BOLSHEVIST RUSSIA:

A PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

Lenine.
(Vladimir Ilianof).

Trotzky.
(L. D. Bronstein).

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BY

ETIENNE ANTONELLI

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PART I

CHAPTER I

BEFORE THE ADVENT OF BOLSHEVISM

The Liberal Movement—The Socialist Movement—The Popularist Movement: Peasants and Workmen—The Three Currents of the Revolution of February, 1917—Bolshevism.

WHEN the Czarist government was overturned during February and March, 1917, not a single protest was heard throughout the great domain of Russia. When the police after a few hours abandoned the machine guns intended to enforce respect for the autocracy, the Revolution encountered no further resistance either material or moral. Not one of those 130,000 landholding nobles who owed everything to their "Czar" felt called upon to lift a finger in his defence; not one of those numerous unbearable tyrants of the old order, the "Chinovniki," gave a thought

to protecting him. It seemed as if a tremendous moral aspiration were carrying the Russian people towards political freedom.

On the other hand, when the Bolsheviks seized the power in October, 1917, the opposition appeared to be immediate and unanimous. All the officials, from assistant ministers down to the lowliest pen-pusher, adopted an attitude of rebellion and boycott; all of the middle class, from the great bankers down to the lowliest shop-keepers, were filled with a vague terror; all the parties, all the politicians from Octobrists to Internationalists, from Alexander Gontchkof to Maxime Gorki and Martov, adopted an attitude of violent opposition and hostility.[1] It seemed the first day, as if Bolshevism was merely a disorderly riot in the outskirts of a metropolis setting itself up in authority for a few hours.

In diplomatic circles, in the press, among the public, the opinion was the same; a wave of disgust would throw down, vomit forth these shameful imposters.

And yet in spite of this unanimous disapprobation,

1 In industrial circles, the rumour was noised about on November 5, 1918, that a new government was being formed that would leave Petrograd and Moscow out of its sphere, anticipating that "even if the Bolsheviks were not crushed by the armed forces, their enterprise was doomed of itself to fail within two weeks at the most, as a result of the exhaustion of all their resources."

On November 22, the Petrograd bar by 466 affirmative votes, six members not voting, passed a motion "against the usurpation of authority by the Bolsheviks."

On the same date the Senate voted a long protest similar in content.

On November 26, the Academic Union of Petrograd unanimously passed a resolution declaring that "it did not recognize the authority of usurpers" and that it acclaimed the Constituent Assembly which "alone has the right to organize the political authority for the whole people and to speak in the name of the whole Russian land. . . ."

Finally, on this same date, an appeal similar in content was published by the press. It was signed by the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Council of the University of Petrograd, the Conference of the Academy of Army Surgeons, the Council of the Institute of Mines, the Council of the Technological Institute of Petrograd, the Council of the Institute of Engineers, the Council of the Female Medical Institute, the Institute of Civil Engineers, the Petrograd Advanced Courses for Women, the Conference of the Female Pedagogical Institutes, etc.

in spite of this coalition against them of all the moral forces of the nation, the Bolsheviks seized the power without encountering any material opposition, and they maintained themselves in power, not for a few hours, as everybody thought on the morning of October 25, not for a few days, but for months, and in such fashion that their power came to take on all the outward signs of stability.

How explain these contradictions, this paradoxical situation which baffles public opinion in Russia, and still frequently baffles public opinion in the allied nations? The answer to these questions has to be looked for first in the history of the Russian revolutionary movement.

The Revolution of 1917 was not a spontaneous, unforeseen, incoherent political movement. It was not an explosion, but a consummation. It was determined by the coming together, fortuitously, it is true, of three distinct social and political movements, which dated far back and were strongly developed: the liberal movement, the socialist movement, and the plebeian movement (proletarian and peasant).

Russia for more than a century had known an aspiration towards liberalism, which during the course of the nineteenth century was several times expressed in various transitory and unlucky manifestations.

The first signs of this liberal movement appeared in Russia during the eighteenth century at the time of Catherine II's philosophical friendships. Great importance, perhaps, should not be attached to the isolated manifestations of the two "Galitzine" with rifle in hand taking part in the capture of the Bastille,

nor to the action of a Strogonof, taking part in the sessions of the Jacobin Club, alongside his teacher, Romme, future member of the Convention.

And yet the account given by Ségur of the manifestation with which the news of the capture of the Bastille was received at St. Petersburg seems to indicate the existence of a vague liberal movement in Russia at that time.[2]

The end of the reign of the Great Catherine is filled with the domestic struggle against free-masonry, "martinistes," "illuminati" or liberals (volnodoumtsi). Ivan Novikof was imprisoned at Schlüsselbourg, and Radichtchef was exiled in Siberia.

Alexander I, brought up by Vaudois, The Laharpe, after a few years of government with liberal tendencies, returned, under the influence of Metternich we are told, to a brutally autocratic régime, but secret societies and Masonic Lodges, recruiting their members among high officials and officers, kept alive beneath the ashes the sacred fire of liberalism. This underground movement, it will be remembered, terminated in the unhappy insurrection of December, 1825. The three secret societies, which had prepared the event, were organized on the model of the "carbonari," and presented at that time the three currents of liberalism which in the course of the nineteenth century were gradually to assert themselves. The Society of the North, established at St. Peters-

2 "I cannot express," writes Ségur, "the enthusiasm which the fall of that state prison and the first triumph of a stormy liberty excited among the lawyers, the merchants, the middle class, and some young men of higher rank. French, Russians, Danes, Germans, English, Dutch, all embraced one another in the streets as if they had been freed from shackles which had been crushing them. This madness, which I hardly believe as I recount it, lasted but a short time; fear soon put a stop to this first movement."

burg, demanded a constitutional monarchy; the Society of the South, recruited from among the officers of Little Russia, stood for a republic; finally the "United Slavs" dreamed of a federation.

The premature Decembrist movement foundered in a famous trial in which 321 suspects, nearly all of them nobles, were arraigned. Five death sentences were pronounced. From this time dates the creation by the frightened authorities of the famous Third Section of Chancellery (Ministry of Political Police).

The régime of brutal political oppression established by Nicholas I, a sinister incarnation of the pitiless autocratic spirit, silenced the voice of Russia. Nevertheless, the *douch* (the spirit of liberalism) breathed in Slav souls. From time to time a little flame, quickly smothered, lighted up this dark space and showed that the fire was still alive. First it was the circle of the *arzamas* which won for its founder, the great Pushkin, several years of exile in the Caucasus on the shores of the Black Sea. Then it was the circle of the student Stankevitch, frequented by Bielinsky, Katkof, Bakounin, and, upon their return after serving their term of banishment, by Nicholas Ogaref and Alexander Herzen. Later Turgeniev was obliged to undergo exile; Dostoievsky, condemned to death, his penalty commuted as he was being led to execution, was sent to Siberia whence he brought us his "House of the Dead."

But then came the accession of Alexander II, and that slavic liberalism, so long repressed, now flourished in this, its golden age. It looked as if the old Czarist empire was about to undergo a transformation. Refugees were recalled, travelling and residing

in foreign countries were permitted, reforms were promised, and preparations were made for the abolition of serfdom. The emperor read Herzen's newspaper *Kolokol (The Bell)*. Russia began to breathe.

But here the stream of Russian revolutionary history separated into two branches. The liberal movement continued, but from it a new socialist movement, democratic and mystical, detached itself.

Up to this time the liberal movement, which with Herzen, Ogaref, and Bakounin, had taken a socialist form, was confined to the cultivated classes of the hereditary or moneyed aristocracy. It was at heart more literary than active. Towards 1860 a new national class awakened to a consciousness of social life, the *Intelligentzia*, as it is called. The members of the Central Revolutionary Committee of 1862 were young scholars, clerks, and journalists like Dobroliubov, Pisarev, and Czernichevski. The new type of short-haired woman appeared, the revolutionary female student with her hair bobbed. Disorders multiplied in the schools and the revolutionary movement became more violent. The year 1886 witnessed the first attempt against the life of Alexander II, the one made by Karakozov.

Then the authorities returned to severe methods of oppression. Alexander II, Alexander III, and Nicholas II went back to the Nicholas I type of autocracy. The liberal movement as such could not express itself; only the poniard and the terrorist's bomb could speak.

However, Nicholas II, under the threat of popular revolution, felt the need of making concessions. And

from 1905 on, we witness a renascence of the liberal movement, which soon won over all the cultivated classes, the nobility, the university world, and the business world.[3]

The accumulated mistakes of the shameful Rasputin régime ended in a formidable coalition of all the moral forces of the country. In the Duma the "Progressive Bloc" was formed, and this brought all the liberal elements of the "Nationalist Progressives" behind the cadets in a demand for "the creation of a united government, composed of persons enjoying the confidence of the country, and agreeing with the law-making bodies on the putting into immediate practice of a clearly defined program."[4]

When the February Revolution broke out, the liberal party was ready for action. It had its personnel and its program; it was the party which was going to play the apparently decisive part in the opening events.

The revolutionary socialist movement, which under the influence of refugee propagandists in foreign countries had become detached from the liberal move-

[3] The importance of the liberal movement in the cities was brought out especially by the elections to the second Duma in 1907. At Moscow the whole cadet ticket (sixty candidates) was elected. Fifty-five per cent. of the votes cast went to the cadets; twenty-four per cent. to the Octobrists, eight per cent. to the monarchists, and thirteen per cent. to the bloc of the left.

At the same time a manifestation which was symptomatic marked the progress of liberal ideas in university society. The Assembly of Delegates of the University Body of all Russia on March 6, 1907, elected its six representatives to the Imperial Council. They were Maxime Kovalevski, member of the Party of Democratic Reforms; Prince Eugene Trubetskoy, member of the Party of Pacific Regeneration; Manuilof, rector of the University of Moscow (cadet); Grimm, dean of the Law Faculty of the University of Petersburg (cadet); Vassilief, rector of the University of Kazan (cadet).

[4] M. Charles Rivet, in his excellent study, "Le dernier Romanof," has indicated clearly the character and origin of this renascence of liberalism at the end of the old czarist régime.

ment about 1861, developed rapidly in the second half of the nineteenth century. This movement, originating in the universities, quickly assumed large proportions. On October 17, 1861, occurred the first political trial before the Senate, that of Michel Michailov. Netschaiev, with the anarchist Tkatschov, then organized the "Society for the Liberation of the People," which quickly gained a large membership—the "Netschaievtzi." A big prosecution in 1871 put an end to the movement.[5]

Although the leader of the "Netschaievitzi" might be regarded as the first formulater of terrorism, his propaganda remained essentially literary in character. Netschaiev sent proclamations to landowners, urging them to avenge themselves on the government; he sent others to the peasants to make them rise against the nobility.

Socialist propaganda, with Tschaiekovsky and the "Circles of Mutual Instruction," which from 1871 to 1873 flourished in all the large Russian cities, was brought to bear especially upon the student class (Dmitri Pisarev, Lermontov, Serdiukov, etc.) and took on a mystical character, which in 1875 was evidenced by the foundation of Malikov's socialist community in America.

Hounded by Count Schuvalov's police, the revolutionary leaders escaped from the country, taking refuge for the most part at Zürich and Geneva. In Russia, under the influence of Dolguschin, Natan-

[5] The story of how Netschaiev succeeded in escaping and taking refuge in Switzerland is well known. By his revolutionary ardour he momentarily won over Bakounin. But before long, the latter, disgusted by his young friend's conduct and morality, broke with him for good and all. The incident reveals the difference in the methods of the two groups.

sohn, and a few others, the character of the propaganda underwent a change. The "Dolguschintzi" adopted the principles put forth by Bakounin—the impossibility of acting upon the ruling classes of Russia and the necessity of acting upon the lowly people. It was from Bakounin also that they borrowed their motto, the watchword, "Go among the forests and the people." But the system, though it fascinated these young mystical souls by its dangerous and messianic elements, was not very successful. Its prophets were frequently arrested even by the people themselves and turned over to the police.

Then little by little, the revolutionists, who were united in the circle known as "Land and Liberty," developed the ideas of Lavrov, who in his newspaper, *Vperiod*, was maintaining the necessity of filling the popular centres with party representatives—small landowners, pedlars, assistant surgeons, and schoolmasters—indoctrinated with the teachings of Pierre Tkatschov, who at this time was writing his pamphlet, "The Problem of Revolutionary Propaganda in Russia."

Under the influence of Tkatschov and his organ, the *Nabat*, under the influence as well of the "Bountari" of Kiev and Odessa, terrorism became the dominating revolutionary doctrine in the new organization, "The Will of the People." It appeared sporadically at first in South Russia; but from the time of the Congress of Lipetsk and the Congress of Voronezh, it began to take on large proportions. The association known as the "Will of the People" was succeeded by the "Executive Committee"

which undertook the direction of the movement. At this time Nicholas Morozov thus proclaimed the profession of faith of terrorism:

"We must bring knives, dynamite, bombs, and poison into play. By such action the authorities will be kept in fear, the general public will be continually excited, the people will be demoralized, the party will assert its vitality, and the prestige of the present authority will be shattered."

Then began the period of real terror, which opened with Vera Zassulitch's attempted assassination. Her acquittal by the jury of Petrograd made a considerable sensation in all the liberal circles of Russia.

Alongside of these "Narodovoltzi," the old party, the "Narodniki," continued to exist, faithful to the principles of the "Dolguschintzi" and to those of the champions of "black repartition" grouped about Plekhanov.

The opposition between these two tendencies took on a more clearly defined character as the result of an incident. In November, 1883, appeared the first number of the *Monitor of the People's Will* (*Viestnik Narodoï-Voli*), the editors of which, Pierre Lavrov and Tvikomirov, refused an article by Plekhanov on "Problems of Socialism." Plekhanov then broke with the *Monitor* and the group "The Will of the People," carrying with him Axelrod, Deutsch, and Vera Zassulitch. This group then founded the "Society for the Liberation of Labour." The aim of the new society, as proclaimed in its manifesto, was to conduct pacifist propaganda in the bosom of the working class and carry on a criticism of the "revolutionary circles which have allowed themselves

to be so far overrun by the political struggle as to forget the indispensable problem of socialism."

In 1886, Plekhanov and his followers undertook a campaign to bring about a unification of all the groups. To that end they sent out questionnaires concerning the principles of the struggle, and the responses to these were to be used for working out an ultimate program. But these efforts were futile.

A certain David Kobermann of Odessa replied to the questionnaire that "it was only those persons who lived outside of the country and had lost every notion about the Russian people who could propose democratic programs for Russia. . . ." The revolutionary socialists were the people of the hour and not the democrats.

At the end of December, 1886, Alexander Oulianof[6] in the name of the group which organized the plot of March 1, drew up a manifesto in which the following statements occur: "The sole method for the struggle is systematic terrorism—This terrorism will not be a form of vengeance, or of despotic judgment, nor an unconscious protest of despair,—neither will it be a more direct means of abolishing the existing economic order; it will be a provisional, self-conscious, and calculated revolutionary struggle against the police of the despotism, who have no ground to stand on."

From 1895 on, the Socialist Party, already divided into two groups, "Narodniki" and "Naradovoltzi,"

[6] Alexander Oulianof, elder brother of Lenine (Vladimir Oulianof), was executed in the fortress of Schlüsselburg in 1887, for his participation in the regicide conspiracy of that year.

underwent a new transformation. Vladimar Oulianof (Lenine) in 1895, in association with Tsederbaum (Martov) founded at Petrograd the "Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class." In 1895 the Russian Social-democratic Labour Party was organized. Lenine, who at this time was serving a term of exile in Siberia with his friend Martov, wrote a pamphlet combating the opportunist policies of the economists in the name of the principles of social democracy.

In 1903 at the second Congress of the Russian Social-democratic Labour Party, the split was reflected in the formation of two groups which took the names of "Bolsheviks" (Adherents of the Majority) and "Mensheviks" (Adherents of the Minority).[7]

These three large divisions of the Russian Socialist Party continued to exist until the Revolution, *i.e.*, Menshevik Social Democrats, Bolshevik Social Democrats, Social Revolutionaries.

The influence of the Socialist Party, in all its forms, but especially the influence of the Social Revolutionaries, has been considerable among the Russian people for over fifty years. But it should be noted that the party itself has recruited its active members exclusively from the intellectual class. It did not originate among the people. It went to the people; it did not come from the people.[8] Among the Bolshevists themselves all the militants were of

[7] See the history of Bolshevism, pp. following.

[8] It was not until the Congress of Stockholm of 1906, after the lamentable failure of the Revolution of 1905, that the Socialist Party officially and for the first time made the following decisions:

1. "That the Party should support a movement to encourage among the workers the organization of trade unions even without party affiliations."

the intellectual class, students, literary men, etc. Not one of them came from the "people."

Lenine (Oulianof) is the son of a present state councillor, and himself a former student; Trotzky (Bronstein) is a man of letters and son of a colonist (emigrant); Lounatscharsky is the son of a present state councillor; Zinovief (Radonisloki) is of the middle class; Kamenev (Rosenfeld) is a former student of the University of Moscow; Martov (Tsederbaum) a former student of the University of Petrograd; Ouriski is an engineer-architect; Rykov is a jury translator; Mme. Kollontai was the wife of a lieutenant-colonel and retains few traces of the plebeian.

It should be stated also that the influence of the Socialist party on the Russian people has been above all a moral influence, a messianic social gospel which is represented in its purest form by Tolstoi-ism.

But alongside of and outside of this socialist movement of the intellectuals, of the "Intelligentzia," the nineteenth century witnessed in its course the formation, at first almost unconscious in the peasant class, and then in the working class, of a class mentality, a spirit of rebellion and of self-governing organization.

A spirit of revolt, the natural fruit of the tyrannical institution of slavery, always existed among the peasantry. Russian history is full of wild scenes of plunder, and of peasant uprisings quickly stifled in

2. "That a campaign must be conducted to procure the complete liberty of trade unions by broadening the scope of the law of March 4, 1906."
3. "Encourage a 'rapprochement' between Trade Unions and the Party by an active socialist propaganda within the Unions."

blood. The most famous instance in modern history of a peasant revolt is the uprising of Pugatchef as recounted by Pushkin.

"This Cossack (Pugatchef)," says the old historian, Léveque, "owed his success less to the name of Peter III, which he had usurped—although he bore no resemblance whatever to Peter III—than to his hatred of the nobility and to the promise that he made to abolish slavery."

It was the reforms of 1851, which, by allowing the peasants to form local self-governing organizations, brought class consciousness to birth. The movement for a long time remained very "underground" and very much concealed. An outward manifestation of an organic social aspiration did not occur until 1905 —and even then in a form still ill defined. The spring of that year witnessed the first deep and widespread agitation of the peasant class. Peasants chopped down the trees in the forests of the lords, ransacked their barns, refused to pay farm rents and taxes as well as the redemption annuities of the reform of 1861. The peasant terror spread in all directions, but it was worst in the south-east.

A Pan-Russian Peasant Union was organized. Peasant congresses were convened.

The first Duma contained 166 peasant representatives who constituted the main strength of "The Labour Group."

The peasants elected to the Second Duma a great many representatives of their own class. In the villages people entered with enthusiasm into the new political life. They held meetings to hear the reading of debates of the Duma on the land question.

Some constituencies even sent a second peasant to keep watch on their deputy at St. Petersburg.

But the Second Duma was dissolved and reaction and repression descended upon the Russian fields. In 1907 more than 4,000 peasants were convicted by the courts for participation in the agrarian movement or membership in organizations pronounced illegal.

As a protest against an iniquitous election law[9] the peasants boycotted the elections for the third Duma. In more than five hundred districts they refused to take part in the elections. At Poltava and at Tver peasants were even convicted for refusing to prepare the ballots.

Land troubles began once more—refusals to pay taxes, individual acts of vengeance against proprietors, arson, destruction of property. Everywhere were evidences of social ferment. At Tomsk five peasant societies were convicted. The leaders of the "General Union of Peasants" were condemned to one and two years of imprisonment.

Stolypin's land reforms not only failed to allay the smouldering of this deep social movement; it added fuel to the fire. The peasant class was silenced; it was not subjugated.

At the same time that it was awakening to a consciousness of its political power, it was developing

[9] By the law of June 16, 1907, three-quarters of the peasants were deprived of the suffrage; the labourers in all cities except Odessa, Riga, St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Kief were deprieved of the suffrage; the large landed proprietors obtained the right to elect one hundred delegates as against ten peasant delegates; the peasant delegates were obliged to hold a joint session with the delegates of the landed proprietors and elect their representatives in a mixed college; in the cities the wealthy wards and the wards of the working people were so organized that the vote of the working people was smothered under.

its economic organization. In 1903 there were three co-operative creameries in Siberia (for the production of butter); in 1907 more than two hundred co-operative enterprises were in operation. In 1912 the "Union of Artels of Siberia" included two hundred co-operative enterprises for the manufacture of butter, and forty-nine co-operative stores. On January 1, 1913, co-operative creameries in Russia numbered 2,700; other rural co-operative enterprises, 4,510.

When the Revolution of 1917 broke out, the peasant class (and in this respect the story differs from that of 1905) was ready to act.

The other element of the "people" consisted of the working class. This class represented until recently only a very small element of the Russian masses. In 1861 it was estimated that there were about 520,000 workers, former serfs forced from the land, who had been emancipated and turned into wage-earners by the law of 1861. The formation in 1875 of the "Workers' Alliance of South Russia" marked the first timid awakening of the Russian working class to political life. In 1883, Blagoiev founded at Petrograd the first socialist society of workers, affiliated with the society "Liberation of Labour." Its organ was the newspaper, the *Worker.*

The year 1891 deserves special mention. The terrible famine of that year drove many peasants into the cities; these augmented the mass of workers, and breathed into them a new spirit of revolt.

The Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party was founded in 1898, and this date marks the begin-

ning of the period of labour agitation. On May 1, 1900, the first labour manifestation took place at Kharkof, and the effect of it was widely felt among the masses. In 1902 serious disorders broke out at Rostof-on-the-Don.

This nascent movement made the government anxious. Instead of meeting the danger openly, it appealed to the old Czarist methods. Zouvatoff, a member of the "Okhrana" police, began playing the part of provocateur, founding workmen's societies and encouraging manifestations among them, so as to furnish a pretext for repressive measures by which the government hoped to quell the movement. Gapone, the priest, became his successor in this rôle. But here the Czarist police policy went astray. Under the new conditions, in which individual action was bound to be submerged in collective action, the system of provocation and corruption was doomed to end in a catastrophe.

The catastrophe befell on January 22, 1905. As a consequence of a dispute with the management of the Pontiloff factories, Gapone was leading a workmen's manifestation in front of the Winter Palace, for the purpose of presenting a petition to the Czar. The peaceful manifestants were received with a volley of bullets.

The general political and economic situation was troubled at this time by the unlucky events of the Japanese War. The ancient worm-eaten edifice of Czarism needed only a spark to burst into flames. This spark was furnished by the bullets of January 22. The movement spread immediately through all Russia—strikes in railroads, the printing houses,

and the bakeries, and mutinies in the navy (the "Potemkin" affair).

On August 6, 1905, Czarism, outflanked, made a first concession by creating the Duma of the Empire. The Liberal Party, satisfied with this unhoped for victory, abandoned the struggle. But the extreme elements, the workmen and the students, continued to carry on the agitation. A new strike broke out among the railroad workers. On October 13, 1905, the first Soviet of Workers' Deputies was formed, and it became the centre of the revolutionary movement.

It should be noted that this first soviet founded by workmen was an organization absolutely independent of the socialist parties. Its president, Krustalev, did not belong to any political organization at this time. It was only after the formation of the soviet that the political parties were invited to take part in it. At this time Lenine was in Finland, directing Bolshevist newspapers, working for a militant socialism, but not directly mingling with the labour movement.

On October 30, a general strike was proclaimed. But the workers, left to themselves, without contact with the peasants, and without the moral support of the liberals, were obliged to give in. The Soviet of Workers' Deputies was placed under arrest. The workers' movement was shattered. The socialist group (Social-democrat) had but six representatives in the first Duma.

But then the workers again allied themselves politically with this party, and in the second Duma the Social Democrats numbered fifty-four.

The third Duma contained eleven workmen's deputies and fourteen Social-Democrats. Thus it seemed as if the workers' movement was resisting fusion with the socialists, even in political matters.

The Trade Union Law of March 17, 1907, granted the Syndicates a precarious existence, subjecting them to the requirement of previous authorization.

Out of one hundred and sixteen requests for registration during the four months following the promulgation of the law of 1907, sixty-eight were refused. Those associations which were tolerated lived under a constant menace of suppression. Persecution of leaders of the movement was systematic and incessant. The Metallurgists' Syndicate of Petrograd, for example, had ten presidents and ten committees from 1907 to 1917; its leaders were constantly being sent to prison, to Siberia, or into foreign exile. Nevertheless the metallurgists, the printers, and others developed a certain degree of organization. At the end of 1913 a movement in Petrograd, Riga, and Moscow in defence of the right to strike brought together more than 150,000 workers.

The war of 1914 changed the character of the workmen's organizations. Women, children, and "non-qualified" workmen[10] soon became the majority in all the munition factories. These new inexperienced elements without poise and without occupational stability were more hot-headed in their demands and less "reformist." The stage was set for revolutionary action.

[10] Translator's Note: Workmen whose productive capacity was below the norm established by the syndicates.

Alongside of this spontaneous organization of labour syndicalism should be mentioned the co-operative movement, which worked along parallel lines, although more moderately, and which was to play an important political rôle in the first part of the Revolution under the government of Kerensky. On January 1, 1913, there were 7,500 co-operative consumers' societies united into a number of federations, the most important of which was the one at Moscow comprising six hundred societies.

. . . . . .

Thus the three great political forces, the Liberal Party, the Socialist Party, the Popular Party (workmen and peasants) were built up. Each had its officers, its program, its organization. The liberals grouped within the parties of the "progressive bloc" of the fourth Duma were constitutionalist, parliamentarian, and democratic. The socialists were revolutionary (with all the vagueness that the term implies) and democratic. The workmen and peasants had no doctrine, but a definite program—the seizure of the power of the government.

Then occurred the Revolution of 1917. It began with a popular movement occasioned by the bad condition of the provisioning service. On February 22 (March 7) a meeting was organized in the Pontiloff factories. The management closed the shops. By way of reprisal, a strike was declared. The next day, Friday, February 24 (March 9), the strike spread, and the street cars stopped running. Women paraded the streets, demanding bread. Some cases

of disorder resulted, and the police charged the crowd. But there was a feeling that the preventive measures were muddled, and that the government was losing its foothold. Then on the night of the 9th the suburbs where the workmen lived were organized. Committees were formed, and on February 25 (March 10) a general strike was ordered. The police were guarding the bridges, but the workmen crossed the Neva on the ice and spread out into the centre of the city. The encounters became bloody.

Note that, up to this time, the movement was exclusively proletarian and labour. It was a riot; it was not yet a revolution.

Then the government made its fatal mistake. By an imperial ukase it ordered the dissolution of the Duma. This action immediately rallied all the liberal elements to the support of the uprising. The Duma decided to remain in permanent session, and to disregard the order of dissolution. It appointed an Executive Committee to re-establish order.

Meanwhile the workmen had been conducting an active propaganda in the army barracks.[11] The first acts of insubordination among the troops took place on Sunday; the fourth company of the "Paul" regiment fell away. The next day, Monday, the Volhynian regiment followed suit; then the Lithuanian, and finally the "Preobajensky."

But the uprising was without leaders; workmen and soldiers formed a mob. It was then that a young

[11] This propaganda was essentially pacifist. The legend of a patriotic Russian Revolution must be dismissed. From the very beginning the Russian populace which made the Revolution was consistently "defeatist."

second lieutenant, George Astakhof, conceived the idea of leading the manifestation to the Duma. From this time on the Executive Committee took charge of the movement. On March 13, all the regiments of the garrison, headed by their officers, marched in front of the Duma. The Revolution was accomplished. Czardom had collapsed.

The three revolutionary forces, which with no previous agreement had brought about the movement by their joint action, now found themselves face to face.

The question now was whether, in view of the accomplished fact, they would understand the necessity of a working agreement for the sake of assuring the orderly development of the new régime. Such a political attitude would be likely in an occidental country.

In Russia, there were two insuperable obstacles in the way of such an attitude. The first is psychological: the idea of compromise and concession is unknown to the Slav mind, which goes straight towards the "absolute," towards complete and exclusive realization. The second is social: Russian society, which until yesterday had been kept securely divided up by air-tight class partitions, could not rise to a democratic or even a national state of mind.

The political forces released by the coup d'état of February (March), 1917, were thus destined to be juxtaposed but not fused. Each would reach out without concession towards the total realization of its ideal.

Yet each of these elements represented a force

very different in kind from the others. The liberals had the prestige of their political experience and intellectual authority. The socialists had the prestige of their fifty years of devotion to the popular cause and their democratic propaganda among the "people." But this "people" organized in its "soviets" alone had the material strength of numbers. It was without leaders, it is true, and as it was naturally docile, it would accept any one who appeared as long as he seemed likely to realize its ideal concretely expressed in its vague but imperative program—"peace, land, and liberty." At the very first it rallied under liberals, but soon embraced the leadership of social democrats like Avksentieff, Dane, and Tchernoff. Kerensky, by the prestige of his career as leader of the "labourite group" (as the peasant group in the Duma was called), succeeded for several months in the gamble of maintaining the leadership of this impatient and troubled mass.

Up to this time what we have witnessed is an attempt at government of that mass from the outside, government by moral influence exercising control over no material force.

. . . . . .

Then Bolshevism suddenly appeared, taking the exact opposite of this policy of preparation and democratic education. Without giving the least thought to the political exigencies of the situation it asserted its Marxian policy of direct and voluntary social organization from the bottom up, by

means of free and self-determined action by the proletariat. Such revolutionary tactics are feasible in a society which has realized political democracy. But in a society such as the Russian, where there has been nothing to lead the people towards the democratic conception of collective interest, the capture of the power by the mass, and the autonomous political organization of that mass mean neither democracy nor socialism, but an irruption of instincts.

Everybody instinctively felt the profound truth of this as soon as the Bolsheviks asserted their doctrine. And political thought was overwhelmingly in opposition to that doctrine. But, on the other hand, Bolshevism answered perfectly to the childishly simple aspirations of the Russian masses. These were not at all concerned with the organization of society as a whole. They pursued their material class interests with such a conviction of the absolute nature of these that they soon came to feel that the only thing which could bring them complete realization of their desires was a direct seizure of governmental power. Moreover, this class, impatient, and intoxicated by the ease of a success which unfolded like a dream, soon reached the end of the concessions and "respites" it was willing to grant to the other classes. And when the Bolshevists launched their watchword "All the power to the Soviets," it was re-echoed by the whole people because it translated their deepest feeling.[12]

[12] Mme. Breshko-Breshkovskaia, returning from Siberia at the age of seventy-four, after a life consecrated to the people, warned the intellectuals against the danger in prophetic terms in the speech which she delivered as senior member before Parliament.

This explains the paradoxical political situation of October 25, 1917, with public opinion unanimously opposed to the Bolshevists and popular forces unanimously supporting them.

But, at bottom, the Bolshevik victory rested on a misunderstanding. They were socialists; that is to say that they were concerned with the social organization of the whole community. "Power to the Soviets" for them was a means; for the mass of the people, it was an end. The Bolshevists began by trying, with undeniable political skill, to manœuvre this mass towards social ends. Soon, however, overcome by the flood, they let themselves go with the tide, their sole thought now, that of keeping themselves in power until the new era of socialism. But then, exposed to the opposition of all the forces of the bourgeoisie, which rightly held them responsible for the tyrannical oppression of mob instinct, exposed at the same time to attack from the socialist parties, which reproached them with deserting and betraying the socialist-democratic ideal, the Bolshevists were fatally led to institute a reign of terror which, under the existing social conditions (numerical weakness of the bourgeois and intellectual parties; sympathy of the peasant body, who saw in terrorism the sole means of ensuring and consolidating its material conquests), it was particularly easy to maintain.

"Russian citizens, we do not pay enough attention," she said, "to the actual historical needs of the people. You must all sooner or later accustom yourself to the idea that the land should belong to the people, and that it will belong to them. If you do not choose the path that I am pointing out, Russia will remain divided into two hostile camps; with intelligence on one side, physical strength on the other. That will mean chaos. Do not forget that I have lived in contact with the Russian peasant for a half century. I am speaking of what I know and I am pointing out to you the one road to salvation."

Thus Russia passed from Czarist despotism to Bolshevist despotism almost without transition.

Yet the Bolsheviks were but the accidental instruments of an inevitable evolution imposed by the historical conditions of organization of Russian social forces. Perhaps, indeed, unbiased history will have to recognize that by their efforts to keep the masses at least in appearance in the path of a socialistic ideal, they were the only ones who could have prevented the complete miscarriage of democracy in Russia and the dissipation of the revolutionary movement into a series of ineffectual peasant uprisings. Perhaps if a Lenine had not been found, a William Caillet or a Ymilka Pugatchef would have arisen and sealed the future by a prompt restoration of the Czar; whereas the political performance of the Bolsheviks, in spite of their mistakes, their acts of madness, and their crimes, will not, perhaps, have been without fruit.

Chingarev, the great intellectual, murdered by a brute on the opening day of the Constituent Assembly, wrote from the prison of Peter and Paul a few days before his death:

"So much the better that the revolution has already taken place! So much the better that the avalanche hanging over the state has broken away and is no longer a menace to us. So much the better that the gulf between the people and the intellectuals has been opened wide, and is being filled up with the débris of the old order. So much the better, for it is only now that we can commence real constructive work, replace the clay feet of the Russian giant with a foundation worthy of him which

will endure. That is why I have no fears for the future. As yet the soul of the Russian people has changed but little, but it is changing, and above all it is awakening to political life."

CHAPTER II

THE BOLSHEVIKS

How They Took Over the Power of the Government—Their Men: Lenine, Trotzky, Lounatcharski, Noghine, Kamenev, Zinoviev, etc.—Their Doctrine: Its History and Principles—Their Troops: The "Red Guard," the "Red Army."

On October 24 (old style) Kerensky, head of the provisional government, delivered before the Pre-Parliament[1] a magnificent speech in which he denounced the criminal conspiracies prepared in the dark by the Bolsheviks to overturn the government. Kerensky declared, amidst the enthusiastic applause of the Assembly: "The moment that the state is made to founder by a betrayal whether wilful or unintentional, the provisional government will be discredited and destroyed, I with the others; but we will not be the ones to betray the life, the honour, or the independence of the state." The following

[1] The Pre-Parliament was an assembly of notables, consisting of representatives of all the classes of society, convoked by the Kerensky government to prepare for the opening of the Constituent Assembly, the elections to which were taking place, and to sit as the legislature until that time.

day, October 25, Kerensky, having turned over to Kichkine all the governmental powers for re-establishing order, secretly boarded a train . . . to go and collect troops.

The Pre-Parliament replied to Kerensky's eloquent cry of distress by adjourning its sitting for several hours, during which interval an attempt was made to find a formula for an order of the day. During this time their opponents were acting, and when at last the Pre-Parliament, by 123 votes against 102 (with twenty absentees) voted an order of the day so fine-spun that Kerensky, upon receiving it, asked Avksentief if he was permitting distrust of the Provisional Government, the Bolshevist Revolution had already been achieved in the barracks. The irreparable had been accomplished.

And yet the Provisional Government and the Pre-Parliament could not plead secrecy or surprise. On October 22 an appeal, which was published in all the papers on the 23rd, had been sent to the Petrograd garrison urging it not to execute orders unless signed by the "Military Revolutionary Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies of Petrograd," which thus substituted its authority for that of the local General Staff. This appeal at the same time informed the inhabitants that "commissioners" had been assigned to the various organizations of the army, and to the most important points of the capital.

Even as Kerensky was making his speech before the Pre-Parliament, October 24, there was handed to him in the rostrum an appeal which he read to the Assembly. It was couched in these terms:

"The Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies is in danger. We order that the regiment be placed on a regular war footing, and await further orders. Any delay or failure to execute this order will be considered as a betrayal of the Revolution.

"For the President: PODVOISKI,
"ANTONOV, Secretary."

However, the garrison at this stage was still wavering, and an energetic leadership might, perhaps, have kept it in the path of duty. But there was no longer any leadership. The following morning, October 25, a delegation of "Junkers" (pupils of the Military Schools) appeared before Kerensky, asking for orders. He replied: "As head of the Provisional Government and as Commander in Chief, I know nothing definite; I do not know what may happen to-morrow. I can give you no information to help you come to a decision. But as an old revolutionist, I appeal to you, as young revolutionists, and I ask you to remain at your posts, and defend what the Revolution has won."

This speech, the newspapers announced the following day, "gave rise to disagreement among the Junkers, some of whom began to waver. . . ." At the headquarters of the General Staff, where the "Junkers" next presented themselves, the Chief of Staff, with pale face and hanging jaw, broke down completely, and was unable to utter the semblance of an order. The same reception awaited them at the Pre-Parliament.

Kerensky's provisional government collapsed like a house of cards.

During this time his opponents had been acting. On the night of the 24th, about midnight, armoured motor cars appeared in the streets, some going towards the telegraph office, others towards the post-office. During the morning of the 25th, detachments of soldiers and red guards occupied the printing offices of the *Rousskya Volia* and the *Birjevia Viedomosti.* The State Bank was occupied by seventy sailors. Four motor-trucks and an armoured motor car loaded with some sixty soldiers and red guards appeared at the Hotel Astoria, which had been under requisition since the beginning of the war and was used as quarters for officers. These officers, numbering several hundred, surrendered their arms without resistance.

Meanwhile at the Winter Palace Kerensky was making various attempts by telephone to collect loyal troops from among the Cossacks and the pupils of the Military Schools. Seeing the futility of his efforts, he determined to quit Petrograd.

A few "Junker" patrols moved about in the streets, carefully avoiding the patrols of Red Guards and soldiers.

At six o'clock in the evening, two soldiers on bicycles rode to the District Headquarters of the General Staff. As delegates from the fortress, "Peter and Paul," they proposed to those present —Messrs. Kichkine (member of the Provisional Government endowed with the full powers of the Provisional Government for putting down disorders), Rutenberg, Paltchinsky, General Balgratouni, Colonel Paradielov, and Count Tolstoi—that they deliver to them (the delegates) the General Staff Headquarters. In case of refusal, the fortress and

the cruiser *Aurora* would open fire. (Note that the Staff Headquarters was not within range of either the one or the other). A conference was then held which deliberated for thirty minutes, and came to no decision. The Headquarters of the General Staff was then occupied by the sailors and the "Red Guard."

All these police operations were conducted without disorder or violence. The only disturbances of the day occurred in front of the Marie Palace, where some shots were exchanged, and in front of the Telephone Exchange where sixty Junkers, attacked by sailors, were quickly disarmed. The city preserved its normal aspect, with the bridges connecting the city and the suburbs open to traffic, the street cars running, and the telephones in operation.

About nine o'clock a few cannon shots were fired on the Winter Palace where some "Junkers" and a battalion of women had decided to make a stand. At eleven o'clock a delegation from the Municipal Duma proceeded to the cruiser *Aurora* to parley. It failed to obtain an audience. At one o'clock some more cannon shots, with shrapnel, were fired on the Palace; at two o'clock the Palace surrendered. Altogether not more than ten rounds had been discharged.

At this same time the ministers of the Provisional Government, Admiral Verderevsky, Kichkine, Konavalov, Malientovitch, Tretiakov, etc., were arrested. From that instant all resistance disappeared.

And while these police measures were being taken, Councils were sitting and deliberating everywhere.

On the 25th, at eleven o'clock in the morning, the Pre-Parliament convened at the Marie Palace. Two

hours were taken up with private conferences held by the president, Avksentief, first with the factions, then with the senior members of the party groups. Meanwhile some Junker and regimental delegations, which came to ask for orders, received no reply. Finally at one o'clock two divisions of Litovski and a detachment of sailors of the guard occupied the Palace and the deputies dispersed.

"The Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies" convened at one o'clock in the morning of the 26th. The majority of the Committee was Anti-Bolshevist. Trotzky defended the action of his friends, and in the face of the hostile attitude of Dane, Liber, and Martov, who denounced their attempt as a crime against the Revolution, the Bolsheviks walked out of the room.

While this was going on, the Second National Congress of Soviets was holding its first session. Here the Bolsheviks were the masters. They had an overwhelming majority—260 Bolsheviks, 60 Mensheviks, 14 Menshevik-Internationalists, 3 Anarchists, 3 Independent Socialists, 220 without party affiliations, and 47 undeclared.

The board of officers consisted of 14 Bolsheviks and seven Revolutionary Socialists of the Left. The other parties, including the Menshevik-Internationalists (Martov), had refused to participate. The whole session was filled with protests from the other parties against the Bolsheviks.

The same evening the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies of Petrograd convened, the body that had organized the coup. The session was taken up with statements by Trotzky, Lenine, and Zinoviev,

announcing the success of the coup d'état, amidst the frantic applause of the audience.

On the 26th, the Municipal Duma met. It also registered an ineffective protest, while a Bolshevik announced that his faction considered it no longer possible to take part in the Duma, and that his friends intended to ask the populace to replace the Municipal Duma. Thereupon the Bolsheviks quit the meeting.

On the evening of the same day a "National Committee for the Defence of the Fatherland and the Revolution," composed of representatives from all the socialist parties, the "Provisional Council of the Republic," and the "Municipal Duma," took the "initiative in re-creating a Provisional Government, which resting upon the force of the democracy will lead the country to a 'Constituent Assembly,' and save it from anarchy and counter-revolution." This manifest, together with the disastrous intervention between Kerensky's troops and those of the Soviet on the 29th and the 30th, constitutes the sole public assertion made by this terrible committee.

At nine o'clock in the evening of this same day, October 26, the "Second Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies" reconvened for its second session. It elected a new "Central Executive Committee" comprising one hundred members, seventy of whom were Bolsheviks, with a minority composed exclusively of Revolutionary Socialists of the Left and representatives of the nationalities—Letts, Poles, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians. Then by a tremendous majority it passed a resolution defining the organization of the new

governmental authority. The text of the resolution follows:

"The National Congress of Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies" enacts the following decrees:

"For the purpose of governing the country until the Constituent Assembly is convened, there shall be organized a provisional workmen's and peasants' government which will be known as the 'Council of People's Commissioners.'

"The administration of the various activities of the State will be entrusted to commissions, the membership of which shall guarantee the execution of the program proposed by the Congress, in close cooperation with the organizations of workmen and working women, sailors, soldiers, peasants, and employés.

"Governmental authority shall rest in a college of presidents of commissions, *i.e.*, in the 'Council of People's Commissioners.'

"Control over the activity of the People's Commissioners and the right to remove them rests in the 'Congress of Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies' and its Central Executive Committee."

"At present, the Council of People's Commissioners is constituted as follows:

"President of the Council, Vladimir Oulianof (Lenine).

"People's Commissioner of the Interior, A. I. Rykov.

"People's Commissioner of Agriculture, V. P. Miliutine.

"People's Commissioner of Labour, A. G. Schliapnikof.

"People's Commissioners of War and the Navy, a committee composed of V. S. Ovsiemko (Antonov), N. V. Krylenko, F. M. Dybenko.

"People's Commissioner of Commerce and Industry, V. P. Noghine.

"People's Commissioner of Public Instruction, A. V. Lounatcharski.

"People's Commissioner of Finance, I. I. Skvortzov (Stepanov).

"People's Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, L. D. Bronstein (Trotzky).

"People's Commissioner of Justice, G. I. Oppokov (Lomov).

People's Commissioner of Provision, I. A. Teodorovitch.

"People's Commissioner for Posts and Telegraphs, N. P. Avilov (Gliebov).

"People's Commissioner for Nationalities, I. V. Djougachvili (Staline).

"An incumbent has not yet been designated for the post of People's Commissioner of Railroads."

The Bolshevist régime was established.

Who are these men who assume authority under such tragic circumstances? To answer that question we must begin by dismissing legends and slanders. These men are not, as they are generally represented, vagabonds, or sinister adventurers, "fishers in the troubled waters who have arisen out of the popular upheaval." They have a well known past. All of them have given substantial proofs of their revolu-

tionary convictions, have risked their lives for their ideas, and have lived for years in Dostoievsky's "House of the Dead" in the terrible prisons of Czarist Siberia. And they are not uneducated people even, or people with mere elementary schooling. All of them, or nearly all are intellectuals who have been through the university. The majority of them, indeed, are not of plebeian origin; not one, I think, was formerly a peasant or workman. All belong to the class of officials or to the well-to-do middle class.

Oulianov (Vladimir Ilitch), called Lenine or Iline, or Ilitch or Taline, belongs to the hereditary nobility, a son of one of the present state councillors[2] of the government of Simbirsk. Born at Simbirsk on April 10, 1870, brought up in the orthodox religion, he studied at the Gymnasium from which he graduated in 1887, when he entered the University of Kazan. This year his father died. His brother, Alexander, Ilitch Oulianov, was implicated in the plot against Alexander III; and on May 8, 1887, was hanged in the enclosure of the Schlüsselburg fort, together with the four chief accomplices in the plot, Gueneralov, Andreiuschkine, Ossipanov, and Schevyriov.

Young Vladimir was expelled from the University and forbidden to live in Kazan because of the part he took in a student revolutionary demonstration. In 1891 he entered the University of Petersburg. Then he married Nadejda Constantinova Krupckaia, daughter of a secondary school assistant who was an active propagandist.

[2] Under "Tichin" his father holds the high rank which entitles him to the appellation, "Your excellency." See note 1.

In 1895 he went to Geneva, entered into relations with Plekhanov's followers, and returned to Petersburg where he busied himself with socialist literature and propaganda under the name of "Toumine." In 1896 he was indicted by a court of inquiry investigating the Social-democratic organization of St. Petersburg. He was tried and on January 29, 1897, he was sentenced to three years exile in Eastern Siberia. He passed this exile at Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk and in the government of Yeniseisk. On July 16, 1900, he left Russia and soon became a member of the Central Committee of the Russia Social-democratic Labour Party, assuming a position of importance in the band of political refugees. In 1901, with Martov and Potressof, he founded the newspaper, *Iskra* (The Spark). In 1903 at the Second Congress of the party, he was the leader of the faction that obtained the majority, called the Majority or the "Bolsheviks" in contradistinction to the Minority, or "Mensheviks," headed by Martov.

In 1905, during the first Revolution, Oulianov returned to Russia, and settling down at Kookhala, in Finland, a few miles outside of Petrograd, directed the activities of the Bolshevik faction of the Social-democratic Party in the Second Duma. Then he was obliged to leave Finland, and to go abroad once more where he continued a great deal of active socialistic work as member of the International Bureau of the Socialist Party.

During the war, he intensified his pacifist and internationalist propaganda. He contributed to the newspapers, the *Social-Democrat*, the *Communist*, and the *Forbocks*. He was one of the organizers of

the Zimmerwald Conference and leader of the faction of the Extreme Left at that conference.

He returned to Russia in April, 1917, and immediately began to play an important part.

He is the author of some important scientific works, among which may be mentioned "The Development of Capitalism in Russia," a compact and compendious work in which the influence of German science is perceptible; the "Land Question," "Materialism and Empirical Criticism." He has also written a number of books of propaganda, among which may be mentioned "In Twelve Years," "Imperialism," etc.

Physically, the man is of medium stature, vigorous, but heavy in carriage, with a red, broad and round face framed in a short beard, a drooping moustache, and a high forehead to which his baldness gives a receding appearance. His eyes, which have the turgid introspective look which characterizes the Slav, light up at times with a hard gleam of intelligence. Altogether he has the impressive head of the mystical prophet.

As a writer, he is master of a simple and popular dialectic, which, however, like his person, is powerful and heavy, pitiless and violent towards adversaries, compelling and authoritative among friends. Lenine's eloquence consists entirely of a homely logic obvious in its clearness. Without ornamentation or striving after effect it casts upon the cloistered and mystical soul of Slav crowds an almost religious spell which baffles description.

Next to Lenine, the most distinguished personality of the Bolshevist group is Bronstein—Trotzky.

Bronstein (Lev Davidof)—called Nicholas Trotzky, Trotzky, Ianovsky—is the son of a colonist of Jewish faith from the government of Kherson near Elisabethgrad. He was born in 1877.

He was indicted for the first time in 1898 in a judicial investigation of the "Workman's Syndicate of South Russia." Sentenced on October 10, 1899, he was sent to Siberia for four years. He settled in the city of Verkholensk, whence he made his escape. In 1905, after the arrest of Khrustalev, he succeeded the latter as president of the Soviet of Workmen's Deputies of Petrograd. Indicted in the proceedings directed against that organization, he was sentenced on October 13, 1906, to be deprived of his civil rights, and to be sent into exile in the city of Berezov, in the government of Tobolsk. He escaped from there on February 20, 1907. Since that time he has lived in Vienna and in Paris, when he was expelled during the war for conducting pacifist propaganda. He went to America, was interned for a while in Canada, and finally returned to Russia by way of England after the Revolution.

The man makes a striking contrast to Lenine. Tall, slender, with bright, intelligent eyes, with a nose arched above a large and voluptuous mouth, an enormous head of black, tangled hair, a little Mephistophelian goatee beneath a smooth-shaven face, Trotzky, full of importance, and very active in a disorderly but intelligent way, is an excellent actor. When he visited the French Ambassador, M. Noulens, on December 5 (old style) he showed himself adroit and insinuating. Bringing the conversation round to the subject of France and how her humani-

tarian rôle had aroused his admiration, choking with emotion, in a beautifully staged performance that neglected no shade or tint, he suddenly stopped speaking, and his eyes filled with tears. Three days later, December 8, at a great popular assembly, he announced to the people of Petrograd with great tragic gestures, that he soon hoped "to hear the red Gallic cock sound the triumph of the Revolution upon the ruins of the Paris Bourse." Such is the man, such his manner. Aside from this, he is a trenchant and talented public speaker, with a sharp, malicious mind, but very close to the crowd, loose in his style and even coarse, aiming at effect and often producing it.

Next to this "fire-brand" it will be fitting to place the delicate and mystic Lounatcharsky.

Lounatcharsky (Anatole Vassilievitch), called "Galerka" and "Voinov," is better known by his family name. He is the son of one of the present state councillors of Moscow. He was indicted in that city in 1899 during a police investigation of revolutionary propaganda among the workers. By virtue of a sentence handed down on May 15, 1902, he was sent to Viatka for two years under surveillance by the high police.

He was arrested once more in April, 1902, by order of the Kief police, to answer to a charge of circulating a revolutionary proclamation in Kief in 1900. In 1904 he was living in Kief, where he was a member of the local committee of the Social-democratic party. In 1906 he was indicted in the inquiry which was opened as the result of a meeting held on the premises of the Imperial Technical Society

School. In the early part of January, 1907, he went to Berlin where he delivered a lecture, revolutionary in content, to the members of the Russian colony. Since that time he has mingled in the activities of the Socialist Party at home and abroad, and has been present at every congress. He has figured as contributor to the French internationalist organ *Le Prolétaire.*

Lounatcharsky, with the thin, emaciated profile of a Slav Christ, mild mystical eyes, and a gentle mind which has more of art than of strength of will, is one of the most attractive types of the group.

On November 2, 1917, dismayed at the news of the depredations committed at Moscow, he submitted his resignation as people's commissioner in the following pathetic letter:

"I have just this instant learned from certain persons coming from Moscow what has taken place in that city. The Cathedral of the Blessed Basile and the Cathedral of the Assumption have been bombarded.

"The Kremlin in which are gathered at present the most important art treasures of Petrograd and Moscow has been bombarded. There are thousands of victims.

"The furious struggle has reached a stage of bestial hate.

"What more is to come? How much further can it go?

"This I cannot endure. My cup is full. I find myself unable to stop these horrors. It is impossible to work under the weight of thoughts that drive one mad?

"That is why I am resigning from the Council of People's Commissioners.

"I understand the gravity of this decision. But I can stand no more."

The next day, November 3, when he was better informed,[3] he changed his decision on the urgent request of his associates, but, as Minister of Public Instruction, he published the following appeal:

"To the workers, peasants, soldiers, sailors, and all the citizens of Russia:

"Comrades,

"The working people now have the absolute mastery of the country. In addition to natural wealth, the people have inherited great cultural riches, buildings of great beauty, museums, libraries. . . . All these are now the property of the people.

"All these will help the poor man and his children to become new men. . . .

"Comrades! We must vigilantly guard and preserve this property of the people.

"You cry 'shame on the thief who appropriates another's goods,' and you threaten him with the worst punishments.

"But it is a hundred times more shameful to be a robber of the people. . . . Yes, you are the young master of the country, and although you now have much to think about and much work to do, you will know how to defend your artistic and scientific wealth.

"Comrades! What is taking place at Moscow is

[3] The early news was greatly exaggerated. In particular, neither the Cathedral of the Blessed Basile (Vassili Blagenny) nor the Cathedral of the Assumption (Ouspenski sobor) had been touched.

a horrible and irreparable misfortune. Civil war has resulted in the bombardment of numerous districts of the city, in the burning of houses. . . . The people in their struggle for authority have mutilated their glorious capital.

" It is particularly terrible in these days of violent struggle and destructive war, to be Commissioner of Public Instruction. Our only consolation is in the hope of the victory of socialism, as the source of a new and higher culture. Upon me weighs the responsibility of protecting the artistic wealth of the people.

" Finding myself unable to continue holding an office in which I was powerless, I submitted my resignation. My associates, the other People's Commissioners, felt that my resignation could not be accepted. I shall therefore retain my office until you find for me a more worthy successor.

" But I beg of you, comrades, give me your support, help me. Preserve for yourselves and your descendants the beauty of our land; be guardians of the property of the people.

" Soon, even the most uneducated who have been kept in ignorance for so long, will awaken and will understand how great a source of joy, strength, and wisdom is art.

" Citizens, watch over our national wealth! "

In this summary sketch of the first People's Commissioners the next name that should be mentioned is that of Noghine, who assumed the office of Commissioner of Commerce and Industry.

Noghine (Victor, Pavlovitch), born February 2,

1878, has long been considered one of the authorities in the Russian Socialist Party.

He was arrested for the first time at Petrograd on December 16, 1898, and sent into exile in the government of Poltava for three years; he succeeded in escaping on August 6, 1900, and took refuge in England. He returned to Russia on October 1, was again arrested at Petrograd and sentenced to exile in Siberia, in the government of Yeniseisk; whence he escaped on April 27, 1903.

On March 8, he was arrested once more at Nikolaief, to which place he had returned under an assumed name. He was then sent into exile in the government of Archangel, whence he escaped once more on August 10, 1905. He was arrested at Moscow on October 1, for participating in a conference of trades-union representatives from the headquarters of the factory workers, and was sentenced to three years imprisonment. Upon being set free in August, 1908, he returned to Moscow to take part in the conference of co-operative institutions. On August 17, he was arrested and exiled for four years in the northern part of the district of Tobolsk, Siberia, whence he again escaped in January, 1909. He then went abroad, returned to Moscow to conduct propaganda, was arrested and exiled in the government of Tobolsk, and escaped from here once more on August 2, 1910. In 1911, he was at Tula, doing propaganda work, when he was again arrested, March 25, 1911.

The People's Commissioner of Finance, Svortzov (Ivan, Ivanovitch) is a teacher and a graduate of the Institute of School Teachers.

He was tried for the first time as a terrorist in

1895, for manufacturing explosive materials, and placed under police surveillance for three years. He was arrested in 1899 at Tula for propaganda among workmen. In 1902 he was exiled for three years in Eastern Siberia. Upon his return in 1905 he was arrested at Moscow for participating in revolutionary demonstrations. He was arrested again in 1908 but released. Then on February 18, 1911, he was again sentenced to three years exile in the government of Astrakhan.

Avilov, Commissioner of Posts and Telegraphs, known as "Gliebov," was formerly a printer. In 1907 he was sentenced to three months imprisonment for revolutionary propaganda. Since that time, an active member of the Secret Society of Moscow, he succeeded in reaching foreign soil, and upon request of this Society attended the courses given in the Bologna School by party agitators and propagandists.

The Commissioner of Nationalities, Djougachvili (Yossif Missarionof) is a Georgian. By profession he is a book-keeper. Convicted of revolutionary propaganda and exiled in the district of Vologda, he escaped on September 29, 1908; was recaptured, and escaped again. Captured a third time he was sentenced in 1912 to three years' exile. He escaped for good and all on September 1, 1912.

Rikof (Alexei, Ivanovitch), Commissioner of Home Affairs, born in Saratof, in 1881, brought up in the Orthodox church, was a translator of foreign languages. Deprived of right of residence in 1908, he was given permission to go abroad. Returning to Russia, he was exiled on February 1, 1910, in

the government of Archangel, and succeeded in escaping from the city of Pinega on December 8, 1910. Rearrested within a short time, he was exiled for four years in the province of Marünsk, whence he escaped once more on September 20, 1914.

Among the persons not members of the first Council of People's Commissioners, who stand out from the Bolshevist group, the following should be mentioned: Sverdlov, president of the Central Executive Committee of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies; Zinovief, who, as president of the Soviet of People's Commissioners of the North, together with Kemenev, was to play a leading part at Petrograd in conjunction with Kemenev during the terrorist period; Ouritzki, who was to be business manager of the Election Committee in charge of the election of the Constituent Assembly, and who later as president of the Committee for Combating the Counter-Revolution was to arouse the hatred which ended in his assassination; Petrof and Tchitcherine who were to succeed Trotzky as Commissioner of Foreign Affairs; Pokrovzki, who was to become a member of the Brest-Litovsk delegation; Boukharine, who was to lead the Bolshevist group in the Constituent Assembly, and to enjoy considerable authority in Bolshevist counsels.

All of these men had a well known past as revolutionists.

. . . . . .

Sverdlov (Jakob Michailov), a Jew, born at Nijni-Novgorod in 1885, was a druggist. He was educated in the Nijni-Novgorod preparatory school. He was

first placed under arrest in 1902 for two weeks. In 1903 he was placed under police surveillance. On September 27, 1907, he was sentenced to two years imprisonment. Scarcely out of prison, on December 13, 1909, he took part in an assembly that had been forbidden, was arrested and sentenced to exile in one of the most distant governments. As his health was badly undermined, he was allowed to go abroad on April 2, 1910. Then arrested again in Russia, he was sentenced on May 5, 1911, to four years exile in the region of Narinski. He escaped on December 7, 1912.

Zinovief is the pseudonym of *Radomilski*, who was born at Novomirgorod in 1883. He was arrested on March 30, 1908, imprisoned at Petrograd, then banished to Elisabethgrad under police surveillance. He succeeded in reaching foreign soil in September, 1908, and became a very active contributor to the principal party organs.

Kamenev, that is *Rosenfeld* (Leon, Boussovitch), born July 22, 1883, is an honorary citizen of Moscow by birth, a Jew, and a former student at the University of Moscow. He was arrested and kept in prison for a month and a half for participating in a student demonstration before the statue of Pushkin. He was again arrested in 1904. In 1907, he was abroad conducting very active propaganda in refugee circles. Arrested at Petrograd in May, 1908, he was set free under bail, and again escaped from the country.

Ouritzki (Moissei Chlemof), a Jew, and a resident of Tchevkass, in the government of Kief, was born in 1875. He was a construction engineer and sales

agent for forest lands. In the period 1900-1902 he was known as a very active propagandist in South Russia. He was arrested at Kief and exiled for two years in the government of Vologda. He obtained permission to go abroad, but returned to Russia, was arrested in 1912 and banished for two years in the government of Archangel. He had formerly been private secretary to Plekhanov.

Petrov is the pseudonym of *Smirnof*, long known as one of the most experienced of socialist propagandists. In 1899 he was haled before the courts for the first time, and since that time has been under police surveillance. Arrested in 1901 at Nijni-Novgorod, he was deprived of the right of residence until such time as a new order should be issued. In 1903, he was arrested at Tver for propaganda and on December 13, 1905, after being summoned before the court, he succeeded in making his escape. On December 20, 1910, he was again arrested at Moscow, charged with conducting propaganda and organizing socialist societies. He was exiled for three years in the province of Norinski. In 1914 he made his appearance at the electric lighting plant of Bogorodsk, and immediately came into prominence as leader of the workmen.

In August, 1915, he was called into military service and sent to Smolensk where he continued his propaganda. During the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, he took Trotzky's place as Commissioner of Foreign Affairs.

Tchitcherine (Gregori, Vassilievitch), a titular state councillor, and a clerk in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had long since been marked as a danger-

ous character. In 1907, he was at Berlin, where he played an active part as propagandist among the members of the Russian colony. In 1908 he was arrested at Charlottenburg and fined eighty marks for assuming a false name. Expelled from Prussia, he later lived in Geneva. He was arrested as a Bolshevik in England, ultimately returned to Russia in the early part of 1918, and assumed the office of Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

Pokrovski (Michel Niklaievitch), born on January 17, 1868, was a tutor[4] in the Moscow faculty and a teacher in various schools. Under police surveillance, and arrested several times during 1905 and 1907, threatened with imprisonment for having attended the London Socialist Congress, he succeeded in making his escape by way of Finland. He played an important part at Brest-Litovsk.

Finally Boukharine (Nicholas, Ivanovitch), born in 1879, the son of a Counsellor at the Court, and of the orthodox faith, was formerly a student in the University of Moscow. Arrested as a socialist in 1902, he was banished to Archangel for three years in 1911; but he escaped after six months and again took up his work of propaganda.

. . . . . .

These men had a doctrine. In its broad outlines it was merely the socialist doctrine, as it has been expressed in all the international congresses. How-

[4] Translator's Note: "Privat docent" is a member of a University faculty, who is a candidate for a chair. During his period as "Privat docent" he received no salary. The institution is universal on the continent; but it does not exist in England or the United States. The word don or tutor conveys the idea in a general way.

ever, Bolshevism has some characteristics peculiar to itself which it is important to distinguish.

The Russian faction of the "Internationale" has always been divided into two large groups, which, after the Congress of London in 1903, adopted the names of "Bolsheviks"[5] (Members of the Majority), and Mensheviks (Members of the Minority), after the manner in which the vote was divided at that congress on the question of party organization.

This Congress defined for the first time the party program, laying down its distant ideal social aims and its immediate political demands. The proposal, drawn up by the editors of the *Iskra*, of whom Lenine was one, was unanimously adopted with a few unimportant changes.

However, conflict between the two general tendencies which already existed within the party was revealed by the debate on a point of seemingly secondary importance. The first paragraph of the by-laws specified the conditions of membership in the party. In the resolution presented by Martov, who was leader of the "Mensheviks," the wording of the paragraph was as follows:

"Anyone who adheres to its program, supports it by material means, and furnishes it assistance under the direction of one of its organizations, will be considered as a member of the party."

The resolution presented by Lenine, who was leader of the majority, the "Bolsheviks," further required the formal membership of every member of the party in one of the party organizations.

[5] Note that the term "Maximalist" rather widely used as a translation for "Bolshevik" is historically false.

The debate, which on the surface appeared trivial, had a very great inner significance, for it was destined to decide between the "centralists" and the "federalists." It was the former who prevailed, and who from that time have been called "Bolsheviks"—Members of the Majority.

The two tendencies persisted and the struggle between them was desperate. They established separate organizations, a "Menshevik Office" setting up in opposition to the "Central Committee." Each established its own agencies and published its own literature. In the end they held separate congresses. After 1904 there were various attempts at reconciliation, but none of them reached a sincere and lasting agreement.

The conflict over, the issue of centralism versus federalism soon became complicated by another more serious question. In their Congresses of 1904, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks proposed for discussion the fundamental question: "In case of a political revolution in Russia, what attitude should the party adopt?"

"The Mensheviks are of the opinion that the victory would be decisive if it ended in the immediate creation of a Constituent Assembly under the direct pressure of the people in revolution. . . . The problem of the revolution in Russia is essentially that of liquidating the monarchical régime. . . . The socialist party ought not to propose cornering the power by eliminating the other liberal parties from the provisional government, but should itself continue as the opposition and the extreme revolutionary party."

On the whole, the Menshevist platform, stripped of its obscure points, may be summed up in this formula: Support and watch over the bourgeois political revolution; do not monopolize it.

The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, from 1904 on, maintained that the establishment of a democratic republic was possible only through a victorious uprising of the people, establishing a revolutionary provisional government. The bourgeois revolution, they said, after a very short time, would try to wrest from the Russian proletariat the largest part of the gains of the active revolutionary period.

As early as 1904 the Bolshevists in their Congress of that year were proclaiming the necessity of placing in the revolutionary provisional government representatives of the socialist party to organize a merciless struggle against counter-revolutionary efforts of the bourgeoisie, and to defend the special interests of the working class.

Thus the two factions—Bolsheviks and Mensheviks—recognized that the political revolution could not be accomplished with proletarian forces alone. But, while the Mensheviks trusted the liberal parties of the cities and the large landowners in the country, to create a Constituent Assembly under pressure from the revolutionary "people," the Bolsheviks, reproaching the liberal bourgeoisie for its softness in being always ready to compromise with reaction, sought their following only among the masses of peasants and workmen, and formulated their program of immediate action in case of revolution in these terms:

"A struggle for the revolutionary dictatorship of

the proletariat and the peasants, aiming at a complete social transformation on the basis of the Bolshevist platform . . ."

Thus, as early as 1904, fourteen years before the coup d'état of October, 1917, the main lines of the Bolshevist program were very clearly drawn. This policy, moreover, led to the bloody defeat of the Revolution of 1905, which miscarried as a result of the isolation of the working class, who, abandoned by the liberals after the creation of the Duma, remained without guides, without leaders, and without a line of action. The Congress of Stockholm, too, in 1906, showed signs of a decided return towards Menshevist methods.

The war of 1914 was to give to the opposition between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks its final form. It resulted in completely alienating the leaders, Lenine and Plekhanov, who because of it almost went the length of mutual insult. Plekhanov's newspaper called Lenine "the revolutionist who can't be restrained," "the visionary," and the "man stuffed with dreams"; while the *Social-Democrat*, Lenine's newspaper, characterized Plekhanov's writings on the war as "sophistries," and "comical blunders." Even the two factions split up into several subdivisions.

Lenine's thesis had been maintained at the Italian-Swiss Conference at Lugano (September 27th to mid-October, 1914), and on November 1 of the same year there appeared in the *Social-Democrat* a manifesto which is an important document in the history of Bolshevist doctrine.

In this manifesto Lenine demanded the immediate

cessation of the war and the organization of the social revolution.

He maintained that the European war had a very pronounced bourgeois character, and that it was an imperialistic, dynastic war. The sole objects of the war, he said, are national plunder, struggle for markets, desire to stultify and divide the proletariat of all countries in the interest of the bourgeoisie. . . .

The conduct of the German, Belgian, and French socialists who voted war credits was a treason, and signified the failure of the ideas of the "Internationale." The aim of the next "internationale" must be "the total elimination of the bourgeois current in socialism. . . ."

Then taking up the question of socialism in Russia, Lenine declared that the object which the party ought to pursue was merciless struggle against slavophile, monarchist, and Czarist chauvinism, and against the sophistry of the self-styled "liberal defensists."[6] The immediate program of the party in Russia then ought to be:

Revolutionary propaganda among the soldiers and on the battlefield, showing the necessity of directing their weapons not against their proletarian and enslaved brothers of other countries, but against governmental bourgeois reaction in all countries.

Lenine proposed the organization of propaganda, upon these bases, in all languages, adding to it propaganda for the creation of a Russo-German-Polish Republic and the formation of a United States of Europe. At the conference of Kienthal, which was

[6] Translator's Note: *Denfensist* in contradistinction to *defeatist*, meaning one who advocated continuing the war against Germany for the defence of Russia.

held during the period from April 24 to April 30, 1916, Lenine, supported by Radek and Rosa Luxemburg, proposed most drastic measures for stopping the war, such as a general strike, sabotage, and armed revolt. And the activity of Lenine in this direction has been constant and consistent.

In the end, the Russian Socialist Party split up into three larger factions over the essential question of the war:

1. Outright defeatists who declared themselves flatly for ending the war by defeat. These were the Leninists.

2. Clandestine defeatists, or "Zimmerwalder" as they are still called, who demanded peace as quickly as possible, without annexations or indemnities. This group included the Social Revolutionists and the Menshevik Internationalist Social Democrats.

3. The defensists, or "Plekhanovists," who demanded the active co-operation of the working class in the defence of the fatherland for victory over Germany, which alone could give liberty to the Russian people. This faction, which was always the weakest, was joined by a part of the Mensheviks, a few Bolsheviks (Alexinsky), and a few Social Revolutionists.

Thus when Lenine returned to Russia and assumed charge of his party, the Bolshevist doctrine was very clearly established and well matured, for in its general outlines it was the same as had been adopted by the party majority at the Congress of 1904, fourteen years before.

Its principles were simple in their brutality: Dictatorship of the proletariat, a pitiless social struggle,

and the employment of every possible means to end the war.

The Bolshevist party had its leaders, its general staff, and its doctrine; it was still without military forces. It was the government of Kerensky itself that was to supply this deficiency.

After the days of February-March many workmen had retained their arms. The Provisional Government had wisely decided to collect gradually all the weapons still in the hands of private individuals.

The attempted uprising of July 3 had proven that the unarmed workmen could not succeed in winning over more than a few companies of soldiers, and that even these were practically powerless. So the Provisional Government after the suppression of the uprising proceeded to enforce its measures for disarming the civil population.

But then came Kornilov's attempt to overthrow the Kerensky government, which in dismay sought the support of the workmen's organizations against Kornilov's soldiers. It decided to arm the workmen, organized them in military units within their factories, and sent them out to fight Kornilov's troops. The manœuvre succeeded perfectly. The workmen responded with enthusiasm to the call, armed themselves, repelled the Kornilov peril and . . . imprisoned the Provisional Government. From that moment, Kerensky was doomed. The Bolshevist army had been created. It was the "Red Guard."

As soon as the Bolsheviks got control, they provided legal regulations for this Red Guard. It is made up of all workmen, organized into factory com-

mittees, which furnish by turns the men required for guard and police duty. These Red Guards, in addition to their factory wages, receive extra pay amounting to a maximum of forty rubles a day.

In the early part of the year 1918, as the Brest-Litovsk negotiations began to take an ugly turn, and the fear spread that the Germans would break them off abruptly and march on Petrograd, the Council of Commissioners determined to create a red army composed exclusively of proletarian elements. The law of January 15, 1918, establishing the "Red Army," was worded as follows:

"The old army served the purpose of oppression of the working classes by the bourgeoisie. Now that the power has passed to the working and exploited classes, the necessity arises of creating a new army which will serve as a rampart to the authority of the soviets, and in the future as a basis for replacing the regular army by a militia, which will be the basic support of the future social revolution in Europe.

"Therefore, the Council of People's Commissioners proposes to create a new army to be called the 'Red Army of Workers and Peasants,' on the following lines:

"The Red Army of Workers and Peasants will be composed of the most conscientious and the best organized elements of the working classes.

"All citizens of the Russian Republic over eighteen years of age will be admitted to it. Every citizen who wishes to enter the Red Army should be ready to sacrifice all his strength and his life for the defence of the October Revolution and the authority

of the soviets and of socialism. For admission to the Red Army, a recommendation is required from a regimental committee, or from one of the democratic organizations which subscribes to the program of soviet authority, or from a party or trade organization, or from at least two members of one of these organizations.

"The soldiers of the Red Army of Workmen and Peasants will be subsisted entirely at the expense of the State and will receive fifty rubles per month.

"Members of soldiers' families, who are incapacitated for work and who were supported by such soldiers, will be provided with all necessities, according to the standards established by the agencies of the local soviets. . . ."

The recruiting of this volunteer army was apparently quite difficult at first, despite the appeals of the Commissioners and rounds of "meetings," such as the one held on January 28, at Petrograd.

But an incident occurred which had the effect of swelling somewhat the ranks of the Red Army. In February it was announced that the Germans were marching on Petrograd. The Bolsheviks, greatly perturbed, made an appeal to all the red guards to become incorporated in the ranks of the red army, as this was the only means of obtaining guarantees that as combatants they would be treated according to the rules of warfare. Several thousand young men, full of revolutionary convictions but worthless as soldiers —most of them could not load a gun—were clothed, equipped, armed, and sent immediately to the firing line. Their career as warriors, needless to say, was

lamentable. They heard a few shots near Jamburg and quickly took train for Gatchina. The Germans did not pursue them.

One portion of this army disbanded; another portion, captivated by the material advantages of a life of ease, remained loyal to the oath of enlistment.

The organization of this army was thereafter carried on slowly and without enthusiasm. The Bolshevist Government with a motive which it is difficult to fathom, but which was certainly not unmixed, even made an appeal at one time to the military representatives of the allies. It officially requested the French Military Mission to furnish it with thirty officers for purposes of instruction.

On May 1,[7] the Bolsheviks were able to parade in the streets of Moscow a rather large number of soldiers, comprising all arms of the service, infantry, cavalry, and artillery; and in spite of shortcomings the general effect was imposing to the eye of the bourgeois who looked on, anxious and frightened.

But the Bolshevist government was to go still further. On May 29 (new style) the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workman's and Soldier's Deputies, in a meeting at the Hotel Metropole in Moscow, after taking account of the danger of counter-revolutionary enterprises which were multiplying in the provinces, determined to decree universal military service. The War Commission was ordered to draw up within a week a plan of conscription for Moscow, Petrograd, and the districts of the Don and the Kuban.

[7] Translator's Note: May 1, the "Labor Day" of the Continent—the day on which socialist manifestations are usually held.

The Bolsheviks realized all the dangers to which the formation of this democratic army exposed them. They determined, therefore, that bourgeois and undependable elements should not be placed in the combatant ranks. An army, said Lenine, has need of an enormous number of auxiliaries for the accessory services, cleaning of stables, bread-making, etc. . . . that is the place to put the bourgeois and the counter-revolutionists.

One may be somewhat sceptical about the future of this new soviet army. And yet along towards September certain witnesses reported that a large number of well-equipped and well-armed units were drilling in the squares of Petrograd and Moscow. It was even announced that this red army numbered about 400,000 men, though this was probably a bluff intended to impress the allies.

Nevertheless it is certain that the Bolshevist government now has a sufficient number of troops to insure the defence of its rule against any counter-revolutionary movement. Lenine, the new Ivan the Terrible, has his "Streltzi."

CHAPTER III

THE BOLSHEVIKS AND THE PEOPLE

The Bolsheviks and the Psychology of the People—Bolshevism at Work on the Army—On the Peasants—On the Railroad Workers—On the Officials—The Armed Revolts: Kaledine, Dutov, Alexeief.

WHEN the Bolsheviks took over the government on the night of October 24, they were supported only by the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies of Petrograd, by a few hundred members of Bolshevist societies provided with arms, and by a very feeble portion of the garrison. All the rest of the population was hostile or suspicious, and without adopting an attitude of violent opposition, was awaiting developments.

The Bolsheviks, however, did not hesitate. It was this mass of the people alone that meant strength; it was this mass which they must win over. How, and by what political means, would they arrive at that goal? There has been much talk about the brutal, despotic method of the Bolsheviks. They have been represented to us as savage doctrinaires, imposing their theories upon facts and upon human beings

with bloody brutality. This is a superficial and false view. When vested with authority, the Bolsheviks gave evidence of very great flexibility of mind and remarkable skill in turning to their profit the indecision and the differences of their opponents as well as a great deal of finesse in sounding and satisfying the material and psychological wants of the masses who supported their social policy.

And these masses, with their virtues and their faults, were the Russian peasantry, moulded by centuries of serfdom—for all the peasants of to-day are former serfs or the sons of serfs—but rich in fine human and social qualities.

The man of the people, the "moujik," is a primitive being, with a mind that is poetic, delicate, and fascinating. All observers of slavic life have long been accustomed to characterize him by certain fundamental traits. First of all, one finds an absolute predominance of feeling over will in the individual. He gives evidence of great laziness in speculative thought, passing from absolute ritualistic mysticism (interminable signs of the cross, genuflexions, prostrations on all occasions and in all places) to the most complete intellectual and moral scepticism (absence of any notion of duty and of any respect for contracts or covenants). He does not perceive inconsistencies, has a broad tolerance for ideas, and being incapable of sustained effort himself, yields to any force that is persistent.

He has a horror of any kind of rule, of any sort of compulsion, of moral routine, and of self interested calculation. In material matters his life is essentially variable; the nomadism of the peasant and the

professional instability of the intellectual are rooted in the same cause. Lacking in foresight, generous, endowed, as he says, with a "chirokaia natura" (a liberal disposition), he despises narrow mindedness, small economy and prudence. In matters of ethics he has no principle of conduct other than that of acceding to the pleasure of the moment; divorce comes easy to him, passion excuses everything and his "Volia"—a vague, untranslatable word which combines the ideas of freedom, will, and fancy—is a sign of this moral attitude. Finally, in political matters, the Russian has a horror of the law and no understanding of the idea of parliamentary government founded on contract.

There is another side of his spiritual being which is entirely different. This is marked by a great intellectual curiosity, and a need of complete explanation, by means of which he often reaches a deeper truth than can be derived by rigid deductive reasoning. But this tendency towards the absolute which pushes him straight to the ideal without regard to possibility, relativity, or realizability, leads him in despair to moral unconstraint, and to sudden crises of complete depression.

Finally, the Russian puts the soul above all the other human faculties. Thus the people are good, incapable of strong hate, indulgent, filled with contempt for material things, but also filled with indolence in action. They have a tendency to efface themselves in the whole, to do their living and thinking collectively, and to distrust the individual who asserts himself, this not from pride but from an instinctive humility. But this notion of the whole is

concrete; the Russian has no conception of a collective abstract, such, for instance, as is implied in loyalty to the state. A Russian journalist wrote very truly last May in the *Rannye Utro:*

"For us the word 'citizen' is something exotic, horribly foreign, distant, almost metaphysical. . . . That is the tragedy of the present moment, the curse of the history of our national civilization. . . . Let us not blame anyone. Those who for centuries have been brought up by the police, and who two centuries ago were still crawling on their bellies 'adoring their Muscovite khan,' who the day before yesterday were bowing down before the throne of the Petrograd autocracy, and who only yesterday were living in the pharisaical atmosphere of the 'self-limited autocracy of a constitutional régime,' these people cannot be citizens. It is comprehensible . . ."

When the revolution broke out after a long period of mystical and passionate incubation, this primitive being asserted no national claim; for him "people's war," "fatherland," "alliances," were mere words. He wanted and he demanded concrete things—peace for the individuals and an immediate return to the "isba," ownership of the land which he and his fathers had cultivated, liberty—to do nothing and to multiply, and as a concrete token of that liberty, long meetings in which his plaintive and wordy passiveness was gratified.

Such are the people. When the Czarist régime crumbled, they immediately accepted events not as a means but as an end, as the concrete realization of all their desires and all their ancestral aspirations. For them, from the very first day, the past was

entirely wiped out for all time. The peasant understood liberty only under the form of its immediate and tangible corollary, "liberty to take the land"; and to the small wage earners and the numerous crowd of parasitic domestic servants of the old masters, it meant liberty to live without working and without a master.

During the first months, they put their trust in the new rulers. But then, behold, days and months passed, and the concrete problems, as the people put them, were not solved. Peace was not made, the land had not been turned over, bread was not more plentiful, and it still had to be earned. A sort of mournful discouragement would once more, perhaps, fill the soul of the poor moujik. And the old masters were lying in wait for this faltering moment, which they had confidently anticipated. The son who had donned the soldier's grey coat and who had been torn away from the village atmosphere of depressing resignation would lend a complaisant ear to those who said to him: "If the land has not been given, if the object of the Revolution has not been realized, it is because you are trusting people who betray you, and who are selling you once more to the old masters." And as the good moujik with his serf mentality knew very well that this was in general the normal thing in old Russia, he listened. He listened with that devout fervour which soon developed into the fierce and mystical stubbornness of the primitive, to those who said: "As long as you do not seize the power yourself, as long as you do not put down every master who stands between you and your desire, you will not have that land to which you look forward with

all your holy fervour, or that liberty which you invoke with all your simple faith ; you will have nothing. . . ." It is this profound popular aspiration which the Bolsheviks, who were perhaps the only ones who comprehended it, proceeded to exploit. "All the power to the Soviets," this battle cry of the socialist workmen, they proceeded to translate into the moujik's language, adapting it to the psychology of the peasants and the people. "The seizure of the power by the Bolsheviks is the direct seizure of the power by the people—the peasant proletariat, the poor, the 'Krestianins.'" This is what they announced in the beginning and never ceased to reiterate.

In his very first speech to the Soviet of Petrograd on the evening of October 25, Trotzky, with profound psychological intuition, declared :

"We are going to establish an authority, which will set for itself no other purpose than that of satisfying the needs of the soldiers, workers, and peasants. The State is to be an instrument for freeing the masses from all kinds of slavery. . . . The peasants, workers, and soldiers must be made to feel that public business is their business. This is the fundamental principle of the new authority."

The same evening, Lenine, less flexible and more doctrinaire, announced the seizure of authority by the working proletariat in terms of the Marxian formula.

"Comrades," he said, "the workman's and peasant's revolution, the necessity of which has always been preached by the Bolsheviks, is an accomplished fact. What does it mean? It means first of all that

we shall have a soviet government, an authority sprung from our own organ, without the least participation by the bourgeoisie. . . . We must undertake the organization of the Proletarian Socialist State."

But, four days later, on October 30, talking to a conference of the Petrograd garrison, he declared:

"The large majority of peasants, soldiers, and workmen are in favour of a peace policy. This policy is neither a Bolshevik policy nor a party policy; it is the policy of a majority of the people. We are not carrying out a mere Bolshevist program. On the land question as well, our platform reflects the will of the peasants. . . ."

The Bolshevist Revolution then was to appear as a direct seizure of authority by primary organizations of the peasants, soldiers, and workmen. But long before this, without noise and without scandal, the "volost" in the country, the governors and chiefs of police in the small towns, had been requested in many places to cease performing their functions, and had been replaced haphazardly by men selected from the people to look after the strictly elemental requirements of social life.

The accession of the Bolsheviks to power was interpreted in the country as a legal sanction of this de facto situation, and as an encouragement to extend this system. At the "Congress of Zemstvos and Cities," which opened at Petrograd on November 9 (old style), that is, less than two weeks after the coup d'état, all the representatives of the cities and the zemstvos were agreed in their description of the situation. "Everywhere," said one of them,

"it's the same as at Petrograd. . . . The Commissioners are chosen from among those 'first come.' One of them is a criminal before the law, convicted of rape; others hardly know how to read and write. . . ."

The Bolsheviks officially encouraged this direct seizure of authority. On November 5 (old style) Lenine, in the name of the Council of People's Commissioners, issued an appeal, in part as follows:

"Comrades, workers! Remember that you yourselves are directing the State. Nobody will help you if you do not yourselves get together, and if you do not take all the business of state into your own hands . . .

"Comrades, labourers, soldiers, and all workers! Take into your hands on the spot all the power!"

On November 10, Lenine and Krylenko, in a written appeal to the army, after citing the difficulties that General Doukhonine had stirred up in connection with the armistice, continued in this wise: "Let the regiments at the front immediately elect authorized representatives to open actual negotiations with the enemy for an armistice. This right is conferred upon you by the Soviet of People's Commissioners." The *Novaia Jizn*, Gorky's newspaper, the next day made this editorial comment: "We have already expressed our opinion of Lenine and Krylenko's stupid and bewildering prikaze which entrusts the question of an armistice to regimental delegates." But that "stupid and bewildering prikaze" was exactly suited to the psychology of the soldiers and the masses at that moment.

It was in this way that from the very first day the

Bolsheviks conformed to the profound aspirations of the people. They placed themselves upon the people's level, and talked to them in the language that they wanted to hear.

But it was a troubled time. The masses themselves had no political cohesion. They were made up of social aggregations which had to be reduced one after another, like the forts of a besieged stronghold.

The most urgent task was to win over the army. When the Bolsheviks accomplished their coup d'état they had on their side only some few exceptional units of the Petrograd garrison—the Volhynian regiment, some sailors, and some machine gunners. The garrison as a whole was very wavering in its attitude. During the first two days it stayed inside its barracks, officially ready for war, in reality awaiting developments. A considerable portion of it even decided, by a vote, to stay out of the conflict. The fact is the Petrograd garrison, held in the rear as a reward for its revolutionary services during the occurrences of February, felt that it was exposed to the vague hostility of the troops from the front, and it was not particularly anxious to face the Cossacks whom Kerensky was reported to be leading on Petrograd. Moreover, it had lost all its fighting spirit.[1] It was the poorest and numerically the weakest unit among

[1] The representatives of the 19th corps, who had been at the front continuously for three years, reported their mission to Petrograd as follows: "According to the facts collected by the delegation, the most complete inactivity reigns among the Petrograd regiments. They have stopped drilling, and they very seldom do guard duty. Among the soldiers, particularly the regiments of the guard, card playing has been carried to inordinate lengths. In certain regiments the soldiers play all night and spend the day sleeping. The stakes run high. When they have lost their money, the soldiers get jobs, such as unloading goods arriving in the capital, or else they go into retail trade. After gathering together a little money, they go back to the game. In a word the soldiers of Petrograd are 'State boarders,' receiving lodging, heat, light, clothing, and pay, and refusing to do any work." And the picture, we can state on the authority of our own observations, is not overdrawn.

the troops that the Revolutionary Military Committee sent against General Krasnov's and Kerensky's Cossacks. The first battalions that marched through the streets of Petrograd on their way to the Gatchina front were composed largely of workmen mobilized by the factory committees, and sailors.[2] The fact is that Kerensky at this moment was at Gatchina, and the troops sent against him, detachments of sailors from Kronstadt and of soldiers from the guard regiments ("Semeonovski" and "Ismailovski") had laid down their arms without offering any resistance.

On October 27, Kerensky and his Cossacks were at Tsarkoe-Selo. The soviet of Tsarkoe took flight. Five hundred men who had been brought there by train quickly scrambled back into the same train and followed the soviet.

On October 30, the Revolutionary Military Committee, in great perturbation, addressed to the garrison an ambiguously worded proclamation which revealed its anxiety. "The times of discord should

2 Upon the refusal of many units to execute the orders of the Bolsheviks to march against Kerensky, Trotzky issued the following prikase: "Kerensky's Kornilovist regiments threaten to enter the capital. Orders have been issued to quell without mercy this counter-revolutionary plot against the people and what they have won. The red army and the red guard of the Revolution are in immediate need of workmen.

"We order the regional committees, and the factory and shop committees:

"1. To furnish the largest possible number of workmen to dig trenches, erect barricades and place barbed wire entanglements.

"2. If for this purpose, work has to be stopped in factories and shops, to have it done immediately.

"3. To secure all the iron wire, plain or barbed, which is on hand, as well as all the necessary tools for digging trenches and building barricades.

"4. To arm the workmen with all the weapons that are available.

"5. To maintain the most severe discipline and be ready to support the revolutionary army by every means.

"The President of the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, People's Commissioner: Trotzky."

Note the cautious terms which Trotzky uses in this prikase in calling upon the workmen to "support the revolutionary army," and to "dig trenches and build barricades."

be left behind us. . . . A unique organization will confirm the unique will of the Petrograd garrison. . . . We have a struggle before us, but after the struggle, victory. Soldiers of Petrograd, forward! . . ."

In reality, nearly all the forces that were sent into the fight were utterly routed. And yet, during the night of October 30 (old style), the following telegram was sent by Trotzky from the village of Pulkova and reached the Council of People's Commissioners at two o'clock in the morning:

"The night of October 30 will pass into history. Kerensky's attempt to make the counter-revolutionary troops advance against the capital has suffered a complete check. Kerensky is retreating, we are advancing. The soldiers, sailors and workmen of Petrograd have shown that they can and will establish by force of arms the liberty and the power of democracy."

Immediately all the Bolshevist authorities struck up songs of victory. "All the regiments of Petrograd are marching with great enthusiasm," declared the Revolutionary Military Committee. And Colonel Mouraviev, commanding the troops, wrote: "On October 30, in a bloody encounter below Tsarskoe-Selo, the Revolutionary Army crushed the counter-revolutionary forces of Kerensky and Kornilov." Thousands of killed were reported.

The truth was much less heroic. Kerensky had arrived at Gatchina with General Krasnov's forces during the night of the 26th. A detachment of two hundred and thirty soldiers and sailors, ordered to this place by the Revolutionary Military Committee,

was surrounded by the Cossacks who gave them five minutes to consider. The detachment immediately surrendered. Instead of being kept as prisoners, these men were fed and sent home! Thence Kerensky marched on Krasnoe-Selo. A few cannon shots in that place resulted in one killed (a soldier) and two wounded (a hack-driver and a woman). The troops surrendered without a struggle, and the men were allowed to go home.

At Tsarkoe-Selo, the same absurd mistakes were repeated. The local soviet, frightened at the news of the arrival of the Cossacks, took flight. The garrison had no idea of resisting. Instead of boldly advancing and imposing his conditions, Kerensky sent envoy after envoy under flags of truce to split hairs over terms of surrender. The parleys lasted from seven o'clock in the morning until four in the afternoon when the Cossacks accidentally fired off two field guns which killed eight men and wounded seven—according to the official Bolshevist dispatches! The soldiers immediately took flight or laid down their arms; five hundred Red Guards, who in the meantime had arrived from Petrograd, hastily boarded their train again.

But "bratanie" (fraternization) had already been allowed to get started between the two camps. "Tavarichs" were distributing Bolshevist proclamations among the Cossacks. One of the soldiers, a member of the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, who was charged with this mission, described his odyssey, the next day, as follows:

"On the third day, with five comrades, I left for Gatchina to distribute the proclamations of the sec-

ond Soviet Congress. When we arrived, Gatchina was already in the hands of General Krasnov. We distributed the proclamations among the Cossacks, some few of whom received us cordially enough and read the proclamations with interest. Many more, after reading the first lines, threw away the proclamations and began calling names. Ten minutes later some officers appeared and gave the order to arrest us and take away our arms. Among them was General Krasnov, who shouted at us: 'You were marching against Kornilov, before, now it's against Kerensky. I'll have the whole lot of you shot'; and then he read us the prikaze which appointed him commander-in-chief of the District of Petrograd. 'You are traitors. You would rather mutiny at Petrograd than go to the front.' He asked us if we were Bolsheviks. Upon our replying in the affirmative, he went away. After a little while an officer came and set us free in the name of the general. We left in an automobile for Vyritsa and from there for Petrograd."

Then intervened the negotiations with the parties. Upon his arrival at Tsarkoe-Selo, Kerensky found awaiting him a delegation from the "Committee for Saving the Fatherland and the Revolution." This delegation immediately went into session with the Social Revolutionists and Social Democrats of the local groups and with representatives from the Cossack detachments. A motion was adopted on the necessity of settling the conflict peacefully and of creating a coalition socialist government.

On the evening of the 29th, Kerensky received a delegation from the Central Executive Committee of

Railway Workers, which informed him of its desire to reach an agreement among the various democratic parties. Kerensky instead of replying that he would take this up with them at Petrograd two days later after establishing order, requested them to fetch the party delegates and the socialist ministers so that he could discuss the question with them.[3] From that moment the game was lost. A few hours later Kerensky issued an order to General Krasnov as follows:

"In accordance with the proposal made by the Committee of Public Safety and all the democratic organizations which have joined with it, I have suspended operations against the insurgent troops and have sent a representative to enter into negotiations. Take what measures are necessary to prevent useless bloodshed."

Then on October 30 (old style) Colonel Mouraviev's troops, who had a few cannon, began a poorly sustained bombardment which lasted until evening. The villages of Kouzmino and Alexandroff were hit, causing some material damage and some casualties among the civil population. There were one or two more casualties at Tsarkoe-Selo. The Cossacks engaged in front of the city suffered no losses.

On the evening of the 30th, upon receipt of an order from Gatchina, the Cossacks evacuated Tsarkoe-Selo, falling back according to orders upon

[3] Note as marking difference of method, that at the same time (session of October 29), Trotzky in the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies was replying in this fashion to a Menshevik who wanted the floor for the sake of expounding the position of his party: "We cannot at this time allow any debate on principles. The decisive step has been taken. All of us, and myself in particular, take entire responsibility for whatever happens. . . ." Is not this simple juxtaposition of the two attitudes suggestive?

Gatchina and Pavlovsk. This was the extent of the great victory which was to make the night of October 30 pass into history.

On October 31 Kerensky was actually abandoned by his army[4] and betrayed by General Krasnov and General Doukhonine.[5] On November 1 he was in flight.

But despite these measures, the army was not yet entirely won over. Some powerful elements in it were organizing resistance to the Bolsheviks. A joint committee of representatives from all the armies, and representatives of the Central Committees of the Socialist parties was formed. It issued the following appeal to the troops:

"The army should charge the Committee of All the Armies to propose to all the socialist factions in

[4] A sailor, Doubenko, under orders to bring Kerensky's troops to capitulate, reached Gatchina on October 31 (old style) and called a meeting (!) which was attended by Kerensky's Cossacks. These, though undecided at first, let themselves be won over by some delegates from the Fifth Army, who arrived during the meeting and announced that "if the Cossacks march against the soviet troops, the army at the front will march against the Cossacks." The latter then determined to arrest Kerensky. It was another victory for the "agitators."

[5] Here is the official text of the deposition of General Krasnov, commanding the Kerensky troops, as it was made to the sailor, Doubenko, delegated by the Petrograd Soviet and the Revolutionary Military Committee to receive it: "To-day, November 1, 1917 (old style), at about 3 p.m., I was sent for by the supreme commander (Kerensky). He was very, very excited and very nervous. 'General,' he said, 'you have betrayed me. Your Cossacks are declaring categorically that they are going to arrest me and hand me over to the sailors.' 'Yes,' I replied, 'they are talking about it, and I know that you have no support anywhere.' 'But the officers are saying the same thing.' 'Yes, it is the officers in particular who are dissatisfied with you.' 'What should I do? I ought to commit suicide.' 'If you are an honourable man, you will go immediately to Petrograd under a flag of truce; you will report to the Revolutionary Committee, with whom you will enter into negotiations as head of the government.' 'Yes, I'll do that, General.' 'I shall assign you a guard, and I shall request that a sailor be assigned to accompany you.' 'No, no sailor. Do you know whether Doubenko is here.' 'No, I don't know. Who is Doubenko?' 'He is my enemy.' 'It's no use. If you play for high stakes, you must be able to meet any move your opponent makes.' 'All right, only I'm going to leave during the night.' 'Why? That would be running away. Leave quietly and openly so that everybody can see that you are not running away.' 'All right, only give me a bodyguard I can depend on.' 'Very well.' I went out and called Roussko, a Cossack of the 10th Regiment of the Don, and ordered him to appoint ten Cossacks as a guard for the supreme commander. . . ."

Two days later, General Krasnov, making a report on his position to the League of Cossack Troops at Petrograd, stated that his Cossacks numbered only three thousand and that they surrendered after ascertaining that no reinforcements were to be sent them!

each of the democratic organizations, in the name of the army as a whole, to proceed immediately to form a government which will include all parties from Bolsheviks to Constitutionalist Populists. . . ." And the Committee proposed as its candidate for the office of minister president, Tchernov.

This Committee refused to recognize the new generalissimo, Krylenko, who had replaced Doukhonine.

Against this new danger the Bolsheviks manœuvred with skill and without loss of time. On November 9 (old style) they ordered General Doukhonine to open negotiations for an armistice. Upon his concealed refusal, Lenine and Krylenko immediately launched their famous radio-telegram commanding the opening of negotiations through the agency of regimental committees.

On November 13, the envoys, Vladimir Schneour, Michel Sagalovitch, and the volunteer, George Merene, appeared before the German general, Hofmeister, who, according to the official Bolshevist report, received them " in full dress campaign uniform with his high German decorations, stars and ribbons on his chest, and surrounded by his general staff. . . ."

From that moment, the Bolsheviks had nothing further to fear from the army. They had brought about peace.

The peasants formed the large majority of the mass of people upon whom the Bolsheviks aimed to base their power. But here they found a real resistance that had to be overcome. The peasants did not know the Bolsheviks, who up to this time had done nothing for them. For a long time indeed,

the Bolsheviks had shown a certain coldness and hostility towards the peasant claims. It was not until 1905 that "the nationalization of the land" was introduced in the platform of the Social-Democratic Party, and even then it was under the compulsion of events. The theory of "proletarizing" the peasants was never abandoned, and the most uncompromising advocate of this theory was Lenine.

However—and this fact it seems to us is a good indication of the great flexibility of the Bolshevist policy beneath its outward appearance of brutal rigidity—from October 25 (old style) the Bolsheviks without taking the trouble to study the land acts worked out by the June Congress of Peasants, gave to these acts the force of laws. Then they started trying by political manœuvres and pamphlets to give the people the impression of close co-operation between the workers' movement and the peasants' movement.

There was one very serious obstacle to such a fusion,—the Executive Committee of the Peasants' Soviets elected by the June Congress of Peasants' Soviets.

This Executive Committee was, in fact, composed mainly of intellectuals, students, or militant politicians. Thus in the sitting of November 2, militants like Gorievitch, Bykhovsky, and Rybine were the spokesmen, and a certain Varks even intervened as representative of the navy. This group was frankly anti-Bolshevik, but it dared not assume any responsibility, and on November 2, by thirty-three votes against twenty-six (with five members absent) it passed a motion, in part as follows:

"The Central Executive Committee of Peasants' Soviets believes that the only just solution of this question during the interval preceding the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, would be the creation of a homogeneous government, excluding the guilty ones, the Bolsheviks. . . . At the same time, wishing to put a stop at any cost to the fratricidal struggle which has begun in many localities in Russia, the Central Executive Committee believes that it is necessary, in case other organizations feel that they can work together with the Bolsheviks in a new government, not to oppose that government and to disclaim all responsibility for the consequences that might result from it."

At this date, the Bolsheviks did not yet feel strong enough to fight openly. But a few days later, November 13, when a congress of peasants, called by the Central Executive Committee, passed a motion supporting that of the Executive Committee, the Bolsheviks left the meeting.

By the following day they had formed a new Congress composed of the dissenting elements of the Left and a few other members, representing nobody knows whom. The presidency was offered to the famous terrorist, "Spiridonova." And the next day this manœuvre resulted in a great demonstration of agreement with the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, a demonstration which was given wide publicity in the Bolshevist press. It was decided in this meeting of the congress to fill up the quota of the Central Executive Committee of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates with 108 representatives from the Peasants' Congress, 100 repre-

sentatives from the front and from the navy, and 50 delegates from trades unions, of whom 10 were to be chosen from the Central Executive Committee of Railway Employés and five from the Postal and Telegraphic Association.

This political juggling was really too clumsy. The need was felt in the Bolshevist Party of establishing a more solid basis for the influence that it aimed to exert upon the peasant class.

A new assembly was called, and this time the delegates, chosen by more or less regular elections in the local peasant election districts, had the appearance of being the authoritative spokesmen of the will of the peasant classes. The congress convened at Petrograd on November 26. More than five hundred delegates were present. "The striking thing," writes a witness, "is the overwhelming preponderance of grey caps. Very few peasants not in uniform. It must be that the civil population of the villages takes little part in the political activity of the soviets."

Like every deliberative body, the congress had had its Left Wing; this contingent was headed by "Spiridonova" and included a few anarchists, a few Bolsheviks, and a great many Social Revolutionists, who had deserted their party to rally round the new government. (From this moment these were distinguished by the name "Social Revolutionists of the Left.") The Centre consisted of the solid bloc of Social Revolutionists with Tchernov as their president. At the Right were the "moderates" gathered round the "Grandmother of the Revolution," the good and saintly Breshkovskaia.

The strength of the factions was shown in the elec-

tion of a president. Spiridinovia defeated Tchernov by 269 votes against 230.

Strengthened by this first success, the Bolsheviks through the agency of Kamkoff (Social Revolutionist of the Left), Kalgaieff, Commissioner of Agriculture, and Volodarski, immediately began procedures against the Central Executive Committee, elected by the first Congress in June. Tchernov undertook its defence, but without success. The peasants were felt to be strongly influenced by the policy of results pursued by the Bolsheviks, who had given them the "Land Laws." Moreover, the Bolsheviks employed every means of producing an effect upon their simple minds. Indeed, the session of November 30 witnessed a well staged theatrical performance. A delegation from the 12th Army at the front, in their campaign uniforms and carrying their rifles, entered the assembly chamber. It had come to bring a greeting from the front to the Peasant Congress. And, as if by chance, it was a young intellectual, a Bolshevik of course, who was its spokesman.

The Congress then adjourned; the Bolsheviks had won the trial. From that moment the hostility of the peasants ceased. They understood that the Bolsheviks would let them regulate the land question, directly and on the spot; the peasants asked nothing more of them. The Third Congress of Peasants, which convened in January, determined in its very first session to join with the Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, which was sitting at the same time. The proposed fusion was ratified by a unanimous vote. The victory of the Bolsheviks in the political field was complete.

On January 17, a Congress of "Land Committees" was convened; this Congress expressed its object as that of taking up the land question in a positive way and aside from all party politics.

The peasant class was not won over by the Bolsheviks, but it remained neutral and independent, ready to take sides against any attempt at reaction or any experiment that looked reactionary. The aim of the Bolshevik leaders was accomplished.

The third element of the people was the labour element. For months past, the workers had been prepared for events by means of Bolshevist activity in the heart of their primary organizations—the factory committees, the syndicates, and the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. It was in the name of the working class through the instrumentality of the Revolutionary Military Committee, a direct emanation of its official organ (The Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates) that the coup d'état of October 24-25 was accomplished. The workmen therefore were lined up with the Bolsheviks.

Nevertheless there was one portion of the working class from whom the Bolsheviks might fear serious opposition—the railway employés. These had placed at their head a Central Executive Committee which was hostile to the Bolsheviks and quite won over to the idea of a socialist coalition government.

The Bolsheviks following their usual tactics began with careful and cautious intrigue among the organizations, planning to follow this with forceful action

against the leaders when they felt sure of the support of the masses.

On October 26, the Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies issued the following "Appeal to all Railway Employés":

"It is the workmen's and soldiers' revolution that has triumphed at Petrograd. The Minister of Ways and Communications has been arrested, together with the other Ministers. . . . The revolutionary government of the Councils is anxious to improve the material situation of the railway employés. The railway employés will be represented in the Ministry of Ways and Communications. . . ."

The Central Executive Committee of Railway Employés, however, continued its ill defined opposition. On October 31, it sent the following telegram to all the regional and local committees of railway employés:

"Believing that in this civil war, the railway employés should preserve the strictest neutrality and should prevent the transportation of belligerent troops, the Central Executive Committee of Railway Employés, in order to protect the lives of the railway employés, has decided to authorize them, in case of threats or of violence, to abandon their posts."

Then on November 2, the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies sent another appeal to the railway employés which was more frankly hostile to the Central Executive Committee than was the first. It read as follows:

"In these days of painful strife by the garrison

of Petrograd and the workmen, the organization known as the 'Central Executive Committee of Railway Employés' under the flag of neutrality, has hindered our operations, and by that fact, has given aid to the enemies of the people. . . . At the present time, after having defeated their enemies, the working people express the hope and the assurance that the proletariat among the railway employés will immediately force the Central Executive Committee of Railway Employés to relinquish its powers, that it will join with the people who are fighting, gather round the new workman's and peasant's government, thus insuring and strengthening the new popular revolution."

Then the Bolsheviks decided to summon a special congress of railway employés at Petrograd on December 1. Getting wind of this move, the Central Executive Committee of Railway Employés called a congress of its own for January 10th, and urged the railway employés not to send delegates to the Bolshevist congress.

In the interval before their congress, the Bolsheviks redoubled their efforts. On November 11 (old style), Yelisarov, the Commissioner, sent the following humble appeal to the railway employés:

"The present moment is such that no individual force is strong enough to pull us out of the situation in which we find ourselves. So much the less can I rely on my own feeble strength in this business, seeing that I have had no preparation whatever for this kind of work. I am relying on the collective good sense of the railway employés. . . . When work has resumed a more regular course, I shall withdraw,

as I do not consider myself qualified to retain this position permanently. I have been appointed 'provisional successor' and not 'Commissioner of Ways and Communications.'"

At the same time, the Bolsheviks brought action to bear upon the Central Executive Committee. They offered to take a delegate out of this body for appointment as Commissioner of Ways and Communications. It was a clever move. The Central Executive Committee decided to accept. Some of the members expressed the wish, merely, that this participation in authority be purely personal, so that the decisions of the Council of Commissioners should not be binding upon the Central Executive Committee of Railway Employés.

Having thus prepared the ground, the Council of Commissioners pushed the attack home. On November 24 it determined to break off all relations with the Central Executive Committee of Railway Employés, and not to recognize its decisions. The Central Executive Committee, bewildered by this straight out blow following so closely upon treacherous advances, held a special meeting that very night to consider the situation. But it came to no decision. The special congress of railway employés, summoned by the Council of Commissioners, convened in spite of the opposition of the Central Executive Committee. It gave its whole support to the Bolsheviks.

It resolved that "The Constituent Assembly can be considered as a body expressing the will of the people only on condition that it recognize the program of the Second Congress of Soviets . . . and

decide to support the Soviets in their struggle against the bourgeoisie. . . ." The defeat of the Central Executive Committee was complete.

In the January Congress, which it had convened, this Committee was unable to recapture the lost ground. A split took place between the Right and the Left. The Central Executive Committee, also known as "Vikjel," resigned. The faction of the Left chose a commission to settle the affairs of the late "Vikjel."

The opposition of the railway employés to the Bolsheviks was dead. The whole working class was united under the same banner.

We have just seen what sort of politics the Bolsheviks employed in dealing with those whom they had reason to fear but whom they wished to win over to their cause. It was a policy, cunning and violent by turns, made up of deceit, treachery, and double-dealing, giving place to brutality and tyranny at the propitious moment.

We have now to show the policy they pursued with those whom they did not fear, whom they placed in the category of "Bourjouis," or "Korilovistes," which was quite simply the category of all their defeated enemies. Among these, the first upon whom their authority—one might say their vengeance—was exercised were the officials and employés of the large administrative departments, the post offices, the banks, etc. . . . Even towards these helpless adversaries the Bolsheviks did not employ violence without covering it with Slav duplicity. One instance will illustrate the method:

Trotzky, appointed Commissioner of Foreign Affairs on October 26 (old style) by decision of the Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, appeared at the Foreign Office on the 27th. The employés had declared a strike and the offices were empty. He went home.

Up to November 4, the Foreign Office remained closed. On that day the following notice was posted in the entrance of the building:

"The employés of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are to report for resumption of their work, November 6 at 1 p.m. Those who have not reported at the time indicated will have to vacate immediately the quarters which they are occupying owned by the State.

"The People's Commissioner: TROTZKY."

The higher officials were requested to present themselves to Trotzky the same day at 7 p.m.

At 4.30 p.m., on the day specified, Assistant Minister Petriaiev, Director of the First Department Lapoukhine, and other officials, arrived at the Ministry. The section chiefs delivered the keys of the closets to the People's Commissioner, declaring that they did so under coercion.

And then the strike continued. Nobody else appeared at the Foreign Office. No measures were taken against the strikers. Finally, on November 13 (old style), Trotzky dismissed, without pension privileges, Messrs. Neratov and Petraiev, assistants in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Tatitchev, director of the cabinet, and thirty officials of the For-

eign Office. From that moment, the other officials, deciding that their resistance had lasted long enough, returned without fuss and without scandal and resumed their work. They were to become the most humble servants of the new masters.

It was the same story in all the departments. The Senate in its session of October 30 (old style) resolved that "having recognized in March of this year the Provisional Government, formed after the abdication of the emperor and the accompanying events, and having administered its oath of office, the Senate now has no legal grounds for considering that government dismissed before the Constituent Assembly has established the new government in its permanent form."

The People's Commissioners did not resort immediately to reprisals. They sounded the Senate to find out whether it would consent to register the "decrees" of the People's Commission as laws. Upon its refusal, they decided that these decrees should have the force of law upon their insertion in the *Official Bulletin* which they determined to publish.

The Senate persisted in its attitude; they decided to abolish it, a measure which brought forth a solemn but ineffectual Senatorial protest on November 23. After December 1 (old style), the salaries of the senators were cut off.

In the post-offices, opponents were attacked in the same way on the pecuniary side. Avilov, Commissioner of Posts and Telegraphs, published the following "prikase":

"All the employés and officials of the Ministry

who do not recognize the authority of the Council of People's Commissioners and my authority as director of the department are dismissed from their positions without pension privilege."

Thus the policy was the same for everybody. It was not brutal or bloody towards anybody, in theory. It was essentially Slav-tricky and tortuous, never meeting a difficulty squarely, never hesitating to use any means to attain its end, and shrinking before no moral consideration. The characteristic of the Bolshevist policy towards the people was not brutality but un-morality.

By these methods they obtained within a few months an absolute and incontestable authority wherever the opposition had not been able to take the form of armed revolt.

However, in the regions where an opposition movement supported by an armed force appeared, the Bolshevist government resorted to the same means, adopting a passive attitude, disintegrating the opposing force from within, but avoiding as much as possible open and direct conflict.

All attempts at reaction by force, such as Kaledine's on the Don, Alexief's in the Ukraine, General Dontov's in the Ural region, or General Semionoff's in Siberia, ran foul of this flexible, inconsistent resistance which in the end triumphed because it alone had the support of the people, who regarded all projects wherever they came from, whether from Cossack generals, from reactionaries, or from the Allies, as attempts at political restoration looking towards

re-establishing their social slavery under a form more or less disguised.

The story of all these revolts is the same. Let us recall just one of them, by way of example, that of the Don.

General Kaledine, holding the office of "Hetman" of the Don Cossacks, on October 27th, two days, that is, after the "coup d'état," sent the following telegram to Petrograd:

"Inasmuch as the Bolsheviks have attempted to overthrow the Provisional Government and to seize the power at Petrograd and in other places, the 'General Directorate' of the Cossack troops, considering such a usurpation criminal and indefensible, will give its whole support, in close co-operation with the Directorates of other Cossack troops, to the Provisional Government of the existing coalition. As a result of exceptional circumstances and the interruption of communication with the central governmental authority, the Cossack Directorate is assuming plenary governmental powers in the Province of the Don until such time as the authority of the Provisional Government is re-established and order prevails once more in Russia."

The next day it was learned that Kaledine was marching on Kharkof and that he had been proclaimed dictator at Taganrog. At the same time a violent agitation among the workers in this region and in the mining district of the Donetz valley was reported. A few days later, Kaledine occupied the whole of the south, including Kharkof and Voronezh, the Donetz valley and the valley of the Krivoi-Rog

as far as Tchertkovo. It was even said that he intended to send a corps of Cossacks to Moscow, but that the railroad employés had refused them transportation.

It was not until November 19 (old style), nearly a month after the beginning of the movement, that the Bolshevist government decided to send against Kaledine a mixed detachment of the strength of about five regiments.

And during all this time, was Kaledine developing an organization? And was he building up a strong government with real power? No. He had treated with all factions, all parties and all clans, and he had accomplished nothing. At Kharkof, for instance, there were two governments, the Kaledinists and the Bolsheviks. As there was only one official stamp at the Municipal Duma, an agreement was reached: the two authorities took turns, each holding the stamp and the authority for a day at a time. In the factories and the departments there was exactly the same confusion under Kaledine's régime as under Lenine's.

On November 23 (old style), it was learned that General Dontov, "Hetman" of the Orenburg Cossacks, had in turn ordered a mobilization, and started a revolt. Simultaneously it was reported that General Kornilov, another Cossack leader, was marching upon Novo Tcherkask, intending to join forces with General Kaledine.

On November 26 (old style), the Council of People's Commissioners published the following decree:

"1. All of the territory of the Ural and the Don and any other places where counter-revolutionary detachments appear, are declared under martial law.

"2. The local revolutionary garrison should proceed with absolute firmness against the enemies of the people without awaiting instructions from above.

"3. All negotiations of any kind with the leaders of the rebellion are absolutely prohibited.

"4. Every Cossack workman who throws off the yoke of the Kaledine, Kornilov and Dontov leadership will be received as a son and will receive the necessary support from the soviet authorities."

At the same time the Council of People's Commissioners made a public statement that a bloody encounter (the Bolshevist communique officially reported two killed and three wounded) had been fought near Bielgorod, in the neighbourhood of the station of Tamarovka, north of Kharkof, against a Kornilovist detachment of two or three thousand men equipped with a considerable number of machine guns (!) On the other hand, an offensive was begun by the Black Sea fleet, the hostility of which the Commissioner had naturally aroused by sending delegations of agitators, as is shown by the following telegram which he sent to Petrograd:

"November 26.—I bring to your attention the fact that the Black Sea fleet, through me and through the democratic organizations, and in part through the 'Tsentroflotte' played the most active part in winding up the Kornilov enterprise. Some special detachments were sent to accompany some delegations. One of the latter was arrested by the Kale-

dinists. Kaledine telegraphed an ultimatum forbidding the fleet to meddle in the domestic arrangements of the autonomous province or in the affairs of the Cossack government. We have already taken command of several ships in case of misunderstandings arising. Telegraph what must be done."

The following days brought forth some epic recitals of the encounter at Bielgorod. Tev Arutianants, leader of the Revolutionary Military Committee at the Stavka, telegraphed, for instance, under date of November 28:

"At ten o'clock in the morning, a courier was captured; he was the bearer of a dispatch indicating that they were preparing to dine at Piskarevka and go towards Moline cutting wires, but we took the necessary measures, and they were not able to accomplish their object. . . ."

While such military operations were under way, the Bolsheviks decided to send some "agitators" to spread their ideas among Doutov's Cossacks.

Two days later a telegram announced that the Cossack cavalry was being concentrated at Tzaritzine, and that the Cossack infantry refused to march. Then came a new bulletin of victory from the aspirant Parlemovski:

"We have cut in pieces a detachment of Kornilovists."

But the Commission, which apparently was not fooled by these bulletins, launched on its side a much more effective offensive, by publishing the arrangements it was making in favour of the Cossacks of the Don, of the Kouban, the Ural, and Siberia:

1. Abolish compulsory military service of the Cossacks and replace it by short-term schools in the "Stantsa" (Cossack village).
2. Charge to the account of the state the clothing and equipping of the Cossacks called into military service.
3. Abolish the weekly guard of the Cossacks under the control of the Stantsa, winter drill, reviews, and camps.
4. Establish full freedom of the Cossacks to change their residence.

A few days later, the Bolsheviks of Kharkof, having received some reinforcements, opened negotiations with the municipal rada.

At Rostof, meanwhile, Kaledine stated that as the agitation had ended, he had freed all the members of labour organizations who had been arrested. But the Bolsheviks gave another version of the affair. "On the 12th," they said, "a little engagement took place with the Bolshevist troops fifteen verstes from the city. On the 13th, the Cossacks tried to arrest the Miners' Committees. They were received with rifle shots and were unable to make a single arrest." The communique adds: "In the city, life is normal. Kaledine has ordered the rehabilitation of the railways throughout the region."

It seems indeed that there were only skirmishes between Cossacks and Red Guards at Poltava, at Yekaterinoslaf, in the valley of the Donetz, and at Voronezh, trivial encounters merely engendering the kind of disorder favourable to robbery of peaceful citizens by the members of both camps. Antonov,

of Kharkof, who directed the movement, telegraphed to the Council of Commissioners:

"Some companies of rear guard infantry, mobilized against the Don, and chiefly against the Rada, are reaching their destination in such a state of disorganization that they have absolutely lost all military value."

This avowal by a generalissimo whom we should not expect to be over-exacting in the matter is eloquent.

But a new dash was imparted to the Cossack movement by Alexief, who took charge of operations after a row with Kaledine, who wanted to "conduct the operations moderately and confine them within the boundaries of the Don. . . ." Alexief marched on Voronezh, after dividing his army into three strong army corps.

The Bolsheviks sent against him an advance detachment of "Cossack defenders of the rights of Cossack workmen." They were still playing "agitator" politics! Two days later General Alexief was in retreat; his formidable army had melted away.

This brings us to Feb. 12. It is useless to follow in detail the story of this guerilla warfare, which at no time resembled an important movement.[6]

The truth is that all this counter-revolutionary agitation found no solid support whatever in the country. The mass of the people, almost in toto, with the exception of a few million bourgeois, was won over to the support of the existing political or-

[6] These pages had been written when the *Revue des Deux-Mondes* published the campaign notes of a war correspondent who took part in the Kaledinist movement. His testimony is suggestive. See *Revue des Deux-Mondes*, 15 Octobre, 1918, p. 777.

der. The Bolsheviks were the masters of the country because they were the most perfect representatives of the lower classes with their vague aspirations and their large appetites. They will remain masters as long as these appetites are neither completely gratified nor completely insured against the return of the old masters.

CHAPTER IV

THE BOLSHEVIKS AND THE PARTIES

The Political Parties Prior to Bolshevism—The Political Parties and Bolshevism—The Struggle for the Division of Authority—The Bolsheviks and the Municipal Duma — The Bolsheviks and the Constituent Assembly.

POLITICAL parties in Russia do not correspond as in the old democracies to a division of opinion on fundamental questions of organization of public affairs. They represent merely coalitions founded on self interest, or groupings established on the basis of speculative doctrines. This explains their great number, the almost infinite variety of their names, and of the overlappings, which often make it impossible for a foreigner to understand the terminology applied to them.

While in the old democratic countries whose civic development has been moulded by education and long experience, the number of parties is relatively small, and each large popular federation is represented by a platform, in Russia we find nothing of the kind.

Party labels represent doctrines of groups consisting sometimes of as few as three or four individuals; they do not stand for electoral organizations at all. Party classification, therefore, is always a rather artificial thing. The following, for example, was the classification of the second Duma, on the basis of parties, made the day after the elections of February-March, 1907: Reactionary parties (Union of the Russian People, Monarchists, Octobrists, the Right Wing), 97; Independent Group, 19; Moderates, 5; Polish Nationalists, 45; Party of Peaceful Renovation, 5; Progressive Group, 36; Cadets (Party for the Freedom of the People), 87; the Bloc of the Left, 48; Dachnakuntioun (Revolutionary Armenian Party), 3; Populist Socialists, 6; Labour Group, 24; Social Democrats, 64; Social Revolutionists, 55.[1]

The Third Duma (442 members) and the Fourth seemed more coherent in political grouping, but only because, as the result of the method of election, the political groupings did not correspond to any real divisions in the electorate. We find from Right to Left, Monarchists of the Right, Octobrists and Moderates, Peaceful Regenerationists, Cadets, Polish Nationalists, Mahometans, Social Democrats, the Left, and Independents.

The Fourth Duma was grouped in this way: The Extreme Right, the Right, the Nationalist Centre, Octobrists, Progressives, Cadets, Labourites, Social Democrats.

[1] At this time were formed the two parties, "Labour" and "Populist Socialist," which were to play an important part in the early part of the Revolution of 1907. The Labour Party on March 17/2, 1907, took the name of "Labour Group and Union of Peasants of All Russia," following the fusion of the two labour groups with the Union of Peasants. The Populist Socialist Group was organized by Annensky, an editor on the periodical *Russkoe Bogastvo*. Neither one of these groups had a definite program.

When the Revolution broke out in 1917, these artificial divisions which corresponded to combinations of groups in the Duma rather than to divisions of political opinion in the country, very soon gave way to new alignments.

The Constituent Assembly which was to consist of 730 civilian deputies, was made up as follows at the opening of the session: Bolsheviks, 165; Social Revolutionists of the Left, 35; Social Revolutionists of the Right, 279; Ukranian Socialists, 79; Mensheviks, 3; Populist Socialists, 2; Cadets, 16; Mussulmans, 19; Jews, 7; Esthonians, 4; Letts, 1; Germans, 1; Buriats, 1; Poles, 1; White Russians, 1; Landowners, 1.

The thing which first strikes one, in attempting a classification of the parties of the Second Duma and the Constituent Assembly on the basis of their representation of popular opinion, is the variety, the indefiniteness, and the instability of their programs. From one election to another, the same labels represent entirely different kinds of groupings. Thus in the Second Duma the old Social-Revolutionary Party became the terrorist group by opposition to the democrats (of the Plekhanov contingent); the peasants were joined mainly with the labour group which had fused with the Peasants' Union. In the Constituent Assembly, on the other hand, the peasants went solidly with the Social-Revolutionary Party, while the former terrorists, rejected by the group of the Left Wing, found themselves out of sympathy with the majority under Tchernov, and concerned themselves almost exclusively with the land question.

It should be further noted that most of the par-

ties have less relation to general political movements than to local or racial interests and that these racial or national groupings themselves are complicated by distinctions in political tendencies. The gamut of Polish groupings, for example, is almost endless.

The political situation is further complicated by similarly deep and incoherent confusion of clan, group, and sub-group divisions within the old Russian Socialist Party abroad.

By way of recapitulation—there is no such thing as parliamentary organization. Only two parties appear which are characterized by doctrines whose essential tendencies have stability—the Cadet Party, and the Bolshevist faction of the Social-Democratic Party. As the Cadet Party through doctrinaire stubbornness had refused to make any concession to the momentary passions of the people and had thus been eliminated from the struggle from the very first day of the revolution, there remained facing each other only the mob of socialist parties and the Bolsheviks. The outcome could not be doubted. The victory was to be with the Bolshevist Party, which had been fortified from the beginning by its cohesion, its unity of doctrine and control, and its relative discipline.

The attitude of all the socialist parties at the moment of the seizure of the power by the Bolsheviks was, as we have already said, unanimously hostile.

On October 24 (old style) at the historic session of the Pre-Parliament in which Kerensky asked for support against the Bolshevist conspiracy, Kamkov (Gotz) spoke in the name of the Social Democrats

of the Left, Dane in the name of the Menshevik Social Democrats, and Martov in the name of the Internationalist Social Democrats. All of these recognized the immediate necessity of fighting Bolshevism.

And from the 26th of October, following the coup d'état, this opposition of all the socialist groups was expressed by the formation of the "National Committee of Defence of the Fatherland and the Revolution," which was composed of the Provisional Council of the Republic (the Pre-Parliament), the Petrograd Municipal Duma, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, factions of the Right Wing and the Centre of the Social-Revolutionary Party, Populist Socialists, and the Social Democrats of the "Yedinstov" group (Plekhanov's).

The Committee issued the following manifesto:

"To the Citizens of the Russian Republic:

"In opposition to the will of the people who have conducted the revolution, the Bolsheviks of Petrograd on October 25 criminally arrested a portion of the Provisional Government, dispersed the Provisional Council of the Republic and proclaimed an illegal authority. Such violence perpetrated upon the government of revolutionary Russia at a moment when one of the greatest perils threatens us from without is an unmitigated crime against the fatherland.

"The insurrection of the Bolsheviks delivers a

mortal blow at our defence and puts a long way off the time of peace which we all want.

"Civil war, begun by the Bolsheviks, threatens to drag the country through the indescribable horrors of anarchy and counter-revolution and to bring about the failure of the Constituent Assembly whose purpose is to consolidate the republican régime and transfer to the people for ever their titles to the land.

"In defence of the single lawful governmental authority, the National Committee of Defence of the Fatherland and the Revolution, which was formed during the night of October 26, is taking the initiative in creating a new Provisional Government, which resting upon the strength of democracy, will lead the country to the Constituent Assembly and save it from anarchy and counter-revolution. The Committee of Defence calls upon you, citizens, not to recognize the authority of violence. Do not execute orders coming from that authority. Arise for the defence of the Fatherland and the Revolution. Uphold the Committee of Defence!"

The fatal rôle played by this Committee with the most laudable of intentions when it intervened as a mediator between Kerensky's troops and the Soviet troops at Tsarskoe-Selo on the 29th has passed into history.

From that moment can be clearly distinguished the two forms that the political conflict of the parties was to take—conflict of principle and conflict of personalities.

We find the first in the sincere protest of democratic feeling which gathered strength in proportion

to the increasingly repressive measures which the Bolsheviks were led to take against their opponents or against the organs of political liberty. Here the opposition found solid support in the public opinion, even within the bodies which supported the government, even within the Council of People's Commissioners.

This democratic opposition within the Bolshevist party first showed itself in connection with measures that were taken against the press.

Larine, in the session of the Executive Committee, held on November 30, rose in opposition to the degree promulgating these measures and requested its repeal. Avanessov defended the position of the Council of Commissioners. He cynically declared:

"Liberty of the press in the mouth of a socialist should have an entirely different meaning from that ordinarily attributed to it. The revolution which is being accomplished at this moment does not hesitate to strike at private property, and it is from this same point of view that the question of the press must be examined."

He proposed a motion which concluded as follows: ". . . The Central Executive Committe categorically rejects any proposition which tends to reestablish the old order in the domain of the press, and upholds without reservation the point of view of the Council of People's Commissioners on that question, declaring itself opposed to the claims and the threats dictated either by the prejudices of the little bourgeoisie or by a manifest complacency towards the interests of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie."

Kareline, a Social Revolutionist of the Left, made this accusation :

" The argument supporting the motion is singularly reminiscent of the point of view of the ' Union of the Russian People ' and of the Czarist régime in former days, even in the matter of style, they too talked about ' the poisoning of the people.' "

Trotzky replied and then Lenine. The latter said bluntly :

" To tolerate bourgeois newspapers means to cease being a socialist. When you make a revolution, you can't mark time. You have either to go forward or backward. Whoever talks about the freedom of the press is going backward and holding up the train which is running full speed towards socialism."

Avanessov's motion was carried by thirty-four votes to twenty-four, but the minority included two well-known Bolsheviks, Riazanov and Lozovski. The next day eleven of the People's Commissioners, including Larine, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, resigned.

The Countess Panine affair coming at this time went to prove that certain socialistic elements of Tolstoi's teachings were still maintaining their hold upon the people.

Countess Panine, for a great many years, had devoted her fortune and her strength to alleviating the distress of the people, establishing institutions for educational and relief work, such as her " People's House," going herself with untiring zeal among the people of the wretched " Krestianins." She was worshipped as a saint everywhere. Under the Kerensky government she had been appointed

Deputy Minister of Public Welfare.[2] At the time of the Bolshevist coup d'état, she had withdrawn the fund of 92,000 rubles from the bank in which it was deposited and proposed to deliver it to no one but the Constitutional Assembly, the only legal authority that she recognized. The Revolutionary Court established by the Bolsheviks tried the case in its first session. The president of the court was a workman named Joukov, employed in the Erikson factory, who had been imprisoned in the fortress of Schlüsselburg upon the outbreak of the February revolution. The other members of the court were four workmen and two soldiers.

When Countess Panine appeared the audience greeted her with an ovation. Some dramatic scenes occurred during the hearing. An old man in the audience was taken ill. He had to be carried out while he kept groaning, "I can stand no more! I can stand no more! How can they try such a woman?"

The court, in the face of this significant indication of public opinion, returned a moderate verdict. Countess Panine was to be kept in prison until she acknowledged where the 92,000 rubles were hidden. The court found her guilty of resisting the authority of the people, but taking into account the defendant's past, it was content to limit the penalty to a public reprimand. A few days later, the Countess was released.

The whole of the old Social-Revolutionary party, with its martyrs who had returned from Siberian prisons, such as the good old Breschkovskaia with

[2] Translator's Note: *Ministre de l'Assistance Publique*, which means literally Minister of Public Relief Work.

her long past of sacrifice to the cause of the people and the cause of the idea, whom the people called the "Grandmother of the Revolution," retained a considerable moral prestige among the most enlightened part of the people.

Under the form of vague democratic protest, then, the opposition to Bolshevism was considerable, and could not be disregarded.

But, as previously stated, it assumed a second form. From the very first day, the opposition to Bolshevism that arose in the other parties was one of persons even more than of principles. People were astonished and chagrined by the unexpected success of the coup d'état, and though they had failed to anticipate and control events, they still wanted to share the gains.

In the face of this double-barrelled opposition what attitude would the Bolsheviks adopt?

As long as they did not feel themselves solidly in power, they compromised, negotiated, discussed, and temporized with the parties. They pretended humility, were prepared to make any kind of concession and any kind of division, placing all responsibility for disagreement upon the shoulders of their adversaries. But towards individuals, although not refusing to arbitrate, they were firm and exacting. They laid down as an absolute condition to any agreement whatever the recognition without reservation and without discussion of the Bolshevist coup d'état.

At the end of two months their policy of duplicity got the better of the opposing coalition and won the struggle. A portion of the Social Revolutionists joined forces with the Bolsheviks; the rest were

definitively forced into a barren opposition, for henceforth they could find no material or moral support among the people.

The opposition of the parties first appeared in the form of a hot campaign within the various organizations for a socialist ministry in which all the parties should be represented.

On October 27th (old style), the Petrograd Municipal Duma held two meetings devoted to discussion of this question. The claims were moderate; the only demand was for a governmental authority which would guarantee the convocation of the Constituent Assembly at the date determined upon. The Committee of Safety of the Fatherland and the Revolution resolved to enter into negotiations . . . with a view to organizing a democratic authority capable of guaranteeing:

(a) "A quick settlement of the Bolshevist enterprise by means which will safeguard the interests of democracy. . . .

(d) "An energetic foreign policy, including a proposal to the allies that they declare themselves ready to commence negotiations immediately with the view of obtaining a peace which shall not be based upon the economic oppression of any one of the belligerents.

(e) "The promulgation of a law placing the distribution of the land of the large estates in the hands of land committees."

In general it was still the same platform of peace and land, though stated with less brutal frankness than in the Bolshevist platform. But attempts at conciliation were unavailing; between those fine-spun

promises and the immediate results obtained by the Bolsheviks the people could not hesitate.

The first important attempt at conciliation was made by the Central Executive Committee of the Federation of Railway Employés. On October 29 (old style), this committee sent broadcast throughout Russia a telegram demanding the immediate cessation of armed conflict between the parties, and the constitution of a coalition socialist government, and threatening in case of refusal to proclaim a general railroad strike on October 29 at midnight. The Committee at the same time called a meeting of all the socialist parties. The meeting was called to order on the 29th at 8.30 p.m., and after prolonged debates, it ended in the appointment of a Commission.

The same day, the new Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldier's Delegates, which had been chosen the day before by the Soviet Congress, and which had a safe Bolshevik majority, resolved to get in touch with the central committees of all the socialist parties on the question of constituting a coalition government in which all the socialist parties, down to the Populist (Kerensky's party) should participate.

But as usual the conspirators wasted their time in useless discussions. A new conference took place on October 30, in which the appointment of a new commission was proposed.

At this same hour, Lenine and Trotzky, almost isolated within their party, called together the representatives of the Petrograd garrison for a conference. Lenine made a skilful appeal to the people

against the parties, asserted the conciliatory nature of his plans, but demanded energetic measures against "the plot contrived by the Internationalist Social Revolutionists (the Gotz contingent) with the old Kerensky Provisional Government and the Kornilovists as accomplices."

Then during the days of October 30th and 31st, the Bolsheviks clinched their victory by defeating Kerensky's troops in battle. Lenine, Trotzky, and the little group of "Irreducibles" then recovered all their authority. They called a joint meeting of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies and the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates for November 2.

At this meeting Riasanov stated the question and made a report on the work of the commission appointed on October 30, which had arrived at the following proposal:

"There shall be created a People's Provisional Council which shall include 100 representatives of the Central Executive Committee of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, 75 representatives of the Peasants' Soviet, 109 representatives of the municipalities of Petrograd and Moscow and some representatives of the trades unions of all Russia."

Kamkov, in the name of the Social Revolutionists of the Left, merely discussed the number of representatives as distributed among the parties. Volodarski, who took the floor for the Bolsheviks, began thus:

"There is probably no one who does not wish to see an agreement effected, but we cannot conclude

an agreement on any conditions one may be pleased to offer; we cannot forget that we are obliged to protect the interests of the workmen, the army, and the peasants. . . ." Then, after this relatively conciliatory statement, he made this uncompromising motion:

"Considering that harmony among the socialist parties is desirable, the Central Executive Committee declares that this harmony can be realized only on the following conditions:

1. Acceptance of the soviet program as it is formulated in the land acts, the decrees on peace, and two resolutions on the question of control of production by the workers.
2. Recognition of the necessity of pitiless warfare against the counter-revolution (Kerensky, Kornilov, Kaledine).
3. Recognition of the Second Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies with peasant participation, as the sole source of authority.
4. Responsibility of the government to the Central Executive Committee.
5. Absolute refusal to admit into the Central Executive Committee representatives of organizations which are not members of the Soviets.
6. Completion of the quota of the Central Executive Committee with representatives of the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, of peasants who are not yet represented in the Soviets, and of the trades unions throughout Russia."

The motion was put to a vote. The opinion of the Assembly seemed very undecided. The first

ballot showed thirty-three votes to thirty in favour of the motion of the Social Revolutionists. But on the second ballot by roll call, the motion of the Bolsheviks was carried.

Following this vote, a caucus of the parties of the Left was held at four o'clock in the morning to examine the situation. Hope was expressed that all chances of an agreement were not yet lost. The Internationalist Social Democrats (the Martov contingent) decided to quit the Central Executive Committee of Soviets until such time as the majority of that body should take a position of "honest and loyal solidarity with the other socialist parties."

On November 3, a meeting was held of the Conference of Socialist Parties, to which the Bolsheviks sent Sokolnikov as a representative. The day before, in the Petrograd Soviet, he had shown his hostility to any kind of concession. No decision was reached, and it was resolved to postpone the meeting until the following day.

Then it was, November 4 (old style), that the members of the Council of People's Commissioners who were in favour of an agreement tendered their resignations in a manifesto, as follows:

"The People's Commissioners named below tender their resignations:

V. Noghine, Commerce and Industry,
A. Rykov, Domestic Affairs,
Y. Milioutine, Agriculture,
I. Teotorovitch, Provisioning,
A. Chliapnikov, Labour."

They alleged the following reasons as their motives:

"We are in favour of the constitution of a social-

ist government representing all the parties on the Council. We believe that the creation of such a government offers the one chance of securing the fruits of the heroic struggle of the working class and the revolutionary army. Aside from such a coalition, only our course remains, the constitution of a purely Bolshevist government by means of political terrorism. This is the road that the Council of People's Commissioners has entered upon. We cannot and we will not follow. We know that such a course will lead to eliminating numerous proletarian organizations from political activity, re-establishing an irresponsible government, and crushing the revolution and the country.

"We cannot take the responsibility of such a policy and before the Central Executive Committee we resign our functions as People's Commissioners."

The following additional Commissioners subscribed to this statement:

D. Riazanov, Ways and Communications,
N. Derbychev, the Press,
T. Arbouzov, State Printing Office,
Joureniev, The Red Guard,
G. Fedorov, Manager of the Labour Disputes, Section of the Ministry of Labour,
Gr. Ion. Larine, Manager of the Section for the Elaboration of Proposed Laws.

Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Milioutine and Noghine tendered their resignations at the same time to the Central Committee of the Bolshevist Party.

If the blow had been delivered the first day, it would surely have brought the Lenine faction into line. But by November 5, the Soviet troops were

victorious and the power of the Commissioners was consolidated. Lenine could count on the support of the garrison and the factories. He took the offensive. He made a ringing appeal to the members of the Bolshevist party and to all the workmen:

". . . This desertion will not make the united masses who march with us falter.

"Remember that two of these deserters, Kamenev and Zinoviev, were guilty of desertion even before the insurrection when on October 10th last, they voted against any kind of manifestation. . . ." The statement concludes with this appeal to the masses against the intellectuals:

"We shall not submit to any program of the intellectual groups with whom the people are not in sympathy. . . . Our party, upheld by thousands of workmen from the cities, the soldiers from the trenches, and the peasants, is prepared, whatever the cost, to bring about the triumph of the cause of peace and the victory of socialism."

This hard counter-thrust disconcerted his opponents. The next day, the chief conspirator, the Central Executive Committee of Railway Employés, leaving at Petrograd a commission of five members instructed to continue negotiations, left for Moscow. The process of breaking up the "bloc" had begun.

The Bolsheviks, continuing their offensive against the "Intellectuals," staged their big demonstration on November 15, which set the seal of approval upon an apparent agreement among the groups over the heads of the leaders. On November 17, negotiations were resumed between the Bolsheviks and the Social Revolutionists of the Left. The latter accepted

some seats in the Council of Commissioners. From that moment the opposition of the socialist parties might be said to be vanquished.

During the night of December 9 (old style), a final agreement was concluded between the Council of People's Commissioners and the Central Committee of the Social-Revolutionary Party of the Left. Seven members of that party, Kalgaiev, Prochiane, Algassov, Troutovski, Michailov, Izmailov, and Stemberg, received seats in the Council. The question of authority was definitely settled.

At the same time that they were breaking the resistance of the socialist opposition, by their skilful policy of temporizing, the Bolsheviks were suppressing or making harmless the institutions and organizations on which this opposition rested.

We have already seen how, on October 26, the Central Executive Committee, elected by the First Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, had been replaced by a new committee which had a safe Bolshevik majority because their opponents were excluded by their own action.

There remained, however, one institution which continued to be especially dangerous, the Petrograd Municipal Duma. It had been elected only a little while before by universal suffrage, and under such conditions of order, quiet, and fairness that its voice was sure to wield indisputable moral authority.

But from the beginning, the Municipal Duma took sides against the Bolshevist government. It became, indeed, the centre of resistance. On October 26 (old style), the Duma held a meeting in which the break came immediately to the fore. Schreider, the

mayor, in opening the meeting, made this statement:

"If you recognize the authority of bayonets, that is the kind of authority which now rules us, but I recognize as legitimate only the authority that rests upon public recognition. . . ."

The Bolsheviks after an attempt to explain, which was hooted by the Assembly, declared that they were going to relinquish their seats and appeal to the people to replace the present Municipal Duma by another.

The threat, however, was not executed immediately. The Duma sat almost continuously during the early days. It first tried to play the part of arbitrator between the opposing forces, but soon returned to the rôle of representative of the material interests of the city. Yet it continued to show its opposition to the principle of Bolshevist authority on every question. Then the Bolsheviks, faithful to their customary tactics, began provoking a labour movement against the Duma.

On November 16 (old style) the municipal employés appeared before the Duma and demanded through an ultimatum increases of salary amounting to a total of fifty-eight million rubles. The Duma opened discussion on the question, but, with a blindness beyond comprehension, joined to it a question of general policy. The mayor, after reading the demands and making a few remarks, declared: "These demands are paltry compared to the threatening measures being prepared against Russia. . . . We are on the eve of breaking with our allies, and, left in a condition of isolation, we may lose every-

thing." Vinaver, representing the Cadets, intervened: "The mayor has said that we are alone. But that is not so. We still have some friends. These friends are our allies."

One speech after another was made on this subject, and the workmen who were waiting in the public boxes were quite forgotten. The sitting was adjourned. At last a motion against the armistice was passed . . . and after several hours, the discussion of the workmen's demands was resumed. Finally it was proposed to appoint a commission, but the will of the Assembly was evident—refusal to satisfy the demands. Then the workmen, who had been present all this time, had a number of threatening motions passed by various shops and factories of Petrograd read to the Duma. These motions demanded the dissolution of the Duma on the ground that it was conducting sabotage and counter-revolution, and insisted upon new elections. The Assembly moved to reject motions of this kind with scorn. But from that moment it was doomed.

The next day, the People's Commissioners signed the decree of dissolution, worded as follows:

"Whereas the Municipal Duma, elected on August 20, before the Kornilov plot, has clearly lost the right to represent the inhabitants of Petrograd, since it is entirely out of sympathy with their state of mind and their aspirations . . . the Council of People's Commissioners regards it as its duty to urge the inhabitants of the capital to pass judgment upon the policy of this autonomous municipal body. To this end, the Council of People's Commissioners has decided:

1. To dissolve the Municipal Duma, as of the date, November 17, 1917.

. . . 4. The new elections for the Petrograd Duma are fixed for November 26, 1917; they will be conducted according to the 'Regulations for Elections of Municipal Councillors,' which is published simultaneously with this decree.

5. The Municipal Duma of Petrograd is to meet at 2 p.m., November 28, 1917."

The Duma, which wanted to disregard the decree, tried to meet on November 17; and was dispersed by a detachment of sailors. The following day the mayor was arrested and interned for several days in the Smolny Institute.

The Petrograd Duma was dead. The Moscow Duma had been dissolved under similar circumstances.

When the Bolsheviks seized the power, they considered it necessary, as we have shown, not to shock openly the democratic hopes and feelings of the people, for these hopes, though very vague, were sincere and profound. The Constituent Assembly in particular, as the "Master of the Russian land," the Constituent Assembly which, in the eyes of the peasants, took on a symbolic form because it was the body which was to distribute the land and realize the great dream of ages—this body represented a moral force of considerable moment.

The elections were to take place on November 12, and throughout Russia when the Bolsheviks seized the power, the Electoral Commissions were functioning. Certainly from this time on, the Bolshevist

leaders had little sympathy for the Constituency, and later on, they were not afraid to say so.

After the coup de force of January 6, we find Trotzky declaring before the Third Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies: "In dissolving the Constituent Assembly, we violated the formal principles of democracy, but we did it in the name of principles which are higher, the principles of social revolution. . . ." And we find Lenine, on the same subject, replying to shouts from the Right of the Asembly: "You reproach us with the violent measures we have taken, but we have never been disciples of Tolstoi."

But in October at the time they seized the power, they did not yet feel themselves sufficiently powerful, and they had not given the peasant class enough in the way of guarantees to speak in this brutal way.

A decree, therefore, was promulgated on October 27, which provided that:

1. The elections for the Constituent Assembly are to take place before the date set as a limit, November 12.

2. All the electoral commissions, the institutions of local self-government, the Councils of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, and the Soldiers' organizations at the front, should make every effort to ensure freedom and regularity in the elections.

The processes of election dragged along so that on November 25, there were but 529 deputies elected out of a total of 730.

But the first returns gave an indication of the future make-up of the Assembly. In the cities the

poll was divided between the two extreme currents, Liberals (Cadets) and Bolsheviks. Petrograd gave 415,587 votes to the Bolsheviks, 245,628 to the Cadets, and 149,644 to the Social Revolutionists; Moscow gave 363,282 votes (47.1 per cent.) to the Bolsheviks, 260,277 (25.7 per cent.) to the Cadets, and 61,394 (8.1 per cent.) to the Social Revolutionists. But the country districts gave an overwhelming majority to the Social Revolutionists.

The Bolsheviks became anxious. On the 29th the Central Executive Committee of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies discussed a proposed law giving the electors the right of exercising the recall at any time. The decree was published the following day.

The Constituent Assembly showed its first sign of life on November 28. On that day, the mayor of Petrograd, as senior member of the Assembly, called its meeting to order. In view of the absence of a quorum (there were about fifty deputies present) he announced that the Assembly was resolved into a "privy session of the members of the Constituent Assembly." On the 29th, the Deputies, in spite of some feeble opposition from the guard, convened once more. Then arose the first serious difficulties. The Bolsheviks, knowing that the Constituent Assembly would be hostile to them, began manœuvring to make a botch of it.

First they determined that a commission headed by the Bolshevik, Ouritzki, should be ordered to verify credentials. On October 29th, they allowed admittance to the Tauride Palace only to those who were provided with certificates. As usual, their

opponents held out, and fought a war of words. The guard was converted into a political rally. Whereupon one of the officers of the guard addressed the soldiers:

"Comrades, there are gathered here impostors who call themselves members of the Constituent Assembly. You are familiar with the order. They are supposed to get certificates. We are going to show them out. We shall not fire. I speak in the name of the People's Commissioners."

But a little further on were two peasant deputies dressed in their country "poddevka." One of them was from the district of Kostroma. They were talking very excitedly to the soldiers, who underneath their uniform were themselves good peasants. The man from Kostroma said: "We've been elected by your peasant fathers and brothers who have sent us here to get the land, if need be to die for the land. We have sworn to that before them. And what do we find here? Bayonets pointed at us. . . ." The soldiers answer gently that they will do them no violence . . . that there must be order . . . that they will use force only if the deputies connive with the bourgeoisie; and one of them concludes with a knowing air: "Father, you're mistaken, you don't understand all. . . ." But he stops short, puzzled in explaining what he of course knows very well!

Finally, fifty dependable sailors entered the hall and drove out the deputies who perforce gave way.

On December 18, the Council of People's Commissioners took up the matter of fixing the date for the official opening of the Constituent Assembly

under its control. In this session, the Social Revolutionists of the Left opposed point-blank the obstructionist politics of the Bolsheviks, such as arresting of members of the Constituent Assembly like Tchernov and Tseretelli; prohibiting private assemblies, etc. . . . In the end, no decision was reached.

A few days later, the official opening of the Constituent Assembly was fixed at last for January 5.

A big manifestation was organized on that day by the opposition parties. The Bolsheviks in a notice posted the day before and published in the newspapers forbade the manifestation to enter the Tauride Palace and announced that they would use force if necessary. The manifestation, however, was organized. But at the moment that it was about to pass from the "Lityeiny" into the "Spalernaia" which leads to the Palace, the Red Guard, barring the way, brought its weapons into play. Some shots were fired, and the manifestation broke up. A little band of sailors and Red Guards took advantage of the occasion to go to the quarantine station, and murder the two Cadet Deputies, Tchingarev and Kokochkine, who were being held there.

Meanwhile the Constituent Assembly had convened. There were four hundred and fifty-five deputies present. The cadets and the members of the Extreme Right were the only absentees.

At four o'clock the senior member, Chvostsov, tried to open the meeting, thus causing a frightful uproar which was not quieted until the entrance of Sverdlov, the president of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workmen's and Sol-

diers' Deputies. He took the floor. "The Central Committee of the Council of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies," he said, "has charged me to call the Constituent Assembly to order. (Heavy applause from the Bolshevik benches; shouts from the Social Revolutionist benches, Right and Centre, 'Your hands are covered with blood! . . . No more blood!') The Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies express the hope that all the decrees and decisions of the Council of People's Commissioners will be recognized by the Constituent Assembly. . . ." He concluded "By order of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workman's and Soldiers' Deputies, I declare the Constituent Assembly opened."

They proceeded to the election of a president. The two opposing candidates were Spiridonova, Social Revolutionist of the Left, supported by her group and by the Bolsheviks, and Tchernov, Social-Revolutionist of the Right, supported by all the Anti-Bolshevik elements. The latter was elected by 244 votes against Spiridonova's 153, out of a total of 402 votes cast (the Ukrainians did not vote). After Tchernov's speech, and the election of the vice-president and secretaries, debate was begun on arranging the order of the day.

The Bolshevist party, through Boukharine as its mouthpiece, maintained that the Constituent Assembly should first of all recognize the authority of the soviets. "All the reforms," he said, "announced by Tchernov will be perverted if they are effected by an authority other than the soviets!" Bouk-

harine, who proclaimed himself member of the "Proletarian-Communist Party" (this was the first time that the Bolsheviks assumed this title; up to that time they had formed the "Majority or Bolshevik" group of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party) scornfully repudiated "the scabby parliamentary bourgeois republic."

Tseretelli then mounted the rostrum. He was clearly the biggest revolutionary figure of the hour. Yet he was received with a flood of insult and outcries. He remained a long time in the rostrum unable to make himself heard. At last he succeeded, and dominated the Assembly by the force and the calm of his reasoning. Through him as its spokesman, the Social-Democratic party insisted that the Constituent Assembly immediately prescribe for itself the tasks indicated in the following program.

1. The establishment of a democratic republic on the basis of direct, equal, and secret suffrage without distinction of sex, and according to the system of proportional representation.

2. Recognizing itself as the sole agency expressing the popular will of Russia and authorized to conclude peace, the Constituent Assembly should appoint from among its members a special body whose duty it will be to regulate the armistice at the front, and to propose to all the belligerent powers to enter immediately into negotiations for a general democratic peace according to the principles proclaimed by the Russian Revolution.

3. Confirmation by law of the free transfer of the land into the hands of those who work it.

4. Measures for rehabilitating manufactures and re-establishing relations between manufacturing and agriculture.

5. The Constituent Assembly should decree immediately the eight-hour working day.

6. Restoration and confirmation by law of the civil rights won by the Revolution.

7. Legal guarantee of the rights of the Nationalities.

This program shows clearly that all parties were agreed on the concrete tasks to be accomplished. These could be summed up in the broad Bolshevist formulas: peace for the people, the land to the peasants, the factory to the workman.

But now the past of the Bolsheviks speaks in their favour, while the people distrust the Constituent Assembly. Therefore when the Bolsheviks withdraw and the meeting is adjourned after the adoption of the motion of the Social Revolutionists by 237 votes to 136, the feeling is that the Constituent Assembly is doomed.

The session is re-opened a half-hour later. The Bolshevik benches are empty. A great uneasiness weighs upon the Assembly. Nevertheless debate is begun on the peace question. But Raskolnikov, a deputy, interrupts it to justify, in a hard and malignant tone of voice, the departure of his Bolshevist colleagues. The reason which he alleges is the refusal of the Assembly to recognize the authority of the soviets. He defers to that authority for the final decision on the fate of "the counter-revolutionary element of the Constituent Assembly."

He is wildly applauded by the spectators. In the Assembly, on the other hand, his peroration is received in lugubrious silence.

After this interpellation, the debates drag along. At last, about five o'clock in the morning, a sailor approaches the chair and addresses the president:

"The guard is tired, end the session."

They go on, however, disregarding the interruption. A few more motions are passed and the session is adjourned.

A few hours later the Council of Commissioners publishes a decree dissolving the Constituent Assembly as a counter-revolutionary body.

It was all over. Political clumsiness once again was as much to blame as the brutality of the people. By recognizing the existing authority—the Duma indeed had recognized Czarism—the Constituent Assembly would have prepared an early triumph for itself. This action it did not want to take. The Constituent Assembly had a Slav soul. It died of its "absolute" in the grey dawn of January 6, 1918.

CHAPTER V

THE BOLSHEVIKS AND THE NATIONALITIES

The Question of Nationalities in Russia—The Bolshevist Doctrine of Nationalities—The Bolsheviks and the Ukraine—The Federation of the South-East—The Bolsheviks and Finland.

AT the end of the old Czarist régime, the question of nationalities was becoming each day more acutely and painfully pressing.

Until the day of the Revolution Russia consisted of a vast agglomeration of peoples profoundly different in racial origin, culture, and religion, and held under the rule of the "Master of all the Russias" by the sternest tyranny. There had never been any sign of an attempt at assimilation except under the form of slavery and of political, religious, and economic exploitation. Under such a régime, instead of being mitigated by time, antagonisms could not but be deepened and aggravated.

The most recent and perhaps the most invidious example of the methods of the old régime may be

found in the history of the invasion of Galicia in the course of the war. The General Staff of the Grand Duke Nicholas included a host of priests, police, and officials who descended upon the unfortunate country like a flock of crows. Then the "Russianization" began. The first ten months of Count Brokinski's government were an uninterrupted nightmare. The four million Ukrainians of Galicia possessed, under the Austrian rule, 2,450 Ukrainian elementary schools, thirteen secondary schools, fifteen chairs in the University of Lemberg, public libraries, two museums, several newspapers, and a numerous United-Greek (Uniat) clergy under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Leopol. The Russian governor, upon his arrival, with a stroke of the pen suppressed all these institutions. The Archbishop of Leopol, Count Andre Czeptizki, was sent to Siberia; the Bishop of Przemysl, Monseigneur Tschechowitch, died of sorrow and the treatment inflicted upon him by the Russians. More than four hundred priests and thousands of peasants were sent to Siberia.

The Jews, of course, were not treated any better. A census of the large and medium-sized landed estates was ordered, so that a process of enforced expropriation might be begun under the pretext that "legislation in Galicia ought to be made to conform to that which is in force in Russia." The people were treated like cattle. In February, 1915, at Nadworna, fifteen hundred Jewish families, comprising eight thousand persons, were driven before the troops and pushed up to the Austrian front. The Emperor of Austria was obliged to make an

official protest to the Pope against these criminal proceedings.

Everywhere throughout the Czarist territories, this system of "Russianization" was applied.

But the people subjected to this rule constituted more than fifty per cent. of the total population of the Empire. The official census of 1897 showed the following distribution:

	Millions.	Per cent. of Total Population.
Great Russians	55.7	43.2
Ukrainians (Little Russians) ...	22.4	17.4
White Ruthenians	5.9	4.6
Poles	7.9	6.2
Lithuanians and Samogetians ...	1.7	1.3
Letts	1.0	1.1
Esthonians	1.0	0.8
Finns and Swedes	3.0	2.4
Ugro-Finnish Tribes	2.5	1.5
Germans	1.9	1.5
Jews	5.1	3.9
Rumanians	1.1	0.8
Armenians	1.2	0.9
Karelians, Georgians, Imeretians, Mingrelians, etc.	1.4	1.1
Caucasian Mountaineers	1.1	0.8
Tatars	3.7	2.9
Kirghizes	4.1	3.2
Other Turko-Tatar Tribes ...	6.0	4.8
Miscellaneous (non-Russian peoples)	1.5	1.2
	128.8	100.0

On January 1, 1913, the Central Committee of Statistics made the following enumeration of the total population of the Empire:

Russians	a little over 80	millions
Ukrainians	30 to 35	,,
White Ruthenians	6	,,
Poles	over 10	,,
Jews	6	,,
Lithuanians	3.5	,,
Letts	1.3	,,
Germans	2.5	,,
Finlanders and Mongol peoples	3.5	,,
Armenians	1.5	,,
Finns	3.4	,,

The distribution of the population according to religion was recorded thus in the census of 1897:

Greek Orthodox	66.6	millions
United Ruthenians (Ruthenian Catholics)	23.0	,,
Catholics	11.5	,,
Protestants	6.2	,,
Other Christian Sects	1.2	,,
Jews	5.2	,,
Mahometans	14.0	,,
Other religions unclassified	1.5	,,

Of course among these non-indigenous populations, it is important to make distinctions. In a first category may be placed those nationalities which by all their ethnological characteristics belong indisputably to the great Slav family, and should logically form a social and political unit with Great Russia. The despotic rule to which these nationalities were

subjected in Czarist times was motivated entirely by reasons of religion. This category includes the Ukraine and White Russia.

In a second category may be grouped all the little nationalities which are very different from the Slav family, but which might logically be expected to be pushed by economic interests to fasten on to the powerful Russian block. These comprise, first the small nations of the Letts, the Esthonians, and the Balts, which condemned to economic suffocation by their powerful neighbours, would lean politically and socially towards a federal Russia rather than towards a Germany which has always been their hereditary enemy. They comprise further the small Jewish nationalities, the groups of German settlers, the Georgians, the Circassians, and the Turko-Tatars. These, scattered as they are, or gathered into very small clusters, cannot conceive of any rule other than a political fusion with the great empire, of which, by the very conditions of their existence, they are a part.

Finally, in a third category, we may place those nationalities which by their fundamental characteristics seem to form independent entities, and which were kept only by force under Czarist rule—Poland, Lithuania, Finland, and Bessarabia. The following ethnological comments will serve to support this classification.

The Ukrainians represent a very ancient branch of the Slav people. Oleg moved the seat of his government to Kief in 882, nearly two centuries before the founding of Moscow. The Tatars took Kief from the Russians in 1240.

After passing under the domination of Lithuania, then of Poland, the Ukraine was united once more to Russia in 1654. In 1686 the Patriarch of Constantinople relinquished his religious suzerainty, which passed to the Patriarch of Moscow. But in the Eastern Ukraine (Podolia, Volhynia, and the Kholm country), assimilation was difficult. Here the inhabitants belonged to the Greek-Catholic (Uniat) church, and the persecution which they suffered was terrible. In 1705, Peter I murdered several Ruthenian priests with his own hands at Polotsk. In 1795 all the Uniat bishoprics, with only one exception, were abolished in the annexed provinces, and their property was confiscated. Finally in 1839, the abolition of the Uniat Church itself was decreed in the Synod of Polotsk.

Alexander II, by his ukase of May 18-30, 1876, suppressed to a certain extent the Ukrainian language.

In 1905, the First Revolution brought a change of rule. The Second Duma included forty Ukrainian deputies. But the electoral régime of 1907, the unfairness of which we have already pointed out[1] reduced the Ukrainian representation to zero, and the following years were marked by a new effort to "Russianize" the Ukraine.

The Ukrainian nationalist movement at the end of the old régime was, primarily, a movement of intellectuals and would seem to have been rather artificial. It was justified only by the odious nature of the régime of political oppression which was

[1] See above.

foisted on the country by the imperial "Tchinovnicks." Freed from this tyranny in a free Russia, the Ukraine might be expected of its own accord to join the great Russian nation.

As much may be said also, it seems, of the White Ruthenians, who occupy Western Russia (the governments of Mogilef, Minsk, and parts of the governments of Vitetsk and Smolensk). The White Ruthenians enjoyed a period of comparative tranquility under Polish rule. With the partitions of Poland and the incorporation of the White Ruthenian territory in Russia, 1793, the "Russianization" began. The national Uniat religion was persecuted during a whole century. Serfdom was introduced. The use of the language in the churches was forbidden. Here, as in the Ukraine, the persecution was directed especially at religion. It may be stated that in a Russia freed from Czarist-orthodox tyranny White Russia ought to be an integral part.

We have placed in a special category those small and scattered nationalities whose social and political interest dictate a union with the main body of the Russian Empire.

Among these must first be mentioned the Jews. We are familiar with the shameful policy to which they were subjected by the old régime, the "zone of residence" system, the "pogroms," the horrible practises of deporting children, which Herzen has branded, and the "forced evacuation," during the retreat of 1915. We are familiar with the list of martyrs. But the Jews, scattered as they were throughout the Empire, could do nothing, in spite

of the past, but make claims for guarantees of equality of political and social rights.

The German colonists, split up for a century and a half in small agricultural settlements in Esthonia, Livonia, Lithuania, and Volhynia, in Southern Russia, and the Caucasus, and in more important colonies in the Volga region, numbered close to three million before the war. For these also it was not a question of nationality, but merely of liberty and equality of political rights.

The Georgians handed themselves over to Russia of their own accord. An alliance with a New Russia would raise no opposition among these people. In the midst of their Mussulman neighbours independence would be fatal to them.

The Turco-Tatar peoples of Russia have never made any claims to independence, but only to the political, religious and social liberties which the Czarist régime denied them.

We mention merely as a reminder, the Crimean Tatars, the Kirghizes, the Tatars of Turkestan, Khanates, Tcheremisses, Mordrines, Kalmucks, Bachkirs, Eschouvaches, Syrjaenes, and Lapps, who represent small and in some cases insignificant ethnological enclosures within the territory of Russia.

In contradistinction to the small nationalities, Poland, Lithuania, Finland, and Bessarabia constitute ethnological and geographical entities with very clearly marked indigenous peculiarities.

The Poles of course belong to the Slav race, but as a result of their long political independence, their Catholic religion, and their occidental culture, they form a very distinct national unit; and one of the

inevitable consequences of the present crisis in Europe will doubtless be the reconstitution of an independent Poland. It is quite unnecessary here to recount the history of Polish persecutions, which were mitigated for a time under the reign of Alexander I, only to be more brutally pursued under Nicholas I, the scourge of orthodoxy. In 1915, under pressure from the Allies, the Russian government made solemn promises to the Poles. But the conduct of the Russians in Galicia left no room for doubt as to the faith that could be put in these false pledges. The Polish question remains entirely unsolved.

The Lithuanians, who, to the number of about five million, occupy the Russian governments of Vilna, Kovno, Suwalki, and a part of Grodno, are less well known than their neighbours to the great European public.

For a long time they formed a powerful, independent kingdom, allied to Poland by a dynastic union, and since 1569 (Union of Lublin) by a political alliance. Almost all the great names of Polish history —Kosciuszko, Michiewicz, Moniuszko, etc.—are of Lithuanian origin. Finally, the territory claimed by Lithuania, with a population of sixty-five per cent. Lithuanian, ten per cent. Jewish, eight per cent. Polish, and ten per cent. White Ruthenian, includes only four per cent. of Great Russians, and this in spite of a century of administrative oppression, of which the rule of General Muravieff, "the Hangman," remains the most perfect type.

When the military evacuation of these regions was being conducted during the retreat in 1915, the Russian authorities did not fail to take advantage

of this opportunity to bring about a forced evacuation of the civil population, for the sake of facilitating the future "Russianization" in the time of the return. A large Russian newsaper, the *Birjevya Viedomosti,* was not afraid to propose, in an editorial of October 16, 1915, to replace the Chinese coolies in the Siberian gold mine regions of the Amur and the Tagas with this population. The writer of this article added, cynically: "We do not think it necessary to add that this convenient solution of the colonization problem in the Far East would facilitate at the same time the Russianization of the frontier lands of the Empire. . . ."

The Germans, during their occupation of the country, were able to exploit these legitimate aspirations of the Lithuanian people towards independence. On April 5, 1916, the Chancellor of the German Empire declared from the platform of the Reichstag: "Lithuania shall not be restored to reactionary Russia." (No more was it restored to Bolshevist Russia!)

The Lithuanian deputy, Januschlevitch, could say, from the rostrum of the Duma in May, 1915: "Down there, we have a new lease of life. Our compatriots who have remained in the country are full of hopes for the future. Taking this state of mind into consideration, the German government is losing no time. Where formerly national oppression and religious persecution reigned, where not a single institution of self-government existed, and where the use of the mother tongue was forbidden, now schools are being created in which the mother tongue is taught, and the language is being introduced in the

courts. You know that at Vilna they have opened numerous Lithuanian high schools, that throughout the entire country they have promoted the opening of hundreds of Lithuanian elementary schools. These are facts that cannot be silently passed over; we have to reckon with them. . . ."

It is beyond question that Europe will have to reckon with these facts—so much the more so, since Germany, when her fate was sealed in the West, abruptly changed her attitude towards Lithuania and did everything possible to bring about its political and economic enslavement.

The Grand Duchy of Finland contracted a political alliance with the Empire of the Czars in 1809. Since that time the Russians have never succeeded in getting a foothold in the country; out of a total population of 3,300,000 inhabitants, Finland has barely 8,000 of Russian nationality. The culture of the people is occidental, and until recent times its history was one of broad self-government. Finland owed no military service to Russia; it had its own bank and its own national coin, and its own legislature. The attempts at oppression by the Russian government were, on the whole, recent. The hardest period was from 1898 to 1904—a period with which the name of Bobrikoff will always be associated. The act known as "the Law of the Empire" was not passed until 1910. But the bonds between Finland and Sweden alienate the country further from Russia. The inhabitants evince a dark and unyielding hatred towards their former oppressors. The independence of Finland is a psychological necessity.

Bessarabia is inhabitated by an extremely motley

population, the main portion of which consists of nearly 2,400,000 Rumanians. The Peace of Bucharest in 1812 and the Congress of Berlin in 1878 gave Bessarabia to Russia. The country was at first granted rather broad autonomy; this was soon succeeded by a rule of oppression which at the close of the last century ended in a policy of intense Russianization. The racial and political affiliations of this region with Rumania are so close that it would seem legitimate and in accordance with the will of its inhabitants, to attach it once more to Roumania.

This question of nationalities, which to Czarist Russia presented political difficulties that might be called insurmountable, had taken on an entirely new aspect upon the passing away of the old régime. Serious troubles, however, had arisen, and imminent struggles could be foreseen between Finland and the Ukraine, and Great Russia.

The Bolsheviks, before their accession, had always shown evidence of a very liberal attitude in the matter of nationalities, even going the length of supporting the claims of Finland and the Ukraine for absolute separation.

And on November 2, 1917 (old style) the Bolshevist government published a Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples, signed by a Georgian, Iossif Djugachvili (Staline) as Commissioner of Nationalities. It was worded as follows:

". . . There remain only those peoples of Russia, who have rested and still rest patient under an arbitrary yoke. We must immediately take up the task of their liberation. During Czarist times, the peoples of Russia were egged on one against

another. The results of this policy are well known —massacres and pogroms on the one hand, slavery of the peoples upon the other.

"There can be no return towards this shameful policy. . . .

"During the period of imperialism after the Revolution of February, when the power passed into the hands of the Cadet bourgeoisie, this policy of excitation was succeeded by a policy of cowardly distrust of the peoples of Russia, a policy of chicanery and instigation, hiding itself under the words, "liberty and equality of the peoples."

"An end must be made to this unworthy policy of lying, suspicion, chicane, and instigation. It must be replaced to-day by an open and honest policy leading to complete mutual confidence among the peoples of Russia.

"It is only in the achievement of such a union that the workmen and peasants of Russia can be welded into a revolutionary force capable of defending itself against any plot on the part of the imperialistic and annexationist bourgeoisie.

"In compliance with the will of the councils, the Council of People's Commissioners has resolved to adopt as the basis of its activity in the matter of nationalities, the principles contained in the following decree:

1. Equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.

2. The right of self determination of the peoples even to the point of separating and forming independent states.

3. Abolition of all privileges and limitations founded on nationality or religion.

4. Free development of national minorities and racial groups inhabitating Russian territory."

In spite of this solemn declaration, the Bolsheviks almost immediately entered into war with Finland and the Ukraine. The fact is that the Bolsheviks understood the rights of peoples only as the right of the proletarian classes to organize freely. By the logic of their doctrine of proletarian internationalism, they were dragged into intervention wherever the proletarian cause appeared to be in danger. This explains their fight against the "Rada" in the Ukraine and the Senate in Finland. This forced duplicity of Bolshevist policy was especially evident in the telegram sent to Krylenko by Trotzky, November 24 (old style), from which the following is quoted:

"In regard to the formation of national regiments, we urge you not to raise any political obstacle. Among the national troops under bourgeois control, it is essential to create socialist nuclei, and to make sure of a close liason between them and our troops and committees."

But it would be ridiculous to compare the attitude of the Bolsheviks with that of the old régime, and to see in their policy evidence of "pan-slavism" or "Great-Russian nationalism." Bolshevist intervention is analogous to the republican intervention of the French Revolution. But it was even more dangerous.

It took no account of the moral and racial factors which, even under a well developed system of proletariazation never disappear, and which in a social system so little capitalistic and industrial as that of Russia are the vital factors. And it contained the germ of another peril, still more formidable. The nationalization of Great Russia is not an entirely artificial invention of the Czarist administration; it has its innate elements in the depth of the Slav soul. This hereditary feeling under the influence of a new régime of liberty and political equality might grow weakened and disappear. But it was sure to be unwittingly revived and nourished by the Bolshevist policy, which, indeed, proclaimed only utter contempt for the rights of nationalities as nationalities, and which by the very logic of the theory which served as its base, was led to enforce a unification which to-day is proletarian, and to-morrow. . . .

Thus, by a singular turn of events, the Bolshevist policy of nationalities, starting from the most absolute federal liberalism was in danger of leading to the despotic centralization and the nationalist forms that characterized of the past. Only honest and broad democratization of rule could save the small nationalities from this imminent danger.

. . . . . .

These general considerations seem to clarify the apparently contradictory facts in the policy employed by the Bolsheviks towards the Ukraine and Finland.

The beginning of the Ukrainian movement took

the form of demands for local autonomy. The conflict became extremely sharp at one time under the Kerensky government.

Petlioura, Commissioner General of War, tried hard before the Ukrainian Rada to allay the anxieties of the government, which was afraid of encouraging a Ukrainian separatist tendency in the pay of Austria and Germany. Petlioura scornfully resented these alleged slanders. In September, 1917, he made this statement to a French correspondent:

"Kerensky's mistake was not having confidence in us, and giving a too indulgent ear to the slanders of certain people . . . who picture the Ukrainian movement as a movement financed by Austria and Germany. We deny with scorn these insinuations. We are good patriots, convinced of the necessity of defending our country against the *boche* invasion. . . ." Subsequent events proved that Kerensky was right!

Early in November, it was learned that the Ukrainian Rada had created a national autonomous government at Kief, and had in fact proclaimed the independence of the Ukraine. But at the same time, the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies at Kief passed a resolution aiming to transform the Central Rada into a Soviet of Workmen's, Soldiers', and Peasants' Delegates. The conflict between these two tendencies was soon to reach a point where no settlement was possible.

On November 24th, Trotzky recognized the right of the Ukraine to have representatives at the conference of Brest-Litovsk, but he declared his wish to aid the Ukrainian proletariat against the Ukrainian

bourgeoisie. And by a telegram to Krylenko he raised the question that was to cause the outbreak of the conflict.

"Ask the Rada," said Trotzky, "whether it feels obliged to co-operate in the struggle against Kaledine, or intends to consider the movement of our troops towards the Don as a violation of its territory. Make the answer known to everybody. . . ."

The Rada replied to the ultimatum of the Bolshevist government received on December 4th, with a document that made no reference to the Kaledine matter, but merely dealt with the question of the Ukrainian military units and their return within the Ukrainian frontiers, the regulation of the problems of currency, of the gold reserve, etc. . . .

The quarrel became more embittered on December 13, following Krylenko's receipt of an arrogant ultimatum from Petlioura:

"If you have the authority to give orders to your revolutionary military committees, order them to set free immediately those who have been arrested, and hereafter to employ no more violent measures against them. I give you thirty-six hours in which to reply. Failing to receive a reply, I shall know what action to take. . . ."

While the General Secretariat was getting ready to convoke the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, the Ukrainian National Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, sitting at Kharkof, decided to proclaim itself as the sole authority for the whole Ukraine. The Moscow Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies decided to provide Colonel Muravief with one thousand red guards and

two thousand soldiers for the purpose of marching against the Rada.

Despite some skirmishes in which blood was shed, another attempt at conciliation was made. On January 8th, a Ukrainian delegation appeared at Petrograd and was received by Staline. But no agreement could be reached, and upon its departure the delegation carried away a statement by the generalissimo, Krylenko, which constituted an actual declaration of war:

"By these presents," the document reads, "I bring to the knowledge of the delegates of the garrison of Kief in the Ukrainian Republic: 1st, That military operations are being undertaken against the Central Rada, and that they will be conducted by me in the name of the struggle for the complete triumph of the authority of the Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the territory of the Russian Federal Republic; 2nd, That the People's Republic of the Ukraine is recognized by me in compliance with the will of the People's Commissioners and the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, without conditions or restrictions. . . ."

In the meantime, the Ukrainian delegation at Brest-Litovsk, acting independently of the Russian plenipotentaries, had concluded peace with the Central Empires, and a part of the delegation had gone to Kief, on January 8th, to have the agreement ratified.

It was not long before Kief had a taste of street warfare. The Bolshevist troops entered the city on January 16th. But fighting continued for twelve days. On the 21st, it was announced that the

Ukrainians were in control of the city, that they had shot three hundred Red Guards and the whole Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. Colonel Muravief, commanding the Bolshevist troops that had been driven back into the suburbs, telegraphed: "Send immediately all the troops at your disposition. The situation is very serious."

But on the 22nd, the Bolsheviks again took up the attack, which was systematic, desperate, and bloody; on the 25th Muravief's troops occupied the city. The fight was over, the revenge was only beginning. It was terrible. All the officers who could be seized during the pursuit were shot in reprisal for the shooting of Bolsheviks by the Ukrainians on the 21st.

Meanwhile the final peace treaty between the Ukrainians and the Central Powers had been signed. It contained seven articles. The boundary between the Ukraine and Austria was fixed on the basis of the *status quo;* i.e., it was to coincide with the former Russo-Austrian frontier. To the north the boundary was to follow the line Zobrejine-Krasnostar-Melinik-Vyssoko-Vodowskortz. Permanent boundaries were to be established according to ethnographical conditions and in conformity with the wishes of the inhabitants.

The question of economic relations was made the special subject of a detailed examination. The two parties agreed to organize exchange of goods on the following bases: Up to July 31st (new style), there shall be exchange of surplus products of rural industry and manufactured products to supply temporary needs. The quality and the kinds of products exchanged shall be determined by a special

commission, which at the same time shall fix the prices of the goods. Payment will be made in gold at the rate of four hundred and twenty-six rubles for one thousand marks. The exchange will be accomplished by means of special agencies of the state. Trade in goods not subject to compulsory exchange is unrestricted.

Fortified by this treaty, the Ukrainian government called the Germans into the Ukraine to help reestablish order—in reality to give them an opportunity to supervise the execution of the economic agreements.

The Bolsheviks now began a guerilla warfare. Antonof was appointed generalissimo of the troops of the Ukrainian soviet government of the Ukraine and of the Don Republic. For two months he carried on a guerilla warfare against the German troops and the Ukrainian "White Guards" (gaïkamaks) with the full support of the military forces of Great Russia.

Then the Germans, convinced that socialistic tendencies were promoting disorder, determined to get rid of the Ukrainian government. On April 28 a Congress of landed proprietors was held at Kief. Only representatives of the reactionary parties and some very pale liberals were present. The representative of the government of Kherson was Lutz, Octobrist ex-deputy of the Third Duma; for the government of Kharkof, it was Prince Galitzine, Octobrist of the Left in the Third Duma. The staging of the comedy was lively. A certain Reichert, delegate of the Co-operative Bank of Kherson, shouts:

"Enough of socialistic experiments (thunderous applause). The place of socialist representatives is not in the government. . . ."

It is decided to appoint a *hetman*, and Skoropadski, who makes his appearance at this moment in a box, receives an ovation. They beg him to accept a seat in the congress. Instantly the president announces:

"The mighty lord, Hetman Skoropadski, has the floor."

"Honourable delegates," says the general, "I sincerely thank you for offering me the power. I take it not in my own interest but to put an end to the anarchy which reigns here. . . ."

At this moment, a German lieutenant enters the Rada and gives the command in Russian:

"Silence, hands up!"

The room fills wih soldiers who cover the members of the Rada with their revolvers. Everybody raises his arms in the air. Some arrests are made. The Assembly is dissolved.

The next day, April 29, the *Hetman* of all the Ukraine published the Constitution of the Ukrainian State, countersigned by the new President of the Council, Custinovitch.

The first act of the new *hetman*, in the realm of international affairs, was a peace proposal to Great Russia.

The Lenine government then compelled Antonof to suspend hostilities; all his guerillas passed into Great Russia and were disarmed. A delegation went to Kief in reply to the hetman's invitation to sign the peace.

But this solution imposed by the armed force of the Central Powers occupying the country, did not bring the hoped for quiet. Anarchy continued. Bands of peasants cut telegraph wires and damaged lines of communication. In the government of Poltava open revolt developed. The assassination of von Eichhorn was but an incident in this unequal warfare.

. . . . . .

The Germans, in pursuance of their plan of campaign, established in South Russia and the Caucasus a number of precarious political combinations which had but the flimsiest sort of relation to nationalities.

Thus the Transcaucasian Republic, which had been founded at Tiflis on November 22, 1917, was dissolved on June 1, 1918. Georgia proclaimed its independence and applied for admission into the South-Eastern Federation with the Don Republic, the Cossacks of Kuban, Terek, and Astrakhan, the South-Caucasian mountaincers, and the free peoples of the steppes of South-Eastern Russia. The government of Stavropol, and those of the Black Sea, and a portion of the district of Tzaritzin were included in the new federation. It was an artificial state created by Germany for the purpose of effecting an immediate seizure of this whole region.

The creation of a Georgie separated from Armenia, delivered the Armenians over to extermination by the Turks. And by a sinister repetition of history, the Russians suffered the same atrocious treatment as their former victims. The Turks pro-

claimed a "holy war" among the Kurds, Tatars, and Mussulman Caucasians.

In this form the question of nationalities in South Russia ceased to be a question of Russian domestic policy.

The problem of Finland developed under the same conditions as the problems of the Ukraine and the Caucasus. It first presented itself as a problem of nationality within the Russian Empire. But as a result of the false position assumed by the Soviet government, which intervened in the party struggle in Finland, this domestic problem was transformed into an international problem by the intervention of the Germans responding to the call of the "Whites" against the "Reds."

Finland proclaimed itself an independent republic in December, 1917. The Diet communicated this decision to the governments of Europe; and the Republic was recognized first by France, then by Germany.

The Russian Soviet government determined to withdraw its troops from Finland. But it was not in a hurry, and when the Finnish Red Guard in January made the coup d'état which drove the Diet and the Senate out of Helsingfors, the Russian troops gave their entire support to the Finnish Red Guard.

The Senate protested against the conduct of the Russian troops to the powers which had recognized the independence of Finland. Trotzky replied to the Finnish government with a very ambiguous note in which he accused the "counter-revolutionary and chauvinistic elements of the Finnish people" of

having treacherously attacked the Russian soldiers, "thus causing naturally the adoption of defensive measures."

"We are in agreement with you," Trotzky declared, "in considering it necessary to withdraw the Russian troops from Finland at the earliest possible moment. But this measure, as you yourselves have recognized, can be put in force only in so far as circumstances and technical conditions allow."

Meanwhile fighting continued at Viborg; a general strike was declared at Helsingfors and . . . a trainload of Red Guards with cannon and machine-guns left Petrograd on the morning of January 12. The civil war assumed large dimensions. On the 15th, the coup d'état of Helsingfors took place, and the Senate had to flee to Nikolaistadt.

The "Whites" concentrated in the north and attempted to recapture the country from the Finnish and Russian Reds.[2] Perhaps they would not have succeeded unaided. But a force of Germans landed in Finland on April 3, and the "Reds" were soon crushed.

On April 11, the Russian fleet upon the summons of the German government was obliged to quit Helsingfors; on April 12th the Germans entered the city. The repressive measures were terrible. The "Whites" interned 70,000 Red Guards, including 10,000 Russians. At Tammersfors they captured 30,000; at Viborg, 10,000; at Helsingfors, 7,000.

[2] The support of soviet Russia was no longer concealed. On January 24, detachments of Russian soldiers paraded at Petrograd, with banners bearing the inscription: "To the aid of our Finnish comrades, in their fight against capital." In addition to these detachments, an armoured train, some machine guns, and some detachments of the regular regiments of Ismailovski were dispatched from Lithuania and Volhynia.

More than two months later, hardly a tenth of these had been released.

Mannerheim, the generalissimo, had to relinquish his command to a German. The president of the government, Svinkhouvoud, was no longer any more than a tool of the Germans, who set about the establishment of a monarchy and the election of a German prince. On July 14 the National Assembly declared for the establishment of a monarchy by a vote of fifty-seven for, and fifty-three against. How this vote was obtained is common knowledge. The Minister of Foreign Affairs read a statement which contained this significant sentence: "The German government deems that the monarchical form is the one best adapted to producing prosperity in Finland. . . ." The German candidate was the German Emperor's own brother-in-law.

Thus in the two cases in which the Bolsheviks were confronted with the question of nationalities, the solution finally adopted had to be contrary to the general principles formulated in the declaration of November 2, 1917.

But in reality the problem of nationalities was not tackled by the Bolsheviks; it was juggled by the Germans. It still remains to be solved. Everywhere groups have been organized looking towards national self-government. The Little Russians held a Congress at Minsk; the Great Russians, another, at Moscow; and the Caucasians had established a stable government before the German intervention. The Lithuanian Diet entered into a sharp conflict with the Germans. The Slav federal movement has everywhere shown evidence of its depth. In the

coming reorganization of Russia it will be a prime factor, and at the present time it constitutes a serious obstacle to the development of the Bolshevist rule, which is federal in theory, but centralizing and unifying in fact.

CHAPTER VI

THE BOLSHEVIKS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

Foreign Policy and Bolshevist Principles—The Peace Question—Relations with the Allies—Are the Bolsheviks Traitors?

WHERE the Bolshevist balance sheet looks most lamentable is in the matter of foreign policy. In May, 1918, after six months of Bolshevist rule, Russia found its population diminished by seventy million souls; Riga, Warsaw, Kief and Odessa had all passed either directly or indirectly into the hands of the enemy. Never in its history, since the end of the sixteenth century, had the Slav land experienced such a defeat or such a humiliation.

If the present was not bright, the future looked still darker. Russia, with her richest regions cut away, stripped of the wealth of her mines in Poland, in the south-east, and in the Caucasus, deprived of the rich in Little Russia, and confined within the regions of Great Russia, was doomed to a tragic decline.

In this distress, Russia, having betrayed her allies without gaining the respect or the friendship of her

enemies, was alone in the world and without any hope of substantial aid. It was a tragic international situation, probably unique in the history of the modern civilized world.

To what extent were the Bolsheviks responsible for this situation? Their enemies have not failed to throw all the blame upon them, and to represent Bolshevism to us as that "scurvy rottenness from which all the trouble came."

In reality, it must be recognized that though the Bolshevist theories contributed largely to the creation of this situation, nevertheless previous events, for which they were in no way responsible had at least as large a share in preparing the way for the situation and making it inevitable. Let us not forget that for a long time back Russia wanted peace, and peace at any price, under any material or moral conditions; that this desire, which had acquired irresistible force, was evinced among all classes of the people and in quarters representing all shades of political opinion. The ruling classes of the old order had wanted peace with their whole strength, and peace in its most dishonourable form!

Charles Rivet, the careful and discerning correspondent of the *Temps*, wrote in November, 1916:

"The bureaucracy does not, cannot, and does not wish to rise to the task that confronts it . . . and from the chancelleries is emitted scientifically measured quantities of a corrupting atmosphere made up of false doubt, disintegrating scepticism, cautious allusion, and above all intentional passiveness. One success to appease their vanity . . . and then if peace were made! Is not Berlin the

natural ally of Petersburg? Fear of victory oozes out here from all the walls. . . ."

The idea of a separate peace was becoming a commonplace in the *camarilla* of the Court, says again the same writer. And Miliukof's famous intervention in the Duma should not be forgotten, when he denounced from the rostrum "the plots woven for the purpose of reaching the unprecedented infamy of a separate peace." When the Revolution broke out, all the elements that were reactionary or simply bourgeois turned in distress towards Germany. The anxious expectation of German support was openly advertised, we can positively state, in all the clubs and in all the salons. The same Miliukof who had formerly denounced the separate peace from the rostrum of the Duma in 1918 entered into suspicious cabals with Germany in the name of his party. It may be stated that at the present time there is not a reactionary or a bourgeois in Moscow or Petrograd who is not still ready to give half of what is left of Russia to see order restored in these cities by the Germans. Imperialistic Germany of the Junkers and the Prussian soldiery is the sole hope of these people who have only a deep and ill-concealed hatred for the Allies, who, by their war policy, brought disaster upon Russia. It would have been easy, they say, to have saved the old régime by making peace in 1915, or even in 1917.

Moreover, the masses of the peasantry and the army wanted peace with all their strength, unconditionally and at any price. Every party, every organization has repeatedly borne witness to this unanimous aspiration of the Russian people. The

history of the Revolution down to the advent of Bolshevism is the history of the peace . . . which everybody promised, but which nobody dared to bring about or was able to bring about until the Bolsheviks seized the power.

On the very eve of the coup d'état, October 24, the Pre-Parliament, describing the conditions by which it seemed possible to avoid the civil war proclaimed by the Bolshevist preparations, declared in its order of the day:

". . . Favourable ground has been prepared for the agitation above referred to by delay in enforcing urgent measures . . . that is why it is necessary . . . to act vigorously in foreign affairs, to take the decisive action of proposing to the Allies that they state their conditions of peace and open negotiations for peace. . . ."

Several days later, November 10 (old style), at the conference of the zemstvos of the cities, Tseretelli, the great leader of the Social Revolutionists, had a motion passed which expressed the party's governmental program:

"1. Assure the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.

"2. Re-establish all the forms of liberty that have been destroyed.

"3. *Open negotiations with a view to the quickest possible conclusion of peace.*"

Thus, it will be seen, the Bolsheviks in making peace merely complied with the unanimous wish of the nation. And what their opponents blamed them for was merely that they profited by so doing.

Certainly, the terms imposed by the victor were lamentable. Yet it may be maintained, without fear of straying from the truth, that the Bolshevist peace was less to be feared by the Russian democracy and by the Allies, than any kind of peace that the reactionaries of the old régime or the liberals of the Miliukof type might have signed. The present peace with Germany was not recognized by the Russian people, nor even by the Bolshevists, who never regarded it as anything but a "respite" (the word is Lenine's) granted to the German imperialists, while a peace signed by a government recognized abroad and strong at home would have been definitive and have sanctioned the agreement between Russia and Germany under the same material conditions, but under conditions of moral alliance infinitely more formidable than the Bolshevist agreements.

The foreign policy of the Bolsheviks, the disastrous results of which are only too apparent to the eyes of the most superficial observer, appears then to have resulted from political and social contingencies, which to a certain extent were independent of their will and their theory. But it is certain, on the other hand, that the Bolshevist doctrine, by its general tendencies, could not but support and hasten the evolution of events.

In the social doctrine of the Bolsheviks, which is that of internationalist and anti-democratic socialism, peace between states is a condition essential to the functioning of society. National wars, by their necessary psychology, result perforce in the temporary suppression of social antagonisms, and effect at least on the surface "the sacred union" of all

classes. That is why the philosophy of the "class struggle" is led by its own logic to absolute pacifism for the nations, and to the apparent inconsistency of prescribing pacifism for all citizens and preaching class war to the proletariat. It is a paradoxical but a logical attitude which a mind as strictly absolute as Lenine's could not avoid adopting. His extreme pacifism, bordering on mysticism, is only one side of his fierce sectarianism as social prophet. The struggle against the bourgeoisie calls for and indeed requires international peace. For this reason Leninist Bolshevism is led to demand peace among nations at any price, under any conditions, and to justify and even idealize the brutish and bestial desire for peace which has everywhere invaded the Slav spirit, wearied by its effort in a war whose length has worn down its endurance.

But peace at any price and under any conditions, it is argued, is going to strengthen the enemy capitalist powers with whom you have to treat, and as a result you yourselves are going to be weakened. The objection does not check Leninism.

He refutes it by alleging that the principle of socialist authority is entirely different from that which governs capitalist powers; it is not territorial and material, it is moral and human. It matters little, therefore, whether you give your opponents, the enemy capitalists and imperialists of some state or other, further sources of territorial or material strength. It is not on this ground that you give them battle. The importance of territorial power, though fundamental in the former organizations based on the old theory of the state disappears en-

tirely when you place yourself on the ground of the social struggle. It makes little difference for instance whether Lithuanian is ceded or is not ceded to Germany. That which matters is the struggle of the Lithuanian proletarian against the Lithuanian capitalist. "He is no socialist," wrote Lenine in an open letter to American workmen, "who does not understand that the victory over the bourgeoisie may require losses of territory and defeats. He is no socialist who will not sacrifice his fatherland for the triumph of the social revolution."

Bolshevism provides an excuse for submitting to the most shameful humiliations the victor may impose and adorns them with a kind of idealism. It is upon these theories that Lenine was to depend to get the treaty of Brest-Litovsk accepted by the congress of soviets against the opposition of Trotzky who proposed making peace and demobilizing without ratifying the treaty . . . and Lenine won.

Thus the Bolshevist doctrine brought to the idea of solving by defeat the difficulties that the disastrous war had inflicted on the nation, a theoretical prop and a moral apology that no other political system or program could give to a people, which was already committed to every kind of moral cowardice.

The first problem of foreign policy that confronted the Bolsheviks upon their accession to power was that of concluding peace. Their first positive political manifesto was connected with this problem. On October 26 (old style) at the first sitting of the Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, even before the insurrection appeared to have brought the government entirely under its control,

Lenine read a long "proclamation to the peoples and the governments of all the belligerent countries." It began with these words:

"The workmen's and peasants' government born of the Revolution of October 24th and 25th, supported by the Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, proposes to all the belligerent peoples and their governments an immediate opening of negotiations for a just and democratic peace.

"By a just and democratic peace, which represents the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the workers and the labouring classes, exhausted and enfeebled by the war, the government understands the kind of peace that the Russian workmen and peasants after overthrowing the czarist monarchy have repeatedly and categorically demanded, an immediate peace without annexations, a peace, that is to say, without conquest of foreign territory, without forcible annexation of other nationalities, and without indemnities. . . ."

After citing the Chartist movement in England, the series of proletarian revolutions in France, and the results obtained by German organizations, the statement continues:

"All these models of proletarian heroism are for us a sure guarantee that the workers of these countries will understand the duty which binds them to free humanity from the horrors of war and its consequences, a sure guarantee that these workers by emphatic, vigorous, and continued action will aid us in bringing to a glorious conclusion the cause of peace and the cause of freedom for the labouring

masses who have been exploited under every form of slavery and by every process of exploitation."

As this proclamation naturally brought forth no reply, a new procedure was arranged. General Doukhonine was ordered to open peace parleys by proposing an immediate armistice on the whole Russian front. The domestic political conditions that pushed the People's Commissioners on to adopt this course have already been stated.

As soon as the proposals were accepted by the German High Command, the socialist aim was revealed, that of slipping through the half-open door of the armistice. First they introduced in the armistice convention an article which seemed to permit the free conducting of pacifist propaganda. Then they decided to publish in German a pacifist newspaper, the *Fakel*, intended to reach the German soldiers; finally, they made up a delegation with Zinovief as president to go into Germany and organize the pacifist movement.

Of course the German government forbade Zinovief to cross the frontier, and it burned up a carload of copies of the famous *Fakel*. It administered the same treatment to an appeal to the German soldiers, signed by Lenine and Trotzky, which read in part as follows:

"Brother soldiers, we urge you to give us your support in our fight for peace and socialism, for socialism alone will insure a durable peace to the working class and cure the wounds caused by the war.

"Brother soldiers of Germany! The great example of your leader Liebknecht, the struggle which

you are conducting through your meetings and through the press, and finally the revolt in your navy, are a guarantee to us that among your labouring masses, the struggle for peace is ripe. . . ."

Meanwhile, the military representatives of the powers of the Entente, America excepted, communicated to the generalissimo, Doukhonine, a protest against any violation of the pledges made by the Czarist government on August 23, 1914. Trotzky in reply sent to the regimental committees a virulent proclamation, concluding thus:

"Soldiers, workmen, peasants! Your soviet government will not suffer your being led anew to the slaughter house under the club of a foreign bourgeoisie. Have no fear of threats. The 'peoples' of Europe, worn out with suffering, are with us."

The first meeting of delegates to discuss the conditions of the armistice took place November 19 (old style). The Russians requested that the Germans undertake: First, not to transfer troops from the eastern to the western front; second, to evacuate Moon Sound. The German general flatly refused, declaring that such terms could be imposed only upon a conquered nation. That was the first of the deceptions practised on Russia. . . .

During this meeting, the Russian delegates, returning several times to the charge, tried to broaden the issues of the debate, stating first that they were considering "an armistice on all fronts as the means of concluding a general democratic peace on the well known bases formulated by the Pan-Russian Congress of Soviets . . ." as their aim was "to bring the governments of all the belligerent countries

to take part in the negotiations for the purpose of effecting a general peace." The Germans reminded them each time that their orders allowed them to discuss only the terms of a separate armistice.[1]

But when the peace parleys were opened in the session of December 12/25, Count Czernin, in the name of the delegation of the Quadruple Entente, read a statement, in reply to the Russian note, formally accepting all the principles of the Russian note: 1. No annexations; 2. Guarantee to restore independence to the peoples who have lost their independence in the course of the war (Siberia, Belgium, etc.); 3. No war indemnities either for expenditures or damages.[2]

The negotiations were then postponed until December 22/January 4. This time the Austro-Germans appeared with a proposed peace treaty. The Russians, however, insisted upon the adoption of the principle of withdrawing troops from the occupied territory previous to submitting any question of political rule to a vote of the people. The Russians protested likewise against the prohibition of their pacifist propaganda in Germany and the refusal to grant passports to the German socialists. They proposed to continue the negotiations at Stockholm.

The Germans flatly refused to submit to these demands. The negotiations were resumed at Brest-Litovsk, January 1/14, 1918. The German delegation delivered a written note containing in very

[1] On November 22/December 5, an armistice for ten days was signed, November 22/December 7 to December 4/December 17.

[2] This historic document furnishes crushing evidence of the systematic duplicity of a government, which, after solemnly recognizing these principles at the very beginning of the negotiations, proceeded indirectly to annex the Ukraine, Finland, Poland, and Lithuania.

confused form its final concessions. The delegation reiterated its formal opposition to any withdrawal of troops from the occupied territories. Kuhlman stated that this was a purely military question.

"The two points of view," he said, "within the limits of which discussions may be pursued are the following: A definite number of armed and disciplined troops is necessary for the maintenance of public order; an organized force is necessary to operate the existing economic enterprises of the country. Upon our side, we will make a binding promise that the presence of organized forces will have no effect upon political life. . . ."

But the German idea emerged clearly from an article which appeared in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* at this time:

"The danger which threatens the border provinces of western Europe from starved and pestilential revolutionary Russia would be great if a moat did not exist between them." These are the words of this semi-official newspaper.

The official organ of the Leipzig socialists wrote at the same time:

"The Bolsheviks would do better to conduct themselves more coolly and more reasonably in the matter of peace, instead of speculating about world revolution and preparing the way for it. The peoples want peace, not words. Nobody in Germany wants any part of Trotzky's 'Red Guard.'"

The separate agreement with the Ukraine permitted Germany to exhibit her brutality towards the Bolsheviks. The conciliatory tone of the early meetings underwent a change. During the last week

of the negotiations, the Germans showed unconcealed impatience and rancour. To all the speeches of the Russian delegates they kept on replying: We don't want to discuss any more with you. If you want to sign the peace, sign it. If you don't want to, say so frankly. We don't want to talk any more about principles, but about practical questions. . . .

Then in the session of January 28/February 10, Trotzky read the following statement:

"In the name of the Council of People's Commissioners, the government of the Russian Federal Republic, by these presents, serves notice upon the peoples of the belligerent, allied, and neutral countries, that Russia, refusing to sign an annexationist treaty, declares the state of war with Germany, Austria, Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, as far as Russia is concerned, at an end.

"An order for complete demobilization on all lines of the front is being issued simultaneously to the Russian troops."

And Russia demobilized! . . .

But while negotiations were being carried on and broken off at Brest-Litovsk, a commission at Petrograd was studying a proposed peace treaty.

A Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates was called, and after a warm fight against the elements that supported Trotzky and his policy of "revolutionary phrases," Lenine got the upper hand, and brought about the ratification of the treaty which sealed the diplomatic defeat of the military defeat. Russia agreed to all the German conditions as to the occupied territories. True, for the sake of mollifying the opposition of the intellectuals,

Lenine maintained before the Congress the thesis of a "respite" which would allow the Revolution time to organize itself for a renewed struggle against German imperialism. In reality, Lenine was simply giving way to the necessity of making peace abroad so that he could keep his hands free at home.

Thus was proven once again how the Bolsheviks, after trying to reconcile their theoretical program with the material aspirations of the people who wanted "peace without phrases," were obliged once more to give in. And this position they succeed in maintaining in spite of the opposition of those who demanded resistance to the repeated encroachments of German imperialism. In a speech containing his platform which he delivered before the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies on May 15, 1918, Lenine defended his foreign policy which he summed up in the following formula:

"At this moment, the Revolution is passing through times which are difficult, and often indeed painful. But we ought to know what is expected of us. People expect us to know how to control ourselves, to manœuvre, to act cautiously, to retreat. . . ."

While the Bolsheviks were negotiating the political peace, they were obliged to enter into negotiations with the Germans for the settlement of future economic relations. Between the first and second sessions at Brest-Litovsk, the Austro-Germans, in their first proposed treaty, had included a number of articles (4, 5, and 7) intended to regulate the eco-

nomic situation for the future: The contracting parties were to agree not to have recourse to measures of economic reprisal; they were to establish a customs system, called transitional, to insure exchange of goods within the shortest possible period of time; they were to sign a new trade and maritime treaty; finally, they were to grant to each other for at least twenty years the rights of "the most favoured nation."

The Russian counter-proposal met this thesis with the principle of international economic liberty and equality. "Each of the contracting parties," it stated, "shall not in any case accord less favourable treatment in all matters of a judicial or economic nature to litigants, ships, or goods of the other contracting party than it accords to the litigants, ships, or goods of any state not enjoying in this respect any stipulated right under the terms of the treaty." But this protest remained a dead letter.

On December 14/27, there arrived in Petrograd a German delegation, which, at least as far as may be gathered from the intentionally ambiguous official communiques, had two heads. It was headed by Count Kaiserling as naval commissioner, and Count Mirbach as economic commissioner. It set to work on December 18/31. The two commissions started operations, and one of them prepared a trade treaty.

Count Mirbach made the Machiavellian statement that despite all the desire that the Central Powers had to re-establish commercial relations, it appeared difficult in view of the internal situation. Germany felt, above all, that production had diminished greatly in Russia, that Russian securities were no longer

worth anything, that it was absolutely necessary to put an end to anarchy. . . . Thus was the ground prepared for special and opportunist agreements.

These agreements remained secret. But, it should be added, political circumstances hardly allowed the realization of the hopes that were entertained for them. On May 9 the ambassador, this same Mirbach, contented himself with a request that postal and telegraphic relations be resumed.

Towards the Allies, the attitude of the Bolsheviks from the very first day was frankly hostile.

But this hostility was not revealed in the routine of foreign affairs. On October 26, Trotzky called upon the British ambassador, who refused to receive him. A few days later he was received in the capacity of a private citizen by M. Noulens, the French ambassador.

But it was evident that the Bolshevist policy, aiming at immediate peace at any price under the cloak of the formula "without annexations and without indemnities" was flatly opposed to the policy of the Allies. Conflict lay in the very nature of the situation. The non-recognition of the Bolsheviks and the Bolshevist opposition to the Allies were conditioned and prescribed by the very functioning of international politics. From the moment the Bolsheviks seized the power, the opposition between the two currents was absolute and irremediable. The Alliance was broken in fact; the Entente and Russia were divided.

But by a singular coincidence, both the Entente and Russia wanted to preserve all the outward forms

of the former bond; the Bolshevist government, because this allowed it more easily to influence the peoples of the Entente, to appeal to their public opinion, and to conduct their pacifist propaganda; the Allies, because they hoped that the Bolshevist government would not continue in authority, and because they wanted to keep in touch with the opposition parties and the forces that might later regain control.

But the time of waiting stretched out. The riot changed into rule. The Bolsheviks lasted; they showed no signs of dying. They treated with Germany. They consolidated their power. Allied diplomacy had to adapt itself to this unforeseen situation.

It then adopted an attitude which from a legal point of view was peculiar. The Allied governments regarded the Bolshevist government as not real, as not existing. They adopted the theory of its non-existence. And they acted as if it did not exist. But then there was no other government. So they proceeded to consider Russia as a land without a head, as a territory internationally colonized. They addressed the people as a Bongainville would address the South Sea Island tribes; they dealt with the people direct. They landed expeditionary forces. They waged war. But they did not consider themselves in a state of war. Never was an international situation between civilized nations more singular or more false. Russia to the Entente was neither an ally, nor an enemy, nor yet a neutral. . . .

This position of the Allies explains the peculiarities of the relations between the Allies and the

Bolsheviks and the issues that began arising between them from the very first.

The occasion for the breaking forth of the first conflict was Rumania.

The opening of negotiations for peace between Russia and the Central Powers, and the intervention of the Ukraine, which as everybody knew was working in agreement with the Central Powers, placed Rumania in what appeared to be an impossible diplomatic and military position. A bitter fight then broke out between the Rumanian military authorities and the revolutionary authorities of the Russian army and the local soviets.

The Bolsheviks sent an arrogant protest to the Rumanian legation at Petrograd "against the criminal elements among the Rumanian officers and in the Rumanian bureaucracy who have dared raise their hands against the Russian Revolution." The message concluded with an unconcealed threat:

"We deem it necessary to bring to the attention of all the Rumanian authorities, through your legation, the fact that the Soviet Government will not hesitate to employ the severest measures against the Rumanian counter-revolutionary conspirators, accomplices of Kaledine, Tcherbatchev and the Rada, no matter what positions these conspirators may occupy in the Rumanian hierarchy."

It was reported at this same time that Rumania showed signs of intending to make peace with Germany, who offered her advantageous terms in the form of the possession of Bessarabia. The Rumanians vigorously denied the rumour in the Odessa newspapers, but continued their negotiations.

As the Rumanian government continued its action against the Russians of Bessarabia, the Council of Commissioners took an unprecedented step; it had M. Diamandy, the Rumanian representative at Petrograd, arrested and locked up in the fortress Peter and Paul. Upon the vigorous protest of the French ambassador he was released after twenty-four hours of imprisonment.

But on January 13/26, the Russian government declared war upon Rumania. This rupture served Rumania's scheme admirably, by disguising her occupation of Bessarabia under the cloak of the laws of war. Following these incidents, Rumania actually occupied that country without difficulty, and on May 7, 1918, signed the Peace of Bucharest with the Central Empires.

The conflicts with the other Allies never took on so clean cut a character, because the legal relationship of these governments to the Bolshevist government was never defined. From the very first day they refused to recognize the Bolshevist government, but entered into unofficial relations with it. The United States went furthest in this direction.

The Bolsheviks on their side made attempt after attempt to establish official relations with the Allies. After making personal overtures to the British and French ambassadors, Trotzky on November 10th, at the same time that the generalissimo was ordered to open negotiations for an armistice, delivered a diplomatic note to the representatives of the Allies. The note implied a request for the recognition of the Bolshevist government. The copy addressed to the French ambassador was worded as follows:

"I have the honour to inform you, Mr. Ambassador, that the Pan-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies constituted on October 26th a new government of the Russian Republic, in the form of a Council of People's Commissioners. The president of this government is Vladimir Ilitch Lenine. The direction of foreign policy has been entrusted to me as People's Commissioner of Foreign Affairs.

"In calling your attention to the text, as approved by the Pan-Russian Congress of Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, of the proposal for an armistice and a democratic peace without annexations or indemnities, based on the right of peoples to dispose of themselves, I have the honour of begging you to consider the said document as a formal proposal for an immediate opening of peace negotiations—a proposal which the authorized government of the Russian Republic is addressing simultaneously to all the belligerent peoples and to their governments.

"Accept the assurance, Mr. Ambassador, of the profound esteem of the soviet government for the French people, which, like all the other peoples exhausted and enfeebled by this unprecedented slaughter, cannot but aspire for peace.

"People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs:

"TROTZKY."

The Allied governments did not reply officially to this note, but through their military attachés delivered a combined protest to the Russian generalissimo on November 10/23:

"Mohilev, November 10/23, 1917.

"To his Excellency, General Doukhonine, Generalissimo of the Russian Armies.

"Your Excellency: The undersigned, heads of missions duly accredited to the Russian Great General Headquarters, acting upon definite instructions received from their governments, through their official representatives at Petrograd, have the honour of addressing to the Russian Supreme Command their vigorous protest against the violations of the conditions of the treaty concluded on August 25th/September 5, 1914, among the Powers of the Entente, by which treaty the Allies, and among them Russia, agreed not to conclude a separate peace, nor to suspend hostilities, one without the other. The undersigned, heads of military missions, consider it likewise their duty to inform your Excellency that any violation of the treaty by Russia would entail the most serious consequences. The undersigned, heads of military missions, beg your Excellency to please acknowledge receipt of this communication in writing, and to accept the assurance of their high regard.

"*Signed:* Barter, Lieutenant General, head of the British military mission; Coanda, General, head of the Rumanian military mission; Romoi, General, head of the Italian military mission; Takgnak, head of the Japanese military mission; Lavergne, Brigadier-General, head of the French military mission; Loutzkievitch, Colonel, head of the Serbian military mission."

The military attaché of the United States, who

did not sign this note, delivered a similar protest to the head of the General Staff on November 12/25.

On November 18/December 1, the Russian press published an unofficial note, which began as follows:

"Certain Russians have been surprised by the silence of the Allied diplomatic representatives up to this time accredited to the Russian government, on the question of the violation by the Bolsheviks of the agreements concluded among the Entente Powers, and notably by their silence on the occasion of the opening of peace negotiations with the enemy. . . ."

After recalling the events, the note concluded:

"While at Petrograd the People's Commissioners are acting as dictators, in France, in England, in Italy, and in the United States, everywhere where organized democracy has arisen, for the defence of the appressed and spoliated weak against German imperialism and barbarism, the legal representatives of these nations, with full knowledge of the facts, will shortly give voice to their sovereign decisions."

Trotzky, however, persisted and under the date of November 23/December 6, he sent another note to the Allied ambassadors, in which, after reporting the occurrences of the first armistice meeting, he added:

". . . Considering the refusal by our delegation to sign a formal armistice on the conditions proposed, we have again extended for one week the period of suspension of military hostilities and have likewise postponed the peace negotiations for one week."

"Thus between the first enactment on peace by

authority of the Councils on October 26, and the resumption of the peace negotiations, November 29th (old style), the interval amounts to more than one month. This interval, even under the present disorganized condition of means of international communication, affords ample time to the Allied governments to enable them to set forth their attitude towards the negotiations, *i.e.*, to say whether they accept or decline taking part in the negotiations for an armistice or a peace, and in case of refusal, to state clearly and definitely before all humanity, in the name of what objects the peoples of Europe should shed their blood during four years of war."

Maintaining the attitude of "non-recognition," the English ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, on November 25 made a statement to the newspaper correspondents, whom he received for the purpose. This statement is very important, as indicating clearly the diplomatic position that the Allies were taking towards the Bolsheviks. It began thus:

"Judging by recent events, secret diplomacy will soon be a thing of the past; that is why diplomats are having recourse to the press more frequently than formerly, as a means of communicating with the nation."

Then he entered into a discussion of the acts of the Council of Commissioners. He made these observations:

"Although the Allies cannot send their representatives to take part in the negotiations concerning a cessation of hostilities at the front, they are ready, as soon as a stable authority recognized by the whole Russian people is established in Russia, to examine

in conjunction with this new government the aims of the war and the possible terms of a just and lasting peace."

Then he rose up in indignation against the unfriendly attitude adopted by Russian Bolshevist circles:

"In his appeal to the Mussulmans of the East, Mr. Lenine calls us 'greedy vultures' and 'thieves' and urges our subjects in India to revolt. He places us even lower than the Turks to whom he is ready to deliver Armenia, forgetting the terrible Armenian massacres conducted by the Turks. It is inconceivable that a man pretending to control Russian policy should talk in this way of a friendly allied power. . . ."

He concluded with this plea to the Russian democracy:

"In conclusion I take the liberty of addressing a word of caution to the Russian democracy. I know that the leaders are animated by the sincere desire of creating a brotherhood of the proletariats of the whole world for the sake of securing general peace. I deeply appreciate their aims, but I ask them to think about the following question: 'Are their present methods finding a sympathetic echo among the democratic peoples of the allied countries in general and of my country in particular?'

"They are giving the impression, doubtless inadvertently, that the Russians attach more importance to the German proletariat than to the English proletariat. Their attitude towards us is such as to repel rather than induce the sympathy of the English working class. . . ."

Thus, despite the refusal to establish official relations, the two authorities (Allies and Bolsheviks) kept informed, each about the other, and brought their dispute before the tribunal of public opinion, at times even adopting the tone of the stump speech.

The socialist parties in turn plunged into the lists. The French Socialist Party made an appeal to the Russian socialists against a separate peace, to which Trotzky replied by a long note of justification, the gist of which is summed up in this sentence:

"The duty of revolutionary socialism as we understood it was to wrest the proletariat from the influence of nationalist ideas and turn its revolutionary energy towards the struggle against war, imperialism, and the capitalist order. . . ."

The Serbian socialists likewise published in their newspaper, the *Future*, an impassioned appeal to the Russian socialists, urging them "to insist upon the complete enforcement of the right of peoples to dispose of themselves, as proclaimed by the Revolution."

On December 15/28, the Allied representatives in a memorandum delivered to the press, discussed for the benefit of Russian public opinion the questions arising out of the treaty proposed by the Central Empires at Brest-Litovsk, and endorsed some of the clauses of the Russian counter-proposal. "The Russian counter-proposal," they wrote, "denounces this inconsistency in general terms, but in terms so unequivocal that we may make its formula our own: 'Historical precedent does not legalize in any case violence committed upon one people by another.'" The note went on to say: "But the principles

should not be merely stated. Will the Russian plenipotentiaries insist upon their enforcement?"

The position of the Allies thus continued unchanged. They did not recognize the Bolshevist government, and the relations which were established in practice were merely de facto relations for routine matters such as the visé of passports and the dispatch of diplomatic couriers.

In London, the British government informed the Bolshevist representative, Litvinov, that they refused to recognize him because the Council of People's Commissioners was not recognized in England, but that they wished to maintain official relations with Mr. Litvinov through an official in the Foreign Office especially appointed for the purpose.

But the march of events was soon to break off even these *de facto* relations.

As the German threat against Petrograd, in spite of the peace parleys, became more serious, the Allied ambassadors requested a special train for the purpose of leaving Russia. This was granted them. On February 27, it was learned from an apparently reliable source that the Germans had advanced in the direction of Jamburg, and that two trains loaded with artillery material had been derailed between that station and Gatchina. The embassies decided to go, and their special train left Petrograd at four o'clock the same day.

After a stop of four days at Helsingfors, the diplomatic train which on the way had taken on a great many allied nationals fleeing from Russia, tried to cross the line of battle in the northern part of Finland where "White" Finns and "Red" Finns were

engaged. After several days of fruitless negotiating and stops at Toijalo and Tammerfors—the English mission was the only one that succeeded in breaking through the lines—the diplomatic train backed up, returned to Russia, and started for Vologda[3] where the Belgian legation, which had been delayed in Finland, arrived in its turn in the early part of April. For a long while the diplomatic corps lived in its train. Finally it obtained quarters in Vologda while waiting to go to Archangel and get settled.

Meanwhile, relations with the Council of People's Commissioners had not been entirely broken off upon the departure of the ambassadors. The Allied consuls at Moscow had entered into unofficial but regular relations with the Commissioners.

Then came the official intervention of the Allies with the landing of expeditionary forces at Murmansk and Vladivostok. The landing at Murmansk did not give rise to any violent protest. It was done by agreement with the local soviet, which officially received the English admiral accompanied by representatives of France and the United States. The official object of the intervention indeed was only the defence of the railway and the port against the projected attacks of the Finns supported by the Germans.

On the other hand, the news of a Japanese intervention at Vladivostok aroused the violent opposi-

[3] Here a rather significant incident took place. The French ambassador through the Danish minister who had charge of French interests made a request upon Finland for a special train. Yoffe, as Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, granted the request, but "expresses his astonishment that the French ambassador and the representatives of the other *Allied* nations deemed it necessary to act through a neutral government as intermediary in entering into relations with the Russian government. . . ."

tion of public opinion in every party. The *Nach Viek*, the former *Riech*, the organ of the liberal bourgeois, stated categorically: "We want no foreign dictation in the East, either Japanese or German. . . ." As to the Bolsheviks, they immediately adopted a tone of utter violence. "The landing of the Japanese," cried Volodarski, "is a defiance of Soviet Russia by the Allies. If the Allied imperialists intend to mix in our affairs, we shall accept the challenge in spite of our temporary weakness. . . ."

The Bolshevist government, following its usual method, took advantage of an incident to give a violent diplomatic form to its alarm. On April 22, the French ambassador gave an interview to several Vologda newspaper correspondents, in the course of which he made an indirect allusion to the possibility of Allied intervention. "The Allies," he said, "cannot regard with indifference the German encroachments in Russia and Siberia. To guard against this menace, they might be led to intervene without interfering in the domestic affairs of Russia and with no concealed purpose of annexing territory. The intervention, if it should take place, will be of an inter-allied nature, and absolutely friendly. . . ."

This cautious allusion put the match to the powder. The *Pravda* of July 25th published an abusive article entitled "The Allied Pupils and the German Master," which read in part as follows:

"Mossieu Noulens (the text is French) is officially entitled the ambassador of the French Republic. It is nevertheless not known to what government he is accredited. He is not ambassador to the Soviet

government, the only one which exists in Russia, for the French government up to the present time has not recognized the Soviet Republic. He is ambassador to some government or other to come, which will be more acceptable to the delicate taste of the French bourgeois. The Allied diplomats pretend not to interfere in the domestic affairs of Russia. But at Vologda they are only waiting for the favourable moment to overthrow the authority of the Soviets."

On April 28, Tchitcherine in the name of the Council of People's Commissioners sent a note to the French government, demanding the recall of M. Noulens:

"The statement made by M. Noulens during the tragic hours through which Russia is passing, cannot but injure the good relations existing between the French and the Russian peoples. The presence of a representative of the French government whose actions have been calculated to aggravate Franco-Russian relations cannot be tolerated on the territory of the Russian Republic. The government of the Soviet Republic expresses its confidence that M. Noulens will be recalled immediately by the government of the French Republic."

As the French government did not, of course, comply with this summons, the Soviet government decided to treat M. Noulens thenceforth merely as a private citizen on Russian territory, and it consequently forbade him the use of the telegraph for his messages in cipher. This prohibition, it should be added, was revoked two days later upon the intervention of the French consul at Moscow.

At this same time, Tchitcherine addressed to the Allied governments and to the Japanese government in particular threatening notes concerning the alleged complicity of the Allied representatives in the Siberian affair, which was fomented by the counter-revolutionary organization known as the "Government of Siberia."

The story of diplomatic relations with the Bolshevist government we must discontinue at this date —the early part of May, 1918. With the landing of large expeditionary forces at Vladivostok, Murmansk and Archangel, the relations between Russia, the Allies, and the Bolshevist government enter upon a new phase not yet within the province of history.

Comparing the tone assumed and the procedure employed by the Bolsheviks towards the Allies on the one hand and towards Germany on the other recalling all the advantages, not merely territorial —for these could be justified by the right of conquest—but moral and economic, which the Bolshevist government granted to Germany or allowed Germany to take, one has the right to ask the question: "Are the Bolsheviks merely traitors in the pay of Germany?"

And when a Frenchman asks himself that question, remembering the anguish of his heart upon the news of Russia's defection, when he recalls the tragic hours through which his country had to live in the spring of 1918 when Germany was pressing upon the French front with the weight of all her accumulated forces, threatening Paris more than she had been able to threaten it since September, 1914, when he

recalls this past which is still so near, it is very difficult for him to consider the question coolly and objectively. Nevertheless, let us make the attempt.

It is known that to the moral testimony furnished by the Allied departments of record, written documents have been added which are said to establish by evidence the fact of criminal collusion between Lenine and Trotzky, and the German representatives.

These documents, we are told, bear various dates covering the autumn of 1917 and the winter of 1917-1918.

In a note dated November 1, 1917, Germany asked the Bolshevist leaders for a report on the quantity of munitions in Russia. In December the German intelligence service communicated to Trotzky the names of the spies charged by it with the surveillance of the Allied ambassadors. A little later Trotzky received instructions enjoining him to detain the Italian ambassador at the moment of his departure and to have his baggage searched. Other orders urged the Bolsheviks to prepare an attack against the Allied representatives in Siberia. Finally, on December 28, 1917, the "Reichbank" communicated to the Bolshevist government the resolutions passed at a conference of the German commercial bankers held to discuss the Russian question.

We shall admit, until there is proof to the contrary, the absolute authenticity of these documents, photographs of which have been furnished by the American Committee on Public Information. Moreover, aside from these material proofs we already possessed a sufficient abundance of moral evidence

to convict the individual traitors who, beyond question, were numerous among the Bolsheviks.

But it would seem that the question of the treason of the Bolsheviks, considered not as individuals but as a party, should be examined by the historian from another point of view. The business of politics is not to make moral judgments upon individuals. It should not ask whether Lenine and Trotzky, according to the laws of individual morality, are dishonest and criminal individuals. It should ask only two questions:

1. Could the Bolshevist leaders be bribed to perform a task opposed to their political convictions?
2. Were the Bolshevist leaders bribed to drag Russia into a path which without them she would not have entered?

The first question has only a retrospective interest. If the answer is yes, we can only regret that the Allies could not pay a higher price than their enemies for these consciences that were for sale. But can our government be fairly blamed for this? There is no evidence that they should be. The Bolsheviks were subsidized but . . . to pursue a policy which was their own, the policy which they had constantly proclaimed since their party was first formed.

The second question is one which is of interest to-day. If the Bolsheviks deflected Russia from the policy that she would normally have followed, if it had not been for them, all that was necessary to make Russia follow the right road again and take her place

once more on the battlefield alongside her allies was to overthrow these usurpers.

Unfortunately all the evidence of the history of the Bolshevist period in Russia when studied impartially and objectively furnishes proof that Bolshevism was in perfect harmony with the historical conditions of the time of the Russian Revolution. Bolshevism was not merely a system imported by a few individuals and imposed by a few bayonets. It has causes which lie deeper, in the social psychology of the Russian people, and reasons much more remote in the facts of Russian history. Neither the interested statements of the *émigrés* of the reactionary parties who took refuge in the Allied countries, nor the assertions of a man like Kerensky at the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference at London—assertions which we want to believe are sincere—can make us believe the contrary.

PART II

THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF BOLSHEVISM

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CHAPTER I

EXTERNAL LIFE

The Outward Appearance of Petrograd: Its Streets and Theatres—Petrograd During the Bolshevist Coup d'Etat—The Cost of Living—Russian Psychology: The Wealthy Class, the Workers, the Little Bourgeoisie—The Bolshevist Order: The Reign of the "Krestianin."

THE stranger who arrived in Petrograd during April, 1918, with the anxiety which an honest man naturally feels upon entering a den of cut-throats was destined to undergo a certain disillusionment. Contrary to his expectations, the City of Peter the Great preserved its normal outward aspect, commonplace, and very bourgeois with very little sign of melodramatic revolution.

The broad avenues, the "Nevsky," the "Lityeiny," the "Morskaia," and the "Sadovaia," with their winter snow cleared away, were perfectly clean. All the shops were open, with their luxurious show cases making their usual costly display to the gaze of loiterers in the streets.

The crowd was circulating peacefully on the broad sidewalks of the Nevsky, and beneath the arcades of the "gastinidvor" at the corner of the Sadovaia, several dubious looking women were still using their arts to attract the passer-by.

The trolley cars were running at short intervals and filled with passengers. Here was a row of "isvostchiki" (hackmen) at the stand which runs the length of the sidewalk in front of the Credit Lyonnais, there a long queue of very peaceful folk before the door of a shop dozing and awaiting their turn sometimes for hours to buy a few cigarettes. Everywhere, in the large thoroughfares as far as the rectangular vistas of the city with their palaces of chipped plaster, there was much movement but no crowding. Order on the public highway was apparently being maintained as usual in spite of the evident complete absence of police.

Doubtless if our green tourist had gone walking late at night in some side street, he would have run the risk of being amiably constrained to shed his overcoat or even all his clothes—a suit of clothes at that time represented a small fortune of anywhere from a thousand to fifteen hundred rubles. But on the whole, there certainly were fewer robberies and burglaries each night in Bolshevist Petrograd than in Paris before the war.

On going into the "Hotel de l'Europe," our stranger would have found there filling the parlours and the bar on the ground floor the same motley crowd that frequents these large international palaces. He could scarcely remark as a feature of local colour, their grave and rather taciturn abandon, or their informal and unceremonious simplicity of conduct, for these always distinguish Russian social life.

The telephones were being operated certainly as well as at Paris, though not as well as at Moscow.

The theatres and the "movies" were filled with crowds, which looked thoughtless and which certainly were eager for enjoyment. And if our tourist wanted to pass his evening gambling, he would have had no difficulty satisfying his fancy; a large choice of clubs or gaming houses was open to him.

Our stranger in search of thrills, would doubtless have been surprised to learn that the external appearance of the life of Petrograd, so commonplace on the whole, had never undergone any change since the Bolsheviks had seized control of the government. Even on October 25th, while Lenine was making his coup d'état, crowds filled the theatres. At the Alexander Theatre "Flavia Tersini" was being played, at the Michel Theatre, "The Glass of Water," and the musical drama "Engene Onéguine." The Narodny Dom was packed with people who crowded to hear Chaliapine in "Don Carols"; and in the *petite salle* Gogols' "Inspector General" was being presented. The Nevsky Farce was offering its audience "The Vine Leaf," and the Lityeini Theatre was playing "Everlasting Love." Even

the Ciniselli Circus was showing its bill of clowns and female equestrians.

The telephones were operated as usual all that night and the following nights. The residents who went to sleep with vague anxiety about the morrow, awoke in a city that was very calm. Only little posters here and there on the walls pointed out where the public was to telephone for the armed force in case of disorder or pillage, and these little white spots were the only evidence of the seizure of authority by the new government. Moreover, there was no disturbance and no pillaging of any sort. Pickets of soldiers and workmen, mostly young men, with their rifles slung over their shoulders, maintained public order, warming themselves around wood fires in the squares. Passers-by perhaps were not so numerous as ordinarily, but movement was not restricted.

At certain points—the Marie Palace, the Winter Palace, the Morskaia, in front of the central telephone office—a few rifle shots were fired and a few volleys of machine gun bullets. There was a show of resistance, but nowhere was there any real fight. At the sitting of the Petrograd soviet held on the evening of October 25th (old style) Trotzky, announcing the *coup d'état*, was able to state: "Up to the present, no blood has been shed. I do not know of a single victim."

Such was the first day of the Bolshevist Terror. And no day since then has there been any greater disorder. In April, after six months of the same régime, Petrograd looked more deserted and more melancholy, and clusters of ragged soldiers were no

longer to be seen hanging on the trolley car steps (everybody now paid for his seat); but the general appearance of the city remained the same, peaceful, indifferent, commonplace.

But if our traveller had pushed his examination further, beyond this first general impression, he would not have failed to be struck by numerous picturesque and disturbing details.

On the Nevsky, the man wrapped in a large overcoat with red lining and selling the evening papers is a general; farther on a young woman of the best society is doing the same thing with timid voice. This lad with his basket at the edge of the sidewalk sells the public very bad chocolate at seventeen rubles per hundred grams. The "isvostchik" (hackman) asks you fifteen rubles for a ten minute drive. The very slender meal served at the "Hotel de l'Europe" costs forty rubles.

The price of a luncheon for two—an omelette, a piece of meat, a bottle of kvass, and a cup of coffee —at the "Medvied" restaurant on April 15 was seventy rubles. Board and lodging in a very modest boarding house from April 7th to April 25th cost two hundred sixty-eight rubles.

It is true that at the same date life was easier in the provincial towns. At Vologda for instance butter was worth 7 rubles 50 per pound, and eggs 0.40 a piece. At Scheliabinsk, ten eggs cost 1r.50, butter was 2r.20 per pound, bread 0.23 per pound; flour 15 to 18 rubles per *poud* (about 35 pounds), and charcoal 14 rubles per *poud*. Fish was very plentiful, and meal scarcer.

But let us leave our tourist in the audience seeing

only the stage and not knowing what is going on behind the scenes. Let us one of these evenings during this same month of April step into the drawing room of the "English Quay" where the players are seated around the bridge tables. It is midnight. People get up and pass into the next room where supper is being served. The menu consists of consommé, fish salad with mayonnaise dressing, fried chops with truffles, vegetables with truffle sauce, pastry, candy, fruit, preserves, red and white Bordeaux, and Burgundy. The table is set for sixteen guests.

And the banks, by order of the Bolshevist government, do not allow their customers to draw more than 150 rubles per week on active accounts. Yesterday Lenine and his friends decided to repudiate the loans and destroy the certificates. This very morning two of the ladies who were guests at this supper were obliged to shovel snow off the quay under the supervision of two "Red Guards," drunken petty officials from the suburbs. Nitchevo! Between two bridge parties or two jokes, they give the Bolshevist régime one month more to live—afterwards it will be a return pure and simple to the good old former régime.

And yet, it may be asked, may not this be an attitude of elegant bravado in the face of fate, prompted by a certain kind of nobility of feeling. No, it is nothing but the mechanical action of a life which will keep going until the last hundred ruble bill is spent, or until the butts of the rifles of the "Red Guard" reverberate in the ante-chamber to-morrow . . . perhaps right now. The heedlessness displayed by

these people does not rise above the event; it submits to it with fatalism and tranquillity.

Let us leave this drawing room and go to the other side of the city into this print shop where the workmen have just arrived. They are supposed to work eight hours. In reality each one works as long as he likes, for the Syndicate has reduced the norm of labour to such a point that the workman, if he is clever, can finish his job in three hours and then leave the shop under the authority of Syndical regulations. Thus it is with these workmen who arrive at half past nine or ten o'clock and leave the shop regularly before noon.

If they prefer not to quit work after they have finished composing the 150 lines of the "norm," which by cheating they easily reduce to half that amount, they are paid double for all over-time work. In the same way, they get double pay for any "waiting" time. If a workman, for instance, not receiving copy promptly from the hands of the page setter who distributes it, remains idle for an hour, he adds to his day's account the sum of 6 rubles 74, representing wages for two hours' work at the rate of 650 rubles for twenty-four eight-hour days.

Thus each of these workmen receives a cash wage of about 10,000 rubles per month. But for most of them this is merely a secondary source of income. One carries on a secret sale of flour, a large stock of which he has been able to keep hidden; another resells clothes and equipment stolen by soldiers; still another, in consideration of a commission of twenty per cent., takes care to get the necessary authorizations from "Smolny" (general headquarters of

the Bolshevist administration) for drawing money from the banks.

All these people trade, speculate, steal, and think only of "making money" quickly without working; they live without any thought of the morrow, their sole preoccupation to ruin the boss as quickly as possible.

When that result is arrived at and the boss closes the shop nearly all these workers will return to the village and quickly become peasants again, living the life of the Russian "moujik" which is so elemental, so stagnant, and so free of wants as to be almost animal-like. The remainder will enlist in the red army. The new masters, it will be seen, just as heedless of the future, as eager for profit without labour, as unconscious of any notion of duty, have a mentality not very different from that of our bridge-players of the "English Quay."

Finally to complete this summary sketch of Bolshevist Petrograd, here, between the masters of yesterday and those of to-day is the middle class of small tradesmen, office clerks, officials, officers, teachers, and all the humbler parasites of the old régime who are more numerous in Russia than anywhere else.

At first these boycotted Bolshevism with a fine show of disregard which brought them a few days of extra and unexpected vacation. But that could not last very long, and most of them, following the example of the bank employés who were the first to surrender, prudently returned to their jobs after a few days. There was not one of them, even in the Academy of Sciences, who did not make a public re-

traction of his crime to Lounatcharski, Commissioner of Education, by accepting a job working out the details of a plan for the economic reorganization of Russia under the control and direction of the Bolshevist government.

Many officials, officers and teachers, however, were not able to get back their former positions, and the poverty into which they fell was frightful, unrelieved and final. Resigned and humble before the masters of the hour, they literally died of starvation.

But it must not be forgotten that this class, which has suffered so terribly from the present régime, is very much less numerous than in our western countries, that, because of its weakness, it can itself do nothing to react against its fate, and that, since compassion for the misfortune of others is a sentiment unknown to the Russian people, it can count on no help from the other classes. It resigned itself therefore to the hope of a German intervention, which would re-establish the ancient order, a hope kept alive from day to day by childish gossip. Every Sunday the occupation of Petrograd by the Germans was announced for Thursday, and on Thursday the emancipation was expected to take place the following Sunday.

And yet for better or for worse, with its creaking and groaning of confusion and poverty, the life of the metropolis kept on going.

Three days in the week the electric lighting was shut off in private dwellings from midnight until six o'clock in the morning. Food was scarce, and in front of the shops the queues grew longer and longer. Butter and eggs were not to be had except at ex-

orbitant prices. Meat cost from fifteen to twenty rubles per pound of four hundred grams. Sometimes there was no bread at all for two or three successive days, and the normal daily ration was only one-eighth of a pound. Still people managed to live. Many of them were still holding on to a small reserve supply of flour and dried vegetables.

The factories almost quit working, as the output of labour was reduced to nothing and raw materials were not to be had; but they did not shut down. The railroads continued to operate seemingly pretty close to schedule. Passenger trains started on time and the Sleeping-car Company guaranteed its services on the Moscow, Archangel and Trans-Siberian lines. But in the freight depots the congestion and confusion were beyond words. Porters asked twenty rubles for carrying two suit-cases from your cab to your train.

Social life was nowhere normal, but nowhere did it come to a complete halt. Economic life continued, relaxed and languishing. It seemed as if each one had agreed to make just sufficient effort to prevent the whole from coming to a complete stand-still.

Petrograd in April, after six months of Bolshevist rule, was not a revolutionary furnace, not the sort of bloody inferno hell pictured by the nice gentle bourgeois. It was merely a city slowly dying of desertion and indolence, and its death pangs were so long drawn out as to give the impression that they would never end.

And at that moment Petrograd might be regarded as the symbol of all Russia: an agony which perpetuated itself as by a miracle which a westerner with

his love of order and regularity cannot understand, but which to the soul of the Slav is perfectly comprehensible. Russia might say with Lenine: "I am a corpse, but there is no one to bury me."

The picture we have drawn of the external life of Petrograd under the Bolshevist régime may stand for the picture of any Russian city during the same period — Moscow, Kharkof, Tiflis, Irkurtsk, or Samara. Wherever the Bolsheviks became the masters external order was preserved.

But the question arises whether this was the expression of something real and profound in the social life of Russia or a mere outward show. How clever the Russians have always been in concealing from foreigners the peculiar characteristics of their civilization and their politics is well known. Does not this instinctive duplicity of the Slavs impel the Bolsheviks to conceal under this calm and commonplace aspect of their capitals, the profound disorder of the country's social life? This is what we shall attempt to determine by an analysis of the facts.

The Bolsheviks seized the power at Petrograd during the three days, October 24-26, 1917 (old style); their first proclamation to the inhabitants, dated October 24, was worded as follows:

"The Revolutionary Military Committee declares that it will tolerate no violation of the revolutionary law.

"Theft, plundering, assault, and attempted pogroms, will be punished summarily. Fomentors of

disorder will be brought to trial before the revolutionary military court, and will be shown no mercy.

"Workmen, soldiers, sailors! Keep a vigilant watch upon the 'black forces' which are trying to corrupt the Petrograd garrison and the Proletariat."

It became immediately evident that these were not vain threats. Thieves who were caught in the act of stealing were shot on the spot, and this summary justice proved very effective. The people began to feel forthwith that a vigorous authority existed determined to enforce respect for the material order.

Moreover, the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks was not, as it is often represented, the unexpected result of a spontaneous popular uprising. The Bolsheviks were not the offspring of a riot. They seized the power in the name of an organized party which was at the head of a definite governmental program. Their coup d'état was preceded by no disorder. It had been announced in Petrograd and Moscow several days before that at the meeting of the Second Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies the Bolsheviks were going to attempt to overthrow the Provisional Government. The fate of this attempt would depend entirely upon the attitude that the garrison might take. As the garrison joined the movement immediately and unconditionally, the new authority was able to set itself up without violence and without popular agitation. Lenine merely took Kerensky's place.

Furthermore in the appeal issued by the Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies on October 26th the whole governmental program was already definitely formulated as follows:

"The Councils with the authority vested in them will propose an immediate democratic peace to all the peoples and an immediate armistice on all fronts. The new governmental authority will effect the transfer of the lands of large estates, appanages, and monasteries to the Peasant Committees without charge; it will protect the rights of the soldier by undertaking the complete democratization of the army; it will establish control by the workers over production; guarantee the convocation of the Constituent Assembly within a specified time; take charge of supplying the cities with wheat and the villages with the most urgently needed products; and grant to all the nationalities in Russia the full right to determine their own destiny.

"The Congress decrees that all local authority shall pass into the hands of the Councils of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, whose duty it is to maintain the revolutionary system."

Thus from the very first hour, the Bolshevist government possessed its personnel, its troops and its program.

It entered into peace negotiations with Germany ending in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

By means of its "law relating to the land" promulgated by the Congresses of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies and adopted in the night session of October 26th (old style), by its decision of the same date conferring the validity of provisional law upon the written instructions drawn up and published by the *Izvestia* (official newspaper) of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies on June 19, by the

decree of November 1 (old style) on the Cantonal Land Committees, giving the regulations approved by the first Pan-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies of June 22, 1917, the force of laws, finally by the instructions issued on November 1 to the emissaries it dispatched to the provinces, the Bolshevist government regulated the land question.

Labour control in its turn was established on December 13 (old style) by compulsory regulations promulgated by the Pan-Russian Council of Labour Control.

But it should be noted, if a sound judgment upon the import of the Bolshevist Revolution is to be arrived at, that the reforms just enumerated were not specifically Bolshevist. All the political parties that had come into power up to this time from the "Populists" and the "Labourites" up to the "Socialist-Revolutionaries" had advocated them, but had been unable to agree on the means of executing them.

It should be added that the soldiers, peasants, and workmen had actually put these reforms in practice a long time previously without waiting for the legislative enactments which were too long coming to suit them. The soldiers had made peace long before the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed.[1] In the coun-

1 Out of 22,000 men sent to the front in May, 1917, only 14,155 reached their destinations.

A prikase of the War Ministry, issued at this time, points out that up to July 15 the Committee of Bugulma had granted leave to nine companies which were to have gone to the front.

Finally, General Doutov pointed out at the same time that his troops were refusing to go into the front line on the pretext that the condition of the trenches was too bad. . . .

try the peasants had driven out the landlords, killing those who resisted, and had seized the lands. In the factories, the workmen had created "Factory Committees" which claimed to be the sole managers. The Bolsheviks merely regulated the previous disorder by giving it a legal basis. Sometimes indeed their intervention took the form of moderation which raised up against them certain elements of the working and peasant populace. Thus in the Petrograd factories during December, serious agitations broke out as a result of the campaign waged by certain classes of non-qualified workers against the "Factory Committees" established by the enforcement of the law on control by the workers.[2]

Aside from those great social reforms which were more in accord with the vague mystical aspirations of the masses than with their own doctrine, the Bolsheviks achieved only minor legislative reforms. They enacted a law which made a state monopoly of banking, abolished the "class" system, established civil marriage, etc. . . .

But it would be a great mistake to judge the social side of the work of the Bolsheviks solely from the point of view of their legislative reforms. The

[2] The demands made by these agitators in the name of socialist principles included equalization of pay by an increase of their wages to the wage level of the "qualified workmen," who were receiving at this time from thirty to fifty rubles a day. The Factory Committees refused to satisfy these wild claims. The agitators then rose in revolt, threatening the "Factory Committees" with the worst reprisals, going as far as murder, and actually in part carrying out their threats by rough handling of the members of the "Factory Committees," as in the case of the "Metallurgical Factory" at Petrograd. Certain terrorized committees appealed to the owners and begged them to take back the administration of the factories. The agitators then went still further. They treated directly with the Bolshevik government. Their representative in a committee meeting of the Workmen's Section of the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies declared bluntly: "If our demands are not satisfied, we will overthrow Lenine's government as we overthrew the Romanoff and Kerensky governments." Bolshevist tactics, it will be seen, did not always consist of out-bidding their opponents.

characteristics peculiar to the Bolshevist social order are found neither in their legislative reforms nor in their statements of doctrine. The new element that the Bolsheviks contributed to the Russian Revolution was, above all else, a moral atmosphere which is not reflected in the text of definite laws, but which controls their whole governmental and social action. The Bolsheviks in their every act from the very first, gave satisfaction to the mystical and emotional desire for despotism which slumbers in every Slav soul. Fletcher wrote in the sixteenth century: "Thus the lowest and the most wretched of the *krestianin*—that is what they are called—who grovels like a dog at the feet of a gentleman and licks the dust off his shoes, proves an unbearable tyrant when he becomes master." The whole Bolshevist Social Revolution is contained in that sentence. The grovelling and boot-licking "krestianin" became master in February-March, 1917. Kerensky wanted to curb his hereditary instincts, but Lenine loosened the bridle. Kerensky wanted to make of him an idyllic apostle of liberty and a self-conscious citizen. Lenine let him develop into an unbearable tyrant who found a sardonic joy, which is incomprehensible to the western mind, in humiliating the bourgeoisie (which in its turn became servile), and in refining the detail of his sovereign despotism. Thus, by substituting for the healing policy of Kerensky, who was smitten with democratic liberalism, dreamed of class conciliation, and gave heed to social contingencies, a policy of mystical absolutism and of material class despotism, the Bolsheviks brought the revolution back into

agreement with the logic of Slav psychology.[3] And this fact is of prime importance in the history of the Russian Revolution.

[3] Of course the Bolshevik leaders who are respectful disciples of Marx invoke the two great principles of orthodox socialist politics to justify their social program, *i.e.*:

1. The social question should be considered exclusively from a class point of view.
2. Socialism can be established only by the seizure of political power by the proletariat—"by the dictatorship of the proletariat."

But as a matter of fact, the masses, transposing the problem to make it conform to their hereditary psychology, made of these socialist *means* an *end;* and the leaders were dragged inevitably and unconsciously into this path by the evolution of events and their own racial instinct.

CHAPTER II

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Bolshevist Principles: Anti-Individualism—Individual Liberty: Justice, Education, the Press—Institutions: Classes, Inheritance, Marriage, Divorce, Religion.

WHAT is the actual social order which has emerged from the social activity of the Bolsheviks, the external aspect of which we have shown in the previous chapter?

Let us ask first of all what is the attitude of Bolshevism in regard to the individual and the fundamental rights that are claimed for him? The answer, it appears, may be compressed into a brief negative formula: Bolshevism is not individualist.

Unlike western socialism (to which all the other Russian socialist parties claim to subscribe) which has always remained unconsciously faithful to the individualist revolutionary philosophy of the eighteenth century, Bolshevism, deriving its inspiration directly from the deepest well springs of the Slav soul, is essentially "social," "collective," even "gregarious," and frankly anti-individualist. For it, the in-

dividual is merely the elementary unit, the social cell; he is neither the end nor the centre of society.

This fundamental theoretical attitude which is perfectly adapted to Slav psychology, but which by the same token makes Bolshevism incomprehensible to the western democrat and even to the western socialist, dominates the entire social policy of the Bolsheviks, and particularly their conception of individual rights. It explains first of all why they have no concern for the individual considered as a "human person," subject endowed with rights, legal entity. Life, fortune, property, family, these are not respected in themselves as legal projections of the individual, who, according to the occidental conception is the source, centre, and end of all legal systems.

The Bolshevik imprisons the individual, confiscates his property, violates his domicile, even shoots the bourgeois, without experiencing any of the feeling of moral repulsion that takes hold of us in the face of such occurrences which we call crimes. The reason is that for him the individual is nothing; the soul, the idea, the "Douch" is everything; the basis of society is not juridical but emotional.

That is why Bolshevism, which denies theoretically the right of individual property, will devise and enforce the sternest measures to suppress theft; will abrogate the death penalty in its first legislative act (the law is of October 25th), and by means of a system of terror and by way of reprisal, for counter-revolutionary crimes, execute thousands of bourgeois. And this psychology of the leaders is also the psychology of the lower classes, who listen to the leaders and follow them! The "Red Guard" will

cold-bloodedly let prisoners die of hunger before his eyes, but he will throw into the waters of the Fontanka at Petrograd an individual caught selling bread at five rubles a pound.

All these acts—theft, punishment by death, trade in provisions—are not reprehensible as crimes against personal and individual legal privilege, but only as violations of the instinctive moral law, the law of the soul. It should be noted that in this respect this social philosophy is profoundly Slav. Thus it happens that all that portion of the Russian people that has not received a veneer of western culture is much more amenable to Bolshevism than to the parliamentary and intellectualist democracy of the Liberal-Cadets and the Socialist-Democrats.

Out of Bolshevist anti-individualism there arises alongside of this contempt for the individual a second practical consequence. Since the individual is not in himself an *object* of society, since he has no social value except through the social purposes in which he participates, except, that is to say, through the cadres within which his personality actually moves, therefore, action must be brought to bear not upon the individual but upon these cadres themselves. Hence, theoretically, there is no abridgment of individual liberty. No prohibitions, no constraints which strike directly at the individual. These social despots are liberals in the strict and individualistic sense of the word. They do not challenge individuals, but institutions.

To illustrate this idea, let us put a hypothetical case. Imagine a dictatorship of the lower classes similar to Bolshevism in one of our occidental coun-

tries. We can be certain that the first thought of such a government would be to indicate its assumption of authority by taking some visible action upon individuals, some action touching the bourgeois directly in his person—such as putting the Phrygian cap on Louis XVI and presenting him to the people in this attitude of humiliation, or preventing a new rich lady appearing in her motor car in the Avenue de l'Opera, or from walking in her perfumed fur coat. In Bolshevist Russia we find nothing of the sort. The "moujiks" who pile on to the steps, the roofs and the fenders of the cars for days at a time will not force open the door of the international sleeping car, and will respect the person of the bourgeois installed in his private compartment. Bourgeois men and women can walk in the streets and go to the theatre without fear of being insulted or maltreated. If at times some unscrupulous instigator proposes a round-up of gentlemen with skunk or astrakhan-collared "shubas," it is because these garments are signs of a counter-revolutionist. But people do not listen to these thugs; they do not understand them.

The nameless individuals who follow the routine of their daily lives, the old professor who goes to his library, the little shop-keeper who dozes in his shop, and the clerk who strolls to his office have no feeling at all of violent upheaval. They come and go, and buy their newspaper at the same street corner at the same hour each morning. The life of the town or the village seems to them to be going on as usual; only they feel a certain inward uneasiness, a sort of restlessness, a vague anxiety, arising from a certain maladjustment in their lives which, while following

their wonted course in freedom, do so within a social framework that has been broken.

This impression is enhanced by the fact that the traditional hierarchy of social authorities itself shares in the maladjustment. Here we touch upon another aspect of the Bolshevist philosophy.

Breaking completely with western methods which the liberals and socialist-democrats during the early part of the Revolution tried to over-lay upon the old Slav ground-work, the Bolsheviks have never conceived of government as a net-work of authority reaching to the people from a central source in such a way that the master at the source is always in effective control of the distribution of powers. On the contrary, they have let the authority spread out directly from the mass of society which has no sense of unity of authority, and no sense of the organic nature of the state. The legal anthropomorphism which created the State as a "Legal Being," a "Moral Person," and which is but a particular aspect of our occidental philosophy of the individual considered as the origin and the end of law, is entirely unknown to Bolshevism. We find then a confused and luxuriant efflorescence of authority with singular overlappings and astonishing apparent contradictions which give us occidentals with our geometrical souls an impression of utter bewilderment, but which allow the Slav soul to evolve progressively with great freedom through these inconsistencies and superpositions. Thus we might see a local soviet—as at Moscow—order the nationalization of the textile industry. Sometimes a mere neighbourhood—like the Poluostrovo district—would order the nationalization of all

real property. We even find two very different authorities co-existing in the same city without any violent conflict or any real incoherence. In Moscow, for instance, the anarchists set up a government entirely separate from that of the Bolsheviks, and requisitioned buildings in which they established their offices. And this did not increase disorder; the black flag merely replaced the red flag on the places under requisition.

One fine day during March, 1918, a little group of people calling themselves "Immediate Socialists" came together. They duly requisitioned a private residence, a delightful "osobniak" on the "Sobatschkaia ploschodka" and made it their headquarters, their peoples' house. These reformers formulated their principles in a manifesto. This document has a vital significance because it reveals the psychological depths of the Russian Revolution:

"Our aim," it says, "is to reconstruct life completely according to purely socialist principles. Not having the opportunity to apply these principles on a large scale, we are putting them into practice on a small scale, starting the reorganization of society not from above but from below, by creating communities of production. . . .

"'Immediate Socialism' originated as follows: The 'Immediatist' group, feeling that the nation was tired of unkept promises and unrealized reforms and that this state of affairs was going to kill the Revolution (note that at this time the Bolshevist Revolution was not yet five months old), without any inaugural formality either written or spoken, entered the arena to begin action.

"The group repudiates any idea of preparation for socialism, on the ground that preparation can take place only conjointly with action.

"The leading ideas should be absorbed in a few seconds. Socialism is the truth and as the truth it should be found wherever truth is found at all times and in all places. To delay action is a sign that you do not recognize its virtues as the truth, or that you repudiate it in spite of its truth.

"Twenty centuries ago Christianity having no instrument of propaganda except that of personal conviction and the spoken word, found solid ground with astonishing rapidity through the existence of Christian communities. Why then, now that all of oppressed Russia, accepting socialism as the truth, has, thanks to socialism, accomplished the Revolution, why do we stray in the old labyrinths, bow down before the old theories which we have overthrown?

"The obscure masses of the people are surfeited with abstract socialism. Give them at last concrete socialism. Only then can you be sure that the people understand you and will follow you."

And throughout Russia there was demonstration after demonstration which did not keep trains from running or telephones from operating. It was a case of instinctive ordered incoherence.

Such was the attitude of Bolshevism towards the rights of the individual. With this attitude, the Bolshevist party was evidently much closer to the Slav spirit than any of the other parties; and that is one of the reasons, unquestionably one of the deepest reasons, which explains its hold upon the ignorant masses, who do not understand the intellectualist doc-

trines of the occidental socialists, but who feel Bolshevism perfectly.

A legislative program based on such a social philosophy cannot be squeezed into the formulas of literary analysis, a process which increases in difficulty as principles give way to acts. For in social matters as in politics the Bolshevist practice was as elastic as its theories were absolute.

The Bolsheviks respect as far as possible the forms of individual rights; these they do not abridge except in the name of socialism, and in doing so they even justify their action by appealing to principles of liberty. And here their Slav duplicity finds firm support in their doctrine, since in truth they are liberals, but liberals demanding new social cadres.

Let us consider the individual by himself as an abstraction made from the social cadres in which he moves. His liberty under the Bolshevist order, whatever his position in society, is complete. But if individual liberty is respected in theory, it is not in practice.

You cannot enter or leave Russia except with an authorization from Bolshevist officials and after submitting to numerous formalities quite as under the old régime or under Kerensky. Every traveller must be provided with a pass-port with the visé of the Bolshevist authorities, and he is searched upon his departure as well as upon his arrival. The law which officially instituted these formalities gave the reason for them at the same time by enumerating the articles which it is forbidden to export. These are first of all documents which might harm the interests of the

Russian Republic, gold and silver in bullion or coin, paper money beyond a sum of five-hundred rubles, etc. . . . It is no easier to fool "one of Tchitcherine's tavarichs" than it was to fool one of Nicholas II's "chinovniks." The system indeed is no worse; it is the same.

In the interior of the country, liberty of movement actually exists. But the formality of the visé of passports continues as formerly. For some time it was even forbidden to come and go into Petrograd and Moscow without a special authorization.

Liberty to buy and sell, and to make contracts, continues unabridged. The notaries' offices are still open and their practice has never been discontinued. In April the notary's fee was raised but merely in accordance with the general rise in prices.

But if the individual is free, the social institutions which guaranteed that freedom, such as the courts, or those which gave meaning to it, such as the educational system or the press, are modified and adapted to the new revolutionary theories. First of all changes were made in the personnel authorized to issue orders for arrest, or search or any of the procedures connected with investigations. These functions were restricted to the following newly established authorities:

1. The Investigating Commission of the Petrograd Council of the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies.
2. Investigating agencies of the District Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies.
3. The Revolutionary Tribunal.

4. The All-Russian Investigating Commission for the Fight Against Counter-revolution and Sabotage.

5. The Committee for the Struggle Against Pogroms.

Then they changed the very procedure of the courts. The indictment, which takes place in the court room, was opened to the public. A college of "defenders of the law" took the place of the former barristers. This college is composed of counsellors nominated by the soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. Appeals are admitted in cases of violation of the fundamental rules of procedure and evidence. When an appeal is to be lodged, it must be forwarded by the Commissioners to the Executive Committee of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. Cases are tried in equity and not according to the old written laws.

Thus the individual is free and his rights are not abridged, in theory, but if he is compelled to defend them, he must do so before a class justice which strives for equity, but an equity which is not the same as that of the former social régime.

With a view to "enriching and enlightening as quickly as possible the intellectual life of the country," a law was passed, November 9 (old style) establishing a governmental commission on public education. Then it was determined to establish new school programs and their elaboration was entrusted to commissions composed of teachers from each school, the school employés including even domestic servants, the parents, and the pupils.

A prikaze was issued by Kolontai granting complete freedom of assembly and association to the students in the educational institutions under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Public Welfare. Thus the whole system of instruction which rested upon the old order was sapped at its foundation. The pupils kept on attending the schools, but the schools were no longer the old institutions.

The press is essentially a social institution. The Bolsheviks recognized that it should be free, but that this freedom should be exercised within the cadres of socialist society and not within those of capitalist or bourgeois society. Lenine announced this in a forceful way at the meeting of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets held on November 5, 1917 :

" We, the Bolsheviks, have always said that when we came into power we would shut down the bourgeois newspapers. To tolerate bourgeois newspapers is to quit being socialist."

And Trotzky, supporting the same position, declared :

" The democratic order that has been established in Russia requires that the oppression of journalism by property be abolished in the same way as the oppression of industry."

And yet the Bolsheviks proclaimed the freedom of the press, and their first law, that of October 27 (old style) was a liberal law within the limits that have been indicated. It was worded as follows :

" I. Only those organs of the press will be suspended

(a) Which appeal for open resistance to the government of workmen and peasants.

(b) Which foment disorders by slanderously falsifying facts.

(c) Which incite to criminal acts: i.e., acts within the jurisdiction of the police courts.

"II. Provisional or definitive suspension can be executed only upon the order of the Council of People's Commissioners.

"III. These regulations are only of a provisional nature and shall be abrogated by a special ukaze when life has returned to normal conditions."

The law was enforced in a rather broad way. Ordinarily the newspapers which were suspended one day appeared the next day under a different name by which nobody was deceived. The *Birjevia Viedomosti (Exchange Gazette)* reappeared as the *Novya Viedomosti (New Gazette)*; the *Riech (Speech)*, as *Svobodnaia Riech (Free Speech)* and later as the *Nach Vieck (Our Century)*; the *Rabotchaia Gazeta (Worker's Journal)* became the *Louitch (Gleam)*; *The Dien (The Day)*, the *Novy Dien (New Day)*; *The Russkoe Slovo (The Russian Word)* became *Nache Slovo (Our Word)*, and the *Noch (Night)* was converted into *Polnoch (Midnight)*.

At Moscow, up to the time that the Bolshevist government was established there in March, the bourbeois newspapers even continued to appear without restriction except supervision by a rather liberal censorship.

But the Bolsheviks, while they rendered this innocuous homage to the freedom of the press in their laws and their official acts, succeeded, by roundabout methods, in making a mockery of this freedom in

practice. First they decided to nationalize the printing shops of certain newspapers, that of the *Novoe Vremia* at Petrograd, for instance, so that they could set up in them their own newspapers, the *Pravda*, and the *Izvestia*.

Then by a law, November 7 (old style) they created a monopoly of advertising. This monopoly is general. The first article of the law was as follows:

"The printing of advertisements in organs of the press, or in books, for posters and news-stalls, for offices and other establishments is declared a monopoly." Advertising concerns were closed. The law provided an indemnity in case of necessity for the owners of these concerns and the reimbursement of small stock-holders. The penalties provided for offenders were very severe—three years' imprisonment and confiscation of all property.

An order of November 18 (old style) fixed November 27 as the date for the inauguration of the system, and charged the *Gazette of the Provisional Workmen's and Peasants' Government* with the administration of the monopoly. The law was rigorously enforced at Petrograd from that date. At Moscow the newspapers continued to publish advertisements freely up to the time that the government moved to that city, March, 1918.

The prohibition to print advertisements or to conduct any kind of indirect publicity (the law required publication of accounts, reports of meetings, etc.) was bound to ruin all the non-partisan news journals. But they did not stop there. They raised the postal rates—the cost of sending a newspaper by mail went as high as sixteen kopecks per copy; they bungled

the distribution of the bourgeois papers while they ensured a wide circulation of the Bolshevist sheets by free transportion and free distribution to the local soviets. They increased the number of partisan publications subsidized by the government. There are at Moscow the *Pravda* and the *Izvestia* of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers and Peasants' Deputies of the city and district of Moscow, the *Rabotchaia i kristianskaia Krasnaia Armia i Flot (Workmen's and Peasants' Red Army and Navy)*, the *Bednota (The Peasant Proletariat)*. The Bolshevist newspapers in the provinces multiplied. Smolensk has the *Zviesda (Star)*, Penza the *Molot (Hammer)*, Saratov the *Saratovskaia Gazeta (Red Journal of Saratov)*, Ufa the *Vperiod (Forward)*, Vologda the *Iskra (Spark)*, Nijni-Novgorod the *Voljskaia Komouna (Volga Commune)*, Baku the *Bakinski Rabotchi (Baku Worker)*, Astrakhan the *Astrakhanski Rabotchi (Astrakhan Worker)*. All the way to Vladivostock there is not a place that has not a *Krasnoe Znamia (Red Flag)*.

Under such a régime, for anything that is not pure Bolshevism, freedom of the press is no longer anything but a high-sounding word.

Alongside of those institutions guaranteeing or giving expression in a general way to the individual freedom which the Bolsheviks preserved in form, there are others which, because of their essentially capitalistic or reactionary nature, they either abolished outright, or radically transformed.

In the first catagory may be placed the class system, inheritance, marriage, and divorce. The object

of all these institutions in their capitalist form is the protection of pecuniary and capitalist interests.

It may seem strange that the revolutionary governments previous to Bolshevism (Kerensky's and Lvoff's) did not abolish classes, an institution obviously unacceptable to liberals. But, as the class system in Russia was closely identified with the property system, the reform presented great practical difficulties.

These difficulties did not stop the Bolsheviks. On November 10 (old style) they passed a law abolishing all classes, all titles and honourary appellations that had been established by the civilian rank, "Tchin."[1]

The property of institutions belonging to the nobility was to pass immediately into the hands of the administrative office of the zemstvos exercising similar jurisdiction. The property of mercantile societies and corporations doing business in cities was to pass immediately into the hands of the corresponding municipal administrative office.

Inheritance was abolished by a law passed May 24, 1918. By virtue of this law, at the death of private individuals, all their property reverts to the Soviet Republic. And to prevent frauds and concealments, the law provides that all gifts exceeding ten thousand rubles in value made by one living person to another shall be illegal.

In a decree dated December 18, the Council of

1 "Tchin," that strange institution founded by Peter the Great, classed all civilian, ecclesiastical, naval, and academic titles and functions in fourteen categories. Classes one to three were given the right to the title "Your High Excellency"; classes three to five, "Your Excellency," etc. The first nine military classes and the first five civilian classes carried with them all the privileges of the hereditary nobility, the others only the privileges of personal nobility. The singular characteristic of the "Tchin" classification was that, theoretically, it had no relation to the importance of the function actually performed.

People's Commissioners declared: "Hereafter the Russian Republic will recognize only civil marriage." Persons wishing to marry notify the local marriage bureau. The man and the woman must be respectively eighteen and sixteen years of age. The religious marriage service is regarded as a private act. The newspapers have reported that in many cities, Samara, for example, the Bolsheviks proposed to establish a system much more . . . communistic. But proofs are lacking.

Finally at about the same time an undated order of the Commission established divorce by mutual consent of man and wife, and even by request of one or the other. The request must be sent to the local court.

Thus everything in the institution of the family which makes it a capitalist force disappears; the union of the sexes is no longer in any way a union of interests.

The Bolsheviks brought about several reforms in institutions which had been sanctified by traditionalism. Thus, for example, at the end of January they determined to replace the Julian calendar by the Gregorian. This reform, which had been studied for a long time and had been almost determined upon in 1830, had always been considered an exceedingly delicate matter. The Bolsheviks decided upon it within two days, put it in force immediately, and nobody was aware of it. The order stipulated:

"The first day after January 31 of this year will bear the date not of February 1, but February 14; the second, February 15, and so on." Wages and salaries were paid on February 28, according to

the monthly scale with a deduction of thirteen-thirtieths.

But there is one social institution which the Bolsheviks did not touch—religion. In certain individual cases, they did not shrink from taking stern action against the clergy, and they even forbade processions intended to serve a political purpose; but in general they avoided interfering in religious matters. It must be recognized too that the Russian clergy on their side showed absolute disinterestedness in political matters. The separation of the church and the civil power was voluntary and thoroughgoing.

The Ecclesiastical Sobor of all Russia, which met at Moscow after an interval of two centuries, included, in addition to the higher clergy (arch-bishops and bishops) who were the sole members under the old régime, the members of the lower clergy (priests, deacons, and psalmists) as well as lay representatives (parishioners). It contented itself, in political affairs, with drawing up several manifestos urging upon the Russian people the necessity of not losing sight of the fundamental moral precepts of Christianity in their daily life.

Before the Bolsheviks came into power it had passed a motion condemning a separate peace. But its main task was the organization of religious self-government. It proclaimed the re-establishment of the patriarchate of All Russia. The man chosen for this office was Tikhone, the metropolitan arch-bishop of Moscow. He is a wise and cautious man of large experience and breadth of outlook, who has passed some time in America.

The patriarch and the Holy Synod are subject to

the Sobor which remains the supreme ecclesiastical authority. But the Sobor, which met at Moscow, contained six hundred members, and of these hardly ten to fifteen per cent belonged to the higher clergy.

The Russian clergy by its wisdom and moderation, although hard hit by the Bolshevist régime, which abolished the property of monasteries and convents, showed that it was able to provide for the future and protect religious liberty, the only kind of liberty which up to the present has remained intact.

CHAPTER III

PROPERTY

Private Property: Requisitioning of Dwellings; Opening of Safes—Landed Property: The Régime of Executive Orders—Historical Survey of the Land Question—The Future—Appendix: Official Texts of Executive Orders on the Land Question.

THE Bolsheviks, like all socialists, regard private property as an enemy institution. It is an expression of the existing order in its purest and most representative form. For short-sighted doctrinaire socialists complete abolition of it is an article of faith. But the Bolsheviks are not merely chamber doctrinaires; they are first of all politicians. Therefore they did not begin by ordering the legal abolition of private property. They made their attack upon it only from within, striving to empty it of all its capitalist content, without altering in theory its legal status. The soviets punished theft very severely and limited the right of expropriation to the duly constituted authorities.

An order dated October 28 stipulated:

"1. The self-governing municipalities are authorized to sequestrate all unoccupied and untenanted places. . . .

"2. The self-governing municipalities are authorized in accordance with the laws and the standards prescribed by law, to install in available lodgings citizens who have no homes or who live in crowded and unhealthy quarters.

". . . 4. The municipalities are authorized to issue orders relating to the appointments of 'House Committees,'[1] their organization, and the extent of their jurisdiction; also to confer legal authority upon them."

As a matter of fact, the requisition order was enforced rather temperately. For the most part only untenanted places were seized. When the government moved from Petrograd to Moscow, it requisitioned the principal hotels of the city as lodgings for its host of employés, but it did not take over occupied lodgings at all. Yet under such a régime, the requisition order could be used as a constant threat against every bourgeois inhabitant, and it was employed as an instrument of humiliation against those who would not or could not come to terms with the new masters. Woe to the unfortunate tenant who was on bad

[1] These "House Committees" as an institution were not created by this order. They were formed by the tenants of their own accord, when the inability of the municipal police to protect the inhabitants against illegal search and pillaging by lawless armed soldiers was demonstrated. The tenants took turns standing guard and by this collective action secured police protection for their property.

terms with his "Schwitsar" or his "Dvornik" (porters)!

The same principles were applied to factory property. In one case the National Economic Committee even compelled a local soviet (at Borisogliebsk) to restore a factory that had been illegally nationalized.[2]

Individual ownership of personal property, furniture, paper securities and money, was not abolished. But the enjoyment of such ownership was subjected to a veritable Draconian system of regulation. The amount of money that could be drawn from the bank per week upon active accounts was limited to one hundred and fifty rubles. All rented boxes in safe deposit vaults in the banks were locked up, and reopened in the presence of Bolshevist commissioners,[3] who deposited the silver and securities in the State Bank to the credit of the owner of the box, and confiscated outright the coined gold and all provisions of food, large stocks of which many people had hoarded in their vaults.[4]

The order of requisition of safe deposit vaults in the banks was worded as follows:

"1. All sums kept in safe deposit vaults in the banks must be deposited in the State Bank as a current account to the credit of the customer.

2 It is true that in this particular case, the soviet had conducted itself like an out and out robber, selling all the materials that belonged to the factory, and thus depriving the workmen of their work.

3 The Commissioner assigned to the duty of opening the vaults at the *Credit Lyonnais* was a young Frenchman, a genuine marquis formerly brought up at the expense of the French Colony in Petrograd—a very delicate touch of consideration on the part of the Bolshevist government.

4 This confiscation was carried out by the enforcement of laws that antedated the Bolshevist régime i.e., laws forbidding the hoarding of coined gold and commodities.

"2. All lessees of boxes in safe deposit vaults will be required to present themselves at the bank, with the keys, immediately upon being summoned, for the purpose of witnessing the examination of the vault.

"3. All lessees of boxes who shall not have appeared within three days from the date of the summons, shall be considered as having refused with malicious intent to attend the examination. All the articles of value in the safes of such absentees shall be confiscated by the State Bank, and shall become the property of the people."

It was only in regard to land that the principle of expropriation was adopted. The decree of October 26 stipulated:

"1. The titles to large landed property are annulled and cannot be redeemed.

"2. The large landed estates, as well as all the lands of appanages, monasteries and churches, together with all live stock, agricultural implements, personal property, and all accessories appertaining thereto are placed at the disposition of the Cantonal Land Committees and of the District Soviet of Peasants' Deputies until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. . . ." But the order also made this stipulation:

". . . 4. Lands belonging to enlisted Cossack soldiers and peasants are not subject to confiscation."

The ruling as to the functioning of the Cantonal Land Committees practically transmitted to these bodies the rights of the former large owners. The Land Committee, it provided, will make a survey of the forests, lay down a plan to be followed in felling trees, and fix the prices of lumber; it will grant permits for fishing, determine the area to be used for pasturage, and fix the rental; it will fix the rental for cultivated lands and meadows, and arrange the method of payment (Art. 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18). It will fix the wages of agricultural labour either by the day or by contract, and determine the amount of labour required for working the land (Art. 22, 23).

The Land Committee is a self-governing body elected by universal direct, equal, and secret suffrage (Art. 3). Where cantonal zemstvos do not yet exist, the number of the members of the Committee is determined by the inhabitants themselves (Art. 4).

Under such a régime, the sociological status of the peasantry was less profoundly disrupted than one might suppose. The expropriation of the large land owners in most cases resulted merely in a change of ownership, leaving the basic organization of the peasants almost intact.[5]

[5] As a matter of fact, the instructions published in the *Izvestia* on the same day (October 26) as the "land decree" analysed above, established a very different sort of land system. The first article decreed: "The right of private ownership of land is annulled forever: land may not be bought, nor sold, nor rented, nor given as security, nor expropriated by any means whatever. All Crown lands, all lands belonging to appanages, to the Emperor's Cabinet, or to monasteries and churches, all lands occupied without title, all lands belonging to entailed estates, all privately owned lands, all lands belonging to communities and to peasants, and others, are confiscated without right of redemption; they become national property and are placed at the disposal of the workers who cultivate them.

". . . Art. 6. . . . The right to enjoy the land is accorded without dis-

Let us recall what the legal system of land ownership was in Russia before the Revolution.

Until 1861, all the land of Russia was the property either of the State, the Imperial family, the church and monasteries, or the nobility. The peasants were the property of this property.

The lord, "pomieshik," divided his domain into two parts. One of these (theoretically, it was the part necessary for the maintenance of the peasant-serfs) was ceded to the peasantry associated into village communities (the *mirs*); the other was retained by the lord, who had it cultivated by these peasant-serfs under the system of the *corvée*.[6] But it frequently happened that in exchange for a stipulated royalty in money *(obrok)*, he turned over to the *mir* the cultivation of the part reserved for himself. This latter system, encouraged by the policy of the czars since Peter the Great, had developed simultaneously with "absentee landlordism."[7]

Under such a system, the peasant, subjected to the most tyrannical and often the cruelest sort of personal service, had the double feeling of being the

tinction of sex to all citizens of the State who wish to work the land, either with their own families or in other forms of association and only as long as they are capable of working.

"Hiring of labour is prohibited. . . .

". . . Art. 8. All the land, after it has been confiscated, is conveyed to a people's land fund. Its reapportionment among the workers is carried out by the local and central administrative offices."

This organization, a sort of hybrid combination of the proposals of the "Labourites" and the "Cadets" on the land question, was never put into effect on any large scale.

[6] Translator's Note: A feudal term for the unremunerated labour which the peasant was obliged to perform for his lord.

[7] Thus Nicholas I required of every noble ten years of military service under penalty of the loss of his privileges. The "pomieshik" (owner of a domain) became simply a "dvorianin" (courtier), regarded by the peasants instinctively and logically as a land parasite.

chattel of the master, and the master of the land—an idea that he expressed by the oft repeated adage: "We are yours, but the land is ours."

The great reform of Alexander II, February 19, 1861, abolished serfdom and the corvée and created the institution of peasant landed property, not in the form of individual ownership, but of collective ownership by the *mir*. It provided for the recovery of this property either by means of an indemnity paid in annuities by the *mir* to the lord, or by the transfer to the lord of two-thirds of the land which he had formerly ceded to the *mir*.

After the revolution of 1905 and the peasant uprisings which, following the dissolution of the first Duma, resulted in the destruction of three thousand cultivated estates belonging to the lords, the land system of 1861 was radically changed. The ukaze of November 9/22, 1906, inaugurated individual peasant ownership, or prepared the way for it. The law stipulated, in effect, that in every parish where there had been no redistribution the members of the *mir* for twelve years, every head of a family was to receive title, with right of alienation, to the parcel of land occupied by him on the day of the promulgation of the law. In the parishes when a redistribution had taken place within a period of less than twelve years the land continued under the provisional ownership of the parish. Parishes of this sort constituted about half of the total number of *mirs*.

To complete this sketch of the former system of land tenure, two institutions of the old régime should be noted which might have been of great use, but

which proved futile because of the negligence and venality of the imperial administration. These were the service of transplantation (*pereselenie*) and the peasants' bank.

The transplantation service was to take care of settling peasants who wished to migrate from overcrowded communities (usually the *mirs* which in 1861 had adopted the system by which their land was reduced by two-thirds) in the eastern governments of European Russia (Ufa and Orenburg) and in Siberia. It is estimated that from 1907 to 1914, one hundred thousand families per year were thus transplanted. But administrative neglect, which antagonized the peasants, and administrative dishonesty which made these transactions ruinous for the treasury, prevented the institution from yielding the results that might have been expected.

The Peasants' Bank was intended by serving as an intermediary between buyers and sellers to facilitate the acquisition of property by the peasants. It received cash from the Savings Bank, which was obliged to accept its paper up to the amount of one hundred million rubles at a discount of $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; it paid the vendor and arranged with the peasant for the payment by means of annuities. The system was too simple. *Tchinovniki* and large proprietors got together to modify it for their own little profit.

On November 16 the regulations of the Peasant Bank were changed:

1. Land commissions composed of representatives of the nobility, the zemstvos, the peasants, and the

Bank are authorized to conclude purchases, to make allotments, and to resell.

2. In its financial operations the Bank ceases to conduct its business through the Savings Bank. It delivers its note directly to the vendor, paying him interest at 5½ per cent.

The system opened the way to all sorts of fraud and abuse. During the first year, November 15, 1905, to November 15, 1906, the land commissions paid 300,435,783 rubles (more than $160,000,000) for 2,527,724 "deciatines,"[8] an average price of 117 r. 86 per "deciatine," while the purchases of 1904 had been made at an average price of 68 r. 5. Only 646,800 deciatines were resold, and for a sum of 83,240,605 rubles, or 128 r. 70 per deciatine. From that time on this complicated trading, which often represented no genuine transaction, but simply collusion between employés of the Bank and large land owners, was merely speeded up. At the beginning of the war, the Bank was administering two million hectares that had not yet been parcelled out and Nicholas II had issued an order to sell to the Bank another two million hectares out of the body of appanages. One can imagine the fine profits that these complicated transactions of provisional administration, of selling and re-selling with the usual "vziatki" (pot of wine) would mean for the worthy "tchinovniki" of the Peasants' Bank.

Such was the land system until the Bolsheviks came into power. Briefly, it had preserved all the vices of the old system as it existed before 1861, and

[8] Translator's Note: A deciatine = 1.0925 hectares or 2.6996 acres.

the alluring reforms of that year and since had merely engendered in the Russian peasantry which economically is so backward, an unhealthy social unrest. Stolypine's reform of 1906 which, had it been enforced faithfully and with the necessary transitional safeguards might have been very fruitful, had not yet yielded any positive social results. The large holdings of the lords endured with all their old characteristics. M. P. owned 800,000 hectares[9] of forest between Viatka, Perm, and Archangel; Count S. and Prince G., almost a million each. Alongside of these nabobs, the peasants possessed only those lands the ownership of which had been granted to the *mir* by the reform of 1861, and which, by definition were just sufficient at that time for the maintenance of the peasantry. Often, too, as has been explained, the size of these lands had been reduced by two-thirds. But since 1861 the population had increased at an enormous rate. During the last ten years alone it had passed from 125,000,000 to 167,000,000 inhabitants.[10] The result is that in this country of Russia with its immense area, the land system had reached the paradox by which a peasant class of more than a hundred million men was left landless in the face of 130,000 landowning nobles.[11]

Stolypine's reform was gradual, but its tendency was to change the system radically by the establishment of individual ownership; the Bolshevist reform

[9] Translator's Note: A hectare = 2.4711 acres.

[10] The birth rate per thousand inhabitants was 49, the death rate 31. The rate of increase, therefore, was 18 per thousand, which is the highest in all Europe, and the cities represented only 13 per cent. of the total population.

[11] In European Russia, the peasant land represented an area of 155,051,028 deciatines out of a total area of 396,500,700 deciatines.

was brusque but superficial.[12] The economics of the system of ownership will not be appreciably changed by the transfer of the large landed estates of the "pomieshiks" to the "National Land Committees." The whole problem remained to be solved and was further complicated by the struggle between "propertied peasants" and "community peasants." The land crisis was only beginning. And the difficulties of the Bolshevist government were not slow in making their appearance. On June 6, 1918, a large meeting, presided over by Sverdlov, was held in Moscow. Lenine made a speech in which he denounced the attitude of the peasant classes. "We have reached a point," he said, "where the problem we face is incomparably harder to solve than the problem of defeating the counter-revolution. We must take over the essential products which have been seized not by members of the upper bourgeoisie but by numerous small owners. There can be but one outcome, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the power of the pitiless iron hand, which will complete the work of the social revolution. The new difficulties that are arising we shall meet by calling to our aid a host of new helpmates, the millions of poverty-stricken country folk."

The system of land tenure which will be established when the present period of crisis comes to an end, cannot be definitely formulated at this time. It is

[12] It was indeed the most superficial of all the reforms proposed by the various revolutionary parties. The Cadets proposed to reduce the maximum size of all estates, whether belonging to the nobility or not, to 500 deciatines (1349 acres), and to create with the residue a national fund to be placed at the disposal of the peasant communities that were too poor in land. Kerensky's "Labourite" party proposed to create a single national land fund, with rights to enjoyment to be distributed among the eligible workers in proportion to their "capacity for labour."

hardly probable that the Russian peasantry will go in a single jump to a widespread system of individual ownership. For a long time to come, community ownership by the primitive group, the family or village, will continue to be the rule. The Russian peasant in general is not attracted to the idea of individual ownership either by his social education or by his hereditary feelings.[13] The very nature of Russian agrarian wealth (immense forests, for instance), moreover, militates in many cases against the establishment of this form of ownership without transition.

It seems certain, however, that the ancient system of lordly ownership and the system of large land exploitation which resulted from it, are for ever doomed. The new forms which are being worked out at present in the midst of tumult and disorder will result in the formation of a farmer class of owners of small and moderate-sized holdings, of whom a nucleus already exists as the result of Stolypine's reform. This new class, whose political power will be considerable, will play a decisive part in the reconstructed nation.

13 It has been said rightly that the institution of the "mir" as an owner and as an administrative personality is recent. It goes back to the reform of 1861. But Russia has always been familiar with community ownership. Before serfdom was established there were examples of community and family ownership in the "association lands" throughout Slavdom. "Syabrinage" is to be found everywhere in the old acts of "Little Russia." The systems, previous to serfdom and down to the modern period has always rested upon this primitive social organization. The remarkable rise of co-operation in all its forms ("arleles," modern co-operation) is an additional indication of the liking of the Russians for community forms of social organization. Moreover, it is a well known fact that the feeling of "collectivity" which absorbs the individual in the mass is one of the essential characteristics of the Slav spirit, and one which strikes every student of Russian social life.

OFFICIAL TEXTS

A LAND DECREE ENACTED BY THE CONGRESS OF WORKMEN'S, SOLDIERS' AND PEASANTS' DEPUTIES, AND ADOPTED IN THE NIGHT SESSION OF OCTOBER 26

1. Titles to large landed estates are annulled and cannot be redeemed.

2. The large landed estates, as well as all the lands of appanages, monasteries, and churches, together with all live stock, agricultural implements, personal property, and all accessories appertaining thereto are placed at the disposition of the Cantonal Land Committees and of the District Soviet of Peasants' Deputies until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.

3. Damages of whatever nature caused to property, which henceforth belongs to all of the people, are considered as serious crimes under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Tribunal.

The district Soviets of Peasants' Deputies will take the necessary measures for the maintenance of perfect order when the confiscation of landed property is put into effect. They will take the necessary measures to determine what area of each parcel and which parcels should be confiscated, and to furnish the most rigorous revolutionary protection for the

land delivered to the people, including structures, material, live stock and stores.

In putting the great land reforms into practice, until the definitive decision shall have been made by the Constituent Assembly, people everywhere will be guided by the following instructions, drawn up on the basis of "instructions" adopted by 252 local peasant societies and by the editors of the *Izvestia*, August 19, 1917.

4. Lands belonging to enlisted Cossack soldiers and peasants are not subject to confiscation.

Instructions Drawn up and Published by the "*Izvestia* of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies," August 19, 1917

The land problem as a whole can be solved only by the Constituent Assembly. The most equitable solution of the land question is found in the following articles.

1. The right of private ownership of land is annulled for ever; land may not be bought nor sold, nor rented, nor given as security, nor expropriated by any means whatever. All Crown lands, lands belonging to appanages, to the Emperor's Cabinet, to monasteries and churches, all lands occupied without title, all lands belonging to entailed estates, all privately owned lands, all lands belonging to communities, and to peasants, and others, are confiscated without right of redemption; they become national property and are placed at the disposition of the workers who cultivate them. Those whose interests

may be prejudiced by reason of the social transformation of the right of ownership will have no claim against the nation for aid except during a period of time sufficient to enable them to adapt themselves to the new conditions of life.

2. All the sub-soil wealth, ores, naphtha, coal, salt, etc. . . . as well as forests and streams which have a national importance are transferred to the exclusive ownership of the state. All small water-courses, lakes, and woods pass to the parishes, with the proviso that they be administered by the local administrative organs.

3. All parcels of land under scientific cultivation, such as gardens, plantations, nurseries, greenhouses, and others, remain undivided, but are changed into model agricultural enterprises and are transferred to the exclusive ownership of the State or to the parishes according to their size and importance.

Buildings, municipal lands, villages with their attached flower gardens, and truck gardens, remain in the hands of their present owners; but the dimensions of such parcels and the rate of tax on the enjoyment of them are fixed by law.

4. Horse breeding establishments, private concerns for raising animals for the use of the government, bird fancying, and plants for other forms of animal husbandry become national property, and are transferred either to the ownership of the State or of the parish, according to their size and importance. Questions of repurchase are under the jurisdiction of the Constituent Assembly.

5. All real and personal property, agricultural machinery and live stock appertaining to the con-

fiscated lands are transferred without charge to the ownership of the state or of the parishes, according to their size and importance. Confiscation of agricultural machinery and of live stock does not extend to the small holdings of the peasantry.

6. The right to enjoy the land is accorded without distinction of sex to all citizens of the State who wish to work the land, either with their own families or in other forms of association, and only as long as they are capable of working. Hiring of labour is prohibited.

In case one of the members of the agricultural society is incapacitated for work for a period of two years, the agricultural society is bound to come to his aid by working his land in common until he recovers his capacity.

Farmers, who through old age or infirmity are permanently incapacitated for working the land themselves, lose their right of enjoyment of the land and receive instead a pension from the state.

7. The enjoyment of the land is to be equal, i.e., the land is distributed among the workers according to local conditions and on the basis of standards of work or standards of needs. The forms under which the land is enjoyed—whether it be under compulsory management, or sharing between landlord and tenant, or community control, or modern co-operation (*artèle*), as the villages and rural communities may decide, are to be absolutely free.

8. All the land after it has been confiscated is conveyed to a people's land fund. Its reapportionment among the workers is carried out by the local and central administrative offices, beginning with the

local democratic organization (excepting city and country co-operative communities) and extending to the central administrative organs of the province.

The land funds undergo periodically new repartitions according to the rise in population, the increase in production, and the improvement of rural economy.

In cases where the boundaries of lots are changed, their centres must not be changed.

The lands of members ceasing to be active return to the land fund; but the near relatives of inactive members or the persons indicated by them have a preferential claim upon these lands.

Upon the reversion of lots to the land fund, sums expended for unused fertilizers or other materials for enriching the soil are to be refunded.

If in particular localities the land fund is not large enough for the needs of the local population, the excess of population is to be transplanted.

Transmigration will be so organized that it will be carried out for the following categories in the order indicated: First, landless peasants expressing a desire to transmigrate; next, members of the parish in bad standing; then, deserters and the like; finally, those chosen by lot or by agreement to fill the quota.

Everything contained in these instructions, being the undisputable expression of the will of the great majority of the self-conscious peasantry of All Russia, is hereby declared provisional law, and it will be put in force immediately as far as may be and continue in force until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly; the enforcement, however, of certain

parts of it to be carried out gradually according to necessity, as determined by the district soviets of Workmen's and Peasants' Deputies.

INSTRUCTIONS TO EMISSARIES SENT INTO THE PROVINCES

1. Upon his arrival in the government to which he has been assigned, the emissary should call a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, before which he will make a report on the land law, and put the question of a meeting of the Assembly of government and district soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

2. He should study the condition of the land problem within the government, under the following heads:

(a) Inform himself as to whether the lands of the landowners have been placed under control. In what districts, and under what control?

(b) Who administers the lands of landowners? Whether it is the landowners as before, or the land committees.

(c) What has been done with the agricultural machinery and live stock.

3. Has the amount of peasants' land under cultivation been increased?

4. How much of the excess of the norm fixed for that particular government is being exported by the peasants?

5. Show that once the peasants have received the land it is absolutely necessary to increase production of wheat to the maximum, and to hasten its shipment to the cities; that this is the sole means of avoiding the danger of famine.

6. What measures have been proposed and enforced for transferring the lands from the proprietors to the Land Committees and to the Committees of Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies?

7. It is desirable to have the well organized and well established agricultural enterprises pass to the soviets of Peasants' Deputies under the direction of competent experts in agriculture.

President: VI. OULIANOV-LENINE.
Commissioner of Agriculture: V. MILIOUTINE.

A DECREE OF THE GOVERNMENT RELATIVE TO CANTONAL LAND COMMITTEES

1. To bring about the immediate transfer to the people of the large and other landed properties, these present regulations relative to the functions of Cantonal Land Committees, as approved by the First Pan-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, June 28, 1917, will be enforced, until such time as the Constituent Assembly makes final rulings on all the details of the land reform.

2. The present law will be put into effect by telegram.

3. The constitution of Land Committees in all cantons is compulsory. The Land Committee is a self-governing body, elected by direct, equal and secret universal suffrage wherever the law on the small unit of the zemstvo is not in force.

4. Where there are as yet no cantonal zemstvos the number of members of the Land Committee will be determined by the inhabitants themselves.

5. All expenses for the formation and administration of cantonal Land Committees are borne by the State.

6. Chambers of Conciliation are instituted within the cantonal Land Committees to settle disputed questions.

7. The cantonal Land Committees are charged with the rapid and definitive liquidation of all vestiges of serfdom preserved in the villages, and the complete abolition of all kinds of slavery.

8. For the sake of rational management of the land fund, the Land Committee will collect all the documentary information about the lands within the boundaries of the canton.

9. The Cantonal Land Committee will make a survey of the forests, and lay down a plan for felling. It will give priority to supplying the national needs in fuel and building material.

10. The Committee fixes the price of woods.

11. Sums accruing from the sale of wood are collected by the Cantonal Land Committee, which deposits them with the state fund, after paying the taxes and the expenses involved in the exploitation and care of the forests.

12. The Committee is responsible for the protection of the forests.

13. The Committee is responsible for the protection of the waters; and issues fishing permits.

14. . . . Sums collected for fishing privileges are deposited with the national fund.

15. . . . The Cantonal Land Committee will determine the areas to be used for pasturage and fix their rental.

16. It will determine the quantity and quality of meadow land and distribute it, fix the rental price of unmowed meadows, and the price of hay. In view of the monopoly of hay, it will receive orders and allocate them according to the norms determined upon between the villages and private individuals; and it

will supervise the proper execution of these orders.

17. The local Land Committee will fix the area of lands to be worked, allot them, supervise the smoking and sowing at the regular times, and at other times upon request.

18. The Cantonal Land Committee will fix the rentals for fields, meadows, etc. . . . and the method by which such rents will be collected.

19. Disagreements over rental rates and delays in payments fixed by the Committee will be settled by the Chamber of Conciliation, the decisions of which are binding.

20. The Cantonal Land Committee will make the local preparations for the institution of the reforms, establish the norms of labour and subsistence, determine the excess or deficit of the land fund, the branches of agriculture for which requirements in land have been satisfied, who are entitled to enjoying the land . . . etc.

21. The Cantonal Land Committee will take all measures for the maintenance of scientifically cultivated agricultural developments, fix the area of land to be allowed to these, and take charge of their management. It will establish the branches of rural economy necessary for the State (model farms, breeding establishments, beet plantations, etc.) and provide for their administration.

22. It will fix the cost of agricultural labour, by the day or by contract, and supervise the carrying out of the terms of employment.

23. The Cantonal Land Committees will determine the number of labourers required for working the lands. In case of a shortage, they will arrange

for bringing the necessary labour from elsewhere.

24. The operations of the Cantonal Land Committees should be co-ordinated with those of the District and Government Land Committees.

All disagreements between cantons and Canton Committees are settled by the District Land Committees.

In the name of the Russian Republic,
The People's Commissioner of Agriculture,
MILIOUTINE.

CHAPTER IV

THE INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM

The Organization of Workers' Control—The Nationalization of Banking and of Foreign Commerce—The Present State of Industry—The Future—Appendix: Official Text of the Decree on Workers' Control.

ALTHOUGH they enacted the fundamental laws of their system on matters of land ownership on the very day of their accession to power, the Bolsheviks hesitated longer to put into the form of law the system which they wanted to apply to industry. The promulgation of land laws, as we have seen, was a political necessity. It was necessary to reassure the peasants immediately, and win them over to the Bolshevist cause by positive and tangible political action. The industrial workers, on the other hand, were entirely won over to the Bolsheviks, politically, as they constituted the main body of the troops who participated in the October Revolution.

Moreover, the industrial problem was merely one of legal sanction, of legislative adjustment. Actually the industrial system had for some time involved

the exercise by the workers of a tyrannical control over all industrial enterprises. In formulating legislation intended to legalize the system, there was no new material benefit which might be brought forward. All that could be done was to limit the powers which up to that time had been unlimited.

From the very first day, Lenine and Trotzky began talking of the establishment of control by the workers as if it were a reform accomplished by the mere accession to power of Bolshevism and the working class.

The Bolsheviks contented themselves with effecting a few minor reforms. On October 29 (old style) the government published a decree establishing the eight-hour day. The decree was to take effect immediately. In another communique, October 31, the Bolsheviks announced to the working class of Russia and to the poor of the towns and villages that they were about to prepare a series of laws for a complete system of social insurance "for all wage earning workers without exception as well as for the poor of the cities and villages." The insurance was to cover accident, sickness, infirmity, old age, pregnancy, widowhood, orphanhood, and unemployment. It was to be entirely at the expense of the employers.

The fundamental reform of the organization of control by the workers was delayed. The proposal of the government was not submitted to the "All-Russian Council of Workers' Control" until December 14, 1917 (old style). A preliminary study had been made of it by a commission consisting of representatives of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants'

Deputies, the All-Russian Soviet of Trades Unions, the All-Russian Headquarters of Shop and Factory Committees, and the Economic Division of the Moscow Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies (Milioutine, Larine, Antipov, Smedevitch and others).

In each industrial enterprise, responsibility for control is vested in a "General Assembly of Workers and Employés" of the plant. This General Assembly elects a special "Commission of Control," to which regular workers (in the narrow sense), technicians, and other employés are eligible (Art. 1 and 2.) This commission has exclusive charge of all relations between the workers and the management (Arts. 3 and 4). It decides upon the amount of raw material, the equipment and the personnel required to operate the plant. It lays down regulations governing the discipline of the workers. It co-operates with the management in estimating costs of production. In one word, it is responsible for the internal technical organization of the plant.

But the Commission of Control does not participate in the management of the enterprise, and has no responsibility for developing or operating the plant (Art. 7). It has no concern with questions of finance (Art. 8). The right to give orders about the management of the enterprise, its development, and its operation, is reserved to the owner, who bears the responsibility for such orders (Art. 7).

All decisions of the Commission of Control of each plant are subject to appeal to the Commission of Control and Distribution of the Trades Union exercising jurisdiction (Art. 8).

Briefly summarized, this legal system did nothing more than stabilize the actually existing system which had been gradually worked out in industry before the advent of the Bolsheviks to power.

Direct expropriation was elevated to the dignity of a principle for only one class of pursuit. The following decree was promulgated on December 14 (old style) by the Central Committee of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies:

"In the interest of a regular organization of popular finance:

"I. Banking is declared a state monopoly.

"II. All stock companies engaged in private banking and all banking agencies are annexed to the State Bank.

"IV. The method by which private banks are to be consolidated with the State Bank will be defined by a special decree.

"V. The direction of private banks is transferred provisionally to the Council of the State Bank.

"VI. The interests of small depositors will be completely safeguarded."

More or less extensive proposals for the nationalization of foreign commerce and shipping were taken up and studied at several different times. As to the industrial system of the future, the Bolshevist leaders continued to take a vague position, defending the idea of voluntary economic organization, and refusing to lay down regulations *a priori* for a legal system.

On May 26, 1918, Lenine made this statement to the Congress of Soviets of National Economy:

"The less we need have recourse to governmental machinery, the stronger will be our economic organizations, such, for example, as the Soviets of National Economy, whose future development will be in direct ratio to a constantly improving organization of socialist production. To attempt to create complex forms of organization by means of laws is impossible. The indispensable thing is to realize and solve in practice the problems that actually arise among the proletariat, and to the extent to which these problems are realized and solved, the proletariat will learn to realize and apply socialism in all its forms. . . ."

On the whole, the legal reforms brought about by the Bolsheviks in the industrial order, amounted to little. But once more it will not do to confine ourselves to an analysis of texts and statements.

In reality the advent of the Bolsheviks to power brought about, through an increasingly confused and increasingly tyrannical intrusion of workers, trades representatives and local representatives in the administration of enterprises, a deep industrial unrest, which was bound to lead to ruin.

One example will suffice to indicate the nature and the extent of the evil. The Moscow Committee on Cotton, in a meeting held on April 11, 1918, fixed the quantity of cotton required for the current semester (March 15 to October 1, excluding the Easter vacation of two weeks) at 6,654,000 pouds. Adding to this amount the required two months' reserve, they arrived at a total of 8,827,000 pouds to cover all needs. The reserves reached 4,400,000 pouds. Consequently, 4,470,000 pouds of raw

material brought to hand would have been sufficient to keep the factories from closing down. But the railroads were in such a critical condition that it was impossible to provide for the shipment of so large a quantity of cotton from Turkestan to the Moscow factories. Furthermore, the amount of naphtha required for the operation of these factories during the same period of time, was estimated at thirty million or thirty-five million pouds. Transportation facilities were very poor. Finally, many factories were congested with manufactured products, while in certain regions there was a scarcity of cotton fabrics, because the distribution of these was centralized in the hands of the "Centro-Textile," which was still inexperienced in such work. To combat a crisis as complex in its causes and its consequences as this one, what did the "Centro-Textile," the central agency of the textile workers, propose to do? In a meeting held on April 17, it declared for the shutting down of the textile industry for a period of from two to four weeks, as a measure of necessity, thus preparing the way for a new crisis upon the heels of the first.

After a few months of the Bolshevist régime, all the whole industrial life of the nation presented the same spectacle of helpless disorder and ruin.

But this disorder in material and technical things is only one and not the most serious of the consequences of the industrial crisis produced by Bolshevism. This system smashes and destroys the material capital of Russian industry as if with gusto, but especially and above all else, it enfeebles and exhausts working capital, human capital. It is safe

to say that the Bolshevist Revolution is accepted so passively by the masses of the Russian people only because in their eyes it is a régime of idleness, speculation, and trade, in which wealth is to be had without work. The soldier, the sailor, the labourer, the "dvornik," and the "moujik," all of these trade, cheat and speculate on all occasions and in all sorts of things—a bag of apples which they had hidden in the cellar, furniture from their barracks which they sell to the by-passer, the cigarettes which they can steal—but no one works earnestly, and no one likes his work. When work cannot be avoided, every effort is made to reduce its intensity and diminish its output. The workman does not want to work less time or to gain more, or rather he wants to do this only indirectly; what he wants first of all, is to do less work, to make a lesser effort. The whole collective labour campaign is in this direction, and the tactics of individuals as well. When a workman takes a job, it becomes evident after a few days that his whole effort and all his ingenuity, which is considerable, are directed towards reducing the intensity of his labour, even though his own income suffers as a result. Thus it is that the premium on production, no matter how high it may be, is powerless to increase output.

This, it would seem, is the most formidable danger of the economic crisis engendered by the moral atmosphere of Bolshevism; for on this road the Bolshevist program does not come into collision with the natural social tendencies of the Russian people. On the contrary, it goes in the very same direction as the inner spirit of the race. It does not involve a sud-

den overturning of the previous economic order, a revolution, but a mere social retrogression, a return to the primitive forms of national economy. Russia which for two centuries was making an effort, under foreign direction, to adapt itself economically and socially to the system of occidental civilizations, returns with a kind of voluptuousness, which though unconscious it finds very sweet, to the forms of the somnolent civilizations of the orient. And because of this the economic and social consequences of the Bolshevist régime will probably reach out into the future beyond the fall of the régime itself as represented by Lenine, Trotzky, and their associates.

"Occidentals" cannot fail to note that the Russian Revolution, so permeated with socialist mysticism, in taking this course, is going in a direction exactly opposite to that of its goal, for all occidental experience goes to prove that a close relation exists between the growth of liberty for the labourer and the productive intensity of labour. It must, in fact, be recognized that the Bolshevist leaders, brought up on occidental and particularly on Marxian socialist literature, perceived this danger and denounced it. But their timid attempts to react against it proved futile and were very quickly abandoned.

Such in its broad outlines is the industrial order set up by the Bolsheviks in Russia. It is clearly revolutionary in its essence, and in the forms of its doctrine and the text of its laws, it is coherent, logical, and even cautious. But in practice, by reason of the force of its thoroughgoing system, and especially by reason of the temperament of the race, it ends in anarchy in social relationship of individuals, and

in the wasting and ruining of material economic forces. Such a régime cannot long survive. Doubtless as a result of the hereditary passiveness and the elemental nature of the needs of the Russian masses, it will survive longer in Russia than it would in any other western country. But in spite of everything it is doomed to disappear. A state of agony is not a normal régime for a society which has sources of vitality as rich as those of modern Russia.

But whatever the régime of the future may be, in its social and economic structure it will have to take account of the Bolshevist Revolution. It will not be able to reject it all, and either willingly or perforce, it will have to reap a part of the burdensome harvest of obligations sown by that revolution. Ruin of individuals, violent changes in people's fortunes and functions, complete confusion in the social and economic hierarchy—there are surely enough to leave profound and lasting traces of the present régime.

But there are two great social phenomena, making themselves felt at the present time, and in so marked a fashion that they should dominate the coming social and economic development of Russia, no matter what sort of political system succeeds to Bolshevism. These two phenomena, which our examination has attempted to bring out, are the inauguration of a new land system, which we have already described, and the collapse of industrialization.

The industrialization of Russia was begun, of course, in relatively recent times and by foreigners. For a long time—until the middle of the nineteenth century—the administrative organization of Russian

society constituted an almost insuperable obstacle to the development of native industrial life.

The bourgeois class, or as the official texts put it, the class of city residents, was divided into three categories, or "guilds," according to their capital. The first guild consisted of those who declared a capital of fifty-thousand rubles; the second, of those who declared a capital of twenty thousand, the third, of those who declared a capital of eight thousand. The first and second guilds could found factories, and engage in any kind of business or industry. The third class could lawfully engage only in running hotels and bathing establishments, and in retail business. In the middle of the nineteenth century, there were 900 merchants of the first guild, 1,900 of the second, 34,000 of the third, and 5,300 serfs carrying on business with the permission of their masters. The total number of individuals engaged in business did not exceed 50,000. A class as limited and as tightly closed as this did not constitute a very promising basis for the growth of national industry. And national industry was very poorly represented. First came the tanning industry, which numbered about a hundred plants. Coarse woollen cloth was manufactured in some fifty factories operating 1,700 looms. At the close of the eighteenth century there existed a single factory at Jamburg for the manufacture of fine woollens, and this one employed only foreign labourers, treated only Spanish wool, and was a big expense to the Imperial Treasury. Some linens were manufactured in Yaroslav, Moscow, and Archangel; velvets, damask, taffetas, and rich materials in Moscow and other places in its vicinity.

Throughout the nineteenth century the development of industry on a large scale was slow, but it made a considerable advance after 1880. On the eve of the war of 1914, Moscow alone could count about 8,800 industrial enterprises—cotton manufacture, spinning, dyeing, metallurgy, wool weaving and silk weaving, tanning, distilling, etc.—employing 350,000 labourers. In the Donetz, the mining and metallurgical industry had developed greatly. And there were other industrial centres in Poland and the Caucasus.

But these industrial enterprises were almost entirely in the hands of foreigners, who provided not only the capital and the management, but also the technical personnel for the subordinate positions as far down as foreman. The total French capital alone invested in Russian industrial enterprises rose to the neighbourhood of two billion francs (nominal capital) in 1910.

Among the older or more important enterprises founded with French capital, should be mentioned first the group of large French firms in Moscow, most of them nearly a century old. Such are the silk mill of Giraud and Son (one of the largest spinning establishments in the world), and those of Moussy, and of Simonod; then there are the perfumery manufacturers, Brocard, Rallet, and Siou. Finally there are silk-throwing factories, ribbon factories, and others.

Then comes the group of large stock companies, which after 1880, raised their capital in the French market. These are: 1. The Briansk steel works which, originally capitalized at 1,066,680 francs,

increased its capital to 32,234,000 and later to 64,467,000 francs. 2. The Makeevka Company, a coal and metal corporation founded in 1895 with a capital of 2,500,000 rubles gold, which was increased to 17,500,000 francs by the issue of preferred stock to the creditors. 3. The Sosnovice Mining Company whose mines and works represent an initial capital of about 34,220,000 francs, to which must be added securities amounting to 20,000,000 francs. 4. The Dombrowa Colliers, which were founded in 1878 with a capital of 6,000,000 francs later increased to 16,000,000. 5. The Krivoi-Rig Company (iron ore) founded in 1880 with a capital of 5,000,000 francs, which was increased to 7,000,000, and then to 9,000,000, representing a real capital of 12,000,000 francs.

To these should be added the Dneprovienne Company (metallurgy), capitalized at 28,000,000 francs; the South Russian Rock Salt and Coal works, 29,000,000 francs; the Ural-Volga Company (metallurgy), 7,500,000 francs; the Russian Omnium (mining and metallurgy), 15,000,000 francs; the Kerch Company (metallurgy), 40,000,000 francs; the Tula Company (cartridge makers), 40,000,000 francs; the Donetz Iron and Steel Works, 12,000,000 francs, etc.

These great industries supplied with modern and often excellent equipment might have vied with foreign industries of the same class. But the economic conditions which surrounded them had never been very favourable. A few odd enterprises flourished. The majority had yielded always but wretched financial returns. A careful study of

the financial history of French enterprises in Russia bears out the statement that the billion and a half of French capital invested in Russian industry during the last forty years has not yielded more than an average profit of one per cent.

The prospects of these ventures, despite outward appearances of magnificent prosperity, had been further undermined since the beginning of the War of 1914 by wild speculation in every kind of stock. Inflations of capital, corresponding to no actual industrial development and merely covering up questionable financial transactions, had multiplied to an extent that was bound to be disturbing to all substantial investors and to imperil the future of ventures whose stock, to use the American expression, was so fearfully watered.[1]

Still, by reason of the expected development of industrial wants in post-bellum Russia, the future looked so auspicious, that there was room for all sorts of hopes. But then came the Bolshevist crisis to administer the coup-de-grace to the great industries of Russia. Everywhere, the factories were almost emptied of their foreign managing personnel. Their equipment, sometimes abandoned, or allowed to run down, more often dismantled and sold in bits by the workers, was made useless and beyond repair. The Russian personnel, consisting largely of "non-qualified" workers, returned to the village where they really belonged. All the healthy elements in the gradual industrialization of the country disappeared. Without material and without personnel, Russian industry is doomed to impotence for years to come.

[1] The new issues during the first eight months of 1916 rose to 525 million rubles.

Moreover, since after the present crisis the need for manufactured products will increase with the democratization of wealth resulting from the revolution,[2] large demands will necessarily have to be made upon imports from abroad. Russia will be able to give only natural products in exchange. One may, therefore, prophesy that for many years to come the industrialization of the country, which has been suddenly curbed, will give way to an essentially commercial national economy.

2 The continual rise in prices, the great inflation of money in circulation (arising from the uncertainty of economic conditions and the obstacles put in the way of saving by Bolshevist legislation), the constant issuing of paper money which was scattered like manna among the workers—all these things will hasten this democratization of wealth. And we must not forget a final factor which is of prime importance—the thefts, robberies, and plunderings committed during the whole period of unrest covered by the revolution. There was not a soldier who, at the time of the self-declared demobilization, did not return home with several thousand rubles which he had acquired by one means or another (sale of military equipment, pillage, etc.).

INSTRUCTIONS ON WORKERS' CONTROL
(Official Text)

I. *Agencies of Workers' Control in Each Enterprise*

I. Control in each enterprise is organized either by the Shop or Factory Committee, or by the General Assembly of workers and employés of the enterprise, who elect a Special Commission of Control.

II. The Shop or Factory Committee may be included in its entirety in the Control Commission, to which may be elected also, technical experts and other employés of the enterprise. In large scale enterprises, a participation of the employés in the Control Commission is compulsory. In large scale enterprises a portion of the members of the Control Commission is elected by trade sections and corps, at the rate of one to each trade section or corps.

III. The workers and employés not members of the Control Commission may not enter into relations with the management of the enterprise on the subject of control, except upon the direct order and with the previous authorization of the Commission.

IV. The Control Commission is responsible for its activity to the General Assembly of

employés and workers of the enterprise, as well as to the agency of workers' control upon which it is dependent and under the direction of which it functions. It makes a report of its activity at least twice a month to these two bodies.

II. *Duties and Privileges of the Control Commission.*

V. The Control Commission of each enterprise is required:

1. To determine the stock of goods and fuel possessed by the plant, and the amount of these needed respectively for the machinery of production, the technical personnel, and the labourers by specialities.
2. To determine to what extent the plant is provided with everything that is necessary to insure its normal operation.
3. To forecast whether there is danger of the plant closing down or lowering production, and what the causes are.
4. To determine the number of workers by specialities likely to be unemployed, basing the estimate upon the reserve supply and the expected receipts of fuel and materials.
5. To determine the measures to be taken

to maintain discipline in work among the workers and employés.

6. To superintend the execution of the decisions of governmental agencies regulating the buying and selling of goods.
7. To prevent the arbitrary removal of machines, materials, fuel, etc., from the plant without authorization from the agencies which regulate economic affairs, and to see that inventories are not tampered with.
7. (Part 2.) To assist in explaining the causes of the lowering of production and to take measures for raising it.
8. To assist in elucidating the possibility of a complete or partial utilization of the plant for some kind of production (especially how to pass from a war to a peace footing, and what kind of production should be undertaken), to determine what changes should be made in the equipment of the plant and in the number of its personnel, to accomplish this purpose; to determine in what period of time these changes can be effected; to determine what is necessary in order to make them, and the probable amount of production after the change is made to another kind of manufacture.
9. To aid in the study of the possibility of developing the kinds of labour required

by the necessities of peace times, such as the method of using three shifts of workmen, or any other method, by furnishing information on the possibilities of housing the additional number of labourers and their families.

10. To see that the production of the plant is maintained at the figures to be fixed by the governmental regulating agencies, and until such time as these figures shall have been fixed, to see that the production reaches the normal average for the plant, judged by a standard of conscientious labour.
11. To co-operate in estimating costs of production of the plant upon the demand of the higher agency of workers' control or upon the demand of the governmental regulating institutions.

VI. Upon the owner of the plant, the decisions of the Control Commission which are intended to assure him the possibility of accomplishing the objects stated in the preceding articles, are binding. In particular the Commission may, of itself or through its delegates:

1. Inspect the business correspondence of the plant, all the books and all the accounts pertaining to its past or present operation.
2. Inspect all the divisions of the plant-shops, stores, offices, etc.

3. Be present at meetings of the representatives of the directing agencies; make statements and address interpellations to them on all questions relating to control.

VII. The right to give orders to the directors of the plant, and the management and operation of the plant are reserved to the owner. The Control Commission does not participate in the management of the plant and has no responsibility for its development and operation. This responsibility rests upon the owner.

VIII. The Control Commission is not concerned with financial questions of the plant. If such questions arise they are forwarded to the governmental regulating institutions.

IX. The Control Commission of each enterprise may, through the higher organ of workers' control, recommend for the consideration of the governmental regulating institutions, the question of the sequestration of the plant or other measures of constraint upon the plant, but it has not the right to seize and direct the enterprise.

III. *Resources of the Control Commission of Each Plant.*

X. To cover the expenses of the Control Commission, the owner is bound to place

at its disposal not more than two per cent. of the amount paid out by the plant in wages. The wages lost by the members of the Factory or Shop Committee and by the members of the Control Commission as a result of performing their duties during working hours when they cannot be performed otherwise, are paid out of this two per cent. account. Control over expenditures from the above mentioned fund is exercised by the Commission of Control and Distribution of the Trade Union of the industrial branch concerned.

IV. *Higher Agencies of Workers' Control.*

XI. The organ immediately superior to the Control Commission of each enterprise consists of the Commission of Control and Distribution of the Trade Union of the industrial branch to which the plant in question belongs.

All decisions of the Control Commissions of each enterprise may be appealed to the Commission of Control and distribution of the trade union exercising jurisdiction.

XII. At least half of the members of the Commission of Control and Distribution are elected by the Control Commissions (or their delegates) of all plants belonging to the same branch of industry. These are

convened by the directors of the Trade Union. The other members are elected by the directors, or by delegates, or else by the General Assembly of the Trade Union. Engineers, statisticians, and other persons who may be of use, are eligible to election to membership in the Commission of Control and Distribution.

XIII. The executive directorate of the Union is authorized to direct and review the activity of the Commission of Control and Distribution and of the Control Commission of each plant under its jurisdiction.

XIV. The Control Commission of each plant constitutes the executive agency of the Commission of Control and Distribution for its branch of industry, and is bound to make its activity conform to the decisions of the latter.

XV. The Commission of Control and Distribution of the Trade Union has the authority of its own accord to convene the General Assembly of workers and employés of each enterprise, to require new elections of Control Commissions of each plant, and likewise to propose to the governmental regulating agencies the temporary closing down of plants or the dismissal of all the personnel or of a part of it, in case the workers employed in the plant will not submit to its decisions.

XVI. The Commission of Control and Distribution has entire control over all branches of

industry within its district, and according to the needs of any one plant in fuel, materials, equipment, etc., assists that plant in obtaining supplies from the reserve of other plants of the same kind either in active operation or idle. If other means cannot be found, it proposes to the Governmental Regulating Commissions to close down particular plants so that others may be sustained, or to place the workmen and employés of plants which have been closed down, either temporarily or definitively, in other plants engaged in the same kind of manufacture, or to take any other measures which are likely to prevent the closing down of plants or an interruption in their operation or which are thought capable of ensuring the regular operation of said plants in conformity with the plans and decisions of the governmental regulating agencies.

Remark—The Commissions of Control and Distribution issue technical instructions for the Control Commissions of each plant of their branch of industry and according to their technical specialities. These instructions must not in any respect be inconsistent with these regulations.

XVII. Appeal may be made against all decisions and all acts of the Commission of Control and Distribution to the regional Council of Workers' Control.

XVIII. The operating expenses of the Commis-

sion of Control and Distribution for each branch of industry are covered by the balances in the treasury of each plant (Art. 17) and by equal assessments on the State and the trades union exercising jurisdiction.

XIX. The Local Council of Workers' Control considers and decides all questions of a general nature for all or for any of the Commissions of Control and Distribution of a given locality and co-ordinates their activity to conform with advices received from the All-Russian Council of Control by the Workers.

XX. Each Council of Control by the Workers should enact compulsory regulations to govern the working discipline of the workmen and employés of the plants under its jurisdiction.

XXI. The Local Council of Workers' Control may establish within it a Council of experts, economists, statisticians, engineers, or other persons who may be useful.

XXII. The All-Russian Council of Workers' Control may charge the All-Russian Trade Union or the regional Trade Union of any branch of industry with the duty of forming an All-Russian Commission or a Regional Commission of Control and Distribution, for the given branch of industry. The regulations for such an All-Russian or Regional Commission of Control and Distribution, drafted by the Union, must be

approved by the All-Russian Council of Workers' Control.

XXIII. All decisions of the All-Russian Soviet of Workers' Control and all decisions of other governmental regulating agencies in the realm of economic regularization are binding upon all the agencies of the institution of workers' control.

XXIV. These regulations are binding upon all institutions of workers' control, and apply *in toto* to plants which employ one hundred or more workmen and employés. Control over plants employing a smaller personnel will be effected as far as possible on the basis of these instructions as a model.

CONCLUSION

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"It is evident, Timopheitch," they said, "that you are smarter than we are, so that you don't have to take counsel of us other fools. Lead us where you will. Though sorrows are many, death comes but once."

TOLSTOI: "Yermak."

Such is the picture of Bolshevist Russia.

For a long time in the salons of the diplomats and the boudoirs of the exiles from Slavism, it was considered the proper thing to say with a discreetly contemptuous smile: "It's nothing. . . ."

It's nothing but a handful of traitors bought up by Germany for a few coppers, who in a few days, will be sent back to their taverns in Geneva and Zurich and Paris by the good sense of the people. . . . And these few days stretched out to weeks and then to months. . . .

It's nothing but the overflow of riot, rising for the moment to break its dirty waves in foam against the throne, where—it goes without saying—the golden soporific wisdom of a well fattened bourgeoisie is bound to succeed the bankruptcy of czardom.

It's nothing but the bad dream of an hour of anarchy.

Oh! Irony of history! Catherine II. wrote to Grimm in 1792 that two thousand Cossacks would be sufficient to restore the monarchy in France, "the example of Belgium proving how little you need to reckon with unorganized resistance."

And yet, people had to admit that it amounted to something.

After saying "It's nothing" for a while, they began saying: "It's a plague."

One evening in February, 1918, a diplomat who prided himself on democratic sentiments—such things happen—confided to me with ill concealed anxiety:

"Look here, my dear friend, there's a lot of talk just now about a League of Nations. . . . Well, take my word for it, after the war the League of Nations will be a bourgeois 'Holy Alliance' directed against Bolshevism."

The prophecy was not without foundation.

But along came President Wilson, who, with his absurd idealism and democratic honesty, proved a bull in a china shop and proceeded to stick his clumsy hoofs through the delicate porcelain of this "Holy Alliance."

Behind the unseeing and the "utilitarians" came a number of honest but poorly informed gentlemen. Oh! the heavy responsibility borne by our war "informers" who said "Why Bolshevism is a servile revolution. . . ."

The definition given of "servile revolution" by that great democratic idealist, Edgar Quinet in the fine preface to his drama "The Slaves," is familiar.

"I call by the name of servile revolution," he says, "any revolution which sets for itself a material goal,

not related to any kind of moral progress, or any kind of spiritual or religious emancipation. . . . Mark that spirit which in the strength of its revolt gives not a thought to freeing itself . . . from the débris of the ruin it has wrought, it keeps overthrowing slavery and never realizes that it carries the germs of slavery within itself and is giving a new birth to it with each breath."

No doubt, in some of the aspects which we have witnessed, the Bolshevist Revolution is a servile revolution. A servile revolution with the soldiers selling their material piece-meal to the enemy for a few rubles—so much for a cannon, so much for a horse. A servile revolution, with the "Red Guards," pillaging and plundering at their pleasure, under pretence of requisition or search directed against counter-revolution. A servile revolution, with workmen selling and re-selling the tools and the raw materials of the factory. A servile revolution, with the peasants massacring their former masters and sacking their castles.

And yet . . . these men I have seen in the bare rooms of the "Smolny," as in the offices of the local soviets in town or country, eating a plain bowl of "kasha" placed on the corner of a table, littered with papers, these men, most of whom have passed several years of their lives in the Czar's prisons or in the jails of Siberia, are not merely the leaders of a servile revolution. The stubborn and visionary mysticism of Lenine is not setting itself a mere "material goal."

And yet . . . these primitive and sweet natured people who have no wants, who pile on top

of each other in the trains and sleep in the provincial depots stretched out pell-mell in all the corridors, who keep going mournfully and plaintively on towards they know not what vague goal, these people who have in them so little materialism, who wanted the land "religiously," who burn the castles but never think of sleeping in the castle beds, who believe in the revolution because they have a mystical need of believing in something . . . no, this people is not the herd of a servile revolution.

It is going towards a very vague future, that it does not clearly perceive, but which is there in its primitive soul like "the real presence" in the Host to the believer.

What future? We know not. The times are troubled. No one is the master of events. We can only venture hypotheses.

For my part, I do not believe that Bolshevism is a system that can survive. You cannot build society against culture and intelligence.

The task of Bolshevism has been and remains purely negative. It has made impossible any such return to the past as the weariness of the worthy moujik confidently expected to find waiting at the door of the revolution.

The ground is now levelled. But the materials are not ready and the plan is barely sketched in confusion and in blood. . . . But what of that! It is a recognized truth that the West works in space, the East in time. The future works itself out in the present.

I believe that Bolshevist Russia, if it is not crushed by the "Holy Alliance" of my diplomat, will pre-

pare for humanity the spectacle of a singular democracy, such as the world will not have known until then, a democracy, which will not be made up of gradual conquests plucked by shreds from a plutocratic bourgeoisie, but which will build itself up out of the very stuff of the people, a democracy which will not descend from the powerful ones to the people, as in all present forms of society, but which will rise voluntarily and surely from the unorganized and uncultivated folk to an organizing intelligence.

And the experiment, perhaps, will not be without interest.

THE END

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