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History of Chinese Political Thought

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THE LATE LIANG CHI-CHAO
1873-1929

History of Chinese Political Thought

During the early Tsin Period

BY

LIANG CHI-CHAO

With two portraits

LONDON
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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

THIS volume is based on the notes of lectures which Mr. Liang Chi-Chao delivered first at the College of Law and Politics in Peking, and later at South-eastern University and the College of Law and Politics in Nanking during the year 1922. The materials thereafter represent the result of a study begun twenty years before, much of which had previously appeared in fragmentary form in magazines and newspapers. As soon as this book was published the present writer was impressed with its tremendous value and intended to put it in English. The actual undertaking was, however, delayed in deference to an abler pen when it was learned that Mr. Hsu Chih-Mo had similar intentions. Several years elapsed and nothing materialised. The writer then redoubled his efforts and secured the author's permission for the translation in the beginning of 1929.

For the sake of clarity the order of the chapters has been somewhat altered. Part I contains the historical study of the subject and Part II the topical essays which in the original are inserted in different sections of the book. This rearrangement is made in order to present a clearer sequence of thought, and at the same time to include all the author's writings on this subject. Furthermore, in order to avoid confusion to the reader no Chinese characters are inserted in the text, but a glossary is provided in which are found all the Chinese words involved in this book.

The writer also wants to make acknowledgment of his indebtedness to Dr. Legge for freely using his translations of Chinese Classics. While his work is not always followed, yet its consultation has proved of inestimable help. Special gratitude is also due to Mr. W. E. Wilkinson for his invaluable assistance in reading the manuscript and making improvements and to Mr. G. F. S. Gray for reading the proof.

L. T. Chen.

BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION

Liang Chi-Chao was born of scholarly parentage in the year 1873 in the city of Hsin Hui in the district of Canton. From early childhood he showed a great propensity for learning, and long before he was 12 years old he had already won recognition as a precocious boy, being able to recite by rote many ancient poems and difficult passages from classical literature. At the age of 16 he distinguished himself at the provincial examination, winning the *Chü Jen* degree.

At the age 19 he became a disciple of Kang Yu-Wei, who had then gained fame as a liberal thinker. He studied history and philosophy under his guidance; also incidentally reading translations of European books. In all these, however, he took little interest. But when after a year's time he learned of his master's writings on "Utopianism", he became madly enamoured with them, insisting that these ideals be given wide circulation. Although Kang prohibited him in this he persisted nevertheless. He was delighted with his master's ideal and began to take great interest in the revolutionary principles found in Mencius and the doctrines of impartial love and the futility of war taught by Motse. These thoughts he shared with many of his friends at this time with himself as the centre of inspiration.

In 1894 the Sino-Japanese war occurred, and resulted in China's defeat. When the treaty of Shimonoseki was signed the following year, China was required not only to cede territory but also to pay a heavy indemnity. This caused great indignation among the people, and Liang became outspoken in his political thinking. In

company with his teacher, he started the short-lived paper *Ch'iang Hsüeh Pao* in Peking, devoted to the spread of constitutional and democratic ideals. When this was suppressed three months after its first appearance, he left for Shanghai, where his political ideals were disseminated through the creation of a weekly, *Shih Wu Pao*, in which the government was criticized and reform measures were advocated. Occasionally, essays were also published dwelling on the rights of the people. A year later, when he was 25 years old, he responded to a call of the governor of Hunan province to take charge of the provincial college. Here he spent much time with the students discussing politics and spreading revolutionary ideals. When this became known to the Court the college was closed and the students were disbanded. Later many of these students participated in a revolt against the ruling dynasty in Wuchang, and all but two of them were executed. One of these two, Tsai Ao, was responsible in 1916 for putting an end to Yuan Shih-Kai's attempt to make himself emperor.

Undaunted in his zeal for political reform he made a final attempt which sent him into exile, thus initiating a period of most valuable service to his country. Towards the close of the last century the Empress Dowager Tsu Hsi instead of the Emperor Kwang Hsu held the reins of government. As a matter of fact, so far from having any part in the government the Emperor was actually held in prison by his aunt. Proceeding on the belief that the emperor was a Liberal and therefore would serve China best, Liang Chi-Chao and his teacher Kang Yu-Wei staged a coup d'état in the summer of 1899, by which the Empress Dowager was to be deposed and the Emperor to be restored to power. A constitutional monarchy would then be ushered in, and China would embark on a vigorous programme of modernization.

Everything was ready, and nothing but the consummation of the scheme remained to be enacted, when the treachery of Yuan Shih-Kai divulged the entire plans. The clock was set back, and what promised to accelerate China's progress as a modern nation remains to-day merely as a source of diversion for those who delight in thinking what might have been. What actually happened was that the Empress Dowager tightened her grip, a few far-sighted patriotic men were made martyrs in a patriotic cause, and Liang and Kang had to seek refuge abroad.

Liang Chi-Chao, a youth of 28, arrived in Yokohama in the fall of 1899. For the next twelve years he spent most of his time in writing and studying, except a short period in which he toured America and Australia, arousing his compatriots abroad to a keen sense of patriotism and national conciousness. He stood for constitutional monarchy, and exercised an influence which remains even to-day. Although he himself became a thorough believer in democracy, some of his former followers still linger under his influence of those days.

The influence which Liang Chi-Chao exercised in the intellectual world of China during the first decade of this century cannot be overestimated. Even Napoleon at the height of his power could not have captivated a larger number of men in his armies than the numberless youths whom Liang held under the influence of his pen. Literally thousands upon thousands devoured whatever he wrote. In addition to the *Ching Yi Pao*, the *Hsin Min Tsung Pao* and the *Kuo Feng Pao* which he edited one after another, he also wrote various pamphlets all of which, by their fiery energy, awakened among his fellow countrymen a burning zeal for political reform. In those days it was he, rather than Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, who sowed the seeds of political reform which bear fruit

in the revolution to-day. In spite of the ban on his publications, students in China circularized in secret every word flowing from his pen.

The revolution came and a republic was established in 1911. Liang returned to China full of delight and enthusiasm. Straightway he organized the Chin Pu Tang (the Progressive Party) in juxtaposition to Kuo Min Tang (the Nationalist Party), in order that politics in China might reap the benefit of rival parties, following the Anglo-Saxon practice. He accepted a public office for the first time in 1914 as Minister of Justice in Hsiung Hsi-Ling's Cabinet, but he resigned before long on account of Yuan's monarchical designs. It was then when he wrote his famous essay to counteract the propaganda which Yuan Shih-Kai's henchman, Yang Tu, was spreading in preparation for the restoration of monarchy. Furthermore he worked at great risk with his pupil Tsai Ao to bring about what is known as the Yunnan revolution resulting in the overthrow of Yuan. A year later he found himself in league with Tuan Chi-Jui to suppress Chang Hsün's coup d'état in favour of the deposed Manchurian Emperor. This was the last time we saw him in public office. He held the portfolio of Minister of Finance, again only for a short while.

Chi-Chao then gave himself entirely to literature, except when he attended the Versailles Conference as an unofficial observer. During this period he has undertaken many writings. Among the published books may be mentioned *Method for the Study of Chinese History*, *The Teachings of Motze*, *A Critique of Motze*, *General Outline of Literary Development during Tsing Dynasty*, and the volume under translation.

This gives a brief outline of the manifold activities of Liang Chi-Chao who died in Peking on January the 19th, 1929. For versatility and for fluency of style

one is inclined to contrast him with Macaulay. In a style all his own he defies all literary standards of the past. His enemies may envy and ridicule him; his words go straight to the heart of young China. He not only opens the Chinese mind to a new outlook but also inspires Chinese imagination with a new purpose. A genius and a tireless student, he combined the depth of Chinese thought and the breadth of Western knowledge. He is an iconoclast of old standards, a pioneer in new scholarship. Discontented with the past he was ever venturing into new explorations. For what he did in ushering in the new age, and for his application of the scientific method to the chaotic mass of Chinese literature, he deserves the profound gratitude of countless generations to come.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

1. THE VALUE OF THIS STUDY

In the development of human civilization before the 15th and 16th centuries, China's achievement is second to none in the world. But the achievement is widely different from that of any other country. China has none of the religious fervour of the Hebrews or Indians; she takes little interest in mystic or metaphysical thinking, in which the Greeks and Germans excel; she makes no claim to a development of objective science. In what respect, then, may China claim a place in the history of human civilization? The central thesis of her literature is the ethical conduct of mankind in this life. Her great thinkers, past and present, have concentrated their energies on problems in this one field, in the field of Political Philosophy and of the Philosophy of Life. Consequently the conclusions of Chinese thinkers often reveal deep insight, surpassing the conclusions of other peoples in the world. These they may well bring as their contribution to the World Exposition of Civilizations.

The Philosophy of Life is not touched on in these pages. Our discussion is confined to Political Philosophy.

Since the literary revival following the turmoils of Chun Chiu and Chan Kuo (600–200 B.C.) the "Writings of the Hundred" have been specially devoted to the political theories of Cosmopolitanism, Democracy, and Socialism. It is not our purpose here to contrast the relative merits of the thoughts of these early philosophers with those of modern scholars in Europe and America. It is enough to point out that these theories are native

to Chinese beliefs, and that they form the basis of the thinking of China's scholars of all schools and in all ages. The Chinese cannot claim exclusive credit for their investigations into such ideals; it is beyond doubt that they are among the very first who taught them.

The history of Europe since the 14th and 15th centuries is marked by a gradual development of nationalism, culminating in the disaster of the Great War. What is Nationalism? Nationalism is a logical development of the machinery of the town and city governments of Europe in the Middle Ages, worked out on a nation-wide scale. The underlying principle is the consolidation of forces within to withstand and defy those without, so that hatred for foreigners is the means of arousing patriotic feelings. Under the nourishment of emotional racial-hatred groups, the bud of nationalism grows into full foliage. The more it develops, the more pronounced the disorders of modern society. On the other hand since civilization began, the Chinese people have never considered national government as the highest form of social organization. Their political thinking has always been in terms of all mankind, with world peace as the final goal, and family and nation as transitional stages in the perfecting of the World Order. China has contended, moreover, that governmental authority should never be the prerogative of any one group or section of mankind. As China has little desire to resist other, outside forces, she has never realized the necessity of special effort for national consolidation. On this point, it is a matter of personal preference to say either that China did not desire to organize herself into a nation, or that she lacked power to do so. Whatever be the explanation, the fact remains that the Chinese people in the past has not been a nation. When the people are accustomed to a system of thinking which either disregards or rises above

nationalism, their attitude towards practical politics is easily understood. A study of the past 2,000 years reveals both the advantages and the disadvantages. China has been frequently conquered by alien races; that is the disadvantage. She has always been able to absorb the invaders in a short while; therein lies the advantage. In the final accounting, the advantages have always more than balanced the disadvantages, inasmuch as the invasions have always meant an increase in the Chinese people, and an expansion of the World Order. This helps to account for the fact that while Europe to-day is split into a number of countries, China for ages has been a unit.

These things are true of the past. Only in the last hundred years has China come into contact with a world in which nationalism is a ruling passion. She has been swimming against the current, and has almost been submerged. In her distress and travail she has frequently complained against her forefathers because of the lack of nationalism. So for us to-day the important question, only to be answered when the schools of philosophy are re-evaluated, concerns the place which the doctrine of super-nationalism shall hold in the China of the future. Super-nationalism, the characteristic attitude of the thinkers of China, advocating universal peace, world brotherhood against the nationalism of the Western world, must be re-thought under the conditions of our own day.

Liberty and equality are the two most valuable results of modern political movements in Europe. In view of the autocratic government under which China has lived for thousands of years, one would logically conclude that both liberty and equality are unknown to her people. This is not so. Except the Emperor alone, everyone in the state is equal in the sight of the law,

with equal personal and public rights. Even the authority of the Emperor is not a right divine, but is conditioned by the wish and consent of the people. These theories, advanced by our forefathers of 2,000 years ago, have sunk deep into the hearts of the people, and are accepted as unalterable as the laws of nature. In practice, also, these things are true. A notable illustration of this is the fact that while slavery and class distinction have not entirely disappeared in the West, to the Chinese mind such things are like a fossilized stone of 2,000 years ago. Furthermore, the rights of man in Europe were won as the result of a class struggle: in China they come as a free gift. So it is natural they are more treasured in the West than here. But for a class struggle to take place, there must first be a class system. In China the class system long ago disappeared; so the struggle cannot exist. Again, we cannot consider that a class struggle is an admirable thing: were it continued, political development among men would sink lower and lower till all class distinctions were obliterated. But as in the development of China the people acquired a measure of rights without experiencing the cruel struggles of the West, it is nothing to be ashamed of, even if she were not proud of it. But, in short, the explanation is that the Chinese people have been taught to believe in the equality of men for so long that even the strongest of rulers has not been able to ignore it.

During the period under discussion (600–200 B.C.) the question of the wisdom of the policy of interfering with the liberty of the people formed a topic of the hottest debate among the scholars. The principle of non-interference exercised an irresistible authority over the emperors and their ministers of later ages. It is therefore an historical fact that after the Tsin and Han dynasties, the liberty of the average man in China far

surpasses that of the European before the French Revolution. True, incidents have not been wanting in which ambitious emperors have misused their power and corrupt officials have abused their office. The liberty of the people has been violated. But officials have been impeached, and sages of all times have recognized and taught the people's right to revolt against arrogant emperors. In this atmosphere of comparative freedom, the Chinese people have been able to maintain a free development of individual rights. This alone accounts for their professing existence as a people.

Lincoln's definition of democratic government, " of the people, by the people, and for the people " is in part within the thinking of Chinese philosophers. " Of the people, and for the people," are essential to their thought. But " by the people " is a thought left untouched. That is, they believe thoroughly in the principles that the country is the common possession of the people, and that politics exist solely for the sake of their common advantage. But they neither studied the method nor even seem to have accepted the theory that government must be " by the people ". And therein lies the fundamental weakness of China's political thinking. There is no point in speaking of the people as the foundation of the country, and then denying them all powers of participation in politics.

The problem of government " by the people " lies, not in the theoretical conception, but in the practical application. What system offers a practical model? Does the forum of the Ancient Greeks, or the majority rule of the representative system of the West, or the new experimental Soviet organization? And if there is no practical solution in Europe or America to-day, what could one expect of historical China? For there the handicaps of social organization, geographical and

otherwise, make it impossible to experiment with methods. So the leading political thinkers of China attempted to carry out a spirit of democratic rule under a monarchical government. And though the ideal was not realised, yet it has sunk deep into the minds of the Chinese people. In spite of the oppressions of tyrannical rule, the democratic spirit has been undaunted. If we regard the birth of the Republic in China as a sudden outburst without historical background, our thinking is all wrong.

That political developments should be determined by economic life is an axiom in countries with an advanced civilization. This was already a policy before the Chun Chiu period. It fills the teachings in the Classics, and forms the thesis of all political philosophers. In Chinese economic thinking, distribution is considered of more importance than production. Socialists appeared in Europe only within the last century; in China, Confucius, Motze, Mencius, Hsuntze, and a train of others, including Hsu-Hsing and Pai-Kuei, were all coloured with Socialistic views. Like their modern brothers, their views about the application of their theories differed radically. Later, in the Han and Tang dynasties, the noteworthy practical politics were concerned with social control, emphasizing the suppression of the rich and strong. There are few countries in the world which can compare with China in the comparatively equal basis of opportunities which the people have for economic pursuits. This is indeed partly due to the influence of environment; the influence of thought has also its share.

The geographical influence of China—a wide plain on which many different kinds of people must live—has given the people a power of accommodating themselves to various schools of thought, so that even controversial and conflicting schools may develop side by side without injuring each other. The elastic nature of the people

is such that incompatible views can be skilfully harmonized in a composite product. The value of this Chinese power, whereby different view-points may exist peacefully side by side, whereby incompatible views may be harmonized, is of inestimable value to mankind. In the realm of thought, scholars doubt the existence of absolute truth; in the realm of practice widely different policies emerge from the various ideals. This can be seen by a consideration of the past two centuries of European political and economic theory. New theories are appearing with perplexing rapidity, some of which have found expression in definite and concrete systems. But with the rise of every new doctrine, defects are discovered, so many and so various that men are thrown into doubt or despondency, and question every form of customary institution. Desperately reaching out for some new panacea, men are disillusioned as a mother who looks in vain for a lost child. The thoughts inherited from the forefathers of China may be immature or even fragmentary, but they cannot be altogether valueless to the present age.

The value of a political theory or of a social practice is never absolute. Different men have different customs; but the customs are not of absolute validity. We must not be so presumptuous as to think that our way is the only way. Nor should one conceal his disease and shun the doctor. The hiding of shortcomings never leads to progress. On the other hand, the Chinese people should bear in mind that a study of the defects as well as the excellencies of their country's political thought has a value. For society to-day is the result of the social heritage of all past generations. This social heritage is the result both of customs and of thought. The thought of the past unconsciously influences the present generation, often with an indisputable authority derived from

history. It is thus that the will of the people is produced. Without the sanction of the people's will, no political institution can be effective. It is true to say that no political institution will survive a day unless it grows out of a popular demand, or receives the passive assent of the people.

During the last two decades China has tried to transplant, one after another, the political institutions of Europe on to her own soil. Constitutional Monarchy has been tried, Republicanism, Confederacy, Sovietism; all have been tried as though China desires to try every form in existence. In reality, nothing but the name has been introduced, and confusion is made more confounded. For when an institution whose roots are not among the people is introduced from the top, it is like plucking the flowers of a neighbour to embellish the dying branches of one's own tree; there can be no life. The bitterness of disillusion now drives her leaders to rally under the banner of a reconstruction of thought. This requires a constructive effort. In order to cast out the old, there must be a satisfying new to take its place, or society would fall into scepticism, and would revert to the inertia of traditional thinking. The reconstruction of China's thought is not to be accomplished by the wholesale transplantation of the thoughts of another society; it must follow the natural development, and must begin with the proper retention of elements of the old social heritage. If that is true, then although some part of China's political thoughts may be of little value to the rest of the world, at least to China their value cannot be underestimated.

II. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE STUDY AND ITS SOURCE MATERIALS

We may look at political thinking under two main aspects, Theory and Application. Theory deals with

such questions as the ideal of social life, the organization to express the ideal, the policy to be adopted to carry out the organization. Application deals with the determination of effectiveness, the bringing into practice of a theory or an organization. For the purposes of thought, Theory and Application may be considered separately; they are, however, mutually dependent. Pure theory can reach perfection only through practice, and all practices should have their foundation in accepted theories. We may also look at political thinking subjectively, that is either as the thought of the individual or the tendencies of the age. The thought of the individual is the purposeful creation of the thinking of scholars and statesmen; the tendencies of the age are the result of the interaction of current institutions and the social heritage of society which is beyond the control of a directing purpose. These two are also often intertwined. An individual may be the pioneer of a new age, and the age may nourish the thought of an individual.

Where then shall we look for source materials to study the history of Chinese political thought? In our judgment we may search under the four following categories:—

1. *The writings and sayings of scholars.* This study will give a complete display of the creativeness of the individuals. Where possible we should make a thorough study of the writings of Confucius, Mencius, Motze, and the long train of teachers down to the present time. Besides these, there are others whose own writings are not found, but whose thoughts are revealed in quotations by their contemporaries. Such is often the case with writers of the Tsin dynasty; for instance the thoughts of Teng Hsi are seen in Lu Shih Chun Chiu, and the ideals of Hsu-Hsing are seen in the writings of Mencius.

2. *The memoirs of statesmen.* Political thoughts differ from pure philosophy in that the former move in

the practical realm of government, while the latter is the work of literary men alone, and is handed down in their writings. Therefore the records of all politicians and statesmen are of real importance to our study, irrespective of the character of the men, or the success or failure of their activities.

3. *Laws and other regulations.* Political thoughts find expression in laws and regulations. Not only the laws that have been actually promulgated, but also the memorials and memoranda relating to the systems and practices of the time, indicate the political tendencies.

4. *History and other Literature.* These furnish the background and trends of the thought of the time. Unless we understand the background and environment of the time, we shall fail to appreciate the full value of the thought. The effect upon society of any set of political thoughts is some criterion of its value. The history of political thinking can be understood only in relation to the political and economic movements which issue from it. Further, the utterances of scholars contain clues to the prevalent ideas of the age. Without a comprehensive knowledge of the literature of the time, a correct estimate of its thought is impossible.

Of the four categories mentioned, the first two will aid the study of the thought of individuals, and the last two give knowledge of the conditions of the time. It must not be forgotten that as these two are interdependent, they must be studied in their relations with one another.

The materials available for a study of Chinese political thought exist in great abundance; they are scattered, so that both a stupendous effort and a keenly critical mind are necessary to make a complete scientific study. Several cautions are needed for those who would select amongst the available material. First it is true

that among the old literature, many books are spurious. Unless great care is taken to divide between the false and the true, the deductions made will be incorrect, devoid of historical value. Furthermore, a common device of early authors was to attribute ideas of their own to earlier writers. Mencius accused Hsu-Hsing of putting his own words into the mouth of Shun Nung, but Confucius, Motze, and even Mencius himself were guilty of the same offence. So quotations which occur in these books must be read as ideas of the writers themselves. A third caution must be given about the vast literature available for collateral reading. This literature must be read with critical discrimination. Mencius said, with reference to the Book of Odes, that care must be taken that the diction does not prejudice the ideas which it conveys; to accept every word of the Book of History is worse than not to read the book at all. This caution is given because literary men are apt to be carried away by their pen. We must not totally ignore the books in which "gems and pebbles are intermingled", but we must read them in the light of our understanding of the trends of thought of the time, which we may gain through other reliable literature. Thus we may critically discriminate. This method is commonly accepted in the study of history.

Books which are spurious need not be rejected altogether. For instance, Kwantse and Shang Chun Shu should not be read as authentic writings of Kwan Chung and Shang Yang, but they are excellent representatives of the legal writings of the end of the Chankou period. Lieh Tze is not the authentic work of Lieh Yu Kou, but that of a man of the Tsin dynasty. And as very few books of the Tsin dynasty are extant, it forms a valuable document for that age. There are, of course, spurious books which must be rejected entirely. The

unworthy writers of the Ming and Tsing dynasties were wont to expound the doctrine of the guarding of the heart as a text for political preaching, and the system of Ching[1] for social reorganization. These books, written to court favour or obtain popularity, are hypocritical, and should be eliminated from serious consideration. The criterion of philosophy is its creative power; the criterion of politics, the creation of a sense of responsibility. When these are wanting, the books are not worthy of study.

III. METHOD AND SCOPE OF THIS BOOK

In a consideration of political thought, there are three possible methods.

1. *The Topical Method.* Here the subject of investigation is divided into a number of topics whose changes are developed through ancient and modern times. If the general topic is, say "The Rise of Nations"; or "Government Organization", the sub-topic will include (*a*) Ownership of Land by the State or by Private Individuals; (*b*) Feudalism, its advantages and disadvantages; (*c*) Punishment or Correction as the basis of penalty. The study of the topic generation by generation and writer by writer has the advantage of simplicity; an accurate and systematic purview of the whole field is obtained. But on the other hand, such a study obscures the causes, direct and indirect, which influence changes; nor is there possible a clear view of the interrelation of the different sets of problems.

2. *The Chronological Method.* Here the natural sequence of events and of schools of thought is followed. By this method we can clearly trace the advance in thought under the influence of the social and political

[1] *Vide* p. 59.

environment of the time. On the other hand, it is impossible to discuss the whole volume of material available. To follow an arbitrary chronology would mean much tedious repetition.

3. *The Categorical Method.* Here we divide the philosophers into their different schools, and discuss the findings of each different school in turn. For instance, the Confucian School includes Confucius, his seventy Disciples, Mencius, Hsun Ching and Tung Chung Shu. The Legal School will include Kwan Chung, Tzu Chan and Ch'ao Ts'o and Chu-Ko Liang. This method gives a clear view of each school of thought, and traces the reactions of various kinds of thinking within the schools, and of the schools with each other. But it precludes the possibility of gaining a birds'-eye-view of the thought life in successive periods. Moreover, it is not possible to group all the thinkers; some, especially of lesser significance, may be left out.

This book follows the Chronological Method. But as the different schools of thought in Chun Chiu and Chan Kuo periods were distinctive, a categorical study is also included, so that the characteristics of the Confucian, Motze, Taoist and Legalist schools are clearly presented.

A word should be said on the relation of political thoughts to other thinking. First, all thinkers have some fundamental philosophy beneath their political systems. In order to study the different schools of political thought, for instance of the Tsin period, it is essential to have a general knowledge of the philosophical background of the time. Second, politics and economics are interrelated and inseparable. The political thought of the Chinese, "to govern is to provide for the people," stresses the importance of the people's livelihood in theory and in policy. Our present study has therefore a politico-economic approach. Third, when a political ideal sinks

deep into the minds of the people, it materializes as laws or regulations which necessarily threaten the existing institutions. This interaction of new thought on old institutions should also not be neglected.

One final word should be said on the attitude of mind which should accompany a study of political ideals. (a) A spirit of objective study is essential to success. In the past, the study of social science has been prejudiced by the importation of human emotions. Natural science escapes that to which social science has been subject. If emotionalism is imported, the accurate selection of evidence is impossible, and any result is falsified. This is true of all social science; it is particularly true of the study of politics. For instance, the scholars after the Tang and Sung dynasties spoke much of "Orthodoxy and heresy", of "Pure virtue and adulterated force", of "The superior man and the little man"; all of which phrases mean an appeal to the emotions and not to the mind. In our study we must be objective, and attempt honestly to present a truthful picture of the thoughts of early scholars, taking care that our personal prejudices do not creep in. We shall try not to pass judgment on any theory, doing so only by way of explanation. (b) The revival of classical studies in China is largely due to the influence of Western methods, which we have used to systematize our old materials. We have re-shaped the old chaos, which scholars despised, into definite systems, and have made clear to our own minds what to them was unintelligible reading. We have benefited by the importation of the scientific method. So we use modern terms of Europe and America to interpret our old books, or even to read modern ideas into old thoughts. This is increased by the arrogance which the Chinese share with the rest of mankind. We argue that what exists in the thought of other peoples must have existed in Chinese

thought. Hence we refer to the abdication of Yao and Shun as the coming of a republican form of government; Kwantze's proposal of rural organizations is called self-government; and so forth. These things are pleasant to hear, but are not true. Of course it is permissible to explain old books with modern terminology to simplify the text. And since human nature is all of a piece, it is a good thing to explain by comparison, since what one can do is not impossible for the others. But we must remember Cromwell's saying, "Paint me, warts and all." If we are faithful to our objective method, we must not permit our own thoughts to creep in among the ancient writers, nor cause confusion by offering explanations which contradict the facts. In earlier years the writer was frequently guilty of both of these offences; but since then he has striven to avoid this habitual weakness.

This book is introductory to the history of Chinese political thought, which the author hopes to finish in the not distant future. The present work is a study of Group I materials, and deals with the review of the political thoughts of the Tsin dynasty.

HISTORY OF CHINESE POLITICAL THOUGHT

Chapter I

INTRODUCTORY

I

Before the coming of the great teachers, Confucius, Laotze, and Motze, under whose inspiration definite systems of philosophy were evolved and schools of thinking were founded, China's political thought was fragmentary and unorganized. Yet no adequate conception even of the work of the great philosophers, is possible unless the background of their thought is understood; the earlier work is the basis of the later scholarship. The present chapter, therefore, deals with political thought before the Philosophers, during the era between Tong Yü and the middle of Chun Chiu. This era presents three well-marked periods: (1) The Nomadic Period (2357–1135 B.C.); (2) The Feudal Period (1135–771 B.C.); (3) The Period of the Aggressors (771–551 B.C.).

1. In the Nomadic Period, the people lived in tribes or clans under the rule of nomadic leaders. The clans were small, life was simple, intelligence undeveloped. As the population was small and the land plentiful, the people were scattered, and conflicts among them—few in number—seemed both unnecessary and savage. Among the nomadic tribes the Hsia (2205–1766 B.C.) and Shang (1783–1135 B.C.) dynasties ruled the longest, while the three dynasties of Tong (2357–2261 B.C.), Yu (2255–2205 B.C.), and Chow (1134–247 B.C.) were less important contemporary kingdoms for over a thousand years.

2. During the Feudal period, the Chow dynasty, rising from a small western tribe, had superseded the house of

Shang. Chow Kung, who formulated comprehensive plans to rule the unified world empire of that age, extinguished fifty kingdoms, and distributed them as rewards to his house and to his trusted officers, hoping thereby to assimilate the conquered peoples. A vast empire was created, and this, the house of Chow, ruled under a Feudal system. Tribal groups grew more civilized. Chow Kung himself launched an educational effort "patterned after the methods of the past two dynasties" so that the civilization of the Chow dynasty was spoken of as highly advanced. An elaborate system of royal visits spread the cultural influence of the Court through the feudal states. For over a century the power of this central authority prevailed, only to decline with the growing power of the tribe of Ch'üan Jung.

3. The breakdown of the Feudal period decentralized the power of Chow, and allowed the surrounding barbarian tribes to contest the power of the central states. The Tsin and the Chu tribes led in the scramble for power, and broke down many of the older states, threatening even the newer states of the Feudal period. Then came a period when tribes allied themselves with other tribes for mutual aid; communications were improved, and cultural development was facilitated. The resultant prosperity gave rise to a class of aristocratic governors, the intellectuals of the time. State government was not uniform, but the prevalent practice was oligarchy. Kwan Chung (708–643 B.C.) of the kingdom of Chi and Tzuchan (543–522 B.C.) of Cheng, two statesmen of this age, introduced institutions which had a great influence on later generations.

It is not surprising that very little source material is available for the Nomadic period. Confucius, visiting the Kingdoms of Chee and Sung[1] in order to trace the

[1] This is not the Sung dynasty, which dates much later.

influence of the Hsia (2205–1766 B.C.) and Shang[1] (1766–1135 B.C.) dynasties, was grieved by the lack of records. The preceding dynasties also have no records. The materials that are available are totally untrustworthy. Even the Book of Rites cannot be considered reliable, though it has much to say of the period. It must be remembered that it was compiled by disciples of Confucius, who himself had been troubled by the paucity of reliable information. The Feudal period document is the sixty chapters of Yichow Shu, of which only half is authentic. This is due to the fact that the early records were kept on bamboo splits, of which very few have been preserved for later generations. The period of the Aggressors had much material, which was destroyed by Tsin Shih Huang (246–210 B.C.). What can be gleaned from Tso Chuan, Kuo Yu and Shih Chi is but one-tenth of what existed before.

The following is a brief description of all the available source materials.

(1) *Shih Ching, the Book of Odes.* This is the most authentic of all. It contains three hundred Odes, of which five bear on the Nomadic period, thirty or forty on the Aggressor period, while all the others are of the Feudal period. It makes little reference to political thought, but it portrays most faithfully the social environment of the age.

(2) *Shu Ching, the Book of History.* In its present form, it has fifty chapters, of which only twenty-eight are authentic, the rest being fabrications of the East Chin times. Of the authentic chapters, the four on Yü and Hsia dynasties, and the five on the Shang dynasty belong to the first period; the one entitled Tsin Shih belongs to the third period; the remainder belong to the second period. The book is invaluable for its reference to the

[1] The same dynasty is also called Yin.

political thoughts of the Shang and Chow dynasties. It should be borne in mind, however, that three of the chapters on the Yü and Hsia dynasties seem to be posthumous accounts of a later generation, and that some of the thoughts expressed are more in line with the thinking of the third period.

(3) *The Commentaries in the Book of Changes.* These are the product of the second period, between the fall of Yin and the rise of the Chow dynasty. It contains very little information on political thought, but a careful reader will learn from it the temper of the age.

(4) *Yi Li.* This is a production of the second or third period, but it has little bearing on our study.

(5) *Yi Chow Shu.* Ten chapters of this book are attributed to the second period, the remainder being the spurious additions of Chan Kuo and the Han dynasty. The genuine part is as valuable as the *Book of History*, containing much information for our present purpose.

(6) *Kuo Yü and Tso Chuan.* Traditionally these two books are considered to be the work of one of Confucius disciples, Tso Chiu-ming. But the fact that some of the references in the book are to events after the Chan Kuo period indicates that the books are of a later generation. Further, Sze Ma Chien, in writing his chronicles, had *Kuo Yü* as one of his sources. *Tso Chuan* was produced towards the end of the Han dynasty (206 B.C.–A.D. 24) by the method of extracting parts of *Kuo Yü* and mixing them with spurious writings. It is important therefore that these two books be considered as one. They were written at the end of Chun Chiu (722–481 B.C.), and the beginning of Chan Kuo (481–247 B.C.), and they record the events of the Chow dynasty during the period of Chun Chiu. They constitute the best record of the political thought of the third period, and are fairly accurate on the events of the other two periods.

(7) *Shih Chi*, *the Chronicles*. The author is Sze Ma Chien. When he deals with the period before Chun Chiu his sources are mainly *Shang Shu* and *Kuo Yü*; where he differs from these books, care should be exercised in accepting his conclusions.

(8) *Sayings of the Hundred*. The miscellaneous writings of the Early Tsin dynasty deal largely with the era before Chun Chiu. In using these sources, one should both ascertain the authenticity of the books consulted, and also exercise special care even after the authenticity is proved, since during this period spurious writings are rampant.

In addition to these sources of material, there are two other books whose authenticity is most questionable.

(1) *Chow Kuan*, also called *Chow Li*. This book has been considered as Chow Kung's work, outlining his plans for peace. It was first known at the end of the West Han dynasty. Scholars of that time pronounced it spurious; later scholars have still more questioned its authenticity. It is probable that Chow Kung was not its author, nor is it entirely the fabrication of Han scholars. It seems that it is partly a description of the political organization of the emperors Li and Hsuan during the last days of the West Han dynasty, and partly a description of the practices during the Chun Chiu and Chan Kuo periods. To this mixture the Han scholars added their own ideas. This is only a conjecture which ought to be verified. An analysis of these three elements in the book would constitute a research in itself. For our present purpose, despite the richness of its contents, it is best to put it aside.

(2) *Kuan Tsu*. The version of this book now available has eighty-six chapters, and is derived from the private collection of Liu Hsiang. Since the days of Sze Ma Chien it has been considered as the genuine work of Kwan Chung. But the fact that the text often refers to events

after Kwan Chung's death, and the likeness of the ideas to those characteristic of the end of Chan Kuo, make it conclusive that it is a work of that period. At best the book may contain quotations from Kwan Chung's actual sayings in three of its chapters. And in addition, Kwan Chung's name is remembered not as a scholar but as a statesman. It would be a mistake to classify him with Yin Wen Tze and Han Fei Tze. The book contains much political discourse of high value, but it should be studied in connection with the work of the legalists of Chan Kuo. It does not fall within the scope of the present study. Moreover, there is much exaggeration of the accomplishments of Kwan Chung which we do not accept. If this source-book is studied, one should accept those parts only that do not differ widely from *Kuo Yü*. In order that we may not tread upon debatable ground, we shall consult only *Shih Ching*, *Shang Shu*, *Kuo Yü*, and *Tso Chuan*.

II

The Age and its Sources of Thought

All the great thinkers of China lived during the three hundred years between 530 and 230 B.C., the Golden Age of Chinese philosophy. It was preceded by a period of fragmentary thought and incomplete institutions, the precursors of the achievements of the age. But in spite of the height of the cultural development, and the fact that at that time history was first recorded, reliable source materials for study are scarce. The books *Kuo Yü* and *Tso Chuan* give accounts of the previous periods; but for the seventy years (477–403 B.C.) from the 18th year of King Ai of Lu to the 23rd year of Emperor Weilieh of Chow not a single page exists. The following two centuries are recorded in *Chan Kuo*, but no dates are given,

and the book itself is full of exaggerated and untrustworthy statements. This is due to the burning of all historical records by the order of Tsin Shih Huang. But in these years kaleidoscopic changes took place in society, with swift and revolutionary changes in thought. So came the great outburst of wisdom during the age. For convenience we shall study this era in two periods under three topics, of which our first period covers the first one hundred years, and the second period the remaining two hundred years.

A

The Political Aspects

(*a*) During our first period, feudalism was in its last days. The "Rule of the Aggressors" was weakening. Tribal military conquests had merged the multitudinous kingdoms into twenty states, which states, during our second period, were amalgamated into seven, which towards the end were drawn into a form of united empire.

(*b*) With the passing of feudalism, the aristocracies failed, and the strong tribes expanded at the expense of the weak. Alone of the kingdoms, Tsin had no aristocratic system, and therefore was not disintegrated. The example of Tsin was followed by other remaining kingdoms until, during our second period, all feudal distinctions entirely disappeared.

(*c*) The amalgamation of the various tribes was completed through improved communications. The tribes which resisted were driven out of the bounds of the civilized world.

(*d*) The extension of the states with the addition of heterogenous elements to their population challenged traditional customs and usages. So everywhere the existing laws and practices were readjusted to meet the demands of the conglomerate society.

(*e*) The disappearance of the aristocracy concentrated all power in the Emperor. Autocratic rule introduced the possibility of an abuse of power.

(*f*) In the second period (the last two hundred years) there was constant warfare, with an increase in the number of soldiers, the use of arms, development of military tactics, and a consequent increase of suffering for the people.

B

The Social and Economic Aspects

(*a*) As the empires grew and political authority became concentrated, large towns sprang into existence where politics, trade, and civilization developed on an unprecedented scale. As people migrated from country to town, an adjustment problem called for a solution.

(*b*) As communications developed and trade increased, the economic fabric of society changed from agricultural to industrial; wealth became a power, and capitalism interfered with politics.

(*c*) In the agricultural stage slaves, regarded as members of the family, were common. The development of capitalism increased the number of slaves, especially when the people were impoverished by the heavy war taxes. There is an anecdote told, extolling the kind treatment of Pai Kwei—a contemporary of Mencius—of his slaves; this suggests that it was an unusual thing for slaves to be well treated.

C

The Intellectual Aspects

(*a*) The downfall of the nobility brought knowledge to the masses; an immediate improvement came which ran through all ranks of society.

(b) Formerly education was an exclusive function of officials. Confucius and Motze taught "Education without Discrimination", and the spread of knowledge was greatly accelerated.

(c) The status of scholars was raised, and the development of learning was helped by the need of the rulers for scholars to assist them. All rulers went out of their way to pay respect to lowly scholars.

(d) In important capitals scholars assembled in large numbers to study or to teach. So was facilitated the exchange of knowledge and the development of learning.

(e) Books were common. Men were known to possess numerous books. Many books must have been in circulation, and private libraries not uncommon. There was therefore both material equipment and mental impetus for education.

Besides these material conditions, two mental attitudes of importance should be noted.

First, in the midst of swift and deep changes in society, the general public was astonished and bewildered, anxiously seeking for a solution. They turned to the scholars as a natural source of help and relief.

Second, since the beginning of the Chow dynasty a well-grounded civilization had been produced. The new social and political changes released a new intellectual energy. The interaction of these two sets of forces could not but produce results unsurpassed in splendour and grandeur by any other age past or present.

TABLE SHOWING THE POLITICAL EVENTS OF THE AGE AND THE PRINCIPAL LEADERS OF THOUGHT DURING THE THREE HUNDRED YEARS.

	Political Events.	Important Philosophers.
500 B.C. Emperor King 14th year to Emperor Ching 38th year, 482 B.C.	Piratocracy in Kingdoms of Lu, Chu, and Chin. Chu conquered Kingdoms Chen and Tsai; Chang conquered Han; Sung conquered Tsao: Wars between We and Chu, We and Yueh. Chun Chiu completed.	Tsechan Tzeng Hsi. Confucius (553–479 B.C.).
Emperor Ching 38th year to Emperor K'ao 6th year, 432 B.C.	Kingdom Yueh conquered We: Kingdom Chu conquered Tsai and Chi. Split of East and West Chow dynasties. Han, Chao, Wei suppressed Chih family; Chin under rule of "Three Families": Beginning of Chankuo.	Chi Jan. Laotse (?). Kwan Yi (?).
Emperor K'ao 10th year to Emperor An 26th year, 382 B.C.	Han, Chao, and Wei dismembered Chin. Tien family usurped power in Chi. Chu conquered Lu; Han conquered Cheng. Chi attempted to absorb Lu. The advent of seven Kingdoms. Constant warfare between Tsin and Wei.	Motse (370–390 B.C. ?). Li Lou (424–387 B.C. ?). Yang Chu.
Emperor An 21st year to Emperor Hsien 37th year, 332 B.C.	Hsiao Kung of Tsin rose to power by using Shang Yang's methods. Kingdom Wei transferred Capital to Liang. King Wei of Chi assembling scholars. Kingdom Chu became more powerful after conquering Yueh. Seven Kingdoms supporting the Emperor. Frequent warfare between Han, Chao, and Wei.	Shuh Hsiao. Shen Pu-hai (died 337 B.C.). Shang Yang (died 338 B.C.).
Emperor Hsien 38th year to Emperor Nuan 32nd Year, 323 B.C.	The Advent of entangling alliances. Conflict between Yen and Chi. Tsin gaining more power. King Wu-ling of Chao invaded the Hu.	Mencius (372–289 B.C. ?). Sung Keng. Yi Wen. Hsu Hsing. Pai-kwei, etc.
Emperor Nuan 34th year to Chin Shih Huang 10th year, 222 B.C.	Han and Wei conquered by Tsin. Conflicts between Tsin and Chao, Yen and Chao, Yen and Chi. United Empire under Tsin.	Chuangtse (365–275 B.C. ?) Hui Shih. Kung Sun-Lung. Hsun Tse (340–250 B.C. ?). Han Fei (died 233). Li Sse (died 208).

III

The Four Principal Schools of Political Thought

During the Chun Chiu and Chan Kuo periods, many schools of learning came into existence. After the Tsin and Han dynasties, these schools are either grouped as the "Writings of the Hundred", or classified as six schools and nine branches, according to the nature of their studies. But actually the distinct types of thinking were four, namely Taoist, Confucian, Motze, and the Legalist schools. Others were variations of these types.

(*a*) The Taoist School believes that Nature is all powerful and is perfection. Nature in contact with human efforts loses its original quality. The political philosophy of this school is therefore founded on the ideal of absolute freedom, and rejects all forms of interference even to the extent of denouncing government as unnecessary. Its ideal is anarchism.

(*b*) The Confucian School believes that society is founded on the fellow-feeling of mankind which, arising from immediate contacts, can be extended to the remotest relationships. Politics is therefore constructed on ethical relations. On the basis of mutual respect and co-operation between individuals this human fellow-feeling should be developed to the fullest extent possible in order to obtain relative freedom and relative equality. They believe also that enlightened politics must be built upon the foundation of an enlightened people. To enlighten the people, constant care must be taken of their physical and spiritual well-being. So both Education and the Distribution of Wealth are tenets of this school. Their ideal is an ethical ideal.

(*c*) The Motze School believes, as the Confucian, in human sympathy, but denies human discrimination. It insists that every man should abandon self and submit

to a supreme ruler. Its political philosophy is founded on the ideal of absolute equality, but it denies absolute freedom. This verges on ecclesiasticism, and may be called neo-theocracy.

(*d*) The Legalist School is materialistic, keeping in view the actual conditions of life. It also firmly believes in the power of the state, denying the sanctity of the individual. Politically it advocates strict interference, with the restraint of formal standards for the man in authority. Only within the Law do people have freedom and equality. The ideal is legalism.

In the language of current politics the Taoists are extreme left and the Legalists extreme right. The Confucian school is in the centre, and the Motze school central right. In point of time, the Confucian school is the oldest, the Taoist was founded next, then the Motze and the Legalist last. Although the beginnings of legal thought even anticipated the Confucian school, the formation of a definite school was late. A word here may be spoken on the founders of these schools.

As is commonly known, Confucius is regarded as the founder of the Confucian school. Confucius was born during the last days of the Chun Chiu period, living from 552–479 B.C. Tradition credits him with the work of compiling the Odes, codifying ceremonies, writing commentaries on the Book of Changes, and editing Chun Chiu; but with the exception of the last named, opinions differ as to the amount of work he actually did. In studying him we should not confine ourselves too strictly to his own writings, but should search into the accounts given by his disciples and the later followers. Among these the best and most reliable accounts are in the *Analects*; *Yi Ching* and *Chun Chiu* rank next. *Li Chi* is a compilation of writings of various times including those as late as the Han Dynasty. The book includes spurious as well

as authentic writings, and should be read with discrimination. With the exception of the Analects it is more discreet to regard the books as expositions on Confucianism than as writings of Confucius himself. During the Chan Kuo period arose the two chief expositors of Confucius, Mencius and Hsuntze. Mencius' literary work consists of seven treatises, recorded by his own disciples and corrected by himself. Hsun Tze left thirty-two essays, a small part of which is probably the addition of later generations. But as they contain no inaccuracies, a thorough study of these two books and the others mentioned will give a complete knowledge of the thought of the Confucian school.

The Taoists claim to be the followers of Laotze and Chuangtze. But the authorship of the treatise of 5,000 characters attributed to Laotze and the thirty-three essays attributed to Chuangtze is questioned among scholars. Tradition takes the man from whom Confucius inquired about ceremonies to be the author of the 5,000 characters. If that is true, the man must have been older than Confucius, and the Taoist school should have preceded the founding of the Confucian school. This theory is founded on the biographies in the *Chronicles*; here three names are mentioned, of which Laotze is one; the author is not definitely mentioned. Further, though both Mencius and Motze were fond of argument, neither mentioned Laotze whose book was full of attacks on the other schools. In addition, the fact that his book attacked the other schools proves that it was subsequent to them. His book therefore could not have been earlier than Confucius nor later than Chuangtze. We do not even known the exact dates of Chuangtze, though we know he was contemporary with Hui Shih who lived one hundred years after Confucius. His book is a mixture of authentic and spurious writings attributed to him by his followers.

Yang Chu is also an important exponent of this school whose book, *Wei Lieh-tze*, is not altogether trustworthy, though there is nothing better extant. Hsü Hsing represents another branch of the school; his teachings are only indirectly referred to in the works of Mencius. Motze, founder of the third school, lived in the interval between the death of Confucius and the birth of Mencius. His teachings are contained in the fifty-three essays under his name; these are substantially unaltered despite occasional additions of later writers. Among his followers, Hui Shih specialized in logic and so made little contribution to political thought, and Sung Keng elaborated a denunciation of war. No records of their work are available except indirect references in the works of Chuangtze Mencius, and Hsuntze.

The Legalist school, later in history, embodies older thought. For after the break-down of the theocracy, rulers resorted to laws to discipline the people. So during the Chun Chiu period Kwan Chung (708–643 B.C.), Tze Chan (543–522 B.C.), and Fan Li (482–472 B.C.); during the Chan Kuo period Li Lee (427–387 B.C.), Wu Chi (401–381 B.C.), Shun Po Hai (351–337 B.C.), and Shang Yang (352–338 B.C.), all were statesmen of distinction whose work and teaching had a tremendous influence in society. Among the general public Teng Hsi and Chi Jan studied law in the Chun Chiu period; Shen Tao and Yin Wen continued this study in the Chan Kuo period; and finally Han Fei epitomized the legal knowledge of the ancient times. So the Legalists helped to build up the country. The writings of Shen Tao, Yin Wen, and Han Fei are representative of this knowledge. Although *Kwan Tze Shang Chun Shu* may not be the genuine work of Kwan Chung and Shang Yang, it holds the same place in the Legalist school as Li Chi in the Confucian school.

With reference to these different schools it must be remembered that among the later followers distinctions become vague and shadowy. Hsun Tze, for instance, is a Confucianist, but his discourses on Ceremonies verge on the Legalist school. Han Fei belongs to the Legalist school, but his discourses on Laotse are purely the teaching of the Taoists. Yin Wen is a Legalist, but his discourses on War follow Motze.

Chapter II

THE CONFUCIAN SCHOOL

I

The root of all Confucian ethical and political thought is 'Jen'.[1] Without comprehending the meaning of this word, no understanding of Confucian philosophy is possible. In the simplest terms, 'Jen' means fellow-feeling for one's kind. Once Fan Chih, one of his disciples, asked Confucius what 'Jen' meant. Confucius replied "To love fellow-men"; in other words this means to have a feeling of sympathy towards mankind. He further says, "Where there is 'jen' there is man," signifying that the general conception of 'Jen' and of man are mutually involved. In modern terminology, 'Jen' is characteristic of the qualities of man. Therefore in order to know what 'Jen' is, it is necessary first to know what man is. What is the origin of the conception 'Man'? By inference from the existence of ourselves we know of the existence of others like us. As we have round heads, flat feet, horizontal eyes, and intelligence, therefore any being of similar appearance and possessing similar qualities we recognize as our own species 'Man'. The conception 'Man' is therefore derived from a recognition of others and self. This recognition is 'Jen'. Therefore is the Chinese character 'Jen' formed from the combination of the characters of two and man. Cheng Hsuan says in the commentaries of the Book of Rites, "Jen is the expression of fellowship among men."

[1] This word is translated as love, benevolence, sympathy, and in various other ways. But as each word represents only one aspect of the full meaning of the word, it is better not to translate, but to transliterate the word.

Without the association of one man with another the conception 'Man' cannot be formed. In other words, if there were only one man living on earth, that which we call personality would have no way of exhibiting itself. The manifestation of personality is dependent upon the existence of a common purpose between two or more persons. That being so, the perfection of personality is dependent upon the relationship between two or more persons.

Intellectually, the relationship becomes common purpose: emotionally it takes the form of fellow-feeling. Hsuntze says, "Any species possessing intellectual powers must inevitably love its fellow-beings." The passive expression of this love for fellow-beings is called 'Shu'; its positive expression is 'Jen'. When Tzukung asked for one guiding principle for life, Confucius answered him, "It is 'Shu'; do not measure to others what you do not like." Etymologically the character for 'Shu' denotes 'similar hearts', that one should put oneself in another's place. For only when people are like-minded can they understand each other's purpose. If I give to a dog or a horse what I do not want, it is possible that I am giving it exactly its heart's desire. But as I am a man like other men, what gives me pain must likewise give pain to another. Let me not give to him according to my dislikes: this is the passive expression of fellow-feeling. Therefore Mencius said, "Earnestly to follow the principle of 'Shu' is a close approach to 'Jen'. But this passive 'Shu' merely approaches 'Jen'; the positive 'Jen' goes much further. Confucius says, "When one who is 'Jen' desires to establish himself, he must establish others; wishing to elevate himself he must elevate others. To understand another's desires by inference from ones' own desires is the way to 'Jen'."[1]

[1] The Analects.

The second statement is a restatement of 'Shu' which is distinct from 'Jen'. The first sentence lays emphasis on extending what one desires; the second sentence on extending what one does not desire. What I like to hold now I must hold together with my fellow-beings; what I wish to attain in the future I must strive for in co-operation with my fellow-beings. This is true because the progression of human life involves relationships. Unless all men stand together, no man can stand; unless all men strive for the attainment, no man can accomplish it. The real meaning of 'establishing others', and 'elevating others' comprehends not individuals but the whole of mankind. Since the whole of mankind consists of others and self, to elevate others is to elevate the whole of mankind; and to elevate the whole of mankind is to elevate oneself. To try to understand this principle by inferring the wants of others from our own desires, is the way to 'Jen'. To be lacking in 'Jen' is to be like a benumbed hand or foot which is insensitive to pains in other bodily members. So the wholeness of personality which comes from the association of two or more persons lacks 'Jen' when it is insensitive to the pains of another; it attains 'Jen' when sensitiveness is keen. In short, the lack of 'Jen' is insensitiveness to fellow-feeling; the fulfilment of 'Jen' is the state of keen sensitiveness.

This leads us to consider the essence of the being of man around which the whole of Confucian literature revolves and whose definition is perennially sought. Mencius says, "'Jen' is what constitutes man. The harmony of Jen and Man is Tao". Hsuntze defines Tao as "the fullest development of Jen. It is not the way of heaven nor the way of earth, but that by which a man lives".[1] It is possible to leave the discussion of the

[1] *The Efficacy of Confucianism.*

A PORTRAIT OF CONFUCIUS OF THE TANG DYNASTY

being of man and seek the principles of the Universe and the Laws of Nature. But that is not the way of Confucianism. The fundamental belief of Confucianism is "Men can develop Tao; Tao does not develop men".[1] Therefore both the way of heaven and the way of earth are considered secondary; that by which man lives is of primary importance. In a word, the Confucian school has only its philosophy of life to offer; and in the philosophy of life there is no postulate save the development of human personality. Having grasped the basic point of view of the Confucian school of philosophy, we are now prepared to ascertain its approach to that aspect of human life which is called politics.

Confucius' definition of politics takes the same form as his definition of 'Jen'. "Politics is that which sets things right".[2] The doctrine of reciprocity, the way for world peace indicates both what conditions are considered right, and the method by which they are to be brought about. "What a man dislikes in his superiors let him not display in the treatment of his inferiors. What he hates in those who are before him let him not exhibit to those who are behind him; what he hates in those behind him let him not imitate in those who are before him. What he hates to receive on the right, let him not bestow on the left; what he hates to receive on the left, let him not bestow on the right. This is the principle of reciprocal action".[3] It is significant that while the objective of Confucian political philosophy is defined as 'world empire', 'order' is spoken of rather than 'administration'. The view is also stated thus: "the world state should be equally shared."[4] Both 'order' and 'Equal sharing' are the outcome of setting things right according to the doctrine of reciprocity. Hsuntze

[1] *The Analects.*
[2] *The Great Learning.*
[3] Ibid.
[4] *The Doctrine of the Mean.*

says " A sage is one who gauges others by their own kind, gauging men by men, emotion by emotion, class by class ".[1] Reciprocity is therefore another way of expressing fellow-feeling. In this connection two points are worthy of note. Reciprocity is based on strict equality of relationships; no unilateral rights or obligations are admitted. Reciprocity requires that all observe a common standard, collectively and individually.

The background of the doctrine is the passive virtue ' Shu ', defined by Hsuntze as " to eradicate malice and to injure nobody ". In order that society may exist wholesomely the minimum requirement must be held sacred and inviolable in the relations among men. But the efficacy of reciprocity does not stop here but asserts itself positively, and in essence as ' Jen '. Thus Mencius says, " A man possessing ' Jen ' extends his consideration for those whom he loves to those whom he does not love." Further he says, " All men have compassion; enlarge this feeling to where compassion is not expected, this is ' Jen '." Fellow-feeling is common to all men; but as self stands at the centre, the intensity of the assertion of fellow-feeling in human relations depends upon the length of the radii of the surrounding circles. Therefore love for one's own kind always exists among those whom we hold dearest and know best. We love our relatives, not those who are not our relatives; we have compassion towards our own countrymen, but fail to be so toward those who are not our countrymen. To extend compassion or love to those cases where we are not personally concerned is the expansion of fellow-feeling. " The excellence of the ancients lies in a simple thing: they were best able to extend what they do ".[2] What is it they were able to do and to extend? " As we care for our own parents, so they cared for another's parents: as we love

[1] On Comparisons. [2] Mencius.

our own children, so they loved the children of others. By this practice the regulation of world order can be held in the hollow of the hand. The Odes say, 'Begin with the wife and then the brothers and then the country'; this is that one should extend the consideration of one's desires to other men."[1] The central principle is the enlargement of the circles of fellow-feeling.

A clear conception of this principle shows that the starting point of the Confucian is totally different from that of political theories current to-day in Europe and America. The latter, encouraging differences in sentimental feelings, brings hatred; the former, nourishing the fellow-feeling in human nature, brings amity. What the West calls nationalism is the sanction of a narrow conception of patriotism. Its attitude towards aliens is merciless, so that people are beguiled into thinking of war as glorious, "extending," as Mencius says, "unloving deeds even to those whom they love." The capitalist class ignores all considerations of reciprocity, giving to the labourers what they themselves dislike. On the other hand, the protagonists of labour, notably the followers of Marx, are also daily advocating retaliation, again giving what they themselves dislike. It is unthinkable that a social revolution, inspired by such motives, will uplift mankind. In the eyes of those who study Confucian teachings, the non-alienation of mankind must be the minimum basis of the social ethic; fellow-feeling among men must be constantly developed. God forbid that a diminution of this feeling should be either encouraged or considered as right or propitious! What is known as national consciousness and class consciousness is quite foreign to the Chinese mind. Whether or not this constitutes a weakness of the Chinese people is yet a debatable question.

[1] *The Great Learning.*

The ideal state of Confucian political thinking is that every man should develop his fellow-feeling to the maximum degree, and so construct a world in which the doctrine of 'Jen' rules. This is called the Great Commonwealth. A full description of this is found in the following quotation from the Book of Rites. "When the Great Doctrine prevails, all under heaven will work for the common good. The virtuous will be elected to office, and the able be given responsibility. Faithfulness will be in constant practice and harmony will rule. Consequently mankind will not only love their own parents and give care to their own children. All the aged will be provided for, and all the young employed in work. Infants will be fathered; widows and widowers, the fatherless and the unmarried, the disabled and the sick will all be cared for. The men will have their rights, and the women their home. No goods will go to waste, nor need they be stored for private possession. No energy should be retained in one's own body, nor used for personal gain. Self-interest ceases, and thieving and disorders are not known. Therefore the gates of the houses are never closed. This state is called the Great Commonwealth." [1]

An analysis of this passage indicates three things. First, it conceives of a super-national organization having the whole world as its field. No hereditary rights are recognized, but government is formed by direct popular election and its administration is founded on fellow-feeling. Second, the tribal family is the unit of society, but its spirit transcends family considerations. Only biological differences are recognized, while emphasis is laid on "the young shall have work". The aged and infants are all supported by the labours of those who are young and strong. Third, natural wealth is exploited to the utmost

[1] Li Yun.

but not for private ownership. The sacredness of labour is intimated, but no one is to work for himself. In this is a likeness to the claim of modern socialists that every man should work for his own living; but the likeness is superficial. Fundamentally the Confucianist is an idealist, opposed to a materialist conception of life; his principle is of "work for work's sake".

II

The Great Commonwealth is the fullest expression of the perfect personality of the Universe. But the Universe never reaches its idea; if it did it would no longer be the Universe. And yet in this incomplete Universe what should human beings strive for? We should strive with all our might to help the Universe to approach its ideal perfection one step nearer. To accomplish this we must enlarge fellow-feeling among men. In a situation when fellow-feeling is inactive, the first step is to awake it to life again. Here the simplest method is to begin with the personal relations between people of our immediate circles in society, with father and son, husband and wife. An understanding of these relationships is a fundamental factor in the enlargement of fellow-feeling. In this lies the basis of all ethics. "When King Ching-Kung of Chi asked Confucius about the policy of state, he replied, 'To maintain proper conduct on the part of the king and his officers, the fathers and their sons.' The King commented, 'Well said.' When the king and his officers, the fathers and their sons, fail to conduct themselves properly, even if there is food, who can benefit by it?"[1] "The king should be benevolent, his officers respectful, the son filial, and the father loving. In their relations they should

[1] *The Analects.*

be faithful." [1] Conversely, Confucius said, "Serve the father in the same way as one would expect of his own son; serve the Emperor as one would expect of his own officers; serve the elder brother as one would expect of those younger than himself. What one expects of his friends, that he should do first." [2] This is putting the doctrine of reciprocity in very concrete terms, for all men are in contact with one another in these relationships. The king is king only as he observes the moral obligations of that position to his courtiers; otherwise the courtiers cannot regard him as king. A courtier is a courtier only as he fulfils his moral obligations to the king; otherwise he is no longer a courtier. Similarly with father and son, with husband and wife, with friend and friend; these five relationships have their existence in the mutual contacts among individuals. Personality grows out of the direct contacts of men, and fellow-feeling develops from the relationships with our nearest and dearest. This is ethics.

Ethics presupposes discrimination. Mencius says, "If one is relentless with his dear ones, there is none with whom he is not relentless." Therefore to begin by being kind to those to whom one cannot afford to be unkind is to follow a natural process for enlarging the sphere of fellow-feeling of which the self is the centre. The relation between the differences of the radii of these circles will determine the procedure and the degree in which the fellow-feeling is cultivated. These discriminations, ignored by the Motze school, are emphasized by the Confucian school.

One of the methods of the Confucian school to awaken the slumbering fellow-feeling is the 'rectifying of name'. When his disciple Tzulu asked Confucius what he would consider of primary importance if he were given the power

[1] *The Great Learning.* [2] *The Doctrine of the Mean.*

to rule in the kingdom of Wei, he replied, "Positively the rectifying of names." "How absurd, master," was the retort; "what does that matter?" Confucius reprimanded his disciple by saying, "You are undisciplined indeed! The superior man would show a cautious reserve when he lacks knowledge. If names are not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language is not in accordance with the truths, affairs cannot be carried on to success. When affairs cannot be carried on to success, proprieties and music will not flourish. When proprieties and music do not flourish, punishments will not be properly administered. When punishments are not properly administered, the people do not know how to move hand or foot."[1] The significance of this passage goes further than is apparent. To appreciate it requires an understanding of the Confucian conception of 'name'. 'Name' is what is attributed to a thing or to a state of things. It is intended to describe the thing itself or its nature, so that the mere mention of it may convey the whole conception. So when a fact is sought by its name there may be revealed many phenomena. If the name and the actuality correspond there is agreement; if not, there is discrepancy. Agreement indicates affirmation, and discrepancy contradiction. Affirmation is honourable, contradiction despicable. This process, the essence of 'rectifying names', provides a criterion for gauging all things and affairs under heaven.

How does this apply in politics? It applies by driving one to think of the actuality when a name is mentioned, and so to uncover any hypocrisy. For instance, at the back of Tzulu's question above, there was a king who had betrayed his father and usurped his power. Both father and son had ceased to be what their relative positions

[1] *The Analects.*

signified. To rectify their names would drive them back to the thought of their relations with each other; and the relationship would then be corrected. Again, China now has the name of Republic, but she has not the reality. A realization of the significance of the name would break down the prevalent hypocrisy, and bring the people back to reality. So 'rectifying names' is effective as a moral influence. Such was the purpose of Confucius in editing the book Chun Chiu; it calls everybody to a sense of reality in social and political relationships; it stresses propriety in names and appropriateness in relationships as the two attributes of 'Jen'. Mencius elaborated the former and Hsuntze the latter in their days. Of these, more will be said later.

III

The success of the political philosophy of the Confucian school depends upon the ascendency of saintly emperors and virtuous officers; in a word, in patriarchism. Everything depends upon the virtuous life of the men in power. This, the weakest point of the system, is seriously criticized by the Legalist school. But this criticism does not prove that the system is a failure. For what are the alternatives to the patriarchism with which we are dissatisfied? There are two; legalism of the Legalist school, and democracy wherein the many take the place of the few in the governing scheme. Of these two, democracy is decidedly the better, and is the direction in which the Confucianists seek to develop.

The firm belief of the Confucian school is that a good people is the foundation of a good government. It seeks therefore to inculcate political capacity, political habits, and political morality, in men. This is both the end and the means of its political thinking. The method of

accomplishment is 'Jen', 'Yi' (propriety), 'Teh' (virtue) and 'Li' (ethics); especially 'Li' in contrast with law. Confucius says, "It is easy to see what has happened, but difficult to foretell what may happen. Ethics stop an act before it is evident, and law exercises restraint after an act is done. Oh! ethics, ethics! It excels in nipping an evil thought in the bud and in putting one on guard at all moments so that one is led from evil to good unconsciously every day."[1] Its strength lies in social sentiment instead of legal compulsion. A man is free to observe or to violate the dictates of propriety, but he has society at large to face; even a man of power cannot escape the indictment of social ostracism. Confucius says, "If the people are restricted by law and influenced by the fear of punishment, they will try to avoid the punishments, but will have no sense of shame. But if they are restricted by virtue and influenced by the regard for ethics, they will not only have the sense of shame, but will also be removed from evil."[2]

An illustration will suffice to show the value of this view. There may be two ways of administering a school. One way is to promulgate regulations of various kinds to warn the students from misdemeanour and idle habits. The function of the teacher here is to watch the students like a policeman and punish them for any offence. Under these circumstances the best results would be that the students, afraid of punishment, would resort to all kinds of trickery to deceive the watchful eye of the teacher, and to avoid physical pain. Outside the letter of the law, they would indulge without care. So would be formed an unconsciously debased character. On the other hand the school may be administered so that the teachers, living exemplary lives, would exert a personal influence for good upon the lives of students, and awaken in their

[1] Li Chi. [2] The *Analects*.

hearts a sense of honesty. A moral atmosphere is thus created, exercising a restraint on any who violate the code of conduct. Students will have a "sense of shame, and will also be removed from evil". What is true of a school is true of a country. For instance, England has the most effective constitutional government in the world. There is no written constitution. What exists is a code of unwritten law which has sunk deep into the hearts of men. No people with a written constitution is as well trained in constitutional practices as the Englishman. Practices of an unwritten law are called habits; reasonable habits are what the Confucianists call 'Li', or ethics. Therefore it is said, "Ethics are the practices of an unchangeable principle."[1] An unshakable belief of the Confucian school is that unless people are helped to nourish reasonable habits, it is useless to talk about politics. To disregard this fundamental necessity and to engage in the promulgation of laws and regulations is not only useless, but is harmful. This is the quintessence of the ethics of the Confucian school.

The Confucian political methods, which depend much upon saintly emperors and virtuous officers, function not by administration but by "influencing the formation of habits".[2] Mencius says, "Comfort those (who come from afar) and show them hospitality; advise and straighten them; help and lead them so that they may be fully at ease." Here lies the ultimate objective of the Confucian statesman. If the constituents of society are all fully at ease, there is nothing that you cannot do with them. In this sense, the work of a statesman is that of an educator. In the words of Mencius, "God creates the people, and appoints for them emperors and teachers." By the influence of their own personality, those in authority call forth the best in the personalities of the

[1] Li Chi. [2] Hsueh Chi.

people, with the final result of the perfection of all the personalities of mankind.

This influence, however, is considered possible not only between the people and those in authority, but also among the common people themselves. "The loving example of one family would influence the life of the whole state; the courteous conduct of one family would react on the conduct of a whole state; the avarice and perverseness of one man may lead to the rebellious order of the whole state; such is the power of influence."[1] "From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people all must consider the cultivation of personality as the root of everything".[2] When asked once why he was not engaged in government service, Confucius replied, "It is said in Shih Ching 'If you are filial, discharge your brotherly duties and spread its influence to politics'. This then also constitutes the function of a government. Is there any particular capacity which alone is considered as in the government?" This implies that whether or not in active political employ, one's actions cannot be without influence on politics. This seems metaphysical; but when we remember the interdependence of all individuals in a society, we see how true the saying is.

In brief, the ideal state of the Confucianists does not confine itself to the ascendancy of saintly rulers. The ideal does not stop short of the uplifting of personality. To them politics and ethics are the same thing; in method, administration and education are intertwined. Starting with the natural family affections, they aim at the ultimate goal of working fellow-feeling into the whole fabric of society. "No children would fail to love their parents; when they grow up, none of them would fail to feel an affection for their brothers".[3] Unless a man is abnormal, the inborn affections are capable of expansion, and may

[1] *The Great Learning.* [2] Ibid. [3] Mencius.

reach out in an increasing range of human relations. "Those who murder the parents of others will find their own parents murdered; those who murder the brothers of others will find their own brothers murdered".[1] "Those who love their own dear ones would not offend others; those who respect their own dear ones would not maltreat others".[2] The Confucian ideal, then, is to cultivate and to foster the commonest feelings of affection among men in order to extend them to build up a society based on 'Jen'. "When every man loves his parents and has affection for his elders, the world peace is achieved."[3]

Such ideals will not materialize in a day. Confucius says, "If a virtuous ruler rises to power it would take him a century to achieve 'Jen'." Again, "If a virtuous man rule for one hundred years he may eliminate killing and other forms of cruelty." This is what is meant among later scholars by "The way of virtue has no immediate success". So long as the creation is imperfect—and the evolutionary process is ceaseless—how can any one expect to find rest and satisfaction? Once satisfaction comes, progress will have ended.

Confucius was criticized by his contemporaries for "knowing it is impossible and yet he still tries". This is the highest tribute paid to him. For the impossible is a common phenomenon in nature, and trying is what makes us men. Forever to strive and develop fellow-feeling to the utmost is what distinguishes Confucius.

[1] Ibid. [2] Hsiao Ching. [3] Mencius.

Chapter III

MENCIUS

The political thought of the founders of the Confucian school is characterized by its uniformity. But during the two centuries after the death of Confucius changing environments caused diverse interpretations of the fundamental tenets of the school to arise. Mencius and Hsuntze manifest this tendency in a marked degree. Both of them are true disciples of Confucius; but as they appraise human nature from different angles, so their views are often at variance. Confucius held that human nature is debased by habits; therefore he merely stressed the importance of habit formation, and ignored any metaphysical consideration of human nature. Mencius held that human nature is essentially good, Hsuntze that it is essentially evil. From these diverse starting points, they inculcated the formation of different habits. Nevertheless their separate approaches have developed two different aspects of the Confucian teaching. We shall consider in a later chapter their special contributions.

Confucian thinking tends to Idealism. This is especially true of Mencius, whose favourite thought is, "When evil thoughts are generated in the mind they do injury to the plans; displayed in the plans they are harmful to the conduct of affairs."[1] He attaches great importance to the mind of man. He says, "A compassionate feeling is common to all men. The ancient kings had it and a compassionate rule resulted. When the compassionate heart is put in practice in government policies, the rule of an empire is as simple as holding a thing in the palm

[1] Mencius: *Kung Sun Chou*, I.

of the hand." [1] Mencius holds that there is a common attribute of the human mind by means of which mankind may be made one. He says, "Thus all things of the same nature are similar. Why should this be questioned with regard to men? Men's mouths are alike in loving good taste; their ears are alike in enjoying musical sounds; their eyes are alike in appreciating beauty:—can their minds alone be without that which they universally approve?" [2]

But what is this universal quality of human minds? "Every man has the following qualities: the feeling of compassion, the feeling of shame, the feeling of complaisance, and the feeling of moral sense. The feeling of compassion is the beginning of benevolence; that of shame is the beginning of righteousness; that of complaisance, the beginning of wisdom . . . Let all men who have these qualities strive to develop them to the full. The result will be like a fire bursting into flame or like a fountain gushing into a stream. Only if these qualities are completely developed will they suffice to give peace to all within the four seas." [3] A desire for good exists in every man. Given its fullest development in every individual, men's contacts with one another would result in the full development of personalities. Here lies the central thesis of Mencius' philosophy.

But Mencius' unique contribution lies in his attack on personal glory and gain. Once king Hui of Liang asked him what gain his counsel would bring. Mencius replied significantly, "Why must you talk about *gain*? Benevolence and righteousness should be your motto. If your Majesty asks 'What is to be done to secure gain for my kingdom?' the high officials ask, 'What is to be done to secure gain for our families?' and the others in the country all ask, 'What is to be done to secure gain for

[1] Ibid. [2] Mencius: *Kao Tzu*, I. [3] *Kung Sun Chou*, I.

our persons?' The people in power and those in the streets will all be engaged in grabbing gain from one another. Then the state is in peril. In a kingdom of ten thousand chariots the murderer of his sovereign shall be the chief of a family with one thousand chariots. In a kingdom of one thousand chariots the murderer of the prince shall be the chief of a family with one hundred chariots. To have a thousand in ten thousand and a hundred in a thousand cannot be said to be a small allotment. But if righteousness be put last and gain first, they will not be satisfied till they have grabbed all.'[1] When Sung Keng told Mencius that he was going to stop the kingdoms of Tsin and Chu from fighting by showing them the waste involved, the latter replied, "Sir, you are going to counsel from the point of gains. Suppose the kings of Tsin and Chu were convinced of your arguments and stopped the movements of troops, then all the troops will rejoice in the cessation of war and proceed to indulge in the pursuit of gain. The officers will serve their sovereign for the gain they cherish; the sons will serve the fathers, and the younger brothers their elder brothers for similar considerations. The consequence is that the sovereign and his ministers, the father and his son, the younger brother and the elder will all abandon their relationships of love and propriety, and consider only the gains involved. When conditions are so no country can escape perishing. . . . Why counsel from the standpoint of gain?"[2]

In a later generation Tung Chung-shu elaborated this thesis and taught, "So long as the obligations are fulfilled the question of gain need not be considered; so long as the right cause is upheld the question of merit is of no concern."[3] Although such teachings were not without

[1] Mencius: *Liang Hui Wang*, I. [2] Mencius: *Kao Tzu*, II.
[3] *Chih Jo Chuh.*

influence in the society of the following two thousand years, very few people have been able to put them into practice. Nowadays many people hide their sins behind a materialistic conception of life. To them what the early sages stood for is nothing more than an object of ridicule.

We all agree that intriguing for private gain is detestable. But the implications of Mencius' teachings go far beyond the mere acquisition of material gains. Mencius was more concerned with motive; his attack was against the acquisitive desire. He was convinced that the acquisitive desire could ruin a whole society; in this he is totally opposed to the pragmatic philosophy of the modern age with its watchword of 'efficiency'. In this matter we have no doubt of the superiority of the Confucian standard. Life is not amenable to mathematical measurements; life is for life's sake, not to achieve efficiency. What we ought to do, what we like to do, are done despite their lack of 'efficiency' value. On the other hand, many things admitted to have great 'efficiency' value are of little value to the meaning of life. For this reason we question the validity of the 'efficiency' standard. And even if we allowed any value at all to 'efficiency', we should reckon life not in terms of material value but by spiritual standards. Furthermore, the sum total of the efficiency of mankind is not measured either by the addition or the multiplication of the efficiencies of all the individuals. Efficiency is a superficial view, and helps in no way to solve the problems of life.

Even lower than the standard of efficiency is the standard of rights upon which is based all the political thinking of Europe and America. What is known as the rights of man, patriotism, and class war, are all actuated by this notion. Even the relationship between father and son, husband and wife, is not free from its influence. What the Chinese mind fails to comprehend

is why there should be a consideration of rights in the relationship between father and son and between husband and wife. As we fail to appreciate this idea underlying all forms of human relationships, we are incapable of understanding the importance of individual rights, municipal rights, institutional rights, class rights, and even state rights. Yet even though we do not appreciate, we are enamoured of these "fashionable" theories, and want to acquire them as ornaments; we feel that they are the secrets of the power and prosperity of western countries. And what is the result? What we had before is lost; what we need is not obtainable. Is not this the root of China's turmoils? But we digress. Suffice it to say that even among Western people themselves there are those who seriously question the safety of their social structure. In the words of Mencius, the people of the West are constantly "struggling over gains, making gains the basis of all their relationships, unsatisfied till they have usurped all". The concept of rights is founded on the feeling of antagonism; its very nature is acquisitive and insatiable. It is evident that the expansion of rights can only be conflict and murder. That a society built upon such foundations will ever be safe is inconceivable. No wonder that men of vision in Europe should predict the collapse of modern civilization.

The Confucian conception is diametrically opposed to this. It is founded on the communion feeling of 'Jen'. It says, "If a prince can govern his kingdom with the complaisance proper to the rules of propriety, what difficulty will he have?"[1] This is as difficult for Europeans to comprehend as it is for the Chinese to comprehend the consideration of gain. The European builds his society upon the foundation of competition, the Chinese upon the foundation of complaisance. The

[1] *The Analects.*

European ridicules the Chinese as weak, the Chinese takes pity on the European for his avarice. They do not appreciate each other; they can agree only for each to pursue his own course.

Mencius is thoroughly opposed to the idea of gain both in national and in personal affairs. He says, "One who extends the territory of his king, and fills his treasuries, is now considered a first-class civil servant; but in the old days he was considered a plunderer of the people. . . . One who succeeds in entangling alliances, and crowns every war with victory is now considered a first-class officer; but in old days he was considered a plunderer of the people."[1] Again, "When a war is fought over the possession of territory, men are killed till the fields are strewn with human bodies. When the contest is over the possession of a city, men are slaughtered till the streets are filled with their corpses. This is equivalent to 'Leading on the land to devour human flesh'. Death penalty is not enough for such crimes. Therefore those who excel in warfare should suffer the highest punishment. Next to them are those who unite the princes in alliances, and next to them those who take the common lands, imposing the cultivation of the soil on the people."[2] To Mencius all things proceeding from the desire of gain are sources of sin. So the scope of his politics is very limited. When asked about the government of a country, he replied to Wen Kung of Teng, "The affairs of the people must not be given deferred attention."[3] What are the affairs of the people? On the negative side, "If the seasons of husbandry are not interfered with, the sufficiency of foodstuffs will be assured. If the fine nets are not permitted in the pond, the supply of fish will be assured. If the felling of trees is regulated according to the proper

[1] Mencius: *Kao Tzu*, ii.
[2] Mencius: *Li Lou*, i.
[3] *Teng Wen Kung*, i.

season, then the supply of wood and timber will be assured. If there is a sufficiency of foodstuffs and fish, and there is no lack of wood and timber, this will enable the people to end their lives and bury their dead without grounds for dissatisfaction; this is the first step of benevolent government."[1] On the positive side, "Only the men of education can maintain a determined heart in the absence of permanent livelihood. As to the common people, they do not have permanent livelihood, and will not have a determined heart. Lacking a determined heart they are capable of doing anything in the way of abandonment, moral deflection, depravity, and licence. When they have thus been involved in crime the application of punishment to them is like entrapping the people. Therefore the enlightened ruler would regulate the livelihood of the people so as to make sure that they should have sufficient with which to serve their parents, and also to support their wives and children; that in good years they should be abundantly satisfied, and in bad years they should be protected from the danger of perishing. After this he may urge them to do good, and the people will follow him with ease."[2]

The Confucian view is that the ultimate object of government is to uplift the personality of the people. Mencius is convinced that this is impossible apart from the fulfilment of material conditions. The minimum requirement for moral life is that the livelihood of a man and his family be safeguarded. As in his day farming was the only source of production, Mencius advocated the equalization of land ownership. This was his favourite teaching. In concrete terms he advocated the 'Ching system'. "A square li is divided into nine lots of one hundred mow each, the central lot being the state farm. Each family cultivates one of the lots and the eight

[1] *Liang Hui Wang*, I. [2] Ibid.

families are responsible for cultivating the state farm." [1] Then each family should arrange its farm in the following manner. . . . "The homestead should occupy five mow of land. All around it should be planted mulberry-trees so that from the silk industry which this makes possible men over fifty years of age will have a good supply of woven silk. In keeping fowl and swine, care should be taken that their times of breeding be not neglected so that persons over seventy years of age may have the nourishment of meat. In the farm the seasons of husbandry should not be interfered with so that a family of eight people may not suffer from hunger." [3] Then let education be attended to in the village for, "If the people are well fed, warmly clad, and comfortably lodged, without opportunity for education they would become like animals or beasts." [3] But "with proper education the young will spend their leisure days in cultivating the virtues of filial regards, brotherly considerations, loyalty and faithfulness." [4] The ideal state under such rule is that "On occasions of death, or removal from one dwelling to another, there will be no quitting the district. Those who belong to the same 'square' of farms will help one another in their movements, aid one another in keeping watch and ward, and sustain one another in sickness. Thus the people live in affection and harmony." [4] Such rural life of co-operating enterprises is the picture of a perfect society according to Confucian ideals; it is commonly known as the Community of the People of Benevolence. Although the actual state was never realized, the influence of this conception has been profound upon the temperament of the Chinese people.

It must be clear that when Mencius speaks of government he means nothing more or less than the livelihood

[1] *Teng Wen Kung*, i. [2] *Liang Hui Wang*, i. [3] *Teng Wen Kung*, i.
[4] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

of the people. The concern of the government is the affairs of the people. He says, "The people is of first importance, the State next, and the Emperor is least important of all."[1] And the function of government is to "give and multiply what the people want and to suppress what they dislike."[2] The following is the way to ascertain what the people want. "When all those about you say, 'This is a man of talents and virtue, it may not be so.' When your courtiers say, 'This is a man of talents and virtue, neither may it be true.' When all the people say, 'This is a man of talents and virtue,' then look into the case, and when you find that the man is such, use him. When all those about you say, 'This man won't do,' don't believe it. When all the people make the charge, then look into it, and when you find that the man is incapable, then dismiss him."[3] If a government brought injury to the people, Mencius would censure it without reserve. Take for instance the following conversation with the King of Liang:—

MENCIUS: "Is there any difference between killing a man with a stick, and killing a man with a sword?"

KING: "No, there is no difference."

MENCIUS: "Is there any difference between sword and mis-government?"

KING: "No, there is no difference."

MENCIUS: "In your kitchen there is abundance of meat. In your stable an abundance of well-fed horses. But the people look famished, and in the fields they are found dying from starvation. This is like leading the beasts to devour human beings. It is disgusting even for beasts to devour one another; if the king who is the parent of the people cannot be free from acts equivalent to leading beasts to devour human beings, how can you qualify to be a parent of the people?"[4]

[1] *Chin Hsin*, ii.
[2] *Liang Hui Wang*, ii.
[3] *Li Lou*, i.
[4] *Liang Hui Wang*, i.

Let it be noted, however, that this principle of complaisance is in no way contradictory to the principle of 'rectifying names' taught by Confucius. For Mencius concludes, "In order to be a king one must fulfil the functions of a king."[1] When a king fails to do that, he loses his claim to be the ruler of the people. On this point the following conversation is illuminating: "King Hsuan of Chi asked, 'Is it authentic that Tong put the Emperor Chieh in exile, and that King Wu led the expedition against the Emperor Chow?' Mencius replied, 'It is so recorded in the book.' 'Is it permissible then for a minister to put to death his sovereign?' 'One who outrages the virtue 'Jen' is a robber; one who outrages propriety is a ruffian. A ruffian or a robber is a mere commoner. I have heard that a man named Chow was decapitated; but I have never heard that a sovereign was put to death.'"[2]

To the Confucian thinker, therefore, a revolution is perfectly legitimate. The *Book of Changes* says, "The revolutions led by Tong and Wu were in accordance with the order of Heaven and in response to the wish of men."[3] That is, revolutions for the sake of righteousness are justified; revolutions designed to gain power for one person or one class they would not countenance. Desires of gain are condemned by them all as the source of evil.

Modern students are apt to criticize Mencius as one who encouraged the people to be parasites upon the government. Nothing is more mistaken than this view. For in giving advice, Mencius had to bear in mind the conditions of his time. Certainly benevolence was better than tyranny and nourishment than exploitation. According to him the functions of government are very simple; negatively government should afford protection; positively it should guide the people in their moral development.

[1] *Li Lau*, ii. [2] *Liang Hui Wang*, ii. [3] *Yih Chuan*.

Chapter IV

HSUNTZE

Hsuntze and Mencius are the chief exponents of Confucianism, but their approach to the same problem differs fundamentally. Mencius, believing that human nature is good, emphasizes the development of self; Hsuntze, holding human nature to be evil, emphasizes the integration of the physical world. His definition of society is as follows: "Water and fire—the mineral kingdom—have being, but are without life. Grass and trees—the vegetable kingdom—have life but are without knowledge. Birds and beasts have knowledge, but are without justice. Man combines in himself life, being, knowledge, and justice; hence he is the noblest of all creation. His strength is not equal to that of the bull, nor his speed to that of a horse: yet both the bull and the horse are subject to him. Why? Because he has social ability and the animals have none. What makes society possible? Individual rights. What makes individual rights tenable? Justice. Therefore when justice and rights are adjusted, there is harmony. Where there is harmony, there is unity. Unity makes for strength, strength gives power, and power ensures conquest over things."[1]

To use modern terms; the supremacy of men is due to the fact that they are able to form themselves into a society. In a well-organized society, there is unity and co-operation, which in turn allows for conquest over Nature. The basis of a successful society is the division of labour. On this point Hsuntze says: "All things share

[1] *The Kingly Way.*

a common existence in the universe in various forms. It is evident that they all serve a purpose in man's life, even though this may not always be apparent. All mankind shares a common life. It is natural that they have different approaches in pursuing the same quest, and that they attain varying degrees of knowledge in realizing the same desire. The choice of what to pursue is open alike to the wise and to the unwise, but differences will exist according to variety of ability. If men of different abilities are given equal responsibilities, if men act as they please without bearing the consequences, and if men are allowed to indulge in debaucheries without cessation, then you cannot pacify the people when they engage in strife and struggles. The curse of the world has its origin in the unbridled exercise of selfish desires:—The objects which men like and dislike are the same. Unfortunately the demand far exceeds the supply, so that struggles will inevitably result:—The consequence of individual life without mutual aid is poverty; the consequence of corporate life without recognizing individual rights is strife. Poverty means anxiety; strife spells misfortune. In order to relieve anxiety and to eradicate strife, nothing is as effective as the institution of corporate life based on a clear recognition of individual rights."[1]

Hsuntze says, in another connection where he states the fundamental requirements of society: "What is it which gave rise to ethics? The answer is to be found in the fact that men are born with desires. When a desire is felt, wants are created. Such wants, pressed recklessly and carried beyond natural bounds, give rise to struggles. Struggle produces disorder, and disorder exhaustion. As the kings of old detested disorders, they adopted regulations according to which human desires are curbed and human wants supplied. To regulate the wants

[1] *Enriching a Country.*

so as not to exhaust the supply, and to administer the supply so as not to suppress the wants—to effect a balance while maintaining a permanent supply—this is the function of ethics." [1]

Again, "When distribution is equal, there is no differentiation. When people have equal power, no one can dominate all others. When equality prevails, no one can give a command . . . It is but natural that between two men of high rank neither would submit to the other, and that between two men of low position neither can dominate the other. People of similar position will have similar wants. When the supply falls short, struggles necessarily ensue. When struggles obtain, disorders needs must follow. After disorders, exhaustion will prevail. As the ancient kings detested disorders they therefore adopted regulations for distribution so that the rich and the poor, the nobles and the commoners, should all have sufficient according to their relative positions. This is fundamental to the maintenance of livelihood, and is the explanation of the precept, 'Order in Inequalities' written in Shu Ching." [2]

These passages are important for they contain the planks in Hsuntze's political platform. There are five of these planks which may here be recapitulated. Mankind cannot live without a constant supply of material goods; as these cannot increase indefinitely, there is constantly an unsatisfied human desire. The instinct to struggle is common to humanity; here Hsuntze differs diametrically from Mencius. Apart from society man cannot live; the result of unrestricted activities in society is conflict. To restrict all men to their proper use of things under given conditions is the only way to ensure against the exhaustion of supply. To recognize the hard fact that

[1] *On Ethics.* [2] *The Kingly Way.*

inequality is inherent in the build-up of society, and to work out some order from the inequalities.

It is a commonplace to say that life cannot be independent of material supplies. Confucius, with his teaching that the people should be enriched as well as educated, and Mencius with his saying that permanent properties are essential to permanent purpose, had the same view in mind. But the approach of Hsuntze to the problem is from the standpoint that human nature cannot be free from desires. Desires create wants, wants breed conflicts. It is therefore inevitable that there should be restrictions and distinctions in order to prevent the exhaustion of supplies. This view bears much similarity to the view of the Legalist school of historians of the Chankuo period; Hsuntze lived during the period, and was naturally affected by their views. But it should be noted that Hsuntze does not admit that desires, of themselves, are evil. What he does recognize is that some kind of "restrictions and distinctions" are necessary in order that the desires of one man may not impinge upon the desires of another man. He calls this method of restriction and distinction complaisance or ethics. So Hsuntze stands at a cross-road; in his teaching ethics attained completion; from him Neo-confucianism took its origin. His teaching on ethics will be the subject of the following paragraphs.

In the book of Fang Chi it is said, "Ethics is that code which gives direction to human emotions, and places restraint on human activities." While it is true that human emotions should not be oppressed, it is equally true that if unchecked they will run to excess. Ethics directs and restrains emotion so as to avoid excess, and is therefore an effective means for the building-up of character. So Confucius said, "In practising ethics a natural ease is to be prized"[1]; and "Respectfulness

[1] *The Analects.*

without ethical consideration becomes laborious bustle; carefulness without ethical consideration becomes timidity; boldness without ethical consideration becomes insubordination; straightforwardness without ethical consideration becomes rudeness." [1] It should be clear that the emphasis lies in spiritual development, not in material standards. Hsuntze was moved by the fact that the material wants of men must be restricted; therefore he utilized what was called ethics in the Confucian teachings to set up restrictions and distinctions. His definition of ethics is, "Ethics is that standard by which the long is shortened and the short lengthened, by which superfluity is reduced and shortage made up. It embodies the elegance of love and respect, and exemplifies the beauty of acting in consideration of proper relationships." [2] Hsuntze's material standard is further stated in the following passage: "It is human nature that when a man has rice and pigs to meet his need of eating, embroideries to meet his need of clothing, horses and carriages to meet his need of transportation, he should still want to accumulate unneeded wealth. That is to say, year by year human nature is always wanting more. When people have raised chickens, dogs, and pigs, then they raise in addition cattle and sheep; and yet at their meals they do not dare have meat or wine. They possess a superfluity of cash, their granaries are filled with grain, and yet they would not dare to wear silk clothing. The miser has bolts of cloth in his keeping, yet he dare not ride in a carriage on his travels. Why? Certainly not because of a lack of desire. But when they think of the days to come, they fear to lack the means for a continuous supply. Those who live a care-free life do not even know this. They are extravagant with food-stuffs, giving no heed to the future. Lo! before long they are poverty-

[1] Ibid. [2] On Ethics.

stricken or bankrupt; they are exposed to cold and starvation, and stand begging for food by the wayside. How could they be expected to understand the teaching of the ancient kings, the ways of righteousness and propriety, or the regulations of ethical conduct? Those who undertake the welfare of the world must plan for the welfare of the people for countless generations." [1] Hsuntze feels that corporately and individually, the insatiable desires of men must not be left unchecked. The responsibility of statesmen is so to regulate and control the material supplies of life as to prevent extravagance in present enjoyment and to forestall the possibility of future exhaustion. As he is concerned with the problem of distribution, he proposes the following scheme: "The position and power of an emperor and the wealth of an empire are desired by all men, but there are neither positions nor wealth to meet the demand. Therefore the ancient kings adopted ethics and rules of propriety to distinguish between high and low, old and young, wise and unwise, capable and useless. Each man is assigned a responsibility according to his ability, and is given remuneration according to his rank and responsibility . . . so that no one need feel embarrassed if he rules an empire or complain if he is a gatekeeper or a watchman. This may be called 'Uniformity in Variety', straightness out of crookedness, unity in multiplicity." [1]

Hsuntze proposes five criteria for the differentiation of society, Position, Wealth, Age, Wisdom, Ability. These determine the amount of wealth which each man should have when a due share is allotted to every man. This is Propriety. The system by which such a classification and distribution of wealth is applied is Ethics. As a principle of government, Hsuntze says, "Applied to emotions ethics produces economic welfare; applied to

[1] *Glory and Shame.*

names it gives glory; applied to groups it produces harmony; applied to individuals it gives content." [1]

Confucius thinks of ethics (li) in terms of 'moderation'; Hsuntze dwells on 'rights'. He feels that once an ethical standard is set up enabling every man to abide in his station, society would be spared conflicts and individuals spared discontent and anxieties. He recognizes that men are not born equal, but contends that real equality lies in each man remaining in his own station in life. We readily recognize the existence of differences in age, intellect, and ability; we wonder whether nature permits differences of wealth and position. To such a question, Hsuntze gives no answer. We suppose that he meant the degree of wisdom or ability to determine the amount of wealth one should possess and the position one should hold. This would seem to be logical, but Hsuntze puts forward no proposals to safeguard it. So it seems that 'distinction' as taught by Confucius is quite different from what his later followers made it to be. Confucius recognizes that one's affection for parents is stronger than for other men; this he makes the starting point for the cultivation of fellow-feeling. But even though he may not have attacked them, he did not attach much importance to the differences in rank or position which feudalism produced. Emphasis upon such distinctions began with Tze Hsia and his followers, and was developed by Hsuntze. It is true that Hsuntze was greatly influenced in this matter by his contemporaries of the Legalist school. The Legalists commanded much attention at the time; Hsuntze's 'ethics' was akin to the Legalists 'Law'. He says, "Is not ethics (li) perfect? Set it as a standard and no one under heaven can add to, or detract from it. . . . Just as when the line is applied it is impossible to be mistaken

[1] Ibid.

as to what is crooked or straight, or as when a scale is used it is impossible to be dishonest about weight, or when a compass is employed it is impossible to deceive anyone as to what is square or circular, so when the superior man applies the standard of 'li' there can be no deceit of conduct. Therefore the line is the standard of straightness, the scale the standard of weight, the rule and compass the standard of squares and circles, and ethics the standard of human conduct."[1] The Legalist says, "There can be no deceit of weights when there is a scale, no deceit of length when there is a yardstick, nor deceit of honourable conduct when there are laws and rules."[2] These two passages are identical in outlook. But the one uses the word 'law' where the other uses 'ethics'; and I prefer the word 'law'. For if efficiency is to be obtained, law is much more effective. I can depend upon law to stop deceits; but under the disguise of ethics a hypocrisy creeps in—a phenomenon with which we are only too familiar. Hsuntze therefore is not thorough. What Shen Tze once said is very apropos. "When a rabbit is seen in the field, everyone will run after it. But when many of them are on sale in the market, people will not even look at them. The desire for rabbit is present, but the ownership is a settled issue".[3] When Hsuntze teaches ethics on the basis of rights, the same is true; that is, he advocates the recognition of rights as a basis. Measured by the Confucian ethical standard his views are legalistic in spirit.

Furthermore, as was said before, ethics (li) is nothing more than reasonable usages. To preserve the reasonableness of the usages it is absolutely necessary to safeguard their elasticity. In order to safeguard elasticity it is obvious that there should be no set rules. For it is only

[1] *On Ethics.*
[2] *Shen Tze.*
[3] Shen Tze quoted in *Ma Tzung Yi Lin.*

when society is capable of adapting itself to changing environments and of stimulating new thoughts which in turn will produce timely and adjustable usages that we can concede an element of reasonableness. Motivation will be found in the contacts between individuals by which process great personalities are often produced. The great personalities become examples for the masses who imitate their ways and so form new habits. Unless it is so, the people would consider them a curse. This is the way ethics function. In the *Book of Changes* it is said, "When the changes are understood, the people do not consider them disgusting. When the people have entered into the spirit of the changes they will be at ease." What makes ethics desirable is that the people feel not disgust but ease. But Hsuntze's conception of ethics is quite different. He says, "Set up a standard which no one can destroy or improve," which clearly indicates the influence of the contemporary Legalist school, who stand for the promotion of rigid and inviolable rules. When the Confucianists found that they had nothing of the same order to offer in their philosophy, they had recourse to what they had upheld from the first, namely ethics. So they concentrated attention on ritual and ceremonies; and so incurred scurrilous remarks from the followers of Motze. What we dislike in legalism is its mechanistic philosophy of life; and the conception of Hsuntze differs in no wise from that of the legalist. No matter what high standard a culture has attained, when it becomes static it will soon decay. So it is true that all criticisms levelled in later days at Confucianism arise from the fact that Hsuntze transformed a living ethics into a dead ethics. Nevertheless let it be remembered that the ultimate object of Hsuntze is still the building-up of personality. Herein lies his claim to be of the Confucian school.

According to the Confucian conception, the counterpart

of ethics in the development of personality is music. On music Hsuntse has much to say of definite value. His words are based on a knowledge of human nature translated into practical living. He says for instance, "Music is the expression of happiness, an irrepressible part of human emotion. Men cannot be without happiness, and happiness invariably breaks out in voice or finds expression in motion. If these expressions are not properly directed, riots invariably result. In view of this the ancient kings invented musical notes so that the sounds may express happiness but excite no riot . . . that composition and orchestration may inspire good thoughts and suppress evil notions." [1]

"Harmony, beauty, and perfection" [2] is the highest social ideal according to Confucian conceptions. If this were realized, world peace would be a foregone conclusion. So to the Confucianist education and government are one and indivisible. Without education no government can function; with education government is a simple matter.

[1] *On Music.* [2] See Glossary.

Chapter V

THE TAOIST SCHOOL

The fundamental difference between Taoist and Confucian philosophies is that Confucian thinking centres around men, and Taoist thinking around Nature. Both schools use the word 'Tao', but with two different meanings. The Confucianist, believing in the ultimate value of human effort, uses the word 'Tao' to indicate the achievement of the incessant efforts of mankind. Confucius says, "Men can develop 'Tao', 'Tao' does not develop men."[1] On the other hand the Taoists believe that the laws of nature are all-powerful, and that 'Tao' which is pre-existent of men is eternal and unalterable. "Man is derived from earth, earth from heaven, heaven from 'Tao', and 'Tao' from nature."[2] Laotze defines 'Tao' thus: "There is a being that is all-inclusive, existing before heaven and earth. Calm indeed, and incorporeal, it is alone and changeless. Everywhere it functions unhindered and may be considered the mother of all creation. I do not know its name, but I characterize it as 'Tao'."[3] Therefore compared with nature from which 'Tao' arises, man is weak and very insignificant. In Chwangtze's words, "A man in the universe is like a pebble or a twig in the mountains. As such he can only obey nature. He may be useful in a small way, but it is beyond him to originate anything."[4] Laotze says, "A man helps all things

[1] *The Analects.*
[2] Ibid.
[3] *The Tao Teh Ching.*
[4] *Autumn Water.*

in their natural course of development, but does not interfere."[1] This is made clear in Hanfeitze's parable. "A man in the kingdom of Sung undertook to make some artificial leaves of a tree. It took him three years to finish one leaf indistinguishable from the real leaves. This man was therefore rewarded. When Liehtze heard of it he said, 'If nature took three years to make one leaf, all leaf-bearing plants would be bare.' Similarly if one does not make use of the resources of nature, but depends upon one's strength, or if one does not follow the course of nature but follows the wisdom of man, it is like he who made one leaf in three years. To reap in winter is impossible even for Houchi[2]; but even Tsang Huo[3] cannot spoil a good crop. Houchi, depending only on the efforts of men, will prove inadequate; following nature even Tsang Huo will be more than competent. Therefore it is said, 'One should not do anything except in pursuance of the natural order of things.'"[4] This implies a denial of the creative powers of man; the inventions of men are trivial happenings in the realm of nature. Yet it is a fact that although man cannot add anything to nature, he can create things in the relationship between man and nature, and between man and man. This fact is denied fundamentally by the Taoist school. The Confucian thinkers believe that creation is yet incomplete, and that with the help of men it constantly works towards perfection. The Taoists believe that creation is all-inclusive and that the efforts of man only spoil its perfection. In Laotze's words, "Anyone who attempts to improve a thing will mar it: anyone who tries to keep a thing will lose it." Chwangtze makes this point vivid in the following parable:—"The ruler of the South Sea is Yu, the ruler of the North Sea is Hu; between them

[1] *Tao Teh Ching*.
[2] Despicable term for barbarians.
[3] Legendary god of farming.
[4] Explaining Laotze.

reigns Huntun. Yu and Hu often met on Huntun's territory where they were always well treated. Thankful for their host's hospitality, one day they agreed to repay his kindness. They said, 'Every man has seven apertures in the head in order that he may look, listen, eat and breathe; Hutun has none. Let us bore some for him.' So they drilled in him one hole a day, till at the end of the seventh day they found Huntun dead." [1]

To the Taoist, Nature is absolute beauty and absolute good. Therefore their watchword is that of Rousseau in the latter half of the 18th century,—"Back to Nature." Laotze, applying his ideal to life, says, "The essence of virtue (teh) is comparable to the state of a baby. His bones are weak, his muscles tender, but his grasp is firm. His spirit is vivid indeed! He can sob and cry all day without becoming hoarse; there is perfect co-ordination." [2] Applying his ideal to government, he says, "When the people are not ordered about, they will be right by intuition." [3] This is opposed to the Confucian conception "If you lead in the right, who would dare to be wrong?" [4] But Laotze also says, "If I let things alone, the people will reform of themselves. If I love quietude, people will of themselves become righteous. If I avoid profit-making, the people will of themselves become prosperous. If I suppress my desires, the people will of themselves become simple." [5] A surface reading makes this appear similar to such Confucian teachings as, "If those in office love the rules of proper conduct, then the people dare not be disrespectful," and, "When those in office are in earnest, loving their parents, the people will then become 'Jen'." [6] Both schools believe in the power of psychological response, but they differ radically in spirit. The Confucian method has a definite

[1] Replying to the Emperor. [2] *Tao Teh Ching.* [3] Ibid.
[4] *The Analects.* [5] *Tao Teh Ching.* [6] *The Analects.*

objective; the Taoist method is of aimless abandon. The Taoists, holding that the way back to nature lies in absolute abandon, oppose all semblance of interference in government. Chwangtze thus illustrates the point: "Horses have hoofs to tread in the snow and hair to protect them from wind and cold; they eat grass and drink water and fling up their heels to jump. Such is the real nature of horses; palatial dwellings are of no use to them. But along came Polo[1] who says, 'I am an expert breeder of horses'. So he branded them, clipped them, bridled them, pared their hoofs, and put halters on them. He tied them up by the head, shackled them by the feet, and stabled them in stables, so that out of every ten, two or three died. Then he kept them hungry and thirsty, he whipped them, galloped them and groomed them, decorated and trimmed them. Then comes the misery of saddle, of tassels in front and the threat of the whip behind. Or the potter says, 'I am adept with clay; I make what is round and rectangular exactly to the standard of compass and square'. Or the carpenter says, 'I am adept with wood. When I make a thing curved or straight it measures exactly to the standard of an arc and the line.' But does the nature of the clay and the wood desire to conform to compass and square, to arc and line? Yet every age extols Polo as an expert horse-breeder, and potters and carpenters for their skill with clay and wood. Those who govern the empire also make similar mistakes."[2]

"To eat, drink and leap"[3] describes the natural state of horses. Polo, breeding them, violates what is natural to them. So with potters with clay and carpenters with wood. The Taoists view human beings, horses, clay, and wood all alike. So long as no exterior force is brought to bear upon them, forever they will maintain their

[1] Legendary expert horse breeder. [2] Horse hoof.

primitive and natural state. So for the Taoist, the ideal society of mankind is described as follows :—" In a small country with a few people let there be officers over tens and hundreds, but not in order to exercise power. Let the people not be afraid of death, nor desire to move to a distance. Then even though there be ships and carriages, they will have no occasion to use them ; though there be armour and weapons there will be no occasion to wear them. The people can return to knotted cords for their records ; they can delight in their food, be content with their dwellings, and rejoice in their customs. Neighbouring states may look at one another ; they may be so close that their cocks and dogs may be naturally heard, but the peoples will have no intercourse till the day of old age or death." [1]

Such a simple society does not exist to-day, for " Desire is the worse calamity ".[2] Unless the people are led to " recognise simplicity, cherish purity, reduce selfishness, and diminish desires ", so that they may be " ignorant and satisfied ", the way is blocked to a return to nature.

This raises the whole question of man in his natural state. What is natural to man, discontent and acquisitiveness, or content and satisfaction ? Is man in his natural state given to selfish desires, endowed with intellect, or is he unselfish, devoid of desires, and ignorant ? The Taoists teach the opposite from the common sense view. They think that the right state of man is the primitive state, and that in it alone is he free from selfishness ; that lack of intellect and desire is his natural state. How then did man become selfish, acquisitive, and covetous ? The Taoist reply is two-fold. First he stresses the stimulation of material things in nature. Laotze says, " An excess of colour blinds the eye ; an excess of noise ruins the ear ; an excess of condiments

[1] *Tao Teh Ching.* [2] Ibid. for all quotations of Laotze.

deadens the taste." And to relieve the situation he proposes, "If one does not see desirable things one's mind would not be disturbed." Second he stresses the temptations and the interferences from the social and political world. Laotze says, "The more restrictions and prohibitions, the more impoverished will the people be. The more weapons there are, the more the state will be in confusion. The more people are artful and cunning, the more abnormal things will occur. The more laws and orders are issued, the more thieves and robbers will abound." To guide the people back to nature Chwangtze proposes, "When sainthood is abandoned and the learned are outcaste, robbery will cease; when jades are thrown away and jewels destroyed, pilfering will not occur; when mementoes are burned and seats broken, the people will become simple and honest. When the bushel is smashed and the scale is bent, the people will have no quarrels." [1] What we regard as culture and civilization are considered by the Taoists as fountains of sin and sources of evil. Literature and knowledge, culture and customs, laws and government, even moral standards are all regarded as sins and evils. This cynical attitude is summarized in the words of Laotze, "There is always an officer to execute a murderer. But if one takes the place of the executioner, it is like taking the place of an expert craftsman at his hewing. One is liable to cut oneself." [2]

Both the Confucian and the Taoist school believe in the law of nature. But where the Confucianists emphasize the part of man in the work of nature, the Taoists believe that nature is omnipotent, that nature will not tolerate man's interference. So in government the Taoists advocate absolute freedom or 'Laissez faire'. Laotze says, "By purifying the subconscious desires one may be

[1] *Opening Taoism.* [2] *Tao Teh Ching.*

without fault. If a ruler loves his people, there will be no call for compulsion in government; in measuring rewards he will be like a mother bird. While sharply penetrating to every corner he may appear to be unsuspecting." Therefore the Taoists classify the kinds of governments in the following five grades. First there is the Rule of Virtue, when things are accomplished without exertion. Next comes the Rule of Benevolence, where exertion is necessary but without pretention. Third is the Rule of Righteousness, where exertion becomes pretentious. Then comes the Rule of Propriety which gets results for the benefits one gains. Finally is the Rule of Formalism where to obtain response obedience must be enforced. Therefore "When one loses *tao* (truth) there is *teh* (virtue); when one loses *teh*, there is *jen*; when one forsakes *jen* there is *yi* (righteousness); when one loses *yi* there is *li* (formalism)".[1] The responses to these five different ways of ruling are also classified. "The best kind of government is that which is not felt by the people; next that which is loved and praised. The third grade is that which is feared, and the fourth that which is abused." The highest type of government is that where authority is founded on moral persuasion. Then "the people will feel that they live and work as they please, that they are their own masters".[2] The ideal is that the people shall be unconscious of interference, unaware of the existence of a government. This ideal is anarchism.

The weakness of this view is that it regards man and brute as alike. It is true that horses are in their natural state when they can "eat, drink and jump about as they like". It is also true that had Polo or any other horse breeder never lived, the horses would forever maintain their natural state of living in freedom. But one must remember that Polo is not a horse; he belongs to another

[1] *Tao Teh Ching.* [2] Ibid.

species, and from that vantage ground he destroys the freedom of the horse. But man in the natural state of life is dissatisfied with it, and wishes to destroy it. Further, we must ask what is the natural life for man. The Taoists maintain that just as the "clay and the wood are not willing to conform to the standards of ruler and compass", so by nature man is not willing to conform to this or that. But the clay and the wood have no feeling and desire. That they should conform to this or that pattern is the wish of the potter or the carpenter. But men of their own volition wish to conform to some standard; none outside their own species could compel them to conform. Laotze and Chwangtze themselves have desired of their own volition to conform to the patterns of non-desire and non-activity, and desire also that all men conform to these patterns. What beings are there to take the place of the potter and the carpenter to force the natural state of Laotze or Chwangtze to conform to this or that pattern? It may be natural for the clay and the wood not to desire to conform to standards, but it is natural to men to desire to be thus or so. And yet the Taoists wish to reverse what is natural to men. It is they who are doing to men what Polo does to horses and what the potter or the carpenter does to clay or wood. In fact they are the inexcusable distorters of nature.

The Taoists conceive the existence of desire to be unnatural. But whence comes desire? They answer first that it is due to the stimulations of the natural world, to light, noise, and the like. But the existence of light and noise is just as natural in nature as the existence of eyes and ears in men. To say that the existence of light and noise spoils the functions of the eye and the ear is to accuse nature of doing harm to itself. To avoid this contradiction, the Taoists suggest that when what is

desirable is not seen, then the mind is not distracted. What a perversion! Is not the function of the eye to see what is desirable? Would it be natural for the eye to cease to see? What folly! Then secondly the Taoists answer that the source of desires is social temptation. It sounds plausible to say that if there were no rice or grain nothing could replace husks and chaff. But rice and grain are not the products of nature, but the product of human effort. In other words, what is social is the outcome of human exertions. Men must work; it is natural for men to work. But the Taoists tell us, "Abandon sainthood and relinquish knowledge; then the people will be benefited a hundred fold," and "When orders are abundant, robbers and thieves are numerous". But to attain sainthood, to reach knowledge, to issue orders and commands is as much the result of human effort as the making of rice or grain. Or again they say, "Break the bushel and destroy the scale; then the people will not quarrel." But the fact is that men invented the bushel and the scale to eliminate quarrels. They can also quarrel with the bushels and the scales. And yet these wise Taoists want to interfere with it. What folly!

In brief the Taoists, instead of seeking the social laws of nature in human life and activities, try to make human life conform to laws of the physical and biological world. Thus they spend much effort to develop men with 'Tao' which itself really depends upon men for its development. They put the cart before the horse; their teachings are full of contradictions which no amount of words can remedy. It is their teachings, and not those of Motze, which really deserve Chwangtze's indictment: "What they call 'Tao' is not 'Tao'; what they positively predict is full of contradictions."[1]

It is said by Mencius, "What takes growth in one's

[1] *On Empire.*

heart will destroy one's attitude; what is present in one's attitude will eventually mar one's deed." Since the Taoists deny the initiative of men and regard all forms of human civilization as sin and evil, what is their remedy? It is clear that all men cannot adopt what they call 'inactivity' as their mode of life. Their reply is that men should employ themselves only in negative 'activities' and abstain from positive 'activities'. Laotze says, "A man should be afraid of being ahead of anyone in order that he may become useful," for "the weakest in the world shall rule over the hardiest". Chwangtze also quotes Laotze as having said, "He who knows he is strong but is content to be weak is the cynosure of mankind. He who knows he is innocent but endures disgrace will be the leader of men. He who contents himself with the last place when all others strive for the first is said to accept the contumely of the world. He who is content with the insubstantial when all others strive for the substantial stores up nothing and therefore has abundance. Then he is in the midst of his abundance which comes to him without effort on his part. He does nothing and laughs at the enterprises of others. He who is content with security when others strive for happiness is said to aim at avoiding evil . . . What is called hard will be crushed, and what sharp will be destroyed." [1]

Enlarging on this text Chwangtze teaches, "Suppose that the boiling metal in a smelting pot were to bubble up and say, 'Make of me an Excalibur,' the caster would reject the metal as uncanny. And if a sinner like myself were to say to God, 'Make of me a man,' he would reject me as uncanny. The universe is the smelting pot and God is the creator. I shall go whither I am sent, to wake, unconscious of the past, as a man wakes from a dreamless

[1] *On Emperors.*

sleep." [1] Further he says, "Here is a tree that is no good for timber; it is therefore left to grow for a long life." [2]

The weakness of this view is the fact that again men are likened to inanimate things. If men were metal or tree, what Chwangtze teaches would be perfectly right. But men are men; it is not natural for men to accept life as metal or a tree does. So that when such an unnatural view of life is pressed, it results in the justification of what is not right. The view enunciated by Laotze "One should be afraid to lead" is directly opposed to what Confucius taught Tzelu when he asked about government. His advice was, "Lead in everything." In order to lead one must be resolute. Avoiding leadership one must be content merely with compromise. So in the final analysis the difference between Taoism and Confucianism lies in the choice of compromise or of rectitude as a principle of life. Alas! What a baneful influence such doctrines have had in China's past and present political developments.

What then are the values of Taoism? In the first place it has laid relentlessly bare the weakness of mankind. So it has forced men to self-examination and to a quest for a new life. Laotze says, "When the great 'Tao' is lost sight of, we have still the idea of benevolence and righteousness. Prudence and wisdom come to mind when we see great hypocrisy." Chwangtze says, "If pecks and bushels are used for measurements they will be stolen. If charity and duty to one's neighbour are used for rectification they will be stolen . . . One man steals a purse and is punished. Another steals a state and becomes a prince. But charity and duty to one's neighbour are integral parts of Princedom. Does he not then steal charity and duty to his neighbour, together with the

[1] *The Great Supreme.* [2] *Man's World.*

wisdom of the Sages?"[1] Although the Taoists deprecate civilization in scathing terms, who can blame them; truly there are elements in civilization which should be deprecated. For civilization through the ages has been an instrument for protecting the strong and the privileged; and always it has tended to decline into formalism and hypocrisy. Huai Nan Tze's words are perfectly true, "In an accumulated pool of water there are fish eating one another. In an accumulated mound of earth there are animals drilling holes. In the formalism of ethical practices lurks the germ of hypocrisy."[2] Against such a poisonous civilization the Taoists wage war. They expose hypocrisy, they emphasise pure nature to stimulate the reforming of the human heart. It is true that we learn from history that such doctrines can thrust man into the melancholy of total despair and bring about social upheavals. But such is necessary before a new and reinvigorated regime can dawn.

In the second place, Taoism provides an incentive to abandon material civilization in pursuit of a higher and more spiritual one. It calls one away from concerns of external existence in order to strive for the perfection of the inner life. Here the Taoists excelled their contemporaries both of the Confucian and of the Motze schools; here they held a place of undisputed distinction. Whether what they conceive as a spiritual civilization and as inner life is correct is another question. We accept without question that such pursuits are the highest possible endeavours of mankind; we recognize that common sense does not teach us much about life beyond its external manifestations; we realize that it is neither practicable to force such a conception of life upon the masses nor is it feasible to make it the basis of social

[1] *Opening Treatise.*
[2] Huai Nan Tze: *Advice for Regulating Nature.*

education and political practices. But we do not contend that it is impossible. For although we do not consider the free will of man almighty, we do feel that it has unimaginable potentialities. One's own life is at least seventy-five per cent dependent upon what one likes to be. It is not beyond possibility that one may reduce material existence to a minimum and develop the spiritual life to the maximum.

The Taoists say, "If a man's passions are deep, his divinity is shallow." [1] Therefore he should "abandon pleasure, extravagance, and indulgence," [2] and should "practise 'Tao' to diminish himself daily till he attains non-activity. When one can practise non-activity there is nothing left undone." [3] In this way one attains the ideal life, which is "to live without care for external existence, to work without claiming the results, and to grow without domination." [4] When this is achieved, "Having worked for others, one will the more exceedingly acquire; having given to others one will leave it in plenty." [5] In a word, such a life is an end in itself. Whatever one does has its satisfaction in itself, beyond which there is no other desire. Such a life, it is evident, is not possible for all men but only for those having greater wisdom. The curse of the world is that men of wisdom indulge in selfishness and devote their energies to the bottomless abyss of material existence; so the more prosperous the civilisation the more ruinous its effect upon society. It is with the desire to rectify this situation that the Taoists taught "Seek simplicity, cherish purity, reduce private possessions, diminish desire." [6] This is the basis of their political as well as their philosophical thinking. Is this then a return to Nature? No it is not,

[1] Chwangtze: *The Great Sophroma.*
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Laotze.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Laotze: *Tao Teh Ching.*

for the marks of their activities contradict the principles which they propose. In reality they work for an achievement contrary to Nature. Nevertheless they achieved something of real permanent human value.

II

Four distinctive types of thought developed from the Taoist school, namely Individualism, Asceticism, Anarchism, and Naturalism.

1. Yang Chu and Mo Chai are the leaders of the Individualistic school. Mencius thus describes their attitude to life, "Yangtze's motto is everyone for himself. Though by plucking one single hair he might have benefited the world, he would not pluck it." In addition, we find references to him in the spurious writings of Liehtze. The central note is that as life is uncertain one should make the most of the present. So we find such sayings as, "As the people of old knew that both life and death are momentary, so they followed their hearts' desires in order not to violate Nature; they enjoyed life as they liked so as not to do injustice to the abundance of creation."[1] By "following hearts' desires" they meant that "One should allow everything to run its course without check or restriction. Let the ear hear what it likes, let the eye see what it likes; let the nose smell what it likes, let the mouth say what it likes; let the body enjoy what it likes and let the mind think what it likes."[2] This is contrary to the injunction of Laotze, "Abandon extravagance, relinquish comfort, reduce private possessions, diminish desires." But in fact a thoroughgoing Individualism must let all things alone. Laotze actually tried to do the precise opposite.

In theory, men with this extreme Individualistic

[1] Liehtze. [2] Ibid.

attitude of mind should have nothing to do with politics. Yet actually no Chinese philosopher has been willing to leave politics alone. Liehtze, in his essay on Yang Chu, says, "If one merely attends to external matters, one would soon tire of efforts barren of results; if one attends to internal things the spirit will be at ease and external conditions may not necessarily be disordered. If government is merely external, the state may seem temporarily well ordered, but the hearts of men are not at peace. To govern according to my way of internal persuasion will bring the whole world into personal relations, and so government will become unnecessary."[1] He means here that when every man is free from interference of any kind, world peace will be achieved. Therefore Yang Chu says, "Men of old would have no part in injuring one single hair if by so doing they might benefit the whole world; nor would they appropriate the world for their own benefit. When every man refuses to injure a single hair, and every man ceases talking about world-benefit, then peace will reign."[2] The philosophical basis of this is: "The best kind of knowledge is that which enables me to live; the most despicable power is that which exploits others. The physical body is not mine, but as I live in it I must preserve it. World surroundings are not mine, but as they exist I cannot destroy them. Although I live in the body I must not be obsessed with it; although I do not destroy the surrounding things I must not be obsessed with them. To be obsessed with this body and with the world is to abuse the body and to abuse the world. To share the material benefits of the world with others is the mark of the superior man."[3] In a word, the Taoists seem to contend that man is merely an article in the natural world. When one article of the natural world lives on

[1] On Yang Chu. [2] Liehtze. [3] Ibid.

another article, there is nothing selfish. But personally I do not think that such thoughts deserve much attention.

2. Chen Chungtze leads the Ascetic school. According to his contemporary Mencius, "he belongs to an old and noble family in the kingdom of Chi. His brother Tai received a revenue of 10,000 *chung*. But Chen condemned his brother's revenue and his house as unrighteous, and would not live nor eat under his roof. Avoiding his brother and leaving his mother, he went to live at Wuling where, three days without food, he could neither hear nor see. Over a well there grew a plum tree whose fruit had been half eaten by worms. He crawled to the tree, and tried to eat the fruit. After swallowing three mouthfuls he recovered his sight and hearing."[1] Chen Chungtze may not have been a Taoist by training, but for a man of his parentage deliberately to choose such a life must have been the result of profound conviction. He reduced his material needs to the lowest possible level in order to give expression to a view he held to be true. In outward appearance his life differed from that of Yang Chu, but still it exhibits a form of Individualism. And his influence must have spread far, for besides allusions to it in the books of Mencius, Hsuntze, and Hanfeitze, his life attracted the attention of the queen of the kingdom of Chao. This is recorded in Chan Kuo Tse. The queen asked the delegate from Chi, saying, "Is Chungtze of Wuling still living? He is a man who does not fulfil his duty to the king as an officer, who does not attend to his household duties at home, and who does not associate with princes. He is showing the way to an idle life. Why has he yet not been punished with death?"

3. Hsuhsing, another contemporary of Mencius, is the exponent of downright anarchism. In Mencius'

[1] *Teng Wen Kung*, II.

book the following passage appears. "There came from Tsou to Teng one Hsuhsing who claimed to be preaching the words of Shen Nung. Coming to the court he told Wen Kung that from afar he had heard that the duke was practising benevolent government, and that he wished to receive a site for a house and to become one of his subjects. The duke gave him a dwelling place. There were thirty or forty of his disciples, all of whom wore clothes of haircloth, and who made hempen sandals and wove mats for a living. Chen Liang's disciple Chen Hsiang met Hsuhsing and was greatly pleased with him. Abandoning what he learned before, he became his disciple. In a conversation with Mencius he recounted the words of Hsuhsing as follows: 'The prince of Teng is truly a worthy prince, but he has not yet known truth. A good prince should farm with his people in order to eat. Along with his governmental functions he should also prepare his own morning and evening meals. But now Teng has granaries, treasuries, and arsenals, all of which deprive the people of their commodities to nourish the prince. How can he claim to be truly virtuous?'"[1]

This 'anarchist' school is under the combined influences of the Motze and the Taoist schools. In advocating a simple life they are like the Motze school, except that the latter admit the necessity of a government. Their conception of society is like that of Laotze, of an absolute equality. Every man should eat and live by his own labours, and thus avoid all possibility of class distinctions. Carrying this to a final conclusion they arrive at anarchism.

Their economic theory is also interesting. Chen Hsiang says, "If Hsu's doctrines were followed there could not be two prices in the market, nor any deceit

[1] *Teng Wen Kung*, ii.

in the kingdom. Even if a young boy were sent to the market no one would impose on him. Cloth and silk of the same length would command the same price, bundles of hemp and silk of the same weight would also command the same price. So with grains of the same quality and shoes of the same size."[1] These views are based on the saying of Laotze, "If the things which are difficult to get are not held as treasures then people will not become robbers." By unifying the standard of values it is hoped that men's attitude towards possessions would be changed, for the values of things are not inherent, but depend upon the whims of men. If artificial differentiation of values is done away, all things would be placed on a par. When Mencius criticized this view he said, "It is of the nature of things to be of varying value. Some are twice, some five times, some ten times, some a hundred times, some a thousand times, some ten thousand times as valuable as others. If you reduce them to the same standard it will throw the present order of the world into confusion". So he put forward a subjective view gained from experience. This is a different language from that of the school of Hsuhsing.

4. To the casual student it would seem wrong for Sze Ma-chien to group the founders of the Taoist and the Legalist schools in one chapter of his 'Chronicles'. But on further consideration we see that he is right. In the writings of Hanfeitze, the chief exponent of the Legalist school, are two chapters on Laotze's teaching; and Huai Nan Tze, the chief exponent of the Taoists, continually advocates legalistic rule. Among the lesser disciples these two schools are curiously mixed. This is odd, since Taoism believes in absolute freedom and in anarchism while the very basis of Legalism is interference in every detail of life. I feel that their common basis

[1] Ibid.

is a mechanistic conception of life. The Taoists conceive of the universe as static, and of the laws of nature as static; both man and the rest of creation are subject to a static law of cause and effect. This view approaches the Legalist view, and the amagalmation of the two schools is the logical outcome. For convenience we shall here study the writings of Shentze who is at once the founder of the Legalist school and the chief line of liaison between the Legalist and the Taoist schools. Chuangtze says: "Peng Meng, Tien Pien and Shen Tao (Shentze) became enthusiastic followers of *Tao*. Their criterion was the identity of all things. . . . They recognised that in creation all things have their possibilities as well as their limits. Therefore they said, 'selection excludes universality; training will not extend in all directions; but Tao is comprehensive.' Consequently Shan Tao discarded all knowledge and self-interest and became a fatalist. Passivity was his guiding principle. . . . Take any worthless person who laughs at mankind for holding virtue in esteem, or any unprincipled vagabond who reviles the great sages of the world; subject them to torture, and they will turn round and discard positive and negative alike. If they can but get free they will trouble no more about knowledge and fore-thought. Past and future will cease to exist for them in their then mental condition. . . . Move when finished, come when dragged. Be like a whirling gale, like a feather in the wind, like a millstone going round. The existence of the millstone is perfectly harmless; in motion or at rest it does not more than is required, and therefore cannot incur blame. And why? Because it is an inanimate thing without anxieties about itself, never entangled in the trammels of knowlege. In motion or at rest it is always governed by fixed laws, and therefore never becomes subject to praise. Hence it has been said,

'Be as though an inanimate thing and there will be no use for sages; for a clod cannot be without Tao.' At this point some full-blooded young buck covered the argument with ridicule by crying aloud, 'Shen Tao's teachings are not for the living but for the dead'."[1]

This quotation ought to convince us that Shentze's philosophical background is derived from Taoism. Laotze conceives men as children; Chwangtze thinks of them as metal and wood; Shentze, as clods. The personality of men must be reduced to the level of inanimate things in order to make it like nature. In other words, life must be nothing but a mere existence. According to this view those who try to develop themselves and try to gain knowledge are depending upon the subjective wisdom of mankind. The inevitable result is a blind alley. Therefore one must abandon knowledge and eliminate self in order to submit to the objective power of the inanimate world. Then one's resources become infinite. This is made clear in the words of Shentze. "Ask Yü how heavy a rock is, and he cannot tell. But if you hang the rock on a scale no one will be in error." From this he derives the political theory that as you cannot deceive a man concerning weight if he possesses a scale, nor a man about length who has a yardstick, so you cannot deceive a man who knows the laws for proper conduct. This is the direct outcome of the mechanistic conception of life of the Taoist school. It is opposed to the Confucian principle of extending sympathy to fellow-beings. So comes the significance of the Taoist saying "Non-activity will regulate all activities". For neither the scale nor the yardstick exerts itself, but all things go by them as a standard. On this we shall have more to say in the chapter on Legalism.

[1] *On Empire.*

Chapter VI

The Motze School

I

The one and only ideal of the Moti school is impartial love for all. Mencius says, "Motze loves all men without discrimination. If by grinding his whole body from the crown to the heel he could have benefited the world, he would have done it." This saying embodies the spirit of the whole of the philosophy of the school. Motze says, "To give peace to the world is the function of the sages. In order to accomplish this it is necessary to ascertain the origin of disorders. What is the origin of disorders? It is the lack of love for one another. If a son loves himself and not his father, he would then seek gain at the expense of his father; if the younger brother loves himself and not his elder brother, he would then seek gain at the expense of his brother; if an officer loves himself and not his emperor, he would then seek gain at the expense of his emperor . . . If a father treats his son evilly, or an elder brother his younger brother, or an emperor his minister . . . all this is due to the lack of love for one another. A robber loves his own house but not that of the other; so he robs it to enrich his own house; a thief loves himself but not the other man, so he steals from him in order to enrich himself. A minister of state loves his own household but not that of another man; so he disturbs another household in order to enrich his own. All the princes love their own but not other countries, so they make attacks upon them in order to enrich their own countries."[1]

[1] *On Impartial Love*, I.

Such is the essence of the philosophy; acquisitiveness is the root of all the evils of mankind. If this acquisitive nature is changed, then the evils will die of themselves. So Motze prescribes, "Impartiality must displace partiality. What proceeds from impartiality means universal good; what proceeds from partiality means universal harm. Acting on the principle of impartiality, sharp ears and keen eyes supplement each other to secure both hearing and seeing, strong arms and legs supplement each other in walking and lifting. When this principle is practised, old men who have neither wife nor children will be taken care of till the end of their days, young and weak children who have no parents will be carefully brought up to manhood." [1]

The difference between Moti's view and that of the Confucianist is deeper than at first appears. Motze contrasts impartiality with partiality; Confucius lays emphasis on fellow-feeling. One's love for oneself should extend to love for others; love for one's own home should extend to love for the homes of others; love for one's own country should extend to love for the countries of others. There is 'self' and there is 'other'; discrimination between 'self' and 'other' is a natural phenomenon. But Motze regards such discrimination as the source of evil. So long as there is the notion of 'self' as against 'other', a conflict of interests will sacrifice 'other' to 'self'. To speak of love under such circumstances is not thoroughgoing. "Love only exists when it has reached everybody; love has disappeared the moment it fails to include all; when love is not pervasive it cannot be called love." [2] The characteristic of love is its impartiality and pervasiveness. If discrimination intervenes, there will be those who are loved and those who are not loved. This is the reverse of impartial

[1] *On Impartial Love*, II. [2] *On Observing Little Things.*

love, and results in discriminating hatred. "The curse of the world arises from the distinction between 'self' and 'other'."[1]

When the ideal of impartial love is realized, the state of society is described as follows: "When the other man's house is looked upon as one's own house, who will steal? When the other man's interest is looked upon as one's own interest, who will offend? When the other man's home is looked upon as one's own home, who will violate it? When the other man's country is looked upon as one's own country, who will attack it?"[2] These are truly lofty ideals, but do they surpass those of the Confucian school? If it were possible to remove the fact of discrimination between self and other, then it would be wise to talk as Motze's followers do. But in the facts of actual human life these discriminations exist. To be blinded by a hypothesis is to ignore the fact that human nature does not readily change. Nevertheless we must note that Motze himself maintains that his teachings are practicable. "If the thing is not practicable, even I would reject it. Is it possible that anything good should be impracticable?"[3] From this we see that the criterion of the Moti school is the utilitarian standard. But although they believe that the good is always practicable, yet their argument for it is absurd. They argue from the basis of self-interest. Motze says, "I wonder what is the mind of a filial son regarding his parents? Does he wish others to love and protect them, or hate and abuse them? Surely he must be anxious that others should love and protect them. What should he do to ensure this? Should he first love and protect the parents of others in order that others may in return love and protect his own

[1] *On Impartial Love*, II. [2] *On Impartial Love*, I.
[3] *On Impartial Love*, III.

parents? The Book of Odes says 'No abuse will be without retort; no virtue will be without reward. When I receive a peach I shall return a plum. The significance of this saying is that those who love others will surely be loved, and that those who hate others will surely be hated."[1] On the surface, this teaching seems similar to that of Confucius, but in essence there is a wide difference. Confucian teaching emphasizes doing good for goodness sake, and as an expression of fellow-feeling. Motze's teaching is based on regard for selfish gain. Of this more will be said later. What concerns us here is the mental attitude of the followers of Motze in the matter of discrimination. Suppose in a famine, when both his father and another old man were on the verge of starvation, Motze found a bowl of rice sufficient to save the life of only one man. To whom would he give the food, to his own father or to the other man? If he gives to his father, he discriminates; if to the other man, then he is rightly blamed for neglecting his parent. Is not the Confucian formula of "extending the love of my parents to those of others, and the love of my children to those of others" more reasonable and more satisfactory? Motze's failure is due to the fact that he sees only the equality of men, and entirely ignores the fact that differences in relationships do exist. And yet, whatever we may think of the practicability of Motze's point of view, we must admit that impartial love is the highest possible of human ideals.

From his doctrine of love comes Motze's teaching against war. This teaching is an antidote to current views of the relationships between nations. What is not permissible to individuals is not permissible to nations. Against the common double standard of morality Motze says, "If a man walks into another man's orchard and

[1] Ibid.

steals his peaches and plums, he will not only incur the anger of the public, but also the punishment of the authorities. This is so because he has done injury to others for his own gain. If a man steals a dog, a pig, or a chicken, his offence is graver than entering an orchard to steal peaches and plums because he has done greater injury. The offence is graver and the crime of a higher degree. If a man breaks into a stable and steals an ox or a horse, then the offence is graver than stealing a dog, a pig, or a chicken because the injury done is greater. As an injury is greater, the offence is graver and the crime is of a higher degree. If a man kills an innocent man, steals his clothing and his spear and sword, his offence is graver than breaking into a stable and stealing an ox or a horse. The injury is greater, the offence is graver, and the crime of a higher degree. Any man of sense knows that it is wrong, knows that it is unrighteous. But when murder is committed in attacking a country it is not considered wrong; it is applauded and called righteous. Can this be considered as knowing what is righteous and what is unrighteous? When one man kills another man it is considered unrighteous and he is punished by death. Then by the same sign when a man kills ten others, his crime will be ten times greater, and should be punished by death ten times. Similarly one who kills a hundred men should be punished a hundred times more heavily. . . . If a man calls black black when it is seen on a small scale, but calls black white when it is seen on a large scale, then he is one who cannot tell black from white. . . . Similarly if a small crime is considered crime, but a big crime such as attacking another country is applauded as a righteous act, can this be said to be knowing the difference between righteous and unrighteous?"[1]

[1] *Outlawing War*, 1.

II

One noteworthy feature of Motze's teachings is his conception of 'Mutual Profit'. While Confucianists, notably Mencius, teach that profit and righteousness are contradictory and mutually exclusive, Motze holds that they are one and the same thing. He says, "Righteousness is that which yields profit."[1] Again he says, "Loyalty exists because it benefits and strengthens the emperor; filial conduct exists because it benefits the parents." What he means is that morality and profit cannot exist apart from each other. The existence of profit is the criterion of moral and immoral. In his books, love and profit are always mentioned in the same breath. "Mutual love produces mutual profit."[2] "Love without partiality is that which will yield profit." "Common good arises from loving and profiting others." "One who loves others will be loved in return; one who profits others will be benefited by others." "God must like to see men loving and benefiting one another."[3] It is evident that Motze uses the word 'profit' in a special sense. Impartial love is 'Jen'; mutual profit is 'Yi'. 'Yi' is what is proper and suitable to man. What is moral cannot be impracticable; hence 'Yi' is synonymous with profit. As what is practical is moral, therefore profit is synonymous with 'Yi'. Profit therefore is not what is profitable to oneself. The fundamental question which Motze always asks is whether or not there is profit. Even his attack on war stands on this basis. "The invader gets no profit, neither does the invaded. War does not profit anybody."[4] Again he says, "When a large country attacks a small country it is like a boy playing horse; it produces labour but no good. When a large country attacks a small country,

[1] *The Classics*, I.
[2] *On Impartial Love*, II, III.
[3] *On Love and Force.*
[4] *Value of Propriety.*

the farmers in that country cannot till, their wives cannot weave; all are engaged in defence. On the other hand the farmers of the country taking the offensive cannot till, and their wives cannot weave, for all are engaged in the aggression." [1] Or in other words, it does not pay. There is therefore a practical standard; when anything does not pay, it cannot be in accordance with 'Yi'. Motze's definition of profit always implies profit to both parties. Mutual profit is the profit of the whole society. So Motze's formula for the ideal state is "If the people are bound by loyalty and faithfulness, and then are brought to understand what is profitable, they will have no dissatisfaction till the end of their lives." [2] He observes that man must work for his own profit; this he sets up as a common standard, and so teaches 'pragmatism' in contradiction to the Confucianists whose emphasis is on idealistic doing for doing's sake. And although 'profit' means to Motze more than merely material things, it is evident that he cannot forsake materialistic considerations. Therefore in his political thinking, economics occupies a central place; and he considers that labour alone is productive. He says, "Men are indeed different from birds and beasts. These are clothed with feathers and hair, shod with hoofs and claws, and fed on water and grass. Consequently if the male does not labour and the female weave, they will still be well supplied. It is not so with men. Those who labour live; the idlers die. If the men in power do not force themselves to work, there will be disorder in government. If the common people do not force themselves to work, there will be a shortage of commodities." [3] According to this view, labour is an obligation arising from the privilege of living; everyone therefore should work to his utmost. Chwangtze's comment on this is

[1] *On Tasking.* [2] *On Economizing*, ii. [3] *Opposing Music*, i.

relevant. "Motze argued in favour of his system as follows: Of old King Yu drained off a flood, and caused the rivers and streams to flow through the nine divisions of his empire. With his own hands he plied the bucket and the dredge till his arms and legs had no hair left on them. The wind bathed him and the rain combed him; but he marked out the nations of the world. Although he was a great sage, he laboured for the world in this manner, so that we of a later generation should also wear short serge jackets and straw sandals, and toil night and day without stopping. Thus we may learn to make self-mortification our end and aim, and say to ourselves, 'If we cannot do this, we do not follow the way of Yu, and are unworthy to be called the followers of Motze.'"[1] But Motze's view of labour is quite different from that of Hsuhsing and his disciples, who take into consideration manual labour alone. Motze recognizes all exertion to be a form of labour, emphasizing 'each doing what he can', and 'each working as his strength permits'. He further tells the following parable to illustrate his view. "In building a wall there are those who lay the brick, those who solidify the earth, and those who dig into the ground. The combined efforts of all make the wall possible. Similarly with righteous conduct, there are those who argue and talk, those who expound the classics, and those who demonstrate in daily affairs. The combined efforts of them all clarify the conception of righteous conduct."[2] He draws a distinction between those who "tire out their arms and limbs and those who exhaust their energy and thought", just as Mencius makes a difference between "those labouring with mind and those labouring with strength". Mental or manual, all forms of labour are sacred. Whoever suffers and works for the welfare of society is following the way of Yu, and

[1] *On Empire.* [2] *On Filial.*

is worthy of Motze. Only those who "indulge in eating and drinking but are lazy in undertaking tasks" are condemned as "disreputable".

Further Motze evaluates labour by the results of the exertion, and on that basis determines whether any type of labour is permissible or not. To this end he has a definite law: "That which increases the cost but yields no profit to the people is permissible to a wise emperor."[1] In another place he states, "One should not do what costs money and taxes energy but does not yield additional profit."[2] To illustrate this point he says, "Clothes are satisfactory when they fit the body and give comforts to the muscles and skin. . . . When embroidery and elaborate designs are added, the object is not to increase the warmth. All such efforts are exerted to a useless end."[3] Utility and efficiency are the only standards by which Motze measures. No efforts, social or individual, should be spared if profit can be produced; if profits will not result, even the lifting of a finger is grudged.

Among unproductive things, luxuries are despised the most; no one should ask for more than is necessary to maintain life. And anything beyond the mere necessity is a luxury which "robs the people of their supplies". This principle is carried to the extreme, so that music and funerals are considered as waste and extravagance. On the other hand Motze does not think that a man should stop at producing merely sufficient for his own needs. "When one has spare energy he should help others: when one has spare wealth he should distribute it to others".[4] Such statements are frequent in his books, and indicate the real meaning of his phrase 'mutual profit'.

[1] *On Economizing*, ii.
[2] Ibid.
[3] *On Extravagance*.
[4] *Practising Equality*.

It should be noted, however, that his view is not the same as that of the Utilitarianism prevalent to-day. Utilitarianism is founded on individual profits; Motze's theory does not consider the individual at all. According to him nothing is profitable unless it profits the whole of mankind. To secure this mutual profit it is necessary that all individuals should sacrifice their personal profits. "Let the scholar restrain himself in order to profit others; let every man perform what he does not like in order to supply what others need."[1] Why should one exercise restraint? Because there are others to work for. This is characteristic of the ideals of Motze.

On the question of music, Motze and the Confucian school are irreconcilable. Motze is opposed to all forms of amusement; Confucius and his school recognize that amusements play an invaluable part in life, and so aim to make the most of them. Motze says, "Of old the wise emperors used to combine the people's efforts to build ships and carriages. These made, they would ask how they should be used. And they would answer, 'Let the ships sail in water and the carriages transport on land so that the common people may lay down the burdens from their shoulders, and that their superiors may be relieved from the fatigue of walking.' Therefore the people gave of their efforts freely without grudging. And why? because it was done for the good of all. If musical instruments can be used for the good of all, then I also should not dare to oppose music."[2] The argument here is that music consumes the time and energy both of the players and of those who listen; therefore it should not be tolerated. This indictment of music because it does not pay indicates a fundamental weakness in Motze's system. His view of life is partial. We cannot say that he neglected spiritual developments

[1] *The Classics*, i. [2] *Opposing Music*, i.

in favour of the material, for his teachings clearly show that he cultivated the spiritual life. But when he calculated the efficiency of actual life, he confined himself to the material. Such details as how early and late a farmer should work to cultivate his farm and prune his trees, how early and how late a housewife should spin and weave, the age of marriage to produce the best eugenic results, were of such vital concern to him as to seem to constitute the whole of the object of life. If it had been possible, he would surely have objected even to sleeping. For what a great waste it is that a man should sleep eight out of the twenty-four hours of the day. Would it not increase the output of men by one-third if sleeping could be done away? Motze's opposition to music is exactly on such grounds.

The fallacy of such a view is obvious in face of modern discoveries about efficiency. But even his predecessor Laotze was shrewd enough to say, "Although the wheel has thirty spokes its utility lies in the emptiness of the hub. The jar is made by kneading clay, but its usefulness lies in its capacity (emptiness). A room is made useful by cutting out windows and doors through the walls, but the space the walls contain measures the value of the room."[1] Motze's opposition to music is like a man who builds a house but deplores the space within the walls as waste. Therefore Hsuntze criticizes him, "Motze is blinded by material considerations to such an extent as to ignore cultural values."[2] Such is the logical outcome of a material view of life. But the fairest criticism of Motze is made by Chwangtze in these words, "Is it reasonable to prohibit singing, weeping, and rejoicing in due season? According to Motze one ought to toil through life and die in poverty. Such an unattractive picture of life would bring men to sorrow

[1] *Tao Teh Ching.* [2] *On What Is Right.*

and lamentation. It is so unpractical that it cannot be regarded as the Tao of the true Sage; it is so opposed to human passions that the world could not bear its consequences. Even if Motze could endure it himself, that does not prove it to be generally practical. To develop one's life isolated in the world is far from the true way of the Sage." [1]

But our most serious objection to Motze's system is that when one looks at life purely from the view of dollars and cents, one has truly missed the whole significance of life. The following incident is typical. "One day Motze asked a follower of the Confucian school why one must have music. The reply was that one must have music because one may have music. Motze said, 'You have not answered my question. Suppose I should ask why there must be houses. Your reply should be in order that one may be protected from cold in the winter and from heat in the summer. Further, a house helps to keep men and women apart. That explains the *raison d'être* of a house. Now when I ask you why one must have music, you reply that it is in order that one may have music. This is the same as saying, 'I must have a house in order that I may have a house.'" [2]

Any utilitarian philosopher would probably pronounce Motze's system superior to the Confucian because the Confucian will only state 'what' where the follower of Motze always asks 'why?'. On the surface this view is tenable. The deeper we go, the more pronounced becomes the fallacy. Of all the conditions of life there is only a small part where it is possible to answer the question 'Why?'. Real happiness comes in life from doing a thing for the mere doing of it. Amusement for the sake of amusement, labour for the sake of labouring, study

[1] *Three Arguments.* [2] *Kung Meng.*

for the sake of studying, and love for the sake of loving . . . these things come from the attitude 'Music for the sake of music'. In such matters as food and clothing it is possible to answer the question 'Why?'. For things in the spiritual realm it is impossible to answer the question 'Why?'. This is exactly where Motze's system is not worthy of a great Sage. It fails to appreciate the spiritual value of things.

Nevertheless no one can deny the fact that Motze attained spirituality in an extraordinary degree. To do this he suppressed his material life to the point of zero. For depth of sympathy, for vigour of altruism, and for the richness of the spirit of self-sacrifice there is none like him, save Christ, in the whole world. Chwangtze is right when he says, "Motze is truly the epitome of goodness; it is impossible to find one like him. Although in many respects he is like a withering tree, one cannot leave him unnoticed. He is a genius."[1]

III

Having reviewed the basic ideals of Motze's philosophy, we are now ready to consider their application to political organization. Here we find that his conception of the origin of human society has many excellent points, but that his approach to the problem differs from that of the Confucian school, especially as that school is represented by Hsuntze. Motze says, "In the days of old when there was no government every man observed his own standard. As every man's standard was different, two men had two standards and ten men ten standards; the more the people, the more the standards that existed. Every man justified his own standard and despised that of the other man, so that there resulted relationships of

[1] *On Empire.*

mutual despising.' In the homes, disagreement existed between father and son, between brother and brother. In the market, people were to one another as water and fire, hating one another like poison, so that spare energy could not be used for mutual help. They held it better that surplus wealth should rot than be used for the common good. Knowledge that was gained was hidden and concealed; no exchange of experiences was possible. Chaos was the order of the day; men lived together like beasts."[1] "Finally it was realized that until there was a leader to unify the standards of men, chaos must be a natural sequence. Therefore the man who combined in himself goodness, wisdom, and sagacity, was made emperor to bring uniformity out of the many standards. When the emperor was enthroned it was felt that, since the power of one man's eyes and ears is limited, he alone could not bring uniformity. Therefore, men who possessed goodness, wisdom, and sagacity, in a lesser degree, were chosen to be high ministers of state to assist the emperor in his task."[2] Because these were not sufficient, the empire was divided into smaller kingdoms. Even the rulers of smaller kingdoms were afraid that their energy would not be adequate to administer all parts of their kingdoms. Therefore they appointed ministers. In turn were created lesser officers over districts lest they might not have sufficient energy to assist their ruler adequately."[3] This view of Motze differs radically from that of Hsuntze. Hsuntze, with his economic view of society, feels that without organization there is no way to balance supply and demand. Motze is interested in the human factor, and contends that without social organization there is no way to unify standards of life. His theory thus powerfully resembles that of Rousseau in

[1] *Practising Equality*, i. [2] Ib., ii. [3] Ib., iii.

'Emile'. Both in this book and also in the writings of Hobbes and Locke, the view is advanced that government and king were created as a necessary condition for regulating the boundless freedom of the individual in his savage state. But one should specially note that Motze founded his idea of society on the people's will. From the passage above it is evident that the people, or 'man' is the subject in all. 'Man' realized, 'man' chose, 'man' established. All this is in opposition to the Confucian teaching of divine rule, which is embodied in such a saying as "God creates men and establishes for them an emperor", or of the patriarchal rule expressed in, "The origin of the state is the family." Motze teaches that the state owes its being to the common consent of the individual peoples. In his own words, "The emperor and his ministers and the people are bound in alliance by contract." [1]

But we are then confronted with the paradox that Motze's system of government for the state is more autocratic than democratic. Thus he says, "When the emperor is enthroned he should issue orders to the people that they should report to him all things good and bad alike. What he considers good, everyone should consider good." [2] Or again, "All the people in the empire should accept the judgment of the emperor and seek no more. What the emperor deems right they should deem right; what he considers wrong they should consider wrong." [3] On this point Motze's view also coincides with that of Hobbes. Once a government is formed, the individuals should abandon all their rights in deference to the will of the ruler. But Motze goes further, and stands for downright interference with individual rights. Not only should there be no freedom of speech, but even the

[1] *The Classics*, I. [2] *Practising Equality*, I.
[3] Ib., II.

freedom of thought should be made impossible. He believes that the wisdom of the emperor lies in his ability "to use others' ears and eyes to assist him in hearing and seeing, to use others' mouths to help him in speaking, to use others' minds to help him in thinking, to use others' arms and legs to help him in his actions".[1] In order to do this the emperor must utilize his wise men. Here is a direct opposition to Laotze's system, which advocates the neglect of wisdom as a means of removing quarrels. Motze says, "How does one know that the employment of wise men is the secret of a successful government? Because if one governs the ignorant and the worthless through the noble and the wise, then order prevails. On the other hand, if one governs the noble and the wise through the ignorant and the worthless, then chaos results."[2] "If the government makes appointments, not by merit, but by personal preference, then one who is incompetent to rule over a hundred men is given a post to rule a thousand, and one who is incompetent to rule over a thousand is given a post to rule ten thousand. . . . When a man incompetent to rule one thousand is made to rule ten thousand, his responsibility is ten times greater than his capacity . . . Consequently he can do only one-tenth of what is necessary, and leaves the remaining nine-tenths unattended."[3]

By giving the emperor unlimited authority, and by holding him to the policy of using the best men to assist him, Motze hoped to see a state as he describes in the following words. "The head of a village is the best of the community. When he issues an order to the people he should say, 'If you are not sure whether my order is good or bad, refer it to the head of the district. What he affirms you should all consider good; what he denies you should all consider bad. Discard the bad

[1] Ibid. [2] *Using the Wise*, II. [3] Ibid.

sayings of your own and learn of the good sayings of the head of the district.' When the head of the district can unify the opinions of all the people in the district, there is good government; but the head of the district must be the best man in the district. When he issues an order to the people he says, 'If you cannot decide whether my order is good or bad, you must refer it to the ruler of the country.' What he affirms you should all consider good; what he denies you should all consider bad. Because he can unify all the opinions of the country, the country is well governed. The ruler of the country should be the best man in the country. When he issues an order he says to the people, 'What the emperor approves you should all consider good; what he denies you should all consider bad.' Because the emperor can unify the opinions of all in the empire it is therefore well governed."[1]

Motze argues on the belief that the man at the head of the village, the district, and the empire is really the best within his own confines and that the higher one is in authority, the greater must one be in virtue. If it is asked how this can be assured, his answer is that the emperor is the best man in the empire, and that one can depend upon him to select the best men for the subdivisions of his country. We are then driven to the ultimate problem of assuring that the emperor is always the best man in the empire. For even Yao and Shun had for their sons Tan-Chu and Shang-Chun. It is clear that the position of the emperor must not be hereditary but should always be filled by election. But Motze says nothing except indirectly about how such an election is to be carried out.

Motze does not attack this problem because he was neither a philosopher nor a statesman. He is a religious

[1] *Practising Equality*, 1.

teacher. In his mind is a lofty and unshakable belief in God. He says, "Cursed is he who kills an innocent man. Who does the killing? Man. Who curses him? God. . . . Those who obey the purpose of God will love one another without partiality and will work for the good of all; they are blessed. Those who disobey God's purpose hate and plot against one another; they are cursed."[1] Again he says, "If I do what God wishes, God will also do what I wish. But if any fails to do what God wishes and does what God does not desire, then God would not do what men like, but would unloose what they do not like, such things as sickness and unhappiness."[2] Unlike the conception of Confucius and Laotze, Motze's conception is of a personal God who has mind, feeling, passion, and individual conduct which he called Heavenly Mind. He says, "Heavenly Mind is to me what the compass is to a wheel-maker or the square to the carpenter. With these they determine what is circular and rectangular. What Heavenly Mind affirms is right, and what it denies is wrong."[3] As Motze very reverently considers the mind of God as the criterion of all affairs, he evolved a religious system very similar to Christianity. The religious urge accounts, for instance, for the spirit of sacrifice which permeates his school. It is only in the light of the religious system that one can trace the genius of his political organization. In his religious system, only the leader can be considered to embody 'goodness, wisdom, and sagacity'. When the religious leader dies, his cloak falls on the one who is the next best of mankind. The man who inherits this authority is called 'The Premier'. In the records of the early Tsin we find three men who succeeded one another in this capacity, to a position not unlike that of the Pope in the Catholic Church. But the successor is not elected, but is named by the retiring 'Premier'. Whether this would ensure

[1] *Heavenly Mind*, I. [2] *Heavenly Mind*, II. [3] *Heavenly Mind*, I.

always the wisest selection seems to be a debatable question.

No one denies that the ideals of the Motze school are lofty and powerful. But they have been found too difficult to be put into practice. And further, one would have to recognize in his social organization the absolute authority of those in power to such an extent as to exclude all individual judgment of good or bad. Motze thus considers society as a whole as of paramount importance; the individual is ignored. The value of an individual lies in the fact of his membership in society; if any should live apart from society, he is regarded as of no consequence. Such a conception is not without value. But Motze has carried it to the extreme, so that the individual is entirely absorbed in the society. One cannot believe that the best thing for social progress is to reduce individuality to nothing, so that all men are on a dull flat level.

It remains briefly to mention the important followers of Motze. Hui Shih and Kung Sun Lun represent a group which emphasized pure logic rather than politics. Sung Keng and Yin Wen represent a group which opposed war and made vivid its wastefulness. Yin Wen stands in between the Moti and the Legalist schools. Of him we shall speak more later. Sung Keng gave new life to Moti's system. Hsuntze records him as saying, "To understand the fact that humiliation is nothing to be ashamed of, will enable one to cease fighting. Generally one engages in fighting because one considers humiliation as something to be ashamed of. When it is recognized that there is nothing to be ashamed of in humiliation, there will be no cause for fighting. . . . Truly human nature desires little. It is wrong to say that by nature one desires much." [1]

[1] *On What Is Right.*

The other followers of Motze dissuade people from fighting by taking the objective view to show the waste involved. Sung Keng, however, traces the origin of fighting as lying in the wrong conception of humiliation. He aimed at changing the mental attitude of men, and at reaching the motive of war. While Motze appeals to the moral sense to exercise self-negation, Sung shows that it is contrary to human nature to be greedy. His approach is therefore rational and analytical, based on appeals to mental attitudes. He conceives of all the conduct of life as the manifestation of an inner urge. In this conception Motze's school owes much to him. He saved the system from a purely materialistic conception of life. While Motze's tendency was to immerse individuality in society, Sung lifted up individuality from the depth to which it had sunk, and gave it a new splendour by making it the very basis of his concept of society.

CHAPTER VII

THE LEGALIST SCHOOL

I

WHILE the emergence of the Legalist school as a definite system of thought came only in the time of Shentze, Yinwentze and Hanfeitze, the ideal of Law existed as far back as the days of Kwan Chung (708–643 B.C.) and Tzechan (543–522 B.C.). Previous schools of thought had prepared the ground for it to begin.

Etymologically the Chinese character for law includes the ideas of straight and erect, and implies a standard of conduct. The Confucianist teaches that law is derived from "an understanding of the ways of nature and from a study of the activities of men. It is modelled after the constant law of nature, and is useful to guide the people."[1] The Taoist teaches, "Men follow the law of earth, earth follows the law of heaven, heaven follows the law of Tao, and Tao follows the law of Nature."[2] Thus nature is the final standard of men. Motze teaches, "Law is that which gives direction to right conduct."[3] These definitions in their very broad terms indicate that all the three schools of thought take the law of nature as the standard from which the criterion of human conduct is derived. It is from this point that the Legalists begin their conception. Kwan Chung says, "From an observation of the force of heaven and earth, the rotation of winter and summer, the nature of water and soil, and the life of the vegetable and animal kingdom, one notes a constant process which never changes. The differences

[1] *The Book of Changes.* [2] *Tao Teh Ching.* [3] *The Classics*, I.

in meaning, name, time, appearance, kind, species, and behaviours, are its phenomena. The existence of yard-stick, line, compass, weight, and measurements, gives the law. When these are applied to the lives and the habitual practices of the people, a civilization is evolved." [1] Yinwentze then gives an analysis of his conception of law as follows: "Law can be divided into four kinds: the unchangeable law which regulates the relationships of the emperor and his officers; the social law which helps to overcome differences in customs; the public law which metes out rewards and punishments; the commercial law which regulates the standards of measurements." [2] The Legalist conception of law includes the first, second, and fourth of these categories; the third category is to them a mere matter of practice. The conception of the Legalists has therefore been brought to a narrow technical basis. Hanfei's definition is noteworthy. "Law is that which is observed by the government as orders and regulations, and observed by the people as standards of reward and punishment. Reward lies in obeying the law; punishment is meted out to those who disobey." [3] Or again, "Law is a codified system duly ratified by the government and promulgated among the people." [4]

In a way, the Legalist school is the result of the merging of the three schools which preceded it. From the Confucian school comes the idea of 'rectification of name'. In order that name and reality should always agree, there must be some governing principle. This is called 'Li'. Hsuntze says, "Li is the chief function of law," and "Li is that which the rules of the emperors set up as a standard for his officers".[5] In this sense 'Li'

[1] *Seven Laws.*
[2] *The Codification of Law.*
[3] *The Efficacy of Confucianism.*
[4] *Yinwentze.*
[5] *Three Difficulties.*

comes very close to the Legalist's conception of law. From the Taoist school the Legalists receive the ideal embodied in the saying, "When I leave things alone, the people will right themselves of their own volition." This is accomplished by the exercise of the law of nature, for the law of nature is exemplified in the conduct of men. This is what Shuntao meant when he said, "If the supreme ruler exercises law and suppresses personal feelings, then the affairs of the state will move by the standard of law."[1] Hwainantze says, "The standards of weights and measures are constant and invariable. They are the same whether in the kingdoms of Tsin and Chu or in the kingdoms of Hu and Yueh. Its constancy makes for exactness. Once adopted, the standard is observed in all ages, an accomplishment of non-action."[2] This purely objective view of standards is the basis of legal thinking. In face of varying conditions the law is invariable, just as the functions of weights and measures are invariable. The later followers of the Taoist school all interpret 'non-action' in this sense. From the Moti school the Legalist receives the idea of uniformity. In order to effect uniformity, a uniform standard—the law—is necessary. Therefore Yinwen says, "All activities should be standardized by one unit; all regulations should be judged by one law. The unit makes for simplicity, and the law makes for order." Yinwen, standing at the cross-roads between the Legalist and other schools, embodies a merging of three ideals: the Confucian ideal that name and fact must correspond, the Moti ideal that uniformity makes for order, and the Taoist ideal that 'non-action' culminates in the upholding of law.

[1] *Shenitze.* [2] *Hwainantze.*

II

There are two other ideals which might easily be mistaken as variations of the legalistic theory, namely Favouritism and Despotism. Curiously enough during this age the theories of legalism and of Personal Favour were terms of great controversy. According to Hanfei, "Favouritism is what the emperor exercises, and law is what the state follows."[1] Again Yinwentze defines 'Personal Favour' as "that which an emperor secretly employs but which his officers must not expect". We could therefore characterize favouritism by its secrecy and legalism by its publicity. Or, by a metaphor, we could compare Favouritism with Machiavellianism which recognizes no principle and believes in resorting to underhand intrigues. This type of policy was advocated by a group of men who found great favour with many of the Monarchs of the Chankoo period. They are opponents, deadly foes, of the Legalist school. The Legalists advocate "the promulgation of public law rather than the use of personal favours"[2] and "the administration of law rather than the use of personal judgment".[3] Therefore it is recorded, "A virtuous ruler will exhaust his wisdom in establishing law and do nothing in the way of personal warnings. A worthless ruler will ignore everything in preference to personal favour after he has promulgated the laws. When a ruler ignores the law and confers personal favour, it is unlawful conduct."[4]

Opposed to this conception but equally disapproved by the Legalist school is the conception of Despotism, which finds expression in the following passage of Shentze,

[1] *Miginings.*
[2] Hanfeitze: *The Existence of Standards.*
[3] Kwantze: *The Exercise of Law.*
[4] Kwantze: *Emperor versus his Officers.*

"Yao as a commoner could not command three persons; but Chieh as emperor was able to throw the whole of the empire into disorder. This shows clearly that position and power count, and wisdom and virtue are of little consequence." To this Hanfeitze retorts, "Power is not something which can force itself into the hands of the virtuous and withdraw itself from the hands of the worthless. Used by the virtuous, power produces order; used by the worthless, power produces the reverse. By common observation the virtuous are few and the worthless many. Consequently there are more of the worthless to use power in creating disorder than there are of the virtuous to use it to effect peace. . . . Power is a thing which can find expression in various ways. But the determining factor is the place where nature places it. When Yao and Shun have power order prevails; when Chieh and Chow have it, disorder prevails. Here I do not mean to minimize the greatness of Yao or Shun, but to emphasize that their condition is not within their own control. If Yao and Shun are born in places of authority, even ten Chieh and ten Chow can create no disorder. Here power makes for peace. On the other hand, when Chieh and Chow are born in positions of authority, not even ten Yao or ten Shun could stop the disorder. It is a matter of natural development which is beyond the control of man. But according to my view, a man can do what he likes."[1] To the casual observer the function of law is interference backed by the authority of government. It is easy, therefore, to consider law to be of the same nature as Despotism. But Hanfei has pointed out that there is a difference. Despotism is the consequence of idle drifting; law is the result of purposeful striving.

The Legalist school is not only opposed to worthless

[1] Quoted in *Misgivings on Circumstances*.

rulers who show personal favour and who abuse their power; it is opposed also to virtuous rulers who do the same. That is, they oppose the practice not the person. Yinwen tells the following story. "Tientze read in his book, 'There was peace in Yao's reign.' Sungtze asked, 'Was that due to the rule of the Sage?' Peng Meng was present and interjected, 'It was due to the saintly law, not the saintly man.' Sungtze continued, 'What is the difference between the saintly law and a saintly man?' Peng Meng replied, 'Master, you are confusing names terribly. A saintly man proceeds from the man himself; saintly law proceeds from the truth. The self may produce truth; truth is not the self. The rule of saintly men is momentary, the rule of the saintly law is for all times.'" Yinwen further explains the meaning of the phrase 'the saintly law is for all times.' "If we admit that order obtains when there are worthless rulers, then the existence of order or disorder is conditioned by the virtuous or the worthless men, and not by rules of conduct. (Li Yueh) That is to say that the saintly system would die with the death of the saintly ruler. On his death, the saintly system would not be available for another generation, and more disorder than order would exist."[1] Or as Hanfeitze says, "Men like Yao and Shun or like Chieh and Chow are born once in a thousand generations. . . . The average man is not as virtuous as Yao and Shun nor as vicious as Chieh and Chow. If they all observe the law, order will reign; if they all violate the law, disorder will prevail. If they all violate the law and wait for Yao or Shun to bring order out of disorder, then there would be only one generation of order out of a thousand. On the other hand, if the people observe the law and wait for the advent of Chieh or Chow to create disorder, then there would

[1] *Misgivings on Circumstances.*

be only one generation of disorder out of a thousand generations." [1]

These are all direct attacks on the Confucian belief of personality as a factor in successful government. There is, of course, an element of truth in them, but their opponents take a different view. Hsuntse says, "The archery of Yi is not lost although such an expert has not appeared in every generation; the way of Yu is still available even though the house of Hsia has not always ruled. Therefore law is not sufficient of itself; order does not perpetuate itself. When the right man comes, law succeeds, but not otherwise. When the saint rules, general laws will meet all cases; but when the ruler is not a saint, no amount of legislation can be properly applied. When the mis-application of law happens, disorder is at hand." [2]

The Legalist's reply to this view is, "It is not right to say that when a swift horse and carriage are in the hands of Tsang Huo it will merely excite laughter, but in the hands of Wang Liang[3] they will cover a thousand li a day! One might just as well expect the expert swimmers of the kingdom of Yueh to save all the drowning people in the empire. It is true that the men of Yueh are expert swimmers, but they are of no avail for people who are quickly drowning. To wait for Wang Liang of ancient days to drive the horse to-day is like waiting for the men of Yueh to save a drowning man. Let teams of good horses be placed in relays fifty li apart. An average driver will be able to cover a thousand li in a day. Why is it necessary to wait for Wang Liang? Further, even when Wang Liang is not available for driving, one need not call on Tsang Huo. In governing a state if Yao or

[1] *Misgivings on Circumstances.*
[2] *The Emperor's Way.*
[3] Legendary skilful driver.

Shun[1] does not appear, the ruler need not be Chieh or Chow. . . . This is straining the point to make an argument. It has no bearing on the actual situation, and does not deserve consideration."[2] No one man is indispensable to a state; no panacea of government is applicable at all times. If the personal factor is all-important, then when the right man is not available disorders will ensue. But when law is observed, any average person will be able to maintain peace and order.

A further attack the Legalists make upon the Confucian emphasis on personality revolves around the questions of efficiency and dependability. Hanfeitze says, "The test of human conduct is in its effect. If one sharpens his arrows and shoots them aimlessly, some may hit the mark by chance. But that is not accomplished archery. To shoot at a mark five inches in diameter at a distance of ten steps is only possible for an accomplished archer like Yi or Feng Meng. When one hits the mark every time, even if the mark is as large as five inches in diameter, one has skill. When one hits the mark by chance, even if the mark is as fine as the fine hair of autumn sheep, one cannot claim to have skill."[3] Shang Chun says, "The ancient kings settled the weights and standardized the yardstick, so that measurements are made without mistake even to-day. If a man comes along who will guess quantities without the aid of weights, or of lengths without the aid of the yardstick, even though his senses were keen no merchant would trust him, for there is no certainty in it. . . . Yao alone could tell the wise and virtuous from the worthless without reference to a set of laws; but not everybody is a Yao. Therefore, knowing that personal judgment could not always be trusted,

[1] Emperors with whose reign authentic history begins. They are remembered as exemplary rulers.

[2] *Misgivings on Circumstances.*

[3] Ibid.

the ancient kings set laws and definite standards. Those men who measure up to them were rewarded; those who proved to be public nuisances were put to death."[1] The point is that personality is not dependable even if the right man is available. A good emperor is usually a fortunate accident. Accidents should never be made the basis of a political theory. The basis ought to have absolute value.

This objection is pressed still further so that the Legalists maintain that, even when the virtuous emperor is on the throne, good government is not ensured. Hanfeitze says, "If one abandons fixed laws and depends upon personal judgments, even Yao is not capable of regulating a state. If one discards the compass and relies upon conjecture, not even Hsi Chung[2] could make a wheel. . . . On the other hand let an average ruler observe the standards of law, and let an unskilled carpenter follow the compass, and neither would go much amiss."[3] In the same strain Kwantze writes, "Sharp eyes and skilful hands cannot compare with ruler and compass in determining squares and circles. The skilful may be able to make the ruler and compass, but they cannot discard them if they wish to make rectangles and circles. Likewise the saints may be able to produce law, but they cannot ignore law and also have a successful government."[4]

This will be enough to indicate the differences between the Legalists and the Confucianists. The latter say, "Just as the ruler and compass are the absolute standards of rectangles and circles, so the sages are the absolute standards of human relationships."[5] As the Confucianists emphasise the factor of human personality, so they

[1] On *Standardising Power*.
[2] First maker of carriages.
[3] Hanfeitze: *The Use of Men*.
[4] Kwantze: *One Law*.
[5] Mencius: *Li Lou*, i.

contrast the sage with the ruler and compass; the Legalists emphasize material standards and so contrast laws with the ruler and compass. They are convinced that not only the lack of virtuous men is a source of trouble, but that even when found, the virtuous man is not of much value by himself. Shentze writes, "An emperor's mind may not necessarily possess the highest virtue. When he does not, it would not be possible for his virtue to overrule that of others; when he does, he could overrule the virtues of all others, still his energy would be limited. Exhaustion, fatigue, ineffectiveness, would fall upon him in quick succession. At the end he would still be unable to cope with the situation." [1]

The last attack upon the Confucian conception is based upon an opposition to 'The rule of the wise'. Shangchun writes, "When the ruler makes appointments on the basis of wisdom and ability, then those who are able and wise will manage affairs to the liking of the ruler in order to court his favour. So will there fail a permanent way of government; chaos and disorder will ensue." [2] For, as Shentze says, "When the ruler of an empire rules by personal judgment instead of by formulated laws, then punishments and rewards depend only on his whim." [3] The safeguard against this is found in Kwantze's precept, "When law determines the selection of men, then personal bias is eliminated. Let the law be the standard of success, then personal judgment is eliminated." [4]

It is inevitable that some should have misgivings about the absolute authority of impersonal law. What if the laws were perchance wrong? The Legalist replies, "Inadequate law is better than no law at all; at least

[1] Shentze: *Miscellaneous Writings.*
[2] Shangchun: *Agriculture and Warfare.*
[3] Shentze: Ibid.
[4] Kwantze: *On Legislation.*

it will settle the minds of the people. For instance when lots are cast to divide wealth and horses, it does not give equal distribution, but it does put a stop to all undue hopes. No one knows what is coming to him." [1] The intention is to produce an objective attitude by means of an impersonal standard. Whether the standard is the best possible is of secondary importance. The elimination of personal bias is the thing of paramount importance. When this is accomplished, the ideal of 'non-action' can be realized. Therefore Yinwen says, "Once the name is fixed, struggles will cease; once the rights are defined, there is then no possibility of personal favours. When the struggles are stopped the motive still exists, but if the rights are defined the desire cannot assert itself. Now motives and desires are common to all men. When they are held under restraint as if they did not exist, that is the mark of perfect government." [2]

III

In their conception of the origin of government, the Legalist school differs both from the Confucian school who trace it back to clan and tribe, and from the Motse school who hold the conception of a civil contract. The Legalists hold that government had its origin in force. "In ancient times the people made no distinction of superiors and subordinates, of emperors and officers. Nor even did they respect the relationship of husband and wife either among the ordinary people or in the imperial family. They lived promiscuously like beasts, they attacked one another by force. Consequently the intelligent took advantage of the ignorant, the strong oppressed the weak, and no one took care of the aged, the weak, the young or the fatherless. In later times

[1] Shentse: *Miscellaneous Writings*.
[2] Yinwentse.

the intelligent people prohibited cruelty and oppression, and by means of united efforts they stopped violence." [1]

This view is founded on the belief that "human disposition is to hate; because of the wickedness of the human heart, laws had to be brought into existence". [2] From this statement it might be inferred that the notion of society founded on human sympathy would be totally unacceptable to the Legalists. Their attitude, however, is not extreme. They consider such a state to be possible only before the conception of government materialized. In other words, the Legalists maintain that it is impossible to form a government on the basis of human sympathy. Shan-Chun says, "When the creation of heaven and earth was completed, men were born. At that time they knew their mother but not their father. Their moral precepts were affection for their own people and love of personal interest. The former gave rise to partiality; the latter led to antagonism. When the people are possessed by partiality and antagonism, disturbances follow. For the people struggle for some advantage, violate others' rights, so that quarrels and disputes result. When such a state arises, no solution is possible without the administration of justice. Therefore men of ability arose, and instituted what was just and impartial; so the people were made law-abiding day by day. This sounded the death-knell of the patriarchal system, and ushered in the rule of the able. The virtuous men would follow the way of love and altruism, but the able men vied with each other to seek distinction. When rivalry and competition became the custom in an unorganized community, disorder was inevitable. So when the saintly men came to rule, they regulated the distribution of land and properties, and effected the separation of men

[1] Kwantze: *Employment of Able Officers.*
[2] Kwantze: *Cruelty Words.*

and women. When every man had been given his due, it was impossible not to make regulations; when the regulations were promulgated, it was impossible not to have some one to look after them. So officers were appointed. When the officers were installed in office, it was impossible for them not to be under central control, so the emperor was made. After the emperor's rule was established, that of able men was superseded, and rank and nobility became part of the definite system of government." [1]

This theory roughly corresponds with the modern theory of sociology which divides the development of government into three stages. In the first stage the organization is dependent upon the ties of blood relationship; family love is the basis force, and the reins of government are in the hands of the tribal elders. As society developed and affairs of state became more complex, ability and strength were necessary for leadership. So the authority in the community was shifted to those who had special qualifications for it. The recognition of ability marks the second stage of development. As society became still more complex and the contest of ability became sharper, a fixed standard was necessary. The rights of the government were regulated, and society entered into the third stage of development, in which class distinction arose. During each of the three stages, a special conception of government was held. For instance, the Confucian conception of patriarchal government is the conception for the first stage; to apply it to the third stage is to be guilty of anachronism. For it must be recognized that the nature of government differs radically from that of a family, and the function of an emperor differs radically from that of parents. On this point Hanfeitse says, "In the attitude of an

[1] *Lifting Ignorance.*

emperor to his officers the affection of father and son is totally absent. To apply such a standard to them would create enormous difficulties. Moreover even with parents the birth of a son brings delight, the birth of a daughter brings distress. Both son and daughter are offspring of their parents; why then should they feel happy with one and sad with the other? Because they are thinking of the future economical advantages and disadvantages. If the relationship between parents and child is determined by considerations of economic advantage, how much more should be the relationships of those between whom the affection of parenthood does not exist." [1]

This is a cynical view of human relationships; its satire on the evils of mankind is relentless. If such a view is held, the Legalist would oppose the Confucian advocacy of love and benevolence as a policy of government. Hanfeitze says further, "Nowadays scholars urge the rulers of states to discard the pursuit of gain as a motive in order to follow the way of mutual love. This is equivalent to asking the rulers of states to do what even parents would not do. It shows such an ignorance of human relationships as to amount to sheer deceit or mockery." [2] Thus the Legalists feel that the way of love as a policy of government is fundamentally unsound. The author quoted above goes on to say, "An enlightened ruler of a state would order the conduct of his people by law, and would not depend upon their sense of honesty. The mother's love for a child is double that of the father. The father, therefore, should command his obedience ten times more than the mother. An officer of the government has no love for the people he rules, therefore he could command their obedience ten thousand times more readily than their parents. If the parents use love to

[1] Hanfeitze: *Sir Controversies*. [2] Ibid.

the extreme, they may not command any obedience; but when the officers of a government exercise authority and power they get complete obedience." [1] Further he says, "The way to maintain a successful home is to forbear in the question of food, and to make every one work. In such a household, even during the disturbance of war or the threat of a famine, all would be well and warmly clad. On the other hand if the members of a family are generous in clothing and amuse each other with entertainments, in time of famine they are the ones who desert their wives and sell off the children. Therefore the working of laws is that there may be hardships at the beginning, but happiness at the end. The way of love leads to the fools' paradise. Wise men, examining differences and choosing the course for the greatest good, will use the forbearance of law and abandon the generosity of love." [2] In another context the same writer says, "The way in which a mother loves her child is unsurpassable. But if the child has wicked habits, he is disciplined by a teacher; if he is sick, he is treated by a doctor. Without the teacher's discipline, he might some day receive capital punishment by the law; without the doctor's treatment he might die. In both cases no amount of mother's love would avail either to alleviate the penalty of the law or to rescue him from the grim clutches of death. If a mother cannot preserve a family by her love, how can an emperor keep a state by love?" [3]

These arguments are in a way convincing; many people of the Chunchiu voiced similar views. For instance it is recorded in Tso Chuan, "When the people meet hardships, they will use their judgment and good thoughts will arise. On the other hand if they enjoy comforts they become extravagant; extravagance will obscure

[1] Hanfeitsu: *Six Contradictions.* [2] Ibid. [3] *The Eight Theories.*

goodness, and evil intentions will arise. Therefore the people of a fertile country are usually mediocre; their comforts have sapped their vitality. The people of unproductive lands are usually heroic, for their labours have hardened them." [1] Tzechan the noted statesman of the kingdom of Cheng said, "Only the virtuous can rule the people by kindness. For others the best policy is severity. For instance, many people are frightened of the ferocity of fire, and few people lose their lives by fire. Water is thought of as harmless; many people play in it, and many people get drowned." [2] Such writings are opposed to the 'greenhouse policy' of the followers of Mencius, and are intended to counteract the attitude of habitual reliance upon the government, so that by hardships and exercise the people may absorb the spirit of independence.

These conceptions are based on the belief that human nature is evil; they set forward law to restrain the natural tendency to evil. Hanfeitze says, "In the days of old, men did not need to till the soil; the natural supply of fruits and seeds was sufficient for their needs. The women did not have to weave; the supply of animal skins was sufficient to clothe them. There was an abundance of supply without the need of labour; there was scarcity of people and superfluity of wealth. Fighting was not necessary. But now a man is not content with only five children; ten is the vogue. It is common for a grandfather to have twenty-five grandchildren. This increased population is confronted with a diminution of wealth; prolonged labour is rewarded with an inadequate return. Under such circumstances fighting is the natural consequence. . . . Therefore in time of famine no young man offers politeness, in times of abundant crops a casual visitor is well fed. This is not because of dislike

[1] *Lu Yu*, II. [2] *Tso Chuan*.

of one's own people or love for the visitor, but because supply and demand are different. Therefore the communistic life of people of the olden times is accounted for not by virtue but by superabundance. To-day people fight for possessions. It is not the lack of virtue but the paucity of wealth which causes it." [1]

On this basis the Legalist school believe that struggle is inevitable, and that practical circumstances force the majority of people to sink into debased living. The aim of government should be to relieve this majority from sinking further, rather than to maintain the goodness of the very small minority. They say, "The government of the wise is based rather on the restraint of evils than on the virtuous dispositions of mankind. The criterion of virtuous conduct may appeal to very few, but the prohibition of evil is a universal standard. As the standard is set with reference to the majority rather than the minority, law instead of virtue is the criterion. If an arrow is to be made from wood naturally straight or a wheel from timber naturally curved, it will take hundreds of thousands of years to make either. . . . But the world is full of men who ride, of men who use arrows; their needs are provided for. Even if there were one arrow or one wheel naturally grown, they would not be treasured, for there is more than one archer, more than one driver. Similarly, no emperor would especially esteem the man who is naturally good without the application of law, because the law is indispensable to the country, and there is more than one man to govern. For the same reason a capable ruler will not follow the drift of natural ease, but will choose the way of fixed standards." [2]

One is apt to criticize the Legalists as exacting and

[1] Hsüntze: *On Five Sources of Trouble.*
[2] Hsüntze: *Upholding Learning.*

inhuman. But they have really a strong passion for men. They preach, "The love for the people should never interfere with law; the administration of law shows love for the people."[1] Confucius himself considered Kwanchung as worthy of 'Jen', and Tzechan as loving. Law is looked upon as absolutely sacred. Even government itself is confined to its own legitimate functions. Kwantze says, "A righteous king sets the law as his own rule of conduct. . . . If it is effective on himself then order will prevail."[2] Again he says, "Never alter a law to suit the whims of a ruler; law is superior to the ruler."[3] Reading these passages makes one admire the lofty conception of law which the Legalists achieved at such an early date in history. But they give little satisfaction to one who looks for a concrete method of safeguarding this sanctity. The best they can offer is the spreading of the knowledge of law. The following story bears on the point. "Hsiao Kung of Chin asked Kung Sun Yang (Shang-Chun), 'law is the product of circumstances. But once it is made, how can the people of the empire understand it so that one and all will observe it?' Kung Sun Yang replied, 'Let those who know the contents of law be officers of law who are considered authorities on law. When any other of the officers or any of the people have questions on the meaning of certain laws, let them explain to them clearly what they want to know. . . . Consequently there will be none who do not understand the law. When officers and people all understand the law, they will not dare misuse them. . . . By this method the law is made clear to all, and will always be carried out.'"[4]

[1] Kwantze: *On Legislation.*
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Shang-Chun: *On Rights.*

IV

The conception of law began in the middle of the Chan-Kuo period, and reached full development before the period was entirely over. With the Taoist ideal as its basis, it gradually evolved a systematic political theory which freely absorbed the ideas both of the Motze and Confucian schools. It provided an instrument of government for both the Tsin and Han dynasties. The statesmen of this period based their plans on this system; even to-day its views are not altogether out of date.

But naturally it had many defects, chief of which was in the method of legislation. In spite of the excellent theory of the sanctity of law, it has to be remembered that the emperor is given full legislative authority. When the authority lies in an individual, it is clear that the emperor may rescind a law just as easily as he makes one. This fact makes for much violation of the law by the ruler. To explain this is quite simple. When a ruler promulgates a new law, it naturally supersedes the old law. If a ruler of former times could make new laws to supersede old laws, a reigning ruler should also have the prerogative of substituting new laws for any already in existence. As this is possible, it is obvious that the Legalist's contention that law makes for permanency in social order becomes untenable.

The lack of what is known as 'Constitutional Law' is therefore a very serious lack. Kwan Chung says, "All countries have laws, but there is no law to enforce laws."[1] Whether this is possible in a democracy is open to question; it is certainly not possible in a monarchy. If in the absence of a censoring body the ruler would deliberately desist from violating laws, then the ruler is a saintly man. But if the observance of law depends

[1] Kwantze: *The Seven Laws.*

upon a saintly man, where is the sanctity of law? The facts of human nature cannot be so easily dismissed as the Legalists make out. In arguing this point they often compare the law of men with instruments for weighing and measuring. But these are dead matter which cannot change; men are living beings with mind and purpose. It is impossible to expect the changing attitudes of men to conform to dead standards as inanimate things do. Hsuntze says, "If a law is made without discussion, then where the law cannot reach there is failure."[1] We can measure the length of all things with one yardstick, and the weight of all things with one balance; but what a variety of laws would be required to measure the lengths and weights of the hearts of men! Even if laws are as numerous as ox hair, there would still be something beyond their reach. If law is made the instrument of government, then what the law does not cover will have to be left either to the free choice of the people or to the discretion of the officials. In either case the law admits failure. Moreover, of all the affairs of the world there are probably more which the laws do not cover than those which they do. This shows that law has more failure than success. Then whence comes the contention that "All affairs assemble in one unit, and all standards are summed up in the law?"

'Legislation without discussion' is an important article of faith in the Legalist school. Consequently it is said, "Orders came from above. But if their application is discussed below, then the authority descends and resides in the people."[2] The Confucian school, as it does not emphasize law, says nothing on the question whether the people should discuss the law. What Confucianists do say is this: "Like what the people

[1] *The Kingly Way.* [2] Kuantze: *On Sanctity of Orders.*

like, and dislike what the people dislike." [1] This clearly recognizes the will of the people as the criterion of government enactments. Hsuntze would not subscribe to the precept prohibiting discussion, although his thoughts are considerably influenced by the Legalist school. He says, "If the laws are made after discussion, . . . all affairs will be free from mistakes. Those affairs for which law exists will be regulated by law; those affairs for which law does not exist will be dealt with by analogy." [2] Again he says, "If etiquette and laws are perfected, there will be orderliness. If the people are given opportunities for discussions and investigations, they will have no suspicions." [3] Hsuntze means that for the law to be carried out, it is essential that the people should understand the intention of the legislation without difficulty. There is only one way to accomplish this, that is to encourage the people to engage in frank and unrestricted examination of the laws and rites which they are expected to observe. In this way mistakes will be avoided. For although the law may fail to cover all cases, one could still have a criterion by analogy, or, in the words of Hsuntze, "To gauge man by man, thing by thing, class by class." [4] This principle is enunciated by Mencius in another way. "After weighing, one would know what is heavy and what is light, and after measuring one would know what is long and what is short. If that applies to things, it applies much more to human hearts. O King, I urge you to measure!" [5] We all admit that the affairs of the universe require a standard of values. But the evaluation of things and the evaluation of men must not be confused. Things are evaluated by material standards which cannot be used

[1] *The Great Learning.*
[2] Hsuntze: *The Kingly Way.*
[3] Mencius: *Liang Hui Wang*, ii.
[4] Hsuntze: *The Kingly Way.*
[5] *On Comparisons.*

in evaluating men. For them spiritual standards alone avail. This is what the Confucianists mean by "What one dislikes in one's superiors should never be used towards ones subordinates."[1] It is a standard based on a condition of heart. The criterion of things can be settled once for all, but the criterion of the heart cannot be found except through 'continuous study and unrestricted investigation'.

The chief aim of the Legalist school is "not to follow the virtue which is occasional, but to apply the law which is fixed". This is a misuse of the idea of the law of nature to human affairs. What is meant by 'fixed' is that there exists an unchangeable law of cause and effect which determines all things. By this law we can foresee the future, and can have a certain knowledge of what results may be expected to follow. The addition of one and one is always two; the combination of hydrogen and oxygen in certain proportions produces water. When there is 'what is fixed', there can be no freedom. And where there is freedom, there cannot be 'what is fixed'. The two are mutually exclusive. In the realm of things fixed laws prevail; in the realm of human life free purpose rules. It is impossible to apply the 'fixed' to human life without doing infinite harm. The materialistic mind of the Legalist school never dreamt of the possibility of that harm.

The views of the Legalist school are very similar to those of the militarists who have no use for democracy. These say that the people have not yet reached the requisite standard for democracy. That is the same as the words of Hanfeitze, "The intelligence of the people is as unstable as the mind of an infant. If an infant does not have his head shaven he will have stomach ache. . . . But when the shaving is being done, some

[1] *The Great Learning.*

one must hold the child while his mother tries to amuse him, or he will cry without ceasing. The infant cannot understand that a little suffering of pain is instrumental in gaining a great good." [1] These words contain a small measure of truth. But even if the people are infants, will they always remain infants? For the sake of argument let us assume that the people are infants. The development of men in different ages does not differ very widely; men of the same age are even less apart in attainment. Further, if the people are all infants, then those who legislate for the people are also infants. How can these infants be sure that their intelligence is greater than others, so that the laws they make ought not to be discussed by others? Again, if we grant that the people will always remain infants, then the effect of any government is futile. The Legalists use the parable that as an infant cannot understand slight suffering, he must depend upon his mother. But does not the mother expect the infant to grow into manhood? If a child remains forever in infancy, what is the value of having a mother? Or do the Legalists believe that the infant's feet should be tied so that he shall not be able to walk, or that his mouth be sealed so that he shall not be able to talk when he is grown up? In brief the Legalist school seems to regard the governing and the governed as two different species, one possessing superior faculties, the other inferior faculties. They have ignored the fact that good government is hastened by the reciprocal influence, the co-operative activities, and the mutual developments of the individual personalities of all mankind. At one and the same time the governing is the governed, and *vice versa*. The metaphor of the mother and child does not really hold. This is perceived only by the Confucianist school; the Legalist school does not

[1] *Upholding Learning.*

understand it. For in illustrating their idea of law with balances and yardsticks, and in using the measurement of things to illustrate the government of people, they have forgotten the truth that things under measurement are inanimate, but men under government are capable of free movement. If, as we measured a bolt of cloth, it were to suddenly shrink or expand as it liked, our measuring rod would be useless. Men are like that. Hsuntze says, "The joining of two pieces of bamboo in the possession of two contracting parties is a method of deceiving people. . . . The use of balance and weights is a method for securing a fair deal, but where it is taken advantage of, it is a nuisance. Therefore mechanical devices are merely the stream, not the fountain-head of good government. Officials are concerned with details; the statesman deals with things at the source. When the source is clean, the stream cannot be but clear; when the source is soiled, the stream becomes impure."[1] In the same strain a later scholar said, "Laws and order are merely the instruments of government, but not the source of the purity or impurity of government."[2] These words unmask in one sentence the mechanistic attitude of the Legalist school. Men are regarded as machines; if men are restricted by the mechanical device of law, then no man can escape the reach of discipline. But they forget that men and things are different by nature. When the people are restricted to the uttermost, they tend to "avoid the law without a sense of shame". Hsuntze says, "The law cannot stand by itself; classification cannot maintain itself. When the right man is in power, everything will succeed; when the right man is not to be obtained, everything will fail."[3] Again he says, "There are instances where

[1] Hsuntze: *Emperor's Way.*
[2] Hsuntze: *The Biography of Tsou Chang Shu.*
[3] Hsuntze: *Emperor's Way.*

disorder prevails in spite of the existence of a perfect law, but there is no instance in history in which disorder happens when righteous men are in power." [1] This is a direct challenge by those who believe in government by men to those who believe in government by law. It is a just and fundamental view. Those who disagree should be reminded of the political conditions of the Republic of China, which has already promulgated a provisional constitution. If they argue that the provisional constitution is not good, let them imagine what conditions will be like after the consummation of even a perfect constitution. If political habits are not fostered, if political morality is not stabilized, then even if China had the best constitution in the world it would be only a scrap of paper. Is not this an illustration of the truth that "The law cannot stand by itself", and "Disorder prevails in spite of the existence of a perfect law". Therefore a final conclusion might be drawn from the words of Hsuntze, "There are men who govern, but there are no laws that govern." Or to strike a middle way, no one could be more moderate than Mencius when he says, "Goodness alone is not sufficient for government; law alone is not capable of applying itself." The claim which the Legalist school makes, "To govern by law is as easy as lifting a thing and then putting it down," cannot be accepted by men of the least intelligence.

Furthermore, even if we grant an entire lack of crime, and that all men would respect the law as inviolable, still this falls short of an ideal government. For the highest purpose of government by law is 'to unify the people', or 'to standardize the views in the empire'. Its result is like the work of a potter who makes thousands of vessels after one pattern. The individual is depersonalized by the state. If the government is

[1] Hsuntze: *The Kingly Way.*

regarded as a dead thing, it is futile to say more. But if the government is regarded as a living organism, it is illogical to maintain that the individuality of the constituent units could be removed without injury to the life force of the organism. The greatest danger of the Legalist school lies in this very point. It is for this reason that the Confucian school considers the supreme object of government to be this: "to seek to explore to the limit the nature of man" [1] so as to enable "every man to acquire the conduct of the princely man".[2] Mencius sums up both in these words, "When the rule is right, the masses of the people would elevate themselves; when they have elevated themselves there would be no evil or crime."

We would again call attention to the profound words of Confucius, "Men can enlarge virtue; virtue cannot enlarge men." If this is adapted to political thinking we might say, "Men can form laws; laws cannot form men."

In conclusion, the Confucian school bases its view on a vital, energetic, living, and idealistic conception of life, whose conclusion in political thinking is government by virtue, dependent upon men. On the other hand the Legalist school bases its view on a dead, static, mechanistic, and materialistic conception of life, taught by the Taoists, whose conclusion in political thinking is government by law dependent upon mechanical devices.

[1] *Doctrine of the Mediator.*
[2] *Chun Chiu Fan Lu*: Chapter on Yu Hsu.

Chapter VIII

CONCLUSION

A perusal of the foregoing chapters will suffice to indicate the depth and breadth of the thought of the early masters. The study covers the political aspect only and yet it is sufficiently invigorating. How superficial of the youngsters who gain a smattering of Western learning, to deprecate their ancestors as ignoramuses! Our problem to-day is, rather, how to apply the excellent teachings of our forefathers to present day conditions, and to realise their lofty ideals. Empty words will not avail: there is need of discerning knowledge in order to put them into practice. No ready formula is available from the past: we of this age will have to labour for our own salvation. To this end we would propose the following questions for consideration.

1. How can we harmonize the spiritual and the material life? We believe that men are distinguished from beasts by virtue of the spiritual life; we also believe that this spiritual life cannot exist apart from the material life. Neither too much nor too little of it is desirable. The ideal is that there should be equal enjoyment of material developments for everybody so that men will be helped to cultivate the spiritual life without embarrassment. This is the basic principle of the Confucianists and we consider it a reasonable attitude. Just as we consider the Taoist principle of 'renunciation' and Motze's principle of 'self-negation' impracticable, so also do we reject the ultra-materialistic point of view which the Legalist

school and even some of Laotze's followers take, giving life no significance apart from material considerations. Material life is merely a means for the maintenance of spiritual life: it should never be taken as substitute for the object which it serves. For this reason we regard all theories such as utilitarianism and economic determinism as superficial and incapable of satisfying the needs of the time. Yet there is no denial of the fact that men are now subject to the oppression of material forces to a degree unparalleled in history. The progress of scientific knowledge we cannot obstruct and should not obstruct; but it has resulted in excessive material development, thus increasing the power of materialism far beyond reasonable proportions. It is of course foolish to dilate on spiritual value and ignore the present state of material development. It is equally wrong to think that materialism is the key to everything. The present development is only partially explained by the realm of *things*; the remainder is accounted for only by the realm of *spirit*. In European nations to-day, the tendency is to regard life solely as material development, with the result that, no matter how plausible the contrivances, the malady only becomes worse. In this the socialists and the capitalists are not different. To fight fire with fire is no use. Our problem is, under the conditions of this unprecedented scientific progress, how can the Confucian ideal of equilibrium be applied so that every man may live a balanced life. In other words, how can we Chinese avoid the rut of economic organization into which Europeans have fallen during the last hundred years, and how can our spiritual life be rid of the trammels of material development? This is an undeniable responsibility which we owe to our country and to the world.

II. How can we harmonize the individual and the collective life?

No individual can exist without responding to the influence and restrictions of the social force, just as no society can exist which does not depend upon the action and interaction of the individuals within it. This, of course, does not mean that there are not occasional phenomena which seem to affect adversely the interest of either the one or the other or sometimes of both. Consequently disputes arise as to which is the more important of the two: the individual or society? What is the procedure in social reform: from the individual to society or *vice versa*? Should the individual serve society or is the reverse true? According to our belief, the progress of the universe begins always with the individual. He creates his own environment and then lives under conditions which he likes. This is the essence of the Confucian teaching "In order to establish oneself one should establish others: in order to elevate oneself one should elevate others", or "to be able to fathom one's own nature is to fathom other men's nature". We have no doubt that this is the most reasonable way of life. The mechanical way by which Motze and the Legalists would have every man conform to the same standard, immersing every bit of the individual in society as a whole, seems to us most unreasonable. Of course one should remember that in ancient times life was simple and society was small. Nowadays life is complicated and society is variegated. Such a society exercises a force so tremendous, that under its evil conditions no individual can stand the strain. Whether it be in parliament, school, or factory, the individual is but a grain in a large granary. Since we do not believe in the absolutely virtuous nature of individual men, naturally we cannot concede that their aggregate life in society can be good without regulation. If this is granted, what is there for one to take exception to in an objective standard? Does not this justify the

widespread influence which a mechanical conception of the state and society enjoys to-day? We admit that here is a dilemma. We cannot concede that a mechanical social organization is ideal, but at the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that society in the future is going to be even more involved and more complicated. How to stem the tide of a mechanical tendency, and how to enable social feeling in the individual to keep pace with material developments is our perplexing problem. Again this is the responsibility of our age.

Without an adequate solution of these problems there can be no relief for the pains and sorrows of this age. Although we find hints for such a solution in the teachings of our ancestors, these are vague and difficult to discern. It remains the goal of our endeavour to discover to what extent harmony is possible, and what are the practical ways of reaching it.

Appendix I

On Chinese Theocracy

China provides yet another illustration of the historical development of nations. During the primitive stage the tribal chieftain functions both as priest and as ruler; in him all religious and political authority resides. Kwan She Fu, in one of the chapters of *Kwo Yü*, develops this point. "In ancient times, spiritual and temporal affairs became separate. Those people whose motive in life was pure, who kept themselves reverent and upright, whose range of knowledge comprehended things above and things below, whose character was illustrious and righteous, whose insight was illuminating, and whose wisdom transcended the obvious, these received the grace of the Gods. The men were called wizards and the women witches. To them was given the responsibility of determining the place and order of the worship of the Gods, and of naming the cattle, implements, time, and costume for use at the sacrifices. As their assistants were selected those of the saints who were illustrious, who could interpret the signs of the mountains and the rivers, who knew the names of the forefathers of the tribes, who understood the ceremonies and the arrangements of the relative positions in the temples of their ancestors, and who were reverent before the Gods. Attendants were chosen from the children of distinguished families who knew the products of the season, the things fit for offerings, the location of the altars, the gods of various ranks, the origin of family names, and who could follow the regulations. Thus were chosen definite persons for

tending the ceremonies of heaven, earth, the spirits, the people, and the animals. They were known as the 'Five Ministers', of which each had separate functions to fulfil, free from interference. So the people were enabled to show their faith and loyalty; so the gods found a means to exhibit their illustrious virtue."

As we read this to-day, who does not despise the witches and wizards as worthless? Yet it was they who provided the highest authority of primitive times. They were all wise and judicious, commanding at will the "descendants of the saints" and the "children of distinguished families". The "Five Ministers" were of a lower social rank than their immediate attendants. So during their age we find no political theory; the will of the deity determines everything.

This early conception of deity was polytheistic; the gods were deified men who lived in great numbers among the rest of mankind. Gradually there came a change, so that when recorded history began the conception of a supreme being known as God, Heaven, or Shangti (the Emperor on High) was already becoming positive. The rule of the deity was supplanted by the rule of a God which we name Divine Rule.

With the advance of time the conception of God developed. In ancient times God was thought of as having purpose and personality, with a direct supervision of all political affairs. Numerous passages in ancient literature attest this. In Shih Ching we find the following lines:—

Great is God[1]
Beholding this lower world in majesty.
He surveyed the four quarters (of the Kingdom)
Seeking some one to give settlement to the people.
Illustrious was the House of Chow
And the appointment of God came at the proper season.
King Wen ascends and descends
On the left and right of God.

[1] Throughout this chapter the term God is the translation of the Chinese word meaning heaven.

As soon as the fragrance ascends,
God, well pleased, smells the sweet savour.

God surveyed the hills,
Where the oaks and Yih were thinned,
And paths made through the firs and cypresses.
God, who had raised the state, raised a proper ruler for it.

God said to the King Wen
'Be not like those who reject this and cling to that;
Be not like those who are ruled by their likings and desires.'

And in the Shu Ching we read: "The Miao (aborigine) people did not use the power of virtue, but created the five grades of cruel punishments. . . . slaughtering the innocent. God surveyed the people; there was no fragrance of virtue from them, only the rank odour of their punishments. The emperor had compassion on the innocent multitudes in danger of being murdered, and exhibited his majesty against the cruelty of the oppressors. He restrained the Miao, so that they should not continue for future generations. . . . He made an enquiry with unbiased mind among the people, and the fatherless and widows laid before him their complaints against the Miao. God could not hold them guiltless, and sent down calamity on the Miao. They had no plea to urge in mitigation of the punishment, and they were extinguished." "His name reached God and God was pleased with him. He charged Wen Wang with a great task, to exterminate the dynasty of Yin."

Thoughts such as these are abundant in the two books. It is clear that the thoughts of the ancients were very simple and crude. Their conception of God was similar to that of the Hebrew prophets of the Old Testament. God has feeling, emotion, purpose, as man had. He constantly supervises and directs political activities of men, so that there seems to be a visible and direct divine rule.

As men's reasoning power developed such simple and crude thoughts could not be maintained. The conception

of God, maturing, became abstract. Such sayings as "Alas! God's will is incessant", "The doings of God have neither sound nor smell", "Pleasantly He is above, definitely He is below, He is seen everywhere", indicate that the conception of a religious God has given place to the idea of a philosophical God which forms the fountain head of all the political thoughts of later generations. The abstract conception of God led our forefathers to believe that in the Universe there is a great natural principle and law which all men must observe. This principle and law is the will of God. One of the Odes says, "When God produces mankind, he gives them life and prescribes them laws. The people possess an inherent liking for these laws; this constitutes virtue." Mencius comments, "Because there is existence there must be laws. Since the people have an innate inheritance, they consequently love virtue." In other words, all phenomena follow certain laws which mankind has learned to regard as basic. The only duty of mankind is therefore to 'follow the laws of God'.

The question then arises as to the manner in which these laws of God are made known to us. In Shang Shu is written the following: "I am told that in ancient times Kun dammed up the inundating waters and thereby deranged the order of the five elements. God was angered and would not give him the nine divisions of the great laws; therefore the chaos of natural relationships continued. But when Kun met his punishment in death, Yü rose in his stead. To him God gave the nine divisions of the great laws whereby the proper order of relationships was restored." This account reads exactly like the story of Moses receiving the Ten Commandments on Mount Sinai. That both stories are legendary, unhistorical, is generally accepted. But such legends are of immense importance in estimating the development of thought,

since the conception that the personal God and natural law are one, was by that time firmly established. The God of religion became nature in philosophy. In one of the chapters of Kuo Yü, Wang Tzu Ch'in says, "Poyü standardized measurements by taking the signs of the universe and following the one hundred laws of nature. These were tested among the people and received the approval of all. . . . This was pleasing to God who blessed him and rewarded him with the throne of the empire." This is an exact commentary on the meaning of the 'lofty laws'. 'Following the hundred laws of nature,' and 'testing among the people' is the way by which 'God's laws' are made evident through men. The most complete expression of this conception is found in Kao Yao Mu of Shang Shu. It says, "God's work is committed to men. The rules of his system prescribe the five relationships in society, and the orderliness of his process determines the five ranks of the state. His differentiated rewards for the virtuous prescribe the five kinds of official costume, and his penalty for the wicked determines the five degrees of punishments. To carry out these functions is governmental administration. Strive, and be careful."

The laws, the principles, the system, and the process, which are referred to above, are all the general expression of the Law of Nature. The laws regulate relationships; the principles determine the method; the system prescribes the position of the parts; the process indicates the method. The law of nature is therefore worked out in detail. The general expression of the law of nature is called by both Confucian and Taoist schools 'Tao'; the way and the details are called by the Confucian school 'the ethical code', and by the Legalist school 'laws'. But the general source of these ramifications is God. The primitive conception was that God was a being having

feelings, emotions, and purpose, with a direct supervision of human affairs. Later the feelings, emotions, and purpose are all embodied in an ethical way of life, called the Heavenly Way. This Heavenly Way is the fundamental principle of politics, and must be followed. This is what is called the abstract doctrine, or the Divine Rule.

Usually we find that the further back in history, the firmer is the grip of superstition. A careful perusal of the Book of Odes, reading according to the time of composition, indicates very clearly the change in the conception of Divine Rule. In the Shan and Chow dynasties, humility and reverence to God was extreme. The chapters of Shang Shu on these periods read exactly like *Deuteronomy* in the Old Testament. Towards the end of the Chow dynasty, the poets began to show a sceptical attitude towards God. Sayings such as, "God is merciless," "The Almighty God is not perfect in virtue," "The great God is unjust," fill the pages of this time. The original faith in God was greatly shaken. In a disturbed society the facts of life insist that happiness is not due to good or disaster to evil. The development of reasons demands an explanation of the facts; when reason fails, doubt begins. Therefore according to the references in Tso Chuan, the thinkers of Chun Chiu no longer regarded God with awe and reverence. The unintelligible facts were attributed to demons and to fate; such thought was despised by the men of learning. For instance Tzu Ch'an said to Pi Tsao, "God's way is afar; man's way is near. What we cannot reach, how can we comprehend? How can you understand God's way? You talk much, and sometimes your guess is right." This represents the general attitude of the scholars of the time. Then Laotze appeared and drew the daring philosophical conclusion that "God is not benevolent. To him all creation is but insignificant creatures." This

view is not surprising in view of the profuse complaints about God made by the poets. The fact is that a belief in divine powers is only acceptable in a semi-barbarous society; it is no wonder that it failed to satisfy the minds of the men in Chun Chiu and Chan Kuo. Even Confucius said, "Get ahead of God; he does not contradict you," a saying which represents an attitude widely different from the traditional.

Motze, however, was purely a religious leader, who deliberately reverted to the ancient conception. His discourse on God's purpose represents thought current before the Shang and Chow periods, and yet it was not acceptable to society. Human intelligence, by the end of Chan Kuo, had advanced even more, and Hsün Tze shouted aloud his message, "It is better to assume control of the things about you than to magnify God in your thoughts: it is better to apply God's rules than to obey and adore him." This may be looked upon as a declaration of independence from God, and it represents not the attitude of Hsün Tze alone, but of all the thinkers of his day. Later Tung Chung Shu continued the thought of Motze and the Confucian teachings, and wrote on 'The Harmony of God and Man', which the scholars of the Han dynasty accepted as fundamental doctrine. This was the second attempt to return to the ancient doctrine. But as it was mixed up with the wizardry and the magic of the exorcists, it had no standing in the realm of learning.

APPENDIX II

ON DEMOCRATIC IDEALS

THE concept of theocracy and the idea of family ties together give rise to the term 'Son of Heaven'. The phrase is first found in Shu Ching, and later in Shih Ching. The phrase is summarized in Shu Ching in the chapter entitled Hung Fan. "The Son of Heaven is the parent of the people and rules over the empire." The Emperor as Son of Heaven and as parent of men forms the connecting link "between what is above and below". The whole universe is but one large family. This thought is simple, but embodies a very high political ideal. Therefore the first stage of government is by witchcraft. The priest is at the same time the transmitter of Heaven's will and the ruler of men. Gradually evolves the idea that Heaven may appoint a representative to work in place of a direct rule. This is the first step towards a separation of politics from religion.

The Son of Heaven is not conceived, however, as belonging to a class distinct from the rest of the people. It is stated, "Great Heaven, the supreme ruler, has changed His chief son." The Son of Heaven, then, is merely the chief of all sons. Heaven is the father of all men, and the emperor is merely the first among them. For if it is possible for the chief son to be changed, the Son of Heaven cannot be said to belong to a distinct class. In other words, every man is conceived to be eligible as the Son of Heaven. This concept of the equality of men is the root idea of the democratic ideal of later generations.

It is also implied that the purpose and will of Heaven is manifested in men. "Heaven sees through what we people see; Heaven hears through what we people hear,"

"What the people desire Heaven will surely carry out." Therefore in theory the people constitute *ipso facto* the highest authority. Considered in this light, Heaven (so-called), is the same as the Crown of a constitutional government, and the Son of Heaven is the prime minister of the cabinet. The Son of Heaven is responsible to Heaven, but actual authority is exercised over him by the people. In Tso Chuan it is said, "Heaven creates the people, and sets up a ruler to guard them and keep them from going astray. . . . Heaven's love for his people is immeasurable. It is not conceivable that he should set a man above them to debauch them." How clear and explicit is this definition of the function of an emperor. Conversely, if Heaven's will is manifested in the desires of the people, then the emperor should consider his conduct towards the people as the expression of his sense of responsibility to Heaven. This is the case with the exemplary rulers Yao and Shun. Later rulers are also constantly reminded of this obligation. But if any ruler falls short of this ideal then the people are at liberty to revolt and make a change. So is manifested the will of Heaven that 'the chief Son be changed'. The teaching of Confucius and Mencius regarding the legitimate right of the people to revolt is derived from this thought.

But a revolution is not the normal policy. What is the way to manifest the will of the people in a normal course of development? It is Public Opinion. This is the only way. For the ancients obstinately insist on freedom of speech. In *Kuo Yü* it is said, "To try to stop the peoples' mouths is more serious than to stem a current. . . . When the considered thought of the people has found expression through the mouth, the only way is to put the thought into practice. One should never muzzle it." To what extent and in what way these ideals were actually carried out it is difficult to ascertain. Many references are found

which imply that the form of government in ancient times resembled the democracy of Athens. The whole population was often called together into an assembly in which three kinds of questions might be discussed: namely, a national crisis, the change of the national capital, and the enthronement of a ruler. This may have been the practice when the population was small, but we cannot tell what was the practice after the Chan Kuo period when the population had greatly increased. One is inclined to conclude that although our ancestors knew that the will of the people ought to be respected, they did not make a serious study of the method by which the ideal might be realized. Therefore unless a ruler had so violated the will of the people as to arouse a revolt, there was no way by which the ruler might be checked in the normal course of his reign. This is a fundamental weakness of China's political thought.

Appendix III

POLITICS AND ETHICS

If the theory that nations began as tribal groups is universally true then the influence of tribal groups in the Chinese nation is very powerful and evident. The conceptions of family and nation are so deeply involved that ethics forms the basis of Chinese politics. In *Shu Ching* it is recorded, "Develop and improve your (the emperor's) virtues so as to endear the relationship of nine generations of the family. When their children live in mutual love, the tribal groups will enjoy peace and harmony." We have no way of knowing how the tribal groups were kept at peace before the Chow dynasty; but later, members of the same tribe were not permitted to marry one another. So all the tribes were allied by blood-relationships. Both from the political and the sociological point of view this has been of tremendous practical value. It has made for unity and peace; it has enriched the racial vitality.

Within the same tribe the blood relationship is much more elaborate, and is made the basis of a complex system. For instance the emperor rules entirely through his family relationships. The following table will make it more apparent.

Such a family group underlies the whole fabric of society. Each smaller group is gathered up into a larger group, so that all trace their relationship to the prime ancestor. The empire and society are thus only a congregation of a few family tribes all inter-related. Therefore it is said in Tso Chuan "The way of men is to love one's relatives. Because of love for relatives, the ancestors are honoured; honour for ancestors brings



respect for the distant relatives; respect for distant relatives brings a sense of kinship". This family concept constitutes the fundamental basis of political organization. When this conception is further strengthened by religious ideals, its effect is the more vigorous. "All creation originates with Heaven; all mankind originates with one common ancestor." The logical result of such concepts is the recognition that all mankind is but one large family.

This conception of the state is naturally out of date to-day, but it forms the basis of Chinese political thought. Its effect upon the politics of to-day can easily be discerned.

Appendix IV

FEUDALISM AND ITS EFFECTS

There is a general but incorrect supposition that feudalism began with the Tang Yü period. But the kingdoms which were in existence before the Chow dynasty were merely the extension of tribal governments. True feudalism, with a graded society culminating in an Emperor, began with Chow Kung. He created a number of small states, of which eighty per cent were under the rule of members of the Imperial family. He both recognized the existing states and also added to their number. These newly created states acted as intermediary between the central authority and the old states, and also exercised supervision over them. The states were classified in four general categories: (1) Tien, the metropolitan areas; (2) Hou, the dukedoms; (3) Wei, the old states; (4) Huang, the frontier states. The central administration maintained its authority by a system of courtly visits, while the feudal states kept in touch with one another by various conferences and conventions.

There were two main effects of the feudal system. A civilizing influence was disseminated, and alien elements were assimilated.

During the feudal period the central government was the pattern and example of all the states in the empire. Within these miniature states the rulers exercised complete autonomy; the limited area facilitated an effective rule, while a watchful competition required a careful administration. In outward form the feudal

states were little different from the tribal states, but there was a fundamental difference. The tribal states were a group of incoherent units living an impoverished life each by itself; the feudal states were ramifications of a systematic whole which was permeated with a purposeful civilizing force. The former, like old trees, were half decayed; the latter were like young twigs newly transplanted. So during the following few hundred years civilization progressed rapidly, enriched and stimulated by many new influences. The amazing outburst of wisdom and intellectual power during the Chun Chiu and Chan Kuo periods is one of the results of this feudalism.

Among the feudal states many were not much above the stage of barbarism; civilized people were only found in the Yellow River basin. The rulers of Chow undertook the tremendous task of colonization by dispersing civilized groups among the aboriginal semi-barbarous tribes. There was great opposition to this by the aborigines. It took several hundred years of persevering struggle to civilize the region between the Tai Hsing mountains on the north and the Yangtze River on the south. This cultural expansion is one of the greatest and most difficult undertakings recorded in the history of China. Even now it is an unfinished task. But its first effective advance was due to feudalism.

From the beginning of recorded history the Chinese have used the term 'barbarian' to describe alien tribes, although the line of demarcation between civilized and barbarian has never been defined. As civilization enlarged its boundaries, numerous barbarian tribes became civilized. For instance in the year 704 B.C. they referred to themselves as a civilized race. In the course of that one hundred and sixty-five years there was a widening of the bounds of civilization. This happened because

the brotherhood of man and the equality of races was an early accepted principle of the Chinese people. An alien tribe was looked upon as a brother not yet of age. The shortcomings of a younger brother should be overlooked. When he comes of age, he is accorded the courtesies due to an equal.

APPENDIX V

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CLASS SYSTEM

A CLASS system seems to be an unavoidable phenomenon in the initial stages of civilization. Its rise, development, and fall are influenced by social environment, and determined by the social consciousness of the people. In China there were few traces of slavery before the Chun Chiu period; the Book of Odes make no mention of it; the Book of Changes and the Book of History contain references which may have to do with it. But Chun Chiu makes the startling statement that in society there were as many as ten classes. If this is true, a very elaborate class-system may have existed. But however that may be, it is certain that intercourse between these classes was of the freest possible kind. Many examples are known of men of low origin promoted to high rank, and of men of high position degraded to low estate. Thus the class-system was a very different thing from the slavery of Ancient Greece, or from the state of the negroes in America, or the serfs in Russia. There was no caste.

Slavery did not thrive in ancient China primarily because there was a deep-rooted conception of the equality of mankind. But economic conditions also provided a natural check on slavery. China began her life on a plateau, with agriculture as the only source of livelihood. In both the tribal and the feudal stages the great problem was the scarcity of men. A constant policy was to enlarge the population in order to develop the farms. In the time of Mencius this was true; in earlier times the scarcity of men must have been greater. The government was obliged to care for the welfare of the people lest

the population should decrease. On the other hand the people were farmers, each tilling his own farm, under which conditions slavery is unlikely.

But in the early days of the Chun Chiu period there was a strict distinction between nobleman and commoner. Even the standard of law was different for them. Political power, as one would expect in a feudal state, was in the hands of a few aristocrats. But by the time of Confucius this oligarchy was tottering to its fall; to this the Sage himself witnesses, who openly admitted his lowly origin, yet by sheer ability rose to high office in the kingdom of Lu.

Unquestionably Motze, Confucius, and the contemporary philosophers had a share in breaking down this aristocracy. During the feudal stage power became popularized. At the beginning political knowledge and political experience were the monopoly of the select few: later, as the feudal society disintegrated, the people were enriched in various ways. First, many of the remote descendants of the nobles lost their estates, and were mingled with the commoners. Second, many of the nobles intermarried with the commoners. Third, political changes deprived many of the nobles of their positions. Fourth, there was much immigration of the descendants of the men of rank. The new commoners created by these circumstances increased more rapidly than the aristocrats, while their intellect was by no means inferior. So the aristocracy lost its hold, and gave way to a more democratic form of government. This is noticeable, for instance, in the changed meaning of certain old terms. The terms 'princely men' and 'inferior men' originally indicated economic distinctions; later they became moral distinctions. The class system dug its own grave, and the democratic ideal of class-equality stepped into its place.

Appendix VI

THE ORIGIN OF LEGAL CONCEPTS

During the tribal and feudal periods the life of the group was regulated by personal friendship and custom; it was not necessary to impose the restraints of law or regulation upon the conduct of men. Not until the Chan Kuo period did a legal conception of government creep in. This conception had not existed before. Among the primitive people, law was identical with punishment. In the Shuo-wen lexicon we find that the obsolete form of the Chinese character for 'law' is identical with the character for 'punishment'; the component parts of this character mean 'level as water' and 'eliminate that which is crooked'. The Book of Changes also bears out this point, saying, "The utility of punishment is the certification of law." This is natural in a primitive society where, with the exception of religious sacrifices and tribal warfare, lawsuits are the only happenings. As custom was fixed, and marriage a matter of formal arrangement, lawsuits were all criminal cases. To suppress by force and by restraint such actions as tended to disturb peace and order was the first step in the development of law. As at first there were no written statutes to guide, the standard was taken from inanimate things, and the purpose was to 'eliminate that which is crooked'. Such is the way of the barbarians in Australia and Africa; such was the way of our people in primitive times.

It is not possible to ascertain definitely the first instance of law in China. But in Shu Ching it is recorded, "The barbarians were not amenable to moral persuasion, but

had to be restrained by punishments. They invented the five punishments and called them law." So it seems that the punishments were begun by the barbarians, and that our ancestors simply took them over. The punishments were applied to aliens only. This is what is meant by 'repay their crimes with force'. So it is recorded in Shu Ching that when Kao Yao, the first Administer of Punishments, was installed in office, the Emperor Shun instructed him, saying, "If the barbarians invade our territory and act as thieves, brigands, rebels, and traitors, you as the grand judge should apply to them the five grades of punishments." It is also recorded in Chun Chiu, "Moral persuasion is the means for influencing China (our own people), and punishment is the way to intimidate the four barbarian tribes." Later this is modified, and in the Book of Rites we read, "Rites do not extend to the common people, and punishments do not apply to the high officials." Judged by modern standards, it is a great perversion of right that all who have been in high office should be exempt from punishment. This is also evidence of the discrimination against aliens, for during the tribal period only the common people were amenable to law, and the common people were largely composed of aliens.

This does not mean that in ancient times punishment was not applied to the nobility. Their punishment was exile. Whoever was considered a danger to the common weal was expelled from civilized society. This exile, corresponding to the ostracism of ancient Greece, is found in force even to the last days of the Chun Chiu period.

Law and punishment belonged to the same category of thought. Therefore the functions of military authority and the administration of punishment were entrusted to the same person. For instance, the duty of Kao Yao

as Administer of Punishments was also to guard against foreign invasion. Force was necessary to suppress crime. Down to a very late date the title of the Chief Justice was still 'Sze Kou', meaning the 'Suppressor of Brigands'. Tsang Wen Chung says in Kuo Yü, "The first grade punishment is warfare, the second grade is sword and saw, the third grade is whip and bamboo." A military expedition was clearly a function of the judiciary.

In the Book of Changes occurs the phrase, "An army moves according to rule." This is the first instance of the use of the word 'rule' in the legal sense; there it is as an instrument applied to the army. As a matter of fact punishment, law, rule, are all intended for aliens and for a specific class of people. For the normal elements in society, personal relationships prevail; no fixed rule is necessary. This is not true with soldiers, for no amount of personal friendship can maintain the discipline of an army. Rules are necessary. So the chapters on law in Shih Chi and Han Shu both begin by stressing the importance of eliminating the personal element in military affairs. At first such an introduction seems unrelated to the subject; but it is necessary to remember that to the ancients war and law are concepts based on the same principle.

In time changes came. On the one hand, as the lines of demarcation between classes and races were obliterated, that which had been applied to special groups was now applied to the general public. On the other hand, as affairs within a special group became more involved, what had been used as a special instrument was now converted into an institution of daily life. So the appeal to law became more and more a common practice.

There still remains the question of the origin of codified law. Although Yao Tien contains a description of the

five grades of punishments, it dealt with their application rather than with a statement of the laws themselves. Shu Hsiang of Chin said, "When the dynasty of Hsia had troubles, they promulgated the Yü punishments; when the dynasty of Shang had troubles, they promulgated the Tong punishments; when the dynasty of Chow had troubles, they promulgated the Nine punishments. The fact that these three codes existed shows that each period had its time of decadence." So each of the dynasties mentioned had then their own code of laws. Again in Yi Chou Shu we read, "In the early spring of the fourth year the Emperor ordered the Grand Rectifier to rectify the codified laws. The Grand Historian accordingly composed a book of law in nine chapters and presented it to the Grand Rectifier." Further we read in Tso Chuan, "Our ancestor Chow Kung had said, 'Those who violate the law are guilty of dishonesty; those who shelter them are accomplices; those who steal public treasures are traitors.' . . . Where there is a constant rule there should be no grace. What is contained in the Nine Punishments must not be forgotten." These quotations all indicate that during the Chow dynasty there actually was a code of law which Chow Kung worked out. It contains nine chapters, and even down to the Chun Chiu period it was still extant, and was widely studied by the officials. On this evidence, it seems also that what the scholars of later generations call the rule of ethics during the reigns of Wen Wang, Wu Wang, and Chow Kung, was not in reality a rule of ethics. Moreover according to the chapter entitled Shih Fa of Yih Chow Shu, the fortitude with which killing was done during the early days of the Chow dynasty was really amazing. Yet even if one should discount much of what is recorded, the detailed way in which the Shu Ching speaks of the punishments

should be sufficient to indicate the seriousness of the situation. The chapter entitled Chiu Kao says, "If it be reported to you that people are drinking in company, do not hesitate, but arrest them all and send them to the court of Chow to be put to death." If death was the penalty for the slight offence of drinking, what would be the penalty for rebellion?

The chapter entitled Fei Shih in Shu Ching was written by Chow Kung's son Po Ch'in. It consists of one hundred and twenty words, wherein the phrase, 'You shall get ordinary punishment, heavy punishment, and many other kinds of punishment' occurs no less than five times. This is a fair indication that in the days when the Kingdom of Lu was first founded, its criminal code was very rigid. It must be remembered, however, that Chow Kung was a thorough believer in punishment as a means of education. In Kang Kao he says, "If a man commits a crime not involuntarily but intentionally, then he deliberately violates the law. Even though his offence be light and occasional, he should not be spared the death penalty. On the other hand if a man commits a great crime not intentionally but by accident, if he frankly admits his mistake, he should not be given the death penalty." Again in Chiu Kao, Chow Kung says, "Do not kill them, but put them under instruction for the time being. Those who carry out my instructions will be rewarded; but upon those who disregard my instructions, even I will have no pity. Unless they give up their old ways they should be put to death like all other offenders." These passages should convince us that the death penalty and other punishments of the time were not intended as vengeance, but to exercise a reforming influence upon the people. The positive conception of ethics was more prized than the negative conception of protection. Therefore in Kang Kao it is

written, "The great criminals are offenders against society. But those who fail in filial and brotherly conduct, —the son who not only fails to serve his father but actually hurts his feelings, the father who not only fails to love his son but actually hates him, the younger brother who ignores the proper relationships and acts disrespectfully towards his elder brother, the elder brother who forgets the trouble with which his parents brought up his younger brother and has no affection for him,—all these are worse. I am grieved. Even if these people escape punishment from those in authority, Heaven will throw the peace of normal relationships in great confusion. Therefore make haste to prescribe punishments according to the way of Wen Wang. All these should be punished without remorse." This conception may be called 'ethical punishment'. Its basis is that penalties help to realize ethical obligations, and its motive is educative. It is a great step forward in the conception of law. It should be noted that the ethical standards are relative, not one-sided. The father and the elder brother owe an obligation to the son and the younger brother as much as the son and the younger brother owe to the father and the elder brother. The law is therefore on a basis of equality.

After this time statutes of punishments are constantly found in the Classics and the Commentaries. For instance in Li Hsing, which was written in the reign of Emperor Mu of Chow Dynasty, there are many penal laws. The kingdoms of Chi, Chin, Chu, and many others all had their codes, the names of which are still known to us. But it was not till the last days of Chun Chiu that the promulgation of laws was adopted as a procedure. At first this aroused a storm of criticism. Tze Ch'an of Cheng composed a code of law, and was reproached by Shu Hsiang. Chao Shang of Chin levied a tax of one *Ku* of

iron for each person. With the iron he had made a *Ting* on which were engraved all the laws. Over this Confucius lamented. There were also cases where private individuals worked on the drafts of codified laws; as for instance Sze Chuan of Cheng put Teng Hsi to death according to the laws which he had inscribed on bamboo splits. And at this point commenced the struggle between ethicalism and legalism.

Appendix VII

A Conjecture on Economic Conditions

Many changes took place in the economic development of society during the sixteen hundred years between the Yü Hsia dynasties and the Chun Chiu period. Each dynasty moved into a new capital and spread further the influence of civilization, so that by the time of the Chun Chiu no less than ten of the eighteen provinces of modern China could be called civilized, each province with its peculiar customs and cultural development. It is not easy to summarize in a few pages the variegated developments of a territory extending for thousands of miles during a period of more than a thousand years. Such a summary can be only a partial statement, much of which must be merely conjectural.

Our chief investigation must be into the changes in the regulation of land ownership, and the practices that were in vogue. In general we know that during the pastoral stage of society land is the common property of the whole tribe. Such conditions still obtain in Mongolia and Turkestan. The land is designated by the name of the tribe owning it. For the purposes of hunting and herding, wide tracts of land are necessary; the prairies must be open to all. When agriculture began the method was still used, so that the arable land was considered as the property of the whole tribe. So it is said in Shih Ching, "The seeds are sown according to the will of the Emperor. No distinctions are made of any boundaries." Later, as tribes developed into nations, this conception of tribal ownership gave way to the conception of government ownership. There are extant

such expressions as, "Everywhere under heaven there is no land which does not belong to the emperor." As to the method by which this conception was worked out so that the people could work on the farms, there is this statement of Mencius, "During the Hsia regime, the government claimed one share out of fifty, called *Kung*; during the Yin regime, one out of seventy, called *Chu*; and during the Chow regime, one out of a hundred called *Ch'e*." We cannot say whether this statement is historically accurate, but at least there are reasons which lead us to believe that it is not far from the truth. First, those who labour in the fields will expect to reap the results. All things could not be considered as common; the rights of ownership must be considered. Second, as population was sparse and land plentiful, whoever exerted himself could easily work fifty, seventy, or even a hundred *mow* of land, which his people alone would cultivate continually. Third, as the tribes would follow the natural course of development, no one standard could be enforced. As the three regimes mentioned above held power for more than one thousand years, they naturally would be obliged to devise ways and means to suit the conditions of their times.

Now we must ask what these three systems involved.

1. *Kung* means that the people are entitled to work on the farms, but out of the produce one part must be set aside for the government. According to Mencius, the ratio is determined on the basis of the average produce of several years. According to Yü Kung in Shu Ching, the kind of goods collected was also determined by the distance of the locality from the imperial court. "Those at a distance of 100 *li* should send in *Tsung* (the whole ear and straw); those at a distance of 200 *li*, *Chieh* (the ear only); 300 *li*, *Ch'i* (grain and husks); 400 *li*, *Su* (unpolished grain); 500 *li*, *Mi* (polished grain). Besides,

the taxes *hien* and *fu* were listed under nine classifications. Mencius may also have had this system in mind, but taxation of this kind seems only possible after the question of the ownership of land is a settled issue. It is difficult to say whether this system was in use at the time of the Hsia dynasty; but it is definitely certain that such a system was practised in some places before the time of Mencius.

2. *Chw* is explained by Mencius as follows: "A square li of farm called a *Ching* consists of nine lots of 100 *mow* each, according to this diagram,  . The eight surrounding lots are each owned by one family; jointly they work on the central lot." This may have been an ideal system, devised by Mencius himself. It is not likely that there could have been such a clear-cut system.

It is impossible to ascertain whether this system was an inherited institution or it was a practice initiated during the Yin period. It is certain, however, that among the many practices of land regulation, there must have been one similar to this system. The significant feature of this system is the 'government lot' as contrasted with the private lots. The work spent on cultivating this lot constitutes the tax paid to the government. References to the distinctive government of private and government lots are found in Shih Ching and other books which confirm the idea that this system was commonly known during the Shang and Chow periods.

3. *Ch'e*. According to references in Shih Ching, this system was in vogue during the Hsia and Shang dynasties. We have no direct information of this system, but there are indirect sources from which certain facts can be inferred. Mencius once said, "King Wen (of Chow) required one-ninth of the produce from the farmers when

he ruled in Chee." Collaboration of this is found in two places. In the Analects, we find the following: "Duke Ai asked Yu Juo, 'In this famine year the government cannot get sufficient revenue. What shall I do?' The latter replied, 'Why not try the *Ch'e* system?' The Duke said, 'Even with twenty per cent it is insufficient; how much less from the *Ch'e* system.'" We infer that *Ch'e* must yield less than twenty per cent. It may be ten per cent, or one-ninth. Furthermore the quotation shows that during the Chun Chiu period the people still knew the *Ch'e* system. But we have no means of telling how the system differs from either *Kung* or *Chu*. Again in Kuo Yü we find the following passage: "Chi-Kang-Tzu sent Jan Yu to ask Confucius about land taxation. Confucius at first made no answer, but later said to Jan Yu privately, 'The ancient Kings had a system by which the people tilled the land for the government and also equalized the differences in distances. If your master wants to adopt this, let him learn after Chow Kung.'" If this system is *Ch'e*, its seems to be a combination of *Kung* and *Chu*. This was the practice as long as Chow was confined to Chee. What system was introduced after their conquest over Shang it is difficult to ascertain.

On the strength of this fragmentary evidence we might conclude that during the era of the 'three dynasties', in principle the land belonged to the government, but the people had the right to use it. Either one-tenth or one-ninth of the produce went to the government as a matter of obligation. Except the government, no one had the ownership of the land, but only the privilege of use. But when a privilege of use is prolonged, it becomes practically identical with ownership. Therefore it is not far wrong to say that in ancient times whoever tilled the farm owned it. In other words, in practice private ownership of the land was an accomplished fact.

It remains to decide whether the right of use was transferable. This we have no means of knowing; and in the absence of accurate information we cannot establish the certainty of private ownership.

Later, private ownership developed in a new direction. At one time the land ownership belonged to the Emperor, which right he held not as an individual but as ruler of the State. In other words, ownership belonged to the State. Gradually the right was construed as the personal right of the emperor, and a peculiar system developed. The emperor, in his personal right, claimed ownership, and began to parcel out the land to other people. So arose the feudal system, where the emperor made grants to the dukes, and the dukes to the lesser dignitaries. These grants were the rights of ownership, not the rights of use, for the officers of State did not work on the farms, but owned them as properties. In this way, private ownership arose as a corollary to feudalism. In the closing years of West Chow and at the beginning of Chun Chiu, private ownership had become a recognized principle. Therefore one of the Odes says, "The farms I owned have been appropriated by you."

We ask then, under such conditions, what was the status of the farmers who cultivated the land? It was right that when they cultivated the land of the government they should pay part of their produce as a return for the privilege. Now under the new system they worked on farms belonging to nobles who reaped the benefits without moving a finger. It is said in Shih Ching, "Without sowing and tilling why do they claim the produce from 30,000 *mow* of farms?". For in addition to their government tax the farmers had to pay to these landowners, which made their burden doubly heavy. Yen Ying, who lived in this time, says in Tso Chuan that in the kingdom of Chi as much as two-thirds of the people's

produce went to the government, leaving only one-third to meet their own demands of life. From this we might infer what conditions were like in other places even though we have no specific records. In an agricultural country the only means of livelihood is the produce from the farms; and yet of this, two-thirds were taken. No wonder this oligarchy could not last, and that the social conditions pressed upon the attention and the study of the scholars of those days.

We must next speak of the conditions of trade. From Shu Ching one would gather that trading was already a common profession in the days of Yao and Shun. Because many parts of Shu Ching are spurious, this may not be the case. It seems more reasonable to assume that before the Hsia dynasty the tribes lived a communal life, and the profession of trading had not begun. It was not till the Chow and Shang dynasties that trade began to develop. By the time of Chun Chiu it was a prosperous profession.

On the question of barter and the use of money, we know definitely that bartering was still common in the Han dynasty. Before that time it must have been even more prevalent. Both the Book of Changes and references in the writings of Mencius substantiate this. The first money used was shells. We may infer from this that the use of money began in the lower region of the Yellow River where it enters the sea. Later, as the use of money became widespread, shells were insufficient, and imitation shells made of bone were used. Recently some of these were unearthed in Honan. Later, copper was used. Later still, the shapes of swords and agricultural implements were adopted. These all represent the first stage of a money system. When copper was first discovered, copper swords and copper instruments were highly valued. These were therefore used in exchange

for other commodities. Then miniatures were made and used as money. The first coins had a ring attached to them; later only the ring was preserved; later still this ring was made with a square hole in the centre. Thus began the 'cash' which China used before the introduction of solid round coins.

My readings in Tso Chuan lead me to think that the use of metal as money was still rare in the Chun Chiu period, even to the end of the dynasty. Barter was still the prevailing practice. This is important, for before a monetary system developed it was impossible for anyone to accumulate unlimited wealth. From this we may infer that a capitalistic system had not begun even by the time of Confucius.

Appendix VIII

UNIFICATION MOVEMENT

All Chinese political thinking has as its objective "all Under Heaven", that is, the whole of mankind. This concept obviously did not include the whole of mankind, but its tendency to reach out toward the bounds of what was known, instead of being content with a merely sectional development, is indicative of the spirit of internationalism. It is a significant fact that in spite of the atmosphere of jealousy and of the conflicts of policies in which they lived, the Chinese not only had the concept of world peace, but also engaged their thoughts and energies to arouse a consciousness of it.

The Confucian school considered national government only as a means or as a first step towards world peace. The final objective was a state in which both national and racial lines should be obliterated. Their highest ideal was that the civilization of one country should be so enlarged as to include within it all mankind on a footing of equality. Whenever we find in the Confucian Classics a mention of 'the way of virtue', 'the way of power', they invariably become discourses on internationalism as against a narrow nationalism. Internationalism is a natural and logical ideal with the Taoists who go back to nature as their fundamental belief, as with the Motze school who believe in impartial love and equality. The belief in a Heavenly purpose makes this ideal even more concrete and practical. If Heaven regards the people of all nations alike, loving and caring for them all to the same extent, then whoever enjoys the care and protection of Heaven

should follow Heaven's will in loving and caring for others. Therefore nationalism can have little meaning for them. The Legalist school was a little different. They correspond to those who to-day advocate a policy of 'blood and iron'. Nevertheless their objective was also a world order. To use a simile, the three schools are like those who stand for a world confederacy, while the Legalists are like those who stand for the conquest of the world.

It was not uncommon for a man to receive an appointment as an officer in a foreign government. Not only the minor scholars, but even Confucius or Motse did not consider it wrong to visit different kings, making no distinction between one's own country and others. This might now be condemned as treason, but our early teachers thought nothing of it. They considered themselves citizens of the world, owing obligations not to any one country but to the whole world.

Europe, half the size of China, is divided into a number of smaller states constantly at war with one another during the last two thousand years. On the banks of the Rhine stand the two irreconcilable enemies Germany and France. In the small Balkan peninsula there are four or five small kingdoms among which hardly a year passes without warfare. In China, however, a United Empire has been the normal condition since the Tsin dynasty. Occasional conflicts have been known of course, but contrasted with the affairs in Europe during the same period, these have been very few. It is understood that Europe is inhabited by different racial groups, but the ethnological conditions in China are not very different. What then accounts for the unification in China? The physical environment has had its share, but the most potent factor has been the psychological influence which the teachings of these

ancient philosophers has exalted. It has been observed before that one's consciousness of others should be enlarged rather than restricted. If our ancestors had encouraged the people of Tsin to love their country only, and the people of Yueh to love their country only, then the attitude of the people to-day would not be better than that of the Germans and French. But the Chinese made it a point to nourish this consciousness, so differences have been merged into a united whole. As Europeans encouraged a discriminatory attitude towards other nations, the differences between them have become accentuated. The psychological effect is unnoticeable, but how real and powerful a factor it can become!

Appendix IX

DISARMAMENT MOVEMENT

Disarmament was first proposed in the last days of the Chun Chiu. In the Kingdom of Sung was held a conference similar to the Hague Conferences before the Great War. At that time the opponents attacked its principle by saying, "Heaven created the five elements. Deprived of any one of them we cannot live. Who can go without arms?" But the scholars determinedly opposed this view. Laotze said, "Arms are an ominous weapon." Confucius said, "At a conference the strong will dominate the weak; in warfare, the party that enters the fray last will dominate those who entered earlier." Mencius said, "No fighting during the Chun Chiu period was righteous," and in another connection he condemned war relentlessly. "It is like leading the monster of the land to devour flesh. Even death does not expiate such a crime." In an earlier connection we have shown how Motze and his disciples denounce war. These people not only preached, but also actually tried to stop fighting. Yet they taught defence as a policy. The following story is instructive. "Kung Shu Pan had just completed a mechanical ladder by which the Kingdom of Chu could lay siege on Sung. Motze heard of it, journeyed ten nights and days without ceasing. His feet were blistered, but he tore up his clothes to bandage them, and continued undaunted. When Kung Shu Pan saw him and asked what he wanted, Motze replied, "There are some rebellious officers in the north. I would like you to kill them." Kung was greatly displeased. Motze added, "I will pay you ten pieces of

gold." Kung replied, "I am a righteous man and do not kill anybody." Motze saluted him and said, "Let me make my meaning clear. I come from the north where I was told that you have completed a machine by which to lay siege on Sung. What offence has Sung committed? In your country there is much land and few people. To diminish that of which you have few to add to that of which you have enough is foolish. Sung has committed no offence; to lay siege on its people is cruel. If you know what is right and do not fight for it, it is the height of disloyalty. If you fight and do not succeed, you cannot be called proficient. If you are righteous and refuse to kill a few people, but have no compunction about killing a large number of people, you are defective in reasoning power." Kung was convinced he was right. "Then why not stop?" pursued Motze. Kung answered "Because I have already promised the king." "Then why not take me to the king," said Motze. Kung agreed. When Motze saw the king, he said, "I hear that you are sending an expedition against Sung. I suppose you do this because you feel sure of victory. On the other hand if you are not sure of success, and if your deed is proved unrighteous, will you still undertake the expedition?" "If there is no assurance of victory, and if furthermore our action involves an offence against righteousness, why should we make the attack" replied the king. Motze said, "Well said. I feel sure that Sung will not be overcome." The king said, "Kung Shu Pan has devised a special machine, and he is the ablest mechanic on earth." Motze said, "Let him lay siege on me, and we will have a mock battle." So the two men staged the war. Kung Shu Pan advanced nine times, and nine times he was repulsed. Although his weapons were exhausted, Motze still had a good supply. Kung Shu Pan murmured, "I know the

way to repel you, but I will not say it." Motze retorted, "I also know the way by which you could repel me, but I will not say it either." The king asked the reason. Motze said, "Kung Shu Pan simply wants to have me killed. After I am killed there will be none to defend Sung, and you will have success. But I have over three hundred disciples armed with my weapons now waiting on the city wall for the invaders to come. Even though I am killed, you cannot put an end to my method." The king said, "Well said! Let us not invade Sung."

This splendid story depicts Motze's love, energy, determination, skill, and resourcefulness. With this kind of personality, vigour, fidelity, and belief, it is natural that not only the men of his time, but also those of later generations should be influenced by his teachings. But there was the other camp, the camp of the Legalists. In the struggle between the two ideals the militarists won, and the empire of Tsin resulted, an empire which lasted only a little over ten years. Then the principle of peace won the day. For four hundred years the Han dynasty ruled, during which time the people were so deeply convinced of the power of peace that there was no time that militarism did not incur popular disapproval. Military undertakings were allowed for defensive purposes only. It is due to Motze's influence that the Chinese can be said to be good defenders but not a combative nation. For since this time, China has been invaded by alien races several times. But the fact that she has been able to assimilate the foreign alien elements and thereby enrich and better her civilization is due to the deep-rooted influence of the early Sages.

APPENDIX X

ON EDUCATIONAL IDEALS

THE attitude of the various schools differs on the question of education. Even within the same school their method differs. A surface view suggests that the Taoists are opposed to education. Yet their belief in ignorance does not proceed from a selfish motive. It is their way of getting back to nature. Although their ideal is the innocence of a baby, it is wrong to think they are thoroughly opposed to education, else what is the purpose of Laotze's essay of five thousand words, or Chuangtze's thirty-three essays? One would be more inclined to say that they advocate education to ignorance! The Legalists use law to bridle the people. Their method seems different from education; but in reality law is their means of achieving education. Their motto is "Not books but law: not the words of a teacher, but the rule of an officer, is the way to give instruction". Instead of the school, the army, the court, and the prison are the institutions for education. In the final analysis, their object still is "The habitual observance of law". They differ from the Confucian school in that the latter aims at training up *men*, and that they wish to turn out *officers*. Regardless of individual character, they wish to cast all men in our mould. In ancient times the Spartan system, and in modern times the Prussian system, are illustrations of what we mean.

The book entitled Kwantze is not typical of the Legalist school. It shows the combined influence of the Taoist, the Confucian, and the Legalist schools. What it has to say on education is very interesting. "The

scholars, farmers, labourers, and merchants are the pillars of the country. They must not be allowed to live promiscuously, or else their language will be mixed and their professions deranged. Therefore the ancients placed the scholars in quiet places, the farmers near the labourers within reach of government offices, and the merchants in the vicinity of larger towns. In this way the scholars will live together, so that the fathers will discuss parental love, the sons will discuss filial conduct. From morning to night these virtues will be taught to the children. While young they will learn and improve by habitual practice; nothing can distract them. Fathers will teach without effort, the sons will learn without discomfort. Therefore the sons of scholars usually turn out scholars. The farmers live with their own group. All day long they work on their farms; with sweated body and soiled feet, with dishevelled hair and weather-beaten skin, they exert their strength to the last ounce. This they have learned while still young. They are satisfied, and there is nothing to distract their mind. The parents teach without distraction, and the children learn with ease. Therefore farmers' sons often become farmers. Likewise with labourers and with merchants." Such a method of education is not without its strong points. It is of course absurd to expect the people to keep to one profession from generation to generation, but the principle of teaching by association is a sound one.

A further passage dealing with citizen soldiery is more interesting. "Civil administration should be allied with military training. . . . Once an administration is settled, the people should not be allowed to move. Those in the army will each protect the other, and their families will love one another. While young, they live together; grown up, they play together. . . . They share in one another's joys and sorrows. So when they fight at night,

their voices will hearten each other; when they fight during the day they will work as friends. They will take delight in dying for one another. These men, placed in defence, will hold fast; engaged in battles, they will win. With thirty thousand of these trained men, one could act as he pleased in the whole world." The main thing in this method is mass psychology, which is the direct result of educational effort.

The educational method of Motze is founded on religious faith enlivened by personality. The expression 'religious faith' is used here not to indicate belief in an after-life, but in the sense of devout beliefs. When a belief is filled with an emotional content it becomes a religious faith. Such is the case with the Chinese revolution against the Manchurians; such is the case with followers of Marx to-day. Only thus will anyone be willing to die for a belief. Religious faith is the highest product of emotion; and Motze especially emphasizes the cultivation of emotion. The reason that he had 'disciples all over the world', was because of the irresistible power of his great personality.

As for the Confucianist, education is everything, the base and goal of their political philosophy. Without education no government is conceivable; government is worth while only so far as it is a means of education. A city, a country, the whole world, all are looked upon as schools, and the people as the students. "The songs of joy" are the marks of an ideal state; "to nip evil at the bud and to foster reverence in what is minute" and "To change the environment so that happiness and harmony will prevail" is at once the means and the end of Confucian political thinking. This conception is founded on the basic belief that contacts of man with man are the most effective way of influencing individual character. In the contacts of men, sincerity is emphasised,

"Only through perfect sincerity can one reach the nature of the cosmos. Having done that, one can reach the nature of men." Or again, "Sincerity has never failed to influence; without sincerity no one can have any influence upon others." The meaning of these quotations is that the whole of the genuine personality must be brought into full play in order that men may achieve perfection. The personality of any one individual is part of the universe; and it is constantly shaping and being shaped by the personalities around it. The development of our personality to its full extent must influence the whole personality of which we are a part; then every individual in the whole cannot escape being influenced also. What one individual strives for will compel all others to strive for it. This is why the Confucianists believe so completely in the power of education.

This education of personality presupposes the presence of a noble personality for the teacher, such as no official person could be. Therefore Confucius began the method of personal ministry or instruction. Before his time, education was entrusted to public officials; no individual had made teaching a profession till Confucius began his work. He rallied round him three thousand disciples, and gave to them and to all who came the same instructions without discrimination. His belief was that when the genuine personality is brought into play, the world will be made better. To him, education and politics are one and the same thing. It is possible to say that he spent his life both in education and in politics.

Appendix XI

ON ECONOMIC CONCEPTS

The Taoists do not recognize that economics comes within the purview of politics; moreover as their ideal is to do away with material wants, they have no concern with economics. And although they are not consistent in their claims, yet it is true that generally speaking they give little or no thought to this subject. For the other schools, economics form an important study; each approaches it from a special angle. The Legalists deal especially with production; the Confucian school with distribution; Motze and his followers deal with both branches of the question, though they investigate neither very thoroughly.

Li Lee is the first man both to put legal concepts into practice, and also to form an economic policy on a careful and systematic study of actual conditions. Han-shu Shih-Huo-Chih records his study of farming conditions in the dukedom of Wei, as follows: "A hundred square *li* is roughly equivalent to 9,000,000 *mow* of farms. Excluding mountains, hills, marshes, and towns, there are left approximately 6,000,000 *mow* for farming purposes. For industrious farmers, the yield per *mow* will be three *Sheng* above the average; for those who are not industrious the reverse will be true. On this basis, the average produce in toto will not exceed 1,800,000 tan. . . . If the selling price is fixed too high, the people generally will suffer; if the price is too low, the farmers will suffer. If the people generally suffer, they will scatter; if the farmers suffer, the country will lose its wealth. So whether the price is too high or too low, the harm is the same.

A good ruler should see to it that the people in general are not exploited and that the farmers are encouraged to become industrious.

"Suppose a farmer with a family of five works on 100 *mow* of farm, and each *mow* yields one and a half *piculs* of grain. His total income is 150 *piculs* of grain. If we take out ten per cent for taxation, there is left for him 135 *piculs*. If each member of his family requires one and a half *piculs* for food, that will be 90 *piculs* for the five, and there will be 45 *piculs* left. He sells this at 30 cash, and obtains 1,350 cash. If we deduct from this 300 cash for necessary expenses at the seasonal sacrifices, 1,050 cash will be left. Suppose that each person required 300 cash for clothing, 1,500 cash will be required during the year, and there will be a deficit of 450 cash. In addition to this, there are likely to be expenses for sickness, for funerals, and for special taxes, none of which are provided for. This is why the farmers are poor. They have no incentive to put extra labour on the farm, and the price of rice is forced up by the lack of supply. Therefore a good controller of food-stuff would first rate the year's crop into first-class, second-class, and third-class. From a first-class crop he will take four times the usual rate, and leave the farmer 400 *piculs*. From the second-class crop he will take three times the usual rate, and leave 300 *piculs* for the farmer. From the third-class crop he will take twice the usual rate, and leave the farmer 100 *piculs*. When the year is poor, only 100 *piculs* will be taken from the best crop, 70 *piculs* from the next, and only 30 *piculs* from the worst crop. From the best crop, 30 per cent is kept by the government; from the second-rate crop 20 per cent; from the worst crop 10 per cent, so that prices are equalized and the peoples needs are met. When there is a slight famine, the savings from the third-rate crop are used; if the famine get

worse, the savings from the moderate crop are used; when the famine is very bad, then the savings from the best crops are used. In this way, even in time of famine, flood, or drought, the price of rice will be uniform, and the people need not scatter. The secret lies in saving up the surplus for a time of need. The dukedom of Wei practised this principle, and the people had no want."

This extract is quoted in full because it is the first record of the economics of ancient times. Its main principles are (1) The fullest exploitation of the farms; (2) Equalization of prices. The first principle would help forward the greatest production on the part of individuals, while the second would enact a social policy by which the government would equalize the profits of each farmer. As agriculture was the only industry of the time, farming alone was considered. Later, as commerce and industry developed, two schools of thought grew up side by side, one thinking in terms of agriculture, and one in terms of commerce.

On the whole the Kingdom of Tsin emphasized agriculture, and that of Chi emphasized commerce. This was due to the different stage of national development. Tsin was a new state, living under the constant fear of a shortage of population. By taking an aggressive polity in farm development it succeeded in increasing its own population. On the other hand the Kingdom of Chi was comparatively old and advanced in life and economic development. In the book Kwantze (a product of Chi) the following economic theory is advanced. "Gold merely represents utility. When its principle is understood, then the difference between extravagance and frugality is clear. When the principle of extravagance and frugality is known, then there will be a plentiful sufficiency. Frugality injures business, extravagance acts unfavourably upon commodities. Money is cheap

when there is frugality; when money is cheap there can be no transactions, and business is dull. Extravagance raises the value of money; when money value is high, the value of goods is low. Extravagance acts unfavourably upon goods." Again, "The five grains are the necessities of life for the people. Gold and money is currency. The wise man will use the currency to exercise control over the necessities of life so that the energy of the people would be properly utilized." Money is considered as having the potentiality of exercising control over other commodities, and grains are considered as belonging to a special class among all commodities. The secret of prosperity lies in effecting an equilibrium between the two. All untoward economic conditions are thought to be caused by unscrupulous monopolies of these elements. It is said, "As a crop is bad or good, the prices of grains are high or low. If the government does not exercise proper control, those merchants with accumulated wealth will take advantage of the unfortunate conditions of the people. For instance everyone may have an equal possession of land; only those who are strong will be able to develop it. Everyone may have an equal share of wealth; only those with talent will be able to develop it. Those with talent may get profit ten-fold; those without talent may even lose their capital. This is why people live under such very different economic conditions." Under these conditions, "unless the government is able to equalize the surplus value, there is no possibility of having peace among the people. Even if the government could increase the amount of wealth by encouraging farming, and by coining more money, this will only serve to heighten the degree of exploitation by unscrupulous people. There is no peace." There are two ways to deal with this problem. (1) The control of capital by the State; (2) The regulation of

commerce by the government. The book goes on to say, "The grains are the major products. If the price of grain is high, the prices of other things will be low; if the price of grain is low, the price of other things will be high. These are rivals and cannot be equal. An emperor should watch the rise and fall between them, and adjust them."

This same book also states that salt and iron should be controlled by the government and used as a source of revenue. Huan Kung asked Kwantze, "Should I tax construction materials?" Kwantze replied, "That will spoil all construction." "Then should I tax lumber?" "That will spoil life." "Then should I tax cattle and pigs?" "That will kill life." "Then I must tax the people." "That is unreasonable." "How then should I maintain the government?" exclaimed Huan Kung. Kwantze replied, "Yes, nationalize the mountains and the sea. That is all right. . . . In a family of ten they all eat salt. In a month's time the men would each consume five and a half *sheng*. The women would each consume three and a half *sheng*; the children would each consume two and a half *sheng*. In a country of ten thousand chariots there is a population of ten million. Each day at least two million people will buy salt. At the rate of 30 cash per head, that will amount to 30,000,000 cash a month.

"Then consider the case of iron. Every woman has to have at least one needle and one knife for her work. Every farmer has to have at least one hoe, one spade, and one hammer for his work, or the work cannot be done. Collect one cash on each needle; thirty needles would be the equivalent to the tax on one man. Collect six cash on each instrument; then five instruments would make up for one man." Thus did the people of 2,000 years ago conceive of the idea of indirect taxation,

which is now a universal principle. The conception of government control of iron and salt was very significant.

These economic views of the Legalists were all put forward from the standpoint of nationalism. Their object was to "gain territory for the ruler and to fill his treasury". The welfare of the people was not considered. Therefore Mencius indicted these men as slaughterers of the people.

Motze's followers also laid much emphasis on production, but they saw that restricted consumption was identical with production. They therefore taught frugality as a cardinal virtue. They said, "When a saint rules a country, its wealth will double. When he rules an empire, its wealth will double. This is due not to widened territory; economy and the elimination of waste is the secret." They would turn all the energy consumed in manufacturing luxuries to the manufacture of the necessities of life. That was their policy. They also dealt with early marriage. They said, "What is the hardest thing to double? It is the number of men. But there is a way. In the old days, the saintly rulers ordered that men should be married at twenty and women at fifteen. None dared disobey. In these later times the people have got out of control. Those who want to marry early, marry at the age of twenty; those who want to marry late delay it till forty. On the average of these two, marriage is delayed ten years. If we calculate at the rate of one child in three years, it means a loss of two or three children."

Diametrically opposed to this view of constantly fearing a shortage of supply, the Confucian school takes the view that production is not the problem. The problem is one of unequal distribution. Tung Chung Shu makes the following comment: "When there is

accumulation, there will be insufficiency. When one is too rich, he will be proud. When one is too poor, he will be anxious. Anxiety drives one to thieving; pride makes one heartless. This is a common experience. From such experiences the good ruler discerns where the trouble lies. He would so adjust things that the rich would be able to distinguish himself, and the poor would be free from worries. By striking such an equilibrium, there will be no want and no disorder." This is a central note of the Confucian economic view. The Great Learning says, "When the producers are numerous and the consumers few, when the workers are proficient and the users are economical, then there will always be plentiful wealth." This simple formula has comprehensive implications. One significant point is that only personal wealth or social wealth is to be considered. When society in general is well supplied, the government will not be in want. The Great Learning says, "It were better to have a man rob a country of its revenue than to have a minister who would make imposts upon the people in order to fill the coffers of the government. Such a government can be said not to be considering money as prosperity, but righteousness as prosperity. When a ruler of state makes revenues his chief business, then he must be under the influence of mean men. He may consider them to be good, but when such men are employed in the administration of a state, calamities and curses will befall the country together. Even though good men may be put in their place, they will not be able to remedy the evil." This again illustrates the saying, 'Money is not to be considered prosperity; real prosperity is to be found in righteousness.' To enrich one person or one class of persons is not desirable; to enrich the government at the expense of the people is also not desirable. For when the people are

poverty-stricken, what good is it that the government should be wealthy?

The Confucian school would let the people have their own way. The part of the government is to sympathize with the people in their distress, and to remove for them their difficulties. When the government has removed both the obstacles to production and the influences that spoil an equilibrium, then its part is done. After that, let the people go their own way and enjoy an unmolested life. Hsuntze says, "The way to supply the needs of the people is to define clearly their rights. . . . Then protect, love, and regulate their life so that even in times of famine, flood, or drought the people may not starve. This is the function of saintly rulers and virtuous ministers." And Mencius says, "Let not the farming seasons be interfered with; then the people will have plenty of grain. Let not fine nets be spread in the waters; then the people will have plenty of fish. Let the trees be felled according to seasons; then the people will have no shortage of timber." These passages epitomize the economic views of the Confucianists.

APPENDIX XII

RURAL GOVERNMENT

EUROPEAN government is based on cities; Chinese government is based on villages; herein lies a fundamental difference between them. It is therefore impossible for either to imitate the other. The Taoists think in terms of isolated independent villages. The followers of Motze think in terms of self-governing villages, each with its leader. The Legalist school works out a very elaborate system of rural government, by which the whole country is divided into inter-related country districts, each looking after its own affairs. This organization is described in the book of Kwantze: "The country is divided into five sections called *hsiang* over which is a 'teacher'. Each section is divided into five districts called *Chow* over which is a 'leader'. Each district is again divided into ten sub-districts called *hi* over which is an 'officer'. This is still further divided into ten communities called *Yu* over which is an 'aldir'. In these communities the people are grouped in tens and fives, all of which have a head."

So also Confucius considers country life as of paramount importance. The Analects record most vividly his life in the country. Whether it be at the community drinking, or at the archery contest, it is in the country that the first step in ethical training is made. Mencius develops this idea further, and conceives of mutually helpful rural communities. Still later the Han scholars worked out a very elaborate system of rural administration which is described in Tso Chuan. "When there is famine

even the personal influence of Yao and Shun cannot prevent banditry in the country. When there is the distinction of poverty and wealth even the law of Kao Yao cannot prevent the strong from exploiting the weak. Therefore the saintly rulers devised the *Ching* system of farms and make allotments to the people. Each family of five is given one hundred *mow* of farm. In each *Ching* there are eight families surrounding a common farm. Such an arrangement makes possible five things; namely, full utilization of the land, occupation for all the families, unification of customs, combination of labour and circulation of commodities. The farms are classified into three grades, and the ownership of farms rotate once in three years so that no one enjoys the monopoly of fertile farms nor does one always bear the loss of arid farms."

"The community in a farm is called *Ju* and the community in a city is called *Li*. One *Li* has eighty families with eight of them on each street. In the centre of the community is a school. An old and virtuous man is elected elder and a strong and talented man is made administrator, both of whom are given twice the farm which the other people have and both rank as officials. After the harvest is reaped the people all go back to their homes. Led by the administrator the men and women will all make hemp strings till midnight each day so that one month's work is equivalent to that of forty-five days. This continues from the tenth moon through the first moon of the next year. The men of sixty and the women of fifty who have no children are fed and clothed by the government. Beginning the tenth moon the elder starts teaching in the school. The children of eight years old are taught the Hsiao Hsüeh; those aged fifteen are taught the Great Learning, the best of whom are sent to higher institutions."

This system has never been put into practice, so it is impossible to know to what extent the suggestions are practical. The important thing to bear in mind is that co-operation and sympathy is its basis. This passage summarizes in a few lines the ideal of a Confucian society.

Appendix XIII

ON PEOPLE'S RIGHTS

People's rights were unknown in the old days in China. The Legalist school emphasizes rights but not the people; the Confucian school emphasizes the people but not rights; the followers of Motze and Laotze have no interest in these questions. So on the question of democracy all four schools are equally silent. Yet we need to study what they think and teach about the people as a factor in government.

The motto of the Taoist is, "Not to give to the people intelligence, but to keep them ignorant." They take the view that the administration of the country is made difficult by giving wisdom to the people. It is clear that they would not allow the people to participate in government. And as they do not see any necessity for a government, so there is really nothing for the people to participate in. This of course means total abandon, which, carried to its logical conclusion would mean that the people should have the right to do anything they like.

The followers of Motze take the view that those below should follow the example of those above. Such is a bureaucratic government, denying all individual rights to the people. Yet equality forms their fundamental belief; and the wise shall rule over the ignorant. This may mean that wherevet the wise are found they should be entitled to rule over the people.

The Legalist school naturally does not allow the people to have any rights. "The people may be given a share in what is already accomplished, but they cannot be consulted in the initiation of things." For, "the

mind of the people is as unpractical as the mind of a baby is weak." The orthodox view is that the part of the people is to obey the law. But those who are influenced by other than their own teachings take a different view. Yinwentze says, "What seems right to one man, but wrong to the rest of the world, is not necessarily right; what seems wrong to one man, but right to the rest of the world, is not necessarily wrong. Therefore it is clear that the correct estimate of right and wrong is the verdict of the many, not that of any one person. The one who contradicts the many is wrong; the one who follows the many is right." This explains in a most vivid way what is conceived of as the will of the people, or public opinion. But the people's will is not necessarily always rational. Yet at any time among a group of people when an idea becomes popular, its effect is powerful and irresistible. The right or wrong of a question is dependant upon the judgment of the masses at the time, for in politics there can be no absolute standard of what is good or bad. A skilful politician will capitalize his popularity to attain his end, and a responsible statesman will not hesitate to lose his popularity in taking a stand on a clear issue.

Yinwentze says in another connection, "Whatever is good or admirable but not permissible to all people, is not of the highest type. Only those things which are permissible to all are really good and really admirable. What one admires in the rule of a saintly emperor is not his individual rule, but the fact that he is able to share his rule with the people. . . . What is virtuous in an individual's conduct may not be applicable as a general standard; what is possible with one person may not be a universal possibility. . . . Therefore the saintly rulers set up the laws in order to have uniformity. The wise and the ignorant, the able and the stupid, all

will be on an equal basis." This is in accord with the modern conception that the common standard must be what is possible for the masses. It is true that this drags down the standard, for what is possible for the masses is bound to be lower than what is possible for an individual. But in order to realize the ideal of "sharing the government with all", that is unavoidable. Later, as the Legalist school became more and more influenced by Confucian thinking, they were found to say, "If one discerns the mind of the people individually, it is foolish; if one discerns their mind collectively, it is saintly." This is tantamount to recognizing that the will of the masses is far more important than that of an individual. They even go so far as to emphasize the importance of giving attention to the gossips on the streets. In these respects they have clearly adopted the teachings of the Confucian school.

We shall now finally consider the Confucian school who very explicitly teach that the foundation of all politics is the will of the people. The Great Learning says, "What the people like, you should like; what the people dislike, you should dislike. Then you are truly the parent of the people." Other quotations of the same kind can be multiplied. But on the question of the participation of the people in the government, Confucius has nothing definite to say except in one instance. This is a statement in the Analects which is open to various interpretations. It may be read as saying, "It is possible to let the people follow, but it is not possible to let them understand." Another reading is, "It is possible to let the people act (in a certain way) but there is no way of letting them understand the reason." Along with this is Mencius' statement that there are many people who habitually do a thing all their life without understanding, or even taking the

trouble to find out the reason for it. Habit formation is a fundamental method of education with the Confucian school. Is it correct to say that the Confucian school has no respect for the will of the people merely because of these two isolated statements? On the other hand are there any definite proofs to establish the fact that the Confucian school advocate democracy? There are no such proofs. Democracy envisages a people who take the initiative in exercising political control. The Confucian thinking envisages a passive people submitting to an imposed administration. It is true that they stress most positively the importance of respecting the will of the people, but they do not say that it must be blindly followed. Due regard should be given to public opinion, but such consideration should be given only after careful study and investigation. We infer from this that at best the people will have an indirect influence only in the government.

Then does the Confucian school divide the people into two classes, the ruling and the ruled? Yes and no. The ruling classes are the 'princely men'. This is not a class in the ordinary sense of the word. The distinction is based on personal character rather than on material standards. A man is princely in the sense of the development of his character; a man is inferior in the sense of lacking in moral attainment. In modern times it is customary only for people of age to participate in politics. The Confucian conception is similar to this, except that the criterion is a moral rather than a physiological one. As it is dangerous to give political power to a minor in age, so it is dangerous to give it to a minor in moral development. Such a classification, however, is never fixed; so the ideal of Confucian philosophy is that the moral influence will so prevail that every man may become a 'princely man'. When this is accomplished, the ideal democracy will be realized.

GLOSSARY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS

A

Advice for Regulating Habits 齊俗篇
Agriculture and Warfare 農戰篇
Ai, Duke of Lu 魯哀公
Analects, The 論語
Autumn Water 秋水

B

Biography of Tung Chung Shu 董仲舒傳
Book of Rites 禮記

C

Chan Kuo 戰國
Chan Kuo Ch'e 戰國策
Ch'ao T'so 鼂錯
Chao Yang 趙鞅
Ch'es 杞
Ch'ee 杞
Ch'en Chungtze 陳仲子
Ch'en Hsiang 陳相
Ch'eng Liang 陳良
Cheng 鄭
Cheng Hsuan 鄭玄
Chi, Kingdom 齊
Chieh 桀
Chi Jan 計然
Ch'iang Hsueh Pao 強學報
Chih An Chen 治安策
Chin 晉
Chin Hsin, II 盡心下
Ching Kung of Ch'i 齊景公
Ching System (of farms) 井田之法
Ch'ing Yi Pao 清議報
Chiu Kao 邱浩
Chow, dynasty 周
Chow Kung 周公
Chow Kwan 周官
Chu 朱
Chu-Ko Liang 諸葛亮
Ch'un Ch'iu 春秋
Ch'un Ch'iu Fan Lu 春秋繁露
Ch'uan Jung 犬戎
Chuangtze 莊子
Classics, I, the 經上
Codification of Law 完法篇
Commentaries, Book of Changes 易傳辭爻圖
Confucius 孔子
Crucial Words 經言篇

D

Doctrine of the Mean 中庸

E

Efficacy of Confucianism, the 儒效
Eight Theories 八說篇

Emperor vs. his officers 君臣篇
Emperor's Way, the 君道篇
Enriching a Country 富國
Exercise of Law, the 任法篇
Existence of Standards, the 有度篇
Explaining Laotze 解老

F

Fan Ch'ih 樊遲
Fan Li 范蠡
Fang Chi 坊記
Fei Shih 費誓
Five Grades of Punishments 五刑
Five Ministers, the 五官
Five Sources of Trouble 五蠹

G

Grand Historian 大史
Grand Rectifier 大正
Great Learning, the 大學
Great Supreme, the 大宗師篇
Glory and Shame 榮辱

H

Han 漢
Han Shu 漢書
Hanfeitze 韓非子
Han Scholars 漢人
"Harmony, beauty and perfection" 義容相樂
Heavenly Mind, I, II, III 天志上中下
Horse Hoop 馬蹄篇
Houchi 后稷
Hsi Chung 奚仲
Hsia, dynasty 夏
Hsin Hui 新會
Hsin Min Ts'ung Pao 新民叢報
Hsing Fa Chih 刑法志
Hsiao Ching 孝經
Hsü Hsing 許行
Hsüan, Emperor 宣王
Hsuan of Chi, King 齊宣王
Hsueh Chi 學記
Hsuntze (Hsun Ching) 荀子
Huai Nan Tze 淮南子
Hui Shih 惠施
Hung Fan 洪範

J

Jen 仁

K

Kao Tze, I 告子上
Kao Tze, II 告
Kao Yao 皋陶
Kao Yao Mu 皋陶謨
K'ang Kao 康誥
K'ang Yu Wei 康有爲
Kingly Way, the 王制
Kung Meng 公孟

Kung Sun Chou, I 公孫丑上
Kuo Yu 國語
Ku 穀
Kun 鯀
Kung 貢
Kung Shu Pan 公輸般
Kwantze (Kwan Chung) 管子
Kwantze Shang-Chun Shu 管子商君書
Kwan She Fu 顏射父
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