# MAKING BOLSHEVIKS

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# На мировом экране

Рис. Гр. Розе.


ЗРИТЕЛИ хорош—Но нравится мне из этих „крупные планы", из этих „кадры"!

CARTOON FROM "YOUNG COMMUNIST *PRAVDA*"
OF NOVEMBER 7, 1929

# MAKING BOLSHEVIKS

By SAMUEL N. HARPER
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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# INTRODUCTION

This volume represents six lectures, given under the auspices of the University College, of the University of Chicago, in the autumn of 1930 after a visit to Soviet Russia during the spring and summer. The lectures are reproduced substantially as they were delivered before an audience. The title under which the lectures were announced was "The New Cadres of Soviet Russia," with the indication for each lecture of the particular group which would be discussed: "The Communist Party-Worker," "The Young Communist," "The Shock-Brigade Workman," "The Collectivist-Peasant," "The Soviet Cultural-Worker," and "The Redarmyist." A Soviet cartoon, reproduced as the frontispiece of this volume, had suggested the title of the lectures, and particularly the use of the word "cadres"; and also had served as the basis on which were selected, from the many aspects of the Revolution in Soviet Russia, the particular subjects under which to present, in six lectures, some of the principles, methods, achievements, and further objectives of the Revolution.

The cartoon itself is historically interesting. It appeared in the November 7, 1929, number of one of the most important newspapers of the Soviet press, the "Young Communist *Pravda*," the official organ of the large and important Communist organization of the

youth. The date was the anniversary of the Revolution. Stalin, already by that time the undisputed leader, contributed an article on the "Year of the Great Turning-Point." The first year of the Five-Year Plan had been completed, and the official statistics on expansion of industry and the development of capital construction showed a successful accomplishment of the arduous task which the leaders had set themselves and the country. The plan was being realized, Stalin declared; and it was being put across by the cadres, or leading and organizing groups of the Soviet system. These cadres represented new types of citizens, with new attitudes, the products of the political and cultural aspects of the Revolution.

The word "cadre" was used by the cartoonist because it had become current in Soviet terminology to designate the organizing, mobilizing nucleus in any group or community. A military term in origin, meaning the framework of organization, the permanent staff into which larger numbers can be mobilized, it had been adopted very properly because of the militant attitude and approach to all problems and tasks which is characteristic of the Revolution. These new cadres are building a new social order, are "building Socialism," to use the most current expression of present-day Soviet Russia, the leading slogan of a new period of Bolshevism that took form about two years ago. This process involves the elimination or "liquidation," as the Communists express it, of other groups, who were the leading or ruling classes of the

previous order. All this is taking place in Soviet Russia, but it is a picture for the whole world to look at and to study, as Stalin writes in his article and the cartoonist emphasizes in his picture.

In the cartoon entitled "On the World-Screen" the map shows what Soviet Russia will have in the way of state-owned new power plants, factories, large-scale grain-growing establishments, and collectivized farms with the completion of the Five-Year Plan of economic expansion. This development is to be brought about by the initiative of selected and trained organizing groups, who are to set the example, supply the leadership, and particularly develop in themselves methods of work and an attitude toward work which will be the distinctive features of the new social order. These new cadres are represented by the six profile faces and are: the *Partiets*, or Communist party-worker; the *Komsomolets*, the member of the *Komsomol*, the Communist Union of Youth; the *Udarnik*, or shock-brigade workman; the *Kolkhoznik*, or collectivist-peasant; the *Kultrabotnik*, which has been translated "cultural-worker"; and the *Krasnoarmeets*, which can be rendered "Redarmyist."

The leading groups of the old, overthrown order, who are to be eliminated by this process of development and who, to quote the cartoonist, "do not like the big plans and these cadres," are: the capitalist, that is, the private manufacturer, merchant, or trader; the so-called "rich peasant"; the engineer or manager trained under the pre-revolutionary régime,

and the "renegade" Socialist. Had the cartoon been drawn a few months later, another figure would have been included, that of a priest. In Moscow's eyes the renegade Socialist is the Socialist or labor leader who has betrayed the cause of the workmen and peasants by co-operating with the capitalists, fearing direct and open conflict, eschewing class struggle in the literal sense of the term. This type has appeared even among the Communists at Moscow; and he, too, is to be eliminated.

Although only profile faces of the new cadres are given, a marked similarity in general appearance is noticeable. Had the full figures been given, a similarity in dress would have been noted. On the other hand, the faces and clothes of the figures at the bottom, of the old classes, show class distinctions and differentiation. The Revolution is fighting for the elimination not only of certain classes but of all class distinctions. The new cadres will eventually bring the classless society—the co-operative commonwealth, the triumph of Communism. Therefore, another of the lessons of the cartoon is that a common basis and a common interest as among the six groups guarantee unity of aim and action.

Before discussing the new plans and the new cadres, a word must be said on the general setting of the new period of Bolshevism in which the new forces are carrying out the new building. Whatever one thinks of the principles and methods of the Revolution, the fact that it has just completed its thirteenth year

makes one pause and consider. New and formidable forces have developed during these thirteen years. The first period of the Revolution, with its violent civil war, in which Red Army fought White Army, and terror and reprisals were practiced widely on both sides, and outside countries intervened, seems a long way back, particularly as this first period was followed by one in which social peace tended to prevail. There was at first militant Communism. Then came the New Economic Policy, in 1921, which represented a retreat from the direct assault on so-called "capitalistic" principles. The retreat was explained at the time as only temporary, although many believed that it would prove to be permanent.

By 1928 both socialistic and capitalistic elements were in existence, and in sharp competition for victory. The Communist leaders thought the development of socialistic elements in the economic structure, and the growth of corresponding new attitudes, would make successful, this time, a second direct drive for Socialism. This thought was intensified by the realization that if matters were allowed to drift, there was the possibility of the re-establishment of the former capitalistic order. So a "resumption of the socialistic offensive" was declared. There came logically a "sharpening of the class struggle." Policies and methods suggesting the first period of militant Communism were adopted. The Five-Year Plan was the program of this new drive for Socialism.

The Five-Year Plan is generally thought of abroad

as a program of economic expansion, of industrialization of an agricultural country, and the reorganization of agriculture on collectivist principles. It is that, but it is something more. It has its political side, where it is a program of class struggle. The capitalistic elements in the country are to be practically eliminated by the completion of the program, and the process is to be political as well as economic. A current slogan behind the resumption of the socialistic offensive calls for the "pulling out of capitalism by the roots"; in the first period of the Revolution only the head had been cut off, and the plant had been allowed to flower again under the New Economic Policy. It is in an atmosphere of active struggle to liquidate all hostile "capitalistic" elements in their own country, and to catch up with and outstrip other "capitalistic" countries in economic development and rate of expansion, that workmen and peasants are called on by their Communist leaders to work for the successful execution of the Five-Year Plan. It is this psychological side of the Five-Year Plan that will be emphasized in the discussion of the cadres.

The amount of attention given to this "front" of the Revolution by its leaders testifies to the importance which they attach to the psychological factor. The success of the Five-Year Plan is dependent in large measure on the effectiveness of the education and propaganda among the masses, which have been going on from the very beginning of the Revolution, and continue as part of the Five-Year Plan, as the

latter's program on the so-called "cultural front." As the Communist leaders assert more and more frequently in the day-to-day progress of their programs of economic development, all the objective material conditions for the success of the Five-Year Plan are at hand; the Soviet Union has the necessary raw materials and labor power. The most important task is that of developing the proper attitude in the political leadership, and in the workman and peasant masses under this leadership.

The selection and use of words in Soviet writings and official terminology give another illustration of the importance of the psychological factor. It will be recalled that in the first year of the Revolution the Communists were always referred to as "Bolsheviks," and their methods and principles came to be known as "Bolshevism." This term was pushed aside at home and abroad by the words "Communist" and "Soviet," the latter term designating the form of governmental structure set up. On the resumption of the socialistic offensive with its policies and methods suggestive of the earlier period, the word "Bolshevik" became again current. The Communist often refers to himself as the Bolshevik. The pace he sets for the people to follow is a Bolshevik pace. The masses are all urged to work Bolshevik fashion, to meet obstacles as Bolsheviks should meet them. The first extensive sowing of wheat on collectivist principles came to be called always the "Bolshevik sowing." Many similar illustrations of the special use of the word "Bolshevik"

could be given. On the basis of this revived use of the word by the Communists, one may speak of a new period of Bolshevism. Frequently an institution or a policy are described as aiming to "make a Bolshevik." "Making Bolsheviks" is therefore an appropriate title for a discussion of the new cadres of Soviet Russia. The new cadres are Bolsheviks in the formal sense of members of the Communist party or its preparatory school, "The Communist Union of Youth," or are working Bolshevik fashion in factory, field, or schoolroom, or are receiving a Communist or Bolshevik training in the Red Army.

The Five-Year Plan on its economic side is one of new construction, of increase of production and of rates of expansion in industry, and of collectivization and increase of production in agriculture. Costs of production and distribution are to be decreased, while productivity and wages are to be increased. The net result will be a higher standard of living and increased leisure, with wider and richer opportunities to use this increased leisure time. The international implications of this promise, economic and political, are always noted—the possibility of underselling capitalism in world-markets, and the appeal to toilers of other countries. All this is statistically outlined for each group and subgroup and for each economic field, and the quota assigned to each group is figured out and brought to the attention of that group. There are constant reports on progress and also on falling behind. These statistics are used to

increase interest and productivity and to stir up enthusiasm. When the many devices to attain these ends are described, the official statistics will be used. It is not the aim here to analyze the statistics of the Five-Year Plan. The official figures must be accepted, for there are no others; and for the purposes of the discussion of the psychological side of the Five-Year Plan they are not only adequate but they are the important, determining ones, the ones given the masses as indexes of success of their efforts under Communist leadership. If for this or that reason these figures are not approximately correct, there will of course be a serious reckoning at some time in the future.

The Five-Year Plan provides for economic development, but the present economic situation in Soviet Russia is extremely bad, and perhaps even critical. There are many "tight places," as the Communists say, in the economic structure and its everyday functioning, leading to food-shortage and a deficit in consumers' goods. The political situation is also very "tight," the censorship being stricter than ever and daily life marked by extensive arrests and even executions by the political police. Both these sets of facts derive logically from the Five-Year Plan. The economic dislocation is due in large measure to the cost of this program of expansion, which mobilizes a very large percentage of the national income for new capital construction and requires short rations at home to allow export abroad, in order to purchase the equipment necessary to carry out the Five-Year Plan. The

people are called on to accept present sacrifices for the benefits of the future. The new cadres have developed this attitude and are to spread it to the masses. But this enormous building program is putting a terrific strain on the resources of the country. A slogan of this period might well be: "Build till it hurts," as America was urged to "give till it hurts" in the Liberty Loan drives of the World War. "Fight and suffer like Bolsheviks" would also be an appropriate slogan. The sharpening of the class struggle that is part of the Five-Year Plan accounts for the tighter political conditions of the last year.

These economic and political conditions suggest a country at war. What one has in this new period of Bolshevism is not a war situation; it is not, on the other hand, a normal state of affairs. The answer is that it is a revolutionary situation, as is often forgotten because the Revolution has been going on for so long. There is much of the military, and certainly of the militant, in this revolutionary setting. The term "cadre" is a military term, and was appropriately adopted by the Communists. Other military terms will be met at every turn, as slogans are cited and the propaganda function of these battle cries of the Revolution is analyzed. "Shock-brigades," "light-cavalry skirmishers," and particularly "mobilization" and "fronts," have become expressions of the everyday life in Soviet Russia.

The revival of the activities of a secret political police, executions without trial, and theatrically

staged political trials also suggest an abnormal situation. Widespread organized opposition to the Revolution no longer exists, and since the first years any active resistance has been sporadic and of very small proportions. But to use the words of one of the leaders, "Socialism cannot move forward without stubborn resistance on the part of capitalistic elements." Therefore these capitalistic elements, represented by the figures at the bottom of the cartoon reproduced in the frontispiece, are antisocial forces from the point of view of the Revolution. Under certain circumstances some of them are considered so antisocial as to call for what is euphemistically termed "the supreme measure of social defense," the death penalty.

To deal effectively with what it classifies as its enemies, the Revolution has its "watchdog," or, to change the figure of speech, its "punishing sword"—a secret political police. Active in the years of civil war under the name of the *Cheka*, this important branch of the Soviet government, under the new name of State Political Administration—in Russian abbreviation it is called the *Gay Pay Oo*—has become more active in the new, third period of the "socialistic offensive." Although this institution has been one of the principal grounds on which the Communists have been condemned by their opponents, and criticized by those who sympathize with many of their aims, it has been given one of the highest places of honor by the revolutionary leaders, and assigned specific tasks

in the program of the Communist training of the cadres of the Soviet order.

A close interlocking of all institutions and organizations, under a single leadership of the Communists, is a feature of the Soviet order. The various "fronts" of the Revolution—the political, economic, cultural, or international—are covered by all six of the cadres. However, it is necessary to take up each of the six organizing groups in turn. This method of presentation has the disadvantage of requiring constant reference to the descriptions of other groups, with respect to which, in a particular field, the cadre under discussion is the important, the organizing force. The monotonous references to other groups cannot be avoided, however, because of the common activity, on the basis of a common aim, of all the cadres. The Bolshevik must be a well-rounded as well as a new type, and this provision for the interaction on each other of the organizing groups is part of the Communist training.

The Five-Year Plan has its statistical tables for the cultural and political as well as the economic fields, and all cadres are working for its success. In turn, by this work for and under the Five-Year Plan, the cadres are learning Bolshevik aims and methods, are becoming Bolsheviks in their attitudes and ways of doing things. The Five-Year Plan, therefore, is the background for the training of the new type of citizen.

In 1926 a first visit to Soviet Russia since the Revolution gave material on which was made a study of

the machinery and methods of civic training under the Soviets.[1] The present volume is an attempt to describe the products of this civic training, as they were found and studied at a later period; in a sense it is an appendix to the earlier volume, and, as the material was presented in public lectures, it is a more popular treatment of the subject. It must be stated again that the lectures have been reproduced as delivered; the time limitation of the lecture period made it necessary to give a summarized as well as a more popular presentation of the material.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
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[1] *Civic Training in Soviet Russia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928).

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# I

## THE COMMUNIST PARTY-WORKER

In a Bolshevik revolution, for which the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels is one of the doctrinal foundations, the first cadre is very logically the Communist party-worker. This first group is the leader with respect to all the other groups, and will be reappearing in the picture at every point. The Communist, and particularly the Communist giving all his time to party work, is the central figure everywhere, in economic and cultural fields, as well as in the political, where he supplies the leadership, in fact monopolizes political leadership. The character of this monopoly, and the organization built up to enforce it, produces an interesting type—the Bolshevik in a strictly technical sense of the word.

The Soviet political order is a dictatorship of a minority class, the workmen, and in practice of an even smaller group, the Communist party, which is spoken of always as the party of the workman class, its organized vanguard. The party effectuates the dictatorship of the proletariat. The party theoretician, and also its practical politician, insist that this dictatorship sets itself always an aim that requires the widest self-assertion and activity on the part of the masses. To promote and direct this activity the dic-

tatorship functions through the party, but also through non-party mass organization, Soviets, trade-unions, co-operative societies, and the Red Army. In this way there is "proletarian democracy," or "Soviet democracy," the essential characteristic of which is the rôle of the organized, politically minded, energetic minority. The Communists admit that this is not a democratic system, as the latter is understood and practiced in Western Europe and America; and at the same time they condemn this democracy of the parliamentary order as merely formal, failing to function because of the fact of the private ownership of the means of production. For the Communists this is a "brutal" fact, while the Soviet system is extolled, despite its use of force and compulsion, as the most perfect form of political organization from the point of view of the masses, in the process of reconstructing their economic life under the leadership of Communists.

There are just short of two million Communist party-members, including candidates passing through a period of probation. It is enough to speak of them as "party-members," for there is only the single party in the Soviet order. The two million Communists are distributed in some 50,000 groups or "cells"; in practically every institution of any importance—government office, school, factory, or collective farm—there is the organized group of party-members, and it is the only group that is permitted to organize. The Communist leads politically the larger group of which he

is a member, and supervises and directs its economic activity, carrying out the directions of the party authorities. These cells are co-ordinated by local committees, which in turn are under higher committees, all headed up in the Central Committee, of which Stalin is the General Secretary.

Stalin and secretaries of local committees and of the primary cells are the party-workers, strictly speaking; but all members of the party must not only follow party policy but must work actively in the party organization. This is one of the conditions of membership, which distinguishes this powerful political organization from the political parties of our Western parliamentary systems. The monopoly of legality of the party and the party's rôle in the Revolution have resulted in practically all responsible positions, in economic and cultural as well as political life, being held by Communists, who function always and everywhere as members of the party. The party organs parallel at every stage the local and central governmental bodies, and also those of the trade-unions and co-operative societies, the latter being the two most important non-party mass organizations. The Communist members in these elective or voluntary mass institutions are always under the control of the corresponding party organ. In this way the leadership of the party and the directing rôle of the party-worker are effectively secured.

This special kind of leadership requires, it is believed, a very careful selection of those to whom it is

to be intrusted. The comparatively small size of the membership is the result of the adoption of the principle of "quality rather than quantity." Every applicant for membership in the party must be sponsored, is then examined carefully as to attitude and past behavior, and finally is made to pass through a period of candidacy before being admitted. There is not, as a rule, active recruiting of new members; the individual must feel the urge to join. There have been exceptions to this rule, when it was deemed expedient to increase the percentage of workmen in the party. Workmen who have joined the party are constantly pushed forward into administrative positions, and by that fact cease to be workmen in the technical meaning of the word. But the party is the vanguard of the workman class; so from time to time contingents of bench-workmen, workmen actually engaged in production, must be recruited into the ranks of the organization. Special occasions, such as the anniversary of Lenin's death, or the successful accomplishment of the first year of the Five-Year Plan, have been used for this mass enlistment. Whole factories have, on such occasions, applied for admission. Collective applications from workmen were considered a great triumph for the party. Peasants who have joined the collective farms or agricultural laborers have also been deliberately recruited. The recruiting of peasants was dictated by the success claimed for the collectivization policy of the party with respect to

agriculture. In all these instances of collective application each workman or peasant is examined and admitted individually.

Applicants who are not workmen or peasants, office-workers for example, have great difficulty in gaining admission, as have also members of what is called the "intelligentsia," that is, professors, writers, engineers, or other technical experts. Recently a very prominent military technical expert, who had been carried over from the old régime, was admitted on application. This case was made much of, as illustrating the authority and prestige which the party has come to enjoy even among those who by social origin and past training would not be inclined to accept its principles and aims. The formality, in some cases really formidable, of acquiring admission enhances the sense of responsibility of the party-worker.

"Application for membership means the voluntary acceptance of the obligations of membership," reads one of the articles of the by-laws of the party. In addition to the general obligation to work in and for the party, and follow its directions in all activities, the party-worker must submit to the very rigid discipline that goes with party-membership. It is called "iron discipline," and it is that. The party-worker is subject to mobilization and assignment to specific tasks. This summer several acquaintances among Communists were sent off on difficult and important assignments. They could not question the wisdom of

the assignment, although their superiors in the institution in which they were working might make mild representations.

The party-members' earnings are controlled and limited. The so-called "party-maximum"—the maximum which a party-member may receive in salary or wages—has been raised slightly, and in a few types of cases practically abolished. But the principle is still in force, and is very generally applied. It is modified somewhat by the perquisites which attain to the responsible positions reserved to party-members, but outstanding instances of flagrant abuse of this privilege are very rare. For the discipline of the party extends also to the manner of life of the member, and any ostentatious private establishment or manner of living would attract the attention of the party's Control Commissions, whose function, as the name indicates, is to enforce the regulations and rules of the party. "Behavior unbecoming a Communist" has come to be defined and includes a list of concrete acts, such as habitual drunkenness or other forms of excesses, wife-beating, or bullying methods in an administrative position. The control over the party-member is indeed very rigid; he cannot, for example, discuss with persons who are not members of the party internal matters of the party and particularly disagreements within the party, until there has been official publication relative to these matters or disputes.

This discipline is enforced by a system of penalties,

from reprimand to exclusion from the party. An offending member may also be demoted. Exclusion from the party almost always means the loss of position in the governmental or other institutions. A member cannot resign, it should be noted; any attempt to resign leads immediately to formal expulsion. The severest penalty, expulsion, which is the strong sanction behind the party discipline, has been very extensively applied during the thirteen years of the Revolution. Although the party has increased from about 240,000 in 1917 to 2,000,000 at the present moment, over 600,000 have been expelled. Some of these were excluded when the party authorities ordered a reregistration of the entire membership for the purpose of "cleansing" the ranks of unworthy elements. Such a purge took place last year. The procedure was very meticulous. Every individual Communist had to appear before an examining committee, in a public meeting of his fellow-workers, in factory or office, and make a confession of political faith and a report on his work. The audience could put questions and make remarks. Over 10 per cent of the total membership—some 150,000—failed at this examination, and their party tickets or diplomas were not extended. On the basis of these principles of organization the official press organ of the party recently made the justifiable boast: "We Communists are the best-organized, best-disciplined, and best-centralized force in the world."

The ruling position of the party, resting on its

monopoly of legality, has practically obliterated all distinction between the party and the government. At times there seemed to be an effort on the part of the Communists to differentiate between their party and the Soviets. But with the resumption of the socialistic offensive, under the leadership of the party, the line between party and government has all but disappeared. The Five-Year Plan was a party plan—first adopted by the party and then later formally sanctioned by the government. Then gradually the party has adopted the practice of issuing orders which become legislative norms without any formal action by a governmental body. "The Soviets are the form of the proletarian State, but the party is the ruling force of the dictatorship of the proletariat," writes the author of one of the Soviet textbooks on civics. In practical everyday life also the party-worker is the real authority. An American mechanic working in a Soviet factory explained that he had learned to go to the party-man if he wanted anything. In my travels I also came to adopt the same practice. Having some small personal errands to do one day, I asked a party-worker to help me; and he was very proud of the way he could get things done by explaining his position as party-worker.

Two other illustrations of the relation of the party to the government and of the ruling position of the party in the Soviet system may be noted. The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, the Soviet parliament, notes in an official act that the success of

a particular policy was due in large measure to the special attention given to the matter by the Central Committee of the party. Or, when it was found last September that the quotas for the second year of the Five-Year Plan were not being met, it was the party that appealed to all organizations, including the Soviets, and, in support of the appeal, issued specific orders. The Central Committee of the party has adopted the practice of passing detailed legislation in its own name, and with respect to practically every field of activity. Stalin is a party-worker, holding no high governmental position; but all know that he has the deciding voice in the determination of policy and the formulation of legislation.[1]

The big political event in Soviet Russia this last summer was the party congress. Under party statutes a general congress must be convened every two years, and a somewhat longer period had intervened since the previous Congress, in 1927. This was therefore the first general congress since the resumption of the socialistic offensive and the passing of the Revolution into its third period. Subsequent to the 1927 Congress Trotsky had been expelled; and other prominent leaders, representing an opposition to the party authorities set up by the Congress of 1927, had been

[1] In December, 1930, Stalin became a member of a central co-ordinating governmental board, the Soviet of Labor and Defense, and his assumption of this post was made much of in the foreign press. It was more significant that Stalin did not assume the position of prime-minister which Rykov had just been forced to vacate.

demoted and pushed to the back of the political stage. There was sharp discussion within the party over alleged deviation from the "party line"; there was still a so-called "leftist" tendency, inspired by Trotsky—leftist only in its phraseology, and in point of fact opportunistic, according to Stalin, who controlled the party administrative apparatus. Stalin's chief charge against this group was its failure to take a realistic approach to the problem of planned political as well as economic activity. Trotsky and his followers advocated sheer adventures or gambles, said Stalin, and showed an absence of that calculating strategic method which should characterize a revolutionary, a Bolshevik.

There was also a rightist tendency, frankly opportunistic, having lost faith in the creative powers of the proletariat and its party, and also unable to sense, in the thirteenth year of revolution, the mechanics of the class struggle. They were old and tried revolutionary leaders; but they had lost, it seemed, the daring and confidence of the real Bolshevik. As Stalin contemptuously remarked, these rightists were getting frightened whenever a cockroach peeped out of a corner; he had in mind the protests, sporadic but violent, that had taken place a few months earlier and had forced a slowing-down of the pace and the abandonment of certain methods—without any mitigation of the class struggle, however. The leftists were discrediting party tradition and discipline, and the rightists were doubters. Both deviations were condemned as vio-

lating the principle of unity of the party, and consequently jeopardizing the Revolution.

The leaders of the rightist tendencies in the party held high responsible positions. Rykov was the prime-minister of the Soviet Union, and also a member of the most important body of the party, the Political Bureau. And these leaders were subjected to the most severe and galling criticism; they were accused even of being "unconscious agents of the class enemies." Forced to do penance by publicly recanting, their sincerity was still questioned, even after their acknowledgment of error. Subjected to this further humiliation, they were allowed to remain in the party and in their offices, but only on probation. The reprimand administered to the prime-minister in the name of the party suggested to the outside observer that this leader would not continue in office and especially in the higher councils of the party. It seemed to many of us that his political usefulness had been seriously impaired by the attacks on him and by his public confessions of error. Several foreign correspondents announced that he would fall from power. But Rykov remained on as prime-minister, and even as member of the Political Bureau of the party which is the actual center of power in Moscow. The explanation of this situation, anomalous from the Western viewpoint, is perhaps to be found in the fact that this organization which is called a party is in reality an order, a revolutionary order, suggesting a political religious order, in which confession of error and the doing

of penance enhance the value of the member for service in the organization.[1]

The sessions of the party congress were secret, although its decisions determined not only the personnel of government but the position of the trade-unions, the control figures for the economic program of the Five-Year Plan, and similar fundamental policies and measures. The speeches of the congress sessions were published, but it was generally assumed that the stenographic reports of these speeches had been carefully edited and censored. Foreign newspaper men were not admitted even to the general sessions. Several delegates were reprimanded sharply for lending their admission tickets to other party-members who were not formal delegates. These features of the congress which sat in Moscow behind closed doors are noted to illustrate, from another angle of approach, the extraordinary position and powers of the party authorities. Without a realization of these facts one cannot understand the character and position of the party-worker.

After the congress, despite the complete triumph of Stalin, representing the centrist group and also the party authorities of the moment, there continued an uninterrupted fire to the left and to the right, against the alleged opportunistic and disloyal tend-

[1] Six months later, at the end of December, 1930, Rykov lost his governmental post and also his seat in the Political Bureau of the party. He remained a member of the important Central Committee of the party, however.

encies. Two prominent leaders lost their high positions in the party organs, others continued to be the object of attack in press articles and resolutions of party committees, and several were expelled from the party. It was not enough that the party-member deemed guilty of opportunism admit his mistake; he was required actively to fight the views formerly expressed. Otherwise he was considered as continuing to aid and abet class enemies, even alleged damage-workers or counter-revolutionary conspirators. The campaign against the right tendency reached its height at the moment of the spectacular trial of a group of engineers. An alleged conspiracy and the rightist deviation in the party were connected as to aims, it was insisted, even though there might be no actual contact; both were accused of working for the re-establishment of the capitalistic order and against the drive for Socialism.

In March of 1930 the local party-workers were upbraided in the most vigorous manner by the central party authorities. They had misunderstood party instructions and directions, it was stated; had behaved like "hot-headed fools, gone dizzy from success," to quote the public reprimand issued by Stalin. One would have expected such a reprimand to weaken the morale of the local party-workers, particularly as everyone knew that they had not misunderstood their instructions—the central authorities had been the ones guilty of overreaching. In the interests of the prestige and unity of the party the local party-

workers accepted the undeserved scolding. This was another illustration of the strength of the discipline that prevails in the party. The party weathered what looked like a real crisis, and came through stronger and more confident than ever. Again it required a particular attitude on the part of the party-member for a procedure of this character to strengthen rather than weaken his morale.

The party has had these several disputes within its leadership and ranks. Penalties have been freely applied to individual members, and general cleansings undertaken. In the course of these disputes, and particularly during the cleansings, the outside observer has thought to see evidences of personal rivalries and recriminations. The cleansing procedure in many instances suggested the rather vicious game of climbing up over somebody else's back. Such a spirit contravenes the injunction of comradely relationship between the members of the revolutionary order. But Bolsheviks are human beings; and personal ambitions still weigh, even in the highest of the leaders. However, the subjection of personal aims to the aims of the party is present to an unusually high degree, the best evidence of this being the fact that the unity of the party has been menaced, but not seriously impaired, in all these thirteen years of revolution, and in the face of a tenfold increase of the membership during these years. The disputes in many respects have been a source of strength, solidifying the party. Discussion in order to define more rigidly the party line,

and thus disclose and disarm doubters or dissenters, has been a Bolshevik practice from the earliest appearance of this particular group of Russian Socialists. The result, to date, has been the remarkable unity characteristic of the organization. In this way there has been on the whole very little hesitation in policy, which would act on the mood of the workmen and peasants, and particularly on the unstable elements in the intelligentsia.

This unity, however, is attainable, it would seem, only on the condition of a single leadership. Lenin, the founder of the party, was the undisputed leader until his death, in 1924. His enormous prestige and influence carried over several years after his death, and kept in the background the personal rivalries among his lieutenants. These rivalries came into action and to a head in 1926, however. There followed several years of disputes within the higher party councils; at times the disagreement assumed a distinctly serious character. Finally, in the name of unity Stalin demanded that the party authorities be relieved of elements that were weakening the will to carry on of the party. He was able to put through his demand, and has emerged the leader of the party, the "boss" if you wish. He is not spoken of as a "second Lenin"; for no one can be that. But he is the "staunchest of Bolsheviks" and the "true and devoted Leninist," to quote typical phrases used recently on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday.

Simultaneously with the rise to power of Stalin,

important changes have been made in the structure of the Soviets and in the party apparatus of administration. The second tier of Soviets, the district Soviets, lying between the local primary units and the Soviets of the larger administrative units, has been abolished. Corresponding party committees have been disbanded. The changes have the appearance of decentralization, but in fact represent further centralization. The former district party-workers must go down to the local committees, and the local committees of Soviet and party are thus brought into closer touch with the central committees. The orders issuing from the center will reach the local workers more directly, and for that reason more efficaciously. Then, the sections of the party apparatus of administration have been reorganized as to functions, to eliminate duplication, but particularly to promote efficiency and responsibility in the party-workers and prevent a repetition of the overreaching of last spring, which came very near causing disaster. The details of this reorganization would take us too far afield. It represents, however, an effort to meet, in the matter of organization, the increase in responsibility which the party-worker must carry as the socialistic offensive develops, as the party's Five-Year Plan passes from its second to its third and important year.

Special educational work is organized for the party-worker, to strengthen him in his practical, everyday activities by arming him with "the theory of Leninism." With this special training he can also detect

and combat more effectively all deviations from the party line. The party schools and universities will be discussed when the educational workers are described. Party education and the study of the history and organization of the party are important factors in the Communist training which permeates all Soviet education.

The party has had to develop an apparatus of administration, a bureaucracy. The opponents of Stalin, particularly Trotsky, make the charge that the party spirit is being weakened by the bureaucratic methods of the central party authorities. Stalin of course denies this charge of "bureaucratic degeneration" of the party, and insists that the emphasis on organization is not only necessary but is making the party more effective in its leadership and direction of the Revolution. As all disputants agree that the success of the Revolution depends upon the ability of the party to promote and release initiative and enthusiasm in the masses, and particularly in the workmen, the progress of the Five-Year Plan will help to answer this question, which may be worded as follows: Is the Five-Year Plan, for which the party claims full credit, a "bureaucratic adventure," as Trotsky has asserted, or the product of the initiative of workmen and peasants, "literally torn from our hands by the masses," as the chairman of the State Planning Commission recently expressed it?

In the reading of Communist newspapers and talks with Communists, one meets more and more fre-

quently the assertion that a Marxist—a Bolshevik, armed with the one and only scientific method of analyzing social phenomena, namely, the Marxian, materialistic attitude—can see ahead, safely make generalizations, and act with faith and confidence, not handicapped in his thinking and acting by such concepts and considerations as patriotism, formal democracy or religious affiliation, which are sentimental idealisms to the materialistic Bolshevik. Putting it in the simpler language used by one active party-worker, "You are just drifting, and are tied hand and foot by all sorts of prejudices, while we are on the offensive, on the jump, with a concrete aim and full freedom of action." This is what the Communists themselves are beginning to term quite frankly "Bolshevik psychology," based, they assert, on the traditions of the party, which now has thirteen years of revolutionary leadership to its credit. This faith is based not only on the thirteen years of power but on the Marx-Lenin doctrine, according to which their kind of revolution is historically inevitable. This is a faith—different, however, from a faith in a supernatural guidance. Some have called it a political religion, for the Bolshevik often speaks of his faith in Revolution.

The personal, human factor comes in even in the case of individuals of Bolshevik persuasion and training, so that there are many types of Communists. There is the former pre-revolutionary intellectual like Trotsky, or the ex-proletarian like the little-known but active local party-worker. It is on the latter that

Stalin relies, in the main; and he is a very important factor in every community, either training Young Communists or leading shock-brigade workmen. One meets Communists in responsible positions, particularly in economic enterprises, who are literally working themselves to death—real "heroes of labor" to whom the Soviets often give a formal decoration, a medal of merit. And these are capable workers. On the other hand, one meets the doctrinaire Bolshevik, a mere agitator, practically useless as a producer or builder of a new order.

It is difficult to determine the proposition between these two types. The party authorities constantly declare that there is "no place in the ranks of the party for the loafer, the four-flusher, the boaster, or the 'hot-headed fool.' " Individual expulsions and general purges are directed against Bolsheviks of these tendencies, but these measures clearly have not been wholly successful. Whether he belongs to one or the other of these two types, or stands somewhere between the two extremes, the Communist party-worker, representing the most important cadre of the Soviet system, supplies the leadership in the institution in which he works, as a member of one of the most highly centralized and powerful machines of political control of modern times. When the party mobilized to put through its Five-Year Plan, all other institutions and organizations had to mobilize also, as the leader of one of these organizations explained to me when he began to outline its work during the last

years. Because of its structure and its disciplinary practices, the party is a very flexible instrument of political action. There can be a rapid change of tactic; special effort can be directed at a particularly weak point; or the pressure can be taken off immediately when it has become too heavy. The party has the widest contacts, in order to exercise its direction and control, and through these contacts can measure very accurately the degree of pressure needed or permissible, as the case may be.

This political machine, through its individual party-workers, has its finger on the pulse of the masses, formulates what it believes to be their aspirations, and then proceeds to lead them to the realization of these aspirations. The method used is "a combination of educative and compulsive measures," to quote from a Communist source. The human material with which these leaders are working, the Russian people, have in the past shown themselves capable of remarkable spurts of energy—on a background of general apathy, however. But the party-worker keeps the larger membership of the party on its toes and at the job, and these in turn mobilize all the mass institutions and organizations of the Soviet system. The party-worker is the organizing force of all other organizing groups or cadres.

At the same time, the party-worker exercises a general supervision over the performance of all governmental functions and all economic activity. He is

in a way a censor extraordinary over the whole life of the community in which he lives and works, his influence extending to the economic and cultural, as well as to the political, and always in an extraordinary fashion. He is in a permanent state of mobilization from the point of view of the central authorities of the organization. In this way one has "planned" political activity, as well as a Five-Year Plan of economic development.

The word "Bolshevik" has been much misused, of course, like all words that acquire wide currency. When someone does something that is not understood or liked, he is called a "Bolshevik." This misusage is not entirely groundless. A Bolshevik is a revolutionist, with a revolutionary psychology—doing things in the name of revolution which will run contrary to the logic of one who does not accept the principles and methods of the Revolution. He will do business as others do it, for a bit, and then suddenly "go Bolshevik," as one says. If one does not have his psychology one frequently is put to it to understand his motives. In a discussion one day in Moscow a very well-informed and competent observer suddenly burst out: "The Bolsheviks do things often that make one think that some mysterious force . . . ."; he then himself went off on a line which the rest of us could not follow—admitting that he did not know how to define what he wanted to say, and finally in considerable agitation dropping the subject. The reference to this

conversation illustrates well the point I wish to make —a Bolshevik thinks differently from the ordinary run of humanity; that is why he is a Bolshevik. And though one may not like him, there he is—and he is busily and actively "making Bolsheviks," training others after his own pattern, and this on one-sixth of the habitable surface of the globe—among some 150,000,000 people.

## II

## THE YOUNG COMMUNIST

The next group to present and place in the picture are the Young Communists, the "younger brothers" of the Communists or Bolsheviks. The term "Young Communist" is not absolutely correct, but has been used for want of a better one. The Communist or Bolshevik is a member of a definite organization, the Communist party. The Young Communist is also a member of a definite organization, the Communist Union of Youth—in abbreviation in Russian, the *Komsomol*. The boy or young man belonging to the *Komsomol* is a *Komsomolets*, and his sister is a *Komsomolka*. These two words have a wide currency, and politically as much significance in Soviet Russia as has the word "Bolshevik." The term "Young Communist" has been substituted for the two words. For the sake of brevity the name of the organization itself of the youth—the *Komsomol*—will be adopted, and there will be reference to the *Komsomol*-member.

In structure and organization the Komsomol resembles very closely the party; this is logical because it is the training school for party-members and is under the immediate control and direction of the party. It has its "cells" in all institutions, coordinated by local and central committees, paralleling

the party organization and also the elective mass institutions of the Soviet system. There are more Komsomol cells than party cells—about 75,000 as against 50,000—because it is a larger group—3,000,000 members and candidates as against 2,000,000 in the party. It has more rural cells than has the party, because of a larger percentage of peasant youth in its membership. Also, Komsomol cells are found in the lower grades of schools, as the age-range for membership is from fourteen to twenty-three years.

Careful selection of membership is also practiced as in the party, although there is no period of candidacy for young workmen or young agricultural laborers or "poor peasants," or the children of workmen and peasants. The children of office-workers, of the intelligentsia, and even of "middle peasants," are accepted only after a probationary period. Children of private traders, "rich peasants," or the clergy are not admitted except in special cases. The Komsomol, like the party, periodically cleanses its ranks by examination and reregistration of all members. The obligation to participate actively in the meetings of, and work undertaken by, the organization is a condition of membership. Komsomol discipline is quite rigid, though less so than that of the party. There is a clear conception of "behavior unbecoming a Komsomol-member," for which the offending member is liable to expulsion. Persons under twenty-one years of age are not admitted to the party except through the Komsomol. Those who reach the age of twenty-

three without gaining admission to the party are automatically dropped. In this way the Komsomol is in a very literal sense the training school for the party. To keep this purpose of the organization always in the foreground, a party "kernel," as it is called, is maintained in the Komsomol. Many young people, even after joining the party, continue as active members of the Komsomol, in order to give it proper leadership. This party kernel is about 10 per cent of the total membership. In its ten years of existence the Komsomol has trained and contributed over 400,000 of the party's total membership.

The Komsomol cell in any institution or group works in the closest co-operation with the party cell, under the latter's leadership. In this way the active element of the youth is drawn into practical politics and from an early age. In general the rôle of the youth is one of the most significant, and in some respects disconcerting, features of the Revolution. In economic activity also, the Komsomol supports the party's policy, as, for example, in the shock-brigade movement among the workmen or the drive for collectivization in the peasantry. The Komsomol often takes the initiative and assumes the leadership in the schools and technical institutes, and also in the peasant villages, where it has a larger representation than has the party. In certain fields, and with respect to certain methods of action, where enthusiasm and a little recklessness even are considered necessary, the Komsomol is allowed, or even egged on by the party,

to be the "scout," or "skirmisher," or the "light-cavalry brigade," preparing the ground for the "shock-brigades" of the older party elements. Many of the most important "pep" meetings and "drives" or "campaigns" of the Revolution are the work of the Komsomol. This last winter the pulling-down of church bells or of whole cathedrals was initiated and carried through in the main by the Komsomol.

The youthful enthusiasm for revolutionary deeds is one of the big assets also on the economic front; and the Komsomol, with its slogan of "Attention to Production," stirs up and mobilizes the youth behind the Five-Year Plan of economic development. It should be noted that almost 25 per cent of those employed in large industrial plants are under twenty-two years of age; and the Komsomol aims to recruit all these younger workmen and workwomen into its ranks, to bring them into the drives for increase of production.

The enthusiasm of the youth is utilized in the political field by bringing them into various aspects of the class struggle. The ferreting-out and eliminating, or "liquidating," of class enemies appeal to the young revolutionaries. Sometimes they go at the task with a vigor and by methods that disturb their elders, the Bolsheviks. Some of the literal and local applications of the principle of class struggle by the Komsomol have brought sharp reprimand from the party. Komsomol-members, even more so than party-members, were found guilty of "hot-headed foolishness," to quote from Stalin's famous circular of March, 1930.

In their enthusiasm the younger workers of the Soviet system apparently are quite indifferent to the difficult conditions of life that have developed in the last years with the resumption of the drive for Socialism. They do not have the family responsibilities of the older generation. Also, they have never known a normal state of affairs, for Russia has been at war or in revolution since 1914, for over sixteen years. The young people do not know pre-revolutionary Russian conditions or the conditions of Western Europe. And this younger generation has received its education and training in the schools and newspapers of the Revolution.

It is a difficult problem to get a correct appreciation of the Komsomol-member, this active organizing element in the Soviet system, and determine the measure of contribution which this cadre is making specifically to the Five-Year Plan—to its execution in terms of economic development, to its realization in terms of class struggle, and particularly to the spirit of sacrifice and heroism which are such important factors for its success. By these contributions through practical participation in production and politics the Komsomol is at the same time performing one of its primary functions, that of giving to the youth a "Communist class training."

The class character of this training given by the Komsomol suggests an important reservation to the general statements with respect to it. Like all institutions of the Soviet system, the Komsomol is based

on the class principle. Its membership comes predominantly from the workman and peasant classes. Only with difficulty can others join; and the children of the old, ruling, or prominent classes are practically excluded. Therefore, in speaking of the enthusiasm of the youth, one should have in mind the fact that a small but important group of young people see no place for themselves in the new order. These are the children of rich peasants, of former landlords, or even of the intelligentsia. This is a distressing aspect of the sharpening of the class struggle. The technical experts of the future must be of proletarian origin, it is insisted, so that even educational facilities are denied to many young people. The future may alter this situation; many Bolsheviks have also suggested the injustice and danger here.

The importance of the attitude of the younger generation of workman and peasant origin, and of the character of the enthusiasm which they are evincing, is brought out by the rôle this question of the youth has played in the party disputes of the last years. Trotsky, in his conflict with Stalin, tried to win over the younger element; and he did in fact make a strong appeal to them with his program. Stalin branded this program as based on pseudo-revolutionary slogans, radical-sounding but in essence opportunistic. Trotsky attempted to use the overexuberance of the youth to support his fight against the party authorities. The leaders of the more moderate tendency in the party, the rightist deviation, on the other hand, were dis-

couraged over the type of youth produced by the Revolution, feared them even, because of their aggressiveness combined too often with lack of proper training. Many of the Young Communists were in fact mere agitators as opposed to "builders of the new order." With this view of the young, the rightists urged a slower pace in the socialistic offensive. Stalin, however, has staked much precisely on the youth and its organization, the Komsomol. He is uniting more systematically the work of party and of the Komsomol, utilizing the energy and enthusiasm of the latter, drawing on the younger generation for the new leaders and organizers, the new cadres.

There is another aspect of the relation between Komsomol and party. The younger generation has been trained in the period of revolution, and does not know defeat as do the older Bolsheviks—the failure of a revolution in 1905. This younger generation, then, is pushing the leadership to more direct, more aggressive action. In this way the younger people are getting into positions of power and responsibility. They are, by their very training, more rough and direct in their methods. Coming from workman and peasant life, and not from the intelligentsia, as did the first leaders of revolution like Lenin, Trotsky, and even Stalin himself, will they be more practical and accordingly less doctrinaire? It is the same question which was suggested above as to the character of the enthusiasm of the youth. Will the enthusiasm of the youth make an important contribution to the suc-

cessful completion of the Five-Year Plan, or will it disrupt economic life by constant overreaching? The question was heard in Moscow last summer in the following wording: Will the Komsomol-member bring the train through to the next station or make it jump the track? The Komsomol is striving almost frantically to give its members adequate training in general education, in political activity, and particularly for participation in production and management.

In the field of education the Five-Year Plan required radical change, in the sense of more direct attention to the task of training the personnel for the new industrial enterprises—training technicians, mechanics, engineers, and managers. It was the Komsomol that called attention to the need of this change, insisted on more emphasis on technical training, and then actively recruited from its own ranks and from the younger generation as a whole, the applicants for training in the newly established polytechnical schools. The Komsomol, by the character of the training it aimed to give its members, was the contact between schooling and actual economic production, and therefore became the practical means for bringing the educational institution into touch with and under the direction of the factory. The factory-school was the concrete result; and it was, so to speak, the child of the Komsomol. The extension of the idea of the school attached to the factory is bringing a complete reorganization of the Soviet educational system. This reorganization was demanded by the Komsomol because the young people realized the

need of having a technical training in the new industrialized, mechanized order contemplated as one of the objectives of the drive for Socialism. In the practical working-out of the reform the Komsomol and its individual members were assigned a responsible rôle. In visits to factory schools or higher technical institutes the secretary of the Komsomol cell was often found in the office of the director and, in the presence and at the suggestion of the latter, told of the activity and responsibilities of the organization in the work of the school.

It was the Komsomol student who gave many encouraging impressions of the younger generation and of their rôle in the building of the new order. The practical, common-sense attitude of many reminded one of the young people of our own country, and often older Russian friends suggested the resemblance between the youth of the Revolution and the American youth. But like so many of the statements with respect to the Revolution, this one also requires qualification. The Komsomol-member must not become engrossed in study to the neglect of his revolutionary duty in politics. He must, in the first place, not neglect the study of the theory of revolution, in his effort to train himself as a technician. The Komsomol requires of its members systematic study of Communist political theory and civics—so that they may have the proper perspective, and therefore the strong faith in the Revolution, and engage actively in its politics, that is, in the class struggle.

This obligation of a specific kind of political train-

ing has resulted in a very large use of sheer indoctrination in Soviet pedagogical methods. Some young Communists showed purely mechanical reactions to the situations or problems that were discussed. The attitude or answer was always in rigid adherence to Marxism or Leninism, often with a citation from the writings of the latter, and also more and more frequently, from those of Stalin. Or another type was often met, one whose training had been one-sided, and on the side of politics, so that here indeed was the mere agitator, with a very simplified and coarse conception of the rôle of the proletariat or the Communist in the Revolution, and not a well-trained technician and builder of the new order. The proportion of distribution of these different types cannot be measured, of course. The progress of the Five-Year Plan will depend on, and therefore will show, whether the enthusiasm of the youth has a solid background of real training and education.

A year ago there was started what was called a "cultural crusade," and the initiative came from the Komsomol. The aim was considerably broader than was that of the drive for factory-schools. One concrete result of the crusade was the forming of a voluntary society called "Techmass." The Russian term is intelligible and defines the movement, which was an effort to spread technical knowledge to the masses. Another product of the crusade was a new development in the theater, the organization of "Theaters of the Workman Youth," the "Tram," to use the Rus-

sian abbreviation adopted. New and interesting dramatic devices and methods were brought into usage. Of particular interest was the close tying-up of the themes of plays given by these troupes to the Five-Year Plan and its concrete problems of production. Under the "cultural crusade" an active interest was developed by the Komsomol among its members in the study of foreign languages. The "Young Communist *Pravda*," the official daily newspaper of the organization, gave correspondence courses in English. The Young Communist must learn foreign languages in order to keep in touch with technical progress, and also with the progress of revolution in the outside capitalistic world, it was explained.

Often in the "cultural crusade" the political and social sense of the movement became too simplified from the Communist viewpoint. It was considered most useful that the Komsomol establish centers for teaching illiterates, close down saloons or blind pigs, invade workmen's quarters with mop and soap, and "liquidate" the bedbug and the louse. It was pointed out to the Young Communists, however, that "culture for us is the lever by means of which we use industry and agriculture for the cultural-political retraining of the masses, for the struggle for the new, collectivist man."

In politics the Komsomol is the immediate helper of the party, following always the party line. For specific political tasks the Komsomol is allowed to do the preliminary skirmishing. An interesting feature of re-

cent Soviet political life illustrates this rôle of the Young Communist. The reference is to the so-called "cleansing" of the Soviet apparatus of administration. There had been a cleansing or purge of the party and of the Komsomol. All governmental institutions also needed cleansing, it was decided. The procedure is still in progress, and will not be completed until September of 1931.

There are reasons for this "cleansing" that follow logically from the class character of the Soviet order. The Soviet state, with its nationalization of economic activity, requires an enormous bureaucracy. It has been necessary to use in these administrative bodies individuals trained under the old order, members of hostile classes even. Further, it has been necessary constantly to combat bureaucratic attitudes and methods characteristic of and carried over from the old order. Also, in theory the state is to waste away and the machinery of government to be absorbed by production units; this is a development of the future, but it is always in the perspective held before the Young Communist. With these various factors in mind the leaders ordered the cleansing of the Soviet apparatus to eliminate harmful and hostile elements, and at the same time to "workmanize" the governmental bodies. The Komsomol organized what it called "light-cavalry brigades," to swoop down on this or that institution—the state bank, a commissariat, or an educational institution—and cross-examine its personnel to see if they were developing bureau-

cratic methods of approach to their tasks, or to discover hostile elements working against the new order by failing to apply the class principle and the proletarian line in the work of the institution. The light-cavalry brigades also were on the lookout for offices or institutions where the situation required the injection of a group of workmen to control and direct the policy and activity of the institution.

The young people threw themselves at this task with great zeal, for it was part of the class struggle in which they were called on to participate actively. They needed no specific mandate to raid an office, so that their enthusiasm was increased by this freedom of initiative and action. The light-cavalry brigades reported their findings to their older comrades, and workmen's brigades took up the more formal procedure of cleansing. The activity of the light-cavalry detachments was undoubtedly useful in many cases and in many respects; there is much bureaucracy in the Soviet system, and this was a rough but effective method of combating it. But the uncontrolled enthusiasm of untrained youths for this exciting political game in many cases led to outrageous bullying and senseless persecution. Its effect on the work of important administrative departments can be easily imagined.

One Young Communist's account of his experiences and activities in the raids on governmental offices was amusing and on the whole reassuring. The rough treatment of the clerk who showed scant courtesy or

attention to the applicant for information or documents gave me a sense of satisfaction in view of the red-tape methods of Soviet bureaucracy. But the young man related one "terrible discovery," of an ex-priest who had served in the governmental office for over ten years. One could not share the Young Communist's horror at what had been discovered, and his gratification over what had been done in this case. Up to July, 1930, over 51,000 office-workers had been dismissed as a result of the "cleansing" of the Soviet administrative bodies.

The participation of the Komsomol in the "liquidation" of the rich peasant and the pushing of the policy of collectivizing agriculture was important and active. In this field particularly, the young people were indeed overzealous in the application of the orders of the party. It is possible that the older leaders expected and wanted this overreaching, for tactical purposes, and found it most convenient to put the responsibility on the young people. It is the younger element of the peasantry that has shown enthusiasm for the new collectivist methods.

One of the forms of political activity under the Soviets is antireligious propaganda; it is part of the class struggle. The Komsomol is expected to be exceptionally active in this field, giving members to the "Society of the Militant Godless," as well as leading in the removal of church bells and the tearing-down of churches. Two years ago the Communist leaders showed concern that many of the young people were

being won over and organized by religious societies. The law allows these religious associations to conduct worship but does not permit them to carry on social work of any kind. Several evangelical groups had managed to circumvent the strict interpretation of the law and had gathered under their guidance many young workmen and peasants, it was announced. An organization of the youth competing with the Komsomol was being started, in some cases calling itself "Baptomol" or "Christomol." To quote the statement from a Communist leader: "The class enemies were trying to get hold of the youth." This situation served as the basis for a revival of an antireligious agitation and movement; the Komsomol responded with avidity, in fact, with too much action: the "hotheaded foolishness" was manifest also in this field, and a halt had to be called by the leaders. This summer one saw everywhere the half-destroyed cathedral or church.

Workmen and peasants come into production at an early age in Soviet Russia. This is a feature of Eastern Europe, of old Russia, and also of the Revolution. The rôle of their organization in production is therefore unusually prominent. Here also the enthusiasm of youth is an important factor. In factories the shock-brigade movement, with its so-called "socialistic competition," was largely initiated by the young workmen, members of the Komsomol. In rural districts Komsomol-members among the peasantry were, if not the first, the most active of the collec-

tivist-peasants. The shock-brigade and collectivist movements are described in the next chapters. This contact with actual production allows the Komsomol to transmit to its members attitudes as well as training. In production, particularly in factories and mechanized agricultural units, the Young Communist acquires his class training and the proletarian attitude which he is expected always to have and manifest. More specifically, the Komsomol-member gets the benefit of the new machines with which the country is being equipped under the Five-Year Plan.

Machinery is to make the Young Communist more productive, and at the same time the machine is to give him a new attitude. For the machine under Sovietism belongs to the people—Communism; and it is the basis for the organization of a production group—collectivism. Lenin emphasized the importance of the machine for the retraining, the Communist training, of the masses. The youth furnish the best material for this task of retraining, and have responded with the greatest enthusiasm to the introduction of new machinery, frequently the last word in technical progress. The arrival of the tractor in a collective farm is the occasion for a grand, revolutionary celebration, with red flags and speeches, the Komsomol taking the leadership in the "hurrah" meeting and giving to it the fullest possible propaganda value. In a factory the completion and starting of a machine imported from America or produced by a Soviet machine factory is made also a political victory by the

Komsomol. Outside observers have suggested the development of a cult with respect to the machine. The Communists reply that under their system the machine is not allowed to conquer man but is made to serve him.

The machine thus is utilized for educative as well as productive purposes—for technical training and for political education. In many of the large new plants only a small percentage of the machinery is being used. This situation is the result of a shortage of raw material, but also of a shortage of trained workmen. The workmen and workwomen who were at the new machines in one factory were all young people. It was frankly explained that the new machinery had been installed in order to give technical training to the youth. This involves a considerable non-productive investment, which, however, does not disturb the Communist leaders because of the importance which they attach to the task of retraining the younger generation.

The use of machinery for educative purposes has another aspect which should be noted: it is hard on the machine. This has been true in all instances of industrialization but is particularly true in view of the speed of industrialization adopted by the leaders of the Revolution. The slogan now is "The Five-Year Plan in Four Years." The already very high speed was increased. Another slogan which suggests that Soviet Russia must "catch up with and outstrip America" results in hard usage of machinery, al-

though of course it is useful as a stimulus to enthusiasm. The Komsomol-member, in response to the appeal of these slogans, always runs the machine in high, regardless of consequences. This enthusiasm, supplemented by the fact that the tempo of industrialization does not allow the gradual development of "machine-mindedness," has recently aroused doubts in the minds of the leaders. One Communist, returning from a tour of inspection, wrote of the "hideous, barbarous misusage and neglect of the new machinery," and demanded immediate steps to put a stop to the spoiling and destroying of the expensive equipment imported from abroad at such a heavy sacrifice. On visits to factories and collective farms the thought that came to mind on several occasions was: "Little children with big toys."

Joy-riding with tractors, for want of other means of locomotion, came to my notice in one place. The Soviet newspapers carried recently the story of two tractor-drivers who settled a personal fight by mounting their machines, developing high speed, and clashing head on, to the complete destruction of the two tractors, of course. This was a perversion of "machine-mindedness." But revolutionary enthusiasm often develops speed in driving which puts out of commission the new machines.

The enthusiasm of the youth has its other side. Komsomol-members spend their holidays at work to finish a job or to bring shock groups to a weak point on the production front. The young people organize and carry out the collecting of junk, this junk to be

utilized to buy new machinery. In one village a poster announced that the junk in the back yards could be turned into a tractor if collected and sent to a designated point. The village would be credited with its value against the purchase of a tractor.

Under what is called "Soviet tourism" large numbers of workmen and peasants, and especially school children and students, are taken around in the summer vacation months to new factories and collective farms, these productive centers and the first-fruits of the Five-Year Plan. The Caucasian Mountains and the Crimea—the Russian Riviera—also are the centers of excursions. But there is a marked emphasis on the study of the new plants with their new methods of production. Soviet tourism is always by large groups, by "collectives"—Cook Tours on a big scale —this method being part of the Communist training of the youth, as is the emphasis on visits to large-scale factories.

The songs of the Komsomol, the plays given by the Theater of the Workman Youth, the banners and posters in Komsomol clubs, all pointed to a larger volume of propaganda than had been noted during a visit in 1926. However, this present propaganda is more closely tied up to the work-a-day interests and problems, and therefore is more subtle, less crude, and more effective. The outsider becomes a bit weary of this constant propaganda on all sides and in everything. The young people do not seem to be bored by it, however.

"Behavior unbecoming a Komsomol-member," for

which the Young Communist is penalized by reprimand or expulsion, may be further defined. Rowdyism, habitual drunkenness, the manifesting of national or racial prejudice or of a "purely masculine psychology" in an attitude toward women, are grounds for action by the local or central committees. The Young Communist also must eschew luxury; tendencies toward dandyism appeared a few years ago and were immediately condemned and combated. The Young Communist hero of an amusing play called *Squaring the Circle* is constantly worried lest his behavior, or even certain tastes he has developed, may be unethical; his companions seek to reassure him, explaining that "the Revolution will not suffer" as a result of his attitude or action.

Young people often give up their membership because of the rigidity of the discipline, which, for example, forbids "bourgeois" dancing—the fox trot or the tango—or showy dressing. This does not mean an austere and always serious state of mind in the youth of Soviet Russia. The young tourists or the young people in the athletic or recreational clubs and parks promenade and play like normal young folk, between political meetings and tasks, however. It is the number, and frequently the burden, of these obligatory political activities that distinguish the Young Communists, with their constant consciousness of civic responsibility. The pressure on them is one of the sources of their enthusiastic activity; it is also a source of extreme nervousness in many instances. A

weakening of discipline was beginning to appear during the summer months of this year as the food situation became tighter and the securing of clothing and shoes was more and more difficult. For the early Russian autumn, with its cold rains, was near, and it would soon pass into the long cold months of the Russian winter. The leaders had to appeal for a cessation of what they themselves termed "a demobilization of enthusiasm," which seemed to be setting in.

The Komsomol is the Communist organization of young people between the ages of fourteen and twenty-three. The Soviet system has a Communist organization for the children also, for youngsters between the ages of ten and sixteen. These are the Young Pioneers, or the Pioneers of Communism. There are at present 4,000,000 Pioneers; a rapid increase of membership followed a severe crisis in the children's movement in 1928. This crisis came as the result of a dispute over methods of work among children. Some wished to adopt the practices of the scout movement of other countries, under which the children would be allowed to choose freely what they wished to do, the emphasis being on the development of habits and knowledge, regardless of purposefulness and "ideological content." Others considered a program of this kind as not in line with the principles of the Revolution, failing, as it would, properly to fit the Pioneers into the general task of training a new type of citizen with a particular outlook, not bringing them into "socially useful" and productive activity and

into the politics of the Revolution. The mobilization of all resources with the resumption of the socialistic offensive in 1928 gave the victory to the second view, and the children were brought into the work of the Five-Year Plan in modest but very definite ways.

The children are organized to help collect junk, to sort seed for sowing, to agitate for socialistic competition and collectivization of agriculture, to help in the elimination of illiteracy, and even to take a part in the cleansing of the governmental administrative bodies. The account of a very systematic and severe raid by a band of Pioneers on one institution was given me at Pioneer headquarters this summer. In villages the Pioneers are to raise chickens on their own initiative. The children respond to this practical and useful kind of activity, the rapid increase of membership being the best evidence. They are reached by the enthusiasm created by the Five-Year Plan and contribute to the further organization of the spirit necessary for the execution of the program. There is the element of heroism here also, to inspirit the young Pioneers. One boy earned wide public applause by starting his chicken farm with a single egg which he hatched in his own armpit.

The Komsomol has among its functions that of leading the Pioneers, playing the same rôle with respect to them that the party plays with respect to it. The Pioneers are organized in so-called troops, which in turn form brigades. There are laws and regulations for the Pioneers which enforce a rather high de-

gree of discipline. The base for every troop is a center of production, a factory, and, where possible, a collective farm. The Komsomol leadership and these features of organization make it possible to carry out the Communist ideas of training, discipline, socially useful activity, and direct contact with actual production. The children enter into socialistic competition with their parents. The child contracts to do his study-tasks on time and well, while the workman-father agrees to complete his quota of production under the Five-Year Plan.

The children seen on the streets and in the parks are "well behaved," and perhaps even too serious. It is the aim to harden the nerves of the children for the responsibilities they must assume later in the work for the Revolution. Under the rationing system in force the children receive privileged allowances of butter, milk, and eggs, so that the food-shortage of the last year has affected the children much less than it has the adults. The goods-shortage has resulted in almost pathetic combinations of clothes on the children one meets in the streets, especially in the matter of shoes.

The Pioneer movement is open to all children; even the child of a priest may join if the parents permit. Theoretically, the principle of the class struggle has not been applied to children, although many of their activities are organized on the basis of participation in the class war. There have been instances of fights, in the schools as well as on the streets, between Pioneers or younger Komsomol boys and girls and the

children of parents "deprived of their rights"; and the antagonism was political and not personal. But the theory is that a child of a "bourgeois" family may be saved, and it is one of the tasks of the Pioneer movement to give this retraining. This is the form which the class struggle is to take among children—Pioneer and school influence against the influence of the family.

This Communist movement among the children is much more important than the amount of space given to its description here would indicate. The Communists act on the generally accepted view that attitudes are formed in the early years of childhood. The Pioneers of Communism are organized in order to start the Communist training in this formative period of life. Pioneers are expected to become Komsomol-members just as the latter train themselves to gain admission to the ranks of the party and become Bolsheviks.

Among the forces behind the Revolution the enthusiasm of the younger generation and the readiness of the young people to accept the burden and sacrifices of the new drive for Socialism are the most noteworthy. This enthusiasm has certain negative features: it is hard on machinery and also on the nerves of the Pioneers and Young Communists. But it is this enthusiasm of the younger generation that has encouraged the leaders to push on, to adopt again the more aggressive methods of the first years of the Revolution, to increase the "tempo" of the Five-Year

Plan, and to emphasize the sharpening of the class struggle. The success of this policy is in turn dependent to a considerable degree on the continued enthusiasm of the young workmen and peasants and on their ability to translate this enthusiasm into practical, constructive works. The Komsomol aims to keep alive the spirit of struggle and also to train the new technicians and managers for the new plants, factories, and collective farms. The Young Communist, with his Komsomol organization and the Pioneers of Communism as both his background and his field of work, represents one of the most important of the cadres of the Soviet order.

## III

## THE SHOCK-BRIGADE WORKMAN

In the discussion of the first two groups, the Communist party-worker and the Young Communist, the emphasis was on the political. It has been a case simply of emphasis, for in revolution all activity is political and politics penetrate to every field of life. But it is the Communist party-worker that determines policy in the party congress and committees, and then sees to it that the general line of the party is followed in all institutions; and the Young Communist helps the party-worker, and particularly keeps up the spirit of struggle and enthusiasm. The political leaders do all this as workmen, peasants, office-workers, journalists, teachers, and so forth. For they must all be engaged in socially useful, productive work of some kind as one of the conditions of membership in the party or Komsomol. To change the emphasis from the political to the economic—that is, to approach the subject of the Revolution from the side of economic organization—the next two groups will be the workmen and peasants, in each of which will be discussed the active organizing element, the shock-brigade workman and the collectivist-peasant.

As it is impossible to divorce economics and politics in a revolutionary movement, it is necessary to point

out the workman's place as a class in the new order. The word "workman" is used here to designate the bench-workman of a large-scale, mechanized industrial enterprise, the proletarian of the terminology of Socialism. Now Soviet Russia is often spoken of as the first "Proletarian State," or "Workman State"; officially it is also a "Toiler's State" with a "government of workmen and peasants." When this latter term is used, it is always qualified by the phrase: "with a dictatorship of the proletariat." The Communist party is the vanguard of the workman class, and carries out its dictatorship. The majority of the membership of the party must be workmen, and bench-workmen.

Although young workmen, as opposed to young peasants or young office-workers, do not constitute the majority in the membership of the Komsomol, they supply the leadership and give the tone in this organization of the youth. Here, as in all Soviet institutions, there is the close alliance of the two basic economic classes of the Soviet order—workmen and peasants. It is not, however, an alliance of equals; the peasant is only a junior partner, for there is always the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

All classes of wage-earners—teachers and office-workers as well as manual laborers—are organized in the Soviet trade-unions. There are over 11,000,000 trade-union members, but the industrial unions of the workmen in the industrial plants and factories are the leaders of the Soviet trade-union movement.

With the development of the Five-Year Plan this leading class of the Soviet social order is growing rapidly; already it numbers over 3,000,000, and considers as closely allied to it those employed in the important transportation services who constitute another 500,000. Agricultural laborers and the so-called "poor peasants" are semi-proletarian elements and are the chief support, in the rural districts, of the workman class leadership. The collectivist-peasant will be nearer to the factory workman in the matter of attitude than the peasantry as a whole, it is believed.

It is, then, the workman class that forms the new ruling class under the Soviet system with its proletarian dictatorship, the ruling class for peasants and office-workers as well as for the remnants of the old, formerly prominent classes. The latter, represented by the figures at the bottom of the Soviet cartoon reproduced as the frontispiece of this volume, have been pushed off the political stage completely, as the first step toward their elimination as economic classes.

One may question whether this theory of workman class rule gives in practice an effective direction of policy and control of legislation by the workmen in the Soviets or even in the trade-unions. But the workmen go through the motions of running the Soviet state, and these motions seem to take on more and more real meaning. In any case, the workmen are constantly being reminded that it is their government. It is, in name, the "Workman-Peasant Red Army," for example. A "Workman-Peasant Militia" performs

the functions of the ordinary police force. One of the most important departments of government is the "Workman-Peasant Inspection." The Soviet apparatus of administration is being "workmanized," and all institutions must follow the "proletarian class line." It is "proletarian culture" that is being introduced and developed. These quotations represent what is being pounded into the heads of the workmen on every occasion, in speeches, in the press, through the slogans used for demonstrations, and on the stage; and the psychological effect is very considerable.

There are many concrete privileges secured to the workman and even to one of workman origin. In addition to special rations on the basis of his heavy physical work, the workman has special co-operatives, which are better supplied than the general co-operatives. His children have first call on the vacant places in schools and higher educational institutions. The rest-homes for workmen are given particular attention. To be of workman origin, even, is a great asset. This is especially the case when it is a question of securing official positions in Soviet institutions and of holding them during the "cleansings" of governmental departments. In one institution that had been thoroughly "cleansed," there was left in 1930 only one of the many acquaintances made four years earlier. When asked how he had survived the *chistka* (the "cleansing"), he replied, somewhat cynically, it seemed, that fortunately his grandparents had been of the workman class, as well as illiterate.

On a Soviet "grain factory," one of the big mechanized farms run by the government to produce wheat, the housekeeper of two employees—office-workers—was a woman of about fifty years of age, from the peasantry. She was cooking the meals for workers in a Soviet large-scale mechanized enterprise, and on this basis, in talking about the situation, always used the term "we 'proletarists.' " She evidently did not quite dare to call herself a proletarian; but she had invented this term, which implied a close contact with the new ruling class. This new ruler is often rough, even crude, in speech, manner, and method. Perhaps these are the very traits necessary for the leadership of the kind of revolution that is going on in Soviet Russia.

In addition to being the ruling class politically, the workman class as an economic unit is the most important basis of the drive for Socialism. The Five-Year Plan is, first of all, a program of industrialization, and therefore a plan of and for the industrial workman, who must also bear a large part of the burden of the plan, as it is frankly explained to him. In the final analysis, the test of the Five-Year Plan is industrial production; and one of the most important factors in production is the productivity of the individual workman, which depends on his attitude toward work. The attitude of the workman toward his work is therefore one of the important psychological aspects of the Five-Year Plan. This attitude is shown most clearly in the so-called "shock-brigade

movement" among workmen, which is interpreted by the Communists as an illustration of a new attitude and as a new and vital force produced by the Revolution.

The shock-brigade of a given factory or mine is a voluntary organization of workmen who have come together to fulfil and, if possible, exceed the quota of production assigned to the factory under the Five-Year Plan of expansion. The Communists and Young Communists usually start the shock-brigade, and this new movement is the revival and extension of the so-called Communist Saturday-work of the first years of the Revolution. In this earlier period Communists worked, and for nothing, on their Saturday holidays, to meet the constant economic crises cropping up in those years of civil war. The movement has been going on for about a year and a half, starting in the middle of the first year of the Five-Year Plan. At present all party-members and Komsomol-members are expected to be shock-brigaders in their places of work. But it is the non-party workman that the movement aims to reach and include. The non-party active workman is to be given a means of intensifying and rationalizing his activity, and at the same time infecting the rest of his group with his enthusiasm, interest, activity, and organization. So the shock-brigade workman forms an important cadre, a mobilizing, organizing framework of the socialistic experiment.

On the occasion of the annual commemoration of

Lenin's death an appeal was issued for a "Lenin contingent" to the shock-brigaders. In some factories the whole personnel joined, and the factory became a shock-brigade factory. At the present moment there are probably about a million and a half shock-brigaders; it is the aim to train all workmen to work shock-brigade fashion. Often these shock-brigades are on paper only, and this pseudo or false shock-brigadism has to be combated. Zealots turned the movement into one of mere demonstration and parade. A control was instituted within a factory by black and red boards, recording the actual achievement of a brigade.

The shock-brigade movement was introduced, and then was further promoted, by competitions between brigades, or between factories. This was called "socialistic competition," and it has developed as an integral part of the shock-brigade movement. Socialistic competition has come to have particular currency and authority because the leader, Lenin, had suggested it as early as 1919. At that time he made a statement which is being repeatedly quoted in connection with the development of socialistic competition between shock-brigades to fulfil, and if possible exceed, the quota of the Five-Year Plan as assigned to the competing parties. The quotation reads: "Communism begins at the point where there appears a self-sacrificing solicitude which rises above hard work, on the part of the rank and file of the workmen, to increase the productivity of labor."

The shock-brigaders have assumed this attitude; they are already Bolsheviks. They are not to become sectarian groups, self-contained, however; they must grow if they are to succeed in organizing new forms of labor. At first they were but a small group, but the movement has been increasing very rapidly. October first of this year was proclaimed "Shock-Brigade Day." The quarter-year from October to December of 1930 has been made an extra period, with a change of the Soviet fiscal year to the calendar year, and a "shock-quarter," in order to make up the falling-behind in the quotas of the last quarter of the second year of the Five-Year Plan, which occurred last summer. With this new drive there are developing "super-shock-brigaders."

Concrete tasks form the basis for socialistic competition. Also, there must be formal registration of the competition, and periodical checking-up. The challenge of one group to another to enter into competition is duly recorded. This socialistic competition is being promoted by the leaders as a "powerful weapon to arouse and organize the initiative of the masses." Starting first among factories in the same line of production, it has spread to workshops within a factory, and also to factories of different fields of industry. Industrial enterprises started competitions with agricultural communities in their respective lines. Cultural organizations also came into the movement, schools competing with factories, for example. Children also entered into competition with their

parents; the Pioneers of Communism thus were brought into the drive for the successful accomplishment of the Five-Year Plan.

There have been lately some interesting departures in the organization of the shock-brigades. "Co-ordinating brigades" have been formed to cover all workshops, so that the shock-brigade of one workshop in its enthusiasm would not make more parts than were needed while other workshops fell behind. This development tends to correct an inherent contradiction between planned economy and shock-production. In some factories an "operative shock-brigade" has appeared; it directs its attention to management, again in the interest of co-ordination. Special brigades have been formed to give help to those shops which are lagging behind their program. These came to be called "social tug boats."

The recent appearance of a movement called "Meeting the Plan" represents a very important development of the shock-brigade idea. Under this new slogan the workmen, through their shock-brigades, discuss and determine just how much they can produce, then go out and meet the Five-Year Plan—and do not meet it halfway by executing the assigned quotas, but more than halfway, by making a plan of their own. This means more initiative on the part of the workmen themselves. This new development came precisely when the shock-brigade movement seemed to be losing its efficacy, for production was falling off, in some fields disastrously.

The decline of production during the last summer was due in part to the fact that many workmen were leaving the factories and returning to the villages because of the inadequate food supply at the factory center. Labor discipline was weakening. Here was a field for shock-brigade methods, and in many factories the brigaders assumed the obligation not to leave their jobs until the conclusion of the Five-Year Plan. In some places the brigades organized the "defense of the factory" against desertion, and by exercising proletarian social pressure, with appeals to class loyalty, and probably also with threats or even direct coercion, kept workmen from abandoning their benches or machines.

The Communists admit that it is still necessary, in the period of the building of Socialism, to appeal to the individual self-interest of the workman. Shock-brigadism is based on enthusiasm and the spirit of sacrifice, but also on a system of rewards. Where wages are based on piece work, the reward is definite, although it may go to a whole group and be reduced for the individual by a readjustment of the wage-scale. Premiums and prizes of substantial worth are also given to the individual or to the larger group in the form of an appropriation for a workman's club-house. Public recognition, on the "red board" of the factory, or by a red flag attached to the lathe or bench, or by notices or pictures in the newspapers, are rewards of another kind, which appeal also to Bolsheviks. Promotion to positions in the management and

the corresponding perquisites of these positions are other incentives to the shock-brigader. On the other side, a group that does not keep up to its assignment of production loses the honorary title of shock-brigade, and is posted on the "black board," which hangs beneath the "red board" of the factory or institution. The Soviet system has its official decorations, and factories or individuals receive the order of "Hero of Labor" for valor in production.

Another reward is admission to the party. Although there is active recruitment of new party-members from the workman class, the formalities of admission are still very considerable. For a shock-brigade workman these formalities are reduced to the minimum, for he has in fact served his apprenticeship and given evidence of the required qualities by his work in the shock-brigade. The shock-brigade movement is literally making Bolsheviks.

The publicity which the shock-brigade movement promotes is making the practice of "self-criticism," of which the Communists boast, more genuine and effective. Shock-brigade workmen dare to criticize, and in fact are urged to do so. This criticism is of course circumscribed; there can be no criticism of the principles of the Revolution, or questioning of their truth; only defects in mechanism may be pointed out. The shock-brigaders give to the Production Conferences, which have been in existence for a long time, a more concrete character. These conferences of workmen are expected to suggest improvements in the methods of produc-

tion. The encouragement of inventions by workmen, which has been a poorly practiced theory, is given an organization and a definite aim in the shock-brigade movement. The institution of workman-correspondent also has been made more vital by the shock-brigade movement.

Factory managers, even when they are Communists, often have looked with little favor on the shock-brigade movement; it did contradict another principle introduced to increase production, the principle of a single responsible management. A tendency to throw cold water on the enthusiasm and activities of the shock-brigade was manifested in many managers and led to immediate and vigorous condemnation. Some managers leaned too far in the other direction by selecting the shock-brigaders; such a practice, of course, ran counter to the very idea of the whole movement, of promoting the initiative of the workman and providing a channel for its expression.

The technical staff of an enterprise, the engineers and technicians, may also come into the shock-brigade movement, entering into the socialistic competition. This side of the movement has not assumed large and important proportions, however. The position of the technical expert is very difficult, and has become more and more so with the sharpening of the class struggle and with the accusation of deliberate sabotage and damage-working brought against many individuals of this group. The methods of shock-brigaders have made the position of these experts even

more difficult. The engineer sees that the shock-brigade movement has distinct drawbacks from the purely technical standpoint; hurried construction often is poor construction, and "pepped-up" production results in poor quality in the product. But he does not dare oppose the enthusiasm of the workmen.

The technicians, including those imported from abroad, see how shock-brigade methods also subject machinery to very hard and even barbarous treatment. Quality of production has fallen very considerably; and the shock-brigade method of speeding-up, to meet or exceed the quantity quota, has contributed to this serious shortcoming. The leaders have begun to realize that more attention must be given to quality, but it is difficult for them to enforce measures to maintain high quality when they have themselves used mainly the quantity index to enthuse and encourage the shock-brigaders. There are laws penalizing the damaging of machinery or the systematic turning-out of products of poor quality, and inspection services aim to enforce these laws. The older workmen are eager to co-operate in this matter, disturbed often, as they are, by the careless and casual ways of the younger enthusiasts for "production." But inspectors have a hard life under proletarian dictatorship; with respect to them the workman often is the boss, sometimes in a very direct and rough manner. The Communists believe that what one has here is only a temporary mechanical defect, and not a permanent, inherent weakness.

The shock-brigade movement has had to develop in the face of the serious shortage of food-supply of the last year. While it has undoubtedly helped to meet this "tight place" in the economic structure, it has also been handicapped by it. For, productivity and enthusiasm for work cannot be easily kept up on short rations. The workmen have received a larger ration than any other class, but at times and in places it has been difficult actually to secure the rationed amount. The ration was short, particularly in fats, of which the Russian workman has always had at least a modicum.

On the occasion of a recent congress of shock-brigade workmen the Soviet newspapers gave interesting comments on the movement. These are quoted to show the Communist interpretation of the rôle of this group. One article describing the actual practices of a shock-brigade was headlined, "A New Man Grows." Another article made the following statement: "In this movement one can see clearly the forerunner of new forms of Communist labor developing before our very eyes. In the brigade, by a natural process, the participants pass from simple work in common, to genuine Communist labor, that is, labor the fruits of which go into the common pot and in which each carries full responsibility for the work of all."

It was noted that opponents were smiling at this movement and at its several manifest weaknesses. But the Communist writer recalled a remark made by Lenin in connection with the Communist Satur-

day-work of the first years of the Revolution, the prototype of the shock-brigade. Lenin at that time pointed out that making fun of the weakness of new ideas was a cheap intellectual skepticism, a form really of the class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat, a defense of capitalism against socialism. This statement was called particularly to the attention of the engineers and technicians in Soviet enterprises who have been wavering in their attitude toward the shock-brigaders. It is expected by the Communists that in time shock-brigades and socialistic competition in production will become an organic, normal, and everyday method of work, developing away from its original shock or agitation basis.

The Communists have always explained that only the general direction to Socialism is known and that the concrete forms of the socialistic order will be produced from the actual experience of the masses. It is now being asserted that the concrete forms of the road to Socialism are beginning to appear in the shock-brigades, in socialistic competition, and particularly in the latest development of this movement, the "meeting of the plan," by which on their own initiative the workmen determine their quotas of production.

There is another set of workman brigades—not shock-brigades among workmen, but brigades of workmen with respect to other institutions, particularly governmental institutions. This type of workman brigade has developed as part of the process of

"cleansing" the Soviet governmental administrative offices—cleansing them of harmful, hostile elements or of bureaucratic methods. There has been reference already to the activities of the Komsomol light-cavalry detachments, which scout around and swoop down on government offices to discover and expose instances of failure to follow the proletarian line or of tendencies to block the initiative and enthusiasm of the workmen and peasants. A workman brigade makes a more formal investigation either on the report of the Komsomol or on its own initiative; and its recommendations are carried out by the responsible and competent authorities, the latter being in some instances the political police. After an investigation the brigade can, if it deems it necessary, establish a permanent patronage over the institution, in the name of the factory from which it comes. This patronage has led to the assignment of workmen to the governmental office, to enter fully and authoritatively into the work of the latter. This is the "workmanizing" of the Soviet apparatus, which is needed, it is believed, under the resumption of the socialistic offensive and the sharpening of the class struggle. Training in management is in this way given to workmen. This cleansing process further contributes to the atmosphere of struggle, which in the opinion of the leaders is absolutely indispensable for the carrying-out of the Five-Year Plan and the retraining of the masses.

The effect of this procedure on the work of the ad-

ministrative office, which is of particular importance in a system of centralized planning and control, can be imagined. An instance witnessed, of a workman cross-examining a scientist on the functions of his laboratory, brought into sharp relief the negative aspect of this institution of cleansing. Yet, the cleansing of the Soviet apparatus is one of the most important political issues of the new period of the Revolution. Though still done in campaign, drive fashion, the cleansing aims at an organic replacement of the older elements in the state administration by tens of thousands of workmen.

This "pushing forward" of workmen is justified on frankly political grounds. At the same time it is claimed that by this method the new managerial staffs, so necessary to the new economic expansion, will be more rapidly produced. Red directors of factories, workmen who are also Communists, are thus being trained while holding positions of responsibility. Party loyalty and revolutionary enthusiasm are becoming less and less the basis for appointment to managerial posts but are still important considerations. One should perhaps note that another class is also held in the highest esteem, is in the social ranks of the Soviet system, side by side with the proletarian, namely, the "professional revolutionary," like the Lenins or Trotskys and now the Stalins. The recently appointed new chairman of the Supreme Soviet of National Economy was prominent as a party-worker before this transfer to the economic field.

Another function of the workmen as a class in the Soviet order suggests brigade and shock methods of a somewhat less organized and militant character. The institution of patronage of one group with respect to another originated among the workmen to carry out the leadership which they assumed with respect to the peasants, representing the practical application of proletarian dictatorship. Workman societies adopted village communities and in an organized manner gave them material and moral assistance. This so-called patronage movement has received a fresh impetus with the resumption of the socialistic offensive and the drive for the socialization of agriculture. Thousands of carefully selected workmen were sent down to the villages to help "liquidate the rich peasant," to form collective farms and use the new machines supplied to the latter. These workmen, scattered throughout the country, are to spread among peasants machine-mindedness and also the proletarian outlook. Members of urban Soviets, also workmen, who have received training in local government, are sent down to work in the rural Soviets, to strengthen and reinforce the latter as the centers of proletarian dictatorship in the peasant community.

The most important and permanent organization of the workmen is of course of the trade-union movement. In a proletarian state the trade-union has had a special rôle to play. The shock-brigade movement, which has been emphasized here, has been in general under trade-union leadership and direction. But the

place and exact rôle of the trade-unions has been a subject of dispute within the revolutionary leadership from the very beginning. The history of this dispute is long and involved; but in its last stage, since the beginning of the third period of the Revolution, the period of socialistic reconstruction, the dispute led to the removal or voluntary withdrawal of the leaders who had directed the trade-union movement from the first years of the Revolution.

The political eclipse of the trade-union leader Tomsky was almost as significant, though not as spectacular, as was that of Trotsky. Tomsky was branded as an opportunist and a "renegade" because he allowed the Soviet trade-unions to "degenerate" into a "bourgeois" conception of the trade-union as an organization primarily to protect the economic interests of its membership. Under the Five-Year Plan, the trade-unions must become "the closest and absolute collaborators of the Soviet authority, directed in all their political and economic work by the conscious vanguard of the workman class, the Communist party."

This quotation, translated into simpler words, means that the trade-unions must be subordinated to the party. They have always been spoken of as "schools of Communism"; they are now to become such in a very peculiar and limited sense. In the first years of the Revolution the trade-unions were agencies of coercion with respect to the workmen. Then, under the New Economic Policy they were degovernmentalized, and began to take a more independent

line, emphasizing the protection of the interests of their members. They exercised considerable influence over the management of a factory, in addition to supervising the collective bargains which they had made with the management in the name of the workmen.

But with the introduction of the principle of a "single manager" to whom wider authority was given to develop greater responsibility in management, the trade-unions have become less influential. The next step, of bringing the trade-unions under more direct party control, has reduced still further their influence and independence. A recent law has practically assigned workmen to the plant or factory in which they are employed, and resolutions of the trade-unions were cited in support of the enactment of this measure. This last step suggests a return to the methods of the first years of the Revolution, when the trade-unions were to a considerable degree agencies of compulsion with respect to their members.

It must not be concluded, however, that the trade-unions do nothing for the workmen; it is a question of emphasis. Collective bargaining is still the law, and the workmen get the many special services organized for them through their trade-unions and workmen's co-operatives supervised by the trade-unions. The trade-unions carry on extensive educational work to raise the cultural-political level of this ruling class of the Soviet system. Workmen's clubs, rest-homes, theaters and parks, and nurseries for the children are the most important institutions maintained and con-

stantly promoted by the trade-unions. But the trade-unions have adopted the slogan, "Attention to Production," and have reorganized their structure and activity to increase production under the Five-Year Plan. The drive and pressure which the party has developed to put through this program has logically introduced an element of coercion in the policies and practices of the trade-unions. The Communists will insist that one has here merely the formal expression of the voluntary acceptance of the burden of the Five-Year Plan by the workmen. In another context a citation from a Soviet source in characterization of the methods used spoke of the "combination of educative and compulsive measures," and this explanation is also applicable to the principles and methods of the Soviet trade-unionism.

For the workman, even in the proletarian state, the trade-union stands for the maintenance of wages. Under the pressure of the drive for Socialism, in which the workmen with their special rôle must carry a considerable part of the burden despite their privileged position as the ruling class, it is doubtful whether the real wage of the workman has been maintained. The Five-Year Plan, in its statistical quotas, provides for an increase in wages as well as in productivity of labor and production. In general articles and speeches it is claimed that these quotas respecting wages have been met. The privileged rations for workmen and the special attention to the supplying of the co-operative stores in industrial centers and in the workman quarters of these centers have meant that the work-

men have felt the food-shortage less acutely than other groups. The rationing system has in a measure protected the workmen against the effects of currency inflation. But the plans to supply workmen have not always been successfully carried out, as evidenced by the extensive migration of workmen back to the villages or to other industrial centers where the food supply, according to reports, was better. When supplies are not available in the co-operatives, the workman also has to resort to the free, open market, where prices during the last summer rose, until they became almost fantastic, for such staples as butter, meat, shirts, and boots. The quality of these goods also was very inferior, and in the official reckoning of the real wage there must have been failure to take into account the two important factors of actual availability and of quality.

The distribution of food supplies and manufactured goods to workmen has been further regulated by a system of "closed co-operatives," to which each workman is assigned for all his purchases. Thus the workmen also have begun to suffer from the insufficiency of food and clothing. It has been a deficit in fats that has reduced the food rations to a dangerously low level. Shock-brigades, socialistic competition, and propaganda may be able to maintain enthusiasm and willingness of sacrifice. But productivity, particularly under the strain of the new, mechanized conditions of work, requires physical strength and nervous energy as well as a heroic spirit and faith.

Continued enthusiasm on empty stomachs can be

maintained to a certain point by propaganda; the injection of too much coercion, even if generously sugared with more propaganda, might easily upset the balance. Last summer there was a small but significant scandal as the result of the practical disappearance of cigarettes for a few days; and the workmen protested in a forceful enough manner to bring immediate action, in the way of concession, from the authorities. The recent easing-up of the food stringency in Moscow—and this over night—was significant. A dictatorship means the possibility of quick and effective action in this direction also.

The incessant drive for increase of production led to the introduction of so-called uninterrupted work, supplemented in some enterprises by extra shifts. Under this system the enterprise runs 360 days of the year, being closed only on the five main revolutionary holidays. By the adoption of a five-day week, one-fifth of the employees are resting every day. Also, a seven-hour day has been in force in many plants. These new measures, in addition to the new construction and the opening of new factories, have for the moment solved the problem of unemployment which presented serious aspects only a year ago and constituted an anomaly which greatly distressed the Communists. The liquidation of hostile classes has also contributed to the very rapid reduction of a large army of unemployed. This change is constantly emphasized by the Communist leaders, and the situation in this respect in Soviet Russia is contrasted with that prevailing in other countries.

The spirit of struggle, on which the enthusiasm of the workman is in part based, is kept alive also by the active antireligious propaganda and activity, carried on by the trade-unions, as well as by the party and especially the Komsomol, the Young Communists, among workmen. The international organization, initiated and led by the Soviet trade-unions, the Red Trade-Union International, serves also to inspirit the workmen of the Soviet Union by characterizing them as the pioneers and fighters for the world-proletariat. At a recent congress of this body, held at Moscow, the speeches of delegates from other countries praised the Soviet workmen, as the models for others, and appealed to the workmen of all countries to come to Soviet Russia with their experience and their tools, to help carry out to successful fulfilment the Five-Year Plan. The Five-Year Plan is interpreted to the workmen as a program of preparedness for defense, against the alleged hostility and machinations of the outside capitalistic world. This appeal to an odd combination of internationalism and nationalism is a forceful technique to evoke in the workmen loyalty to the Revolution, the Soviet state, and the party leadership.

The rôle of the workmen in the building of Socialism is the constant theme in speeches and articles. In an article entitled "Selecting for Industrialization," attention is called to the demand for a minimum of 800,000 new and trained workmen under the Five-Year Plan. The article then goes on to say: "Our building is distinctive not only in its unprecedented

rate of development but also in its new content, namely its socialistic character. It requires the preparation and training of workmen capable of catching up with and surpassing the most technically developed capitalistic countries. The rapid preparation of new corps of workmen means the strengthening of their political-economic power, the reinforcing of their leading rôle in remaking the whole economic life of our country on socialistic principles, and the strongest possible arming for the coming struggle with the world-system of imperialism, a struggle which will become more and more bitter."

These new workmen require special attention in the matter of training, another Communist writer emphasizes, and then points to the kind of training which the shock-brigade movement is giving: "In the shock-brigades a new type of socialistic workman is being born, namely, one who considers everything that has to do with the factory as his own, suffering individually for all mistakes or miscalculations. In other words, where before in the factory there was one director and a hundred workmen, now we can say that we have in a factory one leader and a hundred persons with the psychology of a director or manager of the factory, the 'boss.' "

At a recent party conference one of the party secretaries so discussed and defined the essence of socialistic competition: "It means an economic approach to production on the part of the proletariat, by which the proletariat looks upon production as does a care-

ful and calculating owner, works not as a hired capitalistic slave but as the citizen of the Soviet state, to whom belong all these riches, and who by free Communist labor wishes to raise and increase the well-being of the country."

These citations are given to illustrate not only the Communist theory but also the typical statements made daily and in all connections to the workman class as a whole, to groups of workmen, and to the individual workman. It is the shock-brigade movement among workmen that has made shock methods the everyday way of going at things, which is characteristic of the Bolshevik drive for Socialism and which has been made officially the feature of the movement in the "shock quarter-year" of the last months of 1930. The cartoon reproduced on the following page shows the new plants built, and some already running, under the flag of shock-brigadism—*Udarnichevstvo*. "Facts are stubborn things," suggests the cartoonist to the weeping figures on the left, which represent capitalism, the church, the army, and Social-Democracy—the institutions of the "bourgeois" order, believed by the Communists to be tottering as the result of an economic crisis.

The workman is also constantly reminded of his obligation to organize the rest of the country as workmen are organized in industry, without property and around the means of production, developing in peasants through collectivist methods the proletarian point of view, gradually workmanizing the apparatus


CARTOON FROM *"PRAVDA"* OF OCTOBER 2, 1930

of administration, establishing new traditions of proletarian culture, and developing in all a new attitude toward work.

It is specifically the shock-brigade workman who is "building Socialism," increasing his productivity, rising to important managerial and responsible positions in the nationalized economic life. He is constantly told that history has put him to the front of the stage, that Socialism is to replace capitalism on the basis of its greater productivity, just as capitalism on the same grounds of greater productivity replaced the old economic order of feudalism. This propaganda is, undoubtedly, one of the powerful forces behind the Revolution. The shock-brigade workman—representing one of the new cadres of the Revolution—is a product of this propaganda.

## IV

## THE COLLECTIVIST-PEASANT

The *Kolkhoznik*, the collectivist-peasant, the second of the new economic cadres of the Soviet order, is a type difficult to present. He represents a comparatively recent development, and considerable compulsion, direct and indirect, has been used in producing him. His features therefore are not yet clearly defined. On the other hand, a peasant who has adopted collectivist methods of land tenure and work is a most important factor in the building of the new order; it is possible that he will prove to be the deciding factor, an absolutely necessary cadre if the Soviet system is to prevail.

The importance of this group is evidenced by the fact that all other groups give special attention to his training; he is, as in the frontispiece cartoon-picture hemmed in on all sides by the others, who among their functions have that of producing him. "The collectivist-peasant is not yet a Socialist," Stalin recently said, adding that "it would be necessary still to do a great deal of work to remake the collectivist-peasant, to straighten out his warped individualistic psychology, and make of him a genuine toiler of a socialistic society." The cartoonist of the frontispiece has portrayed him as older than the others, it will be

noted. Politically and economically the adoption of collectivist methods of agriculture by peasants is as important as the introduction of shock-brigade methods by workmen. In both instances it is a question of attitude toward work; in both instances there is held out the promise of greater productivity. Shock-brigadism in industry and collectivism in agriculture represent to the leaders of the Revolution concretely the "building of Socialism."

It has been a commonplace for generations to speak of the peasantry as Russia's knottiest problem; the predominantly agricultural character of the country points to this very elementary fact. Tsarism fell largely because of its failure to solve the agrarian problem, and in particular to satisfy the peasants' land-hunger. For the Revolution the peasant question was very specifically a problem, because the Revolution was, in theory, primarily a proletarian revolution. The disputes within the leadership of the Revolution have been most frequent and acute in this question of agrarian, or peasant, policy. Stalin and Trotsky split over the attitude to be taken toward the peasants, this point of dispute being perhaps the outstanding one in their controversy. Stalin and the so-called "right" opportunistic tendency in the party disagreed sharply on this subject of the peasantry and the policy to be adopted with respect to them.

It is noteworthy that the second distinct contribution to Marxism, attributed to Lenin by his followers, is precisely on the question of the place and rôle of

the peasantry. His first contribution is on the rôle and structure of the party, to effectuate the proletarian dictatorship. He is credited by his followers with having evolved also the method for the effective cooperation of peasants with workmen, under the latter's leadership. That this feature of Leninism is not as clearly defined as others is shown by the fact that Lenin himself stumbled in the application of his theories, and his followers have disagreed sharply over the proper interpretation and the practical carrying out of the teachings of the leader on this most important point of policy.

In the Five-Year Plan the provisions for the expansion and changes in agriculture are more radical and revolutionary than are those with respect to other economic fields. The sharpening of the class struggle that characterizes the present period of the Revolution has manifested itself most actively and poignantly in the rural communities. Last winter the class struggle in many villages became literally class war with violence, reprisals, and many casualties.

These statements, reduced here to their shortest and simplest formulation, show the importance of the collectivist-peasant, who is now to carry the economic and political principles of the Revolution to the peasantry. It may be said that for the peasants the Revolution really started when the active policy of socializing agriculture was adopted two years ago, with the introduction of the Five-Year Plan. The success of the Five-Year Plan depends in large measure

on the character and growth of this new cadre, whose rôle is to mobilize the rest of the peasantry behind collectivist methods.

Until two years ago the policy of the Communists with respect to the peasantry was in the main that of concession, of giving way. At the very beginning the Communists adopted the land program of a rival party, and they had in mind merely to neutralize the peasantry while the workmen consolidated their ruling position in the cities. Then, under the pressure of the need for raw materials and foods, the Communists tried to bring the peasants under their direction and control. They nationalized the land and on this basis requisitioned the peasants' surplus products. They planted "communes" and tried to introduce their collectivist ideas. The first application of Communist principles ended in failure and had to be abandoned. The New Economic Policy of 1921, which ushered in the second period of the Revolution, was in its main provisions a retreat before the protests and demands of the peasants. After the retreat, in theory the land remained the property of the state, that is, nationalized; but in practice individual tenure was recognized and permitted. There came a very marked revival of agricultural production, and this progress was based on the development of individualistic principles, in tenure, and particularly in the matter of the disposal of the crops.

At this point it is necessary to digress and define the peasantry more precisely. From the beginning of the

Revolution the Communists differentiated the peasantry into three groups: the poor peasant, the middle peasant, and the rich peasant—the latter being called the *Kulak*, meaning "fist," an old Russian term used to designate that richer element in a given village which engaged in trade and money-lending as well as in agriculture. These three categories were not, and even today are not, easily definable, varying by localities and periods, and psychologically all three groups often have been the same, taking the same general attitude despite the class differentiation on which the Communists insist.

In the first months of the Revolution all peasants were favored; they were allowed and urged to go out and seize the estates of the landlords. Then the poor peasants were selected to act as the agents of the new proletarian authority in requisitioning the surplus food-products for the state. With the New Economic Policy, the middle peasant was proclaimed an ally; and though the rich peasant was denounced as a hostile element, he was not particularly harassed, for he was needed and was therefore encouraged to be active and to prosper. In 1926 Trotsky attacked this policy of concession to the peasant, particularly to the rich peasant, but he was overruled.

Trotsky was right when he pointed out in 1926 the incompatibility of the growing individualism in the peasantry with socialistic aims. For the nationalized industry and the proletariat had become uncomfortably dependent on the peasantry for food-supplies

and also for raw materials. This situation became acute with the progress of industrialization, after the adoption of the Five-Year Plan. So in 1929 Stalin pushed through, over the opposition of several of the outstanding leaders, what he claimed was the true "Lenin" peasant policy. It was very suggestive of Trotsky's program of several years earlier. Stalin practically admitted this when he argued that the Trotsky program applied in 1926 would have broken the alliance between workmen and peasants, one of the conditions of existence of the Soviet order. In 1929 it would succeed, he explained, because of the progress in thinking and organization among the peasants.

This point of detail in the dispute between Stalin and Trotsky is mentioned because many Communists as well as many outside observers believe that it was still too early in 1929 to adopt the measures of active collectivization. In the spring of 1930 Stalin was forced to reduce the pressure which was being exerted for collectivization, but in the autumn the collectivization policy was once more "activized." By the quantity index collectivization of agriculture has spread so rapidly that in this field of economic development the Five-Year Plan will be executed in three instead of four years. Over one-fourth of the peasant households were collectivized for the winter sowing of 1930. The percentage was higher in March, when compulsion was being used extensively. There was an increase as compared with the period of the

spring sowing; "recollectivization" followed the "decollectivization" of the spring that had taken place when the coercive practices were discontinued. These are the percentages for the entire country. In the grain-growing regions the percentage of collectivization is much higher; in some parts of the country there has come what is termed "practically complete" collectivization, where 50 or more per cent of the individual households have joined together in the so-called *Kolkhozy*, or collective farms.

Side by side with this collectivization movement, so-called "Soviet estates" have been developed. These are government-run agricultural enterprises, and are called *Sovkhozy*. They existed earlier; many former landlord estates were retained as units, not being turned over to the peasants to divide up. Specially equipped and highly mechanized establishments were thus reserved. They had played a very insignificant rôle in the economic life up to 1928. But industrialization under the Five-Year Plan included the extension and development of these Soviet estates, particularly to produce grain. The result has been the establishment of over a hundred enormous highly mechanized "grain factories" run by the state. The largest of these grain factories, called very aptly "the Gigant," has under a single management over 275,000 acres in grain; and all the work is done by machinery. There are only a dozen horses on the place, for the use of field inspectors. The Sovkhoz is not collectivized agriculture, properly speaking. As

the name indicates, it is managed by the state and run like a factory. It has had a considerable influence on the collectivist movement, however.

With the adoption of a more active collectivization policy the Communist class differentiation of the peasantry became more positive. This emphasis on groups within the peasantry was necessary in order properly to deploy the class struggle which was to accompany, and in fact promote, the collectivization. The poor peasants were to be the leaders, as the full allies of the proletariat. The middle peasants were to be won over, and the rich peasants were to be "liquidated as a class," to use one of the most current slogans of the last year. It is the method of liquidation adopted that permits one to characterize what has been going on in the Russian villages as "class war."

The proportionate size of each of these three groups —poor, middle, and rich peasant—varies by regions. Also, the "rich peasant" is not always defined in the same way even in the same region. To give an approximate idea of the distribution of the three groups for the whole country, the following rough percentages may be noted. About 35 per cent of the total peasantry may be classed as poor peasants, that is, peasants inadequately supplied with draft animals and implements properly to cultivate the soil. About 5 per cent of the peasants are so-called "rich," this wealth consisting of two horses and three cows when most of the other villagers have only one horse and one or two cows. If a more active, prosperous peasant

engages in trade side by side with his agricultural work, or rents his draft animals and implements to poorer neighbors, he is definitely classified as a Kulak. This rich peasant is thus a very modest capitalist. The middle peasant then constitutes the largest group, about 60 per cent of the total. These percentages, it must be emphasized, are very approximate, for the local as well as the central authorities have themselves been most arbitrary and often inconsistent in the distribution of the peasantry into these three "classes."

Now in the drive for collectivization of agriculture the poor peasant is relied upon to take the initiative and give the push; the rich peasant is to be eliminated in the process; and the middle peasant is to be won over. The winning-over of the middle peasant is the central aim. The support of the poor peasant—a semi-proletarian element—can be secured with comparative ease. But the middle peasants, constituting the largest group, had shown themselves stubbornly individualistic, and the alliance between them and the workmen had not been strengthened economically or politically. Lenin had taught that an antagonism between urban and rural interests was possible, though not inevitable, under the Soviet system, so that positive steps had to be taken.

The general principle of Bolshevism, that there can be no "growing into Socialism," that the new order can be established only in the atmosphere of struggle, is applicable particularly in the field of agriculture.

It was realized that purely coercive measures could not be used successfully against the middle peasant and that collectivization would have to be based in part on voluntary action. But the use of force against a class enemy is also a basic tenet of Bolshevism. Therefore there was no hesitancy in resorting to force and violence in dealing with the rich peasant. This group, it is true, had been allowed for a time to prosper when it was needed for its contribution to the reestablishment of the productive forces. But now it was decided to "liquidate it as a class," eliminate it economically and even literally; it had been deprived of political rights from the beginning, not being allowed to vote in Soviet elections or participate actively in the co-operative movement.

One reason for the decision to alter the policy with respect to the rich peasant was based on a psychological fact. It was believed that so long as this Kulak existed he would be a source of demoralization from the Communist viewpoint, deterring the middle peasant and even the poor peasant from realizing the economic advantages and superiority of collectivism. The middle peasant, in fact, was always wanting to become a rich peasant, just as the poor peasant's ambition was to become a middle peasant. The Communist's differentiation of the peasantry into classes was in this respect not entirely valid. A poor peasant who had taken a very active part in the liquidation of the rich peasant explained to the writer that the middle peasant could not have been won over with-

out the adoption of this ruthless policy toward the rich peasant. In a word, the liquidation of the rich peasant was a warning to the middle peasant; individualistic tendencies were penalized to promote the collectivist principle, and severely penalized.

Behind this frank use of force there was a rationalized declaration of policy, based, it was always insisted, on a constructive economic approach. From the beginning the Communists had of course proclaimed the superiority of collectivist methods also in agriculture. When they were forced to give way to the individualistic tendencies in the peasantry, they announced that they did so with regret, because in their opinion it was an economic impossibility for the peasantry to rise from their poverty by individual households. The Soviet government in its legislation and administrative practice adopted this Communist view; co-operative societies were promoted by special privileges in the matter of taxation and of credits from the Soviet state bank. Machinery from the nationalized industrial enterprises was sold on special terms, and in some instances exclusively to co-operatives.

The difficulties encountered in 1928 and again in 1929, in effecting the program of state collections of grain for the supply of foodstuffs to urban centers and non-grain-producing provinces, and of raw materials to nationalized industry, brought a more positive statement and a more vigorous application of the Communist policy. Collectivization of agricul-

ture would reduce private trade in grain, it was expected, and thus greatly facilitate the task of the state grain-collecting agencies. The Communists said in paraphrase: We are not going to allow the rich peasants to starve us out. We are going to give the middle peasants a chance to see the light—the choice of clinging to their small bits of land and starving, or of adopting a more rational form of agriculture, namely, collectivism. The poor peasants are with us, for they see at last that the rich peasant is an enemy, not only exploiting them but trying actually to bring them to the point of famine.

A lagging-behind of agricultural production was a fact, though the leaders themselves, with access to the same official data, differed sharply as to the extent and character of the decline. The industrialization program was being menaced by this falling-behind of agriculture. Individualistic tendencies were one of the causes of this degradation in agriculture. The number of individual peasant enterprises had increased from about 16,000,000 in 1921 to almost 26,000,000 in 1929. That such a development had taken place under the political leadership of Communists was itself a challenge to the latter. The parceling-up of the peasant holdings in land was the response of the peasantry to the economic policies of the Communists, but it was at the same time from the point of view of economic production a distinct retrogression. The parceled holdings of individual peasants made more difficult, if not impossible, the

introduction of better methods of agriculture and particularly of machinery and technical advance.

Quite independent of Communist theory, something had to be done to revive agriculture. There were two possibilities. The rich peasant could be allowed greater freedom to unite and absorb the small holdings of his less fortunate neighbors, and to re-establish the old system of estates, under private control—re-establish capitalism in the villages. Or these small, economically hopeless units could be brought together on a collectivist basis. There is no need to explain why Communists, confident of the possibility of building Socialism, chose the second solution of the problem. As Bolsheviks they faced the situation squarely, and went out as Bolsheviks to solve it, by force and violence where it was necessary and expedient to use compulsive as well as educative measures.

Thus, behind the policy of collectivization there were urgent economic considerations; something had to be done to increase agricultural production. Under the existing conditions the country could not even feed itself, it seemed. And there could be no substantial improvement in the methods of agriculture, particularly in grain-producing regions, when the system of minute individual tenure was in force. Machinery could not be introduced on the small holdings, especially when these individual holdings were further divided up, under the village system of parceling out shares in each kind of land, so that the individual

held a dozen or more small garden plots. Individual tenure had in fact developed to a point of absurdity in the grain-growing regions.

Education and propaganda have also been forces behind the collectivist movement. For thirteen years the superiority of collectivism has been taught, in schools, village reading-rooms, and particularly in the political courses organized in the Red Army, through which tens of thousands of young peasants passed every year. The workman patronage societies have been other channels for the spread of the principles of group organization and activity. Particularly in the co-operative societies which were actively promoted after 1921, when Lenin gave the formula "Soviets plus Co-operation equal Communism," an extensive educational work has been carried on. There is therefore this other positive factor making for collectivization.

When, after the first year of the activization of the policy of collectivization, an inventory showed an enormous success in numbers, the Communists reinforced their propaganda by the assertion that facts had proved beyond all question the correctness of the policy. On these grounds they insisted that economists who had doubted the wisdom of the policy should recant and publicly acknowledge that Marxian economics had been proved the only truly scientific doctrine. These economists were called on to revise their theories and to work out a new one which would give a proper perspective for the facts as developing

in actual life. The rigidity of Communist dogma revealed itself with particular force in this field of agrarian economics, called forth by the large number of doubters, by the stubbornness of many elements of the peasantry, and by the seriousness of the fight against individualistic tendencies which the Communist had determined to take up, face squarely, and carry on to a show-down. This decision made the propaganda features of the policy more positive, to the point in some instances of passing-over into the field of sheer compulsion. Many economists who would not publicly recant so that their change of view would give further support to the policy of collectivization were arrested and accused of counter-revolution, of working in the interest of the Kulak and for the re-establishment of capitalism.

Immediate benefits are given to the peasants who accept collectivization. The imported tractors and other agricultural implements go almost exclusively to the collective farms. Cultural institutions—reading-rooms, the printed newspaper, radios, nurseries for children, clubs—can be more readily promoted in the collective group, and represent a very real inducement to join. The ability to supply the new collectives with machinery and cultural institutions has fallen behind the growth of the new groups. But progress here has been sufficient to serve as a strong incentive to others, to eschew their individual holdings for these very real and immediate benefits.

The accompanying liquidation of the rich peasant

offers another immediate benefit, this time of a kind that suggests a less constructive policy. The livestock and machinery, and even the personal belongings of a completely liquidated rich peasant, go to the collective, as the poor peasants' contribution to the capital of the new enterprise. The poor peasant thus gets immediately the tools and horses of his better-off neighbor—in theory not for himself but for the group; in practice, however, often for himself. This cannot be termed a bribe, but it is very clearly a special inducement to the poor peasant to accept the collectivization policy and to get actively behind it. It was in the looting of the rich peasants that the class struggle in the rural districts took on its most distressing forms during the first months of 1930. The spirit of vengeance was often manifest, of the poor against the rich, that sinister but inevitable aspect of class struggle.

The number of families literally thrown out of their homes, and even expelled from the village, cannot be estimated with any accuracy. There were about 5,000,000 officially designated rich peasants. Many of the middle peasants were subjected to practically the same forcible expropriation, being told that they would be treated as rich peasants if they did not join the collective farm and turn all their tools and livestock into the common fund of the new enterprise. These confiscations reached 30 per cent of the households in some villages, which meant that many middle peasants were subjected to direct and forceful com-

pulsion. The confiscations sometimes extended to personal belongings of all kinds.

Thus there was for a period the element of sheer compulsion behind the collectivization policy; the character and extent of this coercion was later acknowledged by the Communists themselves. It is claimed that the use of compulsion was a case of overreaching on the part of local workers, especially of the enthusiastic Young Communists, who played a prominent part in the establishment of the collective farm. That local workers really did just what the central authorities indicated, by their legislation and directions, has not been admitted by the latter. The responsibility for the overreaching was placed on the shoulders of the local men and particularly the youth, although it did not belong there entirely. For the student Stalin must bear a large share of the responsibility. The local workers were severely reprimanded for using compulsion to further collectivization. They were called "hot-headed fools," in Stalin's famous manifesto on *Dizziness from Success*. The principle of voluntary co-operation, which Lenin had formulated, was to be strictly adhered to, it was announced; and the practices of the first months of 1930 have been in fact abandoned.

The easing-up in the pressure for the adoption of collectivist methods, which came just before the spring sowing of 1930, took the form also of promoting a transition type of collective farm. At first the drive by central and local authorities was for the

"commune," in which everything must go into the common pot, not only agricultural implements and draft animals but the family cow, pigs, and chickens. The peasants in the "commune" eat together, the individual household practically disappearing. The transition type is the *artel*, an old Russian institution of collective effort, under which only fields, draft animals, and field work are collectivized.

Another mistake, later corrected, was the failure to provide for a sharing of the profits of the collective enterprise proportionate to the implements and livestock contributed. The middle peasant therefore decided that he might just as well slaughter and dispose of his cow or pig, or even his horse, and enter the collective on an equality with the poor peasant. The resulting indiscriminate slaughter of cattle was stopped by a change of policy, but only after it had gone on for several months, depleting disastrously the livestock of the country. The extent of the slaughter was enormous; the figure has been set at over 30 per cent for horned cattle. It was higher for pigs, sheep, and chickens, and lower for horses. An acute shortage of meat and fats, which is one of the big problems which the Soviet leaders are now facing, is in large measure the result of this killing of livestock by the peasants, in protest against the measures adopted to push the policy of collectivization.

While admitting that compulsion was used to promote the Kolkhoz, the Communists state that it was an unfortunate but really unimportant and minor

mistake. Pointing to the large numbers that remained in the collectives after pressure was taken off, and to the new rush to join after the harvesting of the crops last September, the Communists insist that compulsion must have played an insignificant rôle. How, they argue, can millions of peasants be compelled to join collectives if they do not see that it is in their interests to do so? On the other hand, the claim that the overreaching in the use of compulsion was local hot-headedness cannot be accepted. The published directions of the central authorities were not unclear and were interpreted precisely in the same way all over the country. The overreaching was general and not confined to a few localities. It has been suggested that the overreaching was a deliberate, tactical move, to stir up the poor peasants and intimidate the middle peasants, at the expense of the rich peasants—in a word, to create that atmosphere of struggle without which, the Communists constantly assert, Socialism cannot be built.

That the drive for collectivization resulted in class war in the literal sense is now acknowledged. The rich peasants resisted, practiced reprisals, and then suffered counter-reprisals. In some districts the middle peasants were on the side of the rich peasants, but armed detachments put an end to their opposition. Poor peasants told the writer of the ruthless methods of liquidation of the rich peasant which they adopted: "We gave them till morning to get out; they could go where they wanted, but they had

to get out." The freight trains of those sent north were described by railway workers. The Soviet press itself reported the executions of rich peasants and priests for counter-revolutionary opposition to the government policy of collectivization. In justification of the way they treated the rich peasants, the poor peasants insisted that these rich peasants had set fire to the headquarters of collective farms, destroyed machinery, and even murdered the tractor mechanic or the Young Communist propagandist who had come down from the city to assist in starting and organizing the collective farm. The resistance of the rich peasant is quite understandable, for the policy involved his extermination. In answer to the question, raised by local party-workers, as to just "what the authorities meant by the liquidation of the rich peasant as a class," Stalin in January had answered: "The rich peasant must go. He is a bloodsucker, a vampire—he will recreate capitalism and landlordism. He was not attacked before because he was needed, but he is more dangerous than the old landlord class because he is more numerous." On another occasion, in answer to the objection that the severe treatment meted out to the rich peasant would reduce the amount of grain produced by this group of the peasantry, Stalin answered in the form of a proverb: "When you cut off the head, you do not cry over the hair."

The violent nature of the peasant protests led to changes in methods, but there was no change in pol-

icy. The peasant protests reached the peasant boys in the Red Army and created among them a mood that caused grave concern to the leaders. The political police had to be brought into action on several occasions, to handle the situation that developed in village or barracks. Stalin himself became frightened, although a few months later he ridiculed the timid Communists who, as he expressed it, got scared when a cockroach peeked out of a corner. In March, however, he recognized the seriousness of the situation when he ordered that certain practices be immediately discontinued. Again it may be suggested that revolutionary strategy called for an offensive, with a partial retreat in view, for the purpose of consolidating certain positions and of strengthening the morale in one's own ranks and weakening that of the enemy.

At first the system of compensation to the individual members of a collective enterprise was based on "mouths"; that is, all were fed or given allowances in food-supplies, and the payments in currency were the same for all. This system was soon abandoned, and there was introduced a system of differentiation of labor with a measurement of the work performed. The tractor-driver now receives in wages twice as much as the woman who hoes potatoes, and there are five other categories between these two extremes. The final distribution of earnings could not be made until after the harvest this last September. The Soviet press reports that the earnings per individual have been considerably higher than what the same

individuals had been making these last years on their individual plots of land. The collective farm authorities have been ordered to spread this fact in detailed figures as widely as possible among the neighboring individual peasants. The reported fresh rush into the collective farms, since the harvest of this year, has been promoted by this propaganda, which is made in a formal, business-like way, to be more convincing and effective.

Collectivization of agriculture was to be at the same time the mechanization of agriculture. The prospect of receiving new implements and machinery was one of the forces behind the movement. Then the collectivization went so fast, either of itself or because of the compulsion that was used to foster it, that the machinery could not be supplied. This meant bitter disappointment to the peasants. The failure of the supply of machinery to keep up with the development will not mean failure of the idea, the Communists report. The combining of tools on hand, the throwing-together of scattered fields, eliminating the dividing dead furrows and making the cultivation easier, the enthusiasm evoked by group action under leadership—all these factors have made the collective farm more productive without the addition of a single new tool or machine. The Communists bring forward figures to support this assertion. Commenting on this claim, one need only point out again that economic necessity and technical progress have been factors, side by side with compulsion,

contributing to the rapid growth of the collectivist movement.

There were executions of priests as well as of rich peasants for alleged counter-revolutionary opposition to collectivization. It is the contention of the Communists that the clergy has thrown in its lot with the rich peasant, and on this basis the collectivization policy is accompanied by an active anti-religious drive. Collective farms are expected to have schools, clubs, movies, but no churches; and where the last stage of collectivization has been reached and a "commune" set up, there is no church. But in the intermediary stage, the collectivist-peasant can continue his religious affiliations and practices, can keep his sacred images on his wall, perhaps side by side with pictures of Lenin and Stalin. The ruthless anti-religious activities in connection with collectivization of the last winter have been forbidden. Here also it was found that there was too much compulsion.

It has been the young generation that has shown enthusiasm for the new methods. The older person, even of the poor peasant group, will probably never be entirely happy under the new system, which runs counter to all his views and habits. The conscious, active collectivist-peasant is the young peasant, especially the party-member or the Komsomol-member with an increasing following from the "non-party young peasant mass," as it is categorized. Often the "public sentiment" of the rural committee, which is reported to have voted for a Kolkhoz, or for closing

down the church, is really composed of a small group of these active young enthusiasts, made powerful by the government policy, supported by urban elements sent down to assist them, and sometimes reinforced by the local political police authorities.

The policy of collectivization was, in fact, given considerable impetus by the assignment to the rural districts of 25,000 carefully selected workmen. The "25,000-er," as this workman missionary has come to be called, supplies managerial experience, technical knowledge to handle the new machinery, and political leadership—that is, the proletarian attitude. Some of these workmen have given particular attention to this last function, interpreting it as calling for the immediate liquidation of all rich peasants. This type has been a drill-sergeant also with respect to poor and middle peasants, often losing the confidence of the latter because of arbitrary and even utterly foolish orders. A recent cartoon showed the workman-manager ordering that the hay be gathered, whether it was wet or not. The "plan" called for work on hay that day, and was to be strictly followed.

Others of these "25,000" have been of real assistance to the peasants, putting at their disposal the wider experience with machinery and the habit of group work gained from factory life. In many instances the city workman saw and called attention to the mistakes and disorganizing practices of local "hot-heads" and became the saviors and real leaders of the peasants. This last is the important rôle which

is assigned to the proletariat by the Communist theory; and many instances of its actual working came to notice, side by side with many instances of its utter failure in practice. What are the respective proportions of these two opposed types? The development of the collectivization policy will give the answer, because of the important contribution which this workman leadership is to make to the new collectivized enterprises.

To develop the proletarian attitude in the collectivist-peasant, the institutions developed among workmen—the shock-brigade, socialistic competition, and the "meeting of the plan"—have been introduced in the Kolkhoz. These practices will increase production, as in the factory, and also combat individualistic tendencies. The class struggle thus will continue within the Kolkhoz, directed against all manifestations of "rich-peasant ideology." Cleansings are practiced also in the collective farm.

The Sovkhoz or Soviet grain factory is not discussed here in detail because the peasant working on one of these enterprises is not a collectivist-peasant but a hired wage-earner, a proletarian. However, because it represents mechanized and large-scale agricultural units, the Sovkhoz is expected to promote collective methods among the neighboring peasant villages. More practically the Soviet estate assists the collective farms of the neighborhood by placing its machinery at the latter's disposal whenever possible, supplementing the tractor brigades or stations which have been organized to serve the collective

farms of a district. In this way the Sovkhoz is a "stronghold of militant Socialism," or a "watch-tower of Socialist economics," to use Communist figures of speech.

The Soviet estate, the collective farm, the 25,000 workmen, the young peasants who have been trained in political and economic as well as military subjects in the Red Army, rural party-workers, the rural cells of the Komsomol—all these agencies are mobilized to bring about in the peasant psychology a change of attitude, particularly with respect to land tenure and individual labor and profit. In this way it is expected that there will develop from this collectivist-peasant a rural proletarian, who will have the same general outlook as his brother of the urban proletariat. The class distinction between workman and peasant will then be obliterated, it is believed; there will be no "peasants," but "workmen in collectivized villages."

Will this rural proletarian continue to have his own particular outlook on life for some time to come, however, so that the problem of alliance between workman and peasant will continue to worry the Communist leaders, as it has in the past? It should be noted that by the collectivization movement the peasants have been given an organization which they have always lacked, in Russia as in other countries. This organization may become one of peasant resistance or even activity, against a policy which avowedly is based primarily on industry and the industrial workman.

Against such a development the Communists have

taken special steps to maintain their leadership and control. A recent reorganization of local party organs has given more initiative and power to the primary party "cell" in the village. The Soviets are not to be abolished, as some active collectivists thought, on the ground that the Kolkhoz authorities could and should be the exclusive local authority. "The Soviets are the representatives of the proletarian dictatorship in the village," it was explained to them. The rural Soviets must take an active part in the promotion of the movement for collectivization, and failure to do so is interpreted as evidence that the Soviet has fallen under the control of the rich peasants; on these grounds re-elections are ordered, the Soviet system of representation permitting the quashing of local elections by the next higher authority. The poor peasants are given special organization and powers under the direct leadership of the party, for the specific purpose of gaining effective control of the local, village Soviet.

The use of machinery for the Communist retraining of the peasant is kept constantly in mind. At the time when the electrification of the whole country was first suggested and the first plans drawn up, Lenin gave out one of his many and useful formulas, to the effect that "Soviets plus Electrification equal Communism." The Five-Year Plan is the revised edition of the former rather utopian electrification program. Another formula of Lenin's emphasized the spread of co-operation, as a first step to complete

collectivization. A combination of the two formulas has become very current: "Soviets plus Co-operation plus Tractors equal Communism." Lenin had once remarked in those first years when the peasants were showing themselves particularly obdurate with respect to the policies which the Communists were trying to carry out: "If we could only give the peasants 200,000 tractors, they would be for 'the commune,' that is, for Communism." The tractor is therefore one of the main levers to bring the peasants into Communist line, as well as to improve their technical equipment and methods of agriculture. The name of Ford became at one time as popular and current as that of Lenin. There is a rapidly increasing percentage of Soviet tractors with more revolutionary names —"The Red Putilov" or "The Red October"; and under the Five-Year Plan Soviet tractors will in time greatly outnumber the imported, foreign machines. It is in the villages that one notes an attitude suggestive of a cult of the new machine.

The collectivization policy was greatly helped by the fact that for its first large-scale application in 1930 weather conditions were most favorable. The period for the spring sowing was much longer than usual, and this fact made it possible to repair the mistakes of the winter, which at first promised to upset the spring sowing. It was the first "Bolshevik spring sowing," because of the percentage of acreage sown on collectivist principles. It was a Bolshevik sowing also in the sense that the party and all insti-

tutions were mobilized to put it through. The "campaign" method adopted was costly, but it stirred up enthusiasm and got results.

The weather continued favorable during the summer, so that in the fields the crops were excellent, except in certain regions. There was considerable difficulty in handling the crops. A shortage of labor, transportation delays, the breakdown of machinery, and also a "demobilization of enthusiasm" after the terrific drive of the spring were constant problems. But the crops were harvested; and the grain collections to date—they are still in progress—have been put through without a menacing falling-behind in the program. The bread ration, which on the whole has been adequate, has been maintained, reserve stocks depleted in previous years replenished, and an exportable surplus secured.

The state grain collections on the harvest of 1930 have been more successful than those of previous years. The collective farm is expected to sell only to government and co-operative grain-collecting agencies. This is another means of liquidating the rich peasant, who was often also a local dealer in grain. The law sets the percentage of the gross crop which the collective must sell to the state, and this quota is no higher than that imposed on the individual peasant enterprise. It is believed that this surplus can be more promptly and readily secured from the collective group, and this expectation is one of the main motives for the policy. The collectivist-peasant

is expected to shun private trade as he has learned to abhor and abandon individual land tenure.

Many facts point to the success of the policy. The unusually favorable weather conditions, and the enthusiasm for a new thing and for the new machinery must be taken into account in making a judgment. On the positive side there is no doubt that the policy has increased the productivity of the poor peasant, who has always been a drag on the economics of the country. The rich peasant is being liquidated, so that the productivity of this group has been greatly reduced. Opponents of the policy within the Communist ranks feared that it would reduce the productivity of the middle peasant, that he simply would not work under collectivism. The size of the crops on the collective farms would indicate that the middle peasant did work, and more or less conscientiously. Was it because he was being watched carefully, and was under the constant threat of being considered a rich peasant, or of rich-peasant ideology? Did he, as a peasant, realize that the famine margin was very narrow, and that it was a question of working or starving? These factors operating in this first year of the experiment suggest that it is too early to give a final judgment on the basis of one crop and on the basis of a first year of the experiment.

It is possible that the middle peasant, and even the older middle peasant who has joined the collective, will continue to work, and that others will voluntarily join the movement, for the simple reason that

there is no other way to exist. In regions of "practically complete" collectivization the small remnant of individual households will have to come in or go under. On the other hand, the youth of the middle as well as poor peasant groups, often have become active, enthusiastic collectivists under the influence of party, Komsomol, workman brigades, demobilized Redarmyists, and the new machines put at their disposal, and, it should be added, the new power which has been turned over to them, together with the land and equipment of the liquidated rich peasant.

The background of training behind this enthusiasm, and the real quality of it, will be brought out as the next crops have to be put in and harvested. For the moment, however, one has this new and important cadre of collectivist-peasants, who are doing more than any other group to change the attitude of the masses, to develop a new psychology in the peasantry, and to organize for the building of the new order. As a member of a Kolkhoz, the peasant is becoming at last a conscious socialistic force, it is believed—forgetting that he is a trader, and looking on himself only as a toiler. It is this two-sided character of the peasant that makes him such a problem for the Communist. As a toiler he is an ally, but as a private trader he is an enemy. For the Communist, then, the collectivist-peasant, however produced, is "a deeply progressive and creative force." And Communists constantly tell the peasants that "the collective farm is the only way the peasantry can rise from its state of poverty and need."

# V

## THE SOVIET CULTURAL-WORKER

In the cultural, or educational, worker of the Soviet order another aspect of the Revolution is noted, after the emphasis so far has been on the political and economic by the picking-out of the leading figures in these two fields. The face given in the frontispiece cartoon for this fifth cadre is that of a woman, representing the school teacher. But the Soviet school teacher is only one of a wide range of workers in the field of education. To indicate the larger group, the author of the cartoon used a current Soviet term which has a broader meaning than the expression "educational worker" implies. In abbreviation the Russian word designating the fifth cadre is *Kultrabotnik*, or cultural-worker. There are the corresponding expressions: "cultural revolution," "cultural front," "cultural crusade," "cultural commission," and "proletarian culture." The meaning in which the word "culture" is used by the Communists will be defined by the content of this discussion of the "cultural-worker" of the Revolution. In view of the methods adopted to bring about the "cultural revolution," those to whom the leadership on the "cultural front" has been assigned have come to be spoken of as "cultarmyists"—in Russian, *Kultarmeets*, a

term which fits in very well with the designation of our last group, the "Redarmyist," or *Krasnoarmeets.*

The first three years of the Revolution, to 1921, were taken up for the most part with the struggle for political and military victories over internal opponents and external foes. When success was finally achieved on these two fronts—the military and the political—attention was given to what was called the "third front" of the Revolution, namely, education. A forced retreat on the economic front led to special emphasis on education, and particularly on "Communist training," for the older as well as the younger generation.

The New Economic Policy of 1921 represented concessions to hostile economic elements, and in order to counteract these forces inimical to the aims of the Revolution, it was deemed necessary to define more specifically the "ideology" of the Revolution and promote it in the masses and the youth. The New Economic Policy was often defined as a breathing-spell; and this breathing-spell in the economic struggle was to be utilized for Communist training, in preparation for the resumption of the socialistic offensive. When, two years ago, it was decided that this second drive for Socialism could be undertaken, the basis for the decision was in large measure the confidence that the years of organization and propaganda in the field of education and on the cultural front in general had brought about new attitudes in the masses that would this time guarantee success in the economic field.

In this cultural field the mere fact of thirteen years of revolution is important, particularly as the political dictatorship made it possible fully to utilize this period for the specific purposes of the dictatorship. The importance of the younger element among workmen and peasants has been constantly noted. The generation just coming into political and economic activity has been educated in the Soviet schools and brought up on Soviet newspapers, theaters, movies, and radio, all of which have been kept under a very strict censorship and Communist direction in order to insure the "ideological content" necessary, from the Communist viewpoint, to bring about the "cultural revolution."

The resumption of the socialistic offensive found its concrete expression in the Five-Year Plan of expansion. This plan included the building not only of new factories and plants but also of new educational institutions, to train the personnel necessary for the new economic enterprises. As seems always to be the case, education was given less generous support as compared with other fields, and this despite the fact that the Five-Year Plan represented scientifically planned development and expansion. This mistake was soon discovered, however. The problem of securing properly trained managers and technicians became immediately apparent and urgent, and brought a large increase in the appropriations for education, and radical changes in the organization and curricula of the Soviet school system.

The Five-Year Plan is also a program of class struggle, as has been pointed out time and time again. This means more attention to the ideological content of all education, in order more definitely to fix the attitudes necessary for the proper conduct and successful issue of the class struggle. The result has been a greater emphasis on revolutionary doctrine and its propaganda; and the school more than at any earlier period of the Revolution has been brought into the politics of the Revolution and made to play a very prominent part in the political struggle, that is, in the class struggle. On all these grounds, and because of the general importance of the so-called "cultural front" of the Revolution, the cultural-worker represents a very essential part of the Soviet system for retraining the masses and making Bolsheviks.

In the wide range of these Soviet cultural-workers there is at one end the member of an academy, the scientist or scholar, and at the other end the village school teacher. The academician has few contacts but an important rôle of leadership, while the school teacher has the broadest contacts under the leadership of the theoretician of Communism. Journalists, editors, literary writers, artists in all fields, the circus clown included, are drawn into the fight for "proletarian culture" and are workers in education. Then there are the directors of the organized propaganda, called frankly propagandists and agitators, although of late there has been a tendency to use the term "mass work" in referring to propaganda and agita-

tion. Here one has the trade-union organizer, the director of a workman club or village reading-room, the teacher in the special schools organized for members of the party and of the Komsomol, and the political instructor in the Red Army.

Most of these cultural-workers belong to the Educational Workers' Union, one of the largest of the Soviet trade-unions, with a membership of 850,000. Of this membership, the teachers in the primary schools, where at present 12,000,000 children are enrolled, represent the largest single subgroup. Of the 850,000 members of the Educational Workers' Union, 58 per cent are women; the percentage is larger among the school teachers. It was this fact that suggested to the cartoonist to present this cadre with the face of a woman. Of the school teachers, some 300,000 are to be found working in the rural primary schools, that is, in the peasant villages, representing the most important single intellectual group in direct contact with the enormous mass of the backward peasantry. There are other cultural-workers, in cities as well as in the villages, who are not technically educational workers; the total numerical strength of the "cultarmyists" was recently estimated by a Soviet writer at considerably more than a million.

In the army on the cultural front of the Revolution there are groups peculiar to the Soviet order, although logical products of it. The Communist Academy of Science is naturally a most important institution, for its members define the Communist

doctrine. Here Marxist economists, Marxist pedagogues, and Marxist historians work out in detail, and actively spread, what from the Communist point of view is the only true scientific method, the dialectic materialism of Marxism.

An Institute of Marx and Engels has collected the largest single library on the teachings and lives of these founders of Socialism, and publishes extensively, and in popular form for mass consumption, the results of the researches of its staff. The work of the Institute of Lenin is of the same general character, and is even more practical and immediate because Leninism supplies the doctrinal basis and concrete precepts for the Revolution. The discussions that have taken place over the proper interpretation of Lenin's writings and speeches give to the Lenin Institute an active rôle in the politics of the Revolution.

One more of the many and various Soviet academies or institutes may be mentioned, the Academy for the Communist Training of the Youth, which gives special attention to problems and methods of Soviet pedagogy. This academy is training the new staff of what are called "Red professors," who are to be thoroughly grounded in Marxism and the materialistic interpretation of history and science.

Another type of educational worker whom one very naturally finds well represented is the teacher in a Communist university or a party school. There is a whole network of special institutions to train the party-member and the Young Communist in Com-

munist doctrine and Bolshevik methods. All new party-members and all Young Communists must study the theory and history of the Revolution. This is one of the obligations of membership, necessary also successfully to pass the periodic examinations to which these political leaders of the Soviet order are subjected. The recent reregistration of all Communists in order to "cleanse" the ranks of the party, represented one of these tests. Among these party educational institutions some aim to prepare the leadership for the revolutions that will come in other countries. The Far East is given special attention in this matter of training for revolutionary leadership. The presence of these schools for Communists from other countries is utilized to emphasize the international attitude inherent in Communist training, and these institutions serve as laboratories for the educational work within the Soviet Union.

The outstanding features of the general educational system of the Soviets are, firstly, a close tie between the school and economic production, and, secondly, an active participation of the school in the political life of the community. The Soviet school is a "Labor School," and education also must be in politics, as one of the instruments for strengthening and promoting the ideology of the Revolution. These two characteristics of the Soviet educational system have become more marked with the adoption of the Five-Year Plan and the resumption of the socialistic offensive. It was always the idea to emphasize polytech-

nical training; Marx and then Lenin had written much on its importance. From 1922, when at last after the civil war it was possible to give attention to education, the Labor School was organized with emphasis on productive labor as part of the curriculum. Then special Factory Schools and Schools of Peasant Youth were set up. Now the idea of a "school-factory" is being applied widely and intensively. For agricultural training the Soviet estate or "grain factory" can be used as the base for the school.

This development has led to changes in the administration of the educational institutions. The first years of primary education have been left under the jurisdiction of the Commissariat of Education; but for the continuation courses and for all technical schools of all grades, including research institutes, the economic commissariats have been given concurrent jurisdiction. The strictly educational authorities continue to control methods and to provide the required general education, with emphasis on Soviet civics or Communist training. But the Supreme Soviet of National Economy is also an authority in the educational field, distributing the educational institutions to the various trusts and factories. In this way the closest co-operation between the school and the economic enterprise is secured; factories have been converted into institutes of technology.

The combining of study with actual production has been extended and regularized by the recent reforms. The present system provides for an equal distribu-

tion of time, for periods of fifty days, to study and to do practical work in technical schools and institutes. The uninterrupted work-year, of 360 days, is being applied also to the technical schools. This very radical reorganization of the Soviet educational system is a development of the last year, and the detailed working out of the new plans and programs is still in process. However, the aim of the reform is clear, namely, to produce more rapidly the managers and technicians needed for the economic expansion under the Five-Year Plan, and to produce the kind of personnel required by giving to each economic enterprise a substantial part in the training of the younger generation. What one has here is, of course, not a new idea in the field of pedagogy; but under the Soviet system the idea is given mass application under a unified, centralized plan, with all the powers of the state behind it, and applied with Bolshevik directness and militant methods.

The bringing of the school into the life of the community is also a principle which has characterized Soviet pedagogy from the first. The school programs since 1922 have covered "Society" side by side with the other two basic fields of study, "Labor" and "Nature." Participation in the life of the community by pupils as well as teachers has been promoted and to a very large measure effectively realized, and this even for the pre-school institutions, the children's homes and kindergartens. Political life now is centered on the class struggle, and is more active as well

as more concrete. Also, there are not the same evident contradictions between Communist theory and actual life as there were when under the New Economic Policy hostile economic elements were allowed not only to subsist but even to prosper. Participation in the class struggle, therefore, is more concrete also for the child, and especially for the young person just entering into production. The child is drawn into the shock-brigade movement, socialistic competition, and even the "liquidation" of the capitalistic elements. In the cleansing of the Soviet apparatus the children's organization, the Pioneers, often descended on institutions, checking up on the work of their parents, coming thus actively into the life of the new period of the building of Socialism.

The school in its internal organization has adopted the institutions of the shock-brigade and of socialistic competition, and this imitation of their elders gives the children a closer contact with the problems of everyday life. In order to bring the children into the life of the community, the teachers also have to participate. During the first years many of the teachers were hostile to the politics of the Revolution. Then for a time the attitude was on the whole neutral, although already in this second period many teachers came over and accepted the Communist principles on which Soviet pedagogy was made to rest. When the third period of more active revolution came two years ago, the teachers were told that a neutral attitude would no longer be acceptable. At present the

village school teacher must be an active worker for collectivization of agriculture, for example, and must take part in all political activities led and directed by the Communists or Young Communists.

The peculiarly prominent position of the village teacher, who often is the only person in the village with a broad education, makes the public activity of the teacher important, and also very difficult. Many village teachers chose to follow other less trying professions, and the migration assumed such large proportions that the authorities recently increased salaries and ordered the local party-worker not to ride the poor teacher so hard. Lenin once said that the school teacher should be given a remuneration equal to that of a skilled workman, and the highest respect and consideration from all authorities. This statement has been recalled in the face of the desertion of the educational field by many teachers.

In another respect the teacher has been forced to abandon a neutral attitude and adopt an active, aggressive line. Where before, religious teaching was simply forbidden, now antireligious instruction and propaganda are obligatory in the school and on the teacher. For the Soviet state will not permit any competing loyalties to develop. The class struggle also requires, it is asserted, an active antireligious policy. Concretely, the movement for the collectivization of agriculture must be accompanied by an active atheistic movement. The rich peasant and the village priest are believed to be allies. The priest has

often shown opposition to the collectivist movement headed up by militantly atheistic Young Communists; this attitude was logical, and in the conditions of class war expressed itself in places in active resistance. On this subject, as on so many subjects, the full facts are still not available and a final judgment cannot be given. For our purpose it is adequate to note that the Communists' views on religion have given to the class war sometimes the character of a religious war. No competing loyalty, no loyalty to other than the Revolution and the Soviet state, is permitted.

In the antireligious policy of the Communist there is the positive element of combating medieval superstitions prevalent in many and large sections of a backward people, superstitions that lead to practices which seriously impede constructive efforts in the fields of economics and public health. In a word, the antireligious movement is indeed part of the cultural revolution. But to say that this, and this only, is the basis of the antireligious policy is not to give the full picture. The fighting of a competitor in the name of a doctrine based on a very rigid dogma is another and very important side of the policy.

One aspect of the antireligious movement has been the turning-over of church buildings to other purposes. In theory this was to be done only when there was a superabundance of churches for the worship needs of the community and when quarters were urgently needed for cultural work. Also, a vote of the

local community was required for such a conversion. The local plebiscite often was steam-rollered through in a ruthless, high-handed manner. In the majority of instances the church buildings were put to cultural use, however. Several very excellent libraries and reading-rooms were found housed in former churches. Workmen's clubs and even restaurants in former cathedrals also impressed one as proper and fitting under the circumstances. One met also instances where the church or even the local cathedral had been converted into a garage to serve the new, imported trucks.

That there is a struggle against religion as such is best evidenced by the Communist's view that a "reformed church" is also the enemy of proletarian culture. In the first years of the Revolution the Greek Orthodox church was the center of attack because of its numerical strength and former political position under tsarism. Protestant sects had been persecuted under tsarism, and, for that reason as well as because of their smaller memberships, were permitted to carry on, even in violation of specific regulations on religious societies or bodies. But the turn of the Protestant sects came during the last years, and their activities in social service or cultural work served as the immediate pretext for a more rigorous application of the many disabilities imposed by the law and by administrative practices on all clergy and church workers.

The situation with regard to religion can be briefly

summarized. There is freedom of worship; but a student in a Soviet university who goes to church is boycotted, "as if he had been caught thieving," it was explained. The intellectual takes down the sacred image in his room at home if persons from his place of employment are likely to enter his living quarters. On large church holidays the percentage of workmen absent because of illness often is lower than the average; the conclusion to be drawn is clear. Attendance at church in Soviet Russia may cost a person his position, even in the case of a workman. In such instances one has what must be admitted to be religious persecution, all official denials to the contrary notwithstanding.

The attitude toward the church often expressed is that it has become the refuge of the class enemies, particularly in the face of the socialistic offensive. One Communist writer estimated that the "apparatus of religious organizations" numbered a million and a half; and he listed its personnel as follows: "priests, rabbis, mullahs, protestant preachers, monks, nuns, witch-doctors, and sorcerers," adding that one has here in these elements "the counter-revolution that is not yet behind the prison bars."

The introduction of uninterrupted work, with a new five-day week, aims primarily to increase productivity. It has the secondary aim of suppressing Sunday or any other religious day. It was interesting to note how quickly one became accustomed to the new schedule, although at first one missed that

day in the week when things were different. Four-fifths of the people are always working, and in offices and on the streets or in the parks all days are precisely the same. At no time, on no day was there the ringing of church bells, which was an important part of the life and noise of the "Holy Russia" of the old order.

Another loyalty which the Communists combat when it competes with loyalty to the Revolution is the family, and it is through the school that they reach the children in the important formative years. The abolition of the family as an economic unit is contemplated in the interest of economy of effort. Also, the school and children's homes are looked upon as offering the child more equal and larger opportunities. In the collective farms the children's homes are expected to be an important feature of the new social group, and will be used to win the child over to a collectivist attitude, as opposed to the more narrow interests of the family unit. But the family still has its place, and an important one, in the Soviet order; and laws very effectively protect maternity and the child, despite the much advertised informality of the divorce procedure. The Communists admit and complain that the most backward section of the cultural front is that of pre-school work among children. The primary reason for this backwardness is lack of funds and of properly equipped workers; but also there is hesitation in encroaching too actively on the realm of the family.

The emphasis on the theory and doctrine of the Revolution is so marked as to deserve further mention. When the collectivization movement was in full swing in December of 1929, Stalin demanded of the Marxist economists of the Communist Academy of Science that they produce a theory, on the basis of the facts of life, that would give greater strength to the faith in the success of the movement. Non-Marxist economists were forced publicly to repudiate their former economic thinking and opinions, in the face of the alleged overwhelming triumph of the collectivist principle. Those that would not recant were deprived of their positions in research or teaching institutions, and some were later arrested, on the ground of "ideological support of the class enemy, the rich peasant." On these merely ideological grounds they were considered and treated as antisocial elements. Subsequently several of the more prominent non-Communist economists were accused of counter-revolutionary activity. Others, on the basis of alleged confession of having attempted to disrupt the plans of socialistic reconstruction, were shot. As there was no public trial, there are only the alleged confessions upon which to judge of the character and actuality of the "damage-working" of which they were accused.

The charge of damage-working has been brought against a very large number of the managers and technicians trained under the old, but given responsible positions in the new, régime. This has come since the resumption of the socialistic offensive. The

Communists explain that these older, bourgeois "specialists" could and did work loyally so long as it was a question of re-establishing the economic processes. If they did not like or believe in Socialism, as many of them did not, they had always the hope that the revival of economic life would lead to the re-establishment of capitalism. It was precisely because such a drifting-back into capitalism was a possibility that the Communists resumed the socialistic offensive two years ago. After the adoption of this new policy, it is charged that these specialists in despair set out to try to spoil the plans and prevent the building of Socialism, often with the help of the capitalists of other countries. This is the reasoning of the Communist, on the basis of his interpretation of the principle of class struggle. When the instances of alleged damage-working are questioned, because of the lack of convincing evidence of a deliberate intent to "wreck" the Five-Year Plan, one is told that a refusal to accept as fundamental the doctrine of the class struggle makes it impossible to see and sense the real facts of the situation.

The number of cases of alleged sabotage and damage-working has not been very large, on the background of the considerable number of old-régime managers and technicians holding responsible positions in the Soviet administration. But the presence of alleged "wreckers" has led to the more rigid enforcement of Marxian doctrine in schools, the active recruitment of workmen and peasants to the higher

institutions of learning, and the speeding-up of the training of a new personnel of managers and engineers of workman and peasant origin, with emphasis on Communist training.

The class-struggle principle has been applied in the field of education in another respect. Admission to higher schools and technical institutes is regulated on the basis of class, the workman or the child of a workman being given priority. For a time the class principle was applied in the primary schools in so literal a sense that the child of a rich peasant or even a technical expert was not admitted, or, if allowed to enter the school, was not brought into the political or social activities of the pupils. This practice was condemned by the central leaders, who pointed out that the child could be salvaged, from the Communist viewpoint, whatever his family origin or environment, by the inherent qualities of Soviet pedagogy.

What is the character of the product of Soviet education? Some of the types of Young Communists already described give partial answer to the question. The Soviet child is active, enthusiastic, but often very mechanically indoctrinated. One Communist told with pride of the way his children, of ten and twelve years of age, discussed current political issues with vigor and intelligence. Another, in discussing the question of religion, quoted his child of nine, who announced one day to the family, "There is no God." Later the parent related how this same child, on returning home from school, informed him that "Trot-

sky is a renegade" and that "the British are imperialistic vultures." Indoctrination is a very general practice in all systems of education; but the Soviet system, with its very specific program and aims, resorts to sheer indoctrination to a very high degree. The time element is most important in a period of revolution, for one must get results as quickly as possible, and in the Bolshevik revolution this must be done also in an atmosphere of class struggle.

In its later stages the Soviet educational system is organized to produce the "proletarian cadres," a specific example of which would be the "proletarian engineer." Of workman origin, and having gone through the Communist training of the Soviet schools, the engineer who will take charge of the new plants erected under the Five-Year Plan will be a special type, it is believed. He will maintain his proletarian outlook, having acquired the Communist attitude toward work and life. Whether such an animal exists, to put it colloquially, is one of the tests of the Revolution. When one has a proletarian engineer, the classless society, which is the Communist goal, has started to emerge. It is repeatedly stated that the Soviet order cannot use the technician who does not also have the proper social outlook. The engineer must be a social worker as well, in order properly to contribute, even on the technical side, to the socialistic reconstruction.

The newspapers and books which the Soviet citizen reads, the plays and movies which he sees, and even

the music which he hears at concerts, clubs, political meetings, or over the radio, are all utilized to create the special proletarian attitude. In this way there is the constant and evident propaganda of the ideas of the Revolution, "ideological content" being carefully controlled by censorship. All news, for example, is made to pass through a Communist prism, as one Soviet editor expressed it. Then there are proletarian poets; proletarian literature must prevail; and proletarian culture is the goal.

A greater rigidity as to content and attitude in purely literary writing came with the sharpening of the class struggle. Before, it was enough if a writer were a so-called "fellow-traveler," accepting the Revolution but not working actively in it. But now neutrality is no longer admitted even for the writer of novels. One of the outstanding authors of the last years, Pilniak, recently was expelled from all literary bodies and official positions because of the alleged anti-Soviet tendency in his writing. The suicide last summer of perhaps the most prominent proletarian poet, Mayakovsky, has been officially explained as the result of a purely personal tragedy of a romantic nature. But even Mayakovsky had been severely criticized for the "ideological content" of one of his plays, and it is probable that his inability to accommodate himself to existing conditions had a political basis.

The periodical press is a most important factor in the cultural revolution and in the organization and

development of the mobilizing groups. Each of the cadres has its own set of newspapers and magazines for self-organization and also as a channel of influence on the masses. The organ of the party, the *Pravda*, has a circulation of almost 1,000,000 per day. The *Peasant Gazette* appears three times a week, with a *tirage* of over 2,000,000, aud for special articles it has issued editions of over 10,000,000. The total circulation of all periodicals has increased from 12,000,000 in 1929 to 22,000,000 on May 1, 1930. The Soviet newspaper or weekly is not a channel of information so much as a "collective organizer" or, as another Communist expressed it, "an operative factor of a militant character." The institution of informal correspondents contributes to this peculiar character of the Soviet press. There were over 1,000,000 of these correspondents on May 19, 1930, the inventory having been made for the yearly "Day of the Press," which is one of the lesser but noteworthy dates in the revolutionary calendar. One popular weekly received in the course of a year over 200,000 letters from some 60,000 writers.

The stage also must make its contribution to the struggle on the cultural front. In connection with a new play at one of the leading "revolutionary" theaters of Moscow, an interview given by the theater authorities emphasized that the new production aimed to assist in the execution of the Five-Year Plan: "The theater must be used to develop in the audience an active feeling of class hatred for the

enemy, to sharpen the class watchfulness of the workman audience and arm it with the ability to prevent the disruptive work of wreckers in factories and mills. It must also contribute to the courage and enthusiasm of the shock-brigade workmen." The state opera, on opening a competition for a libretto, stipulated that "the libretto will have to meet the following demands: It must picture the years of the civil war or touch upon questions of the new socialistic building. . . . . It is desirable that the libretto contain scenes in which the masses take part, political meetings, battles or scenes at railway stations. The scenario must be written in a manner that makes it as easily understood by the audience as a pantomime."

In the second year of the Five-Year Plan there was a falling-behind in all fields, including that of education. A change in the calendar gave an extra quarter-year, the autumn of 1930; and these months were proclaimed a "shock-quarter" also for the cultural Five-Year Plan in order to catch up and enter on the third and "decisive year" with a clean slate. The Commissariat of Education recently defined this shock-quarter as a "mass injection of new forms of cultural work, socialistic competition, shock-brigadism, cultural express-messengers, cultural-brigades, all of which will insure the organization of a mass movement for the cultural revolution." Another announcement outlined the concrete activity of the cultarmyists in a factory, where they had formed one of the "cultural-brigades." Illiteracy is to be elimi-

nated in all shock-brigades, and special courses in civics, trade-unionism, and technological subjects are to be organized. "Cultural recreation" during the dinner hours and rest days is to be provided, and so-called "cultural service" extended to the families of workmen in the form of children's corners and nurseries in all workman living-quarters.

All this cultural work must be part of the class struggle. "Cultural work is a field of the sharpened class struggle," writes a Communist editor, explaining that "the class enemies are trying to disrupt all the efforts of the party and the Soviet authority in the field of the cultural revolution." So in education, in the reorganization of school programs and curricula, there must be a political campaign, Bolshevik and Komsomol fashion, with "cleansings" and "agitation" as well as "mobilizations" and "liquidations," to quote terms that are used also in the educational field under the Soviets.

A "unified plan" for cultural work has been elaborated, so as to combine the activities of state educational authorities, the Young Communists, the trade-unions, and the peasant co-operatives and collective farms—"all under a single leadership" of the party. In May the party called a special All-Union Conference on questions of education. Thus there will be greater unity, under party direction and control, more emphasis on technical training, and closer attention to the theory of Revolution and to political education or Communist civics.

The cultural-workers have been told by one of their

authorities, the Assistant Commissary of Education, that they are equally responsible with the economic leaders for the falling-behind in the schedule for economic expansion during the second year of the Five-Year Plan. "For cultural work and institutions influence directly the fight for the Five-Year Plan, for better quality of product, for the strengthening of labor discipline," writes this leader. The productivity of the individual workman does indeed depend on the raising of the general cultural level, as well as on technical training. Cultural advance is expected to lessen bureaucratic methods, with the bringing of the masses into more direct and effective participation in management and administration.

Many of the obstacles on the road to Socialism can be overcome, it is believed, by a "cultural crusade of proletarian public opinion." The militant character of all cultural work under the Soviets testifies to its importance for the Revolution as a whole. An illustration of the Communist's attitude is found in the report of the Commissary of Education to the last congress of Soviets, from which the following extract is taken:

"The word 'front' is not used simply as a symbol when we speak of education. If we desire to plant a culture that should not be similar to the bourgeois-liberal culture, but our own genuine proletarian culture, we shall be met with enemies at every step. The child perverted by his bourgeois family and by his environment will be our enemy; the disorder of

everyday conditions will be our enemy; the child's family, the environment, will be our enemy. Our direct and organized foes will be the priests of all confessions, and the false professors, false men of science, and false bribed journalists and writers. Of course we have them down and are holding them with our knees. We do not give them, we never shall give them much freedom; but they all know how to smuggle through their poison in an underhand manner. Our custom-house officials on this front will have to be very wide awake to protect our educational health from this poison. If once we admit that this is a true front, let us give it the most serious attention. Let us send to this front ammunition and additional troops, and also additional generals, perhaps more talented generals than those we have had so far. Our future depends on our success here more than it does in any other branch of our work. Here we are struggling to create the type we want our children to grow up to be. A disaster on this front might turn into a catastrophe for our last, decisive battle, a battle which we have already begun, in which we have so far been victorious, and in which we shall be victorious to the end."

The school in the Soviet system is "an instrument of Communist training." To this end the child is drawn, from the earliest years, into the turmoil of life, and given "fundamental scientific data concerning all productive processes, and practical habits in the handling of the tools of production." But in

time of revolution educational work has a much broader field than this; there must be a whole "cultural revolution." The cultural "front" requires this large army of cultural-workers; and the cultarmyist, one of the cadres of the Soviet system, has the further special task of preparing the other cadres, giving them general education, technical training, and a specific political attitude. In this way the cultural-worker makes his contribution to the Five-Year Plan as one of the organizing forces behind the Revolution.

# VI

## THE REDARMYIST

The "Redarmyist" is the last of the new Soviet cadres as contemplated by the cartoonist. Another adaptation of a Russian abbreviation has been used, for the sake of brevity, and also in order to avoid the use of terms deliberately excluded from the Soviet vocabulary—the words "soldier" and "officer." The careful elimination of these expressions suggestive of the old army or of the armies of other countries is not only deliberate but appropriate. The armed forces of the Soviet Union are indeed organized on principles different from those underlying the armies of other countries, and these peculiar features make the Red Army one of the cadres in the sense in which we have been using the term, that is, a training and mobilizing framework. This function is performed not only for the technical field of defense but also with respect to all the so-called fronts of the Revolution—political, economic, and even the cultural.

The Red Army serves very aptly as the subject of a concluding chapter on the general topic of the cadres of the Soviet system. It brings together and exemplifies more completely than any other Soviet institution the methods adopted to produce the new type of citizen, the builder of the new order. The

army has its Communists and Young Communists, and gives them, side by side with military training, the special training deemed necessary for the political leadership. It is a "Workman-Peasant Red Army," to give the full official name; only workmen and peasants are admitted to the armed units, and the shock-brigader among workmen and the collectivist among peasants are turned out when the Redarmyist is demobilized after his years of compulsory military service. The political courses in the Red Army are the best organized of the many centers of political education or Communist training to which so much importance is attached. A slogan of the socialistic offensive, "Face to Production," has reached also the Red Army, though to a lesser degree than in other organizations, for the obvious reason that military service and participation in actual production are not easily combined even under Sovietism.

Then, in its turn, the Red Army supplies to the other groups methods and attitudes. It sets the example in defense preparedness, and instills discipline, contributing to the militant way of going at things on all fronts, by shock methods, in brigades, by mobilization, and very often, it must be noted, by drill-sergeant methods. And too, in the training of the Redarmyist and in the Red Army's influence on the Soviet citizenship at large, there is best illustrated an interesting combination of Soviet nationalism and international revolutionism. While repudiating and combating nationalism and patriotism in the name of

proletarian internationalism, the Communists have come to speak of the "Soviet Fatherland" or of "proletarian loyalty," and in a manner most suggestive of the patriotic concept of the national state.

Like the Soviet school, the Red Army is brought into the politics of the Revolution. This is one of the outstanding features of the organization of the armed forces of the Soviet order of society. The permanent commanding staff and the yearly recruits to the ranks continue to exercise fully their political rights as Soviet citizens: voting and taking part in the Soviets, retaining membership in the trade-unions, and participating in the co-operative movement. Political activity is promoted and at the same time controlled by the party and Komsomol, as in all Soviet institutions. The party cells are distributed also through the Red Army, in every regiment and barrack, to the number of over 6,000, co-ordinating the activity of the 120,000 Communists in the official total of 562,000 Redarmyists. The Communist organization of the youth has an even larger representation, numbering 150,000. In the senior commanding personnel and among the "political workers" in the Red Army the percentage of Communists is even higher. Every year several tens of thousands of new party-members are recruited from the Redarmyists in active service.

The general direction of party work in the Red Army is under the Political Administration of the Republic, which is the military section of the Central

Committee of the party. The local cells are co-ordinated by Political Sections, which keep in close contact with the local party committees, attending their meetings and reporting to them on their work in the army. Party Commissions within the Red Army report to and receive instructions from the important Control Commissions of the party. In this way the party organs within the army have a special status because of the kind of discipline required in a military organization.

The "citizen-fighter," as the Redarmyist is often called, is in the closest possible touch with the workmen in the city where the regiment is stationed and with the peasants in the neighborhood of the summer camp. This contact is secured by combined meetings, informal visiting, and formal patronage societies. A factory will assume patronage of a regiment, for example. There is a very complete merging of the army in the life of the community. The Communists frankly express fear of a military organization dissociated from the everyday life of the Revolution. Such an army also would not serve the aim of training Communists—the basis of Communist training being active participation in the revolutionary movement and its specific tasks. It is also important that the years of military service be fully utilized to bring the young peasants into touch with the technical and political conditions of an industrial proletarian center where the winter barracks are generally located. Then, in order to extend the influence

of the city on the rural districts, peasant Redarmyists are urged to maintain contact with their parents or village friends by an organized and regular exchange of letters.

This close relation between the army and life had a very important consequence during the winter of 1929–30 in connection with the collectivization of agriculture. The use of compulsion to bring the peasants into the collective farms came to the knowledge of the Redarmyists and caused serious discontent among them. It is generally believed that the state of mind of the peasant Redarmyists, rather than that of the local peasants, brought the sharp putting-on of the brakes in the drive for collectivization. This state of mind manifested itself in active, forceful protests in individual instances and also in several large units of the army. For several months after this crisis the Commissary of War, who has always set the example of active participation in the politics of the Revolution, remained noticeably silent. At the following May First celebration the military element was not as prominent as is usually the case in all political demonstrations. For the thirteenth anniversary of the Revolution in November, 1930, however, the Red Army and voluntary armed groups under its leadership again were in the foreground. One may conclude that the morale of the army had been re-established after the crisis of the preceding spring.

The Red Army training is of course primarily in

the technical field of military science. But in the curricula of studies much time is given to "political grammar," or Soviet civics, or Communist propaganda, as the subject may be variously called. The Redarmyist studies systematically the history of the Revolution and the theory of Communism. Then there are special courses to give the workmen and peasants technical training for their later production activity. A recent army order provided for the training, in 1930, of "100,000 militant organizers of the socialistic village." Although the Five-Year Plan of socialistic construction represents also the "strengthening of the defense of the Soviet Union," it has been found that the Red Army has been drawn into "socialist constructive work" to an extent involving the neglect of its main task, namely, that of increasing the technical fighting power of its ranks. But the demobilized Redarmyist, as workman or peasant, holds a position of importance politically and supplies leadership in organization and technical progress in rural communities; and the importance of spreading these disciplines has led to the broadest use of the military training period for technical training and political education.

A recent article on the Red Army, written by a Communist, began with the statement: "The Red Army is not only a military school; it is also a school of culture." Its cultural work is carried on through courses to "liquidate illiteracy," general educational and special technical courses, and also libraries, regi-

mental clubs, and large central clubs. There are over 50 Red Army Homes and 750 regimental clubs. Special study circles in these clubs embrace over 140,000 members. The Red Army has 1,500 libraries with over 10,000,000 books. The newspapers published for the Redarmyist have a daily *tirage* of over 200,000 and have organized the regular sending-in of items of news or general articles by over 100,000 "military correspondents," as they are called. These, like the workman-peasant correspondents, represent a novel and important feature of the Soviet press. It is estimated that every Redarmyist sees 50 moving-picture shows, and the majority of these are educational and propagandist in character.

The Red Army has its own theater, that of Moscow being one of the largest of the capital. All summer the play *The First Soviet Cavalry* ran several nights a week. The Soviet production was militant and aggressive, composed of thirty episodes from tsarist time, the World War, and the civil war. The Red Army also has its own museums, where in the first-hand documents on the World War and particularly on the civil war of the first years of the Revolution, the Red Army is doing its part to spread Soviet patriotism to the masses.

There are two bases for the Communists' conception and interpretation of the Soviet Union's position and policies with respect to the rest of the world—and it is part of the task of making Bolsheviks to inculcate this conception in the minds of the masses,

the Red Army serving as one of the most important channels for this propaganda. In the first place the Soviet Union, by its successful carrying-out of the principles of the Revolution, is bringing revolution nearer in other countries, it is constantly asserted; and the reasoning has an element of truth in it. On this basis the Soviet Union is characterized as the fatherland for all toilers, regardless of nationality. This is the international revolutionism of Bolshevism; and as it has a messianic element that has been present in the Russian past, it makes a particularly strong psychological appeal. The Redarmyist is taught that he is the defender not only of the Soviet Union but of the Soviet idea in general, that is, of world-revolution. His oath is to all toilers, and not to a particular national political entity.

There are concrete facts in support of this theme of world-revolution to call to the attention of the Redarmyist and through him to the workman and peasant masses. To note the most recent events, in China, under the names of Soviets and Red Armies, there is a movement suggestive of social revolution, or at least of its preliminary stage of destruction and anarchy. The nationalist movements of suppressed nationalities are considered by the Communists as the prelude to, or at least the clearing of the decks for, social revolution; and the recent happenings in India and Egypt are reported to the Soviet readers with Communist interpretation. The increase in the Communist vote in the recent German elections was

headlined in the Moscow newspapers as the beginning of social revolution, although Germany has disappointed the Moscow Communists twice now, in 1918 and again in 1923.

Now there is no question that Moscow will give substantial assistance, material as well as moral, to any social revolution that breaks out in any part of the world. This is the function as well as the program of the Communist International, situated in Moscow, and acting as "the general headquarters of world-revolution." The relationship between the Communist International and Soviet government, as effectuated by the Communist party, which is the ruling force in both, is a much disputed point. The American government insists that the two are identical, and on this ground, among other grounds, refuses to extend recognition. Great Britain broke off relations over the question of the propaganda activities of the Communist International; these relations have been re-established, but Moscow and London do not take the same view on this point of the relationship of the formal government to the international body. Whatever be the facts in this dispute, for the Communist of the Soviet Union the Communist International is one of the authorities to which he owes allegiance; among the instruments of his training as a Bolshevik are the statutes and resolutions of this organ, which determines and enforces an attitude of international revolutionism.

The Executive Committee of the Communist In-

ternational is housed in a building just outside the Kremlin, which is the seat of the Soviet government. When in Moscow last summer, the writer did not give much heed to this international headquarters, nor did he hear it mentioned very often. Quite a different situation might develop at any time, and such a development might come in connection with the alleged discovery of a "capitalist conspiracy" to invade the "Land of Soviets," the "Land of the Building of Socialism." Most outside observers have concluded that with the adoption of the Five-Year Plan, the Communist International has been pushed into the background. Should the Five-Year Plan be abandoned for any reason, the Communist International would unquestionably again come into prominence, as in the first years of the Revolution, as the organ of aggressive revolution on a world-wide scale. In such an event the Red Army would also play a different rôle. For Bolshevism is essentially international, as illustrated by the following statement from an authoritative Communist source: "The Red Army is an international army, the army of the world-proletariat, bringing liberation to all the oppressed, an army that does not allow in its ranks the element of nationalistic narrowness, of national self-conceit or nationalistic chauvinism." The reward for bravery in the Red Army is the "Order of the Red Flag," aptly described by a Communist writer as "the symbol of world-revolution."

A second basis underlying the attitude of the

Moscow Communist toward the outside world is the result of the feeling of a revolutionary that hands are raised against him. In his mind the Soviet Union is therefore the object of hatred for all bourgeois, non-proletarian governments, that is, for all the other governments of the world. This hatred is so acute, the Communist is always asserting, that efforts to suppress the first Toilers' State by force of arms are inevitable on the part or the outside "capitalistic world." During the last years of the socialistic offensive, this view has become more sharply defined and more frankly expressed.

The economic difficulties which the "capitalistic world" is at present experiencing are contributing, it is asserted, to a more active anti-Soviet attitude and movement. This thesis is supported by constant reference to the friction with China over the Chinese-Eastern Railway or to the "Pope's crusade" against Bolshevism on the religious issue. More recently the hostility of the outside world is seen in the tightening of credit on Soviet orders and the measures taken against Soviet trade on the ground of alleged dumping. Moscow sees in any concerted action to meet its own monopoly of foreign trade a deliberately hostile act of a class enemy. Almost every international convention is interpreted as having among its objectives that of circumventing, harassing, or preparing an attack on the Toilers' State, the Land of Soviets. The alleged damage-workers within the Soviet Union have often been accused of doing their disruptive

work at the behest and in the pay of the outside capitalistic world. The confessions secured *in camera* from some of the accused have pointed to foreign paymasters. The most definite charge of this kind has come very recently and was the basis for one of the most spectacular political trials in the history of the Revolution. In the formal act of indictment Russian technical experts were accused, on the basis of their own confessions, of conspiring with Russian *émigrés* and persons connected with the governments of other countries, to bring about an armed invasion of the Soviet Union, the overthrow of the Soviet government, and the re-establishment of a capitalistic economic order. The intervention was to take place in the summer of 1930, and the intervening powers were to receive large parts of the Soviet Union as their rewards.

The statements, reiterated in open court, of the accused Russian damage-workers that they were in touch with and inspired and paid by foreign capitalists or members of "bourgeois governments" are perhaps a peculiar form of turning state's evidence. Caught in the toils of the class struggle, the accused may have attempted to mitigate their punishment by re-enforcing the political dogma that the outside "capitalistic" world must try to prevent the success of the drive for Socialism. The evidence to prove foreign assistance to the alleged internal counter-revolutionary group was presented in a closed session of the court, so that only the statements of the Russians under trial and the public denials of the foreigners implicat-

ed in the confessions of the Russians are available. The statements in the confessions are very vague and in some instances even fantastic. They seem to have been accepted by the Soviet public, however, the latter having been prepared by the leaders to expect attack from a hostile outside "capitalistic" world. The big political trial stirred up class feeling and also national sentiment, and on both these grounds strengthened the will to carry on the struggle. As those tried were accused and convicted of deliberately disrupting economic plans from the high, responsible positions which they held, a part of the responsibility for the economic difficulties and failures could be made to fall on their shoulders in the minds of the masses.

As in the case of the charges against technical experts and economists of damage-working, so with respect to these constant accusations against all non-Soviet governments—all have at one time or another been accused—the absolute opposition of the Communist and non-Communist viewpoints makes it impossible to argue and weigh the onesided statements that are made. The fact of intervention by outside powers in the first years of the Revolution gives weight to the Communists' viewpoint, although this intervention was part of the World War and was determined in large measure by the considerations of the war. On the other hand, the Communists, like others, have frequently resorted to the practice of drawing the red herring across the trail.

In the political courses for the Redarmyist and in

the extensive public discussion of the foreign policy for the benefit of the masses, the questions of war and peace are frankly faced, the approach being, of course, that of a revolutionary Communist. This approach as presented to the Soviet citizen, and particularly the "citizen-fighter," has a logic of its own. In the first place, the Soviet government emphatically asserts that its policy toward the outside world is one of peace. But while making this assertion, it is constantly warning its people that war with the hostile outside world is inevitable. Peace is, of course, absolutely indispensable for the successful completion of the Five-Year Plan. On the other hand, a showdown between capitalism and socialism, as has been the case in Soviet Russia during the last two years, is ultimately unavoidable, according to the Communists' interpretation of the Marxian theory of class struggle.

Another tenet of the Moscow Communists is that wars are inevitable between "bourgeois" governments and that the only road to peace is by the way of social revolution. Now Moscow apparently works for peace also between capitalistic countries, as evidenced by her adhesion to the Kellogg Pact and her participation in conferences aiming to iron out international frictions and conflicts. On the other hand, Moscow always asserts that the coming and unavoidable wars between "capitalistic" nations will end in social revolutions in other countries, as the World War did in Russia. Here would seem to be a

contradiction in the reasoning of the Soviet leaders. But as revolutionaries they find an explanation of this apparent lack of logic, and an answer to the charge to which this line of reasoning has laid them open, namely, of deliberately promoting friction and conflicts between other countries, so that the resulting war would bring, as they believe, their kind of revolution. The Communists reply that since the masses pay for the wars, Moscow, as the voice of the oppressed masses of the world, is working to postpone wars, in the hope that revolutions will come in time entirely to prevent them. Postponement of war at the same time makes possible the strengthening of revolutionary attitudes and organization, so that if war comes before revolution, it can more quickly be converted into revolution. The slogan put forward by Lenin in 1915, which was followed in Russia in 1917, is still on the board; and it reads: "Convert an imperialistic war into civil war in all countries." It is on these ideas that the citizen is trained, in and through the Red Army, to be a militant Soviet patriot and an internationalist revolutionary, the two attitudes being very interestingly and also effectively correlated.

While denying that their system is militaristic, the Communists boast that it is militant, and strive constantly to further militancy. For, according to them, Socialism will not grow of itself; it can come only in the atmosphere of struggle. The youth must train itself to fight, and fight foreign as well as internal class

enemies. The number of voluntary military circles is enormous. In these voluntary organizations workmen and also workwomen drill, practice shooting, and spread defense preparedness propaganda as widely as possible. A Soviet political demonstration is most military in appearance, with the participation of large units of the Red Army, flanked by corps of armed workmen and workwomen. The militant character of the drive for Socialism is further illustrated by the armed guards on trains, at factories and plants, and even in the grain fields. "On our backs all the time," remarked the train brakeman when the armed guard passed us as we stood on the platform of the car; and he was a workman of the second category in the official tabulation, and therefore of high social rank in the Soviet order. The armed guards are maintained against alleged internal enemies, the damage-workers among the hostile classes, is the official explanation; but the other interpretation of their function was given by many with whom one talked.

The main patriotic societies of the Soviet Union have revolutionary and defense aims. The largest of the societies has a title which in abbreviation runs to six syllables. It is a society to assist in the defense of the Soviet fatherland by developing knowledge and experience in aviation and chemicals. The membership of the *Osoaviachem* is some 5,000,000. All Soviet scientists are obliged to belong to it. It organizes military study-circles and also rifle-practice clubs. The membership is often mobilized for the internal

economic front. It helped in the "Bolshevik spring sowing" of this year, in which collectivized agriculture for the first time played an important rôle. The appeal to the membership on this occasion called for "peaceful work, but on a fighting basis"; and the things to be fought were rich peasants as well as insects and grain-rust.

Another Soviet patriotic society is organized to give assistance to revolutionaries in other countries—the so-called *Mopr*. It claims an international membership of 4,000,000, to which Soviet Russia makes the largest contribution. In a recent statement the officers of the society reported to the membership that in the preceding year 90,000 revolutionaries had been beaten up, arrested, imprisoned, or even killed in "capitalistic" countries.

The Communist picture of capitalism as given in the Soviet press naturally emphasizes the negative side, at times to a point where the picture is almost unrecognizable. Here the Communists are little better than their opponents in exaggerating and distorting the facts. The prevalence and extreme form of this propaganda on both sides are perhaps only the logical accompaniment of a revolution, especially one that has gone so deeply into every field of activity and every corner of life, and always with the militancy of class war.

With the recent increase of emphasis on the international aspect of the Revolution, it was quite logical to suggest to the Communist or Young Com-

munist with whom one was talking, that in theory we were enemies. The older Communist would turn the remark aside by saying that the theory did not apply to an American, not yet in any case. The younger follower of Marxian principles of class struggle would look worried; perhaps he was breaking the regulations of the Komsomol by talking in such a friendly manner with a representative from the "hostile capitalistic environment."

The youth's organization is allowed to go further than the responsible party in expressing its hopes and plans of world-revolution; and this propaganda is giving to the younger generation a "daily international education" of the character described above, without which, to quote again from a Communist statement, "no true Bolshevik education is possible." The Communist International of the Youth, representing for the Komsomol what the Communist International is for the Communist party, emphasizes in its activities the training of the youth in internationalism and in preparedness for defense. To quote from a Communist source: "The Soviet youth must live the life of the world-Communist movement; every bit of work done in the factory or in the village must be closely associated with the international aims of the Revolution."

The principle of federation in the constitution of the Soviet Union is another instance of the combining of Soviet patriotism with international revolutionism. In summary the following technique is adopted. National minorities—the Ukrainians, the Tartars, or the Turkmen of Central Asia—are given sufficient in-

dependence to satisfy their cultural aspirations, so that the non-national Soviet Union is acceptable to them as the directing authority in such fields as foreign relations and trade and in the general field of the "building of Socialism." Then, on the basis of the national self-determination permitted, appeal is made to other national groups, particularly to those subject to oppression at the hands of another and stronger national state, to join the Soviet Union by the road of revolution. To date, the appeal has not led to any gains for Sovietism, although Moscow has been a strong magnet and at times a strong support for nationalist revolutionary movements in the Orient.

By the subordination of the principle of nationality to that of class the basic tenets of Sovietism can be observed side by side with an active encouragement of self-expression along nationalistic lines. The policy has had its failures, though these have not been very serious. The centralization of economic policy has led to a reappearance of the old Russian chauvinistic imperialism with respect to several national minorities. The industrial character of the Russian unit as compared with the non-Russian members of the Union has contributed to this "deviation" from the nationality policy of the party and the Soviet system. On the other side, local particularism has raised its head in protest against the chauvinism of the center, or again in deviation from a carefully defined and conditional nationality policy.

In the general overreaching of last winter, the ex-

cess of zeal in centralistic tendencies and also in national cultural self-determination led to alleged conspiracies and also open revolt. The liquidation of the rich peasant was attended by excesses and answering revolts, particularly in regions of the national minorities, among whom the institutions of religion and private property were very strongly imbedded in the national culture. The nationality policy of the Communists has had a distinctly positive side, however. The aim has been to awaken the backward national minorities, through promotion of their native languages and customs, so that they can express themselves more forcefully as workmen and peasants, and in this way participate more actively in the class struggle. The Red Army of workmen and peasants is a single unit, and its training brings together the many nationalities of the Soviet Union to defend the "conquests of the Revolution" and to develop in all of them loyalty to the "Land of Soviets."

# VII

## CONCLUSION

The six important cadres of the Soviet Union have here been described. The political cadres are the 2,000,000 party-members and the 3,000,000 Young Communists leading the 4,000,000 Pioneers of Communism. In the economic field there are the shock-brigade workmen, numbering about 1,500,000, and the collectivist-peasants, representing some 6,000,000 peasant households, about a quarter of the total number. The cultarmyists are estimated at over 1,000,000, and there are more than 500,000 Redarmyists in active service, and millions of ex-Redarmyists. There is much duplication, for Communists and Komsomol-members are to be found in the other four groups in large numbers. These are the organized and, in turn, organizing groups of the Revolution; and they are distributed widely and systematically throughout the country, represented, always in an organized manner, in all fields of life and in every institution, giving the tone and supplying the attitude as well as the formal leadership.

The revolutionary programs for economic expansion under the Five-Year Plan are objectively realizable, it is believed. That is, there are in the Soviet Union adequate resources in raw material and labor

to execute the program. The mobilization of the national income to finance the expansion is made possible by the nationalization of economic life. The revolutionary methods to achieve Socialism imply the use of force against all opposition. Self-discipline for those who are to benefit by the Revolution is also required during the period of transition, and this self-discipline is promoted by measures of compulsion. Further, a secret political police is an active factor; perhaps it should have been included as one of the basic cadres, for, while its function is mainly that of repressing and coercing, it is also an organizing force.

But one other factor enters into the situation, namely, the psychological factor. In the judgment of some, this factor will be the determining one for the successful carrying-out of the Five-Year Plan. The selection of this aspect of the Revolution for discussion in these pages indicates the writer's agreement with this view. And this judgment finds support in the mass of facts that it has been possible to bring together here, all bearing on the psychological aspect of the "drive for Socialism." In the presenting of these facts, the constant effort has been to keep the picture in proper focus, and not to exaggerate the emphasis given to this factor by the Bolsheviks themselves.

The willingness to accept the cost of the experiment is one of the strongest of the forces behind it. The use of coercion to secure an expression of this willingness is an undoubted fact, but it does not de-

stroy entirely the positive value of this factor. Compulsion is used with discrimination, and in varying degrees, and always well coated with the sugar of propaganda. A mass expression of "public opinion" can be rapidly mobilized through the cadres and their interlocking directorates, under the chairmanship always of the Communists. The latest example of such a mobilization was the country-wide demand for the severest punishment on the eve of the trial of the alleged counter-revolutionary conspirators. The spontaneity of this expression of public opinion is subject to question, but the political effect of similar and simultaneous resolutions from all institutions and groups is considerable.

There is a limit to everything, however. Compulsion cannot be used indefinitely, nor does propaganda work effectively regardless of the time element. But propaganda is very effective when it is concrete and closely tied up to the tasks of workaday life. The Five-Year Plan of economic expansion, as the concrete expression of the socialistic offensive in a third period of the Revolution, is also an instrument of propaganda. The second year has just been concluded, with a serious lagging behind. A change in the fiscal year has given an extra quarter-year in which to make up the deficits. The slogan, "The Five-Year Plan in Four Years" is still officially adhered to, despite the terrific speed and the resulting strain involved.

Living in and seeing and feeling the physical con-

ditions and the state of mind created by this strain, one was inclined to question the wisdom of the rate of speed adopted. Communists have also expressed doubts as to whether the resources of the country or the nerves of the people can sustain the cost of the "Bolshevik tempo" with which the leaders insist on putting the program across. But these Bolsheviks have been excluded from the party or severely and publicly reprimanded as "opportunists" and "unconscious agents of the class enemy." Non-Communist doubters have exposed themselves to the accusation of ideological opposition and even of counter-revolutionary activity.

It is of interest to give the reasons advanced by Communists for the "tempo" adopted. In conversations with party-members, if the expression "terrible tempo" were used, it would be corrected to "wonderful tempo." For the Bolshevik there would seem to be three main reasons for the rate of expansion as indicated by the decision to complete "the Five-Year Plan in four years." In the first place, it is pointed out, the program of expansion forms a single economic whole, which must be carried out as a unit: a whole series of enterprises must be built simultaneously. The second reason advanced has already been noted, the argument being that the measure of success already attained has aroused the outside "hostile capitalistic" world to start a deliberate campaign to prevent, if possible, the successful building of Socialism. In the opinion of the Bolsheviks there are

already evidences of preparations for armed intervention, and therefore the Five-Year Plan must be pushed through at top speed so that the Land of Soviets will be properly equipped to meet and repulse these attacks. This second and political reason given by the Communist for the increase of an already very fast "tempo" of industrial expansion cannot be understood as readily by the non-Communist as can the first and economic reason.

The third reason for the extreme speed imposed by the Five-Year Plan is a psychological one, the conversations with Communists in Moscow clearly showed. To stir the masses from the apathy developed under the conditions and habits of the Russian past, to develop the fighting spirit deemed necessary by the revolutionary leaders to produce the new attitudes required for the success of the economic program, there must be the driving force of enthusiasm. Here is the basis for the slogan, "Catch up with and outstrip America," the concrete content of which the Communists often are at a loss to define. One Communist, after an hour of friendly but insistent pressure for a definition, finally admitted, "It's for propaganda purposes." If the leaders were to suggest that seven instead of four years be taken to execute the program, the slump that would follow—Russians being what they are and the present conditions what they are—would mean that it might be a matter of many years.

Another consideration, which the Communist of

course does not mention or in any case emphasize, forces on the leadership the adoption of high-speed methods, regardless of costs. The willingness to sacrifice the present for the benefits of the future has a time limit, and the shortening of the period of the drive was a political necessity. There are now only two more years to grin and bear under the new slogan of "The Five-Year Plan in Four Years." For the present living conditions must continue with little, if any, alleviation until the realization of the economic program.

The optimism as to the possibility of the successful execution of the Five-Year Plan expressed by the Bolshevik leaders often is overshadowed by the concern caused by the many evidences of the heavy burden entailed by the program. At other times the opposite impression is received, when the "tight places" in the economic structure seem less disconcerting in the light of the enthusiasm which the leaders have been able to arouse and organize. One point stands out clearly, however. The socialistic offensive has gone so far that a second retreat, as in 1921, would seem to be out of the question. The drive for Socialism must be carried through to a definite issue; it is now "Must or bust," to use a colloquial expression with which many of the outside observers have succinctly summarized the situation.

At times one is inclined to the view that perhaps the Moscow leaders, in their doctrinaire thinking and revolutionary zeal have overreached, and have al-

lowed the hands of the clock to approach dangerously near to the hour of midnight. But then it is recalled how on more than one occasion these leaders have known when to stop, and have stopped short of midnight, being able to do so because of their powerful and flexible machinery of mass contacts and controls, through the six cadres of the Soviet system. In a word, the leaders have shown themselves excellent revolutionary strategists, having carried the Revolution already past its thirteenth year. The Five-Year Plan is only the beginning of planned economic development and will have to be followed by a whole series of five-year plans. These later plans are not expected to involve as severe a strain as this initial period, however.

Backed by the cadres that have been produced during the thirteen years of revolution, the experiment goes on, with its new political and economic principles adhered to and vigorously applied, the old organizing and ruling classes as represented by the figures at the bottom of the frontispiece being rapidly pushed off the picture. The Revolution has brought a change in attitude in large groups. Most significant and indisputable is the appeal it has made to the younger generation. These are the new cadres, who are going at their tasks Bolshevik fashion, at a Bolshevik pace, constantly exhorted by their leaders to face obstacles as Bolsheviks should and like to face them. The new social order is still in the process of being built, and it has not as yet proven that it can

produce and distribute efficiently or even keep up the general standards of living. It is too early to say whether the many evident failures are "infantile diseases" or inherent constitutional weaknesses in the Soviet system as a whole.

There is a faith and spirit in these cadres, these Bolsheviks in action and those that are still in the making, the strength and force of which cannot be fully grasped by the non-Bolshevik. There is also much of the Russian, and of the Russian past, in this Bolshevism that is theoretically based on an international doctrine of Marxism. The calendar year of 1931 becomes the third year of the Five-Year Plan, the "decisive year," the Communist leaders are telling the people. There will be further new building, as pictured on the map in the frontispiece. Further new devices will probably be found and adopted to organize and inspirit the new cadres who are to lead in the carrying-out of the program of economic expansion, cultural development, and class struggle. The figures at the bottom of the cartoonist's picture will continue to be eliminated or "liquidated." Perhaps this discussion of the plans and new cadres of Soviet Russia will contribute to a clearer understanding of the developments in this interesting but costly experiment of "building Socialism" and "making Bolsheviks."

# GLOSSARY OF RUSSIAN WORDS

*Artel* is an old Russian form of co-operative organization; in the Soviet movement for the collectivization of agriculture it represents a transition stage to the "commune," the latter providing for complete collectivism.

*Cheka* is the abbreviation in Russian for "Extraordinary Commission," which was the special political police of the first years of the Revolution, enjoying the widest powers to "combat sabotage, illegal trade, and counter-revolution."

*Chistka* means "the cleansing"; the party and the Komsomol practice periodic "cleansings" of their ranks to eliminate unworthy and unstable elements. A "cleansing" of governmental institutions and offices is now in progress to weed out hostile, harmful, or simply "bureaucratic" elements.

*Gay Pay Oo* are the initial letters of the Russian for "State Political Administration," which is the political police institution that succeeded the *Cheka* of the earlier period. It is also called *Ogpu* by many writers on Soviet Russia, the letter "O" standing for "United," as its authority embraces the whole Soviet Union.

*Komsomol* is a combination of the first syllables of the Russian for "Communist Union of Youth." A member of this Communist Youth movement is called a *Komsomolets;* in the feminine, *Komsomolka.*

*Kolkhoz* is an abbreviation for "collective agricultural enterprise" and is usually translated "collective farm." The "collectivist-peasant" is the term used here to render the Russian *Kolkhoznik,* as found in the cartoon of the frontispiece, that is, a member of a collective farm.

*Krasnoarmeets,* literally translated, is "Redarmyist," and is the term in current usage to designate the commanding staff as well as the lower ranks of the Workman-Peasant Red Army, to give the full official name of the armed forces of the Soviet Union.

*Kulak* is an old Russian term, meaning literally "the fist," and was applied mainly to the former local village money-lender. The word is used by the Communists to mean the more prosperous peasants of a given village who also engage in trade or rent their implements of other villagers. The usual though somewhat misleading translation of the word as "rich peasant" has been adopted here.

*Kultrabotnik* is an abbreviation for the Russian of "cultural-worker." The expression *Kultarmeets* is used in the same meaning, and may be rendered in abbreviation as "cultarmyist."

*Mopr* stands for "The International Society to Assist Revolutionaries."

*Osoaviachem* is a combined title adopted by two organizations when they merged; one was "The Society To Aid in Defense," and the other was "The Friends of Aviation and Chemistry." This is the most important of the Soviet patriotic societies.

*Partiets* means "party-member" or "party-worker." As there is only one "party" under the Soviet form of government, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the *Partiets* is always a Communist or Bolshevik.

*Pravda* in Russian means "the truth," and this word has been used from the beginning of the Revolution as the name for the official newspaper organs of the Communist party and of the Communist Youth movement.

*Sovkhoz* is an abbreviation for "Soviet agricultural enterprise," which is the state-managed large-scale mechanized farm or "grain factory." The word is also translated as "Soviet estate."

*Udarnik* is the member of a "shock-brigade" (in Russian, *Udarnaia Brigada*). The shock-brigade movement (in Russian, *Udarnichestvo*, see page 74) started and is particularly important among workmen, and the term has been translated here as "shock-brigade workman" or "shock-brigader." There are "shock-brigaders" also among peasants, office-workers, students, and even children.

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