility" of resuming political relationships with the "so-called Soviet Government."

3. U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. in World Politics

Though the United States and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics* thus remained not on speaking terms, the world-wide interests of each made it impossible for either to ignore the existence of the other. Despite the ostracism of Soviet Russia and the isolationist policy of the United States, the two nations came into frequent contact on the international stage. Since the Genoa Conference Russia had to some degree regained her status as a world power, though she remained in large measure a pariah among nations and could not in the nature of things resume her pre-war diplomatic rôle. Inevitably and notwithstanding the lack of official relations between them, the Russian and American Governments found themselves face to face at many of the cross-roads of diplomacy. The character of these contacts deserves brief consideration at this point as a factor influencing the American attitude.

In certain respects the foreign policies of the two nations appeared to be in harmony. The old bond of friendship—common hostility toward Great Britain—had indeed disappeared, for while Anglo-Russian relations in the post-war period were frequently strained to the breaking point Anglo-American relations were never better, at

* In 1923 the major geographical divisions of the Soviet State were federated into a Union, and the title "U.S.S.R." substituted for "Russia."

least prior to the breakdown of the Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. found themselves at odds with Japan—a circumstance which some observers in both countries seized upon as an argument for more intimate relations between them—but Japan's evacuation of Siberia, her acceptance of the Washington Conference agreements, and her pained acquiescence in the American Immigration Act of 1924 removed the more important sources of friction and made this consideration an element of negligible importance in Russian-American relations after 1925. But Russia and the United States were at one in their attitude toward the League of Nations, being the only Great Powers that had refused to join. Both governments similarly, though declining to participate in the League, professed their desire for international peace and disarmament. If the United States can point with pride to the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 and the unsuccessful Three Power Conference at Geneva in 1927 as evidences of its desire to promote world peace, the U.S.S.R. can point no less proudly to its consistent policy of peace and conciliation with its neighbors, its treaties of neutrality and non-aggression, and its proposal for complete and universal disarmament at the meeting of the preparatory disarmament commission in Geneva in November, 1927. In these regards at least the two nations seem to be following common paths which might be expected, in the absence of counterbalancing considerations, to lead to a rapprochement and a possible restoration of ancient friendship.

The forces working in the opposite direction, however, were much more significant than these accidental instances of common policies. Because of their geographical position the two nations were nowhere in conflict over territorial claims. (The controversy over Wrangel Island in the Arctic Ocean north of Siberia should be mentioned in this connection. This island was discovered by a Russian in 1821, and subsequently claimed by Great Britain, Japan and the United States. In August, 1924, a Soviet vessel removed from it an American citizen and a party of Eskimos who professed, though without authorization, to have occupied it for the British Government. The United States made no protest at this act, nor did it object to the Soviet occupation of the island in November, 1926. Russian title to the island has not since been challenged. In December, 1924, Chicherin made a spirited protest against the placing of a U. S. Geodetic Station plate on the coast of Cape Pesino, Siberia, by a coast guard vessel, declaring it a "threat to Soviet

citizens" and a "gross violation" of Russian sovereignty, but the incident had no results. *Current History,* XXI, pp. 465, 796; *N. Y. Times,* November 15, 1926; 1:7.) But there were other sources of friction scarcely less serious, for the courses followed by the two governments were sharply divergent. American interests, it is true, were much less directly menaced by the maneuvers of Soviet diplomats than the interests of Great Britain and France. And, conversely, for all its suspicion and resentment at the American policy, the U.S.S.R. felt itself in less danger from the United States than from the European powers. There were nevertheless abundant causes of friction between the governments which could not long be ignored.

Nowhere did this conflict assume more dramatic form than in the clash of Russian and American policies in China. The general policy of the Soviet Government toward China was outlined in a declaration of July 25, 1919, a note to Peking of March, 1920, and a further declaration of September 27, 1920. The Moscow authorities declared themselves the friends of the victims of imperialism everywhere and proposed to renounce all the special privileges which the government of the Tsar had wrung from China, including extraterritorial rights, the Boxer indemnity, and the ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway.[29] This policy, constituting a direct challenge of the foreign Powers, led the American State Department in October, 1920, to begin negotiations with other governments looking toward concerted opposition to Chinese acceptance of this offer.[30] The issue hung fire for four years, but finally, on May 31, 1924, after protracted and tedious negotiations, the Soviet representative, L. M. Karahan, signed an agreement with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wellington Koo.[31] The Chinese Eastern Railway was conditionally transferred to China and special arrangements for its joint management were embodied in a supplementary agreement.[32] The U.S.S.R. further renounced all Russian privileges and concessions in China, gave up all claim to the Boxer indemnity, and surrendered its rights of extraterritoriality.

This agreement was naturally distasteful to the foreign Powers, including the United States, who regarded Russia's example as a dangerous precedent. Even before its final signature, the American Government had protested to China on the ground that it feared the establishment of a Russian sphere of influence, contrary to the resolutions of the Washington Conference.[33] Article IX of the Sino-Russian agreement, with its declaration that "the Governments of the two contracting parties mutually agree that the future of the

Chinese Eastern Railway shall be determined by the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R., to the exclusion of any third party or parties," seemed particularly objectionable. It further declared that "The Government of the U.S.S.R. agrees to be responsible for the entire claims of the shareholders, bondholders and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway incurred prior to the Revolution of March 9, 1917." Most of these creditors were, of course, Russians, but foreign capital had also participated to some extent in the venture. Some $5,000,000 of American capital had been invested in the railway and the United States now addressed a new protest to the Chinese Government.[84] The Chinese Foreign Office adhered to the position already taken that the railroad concerned only China and Russia and all protests were ineffective. While all the complex legal and economic questions involved cannot be discussed here, it is clear that the Russian policy in China was regarded by the United States and the other foreign Powers as a menace to their interests.

The situation reached something of a crisis when the Soviet Government named L. M. Karahan as its Ambassador to China and suggested that the other powers also raise their diplomatic representatives in Peking to ambassadorial rank.[85] This coup aroused the indignation of foreign governments, since it meant that the Soviet representative would now become Dean of the Diplomatic Corps and would enjoy precedence over all his colleagues. All of the Powers, including the United States, declined China's proposal that they follow the Russian example. The Diplomatic Corps at Peking now endeavored to prevent the Russian Ambassador from securing possession of the old Russian Legation, insisting that Karahan apply directly to the Dean, on the ground that the Protocol of 1901 gave control of the entire Diplomatic Quarter to the foreign legations and not to the Chinese Government. The Chinese Foreign Minister protested at this demand, and argued that Russia's authorized representative was entitled to his Legation as soon as the Chinese Government gave its consent.[86] The Diplomatic Corps, however, declared that it would not surrender the Legation until assured "of the maintenance of the arrangements which constitute the conventional status of the Diplomatic Quarter." [87] At the end of July, 1924, Karahan finally presented his credentials to the President of China [88] and communicated with the American Minister, Jacob Gould Schurman, acting Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, regarding the Legation controversy.[89] On August 18 the Japanese

Minister Yoshizawa sent a note to Karahan offering to deliver the Legation to him on condition that "the Soviet Government enjoys all the rights, and is impressed with all the obligations of that Protocol (1901) and the Protocol of 1904 and also all subsequent arrangements which bind all the co-signatories to the maintenance of the conventional status of the Diplomatic Quarter." Should the Soviet Government ever renounce its rights under the Protocols, the powers reserved "full liberty of action." [40] This communication was accompanied by a memorandum from the American Legation to the effect that its acquiescence in the note in no way constituted American recognition of "the régime known as the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics." [41]

Karahan's reply, refusing to accept the memorandum, administered a stinging rebuke to the American Minister. He declared that he regretted that the Japanese Minister had consented to transmit such a communication in view of the Russian-Japanese negotiations which, he carefully explained, were being carried on not between two "régimes" but between two governments.

> This understanding may make it easier for Your Excellency, it seems to me, to explain to your American colleague the limits of courtesy beyond which his fear may lead him. It should also be added for the information of your American colleague and for that matter for your other colleagues who may not have had time yet, like the American Minister, to formulate their anxiety, that there does not exist in international law and practice any method of restoring the diplomatic relations between two Governments by way of returning to one of them the Legation of the latter Government situated in the capital of a third Power by the other of these two Governments, which, but accidentally and without the consent of the real owner, has in its hands the keys to the building of such a Legation. Herewith I return the above-mentioned note of August 18.[42]

A long and acrimonious wrangle followed, during which the American memorandum which so incensed the Soviet Ambassador changed hands four times. M. Karahan steadfastly refused to accept a communication which he regarded as neither proper nor courteous and unsupported by international law and practice.[43] Finally, on September 18, 1924, the ambassador was given control of the Russian Legation, on the understanding that his government would abide by the terms of the Protocols of 1901 and 1904.[44] The foreign Powers thus won a technical victory, but only at the cost of increasing Chinese resentment at the rights and privileges which they insisted upon maintaining.

This tea-pot tempest, while of little importance in itself, was extremely significant of a fundamental conflict of policies in the Far East between the United States (and, in fact, all the western Powers) and the U.S.S.R. Minister Schurman subsequently called Karahan a "dangerous and mischievous advisor" to the Chinese, some of whom were being inspired by him to advocate a revolutionary program involving a summary cancellation of the so-called unequal treaties.[45] The American State Department could view with little satisfaction the displacement of the United States by the U.S.S.R. in the hearts of the Chinese as China's friend. Recent developments in China's prolonged civil war have served to intensify rather than to assuage the conflict. It is an open secret that the Soviet Government has lent advice and moral and material support to the Kuomintang and the Canton Nationalists in their efforts to terminate the régime of extraterritorial rights, special privileges and concessions which the foreign Powers have imposed upon China. This circumstance, which explains much of the friction between Russia and Great Britain, has also been a factor in the American policy toward the Soviets, despite the professed sympathy of the United States toward the aspirations of the Chinese Nationalists.

In the Near East, as well as in the Far East, Russian and American policies have clashed, though the controversy here has never assumed serious proportions. At the Lausanne Conference of 1922-1923, summoned in an effort to settle the problems arising out of the victory of the Turkish Nationalists over Greece, the two powers found themselves in conflict over the status of the straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Chicherin contended, in the interests of Russian security, that the straits should be fortified by Turkey and closed to all foreign warships.[46] He argued that any other solution would place the littoral States of the Black Sea at the mercy of the great naval Powers and render all hope of general naval disarmament futile.[47] Ambassador Child, for the United States, urged complete freedom of the straits for warships, as well as for merchant vessels.[48]

Chicherin, recalling that the representatives of the A.R.A. for famine relief had come to Black Sea ports on American destroyers, was willing to grant that "the Turkish Government should have the right to permit the passage of light war vessels in individual cases and for definite purposes, but on no account with a military object. There have been no pirates in the Black Sea since the vessels of Wrangel had left, and light vessels were sufficient for philanthropic, scientific and other purposes."[49] But the arrange-

ments proposed by the Powers and supported by the United States would expose Russia to attack by the great fleets. The Soviet objections were unavailing, however. By the terms of the Straits Convention, signed July 24, 1923, at the second Lausanne Conference, the straits were demilitarized and full freedom of navigation for warships as well as for merchant vessels was established, subject only to the condition that in time of peace no one power should send into the Black Sea a naval force greater than that of the most powerful fleet of the littoral powers at the time of passage. During war fleets of any size might pass the straits without interference from Turkey, provided that her right to bar enemy fleets, in the event of her being a belligerent, remain unimpaired. Russia acquiesced in this arrangement, adhered to the Convention, and is represented on the Straits Commission which enforces it.[50]

While the clash of policies over the straits has thus been terminated, at least temporarily, other sources of friction between the American and Soviet Governments have kept them at odds. The State Department has perceived the hand of Moscow in numerous imbroglios and intrigues in other parts of the world where American interests appear to be menaced. The most recent instance of this is the charge advanced in January, 1927, that the Soviet leaders have designs against the United States in Mexico and Central America. Secretary Kellogg alleged that President Calles of Mexico, in recognizing and supporting Dr. Sacasa, Liberal leader in Nicaragua, against President Diaz, protégé of the United States, was acting in close harmony with the Soviet Government in order to establish a "bolshevist hegemony" in Central America directed against the United States.[51] Acting Commissar Litvinoff's comments on this accusation are not without interest:

> Statesmen of capitalist countries lately have taken the habit of covering their incompetence in internal affairs or aggressive aspirations in the field of foreign policy by playing up "bolshevik intrigues" or "plots" of the Soviet Government. Whether the question at issue is a miners' strike in England, an attack by the American navy against the independent republic of Nicaragua or the shooting of people in Java and Sumatra, there is always the same justification in the "plots and intrigues" of the bolshevist government.
>
> I shouldn't be surprised if the enlightened politicians of the great powers one day set out to explain an earthquake in Japan or floods in America by such "intrigues" of the bolsheviks. It would simply be an insult to public opinion if I were seriously to repudiate such fantastic explanations. . . .
>
> The Soviet Government has always stood and continues to stand on a

platform of restoration of normal relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and I can only express regret that Mr. Kellogg's fantastic attacks are prompted by motives which have nothing in common with the restoration of normal relations between the two countries.[52]

This situation is obviously not conducive to the re-establishment of amicable relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. but tends rather to perpetuate and exacerbate hostility. Regardless of the truth or falsity of specific allegations, it is beyond dispute that the Soviet leaders, openly and confessedly, are enemies of western imperialism in all its forms, European or American, and that they admittedly lend moral encouragement to all subject peoples who resist foreign domination and thereby imperil the "interests" of the western Powers. It is conceivable that any Russian government might pursue policies opposed to those of the United States and detrimental to American interests without this fact's being made the occasion for the breaking off of diplomatic relations. But when the Soviet leaders pursue such policies, the natural conclusion drawn in foreign capitals is that they are acting not as Russians but as international firebrands and apostles of the world revolution. The foreign policies of the Soviet Government, in so far as they run counter to those of the United States, thus tend to support the non-recognition policy of the American Government, even though similar friction with a non-Communist régime would not be regarded as proper grounds for abstaining from diplomatic intercourse with it.

The nature of this friction was clearly revealed in March, 1928, at Geneva, where the two Powers crossed swords upon a subject concerning which one might have expected some measure of agreement between them: disarmament. The occasion was the fifth session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission of the League of Nations, which opened March 15. Because of general interest in the problem, the United States, the Soviet Union and Turkey, though not members of the League, sent delegations. The chairman of the Soviet delegation, Maxim Litvinoff, at once presented for consideration the Russian proposal for immediate and complete disarmament, suggested the preceding November, and looked for support to Ambassador Hugh Gibson, the American representative. Litvinoff declared in part:

The Soviet delegation considers itself entitled to count upon special support from the delegation of that Government, which is now publicly making a proposal for prohibition of war. The sincerity of this proposal could not be more convincingly confirmed than by the adherence of its authors to the Soviet draft convention for complete disarmament,

pursuing the aim not merely of moral prohibition, but also of abolition of the possibility of war.

Since armed forces have no other reason but for the conduct of war and since prohibition of war would make them quite superfluous, it would appear that consistency and logic must dictate to the Government concerned the support of our proposals.[53]

The Soviet proposal for the immediate abolition of all land, sea and air armaments was warmly supported by the German and Turkish delegations and bitterly assailed, in thinly veiled language, by Lord Cushenden, the British representative, who accused the Soviet Government of insincerity and hypocrisy. The British position was upheld by most of the other delegations. Mr. Gibson stated the American position on March 21, in a speech which defended the American plan of outlawing war by multilateral treaties and referred to the Russian suggestion as follows:

I do not feel warranted in taking up the commission's time on this point. However, in order not to leave room for misunderstanding I venture to say that it is precisely on the grounds of sincerity, consistency and logic that my Government supports the idea of a multilateral compact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy and at the same time finds itself unable to support drastic proposals for immediate complete disarmament, which we do not believe are calculated to achieve their avowed purpose. . . .

The American delegation would not feel justified in asking for delay in order that further detailed study could be given to these proposals. We feel that we have only one problem—to find and follow the path best calculated to lead us to a conclusion of our labors. We are not justified in unduly delaying our efforts to embark upon another task which we honestly believe cannot facilitate the reduction or limitation of armaments.[54]

Since this sentiment was shared by all the delegations except the Turkish and German, the Russian proposal was rejected forthwith. The path referred to by Mr. Gibson remained undiscovered, however. Litvinoff presented an alternative plan for partial and gradual disarmament on a quota basis, which fared no better than the original suggestion. Both he and the head of the German delegation, Count Von Bernstorff, insisted that the commission should give this new draft convention a first reading or at least proceed to the second reading of the old draft convention for the consideration of which the commission had convened. The other delegates, with Mr. Gibson in the lead, made haste to reject both suggestions and after much wrangling and confusion the commission adjourned *sine die* on March 24, 1928, with disarmament as far off as ever.[55]

This meeting made it clear that the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. were as far apart on the question of disarmament as on all other aspects of national policy. The Soviet Government contended that the way to disarm is to disarm, while the United States insisted upon the conclusion of treaties outlawing war as a prerequisite condition. A friendly overture which might conceivably have led to a friendly response had it come from any other government was denounced as a threatening gesture of hatred and belligerency because of its source. Again abhorrence of Communism overshadowed all else. Even when Moscow pursues the same goals of diplomacy as Washington, its statements are ipso facto insincere and worthless and its suggestions are anathema.

4. Trade, Credits, Gold and Oil

Despite the absence of political relations between the Governments of the United States and the U.S.S.R., there has developed an extensive commerce between the countries, substantially in excess of that carried on before the war. The following table, based on United States Customs House figures, shows annual American imports from and exports to Russia since 1910.*

Year	*Imports from Russia*	*Exports to Russia*
1910	$13,823,265	$19,533,761
1911	15,899,256	25,458,033
1912	28,346,870	27,315,137
1913	24,377,070	26,909,707
1914	14,569,397	27,956,337
1915	3,086,595	169,993,904
1916	8,618,695	470,508,254
1917	14,514,431	424,510,459
1918	10,760,007	17,335,518
1919	9,663,088	82,436,185
1920	12,480,586	28,727,718
1921	1,073,381	15,779,109
1922	591,564	37,631,490
1923	1,515,779	10,066,726
1924	8,055,729	42,962,886
1925	13,119,673	68,906,060
1926	14,121,992	49,905,642
1927	12,876,791	64,921,693

* Totals for European and Asiatic Russia. Figures furnished through the courtesy of Mr. E. C. Ropes, Regional Expert of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, U. S. Dept. of Commerce.

These figures reveal, among other things, how consistently the United States has maintained a "favorable" balance of trade with Russia and how pronounced an effect the demands of the war years had upon the volume of Russian-American commerce. The totals for 1918, 1919 and 1920 (in part) represent trade with those portions of Russia occupied by the Anti-Bolshevist forces. The Allied blockade and the restrictions imposed by the State Department rendered impossible any commercial intercourse with the areas under Soviet control during this period.[56] The large export total for 1922 includes famine relief supplies. Only since 1923 has commerce approached a normal state. Imports from Russia, it will be noted, have grown until they approximate the figures for the pre-war years. Exports to Russia have shown a much more remarkable growth, more than doubling the highest pre-war figure in 1925 and 1927. The post-revolutionary figures do not, of course, include trade with Finland, Poland and the Baltic States as do the pre-war totals. Commerce with Russia constituted about the same proportion of American foreign trade as in the ante-bellum period. Imports from Russia made up about one-third of 1 per cent of total American imports, as compared with between 1 and 1½ per cent before the war, while exports to Russia constitute approximately 1.4 per cent of total American exports as compared with 1.2 per cent before 1914. On the other hand, the United States holds a much more important place in Russian import trade than before the war, contributing between 15 and 20 per cent of Russia's imports in recent years, as compared with 5 to 8 per cent before 1914.[57]

In character this trade differs from the pre-war trade not so much in the commodities entering into it as in the method of making transactions. American exports to Russia, as before, consist chiefly of raw cotton, machinery, motor cars and trucks and metals. Imports include furs, manganese ore, sheep casings, flax and tow, caviar, bristles and licorice root. These commodities are exchanged not with private firms or individuals in Russia but with the trade agencies of the Soviet State. Foreign commerce is a monopoly of the Union, controlled by the Commissariat for Foreign Trade. Over 95 per cent of the foreign commerce of the U.S.S.R. is handled by State institutions and enterprises, State joint stock companies and cooperatives.[58] About half the volume of Russian-American commerce passes through the hands of the Amtorg Trading Corporation, incorporated under the laws of New York in May, 1924, and acting as the agency of the Soviet import and export bureaus. The

All-Russian Textile Syndicate purchases cotton, dyes and other products needed by the Soviet textile industry. Other trade agencies include Centrosoyus-America, agent of the All-Russian Central Union of Consumers' Societies, the largest co-operative union of Europe, and Selskosoyus-America, agent of the Russian union of agricultural co-operatives.

These developments have been accompanied by a constantly growing interest in Russian commercial possibilities on the part of American manufacturers and exporters. In October, 1923, a "Committee on Russian Trade" was formed in New York with the announced purpose of taking immediate action to prevent British and German merchants from seizing all Russian trade opportunities.[59] The year 1924 found a large number of prominent American manufacturing corporations doing a profitable Russian trade through the Allied American Corporation.[60] This trade was financed through the extension of credits by a number of important New York financial institutions which became agents of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R.[61] The American-Russian Chamber of Commerce was reorganized in June, 1926, after many years of inactivity, with Reeve Schley, Vice-President of the Chase National Bank, as President.[62] The present profits and future prospects of trade with the Soviet Union are commanding increasing attention from a wide variety of American business establishments.

Conclusive evidence of this tendency is to be found in the expanding activities of the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce. It is actively engaged in promoting trade between the two nations by maintaining an information bureau in New York, publishing pamphlets and bulletins, answering inquiries from members, arranging meetings and keeping in close contact with the various Russian trading organizations in the United States. It established an office in Moscow in January, 1927, through the services of one of its vice-presidents, Charles H. Smith, formerly American representative in the Inter-Allied Railroad Commission in Siberia. Here direct contacts are maintained with the various departments of the Soviet Government, visas are facilitated for members and accommodations for visitors are provided. The Board of Directors of the Chamber includes representatives of some twenty leading American financial and industrial establishments. The frequent meetings of the Chamber bring increasing numbers of American business men into contact with Russian trade representatives. At the luncheon at the Bankers' Club of America in New York on February 17, 1928, Mr. Charles H. Smith,

Mr. Vitaly Korobkoff, one of the Directors of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R., and Mr. Saul G. Bron, head of the Amtorg Trading Corporation, addressed a gathering of over two hundred American financiers and industrialists. The work of the Chamber should contribute powerfully to the continued growth of Russian-American commerce.

According to a statement issued by Mr. Bron on April 23, 1928, a new peak in trade between the United States and Russia was reached through the transactions in the six months ending March 31, 1928. The total trade is estimated at $80,000,000, as against $59,000,000 in the preceding half year and $34,000,000 for the corresponding six months the year before. The trade total in the full year 1913 was $48,000,000. The Amtorg summarized the figures of this unusual increase in trade as follows:

> Purchases of goods for shipment to the Soviet Union for the past half-year period amounted to $65,469,199. Sales of Soviet products here by the Amtorg and by the Centrosoyus and the Selskosoyus, representing Soviet co-operatives in this country, amounted to $8,148,829. Estimating the value of manganese exports from Russia to this country and of sales of Soviet furs by American companies under special contracts at more than $6,000,000, a total of $80,000,000 for the Soviet-American trade is obtained. (*N. Y. Times,* April 24, 1928.)

At the same time there has been some investment of American capital in various enterprises throughout Russia through the acquisition of concessions. The Communist leaders early realized that they must secure the assistance of foreign capital if they desired to achieve a rapid rehabilitation of Russia's shattered economic system. Their efforts at Genoa and The Hague to secure a large reconstruction loan, guaranteed by the governments of the western Powers, were unsuccessful. The Soviet authorities, however, still hoped to induce foreign capitalists to invest in Russia by offering economic concessions on advantageous terms to those who would bid for them. They were not mistaken in believing that scruples against dealing with the Communist "robbers" could be overcome by the scent of profits.

The Soviet Union's vast mineral and petroleum resources have been particularly attractive to foreign concessionaires. The first concession negotiations involving an American citizen were those undertaken by Washingon B. Vanderlip in 1920. His bargain for coal, oil and fishing concessions in Kamchatka and eastern Siberia, alleged to be worth $3,000,000,000, never materialized, however. The Soviet authorities apparently hoped, by holding out such prospects,

to create a demand for diplomatic recognition in American business circles and to secure American assistance in ousting the Japanese from Siberia.[63] Another concession of a somewhat similar character was that granted by the Far Eastern Republic in 1922 to Harry F. Sinclair for the exploration and exploitation of the oil resources of northern Sakhalin. Following the absorption of the Far Eastern Republic, the grant was confirmed by the Soviet Government, subject to cancellation if work was not begun within the first year or the United States failed to recognize the Soviet Government within five years. The Japanese forces of occupation refused to permit the "Sinclair Exploration Company" to commence operations and in March, 1925, the concession was annulled by the Soviet courts. The company protested to the State Department and sought to show that the concessions granted to Japanese interests by the Soviet-Japanese treaty of January, 1925, were not only infringements upon the company's rights, but constituted a violation of the principle of the "open door." But the Department declined to take any action.[64]

The failure of these grandiose schemes for economic empire in Siberia did not deter American investors from entering the Russian market under contracts of a more conservative character and unincumbered by political complications. Complete data on the terms of American concessions held in Russia are unfortunately not available at the time of writing, but the more important agreements may be briefly enumerated. One of the largest concessions thus far granted to any foreigner by the Soviet Government is held by W. A. Harriman and Company of New York in the Chiatouri manganese mines of Georgia, which supplied 50 per cent of the total world output of manganese before the war. By the terms of the contract signed June 12, 1925, the company secured the exclusive right to prospect and work the Chiatouri deposits for twenty years. The concession district contains 12,492 acres believed to hold 80,000,000 tons of ore valued at $1,600,000,000. The company agrees to invest $4,000,000 within five years in specified improvements and to export at least 16,000,000 tons of manganese and manganese peroxide during the term of the concession. A royalty of $3.00 per ton on exports during the first three years and $4.00 per ton thereafter must be paid to the Soviet Government. While there have been some minor modifications of the terms of the concession, it appears to be working to the satisfaction of both parties.[65] The concession granted in April, 1925, to the Lena Goldfields Company, a British and American concern, covers mines of various kinds in northern Siberia and the

Ural region, runs for fifty years and involves an investment of $11,000,000.[66] Other concessions of lesser importance have been granted to Americans in the fields of mining, manufacturing and fur trading. In the fall of 1927 an agreement was signed with a group of Americans headed by Percival Farquhar of New York, contemplating a six-year credit of $40,000,000 to reorganize the Makkayev Metal Works in the Donetz Coal Basin.[67] If its terms are carried out, American capital invested in Russia will approximate the pre-war figure of $58,000,000.

A statement of the Amtorg Trading Corporation, based on the data of September 1, 1927, indicated that of the 110 operating concessions in the U.S.S.R. at that time, 31 were held by Germans, 11 by Americans, 10 by Englishmen, 8 by Japanese, 6 by Poles, 6 by Swedes, 5 by Frenchmen, 5 by Austrians, etc. The United States thus holds second place in the number of concessions agreements signed with the Soviet authorities. The following are the American concessions in the Soviet Union according to the data supplied by the Amtorg Trading Corporation:

1. Manganese concession, Georgian Manganese Co., (W. A. Harriman & Co.). Right to prospect, exploit and export manganese for 20 years. Granted, June, 1925.
2. Placer gold mining concession, on the Semertak River, Siberia. Granted to Mr. Vint for 20 years.
3. Asbestos concession, American Asbestos Co. Granted in 1921 for a term of 20 years.
4. Agricultural concession, for farming in the Northern Caucasus. Granted in 1925 for 15 years.
5. Manufacture of pencils, pens and similar articles; Hammer Co. Granted in 1925 for 10 years.
6. Concession for manufacture of oxygen, acetylene and other gases; Russian-American Compressed Gas Co. Granted, December, 1926 for 15 years.
7. Prospecting concession granted to New York Corporation, Beloukha. Rights to send an expedition to the Southern Altai Mountains to explore for minerals. Granted, June, 1927 for two years.
8. Technical assistance in the iron and steel industry; Freyn Engineering Co. May, 1927.
9. Technical assistance in the coal industry; Stuart, James & Cooke. June, 1927.
10. Technical assistance, Dnieperstroy construction; Hugh L. Cooper Co.
11. Technical assistance in the coal industry; Allen & Garcia Co.

The refusal of the United States to recognize the Soviet Government, and the consequent inability of the State Department to afford

diplomatic protection to American investors in Russia have not prevented such investments from being made, though they obviously constitute an obstacle to the free flow of American capital to Russia in so far as they create the impression that ventures in the Soviet Union are less secure than they would be elsewhere. The philosophy of Communism and the example of wholesale confiscation in the past lend support to such a view, but in practice the Soviet Government has scrupulously observed its contracts with concessionaires.[68] The Soviet authorities are particularly anxious to induce American investors to accept concessions and look to America as the greatest source of liquid capital in the world. Although investments thus far are insignificant as compared with the total volume of American foreign investments, the vast economic potentialities of the Soviet Union make it probable that American capital will enter the Russian field to an increasing extent, regardless of the absence of diplomatic relations between the two governments.

While Russian leaders have repeatedly contended that the commercial and financial contacts which have been established between the two nations would be greatly increased by the extension of recognition to the Soviet Government, the Department of State and the Department of Commerce in Washington take the view that the restoration of political relations would have little or no economic effect. The character and volume of Russian-American commerce, they insist, depends upon economic factors and not upon the presence or absence of a Soviet Ambassador in Washington or of an American Ambassador in Moscow. An exchange of consular representatives would achieve little because of the Soviet monopoly of foreign trade, which centralizes responsibility for all sales and purchases abroad and leaves no opportunity for the encouragement of business between Russian and American merchants through the information furnished in consular reports. Recognition would, of course, simplify the problems of travel and of the exchange of commodities and money between the two countries, but, from the Washington viewpoint, it could have no such far-reaching effects upon commerce as some of its advocates anticipate.

The whole question revolves about the problem of credits. It is generally agreed that the future expansion of Russia's foreign trade depends to a peculiar degree upon her success in obtaining long term credits abroad. The present situation in regard to credit facilities for Russian-American commerce is briefly that short term credits, running at most for a year or eighteen months, are readily

obtainable by the Soviet trade agencies in New York, but long term credits are, or have been until recently, quite unavailable. In other words, ordinary commercial credits are granted, but long term loans are refused. The refusal, moreover, is due in large part to the action of the State Department in discouraging such transactions. The Department not only disapproves of the extension of long term loans directly to the organizations engaged in trade with Russia, but has even objected to American financiers' loaning money to bankers and merchants of third countries to facilitate their trade with the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1926 W. A. Harriman negotiated with Soviet and German authorities and with representatives of Berlin banks regarding a loan of $35,000,000 to finance German exports to Russia on long term credits. Owing to the opposition of the State Department, the project was abandoned.[69]

The policy of the State Department in this respect is apparently dictated not by hostility toward the Soviet régime nor by any principle of discouraging loans to countries with unrecognized governments, but by the general attitude taken toward all nations which have not funded their war debt to the United States. On May 25, 1921, President Harding informed a conference of leading bankers at the White House that the Government disapproved of further borrowings in the United States by foreign governments which had failed to meet past obligations. The bankers agreed to inform the State Department of all prospective loan transactions in order that it might have an opportunity to object if it saw fit. Since that time all loans to foreign governments have been submitted for official approval before their conclusion. Early in 1925 provinces, municipalities and private enterprises within the country concerned were included in the prohibition.[70]

Since the objection of the State Department to loans or long term credits to the Soviet Government or its trading agencies is thus not a consequence of non-recognition, but of the failure of Russia to meet her obligations to the United States, the mere resumption of diplomatic relations would effect no change in the situation. The belief of Soviet officials that recognition would at once be followed by the extension of more liberal terms of credit would seem to be unfounded. Recognition unaccompanied by the commencement of debt funding negotiations would not modify the State Department's attitude. It should be noted, however, that a possible precedent for a change of view exists in the virtual abandonment of the established policy as regards France.

In November, 1927, in response to inquiries regarding the Farquhar project, the State Department explained its position more fully and partially lifted the ban on long term credits. It was said that such credits would no longer be objected to when their purpose was to facilitate the sale of American goods to Russia. But the extension of non-commercial loans to the Soviet régime or the flotation of Russian securities in the United States would be barred.[71] In January, 1928, it was reported that the Soviet authorities were already disposing of a part of a $30,000,000 Russian railway bond issue in the United States with the Chase National Bank of New York the Amalgamated Trust and Savings Bank of Chicago, and the Bank of Italy in San Francisco, agreeing to pay interest on the bonds as they accrued.[72] This flotation of securities aroused the resentment of the New York Life Insurance Company and other holders of the repudiated Russian railway bonds of 1916 and fell under the ban of the State Department. On February 1, 1928, the Department announced its objection to the sale of the Soviet bonds.[73] It was indicated that the Farquhar concession loan of $40,000,000 would also be objected to if any attempt were made to raise the required money by the sale of securities. French interests representing former owners of the nationalized Makkeyev works, which were to serve as security for the loan, also voiced their objections.[74] The State Department will doubtless continue to discourage such transactions as well as extensions of long term credits not required directly to finance American exports to Russia, as long as Russia's past public and private financial obligations remain unacknowledged.

Another obstacle to the free flow of Russian-American commerce is the attitude of the Treasury Department toward gold of Soviet origin. The ban imposed in 1920 on the acceptance of such gold by the Mint and Assay Offices was not lifted at the time when other restrictions on trade with Russia were removed. It has been theoretically retained to the present, though $12,200,000 in gold was sent by the Soviet Government to the United States in 1922 in partial payment for famine relief supplies, and smaller sums of Soviet gold have arrived from time to time and been accepted without question. The prohibition was defended on the ground that the Soviet Government's repudiation of Russia's State debts and its confiscation of foreign property left the title to all gold coming from Russia in question. In the absence of diplomatic recognition, the Soviet Government enjoys no legal status in American courts * and holders of

* See Chapter Eleven, Section 1.

claims against Russia could presumably attach such gold with little difficulty. Under the 1920 regulation of the Treasury Department the Assay Offices required the following affidavit from all presenting gold of suspicious origin:

> The undersigned owner of a lot of gold, in the amount of ——— for the purpose of inducing the United States to purchase such gold, delivered to the United States Assay Office, does hereby represent and warrant that said gold is not of Bolshevist origin and has never been in the possession of the so-called Bolshevist Government of Russia.
>
> The undersigned further represents that it is acting on its own behalf and not for account of another in offering said gold for sale to the United States, and does forever warrant to the United States, without any qualification or reservation whatever, the title to said gold.[75]

The effect of this requirement was to bar all shipments of Soviet gold to the United States, since gold which is rejected by the Assay Offices is worthless for ordinary commercial transactions.[76] The ban at first included even indirect shipments of gold from Russia, such as gold of Soviet origin bearing the mint stamp of Sweden, but in March, 1921, the Director of the Mint explained that gold bearing the mint stamp of any recognized nation with which the United States was on friendly relations would be accepted.[77] Considerable shipments were made in this indirect way in order to meet the "unfavorable" balance of Soviet trade with the United States. According to Mr. A. L. Scheinman, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R., "the adverse balance in the accounts between the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. and the banks of the United States have impelled the former on many occasions to sell gold in London or Berlin and to transfer the proceeds of the sales to the United States. This roundabout method of settling accounts was neither in the interest of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. nor in the interests of its American correspondents. Therefore the State Bank attempted to establish direct relations with the American credit market." [78]

Early in 1928 the State Bank, encouraged by the repeated assurances of the State Department that no legal obstacles to Russian-American trade existed and hopeful that its funds in the United States would no longer be subject to attachment, decided to ship directly to the United States $5,210,000 in gold. This sum, in bars of gold mined in Russia in 1925 and 1926 and bearing the imprint of the Moscow Assay Office, was sent from Hamburg by the German correspondent of the State Bank, the Garantie und Kreditbank für den Osten, and consigned to the Chase National Bank and the

Equitable Trust Company of New York. The shipment arrived February 21, 1928. The United States Assay Office informed the banks that the gold could not be accepted under the Treasury regulations of 1920, but it was reported at the White House that President Coolidge regarded the shipment as a purely commercial transaction and the State Department declared that it had no political objections to the acceptance of the gold.[79]

The final decision of the Treasury Department was not given until March 6. On that day Paul Claudel, French ambassador in Washington, transmitted a note to Secretary Kellogg, stating that the Bank of France, because of its gold deposits in the old Imperial State Bank of Russia, had a special interest in all gold of Soviet origin and intended to assert its right to the $5,210,000 by judicial action. The Bank of France simultaneously informed the Chase National Bank and the Equitable Trust Company of its intention and filed suit in the United States District Court of Southern New York, alleging that the gold in question was the identical gold it had deposited in the Imperial State Bank in 1915 and 1917. Later in the same day Secretary Mellon announced that the Assay Offices would refuse the gold, since the consignees declined to present it as owners and to guarantee title to it.[80] It was later reported that the Rumanian Government had also taken steps to secure possession of the gold to satisfy its financial claims against Russia.[81]

These events led Mr. Scheinman to issue a statement pointing out that the Soviet gold held in New York could by no possibility be identical with the deposits of the Bank of France and accusing the French Government of bad faith, in view of the French note of October 28, 1924, extending de jure recognition to the Soviet Government and pledging full protection of Russian interests pending the settlement of all claims by negotiation. The Bank of France had made no attempts to attach the large quantities of Soviet gold shipped to England and Germany and the title to Soviet gold deposited in France had never been questioned. The State Bank of the U.S.S.R., moreover, was in no sense the legal successor of the Imperial State Bank and was not responsible for its obligations.[82]

The controversy closed temporarily with the release of the gold by the Chase National Bank and the Equitable Trust Company and its reshipment to Germany.[83] The Soviet authorities greeted this news with satisfaction as an evidence of the desire of American big business to thwart "European intrigue" designed to hamper Russian-American commercial relations. The re-export of the gold of course

ended the possibility of its attachment by the Bank of France through action in American courts, though it was reported that the suit would be continued. The general issue remains, however. So long as the Treasury Department continues in force the 1920 regulation, it will be impossible for Soviet gold to enter the United States directly to settle accounts and to serve as a basis of credits. This, like the ban on long term loans, constitutes an important qualification to the official policy of "trade without recognition." It is a direct result of non-recognition. Were the Soviet Government recognized, its title to gold shipped to the United States could not be questioned in American courts. The absence of diplomatic relations forbids further gold shipments. Since the Soviet Union is a gold-producing country, this prohibition is a direct restriction on trade as well as an indirect one through its effect on credits. The official position maintained at Washington, i.e., that non-recognition does not constitute an obstacle to commerce, is therefore not in accordance with the facts.

Another of the significant aspects of Russian-American commercial relations is found in the rôle of American oil interests in the world struggle for Russian petroleum resources. At the time of the Genoa Conference both the British Royal Dutch Shell Company, directed by Sir Henry Deterding, and its great competitor, the American Standard Oil Company, held claims to oil properties in Russia which they hoped to have recognized. That the Allied demands for the restoration of private property in Russia to former owners coincided perfectly with the desires of the oil interests requires no demonstration.[84] Following the failure at Genoa and The Hague, the United States and the participating governments declared that they would not assist their nationals to acquire property in Russia formerly owned by other foreign nationals. In September, 1922, the Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Oil, Anglo-Persian, the Franco-Belgian Syndicate and other oil companies formed the *Groupement International des Societés Naphtières en Russie* for the purpose of protecting their claims to the properties which the Soviets had nationalized. Each agreed not to acquire concessions in Russia at the expense of the claims of the others. But the Soviet Government, unable to lease out the oil properties to concessionaires and unwilling to restore them to their former owners, began to develop them itself and was soon exporting oil in substantial quantities. The oil magnates became apprehensive and open to temptation. Sir Henry Deterding, though President of the *Groupement,* began pur-

chasing oil from the Soviets early in 1923. The Standard Oil did the same and the *Groupement* speedily collapsed in a general scramble to secure favorable bargains for the purchase of oil from the Soviet Naphtha Syndicate.[85]

The struggle between the Royal Dutch Shell and the Standard Oil for control of the Mediterranean and Near Eastern markets now began in earnest. The Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus, by reason of the excellent quality of their product and their proximity to these markets, were the logical source of supply. Sir Henry welcomed the opportunity to purchase it for retailing in this region. But in 1924 Soviet oil began to compete with the Royal Dutch Shell in England itself in the retail trade, through Russian Oil Products, Ltd. (ROP). This led to a general outcry against purchasing "stolen oil," led by Sir Henry and his associates and supported by the Association of British Creditors of Russia. Meanwhile Standard Oil commenced purchasing large quantities of Russian oil and opened negotiations looking toward the purchase of most of the output of the Soviet Naphtha Syndicate.[86] These transactions were entered upon energetically by the Standard Oil Company of New York and the Vacuum Oil Company over the protests of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, whose scruples against buying "stolen goods" were doubtless supported by a reluctance to wage open war on the Royal Dutch Shell. The negotiations culminated in a series of contracts in 1926 enabling the Standard Oil of New York, with its source of Russian supply insured, to meet the Royal Dutch Shell in the Mediterranean and Near East markets with every prospect of success.[87]

But Sir Henry's first and more immediate foe was ROP in Great Britain. This dangerous rival, backed by the Soviet Naphtha Syndicate, was able to undersell Royal Dutch oil in the domestic retail market. Despairing of winning the struggle by economic means alone, Sir Henry gave his full support to the press campaign for the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the Soviets and the expulsion from England of the insidious purveyors of Communist propaganda and cheap oil. But the Foreign Office was cold. Sir Henry learned with alarm that the Midland Bank was about to grant to the Soviets a credit of £10,000,000. On May 11, 1927, the credit agreement was signed. On the next day, by order of the Home Office, the headquarters of Arcos, Ltd., the Soviet trade agency in London, were raided and searched. Convenient documents demonstrating the subversive activities of the Russian agents were discovered. Press

and Parliament roared for a rupture. Prime Minister Baldwin and Sir Austen Chamberlain, perhaps against their better judgment, were compelled to bow to the Tory "die-hards." Diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. were severed. The credit agreement was annulled for the time being, though it has since been renewed at £15,000,000. Hints of war followed. Sir Henry rejoiced.*

But he reckoned without his host. No other nation followed the British example. France, to be sure, obliged Moscow to recall Ambassador Rakovsky, but no break ensued. All Russia rallied to the defense of the Soviet régime in the face of the British threat. Worst of all, the situation threw the Soviet Naphtha Syndicate into thè arms of Standard Oil. With Russian oil now at its disposal on very favorable terms, the Standard (N.Y.) carried the war into India. Sir Henry hotly denounced this trafficking in "stolen goods" with "a gang of cut-throats, assassins and thieves" and began price-cutting in turn. At the time of writing sober British statesmen are wondering whether, after all, anything of value was achieved by the break with the Soviets and the Standard, with Russian oil as its weapon, is endeavoring to drive the Royal Dutch Shell out of its markets in India and the Near East.[89] The end is not yet.

Whether these circumstances are likely to have any effect on the American policy toward Russia is problematical. The State Department's position supported American oil interests at the time of Genoa and The Hague and it has not interfered with the dealings of the Standard of New York and the Vacuum Oil Company with the Soviets. It is perhaps not without significance that early in 1926 Mr. Ivy Lee, "adviser on public relations" of the Standard of New York, began a campaign for unrestricted trade relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.[90] The economic determinist may well reason that continued and increasing pressure of this kind from oil interests, banks, concessionaires, merchants and others interested in Russian trade will eventually bring about a resumption of diplomatic relations. This is indeed a probability—when and if American economic interests in Russia become much more important and influential than they are at present. But the undermining of a policy that has almost become a tradition and the swinging of the enormous inertia of public opinion in favor of recognition are not tasks to be accomplished in a day.

* To ascribe the Anglo-Soviet rupture and the Rakovsky imbroglio entirely to the influence of the Royal Dutch Shell would be to overlook other important factors in both situations. It is nevertheless very probable that Sir Henry Deterding played a decisive rôle in the drama.[88]

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE POLICY OF NON-RECOGNITION

1. The Legal Significance of Non-Recognition

In the preceding chapters the development of the policy of the United States toward Russia has been reviewed historically since March, 1917. Certain phases of that policy, such as the earlier insistence upon the preservation of Russian territorial integrity, have a purely historical interest and have lost much of their practical importance. The basic principle of non-recognition of the Soviet Government, however, has persisted without modification from the beginning. In the pages which follow an effort will be made to show the legal and political significance of the refusal of the American Government to recognize the Soviet Government, and to evaluate this policy by an analysis of the grounds upon which it rests. In the present chapter the legal implications of non-recognition will be briefly considered, a comparison of the present American policy with past practice and with the policies of the European nations will be undertaken, and the basic principles behind the American attitude will be indicated.

The policy pursued at Washington for the past decade has had certain interesting legal consequences which are worthy of brief notice as illustrating the difficulties and embarrassments which result from a prolonged suspension of diplomatic intercourse between two governments. These consequences are the logical outgrowth of the well-established principle that the judiciary accepts the views of the executive department of the government on all controversial questions of foreign relations.[1] This so-called "doctrine of political questions," as applied to the problem of recognition, simply means that a foreign government which is unrecognized by the political departments of the United States Government is treated as non-existent by American courts.[2]

The "political department" of the government might be taken to refer to the legislative as well as to the executive. In fact, however, recognition of foreign governments depends always upon the decision of the President and the Secretary of State. As has been shown

above, there has been, in the case of Russian recognition, no conflict between the two departments, Congress having consistently supported the President's policy in this respect. The question of a divergence of views between them is therefore, so far as the present topic is concerned, an academic one which may be dismissed with the general observation that Congress possesses no power of according recognition to foreign governments.[3] In practice recognition has always been extended or withheld by executive action.[4] In the instance under consideration there has been no departure from this precedent, nor is there any likelihood that it will be departed from in the future, since the sending and receiving of diplomatic representatives is, by its very nature, an executive function over which the legislature can have no direct control.

One consequence of non-recognition is that the representatives of the long-defunct Provisional Government continue to be regarded by American courts as the only lawful agents of the Russian State in all suits involving Russian interests in the United States. In January, 1919, for example, the Federal District Court of the Southern Division of New York was obliged to decide whether Ambassador Bakhmeteff could bring a suit for damages on behalf of the "Russian Government" against the Lehigh Valley Railway Company for the destruction of property owned by the Imperial Russian Government in the Black Tom Island explosion of July 29, 1916. The question was at once answered in the affirmative when certificates were presented from the Secretary of State showing that Bakhmeteff was still recognized as Russian Ambassador. "That this court is bound by the recognition of the political branch of its own government, and can and should look no further, is a proposition so well settled and so well grounded in common sense and in the necessities of orderly procedure that further discussion is unnecessary."[5] It was held a few months later in a similar case: "Who is the sovereign de jure or de facto of a country is a question for the political departments of the government. It is not a judicial question. The decision of the matter by the political departments is in this country conclusive upon the judges. . . . So that the certificate of the Secretary of State, above referred to, certifying to the official character of Boris Bakhmeteff as the Russian Ambassador to the United States is not only evidence, but it is the best evidence of Mr. Bakhmeteff's diplomatic character, and is to be regarded by the courts as conclusive of the question, and the court could not proceed upon argumentative or collateral proof."[6] All efforts of the unrecognized representatives

of the Soviet Government, such as Mr. Martens, to speak for Russia in American courts or to secure possession of Russian public property held by Bakhmeteff or his agents were unavailing.[7] Five years after its overthrow, the Kerensky Government was still treated as "the sovereignty that has succeeded to the former Russian Empire, and that government is the sole entity that is entitled to sovereign rights in relation to that territory." [8] After Bakhmeteff's retirement his financial attaché and successor, Serge Ughet, continued to enjoy the right to bring suits in the name of the Russian Government.[9] In December, 1927, he received $984,104.62 from the Lehigh Valley Railway Company following an award in the federal courts in the Black Tom suit. He expressed his satisfaction at being recognized as the "State of Russia" and, according to an agreement reached previously, turned the money, minus counsel's fees of $219,549.73, over to the Treasury in payment of Russia's debts—a procedure which led Litvinoff to protest vigorously and to reserve a claim to the sum on behalf of the Soviet Government.[10]

On the other hand the Soviet Government, being unrecognized, has no legal status and cannot bring suits in American courts. When it attempted in 1921 in the courts of New York to compel one Cibrario, with whom it had contracted for the purchase of motion picture supplies, to account for the moneys which, it was alleged, he had obtained fraudulently and embezzled, it received the following decision:

> Whenever the question has been raised in this state, it has been held that the test of the right of a foreign sovereignty to sue in our courts is its recognition by our own government. . . . In the case at bar, while plaintiff claims to be a de facto government, and its title and right to sue alike rest on that claim, it is unable to show any acts of recognition by the government of this country. On the contrary, the record proves that, so far as this country is concerned, the plaintiff is non-existent as a sovereignty. . . . All these facts appearing without contradiction, it follows that plaintiff, never having been recognized as a sovereignty by the executive or legislative branches of the United States Government, has no capacity to sue in the courts of this state.[11]

The courts of New York went so far as to lay down the doctrine that the Soviet Government might be made the object of suits in American courts, even though it possessed no right to bring suits itself. "It is a matter of common knowledge that the defendant, though not recognized by the government of the United States, is de facto, at least, the existing government of Russia. . . . But, being unrecognized and unacknowledged, it is not entitled to the immunities

accorded to recognized governments. . . . Like a foreign corporation which has failed to comply with the requirements of the General Corporation Law and the Tax Law, it cannot sue in our courts, but may be sued." [12] This decision, however, was subsequently overruled by the Court of Appeals, which held that no foreign government, sovereign and independent in fact, could be sued in the United States. "Such is not the proper method of redress if a citizen of the United States is wronged. The question is a political one, not confided to the courts, but to another department of government." [13]

Another interesting legal consequence of non-recognition is that all laws and decrees of the Soviet Government are treated as nullities in American courts. "The Soviet Government of Russia has never been recognized by our government; hence we may not ascribe any of the attributes of sovereignty to it. It follows that all the acts of that government in contemplation of American courts are ineffective, without consent of the parties concerned, to create, transfer, or nullify legal obligations." [14] Thus a bank is not relieved of its obligation to pay depositors by virtue of the fact that a portion of its assets, out of which such payment was to be made, has been nationalized by the Soviet Government.[15] Soviet confiscation of property can have no effect in American courts. "This government has never recognized the revolutionary government of Russia, and such decrees have no force or effect and are of no importance, except as interesting facts tending to fix dates." [16] A Russian corporation doing business in New York is relieved of none of its obligations by virtue of the fact that it has been dissolved by the Soviet Government. It is treated as though its existence continued unimpaired, the decree of dissolution being wholly disregarded.[17] Indeed, to the judicial mind, "Soviet Russia cannot exist" and all its acts are so many scraps of paper.[18]

The manifestly inequitable results to which this position sometimes leads caused the New York Court of Appeals to reconsider its wisdom in April, 1925. The case at bar was one in which the Russian Reinsurance Company, dissolved by the Soviet Government, brought action against the Bankers' Trust Company of New York to compel it to return securities and moneys which it held as trustee. The defendant resisted the claim on the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish ownership or right of possession to the exclusion of others, e.g., the Soviet Government, who might demand the property thereafter. That is to say, the Bankers' Trust Company feared that it might be obliged, after the recognition of the Soviet Government, to

make payment a second time to its agents, since the Soviet authorities had nationalized the insurance company and taken over all its property and claims. The court here took the view that the effect of Soviet decrees on private rights and obligations was not strictly a political question, but a judicial question of which the courts could take cognizance. The right of the plaintiff to recover was denied, on the ground that the court could not protect the defendant against a second recovery upon the same cause of action in the event of the recognition of the Soviet Government.[19]

This liberal view is clearly more conducive to a just determination in such cases than adherence to the fiction of the non-existence of the Soviet régime.* It is not, moreover, a violation of the doctrine of political questions. The court here is in no sense "recognizing" the Soviet Government or otherwise passing upon questions properly left to the political departments of the government. It is simply taking cognizance of certain facts which must be taken into consideration if private rights are to be adequately protected. As the court declared in the Russian Reinsurance Company case: "In testing a result by standards of common sense and justice we may look beyond all fictions to the facts behind them." [21] To do otherwise is to arrive at conclusions as absurd as they are inequitable. For the courts to regard Russian law as unchanged since November, 1917, simply because the State Department refuses to recognize the de facto government of Russia, is to treat private rights and obligations in a fashion wholly out of harmony with the irreducible facts upon which the determination of justice depends no less than upon abstract legal principles.[22]

In summary then the protracted non-recognition of the Soviet Government by the United States has led to many difficult and anomalous situations in American courts. They must adhere to the fiction that the Provisional Government of 1917 remains the government of Russia, though it vanished from the face of the earth, except for the "Russian Embassy" in Washington, a decade ago. They must recognize its representatives as the only lawful agents of the Russian State, though in fact they have represented nobody but themselves for over ten years. They must ignore the existence of the Soviet Government, though its effective political control over the Russian nation is undisputed, and they must treat all its acts as

* This view is by no means universally accepted as yet. In November, 1926, in a similar case, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court followed the older doctrine.[20]

nullities, however unjust and unreasonable the consequences may be, unless they overcome their reluctance to depart from precedent and accept the more liberal attitude foreshadowed in the Russian Reinsurance Company case.

2. *Past Recognition Policies of the United States*

Turning now to a consideration of the traditions and precedents of American foreign policy bearing upon the general question of the recognition of new governments, we may note in the first place that there have been historically two conflicting theories of action developed to meet this problem, the de jure theory and the de facto theory. The former, in its extreme form, holds that recognition should be extended to a new government only when it has acquired power by legal means and never when it is the product of revolutionary violence. This theory, obviously a reflection of the principle of legitimacy extolled by the members of the Holy Alliance in 1815 and the years following, is quite unworkable if carried to its logical conclusion, since it would completely deny the right of revolution and withhold recognition indefinitely from every revolutionary government. In practice it more often takes the form of a disposition to favor the maintenance of the status quo and to place upon every new government the burden of proving its right to admittance to the international family circle. The de facto theory, on the other hand, rests upon the contention that the only relevant consideration in determining whether or not a new government should be recognized is the simple fact of its effective control of the State. If the new authorities are securely in power and in a position to assume the obligations of a government, recognition should follow as a matter of course.[23]

The de facto theory was early adopted by the United States, which in fact took the lead in developing and consistently following its principles. Jefferson declared it to be an American policy "to acknowledge any government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared." He declared that "the will of the nation" was "the only thing essential to be regarded." [24] That will was manifested by the simple fact of control. A new régime once in effective de facto control of a State should at once be recognized as a government.[25] This view was followed when the question of recognizing the new revolutionary government of France was first presented for decision in 1793. Citizen Genet was received

as French Minister without any inquiry into the character of the régime which he represented aside from the fact of its effective governance of France. The same policy was followed in extending recognition to the new States of Latin America following their revolt from Spain. In arguing for their recognition in Congress in 1818 Henry Clay declared:

> We have constantly proceeded on the principle that the government de facto is that we can alone notice. Whatever form of government any society of people adopts, whomever they acknowledge as their sovereign, we consider that government, or that sovereignty, as the one to be acknowledged by us. We have invariably abstained from assuming a right to decide in favor of the sovereign de jure and against the sovereign de facto. That is a question for the nation in which it arises to determine. And so far as we are concerned, the sovereign de facto is the sovereign de jure. . . . As soon as stability and order are maintained, no matter by whom, we have always considered and ought to consider the actual as the true government.[26]

Similarly, Secretary of State Buchanan, in approving the action of Minister Rush in recognizing the government of the Second French Republic, declared in 1848:

> In its intercourse with foreign nations, the Government of the United States has, from its origin, always recognized de facto governments. We recognize the right of all nations to create and reform their political institutions, according to their own will and pleasure. We do not go behind the existing government to involve ourselves in the question of legitimacy. It is sufficient for us to know that a government exists, capable of maintaining itself; and then its recognition on our part inevitably follows.[27]

Four years later, when the Republic had given way to the Second Empire, Secretary Webster expressed the same view:

> From President Washington's time down to the present day it has been a principle, always acknowledged by the United States, that every nation possesses a right to govern itself according to its own will, to change institutions at discretion, and to transact business through whatever agents it may think proper to employ. This cardinal point in our policy has been strongly illustrated by recognizing the many forms of political power which have been successively adopted by France in the series of revolutions with which that country has been visited.[28]

Prior to the Civil War the de facto theory was so consistently followed by the United States as to give it something of the character of a tradition of American foreign policy. As one student asserts, "It forms one of the distinctive contributions of the United States

diplomacy to the present international system."[29] It early became associated with the rule of non-intervention in the affairs of foreign powers as an established principle of action. In 1861, however, Secretary Seward took the view that a revolutionary government in a republican State ought not to be recognized by the United States if it secured power by force of arms in defiance of the existing Constitution and contrary to the will of the people.[30] This position was a distinct departure from the pure de facto principle, since it made popular acquiescence and legal procedure criteria of recognition apart from the mere fact of the existence of a new régime. Under the old theory de facto control was taken as satisfactory evidence of the acceptance of the new government by the nation. Under the new more was demanded. This view was followed for some years,[31] but later the de facto principle was reverted to and secured general acceptance not only by American governments, but by the European Powers as well.[32] Recognition came to be regarded as a mere formality, to be granted to a new régime as soon as it was apparent that it was in de facto control and therefore in a position to enter upon normal relations with other governments. Goebel explains this position as follows:

> To my mind, the recognition of governments is purely a formality, and attempts to make it something different are born of a misconception of the relations between the state and government. Changes in governmental forces are merely changes in the internal order, and, although governments are the direct bearers of international rights and obligations, they are not a part of the international system in the sense that states themselves are. For this reason changes in the form of a state cannot affect the obligations themselves, a truth which is contained in the ancient maxim: *forma regiminis mutata non mutatur civitas ipsa.* It follows from this that the only international question to which a change of government gives rise is, what authority is vested with the capacity to carry on international relations? It is important to note that this question can occur only where there is a conflict of authority. Where there is no struggle between the old and the new régime, the international relations should proceed as if there had been no change.[33]

Such was the view followed fairly consistently by the American Government until the Administration of President Wilson, who returned to the position of Seward. In refusing recognition to President Huerta of Mexico, he expounded his new recognition policy. Huerta had secured his office through the assassination of his predecessor, Madero. While the de facto character of his control was unquestioned, his rule, in the opinion of President Wilson,

rested upon force and violence rather than upon the will of the Mexican people. In Wilson's view, a government created by force, in violation of a democratic Constitution under which political changes can be brought about by peaceful means, ought not to be recognized.

> Co-operation is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. We hold, as I am sure all thoughtful leaders of republican government everywhere hold, that just government rests always upon the consent of the governed, and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon the public conscience and approval. We shall look to make these principles the basis of mutual intercourse, respect and helpfulness between our sister republics and ourselves.[84]

Three years later President Wilson restated this principle:

> So long as the power of recognition rests with me the Government of the United States will refuse to extend the hand of welcome to anyone who obtains power in a sister republic by treachery and violence. No permanency can be given the affairs of any republic by a title based upon intrigue and assassination. I declared that to be the policy of this Administration within three weeks after I assumed the presidency. I here again avow it. I am more interested in the fortunes of oppressed men and pitiful women and children than in any property rights whatever.[85]

This policy of non-recognition led to Huerta's retirement in 1915. In 1917 it was applied with the same result to the Tinoco Government of Costa Rica. The principle behind the policy is well stated by Hyde:

> The United States now appears to take the stand that normally a government, which by force has won the ascendency in opposition to the will of the people and with contempt for rights created under a local constitution, is internationally a menace because its very supremacy sows seeds of discord bound to ripen into a conflict which, however localized, may fairly be deemed hurtful to the maintenance of the general peace. It is doubtless also believed that a government of such a character will lack those moral qualifications which are found to be essential to enable the agencies of a State to perform scrupulously its obligations to the outside world.[86]

It is interesting to note that this conception was in 1923 embodied in a treaty concluded at Washington, under the auspices of the American Government, between the five States of Central America.[87] The principles there set forth were referred to by President Coolidge early in 1927 in explaining the military intervention of the United

States in Nicaragua in favor of the recognized Conservative government and in opposition to the Liberal revolutionists.[88] As regards Central America at least, the recognition policy of President Wilson appears to have been accepted by his successors as wise and expedient.

Is the policy of the non-recognition of the Soviet Government simply an extension, then, of the policy pursued toward the Latin-American Republics? On the surface this might seem to be the case. In Russia, too, a government was set up by a party representing a small minority of the population through an armed coup d'état in defiance of a constitution (still in prospect, to be sure) permitting peaceful political change. The de facto theory of recognition would seem to require the recognition of the Soviet Government, since its effective control of Russia for a long period of years has been unquestioned.[89] It would appear to follow that the withholding of recognition is to be regarded as a departure from the traditional recognition policy of the United States and as an extension of the principles laid down by President Wilson in the case of Mexico. A closer analysis of the situation, however, will reveal that these conclusions are, in part at least, unwarranted. Suffice it to say in summary at this point that the traditional policy of the United States in regard to the recognition of new governments had been founded upon the de facto principle until President Wilson, following the doctrine earlier laid down by Seward, sought to make popular approval and adherence to established constitutions the criteria of judgment. A consideration of the relation of the policy pursued toward Russia to these precedents may be appropriately deferred to a later section, pending a discussion of the policies which various other governments have pursued toward the Soviet régime.

3. European Policies Toward Russia

The Russian policy of the Wilson Administration, it will be recalled, was adopted in harmony with the Allied Governments, at least as regards non-recognition of the Soviet Government. The principle of preserving Russian territorial integrity was distinctively an American policy in which the Allies reluctantly acquiesced. Military intervention, on the other hand, was an Allied policy in which the United States unwillingly participated. Its failure led to the reassertion of the principle of non-intervention by the United States and its acceptance by the Allies. But the western govern-

ments were one in refusing to recognize the Soviet Government, and great efforts were made to continue this common policy. With the lifting of the blockade by the Supreme Council in January, 1920, however, the "united front" began to crack. Rifts and friction developed, and since 1921 each of the Powers has followed a more or less independent policy toward Russia.

The details of the negotiations between Moscow and the various central and western European capitals obviously can not be discussed at length here, but a brief historical review will serve to illustrate the divergent policies which various governments have pursued toward the Soviets.[40] First to break the "cordon sanitaire" against Bolshevist Russia were the governments of the Baltic States. When it became apparent in the autumn of 1919 that the Soviet Government had triumphed over its domestic and foreign foes, the Baltic States decided that wisdom required that they make their peace with it. Negotiations were begun in Dorpat in November, 1919, ostensibly for the exchange of prisoners but actually for the discussion of the terms on which hostilities could be terminated. Later in the same month Litvinoff proceeded to Copenhagen by permission of the Danish Government and there met a British emissary, James O'Grady, with whom he commenced conversations, also theoretically confined to the question of the exchange of prisoners, but extending to more general issues. The Dorpat pourparlers were finally successful and led to the conclusion of peace treaties between the Soviet Government and the Baltic States in February, 1920.[41]

The British Government, in marked contrast to both France and the United States, continued its efforts to reach some kind of a settlement with the Soviet authorities. The negotiations which were resumed in spring in London were protracted and tedious, but they at length culminated on March 16, 1921, in the signature of a trade agreement by Sir Robert Horne and Leonid Krassin. This instrument represented a definite break between British policy and that of the continental Allies and the American Government and constituted the first de facto recognition which the Soviet régime had received from any of the western Powers in the post-armistice period.* The agreement provided for mutual cessation of hostile propaganda, repatriation of all war prisoners, freedom of commerce

* "De facto," as distinguished from "de jure," recognition, simply means that official cognizance has been taken of the existence of the new government without a complete resumption of diplomatic relations. The British courts held that the trade agreement constituted such recognition in the case of Luther *v.* Sagor and Company, 1 KB 1921, 456; S.C., 3 KB 1921, 532.

and navigation, the exchange of trade representatives and official agents, and the protection from attachment of Russian gold sent to England to pay for imports.[42]

Other governments soon followed the British example. On May 6, 1921, a German-Russian trade agreement was signed.[43] On September 2 Norway followed suit,[44] while Austria, which had already concluded an agreement with the Soviet Government for the exchange of prisoners on July 5, 1920, signed a trade compact on December 7.[45] After prolonged conversations, Italy did likewise on December 26, 1921. France remained cold to suggestions of a resumption of relations, but by the end of 1922, following the failure of the attempt at a collective settlement undertaken at Genoa and The Hague, her hostility toward the Soviet Government had begun to wane.[46] The years 1922 and 1923 saw further progress in the direction of a general abandonment of the policy of non-recognition. By the Treaty of Rapallo, signed April 16, 1922, Germany extended de jure recognition to the Soviet Government. In June a commercial agreement was concluded between Russia and Czecho-Slovakia. Denmark concluded a trade treaty on April 23, 1923.[47]

The year 1924 saw the culmination of the movement on the part of the western Powers to resume normal relations with Russia. Once more Great Britain took the lead. The Labor Government granted de jure recognition to the Soviet régime on February 1.[48] Italy followed on the 7th, Norway on the 13th and Austria on the 20th. March saw Greece, Dantzig and Sweden join the ranks. China did the same on May 31, Denmark on June 18, and Mexico extended full recognition in August.[49] Premier Herriot announced de jure recognition of the Soviet Government by France on October 28.[50] Japan fell into line by signing an agreement with Soviet representatives at Peking on January 21, 1925, providing for full recognition of the Soviet Government by Japan and for Japanese evacuation of Northern Sakhalin by May 15 in return for a Russian expression of regret at the Nikolaevsk massacre and for oil and coal concessions on the island.[51]

The United States was thus left as the last of the Great Powers still clinging to a policy of non-recognition.* All the others have now accepted Soviet Russia into the family of nations and resumed diplomatic intercourse with Moscow though Great Britain severed relations with the U.S.S.R. in May, 1927. Once the de facto character of the Soviet Government was undisputed and all hopes

* See Appendix VI.

of overthrowing it were abandoned, there was a disposition to accept the inevitable and to extend recognition to the régime which, for all its radicalism and other reprehensible features, seemed destined, for a long period of time to come, to remain in political control of the most numerous white people of the world, occupying an expanse of contiguous territory in Europe and Asia larger than that possessed by any other three of the Great Powers. The de facto theory of recognition, based as it is on the obvious convenience and necessity of maintaining diplomatic contacts between nations, clearly seemed to require that the ostracism of Soviet Russia be terminated. Practical political and economic considerations made recognition appear wise and expedient to most of the western governments. But in Washington, despite the customary recognition policy of the United States and despite the tradition of Russian-American friendship, the European example was not followed. The American Government would not "barter away its principles" even though all the rest of the world broke the faith by extending the hand of welcome into international society to the Red dictators in the Kremlin.

4. Why Recognition Is Withheld

What, then, are the basic principles upon which the American position rests and which the President and the State Department have so persistently refused to surrender? Does the American policy represent an admitted abandonment of the de facto theory of recognition? Is it an extension of the policy pursued by President Wilson toward Latin America? Or is it based upon an entirely novel conception of recognition to which the United States will adhere in its future dealings with revolutionary governments? Upon the answers to these questions, and upon an analysis of the fundamentals of the American attitude, as distinguished from the superficial and the ephemeral, must depend any attempt at a critical evaluation of the policy which the United States has pursued toward the U.S.S.R.

During the period of intervention and civil war in Russia the real or imagined instability of the Soviet régime was undoubtedly a consideration behind the refusal of the American Government to recognize it. Its origin in a coup d'état, its radical program and its supposedly unrepresentative character were factors of even greater importance, since President Wilson, in his dealings with Russia as well as with Latin America, sought to use recognition as a political

weapon to maintain and preserve democratic political institutions of the familiar American variety.

But it may be noted that this conception of the rôle of recognition is one which in practice leads to such difficulties as to make its wisdom and practicability extremely questionable. It seeks to make recognition a political instrument to compel foreign States to conform to a particular political pattern which the United States regards as a universal ideal. Governments which are not democratic and based upon the will of the people should not be recognized. To give general application to such a doctrine in this day of the eclipse of democratic institutions would be to disrupt the whole fabric of international intercourse. By this principle the dictatorial governments of Italy, Spain, Hungary or Bulgaria would be no more deserving of recognition than that of Russia. Even President Wilson did not apply his theory consistently and it is quite unlikely that it will ever become the established recognition policy of the United States.

While the unrepresentative character of the Communist régime has continued to furnish material for denunciation by newspaper editors, ministers and Congressmen, Wilson's successors in the White House and the State Department have not made it an official ground for withholding recognition. In fact it was repeatedly emphasized that the American Government was not concerned with the internal affairs of Russia. In his letter to Samuel Gompers, Secretary Hughes declared, "We are not concerned with the question of the legitimacy of a government as judged by former European standards. We recognize the right of revolution and we do not attempt to determine the internal concerns of other States." The will of a foreign nation might be manifested by "long continued acquiescence in a régime actually functioning as a government." [52] In the case of Russia, indeed, the question of acquiescence remained an "open one." But the Wilsonian theory of recognition was repudiated. Non-recognition of the Soviet Government no longer rested upon considerations of its violent origin or its undemocratic character, but upon quite different grounds.

One of the objectives emphasized by both Hughes and Hoover was the economic reconstruction of the Russian nation. This goal had also been one of the bases of Wilson's Russian policy. At no time was it stated in so many words that this was the purpose of non-recognition. But the implication was that the entire American policy was dictated by a desire to facilitate the economic rehabilitation

of the Russian State. Communism was regarded as an unworkable economic system. So long as efforts to make it work continued, Russia must remain an "economic vacuum." To extend diplomatic recognition to the communist régime would be to encourage its persistence in a course of folly. To withhold recognition might be conducive to a return to sanity. Friendship and solicitude for the salvation of the Russian people therefore required that the Soviet Government be denied recognition until it had made fundamental changes in economic theory and practice.

This view was put forward largely in reply to those advocates of recognition who insisted that a resumption of political relations would hasten Russia's economic recovery. It was never presented as a well-reasoned argument in defense of the official policy. And, indeed, it is difficult to perceive any logical basis in support of such a position. Whatever recognition may or may not imply, and whatever the theory upon which it is extended or withheld, the economic welfare of the foreign State would seem to be a wholly irrelevant consideration. To use recognition, as Wilson sought to use it, to propagate certain political theories was, in effect, difficult and impracticable. To use it to control the development of economic ideas and institutions abroad would seem to be something of a *reductio ad absurdum*. While prosperity might perhaps be regarded as an evidence of stability, it is difficult to conceive of any reasoned theory of international law under which the promotion of the material prosperity of a foreign State could be regarded as a proper motive in determining whether or not its government should be recognized. Since this strange conception of the rôle of recognition was not developed or emphasized as a basis of the American attitude, no further demonstration of its unworkability would appear necessary.

If, then, we conclude that the policy of the United States toward Russia, viewed here from the standpoint of law and not of political expediency, is no longer based upon doubt as to the stability of the Soviet Government nor upon considerations relating to its internal political or economic institutions, what remains in the way of fundamental principles behind the refusal to extend recognition? To minimize the importance of the motives which have already been discussed would, of course, be a serious error. The mental processes of those responsible for the policy which has been adopted are not to be over-simplified and over-rationalized by dismissing from consideration all in their reasoning that appears logically weak and indefensible. The views that have been presented above unquestion-

ably played a very real part in the determination of the American policy. But they are essentially irrelevant, fictitious and unworkable so far as a reasoned defense of non-recognition on legal grounds is concerned. The wisdom of the policy must be judged upon other and more fundamental considerations—considerations foreshadowed in the Colby note of August 10, 1920, and clearly expressed and consistently followed by Secretary Hughes and his successor. These considerations are embodied in the three key-notes of all recent statements of policy: propaganda, repudiation and confiscation.

Reduced to the simplest possible terms, the American position is as follows: The Soviet régime, though in de facto control of Russia, is not a "government" which is prepared to meet the obligations imposed upon it by international law, and to maintain normal diplomatic relations with other States. It is not, in the American official view, a national Russian government, capable of fulfilling Russian national obligations, but a congeries of international revolutionists who simply happen, by more or less accidental circumstances, to have secured control of Russia. They serve the world revolution first and Russia second. They regard Russia simply as a jumping-off place for the realization of their larger designs against all other governments. The impracticability of maintaining normal intercourse with them is demonstrated first by their support and encouragement of hostile propaganda directed against the governments of all other States with the object of overthrowing them and replacing them by Communist régimes similar to that prevailing in Russia.* It is further revealed by their open repudiation of the financial obligations of preceding Russian governments, and by their "nationalization," without any color of right or offer of compensation, of the property of foreign citizens previously acquired by them in all honesty and good faith.[54] These policies, deliberately adopted by the Soviet Government as part of its world revolutionary program, render all hope of amicable relations with it futile. "These leaders (i.e., of the Communist Party) recognized fully . . . that the Bolshevik conception of society and the social order of Western

* "The danger to our government and to our institutions may not be immediate. The importance of this matter lies not in the measure of success which may attend these subversive activities, but rather in the fact that they are being made, and that they are being carried on in accordance with instructions received from the authorities at Moscow. And when we are asked to accord recognition, is it unreasonable on the part of those charged with the conduct of foreign affairs of this government to insist that these activities must cease and to decline to enter into negotiations with that régime until these efforts on the part of Moscow are abandoned?" [53]

Europe are in their fundamentals so directly opposed one to the other that harmonious and trustful relations between political systems embodying these different ideas are impracticable and indeed impossible." [55]

If we concede that these are the fundamental considerations behind the American policy, we may next ask what relation they bear to the past recognition practice of the United States. The policy clearly does not constitute a new application of the Wilsonian theory, since it rests primarily upon the unwillingness of the Soviet régime to fulfill its international obligations rather than upon considerations of representative character and popular support. Nor is it a reversion to the de jure theory of recognition. Upon superficial examination, it would seem to be an abandonment of the de facto theory as well, and to be something of a new departure in recognition policies. This view, however, cannot be accepted in the light of a careful consideration of the implications of the de facto theory. This theory would appear to require the recognition of a new régime as soon as its effective control of the nation is beyond dispute. But recognition is not an object in itself. It is only a means to an end: the resumption of normal diplomatic relations between the new régime and other governments. "If the new government is a body which in fact alone can carry out the international obligations of the State, it should be recognized as legally charged therewith. This is the essence of the so-called de facto theory of recognition. It takes as its basis of judgment the power to carry out international obligations." [56] In the past the mere existence and successful maintenance of the new order was regarded as sufficient evidence of its ability to fulfill the international obligations of the State and to enter upon normal diplomatic relations with other States. The latter was regarded as the natural corollary of the former. In the case of the Provisional Government of March, 1917, recognition was accorded at once. Its de facto existence was taken as adequate proof of its ability and desire to meet its obligations and to enter upon the relations common between friendly governments.

But in the case of the Soviet Government, de facto existence, even over a period of many years, has not been regarded in this light. The view has prevailed in Washington that an entirely novel situation is here presented in which the customary tacit assumption of the de facto theory cannot be made. That is to say, the mere existence of the Soviet régime does not constitute evidence that it is prepared to fulfill its international obligations and conduct itself

toward other States as the requirements of amicable intercourse dictate. On the contrary, its very existence is predicated upon a policy of hostility toward all "bourgeois" governments and of the repudiation of the obligations of its predecessors. It does not, then, meet the criteria which the de facto theory of recognition imposes. From this point of view, the American policy is not a departure from the de facto theory. It is, to be sure, a novel and unprecedented application of it. But this circumstance is ascribed not to any new interpretation of the theory, but to the novel and unprecedented character of the régime which has controlled Russia since November, 1917.

In the two chapters which follow it is proposed to examine some of the evidence upon which this view rests. The legal justifiability of the policy of non-recognition clearly depends upon whether or not the allegations behind it are well founded. Are they mere figments of imagination? Or does Russia in fact pursue policies which make it incapable of normal relations with other States and justify the refusal of the American Government to invite intercourse with it by extending recognition?

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE PROPAGANDA OF WORLD REVOLUTION

1. The Philosophy of Communism

THAT the Russian Revolution was in a sense predestined to have extensive international reverberations and to be characterized to a peculiar degree by the proselyting spirit common to all great revolutionary movements might have been foreseen by any careful student of the long germinating forces which produced the final explosion. From the very beginning the revolutionary leaders in Russia, regardless of their particular political complexion, tended to be internationalists. Obliged, as they were, to flee the wrath of the Tsar's police by going into exile abroad, they inevitably acquired a cosmopolitan outlook and became closely associated with revolutionary groups in the capitals of Western Europe. The great anarchist leader, Michael Bakunin (1814-1876), who spent most of his life conspiring and propagandizing in almost every nation on the continent against the political and social status quo, was but a prototype of his numerous successors.[1] Among such men nationalism was at a discount and internationalism became a gospel. Conventional patriotism lost all flavor when its symbol was the hated Autocrat of all the Russias.

This attitude was, of course, peculiarly characteristic of the Social-Democratic Party, since it constituted the Russian section of a revolutionary movement which was truly international in its organization and objectives. Among the most fundamental tenets of Marxian Socialism were the doctrines that the class war transcended all national boundaries and that the ultimate emancipation of the proletariat from the chains of capitalism would be achieved by a world-wide cataclysm in which the workers would overthrow the bourgeoisie and inaugurate the co-operative commonwealth. Both the Menshevist and the Bolshevist wings of the party accepted these principles in full, but the former represented the "reformist" movement which was much less orthodox and uncompromising than that of the more radical defenders of the Marxist faith. To discuss

in any detail the political and social theories of the Socialist movement and the international aspects of its political organization prior to the Russian Revolution would obviously carry us far afield. It will be sufficient for present purposes to attempt a brief sketch of the philosophy of the Bolshevist or Communist Party as a means of understanding the raison d'être of its international propagandist activities and revealing the motivating forces behind the Third International.

To the Communist leaders the overthrow of Tsarism was but the first step toward their goal. Even the inauguration of the class struggle in Russia between workers, soldiers and peasants on the one hand and the landlords and bourgeoisie on the other, culminating in the establishment of the Soviet Government, was only a preparation for larger things. The creation of a proletarian dictatorship in Russia was simply the first phase of the international proletarian revolution. By Marxian theory, to be sure, the revolution should come first in the highly industrial countries, such as England or Germany, where capitalism had already reached its highest development. But if peculiar circumstances of war and political chaos enabled the Communists to seize power in Russia before the comrades abroad could act, well and good. The comrades would soon follow the glorious example of their Russian brothers and the world revolution would follow closely on the heels of the Russian Revolution. Once in control of Russia, the Communists would be in a position to bend all their energies toward the achievement of this objective. As early as 1915, at the conference of "left wing" party groups held at Zimmerwald, Switzerland, Lenin and Zinovieff answered the question of the immediate policy of the party in the event of its gaining power in Russia during the war as follows:

> We would offer peace to all the combatants on the basis of the liberation of the colonies and of all dependent, down-trodden and subject races. Neither Germany nor France nor England would accept these terms under their present governments. We would then prepare (after a separate peace with Germany, of course) to carry out in full by the most decisive measures our minimum programme, and also systematically to stir up revolt amongst all the peoples at present oppressed by the great Russians, amongst the colonies and dependent countries of Asia, India, China, Persia, etc., and also, above all, to call to arms the Socialist proletariat of Europe against their governments and in spite of their chauvinist Socialists. There is no doubt that the victory of the proletariat in Russia would create exceptionally favorable conditions for the development of revolution both in Asia and in Europe.[2]

Similarly, Trotsky in the spring of 1917, before the November Revolution:

> Internationalism in our eyes is not an abstract notion, existing only to be betrayed at every moment . . ., but an immediately dominant, profoundly practical principle. Permanent, decisive successes are not conceivable for us without a European Revolution. We cannot therefore purchase partial successes at the price of such procedures and combinations as may put obstacles in the path of the European proletarian movement. Just for this reason an uncompromising opposition to the social-patriots is for us the condition sine qua non of all our political work.[3]

The "social-patriots" were, of course, the Socialist groups in the various belligerent countries who had "betrayed" their ideals by supporting the war. For these the Bolshevist leaders had the most complete contempt. In their view true Socialism required the most implacable opposition to war in all forms as waged by bourgeois governments. The first goal of the Revolution must be an end of the conflict through the united action of the European proletariat. This achieved, the great struggle against capitalism and imperialism could be begun on an international scale with every prospect of success.

It should be noted that this attitude was by no means confined to the Bolsheviks. The Mensheviks took the same view in the spring of 1917, while the Socialist Revolutionaries were divided. This is clearly shown by the various pronouncements of the Petrograd Soviet during the period when it was still dominated by the more moderate Socialist leaders. These leaders, and the rank and file of the Russian workers, clearly were thinking in terms of peace through international proletarian action and of world-wide revolt against capitalism, long before the Bolsheviks won their confidence. Indeed, the remarkable success of the Bolshevist appeals was due as much to the fertile soil on which they fell as to their own effectiveness as propaganda. The entire Russian labor movement was thoroughly permeated with the doctrines of Marxism long before Lenin and his colleagues appeared on the scene.

The Bolsheviks, however, were international revolutionists *par excellence*. They differed from their Menshevist rivals chiefly in their implacable hostility to all that savored of "reformism," their relentless logic in carrying the tenets of Marxian orthodoxy to the last extreme of reason, and their more radical and uncompromising internationalism. When they secured power in the November Revo-

lution, they soon made known the nature of their program. Not only did they propose to bring the war to an immediate conclusion on the basis of no annexations and no indemnities,[4] but they proposed to encourage world-wide social revolution as the most efficacious means toward this end.[5]

To such skilled professional propagandists as the Bolshevist leaders the means which at once suggested itself for the achievement of these objectives was the promulgation of inflammatory appeals addressed to the international proletariat. Early in December, 1917, the Council of People's Commissars appropriated two million rubles "for the needs of the revolutionary internationalist movement, at the disposition of the foreign representatives of the Commissarist of Foreign Affairs." By way of explanation the decree asserted:

> Taking into consideration that Soviet authority stands on the ground of the principles of international solidarity of the proletariat and the brotherhood of the toilers of all countries, that the struggle against war and imperialism, only on an international scale, can lead to complete victory, the Council of People's Commissars considers it necessary to come forth with all aid, including financial aid, to the assistance of the left, internationalist, wing of the workers' movement of all countries, entirely regardless of whether these countries are at war with Russia, or in alliance, or whether they retain their neutrality.[6]

While the program was thus a general one, aiming at a truly "world" revolution, its immediate objective was inevitably Germany, both because of her geographical accessibility and because her imperialistic government insisted upon a conqueror's peace. Here the interests of the Communists happened to coincide with their interests as the rulers of the Russian State. With this double inspiration, they set busily to work to provoke a proletarian revolution in Central Europe. Valiant attempts were made to convert the war prisoners in Russia to the new gospel, both by written appeals and by addresses in their own language by skillful agitators.[7] The "Bureau of International Revolutionary Propaganda," headed by one Boris Reinstein of Buffalo, New York, aided by two other American Socialists, John Reed and Albert Rhys Williams,[8] supervised the preparation of huge quantities of propagandist literature in German which was speedily rushed toward the front. An inflammatory paper, *Die Faekel* (*The Torch*), was established and regularly printed for distribution behind the German lines. And in these efforts the Allied and American Governments rejoiced, even going so far as to extend encouragement and financial support.

In so far as these activities were directed toward preventing the imposition of a peace of conquest upon Russia by the Central Powers, they were of course unsuccessful. The sword seemed mightier than the pen. The fulminations of the Communist propagandists availed nothing against the grim realities of Brest-Litovsk. But the Bolshevist leaders were not prepared to abandon their efforts, despite the terms of the peace forbidding any further attempts to undermine the German Government. Propaganda was intensified in Central Europe and in November, the German revolution came at last. But, to the chagrin of the Soviet leaders, the German proletariat was "betrayed" by the Social Democrats. The accursed "reformists" and "social-patriots" made their peace with the bourgeoisie and "stabbed the workers in the back." While the Soviet envoy, Joffe, was expelled from Berlin, the troops of Ebert, Scheidemann and Noske suppressed the Spartacists and drowned all hopes of a German proletarian dictatorship in blood. This débâcle was a heavy blow to the dreams of the Moscow revolutionists. But Soviet Russia could afford to wait. If the world revolution came not today, it would come tomorrow. To every good Communist, its eventual triumph was as inevitable as the tides of the sea or the movements of the planets. Only patience and "daring, persistent propaganda" were needed.

With the progress of intervention, however, and the constantly growing menace of the White Armies throughout 1919, the Communist theory of the world revolution underwent a distinct change. With their backs to the wall, fighting in desperation for their very lives, the Bolshevist leaders now came to view their lot as hopeless without active assistance from the proletariat of the Allied countries. Only through the world revolution could Soviet Russia be saved from the clutches of the international bourgeoisie who were slowly strangling her to death. It was no longer merely a pleasant anticipation, but had become a vital necessity, the only means of salvation for the hard-pressed defenders of the citadel of Bolshevism.[9] Bukharin stated the new position as follows:

> The Communist Revolution can triumph only as a world revolution. If, for example, the working class seized the power in any one country, while the proletariat of other countries still supported capitalism, not from fear, but from conviction, the great predatory States would ultimately strangle the proletarian one. . . . If it is true that for the victory of Communism the triumph of the world revolution and the mutual support of the workers are indispensable, then it follows that a necessary condition for success is the international solidarity of the working class.

. . . Only the most complete trust in one another, a fraternal union, the unity of revolutionary deeds against world capital can insure victory to the working class. The Communist working class movement can win only as an *International* Communist movement.[10]

With the energy of fear and despair, the Communists now redoubled their efforts to undermine the governments which were making war upon them and to combat their foes with the propaganda of world revolution.[11] They were rewarded by seeing Communist régimes established for the first time outside of Russia. Unfortunately the proletariat did not seize power where its seizure would be of greatest benefit to the Russian comrades. No soviets blossomed forth in Paris or London or Rome or Washington. But on March 21, 1919, the Soviet Government of Hungary was established with Bela Kun as premier. He at once got into communication with Lenin, who was overjoyed by what appeared at last to be the beginning of the world revolution.[12] On April 7, after many bloody disorders throughout Germany, a Bavarian Soviet was proclaimed at Munich. Chicherin at once sent fraternal greetings and hopes for success.[13] Had they been in a position to do so, the Russian leaders undoubtedly would have sent military aid to the comrades abroad. But Bavaria and Hungary were far away and Soviet Russia was encircled by the bayonets of Kolchak, Denikin and the Allies. After a few hectic months, the government of Bela Kun in Budapest succumbed to the Rumanian invaders and the White terrorists who came in their wake, and the Munich Soviet was smashed by Noske's Reichswehr. Once more the hopes of world revolution had to be deferred.

With the end of intervention and civil war, and the failure of the world revolution to materialize, some of the Communist leaders, hoping for recognition and a restoration of sorely needed trade relations with the west, expressed a readiness to abandon revolutionary propaganda entirely. Thus Radek declared in March, 1920: "If our capitalistic partners abstain from counter-revolutionary activities in Russia, the Soviet Government will abstain from carrying on revolutionary activities in capitalist countries; but we shall determine if they are carrying on counter-revolutionary agitation. . . . The guarantees which our enemies are demanding from us lie in the interests of both parties."[14] But such proposals did not mean that the Communists were prepared to throw overboard their grandiose schemes for revolutionizing the world. They simply indicated their readiness to abandon propaganda in their capacity as rulers of the

Russian State. Their work as leaders of the newly organized Third International was something quite apart. This remarkable organization, the most complete expression of the Communist philosophy and the means through which its aims are to be achieved, must now be discussed, not, of course, with the object of giving any complete account of its history and activities, but of understanding it as a manifestation of the revolutionary internationalism of the Soviet leaders.

2. The Communist International

When the Second Socialist International, successor to the first and original "International Workingmen's Association," which had been founded by Marx himself and had expired in 1876, found its internationalism put to the supreme test in the war of 1914, it cracked under the strain and temporarily dissolved. Following the example of the German Social Democrats, who at once rallied to the cause of the Kaiser on the ground that the war was "defensive," the other Socialist parties in the belligerent countries put aside all their long cherished dreams of international proletarian solidarity as a means of preserving peace and supported their respective governments. In each nation only a small, ultra-radical minority remained true to the faith. Lenin and his confreres, deeply disgusted with the "social-traitors," pronounced the Second International dead and, on their arrival in Russia in 1917, began to lay plans for calling a conference to bury it and established its successor, the Third, or Communist International. So long as the war continued, the difficulties in the way of the project were insuperable. But on January 24, 1919, Lenin and Trotsky issued an official summons to the "left" Socialist groups of all countries to send delegates to a Congress to be held in Moscow.[15]

The First Congress of the Third International was held in the Soviet Capital from March 2 to March 6, 1919. The attendance was small and unrepresentative. Thirty-two voting delegates were present from Russia, Germany, Hungary, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Bulgaria, Rumania, Finland, Ukraine, Esthonia and Armenia. Representatives of Socialist parties in France, Great Britain, the United States, Turkey, Switzerland, Holland, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, Turkestan, Persia and Korea also appeared, but these had no vote.[16] At the time of the Congress, the armies of Kolchak were advancing westward from Siberia and the future of the Soviet

régime appeared dark. The delegates concluded that they could do no more than to place the new International officially on its feet and to issue an appeal for support. A new "Communist Manifesto" was accordingly drawn up and issued on March 10. It was signed by the committee which had drafted it, composed of C. Rakovsky (Balkan Socialist Federation), N. Lenin, L. Trotsky and G. Zinovieff (Russian Communist Party), and F. Platten (Swiss Socialist Party). This lengthy document constitutes one of the most complete and authoritative statements of the objectives of the Third International in existence. It opens with an appeal to the traditions of the past and an introductory statement of the purpose of the Congress:

To the Proletariat of All Countries!

Seventy-two years have gone by since the Communist Party proclaimed its programme in the form of the Manifesto written by the greatest teachers of the proletarian revolution, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Even at that time, when Communism had scarcely come into the arena of conflict, it was pursued by the lies, hatred and calumny of the possessing classes, who rightly suspected in it their mortal enemy. During these seven decades Communism has traveled a hard road; of ascent followed by periods of sharp decline; successes, but also severe defeats. In spite of all, the development at bottom went the way forecast by the Manifesto of the Communist Party. The epoch of the last decisive battle came later than the apostles of the social revolution expected and wished. But it has come.

We, Communists, representatives of the revolutionary proletariat of the different countries of Europe, America and Asia, assembled in Soviet Moscow, feel and consider ourselves followers and fulfillers of the programme proclaimed seventy-two years ago. It is our task now to sum up the practical revolutionary experience of the working class, to cleanse the movement of its admixtures of opportunism and social patriotism, and to unite the forces of all the true revolutionary proletarian parties in order to further and hasten the complete victory of the Communist revolution.

The wreckage left by the Great War, which the Socialists long ago predicted as the inevitable consequence of "the insatiable greed of the possessing classes in both camps of capitalist nations," can be cleared away only by the Proletarian Dictatorship. Only the Proletarian Dictatorship can protect the rights of small nations against the Great Powers and liberate the "colonial slaves" of Asia and Africa. Bourgeois parliamentary democracy is a sham for the invisible rule of a financial oligarchy. The proletariat must create its own organs in the Workers' Soviets. The "half-heartedness, hypocrisy and corruption of the decadent official Socialist parties"

is beneath contempt. The Third International is the *"International of Deeds."*

"Proletarians of all countries! In the war against Imperialist barbarity, against monarchy, against the privileged classes, the bourgeois state and bourgeois property, against all forms and varieties of social and national oppression—*unite!* Under the standard of the Workmen's Councils, under the banner of the Third International, in the revolutionary struggle for power and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, proletarians of all countries, unite! . . . The Communist International calls the whole world proletariat to this final struggle. Down with the Imperialistic Conspiracy of Capital! Long Live the International Republic of the Workers' Soviets!"

On July 18, 1920, the Second Congress of the Communist International opened in Petrograd. The Manifesto had not been without effect. Socialist groups throughout the world displayed increasingly sympathetic interest in the new organization. Many of them became members. At the Congress an atmosphere of exaggerated hopefulness and martial enthusiasm prevailed, due in large part to the victorious advance of the now triumphant Soviet armies into Poland.

This spirit of exultant defiance characterized the proceedings of the entire Congress. The speeches of Zinovieff, President of the Executive Committee of the Third International, of Kalinin and of Lenin all echoed this tone of militancy and this supreme confidence in ultimate victory. Each day the Red Army came nearer to Warsaw. Beyond Warsaw lay the German frontier and alluring possibilities of carrying the flame of proletarian revolution into Central Europe by force of arms. The great event seemed just around the corner. The Congress regarded the Red Army, and the Red Army seemed to regard itself, as the army not of Russia, but of the Communist International.[17] War to the death was declared on all bourgeois governments. In the twenty-one conditions which the Congress laid down for the admission of national groups into the International it was emphasized that all Communist parties must prepare themselves for civil war.[18] One of the "theses" of the Congress declared: "The world proletariat is on the eve of decisive battles. We are living through an epoch of direct civil wars. But the decisive hour is near. In almost all the countries where there is a considerable labor movement the working class will have before it in the immediate future a series of fierce armed encounters."[19]

In the Congresses that have been held since 1920, the high enthusiasm of the "year of assault" has waned somewhat. At the

Third Congress, held in the early summer of 1921, it was conceded that the world revolution was no longer a matter of months, but of years. The reaction and the "counter-offensive of capitalism" were discussed very frankly and it was admitted that hopes must once again be deferred.[20] But the grandiose dreams of the international proletarian revolt were by no means abandoned. Propaganda was intensified and subsidiary organizations such as the Red Trade Union International,[21] the Young Communist International, the Peasant International, the International Council of Red Co-operatives, and the like, were created to assist in the work. The proceedings of the Fourth Congress (November 7-December 3, 1922)[22] and of the Fifth (June 17-July 8, 1924)[23] reveal evidences of disappointment and a disposition to adapt the tactics of the world revolution to the changed conditions resulting from the "temporary stabilization" of capitalism, but the fundamental aim remains unchanged. The Communist leaders pursue the great objective with remarkable singleness of purpose and unanimity of thought, whatever differences of opinion may prevail among them as to means to the end.[24] Inflammatory appeals continue to be addressed to the proletarians of the world.[25] What is lost in Europe is gained in Asia. In the ferment of Chinese nationalism, in the spread of unrest of India, in the clash throughout the Orient between the "Imperialistic Powers" and their "colonial slaves" the Communist leaders see new hope of the impending cataclysm.[26]

It is true, of course, that in recent years the Communist International has suffered something of an eclipse. The world revolution is definitely in abeyance. Its failure to materialize as rapidly as was hoped has inevitably led to a dampening of enthusiasm. Great problems of internal economic reconstruction have absorbed more and more of the attention of the Soviet leaders to the detriment of the Third International. In the fall of 1926 came the deposition of Zinovieff, from the presidency of the International. At the same time Trotsky and Kameneff were removed from the political bureau of the party and later from its Central Committee. "Factionalism" and violations of party discipline were the assigned causes of their downfall.[27] In the autumn of 1927 Trotsky, Zinovieff and other leaders of the "Opposition" were definitely expelled from the Communist Party, which was purged of their followers and united behind the leadership of Joseph Stalin.

Though it may be conceded that these developments admit of diverse interpretations, they scarcely warrant the assumption that

the Communist International has passed into innocuous desuetude or that the rulers of Russia have ceased to dream and hope for the world-wide revolt of the proletariat. The goals for which men have fought and suffered and died are not thus readily cast aside. The Third International, for all its lack of success, remains very much alive and continues to work energetically for the realization of its ambitions. The leaders of the Russian Communist Party are neither willing nor able to abandon a goal which years of prison and exile and martyrdom have made the central feature of a faith which fills them with an almost religious inspiration. They are fighters in a Holy War as truly as ever were the Crusaders of the Middle Ages. Their exaggerated rhetoric is no mere "sound and fury, signifying nothing." It is the expression of their most dearly cherished ideals. Masters of the greatest of the white nations, they are inculcating their new theology in the minds of millions, endeavoring to mould a new generation to their model, and dreaming continually of the great day of days when the world revolution will become a reality. To the outsider, unfamiliar with their revolutionary psychology, their vision seems incredible, terrifying, fantastic. To themselves, it is a part of sober reality. Its achievement, however long delayed, is for them not only probable but inevitable. It is part of the very fabric of their being. It is written among the stars. Without the world revolution as the great dream of the future, without the Communist International as its "general staff," success in Russia is only a half-victory.

3. The American Attitude

Since these anticipations are world-wide in their scope they include the United States among the bourgeois governments which are to be much affected by the international workers' revolution. The Communist leaders regard the American nation as among the most capitalistic and imperialistic of States.[28] In their view the American bourgeoisie stands in the forefront of the international "black hundreds" of capitalism. Its insolence and reactionary arrogance are not tempered by a powerful working class movement threatening its supremacy. Unfortunately, the American proletariat does not yet respond enthusiastically to the call to arms. The revolution, it is conceded, will develop very slowly in the "enormous robbers' League named the United States of America."[29] Capitalism will succumb first in Europe; America will remain one of its last outposts.

But difficulty and delay are not discouraging to those who feel that time is on their side and that the consummation of their hopes is as inevitable as Fate. Despite all obstacles, the task in America is essentially the same as in other bourgeois States: to co-operate with American Communists affiliated with the Comintern (Communist International), to assist them in winning over the masses of the workers to the cause, and to direct their activities toward the revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeois government.

Limitations of space make it impossible in a study of this character to undertake any detailed consideration of the efforts of the Moscow leaders and the American comrades to accomplish this task. The old American Socialist Party, while at first sympathetic toward the Comintern, refused to accept the twenty-one conditions of adherence laid down by the Second Congress. Left wing groups established the Communist Party of America in September, 1919. The "Red raids" and "deportations delirium" which followed led to the withdrawal "underground" of the party in December, 1921, and the creation of the Workers' Party of America as the official and legal representative of American Communism. This party participated in the election of 1924 with William Z. Foster and Benjamin Gitlow as candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency. It claimed 100,000 votes, but the official count credited it with only 33,076.[80] Since 1924 the movement has suffered from internal dissension and a decline in membership. Despite its intensive propagandist activities, its numerical strength does not justify apprehension as yet on the part of the supporters of the existing economic and social order. Few realize more clearly than the Russian leaders themselves that the development of Communism in the United States will be influenced very little by anything done in Moscow.[81] No conceivable amount of seed will raise a crop in a soil which remains relatively sterile.

From the point of view of the State Department, however, the weakness and futility of the American Communist movement is far less significant than the fact of its inspiration and direction from Russia. The Workers' Party of America is admittedly a section of the Comintern, which, as has been shown, was created at the call of the Russian Communist Party, established in the capital of Soviet Russia and largely organized and directed by the men who rule the U.S.S.R. The degree to which the activities of the party have been subsidized from abroad is a controversial question upon which, in the nature of the situation, it is impossible to obtain conclusive

evidence. The State Department claims to possess such evidence in abundance, but, in so far as it relates to financial assistance from Moscow, it is "confidential." This aspect of the situation, however, so frequently the cause for exaggerated alarm in certain sections of the press, is in reality of much less importance to Washington than the inspiration, control and guidance which the American Communist movement receives from the territory of the Soviet Union.

It is on such grounds as these that the State Department defends the thesis that the Soviet régime is not a national government with which it is possible to maintain friendly diplomatic relations, but an aggregation of international revolutionists bent upon the overthrow of all other States. This contention has been presented early and has been consistently adhered to since. In April, 1920, the State Department issued a memorandum, accompanied by documentary proof from original sources, showing the world revolutionary aims of the Russian Communist Party and the Soviet régime.[82] The Colby note of August, 1920, also laid emphasis upon these aims. Later in the same year the State Department issued another memorandum, containing further proof of the nefarious designs of the rulers of Soviet Russia.[83] President Coolidge's message of December 6, 1923, Secretary's Hughes's reply to Chicherin of December 18, 1923, and numerous other statements of policy attached supreme importance to the propaganda of world revolution as the greatest obstacle to the resumption of diplomatic relations. Much of the work of the Division of Eastern European Affairs in the Department of State consists of careful study of the development of the Communist movement in the United States and its relations with the Comintern at Moscow. Without any question these considerations have bulked larger in the official mind than any other and have constituted the most important single deterrent to recognition.

The response of the Soviet authorities to the allegations of the State Department is simply that the Soviet Government is entirely distinct from the Comintern and in no sense responsible for its activities. The International may be interested in promoting world revolution. The Russian Communist Party, as a member of the International, may have a similar interest. Stalin freely admits that the Comintern "renders assistance to the Communist Party of America whenever it thinks it necessary" and concedes that such aid would also be rendered by the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. if required, though in fact it has never been asked for.[84] But the Soviet Government is wholly innocent of any such design. It wishes

to live in relations of peace and amicable intercourse with all other governments, whether bourgeois or proletarian. It cherishes no hostile design against them. It indulges in no propaganda against them. It pleads "not guilty" to the charges hurled from Washington. The culprit is the Comintern, which, as an international organization, is quite outside the control of the Soviet Government and has no direct relations of any kind with it. To hold the Soviet Government responsible for the conduct of the Comintern, and to withhold recognition from it on this account, is to confuse two organizations which are entirely separate and independent. A policy based upon such an unpardonable confusion of thought is illogical and stupid. In the words of the Commissar for Foreign and Domestic Trade, A. N. Mikoyan:

> The Soviet Government must not be identified with the Comintern and I as a member of the Government cannot speak in the name of the Comintern. The Communist International exists by itself, apart and independent from the Soviet Government. It is difficult to understand on what "principles of freedom and justice" the Comintern should not be permitted to remain in Moscow. The Comintern does not receive any financial aid from the Soviet Government. We have enforced the strictest laws against any kind of propaganda by agents of the Soviet Government in any country and anyone who would violate these rules would be discharged. Even the raid by the English Police on the Arcos and the Russian Trade Delegation in London proved the fact that neither the Trade Delegation nor Arcos is in any way connected with the Third International. . . .
>
> It is impossible for the Soviet Government to interfere in the mutual relations between the Comintern and the Communist parties of other countries. Communist parties exist in all countries. In a number of countries communists carry on their work quite openly and without any interference, having their representatives in the Parliament; as, for instance, in Germany, England, France, Czecho-Slovakia, etc. It is therefore quite incomprehensible why the Soviet Government alone should place obstacles in the way of the activities of communist organizations, when even the conservative bourgeois governments of various countries are compelled to tolerate the existence of legal Communist parties.[85]

In rebuttal, the State Department contends that the alleged separation of the Soviet Government and the Comintern is a fiction and a pretense as shown, first, by numerous public statements of the Communist leaders themselves and, second, by the obvious identity of leadership and personnel between the two organizations. Radek, for example, declared at the Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, April 2, 1920, that "the Third International is the child of the Russian Communist Party. It was founded here, in the Kremlin,

on the initiative of the Communist Party of Russia. In our hands is the Executive Committee of the Third International." [86] Stekloff, former editor of *Izvestia,* made the relationship equally intimate: "The Communist International rests on Soviet Russia. . . . The mutual solidarity of the Soviet Republic and the Communist International is an accomplished fact. . . . The spiritual, moral, and material bond between them is based on the complete solidarity of interests." [87]

More significant even than these admissions, in the view of the State Department, is the fact that the men in the controlling positions in the Soviet Government are precisely the same men who dominate the Comintern. From the beginning the leaders of the Russian Communist Party have been at the same time the rulers of Soviet Russia and the organizers and guiding spirits behind the Communist International. For example, in 1923 Lenin was simultaneously a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Soviet Republic, a member of the Federation Central Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars of the Federation of Soviet Republics, and a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Trotsky, Zinovieff and Bukharin were all members of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, the Federation Central Executive Committee, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and the Political Bureau and Central Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party.[88] At the time of writing the situation in this regard is somewhat more obscure than it has been in the earlier years, but it is understood that Stalin and Bukharin are members of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Executive Committee of the All-Union Communist Party. It should be noted, of course, that the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. is a large legislative body. None of these are, however, members of the Council of People's Commissars, which is the executive cabinet of the Soviet Government.

In other words the same men hold positions in the Russian (now All-Union) Communist Party, the Central Executive Committee (Legislative branch) of the U.S.S.R., and the Comintern. While the number of foreign representatives on the Executive Committee of the Comintern is eight times the number of Russian representatives, the prestige of experience and success which the Russian

leaders possess usually gives them a greater influence than their numbers would warrant. In short, says the State Department, while the Communist Party, the Soviet Government and the Comintern are in form separate and distinct organizations, the system of interlocking directorates through which they are controlled makes them all simply different facets of the same stone.

These circumstances, in the opinion of the State Department, constitute a legitimate legal reason for withholding recognition from the Soviet Government. It is universally recognized, as one of the oldest principles of international law, that every State is under a definite obligation to respect the independence of other States in the family of nations by refraining from acts directed against their safety and security or internal peace and order and by using due diligence to prevent its territory from being made the base of acts of this character.[89] To the eyes of Washington, the toleration and encouragement of the world revolutionary activities of the Comintern by the Soviet Government is such a flagrant violation of this elementary obligation as to make diplomatic relations with that government unthinkable.

The outward plausibility of this legalistic argument is apparent, even though most of the other governments of the world have not thought it sufficiently valid to justify the indefinite suspension of political intercourse with Russia. But the Soviet authorities are no less justified in resting their position on narrowly legalistic grounds. They can argue with reason that the United States has itself on occasion fomented revolutions abroad, as evidenced by its policies in Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico and other Caribbean countries. They can contend, with equal plausibility, that the Soviet Government is not, after all, identical with the Russian Communist Party and the Third International any more than the British Government, under Ramsay MacDonald, was identical with the British Labor Party and the Second International. To the impartial outsider, the contentions of the Soviet officials are no less worthy of respect than the fulminations of Mr. Hughes or Mr. Kellogg. In the words of a Russian leader:

> It is true that some of the Soviet officials are at the same time members of the Comintern, but in this respect they do not differ from members of other governments. Mr. Vandervelde, Prime Minister of Belgium, is at the same time one of the leaders of the Second International. When he goes to the League of Nations, he appears there at one and the same time as head of the Second International and as Prime Minister of

Belgium. Yet this does not raise objections from anyone. We are in possession of proofs that some of the members of the Second International made attempts to organize a rebellion in Georgia, yet it did not occur to us to send notes to the Government of Belgium requesting them to stop the Second International from maintaining its offices in Belgium, or to prohibit members of their government from being members of the Second International.[40]

The arguments on both sides lead to innumerable charges, countercharges and metaphysical distinctions which, however true in fact, are scarcely conducive to a clarification of the problem. The Soviet position is certainly not unworthy of consideration. The most that can be said for the State Department's attitude is that the facts of the situation, as they have here been briefly reviewed, can be regarded as a fairly plausible logical defense of its policy.

Whether that policy, whatever its validity on the basis of the legalistic premises assumed by the State Department, is also justified from the point of view of wisdom and expediency is quite another question. The Communist elements in the United States are numerically infinitesimal and politically insignificant. Do the efforts made in Moscow to aid and direct their activities justify the prolonged suspension of diplomatic intercourse between the governments of the two largest white nations on the globe? Does non-recognition tend to further or to discourage such efforts? Upon such considerations as these must depend the answer to the question of the political expediency of non-recognition. But these inquiries cannot be answered adequately at this point, nor can the wisdom of the policy followed be judged on these grounds alone. As has been shown, the policy of non-recognition rests upon the Soviet Government's repudiation of debts and confiscation of property as well as upon the propaganda of world revolution. These aspects of the situation must be examined before anything approaching a final determination of the expediency of the policy as a whole can be undertaken.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

REPUDIATION AND CONFISCATION

1. *American Claims Against Russia*

ON January 21, 1918, the Soviet Government issued a decree whereby all of Russia's past financial obligations were summarily canceled, both those owing to foreign governments and those owing to foreign nationals.

1. All national loans concluded by the governments of Russian landowners and Russian bourgeoisie enumerated in specially published lists are annulled (annihilated) from December 1, 1917. The December coupons of these loans are not subject to payment.
2. In the same manner are annulled all guarantees given by the said governments on loans for different undertakings and institutions.
3. Unconditionally and without exception, all foreign loans are annulled.

The decree went on to define the status of internal loans. Short term obligations remained in force, but interest payments on them was discontinued. Citizens of moderate means holding not more than 10,000 rubles of the internal loans were permitted to exchange their bonds for certificates of the new loan of the Soviet Government, and compensation was promised to co-operatives, local self-governing, and other benevolent or democratic institutions holding obligations of the annulled loans. Local Soviet commissions were given the right to "annul in entirety savings not gained by toil." [1]

This policy was obviously dictated not by financial necessity but by the revolutionary political and economic principles upon which the Bolshevist leaders acted. The decree was simply another step in the direction of the expropriation of the bourgeoisie. As regards its effects abroad, it was frankly a blow at all bourgeois governments. The Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which met in January, 1918, incorporated a declaration to this effect into the organic law of the Soviet State.[2]

While no complete and accurate figures are available concerning the total amount of repudiated obligations held abroad, the best estimate of the foreign pre-war State debt of the Imperial Russian

Government in 1914 is 4,229,000,000 rubles ($2,114,500,000). If the guaranteed State and municipal loans held abroad are added to this sum, the total of Russia's pre-war public indebtedness reaches 5,142,000,000 rubles ($2,571,000,000).[3] The war debt, contracted between August, 1914, and November, 1917, by the Imperial and Provisional Governments, is estimated at 7,681,000,000 rubles ($3,840,500,000), of which almost five-eighths was held by Great Britain. Of the balance, well over half was held by France and the remainder by the United States, Japan, and Italy. From this total should be deducted the value of the 640,000,000 rubles in gold which Russia shipped to the Allies, the 120,000,000 rubles in gold which was paid to Germany under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and subsequently surrendered to the Allies, and the bank balances and Russian public property in the creditor nations.[4] These items total approximately a billion rubles, leaving the war debt at 6,681,000,000 rubles ($3,340,500,000). The grand total of Russia's war and pre-war public indebtedness thus reaches the approximate figure of six billions of dollars.

Of this sum the amount owing to the United States Government is relatively small. The United States Government itself had no share in the pre-war debt. Of the war debt, the loans made to the Provisional Government between May and November, 1917, have already been discussed. It will be recalled that cash advances totalled $187,729,750 up to November 13, 1917, the date of the last advance. Two additional items must be added to this sum. One is a debit of $406,082.30, representing obligations received from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy on account of sales of surplus war material. This apparently is a bill due for war supplies sold to agents of the Russian Embassy, or perhaps directly to the Kolchak Government. The second item is a sum of $4,465,465.07, representing obligations from the American Relief Administration on account of relief supplies furnished. The addition of these items to the original bill brings the total principal of Russia's debt to the American Government to $192,601,297.37.[5]

The accrued interest on this principal has reached a very appreciable sum. Of the original cash advances made in 1917, the first four carried interest of 3½ per cent, the fifth partly 3½ per cent and partly 4 per cent, the sixth 4 per cent, and the remaining advances from September 25 to November 15, 4¼ per cent.[6] Of the total 1917 indebtedness, $97,500,000 bore 3½ per cent interest and $90,229,750 bore 4¼ per cent. But the United States reserved the

privilege of converting the 3½ per cent into 4 per cent bonds before May 15, 1918, and the further privilege of converting the 3½ per cent and 4 per cent bonds into 4¼ per cent bonds at any time after May 9, 1918. This privilege was apparently taken advantage of and interest continues to accrue at the rate of 4¼ per cent.[7] The official Treasury statement of July 1, 1926, gave the figure of $72,075,412.68 as the total accrued and unpaid interest up to that time. Interest payments (not included in this figure), aggregating $7,952,530.53, had been made up to that time by Messrs. Bakhmeteff or Ughet out of the proceeds of their liquidation of Russian transactions in the United States.[8] The Soviet Government has, of course, paid no interest at any time on any portion of the debt. On July 1, 1926, the total indebtedness stood at $264,676,710.05, with interest accumulating at the rate of something like $8,000,000 annually.

In addition to these obligations held by the United States Government, private American bankers and investors still hold obligations of the Imperial Russian Government aggregating about $100,000,000. One issue of $50,000,000, bearing 6½ per cent interest, matured June 18, 1919, and another of $25,000,000, bearing 5½ per cent, matured December 1, 1921. Small amounts of the two billion ruble Tsarist war loan of 1916 were also disposed of in the American market. These bonds paid 5½ per cent interest and matured February 14, 1926. The precise quantity held by American investors is not quite certain, but it is in the neighborhood of $11,000,000.[9] For a long period after the fall of the Provisional Government and the repudiation of all these obligations by the Soviet authorities, the Russian Embassy in the United States continued to make interest payments regularly, with the express approval of the State and Treasury Departments, out of the funds at its disposal from the credits extended by the American Government. In June, 1919, however, the payment of both interest and principal on the loan falling due in that month was defaulted. Serge Ughet assured the holders that he was in communication with Admiral Kolchak on the subject and that they "might reasonably expect arrangements to be made for the payment of this debt as soon as the All-Russian Government is formally recognized."[10] J. P. Morgan and Company, the National City Bank, the Guaranty Trust Company, and Kidder, Peabody and Company, who had floated the loan three years previously, sent out reassuring letters, with excerpts from Ughet's message, to the holders of the bonds, and took steps to form a protective

committee, but their hopes were soon dashed by Kolchak's untimely demise. In December, 1919, interest was defaulted on the 1921 issue [11] and the principal went unpaid when it fell due. In June, 1926, the Board of Tax Appeals of the Treasury Department ruled that all of these obligations were worthless for purposes of taxation in view of their successful repudiation by the de facto government of Russia,[12] but they nevertheless remain valid obligations of the Russian State for which claims will be presented at the appropriate time.

The claims arising out of the confiscation of the property of American nationals in Russia by the Soviet Government remain indeterminate as to their precise amount. In pursuit of their policy of expropriating the bourgeoisie and nationalizing industry, the Communist leaders declared the holdings of all foreigners in Russia, as well as of Russian property owners, the property of the State—all by the simple expedient of issuing decrees with no suggestion of compensation. The total value of property of Americans in Russia thus confiscated has never been computed with accuracy and available sources of information permit only a general estimate. Pre-revolutionary investments of foreign capital in Russian business enterprises aggregated something between two and two and one quarter billion rubles ($1,000,000,000 to $1,125,000,000). Over half of this sum represented British and French capital, with Germany and Belgium next in order in the size of their contribution to the total. Of the enterprises lying within the present borders of the Soviet Union, practically all have been nationalized. The total value of the nationalized foreign investments is estimated at 2,007,000,000 rubles ($1,003,500,000).[13] American investments constituted about 5.2 per cent of the total and aggregated some 117,750,000 rubles ($58,875,000). They were not scattered among small investors, but held by some ten concerns. Two of these were manufacturing concerns: the International Harvester Company, with a stock capital of $31,000,000, and the Otis Elevator Company, with a capital of $250,000. Of the concerns engaged in commerce or insurance, the Singer Manufacturing Company had invested $25,000,000 and the Russian Babcock and Wilcox Corporation $250,000 in their respective enterprises. The New York Life Insurance Society and the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States were represented in Russia by corporations with capital of at least $250,000 each. In addition the National City Bank had about $600,000 invested in the Russian Vacuum Oil Company. American

capital, to the sum of $2,050,000, also controlled the Russian-American Trade and Industrial Corporation, the J. Black Company, and the Russian-American Rato Corporation.[14]

The American State Department has never issued any formal call for the presentation of claims by American citizens against Russia and will doubtless refrain from such a step until the time seems ripe for the commencement of negotiations looking toward their settlement. Claims have come in from time to time, however, and their total is estimated at $400,000,000. This sum includes claims for payment of the Tsarist bonds already referred to. Since these claims total somewhere in the vicinity of $86,000,000, the balance, representing claims for losses of property in Russia, is something over $300,000,000. The discrepancy between this figure and the $58,875,000 given above as the total of American investments in Russia is doubtless due not so much to the differing sources of the two estimates (the smaller figure being derived from Soviet sources and the larger from American) as to the fact that the claims presented include not only losses suffered by American investors through the nationalization of their enterprise in Russia, but also all losses suffered by American residents in Russia through confiscation of their property and through all the incidental loss and destruction occasioned by the revolution and the civil war.

The approximate total of American claims against Russia, as of July 1, 1927, might be summarized as follows:

Principal and Interest of Debt to U. S. Government....	c. $272,000,000
Principal of Debts Privately Held in the U. S.....	86,000,000
Claims Arising Out of Confiscation and Destruction of Property of American Nationals in Russia.....	300,000,000
Total	$658,000,000

The legal fact of the responsibility of the Soviet régime for these obligations is so obvious as to require no demonstration or extended discussion. Few principles of international law are better established or more universally recognized than that internal political changes in a State effect no change in its foreign obligations[15] or that the property of foreign nationals may not be arbitrarily seized and disposed of without compensation. States have traditionally been held responsible for the violation of these principles. Revolution is never regarded as a justification for any departure from them. A government may confiscate the property of its own subjects. It may repudiate its obligations to its own citizens. With such acts

other States have no concern. But it may not repudiate its obligations held abroad, whether issued by itself or by preceding governments which it has replaced, nor may it confiscate the property of citizens of other States within its jurisdiction without committing an international delinquency for which other States may call it to account. Some of the arguments resorted to by Soviet representatives to escape from the inexorable logic of these accepted and acknowledged principles will be considered in the final section of the chapter. But the Soviet authorities themselves have displayed a disposition in recent years to concede the validity of the claims of foreign governments. They have repeatedly expressed their willingness to recognize those claims—on conditions which will be examined presently. There can be no question of the legal soundness of the American contention that the Soviet Government is obligated to pay Russia's national debts and to compensate foreign nationals for confiscated property.

2. *Russian Counter-Claims Against the United States*

The conditions upon which the Soviet Government is prepared to recognize Russia's public debts were first clearly set forth at the Genoa Conference of 1922. There, it will be recalled, Chicherin declared that his Government was ready to accept liability for past obligations, with the exception of war debts, "provided that the damages caused to Russia by the Allied intervention and blockade be recognized." Against the claims of other governments against Russia, totaling $13,000,000,000, he presented counter-claims aggregating $60,000,000,000, which, he asserted, the Soviet Government might scale down to $25,000,000,000—for a consideration. The Soviet delegation was evidently prepared to bargain for a settlement and to abandon in some measure its policies of confiscation and repudiation in return for a foreign loan and for Allied recognition of its counter-claims. The Allied delegations refused to concede their validity and the conference ended in failure.

The Soviet Government, however, has not ceased to insist that it is lawfully entitled to compensation from the governments which engaged in intervention against it in 1918 and 1919. It has made the recognition of its counter-claims a sine qua non of any acceptance of liability on its part for the claims presented by the Allies and the United States. At the end of 1923 a "Society for Assistance to the Victims of Intervention" was organized by a group of Russian

professors and scientists who proceeded, with the full co-operation of the Soviet Government, systematically to collect claims for damages throughout the U.S.S.R.[16] In the negotiations which followed British recognition of the Soviet Government in 1924, Premier MacDonald was presented with a bill for $20,000,000,000 for the British support of Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenitch.[17] Neither the British Government nor any of the other governments which have entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet régime have ever formally acknowledged any responsibility to meet such claims. But the Soviet authorities continue to gather data and to compile imposing columns of figures on the extent of the losses suffered by Russia as a consequence of the intervention. In the spring of 1926 they completed their tabulation of claims against the United States, though they declined to reveal either their total or the method of computation employed until negotiations should be begun for a settlement.[18]

The American Government, in common with the Allies, has refused to admit liability for any of these claims.[19] It has consistently adhered to the position that it owes Russia nothing. So long as recognition is withheld this attitude disposes of the problem. Eventually, however, negotiations will no doubt be undertaken and the subject will assume an immediate and practical importance. Upon the legal status of the Russian counter-claims depends in a measure not only the justifiability of the American policy but also the future terms upon which the American claims against Russia will probably be met. It seems worth while, therefore, to attempt to arrive at a determination of the propriety of the Soviet demands.

The validity of the counter-claims depends, in the first place, upon the illegality of the intervention upon which they are based, and, in the second place, upon the proximate causation of the damage by that intervention. If it was a legal means of achieving the ends for which it was undertaken, the governments participating in it obviously cannot be held responsible for the payment of compensation to the Soviet Government for the loss and destruction occasioned by it. If, on the other hand, the intervention was an infringement upon Russian rights without justification in international law, the participating governments have manifestly incurred a liability to make reparation to the victim. The complex and controversial nature of the facts involved and the unsettled state of the principles of law governing the problem make it difficult to give a conclusive answer to the question. A consideration of the arguments on each side of the case, however, should at least point the way toward a solution.

As to the fact of intervention there is, of course, no question, despite the reluctance of the American Government to employ that term in describing its policy. "Intervention is an interference by a state or states in the external affairs of another state without its consent, or in its internal affairs with or without its consent." [20] "Intervention is dictatorial interference by a State in the affairs of another State for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of things." [21] The facts reviewed above in Chapters V, VI, and VII can leave no reasonable doubt but that intervention, in the technical, legal sense of the word, was undertaken by the Allied and American Governments in Russia in 1918. Troops were landed on Russian soil without the consent of the de facto Russian Government. Hostilities were commenced against the armed public forces of that Government without a declaration of war. Portions of Russian territory were occupied and made a base of military operations against the Soviet régime. Substantial material assistance was extended to elements engaged in rebellion against the Soviet Government. In the civil war which ensued every effort was made to bring about the victory of the White Armies and the overthrow of the Bolshevist dictatorship in Moscow. Such behavior clearly constituted "dictatorial interference" in internal Russian affairs. To deny the indisputable fact of intervention is futile.

That the American Government must bear its full share of responsibility for the consequences is equally clear. The United States, it is true, strongly opposed for many months the suggestions of the Allies for the dispatch of military expeditions to Russia. Its opposition was motivated by President Wilson's conviction that such a policy would not achieve the objects desired and by the ancient and well-established principle of American foreign policy which forbade interference in the affairs of the European powers.[22] When the decision was at length made in July, 1918, to accept the Allied proposals, the statement of policy which was issued explicitly disclaimed any intention of intervening in Russian affairs.* Facts are more significant than fictions and pretenses, however. The facts are that Allied intervention in Siberia was undertaken at the express invitation of the United States. In North Russia American troops waged war against the Red Army. Subsequently, the United States Government not only permitted the Russian Embassy in Washington to send supplies and munitions to Kolchak, but dispatched military stores to his forces on its own initiative and employed its troops in

* Appendix II.

eastern Siberia to facilitate their shipment to the front. These activities were intervention of a most unquestionable character.

Turning now to a discussion of the possible grounds upon which intervention may be regarded as justifiable, it may be observed in the first place that it is, by its very nature, such a flagrant violation of the fundamental principle of the independence of States that it can be justified only by the most extraordinary circumstances. It is prima facie a hostile act, approximating war, and must always be looked upon with disfavor.[23] While there is no unanimity of opinion among publicists as to the occasions on which it is legitimate, it is generally agreed that it is unlawful if its purpose is simply to change a form of government which is disliked[24] or to aid one of the parties in a civil war.[25] Where it is undertaken in pursuance of a treaty right, there is ordinarily no question as to its propriety. Similarly, where it is dictated by an imperative necessity of self-preservation or self-defense, it is regarded as legitimate.[26] Some authorities justify it on a variety of other grounds, such as the protection of the lives and property of citizens abroad, the maintenance of the principles of international law,[27] or the termination of an unlawful intervention by a third State.[28] A few go so far as to uphold it on purely humanitarian or political grounds, such as a desire to put an end to protracted anarchy, to prevent the commission of crimes or atrocities, or to preserve the balance of power.[29]

Most writers, however, consider these latter grounds of intervention to transcend the limits of purely legal considerations. Hall declares: "It is unfortunate that publicists have not laid down broadly and unanimously that no intervention is legal, except for the purpose of self-preservation, unless a breach of the law as between states has taken place, or unless the whole body of civilized states have concurred in authorizing it."[30] Intervention on other grounds than these is a high act of policy, which, in the event of its success, may not expose the intervening State to any responsibility for the violation of the independence of the State subjected to it. But it cannot be regarded as a legitimate measure, consistent with the accepted principles of international law. It is an illegal act which, in case of its failure, exposes the intervening State to diplomatic protest from the State which has suffered thereby and renders it liable to claims for damages.

From a strictly legal point of view it would seem that the only situation, apart from specific treaty provisions, in which intervention is unequivocably justified and does not involve the liability indicated

is where it is dictated by the most urgent considerations of self-defense. This principle was clearly laid down by Secretary of State Webster in the controversy over the *Caroline*. During the Canadian rebellion of 1838 a body of insurgents gathered on the American side of the Niagara River, seized guns from American arsenals, occupied an island in the stream from which they fired shots into Canadian territory, and prepared to cross on the ship *Caroline*. In view of the imminence of the danger a force of British troops boarded the vessel in American waters and sent it over the falls. The United States complained and called upon the British Government "to show a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show also that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the necessity of self-defense must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it." [81] Since the situation involved such a necessity, the American requirements were satisfied and the matter was dropped. Hall comments: "As the measures taken when a state protects itself by violating the sovereignty of another are confessedly exceptional acts, beyond the limits of ordinary law, and permitted only for the supreme motive of self-preservation, they must evidently be confined within the narrowest limits consistent with obtaining the required end." [82]

If these principles are accepted as the only valid criteria for passing judgment upon the legality of the Allied and American intervention in Russia, the problem reduces itself to a simple question of fact: were the intervening governments faced with such an instant and overwhelming necessity of self-defense as to leave them no alternative save the dispatch of military forces to Russian soil and the extension of assistance to one of the parties in the civil war? There would appear to be only two arguments of importance which can be advanced in favor of an affirmative answer to this question. The first is that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk constituted such a direct menace to Allied interests as to justify intervention to nullify its results. The second is that the world revolutionary propaganda of the Bolsheviks was equivalent to intervention in the internal affairs of other States and was such an immediate threat to their peace and security as to warrant counter-intervention as a proper defensive measure. A brief consideration of the cogency of these contentions should indicate the solution of the general problem under discussion.

As to the first, it will be recalled that the Allied and American Governments refused from the beginning to recognize the validity of the peace of Brest-Litovsk. They continued to regard Russia as an ally and refused to admit that the Soviet Government could lawfully substitute a status of neutrality for one of belligerency. This position—a definite departure from the principle that third States are obligated to recognize the validity of treaties with respect to their signatories unless they are inconsistent with the rights of those States under general international law or earlier treaties [33]—was based upon three considerations. The first was the contention that the Soviet Government, being unrecognized, was incapable of binding the Russian State. This may be summarily dismissed with the observation that the survival and subsequent general recognition of the Soviet Government settle all questions of its power to bind Russia as from November 7, 1917, since recognition is always retroactive to the date of the establishment of the government or State recognized. The second has somewhat more weight. It was that no Russian Government could validly conclude peace without the consent of the Allies as required by the Inter-Allied agreement of September 5, 1914. The argument here was that since this agreement gave the Allies certain rights which the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk destroyed, they were under no obligation to recognize the valadity of the latter instrument. But it should be observed that the United States was not a party to the 1914 agreement and could claim no rights under it. Furthermore, the Soviet Government did in fact endeavor to secure the consent of the Allies and at last asked them for aid to block the peace before it finally bowed to force majeure and accepted the German terms. Russia, moreover, might perhaps be regarded, in accordance with the principle of *rebus sic stantibus,* as having been released from the obligations of the 1914 treaty by the physical impossibility of its further fulfillment. In any case the 1914 agreement would not appear to be of such a character as to justify armed intervention to compel its observance, least of all by the United States.

The third contention in support of the Allied position was that the Brest-Litovsk treaty was so manifestly directed against Allied interests and was such an immediate menace to their safety that they were justified in disregarding it and in engaging in military operations against the government which had concluded it.* Certainly

* The argument of Hershey, that the treaty was void on grounds of bribery, fraud and duress is unsupported by evidence and would seem to be based upon

as the Allies viewed the situation in the spring and summer of 1918, when the reinforced German armies were hammering the western front to pieces in a last desperate effort to gain victory, every consideration of national interest and self-defense prompted them to do all in their power to nullify the effects of the separate peace in the east. But from the legal point of view their danger was not of such a character as to justify intervention. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk did not make Russia an ally of Germany. It purported to make Russia a neutral. An Allied attack on Russia as a neutral and innocent third party, as a means of injuring Germany, could have no more legal justification than Germany's attack on Belgium in 1914 as a means of injuring France. The menace to the Allies which the peace of Brest-Litovsk represented was not instant and overwhelming, immediate and direct, but only contingent and remote, and as such it could not justify the violation of Russian territory and independence which intervention constituted.[85] In no case could that danger be considered to have continued after the end of the war in the west and the abrogation of the Brest treaty. Intervention in Russia was begun three months before the armistice ostensibly as part of the war against the Central Powers. Its continuation for fifteen months after the armistice was wholly unjustified on any of the grounds thus far considered.

Has the second general argument in defense of intervention any better foundation than the first? Could the incendiary propaganda of the Bolsheviks be regarded as such a direct and immediate danger to the peace and internal order of the intervening powers as to justify their policy? Hall declares: "If a government is too weak to prevent actual attacks upon a neighbor by its subjects, if it foments revolution abroad, or if it threatens hostilities which may be averted by its overthrow, a menaced state may adopt such measures as are necessary to obtain substantial guarantees for its own security. The state which is subjected to intervention has either failed to satisfy its international duties or has intentionally violated them." [86]

As has been shown, the Communist rulers of Russia have endeavored to foment revolutions abroad through the agency of the Third International. But it is somewhat difficult to justify intervention in the summer of 1918 on this ground. While the International was already conceived in the minds of the Bolshevist leaders,

a misconception of the character of the negotiations. The Russian representatives at Brest-Litovsk were neither bribed nor personally coerced. The "coercion" of the Russian State would, of course, not invalidate the treaty.[84]

it was not born until March, 1919. Such propagandist activities as the Soviet authorities had engaged in prior to intervention were directed primarily against the Central Empires and received the encouragement and support of the Allies. The subsequent intensification of propaganda against all bourgeois governments, while a logical outgrowth of the Communist philosophy irrespective of the international situation, was in no small measure a defense against intervention, perfectly legitimate so long as the Allied and American Governments were bending their energies to bring about the overthrow of the Soviet régime. In the decision of those governments to intervene, moreover, this factor seems to have played no appreciable rôle. The danger was not so instant, overwhelming, direct, and immediate as to justify the policy which was adopted. Whatever may be said of the character of Communist propaganda in later years, it would seem not to have been a proper ground of intervention in the summer of 1918. Intervention directed toward the overthrow of a régime simply because the ideas which it represents are distasteful to other governments is, of course, always unlawful.[87]

We thus reach the conclusion that Allied and American intervention in Russia cannot be justified under any of the accepted principles of international law. Its political expediency may still be defended, though only with difficulty in view of its tragic futility. Its legality is indefensible. None of the governments which participated in it have undertaken to defend it on legal grounds, unless a general denial of responsibility for its consequences be regarded as a defense. It was an ill-considered act of policy, wholly without justification in law, the failure of which subjects the governments involved to full responsibility for compensating the aggrieved party for the losses suffered from it. The Russian counter-claims appear, in principle, to be quite proper. The United States, as well as the Allied Governments, would seem obligated to recognize their validity. Whether their refusal to do so can be persisted in indefinitely remains to be seen.

While no data are available for estimating the precise amount of compensation to which Russia would be entitled in the event that her counter-claims were recognized, or submitted to arbitration, it may be observed that only a small proportion of her total bill would seem to be legitimate. In the Geneva Award of 1872, by which the United States was granted $15,500,000 from Great Britain in compensation for the depredations of the *Alabama* and other Confederate

cruisers constructed in British ports during the American Civil War, the American claims for damages for indirect losses, roughly analogous to the claims for indirect losses presented by Chicherin at Genoa, were not recognized as proper by the arbitration tribunal.[38] According to the decisions of the German-American Mixed Claims Commission of 1922, however, the controlling principle in such cases is not that of the "directness" of the losses, but that of "proximate causation."

> The use of the term "indirect" as applied to the "national claims" involved in the Alabama case is not justified by the early debates in the Senate of the United States, by the record of the preliminary diplomatic negotiations, by the Treaty of Washington, by the "American Case" as presented by the American Agent, or by the award. Its use in this connection has been productive of great confusion and misunderstanding. The use of the term to describe a particular class of claims is inapt, inaccurate, and ambiguous. The distinction sought to be made between *damages* which are direct and those which are indirect is frequently illusory and fanciful and should have no place in international law.[39]
>
> It matters not whether the loss be directly or indirectly sustained so long as there is a clear, unbroken connection between Germany's act and the loss complained of. It matters not how many links there may be in the chain of causation connecting Germany's act with the loss sustained, provided there is no break in the chain and the loss can be clearly, unmistakably and definitely traced, link by link, to Germany's act. . . . All indirect losses are covered, provided only that in legal contemplation Germany's act was the efficient and proximate cause from which they flowed. The simple test to be applied in all cases is: has an American national proven a loss suffered by him, susceptible of being measured with reasonable exactness by pecuniary standards, and is that loss attributable to Germany's act as a proximate cause? [40]

By this principle Russia would be entitled to compensation for all losses. direct and indirect, which could be shown to have been proximately caused by the action of the intervening Powers, but its claims for damages resulting from the mere fact of civil war and not bearing a causal relationship to any act of the Allied and American Governments would seem to be ill-founded. It will be recalled that Chicherin at Genoa claimed some $60,000,000,000, comprising $6,106,580,000 for direct property damages, $5,635,745,000 for indirect losses due to deterioration and damage to railways, buildings, etc., and pensions paid to the victims of the civil war, $7,780,110,000 for losses in foreign trade and in reduced agricultural and industrial production, and an indeterminate balance for all other indirect losses. The first item here obviously includes all property damages suffered

in the civil war. On the principle of proximate causation only such a share of these losses as could be attributed specifically to the intervention could be charged against the Allied and American Governments. Perhaps all of the destruction of property in North Russia could be so attributed. Only a portion of the losses occasioned by the conflicts with Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenitch, and Wrangel could be ascribed to the action of the Allied and American Governments in supplying the White leaders with material assistance and thus prolonging the struggle. The imposing Russian totals clearly include many items which could not be considered proper claims against the intervening governments. The total compensation to which Russia is lawfully entitled, however, as well as the method of allocating this sum among the governments responsible, can only be determined by future negotiation, arbitration, or judicial settlement.

3. The American and Russian Positions

The attitude of the Soviet Government toward the general problem of claims and counter-claims has not been entirely consistent at all times, but its broad outlines can be sketched with little difficulty. The original decree of repudiation was regarded as a "blow at international financial capitalism." The confiscation of the property of foreign nationals was part of the general Communist program of the nationalization or socialization of all property. Both policies were adopted in frank defiance of the western bourgeois governments. But when revolutionary ardor had been somewhat cooled by the sober realities of economic reconstruction, and the desirability of encouraging foreign trade and investment became manifest, the authorities in Moscow expressed their readiness to abandon their extreme position. On October 28, 1921, Chicherin addressed a communication to the British, French, American, Italian, and Japanese Governments, declaring his firm conviction "that no people is bound to pay the price of chains fastened upon it for centuries," but asserting that "in its unmistakable determination to arrive at an entire agreement with the other Powers, the Russian Government is inclined to make several essential and highly important concessions in regard to this question." He proposed to recognize the pre-war debts of the Tsarist régime and suggested an international conference to deal with "the claims of the Powers against Russia and of Russia against the Powers, and to draw up a definite treaty of peace between them."[41] At the Genoa Conference of the following spring, this

proposal was repeated, but Chicherin insisted that credits must be extended and the Russian counter-claims must be recognized as a condition of a settlement. He asserted it as a principle that "governments and systems that spring from revolution are not bound to respect the obligations of fallen governments," but he said that the pre-war debt would be recognized on the conditions indicated. As for the war debts, they could never be paid, for "Russia, having withdrawn from the war without participating in the division of its advantages, could not assume its costs." This general position, with certain modifications to be noted presently as regards the debt to the United States, was adhered to for a number of years. In February, 1926, on the eve of the debt negotiations with France, the Soviet Government reiterated its contention that the war debt had been extinguished by Russia's enormous sacrifices from 1914 to 1917 which made possible the ultimate victory of the Allies.[42] This position, it is interesting to note, is the same which the French Government has been disposed to take regarding the French war debt to the United States.

The Soviet Government's adherence to this position in recent years has doubtless been due as much to practical difficulties in the way of meeting Russia's obligations as to the theoretical considerations upon which the policy of repudiation was originally based. Students of the problem are generally agreed that it will be economically impossible for Russia to discharge her debts for many years to come. Pasvolsky and Moulton declare: "Even if Russia should honor her existing debts, she cannot pay them." [43] This conclusion is based upon a survey of Russia's economic situation, which is such that she apparently cannot for a long period hope to maintain an export surplus sufficiently large to furnish the means of satisfying her foreign creditors.* As the Soviet Government has repeatedly insisted, extensive loans are a prerequisite to anything approaching

* It should be observed that some economists see little value in statistics of past foreign trade as an index of a nation's capacity to make payments abroad. This school contends that a government's ability to discharge its foreign debts depends primarily upon its ability to collect sufficient revenue within the country for the purpose. Once payments are begun out of the proceeds, the mechanism of international trade will automatically adjust itself to provide the necessary export surplus. "The only way to develop an export surplus out of which reparations or debts can be paid, is to start paying the reparations or debts. The first payment must precede the first export surplus." (J. Viner, "Economic Problems Involved in the Payment of International Debts," *American Economic Review*, XVI, No. 1, Supplement, March, 1926, pp. 91-97.) This view, which has much to recommend it, suggests that the pessimism of Pasvolsky and Moulton regarding Russia's capacity to pay her debts may be exaggerated.

a rapid reconstruction of Russia's shattered economic life. Without such reconstruction, past obligations cannot be met. Until they are met, or at least recognized, loans will not be forthcoming. This vicious circle doomed the Genoa and Hague Conferences to failure and remains a seemingly insuperable obstacle to a financial settlement between Russia and her creditors. "Even if the most sober, determined, capitalistic government conceivable were established in Russia—a government that fully appreciated the importance of financial integrity among men and nations—it would be altogether impossible for such a government to command credit abroad in the absence of a general financial reorganization. The only alternative to an outright cancellation of debts, if Russia is to enter into new credit relations with the outside world, is a long moratorium, with a reconstruction loan of roughly 1.4 billion rubles having a prior claim against Russia's international means of payment, namely, the export surplus." [44] "If Russia is to recover economic stability she must have reconstruction loans; and the interest on these loans must be given priority over all past Russian government obligations. Without a prior lien on Russian income, such loans would have to be regarded as the worst credit risk in the world." [45]

While the Soviet leaders have taken the position that nothing is to be achieved by acknowledging responsibility for debts which they are physically incapable of paying, the American Government has insisted that past obligations must be recognized as an evidence of good faith. So long as repudiation and confiscation are adhered to as principles, the Soviet régime must be regarded, in the view of the State Department, as one with which normal intercourse is impossible. The United States has made the acknowledgment of past debts and the restoration of confiscated property, or at least the payment of compensation, essential prerequisites to diplomatic recognition. The Russian counter-claims are ignored. The validity of the American claims against Russia is rigidly insisted upon as a principle from which there can be no deviation. Russia's capacity to pay may be considered in subsequent negotiations to fix the terms of payment. But until an obligation to pay is acknowledged, and a willingness to pay is manifested, no negotiations are desirable or possible.

Since 1923, however, the Soviet Government has repeatedly expressed its readiness to meet these conditions. In its note of December 16 of that year, it declared that it was fully prepared to negotiate for the settlement of all questions of claims "on the assumption that the principle of reciprocity will be recognized all around." In the

sharp rebuff which this suggestion called forth from Mr. Hughes, the Secretary of State asserted that no negotiations were necessary to meet the American conditions for recognition.* The suggestion was not renewed for some time, though Chicherin in December, 1925, publicly announced that "The Soviet Government still adheres to its declaration, made on the occasion of the assumption of office by President Coolidge, that it is ready to consider all disputed questions . . . including the question of the loan granted to Kerensky." [47] Early in 1926 various Soviet representatives again expressed the willingness of their government to commence negotiations for the settlement of the debt question with the United States.[48] In August this proposal began to assume more definite form, apparently as a consequence of the Soviet Government's urgent need of more liberal terms of credit for the financing of Russian-American trade.[49] It was indicated semi-officially that the Soviet authorities were prepared to send a debt-funding commission to the United States as soon as assurances could be had that it would be received.[50] They now sought for the first time to make a distinction between the Kerensky debt and the remainder of the war debt, which was contracted by the Tsar's Government with the Governments of Great Britain and France. The Kerensky debt to the United States they were prepared to recognize, even though most of the money had been spent by Bakhmeteff for purposes inimical to Soviet interests. They were likewise prepared to discuss compensation and adjustment for property with American investors.[51] They would demand neither a further loan nor diplomatic recognition as a condition of settlement.[52] And in October, 1926, Leonid Krassin, Soviet envoy in London, went so far as to declare that his government was prepared to drop its counter-claims and acknowledge its debt to the United States in full, if only negotiations were opened.[53]

To all these hints and suggestions, the United States has turned a deaf ear. It was reported in Washington that no official proposal to send a Russian debt-funding commission had been received, and that if one should be received it would probably be answered in the negative.[54] Treasury officials characterized the reports as "merely a left-handed attempt to bring about recognition of the present Russian Government by the United States." [55] The sincerity of the Soviet offers was apparently questioned. In November, 1927, Premier

* Stekloff, editor of *Izvestia*, commented on Hughes's reply: "Secretary Hughes's haughty refusal of M. Chicherin's offer to negotiate on a mutual basis now is explained, as behind his melodramatic pose Mr. Hughes hides his hopelessness of making out a case against Russia's counterclaims." [46]

Rykoff declared that the progress of the Franco-Soviet debt negotiations opened up the possibility of a debt settlement with America. He asserted that while the recognition in principle of the Tsarist obligations was impossible, he was confident that a satisfactory settlement could be reached if negotiations were once opened.[56] The State Department made no comment on these suggestions, however, and its uncompromising attitude remained unchanged.[57] In the words of Secretary Hughes: "The American Government . . . is not proposing to barter away its principles. If the soviet authorities are ready to restore the confiscated property of American citizens or make effective compensation, they can do so. If the soviet authorities are ready to repeal their decree repudiating Russia's obligations to this country and appropriately recognize them they can do so. It requires no conference or negotiations to accomplish these objects, which can and should be achieved at Moscow as evidence of good faith. The American Government has not incurred liabilities to Russia or repudiated obligations."

Responsibility for the deadlock must clearly rest most heavily upon the United States. The Soviet authorities have at least indicated a desire to reach a settlement. They have not, it is true, officially notified the American Government that they are ready to commence payments of interest and principal on Russia's debts, nor have they compensated American property owners for their losses. These matters, they insist, must be dealt with by negotiations. Their freedom of action is seriously hampered by treaty commitments to the European Powers, under which they cannot meet the American claims on terms more favorable than those they are prepared to grant to other governments. The United States, however, insists that past obligations must be acknowledged before recognition can be extended or negotiations begun. All Soviet gestures in the direction of such acknowledgment are scorned as inadequate or insincere. The Government of the U.S.S.R. is in effect told that it will be recognized only upon terms of unconditional surrender.

The wisdom and propriety of the American position as judged both by legal and by political considerations seem open to serious question. In law, the American claims are, of course, perfectly legitimate and the Soviet Government is under a definite obligation to recognize them. But the Russian counter-claims would seem to be equally valid, resting as they do upon principles of international law no less sacred than those which support the American position. The Soviet Government has declared its readiness to acknowledge the

American claims, albeit with reservations. The American Government absolutely refuses to acknowledge the Russian claims under any conditions. The Soviet Government wishes to negotiate. The American Government flatly refuses to negotiate. Though it is plain that disputes of this character can be peaceably settled only through negotiation between the parties or through submission to the arbitration of an impartial third party,* the United States refuses to consider either of these modes of settlement and offers no alternative. That its obdurate persistence in such an attitude can lead to anything in the way of constructive results appears extremely doubtful.

* While no definite offer to arbitrate the dispute has thus far been made by the Soviet authorities, there is little ground for supposing that such an offer would be favorably received by the American Government.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

AT THE END OF A DECADE

1. The Policy Evaluated

In seeking to arrive at a final estimate of the wisdom of the American policy as a whole, we must consider the problem from both the legal and the political viewpoints. The policy may first be judged by reference to the general principles and precedents of international law applicable to the situation. It may also be judged on the basis of its political expediency and efficacy in attaining the objectives which the United States has pursued in its dealings with Russia since 1917. In the present chapter a concluding evaluation of the policy of non-recognition will be undertaken in terms of both these criteria, and the general consequences of non-recognition upon Russian-American relations will be examined for the purpose of analyzing the alternatives which the future seems to present. The prospects for a modification of the policy will also be considered from the point of view, on the one hand, of the currents of public opinion within the United States opposing or favoring such modification and, on the other, of the effects of the changing situation abroad upon the American attitude.

As to the justification of the policy of non-recognition from a narrowly legal point of view, the evidence which has been presented above constitutes an adequate defense of the American position. It should, of course, be noted that the American position is not above criticism even on narrowly legalistic grounds. The repudiation argument is somewhat weakened by the repeatedly expressed desire of the Soviet Government to open discussion of the debt question and by the refusal of the United States to concede the validity of the equally legitimate Soviet counter-claims. American insistence upon the sanctity of property rights and upon restoration of, or compensation for, the confiscated holdings of American nationals in Russia would also seem more appropriate were the United States disposed to consider compensating Russia for the property unlawfully destroyed during intervention. Similarly the charge of propaganda to overthrow other governments would come with better grace

from a government which had not actively co-operated for a year and a half in a great international effort to overturn the Soviet régime. In these respects the American position savors of the pot calling the kettle black.

These considerations, however, do not materially weaken the legal argument in defense of the American attitude. Propaganda, repudiation, and confiscation have been policies of the Soviet régime. Other governments have a perfect right, if they so desire, to regard a régime pursuing such policies as unworthy of diplomatic recognition. If the American Government chooses to make recognition by the Soviet authorities of the obligations of the Tsarist and Provisional Governments a sine qua non of intercourse, it may do so. If it chooses to regard the activities of the Communist International as an insurmountable obstacle to amicable relations with the government, the capital of which is the International's headquarters, it may do so. No government is under any legal obligation to recognize another, even though the latter may consider prolonged refusal to extend recognition a manifestation of hostility. Diplomatic intercourse between States, though an indispensable condition of the maintenance of international law, remains a question of policy within the discretion of each government. In refusing to recognize the government of the U.S.S.R., the United States is entirely within its rights. Its legalistic defense of its policy is logically sound, subject to the qualifications indicated above. Its contention, moreover, that the peculiar characteristics of the Soviet Government give to recognition a broader implication than it usually possesses is not unreasonable in the light of the Soviet State monopoly of so many activities elsewhere left in private hands. Regarded solely as a question of law, the American position is proper and justifiable.

But the very fact that recognition is a matter of policy and not a mere legal formality makes it impossible to rely upon legal considerations alone in passing judgment upon the American attitude. In practice recognition has commonly been used as a weapon of diplomacy, a political instrumentality for achieving political ends. That it has served this function in the present instance cannot be denied. Recognition was immediately extended to the Provisional Government of March, 1917, for political reasons. It has been withheld from the Soviet Government for political reasons. Those reasons have on the whole not been so clearly stated nor so strongly emphasized as the legal arguments advanced in explanation and defense of the policy followed. But they have been fundamental and

decisive factors in the situation. To overlook them by considering only the legal formulæ in which the American policy has been couched is to mistake the form for the substance, the shadow for the reality. No evaluation of the American position can be adequate which fails to consider also the general political objectives of the United States in its treatment of Russia and the degree of success achieved in attaining those objectives.

There can be little difference of opinion as to the general aims which have motivated the Russian policy of the United States since the November Revolution. The American policy has obviously been predicated upon the proposition that Communism is a dangerous menace to Russia, to the United States, and to the world at large, and that it should be discouraged and suppressed wherever it raises its head.

A determination of the abstract wisdom and propriety of these objectives would manifestly require a general examination of the relative merits of Capitalism and Communism as systems for the satisfaction of human wants. Such a discussion is clearly impossible within the limits of this study and would be quite futile. Governments regard proposals for revolutionary social and economic change not from the point of view of their logical correctness as philosophical abstractions but always with an eye toward their probable effect upon the material interests of the governments themselves and of the groups which they represent. The American Government is no exception to this rule. It governs a nation where the profit system, private ownership of industry, and the sanctity of property rights are accepted as part of the mores and are less seriously challenged than in any other industrial country. It speaks for a social order which the Communists propose forcibly to demolish. It represents interests for whose expropriation and destruction every good Communist hopes and prays. Messrs. Colby and Hughes and Hoover and Coolidge and Kellogg, like other human beings, consider Russian problems not in a mental vacuum, but with an established equipment of attitudes and predispositions reflecting the environment which produced them. Hostility toward Communism is so much a part of those attitudes and predispositions as to be almost instinctive. Some one gifted with unusual powers of imagination might conceive of their abandoning such hostility as a result of persuasion or cogitation. For all practical purposes, however, it seems reasonable to assume that opposition to Communism on the part of the American Government will remain a constant factor in the situation for an

indefinite period to come. The wisdom of the American policy toward Russia must therefore be judged not by the reasonableness or unreasonableness of this opposition, but by other considerations.

Assuming for present purposes, then, that the general objectives of the United States in this connection are legitimate, or at least so much a part of the natural order of things as to be beyond criticism, the question of the political expediency of its Russian policy becomes a matter of determining the consequences of that policy with reference to the achievement of those objectives and of comparing them with the possible consequences of alternative policies. It is perfectly apparent, at the outset, that the American policy has not resulted in the disappearance of the Communist régime in Russia. After ten years of existence the Soviet Government remains among the most stable in Europe with every prospect that it will remain in control of Russia for many years. Domestic opposition to it is microscopic, inchoate, and altogether negligible. What intervention failed to achieve has not been achieved by non-recognition. The United States can sometimes make or unmake governments in Latin America by extending or withholding recognition, but the Soviet Union does not occupy a position relative to the United States comparable to that of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, or even Mexico.* Had all of the other governments of the world continued to co-operate in politically boycotting the Soviet régime, the result might have been different. But with the United States playing a lone hand and diplomatic relations for the most part restored between Russia and the rest of the world, there is no reason to suppose that the American policy will be any more successful in the future than it has been in the past in bringing about the replacement of the Soviet Government by a more acceptable régime.

But perhaps the American policy has brought about an end of Communism in practice even though Russia's government remains Communist in form? Certainly the New Economic Policy of 1921 was a step in the desired direction, since it constituted an abandonment of the military Communism of the early years of the revolution and was, confessedly, a "strategic retreat" toward capitalism. But it would be difficult to show that it was inaugurated as a result of the attitude of the United States or of other foreign governments.

* President Coolidge, in an address in New York on April 25, 1927, openly admitted that recognition in Central America was "equivalent to endorsement" of the government recognized by the United States, thus conceding that recognition by the United States in this region of the world at least, is frankly a weapon of policy.[1]

Indeed there is much evidence that Lenin would have introduced it in 1918 had it not been for foreign intervention which discredited the moderates within the Communist Party and played into the hands of the radical left wing.[2] Subsequent developments have not resulted in any surrender of the fundamental principles of Communism. In the oscillations of Soviet economic policy since 1921 there has been a further development of the NEP, but there has been no pronounced trend toward a restoration of a capitalistic régime. Such departures from pure Communism as have taken place would seem to have been dictated by economic necessity. That they have benefited the Russian people and accelerated reconstruction few would deny. In so far as they have been due to pressure placed upon the Soviet Government by the American policy of non-recognition, they represent a constructive result and a justification of that policy. A careful analysis of the situation would perhaps reveal a correlation in this respect. It appears, however, that the Soviet Government has been influenced in its economic policies not so much by a desire to placate the United States and to secure American recognition as by the exigencies of the internal situation in Russia. There seems little reason to believe that the NEP would not have been adopted and developed regardless of the international situation. While conceding that the American attitude may have played a small part in these developments, there can be only one answer to the contention that it was a factor of measurable importance: not proven.

Whether persistence in the policy of non-recognition will lead to any different result in the future is highly problematical. The position of the United States as the world's greatest source of liquid capital seeking investment abroad constitutes a significant element in the situation not present in the relations of the Soviet Government with other States. The desire of the Soviet authorities to obtain loans and credits makes them particularly interested in securing American recognition and furnishes a strong incentive in the direction of making further concessions in the direction of meeting the American demands. This circumstance may conceivably lead to the fundamental modification of Soviet economic policies which the United States has endeavored to encourage. As has been pointed out above, however, the refusal of the State Department to sanction the flotation of Soviet securities in the United States is part of its general policy toward all foreign governments which have failed to acknowledge their debts to the United States, and not an outgrowth of non-recognition as such. Recognition unaccompanied by the com-

mencement of debt-funding negotiations would effect no change in the State Department's attitude in this respect and would leave the Soviet Government in the same position it occupies at present as far as securing American capital for the expansion of its trade and the development of its resources is concerned. On the other hand, a lifting of the ban without a resumption of diplomatic relations is extremely improbable. In any case, the Soviet authorities clearly feel that the prospects of loans and credits hinge to a great degree on a resumption of diplomatic relations. They will feel impelled to attempt to satisfy the American demands in proportion as they regard such loans as an imperative necessity. Thus far, at least, they have regarded the price asked as excessive.

The policy of non-recognition, then, has not achieved the general objectives of the United States. On the contrary, it has had certain unfortunate consequences which have been strongly emphasized by critics. It has been contended, and certainly not without justification, that non-recognition has contributed much toward the perpetuation of the ignorance and intolerance with which most Americans have viewed the Russian Revolution. The absence of diplomatic relations between the governments of the two countries has led to the persistence of a war psychology between their peoples. In the United States advocates of recognition are still branded in certain circles as "Bolshevists" and enemies of American institutions, while its opponents are hailed as patriots and defenders of the Constitution. A premium is placed upon efforts to discredit the Soviet régime, while those who seek objective truth regarding Russian affairs find themselves blocked at every turn by a wall of misunderstanding and prejudice. A spirit of hatred and contempt, or, at best, of supercilious indulgence, tends to permeate all public thinking and discussion of things Russian. To many Americans the Russian Communists are still impossible fanatics, if not actual criminals, with whom social or political contacts on a basis of equality are quite impossible.[8]

The American policy has undoubtedly had a somewhat similar effect within Russia. As the largest, most powerful and most incurably "bourgeois" of the great capitalistic States of the world, the United States would in any case receive its due share of condemnation from Communist orators and writers. The Soviet leaders, however, recognize the value of American trade, the desirability of attracting American capital, and the contributions which American technology can make to Russian economic reconstruction. Their verbal assaults upon the United States might have diminished

accordingly in frequency and intensity but for the intransigent attitude of the American Government toward recognition. The persistent refusal of the United States to enter into diplomatic relations with the Soviet régime has, of course, been a source of keen disappointment and resentment among all Russians acknowledging allegiance to the U.S.S.R. It has encouraged the Communist leaders to indulge in bitter recriminations and wild threats [4] and has tended, to a slight extent at least, to develop sentiments of hostility toward the United States among the masses of the Russian people.[5]

These circumstances make it extremely questionable whether the old tradition of Russian-American friendship can now be regarded as anything more than a memory. As the history of the American policy since the revolution has shown, the tradition has not been wholly without effect upon the authorities at Washington. Insistence upon Russian territorial integrity, opposition to military intervention, famine relief, solicitude for the economic welfare of the Russian nation all testify as to its continued influence. But friendship for the Russian people has proven increasingly incompatible with hostility toward their government. The State Department may still insist that its attitude is motivated by the most friendly sentiments for the people of Russia and will, in the long run, be most conducive to their welfare, but, from the Russian point of view, whether governmental or unofficial, the distinction between people and government is an impossible one and the American position spells common antipathy toward both. Many Americans, moreover, have lost all faith in a people who tolerate so pernicious and reprehensible a régime as the Soviet Government appears to them to be and have come to regard Russia as a whole with contempt and distrust. Its inhabitants, they discover, have always been "Asiatic barbarians kept in check by a powerful minority." [6] With its government, "peace is impossible . . . conflict is inescapable." [7] The institutions and ideals of the two peoples are further apart than they were in the days of Tsarism. The disharmony between them has become infinitely more open and acute—so much so that relations of mutual hatred and hostility have been substituted for those of tolerance and cordiality.

2. Prospects for Recognition

In view of this situation, it seems profitable to inquire into the probabilities of a modification of the American policy in the future.

Prophecy in such matters remains impossible, but certain factors in the situation which have an important if not controlling influence upon the course of events may be examined. A nation's foreign policy may be altered either as a result of internal changes bringing new men into positions of control or causing present officials to yield to pressure for a new course, or as a consequence of new external facts or new developments in the general international situation which seem to dictate a fresh departure. The Russian policy of the United States may be changed as an effect of new domestic political alignments and a revolution of public opinion creating an imperative demand for an abandonment of the present position, or as a result of new developments abroad either within Russia or in the relations between Russia and other States. Since the prospects for American recognition of the Soviet Government and the opening of a new chapter in Russian-American relations hinge upon both these considerations, an analysis of recent and present trends of American public opinion on the question and an examination of the significant elements in the internal policies and the foreign relations of the Soviet Union should furnish some basis for prognostication.

The policy of the State Department toward Russia has on the whole met with approval, either in the form of passive acquiescence or of active support, on the part of most of the groups constituting the "public." There has been no general appreciation of the legal and political significance of diplomatic recognition and little reasoned discussion of the question. The fear and hatred of Bolshevism so assiduously cultivated during the years of intervention, however, have persisted in a powerful and widespread prejudice against any action savoring of approbation of the Soviet régime. The fantastic extremes to which anti-Soviet propaganda was carried in 1919 and 1920 have tended to disappear, but the legacy of ignorance, suspicion and distrust which remains behind has not yet been dispelled. Diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Government has been popularly confused with endorsement and approval and has been opposed for reasons having no proper relation to the problem at issue.

The views of things Russian conveyed to the American public by the daily press have continued in large measure to be very confused and far removed from the facts of the situation. The Soviet Government, to be sure, has long since ceased to collapse two or three times a month in the columns of American newspapers and its leaders are no longer occupied exclusively in imprisoning and assassinating one another or indulging in wild orgies of crime. But

its ability to maintain its own existence and to preserve peace, order and prosperity in Russia must appear extremely questionable to readers of certain sections of the press. Russian news in the columns of many of the great metropolitan dailies still constitutes an interesting study in political mythology. While no discussion of individual papers can be undertaken here, it will not be without value to select an example for purposes of illustration. The *Chicago Tribune* has taken particular pride in the accuracy of its Russian news:

> Alone among the great American journals THE TRIBUNE has refused to submit to the garbling censorship of the Red government. It has been forced to adopt wearisome, costly and at times hazardous methods in order to print the facts about Russian affairs.
>
> It is not an easy task defying a whole government. The reward is that THE TRIBUNE has been able to learn and publish the truth where others, accepting the restraints laid down, have been hoodwinked and misled into the publication of falsehoods. It is but another proof that only a free press can be a truthful press. Submission is corruption.[8]

A few recent *Tribune* headlines on Russian affairs follow:

SOVIETS FIGHT FAMINE AS GRAIN MYTH EXPLODES (October 26, 1925).
CLAIM STARVING POOR THREATEN DOOM OF SOVIET (June 15, 1925).
RUSSIANS FREE! TO ROB, STARVE, MURDER, AND DIE (November 15, 1925).
SIBERIA TRIES TO SHAKE OFF MOSCOW'S YOKE (November 26, 1925).
RUSSIA UNLOADS JEWELS TO SAVE SOVIET RÉGIME (February 10, 1926.)
SECRET REPORT SHOWS RUSSIA NEAR COLLAPSE (March 20, 1926).
UNCOVER SECRET TERRORIST PLOT TO SEIZE RUSSIA (July 30, 1926).
RUMANIA HEARS OF WIDESPREAD RUSSIAN REVOLT (August 7, 1926).
SOVIET PARTY IN CHAOS AS TRADE, INDUSTRY TOTTER (August 4, 1926).
ODESSA TROOPS MUTINY AGAINST MOSCOW RÉGIME (August 9, 1926).
RUSSIA FERMENTS AS RED FACTIONS GRASP FOR POWER (August 10, 1926).
REDS REINFORCE KREMLIN FORT AS MUTINY GROWS (August 13, 1926).
ECONOMY RÉGIME IN RUSSIA FAILS; CRISIS IMPENDS (August 21, 1926).
REPORTS REVOLT AGAINST SOVIET BEGINS IN RUSSIA (April 9, 1927).
RED ARMY FIGHTS WITH SOUTH RUSSIANS (April 19, 1927).
RUSSIA CALLS SOLDIERS HOME AS REVOLT RISES (April 21, 1927).
FAMINE STRIKES RUSSIA; POLAND FEARS INVASION (July 27, 1927).
MOSCOW TRAPS CASH OF FOREIGN BUSINESS FIRMS (October 16, 1927).
INDUSTRY FACES SWIFT DISASTER IN RED RUSSIA (October 23, 1927).
TROTSKY'S CLAN FIGHTS SOVIET POLICE; 18 DIE (November 23, 1927).
HUNDREDS DIE IN UKRAINE RIOTS, RUMANIA HEARS (November 26, 1927).

No inquiry into the factual basis of these news items would seem to be required. Suffice it to say that all of the reports of mutinies, revolts, and uprisings were wholly without foundation, so far as the writer has been able to ascertain, and that the remaining headlines differed only in the degree of their inaccuracy. The total picture

presented is completely at variance with the facts and is obviously calculated to discredit the Soviet régime. The *Tribune* is, of course, not entirely typical of the American press as a whole. There can be no question, however, but that the facilities available to the majority of American citizens for securing reliable and complete information about developments in the Soviet Union have been extremely unsatisfactory and that the resulting persistence of popular ignorance and prejudice has been a significant factor in producing acquiescence in the policy of non-recognition.

Certain groups and organizations, on the other hand, have actively championed the American policy and have bitterly fought all efforts to modify it. Representatives of financial, commercial and industrial interests, everywhere the target of Communist attack, have naturally assailed the Soviet Government on all possible occasions and, with few exceptions, have vigorously supported the policy of non-recognition. Patriotic societies of various kinds, in part the spokesmen for these interests, have been even more vociferous in their defense of the official position and their condemnation of all suggestions of a departure from it. In the spring of 1924, for example, a group of these organizations, including the American Legion, the American Defense Society, the Better American Federation, the Descendants of the Signers of the Declaration, the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, the Fraternal Order of Eagles, the Grand Army of the Republic, the Knights of Columbus, the Daughters of the American Revolution and the National League of Women Voters, formed an "All-American Conference" to combat radicalism and adopted resolutions condemning Soviet propaganda and opposing recognition of the Soviet Government.[9] In the election campaign of 1924 the American Defense Society sought to demonstrate that Senators La Follette and Wheeler, the Progressive candidates, were agents of Moscow and in league with the "Reds."[10] Ultrapatriotic associations of this kind, representing 100 per cent Americanism and abhorring radicalism of all varieties, have been most energetic and consistent in upholding the Russian policy of the State Department.

Among the most powerful and influential organizations actively opposing Soviet recognition is the American Federation of Labor. Samuel Gompers, its president until his death in 1924, was an untiring enemy of Communism and an uncompromising opponent of the Soviet régime.[11] At every annual convention of the Federation since 1919 the unflinching opposition of the great majority of the

delegates to recognition of the Soviet Government has been stated in no uncertain terms.[12] Under Gompers's successor, President William Green, this opposition has been intensified rather than diminished.[13] In 1926 the annual convention adopted a resolution declaring that the Soviet régime was "the most unscrupulous, most anti-social, most menacing institution in the world today." [14] A few liberal or radical labor organizations, such as the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, have observed the Russian experiment in labor rule with great sympathy and interest, but by far the larger number have condemned it root and branch and have bitterly opposed recognition of the Soviet Government.

On the other side of the ledger opinion is much less firmly crystallized and lacks the support of influential organizations. Sentiment in favor of recognition of the Soviet Government has been most pronounced in liberal and radical circles. Many with socialistic inclinations, despite their differences with the Communists on points of doctrine, have regarded the policy of the United States toward the Soviet Government as ill-advised and reactionary, though a few, it should be observed, have striven mightily to discredit the Communist régime.[15] Liberal opinion of the type represented by the *Nation* and the *New Republic* has on the whole favored recognition, though the undemocratic character of the proletarian dictatorship has aroused much unfavorable comment from the proponents of liberty and democracy. Certain religious, humanitarian and pacifist leaders have also advocated a change of policy. Sherwood Eddy, for example, a member of the International Committee of the Y.M.C.A., declared after a visit to Russia in the summer of 1926 that the Soviet Union was a "challenge to the rest of the world, to nations ruled by swollen, selfish capitalism" and that its government should be recognized by the United States.* In 1927 an American Trade Union Delegation, representing organizations not in sympathy with the official position of the A. F. of L., visited the Soviet Union and prepared an illuminating account of Russian economic progress, followed by a recommendation of recognition. A rank and file labor delegation of over twenty trade unionists also visited Soviet Russia during this year and published a favorable report on their return.[17]

* The *Chicago Tribune* indignantly inquired: "How much does twaddle of that sort represent the views of Y.M.C.A. workers? The Y.M.C.A. is supported by swollen, selfish capitalism. . . . We have not thought the organization is maintained for the promulgation of socialist doctrines or as an agency of political and social agitation." Eddy's views were officially repudiated by the Chicago branch of the Y.M.C.A.[16]

Pressure for recognition has also come from a very different and perhaps much more significant source in the business groups interested in Russian trade. Numerous American financiers and industrialists who have visited Russia or have had dealings with the Soviet trade agencies in the United States have found their natural antipathy to the Red régime mitigated by prospects of profit and have expressed the hope that political relations between the countries might be restored, though they have displayed little disposition to challenge the conditions for recognition laid down by the State Department.[18] This change of sentiment has been reflected to some extent in the attitude of the press.[19] Even the *Chicago Tribune* could say in October, 1926, that "we are approaching a time when satisfactory assurances will be forthcoming from Moscow, and we have lost nothing of importance in the meantime." [20]

Meanwhile contacts of many kinds between the two countries have been growing steadily. The State Department more freely grants visas to increasing numbers of Soviet scientific, technical and commercial missions to the United States. Despite the absence of American representatives in Russia the Department of Commerce endeavors to include in its reports and bulletins many items of information regarding economic opportunities in the Soviet Union. The Federal Reserve Bulletin regularly includes Soviet financial statistics. Mail between the two countries is exchanged without restriction. Soviet representatives have attended such international conferences in the United States as the International Dairy Congress, the International Soils Conference and the International Co-operative Conference. Travel is growing. The American Society for Cultural Relations with the U.S.S.R., established in the beginning of 1927, is attracting more and more public interest in the Soviet Union by its educational activities.

It is plain, however, that American public opinion as a whole continues to support the policy of the State Department. The voices raised in favor of recognition are still few and weak as compared to those opposed to it. A more extensive development of Russian-American commerce would doubtless increase the interest of certain business groups in the question and lead to stronger pressure for a modification of policy. But commerce has grown without recognition and business pressure for a resumption of diplomatic relations has not yet assumed decisive proportions.

This situation, which appears likely to continue for a long period, renders it extremely improbable that the American policy will be

changed in the near future as a consequence of any overwhelming pressure of public sentiment. That policy has never been a political issue between the major parties. The liberal and radical minorities which favor recognition are negligible in numbers and influence. Certain individual leaders within both the Republican and the Democratic Parties have urged a new policy toward Russia, but they have failed to win general support for their views. Barring the possibility that such an individual should be elevated to the presidential chair, there is little prospect that the next Administration, regardless of its political complexion, will depart from the policy of the present one. In any event no insistent demand for a new policy on the part of public opinion is to be anticipated. If recognition is accorded to the Soviet Government it will probably be for considerations of quite a different character.

Are such considerations to be found in the changing situation within Russia itself, or perhaps in the benefits which governments extending recognition to the Soviet régime have derived from their action? As to the former, the future internal changes within the U.S.S.R. cannot, of course, be foreseen. As already noted, all Soviet overtures in the direction of meeting the American conditions have been ignored as inadequate or insincere. It is conceded in Washington that recent changes in the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Government [21] are "in the right direction," but thus far they have been regarded as falling short of what is demanded by the United States as prerequisite to recognition. Though future developments may at any time produce a change in the situation, the prospects are not bright for any such fundamental reversal of policies on the part of the Moscow authorities as the President and the State Department could consider evidence of the realization of the objectives which the United States has pursued hitherto.

A modification of the American policy as a result of contemplating the experience of the nations that have entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union is even less probable. That experience is apparently regarded in State Department circles as a conclusive vindication of the American attitude. The present Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg, had ample opportunity to observe British-Soviet relations at close range during his sojourn as Ambassador at the Court of St. James. The character of those relations has not been such as to encourage the American Government to follow the British example. The British and Soviet Governments have been at loggerheads ever since de facto recognition was extended in 1921, due

primarily to actual or alleged violations of the anti-propaganda clause of the trade agreement by the Soviet authorities.[22] Repeated charges culminated in the dispatch of an ultimatum to Moscow on May 2, 1923, threatening to sever relations unless satisfactory assurances were received within ten days.[23] The Soviet reply made denials and counter-charges, but proposed a conference to settle outstanding difficulties and averted an immediate break. Following de jure recognition by the Labor Government in 1924 relations improved for a time, but at the end of October, just before the general election at which the Labor Party was defeated, the famous "Zinovieff letter," inciting the British Communist Party to revolution, made its appearance and led to new protests.[24] The letter was declared to be a forgery, but Sir Austin Chamberlain, the new Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the Conservative Government, denounced the treaties with the Soviet Government signed by his predecessor and reiterated his charges of propaganda.[25] Throughout 1925 and 1926 relations remained strained, with new allegations of anti-British propaganda in Asia inspired from Moscow [26] and recurring rumors of a rupture. The action of the Russian trade unions in sending almost $6,000,000 to the aid of the striking British miners did not contribute to friendliness between the two governments.[27] On February 23, 1927, the British Government once more dispatched a strong note of protest at the continuation of hostile propaganda on the part of the Soviet authorities and again threatened to break off relations.[28] A breach was again averted by a conciliatory reply from Moscow, but in May, following a police raid on the headquarters of Arcos, Ltd., and the Soviet Trade Delegation in London, Prime Minister Baldwin announced that the "evidence of subversive activities" thus discovered demanded a break.[29] Diplomatic relations were accordingly severed and the two nations have been at swords' points ever since.

The story of the relations between the Soviet régime and the other governments which have accorded it recognition has not been much more encouraging to the American State Department. In no case has the Soviet Government met the obligations inherited from its predecessors. The conflicting and irreconcilable views expressed at Genoa in 1922 remain unchanged. In almost every instance, charges of hostile Soviet propaganda directed against the government of the country extending recognition have been made. Now "propaganda" materials are being found in the baggage of the Soviet trade delegation to Canada.[30] Again the French Government declares itself disappointed with the results of recognition [31] or protests so vigor-

ously at the action of a member of the Soviet Embassy in Paris in addressing local Communist meetings as to compel his withdrawal.[82] On another occasion the German police raid the quarters of the Soviet trade delegation in Berlin because of the alleged protection afforded there to subversive agitators and the Soviet Government suspends all trade relations with Germany until an apology is tendered.[83] More recently the buildings of the Soviet Embassy in Peking are entered and searched by Chinese troops on the ground that the Embassy is a hotbed of revolutionary plots, and Moscow severs relations with the Peking Government.[84] On another occasion France compels the Soviet Government to recall its Ambassador in Paris, Christian Rakovsky, because of his alleged revolutionary expressions.[85] Later, following an abortive attempt of Chinese Communists to establish a Soviet in Canton, the Nationalist Government of South China severs all relations with the Soviet Union, and expels its representatives.[86] In some of these instances the charges are doubtless without foundation and friction is the result of the excessive sensitiveness and suspicion of the foreign governments concerned. But where there is so much smoke there is probably some fire also. In any case, whatever the compensating advantages may be to the governments which have extended recognition, the difficulties and embarrassments which they have encountered in dealing with the Soviet régime have tended to reinforce the American position and to increase the reluctance of the State Department to expose the United States to similar controversies with Moscow.

3. *The Alternatives*

While these considerations suggest that American recognition of the Soviet Government is not a probability of the immediate future, it is not to be assumed that the policy of non-recognition has crystallized into a tradition which will be followed indefinitely, regardless of changing circumstances. A change of attitude may be brought about at any time, probably not by any sudden shift of public opinion or of the point of view of Washington officialdom, nor yet by any surrender on the part of the Soviet authorities to the American demands, but rather by the injection of some new and unforeseen factor into the situation. The war of the oil trusts, the continued development of Russian-American commerce, the situation in the Far East, the diplomatic alignments in Europe, the struggle for disarmament, will all bear watching in this connection. Recognition

will perhaps come when the forces at play in these or other fields create an economic and diplomatic situation which will oblige the State Department to swallow its pride and to reach an understanding with the Soviet régime for the purpose of securing tangible benefits which can be obtained in no other way. In the meanwhile one may examine the alternatives presented by the situation at the time of writing.

The impossibility of reverting to the present policy in the event that recognition should prove in practice to be a mistake has undoubtedly been an important consideration back of the State Department's reluctance to depart from the course thus far followed. Recognition once accorded is irrevocable and leaves no alternative to the recognizing government in the event that it proves unsatisfactory save the severance of diplomatic relations—a step which commonly precedes war and would manifestly be much more unfortunate than the absence of such relations due to non-recognition, as Great Britain has discovered. Between recognition and non-recognition there is no middle course except the dubious expedient of so-called "conditional recognition." The United States might conceivably extend recognition to the Soviet Government in the same manner as it was extended to the Obregon government in Mexico in 1923, i.e., as a result of a definite prior understanding that the American demands for the fulfillment of international obligations would be met. None of the other governments which have recognized the Soviet régime have deemed this course desirable. All have preferred to extend recognition unconditionally and to negotiate concerning outstanding difficulties afterwards. A definite American offer of conditional recognition might perhaps lead to some solution of the problem. But such recognition would also be irrevocable and would afford no assurances that the conditions imposed would be observed on the part of the Soviet Government. In the case of Mexico, in fact, the assurances given by Obregon were repudiated by his successor, Calles. No such offer will be made in the case of Russia as long as the State Department regards the promises of the Soviet authorities as worthless and considers the prospective difficulties of diplomatic intercourse with Moscow insuperable obstacles to recognition of any kind.

It is arguable, however, that the dangers and difficulties of recognition might not necessarily be so serious as the State Department supposes—that they might indeed be less serious than those resulting from an indefinite prolongation of the present deadlock. The

unhappy experience of Great Britain, which has undoubtedly been an element behind the American refusal to follow the British example, is not necessarily conclusive for the United States. Anglo-Russian friction is not a product of the Russian Revolution, but is at least a century old, having in fact served as a motivating factor behind the tradition of Russian-American friendship. It is altogether probable that Great Britain would find itself at swords' points with any Russian Government as a consequence of the seemingly inevitable clash of the ambitions and policies of the two countries in Asia. Anglo-Soviet relations are constantly complicated by political disputes which would be largely absent in the relations between Russia and the United States. The difficulties which Germany, France, Italy and Japan have encountered in dealing with the Soviet Government have also been due in part to political controversies having no relation to the peculiar characteristics of the Soviet régime. In so far as the disappointments of recognition have been the result of hopes that it would lead to the speedy payment of old debts and the complete restoration of nationalized property, they have been due to anticipations of physical impossibilities. Whatever the disappointments and difficulties have been, few students of world affairs would challenge the statement that the interests of international peace and co-operation have been better served by the general acceptance of the U.S.S.R. into the family of nations than they would have been by its continued ostracism.

As regards the United States, it seems reasonable to expect that the course of Russian-American relations in the event of recognition would be considerably smoother than the relations which have prevailed between Russia and certain of the European Powers. Unconditional recognition would probably not result in immediate payment of Russia's debts to the United States, restoration of confiscated property, nor cessation of the propaganda of the Communist International. As to debts and property, however, the Soviet Government would undoubtedly be more than willing to meet the American demands if some formula could be discovered whereby it could avoid acknowledging similar obligations to the European States at the same time. The American claims, as contrasted with the European, are small and within the physical capacity of Russia to pay, but by its treaty commitments the U.S.S.R. cannot accord the United States preferential treatment. In regard to the Russian counter-claims, the American Government will doubtless continue to adhere to the position of all the Powers which engaged in intervention, though the

legal justifiability of that position is very questionable. As to propaganda, the earlier fears that Soviet consular and diplomatic agencies would be made channels for its extension would seem to be no longer well-founded. The Soviet Government has apparently discovered that it cannot profitably expose itself to diplomatic protest and its agents to expulsion from foreign countries by following such a policy. Occasional charges against its agents abroad are still made, but with decreasing frequency in recent years. The propaganda of the Third International has gone on in the United States in the absence of diplomatic relations between the American and the Soviet Governments. With recognition once granted, it might be made the subject of official complaint on the part of the United States and might conceivably be thereby diminished rather than intensified. In any case, in view of the utter insignificance of the American Communist movement, the menace of such propaganda to American institutions would seem to be very slight. If Germany, France and Great Britain, with powerful revolutionary labor movements of their own, have survived the danger, it is probable that the United States could do the same.

It may even be contended that a resumption of diplomatic relations would not only not involve the dangers and embarrassments which the State Department has feared, but would be more conducive to the successful realization of the political objectives of the American policy than non-recognition has been. The hope of bringing about the overthrow of the Soviet régime and its replacement by a frankly capitalistic régime must, of course, be abandoned. To pursue it further is to deal not with realities, but with the fantasies and chimeras that have already played far too large a rôle in Russian-American relations since 1917. There is still considerable opportunity, however, for continued peaceful modification of Soviet political and economic policies in the direction desired by the United States. The "constructive forces" in Russia which the American Government has been anxious to encourage, must be sought not among reactionary émigrés or expropriated bourgeoisie, but within the ranks of the Communist Party, which must be regarded for all practical purposes as permanently in control of the destinies of Russia. From the American point of view the moderates within the Party, favoring a more liberal and flexible economic policy and desiring to cultivate closer political and economic relations with the "bourgeois" States, certainly represent a more "constructive" force than the extremists. If the American Government desires to encourage the former group

at the expense of the latter, it might well question the wisdom of non-recognition as a means thereto. The hand of the Communist radicals in Russia is strengthened to the same degree as the relations of the U.S.S.R. with capitalistic nations become those of hostility and conflict, while the moderates, on the other hand, increase their power and prestige in proportion as those relations become amicable and "normal." The thesis of Lloyd George, also urged by Raymond Robins, Senator Borah and others in the United States, that Bolshevist extremism will be moderated not by war nor yet by ostracism but by a restoration of commercial and political relations between Russia and the rest of the world has been in large measure substantiated. The problem of the influence upon Communist policies of the attitude which foreign governments have taken toward the Soviet régime is obviously too large a one to be profitably discussed here, besides requiring materials necessary for a careful analysis not yet available to American scholars. One may venture the prediction, however, that such an analysis would lead to the conclusion that recognition by, and intercourse with, the western European governments have played a more significant rôle in mitigating the radicalism of the Soviet leaders than has the policy of the United States.

On the whole, these considerations indicate that the probable net effect of recognition in encouraging the "constructive forces" within Russia and in substituting friendship and co-operation for friction and misunderstanding would be preferable to the effects of the present American attitude. Doubtless neither policy can achieve all that the State Department has hoped for. But there is good reason for believing that a resumption of diplomatic relations would come nearer to realizing these hopes than a continuation of the deadlock. Such a step would, of course, represent an abandonment of the legal formula in which the American policy has been couched. That formula, except for its application to the Soviet counter-claims, is logical, correct and irrefutable. But, as a means of achieving the general objectives of the Russian policy of the American Government, it has not been conspicuously successful. To proclaim that the international bad manners of the Soviet régime make all relations with it forever impossible, to demand that certain conditions of recognition be met while at the same time rejecting contemptuously all gestures in the direction of meeting them, to insist upon "works meet for repentance" while affirming the inherent inability of the Communist authorities to undertake such works, is to pursue a course not very likely to lead to fruitful results. While there may be much

dispute as to the propriety of the ends sought, there can be no question whatever concerning the failure of the means hitherto employed to achieve them. When means lose contacts with ends, when formulæ become out of joint with facts, a new departure would seem to be called for. The results of such a step might admittedly prove unsatisfactory and disappointing. Russian-American relations no doubt would not at once attain the State Department's ideal of "normalcy." But an examination of all the considerations on both sides indicates that the experiment may well be worth trying in preference to an indefinite prolongation of an impasse which grows more unbreakable the longer it is continued.

A few concluding observations regarding the American policy may be set forth in the light of the alternative possibilities which the world politics of the twentieth century appear to present as regards the general relations between Russia and the bourgeois States. The social system, the political and economic institutions, and the culture and general idealogy of the Soviet Union are likely to remain widely at variance with those prevailing in the world of capitalism, nationalism and imperialism. This circumstance inevitably makes for friction and hostility between the two systems. The beneficiaries, supporters and apologists of each tend to regard the other as a threat to be met and an enemy to be challenged. Between the systems there may be open war, or there may be such mutual toleration and peaceable co-operation as the situation permits. Extremists in both camps anticipate and prepare for conflict. To them, the years of peace are but a truce. Eventually the two systems must meet in a death grapple for world supremacy resulting in the destruction of the one or the other. Moderates in both camps foresee a more pleasant if less dramatic prospect. In their view, continued intercourse will mitigate the belligerency prevailing on both sides. It will tend to bring about something approximating an assimilation of the systems, Russia perhaps gradually returning in part at least to the ways of the west while the western nations secure a more sympathetic insight into the social ideals of the Russian Revolution and possibly learn and profit from Russia's great experiment.

The American position has obviously been that peaceable intercourse between the proletarian government of Russia and the bourgeois governments of the West is impossible. It has rested upon the view, supported by quotations from the Communists themselves, that the aims and purposes, and even the very existence, of the Soviet régime are such a direct menace to the interests of all other

States that the relations between them can only be those of hostility. The framers of the American policy have tacitly accepted the thesis of the Bolshevist extremists and the Tory "die-hards" that a house divided against itself cannot stand, that two social and political systems so fundamentally different and so diametrically opposed at all points must sooner or later clash, that a great conflict between them for supremacy is inevitable. The United States, of course, has thus far opposed any effort to inaugurate the conflict by armed attack upon the Soviet Government. It has preferred to remain passive and in a defensive posture, awaiting developments. But it plainly regards amicable intercourse with the Soviet régime as an impossibility and envisages the future relations of Communism and Capitalism as those of war.

If this vision is the correct one, non-recognition would seem to be a policy of great wisdom and foresight. If a new Armageddon is inevitable in which the U.S.S.R. and the Communist International, assisted perhaps by the revolutionary proletariat of Europe and the disgruntled subject peoples of Asia and Africa, will face the bourgeois Powers and all the defenders of the existing order in armed combat, the course of wisdom for those Powers is to prepare their defenses and to take no action which would in any way strengthen the future foe. The United States, as the greatest of the bourgeois States and the most powerful champion of the institutions menaced by Communism, has, according to this theory, acted wisely in refusing recognition to the enemy, on the assumption that another general war is sooner or later inevitable in order to make the world safe for Capitalism. If this is a certainty of the future, all other considerations fade into insignificance and the American policy must be regarded as fully justified on the highest grounds of national interest.

The correctness of this assumption is manifestly not a matter upon which any conclusive determination is possible. Much evidence can be cited in support of the view which underlies the American attitude. Much evidence can be cited in support of the opposite view. The problem must remain one of opinion and speculation, since the factors involved are too complex and imponderable to allow of scientific prediction. It may be suggested, however, that the ways of peace appear more inviting to the battle-scarred post-bellum world than the ways of war and that the U.S.S.R. has shown itself to be not among the nations least anxious to avert new international conflicts. There is at least a high degree of probability that amicable, or at

any rate non-hostile, relations will continue to prevail between Soviet Russia and the Powers of western Europe. There is a fair chance that the two systems will reach a modus vivendi (if, indeed, they have not already done so) and that sustained contacts will discredit extremists and war-mongers in both camps and make for toleration and co-operation. All the other great Powers of the world, in recognizing the Soviet Government, have acted upon the assumption that the chance was worth taking as a possible alternative to the disastrous and world-destructive combat which the opposite policy contemplates.

The United States, alone of the world Powers, has refused recognition and has acted upon the assumption of the impossibility of peaceable intercourse and the inevitability of conflict. This position appears a somewhat strange one to be taken by the traditional friend of Russia and the champion of the amicable settlement of international disputes. It obviously tends to promote the hostility which the other Powers have striven to mitigate. If conflict is indeed "inevitable," it will come regardless of the American policy. But such international catastrophes become "inevitable" only when statesmen deal with the causal factors behind them in such a manner as to make them so. Few would contend that the American Government has handled the Russian problem since 1917 in a manner to contribute to international peace and understanding. Its past behavior, though intelligible to the American student as a natural manifestation of the fear and aversion with which the dominant class of one social order views another which casts its sacred idols in the mire and threatens it with destruction, can appear to Russians only as an incomprehensible combination of muddle-headed stupidity and scheming malevolence. Its present policy, like that of the Baldwin Cabinet in Great Britain since May, 1927, rejects all hope of peace and reconciliation and proclaims implacable war between Capitalism and Communism until one has destroyed the other or both have destroyed civilization between them. To those who regard such a combat as desirable or unavoidable, that policy must seem to be a product of enlightened statesmanship, regardless of all the arguments that have been advanced against it. But to those who see only disaster in such a prospect, who would strive to avert it at all costs, who are willing to accept certain hypothetical risks and difficulties for the sake of restored peace and friendship and to abandon past formulæ in order to deal more constructively with present realities, the American policy toward Russia must appear worse than futility.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I.

CABLE SENT BY PRESIDENT WILSON, MARCH 11, 1918, TO THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS AT MOSCOW.

(*Current History,* VIII, Part 1, p. 49.)

May I not take advantage of the meeting of the Congress of the Soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people at this moment when the German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purpose of the people of Russia?

Although the Government of the United States is, unhappily, not now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia through the Congress that it will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs, and full restoration to her great rôle in the life of Europe and the modern world.

The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the people of Russia in the attempt to free themselves forever from autocratic government and become the masters of their own life.

WOODROW WILSON.

APPENDIX II.

OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT ISSUED AT WASHINGTON, AUGUST 3, 1918.

(*Current History*, VIII, Part 2, p. 465.)

In the judgment of the Government of the United States—a judgment arrived at after repeated and very searching consideration of the whole situation—military intervention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it, and would injure Russia rather than help her out of her distress. Such military intervention as has been most frequently proposed, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, would, in its judgment, be more likely to turn out to be merely a method of making use of Russia than to be a method of serving her. Her people, if they profited by it at all, could not profit by it in time to deliver them from their present desperate difficulties, and their substance would meantime be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own or to feed their own men, women and children. We are bending all our energies now to the purpose, the resolute and confident purpose, of winning on the western front, and it would, in the judgment of the Government of the United States, be most unwise to divide or dissipate our forces.

As the Government of the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense.

With such objects in view, the Government of the United States is now co-operating with the Governments of France and Great Britain in the neighborhood of Murmansk and Archangel. The United States and Japan are the only Powers which are just now in a position to act in Siberia in sufficient force to accomplish even such modest objects as those that have been outlined. The Government of the United States has, therefore, proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the two Governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok, with the purpose of co-operating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding, as far as it may be, the country to the rear of the westward-moving Czecho-Slovaks, and the Japanese Government has consented.

In taking this action the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs—not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military forces may be obliged to occupy—and no impairment of her territorial integrity, either now or hereafter, but that what we are about to do has as its single and only object the rendering of such aid as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their endeavors to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory and their own destiny. The Japanese Government, it is understood, will issue a similar assurance.

These plans and purposes of the Government of the United States have been communicated to the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy, and those governments have advised the Department of State that they assent to them in principle. No conclusion that the Government of the United States has arrived at in this important matter is intended, however, as an effort to restrict the actions or interfere with the independent judgment of the governments with which we are now associated in the war.

It is also the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest kind in order in some systematic way to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which an opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered to the Czecho-Slovaks.

It is the hope and expectation of the Government of the United States that the governments with which it is associated will, wherever necessary or possible, lend their active aid in the execution of these military and economic plans.

APPENDIX III.

Reply of President Wilson to a Senate Resolution Concerning the American Troops in Siberia, July 25, 1919.

(State Department Russian Series, No. 4, pp. 5-6.)

For the information of the Senate and in response to the resolution adopted June 23, 1919, requesting the President to inform the Senate, if not incompatible with the public interest, of the reasons for sending United States soldiers to Siberia, the duties that are to be performed by these soldiers, how long they are to remain, and generally to advise the Senate of the policy of the United States Government in respect to Siberia and the maintenance of United States soldiers there, I have the honor to say that the decision to send American troops to Siberia was announced to the press on August 5, 1918, in a statement from the Acting Secretary of State.

This measure was taken in conjunction with Japan and in concert of purpose with the other Allied Powers, first of all to save the Czecho-Slovak armies which were threatened with destruction by hostile armies apparently organized by, and often largely composed of, enemy prisoners of war. The second purpose in view was to steady any efforts of the Russians at self-defense, or the establishment of law and order in which they might be willing to accept assistance.

Two regiments of infantry, with auxiliary troops—about 8,000 effectives—comprising a total of approximately 10,000 men, were sent under the command of Major-General William S. Graves. The troops began to arrive in Vladivostok in September, 1918.

Considerably larger forces were dispatched by Japan at about the same time, and much smaller forces by other of the Allied Powers. The net result was the successful reunion of the separated Czecho-Slovak armies and the substantial elimination in Eastern Siberia of the active efforts of enemy prisoners of war. A period of relative quiet then ensued.

In February, 1919, as a conclusion of negotiations begun early in the summer of 1918, the United States accepted a plan proposed by Japan for the supervision of the Siberian railways by an international committee, under which committee Mr. John F. Stevens would assume the operation of the Russian Railway Service Corps. In this connection it is to be recalled that Mr. John F. Stevens, in response to a request of the Provisional Government of Russia, went to Russia in the spring of 1917. A few months later he was made official adviser to the Minister of Ways and Communication at Petrograd under the Provisional Government.

At the request of the Provisional Government, and with the support of Mr. John F. Stevens, there was organized the so-called Russian

Railway Service Corps, composed of American engineers. As originally organized the personnel of this corps constituted fourteen skeleton division units as known in this country, the idea being that the skeleton units would serve as practical advisers and assistants on fourteen different sections of the Siberian Railway, and assist the Russians by their knowledge of long-haul problems as known in this country and which are the rule and not the exception in Siberia.

Owing to the Bolshevist uprising and the general chaotic conditions, neither Mr. Stevens nor the Russian Railway Service Corps was able to begin work in Siberia until March, 1918. They have been able to operate effectively only since the railway plan was adopted in February, 1919.

The most recent report from Mr. Stevens shows that on parts of the Chinese-Eastern and Trans-Baikal Railway he is now running six trains a day, while a little while ago they were only able to run that many trains per week.

In accepting the railway plan (in February, 1919) it was provided that some protection should be given by the Allied forces. Mr. Stevens stated frankly that he would not undertake the arduous task before him unless he could rely upon support from American troops in an emergency. Accordingly, as provided in the railway plan, and with the approval of the Inter-Allied Committee, the military commanders in Siberia have established troops where it is necessary to maintain order at different parts of the line.

The American forces under General Graves are understood to be protecting parts of the line near Vladivostok and also on the section around Verkne-Udinsk. There is also understood to be a small body of American troops at Harbin. The exact location from time to time of American troops is, however, subject to change by the direction of General Graves.

The instructions to General Graves direct him not to interfere in Russian affairs, but to support Mr. Stevens wherever necessary. The Siberian Railway is not only the main artery for transportation in Siberia, but it is the only open access to European Russia today. The population of Siberia, whose resources have been almost exhausted by the long years of war and the chaotic conditions which have existed there, can be protected from a further period of chaos and anarchy only by the restoration and maintenance of traffic on the Siberian Railway.

Partisan bands under leaders having no settled connection with any organized government and bands under leaders whose allegiance to any settled authority is apparently temporary and transitory are constantly menacing the operation of the railway and the safety of its permanent structure.

The situation of the people of Siberia, meantime, is that they have no shoes or warm clothing; they are pleading for agricultural machinery, and for many of the simpler articles of commerce upon which their own domestic economy depends, and which are necessary to fruitful and productive industry among them. Having contributed their quota to the Russian armies which fought the Central Empires for three and one-

half years, they now look to the Allies and the United States for economic assistance.

The population of Western Siberia and the forces of Admiral Kolchak are entirely dependent upon these railways.

The Russian authorities in this country have succeeded in shipping large quantities of Russian supplies to Siberia and the Secretary of War is now contracting with great co-operative societies which operate throughout European and Asiatic Russia to ship further supplies to meet the needs of the civilian population. The Kolchak Government is also endeavoring to arrange for the purchase of medical and other Red Cross supplies from the War Department, and the American Red Cross is itself attempting the forms of relief for which it is organized.

All elements of the population in Siberia look to the United States for assistance. The assistance cannot be given to the population of Siberia, and ultimately to Russia, if the purpose entertained for two years to restore railway traffic is abandoned. The presence of American troops is a vital element in this effort. The services of Mr. Stevens depend upon it, and, a point of serious moment, the plan proposed by Japan expressly provides that Mr. Stevens and all foreign railway experts shall be withdrawn when the troops are withdrawn.

From these observations it will be seen that the purpose of the continuance of American troops in Siberia is that we, with the concurrence of the great Allied Powers, may keep open a necessary artery of trade, and extend to the vast population of Siberia the economic aid essential to it in peace time, but indispensable under the conditions which have arisen from the prolonged and exhausting participation by Russia in the war against the Central Powers.

This participation was obviously of incalculable value to the Allied cause and in a very particular way commends the exhausted people who suffered from it to such assistance as we can render to bring about their industrial and economic rehabilitation.

APPENDIX IV.

NOTE OF SECRETARY OF STATE COLBY TO THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR, AUGUST 10, 1920.

(Department of State, *Notes Exchanged on the Russian-Polish Situation by the United States, France and Poland,* International Conciliation Pamphlets, October, 1920, No. 155, pp. 5-11.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, August 10, 1920.

Excellency:

The agreeable intimation which you have conveyed to the State Department, that the Italian Government would welcome a statement of the views of this government on the situation presented by the Russian advance into Poland, deserves a prompt response, and I will attempt without delay a definition of this Government's position, not only as to the situation arising from Russian military pressure upon Poland but also as to certain cognate and inseparable phases of the Russian question viewed more broadly.

This Government believes in a united, free and autonomous Polish State, and the people of the United States are earnestly solicitous for the maintenance of Poland's political independence and territorial integrity. From this attitude we will not depart, and the policy of this Government will be directed to the employment of all available means to render it effectual.

The Government, therefore, takes no exception to the effort apparently being made in some quarters to arrange an armistice between Poland and Russia, but it would not, at least for the present, participate in any plan for the expansion of the armistice negotiations into a general European conference, which would in all probability involve two results, from both of which this country strongly recoils, viz., the recognition of the Bolshevist régime and a settlement of the Russian problem almost inevitably upon the basis of a dismemberment of Russia.

From the beginning of the Russian Revolution, in March, 1917, to the present moment the Government and the people of the United States have followed its development with friendly solicitude and with profound sympathy for the efforts of the Russian people to reconstruct their national life upon the broad basis of popular self-government. The Government of the United States, reflecting the spirit of its people, has at all times desired to help the Russian people. In that spirit all its relations with Russia and with other nations in matters affecting the latter's interests have been conceived and governed.

The Government of the United States was the first Government to acknowledge the validity of the revolution and to give recognition of the Provisional Government of Russia. Almost immediately thereafter it

became necessary for the United States to enter the war against Germany, and in that undertaking to become closely associated with the Allied nations, including, of course, Russia. The war weariness of the masses of the Russian people was fully known to this Government and sympathetically comprehended. Prudence, self-interest and loyalty to our associates made it desirable that we should give moral and material support to the Provisional Government, which was struggling to accomplish a two-fold task—to carry on the war with vigor and, at the same time, to reorganize the life of the nation and establish a stable government based on popular sovereignty.

Quite independent of these motives, however, was the sincere friendship of the Government and the people of the United States for the great Russian Nation. The friendship manifested by Russia toward this nation in a time of trial and distress has left with us an imperishable sense of gratitude. It was as a grateful friend that we sent to Russia an expert commission to aid in bringing about such a reorganization of the railroad transportation system of the country as would reinvigorate the whole of its economic life and so add to the well-being of the Russian people.

While deeply regretting the withdrawal of Russia from the war at a critical time, and the disastrous surrender at Brest-Litovsk, the United States has fully understood that the people of Russia were in nowise responsible.

The United States maintains unimpaired its faith in the Russian people, in their high character and their future. That they will overcome the existing anarchy, suffering and destitution we do not entertain the slightest doubt. The distressing character of Russia's transition has many historical parallels, and the United States is confident that restored, free and united Russia will again take a leading place in the world, joining with the other free nations in upholding peace and orderly justice.

Until that time shall arrive the United States feels that friendship and honor require that Russia's interests must be generously protected, and that, as far as possible, all decisions of vital importance to it, and especially those concerning its sovereignty over the territory of the former Russian Empire, be held in abeyance. By this feeling of friendship and honorable obligation to the great nation whose brave and heroic self-sacrifice contributed so much to the successful termination of the war the Government of the United States was guided in its reply to the Lithuanian National Council, on October 15, 1919, and in its persistent refusal to recognize the Baltic States as separate nations independent of Russia. The same spirit was manifested in the note of this Government of March 24, 1920, in which it was stated, with reference to certain proposed settlements in the Near East, that no final decision should or can be made without the consent of Russia.

In line with these important declarations of policy the United States withheld its approval from the decision of the Supreme Council at Paris recognizing the independence of the so-called Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and so instructed its representative in Southern Russia, Rear Admiral Newton A. McCully.

Finally, while gladly giving recognition to the independence of

Armenia, the Government of the United States has taken the position that final determination of its boundaries must not be made without Russia's co-operation and agreement. Not only is Russia concerned because a considerable part of the territory of the new State of Armenia, when it shall be defined, formerly belonged to the Russian Empire; equally important is the fact that Armenia must have the good will and protective friendship of Russia if it is to remain independent and free.

These illustrations show with what consistency the Government of the United States has been guided in its foreign policy by a loyal friendship for Russia. We are unwilling that while it is helpless in the grip of a non-representative Government, whose only sanction is brutal force. Russia shall be weakened still further by a policy of dismemberment conceived in other than Russian interests.

With the desire of the Allied Powers to bring about a peaceful solution of the existing difficulties in Europe this Government is, of course, in hearty accord, and will support any justifiable steps to that end. It is unable to perceive, however, that a recognition of the Soviet régime would promote, much less accomplish, this object, and it is therefore adverse to any dealings with the Soviet régime beyond the most narrow boundaries to which a discussion of an armistice can be confined.

That the present rulers of Russia do not rule by the will or the consent of any considerable proportion of the Russian people is an incontestable fact. Although nearly two and one-half years have passed since they seized the machinery of government, promising to protect the Constituent Assembly against alleged conspiracies against it, they have not yet permitted anything in the way of a popular election. At the moment when the work of creating a popular representative government, based upon universal suffrage, was nearing completion, the Bolsheviki, although in number an inconsiderable minority of the people, by force and cunning seized the powers and machinery of government, and have continued to use them with savage oppression to maintain themselves in power.

Without any desire to interfere in the internal affairs of the Russian people or to suggest what kind of government they should have, the Government of the United States does express the hope that they will soon find a way to set up a government representing their free will and purpose. When that time comes, the United States will consider the measures of practical assistance which can be taken to promote the restoration of Russia, provided Russia has not taken itself wholly out of the pale of the friendly interest of other nations by the pillage and oppression of the Poles.

It is not possible for the Government of the United States to recognize the present rulers of Russia as a government with which the relations common to friendly Governments can be maintained. This conviction has nothing to do with any particular political or social structure which the Russian people themselves may see fit to embrace. It rests upon a wholly different set of facts. These facts, which none disputes, have convinced the Government of the United States, against its will, that the existing régime in Russia is based upon the negation of every principle of honor and good faith and every usage and convention underlying the

whole structure of international law—the negation, in short, of every principle upon which it is possible to base harmonious and trustful relations, whether of nations or of individuals.

The responsible leaders of the régime have frequently and openly boasted that they are willing to sign agreements and undertakings with foreign powers while not having the slightest intention of observing such undertakings or carrying out such agreements. This attitude of disregard of obligations voluntarily entered into they base upon the theory that no compact or agreement made with a non-Bolshevist Government can have any moral force for them. They have not only avowed this as a doctrine, but have exemplified it in practice.

Indeed, upon numerous occasions the responsible spokesmen of this power and its official agencies have declared that it is their understanding that the very existence of Bolshevism in Russia, the maintenance of their own rule, depends, and must continue to depend, upon the occurrence of revolutions in all other great civilized nations, including the United States, which will overthrow and destroy their Governments and set up Bolshevist rule in their stead. They have made it quite plain that they intend to use every means, including, of course, diplomatic agencies, to promote such revolutionary movements in other countries.

It is true that they have in various ways expressed their willingness to give "assurances" and "guarantees" that they will not abuse the privileges and immunities of diplomatic agencies by using them for this purpose. In view of their own declarations, already referred to, such assurances and guarantees cannot be very seriously considered.

Moreover, it is within the knowledge of the Government of the United States that the Bolshevist Government is itself subject to the control of a political faction with extensive international ramifications through the Third International, and that this body, which is heavily subsidized by the Bolshevist Government from the public revenues of Russia, has for its openly avowed aim the promotion of Bolshevist revolutions throughout the world. The leaders of the Bolsheviki have boasted that their promises of non-interference with other nations would in no way bind the agents of this body.

There is no room for reasonable doubt that such agents would receive the support and protection of any diplomatic agencies the Bolsheviki might have in other countries. Inevitably, therefore, the diplomatic service of the Bolshevist Government would become a channel for intrigues and the propaganda of revolt against the institutions and laws of countries with which it was at peace, which would be an abuse of friendship to which enlightened Governments cannot subject themselves.

In the view of this Government, there cannot be any common ground upon which it can stand with a power whose conceptions of international relations are so entirely alien to its own, so utterly repugnant to its moral sense. There can be no mutual confidence or trust, no respect even, if pledges are to be given and agreements made with a cynical repudiation of their obligations already in the minds of one of the parties. We cannot recognize, hold official relations with, or give friendly reception to the agents of a Government which is determined and bound to con-

spire against our institutions; whose diplomats will be the agitators of dangerous revolt; whose spokesmen say that they sign agreements with no intention of keeping them.

To summarize the position of this Government, I would say, therefore, in response to your Excellency's inquiry, that it would regard with satisfaction a declaration by the allied and associated powers that the territorial integrity and true boundaries of Russia shall be respected. These boundaries should properly include the whole of the former Russian Empire, with the exception of Finland proper, ethnic Poland, and such territory as may by agreement form a part of the Armenian State.

The aspirations of these nations are legitimate. Each was forcibly annexed and their liberation from oppressive alien rule involves no aggression against Russia's territorial rights and has received the sanction of the public opinion of all free peoples. Such a declaration presupposes the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory embraced by these boundaries, and in the opinion of this Government should be accompanied by the announcement that no transgression by Poland, Finland, or any other power, of the line so drawn will be permitted.

Thus only can the Bolshevist régime be deprived of its false but effective appeal to Russian nationalism and compelled to meet the inevitable challenge of reason and self-respect which the Russian people, secure from invasion and territorial violation, are sure to address to a social philosophy that degrades them and a tyranny that oppresses them.

The policy herein outlined will command the support of this Government.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

BAINBRIDGE COLBY.

His Excellency, Baron Cammillo Romano Avezzano,
Ambassador of Italy.

APPENDIX V.

NOTE SENT BY SOVIET COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS CHICHERIN TO PRESIDENT COOLIDGE, DECEMBER 16, 1923

It has been the constant endeavor of the Soviet Government to bring about a resumption of friendly relations with the United States of America based upon mutual trust. With this in view, it has repeatedly announced its readiness to enter into negotiations with the American Government and to remove all misunderstandings and differences between the two countries.

After reading your message to Congress, the Soviet Government, sincerely anxious to establish at last firm friendship with the people and government of the United States, informs you of its complete readiness to discuss with your government all problems mentioned in your message, these negotiations being based on the principle of mutual non-intervention in internal affairs. The Soviet Government will continue wholeheartedly to adhere to this principle, expecting the same attitude from the American Government.

As to the questions of claims mentioned in your message, the Soviet Government is fully prepared to negotiate with a view toward its satisfactory settlement on the assumption that the principle of reciprocity will be recognized all around. On its part, the Soviet Government is ready to do all in its power, so far as the dignity and interests of its country permit, to bring about the desired end, of renewal of friendship with the United States of America.

CHICHERIN,
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

APPENDIX VI.

Diplomatic Recognition of the U.S.S.R. by Other States.

(Compiled from the *Soviet Union Yearbook, 1927*, pp. 31, 44-59, 65.)

The following States maintain Embassies in the U.S.S.R. and have extended de jure recognition to the Soviet Government in the manner shown:

Afghanistan (Treaty, February 28, 1921).
Austria (Exchange of notes, February 20, 1924).
China (Treaty, May 31, 1924).
Denmark (Exchange of notes, June 18, 1924).
Esthonia (Treaty, February 2, 1920).
Finland (Treaty, October 14, 1920).
France (Exchange of notes, October 28, 1924).
Germany (Treaty, April 16, 1922).
Great Britain (Exchange of notes, February 1, 1924; diplomatic relations severed, May 13, 1927).
Greece (Exchange of notes, March 8, 1924).
Italy (Exchange of notes, February 7, 1924).
Japan (Convention, January 20, 1925).
Latvia (Treaty, August 11, 1920).
Lithuania (Treaty, June 30, 1920).
Mexico (Exchange of notes, August, 1924).
Mongolia (Exchange of notes, November 5, 1921).
Norway (Exchange of notes, February 13, 1924).
Persia (Treaty, February 26, 1921).
Poland (Convention, October 12, 1920).
Sweden (Exchange of notes, March 15, 1924).
Turkey (Treaty, March 16, 1921).

In addition, de facto recognition, not involving the exchange of permanent diplomatic missions, has been extended by Belgium, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Switzerland.

APPENDIX VII.

Secretary of State Kellogg's Declaration of Policy of April 14, 1928.

(*New York Times*, April 15, 1928.)

During the past four years the Government of the United States has maintained the position that it would be both futile and unwise to enter into relations with the Soviet Government so long as the Bolshevik leaders persist in aims and practices in the field of international relations which preclude the possibility of establishing relations on the basis of accepted principles governing intercourse between nations.

It is the conviction of the Government of the United States that relations on a basis usual between friendly nations cannot be established with a governmental entity which is the agency of a group who hold it as their mission to bring about the overthrow of the existing political, economic and social order throughout the world and who regulate their conduct toward other nations accordingly.

The experiences of various European Governments which have recognized and entered into relations with the Soviet régime have demonstrated conclusively the wisdom of the policy to which the Government of the United States has consistently adhered. Recognition of the Soviet régime has not brought about any cessation of interference by the Bolshevik leaders in the internal affairs of any recognizing country, nor has it led to the acceptance by them of other fundamental obligations of international intercourse.

Certain European States have endeavored, by entering into discussions with representatives of the Soviet régime, to reach a settlement of outstanding differences on the basis of accepted international practices. Such conferences and discussions have been entirely fruitless.

No State has been able to obtain the payment of debts contracted by Russia under preceding Governments or the indemnification of its citizens for confiscated property. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the granting of recognition and the holding of discussions have served only to encourage the present rulers of Russia in their policy of repudiation and confiscation, as well as in their hope that it is possible to establish a working basis, accepted by other nations, whereby they can continue their war on the existing political and social order in other countries.

Current developments demonstrate the continued persistence at Moscow of a dominating world revolutionary purpose and the practical manifestation of this purpose in such ways as render impossible the establishment of normal relations with the Soviet Government.

The present rulers of Russia, while seeking to direct the evolution of Russia along political, economic and social lines in such manner as to make it an effective "base of the world revolution," continue to carry on,

through the Communist International and other organizations with headquarters at Moscow within the borders of other nations, including the United States, extensive and carefully planned operations for the purpose of ultimately bringing about the overthrow of the existing order in such nations.

A mass of data with respect to the activities carried on in the United States by various Bolshevik organizations under the direction and control of Moscow was presented by the Department of State to a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in January, 1924.

Since that time these activities have been developed and extended to include, for example, the stirring up of resentment against the Government and the people of the United States in the countries of Latin-America and in the Far East, and the supervision by Moscow of the organizations through which these activities are carried on has become even more comprehensive and more pronounced. The Government of the United States feels no concern lest this systematic interference in our affairs lead in the end to a consummation of the Bolshevik plan to bring about the overthrow of our Government and institutions.

The Government of the United States, however, does not propose to acquiesce in such interference by entering into relations with the Soviet Government.

Nor can the Government of the United States overlook the significance of the activities carried on in our midst under the direction of Moscow as evidence of the continuation of the fundamental hostile purpose of the present rulers of Russia, which makes vain any hope of establishing relations on a basis usual between friendly nations.

In the view of the Government of the United States, a desire and disposition on the part of the present rulers of Russia to comply with accepted principles governing international relations is an essential prerequisite to the establishment of a sound basis of intercourse between the two countries. A clear and unequivocal recognition of the sanctity of international obligations is of vital importance, not only as concerns the development of relations between the United States and Russia, but also as regards the peaceful and harmonious development of relations between nations.

No result beneficial to the people of the United States, or indeed to the people of Russia, would be attained by entering into relations with the present régime in Russia so long as the present rulers of Russia have not abandoned those avowed aims and known practices which are inconsistent with international friendship.

While the international aims and practices of the present rulers of Russia preclude the recognition of the so-called Soviet Government by the United States, the Government and the people of the United States, are now, as in the past, animated by a sincere friendship for the Russian people, as President Coolidge stated in his annual message to the Congress of December 6, 1923:

"We have every desire to see that great people, who are traditional friends, restored to their position among the nations of the earth."

As concerning commercial relations between the United States and Russia, it is the policy of the Government of the United States to place

no obstacles in the way of the development of trade and commerce between the two countries, it being understood that individuals and corporations availing themselves of the opportunity to engage in such trade do so upon their own responsibility and at their own risk.

The Department of State has endeavored to reduce to a minimum difficulties affecting commercial relations. Visas are readily granted by American consular officers to Russian nationals even if associated with the Soviet régime provided that the real purpose of their visit to the United States is in the interest of trade and commerce and provided that they have not been associated with the international revolutionary activities of the Bolshevist régime.

The American Government has interposed no objection to the financing incidental to ordinary current commercial intercourse between the two countries, and does not object to banking arrangements necessary to finance contracts for the sale of American goods on long-term credits, provided the financing does not involve the sale of securities to the public. The American Government, however, views with disfavor the flotation of a loan in the United States or the employment of American credit for the people making an advance to a régime which has repudiated the obligations of Russia to the United States and its citizens and confiscated the property of American citizens in Russia.

Various Soviet commercial organizations have established branches in this country, and, as may be observed from the following table, a substantial trade has been developed:

	Exports to Russia		*Exports from Russia*
1912	$27,315,137	1912	$28,345,870
1923	7,308,389	1923	1,481,699
1924	41,949,578	1924	8,303,465
1925	68,873,019	1925	13,001,731
1926	49,735,269	1926	14,121,992
*1927	58,812,435	*1927	8,885,366

* Ten months.

Not only has a substantial trade developed between the United States and Russia, but an examination of Russian trade statistics during the past three years shows that the total value of American exports to Russia in that period exceeds the total value of the exports to Russia from either Great Britain or Germany during the same period. It is to be noted in this connection that Great Britain concluded a trade agreement with the Soviet régime in 1921 and accorded recognition in 1924, and Germany reestablished diplomatic relations in 1922 and concluded a comprehensive commercial treaty in 1925.

NOTE: The trade figures differ slightly from those given in Chapter Ten, Section 4 of the text because of the failure to include trade with Russia in Asia in every instance. The 1927 figures are, of course, quite inaccurate because of their incompleteness.

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