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**Psyche**



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# Psyche

The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality  
among the Greeks

By  
ERWIN ROHDE



LONDON  
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W. B. HILLIS, M.A.

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## PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

THIS book offers an account of the opinions held by the Greeks about the life of the human soul after death, and is thus intended as a contribution to the history of Greek religion. Such an undertaking has in a special measure to contend with the difficulties that face any inquiry into the religious life and thought of the Greeks. Greek religion was a natural growth, not a special foundation, and the ideas and feelings which gave it its inward tone and outward shape never received abstract formulation. It expressed itself in religious performances alone: it had no sacred books from which we might determine the inward meaning and interconnexion of the ideas with which the Greeks approached the gods created by their faith. The central essence of the religion held by the Greek people, in spite of this absence of conceptual formulation—or perhaps because of it—preserved its original character to a remarkable degree: the speculations and fancies of Greek poets continually refer to this central nucleus. Indeed the poets and philosophers in such of their writings as have come down to us are our only authorities for the religious thought of the Greeks. In the present inquiry they have naturally had to be our guides for the greater part of the way. But though under the special conditions of Greek life the religious views of poets and philosophers represent an important side of Greek religion, they yet allow us to perceive very clearly the independent and self-determined position with regard to the ancestral religion retained by the individual. The individual believer might always, if his own temper and disposition allowed him, give himself up to the plain and unsophisticated emotions which had shaped and decided the faith of the people and the religious performances of popular *religion*. But we should know very little of the religious ideas that filled the mind of the believing Greek if we had to do without the evidence of philosophers and poets (and of some Attic orators as well) in whose words dumb and inarticulate emotion finds expression. The inquirer would, however, be entirely on the wrong track

and be led to some remarkable conclusions who ventured without more ado to deduce from the religious ideas that find expression in Greek literature a complete Theology of the Greek people. Where direct literary statements and allusions fail us we are left with nothing but surmises in face of the religion of the Greeks and its inmost guiding forces. Of course there are plenty of people of sanguine temperament and industrious fancy who find no difficulty in producing for our benefit the most admirable solutions of the problem. Others in varying degrees of good faith press the emotions of Christian piety into the service of explaining ancient faith in gods. Thus injustice is done to both forms of religion and an understanding of the essentials of Greek belief in its true and independent reality is made completely impossible. A good example of this is provided by the Eleusinian Mysteries, and by that favourite topic of controversy (which has, indeed, received more than its due share of attention from students of religion), the amalgamation of the worship of gods and the belief in Souls said to have taken place therein. Nowhere else has the complete unprofitableness of the attempt to make use of the shifting ideas and tendencies of modern civilization to explain the underlying motive forces of these significant cult practices, been more strikingly and repeatedly demonstrated. On this head in particular the author of the present work has renounced all attempts to cast a fitful and ambiguous light upon the venerable gloom of the subject by the help of the farthing dip of his own private imaginings. There is no denying that here as in so many departments of ancient *religion* there is something greater and finer that eludes our grasp. The revealing word, never having been written down, has been lost. Instead of trying to find a substitute in modern catch phrases it seems better simply to describe, in the plainest and most literal fashion, the actual phenomena of Greek piety exactly as they are known to us. There will be plenty of opportunity for the author's own suggestions and they need not always obtrude themselves. The aim of this work is to make plain the facts of the Greek *Cult of Souls* and of that belief in immortality the inner workings of which are only partially intelligible to our most sympathetic efforts to understand them. To give a clearer presentation of the origin and development of those practices and those beliefs; to distinguish the transformations through which they passed and their relationship with other and kindred intellectual tendencies; to disentangle the many different lines of thought and speculation from the inextricable

confusion in which they lie in many minds (and in many books) and to let them stand out clearly and distinctly one from another, seemed particularly desirable. Why this design has not been carried out by the same methods throughout; why it has sometimes seemed sufficient to give a bald summary of the essential points, whilst at other times certain topics are pursued into their most distant ramifications (sometimes with apparently irrelevant prolixity), will be obvious enough to those who are familiar with the subject. Where a more careful examination of the overflowing mass of detail was to be attempted advantage has been taken of the Appendix to achieve a greater, though still only a relative degree of completeness. This was made possible by the lengthy period which elapsed between the publication of the two parts of the book. The first half [in the end of chapter vii] appeared as long ago as the spring of 1890. Unpropitious circumstances have delayed the completion of the remainder till the present moment. The two parts could easily be kept separate (as they have been): in the main they fall apart and correspond to the two sides of the question indicated in the title of the book—Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality. The Cult of Souls and the faith in immortality may eventually come together at some points, but they have a different origin and travel most of the way on separate paths. The conception of immortality in particular arises from a spiritual intuition which reveals the souls of men as standing in close relationship, and indeed as being of like substance, with the everlasting gods. And simultaneously the gods are regarded as being in their nature like the soul of man, i.e. as free spirits needing no material or visible body. (It is this spiritualized view of the gods—not the belief in gods itself as Aristotle supposes in the remarkable statement quoted by Sextus Empiricus Adv. Mathematicos, iii, 20 ff.—which arises from the vision of its own divine nature achieved by the soul κατὰ φύσιν relieved of the body, in *ἐθερσιγενείᾳ* and *πνεύματι*.) And this conception leads far away from the ideas on which the Cult of Souls was based.

The publication of the book in two parts has brought with it a regrettable circumstance for which I must ask the indulgence of well-disposed readers (that the first half found so many of them is a fact which I must gratefully acknowledge). As the dimensions of the whole work grew beyond expectation and almost overstepped the *πέρας ἀβυσσος*, the sixteen excursions which were promised in



the first volume have had to be dropped: the book would otherwise have been overloaded. So far as they possess independent interest they will find a place elsewhere. They are real excursions and were intended as such, and the proper understanding of the book will not be affected by their absence.

ERWIN RONDE.

HAIDELBERG.

*November 14, 1893.*

## PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

THE publication of a second edition of this book affords me a welcome opportunity of making my account more exact and to the point in certain places ; of adding some points that had been overlooked or omitted ; and of noticing with approval or disapproval some divergent opinions that had obtained currency in the interval. Controversy is, however, confined within the narrowest limits and to points of minor importance (and only then in answer to more serious and significant objections). The plan and—if I may say so—the style of the whole book demanded throughout, and more especially in the great points at issue, a purely positive statement of my own views and the results of my own studies. Such a statement, it may well be imagined, was not arrived at without being preceded in the mind of the author by a controversial reckoning with the manifold views and doctrines of others upon the subjects here dealt with—views which in some cases he felt obliged to reject. Controversy in this sense lies behind every page of the book, though as a rule only in a latent condition. In this condition I have been content to let it remain in this revised edition of the book. My opinions were not arrived at without toil and much careful reflection ; one view being made to reinforce another till they were all bound together in a single closely-knitted whole. Neither further reflection on my part nor the criticisms of others have shaken my belief in the tenability of opinions reached in this way. I have therefore ventured to leave my account unaltered in all its main points. I hope that it contains its own justification and defence in itself without further vindication on my part.

Nothing in the plan or execution of the whole or its parts has been altered ; neither have I taken anything away. The book contained nothing that was superfluous to the attainment of the object that I had in view. This object, it will be apparent, was not in the least to provide a brief and compendious statement of the most indispensable facts about the cult of Souls and the belief in immortality among the Greeks for the benefit of those who wished to take a hasty

glance over the subject. Such a hasty picker-up of knowledge who regards himself—I cannot imagine why—as peculiarly fitted to criticise my book, has ingeniously besought me, in view of a second edition which he was kind enough to think probable, to throw overboard most of what he considered the superfluous parts of the book. With this request I have not felt myself able to comply. My book was written for maturer readers who have passed beyond the school stage and look for something more than an elementary handbook, and who would be able to understand and appreciate the plan and intention which led me to draw my material so widely from many departments of literary and cultural history. The first edition of the book found many such readers: I may hope and expect that the second will do the same.

In its revised form the book has been divided for the convenience of those who use it into two volumes (which correspond with the two parts in which it was first published). I was urged to take away the notes that stand at the foot of the text and relegate them to a place by themselves in a separate appendix. I found, however, that I could not bring myself to adopt this fashionable modern practice, which so far as I have experience of it in books published in recent years seems to me to be inconvenient and to hinder rather than help that undisturbed appreciation of the text which such an arrangement is intended to serve. Independent readers who in using the book are working out the subject for themselves would certainly not desire the separation of the documentary evidence from the statement of the author's view. The book has also, to my peculiar satisfaction, attracted a large number of readers from outside the immediate circle of professional philologists. Such readers have evidently not been seriously disturbed by the elaborate and perhaps rather pedantic aspect of the mysterious disquisitions at the foot of the page, and have been able to fix their attention upon the clearer language of the text above. I have therefore decided to remove a few only of the notes which had grown to independent dimensions to an appendix at the end of each of the two volumes.

ERWIN RONDE.

HARVARD.

November 27th, 1897.

## PRELIMINARY NOTE TO THE SEVENTH AND EIGHTH EDITIONS

IN supervising together this reprint of "Psyche" we have found ourselves faced with the question which Schöll and Dieterich had to decide in bringing out the third edition—whether changes or additions would be admissible. It went without saying that the text must remain untouched in the form last given to it by Rohde's own hand. Nor was it possible to make any additions to the notes without seriously disturbing the carefully considered architecture of the whole book. It would have been more possible to add an appendix or supplementary pamphlet recording the literature of the subject which has appeared since 1898 and giving an account of the present state of the questions dealt with by Rohde: as has been done with the "Griechische Roman" by W. Schmid. But on making the attempt we soon found that the problem was a different one in the case of "Psyche" with which (much more than in the other case) all subsequent study of the history of religion as pursued by all nations has had to reckon, and from which such study has in no small degree taken its starting point. We have therefore refrained; and we have also refrained from remodelling the citations to make them correspond with critical editions that have since appeared. This process could not be carried through without, in some places, introducing contradictions with Rohde's interpretation that would have necessitated more detailed discussion. Rohde's own method of citation was only seriously inconvenient in the case of Euripides: here he evidently, as we observed from about the middle of the first volume onwards, made use of more than one edition at the same time, and has consequently quoted lines in accordance with different enumerations. For the greater assurance and convenience of the reader the lines are uniformly referred to according to the numbering of Nauck. This task has been undertaken by our devoted helper Frl. Emilie Boer, who has also verified, with a very few exceptions, the whole of the references to ancient writers and inscriptions;

#### XIV NOTE TO SEVENTH AND EIGHTH EDITIONS

a considerable number of errors missed by the author or later editors have thus been corrected. The minor changes introduced in the third and following editions—the recording on the margin of the pagination of the first edition and the valuable enlargement of the index due to W. Nestle with the assistance of O. Crusius—have all naturally been retained.

HISTORISBERG.  
*November, 1880.*

F. BOHL.  
O. WEINREICH.

## TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

**R**OHDE is very unsystematic in his mode of quoting from ancient authorities: he has, for example, four different ways of referring to the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, two of referring to Demosthenes and the Orators, etc. In quoting from the lesser authorities he sometimes used editions which have since become antiquated. (He even goes so far as to quote Clem. Alex. by the page and letter of Heinsius' re-edition of Sylburg.) I have made an attempt to reduce the number of inconsistencies and to give references where possible to modern editions. In these and other small ways I have tried to make the notes—the text I hope is intelligible enough—more accessible to English readers. I have given references to English translations of German works (where I have been able to find them): but I have refrained from adding references to the modern literature of the subject: most readers of the book will prefer to do that for themselves. In order to save space I have used abbreviation pretty freely in quoting names of authors and titles of books. The abbreviated forms agree generally with those given in Liddell and Scott (supplemented by the list drawn up for the new edition of the *Lexicon*): most of the following may be noted:—

A. (or Aesch.)	= Aeschylus.
Amm.	= Ammonius.
A.P.	= <i>Anthologia Palatina</i> .
Apollod.	= Pa.-Apollodorus, <i>Bibliotheca</i> (unless <i>Epit.</i> is added).
A. R.	= Apollonius Rhodius.
Alt. Mitth.	= <i>Mittheilungen d. deutsch. arch. Inst. zu Athen</i> .
Aug.	= Augustine.
D. (or Dem.)	= Demosthenes.
D. C.	= Dio Cassius.
D. Chr.	= Dio Chrysostom.
D. H.	= Dionysius of Halicarnassus (i.e. <i>Rom. Antig.</i> , unless otherwise indicated).
D. L.	= Diogenes Laertius.
D. P.	= Dionysius Periegetes.
D. S.	= Diodorus Siculus.
E. (or Eur.)	= Euripides.
Epigr. Gr.	= Keibel, <i>Epigrammata Graeca</i> .
Euh.	= Eumapius <i>Vitae Sophistarum</i> .

Gal.	= Galen (vol. and page of Kühn).
GDI.	= Collitz, <i>Griechische Dialektinschriften</i> .
Gp.	= Geoponica.
Grimm	= Grimm, <i>Deutsche Mythologie</i> transl. as <i>Teutonic Mythology</i> , by J. S. Stallybrass, Lond., 1880.
Heraclid. Pol.	= Heraclides Ponticus, <i>Politica</i> ,
Him.	= Himæus.
Hipp.	= Hippolytus.
Hp.	= Hippocrates.
Hsch.	= Hesychius.
H. Smyrn.	= Hermippus of Smyrna.

or is quoted by the men  
books of the *Iliad*, by it

<i>Inscr. Perg.</i>	= <i>Inscriptiones seu Pergamæ</i> ed. Fraenkel.
<i>IPE.</i>	= <i>Inscriptiones Ponti Euxini</i> ed. Latyschev.
Is.	= Isaacus.
J.M.	= Justin Martyr.
<i>Lag. Sacr.</i>	= von Prott and Zieher, <i>Lager Græcorum Sacras.</i>
Pall.	= Palladius, <i>de Re Rustica</i> .
Pbid.	= Philodotus.
Pl.	= Pindar.
Pl.	= Plato.
<i>PLG.</i>	= Bergk, <i>Poetae Lyrici Graeci</i> ed. 4.
Plot.	= Plotinus.
Pin.	= Ptolemy.
<i>PMagPer.</i>	= Paris Magical Papyrus ed. Wessely.
<i>RA Mus.</i>	= <i>Römisches Museum</i> .
S. (or Soph.)	= Sophocles.
S. E.	= Sextus Empiricus.
<i>SIG.</i>	= Dittenberger, <i>Syllage Inscriptionum Græcarum</i> ed. 2 (unless otherwise stated).
Str.	= Strabo (Casaubon's page).
<i>Tab. Defix.</i>	= <i>Tabellae Defixionum</i> ed. Wünsch (Appendix to <i>CIA.</i> ).
	= Theophrastus ( <i>Ch.</i> = <i>Characters</i> ed. Jebb).
	= E. B. Tylor, <i>Primitive Culture</i> ed. 4.
	= Tzetzes.
Vg.	= Vergil.
<i>Voss.</i>	= Diehl, <i>Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> ed. 4 (vol. 1 unless otherwise indicated).
X. (or Xen.)	= Xenophon historicus.
Zen.	= Zenobius.

I take this opportunity of thanking my friend Mr. R. Burn,  
of Glasgow University, for his invaluable help in these matters.

W. B. HILLIS.

## PART I





## CHAPTER 1

### BELIEFS ABOUT THE SOUL AND CULT OF SOULS IN THE HOMERIC POEMS

#### I

#### § 1

To the immediate understanding of mankind nothing seems so self-evident, nothing so little in need of explanation, as the phenomenon of Life itself, the fact of man's own existence. On the other hand, the cessation of this so self-evident existence, whenever it obtrudes itself upon his notice, arouses man's ever-renewed astonishment. There are primitive peoples to whom death whenever it occurs seems an arbitrary abbreviation of life : if it is not due to visible forces, then some invisible magic must have caused it. So difficult is it for such peoples to grasp the idea that the present state of being alive and conscious can come to an end of its own accord.

Once reflection on such problems is aroused, life itself, standing as it does on the threshold of all sensation and experience, soon begins to appear no less mysterious than death—that kingdom into which no experience reaches. It may even come about that when they are regarded too long and too hard, light and darkness seem to change places. It was to a Greek poet that the question suggested itself : " Who knows then whether Life be not Death, and what we here call Death be called Life there below ? "

From such jaded wisdom and its doubts Greek civilization is still far removed when, though already at an advanced stage in its development, it first speaks to us in the Homeric poems. The poet and his heroes speak with lively feeling of the pains and troubles of life, both in its individual phases and as a whole. The gods have allotted a life of pain and misery to men, while they themselves remain free from care. On the other hand, to turn aside from life altogether never enters the head of anyone in Homer. Nothing may be said expressly of the joy and happiness of life, but that is because such things

go without saying among a vigorous folk engrossed in a movement of progress, whose circumstances were never complicated and where all the conditions of happiness easily fell to the lot of the strong in activity and enjoyment. And, indeed, it is only for the strong, the prudent, and the powerful that this Homeric world is intended. Life and existence upon this earth obviously belongs to them—is it not an indispensable condition of the attainment of all particular good things? As for death—the state which is to follow our life here—there is no danger of anyone mistaking *that* for life. “Do not try and explain away death to me,” says Achilles to Odysseus in Hades; and this would be the answer any Homeric man would have given to the sophisticated poet, if he had tried to persuade him that the state of things after life on this earth is the real life. Nothing is so hateful to man as death and the gates of Hades: for when death comes it is certain that life—this sweet life of ours in the sunlight—is done with, whatever else there may be to follow.

## ‡ 2

But what does follow? What happens when life departs for ever from the inanimate body?

It is strange that anyone should have maintained (as it has been in recent times<sup>1</sup>) that in any stage of the development of the Homeric poems the belief can be found that with the moment of death all is at an end: that nothing survives death. We are not warranted by any statement in either of the two poems (to be found perhaps in their oldest parts, as is suggested) nor yet by the tell-tale silence of the poet, in attributing such an idea either to the poet or his contemporaries. Wherever the occasion of death is described we are told how the dead man (still referred to by his name), or his “Psyche”, hastens away into the house of Aides—into the kingdom of Aides and the grim Persephoneia; goes down to the darkness below the earth, to Erebus; or, more vaguely, sinks into the earth itself. In any case, it is no mere *nothing* that can enter the gloomy depths, nor over what does not exist could one suppose that the divine Pair holds sway below.

But how are we to think of this “Psyche” that, unnoticed during the lifetime of the body, and only observable when it is “separated” from the body, now glides off to join the multitude of its kind assembled in the murky regions of the “Invisible” (Aides)? Its name, like the names given to the

"soul" in many languages, marks it off as something airy and breathlike, revealing its presence in the breathing of the living man. It escapes out of the mouth—or out of the gaping wound of the dying—and now freed from its prison becomes, as the name well expresses it, an "image" (*eikōn*). On the borders of Hades Odysseus sees floating "the images of those that have toiled (on earth)". These immaterial images withdrawing themselves from the grasp of the living, like smoke (*Il.* xxiii, 100) or a shadow (*Od.* xi, 207; x, 495), must at least recognizably present the general outlines of the once living person. Odysseus immediately recognizes his mother, Antikleia, in such a shadow-person, as well as the lately dead Elpenor, and those of his companions of the Trojan War who have gone before him. The psyche of Patroklos appearing to Achilles by night resembles the dead man absolutely in stature, bodily appearance and expression. The nature of this shadowy double of mankind, separating itself from man in death and taking its departure then, can best be realized if we first make clear to ourselves what qualities it does not possess. The psyche of Homeric belief does not, as might have been supposed, represent what we are accustomed to call "spirit" as opposed to "body". All the faculties of the human "spirit" in the widest sense—for which the poet has a large and varied vocabulary—are indeed only active and only possible so long as a man is still alive: when death comes the complete personality is no longer in existence. The body, that is the corpse, now becomes mere "senseless earth" and falls to pieces, while the psyche remains untouched. But the latter is by no means the refuge of "spirit" and its faculties, any more than the corpse is. It (the psyche) is described as being without feeling, deserted by mind and the organs of mind. All power of will, sensation, and thought have vanished with the disintegration of the individual man into his component parts. So far from it being permissible to ascribe the functions of "spirit" to the psyche, it would be more reasonable to speak of a contrast between the two. Man is a living creature, conscious of himself and intelligently active, only so long as the psyche remains within him. But it is not the psyche which communicates its own faculties to man and gives him capacity for life together with consciousness, will and knowledge. It is rather that during the union of the psyche and the body all the faculties of living and acting lie within the empire of the body, of which they are functions. Without the presence of the psyche, the body cannot perceive, feel, or will, but it does not use these

or any of its faculties through or by means of the psyche. Nowhere does Homer attribute any such function to the psyche in living man: it is, in fact, only mentioned when its separation from the living man is imminent or has occurred. As the body's shadow-image it survives the body and all its vital powers.

If we now ask—as our Homeric psychologists generally do—which, in the face of this mysterious association between a living body and its counterfeited the psyche, is the “real” man, we find that Homer in fact gives contradictory answers. Not infrequently (indeed, in the first lines of the *Iliad*) the material body is contrasted,<sup>2</sup> as the “man himself”, with the psyche—which cannot therefore be any organ or component part of the living body. On the other hand, that which takes its departure at death and hastens into the realm of Hades is also referred to by the proper name of the person as “himself”<sup>3</sup>—which means that here the shadowy psyche (for nothing else can go down to Hades) is invested with the name and value of the complete personality, the “self” of the man. But those who draw from these phrases the conclusion that either the body or the psyche must be the “real man” have, in either case,<sup>4</sup> left out of account or unexplained one half of the recorded evidence. Regarded without prejudice, these apparently contradictory methods of speaking simply prove that both the visible man (the body and its own faculties) and the indwelling psyche could be described as the man's “self”. According to the Homeric view, human beings exist twice over: once as an outward and visible shape, and again as an invisible “image” which only gains its freedom in death. This, and nothing else, is the Psyche.

Such an idea—that the psyche should dwell within the living and fully conscious personality, like an alien and a stranger, a feebler double of the man, as his “other self”—this may well seem very strange to us. And yet this is what so-called “savage” peoples,<sup>5</sup> all over the world, actually believe. Herbert Spencer in particular has shown this most decisively. It is therefore not very surprising to find the Greeks, too, sharing a mode of thought that lies so close to the mind of primitive mankind. The earlier age which handed down to the Greeks of Homer their beliefs about the soul cannot have failed any more than other nations to observe the facts upon which a fantastic logic based the conclusion of man's double personality. It was not the phenomena of sensation, will, perception, or thought in waking and conscious man which led to this conclusion. It was the experience of an apparent

double of the self in dreaming, in swoons, and ecstasy, that gave rise to the inference of a two-fold principle of life in man, and of the existence of an independent, separable "second self" dwelling within the visible self of daily life. One has only to listen to the words of a Greek writer of a later period who, far more explicitly than Homer, describes the nature of the psyche and at the same time lets us see the origin of the belief in such an entity. Pindar (fr. 131) tells us that the body obeys Death, the almighty, but the image of the living creature lives on ("since this alone is derived from the gods": which, of course, is not Homeric belief); for it (this *eidôlon*) is *sleeping* when the limbs are active, but when the body is asleep it often reveals the future in a dream. Words could hardly make it plainer that in the activities of the waking and conscious man, the image-soul has no part. Its world is the world of sleep. While the other "I", unconscious of itself, lies in sleep, its double is up and doing. In other words, while the body of the sleeper lies wrapped in slumber, motionless, the sleeper in his dream lives and sees many strange and wonderful things. It is "himself" who does this (of that there can be no doubt), and yet not the self known and visible to himself and others; for that lies still as death beyond the reach of sensation. It follows that there lives within a man a second self, active in dreaming. That the dream experiences are veritable realities and not empty fancies for Homer is also certain. He never says, as later poets often do, that the dreamer "thought" he saw this or that. The figures seen in dreams are real figures, either of the gods themselves or a "dream spirit" sent by them, or a fleeting "image" (*eidôlon*) that they allow to appear for a moment. Just as the dreamer's capacity for vision is no mere fancy, so, too, the objects that he sees are realities. In the same way it is something real that appears to a man asleep as the shape of a person lately dead. Since this shape can show itself to a dreamer, it must of necessity still exist; consequently it survives death, though, indeed, only as a breath-like image, much as we have seen reflections of our own faces mirrored in water.\* It cannot, indeed—this airy substance—be grasped or held like the once visible self; and hence comes its name, the "psyche". The primeval argument for such a counterpart of man is repeated by Achilles himself (*Il.* xxiii, 103 f.) when his dead friend appears to him and then vanishes again: so, then, ye Gods, there yet lives in Hades' house a psyche and shadowy image (of man), but there is no midriff in it (and consequently none of the faculties which preserve the visible man alive).

The dreamer, then, and what he sees in his dream proves the existence of an *alter ego* in man.<sup>7</sup> Man, however, also observes that his body may suffer a deathlike torpor without the second self being occupied with dream experiences. In such moments of "swoon", according to Greek thought and actual Homeric expression, "the psyche has left the body."<sup>8</sup> Where had it gone? No man could tell. But on this occasion it comes back again: whereupon the "spirit is gathered again into the midriff". If ever, as happens in the case of death, the psyche should become completely separated from the visible body, then the "spirit" will never return. But the psyche, which in those temporary separations from the body<sup>9</sup> did not perish, will not vanish into nothingness now.

## § 3

So far experience takes us, from which primitive logic arrived at very much the same conclusions all over the world. But, we may proceed to ask, where does this liberated psyche go? What becomes of it? Here begins "the undiscovered country" and it might appear that at its entrance there was a complete parting of the ways.

Primitive peoples are accustomed to attribute unlimited powers to the disembodied "soul"—powers all the more formidable because they are not seen. Indeed, they refer in part all invisible forces to the action of "souls", and strain anxiously by means of the richest offerings within their power to secure for themselves the goodwill of these powerful spirits. Homer, on the contrary, knows nothing of any influence exerted by the psyche upon the visible world, and, consequently, hardly anything of a cult of the psyche. How, indeed, could the souls (as I may venture to call them without further risk of misunderstanding) have any such influence? They are all without exception collected in the realm of *Aïdes*, far from the living, separated from them by *Okeanos* and *Acheron*, guarded by the relentless god himself, the inexorable doorkeeper. Only a fabled hero like *Odysseus* may for once, perhaps, reach the entrance of that gloomy kingdom alive: the souls themselves, once they have crossed the river, never come back—so the soul of *Patroklos* assures his friend. How do they get there? The implication seems

disappears for ever into the depths of *Erebus*. It was only a

later poet who, in giving the final touches to the *Odyssey*, introduced *Hermes*, the "Guide of the Dead". Whether this is an invention of the poet's, or, as appears more likely, it is borrowed from the ancient folk-belief of some remote corner of Greece, in the completely rounded circle of Homeric belief at any rate it is an innovation and an important one. Doubt has arisen, it appears, whether indeed *all* the souls must of necessity pass away into the Unseen; and they are provided with a divine guide who by his mysteriously compelling summons (*Od.* xxiv, 1) and the power of his magic wand constrains them to follow him.<sup>15</sup>

Down in the murky underworld they now float unconscious, or, at most, with a twilight half-consciousness, wailing in a shrill diminutive voice, helpless, indifferent. Of course, flesh, bones, and sinews,<sup>16</sup> the midriff, the seat of all the faculties of mind and will—these are all gone for ever. They were attached to the once-visible partner of the psyche, and that has been destroyed. To speak of an "immortal life" of these souls, as scholars both ancient and modern have done, is incorrect. They can hardly be said to *live* even, any more than the image does that is reflected in the mirror; and that they prolong to eternity their shadowy image-existence—where in Homer do we ever find this said? The psyche may survive its visible companion, but it is helpless without it. Is it possible to believe that a realistically imaginative, materially minded people like the Greeks would have regarded as immortal a creature incapable (once the funeral is over) of requiring or receiving further *nourishment*—either in religious cult or otherwise?

The daylight world of Homer is thus freed from spectres of the night (for even in dreams the psyche is seen no more after the body is burnt); from those intangible and ghostly essences at whose unearthly activity the superstitious of every age tremble. The living are no longer troubled by the dead. The world is governed by the gods alone; not pale and ghostly phantoms, but palpable and fully materialized figures, working powerfully everywhere, and dwelling on the clear mountain tops: "and brightness gleams around them." No daimonic powers can compare with the gods or can avail against them; and night does not set free the departed souls of the dead. The reader starts involuntarily and begins to suspect the influence of another age, when in a part of Book XX of the *Odyssey*, added by a later hand, he reads how shortly before the destruction of the suitors the clairvoyant seer *Menois* beholds in hall and forecourt the soul-phantoms (*eidôla*)



floating in multitudes and hurrying down to the darkness under the earth : " the sun was darkened in the heaven and a thick mist came over all." The later poet has been very successful in suggesting the terror awakened by a foreboding of tragedy ; but such terror in the face of the doings of the spirit world is entirely un-Homeric.

#### § 4

Were the Greeks, then, always so untroubled by such fears of the souls of the dead ? Was there never any *cult* of disembodied spirits, such as was not only known to all primitive peoples throughout the world, but was also quite familiar to nations belonging to the same family as the Greeks, for instance, the Indians and the Persians ? The question and its answer have more than a passing interest. In later times—long subsequent to Homer—we find in Greece itself a lively worship of ancestors and a general cult of the departed. Were it demonstrable—as it is generally assumed without proof—that the Greeks only at this late period first began to pay a religious cult to the souls of the dead, this fact would give very strong support to the oft-repeated theory that the cult of the dead arose from the ruins of a previous worship of the gods. Anthropologists are accustomed to deny this and to regard the worship of disembodied souls as one of the earliest forms (if not as originally the only form) of the reverence paid to unseen powers. The peoples, however, upon whose conditions of life and mental conceptions such views are generally based, have indeed behind them a long past, but no history. What is to prevent pure speculation and theorizing in conformity with the preconceived idea just mentioned (which is almost elevated to the position of a doctrine of faith by some comparative religionists) from introducing into the dim past of such savage peoples the primitive worship of gods, out of which the worship of the dead may then subsequently arise ? But *Greek* religious development can be traced from Homer onwards for a long period ; and there we find the certainly remarkable fact that a cult of the dead, unknown to Homer, only appears later, in the course of a long and vigorous expansion of religious ideas in after times ; or, at least, then shows itself more plainly—but not, it is important to notice, as the precipitate of a dying belief in gods and worship of the gods, but rather as a collateral development by the side of that highly developed form of piety.

Are we, then, really to believe that the cult of disembodied

spirits was absolutely unknown to the Greeks of pre-Homeric times?

Such an assertion, if made without due qualification, is contradicted by a closer study of the Homeric poems themselves.

It is true that Homer represents for us the earliest great stage in the evolution of Greek civilization of which we have clear evidence. But the poems do not stand at the beginning of that evolution. Indeed, they only stand at the beginning of Greek Epic poetry—so far as this has been transmitted to us—because the natural greatness and wide popularity of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* secured their preservation in writing. Their very existence and the degree of artistic finish which they show, oblige us to suppose that behind them lies a long history of heroic "Saga" poetry. The conditions which they describe and imply point to a long course of previous development—from nomadic to city life, from patriarchal rule to the organization of the Greek Polis. And just as the maturity of material development tells its tale, so do the refinement and maturity of culture, the profound and untrammelled knowledge of the world, the clarity and simplicity of thought reflected in them. All these things go to show that before Homer, in order to reach Homer, the Greek world must have thought and learned much—must, indeed, have unlearned and undone much. As in art, so in all the products of civilization, what is simple, appropriate, and convincing is not the achievement of beginners, but the reward of prolonged study. It is *prima facie* unthinkable that during the whole length of Greek evolution before Homer, religion alone, the relationship between man and the invisible world, should have remained stationary at any one point. It is not from the comparison of religious beliefs and their development among kindred nations, nor even from the study of apparently primitive ideas and usages in the religious life of the Greeks themselves of later times, that we are to seek the truth about the religious customs of that remote period which is obscured for us by the intervening mass of the Homeric poems. Comparative studies of this kind are valuable in their way, but must only be used to give further support to the insight derived from less easily misleading methods of inquiry. For us the only completely satisfactory source of information about pre-Homeric times is Homer himself. We are allowed—Indeed, we are forced—to conclude that there have been changes in conceptions and customs, if, in that otherwise so uniform and rounded Homeric world, we meet with isolated occurrences, customs, forms of speech that contradict the

normal atmosphere of Homer and can only be explained by reference to a world in all essentials differently orientated from his own and for the most part kept in the background by Homer. All that is necessary is to open our eyes, freed from preconceived ideas, to the "rudiments" ("survivals", as they are better called by English scholars) of a past stage of civilization discoverable in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* themselves.

Such rudiments of a once vigorous soul-worship are not hard to find in Homer. In particular, we may refer to what the *Iliad* tells us of the manner in which the dead body of Patroklos is dealt with. The reader need only recall the general outline of the story. In the evening of the day upon which Hektor has been slain, Achilles with his Myrmidons sings the funeral dirge to his dead friend: they go three times in procession round the body, Achilles laying his "murderous hands" on the breast of Patroklos and calling upon him with the words: "Hail, Patroklos mine, even in Aides' dwelling-place; what I vowed to thee before is now performed; Hektor lies slain and is the prey of dogs, and twelve noble Trojan youths will I slay at thy funeral pyre." After they have laid aside their arms he makes ready the funeral feast for his companions—bulls, sheep, goats, and pigs are killed, "and all around, in beakers-full, the blood flowed round the corpse." During the night the soul of Patroklos appears to Achilles demanding immediate burial. In the morning the host of the Myrmidons marches out in arms, bearing the body in their midst. The warriors lay locks of their hair, cut off for the purpose, upon the body, and last of all Achilles places his own hair in the hand of his friend—it was once pledged by his father to Spercheios the River-god, but Patroklos must now take it with him, since return to his home is denied to Achilles. The funeral pyre is got ready, many sheep and oxen slaughtered. The corpse is wrapped in their fat, while their carcasses are placed beside it: jars of oil and honey are set round the body. Next, four horses are killed, two dogs belonging to Patroklos, and last of all twelve Trojan youths taken prisoner for this purpose by Achilles. All these are burnt together with the corpse, and Achilles spends the whole night pouring out dark wine upon the earth, calling the while upon the psyche of Patroklos. Only when morning comes is the fire extinguished with wine; the bones of Patroklos are collected and laid in a golden casket and entombed within a mound.

Here we have a picture of the funeral of a chieftain which, in the solemnity and ceremoniousness of its elaborate detail, is in striking conflict with the normal Homeric conception of the nothingness of the soul after its separation from the body. A full and rich sacrifice is here offered to such a soul. This sacrifice is inexplicable if the soul immediately upon its dissolution flutters away insensible, helpless and powerless, and therefore incapable of enjoying the offerings made to it. It is therefore not unnatural that a method of interpretation which isolates Homer as far as possible and adheres closely to his own fixed and determinate range of ideas, should attempt to deny the sacrificial character of the offerings made on this occasion.<sup>13</sup> We may well ask, however, what else but a sacrifice, i.e. a repast offered in satisfaction of the needs of the person honoured (in this case the psyche), can be intended by this stream of blood about the corpse: this slaughtering and burning of cattle and sheep, horses and dogs, and finally of twelve Trojan prisoners on or at the funeral pyre? To explain it all as a mere performance of pious duties, as is often done in interpreting many of the gruesome pictures of Greek sacrificial ceremonies, is impossible here. Besides, Homer often tells us of merely pious observances in honour of the dead, and they are of a very different character. And the most horrible touch of all (the human sacrifice) is not put in simply to satisfy Achilles' lust for vengeance—twice over does Achilles call to the soul of Patroklos with the words: "To you do I bring what I formerly promised to you" (*Il.* xxiii, 20 ff., 180 ff.).<sup>14</sup> The whole series of offerings on this occasion is precisely of the kind which we may take as typical of the oldest sort of sacrificial ritual such as we often find in later Greek religion in the cultus of the infernal deities. The sacrificial offerings are completely burnt in honour of the Daimon and are not shared between the bystanders as in the case of other offerings. If such "holocausts", when offered to the Chthonic and some of the Olympian deities, are to be regarded as sacrificial in character, then it is unjustifiable to invent some other meaning for the performances at the funeral pyre of Patroklos. The offering of wine, oil, and honey, at least, are normal in sacrificial rituals of later times. Even the severed lock of hair spread out over the dead body or laid in the cold hand is a well known sacrificial tribute, and must be supposed such here as much as in later Greek ceremonial or in that of many other peoples.<sup>15</sup> In fact, this gift in particular, symbolically representing as it does a more valuable sacrifice by means of another and less important

object (in the giving of which only the goodwill of the giver is to be considered)—this very offering, like all such symbolical substitutions, bears witness to the long duration and past development of the cultus in which it occurs—in this case of the worship of the dead in pre-Homeric times.

The whole narrative presupposes the idea that by the pouring out of streams of blood, by offerings of wine and burnt offerings of human beings and of cattle, the psyche of a person lately dead can be refreshed, and its resentment mollified. At any rate, it is thus thought of as accessible to human prayers and as remaining for some time in the neighbourhood of the sacrifice made to it. This contradicts what we expect in Homer, and, in fact, just in order to make this unusual performance plausible to an audience no longer familiar with the idea, and to make it admissible on a special occasion, the poet (though the actual course of his story does not really require it)<sup>15</sup> makes the psyche of Patroklos appear by night to Achilles. And, in fact, to the end of the narrative Achilles repeatedly greets the soul of Patroklos as though it were present.<sup>16</sup> The unusual way in which Homer deals with this whole affair, so full of primeval, savage ideas as it is, seems, indeed, to betray a certain vagueness about what its real meaning may be. That the writer has certain qualms on the subject is indicated by the brevity—not at all like Homer—with which the most shocking part of the story, the slaughter of human beings, together with horses and dogs, is hurried over. But the thing to be noted particularly is that the poet is certainly not devising such unpleasant circumstances for the first time out of his own imagination. This epic picture of the worship of the dead was adopted by Homer from an earlier source (whatever that source may have been),<sup>17</sup> and not invented by him. He makes it serve his special purpose, which is to provide a satisfactory climax to the series of vivid and emotional scenes beginning with the tragic death of Patroklos and ending with the death and dishonouring of the champion of Troy. After such emotional exaltation the overstrained nerves must not be allowed to relax too suddenly; a last flicker of the superhuman rage and grief that made Achilles rave so furiously against his foes must show itself in the serving up of this awful banquet to the soul of his friend. It is as though a primitive and long-suppressed savagery had broken out again for a last effort. Only when all is over does the soul of Achilles find repose in melancholy resignation. More calmly he calls upon the rest of the Achæans to take their seats "in a wide circle round about"; and there follows the

description of those splendid "Games", a subject that must have awakened the enthusiasm of every experienced athlete in the audience—and was there ever a Greek who was not an athlete? It is true that athletic contests are described by Homer mainly on account of their own peculiar interest and for the sake of the artistic effects that their description allowed. Still, the selection of such games as a fitting conclusion to a chieftain's funeral cannot be fully understood except as a survival of an ancient and once vigorous worship of the dead. Such athletic contests in honour of the great immediately after their death are often referred to by Homer;<sup>18</sup> indeed, a funeral is the only occasion<sup>19</sup> recognized by him as suitable for the exhibition of athletic prize-competitions. The practice never quite died out, and it became usual in later post-Homeric times to mark the festivals of Heroes and, later of gods, too, by Games which gradually became regularly repeated performances, developed from the traditional contests that had concluded the funeral ceremonies of great men. Now, no one doubts that the *Agon* at the festival of a Hero or a god formed part of their religious worship. It is only reasonable, then, to suppose that the funeral games which accompany the burial of a chieftain (and are confined to that one occasion) belong to the religious cult of the dead, and to recognize that such a mode of worship can only have been introduced at a time when men regarded the soul, in whose honour the ceremony took place, as capable of sharing consciously in its enjoyment. Even Homer is certainly conscious of the fact that the games, like the rest of the offerings made then, were intended for the satisfaction of the dead and not solely for the entertainment of the living.<sup>20</sup> We may also cite the declared opinion of Varro, who says that the dead in whose honour funeral games are celebrated are thereby proved to have been regarded originally, if not as gods, at least as very powerful spirits.<sup>21</sup> Of course, this feature of the original cultus of the soul was very easily stripped of its real meaning—it recommended itself quite apart from its religious significance—and for that very reason remained longer than other performances of the kind in general use.

If we now survey the whole series of ritual acts directed to the honouring of the soul of Patroklos, we can deduce from the seriousness of these attempts to please the disembodied spirit what must have been the strength of the original conception—how vivid must have been the impression of enduring sensibility, of formidable power possessed by a soul.

to whom such a cult was offered. It is true of the cult of the dead, as of any other sacrificial custom, that its perpetuation is due solely to the hope of avoiding hurt and obtaining assistance at the hands of the Unseen.<sup>20</sup> A generation that no longer anticipated either help or harm from the "Souls" might be ready to perform last offices of all kinds to the deserted body out of pure piety, and to offer to the dead a certain traditional reverence. But this would testify rather to the grief of those left behind than to any special reverence felt for the departed.<sup>21</sup> This is mostly the case in Homer. It is not, however, what we should call piety, but much rather mistrust of a "ghost" become powerful through its separation from the body, that explains the exaggerated fullness of the funeral offerings that are made at the burial of Patroklos. They cannot be made to fit in with the ordinary circle of Homeric ideas. Indeed, that this circle of ideas excluded all misgiving at the possible action of unseen spirits is quite clearly shown by the fact that the honours paid even to a dead man held in such veneration as Patroklos are confined to the solitary occasion of his funeral. As the psyche of Patroklos himself assures his friend, once the burning of the body is completed, it, the psyche, will take its departure to Hades, never to return.<sup>22</sup> It is easy to see that from this point of view there was no motive whatever that could lead to a permanent cult of the soul such as was common among the Greeks of later times. But it should be noticed further that the luxurious repast offered to the soul of Patroklos on the occasion of his funeral had no point if the goodwill of the soul which was to be assured by that process would never have an opportunity in the future of making itself felt. The contradiction between Homeric belief and Homeric practice on this occasion is complete, and shows decisively that the traditional view that would see in this description of soul-worship at the funeral of Patroklos an effort after *new* and more lively ideas of the life after death, must certainly be wrong. When new surmises, wishes, conjectures begin to arise and seek a means of expression, the new ideas generally find incomplete utterance in the old and inappropriate external forms, but express themselves more clearly and certainly (generally with some tendency to exaggeration) in the less conservative words and language of men. Here just the opposite occurs: every word the poet utters about the circumstances contradicts the elaborately wrought ceremonial which these circumstances call forth. It is impossible to point to a single touch that accords with the belief implied by the

ceremonial. The poet's bias is a different and, indeed, an opposite one. Of this much at least there cannot be the slightest doubt: the funeral ceremonies over the body of Patroklos are not the first budding of a new principle, but rather represent a "vestige" of a more vigorous worship of the dead in earlier times, a worship that must once have been a complete and sufficient expression of belief in the great and enduring power of the disembodied spirit. It has, however, been preserved unaltered into an age that, with quite other religious beliefs, no longer understands, or at best half-guesses at the sense of such strange ceremonial observances. Thus ritual generally outlives both the state of mind and the belief which originally gave rise to it.

## § 6

Neither the *Iliad* nor the *Odyssey* contains anything that can equal the scenes at the funeral of Patroklos as evidence of primitive worship of the dead. But even the ordinary forms of interment of the dead are not entirely without such "vestigial" features. The dead man's eyes and mouth are closed,<sup>36</sup> the body is washed and anointed, and after being wrapped in a clean linen cloth is laid upon a bier,<sup>37</sup> and the funeral dirge begins.<sup>38</sup> It is hardly possible to see even the remotest, lingering, reminiscence of a once vigorous worship of the dead in such performances as these; or in the very simple burial customs that follow the burning of the body; the bones are collected in a jar or a casket and buried under a mound, and a post set up to mark the place as a "grave-mound".<sup>39</sup> But when we find that the body of Elpenor, in accordance with the command issued by his psyche to Odysseus (*Od.* xi, 74), is burned together with his weapons (*Od.* xii, 13); when, further, we read that Achilles burnt the weapons of his overthrown foe together with his body on the funeral pyre (*Il.* vi, 418), it is impossible not to feel that we have here, too, survivals of an ancient belief that the soul in some mysterious fashion was capable of making use of these objects that are burnt along with its discarded bodily envelope. No one doubts that this is the reason for such a custom when it meets us in the case of other nations; with the Greeks, too, it must have had an equally good foundation, however little such is to be discovered in the ordinary Homeric view of the soul. The custom, moreover, more precisely described in these cases, was of general observance; we often hear how the completeness of a burial requires the burning of the possessions of the dead along with the body.<sup>40</sup> We cannot



tell to what extent the duty of offering to the dead *all* his movable possessions" (a duty originally without doubt interpreted quite literally) had come in Homeric times to be interpreted in a symbolical sense—a process which reached its lowest stage in the custom prevalent in later times of presenting an obol "for the Ferryman of the Dead". Finally, the "funeral feast" offered by the king to the mourning people either after the funeral of a chieftain (*Il.* xxiv, 802, 865), or before the burning of his body (*Il.* xxiii, 29 ff.), could only have derived its full meaning from an ancient belief that the soul of the person thus honoured could itself take a share in the feast. In the banquet in honour of Patroklos the dead man is given a definite portion—the blood of the slaughtered animals which is poured round his body (*Il.* xxiii, 33). Like the funeral games, this banquet is apparently intended to propitiate the soul of the dead man. Consequently, we find even Orestes, after slaying Aigisthos, his father's murderer, offering him a funeral feast (*Od.* iii, 308)—not, surely, in a mood of simple "piety". The custom of inviting the whole people, on the occasion of important funerals, to such a banquet no longer appears in later times; it has little resemblance to the funeral feasts shared by the relations of the dead man (*παιδικοί*) that were afterwards customary; it is far closer to the great *cenae ferales* that accompanied the *silicernia* in Rome, to which the relations of the dead man, if he were an important person, invited the whole population.<sup>21</sup> After all, it is no harder to understand the underlying conception of the soul in this case sharing the feast with the whole people, than it is to understand the same conception when applied to the great sacrifices to the gods which, though the congregation partakes, are, in name and in fact, essentially "Banquets of the Gods" (*Od.* iii, 338).

Such are the relics of ancient soul-worship to be found within the limits of the Homeric world. Further attention to the spirits of the dead beyond the time of the funeral was prevented by the deeply ingrained conviction that after the burning of the body the *psyche* was received into the inaccessible world of the Unseen, from which no traveller returns. But, in order to secure this complete departure of the soul, it is necessary for the body to be burnt. Though we do occasionally read in the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey* that immediately after death and before the burning of the body "the *psyche* departed to Hades",<sup>22</sup> the words must not be taken too literally; the soul certainly flies off at once towards Hades, but it hovers now between the realms of the living and

the dead until it is received into the final safekeeping of the latter after the burning of the body. The psyche of Patroklos appearing by night to Achilles declares this; it prays for immediate burial in order that it may pass through the door of Hades. Until then the other shadow-creatures prevent its entrance and bar its passage across the river, so that it has to wander restlessly round the house of Ais of the wide gate (*Il.* xxiii, 71 ff.). This hastening off towards the house of Hades is again all that is meant when it is said elsewhere of Patroklos himself (*Il.* xvi, 856) that the psyche departed out of his limbs to the house of Hades. In exactly the same way it is said of Elpenor, the companion of Odysseus, that "his soul descended to Hades" (*Od.* x, 560). This soul meets his friend, nevertheless, later on, at the entrance of the Shadow-world, not yet deprived of its senses like the rest of the dwellers in that House of Darkness; not until the destruction of its physical counterpart is complete can it enter into the rest of Hades. Only through fire are the souls of the dead "appeased" (*Il.* vii, 410). So long, then, as the psyche retains any vestige of "earthliness" it possesses some feeling still, some awareness of what is going on among the living.<sup>3</sup>

But once the body is destroyed by fire, then is the psyche relegated to Hades; no return to this earth is permitted to it, and not a breath of this world can penetrate to it there. It cannot even return in thought. Indeed, it no longer thinks at all, and knows nothing more of the world beyond. The living also forget one so completely cut off from themselves (*Il.* xxii, 389). What, then, should tempt them, during the rest of their lives here, to try to hold communication with the dead by means of a *cult*?

#### § 7

The practice of cremation itself will perhaps give us one last piece of evidence that there had been a time when the idea of the prolonged sojourn of the disembodied spirit in the realm of the living and its power of influencing the survivors existed among the Greeks. Homer knows of no other kind of funeral than that of fire. On a funeral pyre are burnt the bodies of king or leader with the most solemn ritual; those of the common people fallen in war are given to the flames with less ceremony; none are buried. We may well ask whence comes this custom, and what is its meaning for Greeks of the Homeric age? This means of disposing of the bodies of the dead is not by any means the most simple and obvious; it

is far easier to carry out, and far less expensive, to bury them in the earth. It has been suggested that the custom of cremation as observed by Persians, Germans, Slavs, and other peoples, is inherited from a nomadic period. The wandering horde has no permanent habitation in which or near which the body of the beloved dead can be buried and perpetual sustenance offered to his soul. Unless, therefore, as is the custom with some nomadic tribes, the dead body is given up to be the prey of beasts or weather, it might seem a natural idea to reduce it to ashes and carry the remains, preserved in a light jar, along with the tribe on its further journeyings.<sup>24</sup> Whether such practical reasonings can have had so much influence in a connexion that is generally governed entirely by fancy, and in which practical considerations are altogether scouted—I shall leave undecided. But, in any case, if we postulate a nomadic origin for the practice of burning the dead among the Greeks, we should have to go back altogether too far into the past to explain a mode of behaviour that, by no means exclusively practised in early times by the Greeks, becomes absolutely prescriptive in a period when they have long ceased to wander. The Asiatic Greeks, and in particular the Ionians, whose popular beliefs and customs are, in general outline, at least, reproduced for us in Homer, deserted one settled habitation in order to found another. Cremation then must have been so permanently established among them that it never entered their heads to seek any other method of disposing of their dead. In Homer not only the Greeks before Troy and Elpenor, far away from home, are burnt when they die; Eëtion, too, in his own home is given a funeral pyre by Achilles (*Il.* vi, 418). Hektor's body is burnt in the middle of Troy and the Trojans themselves in their own native land burn their dead (*Il.* vii). The box or urn that holds the cremated bones of the dead is buried in a mound; the ashes of Patroklos, Achilles, Antilochos, and Aias rest on foreign soil (*Od.* iii, 109 ff.; xxiv, 76 ff.). It never occurs to Agamemnon that if Menelaos dies before Ilios his brother's grave could be anywhere else than at Troy (*Il.* iv, 174 ff.). There is, therefore, evidently no intention on the part of the living of taking the remains of the dead with them on their return home;<sup>25</sup> and this cannot be the object of cremation. It will be necessary to look for some principle more in accordance with primitive modes of thought than such merely practical considerations. Jakob Grimm<sup>26</sup> suggested that the burning of the corpse might have been intended as an offering of the dead man to the gods. Among

the Greeks this could only mean the gods of the lower world ; but nothing in Greek belief or ritual suggests such a grim intention.<sup>41</sup> The real purpose aimed at in cremation is not so far to seek. Since the destruction of the body by fire is supposed to result in the complete separation of the spirit from the land of the living,<sup>42</sup> it must be assumed that this result is also *intended* by the survivors who employ the means in question ; and consequently that the complete banishment of the psyche once and for all into the other world is the real purpose and the original occasion of the practice of cremation. Isolated expressions of opinion among the nations that have practised the custom do, as a matter of fact, indicate as its object the speedy and entire separation of soul from body.<sup>43</sup> The exact nature of the intention varies with the state of belief about the soul. When the Indians turned from the custom of burying their dead to that of burning them, they were actuated, it appears, by the idea that the sooner and more completely the soul was freed from the body and its limitations, the more easily would it reach the Paradise of the Just.<sup>44</sup> Of the purifying effects of the fire implied in this conception, the Greeks knew nothing until the idea was revived in later times.<sup>45</sup> The Greeks of the Homeric age, innocent of any such "Kathartic" notion, thought only of the destructive powers of that element to which they entrusted the body of their dead, and of the benefit that they were conferring upon the soul in freeing it by fire from the lifeless body, thus adding their assistance to its own efforts to get free.<sup>46</sup> Nothing can destroy the psyche's visible counterpart more quickly than fire. If, then, the body is burnt and the most treasured possessions of the dead man consumed along with it, no tie remains that can detain the soul any longer in the world of the living.

Cremation, therefore, is intended to benefit the dead, whose soul no longer wanders unable to find rest ; but still more the living, for they will not be troubled by ghosts that are securely confined to the depths of the earth. The Greeks of Homer, accustomed by long usage to the burning of the dead, are free from all fears of haunting "ghostly" presences. But when the practice of the fire-funeral was first adopted, that which was to be guarded against in the future by the destruction of the body with fire must have been a real cause of fear.<sup>47</sup> The souls that were so anxiously relegated to the other world of the Unseen must have been feared as awesome inhabitants of this world. And so, from whatever source it may have come to them,<sup>48</sup> the custom of cremation gives firm ground for

supposing that at some period of their history the belief in the power and activity of the spirits of the dead and their influence upon the living—a subject of fear rather than reverence—must have been prevalent amongst the Greeks; even though only a few scattered hints still bear witness to such beliefs in the Homeric poems.

And evidence of these ancient beliefs we can now see with our eyes and touch with our hands. Owing to an inestimable series of fortunate circumstances, we are enabled to catch a glimpse of a far distant period of Greek history, which not only supplies a background to Homer, but makes him cease to be the earliest source of our information upon Greek life and thought. He is brought suddenly much nearer, perhaps deceptively nearer, to ourselves. The last decades of excavation in the citadel and lower town of Mycenæ and other sites in the Peloponnese right into the centre of the peninsula and as far northwards as Attica and Thessaly, have resulted in the discovery of graves—shaft-graves, chamber-graves, and elaborately constructed domed vaults, which were built and walled up in the period before the Dorian invasion. These graves prove to us—what was already hinted at by a few isolated expressions in Homer<sup>42</sup>—that the Greek "Age of Burning" was preceded, as in the case of the Persians, Indians, and Germans, by a period in which the dead were buried in the ground intact.<sup>43</sup> The lords and ladies of golden Mycenæ, and lesser folk, too (in the graves at Nauplia, in Attica, etc.), were buried when they died. Chieftains take with them into the grave a rich paraphernalia of gorgeous furniture and ornaments—unburnt like their own bodies; they rest upon a bed of small stones, and are covered by a layer of loam and pebbles; <sup>44</sup> traces of smoke and remains of ashes and charred wood bear witness to the fact that the dead were laid upon the place where the "sacrifice for the dead" had already been made; upon the hearth where offerings had been previously burnt inside the grave chamber.<sup>45</sup> This may very well be a burial procedure of the most primeval antiquity. Our oldest "Giants'" graves, in whose treasures no metal of any kind is found, and whose age is on that account considered to be pre-Teutonic, exhibit similar features. Either on the ground, or, occasionally, on a specially prepared basis of fire-brick, the sacrificial fire is lighted, and, when it has burnt out, the corpse is set down upon the place and given

a covering of sand, loam, and stone.<sup>40</sup> Remains of burnt sacrificial animals (sheep and goats) have also been found in the graves at Nauplia and elsewhere.<sup>41</sup> In conformity with such different burial customs, the conceptions then held of the nature and powers of the disembodied spirits must have differed widely from those of the Homeric world. Offerings to the dead at a funeral occur in Homer only on special and isolated occasions and accompanied by an obsolete and half-understood ritual. Here they were the regular procedure both with rich and poor alike. But why should they have made offerings to their dead if they did not believe in their power? And why should they have taken away gold and jewellery and art treasures of all kinds and in astonishing quantities from the living and given them to the dead if they had not believed that the dead could find enjoyment in their former possessions even in the grave? Where the material body still remains intact, there the second self can at least occasionally return. Its treasured possessions laid by its side in the tomb are there to prevent its appearing uninvited in the outer world.<sup>42</sup>

Supposing, however, that the soul could return if and where it liked, it is evident that the cult of the dead would not be confined to the occasion of the funeral. And, indeed, that very circumstance—the prolongation of the cult paid to the dead beyond the time of the funeral—of which we could not find a vestige in Homer, can at last (as it seems to me) be traced in pre-Homeric Mycenæ. Over the middle one of four shaft-graves found on the citadel stands an altar which can only have been placed there after the grave was closed and sealed up.<sup>43</sup> It is a round altar, hollow inside, and not closed in at the bottom; in fact, a sort of funnel standing directly upon the earth. If, now, the blood of the victim, mingled with the various drink-offerings, were poured down into this receptacle, the whole would flow downwards into the ground beneath and to the dead man lying there. This is no altar (*θυστήρ*) such as was in use in the worship of the gods above, but a sacrificial hearth (*ἑστία*) for the worship of the inhabitants of the underworld. This structure corresponds closely with the description we have of the hearths upon which offerings were made in a later age to "Heroes", i.e. the souls of transfigured human beings.<sup>44</sup> Here, then, we have a contrivance for the permanent and repeated worship of the dead; for such worship alone can this structure have been intended. The funeral offering to the dead had already been completed inside the grave-chamber. We thus find a

meaning in the "beehive" tombs, for the vaulted main-chamber, beside which the corpse lay in a smaller chamber by itself. They were evidently intended to allow sacrifices to be made inside them—and not once only.<sup>44</sup> At least this is the purpose which the outer chamber serves elsewhere in double-vaulted graves. The evidence of the eye is therefore able to establish the truth of what could only be made out with difficulty from the Homeric poems. We can thus see that there had been a time in which the Greeks, too, believed that after the separation of body and soul the psyche did not entirely cease from intercourse with the upper world. Such a belief naturally called forth a cult of the soul, which lasted on even when the method of burying the body had changed, and even survived into Homeric times, when, with the prevalence of other beliefs, such observances ceased to have any meaning.

## II

Homer consistently assumes the departure of the soul into an inaccessible land of the dead where it exists in an unconscious half-life. There it is without clear self-consciousness and consequently neither desires nor wills anything. It has no influence on the upper world, and consequently no longer receives any share of the worship of the living. The dead are beyond the reach of any feelings whether of fear or love. No means exists of forcing or enticing them back again. Homer knows nothing of necromancy or of oracles of the dead,<sup>45</sup> both common in later Greek life. Gods come into the poems and take part in the action of the story; the souls of the departed never do. Homer's immediate successors in the Epic tradition think quite differently on this point; but for Homer the soul, once relegated to Hades, has no further importance.

If we think how different it must have been before the time of Homer, and how different it certainly was after him, we can hardly help feeling surprise at finding at this early stage of Greek culture such extraordinary freedom from superstitious fears in that very domain where superstition is generally most deeply rooted. Inquiries, however, into the origin and cause of such an untroubled attitude must be made very cautiously and a completely conclusive answer must not be expected. More especially it must be borne in mind that in these poems we have to do, directly and immediately, at least, only with the poet and his circle. The Homeric Epos can only be called "folk poetry" in the sense that it was adapted to the

acceptance of the whole family of Greek-speaking people who welcomed it eagerly and transformed it to their own uses ; and not because the "folk" in some mystical sense had a share in its composition. Many hands contributed to the composition of the poem, but they merely carried it further in the general direction which had been given to it not by the "Folk" or by the "Saga" tradition, as is sometimes too confidently asserted, but by the authority of the greatest poetic genius that the Greeks or, indeed, mankind ever knew. The tradition once formed was handed on by a close corporation of master-poets and their pupils who preserved, disseminated, continued and imitated the original great poet's work. If, then, we find on the whole, and apart from a few vagaries in detail, a single unified picture of the world, of gods and men, life and death, given in these two poems, that is the picture which shaped itself in the mind of Homer and was impressed upon his work, and afterwards preserved by the Homeridae. It is plain that the freedom, almost the freethinking, with which every possible occurrence in the world is regarded in these poems, cannot ever have been characteristic of a whole people or race. And not only the animating spirit, but even the outward shape that is given in the two epic poems to the ideal world surrounding and ruling over the world of men, is the work of the poet. It was no priestly theology that gave him his picture of the gods. The popular beliefs of the time, each peculiar to some countryside, canton, or city, must, if left to themselves, have split up into even more contradictory varieties of thought than they did in later times when there existed some few religious institutions common to all Hellas to act as centres of union. The poet alone must have been responsible for the conception and consistent execution of the picture of a single and unified world of gods, confined to a select company of sharply characterized heavenly beings, grouped together in certain well-recognized ways and dwelling together in a single place of residence above the earth. If we listened to Homer alone we should suppose that the innumerable local cults of Greece, with their gods closely bound to the soil, hardly existed. Homer ignores them almost entirely. His gods are pan-Hellenic, Olympian. In fact, in his picture of the gods, Homer fulfilled most completely his special poetic task of reducing confusion and superfluity to uniformity and symmetry of design—the very task which Greek idealism in art continually set before itself. In his picture Greek beliefs about the gods appear absolutely uniform—as uniform as dialect, political condition, manners,



and morals. In reality—of this we may be sure—no such uniformity existed; the main outlines of pan-Hellenism were doubtless there, but only the genius of the poet can have combined and fused them into a purely imaginary whole. Provincial differences in themselves interested him not at all. So, too, in the special question that we are considering, if we find him speaking of a single kingdom of the underworld, the resort of all departed spirits ruled over by a single pair of divinities and removed as far from the world of men and their cities as the Olympian dwelling of the Blessed Ones is in the opposite direction, who shall say how far he represents naïve popular belief in such matters? On this side Olympus, the meeting place of all the gods that rule in the daylight; \*\* on that the realm of Hades that holds in its grasp the unseen spirits that have left this life behind—the parallel is too apparent to be due to anything but the same simplifying and co-ordinating spirit in the one case as in the other.

## § 2

It would, however, be an equally complete misunderstanding of the relation in which Homer stood to the popular beliefs of his time if we imagined that relation to be one of opposition, or even supposed him to have taken up an attitude resembling that of Pindar or the Attic Tragedians towards the conventional opinions of their time. These later poets often enough allow us to see quite clearly the intentional departure from normal opinion represented by their more advanced conceptions. Homer, on the contrary, is as free from controversy as he is from dogma. He does not offer his pictures of God, the world and fate as anything peculiar to himself; and it is natural, therefore, to suppose that his public recognized them as substantially the same as their own. The poet has not taken over the whole body of popular belief, but what he does say must have belonged to popular belief. The selection and combination of this material into a consistent whole was the poet's real work. If the Homeric creed had not been so constructed in essentials that it corresponded to the beliefs of the time, or, at least, could be made to correspond, then it is impossible to account (even allowing for the poetic tradition of a school) for the uniformity that marks the work of the many poets that had a hand in the composition of the two poems. In this narrow sense it can be truly said that Homer's poems represent the popular belief of their time; not, indeed, the belief of all Greece, but only of the *Ionian*

cities of the coasts and islands of Asia Minor in which the poet and his songs were at home. In a similarly restricted sense may the pictures of outward life and manners that we find in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* be taken as a reflection of the contemporary life of the Greeks with particular reference to that of the Ionians. This life must have differed in many respects from that of the "Mycenaean civilization", and there can be little doubt that the reasons for this difference are to be sought in the long-continued disturbances which marked the centuries that divide Homer from the age of Mycenae, more especially in the Greek migrations, both in what they destroyed and what they created. The violent invasion of northern Greek peoples into the central mainland and the Peloponnese, the destruction of ancient empires and their civilization, the foundation of new Dorian states held by right of conquest, the great migrations to the Asiatic coasts, and the institution of a new life on foreign soil—all these violent modifications of the old course of existence must have dealt a severe blow at the whole fabric of that civilization and culture. In the same way we find that the cult of Souls and the conception of the fate of departed spirits which governed this cult did not remain in Ionia (the beliefs of which country are reflected in Homer) what it had been at the height of the Mycenaean period. To this change, as to the others which accompanied it, we may well suppose that the struggles and wanderings of the intermediate period contributed a good deal. Homer's clear-sighted vision that transcends the limits of city and even of racial gods, faiths, and worship, would hardly be explicable without the freedom of movement beyond the boundaries of country, the common life shared with companions of other races, the widened knowledge of all the conditions of foreign life, such as must have resulted from the dislocations and migrations of whole peoples. It is true that the Ionians of Asia Minor did, as we can prove, take a good many of their religious observances with them to their new homes. The migrations, however, did not preserve the connexion between the old homes and the new country with anything like the closeness that marked the later colonization; and when the colonists left the familiar soil behind, the local cults attached to the soil must often have had to be abandoned, too. Now the worship of ancestors, connected as it was with the actual graves of those ancestors, was essentially a *local* cult. Remembrance of the great ones of the past might survive transplantation, but not their religious worship, which could only be offered at the one spot

where their bodies lay buried and which had now been left behind in an enemy's country. The deeds of ancestors lived on in song, but they themselves began to be relegated to the domain of poetry and imagination. Imagination might adorn the story of their earthly life, but a world that was no longer reminded of their power by the regularly repeated performance of ceremonial, ceased to pay honour to their disembodied souls. Thus the most highly developed form of the cult of Souls—ancestor worship—died out, and the later version of the same thing, the cult of those of the tribe that had died in the new land and been buried there, was prevented from attaining a similar force and development by the newly-introduced practice of burning the bodies of the dead. It may well be that the origin of this new form of funeral rite lay, as has been suggested, in the wish to dismiss the soul of the dead man as quickly and completely as possible from the realm of the living; but it is beyond doubt that the result of this practice was to cut at the root of the belief in the near presence of the departed and the duty of performing the religious observances that were their right; so that such things being deprived of their support, fell into decay and disappeared.

### § 3

We can thus see at least dimly how it was that the Ionian people of the Homeric age were led by the events of their own history and the alteration in funeral customs into holding that view of the soul which a study of their own poets has persuaded us was theirs. This view can hardly have retained more than a few stray vestiges of the ancient cult of the dead. Still, we should only be in a position to say what were the real reasons for this alteration in belief and custom if we knew and understood more about the intellectual changes that led to the gradual appearance of the Homeric view of the world; a view which included within its range a set of beliefs about the soul. Here it is best to confess our ignorance. We have before us the results only of those changes. From them, however, we can at least perceive that the religious consciousness of the Greeks, among whom Homer sang, had developed in a direction which did not allow much scope to the belief in ghosts and spirits of the dead. The Homeric Greeks had the deepest consciousness of man's finite nature, of his dependence upon forces that lay without him. To remind himself of this and be content with his lot was his proper form of piety. Over him the gods held sway, wielding a supernatural power—

not infrequently a misguided and capricious power—but a conception of a general world-order is beginning to make its way; of a plan underlying the cross-purposes of individual and common life, working itself out in accordance with measured and appointed lot (*moira*). The arbitrary power of individual *daimones* is thus limited, and it is limited further by the will of the highest of the gods. The belief is growing that the world is, in fact, a *cosmos*, a perfect organization such as men try to establish in their earthly states. In the face of such conceptions it would be increasingly difficult to believe in the vagaries of a supernatural ghostly order which, in direct opposition to the real heavenly order, is always distinguished by the fact that it stands outside any all-embracing dispensation, and allows full play to the caprice and malice of individual unseen powers. The irrational and the unaccountable is the natural element of the belief in ghosts and spirits; this is the source of the peculiar disquiet inspired by this province of belief or superstition. It owes most of its effect to the instability of its figures. The Homeric world, on the contrary, lives by reason; its gods are fully intelligible to Greek minds and their forms and behaviour are clearly and easily comprehensible to Greek imagination. And the more distinctly were the gods represented, the more did the spirit-phantoms fade away into empty shadows. There was no one who might have been interested in the preservation and extension of the superstitious side of religion; there was in particular no priesthood with a monopoly of instruction or an exclusive knowledge of the details of ritual and the methods of controlling the behaviour of spirits. If anyone did possess any monopoly of teaching, it was, in this age when all the highest faculties of the spirit found their expression in poetry, the poet and the singer. They, however, showed a completely "secular" outlook even in religious matters. Indeed, these very clear-headed men, belonging to the same stock which in a later age "invented" (if one may be allowed to put it so) science and philosophy, were already displaying a mental attitude that distantly threatened the whole system of that plastic representation of things spiritual which the older antiquity had laboriously constructed.

The earliest view held by primitive man about the activities of willing, feeling, or thinking, regards them simply as the manifestations of something which lives and wills inside the visible man. This something is regarded as embodied in one or other of the organs of the human body or as contained

therein. Accordingly the Homeric poems give the name of the "midriff" (*φῆδε, φέμεν*) to most of the phenomena of will or feeling and even to those of the intellect. The "heart" (*φῆρα, κῆρ*) is also the name of a variety of feelings that were regarded as located in the heart and even identified with it. But this mode of expression had already for Homer become mere formula; such expressions are not always to be taken literally; the words of the poet often show that as a matter of fact he thought of these functions and emotions as incorporeal, though they were still named after parts of the body.<sup>67</sup> And so we often find mentioned side by side with the "midriff" and in the closest conjunction with it, the *θυμὸς*, a name which is not taken from any bodily organ and shows already that it is thought of as an immaterial function. In the same way many other words of this kind (*νόος-νοῦς-νόημα, βούλη, αἴσας, μῆνις*) are used to describe faculties and activities of the will, sense, or thought, and show that these activities are thought of as independent, free-working, and incorporeal. A single thread still attaches the poet to the modes of conception and expression of the older world, but he himself has penetrated adventurously far into the realm of pure spirit. With a less cultured people the identification of the special functions of the will and the intellect only leads to the materialization of these into the notion of special physical entities, and consequently to the association of still other "souls", in the shape of "Conscience", it may be, or "Will", in addition to that other shadowy "double" of mankind, the "second self".<sup>68</sup> The tendency of the Homeric singers was already setting in just the opposite direction—the mythology of the "inner man" was breaking down altogether. They had only to take a few steps further in the same direction to find that they could dispense with the *psychē* as well. The belief in the existence of the *psychē* was the oldest and most primitive hypothesis adopted by mankind to explain the phenomena of dreams, swoons, and ecstatic visions; these mysterious states were accounted for by the intervention of a special material personality. Now, Homer has little interest in premonitions and ecstatic states, and no inclination in that direction whatever. He cannot, therefore, have been very much concerned with the evidence for the existence of a *psychē* in living men. The final proof of the idea that the *psychē* must have been dwelling in man is the fact that it is separated from him in death. A man dies when he breathes out his last breath. This breath, something like a breath of air, and not a "nothing", any more than the wind its relative,

but a body with a definite form (though it may not be visible to waking eyes)—this is the *psyche*, whose shape, the image of the man himself, is well known from dream-vision. One, however, who has become accustomed to the idea of bodiless powers working inside man will, on this last occasion when the powers within man show themselves, be likely to suppose that what brings about the death of a man is not a physical thing that goes out of him, but a power—a quality—which ceases to act: nothing else, in fact, than his "life". And he would not, of course, think of ascribing an independent continuous existence after the disruption of the body to a mere abstract idea like "life". Homer, however, never got quite as far as this; for the most part the *psyche* is for him and always remains a real "thing"—the man's second self. But that he had already begun to tread the slippery path in the course of which the *psyche* is transformed into an abstract "concept of life", is shown by the fact that he several times quite unmistakably uses the word "*psyche*" when we should say "life". It is essentially the same mode of thought that leads him to say "*midriff*" (*phres*) when he no longer means the physical diaphragm, but the abstract concept of will or intellect. To say "*psyche*" instead of "life" is not the same thing as saying "life" instead of "*psyche*" (and Homer never did the latter); but it is clear that for him in the process of dematerializing such concepts, even the *psyche*, a figure once so full of significance, is beginning to fade and vanish away.

The separation from the land of their forefathers, and habituation to the use of cremation, the new direction taken by religious thought, the tendency to turn the once material forces of man's inner life into abstractions—all these things contributed to weaken the belief in a powerful and significant life of the disembodied soul and its connexion with the affairs of this world. And at the same time it caused the decline of the cult of the Souls. So much, I think, we may safely assert. The deepest and most fundamental reasons for this decline in both belief and cult may elude our search, just as it is impossible for us to be sure how far in detail the Homeric poems reflect the beliefs of the people who first listened to them, and where the free invention of the poet begins. But the combination of the various elements of belief into a whole which, though far from being a dogmatically closed system, may yet not unfairly be called the Homeric Theology—this, we may say, is most probably the work of the poet. The poet has a free hand in the picture he gives of the gods and never comes into conflict with any popular doctrine because Greek

religion then, as always, consisted essentially in the right honouring of the gods of the country and not in any particular set of dogmas. There could hardly be any general conception of godhead and divinity with which the poet might come into conflict. That the popular mind absorbed thoroughly that picture of the world of gods which the Homeric poems had given, is shown by the whole future development of Greek culture and religion. If divergent conceptions did, in fact, also maintain themselves, they derived their strength not so much from a different religious theory, as from the postulates of a different religious *cult* that had not been influenced by any poet's imagination. They might also more particularly have had the effect of causing an incidental obscurity within the epic itself, in the poet's vision of the Unseen World and its life.

### III

A test case of the thorough-going uniformity and consistency of the Homeric conception of the nature and circumstances of the souls of the departed is provided for us, within the limits of the poems themselves, by the story of Odysseus' *Journey to Hades*—a test they are hardly likely to survive, it may well be thought. How is the poet in describing a living hero's dealings with the inhabitants of the shadow-world, going to preserve the immaterial, dreamlike character of the Homeric "Souls"? How keep up the picture of the soul as something that holds itself resolutely aloof and seems to avoid all active intercourse with other folk? It is hard to see what could tempt the poet to try and penetrate with the torch of imagination into this underworld of ineffectual shadows. The matter becomes somewhat more intelligible, however, as soon as it is realized in what manner the narrative arose; how through continual additions from later hands it gradually assumed a form quite unlike itself.\*

### § 1

It may be taken as one of the few certain results of the critical analysis of the Homeric poems that the narrative of the Descent of Odysseus to the Underworld did not form part of the original plan of the *Odyssey*. Kirke bids Odysseus undertake the journey to Hades in order that he may see Teiresias there and be told of "the way and the means of his return, and how he may reach his home again over the fish-teeming deep" (*Od.* x, 530 f.). Teiresias, however, on being

discovered in the realm of shadows, fulfils this requirement only very partially and superficially. Whereupon, Kirke herself gives to the returned Odysseus a much fuller account, and as regards the one point already mentioned by Teiresias, a much more precise account, of the perils that lie before him on his homeward journey.<sup>41</sup> The journey to the land of the dead was thus unnecessary, and there can be no doubt that originally it had no place in the poem. It is plain, however, that the composer of this adventure only used the (superfluous) inquiry addressed to Teiresias as a pretext which afforded a more or less plausible motive for the introduction of this narrative into the body of the poem. The real object of the poet, the true motive of the story, must then be sought elsewhere than in the prophecy of Teiresias, which turns out to be so brief and unhelpful. It would be natural to suppose that the aim of the poet was to give the eye of imagination a glimpse into the marvels and terrors of that dark realm into which all men must go. Such an intention would be very intelligible in the case of a medieval or a Greek poet of later times; and there were afterwards plenty of Greek poems which described a Descent to Hades. But it would be hard to account for it in a poet of the Homeric school; for such a poet the realm of the dead and its inhabitants could hardly supply a subject for a narrative. And, in fact, the inventor of Odysseus' visit to the dead had quite a different object in view. He was anything but a Greek Dante. It is possible to see the purpose which guided him as soon as his poem is stripped of the manifold additions with which later times invested it. The original kernel which thus remains is then seen to be nothing but a series of conversations between Odysseus and the souls of those of the dead with whom he had stood in close personal relationship. Besides Teiresias he speaks with his old ship-companion Elpenor, who had just died, with his mother Antikleia, with Agamemnon and Achilles; and he tries in vain to effect a reconciliation with the implacable Aias. These conversations in Hades are, for the general furtherance of the story of Odysseus' wanderings and return, quite superfluous, and they serve in a very minor degree and only incidentally to give information about the conditions and character of the inscrutable world beyond the grave. The questions and answers there given are confined entirely to the affairs of the upper world. They bring Odysseus, who has now been wandering so long alone and far from the world of actual humanity, into ideal association with the substantial world of flesh and blood to which his thoughts



stretch out, and in which he himself had once been an actor and is soon to play an important part again.<sup>22</sup> His mother informs him of the distracted state of Ithaca, Agamemnon of the treacherous deed of Aigisthos carried out with the help of Klytæmnestra. Odysseus himself is able to console Achilles with an account of the heroic deeds of his son, who is still alive in the daylight; with Aias, resentful even in Hades, he cannot come to terms. Thus the theme of the second part of the *Odyssey* begins to appear: even to the shadows below there reaches an echo of the great deeds of the Trojan war and of the adventures of the Return from Troy, which occupied the minds of all the singers of the time. The introduction of these stories by means of conversations with the persons who took part in them is the essential purpose of the poet. The impelling instinct to expand in all directions the circle of legend in whose centre stood the adventure of the *Iliad*, and link it up with other circles of heroic legend, was fully satisfied by later poets in the separate poems of the Epic Cycle. At the time when the *Odyssey* was composed these other epic narratives were in the full tide of their youthful exuberance. The streams had not yet found a convenient bed in which to run, and they added their individual contributions (for they all related events which preceded it) to the elaborate narration of the return of the last Hero who still wandered vainly and alone. The main object of the story of Telemachos' journey to meet Nestor and Menelaos (in the third and fourth books of the *Odyssey*) is manifestly to bring the son into relation with the father's companions in war, and so to provide occasion for further narratives in which a more detailed picture of some of the events between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* might be given. Demodokos, the Phæacian bard, is made to recount (in abbreviated form) two adventures that had occurred to the great chieftain. Even when such stories did not immediately add to the picture of Odysseus' deeds or character, they served to point to the great background from which the adventures of the much-enduring wanderer, now completely isolated, should stand out; and to set these in the ideal framework which could alone give them their full significance. This natural creative instinct of legendary poetry also inspired the poet of the "Journey to Hades". He, too, saw the adventures of Odysseus not in isolation but in lively and vital connexion with all the other adventures that took their origin from Troy. He conceived the idea of bringing once more, for the last time, the chieftain famed in council and war, into communication with the mightiest king and the noblest

hero of that famous expedition ; and to do that he had to take him to the realm of the shadows which had long contained them. Nor could he well avoid the tone of pathos which is natural to this interview on the borders of the realm of nothingness to which all the desire and the strength of life must eventually come. The questioning of Teiresias is merely, as has been said, the poet's pretext for confronting Odysseus with his mother and his former companions, and this meeting was his prime motive. Probably this particular device was suggested by the recollection of the story which Meneleus tells of his meeting with Proteus, the Old Man of the Sea (*Od.* iv, 351 ff.),<sup>42</sup> where the inquiry from the seer as to the means of reaching home again is also a mere pretext for the narration of Return adventures—those of Aias, Agamemnon, and Odysseus.

## § 2

It is certain that the intention of this poet cannot possibly have been simply the description of the underworld for its own sake. Even the scenery of these mysterious incidents which might well have attracted his fancy, is only given in brief allusions. The ship sails over Okeanos to the people of the Kimmerians<sup>43</sup> that never see the sun, and reaches at last the "barren coast" and the "Grove of Persephone", with its black poplars and weeping willows. Odysseus with two companions goes on ahead to the entrance of Erebos, where Pyriphlegethon and Kokytos, a branch of the Styx, flow into Acheron. There he digs his sacrificial trench to which the souls flock upward out of Erebos over the asphodel-meadows. It is the same underworld in the bowels of the earth that is presupposed in the *Iliad*, too, as the dwelling-place of the dead, only more accurately described and more fully realized.<sup>44</sup> The details of the picture are so lightly sketched in that one might well suppose that they, too, had been taken from some older mythical material. At any rate, he borrowed the "Styx", so well known in the *Iliad*; and it may be supposed that the same applies to the other rivers as well, whose names are clearly derived from words meaning burning (of dead bodies?),<sup>45</sup> lamentation, and sorrow.<sup>46</sup> The poet himself, interested only in the representation of character, is not at all disposed to dwell upon the merely fanciful, and confines himself to a few brief allusions. Nor does he give any very lengthy account of the dwellers in Erebos, and what he does say of them keeps well within the limits of the usual Homeric belief. The Souls resemble shadow- or dream-pictures, and

are impalpable to the human touch.<sup>66</sup> They are without consciousness when they appear. Elpenor alone, whose body still lies unburnt, has for that very reason retained his senses and even shows a form of heightened consciousness that approaches prophecy; resembling in this respect Patroklos and Hektor at the moment when the psyche is parted from the body.<sup>67</sup> This, however, is to leave him as soon as his corpse is destroyed. Teiresias alone, the prophet famed above all others in Theban legend, has preserved his consciousness and prophetic vision even in the Shadow-world through the goodwill of Persephone; but this is an exception which only establishes the rule. What Antikleia tells her son of the powerlessness and immateriality of the soul after the burning of the body<sup>70</sup> sounds almost like an official confirmation of the orthodox Homeric view. Everything, in fact, in this poet's description enforces the truth of this belief, and though the living are, indeed, untroubled by the feeble souls banished to outer darkness, yet out of Erebos itself the pitious knell of this decree reaches us in the lament of Achilles as he refuses his friend's attempt at comfort—everyone knows the unforgettable words.

### § 3

And yet the poet ventures to go beyond Homer in one important point. What he hints rather than actually says of the condition of things in Hades conflicts in no single point with the conventional Homeric view; but it is an innovation to suggest that this condition of things can even for the briefest moment be interrupted. The blood drunk by the souls gives them back for a moment their consciousness; their remembrance of the upper world returns to them. Their senses must then all the while have been not dead but sleeping. There can be no doubt that the poet for whom this supposition is indispensable to his story did not thereby intend to formulate an entirely new doctrine. But in order to add to his poetic effect, he was led to include in his story some touches which, meaningless within the circle of his own beliefs, pointed elsewhere, and, indeed, backward, to older, quite differently moulded beliefs, and to the usages founded upon them. He makes Odysseus, following the advice of Kirke, dig a grave at the entrance of Hades in which to pour out a solemn drink-offering to "all the dead", consisting first of all in a mixture of milk and honey, then wine and water, over which white meal is finely sprinkled. Next he slays a ram and a black ewe, bending their heads downwards into the grave.<sup>74</sup>

Then the bodies of the animals are burnt, and round the blood collect all the souls, who flutter about it, kept at a distance by Odysseus' sword <sup>72</sup> till Teiresias has first drunk. Here the drink-offerings constitute undoubtedly a sacrificial offering devoted to the dead and poured out for their satisfaction. The poet indeed does not think of the slaughtered animals as a sacrifice; the tasting of the blood is simply intended to restore to the souls their consciousness; in the case of Teiresias, who retains his senses, the gift of prophetic clairvoyance. But this, we can see clearly, is a fiction of the poet's; what he here describes is in every detail a sacrifice to the dead, such as we so often find described as such in accounts from later times. The scent of the blood calls up the spirits; their satiation with blood (*αἱματόφια*) is the essential purpose of such offerings; and these are what the poet's imagination dimly recalls as models. Nothing in this picture has been invented. Neither, on the other hand, it is quite clear, has he altered his sacrificial ceremony to make it fit in with novel ideas that were beginning to gain ground; ideas that ascribed a more vital existence to the souls of the dead. For here, too, just as in the case of the offerings to the dead described in the funeral of Patroklos, the poet's manner of conceiving the life of the dead is not such as could give support to new and more vigorous cult ceremonies. His conception tends rather to contradict the ceremonies that he describes. In fact, what we have here, too, is a "fossilized" and no longer intelligible vestige of a practice that was once rooted in belief—a relic deprived of its original meaning and adapted by the poet to the special purposes of his narrative. The sacrificial ritual used to attract the souls on this occasion strikingly resembles the ritual which was used in later times to conjure up the souls of the dead at those places which were supposed to give entrance to the ghostly world below the earth. It is also not impossible that, even in the time of the poet of the "Journey to Hades", in some remote corners of Greek lands such calling-up of the dead was still practised as a relic of former belief. But, supposing that the poet had some information of such local cults of the dead, and modelled his story on them,<sup>73</sup> that only makes it the more remarkable that he effaces all trace of the original meaning of his ritual, and in adherence to the strict Homeric doctrine on the point, banishes all thought that the souls may possibly continue in the neighbourhood of the living and can thence be conjured up into the light of day.<sup>74</sup> He knows only of one kingdom of the Dead far off in the dim West, beyond the bounds of sea

and ocean, where the legendary hero of romance can, indeed, reach its gateway, but where alone he can have communication with the souls of the dead. The House of Hades never allows its inhabitants to pass out.

And yet all this is hopelessly contradicted by the votive offerings that the poet, by what can only be called an oversight, makes Odysseus promise to all the dead, and particularly to Teiresias, upon his return home (*Od.* x, 521-6; xi, 29-33). Of what use would it be to the dead to receive the offering of a "barren cow,"<sup>78</sup> of "treasures" burnt upon the funeral pyre; or how could Teiresias enjoy the slaughtering of a black sheep far away in Ithaca—when they are all confined to Erebus and could not taste the offerings made to them? This is the most remarkable and important of all vestiges of an ancient worship of the dead. It proves indubitably that in pre-Homeric times the belief prevailed that even after the funeral of the body the soul is not eternally banished to the inaccessible land of shadows, but is able to approach the sacrificer and to enjoy the sacrifices offered to it, just as much as the gods can. A single obscure allusion in the *Iliad*<sup>79</sup> suggests what is here much more clearly and almost naively revealed—namely that even at the time when the Homeric view of the nothingness of the souls for ever parted from their bodies reigned supreme, the custom of making offerings to the dead after the funeral was over (though in exceptional circumstances only, and not as a regularly recurring performance) had not been entirely forgotten.

#### § 4

The contradictions into which he is betrayed by the introduction of such intercourse between the living and the dead proves that the undertaking was rather venturesome for a Homeric poet of strictly orthodox views. Still, in the picture of Odysseus' meeting with his mother and former companions, which was his main object, the poet hardly strayed at all from the normal Homeric path. This, however, was, as it happened, the very point in which later generations of poetically inclined readers or hearers found his narrative wanting. He himself carefully linked up every detail with his living hero, the central interest of his story, and only made him speak with the souls of such as had some real and close connexion with him. A review of the motley inhabitants of the underworld in their multitude hardly interested him at all. It was the very thing which seemed indispensable to later readers. They made additions to his story and introduced the multitudes of the dead of all ages; the warriors with

wounds still visible and in bloodstained armour;” or else, more in the manner of a Hesiodic catalogue for the assistance of the memory than making them live in Homeric fashion for the imagination, they pictured a whole host of mothers, the illustrious ancestors of great families, passing before Odysseus, though they had no particular claim upon his sympathy; nor, indeed, is any serious attempt made to bring them into relationship with him.<sup>72</sup> This seemed to improve the picture of the general multitude of the dead, represented in the persons of selected individuals. Next, the condition of things in the world below must at least be illustrated by a few examples. Odysseus casts a glance into the inner recesses of the underworld—which was hardly possible for him, considering that he stood at its outermost gateway—and sees there the heroic figures of those who, like true “images” (*eikones*) of the living, still continue the activities of their former lives. There he sees Minos giving judgment among the dead, Orion hunting, Herakles still with the bow in his hand, and the arrow fitted to the string, “like one ever about to shoot.” This is certainly not Herakles, the “Hero-God”, as he was known to later ages. The poet knows nothing as yet of the elevation of the son of Zeus above the lot of all mortals—any more than the earliest poet of the “Journey” knew of the translation of Achilles out of Hades. The disregard of such things was naturally regarded by later readers as a negligence on the part of the poet. And, in fact, they boldly inserted three verses here which inform us that he “himself”, the real Herakles, dwells among the gods—what Odysseus saw in Hades was only his counterfeit. Whoever wrote this was practising a little original theology on his own account. Such a contrast between a fully animated “self” possessing the original man’s body and soul still united, and a counterfeit presentment of himself (which cannot be his psyche) relegated to Hades, is quite strange both to Homer and to Greek thought of later times.<sup>73</sup> It is, in fact, an example of the earliest “harmoniser’s” solution of a difficulty. The poet does, indeed, attempt to connect Herakles with Odysseus by making the two enter into conversation, in imitation of the conversations with Agamemnon and Achilles. But it is soon evident that these two have really nothing to say to each other; Odysseus, in fact, is silent. There was no real relationship between them, at most an analogy; Herakles, too, having once descended alive into Hades. This analogy alone, in fact, appears to have suggested the introduction of Herakles in this place.<sup>74</sup>

There now remains (inserted after Minos and Orion and before Herakles and probably composed by the same hand that was responsible for them) the incident of the three "penitents" undergoing punishment; a passage that no reader can possibly forget. First Tityos, whose giant frame is preyed upon by two vultures, is seen, then Tantalos, who in the middle of a lake is parched with thirst and cannot reach up to the fruit-laden branches over his head, and last Sisypheos, who is bound to roll up-hill the stone that ever rolls back again. The limits of the Homeric conception (with which the pictures of Minos, Orion, and Herakles might still perhaps be reconciled) are in these pictures definitely overstepped. The souls of these three unfortunates are credited with complete and continuous consciousness. Without this, their punishment would not have been felt and would not have been inflicted. And, observing the extraordinarily matter-of-fact and cursory description, which takes the reasons of the punishment for granted except in the case of Tityos, we cannot help feeling that these examples of punishment after death were not invented for the first time by the composer of these lines. They cannot have been offered to the astonished ears of their hearers as a daring novelty, but were rather recalled briefly to those hearers' recollection. Probably these three are selected as examples out of a much larger collection of such pictures. Can it be that still older poets (who may still, however, have been more recent than the poet of the earliest parts of the "Journey") had already dared to desert the Homeric view of the soul?

However that may be, we may be sure that the punishment of the three "penitents" was not intended to contradict flatly the Homeric conception of the unconsciousness and nothingness of the shades. They could not in that case have accommodated themselves so well to a poem that is founded upon such conceptions. They do not disprove the rule because they are, and are only intended to be, *exceptions* to that rule. This, however, would be impossible if it were justifiable to interpret the poet's fiction as representing, in the person of these three unfortunates, three types of special sins and classes of sinners; as, for example, unbridled Lust (Tityos), insatiable Gluttony (Tantalos), and Pride of the Intellect (Sisypheos).<sup>41</sup> They would in that case be particular examples of the retribution which one must think of as being extended to all the innumerable hosts of shadows who have been guilty of the same sins. But nothing in the description itself warrants such a theological interpretation; indeed, we have no reason

or excuse for attributing to this particular poet such a desire to prove the existence of a compensatory justice in an after life. It is quite strange to Homer, and so far as it ever became known to later Greek theology, it was only introduced very late, through the influence of a speculative mysticism. No, the almighty power of the gods is able in special cases, so this picture assures us, to preserve for individual souls their consciousness: in the case of Teiresias as a reward, in the case of these three objects of the gods' hatred, in order that they may be capable of feeling their punishment. The real fault for which they are punished can be guessed fairly certainly from what the poet tells us about Tityos—it is in each case a grievous offence committed by them against the gods. The crime of Tantalos we can make out from what we know of him through other sources. It is less easy to discover what was the exact misdeed for which the crafty Sisyphos is punished.<sup>62</sup> In any case, it is clear that retribution has overtaken all three of them for sins against the gods themselves—sins which human beings of later times could not possibly commit. And for this reason alone, neither their deeds nor their punishment can have anything typical or representative about them; they are sheer exceptions, and that is why the poet found them interesting.

The episode of Odysseus' journey to Hades (even in its latest portions) suggests no acquaintance whatever with any general class of sinners who receive their punishment in that place. If, indeed, it had alluded to the punishment in the after-world of *perjurers*, orthodox Homeric doctrine would not in that case have been violated. Twice over in the *Iliad*, on solemn occasions of oath-taking, besides the gods of the upper world, the Erinyes also are called upon as witnesses of the oath: for they punish under the earth those who break their oath.<sup>63</sup> Not without reason have these passages been held to show "that the Homeric conception of the phantasmal half-life of the souls under the earth, where they are without feeling or consciousness, was not a general folk-belief."<sup>64</sup> We must add, however, that the belief held in Homeric times of the punishment of oath-breakers in the realm of shadows cannot as yet have been very vital, for it was quite unable to prevent the success of the totally incompatible belief in the unconscious nothingness of disembodied spirits. A solemn oath-formula (so much that is primitive persisting, even after it has become dead letter, in formula) preserved a reference to that ancient belief, which had become strange to Homeric ears—a vestige, in fact, of a bygone point of view. It may be



that in the dim past, when men still vividly and literally believed in the reality of a punishment in after life for perjury, all the souls in Hades were credited with a conscious existence ; but there never was a time when men generally believed that earthly sins (including perjury as only one among many) were punished in Hades. Oath-breaking was not punished as a specially outrageous moral failing—it may well be doubted whether the Greeks ever considered or felt it to be such. The perjurer, rather than any other particular sinner, was the special victim of the dread goddesses, for the simple reason that the perjurer in his desire to emphasize in the most awful manner his aversion to falsehood, has invoked against himself, if he fails to keep his oath, the most terrible fate of all—to suffer torment in the realm of Hades whence is no escape.<sup>86</sup> To the Infernal Spirits of the Underworld, to whom he had condemned himself, he falls a victim if he breaks his word. Belief in the supernatural power of such imprecations,<sup>87</sup> and not any special moral importance attached to truth-telling—an idea quite strange to the older Antiquity—gave to the oath its peculiar terrors.

### § 5

A final example of the tenacity with which custom may outlive the belief on which it is founded is afforded by the story told of Odysseus, that in fleeing from the Kikonian land, he did not leave it until he had called thrice upon those of his companions who had fallen in the battle with the Kikones (*Od.* ix, 45-6). References to similar callings upon the dead in later literature make the meaning of such behaviour clear. The souls of the dead who have fallen in foreign lands must be "called";<sup>88</sup> they will then, if this is properly done, follow the caller to their distant home, where an "empty grave" awaits them.<sup>89</sup> This duty is regularly performed in Homer for the benefit of those whose bodies it is impossible to recover and bury in the proper way. But a summons of the dead and the erection of such empty receptacles—intended for whom if not for the souls who must then be accessible to the devotion of their relations?—was natural enough for those who believed in the possibility of the soul's sojourn in the neighbourhood of its living friends ; it was not admissible for supporters of the Homeric belief. Here we have once more a remarkable vestige of an ancient belief, surviving in a custom that has not been entirely given up even in altered times. Here, too, the belief which had given rise to the custom, was extinct.

If we ask the Homeric poet for what purpose a mound was heaped up over the grave of the dead and a gravestone set upon it, he will answer us : in order that his fame may remain imperishable among men, and that future generations may not be ignorant of his story.<sup>29</sup> That sounds truly Homeric. When a man dies his soul departs into a region of twilight dream-life ; his body, the visible man, perishes. Only his glorious name, in fact, lives on. His praises speak to after ages from the monument to his honour on his grave-mound—and in the song of the bard. A *poet* would naturally be inclined to think such things.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER I

<sup>1</sup> E. Kammer, *Einheit d. Odyssee*, 510 ff.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. *Il.* 43, πολλὰς δ' ἰφθίμου ψυχὰς (καὶ φάιδε Apol. Rhod., as in *A* 55: mistakenly) "Αἶθε προΐειν ἄρῳ, σπένδε δὲ ἱλάρια νεότης κλέουσα." *Ψ* 105, πρηνυχίῳ γὰρ μοι Πατροκλῆα; θεῶν δὲ ψυχὴ δέμασθαι . . . ἵππο δὲ θλακυλὸν αὐτῷ (cf. 66).

<sup>3</sup> E.g. *A* 262, θεῷ Ἀντήνορος υἱεὶ ὅπ' Ἀτρεΐδῃ βασιλῆϊ πότμον ἀναλίσσαντες ἔδου θέμον Ἀΐδοι ἄσπε. The ψυχὴ of Elpenor and afterwards that of Teiresias, of his mother, of Agamemnon, etc., is addressed by Odysseus in the Nekyia of the *Od.* simply as: Ἑλπύνορ, Τειρεσίη, μήτηρ ἐμὴ, etc. And cf. such expressions as: *Ψ* 244, εἰς δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἰγὼ Ἀΐδε πύθωμαι, or *O* 251, καὶ δὲ ὄντω ἰφθίμῳ, τέκνον καὶ δῶμ' Ἀΐδου ἔμενι τῷδ' ἱσταθαι . . . or *B* 456 f., etc.

<sup>4</sup> The first view is Nagelsbach's, the second that of Genthe.

<sup>5</sup> And of civilized peoples, too, in antiquity. Just such a second self, an εἰδωλὸν duplicating the visible self of man, were, in their original significance, the *genius* of the Romans, the *fravashi* of the Persians, the *Ka* of the Egyptians.

<sup>6</sup> *εὐνοῖσθαι* (sc. Homer) τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς εἰδωλοῖς ταῖς δὲ τοῖς κατόπτοις φανερμέναις ὁμοίαις καὶ τοῖς διὰ τῶν ὁράτων ἀντανακλῆναι, ἃ καθ' ἑαυτὰς οὐκ ἔχουσιν καὶ τὰς ἀνθρώπων μινεῖν στερεοτυπώην δὲ ὁρατοῦσαν οὐδενίαν ἔχει ἐκ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, Apollod. x. βιβλ. ap. Stob., *Ecl.* i, p. 420 W.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Cic., *Div.* i, 63: incert corpus dormientis ut mortui, viget autem et vivit animus. Quod multo magis faciet post mortem cum omnino corpore exarserit. *TD.* i, 29: visis quibusdam saepe movebantur cinque maxime doctissimi, ut viderentur ei qui vita exarserant vivere. Here we have precise ancient testimony both for the subjective and the objective elements in dreaming and for their importance for the origin of belief about the soul.

<sup>8</sup> Τὴν δ' ἔδου ψυχὴ . . . αὐτὴ δ' ἀννήσθη, *B* 696 f. Τὴν δὲ καὶ ἐφθόλμῳ ἐρβανῇ πῶς ἔκλινεν, ἔμενι δ' ἔξωκω, ἀπὸ δὲ ψυχῇ ἐκένουον . . . ἵππο δὲ ἄμνητα καὶ δὲ φέρον θεμὸς ἀγέσθη—*X* 468 ff., 475; and α 348: ἀνοψήματα.

<sup>9</sup> Speaking of *εὐνοῖσθαι* (= *λενοψυχία*), Sen., *Ep.* liv, 2, says, medici hanc "meditationem mortis" vocant, faciet enim aliquando spiritus ille quod saepe sonatus est.

<sup>10</sup> A remarkable idea seems to be obscurely suggested in an expression such as that of *ε* 207, ἀλλ' ἔγωγε τὸν Κῆρτος ἔδου θανάτου φέρονται εἰς Ἀΐδου θέμον; cf. *B* 302. Usually the Keres bring death to men: here (like Thanatos himself in later poetry) they conduct the dead into the realm of Hades. They are *daimones* of Hades, originally and primitively themselves souls of the departed (see below, p. 168), and it is a natural idea to make such soul-spirits, hovering in the air, carry off the souls of men just dead to the realm of the souls. In Homer only a stereotyped phrase preserves the vague memory of such a conception.

<sup>12</sup> Of the dead we read in  $\lambda$  218, οὐ γὰρ ἐν σάρκεσσι τε καὶ ὀστέσιν ὄντες ἴζονται. Taking the words strictly this might mean that the dead possess sinews but not the flesh or bones that should be held together by the sinews. This is how Nauck, in fact, understood the Homeric words: *Mélanges Græcorum*, iv, 718. But it is very difficult to picture "shadows" which in this manner possess sinews but no body of flesh and bones; the corrupt words of  $\beta$ . 229, preserved apart from their context, are quite insufficient to prove that Aesch. derived such an unrealistic impression from the Homeric words.—That the poet of these lines from the *Nek*, simply meant "flesh, bones, and sinews, too, which might have held them together", is shown quite clearly by what follows: ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τε πυρὸς καταπτόν μένος αἰθόμενοι. δαμνῇ. ἰσάει αὖ πρῶτα λίγα λεία' ὄντια θυμῷ, θυγὰ δ' οὐρ' ὀνέμενος ἀεσσανμένον πεπρόσθεον. How, then, could the fire help destroying the sinews too?

<sup>13</sup> The sacrificial character of the proceedings at the *vogus* of Patroklos has again been called in question by v. Fritze, *de libatione veterum Græcorum*, 7; f. (1893). He admits this interpretation of the pouring of the blood on the pyre, but explains the other circumstances differently. It would be quite easy to disprove in this fashion the sacrificial character of every *όλοκαύτωμα* for *χθόνιος* whether Heroes or the dead. It is true that the bodies of sheep and cattle, horses and figs, thus completely consumed by fire, are not a "food-offering", but they are a sacrifice for all that, and belong to the class of expiatory offerings in which the flesh is not offered for the food of the daimon but the lives of the victims are sacrificed to him. That Achilles slays the Trojan prisoners at the *vogus* *κραυόμενος χαλῶσθαι* ( $\Psi$  23) does not destroy the sacrificial character of this offering intended to appease the wrath (felt also by Achilles) of the dead man.—The whole procedure gives a picture of primitive sacrificial ritual in honour of the dead and differs in no particular from the ritual of sacrifice to the *θεοὶ χθόνιοι*. This is recognized by Stengel in his *Cithonischer und Todtencult* (*Erstbuch, Friedland*), p. 432, who also marks clearly the differences between the two religious ceremonies as they were gradually evolved in the process of time.

<sup>14</sup> It cannot be denied that the libation of wine poured out by Achilles during the night (to which he expressly summons the psyche of Patroklos,  $\Psi$  216-22) is sacrificial in character, like all similar *χοαί*. The wine with which the embers of the funeral pyre are extinguished may have been intended to serve that purpose alone and not as a sacrifice. But the jars of honey and oil which Achilles has placed upon the pyre ( $\Psi$  170; cf.  $\omega$  67-8) can hardly be regarded as anything but sacrificial (cf. Bergk, *Opusc.* ii, 675; acc. to Stengel, *Jahrb. Philol.*, p. 849, 1887, they only serve to kindle the flames, but the honey, at any rate, seems a strange material for the purpose. For libations at the *vogus* or at the grave honey and oil are regularly used—see Stengel himself, *loc. cit.*, and *Philol.* xxxix, 378 ff.). Acc. to v. Fritze, *de libat.*, 72, the jars of honey and oil were intended not as libations but for the "bath of the dead"—in the next world, in the Hæmeric Hades!—Honey can only have been used for bathing purposes, in Greece as elsewhere, by those who unintentionally fall into it like Glaukos.

<sup>15</sup> On Greek hair offerings see Wieseler, *Philol.* ix, 711 ff., who rightly regards these offerings as symbolic and no substitutes for primitive human sacrifice. The same explanation of the offering of hair is given in the case of other peoples also; cf. Tylor, ii, 401.

<sup>20</sup> Patroklos' request for prompt burial (80 ff.) gives a motive, since Achilles has already given orders for a place next day, 49 ff. (cf. 541).

<sup>21</sup> Il. 19; 178. Again, in the night following the erection of the funeral pyre, when the body is burning, Achilles calls to the soul of Patroklos *ψυχὴ καλὰ φέουσα Περσέεσσι θεοῖσι* 221. The person thus called upon is evidently supposed to be still close at hand. This is not contradicted by the formula *παῖς . . . καὶ εἰς Ἄϊδον δέμας* (19, 179), for in l. 18, at least, the words cannot mean in Hades, since the soul is still outside Hades, as it tells us itself, 71 ff. The words can only mean "about", "before" the House of Hades (like *ἐν ποταμῷ* "by the river", etc.). In the same way *εἰς Ἄϊδον δέμας* often only means towards the house of Hades (Arnold on v. 512).

<sup>22</sup> From descriptions in ancient poetry? or had similar customs—at least, at the funerals of chieftains—survived into the poet's own time? Especially magnificent, e.g., were the burials of Spartan kings—and also Cretan kings, it appears, so long as there were any; cf. Arist. *fr.* 476, p. 1558a, 37 ff.

<sup>23</sup> Funeral games for Amarynkeus, *Ψ* 630 ff., for Achilles, *u* 85 ff. Such games are referred to as being quite the usual custom in *u* 87 ff. Later poetry is full of descriptions of such *ἀγῶνες θανάσιος* of the heroic age.

<sup>24</sup> As Aristarchos noticed: see *Rh. Mus.* 36, 544 f. Rather different are the (certainly ancient) games and contests for the hand of a bride (cf. stories of Pelops, Danaios, Ikaros, etc.).

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *Ψ* 274, *εἰ μὲν σφὶ θεοὶ δέδωκε δαδιδέσθαι* *Ἄχαιας*, i.e. in *δωρεῶν* of Patroklos; cf. 546: *οὐδ' ἐταῖρον δέδωκεν κερπίδα*. *ἀνταλλάσσει* means to give the dead man his *κέρπεα*, i.e. his former possessions (by burning them). The games are therefore on exactly the same footing as the burning of the personal effects of the dead in which the soul of the dead man was supposed still to take pleasure.

<sup>26</sup> Aug., *GD.* viii, 28: *Varru dicit omnes mortuos existimari manus deos, et probat per ea sacra quae omnibus fere mortuis exhibentur, ubi et ludos commemorat Iunobres, tanquam hoc sit maximum divinitatis indicium, quod non solent huiusmodi munusculis celebrari.*

<sup>27</sup> Quae pietas ei debetur a quo nihil acceperis? aut quid omnino, cuius nullum meritum sit, ei deberi potest? . . . (dei) quamobrem colandi sint non intellego nullo nec accepto ab eis nec sperato bono, Cic., *ND.* i, 116; cf. Pl., *Εὐθύφρ.* pass. Homer speaks in the same way

*βαλὼν τ' ἀπὸ δάκρυ παραυγῆς*, ?

<sup>28</sup> *μή γάρ τ' ὅστις νειομαί εἰς Ἄϊδον ἐκείν μὲ κερπεὶ λαλῶσθαι*. *Ψ* 73 f.

<sup>29</sup> *—λέγει δὲ Ἄϊδον χερσὶ πύρ' ἀφθαλμοῖς ἐλθεῖν σὺν τῇ στήν' ἀρείῳ*, *λ* 426; cf. *Α* 483, *u* 296. To do this is the duty of the next of kin, mother or wife. The necessity for closing the sightless eyes and dumb mouth of the dead is intelligible without reference to any superstitious *avertis penis*. Such an idea is, however, dimly discernible in such a phrase as *εἰς Ἄϊδον ἐκείν μὲ κερπεὶ χερσὶ εἶλῃ δὲ δέμας*, *Epigr. Gr.*, 314, 24. Was there originally some idea of the "soul" being released by these means?—Seat of the soul in the *κῆρυ* of the eye: *χερσὶ δ' ἐν ἀφθαλμοῖς τὰς νεκρυνόμεναι*, *Bahr.* 95, 95 (see *Crusius, Rh. Mus.* 46, 319). Augurium non transdi mortem in eugritudine quandam oculorum pupillae imaginem reddent, *Plin., N.H.* 28, 64; cf. *Geertz*, p. 1181. [If a person can no longer see his or her *σῶμα*

to a mirror is a sign of approaching death, Oldenberg, *Rel. d. Ved.*, 525 [p. 449<sup>a</sup> French tr.].—Among many peoples it is believed that the eyes of the dead must be closed in order to prevent the dead person seeing or haunting anyone in the future: Robinson, *Psychol. d. Nations.*, 44; cf. *Cl. Varr.* v, 118 (of the Greeks); *Vg., A.* iv, 684 f.; *extremum ut quis super habitus errat ore legam.* *Serv. ad loc.*; *muliebriter, tamquam possit animum sororis accipere et in se transferre* (cf. *Epigr. Gr.*, 547; *IG, Sic. et It.*, 607a, 9-10). *ἄνχρ* making its exit through the mouth I 409; cf. "Among the Seminoles of Florida when a woman died in childbirth the infant was held over her face to receive her parting spirit and thus acquire strength and knowledge for future use," Tylor, i, 439.

<sup>12</sup> And even *δὲν πρὸθύοντες ἐκπαυμένους*, I 212, i.e. with feet turned towards the door. The reason for this custom—which existed elsewhere, too, and still exists—is hardly to be sought only in the *ritus naturae*, as Plin. 7, 40, thinks. This has generally little to do with the customs observed on the solemn occasions of life. The meaning of the practice is much more naively revealed in a statement about the manners of the Pehuenches Indians in South America given by Pöppig, *Reise in Chile, Peru, etc.*, i, 383. There they carry the dead man feet foremost out of the door "because if the corpse of the dead man were carried out otherwise his wandering ghost might come back into the house". The Greek custom, though in Homeric times long faded to a mere symbol, must be supposed to have depended originally upon similar fears of the return of the "soul". (Similar precautions arising from the same belief were customary at funerals elsewhere: Oldenberg, *Rel. d. Veda*, 573-4 [459 F.T.]. Robinson, *Psychol. d. Nations.*, 45 f.) Belief in the incomplete departure of the soul from this world has dictated these customs, too.

<sup>13</sup> The details of the procedure until the funeral dirge are given in *X* 343-55.

<sup>14</sup> *ῥάβδος* and *στέλας*, II 457, 575, P 434, A 371, p. 14. A heaped-up *στέλας* as the burial-place of Eetion round which the Nymphs plant elms: *Z* 419 ff.—which preserves a trace of the custom, obtaining also in later times, of planting trees and even a whole grove round the grave.

<sup>15</sup> *στέλας ἀνέστης* in the formula *στέλας εἰς οὐρανὸν καὶ εἰς ἀνέρας ἀνέστης*, = 291, § 222. Here the *ἀνέστης* comes after the heaping up of the grave-mound—possibly the *στέλας* are to be burnt on or at the grave-mound. Schol. B cm 7 212 is, however, mistaken in the rule deduced from these cases: *σπρίσθαι, εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν, εἰς τὰς ἀνέρας, εἰς τὴν γῆν*. All the cases refer to the ceremonial at empty graves. Where the body was obtainable the relatives or friends would have burnt the *στέλας* with the body. This is done in the case of Eetion and Elyenor, and it must be understood in the close connexion of the words *εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ εἰς ἀνέρας ἀνέστης*, Q 38, and again *ἔπειτα τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ εἰς ἀνέρας ἀνέστης*, γ 285.

<sup>16</sup> —a custom that originally belonged to all primitive peoples and remained in force for a very long time among many of them. All the possessions of a dead Inca remain his own absolute property: Prescott, *Peru*, i, 31. Among the Achipontes of Paraguay all the possessions of the dead are burnt: Klemm, *Cultures*, ii, 99. The Albanians of the Caucasus buried all the dead man's possessions with him, and *ἐν τῇ ταφῇ* *ἐκείνου* (*ἐν τῇ ταφῇ* *ἐκείνου*), Str. 503. Of ancient origin are also the extravagant burial customs of the Mingrelians living in what was formerly Albania: Chardin, *Voy. en Perse* (ed. Langlé), i, 325, 296, 314, 322.

<sup>12</sup> Examples given by O. Jahn, *Persins*, p. 218 *fin.*

<sup>13</sup>  $\phi\upsilon\chi\eta$  δ' ἐν βάθειον πρυμνὴν "Αἰδῶος βῆθρον, ἐν ὅτρυν γόμονα λυγρὸν ἀνδραγῆρα καὶ ῥῆγον, II 756, X 362 cf. Y 294, H 415.  $\phi\upsilon\chi\eta$  δ' "Αἰδῶος ἀνδραγῆρα, π 560, λ 65. Complete departure into the depths of the kingdom of Hades is more clearly expressed in such words as  $\beta\alpha\iota\eta\epsilon$  δῶμα "Αἰδὸς δῶμα, II 248, κίον "Αἰδὸς κίον, X 622, etc. Again, in λ 150, the soul of Teiresias while speaking to Odysseus is still in Hades in the wider sense but is more exactly on the extreme edge of that region: we are told  $\phi\upsilon\chi\eta$  μὲν ἔβη δῶμα "Αἰδὸς δῶμα—now at last it goes back again into the depths of the Kingdom of Hades.

<sup>14</sup> *Arctonikos* on F 104: ἡ δὲ αὐτὴ ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀνδρῶν  $\phi\upsilon\chi\eta$  "Ομηροῦ ἐν οὐλοῦσιν τῶν φέροντων ὑποκρίσιν. (Rather too systematically put by Porphy. ap. Stob., *Ecl.* i, p. 422, 20 ff., 425, 25 ff. W.) Elysium is the first to approach Odysseus' sacrificial trench οὐ γὰρ ποτ' ἐκρίσθη, λ 52. His  $\phi\upsilon\chi\eta$  had not yet been received into Hades (*Rh. Mus.* i, 616). Achilles' treatment of the body of Hektor shows that he thought of his enemy (because he was still unburied) as being able to feel what was done to him: *lacerari eum et sentire credo putat*, Cic., *T.D.* i, 105.

<sup>15</sup> Plin. vii, 197, explains the change among the Romans from burial to cremation as being due to the fear that in times of war and disturbance the dead might be deprived of their rest. If a man dies in war time, i.e. during a period of temporary anarchy, his body is burnt, but a limb (sometimes the head) is cut off to be taken home and buried *ad quod servatum iuxta fierent*. Paul. Festi. 148. 11; Varro, *L.L.* v, 23; Cic., *Lp.* ii, 55. 60. The same custom is found among certain German tribes; see Weinhold, *Sitzb. Wien. Ak.* xxix, 186: xxx, 209. Even among the negroes of Guinea and the South American Indians practices resembling the *os reseratum* of the Romans are found in the case of those who die in war in foreign country; cf. Klemm, *Callurg.* iii, 297; ii, 98 f. In every case burial is regarded as the ancient and traditional mode of disposing of the dead, and the one strictly required on religious grounds.

<sup>16</sup> Only once is there any mention of taking home the burnt bones, H 374 f. Aristarch. rightly recognised this as being in conflict with the normal conceptions and practice of Homer and regarded the lines as the composition of a later poet (Sch. A ad loc. and on d 174; Sch. EMQ., γ 109). The lines may have been inserted to account for the absence from the Troad of such enormous grave-mounds as the burial of the ashes of both armies should have produced. The same reason—the desire expressed in these lines to bring back those who have died in a foreign country to their own land at last—is implied as the origin of cremation in the illustrative story of Herakles and Argeios, the son of Ilikymnios, in the *Ierapia* (derived from Andron) of Sch. A on A 52.

<sup>17</sup> *Rh. Schr.* ii, 218, 220.

<sup>18</sup> It would apply better to Roman beliefs: cf. Vg., *A.* iv, 688-9—though even that means something else. (Cf. also Oldenberg, *Rel. d. Veda*, 585, 2.)

<sup>19</sup> Cf. esp. F 75-6, λ 218-22.

<sup>20</sup> Serr. ad *A.* iii, 68: *Aegyptii condita diutius servant cadavera scilicet ut anima multo tempore perduret et corpori sit obnoxia nec cito ad aliud transat. Romani contra faciebant, comburentes cadavera ut statim anima in generalitatem, i.e. in auras optatum rediret* (the pantheistic touch may be neglected).—Cf. the account given by Ivo Fonlan of the burial customs of the pagan Rumanians

(quoted from *Fritha* by J. Grimm, *Alt. Saks.* ii, 292): the preference for burning was due to the idea that the soul was less quickly set free on its way to Paradise when the body was buried intact, than when it was destroyed by fire.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. the Hymn of the Rigveda (x, 18) which is to be said at a cremation, esp. v. 2, 9 (quoted by Zimmer, *Altind. Leben*, 402 f.), and also *Rigv.* x, 14, 8 (Zimmer, p. 408). The Indians also wished to prevent the return of the dead to the world of the living. The feet of the corpse were chained so that the dead could not return (Zimmer, p. 402).

<sup>42</sup> It lies at the root of the stories of Demeter and Demophoon (or Triptolemos), and also that of Thetis and Achilles, when the goddess, laying the mortal child in the fire, *νεκρῶν γὰρ θνητῶν σώματα, ἰσθίμεν δὲ θεὸς ἀνθρώπων*, in order to make it immortal (cf. Preller, *Dem.* u. *Perseph.*, 112); cf. also the custom observed at certain festivals (7 of Hecate, cf. Bergk, *PLG.* iii, 682) of lighting fires in the streets and leaping through the flames carrying children, see Grinnam (E.T.), p. 625; cf. also Cic., *Div.* i, 47: *o praeclarum discessum cum ut Herculi contigit mortali corpore cremato in lucem animas excomit!* Ov., *N.* ix, 250; Luc., *Herm.*, 7; Q.S. v, 640 ff. (For more about the "purifying" effects of fire, see below, chap. ix, n. 127.)

<sup>43</sup> Nothing else than this is implied by the words of *H* 409-10, *οὐ γὰρ τὰ θνήσκοντα καταθνήσκουσιν ὕμνηται, ἀλλὰ καὶ θάρσυναν ποδοποιεῖται ὤμα*. The souls of the dead must be quickly "assuaged with fire" (their longing gratified) and so their bodies are burnt. Purification from what is mortal and unclean, which Diaberech (*Nekyia*, 197, 3) thinks is referred to in this passage, is certainly not suggested as such by the words of the poet.

<sup>44</sup> Light may be incidentally thrown on the question of the transition from burial to cremation by such a story as that which an Icelandic Saga tells of a man who is buried by his own wish before the door of his house: "but as he returned and did much mischief his body was exhumed and burnt and the ashes scattered over the sea" (Weinhold, *Altmod. Leben*, 499). We often read in old stories how the body of a dead man who goes about as a vampire is burnt. His soul is then exorcised and cannot come back again.

<sup>45</sup> It is natural to think of Asiatic influence. Cremation hearths have recently (1893) been discovered in Babylonia.

<sup>46</sup> See Heibig, *D. Hom. Ep. aus d. Denk. att.*, 42 f.

<sup>47</sup> That the men of the "Mycenaean" culture, though much affected by foreign influences, were Greeks—the Greeks of the Hellenic age of whom Homer speaks—may now be regarded as certain (see esp. E. Reich, *Vorb. Wien. Philol.*, 99 ff.).

<sup>48</sup> See Schliemann, *Mycenae*, E.T., 155, 165, 213-14.

<sup>49</sup> Heibig, *Hom. Ep.*, p. 62.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. K. Weinhold, *Sächs. Wien. Ak.*, 1858 (*Phil. Hist. Cl.*), xxix, pp. 121, 125, 141. The remarkable coincidences between the Mycenaean and these North European burial customs do not seem as yet to have been noticed. (The object of this elaborate foundation and covering may have been to preserve the corpse from decay longer, and especially from the effects of damp.)

<sup>51</sup> Also in the domed grave of Dimini: *Atth. Mith.*, xii, 159.

<sup>52</sup> The soul of a dead man from whom a favourite possession is withheld returns (normally whether the body and the possessions with it are burnt or buried). The story in Lucian, *Philops.*, xxvii, of the wife of Eukrates (cf. *Hdt.* v, 82y), is quite in accordance with popular belief.





this it is impossible to regard it as something independent of the body or as anything else than a special faculty of the same living body. Once, indeed, *H* 131, the *θυμός* is spoken of, instead of *ψυχή*, as that which goes down to Hades, but this can only be an error or an oversight (see also below, ch. xi, n. 2). According to Homeric ideas—and this is a conception repeated over and over again in Greek literature and even in Greek philosophy—the body has all its vital powers in itself, not merely *θυμός* but *μῦθος*, *νόος*, *μῆτις*, *βουλή*. Yet it only acquires life when supplemented by the *ψυχή*, which is something different from all these bodily powers—something with an independent being of its own and alone deserving the name "soul", a name which belongs as little to *θυμός* as to *νόος*. Gompertz thinks that *θυμός*, etc., were at first the only recognized faculties of the body and that *ψυχή* was only (for the Greeks) added later. This is certainly not to be made out from Homer—or any other part of Greek literature.

<sup>44</sup> *επὶ ψυχῇ θύω*, *X* 161; *επὶ ψυχῇ ἐμάχοντο*, *χ* 245; *ψυχῇ παραβλήμενος*, *ι* 322; *ψυχῇ παραβέβηται*, *γ* 74, *ι* 255; *ψυχῇ ἐπύθηται*, *ι* 401; and cf. *ε* 523: *οὐ γὰρ ἐὶ ψυχῇ τε καὶ αἰσάνος οὐ δυνάμεν εἶναι νόστος νῆμεν θόμος Ἀχῆος αἰών*. No one strictly speaking can go into Hades bereft of his *ψυχή*, for it is the *ψυχή* alone which goes there. Thus *ψυχή* here clearly = life, as is shown also by the addition of the words *καὶ αἰσάνος* for the sake of clearness. It is more doubtful whether this is the explanation of *ψυχῇ ἐλθῆτος*, *X* 325, or of *ψυχῇ ὀλέσονται*, *N* 763, *D* 168. Other passages adduced by Nügelsh. *Hom. TA.*, 381, and Schrader, *Jb. f. Philol.*, 1885, p. 167, either admit or require the material sense of the word *ψυχή*: e.g. *E* 496 B., *θ* 123, *ε* 91, etc.

## III

a detailed statement and documentation of the following:  
the *Nekyia*

(1898). [*Nl. Schr.* ...]

<sup>45</sup> The information given by Teiresias, *λ* 107 ff., about Thrinakia and the cattle of Helios seems to be put in such a brief and inadequate form just because the fuller account given by Kirke, *μ* 127, was already known to the poet who did not wish to repeat this word for word.

<sup>46</sup> A final example of such pictures intended to suggest the background of the *Odyssey* is the conversation between Achilles and Agamemnon in the "second *Nekyia*", *α* 19 ff. The composer of these lines has understood quite correctly the meaning and purpose of his model, the original *Nekyia* of *λ*, though his continuation of it is certainly very clumsy.

<sup>47</sup> *ε* 538-40 is borrowed from *δ* 388-90, 470.—I find after writing this that Kummer had already suggested imitation of *δ* in the *Nekyia*: *Einkels d. Od.*, 494 f.

<sup>48</sup> It is striking (and may have some special reason) that in Kirke's account there is no mention of the Kimmerians. It is easier to see why the careful description of the country in Kirke's speech, *ε* 509-15, is not afterwards repeated but merely recalled to the memory of the reader in a few words (*λ* 21-2).

<sup>49</sup> I can see no essential difference between the conception and situation of Hades as indicated in the *Iliad* and the account given in the *Nekyia* of the *Odyssey*. J. H. Voas and Nitzsch were right in this matter. Nor do the additional details given in the "second *Nekyia*" of *α* essentially "conflict" (as Teuffel, *Stud. u. Charact.*, thinks) with the description of the first *Nekyia*. It does not adhere

slavishly to its original, but it rests upon the same fundamental conceptions.

<sup>10</sup> Sch. H.Q., κ 314. Περιφάργεθαι, ἔτοι γὰρ εἴρ τὸ ἀφανίζον τὰ εἰσπύον τῶν ἔσθον, cf. Apollodor., s. v. ἔσθον, ap. Stob., Eccl. i, p. 420, 9 W. Περιφάργεθαι εἰσπύει ἀπὸ τῶν εὐπὶ φάργεσθαι τοῖς νεκρῶσιν.

<sup>11</sup> Acheron, too, seems to be regarded as a river. The soul of the unbriaried Patroklos, which has already departed, ἐν εἰσπύοντι Ἄϊδου εἴ, and has therefore passed over Okeanos, is prevented by the other souls from passing over "the river". Ψ 72 f. This can hardly be the Okeanos, and must, therefore, be Acheron (so, too, Porph. ap. Stob., Eccl. i, p. 422 l. 426 W.). κ 315 does not in the least prove that Acheron was thought of as a lake and not a river, as Dergh. Opusc. ii, 696, thinks.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. λ 206 ff., 208-293 ff., 475.

<sup>13</sup> See II 851 ff. (Patroklos), X 358 ff. (Hektor), λ 69 ff. Behind each of these there lies the ancient belief that the soul in the moment of escape achieves a higher state of being and returns to a form of knowledge independent of sense-perception (cf. Artemon ap. Sch., II 854, Arist. fr. 12 [10] R.). Otherwise this power belongs to gods and, strictly, only to Zeus, who can foresee everything (in Homer). But the statements are intentionally modified to suggest an undefined middle position between prophecy in the full sense and mere *συναίρεσθαι* (cf. Sch. B.V., X 359)—X 359 at the most may go beyond this point.

<sup>14</sup> λ 218 24.

<sup>15</sup> *ὅτι ἄρπυιαι εἰδότες, θάλαττα καὶ μέλαινα, εἰς Ἑρφέος ἀντίφας*, κ 527 f. From the word *μέλαινα* the *ὅτι ἄρπυιαι* is also to be understood *ἐνὶ κοινῷ* as being, more precisely, black (and so again in 572)—the ram offered to the gods (or Souls) of the underworld is regularly black, *εἰς Ἑρφέος ἀντίφας*. I.e. bending the head downwards (not towards the west) = *εἰς βόθρον*, λ 36—as Nitzsch rightly explains it. Everything corresponds to the regular *ἵρτασις* of later times for the underworld beings (cf. Stengel, *Zeich. f. Gymn.*, 1880, p. 743 f.).

<sup>16</sup> *καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ ἀσπίδος ἰστίου ἐκδύσας εἰς νεκροὺς καὶ δαίμονας εἰσπύοντες*, Sch. Q., λ 48. It is really the sound of the bronze or iron that drives away spirits: Luc., *Philops.* 15 (cf. O. Jahn, *Abergl. d. Börs. Blicks*, 70). But even the mere presence of iron objects is sufficient: [Aug.] *Hom. de sacrileg.* (about the seventh century), 22, states that to the *sacrilegi* belong among others those who wear rings or armlets of iron, aut qui in domo sua quaecumque de ferro, propter ut daemones timeant, ponunt.

<sup>17</sup> The idea that the Thesprotian *νεκροπαρεΐας* by the river Acheron was the original of the Homeric picture was first started by Paus., I, 17, 5. He was followed by K. O. Müller, *Introd. to a Scientific System of Myth.*, pp. 297-8 (E. T., Leitch), who has been followed by many others. But it has scarcely more justification than has e.g. the localisation of the Homeric entrance to Hades at Komae, Herakleia Pont. (cf. *RA. Mus.* 26, 555 ff.), or other places of ancient worship of the dead (e.g. Pylos). At such places the traditional names of Acheron, Kokyros, Pyriphlegethon were easily introduced—but taken from Homer and not coming thence into Homer. The fact that it is just this Thesprotian oracle of the dead that is mentioned in Hdt.'s well-known story (v, 92 ff) does not at all prove that this was the oldest of all such oracles.

<sup>18</sup> To this extent Lobbeck's denial of necromancy to the Homeric poems (*Agd.* 316) may, perhaps, require to be modified; but so modified it may be accepted.



Thgn., 702 ff.). The case of Sias presents the most serious difficulties that face any attempt to give a moralising sense (quite outside the poet's intention) to the section of the "three penitents". (See also *Rh. Mus.* i. 430.)

<sup>12</sup> Γ 278, Γ 280 (cf. *Rh. Mus.* i. 5). Nitzsch, *Anw. z. Od.* iii, p. 184 f., vainly employs all the arts of interpretation and criticism to deny their obvious meaning to both passages.

<sup>13</sup> K. O. Müller, *Aeschylus Eumenides*, p. 167 = E.T., 1853, p. 159.

<sup>14</sup> It should be remembered also that no legal penalties against perjury existed in Greece, any more than in Rome. They were unnecessary in face of the general expectation that the deity whom the perjurer had invoked against himself would take immediate revenge upon the criminal. (Esp. instructive are the words of Agamemnon on the Trojan breach of faith, *Δ* 158 ff.) Such revenge would be taken either during the life time of the perjurer—in which case the instruments of vengeance would be the spirits of Hell, the Erinyes: Hes., *Op.*, 802 ff.—or else after death.

<sup>15</sup> The oath as a bond in favour of the oath-gods: Thgn., 1193 f., *μῆτι θεοὺς ἐπάρκω* (ἐπάρκωθι, εἰ γὰρ ἀντιπάρκω δεινὰντοὺς κλέβας ἡσάτω ἐπαλόμενον. Perjury would be εἰς θεοὺς ἀναπράναι, Soph. *fr.* 431 (472 P.)).

<sup>16</sup> Eust., *Od.*, p. 1614-15, has understood this. He calls attention to Πι., P. 4, 139, *κλέβας γὰρ εἰς φυχὰν ἀπείκω* (ἄπεικω δεινὰντοὺς πρὸς Αἴφρο θελάμενος—on which passage the Sch. refers us back again to Homer). Both passages imply the same belief: τὰς ἀνολομένης ἐν ζῆνι γὰρ τὰς φυχὰς εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐκτελεσθέντος οἱ φέρον εἰς τὴν εὐμένην καταβῆναι καὶ δίδωσιν κενάγαν αἰσῶν πρὸς τοὺς οἰκίους (Sch. 165 f., Sch. H., 1 82). Nitzsch, *Anw.* iii, 17-18, vainly attempts to get out of the necessity of seeing in this act the fulfilment of a religious duty. He supposes that Odysseus is merely satisfying a "need of the heart", etc. The real meaning of religious performance is too often obscured by such "ethical" interpretation.

<sup>17</sup> The command of Athens to Telem., a 291, presupposes as universally customary the erection of a cenotaph for those who die in foreign lands unless their bodies can be obtained by their friends. Menelaos erects an empty tomb to Agamemnon in Egypt, *δ* 584.

<sup>18</sup> *δ* 584, *χαὶ Ἀγαμέμνονι τῶνδε ἐν ἀβυσσὶ ἀλῆος ἐστὶν*. λ 75 f., *εἴθε τί μοι γένοιτο πολέεσσι δαίθι θεάλασσας, ἀέθροε θυετῶν, καὶ ἀνομήτους εὐθετοῦς*. Achilles in the second Nekyia, ω 30 ff., says to Agam.: Would thou hadst died before Troy, for then the Achaeans would have set up a tomb for thee and *καὶ οὐ παύσει μέγα κλέος ἥρσ' εὐμένην* (cf. 93 f., where Agam. says to Achilles *ὥς εἰ μὴν αὐτὸς ἐπὶ δόρμ' ἄλλοις ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐνὶ νείεσσιν ἐν ἀνθρώπων κλέος ἵσταναι ἐσθλὸν Ἀγίλλε*). The words of Nektor, *η* 84 ff., show how the *εἶμα δαίμων* served to remind sailors as they passed, *ἀέθροε μὲν εἶμα σῆμα σάλας καταστρώμενος ἀνλ.* and to suggest that this was the proper and principal purpose of such erections.—In contrast with this cf. what is stated of the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands: "they laid their illustrious dead in a chest and set them up on a high place or on a rock by the bank of a river in order that they might be worshipped by the pious": Lippert, *Sarionculi*, p. 22.

## CHAPTER II

### ISLANDS OF THE BLEST

#### TRANSLATION

The Homeric picture of the shadow-life of the disembodied soul is the work of resignation, not of hope. Hope would never have beguiled itself with the anticipation of a state of things which neither afforded men the chance of further activity after death, nor, on the other hand, gave them rest from the toil of life; one which promised them only a restless, purposeless fluttering to and fro, an existence, indeed, but without any of the content that might have made it worthy of the name of life.

Was there never any aspiration after a more consolatory picture of the life after death? Did the tremendous vital energies of that time really devote themselves so completely to the realms of Zeus that not even a ray of hope penetrated to the House of Hades? We should have had to suppose so were it not for a single passing glimpse which we get of a distant land of hearts' desire, such as even the Greece that lay under the sway of the Homeric order of things still imagined for itself.

When Proteus, the sea-god who could foretell the future, has finished informing Menelaos, on the sea-shore of Egypt, of the circumstances of his return home to his country and of the fate of his dearest companions, he adds the prophetic words—so Menelaos himself informs Telemachos in the fourth book of the *Odyssey* (560 ff.): "But thou, god-like Menelaos, art not ordained to die in horse-pasturing Argos or to meet thy fate there; for the immortals shall send thee far away to the Elysian plain, to the ends of the world where dwells fair-haired Rhadamanthys, and where life is most easy for men. There is neither snow nor heavy storms nor rain, but Okeanos ever sends zephyrs with soft-breathing breezes to refresh men—because thou hast Helen to wife and art thereby in their eyes the son-in-law of Zeus."

These verses allow us a glimpse into a world about which the Homeric poems are otherwise silent. At the end of the

world, by the River Okeanos, lies the "Elysian Plain", a land where the sky is always clear, as in the land where the gods live.<sup>1</sup> There dwells the great Rhadamanthys, not alone, one may suppose as "men" are spoken of (565, 568). Thither shall the gods some day send Menelaos—he is not to die (562); that is to say, he is to reach that place alive nor shall he suffer death there. The place to which he is to be sent is not a part of the realm of Hades, but a land on the surface of the earth set apart as the abode not of disembodied "souls", but of men whose souls have not been separated from their visible selves—for only thus can they feel and enjoy the sense of life (565). The picture which fancy has drawn here is the precise opposite of the blessed immortality of the soul in its separate existence. Just because such an idea remained quite unthinkable for Homeric singers, hope sought and found an exit from the shadow-world which swallows up all living energy. Hope imagined a land at the end of the world, but still of this world, to which occasionally some few favourites of the gods might be "translated" without the psyche being separated from its body and descending to Hades.

The actual mention of such miraculous "translation" stands alone in the Homeric poems, and the passage in the *Odyssey* seems to have been introduced by a later hand.<sup>2</sup> But the conditions of such a miracle are all implied within the range of Homeric ideas. Menelaos is carried off by the power of the gods and lives an eternal life far from the world of mortals. The belief that a god could suddenly withdraw his earthly favourite from the eyes of men and invisibly waft him away on the breeze not infrequently finds its application in the battle-scenes of the *Iliad*.<sup>3</sup> The gods could also make a mortal "invisible" for a prolonged period. When Odysseus has been so long lost to his friends they suspect that the gods have "made him invisible" (*Od.* i, 235 ff.); they do not regard him as "dead" but "the Harpies have carried him away", and he is consequently withdrawn from all human ken (*Od.* i, 241 f.; xiv, 371). Penelope, in her grief, prays either for swift death through the arrows of Artemis, or that a storm wind may lift her up and carry her away on dark pathways to the mouths of Okeanos, that is, to the entrance of the Land of the Dead (*Od.* xx, 61-5; 79 ff.).<sup>4</sup> To explain her wish she recalls a fairy tale of the kind that must often have been told in the women's quarters; how the daughters of Pandareos, after the violent death of their parents, were brought up to lovely maidenhood by Aphrodite and provided by Hera, Artemis and Athene with all kinds of gifts and accom-

plishments ; till one day when Aphrodite had gone to Olympus to ask Zeus to make a match for them, the Harpies came and carried them off and made them the hand-maidens of the hated Erinyes.<sup>4</sup> This folk-tale reveals more clearly than is usual with the generally cultured Homeric narrative the popular belief that men might be carried off permanently from the land of the living, and, without seeing death, live on in another dwelling-place. For the daughters of Pandareos are carried away alive—to the Kingdom of the Dead, it is true, for that is where they must go if they become the servants of the Erinyes, the spirits of the underworld.<sup>5</sup> That is where Penelope wishes to be carried off, and without dying first—away from the land of the living which has become intolerable for her. Such a translation is accomplished by means of the Harpies or the Stormwind, which is the same thing, since the Harpies are nothing else but wind-deities of a peculiarly sinister kind. They may be compared to the Devil's Bride or the "Whirlwind's Bride" of German folk-tales, who rides in the whirlwind and also carries off men with her.<sup>6</sup> The Harpies and what we are here told of them, belong to the "vulgar mythology" which so seldom finds any expression in Homer ; a popular folk-lore that could tell of many things between heaven and earth of which the Homeric "grand style" takes little notice. In Homer the Harpies never act on their own authority ; only as the servants of the gods or of a single god do they transport mortals where no word of man, no human power, can reach."

The prophesied removal of Menelaos to the Elysian fields at the end of the world is only another example of such a "translation" by the will and the might of the gods. Even the fact that prolonged habitation in that happy land, inaccessible to other men, is promised to him, does not differentiate the fate of Menelaos from that of the daughters of Pandareos, or from that which Penelope wishes for herself. For Menelaos, however, immortal life is promised not in Hades, or even at its entrance, but in a special country of the blest, as though in a new kingdom of the gods. He is to become a "god" ; for since to the Homeric poets "god" and "immortal" are interchangeable terms, a man who is granted immortality (that is, whose psyche is never separated from his visible self) becomes for them a god.

It is also a Homeric belief that gods can raise mortals to their own realm, to immortality. Kalypso wishes to make Odysseus "immortal and ageless for all time", that he may remain for ever by her side (*Od.* v, 135 f. ; 209 f. ; xxiii, 335 f.),



that is to say, make him a god like herself. The immortality of the gods is conditioned by the eating of the magic food ambrosia and nectar; \* man, too, by eating continually the food of the gods, becomes an immortal god. What Odysseus in his longing for the earthly home, to which he is drawn by loyalty and duty, rejects, has been attained by other mortals. The Homeric poems can tell of more than one mortal promoted to immortal life.

As he is struggling in the stormy sea rescue comes to Odysseus in the person of Ino Leukothea, once the daughter of Kadmos, "who had formerly been a mortal woman, but now in the waves of the sea shares in the honour of the gods" (*Od.* v, 333 ff.).<sup>10</sup> Did some god of the sea bear her away and imprison her for ever in his own element? The belief existed that a god might descend from heaven even upon an earthly maiden and carry her off for ever as his spouse (*Od.* vi, 280 f.).<sup>11</sup>

Ganymede, the most beautiful of mortals, had been carried away by the gods to Olympus to dwell among immortals, as the cup-bearer of Zeus (*Il.* xx, 232 ff.).<sup>12</sup> He was a scion of the old Trojan royal house, to which Tithonos also belonged, whom both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* already know as the husband of Eos; from his side the goddess arose every morning to bring the light of day to gods and men.<sup>13</sup> It appears that she had "translated" her beloved not to Olympus but to the distant dwelling-place by the River Okeanos from which she sets out in the morning.<sup>14</sup> It was Eos who had once borne off the beautiful Orion, and in spite of the jealousy of the other gods had enjoyed his love until Artemis "on Ortygia" had slain him with her gentle arrow (*Od.* v, 122 ff.). The story may be derived from ancient star-myths, which represented in the language of myth what is actually to be observed in the morning sky. But in such myths the elements and celestial phenomena are thought of as living and animate like men. And in the same way, these star-spirits, in accordance with the regular development of legend, have long ago sunk, for the Homeric poet, to the level of earthly youths and heroes. If the goddess can raise Orion into her own kingdom, then, according to the belief of the time (which is all that matters to us here), the same thing might happen to any mortal through the favour of the gods. A simple imitation of the same legend in a purely human setting is the story of Kleitos, a youth of the family of the seer Melampon, whom Eos has carried off for the sake of his beauty that he may dwell among the gods (*Od.* xv, 249 f.).

## § 2

The translation, then, of Menelaos, while still alive, to the ends of the earth to live there in perpetual blessedness is indeed a miracle, but a miracle that finds its justification and precedent in the range of Homeric belief. The only thing new about it is that Menelaos has a special dwelling-place assigned to him, not in the land of the gods, the proper realm of immortality, nor as in the case of Tithonos and as Kalyppo desired for Odysseus, in the company of a deity, but in a separate place specially allotted to the translated hero, the Elysian fields. Nor does this appear to be the invention of the writer of these lines. He refers so briefly to the "Land of the Departed"<sup>16</sup> and its delights that we are forced to believe that he did not himself originate so enticing a vision.<sup>18</sup> He can only, in the case of Menelaos, have added a fresh companion to the company of the blessed. That Rhadamanthys the Just dwells there seems to be known to him from ancient tradition, for he evidently only intends to recall the fact and does not think it necessary to justify this selection of the brother of Minos.<sup>17</sup> It might even be supposed that the picture of such a wonderland had been invented and embellished by older poets simply for the benefit of Rhadamanthys. The only novelty is that this picture, which has been fully adopted into the circle of Homeric poetry, now includes a hero of the Trojan epic cycle among the number of those translated to that land of ever unclouded happiness. The lines were inserted, as has already been remarked, at a later date, into the prophecy of Proteus, and it is hard not to suppose that the whole idea lay far from the thoughts of previous Homeric singers. Would the flower of the heroic chivalry, including Achilles himself, have been doomed to that dim shadow-world in which we see them wandering in the Nekyia of the *Odyssey*, if a way out into a life exempt from death had already revealed itself to imagination at the time when the Epic gave the stamp of its approval to the stories which dealt with the fate of the greater number of the heroes? Because the poem of the Trojan War and the adventures of the Return from Troy had not yet decided upon the fate of Menelaos, a later poet could speak of his "translation" to the—since "discovered"—Land of Destiny. It is highly probable that even at the time of the composition of the *Journey to Hades* of Odysseus this conception—afterwards so important for the development of the Greek belief in immortality—of a secluded resting-place of living and translated heroes had not yet been completely

formulated. It fits easily into the framework of belief prevailing in the Homeric poems, but it is not necessarily required by that framework. It is natural on this account to suppose that it entered the *Épic* from without. And, remembering the Babylonian story of Hasisatra and the Hebrew one of Enoch,<sup>18</sup> both of whom without suffering death were translated into the realm of immortal life—either to "Heaven" or to the "End of the Rivers" to the gods—we might be inclined to follow the fashion that prevails in some quarters nowadays, and believe that these earliest Greek translation legends were borrowed from Semitic tradition. Little, however, would be gained by such a mechanical derivation. Here and in all such cases the main question remains still unanswered: what were the reasons which led the Greek mind to wish to borrow this particular idea at this particular time from abroad? In the present instance at least, nothing argues specially for the handing on of the belief in translation from one nation to another rather than for its independent origin in the different countries out of similar needs.

This new idea did not contradict the normal Homeric beliefs about the soul but on the contrary presupposed them and supplemented them without incongruity. It was also, as we have seen, based upon conceptions that were familiar and natural to Greek thought. There was, indeed, no need for any stimulus from without to produce from these materials the undoubtedly new and peculiarly attractive idea of which we receive the earliest intimation in the prophecy of Proteus.

### § 3

The importance of this new creation for the later development of Greek belief makes it all the more necessary to be quite clear as to what exactly this novelty really was. Was it a Paradise for the pious and the just? A sort of Greek Valhalla for the bravest heroes?—or was it that a reconciliation and adjustment between virtue and happiness such as this life never knows had revealed itself to the eyes of hope in a Land of Promise? Nothing of the kind is warranted by these lines. Menelaos was never particularly remarkable for those virtues which the Homeric age rated highest.<sup>19</sup> He is only to be transported to Elysium because he has Helen to wife and is therefore the son-in-law of Zeus; such is Proteus' prophecy to him. We are not told why Rhadamanthys has reached the place of happiness; nor do we learn it through the title by which he was referred to almost invariably by

later poets, the "Just". We may, however, remind ourselves that as brother of Minos he was also a son of Zeus.<sup>10</sup> It was not virtue or merit that gave him a claim to blessedness after this life; indeed, of any such claim we never find the least trace. Just as the retention of the psyche in the body and the consequent avoidance of death can occur only as a miracle or by magic—that is, as an exceptional case—so does translation into the "Land of Destiny" remain a privilege of a few special favourites of the gods. No one could deduce from such cases any article of faith of universal application. The nearest parallel to this miraculous preservation of life for a few individuals in a land of blessed repose is to be found in the equally miraculous preservation of consciousness in those three enemies of the gods in Hades whom we hear of in the *Nekyia* of the *Odyssey*. The Penitents in Erebus and the blessed in Elysium correspond: both represent exceptions which do not destroy the rule and do not affect the main outline of Homeric belief. In the first case, as in the second, the omnipotence of Heaven has broken through the rule. Those, however, who owe to the special favour of the gods their escape from death and their translation to Elysium are near relatives of the gods. This seems to be the only reason for the favour shown to them.<sup>11</sup> If therefore any more general reason beyond the capricious good-will of some god is to account for the translation of these individuals it might perhaps be found in the belief that near relationship with the gods, that is, the very highest nobility of lineage, could preserve a man from the descent into the common realm of hopeless nothingness after the separation of the psyche from the body. In the same way the beliefs of many primitive peoples represent the ordinary man as departing to a joyless country of the dead (if he is not annihilated altogether) while the descendants of gods and kings, or the aristocracy, go to a land of unending happiness.<sup>12</sup> Such a fancy, however, is only dimly apparent in the promise made to Menelaos; nowhere is anything said of a general rule from which the individual case might be deduced.—

#### § 4

But the individuals who are admitted to an everlasting life in the Elysian land at the end of the world are much too distantly removed from the habitations of the living for them to be credited with the power of influencing the world of men.<sup>13</sup> They resemble the gods only in the enjoyment accorded to them of an unendingly conscious life. Of the omnipotence of

the gods they have not the smallest share<sup>24</sup> any more than the dwellers in Erebus, from whose fate their own is otherwise so different. We must not suppose, therefore, that the origin of the stories of the promotion of individual heroes above their companions and their translation into a distant dwelling-place, is to be sought in any cultus offered to those individuals in their previous earthly dwelling-place. Every religious cult is the worship of something real and powerful; no popular religion and no poet's fancy would have given the national heroes, if they were to be regarded as powerful and worshipped accordingly, such a distant and inaccessible home.

It was the free activity of the poetic fancy which created and embellished this last refuge of human aspiration upon the Elysian plain. The needs which this new creation was chiefly intended to satisfy were poetical and not religious.

The atmosphere of the younger of the two Homeric epics already differs widely from that of its older companion, the *Iliad*, with its heroic delight in the untiring manifestation of vital energy. It is likely that the feelings of the conquerors of a new home upon the Asiatic coast may have differed considerably from those of the same people confirmed in undisturbed possession and enjoyment of their conquests. It seems as if the *Odyssey* reflected the temper and aspiration of these Ionian city-dwellers of a later time. A spirit of contentment and leisure seems to flow like an undercurrent through the whole poem, and has made for itself a haven of rest in the midst of the busy action of the story. When the poet's own feelings find their true expression they show us idyllic scenes of quiet enjoyment of daily life; magnificent in the country of the Phæacians, gay and more homely at the farm of Eumæos; pictures of quiet repose after the fights of the heroic past, that have now faded into a mere pleasant memory, such as we get in the house of Nestor, or in the Palace of Menelaos and the regained Helen. Or, again, we have a description of nature in a mood of liberality and gentleness, as upon the island of Syrië, the home of Eumæos' childhood, upon which in ample possession of cattle, wine and corn, a people live free from necessity and pain, till they arrive at a good old age when Apollo and Artemis with their gentlest shafts bring swift death to them (*Od.* xv. 403 ff.). If you ask the poet where this fortunate island lies he will tell you that it lies over there beyond Ortygië where the sun turns back. But where is Ortygië,<sup>25</sup> and who can point out the place where the sun begins his return journey far in the West? The country of idyllic happiness lies indeed almost beyond

the limit of this world. Phœnician merchant-men who go everywhere may perhaps reach that land as well (415 ff.), and Ionian seamen in this earliest period of Greek colonization into which the composition of the *Odyssey* reaches may well have hoped to find far out over the sea such propitious habitations of a new life.

In the same way the country and the life of the Phœaciens seem like an ideal picture of an Ionian state newly founded in a distant land far from the turmoil, the restless competition, and all the limitations of their familiar Greek homes. But this unclouded dream-picture, bathed in purest light, lies far away in a distant land all but inaccessible to man. Only by chance is a strange ship cast away on to that coast, and at once the magic ships of the Phœaciens carry back the stranger through night and cloud to his own home again. True, there is no reason to see in the Phœaciens a sort of ferry-people of the dead, neighbours of the Elysian fields. Still, the poetic fancy which invented the country of the Phœaciens is not unrelated to that which gave rise to the idea of an Elysian plain beyond the bounds of the inhabited world. Given the idea that a life of untroubled bliss can only be had in the remotest confines of the earth, jealously guarded from all intrusion, only one more step remains to be taken before men come to believe that such bliss is really only to be found where neither accident nor purpose can ever bring men, more remote even than the Phœaciens, than the country of the Æthiopians, the beloved of the gods, or than the Abioi of the North, already known to the *Iliad*. It must lie beyond the bounds of real life. Such idyllic longings have given rise to the picture of Elysium. The happiness of those who there enjoy everlasting life seemed to be fully safeguarded only if their place of abode were removed for ever beyond the range of all exploration, out of reach of all future discovery. This happiness is imagined as a condition of perfect bliss under the most benignant sky; easy and untroubled says the poet, is the life of men there, in this resembling the life of the gods, but at the same time without aspiration and without activity. It is doubtful whether the poet of the *Iliad* would have considered such a future worthy of his heroes, or given the name of happiness to such felicity as this.

We were obliged to assume that the poet who inserted these inimitably smooth, melodious verses in the *Odyssey* was not the first inventor or discoverer of the Elysian paradise beyond

the realm of mortality. But though he followed in the footsteps of others, when he introduced into the Homeric poem a reference to this new belief, he was giving this idea for the first time an enduring place in Greek imagination. Other poems might disappear, but anything that appeared in the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey* was assured of perpetual remembrance.

The imagination of Greek poets or Greek people never gave up the alluring fancy of a distant land of blessedness into which individual mortals might by the favour of the gods be translated. Even the scanty notices which have come down to us of the contents of the heroic poems that led up to, continued, or connected the two Homeric Epics and linked them up with the whole cycle of Theban and Trojan legend enable us to see how this post-Homeric poetry took pleasure in the recital of still further examples of translation.

The *Kypria* first described how the army of the Achæans for the second time encamped in Aulis, was detained by adverse winds sent by Artemis; and how Agamemnon on the advice of Kalchas would have sacrificed his own daughter Iphigeneia to the goddess. Artemis, however, snatched away the maiden and transported her to the land of the Taurians, and there made her immortal.<sup>26</sup>

The *Aithiopis*, a continuation of the *Iliad*, tells of the help brought to the Trojans by Penthesileia and her Amazons, and after her death by Memnon the Æthiopian prince, an imaginary representative of the eastern monarchies of inner Asia. Antilochos, the new favourite of Achilles, falls in the war, but Achilles slays Memnon himself. Thereupon Eos the mother of Memnon (and known as such already to the *Odyssey*) obtains the permission of Zeus to give immortality to her son.<sup>27</sup> It may be supposed that the poet described what we see so often represented upon Greek vases: the mother bearing through the air the dead body of her son. According to the story told in the *Iliad*, Apollo, with the help of Sleep and Death, the twin brothers, bore off the body of Sarpedon, the son of Zeus, to his Lycian home after he had been slain by Achilles, merely in order that he might be buried in his own country. But the poet of the *Aithiopis* has tried to outdo the story in the *Iliad* in impressiveness (for it was evidently his model),<sup>28</sup> and has made Eos, with the permission of Zeus, not merely carry off the dead to his far-off home in the East, but there awaken him to immortal life.

Soon after the death of Memnon fate overtakes Achilles himself. When his body, rescued by his friends after much hard fighting, is laid upon its bier, Thetis, his mother, with

the Muses and the other sea-goddesses come and sing the funeral dirge. Of this we are told in the last book of the *Odyssey* (xxiv, 47 ff.) which relates further how his body was burnt, his bones gathered together and entombed under a mound, and the psyche of Achilles departed to the House of Hades; the whole story being told to him in the underworld by the psyche of Agamemnon. But the author of the *Aithiopis*—always remarkable for his bold innovations in the traditional material—here ventures upon an important new touch. From the funeral pyre, he tells us, Thetis carried off the body of her son and brought him to Leuke.<sup>29</sup> That she restored him to life again there and made him immortal the one meagre extract which accident has preserved to us does not say. But there can be no question that that is what the poet narrated—all later accounts conclude the story in this way.

The parallel is clear; the two opponents, Achilles and Memnon, are both set free from the fate of mortals by their goddess-mothers. In bodies once more restored to life they continue to live, not among men, nor yet among the gods, but in a distant wonderland—Memnon in the east, Achilles in the "White Island". The poet himself can hardly have imagined Achilles' Island to have been in the Euxine Sea, where, however, later Greek sailors located this purely mythical spot.

The translation of Menelaos is still more closely paralleled by the story told in the *Telegoneia*, which was the final and the latest-written of the Cyclic poems, of the fate which attended the family of Odysseus. Telegonos, the son of Odysseus and Kirke, slays his father unwittingly; when he discovers his mistake he brings the body of Odysseus with Penelope and Telegonos to his mother, Kirke, who makes them immortal; and there they dwell now (in the Isle Aiaia, far away over the sea, we must suppose)—Penelope as the wife of Telegonos, and Kirke with Telemachos.<sup>30</sup>

## § 6

It is natural to feel surprise that in none of these stories is there any mention of translation to a common meeting-place of the Elect, such as the Elysian plain seemed to be. We must on that account be content to leave unanswered the question to what precise extent these lines of the *Odyssey* which describe the translation of Menelaos to Elysium may have influenced the development of translation stories in the post-Homeric Epics. The influence must clearly have been



considerable.<sup>44</sup> The stories of the translation of individual heroes to a solitary after-life in secluded abodes of immortality show, at any rate, the same direction of fancy as that which produced the fields of Elysium. No longer does Eos, after she has snatched him from Hades, raise her son to be among the gods as once she had raised Kleitos and others of her favourites. Memnon enters upon a peculiar state of being that differentiates him from the rest of mankind as much as from the gods. The same applies to Achilles and the other translated heroes. Thus did poetry increase the number of those who belonged to this middle realm; who, born in immortality have, outside the realms of Olympos, achieved immortality. It is still only favoured individuals who enter this kingdom; it is still poetical aspiration, giving free rein to its creative instinct, that continues to transport an ever-increasing number of the bright figures of Legend into the illumination of everlasting life. Religious worship can have had no more influence in the development of these stories than it had in the narrative of the translation of Menelaos. Achilles, for example, may in later times have had a cult paid to him on an island at the mouth of the Danube, supposed to be Leuke. But the cult was the result and not the motive or the cause of the story. Iphigeneia was certainly the epithet of a Moon-goddess; but the poet who told of the translation of her namesake, the daughter of Agamemnon, had no suspicion of the latter's identity with a goddess—otherwise he would never have regarded her as Agamemnon's daughter. Nor, we may be fairly certain, can it have been an accidental meeting with the cult of the goddess Iphigeneia, which induced him to invent an immortality *iure postlimini* for his mortal Iphigeneia, by the machinery of translation. Both for the poet and his contemporaries the importance and the essence of his narrative—whether free invention or a reconstruction out of older material—lay in the fact that it told of the raising of a mortal maiden, the daughter of mortal parents, to immortal life, and not to religious veneration which could not have made itself very apparent to the maiden relegated to the distant Tauric country.

The busy expansion of the legendary material went on in epics that finally lost themselves in genealogical poems. To what extent it may have made use of the *motif* of translation or transfiguration we can no longer accurately judge. The materials at our disposal are quite insufficient to warrant any conclusion. When such a misty figure as Telegonos is deemed worthy of immortality, it may be supposed that in the mind

of the poet all the heroes of Epic tradition had come to be possessed of a virtual claim to a share in this mode of continued existence in a life after death. Certainly the more important among them could not be left out—those at least of whose end the Homeric poems themselves had not already given a different version. The poem of the Return of the Heroes from Troy may especially have given scope for many translation stories.<sup>10</sup> We may, for example, ask whether Diomedes, at least, whose immortality is often vouched for by later mythology, was not already added to the number of the immortals in the epics of the Heroic cycle. An Attic folk-song of the fifth century can speak with assurance of Diomedes as not having died but as living in the "Islands of the Blest". Thus a far greater company of the Heroes of the Trojan War was thought of by the poetry of Homeric tradition as gathered together in "Isles of the Blest", far out to sea, than we should guess from the summaries of the post-Homeric Epics which accident has preserved to us. This conclusion must be drawn from the lines of a Hesiodic poem which give us some remarkable information about the oldest Greek forms of the Cult of the Souls and belief in immortality, and the lines, therefore, must be subjected to a closer examination.

## II

The Hesiodic poem known as the "Works and Days" consists of a number of independent pieces of didactic or narrative interest loosely strung together. In it, not far from the beginning, comes the story of the Five Ages of Men. As regards its subject-matter, the train of thought which unites this section to the passages which precede and follow it is hardly discoverable; in form it is quite disconnected.

In the beginning we are there told the gods of Olympus created a Golden race whose members lived like the gods, without care, sickness or decrepitude, and in enjoyment of rich possessions. After their death, which came upon them like sleep to tired men, they became, by the will of Zeus, *Daimones* and Guardians of mankind. They were followed by a Silver race, far inferior to the first, and unlike them in body as in mind. The men of this race had a long childhood, lasting a hundred years, followed by a short youth, during which their wantonness and pride in their dealings with each other and with the gods brought them much sorrow. Because they refused the honours due to the gods Zeus destroyed them and they are now *Daimones* of the Underworld, honoured

but inferior to the Daimones of the Golden Age. Zeus then created a third race, this time of Bronze—hard-hearted and of great strength; war was their delight, and being destroyed by their own hands they went down unhonoured to the House of Hades. Thereupon Zeus made a fourth race that was juster and better, the race of Heroes, who were called "Demigods". They fought before Thebes and Troy and some of them died, while others Zeus sent to dwell at the ends of the world on the Islands of the Blest by the river Okeanos, where the Earth brings them her fruits three times in the year. "Would that I did not belong to the fifth Age; would that I had died earlier or been born hereafter," says the poet, "since now is the Iron Age," when toil and grief never leave men, when there is enmity of all against all and force conquers right, and Envy, evil-tongued, delighting in wickedness, fierce-eyed, is over everything. Now, Shame and the goddess of retribution, Nemesis, depart from men and go to the gods; every misfortune is left behind for man, and there is no defence against evil.

The author here lays before us the results of gloomy reflection upon the origin and growth of evil in the world of men. He sees the steps of mankind's degeneration from the height of godlike happiness to the extremes of misery and wickedness. He is following popular conceptions. It is natural to every race of men to lay the scene of earthly perfection in the past, so long, at least, as man gets his information about that past not from distinct historical memory, but from the picturesque stories and beautiful dreams of the poets which encourage the natural tendency of fancy to retain only the more attractive features of the past in the memory. The folklore of many lands can tell of a Golden Age and how mankind gradually fell from that high estate; and it is not at all surprising if fanciful speculation starting from the same point and travelling along the same road has reached the same conclusion in the case of more than one people without the aid of any historical connexion. We have a number of expressions of the idea of man's gradual degeneration through several Ages which present the most striking similarities among themselves and with the Hesiodic picture of the five Ages of Men. Even Homer is sometimes overcome by the mood; it lies, for instance, at the root of such idealizations of the past as are implied when in his description of the heroic life he thinks of "men as they now are" and "how few sons are equal to their fathers in virtue; worse, most of them; few, indeed, are the men who are better than their fathers."

(*Od.* ii, 270 f.). But the epic poet keeps himself and his fancy on the heights of the heroic Past; only occasionally, and in passing, his glance falls upon the commonplace level of real life. But the poet of the "Works and Days" has all his thoughts fixed upon the level plain of real and contemporary life; the glance which he occasionally casts upon the heights of the storied past is all the more bitter on that account.

What he has to say of the first condition of mankind and the gradual process of deterioration is given, not as an abstract exposition of what in the necessary course of things must have occurred, but rather as a traditional account of what had actually happened—in fact, as history.

In this light he himself must certainly have regarded it, though, apart from a few vague memories, no historical tradition is contained in what he says of the nature and deeds of the earlier generations of mankind. His story remains an imaginary picture. And for this reason the development, as he presents it, takes a logically defined and regulated course, based on the idea of a gradual deterioration. The uneventful happiness of the first race of men who know neither virtue nor vice is followed by a second race, which after a prolonged minority displays pride and contempt of the gods. In the third, or brazen age, active wickedness breaks out, with war and murder. The last age, at the beginning of which the poet himself seems to stand, marks the breakdown of all moral restraint. The fourth race of men, to which the heroes of the Theban and Trojan wars belong, is alone among all the others in not being named and ranked after a metal. It is an alien in the evolutionary process. The downward course is checked during the fourth age, and yet in the fifth it goes on again as if it had never been interrupted. It is not apparent why that course should have been interrupted. Most of the commentators have recognized in the story of the fourth age a fragment of different material, originally foreign to the poem of the Ages of Men and added deliberately by Hesiod to this poem, which he may have taken over in its essential features from older poets. But if we adopt this view we have to ask what can have tempted the poet to such serious disturbance and dislocation of the orderly succession of the original speculative poem. It will not be enough to say that the poet, brought up in the Homeric tradition, found it impossible to pass over, in a description of the earlier ages of men, the figures of the heroic poetry which, thanks to the power of song, had acquired in the imagination of the Greeks more reality than the plainest manifestations of actual life. Nor

is it likely that, having in his grim description of the Bronze race introduced a darker picture of the Heroic age, drawn from a point of view different from that of the courtly Epos, he wished to set by its side this bright vision of the same age as he saw it in his own mind. If the picture of the Bronze race does really refer to the Heroic age,<sup>28</sup> giving its reverse side, so to speak, Hesiod never seems to have noticed the fact. He must have had stronger grounds than these for the introduction of his narrative. He cannot have failed to perceive that he was breaking the continuity of moral deterioration by his introduction of the Heroic race. It follows that he must have had some aim, other than that of the description of the moral deterioration of men, which he imagined himself to be serving by the introduction of this new section. This other purpose will become plain if we inquire what it is that really interests the poet in the Heroic race. It is not their higher morality—that only interrupted the series of continually worsening generations. Nor would he in that case have dismissed the subject with a few words which barely suffice to connect this section with the theme of moral development. Further, it is not the fights and great deeds done at Thebes or Troy that interest him for he says nothing of their greatness, and at once declares that the cruel war and the dread fury of battle destroyed the Heroes. This, again, does not discriminate between the Heroes and the men of the Bronze age who also, being destroyed by their own deeds, had to go down to Hades. What distinguishes the Heroic age from the others is the way in which some of the Heroes depart from this life without dying. This is the point that interests the poet, and this it must have been that chiefly induced him to bring in here his account of the fourth race of men. He combines clearly enough with his main purpose of describing the advancing moral decline of man, a secondary aim—that of telling what happened after death to the representatives of each successive race. In introducing the Heroic race of men this secondary aim becomes the chief one, and justifies what would otherwise have been merely an intrusive episode. It is this aim, too, which gives the Hesiodic narrative its importance for our present inquiry.

## § 2

The men of the Golden Age, after sleep has overcome them and they have died and been laid in the earth, become by the will of Zeus "Daimones"—Daimones upon earth, watchers of men, wandering over all the earth, veiled in clouds,

observing justice and injustice,<sup>24</sup> dispensing riches like kings. These men of the earliest times have then become effective realities. They are not spirits confined to an inaccessible region beyond this world, but powers acting and working amongst men. In this exalted state Hesiod calls them *Daimones*, and thus describes them by a name which is otherwise applied by him as well as by Homer only to the immortal gods. The name so employed is not to be understood as implying a separate class of immortals, an intermediate class of beings between gods and men, as later speculation used the word.<sup>25</sup> These later beings of an intermediate class were thought of as possessing an originally immortal nature like the gods, and as dwelling in an intermediate region of their own. Hesiod's *Daimones*, on the contrary, have once been men and have only after their death become immortals invisibly<sup>26</sup> roaming the earth. When they are given the name *Daimones* nothing more is implied than that they now share the invisible might and unending life of the gods, and to that extent may be called gods—with as much right as Ino Leukothea, for instance, who, according to Homer, became a goddess after being a mortal; or as Phaethon, who, according to the Hesiodic Theogony, was raised by Aphrodite from the world of mortality and is now called a "godlike *Daimon*" (*Th.*, 991). On the other hand, these immortals who were once men are clearly distinguished from the everlasting gods, "who have their Olympian dwellings," by being called *Daimones* "who rule upon earth."<sup>27</sup> And though they are given the name, familiar to everybody from Homer, of *Daimones*, i.e. gods, they, nevertheless, form a class of beings which is entirely unknown to Homer. Homer knows of certain individual men who are raised or translated, body and soul together, to undying life. The later Epos can tell of certain also who, like Memnon or Achilles, receive a new life after their death and now live on in undivided unity of body and soul. But that the soul outside Erebus could carry on a conscious life of its own and influence living men—of this there is no mention in Homer. Yet this is exactly what has happened according to the Hesiodic poem. The men of the Golden Age have died and now live on divided from their bodies, invisible and godlike, and therefore called gods. Just as in Homer, the gods themselves assume manifold shapes and visit the cities of men, observing the good and evil deeds of men,<sup>28</sup> so also do the souls of the dead in Hesiod. For the beings who here, after their separation from the body, have become *Daimones*, are *Souls*—that is to say, beings who after their

death have entered in any case upon a higher existence than was theirs while they were united to the body. This, however, is an idea that we never meet with in the Homeric poems.

And yet it is quite unthinkable that this remarkable conception is the independent and passing invention of the Boeotian poet. He comes back to it again later on in the course of his poem. "Thirty thousand," that is, innumerable immortal Watchers over mortal men wander invisibly in the service of Zeus over the earth, taking note of right and wrong (*Op.*, 252 ff.). The conception is important to him for ethical reasons; if he is to make use of it in his argument he must not have invented it himself. And, in fact, nothing that belongs to the sphere of religious belief and cultus, or even the lower levels of superstition, has been invented by this earnest-minded poet. The Boeotian school of poetry to which he belonged was far removed from, and indeed, hostile to the free inventiveness and roaming fancy with which the Homeric school "... know how to put forward many lies and make them seem like truth" (*TA.*, 27). In pursuance of their purpose not simply to please but always in some sense to teach, the Boeotian poets never innovate in the region of the purely mythical, but simply order or piece together, or merely register what they find in the tradition. In religion especially invention lies farthest from their minds, though they do not by any means deny themselves the right of independent speculation about the traditional. Thus, what Hesiod tells us about the men of a previous age, whose souls after death become Daimones, came to him from tradition. It might still be objected that this tradition while being older than Hesiod may, nevertheless, be more recent than Homer, and be the result of post-Homeric speculation. It is unnecessary to develop the reasons which make such a view untenable; the course of our inquiry up to the present has made it possible for us to maintain decidedly that in what Hesiod here says we have a fragment of primitive belief reaching back far beyond Homer and surviving in the secluded Boeotian countryside. We have found even in the poems of Homer vestiges of a cult of the dead sufficient to make us believe that once in a distant past the Greeks resembled the majority of other nations and believed in the continued, conscious existence of the psyche after its separation from the body and in its powerful influence upon the world of man. We found, too, that in accordance with this belief, religious honours of various sorts were paid to the disembodied souls. In Hesiod's narrative we simply have documentary confirmation of

what could only be with difficulty extracted from the study of Homer. Here we encounter the still living belief in the elevation of the soul after death to a higher life. They are the souls, it must be noted, of a race of men long since disappeared, about whom this belief is held. The belief in their godlike after-life must therefore be long-standing, and the worship of these souls as powerful beings still continues. For when it is said of the souls of the second race "these also receive worship" (Op., 142), it is distinctly implied that the Daimones of the first or Golden generation *a fortiori* received worship.

The men of the Silver generation, on account of their refusal to pay due honour to the Olympians, are "hidden" by Zeus under the earth, and are now called "mortal Blessed Ones that live below the earth, second in rank, yet worship is paid to them also" (141-2). Thus, the poet knows of the souls of men who likewise belonged to the distant past, whose home is in the bowels of the earth, who receive religious honour and who must therefore have been conceived as powerful. The poet has not specified the nature of their influence upon the upper world. It is true that he does not distinctly call the spirits of this second generation "good", as he had done the first (123), and he makes them spring from the less perfect Silver age and seems to have given them inferior rank. But it does not follow that he here anticipated later speculation and thought of the second generation as a class of wicked demons whose nature it is to work evil.<sup>40</sup> Only to the Olympians do they seem to stand in a rather more distant relationship—almost one of hostility. They had before paid the gods none of their pious dues, and so now they are not called, like the souls of the first race, "Daimones appointed by Zeus to be Watchers of men." The poet refers to them with a remarkable expression, "mortal Blessed Ones," that is, mortal gods. This very singular denomination, the two parts of which really cancel one another, points to a certain embarrassment felt by the poet in making use of an expression taken from the Homeric vocabulary (to which the poet felt himself confined) to designate clearly and effectively a class of beings that was unknown to Homer.<sup>41</sup> The disembodied souls of the first race he had simply called Daimones. But this name, common as it was both to the race of those who from mortality had achieved immortality and to the immortal gods, left the essential difference between the two classes of immortal beings unexpressed. For that very reason the name was never employed in Hesiod's fashion by later ages,<sup>42</sup> who always



called such as, not having been born immortal, had achieved immortality, by the name of "Heroes". Hesiod, who could not use the word in this sense, described them by the bold oxymoron: mortal Blessed Ones, human gods. As immortal spirits they resembled the gods in their new state of being. But their nature was still mortal, and hence their bodies had to die, and this constituted their difference from the everlasting gods.<sup>43</sup>

The name *Daimones* then does not appear to involve any essential distinction between the spirits of the men of the Silver generation and the *Daimones* of the Golden Age. Only the place where the two classes of spirits have their dwelling is different—the *Daimones* of the Silver race live in the depths of the earth. The expression "of the underworld", used of them, is a vague one, and only suffices to differentiate them from the spirits of the "upper world" who were derived from the first race. Still, the abode of the souls of the Silver Age is in any case not thought of as being the distant meeting-place of the unconscious, vegetating shadow-souls—the House of Hades; the "phantoms" that hover about that place could not have been called *Daimones* or "mortal gods", nor do they receive any kind of worship after their death.

### § 3

The Silver Age, then, belongs to a long-since vanished past.<sup>44</sup> The stalwarts of the Bronze Age, we are told, destroyed by their deeds, went down into the gloomy home of the dreadful Hades, nameless. Black Death seized them, for all their violence, and they left the light of the sun.

Except for the addition of the adjective "nameless" one might, indeed, suppose that this was a description of the fate of the souls of the Homeric heroes. Perhaps, however, the word "only means that no honourable and distinctive title, such as belonged to the souls of the first and second as well as to the fourth race, was attached to those who had gone down into the shadow-world of annihilation and become as nothing.

There follows "the divine race of Heroes who were called the Demigods". The wars at Thebes and Troy destroyed these. Part were "enfolded in the destiny of Death"; others received life and a home far from men at the hand of Zeus Kronides, who gave them a dwelling-place at the ends of the world. There they live, free from care, in the Islands of the Blest, by the deep-flowing Okeanos; favoured Heroes, for whom the Earth, of her own accord, brings forth her sweet fruits three times a year.

Here, at last, for the first time we have reached a clearly definable period of legendary history. The poet means to speak of the Heroes whose adventures were narrated in the Thebais, the Iliad and kindred poems. What we notice here specially is how little the Greeks yet knew of their history. Immediately after the disappearance of the Heroes the poet begins the age in which he himself must live. Where the realm of poetry ends, there is an end of all further tradition ; there follows a blank, and to all appearances the present age immediately begins. That explains why the Heroic Age is the last before the fifth, to which the poet himself belongs, and why it does not, for example, precede the (undated) Bronze Age. It connects itself conveniently with the Bronze Age also in what is related of the fate suffered by a part of its representatives, for the subject which here particularly interests the poet is the fate of the departed. Some of the fallen Heroes simply die—that is to say (there can be no doubt of it) they enter the realm of Hades like the members of the Bronze race or the Heroes of the Iliad. But when others are *distinguished* from those whom "Death took" in that they reach the Islands of the Blest, it is impossible not to suppose that these last have not suffered death, that is, the separation of the Psyche from the visible Self, but have been carried away alive in the flesh. The poet is thinking of such cases as those we have met with in the Odyssean narrative of Menelaos, or, in the Telegonia, of Penelope, Telemachos and Telegonos. These few exceptional instances could hardly have made such a deep impression on him that he felt himself bound on their behalf to erect a special class of the Translated to be set over against those who simply died. There can be no doubt that he had many more examples before him of this same mysterious mode of separation from the world of men that did not involve death. We have already seen how the lines in the Odyssey in which the translation of Menelaos is foreshadowed, point back to other and earlier poems of the same kind. Further, the references to the subject which we found in the remains of the Cyclic Epics make it easy to suppose that later Heroic poetry had been continually widening the circle of those who enjoyed translation and illumination.

Only from such a poetical source can Hesiod have derived his conception of a common meeting-place where the Translated enjoy for ever their untroubled existence. He calls that place the "Islands of the Blest"; and these lie far removed from the world of men, in the Ocean, on the confines of the earth, just where the Odyssey puts the Elysian

plain, another meeting-place of the still-living Translated, or rather the same under a different name. Its name does not oblige us to regard the "Elysian plain" as an island, but neither does it exclude that assumption. Homer never expressly calls the land of the Phæaciants an island,<sup>46</sup> but the imagination of most readers will picture Scherîe as such, and so did the Greeks perhaps already at the time of the Hesiodic school of poets. In the same way a poet may have thought of the "Land of Destiny" that receives passing mention in Homer as an island, or group of islands; only an island surrounded and cut off by the sea can give the full impression of a distant asylum far from the world, inaccessible to all save those specially called thither. And accordingly the mythology of many peoples, especially those who live by the sea, has made a distant island the dwelling-place of the souls of the departed.

Complete isolation is the essential feature of the whole idea of translation, as Hesiod clearly shows. A later poet has added a line—which does not quite fit into its place—to make this isolation even more marked.<sup>47</sup> According to it, these Blessed Ones live not only "far from men" (167), but also (169) far from the immortals, and are ruled over by Kronos. The writer of this line follows a beautiful legend, later, however, than Hesiod, in which Zeus released the aged Kronos, together with the other Titans,<sup>48</sup> from Tartaros, so that the old king of the gods, under whose rule the Golden Age had once prevailed with peace and happiness upon earth, now wields the sceptre of another Golden Age over the Blessed in Elysium, himself a figure of peaceful contemplation dwelling far away from the stormy world, from the throne of which he has been ousted by Zeus. Hesiod himself has provoked this transference of Kronos from the Golden Age to the land of the Translated; for in the few lines that he devotes to the description of the life of the Blessed a reminiscence of the picture of the Golden Age's untroubled existence is clearly discernible. Both pictures, the one of a childhood's paradise in the past, the other of unclouded happiness reserved in the future for the elect, are closely related; it is difficult to say which of them has influenced the other<sup>49</sup> since the colours must have been the same in any case—the purely idyllic having an inevitable uniformity of its own.

#### § 4

Hesiod says nothing of any influence upon this world exerted by the souls of the Translated in the Islands of the Blest, such as is attributed to the Daimones of the Golden

race, nor of any religious worship, which would be implied by such influence if it existed, such as the underworld spirits of the Silver Age receive. All relations with this world are broken off, for any influence from this side would completely contradict the whole conception of these blessed departed. Hesiod faithfully sets down the conception of the Translated exactly as poetic fancy, without any interference from religious cultus, or the folk-belief founded on it, had instinctively shaped it.

Supposing, then, that he follows Homeric and post-Homeric poetic tradition in this particular, whence did he derive his ideas about the Daimones and spirits of the Golden and Silver Ages? He did not and could not have got these from Homeric or semi-Homeric sources, for they (unlike the idea of Translation) do not simply expand, but actually contradict Homeric beliefs about the soul. To this question we may answer with certainty; he derived them from *cultus*. There survived, in spite of Homer, at least in central Greece where the Hesiodic poetry had its home, a religious worship paid to the souls of certain departed classes of men; and this cultus preserved alive, at least as a vague tradition, a belief which Homer had obscured and dispossessed. It only reached the Boeotian poet, whose own conceptions spring entirely from the soil of Homeric belief, as from a far distance. Already in the days of the Bronze race, he tells us, the souls of the dead were swallowed up in the dread House of Hades, and this (with a few miraculous exceptions) applies to the Heroic race as well. And for the poet, standing as he does, at the opening of the Iron Age, to which he himself belongs, nothing remains but dissolution in the nothingness of Erebus. That such is his view is proved by his silence about the fate after death of his generation—a silence that is all the more oppressive because the grim picture that he gives of the misery and ever-increasing depravity of real and contemporary life might seem to require a brighter and more hopeful picture of future compensation, if only to balance it and make it endurable. But he is silent about all such future compensation; he has no such hope to offer. Though in another part of the same poem Hope alone of all the blessings of an earlier and better age still remains among men, such Hope no longer illuminates the next world, at any rate, with its beams. The poet, more deeply distressed by the common realities of life, can by no means dispense so easily as the singers of the epic tradition enclosed in the magic circle of their poetry, with such hopes of the future. He can draw comfort only from what poetry

or religious myth tell him of the far distant past. It never enters his head to believe that the miracle of the translation of living men could transcend the limits of the Heroic Age and repeat itself in the common and prosaic present day. And the time when, according to a law of nature no longer (so it seems) in operation, the souls of the dead became *Daimones* and lived a higher life upon and beneath the earth, is situated far back in the distant past. Another law rules now; the men of to-day may still worship the immortal spirits of the Golden and the Silver Age, but they themselves will never be added to the number of those illuminated and exalted souls.

### § 5

Hesiod's description, then, of the five Ages of Men gives us the most important information about the development of Greek belief in the soul. What he tells us of the spirits of the Silver and Golden race shows that from the earliest dawn of history down to the actual lifetime of the poet, a form of *ancestor-worship* had prevailed, based upon the once living belief in the elevation of disembodied and immaterial souls to the rank of powerful, consciously active spirits. But the company of these spirits receives no additions from the life of the present day. For centuries now the souls of the dead have been claimed by Hades and his vain shadow world. The worship of the soul is stationary; it affects only the souls of the long-since departed; it no longer increases the number of the objects of its worship. In other words, the belief has changed; the Homeric poems have triumphed and the view they held, and to which they gave authority, and, as it were, official sanction, now prevails. They teach men that the *psyche* once separated from the body loses all its powers and consciousness; the strengthless shadows are received into a distant Underworld. For them, no action, no influence upon the world of men is possible, and therefore no cult can be paid to them. Only on the farthest horizon faintly appear the Islands of the Blest, but the circle of the fortunate, who, according to the visionary fancy of the poets, are translated alive there, is now closed, just as the circle of epic story is complete also. Such miracles no longer happen.

Nothing in this evolutionary process so clearly depicted in the poem of Hesiod contradicts what we have learned from Homer. One thing only is new and immensely important; in spite of everything the memory survives that once the souls of departed generations of men had achieved a higher,

undying life. Hesiod speaks in the present tense of their being and working and of the worship paid to them after their death ; if they are believed to be immortal, men will naturally continue to worship them. And the opposite also is true ; if the worship of such spirits had not survived into the present, no one would have held them to be deathless and eternally potent.

In a word, we are in the old Greek mainland, the land of Boeotian peasants and urban farmers, among a stay-at-home race which neither knows nor desires to know of the seafaring life that tempts men to foreign lands whence they bring back so much that is new and strange. Here in the central uplands vestiges of ancient custom and belief remained that had been forgotten in the maritime cities of new Greece on the Asiatic coast. Even here, however, the new learning had penetrated to this extent : the structure of ancient belief, transported into the distant past, interwoven with fanciful tales of the earliest state of mankind, like the expiring echo of half-forgotten song lives on only in memory. But the cult of Souls is not yet quite dead ; the possibility remains that it may yet renew its strength and expand into fresh life when once the magic influence of the Homeric view of the world shall have been broken.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup> It is not for nothing that what is here said of the "climate", if one may so call it, of the Elysian plain, § 568-8, reminds us so strikingly of the description of the abode of the Gods on Olympus, § 43-5.

<sup>2</sup> The announcement of the fate of Menelaos is quite superfluous: it is not necessitated (and not even justified) by his first request (688 ff.), or by his further questions (486 ff.; 551 ff.). Nitsch already regarded the lines 561-8 as a later addition: *Ann. z. Od.* iii, p. 382—though indeed on grounds that I cannot regard as conclusive. Others have done the same since.

<sup>3</sup> The following are made invisible (by envelopment in a cloud) and carried away—this, though not always stated, is most probably to be understood in most cases: Paris, by Aphrodite, *Y* 380 ff.; Agamemnon, by Apollo, *E* 344 f.; Idaios, son of Darex, the priest of Hephaistos, by Heph., § 23; Hektor, by Apollo, *Y* 443 f.; Aeneas, by Poseidon, *Y* 325 ff.; Agamemnon, by Apollo, § 596 ff.—this last appears to be the original copied twice over in the story of this war day of fighting by later poets (in the above-mentioned cases of the use of the motif, *Y* 325 ff.; 443 f.). It is remarkable (for no special reason for it suggests itself) that all these cases of translation are found on the *Trojan* side. Otherwise we only have one instance (and that only in the narrative of a long past adventure), the translation of the Aanktorioner by their father Poseidon, *A* 760 ff. Lastly, a case that hardly goes beyond those already mentioned: Zeus could have translated alive his son Sarpedon out of the fray and placed him in his Lykian home (*I* 436), but refrains owing to the warning of Hera (440 ff.).

<sup>4</sup> The wish to die quickly is expressly contrasted with the wish to be carried off by the Harpies, 63 ἢ ἔπειτα—"or if not," i.e. if quick death is denied to me. (v. *Rh. Mus.* 50, 2, 2.) Again 79-80: *ὡς ἴα' ἀνεύθυνται* 'Ολέμενα δώματ' ἔχοντες ἢ δὲ μ' ἐκπλήρομαθαι βάλαι 'Αρπυγίαι. Thus the Harpies (= θεαί 63) in this case do not bring death but carry away men alive (*ἀνευθύνειν* αἰχμαίρε 83 f., *ἀρπύγαι* ἀρπυγίσματα 77 = *ἀνέλαρτε* θέλλαι 66, and they carry them off *αὐτ'* *ἡγερέντα* *πλήνους* 84 to the pyreal *ἑσπέραι* 'Οκεανοῦ 85 *ἔλαιον* *εὐπυγέσθου* 'Ερμίου *ἀμφιπολέου* 78). At the "mouths of Okeanos" (where it goes into the sea) is the entrance to the world of the dead: *x* 509 ff., *λ* 13 ff. To be carried off by the storm-spirits used proverbially as a wish: *E* 345 ff. *ὡς μ' ἐπέλ' ἔμενι τῷ θεῷ με πρῶτον τίς μ' ἔσθ' αἰχμαίρε προθέρονα καὶ ἄνθρωπο θέλλει εἰς ἔρεβ' ἢ εἰς ἄλυσιν πολυφλοίσβοισιν* *θαλάσσοις* (i.e. to some solitary place, *Orph.*, *H.* 19, 19; 36, 16; 71, 11). Such transportation through the air is elsewhere contrasted with death and dwelling in Hades, as in Penelope's prayer. (Rocher, *Kynemétopis* [Abh. d. sächs. Ges. d. Wiss. xvii], p. 67, gives a strange but hardly the correct explanation of this.) *Cl. Soph.*, *Tr.*, 853 ff.; *Al.*, 1183 ff.; (*Phil.*, 1092 ff. ?); cf. also *Eur.*, *Hipp.*, 1279 ff.; *Ion*, 805 f.; *Supp.*, 838-6. A deeply rooted popular mode of thought, and one of primeval antiquity, lies at the root of all

these instances.—ὅδ' ἀναιδέων ἀνὰ πύργῳ ἐφαιτο γένεσθαι is a reason for *νῦν δ' ἀδύνατο*, in the only half-rationalized story of Hesperos in D.S. J, 60, 3.

\* One would like to know more of this strange story, but what we learn elsewhere of Pandareos and his daughters (Sch. v 86-7; v 518; Ant. Lib. 38) contributes nothing to the understanding of the Homeric narrative and probably belongs in part to another connexion. Pandareos, father of Aidoia (v 518 ff.), seems to be another person. Even the strange representation of the two daughters of Pandareos in Polygnotos' picture of the underworld (Paus. 10, 30, 2) casts no light on the Homeric fable. (Cf. Roscher, *Kyran.*, 4 ff., 85 f.)

\* The Erinyes live normally in Erebus, as is shown esp. by I 571 f.; T 250. But when they punish during the lifetime of the criminal acts done in contravention of the laws of family life, it must be supposed that they were sometimes thought of as going about the earth, e.g. I 454; λ 278—for "working at a distance" seems impossible—as in Hes., Op., 803 f.,—*ἔρυνες ἀμφιπόλεσσι* (78) cannot be anything but "serve the Erinyes", "become their ἀμφιπόλεσι". To understand it as Roscher does (*Kyran.*, 85, n. 183) following Eustathius, in the sense "fly about in the train of the E." is forbidden by the use of the simple dative *ἔρυνες* joined closely with ἀμφι. (θεοὶ ἀμφιπόλων Σοφ., O.C., 680, is different.)

\* When the Bride of the Wind comes by you must throw yourself on the ground as though it were the Muidiaheere (on which see Grimm (E.T.), p. 931) otherwise they will carry you off." Birlinger, *Volkstüm.* u. Schadow, i, 182, "She is the Devil's Bride," ib. (On the "Bride of the Wind", etc., see Grimm, pp. 632, 1009.) Such wind-spirits are in unholy alliance with the "Furious Host", i.e. the unquiet "souls" of the dead that travel through the air by night.

\* On the Harpies, see *H. Mus.*, 50, 1-5.

\* See Nagelsb., *H.T.*, pp. 42-3, and Roscher, *Neklar u. Ambrosia*, p. 51 ff., answering Bergk's objections, *Opusc.* ii, 668. (Arist. *Meta.*, 1000a, 9-14, is very definite.)

\* It is not improbable that this Iro Leukothea was originally a goddess who was later turned into a "Hermine" (identified with the daughter of Kadmos for reasons no longer recoverable) and only afterwards turned back again into a goddess. But for the Homeric age she was essentially a mortal who had become a goddess; for this reason, just because she was an example of such deification of mortals, she remained an interesting character to later writers; cf. in addition to the well-known passages in Pindar, etc., Cic., T.D. i, 28. Only what the actual conception of the people and their poets was—not what may possibly be suggested as the doubtful background of such conceptions—concerns me in this as in many other cases.

\* Only temporary translation (ἀνέφερες) of Harpeia by Apollo I 564.

\* Ganymedes, ἀνέφερος ἄσπερος ἄλλα, h. l'en., 208, as the θεῖα (or ἄσπερος) did the daughters of Pandareos. The eagle is the addition of later poetry.

\* A 1; ε 1.

\* *Ἥμιν . . . δὲ* 'Οκεανὸς ποταμὸς ἄνυσ', ἐν ἑσθραντοῖσι φέουσ' ἔφροι ἡδὲ βροτοῖσιν, T 1 f.; cf. φ 244 (h. *Met.*, 184 f.). So also h. l'en., 224 ff., says of Tithonos: 'Ὅτε γενεόμενος χρυσόθρονον φειγνέει μαιρὰ καὶ' Οκεανὸς ποταμὸς ἐνὶ νηυσὶν γαίῃ, in good Homeric style. It seems that the magic island Aiala was considered the home of Eos (and of Tithonos): μ 3; φ 60; τ' Aiala, δὲ τ' Ἥος; ἡμετέρη





[*τὸν Ηλιοειδῆ*] *μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐρανίου*, Herod. ap. Sync., p. 55, 6, 11. DL.; *θεοὶ πᾶσι δὲ ἀνθρώποις ἀπολλύουσιν*, Abydenus ap. Syncell., p. 70, 13. Of Enoch we read, Gen. 5<sup>24</sup>: *ἐν ᾧ ἐγένετο ἡ μετάθεσις εἰς τὸν θένον* (Jeremidg, Eccum., 44<sup>14</sup>; Hebr. 11<sup>2</sup>): *ἀπολλύσθη δὲ τῇ γῇ*, Eccum. 48<sup>14</sup>; *ἀνέβητο ὁ πῶς τὸ θεῖον*, Jos., A.J. i, 3, 4 (of Moses: *ἀπολλύσας*, Jos., A.J. iv, 8, 48). On the translation of Enoch and Elijah, see also Schwally, D. Loben. nach d. Tod u.d. Fortd. d. a. Israel (1892), p. 140. Translation of the living into Sheol often in the O.T., see Schwally, p. 82. Even Enoch has not escaped the fate of being regarded by comparative mythologists as the sun. Enoch may be given up to them, if the Orientalists have no objection; but it seems a pity that the theory, in accordance with the favourite argument from analogy, should be applied to Greek Translation-myths too, so that we should see the whole series of such figures, from Meliclae to Apollonios of Tyana, transformed by magic into mythological suns (or dawns, water-meadows, thunder-clouds, etc.).

<sup>12</sup> *μεταθετός εἰς πᾶν*, P 363.

<sup>13</sup> *§ 321-2*.

<sup>14</sup> One might even suspect that Meliclae is translated to everlasting life not merely because he has Helen, Zeus' daughter, to wife: *οὐρανὸς ἔχει* 'Ελένη as Proteus tells him, but in imitation of a much earlier mythical tradition, according to which Helen herself was translated and made immortal. No ancient tradition reports the death of Helen—with the exception of the absurd invention of Ptolemaios Chennos (Phot. Bibl., p. 149a, 37 ff.; 42; 149b, 1 ff.) and the not very superior aetiological myth in Paus. 3, 19, 10. On the other hand, we often hear of her deification, living on the island Lenke or else in the Islands of the Blest. It was not unnatural that mythological tradition should have at an early period set free the most "daemonic" of women from the usual fate of mankind and that Meliclae should rather have followed her example than the his (as Isoc. 10, 62, definitely says).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Tylor, l. 85; J. G. Müller, *Ges. d. Americ. Urzeit.*, 660 f.; Walte, *Anthrop.* v, 2, 114; vi, 302, 307.

<sup>16</sup> We are told that Rhadamanthys was once conveyed by the Phaeacians to Euboea *ἐνὸς ἡμετέρος Τριυῖς Παιφίης εἰς* (§ 321 ff.). We have no grounds and no right to complete this story by supposing that this was when Rh. already lived in Elysion. To regard the Phaeacians as a sort of "ferry-folk of the dead" connected in some way with Elysion is pure unsupported fancy.

<sup>17</sup> The possessor of *ἀθανασία* did not necessarily possess also *ἀφθαρσία* (Isoc. 10, 81).

<sup>18</sup> To identify 'Ορτυγία, a 404, with Delos, and Ξυρία with the island Syros as the older commentators and K. O. Müller, *Doct.* i, 381 (if not in E.T.), did, is impossible on account of the addition of the words *ἐν γαλαρ ἡλίω* alone. These show that Syrie was far away in the fabulous west, the only possible place for such a wonderland. It is evident that Ortygia is originally a purely mythical spot, sacred to Artemis and no more certainly fixed in one place than the Dionysian Nyssa, and for that reason always to be found wherever the cult of Artemis was especially popular, in Aetolia, Syracuse, Ephesus, or Delos. Delos is clearly distinguished from O. in A. Ap. 18, and only later identified with O. (Delos being considered the older name, O. Schneider, *Nécessité*, p. 22, n.), when Artemis had been brought into closer connexion with Apollo, and even then not invariably. Thus in Homer Ortygia never clearly = Delos.

<sup>21</sup> Ἄρετος δὲ αὐτὸν ἐξαυτῶνος εἰς ταύρους μετακομίζει (cf. the *metabole* αὐτῶν δὲ θεῶν of Enoch. Gen. 32<sup>d</sup> and ἀδελφὸν σου, ἑλθέτω δὲ αὐτῷ τῆς κόρης παρίσταναι τῷ θεῷ, Procl., *Christ.* ap. Kinkel *Epic. Fr.*, p. 19: (Apollod.) *Epic.* iii, 22, Wagn.).

<sup>22</sup> ταύρω (τῷ Μέμνονι) ἦν δὲ παρὰ Διὸς εὐχρηστέον ἀθανάτων διδόναι says Proclus with regrettable brevity (p. 33, Kinkel).

<sup>23</sup> It cannot be doubted (in spite of Meier, *Anнали dell' Inst. Arch.*, 1883, p. 217 ff.) that the story given in 17 of Sarpedon's death and the carrying away of his body, even if it does not belong to the oldest part of the poem (which I cannot regard as certain), is nevertheless earlier than the *Aithiopis* and was the model for its account of Memnon's death (cf. also Christ, *Lakon. alleg. Epos.*, p. 25). But why do Thanatos and Hypnos carry away the body of Sarpedon (instead of the usual θεῖα, δέλλα, Ἄνεμος, or the winds, Q.S. ii, 550, in the case of Memnon)? Where these two are found on Attic lekythioi as bearers of the corpse (Robert, *Thanatos*, 19) they were perhaps intended in some consolatory sense as in the grave inscriptions ἕνος ἔχεις οὐ, πύρρον . . . καὶ νέμεις οὐκ ἔχοντες. The Homeric poet, however, can hardly have meant anything of the sort, but merely invents the indispensable second bearer to assist Thanatos—an effective touch but not one that rested on any religious grounds. Hypnos as brother of Thanatos is also found in the *diety dionys.* E 231.

<sup>24</sup> ἐν τῇσιν ὑπερὶ τῆς θείας ἀναμύσεως τὸν νοῦν εἰς τὴν ἀνέμῳ εἶπον θεταμίζω, Procl., *Christ.*, p. 34, Kink. Then he continues, οἱ δὲ Ἀχαιοὶ τὴν εἶδον χάσαντες ὄντα νύκταν. Thus a grave-mound is set up though the body of Achilles has been translated: evidently a concession to the older narrative (see 60-4), which knew nothing of the translation of the body but gives prominence to the grave-mound. Besides which, the tumulus of Achilles—a landmark on the seashore of the Troad—required explanation, and the poet accordingly speaks of the erection of a cenotaph. It was not considered a contradiction to erect cenotaphs, not only to those whose bodies were irrecoverable (see above, Ch. I. n. 84), but also to heroes whose bodies had been translated. Thus Herakles, after he has been struck by lightning and snatched up into the sky, has a χῶμα made for him, though no bones were found upon the supd. D.S. 4, 38, 5; 39, 1. (The tumuli found in the Troad were not, indeed, originally empty as Schliemann, *Troy*, etc., pp. 252, 263, supposed; they were not cenotaphs but merely grave-mounds that had once been filled and belong to a type frequently met with in Phrygia; see Schuchhardt, *Schliemann's Excav.* (E.T.), p. 84 ff. Kretschmer, *Einl. Ges. gr. Spr.*, 1896, p. 176.)

<sup>25</sup> What became of Odysseus? Proclus is silent on the point, and we have no means of guessing. According to Hyginus 127 he was buried in Aiaia; but if nothing more was going to be done with his body why bring him to Aiaia? Acc. to Sch. Lyc., 805, he was raised to life again by Kirke, but what happened to him then? (Acc. to [Apollod.] *Epic.* vii, 37 W., the dead Odysseus seems to remain in Ithaka.—We have no grounds for altering the words to suit the Telegonia as Wagner does, esp. as a complete correspondence with that poem cannot be obtained.) The death and burial of Od. among the Tyrrhenians (Müller, *Etruscans* iii, 281 tr. Gray) belong to quite another connexion.

<sup>26</sup> The *Aithiopis* is later than the Hades scenes in *ω*, and consequently later still than the Nekyia of *λ*. The prophecy of the Translation of Menelaos in *δ* is likewise later than the Nekyia but to all appearance older than the *Aithiopis*.

\* The extract from the Nestoi in Proclus, *Chrest.*, is particularly inadequate and evidently gives no full idea of the very wide and various subject-matter of that poem. Thus, too, the notices of it preserved from other sources give details of its subject-matter (esp. of the Nekyia which was included in it) that cannot be fitted into the limits of Proclus' outline.

\* The idea that the Bronze age is really identical with the age of Heroes is at first sight attractive (see e.g. Steltz, *Die W. u. T. des Hesiod*, p. 81); one soon finds, however, that it breaks down on closer examination.

\* It does not seem to me absolutely necessary to strike out lines 124 f. (οὐδ' οὐ φυλάσσουσιν νε δίνες καὶ ἐχέδρια ἄγρια, ἔρρα τοσάμηναι πόντος φουσσῶντος ἐν' αἰῶν). They are repeated in lines 254 f., but that is a natural place to repeat them. Proclus does not comment on them; but it does not follow that he did not have them before him; and Plutarch, *D.O.* 37, p. 431 B, seems to allude to l. 125 in its present context.

\* Plu., *D.O.*, 10, p. 415 B, in obvious error, takes Hesiod's δαίμονες for such an intermediate class of beings; he supposes that Hesiod distinguishes four classes τῶν λογικῶν, θεοί, δαίμονες, ἥρωες, ἀνθρώποι. In this Platonic division the ἥρωες would correspond rather with Hesiod's δαίμονες of the first age. (What Proclus has to say on Hesiod, *Op.* 121, p. 101, *Caust.*, is taken evidently word for word from Plutarch's commentary on Hesiod and resembles closely the remarks in the passage cited from the *Def. Orac.*) Modern critics have often failed to notice the difference between the Hesiodic δαίμονες and the Platonic. Plato himself is very decided about the difference (*Crat.* 397 E-398 C).

\* ἔρρα τοσάμηναι 125 (cf. 223; S 282) is a naive equivalent for "inexhaustible" as Tzet. correctly explains. This is how it is to be understood regularly in Homer whenever there is mention of envelopment in a cloud and the like.

\* These daemones are called ἐπιχθόνιοι in contrast (not to the ἀσχεθόνιοι of l. 141, but) to the θεοὶ ἐπουράνιοι, as Proclus on l. 122 rightly remarks. Thus in Homer we have ἐπιχθόνιοι regularly used as an adjective, or, standing alone, as an equivalent of men as distinguished from gods. Then the ἀσχεθόνιοι of 141 are brought in to form another and secondary contrast with the ἐπιχθόνιοι.

\* p. 485 ff. It follows that the descriptions of the visits paid by gods to the homes of men are of great antiquity: cf. my *Greek Roman*, p. 506 ff. Zeus Philios in particular is fond of visiting men: *Doxl. Com.* 'Εὐείληρ. Mein. *Com.* iii, p. 543 f. [ii, p. 420 K.).

\* τιμὴ καὶ τιμὰς ἐπιχθονί 142. τιμὴ in the sense not of simple honour but of practical worship, as frequently in Homer, e.g. in such phrases as: τιμὴ καὶ εὖδος ἐπιχθονί, P 251; τιμῇ ἐκαστάμενος, α 30; τιμῇ δὲ ἀνελύχουσιν ἱερὰ θεσίου, λ 304; ἔχρη τιμῇ, λ 495, etc. In the same way here, l. 138: σέβουσιν τιμὰς οὐκ ἐπίθεον μανθάνουσιν θεοί.

\* Light and dark, i.e. good and bad, δαίμονες are acc. to Rnth. *Myth. u. d. Weltalter* (1860), pp. 16-17, distinguished in Hesiod's daemones of the golden and silver age. Such a distinction, however, never appears in Hesiod; and it is hardly credible that the gods and spirits of ancient Greek popular belief (which never really admitted the categories good and bad) should in this primitive period have been actually classified in accordance with such categories. At any rate, Greek readers never found anything of the kind expressed in Hesiod:

the conception of bad daimones is regularly supported by reference to the philosophers alone (e.g. *Plut.*, D.O., 17, p. 419 A), and the conception is certainly no older than the earliest philosophic speculation.

<sup>12</sup> l. 141: *οὐδ' αὖτε ὁμοχθόνια* (*ὁμοχθόνια* all MSS. except our, see Köchly's *Apparatus*; also Ts.) *μάναντες θύοντι κολάμενοι*—*φίλωνες θύοντι* was read and explained by Proclus. This is clearly wrong, and is corrected to *φίλωνες θύοντες* (as in l. 123) by Hagen and Welcker. But this transfers from the first to the second race an expression that we cannot be sure Hesiod meant to be transferred. Not merely the words but the sense, too, is thus corrected, without due ground. *μάναντες* does not look like a corruption; it is more likely that *φίλωνες* is an accidental alteration. *ὁν. μάναντες θύοντες καλόμενοι* is the reading of the latest editor: but here to say the least of it the addition of *θύοντες* is superfluous. We should rather try to understand and explain the traditional text and show how the poet came by the remarkable expression.

<sup>13</sup> When philosophers and philosophizing poets of a later age occasionally refer to the soul when freed from the body as a *δαιμόν*, the expression has a totally different sense.

<sup>14</sup> Similarly, though the oxymoron is much less daring in his case, Isocrates, 9, 72, has *δαιμόν θνητόν*. In order to describe a daemon who has originally been a mortal later ages boldly invented the compound *ἀθάνατοδαιμόν*, which corresponds fairly well with the Hesiodic *μάναντες θνητόν*; (*Eur.*) *Rhes.*, 971; *Procop.*, *An.* 12, p. 79, 17 D. (*σεμνὸν δαιμόν* on a *δελφίον* from Carthage, *RGH.* xii, 299). Later still a being destined to become a god is called, even at his birth, by Manetho (i. 280) *θεὸν θεοῦ τὸν ἀθάνατον*.

<sup>15</sup> The silver race was created by the gods of Olympus, like the golden before them (l. 110; 128); only the third race (l. 143) and then the fourth (158) by Zeus alone. It might be supposed from this that the silver age as well as the golden age occurred in the period before Zeus' rule, *ὡς καὶ ἔπος ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν βασιλείᾳ* (l. 111); and in this sense "Orpheus" understood the words of Hesiod when he *τοὺς ἀργυρεὺς γένοντο βασιλεύοντες φησὶ τὸν ἔρπον* (Proclus on l. 128). But it would be very difficult to reconcile l. 138 *Ζεὺς ἔκρινε Κρονίδης* with this view. Hesiod may then have placed the silver age in the time when sub love mundus erat (as Ovid explicitly states, *M.* i, 113 f.); but all the same it lay for him in the far distant past before all history.

<sup>16</sup> *ὀνόματι* 154 may quite as well mean "nameless", i.e. without name or special title, as "fameless" (as it does for the most part though not invariably in Homer).

<sup>17</sup> See Welcker, *Kl. Sch.* II, 3, who, however, in the desire to rule out all possibility of identifying Scherie with Korikya asserts too positively that it was a part of the mainland. § 204 (compared with § 354) at least comes very close to regarding it as an island. But it is clear that nowhere is it explicitly called an island.—It is possible that *Ἰσθμός*, connected with *ὄρεος*, may really mean "mainland" (Welcker, *loc. cit.*; Kretschmer, *Einl. Grsch. gr. Spr.*, 281); but the question still remains whether the Homeric poet, who did not invent the name, understood or respected its original significance. At any rate, it was no longer understood by those who in very early times identified Scherie with the island Korikya.

<sup>18</sup> The objections to l. 169 as regards its form are brought out by Stolz, *Hesiods W. u. T.*, p. 69. The line is missing in most of the MSS.; it was rejected (together with the line following, which, however,

is quite sound) by ancient critics (Proclus on l. 156). Later editors are united in condemning it. But the interpolation is at any rate old: probably even Pindar already knew the line in this place (Q. ii, 70).

<sup>13</sup> ἄλλοι δὲ Ζεὺς ἀφ' ὧν 7. τῶν Πι. (P. iv, 291), in whose time, however, this was a well-known myth to which he is only making a passing allusion for the sake of an example. The Hesiodic Theogony still knows nothing of it.

<sup>14</sup> Before Hesiod we have no mention of the myth of a Golden, Saturnian Age, nor any complete description of the imaginary life upon Blessed Islands. But epic poetry had already, as we have seen, provided him with occasional examples of translation to a place of blessedness, and he only collects these into a combined picture of such a place. To that extent the belief in a blessed life beyond the grave meets us earlier than the myth of a Golden Age. But we have not the slightest ground for saying that the former "must have existed from the beginning among the Greeks" (as Milchhöfer at least thinks, *Auf. Kunst*, p. 230). On the other hand, it may be mere accident that the myth of the Golden Age has no older authority than Hesiod—the story itself may be much earlier. After Hesiod it was frequently taken up and improved upon; not, however, first by Empedocles as Graf supposes. *ad aurea æt. fab. sym.* (Leip. *Stud.* viii, p. 15), but already in the epic *Ἀλκυονίς*, see Philod. *Pict.*, p. 51 Gp. [See also some remarks by Alfred Nutt, *The Voyage of Bran*, p. 269 f., 1895, with which I cannot agree.]

## CHAPTER III

### CAVE DEITIES: SUBTERRANEAN TRANSLATION

The history of Greek culture and religion shows no sudden break or revolution in its course. The Greeks neither at any time experienced a movement from within that caused a violent recoil from the path which they had chosen, nor were they ever diverted by the overwhelming might of an invading force from the natural course of their evolution. Out of their own natural feelings and reflexion this most intellectually gifted nation evolved the great ideas that nourished succeeding centuries. They anticipated all later ages. The profoundest and the boldest, the most devout as well as the most irreverent speculations as to the nature of God, the world and men have their origin among the Greeks. But this excessive many-sidedness led to a general condition of equipoise in which individual factors restrained or balanced each other. Whereas the most violent impacts and sudden revolutions in the history of civilization are given by just those nations who are only able to embrace one idea at a time and who, confined in the narrow limits of their fanaticism, throw everything else overboard.

It is true, indeed, that the Greeks were ever open to influences—whether civilized or the reverse—from abroad. In wave after wave of peaceful invasion foreign ideas and ways of life, especially from the East, flowed over Greece. In one case, at least (that of the ecstatic religion of the Thracian Dionysos-worshippers), a spring flood burst out that broke down all the dykes. In many cases the invading elements might be easily eliminated again from Greek culture; in many others they obtained a permanent footing and influenced it deeply. But never did an influence from abroad obtain in Greece an authority at all comparable to the subversive and transforming power exercised by Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam over the peoples on whom they laid their grip. The Greek genius, as supple as it was tenacious, maintained control over all such foreign influences, in full possession of its original nature, its genial naivety. New ideas, whether introduced from abroad or engendered at home, were taken up and assimilated, but the old were not done away with; they gradually amalgamated with the new so that much was learnt while nothing was quite forgotten. The stream flowed on in its peaceful course, but it still remained the same stream. *Nec mansit ut fuerat nec formas servavit eandem: sed tamen ipse idem est.*

The history of Greek culture, then, has no sharply contrasted epochs, no periods of abrupt change, when the old is completely given up and a new era definitely begins. Indeed, the most serious revulsions of Greek history, culture, and religion took place beyond doubt *before* the time of the Homeric Epos, and in that dim past it is possible that more violent and startling upheavals may have occurred to make the Greeks what we afterwards know them to be. Greek life becomes first clearly known to us in Homer. It is true that the broad uniformity that it has in the picture reflected for us in the poems of Homer vanishes in the course of the years that follow. New forces emerge; much that was forgotten comes to light again now that the Homeric system of ideas, once all powerful, is falling to pieces; out of the very old and the quite new things of which Homer never gives the least hint are being put together. But nowhere during the violent movements of the next troubled centuries after Homer did any absolute break with the Epic or its system take place. Only in the sixth century did the defiant speculation of a few bold spirits begin to seek a way of escape from the thralldom of the Homeric poems which still lay over the whole of Greece. The history of the Greek common people knows nothing of a reaction against Homer and his world. Homeric religion and moral ideas gradually ceased to reign supreme in men's minds, but they were never violently or completely discarded.

So we, too, though we leave behind us Homer and the Epic and enter upon the tortuous paths of the later history of Greek soul worship and belief in immortality, may still for a time be guided by the Ariadne thread of the epic. In our subject, too, there are links which connect the Homeric with following ages. Soon enough the thread will break, and we shall have to enter the new field of inquiry depending on our own resources. . . .

### § 1

Prominent among the chieftains, who, under the leadership of Adrastos, came to the help of Polymeikes and laid siege to Thebes, was Amphiaraos the Argive hero and seer descended from the mysterious priest and prophet Melampous. He was drawn into the war against his will, for he foresaw its unhappy end. After the decisive struggle in which the opposing brothers fell slain by each other's hand, the Argive host turned to flight, and with them fled Amphiaraos. But before Periklymenos, who was pursuing him, could drive his spear into the fugitive's back, Zeus made the earth open before him in a flash of



lightning and Amphiaraios with his horses, his chariot, and his charioteer, was swallowed up in the depths where Zeus made him *immortal*. So runs the legend of the fate of Amphiaraios as we learn it from innumerable sources from Pindar onwards,<sup>1</sup> and we may be sure that thus it was told in the Thebais, the old epic poem of the war of the Seven against Thebes, which was taken up into the Epic Cycle.<sup>2</sup>

At Thebes, then, Amphiaraios lived on for ever under the earth. Northwards in the Boeotian countryside, near Lebadeia, man told of a similar marvel. In a cave of the mountainous ravine, before which Lebadeia lies, lived Trophonios for ever immortal. The legends that professed to explain his miraculous cave-existence do not quite agree among themselves, as, indeed, is generally the case with those figures who were not early taken up by the poets and given a fixed place in the narratives of heroic adventure. But all accounts (the oldest of which perhaps go back to the "Telegonia") agree in the assumption that Trophonios, like Amphiaraios, was first a man, a famous master-builder, who while flying from his foes, had dived underground at Lebadeia and now lives for ever in the depths of the earth whence he foretells the future to those who come and question him there.

These stories, then, claim to speak of men who during their lifetime were swallowed up by the earth, and who now live on for ever at the places where they were taken down into the depths—places situated in quite definite localities of the Greek countryside.

We are not entirely without other legends of a similar character. One of the wild spirits of the Lapith people from Thessalia, Kaineus by name, having been made invulnerable by Poseidon (who had before this transformed him from a woman into a man), was entangled with tree-trunks in a battle with the Centaurs; but they could do nothing to him, and with "upright foot" (i.e. standing upright, alive, not lying at full length like a dead man or one mortally wounded) he clove the earth under him and went down alive into the depths.<sup>3</sup> In Rhodes Althaimenes was honoured as the "founder" of the Greek cities on that island; he had not died but had vanished into a chasm in the ground.<sup>4</sup> Like Amphiaraios, his son Amphilochos, the heir of his prophetic power, appears to have had a legend according to which he still dwelt alive under the earth either in Akarnania or Cilicia.<sup>5</sup> A few more examples of the same type might be produced,<sup>6</sup> but the number of such stories remains small, and they only make their appearance here and there, as if by

accident, in the tradition. Epic poetry without whose co-operation such local legends rarely achieved widespread or lasting popularity, with few exceptions left such narratives out of account. In fact, they conflicted with the normal Homeric outlook. The belief, however, that immortality when it was miraculously bestowed by the favour of heaven upon certain individual men, was absolutely conditioned by the non-occurrence of death, i.e. the separation of the psyche from the visible man—this belief has helped to shape these stories too. They never speak of an undying existence of the soul by itself in separation from the body. Thus far they are firmly rooted in orthodox Homeric belief.

But the heroes of these stories have their everlasting existence in special abodes under the surface of the earth, in subterranean chambers<sup>1</sup>—not in the common meeting place of the departed; they each have their own peculiar domain far from the House of Adoneus. Such isolation of individuals below the earth does not agree with Homeric ideas; though it almost seems as if a dim echo of these stories of seers like Amphiaraus and Amphilochos, translated alive and with consciousness undestroyed, could be discerned in what the Homeric Nekyia says of Teiresias the Theban seer, in whom alone of all the shadows Persephone had allowed consciousness and intelligence (the essential vital powers) to remain undiminished.<sup>2</sup> But even he is fast bound in Erebos, the general home of the dead, and cut off from all connexion with the upper world, as is demanded by the Homeric view of the world. Amphiaraus and Trophonios, on the other hand, are released from Hades; not having suffered death they have not entered the world of the strengthless dead. They are also translated out of this life (besides out of Hades). But this "subterranean translation" is in its nature and in the origin of the belief in it quite distinct from that "translation to Islands of the Blest" of which we spoke in the last chapter. Those Heroes dwelling alone or in company on holy islands far out over the sea are far removed from human life and beyond the reach of prayers and desires. No influence upon the things of this world is attributed to them, and consequently no cult is offered to them; there never existed a cult of the dwellers in Elysium *as such*. They glimmer in the distance like visions of the poet's fancy from which no one anticipates active interference with the world of reality. It is quite different with these dwellers in the caves. They are actually alive under the surface of the earth; not far away in the inaccessible, spectral world of Hades, but here in the midst of Greece. Questions and prayers

can reach down to them, and they can send up aid to those who call to them. To them, accordingly, as powerful and effectual Spirits a *cult* is paid.

We have detailed information of the manner in which Amphiaraus was worshipped, more especially in later times, when, in addition to the neighbourhood of Thebes, where the original legend of his descent beneath the earth was localized, Oropos also, the boundary town between Boeotia and Attica, was with overwhelming success identified as the place of his disappearance and made a centre of his influence.<sup>9</sup> We have also a certain amount of information, again from later ages, about the cult of Trophonios. With the passage of time, the details of the worship grew and multiplied, but among them all certain features stand out as especially characteristic and allow us to understand the religious ideas lying behind them. To Amphiaraus and Trophonios were offered just those sacrifices which were also paid to the Chthonic deities, i.e. those deities who dwelt in the depths of the earth.<sup>10</sup> Aid was not expected from them in the details of the daily life of individuals or states. Only in the actual locality of their descent were they effectual, and only there because they revealed the future. Kroisos had already, and Mardonios after him, sent inquiries to the most famous oracles of the day,<sup>11</sup> and among them to Amphiaraus at his ancient oracular seat near Thebes and to Trophonios at Lebadeia. Of Amphiaraus it was believed that he revealed the future by visions sent in dreams to those who after making offering laid themselves down to sleep in his temple. To question Trophonios, it was necessary to pass through a narrow passage into his cave. Inside, the inquirer expected to see Trophonios in person or, at least, to hear his instructions.<sup>12</sup> He dwelt, like a spirit confined to the scene of his magical existence, in bodily person at the bottom of his cave. In fact, the method of *incubation*, or temple-sleep, by which Amphiaraus (like many other daimones and Heroes) was questioned, was based on the assumption that the daimon, who was only visible indeed to mortal eyes in the higher state achieved by the soul in dreams, had his permanent dwelling at the seat of his oracle.<sup>13</sup> That is why his appearance can only be expected at this particular place and nowhere else. Originally, too, it was only the dwellers in the depths of the earth who were thus visible in dreams to those who lay down to sleep in the temple over the place where they had their subterranean abode. Homer knows nothing of either gods or daimones who live permanently under the ground in definite places in the inhabited world, near mankind; and for that

reason he betrays no knowledge of *Incubation-oracles*.<sup>14</sup> There is some ground for the belief that this method, inherent in the divinatory power, of getting into touch with the spirit world, was one of the oldest types of Greek oracular art—certainly not later than the Apolline *mantikê* of inspiration. And it is precisely in the legend of Amphiaraos, as we may believe it to have been related as early as the cyclic poem of the Thebais, that we have a proof that already in the days when the quasi-Homeric poetry was still popular, people believed in deathless dwellers below the earth and in their active potency in the mantic art.

It is clear, then, that the worship of Amphiaraos and the belief in his subterranean existence was not due to the influence of the Epic. Rather the reverse was the case: the cult already existed and provided the idea of the daimon and this gave rise to the Epic narrative. The Epic found an existing cult of an oracular daimon who dwelt beneath the earth near Thebes ready to its hand. It reduced this fact to a form which it could understand in a manner typical of the relation which frequently existed between the facts of religious life and Epic poetry. The cult was connected with an event in legendary history, and so brought into harmony with the Epic outlook. The Epic knew nothing of gods attached in this way to a cult particular earthly spot, and so the spirit worshipped in the became in the epic imagination a chieftain and Seer who had not always lived beneath the earth in that place, but had only been transported there subsequently by a miraculous fiat of the supreme god, who had also accorded an eternal life in the depths to the translated hero.<sup>15</sup>

We may perhaps find a parallel in more recent Saga story that will throw light on the question. German mythology is perfectly familiar with such figures for ever, or until the day of judgment, alive in caverns of the mountains or subterranean chambers. Thus, Charlemagne, or it may be Charles the Fifth, still has his abode in Odenberg or in Unterberg, near Salzburg. Frederick II (or, in more recent versions of the legend, Frederick I Barbarossa) in Kyffhäuser, Henry the Fowler in Sudemerberg, near Goslar. Thus, too, King Arthur, Holger Danske, and many other favourite characters of popular tradition dwell in subterranean caverns.<sup>16</sup> Occasionally, we can still plainly see how these were originally ancient gods who according to pagan belief dwelt in hollow mountains and whose place has been taken by these heroes and holy men "translated" beneath the earth.<sup>17</sup> So, too, Greek tradition allows us to see even now that those ancient trans-

lated mortals, Amphiaraus and Trophonios, are only Epic substitutes for ancient deities who did not owe their everlasting life and subterranean abode to the favour of heaven, but had possessed these from the beginning. At least, at the site of his worship men knew that the prophetic dweller in the cave was a god; one of them is called Zeus Trophonios or Trophonios, not only by learned authorities, but in inscriptions from Lebadeia;<sup>14</sup> Amphiaraus, too, is once called Zeus Amphiaraus and more often a god.<sup>15</sup> In the Translation legends of Christianized people the kings have usurped the place of the ancient gods because the gods themselves, fallen into neglect, have been dethroned. For reasons not so very different from these the ancient gods on Greek soil were turned into heroes.

Surrounded by the unending multiplicity of contemporary notions of divinity the imagination of the Epic poet had fashioned for itself a generalized picture of a divine kingdom. This was at that time a solitary attempt to erect a Panhellenic theological system, but it had the greatest influence upon the mental conceptions of Greeks of every race, for the Epic poet addressed them all. He stood as though on a height looking down on all the narrow valleys and mountainous countrysides cut off from the rest of the world, and a wide prospect opened out before his eyes. He soars above all the innumerable contradictory and conflicting details of local cult and belief, and finds something universal beyond. The name and conception of Zeus, Apollo, Hermes, Athena, and all the gods represented innumerable diversities in the myths and ritual of the different cities and races; their outward shapes and personalities differed widely according to their localization and the manner of their influence. Instead of all these the Epic poet sees only one Zeus, Apollo, etc., reduced in each case to a single unified personality. And just as he had looked beyond the multiplicity of local deities so he did not confine his gods to particular local habitations and centres of influence in the Greek countries; they did not belong to one locality more than another. True they worked and ruled in the world, but they were for all that free to move where they would. They dwell and meet together on the heights of Olympus, the Pierian Holy Mountain, which, however, became in the imagination of Homer, unfettered by attachment to any particular place, more and more an ideal mountain of fancy. So the broad sea is the dwelling-place of Poseidon; he is not confined to any one place. Even the rulers of the spirit world, Aides and Persephoneia, have their abode, not, indeed, on

Olympos, and certainly not here or there beneath the surface of the Greek countryside, but far away in a land of fancy; they, too, are not bound to any particular locality of the actual world. At the end of this enormous work of unification and idealization, that, out of all the infinite special manifestations of the name Zeus, each worshipped only in its narrow little circle in Greece, had evolved the single almighty figure of Zeus Father of Gods and Men—how could one who had imagined all this be able to understand, if he met with such a creature, a special Zeus, calling himself Zeus Trophonios, who passed his undying existence in a cave near Lebadeia and was only powerful in that one spot?

Of course, the inhabitant of such a holy spot would not allow himself to be deprived of the belief in the existence and presence of the god on his native soil. Though he might be ready enough in general and in respect of other men's local deities to regulate conceptions of the nature of the gods in accordance with the Homeric picture, yet he refused absolutely to be shaken in his belief in his own local deity, however unknown to the Olympian family of gods in Homer that deity might be. The local worship in its unaltered, undisturbed persistence, witnessed to the objective truth of his belief. Thus there were preserved in the pious faith of their worshippers large numbers of local deities whose circle of influence was, however, very limited. They had not been raised with the other gods to the heights of Olympus, but had remained faithful to the soil in which they had their home,<sup>60</sup> witnesses to a far distant past in which the members of every remote little community had their separate god bound to the soil beyond which their thoughts did not stray. We shall see how in post-Homeric times many such ancient earth-gods, i.e. gods thought of as living below the surface of the ground, were given new and in some cases a more wide-reaching lease of life. The Epic in its prime knew nothing of these earth-dwelling deities. When it could not close its eyes to their existence it changed them into translated heroes, and beyond the immediate locality of the cult this version of them became the commonly accepted one throughout the rest of Greece.

## § 2

But the Epic was by no means uniform in intention, or carried through as a systematic unity; it was far from being the offspring of a learned reflection that could tolerate no discrepancy. Even here we find at least some few dim

recollections of the ancient belief in gods that can have their permanent abode in mountain hollows.

The *Odyssey* (xix, 178 f.) calls Minos, the son of Zeus (cf. *Il.* xiii, 456; xiv, 322; *Od.* xi, 568) who ruled in Knossos the Cretan city, "the familiar gossip of great Zeus."<sup>21</sup> Very probably the poet meant by these words much the same as was understood by them in later times: that Minos was personally acquainted with Zeus, on earth, of course, and, in fact, in the cave—not far from Knossos on the side of Mount Ida—which was revered as the "Cave of Zeus."<sup>22</sup> The island of Crete, overrun by the Greeks at an early period, still preserved in its remote seclusion much that was primeval in belief and legend. There, sometimes on Mount Ida, sometimes on Mount Dicte (in the east of the island) the holy cave was pointed out where (already in Hesiod) Zeus was said to have been born.<sup>23</sup> According to a local legend, which probably was present to the fancy of the writer of these lines of the *Odyssey*, the god now fully grown up still dwelt in his subterranean chamber, and was visited by individual mortals. As Minos before him, so, too, Epimenides had been allowed to hear the prophecies of the god.<sup>24</sup> The Zeus that dwelt in Ida was worshipped in a mystical cult;<sup>25</sup> every year a "throne" was "spread" for him, i.e. probably a "divine banquet" (*Theoxenia*) was prepared for his consumption, as for other especially Chthonic deities. The initiated then entered the cave dressed in black woollen garments, and remained within for thrice nine days.<sup>26</sup> Everything points to the existence of conceptions similar to those that we found expressed in the cult of Zeus Trophonios at Lebadeia. Zeus dwelling in bodily form in the depths of his cave can appear in person to those who enter his cave duly sanctified.

Then there appears, from the fourth century onwards, the strange statement, perhaps started by Euhemerus and eagerly taken up in later ages by scoffers like Lucian or Christian opponents of the old religion, that Zeus lay *buried* on Ida.<sup>27</sup> What is here called the *grave* of the god is nothing in reality but the *cave* which was generally regarded as his permanent abode.<sup>28</sup> The idea—always strange to the Greeks<sup>29</sup>—that a god could lie buried anywhere on the earth, deprived of life for ever or even for a limited period of time, is often met with in the tradition of Semitic and other non-Greek peoples.<sup>30</sup> We need not inquire what deeper or perhaps allegorical sense such legends may have had in the beliefs of those nations; there is no reason to suppose that such foreign legends had any influence in the formation of Greek myth. Nor does the

tradition in Greek lands give the slightest support to the view current among modern mythologists that the death and burial of gods is intended to symbolize the "death of Nature". It is, in fact, plain that in the legend of the Cretan Zeus' grave, the "grave" has simply taken the place of the cave as the everlasting abode of the undying god, and that it is a paradoxical expression intended to signify his perpetual confinement to that place. We are immediately reminded of a no less paradoxical notice of a god's grave at Delphi. Under the navel stone (Omphalos) of the Earth-goddess (which was a vaulted piece of masonry in the Temple of Apollo recalling in its shape the ancient vaulted tombs),<sup>21</sup> there lay buried a divine being. Our learned authorities call this being Python, the enemy of Apollo; one and only one quite untrustworthy witness says it was Dionysos.<sup>22</sup> Here we have a case of one god setting up his temple and abode over the grave of another god. Apollo, the god of prophecy, thrones it over the Earth-spirit Python, the son of the Earth-goddess Gaia. Now, we have ancient and in the highest degree trustworthy traditions to the effect that there was originally at Delphi an ancient Earth-Oracle into whose place Apollo and his mantic art came later as an intruder. We are therefore justified in believing that this circumstance in the history of religion has found expression in the legend that Apollo's temple and oracular seat stood over the place where an ancient and superseded oracle-daimon lay "buried".<sup>23</sup> In the days when the primeval Earth-Oracle was still powerful its guardian would not lie dead and buried under the Omphalos of the Earth-goddess, but would have dwelt there alive underground, like Amphiaraos or Trophonios or Zeus on Ida.

### § 3

The "grave" under the Omphalos means in the case of Python the overthrow of an earth-dwelling Chthonic Daimon by the cult of Apollo. The "grave" of Zeus, which had thrust itself into the place of an older legend of the dwelling of Zeus in the cave of the mountain, expresses the same idea as this legend, but expresses it in a form current in later ages which knew of many "Heroes" who after their death and from their graves gave proof of a higher existence and a powerful influence. The Zeus that died and is buried is only a god reduced to a Hero:<sup>24</sup> remarkable and paradoxical is only the fact that unlike Zeus Amphiaraos, Zeus Trophonios (and Zeus Asklepios), he has not, in the usual fashion, dropped his title of god, which directly contradicted his "Hero"



nature. It is possible that in the case of this cave-Zeus, half-god half-Hero, a conception has been transferred merely on analogy from other cases where it was applied more properly, after they had become fully "Heroized", to gods who according to the no longer intelligible theory had once been dwellers in the depths of the earth.

We have several accounts of Heroes who were buried in temples of gods and were sometimes associated with the cult of the higher god to whom the temple was dedicated. The way in which such legends could arise may be seen unusually clearly from the case of *Erechtheus*.

The Ship-Catalogue in the *Iliad* (ii, 546 ff.) tells us that Erechtheus was the son of the Earth, but that Athene brought him up and "settled him in her rich temple",<sup>36</sup> where the Athenians every year honour him with sacrifice of sheep and bulls.<sup>37</sup> It is plain that Erechtheus is here thought of as still living; to honour a dead man with such offerings, repeated every year and attended by the whole community, would be a custom quite unknown to Homer. Erechtheus is, therefore, thought of as dwelling alive in the temple in which Athene has set him down, i.e. the ancient temple on the Acropolis which was enclosed in the "strong house of Erechtheus", to which, according to the *Odyssey*, Athene betakes herself as her *own* home. On the old citadel of the Kings, royal residence and sanctuary of the goddess were combined; its foundation walls have recently been discovered on the spot where later joint worship was paid to Athene and Erechtheus in the "Erechtheion".<sup>38</sup> Erechtheus dwells below the ground in a crypt of this temple,<sup>39</sup> like other earth-deities, in the form of a snake, immortally. He is not dead, for as Euripides still says, in a story which otherwise follows different lines, "the earth gaped and covered him over,"<sup>40</sup> i.e. he was *translated* and lived on under the earth. On the analogy of the examples already discussed it is clear that this is also a case of a primitive local deity,<sup>41</sup> once supposed to have been living always in a cave on the mountain-side, transformed to a Hero who has been brought there and raised to immortal life. The later belief in Heroes required a *graw* at which the continued existence and potency of the "Hero" was localised: by a natural process of development the Hero Erechtheus translated alive and made immortal is thought of as *buried* in a grave. Erichthonios, who was expressly identified with the Homeric Erechtheus, was by later ages supposed to be buried in the Temple of Polias, i.e. the oldest temple of Athene, on the Acropolis.<sup>42</sup> We have clearly before us the steps by which the

aboriginal deity, dwelling beneath the ground, the son of Earth, is made into a mortal Hero, translated to immortality and placed under the protection of the Olympian goddess who has now become more powerful than he; and finally transferred, cave and all, to the precincts of her temple, and finally reduced to the condition of a Hero like another, who had died and lies peacefully buried in the temple of the goddess on the citadel.

With this example before us we may explain several other analogous cases, in which we have only the last stage of the process, the grave of a Hero in a god's temple, without any of the intermediate steps. A single example may be given.

At Amyklai, not far from Sparta, in the holiest temple of Laconia, stood the ancient bronze statue of Apollo upon an altar-shaped base, within which, according to legend, *Hyakinthos* lay buried. Through a bronze door in the side of the altar offerings for the dead were sent down to "*Hyakinthos*" buried below every year at the festival of the *Hyakinthia*.<sup>42</sup> The recipient of these offerings has little resemblance to the gentle youth of popular legend. The Hellenistic poets tell how he was beloved by Apollo and died by a cast of Apollo's discus and was changed into a flower. The fable, almost destitute of local reference, has been put together from many popular themes.<sup>43</sup> The sculpture on the above-mentioned altar, on the other hand, represents among many gods and heroes *Hyakinthos* and his sister *Polyboia* as they are being carried up to heaven—which will not square with the metamorphosis story. Further, he is represented as bearded, and so not as the boy whom Apollo loved,<sup>44</sup> but as a grown man (of whose daughters indeed other legends make mention).<sup>45</sup> The true story of *this* *Hyakinthos* has disappeared almost without leaving a trace. But in what the monument reveals and in what we know of the yearly festival held in honour of *Hyakinthos* significant features emerge which perhaps can tell us the real character of the Daimon that was honoured at Amyklai together with, and as our information clearly shows, before Apollo himself.<sup>46</sup> *Hyakinthos* was given offerings that were otherwise peculiar to the gods that ruled the lower world.<sup>47</sup> These offerings were let down directly into the underground place where, in fact, *Hyakinthos* himself was supposed to dwell. In the great festival of the *Hyakinthia* the alternate worship of Apollo and *Hyakinthos* (after whom as the chief personage the festival is named) points to the incomplete amalgamation of two originally distinct cults; and the plain and unadorned, almost dismal, ceremonies of

the days devoted to Hyakinthos—contrasted with the more cheerful worship paid to Apollo on the middle day of the feast <sup>48</sup>—allow us to see clearly the real nature of Hyakinthos as a Daimon related to the gods of the underworld. On the altar-relief Polyboia was represented as his sister: she was a goddess of the underworld like Persephone.<sup>49</sup> Hyakinthos was, then, an old local deity of the Amyklaiian countryside, dwelling below the earth, and his worship at Amyklai was older than that of Apollo. But he is a dim figure. The Olympian god (probably not before the Doric conquest of the Achaean land) has set himself down beside, and indeed over, the ancient earth-spirit, and now outshines him without quite being able to banish his worship. The divine existence of the latter under the ground could not be imagined by later ages, except as the after-existence of the psyche of a dead and buried Hero whose body lay in the "grave" under the statue of the god. Next, in order to explain their association in cult, poetic legend made the god a lover, just as in another case, and for similar reasons, it had made him the lover of Daphne.<sup>50</sup>

#### † 4

Thus it may be that under many a Hero whose grave was shown in the Temple of a god an ancient local-god was hidden, whose abode beneath the earth had been converted into a "grave" now that he himself had sunk from a deity of higher rank to a human chieftain. It depended upon the circumstances of the case whether his humanization was complete or whether the memory of his former god-head (preserved in cult) secured for him a second elevation to the heavenly regions <sup>51</sup> among the Olympian gods whose nature was originally quite foreign to that of the old earth-daimon. Such conceptions, differing widely according to the circumstances of place and time, are shown most clearly in the different views taken of Asklepios. For Homer and the poets he is generally a great chieftain, a mortal who had learnt the art of healing from Cheiron. In religious cult he was generally set on a level with the upper gods. In reality he, too, is a local earth-dwelling deity from Thesaly, who from beneath the earth dispenses, like so many earth-spirits, healing from the ills of the flesh and knowledge of the future <sup>52</sup>—the two being closely connected in antiquity. He, too, easily bore the change from god to Hero. Asklepios was struck by Zeus' lightning which in this, as in many cases, did not destroy life, but translated the person affected to a higher existence outside the visible world.<sup>53</sup>

We can now easily understand what it means when even this ancient earth-deity is said to be "buried"—his grave being shown at different places.<sup>44</sup> Many peculiarities of the worship paid to him show clearly the original character of Asklepios as an ancient god living below the earth.<sup>45</sup> One essential characteristic indeed of such earth-spirits he lacks—he is not bound to any one particular place. An enterprising priesthood, wandering in company with the rest of their tribe, had taken with them this old established worship of theirs, and spread it far and wide, so that Asklepios himself became at home in many different places.

Now, in closest relationship, though they remained more faithful to their original character, with this Zeus Asklepios stood those Boeotian earth-spirits with whom this discussion began. Trophonios, and Amphiaraos, too, might have been described as an Asklepios, who had stayed at home in his old cavern dwelling.<sup>46</sup> They, too, Amphiaraos and Trophonios, had become mortal men of a past age in the imagination of a time which could no longer properly understand such cave-spirits. But we never hear of their "graves"; for the generation which made them Heroes knew nothing of mortal chieftains who after dying and being buried yet lived on with undiminished powers. But it was the belief in their uninterrupted potency that gave those strange cavern deities a secure place in men's memory. In the epic and in legends inspired by the epic they are recognized as human beings that had not died but had been translated, without any division of soul from body, to everlasting life in the depths of the earth. Ever afterwards—even when they are not only called immortal, but actually "gods"—they are reckoned as men who have become immortal or godlike.<sup>47</sup> And they have become the patterns of what other mortals too may rise to. In the *Electra* of Sophokles (836 ff.) the chorus wishing to justify the hope of a continued life for the departed, expressly appeal to the example of Amphiaraos, who still rules below the earth with all his spiritual powers intact. For the same reason these and other examples offered by ancient legend and poetry of the "translation" of individual great men to a life below the earth are important for our inquiry too. In them, as it did (in another sense) in the case of those translated to the Islands of the Blest, the Epic points beyond its own resigned and gloomy conception of the state after death towards a higher life after the visible world has been left behind. It took isolated cases of the once numerous class of cavern deities worshipped in Greek countries, and deprived

them of their god-head, though not of the superhumanly continued existence and (especially mantic) powers claimed for them by the belief and cult of their countrymen. Thus reduced to mortal rank, it interwove them in the fabric of the heroic mythology, and in so doing instituted a class of outstanding human individuals who had been raised to a godlike existence, far, indeed, from the upper world, but, at least, not condemned to the common realm of the souls. Instead they were given a home beneath the earth, each in a definite place in Greek territory, near living men, and able to help them. The descent from god to mortal Hero resulted, since the essential point of continued existence was not denied, in a corresponding exaltation of the mortal and the heroic to the divine. Thus the epic leads us in this instance towards a range of conceptions which the poems themselves treated as though it never existed, and which now suddenly comes into view.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER III

<sup>1</sup> Pi., *N.* ix, 24 ff., x, 8 f., [Apollod.] iii, 8, 3, 4 (ὅτι τῷ ἔργῳ καὶ τῷ φρονέειν βόταναι . . . ἰαρόνθῃ καὶ Ζεὺς ἀνάστην αὐτὸν ἰαλόντων), etc. The expressions used to describe the translation and continued conscious existence of A. are noteworthy: κατὰ γὰρ αὐτὸν τὴν καὶ θεοδίκων ἵππων ἑμαρτήρ, Pi., *O.* vi, 14. Ζεὺς κράτος δμ' ἵππων, *N.* ix, 28. γὰρ ὑπέθετο πάντων Οἰκλίδης, x, 8. μάντις κακυνθὸς πολυκλίας ἐπὶ χθονός, A., *Th.*, 568. εὐρίπτοροργεῖα Θηβαίων, 5 fr., 873 (= 958 P.). θεοὶ ζῶντ' ἀναπαύοντες ἐς μύχων χθονός αὐτοῖς τεθρίωνες ἐλλογούων ἑρφατός, E. *Supr.*, 928 l. ἔρπασεν χέλυβδης πλοκοπούων, τεθρίωνον ἔρμα περιβαλόντα χόσματι, 501 f. (Eriphyle) Ἀμφιάραον ἱερὸν ἐπὶ γῆν κτάνειν πύλιν ἵππων, Oratio in Ephorus ap. Ath., 232 P. Ἀμφιάραον ζῶντες τὸ σῶμα ἀνταβέξασθαι γῆν γῆν, Agatharch., p. 113, 21 M. ἐπεσπαστο δ' γῇ ζῶντι, Philostr., *V. Ap.*, 2, 37, p. 79, 18 Kay. φησὶν ὁρᾶν of A., St. Byz. s. "Ἀρτα—εὐφρόνης ἀνέοις, S., *El.*, 841; αὐτὸ ζῶν τιμᾶται, Xen., *Cyn.* i, 8.

<sup>2</sup> That the translation of Amphiaras in the form so frequently repeated by later authors (clearly following an important and influential original) appeared already in the Thebais of the epic cycle is taken by Welcker for granted, *Ep. Cycl.* ii, 362, 66. The view is intrinsically probable; but it can claim more definite grounds. Pi., *O.* vi, 12-17, tells us that after Amphiaras and his team had been swallowed up by the earth, Adrastus, over the seven funeral-pyres (which consumed the bodies of the Argives who had fallen in battle), said *πολλὴν σαρπηδὲς ἀββαλὸν ἔμαρ, ἀμφότερον, μάντιν ὅς ἀγαθὸν καὶ λοιπὸν μένενθαι*. That this famous lament was taken *de veris κυλικῇ Θηβαίῳ*, fr. 5 Kinkel, p. 12, is proved by the testimony of the ancient scholia on *πολλὴν καὶ*, quoting Asclepiades. This means that in the Thebais too, after the battle was over Amphiaras was not to be found either among the fallen or the survivors—was in fact translated. Pindar must have taken not merely the words of the lament of Adrastus but the whole situation that led up to these words, as he described it, from the Thebais. (Bethé, *Théb. Held.* [1891], p. 58 f., 94 ff., claims to prove that Pindar took nothing but the words *ἀμφότερον καὶ* from the Thebais which said nothing of the burial of those who had fallen before Thebes, and that Pindar added this last on his own account. *O.* vi, as well as *N.* ix, 28. But the "proofs" of this view, in itself highly improbable, on closer examination come to nothing.)—In the *Odyssey* it is said of Amph. *ἔλεν δ' ἐ Θέσφιν*, v 247; *θεῖον Ἀμφιάραον* 253. The expression "is naturally to be understood as merely implying disappearance from the earth" says Welcker, *Ep. C.* ii, 360. All we can claim is that the expression does not indeed prevent us from assuming that the story of the "disappearance" of Amph. was known also to the poet of these lines. Thus in the DC. of Soph. Antigone says twice over (ll. 1706, 1714) that Oedipus *ἔσται*, whereas he really was like Amphiaras translated alive (*ἔσονται κλέους ἑμαρτῆς* 1691).

<sup>3</sup> Pi., fr. 167. A.R. i, 37-64 (ζῶντι περ ἔτι . . . ἰδόντι νεκρῷ γαίῃ). Orph., *Arg.*, 171-5 (φαίνε . . . ζῶντι δ' ἐ φθιμένοισι πολεῖν ἐπὶ κρότωνι γαίῃ). Agatharch., p. 114, 38-43 M. (ὡς τῶν γῆν καταβόντων ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ ζῶντι). Schol. and Enst. on A 284, p. 1001.—In Ovid, *M.* xii, 312 ff., the translation becomes a metamorphosis (into a bird); and

often an ancient tradition myth has thus been replaced by a metamorphosis in later mythology. The connected story of Kaineos has been lost, and only a few fragments survive in Sch., A.R. i, 57; Sch., d 384 (the best known being the change of sex [cf. also Meisner, *A. coll. com.*, 345], the meaning of which is very dubious. Similar stories are told of Teiresias, Siphon (Ov., *M.* iv, 280), Iphis, and Ianthe, this last reminding us strikingly of a narrative in the Mahābhārata. Then frequently in many miracle tales, both heathen and Christian, to which far too much respect is paid by those who seek to find in them dark reminiscences of bisexual gods). No traces of a cult of Kaineos can be found.

<sup>1</sup> Althaimenes, son of Katreus (cf. *Rh. Mus.* 30, 432 f.). εὐδάμωνος δὲ γάμοις διπλοῖς [Apolld.,] iii, 2, 2, 3. Rationalistic version of Zeno of Rhodes ap. D.S., 5, 50, 4, who says, however, διπλοῖς γάμοις, and, in fact, we learn from B.M. ii, 352, that a political division (Ktiraia?) of the people of Rhodes was called Ἀλθαίμωνες, whose house ἐνέουσαν must have been Althaimenes.

<sup>2</sup> Amphilochoi appeared in person to sleepers at his dream-oracle at Mallos in Cilicia (Luc., *Philops.*, 30)—so also did his rival Mopsos, Plut., *DO.* 45, 434 D—as well as at his oracle in Akarnania, Aristid., i, p. 70 D. [30, 21 Keil]. Mopsos in Cilicia and Amphilochoi in Akarnania are alike in being among those δαίμονες which (ἀπαύειν δὲ τὴν νόσον νόσους σιάντων, Orig., c. Cels. iii, 34, pp. 293-4 L. The same author says of Amph. Mopsos and others, ἀδρανέουσι θεοποιῶντας θεούς, vii, 38, p. 63.

<sup>3</sup> Laodike, daughter of Priam [Apolld., *Epit.* v, 25; Nicol. *Prog.* ii, 1.—Aristides, who ἀφαιετο γύμνασι in M. Haemus and is now honoured ἀδρανέων τιμῇ, D.S. iv, 82, 6. (Cf. Hiller v. Gartr., *Panly-Wiss.* ii, 855, 23 ff.)

<sup>4</sup> The regular expression for these subterranean dwelling-places is *μήλας*. Luc. rhet. ap. Enst., *Od.*, 1387, 17 f. Hence also the sacrificial pits into which men lowered the offerings made to the deities of the lower world are called *μήλας* (Lob., *Ag.*, 830; *μήλας* = χέματα, Schol. Luc., *D. Mer.* 2, pp. 275 ff. Rabe). It was thought that by sinking the gifts in the ground they would immediately reach the dwelling-place of the spirit who lived there. The sacrificial chasm is itself the "chamber", *μήλας*, in which the spirit lives (in the form of a snake) and dwells.

<sup>5</sup> c 482 ff., φεγγὶ χαρσομένους Θερσίαν Τυρρῶνα, μέντοι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀφ' οὗς ἐκείνου εἴου· τῇ καὶ νεκρῶντι νόον νόον Περσεφόνην, εἴς τε νεκρῶντι καὶ δὲ καὶ δαίμονα. His φόνος being understood the most important and distinguishing feature of death is absent. His body, indeed, is destroyed and hence he is called νεκρῶντι ἕκω all the other dwellers in Hades, though it is still difficult to see how the *δαίμων* could remain without a body. It is highly probable that the idea of the continued existence of the consciousness of the famous over-recovered in Theban legend was derived by the poet from a popular tradition according to which Teiresias still gave proof of the cleanness of his wife by the oracles which he sent up from below the earth. In

Plutarch, *Pin.*, *DO.* 44, p. 484 C (as Nitzsch, *Ann.* *Od.* iii, p. 157, also reminds us). If we may argue from the context in which Plutarch speaks of him, this must have been an earth-oracle, i.e. an incubation-oracle. These stories like any have been related of Teiresias

such information the port of

the Nekyia may then have transformed and made use of for his own purposes. Str. 762 not without good ground connects these verses about Teiresias with the stories of Amphiaraios and Trophonios.

<sup>9</sup> The ancient site of the Oracle of Amphiaraios was near Thebes at the place (Kunpia) where according to the epic story he sank into the earth. Paus., 9, 8, 3, Str. 404. Even at the time of the Persian war the envoy of Mardonios inquired of him there, near Thebes, as Hdt. viii, 184, unmistakably says. (That the oracle lay in Theban territory is shown also by the addition of the words, otherwise pointless, *Θεβαίων αἶθρι* *Ἰφικῶν παρδενδῶν αἰθροῖ*. A similar rule is found at the temple of Herakles in Erythrai which may be approached by Thracian women but not by Erythraean women (Paus., 7, 3, 7-8); and in the same way the Lampsakenei were excluded from the funeral games of Kallitades on the Chersonnesos; Hdt. vi, 38.) Oropos also claimed to harbour Amphiaraios under its soil; Sch. Pi., G. vi, 18, 21-3; differently in Paus., 1, 34, 2-4. But the oracle must have been moved there afterwards—hardly before the end of the fifth century (*περίηλθεν*, Str. 404): to suppose that it had always been confined to Oropos is contrary to all the traditional evidence.

<sup>10</sup> Those who wished to inquire of his oracle offered by night to Trophonios, before going down into the cave, a ram, sacrificing it in a pit (*βύσσος*): Paus., 9, 39, 8; to Amphiaraios, after a considerable fast (Philon., V.A., 2, 37, pp. 76, 19 ff. K.) and the provision of a *καλὸν*, the inquirer offered a ram upon the fleece of which he lay down to sleep (Paus., 1, 34, 5).—Ceanthen cum pede terram percussisset verum ex Epigonis (prob. of Soph.) ferunt dixisse: audias haec, Amphiaraios, sub terram abdit? Cic., F.D. ii, 60. The gesture also must have been borrowed from the same scene in the *Teiresias*. It was thus customary to knock on the ground in calling upon A., as in the case of other *καταχθόνιοι* (*Ἀμφικῶπας γῆναι* occurs as late as P. Mag. Par. 1446 f. W.): 1568; cf. Paus., 8, 15, 3. Cf. also Nagchb., Nachh. Thesol., 102, 214. Skedasos in Sparta γῆναι κύματι δακτύλῳ τῇ *Ἐρμῇ*, Plin., A.N. 3, p. 774 B. In his grief for the loss of his daughter Herodes Atticus threw himself on the ground τῇ γῆναι αἶμα καὶ ποῦν τὴν οὐκ ἀνέστην, καὶ αὖτις: τὴν οὐκ ἀνέστην; Philostr., V.S. 2, 1, 10. Pythagoras ἔσται σπονδῶν τῇ γῆναι ἀπαύσας παρῆγγυλον, Lamb., VP. 156.

<sup>11</sup> That the dream-oracle of Trophonios had a much older influence is implied by the story of the inquiry made of it by the *Βασιλεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος* and *Θαλασπῶν* in Phot. (Suid.) *ἀκούειν καὶ λαμβάνει*.

<sup>12</sup> Trophonios himself was supposed to appear in the cave at Lebadeia. The inquirer goes down to it *καὶ ἐκκεῖθεν ἐννομεύσθαι τῷ βασιλεὶ* (Max. Tyr. 14, 2, p. 248 R.); indications were sought from *τίσιν αὖ τῇ γῆναι κενόθεν εἰσέρχεται*;

as, 9, 36, 6. Soon, the discoverer o

cult, had after entering the *παρῆναι* met Trophonios himself in person, τῇ *ἀποπύλλῳ* . . . *ἐκκεῖθεν παρὰ τοῦ Τροφῶνιου φασὶ* (Paus. 9, 40, 2). He dwells and is visible in the oracular caverns: Orig., *Cels.* iii, 34, pp. 283-4 L. vii, 33, p. 33; Aristid. i, p. 76 D. (38, 31 Keil). Even the stupidly rationalizing account of Troph. in Schol. Ar., *Nub.* 908, p. 190 Ruth., Sch. Lac., *DM.* iii, Coem. ad Greg. Nas. p. 184 (Clarke, p. 32) (Eudoc., *Vol.*, p. 852, 8)—implies the bodily presence of an *ἐννομεύσας* *ἐννομεύς* in the cave of Trophonios. Lucian, too, shows that this was the popular impression (*DM.* iii, 2) by his carious satiric fiction that whereas Troph. himself was in Hades (to which acc. to *Neyyom.* 23 the cave of Trophonios was only an



entrance) *vē* *ēides* *phronon* of Trophonios *χρῆ* *ἐν* *Βοιωτίᾳ*. Thus the visitor expected to meet Trophonios there in his divine shape, as Amphiaraus puts it in a similar case with great simplicity and directness, B. 3: *ibi* (*Argis in Epiro*) *Iovis templum hyphionis* (irretrievably corrupt: *Trophonios* absurdly Dekur; *Typhoniis*, *Typhonis* others not much better) *unde eat ad inferos descendens ad tollendas sortes*; in quo loco dicuntur ii qui descendunt Iovem ipsum videre. Otherwise, Tr. was said to inhabit the cave in the shape of a snake as is so frequently the case with earth-deities. Not only are snakes sacred to him as to Asklepios (Paus. 9, 39, 3) and live in his cave (to propitiate them people take honey-cakes down with them) but he himself is present in the form of a snake: *ἔφες* *ἐν* *ᾧ* *μυροειδέες*, Schol. Ar., *Nub.* 508: cf. Suidas *Τροφῳεύς*. It was this personal contact between the god and the inquirer which specially distinguished the oracle of Tr. *μυρον δαίμων* (*ἐν* *μυροειδῇ*) *ἐν* *ὀρεσὶ* *χρῆ* *τοῦ* *χρημῶντος*. Philostr., *Vi.* 6, 19, p. 335, 30 K. Of course, many only heard without seeing: *τῆς* *καὶ* *εἴδης* *καὶ* *ἄλλος* *ἤκουον*, Paus. 9, 39, 11. But it was the god they heard.

<sup>21</sup> Spreading of Zalmoxis among the Getae (cf. Str. 297 f.; 762: Hdt. iv. 95-6. *E.V.* *Ζάλαξ*), *Μορμῶς* in Cilicia. *Amphilochoos* in Akarnania, *Amphiarachos* and *Trophonios*—in fact, all of these daimones who had oracles of Incubation—Or. (*Cels.* iii. 34, p. 283-4 L.) says: they have temples and *δυσλῆστα* as *δαίμονες* *ὅν* *οἱ* *ἴσμεν* *ἰατρῶντες* *ἐν* *τῆς* *κόρης*, *ἐν* . . . *ἀποκρίνται*. They dwell within this *ἐν* *νευλοχουμένης* *κόρης*, vii. 35 (pp. 53-4 L.), cf. iii. 35 fm. In that place and only there are such daimones visible. *Cels.* vii. 35 (p. 53 L.), of the temples of Amph., Troph., *Μορμῶς*: *ἔστι* *ἐν* *ἐκείνῃ* *ἀνθρωποειδῆς* *θεομορφία* *θεῶς* *καὶ* *οὐ* *φανερόμενος* *ἀλλὰ* *καὶ* *ἀφανής*. . . *ἀφανὲς* *τῆς* *εἰδὸς* *οὐδὲ* *ἐμφανέμενος*. . . *ἀλλ'* *ἐν* *ταῖς* *βουλαῖς* *ὁμολογῶν* (and so ever present there). Aristid. i. p. 78 Di. [38, 21 K.], *Ἀμφιάρους* *καὶ* *Τροφῳέως* *ἐν* *Βοιωτίᾳ* *καὶ* *Ἀμφιλόχου* *ἐν* *Αἰτωλίᾳ* *χρησσομένης* *καὶ* *φανερώς*. On the extension beyond its original home of the cult of such an Incubation-deity localization in a single spot was of course relaxed. It was either disputed where his permanent habitation really was (as in the case of Amph.), or else the god gradually ceased to be bound to any one place, though still bound to certain places in the sense that he could appear only there, and not anywhere he chose. Such is the case with Asklepios and with various other daimones equally bound originally to a single spot, who then *ἐντεφάνεον*, *ἀντεφάνεον*, in certain other temples as well (cf. for example, the account of the *ἐντεφάνεος* of Machaon and Podalirios in Admetia given by Marin., *V. Procl.* 32; cf. Suid. *Ἐντεφάνεος*, from Damascius, *V. Isid.*). But when inquiries are made of a god by Incubation the god must always appear in person; if he is absent no oracle can be given. See the story of Amphiaraus in Flut. *DO.* 5, p. 412 A. In the records of miracles of healing found in Epidaurion the god himself regularly comes to the sleeper in the *ἴδιον* (or else in the form of a snake *Ἐφ.* *Ἀργ.* '83, p. 215 f., ll. 113-19), sometimes accompanied by his *ἐντεφάνης* (the Asklepiadai), cf. *Ἐφ.* *Ἀργ.* '85, p. 17 ff., ll. 36 ff., 117 f. In the old miracle of Aristagora of Troezen (*Ἐφ.* *Ἀργ.* '85, 18, l. 10 ff.) reported already by Hippolyte of Rhagion (which there — no reason to doubt) at first only "the sons of the god" appeared to the sick woman *οὐκ* *ἐντεφάνεον* *ἀλλὰ* *ἐν* *ἑνδεκάτῃ* *ἡμέρᾳ*. Only in the following night did Asklepios himself appear to her *ἐν* *ἰδίῳ* *ᾧ* *ἑνδεκάτῃ*. Everywhere it is implied that dream-healing can only take place through personal action of the god (cf. Ar., *Phut.*);

later by the advice, at least, of the god, personally appearing to the patient (see Zacher, *Herms*, xxi, 472 f.); and this presumption is explained by the fact that originally Incubation could only take place at the actual spot where the god (or Hero) had his permanent abode.

<sup>13</sup> The *ἀνδροφάγος* of the Dodonian Zeus the *Ἐλλας ἀνδροφάγος* *ῥεπειδων*, II 234 f., were explained by some already in antiquity as priests of an Incubation oracle (Eust., II, p. 1057, 84 ff.), Weicker agreeing with them, *Kl. Sch.* iii, 90 f. This view is founded solely on the adj. *ῥεπειδων*, which is not, however, to be separated from *ἀνδροφάγος*. But since *ἀνδροφάγος* can have no connexion with Incubation neither then can *ῥεπειδων*. Both epithets refer obviously to the special severity and simplicity of the life of the *Ἐλλας*, the (ritual) reason for which it is true we do not know and have no means of guessing.

<sup>14</sup> It remains indeed impossible to determine what moved the epic to recognise in the Boeotian cave-daimon the *Argive* seer Amphiaraus (even during his life-time an adept in the incubation-mantic art acc. to Paus. 2, 13, 7; cf. Did. in *Gp.* 2, 35, 8, p. 73, 14 ff. Beekh.), or why the heroized god Amphiaraus was turned into an Argive and made a member of the prophetic family of Melampus otherwise the loss of the Illocotian seems; or, finally, why he was brought to Boeotia as an enemy and then made to dwell for ever in that hostile and alien land.

<sup>15</sup> Henry the Fowler in Sudemerberg; Kuhn and Schwartz, *Nordd. Sag.*, p. 185. The other examples in Grimm, ch. xxxii.—G. Voigt in Sybel's *Aist. Zeits.* xxvi (1871), pp. 131-87, shows in his most lucid account that it was not originally Frederick Barbarossa but Frederick II whom the legend represented as not dead but "lost" and to whom the expectation referred that he would come again some day. From the fifteenth century the story begins to appear that he was dwelling in Kyffhäuser (or in a cave in the rocks near Kaiserslautern); the name of Barbarossa does not appear till the sixteenth century, and then gradually predominates. But how it came about that from a definite moment onwards the translated emperor was thought of as living on in a hollow mountain is by no means clear from the written documents alone or from the critical study of the evolution of the legend. Suddenly and without intermediate steps the story assumes this shape, and it can hardly be accounted for except on the view that it arose from the combination of the Frederick legend with already existing Sagastories of translated Heroes or gods (as Voigt also suggests, p. 160).

<sup>16</sup> Grimm, pp. 959-61. Simrock, *D. Myth.*, p. 144.—How easily similar legends can appear spontaneously among different peoples without interconnexion appears from the fact that translation legends are also found not only in Greece but in distant Mexico; see Müller, *Gesch. am. Urrel.* 382. Holy men who have "vanished" and are not dead, but live on in the depths of mountain caves, and are expected one day to reappear on earth, occur in the legends of Mohammedan peoples of the East: A. v. Kremer, *Culture. Straßf. Geb. Islam*, 50; *Gesch. Idem Islam*, 325 f., 378.

<sup>17</sup> *Δις Τραπεζίας* Insc. from Lebadeia, Meister, *Bac. Insc.* 423 (GDI. I, p. 143); otherwise only *Τραπεζίας* (n. 407, 414, *καρβάρ* *ἐν Τραπεζίας* BCH. '90, p. 21). *Τραπεζία* (n. 413); and also by side occur *τὴ Δι τὴ Βαμλῆς καὶ τὴ Τραπεζία*, etc. (n. 425, 429, 430). *Διονῆος ἐντροφίῳ κατὰ ῥαπὸν διὰς Τραπεζίας* Insc. from Lebadeia in Stephanii *Reise d. Geg. nörd. Grichen*, No. 47. Insc. from Leb. IG Sept. I, 3077 (1st-2nd cent. A.D.)—Str. 414: *Ἀββῆσις ἐν τῇ διὰς Τραπεζίας παλαιῇ ἑστῇ.*

Liv. 45, 27, 8, Labadiæ templum Iovis Trophonii adiit. Oha. 80 (= 110) Labadiæ Eutychides in templum Iovis Trophonii degressus—. *diæ nartior* is the name given to the oracle of Tr. in Phot. also and Hesych. *Ἀδελία*.

<sup>88</sup> *Διὸς Ἀμφιαράου ἱερὸν* (at Oropos): [Dicæarch.] *Diæscr. Gr.* i, § 6 (p. 100 M.). Even Hyperides in the speech for Euxenippus refers throughout to Amph. at Oropos as a god. Amph. in Or. *ἡ δὲ δὲ* (1st-2nd cent. B.C.): *IGS.* i, 3488; 412; *GIG.* 1370a, 25, 30, 52. Liv. 45, 27, 10 (in Oropos) pro deo vains antiquis colitur. Cic. *Div.* i, 68: Amphiaræum sic honoravit fama Græciæ, deus ut haberetur. Plutarch also, speaking of the embassy sent by Mardonios to the ancient Theban oracle, calls Amph. *θεός*: *DO.* 5, p. 412 A. Acc. to Paus. i, 34, 2, however, Amph. was first honoured as a god in Oropos.

<sup>89</sup> Origen is expressing it in his own way, but he is quite right in principle when he distinguishes the local gods remaining in the countryside from the gods of Olympus, *Græ.* lii, 35 B.: *μετὰ τῶν θεῶν ἐμμένων καὶ εὐνοῦν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀποκαταμένον, καὶ τῶν ἀνταρτίων οὗ θεῶν καὶ ἐκείνων τῶν καὶ θεῶν καὶ ἀνταρτίων*. He says of Asklepios, 5, 2 (p. 160 L.), *θεὸς γὰρ ἐστὶν οὗτος καὶ λατρεῖται ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἀνταρτίων ὡς καὶ τοῦ εὐνοῦν καὶ θεῶν*.

<sup>90</sup> *Διὸς πύλαις ἀμάρτυς*. The word implies quite as much familiar conversation as well as general intimacy with Zeus. The obscure *ἀμάρτυς* need not be considered here. In any case it is to be taken closely with *παύλας*, next to which it stands, and not with *Διὸς π. ἀμάρτυς* (as many even ancient writers have done).

<sup>91</sup> Intercourse of Minos with Zeus in the cave: [Pl.] *Mia.* 319 E. (whence Str. 782), Ephorus ap. Str. 476; (from Eph. also Nic. Dam. ap. Stob. *Fl.* iv, 2, 25, p. 161 H.). V.M. i, 2, ext. 1. Here the position of the cave is as a rule not precisely stated. But the Idæan cave is generally meant and Max. Tyr. definitely refers to this one as the place where Minos met Zeus, 38, 2 (p. 221 R.).

<sup>92</sup> Birth of Zeus in the cave: *Alphab. de spec. Hes.* TA. 481 S. Thence his mother bore him *ἐκ Ἀδάρης* 482 (cf. 477), which would be near Ida:—*ἐκ Ἰδῆς* Schömann. And, at any rate, the cave on Mt. Dikte was the generally reputed place of Zeus' birth: [Apoll.] i, 1, 6. D.S. 5, 70, 6; Mela 2, 113; D.H. 2, 61 (who also makes Minos visit Zeus there). At Praesos *τὸ καὶ ἀνταρτίων Διὸς ἱερὸν*: Str. 472-B. Others, indeed, mention Ida as the place of the birth of Zeus: D.S. 5, 70, 2, 4; A.R. iii, 134. Both the holy caves are thus continually rivals; but it appears that the legend of the birth of Zeus was principally localised at the Diktæan cave, that of his intercourse with Minos chiefy at Kynos.

Kynos, li, 1. . . .

<sup>93</sup> Max. Tyr. 16, 1 (cf. 36, 5; prob. from Max. only, Theod. Met. *Atic.* c. 90, p. 380 M.). Cf. *RA. Mus.* 35, 1611. Max. speaks of the cave of Diktæan Zeus, perhaps only incorrectly and by oversight. It would be to Ida rather and its cave which rose above Kynos, the home of Epitærides, that the legend would make him go on pilgrimage. So, too, D.L. viii, 1, 3, of Pythagoras, *ἐκ Κρήνης εἰς Ἐπιταρίδην ἀνταρτίων εἰς τὴν Ἰδῆαν δρυῖν*. Pyth. in the Idæan cave, Porph., *VP.* 17.

<sup>94</sup> Schol. Plat., *Lag.* i, introd. (p. 372 Herm.) and *Lag.* 628 B, see Lob. *Ag.* 1121. (*Διὸς Ἰδῆας πύλαις*, Eur., *Cycl.* fr. 472, 10 N.) Recently the Idæan cave of Zeus has been rediscovered high up in the mountains, a day's journey from Kynos (Fadéolus, *Atic. Met.*, vol. 2, 88 E.). Remains of votive offerings of antiquity have been

found, but only before the entrance to the cave *ἐν τῇ σπηλῇ τοῦ Διὸς* (where Thphr. had already remarked the liba, *HP.* 3, 3, 4); inside the cave, which, like a vaulted tomb, consisted of two chambers, only traces of the cult from Roman times were found. It seems from this that the sacrificial ritual of the previous period did not reach further than the entrance of the cave (as was the case also at the temple of Troph. at Lebadeia); while the interior of the cave as the seat of the god himself was only entered by Mystai and priests (the birth-chamber was not to be approached at all: *Bolos*, ap. *Ant. Lib.* 19).

<sup>10</sup> Porph., *VP.* 17, p. 25 N.: αἱ δὲ τὸ ἱεῖον ἀνελθόντες ἄνθρωποι καταβὰς ἔμεινον μέλαινα τὰς κοιλότητας τοῖς ἑσπέραις (cf. Nauck on S., *OG.* 483) ἔμεινον ἐστὶ ἰδιόφυτοι καὶ καθήκοντες τῇ Διὶ, τὰς νεοφροσύνων αἰνῶν κατ' ἐπὶ θένοντες ἱερότατοι. The historical truth of the story of Pyth.'s visit to the cave need not be discussed here, but we may assume the credibility of the details given of the cult of Zeus in the cave and the customary ceremonial of pilgrimage to it. (The story comes from relatively good sources, *Gr. Roman.* p. 254.)—The long time spent in the cave (i.e. in the wide and lofty outer chamber) has its companion picture in what Str. 649 says of *Χερώνιον* at Acharaka, *Pin.*, *Gr. Soc.* 21, 590 D., of the cave of Trophonios. It was necessary also to spend several days in the *οἶκος Διὸς* *δυσκοῦ* καὶ Τύχης in preparation for the descent into the cave: *Paus.* 9, 39, 3. The (to Zeus) *εὐφροσύνη* κατ' ἐπὶ θένοντες has nothing to do with the Korymbant *εὐφροσύνη* (see Hüller, *Hermes.* 21, 365). What is meant is in any case a *lectisternium*: thus in Athens it was usual to καλεῖν εὐφροσύνην τῇ Πλούτῳ, *CIA.* ii, 946-30; to Asklepios (*CIA.* ii, 483b 11); to Attis, *CIA.* ii, 822; (in Cos at the *ἐσπερὰς* of Herakles, *Ins. Cos* 36b, 22), etc. The *θένοντες* (*εὐφροσύνη* *θένοντες* δὲ for a goddess *CIA.* ii, 624, 9, 10) appearing instead of a καλεῖν is possibly in accordance with ancient ritual. Thus in the so-called feasts of the dead in ancient times the Hero is represented on a throne while later he reclines on the κλῆμα. Thus in Rome besides *lectisternia* we sometimes have *stibisternia* especially for female deities: *Comm. Iud. Sacr.*, I, 71; 101; 138 (*Deasau*, *R.* 1, p. 282; *CIL.* vi, 52) and elsewhere.

<sup>11</sup> Acc. to Ennius, *Enl.* 73 Vahl. (ap. Lactant., I, 11, and ap. Min. Fel. xxi, 1) Euhemerus spoke of the grave of Zeus. Call., *ἀ. φω.* B. 8, clearly attacks the fable of Zeus' grave in Crete. It seems to me very probable that Euh. had taken up the story as one that evidently suited his cheap pragmatismal interpretation of myths and had introduced it into literature. It would be Euh. then whom Call., loc. cit., was attacking as he did elsewhere the *γέγονε* *ἑλπίς* and his *ἄλκιμα βελία* (*fr.* 84).

<sup>12</sup> The grave of Zeus in Crete is spoken of without exact specification of the place by Call., loc. cit., Cic., *ND.* iii, 53; *D.S.* 3, 61, 2; *Mela* ii, 112; *Luc.*, *Tim.* 6, *J. Fr.* 43, *Sacr.* 10, *D. Conc.* 6; *Min.* xxi, 8; *Firm.*, *Err. Prof. Rel.* vii, 6. Euhemerus ap. Min. xxi, 1, speaks of the *Dictaei Iovis sepulcrum* obviously inexactly, for acc. to Lact. I, 11, he made the grave in oppido Cnossus far from Mt. Dicta. Even there he means not "in" but "near" Knossos, i.e. on Mt. Ida. For the fact that it was on Mt. Ida we have the testimony of Varro *de isoraliis* ap. Solin. II, p. 81, 12-15 Momms. Finally, the situation of the grave within the Idalian cave is clear from Porph., *VP.* 17, p. 25 N.

<sup>13</sup> Hence the story of the grave of Zeus (when not denied outright as by Call.) was allegorized: *Coloss* hinted at *εὐφροσύνη* *δυσκοῦ*; *Or.*, *Col.* II, 48, p. 307 L.; cf. Philostr., *VS.* p. 76, 15 B. K.

<sup>20</sup> Examples are frequent in the mythology of Oriental, and generally but not exclusively Semitic, peoples. It is generally "Kronos" who is buried (cf. Mayer, *Myth. Lex.* II, 1487 ff.); at other times Asarte, Adonis, the Phrygian Attis, "Herakles," and others. Cf. also the stories of the Heroes sleeping eternally in Sardinia (*RA. Mus.* 33, 157 ff.; 37, 463 ff.); and of Krugos and the other *Syma thei* (or *thei dyptei*? *JHS.* 10, 57, 55) who "were made immortal" on Mt. Krugos in Lykia (St. Byz. *Krugos*); they, too, were thought of as sleeping, and not "dead", as Eust. on D.P. 847 expresses it.

<sup>21</sup> Varro, *LL.* vii, 17, p. 124 Sp.<sup>a</sup>, compares the shape of the Omphalos with a *Massurus*, i.e. with one of the vaulted buildings which used to be called *treasuries*, but which have now been undoubtedly proved to be really vaulted graves. On a smaller scale (as vase paintings show) the *omphalés* had the shape generally given to the dwelling-places made for the spirits of the departed who dwell below the earth, as well as that of the abodes of other earth-spirits: even the *χάμα γὰρ* over the cavern of Trophonica was of this shape. Paus. 9, 39, 10. Was this dome-shape especially connected with earth-spirits who had mantic powers? The Delphic "omphalos" was even used as a technical expression to describe this "tholos" shape: thus the *omphaloi* (οἱ φιδῶν) καὶ τῶν βαλυσίων οἱ θόλοι παρήμενοι, *Alb.* 501 D. P. (cf. Hesych, *Βαλυσιονοφύλων*, *AB.* 225, 6). It was called *omphalós* *Tῆς* because sacred to the earth-goddess. It was later interpreted "navel", i.e. middle point of the earth, by mistake, and then fabulous accounts made up to explain this.

<sup>22</sup> Modern writers have adopted the view that Dionysos was buried under the Omphalos: e.g. Enmann, *Kypros u. Ussip. Apéro.*, S. Petersburg, 1886, p. 47 ff. But closer examination shows that all that we have good authority for is that the *omphalés* was *Pythionis tumulus* (Varro, *LL.* vii, 17, p. 124 Sp.), *τάφος τοῦ Πύθωνος* (Hesych. s. *Τάφης Πυθός*). *Dionysos*, on the other hand, was buried at Delphi, *παρὰ τὴν Ἀνέλλωσαν τὴν χερσὶν* (Philochoros ap. Sync. 307, 4 ff. Di.; *Eus. Arm.* = *Hier. Chr.*, pp. 44-5 Sch.; *Malal.*, p. 45, 7 Di.; from *Africanus* acc. to *Gelzer, Afnc.* i, 132 f.), i.e. he was buried i *ἔθρονος* (cf. Paus. 10, 24, 5), or, what comes to the same thing, *παρὰ τὴν χαρτερήνους* (*Fla.*, *Is. et O.* 35, 365 A.), *παρὰ τὴν τριπόδα* (*Call.* ap. *Tr. Lyc.* 206; cf. *EM.* *Δελφός*). The tripod stood in the *Adyton* (*D.S.* 16, 28; *Str.* 419; cf. *Hdt.* vi, 140). Whether the *omphalés* also stood in the *Adyton* (or whether as some think, in the *Cella* of the Temple) cannot be made out for certain though it seems probable. No one, however, made the grave of Dionysos under the Omphalos except Tat., *Gr.* viii, p. 40 Ott. [p. 9, 16 ff. Schw.]: *ὁ ομφαλὸς τάφος ἐστὶ Διονύσου*, and the statement of this very careless pamphleteer cannot stand against the witness of Varro, etc. It is plain that Tatian confused the two "graves", as Ryg. 140 and Serv. (*A.* iii, 92; *III.* 390; vi, 347) did, reversing the process and making the tripod into the grave of the Python. The real tradition knew, besides the grave of Dionysos near the tripod, the grave of Python in the Omphalos of his mother Gaia. This was never seriously denied; doubt might rather have been believed to linger over the question, who then was preserved in the tripod? Porph., *VP.* 16, p. 28, 6 ff. N., says that it was Apollo himself, or possibly as Apollo the son of Sileus. This absurdity seems to go back to Enchiridion (cf. *Minne*, xxi, 1; worthless is *Fulgentius Exposit.*, 3, p. 172, 3 ff. *Heintz*), and may be merely a frivolous jest. (Too much respect is paid to this tradition by K. O. Müller, *Introd. to Select. Myth.*, p. 246.)

<sup>22</sup> That the snake killed by Apollo was the guardian of the old *μαρτυρίαν γένους* we have on unimpeachable authority (testim. collected by Th. Schreiber, *Apollo Pythionius*, p. 3): esp. Eur., *IT.* 1245 ff. Call., fr. 384; *nonnal* acc. to Paus. 10. 8. 6, who say that (*τὸν Πάθοντο*) *ταὶ τῷ μαρτυρίᾳ φέλαται ἐπὶ τῆς νεφέλης κτλ.* That the struggle was for the oracle is shown briefly and plainly by [Apollod.] 1. 4. 1. 3: *ὡς δὲ ἐφραρυῶν τὸ μαρτυρίαν Πάθοντο ἐφίε δαίμονες αὐτὸς* (*Ἀνδράλῃα*) *καρπιδιὲρ ἐνὶ τῷ χόρῳ* (the oracular cleft), *νοῦτον δαίμον τὸ μαρτυρίαν παραλαμβάνειν.* The snake form is proper to earth-spirits, and, as earth-spirits always have mantic power, to oracle-spirits. Trophonios appeared as a snake and so did Asklepios. There can be no doubt that the Delphian *Ἰδαίον* is the embodiment of the pre-Apolline oracle-daimon. Thus Hesych. says exactly *Πάθον δαιμόνιον μαρτυρίαν* (elaborated in Hyg. 140). Cf. *Act.* 16<sup>18</sup>—"Supporters of the doctrine of the Greek "religion of Nature" and even in the legend of Apollo's fight with the snake an allegorical version of a physical fact tending to become an ethical one. I cannot regard such an allegory as primitive.

<sup>23</sup> An instructive parallel may be added. In [Clem.] *Hom.* 8. 22. p. 70, 32 Lag., there is mention of a *grave* of Plouton ἐν τῇ Ἀχραινῇ λίμνῃ. This may be explained as follows. At Hermionae Hades under the name of Klymenos was honoured together with Demeter Ἰδωσία and Kore. Pausanias knew well that Klymenos was a titular name (*τίτλημα*) of Hades (2. 35. 9), but his rejection of the opinion that Klymenos was a man from Argos who had come to Hermionae (as founder of the Chthonic cult) shows that this was the general view. Behind the temple of Chthonia lay *χαρπὶς ἐκαλεῖσθαι Ἑρμῶνις τὸ μὲν Κλυμένον, τὸ δὲ Πλούτωνος, τὸ τρίτον δὲ αὐτῶν λίμνην Ἀχραινῆν.* At this *λίμνη Ἀχραινῆ* it is possible that a *grave* of Hades, transformed into the Hero Klymenos, may have been shown. This Clemens referred to, but instead of Klymenos or Hades used inaccurately the name more familiar to later times, Plouton.

<sup>24</sup> *καὶ δ' ἐν Ἀθήνῃς* *εἴσω, ἐφ' ἐνὶ οἴκῳ νηῶ.* These words may be kept in mind in order to explain the mysterious narrative in Hesiod *Tk.* 987 ff. of Phaethon whom Apollodite ἀπ' ἀκραφάμενυ καὶ μὲν ζαθέως ἐν ἡφαίᾳ ἐμπαύλας μέγας κοίφασατο, δαίμονα δ' ἔσεν. Aphr. in fact, "translated" Phaethon alive and made him immortal—within her own temple just as Athens had Erechtheus. Perhaps Phaethon was translated beneath the ground under the temple—the adj. *μέγας* may mean this. *θεοὶ μέγας* are those that rule over the *μεγὰς* of a house, e.g. over the *θάλαμα* as the innermost chamber; thus Ἀφροδίτη *μεγὰς* (Ael., *H.A.* x. 34). *Ἀπὸ μεγάς* (Plu. ap. Eux., *PE.* iii. 1. 8. p. 84 c.). A goddess called simply *Μεγὰς*, ina. fr. Myulena, *GDI.* 285. But *μέγας* could also mean dwellers in the depths of the earth (*μεγὰρ χθονὸς εὐρυθεῖης*, Hes., *TA.* 119; more commonly in the plural *μεγὰρ χθονός*, see Markland on Eur., *Sup.* 545; cf. *Ἄϊδος μεγάς*, *AP.* vii. 215, 8 (Archias); also *μεγάς ἐσθνήων*, *Ἀθανῶν* under the earth, *Εἰργ.* *Gr.* 241 a, 18; 858 a; *Ἀθ. Mus.* 34, 192). Thus (of the Erinyes) Orph. *H.* 69, 3, *μέγας, ἐπὶ καίθεσσι οἴκῃ* *ἔχουσιν ἄνθρωποι ἐν φερόντι*. Phot. 274, 18, *μεγέσθων γὰρ Ἄϊδος, Ἀΐδος.*

<sup>25</sup> That the *μὲν* of line 550 refers to Erechtheus and not Athens is shown by the context: Schol. BL. states it expressly. Athens cannot have been intended to accept the offering of bulls and rams, *βόλια τῇ Ἀθηνῇ θύωνται.* And, in fact, cows, not bulls, were offered to Athens; cf. P. Stengel, *quæst. sacrae*, p. 4-5, Berl. 1879.

<sup>26</sup> See Wachsmuth, *Ber. sachs. Ges. Wiss.*, p. 390 B., 1887.



\**Yamr#ides*: [Apollo.] S. 15. 8. 5-6; Hyg. 238 (Phanodemos ap. Suid. *Ilap#inos* arbitrarily identifies the \**Yamr#ides* with the \**Y#des* or daughters of Erechtheus. So also [Dem.] 90, 27). This idea implies a form of the story in which Hyak. did not die while still a boy or a half-grown youth as in the metamorphosis version.—That the figure of Hyakinthos on the sculpture at Amyklai had a beard is expressly mentioned by Paus. 3, 19, 4, as conflicting with the fresh youthfulness of Hyakinthos as Nikias (second half fourth century) with reference to the love-story had represented him in his famous picture (*παρθ#β#τος* \**Y#des*, Nic., Th. 906). Paus. § 5, expressly raises a doubt as to the truth of the traditional fable about H.'s death.

<sup>12</sup> *παρ τ#ς το#ς* \**Αρ#λλ#ουος θ#νας*, Paus. 3, 19, 3. More than once it is stated that at a particular festival sacrifice to the Hero preceded that to the god (cf. Wassner, *de Aeronum* ap. Gr. *calist.* p. 48 ff.). Probably the reason in all such cases is that the cult of the "Hero" (or god turned Hero) is older in that particular spot than the worship of the god whose cult had only been adopted there at a later time. Thus in Plataea at the Daidalis sacrifice was made to Leto before Hera (*παρδ#ρ#δας*): Plu. ap. Euse., *P.E.* iii, 84 C: there it is quite evident that the cult of Hera was adopted later. Perhaps even the form of the word \**Y#des* implies that it was the name of an ancient deity worshipped already by the pre-Greek inhabitants of the Peloponnese. See Kretschmer, *Einl. in Griech. gr.* 5Pr. 402-5.

<sup>13</sup> \**Yacir#p* *δ#ν#λλ#ουος*, Paus. 3, 19, 3.

<sup>14</sup> The second day of the festival was sacred to Apollo and not to Hyakinthos: *τ#ν θ#ερ #δ#ουος* Ath. 139 E. (It has been rightly said that this was when the *sc#des* mentioned by Xen., *H.G.* 4, 5, 11, must have been sung.) It is impossible to deny, with Unger, *Philol.* 37, 30, the cheerful character of this second day of the festival as described by Polykrates ap. Ath. 139 E, F. It is true that Didymus (whose words Athenaeus is quoting) begins in a way (139 D) that might lead one to suppose that all three days of the *τ#ν* \**Yamr#ides* *θ#ν#ς* *δ#δ* *τ#ς* *α#νδ#ρος* *τ#ς* *περδ#ρ#νας* (*Yacir#p*?) *επ#ρ* *τ#ς* \**Y#des* were passed in gloom without festivity, crowns, feasting, or Pagan, etc. But he relates himself afterwards in his description of the second day of the festival, at which not merely at the performances but at the sacrifice and the banquetings festivity reigns supreme. We can only suppose that his language at the beginning is inaccurate, and that he means what he says of the solemnity of the occasion "because of the mourning for Hyakinthos" to be taken as limited like the mourning itself to the first day of the feast.

<sup>15</sup> Hesych. *Πολ#β#ου* \**θ#δ#ς τ#ς* *δ#ν* \**δ#ν#ου* *π#ρ* \**Αρ#ρ#μ#ς*, *δ#ν# δ#* *δ#λλ#ου* *Κ#ν#*. Cf. K. O. M#ller, *Dorians*, i, 381 (\**Αρ#ρ#μ#ς* there probably as *Mekate*).

<sup>16</sup> Another view of the combined worship of Apollo and Hyakinthos at Amyklai is taken by Eumann, *Kypros*, etc., 35. In this as elsewhere he relies on certain opinions adopted from H. D. M#ller's mythological writings, which must be approved of in general before they can be found enlightening as applied to any particular case.

<sup>17</sup> As happened in the case of Hyakinthos, too, in the scene represented on the Amyklai altar, Paus. 3, 19, though nothing can be deduced from this as to his original nature.

<sup>18</sup> The oracular activity of Asklepios plays a subordinate part in the usual accounts of him in comparison with his powers of healing. But originally they were closely united (as was usually the case with earth spirits). Apollodorus v. *θε#ω* ap. Macrobi. 1, 20, 4, puts it dis-



tinctly: scribit quod Aesculapius divinationibus et auguriis paruit. Ceterum talis Asklepios εἰσαγροῦντα καὶ τὰ μάλιστα προλήγοντα ἔλατ νόστον ἀνακαταστάναι δαυτῷ. *Or., Cels.* iii, 3, pp. 255-6 L.

<sup>10</sup> See Appendix I.

<sup>11</sup> Cicero quoting the pragmatist "theologoi" says, *N.D.* iii, 57, Aesculapius (the second one) fulvino percontans dicitur humatus esse Cynouris (the district of Sparta? From a similar source come *Clem. Al., Protr.* ii, p. 28 P.; *Lyd., Mens.* iv, 80, p. 164 Wessach); of the third Ask., *Cic.* § 57 says: cuius in Arcadia non longe a Lusco flumine sepulcrum et lucus ostenditur. Even the temple of Asklepios in Epidaurus was regarded by many as the place of his grave if we are to believe the *Clementine Rom.* v, 21. *Rec.* x, 24 (sepulcrum demonstratur in Epidauru Aesculapil).

<sup>12</sup> The chthonic character of Asklepios is shown specially by the fact that not only are snakes sacred and dedicated to him but that he himself was actually thought of as a snake (cf. Welcker, *Götterl.* ii, 734). *ἔφατ, Γῆς καὶ αἰὲς* (*Hdt.* i, 78); deities who dwell in the earth, and afterwards "Heroes" (in the later sense), appear in the form of snakes as *χθοναί*. Since such earth-spirits generally have oracular powers the snake is an oracular animal; but that is a secondary development. The offer of a cock, too (as by Sokrates before his departure to the underworld), points to the chthonic character of Ask., for it was a sacrifice also made to Heroes. Thus the *ἔφατ* at Athens were frequented by the priests of Asklepios (*C.I.A.* ii, 463 b); cf. Köhler, *Att. Mus.* vol. ii, 365 f. (Sacrificial pte. *βόθρ.* for this chthonic worship in the Asklepieion at Athens? see Köhler, *ib.* 254.)

<sup>13</sup> The connexion between Amphiaraios and Asklepios is shown also by the fact that Iaso, one of the allegorical figures attached to Asklepios, though generally the daughter of Ask. (e.g. *EM.* 434, 17 'Iasó with Syll.; cf. Herod. iv, 8), was probably also regarded as the daughter of Amph.; *Sch. Ar., Phil.* 701. Hesych. s.v. *her* portrait in the temple at Oropos, *Paus.* i, 34, 3). So, too, *Ἀλκυβῆος* the son of Trophonios (*Charax, ap. Schol. Ar., Nub.* 508, p. 500 Bk.) seems to be the same as *Ἄλκυ*, the Asklepiad daimon whose priest Sophonkes was. The portraits of Trophonios followed the type of the Asklepias statues: *Paus.* ii, 39, 3-4. Troph. son of Valens (= Iachys) and Koronia, and brother of Asklepios: *Cic.*, *N.D.* iii, 56, acc. to the *theologi*. With good reason, considering their intrinsic affinity, Trophonios, Amphiaraios, Amphilochos, and the Asklepiades are mentioned side by side by Aristid. i, p. 78 D.

<sup>14</sup> Sulla counted Amphiaraios a "god" and hence the territory belonging to his temple at Oropos was excepted from the lease for the collection of taxes granted to the Roman publicani. The Roman Senate allowed this to stand, *ins. from Oropos* 'Εφ. 'Αρχ., 1884, p. 101 B.; *Hermes*, 20, 288 ff.; the publicani had denied immortality even *illo qui aliquando homines fuit*, *Cic.*, *N.D.* iii, 49. Thus only the fact that he was now a god was claimed by the other side—it was not denied that he had once been a mortal. *Paus.* again ii, 2, 4, mentions Amph. among the *θεοὶ* who *ὑλίσσονται ἐν ἀβύσσῳ*; so too Varro *ap. Serv. A.* viii, 275; cf. *Apul., D. Soc.* 15 fin.; also *Philo. Leg. ad Caium*, § 78, ii, p. 557 M.

## CHAPTER IV

### HEROES

#### § 1

When about the year 620 Drakon at Athens for the first time collected and committed to writing the customary law of his country he also ordained that the gods and the national Heroes should be honoured together according to ancestral usage.<sup>1</sup>

We are thus for the first time introduced to *Heroes* as beings of a higher kind, mentioned side by side with the gods, and like them to be worshipped with regularly offered sacrifice. Their cult, like that of the gods, is by implication of long standing: it does not have to be reorganized, but is merely established in the form ancestral ordinances had given it. We see at this turning-point of Greek religious development how defective our knowledge is of the history of religious ideas in primitive Greece. This is our earliest record, and it has been preserved to us by a mere accident, but it points backwards and beyond itself to a long previous history in the worship of such guardian deities of the country—of which, however, we have hardly a scrap of early evidence.<sup>2</sup> We should in fact, from the meagre remains of the literature that is so important from this point of view, especially the lyric poetry of the seventh and early sixth centuries, hardly have derived a suspicion of the existence of this quite un-Homeric element in the religious life of Greece.<sup>3</sup> When at last the stream of surviving literature begins to flow more broadly, then, indeed, the Heroes are often referred to. Pindar's Hymns of Victory and Herodotus' History cover the generations that lived through the Persian wars and the following fifty years. From them we can see with overwhelming distinctness how strong at that time was the belief in the existence and potency of Heroes even among men of education who had not been too much influenced by the fashionable enlightenment of the time. In the beliefs of the people, in the religious customs of countries and cities, the national Heroes have their recognized place beside the gods. The representatives of states swear by the gods and the Heroes of the country: <sup>4</sup> it is to the gods and Heroes of Greece that the pious attribute the victory over the Barbarians.<sup>5</sup> So well established, indeed, was the validity of the Greek belief in Heroes that even the Persian magi in the army of Xerxes made libation by night in the Troad to the Heroes buried there.<sup>6</sup>

If now we inquire into the nature and essence of this species of higher beings that was as yet unknown to, or disregarded by, the epic we get little information on the subject from direct statements as to their nature by writers of antiquity. We can, however, learn a great deal about them from what we are told of individual Heroes and more particularly from what we know of the peculiar nature of the religious worship paid to them.<sup>7</sup> The Heroes were worshipped with sacrifice like the gods; but these sacrifices were very different from the offerings that were made to the Olympians.<sup>8</sup> They differ in time, place, and character. Sacrifice was made to the gods in broad daylight, to Heroes towards evening or at night;<sup>9</sup> and not on raised altars, but on low, and sometimes hollow, sacrificial hearths close to the ground.<sup>10</sup> For them were slain animals of black colour and male sex,<sup>11</sup> and in sacrificing, the heads of the animals were not turned upwards towards heaven as they were when offered to the gods, but were bent down to the ground.<sup>12</sup> The blood of these animals was allowed to run down into the ground or into the sacrificial hearth, that the Heroes might have their "appeasement of blood."<sup>13</sup> The carcass was completely burnt, for no living man might taste of it.<sup>14</sup> This peculiar mode of worshipping the Heroes was in strict usage described by a different name from that used of the sacrifices to the gods.<sup>15</sup> On special occasions a sacrificial meal of cooked food was prepared, to which the Hero was invited as a guest.<sup>16</sup> They are near by in the earth itself, and there is no need in their case, as for the Olympians, to send up the savour of sacrifice in smoke to heaven.

This sacrificial ritual is in those features which distinguish it from that commonly in use for the gods of Olympus precisely identical with that by which the gods who dwelt under the earth, and, later, even the souls of dead men, were honoured. This will seem quite natural if we regard the Heroes as closely related to the chthonic deities on the one hand, and to the dead on the other. In fact, they are nothing else than the spirits of dead men who now dwell beneath the earth, immortal like the gods of that underworld, and almost equal to them in power. Their real nature as the souls of great men of the past, who have died but have not been deprived of conscious existence, is made plain by another mode of doing honour to them originally belonging to them and them only—I mean the yearly repeated celebration of Funeral Games.

Athletic contests for chieftains at the funeral of a prominent

one of their number were known to Homer, and we have already referred to them among other relics in epic poetry of a once powerful cult of souls.<sup>17</sup> But Homer knew nothing of their repetition, and certainly not of an annual recurrence of such funeral celebrations.<sup>18</sup> Games celebrated afresh after the lapse of a definite period became known to the Greeks only when the cult of Heroes had reached its maturity. Many of these contests were connected perpetually with the yearly festivals of individual Heroes, and were intended to honour their memory.<sup>19</sup> Even in historical times, generally on the command of the Delphic oracle, annual contests were instituted in honour of Heroes.<sup>20</sup> It was the mode of worship proper to Heroes, and men realized that in holding such contests they were really repeating the funeral ceremonies of a dead man.<sup>21</sup> The cult of Heroes was the earliest breeding ground of the Agôn, that most characteristic feature of Greek life and school of the individualism that made the greatness of Greece. It was not unreasonable that afterwards many of the victors at the great Agônes were themselves raised by popular superstition to the number of the Heroes. The greatest Games of all, to which all Greece assembled, the Pythian, Olympian, Nemean, and Isthmian, were during the historical period, it is true, celebrated in honour of gods; but that they had been originally instituted as Funeral Games of Heroes and only subsequently transferred to higher guardianship was, at any rate, the general opinion of antiquity.<sup>22</sup>

### § 3

The Heroes are, then, spirits of the dead, and not a species of inferior deities or "demigods";<sup>23</sup> and quite distinct again from the "daimones" known to later speculative thought and, indeed, to popular superstition. These latter are divine spirits of a lower order; but spirits which have always been exempt from death because they have never entered into the finite existence of men. The Heroes on the other hand have once been living men; from being men they have become Heroes, and that only after their death.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, they have now entered upon a higher stage of existence as a special class of beings who are named by the *sida* of gods and men.<sup>25</sup> In them we meet with something quite unknown to the Homeric poems—souls which after their death and separation from the body have a higher imperishable life.

But though the Heroes have once been men, it does not follow that all men become Heroes after their death. On the contrary, the Heroes, even though their number was not fixed

and limited, but continually admitted additions, remained an *exception*, a select minority which for that reason alone can be contrasted with ordinary humanity. The chief figures, the outstanding representatives of this heroic company, we may say, were those whose lifetime was fixed by legend or history in the distant past—who were in fact the ancestors of later humanity. The worship of Heroes is not, then, a cult of souls, but in a narrower sense a cult of *ancestors*. Even their name, as it appears, distinguishes the Heroes as men of the past. In the Iliad and the Odyssey "Hero" is the honourable title of chieftains, and also, generally, of all free men.<sup>28</sup> Poetry of later centuries, so far as it touched upon the events of the legendary past, continued to use the word "Hero" in this sense. But when in post-Homeric times the speaker, whether he is a poet or prose-writer, regards the matter from the point of view of contemporary life, then by "Hero", if he is referring to a man at all, he means a man of those days when, according to the Homeric poems, this honourable title was still in use among living men—he refers in a word to men belonging to the legendary *past* celebrated in poetry.<sup>29</sup> In Hesiod's narrative of the Five Ages of Men, the use of the word Hero is confined to the Champions of the wars at Thebes and Troy; they are called, as though by their special name, the "divine race of Heroes".<sup>30</sup> For Hesiod the "Heroes" are by no means the transfigured dead of past generations.<sup>31</sup> He knows well enough of such transfigured dead of a still earlier past, but these he calls "Daimones". And so, too, when in after times the name of Hero is applied to these favoured individuals who enjoy a higher life after their death, the name which in itself did not imply the higher nature of such departed spirits is evidently intended to show that the *lifetimes* of those who had received this privilege after their death occurred in a legendary past. As these men of the distant past had been "Heroes" during their life, so, too, they must be called after their death. But the meaning of the word Hero has undergone a change, and now contains the additional notion of unending transfigured existence. The worship of the Heroes reveals itself as something quite new, a form of religious belief and cult, of which the Homeric poems at least gave no inkling. And, indeed, the conception of such transfigured ancestral souls living on in a higher state must have been a novel one, if no special word of ancient coinage could be found to express it, and a long-standing word of the epic vocabulary had to be pressed into a new sense.

Whence came this new thing? If we try to derive it from

a natural process of development in the Homeric view of life we shall find ourselves in the greatest perplexity when it comes to showing the connecting links between two such widely different conceptions. It would not avail us much to say that the prestige of the epic was such that those whom it had honoured in song must have appeared so glorious and distinguished among mankind that it was natural for later imagination to transform them to demigods and to worship them as such. The Homeric poems, so violently opposed to any idea of a conscious or active existence of the soul after death, could hardly have brought it about that those very champions whom it had represented as indeed dead and departed to the distant land of Hades should be regarded as still living and exercising an influence from out their graves. Moreover, it is in the highest degree improbable that in the process of historical development it should have been just the champions of the epic from whose worship the cult of Heroes arose; for in cult, at any rate, with negligible exceptions, those champions played little part. And, indeed, that any cult at all should have arisen from the mere suggestions of fancy, such as the epic offered, is in itself unlikely. And it is essentially upon a religious cult that the belief in Heroes is founded.

In fact after all that has been hitherto shown, what we see most plainly is the *contrast* between the belief in Heroes and Homeric conceptions. The fanciful thought of the translation of individuals to Islands of the Blest or the underground dwellings did not itself conflict with the implications of Homeric eschatology. The miraculous preservation in an immortal existence of men whom the gods loved did not involve the separation of soul from body, nor the consequence of that separation—the dim borderland existence of the disembodied soul. But the belief in Heroes was a different matter; that involved the continuation of a conscious mode of being, in the neighbourhood of the living, after death, and in spite of the separation of soul from body. This directly contradicts Homeric psychology. We should have to give up the attempt altogether to bring this new belief into any real relationship with earlier development—if we could not draw upon what we have learnt from our previous investigations. In the Homeric poems themselves, in striking contrast with the general conception there prevailing of the insubstantiality of the disembodied soul, we found vestiges of a once-vigorous *cult of the soul* which implied the existence of a corresponding belief in the conscious after-life of the soul and its lingering

in the neighbourhood of the living. From the study of Hesiod's picture of the Five Ages of Men, we saw that, in fact, vestiges of an ancient belief in the continued and enhanced existence of dead men, of which no clear trace remained in Homer, had been preserved at least in occasional remote corners of the Greek countryside. But it was only the dead of a legendary past who were regarded by Hesiod as "Daimones": the poet could relate no similar marvels from more recent periods, and still less of men in his own lifetime. Thus, we have in this case traces of *ancestor-worship* indeed, but not of a general worship of souls that is elsewhere the normal development of the worship of ancestors. So, then, in the worship of Heroes, what we have before us is not a general cult of the soul but a cult of ancestors. We may express the matter in this way: in the cult of the "Hero" a still burning spark of ancient belief is kindled to renewed flame—it is not the appearance of something entirely strange and new, but something long past and half-forgotten is awakened to new life. Those Daimones which arose from the men of the earlier golden and silver ages—whom the poet of the "Works and Days" had situated in the dimmest and remotest past—what are they but the "Heroes" worshipped by later ages under a new name and brought down nearer to the period of contemporary life?

#### § 4

How it came about that the cult of ancestors was rescued from partial, and more than partial, oblivion, and rose to a new and lasting importance, that, indeed, we cannot say. We can give no real explanation indicative of the origin and progress of this important development in Greek religious life. We know neither the time nor the place of the first serious revival of this newly awakened primitive worship; nor can we tell the manner or stages of its diffusion during those obscure years of the eighth and seventh centuries. We can, however, bring the fact of the revival of ancestor-worship into relation with a number of other facts which prove that during those years many hitherto buried or repressed ideas about the life of gods and men came to the surface again out of the depths of popular faith and out of an older worship of the gods that had never quite died out. This revival did not, indeed, suppress the Homeric view entirely—that never occurred—but it did set itself on a level with that view. The great movement with which we shall be dealing in the next chapter also contributed to the progress of the belief in Heroes. Many other favouring

circumstances may in detail have helped to strengthen that belief. Even the epic itself had in one point at least approached the ideas that were receiving a new life in the worship of Heroes. Many of the local gods who had faded before the new deities of common Hellenic belief had been reduced to the rank of humanity and joined in heroic adventure. By a sort of compromise effected with the local cult of such gods the epic poets had been led, in a few cases, to the creation of a remarkable series of figures in which the divine and the human was wonderfully mixed. These champions and saviours of old time, as they had once been mortal men among other men, so now after their departure must they live on and have influence eternally like the gods. We can easily see the close resemblance that exists between such figures as Amphiaraios or Trophonios and the Heroes of later belief; in fact, both of them, when they were not called gods, were frequently reckoned among these Heroes. But for all that, they are only *quasi-Heroes*; prototypes of the real Heroes they can never have been. They have been translated during their lifetime, and live on immortally just because they have never tasted death. They, with those others translated to the Islands of the Blest, represent the idea of immortality in the only form recognized by the Homeric poetry. The Heroes of the newly awakening creed, on the contrary, have died unmistakably; and yet they continue to live on, though relieved of their bodies. They are entirely distinct from the translated few of the epic tradition. They emerge out of the obscurity of the half-remembered past as something strange—as something, indeed, opposed to the circle of ideas influenced by the epic.

It was not from poetic imagination or story that the Heroes took their origin, but from the remains of an ancient pre-Homeric belief which local worship had preserved alive.

### § 5

The worship of a Hero is everywhere connected with the site of his grave. That is the general rule proved in innumerable cases. That is why in the case of a more than ordinarily revered Hero, his grave as the centre of his worship is set up in some prominent and honourable place—the market-place of the city, the Prytaneion,<sup>30</sup> or, like the grave of Pelops in the Altis at Olympia, in the very middle of the holy precinct, in the thick of the festival crowd.<sup>31</sup> Or else the Hero who guarded the city and the land might have his grave in the wall of the city gate or upon the farthest border of its territory.<sup>32</sup> Where his grave is, there the Hero is fast bound; that is his



dwelling-place.<sup>31</sup> This idea prevails everywhere, though it may not be given such blunt expression as at Tronis, in the country of the Phocians, where the blood of the offering made to the Hero was poured down through an opening immediately into his grave mound.<sup>32</sup> It is implied, as a rule, in these cases that the grave contains the bones of the Hero. The bones—all that is left of his mortality—chain the Hero to his grave. Hence, when it was thought desirable to attach a Hero and his protective power to a city his bones (or what were taken for such) on the command of an oracle were brought from a foreign land and laid to rest in his native country. We possess many accounts of such transference of relics.<sup>33</sup> Most of them occurred in the distant past, but we also read how in the full light of history in the year 478 enlightened Athens brought over the bones of Theseus from Skyros;<sup>34</sup> and not until they were buried in the Theseion was Theseus properly attached to Athens.

Since the possession of the corporeal remains<sup>35</sup> of the Hero secured the possession of the Hero himself, the cities often protected themselves against strangers, who might remove the treasured bones, by keeping the position of the grave a secret.<sup>36</sup> A grave is always necessary to fix the Hero at a definite place, or, at least, an "empty tomb", which sometimes had to do duty for a grave.<sup>37</sup> In such cases the Hero was perhaps thought of as bound by a spell to that place.<sup>38</sup> As a rule, it is the remains of his former body that hold him fast. But these remains are a part of the Hero himself; though dead (and mummified, as we are told in one case),<sup>39</sup> he works and acts just the same; his psyche, his invisible counterpart and double, hovers in the neighbourhood of the body and the grave.

These are all very primitive conceptions such as have, as a rule, only been preserved among peoples who have remained at a very undeveloped stage of culture.<sup>40</sup> When we find them in force among Greeks of post-Homeric times, we cannot really believe that they arose then for the first time, in complete contrast with the clear-sighted freedom of the men of the Homeric age. They have only re-emerged from the repressive influence of the Homeric rationalism. It would be natural to think that the same ideas that have been described as underlying the belief in Heroes were already in the minds of those prehistoric Greeks who in Mycenae and elsewhere took such care (even it seems going so far as to embalm them)<sup>41</sup> to preserve the bodies of their princes from destruction, and who put ornaments and utensils in their graves for future use

or enjoyment. It has been explained above how, in the times of which Homer's poems give us a picture, the alteration in sentiment as well as the spread of the custom of completely destroying the bodies of the dead with fire must have weakened the belief in the confinement of the soul to this world and to the remains of the body. This belief never entirely perished. It was preserved alive, perhaps for a long time only by a few, in those places where there remained a cult attached to a grave. Such a cult would not, indeed, extend to those whose death had occurred within more recent times, but it did not allow the old-established worship of the great dead of the past to die out entirely. Over the royal graves on the citadel at Mycenae stood a sacrificial hearth,<sup>44</sup> which bears witness to the continuance of the ancient worship of the kings buried there. The Catalogue of Ships in Homer mentions the "grave of Aipyros", an old Arcadian local monarch, as a landmark of the district; <sup>45</sup> may not the sanctity of that grave have been preserved? In many places, at any rate, graves were pointed out and honoured that belonged to Heroes who owed their existence solely to poetic fancy or were even mere personifications—abstractions of the names of places and countries whose ancestors they purported to be. In such cases the Hero-worship had become purely symbolic, and often perhaps a mere formality. But from such a fictitious ancestor-worship the cult of the graves of Heroes cannot possibly have arisen; such fictions are themselves only intelligible as copies of another and more vivid worship, of a cult of real ancestors. If no such cult had existed in actual fact before men's eyes, it would be impossible to understand how men came to imitate ancestor-worship in the shape of such purely imaginary creatures. A copy implies the existence of a model; a symbol requires the contemporary or earlier existence of the reality symbolized. We should certainly know more of the worship of ancestors among the ancient royal families if in nearly all the Greek states monarchy had not been abolished at an early period and all traces of it suppressed. Sparta alone provides us with a solitary example of what may once have been the prevailing custom in all the seats of royal authority. When a Spartan king died his funeral was celebrated with extreme pomp. His body (which, even when he had died abroad, was embalmed and brought home to Sparta) was laid beside the other dead of his family, and honour was paid to him, in Xenophon's words, not as a man, but as a *Hero*.<sup>46</sup> In this case, which undoubtedly represents a traditional usage handed down from remote

antiquity, we have the rudiments of Hero-worship as applied to the dead of a royal family. The members of noble families who, like the Eupatridai of Athens, sometimes traced their descent from a king,<sup>47</sup> must also have retained from ancient times the practice of ancestor-worship. As of all unofficial cults, we hear little of the cults of the old clans based on blood-relationship and connexion by marriage (*γένη, σύμπαι*). But just as out of their combination first the village communities and then the fully organized Greek Polis grew up, so, too, the religious cults which were paid to the ancestors of these unions of kinsfolk set a pattern for the manifold social groups out of which the developed state was built up.<sup>48</sup>

### § 6

The "clans" that we meet with at Athens and in other Greek states are, as a rule, groups for which a demonstrable common kinship is no longer a condition of membership. The majority of such politically recognized, self-contained clans assemble together for the common worship of particular gods but many also honour a Hero as well, who generally in such cases gives his name to the clan. Thus, the Eleoboutadai at Athens paid honour to Boutes, the Alkmaionidai to Alkmaion, the Bouzygai to Bouzyges, in Sparta and Argos Talthybios was worshipped by the Talthybiadai, etc. And in these cases, as the name of the clan itself shows, the Hero of their common worship was regarded as the ancestor of the clan.<sup>49</sup> Further, this ancestor-worship and the name derived from a common, even if fictitious, ancestor, distinguished the clans from the cult-associations of a different origin which since the time of Kleisthenes had been put on a footing of legal equality with the clans in the phratries. The members of these associations (*Orgeones*) lacked a common name, the existence of which, therefore, indicated in the case of the members of a clan a closer bond of union than mere membership of a religious association which had been chosen at will, and was not decided by the fact of birth.

Everywhere these clans kept up the outward formalities of ancestor-worship; and the formality must once have had meaning. However the publicly recognized clans may have developed their own special characteristics, in their origin, at least, they must go back (like the Roman *gentes*) to associations of kinsfolk developed from the family (extended through the maleline) and held together by a real bond of kinship. Even the purely symbolical ancestor-worship of the later "clans", of which hardly a single one could have shown the

pedigree of its descent from the reputed common ancestor, must have arisen from the real ancestor-worship of genuine groups of kinsfolk. The imitation in this case, too, points to the existence at some time of an original.

In the same way the larger groups into which the Athenian state since the time of Kleisthenes was divided were unable to dispense with the practice of association for the cult of a commonly worshipped Hero. The Heroes of the newly organized *phylai*<sup>40</sup> had their temple, land, priests, statues, and regular cult; and so also had the Heroes of the smaller purely local divisions, the *demes*. Here, too, the fiction of ancestor-worship was kept up; the names of the *phylai*, always patronymic in form, represent the members of each *phyle* as the descendants of the Hero Eponymos or Archegetes of the *phyle*.<sup>41</sup> The *demes* also in many cases have patronymic titles which for the most part are also known to us as the names of aristocratic families.<sup>42</sup> It is evident that in such *demes* the members of individual aristocratic families had settled down together or near each other. The Archegetes, whether real or fictitious, of the family must then have been regarded as the Archegetes of the *deme*. We thus see how the cult of a family ancestor, taken over by a wider group of worshippers, might be preserved and extended—little as the cult might benefit in sincerity by such political enlargement.

The cult of Heroes everywhere has the same features as the cult of ancestors; at least, the more influential Heroes, those worshipped by the greater communities, were everywhere regarded as the forefathers and progenitors of the groups of countryfolk, citizens, or kinsmen who honoured them. The fact that the persons of these prehistoric Heroes owed their existence almost without exception solely to poetry or fancy allows us to conclude that at the time when ancestor-worship had its re-birth in Hero-worship, the memory of the real Archegetai of the country, the ancestors of the ruling families and clans, together with their cult, had fallen into oblivion. A great or illustrious name was introduced where the real name was no longer known. More often, even when the real forefather of the clan was still well known, the name of a great man of the primeval past was placed at the head of the list in order to throw the origin of the family as far back into the past as possible and connect it the more closely with a divine source.<sup>43</sup> Men thus came to worship a phantom, often a mere symbol, of an ancestor. But they held fast to the imitation of real ancestor-worship; the remains of a true cult of ancestors provided the model and were the real starting-point for the later belief and cult of Heroes.

We can no longer follow in detail the process of development and extension which the idea of the Hero underwent. The accounts which we possess show us the fully developed product, not the steps which led up to this result. We first get an idea of the number of Hero-cults existing in Greece during the greatest period of its history from the enormous number of graves or cults of Heroes mentioned by Pausanias in the account of his travels in the age of the Antonines over the most important countries of the Greece that was now fast falling into decay. Nearly all the legendary figures celebrated in epic poetry were now worshipped as Heroes, whether in their own homes (as Achilles in Thessaly, Aias at Salamis, etc.) or in other places that either claimed to possess their graves (as the Delphians did that of Neoptolemos, the people of Sybaris that of Philoktetes, etc.) or else, through the genealogical relationship of their leading families with the Heroes, regarded themselves as closely connected with them (as, for example, the Athenians with Aias and his sons). In the colonies especially the Hero-cults, like the ingredients of the population, may have been a motley crew; thus, in Tarentum the Atreidai, the Tydidai, the Aiakidai, the Laertiadai, and especially the Agamemnonidai were worshipped in a combined Hero-cult, and Achilles also had a temple of his own.<sup>64</sup>

There were Heroes with famous names who may yet have owed their subsequent elevation to that position, during the times of the greatest extent of the cult, in part to their fame in ancient poetry. Side by side with these were a host of obscurer figures whose memory had been kept alive by their cult alone, which a small circle of country or city folk had paid to them from primitive times. These are the real "national Heroes", of whose worship Drakon had spoken; as true forebears and real ancestors of their country they, too, are called "Archegetai".<sup>65</sup> We are told the names of the seven Archegetai of Plataea to whom Aristides was commanded by the Delphic oracle to sacrifice before the battle of Plataea; not one of them is ever heard of again.<sup>66</sup> It might happen that the name of a Hero to whom worship had been paid from time immemorial might no longer be known even to the dwellers near his grave. In the market at Elis there stood a little temple whose roof was supported on wooden pillars: men knew that this was the chapel belonging to a grave, but no one could give the name of the Hero buried there.<sup>67</sup> In the market at Herakleia on the Black Sea was a monument of a Hero over-

shadowed by wild olive-trees; it contained the body of that Hero whom once the Delphian oracle had bidden the founders of Herakleia to placate. The learned differed as to his name; the inhabitants of Herakleia called him simply "the local Hero".<sup>40</sup> In the Hippodrome at Olympia stood a round altar at which the chariot horses used to shy. It was disputed what Hero lay buried there, but the people called him, after the effect he had on the horses, simply Taraxippos.<sup>41</sup> In the same way many Heroes, instead of being called by their real names, were more often referred to by adjectives which recalled their nature or their power or some external detail of their appearance.<sup>42</sup> At Athens there was a Hero Physician, a Hero General, and a Hero Garland-bearer.<sup>43</sup> Many a Hero may have been known to the neighbourhood which worshipped him simply as "the Hero".<sup>44</sup> In such cases it was entirely due to the grave and the cult attached to the grave that the Hero's memory had been preserved at all. There might, indeed, be stories current as to his doings and nature as a "spirit", but what it was that had marked him out in his lifetime and caused his elevation to a Hero was totally forgotten. Undoubtedly these are precisely the oldest Hero-cults. In the instances quoted from Elis, Herakleia and Olympia, first one and then another of the famous champions of antiquity were supposed to be buried under that nameless gravestone. But, often enough, the doubt was suppressed, and by an arbitrary and successful imposition some famous name out of the heroic legend may have been substituted as occupant of such ownerless or unclaimed grave sanctuaries.

### § 8

As a rule there was no difficulty in securing great or famous names when it was necessary to find a patron-Hero for the city. In particular the founder of the city and its regular worship of the gods, and the whole divine circle which hedged round the life of the citizens, was regularly worshipped with high honour as Hero Archegetes.<sup>45</sup> Naturally, they were mostly mythical or even arbitrarily invented figures to whom the greater or lesser cities of Greece, as well as their offshoots in foreign lands, did honour as their "Founder".

But from the times when colonies were frequently dispatched and laid out in accordance with a carefully thought-out plan, under the leadership of a single person (generally named by an oracle) who was given plenipotentiary powers,<sup>46</sup> this real *Oikistes* was himself usually promoted after his death to the rank of Hero. Pindar speaks of the sacred grave of the Hero-

founder of Kyrene in the marketplace of the city; "the inhabitants of the Thracian Chersonnese made sacrifices to Miltiades the son of Kypselos as their Oikistes, "as the custom is," and held games annually in his honour; "at Katana, in Sicily, Hieron of Syracuse was buried, and was worshipped with the honours of a Hero as the Founder of the city." At Abdera the Teians on the occasion of the second founding of the city restored to his position of Hero its original founder Timesios.<sup>44</sup> On the other hand, the original and real Oikistes of a colony might be deprived of his worship if the inhabitants quarrelled with the mother country, and another "Founder" chosen after the event and given the highest honours of a Hero in his place. This was what happened in the year 422 with Hagnon and Brasidas in Amphipolis.<sup>45</sup>

In these cases Hero-making leaves the sacred mists of antiquity and enters the light of the contemporary world: faith and cult become profaned by political motives. The name of Hero, once applied only to the glorified figures of the far distant past, now that such Heroizing of the recent dead was possible, must have begun to have the more general meaning of one who has come to enjoy a higher nature and enlarged capacities after his death. In fact, any kind of prominence during a man's lifetime seems at last to have given him a virtual claim to heroic honours after his death. As Heroes are now regarded, great kings such as Gelon of Syracuse, law-givers such as Lykourgos of Sparta,<sup>46</sup> and even representatives of poetic genius from Homer down to Aeschylus and Sophokles,<sup>47</sup> no less than the most famous victors in the contests of bodily skill and strength. One of the Olympic victors, Philippos of Kroton, was reputed to be the most beautiful man in Greece of his time. Over his grave the people of Eggesta, so Herodotos (v, 47) tells us, erected a Hero's temple and paid honour to him with sacrifice as to a Hero merely on account of his great personal beauty.

Still, religious or superstitious motives were not always absent. They were particularly to the fore in the numerous cases where the extent and importance of the world of Heroes were added to on the recommendation of the Delphic oracle. Ever since the Delphic priesthood had risen from its obscure beginnings to a recognized position as the supreme authority in all questions of spiritual right, the opinion of the oracle had been sought on all occurrences that seemed to have any connexion with the unseen world. Especially in the case of prolonged drought or infertility of the soil, or when pestilential sicknesses had attacked a part of the country, was the oracle

requested to state the origin of the misfortune. In many cases the answer of the oracle would be that the origin of the evil lay in the anger of a Hero who was to be placated by sacrifice and the foundation of a permanent worship; or it would command that the plague should be averted by the recovery of the bones of a Hero from a foreign land, which should then be preserved at home and be the object of an official cult.<sup>72</sup> Innumerable cults had their origin in this way, nor do the examples all belong to a half-legendary past. When pestilence and dearth broke out in the island of Cyprus after the death of Kimon, the oracle bade the inhabitants of Kition "not to slight" Kimon, but to regard him as a "higher" being, i.e. do him honour as a Hero.<sup>73</sup> So, too, when some one possessed by special religious scruples inquired the cause of a strange vision that he had had, or of the remarkable appearance of the body of one lately dead,<sup>74</sup> the oracle would often trace the matter to the action of a Hero who must forthwith be given an official cult. When a serious undertaking lay before a state, whether it was the invasion of a foreign land or a decisive battle in war, the oracle would bid the inquirers first placate the Heroes of the country that was to be attacked or where the battle was to be fought.<sup>75</sup> Sometimes the oracle of its own accord, without being applied to, commanded the honours of a Hero to be paid to a dead man.<sup>76</sup>

A peculiar case is that of Kleomedes of Astypalaia. This man had at the 71st Olympic festival (486) killed his opponent in the boxing match. He was disqualified by the Hellanodikai from taking his crown and returned home to Astypalaia full of indignation. There he tore down the pillar which supported the roof of a boys' school, and on the destruction of the boys fled to Athene's temple where he hid himself in a chest. His pursuers vainly sought to open the lid of the chest and at last the chest itself had to be broken into by main force. But Kleomedes was not found inside, either alive or dead. The envoys sent to inquire of the oracle were informed that Kleomedes had become a Hero, and that he must be honoured with sacrifice since he was no longer a mortal.<sup>77</sup> And so the inhabitants of Astypalaia paid honour to Kleomedes as a Hero. In this case the simple conception of a Hero as one raised to divine power after his death is united with the ancient belief, which had never quite died out since the great days of the epic, in the *translocation* of individual mortals who without dying disappear from sight to enter immortal life with body and soul complete. Such a miracle seemed to have occurred once again in the case of Kleomedes. He had "disappeared" and



been "carried away".<sup>18</sup> He could, however, only be called a "Hero" because there was no common name to describe the effect of translation which made men no longer mortals nor yet gods. The oracle called Kleomedes "the last of the Heroes"; indeed, it might well appear time to close at last the already over-lengthy list of "Heroes". The Delphic oracle<sup>19</sup> had itself contributed largely to their increase, and with full intent; nor did it observe for long its own decision to make an end now.<sup>20</sup>

It is easy to understand the reasons for the universal acceptance among the Greeks of the unquestioned authority of the oracle in all matters connected with the Heroes. The god does not invent new Heroes or add to the number of local divinities at his own caprice or by the exercise of his own authority. He merely sees them where human eyes are not clear-sighted enough. He, the all-seeing, recognizes them as one spirit does another, and is able to see them at work when men only feel the results of their activity. Thus, he enables inquirers to be rid of their difficulties, to understand supernatural occurrences by the recognition and worship of invisible powers. For the believer he is in this, as in all other directions of religious life, "the true Expositor".<sup>21</sup> He only points out what already exists; he does not invent anything new, though the information that he gives may be something quite new to men. We, indeed, may be permitted to inquire what motive the shrewd Delphic priesthood may have had in the creation or renewal of so many Hero-cults. There is very evident method in their promotion of the belief in Heroes, as there is in all the activities of the oracle in religious and political matters. Was it ecclesiastical policy that made the priests of Delphi, in this as so many other cases, search out and multiply to the greatest possible extent the objects of belief and cult? The more widespread and the more deeply ingrained was the uneasy dread of an invisible all-powerful spirit-world, the greater became the authority of the oracle that alone could give guidance in this confused turmoil of ghostly activities. Superstition had achieved a power that the Homeric age never knew, and it cannot be denied that the oracle encouraged this *deisidaimonia* and did its best to increase it. Still, the priests of the oracle themselves were undoubtedly subject to the beliefs of their age; at any rate, they shared the belief in Heroes. They would think it quite natural, when faced by anxious inquiries as to the cause of disease or dearth, to confirm the half-expressed attribution of the evil to the action of an angry Hero. They had rather

to give their sanction to what was already anticipated than invent something new. They only applied to the particular case (with free scope in the invention of details) what the popular belief of the times had already settled in principle. But what it all meant was that the oracle took under its protection everything that could promote and strengthen the cult of souls; and in so far as it is possible to speak of a "Theology of Delphi", the popular belief in the survival of the soul after death and the cult of the disembodied soul formed two of the most important articles in its creed. We shall have more to say on this subject hereafter. In any case, if the priests lived in the atmosphere of such ideas, it was natural for them in times of need and stress, when strange things happened, to regard as the author of the disturbance some dead legendary Hero's ghost or even a powerful spirit of more recent times, and to direct the faithful accordingly. Thus, the Delphic god became the patron of the cult of Heroes, just as he was a patron of the Heroes themselves, and invited them every year at the *Theoxenia* to a meal in his own temple.<sup>21</sup>

Thus encouraged on all sides, Hero-worship began to multiply the objects of the cult beyond all counting. The great wars of freedom against the Persians had aroused the deepest and most religious feelings of the Greeks, and it did not seem too much when whole companies of those who had fallen for freedom were raised to the rank of Hero. Thus, even into a very late period, the solemn procession every year to honour the Greeks who had been left on the field of Plataea was never omitted; and at the sacrifice the archon of the city called upon the "brave men who had laid down their lives for Greece" and invited them to a meal and satisfaction of blood.<sup>22</sup> At Marathon, also, those who had once fallen in battle and been buried there were worshipped as Heroes.<sup>23</sup>

Out of the enormous multitude of those who had thus become Heroes an aristocracy of Heroes of a higher rank came to be formed, chiefly composed of those who had been honoured in legend and poetry from the earliest times and had acquired fame all over Greece. Examples of these are those whom Pindar<sup>24</sup> in one place names together: the descendants of Oineus in Aetolia, Iolaos in Thebes, Persens in Argos, the Dioscuri in Sparta, the many-branched heroic family of the Aiakidae in Aegina, Salamis, and many other places. Indeed, a brighter lustre seemed to illumine some of the greater Heroes

and to distinguish them almost in kind from the rest of their fellows. Thus, Herakles was now elevated to the gods, though Homer did not even know him as a "Hero" in the later sense, and though in many places he was still worshipped as a Hero.<sup>55</sup> Asklepios is sometimes a Hero and sometimes a god, as he had been originally.<sup>57</sup> Then many other Heroes began to receive sacrifice as gods,<sup>56</sup> not without the assistance of the Delphic oracle, which in the case of Lykourgos, at least, seems itself to have given the lead in the elevation of that Hero.<sup>58</sup> The boundary line between the Hero and the god seems to become more and more uncertain; sometimes a Hero of the narrowest local observance is called a "god",<sup>59</sup> without our having any reason for thinking of a formal elevation to divine honour in his case or any corresponding alteration of ritual. The title of Hero seemed already to have lost some of its value, though the time had not yet come when to name a dead man as Hero hardly distinguished him at all from all the other dead.

### § 10

However much the meaning attached to the name of Hero may have widened or even deteriorated, the belief in the Heroes lost none of its significance and long retained its hold on the people. The belief in such a class of spirits stood almost on a par with the belief in gods. If the circle of influence possessed by some particular local-Hero was narrow and restricted, that only made him seem all the nearer to his worshippers. The spirits of their ancestors, their own and the country's peculiar possession and shared with no one else, seemed more intimately theirs than other invisible powers even of higher rank. Permanent as the gods themselves, such Heroes were honoured as hardly second to the gods,<sup>60</sup> though they cannot equal them in might.<sup>61</sup> "Not equal"—for their efficacy was confined within bounds; it did not reach beyond the limits of their home and the little band of their worshippers. They were bound to the soil as the Olympian gods no longer were—(a Hero who breaks free from local limitations soon achieves divinity). In particular those Heroes who send up, from beneath the earth where they dwell, relief in sickness or prevision of the future are certainly bound to one spot. Only at their graves can such assistance be expected, for that is their dwelling-place. In their case the relationship between the belief in Heroes and the belief in those subterranean deities, of whom something was said in the previous chapter, is peculiarly plain. Indeed, in so far as their influence is limited

to a single locality and their powers concerned especially with *iatromantic* manifestations, these two classes of spirits essentially coincide.

Such relief in sickness was expected, not only from Asklepios himself, but from the Asklepiadai, Machaon—who had a grave and temple at Gerenia on the coast of Laconia—and Podaleirios. The latter was buried in Apulia, near Mount Garganus. In his heroön those who sought his aid laid themselves down to sleep on the skin of the ram that had been previously sacrificed. In sleep they received other revelations from the Hero besides remedies for the ailments of man and beast.<sup>99</sup> Machaon's son, too, Polemokrates, healed sicknesses in his temple of Eua in Argolis.<sup>100</sup> In Attica there was a *Heros Iatros* in the city whose efficacy in curing disease was witnessed to by innumerable silver *ex voto* facsimiles of various parts of the body restored to health by him.<sup>101</sup> Another Hero Iatros, whose name is given as Aristomachos, had an oracle of healing at Marathon.<sup>102</sup> Healing of disease was rarely attributed to any other than these Asklepiad Heroes. Dream-revelations of other kinds, however, were vouchsafed from their graves especially by those Heroes who had been seers also in their lifetime, such as Mopsos and Amphilochos at Mallos in Cilicia, Amphilochos, again, in Akarnania, Teiresias at Orchomenos, Kalchas in Apulia near the just-mentioned heroön of Podaleirios.<sup>103</sup> Besides these Odysseus, too, had a dream-oracle among the Eurytanes in Aetolia,<sup>104</sup> Proteus one at his grave-monument at Elaious in the Thracian Chersonnese,<sup>105</sup> Sarpedon in Cilicia and another (alleged) in the Troad,<sup>106</sup> Menestheus, the Athenian leader, far away in Spain,<sup>107</sup> Autolykos in Sinope,<sup>108</sup> and perhaps also Anios in Delos.<sup>109</sup> A Heroine called Hemithea had a dream-oracle, from which she dispensed cures in sickness, at Kastabos in Karia;<sup>110</sup> Pasiphaë gave prophecies in dreams at Thalamai on the Laconian coast.<sup>111</sup> Since from none of these Heroes did the epic tradition give any particular grounds in legend for expecting a display of mantic powers, we must suppose that knowledge of the future and communication of such knowledge to the living was regarded as belonging naturally to the spiritual nature of the glorified souls of Heroes. The notices which have come down to us allow us to hear of a few regular and permanently established Hero-oracles, but there may have been numbers of them of which we know nothing, and isolated and occasional manifestations of oracular powers by other Heroes may not have been entirely out of the question.<sup>112</sup>

## § 11

The oracular Heroes are regularly confined to the neighbourhood of their graves. In addition, what we know of the legends that were told of the appearances or the unseen activities of these Heroes shows that, like the spirits that haunt ancient castles or caverns in our own popular mythology, they were confined within the boundaries of their native country, the neighbourhood of their graves or the site of their cult. They are, as a rule, artless stories of the anger displayed by a Hero whose rights have been infringed or whose cult neglected. At Tanagra<sup>106</sup> there was a Hero Eumostos, who, having been deprived of his life through the machinations of a woman, would tolerate no woman in his grove or near his grave.<sup>107</sup> If any of the hated sex intruded there was danger of an earthquake or drought, or else the Hero was seen going down to the sea (which washes away all pollutions) to cleanse himself. In Orchomenos there was a spirit who went about "with a stone" devastating the neighbourhood. This was Aktaion, whose earthly remains were therefore buried with much ceremony on the command of an oracle. A bronze statue of him was also set up and fastened with chains to a rock, and honoured every year in a feast of the dead.<sup>108</sup> Herodotos solemnly tells us of the wrath of Minos with the Cretans, who had not avenged his own violent end, whereas they had gone to the aid of Menelaos.<sup>109</sup> There is a deeper sense in the legend, also related by Herodotos, of Talthybios who was enraged not for any private grievance but because of a violation of the moral law and order. He himself as the protector of heralds and messengers punished the Spartans for their murder of the Persian envoys.<sup>110</sup> But the most awe-inspiring legend of the revenge of a Hero was told of a local-Hero of the Athenian parish of Anagyros. A countryman had cut down the Hero's sacred grove.<sup>111</sup> The Hero first caused the death of the man's wife and then inspired the second wife with a guilty passion for his son, her stepson. The latter opposed her wishes and when she denounced him to her husband was blinded by him and banished to a desert island. The father, having become an object of loathing to all men, hanged himself; the stepmother threw herself into a well.<sup>112</sup> This story is remarkable for the fact that in it the Hero, like the gods themselves, is regarded as able to affect men's consciousness, their feelings, and their resolves. Many of the details may have been improved upon by a taste accustomed to poetry of a higher style.<sup>113</sup> But as a rule the legends of Heroes bear a

thoroughly popular stamp. They are a kind of vulgar mythology, which still put forth fresh shoots in this way now that the myths of ancient gods and champions have become merely traditional and have been given over to the never-ending operations of the poets. Such myths were no longer thrown off naturally by the creative instinct of the people. The gods seemed too far removed, their visible influence in the affairs of men seemed only credible in the legends of a far-distant past. The spirits of Heroes hovered nearer to men; in good fortune and bad men traced their handiwork. In the myths and legends of the people arising out of the events of the immediate present they now constitute the supernatural element without which neither life nor stories would offer any attraction or meaning to the simple-minded.

We can learn what these legends were like from a single example, which happens to have been preserved to us and which must stand for the numbers of similar stories which once must have been current. At Temesa, in Lucania, there was a Hero who went about destroying any of the inhabitants that he could lay his hand on. The Temesians, who had got as far as thinking of leaving Italy, turned in their distress to the Delphic oracle, and were told that the ghost was the spirit of a stranger who had once been stoned to death by the inhabitants of the country for the violation of a maiden.<sup>114</sup> A sacred precinct must be dedicated to him, and a temple built, where every year the most beautiful maiden in Temesa must be delivered up to him. The citizens of Temesa did as they were told, and the spirit left them in peace, but every year the awful sacrifice took place. To this place there came in the 77th Olympiad a famous boxer, Euthymos of Loeri, returning with his crown of victory back to Italy. He heard at Temesa of the sacrifice that was about to take place, and entered the temple where he saw the chosen maiden waiting for the Hero. Pity and love filled his heart; and when the Hero arrived the victor of so many single combats dared to try conclusions with this new foe and finally threw him into the sea and rid the country of the monster. It is just as in our own fairy tale of the youth who went forth to learn how to shudder;<sup>115</sup> and, of course, now that the land is delivered there is a brilliant wedding and the "Knight of Good Courage" marries the beautiful maiden he has rescued. He lived on to extreme old age, and even then he did not die but was translated alive and is now himself a Hero.<sup>116</sup>

Such champions of the Pan-Hellenic contests, of whom

Euthymos was one, are the favourite figures of popular legend both in their lifetime and, after their death, as spirits. A story was told also of one of the contemporaries of Euthymos, Theagenes of Thasos, one of the most famous victors in all the great games, and how after his death one of his opponents went and thrashed his statue by night till one night the statue fell on him and killed him. The Thasians then threw the murderous image into the sea, but were thereupon plagued with barrenness as a result of the Hero's anger. This went on until, after the several times repeated command of the Delphic oracle, they fished up the statue from where it had sunk and restored it to its old position and sacrificed to it "as to a god".<sup>117</sup> The remarkable thing about this story is the way in which the crude and primitive notion, common to almost all image-worshipping peoples, that the strength of a "spirit" resides in his effigy, is here more than usually striking and applied to the belief in Heroes. It lies at the bottom of many stories of the revenge of dumb statues against those who offend them.<sup>118</sup> The statue of Theagenes, indeed, cured fevers even in later ages,<sup>119</sup> as did the statue of another famous boxer, Polydamas of Skotoussa.<sup>120</sup> An Achæan Olympic victor, Oibotas of Dyme, had for centuries prevented the Achæans from winning in any contest by a curse.<sup>121</sup> When he had been appeased the Achæans, on starting out to take part in a contest at Olympia, used to do sacrifice to his statue.<sup>122</sup>

#### § 12

But the belief in Heroes rose to still greater heights. Not merely in peaceful athletic contests, but in real need, in struggles when they were fighting to defend the highest possessions of all—the freedom and safety of their country—the Heroes were found on the side of the Greeks. Nowhere do we see more plainly how real and vivid was the faith of contemporary Greece in the Heroes than in the stories told of the appeals then made to them and of their participation in the Persian wars. At Marathon there were many who saw an apparition of Theseus in full armour fighting in the front of the battle against the barbarians.<sup>123</sup> In the painting of Panainos (the brother of Pheidias) in the Stoa Poikile at Athens there was shown among the fighters at Marathon a certain Hero, Echelos, of whose appearance at the battle a peculiar story was told.<sup>124</sup> In the war against Xerxes Delphi was preserved by two of the local Heroes of the land against a Persian raid.<sup>125</sup> In the morning before the battle of Salamis the Greeks prayed to the gods, but they called directly

upon the Heroes to give them practical help: Aias and Telamon were summoned from Salamis, and a ship was sent to fetch Aiakos and the other Aiakidai from Aegina.<sup>129</sup> So little were these Hero spirits mere symbols or great names to the Greeks. Their actual physical participation in the decisive hour was confidently expected. And, indeed, they came and helped: <sup>130</sup> after the battle had been won a trireme out of the spoil was dedicated to the Hero Aias as well as to the gods as a thankoffering.<sup>131</sup> A Salaminian local Hero, Kychreus, had also come to the help of the Greeks, as a snake, in which form the Heroes, like the earth spirits, frequently appeared.<sup>132</sup> After the battle everyone was fully persuaded that they owed their victory to the gods and Heroes.<sup>133</sup> As Xenophon puts it, it was the Heroes and their aid which "made Greece unconquerable" in the fight against the barbarians.<sup>134</sup> Less frequently we hear of the active participation of national Heroes in the fights of one Greek state against another.<sup>135</sup>

Even in the petty details of the life of individuals the Heroes played their part, helping or hindering, as once in mythical times the gods had done. Everyone will be reminded of well-known legends of the gods, and will at the same time be able to measure the difference between the sublime and the merely idyllic, in reading Herodotos' naive and circumstantial tale of how Helen once appeared in person to a nurse at Therapne. The nurse was praying at Helen's grave for her ill-favoured foster-child, when the Heroine appeared to her and with a touch of her hand made the child the most beautiful maiden in Sparta.<sup>136</sup> So, too, we read how the Hero Astrabakos, in the likeness of Ariston, king of Sparta, visited in secret the king's wife and made her the mother of Demaratos.<sup>137</sup> The heroön of this Astrabakos was situated by the door of Ariston's house,<sup>138</sup> and it was a frequent custom thus to place a Hero's shrine before the house-door where he might give a special protection to his neighbour.<sup>139</sup>

In all the circumstances of human life, in happiness or in need, for individuals or the city, the Heroes are thus very near to men. It is now often said of the Hero worshipped by a city (just as it was said of the city's gods) that he rules it, is its possessor, or is lord over it; <sup>140</sup> he is its true guardian and protector. It may, indeed, have been the case in many cities, as it was said to be in some, that the belief in the city-Hero was more deeply held there than the belief in the gods worshipped by all Greece in common.<sup>141</sup> The relation of man to the Heroes is closer than it is to the majestic gods above:



the faith in Heroes gave a different and a more familiar bond of union between men and the spirit-world above them. The worship of Heroes began as an ancestor-cult and an ancestor-cult it remained in essence, but it had now been widened to a cult of certain greater human souls who had raised themselves above their fellows by peculiar powers exercised in many, and by no means predominantly moral, directions. Many of them were of later ages or even of the quite recent past, and in this lies the peculiar importance of their cult. They show that the company of the spirits is not fixed and made up; individual mortals are still continually being raised to that higher circle after the completion of their earthly life. Death does not end all conscious existence nor does the gloom of Hades swallow up all life.

But for that reason the cult of Heroes cannot be the origin of the belief in an immortality belonging to all human souls by their very nature. Nor can this ever have been its effect. In the beginning, among the hosts that streamed down to Hades, the special individuals who had another fate were a small class apart and favoured above all others—and so it still remained. Though the numbers of the heroic figures might be increased enormously, yet every individual case of the transition of a human soul into the ranks of the Heroes was a fresh and special miracle. Such exceptional cases, however frequently repeated, could never produce a general rule applying without distinction to all men alike.

The belief in Heroes in its gradual evolution and extension unquestionably led far away from the course taken by the Homeric belief in the things after death. In fact, it pointed in the opposite direction. But with the belief in Heroes men had not yet arrived at the belief in an immortality proper to the human soul by virtue of its own nature, nor yet (which would be something different again) was a general cult of souls thereby founded. In order that such beliefs might arise after, but not out of, the cult of Heroes, and maintain themselves side by side with an undiminished cult of Heroes, a movement was first necessary that had its origin in different sources.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

<sup>1</sup> Porph., *Abst.* 4, 22, p. 266, 23 Nauck.

<sup>2</sup> It is not quite clear whether it is legitimate to see in what Paus. 2, 2, 2, says about the graves of Neleus and Sisyphos a first trace of the worship of Hero-relics; as Lobeck does, *Agla.* 284. The oracle verse from Oionom. ap. Eus., *PE.* 5, 28, p. 223 B, in which Lykomegros is warned to honour *Μενέλαον τε καὶ ἄλλους ἀθανάτους ἥρωας*, of *Ἐσπερίωνος* *ἱγ*—is certainly quite late, later than the *ἥρωας ἃ Ἀντιόπη* that was known already to Herod.; earlier however than the second century, cf. Isyllos (*GDI.* 3342), l. 28. Oionompos got it, like all the oracles that he used in making his *Το-ῶνα* *φάρα*, from a collection of oracular sayings, certainly not from (or even indirectly from) Ephoros as has been groundlessly maintained.—Unquestionably the cult of Helen and Menelaos at Therapne was ancient: see Ross, *Arch. Anfs.* ii, 341 ff. Connexion with the legitimate pre-Dorian monarchy was eagerly sought for in Sparta: thus the bones of Orestes and Tisamenos were brought to Sparta and both honoured there as Heroes. The cult of Menelaos in Therapne has nothing whatever to do with his translation to Elysia (*Od.* 5).

<sup>3</sup> One *Δαίτης ἥρως τιμώμενος* *παρὰ τοῖς Τρωαῖς* is mentioned by Nisus, *fr.* 18. Still earlier Alc. seems to refer to the cult of Achilles as a Hero, *fr.* 48 b: *Ἀχιλλεύ, ὃ γὰρ Ζευδίνης μέβης* (see Wasmser, *de her. cult.*, p. 33).

<sup>4</sup> *Θεοὶ δὲ καὶ γὰρ τῶν Ἰλαρταῖα Σχέρι καὶ ἥρωας, ξυνοιστοῖς ὄντες.* Thuc. ii, 74, 2; *μάρτυρας θεῶν καὶ ἥρωας ἐγχυρίους ποιεῖσθαι.* Th. iv, 87, 2; cf. Th. v, 30, 2-3.

<sup>5</sup> Hdt. viii, 109: *εἰδὲ γὰρ οὐκ ἦμαίς περὶ τρωαίμεθα ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τε καὶ ἥρωες.*

<sup>6</sup> Hdt. vii, 43.

<sup>7</sup> In the first edition of this book I could not refer to the copiously documented article by Deneken on "Heroes" in Roscher's *Myth. Lex.* Even now I must be content to refer the reader generally to the rich collections of material there supplied. The view taken of the nature and origin of the Hero is, however, one which I can only reject. According to that account (which in this follows the current view) the belief in Heroes arose from a weakened belief in gods, and the race of Heroes was composed of formerly divine figures who had come to be regarded in the course of time with diminished awe. But the cult of Heroes was by no means an attenuated worship of the gods; on the contrary it was fundamentally contrasted in its essence to the cult of the gods above: *ἀνθρώπων* can never have been derived from *θεῶν* in however attenuated a form. Equally little can the Heroes of cult have been ever (much less frequently) derived from gods directly. The "Heroes" (as objects of a cult) are invariably elevated souls of men, not reduced divinities. This rule holds good even though a considerable number of once divine figures after they had been deprived of their godhead and made into great men, were when they died exalted, as outstanding human beings, to the rank of Hero. In this respect they did not differ from the innumerable cases before and beside them of simple mortals who had never been gods. Only when and because they had become men and been mortal could such

ex-divine personages become Heroes: no one stepped straight from godhood to Herohood. The Hero is regularly a promoted human spirit and nothing else.—I intend here and generally in this book to avoid further polemic against the currently accepted view of the origin of the Hero out of degraded godhead and to content myself instead with the statement of my own positive attitude in these matters.

<sup>4</sup> *ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἄλλοι τιμὰν ὑπέσχεσθαι καὶ ἡρώων ἄλλων, καὶ αὖτις ἀνοστήσαντες τοῦ θεοῦ.* *Att. Anab.* iv, 21, 3.

<sup>5</sup> Sacrifice to Heroes is *θερμαίνον αἴθερ* and throughout the night. *Pl.*, *I.* iv, 65 E. *ὡς καὶ νύκτας*, *Ap. Rh.* i, 587 (= *καὶ ἡμέρας* *θεοῦ*, *Schol.*). τὰ μὲν (*Ἀλεξάνδρου*) αἷς ἡμέρῃ κατὰ ἡμέραν δύναντα ἀναγίλλουσι δῖοι καὶ νύκτας δὲ ὡς θεῶν θύουσιν, *Paus.* 2, 11, 7. νύκτας κατὰ ἡμέρας ἀναγίλλουσιν, (the Phœnicians) to Myrtilos, *Paus.* 8, 14, 11. By night Solon sacrificed to the Salaminian Heroes. *Plu.*, *Sol.* 9.—After noon, αἰὲ μὲν ἡμέρας, must sacrifice be made to the Heroes, *D.L.* viii, 33; τοῖς νεκρομένοις καὶ μεσημβρίας, *EM.* 468, 34 (cf. *Procl.* in *Hes. Op.* 763, *Eust.*, § 65, p. 680, 36). The Heroes also are among the νεκρομένοις: τοῖς ἡρώων ὡς νεκρομένοις ἐντομα ἔθνη, ἀναβλάντας αἶμα ἐν γῆ, *Schol. A.D.*, A 459.—In later times sacrifice seems to have been made to the ordinary dead even in broad daylight (see Stengel, *Chthon. u. Totenkult.*, 422 f.), but to "Heroes", as once to the dead (Ψ 218 f.), always towards evening or at night.

<sup>6</sup> *ἑρῶες*, see above, Ch. I, n. 53.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Stengel, *Jb. f. Phil.*, 1880, pp. 322, 329.

<sup>8</sup> *Schol. A.D.*, A 459. *Schol. Ap. Rh.* i, 587. *ἑρῶες*, see Stengel, *Zf. f. Gymn.*, 1880, p. 743 ff.

<sup>9</sup> *ἀνακαμψία*, *Pl.*, *O.* i, 80. *Plu.*, *Aristid.* 21. The word is supposed to be Boeotian acc. to *Schol. Pl.*, *O.* i, 146 (hence *Greg. Cor.*, p. 215, *Schaefer*).

<sup>10</sup> Rightly (as against Welcker) *Wassner*, *de h. cult.*, p. 6, maintains that the *ἑρῶες* for Heroes were *ἐλευσινύμενοι*.

<sup>11</sup> *ἑρῶες* to heroes, *θεῶν* to gods. Pausanias in particular is careful in his use of the words, but even he, and Herodotus, too, occasionally says *θεῶν* where *ἑρῶες* would have been correct (e.g. *Hdt.* vii, 117, τὰ Ἀργαῖς θεοὺς Ἀνδρόνι ὡς ἡρώων). Others frequently say *θεῶν* instead of *ἑρῶες*, which as the more special idea could easily be included in *θεῶν* the more generic word for making sacrifice.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *Deneken*, *de theocentis* (Berl. 1881), cap. 1; *Wassner*, *de h. cult.*, p. 12. The expressions used by primitive peoples allow us to see the ideas that lie at the bottom of this mode of offering: cf. *Réville*, *les rel. des peuples non-civ.* i, 73. The ritual may be regarded as specially primitive and even earlier than the practice of burnt offering (cf. *Oldenberg*, *Rel. d. Veda*, 344 f.).

<sup>13</sup> See above, Ch. I, p. 14 f.—*ὡς Ἀλκίαν τῷ Ἀναδάμει τελευτήσαντι ἔλλα δρόμῳ ἡρώων*—*ὃ μὲν καὶ ἔλλα οὐκ εἴδα, ἰκανότατος δὲ δρόμῳ*, *Paus.* 8, 4, 5.

<sup>14</sup> The same is implied by the observation of *Aristarchos* that *Homer* knows no *ἑρῶες* καὶ *νεκρομένης ὁμίης*, see *Rh. Mus.* 38, 544 f. (as to the observation there put forward that *Homer* in fact did not know the word *νεκρομένης* or its use, cf. further *Schol. Pl.*, *New. intr.*, pp. 7, 8 f., *Abel*; see also *Merkel*, *Ap. Rh.* proleg., p. cxxvi: *νεκρομένης* derived from *νεκρός* not from *νεκρῶν*: *Schol.* § 511).

<sup>15</sup> Many such Agones for Heroes are mentioned, esp. by *Pindar*.

<sup>16</sup> e.g. on the command of the oracle an *ἀγὼν νεκρῶν* καὶ *ἰσχυρῶν* was founded in honour of the fallen *Phocæans* in *Agyia*, *Hdt.* i, 167,

Agon for Miltiades, *Hdt.* vi, 38; for Brasidas *Thuc.* v, 11; for Leonidas in Sparta, *Paus.* 3, 14, 1.

<sup>14</sup> At the Iolais in Thebes *μυρτόντι στεφάνου στεφανώσεται ο νικῶντες* *μυρτόντι δὲ στεφανώσονται διὰ τὸ εἶναι τῶν νεκρῶν στεφάνοι*, *Sch. Pl.* I, iii, 117. (The myrtle *τοῖς χθονίους ἀφίστατο*, *Apollod.* ap. *Sch. Ar.*, *Ran.* 330; as adorning graves, *Eur.*, *Et.* 324, 511.)

<sup>15</sup> General statement: *ἐπελόντο οἱ παλαιὶ πάντες ἀγῶνες ἐπὶ τῶν νεκροῖς*, *Sch. Pl.* I, p. 349 Ab. (*τοῖς ἐπιταφίσιν καὶ τῶν νεκρῶν*, *Cleas. Alex.* calls the four great games, *Protr.* ii, p. 28 P.). The Nemesis as an *ἀγὼν ἐνθάδης* for Archetomox, *Sch. Pl.* N., pp. 7, 8 Ab.; later offered to Zeus first by Herakles, *ib.*, p. 11, 8 ff.; 12, 14-13, 4 (cf. Welcker, *Ep. Cycl.* ii, 350 ff.). Victor's crown, since the Persian wars, of parsley *ἐπὶ τῶν κατοιχομένων*, *ib.*, p. 10 (parsley on graves: *Schmidewin* on *Dgn.* viii, 57; see below. *οὐλοῦν ἐνθάδης πένθημα* . . . *δοῖται ἐν τῷ κατὰ ἀγῶνα*, *Phoc.* 508, 5). Black dress of the judges, *ib.*, p. 11, 8 ff. *Schol. Arg.*, N. iv, v.—Isthmian games as *ἐνθάδης ἀγῶν* for Melikertes and then for Sinis or Skiron, *Plu.*, *Thes.* 25. *Sch. Pl.* I, pp. 350-2 Ab. Crown made of parsley or pine, both signs of mourning, *Paus.* 8, 43, 2 (and elsewhere see *Meincke, An. Alex.*, 80 ff.). The Pythian games are said to be an *ἀγὼν ἐνθάδης* for Python; the Olympic for Oinomaos or Pelops (*Phlegon, FHG.* iii, 603; cf. P. Knapp, *Corresp. Wirt. Geogr.* 1881, p. 9 ff.). These notices cannot all be learned inventions. It is a fact, for instance, that the funeral games of Telepolemos in Rhodes, known to Pindar, *O.* vii, 77 ff., were later transferred to Helios (cf. *Sch. Pl.* O. vii, 38, 146-7, and *Stöckh* on v. 77).

<sup>16</sup> "Half-gods," *ἥμίδες*. The name does not, as is sometimes declared, imply that the Heroes were spirits who thus constituted a class of intermediate beings between gods and men. The Heroes were not called *ἥμίδες*; the name was really applied to the kings and champions of the legendary age, more especially those who fought at Troy or Thebes (*Hes.*, *Op.*, 160; *Hom. M.* 23; *h. Hom.*, 31, 19; 32, 19. *Callin.*, fr. 1, 19, and often later). It applies to them, however, as living men not as glorified spirits (thus *Plu.*, *Ap.* 41A; cf. *D.H.* 7, 32, 13. *ἥμίδες γαστρεύει* [on earth] *αἱ ψυχαί*).—The *ἥμίδες* are a species of men not of spirits or daimones: they are those *οἱ κατὰ τὸν νότον ἐκείνους, οὓς δ' ἐξ ἀνέκων ἐγένοντο* *ὡς ἥμίδες* (*Simon.*, fr. 36; cf. *Plu.*, *Cras.* 398 D), the sons of gods and mortal women and then their companions as well (a portion so named). Even the idea that the great men of the past, thus called *ἥμίδες*, were naturally made "Heroes" after their death as a consequence of their half-divine nature which might give them special privileges even then—this idea has no very ancient authority. *Cicero, ND.* iii, 45, seems to be the first to suggest such a view. That the Greeks of the best period ever regarded semi-divine origin as a qualification for becoming a Hero is refuted by the simple fact that for the great majority of the "Heroes" descent from a god was not claimed. Of course, poetry was always ready to give a Hero a divine father in order to enhance his value, cf. *Paus.* 6, 11, 2; but this was never a condition of being made a Hero (rather of being raised from Hero to god).

<sup>17</sup> *πάντες μὲν ἀδελφοὶ μέγα, ἄνους δ' ἴσους ἀπορρίπτει*, *Pl.*, *P.* v, 94 f.

<sup>18</sup> *τίνα θεῶν, τίνα δ' ἀνθρώπων, τίνα δ' ἀδελφῶν*; *Pl.*, *O.* ii *ιστί. οὐκ θεῶν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἀδελφῶν ἀνακαταίεται*, *Antiph.* i, 27. With "daimones" added: Gods, daimones, heroes, men: *Pl.*, *Rp.* 382 A; 427 B; *Lg.* iv, 717 AB. In later times the distinction between *θεοί*, *δαίμονες*, *ἥμίδες*, corresponded to a real and popular opinion, see e.g. *GDI.*

1562 (Dodona), cf. also 1560, 1585 b.—There can be no question of identifying Heroes with the daimones (as Nägelsb., *N. Zk.* 104, does). When philosophers call the *dæmōnes* "that is from quite a different point of view. It is a speculative idea peculiar to Plutarch himself that, in view of the transition from men to Heroes and from these to daimones, the Heroes themselves might be regarded as a sort of lower daimon (*DO.* 10, 415 A; *Rom.* 28). A Schol. on Eur., *Her.* 165, quite justifiably makes a parallel between gods and daimones on the one hand and Heroes and men on the other: the gods are *ἐφαλόεσθαι τι τάγμα τῶν θεῶν* and this is the relation of *οἱ ἄνθρωποι* τῶν θεῶν *ἀνθρώπων*, *ἐφαλόεσθαι τινος θεοῦ* καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

<sup>21</sup> Aristarchos' remark that in Homer not only kings but *véreer* *κοῖται* are designated as *ἄνθρωποι*, was directed against the mistaken limitation of the word by later; see Lehrs, *Aristarch.* <sup>1</sup>, p. 101. Before Aristarch., however, the mistaken idea that *οἱ ἄνθρωποι τῶν ἀρχαίων* *μόνοι* *ἄνθρωποι*, *οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ ἄνθρωποι* seems to have been general; it is expressed in the [*Arist.*] *Probl.* 19, 48, p. 922b, 18; Rhianon, 100, held it, see Schol. *γ* 41 (Mayhoff, *de Rhiani stud. Hom.*, p. 46).—It is incorrect to say that in the supposed "later" parts of the *Odyssey* *ἄνθρωποι* is no longer used of all free men, but only of the aristocracy (*Fanta, Sämtl. in H. u. Od.*, 17 f.). In § 288, § 242, § 97, the word is used as an honourable title of free men of superior rank, but there is no suggestion of a restriction of the word to such use. In addition to which, the word *ἄνθρωποι* unmistakably appears in its wider sense also in other parts of the poem equally and rightly supposed to be late (α 272, § 483, α 68, etc.).

<sup>22</sup> So for example esp. when Pausanias speaks of the *καλούμενοι ἄνθρωποι*, 5, 8, 2; 5, 5, 1; 7, 17, 1; 8, 12, 2; 10, 10, 1, etc.

<sup>23</sup> *ἀρχαῖοι ἄνθρωποι* *ἐκείνους*, Hes., *Op.* 158.

<sup>24</sup> Of the "Heroes" of his fourth race the great majority fell according to Hesiod in the war of Troy or Thebes and died without any "illumination"; the few, on the other hand, who are translated to the Islands of the Blest are illuminated indeed, but have never died. To regard them as the prototypes and forerunners of the Heroes worshipped in later times (as many do) is inadmissible.

<sup>25</sup> Grave in the market: Battus in Kyrene, Pl., *P.* v, 87 ff., and frequently. Hero-graves in the Prytaneion at Megara, Paus. 1, 43, 2-3. Adrastus was buried in the market at Sekyon. Kleisthenes, to play a trick on him, brought from Thebes (the corpse of) Melanippos, who, when alive, had been his greatest enemy, and placed him *ἐν τῇ ἀγορῇ* καὶ *μὴ* *ἵδμενος* *ἰδόμενος* *ἐν τῇ ἀγορῇ*, Hdt. v, 67. Themistokles had a *μνησίον* in the market at Megara on the Malander. Th. 1, 138, 5; i.e. a *ῥαῖος* (see Wachsmuth, *Rh. Mus.* li, 140).

<sup>26</sup> *ῥαῖος ἀνέστη* *ἐκ τῶν καλεσσομένων κατὰ δόξαν*, Pl., *Q.* i, 93; i.e. the great *arch-aitor* of Zeus. The excavations have confirmed Pindar's description (cf. Paus. 5, 13, 1-3).

<sup>27</sup> Grave built in the gateway: *ἐν αἰθρῇ τῇ πύλῃ* at Elis Aitolos the son of Oxylos was buried, Paus. 5, 4, 4; cf. Lobbeck, *Agf.* 281 f. Grave at the boundary of the country: Korobos, the first Olympic victor, was buried *ἡμέτερος* *ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ* as the insc. stated: Paus. 8, 28, 4. Grave of Korobos, son of Mygdon, *ἐν ἱερῇ* *Θρυῶν* *Ἰνκρυῶν*, Paus. 10, 27, 1.

<sup>28</sup> The idea of the grave as the dwelling-place of the Hero is shown in a very strange fashion by the story that the Phylakians before the feast of Demeter *ἀνέστησαν* *ἐν τοῖς σπυδαῖς* the hero Aras and his son, looking while so doing towards the graves of these Heroes: Paus. 2, 12, 5.

\* This hero (Xanthippon or Phokos) *ἔχει δὲ ψῆφον καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς καὶ ὕστερον ἰσχυρὰ ἐπαύρις τὸ πᾶν εἶπεν δι' αὐτῆς ἐγχεσθαι ἐν τῷ τάφῳ κτλ.* Paus. 10, 4, 10. Similarly at the grave of Hyakinthos at Amyklai, Paus. 3, 19, 3. The meaning of such an offering is the same in Greece as in similar cases among any "savage" tribe. In Tylor, ii, 28, we read: "In the Congo district the custom has been described of making a channel into the tomb to the head or mouth of the corpse, to send down month by month the offerings of food and drink."

\* Most of the examples are mentioned by Lobeck, *Agf.* 281 [u], but he omits the most remarkable case, fully reported by Hdt. i, 87-8, of the transference of the bones of Orestes from Tegen to Sparta (cf. Paus. 3, 3, 6; 11, 10; 8, 56, 4. The reason is obvious, cf. Müller, *Dorians*, i, 72). Besides this note: the removal of the bones of Hektor from Ilion to Thebes, Paus. 9, 18, 5, Sch. and Tz., *Lyc.* 1194, 1204; of Arkas from Mainalos to Nantinea, Paus. 8, 9, 5; cf. 8, 36, 8; of Herakles from Naupaktos to Orchomenos, Paus. 9, 38, 3; of Hippodameia from Midea in Argolis to Olympia, Paus. 8, 20, 7; of Timaristos from Helike to Sparta, Paus. 7, 1, 8; of Aristomenes from Rhodes to Messene, Paus. 4, 32, 3. Strange story of the shoulder bone of Pelops, Paus. 5, 13, 4-6. In all these cases the removal followed upon a command of the oracle, cf. also Paus. 9, 30, 9-11. Practical stimulus may have been given occasionally by the discovery of abnormally large bones in dug-up graves; we often hear of such discoveries, cf. W. Schmid, *Atthisstud.* iv, 572 f., and it was always believed that such gigantic bones were remains of one of τῶν καλοῦμένων ἥρώων, Paus. 6, 5, 1 (cf. also 1, 35, 5 f.; 3, 22, 6). It would be the business of the oracle to determine the name of the Hero concerned and see that the remains were reverently preserved. (One example may be given, though from a later period. In the dried-up bed of the Orestes a clay coffin 11 yards long was found and a corpse within it. The oracle of the Clarian Apollo on being applied to for enlightenment as to its origin answered, *Ὀρέστης εἴσιν, γένειον δὲ μύριον εἴσιν τῷ Ἰσχυρῷ*, Paus. 6, 29, 4; Philostr., *H.* 669 p. 138, 6-19 ff.)

\* Plu., *Cim.* 8; *Thes.* 36; Paus. 3, 3, 7.—In the year 437-6 we hear of the removal by Hagnon and his Athenians, at the command of the oracle, of the bones of Rhesos from Troy to Amphipolis: Polyaeus, vi, 53. The neighbourhood of the mouth of the Strymon on the western slopes of Mt. Pangaios was the original home of Rhesos: he was already known to the Doloness as the son of Elioneus; to later writers as the son of Strymon and (like Orpheus) a Muse—which is the same thing (see Conon, 4). On Mt. Pangaios he still lived as an oracular deity: this must have been the popular belief of the district which the author of the *Rhesus* explains after Greek fashion (ll. 955-66). He is a tribal god of the Edonians, of the same pattern as Zalmoxis of the Getai, and Sabos or Sabanos of other Thracian tribes. In the mind of the Greeks he had become since the poem of the Doloness entirely detached from the site of his worship and was a mere mortal champion with whom fancy might do what it chose (cf. Parth. 36). The restoration of his bones to the neighbourhood of the lower Strymon (μνηστῆρες τοῖς Πάσι in Amphipolis: Μνηστῆς δ' οὐδὲν ἐστιν in Sch., *Rhes.* 348), and the heroic cult which was undoubtedly paid to him in connexion therewith, may have been a kind of official recognition by the Greeks of the worship of Rhesos discovered in that neighbourhood by the Athenian colonists. I see no reason for doubting the historical fact of the occurrence, though some of the details of Polyaeus' account have a fabulous colouring. It is true Cicero says of Rhesos, *natusque*

colours (*ND.* iii, 45), and so it may have been in C.'s time: for the earlier period the close of the tragedy clearly suggests the cult of R. as a divinity, while the story of Polyasus implies his Hero-cult.

<sup>71</sup> Sometimes only single parts of the body, e.g. the shoulder-blade of Pelops at Olympia (*Paus.* 5, 13).—In Argos on the road to the Akropolis their heads were buried in the *πύγμα τῶν Αἰγύφτων καύλων*, while the rest of their bodies were in Larne. *Paus.* 2, 24, 2.

<sup>72</sup> See Lob., *Ag.* 281. This only can be the meaning of *Soph.*, *OC.* 1522 f. (Nauck otherwise).—A strange case is that of Hippolytus in Troezen: ἀνθεστής αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἐβέβαιον (cf. *Τροίη*) σπένειν ὄντι τῶν ἱερῶν οὐκ εἰς τὸν τάφον ἀποβαίνοντες εἰδότες τὸν δὲ ἐν αὐτοῦ καλομένον φῶχος τοῦτον εἶναι ταλλέμενον ἱερίων (ἱερίων?) Ἰστιάδων, τιμὴν κατὰ θεῶν ταύτην ἔχοντα *Paus.* 2, 32, 1. Here it seems as if the grave were not shown because Hipp. was not regarded as having died and therefore would not have a grave: he is said to have been translated and set among the stars. But there was a grave and the translation story must therefore only be an afterthought. (The death of Hipp. is spoken of clearly enough by the poets: but what happened to him after Asklepios had restored him to life again? The Italian Virgins legend seems to have been little known in Greece. *Paus.* 2, 27, 4, knows it from Aricia.)—Very occasionally the possession of the relics of the Hero was secured by burning the bones and scattering the ashes in the market place of the city. Thus Phalaethos in Tarentum, *Justin.* 3, 4, 13 ff.; Sokon in Salamis, *D.L.* i, 63; *Plu.*, *Soi.* 32. As a rule the scattering of ashes is intended to serve a different purpose, cf. *Plu.*, *Lycorg.* 31 ff.; *Nic. Dam.*, *Paradox.* 29, p. 70 West.

<sup>73</sup> A few examples: *κένω εἶμας* of Teirenos in Thebes, *Paus.* 9, 18, 4; of Achilles at Elis, *Paus.* 6, 23, 3; of the Argives who fought in the war against Troy, at Argos, *Paus.* 2, 20, 6; of Iolaios at Thebes, *Paus.* 9, 23, 1; *Sch. Pl.*, *N.* iv, 32 (in the tomb of Amphitryon? *Pl.*, *P.* ix, 81); of Odysseus at Sparta, *Plut.*, *Q. Gr.* 48, 302 C; of Kalchas in Apulia, *Lyc.* 1047 f.

<sup>74</sup> Perhaps by ἀνάληψις of the στήθε? see above, Ch. I, p. 86 (at the foundation of Μεσσηνία ἀναλαμβάνειν ἐν κοινῇ καὶ φρονεῖ σφαιρὶ ἐπὶ σφαιρῶν σπένειναι, *Paus.* 4, 27, 6).

<sup>75</sup> καὶ ταύτας καὶ τάμεις δὲν θέοισιν ἐπὶ θεῶν ἔχαι τὸν δῆμιον νόμισμα, *Hdt.* ix, 120.

<sup>76</sup> No detailed proof of this statement is needed. We will only remark that the attempt to conceal the grave is often met with among so-called "savage" tribes and has the same purpose as in the Greek Hero-cult: cf. on this subject Herbert Spencer, *Princ. of Sociol.* i, p. 178.

<sup>77</sup> See Helbig, *D. hom. Epas ant. Dnm.* i, p. 41.

<sup>78</sup> See above, p. 23.

<sup>79</sup> *§ 403 αὶ δ' ἔχαι Ἀρεσίην ὄντι Κυλλήφης ὄρεσι σῖσι. Αἰνέειον κατὰ τῆς πόλεως.*—*Cl.* *Paus.* 8, 16, 2-3.—In the Troad the frequently mentioned Ἴλιον σῆμα, the στήρα πολυκέρειον Μυρίνης which "πολλὰ" tall *Barisai*, were similar monuments.

<sup>80</sup> The ceremonial announcement of death, the *καραμάνεσθαι* of the proper persons (as usual the next of kin to the dead); the assembling of Spartan Perioikoi and Helots (cf. *Tyrt. fr.* 7) with their women to the number of several thousands, the extravagant expressions of grief and praise of the dead, the period of mourning (no business in the market for ten days, etc.)—all this is described by *Hdt.* vi, 56. He compares this grandiose funeral with the pomp customary at the burial of an Asiatic (Persian) monarch.—The Lycian *εἶμας* by these funeral rites *ὡς δὲ ἀποθνήσκουσιν ἄλλ' ὡς θῆρας τοῦ ἀναβαρμάνειν*

Βασιλεῖς κτερονιμῆσαν, Xen., *Rp. Lac.* xv, 9. King Agis I *ἐνυχε σπαστότατος ἢ καὶ ἑθνησπορ τυφῶς*, Xen., *HG.* 3, 3, 1.—A peculiar circumstance at the burial of a Spartan king is mentioned by Apollod., *fr.* 36.—The burial places of the royal Houses of the Agiadae and the Eurypontidae (apart even in their death), Pauk. 3, 12, 8; 14, 2 (cf. Burman, *Geog.* II, 128).—Embalming of the body of a king who dies abroad, Xen., *MG.* 5, 3, 19; D.S. 15, 99, 6; Nep., *Agas.* 8; Plu., *Agas.* 40.—Besides this the participation in primitive times of the whole people in the funeral of the Herakleid kings in Corinth may probably be deduced from the story told of the compulsory attendance of the Megarian subjects of Corinth at the funeral at Corinth of a king of the Bakchiad family; Sch. Pl., *N.* vii, 155 [cf. *AB.* 281, 27 B.; Zenob. v, 8; Dign. vi, 34]. In Crete τὰν βασιλῶν ἀνδραμύμων παρρηγῆτο κυρτοχῆλος ὁ σπαστότατος as at the funeral of Patroklos, *V* 131 ff.; Arist. *ap. Schol.* V., *V* 130.

<sup>47</sup> Βασιλεῖται, of . . . μετέχοντες τοῖς βασιλικοῖς γένους, *EM.* 395, 50.—Thus the Bakchiadae in Corinth were descendants of the royal family of the house of Bakchia. The Βασιλεῖται, a ruling family of oligarch nobles in Ephesos (*Ael. fr.* 48), Erythrai (*Arist., Pol.* 1305b, 19), and perhaps Chios as well (see Gilbert, *Gr. Ath.* ii, 153), also traced back their descent to the old kings of those Ionic cities. Respect paid to those who were descended *ἐκ τοῦ γένους* of Androklos at Ephesos, *Str.* 633.—The Aigid Admetos, priest of Apollo Karneios at Thera was descended *Ασπυδαίμονος ἐκ βασιλῶν*, *Epigr. Gr.* 191; 192.

<sup>48</sup> Here some reference might have been expected to Fustel de Coulanges' brilliant and penetrating work *La Cité antique*. In that book the attempt is made to fix upon ancestor-worship, *la religion du foyer et des ancêtres*, as the root of all the higher types of worship (among the Greeks; only that part of the book concerns us here); and to show how out of these ancestor-worshipping aggregations, begun by the family, larger communities of ever-widening membership developed, and finally out of these the *πόλις* itself—the highest and most extensive political as well as religious community of all. For the author of that book the proof of his theory lies entirely in the simple logical consequence with which the details and, as far as we know it, the development of both private and public law follow from the original causes adopted by him essentially as postulates. A strictly historical proof that should not have to deduce the original causes from the results but should start from known beginnings and demonstrate the actual existence of every step was indeed an impossibility. The whole historical process must have been already finished when our knowledge first begins: for Homer shows us the *πόλις* and its component parts (*καὶ δὲ θεῶν καὶ πόλεως καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀνδραμύμων*) as well as the worship of the gods as fully established and developed. It is no disparagement of the valuable and fruitful suggestions made in that book if we say that its leading idea—as far as Greece is concerned—cannot be considered as more than an intuition, which though it may be just and true, must remain unproved. If there ever was a time when ancestor-worship was the only Greek religion at least we cannot see into that dim epoch long anterior to all tradition. To that remote period long before both the all-powerful religion of the gods and the earliest records of the Greek genius, even the narrow and slippery path of inference and reconstruction will hardly lead us. Natural as it might seem, therefore, so far as the subject itself is concerned to deal with such questions, I have taken no notice in the



present work of any attempts to deduce Greek religion from an original sole worship of ancestors (such as have been made by many scholars besides F. de Coulanges both in England and in Germany).

<sup>12</sup> Those worshipped by a *γένος* regarded as its progenitors, *γένει*: *AB.* 240, 31 (τὰ θεῖα διδασκὶν εἰς τὰ γένεα (ιστὸς) τὰ γένεα.—Physical relationship between the *γενέταις*, originally a fact though afterwards only occasionally demonstrable, is indicated by the ancient name *ἐμμεγέλειες* applied to the members of the same clan (*Philoch.* fr. 91-4) and meaning strictly *weiler* καὶ *weiler* *weiler* (*Arist.*, *Pol.* 1282b, 18).—The word *μάρα* with the same meaning as *γένος* (*Μεδολιδέω μάρα*, *Pl.*, *P.* viii, 38), makes it still more clear that the members of such a group are regarded as the descendants of a single ancestor. See *Dikaiarch.* ap. *St. Byz.* *μάρα*.

<sup>13</sup> Whose names were chosen by the voice of the Delphic oracle out of a hundred submitted to the Pythia. *Arist.* *Ἀθ.* 21, 8, *Cf.* *Monmaen.* *Philol.*, N.F. 1, 456 f.

<sup>14</sup> Instead of the common *ἰσώνυμοι* we also find the word *ἀρχήγους* used of the Heroes of the phylai: *Ar.* *Γῆρας*, fr. 126 H.-C. (*AN.* 449, 14); *Pl.*, *Eys.* 205 D. cf. *Cf.* 11, 1191; 1575. It is even plainer that the Hero is regarded as the ancestor of his *φύλη* when he is called *ἀρχηγός*: thus *Oineus* was the *ἀρχηγός* of the *Οινεΐδαι*, *Kekrops* the *ἀρχηγός* of the *Kekropidae*, *Hippothoos* *ἀρχηγός* of the *Hippothooidae* in [*Dem.*] 60, 30-1. The *ἀρχηγός* τοῦ γένους is its physical forebear and progenitor, *Poll.* iii, 19, thus *Apollo* ὁ ἀρχηγός τοῦ γένους of the *Seleucidae*, *CIG.* 3395, 26; cf. *Isocr.* 5, 32. Thus too the members of a phyle are actually described as the *οὐγγενεῖς* of their Heroeponyms: [*Dem.*] 60, 28.

<sup>15</sup> Thus we know of both *δῆμος* and *γένος* of the *Ionidae*, *Phlakidae*, *Bontadae* (for the intentional distinctness of the *Ereoboutadae* see *Meier*, p. 20), *Kephakidae*, *Perishoidae*, etc.: *Meyer, de gentib. Attica*, p. 35. Such demes were called ἐπὶ τῶν κτισμάτων, others ἀπὸ τῶν τόπων: *Arist.* *Ἀθ.* 21, 5 (in which case a name as much like a personal name as possible was extracted out of the place-name and made into the local Hero: cf. *Wachsm.*, *Stadt Athen*, ii. 1, 248 B.). Similar conditions existed at other places. In *Teos* the same names occur as *νύργου* (= *δῆμος*) and *συμμορίου* (= *γένος*), e.g. *Νολανίω*, τοῦ Ἀλεξίμου νύργου, Ἀλεξιδῆς (also names which differ *Ναῖω*, τοῦ Μηρόδου νύργου, *Βρυσιδῆς*), *CIG.* 3064, where see *Böckh* II, p. 651. In *Rhodes* a *γένος* as well as its larger inclusive group (*οὐσία*?) is called Ἀμφιγῆς: *IGM.* *Arg.* i, 995, Ἀμφιγῆων μάρα; *Εὐκλείδης*, Ἀμφιγῆς, etc. [Ancestor worship *σπονδαί* led in the *Rhodian κνέαι* is vouched for by *Heuz.*, *κνέαι*: see *Martha*, *BCH.* iv, 144.]

<sup>16</sup> Thus the descendants of *Bakchis* in *Corinth* traced their descent to *Aletes* (*D.S.* 7, 9, 4; *Paus.* 2, 4, 3); the descendants of *Aipyros* in *Messenia* to *Kreophontes* (*Paus.* 4, 3, 8), the descendants of *Agis* and *Eurypon* in *Sparta* to *Eurythanes* and *Prokles*. The real ancestors were in these cases well known and could not be entirely eclipsed (being too deeply rooted in cult): thus later, as well as in the earlier period, these same families are called *Βακχίδαι*, *Αἰπυρίδαι*, not *Ἰππασιδῆαι* (*D.S.*, loc. cit., *Paus.* 4, 3, 8); the *Spartan* royal families are still *Agidae*, *Euryponidae*, while the fictitious ancestors *Eurythanes* and *Prokles* never quite achieved the status of *ἀρχήγους*: *Ephoros* ap. *Str.* 306. In many other, perhaps more numerous, cases the fictitious ancestor may have ousted the real and once better known from men's minds altogether.

<sup>17</sup> [*Arist.*] *Mirab.* 105.

<sup>12</sup> See PAUS. 10, 4, 10. In an oracle ap. PLU., SOL. 9: ἀρχηγὸς χώρεσθαι δυνάμεσθαι ἄριστος ἔλασθαι.

<sup>13</sup> PLU., ARIST. 11, names seven ἀρχηγέται Πλαταιῶν; CLEM. AL., PROTR. II, 35 P., gives four of these (Κυνδαίος seems to be a mistake). Androkrates seems to have been the most prominent; his τέρμενος is mentioned by Hdt. ix, 25, his ἄρμον Thuc. iii, 24, 1; it stood in a thick grove, PAUS. loc. cit.

<sup>14</sup> PAUS. 8, 24, 9-10.

<sup>15</sup> A.R. II, 835-50, says that this Hero was Idmon the prophet, others called him Agamemstor. Sch. ad 845: λέγουσι δὲ καὶ προμυθῆναι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν ὄντις εἰς ἐπιχώριον ἦσαν καλοῦσθαι τὸ Ἡρακλεῖον. He was the local daimon worshipped on the spot before the colony came, and then taken over by the colonists for their own. Cf. the case of Rhesos, above, n. 38.

being one as it was the grave and altar of Αἰάκος at Αἴγινα, PAUS. 2, 24, 8—whose name was Οἰνεία. Acc. to others it was the grave of Νάπαιον son of Πήλοιο and of his horse; or the μνῆν ἥλοιο of Mytilos set up in his honour by Pelops; or of Οἰνομάχοιο; or of Αἰκάδοιο king of Portheion, one of the suitors of Hippodameia—to say nothing of the learned suggestion of the ἀρχὴ Διγύνοιο given by PAUS. loc. as a last resort. Acc. to Hesych. ταραξίνοιο it belonged to Pelops himself, acc. to Lyc. 42 f. to a giant called Ischenos (see Sch. and Ta.). Besides all this a ταραξίνοιο seems to have been almost indispensable on the racecourses of the great games. The Isthmus and Nemea had theirs as well (PAUS. § 19)—and PAUS. 10, 37, 4, mentions it as something unusual that the course at Delphi had no ταραξίνοιο. Cf. POLLAK, Hippodamika, p. 91 ff., 1890.

<sup>16</sup> ἥρωεσ γέβοιο, CIG. 4838b, cf. Welcker, Rhein. Mus., N.F. vi, 618—καλαμῖνος ἥρωε (Dem. 18, 129, with Sch. and Hesych. s.v.)—ἥρωε τριχημῖναι εἰς Μυρῖον, Hesych.—ἥρωε ἐπὶ νέρωιο, CIG. in, 1, 290, and 1, 194-206, see Hüller v. Gär., Philol. 55, 180 f.—With place-names ὁ εἰς βλαδίον ἥρωε, Poll. vii, 87—ἥρωε ἐν ἀδίῳ, Att. ins. ap., Leg. Sacr. i, p. 5.—In Epidaurion on an architrave occurs the inser. ἥρωεσ κλαυκρόφοιο. F. d'Epré, i, n. 245. τῷ κλαυκρόφῳ also occurs in an inser. from Mt. Ithome, Leg. Sacr., p. 36 (n. 13, l. 11).—Probably in this class belongs the ἥρωε νεοφ at Athens, Pl. Lys. init.; Hesych. Phot. s.v.

<sup>17</sup> ἥρωεσ λατρεῖς in Athens, CIG. II, 403-4, see below.—A ἥρωεσ ἀνταρτήγες is mentioned by a (late) ins. 'Εφ. Αρχ., 1884, p. 170, l. 53. From their activities are named also the Heroes Matron, Keraton in Sparta, Deipneus in Achaia (Polemon: Ath. ii, 38 C; iv, 173 F).—The Δεφεινοφόροιο ἥρωεσ was mentioned by Antiph., σφεινοφόροιο ἥρωεσ by Hellen., but his name was unknown: Harp. Phot. Suid. s.v.; AB. 301, 19 ff. Cf. Böckh, Econ. of Ath., p. 144 Lew.; CIG. I, p. 168.

<sup>18</sup> In Phaleron there was an altar, καλεῖται δὲ "ἥρωεσ"—the learned declared it to be an altar of Androgeos the son of Minos: PAUS. I, 1, 4.—Cf. 10, 36, 6: Χαραδραῖοιο (at Charadra in Phocia) ἥρωεσ καλουμένων (i.e. they were called "the Heroes") αἰὲν ἐν τῇ ἀγορῇ βωταί, καὶ οὐτοὶ οἱ πρὸ Διοσκόφοιο, οἱ δὲ ἐπιχώριοι φασὶν αἰεὶ: ἥρωεσ.—ἥρωεσ, ἥρωεσ a sacrifice is offered at Marathon: sacrosanct Calendar of the Attic Tetrapolis (fourth century B.C.) in Leg. Sacr. i, p. 48. ἥρωεσ, ἥρωεσ, ib., p. 2; CIG. I, 4; fifth century.—Decree ordering a record to be set up in the Peiraeus παρὰ τὸν ἥρωε, SIG. 834, 28; CIG. II, 1545-7: ἥρωε ἀνθῆρον δὲ βωταί. Roehl, IG.

*Ant.* 29: (Mykonai) τοῦ ἥρωος ἡμ. cf. Furtwängler, *Att. Mitt.* 1896, p. 8; ib. 323; *ἐπιθήματα τῶν ἥρων* (Locris).—On the different superimposed layers of stucco on the so-called Heron west of the Altis at Olympia were the ins. "Ἡρώς, "Ἡρώς, and once also "Ἡρώς. There seems to me to be no reason to suppose that this nameless Hero was Iamos in particular, the ancestor of the Iamidae (as Curtius does, *Die Altäre v. Olymp.*, p. 25, *Abh. Berl. Ak.* 1881). For what reason should the name of this highly honoured oracular Hero—which had by no means been forgotten—be suppressed? The name of the Hero was not given for the simple reason that it was unknown. Nameless ἥρωες *ἐπιθήματα*, who according to some had set up the great sacrificial altar of Zeus in Olympia, are mentioned by Paus. 3, 13, 8. In some cases the namelessness of a Hero is explained by the fear of uttering awful names, which esp. in the case of the spirits of the lower world are very frequently suppressed or referred to by a circumlocution (cf. Erinyes and spirits of the dead, *Rh. Mus.* 50, 20, 3); cf. *Ant. Lib.* 13, p. 214, 19 W. This was perhaps why Narkissos was called ἥρωες οὐραλός, *Str.* 404. On the other hand, it was a special form of respect, at the sacrifice to a Hero, to call out his name: τῶ 'Αρραυλῆ θύουσι 'Ανάδρα ἐκ Θεωνοῦσις ὡς ἥρωι ἐνομομάχοντι τὸ σέβειν, *Hdt.* vii. 117. "Υἱὸς θεῶν καὶ αὐτὸν ἐξ ἐνόματος εἰς τὰς ἐπεὶς θύουσι κατὰ Ἀντων. *Lib.* 28 fin. Cf. Paus. 8, 26, 7: ἐνομαλοῦσθαι τὸν ἥρωα.—No one will miss the obvious analogy with the worship of the gods. In many places in Greece nameless (or merely "adjectival") gods were worshipped, *ἐνομαστοὶ θεοί*, as at Olympia, Paus. 5, 14, 8, and elsewhere. At Phaleron *βωμοὶ θεῶν τε ἀνομαλοῦσθαι ἐνομασθαι καὶ ἥρωων* (sc., *ἐνομασθαι*?) Paus. 1, 1, 4. (*ἀνομαστοὶ θεοὶ* Poll. viii. 119. *Herzsch. s.v.*; *βωμοὶ ἀνομαστοὶ* in Attica D.L. i. 110.)

<sup>12</sup> *Thesauriopolis ἀρχαῖα* Pi., O. vii. 78; P. v. 58. The regular custom is mentioned by Ephorus ap. *Str.* 366: οὐδ' ἀρχαῖος νομισθεῖται: ἐπεὶ αὐτοὶ ἀεχθίζονται οἰκονοῖς.

<sup>13</sup> *Δημοκρατίαν δὲ καταστήσαντι τὴν ἀνακλάν ἀποχρησάμενα*. Official decree about Bras: *CIA.* i. 31 [Hicks and Hult, n. 41, l. 8].

<sup>14</sup> Pi., P. v. 67 f.

<sup>15</sup> *Hdt.* vi. 38.

<sup>16</sup> D.S. ii. 66, 4.

<sup>17</sup> *Hdt.* i. 168.

<sup>18</sup> *Thuc.* v. 11.—Thus in the fourth century at Sikyon Euphron the leader of the demos has been murdered by some of the other party, but οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς θεῶν δυνάει νομισάμενος *ἐθαπέρ* καὶ ἐν τῇ *ἀγορῇ* καὶ ἐν ἀρχαῖσιν τῆς πόλεως εἰσέβαιναι. *Xen.* *HG.* 7, 4, 12.

<sup>19</sup> Worship of the law-givers of Tegea as Herones: Paus. 8, 48, 1.

<sup>20</sup> In the case of Sophokles the "heroizing" had a special superstitious reason. He had once received Asklepios as a guest into his house (and established a worship of A.) and was therefore regarded as especially favoured by heaven and after his death worshipped as Hero *Ἀσκληῖος*: *EM.* 256, 7-13. (In the temple of Amyneon, an Asklepiad daimon, on the west of the Akropolis an inscription dating from the end of the fourth century B.C. has been discovered, referring to the *ἀφικόμενος τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ* together with those of Amyneon and Asklepios: *Att. Mitt.* 1896, p. 299.) In this way many mortals who had entertained the gods as guests were themselves made Heroes, cf. Dencker, *de Theozen.* c. ii.

<sup>21</sup> In the examples collected in n. 35 above the removal of the Hero's bones was in each case commanded by the Delphic oracle. Typical examples of the foundation of an annual festival of a Hero on



of horses and the sound of battle. Those who attempted to witness the doings of the spirits suffered for it, Paus. l.c. The sight of the spirits made men blind or killed them. This is well known of gods—*χαλεροὶ δὲ θεοὶ φανεροὶ θανάτῳ*. As to the results of seeing a Hero cf. the story in Hdt. vi. 117.

<sup>40</sup> Pl., *J.* iv. 28 B.; cf. *N.* iv. 48 ff.

<sup>41</sup> Hdt. ii. 44, has recourse to the idea that there was a difference between the god Herakles and the Hero Herakles the son of Amphitryon: καὶ δυνάμει δὲ μὴ οὐτοὶ δαδότερα Ἑλλήνων νοεῖν, οἱ δὲ δὲ Ἡράκλειον ἱεροῦσθαιον ἱερῶσαι καὶ τῷ μὴ ὡς εἰδέναι Ὀλεμπίῳ δὲ ἱεροῦσθαιον θύειν, τῷ δὲ ἱερῶσαι ὡς ἡμῶν ἀστυλίου. Combination of θεός and ἡρώτης in one sacrifice to Herakles, at Sikyon: Paus. 2, 10, 1. Herakles ἡρώς θεός Pl., *N.* iii. 22.

<sup>42</sup> Varying worship of the same person as Hero and as god, e.g. Achilles. He was a god in Epirus for example (called upon as Ἄσπερος, Plin., *Pyrr.* 1) in Astypalaia (Cic., *N.D.* iii. 45) in Erythrai (third century ins. SIG. 600, 50, 75), etc. As Hero he was worshipped in Elis where an empty grave was erected to him ἐν μνηταίᾳ, and where at his annual festival at sunset the women κόνισθαι νομίζοντο, i.e. lament over him as dead, Paus. 6, 23, 3.

<sup>43</sup> I shall not multiply examples and only note Plin., *M. Trist.*, p. 235 E: τῷ Ἀμφιδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡρώων τινὲς ἀποθεῖσθαι, ὁστὶς αὖτὲ θεῶν θύειν ἐφήκειτο.

In the well-known lines ἦεν δὲ Ἀντίοχος καὶ. Hdt. i. 63.

<sup>44</sup> Thus Eupolis calls the Hero Akademos θεός, as Sophokles does the Hero Kolonos, and others do the same, see Nauck on Soph., *OC.* 65.

<sup>45</sup> οἱ ἡρώες καὶ οἱ θεοὶ τοῖς θεαῖς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔργου λόγον (i.e. for dreams-interpretation), εἰς τὴν δόξαν ἐνέμενον ἀπολαύοντες, Artemid. iv. 78.—Paus. 10, 31, 11: the ancients considered the Eleusian mysteries as τοσοῦτος ἱεραιότερος than all other religious ceremonies εἰς καὶ θεοὺς ἀνέμενον ἡρώων.

<sup>46</sup> Machaon's μῦθος and ἱερεῖς ὄντων at Gerenia, Paus. 3, 26, 9. His bones had been brought by Nestor when he came home from Troy: § 10. Cf. Schol. Marc. and Ts. Lyc. 1048. The first to sacrifice to him was Glaukos the son of Alpyros: Paus. 4, 3, 9.—Podaleirion. His ἡρώς lay at the foot of the λόφος Δρίων by Mt. Garganus 100 stades from the sea, καὶ δὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ποταμὸν εὐάνης πρὸς τὰς τῶν θεομενέων νόσους, Str. 284. The method of incubation given in the text is described by Lyc. 1047-55. He also speaks of a river Althainus (so called because of its medicinal properties, cf. *E.M.* 63, 3, from Schol. Lyc.), which cured disease if one sprinkled oneself with water from it.—? from Timaeus, cf. Ts. on 1030. [Cf. also the spring by the Amphiarion at Oropos: Paus. 1, 34, 4.]

<sup>47</sup> Paus. 2, 38, 9.—The brother of Polemokrates, Alexander, had a heroon at Titane in the territory of Sikyon: Paus. 2, 11, 7; 23, 4; but we hear nothing of sick-cures (though his name would lead us to suspect such).—Other Asklepiadae: Nikomachos, Gargasos, Sphyras (Wids., *Lit. Cult.*, 195).

<sup>48</sup> Sanctuary of Ἥρας ἱερὸς near the Thesieion: Dem. 19, 249; 18, 129; Apollon., *V. Aescl.*, p. 265, 5 l. West. Decree about melting down silver votive-offerings (third and second century), *G.I.D.* ii. 403-4.—Acc. to Usener (*Göttingen*, 148-53) ἱερὸς is to be regarded as the proper name of this Hero (really a functional "Sondergotz") and not as an adjectival description of a nameless Hero (as in ἡρώς ἀντρογγύς, ἀνδρογυφός, ἀλαιοφύρος—this last in two different places, Elia ἡρώς ἱερὸς, see above, n. 61). Acc. to

his view *Ἰατρός* was given the adj. title *ἥρως* to distinguish him from a *θεός Ἰατρός*. But this would only be possible if there existed a god who was not merely an *ἰατρός* and so called by this title, like *Ἀσκληπιός*, *Προμηθεύς ἰατρός*, but whose proper name was *Ἰατρός*. But there was no such god. Usener (151) infers the existence of a god *Ἰατρός* out of the proper name *Ἰατροκλήτης*. But this would only be justifiable if there were not a whole host of proper names compounded with *-κλής*, the first part of which is anything but a god's name (list in Fick, *Griech. Personennamen*<sup>1</sup>, p. 165 ff.).—There seems no real reason for understanding the name *ἥρως ἰατρός* differently from the analogous *ἡ στρατηγός*, *ἡ ταχόβηλος*, etc.—There existed besides even *νύμφαι ἰατροί*, *περὶ Ἡλίου*. Hesych.

<sup>11</sup> *CIA*, ii, 404, distinguishes the Hero referred to by the decree as the *ἥρως ἰατρός ὁ ἐν ἄρῃ*. This clearly implies a second *ἥρως ἰατρός*, outside Athens. But the Rhet. Lex. in *AB*. 282, 16 f. (cf. Sch. Dem., p. 437, 19–20 Pl.), speaks of a *ἥρως ἰατρός* called Aristomachos *ὁ ἐν ἄρῃ ἐν Μαραθῶνι περὶ τὸ Διονύσιον*, who it is clear cannot be the *ἥρως ἰατρός* that Demosthenes meant—for he is *ὁ ἐν ἄρῃ*; but the description applies very well to the Hero Physician worshipped in Attica outside the *ἀρῃ*. See L. v. Sybel, *Hermes*, xii, 43.

<sup>12</sup> Cenotaph of Kalchas in Apulia near the heroön of Podaleirios, Lyc. 1047 ff.—his body was said to be buried in Kolophon: *Νέμεος*; Tz. Lyc. 427; Schol. D.P. 860. *ἐνκοιμητὴς* at his heroön, sleeping on the skin of the sacrificed ram: Str. 284; the same as, acc. to Lycophron, in the temple of Podaleirios. It almost looks like a mistake in either Strato or Lyc. But the ritual may quite well have been the same in both temples and we find it again in the dream-oracle of Amphiaraus in Oropos, Paus. i, 34, 5.—At the present day the Archangel Michael is worshipped at Monte Sant' Angelo beneath Mt. Garganus. He appeared there during the fifth century and in a cave which is perhaps rightly regarded as the former site of the incubation-oracle of Kalchas; Lenormant, *à travers l'Asie*, i, p. 61, Paris, 1883. S. Michael had in other cases also taken over the duties of the ancient incubation mantic, and continued them in a Christian form—though the task belonged more often to SS. Cosmas and Damian—e.g. in the Michaelion in Constantinople, the ancient *Ἰωάννης*; see Malal., pp. 78–9 Bonn.; Soz., *HE*, ii, 3.

<sup>13</sup> Lyc. 799 f. Arist. and Nicand. in Schol. ad. loc. Was there a legend that made Odysseus die there? Lyc. himself, it is true, gives quite a different story a little later (805 ff.), much to the amazement of his scholiasts. Perhaps in 799 f. he was thinking, in spite of the dream oracle, only of a *νεκρὸν σῆμα* of Odysseus in Aetolia (as in the case of Kalchas).

<sup>14</sup> Grave of Prot.; Hdt. ix, 116 ff.; Lyc. 532 ff. *Ἰατρός τοῦ Πρωτοκλήδου* Thuc. viii. 102, 3. Oracle: Pseudostr., *Her.* 678, p. 146 f. K. It was exp. also an oracle of healing; ib., 147, 30 f. K.

<sup>15</sup> An oracle "Sarpedon's in Troas" is mentioned in a cursory enumeration of oracular sites by Tert., *An.* 46. It is difficult to imagine how Sarpedon, the Homeric one—no other can be meant here—whose body had been so ceremoniously brought to Lykia, can have had an oracle in the Troas. It may be merely a slip of the pen on Tertullian's part.—At Seleucia in Cilicia there was an oracle of Apollo Sarpedomion, D.S. 32, 10, 2; Zon. i, 57. Wesseling on D.S. ii, p. 519, has already called attention to the more detailed account in the *Vii. S. Theodas* of Basilides Bishop of Seleucia; see the extracts given by R. Köhler, *Rhein. Mus.* 14, 473 ff. There the oracle is described

as a dream-oracle of Sarpedon himself who was consulted at his grave in Seleucia. It is also certain, as Köhler remarks, that Sarpedon, the son of Europa and brother of Minos, is meant. (This Cretan Sarpedon appears first in Hesiod and is quite distinct from the Homeric one: Aristonic. on *Z* 199. Indeed, Homer knows no other brother of Minos except Rhadamanthys: *§* 322. In spite of this he was often regarded as the same as the Homeric Sarpedon who came from Lykia [cf. the name Ζρπάδων on the Obelisk of Xanthos: *Lyc. Inscri.* tab. vii, l. 6]: acc. to [Apollod.] 3, 1, 3, he lived through three years, cf. Schol. V., *Z* 199: which seems a marvellous feat much in the manner of Hellenikos. Others made the Cretan Sarp. into the grandfather of the Lykian: D.S. 5, 78, 3.) The oracle belonged properly to Sarpedon: Apollo seems merely to have been an intruder here and to have taken the place of the Hero as he did with Hylakinthos at Amyklai. That Sarpedon, however, was not therefore quite forgotten is shown by the Christian notice of him. Perhaps Apollo was regarded as merely the patron of the oracle whose real guardian was still Sarpedon. It certainly indicates community of worship when Ap. is there called Ἀράλλων Σαρπηδόνης: so too in Tarentum—brought thither from Sparta and Amyklai—there was a νεῖκος κατὰ μὲν τοῦ Ἰακίβου παρρηγορεύματος, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ Ἀράλλωνος Ἰακίβου (in which no alteration is necessary), *Plb.* 8, 30, 2. In Gortyn there was a cult of Atymnos (Solin. II, 9, p. 73 Moen.), the beloved of Apollo (or of Sarpedon): he too was worshipped as Apollo Atymnios (Nomon., *D.* 11, 131; 258; 12, 217).

<sup>140</sup> The inhabitants of Gadeira sacrificed to Med.: Philostr., *V.A.* 5, 4, p. 167, 10 K. τὰ Μινωτικὰ μυστήρια on the Baetis is mentioned by Str., p. 140. How it got there we do not know.

<sup>141</sup> Str. 546. Autol. came there as a sharer in the expedition of Herakles against the Amazons and with the Argonauts. A.R. ii, 855-61. *Plut.*, *Luc.* 23.

<sup>142</sup> For Anio see Meisner, *An. Alex.* 16-17; Wentzel in *Fauly-Winsowa Anos*. Apollo taught him the mantic art and gave him great τιμῆς: D.S. 5, 62, 2. He is called μάντις also by Clem. Al., *Strom.* i, p. 400 P. Perhaps he was also a mantic Hero in the cult that was paid to him at Delos: in giving a list of the βασιμῶν ἐμμελῶν, Clem. Al., *Protr.* ii, p. 35 P., mentions also κατὰ δ' Ἡρώων Ἄνιον, which Sylburg corrected to κατὰ δαίμονας. A priest of Anio λευκὸς Ἄνιος at Delos is given *CIA.* ii, 885 D 10: E 4, 53.

<sup>143</sup> D.S. 5, 69, 2. There she is identified with Nelpadia, daughter of Staphylos. In that case ἡμῖτα would more probably be an adjectival title of a Heroine whose real name was unknown, like the names of the unknown Heroes mentioned above, no. 60-2. The

dream-oracle of Ino in front of which was a statue of Pasiphae: *Paus.* 3, 28, 1. This probably means, as Welcker, *RI. Schr.* iii, 92, says, that the same oracle had once belonged to Pas., but had then been afterwards dedicated to Ino. (Not of course that Pasiphaë = Ino, and this is not suggested by W., but merely that Ino may have taken the place of Pas.) A μαντεῖον τῆς Πασίφιας is also mentioned by Apollon., *Met.* 49: see also Müller, *FHG.* ii, 288 [see Keller, *Paradoxa*., p. 55, 15].

<sup>144</sup> Something of the kind seems to be suggested by Pl., *P.* viii, 57: I praise Alkistaios γένοιτο ὅτι: σὺ καὶ κτεάνων φύλαξ εἴμην ὁπότεναι τ' ἔδωκε γὰρ ἐμφαλὲν αὐτ' ἀνέμῳ μαρτυρόμενον τ' ἐφίπτατο στυγερῶναι

*réveurs*. These much-discussed words I can only interpret as follows. Alkmaion had a *φύλαξ* near Pindar's house: he could only be "Guardian of his possessions" if he were either the guardian spirit of his neighbour or if Pindar had deposited money for safe keeping in his temple—the custom is well known, see Böckhenschütz, *Besitz* in *Cl. Alt.*, p. 508 ff. As Pindar was once thinking of going to Delphi "Alk. applied himself to the prophetic arts traditional in his family" (*φύλαξ* to be connected with *φύλαξ*, a construction common in Pind.); i.e. he made him a revelation in a dream—on what subject Pindar does not say—was customary in the family of the Amythamidae, though not generally undertaken by Alkmaion (elsewhere) who unlike his brother Amphilochos nowhere seems to have had a dream-oracle of his own. (It seems to be a mere slip when Clem. Al., *Str.* i, p. 406 P. attributes the Oracle in Alkmaion to Alk. instead of Amphil.)

<sup>136</sup> *Plu., Q. Gr.*, 40, 300 D.

<sup>137</sup> Thus no herald might approach the heros of Okridion in Rhodes, *Plu., Q. Gr.*, 27, 287 C. No flute-player might approach, nor the name of Achilles be mentioned in the heros of Tenos at Tenedos, *ib.*, 28, 297 D. How an old grievance of a Hero might be continued into his after-life as a spirit is shown by an instructive example given by Hdt. v, 67.

<sup>138</sup> *Paus.* 9, 38, 5. The letters were no doubt intended in such cases to fasten the statue (as the abode of the Hero himself) to the site of his worship. Thus in Sparta an *αὐλὴν ἀρχαίων* of Enyalios was kept in letters. About this the *πρώτη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων* was that *οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδὲ Ἐνυάλιος φέροντα εὐχάεσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπεχέμενον τοῖς πύλοις*. *Paus.* 3, 15, 7. Similar things elsewhere: *Lob., Afl.* 275; cf. again *Paus.* 8, 41, 8. The striking effect of the statue fastened to the rocks may then very well have given rise to the (aetiological) legend of the *αἶψα ἵσταί τε*.

<sup>139</sup> *Hdt.* vii, 169-70.

<sup>140</sup> *Hdt.* vii, 134-7.

<sup>141</sup> Sanctity of trees and groves dedicated to a Hero: *Ael., VH.* v, 17; *Paus.* 2, 28, 7; but esp. 8, 24, 7.

<sup>142</sup> The story of the wrath of the Hero of Anagyros is told, with a few variations in detail, by Jerome ap. *Suid.*, *Ἀνάγ. δαίμων* = *Apostol.* ix, 78; *Dgn., Froc.* iii, 31 (in cod. *Const.*, p. 219 f. *Götting.*); cf. *Zenob.* ii, 55 = *Dgn.* i, 25. Similar stories of a *δαίμων* *Κελίνος, Αἰνός*, are implied but not related by *Macarius*, *id.* 18 (it, p. 155 *Gött.*).

<sup>143</sup> The story in *Suid.* goes back to Hieron. *Rhod. περί τρυφῆς* (fr. 4 *Hall.*), who compared the story with the theme of the Euripides *Phoenissae*.

<sup>144</sup> According to *Paus.* the ghost was explained to be one of the companions of Odysseus. Strabo says more particularly *Polites*, who was one of these. But a copy of an ancient picture representing the adventure called the *daimon* *Lykos* and made him black and grim-looking and dressed in a wolf-skin. The last is probably merely symbolic and represents *σύν* wolf-shape such as belonged to the Athenian Hero *Lykos*: *Harp. δαίμων*. Wolf-shape given to a death-bringing spirit of the underworld, as often: cf. *Roscher, Kynanth.* 60-1. This must have been the more ancient form of the legend and the *daimon* was only subsequently changed into a Hero.

<sup>145</sup> The story in its general outline recalls esp. the other Greek legends in which similar rescues occur; we are reminded not merely of the stories of Perseus and Andromeda or Herakles and Hesione, but also of the fight of Herakles with Thymotes for the sake of Alkmaion.



in Eurip., *Alc.*, and of Kautoibos' struggle with the *Hebe* in Argos. But the story of Euthymos and the Hero of Temesa agrees even in its details with a story coming from a far distant locality, Kriss in the foot of Mt. Parnassos, where lived the monster Lamia, or Sybaris, who was overthrown by Eurybatos—as it is told in Nikander's *Alexandromache*. ap. Ant. Lib. vii—and is even to this day related as a fairy-tale: see B. Schmidt, *Gr. Märchen*, 162, 248 f. It is unnecessary to suppose imitation of either legend by the other; both independently reproduce the same fairy-tale motif, which is in fact very common everywhere. The monster overcome by the champion is regularly a chthonic being, a fiend from below: Thamasos, Poner, Lamia (which is the generic name, *Εὐφρα* being apparently the special name of this particular Lamia) and the ghostly "Hero" of Temesa.

<sup>114</sup> Paus. 6, 6, 7-11, the main source; Str. 255; Ael., *VH.* viii, 18; Plut. *Paroem.* ii, 31; Suid. *Εὐθύμος*. The "translation" occurs in Paus., Ael., and Suid. According to Aelian he went to the river Kaikinos near his old home Locri and disappeared: *ἐφανερώθη*. (The river-god Kaikinos is regarded as his real father: Paus. 6, 6, 4.) Perhaps the heroism of Euthymos may have been near the river. "Heroizing" of Euthymos by a flash of lightning is confirmed by his statue: Callim., *fr.* 390; Pliny, *NH.* 7, 132; Schol. Paus., *Herms*, 29, 148. Inscription on base of statue of E. at Olympia: *Arch. Zeit.*, 1878, p. 82.

<sup>115</sup> Paus. 6, 11, 2-8. D. Chr. 31, 340 N. (i, 247 Arn.). Cf. Oinomaos ap. Eus. *PE.* 3, 34, p. 231-2 V. Oinomaos 232 C refers to a similar legend of the *pentaklinos* Euthyides and his statue, at Locri.

<sup>116</sup> The story of Mitys (or Bitys) in Argos is known from Arist. *Po.* B. p. 1452a, 7 ff. (*Metab.* 156). A few more such stories are recorded in Wyttienbach, *Phil. M.* vii, p. 316 (Oxon.); cf. also Theoc. 23. Just as in the story of Theagones, the statue was punished as responsible for the murder, so, too, the attribution of a fetishistic personality to inanimate objects lies at the bottom of the ancient customs observed in the Athenian murder laws, by which judgment was given in the Prytaneion *επὶ τῇ ἀρχῇ τοῦ ἀποκτείνοντος καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀποκτείνοντος*: Poll. viii, 120, after Dem. 23, 76, cf. Arist. *Ath.* 57, 4. Such judgments cannot originally have been merely symbolical in meaning.

<sup>117</sup> Luc., *D. Conc.* 12; Paus. 8, 11, 9.

<sup>118</sup> Luc., *l.c.* On Polydamas see Paus. 8, 5, and among many others Eus. *Cáron. Olympionum.*, Ol. 83, p. 204 Sch.

<sup>119</sup> His victory was won in Ol. 6 (see also Eus. *Cáron.*, Ol. 6, p. 186); the statue erected to him only in Ol. 80; Paus. 7, 17, 5.

<sup>120</sup> Paus. 7, 17, 13-14.

<sup>121</sup> Phil., *Tac.* 35.

<sup>122</sup> Paus. 1, 15, 3; 32, 5.

<sup>123</sup> Hdt. viii, 38-9.

<sup>124</sup> Hdt. viii, 84. The difference should be noted: *ἐξέσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ ἐναικλίσασθαι τοὺς Ἀλκίβητας ἀντιμάχους*. So, too, we are told in Hdt. v, 75, that both the Tyndaridai *ἐνέκληρον* the Spartans into the field. (The Aeginetans sent the Alakidai to the help of the Thebans, but as they proved unprofitable the Thebans *τοὺς Ἀλκίβητας ἀνέκλῃσαν*. Hdt. v, 80).

<sup>125</sup> Plu., *Them.* 15.

<sup>126</sup> Hdt. viii, 121.

<sup>127</sup> Kyklops: Paus. 1, 36, 1. The Hero himself appeared as a snake, as also e.g. Sciripolis in Elis before the battle, Paus. 6, 20, 4-5; Erichthonios, Paus. 1, 24, 7: *τοὶ αἰ γὰρ αὖτε μάλιστα τῶν ζώων τὸν ὄφιν οὐκ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἀντιμαχεύονται*, Plu., *Cáron.* 26. The temple snake,

the *Kypselos* *daos* kept at Eleusis, was undoubtedly the Hero himself: though acc. to the rationalizing account in Str. 323-4 it had merely been reared by Kychreus.

<sup>126</sup> Themistokles in Hdt. vii, 109.

<sup>127</sup> Xen., *Cyn.* i, 17.

<sup>128</sup> The Dioscuri helped the Spartans in war, Hdt. v, 75; the Locrian Aias the Locrians in Italy: Paus. 3, 19, 12-13; Conon 18 (artistically elaborated and no longer naive legend but both taken from the same source).

<sup>129</sup> Hdt. vi, 51 (hence Paus. 3, 7, 2): grave of Helen at Therapon, Paus. 3, 18, 8.

<sup>130</sup> Hdt. vi, 89. Thus, too, the Theagenes regarded in Thasos not as the son of Tim.

*τῷ πατρὶ Ἡρακλῆος ἀνυμνεῖσθαι θέσμεν* ii, 2.—Everyone will be rewarded, too.

Alkmeon. But it should be noticed how near such stories as that so naively told by Herod. approach the risky novel-plot in which some profane mortal visits in disguise an unsuspecting woman and plays the part of a god or spirit-lover. That in Greece, too, such stories were current we may perhaps deduce from Eur., *Ion*, 1530 ff. *Ov.*, *M.* iii, 281; says outright: *multi nomine divorum thalamos iniere poticos*. An adventure of this sort is told by the writer of [Aeschines] *Ep.* 10, and he is able to produce two similar cases which he certainly has not invented himself (8-9).—In more recent times both western and Oriental nations have delighted in telling such stories; a typical Oriental example is the story of "the Weaver as Vishnu" in the *Panchatantra* (see Benfey, *Panich.* i, § 56): in the West there is the story of Boccaccio dealing with Alberto of Imola as the angel Gabriel, *Decam.* iv, 2.—Very suspicious, too, seems the account of a miracle that occurred in Epidauros: a barren woman comes to the temple of Asklepios to seek advice by *ἐκταμίσις*. A big snake approaches her and she has a child. *Ἐφ. Ἀρχ.* 1885, pp. 21-2, l. 129 ff.

<sup>131</sup> *ἐν τοῦ ἡρώου τοῦ παρὰ τῆς θύρας πύλαις ἱερμίνου*, Hdt. vi, 89.

<sup>132</sup> Hero *ἐνὶ προθύρῳ*. Callim., *Ep.* 26, a Hero *πρὸ πύλων, πρὸ δόμου*, late epigram from Thrace, *Epigr. Gr.* 841: *ἥρωος πύλαιον τῆς τοῦ ἱερότος αἰκίας ἱερμίνους*, Arsenud. xv, 79, p. 248, 9 H. This, too, is how Pindar's words about the Hero Alkmeon as his *γείνων* are to be understood: *Pist.* viii, 57, see above, n. 103. An Aesopian fable dealing with the relations of a man with his neighbour-Hero begins *ἄνω ἐκ τῆς αἰκίας ἔχον τοῦτο πολυεχὲς ἱερὸν*, 161 Halm.: cf. also Babr. 83.—A similar idea is at work when a son put up a monument to his father at the doorway of his house—see the fine lines of Eur., *Hcl.* 1165 ff.

<sup>133</sup> *Κύπρις Ἰνδα Τεύρος ἀνέχετο*. Aias ἔχει Salamis and Achilles his island in the Pontus; *Θέτις δὲ κραυγὴ θάλας*, and so, too, Neoptolemos in Epirous: *Ph.*, *N.* iv, 46-51; *ἀμφίπαι* used of a Hero, *P.* ix, 70: *τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ ἄνθρωποι κατέχουσιν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν Ἀθηναίων*: *Dem.* 18, 184.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. Alabandus whom the inhabitants of Alabanda sanctius colunt quam quemquam nobilium deorum: Cic., *N.D.* iii, 50 (in connexion with an anecdote relating to the fourth century)—Tenebris sanctissimus deus habetur, *Cic.*, *T.* ii, 1, 49.

## CHAPTER V

### THE CULT OF SOULS

Greek civilization as we see it reflected in the Homeric poems strikes us as so variously developed, and yet so complete in itself, that if we had no further sources of information, we should naturally suppose that the characteristic culture of the Greeks there reached the highest point attainable under the conditions set by national character and external circumstance. In reality the Homeric poems stand on the border line between an older development that has come to complete maturity and a new, and in many ways differently constituted, order of things. The poems themselves offer an idealized picture of a past that was on the point of disappearing entirely. The profound upheavals of the following centuries can be measured by their final results; we can guess the underlying forces from a study of the individual symptoms. But the fact remains that in the very imperfect state of our information about this period of transformation, we can do little more than recognize the existence of all the conditions necessary for a complete reorganization of Greek life. We can see how the once less-important races in Greece now come into the foreground of history; how they set up new kingdoms by the right of conquest on the ruins of the old, and bring into prominence their own special ways of thinking. Colonization over a wide area meant the expansion of Greek life; while the colonies themselves, as is so often the case, traversed all the stages of development at a much faster rate. Commerce and industry developed, calling forth and satisfying new demands. New elements of the population came to the fore, governments began to fall and the old rule of the kings gave way to Aristocracy, Tyranny, Democracy. In friendly and (in the West especially) hostile relationship the Greeks came into contact more than formerly with foreign peoples in every stage of civilization who influenced them in many directions.

All these great movements must have produced many fresh currents in intellectual life too. And in fact the attempt to get free from tradition, from the long-standing culture that seemed, when reflected in the Homeric poems, so permanent and

complete in itself, is seen most clearly in the sphere of poetry. The poets threw off the tyranny of the epic convention. They ceased to obey its formal verse-rhythm. And with the freedom thus gained from its vocabulary of stock words, phrases, and images, it was inevitable that the point of view also should change and gain in width. The poet no longer turns his gaze away from his own time and his own person. He himself becomes the central figure of his poetry; and to express the ferment of his own emotions he invents for himself the most natural rhythm, in close alliance with music which now becomes an important and independent element in Greek life. It is as though the Greeks had just discovered the full extent of their own capacities and dared to make free use of them. In every branch of the plastic arts the hand of the artist wins in the course of the centuries an ever greater capacity to give visible shape to the imagined world of beauty. Even the ruins of that world reveal to us more plainly and impressively (because less mixed with conscious reflexion) than any literary achievement, the thing that is of permanent value in Greek art.

It was impossible that religion, alone unaffected by the general atmosphere of change, should remain unaltered in the old paths. But here, even more than in other directions, we must admit that the inward reality of the change remains hidden from us. We can see indeed many external alterations, but of the directing spirit which called them forth we hardly catch more than a glimpse. It is easy, by comparing the later condition of religion with the Homeric, to see how enormously the objects of religious worship have multiplied. We can see how much more sumptuous and elaborate ceremonial has become and observe the development in beauty and variety, in conjunction with the fine arts, of the great religious festivals of the different cities and peoples of Greece. Temples and sculpture bear unmistakable witness to the increased power and importance of religion. That an inward and far-reaching change had come over religious thought and belief might have been already guessed from the fame and importance which belonged to the oracle at Delphi, now coming into real power; and from the many new developments in Greek religious life taking their origin from this spiritual centre. At this time there grew up, under the influence of a deepening moral sense, that new interpretation of religion that we meet with in its completed form in Aeschylus and Pindar. The age was decidedly more "religious-minded" than that in which Homer lived. It is as though the Greeks then went through a period such as

most civilized nations go through at some time or other, and such as the Greeks themselves were to repeat more than once in after centuries—a period in which the mind after it has at least half succeeded in winning its freedom from disquieting and oppressive beliefs in invisible powers shrinks back once more. Under the influence of adversity it feels the need of some comforting illusions behind which it may take shelter and be relieved in part of the burden of responsibility.

The obscurity of this period of growth hides also from our sight the origin and development of beliefs about the soul very different from the Homeric. The results of the process are however visible enough and we can still discern how a regular cult of the disembodied soul and eventually a belief in immortality fully worthy of the name were being built up at this time. These things are the result of phenomena which partly represent the re-emergence of elements in religious life which had been submerged in the previous period, and partly the entry of fresh forces which in conjunction with the resuscitated old give rise between them to a third and new creation.

## I

## CULT OF THE CHTHONIC DEITIES

The chief new feature revealing itself to comparative study in the development of religion in the post-Homeric period is the worship of *chthonic* deities, that is, of deities dwelling in the interior of the earth. And yet it is an undoubted fact that these divinities are among the oldest possessions of Greek religious faith. Indeed, bound as they are to the soil of the country, they are the true local deities, the real gods of home and country. They are also not unknown to Homer; but epic poetry had transferred them, divested of all local limitation, to a distant subterranean region, inaccessible to living men, beyond the limits of Okeanos. There *Aides* and the terrible *Persephoneia* rule as guardians of the dead. From that distant and unapproachable place they can have no influence upon the life and doings of men on earth. Religious cult, too, only knows these deities in connexion with particular localities and particular groups of worshippers. Each of these worships the deities of the underworld as denizens of their soil and their countryside alone. They are untroubled by any considerations of a general and uniform kingdom of the gods such as the epic had set up; nor are they disturbed by similar and conflicting claims made by neighbouring

communities. And only in these local cults are the gods of the lower world seen in their true nature as they were conceived by the faith of their worshippers. They are the gods of a settled, agricultural, inland population. Dwelling beneath the soil they guarantee two things to their worshippers: they bless the cultivation of the ground and ensure the increase of the fruits of the soil to the living; they receive the souls of the dead into their underworld.<sup>1</sup> In certain places they also send up from the spirit-world revelations of future events.

The most exalted name we met with among these dwellers below the earth is that of Zeus Chthonios. This is at once the most general and the most exclusive designation of the god of the lower world; for the name "Zeus" had in many local cults thus preserved the generalized meaning of "god" in combination with a particularizing adjective. The *Iliad* also once speaks of "Zeus of the lower world"; though by this is meant none other than the ruler of the distant realm of the dead, Hades. Hades too, in the Hesiodic *Theogony* is once called "Zeus the Chthonian".<sup>2</sup> But the agricultural poem of Hesiod bids the Boeotian countryman, when preparing his fields for sowing, pray for a blessing to the Chthonic Zeus. Zeus Chthonios was also sacrificed to in Mykonos for the "fruits of the earth".<sup>3</sup>

But, more frequently than under this most general and exalted title,<sup>4</sup> we meet with the god of the living and the dead under various disguises. The gods of the underworld were generally referred to by affectionate or cajoling nicknames that laid stress on the lofty or beneficent character of their rule and threw a veil over the darkest side of their nature with conciliatory euphemism.<sup>5</sup> Thus Hades had many flattering titles and special names.<sup>6</sup> So, too, in many places Zeus of the underworld was worshipped as Zeus Eubouleus or Bouleus,<sup>7</sup> at other places, especially Hermione, as Klymenos.<sup>8</sup> Zeus Amphiaraos, Zeus Trophonios we have dealt with already in their capacity of Heroes, but they are really nothing else but such earth deities with honourable titles, who have been deprived to some extent of their full status as gods<sup>9</sup> and have on that account developed all the more strongly the oracular side of their powers. Hades, the ruler of that distant kingdom of darkness, is one of this class of manifestations of Zeus Chthonios that vary in name according to the different localities of their worship. The king of the shadows in Erebus as he appears in Homer has no altars or sacrifices made to him<sup>10</sup>; but these things belong to him as the local god of particular places. In the Peloponnese there were local centres

of his worship in Elis and Triphylia,<sup>11</sup> sites of a very ancient civilization; and it is probable enough that tribes and clans having their origin there contributed by their wanderings to the spread of their native cult of the chthonic deity in other Greek countries as well.<sup>12</sup> Hades, too, was for his Peloponnesian worshippers a god of the fertility of the earth just as much as a god of the dead.<sup>13</sup> And in the same way he was the lord of the Souls as well, in those places where "in fear of the name of Hades"<sup>14</sup> he was called, in honour of his beneficent powers, *Plouton*, *Ploutens*, or *Zeus Plouteus*.

The welfare of the living and the dead was also the concern of the female deity of the underworld called by the name of the earth itself *Ge* or *Gaia*. At the places where she was worshipped she was regarded as one who brought fruitfulness to the fields, but she held sway over the souls of the dead as well, in conjunction with whom prayers and sacrifice were offered to her.<sup>15</sup> Her temples remained in honour, especially at Athens and at the primeval centre of ancient worship of the gods, *Olympia*.<sup>16</sup> But her personality had never been quite reduced to definite and intelligible outline from the enormous vagueness natural to primitive deities. Earth-goddesses of more recent and intelligible form had supplanted her. She retained longest her mantic powers which she exercised from beneath the earth, the abode of spirits and souls, at ancient oracular sites—though even here she often had to give way to oracular gods of another description, such as *Zeus* and *Apollo*. A poet indeed mentions her once side by side with the great ruler of the lower world,<sup>17</sup> but in actual worship she was seldom found among the groups of male and female deities of chthonic nature such as were worshipped together at many places. Above all, at *Hermione* there flourished from primitive times a solemn cult of the lower-world *Demeter* in conjunction with the lower-world *Zeus*, under the name of *Klymenos*, and with *Kore*.<sup>18</sup> At other places *Plouton* and these two goddesses were worshipped together, or *Zeus Eubouleus* and the same two, etc.<sup>19</sup> The names of the underworld god vary indefinitely, but the names of *Demeter* and her divine daughter appear every time unchanged. Either alone or together, and worshipped in connexion with other related deities, these two goddesses have by far the most important place in the cult of the underworld. The same and widespread popularity of their cult in all Greek cities of the mother-country and in the colonies proves more than anything else that since Homeric times a change must have taken place in the sphere of religious emotion and service of the gods.

Homer gives no hint of the character or importance of the later cult of Demeter and Persephone. For him Persephone is simply the grim unapproachable Queen of the dead, Demeter invariably (and solely) a goddess of the fertility of crops<sup>20</sup>; she stands apart indeed from the rest of the Olympians, but no reference to a close association with her daughter is ever made.<sup>21</sup> Now, however, both goddesses appear in various and changing activity, but always closely associated, and it seems as if they had come to share some of their previously distinct characteristics. Both are now chthonic deities who together have in their protection the growth of the crops and the care of the souls of the dead. How in detail the change came about we can no longer discover. It may be that, in the times of the great migrations, from various centres of the worship of the two goddesses, such as had existed from great antiquity in the Peloponnese especially,<sup>22</sup> there issued forth this faith that differed so essentially from the Homeric-Ionic view of things. It must have spread just as in later times the special variety of the cult of the closely associated goddesses that was practised in Eleusis was widely propagated by regular missions. It also seems that Demeter, in whose name there was early a tendency to recognize a second "Mother Earth," in many places took the place of Gaia in religious cult, and thereby entered into closer connexion with the realm of the souls below the earth.

## § 2

As the numbers of the underworld beings increased, and their cult grew and expanded, these divinities began to have a very different meaning for the living from what they once had for the Greeks of the Homeric age. The upper and the lower worlds are drawn closer to each other; the world of the living borders upon that world after death over which the chthonic gods hold sway. The ancient belief that the earth-caverns of their own land, on which men dwelt and worked, were the near and accessible abode of divinity, now reappeared here and there, and was no longer completely awed into silence by the poetic lustre of the all-embracing divine world of Olympus. We have spoken in a previous chapter of Amphiaraos at Thebes, Trophonios in the Lebadean cave, and Zeus in the cave on Mt. Ida; and again of that Zeus who was seen enthroned by those who descended into a cave in Epirus. These are all vestiges of the same belief which originally underlay all local cults of underworld deities. The realm of



chthonic gods, of spirits and departed souls, seemed to be close at hand. *Ploutonia*, i.e. direct inlets to the underworld, existed at many places,<sup>33</sup> as also did *Psychopompria*, clefts in the rock through which the souls can pass out into the upper world. In the middle of the city of Athens, in a natural chasm on the Areiopagos, underworld beings were reputed to have their home.<sup>34</sup> The most striking denial of the separation between the living and the underworld, such as was demanded by Homeric theology, was at Hermione. Here, behind the temple of Chthonia lay a sacred precinct of Plouton or Klymenos with a chasm in the ground through which Herakles had once brought up Kerberos to the earth—and an "Acherusian Lake".<sup>35</sup> So near did the spirit world seem here, that the people of Hermione did not give their dead the usual coin to pay the fare of Charon, the ferryman of the dead :<sup>36</sup> for *thow*, in whose own country lay the river Acheron, no tract of water lay between the land of the living and the dead.

More important than these cases of contact between the dark underworld and the world of the living—for the localization of the underworld still remained for the most part matter of fancy—is the fact that the creatures of that world are again drawing closer to the senses of men. The thoughts of men turn more frequently to the other world at so many festivals and anniversaries : the gods who rule below desire and repay the veneration of mankind, both of the individual and the city. And in the train of the chthonic gods the souls of the dead, always closely bound to them, receive a cult which in many particulars goes beyond anything customary in the Homeric Age.

## II

### FUNERAL CEREMONIES AND WORSHIP OF THE DEAD

The first duty that the survivors owe to their dead is to bury the body in the customary manner. This age takes the matter more seriously than the Homeric people had done. Whereas in Homer denial of burial to enemies fallen in war is often mentioned, it is now regarded as a religious duty that is seldom neglected to give back the bodies of the fallen foe for burial. To deny the honour of burial to members of one's own city is an outrage of the most extreme kind ; everyone knows what terrible vengeance for such a neglect of duty was taken, by the excited populace at Athens, on the generals after Arginusai. Nothing can release a son from the duty of burying his father and offering him the regular gifts at his

grave.<sup>27</sup> And if the relations, in spite of everything, neglect their task the law at Athens requires the Demarch to see to the burial of his fellow demesman.<sup>28</sup> Religious requirements, however, go beyond the law. At the solemn agricultural festival of Demeter the Bouzyges at Athens invoked a curse on all who should leave a corpse unburied.<sup>29</sup> This matter, which the chthonic deities take under their protection, is no mere sanitary police regulation. It is not any such consideration, but solely the "unwritten laws" of religion which are obeyed by Antigone when she covers the dead body of her brother with a little dust: even such symbolical burial is enough to avert the "abomination" (*dyot*). Motives of pure piety may have played their part, but the really fundamental idea underlying all such practices was the one already met with in the *Iliad*:<sup>30</sup> that the soul of the unburied person can find no rest in the hereafter. The ghost haunts the neighbourhood, its rage afflicts the land in which it is detained against its will; and the withholding of burial "is worse for the withholder than for him to whom burial is refused".<sup>31</sup> Condemned criminals, indeed, are thrown by the state, unburied, into a pit;<sup>32</sup> the sacrilegious and traitors to their country are denied burial in the ground of that country.<sup>33</sup> This is a formidable punishment, for even though the outlaw is buried in a foreign country,<sup>34</sup> his soul cannot be permanently tended there. Only the family of the dead in their own home can give their departed kinsman the honour due to him in the cult of the souls, and only they at the spot where his remains lie buried.<sup>35</sup>

What we know of the details of the funeral ceremonies, differs very little in essence from what had survived into the Homeric age as customs no longer fully explained by contemporary belief. The new features that we meet with may also, for the most part, be very primitive usage restored to currency. Some of the particular details make the solemnity of the act more apparent.

After the eyes and mouth have been closed by the next of kin the body is washed and anointed by women of the family, and clothed in clean garments. It is then laid out upon a bier in the interior of the house for the ceremonial lying-in-state. In Athens *marjoram* was strewn under the body, for superstitious reasons,<sup>36</sup> and also four broken-off vine branches; in the grave, also, the corpse lay on vine branches.<sup>37</sup> Underneath the bier were placed ointment vessels of the peculiar slim shape that the graves have restored to us again in such numbers. At the door of the room, for the benefit of those leaving the house who had incurred religious defilement by coming in contact

with the corpse, was placed a bowl full of pure water brought in from another house.<sup>33</sup> Cypress branches fixed upon the house door outside warned the scrupulous that a corpse was in the house.<sup>34</sup> The head of the dead person was generally decked with garlands and fillets, in a manner unknown to the Homeric age, as a sign, it appears, of respect for the higher sanctity of the departed.<sup>35</sup>

The lying-in-state of the dead, lasting the whole of one day, was certainly not intended originally to serve the purpose of a public "notification of death", such as later writers attribute to it.<sup>36</sup> The funeral dirge was sung at the bier of the dead man, and to give opportunity for this ceremony was its real purpose. The habit of the old Attic government of the Eupatridai had increased the pomp of funeral ceremonies in every direction, and had encouraged an extravagant cult of the souls of the departed. Solon's legislation had to restrain and limit such exaggeration in many ways, and in particular, the tendency to increase unduly the lamentation sung over the dead body required to be kept within bounds. Only the women of the immediate family of the dead might take part in it, for to them alone the cult of the departed belonged as a duty.<sup>37</sup> The violent expression of grief, the tearing of the cheeks, beating the breast and head, was forbidden,<sup>38</sup> as also was the singing of "poems",<sup>39</sup> i.e. in all probability regular funeral dirges specially written for the purpose such as Homer made the women sing round Hektor's bier. To extend the subject of the funeral dirge to apply to others beside the person then being buried had to be made absolutely illegal.<sup>40</sup> This prohibition must also have been applied already to the gathering at the graveside. But to sacrifice animals before the procession to the grave was a very ancient custom, and it seems as if Solon forbade this too.<sup>41</sup> In other states, also, legislation was necessary to put a curb on the tendency to overdo the violence of the expressions of grief for the dead<sup>42</sup> which were common in the antiquity of the Greeks as among many of the "uncivilized" tribes who carry them to the point of exhaustion. It was not simple piety or natural human grief (never particularly given to violent or excessive demonstration) that caused these things. It was rather the ancient belief that the soul of the dead was still invisibly present, and would be pleased at the most violent expressions of grief for its loss.<sup>43</sup> The dirge, carried to this extreme, belongs in fact to the *cult* of the departed spirit. The restraints placed upon the traditional lamentation may in their turn—in so far as they were effective—have been derived not from considerations of good

sense (which rarely have much influence in such matters) but from religious or superstitious reasons.<sup>40</sup>

The lying-in-state of the body seems invariably to have lasted for one day only.<sup>41</sup> In the early morning of the third day<sup>42</sup> after death the corpse, together with the bier on which it lay, was borne out of the house. Legislation was in some places necessary to check excessive ostentation at the funeral procession.<sup>43</sup> What pomp and ceremony was customary in the time of the old aristocratic rule at this part of the cult of the dead, we may gather (if it corresponded at all to reality) from the picture of a funeral procession represented on a very archaic "Dipylon vase".<sup>44</sup> There the body is carried on high on a wagon drawn by two horses: men carrying swords surround it, and a whole company of women, making lamentation and beating their heads, follow the procession. At Athens the attendance in the procession was confined, in the case of women at least, to those of the immediate kinsfolk (for three generations). The men, who had their place in front of the women seem to have been admitted without such restriction.<sup>45</sup> The admission of hired companies of Karian women and men, singing the national dirges, seems at Athens not to have been forbidden.<sup>46</sup> At Keos and elsewhere, the laws ordered processions to the grave to be conducted in silence.<sup>47</sup> On the whole, the discipline of respectable city life reduced the "excessive and barbaric",<sup>48</sup> which must once have been the rule in the display of mourning, to a discreet symbolism.

On the details of the burial procedure our information is incomplete. Occasional expressions used by Greek authors allow us to conclude—and this is confirmed by the excavation of graves in Greek countries—that besides the custom, exclusively prevailing in Homeric times, of cremation, the more ancient practice of burying the body unburnt was still kept up.<sup>49</sup> The body was not intended to be completely destroyed. Out of the ashes of the funeral pyre the son carefully gathers the remains of his father's bones<sup>50</sup> in order to bury them, enclosed in an urn or a box. If on the other hand the body remains unburnt, it is either enclosed in a coffin made of baked clay, or wood<sup>51</sup>—a custom clearly betraying its foreign origin, or else—and this must have been certainly the older and more purely native Greek usage—it is let down into the earth without a coffin, and laid upon a bed of leaves;<sup>52</sup> at other times, if the nature of the ground allows, it may rest unburied in a rock-chamber, upon a bed of stonework.<sup>53</sup>

The soul, though now set free, keeps up some connexion with the body it once inhabited. It is for its use and pleasure

that an ample provision of household implements and vessels is laid beside the corpse (though no longer the whole of the dead man's possessions as once was usual); and graves since opened have restored such things in large numbers to our gaze.<sup>63</sup> But the Greeks never seriously believed that such a phantasmal existence could be prolonged to eternity. Elaborate expedients for the perpetual preservation of the corpse (by embalmment and other means, such as were employed in the case of bodies buried in the Mycenaean shaft-graves)<sup>64</sup> were unknown in these later times—except as a peculiar archaism in the burial of Spartan kings.

## § 2

Once the body is buried, the soul of the dead enters the invisible company of the "Better and Superior."<sup>65</sup> This belief, which Aristotle regarded as of primeval antiquity in Greece, emerges very clearly in the cult-observance of these post-Homeric centuries from the obscurity which the Homeric age had imposed upon it. The soul of the dead has its special cult-group composed naturally enough of the descendants and family of the dead, and of them only. There even survived a dim memory of the time when the body of the dead was buried inside the house, which thus became the immediate centre of his cult.<sup>66</sup> That must quite certainly have been during an age which knew little or nothing of the almost painful sensitiveness to the idea of ritual "purification" such as prevailed in later times. At least, we have no reason for supposing that the Greeks (like many so-called "savage" peoples among whom the custom prevails of burying the corpse within the dead man's own hut) deserted the house that had now become haunted, and left it to the undisturbed possession of the ghost of the dead man buried there.<sup>67</sup> To bury the dead within the walls of the city, at least, was considered unobjectionable in later times by certain Dorian states.<sup>68</sup> Even where religious scruples and the practical convenience of city life combined to fix the place for burials outside the city walls, families kept their graves together often in a single extensive plot with a wall built round it.<sup>69</sup> Where a country estate belonged to a family, this generally also included the graves of its ancestors.<sup>70</sup>

Wherever it was situated, the grave was holy, as being the place where later generations tended and worshipped the souls of departed members of their family. Grave columns indicated the holiness of the spot;<sup>71</sup> trees and sometimes a complete

grove surrounded the grave, as they did so often the altars and temples of the gods.<sup>72</sup> These were intended to serve as pleasant retreats for the souls of the beloved dead.<sup>73</sup>

Sacrificial offerings began for the most part at the actual time of the funeral. The custom of pouring libations of wine, oil, and honey at the grave was probably in general use.<sup>74</sup> Even the sacrifice of animals, such as was made at the funeral pyre of Patroklos and even of Achilles, cannot have been unusual at an earlier period. Solon expressly forbade the sacrifice of an ox at the grave.<sup>75</sup> At Keos, permission is just as expressly given for a "preliminary sacrifice to be offered at the funeral in accordance with ancestral custom".<sup>76</sup> When the funeral ceremony is over, the members of the family, after a solemn rite of religious purification,<sup>77</sup> put on garlands (they had previously avoided this<sup>78</sup>) and begin the funeral feast.<sup>79</sup> This also was a part of the cult of the dead. The soul of the dead man was regarded as being present—even as playing the part of host.<sup>80</sup> It was awe felt for the invisible presence that originally inspired the custom of speaking only praise of the dead at the funeral feast.<sup>81</sup> This feast was an entertainment given in the house of the dead man to the surviving members of his family. The dead man had a meal to himself alone, which was offered at the grave<sup>82</sup> on the third and on the ninth day after the funeral.<sup>83</sup> On the ninth day it appears that ancient usage brought the period of mourning to an end.<sup>84</sup> Where it was extended to a longer period the earlier series of offerings to the dead was prolonged proportionally. Sparta had a period of mourning lasting eleven days.<sup>85</sup> At Athens, in addition to the sacrifice on the third and ninth days, another funeral feast which might be repeated several times,<sup>86</sup> was held on the thirteenth day.<sup>87</sup>

Even after the ceremonies attached to the funeral itself were at last over, the relations of the dead were by no means released from the duty of tending not merely the grave, but the soul of the deceased member of their family. In particular the son and heir had no more sacred duty to perform than the offering of "the customary things" (τὰ νόμιμα) to the soul of his father. These consisted above all of libations to be made to the dead on certain fixed and recurrent festivals. On the 30th of the month there was a traditional feast of the dead.<sup>88</sup> Besides this, every year at the "Genesia", when the birthday of the dead came round, the occasion was regularly celebrated with sacrifice.<sup>89</sup> The day on which he first entered this life is still of importance to the psyche of the dead man. It is plain that no impassable gulf was fixed between life and

death: it almost seems as though life went on quite uninterrupted by death.

Besides these variable feasts of the *Genesisia*, celebrated as they occurred by the individual families, there was at Athens a festival, also called the *Genesisia*, at which the whole citizen body did honour to the souls of their dead relatives on the 5th Boëdromion.<sup>80</sup> We hear also of the *Nemesis* as a feast of the dead in Athens<sup>81</sup> (probably intended for the averting of the anger of the dead—always a subject of apprehension), and of various festivals of the dead in other Greek States.<sup>82</sup> At Athens the chief festival of all the dead occurred at the close of the Dionysiac feast of the *Anthesteria*, in the spring, of which it formed the concluding day. This was the time when the dead swarmed up into the world of the living, as they did in Rome on the days when the "*mundus patet*", and so still in the belief of our own (German) country people at "*Twelfth-tide*". The days belonged to the souls (and their master *Dionysos*); they were days of "uncleanness"<sup>83</sup> unsuited to the business of city life. The temples of the gods were closed during that period.<sup>84</sup> As protection against the ghosts invisibly present, the citizens employed various old and tried precautionary measures: they chewed hawthorn leaves on their morning walk, and smeared their doorposts with pitch. In this way the ghosts were kept at arms length.<sup>85</sup> Each family made offering to its own dead, and the offerings they made have remained for the most part the appropriate gifts of the dead on their feast-days in many lands down to modern times. A special offering was made to the dead<sup>86</sup> on the last day of the feast, the *Chytroi*, which was sacred to none of the Olympians, but to *Hermes* the leader of the dead. To this god—but "for the dead"—were offered cooked vegetables and seeds in pots (which gave their name to this day of the festival).<sup>87</sup> It seems probable that as a sacrifice to the dead honey-cakes were thrown into a cleft of the earth in the Temple of *Ge Olympia*.<sup>88</sup> Indoors, too, the swarming ghosts entered and were entertained. They were not, however, permanently welcome guests, and finally they were driven out of the house in a manner paralleled at the close of festivals of the dead among many nations of old and modern times.<sup>89</sup> "*Begone ye Keres. Anthesteria is over*" were the words used in sending away the souls, and it is remarkable that in this formula they were given their primeval name—a name whose original sense had been forgotten by *Homer*, but not by the language of the common people of *Attica*.<sup>90</sup>

Individuals may have found still further opportunities of

bringing gifts to their own dead and showing their reverence for them. The cult paid by the family to the spirits of their ancestors is hardly distinguished, except by the greater limitation of the circle of worshippers, from the worship of underworld deities and Heroes. In the case of the souls, however, nature itself united the sacrificers and worshippers (and no one else) with the object of their devotion. If we wish to form some idea of the way in which (under the influence of a civilization that tended to reduce all primitive grandeur to mere idyll) the worship of the dead altered its character in the direction of piety and intimacy—we need only look at the pictures representing such worship (though rarely before the fourth century) on the oilflasks which were used at funerals in Attica and then laid by the side of the dead in the grave. These slight sketches breathe a spirit of simple kindness; we see the mourners decking the grave monument with wreaths and ribbons; worshippers approaching with gestures of adoration, bringing with them many objects of daily use—mirrors, fans, swords, etc., for the entertainment of the dead.<sup>101</sup> Sometimes the living seek to give pleasure to the spirit of the dead by the performance of music.<sup>102</sup> Gifts, too, of cakes, fruit, and wine are being made—but the blood of the sacrificial animals is never spilt.<sup>103</sup> There was a time when more solemn—and less comfortable—thoughts prevailed;<sup>104</sup> and of these we learn something from the much older sculptured reliefs, found on sepulchral monuments in Sparta, which give the dead a more awe-inspiring attitude. The ancestral pair sit in state and are approached by members of the family (represented as much smaller figures) offering their worship. These bring with them flowers, pomegranates, and sometimes even animals for sacrifice, a cock, a pig, or a ram. Other and later types of such "banquets of the dead" show the dead person standing up (not infrequently by the side of a horse) or lying upon a couch and accepting the drink-offering made to him by the survivors.<sup>105</sup> These reliefs allow us to see at what a distance the departed spirits are supposed to stand from the living: the dead do, indeed, seem now to be "better and stronger" beings; they are well on the road to becoming "Heroes". Drink offerings such as those we see offered on these reliefs—a mixture of honey-water, milk, and wine, and other liquids, offered in accordance with precise ritual—always formed a regular part of sacrifices made to the dead.<sup>106</sup> Besides these, animals, too, were slain, especially sheep (less often oxen) of black colour. These must be completely burnt, as being intended for the sole enjoyment of the dead—a custom



observed at all sacrifices made to the spirits of the underworld.<sup>107</sup>

The whole of this very material cult depended upon the assumption—which was sometimes distinctly expressed—that the soul of the dead is capable of receiving, and is in need of, a physical satisfaction from the gifts made to it.<sup>108</sup> It is consequently, not thought of as deprived of the power of sense-perception. Even in the grave it can feel what is going on in its neighbourhood.<sup>109</sup> It is not a good thing to attract its attention: it is best to pass by the graves of the dead in silence.<sup>110</sup> The common people thought of the dead, according to a famous phrase of Plato's, as "hovering" suspended over their graves, the site of their cult.<sup>111</sup> The pictures on the Attic oilflasks illustrate this belief, for they represent the souls of the dead flying above the grave-monument, and the diminutive size of these winged figures is evidently intended to represent their somewhat contradictory immaterial materiality, and to express their invisibility for mortal eyes.<sup>112</sup> Sometimes, indeed, the souls become visible, and then, like the underworld gods and the Heroes, they prefer the shape of a snake.<sup>113</sup> Nor are they absolutely bound to the immediate neighbourhood of the grave: they sometimes revisit their old habitations among the living, and not only on those days of the dead in the month Anthesterion. The Greeks, like other people, were acquainted with the custom of allowing what fell to the ground to lie there undisturbed for the spirits that hovered about the house to carry away if they liked.<sup>114</sup> The dead man's spirit, being thus invisibly present, can overhear if anyone speaks ill of it; either with the idea of defending the helpless, or, on the contrary, to avoid incurring the wrath of invisible but potent spirits, a Solonian law forbade abusive language to be addressed to a dead man. That is the real meaning of the old warning *de mortuis nil nisi bene*, as popular belief understood it. The descendants of a dead man were bound to prosecute anyone who slandered their ancestor:<sup>115</sup> this also is among the religious duties owed by the living to the soul of the dead.

### § 3

Like all other cults, the cult of the dead had more to do with the relations of the daimon to the living than with his nature and essence considered abstractly, and in itself: a dogmatic account of this nature was neither offered nor required by his worship. Still, the cult was founded upon a general concep-

tion, merely evading more exact definition, of the nature of the departed spirit. Men sacrificed to the souls of the dead, as to the gods<sup>116</sup> and Heroes, because they regarded them as invisible Powers,<sup>117</sup> a special class of "Blessed Ones", as the dead were beginning to be called even in the fifth century. They attempted to propitiate them,<sup>118</sup> or at least to avert their easily awakened displeasure.<sup>119</sup> Their help was also sought in all times of need; but most especially, like the chthonic gods into whose realm they have entered, they can prosper the fruits of the earth<sup>120</sup> and lend assistance at the entry of a new soul into life. For this reason libation is made to the souls of ancestors at a marriage.<sup>121</sup> The Tritopatores also, who were invoked at wedding celebrations in Attica that the marriage might prove fruitful,<sup>122</sup> were nothing else than the souls of the ancestors.<sup>123</sup> We know them also to have been referred to as wind-spirits,<sup>124</sup> and in this there appears, plainly or obscurely, an isolated fragment of the most ancient belief of the people: the departed spirits of the dead become spirits of the air; the ghosts that travel on the winds are the liberated souls of the dead.

Though it is good and profitable in one's own interest to enlist the sympathy and retain the goodwill of these invisible spirit powers by sacrifice, yet their worship is to a much greater degree conditioned by a sentiment of piety which no longer seeks its own advantage, but the greater honour and welfare of the dead. Such piety certainly takes on a curious form, but it is this which gives its special character to the cult of the souls, and the ideas which lie behind that cult. The souls of the dead are dependent upon the cult paid to them by the members of their family who still live on in this world; their fate is determined by the nature of this cult.<sup>125</sup> The beliefs which nourished the cult of the dead are totally distinct from the mode of thought prevailing in the Homeric poems according to which the souls are banished into the distant realm of Hades and cut off eternally from all attention or care that the living might pay them. It differs again from the beliefs which the mysteries implanted in the minds of their worshippers; for in this case it was not their *merit*—whether religious or moral—which secured to the disembodied souls their position in the future life. These two streams of religious belief flowed side by side, but never met. The nearest analogue to the cult of the souls and its appropriate beliefs was undoubtedly the cult

of Heroes, but even here the difference is profound. It is no longer a special privilege miraculously bestowed upon a few favoured individuals; every soul has a right to the attentive care of its own family, and in each case its fate is settled, not by the character displayed or deeds done during its lifetime, but by the relation to itself of those who survive. As a consequence everybody on the approach of death thinks of the "future state" of his soul, and that means the cult which he would like to make sure will be offered to his departed spirit. Sometimes for this purpose he makes a special foundation, or bequest, which is provided for in his will.<sup>116</sup> Of course, if he leaves a son behind him, the care of his spirit will be amply provided for; until that son comes of age, a guardian will offer the appropriate gifts.<sup>117</sup> Even slaves to whom he has given their freedom will be sure to take part in the permanent and regular cult of their former master.<sup>118</sup> One who has no son to leave behind him will make haste to take a son from another family into his own house, who, together with his property will inherit also the duty of offering a regular and enduring cult to his adopted father, and his new ancestors, and of caring for the needs of their souls. This is the real and original meaning of all adoption; and how seriously such provision for the proper care of the souls of the departed was taken, can best and most clearly be seen from the testamentary speeches of Isæus, in which with a completeness of art that almost conceals itself expression is given to the genuine and simple feelings of the homely Athenian bourgeoisie whom no enlightenment had ever disturbed in the beliefs of their fathers.<sup>119</sup>

All cult, all prospect of a full life and future well-being—for so we may express the naive conception—of the soul on its separation from the body, depends upon the holding together of the family. To the family itself the souls of its former ancestors are, in a limited sense, of course, gods—its gods.<sup>120</sup> It can hardly be doubted that here we have the root of all belief in the future life of the soul, and we shall be tempted to subscribe to the belief—as a guess tending in the right direction—of those who see in such family worship of the dead one of the most primitive roots of all religious belief—older than the worship of the higher gods of the state and the community as a whole; older even than the worship of Heroes, and of the ancestors of large national groups. The family is older than the state,<sup>121</sup> and among all peoples that have not passed beyond family-organization and formed states, we find this type of belief about the soul invariably present. Among

the Greeks, who in the course of their history learnt so much that was new without ever quite discarding the old, this belief lived on in the shadow of the great gods and their cults, even in the midst of the tremendous increase in the power and organized influence of the state. But these larger and wider organizations cramped and hindered its development. Left to itself, and given more freedom to grow, such belief might possibly have elevated the souls of the family ancestors to the position of all-powerful spirits of the house under whose hearth they had once been laid to rest. The Greeks, however, never had anything to correspond exactly with the Italian *Lar familiaris*.<sup>120</sup> The nearest equivalent to it would be the Good Daimon which the Greek household honoured. Careful examination shows this Daimon to have been originally the soul of an ancestor who has become the good spirit of his house—but the Greeks themselves had forgotten this.<sup>121</sup>

### § 5

We cannot at this late date trace the reawakening of the cult of souls in post-Homeric times or the varying stages it may have gone through in its development. Still, some of the facts are plain. Indications have already been noticed that point to the view that the cult of the dead was carried on in the days when the aristocratic regime still held sway in Greece with greater pomp and seriousness than in the centuries—the fifth and sixth—beyond which our knowledge hardly extends. In these earlier times, we are forced to conclude, there must also have been a livelier belief in the power and importance of the souls corresponding with the greater vigour of religious cult. It seems as if at this time ancient usage and belief broke violently through the suppression and neglect under which they lay in the times that speak to us in the Homeric poems. There is no reason to suppose that any one member of the Greek peoples was specially responsible for the change. At the same time, different districts in accordance with their varying natural proclivities and civilization differed in the cult they paid their dead. In Attica, with the spread of democracy, the ideas at the bottom of such practice tended more and more in the direction of mere affectionate piety. In Laconia and Boeotia<sup>122</sup> and in other places where primitive life and customs maintained themselves for a long time, more serious notions of the nature and reality of the disembodied spirits remained in force and a more serious cult was paid to them. Elsewhere, as in Locris and on the island of Keos,<sup>123</sup> the

cult of the dead seems to have maintained itself only in a very much weakened form. When advancing culture made individuals less dependent on the traditional beliefs of their own country many temperamental variations and gradations in belief and conception made their appearance. Homeric ideas on the subject, universally familiar from poetry, may have entered into the question and added to the confusion; even where the cult of the dead was practised with the greatest fervour, ideas radically incompatible with that cult—as that the souls of the worshipped dead are “in Hades”<sup>104</sup>—are sometimes revealed unintentionally. At quite an early period we find expressions of the view, which goes beyond anything said in Homer, that nothing at all survives after death. Attic orators, for example, are allowed to speak to their audience in a tone of hesitation and doubt about hopes commonly cherished of continued consciousness and sensation after death. Such doubts, however, only affect the theoretic consideration of the soul’s future life; the cult of the souls was still carried on inside the family. Even an unbeliever, if he were in other respects a true son of his city and deeply rooted in its ancient customs, might in his last will and testament provide seriously for the perpetual cult of his own soul and those of his near relatives—as Epicurus did in his will, to the astonishment of after ages.<sup>105</sup> Thus, even unbelief still clung to cult as to other old established customs, and in many an individual the cult still tended to awaken the beliefs which alone could justify it.

### III

#### TRACES OF THE CULT OF SOULS IN THE BLOOD-FEUD AND SATISFACTION FOR MURDER

##### § 1

In the renewal and development of the cult offered to the dead, an important part was again played by that priestly association which exercised such a decisive influence on the public worship of invisible powers in the Greek states—the priesthood of the Delphic oracle. On the occurrence of disturbing portents in the sky recourse was had to the god, who gave orders that in addition to the gods and Heroes “sacrifice should be made to the dead also on the appointed days, in accordance with custom and tradition, by their relatives.”<sup>106</sup> Individuals in doubt as to what the sacred law

required in the observance due to a departed soul applied at Athens to one of the "Exegetai"—probably one of that college of Exegetai that had been founded under the influence of Delphi.<sup>140</sup> The god protected the rights of the dead, too; the fact that his decisions confirmed the sanctity of the cult of the dead must have contributed a good deal to the consideration and awe in which that cult was held by the living.<sup>141</sup>

The decrees of Delphi were even more influential where they concerned a cult to be offered not to one who had died in peace, but to a person who had been robbed of his life through an act of violence. The treatment of such cases shows with striking distinctness the change which had come over the beliefs about the dead since the Homeric period.

In Homer, when a free man has been killed, the State takes no share whatever in the pursuit and punishment of the murderer. It is the duty of the nearest relatives or the friends of the murdered man<sup>142</sup> to carry on the blood-feud against the assailant. As a rule the latter puts himself out of reach of reprisals by flight. He withdraws to a foreign country which is unconcerned in his action. We hear nothing of any distinction between premeditated murder and unintentional or even justifiable homicide;<sup>143</sup> and it seems probable that at that time, when no regular inquiry was made into the nature of the individual case, the relatives of the murdered man took no account of the different varieties of killing. If the guilty man can escape by flight from those whose duty it is to avenge his deed, they on their part may forgo the full toll of vengeance, which would have required the death of the murderer, and may be satisfied with the payment of compensation, after which the doer of the deed is allowed to remain in his own country undisturbed.<sup>144</sup> The requirements of vengeance are thus in essence fulfilled, but the retaliatory murder of the murderer can be bought off. This decided relaxing of the ancient notion of vengeance can only be accounted for by an equally decided weakening of the belief in the continued consciousness, power, and rights of the murdered man, upon which the requirement of vengeance was founded. The soul of the dead is powerless; its claims can be easily satisfied by the payment of "weregild" to the living. In such a satisfaction as this, the departed soul is in reality not concerned at all; it remains a simple business transaction between living people.<sup>145</sup> In the midst of the general declension of the beliefs about the dead—amounting almost to complete extinction—which is found throughout the Homeric poems, this weakening of belief in one particular point is not very surprising. But

in this case, as in the general study of Homeric beliefs about the dead, it is clear that the conception of the soul as powerless, shadowlike, and feeble is not the primitive or original one; it has foisted itself gradually in the course of years upon a more ancient mode of conception in which the dead had undiminished sensibility and could influence the condition of the living. Of this older conception we have emphatic witness in the duty—not forgotten even in Homeric Greece—of prosecuting the blood-feud.

In later times the pursuit and punishment of homicide was organized in accordance with quite different principles. The *State* recognized its interest in the reprisals made for such a breach of the peace: we may take it as certain that in Greek cities generally the state took a share in the regular investigation and punishment of murder in its courts of justice,<sup>146</sup> though here, too, it is only in the case of Athenian law that we have precise information. At Athens, in accordance with the ancient code dealing with the legal prosecution of murder (which never fell into disuse after Dracon had established it by his penal legislation), the exclusive right—and the unavoidable duty—of prosecuting the murderer belonged to the next of kin of the murdered man. (In special cases only it was extended to include the more distant relatives, and even the members of the *phratry* to which he had belonged.) It is clear that this duty of making an accusation which fell upon the next of kin, preserves a relic of the ancient duty of the blood-feud which has been transformed by the requirements of the public welfare. It is the same narrow circle of relationship, extending to the third generation, united by a strict religious bond, to which alone belonged the right to inherit property and the duty of performing the cult of the dead. This circle of relatives is here again called upon to "succour" the unfortunate who has been violently done to death.<sup>146</sup> The reason for this duty—a duty evidently derived from the ancient blood-feud—is easy to understand: it, too, is a department of the cult of the dead which was binding as a duty upon exactly that circle of relatives. It was no mere abstract "right", but a quite definite personal claim, made by the dead man himself, that the surviving relatives were required to satisfy. At Athens even in the fourth and fifth centuries the belief still survived in undiminished vigour that the soul of one violently done to death, until the wrong done to him was avenged upon the doer of it, would wander about finding no rest,<sup>147</sup> full of rage at the violent act, and wrathful, too, against the relatives

who should have avenged him, if they did not fulfil their duty. He himself would become an "avenging spirit"; and the force of his anger might be felt throughout whole generations.<sup>148</sup> Implacable revenge is the sacred duty of those—his representatives and executors—who are specially called upon to fulfil the needs of the dead soul. The state forbids them to take the law into their own hands; but it commands them to seek redress at the tribunals of justice. It will take over the duties of judge and executioner itself; but a decided consideration will be shown to the relatives of the murdered man at the hearing of the case. In duly conducted criminal procedure the courts specially appointed for this purpose will decide whether the deed is to be considered one of wilful murder, unintentional manslaughter, or justifiable homicide. In making these distinctions the state has struck a blow at that older code of the blood-feud in which the right of vengeance belonged entirely to the family of the murdered man. According to that code, as we cannot but conclude from Homer, nothing but the fact of the violent death of a relative was considered, not the character or motive of the deed itself. Now, however, the murderer is liable to a death penalty which he can avoid before the verdict is given by going into voluntary and perpetual exile. He disappears and leaves the country—at the boundaries of the country the state's authority ceases, and so does the power of the indignant spirit of the dead, which is bound to its native soil—like that of all local deities, whose influence is confined to the place where they are worshipped. If, by such flight over the frontier, "the doer of the deed withdraws himself from the person injured by him—i.e. the angry soul of the dead man"<sup>149</sup>—his life is thereby saved, even if he himself is not justified. This alone is meant by the permission of such voluntary exile. Involuntary homicide<sup>150</sup> is punished by banishment for a limited period, after the expiration of which the relations of the dead man are to grant a pardon to the murderer on his return to his native land.<sup>151</sup> If they voted for it unanimously<sup>152</sup> they could even do this before he went into banishment, in which case this would not take place at all. There can be no doubt that this pardon had to be granted by them in the name of the dead man as well, of whose rights they were the representatives; indeed, the man himself lying mortally wounded could before his death, even in the case of wilful murder, pardon his assailant and thereby excuse his relatives the duty of prosecution;<sup>153</sup> to such an extent was the injured soul's wish for vengeance the only point at issue,



even in the legal procedure of a constitutionally governed state, and not in the least the lawless act of the murderer as such. When there is no desire for vengeance on the part of the victim requiring to be satisfied, the murderer goes unpunished. When he suffers punishment, he suffers it for the satisfaction of the soul of the murdered man. He is no longer slain as a sacrifice to his victim; but when the relations of the dead exact vengeance from him by legally constituted processes, that, too, is a part of the cult offered to the soul of the dead.

## § 2

It is true that the state directs the blood-feud required of the relatives of the dead man along constitutional channels that shall not contravene the laws of the community; but it does not in the least intend to abolish the fundamental idea of the ancient family vendetta. It reasserts the original claim to vengeance of the victim violently done to death—a claim closely bound up with the cult of the dead—by forbidding the old custom, common in Homeric times, of buying off the blood-guiltiness of the murderer by a compensatory payment made to the relatives of the dead man.<sup>184</sup> It does not destroy the religious character of the whole transaction; it uses its own processes to secure the fulfilment of the requirements of religion. That is why the head of all criminal jurisdiction is the King Archon, the constitutional administrator of all the religious functions of the ancient royal government. The religious basis of the oldest Athenian criminal jurisdiction is particularly evident. It has its seat on the Areiopagos, the hill of the Curse-Goddesses, over the sacred chasm in which they themselves, the "Venerable Ones", have their dwelling. The judicial office is closely bound up with the service of the goddesses.<sup>185</sup> At the commencement of the proceedings both parties take an oath in the name of the Erinyes.<sup>186</sup> Each of the three days at the end of the month, upon which legal proceedings in these courts took place,<sup>187</sup> was sacred to one of the three goddesses.<sup>188</sup> To them sacrifice was made by those who were acquitted in those courts;<sup>189</sup> for it is the goddesses who have given them absolution just as it is the goddesses who demand the punishment of the guilty. They still do it, as once they had done in the typical case of Orestes, in which they themselves had been the accusers.<sup>190</sup> In this Athenian worship the Erinyes had not yet entirely lost their true and original character. They had not become the mere guardians of law in general, as which they were sometimes

represented by poets and philosophers who thus extended and weakened immeasurably their once much narrower significance. They are formidable daimones, dwelling in the depths of the earth from which they are conjured up by the curses and maledictions of those who have no earthly avenger left. Hence they are more particularly the avengers of murder committed within the family itself: they punish the man who has slain the very person whom he would have been called upon to avenge, if that person had fallen at the hand of another murderer than himself. When the son has slain his father or mother, who shall then carry out the blood-feud incumbent upon the nearest relation of the dead? This nearest relation is the murderer himself. It is the Erinyes of the father or the mother who sees to it that the dead shall still receive due satisfaction. She breaks out from the kingdom of the dead to seize the murderer. She is ever at his heels in pursuit, leaving him no rest night or day. Vampire-like she sucks his blood: <sup>131</sup> he is her destined victim.<sup>132</sup> Even in the judicial procedure of the fully organized state it is the Erinyes who demand revenge for murder at the courts of law. Their absolute power extends in widening circle to all murder, even when it is committed outside the limits of the family; though it was only the imagination of the poetically or philosophically minded that ever transformed them completely to champions of justice of all kinds, in heaven and upon earth. In the cult and beliefs proper to individual cities they remained the auxiliaries attached to the souls of murdered men. These gruesome daimones had their origin in the worship of the dead, and they lived on in connexion with the undying worship of which they were a part. Indeed, if we examine closely the sources of information at our disposal, we can see even through their inadequacy and obscurity that the Erinyes was nothing else but the soul itself of the murdered man, indignant at its fate and seizing its revenge for itself—till later ages substituted for this the conception of the ghost from hell taking over to itself the rage of the dead man's soul.<sup>133</sup>

### § 3

Thus, the whole procedure at murder trials was directed rather to the satisfaction of invisible powers—the injured souls of the dead and the daimones that represent them—than of the state and its living members. In essence it was a religious act. As a result all was not at an end when the human verdict on the case had been given. On his return from exile the man guilty of involuntary homicide, besides receiving the

pardon of the relatives of the dead man, had still a double duty to perform; he had to be purified and to offer propitiatory sacrifice.<sup>144</sup> Purification from the blood of the slain was necessary even in the case of the unpunished agent of what the state regarded as justifiable homicide;<sup>145</sup> it restored the man, hitherto regarded as "unclean", to participation in the religious gatherings of state and family which could not have been approached by an unpurified person without suffering defilement. The Homeric poems know nothing of any such religious purification of those who have incurred the stain of blood.<sup>146</sup> Analogous occurrences in the religious usage of allied peoples make it, however, almost impossible to doubt that the notion of religious uncleanness belonging to a man who has had any dealings with uncanny powers was of primeval antiquity among the Greeks, too. It can only have been suppressed in the Homeric view of the matter; just as that view also suppressed the usages of expiation. These were intended to propitiate the indignant soul of the dead and the gods who protected it, by means of solemn sacrifice; but in the Homeric picture of the world they never appear, for the ideas on which they were based had themselves been swept away.

The details of purification and expiation—the former serving the interests of the state and its religious needs, the latter intended as a final appeasement of the injured powers of the unseen world—were closely united in practice and are often confused in the accounts which have come down to us. A hard and fast distinction between them cannot be drawn. So much at all events is clear; the expiatory rites indispensable when murder had been committed had the closest possible similarity with the ritual of sacrifice to the gods of the underworld.<sup>147</sup> And, in fact, the deities invoked at such rites of expiation—Zeus Meilichios, Zeus Apotropaïos, and the rest—belong to the underworld circle of gods.<sup>148</sup> To them, instead of the murderer himself, a victim was offered to appease the anger felt by them as the patrons of the departed soul. The Erinyes, too, have sacrifice made to them at expiations<sup>149</sup>—everything in these matters is connected with the kingdom of the dead and its inhabitants.

But it was the Delphic Oracle that saw to the details of purification and expiation after murder. The necessity of such rights was impressed on men by the example set in the story of Apollo's own flight and purification after the slaying of the earth-spirit at Pytho. These events were symbolically enacted over again regularly every eight years.<sup>150</sup> At Delphi,

too, according to Aeschylus, Apollo himself purified Orestes the matricide from the pollution of his crime.<sup>171</sup> At Athens one of the oldest propitiatory sites was called after one of Apollo's titles, the Delphinion.<sup>172</sup> The Oracle must often have directed its inquirers to placate not merely the Heroes, but also the angry souls of murdered (and not heroized) men by means of expiatory sacrifices: as it bade the murderers of Archilochos and the Spartan king Pausanias.<sup>173</sup> Propitiatory sacrifice in this sense does not belong to the Apolline cult as an exclusive possession; it belongs, also, to other, mostly lower-world, deities; but it was the Oracle of Apollo that set the seal on its sanctity. At Athens the Exegetai founded under the influence of the Delphic Oracle were the official administrators of this expiatory ritual.<sup>174</sup> Plato was certainly following the customs of Greek cities when in the "Laws" he declares that his state shall take its regulations for purification and propitiation from Delphi.<sup>175</sup>

#### § 4

The Oracle, then, of the omniscient God sanctified and recommended these rites of expiation; the state regulated its judicial procedure in murder cases on the lines of the old family blood-feud. It was natural, then, that the ideas on which these religious and political institutions were based—the conviction of a continued existence enjoyed by the murdered man's soul and of his consciousness and knowledge of what occurred among the living who survived, his anger and his powers—that these ideas should attain to something like the position of an article of faith. The confidence with which these beliefs were held still manifests itself to us in the speeches at murder trials in which Antiphon, suiting his language to his real or imagined public, tries to arouse terror and awe, as at the presence of indubitable realities, by calling upon the angry soul of the dead man and the spirits that avenge the dead.<sup>176</sup> About the souls of murdered men indeed, regarded as more than other spirits unable to find rest, a strange and ghostly mythology grew up, of which we shall have some specimens later on. How primitive such beliefs could be we may gather with startling clearness from occasional records of purely savage customs<sup>177</sup> which are derived from them—customs which cannot possibly have been freshly invented in the Greece of this enlightened period, and must be either primitive Greek savagery come to light again, or else barbarisms only too easily welcomed from less civilized neighbours. In any case they imply the most materialistic view of the survival

of the murdered man, and of the revenge that might be taken by his soul.

It is evident that what men believed about the souls of murdered men must have had an important influence upon the general belief in a future life as it took shape in the mind of the people. But the extent of such an influence can be more exactly measured in the story which Xenophon tells about the dying Kyrus: as the strongest grounds for the hope that an after-life will be the portion of *all* souls after their separation from the body, the dying king points to the unquestioned facts which, as all admit, prove a special after-life for the souls "of those who have suffered injustice". In addition to this he lays stress on the argument that the worship of the dead would not have been preserved intact to his own time if their souls had been entirely deprived of all active power.<sup>170</sup> Thus we see how the *cult* of the souls of the dead was the chief source of the *belief* in a continued life after death.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER V

<sup>1</sup> This dual efficacy of the *χθόνια* is explained naturally enough by their nature as underground spirits. There is no reason for supposing that their influence on the fertility of the fields was a later addition (as Preller does, *Dem. u. Pers.* 188 ff., followed by many). Still less have we any grounds for regarding the protection of souls and the care for the fertility of crops as a sort of allegorizing parallel (soul = grain of seed) as has been usual since the time of K. O. Müller.

<sup>2</sup> Ζεὺς παραχθόνιος. I 657. θεοὶ χθόνιοι . . . ἰσθίμιον Ἀθην. Hes. Th. 767 l. Evidently there is no distinction here between παραχθόνιος and χθόνιος, as Preller, *Dem. u. Pers.* 187, wishes to make out.

<sup>3</sup> Hes. Op. 465. εὐχόμεθα Μοῖσι χθονίῳ Διὶ ἀντράκι Εἰ ἀνγὴ κτλ. It is impossible even by far-fetched methods of interpretation (such as Lehrs makes use of, *Popul. Aufs.* 298 l.) to make this Ζεὺς χθόνιος into anything else than a Zeus of the underworld. The god of the lower world, totally distinct from the Olympian Zeus (Ζεὺς Ὀλύμπιος, Ansch., *Suppl.* 231), is here a dispenser of blessings to the farmer. In the sacrificial regulation from Mykonos (S/G. 815) it is prescribed to offer: εὐχὴν παρὰ τῶν (αὐμνῶν on the stone) Διὶ Χθονίῳ Γῇ Χθονίῳ ΔΕΠΤΑ μέλας ἐνφύα· εἶναι αἱ θύμῃ (where βεπρά = hostias pellē spoliatae, see Protz, *Leg. Sacr.* 4, p. 17; though the addition of the colour of the no longer visible skin seems remarkable)—εὐχὴν παρὰ τῶν here belongs to Διὶ, etc., as the division-mark on the stone before εὐχὴ shows: see BCH. 1888, p. 460 l. Evidence of this sort makes it clear how unjustifiable it would be to rule out all fructifying influence from the "idea of the chthonic" and to regard the chthonic deities as simply the power of death and destruction in the world of nature and men, as is done by H. D. Müller (who is met by serious difficulty in this passage from the Op.: *Mythol. d. griech. Sl.* ii, 40). It is, indeed, scarcely necessary to seek for an abstractly formulated "idea of the chthonic"; but if this fructifying and life-giving force does belong to the nature of the *χθόνια* as such, what becomes of H. D. Müller's ingenuously thought-out and violently defended view according to which the chthonic only constitutes one side of the nature of certain deities who have in addition a different, Olympian, side in which they are positively creative and beneficent?

<sup>4</sup> Ζεὺς χθόνιος at Corinth, Paus. 2, 2, 8; at Olympia, 5, 14, 8.

<sup>5</sup> Thus Persephone is called Ἀνγὴ, Δάμωια, etc. (Lehrs, *Pop. Aufs.* 288), also Μελευμένη. Μεληβόνα; Μελευβία consort of Hades. Melaleia, p. 62, 19. Di. (8th ed., Bonn.) (? Μεληβόνα as Hekate is Μελευμένη. Orph., H. 71). Ἀριστερὴ χθονία, P. Mag. Par. 2450.—Hekate is Καλλιστερὴ, Εὐκυλίστη (παρ' ἐννέφρασις φ' μὴ εὐδα εὐκυλός, E.M.), the Erinyes Λυγροί, Εὐμενίδες; their mother Εὐκλύμη (= Γῆ): Inter ap. Sch. Soph., OC. 42 (from a similar source. Sch. Aeschin. i, 188), etc. Cf. Bücheler, *Rh. Mus.* 33, 16-17.

<sup>6</sup> Πολυδάκτυλος. Πολυδάκτυλος. Ἀργεῖλος (Epigr. Gr. 195; see Bentley ad Callim., *Lev. Pall.* 130; Preller, *Dem. u. Pers.* 192; Walcker, *Götter.* ii, 482). Εὐκλύμη (Bücheler, *Rh. Mus.* 36, 332 f.).—Εὐκυλός (corresponding to the Εὐκυλίστη above) as a title of Hekate must be rejected if Köhler's correction of *CIA.* ii, 3, 1629, is right: Ἥδελος—Εὐδελος.

<sup>1</sup> Cult of Ζεύς Εὐβουλεύς at Amorgos, Paros (inse. cit. by Foucart, *BCH.* vii. 402), of Ζεύς Βουλεύς at Mykonos, *SIG.* 615 (Ζεύς Βουλεύς, (ins. *Pres.* i. 248, l. 49, does not belong here); of Εὐβουλεύς (original title of Hades: Orph., *H.* xviii, 12) in Eleusis (side by side δ θεός, ὁ θεός): *SIG.* 20, 99: *CIA.* ii. 1630 c.d. (The Athenian legend makes Eubouleus into a mortal herdsmann: Clem. Al., *Protr.* ii, pp. 14-15 P.; Schol. Luc., *De Mero.*, 2, p. 275. 27 Rabe.) Εὐβουλεύς simply = Hades: Nic., *At.* 14; epitaph from Syros, *Epigr. Gr.* 272, 8, and frequently. So, too, the Ζεύς Εὐβουλεύς (Hesych. s. Εὐβ.) worshipped in Kyrene must have been a Ζεύς χθόνιος. Eubouleus is also a title of Dionysos as Zagreus (Iakchos), i.e. the Dionysos of the underworld.—Incidentally, what is the origin of this designation of the god of the underworld as "good counsellor" (howi *consilii praestitorem* as Macr. l. 8, 17, translates Εὐβουλή)? It can hardly have been because he was specially able to take counsel on his own behalf (this is the sense in which D.S. 8, 72, 2, takes the title); but rather because he was an oracle god, and as such dispensed good counsel to inquirers. Thus the oracle-god Nereus is called εὐβουλεύς in Pi., P. iii, 92; so also *I.* vii, 32: εὐβουλεύς θεός.

<sup>2</sup> *Isoson* fr. 1 (*PLG.* iii, 376), etc.—Consecration to Κλυμένη from Athens: *CIG.* 409.—Hesych. Περικλόμενος δ Πλούτων lit is no accident that gave the name Periklomenos to the magically gifted son of Neleus). Κλυμένης = Hades. *Epigr. Gr.* 522 a 2.

<sup>3</sup> The name Τροφίονος, Τροφίονος itself also points to the fact that assistance to the fertility of the earth was expected of this Ζεύς χθόνιος. In the later cult of Trophaios not a trace of such a belief survives.

<sup>4</sup> *Is oideμαί πάλε "Αϊδον βυραί ζευσ. Αἰχμήας φρενὶ μένος θιῶν γὰρ θάνατος αὐτὸν βίρωτο ἐφ' αἴα.* (fr. 161 Sids): Schol., AB. on A 158.

<sup>5</sup> In Elis *ἐπέτε τοῦ "Αἰδον ἀγρίβυλός τε καὶ τοῦς*, Paus. 6, 25, 2. Cult of Demeter and Kore and of Hades in the very fertile Triphylia, Str. 344.

<sup>6</sup> Kaukonos from Pylos, the Nélidas at their head, reach Attica: connexion with the cult of the χθόνιος in Phylia in Eleusis: see K. O. Möller, *At.* S. ii, 258. Such accounts may have an historical foundation. The elaborate accounts by H. U. Möller, *Mythol. Gr.* I, c. 8, and O. Crusius, *Erzähl-Gesch.* "Kaukonos"—operate with too many uncertain factors for the results to have any certainty.

<sup>7</sup> *"Αἰδῶν . . . τοὺς ἀνέθετο ταυμάσια ἀνὰ δόλους:* Pl., *Crat.* 403 E. δ' *"Αἰδῶν αὐτὸν μένος τῶς φυχῆς ἀνέχει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς καρπὰς αἰνὰς ζεῦσι δαίμονας καὶ δακτύλους καὶ κούφους:* Schol. B.L., O 188.

<sup>8</sup> *οἱ πάλαι θεοθέμενα τὸ ὄνομα Πλούτωνος καλοῦσιν αὐτὸν ("Αἰδῶν).* Pl., *Crat.* 403 A.

<sup>9</sup> At the Geomix (Nekyria) sacrifice for Ge and the dead. Hesych. *Γεῖσιον*—*ἡμεῖς γὰρ τε καὶ ἀλλοίς.* A. Pers. 220—calling to Hermes, Ge, and Aidoneus in "spirit-raising", Pers. 628 B., 640 B., cf. Cā, 124 B.—appeal to Hermes and Γῆ κατέχουσι οἱ δαίμονες: *CIG.* 538-B.

<sup>10</sup> Γαίω in Olympia Paus. 5, 14, 10; cf. E. Curtius, *Altär v. Olymp.*, p. 15. At Kos it would seem to have been stated that Ge was worshipped *μέγας θεός*. Ant. Lib. 15 (acc. to Euseb.). Side by side with Ζεύς Χθόνιος was worshipped Γῆ χθονία at Mykonos, *SIG.* 615, 28.

<sup>11</sup> *νόημα Γῆ Ζωγράφ τε, θιῶν παραδέσσεια σφύρω, Αἰμαίωνης* fr. 5 (Kink.).

<sup>12</sup> Cult of Klymenos and Demeter Χθονία (her festival Χθώνια: see also Ael. *HA.* xi, 4) in Hermione, Paus. 2, 35, 4 ff. Pausanias also thinks (3, 14, 9) that the cult of Dem. Χθονία was brought to Sparta.

from Hermlone, which may be right. Kore as *Μελίβηα* is also mentioned in this connexion by Lasos of Herma. *fr.* 1, *PLG.* iii, 378. Dedicatory inscriptions (*CIG.* 1194-1200) also mention, side by side with Demeter Chthonia, Hymenoe, and Kore as well. Once (*BCH.* 1889, p. 198, n. 24) only *Δαίμαρ, Κλειμένη*. Demeter was clearly the chief goddess; cf. *CIG.* 1199.—From the community of the worship of Demeter Chthonia in both Hermlone and Alos it may be justifiable to conclude that this cult belonged originally to the Dryopians who combined with the Dorians in Hermlone and were driven by them out of Argolic Alos. There is no warrant whatever for the fanciful derivation of the Demeter-cult of these neighbourhoods from "Pelagians" submerged by Dryopian invaders.

"There was a common worship of: Zeus Eubouleus, Demeter, and Kore at Amorgos; Zeus Eub., Demeter Thesmophoros, Kore, Hero, Hako at Paros; Plouton, Demeter, Kore, Epimachos, Hermes in Knidos; Plouton and Kore in Karia. See the citations given by Foucart, *BCH.* vii, 402 (with whose own pronouncements I cannot, however, agree at all). In Deko, Demeter, Kore, Zeus Eubouleus: *H.H.* 24, 505 n. 4. So, too, in Corinth Plouton, Demeter, and Kore: *Paus.* 2, 18, 3; Hades Demeter and Kore in Triphylia, *Str.* 344. Observe also the group of divinities at Lebadesia in the cult of Trophonios: *Paus.* 9, 39.—At Eleusis side by side with Demeter and Kore Plouton also was worshipped: *CIA.* ii, 834 b. But there existed even there other groups of *χθονία* worshipped in conjunction, *εἰ θεῶν* once more joined with Triptolemos, and a second triad: *δ θεῶν, ὁ θεῶν, and Eubouleus.* *CIA.* *Suppl.* i, 27b, p. 89, ff. is, 1620 b; iii, 1106 9. This second triad, which is not mentioned on the inscr. *CIA.* i, 5 (from the beginning of the fifth century), may have only been subsequently added to the Eleusinian official cult (see Ziehen, *Ug. Sacr., Desseri* pp. 9-10). It is a waste of time to try and identify the vague appellations *θεῶν* and *θεῶν* with the names of definite chthonic deities (as e.g. Kern attempts, *Ach. Myth.* 1891, pp. 5-6). Acc. to Luchner, *D. Eumenidescript. bei Paus.*, pp. 15-16, these Eleusinian divinities were imported into Athens, established in the chasm of the Eumenides, and instead of *δ θεῶν, ὁ θεῶν and Eubouleus*, were called Hermes, Ge, and Plouton. But the correlation of these divinities worshipped there in conjunction with the *Ἐρμῆν* (acc. to *Paus.* 1, 28, 8) with the Eleusinian group depends entirely upon the identification of the *Ἐρμῆν* with Demeter and Kore. This, however, is based on nothing more than a guess of K. O. Müller's (*Aesch. Eum.*, p. 176 [1865 E.T.]), which would still be very much in the air even if the theories about "Demeter Erinyes" with which it is connected did not rest on such insecure foundations. (To identify the Eleusinian-Athenian Eubouleus with Plouton is impossible, if only because of the fact that in the chthonic cult of those places *Εὐβουλεύς*, originally the name of an underworld god, has developed into the name of a Hero who now has a place alongside the chthonic deities.)—With the cautious appellations *δ θεῶν, ὁ θεῶν* we may compare the appeal on a *δελφίον* from Athens, *CIG.* 1034: *βοῶμεν χθονίῃ καὶ τῇ χθονίῃ καὶ τοῖς χθονίαις ὁδοῖς καὶ.*

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Maasshardt, *Mythol. Forsch.* 1884, p. 223 ff.

<sup>11</sup> It cannot, however, be denied that already in Homer Persephone is the daughter of Demeter and Zeus. Adducing *E* 326 and *λ* 217 K. O. Müller (*Alt. Sch.* ii, 81) has disposed conclusively of Preller's doubts: in spite of which H. D. Müller in his reconstruction of the Demeter-myth clings blindly to the view that the goddess carried



away by Hades was only afterwards made the daughter of Demeter.—The Homeric poems seem to know of the rape of Persephone by Aidoneus but not the story of her periodical return to the upper world—which is the most important feature in the Eleusinian creed. What Lehrs says on this much-discussed subject is completely convincing (*Pop. Aufst.*, p. 277 f.).

<sup>1</sup> The cult of Demeter is old in Phthiotis too (—*Πύρρον. Δήμους: ῥήματα. B 405 f.*—*Symeon 'Ανταίων μεταφέρει. A. Corr. 490*). Also in Paros and Crete. That it is possible to trace the extension of the worship of Demeter in detail (as many have tried to do), is one of the current illusions on this subject that I cannot share.

<sup>2</sup> *Aionion* and *νεμερμαρτεῖον* (*νεμερμαρτεῖον* Phot. *Θεοὶ Μελετῆται* cf. *Append. prov. iii*, 18 L. S.; *Eust.* x 514, p. 1067) at Ephesus on the River Acheron in Thesprotia; well known from Hdt.'s story of Perikles (v. 92). Here the place of Orpheus' descent to the lower world was localized, *Paus.* 9, 30, 4; cf. also *Hyg.* 88, p. 84, 19-20 Schen.—Entrance to Hades at Tainaron, through which Herakles dragged up Kerberos (Schol. D.P. 791, etc.), with *νεμερμαρτεῖον*: cf. *Fla.*, *Ser. Num.* *Vind.* 17, p. 580 E (cf. *Stat.* 74. ii. 32 ff., 48 f., etc.).—Similar entrance to Hades at Hermione, see below; *καταβόμης ἄβαν* at Argos = Sikyon: *Call. fr.* 110.—At Phigaleia in Arkadia a *νεμερμαρτεῖον* at which King Pausanias inquired, *Paus.* 9, 17, 8.—More famous is the *νεμερμαρτεῖον* at Herakleia Pont.; see *Rh. Mus.* 36, 556 (this also was a place where Kerberos appeared above, *Meia* j, 103). Neither Pausanias came for guidance, acc. to *Fla.*, *Ser. Num.* 19, p. 555 C; *Cimon* 8.—The *Πλατωνίαν* and *νεμερμαρτεῖον* at Cumae in Italy had a long-standing reputation (mentioned as early as *Soph.*, *fr.* 682 (768 P.); cf. *Rh. Mus.* 36, 555 (an Italian Greek applies to it *νεμερμαρτεῖον*, *Fla.*, *Cons. Apoll* 14, p. 109 C).—Next the Asiatic *Πλατωνίαν* and *Αἰώνιον*: at Acharaka in Karia, *Str.* 649-50; at Magnesia on the Maeander, *ἄβαν ἐν ἑλάνῳ ἱερὸν. Χερσίων ἄβαντος*, *Str.* 639; at Myous, *Str.* 578. This is what *τὸ ἐν Αἰώνῳ ἄβαν* must have been, mentioned among other *Αἰώνια* by *Antig. Caryss.* 123; the *Κιβήτος ἐν ἑλάνῳ ἱερὸν ὅπου Φρυγίαν βίβητος* also mentioned there, may very well have been the place in Phrygia spoken of by *Alkman* ap. *Str.* 580: *βίβητος Κερβήτους ἔχει διελθῆναι ἀναφορὰν* (suggested by *Keller* on *Antig.*). Perhaps the latter place—named after the Korymbantes (?) see *Brink* on *Alcm. fr.* 82—is the same as the cave at Hierapolis—Better known than any was the ocellular cavern at Hierapolis in Phrygia into which only the Galli of the Great Mother, the *Μαδρία Μαναν sacerdos*, can go without being overcome by the vapours issuing from it: *Str.* 629-30, *Fla.* ii, 208. There existed under a temple of Apollo a direct *καταβόμης ἄβαν*, accessible at least to the faithful *μελετῆται*: see the very remarkable account of *Damasac.* V, *Isid.* ap. *Phot.*, p. 344b, 35-345a, 27 Bk. (Cult of Echlidna in Hierapolis, see *Gutschmid*, *Rh. Mus.* 19, 398 ff.; this is also a chthonic cult: *Herzog* "Ergon. Eur. Pk. 1023: Echlidna among the monsters of Hades: *Ar.*, *Rh.* 473).—These are the mortifiers in Asia Phrygia, quae vidimus, *Cic.*, *Div. i*, 79 (cf. *Gal.* iv, 540; *xvii*, i, 10).—Entrances to Hades were regularly to be found at those places where the cave was shown by which Aidoneus made his exit or his entrance in carrying off Kore. Thus at Eleusis, *τὴν σπ. νόστον ἐκ'* 'Αἰδῶν, *Orph.*, *H.* 18, 15, *Paus.* i, 38, 5; at Kolonos, *Sch. S.*, *OC.* 1660-3; at Leros, *Paus.* 2, 36, 7; at Phoenos (a *χέλυς* ἢ *Κολύβη*: *Conon* 15), and probably in Crete too (cf. *Racch. fr.* 83 *Jebb*, ap. *Sch. Hes.*, 74. 914); at Enna in Sicily a *χέλυς καρυγίων*: *D.S.* 5, 3, 3; *Cic.*, *l'arr.* iv, 107;

at Syracuse at the spring Kyano, D.S. 5, 4, 2; at Kyzikos, Prop. 3 [4], 22, 4.

<sup>14</sup> The *Leporel* live there in a *χώρα χερσέ*, Eur., *El.* 1206 f., on the eastern slope of the hill.

<sup>15</sup> Paus. 2, 35, 10. The precinct of the temple was an Asylon, Phot. 'Ἐπύλας; *AB.* 256, 15; Zeb. ii, 25 (*Ar. Baal*).—Kerberos is brought up from below at Hermione; Eur., *H.F.* 815. An Acheron, and even an 'Αχέρωνας λίμνη, was to be found in Thesprotia, Triphylia, Herakleia on the Pontus, Carana, and Comella in Bruttium—all sites of ancient cults of Hades and reputed as in close proximity to the underworld.

<sup>16</sup> Strabo viii, 372—the same is reported by Call. *fr.* 110 of the inhabitants of Αἰνυαίης (prob. = Sikyon, where there was a cult of Demeter, Paus. 2, 11, 2-3; cf. 2, 5, 3. Hesych. *ἱερὸν δὲ ἀστυρεὶν καὶ Λαυονίαν*), where, at any rate, there was a *καταβόσκον ἄδων*.—The name "Hermione" seems almost to have acquired a generic sense. In the Orphic *Argonautica* a city Hermlioneia is said to be situated in the fabulous north-west of Europe in the neighbourhood of the gold-bearing river Acheron, where (as always on the margin of the *oleum*) there dwell *γῆν βασιλεύοντες δαδρίων, δὲν ἀνδράσι μὲν δάμνην καὶ δὲν ἄνδρα, etc.* (1135-47). Thus Hermlioneia in this case lies immediately in the country of souls and blessedness, which the ancient inhabitants of the Peloponnesian city rather supposed to be in the neighbourhood of their own country.—Hesych. strangely: 'Ἐπύλας' αὖτ' ἡ ἀστυρεὶς καὶ ἡ χώρα τῆς Εὐαρυμῆος. Was there a place called Hermlione there too? See Lob., *Paralip.* 289.

## II

<sup>17</sup> If a father makes money by his son's unchastity, the son is released from the duty of providing food or shelter for his father while the latter is alive—*ἀναβάρετα δ' αὐτῷ πατέρει καὶ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ*: Solonian law ap. Aeschin., *Tim.* 13.

<sup>18</sup> Dem. 43, 57-8.

<sup>19</sup> Sch. Soph., *Ant.* 253. Philo ap. Euseb., *PE.* viii, 358 D; 359 A. See Bernays, *Berichte Ber. Ak.* 1876, p. 604, 606 f.

<sup>20</sup> *ψ* 71 R.

<sup>21</sup> Isoc. 14, 35.

<sup>22</sup> The *ἀεὶς* at Athens, the *καὶ* at Sparta. But the bodies were often given up to the relatives to bury, and in any case the refusal of burial can only have been temporary—it is incredible that they could have wished to leave the bodies to rot in the open air.

<sup>23</sup> Athenian law, Xen., *FG.* I, 7, 22; common Greek institution at least as against temple-robbers, D.S. 16, 23. Examples of the enforcement of this law in the fifth and fourth centuries discussed by W. Viacher, *Rh. Mus.* 20, 446 ff.—Suicide in some places was refused burial honours (in Thebes and Cyprus); even in Athens it was customary to cut off the hand of the suicide and bury it separately (Aeschin., *Ctes.* 244). This is the punishment of *ἀνδράπευ*. Self-starvation was considered less shocking and that is perhaps why it occurs so frequently as a method of suicide. Cf. Thälheim, *Gr. Rechtsalt.* p. 44 f. Perhaps also the religious objection of the Pythagoreans (and Platonists) to taking this means of escape from an existence that has become unbearable rests upon popular feeling and belief—it was not shared at all by the enlightenment of later ages. (There is, however, nothing in ancient beliefs that points to the idea that the body of the suicide should be allowed only burial, not burning. Acc.

to the *Thais* *μαρὰ* Alas after taking his own life was bared, not burnt. *3d εἰς ἄπυρ τοῦ θανάτου*—fr. 3: [Apollod.] *Epit.* v. 7. There is no ground for supposing that the fable of Philoctet., *H.* 721, p. 188 K., acc. to which Kalchas declared the burning of the bodies of suicides to be not *ἴσως*, is taken out of an ancient poem; as Welcker does *Kl. Schr.* ii. 281.]

<sup>19</sup> Cf. the words *ο* 17 ff. Hens.), and the answer *ο* ap. Plu., *Adul.* 2<sup>a</sup>, p. 69 CD. It is worth remarking that in the fourth and even third centuries it was still necessary to reply to the idea *ἔμμεν δὲ τὸ εἰς αἶμα καθάρσιον ἔσθαι*. When later on the cosmopolitanism preached by the Cynics (and after their model by Teles) becomes really common property it seems no longer necessary to introduce special grounds of consolation for having to be buried in foreign soil into pamphlets *εἰς ἀπύρ*. At least this is not done by the Stoic Musonius or the Platonizing Plutarch. Cf. also Philodem., *Mort.*, p. 33-4 Mehl.

<sup>20</sup> This is the reason why so often the bones or ashes of those who die abroad are collected and brought home for burial by their relations. *Exc.* ap. Westermann on Dem., *Eubul.* 70; cf. also Plu., *Phoc.* 37.

<sup>21</sup> *Ar.*, *Ec.* 1030. Origanon (wild marjoram, white thyme) possesses apotropaic power: it keeps away evil spirits. The ancients knew of the virtue possessed by these plants of scaring snakes, ants, and other vermin—Aristot., *HA.* 4, 8, 334b, 27; Plu., 10, 185; Thphr., *CP.* 6, 3, 4; Diosc., *MM.* ii, 29—1, p. 375 Spr., *Gp.* 12, 19, 8; cf. Nictas ad *Gp.* 13, 10, 5. Modern superstition employs them against goblins and water sprites, witches and ghosts. Grimm, p. 1214, p. 1426, n. 900. If marjoram and gentian are laid by women in child-bed ghosts and devils can do them no harm "for they shun such herbs": J. Ch. Männlingen ap. Alwin Schulte, *Alltagsleben z. d. Fran am 18 Jahrh.*, p. 193 f. The two purposes are closely connected. The pungent odour of herbs and burning stuff keeps away snakes as do nocentes spiritus monstra noxia: Pall. i, 35 = ii, 3, p. 49 Schu. The same thing applies to monstra noxia if they try to approach the corpse in the shape of snakes or insects (just as the ghost in Apul., *M.* ii, 25, approaches the corpse in the shape of a weasel: where we also read that the verisepelles which threaten the corpse et aves et fursum capes et tources immo vero etiam muscus induunt: ii, 22). So, too, the marjoram has a kathartic effect on the corpse, i.e. it is a means of keeping off underworld spirits.

<sup>22</sup> *Ar.*, *Ec.* 1031. The corpse lay on vine branches in several of the recently discovered Dipylos graves at Athens: *Athen. Mit.* 1893, pp. 185, 184. Superstitious reasons (as in the cases where olive leaves are used as a bed: see below) are to be suspected in this case, too, but can hardly be proved: cf. Friedrich, *Sarkophagstud.*, Nach. Gott. Ges. Wiss. Ph. Cl. 1895, pp. 18, 69; Arrich, *Gr. Mythen*, 102, 3. Apart from this the *ἀνθή* does not seem to have lustral effect.

<sup>23</sup> *ἀνθή, ῥοδόπανον*: *Ar.*, *Ec.* 1032 f.; *ῥοδόπανον δὲ ὀνόμαζον*: Eur., *Al.* 98 ff. The bowl was called *ῥοδόπανον*: Sch., *Ar.*, *Ec.* 1033; Pall. viii, 85 (cf. Phot. 346, 1 *ῥοδόπανον*). It contained water leached from another house: Hesych., *ῥοδόπανον*—obviously because the water in the house where the corpse lay was regarded as polluted. (Thus when the fire, for example, is "polluted", fresh fire is brought in from outside: Pro., *Q. Gr.* 24, p. 287 A; Arist. 20.) Those who left the house purified themselves with it: Hesych., *ῥοδόπανον*, cf. *ῥοδόπανον*,

σφαιρὶ ἄλκυ. A laurel branch (as holy-water sprinkler, as commonly in instructions) was placed in it: Sch. Eur., *Al.* 88.

<sup>39</sup> Serv., *A.* iii, 880: *apud Atticos iuvenat domos huius (cupressi) fronde volentur*. The object may have been to ward the superstitious against approaching the "unclean" house: it is a characteristic of the *ἀνορθότατος, ὅστις ἐπιβήσας μύσθας, ὅστις ἐπὶ νεκρῷ ἐστὶ ἐπὶ λαχρῇ δάκρυ ἐκλάσσει*, Thphr., *Ch.* 16. This at least was the reason given at Rome for a similar custom: Serv., *A.* 3, 84; 4, 507.

<sup>40</sup> Crowning of the dead with garlands, afterwards a general custom, is first mentioned in the *Ἀλκυωνεύς* (epical, but hard to date precisely: *fr.* ii, p. 76 Kink.). On the "Archemoros" vase a woman is about to place a myrtle-wreath on the head of Archemoros. The myrtle is sacred to the *χθόνιος*, and hence the myrtle-crown belongs to the Mystai of Demeter as well as to the dead: see Apollod. ap. Sch. Ar., *Ran.* 390; later ap. Sch. Soph., *OC.* 681. Grave-monuments too were crowned and planted especially with myrtles: Eur., *El.* 324, 812; cf. Thphr., *HP.* 3, 8, 3; Vg., *A.* iii, 23. Not only the dead but graves too were frequently crowned with *ἀλκυας*, parsley: Plu., *Timol.* 26; *Smp.* 3, 3, 2, p. 676 D; Diogen. viii, 57, and others; cf. above, chap. iv, n. 21. The crowning invariably implies some form of consecration to a god. Acc. to Tertul., *Cor. Mil.* 16, the dead were crowned *quoniam et ipsi idola statim sunt habitu et cultu consecrati*; which at least gets nearer the real sense of the practice than the view of Sch. Ar., *lys.* 681: *ἐκείνοισι δέδοται τοῖς νεκροῖς ὡς τοῖς ζῶσι Ἀλκυωνεύμενος*.

<sup>41</sup> 17, *Lg.* 959 A. Poll. iii, 65. A still stranger reason added ap. Phil., *πρόθερος*.

<sup>42</sup> Permission to attend either the *πρόθερος* of the corpse (and the funeral lamentation) or the funeral procession (the *ἐκφορά*) given only to women of kinship *παρὰ ἐκείνους*: Law ap. Dem. 43, 82-3: i.e. within the *ἐγγυρεῖα*, to which alone the duty of the cult of the dead belonged in principle. Only these women of the immediate kin are *μυσημέναι* in the case of death: cf. *Idt.* vi, 58; this is the reason for the restrictions laid down by the funeral regulation from Keos (*SFG.* 877, 25 ff.), which makes an even narrower selection within the ranks of the *ἐγγυρεῖα*. (From l. 22 *μὴ ἐκπορεύεσθαι*, etc., the law speaks of the *πρόθερος*, even though at the beginning only the *ἐκφορά* is in question.)

<sup>43</sup> *ἀμυγδαὶ κομμομένης δάφνης*. Plu., *Sol.* 21. The democratizing of life in Attica after Solon's time may have contributed to the carrying out there of provisions restricting the elaborate funeral rites of the old aristocratic period. The practice of *κόμμοσθαι* *καὶ νεκρῶν* appears, however, to have remained in use: beating of the head at funeral lamentations is a favourite motif in Attic vase-paintings (the so-called "Prothems" vases): cf. *Mosnum. delf. Instit.* viii, 4, 5; iii, 80, etc. See Benndorf, *Griech. Sinf. Vasenb.* I.

<sup>44</sup> *καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκμνησθέναι*, Plu., *Sol.* 21: by which is meant funeral hymns carefully prepared beforehand and perhaps ordered from professional *ἐκφῶναι* *ἐκφῶνται*, not spontaneous expressions of grief breaking out as though involuntarily.

<sup>45</sup> Plu., *Sol.* 21: *καὶ καὶ ἀλλοῖς ἄλλων ἐν νεκροῖς ἐκφῶναι*. This must surely mean: Solon forbade dirges to be sung at a funeral of one person in honour of another, different from the person actually being buried. (*ἐκφῶναι* is only used for variety after *ἄλλων* and simply = *ἄλλων*: so frequently by Attic writers: *μὴ ἀπολθῆναι ἄλλων ἐκφῶν τῶν ἄλλων*, Pl., *Lg.* viii, 849 E; *ἐκφῶν—ἄλλων* Isoc. 10, 38, etc.)

The tendency to extend the funeral hymns to include others besides the dead man is implied by a prohibition in a funeral ordinance of the *verge* of the *Asphedon* at Delphi (8th-4th century B.C.), *RCH.* '95, p. 11, l. 39 ff. *τὸν δὲ ὡδὸν καθάριον ἐν ταῖς ἐνδύσεσιν μὴ θρηνητὸς μὴ δ' ὀδυνῆται* (at the funeral of another person). Was Homer thinking of something of the kind in T 302: *Πάριον ἄνδρα*—?

<sup>40</sup> In Athens it had once been the custom *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνδύσεως*, i.e. while still in the house of the dead person: (Pl.) *Mis.* 315 C. Such a sacrifice before the *ἐνδύσεως* (which is not described till l. 128) ff.) is implied by Euripides, *Hec.* 1235, at the burial of the dead body found in the sea: *ἀποφύγετε μὲν ἄλκις ὡδὸν νεκρῶν*—where *ἀποφύγετε* is used inaccurately of sacrifice at the grave, in which case the *ὡδὸν* is meaningless; as also in the insc. from Xos (S/G. 877, 21). *ἀποφύγετε* is also thus used, Eur., *Hec.* 41. Plu. (Sol. 21) says of Solon: *ἐνέχοντο δὲ βόει ὅτι ἔφερον*. Possibly Solon forbade the sacrifice of animals before the *ἐνδύσεως*, since the author of the *Pl.-Platonic Menos* seems also to refer to such a prohibition.

<sup>41</sup> The Solonian restrictions says Plu. (Sol. 21) have been for the most part adopted in our (i.e. the Boeotian) *εἴκοσι*—as acc. to the indubitable witness of Cicero, Solon's funeral regulations had been reproduced *claudum prope verbis* in the tenth of the Twelve Tables by the Decemviri. *Limus* set to ceremonial mourning in Sparta: Plu. *Lyc.* 27 (whence *fast. Luc.* 18, p. 238 U), in Syracuse by Gelon: D.S. 1, 38, 2; cf. "Charondas", Stob., *Fl.* 44, 40 M. = iv, 2, 24, p. 153, 10 H. Some degree of restriction was imposed on their members (about the beginning of the fourth century B.C.) by the *verge* of the *Asphedon* in Delphi in the *verge* published in the *RCH.* '95, p. 9 ff.

<sup>42</sup> We have a very naive expression of the ideas lying behind such violent lamentations, self-inflicted injuries, and other excessive demonstrations of grief in the presence of the dead body, when e.g. in Tahiti people wound themselves and then "call out to the soul of the dead man to witness their attachment to him" (Ratzel, *Hist. of Mankind*, i, 300); cf. Waitz-Gerland, *Anthrop.* vi, 402.

<sup>43</sup> It is a very ancient idea common to many different nations that too violent expressions of grief for the dead man may disturb his rest and make him return: see Mannhardt, *Götter der deutschen Völker*, 1880, p. 290 (for Germany in partic. see Wuttke, *Deut. Volksabergl.*, § 728, p. 431; Rochholz, *D. Götter u. Brauch*, i, 207). Similar superstition in Greece is referred to in Lucian, *Luci.* 24 (in which the lateness of the witness does not prevent the belief from being ancient). The survivors who prolong beyond reason their lamentations are asked: *μὴν εἰς τὴν ἐνδύσεως; ἄρα δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὡδὸν τοῦ τοῦ νεκροῦ δεινότερον*.—In Pl., *Mis.* 248 B, the dead say *ἀνδρῶν ὡδὸν καὶ ἀνδρῶν εἰδὼν ἐν τῇ τῇ ἐνδύσεως ὡδὸν ἐν τῇ τῇ ἐνδύσεως*—thus violent grief is intended in Greece, too, to please the dead: see last note—*ἀλλὰ . . . ὡδὸν ἐνδύσεως ἐν τῇ τῇ ἐνδύσεως*: while etc. to "Charondas", Stob., *Fl.* iv, 2, 24, p. 153 H.: *ἐν τῇ τῇ ἐνδύσεως ἐν τῇ τῇ ἐνδύσεως*.

<sup>44</sup> *ἐν τῇ τῇ ἐνδύσεως ἐν τῇ τῇ ἐνδύσεως* & *ἐν τῇ τῇ ἐνδύσεως*, *ἐν τῇ τῇ ἐνδύσεως*, Solonian law in D. 43, 62; cf. Antipho, *Chor.* 34. Xenarch, ap. Proclus in *Pl. Rp.* ii, 134 Kroll: Kleonymos in Athens, *ἐν τῇ τῇ ἐνδύσεως* *ἐν τῇ τῇ ἐνδύσεως* *ἐν τῇ τῇ ἐνδύσεως* *ἐν τῇ τῇ ἐνδύσεως*, i.e. it was the mourning of the third day, immediately before the *ἐνδύσεως*, the *ἐνδύσεως* having occupied the whole of the second day (quite differently: by Maass, *Ophiom.*, 1895, p. 227, 48; but hardly correctly. It is very probable that a man *ἐν τῇ τῇ ἐνδύσεως*, i.e. seeming to those

around him to be dead, should be recognized by these same people and treated as merely in a trance—as in fact, was the case). So, too, in the analogous story of Theopompus of Soli in Plutarch, *S. Num. Vind.* 22, p. 583 D. *ἄνθρωπος, ὃς ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ταφῇ αὐτοῦ, ἐκθνήσκων* (Philostr., *I'd.* 3, 38, p. 114, 28 K.: the wife of the man who has just died *κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς θάψαν, θνήσκων αὐτοῦ* (sc. *καὶ ἀδελφῆς*) *γαμβρία* *ἐστίν*: i.e. immediately before the *ἐκφορά*, while the dead man still was in the house). Similar customs are implied for the Greeks in Cyprus ap. Ant. Lib. 38, 5, p. 235, 21 West. [= p. 122, 7 f. Mart.]: *ἡμέρη δὲ τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφαιρέσεως εἰς ἑρμῆν (εἰς τοὺς ἑρμῆν;) αἱ νεκροφρονεῖς*. Further, acc. to Plato's view as given in *Lg.* 959 A, there should be *ἑρμῆς ὑπὲρ τὸ μῆλον ἐκφορά*.

<sup>41</sup> Before sunrise: D. 43, 62 (more distinctly commanded by a law of Isem. Phal.: Cic., *Lg.* ii, 88). On the other hand, it was considered a disgrace to be buried during the night: *ἡ κακὴ κακὴ ταφὴ, νεκρὸς εἰς δὲ ἡμέρη*, Eur., *Trö.* 448.

<sup>42</sup> So in particular the funeral-law from Keos, *SIG.* 877; cf. Plu., *Sol.* 21; Herakl. *Rh. Muz.* 15, 468. Funeral-law of the Labyndal at Delphi, l. 29 f.: *σπάρμα δὲ ἐν ἀποβάσει καὶ συνεφέσειον ἐν νεκροῖς* (for the dead).

<sup>43</sup> Reproduced *Museum dell' Instituto*, ix, 391 [and in Rayet-Collignon, *Cronique grecque*, Pl. i].

<sup>44</sup> The law in D. 43, 62 (cf. 64), makes restrictions in the attendance at a funeral which are to apply to women only (and only then for those under 60); men seem therefore to be granted permission indiscriminately. We are told too in Plu., *Sol.* 21, that at the *ἐκφορά* Solon had not forbidden *ἐν ἀλλήροις μέμετα βαλόντων*—for men that is, we must suppose. The men went in front in procession; the women followed: D. 43, 62. Evidently the same applied in Keos: *SIG.* 877, 20.—Pittakos as asymmetes in Mitylene forbade absolutely accendere quatuordecim in funus aliorum, Cic., *Lg.* ii, 85.—Funeral-law of the Labyndal (Delphi), l. 42 ff.: from the burial *ὧς ἐπεὶ φορέσει ἱεμεν, ἔχθρα ἀμαρτίαν καὶ παραβιβάσει καὶ νεκροῖς ἀφαιρέσει καὶ γαμβρίαν*, i.e. the next-of-kin of the dead in ascending and descending order.

<sup>45</sup> This is referred to as still-existing custom by Plato, *Lg.* 800 E; cf. Sch. ad loc.; Herakl. *Kapitoul.* *Μεσαυδ. Κεπίου*, Meis., *Com.* iv, p. 164 (Karo-phrygian funeral-futes: Ath. 174 F; Poll. iv, 78-8).

<sup>46</sup> *τὸ ἐκφόρειν δὲ φέρον κατασπαρμμένον πλεονεχόμενον ἐν τῷ αἵματι*, *SIG.* 877, 11. Funeral-law of Labynd., l. 40 B. *καὶ ἐν τοῖς στενοῖς ἀντακρῶμεν φέροντες κατὰ, καὶ κατὰ ἐκφοράς* ("at the street-corners") καὶ καταβιβάσαντες ἀφαιρέσει, καὶ ἐν ἀποβάσει ἔχθρας τὰς φορέσει ὑπὲρ καὶ ἐν τῷ αἵματι ἱεμεν: *καὶ δὲ ἱεμεν ἱεμεν καὶ*. (the last not yet satisfactorily explained).

<sup>47</sup> Solon diminished (under the alleged influence of Epimenides) at funerals *τὸ ἐκφόρειν καὶ τὸ καταβιβάσειν φερόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος*, Plu., *Sol.* 12.

<sup>48</sup> In the list of quotations from individual authors from the fifth century *bc*, given in Becker *Char.* iii, 88 ff. [= E.T.<sup>2</sup> pp. 390-1], only the last speak for burial as the prevailing custom: Plu., *Sol.* 21, *οὐκ εἶσαν* (Solon) *συνεφέσειον πλεονεχόμενον ἱεμεν*, and Plu., *Lyc.* 27, *καταβιβάσαντες ἀφαιρέσει* (Lycurg.) *ἐλλὰ δὲ φερόμεν καὶ φέροντες ἔχθρας τὸ αἷμα ἀποβάσειον*: cf. Th. i, 134, 4. Cremation, on the other hand, is implied as the more common in Athens (fourth century) by Is. 4, 19: *αὐτὸ ἱεμεν καὶ ἀποβόλῃ*; so, too, the will (third century) of the Peripatetic Lykon (D.L. v, 70): *κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἐκφοράς καὶ*

# NOTES TO CHAPTER V

S. H.: *cf.* ἀνδρῶν τὰ σώματα κτενέμεθα.

Great funeral usage.—In the graves recently discovered before the Dipylon gate in Athens those belonging to the earliest period almost without exception have their dead buried (without coffin); the following period (into the sixth century) generally burnt their dead; later, burial seems to have been more usual—see the account by Brückner and Pernice of the excavations before the Dipylon gate, *Abh. Mus.* 1893, pp. 73–191. Thus it appears that in the later period burial was the prevailing practice in Attica (I. Rom. *Archaeol. Aufs.* i, 23), as also, being essentially cheaper than cremation, in other parts of Greece as well (a few references given in *BCH.* '95, p. 144, 2).

<sup>20</sup> ἀνελόμενοι, Is. 4, 18.

<sup>21</sup> The custom of *dephed* on an open *alitra* is not in harmony with the intention of laying the body of the dead in a coffin, but evidently presupposes that the body is to be placed either unenveloped in the ground or else to be burnt. The practice of coffin-burial (probably introduced from the East) later became common, but was never completely harmonised with the ancient ceremonies of the *dephed*.

<sup>22</sup> Coffinless burial was usual in the graves of the "Mycenaean" period, and also in the oldest times in Attica. The Spartans were merely keeping up this ancient custom when they *ἐκ δαμάσκη καὶ φαλλοῦ ἱλαστὸν θύοντες τὸ σώμα σφαιροειδὲς* (buried), *Plu.* 1, c. 27. Here everything points to the retention of primitive usage. The bodies were buried in the ancient fashion, not burnt; they were wrapped in a crimson robe. Crimson is otherwise the special colour for war and festival dress (*cf.* Müller, *Dorians*, ii, 264); here it is used in connexion with chthonic cult: *ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὴν τὸ σφαιροειδὲς χροῖον σφαιροειδὲς ὑπὲρ τὸ θύοντος σημαίνει* Artemid. I, 77, p. 70, 11 H. This can hardly be because of the red colour of blood; any more than that is why *θύοντες* is called *σφαιροειδὲς*. But even Homer *Q* 786 makes Hector's bones wrapped *σφαιροειδὲς σφαιροειδὲς*—the bones only in this case instead of the whole body; clearly a vestige of an older custom which survived unchanged in Sparta. Similarly *P* 254. So, too, e.g. in the Dipylon graves at Athens burnt bones were found wrapped in a cloth, *Abh. Mus.* 18, 180–1, 185. The head of the murdered brother *δαμάσκη δαμάσκη καὶ ἱλαστὸν* the two other Kaimenoi in the religious myth related by Clem. Al., *Protr.* ii, p. 16 P. Crimson frequently occurs as a colour used in chthonic cult; e.g. at the ceremonial *δραμ* implying consecration to the infernal deities in (*Lys.*) 8, 51; at sacrifices to the Platæan Heros; *Plu.*, *Arist.* 21; at the transfer of the bones of Rheneas: see above, chap. iv, n. 36; *Polyaen.* vi, 53; at sacrifices to the Ennemidæ, *Aesch.*, *Æsch.* 1028. —The custom of burial upon leaves was also retained by the Pythagoreans: they buried their dead (without burning them, *Lamb.*, *l'P.* 154) in myrti et oleas et populi nigrae foliis (in fact, the trees regularly sacred to the *χρόνια*). *Plin.* 35, 160. Fauvel (*ap. Ross, Arch. Aufs.* i, 33) found in graves by the Melitian gate at Athens le squelet couché sur un lit épais de feuilles d'olivier encore en état de brûler. (Other bones in Mycenaean Graves, *Tournaud, 'Ép. 'Ap.* '96, p. 338; '89, p. 152.)

<sup>23</sup> Thus in the letter of Hipparchos, in *Philegon.* 1; similarly *Xen. Eph.* 3, 7, 4 (see my *Griech. Roman.* p. 391 n. 2). Plato wished his Euthyphro to be buried like this on stone *alitra* (*Lg.* xii, 947 D); and this is probably how the bodies were placed in the rock burial-chambers provided with separate couches, such as occur at e.g. Rhodes and Kom

(see Ross, *Arch. Aufs.* II, 364 ff., 392); cf. esp. the description given by Hensey, *Mission arch. de Maridone (Tarr)*, p. 257 ff., 78. It is the regular mode of burial in Etruria (following Greek models?): several skeletons have been found there lying on couches of masonry in the grave-chambers.

<sup>40</sup> As though the dead had not entirely departed καὶ δαυλὸν καὶ σκεδὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς σκεδῆς τοὺς νεκρούς ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις ἔχουσιν Plu., *N. Suan.* Ep. 26, p. 1104 D. Restrictions in Law of the Laityad. (l. 19 ff.) δὲ τὸ θεμὸν περ τῶν ἐκταφῶν· μὲ πλείον κένε καὶ τμήματα δραχμῶν ἐκδίδειν, μήτε ἀρκυμένον μήτε φοῖνον.

<sup>41</sup> Helbig, *Hom. Ep.* 41.

<sup>42</sup> *Βασιλεὺς καὶ ὑπερταύς.* Arist., *Eudem.* 37 [44] ap. Plu., *Com.* Apoll. 27, p. 115 BC.

<sup>43</sup> [32.] Min. 315 D. To raise doubts on this point is mere perversity. It is of no avail to advance the argument (which is commonly used also against the similar statements about Rome in Serv., *A.* v. 64; vi. 152) that this story only intends to explain the origin of the worship of the household Lares. The Greeks did not have this particular worship, or else it was so completely forgotten that no explanatory account of its origin was ever offered.—Beside the hearth and the altar of Hestia the most ancient resting place of the head of the house must have been placed too. When the wife of Phokion had had the body of her husband burnt abroad ἐκτεμένην τῷ νόμῳ τὰ δὲν καὶ κομίσασα νύκτωρ εἰς τὴν οἶκον κατέσπερ περὶ τοῦ λείψανος, Plu., *Phoc.* 37.—It was wrongly believed that in the remarkable rock-graves in the neighbourhood of the the house had  
Deukm. 153b.

<sup>44</sup> This occurs among the New Zealanders, Eskimox, etc.; cf. Lubbock, *Prehistoric Times*, pp. 585, 511, etc.

<sup>45</sup> In Sparta and Tarentum: see Becker, *Char.* iii, 105 (E.T. p. 393). Acc. to Klearch. ap. Ath. 522 F certain men of Tarentum were struck by lightning and killed: they were then buried κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν of their houses and ἐργάται were put up in their honour. If they had really been the criminals that legend made them it would have been impossible, even in Tarentum, for them to have been buried within the walls of the city, still less before the doors of their houses—an honour given only to Heroes; cf. above, chap. iv, n. 136. The violent alteration of κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν into κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν in order to avoid this difficulty, is obviously rendered untenable by the previous ἐκταφῆς τῶν αἰκῶν ὄνομα. The legend is evidently a fiction and these ἀδόξαστοι (in whom it appears, as Heroes, neither the funeral dirge nor the usual xani were offered) must have belonged to the class of those whom death by the flash of lightning raised to a higher and honoured rank (see Append. 1). Thus, too, the graves in the market at Megara mentioned by Becker must have been Hero-graves: see above, chap. iv, n. 83. These cases where the graves of Heroes are found in the middle of the city, in the market place, etc., show very plainly the essential difference that was held to exist between the Heroes and the ordinary dead.

<sup>46</sup> The μῆτρος κινεῖται κατὰ τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς γινόμεναι was a πῶλον τῶν τετραβλημένων, ὡς οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ἐκάλουν: D. 43, 79. The Bouselidal composed not a γένος, but a group of five κληῖς bound together by definitely traceable ties of kinship. The members of a γένος in its political sense no longer held graves in common possession: see Meyer, *de gentib.* 44. 33; Dittenb., *Hermes*, 20, 4. The Εὐαίονες



μήματα were also family-graves: *Plu., Cim.* 4. Marcellin. V. 74. 17, *Plu., X Or.*, p. 838 B. It was always insisted on, for obvious reasons, that no stranger to the family should be laid in the family grave. But just as the pœnal clauses so often inscribed on graves of a later period were necessary to prevent the burial of strangers in those graves, so too Solon had to make a law in respect of graves no quis alienum inferat: *Cic., Lg.* ii. 64.

<sup>70</sup> The speaker in *Dem.* 55. 13 ff., mentions the παλαιὰ μνήματα of the πρόγονοι of the earlier possessors of his χωρίον (country-estate). This custom of burying the family dead in the private ground of the family and τοῖς ἄλλοις χωρίοις συμβέβηκε. Timarchos is asked by his mother τὴν Ἀλκωνίδην χωρίον (which lay 11 or 12 stades away from the city walls) ἀναδέσσειν ὁμιλῶντι αὐτῇ (in spite of which he sold it): *Aschsch., Tim.* 99. Examples in East Attica of walled-in family cemeteries with room for many graves: *Belget, Localité von den Gräbern Agamem., etc.* (Progr. Berl. 1883), pp. 40-2. It was thus the very general custom to keep the family graves on their own ground and soil: and this corresponds closely enough with the oldest custom of all, that of burying the master of the house in his own home — in *Plu., Arist.* 1, *Demetr. Phal.* mentions an Ἀριστοίδην χωρίον ἐν τῇ κείσσεια in Phaleron.

<sup>71</sup> Restriction of the growing magnificence of grave columns in Athens made by *Demetr. Phal., Cic., Lg.* ii. 66. (Pœnal clauses εἰ τις ἢ θέλῃ ἢ ἐπισημεύσῃ ἄλλου τινὸς καὶ in a law from Nisyrus: *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1888, pp. 180, 423): they probably do not refer to a general prohibition of tombstones altogether.)

<sup>72</sup> Cf. *Curtius, Z. Ges. Hergehens Gr.*, p. 282.

<sup>73</sup> Nemoque apudant sepulchris ut in amœnitate animas forest post vitam: *Serv., A. v.* 780. In lucis habebant manes priorum: *ib.* 392: cf. *ad i.* 441: vi. 873. "My grave is in a grove, the pleasant haunt of birds," says a dead man ἔφη καὶ εἰς "Αἶδα ταπεινὸν ἔχωμα νόσου, *Epirr. Gr.* 346, 3-14.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. the ins. from Keos, *SIG.* 877, B-D. *Eur.* II. 832 ff.: φαῖν' ἰδούμιν εἴη ἐνταφίσθαι, καὶ γὰρ . . . ζωθῆναι μέλλουσιν ἐν ποταμῷ.

<sup>75</sup> ἀπαγγέλλει δὲ βῆναι τὸν ἕσπερον, *Plu., Sol.* 21.

<sup>76</sup> ἀποθύσις (at the funeral) χάσθαι κατὰ τὸ εἶκος, *SIG.* 877, 13. In general, however, the sacrifice of animals at the graves of private individuals gradually became rarer and rarer: see *Steingr., Chion.* v. *Todt.* 430 f.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. esp. the ins. from Keos, l. 15 ff., 30. The ὀγκυρότερας employed in old Athenian usage. [17.] *Μην.* 315 C, seem to have been women who caught the blood of the sacrificed animals in bowls and purified the μυστήριον with it. The name itself suggests it; to this effect is one among several other, clearly mistaken, explanations given by the Schol. to *Μην.*, loc. cit. (differently *Sch. Ar.*, *Isop.* 280).

<sup>78</sup> κατὰ τὸ πᾶθος . . . ἀνακαθίστηναι τὸν ἀκαθάρτον καὶ ἀποκαθάρσιν φέρει εὐνοῦς τῇ τε κορφῇ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ τῇ τῶν σπείρων ἐκφυσίσει, *Arist.* *fr.* 106 (101) *Rose*.

<sup>79</sup> ἀποθίσκων. This is implied as universally occurring by *Arn. Tact.* 10, 3. This meal shared by the relatives (who alone are invited: *Dem.* 43, 62) must be meant by *Heraklid., Pol.* 36, 2, κατὰ τοὺς ἰδιώτους ἀδελφούς, οὗτοι ἔστω ἐπὶ τοῖς τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ' ἰουδὴν καταμίσκωνται νεκροῦνται.

<sup>80</sup> ἡ ἐκδοχὴ γίνεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἐκδοθέντες, *Artemid.* 5, 62, p. 271, 10 H.

<sup>81</sup> *Cic., Lg.* ii, 63 (cf. *Alexandr., ap. Ath.* 464 A.). On the other

hand, manifestly nefas erat. And yet *clandestine* or *secret* is not necessarily *indecorum* or *indecoratus*, and is *palatius* in Xenob. v, 28, and other Pseudo-Plat. Besides this the lamentation for the dead may have been renewed at the various commemorations of the dead; the funeral regulation of the Labyadai at Delphi forbids expressly (not the festival but) the funeral dirge on such occasions: l. 46 ff. *μηδὲ* as the *epitaphium* was held)

22 These meals given to the dead took place at the grave itself.

<sup>42</sup> The *raiva* and *hvara*, at any rate, were held on the third and ninth days after the funeral, and not after the day of death. It is true the references to these sacrifices in Ar., Lys. 512 ff., Is., etc., do not make this very clear. But if the *raiva* had taken place on the third day after death it would have coincided with the *expiatio* itself, which is against all the evidence. Further, the Roman *supplicatio*, which was clearly modelled on Greek custom, also occurred on the ninth day after the burial, acc. to the unequivocal testimony of Porph. on Hor., *Epod.* xvii. 48 (nona die quam sepultus est). This is also deducible from Verg., *A.* v. 46 ff., and 105; cf. also Ap., *M.* ix. 31.

<sup>44</sup> That this was the object of the Noverndialia festival at Rome is shown clearly enough by the evidence; that the same was true of Greece is at least highly probable; cf. K. O. Müller, *Arch. Exam.*, p. 142 [120 E.T.], Leist, *Graccolitische Rechts.*, p. 34.—Nine is evidently a round number, esp. in Homer, i.e. the division of periods of time into groups of nine was in antiquity a very common and familiar practice. Cf. now, Kaegi, *Die Neunzahl bei den Ostgermanen*, Phil. Abh. f. Schweizer-Sidler, 50 ff. Mourning customs were really intended to ward off maleficent action on the part of the dead. They lasted as a rule as long as the return of the soul of the dead was to be feared (esp. so in India: see Oldenberg, *Rel. d. Feind*, p. 368), and acc. to ancient belief the soul can return once more on the ninth day after death. See below, chap. xiv. l. n. 154.

<sup>22</sup> A *xpōs* *mbōlos* of eleven days, the mourning concluded with a sacrifice to Demeter: *Plu. Lyc.* 27; cf. *Hdt.* vi. 58 fn. The Labyadae at Delphi celebrate the *leuth* day after the funeral as a feast of the dead; see above, n. 81 of this chapter. This mourning period is not otherwise demonstrable for Greece (*SFG.* 633, 5, is different), but it is met with again among the Indians and Persians (cf. *Keryg.* o. 3. 11), and may be primitive.

\* Lex. Rh., in A.E. 268, 19 ff.; Phot. a little differently: αὐτῶν  
 ὡς τριπλοῦτος (συνήρ) Phot.: Α instead of Δ) ἡμέρη ποτ' ἀνι  
 οί κρη-φάρτις συνελθόντες καὶ ἐβαστούν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ  
 τοῦτο αὐτῶν δακτύλῳ (Phot. adds: ἐν καθέλωμεν εἰς  
 ἃ αὐτῶν τόσσον (the last meal shared by the relative

dead in honour of the dead and held "on the thirtieth day"; possibly nothing more nor less than the oft-mentioned *speusis*. The guests eat their food *sitting* after the old custom prevailing in Homeric times and always observed by women; as applied to men it survived in Crete only, see Møller, *Doricana*, ii, 284. Perhaps this primitive attitude preserved in cultus is what we see in the Spartan sculptured reliefs representing "feasts of the dead" where the figures are seated. There were four such *anabaias*, i.e. the period of mourning extended over four months; thus it was the law in Gamberion (S/G. 879. 11 ff.) that

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the dead: monthly celebration of the *shikharis* for Epicurus in acc. with his will, D.L. x, 18; cf. Cic., *Fin.* ii, 101; *Plin.* 35, 5: *sacra* *pro* *sacris* to the deified Ptolemies, *CIG.* 4007, 48. (In India, too, the sacrifices to the dead on the thirtieth of the month were several times repeated: Karsai, 7: 11.)

"The Lexicographers, Harp., Phot., etc. (*AB.* 306, 5, is ambiguous, too), speak of the *ἑορτή* in a way that makes it hard to see whether they mean the traditional sacrifice of the dead taking place regularly on the thirtieth day of the month, or a special offering on the thirtieth day after burial or after the day of death (cf. *ἑορτὴν ἡμέραν δὲ καὶ θνήσκουσιν* Harp., Phot. *περὶ θνήσκουσιν* is the correction of Schomann on Is., p. 219, but *δὲ θνήσκουσιν* is formed, not quite correctly, on the analogy of *ἡμέραν θνήσκουσιν* even *ἡμέραν ἑορτῆς* "since the time of our forefathers"; Polh. 21, 21, 4, and must mean the same thing, viz. "after death"). But in *Lys.* 1, 14, we have the idea clearly expressed that the period of mourning should last till the thirtieth day (see Becker, *Class.* 3, 117 E.T.<sup>3</sup>, p. 396), and in this case it is natural to suppose that the *ἑορταί*, corresponding with the *εἴρεα* and *θνήσκειν*, took place on the thirtieth day after burial. No, Inn. the un., from Kees. *Stu.* 877, 21, *ἐπὶ τῇ ἑορτῇ τῇ τριηκοστῇ καὶ ἑορτῇ*. But Argos see *Mu.*, *Q.* 117, 24, p. 296 f. It is evident that the *ἑορταί* were not so firmly established in Athens (at least in the fourth century) as the *εἴρεα* and *θνήσκειν*: e.g. Isaeus generally only refers to these last as the indispensable *μυστήρια*: 2, 36-7; 8, 39. It appears also (but it is wrong to regard the *ἑορταί* as otherwise exactly on a footing with the *εἴρεα* and *θνήσκειν*, as is generally done. The last-mentioned pair were sacrifices to the dead, the *ἑορταί* seems to have been a commemorative banquet of the living.—Those fixed periods of mourning like so much else in the cult of the dead may have been handed down by tradition from a very early time. The third, ninth (or tenth), and thirtieth days after the funeral marked stages in the gradually diminishing "uncleanness" of the relatives of the dead, and thus existed, it appears, already in "Indo-Germanic" times. Until the ninth day the relatives were still in contact with the departed and were consequently "unclean"; the thirtieth day puts an end to this, and is a memorial festival (though often repeated): cf. Kaegi, pp. 3, 10, 12 (of the separate edition); Oldenberg, 578. In Christian usage, sanctioned by the church, the third, ninth, and fortieth days after death or after burial were very early observed as memorial days (sometimes third, seventh, thirtieth; cf. Rischholtz, *D. Gl. u. Brauch*, p. 11, in some cases to the present day; see *de. Sup.*

*ῥαβδὸν ἑρπιδιὰ δαΐρας* : *Plu., Prot. Alex.* viii, p. 6, 70 Crue (App. prov. Vat. in Schneidewin's Crit. App. to Diogen. viii, 39). There was a festival kept by servants in honour of their dead masters (*ἀλλυτῶδες*, *GDI.* 1731, 10; 1775, 28; 1798, 4) twice monthly, at the *εὐσπεία* and on the seventh : *GDI.* 1801, 6-7 Delphi. The last three days of the month are at Athens sacred to the inhabitants of the lower world and therefore *ἀσπιδίαι* : *ENF.* 131, 13 f.; *E. Gud.* 70, 3 f.; cf. *Lys.*, fr. 53. On these days banquets were prepared, at the crossroads, etc., for *Hekate* (acc. to *Ath.* 325 A), for *Hekate* and *ῥαβδὸν δαΐρας* (*Plu., Symp.* 7, 8, p. 708 A). The souls of the dead were then not forgotten. *Sch. Plu., Lg.* vii, 800 D, *δραψιδίαι* *ἀπὸ τῶν αἰετῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ζώων*.

<sup>10</sup> The son *ἑταίρει* and *ἑταίρον ἑταίρῳ* to his dead father, Is. 2, 46. This sacrifice to the dead, celebrated once every year (*θεῖα ἱερέια* offered by a *εὐαγγεστής*), is the festival of the *Perseus*, in vogue acc. to Hdt. iv, 26, among the Greeks, everywhere as it appears. As the name shows this festival fell on the birthday of the honoured ancestor as it recurred (not on the day of his death as Arum. pp. 34-5 Valck. incorrectly says); cf. Schol. Pl., *Alc.* i, 121 C. So Epicurus in his will (D.L. x, 16) provides for a yearly celebration of his birthday. (Similar foundation, *CIC.* 3417.) The Koans *ἑταίρειον* to Hippokratēs every year on the 27th Agnaios as his birthday: Soran., *Ulip.*, p. 450, 13-14 West. Hero-festivals, too, fall on the birthday of the Hero: Plut. *Arat.* 83. Gods have their feast-days and their birthdays combined; thus Hermes has his on the 4th of the month, Artemis on the 8th, Apollo on the 7th, and so on. These are birthday festivals repeated every month. In the second century at Sestos, following such precedents, there was held *τὰ γενέθλια τοῦ βασιλέως* (one of the *κείδεις* *Αἰταλίδες*) καὶ ἑταίρων πῆρε: *SFG* 1246, 36. Celebration of the *ἑταίρειον γενέθλιον* of the ruling Emperor: *Ins. Perg.* ii, 374 B, 14. Even in later times in imitation of heathen usage

... αὐτῶν αὐτῶν ἑταίρων  
γενέθλιον ἀποτίθεισαν.  
the public festival is

Ruth. when to distinguish it from the birthday celebrations of persons, *γενέθλια* (which did not become common till later), he calls the *Γενέθλια*, *Ἀδελφῶν ἑταίρων* [*ἀδελφῶν* add. Meursius; cf. Henrych, *Ar.* 231, 18]. The Antistatists, in his rather absurd polemic against Phrym. (p. 86, 20 ff.), add the still clearer statement taken from Semon's *dēoxer* and *Phalochoros*) that the *ἐταίρει ἑταίρειον* of the *Perseus* at Athens was held on the 8th Boedromion. There is not the slightest reason for doubting the correctness of this statement (as many have done). In Rome, too, besides the many movable *parentalia* of the families there was an official and public *Parentalia* held every year (in Feb.). Similarly in ancient India: Oldenberg, 550, 3.

<sup>11</sup> The *Nemeseia* is mentioned by Dem. 41, 11. The context suggests a rite performed by a daughter in honour of her dead father. It is a quite certainly correct conjecture [*μῆμερα*] of the *Leucog.*, that the *Nemeseia* may be a festival of the dead (see Harp. s.v. *Ar.* 282, 32: both glosses combined in Plut. *Suid. reviv.*). It is clear, however, that they knew nothing further about it. Mommsen declares (*Heort.* 206) the *Nemeseia* to have been "without doubt" identical with the *Perseia*. I see no reason at all for supposing so.—The name *νεμεσις* characterizes it as a festival dedicated to the "memory" of the dead, to the *νεμεσις τῶν βασιλέων*, Soph., *El.* 192: *φθιμένην ἀποτίθειν νεμεσις*, *Epigr. Gr.* 119; cf. 185—this easily becomes a personified *Nēmeis*: *ἀντιπαρὶν ἐν φθιμένην Νέμεϊν πῆρε*, *Epigr.* (v, 367, 9. The cult of the dead, like the cult of the underworld in general, is always apotropaic in character (*placantur sacrificiis ne noceant*, Serv., *A.* iii, 63): the *Nemeseia* must then have been apotropaic in intention too.

<sup>12</sup> At Apollonia in Chalcidice there was a yearly custom *τὰ νέμια ἀποτίθειν τοῖς τελευτήσαντι* in early times in Elephobolion, later in Anthesterion: Hegesand., ap. Ath. 334 F.—*δραχόνες*, a yearly festival of the dead (but perhaps rather to be taken as *sacra privata*) in Kos: *Stti.* 678.—There is a month called *Nemeseia* in Knossos (and common to the whole of Crete acc. to the *ἑταίρειον* Mor. [Corvin], *Fast. Att.* ii, 428)). It took its name from a feast of the dead (*μῆμερα* is mentioned along with *νεπέθλιον*, as a regular expression by Artemid.



<sup>10</sup> EM. 774, 56: 'Υδροφόρος: ἑστὶν Ἀθήνησι πτόλιμος (so far Hesych. too, s.v.) διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ ἀνακλισίᾳ ἀναλαβάναν. The feast of *Chytroi* was also supposed to have been a commemoration of Deucalion's Flood. The flood was said to have subsided finally through a cleft in the earth in the Temple of Ἡΐ Ὀλεμνία: Paus. i, 18, 7. Pausanias adds, ἱερόδωτον ἐς αἰῶν (the chasm) διὰ τὴν ἑστὶν ἕλκυσιν πυλῶν μάλιστα μέγιστος. It is at least natural, with Preller, *Dem.* v, *Paus.* 228, n., to see in the *Hydrophoria* a part of which is described by Pausanias, a festival related to the Chytroi. Commemoration of the dead with Ἡΐ in the *Perseia* too: Hesych. s.v.—'Υδροφόρια a feast of Apollo at Aegina: Sch. Pl., *N.* v, 81 (fanciful remarks thereon by K. O. Müller, in *Aesch. Exam.*, p. 141 [116 E.T.]).

<sup>11</sup> Ovid's account of the *Lanuvina* at Rome, *F. v.* shows the closest resemblance to the Athen. customs. The spirits are finally driven out: *Manas exire paterni* (443). The same happens in the festivals of the dead in many places; esp. in India, Oldenberg, 533; cf. also the Esthonian customs: Grimm, p. 1844, n. 42. A parallel from ancient Prussia is given (after Joh. Meletius, 1551) by Ch. Hartknoch, in *Alt. n. News. Prussien*, 1684, pp. 187-8. There on the third, sixth, ninth, and fortieth day after the funeral a banquet of the relatives of the dead was held. The souls of the dead were invited and (with other souls as well) entertained. "When the feasting was ended the priest rose from the table and swept out the house, driving forth the souls of the dead as though he were driving out fleas, saying the while: 'Ye have eaten and drunk, O ye Blessed Ones, depart hence! depart hence!'" At the close of the lantern-feast to the dead in Nagasaki (Japan) when the entertainment of the souls was over a great noise was made all over the house "so that no single soul should remain behind and haunt the place—they must be driven out without mercy": *Preuss. Exped. nach Ostasien*, ii, 23. Other examples of the expulsion of souls given in Tylos, ii, 199. The ghosts were thought of in a thoroughly materialistic fashion, and driven out by waving clubs in the air, swinging torches, etc., as in the case of the female *hoi* of the Kaurians: Hdt. i, 172. Compare with this the prayers addressed to Herakles in the Orphic Hymns (reproducing ancient superstitions as frequently): ἰδὲ μέγας . . . ἰδὲ δαίμων ἐν κοῦρῃ δ' ἄνδρ. κλέων ἐς χεῖρ μάλλον, πηνεὶς τ' ἱερόδοτος κῆρυς γελῶν ἐδεδωκεν (12, 15-16). It will be clear how near such personified *δαιμόνες* and *κῆρυς* are to the angry "souls", from which in fact they have arisen: cf. besides, Orph., *H.* 11, 23; 14, 14; 36, 16; 71, 11.—*κῆρυς* ἀνδροειραμένης, Plu., *Lys.* 17.

<sup>12</sup> *Ἡέραις Κῆρυς, οὐκ ἐν Ἀθήνεσσιν*. This is the correct wording of the formula: *Κῆρυς* the form common later and explained with mistaken ingenuity. Photius has it right and explains, *ὡς καὶ τῶν μάκρ τοις Ἀθηναίοις τὴν φύσιν περιγραφόμενον*.—*Κῆρυς* is clearly a most primitive equivalent for *φυγὰς* which has become almost completely obscured in Homer, though it dimly appears in B 302, § 207, where the *Κῆρυς* are spoken of as those who carry away other *φυγὰς* to Hades. Archylius knew it (presumably from old Attic speech) and simply substituted *φυγὰς* for the *Κῆρυς* in the late-weighting scene in Homer, thus turning the *Kerontasia* into a *Φυγαεσία* (to the surprise of the Schol. A, § 70; A.B. I 209). See O. Crusius in *Erach-Gruber*, "Keront." 2, 38, 265-7 [*Aesch. fr.* 279 Sdg.].

<sup>13</sup> Cf. the collections in Pottier, *Les lécythes blanches attiques à vases*, p. 57, 70 ff.

<sup>14</sup> Though not all of them, some at any rate of the scenes in which

lyre-playing at a grave is represented on a lekythos are to be taken as implying that the living provide music for the entertainment of the dead: see Furtwängler on the *Sammlung Schubert* i, Pl. 1a.

<sup>138</sup> See Hensdorf, *Sicil. u. italisch. Vasenb.*, p. 33.

<sup>139</sup> How the mode of conceiving the spiritual activity of the dead and consequently the cult of the dead was at first more solemn and awe-struck and completely on a par with the cult of the *xénoi*; how in the course of time the relations of the living to the departed became more familiar and the cult of the dead correspondingly less awe-inspiring, more piously protective in character than apotropaic—all this is set out in more detail by P. Strudel, *Chthonisch. u. Todesculte* [Festschrift für Friedländer], p. 414 ff.

<sup>140</sup> The reliefs represent a man enthroned, sometimes alone, sometimes with a woman beside him, stretching out a kantharos to receive the offerings. As a rule he is approached by a group of worshippers represented on a smaller scale. The earliest examples of these reliefs were found in Sparta and go back to the sixth century. Since the investigations of Milchhöfer especially, they are now generally recognised as representing the family worship of the dead. They are the forerunners of the representations of similar food-offerings in which (following later custom) the Hero is lying on a *klisse* and receiving his worshippers. (That this class of reliefs representing "banquets of the dead" was also sacrificial in character is proved clearly by the presence of the worshippers who in many cases lead sacrificial victims. H. v. Fritze in *AM. Mitt.* '96, p. 347 ff., supposes that they are intended to represent not sacrifices but the *evangelia* which the dead person is to enjoy in the after life. But he can only account for the presence of the worshippers in such a forced and unnatural way [p. 356 ff.], that this alone seems to refute his theory. *evangelia* and incense among the offerings made do not by any means contradict its nature as a sacrifice to the dead.) The same is the meaning of the reliefs found esp. in Boeotia in which the person worshipped is seated on a horse, or leading a horse, and accepting offerings (summary by Wolters, *Arch.-Ztg.*, 1882, p. 299 ff.; cf. also Gardner, *JHS.* 1884, pp. 107-42; Furtwängler, *Samml. Sch.* i, p. 23). The worshippers bring pomegranates, a cock (e.g. *AM. Mitt.* ii, Pl. 20-2), a pig (cock and pig on Theban relief: *A. Mitt.* iii, 377; pig on Boeotian rel.: *A. Mitt.* iv, 17, 17, 2), a ram (rel. from Patras: *A. Mitt.* iv, 125 f.; cf. the ram's head on a grave monument from the neighbourhood of Argos, *A. Mitt.* vii, 147). All these gifts are of the kind proper to the underworld. We know the pomegranate as food of the *xénoi* from the Hymn to Demeter: the pig and ram are the main constituents of sacrifice made to the *xénoi*, and burnt in cathartic or hylastic (propitiatory) ceremonial. In such cases the cock, of course, does not appear because it was sacred to Helios and Selene (cf. D.J., vii, 34; Jamb., *YP.* 84), but because it was a sacrificial animal of the *xénoi* (and of Asclepius) and for the same reason much used in necromancy, spirit-raising, and magic (Dieterich, *Pap. mag.* 185, 3). As such it was forbidden food to the Mystai of Demeter at Eleusis: Porph., *Abh.* 4, 16, p. 255, § N. Sch. Loc., *D. Ma.* 7, 4, p. 280, 23 Rahe.—Anyone who partakes of the food of the underworld spirits is forfeit to them. On their side the reclining or enthroned spirits of the dead on these reliefs are brought into conjunction with a snake (*A. Mitt.* ii, 17, 20-2; vii, 17, 18, 1, etc.), a dog, or a horse (sometimes a horse's head only occurs). The snake is the well-known symbol of the Hero: the

dog and the horse certainly do not represent victims as Gardner, p. 131, thinks—their real meaning has not yet been made out. The horse occurs sometimes by the side of women and therefore can hardly symbolise a knight's statue. I regard it as also a symbol of the departed as now having entered the spirit-world, like the snake too (Grimm understands it differently: p. 441 f., 844). I can form no decided opinion as to the dog: it is not likely to be mere genre—any more than anything else in these sculptures.

<sup>146</sup> The *psal*, *δωρεα νεκροῖς ψαλιδίαις*, of wine, honey, water, or oil, which are offered in Tragedy by children at the grave of a father—A., *Psya*. 609 A.; Ck. 84 B.; E., *IT*. 159 B.—are modelled upon the food offerings to the dead in real life. Honey and water (*μαλισματα*) were always the chief ingredients: cf. Stengel, *Philolog.* 39, 378 B.; *Jahr. f. Phil.* 1887, p. 853. The ritual at the pouring of an *δωκεσμα*—essentially a cathartic libation-sacrifice but also offered *εἰς τιμὴν τοῖς νεκροῖς* is described by Kleidemos *ἐν τῷ Ἑλληνισμῷ* (the quotation is not complete), *Ath.* 409 F. 1. (Striking similarities in ritual and language in Indian sacrifice to the dead: Oldenberg, *Rel. d. Ved.* 550. Something extremely primitive may be preserved in these uses.) The same is the meaning of the *χθονία δωκεσά τοῖς νεκροῖς δεικνύμενα*, Zenob. vi, 45, etc. These things have nothing to do with the *Υπερθέματα*, as some have thought.

<sup>147</sup> The regular animal used as victim in *δωκεσματα* for the dead is a sheep; other animals occur less frequently. The black colour is general: the sacrifice was burnt completely: cf. the instances collected by Stengel, *Zschr. f. Gymnas.*, 1880, p. 745 f., *Jahr. f. Phil.* 1882, p. 322 f.; '83, p. 375.—Phot. *καρπύων δ' ἐπαίξεται τοῖς νεκροῦσι* (cf. Hesych. *καυτός*).—The *οἶλινος* (a plant sacred to the dead: see above, n. 40) probably served as food for the dead at the *εἶσις* and other banquets "of the dead", and was not used as food for the living at the *μερίσματα*; consequently it might never be used at the meals of the living: *Mus.* 20, 113, following Chrysippus and Dionysius. (In the mysteries of the Kabeiroi the *ἀνακτορεῖσθαι* had a special reason of their own but forbidding parody *εὐδμήζον ἐπὶ τραπέζῃς τρώειν*, Clem. Al., *Protr.* ii, p. 16 P.)

<sup>148</sup> The food offered is a meal for the dead: A., Ck. 483 B. (cf. Luc., *Jur.* 9; *Char.* 22). The dead man is summoned to come and drink the offerings (*ἐλθέ δ' ὡς νῆες*): E., *McC.* 535 B. It was the general opinion that *δ' νεκρὸν νεκρὸς* of the drink offerings (*AP.* xi, 8; *Ἐπίφ.* ix, 646, 12), *οἷον γὰρ γὰρ καρπύων τις εἰσάφεται τοῖς εἰδωλοῖς τῶν νεκροῦσθαι καὶ*, *Lyd.*, *Asien.* 4, 31, p. 90 Wq.

<sup>149</sup> It feels when friends or enemies approach its grave: Is. 3, 4, 19.

<sup>150</sup> Sch. Ar., *Av.* 1480 (referring to the *Τιμωόμενος* of Mytilos, a poet of the Old Comedy). Phot. *καίτρωτες* (Hesych. *καίτρωτες*): *οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὲ νεκροὶ δὲ κακῶτατοι εἶναι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὸ ἄρμα κακῶτατοι εἶναι καὶ*. (*φύσις* and *ἄρμα* here, in accordance with the usage common in later times, simply = *νεκροῦσθαι* and *μερίσματα* of the usual kind.) Since a Hero in the higher sense was buried there it was customary to pass in silence the monument, e.g., of Narkissos, *ἄνθρωπος Ἐργυλός*: Str. 464 (so also the grove and chasm of Kolonos where the Erinyes dwell: S., *OC.* 130 ff.). The feeling underlying this is easy to understand, and the custom therefore is widespread: e.g. among West African negroes, Réville, *Relig. des peuples non civil.* i, 73. It is a German superstition (Grimm, p. 1811, n. 830). "Never call the dead by name or you may cry them up".

<sup>151</sup> Pl., *Pld.* 81 CD. The *φύσις* . . . *ὡς περ ἀγγεῖα περὶ τὸ μέγεθος τα*



καὶ τοὺς τάφους πολυδαμνίῃ· καὶ ἡ δὲ καὶ ὡς θῆκε ἔρετα φησὶν ἀναστῆ  
φανεύματα, καὶ.

<sup>118</sup> See O. Jahn, *Archæol. Beitr.* 128 ff.; Beudant, *Griech. u. sicil. Vasebild.*, p. 33 f., p. 65 (on Pl. 14, 32); also Pottier, *Lécythes blanches*, p. 65, 2 (who proposes a doubtful theory of a supposed *eros* funeral, p. 76 ff.).

<sup>119</sup> We frequently on vases see the occupant of a grave represented in the form of a snake at the foot of his tomb, etc.; e.g. on the *Prothetis* vase, *Monum. d. Insist.* viii, 4, 5, and often, see Luckenbach, *Jahrb. f. Phil.*, Suppl. ii, 300.—We have already met with snakes as a favourite form of incarnation chosen by *χθόνιοι* of all kinds, deities of the underworld, Heroes, and the ordinary dead, and we shall frequently meet with the same thing again. Here we need only refer to Photius *ἔπος παύλας*—ἐπὶ τῷ τοῖς ὅποις παύλας ὄντας ἔρως καλεῖσθαι.

<sup>120</sup> What falls to the ground belongs to the *ἔρως* (w souls of the dead): Ar. *Hesper fr.* 305 H. and G. οὐκ ἐπελευθεύει τῶν φίλων δούλων τὰ μινύοντα τῆς γροφῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τραπέζων (alluded to by Eur. in the *Hellespont*). [*Silvest. fr.* 667 Dindorf]. ap. Ath. 427 E. This is the origin of the Pythagorean *σύμβολον*—as usual bounded on ancient beliefs about the soul—τὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ τραπεζῆς μὴ ἀναρριπῆσθαι, D.L. viii, 34. Suid. *Προσέγγισι τὰ σύμβολα*. This superstition is also the reason for the *εἶμας* said to have been current in Kroton, τὰ νεκρῶν εἶμας τῆς γῆς καλεῖται ἀναρριπῆσθαι, Isamb. *I.P.* 126. Similar belief and custom in Rome: Plin. 28, 27. Among the ancient Prussians it was the custom not to pick up the fragments of food that fell to the ground at meal times, but to leave them for the "πῶρ" souls that have no blood-relatives or friends left behind in the world to look after them; see Chr. Hartmann, *All. u. Neues Preussen*, p. 188. Similar customs elsewhere: Spencer, *Princ. of Sociol.* i, 281.

<sup>121</sup> Solonian law: D. 20, 104; 40, 49. Plu., Sol. 21, Σόλωνος ἡ καλὴν νόμος τὴν τελευτῶντα κακῶς ἀγορεύειν. καὶ γὰρ ὅστις τοὺς τελευτῶντας ἱερῶς νομίζειν. This reminds us of the words of Arist., *Eudem. fr.* 37 [44]; given in Plu., *C. Apoll.* 27, p. 115 B, τὰ φανεύματα τι κατὰ τὴν τελευτῶντα καὶ τὸ βλασφημῶν εἰς δόξαν ὡς κατὰ βελούτων καὶ κρυπτόντων φῆγ γυναικῶν (Chilon ap. Stob. *Fl.* 125, 35 M.: τὴν τελευτῶντα μὴ κενεῖν ἀλλὰ καλεῖσθαι). A very extreme form of outrage is φανεύσθαι κατὰ τοῦ τελευτῶντα: Is. 9, 8: 23; 26. (The κακολόγος is particularly liable to κατὰ εἶναι παρὶ τῶν τελευτῶντα, Thphr., *Char.* 28.) The heir of the dead man has the duty of carrying out the cult of the dead man's soul, and this includes the legal prosecution of slanderers of the dead: see Meier and Schömann, *All. Process*, p. 330.

<sup>122</sup> Ar., *Tagenist. fr.* 48A, 12, says of the dead, καὶ θίμειν γ' αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν τάφων, ὡς περ θεοῖν καὶ.

<sup>123</sup> *ἀρριπῆσθαι* Hecych. Phot. s.v. Arist. ap. Plu., *C. Apoll.* 27, p. 115 C.

<sup>124</sup> *Πνεῦμα ἔχει* (τοὺς τελευτῶντας): Pl., *Rp.* 427 B.

<sup>125</sup> That the *ἔρως* διεδόγηται καὶ καλεῖται τοὺς ἐμμελῶντας γέννηται (Sch. Az., Ar. 1490) applies equally to the "Heroes" properly so called—see above, chap. iv, § 11, the legends of the Hero Anagyrus, the Hero of Tomos, etc.—and to those who gradually came to be called "Heroes" in later times by an extension of the term, viz. the souls of the dead in general—καλεῖσθαι καὶ πᾶντας τοὺς ἔρως νομίζουσιν, καὶ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἡ μὲν ἑμμελῶν: Chamaeleon ap. Ath. 461 C (and hence the precautions taken against nocturnal

apparitions; *Ach.* 149 C). Cf. Zeno. v, 80. Herych, *Phot.* s. *ἀπέρωνες*.—That the *φάρμακοι* do, and are responsible for, evil only and never good (*Sch. Ar., Av.* 1490; *Habr.* 83) is a late belief; it does not apply either to Heroes or ordinary dead in the conceptions of earlier ages. Originally the "gods", just as much as Heroes and the dead, shared in the violent and malignant nature of the unseen. This was later confined more and more to the lower classes of the *ἀπέρωνες* and came to be attached to them so exclusively that it could in the end be regarded as a sufficient ground of distinction between them and the gods (as it certainly had not been to start with) that malice is excluded from the nature of the gods and benevolence on the contrary from that of Heroes and the dead.

<sup>144</sup> *Ar., Tagenist. fr.* 488, 13: καὶ χόες γε χερύμεναι (to the dead) *ἀνδράσιν* *ἐνδρόσιν* ἐλὲν καλὰ δέσιν *ἀνδράσιν* (intended as a *παροίμια* or at any rate imitated from a tragedian—apostrophe to a dead woman *ἐνρί* *βλάτωσαν*, *δρίσιν* *δρίσιν* *τάχα*). *Sch. Ar., Men.* 1462—and reproduced in this passage by the interpolator of *Aristoph.*). This "sending-up blessings from below" is to be understood in the widest sense (*cf. A., Pers.* 222); but it is natural to be reminded by such a prayer to *ἀνδράσιν* *τάχα* of Demeter *ἐργασάμε* (*Pans.* i, 31, 4; *Plu., Simp.* 9, 14, 4, p. 745 A), and of *τῇ* *ἀργασίᾳ*. *But* τὸ *ἀπέρωνες* *ἀνδράσιν* (*Herych.*); *S., OT.* 269, *ἐχόμεναι* *θεοῖς* *πᾶσι* *δωρεὰν* *ἀνθρώποις* *γῆς* *ἀνθρώποις* *ἐνδρόσιν*.—That the dead who dwell beneath the ground were really expected to assist the growth of the soil we may learn especially from a very interesting statement in the Hippocratic work *περὶ ἀναιμίας* (ii, p. 14 Kühn: vi, p. 658 Littré; v, *διαίτης* iv, 92). If a person in his dream seen *ἀνοσφαιρόμενος* dressed in white, offering something, that is a good omen: *ἐνθὺ γὰρ τοῖς ἀνοσφαιρόμενος αἱ τρεφεῖ καὶ αὐξάνει καὶ ἐσθίματα γένεσθαι*. There was a custom at Athens of strewing seeds of all kinds over the newly-made grave; *Isigon., Mir.* 67; *Cic., Lg.* ii, 83. The reason for this (evidently religious) is variously given (another, no more convincing, is suggested by K. O. Müller, *At. Schol.* ii, 302 I.). It seems most natural to suppose that the seed of the earth is put under the protection of the souls of dead who have now themselves become spirits inhabiting the earth. (Note besides the entirely similar custom in ancient India, *Oldenberg, Rel. d. India*, 562.)

<sup>145</sup> *Electra* in *A., Ch.* 488 B, makes a vow to the soul of her father: *καὶνὸς* *χόες* *ἐν* *τῇ* *ἐμῇ* *πενήλῃ* *ὅλον* *παρθένο* *δε* *δίδωμι* *παυκλήνῃ* *παισὶν* *ὅτι* *ἐμῶν* *τοῖς* *προσβίου* *τάχον*.—An chthonic power the *Erinyes* also send blessings to agriculture and the bringing-up of children. *NA. Mus.* 50, 21. Prayer was also made to *τῇ* by those who desired to have children.

<sup>146</sup> *Θερσίημος* *ἀπὸ* *ἐν* *μῶν* *Ἀθηναίων* *θίονον* *καὶ* *ἐχόμεναι* *ἀνθρώποις* *ὅπως* *γενέσθαι* *καὶ* *δωρεὰν*, *δωρεὰν* *παρὲς* *πάλαιον*, *Phot. Scid.* *ἐπρονέτωρ*.

<sup>147</sup> The form of the word itself shows that the *ἐπρονέτωρ* are simply *ἐπώνυμοι*. *ἐπρονέτωρ* is the earliest ancestor, *ὁ* *ἐμῶν* *τῇ* *ἐμῇ* *ἐμῇ* (*Arist. ap. Poll.* 3, 17). Just as *ἐπρονέτωρ* is *ὁ* *ἐμῇ* *ἐμῇ* *ἐμῇ* and *ἐπρονέτωρ* *ὁ* *ἐμῇ* *ἐμῇ* *ἐμῇ* (*Poll.* 3, 18), *ἐπρονέτωρ* the forefather, *ἐπρονέτωρ* = *ἐπώνυμ* *ἐμῇ*, *ἐπρονέτωρ* the stepfather (*ἐπρονέτωρ* = *ἐπώνυμ* *ἐμῇ*)—in the same way *ἐπρονέτωρ* is the third forefather, the father of the *ἐπρονέτωρ*, i.e. the *ἐπώνυμ*. The *ἐπρονέτωρ* have an alternative form *ἐπρονέτωρ*. *Philoch. ap. Sudas* *ἐπρονέτωρ*: *SIG.* 443; *Lg. Serv.* i, p. 40, L 32, 52; in Orphic verse this form alone, and not *ἐπρονέτωρ*, could be used: see *Lobeck, Agl.* 764. They were in fact the *ἐμῇ* *ἐμῇ* (just as

the *πατρίωνες* are the *παῖρες ὄψωνος*, the *ὄψωνος* of the third generation! But the "third forefathers" are in fact the first ancestors (Lobeck, 763 f.), of *ἀπατρότης* (Hesych.), of *παῖρες ἀρχαῖστας* (A.B. 307, 16)—the ancestors of the individual first of all, his bodily *γενεή* (the series of whom was not generally counted beyond the *πατρωνέω*—i.e. 3, 32—i.e. the *πατρωνέω*), and then the "ancestors" of the human race in general (acc. to the explanation of Philoch. ap. Phot. Suid. *παῖρες*; cf. Welcher, *Götterl.* iii, 73).—We cannot do more than refer here to the completely analogous ideas of the ancient Indians about the "three-fathers": the father, grandfather, great-grandfather, as the Sapinda-fathers beyond whom the line of ancestry was not traced (Nargi, *Neusatzl.* pp. 5, 6).

<sup>134</sup> The Tritopatores are most distinctly referred to as *δαιμόναι*: Demon ap. Phot. Suid. *παῖρες* cf. *δαιμόναι δαιμονίῃ* Phot. *πατρωνέω*; Ts. Lyc. 730. Orphic poetry made them *Περαιεῖς* and *φύλακες τῶν δαιμόνων*. This is already a free interpretation: the Attic belief, expressed by Demos, knows nothing about this. It can only have been learned invention that limited their number to three (as in the case of the originally unlimited number of Herai, Erinnyes, etc.), and gave them definite names (Atalkeiden, etc., Orph. fr. 240 Ab.) or identified them with the three Hekatoncheires (Kleidemoi in the 'Eῖρη). The genuine and ancient belief about them can still be discerned through all the confusion of misinterpretation and misunderstanding, and according to this the *πατρωνέω* were the souls of ancestors who were also wind-spirits. People prayed for children to these spirits: and Lobeck, *Ag.* 755 B., is right in connecting with this custom the Orphic doctrine that the soul of man comes into him from without with the wind. Even this, however, is only a speculative embellishment of the popular belief about the Tritopatores (which the Orphics cannot, as Welcher thinks, *Götterl.* iii, 71, have "invented": they only explained it after their fashion and consequently must have found it already existing). When we have stripped off all speculative accretions we find the Tritopatores to have been the souls of ancestors who have become wind-spirits and travel in the wind like other *δαίμοι* (whose name even is derived from the breath of the wind). From these as from real *αἰσῆς* (*σπυδαί*) their descendants hope for aid where the entry into life of a new *ψυχή* is concerned. It is not hard to understand the connexion between souls and wind-spirits, it is merely that such conceptions were rare among the Greeks and for that reason these isolated wind-spirits surviving in popular belief were turned into individual daemones—the Tritopatores no less than the Harpes (see *Rh. Mus.* 50, 3 ff.).

<sup>135</sup> The words of Orestes in A. Ck. 463, give very naive expression to the belief. He calls to the soul of his father: *παῖρα* (if thou sendest me aid) *γὰρ ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλκιρος Ἰσχυρὸς ἀνελπίστ'· εἰ δὲ μὴ, παρ' αἰθέρας δὲν ἄνθρωπος ἐμυρίαὶς κενεῖται χθονί.* That we too that the belief ridiculed by Luc., *Luc.* 9, was true of earlier times as well: *ἐπιδόματα δὲ δαίμων (the dead) τὰς παρ' ἡμῶν γαστρί καὶ τὰς καθύπερθε καὶ τὰς κάτω*—*οὐκ εἰ τῶν μὴ ἐκ καταβλάστησεν ὅπως γὰρ φίλος ἢ σπυριγῆς, δαιμόνιος ὅστις νεκρὸς καὶ ἀπύρρετος ἐν αἰθέρι περιεστέταται.*

<sup>136</sup> Epicurus devotes by will certain definite *ὑπόθεσιν* to the yearly offering of *δωρεῖσθαι* to his parents, his brothers, and himself: D.L. x, 18.—To the end of the third century belongs the "Testament of Epikteta", i.e. the inscription recording the foundation by Epikteta (who came from Thera as we know now for certain: *Eph. Arch.* 1884, p. 142) of a three-day sacrificial feast to be performed every year for

the Muses and "the Heroes", i.e. for her husband, herself, and her sons; and the institution for this special purpose of a *κοινὸν τοῦ δῶματος τῶν συγγενῶν* (together with women of the family). The *ἱμερ.* gives also the rules of this sacrificial society (Michel n. 1001, *CIG.* 2448).—The offerings to the dead in this case (vi, 6 ff.) consist of a *θύρριον* i.e. a sheep) and *ἱερά*, especially *ἄλλετρις* of five choikinikes of wheaten flour and a stater of dry cheese (*ἄλλε* are a kind of sacrificial cake specially offered to the deities of the lower world, as for ex. to Trophonios at Lebadeia: *GDI.* 413 with n., p. 363), and in addition to these garlands are mentioned. The following are to be sacrificed: the customary parts of the victim, an *ἄλλετρις*, a loaf, a *κόρυς* (= *βάρυς*, *θύρρις*: interchange of tenuis and media as frequently) and some *ὀψάρια* (i.e. small fishes: cf. the *ὀψάρια* for the dead, *GDI.* 3634 Kou). The rest was probably consumed by the religious society: these special portions the person offering the sacrifice, we are told, *καταποιεῖ*, i.e. (he) shall offer them to the Heroes by burning; them entire. Cf. Phot. *καποστέον* καταποιεῖν, ὃ ἐνυγίζετο τοῖς νεκροῖς κατὰ νόμον (καποστέον, κατέπων, ἀκατέπων, etc., are frequent in the LXX) and Phot. *ἀκαποστέων* and *ἀκαποστέμος*. *καποστέον* = *ἀκαποστέον* in the sacrificial calendar from Kou, *GDI.* 3636; cf. Stengel, *Hermet.* 27, 161 f.

<sup>137</sup> See Ia. 1, 10.

<sup>138</sup> In *μανικειναι* records it is sometimes definitely enjoined that the freed persons shall at the death of their masters *θεοφύλαττον καὶ τὰ ὄψια οὐτῶν καταποιεῖν*: thus on the *unc.* from Phokis, *SIG.* 841. (Instructions of this kind as esp. frequent in the records of emancipation from Delphi: see Büchsenwächter, *Ber. u. Erw.*, 178 Anm. 3-4.) *τὰ ὄψια* when applied to the dead (*GDI.* 1345-6: *ὄψιας τυχεῖς* P. Sup. 173) means the *καθ' ὥραν συντελούμενα ἱερά* (Hesych. *ὄψια*; funeral ordinance of the Laityades, i. 49 ff.: *τὸ δ' ἄλλος θοῖος κατ' τὴν ὥραν ἀγαγεῖν*), i.e. the sacrifices to be celebrated periodically (*τοὺς συνυμνῶντες ἡμέραις*, n. 138; cf. *ταύτα ὄψια*, Pl., P. ix, 98 f.). This doubtless means in particular the *ἐνοσίχθων ἱερά* (cf. no. 81, 209, 92 of this chap.). (Garlanding of graves κατ' ἐνοσίχθων τοῖς ὄψιοις (so, *ἡμέραις*). *GDI.* 1773, 21; κατ' ἐνοσίχθων ὄψια ἱερά ἀντελεῖν (to the Heroes), Pl., Cri. 118 C.

<sup>139</sup> The foll. are the expressions occurring in the speeches of Isaeus which conclusively warrant what is said above. The childless Menekles *δοκέει δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔσονται ἔκγονα, ἀλλ' ἔσονται ἀντὶ θένος ζῶντα γρονθοφῶναι καὶ τελευτῶντα θάψαι ἀντὶ καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔκγονον χάριν τὰ καμνόμενα ἀντὶ σωφρον.* 2, 10. To be cared for in old age, buried after death, and to have permanent attention paid to one's soul is a single unified conception, in which ritual burial at the hands of one's own *ἐγγονοι* (thus securing the cult of the family) does not form the least important part (cf. Pl., *Hipp. m.* 291 DE: it is *ἀλλήλων* for a man—according to the popular view—*ἀφισπένδω εἰς γῆρας τοὺς ἀντὶ νόθους τελευτῶντας καλῶς μεριμελλέοντι ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀντὶ ἐγγόνων καλῶς καὶ μεγαλημενῶς ταῖς θήναι*. Medea says to her children in E., *Med.* 1092 *εἴχον ἐλπίδας πολλὰς εἰς μὲν γρονθοφῶνται' ἐμὲ καὶ κατὰ νόμον ἔργον εἰς μεριμελεῖν, (ἐλευθέρων ἀνδράωνος)*. That he may share in this attention to the souls of the dead a man must leave behind him a son; upon a son alone this will fall as a sacred duty. Hence a man who has no son takes the chosen heir of his possessions into his own family by adoption. Inheritance and adoption invariably accompany each other in such cases (and even in the first speech, where, though nothing is actually said of adoption, it is certainly implied throughout). The

motive of adoption is said in the clearest possible terms to be the desire on the part of the adopter for a permanent care of his own soul at the hands of his adopted son: 2, 25, 46; 8, 51, 65; 7, 30; 9, 7, 36. There is consequently a close communion between *ebai katephedon* and *ebai* *và* *μάρτυρα* *ἵσται*, *πρότερον* and *ἐνταυτοῖς* (9, 51). It is a mark of the heir *và* *νομιζόμενος* *νομίς*, *ἐνταύθα*, *παιδείας* (6, 65); cf. also D. 45, 85. Duties towards the soul of the dead consist in the son and heir's provision for a solemn funeral, the erection of a handsome grave-monument and in his offering of the *τρεῖς* and *δύναμις* and *τὰ* *ἐπὶ* *τῇ* *ταφῇ*: 2, 36, 37; 4, 19; 9, 4. After that he is responsible for the regular continuance of the cult and of sacrifice to the dead, *ἐνταύθα* *καθ' *ἑαυτοῦ* *ἡμεῖς* (2, 46), and generally, *καὶ* *εἰς* *τὰς* *ἐνταῦθα* *χρήσας* *và* *νομιζόμενος* *νομίς* (2, 10). Then, just as he has to carry on for the dead man his family worship, his *ἐπὶ* *ταφῇ* (2, 46; e.g. for Zeus Ktesios: 3, 16); so also he must, as the dead man once did, make regular offering to the *εὐρύνομος* of the house: 9, 7. In this way the family cult secures its own continuity.—Everything in this reminds us in the strongest way of what is done for the continuation of the cult of the dead, esp. by adoption, in the country where ancestor-worship reaches its greatest height—China. Desire to perpetuate the family name, the strongest motive with us in the adoption of male children, could not be so strong in Greece when only individual names were usual. Even this, however, occurs as a motive for the adoption of a son, *ἵνα* *μὴ* *ἀνώνυμος* *ᾖ* *ἀλλὰ* *νόμιος* *γένηται*, 2, 36, 66; cf. Isocr. 19, 33 (and Philodem., *Μορτ.*, p. 26, 9 ff. Mehl.). The "house" at any rate is called after its ancestors (like those *Βουκλῆδες* of whom Dem. speaks), and if the house has no male heir this common name will disappear. Apart from this, the adopted person will call himself the son of his adoptive father, and will ensure the preservation of the latter's name, in the well-known fashion, by giving this name to the eldest (Dem. 39, 27) of his own sons. (A similar perpetuation of a name is probably intended in E. 17, 605-8.)*

<sup>126</sup> Appealing to *ἐφῆμι*, *καλλῶ* and *ἐφίθερα* *κατακαί*, Plato *Alcibiades*, *Lg.* 827 A, *ὅτι* *ἀπὸ* *αὐτῶν* *τῶν* *ἐκτεταγμένων* *φύχει* *δύναμις* *ἔχουσι* *τινὰς* *τελευτήσαντας*, *ᾧ* *τῶν* *κατ'* *ἀνθρώπων* *πραγμάτων* *ἐπιμελησάντων*. Hence the *ἐκτεταγμένοι* of orphaned children *πρώτος* *μὲν* *ταῖς* *δυνάμει* *φασβιλοῦν* . . . *ἐπὶ* *ταῖς* *τῶν* *καταμνησάντων* *φύχεσσι*, *ὡς* *ἔστιν* *ἐν* *τῇ* *φύσει* *τῶν* *σώτων* *δυνάμει* *ἐφίθερα* *διαφασβιλοῦν*, *καὶ* *καθὼς* *εἰς* *ἐνὸς* *τέλετος* *καὶ* *ἐπιμελῆσαντος* *ἵππευσι*. It is only the circle of influence belonging to the *φύξις* which is here limited (and the circle of worship in consequence), not the potency of that influence.

<sup>127</sup> This is true at least of the Greeks, as ancient philosophy was already aware: Arist., *Pol.* i, 2; Diocarchus ap. St. Byr. *νέμει* (who apparently thinks of the *νέμει* as held together by "endogamous" marriage). The whole development of Greek law and politics—this much at least may be conceded to the analysis of Fustel de Coulanges (*La Cité antique*)—points to the conclusion that the division into the smallest groups goes back to the beginning of Greek life. The Greeks were even then divided into families and groups of kindred, from the combination of which the later Greek state grew up; they never (as happened elsewhere) lived the community life of the tribe or the horde. And yet, can we imagine the Greek gods without the tribal community that worshipped them?

<sup>128</sup> The idea of the *Law familiaris* can be translated into Greek not inadequately by the words *ᾧ* *κατ'* *οἴκῳ* *ἔσται*. *ἔσται* *αἰωνότατος*, as is done by Dionys. Hal., and Plutarch in their accounts of the story

of Oecrisia (D.H. 4, 2, 3; *Plu. Fort. Rom.* 9, p. 323 C). But this was not an idea current among the Greeks. The Latin *genius* genericus = *lar familiaris* (Laber. 34 Rib.) is most nearly approached by the remarkable expression *ἄνθρωπος οὐρανός*, *CIA.* iii, 1460. Inside the house, at the family hearth (in whose *μυροί*, "dwells" Hekate: E., *Met.* 387), the Greeks worshipped—no longer the spirits of the ancestors—but the *δαίμονες οὐρανός*, *εὐχέας*, *μήλαια*, *ἐρασιον*. These were compared with the Roman Penates (D.H. 1, 67, 3; cf. *Hyg. ap. Macr.* 3, 4, 13), but their relationship to the spirits of the house and of the family is considerably less apparent than in the case of the Penates. It is simply imitation of Roman custom that makes the dying Persepolis call upon the *δαίμονες οὐρανός* καὶ *μυροί*: Luc., *Perseps.* 38. *Εὐχέας* τοῖς τοῖς *οὐρανός* *δαίμονες*, *int. from Lykia, CIG.* 4292 = *BCH.* xv, 652, n. 26. τοῖς *δαίμονες* τῆς *δωδεκαθεῶν* *γυναικός*, *Ibido, Leg. ad G.* 85, ii, p. 585 M. More in Lob., *Ag.* 769 n.)

<sup>200</sup> The *δυσδαίμων* of which Attic writers in particular often speak has very indefinite features. Those who used the word combined ideas—no longer fully intelligible—of a divine being of fairly definite nature and shape with this name which in itself was altogether too liable to generalization. Modern writers have declared that it was originally a daimon of the fertility of crops. But there is just as little ground for believing this as there is for identifying it with Dionysos, as was done by the physician Philonides in connexion with an absurd story which he has invented on his own account (*Ath.* 675 B). There is much, however, that points to the connexion of the *δυσδαίμων* with chthonic powers. He appears as a snake (Gerhard, *Akad. Abh.* ii, 24) like all *χθονία*. (On a snake as a talisman the words are written τὰ *δρακὸν* καὶ *δυσδαίμων* *δαίμονες*: *P. Mag. Par.* 2427 B.) *δυσδαίμων* was the name given to a special kind of non-poisonous snake [described after Archigeneus, in the Vatican iologus brought to light by myself: *Rh. Mus.* 38, 278; cf. Photius, *vapriai* *ἐχέας*, and again esp. v. v. *ἐχέας* *παπύρας*, 364, 1). Sacrifice was made to them in Alexandria on the 25th Tybi as τοῖς *δυσδαίμονες* *δαίμονες* τοῖς *ἀποκομῆς* *τῶν οὐρανός*: [Callist.] i, 32 (cod. A), or as "penates dei" as the words are translated by Jol. Valer., p. 38, 29 ff. (Kuebl.). In this instance the *δ.* *δ.* is evidently a good spirit who protects the house. Only with this in mind can we understand how anyone could consecrate his house *δυσδαίμων* as Timoleon did at Syracuse (*δυσδαίμων*, *Plu., Ipr. Luc.*, 11, p. 843 E; τῶν *δαίμων* *δαίμων* *εὐχέας*, *Plu., Timol.* 36, where *δαίμων* is evidently an ancient copyist's error). Cf. also the saying of Xenias, D.L. vi, 74. Such guardian spirits of the house are of course familiar enough in our own popular superstition, but in their case "the transition from souls of the dead to kindly house-spirits or kobolds is still demonstrable" (Grimm, p. 913). At the household meal the first few drops of mixed wine belong by right to the *δυσδαίμων* (*Hug. Plat. Symp.*, p. 23); then follows the libation to Zeus Soter. But sometimes it was the "Heroes" and not the *δ.* *δ.* who preceded Zeus Soter (*Sch. Pl., I. v.* 10; Gerhard, p. 369). They have taken the place of the *δ.* *δ.*, which itself reveals the connexion between the *δ.* *δ.* and these "souls". Another fact pointing in the same direction is the worship of the *δυσδαίμων* in common with many other deities of chthonic nature in the temple of Trophonios at Lebadeia (*Paus.* 9, 39, 6). In this case it is mentioned by the side of Tyche and these two are sometimes met with together in grave-inscriptions (e.g. *CIG.* 2485 f.) and Tyche herself appears with such chthonic deities as Despoina, Phonton, and Persephone (*CIG.*

1444 Sparta). In epitaphic inscriptions *δαίμων* *δυσάδης* sometimes occurs as completely equivalent to *Dis Manibus*: e.g. *δαίμων* *δυσάδης* *Πορταῖοι*, *CIG.* 2700 b.c. (Mylasa); *δαίμων* *δυσάδης* *Ἀρτίμαχος* καὶ *Τίμων*, *Att. Mith.* '90, p. 110 (Mylasa); cf. the inscr. from Mylasa in *Att. Mith.* '90, pp. 276-7 (nn. 25-5, 27). The singular is rare: *δαίμων* *δυσάδης* *Ἀριστοῦ* ἐπὶ λ., *BCH.* '90, p. 628 (Karia). (*δαίμων* *δαυτῶ* = καὶ *Δαυτίτης* τῆς γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ = *Dis Manibus* suis et *Lacitiae* uxoris in the bilingual ins. from Hieroca, *CIG.* 4452: cf. 4232 and 5827.) All these have come under Roman influence, but it is worth noticing, all the same, that the *δυσάδης* *δ.* was identified with the *Di Manes*; which means that it was regarded as a daimon that had once been a disembodied human soul.—The subject might be dealt with more fully than would be in place here.

<sup>204</sup> In Boeotia (and elsewhere, particularly in Thessaly) the designation of the dead as *φῆμα*—always an indication of a higher conception of its spirit nature—is especially frequent on tombstones. More will be found on this subject below. The inscriptions are for the most part of late date. But even in the fifth century (at all events at the beginning of the fourth) the custom of "heroising" the ordinary dead was current. To this Plato *Com.* (i, p. 622 K.) alludes in the "Menelaos", *εἰ οὐκ ἀρχέτω, ἢν θύῃται φῆμα γὰρ*; (*Zenob.* vi, 17, etc. The *Paroemiogr.* connect this with the Thessian custom of refusing the honours of the dead to those who committed suicide. This is certainly wrong and contradicts Pl.'s intention. Keil shows this clearly, *Syll. Inst. Boeot.*, p. 153).

<sup>205</sup> Among the Epizephyrian Lucrains *δαίμονες* *οὐκ ἔσται ἐπὶ τοῖς νεκροφύτοις*, ἀλλ' ἐνθάδε *ἐκταμίωσιν*, *ἐλαιοφύτοις*. *Heraclid.*, *Phil.* 30, 2. In Keos the men never wear any sign of mourning, though women mourn for a year for a son who dies young: *ib.* 9, 4 (see *Weicker, At. Schr.* ii, 502). The funeral regulation of Iuba (*SIC* 877, published in imitation of Athenian usage implies rather a tendency to exaggerated display of mourning, at least among the common people.

<sup>206</sup> e.g. *Is.* 2, 47: *βασίλειος καὶ φίλοι καὶ δούλοι τῷ δὲ "Διδῷ* ἐντι. Strictly speaking no one can *βασίλει* the departed in Hades. Few nations have entirely escaped such contradictions between a cult of the dead in the house or at a grave and the conception of the relegation of the soul to an inaccessible other world. They arise from two simultaneously existing mental attitudes (representing also different stages of culture) towards these obscure subjects. The naive theology of the common people reconciles such discrepancies by attributing two souls to men, one of which goes down to Hades while the other remains beside the still-animated body and receives the offerings of the family: e.g. North American Indians: *Müller, Ges. d. Amer. Urw.*, 66; cf. *Tyler*, i, 434. These two souls are in reality the creation of two mutually incompatible modes of thought.

<sup>207</sup> —*Idem* testamenta cavebit in qui nobis quousq. oraculum ediderit nihil post mortem ad nos pertinere? *Cic.*, *Fin.* ii, 102.—Besides *Epic.*, Theophrastus seems to have made some arrangement for the regular celebration of his memory (by the associates of the *Peripatetoi*). *Marp.* 139, 4 ff.: *μνηστεῖ δὲ ἑταίρων ἐνέμενον τὸ ἐνὶ ταῖς ναταῖς τῶν ἀποθανόντων συνέδριον καὶ ὁρτυσσόμενον ἑκατόμηνον* αὐτῶν ἔστι συνέδριον δὲ τῶν ἑταίρων *ἐκδοχῶν*. The will of Theophr. preserved by *D.L.* 5, 2, 14, is silent on the point.

## III

<sup>138</sup> Oracle ap. D. 43, 66 (cf. 67) τοῖς ἀναφθιμένοις ἐν ἱερουργίᾳ ἔμμεν (ἐν τοῖς καθύπερθεσι θύροις, § 67) ταῖς τε καὶ καθύπερθε κατὰ δῶμα. — τὰ ἀγγεῖα = τὰ νομίσματα "the customary things" (Sultmann, *Aufz. Gramm.*, § 113 n. 7, l. p. 84 Lob.).

<sup>139</sup> Inquiry, at sacrifices to the dead, of an ἐγγεγραμμένος: Is. 8, 38; of the ἐγγεγραμμένοι (who give detailed instructions and advice): {D.} 47, 68 ff. Harp. ἐγγεγραμμένος ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἐ (perh. ἐν τῷ) ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀποκαταστάσεως νομίσματος ἐγγεγραμμένος τοῖς ἀποστόλοις. Tim. Lex. ἐγγεγραμμένος: τοῖς γένεσι καὶ ἀποκαταστάσεως (There is no need to understand this other than literally, i.e. that the college of the νομίσματα, ἐγγεγ., consisted of three members: Schöll, *Hermes*, 22, 584), οὗ μὲν καὶ καθύπερθε τοῖς θυγατρὶ δῶμα. The purification of the δῶμα is closely connected with the cult of the souls. It is true that prescriptions for such purification were to be found also ἐν τοῖς τοῖς δῶμασι (so Müller, *Arch. Eum.* 163 A. 20 [152 n. E.T.]) παραλοῖς: Ath. 8, 410 A, and it may be that the college of the ἐγγεγραμμένοι ἐγγεγραμμένοι may have also given decisions in such cases. Still, that does not prevent the statement of Timaeus in regard to the ἐγγεγ. νομίσματα from being true. (Expiations belong principally if not exclusively to the Apolline cult.)

<sup>140</sup> Mu. *Ser. Num.* 17, p. 850 C.D. expressly appeals for confirmation of the belief in a continued existence of the soul after the death of the body to utterances of the Delphic god: ἔγωγε τοῦ πολλοῦ ποσὶν ἀποκαταστάσεως, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καταστάσεως θάνατον.

<sup>141</sup> That already in Homer the circle of the ἀγγεῖα (in the Athenian legal sense) was called upon to prosecute the blood-feud is certainly probable in itself; it cannot, however, be proved from examples occurring in Homer. Leist's statements in *Generis, Rechtsges.*, p. 42, are not quite exact. The facts are: a father is called upon to avenge his son, and a son his father, and a brother to avenge his brother (γ 307; ι 632 f.; ω 434); once the avengers are the ἀντιπρόσωποι τοῦ θύτου of the murdered man, α 273. θύτης has a very wide sense and is not even confined to kinship; at any rate it is not simply "cousins" (θύτης καὶ ἀντιπρόσωποι τοῦ θύτου, ι 464).—In Aitic law, too, in certain cases the duty of prosecuting the murderer extended beyond the limits of the ἀντιπρόσωποι to more distant relatives and even to the ἀντιπρόσωποι of the murdered man (Law ap. D. 43, 57).

<sup>142</sup> Flight, indeed δειψυρία, on account of φόβος ἀπὸ τοῦ θύτου: Ψ 65 ff. (The fugitive becomes the δειψυρία of the person who receives him into his house in the foreign land: ι. 60; cf. Q 431 f.; this must have been the rule).—Flight on account of φόβος ἀπὸ τοῦ θύτου (ἀποκαταστάσεως 268) = 250 ff. And so frequently.

<sup>143</sup> ι 632 ff. καὶ μὲν τίς τε καὶ ἀντιπρόσωποι φόβος ἢ οὐ καὶ τὸ δέξασθαι τοῦ θύτου: καὶ δ' ἂν μὲν ἐν δέξασθαι μὲν καὶ τὸ δέξασθαι τὸν θύτον ἐστὶν ἀντιπρόσωποι τοῦ θύτου. Here it is very plainly represented that all that is required is to appease "the heart and spirit" of the receiver of the ἀντιπρόσωποι: the murdered man is not considered.

<sup>144</sup> It is very natural to suppose that the νόμος (as K. O. Müller suggests in *Arch. Eum.* 163 [122 E.T.]) may have arisen out of the substitution of a vicarious sacrifice instead of that of the murderer himself, who should strictly have been offered to the dead man. In this way primitive human sacrifice has in many cases been replaced by sacrifice of animals. In that case the νόμος too must have originally been offered to the murdered man; in Homeric times



only the satisfaction of the living avenger was thought of.—In any case it is a mistake to look upon the permission to buy off the blood-feud as a mitigation of primitive severity in the taking of vengeance due to the intervention of the State. The State in this case mitigated nothing since it took no interest at all (in Homer) in the treatment of murder cases. Of course, legal proceedings can be taken to decide whether a stipulated *pará* has been paid or not (Z 497 ff.), as in the case of any other *apóphainon*. But the prosecution of the murderer in all its departments is left entirely in the hands of the family of the murdered man.

<sup>143</sup> We have very few details on this point. In Sparta of *πόρνευ* (*πορνεία*) *καὶ φονεὶς* (*δίνες*), Arist., *Pol.* 3, 1, p. 1273b 10 (and in Corinth, too, D.S. 16. 63, 6 ff.). Involuntary homicide is punished by exile and (in this being more severe than at Athens) perpetual exile as it appears. The Spartan *Drakontion* serving in the army of the Ten Thousand *ἐδωκε καὶ ὡς αἰσέθεν καὶς δαόν αὐτοῦ* (like Patroklos in fact, *᾿* 87), *ἐνὶ ἄρ' ὠρέσθαι*, Xen., *An.* 4, 8, 25. If his banishment had been only temporary the period must have expired long before.—In Kyme there are vestiges of legal prosecution of murder (with witnesses): Arist., *Pol.* 1269a, 1 ff.—In Chalkis *ἐπὶ ὅσῳ* the laws of Androklos of Rhgium were in force *κατὰ τὰ φόνους καὶ τὰς ἐπιελάσεις*, Arist., *Pol.* 2, 8, p. 1274b 23 ff.—In Lokri were used the laws of Zaleukos in combination with Cretan, Spartan and Areopagite institutions; these last undoubtedly dealing with homicide, which must therefore have been regulated constitutionally. (Str. vi, 260, following Eph.)

<sup>144</sup> The limits of those qualified to inherit extends in Athenian law *πρὸς ἀποφύας τοῦτον* (Law ap. 1, 43, 51; cf. § 27); as did the duty of avenging murder *πρὸς ἀποφύας*: 1, 47, 72 (*ἐπὶ δὲ ἀποφύας*), which must mean the same thing, Law ap. 1, 43, 57). The circle of persons thus united in the right of inheritance and the duty of taking vengeance for murder constituted the *οἰκονομία*, the body of kindred tracing their descent (in the male line only) from the same man, the father, grandfather, or great-grandfather of them all. This is the limit to which the *γενεὴ* are traced: 1s. 8, 32; cf. above, note 122. Many nations of the earth are familiar with a similar limitation of the narrower body of kindred composing a "house": as to the underlying reasons for the practice many conjectures are made by E. E. Schöbelen, *On the Structure of Greek Tribal Society* (1895).

<sup>145</sup> As to the restless wandering of the *δαιμόνιον* more details will be given below (Append. vii). In the meantime it will be enough to refer to A. *Énn.* 98, where the still unavenged soul of the murdered Klytaimnestra complains *αἰσχυρὸν ἄλῳμα*. A later authority uses words that correspond well with ancient belief: Porphy., *Abst.* ii, 47, *τὸν αἰδρώσαντα αἱ τῶν βίη ἀποθανόντων (ψυχαὶ) περιέχονται πρὸς τῇ αἰσχυρί*, like the souls of the *δράκον*.

<sup>146</sup> In Homeric times the injured dead becomes a *θεῶν μέριμνα* to the evil-doer (X 358, X 79). Later times believed that the soul of the dead man himself angrily pursued the murderer with its terror till it drove him beyond its own boundaries: *ὁ θανάσιμος θυμὸς τοῦ δράσαντος πύλλει*. Pl., *Leg.* 885 DE, appealing to *καλεῖν τὸν τὸν δράσαντον μὴδεν ἀποφύοντα*; cf. X., *Cyr.* 8, 7, 18; A., *Cho.* 39 ff., 323 ff. If the next-of-kin whose duty it is to avenge the death of his relative shrinks the duty incumbent on him the anger of the dead man is turned upon the latter: Pl., *Leg.* 9, 866 B—*τοῦ καθένος ἀποφύοντος τὸν πάτρν*. The indignant soul becomes *προσπράντος*, *προσπράντος* probably

applies only in a derivative sense to a *δαίμων* who takes the part of the dead man (esp. *Zeḗ προστρόπαιος*); it is strictly speaking an epithet of the soul itself in its longing for vengeance. Thus in Antiphon *Tetral.* I, γ 10, *αὐτὴ μὲν προστρόπαιος ὁ ἀποθανὼν οὐκ ἔστιν*. 3, δ 10, ὁ *δαίμων* (or rather ὁ *εὐδαιμόνιος*) τοῖς αἰετοῖς προστρόπαιος ἔστιν. See, too, A., *Clio.* 287, *ἐκ προστρέπαιον ἐν γένει πεπρωμένων*. *EM.* 42, 7, *Ἥμετέρον, ἀνατρεφόμενον ταύτῃ, προστρέπαιος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις γενέσθαι*. We can, however, see particularly well from this case how easily the change came about from a soul in a special condition to a similar daemonic being which takes the place of the soul of the dead. The same Antiphon speaks also of οἱ τῶν ἀποθανόντων προστρέπαιος, ὁ προστρέπαιος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος as something distinct from the dead man himself: *Tetr.* 3, α 4; 3, β 8; cf. δ *Μυρίλων* προστρέπαιος, *Isis.* 2, 18, 2, etc.; cf. Zacher, *Dissert. phil. Halens.* iv, p. 228. The injured dead himself becomes *δαίμων*. *Soph.* *Tr.* 1201 ff. [cf. *fr.* 347; *E.*, 17, 778; *Med.* 808]; later his place is taken by *δαίμονες* *δαίμων*. What terrible evils the unavenged soul can bring upon the person who is called upon to take vengeance are painted for us by Aesch. in *Clio.* 278 ff. (or else as some think an ancient interpolator of A.). Sickness and trouble might be sent over several generations by such *παλαιὰ μνήματα* of the dead: *Pl.*, *Phdr.* 244 D (see Lobbeck's account, *Agel.* 638 l.). True to ancient beliefs an Orphic hymn prays to the Titans *μὴνὲν χαλεπὴν ἀποπέμψαι, εἰ τις ἀπὸ χθονίων πράξῃ τινα αἰετοῖς πελώρεσσι*, *H.* 57, 7 l.; cf. 39, 8-10.

<sup>138</sup> *πρῶτος ἔστιν ὑπεξέλαβεν τὴν παρόντι τὸν θύσαντα τὰς ὥρας πάσας τὰς ἡμετέρας, καὶ ἐξηρώσας πάντας τοὺς πινόντας τῶναις θυμῶσι τῆς πατρίδος*, *Pl.*, *Lg.* ix, 885 E. The law says in the case of the criminal convicted of murder *εἴργειτο μὲν τῆς τοῦ παθόντος πατρίδος, κτείνειν δὲ οὐχ ὁμοῦ ἀπονομοῦσθαι*, *D.* 23, 38.

<sup>139</sup> When the victim was a citizen, and also in wilful murder of a non-citizen. See *Men.* and *Sch.*, *At.* *Proc.*<sup>2</sup>, p. 379, n. 520.—When the citizenship of a city rested upon conquest the lives of the subjects belonging to the older subject population were of less account. In *Tralles* (*Karia*) the murder of one of the *Leleges* by an (*Argive*) full citizen might be bought off by payment of a bushel of peas (a purely symbolical *ransom*) to the relations of the victim: *Plu.*, *Q.Gr.* 46, p. 302 B.

<sup>140</sup> On the expiry of the legally appointed period of banishment the relations of the dead man do not seem to have been allowed to resume *αἰσῶσις*. See *Philippi*, *Ascop.* n. *Epistelen.* 118 l.

<sup>141</sup> *Law ap.* D. 43, 57.

<sup>142</sup> *D.* 37, 69. See *Philippi*, *op. cit.* p. 144 R.—*Cf.* E., *Hipp.* 1435 l., 1442 l., 1448 l.

<sup>143</sup> Such prohibitions against taking a *ransom* for murder is made by the *Law ap.* D. 23, 28: *τοὺς δ' ἀνδροφόνους ἐξέλαβεν ἀνομοκτείναν . . . ἀπαίνεσθαι δὲ μὴ, καὶ δὲ ἀνομοῦ* (cf. γ 33 *τὸ δὲ μὴ δύνανται μὴ χρεῖματα πᾶντας, τὸ γὰρ χρεῖματα δύναναι ἀνέχεσθαι αἱ πόλεις*). In spite of this Meier and others unjustifiably conclude that murder could be indemnified by payment of money. From the illegal practice mentioned in (D.) 38, 29: this speaks rather for the contrary. They have more appearance of justification when they appeal to *Harp.* (*Phot. Suid.*, *h.v.* 784, 28; *At.* 313, 3 ff.), s.v. *ἀνδροφόνος*: *τὸ ἐνὶ φόρῳ ἀιδήμενα χρεῖματα τοῖς αἰετοῖς τοῦ φονεμένου, ἢ καὶ ἐνέφλουον*. On the strength of this Hermann, *Gr. Staatsr.* 104, 6, says, "even intentional murder could be absolutely indemnified." Nothing is actually said of *φόρος* *ἀνδροφόνος* here nor do we anywhere learn that the payment of *ἀνδροφόνος*

on the occasion of a murder was ever a formally *legalised* proceeding. It remains possible, and even in the circumstances more probable, that Dinarch. and Thphr. in the passages on *prophetai* quoted by Harp. referred to the practice as one *forbidden* by law, though it might be, on occasion, an actual fact. If we had only the gloss of Suidas—*δυναὶ δέσσειν, ἡ δὲ βίβλος τῶν ἐν τῇ δέσει τῶν ἐπισημασμένων ἐστὶν ἐν νόμῳ*—we might have concluded that payment of such blood-money was allowed in Athens and mentioned in Solon's laws as allowable. This would be quite as justifiable as to argue as above from Harp. s. *prophetai*. We know, in fact, that the law referred to the *δυναὶ* and *δέσεις* as *forbidden* things, from the passages already quoted from Dem. (23, 28-33). From these the gloss was itself probably derived.

<sup>124</sup> We cannot, however, believe on the poor authority of Sch. Dem. p. 607, 16 ff., that the *λεγωσὶν* τὰς *ἑκατὸν δέκα* were selected out of the whole Athenian citizen body by the *Areiopagos*. ("Three" were chosen out of all the Athenians: D. 21, 115; at other times "ten": Dinarch. ap. Edf. 469, 12 ff.; an indefinite number: Phot. *λεγωσὶν*.) According to all analogies we should rather expect this selection to have been made by the popular Assembly.

<sup>125</sup> *οἱ ἑκατόντρες αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ νόμιμα*. Antiphon, *Herod.* 88. In more detail D. 23, 67-A. Those who had to take an oath swore by the *ἑκατὸν θεοὶ* and other gods: Dinarch., *adv. Demosth.* 47. Both sides had to swear to the justice of their case in respect of the material facts in dispute (Philippi, *Arrop.*, pp. 87-98). Such a compulsory oath taken by both parties could not of course in any circumstances serve as proof: one side at least must be perjured. Nor can the Athenians themselves have failed to see this. It is surely doing them an injustice not to see the simple explanation of this strange sort of preliminary oath-taking and to dismiss the matter with a reference to the Athenians as "not a legally-minded people" (as Philippi does, p. 88). It is much more natural to suppose that this double oath, taken under circumstances of peculiar solemnity, was not regarded as a juridical matter at all, but had a purely religious sense (as it had in the quite similar cases mentioned by Meiners, *Allg. Gesch. d. Relig.* ii, 296 f.). The oath-taker invokes a dreadful curse upon himself if he breaks his oath and devotes *αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν νόμον καὶ οὐκ ἄλλας τῶν ἀνθρώπων* (Antiphon, *Herod.* 11) to the Curse-Goddesses, the *'Απαι* or the *'Εμπίδες* αἱ δ' *ἐνὰ γὰρ ἀνθρώπων νόμον, ἀπὸ δ' ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἑκάστω* (T 256 f.)—and to the Gods who are to punish his children and his whole kin and kin on earth (Lycurg., *Isocr.* 78). If the court discovers the perjured party the punishment due to his action overtakes him (or if he is the plaintiff, he fails in his purpose) and at the same time the justice of heaven punishes him for his broken oath (cf. D. 23, 88). But the court may make a mistake and not find out the perjurer; in which case the perjurer is still punished for he becomes a victim of the gods to whom he has devoted himself—who do not err. Thus the double oath is an addition to the judicial inquiry, and heavenly punishment stands side by side with that of men. The two may coincide, but this need not be so, and in this way the guilty is punished whatever happens. (How familiar such ideas were in antiquity we see from expressions used by Isocrates: *Isoc.* 18, 3; D. 19, 236-46; Lycurg., *Isocr.* 79.) The oath, being an appeal to a higher court, supplemented human justice, or rather the legal proceedings of men supplemented the oath-taking, for to this partnership the appeal to an oath must have been the older

<sup>101</sup> Poll. 8, 117, καὶ ἑκατόν δι μῆνα τριῶν ἡμερῶν δίκασαν (the judges on the Areiopagus) δίκασαν, τριῶν ἡμερῶν, τριῶν, ἡμερῶν.

<sup>102</sup> cf. Ἀποκρυφῶν τριῶν καὶ τοῦ μῆνος ἡμέρας τὰς φανερὰς βλάσιν δίκασαν, διῆσαν τὰς δὲ τριῶν ἡμερῶν ἀφανίσαντες, Sch. Aschb. 1, 168, p. 282 Sch. This certainly implies that the limitation of the number of the Erinyes to three (and not two for example)—which first appears in Eurip., but was certainly not his own invention—was officially current in the worship of the city.—Since these three days were sacred to the Erinyes, as goddesses of Hades, they counted as ἀποφάσεις ἡμέρας: E.N. 131, 16 f.; Et. Gud. 70, 5 (the thirtieth day of the month is for that reason φάσις, ἡμέρα ἔργου acc. to "Orpheus" fr. 28 Ab.).

<sup>103</sup> Paus. 1, 28, 8.

<sup>104</sup> The Erinyes are the accusers of Orestes not only in Aeschylus (and thence in Eurip. too, IT, 240 ff.), but also in the varying accounts derived from different sources, in which the twelve gods served as judges ap. D. 23, 86 (cf. 74, and Dinarch., edw. Dem. 87).

<sup>105</sup> The Erinyes are said ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ἐκ μύλων ὕδατος. A., Eum. 254 f.; cf. 183 f.; 302; 305. In this they closely resemble the "vampires" which we hear of especially in Slav popular mythology, and the Tii of the Polynesians, etc. These, however, are the souls of the dead returned from the grave and sucking men's blood.

<sup>106</sup> The Erinyes say to Orestes: ἐμοὶ τραπεζὴν καὶ καὶ καθαρμῶν, καὶ τὰς με δούλεις εὐδαίμωνος θανάτου σφαιρεῖς. A., Eum. 304 f. The matricide is divus parentum (i.e. their Hades) sacer, their sacrificial victim (θεῖα κατεχθονίου θεός. D.H. 2, 10, 3), in the older belief of Greece, too.

<sup>107</sup> See R.A. Mus. 50, 6 ff.

<sup>108</sup> The fact that after receiving the alms of the dead man's relatives the agent of a θεῖος ἀνάστωρ was still required to offer the expiatory sacrifice as well as undergo purification (ἡσυχία καὶ καθαρμός) is alluded to by Dem. 23, 72-3, in the double expression θεῖα καὶ καθαρμῶν, δούλεις καὶ καθαρμῶν (cf. Müller, Aschb. Eum., p. 164 [122, n. 2, E.T.]).

<sup>109</sup> See Philippi, Arsop. u. Eph. 82.

<sup>110</sup> In the Iliad and the Odyssey there is a total absence not only of all reference to purification from blood-guiltiness but of the necessary conditions for it. The murderer goes freely among men without there being any fear of others suffering from a μῶστος attaching to him. Cf. the case especially of Theoklymenos, o 271-8. Lobbeck rightly emphasises this, Agl. 301. K. O. Müller's attempts to prove in spite of everything that purifications from the stain of murder were a Homeric custom, are failures. See Nagelsbach, Hom. Theol., p. 293.—The oldest examples of purifications from murder in the literature are (Lobbeck 309): purification of Achilles from the blood of Thersites in the *Aithonē*, p. 33 Kink.; refusal of Neleus to purify Herakles from the murder of Iphitos: Hesiod & κατελόγους, Sch., II. B 338.—Mythical exx. of such purifications in later accounts: Lob., Agl. 308-9.

<sup>111</sup> E.g. offering of cakes, sacrifice of drink-offerings without wine, burning of the materials of sacrifice; cf. the description of ἡσυχία (in this place clearly distinguished from καθαρμός) in A.R. iv, 713 ff. Similar account (offerings without wine, etc.) of the ἡσυχία (which is, however, improperly called καθαρμός, l. 456) of the Eumenides at Kolonos which the chorus recommends to Oedipus, S., O.C. 460 ff. No one might eat of the expiatory sacrifice: Porph., Abstr. 2, 44. It is burnt completely: Stengel, Jahrb. f. Phil. 1883, p. 369 ff.—The

clash of bronze was used *ἐπεὶ* *ὅταν ἀποκρίσται καὶ ἀνταδίδωται*: Apollod. fr. 36 (and in offerings to Hekate, Theoc. ii, 36; as protection against ghosts, Luc., *Philops.* 15; Sch. Theoc. ii, 36; Ta., *Lys.* 77. Clash of bronze in this apotropaic sense occurs, too, in the dance of the Kouretes, etc.; see below). The ritual of expiation was affected in many

Lydia.

(chthonic) Zeus. Thence it seems to have spread all assisted by the Apolline oracle of Delphi. This is why the ram, the peculiar victim of *ἑὸς χθόνιος*, is the principal victim in expiatory sacrifices, its fleece, the *διδὸς κνήκος*, receiving the various materials of expiation, etc.

<sup>130</sup> On the chthonic character of the deities of expiation see in gen. K. O. Müller, *Arch. Eum.*, p. 139 ff. (112 ff.). Chief among them is *Ζεὺς μελίχμος* (a euphemistic title: cf. above, n. 5), who is unmistakably a *χθόνιος*. Hence, like all *χθόνιοι* he is represented as a male on the votive tablet to *Ζ. μελὶς* discovered in the Peiræus (certainly the Athenian god and not a foreign deity identified with this god whom all Athenians knew well from the feast of the *Ἰανία*): *BCH.* 7, 507 ff.; *CIA.* ii, 1578 ff. On a votive insc. from Lykia we have, side by side with the chthonic Hekate, *Διδὸς Μελίχμῳ καὶ Ἑκάτῃ*, *BCH.* 13, 392. Other *θεοὶ μελίχμοι* in Lokris were worshipped with nocturnal sacrifice (as regularly in the case of underworld deities): Paus. 10, 38, 8. The *δαίμονες μελίχμοι* as *χθόνιοι* are contrasted with the *μενέμενοι οὐρανίου* in the oracle verses ap. Philigon, *Met.* iv, p. 93, 3 Kel.; *deis melichmoe Acta Ind. Sacra. Tab. A. I.* 11 (= *CII.* vi, 32, 323; see Mommsen, *Ger. Schr.* viii, 570).—Then come the *δωροδόμοι*: their nature can be guessed from the fact that they were worshipped together with the dead and Hekate on the thirtieth day of the month (see above, n. 88). After a bad dream offerings were made to the *δωροδόμοι*, to Ge and the heroes: Hp., *Diact.* 4, 8, vi, p. 632 L. *Zeus δωροδόμος* must have been a *χθόνιος*, but we have side by side with him an *Ἀπόλλων δωροδόμος* (and an Apollo *δωρο. του*): ins. from Erythrai, *SIG.* 600, 69; 115: the provinces of *Ἰόλμωσι* and *χθόνιοι* were not always kept absolutely distinct.—An ancient and hereditary service of the propitiation deities belonged to the Attic family of the Phylalids who had once purified and offered expiatory sacrifice for Theseus after the murder of Skiron and others (*ἀγνίσματα καὶ μελίχμοι θύοντες*): Plu., *Tæss.* 12. The gods to whom this family offered sacrifice were *χθόνιοι*, Demeter and Zeus Melichmus: Paus. i, 37, 2-4.—Isoc. 5, 117, makes a clear distinction between the *θεοὶ Ὀδυσσεύς* and the gods to whom only an apotropaic cult, *δωροδομῆς*, was offered; these being the gods of expiation (cf. *ἀποδωροδομῆδος* Apollod. ap. Harp.

in contrast to the *καὶ τοῦ τοῦ*: Anon. *Vir. Herb.* xii, 185. See Hemsterhuys, *Lucian* ii, p. 253 Hp.; Lob., *Ag.* 984, ii).

<sup>131</sup> e.g. in the description of the *Ἰλαρὸς* of Medea by Kirke in A.R. iv, 712 ff.

<sup>132</sup> K. O. Müller, *Dorians*, i, 328, 336; cf. the same ancient custom of flight for nine years and penance for the slaying of a man in the legend and cult of Zeus Lykaios: cf. H. D. Müller, *Myth. d. gr. St.* ii, 105. See below.

<sup>133</sup> *CIA.* 1055-60. *Eum.* 237 ff., 281 ff., 445 ff., 470.

<sup>134</sup> The Delphinion, the court for trying *φόνος δίκαιος*, and the ancient dwelling of Argos (*Plu., Tæss.* 12), was at the same time

(and perhaps originally) an expiation site. Expiatory sacrifice was there made for Theseus after his fights with the Pollantidae and the highway robbers (*ἀφαισούμενος τὸ δῶμα*, Poll. viii, 119).

<sup>136</sup> Plu., *Ser. Num.* 17, p. 500 EF. Note the expressions: *ἐλάσασθαι τὴν τοῦ Ἀρχιλόχου ψυχὴν*, *ἐλάσασθαι τὴν Πανστανίου ψυχὴν*, Simul. Ἀρχιλόχος, ἵσταν Ἀέλιαν; *μελιζέσθαι τὴν τοῦ Τελαικλήδου παιδὸς ψυχὴν*, καὶ πρᾶναι χοαί.

<sup>137</sup> The three *ἐγγρηταὶ παθέσμενοι*, οἱς μέλλει καθεύρειν τοὺς ἄντι τοῖς ἰσοχρηθέντας. Tim. Lex. p. 109 R.

<sup>138</sup> Pl., *Lg.* 885 R: the agent in a φόνος ἀνόστος (of a special kind) καθαρθεὶς κατὰ τὸν ἐκ δελφῶν κομισθέντα περὶ τοῦτων νόμον ἔστω καθαρός.

<sup>139</sup> I set down here the expressions occurring in the speeches and the (at any rate contemporary (see Appendix iv) Tetralogies of Antiphon, which throw light on the religious ideas lying behind the procedure in trials for murder. In the prosecution of the murderer the following are concerned: ὁ τεθνήσκων, οἱ νόμοι, and θεοὶ ἐκ πάντων. Or. I, 31. The vigorous prosecution of the case on the part of the relations of the dead is βαρεῖν τῷ τεθνήσκῳ: I, 31. *Tetr.* I β, 13. The condemnation of the murderer is τιμωρία τῷ δεικνύοντι, his personal revenge: 5, 88 = 6, 6. The accusing relatives come before the court as representatives of the dead man, ἀντὶ τοῦ παθόντος ἐπισκῆπτοντες ὅμῳ, as they say to the judges, *Tetr.* 3 γ, 7. The duty of accusing as well as the αἰσθημα of the dead of bloodshed rests upon them until satisfaction is made for it: *Tetr.* I α, 3. But the μέσση of the deed attaches to the whole city in which the murderer lives. All who sit at table with him, or live under the same roof, even the temples he walks in, are polluted by his mere presence: hence come ἀφάρια and ἀνοσγεία κατὰς on the city. It is to the greatest interest of the judges to avert this pollution by giving a propitiatory judgment: *Tetr.* I α, 10; Or. 5, 11. 82; *Tetr.* I α, 3; I γ, 9, 11; 3 γ, 6, 7. Above all it is necessary to find the real criminal and to punish him. If the relatives of the dead prosecute some one other than the real doer of the deed, it is they, and not the judges (on account of their wrong decision), who will have to bear the wrath of the dead man and of the avenging spirits: *Tetr.* I α, 3; 3 α, 4; 3 β, 10; for in this case the murdered man is deprived of his τιμωρία; 3 α, 4. But perjured witnesses and unjust judges are liable to a μίσση, too, which they then introduce into their own houses: *Tetr.* 3 α, 3; or at least, if they give a false condemnation (but not a false acquittal) of the accused, they incur the μίσση τῶν ἀληθεύων acc. to *Tetr.* 3 β, 8—i.e. that of the falsely condemned person (whereas the murdered man still continues angry with his own relatives). If they knowingly acquit the murderer contrary to justice, the murdered man becomes ἀνθύμιος to the judges and no longer to his relatives: *Tetr.* I γ, 10.—The source of the resentment is said to be the dead man himself: ὑποεργάσται δ' ἀποθανών, *Tetr.* I γ, 10; cf. 3 β, 10; where he is parallel with τῷ μύμῳ τῶν ἀληθεύων. The murdered man leaves behind him τὴν τῶν ἀληθεύων δρομήν (and this is what the μίσση really is—not as some modern writers have imagined, any sort of "moral" pollution—as is clearly stated in this passage: τὴν τῶν δειν. δρομήν, 3 α, 3 . . . μίσση . . . εἰσάγοντας): *Tetr.* 3 α, 3; cf. again 3 β, 8; 3 γ, 7. In this case the avenging spirits substitute themselves for the soul of the dead man (just as in the case where a φροσφόνος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος is spoken of: cf. above, n. 148). The φροσφόνες τῶν ἀποθανόντων become themselves δεινοὶ ἀληθεύων of the dilatory relatives:

*Tetr.* 9 a, d. There is no essential distinction between the two (cf. *Pol.* 5, 131). Elsewhere we hear of τὸ προστρόμιον as the special attribute or feeling of the murdered man himself: *Tetr.* 2 b, 9. Thus also we have the alternatives ἐνθήμεος ἢ ἐνδοθήμεος (1 γ, 10) and τὸ ἐνθήμεον (2 a, 2; 2 b, 9). In this connexion it is clear that ἐνθήμεος (as the fixed and conventional expression for these superstitions) means the indignant memory, the longing for revenge of the murdered man (—ἐνθήμεον ἰστέον δέμαςτος καὶ Ἡκάδας, *GDI.* 3541, 8). The proper understanding of this word will help us to see what is meant by the expression ἐνδοθήμεον used of the meal offered to the dead and Hekate, and the almost identical purificatory offerings, that after the religious cleansing of a house were thrown out at the cross-roads (*Harp.* s.v. *Phot.* s.v. *Art.* 1, 2, 3; *AB.* 287, 24, 288, 7; *EM.* 820, 44 ff.). They are intended to appease the easily awakened anger of the souls (and of their patroness Hekate), their ἐνδοθήμεον, a stronger version of ἐνθήμεον, by apotropæic sacrifice.

<sup>172</sup> See Appendix ii (μασχολεψιμός).

<sup>173</sup> *Xen., Cyr.* II, 7, 17 ff.: αὐτὸ γὰρ θήσους τὰτά γε νοσήσας δοκίμῃσι αἰδέσθαι ὡς οὐδὲν αἰμα ἔχειν ἐστι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνθρωπείων βίαια τελευτῶσι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐτοῦ τοῦ τῆν γ' ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ἑμάρτε . . . τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀδικῶν παύσασθαι ψυχὰς οἷμαι κατενεύσασθαι, αἷους μὲν φέβεται τοῖς μεταφύτοις ἐμφύλλουσιν, αἷους δὲ παλαρμαίοις (which means first the criminal and then, as here, the punishing spirit that avenges the criminal deed, exactly like προστρόμιος, ἀνιέρωνες, ἀλάστορες, μίστρες: see *Zacher, Dissert. phil. Hellen.* iii, 232 ff.) τοῖς ἀνοίοις ἐπιπέμμενοι; τοῖς δὲ φθιμένοις τὰς τιμὰς διακίμναι ἐστι ἂν δοκίμῃσι, εἰ μηδενὸς αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχὴι κίρμαι ἔσται; οὐτοῖς ἔργον, ὧ ταῖς, οὐδὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνων, ὡς ἡ φύξις. ἴσως μὲν ἂν ἐν θνητῷ σώματι β, γ, δ, ὅπως δὲ τούτων ἀνυπόληπτος, τέθνηκεν. Then follow other popular arguments for the belief in the continued existence of the soul after its separation from the body.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES

The cult of the dead, thus pursued in unhampered freedom, preserved and encouraged certain ideas of the life of the soul after death: of the soul as a conscious and powerful being which though separated from the body has not been parted for ever from the scene of its earthly existence. To the Greeks such ideas had become strange and unfamiliar—strange, at least, to the Ionian Greeks of the Homeric age.

But from such a cult no dogmatic or distinctly outlined picture of the life of the departed soul could have been deduced, nor ever was deduced. Everything in this connexion dealt with the relation of the dead to the living. Families by means of sacrifice and religious acts sought to nourish the souls of their own dead. But the cult was in itself chiefly precautionary (apotropaic) in character, and as a consequence men preferred rather to avoid investigation into the nature and condition of the dead themselves, except in so far as they came into the life of the living.

This is the point at which the cult of the souls and belief in the existence of souls stopped short among many of the so-called "savage" peoples who have no history. Nor can there be much doubt that it had reached this stage of development in Greece, too, before the time of Homer; though temporarily overshadowed, it continued to exist for it was rooted firmly in the united life of the family and its traditional practices.

Such traditional beliefs, however, left the nature of the disembodied soul vague and undefined; they viewed it purely from the standpoint of the living and almost entirely in its relations with this world; and resting on such foundations it is not very surprising if they yielded unresistingly and sank into insignificance once the feeling of the influence exercised by the dead upon the living began to weaken, or if anything happened to cause the decline or discredit of the cult of the dead. When the living withdrew their support and reverence from the departed soul the latter ceased to present any clear picture to the minds of men—it became a mere evanescent shadow—insubstantial—little more than nothing. This is what



happened in the period of Ionic culture, in which Homer lived.

The poetry of that period, however, had of its own accord given rise to aspirations after a fuller and more definite picture of the long, unbounded future in the life to come. These aspirations had been given shape in the pictures of the translation of individual mortals to Elysium and the Islands of the Blest.

Such things, however, were, and continued to be, matters of poetry, not of religious faith. Even the poetical fancy dealt with the marvellous past and with exceptional heroes chosen out long ago by the special favour of the gods: such favour was not extended to include the living generations of men. The desire, once it was awakened, for a more hopeful prospect of the life to come beyond the grave and for something more than the mere negative existence of the ancestors worshipped in family cults, must look to other sources for its satisfaction. Such desires began to be felt by many, but their originating source and the secret forces that set them going must remain for us hidden behind the obscurity that lies over the most important period of Greek development, the eighth and seventh centuries. Nor does it help us very much when historians try to stop the gaps of our knowledge with platitudes or the barren offspring of their own imagination. The existence of such desires and their growing strength is shown by the fact that they were able to create for themselves a means of satisfaction (a peculiarly limited satisfaction it is true) in a direction that immediately occurs to everyone as soon as the subject of future blessedness or belief in immortality among the Greeks is mentioned—the Eleusinian Mysteries.

## § 2

Wherever the cult of the gods of the earth and the lower world, and particularly of Demeter and her daughter, was at its height it was not difficult for hopes of a better fate in the kingdom of souls below the earth, where those deities ruled, to become attached to participation in their cult. The tendency to connect closely such hopes with the worship of these gods may have existed in many different localities. In Eleusis alone, however (and in the cults, mostly of later origin, affiliated to Eleusis), we see this connexion carried out as a fully organized institution. We can follow at least in general outline the gradual advance of the Eleusinian religious organization. The *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* tells us the origin

of the cult according to the national legends of Eleusis. In the country of the Eleusinians the divine daughter of Demeter, after being carried down to the lower world by Aidoneus, came up once more to the light of day, and was restored to her mother. Before ascending to Olympus and the company of the other immortals, in accordance with the wish of Zeus, Demeter fulfilled her promise, and when the Eleusinians had erected a temple to her outside the city, over the spring Kallichoros, she founded the sacred worship whereby men should do honour to her in the future. She herself instructed the princes of the land "in the performance of the cult and taught them her sacred *Orgia*", which respect for the goddess does not allow them to communicate to others.<sup>1</sup> This primitive Eleusinian cult of Demeter, then, is the religious service of a close corporation. Knowledge of the holy ritual, carrying with it the priesthood of the two goddesses is confined to the descendants of the four Eleusinian princes to whom Demeter once gave her ordinances as an inheritance. The cult is therefore a "secret" one: not more so, indeed, than a great many cult-societies of Greece, participation in which was strictly forbidden to all unauthorized persons.<sup>2</sup> It differs from them, however, in the solemn promise which is made to the participants in its worship. "Blessed is the man who has beheld these holy acts; but he that is uninitiated and has no share in the holy ceremonies shall not enjoy a like fate after his death, in the gloomy darkness of Hades." To those who share in the Eleusinian worship a privileged fate is promised after death; but even in his lifetime, we read further on,<sup>3</sup> he is highly blessed whom the two goddesses love: they send him Ploutos, the giver of good things, to be a beloved partner of his hearth and home. On the other hand, whosoever honours not Koré, the queen of the lower world, with gifts and sacrifice, shall do penance everlastingly (368 ff.).

The narrow circle of those to whom such a tremendous promise was made began to be extended after the time when Eleusis was united with Athens (which may have taken place some time in the seventh century), and when the Eleusinian worship was raised to the position of an official cult of the Athenian state. Nor was it Attica alone, but the whole of Greece which became interested in the Eleusinian festival, when Athens became the chief centre of Greek life. A solemn "truce of God" was proclaimed which assured the peaceful and undisturbed performance of the sacred ritual, and distinguished the Eleusinia, like the great games and Fairs of Olympia, the Isthmus, etc., as a Pan-Hellenic festival. At

the height of Athenian power (about 440) <sup>4</sup> a decree of the people was passed which required the yearly offering of first fruits of the fields to the Eleusinian temple from Athenian citizens and allies, and invited similar offerings from *all* Greek states. The decree could appeal in so doing to ancient and ancestral custom, and to an utterance of the Delphic god who had authorized these things.<sup>5</sup> The inner history of the development of the Eleusinian festival is a matter of some obscurity. The holy rites continued to be performed at Eleusis; Eleusinian noble families still took part<sup>6</sup> in the worship of the goddesses, which was yet directed by the Athenian government. On the other hand, a good deal must have been altered in the course of time. The popular decree mentioned above acquaints us with the names of two triads, each composed of two divine personages and a Hero, who were worshipped at Eleusis at that time. Demeter and Korè occur together with Triptolemos, and also "the god, the goddess, and Eubouleus."<sup>7</sup> The Homeric hymn gives no hint of the very important position here (and in innumerable other accounts, as well as pictorial representations) attributed to Triptolemos, nor of the other addition to the Eleusinian group of divinities. It is evident that in the course of years many different local figures and modes of worship have been added to and fused with the old cult of the two goddesses; and that in these local figures we have always the one type of chthonic godhead expressing itself anew in ever varied and differentiated forms. Their number is not exhausted by the six already mentioned.<sup>8</sup> The most important addition to the Eleusinian circle of deities was Iakchos, the son of Zeus (Chthonios) and Persephone. This god was himself an underworld deity, quite distinct from that Dionysos, with whom other Athenian cults confused him, and with whom he was in fact commonly identified.<sup>9</sup> It is a very probable supposition that this god, who soon came to be regarded as the central figure of the group of deities worshipped at Eleusis,<sup>10</sup> was the contribution of Athens to that circle: his temple was situated in Athens not Eleusis;<sup>11</sup> in the Athenian suburb Agrai the "Little Mysteries" were celebrated in his honour in the spring as a sort of prelude to the greater festival. At the Eleusinia itself, the sacred procession, in which the picture of the youthful god was borne from Athens to Eleusis, formed the link between the part of the festival already performed at Athens and that still to take place at Eleusis. The introduction of Iakchos into the festival of Eleusis did not merely make an external addition to the group of divinities that already shared in it; it added

an act<sup>13</sup> to the sacred story, the representation of which was the goal and summit of the festival; and thereby in all probability enriched it internally in meaning and substance. It is, indeed, quite impossible for us even to hazard a guess as to the exact meaning and essence of the change which came over the festival thus enlarged in the course of time. We can, however, be sure of this much: there is no ground at all for entertaining the commonly held view that it was the private mysteries of Orphic conventicles which exercised such a transforming influence on the public mysteries of the Athenian state. Those who are not content with solemn and mysterious jargon about "Orphics" and the like, but keep clearly in mind the well-known and quite distinctive features of the Orphic doctrine about gods and the souls of men, will easily recognize that everything points to the unlikelihood of even a single one of these having entered the circle of ideas current at Eleusis. They could only have shattered such ideas to pieces.

If the festival, then, grew of its own accord in inward meaning and outward circumstance, the circle of those who came to take part in it grew as well. Originally this festival, so rich in promised blessings, admitted only the citizens of Eleusis, perhaps only the members of certain noble Eleusinian families—and may have appeared to its members an even greater privilege through this very exclusiveness. In this respect it changed completely. Admission to it was thrown open to all Greeks—not merely Athenians, but every Greek without distinction of race or country, whether man or woman, was welcomed at Eleusis (and even *hetairai*, who were still excluded, e.g. from the Demeter-festival of the Athenian women; to say nothing of children and slaves).<sup>14</sup> The generosity of Athens—such was the glorious boast—wished the unexampled salvation which this festival promised to its worshippers to be made accessible to all Greeks.<sup>15</sup> What contrast to the exclusive cult-unions into which a man had to be born in order, as citizen of a state, member of a *phratry* clan, or family, to participate in the advantages they offered! The society of the Eleusinian mystery-festival, once just: exclusive as the rest, had thrown open its doors so widely that this almost unconditional freedom of access became its principle and distinguishing characteristic. The attraction of membership was even heightened by the fact that just by his own unhampered free will and choice the individual could enter the great society through the mediation of one of the two families to whom the highest priesthood of the festival

was committed.<sup>16</sup> The only condition made was ritual purity, and murderers, for whom this was an impossibility—as it was even for those who were only accused of the shedding of blood—were as such excluded from the mysteries: as, indeed, they were from all the religious ceremonies of the state.<sup>17</sup>

Religious purification of the worshippers preceded and accompanied the holding of the festival; to many of the believers it may have appeared that the whole festival itself was principally a great purification and religious dedication of unusual solemnity, by which the members ("the Pure"<sup>18</sup> as they called themselves) were made worthy of the favour of the goddesses.

### § 3

As to the actual details of what went on at the long-drawn-out festival itself our knowledge hardly extends beyond the most external circumstances, and is even so most incomplete. A few notices in late and often untrustworthy writers give us a very inadequate picture of what took place inside the great temple of initiation and of the essential Mystery. The secret which was committed<sup>19</sup> to the Mystai and Epoptai has been well kept. Considering the enormous number of worshippers indiscriminately admitted to the festival, this would, indeed, have been a real miracle, if the secret to be kept had taken the form of dogma expressed in concept and words and capable of being communicated verbally to others. Since the labours of Lobeck, however, drastically reducing to order the confusion of opinions on this subject, no reasonable person believes that this was the case. It was difficult to let out the "secret", for there was essentially no secret to let out. Profanation could only come through actions, through "the Mysteries being acted",<sup>20</sup> as they were in the year 415 in the house of Poultyion. The Mystery was a dramatic performance, or, more strictly, a religious Pantomime, accompanied by sacred songs<sup>21</sup> and formal speeches; a representation, as Christian authors let us see, of the Rape of Koré, the wanderings of Demeter, and the final reunion of the goddesses. This in itself would not have made the mysteries remarkable; a similar dramatic reproduction of the circumstances attending the life of a god, which had led to the foundation of the festival in question, was a very widespread cult-practice in Greece; it was part of the festivals of Zeus, Here, Apollo, Artemis, Dionysos, and, above all, of other festivals in honour of Demeter herself. But the Eleusinia was distinguished from all other such festivals, even from the equally secret festivals of Demeter known as the Thesmophoria and the Haloa, by reason

of the hopes which it inspired in the minds of the initiated. The Hymn to Demeter tells us that the pious worshipper of the Goddess at Eleusis might hope for riches upon earth and a better fate after death. Later authorities also speak of the success in this life which initiation at Eleusis gave good ground for expecting. But far more emphatic are the statements, made by innumerable witnesses from Pindar and Sophokles onwards, that only they who have been initiated into these mysteries may entertain a joyful expectation of the life to come. To them only is it granted to have real "life" in Hades ; nothing but evil awaits others in that place.<sup>21</sup>

It was these promises of a blessed immortality that for centuries drew so many worshippers to the Eleusinian festival. Nowhere else could such promises be obtained with such distinctness and assurance. The injunction commanding secrecy must obviously have referred to quite other matters ; it cannot have applied to this, the greatest boon anticipated from initiation at Eleusis. Everyone speaks out aloud and without restraint about it. At the same time, all our information is so completely at one on the point and so free from doubt or uncertainty that we must perforce believe that the performances that were to be preserved so secret were, in reality, for the believers the source of an assurance which was not held as the mere probable conjecture of individuals, but as fixed and certain truth beyond question or need of interpretation.

How this was brought about certainly remains obscure. Since the discrediting of "symbolism" in the sense made familiar by Creuzer or Sebelling, many of our modern mythologists and historians of religion have been all the more eager to assert that the performances at the Eleusinian mysteries were in reality the true and mystic celebration of the Greek "Religion of Nature" as discovered by themselves. Demeter, in this view, would be the earth ; Koré-Persephone, her daughter, the seed of corn ; the Rape and Return of Koré would mean the sowing of the seed in the earth and the rise of the young grain from beneath the soil ; or, in a more general sense, "the yearly decay and renewal of vegetation." In some way or other the Mystai must have had revealed to them the real meaning of the "nature-symbolism" hidden in the mystical performances. Witnessing these performances they are supposed to have learnt that the fate of the seed of corn, represented by Persephone, its disappearance beneath the earth and eventual rebirth, is an image of the fate of the human soul, which also disappears that it may

live again. This, then, must be the real content of the holy Mystery.

It remains, however, first and foremost, to be proved that the Greeks <sup>20</sup> themselves would have regarded such symbolistic mummery, in which the phenomena and processes of nature appear under the guise of anthropomorphic gods, as religious at all, or would have recognized their own religion in such things. Still further—admitting for the sake of argument the possibility of such an interpretation—the identification of Korè with the seed of corn and its fate leads at once, if we try to get beyond the vaguest generalities, to intolerable absurdity. It is difficult to see, however (and this would be the main point at issue), how such an analogy between the soul and the grain of seed could have led to a faith in immortality that was not to be had, it would seem, in a more direct fashion. What possible effect could have been produced by such a far-fetched and arbitrary parallel between the phenomena of two such wholly different provinces of existence? If a reasonably plausible deduction was to be made from the visible and unmistakable (the condition of the grain) to the invisible and unknown (the condition of the soul) surely the first and simplest requisite would be that a real causal connexion between the two should be plainly demonstrated. These may seem dull and pedantic considerations where the sublimest forebodings of the heart are concerned; but I should not have supposed that it would have been so easy to tempt the Greeks with vague surmises from the path of logic and lucidity, or that such surmises would have afforded them such extremity of "bliss".

Lastly, the analogy, even if it proved anything, is false. It would only hold if the soul, like the grain, after a temporary disappearance below the earth, were promised a new life upon the earth—if a *palingenesis* in fact were promised. That this, however, was not a belief supported by the officially conducted mysteries of Athens, is admitted on all hands.

Equally untenable is the view that the dramatic presentation at the mysteries of the Rape and Return of Korè (regarded this time as a divine personage, not as the personified grain of corn) was intended to inspire hopes of an analogous fate for the human soul, by virtue of a mystic unification of the life of man with the life of the godhead to whom he swears allegiance.<sup>21</sup> Even so the hope based upon the typical fate of Korè could only have led to a hope for the *palingenesis* of mankind in general, not (what was and always remained the real belief of Eleusia) to the hope of a specially

favoured after-life for the Mystai in the kingdom below the world. Indeed, we must not look to the Eleusinian mysteries for the ecstatic exaltation of the soul to the recognition of its own godhead—though such exaltation was the motive force and the essential core of Greek mysticism, as of all mysticism and mystic religion. From the mysteries of Eleusis, however, it remained far removed; the belief there fostered, with its absolute division and distinction between the divine and the human, never transgressed the bounds of popular Greek religion, over whose portals stood the universally prescriptive words: *ἡ ἀνθρώπων, ἡ θεῶν γένος* — “the race of men is one, and the race of gods is another.” Nor was Eleusis any exception to this rule: the mysteries did not point the way to mysticism.

#### § 4

Inquiry is on the wrong track when a deeper meaning is sought for in the mimic presentation of the sacred myth at Eleusis whereby the human soul was to obtain the blessed hope of immortality. The conviction that the human soul was immortal in its own right, by reason of its own nature, was not a conviction that was obtained at Eleusis. That is why we may dismiss such fanciful analogies as those between the human soul and the seed of corn or the goddess of the earth's life. Such analogies, if they proved anything, would prove at most the complete indestructibility, in spite of all vicissitude, of the life of the human soul—of every human soul. But this was not Eleusinian doctrine. The continued conscious existence of the soul after its separation from the body was not a doctrine but a presupposition of Eleusis; and it could be thus presupposed because it was the basic idea of the popular and widespread cult offered to the souls of the departed.<sup>22</sup> The advantage obtained by the initiated at Eleusis was that a livelier and fuller content was given to the bare existence of the disembodied soul, which was all that the current worship of the souls essentially contemplated. We are assured that only the initiated at Eleusis will have a real “life” after death; that evil will be the fate of “the others.”<sup>23</sup> Not *that* the soul, relieved of the presence of the body, will live hereafter, but *how* it will live was what Eleusis taught men. With the calm assurance common to all close and confined religious associations, the Eleusinian society divided mankind into two classes: the “Pure”, that is those who had been initiated at Eleusis, and the innumerable multitude of the uninitiated. Only for the members in com-



munion with the mystery of Eleusis was salvation assured. Salvation was theirs as a reversionary right, but salvation such as theirs was a privilege and could only be obtained by participation in the bounteous festival of the Athenian State and in its ceremonial. Centuries of large-minded tolerance in admitting to the mysteries extended this privilege to an immense number of Greeks (and of Romans, too, in later times). But the prospect of a blessed hereafter never became a matter of course; not as man, not even as a virtuous and pious man did such a privilege come to anyone. It was granted solely to the member of the Eleusinian religious society and the participator in the divine service of the goddesses.<sup>27</sup>

What were the means employed to impress this hope—this certain expectation rather—of a blessed hereafter in Hades upon the Mystai? We must frankly admit that we cannot, unfortunately, say anything definite in answer to this question. Only to the suggestion that these hopes were grounded upon symbolic representations of any kind may we give a decided denial. And yet this is the generally accepted opinion. "Symbols" there may have been, as an assistance to the dramatic or pantomimic representation of the Rape and Return of Kore;<sup>28</sup> but hardly in any other sense than that of typical condensations—the part being put for the whole, or the whole understood in the part—of scenes impossible to represent in their entirety. It is true that with the lapse of centuries, and in the absence of any official written interpretation of the inner meaning and intention of the ritual many of these symbols became unintelligible—a disadvantage which belonged to all other departments of Greek religion as well. As soon as independent reflexion on matters of religion began to arise, many sorts of allegorical or symbolical interpretations began to be applied to the details of the performances at the mysteries. Does it follow from this that the mysteries of the Earth divinities, as some are inclined to believe, bore a symbolical or allegorical character from the outset, and differed in this respect from all other Greek worship of the gods?<sup>29</sup> Similar interpretations were applied by philosophers or would-be philosophers to the fables of the gods in Homeric or popular mythology; the mysteries did not by any means hold a peculiar position in the minds of connoisseurs of myth-interpretation in antiquity. If a "deeper meaning" was attached by preference to the performances at Eleusis, that only shows that much in these performances was no longer understood, or in its real meaning no longer satisfied the spirit of the philosophic centuries. But it shows also that for this

festival of unexampled splendour, where night and the injunction of secrecy awakened awed expectancy,<sup>10</sup> performed according to an archaic ritual of ever-increasing perfection and attended by the whole of Greece, an unusual sympathy was felt. It offered something to the eye and the ear which was attractive to all men, and they exerted themselves to find a satisfactory meaning in its sights and sounds. Finally, it is likely enough that the "meaning" which they themselves had arbitrarily bestowed upon them was what made the mysteries specially attractive to many. To this extent it is legitimate to say that symbolism was a real and historical factor in the constitution of the mysteries.

Even supposing, however, that much in the presentation of this mystic festival was consciously ordered and disposed by the founders of it with a view to symbolic interpretation, and consequently to the possibility of an ever-increasing idealization of its significance, yet this cannot have extended to the hopes of a blessed immortality revealed to the Mystai. Symbolist or allegorizing modes of interpretation must always have been the private concern of individuals and therefore liable to much uncertainty and variety.<sup>11</sup> Our authorities, however, from the most diverse periods, speak with far too great distinctness and unanimity about the blessed hereafter vouchsafed to the initiated in the mysteries, for it to be credible that this can have been the outcome of any interpretation of complexities, or of any metaphorical application of the hopes derived from events in the life of the gods to a quite different province, the life of the human soul. What every witness speaks of in the plainest and simplest language without any special "mystery"—the hope of future blessedness—must have been offered to the participants in the mysteries in the most unequivocal fashion. It is natural, above all, to suppose that the exhibition of the "mystic drama" included particularly the final scene as it is sketched in the 2nd Homeric Hymn: the foundation of the Eleusinian festival by the goddess herself—what had once been revealed to the little city-community must have been proclaimed to the great company of those admitted to the common festival of Eleusis: <sup>12</sup> the highest reward of participation in this unparalleled act of worship is what the Homeric Hymn distinctly puts forth as such—the peculiar favour of the gods of the lower world and a future life of blessedness within their kingdom. The statues of the goddesses were seen radiantly illuminated; <sup>13</sup> at this festival of grace in remembrance of their trials, their happiness, and their beneficent acts, they

themselves—as it seemed to the faithful believer—were invisibly present. What further need of warrant was there for the promises of future blessedness?

### § 5

In spite of many extravagant statements from antiquity, we have no means of estimating how widely participation in the Eleusinian mysteries (whether of those celebrated at Eleusis itself or in the numerous associated festivals) was extended in Greece. Still, it is probable that large numbers, not from Athens alone but from the whole of Greece, sought eagerly to enter the state of grace vouchsafed to the worshippers at Eleusis. In this way the more lively conception of the state of the soul in the hereafter may have gradually become the common property of Greek imagination.

On the whole, we must be on our guard against attributing too great an importance to these mysteries. There can hardly have been any question of moral influence—the ancients themselves in their most exaggerated eulogies of the mysteries and their greatness, say almost nothing of this.<sup>24</sup> Nor is it easy to see what part of the mysteries could have served as a vehicle of moral influence.<sup>25</sup> Distinct dogma in the religious sense was never provided by the mysteries any more than by other worships of the gods in Greece. Nor was there anything exclusive about the cult of the mysteries: side by side with that cult and after it the Mystai took part in other worships of the gods, according to the usages prevailing in their own homes. The great festival when it was over left no sting behind in the hearts of the initiated. No requirement of a new manner of life, no new and peculiar condition of conscience was theirs on its account; no strange revaluation of values, contradicting the general opinions of the time, was learnt there. There was a total absence of that which (if we rightly understand the word) gives to the doctrines of sectarian religion their force and persuasiveness—*paradox*. Even the prospect of future bliss opened to the initiated did not divert them from the normal tenor of their existence. It was a genial prospect; not a compelling demand drawing all things to itself and turning men away from ordinary life. The light that fell from beyond was not so blinding that it made all things on this earth seem dark and mean. It in the decadence of Greek culture—and even among the people of Homer—ideas hostile to this life made their appearance and in many places acquired weight and influence; if some men began to think death superior

to life, and this life, of which alone we can be assured, as merely a preparation, a land of passage to a higher life in the world invisible—for all this the mysteries were not responsible. It was not they, nor the feelings and surmises awakened by their pictures and performances, that dulled the beauty of this earth for the enthusiasts "intoxicated with other-worldliness", or made them strangers to the instincts of life and sanity prevailing in older and unspoiled ages of Greek life.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

<sup>1</sup> *H. Cer.* 270 ff. (Demeter speaks) ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι γὰρ τα μέγαν καὶ θυμὸν ὕψ' αὐτῷ τεύχετόντας πᾶς δῆμος ἔπει πάλιν αἰεὶ τα τεύχεα. Καλλιχόρου περὶ ἱερῶν, ἐπὶ προδύοντι καλῶν. ἔργα δ' αὐτῇ ἔργων ὑποθέσθαι, ὡς ἐν ἱερίῳ εὐαγγελίῳ ἔρδοσιντες ἑμὸν μῦθον ἰδέσκησθαι. Building of the temple: 290 ff., and following that the instructions of the goddess as to the ἑρπεμοσύνη ἱερῶν and the ἔργα, 474 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See Lobbeck, *Agf.* 272 ff.

<sup>3</sup> 487 ff. I will not stop to answer the attacks made on the concluding part of the hymn, nor to defend the many lines which editors have rejected. None of the attacks seem to me justified.

<sup>4</sup> Körte, *Alt. Mitt.* 1896, p. 320, dates the decree in the year 418.

<sup>5</sup> ἀπὸ τὰ πάτρια καὶ τῆς μαρτυρίας τῆς ἐν Δελφῶν, *StG.* 20, l. 5, 28 f.; 35 [*IG.* i, *Suppl.*, p. 59, 27b]. In Sicily the Eleusinia are already well known in the time of Epicharmus: Epich. ἐν Ὀδυσσεὶ ἀπομύμῳ ap. Ath. 374 D = 100 Kaib. *EM.* 253. 2; cf. K. O. Müller, *Kl. Schr.* ii, 250.

<sup>6</sup> We can only state this definitely of the Eumolpidae who provided the male and female hierophants. Severely as the genealogy of this family has suffered on all sides through fictitious accretions and combinations there can be no doubt of its Eleusinian origin. On the other hand, it is a striking fact that none of the γένεα who are known to have shared in the direction of the Eleus. mysteries derived their origin from the Eleusinian princes mentioned in *H. Cer.* 475-8 as receiving with Eumolpos the instructions of the goddess (Triptolemos, Diokles, Kolonos). The Krokonidae and Koronidae did, it is true, claim Triptolemos as their ancestor, but their connexion with the sacred festival is obscure and dubious (see K. O. Müller, *Kl. Schr.* ii, 255 f.). The Kerykes (in whose family the posts of *Diadochos*, *Herald of the Mysteries*, *Priest of the Mysteries*, etc., were hereditary) were only connected with Eumolpos by a tradition which the family itself regarded as apocryphal (Paus. i, 38, 3); they themselves traced their descent from Hermes and Herse the daughter of Kekrops (s. *Mittenbeger, Hermes*, xi, 2), and therefore evidently regarded themselves as an Athenian family. We know too little of these relationships to venture to say that this claim was unjustified (as Müller, p. 250 l., is inclined to do). Nothing need prevent us from supposing that this is one of the many innovations introduced at and after the union of Eleusis and its festival with Athens—many of them are quite evident—and that in addition to the old Eleusinian priestly families the Athenian family of the Kerykes was given a regular part in the ἑρπεμοσύνη ἱερῶν. This would then be part of the compromise (*συνθήκη*, Paus. 2, 14, 2) between Athens and Eleusis upon which the whole relationship between the two states and their religious cults rested.

<sup>7</sup> See above, chap. v, n. 18.

<sup>8</sup> It is doubtful what part the goddess Daima played in the Eleusinia; that she played some part must be regarded as certain from the fact that among the official priesthoods of the festival a *Δαίμων* is expressly mentioned (Poll. i, 55). She stands in a certain opposition to Demeter: but though she is nevertheless identified by Arsch.

and others with Persephone (K. O. Müller, *NJ. Schr.* li. 286) the most we may deduce from this is that she also was a chthonic deity. (Acc. to the sacrificial calendar of the Attic Tetrapolis, *Lgg. Sacr.* i. p. 48, B. 12. *Δαίης οἷς μυσταὶ* was offered. This does not point to the identity of this goddess with Persephone—as the editor, p. 52, points out. Pregnant animals were by preference offered to Demeter, though occasionally to Artemis and Athens too.) *Daisira* seems from all the indications to belong to the *χθονία*. (Meaning of this name uncertain: ? “the knowing one” or “the (torch) burning one”: cf. *Lobeck, Pathol. prob.* 283.) In Eust. on Z 37A, p. 648, 24, among the notices collected from the lexicographers there is one in which Pherekydes makes her the sister of Styx (it is not Pherekydes but the over-subtle scholar to whom Eust. owes his note, who thinks that *Daisira* signified the *ἑσπέραιαι* to the ancients; so also Ael. Dionys. quoting of *ἀπὸ τελετῆς καὶ μυστήρια* in his Lexicon, ap. Eust. 648, 41. This is a worthless allegorical interpretation).—For which reason some make her the daughter of Okeanos (Müller, pp. 244, 288)—*οὐκ οὐκ οὐκ Περσεφόνης ἐκὸς Πλάτωνος ἀποδεικνύει φῶς τῆς Δέσμης* (648, 40). According to this she would be a Hades-daemon keeping guard over the wife of Aidoneus (cf. the guardian *Κουρεὶς περιβραχίαι* *αἰνῆς* in *Ar., Hum.* 472, quoting Eurip.). In this case we can see the origin of Demeter's hostility. Did this *Daisira* also play a part (as a character) in the Eleustian *ἑσπέραιαι* *μυστήρια*? Ap. Rh. makes her the same as *Hekate*, who, however, in the *A. Cer.* (and on vase-paintings) is the helper rather than the enemy of Demeter.

<sup>9</sup> So also in the recently discovered Pagan (fourth century B.C.) of Philodamios of Skarpheia addressed to Dionysos (*BCH.* 1895, p. 403), where in the third section we are told how Dionysos, the son of Thyone, born in Thobes, went from Delphi to Eleusia where he was called *Iakchos* by the mortals to whom he had (in the mysteries) revealed *νέαν ἑσπέραιαν ἑλπίαν*.—The attempt at historical syntheses, bringing together as many as possible of the different relations and ramifications of the Dionysos nature, is particularly evident in the whole composition of this hymn. The cult of Dionysos was established in Attica by the Delphic oracle—so much is certain; and that is enough for the poet who now makes *Iakchos*, too, come from Delphi to the people of Attica. Such a conception has no historical significance.

<sup>10</sup> *Iakchos* (there clearly distinguished from *Δέσμωνος*) *τῆς Δέσμης* *δαίμων* is described as *ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τῶν μυστηρίων* in Str. 468 (cf. *Ar., Hum.* 398 f.).

<sup>11</sup> The *‘ταυγεῖος* (Plu., *Artif.* 27. Aklphr. lib. 59, 1).

<sup>12</sup> Was the birth of *Iakchos* any part of the spectacle at the mysteries? It might be thought so from what we are told by Hippol., *Krit.* 5, 8, p. 162 D.-S.: the hierophant *ἐν τῷ ἑλευσίνῃ ἐκὸς πολλὰ καὶ τὰ μυστήρια βοᾷ καὶ ἀνέργει λόγον* *ἐπὶ τῇ ἐκείνῃ ὁρῇ καὶ ἑσπέραιαν ἑλπίαν*. This statement, however, suffers from the disadvantage belonging to all information given by Christian writers on the subject of mysteries when not confirmed by earlier evidence: such information is admissible at most for the actual time of the writer. (Immediately combined with this in Hippol. comes the remarkable assertion that the hierophant was *ἐν τῷ ἐλευσίνῃ ἐκὸς καὶ καμῖου*. Of this Epictet. for example (3, 21, 16) knows nothing, but only speaks of the *δυσία*—probably confined to the time of the festival and its preparation—of the hierophant. Still, Jerome, *adv. Jovin.* 1, 48, p. 320 C Vall., speaks of the *cicutae scythionis castrari* of the hierophant, likewise Serv., *A. vi.* 681.)

<sup>12</sup> An opportunity of speaking in more detail of Orphic doctrine will occur later on. Here I will only point out in passing that the ancients themselves never suggested for a moment that Orpheus—the master of every kind of mysticism—had anything in particular to do with the Eleusinia; as Lob. *Agf.* 239 shows.

<sup>13</sup> As to the admission of slaves to the Eleusinian initiation ceremonies K. O. Müller, *Al. Schr.* ii, 88, opposes Lobeck (*Agf.* 19) and suggests a doubt. His main objection is that on the great inscr. dealing with the regulation of the Eleusinia (*C.I.A.* i, 1) side by side with *μύσται* and *δεσφύται* there is mention also of *δουλοῦσθαι* (but not of *δοῦλοι*, Zieher, *Leg. Sacr.* [Diss.], p. 14 f.)—i.e. presumably slaves, not themselves Mystai, belonging to the *μύσται*. But if slaves were initiated that would not prevent there being other slaves, *ἐκδοῦσθαι* of the *μύσται*, initiated and not reckoned among the *μύσται*. It is definitely stated on the official record of building expenses at Eleusis dating from the year 329 B., *C.I.A.* ii, 834, b, col. 2, 71, *μύσται* *δουτὶ τῶν δημοσίων* (the state slaves employed in the building operations) *ἄδδ* (cf. i, 68). Initiation of the *ἐκδοῦσθαι* also in *C.I.A.* ii, 834 c, 24. On this view, when the comic poet Theophrilos (ii, p. 473 K.) makes *αὐτοῦ* speak of his *ἀνταγρίης* *δουλόγης* by whom he *ἐμαίθη* *θεοῖς*, it will not be necessary to suppose that a freedman (as Meineke, *Com.* 3, 628) is speaking and not a slave.—The generosity implied was all the greater since in many of the most sacred *lessees* of the gods at Athens slaves were expressly excluded: cf. Philo, *Q. smn.* Prob. 20, ii, p. 467 M. Cassaubon on Ath., vol. 12, p. 498 Schw.

<sup>14</sup> Isoc. 4, 28, *ἀμνηστὸς γὰρ ἀφαιρόμενος εἰς τὴν χώραν . . . καὶ λαοῦται θυραῖς ἑκείναις, ἀπὲρ μέγιστα τοῦ γένους οὐκ εἶναι, τοὺς τε κακοὺς καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν . . . αὐτοὺς δ' ὅπως ἔστιν οὐ μένιν θεοφιλῶς ἐλλὰ καὶ φιλοφρόνως ἔρχοντο, ὥστε πᾶσι γενομένην νεοφύτων ἀρετῶν οὐκ ἐθέλοντες τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἀλλ' ὡν ἴσθαιεν ὕψους (be pious all Greeks; cf. 152) μετῴκειν.*

<sup>15</sup> *μύσται* δ' εἶναι τοὺς οὐκ ἑγγύς καὶ ἐκβολαῖδων as the law appoints, *C.I.A.* i, 1 (more exactly *Supp.* p. 3 f.), ll. 110–11. Thus the *μύσται* belonged exclusively to the members of the *γένος* of the Eumolpidae and Kerykes (but to all the members, not merely those serving as officers at the particular festival concerned). Cf. Dittenberger, *Hermes*, 20, 31 f. The Emperor Hadrian, in order to be able to hold the festival in a more sumptuous manner, had himself made *ἀρχὴν* of the *Εὐμολπιδῶν γένος*, having already been made a member of that *γένος*: ins. from Eleusis, *Al. Mitt.* 1884, p. 172.—There is no reference to the Eleusinia in what is said about the *μύσται* of a priestess belonging to the family of the Phylidae in Phot. *Φιλολογία*; see Topffer, *Al. General.* 92.—The exx. of *μύσται* collected by Lobeck (*Agf.* 24 B.) do not contradict this law: in the case of Lyngias who *ἐνέταξε* *μύσται* the *ἐταῖροι* Metastetra (D., 59, 21, *μύσται* merely means *metastetra* the cost of initiation (quite correctly explained by Müller, review of *Agf.* 24 B., *Kl. Schr.* ii, 56). So, too, in the case of Theoph. (ii, p. 473 K.) *ἐμαίθη* *θεοῖς*, i.e. at the expense of my master.

<sup>16</sup> The *ἀρρόφονοι* of the Hæliæus and the proclamations of the hierophant and dadouchæ excluded all *ἀρρόφονοι* from those taking part in the mysteries: Lob., *Agf.* 15. They were also, it is true, excluded from all other sacred rites: Lob. 17. Even *τοὺς ἐν αἰσῇ* the Archon gave warning *ἀνέχεσθαι* *μυστηρίων* καὶ τῶν ἄλλων *νομῶν* (Poll. B, 90); in fact, the person accused of murder was in any case, as “unclean”, excluded from all *νόμιμα*: Antipho, vi, 38 (in *AB.* 310, 8 read *νομῶν*).

<sup>10</sup> *δοῖαι μέγιστα*, Ar., *Ran.* 336. (So, too, the *Μύσται* of the Orphic mysteries are called of *δοῖαι*: Pl., *Rp.* 363 C; Orph., *H.* 84, 3.) *δοῖαι* is probably here used in its primitive sense = "clean" (*δοῖαι* *ῥίπτοι*, etc.). [Pl.] *Asiarch.* 371 D refers to *τὰς δοῖους ἀγγιστὰς* of the Eleus. *Μύσται*. In the same way *δοῖω* was used of ritual purification and expiation: *φύγετε δαῖδον* the murder, E., *Or.* 515; *δαῖδον* the returned homicide, D., 23, 78; (of the Bacchic mysteries *βέγγος ἐνλήθη δαῖδαις*, E., *fr.* 472, 13). Thus the *δοῖαι* are identical with the *κεκαθαρμένοι* as the initiated are called: Pl. *Phd.* 89 C, and frequently. It would be hazardous to suppose that the *Μύσται* called themselves *δοῖαι* as the only pious and righteous people (though that is what *δοῖαι* *θεσμων* and the like mean elsewhere). Their spiritual self-satisfaction hardly went as far as that, and indeed they did not ascribe so much personal merit to themselves at all.

<sup>11</sup> In a solemn announcement of the *Κεϋξ* as it seems: the latter acc. to *Σοπᾶτερ δαῖδα* (*ἔτηξ*). (Walz, *Rhes.* *Gr.* viii, 118, 24 l.) *δημονίᾳ ἐπαγγέλλει τῆς σωκῆς* at the commencement of the sacred ritual.

<sup>12</sup> *τὰ μυστήρια ποιῶν*, *Andon.*, *Myss.* 11-12.—The more clearly descriptive expression, *ἐφαρχισθεῖς τὰ μυστήρια* does not seem to occur before Aristides, Lucian, and the latter's imitator Alciphron. [Lys.] 6, 51: *αὐτοὶ ἐνδὲς ἐτολήρ, μυστήριον τὰ ἐπὶ δαῖδαις τοῖς ἀμύχαναι καὶ εἴνε τῇ σωκῇ τὰ ἀποφῆρα*. The *ἀποφ.* thus divulged were the sacred formulae uttered by the hierophant.

<sup>13</sup> At least in later ages there was plenty to hear: *εἰς ἐφώμελλον κατέστη τοῖς ἀκούσις τὰ δρώμενα*, *Aristid.*, *Eleus.* I, 415 Di. (ii, 28 Ke.). We frequently hear of the beautiful voices of the hierophants, of *ἄμροι* ringing out, etc.

<sup>14</sup> The well-known statements of Pindar, Sophocles, Isocrates, Kriassodora, Cicero, and others are collected by Lobbeck, *Agf.* 89 ff. There is a reminiscence of Isocr. in *Aristid.*, *Eleus.* I 421 Di. (ii, 30 Ke.) *ἀλλὰ μὲν τὸ γε κέρδος τῆς παρηρέως οὐχ ἔστιν ἢ παρὰ τὴν εὐθυμίαν . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τῆς τελευτῆς ἡβίας ἔχει τὰς ἐλπίδας*, *id.* *Panath.* I, 302 l. *τὰς ἀργύρας τελευτὰς ὡς τοῖς ματαιοῦσι καὶ μετὰ τῆς τοῦ βίου τελευτῆς βέλγιοι τὰ πράγματα γίγνεται* *δοκεῖ*. Cf. also Welcker's account, *Gr. Götterl.* ii, 519 ff., in which, however, there is a good deal mixed up which has nothing to do with the mysteries.

<sup>15</sup> That is, in the time of null vital religion and in the circles which still retained an unpoetic feeling for it. Apart from these it is true that the allegorical interpretation of myths was already familiar in antiquity, and in learned circles the gods and the stories of the gods were transformed and disintegrated *εἰς συνήματα καὶ βέλγηματα καὶ οὐρόους καὶ ἀρότους καὶ αἰθήρ γῆ καὶ μεταβολὰς ὥρων* as Plutarch complains, *Is. et O.* 69, p. 377 D. These allegorical interpreters from Anaxagoras and Metrodorus onwards are the real ancestors of our modern "nature" mythologists. No one doubts, however, that from their interpretations nothing can be learnt except what the real sense of Greek belief in the gods certainly was not. It is worth noticing that Prodicus, because he said that *ἔλκος καὶ σελήνη καὶ παρὰ τὸς καὶ λευκὸς καὶ κερμαῖ καὶ ὅτι τὸ τινανθῶδες* were the real essence of the Greek gods, was looked upon as one of the *ἄθεοι* [S.E., *AI.* 9, 51 2 = B 5 Diels]. *Quam tandem religionum reliquit?* asks the Greek whom Cicero is reproducing in *N.D.* I, 118, with reference to this ancient prophet of Greek "nature-religion".—For the ancient allegorists *Περσεφονε*, too, is nothing but *τὸ ἐκ τῶν καρπῶν φερόμενον σπέρμα* (so Kleanthes: *Plu.* as above). Acc. to Varro *Περσεφονε* means "fecunditas seminum,



carried off by Orcus on the occasion of some crop-failure, etc. (Aug., *CD.* vii, 20). In Porph. *sp. Ens.*, *PE.* 3, II, 7-8, we actually have the very interpretation which has been recently restored to so much favour—that *Néphē* is nothing else but a (feminine) personification of νέφος = young plant, shoot.

<sup>12</sup> A hint of such an explanation occurs in Sallustius, *de Dis* iv, *κατὰ τὴν ἐστρινίαν ἡμετέριαν* (i.e. the autumnal) *ἢ τῆς Νέφης ἀρωγῇ μεταλειτουργοῦναι* *ἢ δὲ ὑδατὶς δότι τῶν φυτῶν* (from the standpoint of this Neoplatonist at any rate the analogy might be carried through). So, too, Sopater *deia.* *ζψ.* in *Wais.*, *Rh. Gr.* viii, 115, S. speaks of *τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῶν ἀγγελεῖ* as if it were confirmed in the (Eleusinian) mysteries.

<sup>13</sup> It may be mentioned here by anticipation that a real doctrine of the indestructibility of the human soul was first traditionally attributed in antiquity to the Greek philosophers such as Thales or to the *theosophoi* such as Pherekydes (and Pythagoras too). In what sense this can be regarded as true we shall learn in the course of our inquiry. The mysteries of Eleusis, from which many modern critics would like to derive the belief in immortality among the Greeks, are mentioned by no ancient authority as among the sources of that belief or of such a doctrine. In which they were quite right.

<sup>14</sup> *Soph.* *fr.* 753 N. [791 P.] *ὡς τὰς ἄλλων κείνων βροτῶν, οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖσιν εἰλη μύθων' ἐς ἄβαν' τοιοῦτο γὰρ μύθος ἀπὸ ζῆφ' ἐστίν, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις πᾶσι δέσι ἀνά.*

<sup>15</sup> The privileged position of the initiated is exhibited with striking vigour in the well-known outburst of Diogenes: *τί δέγετε, ἰδοὺ, ἀρίστουτα μύθων ἔφην Πλάτωνος ὁ κλέιστος ἀνθρώπων ἢ Ἑκαταμένης, δει μύθους!* *Plu., And. Poet.* iv, p. 21 F.; *D.L.* vi, 39; *Jal., Gr.* vii, 238 A. (p. 308 Here.).—A homiletic application of Diogenes' saying is made by Philo, *Phil. Off.* 12, ii, p. 261 M. *συμβαίνει πολλὰς τῶν πρὸν ἀγαθῶν ἀλυσῶν μυστικῶς μυθεῖσθαι. ἀγαθὰ δὲ ἔντα ὅτι αὐτὸς κατανοήσας καὶ γινώσκων θέλει οὐ βέλτερόν αὐτὸ ἀποκάλυπτον, ἐπὶς ἄγγελλον παροίσχων τοῖς τελείοις καὶ ἱεροφάντοις.* Cf. *Spec. Leg.* 3, 7, i, p. 306 M.

<sup>16</sup> Of this nature were the *larai* which the hierophant "showed" and the other things that were employed in the festival: pictures of gods, relics, and paraphernalia of all sorts (e.g. the *niobai* and the *niobai*): *O. Jahn, Hermes*, 3, 327 f.; see *Lob. Agl.* 51-62.

<sup>17</sup> Preller, for example (stimulated by K. O. Müller), is tired of dwelling on the special character and meaning of the worship of the chthonic deities as something quite distinct from other Greek worship of the gods. An example may be found in Pauly-Wissowa, *n.v.* *Eleusis*, iii, p. 108: "The department of religion to which the Eleusian cult belongs is that of the chthonic deities, which had been indigenous in Greece from the earliest times and was a widely popular cultus. In this cultus ideas of the generous fruitfulness of the earth's soil and of the fruitfulness of death—whose seat seems to be beneath the earth like the Old Testament Sheol—were interwoven in a mysteriously suggestive way: a way which essentially resisted all efforts at clear and distinct comprehension, and could not help leading to mystical or occult suggestions and obscure symbolic expression." This and further applications in the same sense all rest upon the unprovable axiom that the activities of the *χθόνιοι* as gods of the soil and as gods of the kingdom of the souls were "interwoven": the suggestive base of the rest follows naturally. But what in all this is Greek?

<sup>18</sup> *ἢ ἐρῶς ἢ μυστικῇ τῶν ἱερῶν λειτουργίᾳ τὸ θεῶν, μνημονεῖν τῶν θεῶν αὐτὸς φησιν αὐτὸν ἡμῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.* *Str.* 467.

\* In fact the ancient allegorical interpretations of the mysteries differed widely among themselves: Lob., *Agl.* 136-40.—Even Galen attributed an allegorical sense to the mysteries of Eleusis, but he thinks *ἀμύδῃ λέγειν πρὸς τὸνδε αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐκείνῃς διδόναι* (iv, p. 361 K.). This cannot have been true of the assurances given to the Mystai of a blessed future in Hades.

<sup>22</sup> Such proclamations may have occurred in the *τεροφύκτον εἶπος* (Sop. *θεατρ. ζῳγ.* Walz, viii, 123, 29; cf. Lob., *Agl.* 189).

<sup>23</sup> Lob., *Agl.* 52, 58 f.

<sup>24</sup> No one says anything of any kind of moral obligation undertaken by the Mystai or of any consequent moral influence of the festival: not even Ansohidēs in whose warnings addressed to the college of judges composed of Mystai (*Afysi.* 31) the words *ἐν τιμωρίῃσιν πλεονεκτήματα καὶ ἀποδοῦντας καὶ* are not to be taken with the previous *μεμνησθε καὶ ταπεινὰ τοῖς θεοῖς τὰ ἱερὰ* but with *ὅπως πενήτους καὶ ἀποδοῦντας καὶ*. He speaks, in fact, of the moral obligation of the jury who have taken the oath, as judges not as Mystai. In *Ar., Ran.*, 455 ff., the words *δοτε μεμνησθε* stand loosely side by side with *ἐνέβηθι διδόντες τρεῖς καὶ τοὺς εἴκοσι καὶ τοὺς ἑξήκοντες*. (Of the Samothracian mysteries Diogenes says, 5, 49, 8: *γινώσκας δὲ φανὸς καὶ εὐσεβεῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ κατὰ τὰς θελήσεις εὐεργετοῦν τοὺς τῶν μυστηρίων νομίζοντας*—as it seems without effort on their part by a pure act of grace.)

<sup>25</sup> Formal or verbal instruction of a theological or moral kind was not supplied at Eleusis: so much may be stated without fear of contradiction since the work of Lobeck. Thus, the three commandments of Triptolemos, which acc. to Xenokrates *διὰ τρεῶν* 'Ελευσίων (Porph., *Ἄξ.* 4, 22) cannot be regarded as moral precepts proclaimed at the mysteries: indeed, there is nothing to lead one to conclude that they had anything to do with the mystery festival at Eleusis. In character these very simple precepts seem related to the laws of Bourgyes, with whom Triptolemos is sometimes confused (Haupt, *Opusc.* iii, 505) and were very likely, like them, recited at some agricultural festival. Supposing further that the third "law" of Triptolemos: *ὥν μὴ σφάλλας* was really (as Xenokr. seems to have understood it) intended to recommend a complete *ἀνοχὴ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ*, then it certainly cannot have been proclaimed at the Eleusinia (though this is what Dieterich thinks happened, *Nekyia*, 165). It is surely unthinkable that the Mystai at Eleusis were, after the Orphic model, absolutely forbidden to eat flesh for the rest of their lives. It remains a possibility that the precept had quite a different meaning—it does not definitely speak of the killing of animals—and that it belongs to some simple farmer's festival (not to the great festival of Eleusis, but rather, e.g. the Halon) at which the farmer was recommended to spare his live stock (just as the third of the three laws of Democritus at Cyprus forbade the farmer *μὴ σφάλλειν βοῦν ἀγρίον*, D. Chr. 64, 3 [228 K., 148 Arn.]; Attic law ap. *Ar.* *VH.* 5, 14, etc.).—In any case to bring all this into connexion with the mystery festival of Eleusis is absolutely without justification.

## CHAPTER VII

### IDEAS OF THE FUTURE LIFE

Certain allusions in Plutarch and Lucian<sup>1</sup> would lead us to suppose that the "mystery-drama" of Eleusis included also a visual exhibition of the underworld and its blest, or unblest, inhabitants. But these contemporaries of a final and luxuriant flowering of mystery-religions of every kind can serve as reliable witnesses only for their own period. In their day the Eleusinian festival, in competition it may be with other secret worships which were invading the Greco-Roman world in ever-increasing numbers, seems to have undergone a considerable alteration and extension of its primitive and traditional shape. We may doubt whether in earlier, classical times the Eleusinia can have attempted to bind the imagination with what were always petty details, or confine within formal limits what lay beyond all human experience. Still the solemn promise of future blessedness made in the mystic festival may, at any rate, have stimulated the imagination of its worshippers and given a more definite turn to their own natural efforts to picture the life to come. The ideas cultivated at Eleusis unmistakably contributed to the process by which the picture of Hades acquired colour and distinctness. Even without such stimulus, the natural instinct of the Greeks at all periods to give form even to what was essentially formless, worked in the same direction. The limits set by Homeric beliefs about the future world had made the Odyssean description of a descent to Hades seem a risky experiment only to be undertaken with the greatest caution. Now, however, since the re-establishment of the belief in a conscious after-life of the disembodied soul, such imaginative bodyings-forth of the invisible realm of shadows had become apparently the most natural and innocent employment of poetic fancy.

The story of Odysseus' journey to Hades and its expansion in conformity with the gradually increasing distinctness with which the life after death was conceived, was followed at an early period in the development of Epic poetry by further accounts of such journeys undertaken by other heroes. A Hesiodic poem described the descent of Theseus and Peirithoos to the underworld.<sup>2</sup> A *Nekyia*, the details of which are unknown, occurred in the poem of the *Return* of the heroes

from Troy. The epic which went by the name of the "Minyas" seems to have given considerable space to a descent to Hades.<sup>4</sup> The ancient fable of Herakles' descent to Hades and conflicts in the underworld received embellishment at more than one poet's hand.<sup>5</sup> As a result of such repeated and rival interpretations of the story the stock of characters and events associated with Hades was gradually and continually being enlarged. Accident has preserved to us the fact about the little-known *Minyas* that it, too, added to the details of the picture. To what extent popular imagination and mythology, on the one hand, and poetic inventiveness, on the other, may have been responsible for all this we can hardly say. It seems probable that here, as in the development of so many Greek myths, on the whole the balance of invention lay on the side of the poets. Purely poetic visions or pictures like that of the translation of individual heroes to Elysium may have gradually won their way to popular acceptance. "Dearest Harmodios," said the Athenian Skolion, "thou art not dead indeed, but livest yet, men say, in the Islands of the Blest." Not that there was anything fixed or dogmatic on the point. In a funeral oration Hyperides represents Leosthenes and his companions in battle as meeting in Hades, among the illustrious dead, the Tyrannicides, Harmodios and Aristogeiton.<sup>6</sup>

Much that may have been the invention of poets for the filling up or furnishing of the desert region so stamped itself upon the general mind that it almost seemed the natural growth of authentic popular belief. Everyone was familiar with the guardian of the gate of Plouton, the malignant hound of Hades who admits everyone but lets no one out again. He is the same creature, long known from the adventure of Herakles, which is already named Kerberos by Hesiod.<sup>7</sup> Like the gate and the gate-keeper, the waters that divide Erebus from the world of the living are already known to Homer. Now they have a Ferryman added to them, the churlish old man Charon, who, like a second Kerberos, safely transports everyone across the water, but lets no one return.<sup>8</sup> The *Minyas* is the first to mention him; that he became a real figure of popular belief (as he is still in Greece to this day, though with altered significance) is shown by pictures on the Attic vases that were put into the graves with the dead. These represent the soul as it stands upon the sedgy bank and meets the ferryman who will carry it over to the other side whence no man returns.<sup>9</sup> The custom of burying the dead with a small coin fixed between the teeth was also explained as provision for the passage-money that would have to be paid to Charon.<sup>10</sup>

## § 2

The soul, then, being safely arrived on the other bank and Kerberos passed by—what awaited it there? Those who had been initiated into the mysteries now counted upon enjoying the glad future that their hopes had formerly pictured. In reality this blessed future, vouchsafed by the grace of the deities who rule below, was not very hard to obtain. So many were initiated and recommended to divine favour that the picture of Hades, once so gloomy, began to assume a more genial aspect. Quite early we meet with the general name of "Blessedness" as applied to the future life; while the dead without much distinction are called the "Blessed".<sup>10</sup>

Of course, anyone who had been so foolish as to neglect or despise initiation has "not the same fate below", as the *Hymn to Demeter* discreetly puts it. Only the initiated have life, says Sophokles: the uninitiated, with whom it goes ill in the land below, can hardly have been thought of otherwise than as floating in the glimmering half-life of the shadows in the Homeric Erebos. Well-meaning modern efforts to read a moral meaning into things Greek have sought to prove that the Greeks, too, had a genuine popular belief in a future judgment and recompense for the past deeds and character of the dead. Homer makes hardly the most distant allusion to such a belief. The perjurer alone suffers in Homer the punishment at the hands of the gods of the underworld which he had invoked upon himself in his oath. Even the "Sinners" and their punishment which later imitation added to the story of Odysseus' Journey to Hades, considered without prejudice, do not support the opinion that Homeric poetry knew of a belief in retribution hereafter. Later poets were only following this model when they made other enemies of the gods endure eternal punishment in Hades—Thamyris, for example, or Amphion (as the *Minyas* related), and later Ixion in particular.<sup>11</sup> All this does not, even in the slightest degree, suggest a general belief in future rewards and punishment. Of course, there is the judgment that is given in Hades by "One" according to Pindar (*Ol.* ii, 65), but this occurs in connexion with a description of the "last things" which the poet has borrowed from the teachings of mystic separatists. Aeschylus<sup>12</sup> knows of a judgment pronounced by Hades himself; but his thoughts about divine retribution both on earth and hereafter are derived from his own religious temperament which was entirely opposed to the popular beliefs of his day and more inclined to accept the speculative doctrines of the theologians. The

first precise account of the three judges in Hades, Minos, Rhadamanthys, and Aiaikos, who judge the deeds of men done in their lifetime upon earth occurs in Plato in a description of the other world which reproduces anything rather than the popular beliefs of the time.<sup>12</sup> Later on, the picture of the judges in Hades (to whom Triptolemos was also added),<sup>14</sup> like many other details of the Platonic eschatological myths, became a real part of popular fancy, as allusions in later literature and even, perhaps, pictures of the underworld on vase-paintings from Southern Italy, bear witness. But the idea that in the supreme period of Greek culture the belief in a judgment and judges in Hades, who passed sentence on the deeds of men done on earth, had really any root in popular belief, is quite unproved and can be shown to be erroneous from the argument *ex silentio*. And where there are no judges no judgment can take place.

We often see it asserted that the belief in a future state of compensation for the good and evil deeds of this world was obtained by the Greeks from the Eleusinian mysteries. In reality the opposite is true; if and in so far as the Greeks ever received or entertained such a belief in future rewards and punishments the mysteries of Eleusis had nothing whatever to do with the matter. We have only to remember the simple fact that the Eleusinian mysteries admitted to initiation, with the single exception of those stained by the crime of murder, Greeks of all sorts without any inquiry into their past life and actions, or even their character. The initiated were promised a blessed life hereafter; a gloomy fate awaited the uninitiated. The difference was not made by goodness or badness: "Pataikion the thief will have a better fate after his death because he has been initiated at Eleusis than Agesilaos or Epanweinondas" sneered Diogenes the Cynic. Not political or moral worth but "spiritual" merit alone is decisive. Nor will anyone be very surprised at that. It is so in most religions. But in any case, the idea of a sentence passed on virtue or vice in Hades had been forestalled by the system of rewards and punishments in the lower world which the mysteries had already formulated from quite a different point of view. Where the mysteries were seriously and conscientiously taken they would rather have thrown their weight into the scales against any such idea, if it began to make itself felt, of compensation for good and evil deeds in Hades; they certainly contained nothing that fostered such a belief.

No doubt in the long run, among a spiritually alert people,

the morality inculcated by religion allied itself freely and without reluctance to the morality of the citizen in its independent development. Only in this way could the former maintain its ascendancy. Thus, in the minds of many of the Greeks the idea of religious justification (through the mysteries) may have lent its support to the idea of civic just dealing; and, at the same time, the company of the unblest who had neglected the sacred mysteries and their future salvation as well, was increased by the not unimportant body of those who receive the wages of sin in Hades and expiate their crimes against the gods, the family, and the civil society of men. Those who have taken a false oath, parricides, violators of the laws of hospitality are made by Aristophanes (in the *Frogs*) to "lie in the mud"—a form of penalty originally anticipated for the uninitiated in some Orphic private mysteries, but now transferred by him to those guilty of moral misdemeanours.<sup>15</sup> The inconsistency with the promises made in the mysteries themselves involved in such conceptions may have been the less observed just because the idea of a future system of compensation in accordance with the requirements of morality was never seriously or fully developed, but remained merely a matter of vague suggestion. In circumstances of real need that ideal never satisfied anyone in Greece. Men expected to see the retributive power of the gods visibly active upon earth; those in whom experience weakened this belief would not have derived much comfort from the idea of compensation hereafter. Everyone knows the typical case of Diagoras, the "Atheist".<sup>16</sup>

### § 3

The picturing of the future life, however seriously it might be carried on by adherents of certain mystical sects, remained for the poets and the public at Athens in the fifth century little more than an amusement of idle fancy in which a man might indulge his own whim with perfect freedom. The comic poets from Pherekrates onwards regarded a Descent into the Unknown country as a suitable framework for a burlesque play.<sup>17</sup> According to their fancy a Paradise, like that of the golden age on earth when Kronos still ruled, awaited the "Blessed" in the world below;<sup>18</sup> a "City of Delight"<sup>19</sup> such as men hoped to meet with at the ends of the world, or even somewhere upon the real world. It is from a comedy, the *Frogs* of Aristophanes, in connexion with the Descent to Hades of a typical commonplace Athenian citizen, who for the time being plays the part of Dionysos, that we get a clearer outline of the geography of the lower regions. Beyond

the Acherousian Sea with its cross-grained ferryman dwell snakes and monsters of all kinds. Having passed by the darkness and putrescence of the slough in which wallow perjurers and those who have committed crimes against father or stranger, the way leads to the palace of Plouton, near which lives the chorus of those who have been initiated into the mysteries. For them even in Hades the sun dispenses a brilliant light; they dance in myrtle groves and sing to the sound of the flute hymns of praise to the gods of the underworld.<sup>10</sup> A separation of the inhabitants of the lower regions into two classes as taught by the mysteries, is here also carried through; at least clear consciousness is implied in the case of the *Mystai* which in itself marks clearly the change which has taken place since the *Nekyia* of the *Odyssey*. Then there are other regions in Hades besides the places where the initiated and the impious dwell. There is a reference to the plain of *Lete*,<sup>11</sup> and to the place where *Oknos* is plaiting the rope which his she-ass gnaws to pieces as fast as he plaits it. This is a parody, half humorous, half pathetic, of the Homeric figures of *Sisyphos* and *Tantalos*; a sort of bourgeois counterpart of that Homeric aristocracy of the enemies of heaven, whose punishment, as Goethe remarked, is a type of ever-unrewarded labour. But, we may ask, what had honest *Oknos* done to deserve this fate of eternally fruitless toil? He is only a man like other men, but he "typifies all human endeavour." That anyone could have introduced such quaint inventions of innocent humour into the realm of Hades shows how far all this was from theological seriousness.

#### § 4

We ought to be able to observe the change which had come over the conception of the future life since the days of Homer from a consideration of the picture of the Underworld which Polygnotos of Thasos painted on one of the walls of the Hall of the *Knidians* at Delphi. The details of this picture are precisely known to us from the account given by *Pausanias*. The first impression that we get from it is the extraordinary vagueness and undeveloped state of the mythology of the underworld at this period, about the middle of the fifth century. On the wall was represented the questioning of *Teiresias* by *Odysseus*; the companies of heroes, the men and women of poetry, occupied the greater part of the space. The divine judgment of heaven was illustrated by the figures of the Homeric "Sinners", *Tityos*, *Tantalos*, and *Sisyphos*. Outside the ranks of the Heroic company is *Oknos* and his



she-ast. But where is the reward of virtue, the punishment of wickedness? In expiation of the worst excesses, those committed against gods and parents, a temple-robber receives a cup of poison from a sorceress,<sup>82</sup> and an undutiful son is being choked by his own father.<sup>83</sup> Apart from these evil-doers are the "uninitiated", those who have made light of the Eleusinian mysteries. Because they have missed the "completion" of the initiation they are now forced, men and women, to pour water from broken pitchers into a (perforated) jar in ever-unavailing endeavour.<sup>84</sup> There is no sign anywhere of a judge who should separate the souls into two classes; and of the monsters of the underworld there only appears the corpse-devouring daimon Eurynomos who must have been known to the artist from some local legend.<sup>85</sup> Of the reward of the "virtuous" there is not a trace, and even the hopes of the initiated in the mysteries are only vaguely alluded to in the casket which Kleobolia, as she crosses the river in Charon's boat with Tellis, is holding on her knee.<sup>86</sup> This is a symbol of the sacred mysteries of Demeter which Kleobolia once brought from Paros to Thasos, the home of Polygnotos.

With this series of pictures, hardly altered at all from Homer,<sup>87</sup> contrast for a moment the scenes of torment represented in Etruscan pictures of the Underworld, or the pedantic details of the trial of the dead on the day of judgment as the Egyptians elaborated them in picture and writing. From such gloomy severity, from the rigid and overpowering dogmatism that a people without imagination had constructed for itself out of religious speculations and visions won by much labour and thought, the Greeks were fortunately preserved by their own genius. Their fancy is a winged god whose nature it is to pass lightly over things—not to fall heavily to earth and there remain ponderously prostrate. Nor were they very susceptible during their best centuries to the infectious malady of a "sick conscience". What had they to do with pictures of an underworld of purgatory and torment in expiation of all imaginary types and degrees of sin, as in Dante's ghastly Hell? It is true that even such dark fancies of the Christian Hell are in part derived from Greek sources. But it was only the misguided fancy of particular isolated sects that could call forth such pictures as these, and recommend itself to a philosophic speculation which in its worst excesses violently contradicted all the most fundamental principles of Greek culture. The people and the religion of Greece, the mysteries which her cities organized and deemed holy, may be freely acquitted of all such aberrations.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

<sup>1</sup> Plu. (the MSS. wrongly give Themiſtion) *de An. fr.* 6 ap. Stob., Fl. iv, 52 b, 48 H. = p. 107, 27 ff. Meim.: *Loc., Catacl.* 23.

<sup>2</sup> Paus. 9, 31, 5.

<sup>3</sup> The remains in Kinkel, *Frag. Epic.* i, 215 ff. This *Mimnē* was identified by K. O. Müller, *Orchom.*, p. 12, with the Orphic *κατάβαστος* i.e. "Aëdon, and this suggestion has been followed, though with hesitation, even by Lobeck, *Agf.* 360, 373. It rests solely on the fact that the Orphic *κατάβαστος* was very doubtfully ascribed according to Clemens to Prodikos of Samos, according to Seidas to Herodikos of Perinthos (not to Kerkeops, or to Orpheus of Kamasina); while the *Mimnās*, according to Paus. 4, 33, 7, was very doubtfully ascribed to Prodikos of Phokais. Müller first identified Prodikos of Samos with Herodikos of Perinthos, and then both of them with Prodikos of Phokais. The justification of such a procedure is by no means "self-evident" and the identification—entirely depending upon this quite arbitrary view—of the Orphic *κατάβαστος* i.e. "Aëdon with the *Mimnās* is in the last degree hazardous. Such an alternative title to an ancient narrative poem can only be defended by fictitious and quite untenable parallels. The name *Mimnās* has no parallel in Orphic literature, and suggests rather a poem dealing with heroic adventure in which the *Nekyia* would only be an episode. If we are to believe in the double title we require at least to be told how the name (*Mimnās*) could possibly have been given to a poem whose contents as implied by the title *κατάβαστος* i.e. "Aëdon plainly consisted in a descent to Hades—made by Orpheus himself (as Lobeck also understands, p. 373). Besides, everything we learn about the *Nekyia* of the *Mimnās* differs widely from the temper and doctrine of Orphism, which should have manifested themselves very distinctly in such a vision of the life to come. Not is anything from the *Mimnās* given elsewhere under the name of Orpheus, like so many of the details of underworld mythology. There is nothing to suggest that it was Orpheus who sought the *εἴσα αἰθία Διὸς*: an unprejudiced interpretation of *fr.* 1 (ap. Paus. 10, 28, 2) would suggest that it was rather Theseus and Peirithoos whose descent to Hades supplied the framework for the Hades episode in the poem. There is then not the slightest justification for including the *Mimnās* in the list of Orphic poems or for citing what is known of its contents as Orphic mythological doctrine (which last Lobeck himself did not do: he knew too well the real nature and meaning of Orphism). Cf. Dümmler, *Delphika*, p. 19 (Liss. 1894).

Allusions in the *Iliad* and

in poem on the journey

imagined by Eurystheus, conducted by Athene (and Hermes), went down below and wounded Hades himself and carried off the dog of Hades. Many hands must subsequently have taken part in filling in the details of the adventure: we cannot, however, definitely name the poet who gave its final form and character to the whole. As far as the individual features of the poem are known to us (esp. from the survey given in [Apollod.], 2, 12, *Myth. Gr.*, 2, 122 ff. W., combining both early and late mythological characteristics), they are rather the features of a vigorous story of heroic adventure, full of movement and tending to the grotesque and the extravagant—not of a static or

tranquil narrative that would allow of the calm reception of pictures illustrating the quiet ordinary life and events of frequent occurrence in the mysterious world of darkness. In this respect the *paradoses* of Herakles in its traditional form must have differed noticeably from the *Nekyia* in  $\lambda$ , as well as from the *Minyas*. In fact, not one of the fabulous details current in later times about Hades can be traced back to a description in the Herakles adventure (even "Kerberos" seems to have got his name elsewhere).

<sup>1</sup> Hyperides, *Epit.* § 35-9 — p. B2 f. (Blada<sup>7</sup>): Leontheos will meet  $\lambda$  "Aidos the Heroos of the Trojan war, the Persian war, and also Harmodios and Aristogeiton. This is a stereotyped rhetorical idea: cf. Pl., *Ap.* 41 A-C. An epigram from Knossos on a Cretan who has distinguished himself in a cavalry battle (*BCH.* 1889, p. 60, ll. 1-2, after Simon., *Ep.* 99, 3-4 Bgk.), ll. 9-10:  $\tau\alpha\upsilon\rho\epsilon\tau\alpha\ \tau\epsilon\ \phi\epsilon\rho\alpha\iota\sigma\alpha\iota\ \kappa\alpha\theta'\ \epsilon\pi\epsilon\gamma\gamma\alpha\tau\epsilon\ \delta\ \epsilon\lambda\alpha\rho\epsilon\iota\ \text{"}A\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\ \text{for}\ \tau\alpha\lambda\epsilon\sigma\tau\alpha\tau\alpha\ \mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\beta\alpha\iota\sigma\alpha\iota\ \text{"}I\theta\alpha\kappa\epsilon\iota$ .

<sup>2</sup> Kerberos is first named in Hes., *TA.* 311, and he is the same hound of Hades which Homer knows and leaves unnamed, as Hesiod does, *TA.* 799 ff. According to this account he admits everyone, fawning about them and wagging his tail: but anyone who tries to slip out of Hades again he devours. That Kerberos inspires terror in those who enter Hades is therefore a conception of later ages (when his name was sometimes derived from the fact that he  $\tau\alpha\epsilon\ \kappa\epsilon\rho\alpha\iota\ \delta\ \delta\epsilon\lambda\alpha\iota\ \tau\epsilon\ \delta\epsilon\gamma\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\gamma\epsilon\ \beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\epsilon\iota$ : Porph. ap. Eus., *PE.* 3, 11, 11, p. 110 A, etc.): the superstitious are afraid  $\tau\alpha\ \kappa\epsilon\rho\beta\epsilon\rho\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\tau\epsilon\kappa\alpha\tau\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  (Plu., *N. P. Sum.* *Ep.* 1105 A; cf. Verg., *A.* vi, 401, Apul., *Met.* 4, 15 ff.). The honey cakes given to those who enter Hades are intended to pacify him (Sch. Ar., *Lys.* 601; Verg., *A.* vi, 420; Ap., *Met.* vi, 191. It cannot be proved that this is an ancient conception (certainly not from the absurd invention of Philochorus, *fr.* 46, to which Dürerich, *Nekyia*, 49, appeals). Ar., *Lys.* 601, speaks of the  $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\rho\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\sigma\alpha\iota$  for the dead without suggesting any such purpose; and in fact honeycakes would hardly be a satisfactory bait to a dog: they rather suggest offerings for underworld snakes (as in the cave of Trophonios, Ar., *Nu.* 507: for the Asklepias-snake, Herod. iv, 90-1) and for spirits appearing as snakes (and hence customary as offerings for the dead, and even e.g. according to the precepts of the  $\beta\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\rho\alpha\iota$  when digging up medicinal plants, Thphr., *HP.* 9, 8, 7). In the lines of Sophokles, *OC.* 1574 ff., Löschke, *Aus der Unterwelt*, p. 9 (Progr. Dorpat, 1888) finds an expression of the idea that there was need of pacifying Kerb. in his rage against souls entering Hades. In reality nothing of the kind is even suggested there. The traditional text is unintelligible, and is emended and interpreted with probable correctness by Nauck ( $\delta\epsilon\iota$  instead of  $\delta\iota$ ). Adopting this correction the words express a prayer of the Chorus addressed to a child of Tartaros and Ge, who is called  $\delta\ \alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota$ , which must mean "who sends to everlasting sleep" (not "who sleeps for ever")—for to separate  $\omega\epsilon\iota\tau\ \tau\alpha\tau\alpha\rho\alpha\varsigma$  from  $\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota$  as the Schol. would do, is impossible. The  $\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota$ , as the Schol. has already noticed, can hardly be anyone else than Thanatos (it would be an unintelligible epithet for Hecychos, of whom L. thinks). Thanatos, however, is nowhere else called son of Tartaros and Ge (nor is Hecychos, while Typhon and Echidna are, though the  $\alpha\delta\iota$  would not suit them: who else besides Soph., *OC.* 40, calls the Erinyes daughters of Ge and Skotos?). The Chorus pray to him (acc. to Nauck's correction) to grant Oedipus a safe passage in his journey to Hades. Terrors of all kinds were to be met with on the way there,  $\delta\epsilon\iota\tau\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\pi\alpha\iota\sigma\alpha$  (Ar., *Rs.* 143 ff., 276 ff.; we may also remember Verg.,

A. vi, 273 ff., 285 ff., etc.): that Kerberos is among these terrors is suggested by Soph. as little as it is by Aristoph. in the *Frags.* In fact, Soph. had spoken of him a few lines before (1669 ff.) in words which suggest anything rather than danger to those who enter Hades. Sophokles, then, cannot be made to serve as witness for the view that the Greeks thought of Kerberos after the manner of the two piebald dogs of the Indian Yama that terrify and drive back the dead. Further, there is no good evidence for a Greek tradition of two hounds of Hell. Nor can it be proved by the case adduced by Löschcke: the picture on a sarcophagus from Klazomenai of a naked boy holding a cock in each hand and standing between two (female) dogs that leap round him (in a manner suggesting play rather than anger). The picture can hardly have a mythical sense. This cannot give support to the view (as old as Wülford) that *Kérbepos* is no other than one of the two piebald (cabala) dogs of Yama and a creation of primitive Indo-Germanic times. In any case, the evidence is weak enough. See Gruppe, *Gr. Cult. u. Myth.* i, 113-14; Oldenberg, *Rel. d. Veda*, 538 (= 459 Fr. T.).

<sup>1</sup> Agatharch. p. 115, 14 ff. Müll., says that it is a popular belief *τὰς οὐκείας δόματα τοῖς τῆρας ἐν ποταμῷ δραπεῖν, ἔχοντας Χάρων καὶ Πλούτων καὶ κυβερνήτην. ἔτι μὲ καυοστροφέρας ἰσχυρὰς ἐκβάλλουσι οὐκείας.*

<sup>2</sup> Cf. v. Thuhn, *Arch. Zeit.* 1885, 19 ff.; *Jahrb. arch. Inst.* ii, 240 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Charon's fare (2 obols instead of the otherwise usual one—the difference not satisfactorily explained) is first mentioned in *Ar., Ran.* 140, 270. That this is the purpose of the money that was inserted between the teeth of the dead is frequently asserted by later authors. The many different names which were given to this "Charon's penny" (*καρναῖον*, cf. Lobbeck, *Prol. Path.* 351; *καρναῖον*, *βαρὴν* and simply *ταῖλον*; see Hemsterh. *Lucian*, ii, 514 ff.) show that this idea and the symbolism underlying it was a favourite subject of speculation. In spite of this we may doubt whether the custom of supplying the dead with a small coin has really arisen out of the wish to give them the fare-penny for the underworld ferryman. It is extremely doubtful whether Charon and his boat can have been figures of such clear dogmatic fixity as to have given rise to such a remarkable custom expressing itself in such a literal fashion. The custom itself, now, it seems, attested in Greece only from graves of a late period (see Ross, *Archaeol. Aufs.* i, 29, 32, 57 Anm.; Raoul Rochette, *Mém. de l'Inst. de Fr., Ac. des Ins.* xiii, p. 665 f.) must be ancient (though no older than the use of coined money in Greece), and has held its own with the most remarkable tenacity in many parts of the Roman Empire to a late age—even through the Middle Ages to our own time (cf. among others Maury, *Le magis et l'astrolog. dans l'antiq.* 156, 2). It is not very hard to understand that it might be ingeniously connected with the poetical story of the ferryman of the dead, and this plausible explanation of the strange custom might then become a part of popular belief. The custom itself ought rather to have been brought into connexion with the practice common in many lands of satisfying the requirements of the dead by the gift of some diminutive and all but symbolical object which is offered at burial and put in the grave (see something of the kind in Tylor, l. 183-4). *Parva petunt Manes; pietas pro divite grata est munere; non avidos Styx habet ima deos.* The obol may be the last symbolical vestige of the entire property of the dead which the ancient law of the dead required to be placed undiminished in their graves. *ταφῆς . . . ἐκ πολλῶν ὀβολῶν*

*μυλὸν δρυαίνοντες*: the epigram of Antiphanes Maced. (*AP.* xi, 168) expresses more nearly perhaps, though in sentimental language, the original and primitive intention of the gift of an obol, than does the fable of Charon's penny (cf. *AP.* xi, 171, 2; 208, 3). According to German superstition "money should be laid in the mouth of the dead man so that if he has buried a treasure he may not return". Grimm, p. 1785, n. 207. Here the undoubtedly ancient conception is quite clearly betrayed: that by giving a coin the property of the dead was bought up. The evidence for this first and proper meaning of the custom has been preserved in the strangest fashion, together with the custom itself, even down to the nineteenth century, when J. Chr. Mäntlingu voices it, *Ålderstiden* 353 (summarised in A. Schultz, *Alltidsbladen* s. d. *Från* 18 jh., p. 232 f.): this custom, common both to heathendom and Christianity, of putting a penny in the coffin of the dead "means that men buy up the property of the dead, whereby they think they will have good luck in their life".

<sup>11</sup> *Ar.*, *Tagemist.* fr. 488, 9: *ὅδ' ἔσθ' ἄρα νῦν καὶ ἀναδύναται (αἰ νεύει) μακρίαν· ὅδ' ἄρα λέγει τις, ὃ μακρίτης οἶγμα ἐκὰ μακρίτης*, then, was already, by that time, a common expression for the dead which had lost its full sense and value, just like the German "selig" (which is borrowed from Greek). Strictly speaking it means a condition approaching the existence of the *μακρὸς θεοὶ αἰὲς ἰόντες*. The full meaning still appears in the appeal to the herulized Persian monarch: *μακρίτης ἰσθῆ(μὲν βασιλεὺς, Scyth., Pers. 633 (ὅν δ' ἐπεὶ μάστιγι θνήσκω, E., Afr. 1003);* cf. also Xen., *Agri.* xi, 8, *πολλὰς τὰς ἐκείνῳ ἐνδεδραστημένους μακρίους*. Such passages allow us to see that *μακρὸς, μακρίτης* were not used of the dead in any sense *ver' ἀνέλιπον*, as *μακρὸς* sometimes is (*Pha.*, *Q. Gr.* v, p. 292 B; though on grave inscr. it is generally meant in its proper sense): cf. *ἐμπερεῖ, Phot.*, *Suid.* *μακρίτης* frequently occurs as applied to one lately dead in late writers: see Huhnken, *Tim.*, p. 59. *Lehrs, Popul. Aufs.*, p. 344. Doric form (*μακρίτης*: *Phot.* *μακρίτης, μακρίης* "Hesperides", the land of the blessed, i.e. the dead, is only used in a humorous sense in such phrases as *ἀγὰρ δὲ μακρίτης* (*Ar.* Eq. 1351), *φίλλ' δὲ μακρίτης*. So, too, is *ἐς ἄβυσσον*. *ὡς εἰς μακρίτης τὸ εἰς φθόν*, *Phot.* (*μακρίτης*, the name of a sacrificial cake—*Harp. ῥήματα*—occurs in modern Greek usage as a cake used at funerals, *Loh.*, *Ag.* 879).

<sup>12</sup> The punishment of Ixion for his ingratitude to Zeus consisted according to the older form of the story in his being fastened to a winged wheel and then being whirled through the air. That Zeus *ἐπαρτάμενος* him (*Sch. Eur.*, *Ph.* 1185) must then be a later story or one which did not become current till later: not until A.R. iii, 41 f., is there any mention of Ixion in Hades, though after him frequently: cf. Klagmann, *Annali d. Inst.*, 1873, pp. 93-5. (The analogy with the punishment of Tantalos and its displacement from the upper world to Hades is obvious: see Compagnot, *Philol.* 32, 237.)

<sup>13</sup> *Aesch.*, *Eum.* 273 f.; cf. *Supp.* 230 f. The fact that in this passage the poet says *ἀπὸ θεοῦ τὰς ἐμπερεῖας, ὡς λέγουσιν. Ζεὺς ἔλεος* simply shows that he is not simply following his own ideas in this fancy of a judgment in the other world (*οὐδ' ἔστι δ' ὁ μῦθος*). It does not in the least suggest (as Dietrich, *Nek.* 126, seems to think) that he is reproducing popular tradition or could be so doing. Only theological doctrines, at that time at least, knew anything of such a judgment in the future life upon the deeds of this: it is *their λόγος* that *Aesch.* is following (in this one point). See below, p. 428.

<sup>14</sup> *Gorg.* 523 A 8. (whence *Arloch.* 371 B 8., etc.). When Plato

# NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

δοῖν τὰς ψυχὰς δίκην ὑπέρβου δὲ τῶ λαυτοῦ βίου. He says nothing of a judgment given on the deeds done in this life, and clearly does not imply any decision as to the good or evil deserts of those who have just left the upper world and come down to Hades. We should be much rather led to suppose that those ἀγῶναι δικασταί, οἷον καὶ Ἀΐωνες καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς exercise their powers as judges among the dead, too, and decide between them in their disputes just as Minos does in the *Nekyia* of λ 566-71, and as Rhadamanthys still does in *Pl.* *O.* ii, 83 ff., on the παρόντων νόμοις. Only the number of those who have thus wide authority below is extended (in Plato) almost indefinitely. The process seems to have been as follows: the allusions in the *Odyssey* were taken up and in the course of the elaboration of the picture of Hades the number was enlarged of those who like Minos are patterns of justice among the dead and give judgment among them. Then philosophico-poetical speculation (perhaps not without Egyptian influence) about a judgment in the next world handed over to this increased number of judges in Hades the office of judging the conduct during their lifetime of those who have just entered Hades.—The selection of judges is not hard to understand. Aiaikos, Rhadamanthys, and Minos are regarded as patterns of justice: *Dem.* 18, 127. Minos as judge in Hades was taken from λ 566 ff. Rhadamanthys is known to λ 564 as dwelling among those who have been translated alive to Elysion. There he is—not judge: there is nothing there to judge, but—ἐπιμάρτυς of Kronos, acc. to *Pl.* *O.* ii, 83. As soon as men began to transfer Elysion to Hades (of which more later) Rhad. also found his place there. His fame as the most just of judges (see *Cratin.*, *Χελωνοὶ*, 231 [i, p. 83 K.]; *Pl.*, *Lg.* 948 B, etc.; cf. also *Plon.*, *Thes.* 16 ad fin.) allowed him easily to find his place next to Minos as judge over the dead. Aiaikos, too, as a model of εὐνομία (*Isoc.* B, 14, etc.), lawgiver to Aegina, arbitrator among the gods themselves (*Pl.*, *I.* viii, 24 f.), seemed naturally called to be a judge among the dead. His position as judge, however, was never so secure as that of Minos and Rhadamanthys. Pindar, though he often speaks of Aiaikos and the Aiakidae gives no hint of a special position held by Aiaikos in the next world. *Isoc.* 9, 15. ἀγῶναι κατὰ Πλούτωνος καὶ Κόρης μάλιστα εὐδοὶ ἔχον ἀρετῶν τεύχεα where nothing is implied as to his office of judge but merely to the honour done to Aiaikos in being given a seat near the ruling pair (cf. *Pl.*, *O.* ii, 83, of Rhad.; *Ar.*, *As.* 785, there is a rule in Hades that the best artist ἀμφότεροι ὁπάρη τῶ Πλούτωνος δέξῃ. Proedria of the Mystai in Hades, etc.). Aiaikos is κλειδέων of Hades: [*Apollod.*] 2, 12, 6, 10; *Epigr. Gr.*, 946, 4; *P. Mag. Per.* 1284 ff.; *εὐκατέ* (cf. Hades himself as *εὐκατέ*, § 368) in *Luc.*, *D. Moe.* 13, 3; 20, 1, 6; 22, 3; *De Luc.* 4; *Philop.* 25 and *Philostr.*, *V.A.* 7, 31, p. 385 K. "Holder of the Key" is an office of high distinction (suggested in the case of Aiaikos perhaps by the cult offered to him together with chthonic powers): keys belong to many of the gods—Plouton himself, *Paus.* 5, 20, 3, and others; see *Tafel* and *Dissen* on *Pl.*, *P.* 6, 4; in *P. Mag. Per.* 1403 comes the trimeter, κλειδέων Περσεύεω. Ταυρίων κέρας. It is difficult to believe that the attribution of this remarkable office of distinction to Aiaikos was a later invention than the apparently commonplace office of judge. It seems, in fact, that Eurip. in the *Perikhoos* (fr. 391 N.) made Aiaikos the first to meet Herakles as he entered Hades, i.e., probably at the gate itself. It can hardly be anything but a

reminiscence of Eurip. that suggested [not to Aristoph. himself—see Hüller, *Homers* viii, 438—but to a well-read *grammatikos*] the name "Aiakos" as that of the person who meets Herakles at the very gate of Plouton in the *Frogs* (l. 464). Just because the story of Aiakos' position as holder of the key at the gate of Hades was an old one and mentioned by respected authorities, the belief in his position as judge never quite prevailed, in spite of Plato.

<sup>24</sup> This is obviously Attic invention. Plato certainly mentions Triptolemos in addition to Minos and the other judges. But it seems that to the Athenians Minos was unacceptable as a type of justice (he was, especially on the stage, the object of bitter attacks as an enemy of the country; see *Hu.*, *Thest.* 16), and they tried to substitute their own Triptolemos for him in the triad of judges. Thus we find Triptolemos not beside Minos but in his place in a picture of the underworld on a vase from Altamura (Tript. Aiak. Rhad.), and in an analogous picture on an amphora at Karlsruhe (Aiak. Tript., the left side is broken off but prob. represented Rhadamanthys not Minos). Cf. Winkler, *Davol. d. Unterwelt auf. unterital. Vasen*, p. 37. For the rest, nothing suggests that the three judges on these vase-pictures pass judgment on the deeds of men done in their lifetimes: in strictness nothing is implied about their giving judgments. What is certain is simply that they, as types of justice, *ἐνὶ ναυὶ τοῦ Πλούτωνος στέφανοι βύβας* (like the *Myntai* in *Ar.*, *Na.* 163): they enjoy the rights of *εὐεργέται* of the divine pair, and hence they are seated on *βάνοι* or *βίβας*.

<sup>25</sup> *Ar.*, *Na.* 145 ff., 273 ff. "Darkness and mud," *σκότος καὶ λάσπες*, as manner and place of punishment for *ἀσεβέστες καὶ ἀνέθεστες*, are derived from Orphic teaching: *Pl.*, *Rp.* 383 D; *Olympod.*, on *Pl.*, *Phd.* 89 C. By an inaccurate extension of meaning this fate was said to threaten all *ἀσεβέστες* without distinction: *Plu.* v. *ἀργεῖ* ap. *Stob.* *Fl.* 120, 28 (4, 108, 2 *Mein.*); *Aristid.*, *Elem.*, p. 421 ff.—it, 30 *Keil*, 170 L, 1, 8, 6. Platon undoubtedly has the right interpretation of the reason for this strange form of punishment: the mud in which the uninitiated he marks them out as *μὴ νοοῦσθαι δύναντες* who have not shared in the purifications such as were offered by the Orphic initiation ceremonies. Hence they remain fixed for ever in their original foulness (and in darkness because of their ignorance of the *θεῖα*). It is, in fact, an *allegorical* punishment which has no meaning outside the range of Orphic doctrines of *ἀσκαρία* and attainment. Aristoph. transfers it to those who have seriously transgressed the laws of city or religion, for whom it was unsuitable: this only shows that an appropriate penalty in Hades for crimes against civil society had not yet been invented. It had evidently been thought sufficient to say generally that the *ἀσεβεῖς* (or at least the more heinous offenders) would be punished in Hades. This commonplace form of the opinion is probably to be regarded as a final echo of some definite theological doctrine which had become vulgarised and emptied of distinct meaning among the general public of the profane. The author of the first speech against Aristogeiton (*[D.]* 25) who speaks of the *ἐν τοῖς λάσπεσι καὶ σκότειναι* in Hades (53), confesses himself an adherent of Orpheus (11).—The *γενημένους* dwell in Hades next to the palace of Plouton himself: *Ar.*, *Na.* 162 L, where they have the privilege of *σποδοῖα*, *[D.]*, vi, 39. When a distinction between a *χῆρος εὐεργέτης* and a *χῆρος δολοῦν* in Hades began to be made, in order that they might not be deprived of their privileged position, were given *σποδοῖα* in the *κ. σκότειναι*. In this way, e.g. the author of the *Aristoch.* 273 D (who

can hardly have written before the third century) tries to reconcile the hopelessly contradictory pretensions of the *εὐεφέα* and *μεταμύεροι* to reward in Hades.

<sup>16</sup> Sex, Emp., *M.* ix, 53. Suid. *διαγέρας*.

<sup>17</sup> Descents to Hades occurred in the *Κρανάδος* of Pherecr. (i, p. 167 K.); the *Βάρπαρι* and *Φηρεσίης* of Ar.: [Pherecr.] *Μεταλλ.* (i, p. 174 K.); and probably also in the *Τροφίμωι* of Cratin., etc.—On a vase from Eretria, fifth century, there is a representation of a repulsive scene of torture: an old woman, naked and tied to a tree, is being tortured by three satyrs. This, according to J. Zingerle, *Archäol. epigr. Mittheil.* u. *Oesterreich*, 16, 162 ff., is a parody of some incident from a comedy of the time, the plot of which was laid in Hades. But nothing in the picture suggests that the lower regions are the scene of this gruesome affair; and what would the satyrs be doing there?

<sup>18</sup> Utopian existence in Hades: see in partic. [Pherecr.] *Μεταλλ.* (i, p. 174 K.). A pretext for such parodies was perhaps given by the Orphic promise of an everlasting carouse for the initiated at the *εὐμύεροι τῶν δαίμων* in Hades (*Pl., Rp.* ii, 263 C, *μετάρωι εὐμύε.* Ar., *Ra.* 85). Many details were borrowed from the descriptions of the reign of bliss upon earth in the golden age under Kronos' rule which had long been a familiar subject of comedy (cf. Pöschel, *Das Märchen vom Schlaraffenland*, 7 ff.). The golden age in the dim past and the land of Elysium in the future always had many features in common. (See above, chap. ii, n. 48.) From these traditional pictures of a spirit-world only to be met with in the long-vanished past or in the next world, the whole Greek literature of imaginary Utopias drew its sustenance (see my *Griech. Komien*, ii, § 2, 3). That literature was really an attempt to transpose those early fantasies of a land of spirits into real life and on to the inhabited world.

<sup>19</sup> *Ἰὼν γ' εὐδαίμων πόλις παρὰ τῇ ἐρυστέρῃ δαίμονι*, Ar., *Ar.* 144 f. (cf. *Griech. Komien*, 201 ff.).

<sup>20</sup> *λίμνη* (the Acherontian lake: Eur., *Alc.* 443, and often afterwards). Charon: Ar., *Ra.* 137 ff., 182 ff., 185 ff.—*μακάρες καὶ βέλβεροι* 144 ff., 278 ff., 289 ff. Abode and life of the *Μυταί*: 159, 163, 311 ff., 454 ff.

<sup>21</sup> *τὴν Ἀθήης πύλην*, l. 186. This is the earliest reference to Lethe of which we can be quite sure, but it is made so casually that it is obvious that Aristoph. is merely alluding to a story well known to his audience. Plato makes use of the *Ἀθήης πύλην* together with the *Ἀψιδὸς ποταμὸς* (hence 821 C: *Ἀθήης ποταμὸς*) in the myth at the close of the *Republic*, x, 621 A, which is intended to illustrate and support the theory of *psuchoporeia*. Of course, this ingenious fancy was eminently suitable for use by adherents of the doctrine of metempsychosis; but there is nothing to show that it had been actually invented for the special benefit of this doctrine, i.e. by Orphics or Pythagoreans—as many have supposed. It is probable that it was nothing more originally but an attempt to explain symbolically the unconscious conditions of the *δυνατὴν κέφαλα*. Does Theognis already (704, 705) refer to it?—*Περσεφόνη . . . ἔτι βρότον παρέχει Ἀθήην, βλάπτοντον πόσιν*. Other references to the *Ἀθήης πύλην*, *Ἀδδης δόμος*, *Ἀθήης δάμνη* are all later: the *Ἀθήης θρόνος* in the account of Theseus' journey to Hades in [Apollon.] *Εὔρι.* i, 24, is perhaps taken from older legendary material. [Bergk's assertion, *Cynusc.* ii, 716: "The conception of Lethe's fountain and stream is certainly ancient and popular: the well of Lethe is nothing but the fountain of the gods: whoever drinks of it forgets all sorrow, etc.,"



is entirely devoid of foundation in fact.) The river of Lethe was in later times localized on earth like Acheron and Styx; in the R. Limis of Gallacia—far away on the western sea—men rediscovered the *Ombrivivis flumen* (account of the year 137 a.c.: Liv., *Epit.* 55; Flor. 1, 33, 12; App., *Hisp.* 72; Plin., *Q.N.* 34, p. 272 D; cf. Mela, 3, § 10; Plin., *N.H.* 4, § 115. Absurd antiquology in Strabo, p. 153).

<sup>10</sup> This is presumably the meaning of the words which Pausanias (10, 28, 8) uses: his absurd mannerism makes him talk round the incident instead of simply describing it. (Much too artificial explanation of the circumstance in Dümmler, *Delphika*, p. 15 [1894].)

<sup>11</sup> Paus. 10, 33, 4.

<sup>12</sup> See Appendix iii.

<sup>13</sup> Euryanctos: dark-blue body like a bluebottle, with prominent teeth, sitting on a vulture's skin, Paus. 10, 28, 7. There seems to be no mention of him in literature: whether the statement of Pausanias that he was a *βούβων τρώς* is "Aster who eats the flesh of corpses off their bones, is anything more than a guess, we cannot tell. The vulture-skin indeed suggests that the nature of the Daimon who sits on it was related to the vulture. The fact that the vulture eats the flesh of corpses was often observed by the ancients: see Plin., *Rom.* 9, etc.: Leemans on Horapollo, p. 177). Welcker (*KL Schr.* v, 117) sees in Euryanctos nothing but the "corruption" of the body, in which case he would be a purely allegorical figure. On the contrary he is much more likely to be one of those very concretely imagined spirits of Hell (only with a euphemistic name), like the lesser spirits Lamia, Mormo, Gorgyna, Empousa, etc. (a word about them will be found below, Append. vi). The artist must have known him from some local tradition. He devours the flesh of the corpse: thus a late epigram (*Epigr. Gr.* 947, 18) calls the dead *ἀνέστη βούβων τρώς*. Even in Soph., *El.* 542, we have: "Ἄνδρες ἰσχυροὶ τρώμενοι τῶν ἐνέκλεις *λαγὰς βούβωνας*" (Welcker, *Syll.*, p. 94).

<sup>14</sup> Paus. 10, 28, 3. Cf. O. Jahn, *Hermes*, lli, 329.

<sup>15</sup> The third century vase-paintings from Southern Italy also as a rule keep within the limits of the epic Nekyia. In addition to the few special types of the sinners undergoing punishment in Hades (Sisyphos, Tantalos, the Danaides) we have allusions to the journeys to Hades of Theseus, Peirithoos, Herakles, and Orpheus. All attempts to read mystical or edifying intentions into these (as in Haumenster's *Denkm.* 1928-30) are now regarded as completely mistaken. (Orpheus appears there not as founder and prophet of his mysteries but simply as the mythical singer who goes down to the underworld to rescue Eurydike with his singing. This is rightly maintained by Milchhöfer, *Pañal.* 53, 383 ff., 64, 750 f., against Kuhnert, *Arch. Jahrb.* viii, 194 ff.: *Pañal.* 54, 193.) Nothing at all is suggested as to the fate of mankind in general. On a vase from Canosa a father and mother with a boy stand on the left of Orpheus: this, too, must belong to the region of mythology. (They cannot, however, be Dionysos and Ariadne as Winkler suggests, *Dasel. d. Unterw. ant. unterird. Varca*, 48. But it is difficult to imagine that they can be a family of Myrtai as Milchhöfer

n.)

## PART II



## CHAPTER VIII

### ORIGINS OF THE BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY

#### THE THRACIAN WORSHIP OF DIONYSOS

The popular conception of the continued existence of the souls of the dead, resting upon the cult of the dead, grew up and coalesced with a view of the soul derived from Homeric teaching on the subject, which was in essential, though unrecognized, contradiction with the cult of souls. The popular conception, unchanged in all essentials, remained in force throughout the coming centuries of Greek life. It did not contain within itself the seeds of further development; it did not make any demand for better and deeper ideas of the character and condition of the soul in its independent life after its separation from the body. Still more, it had nothing in it that could have led beyond the belief in the independent future life of those souls to the conception of an everlasting, indestructible, immortal life. The continued life of the soul, such as was implied in and guaranteed by the cult of souls, was entirely bound up with the remembrance of the survivors upon earth, and upon the care, the cult, which they might offer to the soul of their departed ancestor. If that memory dies out, if the venerating thoughtfulness of the living ceases, the soul of the departed is at once deprived of the sole element in which it still maintained its shadow of an existence.

It was impossible, then, that the cult of the souls should produce out of itself the idea of a true immortality of the soul or of the independent life of the soul indestructible by its very nature. Greek religion as it existed among the people of Homer could not shape such a belief of its own accord, and even if it were offered from outside could not have accepted it. It would have meant giving up its own essential character.

If the soul is immortal, it must be in its essential nature like God; it must itself be a creature of the realm of Gods. When a Greek says "immortal" he says "God": they are interchangeable ideas. But the real first principle of the religion of the Greek people is this—that in the divine ordering of the world, humanity and divinity are absolutely divided in place and nature, and so they must ever remain. A deep

gulf is fixed between the worlds of mortality and divinity. The relations between man and God promoted by religion depend entirely upon this distinction. The ethical ideas of the Greek popular conscience were rooted in the frank admission of the limitations proper to human capacity which was conditioned by an existence and a fate so different from that enjoyed by the gods; in the renunciation of all human claims to happiness and independence. Poetic fancies about the "Translation" of individual mortals to an unending life enjoyed by the soul still united to the body might make their appeal to popular belief; but such things remained *miracles* in which divine omnipotence had broken down the barriers of the natural order on a special occasion. It was but a miracle, too, if the souls of certain mortals were raised to the rank of Heroes, and so promoted to everlasting life. The gulf between the human and the divine was not made any narrower on that account; it remained unbridged, abysmal. The bare idea that the gulf did not in reality exist, that actually in the order of nature the inner man, the "Soul" of man belonged to the realm of gods; that as a divine being it had everlasting life—such an idea would involve further consequences about which no one can be in much doubt; it would have contradicted every single idea of Greek popular religion. It never could have become widely held and believed in by the Greek populace.

Nevertheless, at a certain period in Greek history, and nowhere earlier or more unmistakably than in Greece, appeared the idea of the divinity, and the immortality implicit in the divinity, of the human soul. That idea belonged entirely to *mysticism*—a second order of religion which, though little remarked by the religion of the people and by orthodox believers, gained a footing in isolated sects and influenced certain philosophical schools. Thence it has affected all subsequent ages and has transmitted to East and West the elementary principles of all true mysticism: the essential unity of the divine and the human spirit; their unification as the aim of religion; the divine nature of the human soul and its immortality.

The theory and doctrine of mysticism grew up in the soil of an older cult-practice. Greece received from abroad a deeply emotional religious cult, accompanied by practices that stimulated mysterious and extraordinary imaginings. The sparks of momentary illumination struck out by this faith were fed and fanned by mysticism till they became a vivid and enduring flame. For the first time, clearly dis-

cernible through its mystical wrappings, we meet with the belief in the indestructibility and eternal life of the soul: we meet it in the doctrines of a mystical sect which united in the worship of Dionysos. The worship of Dionysos must have sown the first seed of the belief in an immortal life of the soul. To explain how this may have happened; to make clear to the mind of the reader how the essence and inner reality of that worship was bound to stir up the belief in an immortal life—such is our next task.

In the spiritual life of men and nations, it is not by any means the extravagant or, in one sense or another, the abnormal that is most difficult for our sympathetic understanding to grasp. By clinging to a traditional and too narrow formula for the Greek spirit we make difficulties for ourselves; but it is not really a matter of serious perplexity, if we reflect upon it, to understand how Greek religion at the height of its development regarded "madness" (*μανία*) as a religious phenomenon of wide-reaching importance. Madness, in this sense, is a temporary destruction of physical balance, a condition in which the self-conscious spirit is overwhelmed, "possessed" by a foreign power, as our authorities explain it to us. This madness "which comes not from mortal weakness or disease, but from a divine banishment of the commonplace"<sup>1</sup> found effective application in the *mantic* and *teletic* arts. Its effects were so common and well recognized that the truth and importance of such religious madness (entirely distinguishable from bodily disease) was treated as a fact of experience not merely by philosophers, but by the doctors themselves.<sup>2</sup> For us it only remains obscure how such "divine mania" was fitted into the regular working order of the religious life; the sensations and experiences themselves belonging to this condition are made intelligible enough by a whole host of analogies. In fact if the truth were told we should rather have to admit that it is easier for us to sympathize with such overflowing of sensation and all that goes with it than with the opposite pole of Greek religious life, the calm and measured composure with which man lifted up heart and eye to the gods, as the patterns of all life and the patrons of a serenity as brilliant and unmoved as that of the clear heavens themselves.

But how came it that in the character of a single people such extravagance of emotion was combined with a fast-bound and regulated equilibrium of temper and behaviour? The answer is that these opposing features sprang from two

different sources. They were not originally combined in Greece. The Homeric poems hardly give any hint of that overflowing of religious emotion which later Greek peoples knew and honoured as a heaven-sent madness. It spread among the Greeks themselves in the train of a religious agitation, we might almost say revolution, of which Homer records, at most, only the first faint essays. It had its origin in the religion of Dionysos, and in company with this religion enters as something new and strange into Greek life.

The Homeric poems do not recognize Dionysos as belonging to the gods of Olympus, but they are aware of his existence. It is true they nowhere plainly<sup>3</sup> refer to him as the wine-god honoured in joyful festivals, but we read (in the narrative of Glaukos' meeting with Diomedes) of the "frenzied" Dionysos and his "Nurses" who were attacked by the Thracian Lykourgos.<sup>4</sup> The *Mainas*, the frenzied woman of the Dionysos-cult, was such a well-known phenomenon, so familiar in men's minds, that the word could be used in a simile to explain the meaning of something else.<sup>5</sup> In this form the worship of the god first came to the notice of the Greeks: this was the origin of all the other festivals of Dionysos that later Greece developed in so many different directions.<sup>6</sup> They learnt to know Dionysos Bakcheios, "who makes men frenzied,"<sup>7</sup> as he was worshipped in his own country.

That the original home of Dionysos-worship was in Thrace, that his cult, popular among many of the Thracian peoples,<sup>8</sup> was particularly honoured among the southernmost of the Thracian stocks who were best known to the Greeks and lived on the coast between the mouths of the rivers Hebros and Axios and in the mountainous country behind—to all this the Greeks themselves bore frequent and manifold witness.<sup>9</sup> The god whose name the Greeks knew in its Greek form "Dionysos" had, it appears, among the numerous and divided Thracian peoples various appellations of which those most familiar to the Greeks were Sabos and Sabazios.<sup>10</sup> The Greeks must have known and remarked on the nature and worship of the god at an early period of their history. They may have met with him in Thrace itself. At all periods they had an extensive and varied intercourse with this country and must in the early days of their wanderings have passed through it on their way to their future home. They may have had further opportunities of knowing it from the Thracian races or tribes who, according to a few isolated legends, had dwelt in primitive times in certain localities of Central Greece. The ethnographical material of these

legends was regarded as founded on fact by the great historians of the fifth and fourth centuries.<sup>11</sup>

The cult of this Thracian divinity differed in every particular from anything that we know of from Homer as Greek worship of the gods. On the other hand, it was closely related to the cult paid by the Phrygians, a people almost identical with the Thracians, to their mountain-mother Kybele. It was thoroughly orgiastic in character. The festival was held on the mountain tops in the darkness of night amid the flickering and uncertain light of torches. The loud and troubled sound of music was heard; the clash of bronze cymbals; the dull thunderous roar of kettledrums; and through them all penetrated the "maddening unison" of the deep-toned flute,<sup>12</sup> whose soul Phrygian *aulētai* had first waked to life. Excited by this wild music, the chorus of worshippers dance with shrill crying and jubilation.<sup>13</sup> We hear nothing about singing: <sup>14</sup> the violence of the dance left no breath for regular songs. These dances were something very different from the measured movement of the dance-step in which Homer's Greeks advanced and turned about in the *Paian*. It was in frantic, whirling, headlong eddies and dance-circles<sup>15</sup> that these inspired companies danced over the mountain slopes. They were mostly women who whirled round in these circular dances till the point of exhaustion was reached; <sup>16</sup> they were strangely dressed; they wore *bassarai*, long flowing garments, as it seems, stitched together out of fox-skins; <sup>17</sup> over these were doeskins,<sup>18</sup> and they even had horns fixed to their heads.<sup>19</sup> Their hair was allowed to float in the wind; <sup>20</sup> they carried snakes sacred to Sabazios<sup>21</sup> in their hands and brandished daggers or else thyrsos-wands, the spear-points of which were concealed in ivy-leaves.<sup>22</sup> In this fashion they raged wildly until every sense was wrought to the highest pitch of excitement, and in the "sacred frenzy" they fell upon the beast selected as their victim<sup>23</sup> and tore their captured prey limb from limb. Then with their teeth they seized the bleeding flesh and devoured it raw.

It is easy enough, by following poets' descriptions and plastic representations of such scenes, to elaborate still further the picture of this nocturnal festival of fanatic enthusiasm. But, we must ask, what was the *meaning* of it all? We shall get nearest to the truth if we will exclude as far as possible all theories imported from unrelated provinces of thought and fix our attention solely on what, for the participants, was the result of it all—the result anticipated and consciously proposed by them, and therefore the recognized object, or, at least, one



of the recognized objects of these strange proceedings. The participators in these dance-festivals induced intentionally in themselves a sort of mania, an extraordinary exaltation of their being. A strange rapture came over them in which they seemed to themselves and others "frenzied", "possessed".<sup>54</sup> This excessive stimulation of the senses, going even as far as hallucination,<sup>55</sup> was brought about, in those who were susceptible to their influence, by the delirious whirl of the dance, the music and the darkness, and all the other circumstances of this tumultuous worship.<sup>56</sup> This extreme pitch of excitement was the result intended. The violently induced exaltation of the senses had a religious purpose, in that such enlargement and extension of his being was man's only way, as it seemed, of entering into union and relationship with the god and his spiritual attendants. The god is invisibly present among his inspired worshippers. At any rate, he is close at hand, and the tumult of the festival is to bring him completely into their midst.<sup>57</sup> There are various legends about the disappearance of the god into another world and his return thence to mankind.<sup>58</sup> Every second year his return is celebrated, and it is just this Appearance, this "Epiphany" of the god, that gives the reason and the motive of the festival. The Bull-God, in the most ancient and primitive form of the belief, appeared in person among the dancers,<sup>59</sup> or else the imitated roaring of a bull produced by hidden "Mimes of Terror" served to suggest the invisible Presence.<sup>60</sup> The worshippers, too, in furious exaltation and divine inspiration, strive after the god; they seek communion with him. They burst the physical barriers of their soul. A magic power takes hold of them; they feel themselves raised high above the level of their everyday existence; they seem to become those spiritual beings who wildly dance in the train of the god.<sup>61</sup> Nay, more, they have a share in the life of the god himself; nothing less can be the meaning of the fact that the enraptured servants of the god call themselves by the name of the god. The worshipper who in his exaltation has become one with the god, is himself now called Sabos, Sabazios.<sup>62</sup> The super-human and the infra-human are mingled in his person; like the frenzied god<sup>63</sup> he throws himself upon the sacrificial animal to devour it raw. To make this transformation of their nature outwardly manifest, the participants in the dance-festival wear strange dress: they resemble in their appearance the members of the wild *thiasos* of the god;<sup>64</sup> the horns they set on their heads recall the horned, bull-shaped god himself, etc.<sup>65</sup> The whole might be called a religious drama, since

everything is carefully arranged so as to suggest to the imagination the actual presence of the mysterious figures from the spirit world. At the same time, it is something more than mere drama, for it can hardly be doubted that the players themselves were possessed by the illusion of living the life of a strange person. The awe-inspiring darkness of night, the music, especially that of the Phrygian flute, to which the Greeks attributed the power of making its hearers "full of the god",<sup>40</sup> the vertiginous whirl of the dance—all these may very well, in suitably disposed natures,<sup>41</sup> have really led to a state of visionary exaltation in which the inspired person saw all external objects in accordance with his fancy and imagination. Intoxicating drinks, to which the Thracians were addicted, may have increased the excitement; <sup>42</sup> perhaps they even used the fumes derived from certain seeds, with which the Scythians and Massagetai knew how to intoxicate themselves.<sup>43</sup> We all know how even to day in the East the smoke of hashish may make men visionaries and excite religious raptures <sup>44</sup> in which the whole of nature is transformed for the enthralled dreamer. "Only when thus possessed did the Bakchai drink milk and honey out of the rivers; their power ceased when they came to themselves again," says Plato.<sup>45</sup> For them the earth flowed with milk and honey, and the air was filled with the sweet odours of Syria.<sup>46</sup> Hallucination was accompanied by a state of feeling in which pain itself was only an added stimulus to sensation or in which the visionary became completely insensible to pain, as is not unusual in such states of exaltation.<sup>47</sup>

Every detail confirms the picture of a condition of wild excitement in which the limitations of ordinary life seemed to be abolished. These extraordinary phenomena transcending all normal experience were explained by saying that the soul of a person thus "possessed" <sup>48</sup> was no longer "at home" <sup>49</sup> but "abroad", having left its body behind. This was the literal and primitive meaning understood by the Greek when he spoke of the "ekstasis" of the soul in such orgiastic conditions of excitement.<sup>50</sup> This ekstasis is "a brief madness", just as madness is a prolonged ekstasis.<sup>51</sup> But the ekstasis, the temporary *alienatio mentis* of the Dionysiac cult was not thought of as a vain purposeless wandering in a region of pure delusion, but as a *hieromania*,<sup>52</sup> a sacred madness in which the soul, leaving the body, winged its way to union with the god.<sup>53</sup> It is now with and in the god, in the condition of *enthousiasmos*; those who are possessed by this are *θεοεμψυχοι*; they live and have their being in the god.<sup>54</sup> While still retaining

the finite Ego, they feel and enjoy to the full the infinite powers of all life.

In *ekstasis* the soul is liberated from the cramping prison of the body; it communes with the god and develops powers of which, in the ordinary life of everyday, thwarted by the body, it knew nothing. Being now a spirit holding communion with spirits it is able to free itself from Time and see what only the spiritual eye beholds—things separated from it in time and space. The enthusiastic worship of the Thracian servants of Dionysos gave birth to the *inspiration mantiké*,<sup>41</sup> a form of prophecy which did not (like prophecy as it invariably appears in Homer) have to wait for accidental, ambiguous and external signs of the god's will, but on the contrary entered immediately into communion with the world of gods and spirits and in this heightened spiritual condition beheld and proclaimed the future. This power belonged to men only in *ekstasis*, in religious madness, when "the God enters into men". The *Mαινάδες* are the official exponents of this *mantiké* of inspiration.<sup>42</sup> It is simple and intelligible enough that the Thracian cult of Dionysos, which was throughout a means of stimulating men to a condition of extreme exaltation that they might enter into direct communion with the spirit-world, also encouraged the prophesying of inspired seers, who in their rapt exaltation and frenzy became clairvoyant. Among the Thracian Satrai there was a tribe called the Bessoi who produced *prophétai*, and these were in charge of an oracle of Dionysos situated on the top of a high mountain. The prophetess of this temple was a woman who gave prophecies like the Pythia at Delphi, that is to say, in a state of rapt ecstasy. This, at least, is what Herodotos says,<sup>43</sup> and we have many other accounts of Thracian *mantiké* and its close connexion with the orgiastic cult of Dionysos.<sup>44</sup>

### § 3

The Greek type of religion, perhaps from its very origin, certainly at the earliest period of its development in which it becomes accessible to our observation—the period to which the Homeric poems belong—had no leaning to anything resembling an excited emotional worship like that practised by the Thracians in their orgiastic cult of Dionysos. The whole movement wherever it came to their notice must have struck the Greeks of Homer as something strange and barbaric, attractive only through the interest ever attached to the unknown. And yet—the fact is certain—the thrilling tones

of this "enthusiastic" worship awoke an answering chord deep in the hearts of many Greeks: in spite of all that was strange they must have recognized a familiar accent in it—something that, however outlandishly expressed, could appeal to the common nature of mankind.

This enthusiastic Thracian cult was in fact only a special expression, conforming to their peculiar national characteristics, of a religious impulse that is to be found all over the earth, and which breaks out in every stage of civilization. It must, indeed, answer to an instinctive need of human nature, and be rooted in the physical and psychical constitution of man. In moments of supreme exaltation man felt the presence above him and around him of mighty powers that seemed to express themselves even in his own personal life. These he was no longer to confront in pious and fearful awe, passively confined within the limits of his own separate personality; he was to break down every barrier and clasp them to his heart, making them his own in unconditional surrender. Mankind needed not to wait for that strange product of poetry and thought, Pantheism, before it could experience this instinctive need to lose its own private existence, for a moment, in the divine. There are whole races of men, not otherwise among the most distinguished members of the human family, who have a special tendency and gift for such expansion of the human consciousness into the supra-personal. They have an urgent impulse to such rapt and visionary states, and they regard the enticing or horrifying visions that visit them in those states as actual experiences of another world into which their "souls" have for a brief while been transported. In every part of the world there are peoples who regard such ecstatic exaltation as the only true religious act, the only way of intercourse with the spirit-world available to man, and base their religious performances principally upon such ceremonial as experience has shown to be most capable of inducing the ecstasies and visions. The means most commonly adopted by such peoples to produce the desired intensity and stimulation of feeling is a violently excited dance prolonged to the point of exhaustion, in the darkness of night, to the accompaniment of tumultuous music. Sometimes whole companies of the people induce in themselves a state of religious excitement by wild and furious dancing.<sup>84</sup> More often selected individuals, specially susceptible to such impressions, suffer their "souls" to be drawn out by music and dancing and every other sort of stimulating influence, and made to visit the world of spirits and gods.<sup>85</sup> Such "magicians" and priests who can place

themselves in immediate contact of soul with the spirit world, are to be found all over the globe. The shamans of Asia, the "medicine men" of North America, the Angakoks of Greenland, the Butios of the Antilles, the Piajes of the Caribbees are merely special cases of a universal type, essentially the same in all its different manifestations. Africa, Australia, and the island world of the Pacific are equally familiar with them. Both their performances and the range of ideas that lie behind them belong to a type of religious experience that occurs with the regularity of a natural phenomenon, and most therefore not be regarded as abnormal. Even among Christian peoples of long standing, the smouldering fires of this primitive and emotional type of religion are ever ready to burst out again in renewed flames, and those who feel their warmth are kindled to a more than human sense of life and vigour.<sup>42</sup> Conventionality and traditionalism, even the substitution of a cold and spurious mimicry for real feeling, are of course quite compatible with a form of religion which consists so much in the display of emotion. But even so, the most cautious observers<sup>43</sup> have declared that by such violent stimulation of every sense the "magicians" are thrown into a state of quite unfeigned exaltation. In accordance with the character and content of their normal modes of thought, the hallucinations to which the magicians are subject differ in different cases; but as a general rule their frenzy opens to them a way of immediate intercourse, frequently of complete communion of being, with the gods. This is the only explanation which will account for the fact that, like the inspired *Bakchantes* of Thrace, the magicians and priests of so many peoples are called by the name of the divinity to whom their "enthusiastic" worship elevates them.<sup>44</sup> The impulse to union with God, the extinction of the individual in the divine—these are what form the fundamental points of contact between the mysticism of the most highly cultivated and talented peoples and the emotional religion of primitive "savages". Even the external machinery of excitement and stimulation are not always dispensed with by the mystics: "they are always the same as those with which we are already familiar in the orgiastic religion of primitive peoples—music, the giddy whirl of the dance, narcotic stimulants. Thus (to take the most striking example out of many that might be given) the dervishes of the Orient whirl round in their violent dances to the rattle of drums, and the sound of flutes till the last stages of excitement and exhaustion are reached. The purpose of it all is vividly expressed by the

most fearless of all the mystics, Jelaeddin Rumi, in the words: "He that knows the power of the dance dwells in God; for he has learnt that Love can slay."<sup>42</sup> Allah hu! . . ."

#### § 4

Wherever a cultus of this kind, making its aim and object the evocation of ecstatic raptures, has taken root—whether in whole races of men or in religious communities—there we find in close alliance with it, whether as cause or effect or both, a peculiarly vital belief in the life and power of the soul of man after its separation from the body. Our comparative glance over the analogous phenomena of other lands has shown us that the exalted worship offered to "Dionysos" among the Thracians was only a single variety of a method, familiar to more than half the human race, of getting into touch with the divine by a religious "enthousiasmos". We therefore expect to find among the Thracians a specially strong and well-developed belief in the life of the "soul". And in fact we find Herodotos telling us of a Thracian tribe, the Getai, whose belief "made men immortal".<sup>43</sup> They had only one god, Zalmoxis by name.<sup>44</sup> To this god, who dwelt in a cavernous mountain, all the dead of their race, they believed, would one day be gathered and have immortal life.<sup>45</sup> The same belief was held by other Thracian tribes, too.<sup>46</sup> This creed seems to have had in view the "transplantation"<sup>47</sup> of the dead to a blessed life in the hereafter. But, it would seem, this transplantation was not perhaps for ever. We hear of the belief that the dead would "return"<sup>48</sup> from the other world; and that this idea existed among the Getai is implied (though the narrator does not clearly understand this) by the absurd pragmatizing fable which Herodotos got from the Greek settlers on the Hellespont and the Pontos.<sup>49</sup> In this story (as often in later accounts too) Zalmoxis is actually a slave and pupil of Pythagoras of Samos. Whoever invented this fairy-tale was led to it by observing the close relationship between the Pythagorean doctrine of the soul and the Thracian belief. In the same way later observers of the same fact reversed the positions and made Pythagoras the pupil of the Thracian.<sup>50</sup> In any case the fact cannot be doubted that in Thrace people thought they had found again the special doctrine of Pythagoras as to the *transmigration of souls*. The belief in the "return" of the soul must be interpreted as meaning that the souls of the dead return to life in new bodies and resume their life on earth, to this extent being

"immortal". Only so interpreted could it have been held for a moment without coming into conflict with obvious appearances. An allusion in Euripides seems to regard as Thracian such a belief in a recurrent incarnation of the soul.<sup>72</sup>

We should be justified in expecting to find an inner connexion between this Thracian belief in immortality, which seems to have made such an impression on our Greek informants, and the religion and "enthusiastic" worship of the same people. Nor are traces lacking of a close association of the Thracian worship of Dionysos and Thracian cult of the Souls.<sup>73</sup> But if we ask why the religion of the Thracian Dionysos was attended by a belief in the independent, indestructible life of the soul, a life not confined to the period of its sojourn in the body which at present envelopes it, the answer must be sought not in the nature of the god to whom the cult was offered (that nature being, in fact, insufficiently known to us) but in the nature of the cult itself. The object of that cult—we might almost say its special task—was to exalt its worshippers to a state of "ekstasis" in which their "souls" should be forcibly delivered from the normal circle of their human and circumscribed being, and raised as pure spirits to communion with the god and his company of spirits. The true "Bakchai"<sup>74</sup>—those who were really cast into a state of religious madness—found in the rapture of these orgies a new province of experience open before them: they experience things of which they could give no account in the fully conscious light of ordinary day. There can be no doubt that the experiences and visions that their "ekstasis" gave them were regarded by them as the plainest and most literally real of facts.<sup>75</sup> The belief in the existence and life of a second self distinct from the body and separable from it was already encouraged by the "experiences" of the separate existence and independent behaviour of that self in dreams and fainting fits.<sup>76</sup> How much more strongly and vividly must this belief have been confirmed for those who in the intoxication of those delicious dances had "experienced" for themselves how the soul, freed from the body, could participate in the joys and terrors of the divine existence; not indeed the whole man, body and soul together, but the soul by itself and in separation from the body—the spiritual being invisibly living within the man. The sense of its own divinity, its eternity, which had been blindingly revealed to it in "ekstasis", might be developed by the soul into a lasting persuasion that it was indeed of a divine nature, and called to a divine life which it would enjoy for ever as soon as it was freed from the body,

just as it had then enjoyed it for a moment. No mere intellectual arguments could give such powerful support to a spiritualism of this kind as the personal experience itself which, even in this life supplied a foretaste of what the individual was one day to enjoy as his own for ever.

In some such way as this, the persuasion of an independent, continued existence of the soul after the death of its body was developed into a belief in the divinity and immortality of the soul. In all such cases it was almost inevitable that the naïve distinction between "body" and "soul", natural to simple-minded peoples and individuals, should harden into an *opposition* between the two. The descent from the heights where the ecstatic and emancipated soul enjoyed its thrilling delights was too sudden: the body could not but seem a burden and a hindrance, almost an enemy of the heaven-born soul. Disparagement of the ordinary existence of every day, a turning aside from this life—these are the natural results of such an advanced spiritualism, even though it may have no speculative basis, when it influences so profoundly the religious temperament of a people as yet untroubled by the subtleties of a scientific culture. A trace of such a depreciation of the earthly life of mankind in comparison with the joys of a free spirit-existence is to be found in what Herodotos and other narrators tell of certain Thracian tribes<sup>75</sup> who receive the new-born among their kinsfolk with mourning, and bury their dead with joyful acclamation, for the latter are now beyond the reach of all pain, and are living "in perfect happiness".<sup>76</sup> The cheerfulness with which the Thracians faced death in battle<sup>77</sup> was explained by the persuasion which they held that death was only an entrance into a higher life for the soul. They were even credited with a real desire for death, for to them "dying seemed so fair".<sup>78</sup>

### § 5

Further than this the Thracians—who never quite outgrew a sort of semi-animated torpor of the intellect—could not go on the way marked out for them. The seed of a mystical form of religion that existed in the ecstatic dance-orgies of Dionysos-worship never came to fruition. We never feel with them that we are being taken beyond the region of vague unconscious emotion; it is but a passing illumination that for a moment of wild excitement reveals the near presence of overwhelming spirit-forces.

Not until the flames of such ecstatic worship were fed and nourished by a people of more independent and developed spiritual life, could fitful suggestions be welded into deep and



enduring thought. Reflexion upon the nature of the world and of God, the changing and deceptive flow of appearance with the indestructible One Reality behind it; the conception of a divinity that is One, a single light that, divided into a thousand rays and reflected from everything that is, achieves its unity again in the soul of man: such thoughts as these, allied to the dim half-conscious impulse of an enthusiastic dance-worship, might allow the pure waters of the stream of mysticism to run clear at last, freed from the turbid and unsatisfying enthusiasm of popular religious practices.

Thus, for example, among the stern and rigid-minded peoples of Islam, with their stiff, uncompromising Monotheism, there arose, no one knows whence, the inspired dance-orgies of the Dervishes, which then spread far and wide carrying with them the mystical doctrine of the Sûfis, that child of the profound mind of India. Man is God; God is All: such was the pronouncement of the inspired poetry—the special contribution in particular of Persia to this religion of mystic ecstasy—now in the most transparent simplicity, now in the most gorgeous magnificence of imagery. In the ecstatic dance, which in this case remained in organic connexion with the mystical doctrine (as the soil of the maternal earth with the flowers which she puts forth) new strength was ever being added to the spiritual superstructure. Mystical theory was invigorated by the practical experience, in heightened consciousness, of an internal and unquenchable source of undying power and might. The veil of the world was torn aside for the inspired worshipper; the All-One became sensible and intelligible for him; it poured into his own being; the "deification" of the Mystai was realized in him. "Who knows the power of the Dance dwells in God" . . .

Many years before all this, a process of development was completed on Greek soil which has no closer parallel than the special phase of Oriental religion just referred to. Greek religion never indeed (so long at least as the independence of Greek life lasted) went to the extravagant lengths of Oriental mysticism. Even the sense of the infinite had to be expressed by the Greek imagination in plastic form. But for all that, on Greek soil, in the ecstatic Cult of Dionysos, under the influence of Greek reflexion upon God, the world and mankind, the seeds which previously lay undeveloped in the womb of that cult were unfolded in a mystical doctrine, whose guiding principle was the divinity of the human soul and the infiniteness of its life in God. It was from this source that Greek philosophy found the courage to advance a doctrine of the immortality of the soul.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

<sup>2</sup> Pl., Pub. 265 A.

<sup>2</sup> e.g. Cacl. Anet. (i.e. Sorazou), *Morb. Chr.* I, § 144 ff.; Anet. *Chron. Pers.* i. 6, p. 84 Kühn [vol. 24].

<sup>1</sup> Even the late interpolated passages *B* 325, at 74, are not quite conclusive. Apart from these the statement of Sch. i 196 applies strictly throughout both poems: το μὴ παρακρίδω "Ομῶς δὲ νεώτερον λέγειν ἐπὶ τῷ, *Lehrs, Arist.*<sup>3</sup> p. 181.

<sup>4</sup> Z 132 ff. The scene is evidently meant to be a Bacchic festival. This is shown by the *αἶψα*, which the *Διονυσιοὶ ἑσθλὰ* let fall out of their hands. All the rest is obscure. Even in antiquity no one knew who the *ἑσθλὰ* of Dionysos really were, and hence alternative suggestions were all the more numerous: cf. Nauck, *Fr. Trag.*, p. 17; Voigt, in Roscher's *Mythol. Lex.*, i, 1049. It can hardly be necessary (with Sch. A on Z 126) to deduce from the reference to *ἑσθλὰ* that Dionysos himself was regarded as *ἑσθλός* *ἐν καὶ ναῖς*. His former *ἑσθλὰ* follow him in the Bacchic festival even after he has grown up, exactly as in A. Hom. xxvi, 3, 7-10. of *Διονυσίου ἑσθλὰ* as the frenzied mob worshipping the god. *τῷ δὲ θεῷ ὀφθαλμοῖσιν* (in Thessaly), come in D.S. 3, 50, 4, in a parallel narrative to the story of Lykourgos and the Nainads. With the conception of the god as *ἄκρως* neither his leap into the sea (Z 135 ff.), nor esp. the adj. *μακρόχροος* (132) are in harmony. This last word does certainly give us pause. The accounts provided by later ages of the madness of Dionysos are obviously made up from the lines of Homer and are therefore of no use to us (already ap. Eumelos in the *Εἰπωρία*, Schol. AD. Z 131; then Pherekydes, Achaïos *δὲ ἱππὸς* in Philo., *Plot.*, p. 26 [Nauck, *Fr. Trag.*, p. 751]; E., Cye. 3. [Apollod.] iii, 5, 1, is prob. derived from Pherec. as are also Philistos *fr.* 57, *PHG.* i; Pl., *Lg.* 672 B; Nic. *Ὀδυσσ.* *fr.* 30 Schn., etc.). Scholaristic interpreters even thought

certainly in this case a sort of mythological or sacramental hypallage: the state of mind brought about by the god in those who surround him is reflected back on to the god himself (*παρέμυτοι Δίῳ*, E. Ba. 130; cf. the mad nurses of Dionysos, Nonn., D. ix, 38 ff.). It would not be hard to parallel this (e.g. *Dionysos, who makes men drunk is represented as himself drunk*, Ath. 438 E. etc.).

\* X 480, *μεινὰς δὲ ποσσὶν παύειν λόγ, ἠδὲ κούρην κροῖσιν*. The evidence of this passage for the familiarity of Homer's audience with the nature of the *Μαίνας* cannot be set aside as Lob., *Ag.* 285, tries to do. The word could only be used as an *ειρὼν* if the thing were often before men's eyes. *μαίνας*, indeed, is even something different from, and more specialised than *μαῖνομαι* (Z 369).

\* The view that *melancholia* was primitive in the cult of D., the wine, etc., being added later, was definitely put forward in 1825 by O. Müller (*Ni. Schr.* ii, 28 ff.) arguing against J. H. Voss. But it is only in quite recent times that in tracing the origin of the religion of Dionysos occasional inquirers have taken this view as their starting point: cf. esp. Voigt in his noteworthy treatment of Dionysos in Roemer's *Myth. Lex.* i, 1028 ff.

<sup>†</sup> *De universali deorum deificatione*, Edt. iv, 78.

\* E.g. the Odrysi, who, however, lived further north in the Hebrus valley: *Atta*, ii, 17, mentions distinctly the mountain chains of Haimos, Rhodope, and Orbelos as sacra Liberi patriæ et cœtæ Macedoniae celebrationes.

<sup>1</sup> *Loc. cit.* Agl. 280 A.

<sup>2</sup> Sabazios: *Σαβάζιος* *vêr* *diônosos* of *Θησέας* *καλοῦμαι* Sch. Ar., *Vox* 9; cf. Sch. Ar., *Lys.* 388; D.S. 4. 4. 1; *Rarp. Zepot*; Alex. Polyh. ap. *Maer.* i, 16, 11 (*Sabazius*; cf. *Apul.*, *M.* vii, 28, p. 150, 11 *Fy.* The original form of this name seems to have been *Savos*, *Savadios*, *Kretschmer, Einleitung in d. griech. Spr.* 198 f.; *Usener, Götternamen* 44). *Sabos*, *Phot.* p. 495, 11-12 *Porp. Hesych.* s.v.; *Orph.*, *H.* 49, 2, etc. The fact that others could call Sabazios a Phrygian god (*Amphitheros* v. *Ἡρακλῆς* *f* ap. Sch. Ar., *Ar.* 874; *Str.* 470; *Hsch.* s.v.), only serves to bring out more clearly the opinion, unanimously held even in antiquity, that the Thracians and the Phrygians were closely related. Sabazios (besides being identified with *Hekios*: Alex. Polyh. l.c.; cf. *Soph. fr.* 323 N.), as the supreme and almighty god of the Thracians, was even called *Zeûs Σαβάζιος* (*Val. Max.* i, 3. 7), esp. on ins. (a few are given in *Rapp. Dionysiacis* [*Progr.*] p. 21); cf. also ins. from *Peiræus* 'Εφ. 'Αρχ. 1863, p. 245; *Ins. Per. om.* i, 248, 33, 49; from *Prindia, Papers of the Amer. School at Athens*, ii, p. 54, 56. *Jová Sabazia*, *Orch.*, *Ins.* 1259). We even find *Zeûs Βάκχος*, *Zeûs Ἡλῖος* (*BCH.* vi, 189).—The name *Σαβάζιος* was derived from *σαβάζω* = *εὐάζω*, *ἐκ τῶν γενόμεθα περὶ εὐάζειν εὐαγμένον* (*δυναμῶν*): Sch. Ar., *Ar.* 874; *Lys.* 388. So, too, *Βάκχος* was on this view only another way of expressing the same meaning: since this name also was derived by the ancients from *βάλλω* = *εὐάζω* (it is really from the root *Paq* (*ἰσχύω*) *Βάκχος*, with "affrication": a reduplicated form of it is *Βαβαγος*, *ἰσχυος*, *ἰσχύω*, *ἰσχυέω*; cf. *Curtius, Griech. Etym.*, p. 480, 576). Other names of the Thracian *Dionysos* are the following: *Βανναρές* (*Βανναρος*, *Orph.*, *H.* 45, 2), derived from *βανναρῆς* the long dress (made of skin?) worn by the *Βανναρῆς* = *Θησῖαι* *Βάκχαι*, *AB.* 222, 38 f.; *Hsch.* s.v. *Βανναρος* and *EM.* s.v. (the last compiled from *Orion* and *Sch. Lyc.* 771). Other accounts (not contradicting in this point the statement of *Hsch.*) made it the dress worn by the god himself: Sch. *Pers.* i, 101. (The *Βανναρῆς* was generally described as bearded and even *senili specie*, like the representation of *Dionysos* himself in the oldest Greek art: *Maer.* i, 18, 9.) If *Βανναρῆς* means "the wearer of the long fox-skin" we should be strongly reminded of the—also Thracian—god *Σάλλμαλς* (*Σάλλμαλς*), whose name was derived from *σαλμός* = *δερὶ δάκτυλου* (*Porph.*, *VP.* 14, though this comes only from *Antoniûs Diogenes* 6), and probably means "he who is clothed in the bearskin" (see *Fick, Sprachsch.*, d. *Indog. Europ.*, p. 418; *Hehn, Kulturpflanzen*, 428 E.T.).—*Γίγας* a name of *Dionysos*, *EM.* 231, 29: perhaps a name given to the god in the city *Gigones* mentioned in the same passage, and the *δρυς Γίγας* at the western end of the Thracian *Chalkidike*.—*EM.* 188, 32, is too short to be intelligible: *βαλδ. δειροσίριδος. καὶ τῶν διδύμων ὄφθες*.—*Διῶτης διδύμων* *κατὰ Πτολεμ.*, *Hesych.*

<sup>3</sup> At any rate the people whom *Thuc.*, *Ephoros*, and others call Thracians and regarded as having been once settled in *Phokis*, *Bocotia*, etc., are undoubtedly to be considered Thracians—and not the impossibly honest and exemplary people, a creation of the fancy, the "Thracians of the Muses", alleged to be quite distinct from the real Thracian peoples, of whom we have heard so much since *R. O.*

Müller (*Orskow*, 379 ff.) introduced the idea. Antiquity only knew of one kind of Thracians. In the Homeric poems they are not so different from the Greeks in civilization as they were in later times, when we know them from the accounts of Herod. and Xen. For all that they are the same people. They seem in the course of time to have degenerated, or rather they have not shared in the progress made by others and so have remained backward (even behind their Phrygian relatives who wandered to Asia Minor and achieved a higher culture under Semitic influence). In fact, like the Keltoi, they were never able to get beyond a condition of semi-civilization.

<sup>12</sup> *μυρία δακρυῶν δμολαία*. Aesch. in the *Hērmoi* ap. Str. 470-1 (*fr.* 57), is the locus classicus for the music in the Thracian festival of Dionysos. Apart from this it is impossible to distinguish in the accounts given by our ancient authorities, between the strictly Thracian festival and the *ideal* generalized festival of Dionysos (not the mitigated ceremonial actually used in the festival in Greece). They merge completely into each other.

<sup>13</sup> *οὐδέτερον* = *οὐδέτερον*, Schol. Ar., *Av.* 874; *Lys.* 388.

<sup>14</sup> *αἱ δάκρυα οὐκ αὖτις*. Diogen., *Prov.* iii, 43.

<sup>15</sup> Complete revolution round one's own axis, as in the dance of a dervish, is known at least only in the more fanatic dance-festivals of antiquity: *στροφὴν ἐκασήμερον ὡς περ αἱ κότερον ἑκαστόντες*, Herod. 4, 17, p. 116, 1 Bk. *δίσκοις τῶν στροφῶντων* in Phrygia: Horus ap. *EM.* 278, 32. Crusius, *Philol.* 35, 585, compares besides Verg., *A.* vii, 377 ff.; Alex. Aphr., *Prob.*, p. 8 Us. In the Spartan dance *ἱερὰλλας* (?) Scyllenii and Satyræ appeared *ὀρχομένοι ὑνέστροχα* [*ὑνέστροχα* acc. to Meineke: perhaps better]. Poll. 4, 104.

<sup>16</sup> *E.*, *Da.* 118 ff., 604 ff. Thracian: *ασιδουῖς* Edonis *ἑσσα χοροῖς* qualis in herboso concidit Apidano, Prop. 1, 3, 5 f.

<sup>17</sup> *Bassarai*: Thracian acc. to Sch. Pers. i, 101; worn by *βάραι* Hesch. *βασσαί*. Lydian, too: *ἄνους χιτῶνας βασσάρας* or *Αυδίας* *ἔχει* *μετέσσει*, A. *ἐν* *Ἡδμοῖς*, *fr.* 59; cf. Poll. 7, 59. "Perhaps a Phrygian word that has penetrated into Lydia," Kretschmer, *Einleitung*, 390. The worship of Dionysos which had also presumably come from Phrygia, was esp. popular in Lydia.

<sup>18</sup> Familiar in the Bacchic ceremonial of Greece; but occurring already in Thrace: Aesch. in *Ἡδμοῖς* (dealing entirely with Thracian customs) mentions the *νεβρίδες*, and in the same place has *εὐψίβας* as well (*fr.* 64).

<sup>19</sup> The *δίσκοι* of Macedonia and the *Μιμαλῶνες*, in all respects resembling the Thracian Bacchantes. *κερατοφόροις κατὰ μίμους δαμένω*: Sch. Lye. 1237 (*Αἰφροῖς κερατοφόροις γυναικας*).

<sup>20</sup> *Mentis inops rapitur, quales audire solentus Thracias passis* *Macedanas ire comia*, Ov., *F.* iv, 457 f.

<sup>21</sup> *Thphr.* Ca. 16 (28, p. 141 Jebb); Artemid. 2, 13, p. 106, 9 H.

<sup>22</sup> Snakes and daggers are found in the hands of the *μιμαλῶνες* καὶ *βασσάραι* and *ῥαβδοὶ* in the train of Ptol. Philad.: *Καλλίππος* ap. Ath. 198 E. Snakes and *δαίματα* belong to the paraphernalia of the *ἑσπεροὶ* τοῖς *Ὀρφικοῖς* καὶ τοῖς *κατὰ τὸν δαίμονα ἄρχασμοῖς* γυναικας in Macedonia, and of the *Κλώβωνες* καὶ *Μιμαλῶνες* who walk τὰς *Ἡδμοῖς* καὶ τοῖς *κατὰ τὸν Ἄλφειον* *Θεῖον* *ἔθνος* *δαίμων*, Plu., *Alex.* 2 (in connexion with the snake of Olympia). She was especially given to the Thruko-Dionysian mysteries: cf. the letter of Olympia to Alexander, Ath. 689 F.—*ἔθρονος* of the Macedonian *Μιμαλῶνες*: *Polyaen.* 4, 1; Sch. Pers. 1, 99.—"Even now" the thyrsos wands are decked with ivy in the *Τάμελας* *populis salomonibus sacris*, Plu.,

NH. xvi, 144.—The *κύρην* of the thyrsos is really a shepherd's staff: Clem. Al., *Protr.* ii, p. 14 P.

= *Exx.*, Ba. 735 B. and frequently.

... *καὶ οἱ δὴσυνετοὶ* in the Thracio-Macedonian worship of Dionysos: Plin., *Alex.* 2. (The Mimaëones *δωτισαντες* *καὶ νυν* *Εἰβρι*, Sch., Pers. i, 98.) *οἱ τῷ Εὐσελίῳ κέντροι*: Porph. ap. Iav.

3, 2, p. 117, 16. *Βάκχοι δὲ μενέδοντες*, Eust. 8249: § 16. *Κλαῖον*. . . the name given to the *μενέδοντες* *καὶ βάκχοι* *ἐν τῷ παρόντι γινόμενοι*. *κλαῖον*, *EAf.* 531, 50. *οἱ κέντροι τοῖς ἐπὶ τῷ δίδοντι ὀργασμοῖς*, Plin., *Is. et Os.* 35, p. 364 F.

<sup>14</sup> *ὁ βάκχονος καὶ ποσειδωνίου ἐνδομαζέου*. *μέγας δὲ τὸ ποσειδωνίου* *θεῶν*, Philo., *Gal. Com.* 2, ii, p. 473 M.

<sup>15</sup> So too the wild shaking and whirling-round of the head, which acc. to innumerable literary and pictorial descriptions was a regular feature of the Bacchic dance and cult, must have contributed—and was so intended—to bring about the condition of ecstasy and frenzy (*ἐκστασις* *ἐν κέντρῳ*, Pl., *fr.* 208: *κῆρυ* *οἶνον*, E., Ba. 185, etc.).—How such fanatic shaking of the head, if kept up for along time, is by itself sufficient, in persons naturally predisposed to it, to bring on complete religious *ecstasis*, may be learnt from a remarkable account in Moreau *de kachisch*, p. 290 ff., derived from personal observation in the East.

<sup>16</sup> The object of the trieteric festival of Dionysos (repeated every second year) held in so many places in Greece (cf. Weniger, *Dionysos-feste* in *Ellis*, Progr. 1863, p. 8) was to celebrate the presence of the god. This is clearly shown by D.S. 4, 3, 2, who also attributes the trieteric festival to the Thracians: *τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις* "Ἐλλήνων καὶ Θράκων . . . *καταβίβου* *τὰς τριηγεῖδας* *βουλες* *διάρου* *καὶ τὸν θεὸν* *καίβου* *κατὰ τὸν χρόνον* *ταύτης* *σταθείας* *τὰς* *ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀεθρήμοις* *ἐμφανείας*. At this time women and maidens celebrated *τὴν* *εὐφροσύνην* *τοῦ* *διοῦ*. (In the archaic song of the Eleian women the Bull-god is thus called upon: Plin., *QG.* 34, 299 A: *Is. et Os.* 35, p. 364 F; whereas the Eleians believed that *τὸν θεὸν* *εὐφροσύνην* *ἐκ* *τῆς* *Θέρας* *τῆς* *δορυ*: Paus. 6, 28, 1.)—For Bakhche amongst the dancers see E., Ba. 185 ff., 306 L, and often. At the trieteric festival at Delphi *διόνυσος* . . . *παρὰ τὴν πύλιν* *καίβου* *κατὰ τὸν χρόνον* *ταύτης* *σταθείας*, E., *Hypsip.* *fr.* 752. And so often in poetry: see Nauck on S., *OT.* 213: *Ani.* 1126 ff.—Thracian trieteric festival: two motes proles Semelcis thyrsos Ismariac celebrant repetita triennia bacchae, Ov., *M.* ix. 641 f.; *tempus erat, quo sacra solent trieterica Barcho Sithoniac celebrare iuvus*; *nox comicia sacra*, etc., vi, 387.

<sup>17</sup> *ἐμφανείας* followed by *ἐμφανείας* of Dionysos represent, as we frequently learn, the varying relationship of the god with mankind. These are alternating and periodically repeated, and they are reflected in the trieteric period of the festivals. It is customary to explain this disappearance and return of the god as an allegorical typification of the destruction and restoration of vegetation. There is no reason at all to believe this, except for those who regard the doctrines of the Greek "Religion of Nature" as infallible axioms. The god is simply, and in the literal sense of the words, regarded as removed for a time from the world of men, during which period he is in the world of spirits. In the same way Apollo, according to the Delphic legend, is carried away from the human world for certain periods: he lives during that time among the Hyperboreans, whose land is inaccessible to mortal foot or ship. We ought not to be afraid to make use of the light thrown on these matters by parallel legends of the temporary disappearance

of gods among uncivilized peoples (the god may be sometimes asleep or under constraint; cf. *Plu., Is. et Os.*, 68 ff. 378 F); cf. what we are told in Dobrichoffer's *Geach. d. Abip.* II, p. 63 (E.T.), about the beliefs held by the Abipones of Paraguay; or, again, what is said of the negro races of West Africa, according to whom the god normally lives in the depths of the earth, but at regularly recurring intervals comes up to visit men; whereupon the members of a mystical society build him a house, receive his oracles, etc.; Réville, *Rel. des peuples non-cit.* I, 110-11. Thus Dionysos, too, is for a time in the underworld, in the world of spirits and the souls. This is clearly presupposed by the festival at Lerna, in which Dionysos is called up out of the bottomless spring Alkyonia by which there was an entrance to Hades (just as the inhabitants of Kos every year *ἀνακαλέοντες* Hygie out of his spring, i.e. from the underworld: H. Türk, *De Hygie*, p. 31.; Welcker, *Alt. Schr.* I, 12; and see Maass, *Litt. Ztg.* 1896, 7-8). Hence also in Lerna a lamb was offered as a victim *τὸ πρῶτόν*, i.e. to Hades himself, and was thrown into the spring (*Plu., Is. et Os.* 38, p. 368 F. ing *Σοκράτης ἐπὶ τοῦ Ὀπίου*: *Smp.* 4, & 2, p. 671 E;

2. 36, 7; 37, 5-6). Because he is in the realm of the dead a pragmatical myth represented him as slain by Perseus and thrown into the spring of Lerna: *Loeb., Agl.* 674. In Delphi, too, something was known of the death and reawakening of Dionysos, but we have in *Orph., H.* 53, a quite unambiguous expression of the real conception, acc. to which D. "rested in the house of Persephone", and appears again in the upper world at the time of the trieteric festival when he *δυσκοί* his *μῦθος*, *εὐδίζον* *κατὰ* *τὰ* *χρόνια*. We may be all the more certain that the same idea is to be attributed to the trieteric festival in Thrace, since the same belief exactly occurs again in the legend of the Thracian (Getic) god Zalmoxis (see below)—he was believed to have disappeared into his infernal kingdom among the spirits and souls and to have made periodical returns to the world of the living. The reason why Dionysos, as worshipped both in Thracian and Greek trieteric festivals, stops for a time in the underworld of the souls, is clear enough: that too was his realm. We can now understand why it is that Dionysos is also ruler over the souls and can be called *Ζῳσιεύς*, *Μυροδότης*, *Ψυχολάτρης*: i.e. he is simply given names of Hades himself (*Plu., E ap. D.* ix, p. 368 A). His real character of master of the souls and spirits (*ἀρχὴ*, *ἄρως*), as it had been originally in the Thracian cult, was thus preserved, in spite of much alteration in its Greek form, partly in Greek local cults, partly in the Orphic cult of Dionysos.—There is a legend which is based on a reminiscence of this periodic disappearance of Dionysos to the underworld, viz. the thoroughly Greek story of his descent on a single occasion into Hades in order to bring back Semele. Elsewhere his disappearance into the realm of the spirits gave rise to the legend of his escape and flight to the Muses; this was spoken of in the *Agriaia* at Chairmeia (*Plu., Smp.* 8 Praef.).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *Eur., Ba.* 920 ff. 1020 f.

<sup>15</sup> *ταυροδωκίαι*. *Ὁ* *ἀνομιμασμένος* *νόθος* *ἐξ* *ἀδελφῆς* *ἀδελφοῦ* *μήτρας*: A. Hübner describing the Thracian worship of D. (*Jr.* 57). This was "certainly intended to increase for the participants in the festival the feeling of the god's presence and thus to add to the wildness of their cries", as Rapp, *Dionysos*, 18, very rightly observes. The invisible bellowing bull is the god himself. (Dionysos appears as a bull to the insane Pentheus: *E., Ba.* 920 ff.)—"The Batdoka, a tribe in the Northern Transylvania, hold a yearly festival of the dead in which

hidden magicians make weird sounds with flutes which the people take for the voice of spirits: they say 'Modimo is there'." Schneider, *Relig. d. Afrikan. Natur*, 142.

<sup>12</sup> The women taking part in the trieteric festival of the god play the part of the *μυρίδες* in his train: D.S. 4, 3, 3. Imitation of the *Νέμεσος* *καὶ αἱ Πέρες αὐτὴν* *Ζεῦλον καὶ Ἐρμῆν* in the *θυσία*: Pl., *Lg.* 815 C. What was afterwards merely a piece of traditional ritual was originally without doubt a real hallucination of the *αἰρέσις*.—The idea that a throng, *θίασος*, of wood-spirits Satyrs and Seilenoi danced about the God must also have been common in the Thracian cult (*συγχωρεταὶ δαίμονες*, Acl., *I.H.* iii, 40: *ὁ τῷ δαίμονι συμπαρόντος ὄχλος*, Ath. 362 E). *σαυδάμ* (obviously related to *Σαβάζω*; cf. Usener, *Götternamen*, 44 f.) was the name given to *αἱ αὐληταὶ* by the Macedonians, who in the practice of Dionysos-worship were entirely dependent upon the Thracians. Hsch. s.v., cf. Hdt. viii, 138 ff.

<sup>13</sup> The *θιαγεῖσθες* τῷ θεῷ (i.e. Sabazios, Sabra) are called *αἰθεῖ* *καὶ νόβη* *καὶ νοβάζω*: Phot., *αἰθεῖ*; cf. Eust., *δ* 16, p. 2431, 48. Harp. (Phot.) *αἰθεῖ*; Phot., *καποσαβάζω* (p. 383, 16 Pors.); Sch. Ar., *As.* 874. This identification of the god with his ecstatic worshippers belongs to the Phrygian cult of Kybele as well. Just as the goddess is called *Κυβέβη* *ὁ κατεχόμενος τῇ μῆτι τῶν θεῶν* is called *Κύβητος*: Phot., *Κύβητος*, *αἰθεῖ*, Eust. *δ* 16. Thus the Greeks in calling the ecstatic worshippers of Hekchos by the name of the god were only adopting the conceptions and vocabulary of the Thracian religion of inspiration into their Dionysos-worship which was modelled on the Thracian cult. *Βάκχος* is their name for the *ὄργανός* τοῦ θεοῦ (etymologically connected in *βαβάζω* [*κραύγαστος*, *ὄβρις* *καὶ* *Βάκχος* Hsch.] a Phrygian word for the frenzied priest of Kybele: and therefore = *Κύβητος*; cf. Hubbock, *Alaron*, p. 86). It appears that the *Βάκχοι* of Dionysos were often called by the old Thracian name *αἰθεῖ*: *αἰθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἐν ἐστὶ πολλοὶ τῶν Βάκχων ἐκδοσόν*, Plu., *Συμπ.* 4, 6, 2, p. 671 F (*Αἰφύριος* is also a name given, after *δαίμονος* *Αἰφύριος*, to the *Βάκχοι* who worship him: Lyc. 1237 with Sch.).

<sup>14</sup> *δαίμονος ὁράβιος* (Porph., *Ab.* ii, 55), *ἀμφοῖς* (Plu., *Them.* 13), *λαφόνιος*, *ταυροφάγος* (Soph., *fr.* 607 N.).—At other times we catch a glimpse of the idea that the god himself is the torn and devoured bull (just as in many ancient worship the proper victim of the god is the animal most homogeneous with him): this is evidently the most primitive form of *θεο-σφαγισμός*, the primeval symbolism of a mystic worship that, like all mysticism, desires to take personal possession of the God.

<sup>15</sup> Dionysos himself also carries the thyrsos (as often in sculpture): E., *Hyp.* *fr.* 752, etc.

<sup>16</sup> See above, n. 19 (*ὁ βούκερος* "Ιάκχος, Soph., *fr.* 874, *ταυροφάγος* *θεός*, E., *Ba.* 100). The Greek Dionysos is often described as bull-shaped and horned: this, too, in imitation of Thracian belief. It is Sabazios whom they *κερατὶας παραδιδύμου*, D.S. 4, 4, 2; cf. J. 64, 2. "Ἐν ταυροφάγῳ, Euphor. *fr.* 16.—An allusion in D.S. 4, 4, 2 seems to suggest that the god, the *μυρδαμοφῶς*, was also (like Attis) regarded as a herdman. Something of the sort may be referred to in the unintelligible lines quoted by Cl. Al., *Prot.* ii, p. 14 P., apparently in connexion with the Sabazios mysteries. So Dionysos, too, is sometimes thought of as a *βουκόλος*: *ποιμένη* *δ'* *ἀγρὰν* *αὐτῶν*, *ἀδὲς* *ἀλκυόνα* *αἰὲν* *μυροφάγον* are words used of him in [Orph.] *Lia.* 280. Again, in imitation of the god himself his *μῦθες* are *βουκόλοι* on the inscriptions from Asia Minor (*Ins. Perg.* ii, 485-8) and Thrac., of

which H. Schöli speaks, *de comuun. et coll. Graecis* (Saturn philol. Soupp.), p. 178 B. *Βουκόλος* occurs among the coll. officials in the *Isotakheia* at Athens: *Atk. Mith.*, 1884, p. 260, l. 122; *archibucolos dei Liberi* in inscriptions of the city of Rome. *Βουκόλος* and *Βουκόλειν* occur in connexion with Bacchic worship as early as Kratinos, Aristoph., and Eurip.; *Βουκόλειον Ζευσιπύος Βούτας*, E., *Crat. fr.* 472, 11 (acc. to Diels). See Crusius, *Rh. M.* 45, 288 f.; *Metensch de hymnis Orph.* (Marb., 1891), p. 3 ff.

<sup>34</sup> The special flute-theories going under the name of Olympus were called *θελα* (Pl., *Atk.* 318 B); *αυτήρεσσαν ποσει* (Pl., *Smp.* 215 C); *ἐμοληγομένης ποσει* τὰς ψυχὰς ὁδονοματικῆς (Arist., *Pol.* 1340a 10). *Chr.*, *Dir.* i, 114: ergo et ei quædam animi, appetit corporibus, evadunt aliquæ excurrunt formas, ardore aliquo inelatis atque inflammatis, cernunt illa profecto quæ vaticinantes præstantur: multisque rebus influantur tales animi quæ corporibus non inhaerent: ut ei qui sunt quidam vocum et Phrygiæ cantibus incitantur. An unmistakable description of what was meant by *ἐκστασις* and Korymbantle steszy (see below).

<sup>35</sup> i.e. those who are *ἐκδομασμένοι κρυμώχιστοι*, as Aristotle knew them: certain *παῖδες θεόφρονες* are known to Plato. Somewhat similar is the *θεῶν θεύζουσαν* which according to Demokritos (*D. Chr.* 36, 1) *fr.* 21 *Met.* belongs to the inspired poet.

<sup>36</sup> The drunkenness of the Thracians and their ancient cultivation of the vine are well known. They even brewed beer from barley: *Atk.* 347 BC (cf. Hehn, *Culturpflanzen*, p. 121 E.T.). The prophetai (prophesying in "enthusiasm") of a Thracian oracle prophesied *φιλονεικία μικτά σumpfio*, Aristot. *ap. Mact.* i, 18, 1.—Even the women drank unmixed wine in Thrace: *Pl.*, *Lg.* 637 E.

<sup>37</sup> *Met.*, 2, 21 (and from him Solin., 10, 8, p. 75, 16 Mom.) says of the Thracians *epulantibus ubi super ignes quos circumnsident quædam nemora inserta sunt, similis ebrietati hilaritas ex sidore contingit* (cf. *Plu.* *de flu.* 3, 3). There can be no doubt that it was hemp-wood (*κάνναβις*) which had this effect. Hdt. iv, 74, says expressly that the Thracians knew hemp. It was this with a sort of hashish (that they intoxicated themselves [hashish is an extract of *cannabis indica*]). The Scythians did something similar: Hdt. tells of their vapour-baths in tightly closed huts (iv, 75): they produced a smoke by laying hempsedds on red-hot stones and—though Hdt. does not say so—must necessarily have got into a state of wild intoxication. This may have been a religious performance. Drunkenness is generally regarded by savage tribes as a religiously inspired condition. Further, the Scythian practice has the most striking parallel in the use of "vapour-baths" among the North American Indians, in which case the religious intention is certain (see the account in Kleram, *Culturg.* ii, 175-8; J. G. Miller, *Amerik. Ueberl.* 92). Hdt. i, 202, also mentions intoxication from the fumes of certain "fruits" among the Massagetai; these last, after they had completely bemused themselves, stood up to dance and sing. The Thracians, too, may very well have used intoxication through hashish-fumes as a means of exciting themselves to their ecstatic religious dances.—The ancients were quite familiar with the practice of inhaling aromatic smoke to produce religious hallucinations: [Galen] *Ep. iorp.* 187 (xix, p. 462 N.) *ἐκδομασμένης τῆς κνήμης ἐκταραμένη τῆς ψυχῆς* (ὁ δὲ ?) τὰν ὁδομασμένην ἐκ τοῖς ἱεροῖς, < φέρονται (om. edd.) > ἐκταρῶν ἢ νυμώχων ἢ αἰλῶν ἢ νυμώχων (scr. νυμώχων) δυνάμετες; cf. *nocturno deliramento potent animum humana externari*, Apul., *Ap.* 43.—For the use of smoke in the



Rhythmic ceremonies see below.—The γοργός λίθος ἐνθαυμαστικός is useful as an ἐνθαυμαστικός ἄλκοος (Nimrod, v, 146); it brings on the convulsions of the victim of ἐπὶ νόσος (epilepsy) (Orph.) L. 478 ff. (cf. further Damigeron, *de Lap.* 20, p. 179 Ab.; Plin., *NH.* 36, 141; and also Gal. xii, p. 203 K.).

\* Plin., *Persica*, ii, 245 ff.—We have only to read the accounts derived from personal experience of the sensations and hallucinatory states accompanying hashish-smoking—such as those given, for instance, by Moreau (de Tours) *Des haschisch et de l'aliénation mentale* (Paris, 1845), esp. pp. 23 ff., 51 ff., 59 ff., 90, 147 ff., 151 ff., 368 ff.—to have a complete parallel to the condition which underlay Bacchic excitement. There, too, is the complete *ecstasy* of the spirit, a waking dream-state, an *ἐκστατικός* κατάστασις. It only requires the special tone and character given to the hallucinations and illusions by deep-rooted religious or fanciful conceptions—and the external machinery for cultivating such illusions—to make them an exact equivalent of the delirious condition of the real βάνης at the nightly festival of Dionysos. (The helpless state of impressionability to outward—e.g. musical—and inward influences is a marked feature of the intoxication and *fantasia* of hashish.) Other narcotics also have similar effects (Moreau, p. 184 ff.).

\* Pl., *Ion*, 534 A (perhaps an allusion to the words of Aischylos Socr. in the *Alkestis* (Aristid. *RA.* ii, 23 f. Dind.)).

\* E., *Bo.* 142 f., 706 ff. (144 *Συγὰς δ' ὡς λιβέρον κενός*).

\* Anæsthesia of the Bakchai: *ὅτι δὲ βραχέως οὐκ ἔμενεν οὐδ' ἔμενεν*, *Bo.* 757 l.—*num Bacche non sentit saucia volens, dum stupet Edonia exultans iugis*, Ov., *Tr.* 4, 1, 41 f. *qualis deo petrusa maenas . . . atque experti sui volens dedit nec sensit*, Sen., *Troad.* 682 ff. Similar insensibility to pain (certainly not always *igned*) was shown in their ekstasis by the self-wounding galls of Kybele, the priests and priestesses of Μά (Tibull. 1, 6, 45 ff.)—something of the sort is reported of the prophets of Baal (1 Kings xviii, 28). See in general on the subject of anæsthesia and the *ἀπὸ τοῦ νεκρῆς οὐκ εἶναι* *θεῶν*, *Isaiah*, *Myst.* 3, 4, p. 110 Par. In the case of the shamans, the Indian Yogis, the dervishes, and the natives of North America the existence of such states of insensibility in religious excitement has been actually observed.

\* *κατεχόμενος* *ὡς* *καὶ* *θεός* (Pl., *Men.* 98 D; X., *Sym.* i, 10. *κατεχόμενος ὡς* *καὶ* *βάνης*, Pl., *Ion*, 534 A; *Sym.* 213 C. *μανίει* *τε* *καὶ* *κατασχομένη* *Phil.* 244 E). *ὅ δ' ἄρ' ὁρᾷ ἐξ ἑστῆς καὶ καταστροφῆς* *κόρος* (Aristot., *ἐπὶ φρονέει* *δ' ὡς* *φρονέει*, *de Beætiis* *κατεχόμενος*, E., *Bo.* 1122 ff. *πάντες* *above*, p. 24).

\* *ἐκστατός* *τε* *γίνεται* *καὶ* *ἐκστατός* *καὶ* *δὲ* *τοῦ* *πάντος* *δε* *πᾶσι* *ἐκστατός*, Pl., *Ion*, 534 B (where it is applied to the inspired poet but properly belongs to the Bakchai).

\* *ἐκστατός*, *ἐκστατός* is often used of the inspired state. *μανία*, *ἐκστατός*, *ἐκστατός* *γίνεται*, *ἐκστατός* are all used in the same sense and apply to the "inspired" prophets (*βάνης*, *ἱερεῖς*) and the poets: *Arist.*, *Prob.* 30, 1, p. 854a, 34-9. *ἐκστατός* *καὶ* *μανία*, *Arist.*, *RA.* 6, 22, p. 577a, 12. The religious *ἐκστατός*, *ἐκστατός* *φύξις* *ἐκστατός*: *Philostr.* ap. *Stob.*, *Fl.* iv, 23, 81a, p. 583 H. *ἐκστατός* is a state in which the soul seems estranged from itself: when the *ὁλκίος* *πρόφως* *οὐκ* *ἐκστατός* *ἀλλ'* *ἐκστατός* *ἐκστατός* (*Arist.*, *Pa. Nat.* 464a, 25). The word became weak and commonplace enough in later usage, but it was evidently meant, originally, to express the "out" of the "soul" from its body. In the same way.

goes off into a faint : *τὸν δ' ἔλκεν θυγὴ* originally meant the same thing and was so understood, see above (chap. i, p. 8). The same idea occurs again in *P. Mag. Par.*, l. 725, p. 83 Wessely: *κατέλυτο δ' ἔπειτα + θυγὴ καὶ οὐκ ἐν στανῶν ἔπειτα θρασυεισχυρίζεται* (the god conjured up).

<sup>13</sup> *ἐκστασις ἐστὶν ἀλογισχότος μαρία* (Galen) *de iatr.* 485 (xix, p. 462). *μανὴς ἐκστασις ἐστὶν χρόνος* Aetiacus, *Chr. Pasc.* i, 6, p. 78 K.

<sup>14</sup> *Διδόνουσαν μετὰ τὴν ἀργαλίστου βίαν, ἀποφύγι τῆς ἰερομανίας ὄντες, καὶ τελειοῦσαι τὰς κραινομίας τὸν φόνον ἀεστερμύου* τοῖς δέοντι ἐπολεμάσαντες εὐδία, Clem. Al. *Protr.* ii, p. 11 P.

<sup>15</sup> The ἐκστασιώντες ἐκ θεοῦ τινος become like the god, λαμβάνουσι τὸ εἶδη καὶ τὰ ἐκτελεστέα (τοῦ θεοῦ), καθέσας ὁμοίαν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπων μετασχύν, Pl., *Phdr.* 233 A. More boldly λατῶν ἐκστασις ὅλων ἐκτελεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ἐκτελεῖν, Procl. in *Ar.* ii, 108, 23 K.—οὐκ ἐκστασις ἀπλως οὕτως ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ (in its positive sense) ἐπὶ τὸ κραιττον ἐκφυγὴ καὶ μεταστροφή, Iamb. *Myet.* 3, 7, p. 116, 9 Parth.

<sup>16</sup> *Ἰθεοὶ γυναικὲς* of the Bakkhai, S. *Ant.* 963, αἱ βίαιαι θῆναι ἰθεοὶ γίνονται—Aesch. *Socr.* ap. Aristid., *Rh.* (ii, 23 Dind.). Ἰθεοὺς εἶναι ἢ μανίῃ (the religious sort) Aret., p. 84 K. The essential meaning of ἰθεοὺς εἶναι (frenum esse doc) is clearly defined in Sch. E., *Hir.* 141: Ἰθεοὺς λέγουσι αἱ ἐκὸς φάσματός τινος ἀφαιρέσιντες τὸν νοῦν, καὶ οὐκ ἐκείνου τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ φασματωμένου παρεχόμενοι καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα καὶ οὐ νοοῦντες. The ἰθεοὺς is completely in the power of the god; the god speaks and acts through him. The ἰθεοὺς has lost his consciousness of himself: like the *θεῖα ἑδρα* (which phrase in Plato has the same meaning as *ἐνθεὸς ἑδρα*) esp. the *θεομαντεῖς*, λέγουσι μὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ πᾶσι, ἵσασι δ' οὐδὲν ὅν λέγουσι, Pl., *Men.* 98 C. (Phil., *Spec. Leg.* ii, p. 343 M., sayn of the inspired prophet: *ἐκστασις γυναικὸς ἐν ἑσπέρῃ, μεταστοχάζειν μὲν τοῦ λογισμοῦ . . . ἐκτελεσθέντος δὲ καὶ ἐκμαχέτος τοῦ θεοῦ ἀνείματος καὶ τῶν ὅτι φῶνται ἀργασιῶν κραιττονες κτλ.*: cf. Iamb., *Myet.* 3, 4, p. 109.)

<sup>17</sup> *Ἰθεοὺς μάντις* (Bakkhai, Sibyllai) Arist., *Pol.* 30, 2, 954a. 37. *θεομαντεῖς* Pl., *Men.* ad An. *μαντιὰ κατὰ τὸ ἰθεόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐκστασις* [Hec.] *Phac.* Phil. 6, 1, 1 [Dor., p. 415].

<sup>18</sup> *μάντις δ' ὁ βαίμων εἶναι* (Plonysus): τὸ γὰρ βοαγέμενος καὶ τὰ μαντικὰ μαντικὴν καλλῶν ἔχει. οὐκ γὰρ ὁ θεὸς αἰετὸς οὐδ' ἐλθὼν πάλαι, λέγειν τὰ πᾶσι τοῖς μεμνημένοις νοεῖ, E., *Ba.* 298 E. Here the inner relationship of the inspiration *μαντιὰ* and the "possession" which took place in ecstatic frenzy is expressed with all possible richness (drunkenness is surely not referred to). This is how Plu., *Symp.* 7, 10, p. 718 B, also understood Eur. *Prophesizing Maenads*: *μαντικὰς θυσίας* P., *Ba.* 224—οὐδὲν ἴσους ἐφάπτεται μαντικῆς ἐκείνου καὶ ἀληθείας, ἀλλ' ἢ καὶ ὅταν τῇν τῆς φροσύνης μεθυσθῇ βίοντες ἢ καὶ κῆρος ἢ θεῶν πρὸς ἐκστασιᾶν παρελλάξας, Pl., *Ti.* 71 E. *νοεῖσθαι μαντικῇ ἢ ἐκστασιᾶν* make inspired *μάντις* what they are: Arist. *Prob.* 984a, 35. Such *μαντιὰ* takes place in the state of *fury*, cum a corpore animus abstractus divinis instinctu concitatur, Cic., *De.* i, 88. A famous case is that of Cassandra from whom the deus inclinus corpore humano, non iam Cassandra loquitur, §47: cf. the Sibyl who prophesies *μαντικῶν ὁράων* (Heracit. fr. 12 By. = 92 D.) and the Pythia at Delphi prophesying in a state of *mania*. For the prophecy of Korymbant Phrygians possessed and "frenzied", see Arrian ap. Eust., on D.P. 809.

<sup>19</sup> Hdt. vii, 111 (for Hdt. the *Βακχῶν* seem to be a division, perhaps a clan, of the Satrai. Polyb., Strabo, Pliny, Dio C., and others know them as an independent Thracian tribe):

*ἰσάντες ἐν Δελφοῖς*—which means that it

is that is what the Pythia at Delphi did.

Phu., *Def. Or.* 51, p. 438 R., Lucan vi. 186 B., clearly describes the phenomena supposed to attend their religious *ekstases*: artus Phœbeadon irripit Pagan, mentemque priorem expulsi, atque hominem toto adu crivere iussit pectore. bacchatur deusque allens, etc.)

<sup>14</sup> ὁ Θυγὴ μῆτις διέκρινε, E., *Hæc.* 1367. Rhœsœs dwelling in Mt. Pangæa is βαρύων προφῆτης, R.R. 972. ἀφαιδολογῶν τοῖς Διαιθη-θῆσις ἐπὶ τοῖς διαιθεῖσι μαντεύμα ἐκ θράκης, Paus. 9, 30, R. Aristoteli-qui Theologumena scripsit, apud Ligyreos (?) ait in Thracia esse adytum Liberæ consecratum, ex quo redduntur oracula. Macr. 1, 18, 1. The wife of Spartacus, herself a Thracian, was πορνὴ καὶ κλέπτει τοῖς ἐπὶ τῷ Διόνυσῳ ὄρχησιν, Plu., *Crass.* 8. Octavian in Thracæ consulted in Liberæ patria ludo barbaræ caerimonia, i.e. an oracle: Suet., *Oct.* 94. Even in 11 B.C. the *θεσμοὶ* still had a *ἱερὸς τοῦ διαιθεῖος*, Volageses, who by means of prophecysings (πολλὰ θεομαν) and τῶ κατὰ τὸ θεῶν δόξῃ stirred up his people to rebel against the Odryæi: D.C. 54, 34, 5. In 29 B.C. M. Crassus had handed over to the Odryæi the piece of land occupied by the *Βενοι* & ἡ καὶ τὸν θεὸν δυνάμεν, D.C. 51, 25, 5.—The spirit of the old Thracian ecstatic cult reappeared in the character of the Bacchic worship introduced from Greece into Italy whose excesses (in 186 B.C.) are narrated by Livy: 39, 8 B.; among these being viros velut mente capta cum incitatione fanaticæ corporis vaticinari: 39, 13, 12.

<sup>15</sup> Compare, for example, what we are told of the religious dances of the Ostiaks (Erman, *Travels in Siberia*, ii. 45 f., E. T., Cusley), the Hakoah dance of the Dakots, the "medicine-dance" of the Winnebago in North America (Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes*, iii, 487 B., 286 B.), the dance of voodoo negroes in Haiti (New, *Annales des voyages*, 1858, iii, p. 90 B.). For the violent religious dances of the people in ancient Peru see Möller, *Amerik. Uebers.* 393; in Australia, R. Bronght-Smith, *Aborigines of Victoria*, i. 166 B. (1878). Among the Veddas of Ceylon there was a dance of the "devil's priests" (called Kattadua) dressed up as demons: see Tennent, *Ceylon*, i. 540 f.; ii. 442.—In antiquity the following have the closest relationship to the ecstatic cult of the Thracians: the dance festivals in honour of the "Syrian Goddess", of the Cappadocian M., of the Phrygian Mountain Mother, and of Attis (the last having much the same origin as the Thracian festival, but being more strongly affected by Semitic influences, and perhaps by the religious practices of the prehistoric inhabitants of Asia Minor). Besides these we may remember the account given by Poseidonios ap. Strabo, 198, D.P. 570 B., of the excited nocturnal festival celebrated in honour of "Διόνυσος" in an island at the mouth of the Loire by the women of the Nannites (Nannites, Annites) *διονύσιον πανηγύριον* in the wildest delirium (λύρη).

<sup>16</sup> This is regularly the meaning of such excesses practised by "magicians". The shaman (with his "soul") voyages out into the spirit-world: see the remarkably vivid account of Jædlöf, *Siberien*, ii, 1-67; and also Erman, *Zachr. f. Ethnologie*, ii, 324 B.; A. Krause, *Thiastindianer*, p. 294 B., 1885. So does the Lapp magician (Knud Lemm, *Lappen in Finnmarken* [E.T. in *Linköping's Voyages*]). The Angahok enters into communion with his Torgak (Crantz, *Hist. of Greenland*, i. p. 184, E.T., 1820); the Hæto with the Zemen (Möller, *Amerik. Uebers.*, 191 f.); the Pajen with the spirits (Möller, 217). Thus, too, communication with the divine "grandfather" of the people is established by means of dances, etc., among the Abipones (Jobrisboffer, *Abipones*, ii, 44, E.T.). The expulsion of the soul to visit the spirit-world is also practised (in their convulsions) by the

magicians of the North American Indians, the people of the Pacific Islands (Tylor, ii, 133), etc. Such practices start out from a commonly held conception of the nature of body and soul and of their relations with the unseen. The magicians believe "that in their ecstatic condition they can break through the barrier between this world and the next", Müller 397. To facilitate this process they employ the various means alluded to of stimulating their senses.

\* The most remarkable case of this is provided by the history of a religious sect of our own day widely spread in Russia, who call themselves "the Christs", i.e. sons of God. The sect was founded by a holy man named Philipov in whose body God one day took up his abode: after which the man spoke as the living God himself and gave commandments. The sect particularly stood for the idea that the divine dwells in mankind, Christ in men and Mary in women, and that the sense of their presence can be awakened in men by the action of the Holy Ghost, through the force of strong belief, by saintliness and by religious ecstasy. To produce the ecstasy dances are held in common. About midnight, after long prayers, hymns, and religious addresses, the participants in the secret festival, both men and women, dressed in strange costumes begin to dance. Soon the ranks and circles of the dancers and singers break up; individuals begin to turn round and round, revolving on their own axis with incredible speed, balancing meanwhile on their heels. The excitement of the dancing and leaping crowd grows continually greater. Finally one of them calls out "He comes: He is near—the Holy Ghost". The wildest ecstasy takes hold of every one. Details may be found in N. Tsakui's *La Russie secrète*, p. 63 ff. [cf. what is said in the same work, p. 80 ff., of the religious dances of the Skopzes, and p. 119 f. of the sect of the "Leapers"].—All this is true *Bartholomæo christiana* and therefore mentioned here.

\*\* e.g. Mariner, *Tonga Islanders*, i, 108 (1817); Wrangel, *Reise in Sibirien*, i, 206 ff. 267 f. (French trans.); Radloff, *Sibirien*, ii, 68. Even the respectable Cranz, whose own point of view made it impossible for him to appreciate properly the Angelenk practices so clearly observed by him, admits that many of them really saw visions that suggested "something supernatural" to them: *Hist. of Greenland*, p. 197 E.T. Something similar is said about ecstatically dancing dervishes by Lane, *Modern Egyptians*, ii, 197.

\*\* Magicians called by the name of the god (*Keebeh*) among the Alupones: Dolmizhofer, ii, 248. Similar cases elsewhere: Müller, 77. In Tahiti the person inspired by the god so long as the "inspiration" lasted (several days sometimes) was himself called "god" or given the name of some particular god: Waitz, *Anthropol.* vi, 383. In the case of an African tribe dwelling on the banks of Lake Nyanza the chief spirit sometimes takes temporary possession of one of the magicians (man or woman) who then bears the name of the spirit: Schneider, *Relig. d. Afrk. Natur*, 151. Sometimes the identity of the magician with the god is expressed by the wearing of the god's distinguishing dress and imitation of his outward appearance (in the manner of the Thracian *Bakgus*): cf. the devil-dancers in Ceylon, etc.

\*\* When it acquires a more philosophical temper mysticism seeks its unification with the highest (the *ἄλλοις ὑπὲρ πάντων τοῖς πνεύματι*) more by means of the completest passivity of mind and body. It employs the *εἰς αὐτὸν ἐκκένωσις καὶ ἀποκένωσις* of the soul (Plato), or its withdrawal from all that is finite and particular (the *recojiminto* of the Spanish mystics). The profoundest quietude of spirit brings

about the unification with the One behind all multiplicity: cf. the Neoplatonic mystics, the Buddhists, etc. Sometimes both are found together: absorption and passivity of the spirit side by side with wild excitement. Both methods were practised by the Persian Saks. Chardin, *Voyage en Perse*, iv, 436 (ed. Langlès) says of them, *dependant ils se servent plus communément du chant de la danse et de la musique, disant qu'ils produisent plus aisément leur extase*. It may be that the cult of religious exaltation is always the real origin of these ecstatic states. Though the cult sometimes falls into decay itself, its offspring the *zartans* survives.

<sup>12</sup> In the language of these mystics the words mean: he knows that the passionate longing for reunion with God, the Soul of the universe, breaks down the individual personality and its limitations—"for where Love awakes"

<sup>13</sup> *Γέρων οὐ δέσμευται*

others, see Wesseling on D.S. i, p. 105, 32).

<sup>14</sup> . . . οὐδὲν ἄλλον θεῶν νομισσοῦντες εἰ μὴ τὸν ἀδρεπεῖν (the Zalmoxis just mentioned) Hdt. iv, 94 fin. There we are told that the Getai *αὐτὸς ἀπορρίπτει καὶ καὶ ἀρπαγὰς τοῖς θεοῖς ἀνταγωνίζονται καὶ θεῶν, οὐδὲν ἔτι*. If it were true (as most people seem to think) that the god (δ θεός) threatened by the Getai during thunder was their own god Zalmoxis, then it certainly is difficult, or, indeed, impossible, to understand the point of explaining the threatening of this god by the statement that they hold him for the only true god. The truth is that the τὸν θεόν refers simply to the "sky" during a thunderstorm. The usage is common in Greek and is only transferred to the Getai by a rather awkward extension. This thundering θεός is not Zalmoxis at all (hence Z. is not as some have thought a "sky-god"). The Getai regarded Zalmoxis as the only god: the Thunderer is no real god to them (at the most a bad demon or a magician or something of the kind). To show that they are not afraid of him they shoot arrows against him, probably in the hope of breaking the thundercloud. (Parallels in other countries: Grimm, p. 1068; Dohrshoffer, ii, 78. In India, Oldenberg, 481-4. Excitement during an eclipse of the moon: Weissenborn on Livy, 28, 5, 9. Reminiscence of such customs in the myth of Herakles: [Apollod.] 2, 5, 10, 5. From Hdt. by indirect channels comes Isig. Mir. 42 [p. 162 West.]; cf. also the account of D.C. 98, 28, 8 about Chingula.—Pallad., RR. i, 38 [contra geonidion].)

<sup>15</sup> δέσμευται δὲ τὸ θεῶν τὸν τρέφει . . . οὐκ ἀποθνήσκει ἑαυτοῖς νομισσοῦντες, ὅταν εἰ τὸν ἀνυπόθετον κατὰ Ζεῦσιον θεῶν (εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸν οὐκ οὐδὲν ταῖς τοῖς ἀνυπόθετον Γετταῖς). Hdt. iv, 94. Here, as regularly in Greek use of the words, we must not understand by δέσμευται alone a mere shadowy (if timeless) survival of the soul after death as in the Homeric Hades. Such a belief if it had been held by the Getai would not have struck Hdt. or his readers as remarkable in the slightest degree. It must therefore imply an unending and fully conscious existence, in this last respect resembling the life on earth.

<sup>16</sup> δέσμευται δὲ καὶ τῆς τῆς (τῆς τῆς Phot.) καὶ Κρόβυτος καὶ τοῦ Κρόβυτος καὶ Ζεῦσιον φανερὸν οἶσθαι, Phot. Seid., EM. Ζεῦσιον. The Krobysioi are a well-known Thracian stock. The Terioi are not elsewhere mentioned; perhaps they may be placed in the neighbourhood of Τίριον, Τίριος ἄνα = C. Kallakra (cf. C. Müller on Arrian, P. Em. 35); there we also hear of a Τίριος ὄψις, Ptolema. With this Tomachok also agrees (D. αὐτὸν Τίμας, Ber. Wien. Ak. 128, iv, p. 97). In this case they would be neighbours of the Krobysioi.

<sup>10</sup> οὐκ ἀνεσθίοντες ἀλλὰ μετὰκίλιντες κατὰ τὸν ἦν in what we hear of the Getai in Julian, *Cars.* 327 D. animas (putant) non extinctas sed ad beatiora transire, *Mela*, ii, 18.

<sup>11</sup> . . . τοὺς ἀναβαίνοντες εἰς Ζάμοξιν φανὸς εἶπασι, ἥσαν δὲ αἰθερ. αὐτοὶ ταῦτα δὲ κατὰ τὸν αἰθερὸν ἀναβαίνουσιν. θάνατος δὲ καὶ εὐχαιρόμενος εἰς αἰθερ ἤφερτος καὶ ἀνεσθίοντες, Phot. Suid., *Et. Zámoxis*. *Mela*, ii, 18: alii (among the Thracians) redituros putant animas obuentum.

<sup>12</sup> Hdt. iv, 85, Zalmoxis, a slave of Pythagoras in Samos, is set free and comes back a rich man to his poverty-stricken country. He collects together the leading men of the race in a room, where he entertains them and seeks to persuade them of the belief that neither he nor they nor their descendants will die but that they will all come after death to a place where they will enjoy all good things in abundance. Thereupon he withdraws into a secret underground chamber and lives there for three years. In the fourth year he comes to light again and "the Thracians are persuaded of the truth of what Zalmoxis had told them." This implies—though Hdt. omits to say so, and so does (Hellen.) s. v. *Ζάμοξ* (following Hdt.) ap. Phot., etc., s. *Ζάμοξ*—that he had also promised that he and his adherents should return to earth alive after the expiry of a definite period (three years). That such a belief in the "return" of the dead was actually held by the Thracians is clear enough from the quotations given in the last note. The story of Zalmoxis' trick (which was perhaps intended humorously by its inventors) seemed suspicious even to Hdt., but it is not pure invention (any more than the analogous stories about Pythagoras, Trophonios, and later Empedokimos); it is rather a subterranean version of a miraculous legend. The disappearance of Zalmoxis into a subterranean chamber is a distortion of the belief in his permanent abode in a hollow mountain-side, an *ἀντροῦς* v. *χάμας* in Mt. Kogaionon of which Str. 298 speaks plainly enough. In that mountain the god dwells; just as Khresos *κατακτὴν ἐν ἄντρον εἰς ἀντροῦν γένον* of Mt. Pangaios, dwells there as an *ἀντροκατακτὴν* [E.], *RA.* 970: cf. chap. iv, n. 36. He lives there undying like the *Βάρυς κατὰ τὸν*, who has become a god, to whom the tragedy obscurely alludes in l. 972 f. as living on Mt. Pangaios (this may perhaps refer to Lykourgos—see G. Hermann, *Op.* v. 29 f.—surely not to Orpheus as Maass, *Orpheus*, p. 68 [1895], suggests). The obvious parallel is Amphitrakos and Trophonios in their caves, and Orig., *Cels.* iii, 34 (see above, chap. iii, n. 13), puts them and Zalmoxis together. We may safely complete Hdt.'s account of how the *ἀντροκατακτὴν* of the Getai go away and have everlasting life *κατὰ Ζάμοξιν χάμας* (iv. 94), by saying that they reach this same hollow mountain, a subterranean place of delight where they dwell with the god. Menander compares Zalmoxis with Kronos (*FGH.*: Phot. Suid. *Et.*, as before) and the similarity doubtless resides in the fact that both rule over the spirits of the dead in another world. But besides this the Thracian belief must also have included the idea of a periodical appearance of the god in the upper world. Hell.'s story of the trick practised by Zalmoxis shows this (the return of the souls to which the story also points, is a sort of counterpart of this). Are we to suppose that the *ἀντροκατακτὴν* of the god was expected after the expiry of three years (just as it was after two years in the Dionysos festival; see above, n. 27)? We do not know whether these Thracian tribes celebrated the *ἀντροκατακτὴν* of the god with "enthusiastic" worship. Such an element in the cult of Zalmoxis seems to be suggested by the fact that we hear of "physicians of Zalmoxis" (*Pl.*, *Charm.* 156 D) and of *μαντιαί*—which is generally closely bound up with *τελετή*—

in the cult of this god. This must be the meaning of calling Zalm. himself *μῆνιος*: Str. 762, 267; cf. also the otherwise valueless account of Ant. Diog. ap. Porph. *VP.* 14-15. Finally, the enthusiastic character of the cult seems to be implied in the identifying of the priest with the god by the Getai (as in the similar cases mentioned above, notes 32 and 56). Thus, the high priest is himself called "god": Str. 286 (he has authority over both king and state: cf. the *ἱερεὺς τοῦ Διονύσου* among the Bessaí, above, n. 83; cf. Jordanes, *Gri.* 71). This made it easy for the "god" Zalmoxis, whom even Hdt. quite rightly regarded as *βασιλεὺς ἐν Ἑλλάδι* (*ἐν* *Ἰνχόποσι* [iv. 96]) to be metamorphosed into a man of the historical past (he is this in D.S. I, 94, 2; Str. vii, 267; cf. Jordanes, *Gri.* 39). If the contemporary priest was called "god" it might naturally be concluded that the "god" Zalmoxis was once only a priest too.

<sup>16</sup> Hermap. ap. Jca., *Ap.* i, 22.

<sup>17</sup> In E., *Hec.* (1285 B.) the Thracian Polymeator prophesies to Hekabe that she shall become a dog after her death, *οὐρα' ἔσθωαι ἑμύπαρα*. Hekabe asks *τίς δ' οὐδὲ μορφής τῆς ἑμῆς περὶοράει*; Pok.: *ὁ ἑμῆς μορφής ἐστὶ δῖοντος τόδε*. It looks as if Eur. in this allusion to a belief in metempsychosis was intending to give a realistic touch of Thracian national character. He was well informed in such matters.

<sup>18</sup> The connexion between Thracian Dionysos-worship and the belief in immortality and cult of the dead is vouched for, acc. to Knapp, *Dionysos*, 15 ff., by the insc. found by Henry in Thracian districts. An epitaph found at Dokato (near Philippi) says of one who has died young (ll. 12 ff.): *reparatus vivis in Elysia. Nec placitum est divae aeterna vivere forma qui bene de supero lumine ut inventus—nunc seu te Bromio signatae* (see Anonch, *Antike Mythenwelt*, 123 f.) *mystides ad se congero in prato congregem uti Satyrum, sive canistriferar pecunt sibi Naktes aequae, qui ducibus taedis agmina festa trabas . . .* (*CIL.* iii, 686). It is true that this remarkable fantasy contains nothing directly alluding to specifically Thracian worship. On the other hand this is certainly suggested and both the Thracian god and his connexion with a cult of the dead is implied in the use of the local cult-title of Dionysos in an offering made by Hythos and Hulus to the *ἑταῖοι Λίβηρι πατρὸς Ταμβαντινὸς* 300 *denarii ex quorum reditu nonno meolibus* (and so at the yearly festival of the dead) *ad monumentum eorum veniuntur*, *CIL.* iii, 703; cf. 704. Even the conjunction by E., *Hec.* 1285 B., of the belief in palingenesis with the oracle of the Thracian Dionysos seems to imply a connexion between that belief and the cult of Dionysos.

<sup>19</sup> *οὐ πολλοὶ μὲν ἐκπαρσύνονται, οὐλοῖται δὲ τοὶ βέλγεσσι*, ap. Pl., *Phd.* 69 C. The strict meaning of this Orphic verse (Lob., *Agd.* 413 B.) is that out of the multitudes who take part in the Bacchic festival only a few have any real right to call themselves by the name of the god—as having become one with him through their ecstasy and exaltation. A special morbid state was necessary for that: the same state which in other circumstances made the real shamans, Pajet, etc.

<sup>20</sup> Even when their *ἰερωσύνη* had ceased the ecstatic worshippers still regarded as real the visions which they had enjoyed in that condition: *οὐκ οὐδὲν Ἀρριόπορι τῷ Ὀπίτρῳ καὶ ἄλλοις ἱερωμένοις. τὰ γὰρ θάρσυνον ἔλαυνε ὡς γυνάμην καὶ ὡς περὶ ἀνδρῶν*, Arist. v. *metaph.* I, p. 451a, B. "Magicians who had subsequently been converted to Christianity were still convinced of the reality of their earlier visions: they thought they had seen something perfectly real."

Müller, *Amerik. Ueersch.* 80. Add: Tylor, ii, 131; Crane, *Greenland*, p. 197.

<sup>14</sup> See above, chap. i, p. 73.

<sup>15</sup> Hdt. v, 4 (speaking of the Τραυοί. Mach. has the same, x.v. Τραυοίς). The story was then added to the regular list of νόμιμα βαρβάρων used for illustrating the variability of νόμος. It was soon after told of the Κρόβαιοι; Isig., *Asir.* 27 (they were also regarded as strong adherents of a belief in immortality; see above, n. 65); then of the Κανουαί; Nic. Dam., *Asir.* 18 West. Zenob., *Prov.* v, 25, p. 128, K L-Schn. (Κρόνιοι, Κανουαί). It occurs again in a fragment of some collection of νόμιμα βαρβάρων written before the third century (there is no reason to ascribe it to Aristotle) given by Mahaffy, *On the Flinders Petrie Papyri, Transcripts.*, p. 29: Κανουαίς δὲ νόμιμον τοὺς μὲν γηγενεμένους θρησκύν τοὺς δὲ τελευτήσαντας εὐδαμονίζεσθαι ὡς πολλὰς κακῶν ἀναπαυομένων (κακῶν as above or νόμον must be supplied to fill the gap; cf. the well-known fragment of Eur. *Cresph.*: ἐξαπὲρ γὰρ ἡμῶς . . . fr. 449, which perhaps alludes to Hdt.'s account). It is told of Thracians in general, or of some tribe not particularly named, by S. E., P. iii, 232; Val. Max. 2, 6, 12 (both clearly drawing on collections of νόμιμα βαρβάρων); Mela, ii, 18; AP. iv, 111 (Archias). There were thus three sources of the story: besides Hdt.'s, two in which either the Κρόβαιοι or the Κανουαί were named as the Thracian tribe instead of Hdt.'s Τραυοί.

<sup>16</sup> Some κακῶς ἱσχυομένης ἐστὶ ἐν νόμῳ εὐδαμονία, Hdt. v, 4.

<sup>17</sup> See Jul., *Caes.* 337 D, Mela, ii, 18. Likewise of the Κανουαί in Anon. ap. Mahaffy (see n. 75), p. 29, 10-12. Iamb., VP. 173; as a result of the (Pythagorean) doctrine of immortality taught by Zalmoxis ἐν καὶ οὐ ἐφ' ἑλάνται (because they had been instructed by Zalm.; from a singular fabulous source comes Hippol., *RE.* i, 2, p. 14, 93 H.-S.) καὶ οἱ Τράλεις καὶ πολλὰ τῶν βαρβάρων τοὺς αὐτῶν νόμους πεύθουσιν αἳ οὐκ ἐστὶ φθορῆς τῆς ψυχῆς . . . καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν θάνατον οὐ φοβητόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τοὺς εὐδαμονίας ἐκείνους.—Τράλεις Scaliger for the MS. τραλεις, rightly as far as sense goes. But we find the name ΤΡΑΛΕΙΣ given to the Pergamene mercenaries called after the Thracian tribes: *Ins. Perg.* i, n. 13, 23, 59. These had already served as infantry in 331 in the army of Alexander the Great: D.S. 17, 65, 1; cf. Mach. Τράλεις. They were a South Thracian tribe: *Plu., Ages.* 16. *Ap. Luc.* 42, Stz. 649 (where read Τραλλίαι); Tralles Thracers, Liv. 36, 21, 2, who elsewhere calls them Illyriacum genus, 27, 32, 4; 31, 35, 1. It appears that a branch of the Thracian tribe of the Tralles reached Illyria in their wanderings: there Theopompus, too, knew them: Steph. Byz. Τραλλίαι; cf. also x.vv. Βόγης. Βόλουρος (cf. Tomaschek, *Stzob. Wien. Ak.*, 128, iv, p. 56 f.).

<sup>18</sup> Appetitus maximus mortis, Mart. Cap. 6, 656. The Thracians esp. are meant by Galen when he speaks of βαρβάρων ἄνθρωποι who entertained the belief ἐν τῷ ἀνασθῆναι ἐπὶ κολόν (κικ, p. 704 K.).



## CHAPTER IX

### DIONYSIAC RELIGION IN GREECE

ITS AMALGAMATION WITH APOLLINE RELIGION.  
ECSTATIC PROPHECY. RITUAL PURIFICATION AND  
EXORCISM. ASCETICISM

The Greeks received from the Thracians and assimilated to their own purposes the worship of Dionysos, just as, in all probability, they received the personality and worship of Ares and the Muses. Of this assimilation we cannot give any further particulars; it took place in a period lying before the beginnings of historical tradition. In this period a multiplicity of separate tendencies and conceptions, freely mingled with features borrowed from foreign creeds, were welded together to form the religion of Greece.

Homer is already acquainted with the fanatical worship of Dionysos; the god is called by the name under which Greek worshippers made themselves familiar with the stranger.<sup>1</sup> But in Homer, Dionysos appears only once or twice for a moment in the background. He is not the bountiful giver of wine; he does not belong to the Round Table of the great gods assembled on Olympos. Nowhere in the story told in either of the Homeric poems does he influence the life and destiny of human beings. There is no need to seek far for the reason of Dionysos' subordinate position in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Homer's silence makes it quite plain that at that time the Thracian god had not yet emerged from a position of insignificance or merely local importance in the life and faith of Greece. Nor is this hard to understand; the cult of Dionysos only gradually won recognition in Greece. Many legends tell of the battles that had to be fought by the new worship and of the opposition that met the invader. We hear how the Dionysiac frenzy and the *ekstasis* of the Dionysiac dance-festival took possession of the whole female population of many districts of Central Greece and the Peloponnese.<sup>2</sup> Sometimes a few women would venture to join the wandering choruses of wild Bacchantes who danced upon the mountain tops; here and there the king of the land would oppose the progress of this tumultuous worship. Such stories are told of the daughters of Minyas in Orchomenos, of Proitos in Tiryns, of King Pentheus at Thebes, and Persens at Argos;<sup>3</sup> their opposition to the Dionysiac form of worship, occurring in

reality at no precise date, assumed a deceptive distinctness in the artificial systems of the mythologists and developed the character of historical events. In reality what we are told of these individuals—how the opponents of Dionysos themselves fell into even wilder frenzy and in Bacchic delirium slew and tore in pieces their own children instead of the victim-animal, or (as in the case of Pentheus) became themselves the victim slain and torn in pieces by the raging women—all this belongs to the class of *etiological* myth. They are legends in which special features of worship (for example, the existing or dimly remembered sacrifice of human beings at the feasts of Dionysos) are provided with a mythical prototype in the supposed historical past of mythology, and thus receive their justification.<sup>4</sup> Still, there remains a substratum of historical fact underlying such stories. They all presuppose that the cult of Dionysos arrived from abroad and entered into Greece as something foreign. This presupposition notoriously corresponds to the actual facts of the case, and we are bound to assume that the account which they immediately proceed to give of the violent opposition which this cult, and only this cult, met with in many parts of Greece, is not pure fiction.<sup>5</sup> We are obliged to recognize that such stories preserved a trace of real historical memory expressed in the one form which was invariably assumed by the earliest Greek tradition, namely mythology, in which all the accidents and varieties of earthly experience were condensed into types of universal applicability.

It was then not without opposition, it appears, that the worship of Dionysos, descending from the north into Boeotia, spread from thence to the Peloponnese and at an early period invaded even some of the islands as well. In truth, even if we had no evidence at all on the point, we should have expected the Greeks to feel a profound repugnance to this disorderly and tumultuous Thracian worship; a deep-seated instinct must in their case have resisted such extravagance of emotional excitement and refused to lose itself in the limitless abyss of mere feeling. This unchecked roaming over the mountain sides in nocturnal revelry might be suitable enough for Thracian women-folk, but respectable Greek citizens could not give themselves up to such things without a struggle—without, indeed, a break with all inherited propriety and decorum.<sup>6</sup> It seems to have been the women who were the first to give in to the invading worship,<sup>7</sup> carried away in a real frenzy of inspired enthusiasm, and the new cult may really have owed its first success chiefly to them. What we are told of the irresistible progress and widespread success<sup>8</sup> of the

Bacchic dance-worship and its exaltation reminds us of the phenomena which have attended similar religious epidemics such as have in more recent times occasionally burst out and overflowed whole countries. We may in particular recall to mind the accounts which we have of the violent and widespread dance-madness which, soon after the severe mental and physical shock suffered by Europe in the Black Death of the fourteenth century, broke out on the Rhine and for centuries could not be entirely stamped out. Those who were attacked by the fever were driven by an irresistible impulse to dance. The bystanders, in convulsions of sympathetic and imitative fury joined in the whirling dance themselves. Thus the malady was spread by contagion, and soon whole companies of men, women, and girls, wandered dancing through the country. In spite of the insufficiency of the surviving records, the religious character of this dance-enthusiasm is unmistakably apparent. The Church regarded it as a "heresy". The dancers called upon the name of St. John or of "certain demons"; hallucinations and visions of a religious nature accompanied their ecstasies.<sup>8</sup> Can it have been another such popular religious malady which attacked Greece—perhaps in the train of the disturbance of spiritual equilibrium caused by the destructive migrations which take their name from the Dorians? The circumstances of the time must have predisposed men's minds in that direction and made them ready to accept the Thracian Dionysos and his enthusiastic dance-worship. In any case this invasion did not, like its mediæval counterpart, break down by coming into conflict with a well-established religion and an exclusive ecclesiastical organization of a very different temper from its own. In the deceptive twilight of myth we can only dimly discern the arrival and progress of the Dionysiac religion in Greece. But so much at least is evident: the Bacchic cult, though it had to overcome many obstacles, at last established itself in Greece and triumphantly overran both mainland and islands, until in the course of time it obtained a profound and far-reaching importance in Greek life of which Homer could scarcely give a hint.

## § 2

It was no longer simply the old Thracian Dionysos who now took his place beside the other great gods of the Greek Olympus as one of themselves. He had become Hellenized and humanized in the meantime. Cities and states celebrated him in yearly festivals as the giver of the vine's inspiring fruit, as

the daimonic patron of vegetation, and the whole of Nature's rich and flourishing growth. He was worshipped as the incarnation of all natural life and vigour in the fullest and widest sense; as the typical exponent of the most eager enjoyment of life. Even Art, the highest expression of the courage and pride of life, drew much of its inspiration and its aspiration towards the infinite from the worship of Dionysos; and the drama, that supreme achievement of Greek poetry, arose out of the choruses of the Dionysiac festival.

Now the art of the actor consists in entering into a strange personality, and in speaking and acting out of a character not his own. At bottom it retains a profound and ultimate connexion with its most primitive source—that strange power of transfusing the self into another being which the really inspired participator in the Dionysiac revels achieved in his *ekstasis*. The essential features of the god as he first arrived in Greece from foreign lands, in spite of much alteration and transformation of the primitive type, were thus not entirely lost. There remained also, in addition to the cheerful festivity of the daylight worship of Dionysos, as it was celebrated more particularly in Athens, certain vestiges of the old ecstatic worship which drove men and women over the mountains in nocturnal revelry. In many places there were still celebrated the *trietic* festivals<sup>10</sup> in which at recurrent intervals the "Epiphany" of Dionysos, his appearance in the world of men and ascent from the underworld, was solemnized by night. The primitive character of Dionysos the Lord of Spirits and of the Souls of the dead—a very different figure indeed from the tender and delicate Wine-God of later times—was still obscurely present in many features of the Dionysiac festivals, in those of Delphi especially, but even to some extent at Athens too.<sup>11</sup> The ecstasy and the violence, even the dark savagery of the ancient cult did not quite die out in the midst of all the refinements of Greek civilization; recognizable traces of such things were preserved in the *Nuktisia* and *Agrionia* and in the various trietic festivals that were offered to the god in many different localities.<sup>12</sup> In Greece the awful god received the blood of human victims.<sup>13</sup> Nor did the outward signs of delirious frenzy, such as the eating of raw flesh, the killing and tearing in pieces of snakes, entirely disappear.<sup>14</sup> So little indeed, did the Bacchic frenzy that could exalt and lift the worshipper to communion with the god and his train, disappear before the gentler attractions of the gracious wine-god and his festival, that the raving and "possession" which characterized the cult of Dionysos were

now actually regarded by foreign peoples as the essentially *Hellenic* form of the worship of the god.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, a sympathetic understanding of the orgiastic cult and its tremendous capabilities lived on. The "Bacchants" of Euripides still preserves for us a breath of its magic, a trace of the enthusiasm and exaltation that overwhelmed the senses and enthralled the will and consciousness of those who gave themselves up to the powerful Dionysiac influence. Like an irresistible current that overwhelms a swimmer or like the mysterious helplessness that frustrates the dreamer, the magic power emanating from the neighbourhood of the god took complete possession of the worshipper and drove him whither it willed. Everything in the world was transformed for him; he himself was altered. Every character in the play falls under the spell as soon as he enters into the magic circle. Even the modern reader who turns over the pages of Euripides' poem feels something of that strange power to subdue the soul wielded by the Dionysiac mysteries and experiences in his own person a faint reflexion of these extraordinary states of mind.

Probably as a result of this profound Dionysiac fever which had once raged through Greece like an epidemic and was liable to periodic returns in the nocturnal festivals of the god, there remained in the constitution of the Greek people a certain morbid weakness, a susceptibility to suddenly appearing and as suddenly disappearing crises in which the normal powers of perceiving and feeling were temporarily overthrown. A few stray accounts have come down to us in which we read how such brief attacks of passing insanity ran through whole cities like an infectious disease.<sup>14</sup> The Korybantic form of the malady, which was religious in character<sup>15</sup> and took its name from the daimonic companions of the Phrygian Mountain Mother, was a phenomenon quite well-known to doctors and psychologists. Those affected by such fevers saw strange figures that corresponded to no objective reality, and heard the sound of invisible flutes, until at last they were excited to the highest pitch of frenzy and were seized with a violent desire to dance.<sup>16</sup> The initiation festivals of the Phrygian deities were specially directed to the discharge and so eventually to the cure and "purgation" of such emotional states; the means employed being principally dance and music—more especially the music composed for the flute by the old Phrygian masters; music that could fill the soul with inspiration in suitably disposed natures.<sup>17</sup> By such methods the ecstatic element was not simply suppressed or expelled, it was taken

up as a special disciplinary process by the physician-priesthood who recognized in it a vital movement and added it to the regular worship of the god.

In a similar fashion Greece in its most enlightened period accepted and practised the "enthusiastic" cult of Dionysos. Even the tumultuous night-festivals of the Thracian god—festivals closely related to those of Phrygia from which they had borrowed and to which they had given so many features—were made to serve the "purgation" of the ecstasically exalted soul. The worshipper in such festivals "initiated his soul into the company of the god in holy purifications, while he raged over the mountains in Bacchic frenzy".<sup>38</sup> The purification consisted in this case, too, of violent excitement in which the soul was stimulated to the highest pitch of religious ecstasy. Dionysos as "Bakcheus" awoke the holy madness which he himself again, after it had reached its highest point of intensity, stilled and tranquillized as Lysios and Melichios.<sup>39</sup> The old Thracian cult of ecstasy has here been modified in a fashion that belonged only to Greek soil and to Greek modes of thought. Legend, allegorizing the facts, threw back this final development of the Dionysiac worship into the remotest antiquity. Even Hesiodic poems<sup>40</sup> related how the daughters of King Proitos of Tiryns wandered in the holy frenzy of Dionysos<sup>41</sup> over the mountain of Peloponnesos, until at last they and all the multitude of women who had joined them were healed and "purified" by Melampous the Seer of Pylos famed in legend.<sup>42</sup> The cure was effected through the intensification of the Dionysiac frenzy "with loud crying and inspired dancing,"<sup>43</sup> and, further, by the use of certain special purificatory devices.<sup>44</sup> Melampous did not put an end to the Dionysiac cult and its "enthusiasm"; he rather regulated and developed it. For this reason Herodotos can even call him the "Founder" of the Dionysiac cult in Greece.<sup>45</sup> Legend, however, always recognized in this "founder" of the Dionysiac festival an adherent of the specifically Apolline form of religion. "Apollo had favoured him especially," and bestowed upon him the Seership which became ancestral in his family.<sup>46</sup> Legend used him as a type in which the reconciliation between the Apolline and the Dionysiac was figuratively expressed. The reconciliation is an historical fact, but it did not happen in the primitive past of legend.

It is a fact, however, that Apollo did at last, doubtless after prolonged resistance, enter into the closest alliance with this remarkable divine brother of his, the Hellenized Dionysos.

The covenant must have been made at Delphi. There at least on the heights of Parnasos, in the Korykian Cave, the trieteric festival of Dionysos was held every second year in the close neighbourhood of Apollo the Lord of Delphi. Nay, more, in Apollo's own temple the "grave" of Dionysos was shown,<sup>37</sup> and at this grave, while the Thyiades of the god rushed over the mountain heights, the priests of Apollo celebrated a secret festival of their own.<sup>38</sup> The festal year of Delphi was divided, though unequally it is true, between Apollo and Dionysos.<sup>39</sup> To such an extent had Dionysos taken root at Delphi,<sup>40</sup> so closely were the two gods related, that while the front pediment of the temple showed the form of Apollo, the back pediment represented Dionysos—and the Dionysos of the nocturnal ecstatic revels. Apollo, too, shared in the trieteric festival of Dionysos,<sup>41</sup> while Dionysos in later times at the penteteric festival of the Pythia, received, as well as Apollo, his share of sacrifice and the contests of cyclic choruses.<sup>42</sup> The two divinities have many of their titles and attributes in common; in the end the distinction between them seems to disappear entirely.<sup>43</sup>

Antiquity never forgot that at Delphi, the radiating centre of his cult, Apollo was an intruder. Among the older deities whom he supplanted there, the name of Dionysos also occurred;<sup>44</sup> but the Delphic priesthood thought it wise to tolerate the Thracian god and his ecstatic cult that at first seemed so opposed to that of their own deity. Dionysos may have been too vigorous a spirit to allow his worship to be suppressed like that of the Earth divinity who sent the prophetic dreams. Apollo is the "Lord of Delphi"; but the priesthood of the Delphic Apollo, following in this the tendency to religious syncretism which is so recognizable in them, took the worship of Dionysos under their protection. The Delphic Oracle in fact introduced Dionysos into localities where he had hitherto been a stranger, and nowhere so successfully or with such momentous consequences as at Athens.<sup>45</sup> It was this promoting of the Dionysiac form of religion by the great corporation which had the leadership in Greece in all matters of religion, that did more than anything else to secure for the god and his worship that profound, wide-reaching influence on Greek religion that Homer, who knows little even of the Delphic Oracle, completely ignores.

But it was a gentler and more civilized Dionysos whom Delphi popularized and even helped to re-shape; the extravagance of his ecstatic abandonment was pruned and moderated

to suit the more sober temper of ordinary city-life, and the brighter, daylight festivals of urban and countryside worship. Hardly a trace of the old Thracian worship of ecstasy and exaltation is discoverable in the Dionysiac worship of Athens. In other places, and especially in the districts ruled over by the Delphic Apollo himself, Dionysiac worship preserved more of its primitive nocturnal wildness. Even Athens, in obedience to an oracular command, sent a religious embassy of elected women to the Delphic Trietelia. It is plain enough however, that in all this there was nothing but a dim counterpart of the former tumultuous mountain-worship of the god, and its profound soul-stirring ceremonies; the worship of Athens and Delphi had reduced all that to a vague ritual traditionalism.<sup>31</sup>

### § 3

But in spite of all attempts to moderate and civilize it outwardly, the cult of Dionysos retained as its most enduring feature a tendency to the ecstatic and the extravagant that was continually breaking out in threatening or alluring guise. So strong indeed was the ecstatic element in Dionysiac worship, that when the Apolline and Dionysiac forms of religion became united, as at Delphi, it was the Apolline worship—once so hostile to anything in the nature of ecstasy—that had to accept this entirely novel feature.

The "prophecy of inspiration", deriving its knowledge of the unseen from an elevation of the human soul to the divine, was not always a part of Greek religion. Homer, of course, knows of the prophetic *art* in which specially instructed seers explained such signs of the gods' will as occurred accidentally or were purposely sought out by men, and by this means claimed to discover the will of heaven both at the moment and for the future. This is, in fact, the sort of prophecy that Apollo bestowed upon his seers.<sup>32</sup> But the prophecy of which there was no "art" and which "no man could be taught" (for it came in a moment by "inspiration")—of this Homer shows no trace.<sup>33</sup> In addition to professional and independently working prophets the Odyssey, and even the Iliad, too, are aware of the enclosed oracular institutions belonging to the temple of Zeus at Dodona and that of Apollo at Pytho.<sup>34</sup> Both these used the names of the gods with whose services they were concerned to increase the effect and the credit of their utterances. In the Odyssey (but not the Iliad) there is a reference to the influence wielded by the oracle of Apollo in the more important circumstances of a people's



life. But whether at that time it was an inspired prophetess who gave replies at Delphi we cannot be sure from the poet's words. There must have been oracles of sortilege<sup>43</sup> at that place from an early period under the protection of the god and it is these we should naturally expect a poet to mean who nowhere<sup>44</sup> shows any knowledge of the striking phenomena of ecstatic *mantiê*.<sup>45</sup>

In any case this new *mantiê* of inspired prophets, which subsequently enjoyed such enormous development and gave the Delphic oracle such peculiar power, was a late-coming innovation in the Apolline cult. Over the chasm in the rock at Pytho, out of which arose a strange and potent vapour from the depths of the earth, there had once existed an oracle of Gaia at which perhaps inquirers had received their instruction through the means of premonitory dreams by night.<sup>46</sup> The earth-goddess was displaced by Apollo here as at many other oracular sites.<sup>47</sup> The accuracy of this tradition is confirmed by the Delphic temple legend which speaks of the overthrow of the oracular earth-spirit Python by Apollo.<sup>48</sup> The change may have been gradually brought about; in any case, where once the earth-divinity had spoken directly in dreams to the souls of men, there Apollo now prophesied—no longer indirectly through the intervening medium of signs and omens, but directly answering those who, in open-eyed wakefulness, inquired of him, and speaking to them out of the mouth of his ecstatically inspired prophetess.

This Delphic prophecy of inspiration is as far removed from the old Apolline art of interpreting omens as it is closely allied to the *mantiê* which we found attached from the earliest times to the Thracian cult of Dionysos.<sup>49</sup> It appears that in Greece Dionysos but rarely obtained an official priesthood that could have organized or maintained a permanent oracular institute attached to a particular place or temple. In the one Dionysiac oracle in Greece, however, of which we have certain knowledge a priest gave prophecies in a state of "enthusiasm" and "possession" by the god.<sup>50</sup> Enthusiasm and ecstasy are invariably the means of the Dionysiac prophecy just as they were the means of all Dionysiac religious experience. When we find Apollo in Delphi itself—the place where he most closely allied himself with Dionysos—deserting his old omen-interpretation and turning to the prophecy of *ekstasis*, we cannot have much doubt as to whence Apollo got this new thing.<sup>51</sup>

With the mantic *ekstasis*, Apollo received a Dionysiac element into his own religion. Henceforward, he, the cold,

aloof, sober deity of former times, can be addressed by titles that imply Bacchic excitement and self-abandonment. He is now the "enthusiastic", the Bacchic god: Aeschylus strikingly calls him "ivy-crowned Apollo, the Bacchic-frenzied prophet" (*fr.* 341). It is now Apollo, who more than any other god, calls forth in men's souls the madness<sup>53</sup> that makes them clairvoyant and enables them to know hidden things. At not a few places there are founded oracular sites at which priests or priestesses in frenzied ecstasy utter what Apollo puts into their mouths. But the Pythian oracle remained the pattern of them all. There, prophecy was uttered by the Pythia, the youthful priestess who sat upon the tripod over the earth-chasm and was inspired by the intoxicating vapour that arose from it, until she was filled with the god, and with his spirit.<sup>54</sup> The god, so ran the belief, entered into the earthly body; or else the soul of the priestess, "released" from her body, received the heavenly revelation with spiritual sense.<sup>55</sup> What she then "with frenzied mouth" proclaimed, that the god spoke out of her; when she said "I", Apollo was speaking of himself and of what concerned him.<sup>56</sup> It is the god who lives, thinks, and speaks in her so long as the madness lasts.

#### § 4

A profound and compelling tendency of the human mind must have been the source of the great religious movement that could succeed in establishing, with the ecstatic prophecy of the Delphic priestess, a seed of mysticism in the very heart of Greek religion. The introduction of *ekstasis* into the ordered stability of the Delphic mode of religion was only a symptom of that religious movement and not its cause. But now, confirmed by the god himself, and by the experience which the mantic practice seemed to make so evident, the new belief, so long familiar to Dionysiac religion and worship, must have at last invaded the older and original type of Greek religion, and taken hold of it in spite of that religion's natural antipathy to anything of the kind. And this belief was that a highly exalted state of feeling could raise man above the normal level of his limited, everyday consciousness, and could elevate him to heights of vision and knowledge unlimited; that, further, to the human soul it was not denied, in very truth and not in vain fancy, to live for a moment the life of divinity. This belief is the fountain-head of all mysticism, and tradition still records a few traces of the way in which it grew and spread at that time.

It is true that the formal and official worship of the gods in Greece (where their cults were not obviously affected by foreign influence) remained as fast-bound as ever within the confines of order and lucidity. We hear very little of the entrance of ecstatic exaltation into the constitution of the older cults.<sup>66</sup> The irresistible religious impulse to such things found an outlet through other channels. Men and women began to appear who on their own initiative began to act as intermediaries between the gods and the needs of individual men. They were natures, we must suppose, of unusual susceptibility to "enthusiastic" exaltation; having a strange capacity for projecting themselves into the infinite. Nothing in the organization of Greek religion prevented such men and women, if they could not obtain authority from any religious community of the state itself, from acquiring a real influence in religious matters simply from their own experience of divine favour,<sup>67</sup> their own inward communion with divine powers.

In the darkness and ferment of this period of growth, from the eighth to the sixth centuries, we can vaguely discern many such shadowy figures; they look uncommonly like those strange products of the earliest infancy of Christianity when prophets, ascetics, and exorcists wandered from land to land, called to their work by nothing but the immediate grace of god (*χάρισμα*), and not attached to any permanent religious community. It is true that what we hear of Sibyls and Bakides—men and women who wandered from land to land prophesying the future, independently of and uncommissioned by any particular oracular institute—is mostly legend; but these are the sort of legends that preserve real historical tradition condensed into single types and pictures. The nomenclature itself tells us much: Sibyls and Bakides are not individual names, but *titles* belonging to various types<sup>68</sup> of ecstatic prophet, and we are entitled to suppose that the types so named once existed. The appearance in many places of Greek Asia Minor and the old mainland of Greece of such divinely inspired prophets is among the distinguishing marks of a clearly defined period in Greek history: the age of promise that came immediately before the philosophic period of Greece. The later age, entirely given up as it was to the pursuit of philosophic enlightenment, made so little claim to the inheritance in their own time of the divine favour that had once enabled the Sibyls and Bakides to see their visions and utter their wisdom, that there actually began to appear in large numbers prophets at second-hand, who were satisfied

with preserving the traditional wisdom of the inspired prophets of the past, and with the judicious interpretation of their treasures.<sup>40</sup> The age of *enthusiastic* prophets was evidently a thing of the past. The very literature of Sibylline and Bakid oracles, which began to appear just at that time and showed itself capable of an almost indefinite extension, was itself largely responsible for the veil of myth and legend which completely enveloped the original bearers of the prophetic title. Earlier and earlier became the historic events of the past which they had foretold; further and further into the mythical past, *before* the time of the events prophesied, receded the imaginary period of the great prophets.<sup>41</sup> In spite of which the scientific chronologists of antiquity, who were far from being imposed upon by the delusive anticipations of prophetic poems, found reason for fixing the date of particular Sibyls—which means for our purpose the whole prophetic age of Greece—in the fully historical period of the eighth and seventh centuries.<sup>42</sup>

We may recognize, in what we hear of these prophets, the shadowy representatives of a once real and living past; they are reminiscences of a striking and therefore never quite forgotten phase of Greek religious life. The Bakids and Sibyls were independent agents—though not entirely without connexion with the regular worship of the gods, they were not attached to any particular temple—who wandered from land to land according to the needs of those who sought their counsel. In this respect, at least, they resembled the Homeric *omen-interpreters*,<sup>43</sup> and continued their work; but they differed from them profoundly in the mode of their prophesying. They were “seized by the god” and in ecstatic clairvoyance saw and proclaimed unseen things. It was no academic skill that they possessed, enabling them to interpret the meaning of signs and omens that anyone could see—they saw what was visible only to God and to the soul of man filled with God.<sup>44</sup> In hoarse tones and wild words “the Sibyl gave utterance to what the divine impelling power within her and not her own arbitrary fancy suggested; possessed by the god, she spoke in a divine distraction. An echo of such daimonic possession, and of the horrible reality and terror that it had for the possessed, can still be heard in the cries and convulsions which Aeschylus in the *Agamemnon* gives to his *Kassandra*—a true picture of the primitive Sibyl, and a type that the poets of that prophetic generation had reflected backwards into the earlier past of legend.”<sup>45</sup>

## § 5

The activity of the seer was not confined to foreseeing and foretelling the future. We hear of a "Bakis" who "purified" and delivered the women of Sparta from an attack of madness that had spread like an epidemic among them.<sup>46</sup> The prophetic age of Greece must have seen the origin of what later became part of the regular duties of the "seer": the cure of diseases, especially those of the mind;<sup>47</sup> the averting of evil of every kind by various strange means, and particularly the supply of help and counsel by "purifications" of a religious nature.<sup>48</sup> The gift or art of prophecy, the purification of "the unclean", the healing of disease, all seem to be derived from one source. Nor can we be long in doubt as to what the single source of this threefold capacity must have been. The world of invisible spirits surrounding man, which ordinary folk know only by its effects, is familiar and accessible to the ecstatic prophet, the *Mantis*, the spirit-seer. As exorcist he undertakes to heal disease;<sup>49</sup> the *Kathartic* process is also essentially and originally an exorcism of the baleful influences of the spirit-world.

The wide popularity and elaboration given to the notion—hardly hinted<sup>50</sup> at as yet in Homer—of the universally present menace of "pollution", which is only to be averted or got rid of by means of a religious process of purification—this is one of the chief distinguishing features of the over-anxious piety that marked the post-Homeric age when men could no longer be content with the means of salvation handed down to them by their fathers. If we confined our attention to the fact that now we find purification required for such actions as murder and the spilling of blood which seem to imply a moral stain to the doer of them,<sup>51</sup> we might be tempted to see in the development of Kathartic practices a fresh step in the history of Greek ethics, and to suppose that the new practices arose out of a refinement and deepening of the "conscience" which now desired to be free from the taint of "sin" by the help of religion. But such an interpretation of Katharsis (favourite as it is) is disposed of by a consideration of the real essence and meaning of the thing. In later times the methods of Katharsis were nearly always in competition and conflict (rarely in friendly alliance) with "conscience", with the independently developed ethical thought that based itself upon the unchanging requirements of a moral law transcending all personal will and feeling, and even the will of daimonic powers. In its origin and essence Katharsis

had nothing whatever to do with morality or with what we should call the voice of conscience. On the contrary, it usurped the place which in a more advanced and morally developed people would have belonged to a true morality based on an inner feeling for what is right. Nor did it fail to hinder the free and unfettered development of such a morality. Kathartic practices required and implied no feeling of offence, of personal guilt, of personal responsibility. All that we know of these practices serves to bring this out and set the matter in a clearer light.

Ceremonies of "purification" accompany every step of a man's life from the cradle to the grave. The woman with child is "unclean" and so is anyone who touches her; the new-born child is unclean;<sup>72</sup> marriage is fenced about with a series of purificatory rites; the dead, and everything that approaches them, are unclean. Now, in these instances of the common and almost daily occurrence of purification ceremonies, there can be no moral stain involved that requires to be washed off, not even a symbolical one. Equally little can there be any when ritual purifications are employed after a bad dream,<sup>73</sup> the occurrence of a prodigy,<sup>74</sup> recovery from illness, or when a person has touched an offering made to deities of the lower world or the graves of the dead; or when it is found necessary to purify house and hearth,<sup>75</sup> and even fire and water<sup>76</sup> for sacred or profane purposes. The purification of those who have shed blood stands on exactly the same footing. It was necessary even for those who had killed a man with just cause, or had committed homicide unknowingly or unwillingly; the moral aspect of such cases, the guilt or innocence of the doer, is ignored or unperceived. Even in the case of premeditated murder, the remorse of the criminal or his "will to amend"<sup>77</sup> is quite superfluous to the efficacy of purification.

It could not be otherwise. The "stain" which is wiped out by these mysterious and religious means is not "within the heart of man". It clings to a man as something hostile, and from without, and that can be spread from him to others like an infectious disease.<sup>78</sup> Hence, the purification is effected by religious processes directed to the *external* removal of the evil thing; it may be washed off (as by water from a running spring or from the sea), it may be violently effaced and obliterated (as by fire or even smoke alone), it may be absorbed (by wool, fleece of animals, eggs),<sup>79</sup> etc.

It must be something hostile and dangerous to men that is thus removed; since this something can only be attacked by

religious means, it must belong to the daimonic world to which alone Religion and its means of salvation have reference. There exists a population of spirits whose neighbourhood or contact with men renders them "unclean", for it gives them over to the power of the unholy.<sup>40</sup> Anyone who touches their places of abode, or the offerings made to them, falls under their spell; they may send him sickness, insanity, evils of every kind. The priest with his purifications is an "exorcist" who sets free those who have fallen victims to the surrounding powers of darkness. He certainly fulfils this function when he disperses diseases, i.e. the spirits who send the diseases, by his ministrations; "when he employs in his purificatory ritual hymns and incantatory formulæ which regularly imply an invisibly listening being to whom they are addressed";<sup>41</sup> when he uses the clang of bronze instruments whose well-known property it is to drive away ghosts.<sup>42</sup> Where human blood has been shed and requires "purification" the Kathartic priest accomplishes this "by driving out murder with murder",<sup>43</sup> i.e. he lets the blood of a sacrificed animal fall over the hands of the polluted person. Here, the purification is plainly in the nature of a substitution-sacrifice (the animal being offered instead of the murderer).<sup>44</sup> In this way the anger of the dead is washed away—for this anger is itself the pollution that is to be removed.<sup>45</sup> The famous scapegoats were nothing but sacrifices offered to appease the anger of the Unseen, and thereby release a whole city from "pollution". At the *Thargelia* or on extraordinary occasions of need in Ionic cities, and even in Athens, unfortunate men were in ancient times slain or stoned to death or burnt "for the purification of the city".<sup>47</sup> Even the materials of purification that in private life served to free the individual and his house from the claims of invisible powers, were thought of as offerings to these powers: this is proved clearly enough by the custom of removing such materials, when they had served their purpose as "purifications", to the cross-roads, and of making them over to the unearthly spirits who have their being there. The materials of purification so treated are in fact identical with offerings to the dead or even with "Hekate's banquets".<sup>48</sup> In this case we can see most clearly what the forces are which Kathartic processes essentially aim at averting. In them no attempt was made to satisfy a heartfelt consciousness of sin or a moral sense that has become delicate; they were much rather the result of a superstitious fear of uncanny forces surrounding men and stretching out after them with a thousand threatening hands in the darkness.

It was the monstrous phantasies of their own imagination that made men call upon the priests of purification and expiation for much-needed aid and protection.

It is simply the invasion of human life by the sinister creatures of the daimonic world that the clairvoyant *mantis* is supposed to avert with his "purifications". Among these sinister influences Hekate and her crew are particularly noticeable. This is without doubt an ancient product of religious phantasy—though it is not mentioned by Homer—which did not till a late period emerge from the obscurity of local observance and obtain general popularity: even then it only here and there ceased to be a private and domestic cult and reached the dignity of public city-worship.<sup>82</sup> The cult of Hekate fled the light of day, as did the wild farrago of weird and sinister phantoms that surrounded her. She is *chthonic*, a goddess of the lower world,<sup>83</sup> where she is at home; but, more easily than other lower-world creatures, she finds her way to the living world of men. Wherever a soul is entering into partnership with a body—at birth or in child bed—she is at hand;<sup>84</sup> where a soul is separating from a body, in burials of the dead, she is there. Amidst the dwelling-places of the departed, the monuments of the dead and the gloomy ritual of their worship, she is in her element.<sup>85</sup> She is the queen of the souls who are still fast bound to the upper world. It shows her deep-seated connexion with the primeval worship of the dead at the household hearth,<sup>86</sup> when we hear of Hekate as dwelling "in the depth of the hearth",<sup>87</sup> and being honoured together with the underworld Hermes, her masculine counterpart, among the domestic gods who "were left to us by our forefathers".<sup>88</sup>

This domestic cult may be a legacy from times when in familiar intercourse with the lower world men did not yet fear "pollution" therefrom.<sup>89</sup> To later ages Hekate was the principal source and originator of all that was ghostly and uncanny. Men came upon her suddenly and to their hurt by night, or in the dreamy solitudes of midday's blinding heat; they see her in monstrous shapes that, like the figures in a dream, are continually changing.<sup>90</sup> The names of many female deities of the underworld of whom the common people had much to say—Gorgyra (Gorgo), Mormo, Lamia, Gello or Empousa, the ghost of midday—denote in reality so many different personifications and variations of Hekate.<sup>91</sup>



She appeared most frequently by night, under the half-light of the moon, at the cross-roads. She is not alone but is accompanied by her "crew", the hand-maidens who follow in her train. These are the souls of those who have not had their share of burial and the holy rites that accompany it: who have been violently done to death, or who have died "before their time".<sup>98</sup> Such souls find no rest after death; they travel on the wind now, in the company of Hekate and her daimonic pack of hounds.<sup>99</sup> It is not without reason that we are reminded of the legends of "wild hunters" and the "furious host", so familiar in modern times in many countries.<sup>100</sup> Similar beliefs produced similar results in each case; perhaps there is even some historical connexion between them.<sup>101</sup> These night-wandering spirits and souls of the dead bring pollution and disaster upon all who meet them or fall into their hands; they send evil dreams, nightmares, nocturnal apparitions, madness and epilepsy.<sup>102</sup> It is for them, the unquiet souls of the dead and Hekate their queen, that men set out the "banquets of Hekate" at the cross-roads.<sup>103</sup> To them men consign with averted faces the remains of the purificatory sacrifices<sup>104</sup> that they may not come too close to human dwelling places. Puppies, too, were sacrificed to Hekate for "purifications", i.e. "apotropaic" sacrifices.

Gruesome inventions of all kinds were easily attached to this province of supernaturalism: it is one of the sources which, with help from other Greek conceptions and many foreign creations of fancy, let loose a stream of anxious and gloomy superstitions that spread through the whole of later antiquity and even reached through the Middle Ages to our own day.

Protection and riddance from such things were sought at the hands of seers and "Kathartic priests" who, in addition to ceremonies of purification and exorcism had other ways of giving help—prescriptions and recipes of many strange sorts which were originally clear and natural enough to the fantastic logic of superstition and were still credited and handed down as magic and inexplicable formulae after their real meaning had been entirely forgotten. Others, again, were driven by a fearful curiosity to attempt to bring the world of surrounding spirits—of whose doings such strange stories were told in legend<sup>105</sup>—even closer to themselves. By magic arts and incantations, they compelled the wandering ghosts and even Hekate herself to appear before them:<sup>106</sup> the magic power forces them to do the will of the spirit-raiser or to harm his enemies.<sup>107</sup> It was these creatures of the spirit-world that

magicians and exorcists claimed to banish or compel. Popular belief was on their side in this, but it is hardly possible that they never resorted to deceit and imposture in making good their claims.

### § 7

The mantic and Kathartic practices, together with what arose out of them, are known to us almost exclusively as they were in the time of their decay. Even in the brief sketch just attempted of this notable by-way of Greek religion, many details have had to be taken from the accounts left to us by later ages that had quite outgrown the whole idea of mantic and Kathartic procedure. Compared on the one hand with science, seriously engaged in studying the real and inward sources of being and becoming throughout the world, together with the limitations of man's estate, and on the other hand with the practical and cautious medical study of the physical conditions of human life in health and sickness, the mantic and Kathartic practices and all the myriad superstitions arising from them seemed like a legacy from a forgotten and discredited past. But such things persisted in many circles of old-fashioned and primitive-minded people, though by the emancipated and cultured they were despised as the silly and dangerous quackery of mendicant priests and wizards.

But this product of the religious instinct cannot always have appeared in such a light; it certainly was not so regarded when it first came into prominence. A movement that was zealously taken up by the Delphic oracle, which influenced many Greek states in the organization of their religious cults, must have had a period when its right to exist was incontestable. It must have answered to the needs of a time when the dawning sense of the profound unity and interconnexion of all being and becoming in the world still contented itself with a religious explanation of what seemed mysterious, and when a few chosen natures were seriously credited with the power to communicate with the all-embracing spirit-world. Every age has its own ideal of Wisdom; and there came a time when the ideal of the Wise Man, who by his own innate powers has achieved a commanding spiritual position and insight, became embodied in the persons of certain great men who seemed to fulfil the highest conceptions of wisdom and power that were attributed to the ecstatic seer and priest of purification. The half-mythical stories in which later ages preserved the memory of the times lying just before the

age of the philosophic exploration of nature tell us of certain great masters of a mysterious and occult Wisdom. It is true that they are credited with powers over nature of a magical kind rather than with a purely intellectual insight into the laws of nature; but even in the scanty accounts of them which have come down to us there are clear indications that their work already included the first attempts at a mode of study based on theory. We cannot call them philosophers—not even the forerunners of Greek philosophy. More often their point of view was one which the real philosophic impulse towards self-determination and the freedom of the soul consciously and decisively rejected, and continued to reject, though not indeed without occasional wavering and back-sliding. These men must be counted among the magicians and exorcists who so often appear in the earliest dawn of the spiritual history of civilized nations, and, as primitive and marvellous types of the spirit of inquiry, precede the philosophers. They all belong to the class of ecstatic seers and Kathartic priests.

Legend related how, out of the country of the Hyperboreans, that distant Wonderland where Apollo hid himself in winter, there came to Greece one Abaris, sent by the god himself. He was a saint and needed no earthly food. Carrying in his hand the golden arrow, the proof of his Apolline origin and mission, he passed through many lands dispelling sickness and pestilence by sacrifices of a magic kind, giving warning of earthquakes and other disasters. Even in later times prophecies and "purifications", going under his name, were still to be read.<sup>108</sup>—This man, and also another like him, called Aristeas, were already mentioned by Pindar (*fr.* 271). Aristeas, a man of high rank in his native city of Prokonnesos, had the magic gift of prolonged *ekstasis*. When his soul left his body behind, being "seized by Phoibos", it (as his second self made visible) was seen in distant places.<sup>109</sup> As Apollo's attendant he also appeared together with the god in Metapontum. A bronze statue in the market-place of that city remained to testify to his presence there, and to the astonishment awakened by his inspired utterances.<sup>110</sup> But among all these examples of the type,<sup>111</sup> Hermotimos of Klazomenai is the most striking. His soul could desert his body "for many years", and on its return from its ecstatic voyages, brought with it much mantic lore and knowledge of the future. At last, enemies set fire to the tenantless body of Hermotimos when his soul was away, and the latter returned no more.<sup>112</sup>

The greatest master of all these magically gifted men was,

according to tradition, Epimenides. His home was in Crete, an ancient centre of Kathartic wisdom,<sup>113</sup> where Epimenides was instructed in this lore as an adherent of the cult of the underworld Zeus.<sup>114</sup> Through a mist of legend and fable we hear of his prolonged stay in the mysterious cave of Zeus on Mt. Ida, his intercourse with the spirits of the darkness, his severe fasting,<sup>115</sup> the long ecstasy of his soul,<sup>116</sup> and his final return from solitude to the light of day, much experienced and far-travelled in "enthusiastic wisdom".<sup>117</sup> Next he journeyed through many lands bringing his health-giving arts with him, prophesying the future as an ecstatic seer,<sup>118</sup> interpreting the hidden meaning of past occurrences, and as Kathartic priest expelling the daimonic evils that arose from specially foul misdeeds of the past. The Kathartic activity of Epimenides in Delos and other Greek cities was famous.<sup>119</sup> It was in particular never forgotten how in Athens at the end of the seventh century he brought to a satisfactory close the expiation of the godless murder of the followers of Kylon.<sup>120</sup> With potent ceremonies of which his wisdom alone knew the secret, with sacrifice of animals and men, he appeased<sup>121</sup> the anger of the offended spirits of the depth who in their rage were "polluting" and harming the city . . .

It was not without reason that later tradition, undeterred by questions of chronological possibility, brought all the names just mentioned into connexion with Pythagoras or his adherents,<sup>122</sup> and was even accustomed to refer to Pherekydes of Syros, the latest of the band, as the teacher of Pythagoras. The practice, if not the philosophy, of the Pythagorean sect grew up among the ideas and what may be called the teaching of these men, and belongs to the epoch which honoured them as Wise Men. We still possess a few scraps of evidence to show that the conceptions guiding their life and work tended to reach some sort of unification in the minds of these visionaries who were yet something more than the mere practitioners of a magical species of religion. We cannot, indeed, tell how far the fanciful pictures of the origin of the world of men which Epimenides<sup>123</sup> and Pherekydes drew were connected with the business and professional activity of these men;<sup>124</sup> but when it is related of Hermotimos that he, like his countryman Anaxagoras, attempted a distinction between pure "mind" and matter,<sup>125</sup> we can see very clearly how this theory might arise out of his special "experiences". The ecstasies of the soul of which Hermotimos himself and this whole generation had such ample experience seemed to point to the separability of the soul from the body<sup>126</sup>—and, indeed, to the superiority of

the soul's essence in its separate state over that of the body—as to a fact of the most firmly established authenticity. In contrast with the soul the body could hardly help appearing as an encumbrance, an obstacle to be got rid of. The conception of an ever-threatening pollution and "uncleanness" which was nourished by the teaching and activities of those innumerable purification-priests of whom Epimenides is known to us as the supreme master, had gradually so penetrated the whole of the official religion itself with purification-ceremonies that it might very well have seemed as though, in the midst of this renovation and development of a type of religious thought that had been more than half forgotten in the Homeric period, Greek religion was fast approaching the condition of Brahmanism or Zoroastrianism and becoming essentially a religion of purification. Those who had become familiar with the contrast between body and soul, especially if they lived in the atmosphere of Kathartic ideas and their practical exercise, were almost bound to proceed to the idea that even the "soul" required to be purified from the polluting embarrassment of the body. That such ideas were almost a commonplace is shown by many stories and turns of phrase which represent the destruction of the body by fire as a "purification" of the man himself.<sup>107</sup> Wherever these ideas—the precise opposite and contrary of the Homeric conception of the relation between body and soul-image—had penetrated more deeply they must have led to the idea that even in the lifetime of the body the purification of the soul should be prepared by the denial and inhibition of the body and its impulses. The first step was thus taken towards a purely negative system of morality, not attempting the inner reformation of the will, but aiming simply at averting from the soul of man a polluting evil threatening it from without—in fact to a morality of religious asceticism such as later became such an important and decisive spiritual movement in Greece. In spite of all the inadequacy of our information about these Wise Men of the early pre-philosophic period, we can still dimly make out the fact that their natural bent lay in this ascetic direction (the abstention from food practised by Abaris and Epimenides are distinct cases of it).<sup>108</sup> How far, exactly, they went in this direction is indeed more than we can say.

Thus, the ascetic ideal was not absent even from Greece. It remained, however—in spite of the influence it had in some quarters—always a foreign thing in Greece, having its obscure home among sects of spiritualistic enthusiasts, and regarded in contrast with the normal and ruling view of life, as a paradox,

almost a heresy. The official religion itself is not entirely without the seeds of an ascetic system of morality ; but the ascetic ideal, fully developed and distinguished from the simple and normal religious attitude, was in Greece found only among minorities who cut themselves off in closed and exclusive conventicles of a theological or philosophical temper. The "Wise Men", as idealized in the legends of Abaris, Epimenides, etc., were as individuals not far removed from the ideal of asceticism. Nor was it long before the attempt was made to use these ideals as the basis on which to found a society.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

<sup>1</sup> We may safely take it for granted that *Διόνυσος* is the Greek name of the god, though a completely convincing etymology for the word has yet to be found. Recent attempts to derive it from the Thracian language are not very convincing (Tomasschek, *Sitzber. Wien. Ak.* 130, 41; Kretschmer, *Aus der Anomia*, 22 f.; *Ind.* 241.) Acc. to Kretschmer a Thracian origin for the name is proved by the appearance of the form *Διόνου*—on ins. found in a few Greek towns surrounded by Thracian influences, e.g. Abdera, Maroneia. Acc. to him the transition from *ι* to *ε* before a vowel is regular in Thracio-Phrygian, while on the other hand "it is completely incompatible with all the laws of Greek phonetics". Others have disagreed with this view, e.g. G. Curtius, certainly an *author probabilis*, to whom the occasional appearance of the transition from *ι* to *ε* before a vowel (side by side with the much commoner reverse process) seemed quite compatible with the laws of Greek phonetics. He even counted *Διόνου*—*Διόνου* (Anakreon) among the examples of this vowel change within the limits of the Greek language (*Gr. Etym.*<sup>4</sup>, p. 808 f.). At any rate *Ἰδών* = *Ἰδών*, and *σέρπωνας* = *σέρπινας* are certain cases of it (see Meister, *Gr. Dial.* i, 294; G. Meyer, *Gr. Gramm.*<sup>2</sup>, p. 162). Kretschmer himself, *Ind.* 225, supplies *Ἀεὶ ἀγνέδδωπος*, *Δι* = *δι*. To account for these forms he postulates the influence of Thracian surroundings on Greek pronunciation: but in the case of such a purely Greek word as *Ἀεὶ ἀγνέδδωπος* the Thracian influence must have been a secondary phenomenon operating to cause the alteration of the old *αἰ* into *ῆ*. Why should we not use the same explanation in accounting for the change from *Διόνου* to *Διόνος* and (if Thracian influence is to be presumed—by no means probable in view of the statement of *EM.* 256, 30, *Διόνος*, *αἶμα γὰρ Διόνου ἀποδίδωμι*) say that this Thracian influence was a secondary one acting upon the original Greek form of the name *Διόνος*?—It is evident that the ancients had no idea that *Διόνος* (*Διόνου*, *Διόνος*) was the indigenous name of the Thracian god, for they would in that case have said so without hesitation. They derived the conception, figure, and cult of the god from Thrace but not this particular name, which they regularly regard as the Greek name of the daimon whom the Thracians spoke of as *Ἐσάβιος* or otherwise. (So too *Hdt.* regards *Διόνος* as the Greek name of the god whose essential nature is Egyptian.) This is by no means without importance; on the contrary, it provides cogent reason for doubting the (otherwise insecurely founded) derivation of the name from the Thracian.

<sup>2</sup> The women in Boeotia *ἰδούσαν ἰούσαν* (cf. Eur., *Hel.* *ταῖς Ἀνελήτοιαισι γυναιξὶν ἰδούσαις τις ὀλέστος παρὰ τὰς αἰετὶν τῶν Ἰλίων*, *Ael.*, *VH.* *id.*, 62. *Hdt.* ix, 24, speaks inclusively of the madness of the women in Argos (*ταῖς δὲ Ἀργεὶ γυναιξὶν μεμνημέναις*), where others speak only of the frenzy attacking the daughters of Proitos. Neither is incompatible with the other: they simply represent two different stages of the story. The *μεμνημένα* which attacks the entire female population is not (as later accounts generally make out) the punishment sent by Dionysos: it is simply another way of expressing the general acceptance of his worship which essentially consisted in

*παῖδες* (= *Baryades* in Ant. Lib. 10). The *παῖδες* of individual women who try to resist the contagious enthusiasm of the Dionysiac revelry going on around them (e.g. the daughters of Eleuther: Suid. *ἐλευθεῖων δῖον*) is, however, a punishment sent by the angry god when it leads them to murder their own children.—The regular and widespread "mania" of the newly introduced cult of Dionysos is referred to also by D.S. 4, 68, 4; [Apollod.] 3, 2, 2, 5; Paus. 2, 18, 4; cf. also Nonn., *D.* 47, 481 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Resistance of Perseus to Dionysos who in this account arrives with the Mαινάδες from the islands of the Aegean Sea (so Paus.); victory of Perseus, followed, however, by a reconciliation with the god whose worship is established and a temple built for Dionysos Krenos: Paus. 2, 20, 4; 22, 1; 23, 7-8. So, too, Nonn., *D.* 47, 475-741: [Apollod.] 3, 6, 2, 3; Sch. V., B 319; cf. Meineke, *An. Alex.* 61. (Dionysos is slain in the war with Perseus: Dnarchos "the poet" *ajj.* Eur., *Chr.* ii, pp. 44-5 Sch. = an. 718 *Abr.*; Lob., *Agf.* 537 f.).—Lykourgos does not properly belong to this series: his legend, as told by [Apollod.] 3, 5, 1 (apparently following the direction given to it by Aesch.), is a late transformation of the story preserved by Homer, in which stories of Pentheus or the Minyads or the Phrygians are initiated.

<sup>3</sup> This is exp. clear in the legend dealing with Orchomenos: cf. the account in *Plu.*, *Q.Gr.* 38, p. 293 D. It is very probable that the other stories, too, were founded upon sacrificial ritual; cf. Welcker, *Gr. Götterl.* i, 644 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. also Sch. Ar., *Act.* 243.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Eur., *Ba.* 217 ff., 487, 52 ff. The daughters of Minyas *ἐδδδω τοὺς γυνεὺς* (see Perizon. ad loc.) *καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὴ ἐλύμετο ἐπὶ θεῷ μαινάδων*, Act. i, 17. Throughout all these legends the contrast between Dionysos and Hera, who is the patroness of marriage, is very marked.

<sup>6</sup> *ἄρρηκτα δάκρυα*—unknown poet ap. Plu., *Exil.* 17, p. 607 C; Smp. 4, 6, 1, p. 671 C; *E ap. D.* 9, 388 B. *ἴλαθ, εἰρησώσα, γυναικείν,* *A. Hom.* 34, 17.

<sup>7</sup> Like an infection or a conflagration. *ἄλλ' τοῦτ' ἔγχευ ὥστε πᾶς ἰφάντεσσι βῆματι βαλχέω, φέρος ἐς "Ελλάδας μέγας*, Pentheus in *E.*, *Ba.* 778.

<sup>8</sup> See the accounts reported ap. Hecker, *Epidemics of the N.A.*, pp. 88, 153 Babington, esp. those of Petrus de Herental (ap. Steph. *Babul.*, *l'id. Pap. Antonin.* i, 483): quaedam nomina daemoniorum appellabant. The dancer *cerret Marac nium et caelum apertum*.—"The masters of the Holy Scripture who exorcised the dancers regarded them as being possessed by the devil." (Limburg Chronicle; see *Mon. Germ.*, *Carol.* iv, 1, ed. Hlennann: p. 64, ed. Wren.)

<sup>9</sup> Details given by Weniger, *Dionysosdienst in Elis*, p. 8 (1883).

<sup>10</sup> At Delphi there was a festival called *ἡσπία* in which the Dionysiac *Thyades* took part: a *Δραῖλος δωρυαγῆ* was the chief feature of the *ἡσπία δωρυαγῆ* (*Plu.*, *Q.Gr.* 12). The name *ἡσπία* points to a general festival of the dead (cf. Voigt in Roebner's *Lex.* i, 1048); for another general festival of "Heroes" at Delphi see chap. iv, n. 82. At Athens the great festival of the dead, the Choes and Chytroi (chap. v, p. 168) formed part of the Anthesteria. It is precisely in these *ἄρρηκτα δάκρυα* (Thuc. ii, 15, 4) that Dionysos appears as he was in primitive belief, the "master of the souls". Thus, too, in Argos one of the most ancient seats of the worship of Dionysos, the Dionysiac festival of the Agrania was at the same time a festival



of the dead, *νεκρῶνα*: Hesch., *ἄγριον* (it was specially *ἐνὶ μὲν τῶν Περσέων θυμῶν* [Iphig. Apollod. 2, 22, 8], Hesch. s.v.: even so it was a festival of the dead).—[u Plu., *E ap. D.* 8, 389 A, in view of the hopeless confusion shown by Plutarch in that chapter between Delphic cult-procedure and the opinions of certain unspecified *θεολόγοι*, it is unfortunately impossible to say with certainty whether it is the Delphians who *ἀδόνουσι καὶ Ζαγὰ καὶ Νευρίδιον καὶ Ἰσοδαίμον* *δορῶσιν* or whether this only applies to the *θεολόγοι* (in which case they are probably Orphics).

<sup>12</sup> The *Agriomis* to the "savage" god (*τοῦ σαρκεῖος καὶ ἄγριου*) as contrasted with the *χαριτόντος καὶ πολέμου*. Plu., *Art.* 24) were celebrated in Thebes and Argos. *ἄγριον καὶ νεκρῶνα* *ὡς τὰ πολλὰ* *δορῶντος ἡδῶτος* are opposed to the *ἐλπίων ἱερῶν* by Plu., *QR.* 112, p. 291 A. Bacchic *δίν*, *φάβος*, at the *νυκτερία*, Plu., *Smph.* 4, 8, p. 672 A.—Temple of D. *Νευρίδος* at Megara: Paus. i. 40, 6. Nocturnal festivities (*ἐν νυκτὶ τὰ πολλὰ*, Eur., *Ba.* 466) at the Dionysia at Lemna = Paus. 2, 37, 4, at the festival of *Ἀδόντος Ἀδωνίης* in Pellour: Paus. 7, 27, 3. *ἄγριον* of D. at Melangeia in Arcadia 8, 6, 5; at Herzia 8, 26, 1. The orgiastic cult of D. seems to have been preserved particularly in Sparta. We hear of the *εἰσῆγοι βακχιστοί* that once attacked the women of Sparta from Aelian, *EH.* ii, 42; some lines of Alkman (*fr.* 34) allude to the fanatical Bacchic revels on the mountain tops (quite misunderstood by Welcker, *Kl. Schr.* iv, 49). It became proverbial: *virginibus bacchata Lacedaenis Taygeta*, Vg., *G.* ii, 467. A special word is applied to the Bacchic fury of these Spartan Maenads: *δωραμν* (Philarg. on Vg., *G.* ii, 467; Hesch. s.v.; Meineke, *An. Alex.* 360). In view of these ecstatic mountain-revels we need not be surprised at the prohibition of drunken roaming about the city and countryside, of which Pl., *Lg.* 637 AB speaks.

<sup>13</sup> Welcker, *Gr. Gött.* i, 461.—But human sacrifice in the Thracian worship of D. is nevertheless suggested by the remarkable story of Porphy. (*Ad.* ii, 8) about the *Βακχισαί* (whom he seems to take for a Thracian tribe).

<sup>14</sup> Clem. Al., *Arn.*, Firm. all speak of the *ἀποφύγῃς* of the Bakchai as a still-prevailing cult-practice. Bernays, *Heraklit. Briefe*, 73. Galen, too, speaks in the same way of the bearing in pieces of snakes at the Bacchic festivals (quoted Lob., *Agf.* 271 a); to snare vipers *καλλιπρότερον ἔστιν αὐτοῖς, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰς Ἀνδρομάχης* (79 ff. of his poem) *ἰθὺς* *φύλας* καὶ *οἱ τῶν διονύσιου βακχιστοῖς τιμῶσι* *δωραμν* *τὰς ἰγλῖδας*, *κατακτείνον μὲν τὰς ἡσὺς αὐτῶν* *δ' ἄγριον τὰς θήρας* (*Antid.* i, 8 = xiv, p. 45 K.). *φύλας*—*ἰγλῖδας* are Gal.'s words not Andromachos'. Cf. also Prod., *Sym.* i, 130 ff.

<sup>15</sup> We need only recall the remarkable story of Hdt. (iv, 79) about the Scythian king who in Borysthenes was initiated into the mysteries of Dionysos Bakcheios *ὅτι μέλινθος ἐτίθει ἀνθρώπων*. His Scythian subjects took exception to this. For them the religion was specifically Greek. A Borysthenite says to the Scythians: *ἡμῶν γὰρ κατακτείνε, ὃ Ζεὺς, ἀπὶ βακχισμοῦ καὶ ἡμῶν δ' οὐδε λαμβάνει. οὐδ' αὖτε εἰ δαίμων καὶ τὸν ἑμῶντερον βασιλεὺς ἀλάβηκε καὶ βακχεῖ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν μέλινθος*.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. the remarkable account given by Plu., *Mut. Viti.* 11, p. 248 B; *fr. de An.* ap. Gell. 18, 10; Polybios. 8, 63; and Lucian in *H. Consec.* (28), 1.

<sup>17</sup> Of a different description are the attacks of temporary insanity accompanied by similar features but not religious in complexion described by Arctaeus, p. 62 K., and Gal. vii, pp. 60-1 K. (the case of Theophrastus).

\* Phenomena of *κορυβαντισμός*: hearing the sound of flutes Pl., *Crat.* 54 D, Max. T., *Diag.* 38, 2, p. 220 R.; cf. *Ck., Div.* i, 114: seeing *φασμαί*, D.H., *Dem.* 22. It is this waking dream-condition, a condition related to hypnosis, which Pliny probably means: *patentibus oculis dormiant multi homines, quos corybantiani Graeci dicunt*, NH, xl, 147. Excitement, beating heart, weeping: Pl., *Smp.* 216 E. Maddened dance: of *κορυβαντιστῶν* οὐδὲ ἑμψονος ὄντες ἀρχοῦνται, *Ion*, 834 A. "Sober drunkenness" *μίσθῃ κηφέλιος* of the *κορυβ.*, Philo, *Mund. Op.* 23, i, p. 16 M.—The name shows that those attacked by the disease were regarded as "possessed" by the Korybantes. *κορυβαντῶν τὰ Κορύβαντι κατέχοντες*, Sch. Ar., V, 9. The Korybantes *μαίνας καὶ ἐκστασιασὰς εὐνοῦς ἐμψονοῦσι*, ib. 8. *ἰσθῶς δὲ νεμερῶν Κορυβάντων*, E., *Hip.* 142; Sch. ad loc.: *Κορυβαντες μαίνας μίνας*. *Ἰσθῶς καὶ κορυβαντῶν*.—Aristian gives an unusually good account of the Korybantic frenzy of the Phrygians in a little noticed passage ap. Eust. on D.P. 808: *μαίνομεν γὰρ Πάρι καὶ πάλιν Κορυβάντων κατέχοντες, ὅπως κορυβαντῶσι δαιμονώμεντες* (i.e. possessed by the *δαίμων*, see Usener, *Götternamen*, 283). *ὅταν δὲ παύσῃ αὐτοῖς τὰ θεία, ἱλασόμενοι καὶ μὴ βούλονται καὶ ἀρχόμενοι προθεσίζουσι τὰ πολλότερα, θεοφοροῦμεν καὶ μανόμεν*. The complete similarity between this condition and that of the Bacchic worship is sufficiently obvious.

† Use of dance and music to cure those who are attacked by Korybantic excitement: Pl., *Lg.* 780 DE, 781 A. More especially the melodies for the flute composed by Olympus, being *θρία*, were able to discover and cure those liable to Korybantic *ekstasis* (by means of the inspiring effect which they had on such persons). This is shown particularly by a passage in Plato (*Smp.* 215 C-E); where it is evident that the *κορυβαντιστῶν* of 215 E are not to be distinguished from the *θῦραι καὶ τελετῶν δαίμονες* of 215 C (C states the general rule of which E is a particular application). This homeopathic cure of the *κορυβαντιστῶν* by the intensification and subsequent discharge of the disorder is implied in all that we hear of the character of the Phrygian mode as *ἐκστασιαστικὴ* and of the *μὴλῃ Ὀλύμπου* as exciting the souls of men to "*εκστασιασμός*". Arist., *Pol.* 1340a, 4, 5, 1342a, 1 ff., 1340a, 8: (Pl.), *Mén.* 318 B: Cic., *Div.* i, 114. The *κορυβαντιστῶν* are also meant in Arist., *Pol.* 8, 7, 1342a, 7 ff. . . καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ταύτῃ τῇ εὐφροσύνῃ (i.e. τοῦ ἰσθῶς καὶ ἐκστασίας) *κατασπῆσται τὸς εὐνοῦς ἐν δὲ τῶν ἱερῶν μολῶν ὁρῶμεν τοσοῦτον, ὅταν χρῆσονται τοῖς ὀργανοῖς τῇ ψυχῇ μάλιστα, ἀποκαταναῖναι ὥσπερ ἰατρὸς τοσοῦτος καὶ καθάρουσι*. Plato's analysis (i.e. 780 D ff.) is exactly parallel: the cure for the *μαίνας κατέχοντες* of the Korybantic patients is *οὐδὲ φούξιν ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτος κύριος*, whereby they are assisted to regain their *θεῖον ἑμψονος*. (It is from this religious-musical procedure and not from strictly medical experience or practice that Aristotle, taking a hint from Plato, *Rp.* 606, derived his idea of the *κάθαρσις τῶν παθῶν* by violent discharge of the emotions and transferred it to tragedy—not, as in the explanation to which some have recently returned, by a tranquilization of the emotions in "a final reconciliation.") This *κάθαρσις* and *largeia* of the *κορυβαντιστῶν* is the object of the initiation ceremony of the Korybantes (whose true *θεῖος* are the *κορυβαντιστῶν*, i.e. the worshippers who are in need of and capable of cure): of the *Κορυβάντων μυστήρια* which are held *ἐν καθάρσιν τῆς μάλας* (Sch. Ar., V, 118-20, *ἐκστασιαστικῆς*): cf. the *τελετὴ τῶν Κορυβάντων* (Pl., *Euthd.* 277 D, including *θρόνοι*: D. Chr. 12, p. 388 R., § 33 Am.; Lob., *Ag.* 116, 389. There is a parody of *θρόνοι* in the initiation scene of Ar., *Nub.* 254, where Streps. sits *ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ αὐτοῦ*. *τεθρονημένος τοῖς θεοῖς* is initiated

in *P. Mag. Lond.* 747 f. — Kenyon, *Great Papyri in B.N.* i, p. 106; and cf. the *μεγροὶ καὶ νεφελαρμέναι ῥαῖς*: D.H., *Dem.* 22. At the initiation ceremony (*νεφελαρμένους* = *νεφέρες* *πυρραὶ* Hoch.) held in the *Νεφελαρμία* (Hdt. Gr. 1, 375, 18 Lenz: *App. Frou.* ii, 23) the famous music of "inspiration" was played; there was also *ῥυθμία* (Pl., *Enthal.*), *ῥυθμ* e.g. the sound of *ῥυθμῶνα* (Ar., *Ves.* 120 f.; Luc., *DD.* 12, 1), and also it appears incense-burning: *δομαί*, D.H., *Dem.* 22; cf. above, chap. viii, n. 39. All these stimulants intensified the pathological tendency of the *νεφελαρμένους* and gave them relief by the violent discharge of their emotions.—There is no need to doubt the actual occurrence of such pathological states and their medical treatment by music, etc. It was clearly the same type of psychopathical malady that invaded Italy in the Middle Ages under the name of Tarantism, repeating its attacks for several centuries: in this case, too, music (and even the sound of a particular melody) served both to excite and eventually to cure the violent dance-mania. cf. Hecker 172, 176 ff. — There seems to be a fabulous element in other stories current in antiquity about the cure of madness, love-passions, and even sciatia by the music of the flute (Pythagoras, Empedokles, Damon, *Taphr. fr.* 87). Such belief in the curative powers of music, esp. of the flute, seems to have been derived originally from actual experience of the *νεφέρες* practised in Korymbic festivals, and then to have been exaggerated into a fable. Even doctors had no doubt that *mania* was curable by the *ῥαυθμῶνα ἰδιώμα*, see Carl. Aur., *Morb. Chr.* i, 5, 175, 178 (Asklepiades); Carl. Aur. (i.e. Soranus), *ib.* 176, however, denies it. It depended entirely upon the theory, originally derived from *νεφελαρμία*, of cure by intensification and discharge of the emotional state.

<sup>10</sup> *ἡ μέλας ἑρως* . . . *ῥοκνύσεν φυχὰς, ἐν ἑσπέρῃ βαρυγένη, δόλοισι νεφελομένη*, E., *Be.* 72 ff.—dicunt sacra Libens ad purgationem animae pertinere Serv. on *Vg.* G. ii, 388; cf. also on *A.* vi, 741.

<sup>11</sup> *Διόνυσος ἰώνος* (like *ἡ μέλας ἑρως* and *ἡ μέλας ἑρως*) is rightly taken as the "free from orgasmic frenzy" (and not in the ordinary political sense) by Klausen, *Orpheus*, p. 28 (Erach-Gruher) and Vaght in *Bomcher's Lex.* i, 1062. That this is the proper meaning of *ἰώνος* is shown by its being contrasted with *βαρυγένη*, which by common consent means the god *ἡρ μέλας ἑρως* *ἐν ἑσπέρῃ* (Hdt.); e.g. in Norinth, *Paus.* 2, 2, 6; Sikyon, *I'aus.* 2, 7, 5-6. And *ἡ βαρυγένη* and *μέλας* in *Naxos*, *Att.* ii, 78 C.

<sup>12</sup> In the *νεφελομένη* *ῥαυθμία* as it seems; *fr.* 54 Rz. But perhaps also in the *Μελεποδία* (*fr.* 184 Kink.).

<sup>13</sup> *Ἀπόλλων, ὃς ἡεῖσθαι φησὶ, ἐν τῇ Διονύσειοι τελετῇ οὐ κατέβηκεν*. [*Apollod.*] 2, 2, 2, 2, and cf. 1, 9, 12, 8. The same story (only with the name Anaxagoras substituted for that of his grandfather Proton—doubtless on chronological grounds) with the words *τῇ Ἀπυρίᾳ ῥαυθμῇ παρέρχεται ἐν τῇ Διονύσειοι μῆνι*: D.S. 4, 68, 4. (*ἡ μῆνι*—in the reign of Anaxagoras—*Paus.* 2, 18, 4; *Eust.*, on B 568, p. 288, 28).—Otherwise, it is generally Hera who sends the *μῆνι* *Akhum.* ap. [*Apollod.*] 2, 2, 2, 2 [*fr.* 14 Diels]. *Pherekyd.* ap. Sch. on e 228. *Probus* and *Serv.* on *Eccl.* vi, 48. This is a later version of the legend depending upon a different interpretation of the "insanity".

<sup>14</sup> [*Apollod.*] 2, 2, 2. Acc. to Hdt. ix, 34, the treatment of Melamp. was applied generally to all the *Ἀπυρίαι ῥαυθμῆς* (who acc. to [*Apollod.*] § 5, were also attacked by the madness); cf. D.S. 4, 68, 4. ( . . . *τῇ Ἀπυρίᾳ ἡ ὡς ῥαυθμῇ μέλας ἑρως* *ἡ ἡεῖσθαι* *Eustath.* *κατὰ τὴν ἰστορίαν*). *ἡεῖσθαι* in D.S.' word; *ἡεῖσθαι*, Sch. Pl., N. ix, 30; *purgari* Serv.

\* Μελίμπουτ παραλαβὼν τοὺς θυγατέρας τῆς νεοῦσθ παρ' ἀλλήλων καὶ τὴν ἐνθὺν χορίαν ἐκ τῶν δρόν ὧντες ἐκ Διωνύῳ συνεδίωξε [i.e. the frenzied women who had eventually become very numerous: I 5, 8] [Apollod.] 2, 2, 2, 7. The account in Pl., *Phdr.* 244 D, E, corresponds closely with the proceedings of Melampus and perhaps refers

ἔχοντα πρὸς τὰ τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἐπείτα χρόνον, ἴδιον τῷ ὁρθῶς μαντῇ καὶ κατασκευῇ τῶν παρόντων καὶ ἐπείτα χρόνον. This is a description of the remedial methods used in the Bacchic and Korybantic *enthusiasmos* but applied to special circumstances of the mythical past which are regarded as the standard of all later kathartic methods.

\* καθαρμαί [Apollod.] § 8. The regular kathartic materials are οὐκίλλα, δοφίλητος, water, etc.: Diphilus, *fr.* 126 K., employs them all for his own purpose, ap. Clem. AL, *Stv.* vii, p. 844 P. The black hellebore (ἰαλῆβορος μέλας) was popularly known as μελαμπόδιον because Melampus had first gathered and employed it for the purpose (Thphr., *HP.* 9, 10, 4), esp. when he cured and purified the *Ἰπρίαν* θυγατέρας μορτίνας (Gal., *Antrab.* 7 = v, p. 132 K.; it can only be by mistake that he calls it the white hellebore: cf. also Diosc. 4, 149, where the old καθαρμαί becomes Μελάμπος τοῦ αἰσάλας [hence Plin., *NH.* 25, 47]; the reason may be elicited from Thphr., *HP.* 9, 10, 2). The place where the καθαρμαί took place and where the καθάρια were thrown away differed acc. to the natural features of the locality and the convenience they offered: thus in Argolis it was at Louisa, in Elis at the river Anigros, etc.: Ov., *M.* xv, 322 ff.; Virg. 8, 3, 21; Paus. 5, 5, 10; 8, 18, 7-8; cf. Gall., *H. Ari.* 233 f.; Str. 346, etc.

\* Melampyricus "Ἐλλῶνος ὁ ἐξηγητὴς τοῦ Διονύσου τὸ τε εἶναι καὶ τὴν θεοῦ καὶ τὴν νοστήν τοῦ θεοῦ, Hdt. ii, 48. Hdt.'s elaborate theory in this passage of a connexion between Mel. and Egypt, etc., is of course historically quite worthless, but the fact that he pitched upon Melamp. especially as the introducer of the Dionysiac religion can only have been due to the existence of ancient tradition (i.e. legendary tradition of course). There can be no doubt that he, like Hesiod, regarded as *Dionysiac* the frenzy in which the Argive women were said *μαρῆναι* and to have been healed by Melamp. (ix, 34).

\* Μελάμπος φίλτρος ὡς Ἀπόλλων, Hera., *Enai.* (168 R.) ap. Sch. A.R. i, 118. φίλος Ἀπόλλων, D.S. 6, 7, 7 Dind. The poet of the family tree of the Melampodidae given in a 244 ff. undoubtedly regarded Melamp. as an Apollino μένεις like all μένεις in Homer. This poet at least knows nothing of the Dionysiac side of Melampus' activities. How Mel. met Apollo on the banks of the Alphaios and from him received his consecration as true μένεις, we learn from [Apollod.] 1, 9, 11, 3. The name is said of Polyphides, a descendant of Mel. a 232: αὐτὸς ὑπερβυον Πολυφίδης μένεις Ἀπόλλωνος θεοῦ βροτῶν ὅς' ἔμενον, ἐκεῖ δὲν Ἀμφίπονος. Another descendant of Melamp., Polydorus, comes to Megara to purify Alkathoos from the murder of his son, and founds there a temple of *Dionysos*: Paus. i, 43, 4.

\* See above, chap. iii, p. 32.

\* Plu., *fr.* at D. 35, p. 365 A. Sacrifice made by Agamemnon to Dionysos ἐν μυαῖς θελήσειον παρ' ἄνθρωπον παρὰ θεοῦ, Lyc. 207 B.

\* Plu., *E ap.* D. ix, p. 368 P. Three winter months were sacred to Dionysos [cf. the three chief Dionysiac festivals at Athens which

occurred in the months Gamelion, Anthestion, Elaphebolion). Only during these three months is the god on earth. So, too, Kore shared her rule over the underworld with Aidoneus for three months (or six); the rest of the year she is on earth *παρὰ μητρὶ καὶ δόμοις ἐθουσίῃσιν*.

<sup>12</sup> *Διονέων τῶν Δελφῶν οὐδὲν ἦντος ἢ τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι μένενται*, Paus., *E. ap. D.* ix, 384 D.

<sup>13</sup> *τὰ δὲ νεφέων ἐξ ὧν ἀνστήρουν τὰ δαίμα (τοῦ Παρνασσῶς), καὶ αἱ θουαῖαι ἐπὶ ταύταις τῷ Διονέων καὶ τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι μένενται*, Paus. ix, 32, 7. Parnassus gemino petii aethera colle, moens Phoebe Bromoëque sacer, cui numine mixto Delphica Thebanæ referunt tristorica Bacchæ, Lucr. v, 72 ff. We hear of a Delphos the son of Apollo and Thyia the first priestess and Maïnad of Dionysos at Delphi: Paus. ix, 6, 4.

<sup>14</sup> Apollo himself in an oracular command *Ποσειδῶνι πανταγένησιν . . . ἵνατε δαίμονας θύειας γράψωτε τοὺς πολλῶν κυρίων ἀμύλλαν*: so says Philodamus of Sharpheia in the Palan (second half fourth century A.C.), *BCHN.* 1895, p. 408. We must suppose, too, that this command (i.e. decree of the Delphic priesthood) was actually carried out.

<sup>15</sup> *Δελφοὶ δὲ ἐκείῃ προσηγορίῃ νεμεῖον (οὐ, i.e. Apollo), Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ Διόνυσον λέγουσιν*, Men. Rhet., p. 446, 5 So.

<sup>16</sup> *Ἀργ.*, Sch. Pl., P., p. 297, Böckh [p. 2, § ff. Drex.]: . . . τοῦ γραφέντος γράμματος (in Delphi) ἐν ᾧ πρῶτος Διόνυσος ἐθεμελιόταν. Ἀνὴρ γὰρ . . . δαίμονας (a part of the *νόμος Πιθαρῆς*) ἐκὸς Διόνυσου, οὗ πρῶτος ὄντας ἔσται καὶ τοῦ γράμματος θεμελιόταν. As it has been previously said that at the Delphic *μενεῖον* πρῶτος Νηὶ ἱεροποιήθησιν, Dionysos seems to be here regarded as *πρῶτος* of Nyz. Thus, at Megara there was a temple of Διόνυσου *Μυρτιάδος* in the immediate neighbourhood of, and in all probability closely associated with a *Μυρτίης μενεῖον*: Paus. i, 40, 8.

<sup>17</sup> Paus. i, 2, 5; Ribbeck, *Anf. d. Dionysoscult in Att.*, p. 8 (1899): cf. Dem. 21, 52. Regulation of a festival of Dionysos in Kotone by the Oracle: Paus. 3, 13, 7: in Aika, Paus. 8, 23, 1 (at which women were scourged, a substitution for primitive human sacrifice, as at the *θιασσηγῶν* in Sparta, of which Paus. is reminded). Introduction of the worship of Διόνυσου Φαλλῶς at Melthynna by the oracle: Paus. 10, 19, 3.—At Magnesia on the Maeander a plane-tree split by a storm revealed a statue of Dionysos (a true Διόνυσος ἰσοθέης). The Delphic oracle commanded the ambassadors sent by the city to build a temple to Dionysos (who had hitherto been without one in Magnesia) and put a priest in charge of it: then, for the institution of the cult they were to introduce from Thebes Maïnads of the family of Ino: *Μαιώδες αἱ γυνεῖς Διόνωθ' ἀπὸ Κωβαίων*. (The cult of Dionysos was evidently traditional at Thebes in this family which traced its descent from Ino, the foster-mother of Dionysos.) The three Maïnads obtained from Thebes (called Koeke, Baubo, and Thetale) instituted the cult of the god and founded three *θῆμαι* arranged according to locality (there were three *θῆμαι* in Thebes, too, E., *So.* 680 B.). They themselves remained in Magnesia till their death and were buried with great ceremony by the city, Koeke on the "Hill of Koeke", Baubo ἐν Τεβάρει, Thetale *παρὰ τῷ Ἰαργῷ*. See the *ἀρχαῖαι γράμματα* with explanatory notes in prose, restored by Ἀνυλλώμενος Μαρτύλης, *ἀρχαῖαι μύθη* (of Dionysos): *Att. Mith.* 15 (1899), p. 331 f.

<sup>18</sup> See Rapp, *Rhein. Mus.* 27. In spite of his quite correct emphasis in general upon the ritual and purely formal character of this sacred embassy and the dance-festival that followed, Rapp makes the mistake of underestimating the ecstatic side of the Dionysiac festivals—a side

which was once predominant and was always liable to recur. (If this element had not been real there would have been no need for a symbolical ritualistic imitation of such *ῥαγισμός*). How even in later times a true ekstasis and self-forgetfulness seized upon the Thyiads in their sacred night-festivals and in consequence of the numerous stimulating influences of the occasion, we can learn very clearly from Plutarch's description of the Thyiads who wandered in their frenzy to Amphissa (*Nat. Vita* 19, 249 F). Rapp., p. 22, tries in vain to upset the historical value of this account. Other points have already been mentioned incidentally.

<sup>10</sup> *ἡ δὲ βία ποταμὸς τε καὶ αἱ πόλεις Φοῖβος Ἀσέλλου*, *A* 72.

<sup>11</sup> *τὰ δ' αὖτε καὶ δαίμονες (ῥῆς ματιχῆς) ταυτίσιν ἰδέσθαι καὶ ἰδουμένους* (Plu.) *Vat. Poet. Hom.* i, 212. The only form known to Homer is *ἡ τὰν ἐμπεδόν* (*ἵπποις τὸ πᾶλλον διὰ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*) *καὶ τὸν ἄλλον σφύγαν* (Pl., *Phdr.* 244 C).

<sup>12</sup> The Ps.-Plutarch of the last note does, however, find in Theoklymenos' position among the suitors, *π* 345-57 (in any case a passage added by a later hand), a proof that he is an *ἰσθεὺς μάντις*, *ἔν τινος ἐμπεδοῦς σφύγαν τὸ πᾶλλον*. But in that story the abnormal state belongs rather to the suitors than the seer. See Lob., *Ag.* 764. Still less can we (with Welcker, *Götterl.* ii, 11) deduce Homer's knowledge of ecstatic prophecy from *A* 91 ff. or *H* 34-35. The derivation of the word *μάντις* from *μαίνεσθαι*, frequently repeated since the time of Plato, would make the ecstatic element predominant in the idea of the prophet. But this derivation is quite uncertain and a connexion with *μανία* is much more probable.

<sup>13</sup> Pythia: *π* 80, *l* 405. Dodona: *π* 234, *l* 327 f., + 286 f. An oracle is questioned perhaps in *π* 402 l. See Nagelsbach, *Hom. Theol.* p. 181 f.

<sup>14</sup> See Lob., *Ag.* 814 f. (even the regular use of the expressions *ἀνδρῶν ἡ βία*, *ἡ ταῦτα* suffice to prove it). Cf. also Bgk., *Gr. Lit.* i, 234. *A. Hom. Merc.* in its own fashion (552-66) tells how the god deserted the "lot" oracle at Delphi as too unreliable and unworthy of the god.

<sup>15</sup> Even the case of Helenos is no real example of this: *H* 44 (Plu.) *Vit. Hom.* ii, 212, seems to regard it as one. Cic., *Div.* i, 89, expressly distinguishes the prophesying of Helenos from the "enthusiastic" frenzy of Kassandra.

<sup>16</sup> Even the *A. Hom. Merc.* to the Pythian Apollo, though it describes the institution of the cult and oracle of Apollo at Delphi, nowhere mentions the Pythia (as Lob., *Ag.* 264, very pertinently remarks). (Acc. to 306 f. we must suppose that at that time the prophesying was done exclusively by male *μάντις* or *σπαρφόροι*.)

<sup>17</sup> See Eur., *IT*, 1234 ff. Oracles of earth-divinities were always given by *ἰσχυαίαιον*. Even Cicero (*Div.* i, 38, following Chrysippos) refers to *vis illa terrae, quae mentem Pythiae divino afflatu concitebat* (as something that has disappeared). It is often referred to by later authors. The placing of the tripod over the chasm from which the vapour of inspiration came, is certainly, with Welcker, *Götterl.* ii, 11, to be regarded as a reminiscence of the ancient method of the earth-oracle which was thus continued in the direct inspiration of Apollo. (The *ἰσχυαίαιον* does not exclude other stimulants. The Pythia drinks from the inspired spring—like the *μάντις* at Klaros: *Att. Mith.* xi, 430—and thereupon becomes *ἑρμῶς*: Luc., *Hermet.* 60. The prophetess of Apollo Delphiotēs at Argos by drinking the sacrificial blood *κέρκετος* *ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ γίγνεται*: Paus. 2, 24, 1. The Pythia chews the sacred laurel-leaves to become inspired: Luc., *Bis Acc.* 1; also

the *delph.* *ἢ* *νῦν* *καταδραστής* *πυθίων* *δελφικῶν* *ἐκείδε* *αὐτῷ* *δρατῆ* *καταδραστής*: *H. Mæg. ap. Abel. Orphica*, p. 288. The holy plant contains the *vis divina* which one absorbs into oneself by chewing. This is the crude, primitive idea underlying such actions, as plainly appears in a similar case mentioned by Porph., *Abz.* ii. 48.)

<sup>11</sup> e.g. in Sparta: *Ἰσὺν* *ἰσομαχόμενον* *Πάρατον* *ἱερὸν* *Γῆρ.* *Ἀσέλλιον* *δ'* *οὐκ* *αὐτὸς* *ἱσχυρὰ* *Μαλεδάρε*. *Paus.* 3, 12, B.—The legend of Apollo and Daphne symbolizes the overthrow of the earth-oracle by Apollo and his own land of prophecy.

<sup>12</sup> See above, chap. vii. p. 97. *Welcker, Götterl.* i, 520 ff.

<sup>13</sup> See above, p. 260 ff.

<sup>14</sup> At Amphikleia in Phokis there was an oracle of Dionysos: *πρόμαρτος* *δὲ* *ἡ* *ἱερὰ* *ἐστὶν*, *καὶ* *δὲ* *ἐκ* *τῶν* *θεῶν* *αὐτοῦ*, *Paus.* 10, 35, 11. The words of Cornutus probably refer to Greece (chap. xxx, p. 59, 20 Lang): *καὶ* *μαρτυρεῖ* *δὲ* *ἴσους* *τοῦ* *Διονύσου* *ἱσχυρὰ* . . . *cf. Plin.*, *Smpr.* 7, 10, 17, p. 716 B: *οἱ* *πάλαιοι* *τὴν* *θεῶν* *(Dionysos)* *μαρτυρεῖ* *πολλὰν* *ἔχειν* *ἡγεμονίαν*.

<sup>15</sup> Dionysos the first giver of oracles at Delphi: *Arg.*, *Vi. Pyth.*, p. 2, 7 *Drch.* (see above, n. 36). *Voigt ap. Rocher*, 1, 1033-4. regards Apollo at Delphi as the heir of the Dionysiac mantle; but he considers Dionysos to have been in the same condition as the Python who was overthrown and killed by Apollo—a view that can hardly be justified. My own view is that Apollo, after destroying the chthonic (dream) Oracle adopted from the mantle of Dionysos the prophecy by *ἑαυτοῦ* *ἐκτελεῖ* which had been hitherto unknown to him.—No one can seriously claim to have a clear insight into the intricate and kaleidoscopic changes of power and authority that finally led to the supremacy of the composite Apolline cult in the violently disputed centre of Greek religion.

<sup>16</sup> . . . *δοῦναι* *δὲ* *Ἀσέλλωνος* *μαρτυρεῖ* *λέγουσι* (i.e. the ancient *χαρτομαλόμενοι*). *Paus.* 1, 34, 4. *μαρτυρεῖ* *τοῦ* *χαρτομαλόμενου*. *Thgen.*, *Fr.* 8, 47. *So.* *τοῦ*, *ἱππικῶν*: *Sittl. Götterden der Gr. u. R.* 345. *ὁ* *ἰσομαχίας* *ἰσχυρὰν* *τοῦ* *θεῶν* *ἔχειν* *ἡγεμονίαν*. *Str.* 467.—*οἱ* *καταδραστήται* *καὶ* *ἐκδραστήται* *τὸν* *καταδραστήν*. *ἱππικῶν* *ἡγεμονίαν* *τοῦ* *θεῶν* *ἔχειν* *ἡγεμονίαν*. *Εἰκ. Eud.* i, 1, 4, 1214a, 23.

<sup>17</sup> Ecstatic condition of the Pythia: *D.S.* xvi, 28; misinterpreted in a Christian sense. *Sch. Ar.*, *Plu.* 39 (see *Hemsterh. ad loc.*). *ὅλη* *γίγνεται* *τὸ* *θεῶν*, *Isamb.*, *Myst.* 3, 11, p. 126, 15 *Parthey*. Description of a case in which the prophesying Pythia became completely *ἑαυτοῦ*: *Plu., Def. Or.*, 51, p. 438 B.

<sup>18</sup> In the inspired mantle the soul becomes "free" from the body: *animus ita solutus est et vacuus ut eo plane nihil sit extra corpus*, *Cic.*, *Div.* i, 113; *cf.* 70. (*καὶ* *ἑαυτοῦ* *γίγνεται* *ἡ* *ψυχὴ* *in* *dreaming* *and* *μαντεῖα*: *Arist.* *ap. S.E.*, *M.* 9, 21 *fr.* 10 ff.). *δοῦναι* *ἡ* *ἀρχὴ* *(of*

*ἐκδραστήται* *τὸ* *λέγειν* *ἐκτελεῖ* *μᾶλλον* *in* *enthousiasmos*. *Ε.Ε.* 1248b *cf.* 1225a, 28.) This is *ἑαυτοῦ* of the understanding itself

see above, p. 260 ff. At other times it is said that the god enters and fills their souls; *whence* *the* *man* *is* *θεῖος*: see above, chap. viii, n. 50; *cf.* *πλεῖν* *εἰ* *μυλὶ* *ἀπο* *τοῦ* *θεῶν*, *Minat.* 7, 6. The priestess at the oracle of Branchidai *ἔδραται* *τὸ* *θεῶν*, *Isamb.*, *M.* 5, 11, p. 127, 7 *Par.*—*ἰσχυρὰ* *δ'* *ἐν* *ἑαυτοῦ* *κατὰ* *τὴν* *τὸ* *θεῶν* *καταδραστήται* *ἐκτελεῖ*, *κατὰ* *δὲ* *τὴν* *μαντεῖαν* *αὐτῶν* *ἐκτελεῖ* *ἑαυτοῦ* *κατὰ* *τὴν* *τὸ* *θεῶν*. *Philo.*, *Q. res. div.* 60, i, p. 511 M., speaking of the *θεῶν* *καταδραστήται* *τὸ* *κατὰ*, *ἡ* *τὸ* *καταδραστήται* *τὸν* *κατὰ* *τὸ* *θεῶν* (*p.* 509 M.); *cf.* *also* *Speus. Leg.* i, p. 343 M. This also was the idea prevailing at Delphi. *Plu., Def. Or.* 2, p. 434 B, subjects as *ἐκτελεῖ*, *τὸ* *κατὰ* *τὸ* *θεῶν* *κατὰ* *τὸ* *θεῶν*, *κατὰ* *τὸ* *θεῶν* *κατὰ* *τὸ* *θεῶν*.

ἐνδύμενος εἰς τὰ σώματα τῶν προφητῶν ἐπαφίγγεσθαι, καὶ ἐκείνους ἀνέμειναι καὶ φωναίη χρώμενος ὀργάνους. But this was evidently the ordinary and deep-rooted opinion (τὸν θεόν εἰς σῶμα καθενεργήσαντα θεοῦν, *Plu., Pyth. Or.* B, p. 396 A). The primitive idea is naively expressed by a late magic papyrus (*Kenyon, Gr. Pap. in B.M.* i, p. 118 [1883], No. 122 [fourth century B.C.]; i. 2 ff.: εἰπά μοι, κύριε Ἐρμῆ ὡς τὰ θεῖα εἰς τὰς κοιλίας τῶν γυναικῶν κηλ—Neither in *κεκαῖλῃ* nor in *κεκαίμεν* is any great distinction made between the out-going of the soul and the in-coming of the god: the two ideas merge together. The condition is regarded as one in which two persons are united and become one: the human bring εἰς αὐτὸν ἄλλον γυνόμενος καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν, θεὸς γυνόμενος μέλλων δὲ ὦν, no longer experiencing a sense of division between himself and divinity μεταφ' ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲν, οὐδ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἄλλ' ἐν ᾧ ὦν (as the subtle mysticism of Plotinus describes *ἐκστασις*, 6, 9, 9-10; 6, 7, 34-5). In the above-mentioned magic invocation of "

the yōge who has conjured the god into himself says to the god  
 " καὶ τὸ δῆμόν :

Swainburne, *Songs before Sunrise* ii. 74 f.]

\* So Bergk, *Gr. Lit.* i. 335, n. 58. The verses of the magic are regarded as the god's own: *Plu., Pyth. Or.* v. 396 C ff. Since the god himself speaks out of her the Pythia can properly speaking only give true oracles εὖν ἀπαλλάσσει Ἀπόλλωνος τεύχεσσι, *Pl.* i. iv, 5; i.e. when Apollo is present at Delphi and not (as he is in winter) far away among the Hyperboreans. This was why oracles were originally only given in the spring month *Bysios* (*Plu., Q. Gr.* 9) in which apparently the *θεοδωμία* occurred (*Hdt.* i. 51). Just as in the case of the old oracular earth-spirits [see above, *Chau.* ii, n. 12] who were confined to special localities, so in the case of the gods who work through the *ἰεθουσιαιμότ* of an inspired prophets, their personal presence in the temple at the time of the prophesying is requisite. This presence is thought of as actual and corporeal in the primitive form of the belief (though it was got over and reinterpreted in later times), and therefore in the case of the gods can only be temporary. When, in summer, Apollo is in Delos (*Ag.* i. iv, 143 ff.), no χρηστέας takes place in the temple of Apollo at Patara in Lycia (*Hdt.* i. 182). And so in general *φυγόντων ἢ μένουσάντων (τῶν περὶ τὰ μαντεία καὶ χρηστέας ταταγμένων διαπορίων) ἀποβάλλει τῶν εἰσέμεν (τὰ μαντεία)*, 17a., *DO.* 15, p. 418 D.

\* The cult of Zeus in Crete was held *μετ' ὀργασμοῦ*: *Str.* 468. The same applies to the cult offered in many places to the various and very different female deities who were generally combined together under the name of Artemis: *Lob.* *Ag.* 1065 ff.; *Meineke, An. At.* 361. In their case Asiatic influence was at work sometimes, but by no means always: *Welcker, Götter.* i. 391; *Möller, Doriens.* i. 404 ff. The worship of Pan was also orgiastic. Otherwise we find it principally in foreign worships that had made their way at an early period into private cults: e.g. the Phrygian worship of Kybele, etc. These easily combined with the Bacchic worship and became almost indistinguishable from it: sometimes they even allied themselves with true Greek cults, with that of Pan, for example, which was closely assimilated both to the worship of Kybele and that of Dionysos. It remains obscure how far the Cretan cult of Zeus was affected by Phrygian elements.

\* A remarkable example is given by Herod. (ix, 86), who tells us of the blind Eusebia in Apollonia who suddenly became possessed of



*ἐμφυτὸς μαντιῇ* (not acquired by learning). He is a true *ἀδάμαντις* (Pl., *Ap.* 22 C).

<sup>11</sup> The ancients knew quite well that *Βάαι* and *Σίβυλλαι* were really a name denoting inspired *χρησμοί*: thus *Σίβυλλα* is the *μία* of Herophile, Pl., *P. Or.* 14, p. 401 A, and *Βάαι* an *ἐπίθετον* of Ptolemy, Sch. Ar., *Par.* 1071. The words are clearly used to denote whole classes of individuals by Arist., *Prob.* 934a, 26: *σοφιστὰς μαντιῇ καὶ δεικνομένοι* are liable to attack *Σίβυλλαι καὶ Βάαι* καὶ οἱ ἱεροὶ ἄνθρωποι. And in general when the ancients speak in the singular of "the Sibyl" or "Bakis", the word is generally meant as a class-name: just as for the most part when *ἡ Πυθία*, *ἡ Πυθίς* occurs it is not a particular individual Pythia who is meant but the class-concept of "the Pythia" (or some particular member of the class actually functioning at the moment). Hence it is by no means certain that Herakleitos, etc., when they speak simply of *ἡ Σίβυλλα*, and Herod. when he says *Βάαι* were of the opinion that there was only one Sibyl and one Bakis.—It must be admitted that we do not know the real meaning of these adjectival words themselves, their etymology being quite uncertain. Was the ecstatic character of these prophets already expressed in their titles? *σιβυλλεύειν*, of course = *διδάσκειν* (D.S. 4, 68, 7), but the verb is naturally enough derived from the name *Σίβυλλα*, just as *βακχεύειν* is from *Βάαι*, *ἐμμεύειν* from *Ἑμμεύς* and not vice versa. Nor can we tell how far the personal names attached to certain Sibyls and Bakides have real historical significance. Sibyl names are Herophile, Demophile (abbreviated to *Δημό*), *Θουά* or perhaps rather *Θουά*: cf. *φαίρεται ὑπερβόρῃ*, A., *Ag.* 1273 (so Lachmann on Tib. 2, 5, 88): the Arcadian Bakis was called *Kylas* or *Altes* (cf. *Θουά*) acc. to Philotas Eph. op. Sch. Ar., *Pa.* 1071. It is impossible to extract from the by no means scanty materials any real element of historical fact with respect to these stories of individual Sibyls. Most untrustworthy of all in this as in all he says on this subject is Herakleides Pont. and his story of the Phrygian (or Trojan) Sibyl: we might be more inclined to believe what Eratosthenes reported acc. to the *antiqua annales Samiorum* of a Samian Sibyl (Varro ap. Lactant., *Jul.* 1, 6, 9)—if it had not included so entirely worthless a story as that preserved in Val. M. 1, 5, 8.—Clem. Al., *Str.* i, 21, p. 398 P., gives after Bakis a whole list of *χρησμοί* with names: they evidently do not all belong to legend, but hardly one of them is otherwise known to us. The following are possibly real persons belonging to the prophetic period: Mellesagoras of Eleusis who prophesied in Athens like another Bakis *ἐκ συμφύτου μαντιῇ*: Max. Tyr. 38, 3 (there is not a shadow of a reason for identifying him with Anaxagoras, the author of an alleged ancient *Atthis*: Müller, *PHG.* ii, 21); Eoklos of Cyprus whose *χρησμοί* written in the old Cypriote language inspire a certain confidence (M. Schmidt, *Kyklos Zisch.* 1880, p. 381 B.); unfortunately he wrote before Homer: Paus. 10, 24, 3; Tat., *Gr.* 41, which makes his personality dubious again.

<sup>12</sup> Of this description were the *χρησμοί* of the fifth and fourth—even of the expiring sixth—centuries (Onomakritos belongs entirely to this class). Lab., *Ag.* 978 B., 932. It is very rarely that we hear in these times of real prophets on their own account, prophesying in the *furor disium*, like that Amphilytos of Acarnania who met Ptolemy as he returned from Eretria before the battle of *ἡ Πύλας* and prophesied to him *διδάσκων* (Hdt. i, 62 1; he is an Athenian in [Pl.] *Tig.* 124 D—where he is mentioned side by side with *Βάαι* καὶ

καὶ Εἰβύλλα—and in Clem. Al., *Str.* i, 21, p. 396 P.). In the same way occasional "Sibyls" occur even in late times (Phaenias, Athenais: see Alexandre, *Œr. Sib.* ii, p. 21, 48).

<sup>40</sup> Herakl. Pont. ap. Cl. Al., *Str.* i, 21, p. 384 P., seems to have been the first to speak definitely of two Sibyls, Herophile of Erythrai and the Phrygian Sibyl (whom he identifies with the Marpesian Sibyl or the S. of Gergis: Lact. i, 6, 12, see Alexandre, li, p. 25, 32. Philetas ap. Sch. Ar., Av. 962, follows him except that he adds a third, the Sardinian). The Phrygian-Trojan Sibyl is dated by Herakleides in the times of "Solon and Cyrus" (Lact.); we cannot tell what date he assigned to the Erythraean. Perhaps it was only after his times that the *prophetia* of Herophile first appeared in which she prophesied the *Troica*. From these verses it was now deduced that she lived before the Trojan war: so Paus. 10, 12, 2, and even Apollodoros of Erythrai (Lact. i, 6, 9). Thenceforward the name of Herophile was associated with the idea of extreme antiquity. (The Libyan Sibyl of Paus. who is said to be the oldest of all is merely an invention of Euripides and never really obtained currency: *Αἰθιοπία* = *Εἰβύλλα* anagrammatically. See Alexandre, p. 74 f.) Herophile was identified also with the *spōra* *Εἰβύλλα* who came to Delphi and prophesied there: Flut., *P.Ox.* 8, 368 C., expressly so by Paus. 10, 12, 1, and Boeckh ap. Solin. 2, p. 38, 21-4 Mom. Acc. to Herakleides (ap. Clem. Al.) it was rather the *Θρυία* who calling herself Artemis prophesied in Delphi (so, too, Philetas following Herakl. and see also Suid. *Εἰβ. Δελφί*). This is due to the local patriotism of the inhabitants of the Troad. Their Sibyl is the Marpesian (= the *Θρυία* of Herakl.). The artificial sort of interpretation and forgery that enabled a local historian of the Troad (it cannot have been Demetrios of Skepsis) to identify the Marpesian Sibyl, who also called herself Artemis, with Herophile and turn her into the true *ἱερήνη*, may be guessed from Paus. 10, 12, 2 ff. (The same source as that of Paus. is used by St. Byz. s. *Μαρπησίου*, as Alexandre, p. 25, rightly remarks.) The Erythraean claim to Herophile was also disputed from other directions. The Erythraean is distinguished from Herophile as being later by Boeckh ap. Solin. 2, p. 38, 24; and in a different fashion the same is done by Mart. Cap. li, 159. Acc. to Euseb. *Chr.* 1305 Abr. (not Eratosthenes in this case) even the Samian Sibyl was identified with Herophile—to say nothing of the Ephesian Herophile in the fragment of the enlarged Xanthos, *FHG.* iii, 408-B. From the fable of the Marpesian Herophile was later invented the story of her prophecy to Aeneas: Tib. 2, 8, 67; D.H. i, 33, 4; Alexandre, p. 25.—In comparison with these different claimants to the name of Herophile (even the Cumaean Sibyl was said to be the same as Herophile) the rest of the Sibyls were hardly able to obtain a real footing in tradition.

<sup>41</sup> The Erythraean Sibyl was dated by Euseb. in Ol. 9, 3 (the absurd addition of *Αλκίον* belongs only to the author of the *Chron. Paus.* and not to Euseb.: Alexandre, p. 80); he dated the Samian in Ol. 17, 1 (it is quite arbitrary to refer this view to Eratosthenes). Acc. to Suid. *Εἰβύλλα* *Ἀνδάλειος* καὶ *Ἀσπίς* the Erythraean lived 483 years after the fall of Troy: i.e. Ol. 20, 1 (700 a.c.). Herakleides put the Phrygo-Trojan Sib. in the times of Solon and Cyrus (to which Epimenides also belongs and to which Aristaeas and Ataris were supposed to belong). We can no longer discover or guess at the reasons for these datings. In any case the Chronologists to whom they go back evidently regarded the Sibyls as later than the earliest Pythia at Delphi. Even the Cumaean Sibyl was not to be distinguished

from the Erythraean: [Arist.] *Mimn.* 85, which perhaps comes from Timæus: Varro ap. Serv. *A.* vi, 36: cf. D.H. 4, 62, 8. In spite of which she is a contemporary of Tarquinius Priscus (this was enough to distinguish the *Cumæa* in *Italia* who prophesied to Aeneas from the *Cumæan Sibyl*: Naev. and Calp. Piso in Varro ap. Lact. 1, 6, 8). Naturally in these chronological straits recourse was had to the favourite device of such accounts—unnatural longevity. The Sibyl is *ωλὸχρομωδὴ* [Arist.]: she lived a thousand years or thereabouts: Phleg., *Macr.* 4 (the oracle of this passage was also known to Plu.; cf. *PO.* 13, 401 B: a similar source inspires Ov., *M.* xiv, 102-53. In this case the Sibyl has already lived 700 years before the arrival of Aeneas, and she will live another 300, which would bring her—by a rather inexact calculation—to about the time of Tarquinius Priscus). In the verses found at Erythrae belonging to a statue of the Sibyl (Bursch, *Woch. Klass. Phil.* 1861, p. 1042: *Atk. Mit.* 1892, p. 201, the Erythraean Sibyl is said to live 900 years—unfortunately one cannot be sure that this means till the time of the inscr. itself and of the *ωλὸχρομωδὴ* of Erythrae is the age of the Antimenes who is referred to at the close. If so the Sibyl would have been born about the year 700 B.C. (as in Suid.) or a little earlier. Perhaps, however, the lengthy period refers to the life time of the long since dead Sibyl herself, while the *εἰς τὴν ἐβδόμην ἡμέραν* of l. 11 f. only applies to the statue. In which case the commencement and end of the Sibyl's lifetime would be unknown.—*Cumæa sacra* *causa* became proverbial: Alexandre, p. 57. Finally the Sibyl was regarded as entirely forgotten by death, as in the story in Petronius 48 (cf. also—probably referring to Erythrae—Ampel., *L.A.F.* viii, 13; *RA. Mus.* 32, 639).

<sup>62</sup> p. 383 B.

<sup>63</sup> The Sibyl is overcome by the *furor divinus* in such a way that *quasi sapiens non videat ea vident insanus, et ei qui homines sensus antebat divinos amecutus sit*, Cic., *Deo.* ii, 110. cf. i, 36. *νοήματα μανίας καὶ ἐκθεσμενίας* of Sibyls and Bakis Arist. *Prob.* 30, 1, 854a, 36. The Sibyl prophesies *μυστικῶς χρομένη ἐν θύραις*, Pl., *Phdr.* 244 B. *μαντικῶς τε καὶ ἐν τοῦ θεοῦ κέντρῳ*, Paus., 10, 12, 2. *deo furibonda recepta*, Ov., *M.* xiv, 107. There is in her *divinitas et quaedam caritum societas*, Plin., *N.H.* vi, 119. *μαντικὴ καὶ δαιμόνια* [Jul.], *Co. ad. Cr.*, 37, 36 A. So, too, in our collections of Silylline oracles the S. often speak of their divine frenzy, etc.: e.g. ii, 4, 3; iii, 182 f., 295 f.; xi, 312, 320, 323 f.; xii, 294 f., etc. Frenzy of the Cumæan S.: Vg., *A.* vi, 77 f.—Bakis has his prophetic gift from the Nymphs (*Ar.*, *Pa.* 1071); he is *κατάχρητος ἐν ρομφαίῳ, παρὶς ἐκ ρομφαίου* (Paus. 10, 12, 11; 4, 27, 4), *ωμολόγητος* (cf. *θεόληπτος, φοβόληπτος* *μαρτ.* Paul).

<sup>64</sup> *Εἰφύλλα* 84 *μαντικῶς οὐδέποτε ἐπὶ*; Herakleitos ap. Plu., *Pyth.* Ov. 6, p. 387 A, *fr.* 12 Hy. = 82 Diels (the words *μαντὶς . . . θεῶν* are not H.'s but Plutarch's. Cf. *Al. Sen.* 1, 15, p. 358 P. uses only Plu.). To regard Herakleitos' Sibyl as the Pythia (with Pylk., etc.) is absurd apart from the fact that the Pythia is never called *Εἰφύλλα*. It is excluded by the way Plu. introduces the word in this passage, and connects chap. 9 with chap. 8. It is true, though, that Pl. draws a parallel between the nature of the Sibyl and that of the Pythia.

<sup>65</sup> Homer knows Kassandra as one of the daughters of Priam and indeed as *Πριάμῃσι θυγατρὶν ἴδιος ἐπὶ τέρψῃ*, *fr.* 365: probably that is why she is allotted to Agamemnon as his share of the spoil and why she is slain with him, *A.* 421 B. The *Késsa* is the first to tell of her

prophetic skill. Was it the narrative of *Q* 499 which first suggested to the readers the idea of her knowledge of the future? (In reality that passage alludes rather to the *συμπίθνα* of the sister and daughter and not to *μαντική*: Sch. B. ad loc.) Her prophetic gifts were elaborated later in many stories: e.g. Bacchyl. xiv, 50 = fr. 28 Hgk. (Porph. on Hor. *O.* i, 15). Aesch. represents her as the type of the ecstatic prophetess (*θενομανής, θεοφόρητος*, *Ag.* 1140, 1216). As such she is called by Eur. *μαρτιώλος βαμχη*, *Hec.* 121. *φειδίας* 827. τὸ βακχίον κάρη τῆς θεομανοῦς Κουονόφρας 676. She wildly shakes her head like the Bacchantes *ὄναι θεῶν μαρτιώλους πύθοντο* *ἀνέγκας*, *IA.* 760 ff.

<sup>12</sup> About the Arcadian Bakis (Kydas or Aletes by name) *θενομανος ἐν τῷ θ' τῶν Φιλιππικῶν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἱστορεῖ παραδοξα καὶ οἱ ποτὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τὸς γυναικας μαρτίους ἐκείνητος, Ἀπὸλλωνιος τοῦτος τρέπον καθαρὰν δόξαν*, Sch. Ar., *Pa.* 1071. The story is closely parallel to that of Delamprus and the Pythades, see above, nn. 22-5.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. e.g. Hippocr., π. *καθάρσις* (ii, p. 528 K.; viii, 468 L.). Upon their recovery from hysterical hallucinations the women dedicate valuable *ἱμάτια* to Artemis *καλύνοντες τῶν μάντεων*. This is the regular name for the μάγαι, καθάρται, ἀγύρται (cf. Teiresias δούλος ἀγύρται, *S.* *OT.* 348; Kassandra is accused of being *φωκὴς ἀγύρται*, *A.*, *Ag.* 1273). Hp. speaks elsewhere also of their manner of healing epilepsy, i, p. 568 K. (vi, 354 L.).

<sup>14</sup> καθάρται . . . κατὰ τὴν μαρτιήν. *Pl.*, *Crat.* 405 AB. The μάντις are able e.g. to drive away by magic the mist that is so dangerous for the olive-trees: Thphr., *CP.* 2, 7, 5. The μάντις καὶ τερατοκόνες, ἀγύρται καὶ μάντις possess the arts of *μαγαντεύματα, ἐμψόαι, καταδύσεις, and ἐκασμῶναι* which compel the gods to do their will, *Pl.*, *Rp.* 364 BC; *Lg.* 933 CF. These μάντις correspond in all essentials to the magicians and medicine men of savage tribes. Prophet, doctor, and magician are here united in a single person. A mythical prototype of these Greek "medicine men" is Apis, of whom we hear in Aesch., *Sup.* 280-70. (The μάντις also officiate as sacrificial priests, esp. where the sacrifice is combined with a special sacrificial *μαντήλα*—quite unknown to Homer—in which the will of the gods is required: Eur., *Held.* 401-819; *PA.* 1253 ff. and frequently. Hermann *Golkadlensth. Alterth.* 33, 9.)

<sup>15</sup> The clearest evidence for this is Hp., *Morb. Sacr.* (vi, 352 L.). See below, n. 81. Assistance in the case of internal diseases is naturally sought in ancient times from magicians, for such diseases arise immediately from the action of a god: *στυγερὰς δὲ αἱ ἐκ θεῶν βαίμων, ε 396* (cf. α 64), is said of an invalid who lies *ἀπὸν τοῦθερος*. Cf. *εὐσας διὰς μεγάλου, ε 411*. In such cases help is sought from the *ἐντρόμαντες* (*A.*, *Sup.* 263) who is at once μάντις and τερατοκόνες and καθάρτης like his divine prototype Apollo: *A.*, *Eu.* 82-3. In a long illness King Kleomenes I of Sparta resorts to καθάρται καὶ μάντις, *Plu.*, *Ap. Lac.* i, p. 223 E.

<sup>16</sup> *A* 313 f.; *χ* 481 E. Kathartic practices, however much they may contain a primitive core, were fairly late in attaining popularity in Greece (or in regaining a lost popularity): as is shown esp. by the all but total absence of any mention of such practices and the superstitions underlying them from Hesiod, *Op.*, which otherwise preserves the memory of so much countryside superstition (something rather like it is perhaps to be found in *Op.* 733-6).

<sup>17</sup> Nothing is said in Homer of the purification of the murderer or the homicide: see above, chap. v, n. 160.

<sup>18</sup> Thus at the *ἐμφιδόμια* all who have had anything to do with

the *paimeis*, ἀνορθίζοντες τὰς χεῖρας (Suid. s.v.). But even the child is lustrated: it is carried in the arms of a grown-up who runs with it round the altar and the altar fire: clearly a vestige of the ἀνορθίζοντες καὶ ἀδύσαντες of the child by sacred fire of which so many relics have been observed: see Grimm, p. 625; Tylor, ii, 430 f.—Uncleanness of the pregnant woman until the fortieth day after the child is born: Welcker, *RI. Schr.* iii, 197–8. At the birth of a child crowns of olive-branches or woollen fillets (ἱμαί) were in Attica hung up on the house-door; just as cypress-branches were hung on the doors of houses where a corpse lay (see above, chap. v, n. 39): for kathartic purposes strings of onines (aquills) were suspended on house-doors: see below): Hsch. ἐνθάδε ἐκέρπειν. Both are lustral materials. Use of olive branches at νεοσμήσι: S., *OC.* 483 f.; Vg., *A.* vi, 230. When a mother gives her child that is to be exposed a crown made of olive branches (as in Eur., *Ion*, 1433 ff.), this, too, has an apotropaic purpose as also has the Gorgon's head on the embroidered stuff that also accompanies the child (l. 1420 l.): see on this O. Jahn, *Bü.* *Blisch*, 60. The olive is also sacred to the χθοναί (hence its use as a bed for corpses: see above, chap. v, n. 61: cf. τὰς δαεσσομένης ἑλκὸς στανθόσσαν: Artemid., iv, 57, p. 236, 20 H. ἄοριον καὶ τανύς the goddesses crown Chios in his dream and points the man thus dedicated to death to his μέγας: Chios, *Epist.* [7, 2]. This makes the olive suitable for lustration and ἀνορθίζοντες. The house in which the child lay was thus regarded as needing "purification". The "uncleanness" felt to exist in this case is clearly expressed by Phot. *Σύμμετρος* ἐμίσμετρος ἡ μήτρα· διὸ καὶ ἐν ταῖς γυναικὶ τὰς νεοσμίας (neōsmias) χθοναί τὰς νύκτας, εἰς ἀνέλεον δαίμονας (see above, chap. v, n. 85). It is the neighbourhood of these (chthonic) δαίμονας that cause the pollution.

<sup>18</sup> A., *Pers.* 201 ff., 216 ff.; Ar., *Ra.* 1040; Hp., *Insom.* [ii, p. 10, 13 K. = vi, p. 854 L.]: cf. Becker, *Charicles*, p. 130, n. 4 E.T.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Plu., *Sept. Sap. Com.* iii, p. 149 D, and on this Wytteb., vi, p. 930 f.

<sup>20</sup> Purification of houses (y 481 ff.): e.g. [D.] 47, 71. It was customary to purify οἴκας καὶ ἀνάτορα with black hellebore: Thphr., *HP.* 9, 10, 4; Dec. 4, 149 (hence the superstitious details of its gathering, Thphr., *HP.* 9, 8, 8, and Dec.). The touching of the house by unholty daemons necessitates purification: Thphr., *Ch.* 28 (16), 15, of the δαιμόνιον καὶ στανθὸν δὲ τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὰς θυρὰς δαίμονες· δαίμονες δὲ οὐκ ἀνορθίζοντες γυναικας.

<sup>21</sup> Presence of a dead body in a house makes the water and fire unclean: "clean" water and fire must then be brought in from elsewhere. See Plu., *QG.* 24 (Argos), p. 297 A (see above, chap. v, n. 38). At a festival of the dead in Lemnos all the fires were put out (as unclean): "clean" fire was sought from Delos, and, after the completion of the ἐνέπλεονα brought into the country and distributed. Philostr., *H.* 19, 14, p. 208–9, 7 K.—Alexander was following Greek, as well as Persian, customs when at the burial of Hephæstion he allowed τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Πέρσας καλοῦμενος ἱερὰν εἶναι to go out, μέγας δὲ τανύς τὸν ἐκέρπειν. D.S. 17, 114, 4.

<sup>22</sup> "When a Greek saw anyone using expiatory rites, he presumed in that person the will to amend," Nagelsbach, *Nachhem. Nachl.*, 303. If this was really so it is strange that we never see this "presumption" expressed in words. We do indeed read that the δαιμόνιον mortifies himself and ἐξαγαγείας τὰς ἀμαρτίας αὐτοῦ καὶ πλεγματίας, but in what do these ἀμαρτίας consist?—ὡς τοῖς φαγόντες ἢ πίνοντες ἢ βιβάζοντες

ἴδω δὲ οὐκ εἶναι τὰ δαιμόνια. *Plu., Superst. 7, p. 188 D*: merely ritual omissions in fact, not moral transgressions at all. It is the same everywhere in this domain. The conceptions underlying purificatory practice certainly did not correspond to the refined morality of later ages, but they continued in force so long as *kathartikē* remained popular: they are well expressed (though disapprovingly) by Ovid in the well-known lines which we shall, however, do well to recall: *omne nefas omneque mali purgamina causam credebant nostri tollere posse senes. Graecia principum moris fuit: illa nocentis impia lustratos ponere facta putat.*—a! *nimum faciles, qui tristia crimina caedis flumina tolli posse putetis aqua, F. 2, 35 ff.*; cf. *Hp. i, p. 593 K., vi, 382 L.*

<sup>40</sup> We can only here allude to the remarkable parallel provided by the purificatory and expiatory ritual of India, which is completely analogous to the *kathartikē* of Greece and had a similar origin. Even in details Indian conceptions and procedure answer closely to Greek. They are both as far removed as possible from all idea of quiering a guilt-laden conscience and are directed solely towards effacing, expunging, or expelling an external *plasma*, a pollution arriving from without, a taint arising from contact with a hostile *δαιμόνιον* conceived as something in the nature of a daimonic fluid. Indian sources are on this point very rich and full: an excellent account of them is given by Oldenberg in his *Religion des Veda* (esp. *Fr. tr.* 243 ff.: 417 ff.). Greek and Indian practices illuminate each other. It would be a valuable experiment to take the highly elaborated *kathartikē* ritual of the Avesta and compare it with the history and technique of purification and expiation in Greek religion. It would mean renewing Lomeier's old book [*Epimenides s. de lustrat.* Zutphen 1700]: the materials are very scattered and the ground has never been thoroughly gone over since then. By the help also of the "comparative" method of religious study, which in this case is quite justified, it would then be possible to reconstruct a most important fragment of primitive religion—a fragment which had become almost entirely forgotten in Homeric times, which then recovered its ancient influence and continued to develop and was even transmitted to the ritual of the Christian church (cf. *Asch. D. and Mysticism.* 190 f.). We must be careful, however, to shut our ears to the otherwise very convincing people who are so anxious to introduce purely moral interests and conceptions into ancient religion. Morality is a later achievement in the life-history of the children of men: this fruit did not grow in Eden.

<sup>41</sup> See Appendix v.

<sup>42</sup> What the Greeks mean in the conversation in 316 ff. Phaidra's distress of mind is not derived from a deed of blood: *γυῖς μὲν ὄντοί τ' ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ δ' ἐξεί μίαιμα τ.* Does the Nurse think of any moral disgrace or defilement of the distressed woman in this *φαιδρῆς μίαιμα*? Not at all: she only asks, *μὴν δ' ἐκ τούτου ἐμάρπησεν ἔχθρ' οὗτος*: in other words by "defilement of the mind" she can only conceive of an enchantment, something from without that comes by *ἐμάρπησεν τὴν δαιμόνιον* (see below, n. 106), a stain derived from the polluting neighbourhood of such daimones. This was the general and popular conception. (Taken literally Plato's words also give expression to the popular conception: *καλλὸν ὄντων καὶ καλὸν ἐν τῷ τῶν δαιμόνων βίῳ, τοῖς κακίαις αὐτῶν αὖτε κατὰ συνέχθησαν, αὐτὰρ καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν αὐτῶν αὐτῶν αὐτῶν, ἡ. 637 D.)*

<sup>18</sup> Diseases come *αὐθιγὰ ἐκ γενεαῶν* in *μετεμέτω*, Pl., *Phdr.* 244 DE; i.e. from the rage of departed generations of souls or of *χρόνους*, Lob., *Ag.* 635-7. Esp. madness is a *νόσος ἐξ ἀλυστῶν*, S., *Tr.* 1325, a *νόσος νοσησέμενη*, E., *HF.* 89. Cure of such diseases is undertaken not by doctors but by *καθαροὶ μέγας καὶ ὀλίγους*, expiatory priests with magic proceedings—this is well shown by the treatment of the "sacred disease" in Hp., *Morb. Sac.*, p. 587-84 K = vi, 352-64 L. Such people, introducing themselves as magicians in the strict sense (p. 358 L.), use no regular medicinal treatment (356), but operate partly with *καθαροὶ* and *τελεταί*, partly with various prescriptions of abstinence *δυσταὶ καὶ καθαρότης*. These last are explained by Hp. on dietetic grounds but the *Καθαροὶ* themselves derived them from *τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον* (356). And such they were evidently in intention. The account of such prescriptions given on pp. 354-6 mostly refers to abstinences from plants and animals supposed to be sacred to the underworld. Noticeable also: *ἰσχυρότερον μέλας μὴ ἔχειν, θάλασσοι γὰρ τὸ μέλαν* (all trees with black berries or fruit belong to the inferi: *Macr.* 3, 20, 3). Other superstitions are found with these: *μηδὲ νόσθι ἐνὶ νοσθί ἔχειν, μηδὲ χεῖρα ἐνὶ χερσὶ νόσθι γὰρ νόσθι ἀσκήματα εἶναι*. The belief is familiar from the story of the birth of Heracles. See Welcker, *Al. Schr.* iii, 191. Sittl, *Gebarden* 128. (Something of the kind in *P. Mag. Par.* 1052 B., p. 71 West.) The source of the disease was, however, always supposed to be the direct influence of a *δαίμων* (360-2) which must therefore be averted. Acc. to popular belief it is always God who *τὸ δαιμόνιον νόσθι μεῖνει* (cf. p. 362). For this reason the magicians punish, *καθαίρουσι*, the sick *ἄνθρωποι καὶ τοῖσι ἀλλοῖσι* which are used to purify people *μίσρον* v. *ἰσχυρότερον* of on whom a curse has been laid. The *καθαίρουσι* are buried or thrown into the sea (*καὶ εἰς ἅλα ἄνθρωποι ἐβαλλόν*, A 314), or carried away into a deserted mountain district (p. 362). Such *καθαίρουσι* are now the resting place of the *μίσρον* that has been washed off, and so the magicians drive *εἰς δαίμον ἀσφαλὲς νοσήσαντες καὶ εἰς ἔλκεν*, Orph. *H.* 38, 16. Similarly in India, Udenberg 485.

<sup>19</sup> *Ἐπὶ δαίμονι* used for stopping the flow of blood, τ 457. Frequently mentioned in later times: particularly used in the magic cure of epilepsy, Hp. vi, 352-4; [D.] 25, §§ 79-80. When houses and hearths are perished by being sprinkled with hellebore *ἐνερπίζουσι τὰς ἐσθλὰς*. Thphr., *HP.* 2, 10, 4 (compensationem solennem in Pliny's trans., *NH.* 25, 49). Pains of childbirth prevented or alleviated by *ἐπὶ δαίμονι*, Pl., *Taf.* 148 CD. (Much more of the kind in Welcker, *Al. S.* iii, 84 ff.) The essential meaning of such *ἐπὶ δαίμονι* is regularly an appeal or exorcism addressed to the daimonic creature (clearly an appeal when lions or snakes are appeased in this way: Welcker, *ii*, 70, 14-15). *Ἐπὶ δαίμονι* accompanying *ἰσοστασίαν* are *ἐνισχυόμενοι* of the *δαίμων* ὃ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀνέστηκεν: *P. Mag. Par.* 2073 B. The meaning of such "conjurations" addressed to diseases—when the daimon is exorcised—is clearly seen in what Plotin. says of the Gnostics: they claimed to heal the sick by means of *ἰσοστασίαν*, μέλη, ἄνθρωποι, καὶ καθαίρουσιν νόσους, *ἐνερπίζουσιν* τὰς νόσους *δαίμονες* εἶναι, καὶ τὰ νοσήσαντα ἐξοικιστὶ λόγῳ φέροντες εὐνοῦσθαι, 2, 9, 14.

<sup>20</sup> Clashing of bronze used at *ἰσοστασίαι* to drive away ghosts: see above, chap. v, n. 187; cf. also *Macr.* 3, 19, 11. Claud. in *Cons. Hon.* 149: nec te (like Juppiter) progenitum Cybeleius are sonore hustravit Corybas. The noise of bronze has a kathartic effect simply as averting ghosts. In the process of driving out the ghosts at the *Leumuria*, *Tennesseas concrescat aera*, Ov., *F.* 5, 441. Hence (?) *χαλκῶς*

αἵματι χθονίῳ, E., Hal. 1348. At eclipses of the sun or moon *καὶ αἵματι καὶ αἵματι ἀνθρώπων αἵματι* (cf. Plu., *Aem.* 17; Juv. vi, 443; Mart. xii, 57, 181, etc.) *ὡς τοὺς αἵματι ἀνθρώπων αἵματι*, Al. Aphr., *Prob.* 2, 44, p. 85, 28 Id. This is the object of the *εὐχὴν ἀσίστου* at eclipses of the moon: Plu., *NH.* li, 84; Liv. xxvi, 5, 8; Tac., *A.* i, 28, and cf. Tib. i, 8, 21 f.; *ob striae*: [Aug.] *Sacrilg.* v, 16, with Caspari's *retz.*, p. 31 f.

\* *φόνος φόνος ἀνθρώπων*, E., *IT.* 1233. *Purgantur <crucore> cum cruore polluantur* . . . Herachit. (p. 335, 5 Schust. [5 D. = 130 B.]).

\* A.R. iv, 703 B. *καθαροὶς χερσίν* . . . : A., *Eum.* 283, 449, *αἵματι καθαροὶς*; cf. Müller, *Arch. Eum.* 124. Representation of the *καθαροὶς* of Orestes on well-known vase-paintings: *Mon. d. inst.* iv, 48, etc.

\* The "purification" of the stain of blood in these and similar cases really consisted in a "substitution" sacrifice whereby the anger of the daimones was appeased: so much was, on the whole correctly, observed long ago by Meiners, *Abg. Græc. der relig.* ii, 187. The *δῆμος* that clings to the murderer is in fact just the indignation of the murdered man or of the underworld spirits: this is plain in Antiph., *Tol.* 3a, 3 (see above, chap. v, n. 178). The thing that makes the son who has not avenged his father's murder "unclean" and keeps him away from the altars of the gods is *ὁδὸς ἀκαθάρτου* *μῆτις*, A., *Ch.* 283.—In the case of murder or homicide there is not only the contact with the sinister other-world that makes men unclean (this applies to all cases of "pollution"), but, besides this, there is also the anger of the murdered soul itself (and of its protecting spirits). Hence in this case, besides *καθαροὶς*, *καρπός* as well is necessary (see above, chap. v). It is evident, however, that it would be difficult to keep the two processes distinct and that they would easily merge into each other.

\* The *φάρμακοι* are put to death at the *Thargelia* of Ionic cities: Hipponax *fr.* 37. In other places on extraordinary occasions, but regularly at the Thargelia in Athens. This is denied by Stengel, *Hermes*, 22, 86 ff., but in the face of definite statements from antiquity general considerations can have no weight. In addition it was only a special mode of execution applied to criminals already condemned to death. (Two men, acc. to Harp. 180, 19: a man and a woman *Hsch.* *φάρμακοι*: the variation is explained by Hefel. *ap. Phot.* *Bibl.*, p. 354a, 3 ff. Bk.) The *φάρμακοι* serve as *καθάρματα* to the city (Harp. 180, 19 Bk.): Hippon. *fr.* 4; Hellad. *ap. Sch. Ar.*, *Eq.* 1136. *φάρμακος = καθαρμοί*, Phot., *Lex.* 640, 8 Porc. The *φάρμακοι* were either burnt (after being put to death) like other propitiatory victims: Tz., *Ch.* v, 736, prob. following Hippon. (the burning of the *φάρμ.* at Athens seems to be alluded to by Eur. *Alph.* 120 [i, 280 K.]); or stoned: this form of death is implied (in the case of Athens) by the legend of Istros *ap. Harp.* 180, 23. Analogous customs (indicated by Hefel, *Dorians*, i, 345) at Abdera: Ov., *ib.* 485 f. (which acc. to the Sch. is taken from Call., who evidently transferred to Apollonios the pious wish directed by Hippon. against Boeupalos): at Massilia (*Petr. fr.* i Bc., where the *φάρμακος* is either thrown down the cliff or *saxis occidit* after a populo: Lact. *ad Stat.*, *TA.* 10, 799). Apollonios of Tyana was clearly following ancient custom when he made the people of Ephesos stone an old beggar, who was evidently nothing but the plague-daimon itself, for the purification of the city: *καθάρματα τοῖς ἑσπέραις τῆς πόλεως*, Philostr., *VA.* 4, 10-11. Was the stoning a sort of counter-enchantment? See Roscher, *Kyminthropolis*, 36-8.



<sup>12</sup> Among the ingredients of a *ἑκάστη θύσις* is *τῆς γαλῆς* was an *ὄνιον* or an onion: Luc., *DM.* 1, 1; or the testicles of a sucking pig that had been used as a victim: *D.*, 54, 38. The *ἐκθέματα*, sacrifices to Hekate and the souls of the dead (see above, chap. v, n. 176), are identical with the *καθάρματα* καὶ ἀνέλεμνα which were thrown out at the crossroads in the *Ἑσπερία*: *Did. ap. Harp. ἐκθέματα*; cf. *E.V.* 426, 44. *καθάρματα* is the name of the purificatory offerings: *καθάρματα* of the same when they are thrown away: *Ammon.*, p. 79 Valck. The dead bodies of dogs which had been used as victims at the "purification" were afterwards thrown *τῆς ἑκάστης μετὰ τὴν δάκτυλον καθάρματα*, *Pln.*, *QR.* 68, p. 280 C. Even the blood and water of the purificatory sacrifice, the *ἀνέλεμνα*, is also dedicated to the dead: *Ath.* 409 E 8. The fact that the *καθάρματα* are made over to the invisibly present spirits at the cross roads might be derived also from the necessity for throwing them out *ἐκπαρσπερι* (see below, n. 104). Even the Argive custom of throwing the *καθάρματα* into the Lernaean lake (*Zoh.*, iv, 36; *Dgn.*, vi, 7; *Hsch.* *Ἀλφειὸν θάλαττα*) shows that these kathartic materials are intended as a sacrifice to the underground spirits since the Lernaean lake was an entrance to the underworld (see above, chap. viii, n. 28).

<sup>13</sup> Annual *relief* to Hekate in Aegina reputed to have been founded by Orpheus. Hekate and her *καθάρματα* were there regarded as valuable against insanity (for she can remove what she herself has sent): *Ar.*, *Ves.* 122; *Loh.*, *Ag.* 242. This initiation festival lasted on into the fourth century a.d.—*Paus.* refers to only one other temple of Hekate in Argos: 2, 22, 7.—Indications of a vigorous worship of Hekate in Kos: *GDI.* 3824, iii, p. 345 *no.* Hekate was patron-goddess of the city of Surloukheia: *Tac.*, *A.* iii, 62, Str., 680, and in other cities of Asia (as is known from inscr.). Possibly Hekate is there only a Greek title of a native Kurian deity. The ancient cult of the *ῥέουσα* at the Trionion in Knidos was, however, Greek: *Burkh on Sch. Pl.*, p. 314 f.; *CIG.* i, p. 45.

<sup>14</sup> *Ἥδρα καὶ νεφέων ἡγήμενη*. *Sophr. fr.* 7 *Karb. ap. Sch. Theoc.* ii, 12.—She is actually queen in Hades, sharing the throne of Plouton it seems: *S.*, *Ant.* 1120. She is often called *ῥέουσα*. She is *Ἀλφειὸν κέρας* (i.e. of Hades, *K. O. Müller, Introd. Scint. Myth.* 245); *Hsch.* She is called *ἰδμετὴ* herself in *H. Nag. Hec.*, *Abel. Orph.*, p. 280. She is the daughter of Encheolus, i.e. Hades: *Orph. H.*, 72, 3 (elsewhere of course she has other origins). As *ῥέουσα* she is often confused with Persephone (and both, as they are all thus united in several particulars, with Artemis). In the transcript of a magical pater. from Budrum (Cilicia) in *JHS.* xi, 232, there appears a *ῥέῃ ἑκάστη*. This would certainly be very remarkable but on the stone itself the actual words are *τῆς ἐκθέματος ἑκάστης*. [But cf. *Tab. Delph.*, p. xiii, a 13.]

<sup>15</sup> Hekate goddess of childbirth: *Sophr. fr.* 7, worshipped in Athens as *καυορράφος*, *Sch. Ar.*, V. 804. Samian worship of the *καυορράφος* *ἐκ τῆς γαλῆς* (i.e. as Hek.), (*Hdt.*) *V. Hom.* 30; *Hec.*, *Tag.* 450; *ἑκάς ἐκ γαλῆς* (Hek.) *Καυορράφος καυορράφος*. (Even as early as this word is the epithet of Hek. and not the name of an independent, female daimon which it may have been to begin with, and in isolated cases remained.) *Γενετήριος* goddess of childbirth is said to be *ἑκάστη τῆς ἑκάστης*: *Hsch. Gr.* The goddess Eileithyia to whom dogs were sacrificed in Argos is certainly a Hekate (*Sobr. ap. Plu.*, *Q. Rom.* 82, p. 277 B—she was *Artemis elsewhere*). A consecration to Hekate *ἐκ τῆς γαλῆς*: ..... from Larisa, *Arch. Mitth.* xi, 450. Hek. is also a goddess of marriage: as such (*ἐκ τῆς γαλῆς* *ἑκάστης*, *Sch.*) she is called upon with *Hymenaios*

by Kassandra in Eur., *Tr.* 323. Hekate is γαμήτωρ simply as χθονία: the χθονίοι frequently take part in marriage as well as birth: see above, chap. v, p. 84 ff.; Gaia: see Welcker, *Götterl.* i, 327. Offering made *πρὸς* walking and *παμφύλων* refers to the Erinyes: A., *Eu.* 838.

<sup>12</sup> Hekate present at funerals (roaching *πρὸς* εἰσβάς *κατὰ* φέροντα. Sophr. fr. 7) ἀγῶνδρα δὲ τ' ἦναι καὶ πόλεω σίμα Theoc. ii, 13. χαλκῶνα ἐνὶ λείῳ ἵλασθαι καὶ αἰματὶ πόλεω ἐν νύκτι στείχοντα κατ' ἦναι τειρομένον. H. Hec. ap. Hipp., *RH.* iv, 35, p. 102, 84 f. D.—S.—Hekate present at all infamous deeds: see the remarkable formulae ap. Plu., *Supers.* 10, p. 170 B (Bgk., *PLG.* iii, p. 880).—Hek. regarded as devouring corpses (like Eurytomos, etc., above, chap. vii, n. 24): αἰματόν, καρδιδόν, σαρκοφάγ, ἀσποδόρ are said of her in the Hymn. *Magis.* 5, II, 53-4 (p. 294 Ab.). φθόνιος should be also read, ib., l. 44 (εἴψας = φθαί, see above, chap. v, n. 100); cf. ἀσποδόρ *χθονία*, *P. Mag. Pat.* 1446. Ἐνδρὴ ἀσποδοδόρ *αὖ* a definition from Megara ap. Tab. *Dial.*, p. xiii, l. 7 Wünsch. Probably ἀσποδόρ should be read (Wünsch differently, p. xxb).

<sup>13</sup> See above, chap. v, zn. 66, 132.

<sup>14</sup> Medea in E., *Iled.* 385 ff.: οὐ γὰρ οὐ καὶ τῇ Μοιρῶν τῇ ἰσὺ (as magician) ὀφθαλμοῖς μάλα πολλὰ κλέπτει καὶ ζυγοῖσιν εὐλόγῃ, Ἐκείνη, μυχοῖς κεύθεσσι δάμναε ἱμάς.—Δήμητρος κῶρη is addressed as *κατὰ* Μοιρῶν, in company with Hephæstos, in E., *Phaeth.* fr. 781, 59. Probably Hekate is meant being here as frequently combined or confused with Persephone the daughter of Demeter (cf. *Ion*, 1048).

<sup>15</sup> The pious man cleans and decorates every month τῶν Ἑρμῶν καὶ τῶν Ἐκείνων καὶ τῶν ἑσθῶν τῶν ἱερῶν & ὅ τῶν προγόνων ἀετακένων, Theopomp. ap. Porph., *Ab.* ii, 18 (p. 146, 8-9 N.). Acc. to this Hekate and Herones belong to the best *κατὰ* οἶκος of the house.—Shrines of Hekate before the house-door (Lob., *Ag.* 1336 f.); cf. the sacella of the Heroes in the same place: above, chap. iv, n. 135.

<sup>16</sup> The late interpolation in Hes., *Th.* 411-52, in praise of Hekate leaves out the uncanny side of her character altogether. Hekate has here become so much the universally revered goddess that she has lost all definite personality in the process. The whole is a telling example of the sort of extension that might be given to a single divinity who had once been the vital cult-object of a small locality. The name of this universally known daimon becomes finally of little importance (for everything is heaped upon one personality). Hence there is little to be learnt of the special characteristics of Hekate from this Hymn. (In any case it is time we gave up calling this Hymn to Hekate "Orphic": the word is even more than usually meaningless and conventional in this case.)

<sup>17</sup> Hekate (*νύκτωρ* at the crossroads, S. fr. 492 N.) meets men as an *ἀνταία* *θεός* (S. fr. 311) and is herself called *ἀνταία* (fr. 311, 368; cf. *EM.* 111, 50, where what precedes is from Sch. A.R. i, 1141). The same adj. applies to a *δαίμων* that she causes to appear: *Hek. ἀνταία*, *ἀνταία*, in this as in most cases with the added sense of hostile. *Hek. ἀνταία* *ἐν* *ἀνταία* *δαίμων*, Seld. *Ἐκείνη*. (from *Elia* *Crit.* on *Greg. N.* iv, p. 467 Mg.). She appears or sends apparitions by night as well as by day: *Ἐκείνη*, *Ἐκείνη* *ἀνταία*, & τῶν κατὰ πόλιν *ἀνταία* *ἀνταία* καὶ *κατὰ πόλιν*, E., *Ion*, 1048 ff. Melinoë, a euphemistically (cf. above, chap. v, n. 6) named daimonic creature, either Hekate or Empousa, meets *ἀνταία* *ἀνταία* κατὰ *ἐσθῶν* *νύκτωρ*, *Orph. H.* 71, 9. Hek. appears at midday in Luc., *Philo.* 22. In this midday vision she opens the earth and τὰ ἐν Ἄιδου *ἀνταία* become visible (c. 24). This reminds us of the story told by Herakl.

Pont, of Erpedotinae to whom Plouton and Persephona appeared in *περυσσίστῳ ἀράτῳ* in a lonely spot and the whole world of the spirits became visible (ap. Procl. in *Rp.* ii, 119 Kroll). Lucian is probably parodying that story. Elsewhere in the same pamphlet he gives an absurd turn to a fabulous narrative of Plutarch's (*de An. fr.* i Hera. = *Philops.* 35).

<sup>77</sup> See Append. vi.

<sup>78</sup> See Append. vii.

<sup>79</sup> Hekate herself is regarded as having the head of a dog: undoubtedly an ancient conception of her (she has *κυλινδοειδὴς φάσος*, *H. Mag.* 5, 17 Ab.). She is sometimes even a dog herself; *Hek.* *Ἑκάτης ἀνὰ δόγμα*, and partic. *AB.* 338, 31-337, 5; *Call. fr.* 200 h, 4. She is identified with Kerberos: *Lydi. Mon.* 3, 8, p. 42 W. She is actually invoked as a dog in *P. Mag. Par.* 1432 ff., p. 80 W.; *rupis* *Ἑκάτης κυνέας, κύων πέλας*. Hence dogs are sacred to her and are sacrificed to her (earliest witness *Sophr. fr.* 8 Kaib.). The hounds with whom she flits about at night are daimonic creatures like Hekate herself. Porphy. (who was specially well informed about such things) said that *σαῖες* the hounds of Hekate were *νοκταὶ δαίμονες*: ap. Eust., *PE.* 6, 23, 7-8. In Lycophron's account (ll. 1174-80) *Hekate* is represented exactly in this way, i.e. as a daimonic creature who appears to men as a hound (cf. *PLG.* iii, 721 f.). She is transformed by Hekate (*Primo*) into one of her train (*παραστάς*) who by their nocturnal howling strike terror into men who have neglected to make offering to the goddess.—Dogs occur as symbols of the dead on grave-reliefs!—above, chap. v, n. 105. (Erinyes as hounds; Keres as "Hounds of Hades": *A.R.* iv, 1685; *AP.* vii, 430, 3 [Theoklyd.], etc. *Ruhnke, Ep. Cr.* i, 94.)

<sup>80</sup> See *Dithy.* *Rh. Mus.* 25, 332 ff.

<sup>81</sup> The Italian Diana who had long become identical with Hekate remained familiar to the Christianized peoples of the early Middle Ages (allusions in Christian authors: *Grinin.* pp. 283, 286, 833, 949, 1162 f.; *O. Jahn, Bus. Blick.* 106). She was, in fact, the meeting point of the endless mass of superstition that had survived into that time from Graeco-Roman tradition. The nocturnal riding of a mob of women (i.e. "souls" of women) *cum Diana, peragorum dea* is quoted as a popular superstition by the so-called *Canon Episcopi*, which in the controversies on witches was so often appealed to. Thus due it seems,

century). It was rescued from  
the Decretals of Gratian,

very well known in the Middle Ages. (The passage from Burkhard is printed in *Grinin.* p. 174). That the whole in a Canon (24) of the Council of Ancyra, 314 a.d., is, however, only a mistaken idea of Burkhard's.) This belief in the nightly hunt of Diana with the souls may be regarded as a vestige of the ancient idea of Hekate and her nocturnal crew. It was all the more likely to survive in northern countries with their native legends of wild Hunters and the "fiery hunt" with which it could so easily combine. ["Horne the Hunter," *Merry Wives of Windsor*, iv, 4; v, 5.]

<sup>82</sup> *ἐκείνη δαίμονα κυνέας πέλας*, καὶ φάσος καὶ νυκτοὶ καὶ ἀνυκτοὶ ἐν τῇ κλίτῃ καὶ φάσος καὶ φάσος ἔστω. *Ἑκάτης φάσος* ἐκείνη ἐκείνης καὶ φάσος ἐκείνης, καὶ φάσος καὶ φάσος. *Ep., Abstr. Sac.* vi, 382 L.; cf. *Plu., Supers.* 3, p. 166 A; *Hor., AP.* 454. Hekate is *κυνέας* *αἰρία*, *Eust., Il.* p. 87, 51 (hence also releases men from  
in the initiations of August. see above, n. 30); cf. *Ἑκάτης*

cf. *Ἑνδρα. E., Hép.* 141. Dreams of Hekate, Artemid., 2, 37, p. 139, 1 ff. H. The *φῆμεις* *ἀνελκόμενοι* *κατὰ* *δόντας*: Sch. Ar., *Ar.* 1490. The *φῆμεις* are also the source of nightmares, *Rk. Mus.* 37, 467 n. (like Pan as Ephialtes: Didym. ap. Sch. Ar., *Ves.* 1038—where *ῥῆμεις* should be read, from *ῥῆ* the noise of bleating goats and *ἦν*: Suid. and *CIG.* iv, 8382). The Lamiai and Empousai seem also to have been night-terrors: cf. what is said of their amorous disposition and desire for human blood by Apollonios ap. Philoniz. *V. d.* 4, 25, p. 145, 18; and what is said of Pan-Ephialtes, *ἔν* *δὲ* *νεμεσσίῃ*, Artemid., p. 139, 21 H. General statement: *δρεπόμενοι* comes *ἐκ* *δρεπόμενοι* *δρεπόμενοι* Suid. *δρεπόμενοι*, p. 1124 Gaisf. Seirenes: Crusius, *Philol.* 50, 97 ff.

<sup>128</sup> The "Banquets of Hekate", besides the *καθάρματα* referred to above (n. 88), included also the specially prepared dishes that were made and put out for Hekate *κατὰ* *μῆνα* (Ar., *Plu.* 596) at the *ἐπισημίες* (see above, chap. v, n. 88) or else at the *νεμεσίαι*, Sch. Ar., *Plu.* 594; *κατὰ* *τὰς* *νεμεσίαις*, *ἑορταίς*: cf. the offering to Hekate and Hermes at each *νεμεσία*: Theopomp. ap. Poryph., *Abst.* 2, 16, p. 146, 7 N. Those banquets of *ἡὲρ* are meant by Ar., *Plu.* 594 ff., *S.* fr. 668 N.: *Plu.*, *Symp.* 7, 3, p. 709 A.—It is possible that at the turn of the month there was a "purification" of the house, in which case the *καθάρματα* and the *ἑνδραὶ* *δόντας* would be again combined.—Ingredients of the offerings to Hek.: eggs and toasted cheese (Sch. Ar.); *ἐπίπλα* and *μαράς* Ath. 325 B.: *stamēnakes* [of cheese, *κλαμμένης* *ἀπὸ* *τυροῦ*, Paus. *Lex.* ap. Eum. 1165, 14] *ἀμφιφύματα* (see Lob., *Agk.* 1082 i.).

<sup>129</sup> The person *καθάρματα* *ἐκτείνων* throws them away *ἀνελκόμενος* *δρεμύει*: A., *Cho.* 98-9. The vessel filled with the purificatory offerings was emptied *ἐν* *ταῖς* *ἐπισημίαις* and *ἀμεινόμενοι*: Schol. ib. This was regular with *καθάρται*: Theoc. xxix, 94 ff., and at offerings to the Erinyes: S., *OC.* 490. Even Odysseus is obliged at his sacrifice to the dead *ἀνελκόμενος* *καυδοῖν*, v 528. Medea in collecting her magic juices turns her eyes *ἐξ* *ὀπίσω* *χερσὶ*: S., *Ph.* fr. 491 N.; A.H. iv, 1515, cf. also Lomaeier, *de* *hysterat.*, p. 455 f. This remained the rule at sacrifices to *ἑβένος* and in magic ceremonies which regularly had to do with the underworld. Even Marc. Emp. in giving directions for the cure of *φθῆσις* often enjoins *neq retro respice* e.g. 1, 54, likewise *Plin.*, *NH.* 21, 176; 26, 91. In making an enchantment *καυδοῖν* *ἀνελκόμενος* *μυθῶν* *ἑνὸς* *ἐν* *καυδοῖν*, P. Mag. Lond., given in Kenyon Greek Pap. in *B.M.*, l. p. 98. Modern superstition agrees: cf. Grimm, p. 1786, n. 299; cf. nn. 357, 558, 890, 1137. The eye must be turned away from the "furious host": Birlinger, *Am. Schaubew.*, N.5. i, 60. The precaution is, however, of primeval antiquity. In the old ladies cult of the dead and worship of formidable deities many of the proceedings must be performed *ἀμεινόμενοι*, Oldenberg, 335 i., 487 i., 550, n. 8; 877 i., 560. The reason for the precaution is not hard to see. If the person looked round he would see the spirits engaged in taking possession of the objects thrown to them, which would be sure to bring ill-luck—*κατὰ* *δὲ* *ὅτι* *ἐκ* *ταῖς* *ἐπισημίαις*. Hence Odysseus, when he is returning Leukothoe's wimple by throwing it into the sea, must *μὴ* *δρεπόμενος* *καυδοῖν*, v 350. Hence Orpheus must not look back at Eurydike while she belongs to the lower world. (Cf. Hannibal's dream reported after Silenus and Caes. Ant. by Cic., *Div.* i, 48.) of *δρεπόμενος* *καυδοῖν* *καυδοῖν* *καυδοῖν* *καυδοῖν* *καυδοῖν*: Sch. Ar., *Ar.* 1493. Very clearly put by Ov., *F.* 5, 437: at the Lemnia the sacrificer throws away the beans *aversus* . . . *neq respicit. umbra potestur colligere et nullo tunc videntis seque.* At last when the Muses are

all driven out, *respicit* (444). One of the Pythagorean *vévêla*, those invaluable fragments of Greek old wives' wisdom, runs: ἀποβύειν τῆς ψυχῆς μὴ ἐκτενέσθαι· Ἐμπίει γὰρ παρρηγορεύει (Iamb., *Protr.*, p. 114, 29 f. Plat.). Here the reason for the superstitious practice is clearly shown (cf. also Grimm, p. 1778, n. 14; cf. n. 560); the underworld spirits (wandering over the earth, esp. on the fifth of the month, as in Hes., *Op.* 803) are following the departing person; if he were to turn round he would see them.

<sup>129</sup> Appearance of *εἰδωλά* of the dead: not as in Homer in dreams only, but openly before men's waking eyes. Stories of this go back as far as the poems of the Epic Cycle; cf. appearance of Achilles in the Little Iiad (p. 37 Nf), in the *Néera* (p. 33). How familiar this idea had become by the fifth century may be judged from the frequency of ghosts in the tragedians: A., *Pers.*, *Eum. Prom. Fug.*; S., *Phaen.*; cf. fr. 796 N.; E., *Hec.*; raising of the spirit of a dead man, fr. 612; cf. also the stories of Simonides and the grateful dead (Hek. on Sim., fr. 128); of Pelope and the *εἰδωλά* of Kallias (see A. Marx, *Griech. Märchen vom dunkeln Jenseits*, p. 114 f.).

<sup>130</sup> Spirit-raising at entrances to the underworld at definite *φύλακται* or *νευροφύλακται*: see above, chap. v, n. 23. There were, however, *φύλακες* who could compel individual souls to appear at other places as well: E., *Atr.* 1128 f. Such *φύλακες* belonging to the fifth century and to be found in Thesaly are spoken of by Plu. ap. Sch. E., *Atr.* 1128. People *τοῖς τε τεθνηότας φέροντες φύλακες* and *θεοὺς ἐκκαλεσμένους αἰθέρι, ὡς θυμὸς τε καὶ εὐχὴ καὶ ἀντίθετος γαστέρας* occur in PL, *Lg.* 808 B. Latest literature abounds in such spirit-raising. Conjuror Hekate to appear was a favourite magic experiment: A. R. iii, 1006 f., etc., recipe for producing this illusion in Hipp., *Rif.* iv, 35-8, p. 102 f. D.-S. A *Ἑδρὰς ἐκκαλῶν* occurs as early as Thphr., *Ch.* 28 (16).

<sup>131</sup> *ἑδραίω* vel *μαρτυρῶ* profess *ἀντὶ τοῦ τοῦ ἑδραίω μαρτυρῶ δέλην* and *μαρτυρῶ* *δεναιὸν* *ἀπολεῖ* *δέναι* *δέναι* *δέναι* *δέναι*, *ἐκκαλῶν* *τοῖς* *καρτέλλοις* *τοῖς* *θεοῖς*, *ὡς* *ἐμὲ*, *μαρτυρῶ* *ἐμὲ* *ἐκκαλῶν*. Pl., *Rf.* 364 C. And esp. from *Lg.* 933 AE we get a good idea of the fear that the *μαρτυρῶ* and *καρτέλλοις* generally inspired with their *καρτέλλοις* *ἐκκαλῶν*, *ἐκκαλῶν*, and other *μαρτυρῶν* (we even hear of wax-figures on house-doors, grave-stones, *ἐνι* *ἐκκαλῶν*, as so frequently later, with the same superstitious purpose). Plato himself does not rule out the possibility of such magic incantations; at least they did not conflict with his own daimonic theory; see *Smp.* 203 A. *ἐκκαλῶν* are "evocations" of spirits or gods: see Rohrb., *Tim.*, p. 115. *ἐκκαλῶν* have the same meaning: see above, chap. v, p. 188. *ἐκκαλῶν* frequently in this sense in the *Orph.* H., *καρτέλλοις*, *καρτέλλοις* are the "bindings" whereby the spirit-raiser magically compels the unseen to do his will. Compulsion is regularly found to be necessary: the spirits do not come willingly. The magician by his spells and ceremonies in their master: he extorts over them that *ἐκκαλῶν* (*ἐκκαλῶν* is frequent in the magical books) or *μαρτυρῶν* of which Porph. ap. Eus., *PE.* 5, 6, specially tells us (probably deriving it from Pythagoras of Rhodos). *μαρτυρῶ* is Plato's weaker word: the most extreme is *δέναι* *δέναι*, Iamb. *Myt.* 6, 9 (i.e. Porph. *Rp. Arab.* fr. 31 Parth.); cf. *τὸ* *δέναι* *μαρτυρῶν* *τὸ* *δέναι* *τὸ* *μὴ* *δέναι*: refrain in a magic hymn, P. *Meg. Per.* 3353 f.—Just as in these incantations the *καρτέλλοις* affects the gods themselves so in other cases the victim is the unfortunate person whom the magician intends to harm: in this sense we have *καρτέλλοις*, *καρτέλλοις*, P. *Per.* 338; *Orph. Lit.* 682, and the

*apothemas* or *defixiones* written on metal tabulae which have been found in such numbers in graves; see Gothofred. ad *Cod. Theod.* B, 16, 3. These are now collected and edited by R. Wünsch, *Defixionum tabellae in Aetia reperiuntur* (C.I.A. App.), 1887, with those found outside Attica included in the *Prasfatio*. Here we find *καταδῶ* (*καταδίδωμι*) τὸν δῖον his tongue, limbs, mind, etc. (nn. 68, 89, 95, etc.), i.e. a magical disabling, paralyzing, lettering of his faculties—and of all his efforts: *ἐνὰ τῇ ἐνερσίᾳ πάρεα γέμετο*, nn. 64, 98. The carrying out of this is entrusted to Hermes *χθόνιος* or to Hekate (*καταδῶ σὺν τῇ ὑπὸ τὸν ἔδαφιν κτλ.*) as the *αἰσχροὶ δαίμονες*; cf. nn. 81, 84, 85, 86, 101, 105, 106, 107. Sometimes the promoter of the *καταδῶ* *αἰ* *κατάγῃ*, 108, etc. The *defixio* Gk. Pap. in *B.M.* (Ken.), No. 121, ll. 384, 41. — therefore here = *καταδιδῶναι* *κατὰ* (= disable him—not make him "possessed") and implies the delivery of the victim into the power of the infernal spirits.—The *αἰσχρὸς* and *κατάγῃ* appear as accomplished weather-magicians in Hp., *Morb. Sac.* vi, 358 L. They are claimed to be able to draw down the moon (an old art of Thessalian witches), make the sun go out, cause rain or drought at will, etc. A *γῶρος* of *ἀερανοῖται* at Korinth was able *τοῖς ἀέροις καταγῆναι*: Hsch. Suid. *ἀερανοί*; cf. Welcker, *RI.S.* iii, 63. The claims made by these *κατάγῃ* for themselves were made by later ages on behalf of Abaris, Epimenides, Pythagoras, etc.; Porph., *V.P.* 28-9 (Iamb. 135 f.); Empedokles promised them to his own pupils: 464 f. Mull., fr. 111 Diels; and cf. Welcker, *RI.S.* iii, 60 f.—These are all examples of magical arts from early times; the overwhelming mass of evidence for such proceedings in later ages cannot be mentioned here except as explaining ancient accounts.

<sup>146</sup> Abaris had been mentioned by Pindar (*Harp.* "Αβάρης); Hdt. mentions him in iv, 36. There we hear of the arrow which he bore along with him *κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν* and of his complete abstinence from food (cf. Iamb., *V.P.* 141). The arrow, a *σὺμβολον* τοῦ Ἀνδάλκωρος (*Lycurg.* fr. 85, ap. Eudoc., p. 34, 10) is borne by Abaris in his hand—the suggestion of Wesseling, recently revived, that we should in Hdt.'s passage read *ὡς τὸν ἄνθρωπον περιέφερε*, has been shown to be linguistically impossible by Struve, *Opusc. Crit.* ii, 269. The embellishment of the Abaris story, whereby he (like Moschion) flew through the air on his arrow, is later than Hdt. or than Lyk. (The arrow is presumably the same as the one of which Herak. Pont. tells some strange things; ap. [Eratostr.] *Cassus*, 29.) The story sounds rather like Herakleides. See Porph., *V.P.* 29; Iamb., *V.P.* 91, 136; Him., *O.* 25, 2, 4; Nonn. *D.* 11, 132 f.; *Proc. Gaz.*, Ep. 88. Abaris was regarded as *ἰσχυρός* (Eudoc.) as *καταγῆς* and *χρηματοδόχος*, as driving away pestilences by magic arts (esp. in Sparta, where *καταγῆς* = apotropaic sacrifices, were instituted and a temple of *Κόρυ σάκρα* founded; Apollon., *Niv.* 4—prob. from Throtophr.; see *RI. Mus.* 28, 353—Iamb., *V.P.* 92, 141; Paus. 3, 13, 2). He is also said to have prophesied earthquakes, pestilence, etc. (Apollon.), and to have given prescriptions against disease and *ἐνδοῖαι* (Pl., *Charm.* 150 CD); was a type of *ἐκκλησίας* and *ἀνδρογῶνος* and *ἀνδρογῶνος*; Str. 301.—The figure of Abaris thus left rather vague in ancient legend was elaborated from two sources: (1) the Athenian cult-legends of the foundation of the Protosia; *Harp.* "Αβ., Suid. *σπονδία* Sch. Ar., *Eq.* 729; *Lycurg.* κατὰ *Μουσολύχας*; and (2) the Pythagorean legends. It is in itself very probable that the story in Iamb., *V.P.* 91-3, 147, of the meeting between Abaris and Pythagoras goes back to the fabulous "Abaris" of Herakleides

(the story in 215-17 of Abaris and Pythagoras before Phalaris evidently comes from Apoll. Ty.). This was suggested by Kriech. *de soc. Pythag.*, p. 38, and has been more definitely maintained by Diels, *Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos.* iii, 468: It cannot, however, be demonstrated absolutely—there is not a scrap of evidence to show that Herakleides did actually make Abaris meet Pythagoras. (*Ἡρακλείδης δὲ τῷ πρὸς Ἀβάρην λόγῳ*, Procl. in Tim. 141 D, may very possibly, but not necessarily, as Diels thinks, refer to the *Abaris* of Herakleides.)—In any case the bringing together of Abaris and Pyth. is a late invention: it is impossible to say whether it could have occurred or did occur as early as the Aristotelian work *περὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων*.—In any case, the guiding conception in all this is that Abaris did not belong to the primeval past but came to Greece in the daylight of historical times. Pindar makes this happen *κατὰ Κρήτας τῶν Ἀνδρῶν βασιλῆα* (prob. about the time of the Σάρπητος ἔλκευς, Ol. 58, 3 = 546): "others" (acc. to Harp.) made it earlier, in Ol. 21 = 696. It is impossible to tell what the reasons were for either of these particular dates. Abaris might still be regarded as a contemporary of Pythagoras by those who, with Eusebius and Nikostratos ap. Harp., put him in Ol. 53 (*κατὰ τῶν 53 Ὀλυμπιάδων*, for so the figure in Harp. should be read and not  $\frac{1}{2}$  Ol.; the right reading is preserved from Harp. in Suid. "Aβ."). This view, however, is not, as Diels thinks, obtained by making Abaris forty years older than Pyth. (The *ἀρχὴ* of Pyth. falls in Ol. 62—see *Rk. Mus.* 26, 670—and that, too, is the date—not Ol. 63—given by "Eusebius *Chronica*", i.e. the Armenian. tr. and the MSS. *PEMEN* of Jerome.) Perhaps Abaris was regarded as the contemporary of Phalaris whose reign according to one of the versions given by Eusebius began in Ol. 53, or 52, 3. Cf. *Rk. Mus.* 26, 567.

<sup>10</sup> *Ekthesis* of Aristæus: *τοῦτον φῶς τῶν ψυχῶν, ὅταν ἔρπονται, ἔξωθεν καὶ ἐκείθεν πάλιν* Suid. 'Aristæus. His body lies as if dead  $\frac{1}{2}$  *ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείθεν τοῦ σώματος ἐκείθεν δὲ τῷ αἵματι πάλιν* Max. Tyr. 16, 2, p. 288 R. (reperimus) Aristæus animam evolutam ex ore in Proconneso corvi effugit, Plin., *NH.* vii, 174 (very similar stories from here, Grimm, p. 1083 [and Baring-Gould, *Myths of M.A.*]).

So, the *Ἀριστέωσα* said that Aristæus reached the *Isodemon* *ψυβέλασσαντες γυνέμενος* (Hdt. iv, 13); which at least means in some strange way impossible for other men, i.e. in Apolline ecstasy (cf. above, n. 63, *συμβέλαστος*, etc.; *δὲ ἐκείθεν ἐκπρόβωσκοντες*, *P. Mag. Par.*, p. 63 Wees.). So, too, Max. Tyr. 38, 3, p. 222 ff., makes Aristæus describe how his *ψυχὴ, κελεύμενος τῷ σώματι* had reached the Hyperboreans, etc. These accounts are not derived from Hdt. who on the contrary says that Arist. died in a fuller's mill at Proconnesos and that his body then disappeared and was seen by a man at Kyzikos. This would be translation of body and soul together not *ἐκπρόβωσις* of the soul alone. In this case Hdt. is probably inaccurate. In such cases of translation the point of the story, in fact its whole meaning, lies in the fact that the translated person has not died but that he has vanished without his soul being separated from his body, i.e. without dying: for normally in death the soul alone vanishes. This applies to all the cases of translation referred to in this book (see e.g. the story of the Hero Euthymos: above, chap. iv, n. 116; of Kleomedes, p. 120, above); and also to the legend of Romulus in *Mu., Rom.* 27-8, in which Plu. rightly finds much resemblance with the story of Aristæus as told by Hdt. It applies to the numerous stories of translation which, evidently after Greek models, were told of the Latin and Roman kings (see Preller, *Rom. Mythol.* 2 n. 24 f. 704f.) To mention them here

Hdt. has combined two versions of the legend: one acc. to which Aristæus "died" (not only on this occasion but often), i.e. his soul separated itself from his body and had a life of its own; another in which his body and soul were "translated" together without his death. In either version Aristæus might meet with the man in Kyzikos; if he were translated, it would be his vanished body (cf. Romulus' meeting Julius Proculus); but if his soul left his body behind as though lifeless then it would be the soul as *πνεῦμα* of its body that appeared to the man (as in the cases of Pythagoras and Apoll. Tyab. who were seen at two different places at the same time). This last story seems to be the real and primitive one: it is suggested by the above-mentioned accounts of the *ferocious* of the soul of Aristæus and it was so understood by the authority (apparently Thponp.) whom Apollon., *Misib.* 2, is following.

<sup>112</sup> Hdt. iv, 15, Thponp. ap. Ath. 13, 605 C: the bronze laurel was set up *ἐν τῇ νήῳ Ἀριστῆος καὶ Προκοννησίου ἐν τῇ πόλει δὲ Ὑψεραπιδῶν ὑπερπυρρίων*. This is not said by Hdt. but is compatible with his account. Acc. to Hdt. Aristæus told the people of Metapontum that they alone of all the Italians had been visited by Apollo and that he, Aristæus, had been in the god's train in the shape of a raven (sacred to Apollo). This last feature allows us to conclude that Hdt., too, knew of the wanderings made by the soul of Aristæus while his body remained at home as though dead. The raven is clearly the soul of Aristæus: Plin., *Nat.* vii, 174.—The *ἐν τῇ πόλει* of Aristæus in Metapontum fell acc. to Hdt.'s own calculation (*ὡς συμβαλλόμενος . . . ἐβίωσεν*) 240 years (not 230) after the second *ἀφαιρέσις* of Aristæus from Prokonnesos. As Aristæus had in his poem spoken of the beginning of the Kimmerian invasion (Hdt. iv, 13) his first *ἀφαιρέσις* cannot have been before 681 (the first year of Ardyr's reign, when the Kimmerian invasion began acc. to Hdt. i, 13: Prokonnesos was, too, first founded under Gyges: Str. 387). Taking this as a starting point (and it is the earliest admissible terminus) and subtracting 240 + 7 years (Hdt. iv, 14 *ἀν.*) we should arrive at the year 434. This, however, cannot possibly have been meant by Hdt. as the year of the miraculous presence of Aristæus in Metapontum. We seem to have one of Hdt.'s errors of calculation to which he is prone. We cannot indeed make out when exactly he intended to date the various scenes of the Aristæus story.—In any case, Hdt. never intended to make Aristæus the teacher of Homer, as Bergk following others thinks. He makes Homer's *flor.* about 856: see *RA. Mss.* 36, 397; and puts the Kimmerian invasion much later. Aristæus could only be regarded as teacher of Homer (Str. 639: *Tal. Gr.* 41) by those who made Homer a contemporary of the Kimmerian invasion, Thponp. esp.: see *RA. Mss.* 36, 558.—We do not know what grounds those Chronologists had who made Aristæus contemp. with Kroisos and Kyros and put his *flor.* in Ol. 58, 3 (Suid.). The reason may possibly have been "identification"—this is hardly likely—or conjunction with Abaris" (Gutschmid ap. Niese, *Hom. Schiffskel.*, p. 48, n.). Unfortunately nothing is known of such a conjunction with Abaris (very problematical conjectures by Crotius in *Myth. Lex.* 4, 2814 L). Possibly those who favoured this view held that the *Ἀμφιάκων* had been joined upon Aristæus: cf. D. H., *Tac.* 23; v. *ἔπος*, 10, 4. This work was certainly regarded as having been composed at the time of the Kim. invasion. The historical reality of Aristæus was never doubted in antiquity and in spite of the many legends that gathered about his name there is no need for us to



Kim. invasion to the evidently much later period in which he really lived) appear to have been derived chiefly from fictions in the *'Apuderos* which probably also gave reasons of a mysterious kind for this marvellous extension of his existence. We cannot tell whether Aristos himself wrote the poem and provided his own halo of marvel or whether someone else, coming later, made use of this name so famous in legend. If there was any basis for the account in Suid. *Ἡσιόδοτος Ἡσιώου* fin. we might be justified in attributing the composition of the *'Apuderos* to Aristos himself. In any case the poem was already in existence at the beginning of the fifth century; it can hardly be doubted that Aeschylus modelled upon it his picture of the griffins and Arimaspoi in *Pr.* 903 ff.

<sup>11</sup> *Δεκλέρων* in Samos, *Plu., Q. Gr.* 54.—Polyaratos of Thasos, Phormion of Sparta: *Cl. Al., S. i.* 21, p. 399 P. Phormion is better known because of his marvellous experiences: *Phan.* 3, 16, 2-3; *Thymop.* ap. Suid. *Θεσ.*; see Meinelke, *Com.* 2, p. 1227 ff.—At the end of the above-mentioned enumeration of *μύθων* ap. *Clm. Al.* a certain *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ Ἐρπιδεύης* is given. Varro ap. *Serv.* on *G. i.* 34, tells of the ecstatic vision of this Empedotimos: after being a quadans potentate divina mortalis aspectus deterrens he saw in the sky *inter cetera* three gates and three ways (to the gods and the kingdom of the dead). Varro is evidently quoting the account of some ancient authority not a work of Empedot. himself; but in any case this vision is the source of what Empedotimos had to say about the dwelling-place of the souls in the Milky Way: Suid. *Ἐμπεδ.*, *Ἰουλιανός*: *Rh. Mus.* 32, 331, n. 1; cf. *Damasc.* ap. *Philop.* in *Arist. Meteor.*, p. 117, 10 Hayd. Suid. *Ἐμπεδ.* calls (probably a guess) the work in which Empedot. gave an account of his visions *περὶ ψυχῶν Ἐμπεδοκλέους*. (Because E. also brought back with him information about the future life, the usual stories about the subterranean chamber, etc., are transferred to him by Sch. ad *Greg. N. z.*, *C. vii.* 298 = *Eudocia*, p. 682, 15.) Apart from this no one gives us any information about the personality of Emped. except *Jul., Ep.* 295 B., p. 379, 13 ff. 11., who tells us how he was murdered but the gods avenged him upon his murderers. This, however, rests upon a confusion (either Julian's or his copyist's) with *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς* whose murderers were punished in the next world acc. to *Plu., Gen. Socr.* 22, p. 592 C. The above-mentioned story of the souls and the Milky Way was also known to Julian (see Suid. *Ἰουλ.*): his source being *Heraclides Pont.* (who also probably supplied it to others, e.g. *Nourmenting* ap. *Procl.* in *Rp.* ii, p. 129 Kroll, *Porph., Isamb.* ap. *Stob.*, *Ed.* i, p. 378, 12 W.), and even earlier, *Cicero, Somn.* 15-16). No older source of this fancy is known: "Pythagoras" mentioned as its authority by Julian, etc., only takes us back again to *Heraclides*. All that we know up to the present about it suggests the suspicion that the very existence and history of this remarkably little-known "great Empedotimos" may have been a simple invention of *Heraclides*, who may have made use of him in one of his dialogues to add interest and importance to some of his own fancies. But now we come upon something more detailed about the story told by *Heraclides* of the vision in which Emped. (*μυρὰ τὰς αἰσώσεων*, p. 122, 2) beheld *ὡς αὖτε τῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ἀγέλης*: *Procl.* in *Rp.* ii, 119, 21 Kroll. From this passage it is quite clear that Empedotimos is simply a figure in a dialogue by *Heraclides*, and no more existed in reality than *Er* the son of *Armenios* or *Thespisios* of *Soli*, or than their prototype *Kleonymos* of *Athens* ap. *Klearchos* of *Soli* (*Rh. Mus.* 32, 335).

<sup>140</sup> Apolloon, *Mérob.* 3 (prob. from Thponp.); Plin., *NH.* vii, 174; Plu., *Gw. Soc.* 22, p. 392 C ('Ερμύδαρος—the same copyist's error occurs in Procl. in *Rp.* ii, 113, 24 Kroll); Luc., *Enc. Mus.* 7; Tert., *Am.* 2; 44 (from Soranus; cf. Coel. Aur., *Tard.* i, 3, 6); Or., *Cels.* iii, 3; 32. The same Hermotimos of Klazomenai is undoubtedly the person meant when a 'Ερμώτιμος is mentioned among the earlier incarnations of the soul of Pythagoras, even when the country of the person in question is not named (as in D.L. vii, § 1; Porphy., *VP.* 45; Tert., *Am.* 28) or is incorrectly called a Milesian (e.g. in Hipp., *RH.* i, 2, p. 22 D.-S.). A quite untenable theory about this Hermot. is given by Gottling, *Opusc.* 4c. 211.—Acc. to Plin. the enemies who finally burnt the body of Hermot. (with the connivance of his wife) were the Cantharidae—probably the name of a *γένος* hostile to Hermot.—There is a remarkably similar story in Indian tradition; see *Rh. Mus.* 28, 339 n. But I no longer suspect any historical connexion between this story and that of Hermot.; the same preconceptions have led in India as in Greece to the invention of the same tale. Similar conceptions in German beliefs: Grimm, 1803, n. 650.

<sup>141</sup> Hence the legend that Apollo after the murder of Pythos was purified not at Tempe, as the story generally went, but in Kreta at Taurha by Karmanor: Paus. 2, 7, 7; 2, 30, 3; 10, 6, 7 (the hexameters of Pherekrates); 10, 16, 3. The καθάρσις for Zeus was brought from Kreta: Orph. *fr.* 163 Ab.; cf. the oracle ap. Oianon. Eus., *PE.* 5, 31, 2; K. O. Müller, *Introduct. Scient. Myt.* 98.—Kreta an ancient seat of μανική: the Lokrian Onomakritos, teacher of Thales, lived in Kreta κατά τήν τε μανικήν, Arist., *Pol.* 1274a, 25.

<sup>142</sup> See above (pp. 86 ff.). As one who had been initiated into the orgiastic cult of Zeus in Kreta (Str. 468), Epimenides is called κατὰ δαίμονα: Plu., *Sol.* 12; D.L. i, 115. He is called ἐκείνῳ διός καὶ Πάρι in Sch. Clem. Al. iv, p. 103 Klotz.

<sup>143</sup> Legend of the δαίμων of E.: H. Smyrn. 18. D.L. i, 114. Plu. 7 *Sop.* 14. He was prepared for it by living on ἀρτίδελος, μελέγχ, and the edible root of a kind of σκόλια (Thphr., *HP.* 7, 12, 1). All these are sacred to the θρόνιος (on ἀρτίδελος, see partic. *AB.* 457, 5 ff., which goes back to Aristarchos; and Hsch. s.v.), and were only eaten occasionally by the poor: Hes., *Op.* 41.

<sup>144</sup> αὐτὸ ('Επιμενίδου) λόγος ὡς ἔβλεν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔκτοθεν ἔθελε χρεῖσιν καὶ πόλιν εἰσελθεῖν ἐν τῷ σώματι, Stuid. 'Επιμεν. This is possibly the meaning of ἀποκοινηθεῖς (ἀγνοῦν) πολλὰς ἀναβιβασθεῖς, D.L. i, 114. Epimenides like others μετὰ θάνατον ἐν τοῖς ζώον γινόμενος, Procl. in *Rp.* ii, 113, 24 Kr. The story of his prolonged sleep in the cave is an example of a widespread fairy-tale motif; see *Rh. Mus.* 33, 209, n. 2; 55, 160. In the case of Epimenides it has been exaggerated beyond all bounds and attached to him as a sort of popular mode of expressing his long δεινότης. This cave-sleep is interpreted as a state of *ekstasis* by Max. Tyr. *Tyr.* 16, 1; ἐν τοῖς διός τοῦ δαιμονίου (see above, chap. III, n. 23) τῷ ἔντρον καίματος ἵσχυρ θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ (cf. the ψυχὴ of Hermot. which διὰ τοῦ σώματος πλεονέμεται ἀποβῆται ἐνὶ πολλῇ ἐν, Apolloon, *Mérob.* 3) ὅσαρ ἐν ἐντρον αὐτὸς θεοῦ καὶ. Thus his ἔντρον became δαίμωνες to him, Max. Tyr. 38, 3; cf. Sch. Luc., *Tim.* 6, 110 Rh.

<sup>145</sup> σοφὸς καὶ τὰ θεῖα (θεοὶ καὶ θεῖα, Max. Tyr. 38, 3) τὰ δεινωτικὰ καὶ σοφία, Plu., *Sol.* 12. Epimen. is put among the δεινοὶ μάστερ, Bakis and the Sibyl, by Cic., *Div.* i, 34.—Prolonged solitude is a preparation for the business of the ecstatic seer (cf. Plu.'s story of a sort of counterpart to Epimenides, *Def. Or.* 21, p. 421 B). There

is still another fragment remaining from the story of Epim. on this head in the account given by Theopompus (though he makes too rationalistic a use of it): Epim. did not sleep all that time ἐλλή γὰρ οὐδ' ἐκνεύσας, ἀρχαλοῖσεναι καὶ ψιφοποιῆσαι (which he needed as an *εὐρησμός*): D.L. i, 112. We cannot help being reminded of the way in which the Angkok of Greenland, after prolonged and profound solitude, severe fasting and concentration of thought, makes himself into a magician (Cruise, *Mist of Greenland*, p. 104). In the same way the North American Indian stays for weeks in a solitary wood and consciously prepares himself for his visions. At last the real world falls away from him, the imagined world of his visions becomes the real one and seems almost palpable; till finally in complete ecstasy he rushes out of his hiding place. Nor would it be hard to find analogies in the religion of civilized peoples.

<sup>10</sup> Epim. is credited with prophecies of coming events: Pl., *Lg.* 642 D.; D.L. i, 114, and also Cic., *Div.* i, 34. On the other hand, Arist., *Rh.* 3, 17, 10, has καὶ τὰς ἐπιμειδίας αὐτὸς ἐκνεύσας, ἐλλή καὶ τὰς γυναικῶν μὲν ἀδελφῶν δὲ which at least means discovering the grounds of an event—grounds known only to the god and the seer; e.g. the interpretation of a pestilence as the vengeance of the daimones for an ancient crime, etc. If only rational explanation were meant there would be no need for a *μῦθος*.

<sup>11</sup> Delos: Pl., *Sept. Sap.* 14, p. 158 A. (There is no need to suppose that there has been any confusion between this *μῦθος καθαρῆς* by Epimenides and any other purification of Delos that happens to be better known to us—the Pisistratus or that of the year 426.)

καὶ τὸν ἐκδύσσειν ἐλλοι καὶ τοὺς τοῦ Ἀθηναίων, PAUL. 1, 14, 4.

The purification of Athens from the Kylonian *Eyes* by Epimenides is now further confirmed by the Aristotelian *AE.* vol. I fin. This admittedly is not a very strong guarantee of its historical truth; but no strong guarantee is required to dispose of the doubts recently raised as to the historical truth of the story that Athens was purified by Epimenides, and even of Epimenides' very existence. There is no reason at all for such a doubt. The fact that the historical figure of Epimenides has been almost entirely obscured behind the veil of fable and romance gives us of course no right to doubt his existence (or what would be the fate of Pythagoras, Pherekydes of Syros, and of many others?): and further, because some parts of the story of Epim. and his life are fabulous, to doubt the truth of his entirely non-fabulous purification of the Athenians from murder is a monstrous inversion of true historical method.—No exact dating for the purification of Athens is to be derived from the Aristotelian account of the event, as the English ed. (Kenyon) of the *AE.* vol. rightly observes. It certainly does not follow (as e.g. Bauer takes for granted in his *Forsth. zu Arist.* *AE.* vol. 41) that the purification took place *before* the archonship of Dracon (Ol. 39). Furthermore, it is probable that in Pl., *Sol.* 12, everything that comes before καὶ δὲ ποτε (p. 165, 19, Sint. ed. min.) is taken from Aristotle (though perhaps not directly). In this case Aristotle, too, would be shown to have attributed to Solon the first suggestion that led to the condemnation of the *δωδεκ*. In Pl., however, Solon is still far from having thoughts of his *νομοθεσία*, he is still only *ἀρχὴ δέξας δῆμον*, c. 12 (not till c. 14 does his archonship begin). Solon's archonship is put by *AE.* vol. in the year 591/0 (c. 14, 1, where we should be careful to avoid arbitrary alteration of the figures); Suid., *Ελλὰν. Εὐα.*, *Χρόν.* also date it in Ol. 47, and the same period is implied by Pl., *Sol.* 14, p. 169, 12. (*AE.* vol.

13, 2, also brings the first archonship of Demasias to 562/1 = Ol. 49, 3 : a date to which all other reliable tradition also points). The condemnation of the *dryeis* and the purification of Athens by Epimenides thus took place some considerable time before 581. It is possible that Suid. gives the right date, s.v. 'Επιμενίδης' ἐκώσθη τῆς Ἀθήνης καὶ Κιρραίων ἀγῶν κατὰ τὴν μὲν Ὀλυμπιάδα (604/1)—that in the Kirraian war there was an Ἀλαμειών general of the Athenians offers no objection. Plu., Sol. 11. Suidas' statement has not (as I once thought myself, with Barnabady) been taken from D.L., nor is it to be corrected acc. to his text. D.L. i, 100, only brings forward the connexion between the purification and the Κιρραίων ἀγῶν as the opinion of "some" (which in spite of the vagueness of expression must mean Neanthes ap. Ath. 802 C), while the real reason is said to be a λοιμός, and the purification (as in Eus. *Chr.*) is placed in Ol. 46 : i.e. probably 46, 3, the traditional date of Solon's legislation.—Plato, *Lg.* 642 DE, does not conflict with the story of the expiation of the Κιρ. ἀγῶν by Epimenides : his story that Epimenon was present in Athens in the year 500 and retarded the threatened Persian invasion for ten years is not intended to contest the truth of the tradition of the much earlier purification of Athens by Epimenes. ("retarded" : so Clem. Al., *Str.* vi, 13, p. 755 P., understood Plato and prob. rightly ; we often hear in legendary stories of the gods or their prophets retarding coming events which have been determined by fate ; cf. Pl., *Smp.* 201 D ; Hdt. i, 91 ; Ath. 602 F : Eus., *PE.* 5, 35, p. 233 BC ; Vg., *A.* vii, 313 ff. : viii, 398 f. ; and what Serv. ad loc. reports from the *libri Acherontici*). How the same man could be living both at the end of the seventh and of the sixth centuries would have troubled Plato not at all—tradition attributed a miraculously long life to Ep. At any rate, it is quite impossible to base the chronology of Ep.'s life on the story in Plato. (It may have been suggested by a forged oracle made *ex eventu* after 490 and lathered on Epim., as Schultess suggests, *De Epim. Crerk.* p. 47, 1877.)

<sup>14</sup> Details of the expiating ceremonies : D.L. i, 111–12 ; Neanthes ap. Ath. 602 C. It is not the human sacrifices but the sentimental interpretation of Neanth. that Polemon (Ath. 602 F.) declares to be fictitious. They are invariably sacrifices to the *χθονία* that Epim. institutes. Thus (as Abaris founded a temple at Sparta for Κόρη αἰώνια) he founded at Athens, evidently as the concluding part of the purgation : ἱερὰ τῶν ἐρινυῶν θεῶν, i.e. of the Erinyes : D.L. i, 112.

<sup>15</sup> Such a connexion must at least be intended when Aristaeus is brought to Metapontum and Phormion to Kroton, both important centres of the Pythagorean society. Aristaeus, too, as well as Abaris, Epimenides, etc., is one of the favourite figures of the Pythagoreans : see Lamb., *LP.* 138.

<sup>16</sup> It would certainly be necessary to deny to Epimenides the "Theogony" that the whole of antiquity read and quoted under the name of Epimenides without once expressing a doubt, if the fragments of that Theogony really contained borrowings from the teaching of Anaximenes or, even worse, from the rhapsodical Theogony of Orpheus, as Kern, *de Orphci Ep. Phor. Theog.* 68 ff. maintains. But in the first place a few vague resemblances are not enough to show any connexion between Epimenides and those others. In the second, supposing the connexion proved, Epimenides need not necessarily have been the borrower. In any case, such alleged borrowings do not oblige us to advance the period when Ep. lived from the end of

the seventh to the end of the sixth century. If they really exist then we should rather have to conclude that the Theogony is itself a forgery of a much later date.

<sup>126</sup> The possibility of theoretical activity in the case of these men is often implied in the statements of later writers; e.g. when the name *Θεολόγος* is given to Epimenides (D.S. 5, 80, 4) or Abaris (Apollon., Mir. 4); or when Aristeas is called an *ὄψις φιλόσοφος* (Max. Tyr. 38, 3, p. 222 R.).

<sup>127</sup> Arist., *Meta.* 1, 3, p. 948b, 19 f.

<sup>128</sup> See Append. viii.

<sup>129</sup> See above, chap. i, n. 61. Archiloch, fr. 12: *κτενον κεφαλῆς καὶ χαρίεσσα μέλη* "Hécubaτος καταποιῶν ἐν αἵματι ἀμφιπεπληγῆ. E., Or. 40 l.: the slain Clytaimnestra *κατὰ καθήματα δέμας* and Sch. πάντα γὰρ καθαίρει τὸ σῆμα, καὶ ἀγὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὰ καίματα, τὰ δὲ ἀεὶ μεμνημένα. E., Sup. 1211: . . . ἐν αὐτῶν (those who are being buried) *σώματι ἡγνίσθη* *κατὰ*; cf. *ἀγνοον ποροῦ μέλαθρον*, IT. 1216. On a grave inscr. from Attica (Epigr. Gr. 104): *ἐνθάδε Διόλογοι καθαροὶ κατὰ γνῆς καθήματα . . . ὥστε ἐν ἀθάνατον*—evidently modelled on ancient ideas; cf. also ib. 109, 5 (CIA. iii, 1325). Those, too, who are struck by lightning (see Appendix I) are purified from all earthly taint by the holiest sort of *καὶ καθαίρει* (E., IA, 1112; *καθαίρει φλογί*, E., Hel. 899) and go straight *πρὸς ἀθανάτων*. Iamb., *Myst.* v, 12, also explains how fire *τὰ προσγόμενα καθαίρει καὶ ἀνοίει τὰν ἐν τῇ ὑλῇ δεσφῶν, ἀφορμῶν τοῖς θεοῖς*, etc.

<sup>130</sup> Cf. also Pl., *Lg.* 677 DE; Plu., *Fac. Orb. Lun.* 25, p. 940 C.

## CHAPTER X

### THE ORPHICS

The earliest authority who mentions Orphic sects and their practices is Herodotos (ii. 81), who calls attention to the correspondence between certain sacerdotal and ascetic ordinances of the Egyptian priesthood, and the "Orphic and Bacchic" mysteries. The latter, he says, are really Egyptian and Pythagorean, or in other words they were founded by Pythagoras or Pythagoreans upon Egyptian models; and thus, in the opinion of the historian, they cannot have come into existence before the last decade of the sixth century. Herodotos then, either in Athens or elsewhere, had heard during his journeys of certain private societies who by calling themselves after the name of Orpheus, the prototype of Thracian song so well known to legend, recognized the origin of their peculiar cult and creed in the mountains of Thrace, and did honour to Bakchos the Thracian god. The fact that the Greek Orphics did indeed worship Dionysos, the lord of life and death, before all other gods, is clearly shown by the remains of the theological poems that originated in their midst. Orpheus himself, as founder of the Orphic sect, is actually said to have been the founder also of the Dionysiac initiation-mysteries.<sup>1</sup>

This gathering-together in the name of Orpheus for the purpose of offering a special worship to Dionysos was, then, the work of *sects* who, in private association, practised a cult which the public and official worship of the state either did not know of or disdained. There were many such associations, and of very varied character, which kept themselves aloof from the organized religion of the community, and were tolerated by the state.<sup>2</sup> As a rule, they were "foreign gods"<sup>3</sup> who were thus worshipped; and generally by foreigners who thus kept up the special worship of their own homes, though they did not always exclude natives of their adopted country. Now, Dionysos, the god of the Orphic sects, had for a long time ceased to be a foreigner in Greek countries; since his arrival from Thrace he had been refined and matured under the humanizing sun of Greece, until he had become a Greek god, and a worthy associate of the Greek Olympos. It is possible, however, that in this process, the old Thracian god may have seemed to his original worshippers to have lost his real

character, and they may on that account have joined together to offer, in separation from the official worship, a special cult in which all the old ideas of the national religion should be preserved unaltered. A secondary wave of influence thus broke upon the long-since-Hellenized god, the Thracian Dionysos in Greece, and this wave the official worship either had not the power or lacked the will to assimilate. It was therefore left to special sects who honoured the god after their own private laws. Whether indeed they were *Thracians* who, as in the similar case of the unmodified worship of Bendis,<sup>4</sup> or *Kotytto*, thus reinstituted their ancient and national worship of Dionysos in Greek countries, we cannot with certainty tell; but this special cult would certainly not have achieved the importance it did in Greek life if it had not been joined by Greek adherents brought up in the native conceptions of Greek piety, who under the name of "Orphics" once more adapted the Thracian god to Greek modes of thought—though this new adaptation differed from the previous assimilation of the god by the official worship of the state. We have no reason for believing that Orphic sects were formed in Greek states before the second half of the sixth century,<sup>5</sup> that critical age of transition when in so many places primitive and mythological modes of thought were developing into a *theosophy*, which in its turn was making an effort to become a philosophy. The Orphic religious poetry is itself clearly marked by this effort—for in Orphism it never became more than an effort and never succeeded in reaching its goal.

The exact point of origin of this combined movement of religion and theosophy, the various steps and manner of its development remain hidden from us. Athens was a centre of Orphism; it does not therefore follow that Orphism had its origin there, any more than had the multifarious tendencies and activities in art, poetry, and science that at about the same period flowed together, and as though driven by an unseen intellectual current, found their meeting place at Athens. Onomakritos, we are told, the giver of oracles in the court of Peisistratos "founded the secret worship of Dionysos".<sup>6</sup> This appears to refer to the first founding of an Orphic sect at Athens; and we meet with the name of Onomakritos among the authors of Orphic poems. But the real authorship of these poems is far more often ascribed to certain men of Southern Italy and Sicily, who can be more or less clearly connected<sup>7</sup> with the Pythagorean societies which were flourishing in those districts about the last decades of the sixth and the first of the fifth centuries.

It seems certain that in Southern Italy at that time, Orphic societies were already in existence—for whom else can these writers have intended their "Orphic" poems? In any case we must take it as certain that the correspondence of Orphic and Pythagorean doctrine on the subject of the soul is not purely accidental. Did Pythagoras when he came to Italy (about 532) find Orphic societies already settled in Kroton and Metapontum, and did he associate himself with their ideas? Or did the "Orphic" sectaries (as Herodotos imagined<sup>4</sup>) owe their inspiration to Pythagoras and his disciples? The various cross-currents of reciprocal influence can no longer be disentangled by us, but if the Pythagoreans were the sole creditors in the bargain we should undoubtedly find the whole body of Orphic doctrine thoroughly permeated with conceptions that belong exclusively to the Pythagorean school. In the wreckage of the Orphic poems, however, except for a few negligible traces of the Pythagorean mystic theory of numbers,<sup>5</sup> we find nothing that must necessarily have been derived by the Orphics from Pythagorean sources.<sup>10</sup> Least of all did they need to derive the doctrine of the migration of souls and its application from this source. It is possible, therefore, that it was the independently developed Orphic doctrine which exerted an influence upon Pythagoras and his adherents in Southern Italy; just as it was a ready-made Orphic teaching (and that, too, perhaps, brought from Southern Italy) with which Onomakritos, the founder of the Orphic sects at Athens, associated himself—about the same time as Pythagoras' similar action in Kroton. It is hardly possible to interpret in any other way the various relations of the Orphics with each other when we learn that at the court of the Peisistratids, in addition to Onomakritos, two other men who had arrived from Southern Italy were active and were counted among the earliest writers of Orphic poems.<sup>11</sup>

## § 2

The Orphics wherever we meet with them in Greek countries always appear as members of a private cult-society who are held together by a specially organized and individual mode of worship. The old Thracian worship of Dionysos in its straining after the infinite conducted its revels under the open sky of night, seeking out deserted mountain-sides and forests where it was farthest from civilization and closest to unspoiled and untrammelled nature. How this cult may have accommodated itself to the narrow limitations of ordinary city-



life, it is hard to imagine; <sup>12</sup> though it is natural to suppose that much of the extravagance that was literal and actual enough in the old northern festival of night was represented in the milder worship of Greece by mere symbol. We have less difficulty in discovering the side of their religious activity which the Orphics, apart from the private worship of the conventicles, revealed to the outer world of the profane. Orpheus himself in the tradition had been not merely the inspired singer but the seer, the magically endowed physician and purification-priest as well, <sup>13</sup> and the Orphics, as his followers, were active, too, in all these directions. <sup>14</sup> In the composition of Greek Orphism the kathartic ideas which had been evolved on Greek soil were combined in a not unnatural alliance with the old Thracian worship of Dionysos. The Orphic priests of purification were preferred to others of their kind by many religious people. <sup>15</sup> But among the inner circles of Orphism the sacerdotal activities of purification and the removal of daimonic hindrances, which were by no means given up, tended rather to produce deeper and broader ideas of purity and of release from the earthly and the transitory. In some such way was evolved that asceticism which in close combination with the Thracian worship of Dionysos gave the peculiar tone to the faith and temperament of the sectaries and gave to their lives their special direction.

The Orphic sect had a fixed and definite set of doctrines; this alone sufficed to distinguish it both from the official worship of the state, and from all other cult-associations of the time. The reduction of belief to distinct doctrinal formulæ may have done more than anything else to make Orphism a society of believers—none of the other *theologies* of the time, Epimenides, Pherekydes, etc., accomplished as much. Without its fundamental religious doctrine Orphism in Greece is inconceivable; according to Aristotle the "doctrines" of Orpheus were put into poetical form by the founder of the Orphic sect in Athens, Onomakritos. <sup>16</sup> The uncertain accounts given us by the later authorities do not allow us to make out quite clearly <sup>17</sup> what was the extent of Onomakritos' work in the formation or collection of Orphic doctrinal poetry. What is important is the fact that he is distinctly named as the author of the poem called "Initiations". <sup>18</sup> This poem must have been one of the basic, and in the strictest sense "religious", writings of the sect; a poem of this character may very well have had for its central incident the dismemberment of the god at the hands of the Titans—a story which Onomakritos is said to have put into verse. <sup>19</sup>

The religious beliefs and worship of the sect were founded upon the detailed instructions of certain very numerous writings dealing with matters of ritual and theology. These claimed the authority of religious inspiration,<sup>20</sup> and were as a whole supposed to be the work of the primitive Thracian bard, Orpheus, himself. The anonymity which concealed the identity of the real authors of these poems was not, however, very thoroughly preserved; even towards the end of the fourth century there were those who claimed to be able to give with certainty the names of the original authors of the various poems. Strictly canonical authority, such as would at once have reduced to silence every conflicting view or statement, never seems to have belonged to any of these writings. In particular, there were several "Theogonies"<sup>21</sup>—poems which attempted to give expression to the fundamental ideas of Orphic speculation on religious subjects—and in spite of much harmony in general effect they differed considerably from each other in particular mode of expression. They represented ever-renewed and increasingly elaborate attempts to construct a connected doctrinal system for Orphism. With unmistakable allusion to the oldest Greek theological system—that which had been committed to writing in the Hesiodic poem—these Orphic Theogonies described the origin and development of the world from obscure primordial impulses to the clear and distinct variety-in-unity of the organized kosmos, and it described it as the history of a long series of divine powers and figures which issue from each other (each new one overcoming the last) and succeed each other in the task of building and organizing the world until they have absorbed the whole universe into themselves in order to bring it forth anew, animated with one spirit and, with all its infinite variety, a unity. These gods are certainly no longer deities of the familiar Greek type. Not merely the new gods evolved by the creative fancy of Orphism—creatures which had almost entirely lost all distinct and sensible outline under the accumulation of symbolical meaning—but even the figures actually borrowed from the Greek world of divinities are turned into little more than mere personified abstractions. Who would recognize the Zeus of Homer in the Orphic Zeus who after he has devoured the World-God and "taken unto himself the power of Erikapaios",<sup>22</sup> has become himself the Universe and the Whole? "Zeus the Beginning, Zeus the Middle, in Zeus all things are completed."<sup>23</sup> The concept here so stretches the personality that it threatens to break it down altogether; the outlines of the individual figures are

lost and are merged into an intentional "confusion of deities".<sup>34</sup>

Still, the mythical envelope was never quite given up; these poets could not do without it altogether. Their gods did indeed strive to become pure abstractions but they were never quite successful in throwing off all traces of individuality and the limitations of form and matter: the concept never quite broke through the veil of mythology. The poets of the Orphic Theogonies vied with one another in their attempts to make the half-seen and half-conceived accessible alike to the imagination and the reason; and in succession gave varying expression to the same fundamental conceptions until finality was reached as it seems in a poem whose contents are better known to us than the others from quotations made from it by Neoplatonic writers—the Theogonical poem of the four-and-twenty Rhapsodies. Into this poem was poured all the traditional material of mythological and symbolical doctrine, and in it such doctrine achieved its final expression.<sup>35</sup>

### § 3

This combination of religion and quasi-philosophical speculation was a distinguishing feature of the Orphics and of Orphic literature. Religion only entered into their Theogonical poetry in so far as the ethical personalities of the divinities therein described had not entirely faded away into transparent allegories.<sup>36</sup> It was abstract speculation alone which really prevailed there, little respect being paid to religion; and as a result a much greater licence was given to speculative construction.

This abstract speculation, however, reached its climax in a religious narrative of the first importance for the beliefs and cult of the sect. At the end of the series of genealogically connected deities came the son of Zeus and Persephone, Dionysos, who was also given the name of the underworld deity Zagreus.<sup>37</sup> To him, even in infancy, was entrusted the rule of the world by Zeus. But the wicked Titans, urged on by Hera, approached him by a stratagem. They were the enemies of Zeus, and had already been overthrown by Ouranos,<sup>38</sup> but had, it seems, been let loose again by Zeus from Tartaros. They made Dionysos trust them by giving him presents, and while he was looking at his own image in a mirror<sup>39</sup> that they had given him, they fell upon him. He tried to escape them by repeated transformations of shape; finally, in the form of a bull,<sup>40</sup> he was at last overcome and his body torn to pieces which his savage foes thereupon devoured. The heart alone

was rescued by Athene, and she brought it to Zeus who swallowed it. From Zeus there sprang the "new Dionysos", the son of Zeus and Semele, in whom Zagreus came to life again.

The myth of the dismemberment of Zagreus by the Titans was already put into verse by Onomakritos;<sup>41</sup> it continued to be the culminating point of the doctrinal poetry of the Orphics. It occurred not only in the Rhapsodies,<sup>42</sup> but in other versions of the Orphic legend composed in complete independence of these.<sup>43</sup> It is a religious myth in the stricter sense; its *etiological* character is most marked;<sup>44</sup> its purpose is to explain the religious implication of the ritual dismemberment of the bull-god at the Bacchic nocturnal festivals, and to derive that feature from the legendary sufferings of Dionysos-Zagreus.

But though the legend thus has its roots in the primitive sacrificial ritual of ancient Thrace,<sup>45</sup> in its extended form it belongs entirely to the region of Hellenic thought; and in this combination of the two elements it becomes truly Orphic. The wicked Titans belong entirely to strictly Greek mythology.<sup>46</sup> In this case, as the murderers of the god, they represent the primeval power of evil.<sup>47</sup> They dismember the One into Many parts; by their impiety the One divine being is dispersed into the multiplicity of the things of this world.<sup>48</sup> It is reborn as One in the new Dionysos sprung from Zeus. The Titans—so the legend goes on to relate—who had devoured the limbs of the god were destroyed by Zeus with his lightning flash. From their ashes sprang the race of men in whom, in conformity with their origin, the good derived from Dionysos-Zagreus is mixed with a wicked Titanic element.<sup>49</sup>

With the rule of the new-born Dionysos and the origin of mankind, the series of mythological events in the Orphic poetry came to an end.<sup>50</sup> With the entry of mankind into Creation<sup>51</sup> the existing period of the world begins; the period of world-revolutions is over. The poems now turn to the subject of man and the revelation of his fate, his duty and his purpose in the world.

#### § 4

The mixture of the elements that make up the totality of his being in itself prescribes for man the direction that his effort shall take. He must free himself from the Titanic element and, thus purified, return to the god, a fragment of whom is living in him.<sup>52</sup> The distinction between the Titanic and Dionysiac elements in man is an allegorical expression of the polar

distinction between body and soul; it also corresponds to a profoundly felt estimate of the relative value of these two sides of man's being. According to Orphic doctrine man's duty is to free himself from the chains of the body in which the soul lies fast bound like the prisoner in his cell.<sup>43</sup> The soul has a long way, however, to go before it can find its freedom; it may not by an act of violence tear its bonds asunder for itself.<sup>44</sup> The death of the body only frees it for a short while; for the soul must once more suffer imprisonment in a body. After leaving its old body, it flutters free in the wind, but a breath of air sends it into a new body again.<sup>45</sup> So it continues its journey, perpetually alternating between an unfettered separate existence, and an ever-renewed incarnation—traversing the great "Circle of Necessity" in which it becomes the life-companion of many bodies both of men and beasts. Thus, the "Wheel of Birth" <sup>46</sup> seems to return ever upon itself in hopeless repetition: in Orphic poetry (and there perhaps for the first time) occurs the despairing thought of the exact repetition of the past; events which have already been lived through once returning again with the convergence of the same attendant circumstances.<sup>47</sup> Thus, Nature, ever reverting to its own beginnings, draws men with it in its senseless revolution round itself.

But the soul has a way open for escape from this perpetual recurrence of all things that threatens to close in upon it; it may hope "to escape from the circle and have a respite from misery".<sup>48</sup> It is formed for blessed freedom, and can at last detach itself from the condition of being it has to endure upon earth—a condition unworthy of it. A "release" is possible; but man in his blindness and thoughtlessness cannot help himself, cannot even, when salvation is at hand, turn himself towards it.<sup>49</sup>

Salvation comes from Orpheus and his Bacchic mysteries; Dionysos himself will loose his worshipper from Evil and the unending way of misery. Not his own power, but the grace of the "releasing gods" is to be the cause of man's liberation.<sup>50</sup> The self-reliance of the older Greece is breaking down; in humility of heart the pious man looks elsewhere for help; he needs the revelation and mediation of "Orpheus the Ruler" <sup>51</sup> in order to find the way of salvation; he must follow his ordinances of salvation with perfect obedience if he is to continue in that way.

It is not only the sacred mysteries themselves, in the form in which Orpheus has ordained them, which prepare for the release; a complete "Orphic life" <sup>52</sup> must be developed out

of them. Asceticism is the prime condition of the pious life. This does not mean the practice of the respectable bourgeois virtues, nor the discipline and moral reformation of a man's character; the height of morality is in this case the turning again towards god,<sup>43</sup> and the turning away not merely from the weaknesses and errors of earthly being but from the whole of earthly life itself; renunciation of all that ties man to mortality and the life of the body. The fierce determination with which the Indian penitent tears away his will from life, to which every organ in his body clings desperately—for this, indeed, there was no place among the Greeks, the lovers of life—not even among the world-denying ascetics. Abstinence from the eating of flesh was the strongest and most striking species of self-denial practised by the Orphic ascetics.<sup>44</sup> Apart from this, they kept themselves in all essentials uncontaminated by certain things and situations which rather suggested to a religious symbolism than actually indicated in themselves attachment to the world of death and transitoriness. The long-standing ordinances of the priestly ritual of purification were taken up and added to;<sup>45</sup> but they were also raised to a higher plane. They are no longer intended to free men from the effects of daimonic contacts; the soul itself is made pure by them<sup>46</sup>—pure from the body and its polluting association, pure from death and its loathsome mastery. In expiation of "guilt" the soul is confined within the body,<sup>47</sup> the wages of sin is in this case that life upon earth which for the soul is death. The whole multiplicity of the universe, emptied of its innocent and natural sequence of cause and effect, appears to these zealots under the uniform aspect of a correlation between crime and punishment, between pollution and purification. Thus, mysticism enters into the closest alliance with kathartic practices. The soul which comes from the divine and strives to return thither, has no other purpose to fulfil upon earth (and therefore no other moral law to obey); it must be free from life itself and be pure from all that is earthly.

The Orphics, moreover, were the only people who could venture among themselves or before strangers to greet each other with the special name of the "Pure".<sup>48</sup> The first reward of his piety was received by the initiate of the Orphic mysteries in that intermediate region whither men must go after their earthly death. When a man dies, Hermes leads the "deathless soul" into the underworld.<sup>49</sup> Special poems of the Orphic community announced the terrors and delights of the underworld kingdom.<sup>50</sup> What the Orphic mystery-

priests vouchsafed to their public upon these hidden matters—outdoing the promises made in the Eleusinian mysteries in coarse appeal to the senses—may have been the most popular, but was certainly not the most original feature of Orphic teaching.<sup>61</sup> In Hades a judgment awaited the soul—it was no instinctive fancy of the people, but the “sacred doctrine”<sup>62</sup> of these sectaries which first introduced and elaborated the idea of compensatory justice in the world of the dead. The impious suffer punishment and purgation in the depths of Tartaros;<sup>63</sup> those who have not been made pure by the Orphic mysteries lie in the miry Pool;<sup>64</sup> “dreadful things”<sup>65</sup> await “the disdainer of the sacred worship. By a conception that is quite unique in ancient religion, participation in the Orphic ceremonial enables the descendant to obtain from the gods “pardon and purification” for his departed ancestors who may be paying the penalty in the next world for the misdeeds of the past.<sup>66</sup> But for the initiate of the Orphic mysteries himself who has not merely borne the *narkhe* but has been a true *Bakchos*,<sup>67</sup> his reward is that he shall obtain a “milder fate” in the kingdom of the underworld deities whom he has revered on earth, and dwell “in the fair meadows of deep-running Acheron”.<sup>68</sup> The blessed home of refuge no longer lies like the Homeric Elysium upon earth, but below in the world of the Souls, for only the released soul reaches there. There, the initiated and purified will live in communion with the gods of the nether world<sup>69</sup>—we feel that we are listening to Thracian and not Greek conceptions of the ideal when we hear of the “Banquet of the Pure” and the uninterrupted intoxication which they enjoy there.<sup>70</sup>

But the depths restore the soul at last to the light, for its lasting habitation is not below; it stays there only for the interval which separates death from its next rebirth. For the reprobate this is a time of punishment and purgation—the Orphics could not distress their hearers with the awful and intolerable idea of the *perpetual* punishment of the damned in Hell; many times over the soul rises again to the light and in continually renewed bodies fulfils the cycle of births. For the deeds of its past life it is recompensed in the next life that it lives, and each man must now suffer exactly what he has done to another.<sup>71</sup> So he pays the penalty for ancient guilt: the “thrice-ancient law”—what thou hast done thou shalt suffer—is thus fulfilled for him in far livelier fashion than it could be in any torments of the shadow-world. So surely also shall the pure be rewarded in future lives by ever-increasing happiness. How exactly the Orphic fancy filled out the

individual gradations in the scale of happiness is beyond our knowledge.<sup>72</sup>

But the soul is immortal, and even sinners and the unredeemed cannot perish entirely. Hades and the life on earth holds them in their perpetual round, and this is their punishment. For the soul of the blessed, however, neither Hades nor earthly life can offer the highest crown of happiness. If it has been made pure and spotless in the Orphic mysteries and the Orphic manner of life, it is freed from the necessity of rebirth and withdrawn from the cycle of becoming and perishing. The "purification" ends in a final redemption. The soul mounts upwards from the base level of earthly life, not to become nothing in a final death, for it is now that it first truly begins to live; hitherto it has lain imprisoned in the body like the corpse in the grave.<sup>73</sup> It was death for the soul when it entered into life—now it is free and will no more suffer death: it lives for ever like God, for it comes from God and is itself divine. We do not know whether these theosophists went so far as to lose themselves in detailed picturing and contemplation of the blissful heights of the divine life.<sup>74</sup> In the remains of their poems we read of stars and the moon as other worlds,<sup>75</sup> perhaps as the dwelling-place of illuminated spirits.<sup>76</sup> But perhaps also the poet allowed the soul to flee from its last contact with mortality without himself desiring to follow it into the unbroken radiance of divinity that no earthly eye can abide.

### § 5

This, then, is the keystone that completes the arch of Orphic religion—the belief in the divine, immortal, and abiding life of the soul for whom union with the body and its desires is a thwarting hindrance and repression—a punishment from which its one desire, as soon as it is awakened to a full knowledge of itself, is to escape in order that it may belong entirely to itself in full enjoyment of its powers. The contrast between these ideas and those of the Homeric world is complete; *there*, the soul released from the body was credited only with a poor, shadowy, half-conscious existence, so that an eternity of godlike being in the full enjoyment of life and its powers was only thinkable if the body and the soul, the twofold self of man, were translated in undissolved communion out of the world of mortality. The Orphic legends about the origin of the human race do not tell us the real source and derivation of the very different beliefs about the soul held by the Orphics; those legends only give expression to the



way—and only one of many ways<sup>72</sup>—in which the already established confidence in the divinity of the soul was deducible from what might be considered the oldest historical story of mankind, and how it might be brought into connexion with the Orphic legend of the gods. This persuasion, the belief that a god was living in man and a god that could not be free until he had broken through the prison of the body, was deeply rooted in the worship of Dionysos and the ecstasies belonging to that worship: we cannot be in much doubt that it was taken over ready-made, together with the "enthusiastic" cult of the divinity, and further developed by the Orphic believers. We have already met with traces of this belief even in the Thracian home of the Dionysiac cult; and in what we know of the Thracian form of the religion, traces are not absolutely wanting of an ascetic tendency of living that would easily and naturally arise from such a belief.<sup>73</sup> Even in those Northern countries we found the belief in the transmigration of souls bound up with the religion of Dionysos, and that belief, when it is naïvely held, has as its essential presupposition the idea that the soul, in order to have a complete life, and one that can survive bodily death, must of necessity be united to another body. Even this idea is, however, quite foreign to Orphism. The Orphics retained, in spite of everything, the doctrine of transmigration, and combined it in a strange alliance with their own belief in the divinity of the soul and its vocation to a life of perfect liberty. It is evidently improbable that they invented that doctrine entirely on their own account; the first principles of their creed by no means led necessarily to it. Herodotos<sup>74</sup> asserts distinctly that the doctrine of transmigration came to the Greeks from Egypt; and as a consequence, that it was from Egyptian tradition that the Orphics received it. This assertion has no more to recommend it than any other of Herodotos' many pronouncements as to the Egyptian origin of Greek opinions and legends, and it is even less likely to mislead us in view of the fact that it is by no means certain and not even probable that a belief in transmigration ever really existed in Egypt.<sup>75</sup> This belief has arisen independently in many places on the surface of the earth, without the need of transmission from one place to another; <sup>76</sup> it might easily arise in a country where the belief prevailed that there existed only a limited number of souls of which each one—in order that no earthly body might be without its spiritual guest—must inhabit many perishable life-tenements, and not be bound to any one of them by a real inner necessity. This,

however, is a conception common to popular psychology all over the world.<sup>52</sup> If it is still considered more probable that the idea of a migration of the soul through many temporary bodies was not spontaneously evolved by the Orphics, but was received by them from the hands of others, there is yet no reason to reject the most natural assumption—namely, that this also was one of the beliefs that the Orphics took over with the cult of Dionysos from Thrace. Like other mystics,<sup>53</sup> the Orphics took over the belief in transmigration from popular tradition and turned it into a serviceable member of their own body of doctrine.<sup>54</sup> It served them by giving a striking and physical expression to their own conception of the inevitable connexion between guilt and penance, pollution and the refining power of punishment, piety and future blessedness upon which all their religious ethic depended. It was with an exactly similar purpose that they also retained and developed the old Greek idea of a place of the souls in the depths below the earth.

But if they believed in the transmigration of souls, that belief did not with them hold the highest place. There is a realm where the ever free and divine souls have their being, a realm to which the series of lives in earthly bodies is only transitional, and the way to it was pointed out by the saving doctrine of the Orphic mysteries, by the purification and salvation afforded by Orphic asceticism.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER X

... ὅς ποτε καὶ τελευτὸς μυστηρίδων εὐρετο Βάκχον, *AP.* vii, 9, 5 (Darmagetos). διὰ καὶ τὰς ἐν τῷ Διονύσειον γινόμεναι τελευτὰς Ὀρφικὰς προσγορευόμεναι. *D.S.* I, 85, 6. εἴρη δὲ Ὀρφικὸς τὸ διορίσκειν μυστήρια [Apollocl.] I, 3, 2, 3. (Dionysism) love of Luma (nature), cui sacra Orphica putantur conferri: *Cic.*, *ND.* lii, 58; cf. *Lyd.*, *Mens.* 4, 51, p. 107 W. Βακχικὸν an Orphic poem: *Suid.* Ὀρφικὸς (cf. *Hiller*, *Ficinus*, 21, 364 f.), whence *fr.* 3 (Abel); and perhaps *fr.* 152, 167, 169, 188. τὰ Ὀρφικὰ καλούμενα καὶ τὰ Βακχικὰ are already reckoned as a single class by *Hdt.* ii, 81.

\* This is seen in the decree of the Council and people of Athens dealing with the *ἑμπεροὶ Κερυαῖς* and their temple of "Aphrodite"—*CIA.* ii, 168 (333/2 B.C.).—That on the other hand such foreign mystery-cults were not always so tolerated (or not without resistance) is shown by the case of Nicias: *Dem.*, *FL.* (19) 281 with Sch.; cf. *D.H.*, *Demarch.* 21.

\* *Βροὶ ξένους*, *Hsch.*, see *Loeb.*, *Agf.* 627 B. A nameless *θεῖος ξένου* occurs in *CIA.* i, 273 f., 18.—The foundation of such *βίαιαι* for foreign deities (or deities at least not officially worshipped by the city in question) is almost invariably the work of foreigners (many ex. from Rhodes in *BCH.* 1889, p. 364). They are all foreigners, e.g. whose names occur in the decree of the *ἑκαστοὶ* of the Karan Zeus Labraundon, *CIA.* ii, 613 (290/7 B.C.); cf. *ib.* 614, *SFG.* 726. Merchants from Kition found a cult of their Aphrodite (Astarte) in Athens, just as some Egyptians had a little while before put up τὰ τοῖς ἱεσὶν ἱερὰ there: *CIA.* ii, 168. The names of foreigners (in addition to Athenians) are very numerous among the *θεομετὰ τοῖς ἱερουργοῖς* of a *collegium* of *Σαβαῖοι* in the Peiraeus (second century B.C.): *Ed.* *Arch.* 1883, p. 245 f. The foreign worship would then begin to receive the support of natives of the host-city (most of them being at first of the poorer classes), and in this way the new religion would gain a footing in its adopted home. (Pure Athenian citizens compose the society of the *Διονυσιασταὶ* in the Peiraeus, second century B.C., *Att. Mik.* ix, 288 = *CIA.* iv, 2, 623 d.)

\* The Bendisela early became a state festival in Athens (even fifth century, *CIA.* i, 210, *fr.* n, p. 93). An allusion in Plato (*Rp.* 327 A), however, shows that the Thracians (who must have introduced the cult of Bendis into Athens, or at least into the Peiraeus, the home of most *βίαιαι*) still kept up a special worship of their goddess in their own manner, side by side with the Hellenized cult. It appears at least as if the worship in its remodelled Greek form seemed to them no longer the right one. (Bendis, too, like Dionysos, is a divinity of both this world and the next: see *Hsch.* *δ/δοντων*.)

\* Alleged traces of Orphic influence on special sections of the *Iliad* (*ἀϊδη ἔνδρα*) or the *Odyssey* are entirely illusory, nor did the Orphic doctrines exert any influence on the Homeric *Thargomy*. On the other hand, Orphism was itself strongly affected by the primitive Greek theology the fragments of which were put together in the Hesiodic poem.

\* Ὀρφέα κενεὸν . . . διορίων ἀνδράσιν ἔργα, *Paus.* ii, 37, 5.

<sup>1</sup> Among the writers of Orphic poems mentioned by (1) Clem. Al., *Str.* i. 21, p. 397 P. (from Epigenes) and (2) Suidas (from Epigenes and another authority: both Sa. and Clem. probably got their information through the mediation of D.H.)—two certain Pythagoreans are named, Brotianos (of Kroton or Metapontum) and Kerkops (not the Milesian). [Abel, *Orphica*, p. 139.] From lower Italy or Sicily come: Zopyrus of Heracleia (the same person is probably meant by Iamb., *VP.* 190, 5 N., when he counts Zopyrus among the Pythagoreans coming from Tarentum), Orpheus of Kroton, Orpheus of Kamarina (Suid.), Timokles of Syracuse. Pythagoras himself is mentioned among the writers of Orphic poems in the *Timaeus* of [Ion] (at least as early as the beginning of the fourth century). Apart from these the only names of conjectured composers of Orphic poems are: Theognetos & Herakleides, Prodikos of Samos, Herodikos of Perinthos, Persinos of Miletos: all of whom are unknown to us except Persinos, whom Obrecht not improbably identifies with the court poet of Euboulos of Alameus mentioned by Poll. ix, 93 (cf. Lob. 389 f. Bgk., *PLG.* iii, 655). In this case he is an Orphic of a much later period.

ἐνδεδυμένοι δὲ [sc. Αἰγύπτου] νύκτα (prohibition to bury the dead in woollen clothing) τοῖς Ὀρφείοις καλεσμένοι, καὶ Βαχχεῖσι, ἰαθὲν δὲ Αἰγυπτίοις καὶ Πυθαγορείοις, Hdt. ii, 81. There can be no doubt that Hdt. in these words meant to derive the Ὀρφικά καὶ Βαχχεῖα (the four datives are all neuter, not masc.) from the Αἰγύπτια καὶ Πυθαγορεία, i.e. the Pythagorean ordinances which were themselves derived from Egypt (cf. Compera, *Sitzb. Wien. Ak.* 1886, p. 1032). If he had regarded the Πυθαγορεία as entirely independent of the Αἰγύπτια and the Ὀρφικά as independent of the Πυθαγ., he certainly could not have brought them in here. (This answers Zeller, *Ber. Archiv.* 42, 1886, p. 894, who introduces a comma before καὶ Πυθ.)—It is equally impossible (with Maass, *Orpheus*, p. 165, 1895), to connect the εἰρηὶ δὲ Αἰγυπτίοις with Βαχχεῖσι only; it must of necessity go with τοῖς Ὀρφείοις as well; for it is the whole point of Hdt.'s note to show that the religious usage which he mentions has, like so much else of the kind in Greece wherever it may be found, been borrowed from Egypt, and "is Egyptian". In this he would fail completely if he did not regard the Ὀρφικά (and hence also the Πυθαγορεία) as Αἰγύπτια ῥήματα and clearly say so. Hdt. certainly has no idea, as Maass would have us believe, of making a generic distinction between Ὀρφικά and Βαχχεῖα: Βαχχ. is the name of the genus of which Ὀρφ. is the species.—"the Ὀρφικά, and the Βαχχεῖα in general." Not all Βαχχεῖα are Ὀρφικά. This use of καὶ whereby the whole is added subsequently to the part is perfectly regular and legitimate (it may also add the part to the whole as in the cases adduced by Maass, 168 n.: τὰς ἀποσκευὰς καὶ τὰς Ὀρφικάς, etc.). Hdt. mentions the Πυθαγορεία last in order to indicate by what intermediate step the Egyptian element in the first-mentioned Ὀρφικά was specially assisted—he has further in ii, 123, shown clearly enough that he regarded Pythagoras as one of the pupils of the Egyptians (P. in any case is one of the teachers of immortality there referred to). This is also obvious from his whole attitude.—Hdt.'s opinion does not in any case oblige us to believe in it. He was forced to regard Pythagoras as the earliest author of Orphic doctrine because his connexion with Egypt seemed certain (cf. Hdt. ii, 123) while that of the Ὀρφικά themselves was not so: in this way only could Hdt. seem to prove the Egyptian origin of that doctrine.—The priority of the Orphics is often supposed to be proved by the witness of Philolaos (fr. 14 D.) ap. Clem. Al., *Str.*

3, 3, p. 318 P. (and cf. Cic., *Hortens.* fr. 85 Or.) : it must be admitted, however, that the passage does not prove what it is supposed to do.

\* *Err.* 143-51 (cf. Lob. 715 ff.). Here, indeed, Orphic and Pythagorean doctrine are mixed up inextricably. *Fr.* 143 (*Ἡθερογενέας* καὶ Ὀρφικὸς Syrian.) belongs to the *εἰς τὴν ἀσθενὴν Πυθαγόρειος ἔμμε* which is several times distinctly so called by Proclus. (The *frs.* are in Nauck, *Iamb.* VP., p. 228, *fr.* iii). *Fr.* 147 (*Lyd. Atens.*) obviously comes from the same (Nauck, p. 234, *fr.* ix). The same is at least highly probable of the *frs.* 144-6, 148-51. Probably what Orpheus says of the number 12 comes from the same *ἔμμε* (cp. Procl. in *Rp.* ii, 131, 10 Kroll). Proclus, however (in *Rp.* 169, 25 K.), also cites ll. 2-5 from the *ἔμμε* (Nauck, *fr.* iii) but this time attributes them to an *εἰς τὴν ἀσθενὴν Ὀρφικὸς ἔμμε*. This Orphico-Pythagorean *ἔμμε* had at any rate nothing to do with the (Rhaps.) Theogony of Orpheus. On the other hand, the words *τετράβη τετραπύλον*, which acc. to Procl. in *Rp.* 169, 29 K., occurred *superior* in the *Ὀρφικὴ ἀσθενία*, come from the Theogony. They were possibly used as a title of Zagreus the *κεφαλὴ βέλτο* (Noms., D. vi, 165) : though what is here said by Proclus about the *διονυσιαὶ* (i.e. of Zagreus) *θεόγρ.* viz. that it *τετράβη ἔμμε*, was applied rather to the four-eyed Orphic *Phanes* by Hermias (*fr.* 84 Ab.).

<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, there is much in Orphic theology and poetry that is taken immediately from the primitive Thracian worship of Dionysos and absent from Pythagorean teaching. This makes it very probable that even such *theologoumena* as are common to Orphism and Pythagoreanism really go back to the fanatical cult of Dionysos, or at least were early thence derived by religious speculation : in this case the Orphics may well have got them from this original source of mystic lore that was common to both parties and not by the circuitous route of Pythagorean teaching. Orphism remained more closely attached to the common source than did Pythagoreanism, and may for that reason be regarded as somewhat older than its rival and be supposed to have originated independently of it.

<sup>13</sup> Zopyros of Herakleia, Orpheus of Kroton : *Te.*, *Procl.* in *Aristoph.* (p. 20, 28 Kaibel, *Com. Fr.*) Ritschl, *Opus.* I. 207) ; Suid. *Ὀφ. Κασσανδρεύς* (from Asklepiades of Myrlea).

<sup>14</sup> We may not simply take it for granted that the account given in Dem. 18, 258-60, of the nocturnal initiations and the processions by day through the city held by a mystical sect, is intended to describe

an Orphic conventicle (as Lob. does 846 ff., explanation of the *ἀνομήνους τῶν πολλῶν* of that : the specially Orphic myth of Zagreus and the itself and hard to reconcile with the language of Demosth. (Harp. and Phot. are responsible for this expl.) Hardly more successful is the derivation of the call *δρυγὲς ἔμμε* from the *δρυγὲς* of Dionysos (Zagreus) on being torn to pieces by the Titans : *SN.* 163, 63. A definite connexion undoubtedly does exist between the *Ὀρφικὴ ἔμμε* and the *Σαβάζου καὶ Μήρακος* (Str. 471) described by Dem. : but the Orphics were never called worshippers of Sabazios nor their god *Σαβάζου*, and it seems likely that their secret worship was different from the ceremonies of the *Σαβάζουρα* that Dem. had in view (the latter may have retained more of the primitive barbaric ritual : cf. the law given in *Ἐφ.* *Ἀρχ.* 1883, p. 245 f. = *CIA.* iv, *Suppl.* ii, n. 826 b ; from the end of second century B.C.).

<sup>15</sup> See Lob. *Ag.* 338 f., 237, 242 f.

<sup>16</sup> To attribute the practical side of Orphism to a late degeneration

of the once purely speculative character of the sect (as many have done) is a very arbitrary proceeding and quite unjustifiable on historical grounds. The fact that a clear description of this activity does not occur before the fourth century (in Plato) does not prove that it did not exist earlier. Apart from this an ἀρχοτέλειος named Philippos is mentioned by Plu., *Apoph. Lac.* 224 E as a contemporary of King Leostychidas II of Sparta (reigned 491-489). This evidence is not to be so easily set aside, as K. O. Müller, *Introd. Scienc. Myth.* 311 ff., would like to do. The Orphic sect from the very beginning derived its strength from its *telestic* and *kathartic* practices.

<sup>10</sup> Thphr., *Ck.* 28 (16).

<sup>11</sup> αἰνέει ('*Orphikos*') μὴ εἶναι τὰ θόγγματα, ταῦτα δὲ φησιν (Aristot.) 'Ὀνομακρίτου ἢ Ψεφεί κατατίνας Arist. ο. φιλοσοφίας *fr.* 10 [7] Rose, *Arist. Pseudopis.*

<sup>12</sup> Tatian, *Gr.* 41 [p. 42 Schw.], seems to speak only of *redaction* (συνοψίζουσι) of the εἰς Ὀρφέα ἀναφερόμενα among already existing Orphic poems as the work of Onomakritos (in the same way Onomakr. is only the ἀνατρεῖς—the arranger not the author—of the *χαρσμοὶ* of "Mousaios", *Hdt.* vii. 6). Traces of an external linking-together of the individual poems of Orpheus in a "redaction" are not wanting (cf. the linking-together of the poems of the Epic Cycle or of the corpus Hesiodicorum); first of all coming in all probability the greater *apartus* (as in the enumeration of Clem. Al., *Str.* i. 21, p. 397 P.); see Lob., 378, 417, 489.—Clem. Al., *Str.* i. p. 397 P. (and Eus., *PE.* 10, 11, p. 495 D) is only derived from Tatian, though Onomakr. is here definitely called the author of the εἰς Ὀρφέα φερόμενα ποιήματα. Onomakr. seems also to have been simply regarded as the author of the Ὀρφέει in the doxographical excerpt ap. S.E. *P.* iii. 30 = *M.* 9, 361, p. 287 Mutschk.; cf. Gal., *H. Philus.* [Dox., p. 610, 15]: 'Ὀνομακρίτος δὲ τοῖς Ὀρφέεισι.—On the other hand, in the—admittedly incomplete—enumeration of Orphic poems in Clem. Al., *Str.* i. 21, p. 397 P., not one is attributed to Onomakr., and in Suid. Ὀρφέει he is only given the *χαρσμοὶ* (no confusion with the *χαρσμοὶ* of Μουσaios is to be suspected here) and the *τελεταί*. Paus. (8, 37, 5) mentions (without naming them) *λεγ.* of Onomakr. (cf. Ritschl, *Opusc.* i. 241). Some at least of the poetry going under the name of Orpheus must have been ascribed to Onomakr. by Arist. (*fr.* 10 [7 Teubn.]).

<sup>13</sup> Suid., Ὀρφέει, 2721 A (sais).

<sup>14</sup> Onomakr. εἶναι τοὺς Πιτάνες τῷ Διονύσῳ τῶν ποθημάτων ἐποίησαν ἀπορρηγνόντες. Paus. 8, 37, 5. Lob., p. 335, thinks this refers to the "Theragony": but no authority attributes a single one of the several Orphic Theogonies to Onomakr. as its real author. We should rather be inclined to think of the *τελεταί* which is distinctly ascribed to Onomakr. and which at least dealt with the practical side of worship: cf. Pl., *Rp.* 364 E-365 A, λήγεις, καθάρματα δὲ κακῶτάων καὶ ὅτι δὴ τελεταὶ καλοῦνται (but it was not that the mystical βιβλία were called *τελεταί* as Gruppe, *Gr. Cosm. u. Mythol.* i. 840, mistakenly supposes: he is otherwise quite right in his protest against Abel's treatment of the *τελεταί*). They must almost necessarily have dealt with the reproduction of the *μῦθος* τοῦ Διονύσου (as providing the *ἑρπύς λόγος* to the *δρώμενα*), and, as the central idea of the orgiastic cult. must have included the most important circumstance of the Orphic *τελεταί* (see D.S. 8, 75, 4: Clem. Al., *Protr.* ii. 17, p. 15 P.).

<sup>15</sup> One of the poems (perhaps indeed the poem of the *ῥαψῳδία*, and in that case the *ἑρπύς λόγος* as well) made Orpheus distinctly appeal to a revelation made to him by Apollo: *fr.* 46 (see Lob. 489).

<sup>11</sup> Besides the three Theogonies distinguished by Damascius there were (apart from other more doubtful traces) at least two other variations of the same theme: see *fr.* 85 (Alex. Aphrod.) and *fr.* 37: 38 (Clem. Rom.); cf. Gruppe, i, 840 f.—The series of divine rulers given by "Orpheus" acc. to Nigid. Fig. ap. Serv. *Ecl.* iv, 10 (*fr.* 248 Ab.), conflicts with all the other Theogonies but agrees in some particulars with Lact. i, 13 (*fr.* 243). Still, this remark need not necessarily have been taken from any Orphic "Theogony".

<sup>12</sup> (Zeus) . . . *παρωγόμενος χάρις μένος Ἑρκενναίου, τὸν μένος ἔλατ' εἶπερ τῇ δι' ἡμετέρας αἰῶν, fr.* 120 (from the Rhapsodist). We are accustomed to read here *χάρις* with Zoega (*Idh.* 282 f.): but *χάρις* does not mean "catching up or devoting" 'Zo.'; at most it might mean, in bad late-Greek, just the opposite of this—"abandoning" (transitive). Lobeck's explanation (p. 319 n.) is also unsatisfactory. The word may have been originally *χαδών*.

<sup>13</sup> The line occurred in various forms in the Theogonic poem: *fr.* 33 (Plato?); 46 (Arist.; *de Mundo*); 123 (Rhapsodist); see Lob. 520-32. It seems certain then (Gruppe's doubts go too far: *Rhaps.* *Thog.* 704 ff.) that the line appeared in the oldest form of Orphic Theogony and was merely borrowed thence, like so much else that was ancient, by the Rhapsodist Theogony (i.e. the words, *Ζεὺς ἀφελῆ ἐπλ.* which would be the oldest form, as Gruppe rightly remarks: *αφελῆ* = *αφελύχ*: cf. Pl. *Fr.* 69 B). Even the writer of the speech against Aristogeston *A.* (Dem.; 25), an Orphic adherent, appears, as Lob. remarks, to allude to the words in § 8.

<sup>14</sup> Theocrata must have belonged to Orphic theology from the outset: Lob. 614; though the most extreme examples of this may perhaps come from later poems: *fr.* 167. 169 (Maer.); 168 (D.S.); 201 (Rhaps.), etc., being probably derived from the "Little Keater" (*fr.* 180), in which Chrysippus seems to be imitated (*Lob.* 735 and *fr.* 164), and from the *Διαθήκαι, fr.* 7 (J.M.) a forgery in Judaeo-Christian interests which nevertheless made use of many ancient pieces of Orphic literature (the *ἱερός λόγος*: Lob. 450 ff., 454)—Theocrata is met with even in the orthodox poets of the fifth century, though they did not invent it; the "theologoi" of the sixth century Epimenides and Pherecydes were as familiar with it as were the Orphics: cf. Kern, *de Theogon.* 82.

<sup>15</sup> See Append. ix.

<sup>16</sup> It must have been chiefly the religious significance of the gods which caused the retention of their personalities and prevented them from fading into mere personifications of abstract ideas or elementary powers with which religion could have had nothing further to do.

<sup>17</sup> In the statements of the Neoplatonic writers this first Orphic Dionysos is regularly called *Διόνυσος* simply (perhaps also *Διόνυξ*: *fr.* 182). Nonnus in recounting the Orphic legend calls him Zagreus: *D.* vi, 163; cf. *Ζευὸς γαροντὴν* (of Perseph.) with clear allusion to Callim. *fr.* 171, *ὦ Ζεῦ Διόνυσος Ζευὸς γαροντὴν*. Callim. here, as elsewhere, seems to have in mind the Orphic story. *Tr.* on l.yc. 355 calls the god of the Orphic legend *Διόνυσος τὸν καὶ Ζευὸς καλούμενον*, *Zayyón* the great Hunter is a name of the all-absorbing Hades: thus also the *Alkmaeonis fr.* 3 Kink. Zagreus is identified with the Dionysos of nocturnal revelry in E., *Nietz.* *fr.* 672, 10 (a reference in *Ba.* 1181 Kirchh.); and see above, chap. viii, n. 28. This Dionysos is regarded as a *χάδωνος* (see Hoch. *Zeyyón*) and this must indubitably have been quite familiar to the poets who made him the son of Persephone: *χάδωνος δ' ἔφ' Ἐρμειόφρονος Διόνυσος* (Harp. *Antiq.*).

They were as clearly conscious as was Herakleitos of the fact that *diver' Aúqer xai díxeront*, whereas this consciousness was undoubtedly obscured in the public ceremonial of Dionysos-worship (to which, however, Hdt.'s saying refers). Zagreus-Dionysos was never identified with the *Íxagros* of the Eleusinia (to which Orph. *fr.* 216, l. 2 refers); though Dionysos alone was often so identified.

<sup>10</sup> Ouranos casts the Titans into Tartaros: *fr.* 87, 100. Acc. to Procl. (*fr.* 205) and Arn. (198: prob. not from the Rhaps.) we should be led to suppose that the Titans after they had torn Zagreus in pieces were cast down to Tartaros by Zeus. In Arn. this is set down side by side with the statement that the Titans were destroyed by the lightning of Zeus (cf. *Tiáwov xepetpáwov*, Plu., *Es. Carn.* 1, 7, p. 998 C), though obviously incompatible with the latter statement, as it is also (even more so) with the origin of mankind from the ashes of the Titans which is known not only to Olympiodoros (*ad Phd.*, p. 68 Finckh; Lob. 566), but also to Proclus who got it from the "Rhapsodist" (as also did Olymp.): Procl. in *Rp.* ii, 74, 29; i, 83 Kroll. It seems from this that Proclus (and perhaps Arn.) in error ascribed the *xepetpáwov* of the Titans to Zeus instead of to Ouranos.

<sup>11</sup> Nonn. vi, 173; O., *fr.* 185. Perhaps Proclus is right in explaining this doubling of the god's figure in the mirror as meaning his entrance upon the *μυριὰ δύναμιν*. A reference to a similar explanation of this *δίπλοον εἰκόνιστον* occurs even in Plot. 4, 3, 12 (Lob. 855)—? also in the strange statement made by Marcellus Ficinus as to the crudelissimum apud Orpheum Narcissi latum (was Zagreus another Narcissus?) *fr.* 315: cf. Plot. 1, 6, 8. The entry of the one origin of the universe into the multiplicity of phenomena is first clearly referred to in the dismemberment of Zagreus, but it would be quite like this symbol-loving poetry to introduce the same motif in a different form with a passing reference earlier in the poem.

<sup>12</sup> Nonn., *D.* vi, 197 ff.

<sup>13</sup> Paus. 6, 37, 5.

<sup>14</sup> Procl., O., *fr.* 185, 188, 198. In any case Nonn. vi, 168 ff. is following the Rhapsodist.

<sup>15</sup> Callim. and Euphor. knew of the dismemberment of Dionysos by the Titans: Ts. *ad Lyc.* 208 (from the completer version in *EM*). In any case it is not from the Rhaps. that this legend is also known to D.S. 5, 75, 4; Cornut. 30, p. 82, 10 Lang; Plu., *Es. Carn.* 1, 7, p. 896 C; Is. *et Os.* 38, p. 384 F; Clem. Al. (see Orph. *fr.* 196, 200).—A roughly caricatured drawing on a hydria belonging to the early fourth century found at Rhodos and made probably in Attica appears in *JHS.* xi (1890), p. 243; where it is said to represent the dismemberment of Zagreus as conceived by Orphics. The picture, however, does not agree at all with the meaning thus attributed to it: the interpretation cannot be the right one.

<sup>16</sup> A true *ἀπὸς λόγων*, i.e. an account of the origin of ritual acts founded upon myth or legend. (The Orphics had such accounts, e.g. of the prohibition against being buried in woollen clothing: Hdt. ii, 81 *fm.*)

<sup>17</sup> That the tearing in pieces of the bull in the primitive Thracian manner occurred also in the Orphic *θύσις* may perhaps be deduced from the fact that in the legend Orpheus himself is torn in pieces by the Mαινades. The priest stands in the place of the god: what the god suffers in the ritual *θύσις* that the priest suffers too. This is frequently met with. 'Ὀρφέως ἔρε νῦν ἀσέβητος εἰσέρχων θύσαντα παρέρχεται τὰ δῖονα καὶ τὴν ἄλυσαν τῇ σφαιρῇ θύει, Procl. *in*



Rp. i. 175 Kr. The ancients were fully aware that the bull torn in pieces in the Bacchic orgies represented the god himself (and this not only in Orphic ritual but from the beginning in the Thracian worship) : the idea is often expressed (see e.g. *Erna. Mat., Error. P.R.* vi. 3), but nowhere more clearly than in the Orphic *ἑρὸς λόγος*.

\* The introduction of the Titans from Hellenic mythology into the Thracian myth is clearly described as the work of Onomakritos by *Pans.* B. 37, 5.

<sup>1</sup> *Τερψες ἀκούσθαι, ἐνέσθαι ἀπὸ ἔχοντος*, *fr.* 102.  
... *ἔχοντος καὶ φόνος ἐσθίου*, *fr.* 97. As early as Hesiod are noted by their father as *ἑκόντες καὶ δύνανται* (*Theog.* 155). *Τρανὴ φόνος* is the evil character that cannot keep an oath : *Pl., Lg.* 701 C ; *Cic., Lg.* iii. 5 ; *ἱμῖος Τίτωνα*, *Hor., O.* 3, 4, 42.

\* This explanation of the *ἀμειδιότης* of Ζεφρεὺς is often put forward (though subtitled into a Neoplatonic sense) by those who use the Orphic Rhapsodias ; see Lob. 710 B. But even Plutarch has something of the sort (*E ap. D.* 9, p. 389 A), and it cannot be doubted that this (apart from its Platonist wrappings) was the meaning of the legend in the mind of its first inventor. Nor can the conception that the separate existence (multiplicity) of things first came into the world by an act of *impiety*, have been strange to the *theologoi* of the sixth century : we must admit this at once on remembering the doctrine of Anaximander that the multiplicity of things which has arisen out of the original one *ἀπειρος* is in itself an *ἀνομία* for which it must pay "recompense and punishment" (*fr.* 2 Mull., 9 Diehl). Such personification of the processes of nature and the reading of an ethical sense into them, combined as it was with a quietist tendency, was much more likely to have arisen in the fanciful minds of semi-philosophical mystics than to have been given to them by the philosophers.

\* See the accounts given in Lob. 563 f. : they come from the Rhapsodias. The fact that the origin of men and the doctrine of Metempsychosis as well were dealt with in the Rhaps., follows from Procl. in *Rp.* ii. 338 Kroll. It must, however, have been from older Orphic poetry—at any rate, not from the Rhaps.—that the story was derived by D. Chr. 30. 10 f. Plutarch, too, does at least refer to it : *τὸ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἀλογίας καὶ ἀσέβειας καὶ βίαιας ἐκ πάλαισι Τυράνσι ἀνέπαυον*, *Ex. Cora.* I. 7, p. 996 C ; and possibly Opp., *H.* v. 8-10 ; *Ael. fr.* 89, p. 230, 19 f. Herch. (Lob. 887 g). Even the words of Xenokrates (*fr.* 20, p. 188 Heuzen) seem to allude to this Orphic myth. Thus the Rhapsodias in this case also were following older Orphic teaching and poetry. Orph. H. 37 derives from a later age. What *Nic. Th.* 8 ff. reproduces (mistakenly ?) as Hesiodic tradition was perhaps really an echo of Orphic poetry. Was the derivation of Men from the Titans suggested by still earlier fancies such as e.g. meet us in passages like *A. Hom. Ap.* 335 (137) f. : *Τὴν ἑρὸν καὶ θεοὺν τὸν ἐξ ἀδελφῶν καὶ θεοῦ* (v) ? This is not Homeric (for all the Homeric *καὶ ἀδελφῶν καὶ θεοῦ* (v)), though possibly it had a different sense from what it had for "Orpheus".

\* Dionysos is the last of the divine rulers of the world : *fr.* 114, 180. Hence *ἑκόντες ἡμῶν*, Procl. in *Crat.*, pp. 59, 114 Jkiss. (though Procl. also speaks of e.g. Hermes as *ἑκόντης ἡμῶν* in *Cr.*, p. 73 B.). Dionysos is the sixth ruler : Zeus who came before him being the fifth : *fr.* 113 (85, 121, 122). The order given is : 1 Phanes, 2 Nyx, 3 Ouranos, 4 Kronos, 5 Zeus, 6 Dionysos. This is definitely stated by Syrian : *fr.* 85 (Proclus follows his master : *fr.* 85, 121), and confirmed by the fragments of the Rhapsodias : *fr.* 86, 87, 96, 113. It seems, however, as if Plato actually found this order (as Syrian thought)

in the Orphic Theogony which he read. It is true that as their silence shows the Neoplatonists did not find the verse cited by Plato in the Rhapsodia as they knew them. (Plato's line is *ἔκρη θ' ἐν γυνεὶ κεραιώεσσι καὶ ὅσοι δουροί*; *Plat., E. op. D. 13, p. 381 D*, has the meaningless *θρηπὲν* instead of *καὶ ὅσοι*—did he read *θραπὲν*?) They were right, however, in deducing from the line that the ancient Orphic Theogony referred to by Plato also knew of six generations of the gods (following the Pythagorean *εἰκοσι ἀποθνήσκουσιν*?) and ended with the sixth generation. The verse was intended doubtless by Plato himself in rather a different sense and he only quotes it humorously (*Gruppe differs: Rhops. Theog. 893 l.*). This passage therefore provides important evidence of the harmony that existed between the Rhapsodiai and the oldest Orphic Theogony in the general outlines of their construction. It is, of course, quite a different question whether the six rulers in the poem referred to by Plato were the same as those given by the Rhaps.; nor can we tell whether Dionysos there occupied the last place, though the predominance held by Dionysos in Orphic belief makes it very probable that he did.

<sup>44</sup> The authorities who speak of the origin of mankind from the ashes (or the blood) of the Titans (*Lob. 365 ff.*) express themselves in such a way that we are forced to suppose that they regarded this as essentially the first appearance of men. This, however, cannot be reconciled with what Proclus, as usual following the Rhapsodiai, says of the golden and silver ages of mankind under Phanes and Kronos, which then, and not till then, are followed by the third and last race, *τὸ ἀνθρώπου γένος*: see *fr. 244* and esp. in *Rp. ii. 74 Kr.* *ἄνθρωποι* in the reign of Phanes even occurs in the line quoted by Syrian. (*In Ar. Meta. 635a 22 Us.*) *fr. 85*. It is impossible to say whether this improvement upon the Hesiodic legend of the Ages of Mankind actually occurred in an ancient Orphic Theogony (the one used perhaps by Lactant.: *O., fr. 243, 8*; cf. 248), and was thence taken for the Rhapsodiai without being reconciled with the legend of the origin of men from the ashes of the Titans; or whether the two scarcely reconcilable accounts of the origin of men were somehow or other made to agree. (*Fr. 246 [Hs.]*) prob. comes from a picture of the long life enjoyed by the earliest generations of men: see *Lob. 513*. This picture does not necessarily presuppose a series of several *γυνεαὶ* before the Titanic race.)

<sup>45</sup> *μέγας αὐτός (τοῦ Διονύσου) δαμνῶ, Olymp. (from Orphic doctrine) in Pl. Phd., p. 3 Finckh, ὁ δὲ ἥντις τοῦς Διονυσιακοῦς δαμνῶ καὶ ἀγῶνα ἔντας τοῦ Διονύσου, Procl. in *Crat.*, p. 82 Moiss. The Hellenes are accustomed to make use of the dismemberment, re-integration and resuscitation of Dionysos *εἰς τὸν περὶ τῆς θύτης λόγον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ τοὺς ὀρφικοὺς*, *Orig., Cris. 4, 17, p. 21 Lo.**

<sup>46</sup> *οἱ δὲ περὶ Ὀρφικοῦ* think that the soul has the body as a *νεφέλαιον, διαμορφώσιον αἰθέρα*, *Pl., Crat. 400 C*. Certainly Orphic, too (as the Schol. also say), *ἡ δὲ ἐκ ἀποσπέντων λαμβάνειν λέγειν: ὡς δὲ τινι φρεσὶ δαμνῶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι κτλ.* *Pl., Phd. 62 B*; see *Lob. 793 f.*

<sup>47</sup> *fr. 221 (Phd. 62 B with Sch.)*. The similar saying of Philolaos is, as Plato's manner of recording it shows (*Phd. 61 E - 62 B*) evidently derived from a saying of the Orphic *ἄνδρες* (and Philolaos himself appealed to the *παλαιὸν θελόγοι τε καὶ πάντες* in confirmation of the closely connected doctrine of the enclosure of the *ψυχή* in the *σῆμα* of the *νῦμα*: *fr. 23 Mull. 14 Di.*). The doctrine continued to be taught by Pythagoreans: see Euxitheos *Pyth. ap. Kierarch. in Ath. iv, 157 CD*; *Cic., Sen. 79*. It had moreover some root in popular belief and in legal usage: see above, chap. v, n. 33.

<sup>12</sup> According to the 'Orphic *teu kalothron*, ap. Arist. *de An.* 1, 5, p. 410b, 28 ff.: *τῆς φύσεως ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος εἰσὶν αἰσθητὰς ἀνεκδιέστους φερόμεναι καὶ τὰς ἀνέμων.* (The ancient commentators add nothing fresh.) *ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος* means simply "out of space". The *δωματα* were regarded as daimonic powers subordinate and related to the *Τριτωνέστες*: see above, chap. v, n. 124. We cannot say how this conception was made to square with the other articles of Orphic belief (purgation of souls in Hades, etc.). It is plainly nothing but an attempt at such reconciliation that (following the Rhapsodist, fr. 224) makes the souls that pass in death out of the bodies of men, go into Hades, while those that have inhabited the bodies of animals fly about in the wind *εἰσὶν αἰσθητὰ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἀφαιρούμενα μίσην ἀνέμων προσηύ.* Aristotle knows nothing of any such restriction. Plato (*Phd.* 81 D; rather differently 108 AB) apparently making free use of Orphic ideas regards all the *καὶ καθαρὰς ἀναλίσκονται ψυχὰς* as liable to the same fate as that allotted by the Rhapsodist to the beasts. (Of course it is possible to suppose that the *ψυχὰς* on being released from Hades for a new *ἐκσυμμετρῶνται* first of all fly about in the wind round the dwelling places of the living and are then breathed into a new body. This would not prevent there being a predestined conjunction of a particular soul with the particular *οἶκος* corresponding to its state of purification.)—The establishment in later Orphic poetry of the theory that the *ψυχὰς* dwell in the air may have been assisted by the philosophic theory of the soaring-up of the *συνελευσιν* into their element the aether (of which more below). This theory, though not first put forward by the Stoics, was specially favoured by them: it almost attained the status of a popularly accepted belief. When the realm of the souls had thus been at least in part transferred to the air, late Orphic poetry began to regard one of the four rivers of the soul-world, 'Αχέρων, as the *ἀψ*: frs. 155, 156 (Rhaps.). There is no reason to see in all this the traces of a supposed ancient conception in which Oceanos is really a river in the sky (in spite of Bergk's fanciful speculations in *Opusc.* ii, 461-6). The elevation of the soul-kingdom to the sky is in Greek thought invariably the result of comparatively late speculation. We might even ask whether there is not Egyptian influence at work in the transference of Oceanos (= the Milky Way!) to the sky. Such influence would be late of course; but in Egypt the idea of the Nile in the sky was quite familiar.

<sup>14</sup> *καὶ λαὸς τῆς γενέσεως*, fr. 228: *ὁ τῆς πόλεως τροχὸς ῥοτὰ λατὶ ἐξ γενεαῶναις*: see Lob. 787 ff.

<sup>15</sup> *οἱ δ' αἰὶναι περὶ τὴν καὶ αἰὲς ἐν μεγάρωνι (πολλὰν) ἥδ' ἄλογον οὐρανὸν καθύπερ τε θύγατρε . . . γίγνεται ἀλλήλων μεταβαλλόμενοι γενέθλων*, frs. 225, 222 (Rhaps.). Here, as Lob. 797 rightly remarks, there is an allusion to the dogma of the recurrence of exactly the same state of things in the world. The doctrine of complete *ἐκσυμμετρῶνται* or *ἀνεκδιέστους ἐκάρων* (see Cataker ad. M. Ant., p. 385) was closely and indeed indissolubly bound up with the doctrine of the migration of souls. (Illogicality belongs rather to the conception of the break in the circle caused by the secession of individual souls.) It was therefore found among the Pythagoreans to whom it is ascribed by Eudemos fr. 51 ap. (see Porph., *V.P.* 18, p. 26, 23 ff. N.; used later still in a Pythagorean sense by Symp., *Aug.* 2, 7, p. 62 l. Krab.). It was borrowed from the Pythagoreans by the Stoic (by Chrysippos esp.), which after its usual fashion pushed the rather bizarre fancy in pedantic extremes. (After the Stoic model is Plot. 5, 7, and perhaps also the *genethiaci* spoken of by Varro ap. Aug., *CD.* 22, 28.) It is at least

probable in the extreme that these ideas were first held by the Orphics and not borrowed by them from the Stoics: there are even traces in Orphic tradition of the great World-year (which is always closely connected with the *ενοκαίστερας τῆς ἀνέστητος*): Lob. 792 ff.

<sup>42</sup> *καὶ λαὸν τε ἄγῃαι καὶ δαίμονας κακόντρος* were the words Proclus probably had before him: (*fr.* 226) in Tim. 330 B. The forms *αἱ ἄγῃαι καὶ δαίμονες*—thus rightly accented here by Schneider—come from Procl. himself, who accommodates the words of the original to the construction of his own sentence. We must therefore not write *οἱ ἄγῃαι* with Gale and Lob. 800. In this case the subject of the sentence is the praying soul: on the other hand, in the form preserved by Simplic., *καὶ λαὸν τ' ἀλλόθεν καὶ δαίμονας κακόντρος*, the subject is the gods to whom the soul prays: *ψυχῇ* being object. In either form the freeing of the soul from the circle is regarded as a grace from the gods.

<sup>43</sup> *fr.* 78. The lines of the *Carm. Auv.* 55 ff. (Nauck, p. 207) are probably modelled on the Orphic *οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ μακάρεσσιν καὶ*. The point is: few are they who trouble about the salvation that Orpheus (or Pythagoras) brings them: the *δemos* are always a small minority.

<sup>44</sup> *fr.* 208, 226. *Διδόντες λυαίης, λένους, θεοὶ ἄδοντες*: see Lob. 809 f. and cf. *fr.* 311 (Ficinus).

<sup>45</sup> *"Ορφέα τ' ἔσαν" ἔχον βέλγερον . . . E., Hp. 953 (N.B. *δὲ* not *δὲ* *δὲ* *δὲ*).*

<sup>46</sup> *Ορφέατος βίος*, Pl., *Lg.* 782 C: Lobeck, 244 ff.

<sup>47</sup> The Pythagorean *ἐπου δειψὺ, ἀνδρονόβην τῷ θεῷ* (Iamb., *VP.* 137, from Aristoxenus) might also have been given to the Orphics as their motto.

for

*victu sordo deterruit Orpheus* means to speak not of the ritual vegetarianism of "Orpheus", but of the previous cannibalism of men which Orpheus had put an end to. As this is nowhere else mentioned of Orpheus we might perhaps regard it as mistaken allusion on the part of Horace to the passage of Aristoph. quoted above. It is not, however, impossible that Horace did in fact have in mind some Orphic verse which really reported something like what he himself says of Orpheus. The Orphic fragment [247] ap. S.E., *M.* ii, 31: ix, 13 (Lob., p. 248), may have arisen in the same way: see *Maass, Orphens*, 77. (The well-known lines of Kritias [S.E., *M.* ix, 54 *fr.* 26 Di.] and Moschion, p. 813 Nauck, can hardly have anything to do with Orphism and should rather be connected with the theories of the Sophists and Democritus—followed later by the Epicureans—about the gradual evolution of human civilization from miserable and savage origins: and not from a "golden age" of which the Orphics too spoke.)

<sup>48</sup> Prohibition to bury corpses in woollen garments: Hdt. ii, 81 (in such case in order that nothing *ἀποσίλειαι* might cling to the departed). Prohibition against eating eggs: Lob. 251 (eggs are part of the offerings to the dead and the food of the *χθόνιοι*, and so forbidden: so rightly explained by Lob. 477). It was forbidden in Orphic poetry, as well as Pythagorean, to eat beans: Lob. 251: Nauck on Iamb., *VP.*, p. 231 f.: the reason here, too, being that beans as part of the offerings to the dead, *ποσειδωνος καὶ μαρτυροῦ πατρίδος* (Vest.): see Lob. 284 and Cuiusius, *RA, Mus.* 89, 165. The same or similar reasons are everywhere at work to cause the eating of certain foods to be forbidden

both by the Pythagorean ordinances and in the mystical cult of the *χθονία*: it is because they are used as offerings to the beings of the lower world, *πρὸς τὰ περὶθεῖνα καὶ τὰς προκλήσεις τῶν νεκρῶν*, or even because they have names which, like *λάβηρος* or *λάβρος*, recall *ἔρβος* and *λάβη*: *Plu., Q.R.* 85, p. 286 E. The purified state requires above all complete separation from anything connected with the realm of the dead and the divinities of the dead.

<sup>37</sup> *Cl. fr.* 208.

<sup>38</sup> The soul is confined within the body (according to these *ἀμφὶ ὀστέα*), *ὡς εἶναι ἐκδεχόμεν τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς εἴ ἐνεναι δίδωσιν*, *Pl., Crat.* 400 C. The exact nature of this "gulf" of the soul is not explained in our remains of Orphic literature. The point, however, is chiefly that the life within the body is according to their doctrine not in accordance with but contrary to the proper nature of the soul.

<sup>39</sup> *αὐποθέων τῶν δαίμων*, *Pl., Rp.* 363 C. *δαίμων μύσας*, *Orph., H.* 84, 3; see above, chap. vi. n. 18.

<sup>40</sup> *ψυχὴν δαίμονας κατέχει Κυλλήνηος Ἑρμῆς γαίης ἐς αὐθιμῶνα καλάρων* *fr.* 224 (it would be vain to look for an example of *δαίμονας* used as adjective to *ψυχὴ* in Homer). *Hermes χθόνιος* leads the souls down into Hades and also upwards again (to fresh *ἐνωματώσεις*): *Orph., H.* 57, 6 ff. (For the Pythagorean *Hermes* see *D.L., viii.* 31.)

<sup>41</sup> Especially in the *κατέβηκε εἰς Ἄϊδον* (*Loeb.* 373; cf. above, chap. vi. n. 3). The descent lay through the chasm at Tainaron: see above, chap. v. n. 23, and cf. *Orph., Arg.* 41.—Other Orphic poems may also have dealt with such matters: *πολλὰ μνησθολόγηται καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄϊδον προγμάτων τῷ τῆς Κυλλήνης, Jul., Or.* vii, p. 281. 3 Hertl. (26 D).

<sup>42</sup> *ἀφ' οὗ καὶ καθάρσις* of the living and even the dead carried out by Orphic priests: *Pl., Rp.* 364 E. Reward of the initiated in Hades: cf. the anecdote of Leontichidas II in *Plu., Aporrh.* *Lat.*, p. 224 E; and of Antisthenes in *D.L., vi.* 4. Those who feared the bite of Kerberos

in the leaky cask (see App.

*τελευτῇ καὶ καθάρσις*: *Pl.*

27, p. 1105 B. Hope of immortality for the soul rests on the Dionysiac mysteries acc. to *Plu., Cons. ad Ux.* 10, p. 511 D.

<sup>43</sup> It is significant that the belief in a judgment and punishment of *ψυχαί* is based in [*Pl.*] *Ep. vi.* — on the statements of poets but on chap. vii, n. 13.

<sup>44</sup> *fr.* 154 (punishment in Hades of those guilty of crimes against their own parents? *fr.* 281).

<sup>45</sup> See above, chap. vii, n. 15.

<sup>46</sup> *ἀνὰ περιμένα*: *Pl., Rp.* 365 A; cf. *fr.* 314 (Ficino).

<sup>47</sup> *fr.* 208 [*Rhaps.*] *ἔργα τ' ἐνελκύνουσιν (ἀσθάρων), λίαν προγόνων ἀσθάρων μισόμενοι* *ὡς* (sc. *Dionysos*) *ἔτελεον* (dat. commodi), *ἔργον κράτος, οὗς α' ἐβλάθητο λίαν ἐν τῷ πόντῳ χαλεπῶν καὶ ἀντίπαρος ὀδύρων* (of continual rebirth). That this belief in the efficacy of prayers for the "poor souls of the departed" belonged to the earlier stratum of Orphism follows from *Pl., Rp.* 364 BC, E, 365 A, where he speaks of *ἀφ' οὗ καὶ καθάρσις* of the Orphics which promised to deliver living and dead from the *ἀσκήματα ἀνὰ τὴν προγόνων*. (It has been wrongly attempted to fasten the same belief on Plato himself, in the *Phaedo*.)—For Gnostic and early Christian ideas of the same kind see *Arrich, D. Ant. Mysterienwesen*, 87, 4; 120 n. But even in the *Rigveda* (7, 35, 4) we may find the thought that the "pious works of the pious" can help others to salvation [*Oldenberg, Rik. d.*

Vada, 289). Religious pietism seems to produce the same effects everywhere.

<sup>41</sup> πολλοὶ μὲν παρθηνόφοροι καὶ was an Orphic verse, Lob. 809, 813.

<sup>42</sup> *fr.* 184.

<sup>43</sup> ὁ παρθηνόφορος τε καὶ τελεθισμένος έκείσε (eis "Αἴδαν) ἀφένδμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσεται, *fr.* 228 (Pl.).

<sup>44</sup> συμπαύειν τῶν δόλων in Hades, πύθω πόνους their reward: Pl., *Rp.* 336 CD (cf. Dietsch, *Nelkyia*, 80 n.). Plato there mentions Μουσάιος and his son (Εὐμολπος) as authorities for these promises and contrasts with them, by a οἱ δὲ, others who made different promises; perhaps referring to other Orphic poems (cf. *fr.* 227). But Μουσάιος, himself always closely connected in Plato with Orpheus (*Rp.* 384 E, *Prot.* 318 D, *Ap.* 41 A, *Ion*, 536 B), here simply means "Orphic poetry". A literature of essentially Orphic character went under his name. So Plin., *Comp. Cim. et Luc.* I seems right in substituting simply τῶν Ὀρφέων for the Μουσάιος named in Pl.

<sup>45</sup> Pl., *Lg.* 870 DE; then in more detail for a special case but derived from same source: νόμος . . . τῷ νόμῳ δὲ (i.e. in 870 DE) ἀρχόμενι 872 DE, 878 A.—The idea of such a religio-judicial *salvo* was popular also in Greece; see below (chap. xi, n. 44). Frequently for instance in curses of vengeance the wish is that the doer may suffer exactly the same thing as that which he has done to his victim. Exx. from Soph. (best is Tr. 1039 f.) given by G. Wolf in S., *Aias*, 839, cf. A., *Cao* 308 ff., *Ac.* 1430.—As a Neoplatonic idea: Plot. 3, 2, 13; Porph. and Iamb. ap. Aen. Gaz., *Théophr.*, p. 18 B.

<sup>46</sup> We may, however, suppose that the ideas of the Orphics corresponded with the statements of Empedokles, Plato, etc., about the series of births.

<sup>47</sup> σῶμα—σῆμα is Orphic: Pl., *Crat.* 400 C.

<sup>48</sup> Complete escape from the world of birth and death is distinctly anticipated for the pious Orphic in *fr.* 226, εὐχόμεν τε λήξωμεν καὶ. The other and positive side completing this negative promise is not clearly supplied for us by any fragment. (We never even hear distinctly of the return of the individual soul to the one Soul of the World; though certain Orphic myths—probably of late origin—seem to suggest such a doctrine of Emanation and final Remanation.)

<sup>49</sup> *fr.* I, H). The moon was regarded as inhabited, like the world, by Pythagoreans too (esp. Philolaos) and also by Anaxagoras.

<sup>50</sup> This at least was the belief of Pythagoreans and later of Platonics: see *Griech. Röm. Ant.* 269; Wytténb. on *Bun.* FS. 117. But the idea occurs as early as in the Ti. of Plato, esp. in 42 B. It may have been long familiar to Greek popular belief (as to other peoples: cf. Tylor, ii, 70), and reached Orphics from that source. (Similar though not quite the same is the popular belief ὡς δολοίτες γενόμεθα' ἔσθωμεν καὶ ἀνασθώμεν, Ar., *Po.* 833 l., which the Greeks shared with all the nations of the earth: cf. "Pythagoras" ap. Comm. Bern. in *Lucan.* 9, 9).—No opinion can be built upon the statement of Flavius (*fr.* 321).

<sup>51</sup> Orphic poetry must have varied in its account of what happened to the dismembered limbs of Zagreus-Dionysos. That the Titans tore the god limb from limb seems to have been common to all versions of the Theogonic poem (see no. 28, 41; p. 341). But whereas according to one account the Titans then devoured the god (except the heart) and from the mixed Titanic and Dionysiac elements of their bodies after they had been destroyed by lightning the race of men had its origin (p. 341); according to others the mangled limbs

of the god were brought by Zeus to Apollo who buried them taking them "on to Parnassos", i.e. at Delphi: see Orph. *fr.* 200 (Clem. Al.) and so, too, Callim. *fr.* 374. The Rhapsodiai gave the first version in detail, but also preserved an account resembling the second (see *frs.* 203, 204: the *ἑλκεα καὶ μαρμαίρεα τοῦ Διονύσου μέλι* there refers probably to the reunion of the collected limbs for the purpose of burial and not for the restoration of the dead god to life. This is also possibly the meaning of the *διονύσου μέλιρ ἀλλήετες* in Jul., *Chr.*, p. 167, 7 Neum. But Or., *Cels.* 4, 17, p. 21 Lom., speaks of the reanimation of Dionysos *ἐννιθεμένου* after the dismemberment). This second account, where it occurs alone, of course excludes the *Authepogony* from the Titans' ashes. The second version unmistakably connects itself with the Delphic legend of the grave of Dionysos at the foot of Apollo's tripod (see above, pp. 87 f.) as K. O. Müller observed, *Introd. Scient. Myth.* 242. It does, in fact, accord in this instance, but apart from this it has no connexion whatever with the real Delphic legend about the disappearance of Dionysos into the underworld and his periodic return to this world. (See above, chap. viii, n. 28. The Orphic and Delphic legends are elaborately compared and worked in together as though they were separate fragments of a single whole in Lübbert's book, *de Pindaro theologiae Orph. censura*: Ind. Sch. Bonn. Lib., 1888, p. xiii f.—with shocking results and no intrinsic justification.) Whether this second version was the one put forward by Ooemakritos is uncertain. In any case, both accounts are much older than the Rhapsodiai, in which, it appears, they were included side by side and superficially harmonized (—only the limbs of the god not devoured by the Titans being buried acc. to this version). Besides these two versions there may have been another *Authepogony* differing from that given in the first account: the existence of something of the kind is perhaps to be deduced from what the Rhapsodiai themselves have to tell about the golden and silver generations of mankind (see above, n. 41).

<sup>10</sup> Of the Thracian Mysioi λέγουσι δ' Ἐσσυθίωνες καὶ ἐμφοῦνος ἀνέχεσθαι (which Pythagoras is said to have learnt from Zalmoxis, Str. 298) κατ' ἐνόςθου, ἅδ' ἢ τοῦτο καὶ ἀρκεμάνου· μέλιτι δὲ χρῆσθαι καὶ γάλακτι καὶ τυρῇ, ζῶντας καὶ ψυχίαν· ἅδ' ἢ τοῦτο ἐκλήθησαν θεοεβείε τε καὶ κασσιβέρας (perh. κασσιβέρας acc. to an ancient conjecture). εἰναὶ δὲ τινες τοῦ Ἑλληνισμοῦ οἱ πρώτοι γυναικὲς ζῶσι, οὐκ αἰσύνουσι φαλίσθαι, διατρέφουσι τε καὶ τιμῇ καὶ μὲν' ἀβείας (cf. Str. 296. The religious character of this asceticism is seen in the words κατ' ἐνόςθου and the name θεοεβείε; also in the word διατρέφουσι, which are all used of the *εὐεβείας* as of a monastic order. Jos., *A.J.* 18, 1, 5, says of the Essenes ζῶσι δ' οὐδὲν πορνεύοντες ἀλλ' ἐνὶ μέλει ἀμείνονες δακνόν (i.e. *θεοειδῶν, Γερόν: Gelae, Duci Romanis dicti*, Plin., *NH.* iv, 80) τοῖς νεκροῖσι καταμύοντες. In any case the same Thracian ascetics are meant whom Poseidonios (literally translating a Thracian word) calls the *κρίστας*. Thus, they are said like the Essenes to live without women, eat no meat, and in the practice of various other asceticisms live together and have all things in common.—It cannot be certainly decided how old this Thracian asceticism was, its exact connexion with Dionysiac religion, and whether it could or did give any impulse in the direction of asceticism to the Orphics. (Following Mom., *N* 4 ff., many told similar stories of the nomadic Skythoi: see Ephor., *frs.* 76, 76; or of the fabulous Argimpeoi, Hdt. iv, 23; Zab., *Fr.* 3, 25, p. 129, 1, etc. *Griech. Roman.*, 203.—*δωρεὰ ἐμφοῦμος* occurred also among the Atlantes and certain Indian races: Hdt. iv, 164; iii, 100.)

<sup>79</sup> It, 123. His words make it plain that the Greek teachers of transmigration of souls whom he has in mind (Pherekydes, Pythagoras, Orphics, Empedokles) had no idea of the Egyptian origin of that doctrine (*Rh. Mus.* 20, 550, 1).

<sup>80</sup> The Egyptian monuments show no knowledge of a general transmigration of souls, due to a law of nature or the decree of the gods. We can see very well, however, what it was in Egyptian traditions that might seem like a doctrine of transmigration to Herodotos (cf. Wiedemann, *Erläut. zu Herodot. I. B.* p. 457 f.).

<sup>81</sup> It is sufficient to refer to Tylor's collections: II, 3 ff.—In antiquity the Greeks met with a doctrine of Transmigration, apart from Thrace, among the Keltic races (Caes., *B.G.* 6, 14, 5; D.S. 5, 28, 6; cf. Timagenes ap. Amm. Marc. 15, 8, 8). This was the sole reason why Pythagoras was made the pupil of the Gallic Druids: Alex. Polyh. ap. Clem. Al., *Str.* i, p. 355/6 P., etc.

<sup>82</sup> That it was not unnatural for the Greeks also to have the conception of the migration of the soul from its first body to some other suitable second or third body (entry of *τῆς τρυφῆς ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ νυξὲς σώμα* acc. to Arist.) may be seen from the fact that in Greek popular tales of the transformation of men into beasts the idea regularly prevails that while the body changes in such cases the "soul" remains the same as before. Thus, explicitly in Hom. *π* 240 (cf. Sch. there and 328); cf. also Ov., *M.* ii, 485; Nonn., *D.* v, 322 f.; Aesop., *F.* 284 (Halm); [Luc.] *Asin.* 13, 15 init.; Apul., *M.* lii, 28 init.; Aug., *CD.* 18, 18, p. 278, 11 ff. Domb., etc. (In all transformation stories this is regularly implied and gives the point to the story.) This is true from the earliest times onward, down to Voltaire's muletier who was turned into a mule et du vilain l'âme terrestre et crasse à peine vit qu'elle eut changé de place.—The beasts also have a *ψυχή*: e.g. § 428.

<sup>83</sup> Brahmins, Buddhists, Manichaeans, etc.

<sup>84</sup> A fixed term for "transmigration of souls" does not seem to have been offered by Orphic teaching. It was later called *μετεμψυχή* (a term which did not exactly fit the real meaning of the idea): this seems to have been its oldest name (cf. of *ψυχῆς σώμα γίνονται ἐν τῶν τελευτῶν*. Pl., *Phd.* 70 C), and remained its most common one. "Pythagoras" *ποῦ μετεμψύχωντο καὶ μετεμψυχῶνται εἰς αἰετὶς*: Serv., *A.* iii, 68. *μετεμψυχωμεν* is not uncommon (frequent in Hippol., *RF.*, p. 12, 53 D.-S.; 268, etc.). The word most commonly used among ourselves, *μετεμψύχωνται*, is among the Greeks precisely the least usual: it occurs e.g. in D.S. 10, 6, 1; Gal. iv, 763 K.; Tertul., *de An.* 31; Serv., *A.* vi, 532; 602; Suid. s.v. *ἑρπιδῆς*. *μετεμψυχοῦνται* occurs in Sch., *A.R.* i, 845.



## CHAPTER XI

### THE PHILOSOPHERS

The Orphic teaching, in which a protracted movement of religion in Greece reached comprehensive expression, might seem almost an anachronism, appearing as it did in an age when a religious interpretation of the world and of mankind was hardly any longer admissible. Eastwards, on the coasts of Ionia, a new view of the world had arisen which, like a youth that has come of age, demanded the right to pursue its course without any guidance from traditional beliefs. The Ionic maritime cities were the meeting-place of all the collected wisdom and experience of mankind; and there all the more serious knowledge and study—both indigenous and of foreign origin—of "Nature", the earth, and the heavenly bodies, was gathered together in the intelligence of those ever-memorable spirits who at that time were laying the foundations of natural science, and of all science in general. This knowledge was now attempting to turn itself into an organized and all-embracing whole. Observation and constructive study combined with an imaginative vision to hazard a picture of the world and reality as a whole. Because it was impossible anywhere in this world to find anything completely and for ever fixed and dead, speculation inevitably pressed forward to the discovery of the undying source of Life, that perpetually fills, moves, and rebuilds this whole, and of the laws according to which it works and necessarily must work.

This was the direction pursued by these earliest pioneers of philosophy; and they pursued it unhampered by any subservience to mythical or religious modes of thought. Where mythology and the theology founded upon it saw a complete history of cosmic events each one of which was the result of the separate and unique action of divine personalities endowed with consciousness and the power of arbitrary choice—there the philosopher saw the play of everlasting forces which could not be completely resolved into the single events of any historical process, for, without beginning or end they had been ever in action, tirelessly fulfilling themselves in accordance with unchanging laws. In such a universe there seemed

to be little room left for divine figures created by man after his own image, and worshipped by him as the guiding and supreme powers of the world. And in fact, the foundations were now laid of that tremendous structure of free inquiry, which finally succeeded in weaving out of its treasure new worlds of thought, where even those who had quarrelled or were dissatisfied with the old religion (now inwardly falling into decay for all its outward appearance of being at the most brilliant zenith of its powers) might yet find a refuge if they would not fall back upon sheer nothingness.

And yet Greece never saw a thorough-going opposition and conscious quarrel between science and religion. In a few special cases the religion of the state was forced to recognize its incompatibility with the openly expressed opinions of individual philosophers, and took steps to make its claims to universal supremacy respected. But for the most part, the two streams of influence flowed on side by side for centuries without ever coming into hostile contact. The propagandist temper was completely absent from philosophy from the very beginning. (Even when it appeared later as among the Cynics it produced very little effect on the supremacy of the state religion.) Religion on its side was not represented by any priestly caste which might have been led to take up arms for religion and for what it believed to be its own interest alike. Theoretic contradictions might the more easily remain unobserved when religion depended so little upon fixed dogma or upon a world-embracing whole of opinions and doctrines; while Theology, wherever it accompanied the worship of the gods (*theôlogia*), which was the real core of religion, was, just as much as philosophy, the business of individuals and their adherents gathered together outside the limits of the official religion of the state. Philosophy (except in a few special and unrepresentative cases) never sought open war with religion—not even with the weakened and diluted religion of the masses. In fact the juxtaposition of philosophy and religion (with theology itself by their side) sometimes went beyond the external conditions of the time, and affected the private intellectual life of certain thinkers. It might seem as if religion and philosophy were not merely different but dealt with different provinces of reality, and thus even strict and philosophically minded thinkers could honestly and without imagining disloyalty to philosophy, adopt particular and even fundamental conceptions from the creed of their fathers, and allow them to grow up side by side and at peace with their own purely philosophical ideas.

## § 2

What the Ionic philosophers in connexion with the rest of their cosmology had to say about the soul of man did not for all its striking novelty bring them into direct conflict with religious opinion. Philosophy and religion used the same words to denote totally different things; it could surprise no one if different things were said about quite different objects.

According to the popular view, which finds expression in Homer, and with which, in spite of their very different estimate of the relative values of body and soul, the religious theory of the Orphics and other *theologi* also agreed—according to this view the "psyche" was regarded as a unique creature of combined spiritual and material nature that, wherever it may have come from, now dwells within man and there, as his second self, carries on its separate existence, making itself felt when the visible self loses consciousness in dream, swoon, or ecstasy (see above, pp. 8 f.). In the same way, the moon and the stars become visible when no longer obscured by the brighter light of the sun. It was already implied in the conception itself that this double of mankind, which could be detached from him temporarily, had a separate existence of its own; it was no very great step from this to the idea that in death, which is simply the permanent separation of the visible man from the invisible, the latter did not perish, but only then became free and able to live by and for itself.

This spiritual being and the obscure manifestations of its existence in the living man, did not attract the observation of the Ionian philosophers. Their thoughts were all for the universe as a whole; they looked for the "origins" (*ἀρχαί*) of all that is and becomes; for the simple elements of multifarious appearance and for the force which turns the simple into the multifarious while controlling, moving, and giving life to primeval matter. The power of life, the force which can set in motion both itself and all else that without it would be fixed and motionless—this force penetrates all being; where it manifests itself most strikingly in separate individual beings, there it is what these philosophers call the "psyche".

Thought of in this way, the psyche is something quite different from the old psyche of popular belief, idly observing the life and activities of its body, as of some stranger, concentrated in itself, and pursuing its own secret, hidden life. And yet the name given to these very different concepts remained the same. The application of the word "psyche"

to the power which gives life and movement to the visible body—man's power of life—might have been suggested to the philosophers by a manner of expression which, though in the strict sense of the words conflicting with Homeric conceptions, is occasionally observable in the Homeric poems, and seems to have become more and more frequent in late times.<sup>1</sup> In more exact language, the "psyche" of these philosophers is a collective expression for all the powers of thought, desire, and will (*νόος, μένος, μήτις, βούλη*), and especially for the functions denoted by the untranslatable word *θυμός*—powers which according to the Homeric and popular partition all belong entirely to the side of the visible man and his body.<sup>2</sup> According to that view, they are all expressions of the body's natural powers of life—though they cannot indeed be awakened to real life before the arrival of the "psyche"—and in Homeric usage are almost the exact opposite of the "psyche", for they perish at death, while the psyche leaves them behind to wander about in its separate shadow-life.

But the soul, according to the view of the physiologists, has quite a different relation to the totality of life and living, and differs in this respect both from the Homeric psyche and the Homeric *θυμός*. The same force which manifests itself so strongly, as though specially concentrated there, in the psyche of man, works and rules in all matter as the general source of life that creates and preserves the world. Thus, the psyche loses the special singularity that distinguished it from all the other things and substances in the world, and made it incomparable and unique. Later reporters are wrong in attributing to these Ionic thinkers (for whom vital power and material substance seemed immediately and indissolubly united) the conception of a separate, independent "World-Soul". Not as emanations from a single Soul of the World did they conceive the separate souls of men; but neither did they conceive them as simply independent, unique, and entirely incomparable essences. They are expressions of that force which everywhere in all the phenomena of the world

.....ally could not assume any; .....  
between that source and the "soul". Deprived in this way of its separateness, the soul acquired a new importance in exchange; in another sense from that of the mystics and theologians it could still be thought of as something divine, for it was a participator in the one Force which builds and rules the world. It is not the abode of a single daimonic

nature, but instead, the very nature of god is alive within it.

The closer its inward connexion with the universal Whole the less, of course, will the soul be able to preserve its individual existence, which was only lent to it while it gave life and movement to the body, when that body, the sign and support of its separateness, is overtaken by death. These earliest philosophers whose view was almost entirely concentrated on the broad outlines of the life of nature as a whole, would hardly have regarded it as part of their task to formulate a deliberate opinion about the fate of the puny individual soul after the death of its body. In no case could they have spoken of an *immortality* of the soul in the same sense as did the mystics who regarded the soul of which they spoke as something which has entered from without into material existence, and as a spiritual essence quite distinct from everything material. The latter were thus able to attribute to the psyche a capacity for separate and continued existence which was inadmissible in the case of a force of movement and sensation completely inhering in matter and in the shaping of matter. And it was such a force which the physiologists called the soul.

Ancient tradition, nevertheless, asserts that Thales of Miletos, whose genius first began the philosophic study of nature, was the first "to call the soul (of man) immortal".<sup>1</sup> But Thales, who recognized a "soul" also in magnets and plants,<sup>2</sup> and thought of the material stuff and the motive force of the "soul" as inseparable, can only have spoken of the "immortality" of the human soul in the same sense as he might have spoken of the immortality of all "soul-forces" in nature. Like the primal Matter which works and creates by reason of its own natural powers of life, so, too, the universal Force which permeates it<sup>3</sup> is imperishable and indestructible, as it is uncreated. It is entirely and essentially alive and can never be "dead".

Anaximander said of the "Unlimited" from which all things have been developed by separation, and by which all things are enveloped and directed, that it never grows old, but is immortal and imperishable.<sup>4</sup> This cannot be intended to apply to the human soul as a separate existence; for like all separate creations out of the "Unlimited" it must "in the order of the time" pay the penalty for the "offence" of its separate existence,<sup>5</sup> and lose itself again in the one primordial matter.

Nor could the third in this series—Anaximenes of Miletos—have differed seriously from Thales in the sense in which

he spoke of the soul as "immortal"; for him it was of the same nature<sup>8</sup> as the one divine<sup>9</sup> primal element of Air that is eternally in movement and produces all things out of itself.

### § 3

In the teaching of Herakleitos of Ephesos the living power of the primal essence—the one<sup>10</sup> and universal, out of which arises through change the many and the particular, which manifests itself in the union, regarded as indissoluble, of matter and motive force—received even greater prominence than with the older Ionians. By them matter itself—described as either limited or not limited in reference to one particular quality—is regarded as self-evidently in motion. For Herakleitos the origin of all multiplicity lies rather in the creative energy of absolute Life itself which is at the same time a definite material substance or analogous to one of the known substances. The idea of *life*, and that form of it which makes its appearance in man, must have been more important for him than for any of his predecessors.

This never-resting force and activity of becoming that has neither beginning nor end, is represented by the Hot and Dry and called by the name of that elementary condition which cannot be thought of as ceasing to move, namely, Fire. The ever-living (ἀνίκητος) fire, which periodically kindles itself and periodically goes out (Bywater, *fr.* 20), is formed entirely of movement and livingness. Living belongs to everything; but living is becoming, changing, becoming something different without cessation. Every appearance brings forth from itself, at the moment of its appearance, the opposite of itself. Birth, life, and death, and fresh birth clash together in a single burning moment, like the lightning (*fr.* 28).

That which thus moves itself in unceasing vitality and has all its being in becoming; which perpetually changes and "in backward-straining effort" finds itself again—this is something endowed with reason, creative in accordance with reason and "art": is Reason (λόγος) itself. In creating the world it loses itself in the elements; it suffers its "death" (*fr.* 66, 67) when in the "Way downwards" it becomes water and earth (*fr.* 21). There are degrees of value in the elements decided by the relation which they hold towards the moving and self-vivifying fire. But that which in the multiplicity of the phenomena in the world, yet preserves its god-like fiery nature—this is for Herakleitos "psyche". Psyche is fire.<sup>11</sup> Fire and psyche are interchangeable terms.<sup>12</sup> And so, too, the psyche of man is fire, a part of the universal fiery

energy that surrounds it and upholds it, through the "inhalation" of which it maintains itself alive; <sup>32</sup> a portion of the World-Reason by participation in which it is itself rational. In men God is living.<sup>34</sup> But god does not descend into man, as in the teaching of the Theologians, entering as a finite individuality into the vessel of the individual human life. As a united whole he surrounds men with his flood and reaches after and into them, as though with fiery tongues. A portion <sup>35</sup> of his universal Wisdom is living in the soul of man; the "drier", more fiery, nearer to the universal Fire and further from the less living elements he is, the wiser will he be (*fr.* 74, 75, 76). If he sundered himself from the universal wisdom, man would become nothing; it is his business in thinking, as in acting and in moral behaviour, to surrender himself to the One Living essence that "nourishes" him and is the Mind and Law of the world (*fr.* 91, 92, 100, 103).

But the soul itself is also a portion of the universal Fire that in the perpetual variation of its form of being has been encompassed by the body and become entangled in corporality. Here we no longer have the rigid, unmediated contrast between "Body" and "Soul" such as it appeared from the standpoint of the theologian. The elements of the body, water and earth, have themselves arisen and perpetually arise out of the fire which changes into all other things, and into which everything else changes (*fr.* 22). So it is the soul itself, the creative fire, which *creates* the body. "Soul," i.e. Fire, unceasingly turns itself into the lower elements; there is no contrast between them, and it is but a continual flux of transition.

While it is enclosed in the body the soul is still affected by unceasing change. In this it is like everything else. Nothing in the world can for a single moment preserve the parts which compose it unaltered; the perpetual movement and alteration of its being constitute its life. The sun itself, the greatest fire-body, becomes another sun every day (*fr.* 32). So, too, the soul, though distinct from the body and a self-existing substance, yet is a substance that never remains like itself. In unceasing alteration of its material substance, its contents are perpetually being transposed. It loses its fire of life in the lower elements; it absorbs fresh fire from the living Fire of the universe that surrounds it. There can be no question of the permanent identity of the soul, of the spiritual personality, with itself. What in the unbroken process of upward and downward straining seems to maintain itself as a single person, is in reality a series of souls and person-

alities, one taking the place of another and ousting and being ousted in turn.

Thus, even while it is in life, the soul is perpetually dying—but to live again; ever supplementing the departing soul-life or supplying its place with another. So long as it can recruit itself from the surrounding World-Fire, so long the individual lives. Separation from the source of all life, the living and universal fire of the world, would be death for it. The soul may temporarily lose its life-giving contact with the "common world": this happens in sleep and dreaming which enclose it in their own world (*fr.* 94, 95), and this is already a partial death to it. Sometimes, too, the soul has a tendency to transform itself to a humidity not always made good by fresh fire; the drunkard has a "moist soul" (*fr.* 73). Finally, there comes the moment when the soul of man cannot any longer repair the loss of the living fire which is taken from it in the perpetual alteration of its matter. Then it dies; death carries off the last of the series of living fires which in their continuity made up the human soul.<sup>14</sup>

But in Herakleitos' world there is no such thing as death in the absolute sense—an end followed by no beginning, an unconditional cessation of becoming. "Death" is for him only a point where one condition of things gives way to another; a relative "not-being", involving death for one but simultaneously bringing birth and life for another (*fr.* 25, [64], 66, 67). Death, just as much as life, is for him a positive thing. "Fire lives the death of earth, and air lives the death of fire; water lives the death of air, and earth the death of water" (*fr.* 26). The One that is in all things is at once dead and alive (*fr.* 78), immortal and mortal (*fr.* 67); a perpetual "death and becoming" agitates it. So, too, the "death" of man must be the exit from one positive state of things, and the entry into another, also positive, condition. Death occurs for man when the "soul" is no longer within him. Only the body is then left; alone and by itself it is no better than dung (*fr.* 85). But the soul—what becomes of that? It must have altered; it was fire, but now it has descended on the "Way downwards" and become water—to become earth after that. So it must happen to all fire. In death the fire in man "goes out" (*fr.* 77). "It is death for the souls to become water" says Herakleitos clearly enough (*fr.* 68).<sup>15</sup> The soul must tread this path at last, and treads it willingly; change is for the soul its delight and refreshment (*fr.* 63). The soul has then changed itself into the elements of the body, has lost itself in the body.



But it cannot rest permanently in this transformation. "For the souls it is death to become water; for the water it is death to become earth. And yet from earth comes water; and from water, soul" (*fr.* 88). Thus, in the restless up and down of becoming, in the "Way upwards" the soul reconstitutes itself out of the lower elements. But not *that* soul which had formerly animated the particular individual and of whose complete self-identity in the midst of the influx of the Fire-spirit there could be no question even during the life of the body. The inquiry after an individual immortality or even a continued existence of the separate soul could hardly have had any meaning at all for Herakleitos. Nor can he have admitted it under the form of the "transmigration of the soul".<sup>18</sup> It is quite certain that Herakleitos can never have distinctly asserted the changeless persistence of the individual human soul in the midst of the unbroken stream of becoming in which all fixity is nothing but an illusion of the senses. But it is also incredible that, in despite of his own fundamental principles, he even admitted the possibility of this popular view with an indulgence quite foreign to his nature.<sup>19</sup> What could have tempted him to do so? We are told<sup>20</sup> that it was from the mysteries that he adopted this opinion which was one of their most important doctrines. Herakleitos, however, only casts an occasional glance at the mysteries and what might be called their "doctrine" (just as he glanced at other prominent manifestations of the excited religious life of his time<sup>21</sup>); and he does so in order to harmonize their teaching with his own—a result which he achieves rather by imposing an interpretation than by patiently eliciting one. He demonstrates that the mysteries might be harmonized with his own doctrine,<sup>22</sup> which seemed to him able to explain all the phenomena of the world; that contrariwise he ever sought to set his own teaching in harmony with that of the mysteries, or that the latter had shown him the way to his thought, or could ever have tempted him to set foot outside his own self-chosen path—of this there is not a scrap of evidence to be had.

The individual in its isolation has, for Herakleitos, neither value nor importance: to persist in this isolation (if it had been possible) would have seemed to him a crime.<sup>23</sup> The Fire is for him indestructible and immortal as a totality, not as divided into individual particles, but only as the one Universal Mind that transforms itself into all things and draws all things back again into itself. The soul of man has a claim to immortality only as an emanation of this universal Reason,

and shares the immortality which belongs to it. So, too, the soul, even when it has lost itself in the elements, finds itself again. Between "want" and "satisfaction" (*fr.* 24, 36), this process of becoming has its perpetual being. A day will come when the Fire will "overtake" everything (*fr.* 28); God will then be utterly by himself—all in all. But that is not the purpose of this world; here change, becoming and passing away will never end. Nor should they end; the "Strife" (*fr.* 43) which has created the world, and ever fashions it anew, is the most inward nature of the All-living which it perpetually stirs to insatiable desire of becoming. For the desire and refreshment of all things is Change (*fr.* 72, 83), the coming and going in the interplay of Becoming.

It is the precise opposite of a quietistic mood that speaks from the whole teaching of Herakleitos. His voice is a trumpet call that grows louder and louder as his lofty and majestic spirit with ever-increasing intensity proclaims prophet-like the last word of wisdom. He knows well that it is only labour that can give meaning to rest, and hunger to satisfaction; only sickness can call forth the desire of health (*fr.* 104). That is the law of the world which binds together the opposing contraries, each of which is engendered from the last, with an inward and complete necessity. He bows before it and assents to it. For him the fixity of the soul in a Blessedness that was without activity and without change—even if such were thinkable<sup>24</sup>—would not have seemed a possible goal of desire.

#### § 4

Even before the days of Herakleitos the torch of philosophic inquiry had been borne from the coasts of Ionia to the West by Xenophanes of Kolophon who in a life of adventure had wandered as far as Southern Italy and Sicily. For his fiery temperament the most subtle reflection was turned into life and experience, and the one enduring source of Being to which he ever directed his gaze became the universal Divinity that is all perception and thought, that tirelessly embraces all things in its thought and intelligence, and, without beginning or end, perpetually remains the same with itself. What Xenophanes had to say about this God which for him is the same as the world, became the basis for the elaborated doctrine of the Eleatic school which, in declared opposition to Herakleitos,<sup>25</sup> denied all possibility of movement, becoming, alteration, division of the One into Many, to the one absolute Being that completely and entirely occupies Space, is raised

above all development, whether temporal or spatial, and remains perpetually enclosed in itself in absolute self-sufficiency.

For this view the whole multiplicity of things that presses itself upon sense-perception is an *illusion*. Deceptive also is the apparent existence of a multiplicity of animated beings, just as the whole of nature is an illusion. It was not "Nature", the content of actual experience, that provided the starting-point of the philosophy of Parmenides. Without any assistance from experience, simply by the pure logical deductions to be made from a single fundamental concept (that of "Being"), which was to be grasped only by the understanding, this philosophy claimed to arrive at the whole content of its teaching. For the philosophic scientists of Ionia the soul also had been a part of nature and the science of the soul a department of the science of nature; and this inclusion of the psychical within the physical was the peculiarity in their doctrine of the soul which distinguished it from the ordinary popular psychology. When, however, the whole of Nature was to be ruled out of account as a subject of scientific knowledge, the derivation of psychology from physiology had to be given up as well. These *aphysici*<sup>26</sup> were logically debarred from holding any doctrine of the soul.

With a complaisance that is remarkable in view of the uncompromising logical vigour with which they deduced their main theory and based it on abstract, super-sensual knowledge, the Eleatics conceded so much at least to the region of appearance and the pressure of sense-perception that, although they did not deduce from their own fundamental conceptions a physical theory of multifarious appearance and its development, yet, side by side with their rigid doctrine of being, in unjustified and unjustifiable relation with it, they did in fact put forward such a theory. Xenophanes, himself, had already in the same way offered a physical theory of limited and relative validity. Parmenides in the second part of his doctrinal poem, developed, "in deceptive adornment of words," not an authoritative statement of the true nature of being, but "human opinions" of becoming and creation in the world of multiplicity. This, too, must be the standpoint of the physiological doctrines put forward by Zeno of Elea, the boldest dialectician who upheld the doctrine of the motionless All-One. In the course of such a physiology, and with the same implied reservations, the Eleatic philosophers dealt also with the nature and origin of the soul. Their physical doctrine was framed entirely on the lines of the older type of

natural philosophy, and they regarded the relation of the spiritual to the corporeal from exactly the same point of view as their predecessors had done. For Parmenides (146 ff. Mull. = *fr.* 16 Diels) the mind (*νóος*) of man depends for its existence upon the mixture of two ingredients of which everything, including its body, is composed. These ingredients are the "Light" and the "Night" (the Warm and the Cold, Fire and Earth). What is intellectually active is, even in mankind, the "nature of his limbs": the character of his thought is determined by the one of the two elements which preponderates in the individual. Even the dead man (because he still has a body) has feeling and sensation: but these powers are deserted by the warm and the fiery and given over to the cold, the dark, and silence. All that is has some capacity of knowledge.<sup>21</sup>—It would be impossible to condemn the "soul" to corporeality more completely than is here done by the bold philosopher of abstract Reason, who at the same time denied so unconditionally all validity to sense-perception. The soul is evidently no longer an independent substance but a mere resultant of material mixture, a function of elements in composition. For Zeno, too, the "soul" in the same way was an exactly equal mixture of the four elementary properties of matter, the Warm, the Cold, the Dry, and the Wet.<sup>22</sup>

It is, therefore, startling, in the face of these utterances, to find that Parmenides also said about the "soul" that the deity that rules the world "at one time, sends it out of the Invisible into the Visible, and at another time back again".<sup>23</sup> Here, the soul is no longer a condition arising from the mixture of material elements, but an independent being credited with pre-existence before its entry into the "Visible", i.e. before its entry into the life of the body, and also with a continued existence after its separation from the realm of visibility—and indeed, with a sojourn, several times repeated, in those two worlds. Did Parmenides distinguish between this independently existing soul and the being that perceives in the mixture of the elements and as mind (*νóος*) thinks, but whose existence is bound up with the elements and the body they together compose? It is obvious at any rate that in what he says of the psyche, and its alternate life in the visible and the invisible, Parmenides is not speaking as a physiologist, but as an adherent of the Orphic-Pythagorean theosophy. While reserving for himself his knowledge of "Truth" and unalterable Being, he could select as he liked among the "opinions of men" when speaking only hypothetically. In his doctrine as a practical teacher with an ethical purpose

in view he preferred to adopt the conceptions of the Pythagoreans with whom he lived in close association.<sup>20</sup>

### § 5

Ionic physiology had fixed its attention on Nature as a whole, and on the phenomena of life displayed in every nook and corner of the universe; man, as a mere ripple on the surface of the ocean of becoming and taking form, was almost entirely neglected. A philosophy that made it its main effort to learn the nature of man, and, still further, with the knowledge so acquired, to show man the way and purpose of his living, had to try other paths.

This is what Pythagoras of Samos did. What he called his "Philosophy"<sup>21</sup> was in essence a practical effort. Plato<sup>22</sup> tells us that Pythagoras was so peculiarly honoured because he discovered a special mode of directing one's life. A distinct way of living, formed on a religious and ethical basis, was his creation. How far his "polymathy",<sup>23</sup> which indubitably contained already the substance of Pythagorean science, may have become a system in his hands, is not distinctly known. What is certain is that in Kroton he formed a society which, together with the strict rules in accordance with which he organized their manner of life for his associates, eventually spread far and wide among the Achæan and Dorian cities of the Italian "great Greece". In this society a profound conception of human life and its purposes was given practical and visible application, and to have brought this about must be regarded as the act and the special service of Pythagoras. The fundamental conception of this way of life, except in so far as it may have contained from the beginning a mystic philosophy of numbers, was by no means the special invention of Pythagoras; the new and potent feature which he introduced was the force of personality which was able to give life and body to the ideal. What was apparently lacking in similar movements in ancient Greece was now provided by a great man who for his followers was a pattern and an example, a leader inspiring imitation and emulation. His personality became a centre to which a whole community was attracted by a sort of inward necessity. Before very long this founder of a community appeared to his followers as a superman, unique and incomparable among all other men. Some lines of Empedokles,<sup>24</sup> who did not himself belong to the Pythagorean society, bear witness to this fact, and to his followers Pythagoras became in memory a saint or even a god in human form, and they related legends of the miracles he had

performed. For us it is difficult to form a connected picture or trace the real features of the man beneath the dazzling halo of the saint.

The teaching which enabled him to knit together his followers in a far closer bond of fellowship in living than had been achieved by any Orphic sect, must still in the main have coincided with what in the Orphic doctrine immediately related to the religious life. He too pointed out the way of salvation for the soul and his doctrine of the soul formed the central feature of his philosophy.

So far as our scanty and dubious evidence serves us, the substance of the Pythagorean doctrine of the soul may be stated as follows.

The soul of man, once more regarded entirely as the "double" of the visible body and its powers, is a daimonic immortal being<sup>38</sup> that has been cast down from divine heights and for a punishment is confined within the "custody" of the body.<sup>39</sup> It has no real relationship with the body; it is not what may be called the personality of the individual visible man: any soul may dwell in any body.<sup>40</sup> When death separates it from the body the soul must first endure a period of purgation in Hades<sup>41</sup> and then return again to the upper world. The souls invisibly swarm about the living;<sup>42</sup> in the tremulous motion of motes in the sunbeam the Pythagoreans saw the movement of the "souls".<sup>43</sup> The whole air is full of souls.<sup>44</sup> Upon earth, however, the soul must seek out another body, and this may be repeated many times. So it wanders a long way, passing through many bodies of men and beasts.<sup>45</sup> Very ancient tradition<sup>46</sup> said that Pythagoras himself remembered the earlier incarnations through which his soul had passed (and of which he gave information for the instruction and warning of the faithful). Here, too, the doctrine of the soul's transmigrations took on an edificatory character in a religious and ethical sense. The conditions of the new incarnations and the character of the new lifetime are governed by the performances of the past life. What the soul has done in the past, that it must suffer in its own person when it becomes a man again.<sup>47</sup>

It is thus of primary importance both for the present life and for future incarnations to know and to follow the methods of salvation delivered by Pythagoras to his followers. The society points out the way to its company of the faithful in purifications and initiations, in a "Pythagorean life"<sup>48</sup> entirely organized with the same purpose in view—to "follow the god".<sup>49</sup> Much of the old ritual symbolism that had been

in use for ages must have been incorporated in this Pythagorean asceticism.<sup>47</sup> The theological ethic of asceticism was essentially negative in character, and here, too, it meant nothing more than a protecting of the soul against the attacks of external evil that might come and pollute it.<sup>48</sup> All that matters is to keep the soul pure: no need for moral reformation—only that it be kept free from external evil. The fact of immortality, the soul's perpetuity, stands fast and unalterable; as it was from the beginning so it must ever be and live.<sup>49</sup> To lift it at last altogether from this earthly existence and restore it to a free divine state of being—that, at least, was the final goal.<sup>50</sup>

The practical philosophy of the Pythagorean school is founded upon a conception of the soul as absolutely distinct from "nature", and, in fact, opposed to it. It is thrust into the life of nature, but it is in a foreign world where it preserves its self-enclosed individuality intact and from which it escapes into independence to undergo ever-renewed incarnations. Its origin is supra-mundane, and so, too, when liberated from the shackles of natural life it will one day be enabled to return to a supernatural existence as a spirit.

Not one of these ideas is achieved by a process of scientific thinking. Physiology, the science of the world and all the phenomena of the world could never lead to the conception of the soul's separateness from nature and its life. It was not from Greek science, but neither was it, as ancient tradition would have us believe, from foreign lands, that Pythagoras got his belief in the fallen nature of the soul, descended from supra-mundane heights to this earthly nature, and in its long pilgrimage through many bodies on the completion of which it is to be free at last, through purifications and initiations. He may have owed much to his travels; from his stay in Egypt, perhaps, he may (like Demokritos after him) have derived the stimulus to his mathematical discoveries and much else besides of the "learning" which Herakleitos ascribes to him. His doctrine of the soul, on the other hand, simply reproduces in essentials the fanciful ideas of the old popular psychology, as it had been enlarged and transformed by the *theologi* and the purification priests. Tradition was right in its estimation of his character, when it set him in this company and made him the pupil of Pherekydes of Syros, the *theologos*.<sup>51</sup>

It can hardly be doubted that Pythagoras himself laid the foundations of the Pythagorean science—the doctrine of the creation of the world and perhaps, too, the interpretation of

all being and becoming in the world as due to the action and relation of numbers, as the essential basis of all things—all this, at least in elementary outline, must have been handed on by him to his followers. After his death the two sides of his doctrine continued to develop for a period in loose conjunction side by side; the guidance of life by the mystical and religious philosophy (though this, indeed, was hardly capable of further development), and the scientific interest which grew into a fairly elaborate system. Indeed, with the break-up of the Pythagorean society and its bifurcation in the fifth century, the scattered members of the band now brought into touch with the scientific studies of other communities and cut off from the ideal of the Pythagorean life which could only be realized within the limits of the society, were forced to continue their scientific studies in solitude. Pythagorean science, evolving, as it did, a picture of the world as a whole, no less than Ionian physiology deprived the soul of the unique and, indeed, antagonistic relation to nature that Pythagorean theology had given it. Philolaos, conceiving it in a manner strictly conforming to the mathematical and musical theory, called the soul a *Harmony* of contrary elements united together in the body.<sup>43</sup> If, however, the soul is only a binding-together of opposites to unity and harmony, then it must, when death breaks up the conjunction of the united elements, itself pass away and perish.<sup>44</sup> It is difficult to imagine how the older Pythagorean faith in the soul as an independent being dwelling in the body and surviving it—in the immortal soul, in fact—could be accommodated to this conception. Can it be that the two conceptions were not originally intended to be brought into conjunction at all, or were not meant to exclude each other? Ancient tradition spoke of different groups among the followers of Pythagoras who had also different objects, methods, and aims of study; nor shall we be inclined to deny all credibility to this tradition when we observe how little, in fact, Pythagorean science and Pythagorean faith had to do with each other.<sup>45</sup>

And yet we have to admit that the same Philolaos, who described the soul as a harmony of its body, also spoke of the soul as an independent and imperishable being. We may well doubt whether these two contradictory utterances can really come from the same man and apply to the same object; though the same man might really speak in varying language about the one soul if he recognized different *parts* of the soul of which different truths held good; and this was, in fact, first suggested by the Pythagorean school.<sup>46</sup>



Empedokles of Akragas did not belong to the Pythagorean school (it lost its external unity in his time); but he approaches Pythagorean doctrine so closely in his opinions and teaching about the soul of man, its problems and destinies, that there can be no doubt about Pythagorean influence upon the formation of his convictions on these points. His many-sided activities also included the study of natural science and he took up the researches of the Ionic Physiologists with zeal and a marked aptitude for the observation and synthesis of natural phenomena. But the roots of his peculiar individuality—the *pathos* which moved and agitated him—lay in a practical activity far removed from scientific investigation and representing a brilliant resuscitation in a very different age of the character and practice of the *mantis*, the purification-priest and magical-physician of the sixth century. The introduction to his "Purifications"<sup>14</sup> gives a picture of his triumphal progress from city to city, crowned with ribbons and garlands, adored as a god and questioned by thousands: "Where is the road to healing?" He intends to give his disciple Pausanias the results of his own experience and to teach him all his remedies for disease and their virtues, the arts of stilling the winds and stirring them up, producing drought or rain, raising the dead from Hades.<sup>15</sup> He himself boasted of being a magician and his pupil Gorgias saw him "do magic".<sup>16</sup> Through him those efforts of the *Kathartes*, the expiation-priest and seer, which an earlier and already distant-seeming time had honoured as the highest form of wisdom, at last achieved a voice and literary expression—an expression given them with the fullest personal experience of the truth of their claims by one who was convinced of their power to control nature and sure of the godlike status of the man who had reached these almost superhuman heights of empire over nature. As a god, an immortal no longer subject to death, he passed through all the land—so Empedokles himself tells us.<sup>17</sup> He may have won credit in many places. He did not, indeed, found an ordered society of disciples and adherents, a sect: this does not seem to have been his intention. But he alone as a unique and unparalleled being, a self-confident personality of the greatest force and weight impressed himself masterfully both as mystic and politician upon the mundane affairs of his contemporaries and pointed the way beyond time and all things temporal to a blessed and divine state as the final goal of human life. He

must have made a profound impression upon the men among whom he lived,<sup>40</sup> though he disappeared from their midst like a comet, and left no permanent traces of his presence behind him. Many legends still witness to the astonishment that his appearance among men provoked, more especially those legends that in varying form related his end.<sup>41</sup> They are all expressions of the same belief: that he, as his own verses had foretold, in his departure did not have to suffer death; he had vanished, "translated" body and soul together to an everlasting divine life, as once Menelaos had been and so many great figures of the ancient days, and even a few Heroes of more recent times.<sup>42</sup> Once more the ancient conception shows in this story that it still lives on: immortal life can only be obtained by undissolved union of the psyche with its body. Such a legend hardly did justice to Empedokles' own idea. When he claimed to be a god who would never die he certainly did not mean that his psyche would remain for ever bound to his body. On the contrary, he thought that in "death", as men<sup>43</sup> call it, it would be freed from this last corporeal envelope<sup>44</sup> and never again have to enter into a body, but would live for ever in freedom and divinity. His conception of the conscious after-life of the psyche was as different as it was possible for it to be from the Homeric conception on which that translation legend was based.

Empedokles united in his own person to an astonishing degree the most sober attempts at a study of nature that was scientific according to its lights, and quite irrational beliefs and theological speculations. Occasionally the scientific impulse passes over to influence even the world of his beliefs;<sup>45</sup> but as a rule theology and natural science exist side by side in his mind quite independently. As a physiologist he inherited the already extensive and variously developed stock of ideas belonging to the older generations of inquirers and thinkers. He himself was able to unite conceptions derived from the most different sources into an original whole that satisfied himself at least. Becoming and passing-away, all qualitative change, were denied by him as by the Eleatics, but the permanent substance of Being is for him no single indivisible unity. There are four "roots" of things, the four bodies of elements, which in this division are for the first time clearly distinguished. It is the mixture and separation of the essentially indivisible elements that cause the appearance of becoming and perishing; and those two processes are caused by the two forces—clearly distinguished from the elements—of attraction and repulsion.

Love and Hate, which in the creative process struggle and in turn overmaster each other until at last, in the final victory of one of the two forces, all things are either united or divided; in either case an organic world ceases to exist. The present state of the universe is one in which "Love", the tendency to amalgamation of differences, is prevailing; when this tendency is completed, there will be an absolute levelling-out of all distinction; a result which Empedokles, a quietist in his scientific studies as well, regards as the most desirable end.

In this world, then, that experiences only mechanical movement and change, and from whose evolution Empedokles by an ingenious turn is able to exclude all idea of purpose, there are also to be found souls; or rather psychical powers which grow up entirely within it. Sense-perception is expressly distinguished from the capacity of thought by Empedokles.<sup>66</sup> The former takes place when each of the elements, from the mixture of which the perceiving being has its origin, comes into contact with, and so becomes aware of, the same elements in the object perceived, through the "passages" that connect the interior of the body with the exterior.<sup>67</sup> "Thinking" has its seat in the heart's blood, where the elements and their powers are mixed most equally. Or rather this blood actually is thinking and the power of thought; <sup>68</sup> the material substance and its vital functions thus also for Empedokles completely coincide. Plainly, nothing in the nature of a permanent substantial "soul" is here intended by the thinking-power of the "mind", but rather a capacity of bringing together and unifying the individual sense-activities; <sup>69</sup> a capacity no less than the individual powers of sensation bound up with the elements, the senses, and the body.<sup>70</sup> With the varying constitution of the body, they too vary.<sup>71</sup> Both capacities, that of sense-perception, and that of thought, as vital expressions of the matter that is combined together in the organic creature, are present in all organisms; in men, in beasts, and even in plants.<sup>72</sup>

If we give the name of "soul" <sup>73</sup> to the sum of these psychical powers—a name generally reserved for the common permanent substratum of the changing psychical activities—we cannot avoid concluding, in accordance with the logic of this philosopher, that the "soul" must be perishable. With the death and destruction of the individual the elementary parts that go to compose him are disunited, and the soul which in this case is nothing but the highest resultant of that composition, must itself disappear with their dissolution—as it had come into being with their union.<sup>74</sup>

It might seem as if Empedokles himself was as far as possible removed from drawing such conclusions from his own premises. No one speaks more distinctly and forcibly of the spiritual, individual beings that dwell in men and in other creatures of nature as well. They are regarded by him as Daimones fallen to the corporeal world, who have to pass through many different forms of life till they may at last hope for release.

In the introduction to his poem on Nature, he describes, from his own experience, and the information of the Daimones who had once led his soul down to this earthly Vale of Grief,<sup>72</sup> how by an ancient decree of the gods and the compulsion of Necessity, every daimon that has "polluted" itself by drinking the blood or eating the flesh of living beings,<sup>74</sup> or has broken its oath,<sup>77</sup> is banished for a long period<sup>78</sup> from the company of the blessed. It is thrust down to the "Meadow of Disaster", into the realm of contradiction,<sup>79</sup> the cave of misery upon this earth, and must now wander through many "painful ways of life"<sup>80</sup> in changing incarnations. "Thus, I myself was once a boy and also a maiden, a bush, a bird, and a voiceless fish in the salty flood" (ll. 11, 12 = fr. 117). This daimon that in expiation of its crime must wander through the forms of men, beasts, and even plants, is evidently no other than what popular speech and that of theologians as well called the "psyche", the soul-spirit.<sup>81</sup> In all essentials though perhaps in clearer language, Empedokles merely repeated<sup>82</sup> what the adherents of the doctrine of Transmigration had long told of its divine origin, its fall and penal banishment in earthly bodies. So, too, when as teacher of the means that bring salvation, he tells how more gracious forms and conditions of life may be obtained in the series of births, till at last complete release from rebirth is achieved<sup>83</sup> Empedokles follows in the footsteps of the purification-priests and *theologi* of old. It is a matter of keeping the daimon within us free from the pollutions that bind it fast to the earthly life. To this end the methods of religious purification are most efficacious; Empedokles respects them quite as much as did the old *Kathartai*. It is necessary to keep the internal daimon far removed from every kind of "sin",<sup>84</sup> more particularly from the drinking of blood and the eating of meat which must necessarily involve the murder of kinsmen daimones which are dwelling in the slaughtered beasts.<sup>85</sup> By purification and asceticism (which here again dispenses with a positive form of morality aimed at reforming the man) a gradual process to purer and better births is achieved;<sup>86</sup> in the end the persons thus reborn in a purified condition

become seers, poets, doctors, and are the leaders of mankind.<sup>87</sup> Finally, when they have emerged superior even to these highest steps of earthly life, they return to the other immortals, and become themselves gods released from human misery, escaping death, and now indestructible.<sup>88</sup> Empedokles regards himself as one who has reached the last stage,<sup>89</sup> and points out to others the way up to it.

Between what Empedokles the mystic here tells us of the soul that was once living its divine life, but has since been plunged into the world of the elements, though it is not for ever bound to them; and what Empedokles the physiologist teaches of the psychical powers that dwell in the elements and are bound to the body that is composed of the elements and perish with their dissolution, there seems to be a hopeless contradiction. And yet if we are to grasp the whole truth of what Empedokles means, we must neither leave on one side half of what he says,<sup>90</sup> nor yet by well-meaning interpretation seek to bring the philosopher into harmony with himself,<sup>91</sup> when he clearly speaks with two different voices. The two voices say different things, and yet in the mind of Empedokles, there is no contradiction in what they say, for they are dealing with totally distinct objects. The psychical powers and faculties of feeling and perception which are functions of matter, born in matter, and determined by it, together with the thinking faculty that is no other than the heart's blood of men—these neither make up the character and content of that soul-spirit which dwells in men, beasts, and flowers, nor are they expressions of its activity. They are entirely bound up with the elements and their combination, and in man they are joined to the body and its organs; they are the powers and faculties of this body, and not of a special and invisible entity, the soul. The soul-daimon is not made out of the elements, nor is it for ever chained to them. It enters as a stranger into this world in which the only permanent component parts are<sup>92</sup> the four elements, and the two forces of Love and Hate; and it enters it from another world, the world of gods and spirits, to its detriment; the elements cast it about from one to another "and they all hate it" (*fr.* 116, 12, l. 35 M.). This living soul, with its independent existence, that thus enters into foreign and hostile surroundings, only enters into such earthly creatures as already possess senses, feeling and perception, together with reason or the faculty of thinking, the crowning manifestation of their material union. It is, however, as little identical with these psychical faculties as it is with the mixture of elementary matter or, in

the case of men, with the heart's blood. It exists, unmixed and incapable of mixture, *alongside* the body and its faculties which indeed only have life—"what men call life"—(*fr.* 15, 2, l. 117 M.) when united with it. When they are separated from it they fall into dissolution; not so the soul, which continues its journey and visits other dwelling places, and does not share in their dissolution.

This peculiar dualistic doctrine reflects the two sides of Empedokles' own mental activity. He probably intended in this way to unite the views of both the physiologists and the theologians. To the Greeks, such a twofold division of the inner life may have seemed less surprising than it does to us. The conception of a "soul" that as an independent, unique, and self-contained spiritual being dwells within the body, while the body does not receive its intellectual faculties of perceiving, feeling, willing and thinking from the soul, but exercises these by its own power—this conception agrees at bottom with the ideas of popular psychology that are as a rule described or implied in the Homeric poems.<sup>53</sup> The only difference is that these ideas of poet and populace are elaborated and defined by the speculations of theologians and philosophers. How deeply impressed upon the Greek mind such conceptions, derived eventually from Homer, actually were, can be measured by the fact that a conception of the twofold origin of psychic activity, its twofold nature and sphere of action, closely related to that of Empedokles, is continually recurring in more advanced stages of philosophy. It occurs not merely in Plato, but even in Aristotle, who in addition to the "soul" that directs and expresses itself in the physico-organic nature of man, recognizes another being of divine descent that enters into man "from without", the "mind" (*νοῦς*) which is separable both from the soul and from the body, and is alone destined to survive the death of the man to which it was assigned.<sup>54</sup> In the doctrine of Empedokles, too, it is a stranger-guest from the distant land of gods that enters into man to give him a soul. This being is indeed far below the "mind" of Aristotle in philosophic importance; nevertheless, in the introduction of this Stranger into the world composed of the elements and vital faculties, a sense of the absolute uniqueness of spirit, its unlikeness to everything material, its essential distinctness from matter, finds expression, if only in a limited theological fashion.

In the light of such theological considerations, the soul seems also to Empedokles something essentially distinct from its prototype, the Homeric psyche, which after its separation.

from the body passes to the twilight of a shadowy dream-life. To him, the soul is of divine race, too noble for this world of visibility, and only when it escapes from this world does it seem to him to begin its real and full life. Though confined within the body, it has its separate existence there; it has no concern with the everyday business of perception and sensation—not even with that of thinking, which is nothing else but the heart's blood. But it is active in the "higher" mode of knowledge, in ecstatic inspiration;<sup>86</sup> to it alone belongs the profound insight of the philosopher who is enabled to pass beyond the limits of mere experience and sense-perception, and behold the totality of the universe in its true nature.<sup>87</sup> To it alone apply all the requirements of ethical and religious systems—duties in this higher sense belong only to the soul; it is something in the nature of a "conscience". Its highest duty is to free itself from the unhallowed union with the body, and the elements of this world; the rules of purification and asceticism refer solely to it.

Between this soul-daimon that yearns after its divine home, and the world of the elements, there exists no inward bond or necessary connexion. And yet, since they have become implicated in each other's existence, a certain parallelism exists between them in character and destiny. In the mechanically moved world, too, the separate and particular phenomena tend back again towards their starting point, the inwardly coherent Unity from which they once took their origin. A day will come when, after all struggle has been done away, "Love" alone will have absolute rule; and this means for the poet—who in his description even of this world of mechanical attraction and repulsion interpolates half-realized ethical concepts<sup>88</sup>—a state of absolute goodness and happiness. If there is no longer any world, then, until another one is created, no soul-daimon can be bound any more to the individual organisms of a world. Have they then all returned to the blessed communion of the immortal gods? It appears that not even the gods and daimones (and so not the spirits enclosed in world as "souls") are regarded by Empedokles as having everlasting life. "Long-living" is the name he repeatedly applies to them; he never distinctly ascribes eternal life to them.<sup>89</sup> They, too, shall for a period enjoy "the happiness of profoundest peace" until, just as the elements and forces are drawn into the unity of the Sphairos, they, too, come together in the unity of the godlike Universal Mind, thence at a new world-creation to appear once more as individual separate being.<sup>90</sup>

Empedokles took a fully developed "hylozoic" system (which in itself, with its introduction of the motive forces of Conflict and Love, already betrayed a latent dualism) and attempted to combine with it an extreme form of spiritualist teaching. His attempt illustrates very clearly the observation that a philosophic science of nature in itself could never lead to the establishment of the axiom that the individual "soul" after its separation from the body continues to exist, still less that it is indestructible. Any one who still felt it necessary to assert that axiom could find support for it only by allowing physiology to be either overwhelmed by theological speculation, or else supplemented by it in the manner attempted by Empedokles.

Such an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable can have found few adherents among those who were accessible to scientific ideas, nor was it likely to tempt the physiological philosophy from the path which it had hitherto followed. Soon after Empedokles, and in essentials hardly influenced by him, Anaxagoras and Demokritos developed those doctrinal systems which were the last products of the independent speculation of Ionia. Demokritos was the founder and completer of the atomic doctrine according to which there exist "in reality" only the indivisible, minutest material bodies—which, while qualitatively indistinguishable, yet differ in shape, position, and arrangement in space as well as in bulk and weight—and empty space. He was obliged to seek for the "soul" (which to the materialist may easily present itself as being a separate, substantial, self-existent thing) among those minutest bodies out of which the whole fabric of the world of appearance is built up. The soul is that which confers movement upon the inherently motionless collections of bodies. It is composed of the round and smooth atoms which, in the universal condition of unrest that keeps all the atoms in agitation, are the most easily moved, for they offer least resistance to change of position, and can most easily penetrate others. These atoms compose fire and the soul. It is the soul-atom—one being inserted between every two of the other atoms<sup>100</sup>—which gives these their movement; and it is from all the soul-atoms uniformly disposed throughout the whole body that the body gets its movement, whence also (though it must be admitted in an unintelligible manner) comes the power of perception, which equally depends on movement, and the thought arising thence, of this same body.



During the life-time of the individual body, the continuance of the soul-atoms is secured by the breathing which continually replaces the smooth soul-particles that are as continually being expelled from the whole atom-complex by the pressure of the surrounding atmosphere. The breathing is always drawing in fresh soul-stuff from the air which is full of floating soul-atoms, and supplies it to the body. A time comes, however, when the breathing refuses this function, and death occurs, which is simply the insufficient supply of these moving and animating atoms.<sup>140</sup> With the coming of death, there is an end to the union of the atoms, whose amalgamation had formed the particular living organism. Neither the soul-atoms nor any of the other atoms are destroyed; they do not alter in kind; but from the loose state of aggregation which even in the living body hardly amounted to an absolute unity to which a single common name could be applied—from this they now escape entirely. It is scarcely possible to see how, on this view of what essentially constitutes mental and vital phenomena, as a mere resultant of the separate and individual activities of individual and disconnected bodies, the unity of the living organism and the spiritual entity could ever come into being. It is even more evident that a unified "soul" could not possibly continue to exist after the dissolution which takes place at death of the atoms that in their union made up the organism. And, in fact, the soul-atoms disperse;<sup>141</sup> they return whence they came into the restless mass of world-stuff. The human individual, in this view of the case, perishes in death entirely.<sup>142</sup> The materials out of which he was shaped and composed are indestructible, and reserved for future construction; but his personality—the invisible personality, the "soul", just as much as the visible—has but a single existence strictly limited to its one appearance in time. The continued existence of the soul after death, an immortality in whatever manner the thing may be conceived, is here for the first time in the history of Greek thought, expressly denied. The Atomist, with the candid precision that distinguishes him, draws the necessary consequences of his premises.

Anaxagoras strikes out a path almost directly opposed to this materialist doctrine. As the first decisive and conscious dualist among Greek philosophers, he takes the material substratum of being, the inexhaustible many of distinctly characterized and distinctly separate "Seeds" of things—which are nevertheless indistinguishably intermingled with each other—and sets over against them a force which he

obviously did not mean to derive from them, to which he gives a name usually attached to the faculty of thought in man, and which in any case he thought of as analogous to that faculty.<sup>104</sup> This "Mind", simple, unmixed and unchangeable, is given such titles and adjectives that it is impossible to mistake the effort of Anaxagoras to think of it as something distinct from everything material, and in fact, absolutely immaterial and incorporeal.<sup>105</sup> It is at once power of thought and force of will; at the creation of the world it gives the first circular impulse to the intrinsically motionless lump of matter; the creation of distinct forms in accordance with a conscious purpose is begun by it—though the carrying out of this purpose is indeed to be completed in accordance with pure mechanical laws without the interference of "Mind". This "Mind" that plans and orders but does not make the world, that with the conscious insight of its omniscient wisdom<sup>106</sup> influences matter without being influenced in turn, that moves without being moved;<sup>107</sup> set over against the multiplicity of things as an indivisible unity,<sup>108</sup> "having nothing in common with anything outside itself"<sup>109</sup> but entirely self-contained<sup>110</sup>—how shall we conceive of it otherwise than as an almost personified, transcendent divine power confronting the world of matter as something foreign to it, ruling the world from without by magical, not mechanical, means?

But this transcendent is also completely immanent. Wherever in this world life and independent movement are found, there, too, the mind as the source of life and movement must be active. "Mind rules all that has soul" says Anaxagoras.<sup>111</sup> In saying this he has not indeed asserted the presence of "Mind" within the animated being nor yet identity of nature as between soul and mind. But when we hear that Mind "goes through all things,"<sup>112</sup> that in everything there is a part of all things, except of mind, and in some things of mind also",<sup>113</sup> that must imply the penetration of many associations of matter by mind (hardly any longer to be thought of as immaterial) whereby the previously asserted transcendency of mind seems to be given up. At any rate, as such associations in which is "Mind", living and animated beings are regarded. It is in them that "Mind" is present in continual, equal creativeness, though in different degrees;<sup>114</sup> indeed, Mind is or constitutes that very thing that we call the "soul" of a living being.<sup>115</sup> Among these living beings, which exist upon the moon,<sup>116</sup> as well as on earth, are not only men and beasts, but also plants.<sup>117</sup> In all these "Mind" is active; without losing any of its purity or unity, it is mixed with them,<sup>118</sup>

How we are to conceive the omnipotent Mind, whose oneness and self-containedness has been so emphatically asserted, as nevertheless entering simultaneously into the infinity of individual being—that certainly remains obscure. It is clear, however, that having thus derived all animated being from the single World-Mind, Anaxagoras could not speak of the continued existence of individual, self-existent "souls" after the dissolution of the material concretions in which moving and animating "soul-force" had once lived. The view is definitely ascribed to him that separation from the body is also "the soul's death".<sup>11</sup> Nothing, indeed, of the component parts that belong to the whole perishes, and no change in its nature takes place. So "Mind", whose manifestations the "souls" were, maintains itself unaltered and undiminished; but after the dissolution of the united, which "the Hellenes" regard as its destruction,<sup>12</sup> though the component parts of the individual remain, yet not *that* particular mixture in which the peculiarity of the individual was inherent—"Mind" remains, but not the soul . . .

Thus, the first distinct separation of the intellectual thinking principle from the material substance with which it was—not fused, much less identified, but—contrasted in sovereignty and independence, did not lead to the recognition of the indestructibility of the individual spirit.

Shall we say that the mental, self-moved, life-giving principle, whether set over against the material and corporeal or indivisibly united with it, is for the physiologist always something universal—that the essentially real is impersonal? For him the individual, the personality conscious of itself and of the outer world, can be nothing but a manifestation of the universal, whether the latter is regarded as fixed and at rest, or as a living process that untiringly develops itself, recruits itself, and reconstructs itself in ever renewed creations. The only permanent, unchanging reality is the universal, the essential and fundamentally real Nature which appears in all individual things, speaks out of their mouth, and, in reality, only works and lives in them. The individual human soul has its indestructibility only in its identity with the universal that represents itself in it. The individual forms of "appearance", having no independence of their own, cannot permanently abide.

The view that imperishable life belongs to the individual soul could only be reached by a line of thought that took as a fact and held fast to it as something given that the individual spirit is a reality. (Its appearance and disappearance in the

midst of the one universe was indeed for the physiologists the true miracle, the problem never satisfactorily solved.) Such a belief in individuality, the belief in an independently existent individual substance that had never had a beginning and could therefore never have an end, was the contribution, however fancifully it might be expressed, of the theologians and the mystics. For them immortality, the power of substantive duration unlimited by time, was extended also to include the individual. The individual soul is for them a self-existent, individual, divine being, indestructible because it is divine.

Greek philosophy underwent many changes in the course of its speculations during the following ages; but exactly in proportion as it, to a greater or lesser degree, accepted theological elements or on the other hand rejected such elements, did it give fundamental support to the view of the soul's immortality, or grudgingly admit it, or absolutely reject it.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER XI

<sup>1</sup>  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  = "life," "concept of life," in Homer (though not indeed used to denote psychical powers during lifetime): see above, pp. 30, 31. So, too, occasionally in the remains of the Iambi and Elegiac poets of the earliest period: Archil. 23; Tyrt. 10, 14; 11, 5; Sol. 13, 46; Thgn. 508 f., 790; (Hippoc. 43, 1?).  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  = "life" in the proverbial phrase  $\kappa\alpha\iota \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma \tau\alpha\chi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$  (see Wiescl. and Valck. on Hdt. vii, 57; Jacobs on Ach. Tat., p. 696).  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  frequently = "life" in the idiom of the Attic orators (see Meurs. *Jahrb. f. Philol.* 1889, p. 603).

<sup>2</sup> See above, pp. 8, 30. Even the Homeric poems in one case show a slight uncertainty of language and of psychological conception when they use  $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ , the highest and most general of the powers of life dwelling within the visible and living man, in the sense of  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ , the double of the man who dwells as a lodger in his body, separate and taking no part in the ordinary business of his life. The  $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$  (see above, chap. i, n. 57) is active during the man's lifetime, is enclosed in the midriff ( $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\varsigma \psi\alpha\sigma\iota \theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ ) and when that is overtaken by death is itself overwhelmed ( $\Psi$  104): on the arrival of death it leaves the body and perishes—while the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  flies away intact. The distinction is clearly maintained, e.g. in  $\lambda$  220 f.: "fire destroys the body"  $\delta\alpha\iota \mu\epsilon\tau \theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma \lambda\iota\gamma \lambda\acute{\alpha}\nu' \theta\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota \theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ ,  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta \delta' \eta\mu\epsilon\tau \theta\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota \delta\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\mu\acute{o}\varsigma \nu\epsilon\kappa\acute{\rho}\alpha\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ .  $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$  and  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  therefore leave the body of the slain man simultaneously ( $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma \kappa\alpha\iota \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma \kappa\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\theta\acute{\alpha}\iota\varsigma$ ,  $\Lambda$  334,  $\phi$  154); but in very different ways. The relation between them becomes, however, interchangeability in the single case when it is said of the  $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$  that it in death will enter  $\delta\alpha\iota \mu\epsilon\tau \theta\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota \theta\epsilon\mu\alpha\varsigma$  "Aides' house— $\mathcal{H}$  131: in reality this could only be said of that very different being, the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ . (When a fainting-fit has passed over we do indeed hear, not that the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ —though this it was that had left the man: see above, chap. i, n. 8—but that  $\delta\epsilon \psi\alpha\sigma\iota \theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma \delta\epsilon\psi\theta\eta$ ,  $\chi$  475,  $\epsilon$  450, = 349. This, however, is not a case of  $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$  instead of  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ , but  $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$  is merely an abbreviated form of the whole statement which would be in full:  $\delta\alpha\iota \theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$  and  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  have now returned into the man: cf.  $\mathcal{H}$  606. It is a kind of synecdoche.) In the line  $\mathcal{H}$  131 we really, then, do have  $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$  instead of  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ , either as the result of a misunderstanding of the real meaning of the two words or merely through an oversight. But never (and this is the most essential point) do we have a case in Homer of the opposite exchange of significance: i.e. of  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  used in the sense  $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$  ( $\acute{\alpha}\delta\alpha\varsigma$ ,  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\tau\alpha\varsigma$ ,  $\tau\epsilon\mu\acute{\nu}\alpha\varsigma$ , etc.), as meaning the mental power and its activity in the living and waking man. Just this, however, and more than this, the sum and substance of all the mental powers in general, is what the word  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  means in the language of the philosophers (except those affected by religious tendencies). They left out of account altogether that spiritual double of mankind whom the popular psychology called the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ , and were thus free to use the word to express the whole psychical content of the human individual. From the fifth century onwards we find the word  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  used commonly, and even regularly, in this sense in the vocabulary of non-philosophical poets and prose writers. Only theologians and poets, or philosophers of a theological tendency, continued to use the

word in its ancient and primitive sense. Indeed, when the separation of a spiritual being from the body of a man in death was being spoken of, *ψυχή* always continued to be the proper word for this sense even in popular language. (An extremely rare example of *θυμὸς* in this sense, comparable with E 131, is [Arist.] *Popl.* 81 Bgk.: *θυμὸν . . . αἰθέρα λαμπρὸν ἔχει*. In the corresponding epigram, *Epigr. Gr.* 41, we have *ψυχήν*.)

<sup>1</sup> *ἄντα*, among them Chirilos of Samos: D.L. i, 24 (from Favorinus): *Voss.*, i, p. 1, 21.

<sup>2</sup> Arist., *An.* i, 2, p. 405a, 20 f. "Aristotle and Hippias" ap. D.L. i, 24: *Voss.*, p. 2, 1. *τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἔχειν* *ἴσα*, Dor. 435a, 8, b, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Metaphorical language: *θυμὸς φῶστος νόστος ὡς ἄνθρωπος* *ἔχειν* *ἔσθαι*. Arist., *An.* i, 5, p. 412a, 8. *τὸν πόντον (ἐμφύοντα) διαμένον ὡς ἄνθρωπος*, D.L. i, 27; Dor. 301b, 2; *Voss.*, p. 2, 20. Pl., *Lg.* 800 B, is an allusion to the *θεὸς ὡς ἄνθρωπος* (as Kriechbaum, *Thael. Lehr. d. Gr. Denker*, p. 37). There is perhaps a half-mocking reference to the words in the saying attributed by anecdotal tradition to Herakleitos: *ἔσθαι καὶ ἑναισθῆναι θεῷ* (i.e. in his own hearth) Arist., *P.A.* i, 5, p. 643a, 17 ff. Hence Herakleitos himself was credited with the opinion of Thales in slightly altered form: *πάντα ψυχῶν ἔσθαι καὶ θυμώδους ὡς ἄνθρωπος*, D.L. ix, 7 (*Voss.*, p. 68, 29), in the first (and valuable) of the two lists of the doctrines of Herakl. there given.

<sup>4</sup> Arist., *Phys.* 3, 4, p. 203b, 10-14. Dor. 539, 18. *Voss.*, p. 17, 35.

<sup>5</sup> Anaximander, fr. 2 Mull. *Voss.*, p. 15, 28. That Anaximander declared the soul to be "like air" is an erroneous statement of Theophrast.: see Diels, Dor. 367b, 10 (*Voss.* 21, 5).

<sup>6</sup> Anaximenes in Dor. 278a, 12 ff.; b, 8 ff. fr. 2 Diels.

<sup>7</sup> Anaxim. *κατὰ τὴν δόξαν θεός*, i.e. it has divine power: Dor. 302b, 5; 331a, 17, b, 1-2. *Voss.* 24, 18. This at least is to be understood to the same sense in which Anaximander is said to have called *τὸ ἀείρον*, *τὸ αἶθρ* (Arist., *Phys.* 3, 4, p. 203b, 13; *Voss.*, p. 17, 35).

<sup>8</sup> *τὸ αἶθρ* *ἔσθαι*, fr. 1 (Byw.); 80 (Diels).

<sup>9</sup> Arist., *An.* i, 2, p. 405a, 25 ff. *Voss.* 74, 30. Hkl. is also meant in p. 405a, 5. Dor. 471, 2 (Arius Didymus): 368a, 3 ff.

<sup>10</sup> Arist., p. 405a, 25 ff. Hkl. fr. 68 (38 D.).

<sup>11</sup> S.E., *M.* 7, 127, 129-31. *Voss.* 75, 14 ff.

<sup>12</sup> *ὁ θεός* is both the Universal Fire, that transforms itself into the world, and at the same time its power (and *λόγος*: fr. 2 [1], 82 [3]): fr. 36 (87). *τὸ πᾶν θεὸς ἐνείηκεν*, Herakl.: Cl. Al., *Prot.* 5, 64, p. 55 P. [*Voss.* n. 8 A B]. *πᾶν νοεῖν τὸν θεόν* (i.e. *ἐφ' ἑστέφει*), Hippol., *RH.* i, 4, p. 10, 57 Mull.—"Zens" as metaphor for this universal fire (hence *αὐτὸς ἴσθης*: cf. 194a), the "only wise one": fr. 65 (32).

<sup>13</sup> *ἡ ἐννοεσθῆναι τοῖς φρονέουσιν νοούμενη ἀπὸ τοῦ νοεῖντος νοῖα* (νοεῖν = the universal Fire) is said of the soul and its reasoning faculty ap. S.E., *M.* vii, 130; *Voss.*, p. 75, 19; (cf. *ἐσπερὶ καὶ νοῖα διὰ τὸν φρονέοντα*, Plu., *Is. d. O.* 77, p. 382 B). This is fully Heraklitean in thought if not also in actual form of expression.

<sup>14</sup> That Herakleitos drew the conclusions affecting also the "Soul"—the spiritual man—freely paraphrased in the text, arising necessarily out of his doctrine of the perpetual change in the material substance that excludes all possibility of lasting self-identity in any object (fr. 60, 41, 42, 81 = 91, 12, 49 a), is proved especially by the words of Plutarch in the eighteenth chapter of his treatise *de E Delph.* p. 362—a chapter which is entirely based on Herakleitos, who is twice actually cited in it. Not only does *ὁ νόος διὰ τὴν τὸν ἀκαταστάτον ἀλλ.*, but *ὁ γῆς (διδρασκῶν) ἐκ τὸν νοῦμον νόοντες*, *ὁ δὲ νοῦμον ἐκ τὸν*

αἴθερ ἐνοεργεῖται. μὴν δ' οὐδέτις, οὐδ' ἕτερος ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ πανόρμητος πολλοὶ  
 αὐτὸ το γέννησθαι ἐπὶ : cf. *Cour. ad Apoll.* 10, p. 106 E. Herakl. is  
 also the origin of what is said in Plato, *Smp.* 207 D ff.: each man is  
 only apparently one and the same; in reality, even while he is still  
 alive, "he continually suffers a new and different man to take the  
 place of the old and departing one"—and this applies, just as much to  
 the soul as to the body. (Only from the standpoint of Heraclidean  
 doctrine—here adopted in passing by Plato as suiting his chosen  
 method of argument—is the conclusion he reaches justified: the  
 conclusion is that it is only by the perpetual substitution of a new  
 being like the old one that man has immortality, and not by the eternal  
 preservation of his own proper being: for this advantage belongs  
 peculiarly to the divine. This, of course, cannot possibly be under-  
 stood as the serious teaching of Plato himself.)—The Heraclidean denial  
 of personal identity in men is alluded to by Epicharmos (for a pseudo-  
 Ep. ?) ap. D.L. iii, 11, ll. 13-18; *l'ouv.*, p. 118-19 (cf. Wytt. ad *Plu.*,  
*Ser. Num.* V, 859 A = vii, p. 397 f. Ox.; Bernays, *RA*, *Mus.* viii,  
 280 ff.); and cf. *Sen.*, *Ep.* 56, 23.—It is instructive to compare with  
 Herakl.'s doctrine of the instability of the psychic complex the very  
 similar theory of the influx and reflux of the elements of the "soul"  
 as described in the Indian doctrine of Jainism. The soul (in the Indian  
 doctrine) continually transforms, re-arranges, and restores itself,  
 just like the body. See Deussen, *System d. Vedānta*, 330.

<sup>12</sup> The apparently contradictory statement *ψυχῶν εἴδη, μὴ  
 ἴδιαι, ὅππῃς γενέσθαι* ap. Porph., *Ant. Nymph.* 10 (72 By., 77 D.),  
 does not represent the words or real opinion of Hkl., but only of  
 Numenius (fr. 35 Thedinga) arbitrary and personal interpretation  
 of Hkl. doctrine (see Gompertz in *Sitzb. d. Wien. Ak.* 113, 1015 ff.).

<sup>13</sup> A doctrine of transmigration of souls is attributed to Hkl. by  
 Schuster, *Heraclit*, p. 174 ff. (1873). The utterances of Heraclitus

"... quoted to prove this thesis (fr. 78, 67, 123 = 88, 92, 83) do  
 not in kind and there is not the slightest  
 doctrinal system upon which a theory  
 of the transmigration of the soul might be founded.

<sup>14</sup> To prove that Heraclitus spoke of a continuation of the life of  
 the individual soul after its separation from the body, appeal is made  
 partly to the statements of later philosophers, partly to actual utterances  
 of Herakl. (cf. in particular Zeller, *Greek Phil. to Soc.* ii, 88; Pfleiderer,  
*Philos. d. Heraklit im Lichte der Mysterienidee*, p. 214 ff.). Platonist  
 philosophers do, of course, attribute to Heraclitus a doctrine of the  
 soul which taught the pre-existence of the individual soul, "its fall in  
 birth," and its departure into a separate life of its own after death  
 (cf. Numenius ap. Porph., *Ant.* 10; Iamb., ap. Stob., *Ecl.* i, 375, 7;  
 38, 21 ff. W.; Aen. Gaz., *Taphr.*, pp. 5, 7 Boiss.). These accounts,  
 however, are plainly but private and arbitrary interpretations of  
 Heraclidean sayings (*παραβλήσεις δευτέρων, ἀπὸ τῶν δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν  
 ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ*) in the light of the conceptions current among  
 those philosophers themselves; they are homiletic, fancifully conceived  
 expositions of very short and ambiguous texts, and can so much the less  
 serve as witnesses of Heraclitus' real opinions since Plotinus (6, 6, 1)  
 openly admits that Herakl. in this matter has omitted οὐδὲν καὶ  
 οὐδὲν τὸν λόγον. Others read into certain Heraclidean utterances  
 the Orphic doctrine of *σῶμα-σῶμα*, the entombment of the soul in  
 the body (Philo, *Leg. Alleg.* i, 33, i, p. 45 M.; S.E., P. iii, 230), which  
 cannot, however, be seriously supposed to be his teaching. The soul  
 did not for Hkl., any more than for the Pythagoreans or Platonics,

come into existence at birth (substantially) out of nothing (which was the popular idea); it rather, as a portion of the universal fire (the universal psyche) is in existence from eternity. But it certainly does not follow, because later writers insisted on finding in him the idea so familiar to themselves, that Hkl. himself accepted the pre-existence of disembodied separate souls possessing complete and absolute individuality. A few enigmatic and highly picturesque expressions—typical of this philosopher's favourite manner of expressing abstract ideas by clothing them in symbolic imagery—might tempt to such an interpretation. ἀθάνατοι θυγατρὶ θυγατρὶ ἀθάνατοι, ζωὴς τὰς ἐκείνων ἀθανάτων τὰς ἐκείνων βίαν νεότητος (fr. 67 = 62)—that certainly does sound as if Hkl. had meant to speak of the entrance into the human life of individual divine beings (and this was simply substituted in inaccurate quotations of the saying: θεοὶ θυγατρὶ, ἀθανάτων ἀθάνατον, etc.; cf. Bernays, *Herakleitos Briefe*, 39 ff.). And yet Heraclitists can only have meant, in conformity with his whole position, that eternal and perishable, divine and human are alike and interchangeable; he has for the moment personified τὰ θεῶν (also called εἰσέ; fr. 36 = 67; cf. fr. 61 = 102) as individual ἀθάνατοι, but he only means what he says in another place: νεῖρε τὸ ζῶν καὶ νεότης (fr. 78 = 68), βίη and ἀθανάτων are the same (fr. 66 = 46). It seems to me impossible to extract from these words of this 67th fragment (62nd), or from no. 44 (= 53), a doctrine of the ascent to divinity of special great men (with Gomperz, *Silb. Wien. Ak.* 1886, p. 1010, 1041 f.). Nor would anything be asserted by such a doctrine about the immortality of such men. The striking phrase ἀθάνατον μὲν νεότητος ἀθανάτων οὐκ ἔστιν (fr. 122 = 27) is certainly understood by Cl. Al. as referring to the punishment of the soul after death. But the same Cl. Al., *Str.* 9. v. p. 649 P., is capable of explaining the Heraclitean ἀθάνατος (in which Heracl. actually speaks of a *spino* by fire: fr. 28 = 66) as a τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἀθανάτων. In fact, he is giving to statements torn from their context a meaning that accords with his own knowledge and comprehension. The same sentence (fr. 122 = 27) is given a quite different and consolatory sense by Plu. ap. Stob., *Fl.* 120, 8 ff.; cf. Schuster, *Heraklit*, p. 190, n. 1. Heracl. himself need have meant nothing more than the perpetual process of change that "awaits men after death".—Other utterances are no more conclusive for a doctrine of immortality in Hkl. (fr. 7 = 18 belongs to quite another context). "Those who have fallen in war are honoured both by gods (whose existence was not denied by Hkl. nor was it necessary that he should) and men," fr. 102 = 24; that their reward was anything else but same—for example, blessed immortality—is not suggested even by Cl. Al. (*Str.* iv, 16, p. 571 P.), and is certainly not to be extracted from H.'s words, fr. 126 = 5 (the fool) οὐκ ἔστιν ἀθάνατος ἀλλὰ εἰς τὸν αἶον αἰὶνός ἐστιν simply shows that Hkl. did not share the popular ideas about gods and Heroes, but supplies nothing positive.—In fr. 38 = 98 we have αἱ ψαλαὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἔστιν. Are we really to deduce from this that Heracl. believed in a regular Homeric Hades? ἔστιν is a metaphorical expression for the opposite of the life on earth (just as it is used metaphorically for the opp. of *φύσις* by the Heraclitean [Hippocr.] *de victu*, I, 4, p. 632 Kühn = vi, 476 Lit.). For the souls ἔστιν means the *ἐκείνη αἰών* and the sense of the dictum is: after disappearing in death the souls when they have travelled on the way downwards through water and earth will at last rise up again through water, and drawing in to themselves pure, dry "fire" will become "souls" again. (ἀθάνατος is remarkable



but not to be altered. *doulos* Pöschger: but the connexion in which Pln. quotes the saying of Herakl. (Fec. O. L. xviii, p. 843 E) shows that there is no reference to the purification of the soul in Hades, but merely of their nourishment and strengthening by the *drachmas* of the fiery ether: cf. also S.E., M. ix, 73, following Pseudo-Pln. This *drachmē*—and the becoming “fiery” again—is what Hkl. calls *drachmē*.—From the hopelessly corrupt fr. 123 = 83 nothing intelligible can be extracted.—Nowhere can we find clear and unambiguous statements of Herakleitos witnessing to his belief in the immortality of the individual soul: and it would require such statements to make us attribute to Herakleitos a conception that, as everyone admits, is in hopeless contradiction with the rest of his teaching. He says perfectly plainly that in death the soul becomes water; and that means that it, as the soul = fire, perishes. If his belief had been anything like that of the mystics (as the Neoplatonists supposed) he must have regarded death—the liberation of the soul from the fetters of corporeality and the realm of the lower elements—as a complete issue of the soul into its proper element, the fire. Whereas, what he teaches is the opposite of this: the soul perishes, becomes water, then earth, and then water again, and finally soul once more (fr. 88 = 36). Only in this sense is it indestructible.

<sup>12</sup> e.g. by Pöschger, *Philos. d. Heraklit*, etc., p. 209, and frequently.

<sup>13</sup> The Sibyl fr. 12 = 92; the Delphic Oracle 11 = 85; Kathartic practices 130 = 8; Babchol, etc., 124 = 14.

<sup>14</sup> *ἡρώς* “*Ἄδης καὶ δίδωτος*” fr. 127 = 15 (and to that extent—as being reconcilable with the doctrine of Hkl.—may the Dionysiac mysteries be considered valid: this must be the meaning of the sentence). On the other hand, we have disapproval of the *μυστήρια* carried out *ἀνθρώποις* by men: fr. 125 = 14 (for the worshippers do not perceive the real meaning of the ceremony).

<sup>15</sup> In contrast to the Neoplatonic writers who attributed to Hkl. a doctrine of the soul like the Orphico-Pythagorean, the [Plutarchian] account in the *Placita Philoa.* is again much nearer the real meaning of Herakleitos: cf. 4, 7 (where the name of Herakleitos has fallen out, as from Theodoret; see Diels, *Dox.*, p. 392; *Vors.* 76, 1)

... *ἐξήσαν* (τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχῶν) εἰς τὴν καὶ παντὶ ψυχῇ ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἄμεναι. Even this is not quite correct as expressing what Hkl. really thought as to the fate of the soul but it does at least

show that the contrary views of the Neoplatonists are also only interpretations, not evidences.

<sup>16</sup> “*Ἡράκλειτος φησὶ καὶ εἶπεν ἐν τῶν ἑλόντων ἄνθρωποις, γὰρ τοῦτο τὸν κατὰ τὸν. Dox.*, p. 320; *Vors.* 74, 10. *εἶπεν* and *φησὶ* could never make a real “life”—not even a blessed life far removed from the world—but are signs of what is “dead”, i.e. of what is nowhere to be found in this world, in fact, Nothing.

<sup>17</sup> Parmenides’ polemic against Herakleitos: I. 46 E. Moll.; fr. 8, 4 E. Diels; see Hermanns’ *RA. Mus.* vii, 115 (cf. Diels, *Parm.* 98).

<sup>18</sup> Aristotle (acc. to S.E., M. ii, 48; *Vors.* 142, 23 ff.) ἀφαινεῖται αὐτοῖς κίχληται, ἐπὶ ἀρχῇ καὶ ἐπὶ ἑσέτις ἵσταται ἢ φάσιν. ὅτι ἀείδοντες φάμεθα μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς.

<sup>19</sup> *Tibull.*, *Sens.* 3 6; *Vors.* 148, 12 f.

<sup>20</sup> γινώσκοντες τὴν τῶν πάντων φύσιν ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ ψυχῆ καὶ ἡρώος καὶ ἔρως, λαμβάνοντες εἰς ἑλλὰς τὴν μεταβολήν, καὶ ψυχῇ ἡρώος ὑπάρχον ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ μὴ ἀντὶ τούτων στοιχείων, Zeno ap. O.L. ix, 39; *Vors.* 184, 14. The composition out of four elements instead of two as with Parmenides may have been arrived at by Zeno

in imitation of the "four roots" of Empedokles, each of which was distinguished by possessing one of the four qualities *θερμὸν καὶ*. The statement that the *ψυχὴ* arises from the equal mixture of the four qualities reminds us of Empedokles' account of *σπερμὰ* (Voss. 218, 1 = 720, 23; Taphr., *Sens.* 10, 23). On the other side, Zeno takes over and applies to the *ψυχὴ* what the Pythagorean physician Alkmaion said about *kylos* (Voss. 136, 1; *Der.*, p. 442; cf. Arist., *An.* 408a, 1): his point of view is almost identical with that of those Pythagoreans who regarded the "soul" as made up out of a *dyssoria* of the Cold, the Warm, etc. (see below). He may have actually got his views from the acquaintance of Pythagorean physiologists (he was regarded as a "Pythagorean": Str. 252).

<sup>14</sup> Simplicius ad Arist., *Ph.*, p. 39 D.; Voss. 162, 11; cf. Diels, *Perm.* 109 f. (1897).

<sup>15</sup> Parmenides pupil of Diokleites the Pythagorean and of Ameinias, also as it appears a Pythagorean: Sotion ap. D.L. ix, 21; Voss. 136. He was counted a Pythagorean by tradition which, however, was very free with its attributions of this kind. Call. *fr.* 100d, 17; Str. 252: 1. *Pyth.* ap. Phot., *Bibl.* 249, p. 499a, 37 Bk.; Lamb., *VP.* 267 (with Sch., p. 190 N.). The Pyth. influence on Parmenides may have been essentially of an ethical nature: *εἰς ψυχὴν ἀπερπατῶν ἐνδ' Ἀμενίου*, D.L. ix, 21. *Παρμενίδους καὶ Πυθαγόρου βίος* as equivalent: [Ceb.] *Tab.* 2 6n. Str., p. 252, connects the good government of Elea with the Pythagorean influence of Parmenides (and of Zeno). Parmenides law-giver of Elea: Spens. κ. *φιλοσόφου* ap. D.L. ix, 23.

<sup>16</sup> *φιλοσόφου δὲ πρῶτος ἀνέστη Πυθαγόρας καὶ ἐντὸς φιλοσόφου*: D.L., *Proem.* 12 (though the rest is from the fictitious dialogue of Heracl. Pont. see Cic., *T.D.* v, 8-9).

<sup>17</sup> Pl., *Rp.* 600 AB.

<sup>18</sup> *πολεμικός, ἰσοπέγυ* of Pythag.: Heracl. *fr.* 14, 17 = 40, 129. *πολεμικὸν καὶ πόλεμον ἀμφὶν ἐπιφρατοῖς ἔργων* is said of Pythag. by Emped. (429 Mull.) *fr.* 129, 3.—The Pythagorean account of the construction of the world was known to Parmenides at the beginning of the fifth century and imitated by him in several points: Kriech. *Theol. Lektur d. gr. D.* 103 ff. (To what extent Parmenides in other respects controverted Pythag. doctrine—as has been recently asserted of him—may be left undecided.) Fanciful speculations about numbers are attributed to Pythag. himself by Aristot., *MM.* 1182a, 11 ff.: Voss. 347, 3.

<sup>19</sup> Emped. 437 H. Mull.; *fr.* 129 Diels. That this *proemionion* does really refer to Pythag. (as Timaeus and others supposed) and not to Parmenides (as the undoubted *αὐτὸς* of D.L. viii, 56, thought) appears to be proved by l. 4 ff., which allude to a remarkable power of *ἀνέμωτος* which was certainly attributed by legend to Pythag., never to Parmenides.

<sup>20</sup> *ψυχὴ* filling the whole air, not distinguished from *ἀέρας* and *ἄνερ*. Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 32; Voss.<sup>21</sup>, *αἰρ* (who in this section of his account—§§ 31 ff.—is giving older Pythagorean ideas. Posidonios expresses the same ideas: but it does not therefore follow that he got them from the Stoics. Posid. borrowed and elaborated many Pythagorean views). More subtly expressed: the soul is *ἀέρας* because it is eternally in motion like *τὰ ἄστρα κῆρα*, the moon, sun, stars, and heaven: Alkmaion ap. Arist., *An.* 405a, 29 ff.; Voss. 133, 40; cf. Kriech., 75 f. The perpetual movement of the *ψυχὴ* was one of the older Pythag. beliefs: it is expressed in the old fable (known already to Democritus) of the mores in the sunbeam,

which, in their continual agitation, are, or enclose, swimming souls (see below, n. 40). In Alkmaion's treatment of the doctrine there is the additional idea that the soul of man *leaves only downward*. The derivation of its immortality and divinity from its origin in the World-soul (this is often said to be a Pythagorean doctrine: Cic., *N.D.*, i, 27; Sen. 28; D.L. viii, 28; S.E., *M.*, ix, 127) does indeed suggest Stoic pantheism in the form of its expression but in substance it may very well go back to the older Pythag. teaching. (The genuineness of the frag. [21 D.] of Philolaos ap. Stob., *Ecl.* i, 70, 2 ff.; *For.* 328, 13, remains, however, dubious.) The idea that the soul and *reins* of man came to him from an impersonal *πῦρ*, an all-pervading *ἄν τῷ παντί ἀποδοῦναι*, must have been widespread even in the 5th century. It finds expression in Xen., *M.*, i, 4, 8-17; 4, 3, 14, where it is certainly not an original fancy of Xenophon's, but must have been derived by him from somewhere or other (not from Socrates, however, nor Plato).

<sup>44</sup> *ἡ ψυχή*, Pl., *Phd.* 62 B. This is traced back to Pythag. belief (though he misinterprets the meaning of the word *ψυχή*) by Cic., Sen. 73; cf. the Pythagorean Euxitheos ap. Ath. 157 C.; *For.* 515, 19. See Böckh, *Philol.* 179 ff. [*Philolaos* fr. 15 (16 Mull.) speaks of the World-soul or God who holds and contains all things *ἡ ψυχή* without mentioning the human soul: see Böckh, p. 151.] The comparison of life in the body to a *ψυχή* may very well be Pythagorean; nor is this prevented by the fact that it is also Orphic (see above, chap. x, n. 45). This comparison implies the conception of the earthly life as a punishment. *ἡ δὲ τὴν ἐκπέμπει* the soul is enclosed in the body: *Philolaos* fr. 14 (23) appealing to *παλαιὸν θεολόγον* *καὶ καὶ μάλιστα* (cf. Lamb., *V.P.* 85, *ἀρχαῖος αἰ νόμος . . . ὅτι καλεῖται γὰρ θεόλογος ὁ ἀνελκόμενος*).—Raspaine in *Arch. f. Ges. d. Philol.* viii, 462, interprets the *ἡ ψυχή* of Pl., *Phd.* 62, as *αἰ* "in the cattle-pen" or "sheep-fold": the idea of God as the Shepherd of man would then be vaguely present even here (cf. *Pl.* 271 E; *Crit.* 106 E). It remains, however, to be proved (to begin with) that *ψυχή* is ever used in the sense of *αἰσθή* or *αἰσθητή*.

<sup>45</sup> Arist., *An.* i, 3, p. 407b, 22 ff.

<sup>46</sup> *οἱ ἐν τῷ γαστήρῳ* terrified by *αἱ*  
Arist., *An. Po.* 84b, 32 ff.; *στέλλει τὰς* . . .  
earth, *Ael.* *VH.* iv, 17 (perhaps from Arist. *π. τῶν Περὶ τῶν πάλαιον*). Description of the condition of things in Hades given in the Pythagorean *Καρδίας* *εἰς ἦδον*. As in the case of the Orphics this purgation and punishment in the spirit-world must have belonged to the parts of the *Πυθαγόρειαι μύθοι* that were quite seriously believed.

<sup>47</sup> *ἐκπέμπει* (out of the body) *αἰσθή* (*τῶν ἀνθρώπων*) *καὶ γὰρ πάλαιον*  
*ἐν τῷ αἵμα ἀμικτὰ τῷ σώματι* (being a complete *σῆμα* of the living):  
Alex. *Polyb.* ap. D.L. viii, 31.

<sup>48</sup> Arist., *An.* i, 2, 4, p. 404a, 16 ff.; *For.* 367, 1; many called the *ἐν τῷ αἵμα φέμενα* themselves "souls", others *ἐν τῷ σώματι*. This may rest on a real popular belief which, however, has already been partially elevated to a philosophical standing: the souls are compared to what is evidently itself in perpetual agitation (Arist., i, 19 f.). This was undoubtedly Pythagorean (and old Ionic) teaching: see Alkmaion ap. Arist., *An.* 405a, 29 ff.; *For.* 133, 40. (Statement of *Dev.* 366a, 13 ff., b, 6 ff., is more doubtful.)

<sup>49</sup> D.L. viii, 32; *For.* i, p. xlv

<sup>50</sup> That the Pythagoreans believed in the entry of the soul into the bodies of animals also is implied in the satirical verses of Xenophanes

(fr. 9) ap. D.L. viii, 36. All probability suggests that this was the reason for the injunction to abstain from flesh food among the older Pythagoreans themselves (and with Empedokles). (S.E., *M.* ix, 127 ff., however, drags in the "World-Soul" in a moment of untimely Stoicism. S.E.'s own quotation from Empedokles shows that the latter at any rate derived the ἀσκήσις ἀσκήσις simply from the fact of Metemorphosis, and not at all from the ἀσκήσις ὡς ὅτι which rules in all life; though this last is attributed to him by S.E.)

<sup>44</sup> See Appendix x.

<sup>45</sup> According to the Pythagorean τὸ δίκαιον is nothing else than τὸ ἀντιμεμετρεῖν, i.e. δὲ τὰ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ ἐν ἑστέρι; Arist., *EN.* 5, 5, p. 1132b, 21 ff.; *M.M.* 1194a, 29 ff. [also given with fanciful numerical expression, *M.M.* 1182a, 14; Sch. Arist. 540a, 19 B.; 541b, 6 B.; (Iamb.) *Taeof. Arist.*, p. 28 f. Ast]. This definition of justice was simply taken over by the Pythagoreans from popular sayings such as the verse of Rhadamanthys ap. Arist., *EN.* about the ἀντιμεμετρεῖν and similar formulas; see collection in Blomfield's Gloss. in A., *Cdo.* 307: *Soph. fr.* 229 P. Compensatory justice of this kind we may suppose was manifested in the rebirths of men (in this respect the P. went beyond the commonplace sense of that τρεῖς ἄνθρωποι μῦθος); we may assume this without further hesitation if we remember the completely analogous application of this conception by the Orphics (above, chap. x, n. 71).

<sup>46</sup> Πυθαγόρειοι τρώες τοῦ δίκου, Pl., *Rp.* 600 B.

<sup>47</sup> ἀσκήσις τῷ δίκῳ, Iamb., *VP.* 137 (following Aristoxenos); *I'ora.* 362, 32; *Incip. Oris.* Pythagoras ap. Stob., *Eccl.* ii, p. 48, 16 W. See Wytténb., on Plu., *Ser. Num.* *Prod.* 350 D.

<sup>48</sup> Ancient testimony ascribes to the Pythagoreans: abstinence from flesh-food or at least from the flesh of such animals as are not sacrificed to the Olympians (the ἀσκήσις ἀσκήσις does not enter into the ἀσκήσις ὡς in transmigration; Iamb., *VP.* 85, *I'ora.* 359, 13); from eating fish, particularly ῥέγγας and μελίρροπος, and beans; from using linen clothing (or being buried in it; Hdt. ii, 81); and a few other forms of abstinence and measures ensuring ritual purity. The whole apparatus of ritual *dyseis* is ascribed to the older Pythagoreans by Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 33. This, as a general statement is certainly correct. It is customary to say that it began among the degenerate Pythagoreans after the break up of the Italian society (so esp. Kriech, *De Soc. a Pythag. cond. scopo politico.* Gott., 1831). But when Aristoxenos, the contemporary of the later, scientifically-minded Pythagoreans, denies all such superstitious ideas and regulations to the original Pythagoreans, his evidence really applies only to those Pythagorean scholars with whom he was acquainted and who seemed to him to have preserved the real spirit of the older Pythagoreanism much more truly than the ascetic (and in any case degenerate) Pythagoreans of the same period. Everything, however, goes to show that the strength of the surviving community as it had been founded by Pythagoras lay in the religious and mystical elements of its doctrine; and that what was oldest in Pythagoreanism was what it had in common with the faith and religious discipline of the Orphics. To this side belongs what we learn from tradition of the older Pythagorean asceticism. Much, then, that is of early Pythagorean origin (though certainly combined with other and later elements) is to be found in many of the ἀσκήσις or ὡς of the Pythagoreans, esp. in those of them (and they are numerous) that give directions of a ritual or merely superstitious kind. A fresh collection, arrangement and

explanation of these remarkable fragments would be very useful: Götzling's purely rationalist treatment of them does them less than justice. (Cora. Hölk, *De mathematicis et symbolis Pythag.*, Diss. Kiel, 1894.)

<sup>44</sup> Efforts in a more positive direction may perhaps be seen in the practice of the musical form of *enkheirion* which Pythag. and the Pythagoreans used in accordance with an elaborate system: cf. Lamb., *V.P.* 64 ff., 110 ff.; Sch. V. on *X* 301; also Quint. 2, 4, 12; Porph., *V.P.* 33, etc.—What Aristoxenos has to say about Pythagorean ethica, moralistic *paideia* and edification—most of it of a purely rationalist kind—can scarcely be said to have historical value.

<sup>45</sup> Good formulation of Pythag. belief ap. Max. Tyr. 18, 2, 1, 287 R.: *Πυθαγόρας ἀνέειπε τοῖς ἑλλήσιν ἐκείνων αἰῶνι, ὅτι αἰὼν τὸ μὲν σῶμα καθίστηται, ὃ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος μὴ φθαρταὶ δέσμιος καὶ θύρατος. καὶ γὰρ αἰὼς αἰὼν ἐστὶν ὅπου οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρχη. i.e. the life of the soul is not only endless but without beginning: the soul is immortal because it is timeless.*

<sup>46</sup> The withdrawal of the soul from the *enkheirion* *δωμάτιον* and its return to an anticipated existence as a bodiless spirit was never so clearly held in view for the "Pure" by the older Pythagorean tradition as it was among the Orphics (and by Empedokles). It is, however, hardly thinkable that a system which regarded every incarnation of the soul as a punishment and the body as its prison or its tomb should never have held out to the true *βέλους* of its mysteries the prospect of a full and permanent liberation of the soul, at last, from corporeality and the earthly life. Only so could the long chain of deaths and rebirths reach a final and satisfactory conclusion. Eternally detained in the cycle of births the soul would be eternally punished (this is e.g. the idea of Empedokles: 435 f., fr. 143 D.); and this cannot have been the real conclusion of the Pythagorean doctrine of salvation. Claud. Mamertus, *de An.* 2, 7 (Vers. 320, 12), gives it as a doctrine of Philolaos (fr. 22) that the (pure) soul after its separation from the body leads a "bodiless" life in the "Universe" (the *κόσμος* situated above the *ἐμπέδαι*); see Böckh, *Philol.* 177. Apart from this the only evidence for the withdrawal of the soul is late: *Carm. Ar.* 70 f. (making use of the Empedok. verses, fr. 112, 4 f., = 400 Müll.), Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 31 (*ἐφεσθαι τὰς ἀνέμους [ψυχὰς] ἐπὶ τὰς ἐφύρας* "in altissimum locum" Cobet: but an ellipse of *τίνας* is hardly admissible. *ὁ θεὸς* = the highest God would be a Hebraic form of expression, nor can it be a possible one here for Alex. Polyh.—we should also, with this meaning of *ἐφύρας*, expect *ἐπὶ τὴν* 5. *ad superiores circulos bene viventium animas, secundum philosophum altam scientiam*, Serv., *A.* vi, 227—should we then supply *ἐπὶ τὰς ἐφύρας* <*ἀνέμους*>? Or perh. *ἐπὶ τὰς ἐφύρας*?)—An escape of the souls after the expiry of their *τελείαν* must have been known as a Pythagorean belief to Luc., *VH.* ii, 21. (Vergil, too, is speaking in a Pythagorean sense, *A.* vi, 744, *pauci laeta arva* (Elysiu) *tenent*—i.e. live ever without renewed *δωμάτιον*—see Serv., *A.* vi, 404, 428, 713. It is true the line is out of its right place, but there can be no doubt that it reproduces the words and the—in this section Pythagorean—opinion of Vergil.) The idea that the cycle of births is never to be broken cannot be regarded as Pythagorean nor even as Neopythagorean. (A few isolated later accounts of Pythag. doctrine; e.g. D.L. viii, 14 (from Favorinus), Porph., *V.P.* 18, and also the curious description in Ov., *M.* xv—with a good deal of foreign matter added—speak of the Pyth. doctrine of soul-transmigration without also referring to the possibility of *ἀνάληψις* *ἀφ' αὐτῶν*: but they are not meant to deny that

possibility but merely leave it unmentioned as unnecessary in the context.) There seems to be no example of a Greek doctrine of transmigration that did not also include a promise to the *doxoi* or the *philetois* that they would be able to escape from the cycle of births (at least for a world-period: as Syrian. took it, though probably not Porph.). Such a promise, as the consummation of the promises of salvation therein made, could only be dispensed with in the case of a doctrine of transmigration in which being born again was itself regarded as a reward for the pious (as in the teaching which Jos., *B.J.* 2, 8, 14, attributes to the Pharisees). By Greek partisans of the doctrine of Metempsychosis rebirth upon earth is always regarded as a punishment or at any rate a burden, not as a desirable goal for the life of the soul. We must therefore presume that the promise of escape from the cycle of rebirth was made also by the oldest Pythagorean teaching as the final benefit of its message of salvation. Without this completing touch Pythagoreanism would be like Buddhism without the promise of a final attainment of Nirvana.

<sup>4</sup> Pythagoras is called the pupil of Pherekydes as early as Andron of Ephesos (before Theopompus): *D.L.* i, 119; *Por.* ii, 199, 18. Pherekydes was regarded as "the first" who taught the immortality of the soul (*Cic.*, *T.D.* i, 38) or more correctly metempsychosis (*Suid.* *Φερ.*): cf. Preller, *Rh. Mus.* (N.F.), iv, 388 f. A hint of such teaching must have been found in his mystical treatise (cf. *Porph.*, *Ant.* 31; *Por.* ii, 204, 12—Gompertz is rather too sceptical, *Gr. Thinkers*, i, 542). This teaching seems to have been the chief reason which tempted later writers to make the old *Isiologos* into the teacher of Pythagoras, the chief spokesman of the doctrine of the soul's transigrations.—It is, however, an untenable theory that Pherek. illustrated his doctrine of transmigration by the example of Aithalides. What the Sch. on A.R. I, 645 (*Por.* ii, 204, 24), quotes from "Pherekydes" about the alternate sojourn of the *ψυχή* of Aithalides in Hades and on earth, does not come from Pherekydes the *Isiologos* (as Götting, *Opusc.* 210, and Kern, *de Oph. Epim.*, *Pherec.*, pp. 89, 106, think) but without the slightest doubt from the genealogist and historian; this is the only Pherekydes who is used by the Sch. of Ap. Rh., and he is used frequently. Besides this, the way in which the different statements of the various authorities used in this Scholion are distinguished, shows quite clearly that Pherekydes had only spoken of Aithalides' alternate dwelling above and below the earth, but as *still* being Aithalides, and not as metamorphosed by the series of births into other personalities living upon earth. Pherekydes was obviously reproducing a Pithiotic local-legend in which Aithalides as the son of (the ethiopic ?) Hermes alternately lived on and below the earth, as an *εναεργος*—like the Dioscuri in Laconian legend (*A* 301 ff.; in that passage and generally in the older view—as held by Alkman, Pindar, etc.—both the Dioscuri change their place of abode together: it is not till later that the variant arose acc. to which they alternate with each other; see *Hesist.*, *Lac.* ii, p. 344 Bip.). It was Herakleides Pont. who first turned the alternate sojourning of Aithalides into death and resurrection (he also made Aithalides one of the previous incarnations of Pythagoras: see Appendix x); but as a different person, so that A. thus became an example of metempsychosis. It is not hard to see why Aithalides was chosen as one of the previous incarnations of P., nor how the old miracle-story, preserved to literature by Pherekydes, was thus transformed to suit its new purpose. Plainly Pherekydes did not say that Hermes,

also gave Aithalides the power of memory after his death (otherwise the statement to this effect in Sch. A.K. would have stood under the name of Pherek.); and the privilege was rather meaningless until after Herakleides' narrative. Perhaps it was Her., who first added this touch to the story. Ap. Rh. follows him in this point (i, 643 ff.), but not—or not plainly, at least: 648 ff.—in what Herakleides had invented about the metempsychosis of Aithalides.

<sup>12</sup> Macr., *Som. Scip.* i, 14, 19, attributes this view to Pythagoras and Philolaos, being certainly correct in the case of the latter: since the opinion that the soul is a *υδατος* and *αερωδης* of the warm and the cold, the dry and the wet, which go to make up the body, is given by Simplicius in Pl., *Phd.* 86B, as a tradition that he has received and not an invention of his own. But what else can this mean than a tradition handed down in Thebes by his teacher Philolaos (*Phd.* 81 D)? [Hence 'Αρρωδης τῆς Θυγατρὸς, 95 A.] It is true that Claud. Mam. *de As.* ii, 7, only attributes to Philolaos the doctrine that the soul is bound up with the body "in eternal and incorporeal harmony" (*consonantiam*); which would imply an independent substance of the soul side by side with that of the body. But this must have been a misunderstanding of the real meaning of Philolaos. Aristoxenos, too, can only have got his doctrine of the soul as a harmony from his Pythagorean friends. Perhaps, too, this was the influence which suggested to Dikaiarchos his view that the "soul" is a *ἀρμονία τῶν νοεμένων στοιχείων* (*Dox.*, p. 387), and indeed τῶν ἐν τῇ σφαιρῇ ἀρμονία καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ὅρων καὶ ἔργων καὶ ἡθῶν, as Nemes., *Nat. Hom.*, p. 68 Maith., tells us—thus exactly resembling Simplicius in Plato (unless indeed the passage in Nemes. is a mere reminiscence of Plato strayed here by accident). See also chap. x, n. 27.

<sup>13</sup> See Pl., *Phd.* 86 CD. Pre-existence of the soul impossible if it is only an *ἀρμονία* of the body: 92 AB.

<sup>14</sup> It was in itself almost unavoidable that a community founded like the Pythagorean mainly on a mystical doctrine but not ill-disposed to scientific studies, should, as it was extended (and still followed practical aims) split up into two parties: an inner circle of qualified teachers and scholars, and one or more groups, outside and attached to them, of lay members for whom a special teaching suited for popular comprehension would be provided. Thus the inner circle of Buddhism, the *Bikkhus*, was surrounded by the common herd of "worshippers"; and the same can be seen in Christian monastic organisations. A division, then, of the followers of Pythagoras into *Akousmatikoi* and *Mathematikoi*—Pythagoreoi and Pythagoristai—etc., is not in itself at all incredible.

<sup>15</sup> The division of the soul, or the *διάνοια* of the soul, into the *λογιστικὴ* and the *λογισμὸς* was made, before Plato, by Pythagoras—as we might have learnt, *αἰτοῖ τὴν Πυθαγόρου οὐνογεωμετρικὴν εὐδαίεα εἰς ἑπτὰ ἀνελκόμενα*, from the writings of his followers, acc. to Poseidonios ap. Galen, *de Plac. Hipp. et Pl.* 5, p. 458 Müll., = v, 478 K.; cf. also 625 K. (*Yors.* 34, 23). From Poseidonios evidently comes the same opinion in Cic., *T.D.* iv, 10. And, in fact, a fragment of Philolaos v. *φύσις*, fr. 13 Diels (*Theol. Ar.*, p. 20, 35 A.), gives a division of the *λογιστικὴ καὶ ἔργον καὶ λογισμὸς*, which depends upon the idea that the highest living organism contains within itself and makes use of all the lower organisms as well (not in the head, *ἐν κεφαλήν* *ἀνὰ*—*ψυχὴ καὶ εὐδαιμονία* in the heart, *ἐν καρδίᾳ*—*φύσις καὶ εὐδαιμονία* in the soul, *ἐν ψυχῇ*—*εὐδαιμονία μεταβολὴ καὶ γίνεσις* in the *αἰθερῷ*, *ἐν αἰθέρῳ* *ἀνὰ*). Then in the psychical region we have a division between the *λογιστικὴ*

and the *λογος* according to their nature and "seat" in man (*λογος* being made up of reasoning power, *νους*, specific to man, and sense-perception, *αἴσθησις*, which also belongs to the other *ζῷα*, while the *λογος* — *βίωσις* and *διείρησις* and resembles the *αἴτιος τοῦ γρηγοῦναι καὶ αἰσθάναι*, or the *φωσφῆν*, a part of the *λογος τοῦ φωτός* in Ariat., EN. I, 13, p. 1102a, 32 ff.). This evidently represents an attempt at a division of the soul into *λογικὴ* and *λογος*, such as Possidonios must have found carried out by other Pythagoreans. A clear distinction between *φρονεῖν* (*φρονῖς*) and *αἰσθάνεσθαι* was made by the Pythag. physician Alkmaion, whose division was at least different from and more profound than that of Empedokles (with whom he is contrasted by Thphr., Sens. 25; Forx. 132, 30). Empedokles did indeed distinguish between thinking and perceiving, but thinking (*νοεῖν*) was only a *συναισθῆναι* πρὸς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι and to this extent *ταύτης* with it (Arist., An. 3, 3, p. 427a, 21). Alkmaion cannot, therefore, have made *φρονῖς* *συναισθῆναι*. These Pythagoreans were on the way to separating from the soul as a whole a separate, thinking soul that required no sense-perception for its thought, the *νοῦς*. To this latter alone would divinity and immortality be ascribed, as in later philosophy (and thus Dox. 363a, 10, though unhistorically and prematurely, gives τὸ *λογικόν* [τοῦ φωτός] ἀθάνατον as a doctrine of "Pythagoras").—It is certainly difficult to see how Philolaos' doctrine of the distinction between the *ἀσθράντων ἀρχή*, the *νοῦς*—an element of the soul belonging exclusively to men—and the *ζῶον ἀρχή* (confined to *αἰσθησις* and *ψυχὴ*, power of life) could possibly be reconciled with the older Pythagorean doctrine of the soul's transmigration. Acc. to that belief the soul wanders through the bodies of animals as well as men, and the idea implies the view that the *same* soul could inhabit animals as well as men; that, in fact, *νέμεται καὶ γινώσκουσι ζῷα* are *δμογενῆ* (Porph., VP. 19; cf. S.E., Af. ix, 127). Philolaos, on the contrary, holds that the soul of man is differently constituted from the souls of animals—the latter lack *νοῦς* (it is not merely that its efficacy is hindered in animals by the *συνεπαρὰ τοῦ σώματος* as is said wrongly to be the opinion of Pythag. by Dox. 432a, 15 ff.). The same difficulty arises again in the case of Plato's doctrine of transmigration.—Alkmaion who ascribes *φρονῖς* to man alone seems not to have held the transmigration doctrine.

<sup>40</sup> 401 ff. Mull.; fr. 112, 5 Diels.

<sup>41</sup> 462 ff. fr. 111.

<sup>42</sup> Satyrus ap. D.L. viii, 58; Forx. 195, 28.—Especially famous was his feat of driving away adverse winds from Akragas (cf. fr. 111, 9); see also Welcker, *RI. Schr.* iii, 80-1.—The asses' skins with which Emped. kept the north winds away from Akragas were at any rate intended as apotropaic materials—magic means of driving away spirits. In the same way protection against hail and lightning is obtained by hanging up the skin of a hyrax, a seal, etc. (see Geop. I, 16, 3-5; I, 16, and Niclas' notes there). These skins *ἐχέουσι δύναμιν ἀντιπαραστήσασθαι*; Plu., Smp. 4, 2, 1, p. 684 C.—Other magic charms against hail—the *καλαμίσκοι*, Plu., Smp. 7, 2, 2, p. 700 F; Sen., AQ. 4b, 8.

<sup>43</sup> . . . *ὅπως ἂν οὐκ ἔλθῃ δαίμων ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ αἰσθῆται κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτῆς*. 400 f. (fr. 112, 4 f.).

<sup>44</sup> A late echo is to be found in the inspired lines of Lucretius in praise of Empedokles, i, 717 ff.

<sup>45</sup> The well-known story of Empedokles' leap into the crater of Mt. Aetna—intended by his complete disappearance to call forth the belief that he had not died (Luc., DM. xi, 4), but had been *transmuted*





elements in which the powers of perception inhere (*Interer τὰ πνεύματα φύξις* *chou* is the opinion attributed to Emped. by Arist., *An.* 404b, 12). But elements are present in the mixture of all things, and thus stones, etc., have *σπέρματα* and a "portion of mind" in them (though the statement that it is *αἶσα* that first produces *σπέρματα* will not square with this: Thphr., *Sens.* 23). Emped. attributed complete sensation and perception to plants, and even gave them *ρόσθ* and *γνώσις* (without blood?): (Arist.) *Met.* 815a, 18 ff.; b, 18 f. That is why they, too, are capable of harbouring fallen daemons.

<sup>75</sup> Emped. himself does not use the word *φύξις* at all in the fragments that have been preserved to us; and it is hardly probable that he himself would have used the term of the psychical faculties of the body even if he regarded them as gathered together to a substantive unity. Later authorities, on the other hand, in their accounts of the doctrine of Emped. give the name of *φύξις* precisely to these "somatic" intellectual faculties; thus Arist., *An.* 404b, 9 ff.; 409b, 23 ff.: *αἶμα σπέρμα εἶναι τὰ φύξις*, Gal., *Hipp. et Pto.* 2 = v, 283 K.; cf. Cic., *T.D.* i, 19; Tert., *An.* 5.

<sup>76</sup> 113-19 Mull.; *fr.* 11, 15, do not (as Plu., *adv. Col.* 12, p. 1113 D, understood them) teach the pre-existence and persistence after death of the psychic powers within the world of the elements, but merely speak of the indestructibility of the elements that are the component parts of the human body, even when the latter has suffered dissolution.

<sup>77</sup> *ἄντρον ἀνταίο*, *fr.* 121, 4 (21 Mull.; cf. 16) is the name given by Empedokles to the earth; and not to Hades (as has been supposed), of which—as an intermediate place of purgation between two births—there is nowhere any mention in his verses. That the *ἀντρον ἄντρον* (*fr.* 121, 1) to which Emped. is cast down, the realm of *Θέρος* *αἰῶν* (*fr.* 121) and the *ἄντρον ἀνταίο*, all refer to the *αἰὼν*, ὁ ὅστος ὅστος, *τὰ πᾶσι γὰρ*, is expressly stated by Themistius, *Or.* 13, and Hierocl. in *C. Aur.* 24 (*fr.* 121), p. 470 Mull. (*EPG.* i); Synes. also implies it (*Ep.* 147, p. 233 C; *Pers.* i, 89 D); the same is distinctly implied for *fr.* 121, 4, and by Jul., *Or.* vii, 226 B; Philo, ii, p. 635 M.—Procl., in *Crat.*, p. 103 Boiss., connects *fr.* 121, 3, *ἀντρον ἀνταίο* *τὰ πᾶσι γὰρ* *καὶ ὅστος ὅστος* *ἔσται* *ἐν* *ἀντρον* immediately with *fr.* 121, 2, and both lines acc. to him apply to *τὰ πᾶσι γὰρ* *καὶ ὅστος ὅστος*; i.e. not to any kind of underworld but to the region of the earth (cf. Emp. ap. Hippol., *RH.* i, 4; *Voss.* 210, 27; *Dox.* 559). The idea that Hades is being spoken of in these lines is a view peculiar to moderns who have misunderstood the poet and set aside the clear testimony of Themistius and the rest. Maass, *Orphæus*, 113, speaks as though the interpretation in favour of Hades rested upon a tradition which is "contradicted". On the contrary, that interpretation is itself contradicted by definite tradition and by common sense (for Emp. falls from Heaven to earth and not, please God, to Hades!). The view is quite baseless (though Maass himself finds in the *ἔσται* *ἐν* *ἀντρον* of *fr.* 121 [20 M.]—the inconstant, transitory works of men upon earth—a support for his Hades-view: these "fluid works" or things are, he thinks, nothing else but the stream of filth, the *εὐνὴ δολιχὴ*, in Hades of which poets invention remoured: certainly an ingenious interpretation). Emp. is, in fact, the first to regard this earthly sojourning as the real Hell—the *δουλείαν*, *ἀντρον ἄντρον* (*fr.* 118, 121, 1, the latter a parodying reminiscence of λ 94)—an *ἀντρον ἀνταίο* (*fr.* 120) filled with all the plagues and terrors of the original Hades (121). Stoics and Epicureans (see below) took up the idea after him and elaborated it in detail. The daemons that are shut up in this life here below—a *ζωὴ* *ἀντρον* (*fr.* 2, 3)—are as it dead:

fr. 125 (?), 35, 14. The Orphic idea of the *εὐνο-εἶρα* (see above, p. 345) was thus thoroughly and energetically carried out. (Macr., in S. Scip. I, 10, 9 ff., attributed the idea that the *inferi* are nothing else but the material world of earth to the old theologist (§ 17) who, he says, lived before the development of a philosophic science of nature.)

<sup>12</sup> S. Mull.: fr. 115, 3: *εἶδ' οὐκ (οὐκ ὁραμένους) ἀνελκυσίου φόνου φίλο γυῖα μύθος*. He means *βρώτων σαρκῶν καὶ ἀλλοτρίων φιλία* as Plu. paraphrases it, *Es. Corn.* I, p. 995 B (for this must always imply acc. to Emp. the "murder" of a spirit of the same race: fr. 136). Even for God it is a crime to taste of a meat ("blood")-offering and, in fact, there were only bloodless offerings made in the Golden Age (which was described by Emp. not in the *Θουσιὰ*—the principle of which work denied that there had ever been such a period—but in some other poem in which he left his philosophic doctrine out of account: perhaps the *Κοσμοποιή*): 420 ff. M; fr. 128, 3 ff.

<sup>13</sup> fr. 115, 4. The earth then becomes the place of their banishment and punishment for gods that have broken their oath. This is a version of the impressive picture in Hes., *Th.* 793 ff. *Dei pesterantes* were punished for nine years (cf. Hes., *Th.* 801) in Tartarus: Orpheus (not Lucan in his "Orpheus") ap. Serv., *A.* vi, 565. (To this also alludes the poet from whose elegiac verses came the frag. ap. Serv., *A.* vi, 324: *καὶ (sc. Ἐρως) ὕδατος πύργον πάρος καὶ δεινὰν*; this is probably how the words should be read.) So that instead of the "underworld" or Tartarus, the world is for Emp. the worst place of sorrows. From Emp. is derived the conception that the realm of the *inferi* is our world, that inhabited by men, and that there is no other, nor any need of another *γῆρας*—a conception often alluded to and improved upon by Stoic and other semi-philosophers (esp. clear in Serv., *A.* vi, 127, often only in allegorical sense: Lucr. iii, 978 ff. [See also Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics*, p. 107.]).

<sup>14</sup> 30,000 *εἶμα*: which means probably "years" (hardly "seasons" as Dieterich, *Nachtr.*, 119, takes it). The figure 30,000 has no special meaning (e.g. 300 periods of a life-time each): it is merely a concrete phrase for "innumerable" (and is frequent: Hirsch, *Ber. Jahrb. Ges. d. Wiss.* 1885, p. 84 ff.). This enormous period of time is the divine counter-part, as measured by divine standards of time, of the *αἰῶνας ἡμετέρος*, the *εἰκοστήτης* during which the earthly murderer had to fly from the land of his violent deed. The fiction of Emp. clearly shows the influence of this expiation of murder by *ἀποκαταστάσις*.

<sup>15</sup> fr. 121 (22 ff.).

<sup>16</sup> *ἐνυκλίας βίαιος κελύθειος* . . . fr. 115, 8 (8).

<sup>17</sup> Emp. does not even use the word *φύσις* of these *δαιμόνια* confined within corporeality. They are so named, however, regularly and without qualification by the later authors who quote verses from the *Proimion* of the *Θουσιὰ*, Plutarch, Plotinus, Hippolytus, etc.

<sup>18</sup> Peculiar to Emp. is the attempt to give actual details of the crimes for which the spirits are condemned to *ἐνενεμέμενος*; and also the extension of metempsychosis to plants (which is occasionally attributed, but by late authorities only, to the Pythagoreans as well).

<sup>19</sup> The entirely unpurified seem not to have been condemned to everlasting punishment in Hades, of which in general he shows no knowledge, by Emp. (as by the Pythagoreans sometimes). He merely, it seems, threatens them with ever-renewed rebirth upon earth and the impossibility of *καὶ ἀνάλω λήθη* (until the complete ascendancy of *φύσις*). This appears to be the meaning of fr. 145 (455 f.) from the way in which Cl. Al., *Protr.* II, 27, p. 23 P., cites the lines.

<sup>11</sup> As we may paraphrase—though indeed here, too, only with reservations—the *nauwog* and *vauérhag* of Emp. *fr.* 145 (454 f.).

<sup>12</sup> *fr.* 136-7, 128, 9 f. (424, 440). Very remarkable is a thinker of such an early period in what is said (*fr.* 136) about the *vérrov vépmav* which forbids *evéivav vð ímóvhwv*.—Apart from this we have other vestiges of *Antastolic* rules: purification with water drawn from five springs: *fr.* 143 (see Append. v); abstention from the eating of beans (*fr.* 141) and of laurel leaves (*fr.* 140). The laurel is sacred as a magic plant, together with the *ouílla* (see App. v) and *ósmos* (see above, chap. v, n. 98). Cf. *Gp.* 11, 2, etc. Its special sacredness gives the laurel its importance in the cult of Apollo. Emp. (like Pythagoras) seems to have paid special honour to Apollo: it appears from something that is said ap. D.L. viii, 57, that he wrote a *vpoúmav eis 'Avéállwv*: the exalted conception of a divinity that is pure *φῶρ* *ἐνὶ* in abstraction from all sense-perception, elaborated by Emp. in *fr.* 138-4, was regarded by him as applying particularly *πρὸς 'Avéállwv* (Anon. in *Arist., Interpr.* 248, 1 ed. Brand. 185a, 23).

<sup>13</sup> In laudible ways: *fr.* 127 (Iion, laurel), 448 Mull.

<sup>14</sup> *fr.* 146 (457) *πράμος* being used probably with intention as a vague term: regal power would hardly have seemed to possess special merit to the democratically minded Emp. He hardly knew it in any form but the tyrannis and to this he showed himself an energetic opponent (even though the violent language of *Timaeus*, the enemy of tyrants, is not to be taken quite literally). He himself was offered royal power, but he refused it with contempt as one who was *νάος ἀρχῆς ἀλλότρου*: *Xanthos* and *Arist.* ap. D.L. viii, 63; *Voss*, 196, 10. He might all the same (and rightly) regard himself in political matters, too, as one of the *πράμοι*: it is plain that in the enumeration of those who were *εἰς τέλος* born as *μυρτίαι τε καὶ ὀμωπέλοι καὶ ἰστροί, καὶ ὁρῶμοι ἀνθρώπων ἐκχθονίου πέλομαι*, and were never to be born again, he includes himself especially, and, in fact, takes himself as the model of this last and highest stage upon earth. He himself was all these things simultaneously.

<sup>15</sup> *fr.* 146-7 (459 ff.) *ἐνθ' ἐσθλασσομένη θεαὶ τιμῶν φέρονται, ὁμοειδὲς ἄλλων ὁμῶνται, ἐν τε γυνέταις (read ἐν τε γυνέταις) — a tmesis, — ἐν τρώεσσι τε* "civis ἀνδρείων ἄντων, ἀνέκρον ἀνέκρον".

<sup>16</sup> Emped. perhaps described himself as "god" also in *fr.* 23, 11 (144) *ἀλλὰ τοσούτ' εὐθ' ἐσθ' ἢ ἐστιν ἐπὶ πάντας*. *θεὸς πᾶσι μέθω δυνάμεις*. See *Bidez, Biogr. d'Emp.*, p. 146 (1894)—unless these words would be better taken as an abbreviated comparison (with omission of *ὡς*): "as certainly as if you had received these words from a god."

<sup>17</sup> As *Plu.* is inclined to do: *Érel. xvii*, p. 807 D.

<sup>18</sup> As several modern critics have attempted to do.

<sup>19</sup> *fr.* 17, 30 (92).

<sup>20</sup> See above, chap. i, pp. 4 ff.

<sup>21</sup> As late again as *Plotinus*, who speaks of the *θερὰ ἐν ἡμῖν*: the *εἶμα* which is a *φῆρ* *ἐκαστῶν* and the *ἀληθὴς ἀσθρονος* distinct from it, etc. (i, 1, 10: 6, 7, 8).

<sup>22</sup> At any rate Emp. spoke of the *ekstasis*, the *furor* which is an *αισθησις* and to be entirely distinguished from that which is produced by *αισθησις* *mentis* (*φρονῆς ἀλλοία*, *fr.* 108): *Cael. Aur., Morb. Chron.* i, 6, p. 25 *Sich.* = *Voss*, 223. A special *ἐκστασις* in the soul as its *θερὰ* (part): *Stoics* (and *Plato*) acc. to *Don.* 638, 25. A special organ of the soul which effects the union with the divine, being the *ἐνὸς τῆς αἰσθησις* *ἡμῶν*, is mentioned in *Proclus* (*Zeller, Phil. d. Griech.* ii, 2, 738).

<sup>20</sup> *và êlan*, the whole reality of Being and Becoming in the world, cannot be comprehended by man through his senses nor even with *noûs*: *fr.* 2 (36-43). But Empedokles has in his own persuasion grasped it: he is situated *ἐντὶ τῷ ἔσωτι* (*fr.* 4, 8), *ἐντὶ τῷ ἀσπυλλήτῳ βάθῳ τῷ ἐλπίστῳ* (*Procl.*, in *Ti.* 108 E). Proclus declares that the words *ἐντὶ τῷ ἔσωτι*—and this is a further point—are meant to apply to Emped. himself. [I do not quite understand Bidez' doubts about what is said here, and in what follows: see *Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Phil.* ix, 205, 42.] Whence, then, did the poet obtain this knowledge of the truth since it is revealed neither to the senses nor to the *noûs*? At any rate, the *φύξεσσι δαίμονι* (*Porphy.*, *Aut.* 8), who conducted his soul-daimon out of the region of the gods, say to the soul (*fr.* 2, 8): *αὐτὸς αὖτε ἐστὶ δαίμων* (i.e. "since you have been cast up here—on the earth"—not "since you have so desired it", as Bergk, *Opusc.* ii, 23, explains: which would be a distorted idea expressed in distorted language)—*ἐνδοῦς δὲ πᾶσι* *ἢ ἄρατις μῆτις δαίμονι* (thus with Panzerbieter, for *δωκεν*). According to this we must suppose that his more profound knowledge (insight into the *μυστὲς* *καὶ ἀλλήλας* *καὶ μυστῶν* of the elements, together with knowledge of the destiny and purpose of the soul-daimones, etc.), which he cannot have got on earth or in his earthly body must have been brought with him out of his divine past-life. This knowledge is then peculiar to the daimon (or *φύξι* in the older sense) that is buried in the body; and Emp. presumably owes it to an *ἀνέμνησις* of his earlier life (a faculty that is only rarely active). From what other source could he have got his knowledge of his previous *δωκεμένους* (*fr.* 117)? He has even farther and more profound knowledge than he dares communicate—*fr.* 4 (45-51), and says quite plainly that he is keeping back in ploty a last remnant of wisdom that is unsuited for human ears (to this extent the authorities—*ἔλκω δ' ἔσορ* of *ἀφ' ὧν*—of S.E., *Al.* vii, 122—have rightly understood him).—The belief in a miraculous power of *ἀνέμνησις* that goes beyond the present life of the individual may have been derived by Emp. from Pythagorean doctrine or mythology. Emp. himself follows the legend of the Pyth. school and attributes such a power of recollection to Pythagoras: *δωκεν τὰς νέεσσι* . . . *fr.* 129 (430 H.). See Append. x. The eager development—indeed, the cult—of the *μῆτις* in Pythagorean circles is well known. The invention of the myths describing the fountain of Mnemosyne in Hades may also be Pythagorean (see below). Throughout the various *δωκεμένους* of the soul it is the undying *μῆτις* that alone preserves the unity of personality which (as the *φύξι*) lives through all these transformations and is bound together in this way. It is evident how important this idea was for the doctrine of transmigration (it occurs also in the teaching of Buddha). Plato, like Empedokles, seems to have got the idea of an *ἀνέμνησις* reaching beyond the limits of the present life from the Pythagoreans: he, then, it is true, developed the idea in connexion with his own philosophy to unexpected conclusions (cf. further, Dieterich, *Nakya*, 122).

<sup>21</sup> *ψάλλε* is for him (not indeed in his words but in his intention as Arist. understood him): *αἰρία τὰς ἀναβῶν, τὸ δὲ μέγας τὰς κερδῶν*, *Metaph.* 985a, 4 ff.; 1073b, 1-7. Hence the *ψαλλόμενος* *Φιλόσοφος ἀναβῶντος ἐκέρδῃ* (*fr.* 35) is contrasted with *Μέγας κερδόμενος* (113, 14), *αἰδέμενος* (17, 19), *ἡγούμενος* (109). The *αἰδέμενος* in which only *ψάλλε* prevails while *μέγας* is completely vanquished, is called *μῆτις* *καταφύλας* *ψάλλου*, *fr.* 27, 28.

<sup>43</sup> *Psai* δολύχαλκον (*fr.* 20, 12, 23, 8). Exactly the same is said of the δολίμοις αὐτῶν φῶς δολύχαλκον μικροψύχων (115, 5). In the face of these expressions, so definitely setting a period to the lifetime of the gods, we must suppose that the epithets which Emp. applies to himself—he is to be in the future θεὸς ἀμφοτέρων ἐκ ἀν. θνητός, 112, 4—are merely intended to assert that he shall not die any more in his incarnation as a man (the same thing must be meant when those who are delivered from the circle of rebirth are called δολύχοι, ἀνελπί (147); the gods are only called ἀθάνατοι by traditional convention). Plutarch also, *Def. Or.* 16, p. 418 E, distinctly states that the δολίμοις of Emp. eventually die. That the gods (but not *vē* θεός itself) were liable to extinction had already been the opinion of Anaximander and Anaximenes. Acc. to Emp. the individual δολίμοις would be re-absorbed into the universal divinity, the *σφαῖρα* (just as the individual deities of the Stoics are reabsorbed at the world-conflagration into Zeus who is alone indestructible). [= U. 133, 141, 461, 460 K.]

<sup>44</sup> Emp., *fr.* 133, 134 (389-86), speaks of a supersensual divinity that is entirely *σφαῖρ ἱερή*: he gives to this divinity the name of Apollo, but the description is said to apply *κατὰ νομόν τῶν θεῶν*. Hipp., *RH.* vii, 28, p. 386 D.-S., refers the description to the *σφαῖρα*. The *σφαῖρα*, in which no witness is left was called by Emp. *ὁ θεός, ὁ εὐδαιμονότατος*; *θεός* (Arist., *An.* i, 5, 410b, 5-8; *Metaph.* ii, 4, 1000b, 3). It is, however, certain that Emp. would not have regarded the *σφαῖρα* as pure *σφαῖρ ἱερή*. It appears, in fact, that in the *σφαῖρα*, in which everything is together and united, even the divine power thought of as supersensual is brought to a close. In the world-state of multiplicity caused by *σφαῖρα* divinity seems to be regarded as separate from the elements and the forces. "Furious conflict" (115, 14) then attacks even the divinity and divides it against itself; hence the origin of individual δολίμοις as a self-caused division of the divine, a desertion from the One θεός—the individual δολίμοις are *φυγάδες θεῶν* (115, 13). These individual δολίμοις are entangled in the world from its origin until at last, having become purified, they rise again to the heights of divinity; and when all individuality is again fused into one by *φύσις* they return once more into the universal divinity in order with it to enter into the *σφαῖρα*.—Thus we may perhaps reconstruct the Empedoclean fantasy. His lines do not supply sufficient evidence for the complete reconstruction of his picture of the perpetually recurring process. We should naturally expect a certain obscurity to cling to this attempt to fuse together physiology and theology.

<sup>45</sup> Lucr. iii, 370-3.

<sup>46</sup> All that is essential on the subject of Democritus' doctrine of the soul is to be found in Arist., *An.* i, 2, p. 403b, 31-404a, 16; 405a, 7-13; i, 3, p. 406b, 15-22; *Resp.* iv, p. 471b, 30-472a, 17.—The air is full of the particles which Democritus calls *ψυαῖ* and *ψυαῖ*; *Resp.* 472a, 8-8 (*For.* ii, 36). The atoms hovering in the air become visible as "moles in the sunbeam"; of these some are the soul-atoms (this must be the meaning of *An.* 404a, 3 E.; Lamb. ap. Stob., *Ecl.* i, p. 384, 15 W., is only drawing upon Arist.). This is a modification of the opinion held by the Pythagoreans (mentioned also by Arist. 404a, 16 E.) that the moles in the sunbeam are "souls" (see above, chap. x, n. 34). Inhalation of the world-stuff as a condition of life in the individual is hinted at by Heraclitus (see S.E., *fr.* vii, 128).

<sup>47</sup> The soul acc. to Dem. *ψυαῖα μὲν τῶν σφαιρῶν, ὃ δὲ τὸ ψυαῖα καὶ σφαιρῶν καὶ σφαιρῶν*, Lamb. ap. Stob., *Ecl.* i, p. 384, 16 f. W.

# NOTES TO CHAPTER XI

not effected at a single blow death may, in consequence, times be only apparent; i.e. when many but not all the soul-particles have escaped. For this reason also, with the possible re-arrangement of the soul-atoms, *ἀναστροφὴ* of the apparently dead may occur. Cases of this kind seem to have been treated in the work *ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου*: see Procl., in Ep. ii, 113, 2 Kr.; D.L. ix, 46; it is counted among the most famous, or at least the most popular of Dem.'s writings in the anecdote ap. Ath. 168 B; cf. (Hyp.) Ep. 10, 2, p. 281 Hsch. [ix, 322 Lit.]; Voss, 35 C, 2. This view of the retention of vitality, of course, only applies to the period immediately following the (apparent) death (it is fairly correctly represented by (Phu.) Plac. Ph. 4, 4, 4 [Dox. 390]; it was probably attributed to Dem. on account of a similar observation made by Parmenides; see above, p. 373). Nevertheless, out of it grew up the assertion, which was then attributed to Dem., that in fact *τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν οὐρανῶν ἀναστρέφονται*: e.g. Alex. Aph. in Arist., Top. 21, 21; [Voss. ii, 38, 8]; Stob., Eccl. i, p. 477, 18 W. In the case, at least, of those that are really "dead", i.e. of bodies that have been deserted by all the soul-atoms, Dem. certainly never taught the presence of *ἀλκυον*: against the vulgarization of his opinions that would attribute such a view as this to him (as Epicurus himself did) the *Democritici* spoken of by Cic. (T.D. i, 82) made their protest.—The work *ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου* can certainly not have confined itself to considerations of a purely physical nature: otherwise Thrasyllus (D.L. ix, 46) could not have dismissed it among the *ῥητορικὰ ἔργα* of Dem. [Voss. ii, 18]. It is, indeed, difficult to imagine what from Dem.'s point of view there could have been to say about "the things in the Underworld". It is hardly possible to suppose (as Mullach, Dem. *fr.*, pp. 117-18, and Heyne do) that Dem. would think himself obliged either to answer or to parody the fabulous inventions of the poets about the realm of shadows. It is difficult to be certain that Dem. was really the author of the work: the forgery of later times was particularly fond of turning the most clear-headed of materialists into a mage and a jack-of-all-trades. (Dem.'s observations of the possibility of *ἀναστροφὴ* is in part at least the origin of the writing *μ. γ. ἐν Ἅιδου*: it is also responsible for the anecdote that makes him promise to the Persian king that he will restore his dead wife to life again, etc.—a variation of an ingenious story widely spread both in the East and the West. See my Lecture on Greek Novel-writing: *Lehrb. der Philologienwiss. zu Rostock*, 1875, p. 68 f.).—The "fragmenta moralia" of Dem. are with rare exceptions (e.g. Mull. *fr.* 7, 23, 48, 49, etc. = 146, 159, 147, 127 D.) wholesale fabrications of the feeblest kind. One of them, however (119 Mull., 297 D.), agrees at least with what Dem. may very well have said about the punishments in Hell (though in rather different words—he was incapable of quite such a monstrosity as *μυθεολογίαι*, which sounds very late Greek. Vain efforts have been made to justify this *μυθεολογία* by reference to the older *μυθεολογία*. But *μυθεολογία*, *μυθεολογία*, *μυθεολογία*, etc., are also old, and it is no secret that verbs derived by further extension from such composite verbal nouns are mostly late formations: thus *μυθεολογέω*, *μυθεολογῶ*, *μυθεολογῶν*, and again *μυθεολογῶν*, *μυθεολογῶν*, *μυθεολογῶν*, etc.). In another of these *ῥητορικὰ ἐργα* even of Dem.'s thought is to be found: *fr. moral.* 1 Mull. [171 D.] *φύξις ἀναγνώστου βέλματος*.

<sup>146</sup> Dem., whose inquiries set out from the study of inorganic nature,

was led to predicate a mechanical obedience to law in organic nature as well. Anaxagoras starting from the study of organic nature and in particular of man, its highest development, derived from that study the concept of purpose—purpose consciously undertaken and carried out—and this idea affected his outlook upon the whole of nature, including inorganic nature. This teleological system, regarded as of universal application, is made by him to depend on a Being modelled upon the human mind, the only source, in fact, from which he could have derived his experience of action carried out in accordance with pre-arranged purpose.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. here and on what follows, Heimerl, *Ber. d. Sächs. Ges. d. Wiss.* 1890, pp. 1 ff.

<sup>107</sup> *νοῦς* must be omniscient if it *γνώμην ἐπεὶ παντός ἔχει* (fr. 635. = 12 D.). It has organized (*βιολόγησας*) not only what was and is but also what is to be: fr. 6, 12 [12, 14 D.].

<sup>108</sup> Arist., *Ph.* 256b, 24 ff.

<sup>109</sup> *ὁ γὰρ νοῦς* (of Anaxag.) *ἐστὶ*: Arist., *Metaph.* 1049b, 31. On the other hand, *πρῶτα δέοντα πλάθας*: Anaxag. fr. 1.

<sup>110</sup> *Ἀνοργανότατος θεὸς τὸν νοῦν ποιῶν εὐδαίμων εὐδαίμων τῶν ἄλλων ἔχειν*. Arist., *Ac.* i, 2, p. 405b, 18 ff.; cf. iii, 4, p. 429b, 23 f.

<sup>111</sup> Anaxag. fr. 6 [12]: *τὰ μὲν ἅλλα <πάντα> πάντες μοῖραν μετέχει, νοῦς δὲ ὅτις ἀκίνητος καὶ αὐτοκρατής καὶ μέγιστος εὐδαίμων χρεῖται, ἀλλὰ πάντες αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἵσται*. (Ἄνευρος does not seem to supply the required opposition to what preceds: ? *ἐν ἑαυτῷ*. Anaxag. used the word of *νοῦς* acc. to Arist., *Ac.* 403a, 18; 429b, 23. Zeller also suggests *ἐν ἑαυτῷ*, *Arché* f. G. d. Philol. v, 441.)

<sup>112</sup> *ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα καὶ τὰ ἐλάττω, εὐδαίμων νόος ἀπείρητος καὶ τῇ περιχωρήσει τῇ ἀνπαύσει νόος ἐκράτης, ὥστε περιχωρήσει τῇ ἀρχῇ*. fr. 6 [12]. This *ἀνπαύει* at the beginning of the *περιχωρήσει* cannot at any rate take place by the inter-mixture of *νοῦς* in the *εὐδαίμων* or by the entry of *νοῦς* into these. Because *νοῦς* is both *εὐδαίμων* and *ἀμείων*, it *ὑποταίη ἐν ἀμείων ὡς*, Arist., *Ph.* 256b, 27; cf. 429a, 18. Does this also apply to *νοῦς* when it *τὸν θυγχεῖ ἐκράτης κρατῶν*? And yet in this case it appears to be divided, as *μέγιστος* or *ἐλάττω* in each case, in the *ψυχή*.—No one can help being reminded here of the insoluble *aporiai* raised in Aristotle's own doctrine of the active *νοῦς* which, in this case too, is *εὐδαίμων*, *ἀμείων*, *χωριστός* from the body; is also deprived of all attributes of individuality (which reside entirely in the lower psychical powers) and thus appears as a common divine spirit. And yet it is said to be a *μέγιστος τῇ ψυχῇ*, present *ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*, dwelling inside the body yet having nothing in common with it, and in any case is thought of as an individual mind. In the case of Anaxagoras the same *aporiai* apply also to the nourishing, feeling, desiring, and moving soul (as it is called by Arist.); for all the "parts" of the soul are included almost indistinguishably by him under the conception of *νοῦς*.—The difficulty of reconciling the unity and inward continuity of the spiritual (immaterial, that cannot be thought of as divided)—with its individuation and distribution into the multiplicity of souls, is one which repeatedly occurs in Greek philosophy.

<sup>113</sup> *ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἵσται*, Pl., *Crat.* 413 C.

<sup>114</sup> *ἐν παντί παντός μοῖραν ἔχειν* *πλήρ' ὅσον*: *ἐντι ὅσον* *δὲ καὶ νόος* *ἐστὶ*, fr. 3 [13].

<sup>115</sup> *νόος δὲ πᾶς ὁμοῦς ἐστι καὶ ὁ μέγιστος καὶ ὁ ἐλάχιστος*, fr. 6 [12].

<sup>116</sup> Arist., *Ac.* i, 2, p. 404b, 1-7: Anaxag. often gives *τὸν νοῦν* as *τὸ εἶναι τοῦ καλῆς καὶ ἀρῆς*: *ἐν ἑαυτῷ δὲ* (he says) *εὐδαίμων ἐστὶ τὴν θυγχεῖ*: *ἐν ἑαυτῷ γὰρ ἐκράτης εὐδαίμων* *καὶ μέγιστος καὶ ἀμείων*



and various *καὶ ἀντιστρέφουσιν* (in which case the *νοῦς* that dwells within all the *ζῷα* cannot be any longer regarded as *ὁ κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχόμενος νοῦς*). Anaxag. had expressed himself indistinctly: *ἔρως ἀποσφίγει νοῦν πάντας* (i.e. the relation between *νοῦς* and *φύξις*). Cf. 405a, 13 f. In the sense of the words as used by Anaxagoras *νοῦς* and *φύξις* were simply identified by Plato: *Crat.* 400 A.

<sup>116</sup> D.L. ii, 8 (1'ors. 375). Acc. to Anaxag. the moon has *εὐφροσύνη* (*δὲλα καὶ ἀφῆες καὶ φάσγαντες*). Fr. 10 [6] probably refers to the moon and other *ζῷα* in the moon (to whom yet another moon gives light). Anaxag. *τῷ αὐτῷ γὰρ ὅποιε εἶναι* (i.e. an inhabitable heavenly body like the earth), Pl. *Ap.* 28 D; cf. Hippol., *R.H.* i, 2, 10, p. 22, 40 D.-S.—We are reminded of the Orphico-Pythagorean fantasies about life on the moon (see above, chap. x, n. 78).

<sup>117</sup> Anaxag. counted the plants as *ζῷα* and ascribed emotions to them: *ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας* (Arist.) *Plant.* 815a, 18. Like Plato and Democritus Anaxag. also regarded plants as *ζῷα θυμια*: Plu., *QN.* i, 811 D.

<sup>118</sup> In spite of its entry into *χρῆματα*, *νοῦς* is yet said to remain "unmixed" and unaffected by them: *ἀντοκρίνομεν γὰρ αὐτὸν ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸν μὲγαλινον πάντα φασὶν αὐτὸν ποιεῖν τὰ πράγματα ὅλ' ὅσονταί τε*. Pl., *Crat.* 413 C. We thus have at the same time *ἀπὸ μίξεως ἴσως* and denial of mixture which is reiterated in stronger and stronger language. Thus *νοῦς* even so remains still *ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ* (εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ ἦν, ὁλόκληρὸν τὸν ἐμμένοντα ἂν· ματαίῳ δὲ ἂν ἀνέστην χρῆματ' εἰ ἐμμένοντό ταν· ἐν παντί γὰρ ταῦτάς καί ποτε εἴσονται κτλ.). So perhaps we should read fr. 6 [12] restoring a completed syllogism. In the traditional text the clause *εἰ ἐμμένοντό ταν* is superfluous and in the way). It takes no particle of the others into itself.

<sup>119</sup> [Plu.] *Plac. Phil.* 5, 25, 2 (Act., *Dox.* 437: 1'ors. 397, 16), in the chap. *νοῦς* ὅσονταί τε ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν τὰ πράγματα ὅλ' ὅσονταί τε. Anaxag. taught: *εἶναι δὲ καὶ φύξις θάνατος τὰς ἀναμεικτάς*. Nothing else can be meant by the words—the theme of the chapter alone shows it—than: the death of the soul (as well as of the body) occurs with its separation (from the body). *τὰς ἀναμεικτάς* is subject and *αὐτὸν ποιεῖν τὰ πράγματα* predicate of the sentence (not the other way round as Sebeok seems to think: *Ges. d. Psychol.* i, 285). The violent alteration proposed by Wyttienbach (*de immort. animi*, Opusc. ii, 597 f.) has not the smallest justification: *εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὰς θάνατος φύξις ἀναμεικτὰς καὶ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν*. There could have been no reason at all in appealing especially to Anaxagoras for a confirmation of the popular conception of death (it would be nothing more). Further, in this particular connexion such a definition of death is quite out of place: since the theme of the chap. is only to ask the question whether death also affects the soul, not what it is. *φύξις* here must mean the individual soul, not the *νοῦς* which is the basis of the individual souls. Anaxag. made the individual soul perish at death—so much is certain. It must be admitted that we cannot say for certain whether the Placita are referring to an actual utterance of Anaxag. or are only drawing conclusions from his teaching.

<sup>120</sup> fr. 17 [17].

## CHAPTER XII

### THE LAY AUTHORS

Theology and Philosophy, each in its own way attempting to go beyond inadequate popular belief, could only very gradually transcend the limits of those narrow communities within which their influence was first felt and reach the circles in which that popular belief held sway. During the earliest successes of the theological and philosophical spirit hardly a voice was raised that might have suggested that the belief in the imperishability and divine nature of the human Soul, of the inherence of all things spiritual in one imperishable, fundamental substance, might become something more than a mystery known to the wise and illuminated, and enter into the convictions of the people and the unlearned. "After the death of the body, the Image of Life remains alive; for that alone is descended from the gods"—such is the announcement of Pindar. But for all the confidence with which, as though anticipating no contradiction, he here proclaims the view of the soul's immortality and bases it upon its divine nature, such an opinion can at that time have been no more than the persuasion of isolated communities formed and instructed in that particular doctrine. It cannot be merely accidental,<sup>1</sup> that in the fragments which have come down to us of the lyric and semi-lyric (elegiac and iambic) poetry—poetry intended for a wide and unspecialized public and expressing feelings and ideas in language that all could understand—hardly a trace appears of that enhanced conception of the worth and nature of the Soul. Reflexion does not linger over such dark subjects; whenever they are illuminated for a passing moment, we discern the outlines of those figures from the spirit world just as the Homeric imagination had given them shape.

Life and light are only to be found in this world; <sup>2</sup> Death, to which we are all "owing", <sup>3</sup> leads the soul into a realm of nothingness. <sup>4</sup> Inarticulate, voiceless, the dead man lies in the grave like a statue. <sup>5</sup> Upon earth, and not in any shadowy hereafter, is completed that judgment <sup>6</sup> which divine Justice passes upon the criminal himself, or upon his descendants in whom something of him still lives on. It is the lack of such descendants that forms the bitterest pang, as he goes down to Hades, of the man who passes childless out of this life. <sup>7</sup>

More distinctly and bitterly, in this age of advancing civilization and growing sensibility, sounds the wail over the pain and affliction of life, the obscurity of its ways, and the uncertainty of its outcome.<sup>8</sup> Silenus, the prophetic wood-spirit, so went the ancient legend, when captured by King Midas in his rose-gardens at Bermios earned his release with the judgment of melancholy wisdom that the Greek was never tired of repeating in ever-varying forms—*not to be born is the best thing for men, but having been born, let him pray that he may return as soon as possible to the kingdom of Night,<sup>9</sup> and of Hades.<sup>10</sup>* The cheerful enjoyment of life is no longer so sure of itself as once it had been in the days of its naive confidence; and yet there is no substitute attempted, no compensatory hereafter in a next world of justice and untroubled happiness. We rather hear the opinion expressed that rest is the greatest of all earthly blessings; and rest is brought by Death. Nevertheless there is little demand for consolation; a robust and virile sense of life that can put up with whatever may befall of evil or hardship in healthy indifference, is in the air, and speaks to us from many a page of this portic legacy with unpretending veracity. No attempt is made to smooth over the hardship and cruelty of life. Man's power is small, his efforts go unrewarded, one necessity after another besets his short life; over all alike hangs the shadow of inevitable death. All things come at last to the awful chasm—the bravest virtue and the highest authority in the world.<sup>11</sup> Yet life is good and death an evil; else, why do the blessed gods not die? asks Sappho<sup>12</sup> with feminine naiveté; though indeed, her life's path had lain through the deepest valley of the shadow. Even the dead man, if he wishes to be preserved from utter nothingness, must depend upon the world of the living as the only place of reality; the fame of his virtues and his deeds is all that outlasts his death.<sup>13</sup> Perhaps some dim perception of that fame reaches even to the dead.<sup>14</sup> They themselves are for the living as though they had passed into nothingness; we should not, thinks a poet, give them another thought after we have buried them.<sup>15</sup>

Here even the time-honoured conventions associated with the cult of souls seem to be perversely cast aside. In general, the poet with his wide-ranging observation of mankind had small occasion to be reminded of the cult of the soul that the narrow circles of family or city offered to their dead, or of the conceptions thereby encouraged of the continued life enjoyed by the departed. The omission is supplied by the Orators of the fifth and fourth centuries and by what they say—and do

not say—of the state of things hereafter. The greatest period of lyric poetry was by that time already fading into the past, and yet whoever wished in speaking before a citizen assembly to meet with general agreement and understanding was still obliged to refrain from speaking of the blessed immortality, the eternity and divinity of the soul. The Orators<sup>18</sup> never pass beyond the conceptions of the survival, power, and rights of the souls of the departed which were called forth and maintained in existence by the cult of the soul. The continued existence of the souls in the next world is not called in question; but the opinion that the souls still preserve their consciousness and have any knowledge of what happens on this earth is only expressed with the most cautious avoidance of definiteness.<sup>19</sup> What—apart from the sacrificial offerings of their relatives—still binds the dead to the life upon earth, is little more than the fame accorded to them among the living.<sup>20</sup> Even in the elevated language of solemn funeral orations the consolations offered to the survivors omit all mention of any enhanced state of being, any thought of immortal life in fully-conscious blessedness, that might belong now to the glorious departed.<sup>21</sup> Such high visions and hopes for the future were still, it appears, as little necessary or demanded for the comfort of the people as they had been in the times of the great wars of liberty.<sup>22</sup> The beloved dead who had given their lives for their country in those wars, as well as many others of the time whom death had overtaken, were the recipients of the epitaphs composed by Simonides the master of brilliant and condensed inscriptions. Nevertheless, not once does he vouchsafe a word that might point forward to a land of blessed immortality for the departed. There is a vestige of life still remaining for the dead—but it is in this world: the memory of the living and their own great name honoured by alter generations is all that can prolong their existence.

It seems like an echo from another world when (about the middle of the fifth century) Melanippides the dithyrambic poet addresses a god in the words: "Hear me Father, marvel of all mortal men, Thou that rulest over the *everliving Souls*." The words must be addressed to Dionysos;<sup>23</sup> for such as entered into the magic circle of his mighty festival those visions of the imperishability of the human soul and its divine power acquired reality. Such wisdom received but partial assent from those who lived unaffected by the conceptions of isolated sects of the theologically or philosophically

## § 2

A peculiar position is taken up by Pindar. Two contrasted views of the nature, origin, and destiny of the soul seem to be combined in his mind with equal claim to authority.

In the Victory Odes allusions predominate which imply an agreement with the popular view expressed in the sayings of poets and the presuppositions of the cult of souls and the worship of Heroes. After its separation from the body, the soul disappears into the underworld.<sup>33</sup> The piety and affectionate memory of relatives and descendants remains as a link between the dead and the living; <sup>34</sup> whether the soul itself is still conscious of any connexion with the world of the living seems uncertain.<sup>35</sup> Its power is over and done with—it is certainly no condition of blessed happiness into which it has entered. Only the glorious name, the fame that is honoured in song, rewards the great deeds of the virtuous after death.<sup>36</sup>

An exalted state of being, after their departure from this earth, is attributed to the Heroes alone. The belief in the existence, importance, and power of these illuminated spirits holds complete sway; <sup>37</sup> it emerges in lively reality from the words and narrations of the poet throughout all his work. Moreover, the ancient conception—in reality rendered untenable by the belief in Heroes—that only with the undivided union of body and soul is complete life imaginable, is discernible in many allusions and stories of Translation that imply that conception. Amphiaraios, the most illustrious of those who have been translated to everlasting life, is specially dear to the heart of the Theban poet, and is glorified more than once in the language of unaffected faith in such miracles.<sup>38</sup> But, further, even when death has occurred in the meantime, elevation to a higher life remains possible—even beyond the heights of the "Hero". Semele lives for ever, though she died under the crash of the thunder-bolt.<sup>39</sup> The barrier between men and gods is not insuperable; we can distantly approach the immortals not only in greatness of mind, but in bodily vigour.<sup>40</sup> One mother gave birth to both races, though the gulf between them is indeed a deep one; man is nought—a shadow's dream-image; for the gods the brazen heavens remain for ever as an unconquerable stronghold.<sup>41</sup> Only a miracle of divine interference with the lawful and normal course of nature, can raise the individual soul to the everlasting life of the gods and Heroes.

Such visions as these could be indulged in by one who still

kept his feet firmly fixed upon the ground of popular belief. And yet side by side with them in Pindar's works are to be found descriptions of quite another order in which is expressed, with elaborate fullness and dogmatic exactitude, a complete doctrine of the nature, destiny, and fate of the soul: passages in which, in spite of some little poetic licence in detail, a well ordered and, in the main, consistent whole is pictured.

The Soul, the "Image of Life", the other Self of the living and visible man, sleeps while the limbs of man are active; when the individual is asleep it shows him dream-visions of the future.<sup>24</sup> This psyche<sup>25</sup> which during the waking and conscious hours of the man is itself lying in the darkness of unconsciousness, is far from being the totality of mental powers gathered together in a single creature, or at any rate, in a single concept, such as the philosophers as well as the everyday use of the word at that period understood by the name "psyche". Here, again, the name once more denotes the double of mankind dwelling within the living man such as it was known to primeval popular belief and to the Homeric poems. A theological meaning has, however, been added to it. This "Image" of man, we are told, "is alone descended from the gods," and with this the reason also is discovered why the soul-image alone after the destruction of the body by death remains alive.<sup>26</sup>

Derived from the gods and therefore eternally exempt from destruction, everlasting and immortal, the soul is none the less condemned to finiteness; it dwells within the mortal body of man. This is the result of the "ancient guilt" of which, quite in the manner of theological poetry, Pindar also speaks.<sup>27</sup> After the death of the body it is to await in Hades the stern sentence that "One" shall pronounce over its earthly deeds.<sup>28</sup> For the condemned there is in store "affliction past beholding"<sup>29</sup> in deep Tartaros, "where the slow rivers of murky night spit out endless darkness," and forgetfulness encloses the victims.<sup>30</sup> The just enter into the subterranean places of bliss where the sun gives them light when he has set upon earth.<sup>31</sup> In flowery meadows they enjoy an existence of resplendent idleness, such as only the Greek imagination, nourished amid the artistic surroundings of Greek life, could describe without falling into emptiness and futility.

But the soul has not even so found its last resting place. It must again give life to a body and not until it has completed upon earth a third faultless life can it hope for an end of its earthly course of being.<sup>32</sup> The conditions of each new life

upon earth depend upon the degree of purity that the soul has achieved in its previous lifetimes. When at last the Queen of the Underworld considers that its "ancient guilt" has been atoned for, she sends forth the souls after the ninth year<sup>40</sup> of their last sojourn in Hades once more to live in the upper world, this time in happiness. Here they pass through one more lifetime as kings, mighty men of valour, and Wise Men.<sup>41</sup> Then at last they escape from the necessity of earthly rebirth. As "Heroes" they are honoured among men;<sup>42</sup> and they have therefore entered into a state of higher being which the popular belief of Pindar's time ascribed not only to the souls of the great ancestral figures of the past, but also to many who had departed hence in more recent times after a life of valour and service.<sup>43</sup> Now they are beyond the reach of Hades as much as of the world of men. Faith seeks them in "Islands of the Blest" far out in Okeanos; thither, to the "Citadel of Kronos" they travel on the "Way of Zeus"<sup>44</sup> and enjoy, in company with the great ones of the past, under the protection of Kronos<sup>45</sup> and his assessor Rhadamanthys, a life of bliss for ever undisturbed.

Such conceptions of the origin, fortunes, and ultimate destiny of the soul, the more they diverge from commonly held opinions, the more certainly must they be regarded as being part of the private and real persuasion of the poet himself. The poet, who on other occasions when he makes passing and casual reference to the things of the next world accommodates himself to the traditional view, gives himself up willingly to such hopes and aspirations where the circumstances of his song provided an opportunity of dealing at length with such matters—especially in hymns of mourning for the dead. He may have paid attention in such poems to the special opinions of those who were to be the first hearers of his song. Theron, the ruler of Akragas, to whom was dedicated the second Olympian Ode of Victory that deals so fully with the hope of bliss to come, was an old man whose thoughts might well be occupied with the life after death.<sup>46</sup> In this case, therefore, we may presume perhaps the special interest of the person whose praises are sung in these reflections that lead so far away from the commonly accepted view of the Soul.<sup>47</sup> But that Pindar, proud and self-willed, conscious of special knowledge and proud of that consciousness, should have given expression to strange doctrine so foreign to popular ideas simply out of complaisance to another's will, and in subservience to another man's belief—that is quite unthinkable. It is rather the substance of what he believes himself

and has achieved by his own struggles that in a solemn hour he reveals for a moment to like-minded friends.

The different elements out of which Pindar has composed his special view are not hard to distinguish. He is following theological doctrine in what he tells of the divine origin of the soul, its wanderings through several bodies, the judgment in Hades, the special place assigned to the just, and that of the wicked. But it is layman's theology that he is propounding; it does not bind itself to a single unalterable formula, and betrays throughout that its exponent is a poet. Pindar, throughout the whole of his poetic activity, combines the office of singer with that of professional teacher, more especially where he has to speak of the things of an invisible divine world. But for all his didactic professionalism he remains the poet, for whom as depository and trustee of the Myth it is out of the question to abandon the traditional, whether in legend or belief. His task is to keep pure what has been handed down to him, to make it more profound, perhaps to supplement and complete it, but with all this to justify it. Thus, poetic legend and popular belief enter even into his theologian's doctrine of the Soul; the Islands of the Blest, the elevation of man to Hero—these were things he could not give up.

From what particular direction Pindar's theological interests may have come to him we cannot say with precision or certainty. Orphic as well as Pythagorean doctrines may have come to his notice in Sicily whither he made repeated visits after 477 B.C.<sup>46</sup> For both sects this country was the original nursery and breeding ground.

There, too, the poet may perhaps have (even at that date) met with certain varieties of the Orphic mystical doctrine which, like his own views, were intermingled with elements taken from conventional mythology. Examples of this type of Orphic mysticism allied with foreign elements are the verses which, inscribed upon gold tablets, were found not long ago in graves near the ancient Sybaris.<sup>47</sup> Three of these poems begin with phrases that are common to them all, and imply the same underlying conceptions; after that they part company and represent two different views. The soul of the dead person<sup>48</sup> thus addresses itself to the Queen of the lower world, and the other gods of the depths below: "I draw near to you purified and born of pure parents."<sup>49</sup> It belongs then to a mortal who, like his parents before him, has been "purified" in the sacred mysteries of a religious association.<sup>50</sup> It claims also to be descended from the blessed race of the deities of the lower



world.<sup>8</sup>

sions

some,

expressed: the Soul has now at last escaped entirely from the "Circle of Births",<sup>44</sup> and it enters as it tells us "with speedy feet into the wished-for precinct",<sup>45</sup> and buries itself in the bosom of the Queen of the Underworld.<sup>46</sup> It is the latter, probably, who at the end greets the liberated soul with the words: "Fortunate and to be called Blessed art thou; now shalt thou be, instead of a mortal—a god."

Much less exalted are the hopes expressed in the other two versions of the mystic document—two versions that resemble each other in most essentials. Here the soul asserts that it has done penance for unrighteous deeds; now it appears before the revered Persephoneia to implore her graciously to send it to the dwelling places of the pure and the holy.<sup>47</sup>

How are we to explain the discrepancy? It would indeed be possible to explain the more restrained version as that of a sect whose members were less confident of their own divine origin and of the necessary return of the soul at last to its enfranchised divine state. It is much more probable, however—since in fact the presupposition of the divine nature of the soul and its kinship with the divine is really made in both cases and with the same words—that we here have to do with the beliefs of one and the same sect, and that the varying heights of felicity aspired to correspond to different stages of the process of redemption. He who through participation in the sacred mysteries has atoned for the ancient guilt, can be admitted by the goddess into the paradise of the blest in the midst of Hades. But he must still, in subsequent rebirths upon earth first complete the cycle before he can be fully released from rebirth and become once more what he was at the beginning, entirely a god. The dead man of the first tablet has reached the final goal of his pilgrimage; the other two have only reached an intermediate resting place.<sup>48</sup> Another inscription, found in a grave of the same neighbourhood,<sup>49</sup> by its use of a mystic formula<sup>50</sup> appended also to the first version of the above-mentioned poems, reveals itself as an expression of faith deriving from the same sect. Among a variety of disconnected instructions and appeals to the dead,<sup>51</sup> strung together with no particular arrangement, it contains the following statement: "a god hast thou become instead of a mortal." This then always remained the crowning point of the salvation promised by the sect.

In the cult and beliefs of this sect which thus with divided voice speaks to us in these verses, the worship of the ancient Greek divinities of the Underworld (among whom Dionysos is not this time included) was fused with the boldest conception belonging to the Dionysiac mysteries: the confident assurance that the divine nature of the soul must in the end break through, purified and triumphant over the earthliness that obscured it. Pindar in another, but not very different, way has brought the same elements into conjunction. One would indeed like to be able to estimate the influence which his doctrine, which lay so close to his own heart, may have exercised on the hearers and readers of his poems. He was at once something more and something less than a theological teacher. Never again among the Greeks did the blessed life of the sanctified soul receive such majestic expression, clothed in such ample and resplendent diction, as that which poured so freely from the heart of this richly gifted poet. But though the poet may have touched the heart of his hearer and tempted his imagination to stray along the path laid out for him, yet it cannot have been easy (and perhaps the greatness of the poet's triumph almost made it harder) permanently to mistake the magic gleam of poetry for the sunlight of reality. One may doubt whether the poems in which Pindar recounted his dreams of future blessedness can have found many hearers in whom they awakened not merely æsthetic satisfaction, but belief in the literal truth of the teaching, in the reality of those beautiful, dim, haloed figures.

## § 3

But perhaps by the expression of such doubts we do less than justice to the influence which a Greek poet might exercise upon the minds and dispositions of his hearers. Greek popular opinion was very much inclined to place the poet on a pedestal to which his modern representative would hardly care to aspire, and to which at any rate he could never attain. The purely artistic value and importance of a poem did not seem to be impaired by the demand that it should at the same time instruct and edify. The poet was to be the teacher of his people in an age when, in the conditions of Greek life, the people had no other instructor. He was to be a teacher in the highest sense of all when, speaking in the language of the most exalted poetry, he dealt with the doubts and certainties of religion and the relationship between religion and morality. In these matters he could supplement out of the wealth of

his own far-reaching reflection what was lacking in the public morality of the time through the absence of an official, authoritative religious Book. By giving them intelligible and memorable expression, together with greater cohesion and unity, he could strengthen the foundations of the common stock of moral ideas that had been evolved in the course of social and city life. He might also expand and give greater depth to the ideas of popular morality, tempering them in the fire of his own more rigorous thought and interpreting and refining them from the heights of a more elevated understanding of the divine. What he thus gave back to the people stamped with the impress of his own very personal temperament and outlook, no longer remained the casual opinion of a single individual, but took root in suitably constituted minds and became for many a valued possession, an enduring addition to their consciousness.

It was not until the rise in later times of a fully developed philosophy extending its range of interpretation to the whole of life that poetry was deprived of its special office of instructress to the aspiring minds among the people.<sup>63</sup> Poetry had always been willing to exercise this function, but never so decidedly or with such fully conscious purpose as in the times of transition at the beginning of which Pindar lived—the transition from an unsophisticated faith in the traditional view of all things visible and invisible to a fresh stabilization of belief secured by, and resting upon, philosophic conviction. The need felt for the readjustment or verification of the ancestral or traditional forms of belief was vividly awakened, and it was still only poetry that could extend the light of its teaching to illuminate the minds of whole classes of the population. The influence of the poets must have increased in proportion as the numbers increased of those who were ready to receive the special bounty which they were able to offer. But if the influence wielded by Pindar, the Pan-Hellenic poet of the great Festivals, as the teacher of his people was, as we have seen, considerable, a very wide field indeed for the propagation of fruitful ideas lay open to the Attic tragedians in the huge concourse of the people which flocked together to hear their creations—a multitude which seemed all the greater for being confined within a narrower space. The poets themselves frequently allow it to be seen how seriously they regarded themselves as the teachers of their public, and the people admitted their claims. All men expected and demanded instruction from the word of the poet—the highest instruction from the highest poetry.<sup>64</sup> We shall not be much mistaken

if we believe that the opinions and reflections to which Aeschylus, Sophokles, and not least Euripides, gave utterance in their tragic drama did not remain the sole property of those in whose minds they had first arisen.

### § 3

The Attic Tragedy of the fifth century must of its own accord, even if the conscious purpose of the dramatists had not tended in the same direction, have developed into an artistic product based on psychological interest. The real theatre of that drama must inevitably have become the interior of its hero's mind.

The tragic poet attempted something hitherto unknown. The characters and events of ancient legend or history which had passed shadowlike before the minds of the hearers or readers of all earlier poetry, at the mercy of those hearers' own private and variously limited imagination—these same events and characters were now to take form and body and appear visibly before the eyes of all beholders alike in equal clearness. What had hitherto seemed a dream-vision of the imagination now visibly presented itself to the eyes of the beholder, unchanging, precise, independent of the limitations of intellect among the audience, a concrete and self-moving object of waking perception. Thus reawakened to a palpable and fully realized life, the myth was seen in a new light. What in it was mere incident became subordinated to the personality of the man who plays his part in these events before our eyes, and whose importance and content is not exhausted in the single particular action. The old legend in becoming drama has undergone an extension both spatial and temporal, and even in externals the plot that unfolds itself in a series of momentary acts plays the least part in the story. The speeches and counter-speeches of the hero and the other actors who take part in the story were bound to take up the greater part of the time. Motives of action, expressed, debated and fought out in words, become more important than their eventual outcome in passionate deed or mortal woe. With the advance of artistic skill the intellect seeks to grasp the permanent outlines of the character that in the given circumstances can be moved by particular motives to particular acts. Thus, the complete materialization of the myth leads to its complete spiritualization. The eyes and mind of the beholder are directed less to the external events—these, being familiar from the ancient legend, could

awaken little curiosity—and more to the inward meaning and import of what the hero does and suffers.

And it was here that the dramatic poet was faced with his special and peculiar problem. What was to happen in his drama was settled out of hand by the course of the ancient legend (in a few cases by the course of historical events) and the lines along which his invention must move were planned out for him in advance. To give life to the personages of the drama, motivation and justification to the events of the drama—that was his particular business. But in this he was thrown entirely upon his own resources. Even if he could he was not permitted to derive the inner motive forces of the action from the real modes of feeling and thinking that had belonged to the distant past in which the myth had first been conceived. Such motives would have remained unintelligible to the audience, and his play would have been stillborn. But on the other hand, how was he to make plausible and intelligible to the vastly different mentality and changed feelings of the age in which he lived actions which really sprang from the habits and moral ideas of a long since vanished age? It is open to him (if he is not content to be a mere annalist simply stringing together bare events) to take the actual incident given him by the mythical legend and set over against it the actor in the story whose emotions are those of a modern man, and upon whose shoulders the burden of the event is laid; he may represent this opposition as beyond reconciliation, and so lead to the most simple and overwhelming of tragic conflicts. This simple opposition of character and destiny which places both the poet and his hero—another Hamlet—in a position of direct hostility to the mythological background can, however, never become the rule. It is the business of the poet as far as possible to assimilate and make his own the spirit that actually called forth the dark and cruel legend of the past, while yet remaining true to the mode of perception proper to his own time. He must manage to leave undisturbed the full primitive sense of the mythical story and bring it about that by its marriage with the spirit of a later age its meaning is not destroyed but deepened. He is committed to the search for an adjustment between the mental attitudes of an older and a newer age.

Such an adjustment came most easily to Aeschylus and satisfied the needs of his temperament. As one who had grown to manhood in the Athens of the period before the Persian wars his own character had its roots in ancient and traditional modes of thought. These he built up under the guiding

influence of his own special ways of thinking and feeling into a new and loftier whole: to corroborate this whole, which appeared to him as a law of the moral world, by reference to typical examples taken from mythology—examples chosen by him with deliberate care to serve as subjects of his dramatic poetry—this was one of the chief aims of his art. To the plot in its moral—nay, its religious—sense, all his thoughts are directed; the characters of the actors themselves are only illuminated from the standpoint of this special interest; their wider, independent existence outside the life of the drama which completely envelopes them is not meant to draw attention to itself. He himself gives us the right, in studying his plays, to leave out of sight for a moment the representational aspect of the particular and the personal—all that in fact makes them essentially works of art—in order to observe more closely the under-current of generalized belief which we may reasonably call the ethic and theology of the poet.

Behind the living tissue of his artistic creation Aeschylus allows us to perceive pretty clearly the firm outlines of his own ethical and religious convictions. He fuses together elements prescribed to him from without with that which was dictated by his own spirit. What is prescribed to him by legend—which he allows to run its full course, in strictly dramatic form and by preference as a trilogy, a form in this case uniquely adapted to the subject—is a history that deals with the continued operation of the forces of evil and suffering upon several generations of a family, persisting from father to son and from son to son's son. The belief also in such interconnexion of human destinies is prescribed to him from without. That the sins of the ancestors were visited upon their descendants here upon earth was an ancient article of faith especially strong in Attica.<sup>46</sup> What Aeschylus contributes on his part is the unswerving conviction that the son and grandson of the sinner are punished for their own sin too. Suffering is punishment,<sup>47</sup> and suffering would not have overtaken Oedipus, nor the sons of Oedipus, if Laios had been the only guilty one—if their own sin had not deserved punishment.

And yet it does not lie within their power to choose whether the guilt shall be theirs or not: they cannot escape the deed of sin. How, we may ask, can a guilty deed be necessitated, imposed upon the guilty one by the decree of a higher power, and yet at the same time the *fault* of the doer of the deed, as though he had acted of his own free will?

The question is a perplexing and a formidable one, and it was by no means unnoticed by the poet. Behind the external apparatus of myth he finds himself faced by the problem of the freedom or determination of man's will, which, as civilization and culture advance, feels itself morally responsible for every decision. He finds a way out of the difficulty in the view that it is not merely the deed of wickedness itself, but the conscious decision that leads up to the deed that arises out of the family inheritance of crime. The conscious choice and decision, though regarded as necessary, seemed to demonstrate fully the personal guilt and responsibility of the doer.<sup>67</sup> The cloud of evil that proceeds from the deed of the ancestor casts a dark shadow also over the minds of his son and his son's son. Not from his own mind or character does the will to do wrong take its origin. The noble, pure and resolute Eteokles, the model of intelligent manhood, the shield and protection of his people, falls in a moment, a victim to ominous destiny; his clear-sighted spirit is darkened, he gives himself up—his better self—for lost,<sup>68</sup> and rushes upon his doom with awful resolve. The "sins derived from his ancestors"<sup>69</sup> drive him on. Then, and not till then, is the full measure of penance at last paid for the crime done by the ancestor;<sup>70</sup> his descendants are his representatives, and become guilty on his behalf and then, for their own guilt as well as his, they suffer retribution. Divinity, or a spirit of vengeance sent with a divine mission, drives the victims burdened with the inheritance of crime to the criminal deed. The divine guidance is actuated no longer, as in ancient and undying popular belief, by personal desire of vengeance, anger or malice,<sup>71</sup> but by divine justice, acting with "just deceit,"<sup>72</sup> that the measure of guilt may be fulfilled, and that the divine will to justice may have a means to complete satisfaction. The evil Spirit of the House assists Klytæmnestra to conceive the thought of murdering her husband;<sup>73</sup> God himself guides and urges forward Orestes to the act of matricide which he plans and carries out with fully conscious purpose—a crime that is also a duty. To the poet the old ideas of the duty of avenging murder are a very living reality. The right to worship and cult possessed by the souls, their claim to vengeance when they have been violently done to death, their ghostly influence exerted upon the life and destinies of their immediate kinsfolk upon whom the duty of taking vengeance rests—all these things are for him not the obsolete fancies of an older generation but true and awful realities.<sup>74</sup> Whole dramas, the *Choephorai* and the *Eumenides*, for

instance, would appear as a meaningless beating of the air if they were not animated and made significant by unaltered faith in the right and the might of the souls, the reality and potency of the daimonic counsel, the Erinyes,<sup>76</sup> who appear on behalf of the murdered mother. And now at last light breaks through the dark and clouded sky of awful imagination: where Duty and Crime have become inextricably confused, divine grace, though yielding nothing of its rights, finds at last a solution.

All these things, however—conflict and solution, crime and its expiation in ever-renewed crime and the suffering that arises thence—fulfil themselves in *this* world. Guilt is avenged always upon earth. The "other" world is by no means an indispensable link in this chain of conceptions and fancies: the poet's view is rarely turned in that direction. Speculation upon the state of the soul after death, upon a blessed life in the kingdom of the spirits,<sup>77</sup> does not interest him. Only such portions of the eschatological imaginings of the theologians as might serve the purposes of moral inspiration or support, found favour with the poet. There are occasional allusions to the judgment that, in Hades, "another Zeus" holds over the deeds of earthly life,<sup>78</sup> but they remain dark and vague. It is not explained in what relation this judgment in Hades stands to the complete equivalence of guilt and destiny that, here upon earth, Zeus and Moira bring to completion in the person of the criminal himself and, after his death, of his descendants. Side by side with the allusions to the judgment in the underworld implying the complete consciousness of the dead, stand expressions that call up a picture of the senseless, twilight existence of the souls in Hades like that described in Homer.<sup>79</sup> The poet, to whom every feature of the beliefs derived from the cult of the souls about the relations of the departed to the life of the dwellers on earth was intensely and vividly real, never cared to fix his attention for long upon the nature and condition of the dead in their separate other-world existence. In fact his chosen work of giving a moral significance and deeper meaning to popular and ancient faith was wholly derived from this faith itself; and so also was the lofty and consistent idea of divinity which fills the background of his picture of life. The generation which had fought at Marathon, in spite of a profounder and even more sombre meditation upon life and destiny, could still dispense almost entirely with the assistance of the theological doctrines of the sects who sought refuge from the dark and austere



realities of this unsatisfying world in thoughts of an imagined hereafter.

§ 5

Towards the great problems of dramatic philosophy—the problems of the freedom or compulsion of the will, the guilt and destiny of man—Sophokles took up a position that differed essentially from that of his great predecessor. A maturer and calmer self-abandonment to the observation of life and its difficulties made him less able to rest content with simple or sweeping solutions of the complexities; made him seek out other and more various modes of understanding. The individual man, stamped with the unique impression of his peculiar being, with him becomes more fully detached from the background of omnipotent might and universal law. The individual finds within himself the rules of his behaviour, the causes of his success, or his tragic failure. No petty, egotistical motive inspires the action of Antigone or Elektra: they are obedient to the old, unwritten laws of the gods. But the force that leads them to obey is derived solely from the special fashion and impulse of their own hearts. No one else could do what they do, suffer what they suffer. We realize the necessity and justification of what they do and suffer solely from the contemplation of the strength and weakness of their own characters as displayed for us in the action that takes place upon the stage. Indeed, the length to which Sophokles, in the "Elektra", goes in the suppression of such universally recognized and binding motives as those derived from the duty of vengeance and the rights of injured souls, may well cause surprise. The special and individual case must for him carry its own justification within itself, and in fact it receives such justification so completely from the character and behaviour of the actors in the drama that, unlike the hero of Aeschylus' tragedy, Orestes needs to have no qualm of doubt in the performance of his deed, and suffers no remorse after the murder of the wicked murderers. Once again as in the Homeric story, with Orestes' "righteous deed of blood," the circle of calamity is complete: no Erinys rises from the earth to demand his overthrow.<sup>64</sup>

So, too, when the suffering and calamity that befalls the mortal hero comes not from his own conscious decision and exercise of will, but from obscure decrees of fate it is still the special character of the hero which not only demands the greater part of our attention, but entirely conditions and sufficiently explains the course of events. The same

misfortune might overtake another man, but neither its inward nor its outward effects would be the same as they are for Oedipus or Aias. Only tragically extreme characters can have a tragic fate.

And yet, in these as in other tragedies, what gives the first impulse and direction to the course of the story does not arise from the will or character of their heroes. The mind of Aias is not free but subject when he performs the deed that sends him to his death. Oedipus, Deianeira take vengeance upon themselves for the deeds of horror that they have brought about without knowing what they did. Notwithstanding the fact that the interest of the "Philoctetes" centres so completely round the vividly contrasted characters of Philoktetes, Neoptolemos, and Odysseus, yet the situation which brings them into opposition is one which it was beyond the power or the purpose of man to bring about or to hinder. An obscure destiny plunges man into suffering, drives him to actions in the face of which easy and ready-made judgments about "guilt" and the relation between suffering and desert are silenced. It is not inherited family crime that here forces the son and the grandson to deeds that can hardly be called their own. The poet, it is true, knows of these conceptions<sup>22</sup> that play so large a part in the poetry of Aeschylus, but they are mere historical tradition to him, not vital motives of his drama. Nor is it mere irrational chance, or impersonal fate working by necessity and without passion that directs the mind and guides the hand of the actor in his bondage. Clearly or obscurely moving about in the background of events the will of a divine power can be discerned that, inevitable as fate,<sup>23</sup> guides the deeds and the fate of men in accordance with its own purpose.

The divine purpose brings to maturity a plan in which the individual man and his destiny are mere instruments. To make plain the premeditated character of this purposeful direction of human affairs is the object of the prophetic anticipations of the future, the divine oracles and prophecies of seers of which we hear so much in the plays. If this divine purpose should involve the fatal act, the undeserved suffering of the individual, then that purpose will be fulfilled though human happiness may be destroyed in the process, and though pain, crime, agony, and violent death may overwhelm the mortal individual. The well-being of the individual does not enter into the question where the intentions of a divinity that sees far beyond this puny existence are concerned. An honest, simple-minded, good-hearted man, without

deceit or fault, like Philoktetes, is abandoned for many long years to every kind of suffering in order that he may not interfere prematurely in the development of the war against Troy with the magic weapons that are in his possession.<sup>62</sup> He is an involuntary martyr for the good of the whole community. In order that Herakles may be released from this life at the precise moment of time that has been fixed by divine foreknowledge,<sup>64</sup> Deianeira, the most devoted and womanly character in the whole of the Attic drama, must out of the goodness of her heart and the love she bears to her husband send him to the most awful of deaths and then perish herself. Simply because such is the will of heaven<sup>65</sup> must Oedipus, unknowing and blameless, slay his father, marry his mother, and plunge himself into the deepest depth of misery.

Thus, out of the darkness, the hand of divine superiority guides the destinies of humanity, the will and behaviour of men, according to its own purposes. The problematical in human life, the disparity between personal guilt and personal suffering, which daily experience brings before our eyes, seemed to the poet to be rendered more intelligible by this conception. He preaches dutiful submission to these dispensations of a higher power. He himself is one of the pious, in the specific sense of the word,<sup>66</sup> for whom to perceive the will of the gods is sufficient to call forth adoration of the gods: who feel no need that this mighty will should justify itself to human ideas of morality and goodness.<sup>67</sup> It may be right to call this will a holy will: but there is no need for it to prove itself such at the bar of human judgment. Nor does such piety find itself disturbed in its worship when, in order to assert the divine prerogative over humanity (whose first duty it is to recognize the limits of what is allowed and possible for it), divine inhumanity and cold lust of vengeance manifest themselves so clearly as in the Athens of the "Ajax".<sup>68</sup> It gives the measure of the peculiar and unique character of Sophoklean art and the Sophoklean attitude to life—a quite personal character not to be explained on abstract grounds—that this attitude of awed submissiveness in matters of religion could exist side by side with the strong appreciation and justification of the undeterred action of free individuality. Rarely—only once or twice in the plays—is a cry of pain wrested from the lips of one of these uncomplaining victims of a purpose not their own.<sup>69</sup> As a rule, the eye seems to behold, the judgment to criticize, the ultimate reasons of divine action. It is partly artistic restraint no doubt, but religious discretion, too, makes the poet leave

such things in semi-obscurity.<sup>81</sup> The majesty of divine power remains for the most part in the background and does not mingle familiarly with men or too notoriously interfere with human destiny.<sup>82</sup>

But the individual who with his sufferings must serve a purpose that is not his own, Humanity that lives under such bitter laws—what elevating and consoling thoughts are awakened by the contemplation of their fate. The poet employs all the resources of his overwhelming art to secure the profoundest sympathies of his hearers for the undeserved sufferings of the victim, for the delusions of well-intentioned but limited vision that must always stray from the goal at which it aims. The moral of the play is not lost even on the sufferer's foe as he beholds the error and guilt of the noble but misguided heart.<sup>83</sup> What thus overwhelms the strong and the wise, the good and the well-meaning, through no fault of their own, may descend upon any member of the human family. Thus the destinies of men are allotted. The lament over the vanity and the sorrow of life, its brief happiness, and the uncertainty of its joy, is poured forth in memorable lines.<sup>84</sup> They end on a note of resignation which gives the keynote of the poet's own character; but there is a bitterness which remains behind.

It might have been supposed that one who thus abandoned all attempt to reconcile the worth and actions of men with their fate upon earth, would feel all the more need, for his own satisfaction and that of others, to prove the existence of a divine justice that should restore the balance in a future state of being. But the poet shows little sign of any such need. Thoughts of what may happen after death are never of very great moment to him. They never distinctly affect the behaviour of those whose deeds or suffering fill his plays.<sup>85</sup>

When, however, light is thrown for a passing moment on the unknown land beyond the grave the scene that imagination reveals hardly differs at all from the picture that had once been present to the minds of the Homeric singers. The place that is in store for the departed is Hades,<sup>86</sup> the unlovely country of the dead,<sup>87</sup> whither the Soul flits powerless, shadowlike, little more than a nothing,<sup>88</sup> feeling no joy but no pain either; <sup>89</sup> where it enters upon a state of insensibility that the grief-stricken sufferer on earth often longs for as a much-desired haven of rest.<sup>90</sup> Plouton, Persephone, all the deities of the earth below,<sup>91</sup> there rule over the departed. But it is not grace nor kindness that prevails there—only justice: Hades demands equal justice for all.<sup>92</sup>

Pious veneration of the gods continues also in the other world,<sup>100</sup> and for the rest we hear nothing of either reward or punishment or of a final supplementing in the land of the Souls of the inadequacy of the justice that fulfils itself on earth.

But though departed into Hades the dead have still a claim upon the upper world and on those who still are living there. Together with the Homeric picture of the lower world is united the cult of the souls and the ideas, connected with that cult, of the continued life of the dead. The next of kin owe to the departed the ceremonious burial that is the first expression of their pious solicitude for his soul's welfare.<sup>101</sup> In two plays the "Ajax" and the "Antigone", the love and loyalty of the survivors is obliged to fight for this right of the dead in desperate encounter with earthly authority and even with the sacrifice of their own devoted lives. Such instances serve to bring out clearly the fact that it is no empty convention or tradition that is thus defended and carried through to the end. Nor does the completion of the burial mark the end of the dead man's relations with the upper world: even after that he may be benefited by offerings made at his grave.<sup>102</sup> Information of what happens on earth may penetrate to the dead;<sup>103</sup> and he himself, under the protection of the underworld spirits and of their assessor Diké, who take cognizance of his claims,<sup>104</sup> may interfere in the affairs of the living as a "Curse-spirit" upon those who disregard his wishes,<sup>105</sup> by sending threatening dream-visions upon his foes,<sup>106</sup> and as a very present help and unseen ally to his friends in their hour of need.<sup>107</sup>

As to an eternity of bliss awaiting the soul, the god in man, after its final release from the shackles of the body, the poet knows as little of such as he does of an eternity of damnation for the wicked. Only the quite special state of grace which is enjoyed by those who have been purified in the mysteries of the goddesses at Eleusis receives mention by him<sup>108</sup>: he is frequently disposed to think of this supreme expression of Attic worship with patriotic pride.<sup>109</sup> But it is only a minority of the good who thus achieve by the grace of the goddesses a privileged "life" in the kingdom of shadows. One and only one is lifted by the divine grace clear of the human fate of annihilation, and in the Grove of the Erinyes the sorely-tried Oedipus is translated without seeing death out of this earthly life.<sup>110</sup> So living a reality to this poet of ancient piety is the conviction that the divine miracle of translation<sup>111</sup> is a literal truth, that he is even ready

to make this strange circumstance serve as the sole aim and purpose of a whole drama: a miracle which all the other scenes serve not so much to prepare as simply to postpone, and thus heighten the expectancy with which the event is awaited. It is not supreme virtue that secures an immortality for Oedipus which others also who showed an equal degree of goodness might possibly attain. He reveals himself to us as an innocent sufferer indeed,<sup>114</sup> but also as obdurate in his rash and violent nature, vindictive, stubborn, and self-willed, not ennobled but rather brutalized by his sufferings.<sup>115</sup> Nevertheless, divine power elevates him to the state of immortal *Hero* less almost for the sake of the satisfaction and bliss to himself as in order that he may be the saviour of the Attic land, the country of humanity and kindness that has taken into its protection<sup>116</sup> the unfortunate one, and desires to preserve for ever his power of blessing.<sup>117</sup> Just as once it had pleased divine power to overwhelm the innocent victim in a sea of crime and suffering, so now it pleases the same divine power to raise the sufferer, without any new or special merit on his side, to a fate of superhuman bliss.<sup>118</sup> In his case a divine miracle occurs, into the ultimate reasons for which it is not profitable to inquire.

In his views, so far as he allows us to see them, of the things of the next world, Sophokles differs not at all from those who still saw life and worshipped the gods as their fathers had done before them. The great poet of human, tragic destiny, the profound student of the divine government of this mournful world, was unwilling to set by the side of it a brighter and more comforting picture of a spirit world of the imagination. In this, too, he is modest and will not say much—he knows no more of these matters, and in no other fashion, than “any other honest citizen of Athens”.<sup>119</sup>

### § 8

In the course of a long life Sophokles was able to make himself complete master of his art and grow up into strong and generous manhood without the guidance or support of either theological or philosophical learning. Theology he did not care to seek out in its hiding place, the obscurity of isolated sects. Philosophy, in the period of his impressionable youth, had not yet reached Athens, and when he had attained riper years his noble simplicity of temper had little to gain or to fear from the meditated wisdom or folly of the younger generation. In serene detachment he passed on his way through all the press and clamour of the market place.

The moving impulse which since the end of the sixth century had collected together at Athens all the intellectual forces of Greece for a final expansion of their capacity now began, in the middle of the fifth century, to take hold of philosophy as it had long since done literature and the fine arts. Athens saw the last representatives of Ionian physiology gathered together within her walls. Some, like Anaxagoras, took up their residence there for a long period, and left the impress of their teaching upon the foremost minds of the city. The others who paid briefer visits were those who in conscious opposition to the recent trend of thinking, stoutly upheld the older principles of philosophic Monism or Hylozoism, such as Diogenes of Apollonia or Hippon of Samos; or who sought like Archelaos to reconcile the old and the new Ionic doctrine. Besides these, Athens was a headquarters of the wandering exponents of the newest wisdom, the Sophists. Nowhere did unlettered discussion find such cultivated appreciation of its daring; nowhere was such an eager welcome given to the dialectical word-play that, seeming to be an end in itself, was destined to become the most fruitful nursery of native Athenian philosophy. All traditional beliefs and customs that had not their origin or their justification in reflexion were already doomed as soon as they, together with every conventional view of life and the world, were deprived of their natural protection of unchallenged self-evidence by the cold scrutiny of the sovereign tyrant Dialectic. The Sophists, those skirmishers of a new and as yet unrecognizable philosophy, scattered and put to flight the old guard of positive and doctrinal wisdom, but to the individual, who was bidden to depend upon his own resources, they offered stimulus to reflexion in abundance but no permanent foothold in the shifting sands of opinion. It would be but a final assertion of the principle that there are no principles if by any chance the Sophists themselves should for a moment speak in the language of edification and, for example, lend the support of their eloquence to certain articles of doctrine that provided a positive teaching as to the nature and life of the soul.<sup>222</sup>

If Sophokles remained quite unaffected by this whole movement which reached its flood tide in Athens, Euripides was drawn completely into its current. He sought out philosophers and sophists personally and in their writings. His was a spirit that urgently desired to know the truth and he followed every available guide to knowledge and wisdom for a stage upon their journey. But he was never able to continue permanently in any one direction; in the restlessness

and bewilderment of search and experiment he is the true son of his age.

His philosophical and sophistical leanings were sufficiently marked to make it impossible for him to accept any part of the belief or tradition of his countrymen without trial. So far as it is possible within the limits of dramatic art, he instituted an unsparing and unhesitating criticism of all accepted things, and in the process felt himself immeasurably superior to the wit and wisdom of the past. And yet he never satisfied himself. He could never rest content with a merely negative position, for all oneness was foreign to his nature. The tremendous honesty of his nature made it impossible for him to admit that element of frivolity which made the sophistic movement and the dialectical negation of all certainty so simple and attractive, and at the same time took away half its sting. But he could take nothing easily; and so with all his sophistic enlightenment he was never happy. The pupil of the Sophists would hear every other side as well; there were even moments when he longed to take refuge in the restful narrowness of old and traditional piety. But it was not given to him to settle down in any fixed set of opinions; all his convictions were provisional, mere hypotheses adopted for the purposes of experiment. Afloat on a changeful sea, he let himself be driven hither and thither by every wind of intellectual excitement or artistic necessity.

When all convictions were involved together in a state of perpetual change and instability, the conception of the nature and being of the soul and its relation to the powers of life and death could not alone remain in fixed and dogmatic certainty.

Where the content and character of the fable chosen as the subject of his drama demand it, the poet frankly adopts the popular view of the nature and destiny of the departed soul, its power and claim upon the worship of the survivors upon earth. In the fairy-tale play of the "Alkestis" the whole apparatus of popular belief plays its part; the God of Death and his awful office, the dwelling of the dead in the underworld, are spoken of as facts and creatures of experience and reality.<sup>121</sup> The elaborate funeral ceremonies owed to the dead are treated with the utmost seriousness and precision.<sup>122</sup> A whole drama, the "Suppliant Women", has as its real subject, or at least as its ostensible motive, the religious importance of a ritual burial,<sup>123</sup> nor is there any lack of isolated passages in which the importance of burial and the honour paid to graves is stressed.<sup>124</sup> The survivors on earth give pleasure to the dead by offerings at their graves.<sup>125</sup>



and in this way obtain their goodwill and can count upon their support.<sup>122</sup> Power and honour belong not only to the great ones of antiquity translated to a higher state of being ;<sup>127</sup> not only "Heroes" can extend their influence beyond their graves and affect the course of earthly events ;<sup>128</sup> from the soul of his murdered father, the son expects assistance and succour in his time of need. The dread creatures of antique faith, the Erinyes, exact vengeance for the murdered mother.<sup>129</sup>

But at this point it becomes apparent that the poet only associates himself for his own purposes with this circle of ancient and sanctified popular fancy—so long in fact as it suits the tone that he wishes to give to the drama and its characters. The Erinyes are excellent material for the play—that in reality their horrid figures only exist in the imagination of the mentally diseased is clearly asserted in the "*Orestes*."<sup>130</sup> The whole series of beliefs and demands—murder ever calling forth fresh murder in accordance with the sacred duty of vengeance, the Erinyes, the bloodthirsty patrons of the murdered victim who leaves no proper avenger behind him—all these have ceased to have any validity for him. The "animal and bloodthirsty" part of these figures of ancient belief call forth the loathing of the poet living in the days of organized justice and humaner manners.<sup>131</sup> He does not believe in the souls' right to blood ; the ancient legends which depend on this right are an abomination to him. In fact, he only seems to have written his plays about them in order, by the manner of his presentation, to have his revenge upon this material that was almost unavoidably thrust upon him by the tradition of the tragic stage. The duty of the living to offer a cult to the departed souls becomes doubtful in its turn. The seriousness with which that cult is sometimes handled in the plays is compromised by such reflections as these : it is certain that it matters little to the dead whether rich offerings are placed in their graves or not ; such things only satisfy the idle vanity of the living ;<sup>132</sup> honour and dishonour are of no further consequence to the dead.<sup>133</sup> How should they be, if the departed no longer feel either pleasure or pain, are nothing at all, as is repeatedly declared even in the middle of the "*Alkestis* " ?<sup>134</sup>

It is evident that only from an arbitrarily adopted point of view do the picturesque creations of popular belief in the soul and of the cult of souls seem real to the poet ; apart from this they disappear from his mind like the creatures of a dream.<sup>135</sup> The teachings of the theologians supplied him with no real substitute for popular faith ; at the most they were a

momentary and passing stimulus. No doubt he did not shut his eyes completely to these manifestations of the spiritual life of his time. His plays contain allusions to Orphic poetry and he joins the asceticism of the Orphics to the cold virtue of his Hippolytos.<sup>140</sup> The thought that the soul has fallen from a higher state of being and is enclosed within the body like the dead man in his coffin takes captive his imagination for a moment. "Who knows then whether life is not a kind of death," so that in death the soul awakes to its real life?<sup>141</sup> The gloomy view of human destiny upon this earth to which the poet so often gives expression, might seem to hint at a consolation to come in a more satisfactory hereafter; but the poet has no longing for the consolation offered by the theologians. Among the many and various reflections of the poet upon the reality that may reveal itself when the curtain is drawn aside by death, we never meet with the conception that lies at the bottom of the assurances made by the theologians—the conception that the spiritual individual is certain of its immortality because in its individuality it is of divine nature and is itself a god.<sup>142</sup> True, he is the author of the bold saying so often quoted and varied in later times, that God is nothing else but the mind that dwells in men.<sup>143</sup> But this makes no allusion to the theological doctrine of the multiplicity of individual gods or daimones banished into the life of men; it rather implies a semi-philosophic doctrine of the soul in which one may perceive for the first time the expression of a permanent conviction on the part of the poet.

In quite inapposite contexts Euripides sometimes introduces passing allusions to a philosophical view of the world and humanity, that is the more certainly to be regarded as the private conviction of the poet himself as the utterances fail to correspond fully with the character of the person in the play who makes them, and do not arise necessarily from the dramatic situation. Everything in the world has had its origin from Earth and "the Aether of Zeus"; the Earth is the maternal womb from which the Aether brings everything to birth.<sup>144</sup> Both constituents combine to produce the multiplicity of appearance; they are not fused together nor are they to be derived from a single common original element; <sup>145</sup> they remain in dualistic contrast side by side.<sup>146</sup> It was probably the dualism of this cosmological fancy that reminded the ancients of Anaxagoras; but these statements cannot be regarded as simply a poetical version of the doctrine of Anaxagoras; <sup>147</sup> for they derive the multiplicity of matter and things from the simple element of "Earth" from which

they arise only by a process of change and transformation, while in the "seedmixture" of Anaxagoras, the unchangeable seeds of all things only separate themselves out from the whole and give rise by mechanical reassemblings to all the perceived appearances of the world. The "Aether" of Euripides in its relations with the "Earth" is besides being the active partner also the intellectual and animated element. The isolation of such an element from the rest of matter does indeed remind us of the procedure of Anaxagoras. But the poet's Aether is still an element though it may be penetrated by mind and animated by spirit; it is not a mental being standing over against all the other elements in essential distinctness like the *Nous* of Anaxagoras. The fact that it is the element of the Aether, i.e. the dry and hot air, in which intellectual capacity is said to inhere, may be regarded as having been borrowed from Diogenes of Apollonia, a philosopher who was held in considerable estimation at Athens at that time, and who was well known to Euripides.<sup>144</sup> In his doctrine, the air (which indeed, in contrast to the view of Euripides, produces all other things simply out of itself) is expressly identified with the "Soul" and is itself described as "having understanding".<sup>145</sup>

This view of the elementary forces and constitution of the universe, made up as it is from philosophical suggestions of a scarcely reconcilable character, in which the dualistic tendency is in fact finally predominant, suggests itself to the poet whenever in an exalted mood he speaks of the final destiny of the human soul. The soul on its separation from the body will depart to join the "Aether". But in such conceptions it is not always the imagination of the philosopher-poet that finds expression. On this subject it is accompanied or replaced by a more popular view that only distantly resembles it, but which led to the same result. When we hear now and again of the Aether, the luminous atmosphere above the clouds, as being the *dwelling place* of the departed souls,<sup>146</sup> the view—more theological than philosophic in its character—seems to be implied that after death the liberated soul will float upwards to the seat of the gods<sup>147</sup> which has long ceased to be situated upon Olympus, but is in "heaven" or in this same Aether. This, too, was the meaning of a saying traditionally ascribed to Epicharmos the comic-poet of Sicily who was himself versed in philosophy. In this saying the pious man is assured that for him death will bring no evil for his "mind" will dwell permanently in "heaven".<sup>148</sup> This conception, which appears so frequently in later epitaphs,

must have been familiar to popular imagination at Athens at an early period; at least in the grave-epigram officially dedicated by the state to the memory of the Athenians who fell in the year 432 before Potidaia, we find the belief expressed (as a commonly received opinion) that the souls of these brave men have been received by the "Aether" just as the earth has received their bodies.<sup>129</sup> Such official use implies a commonly accepted opinion and the fundamental ideas of the popular cult of the souls might have led to similar results. From the beginning popular belief had regarded the psyche, which got its name from the air or breath, as closely akin to the winds, the mobile air and its spirits. It would not be difficult for the idea to arise that the soul, as soon as it was free to decide for itself what should become of it, should go to join the elemental spirits that are its kinsfolk. Perhaps this, too, is what Epicharmos means when on another occasion he says that in death when the united are parted asunder each returns whence it came, the body to earth, but the soul up to the heights—its name, in which allusion is made to its perpetual mobility, being now after the example of Xenophanes derived from the breath of the wind, the moving air (*πνεῦμα*), a usage which became very common in later times.<sup>130</sup>

But perhaps the use of such a name is an indication that this poet also regards the soul as standing in a close relation and kinship with the Aether that is destined to receive it after its release from the body; so that from this side, too,<sup>131</sup>—in addition to the more popular conception just mentioned—Euripides may have received a hint for his peculiar version of the physiological theory of Diogenes. In his view the soul participates in the nature of the Aether. But it is more important to notice that the Aether participates in the nature and true reality of the soul; it possesses life, consciousness and power of thought. They both belong to one family. The Aether according to the poet—and here the speculations of Anaximenes as revived by Diogenes are unmistakable<sup>132</sup>—is a true vital atmosphere, an all-embracing psychic element, so that it becomes, not a mere vehicle of mind, but the All-Mind itself. The concept is even condensed and half-personified, it is called by the name of the highest divine power, Zeus,<sup>133</sup> and the poet as though speaking of a personal god, calls it "immortal."<sup>134</sup> The human mind, too, as akin to the universal god and the All-Mind, appears, as it had been in the teaching of Diogenes,<sup>135</sup> as a part of this God, this universal Mind. God is the mind, and the mind and understanding in us is God—so the poet clearly asserts.<sup>136</sup> In death, when

the separation of the mind from its earthly elements takes place, the *Pneuma* of man will "not indeed live", as it had done in the separate existence of the individual man, but it will "preserve an immortal consciousness", entering into the immortal *Aether* and fusing itself with the All-living and the All-thinking.<sup>167</sup> None of the physiologists who conceived the same idea of an immortality excluding the personal immortality of the individual, of the universal spirit of life in mankind, has expressed his meaning with such distinctness as this philosophic layman.

The poet may have wished to remain permanently upon the sublime heights of this Pantheistic vision: but he must, in his peculiar all-embracing spirit that never held fast to any one view with enduring persistence, have experienced too often the truth of the saying of Protagoras that every statement calls forth its equally legitimate opposite,<sup>168</sup> to have become an unswerving adherent of any single opinion. Death, and whatever may reveal itself after death, is beyond the experience of any man.<sup>169</sup> It may be that complete disappearance into nothingness follows death: that the dead man becomes simply nothing.<sup>170</sup> It may be that in the permanence of the human race the great name and the renown of glorious deeds lives on undying.<sup>171</sup> Whether there may remain besides a vestige of life in a spirit world, who can tell? Perhaps such a thing is hardly even to be wished.<sup>172</sup> It is just what makes death such a comforting thing, that it puts an end to all feeling and therefore to all pain and every care. We should not lament over our fate if, like the harvests that follow each other in the course of the years, one generation of men after another flowers, fades, and is carried off. So it is ordered in the course of Nature, and we ought not to be dismayed by anything that is rendered inevitable by her laws.<sup>173</sup>

## NOTES TO CHAPTER XII

\* The *leutaoi* and more particularly the philosophers of later ages paid special attention to utterances of the older poetry that gave expression to belief of a spiritualist tendency. Just as they selected and preserved passages from Pindar (and from Melanippides in the case soon to be mentioned), which bore witness to an advanced view of the soul, so they must also have given us similar passages from other lyric or from iambic and elegiac poets—if such passages had existed. They must, for example, have been absent from the *kyklos* of Simonides which were famous as the models of this kind of poetry. And so with all the rest.

\* Hades puts an end to all pleasure for every man: hence the warning that man should enjoy his youth upon earth: Thgn. 973 ff.; cf. 877 f., 1161 ff., 1009 f.; Sol. 24; Thgn. 719 ff.

\* *ἄνθρωποι πάντες ἐφελκόμεθα*—an ancient saying often repeated; cf. Bergk on Simon. 122, 2; Nauck on Soph., *El.* 1173 [*ἡμῶντες* ad loc.].

\* Hades himself plays the part of Thanatos and carries off the souls to the lower world. Thus as early as Simon. i, 13 f., *τοῦτο δ' ἄπει δεικνυμένους πέμψας μάλιστα Ἄλφει τῷ χερσὶν*. In metaphorical language "*Ἄλφει*" for *θάνατος* is quite regular from the time of Pindar onwards. This, in turn, lent support to the use of the name of "*Ἄλφει*" instead of the personified *θάνατος*. So esp. in Pi., *O.* ix, 33-5; cf. besides, Epigr. Gr. 88, 3-4. *νόστις . . . μάστις Ἄλφει αἰ κεκοίται ἐπὶ βάλανι ἐνέμενος*: cf. 201, 2: 232, 1-2. (And therefore in Eur., *Alc.* 261, we should not alter the *νεκρωτής Ἄλφει* who is named instead of Thanatos—not even in favour of the otherwise ingenious *βλάτω . . . φθῶν*.)

\* *Ἄλφει ἱερὰς γὰρ ἀλλοὺς φύχῃ κείνομαι ὥστε λίθος ἐφθάρτος* Thgn. 567 f.—the condition of things in Hades is regarded exactly as in the Homeric pictures: Thgn. 704-10.

\* See esp. Sol. 13, 29 ff.; Thgn. 731-42; 205 ff.

\* Mimn. ii, 13: *ἄλλος δ' αὖ σπιδῶν ἐνδύεται ὥστε μέλινος ἱαίφην κατὰ γὰρ ἔρχεται εἰς Ἄλφειν*. Without children there can be no assurance that the cult of the soul will be carried on. But we may well believe that the attaching of so much importance to offspring was assisted by the natural human belief that the man who left children behind him on earth did not completely perish in death (hence *δαίνυντε δὲ καὶ δίδωτε ὥς θυγὰρ ἢ γέννητος* as in Plato, *Smp.* 208 E). This alone gives a meaning and a reason for the widespread belief among the Greeks that the wicked man who is punished after his death in his children and children's children himself feels that punishment.

\* Simon. 1; S. Mimn. 2. Sol. 13, 53 ff.; 14. Thgn. 167 f.; 425 ff. We may also add here the expressions of resignation, Hdt. vii, 46; i, 31.

\* *Νουθεῖς ἀδελφῶν* [lon] fr. 8, 2.

\* On the story of Midas and Silenos see Griech. Romant., p. 206 f. As to the ancient and often repeated maxim *ἀρχὴ (or πάρος) μὲν μὴ φθῆναι ἐπιθυροῖεντες ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν*, see Bergk., *Opusc.* ii, 214; *PLG.* ii, p. 155 f. Nietzsche, *Rb. Mus.* xxviii, 212 ff. (whose view that the

beginning ἀρχαῖς . . . is old and original—but not his involved explanation of this—has been fully confirmed by the finding of the primitive form of the *dyōs*: Mahaffy, *On the Flinders Petrie Papyrus*, p. 707).

<sup>11</sup> Simon. *fr.* 39; 38.

<sup>12</sup> *fr.* 137.—USENER, *Götternamen*, 229, 13, says of Sappho that "she was possessed by the belief that as a poetess she would live again after her death among the gods, and would therefore become a *heroine*"; see *fr.* 68 and 136<sup>11</sup>. But from these fragments of Sappho no such belief can be extracted without first reading into them a good deal that they do not say.

<sup>13</sup> Of the man who has fallen in glory on the battlefield Τυρταίος says, 12, 31 f.: οὐδέ ποτε κλέος ἐσθλόν ἀσέλλεται οὐδ' ἀνὴρ ὠδῶν, ἀλλ' ἐνὲ γῆς περ εὖν γλυκεῖα ἔθνητος (i.e. in renown upon earth). TUGU. says to his Κύρνος, 243 ff., in your lifetime my songs will make you famous καὶ ἔναι διαφάρη ἐνὲ καύθει γαίης βῆε πολυκμήστου· εἰς Ἀἴθρα δέμας, αἰδέσθαι· οὐδέ θανάτ' ἀνολέει κλέος ἄλλο μολήεις δόξουσ ἀνδράων· αἰεὶ ἔχωρ ἔσμεν . . . : cf. Aesch., *Epigr.* iii. 3 (241 Bgk. = 449 Di.), ζῶντι δὲ ἐθιμίζον κλέος αἰεὶ.

<sup>14</sup> Even in Hades the dead perceive χθονία φρονί if they themselves or the *descent* of their descendants upon earth are praised: PL., *P.* v. 98; cf. *O.* vii. 81 ff.; xiv. 20 ff.; [Ion] *Arch.* vii. 43, 3 (to Eurip.), *τεθὲ δ' ἐνὲ χθονὸς ἄν, ὅτι οἱ κλέος δόξουσ ἰσσοι κτλ.*—In the expressions collected by MEISS, *Jaehn.* f. *Pärol.* 1889, p. 812 f., from the fourth century orators there only remains a very faint recollection of such a belief.

<sup>15</sup> Simon. 2, τοῦ γὰρ θανόντος οὐκ ἐσθ' ἀνθυμίζεσθαι, εἰ τι ἀρεταίμην, κλέος ἔμαρτε μῆτε.—Stes. 51 ἀνελίσσεται γὰρ καὶ ἀμάρταν τοῦ θανόντος κλέειν. 52, θανόντος ἀνθρώπου οὐκ' ἀκάλλιστα σὺν' ἀνθρώπων χάρει.

<sup>16</sup> This emerges at once if we review the material collected by H. MEISS upon "the conceptions appearing in the Attic orators of existence after death": *Jaehn.* f. *Pärol.* 1889, pp. 891–15. For the cult of the soul and all that attaches to it the orators are our most authoritative witnesses and as such are frequently examined in the sections of this book that deal with the subject.

<sup>17</sup> εἰ τινοὶ τῶν νεκλινόμενων λάβουσ τράπω τι τοῦ εἶναι γνησιόμου πρόμαχος αἰσθῆναι and frequently in this style: cf. the passages quoted by WESTERMANN on D., *Lept.* (20), 87; cf. also LEHR, *Pop. Aufs.* 328 ff. The question is always whether the dead are capable in any way of apprehending what goes on in this world. The continued life of the dead is never doubtful but rather implied throughout, for without such implication no possibility whatever would be left for that *εἶναι*.

<sup>18</sup> See NAGELBACH, *Nachkom.* Thesol. 420. MEISS, p. 812.

<sup>19</sup> This is well brought out by LEHR, *Pop. Aufs.* 331. But the statement holds good in an even more precise and exclusive sense than he there gives it. The words of Hyper., *Epist.* xiii. § 39, deal simply with the existence in Hades of those who have died for their country (with some traditional embellishments: see above, chap. vii. n. 5)—this much can hardly ever have been expressly doubted or denied by any orator. But it is wrong to say (as LEHR does: p. 331) that Hyper. expresses, though in other words, what was afterwards laid down by [D.H.] *Rhet.* vi. 8, as proper "or such funeral speeches" (no, only for *private* funerals—which is quite another matter). It is true that the advice there given is to say that the soul is *ἀδύνατος* and now dwells

"with the gods". But it never enters into the head of Hyp. to say any such thing (nor in the frag. of the speech preserved by Stob., *Fl.* 124, 38). In fact, the precept of this sophistic writer (still more the advice given by Men. Rhet., *de Encom.* 414, 16 ff.; 421, 16 ff. Sp.) rather reveals the enormous contrast between the style of the sophistic funeral oratory of a later period and the real characteristics of the old Attic funeral orations: a difference founded upon the difference of sentiment manifested by the public that listened to such speeches in two different ages. Even the statements of (Dem.) *Epid.* (80) 34 (καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ὅσους together with the ἀγαθοὶ ἄνθρωποι of earlier times ἢ παλαιῶν ἄνθρωπων) betray sophistic colouring though falling far short of the excesses of Ps.-D.H. and Men. Rhet.

<sup>10</sup> The only thing *dyōphoros* about those who have fallen in the wars of freedom is their *eulogy* Simon. 100, 4; cf. 106, 4 (with Bgk.'s note). *DB.* 3-4 εὐδοκίαν τεινέας θανόντες ἐπὶ αἰὶ ἀπαρὶ νεώτερον κοδαινεύοντες δαίμια δαίμωνος ἐξ Ἀἰθέρος (which is imitated in the epitaph of Thrasymachos the Kretan εὐδοκίαν θανάου ἀπαρὶ ἔργου ἄλλοις, ἀλλὰ οὐ θάματα κοδαινεύοντες δαίμια δαίμωνος ἐξ Ἀἰθέρος, *BCH.* 1889, p. 80).

<sup>11</sup> εὐδοκίαν μοι δὲ πόλεως, θάματα θανόντων, τὰς δαίμονας καὶ δαίμων φύλλας, Melanipp. 8. The words θάματα θανόντων (modelled on the θάματα θανόντων of Homer) can refer only to *Daimones* (of the gods who enter into the question here): δαίμονες, χάματα θανόντων, *S* 325. Further, it is natural to think of *Daimones* in the work of a dithyrambic poet.

<sup>12</sup> The dead man ἐμὲ Ἀχαιοὶ τιμεινέον. *Pl.*, *N.* iv, 85. This is the general assumption: e.g. *P.* xi, 19-22; *O.* ix, 33-5; *I.* viii, 59 f.; *Jr.* 207 Bgk.

<sup>13</sup> ἔστι δὲ καὶ τι θάρσυνοντος μέρος καὶ νόμος ἐπιδόμωντες κατακρήντες δ' οὐ νόμος σπυρίδωνος κείνων χάριν, *O.* viii, 77 ff.

<sup>14</sup> Something of the kind is adopted for the moment, e.g. in *O.* xiv, 20 ff.; viii, 81 ff. A real belief in such a possibility appears perhaps most clearly in *P.* v, 98 ff.

<sup>15</sup> For him who dies fighting for his country there is in store—not blessedness but only Fame, *I.* vii, 26 ff. He who comes κατὰ ἐξουσίαν δούδης εἰς τὴν Ἀἴθρα αναθνήσκει has little reward for his pains (his reward would, in fact, have been just the praise given to the δούδης), *O.* x, 91 ff., cf. *N.* vii, 10-2.

<sup>16</sup> A strange expression is the δαίμων γενέσθαι of *O.* xiii, 105 (in the same poem we also have γενεσθύνων δαίμων 28, which in this case at least is something more than "destiny", otherwise the normal meaning of δαίμων in Pindar, cf. *P.* v, 123, *I.* vii, 43). It almost seems as if it were intended to describe the ancestor spirit that brings good luck to the house like the *genius gentis* or *genius vespertinus* (see above, chap. v. n. 132).

<sup>17</sup> Amphiaraios, *O.* vi, 14; *N.* ix, 24 ff.; x, 8 f. [Amph. from his underground cavern sees the fighting in the war of the Epigonoi, *P.* viii, 39-46. There is no suggestion that the Ἐπίγονοι inquire at his oracle—as Disson supposes: with this the δὲ εἰς ἀπρόσμενον 43 is inconsistent.]—Ganymedes translated to eternal life, *O.* i, 44; x, 104 f. Apart from this there are temporary translations to the gods or from one place on earth to another, *O.* i, 38 ff.; ix, 59; *P.* ix, 5 ff.; *I.* viii, 20 f.

<sup>18</sup> *O.* ii, 27 ff.

<sup>19</sup> ἀλλὰ τὸ προσφθάρμεν ἔμενεν ἢ μέγαν γένον ἄνθρωπος ἀθανάτοισι, *N.* vi, 4 f.

<sup>20</sup> αὐτὸς εἰς ἀθάνατον, *P.* viii, 95. ἢ δαίμων ἐν θεῶν γένει, ἐν κατὰ δὲ νόμον παρὰ ἐμφύτῳ ἡρώων ἢ αὐτὸς ἀναμνησθέντα ἔμενεν,



ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶδος, ὃ δὲ ἡλικίας ἀφαιρῆς αὐτὸ ἔσσι μὲν εἰσπράττει,  
N. vi, 1 ff.

<sup>11</sup> *fr.* 131 Bgk.

<sup>12</sup> Pindar in these lines speaks only of the *μένος εἶσαλον*; but that by this he means the *ψυχή* is obvious in itself and is stated by Philarch, who preserves the lines, *Com. ad Apoll.* 35, p. 120 D [*καὶ ψυχῆς λέγεται*: cf. *Rom.* 28].—*ψυχή* in Pindar sometimes stands for what is otherwise called *καρδία* or *φῆσις*, "heart" or "disposition" e.g. *P.* i. 48; iv. 122; *N.* iv. 39; *I.* iv. 53b, and *O.* ii. 77, and prob. also *P.* iii. 41: "disposition," *N.* ix. 32. The word is sometimes (as in Homer) equivalent to *ζωή*, *P.* iii. 101, *ψυχὴ ζωνόν*. It simultaneously = "life" and the *αἶψα* ago dwelling within the living man, *O.* viii. 39, *ψυχὴ βέβηκε*: cf. *N.* i. 47. But the poet knows also the full meaning of *ψυχή* in the older idiom and belief. Entirely in the manner of Homeric usage *ψυχή* denotes the spiritual double of mankind, which survives the man himself, in those instances where the *ψυχή* of the dead is said to be still in existence: *ψυχὴν ἐκρίβη*, *P.* iv. 158; *N.* viii. 44 f.; *ὅν Ἀντιφρόνεια ψυχὴ* (in Cassandra sent into Hades), *P.* xi. 20 f. *Persephona ἀναβῆαι ψυχὴν αἶσαν* (out of Hades), *fr.* 133, 3 (Bgk.); *I.* i. 68, *ψυχὴν Ἄλκυι ῥέλει* (in death).—*ψυχῆς* is also used in the old idiomatic sense in *fr.* 132, 1; which is, however, spurious.—*ψυχή* in Pindar never denotes the psychical powers of the living man inclusive of the intellect, much less the intellect, *νοῦς*, alone.

<sup>13</sup> καὶ εἶδος μὲν νῆστον ἔσσι μὲν εἰσπράττει, ζῶν δ' ἐν λείπεται αἶψα εἶσαλον· τὸ γὰρ ἐνὶ κόπον ἐκ θανά, *fr.* 131 (96 Boeckh).

<sup>14</sup> καὶ δὲ *Persephona* *καρδίᾳ καλῶς νήθει* *δίδεται*—*fr.* 133. What is meant is undoubtedly the ancient "guilt" of the soul for which *Perseph.* receives satisfaction. This guilt can only be called a *ῥάσος* if she who accepts the satisfaction is regarded as herself grief-stricken by the guilty dead: if, in fact, the dead has been the occasion of mourning for *Persephone*. That this can apply to the goddess of the underworld is startling, but it cannot be got rid of by artificial interpretation (as Dissen would like to get rid of it). Pindar follows throughout the analogy of the ancient procedure of expiation in the case of blood-guiltiness. But this procedure seems to be familiar with the idea that, apart from the *εἴργεσι* of the murdered man, the underworld gods themselves (as guardians of the Souls) are immediately injured by the deed and stricken by grief and must receive satisfaction on their own account. Hence in certain legends (typificatory of ritual) the murderer not only has to fly from the land but to undergo servitude to the *χθονία*: *Apollo*, especially after the slaying of *Python*, has to serve *Ἄδης*, i.e. *Hades* for an *εἰσαίεσις* (more on this subject below, n. 40). Thus, the guilty soul banished from its proper home serves a "great year" under *Persephone*, and this is the *ῥάσος* that it pays.

<sup>15</sup> *O.* ii. 63–5. Everything here refers to judgment and compensation in *Hades*. In the words *θανόντος μὲν ἐνδὲς αἰῶν' ἀνδραγαθὸν φέρεται* words *θανόντος* the *ἐνδὲς* cannot possibly belong to the words *θανόντος*, as *Asistarchos* supposed, so that the words should refer to the punishment in the course of a new birth upon earth of crimes committed in *Hades* (in itself a remarkable conception). *θανόντος* alone would not be put for *θανόντος καὶ ἀναβιβασθέντος*, and we can only understand by the word those who after a life-time upon earth have died and are now spending their time below in the underworld. Moreover, it is hardly likely (as Ty. Moenstgen reminds us *adnot. crit. ad Olymp.* 24) that the exposition of the "knowledge of the future" (62) on the part of

a man still living upon earth would begin with what may happen to man, not after his death, but in a second appearance upon earth that is to fall to his lot later on. We must first of all be told what happens after the conclusion of the present condition of life, viz. that upon earth. Finally, the use of *aidria* is quite satisfactory if it refers to the judgment in Hades that follows immediately after death: while it is meaningless in Aristarchos' interpretation (hence Rauchenstein writes *aidria*—a mere conjecture and a superfluous one). The view that the *aidria* of 63-4 necessitates Aristarchos' explanation is not convincing (as Lubbert thinks, *Ind. Schol. Bonn. Alb.* 1887, p. xviii—incidentally he quite unjustifiably introduces specifically Platonic fancies into Pindar, p. xix). The *aidria* of 63 is not answered till *ἔπειτα δ' ἐνθάδε* . . . 75, just as the *aidria* of 63 does not receive its contrast till we come to what happens much later—after the life on earth has been thrice repeated—described in 75 ff. The *aidria* of 64 and 67 are subordinate (not adverbial) to what is introduced by the *aidria* of 63 and they continue the thought. The *aidria* of 63 might indeed, in accordance with an otherwise correct usage, be connected with *ἐνθάδε* *aidria*, as it is by one of the Scholiasts: "the *aidria* which have committed crimes here upon earth." But *ἐνθάδε* does not mean *infernalis*, *inferus* (nor does it in the passages adduced for this meaning by Zacher, *Dijs. Hefner*, iii, 237; Thgm. 281; Sint. v, 3). The *ἐνθάδε* *aidria* are simply equivalent to the *ἐνθάδε* *aidria* of Homer, and are a very suitable expression for the *judicial* of the dead (though not indeed for the *judicial* of the reborn as Aristarchos would have it). No alternative remains save to connect *ἐνθάδε* and *aidria*: *simulac mortui sunt hic, a. decedunt hinc* (Dietsch). The sentence *καὶ δ' ἐνθάδε* . . . must then either be a more exact description of what has been stated generally just before in *words* *ἐνθάδε* (and this is Mommsen's view supported by one Schol.), or else be subordinated—together with its contrasted *ἐπειτα δ'* . . . 67 ff.—to *words* *ἐνθάδε*. *words* in Pindar means regularly compensation, whether expiation for evil deeds or reward for good (cf. *P.* i, 59; *A.* i, 70b). If we might suppose that by a brachylogy not beyond possibility in Pindar *words* *ἐνθάδε* is put for *words* *ἐνθάδε* *καὶ ἐνθάδε*, then the sense might be: after death the souls receive at once recompense for their actions—and then follows the division of the bad 64 ff. and the good 67 ff. But we may perhaps rest content with Mommsen's explanation.

<sup>21</sup> O. ii, 74.

<sup>22</sup> *Plu. de Lat. Vir* 7, p. 1130 C. after citing the lines of Pindar *fr.* 130 (95) adds: (the rivers of Erebus) *ἐνθάδε καὶ ἀνταρταρὸν ἀνθρῶς καὶ ἀνθρῶν καὶ ἀνθρῶν καὶ ἀνθρῶν*. This might possibly be an addition made by Plu. on his own account—he had frequently spoken of *ἐνθάδε* *ἀνθρῶς*, etc., in his war against the Epicurean *ἀνθρῶς* *ἀνθρῶς*. But the words are more probably a paraphrase from Pindar. At any rate, what is said in Plu. about the *ἀνθρῶς* *καὶ ἀνθρῶς* of the *ἐνθάδε*; in clear contrast with the *ἀνθρῶς* of the *ἀνθρῶς*, comes from Pindar: this is shown by the allusions of Aristid. i, p. 146, 1 Dind. From this parallel it is also clearly proved that the *ἀνθρῶς* does not refer (as Lehrs, *Pop. Anfs.* 213 thinks) to the forgetfulness of the *ἀνθρῶς* in the minds of the living, but forgetfulness of their previous life by the *ἀνθρῶς* themselves. Accordingly we are to suppose that Pindar assigns retention of memory and complete consciousness only to the good in Hades, as their special privilege (cf. the position of *Tetrasias* in *κ* 494), while the punishment

of the wicked is enhanced by λήθη (cf. above, chap. vii, n. 21). Not to have fallen a victim to λήθη in Hades—not to have drunk the waters of Lethe—is occasionally alluded to in poetico-religious utterances of later times as a special privilege of the good. e.g. *Epigr. Gr.* 204, 11 (first century A.C.); 414, 10. *Λήθη* and *Μνημοσύνη πάγη* in Hades (as in the sanctuary of Trophonios at Lebadea, Paus. 9, 38, 8): *Epigr.* 1037 (cf. above, chap. vii, n. 21; chap. xi, n. 88; and see also below).

<sup>39</sup> οὐτοι λήθουτες μένος δαίμονος εὐνοῦντος ἑλίου λέγουσιν αὐτῷ, *fr.* 129. In this naive conception, what Helios only threatens to do in Homer, δίδωμι εἰς Ἄϊδου καὶ ἐν νεκύεσσι φάειναι, he does:

[so Boeckh]—the δαίμων lives in the χώρος εὐνοῦντος in Hades; they have by night and day the same sun (as we: the ἀνωτέρω of 82 also implies this), that is to say, just as much of the sun as we have on earth only in reverse order of time. The sun only shines upon the εὐνοῦντες below; μένος γὰρ ἡμῖν ἥλιος καὶ φέγγος ἰδέναι ἐστι σὺν τῷ ἐκτεθειμένῳ in Hades in *Art.*, *Rom.* 454 f. (but it is the same sun which shines upon them as shines on us, φῶς κολλημένον ὧσπερ ἐνθάδε 155, soleque surum sua sidera norunt is a subtlety of later exegesis). Helios shining by night in Hades occurs again in the late Greek Hymn etc. "*Ἥλιος* (*Orph.*, p. 291 Ab.), v. 11, ἥ γαίης κρυψώμεν μὸλχε πέντων ἱεὶ χώρον. *Epigr. Gr.* 228b, 7-8, Ἀγνοεῖται, σὸ δὲ παῖδες ἐν ἡμέλει φυλάττουσι. εὐνοῦντος ἐνὶ χώρον ἐκτεχόμενος.

<sup>40</sup> O. ii, 75 ff.

<sup>41</sup> *fr.* 133 ἐνέτω ἔσσι. What is meant is beyond all question "after the expiration of an *ennæteris*" (period of 99 months, i.e. 8 years and 3 intercalary months), a period which besides being familiar as a cycle of religious festivals (Apolline specially but not exclusively) also occurs in the ancient procedure of atonement for murder as the period of self-banishment and servitude in a foreign land undergone by the murderer. Apollo after slaying Python serves μέγας εἰς ἐνέτωρ (i.e. an *ennæteris*) in the house of Admetos (i.e. the god of the lower world) and then returns purified (Müller, *Dorians*, i, 338); in the same way Herakles serves Eurystheus (at least a trace of this is found in [Apollod.] 2, 5, 11, 1; see Müller, *Dorians*, i, 445).—After the murder of Iphitos Herakles has to serve as bondsman to Omphale (peculiar in this case is the combination of this species of atonement for murder with the buying-off of the relatives of the murdered man [Apollod.] 2, 5, 2, 5; D.S. 4, 31, 5). At the end of this period of service he is once more "pure" (ἀγνός cf. S., *Trach.* 358).—Kadmos after slaying the dragon and the *Σαυράς* serves Ares (the χθονικός?) for an *ἐνέτωρ* of eight years [Apollod.] 3, 4, 2, 1; Müller, *Orchomen.* 213.—Hippotes after the murder of Mantia has to fly the country δένει ἔργ (Apollod.) 2, 8, 3, 3.—On the analogy of this custom the gods, too, who have broken an oath sworn by the Styx are banished nine years from the rest of the Olympians (and confined to Hades, since aërial service of the γέθριον is the essential idea of all such *ἐννέτηρας*), Hes., *Tf.* 793 ff.; *Orph. fr.* 157. With a reminiscence of this expiatory banishment Pindar makes the souls at the conclusion of their earthly pilgrimage (which is itself a banishment) undergo a final period of penance in Hades for an *ennæteris*, at the end of which the *νοῦς* for the ancient crime is regarded as completely paid off.—The life on earth and the period in Hades which follows is regarded as an exile of the souls (on account of serious crime).—Such an idea was most natural if the real home of the soul was thought of as being



the Empedocles of Heraklel. Pont. calls the Milky Way  $\delta\delta\alpha\tau\ \delta\epsilon\gamma\alpha\upsilon\ \nu\alpha\varsigma\ \delta\delta\eta\tau\ \nu\alpha\varsigma\ \delta\epsilon\ \nu\alpha\pi\lambda\alpha\varsigma\ \delta\epsilon\alpha\sigma\tau\epsilon\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\tau\alpha\varsigma\ \alpha\pi\ \Phi\iota\lambda\lambda\omicron\pi\ \text{in}\ \text{Arist.},\ \text{Meteor.},\ \text{p. 117, 10 Hayd.};\ \text{see above, chap. ix, n. 111. But Pindar situates his}\ \mu\alpha\kappa\epsilon\pi\alpha\upsilon\ \nu\alpha\varsigma\ \text{in the Ocean (78): it is difficult to see how the souls could arrive there on the Milky Way from the place where they find themselves after death. (We may surely acquit Pindar of the later fancies about an Oceanus in the heavens.) (Q.S. iii, 781 ff. (cited by Tafel) knows of a special way belonging to the gods which leads from heaven down to the}\ \text{'H}\delta\alpha\iota\tau\alpha\varsigma\ \nu\epsilon\beta\lambda\omicron\varsigma\ \text{. But the way by which the souls reach the}\ \mu\alpha\kappa\epsilon\pi\alpha\upsilon\ \nu\alpha\varsigma\ \text{does not, like that way, begin in heaven. We should rather think of some way only passable for gods and spirits leading from the inhabited world over the pathless Ocean to the letter's "sources" far in the West.}$

<sup>16</sup> In O. ii, 84-5, it is certainly Kronos who is meant (as Didymos took it, though he gave an absurd interpretation of the passage) and not Zeus as Aristarchos imagined. The exceedingly corrupt and (owing to the intrusion of glosses) unmetrical lines are beyond certain restoration: the emendations of the Byzantine scholars give the required sense.—What happened to the incorrigibly wicked? In accordance with the theory of the soul's Transmigration two alternative views as to their fate were possible: they might be regarded as passing from body to body unceasingly (Empedokl.) or as doing penance by suffering eternal punishment in Hell (as with Plato and others). The circumstances in which he alludes to these matters do not give Pindar any special occasion to declare himself for either view. He has only to speak of the final condition of the just: the fate of the *dankels* is left in semi-obscurity. Something about the matter is, however, said in fr. 132:  $\phi\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\iota\ \delta\epsilon\sigma\tau\epsilon\lambda\alpha\varsigma\ \text{hover under the vault of heaven that covers the earth (}\nu\alpha\iota\alpha\ \text{either corrupt or grammatically bad Greek), while the pious above the vault of heaven (}\nu\alpha\sigma\tau\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\alpha\varsigma\ \text{) sing to the "Great Blessed One". Everything in this is un-Pindaric, the inadequacy and even incorrectness of the language (}\mu\epsilon\lambda\omicron\tau\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \delta\epsilon\ \delta\iota\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\tau\epsilon\tau\alpha\varsigma\ \text{), the unconcealed monotheism of the phrase}\ \mu\alpha\kappa\epsilon\pi\alpha\ \mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\varsigma\ \text{, the conception of the souls as having nothing else to do than sing to the One God, the whole idea that these blessed ones dwell "in heaven". This last is an idea familiar to Greeks of a later period, nor is the division of souls into}\ \nu\epsilon\pi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\pi\alpha\iota\varsigma\ \text{and}\ \nu\alpha\sigma\tau\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\alpha\varsigma\ \text{unknown to them; cf. Epigr. Gr. 840, 8 ff. But Pindar cannot have written anything of the kind. It is even doubtful whether Clem. Al. who, Str. iv, 840 P., names as the author of the lines}\ \nu\alpha\varsigma\ \mu\alpha\kappa\epsilon\pi\alpha\upsilon\varsigma\ \text{, meant Pindar by the words: Theodoret. (Gr. Aff. C. vii, 598 C), who attributes the second half of the frag. to Pindar, had no other source but the same Clem. Al. But it may be doubted whether the whole is to be attributed to any Greek of the older faith. It has quite the appearance, as Zeller, *Socr. and Socratic*, p. 24, n. 3, strikingly suggests, of one of those Jewish forgeries in which Jewish monotheism and the ideas connected with it were to be fathered upon Greek antiquity. Welcker, *Kl. Schr.* v, 282 ff.; *Götting. i.* 741 f., defends the fr. (and most unconvincingly connects the  $\phi\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\iota\ \nu\alpha\sigma\tau\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\alpha\varsigma\ \text{and}\ \nu\alpha\sigma\tau\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\alpha\varsigma\ \text{of the fr. with the quite different}\ \delta\alpha\iota\mu\omicron\nu\epsilon\varsigma\ \epsilon\mu\chi\theta\epsilon\tau\alpha\varsigma\ \text{and}\ \epsilon\mu\chi\theta\epsilon\tau\alpha\varsigma\ \text{of Hes., Op. 123 and 141). He thinks he can defend the genuineness of the lines (which had already been declared spurious by Dissen) by pointing to the words of Horace about Pindar's}\ \delta\epsilon\phi\eta\tau\alpha\varsigma\ \text{(O. iv, 2, 31):}\ \text{Scilicet epoumque iuvenem raptum plorat, et vires umantemq; moremque aurem educit in astra nigroque videt Orco. Even supposing that this referred to the transport of the souls to the stars the witness of Horace thus given would only}$$

remove a single difficulty from a passage that has other overwhelming difficulties in profusion. But Horace says nothing of the transport of the "Soul" to the heavenly regions. *vires, animas, mores*, all these together refer not at all to the *ψυχή* but to the *ψῆς* and the *ἀφρα* of the dead. Pindar, Horace means, rescues the *memory* of the nature and merits of the youth from decay: only the *name* which the poet secures for him is under discussion. *adulit in astra* and *invidet Orco* mean nothing more than: he rescues the memory of the dead from oblivion, exactly as in the epitaph quoted above, n. 20: *πάλλει θανάτῳ δερρέας θρύψ' ἄλκας ἑλάει* or *Θάνατος κρεμόμενος ἀνείκελ δέμας* of *Ἄλφα*. Thus, it is least of all to be concluded from Horace's words that Pindar transported the souls of the *εὐσεβεῖς* into the heavens (rather than in the *ἐρῆος*—as much as anywhere else: see above, n. 25—Pindar sometimes only recognizes the immortality of fame: of that alone does Horace speak).

<sup>47</sup> O. ii celebrates the victory which Theron had won at Olympia in O. 76, but was probably written some time after that victory. Theron died O. 77, 1, or 78, 4.

<sup>48</sup> Sicily was rich in cults of *χρόνος*, in which Gelon, Hieron and their ancestors were hierophants, *Hdt.* vii, 153; *Pl.*, *G.* vi, 95. So, too, Akragas the city of Theron (and the home of Empedokles which also is not without its importance) was *Θεοπερίερος Ἰλίου*, *Pl.*, *P.* xii, 2, having been given by Zeus to Persephone on her marriage, *Sch. Pl.*, *O.* ii, 16 (as also had, in addition to other cities, Pindar's native city Thebes, *Euphorion*, *fr.* 48; cf. *Eur.*, *Phoen.* 664 ff. Theron's family traced its descent from Eteokles the son of Oedipus). It is very possible that the hopes of a blessed immortality of the soul such as were fostered in many ways in the cult of the *χρόνος* and particularly in that of Persephone, should have been familiar to Theron from such a cult and attractive to him.

<sup>49</sup> The theological character of much of Pindar's work makes knowledge of mystic doctrine not surprising in him. In *fr.* 137 he speaks of the Eleusinia (to which he otherwise owes nothing). In *fr.* 191, though the words are unfortunately most corrupt and probably contain lacunae as they have been transmitted, he speaks of the "releasing initiations", *ἄλφια δ' ἀνέμεναι ἀπὸ λυσιπποῦς κελάρων*—this is the form of the words required by the metre (dactylo-epitritic), and thus (not *κελάρων*) they appear in *Flux. Com. Apoll.* 35, p. 120 D, and also in *cod. Vatic.* 138 (which I have collated).

<sup>50</sup> *IG.* xiv = *IG.*, *Sic. et It.*, 641, 1-2-3. [Harrison-Murray, *Prolegom.* 661 ff.; *Fors.* 66 B, 18, 19.]—The inscription of the oldest of these poems belongs to the fourth century B.C. The verses can, however, be cited here because the original or rather the two originals upon which the poems are modelled were older than the oldest of the three surviving lines, (which itself shows serious corruption of the primitive text); and nothing prevents us from supposing that the original forms of these verses go back to the fifth century.—The common ancestor of versions 2 and 3 is not derived from version 1, even in the parts in which it agrees with that version, but from a still older original.—Acc. to Dietherich, *Nekyia* 128 f., the lines are taken from a poem of *Orpheus*' descent to Hades; but of this they themselves offer not the slightest suggestion.

<sup>51</sup> The feminine *ἐρῆος* is certainly retained—and also *οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἴκω* (though this indeed is metrically impossible) *IG.* xiv, 641, 2, l. 8—refers probably to the *ψυχή* and not to the sex of the dead person as though a woman were speaking in all three cases. Moreover, in

No. 1, 3, Persephone speaks as though to a man *θάβης καὶ μεταμορῆς, θεὸς δ' ἴσθι ἐνρί βροτοῖο*.

<sup>31</sup> L 1, *Ἰσχυρὸς ἐν καθάρῳ καθαρὸν χθονίων βασιλεὺς*. This is certainly the right punctuation (and is given by the editors), and not Hofmann's *ἐν καθάρῳ, καθαρὸν χθ. β.* "Pure and born of the pure" (referring to the immediate parents of the dead; more distant ancestry would be expressed by *ἀνδρῶν*); cf. *καίτινος κἄν κοῦδος*, etc. (Nauck on Soph., *OT*. 1397; *Ph*. 874); *ἀγαθαὶ δὲ ἀγαθῶν δότες*, Andoc., *At*. 109.

<sup>32</sup> καὶ γὰρ ἴσθις ἐμῶν γένος ἔλθῃς εὐχομαι εἰμύμην in all three versions.

<sup>33</sup> ἄλλὰ μὲ κοῖρ' ἐδάμνασθαι καὶ ἀστεροπαῖτα κερωνῶν (particip.) : so in the original to which the readings of three versions point, as restored by O. Hofmann in *GDI*. 1854. *ἀστεροπαῖτα* is in No. 1.—this might simply = *ἀστεροπαῖτα*, but it may only have been substituted by mistake for *ἀστεροπαῖτα* (= *ἀστεροπαῖτης* of Homer). The line in this form occurs in No. 1, 4. Versions 2 and 3 have *εἰς μὲ κοῖρ' ἐδάμνασθαι* *ἐν' ἀστεροπαῖτα κερωνῶν*. But the dead had no choice between natural death (for this is what *μῆϊς* must mean as contrasted with death by the thunderbolt) and death by being struck by lightning; one or other of the two (or more) forms of death must in actual fact have occurred. In this embarrassment—for death by lightning is not a very frequent occurrence—the ancient verse was altered in such a way that it might refer also to one who had died a natural death. The attempt was indeed not a great success. Originally death by lightning can alone have been mentioned (as in No. 1) and the original form of the lines must have referred to someone who had actually perished in this way. The dead person was then immediately regarded as sanctified simply on account of the method of his death; he became a *ἱερός* *κνρός* translated to a higher and continued life: see above, chap. ix, n. 127, and Appendix i. This is the only interpretation of the lines which gives any point to the introduction here of this peculiar manner of death—one who has been thus translated out of life will certainly now be *θεὸς ἐνρί βροτοῖο*.

<sup>34</sup> *ἀνέλας τῆς γένεσας, τοῖς ἰατί, etc.* Lob., *Agf*. 798 ff.

<sup>35</sup> *ἱερὸν δ' ἐνθάδε νεφέωνος κοῖρ' ἀκαυλῶμεν, ἀσπερὶν δ' ὠνὲν ῥέκνον ἴδεν χθονίων βασιλείας*, No. 1, 6-7. The *νεφέωνος* will probably be the sacred precinct, the enclosure that surrounds the realm of Persephone, as Dieterich, *De hymn. Orph.* 33, very plausibly suggests.

<sup>36</sup> See Appendix xi.

<sup>37</sup> *ὡς μὲ νεφέωνος πέτρῳ ἴδεναι ἐς εὐαγέων*. The *ἴδεναι* *εὐαγέων* correspond to the *χῶρος* *εὐαγέων* of other poets and mythologists. But the strange phrase does also contain an allusion to the fact that this paradise of the "pure" is specially reserved for the initiates of the mysteries. The *εὐαγέης*, the man untouched by any *έπον*, is *ἱερός* (*ἱερός ἴσθι καὶ εὐαγέης ἴσθι* ap. And., *At*. 98): *εὐαγέης* = *ἱερός* in an ins. from Ialyssos in Rhodes, *IGM. Arg.* i, 677. Ordinary non-religious language also preserves the original meaning of the word: it frequently means (in contrast to *συνώβρις* and the like) "bright, pure, clean" (and in places, too, where it is customary to insert without good reason *εὐαγέης*, following the ex. of Hemsterh. on Eur., *Suppl.* 662).

<sup>38</sup> The similarity with the stages of the reward given to the good in Pindar is obvious: *χῶρος* *εὐαγέων* in Hades; then and not till then

escape from the underworld and from human life as well. The only difference is that in *Fi.* the soul's final end is to become a *σπῆς* while here it becomes *θεός*.

<sup>10</sup> *JG.* xiv, 842.

<sup>11</sup> *id.* 641, 1, v. 10, *ἐρμῆς δὲ γὰρ ἔμενον*. 842, 4, *θεός ὅντινος ἴφ' ἀνθρώπων*. *ἐρμῆς* is γάλα *ἐννεπε*. The conjunction of the two phrases in 842 shows that "As a kid I fell into the milk" is a condition of "I became a God". We may certainly recognize in the phrase a σύνθημα or σέμβολον of the Mystai like those usual in other secret initiatory rites—*ἐκ τρυφῆς ἐφαγον κτλ.*, *Loh.* 23 ff.—which refer to performance of symbolical actions in the initiation ceremonies. The precise sense of this σύνθημα cannot be made out (Dieterich's efforts, *H. Orph.*, p. 35, have not succeeded in clearing up the matter).

<sup>12</sup> Worth remarking is the instruction ἀλλ' ἐνέμενα ψυχὴν νοσῶντα δάος δαίμονα, δαείδω σιούδω πεφύλαγμένον εἰ μέγα νόστον (this or something like it may have been the original form of the lines which have been thrown into confusion by the intrusion of the explanatory words δαί νοσῶ). Then at the conclusion (δ) χαῖρε χαῖρε, δαείδω δόδοισιν ἀμυγνέειν καὶ ἱερὸς καὶ δόξα θεοειδένος. (and: this and nothing else is probably concerned by the KAT of the inscription—*καὶ* long before a vowel in 3rd thesis is even in Homer not unheard of.) Here at a comparatively early date we meet with the legend of the Two Ways at the entrance to the underworld, of which that to the right leads to the χαῖρε εὐεβδῶν, the left to the place of punishment of the δάκρυα. It may derive from the fancies of South Italian mystic sects. *δαείδω* and *ἀμυγνέειν* in the Pythagorean table of Opposites—and in *σιονιστικῆς* for a long time before that—mean the same as *ἀγαθόν* and *κακόν* (*Arist.*, *Metaph.* 1, 5, p. 986a, 24; cf. *Iamb.*, *V.P.* 156).—The Y Pythagoreum denoted the parting of the ways of life to the right (to virtue) and to the left (vice): *Serv.*, *A.* vi, 136; cf. *O. Jahn*, *Pers.*, p. 155 f. Plato transferred the Two Ways to the underworld probably following Pythagorean example, *Rp.* 614 C; cf. *ῥα ὁδῶν*, *Gorg.* 524 A; *διόρσοι σίνεσσ*, *Cato ap. Sall.*, *C.* 52, 13, is a Platonist passage. To the right the fountain of Mnemosyne, to the left that of Lethe—grave-tablet from Petelia: *Epigr. Gr.* 1037 = *JG.* xiv, 838. The Two Ways in the underworld (of which that to the right hand regularly leads to salvation) are also spoken of by the *μενέρες* whose lines are quoted by Hippol., *NH.* 5, 8, p. 164, 80 D.-S. (perhaps "Orpheus" as Dieterich, *Nek.* 193 thinks); cf. also *Verg.*, *A.* vi, 840 ff., *Regenipp.*, *AP.* vii, 545, and the Jewish forgery under the name of Philon., *Mein.* 4, 67, 8 f. (ii, p. 358 K.).—*Three Ways* in the world of the spirits, which he takes as being in the sky, are seen by the Empedocleus of Herakl. Pont. (see above, chap. ix, §. 111): *Serv.*, *G.* i, 34. Plutarch also alludes to *Three Ways* in the underworld, *Lat. Tiro.* vii, p. 1130, for in giving his quotation from Pindar's *Θαῖρος* fr. 129-30 he suddenly, without having previously said anything about the other two Ways, speaks of the *εἰς τὴν ἀνδρῶν βεβηκότων καὶ ἀποδράμων ὁδῶν* which leads into Erebus. We should suppose that he found these *Three Ways* in Pindar whom he is making use of throughout the passage. *Three Ways* would seem natural to one who knew of three classes of souls: the *εὐδαίμων* and the *δαείδω* having in between them those who have not strayed seriously from either side of the middle way of ordinary morality and deserve neither reward nor severe punishment. To these then was probably allotted, instead of the bliss or sorrow of the two other classes, the indifferent state of the Homeric *αἰθέρα κομάντων*. So at least it appears from *Lucian*, *Luc.* 7-8. A similar triple



division occurs in a popular form ap. D.H. viii, 83 ad fin. : (1) a place of punishment, a kind of Tartarus ; (2) *τὸ λεγόμενὸν μέσσιον* (which is here the indifferent state) ; (3) the *αἰθέρ* which is the dwelling-place of the Blessed. Verg., too, has three classes, but he places the middling characters in the limbus infantium, beyond which the road first divides towards Elysium and Tartarus. Did Pindar then anticipate these and incidentally—he need not have been logically consistent about it—introduce such a triple division of the souls ?

<sup>52</sup> Plato's violent attacks on poets and poetry—in which nevertheless acc. to his own account *οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου γὰρ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν ἔστιν αὐτὰ βίαιον*—show more clearly enough that in his time the old Greek view of the poets as the true teachers of their age was by no means a thing of the past. It was precisely as teachers, whether rightly or wrongly so regarded, that they seemed to him dangerous and worth opposing.

<sup>53</sup> Aristophanes is only formulating popular opinion—and in unusually naïve language—when he says *Ἦαυ. 1030 ταῦτα γὰρ εὐδαίμων καὶ ποιητὴς ἀνέλε* : *οὐδένα γὰρ ἐκ' ἀρχῆς οἷς ἀδελφοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν αἱ γυναῖκες ποιεῖσθαι ἐνλ.* And again 1053 ff. where he is referring particularly to tragic dramatists, *ἀποκρίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τὸν γε ποιητὴν, καὶ μὴ παρῶν μὲν δίδασκεν. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ παιδαγωγῶσι ἱερὸν διδάσκαλον θεοὶ φέρουσιν, τοῖς δὲ θεοῖς δὲ ποιηταί.*

<sup>54</sup> This idea is alluded to as early as *Δ 160 ff.* Then *Hes., Op. 282 ff.* It is established for *Hdt.* : *cl. i, 91, vi, 86.* Further examples collected by Nagelsbach, *Nachkom. Târol. 34 f.* *Thgn. 205 ff., 731 ff.*, is particularly definite. Among Attic authors : *cl. Sol., fr. 13, 29 (δαίμων ἴσται νίκης)* ; *E., Hipp. 831 ff., 1378 ff.* (where note *τὸν οὐδὲν ἐκ' ἐμῶν*), *fr. 940* ; (*Lys.*) *6, 20* ; *Lycurg. 78.* It is briefly alluded to as a commonly held opinion by *Isoc. II, 25* ; *cl. Lys., fr. 33 Th.* The case of Diagoras of Melos the *ἀθεός* may also be remembered ; *cf. above, chap. vii, n. 18.*—This idea of the punishment of the son for the deeds of the father receives its justification acc. to *Plu., Ser. Nū. V, 18, 558 D* (quite in accordance with primitive ideas) in the unity that belongs to all the members of the same *γένος*—so that in the person of the son it is the father himself, though he may be dead, who is also punished. The idea arises from the deeply ingrained feeling of the unity, solidarity, and continuity of the ancient family cult-circle pre-supposed by the cult of souls. (This is primitive and meets us, e.g. in India as well : “release us from the wrongs that our fathers have done ; take away the sins of that we ourselves have committed” is the prayer to Varuna in the *Rigveda*, 7, 86, 5. *τὰ δὲ νεκρῶν ἐπιμαρτυρίαι* are transferred also to the next generation “like a penitence-breeding substance”. *Oldenberg, Rel. d. V. 268.* Elsewhere the conception emerges that the guilty ancestor lives again in the descendant and is punished in his person : *Robinson, Psychol. d. Natur. 47.*)

<sup>55</sup> It is precisely on this point, namely, that evil does not befall men without their own fault, that the *Chron.* i.e. the poet, of the *Agamemnon* (757), acknowledges *ἴδμε δ' ἅλλων μοιόφρων ἐμῶν.*

<sup>56</sup> In this way, too, the Stoics saved the responsibility of men for their own deeds in spite of the unavoidable *ἀναγκή*. The deeds would not have come to fruition if the personal *συγκατάθεσις* of the man had not been added to the original necessary cause conditioning the acts. The *συγκ.*, though not itself “free”, yet always remains *ἐφ' ἑμῶν* and makes us responsible : *Cic., Fat. 18* ; *Nemes. Nat. Rom., p. 291 Matth.*

<sup>10</sup> Clearly so from l. 688 onwards.

<sup>11</sup> τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ σπορίῳ ἀναισθητὸν οὐ πρὸς νόον (τὸς Ἑσπίας) *daítes*, *Eum.* 834.

<sup>12</sup> Only when Eteokles and Polyneikes have fallen in single combat *ἄγχι δαίμων*, *Sept.* 956.

<sup>13</sup> This idea is quite common in Homer (*Nagelsbach, Hom. Theol.* 70 f., 320 f.), and in later times reappears frequently in the case of such authors as always, or on occasion, express popular ideas: *Togn. Hdt. esp. Eur. (cf. Fr. Trog. Adesp. 4, 58 N.)*, and the orators: see *Nagelsbach, Nachkom. Th.* 54 ff., 332 f., 378.

<sup>14</sup> ἀνδρὶς δαίμων οὐκ ἀνορέωνι θεῷ, *fr.* 301 S. This, too, must be the meaning of other expressions in which the poet refers less plainly to the righteous purpose of divine deception: *Pers.* 83 ff., 742; *fr.* 156, 302 (cf. also *Suppl.* 403 f.).—Aristoph. makes his *Clouds* speak quite in accordance with the Aeschylean ideas, *Nub.* 1458 ff. This grim idea must, in fact, have had considerable success and spread beyond the stage. Falsehood and deception for a good end presented an difficulty to the mind of the Greeks (even as applied to their gods). Hence Sokrates (in *Xen.*), Plato, and certain Stoics could quite openly approve of and recommend such falsehoods [and the author of the *diakrisis*, c. 3 in defending the same theory also appeals to the lines of Aesch.].

<sup>15</sup> *Ag.* 1497–1508. Here there is a clear opposition between the popular view which attributed all guilt to an ἀδελφὸς tempting to crime (a reminiscence of which appears in *Soph., El.* 197 ff.), and the more elevated conception of the poet who holds fast to the view that though the ἀδελφὸς may contribute to the result the agent of the evil deed is not δαίμων.

<sup>16</sup> The dead man stands in need of the cult paid by his surviving kinsfolk, *Cho.* 484 (his grave a βωμός, *Cho.* 100; καὶ γὰρ ἔλας for him, 486 f.). As an appeasement of his easily aroused wrath καὶ μετάνειμα μελίσσεται, *Cho.* 18. The dead man is still conscious of events both past and present upon earth: φρόνημα τοῦ θανόντος οὐ δαίμωνι περὶ μάλα πολλὰ γνῶσις, *Cho.* 324 f. In the song of awakening addressed to the departed and the invocations sung by Electra and the Chorus in *Cho.* the soul of Agamem. is similarly regarded as fully alive and accessible to the callers (though, indeed, ἐξ ἑμυποῦς φέρεις 157) and addressed accordingly (cf. 139, 147 f., 166 f., 479 ff.; *Pers.* 638). It is even expected that his soul, invisibly present in the upper world, will take an active share in the work of vengeance: δαίμων ἐς φῶς μάλα, φῶς δὲ γυνὴ καὶ ἐχθρὸς, *Cho.* 459; cf. 448. So, too, Orestes, *Eum.* 898, hopes in his extremity of need that δαίμων ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κήρυξεν νόον. More especially the murdered man has a right to be avenged by his δαίμωνις (of δ' ἀπ' ἑλάνου, *Cho.* 472) and Apollo himself has commanded Orestes to take such vengeance, *Cho.* 268 ff., etc. Dread results of neglecting this duty, *Cho.* 278–86 (possibly an interpolated passage, but still an extension of the words of A. himself 271 ff. in a sense thoroughly in consonance with popular belief).

<sup>17</sup> The Erinyes only avenge the murder of a blood-relation and not therefore when one of a married pair is murdered by the other, *Eum.* 210–12, 604 ff. But the opinion emerges that they are particularly charged with the vengeance of a mother who has been murdered by her son (rather than a father who has suffered the same fate), 658 ff., 798 ff. (Reminiscences of such a view in *S., El.* 341 ff., 382 ff.; *E., Orest.* 552 ff., *fr.* 1064.) This may possibly be an old popular belief (not fully understood by A. himself) which need not, however (as is often

supposed), depend upon an ancient system of "matriarchy" for which there is no other evidence in Greece. It is simply explained by the fact that the father has plenty of men still living among his kindred who will avenge him (even against his own son), whereas the mother who is separated from her own family can expect no avenger from that side, while in the family of her husband there will be nobody yet old enough to take vengeance on her own son. For this reason it is for her most particularly and necessarily that the daimonic avengers of murder must intervene, and they are the Erinyes, who are always thought of as only active where no earthly avenger is available. —Of course, it could never be denied that there exists also *συνετής ἀνταρτία* *Ἐρινός*, *Sep.* 783.

<sup>12</sup> *δαίμων*, *δαίς*, *δία* *ἀνδραγ.* *ἰσοδαίμων* *βραδύς* are titles given only to the dead Persian king, *Pers.* 620, 633, 644, 651. They are, however, probably intended to characterize Persian and not Greek beliefs (the Greek king, too, is still a king in Hades, but not a *δαίμων*, *Cho.* 355-62).

<sup>13</sup> *καὶ δὲ διώξῃς ἐμπαλαστήσῃ*, *ὡς λόγος*, *ἔτις ἄλλος* (cf. *Σίγν. τῶν περὶ μαχηκῶν* 136) *ἐν καμνοῦν ὀνύχας δίκας*, *Suppl.* 230 f.; cf. 414 ff. — *μήναι γὰρ* "*ἄδης ἰστίῳ εὐθύνῃ* *Ἰστιάῳ ἱερῇ χθονί, δεικνυμένη δὲ πᾶσι*" *ἱστίῳ ἱερῇ*, *Enm.* 273 ff. Not even in Hades do the Erinyes let the murderer go, *Enm.* 340. The punishment in Hades seems to be regarded as merely supplementary to the (perhaps delayed) punishment of crime on earth *οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἐμμενοῦς δίκας ταχέα τοὺς πῦν ἐν φάει*, *τὰ δ' ἐν μεταστάσει σκότον μῖναι χροῖσσαντες ἄχθ.* *τοὺς δ' ἄνακτος ἔχει νῆς*, *Cho.* 61 ff.

<sup>14</sup> *τοῖς θανάτοις εἰ θύλῃσι κτερυγνέειν αἶψ' ὅτε κακουργαῖν, ἀμφιβεβήκει* *ἔχει τῷ πᾶσι χερσὶν μέτε λυγισθῆαι σκροῦς*, *fr.* 268. This does, not, however, agree with *Cho.* 324 f., or with the frequently occurring expressions which presuppose consciousness and feeling (and so also *χεῖρας* and *λυγισθῆαι*) in the dead. Consistency in such matters must not, in fact, be looked for in a non-theological poet. The *δωγὴ* of the dead man a shadow without the sap of life, *fr.* 279. Death a refuge from earthly suffering, *fr.* 255. The speedy death which the Chorus wish for themselves, *Ag.* 1449 ff., brings with it *νῦν δὲ ἐνέλευτον ἴσμεν* and therefore a condition of unconsciousness if not of complete nothingness. —The shadow of Darius takes his leave of the Persian nobles in the folk words: *ὅμοις δέ, πρίσθεις, χεῖρες*, *ἐν ναοῖς ὁμοῦς φυχῶν ἀκόοντες ἄπορ' αὐτ' ἡμίρον*, *ὡς τοῖς θανάτοις ἀκόοντες οὐδὲν ἀφέλει*, *Pers.* 640 ff. This view of life is perhaps intended to have an Oriental colouring (like the epitaph of Sardapalpus which is rightly quoted in illustration of this passage); the reason given *ὡς τοῖς θανάτοις* *αὐτὸς* is perhaps to be similarly explained.

<sup>15</sup> *Ἰστιάῳ ἱερῇ*, 37. Orestes is to his father's house *δῖος καθαρῆς* *πρὸς θεῶν ὁρμητῆρος* 70.

<sup>16</sup> One reason why no Erinyes pursue Orestes after he has murdered his mother is, indeed, the fact that Sophokles is treating the "Elektra" in isolation as an independent drama and could not therefore introduce a fresh thread of interest at the end, if he was to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion. But the mere fact that he could so arrange matters shows that for him, in contrast with Aeschylus, the belief in the veritable reality of the Erinyes and the necessary perpetuation of the idea of vengeance in the family was already obscured and almost obsolete. The ancient family blood-tend is less important to him than the rights of the separate and independent individual.

<sup>17</sup> *Carual allusions*, *El.* 304 ff.; *OC.* 865; *Ant.* 858; and cf. 384 ff., 564 ff.

<sup>10</sup> οὐ γὰρ θεὸς ἐν ἀθροῦς βροτῶν δοτὶς ἐστί, τί θεὸς ἔγωγε, ἐκφυγὼν δύναιτο, O.C. 252. ἔπειθ' οἱ τὸς θεῶν βλῶντα, δάσαιτ' ἂν οὐδ' ἂν ὁ σθεῖναι φαργῆν, El. 886 f. εἰσχε μὲν, ᾧ γυναικίης, οὐδ' ἂν εἴη φέροις βροτῶν ποτ' ὃ καὶ Ζεὺς (as the one who rules and ordains everything, cf. El. 175; O.C. 1085) ἰσορροφῆ καὶ τῶντος δ' ἀνάγκη τὰς θεηλάτους φέρειν, fr. 619 N.

<sup>11</sup> Phil. 191-200.

<sup>12</sup> It is fixed long before by an oracle: 821 ff.; 1156 ff. It is not exactly overpowering violence or heaven-sent madness that drives Deianeira to carry out the prophecy; it is rather an obscure force that transforms her purest intentions to an evil result. She herself is completely innocent: ἄμαρτε χρηστέ μοιμήν.

<sup>13</sup> The reason for this will of the gods is not revealed to us, either in OT. or in the subsequent treatment given in OC. The only thing that is made quite clear there is the complete innocence of Oedipus: as to the meaning of the divine purpose that has plunged him into such deeds of horror the sufferer can only say θεοῖς γὰρ ἦν οὖτω φίλον, τάχ' ἂν τι μυνίσουσιν εἰς γένος πάλαι (884 f.). This is a passage in which modern interpretation of the ancients finds the "upholding of the moral order in the world" clearly expressed as a motive of divine will.

<sup>14</sup> καὶ γὰρ ἦν τῶν θεοσβεστώνων, Sch., El. 831.

<sup>15</sup> fr. 226 N., ποδῶς γὰρ οὐδὲν πλὴν οὐκ ἔστι τὰς θεῶν. ἀλλ' εἰς θεὸν ὁ δρώωντα, κἄν ἴδω δέωγε χρῶνιν κλέϊν, κείν' ἔδοξε ποτὶν χρῶνιν. εἰσχαδὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν ὦν ὑφ' ἡγεμόνας θεοῖ.

<sup>16</sup> Ajax has angered the goddess because he has boasted that he could do without her help. Thus he has drawn upon himself δυνεργῆ θεὰς ἄργον, 776. The goddess makes him insane that he may recognize τῆν θεῶν ἰσχὺν δαή, 118. Thus, her superior power is shown and the folly of men who despise that power. But as for showing that the revengeful act of the goddess has any sort of moral purpose or meaning behind it, the pious poet makes no such attempt.—The interpolation of ideas more familiar in modern times does not make it any easier to understand the peculiar character of such antique εὐσθεῖα and δεισιδαιμονία. The same kind of fearful awe of the gods which we find here, runs through the whole of Herodotus' historical writing (Hdt. was not without reason a friend of Sophocles) and meets us again in the character of Nikias and to a large extent in Xenophon, too. Thus, and, on the whole, Eurip., (for he varies) calmly ignore it or else violently reject it. Its nature is shown (better than in the more usual εὐσθεῖα) by the phrase εἰς τὸς θεοὺς εὐλόβεια which also occurs: [D.] 59 (Neaer.) 76.

<sup>17</sup> Trach. 1266 f.; 1272 (where, however, there remains a suspicion that the traditional text may be unsound); fr. 103 N. Parallels occur also in Phil.

<sup>18</sup> There exists a region of divine mystery that is not to be fathomed: οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ θεῶν πνευμάτων θῶν μάθος ἦν, οὐδ' εἰ πάντ' ἐντελέθους σκευῶν, fr. 833; cf. OT. 280 f. and πολλὰ καὶ λαθρὴν καλόν, fr. 80 N.

<sup>19</sup> The behaviour of Athena in the prologue of the *Aias* is an exception.

<sup>20</sup> Odysseus beholding the insane Aias: ἰσχυρῶς δέ μιν δυνήσαντα ἔπειθ' αἰσέτω δότα θυμῶν, εὐθύνειν' ἔργ' ἀνταρξάμεναι καμῶν, οὐδὲν τὰ τοῦτον μέλλον ἢ τοῦμῶν σκευῶν. ὅρα γὰρ ἤμαρ οὐδὲν ὄντας ἄλλα πλὴν εἰδωλῶν δαίμονες ζώμεν, ἃ καὶ γὰρ ἀνάν, Ai. 121 ff.

<sup>21</sup> ἰὼ γυνεὶ βροτῶν καλ. OT. 1186 ff.; οὐτὶς τοῦ πλόντος μέρους χρεῖς . . . OC. 1211-38; cf. fr. 12, 535, 536, 582, 856, 860.

<sup>22</sup> Nor is Antigone affected by such motives as might appear from a casual or isolated study of such lines as Aia. 73 ff. The whole play

shows that Antig. throughout follows the *δυσμενὲς νόσφαις θεῶν νόμιμα* and the instincts of her own nature, without paying any attention to what may happen to her on earth and without a side glance at what may be the result in the world below of her "pious crime".

<sup>92</sup> We often have in "Αἰθῶν κατωθέμενος (*Ant.* 911) *μυχοῖς κελὶν τοῦ αἵματος θεοῦ* (*Ant.* 571) and other phrases = "be dead" (cf. to be an *εὐχρησμός* of Erebus, *Ant.* 393 ff. Hades seems to be called *κατωθέμενος* *ferveant* fr. 252). The confusion of the idea of a kingdom of Hades with that of the grave is shown in the not infrequent expression in "Αἰθῶν, *κατ'* "Αἴθῃ κατέβη, *El.* 463; *OT.* 972; *Ph.* 881; *φίλη μὲν' ἀπὸ τοῦ κατωθέμενου φίλον μέγα, Ant.* 73; cf. fr. 578.

<sup>93</sup> *κατὰ ἀναγκάλην*, i.e. of this, in the Homeric and a measure of semi-conscious existence is presumed in the shades in Hades: *OT.* 1371 ff.—Doubt: *εἰ τις δὲρ' ἐστὶ χάρις, El.* 358.

<sup>94</sup> *θανόντων οὐδὲς ἔλκος ἔσται, OC.* 855. *ταῖς γὰρ θεοῖσι μέχθον οὐ προσγύγεται, Tr.* 1173. *ταὺς γὰρ θανόντας οὐχ ὀρῶ λησσομένους, El.* 1170. (All three lines are denied to Soph. by the latest criticism.)

<sup>95</sup> *Ph.* 797 f.; *Ant.* 884; *OC.* 1320 ff.; fr. 831 (cf. *h.*, fr. 285; *Fr. Tr.* *Adesp.* 360. *ἀπὸ τοῦ κατωθέμενου*, a commonplace of later moralists: see Wyttenb. *Phu.*, *Nor.* vi, p. 720, was taken over from tragedy).—The converse fr. 64, 275.

<sup>96</sup> Collectively of *νέκτεροι, οἱ νέκτεροι θεοί, OC.* 1681; *Ant.* 602. Hades in particular is often mentioned, and also *Πλούτων*: "Αἴθῃ στανάγκαις καὶ γόοις κλονίζονται, *OT.* 30; fr. 251. *ὁ παρὰ τὸν Ἀχέρντη τὸν Ἀχέρντην ἄκταν, Ant.* 812. *ἄκταν δονήσας θεοῦ, OT.* 177) *θεὸς ἀνάσσει, El.* 184. Persephone and Aidoneus, *OC.* 1556 ff. Erinyes, Thanatos, Kerberos: *OC.* 1568 ff. *νομῶσις Ἑρμῆς χθόνιος, Ant.* 832; and see *El.* 119 ff., etc.—"Αἴθῃ (here as often = *θάνατος*) desires to devour men; *δαίνοσθαι, El.* 542, f.—a popular conception or at least popular language: see above, chap. vii, n. 26.

<sup>97</sup> Hades *ὅς οἱ τελευτῶντες οὐτε τὴν χάριν αἰδοῖ, μέγαν δ' ἰσορροφίαν ἀνέως δίδωκε, fr.* 703, i.e. the justice of absolute equality (for all earthly distinctions have passed away): *ὁ γ' "Αἴθῃ τοὺς νόμους ἴσους ποιεῖ, Ant.* 519.

<sup>98</sup> *ὃ γὰρ ἐπείθεται οὐκ ἐθέλει βροτοῖς* [it dies when the man dies to whom it belonged: i.e. it follows him, or his *ψυχή* into the lower-world. No textual corruption need be assumed here], *καὶ ζῶν καὶ θνήσκων αἶν ἐνὸς αἵματος, Ph.* 1443 f.

<sup>99</sup> Without ritual burial the dead man is *τὸν κέρως θεῶν εἴματος δαρδύλωντος ἀδύνατος νέμει, Ant.* 1070 f.

<sup>100</sup> *ἀνέφεα αἶα τοῖς αἵματι νομίζονται, El.* 336. *κατελέμενα, 434, 931. ἡντορῶ, 84, 434* (cf. above, chap. v, nn. 108, 107). *ἐμψυμα, 405. χοῆ, 440.—El.* 432, prayer is made to the dead that he "shall help us and Orestes" *ἔσως εἰ λουρὸν κέρως ἀφαιρούμεναι χερσὶν οὐδὲν ἔσθωμεν ἢ τὰ τὸν θανόντα* (at present only a lock of hair and a girdle, 448 ff.).—Offerings to the dead made by foes and even the approach of such persons to the neighbourhood of the grave is displeasing and hateful to the departed who live therein: *El.* 431 ff., 442 ff.; *Ant.* 1394 f. (cf. above, chap. v, n. 109). In this case as in the cult of the soul generally the presence of the dead man in the grave, or else in its immediate neighbourhood, is presupposed—not his departure into an inaccessible land of the dead. The latter view, retained from Homeric

poetry, is generally allowed to remain incongruously side by side with the former.

<sup>106</sup> *El.* 1086 f.

<sup>106</sup> The god of the underworld is *αἰὲς ἀνεπίστομος* of the murdered man: *El.* 182 f. Hence all the gods and spirits of the lower world are summoned to take vengeance for the murder of Agamemnon: *El.* 110-16. We hear of *Δίῃ καὶ Ζήνοικος τῶν κέρει θάνατ' ἄνδρ' ἄνδρ' ὡς* as the patron of the dead in their claim to justice: *Ant.* 451.

<sup>107</sup> Herakles in giving his last commands to Hyllos finally threatens the latter: *αἰ δὲ πρῶτον οὐδ' ἔγωγε καὶ κέρει δύν, ἀπείρος εἰς δὲ βροτῶν*, *Tr.* 1201 f.; cf. *fr.* 387; see above, chap. v, n. 149.

<sup>108</sup> Elektra thinks that Agamemnon himself may have sent the *δρυπρόνομος* *δρυπρόνομος* to Klytaimnestra: *El.* 459 f. (There is no reason for altering the traditional text here—with Nauck—to make the gods the senders of the dreams instead of the dead man. *ἄνθρωπος*, too, can send nocturnal visions of terror: see above, chap. ix, n. 102.) Here Elektra supposes that by sending such harbingers of his wrath the unavenged victim of murder has signified his readiness to assist in the taking of vengeance. This makes perfectly good sense and is the only interpretation that suits the context of Elektra's admonitions to her sister.

<sup>109</sup> *ἀπογὰς*, *El.* 454. *ζῶντων οἱ γὰρ κέρει κεῖμεν, ἐκλήρωται γὰρ αἶψα ὑπερβαίνει τῶν κτανόντων οἱ πάλαι θανάτους*, *El.* 1418 f. "The dead man brings death to the living," Nauck on *Tr.* 1163.

<sup>110</sup> *fr.* 753, 805.

<sup>111</sup> *OC.* 1049 f., 860; *fr.* 736.

<sup>111</sup> Oedipus does not die but vanishes (is seen no more, 1649); the depths of the earth open and receive him: 1661 f., 1681. What is meant is *translation* without death as in the case of Amphiarao, etc. The poet only hints at the miracle in intentionally vague words—but they cannot refer to anything but translation. *ἄλλο* 1858, and *ἴθις* are therefore only inaccurate expressions to describe his departure (see also above, chap. iii, n. 2). The Messenger of 1888 f. refuses, however, to give a distinct answer to the question of the Chorus *ἄλλω γὰρ δέοντι*: he will only hint that Oedipus has indeed *ἄλλω* (1880), but has not simply died—he has instead been translated out of earthly life. The corrupt *ὡς ἀλλοπρότερον καὶ δὲ δὴ* (this was already what the Alexandrians read) *βίον ἀφ' αἰώνος* may not therefore be altered simply into *τὸν αἶον*, *τὸν αἶον βίον*. It may perhaps have originally been something like *τὸν αἶον, τὸν ἐν γῇ, τὸν ἀνδρῶν βίον* (cf. *Maden* to her children *ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐχ ἄνδρ' ἀνδρῶν βίον*, *E., Med.* 1039. A dead woman *ὑπερβαίνει αἰώνιον τοῦ κατ' ἀνδρῶν βίον*. *Ina* from Amorgos, *BCH.* 1891, p. 576, ll. 9-10).

<sup>112</sup> A distinct act of precaution against disbelief in such a miracle: *OC.* 1666 f. (cf. *ἴσως δὲ καὶ δὴ*, *OT.* 906 f.: which refers esp. to the belief in the Oracle of Loxias, a matter of great importance to Soph.).

<sup>113</sup> The innocence of Oedipus and the fact that the awful crimes committed by him have been done in ignorance and against his will *θεῶν δόξαν*, is stressed in order that his elevation to the position of *Heros* may not seem to be an honour done to a guilt-stained criminal. But the poet does not attribute positive virtues to him even in *OC.*—far less in fact than in *OT.*

<sup>114</sup> One has only to read the play without preconceived ideas to see that this passionate and savage old man, pitilessly heaping dreadful curses on his sons, gloating vindictively over the coming misfortunes



with what Teles (p. 38 Hens.) has to say on the same subject apparently in entire dependence on Krates the Cypriote. It seems extremely probable that the author of the *Arctophila* also had Krates before him or even Teles (as Wyttenbach already suggested, *Plu., Mor.* vi. p. 41); and that he attributes what he has thus borrowed from extraneous sources to "Prodikos" by a fiction that never came amiss to the composers of such dialogues.—It follows then that what Prodikos really said about the soul and its destiny is unknown to us; cf. on this recently much-discussed subject: Brinkmann, *Rh. Mus.* 51, 444 ff.

<sup>181</sup> In the Prologue Thanatos at once describes his claims and his office. He has to receive the departed and cut off the lock of hair from the forehead (75 l. probably as a sign that the dead enter into the possession of the underworld deities: in Verg., *A.* iv, 688 l. Proserpina in the same way dedicates the dead to Orcus). He then leads them to Hades, 87 l. He comes in person to the grave and enjoys the offerings laid there, 844 ff., 851 f. (like the dead man himself on other occasions, see above, chap. v, n. 106). Properly speaking he is only the servant of Hades; but just as the word *δαίμων* was already common as — *δαίμων*, so Thanatos himself is also actually called "*δαίμων*" (268, see above, n. 4); only as identical with Hades can he be called *ἑνὸς ὅρατος*, 843: cf. *δαίμωνος τοῖσιν*, 1140.—In the underworld are Charon ὁ ψυχασπορέας, 361, 254 ff., 436 f., and Kerberos, 360. Hades and Hermes *χρόνως* receive the dead. *εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐτὰς τῶν δυνάμεων* Alkestis will have the seat of honour next to Persephone: 744 ff. By the living who survive she is regarded on account of her incomparable virtue as *μάκαρ* *δαίμων* and her grave is not the abode of a dead woman but a place of worship, 995–1005. Such facile elevation to the rank of "Heroine" was supposed to be characteristic of Thessaly and Euboea, may in this also have intended to give his poem a touch of Thessalian local colour. (*δαίμων* as an intermediate stage between *θεοὶ* and *ἀνθρώποι*; so frequently in Eur., e.g. *Tro.* 55–6; *Med.* 1391; in this the meaning of the *μέσση* in *Hel.* 1137 f.)—Thoroughly in keeping with popular belief is *χαίρει καὶ Ἄϊδον δόπου τὸ σῶν γένηται*, 626 l. (such a *χαίρει* in the last word with which *ὡς νομίζουσι* one addresses the dead *ἔσθουσι ὑστάτης* *ἔθου*, 609 l.).—Thoroughly also (but really implying the conception of the dead as resting in the grave and not in Hades) is: *καὶ δὲ σὺν χθονὶ ἐκείνῃς ἔσθου*, 453.

<sup>182</sup> The funeral dirge, 86 ff.; *κόσμος* buried with the dead, 818 ff.; mourning ceremonies: the names of the horses are cut short; no sound of flute or lyre is to be heard in the town for twelve months, 428 ff. (*πένθος ἑτάσιος* is usual, 336). These extreme observances are probably taken from the mourning customs of the Thessalian dynastic families.

<sup>183</sup> Burial of the dead in accordance with νόμος *κατὰς* *δαίμονων*, *Suppl.* 383; νόμος *θεῶν*, 19; a general Hellenic custom, 526 f.—Burial of Polyneikes in spite of Kreon's prohibition: *Phoen.* and probably *Antigone*.

<sup>184</sup> *οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ θάνατος ὑπὲρ τὸν αὐτὸν τελευτήσαντα τιμὴς διδομένη χεῖρον εἰδομένη θάνατον*, *Ph.* 1320 l. *ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ νόμος μὴ κλέπτειν νεκρῶν*, *Hel.* 1277. The honour of the grave more important even than good fortune upon earth, *Hec.* 317 l. Lament over the dishonouring of the grave of Agamemnon, *El.* 323 ff. Request for the burial of Astyanax, *Tro.* 1133 ff., of Orestes, *IT.* 702 ff., of Mektaris, *Hcl.* 588 ff. The shade of the murdered Polydoros prays especially for burial, *Hec.* 47 ff. (31 l., 796 l.). He is an example of the wandering of the *εἰσέοι* upon the upper earth; he *ἔθου* *ἀλκίως*, *Tro.* 1081 (see above, p. 163, and Append. vii).—Funeral ceremony for those who have





speak and act in accordance with their own proper conceptions and springs of action—not in accordance with the poet's. But in the antique drama this complete detachment of the creatures of the dramatic imagination from their creator, the poet of the drama, only holds good in a limited sense. The ancient dramatists exercised their office of judge much more vigorously than the greatest of the moderns. The course of his play showed clearly what acts and characters the poet disapproved of, but also which opinions he sanctioned and which he did not. We have only to remember the attacks of Oedipus and Iphigeneia upon the judgments of the gods in *O.T.* (or the story of Sen., *Ep.* 113, 14; *Eur. fr.* 324). Accordingly we may take it that such utterances of dramatic characters as are not supplied with practical or spoken corrective are among those of which the poet did not disapprove. Euripides so very frequently puts words into the mouth of his characters which can only express his own moods or opinions that we may also assume that when their language harmonises with traditional belief then, too, the most subjective of the tragedians is for the moment expressing his own view. Thus, for example, we cannot doubt that the strain of piety running through the whole of the *Hiketides* (subjection of *Andromache* to God's wisdom, 216 ff., submission to the guidance of the gods, 592 ff., and to Zeus' government of the world, 734 ff.), and especially the whole-hearted elaboration of the picture of Theseus as a model of *edōphros*, represent the actual opinion of the poet at that particular period (he clearly speaks of himself, 180–3). At other times, too (apart from the *Bacchae*), though generally for a short time only, he shows vague aspirations towards orthodoxy.

<sup>125</sup> *Alc.* 968 ff.; *Hipp.* 852 ff.—Asceticism of the mystai of Zeus and Zagreus of the Mountain Mother and the Kouretes; *Kyprien*, *fr.* 472.

<sup>126</sup> *Polyid. fr.* 638; *Phrixos, fr.* 833. It is usual (cf. Bergk, *Gr. Lit.* 2, 475, 34) to see here a reminiscence of Herakleitos. But the latter's ἀθάνατοι θύπτοι, θύπτοι ἀθάνατοι, ζωὴν τὰν ἐνὶ ὕδατι βίαντες, τὰν δὲ ἐνὶ ὕδατι βίαν τεθνήσκουσιν (*fr.* 67 Byw. 62 D.) is clearly intended to express the view that "death" and "life" are purely relative concepts; that death (of the one, i.e. Fire) and life (of the other, i.e. Water or Earth) are simultaneously present in the same object (see also *frs.* 68, 78–36, 88). According to this view it would be strictly true that life on earth is not more life than it is death; but that is certainly not what Eurip. means to say. Philo and Sext. Emp. are mistaken in attributing to Heracl., the Orphic doctrine of the "death" of the soul which takes place when it is enclosed in the σῶμα, as its εἶμα (see above, chap. xi, n. 19). But it is precisely this Orphic doctrine that is present to the mind of Eurip. (and Plato, *Gorg.* 492 E, 493 A, brings it into immediate connexion with the verses of H.). He is speaking of the true "death" of the soul in the life of the body and of its release to a real (and not a merely relative) life after death; and thinks that "life" has no claim to the distinguishing name (cf. δὲ δὴ βίαν καὶ θάνατον Emped. 117 Mull. = *fr.* 15 D.).

<sup>127</sup> *Patignostia* is alluded to once only and in jest as a desirable reward for the virtuous, *HF.* 635–66; cf. *M. Ant.* xii, 5.

<sup>128</sup> δὲ καὶ γὰρ ἡμῶν τέμναι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς θάδε, *fr.* 1018.

<sup>129</sup> *fr.* 839 (*Chryseipp.*) fully physical in *fr.* 698, 7 E.—*fr.* 1023 Αἰθέρα καὶ Γαίαν ἐνὶ ὕδατι γαυροῦσθαι δέδωκε. Cf. *fr.* 1004.

<sup>130</sup> *fr.* 184 (*Μελαν. ὁ καὶ δὲ*)—ὡς εὐπορεῖτε τε γὰρ τ' ἐν κορυφῇ μὲν καὶ. Here, too, the poet is speaking of a mere initial association of the elements afterwards to be parted, but thought of as always from the

beginning independent—there is no derivation of both from a single common original element, or of one out of the other. Eurip. may really have been thinking here of the *ἐμὴν νότον χεῖμα* of Anaxagoras (as the ancient authorities supposed), esp. as, with Anax. also, out of the general conglomeration *two* masses, *ἐξ* and *ἐκ*, first emerge (though in this case *νότος* is not included in the *ἐκ* as it is with Eurip.). Here, too, then the usual dualism of the Euripidean cosmogony is preserved. For the rest this *fr.* 484 allows us to perceive that in spite of all his physiological tendencies Eurip. can never quite get rid of the mythical element in his cosmogonical events. The reason why Ouranos and Gaia in particular recommend themselves to him as elemental forces (and *καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀνέστησαν ποταμοί*, *fr.* 1604) was that these figures had long been set at the beginning of the world and of the gods by cosmogonical poetry (*ἐκ* is simply the more physiological term for what is half-personified as *Θέτα*). This probably explains why matter (or at least the more solid forms of matter as distinguished from the *ἐκ* the *λευκότερον πνεῦμα χρηματίζω*) is for him included in the description "earth". In this he is not following the old physiologists, none of whom had called "earth" the original matter—at least not earth alone (see Blatz, *Quaest. Pseudohippocrat.*, p. 16 ff., 1883). "Earth" as describing the merely material, matter deserted by spirit, may have come to him from popular usage. As early as *fr.* 54 the body deserted by soul and life is called *κατὰ ψυχή* (cf. Eur. *fr.* 532; 757, 5). Thus for the poet the contrast between *γῆ* and *ἐκ* almost amounts to that between "matter" and "mind", except that he either could not or would not think of a "mind" without any material substratum and that for this reason his *ἐκ* still preserves a remnant of matter.

<sup>13</sup> This is esp. clear in *fr.* 838, 8 ff. In the disruption of the elements out of which *αἶσα* are composed each of the *τῶν γῆ* and *ἐκ*, preserves itself undiminished and unmixed. *ἐνθάδε δ' αἶσαν τὰς γενεαρχίας διακρίνομεν δ' ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλον κορφὴν ἰδίαν ἀνέθεκεν* (separates itself in its independent being). Whereupon we feel ourselves irresistibly reminded of the saying of Anaxagoras—*οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινὸν γίνεται οὐδὲ ἀλλάτταται, ἀλλ' ὅσ' ἴδιον χρημάτων συμμίσχονται τε καὶ διακρίνεται, καὶ οὕτως ἀν' ἑαυτῶν καλεῖται τὸ τε γίνεσθαι συμμίσχουσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπὸλλυσθαι διακρίνεσθαι*, *fr.* 17 Mull. [and D.].

<sup>14</sup> That it was not Anaxagoras, or at least not he alone, who gave the decided direction to the philosophic ideas of Eurip. has rightly come to be held of late. We do not find a trace in Eurip. of the separation of *νότος* from matter, at least not in the form in which Anaxagoras understood it. For E. the mind is bound to one of the two primal elements and quite foreign to the other, the earth. Thus he arrives at a dualism indeed, but in quite a different sense from that of Anaxag. Diimling, *Proleg. zu Platons Staat* (Stogr. Basel, 1881), p. 48, points out reminiscences in Eurip. of Diogenes of Apollonia—but it is not true to say that the poet's views show the "closest kinship" with the monistic system of Diog., or with any Monism.

<sup>15</sup> *Fr.* 884 ff. The air, called by the name of Zeus, and identical with the *νότος βροντῶν*, can only be taken from the doctrine of Diog.: Diels, *Rh. Mus.* 42, 12.

<sup>16</sup> Diog. Apoll., *fr.* 3, 4, 5 Mull. (= 8, 3, 4 D.). The soul is *ἀπὸ θερμότερος τοῦ ἕως, ἢ ὃ ἴσμεν*, though it is colder than the air which is *ψυχρὸν ἢ ἕως*, *fr.* 6 (5). The soul is therefore more akin to the *ἐκ* than to the *γῆ* (*ἐκ* and *γῆ* were at that time often confused; e.g. in E., *fr.* 844, *ἐκ* instead of *γῆ*).

Elektra expects to find her dying man, *πνεῦμα' ἀφ' αἵματος εἰς αἰθήρα*, *fr.* 971 (differently, *Or.* 1088 l.); cf. also *Suppl.* 531-6 (imitated from Epicharm.), where again the *αἰθήρ* is only spoken of as the abode, and not as the original and consubstantial element of the soul.

<sup>141</sup> *αἰθήρ αἰκωνος διός*, *Eur.*, *fr.* 487 [*Melanip.*].

<sup>142</sup> *Epich.*, *fr.* 7, p. 257 *Lor.* (= *fr.* 263 *Kaibel.*).

<sup>143</sup> *Gl.A.* i, 442. *αἰθήρ μὲν ἄνωχός ἐκαστίζετο*, *σώματα δὲ χθονὶ τῶνδε*.

<sup>144</sup> *συνεκρίθη καὶ διακρίθη, κἀπῆλθεν ὅθεν ἦλθεν πάλιν, γὰρ μὲν ἐς γαῖαν, πνεῦμα' ἄνω· τὶ τῶνδε γὰρ λέκον· οὐδὲν*, *Epich. ap. Plu., Comp. ad Apoll.* 15, 110 A; *Epich.*, *fr.* 8 [245 *Kaibel.*]. *πνεῦμα* as a general name for the *ψυχή* occurs also in *Epich.*, *fr.* 7 [263]. No earlier authority is to be found for this usage that became so common later (under Stoic influence) than Xenophanes who πρώτος ἀπεφάνετο εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πνεῦμα (*D.L.* ix, 19). Epicharm. may have been actually following Xenophanes (whose writings he knew; *Arist., Meteor.* iii, 5, 1010a, 6) in this use of the word. Eurip. then did the same, *Suppl.* 533. *πνεῦμα* is the name given to the *ἀήρ* in so far as it is in motion. (*ἰσχυροτέρου, εἶναι σῶμα τὸν ἀήρα*) γίνεσθαι δὲ πνεῦμα κινηθεῖς. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔρεμνόν δοτι πνεῦμα ἢ πνοόμενον ἀήρ: *Hiero. μηχαν. σφαιρ.*, p. 121 (ed. Diels = i. p. 8, ed. Schmidt) after Straton. The soul is called a *πνεῦμα* just because the soul is that which has continual movement from its very nature (and is the principle of movement): as such it had already been regarded by Alkmaeon (and later by Plato), and even before that by Pythagoras (see above, chap. xi, n. 40); in a different way by Heraclitus and Democritus also. The universal *ἀήρ* and the Soul-*πνεῦμα*, if we give the terms their proper meaning, are to be thought of as being of the same nature, so that the *ἀήρ*, too (still more the *αἰθήρ* as a higher *ἀήρ*), is psychical and animated by soul. That at least was how Diogenes of Apollonia regarded it. (*ἀήρ* = the outer air, *πνεῦμα* the air which is inside men's bodies; [*Hp.*] *de Flatib.* 3 [vi, 94 L.], a section taken from *Diog. Ap.*)

<sup>145</sup> Numerous references in Eurip. to verses of Epicharm. are pointed out by Wilamowitz, *Eurip. Herakles*, i, 29. The fact that Eurip. knew the poems of Epich. and valued them for their philosophic contents is clearly made out by Wilamowitz's study. But he goes on to assert that all the allusions of Eurip. refer only to (the for one of the) forgeries in the name of Epicharm., of which many were known in antiquity. The reason alleged for this statement—"Euripides never quotes comedies"—is merely a *petitio principii*. It may be that Eurip. does not "quote" contemporary Attic comedy, but whether he maintained the same attitude to the brilliantly original comic poet of Sicily, whom Aristotle and even Plato (*Gorg.* 805 B and esp. 712, 152 E) were not ashamed to notice, is the very point at issue; nothing is gained by unproved denial of this main premiss.—Moreover, it would be a most unusual species of forger that preferred to publish genui-like *πῶς αἶνι* . . . (imitated by Eurip.) or *ποῶς ἀφῆ*—under another man's name. The fragments of the *Πολυαῖα*, which is really a forgery fathered on Epicharmos (*ap. Clem. Al., Str.* v, p. 719 P. = *Lor.*, p. 297), are of a very different character.

<sup>146</sup> Archelaos makes a less satisfactory model for Eurip. here. Arch. in his reconciliation of the doctrines of Anaxagoras and Diogenes did not separate *νοῦς* from the mixture of the material elements (or from the *ἀήρ*), but he distinguished between them, while for the poet *αἰθήρ* and mind are the same.

<sup>110</sup> αἶθρ = Ζεὺς, *fr.* 841. αἶθρ . . . Ζεὺς δὲ ἀνθρώποις ἀναμύεται, *fr.* 877. Hence the αἶθρ is αεροφῶ θεός, *fr.* 812.—In the same way for Διὸς. *Ap.* the air is god (*Clc.*, *N.D.* i. 29) and Ζεὺς (*Philod.*, *Perr.* c. 5b, p. 70 *Comp.* : *Dox.* 536).—In *E.*, *fr.* 841 : τὸ ἐφ' οὗ τόπος ἐκτετακται αἶθρ καὶ γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀναμύεται ἀνθρώποις τὸ αἶθρ is not put instead of αἶθρ (for τὸ ἐφ' οὗ only suits αἶθρ in its proper sense), but the two are combined under the one word (ἄνθρωποις δὲ ἀνθρώποις could not be said of the αἶθρ in the strict sense), just as the ἀφ' of Diogenes includes the αἶθρ (for the hot ἀφ' ἀπὸ τοῦ φλογος, *fr.* 8 [5 *Diels*] is, in fact, the αἶθρ, and so, too, essentially, is the warm ἀφ' in our bodies).

<sup>111</sup> —εἰς ἀθάνατον αἶθρ' ἐμπεσών, *Hel.* 1016.

<sup>112</sup> ὁ δὲ ἀνὴρ δῆρ (which alone νοσέονται—not the senses) μικρὸν μέγεθος ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ, *Diog.* *ap.* *Tibhr.*, *Sens.* 42.

<sup>113</sup> The living air, or Ζεὺς, is πᾶς βροτῶν, *Trö.* 886. And vice versa, the πᾶς in each one of us is no other than God, *fr.* 1018.

<sup>114</sup> ὁ πᾶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐξ ἑνὸς οὗ, γινώσκοντες δ' ἔχον ἀθάνατον, εἰς ἀθάνατον αἶθρ' ἐμπεσών, *Hel.* 1013 ff.—Ambiguity attaches to the passages in which a dying person is said to depart εἰς ἄλλο στήθεα βίον (*Med.* 1039), εἰς ἄλλο βίον πορεύεσθαι (*Ion.* 1064), τοῖς ἔτεσιν αἰῶνα καὶ μέγαν (*I.A.* 1508). It is possible that in each case a personal existence continued in a land of the dead is understood—but if they mean no more than that they are remarkably pregnant in form. In reading them (esp. *Med.* 1039) one is reminded of the remarkable lines of Philiskos (pupil of Isocr.) *ap.* [*Plu.*] *Is.* *X Or.*, p. 243, 60 West. τῷ γὰρ εἰς ἄλλο στήθεα μεταρρυθνέει καὶ ἄλλος ἐν κύμασι βίον πῶμα λαβώντες ἔτερον—said of the dead Lysias. But here the idea of metempsychosis seems really to be involved, which it can hardly be in the case of Eurip.

<sup>115</sup> Eur. adopts it for himself, *fr.* 188 (*Andrope*), and confirms it by so many λόγων ἑμμελῶν in which he allows the most contradictory opinions about a single subject to be given equally plausible expression.

<sup>116</sup> ἀεὶ ποσὶν ἄλλου βίον, etc. *Hip.* 191-7. τὰ ζῆν γὰρ ἴσμεν, τοῦ θανάτου δ' ἀντιτίθωμεν τοῖς σοφισταῖς φῶς λαλῶντες τὸν ἄλιον, *fr.* 818, 10 f. (*Phoinix*).

<sup>117</sup> The dead man is γὰρ καὶ θανάτου—τὸ μέγιστον αἰεὶ οὐδὲν βίον, *fr.* 532; cf. 533, 534. τὰ μὲν γινώσκοντες τῷ θανάτῳ ἴσμεν—ἀνθρωποι οὐκ ἴδοντες φῶς the dead woman knows nothing of herself or her sufferings, *Trö.* 638-44 (a locus often initiated in "consolations": *Axiarch.* 363 D, *Plu.*, *Cons.* ad *Apoll.* 13, p. 110 A).

<sup>118</sup> Ἀφ' ἧς τὸ ἰσθλὸν καὶ μάλιστα δαίμονες γὰρ, *fr.* 865. ἀφ' ἧς δὲ αὖθις τοῖς αἰεὶ δαίμονες, ἔξ δ' αὖθις δὲ ἀνθρώποις, *fr.* 734 : cf. *Andr.* 772. At the sacrifice of Makaria the chorus in *Hel.* 821 ff. can only offer as consolation the fame which awaits her—οὐδ' ἀνέλεος καὶ δαίμων ἀνθρώπων ἐκδοθήσεως.

<sup>119</sup> Makaria voluntarily going to meet her death—εἰς τὴν δὲ κατὰ φθόνου· εἴη γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ μέγιστον καὶ καὶ μέγιστον αἰεὶ δαίμονες καὶ ἀνθρώποις οὐκ αἰεὶ δὲ ἀνθρώποις τὸ τρέφεται· τὰ γὰρ θανάτου καὶ καὶ μέγιστον φέρμασιν πορεύεται, *Hel.* 392 B.; cf. *fr.* 918.

<sup>120</sup> *fr.* 757 (the metaphor of *Il.* 5 ff. is employed for homiletic purposes by Epictet. ii. 6, 11-14); *Andr.* 1270 ff.

## CHAPTER XIII

### PLATO

The belief in human immortality, construed in a theological or philosophical sense, had at this time hardly penetrated to circles of ordinary lay folk. Socrates himself, when it came to such inquiries into the unknowable, never claimed to provide an answer that differed from that which would be given by the majority of his fellow citizens out of the accumulated wisdom of their ancestors. Where in the pages of Plato he is allowed to give undisguised expression to his natural and homely vigour—in the *Apology*—he shows little anticipation of an immortal life of the soul. Death, he thinks, either brings complete unconsciousness to men, like a dreamless sleep, or else it means the transition of the soul to another life in the realm of the Souls—a realm which, to judge by his allusions, has much more resemblance to the Homeric Hades than to any of the visionary countries imagined by theologians or theologically minded poets.<sup>1</sup> Both possibilities he accepts with complete equanimity, trusting in the righteousness of the controlling gods,<sup>2</sup> and he looks no further. How should he know with certainty where everyone was ignorant? <sup>3</sup>

With a like absence of concern it is possible that the majority of the cultured (who were just beginning to separate themselves from the rest of the community) left unsettled the problem of the Unknown.<sup>4</sup> Plato assures us that it was in his time a widespread belief of the populace that the outgoing soul-breath of the dying was caught up by the winds—especially if its exit took place in stormy weather—and was dispersed, blown away, into nothing.<sup>5</sup> In other ways, too, we may suppose that the orthodox Greek, when death approached, allowed his fancy to picture what might await his soul on the other side of death's threshold.<sup>6</sup> But it is certain that the belief in an unending life of the soul—a life with no end because it had no beginning—was not among these thoughts. Plato himself lets us see how strange such a conception was even to those who were capable of following and understanding a philosophical discussion. Towards the end of the long dialogue upon the best kind of State his Sokrates asks Glaukon with apparent irrelevance "are you not aware that

our soul is *immortal* and never perishes?" Whereupon, we are told, Glaukon looked at him in astonishment and said, "No, in truth, of that I was not aware: can you then assert any such thing?"

The idea that the soul of man may be everlasting and imperishable seemed thus a paradoxical freak to one who was no adept in the theological doctrine of the soul. If in later times the case was altered, no one contributed more effectually or more permanently to bring that change about than the great thinker and poet who established the theological conception of personal immortality in the very heart of philosophy and then gave back the idea strengthened and made more profound to its parent theology, while he himself extended the influence of that idea far beyond the bounds of school or sect by the far-reaching power of his own unaging writings which belong, not to the schoolroom, but to the greatest achievements of literature whether of Greece or of mankind. It is beyond calculation what power has been wielded since their first appearance by the Platonic dialogues in the confirmation, dissemination, and precise definition of the belief in immortality—a power that with all its alteration in the passage of the centuries has maintained itself unbroken into our own times.

## § 2

Plato had not always given his assent to the belief in immortality. At any rate, it must have remained very much in the background of his thoughts and his belief in the days when he still regarded the world from the point of view of a slightly more developed Socraticism. Not only at that period (in the *Apology*) does he make his Sokrates go to his death without the most distant approach to a belief in the undying vitality of his soul, but also in the first sketch of his *Ideal State*—a sketch made while the influence of the Socratic view of life still prevailed with him—the belief in immortality is omitted and even excluded.\* It seems as if Plato did not reach the higher conception of the nature and value of the soul, its origin and destiny reaching out beyond all temporal limitation, until the great change which came over his philosophy had been completed. The world of ever-changing Appearance manifesting itself to the senses in perpetual flux and efflux—this in its inessential, unceasing unreality he abandoned to the criticisms of Herakleitos. But above it, in accordance with his own deepest longings and, as it seemed, implied as its real object by the Socratic search itself after

conceptual knowledge, stood a world of unchangeable Being without beginning or end, to which all the appearances of this lower world owed such reality as they possessed. "Being" itself, the totality of the Ideas, remained uncontaminated with "Becoming" and passing away; remained the highest goal and supreme aim standing high above all that aspired to it, or felt a longing for its complete and unlimited fullness.<sup>9</sup> This everlasting reality holds itself aloof from the stream of appearance and is not to be grasped within that stream; it is not manifested in the deceitful ever-changing perception of the senses, nor yet in the Opinion that is based upon them; it can only be apprehended, without any assistance from the senses, by the pure intuition of the Reason.<sup>10</sup> This world of everlasting self-identical Being exists outside the thought and knowledge of man, but it first reveals itself to man in the activity of his own thinking;<sup>11</sup> and at the same time there is revealed to him a higher power than the mere capacity to abstract the unsubstantial general conceptions from the multiplicity of experience—a power that is the highest capacity of the soul, enabling it to voyage out beyond all experience and with infallible knowledge<sup>12</sup> to soar of its own independent power upwards to a transcendental world of permanent and essential reality. The highest capacity that belongs to man, the soul of his soul, is not enclosed within this world that surrounds his senses in its restless flood. Like the objects that are the last goal of its study the soul itself is raised to where it can for the first time find a form of activity worthy of its natural powers. It achieves a new distinction, a priestlike dignity, as an intermediary between the two worlds to both of which it belongs.

The soul is a pure spiritual essence; it contains nothing within it that is material, nothing of the "place" where Becoming is shaped into a distant resemblance to Being.<sup>13</sup> It is incorporeal and belongs to the realm of the "invisible", which in this immaterialist doctrine counts as the most real of all, more real than the most solid matter.<sup>14</sup> It is not one of the Ideas; on the contrary it seems to partake in one of the Ideas—that of Life—only as other appearances share in their Ideas.<sup>15</sup> But it stands nearer to the whole world of the everlasting Ideas than anything else that is not itself an Idea; of all the things in the world it is "most like" to the Idea.<sup>16</sup>

But it has also a share in Becoming. It cannot simply remain with the Ideas in unaltered other-world transcendence. It has its origin indeed in that other world beyond Appearance. It was from the beginning, uncreated<sup>17</sup> like the Ideas and like



the Soul of the World to which it is akin.<sup>38</sup> It is "older than the body"<sup>39</sup> to which it must link itself; it does not come into being at the same time as the body, but is only drawn down from its spiritual state of being into the realm of matter and becoming. In the *Phaedrus* this "fall into birth" appears as the necessary result of an intellectual "fall" which takes place within the soul itself.<sup>40</sup> In the *Timæus*, however, with its study of the general life of the whole world-organism, the animation of the living creature has now to be explained as arising out of the plan—not from a failure of the plan—of the Creator.<sup>41</sup> The soul thus seems to be destined from the beginning to give life to a body. It is not only the knowing and thinking element in a world of inanimate things, it is also the source of all movement. Itself in motion from the beginning it bestows the power of movement upon the body with which it is associated; without it, there would be no movement in the world, and no life either.<sup>42</sup>

But though enclosed within the body it remains a stranger to the body. On its side it has no need of the body and is not conditioned by it. It remains independently associated with it as its mistress and leader.<sup>43</sup> Even in their united existence there is a great gulf fixed between the soul and all that is not soul;<sup>44</sup> body and soul never fuse into one, however closely they may be bound up with each other. And yet the body and its impulses have the power to influence profoundly the immortal being that dwells within it. By its union with the body the soul can be made unclean; "diseases" such as folly and unrestrained passion come to it from the body.<sup>45</sup> It is not beyond the reach of change like the Ideas, to which it is akin without being of their nature; on the contrary, it can degenerate entirely. The evil influences of the body penetrate to its inmost being; even in its everlasting, immaterial, spiritual nature it can derive something "corporeal"<sup>46</sup> from such a sinister partnership.

It is bound to the body by influences of a lower kind which attach themselves to the pure power of knowledge that alone is proper to it. At the outset of his speculations Plato, like other thinkers before him,<sup>47</sup> had thought of the different capacities of the soul, alternately in conflict or alliance with each other, as "parts" of unequal rank and value, bound up together within the soul of man.<sup>48</sup> Even in the previous life of the soul, in the other world, the reasoning power of the soul is, according to the *Phaedrus*, already coupled with "Temper" and "Desire"; it is these in fact which drag down the soul into the realm of the material; and the three parts still

remain indissolubly united in the everlasting life which awaits the soul after its release from the body.

But in proportion as the philosopher extends and elevates his conception of the soul, and as he becomes more convinced of its eternal destiny and vocation to a life of unending blessedness in a realm of unchangeable being, the more impossible does it seem to him that this candidate for immortality in the realm of the everlasting Forms can be a composite amalgam of elements capable of being resolved again by division and analysis<sup>28</sup>—that the reasoning faculty can be for ever united with Effort and Desire, which perpetually threaten to drag it downwards into materiality. The soul in its true and original nature is now for him simple and indivisible.<sup>29</sup> Only with its enclosure in the body does the everlasting, thinking soul, whose tendency is towards the eternal, acquire impulses and desires<sup>30</sup> that have their origin in the body and belong to the body,<sup>31</sup> that only adhere to the soul during the period of its earthly life, that with their separation from their immortal associate will pass away, since they are themselves mortal and such as perish with the body.

The soul, to which sense-perception,<sup>32</sup> feeling, emotion, and desire are only added from outside, is in its own imperishable nature nothing but pure capacity of thought and knowledge—with which indeed the power to will that which is conceived in thought, seems to be directly associated. It is destined for the "other" world, for the intuition and undistorted reflection in its consciousness of the immaterial essences. Banished to this earth amid the restless change and alteration of all being, and not uninfluenced by the forces of bodily life, it must endure a brief exile here.<sup>34</sup> Not unscathed does it leave behind it, in death, its ill-assorted companion, the body.<sup>35</sup> Then it goes into an intermediate region of bodiless existence in which it must do penance for the misdeeds of its life on earth, and free itself from their effects.<sup>36</sup> After that it is driven away once more into a body and transported to a fresh life upon earth, the character of which it chooses for itself in accordance with the special nature that it had evolved in its earlier incarnation upon earth.<sup>37</sup> Though no organic connexion exists between them, yet there is a certain "symmetry"<sup>38</sup> between the individual soul and the body that is lent to it.

Thus, the soul lives through a series of earthly lives<sup>39</sup> of the most varied character; it may even sink so low as the animals in the course of its incarnations.<sup>40</sup> Its own merits, the success or failure of its conflict with the passions and desires of the

body, decide whether or not its lives shall lead it upwards to a nobler type of existence. Its task is plain: it must *free* itself from its impure companions, sensual Lust and the darkening of the powers of Reason. If it can succeed in this it will find once more the "way upwards" <sup>41</sup> which at last leads it into complete immunity from renewed incarnation and brings it home again into the kingdom of everlasting untroubled Being.

### § 3

It is evident that in what he thus, clothing philosophy in the language of poetry, says of the origin, destiny, and character of the soul, which though beyond time is yet placed within time, and though beyond space is yet the cause of all movement within space—that in all this Plato is following in the track of the *theologians* of earlier times. Only in the poetry and speculative thought of *theologi*, not in any physiologists' doctrine, did he find the conception, imaginatively expressed and pointing in the direction which he also followed, of a multiplicity of independent souls whose existence had been from all time and was not first begun in the material world with the creation of a living organism: of souls enclosed in the corporeal as though in a foreign, hostile element, which survive their association with the body, passing through many such bodies and yet preserving themselves intact after the destruction of each of those bodies, immortal, endless (for they are without beginning), <sup>42</sup> and alive from the very beginning of Time. The souls, moreover, have life as distinct, complete, and indivisible personalities, not as mere dependent emanations of a simple common Source of all life.

The theory of the eternity and indestructibility of the individual souls, of the personal immortality of the souls, is difficult to reconcile with more specifically Platonic doctrine—with the doctrine of the Ideas. <sup>43</sup> And yet it is undeniable that from the moment that he first adopted this theory—and adopted it, too, precisely in connexion with the philosophy of the Ideas—he adhered to it steadfastly and without deviating from its essential meaning. The process by which he arrived at it is not to be found in the "proofs" by which he attempts in the *Phædo* to establish the truth of the soul's immortality in which he himself already believed. Those proofs in reality do not prove what they are intended to prove (and what considered as a fact of experience is unproved and as an axiom necessary to thought is beyond proof); they cannot therefore be the reasons that led the philosopher to

hold his conviction. He has in fact borrowed this article of his faith from the creeds which already contained it. He himself scarcely conceals the fact. As authority for the main outlines of the soul's history as given by himself he refers us almost apologetically, and as though excusing himself for not providing a philosophical proof, to the *Isaologi* and priests of the mysteries.<sup>44</sup> And he himself becomes the philosophical poet, completely and without concealment, when in imitation of the poetry of edification he, too, gives a picture of the soul's sojourn in an intermediate station of its pilgrimage or describes the stages of its earthly existence<sup>45</sup> that lead the soul down even to the animal.

For such mythological expressions of the inexpressible the philosopher himself claims no more than symbolical truth.<sup>46</sup> He is fully in earnest, however, with the fundamental conception of the soul as an independent substance that enters from beyond space and time into the material and perceptible world, and into external conjunction with the body, not into organic union with it; that maintains itself as a being of spiritual essence in the midst of the flux and decay of the material world, though at the same time its pure brightness is overshadowed through this conjunction and must purify itself from the effects; that can disentangle itself,<sup>47</sup> even to the extent of complete severance from the embrace of the material and the perceptible. All that is essential in this conception he derives from the theologians, but he brings it into close relationship with his own philosophy which depends upon a conviction of the absolute opposition between Being and Becoming, and upon the dualistic division of the world into matter and mind—a dualism that applies also to the relations of soul and body and throughout the whole realm of Appearance. The soul which stands half-way between the unity and unchangeability of Being and the ever-varying multiplicity of matter has in this realm of fragmentary and subordinate validity, into which it is temporarily exiled, the power to reflect the Ideas and represent them in its own consciousness clear and unfalsified. The soul in its complete independence of sense-perception and of concepts derived from the senses is alone able to pursue the "Quest of Reality".<sup>48</sup> In this pursuit the body with which it is associated is nothing but a hindrance and a serious one. The soul has a hard struggle against the tendencies of the body in spite of its independence and aloofness. Just as, in the creation of the universe, matter, though not a cause is at least a subordinate cause which by its influence and exigencies gives

various hindrances<sup>41</sup> to the "Mind" that shapes and orders the world, so, too, the soul finds in this ephemeral and inconstant Matter, with its stirring and tumultuous unrest, a serious obstacle to its own proper activity. This is the evil, or the cause of evil,<sup>42</sup> which must be overthrown in order that the mind may win its way to freedom and final rest and security in the realm of pure Being. Plato often speaks of the *katharsis*, the purification, after which man must strive.<sup>43</sup> He takes both the word and the idea from the theologians, but he gives it a higher meaning while yet preserving unmistakably the analogy with the *katharsis* of the *theologi* and mystery-priests. It is not the pollution which comes from contact with sinister *daimones* and from all that belongs to them, that is to be avoided, but rather the dulling of the power of knowledge and of willing what is known (regarded as a simultaneously created power) due to the world of the senses and its fierce impulses.<sup>44</sup> Man's effort must be directed not so much to ritual purity, as to the preservation of his knowledge of the eternal from eclipse through the deceptive illusions of the senses: towards the concentration and gathering together of the soul within itself; <sup>45</sup> its withdrawal from contact with the ephemeral as the source of pollution and debasement.

Thus, even in this philosophic reinterpretation of ritual abstinence in terms of a spiritual release and emancipation, the effort after "purity" retains its *religious* sense. The world of the Ideas, the world of pure Being, to which only the pure soul can attain,<sup>46</sup> is a world of divinity. The "Good" as the highest of the Ideas, the loftiest pattern, the supreme aim to which all Being and Becoming tend, which is at the same time more than all the Ideas—the first cause of all Being and all knowledge—is also God.<sup>47</sup> The soul for which, in its desire and longing for the full being of the Idea, the knowledge of the "Good" is the "supreme science",<sup>48</sup> enters hereby into the closest communion with God. The "turning away" of the soul from the many-coloured image to the sun of the highest Idea, is itself <sup>49</sup> a turning towards the divine, towards the luminous source of all Being and Knowing.

Thus exalted, philosophic inquiry turns to *enkouriasmos*.<sup>50</sup> The way which leads upwards from the lower levels of Becoming to Being, is discovered by means of *dialectic*, which in its "comprehensive view"<sup>51</sup> is able to unite the distracted ever-moving flood of multifarious Appearance into the ever-enduring unity of the Idea which is reflected in Appearance. Dialectic travels through the whole range of the Ideas, graduated one above the other, till it reaches the last and

most universal of the Ideas. In its upward course it passes by an effort of sheer logic through the whole edifice of the highest concepts.<sup>60</sup> Plato is the most subtle of dialecticians; he almost carries subtlety to excess in his eager pursuit of every intricacy of logic—and of parallogism. But he combined to a remarkable degree the cold exactitude of the logician with the enthusiastic intensity of the seer; and his dialectic, after its patient upward march step by step from concept to concept, at last soars to its final goal in a single tremendous flight, in which the longed-for realm of the Ideas reveals itself in a moment of immediate vision. So the Bacchant in his ecstasy saw divinity suddenly plain, and so too in the nights consecrated by the mysteries the *epoptes* beheld the vision of the Goddesses in the torch-lit glare of Eleusis.<sup>61</sup>

To this loftiest height whence a view is obtained of "colourless, formless Being, beyond the reach of every contact", inaccessible to sense-perception, it is dialectic that shows the way; and dialectic now becomes a way of salvation in which the soul finds once more its own divine nature and its divine home. The soul is closely akin to godhead and like it<sup>62</sup>—it is itself something divine. The reason in the soul is divine,<sup>63</sup> and comprehends everlasting Being immediately by its power of thought. "If the eye were not sunlike, it could never see the sun";<sup>64</sup> if the mind were not akin by nature to the good,<sup>65</sup> the highest of the Ideas, it could never comprehend the Good, the Beautiful, and all that is perfect and eternal. In its power of recognizing the eternal the soul bears within itself the surest proof that it is itself eternal.<sup>66</sup>

The "purification" by means of which the soul gets rid of<sup>67</sup> the detachment that has overtaken it during its earthly life reveals again the divine in man. Even on earth the philosopher is thus rendered immortal and godlike.<sup>68</sup> As long as he can continue in a state of pure intellectual knowledge and comprehension of the everlasting, for so long is he living, already in this life, "in the Islands of the Blest."<sup>69</sup> By expelling all traces of the corruptible and the mortal in and about himself, he is more and more to "become like God";<sup>70</sup> so that when it is at last set free from this earthly existence, his soul may enter into the divine, the invisible, the pure, the eternally self-identical, and as a disembodied mind remain for ever with that which is its kin.<sup>71</sup> At this point, language that can only make use of physical imagery becomes totally inadequate.<sup>72</sup> A goal is set before the soul that lies outside all physical nature, beyond time and space, without past or future, an ever-present now.<sup>73</sup>

The soul can escape out of time and space and find its home in eternity, without at the same time losing its own self in the General and Universal that stands above time and space. We must not inquire what sort of personality and individual distinctness can yet remain with the soul when it has cast off all effort, desire, sense-perception, and everything related to the world of change and multiplicity, to become once more a pure mirror of the eternal. Nor must we ask how it is possible to think of a spirit removed above space and time and all the multiplicity of matter and yet personal and separate in its personality.<sup>76</sup> For Plato the Souls live on as they had been in the beginning—individual beings conscious of themselves in a time that has no end and is beyond all time. He teaches a personal immortality.

### § 4

There is an "other-worldly" tone in this philosophy, and its doctrine of the soul. Far beyond the world in which life has placed man lies the realm of pure Being, the good, the perfect, and the unspoilt. To reach that realm at last, to free the mind from the unrest and illusion of the senses, to be rid of the desires and emotions that would "nail" it down here below, to sever its connexion<sup>78</sup> with the body and bodily things—that is the soul's highest duty. The only reason why it is banished into this world is that it may all the more completely separate itself from the world. To die—to be dead inwardly to all that is visible, material, physical—that is the goal and the fruit of philosophy.<sup>79</sup> "To be ready and fit to die" is the hall-mark of the complete philosopher. For such, philosophy is the deliverer that frees him for all time from the body<sup>77</sup>—from its desires, its restlessness, its wild passions<sup>78</sup>—and gives him back again to the eternal and its silence.

To be pure, to be free from evil, to die already in this temporal world—these are the oft-repeated exhortations which the philosopher addresses to the immortal soul. Ascetic morality here again demands from man what is essentially a quite negative proceeding. But this denial of the world is only a step leading on to the most supremely positive behaviour. *Katharsis* is only the gateway to philosophy; and it is philosophy which teaches man how to reach what alone is positive, the only true and unconditional Being; instructs him how to reach the clear and perfect understanding of the only permanent good and how to merge himself utterly in that good.<sup>79</sup> The soul of the thinker yearns after Reality;<sup>80</sup>

death is for it not merely the annihilation of the chains of the body that impede it, but a very positive "acquisition of intellectual knowledge" <sup>23</sup> to which it is urged on by its proper nature—which is therefore also a fulfilment of its proper task. So the turning aside from the physical and the ephemeral is at the same time and without transition a turning towards the eternal and the divine. The flight from the things of this world is in itself an entry into that other world, and a becoming like to the divine. <sup>24</sup>

But the true realities are not to be found in this world. To grasp them plainly in its thought—to recover the untroubled vision of its spiritual eye—the soul must divest itself entirely of all the stress and distraction of the earthly. For this mundane world, the mirage that encompasses the senses, the philosopher has nothing but denial. Because it gives no foothold for true knowledge the whole world of Becoming has no independent value for his science. The apprehension of that which is never more than relative, which simultaneously manifests contrary qualities in itself, can only serve as stimulus and invitation to the search for what is absolute. <sup>25</sup> In this realm of doubtful shadows the soul finds nothing but obscure reminders of that which it had once beheld plainly. The beauty of the physical world which is apprehended by the noblest of the senses, the eye, serves indeed to recall to the soul's memory the Beautiful-in-itself, of which that other is but a pale copy, and to disclose to the soul what is really its own property, what it had brought with it ready made from an earlier existence beyond the bounds of all matter. <sup>26</sup> But the observation of beauty here below must lead beyond itself at once and conduct the mind out of the world of mere appearance to the pure forms of the Ideal world. The process of Becoming tells us nothing about the nature of Being; the thinker learns nothing from this source—in fact he learns no new knowledge or wisdom of any kind in this world; he only recovers what he had before and always possessed in latent form. <sup>27</sup> The treasure, however, lies beyond the limits of this world. He must turn away his gaze from the shadow-figures upon the wall of the cave of this world, and direct it towards the sun of eternity. <sup>28</sup> He is placed in this world of perpetual change; to it his senses and his understanding are directly referred; and yet he must disdain and rise superior to, and flee from, all that this world offers, giving himself up immediately and entirely to the unseem, and taking flight from this world to that where he will become like God, and be purified and justified by the power and might of his knowledge. <sup>29</sup>



Earthly life as it actually is will remain strange to him, and he a stranger in earthly life,<sup>54</sup> despised as a fool for his inaptitude in earthly affairs by the great majority of those who are so versed in such things.<sup>55</sup> He has something higher to think about—the salvation of his own soul. He will not live for the community, but for himself, and his real task.<sup>56</sup> Human interests seem to him hardly worth troubling about,<sup>57</sup> the state itself hopelessly corrupt, founded as it is upon deception and passion and injustice. At the same time, he himself of course would be the real statesman,<sup>58</sup> the leader who could guide his fellow citizens to their true salvation—acting not as the servant of their lusts, but as a doctor who gives help to the sick.<sup>59</sup> It is “not ships and harbours and walls and taxes and such trivialities”<sup>60</sup> that he would give the city, but justice and health and everything else which after this life can stand before the stern judgment of the other world.<sup>61</sup> This would be the best mode of life,<sup>62</sup> and he could show them the way to it; no worldly power or greatness can do as much—none of the great statesmen of the past, Themistokles, Kimon, and Perikles, understood anything of all this; all their efforts were nothing but blind error and wandering.<sup>63</sup>

At the climax of his life and of his philosophical development Plato completed an ideal picture of the State, drawn in accordance with the principles and the requirements of his own philosophy. It rests upon a broad foundation—the multitude of its inhabitants divided strictly into classes that in themselves and their manner of life are to display, like a beacon that can be seen afar, the virtue of Justice. At one period this had seemed to include all that was necessary for the completion of the ideal State; but now, far above that level, pointing upwards into the lofty *arktes* above the earth, a final consummation reveals itself to him, to which all mere mundane things serve but as support and furtherance. A small minority of the citizens, the philosophers, form this last pinnacle of the building. Here on earth and in this state that is organized in conformity with justice, they will serve the state, as in duty bound and not for their own satisfaction, and take part in government.<sup>64</sup> As soon as duty is fulfilled they will return to the supramundane contemplation which is the aim and content of their whole life's activity. To provide a place where these contemplatives may live, where they may be educated for their vocation, the highest there is; to allow *dialectic* as a form of living to take its place in the activity of worldly civilization as an object of men's effort<sup>65</sup>—to bring about all this the Ideal State is built up step by step. The

bourgeois social virtues and their firm establishment and inter-connexion, which had once seemed the real and sufficient reason for the erection of the whole edifice of the state—seen from this elevation, these no longer retain their independent importance. "The so-called virtues" all pale before the highest capacity of the soul, which is the mystic beholding of the eternal.<sup>140</sup> The chief mission of the perfect wise man is no longer to fulfil his obligations to the others that stand without. To make his own inner life fit and ready for self-emancipation is now his real and immediate task. Mysticism aims at a personal salvation such as the individual can only obtain for himself. Good works are no longer necessary when the mind has no further connexion with earthly life and conduct. When it comes to dealing with practical earthly affairs he who possesses the highest virtue will have all these others added unto him.<sup>141</sup> Virtue belongs to him; it is his real condition of being; but the particular virtues he will rarely need to use.

This lofty pinnacle is accessible to but a few. God alone and a small<sup>142</sup> company of mortals are able to approach in pure thought to the everlasting Reality, the sole object of certain, plain and unchanging Knowledge. The majority of men can never become philosophers.<sup>143</sup> And yet, according to this philosophy, the crown of all life belongs to the philosopher. This is no religion for the poor in spirit. Science—the supreme knowledge of the highest Being—is a pre-condition of salvation. To know God is to become like God.<sup>144</sup> It is easy to see why such a message of salvation could not attract a wider community of believers. It could not have done so without being false to its own nature. To a few lofty spirits among mankind, it offers a reward that beckons from eternity. Freedom from life in the corruptible body is the prize it offers; that and a never-ending union with true Reality—a return to what is everlasting and divine. A symbol of what the philosopher has achieved after his death will be provided by the community by whom the departed will be honoured as a Daimon.<sup>145</sup>

Such then is the ideal vision of a civilization in which the belief in the soul's immortality and its vocation to an everlasting life in the kingdom of the gods was held with profound and serious conviction. The belief in immortality here becomes the corner-stone of a building, the architect of which regards all earthly things as only valid for the moment, and therefore of profound unimportance. For him only the Heaven of the spiritual world with its everlasting laws and

patterns seriously matters. He discards without a regret the whole of Greek culture as it had expressed itself in state and society, custom and art—an art that will last as long as humanity itself. He demands an aristocracy, and an aristocracy measured by a standard of what is the "best" that was quite beyond the reach of any possible human society even though it were as deeply impregnated with aristocratic ideas as Greek society always was. And the final aim and ideal sought by this organization of life on earth was to be the superseding of all earthly life . . .

The mind of Plato, equally ready to receive as to give, was not likely to become immobilized for ever in a mystic rapture of vision. Even when he had finished the *Republic* he did not cease to reshape his system at many points and in many directions, while some special problems were taken up again for further and repeated study. Even a second sketch of a political system was left behind by him in which he sought to lay down rules for the guidance of life among the multitude who are still regarded as completely shut out from the realm of the everlasting Forms. To this end the highest aims of human endeavour are almost left out of sight and practical rules for reaching the attainable "better" are supplied for the benefit of the majority. He had learnt resignation at many points. Nevertheless, the profound conviction of all his thoughts remained unchanged: the claims that he put before the world and mankind remained essentially the same. For this reason after generations have not been mistaken in seeing in him the priestly man of wisdom, who with warning finger points the immortal spirit of man on its way from this feeble world upwards to the everlasting life.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII

<sup>1</sup> Pl., *Ap.* c. 32 f. (40 C ff.).

<sup>2</sup> *Ap.* 41 C D.

<sup>3</sup> *Ap.* 29 A B, 37 B.

<sup>4</sup> Xen.

the soul

of souls than from would-be-philosophical considerations above, chap. v, n. 178). In spite of this he allows the question to remain undecided—as though of little importance—whether, in fact, the soul then leaves the body and lives on or whether *μέρους ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ σώματι συναποθνήσκει*, § 21. In either eventuality he will after death *μᾶλλον ἐν κακῷ πάλιν*, § 27.—Arist., *SE.* xvii, p. 176b, 16, *πάντες φέρεται ἢ εὐδαίμονες ἢ ψυχὴ τῶν ζώων, οὗ διαρίστηται τοῖς πολλοῖς*—in this question they *ἀμφιδοξοῦσι*.

<sup>5</sup> Pl., *Phd.* 70 A, 77 B, 80 D. This belief of the  *πολλοί*  and  *πάντες*  looks indeed much more like a piece of superstition than a denial of the continued life of the  *ψυχὴ*  (in which light Pl. represents it). We have already met with the soul as a wind-spirit more than once: when it leaves the body the other wind-spirits carry it off and away with themselves (cf. above, chap. i, n. 10), esp. when a high wind is blowing (cf. the German popular belief that when a man hangs himself a storm arises: Grimm, p. 635: cf. Mannhardt,  *Germ. Myth.* 270 n. In other words, the "furious host", the personified storm-spirits—Grimm, p. 632: cf. Append. vii—come and carry away with them the poor unquiet soul).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Pl., *Ap.* 330 D E. There is more about these matters in the speech against Aristogeiton, (*D.*) 28, 52-3. In spite of the popular form in which it is put such an opinion is not to be claimed at once as a popular and generally held belief: the author of this speech is a follower of Orpheus, a fact which he himself betrays in § 11.

<sup>7</sup> Pl., *Ap.* 606 D.

<sup>8</sup> It is probable that in the  *Πολιτεία*  two essentially distinct stages of Platonic doctrine are found side by side with only an external bond of union, and that in particular what is said in Bk. v, 471 C ff., to the end of Bk. vii about the  *παιδεύσεις* , their education and position in the state (and outside politics), is an extraneous addition to the completed picture of the  *πόλις*  which is given in Bks. ii—v, 471 C: an after-thought not originally included in the plan of the whole book and not anticipated in the beginning of it. This seems to me to emerge unmistakably from a careful and unprejudiced study of the whole work and to have been completely demonstrated by Krohn and Pfeiderer. That Plato himself regarded the first sketch of an ideal state as a separate work (which may even have been actually published separately: Gellius, 14, 3, 3), is shown by the beginning of the  *Timaeus* . Here—with the implication of quite a different staging of the dialogue and a different introduction from what we now read in  *Rp.*, Bk. i. c.1—ii, c. 9—we have an exact recapitulation of the subject of the inquiry in the  *Πολιτεία*  from ii, 10, 367 E, to v, 480 C, with the definite statement (19 AB) that thus far and no farther had the discussion gone "yesterday". The stages in which the whole work was composed seem then to be divisible as follows: (1) Sketch of the state of the

*Politeia* (in brief) embodied in a dialogue between Sokrates, Kriton, Timaios, Hermokrates, and another companion: in subject matter agreeing (apart from the introduction) substantially with *Rp.* ii, 10, 367 E, to v, 480 C. (2) Continuation of this sketch in the story of ancient Athens and the people of Atlantis. Its completion is transferred elsewhere because in the meantime the *Politeia* itself has been extended and into the empty framework of the *Tim.* thus left available the account of the creation of the world given by Timaios is very loosely inserted: the frame-narratives of the *Timaios* and *Kritias* never being completed. (3) Continuation of the first sketch (still virtually along the lines originally laid down) in *Rp.* v, 469 D-471 C (in which 488 E ff. is a brief account of the behaviour of the state in time of war—a substitute for the longer and more detailed statement on the same subject in *Tiw.* 20 B f.), and in viii, ix (the greater part), and x, second half (600 C ff.). (4) Finally the whole work receives its crown and completion in a section that was, however, not foreseen in the older parts of the design, for it disturbs part of that original design's independence and validity and does more than merely supplement it—the introduction of the *φιλόσοφοι* and their special type of "virtue". v, 471 E-vii ff.; ix, 580 D-588 A; x, part 1 (to 606 B).—Then came the final editing of the whole: insertion of the new introduction, i, 1-11, 9 (not necessarily left until the completion of the whole); necessary bringing into harmony of the divergent elements by a few excisions, qualifications, etc.; and probably a literary revision and polishing of the whole book.—The whole thus finally produced reveals its origin clearly enough in the outgrowing of a first plan and its replacement by a second that has naturally suggested itself in the course of the author's own continued development. At the same time Plato could claim that the whole edifice, in spite of much extension and rebuilding in a different style of architecture, should be considered as a unity in the form in which he finally left it (as a noteworthy monument, too, of his own alteration of view). He himself in the sublimer moments of his mystic flight in *Bica.* vi and vii in no sense rejects the groundwork of the *καλλίστου* of ii-v (though not, indeed, designed originally as such), but merely reduces it to the position of a substructure which remains a necessary and sole foundation even for the mystic pinnacle and preserves its absolute validity for the great majority of the citizens who inhabit the *καλλίστου* (for the *φιλόσοφοι* are still regarded as very few in number) for whom it is a school for the exhibition of political virtue.—In the first sketch, then, there is no trace of a doctrine of immortality that can be properly so called, and the popular belief in a continued life of the soul after death has for Plato, at this stage at least, no serious weight or importance. The *φύλακες* are not to trouble about what may follow death (iii, 1 ff.); the main purpose in view is to show that *δυνατότης* is its own reward, and the rewards which are anticipated for it after death are only ironically alluded to (ii, 363 CD; cf. 386 AB); Sokrates means to do without such hopes (386 E ff.). The *εἰσφορά ψυχῆς* is only introduced as a paradox in x, 606 D (in the continuation of the first sketch) for which proof is sought; whereupon the importance of the question as to what may await the soul after death emerges (614 A ff.) as well as the necessity of taking thought not for this short life but *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα χρόνον* (606 C), of which nothing had been said or could have been said in ii-v. Finally in vi-vii the indestructibility of the soul is implied in its sublimer form. It is evident that Plato's own views on these matters had undergone changes in the course of time, and that them

changes are reflected in the various strata of the *Politeia* even after its final editing. (Cf. Krohn, *Platon. Staat*, p. 285; Pfeiderer, *Proleg.*, p. 23 f., 35 ff., 1888.)

<sup>12</sup> The Appearance *φαίνετα*, *δρῶντα*, *προσβλεψίμω* *εἶναι* what its Idea is: *Phd.* 74 D, 75 AB. The Ideas are thus teleological causes like the divine *νοῦς* of Aristotle which, unmoved itself, *κινεῖ ὡς δρῶντων* (just as matter has a desire for *ἔστω*, potentiality for actuality). Plato it is true did not keep to this method of illustrating rather than explaining the relation between the Appearance and the unmoved Idea.

<sup>13</sup> *κοῖτον* *παρὰ λόγου περιληπτόν*, *Tim.* 27 D. *οὐ οὖν* *δε ἄλλω ἐπιλάβου* *ῥ' τῷ ἑστὶ διακόλου λογισμῷ*, *Phd.* 79 A. *οὐτὲ δὲ αὐτῆς ἢ ψυχῇ καὶ κοινῷ φαίνεταί* *παρὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπῆς*, *Tal.* 155 D.

<sup>14</sup> The *πρῶτος* in the case of man is really the perception of his own mental activity in *νόησις* *παρὰ λόγου* as being a process essentially different from *εἶδε μὴ εἰσέχουσιν εἶλογον*. It is inference from the former alone that leads to the conclusion that the *νοῦς* *εἶναι* exist: *Tim.* 51 B-52 A. It is the Ideas that we grasp in abstract thought: *οὐτὲ ἢ αὐταῖς ἢ λόγον διδομεν καὶ ἀναγνώστες καὶ ἀπακρινόμενοι*, *Phd.* 76 D.

<sup>15</sup> The *ἐπιστήμη* which *διπλοκτινῆ* alone can give (*Rp.* 533 DE) is *ἀναμέμνηται* (*Rp.* 477 E).

<sup>16</sup> Of the three *εἶδη* or *γένεα*—the *ᾧ*, the *γενόμενον* and the *ἐν ᾧ γίνεταί* (the *χώρα*), of *Tim.* 48 E f., 52 ABD—the third at any rate is quite foreign to the soul. Like the World-Soul (*Tim.* 35 A), along with which it is "mixed" (41 D), the individual soul also is a middle term between the *εἶδος* of the Idea and the *κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστόν*, having a share in both.

<sup>17</sup> True, unalterable Being belongs only to the *δεῖξαι* and therefore also to the soul: *Phd.* 79 A f.

<sup>18</sup> *Phd.* c. 54-6 (105 B-107 B).

<sup>19</sup> *ἀραιότερον ψυχῇ σώματος ἐστι τῷ δεῖξαι* (and that = *τῷ δεῖν ἀσπέντως ἔχειν*), *Phd.* 78 B. *τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ νοστήν καὶ μονοειδέϊ καὶ ἀδιεσώτῳ καὶ αὐαύτως κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχειται* *ἐντὶ ὁμοιωτάτων ψυχῇ*, 80 AB.

<sup>20</sup> *ἀνέστηκεν*, *Phdr.* c. 24, 245 D (*ἀΐθεος* simply, *Rp.* 611 B). The creation of the souls in *Tim.* is only intended to represent the origin of the spiritual from the *ἀρχαίαιος* (not the coming into being of the soul in time): see Siebeck, *Ges. d. Psychol.* I, 1, 275 ff. Still, it remains impossible to say whether Plato whenever he speaks of the pre-existence of the soul always means that the soul existed without beginning.

<sup>21</sup> As to the relation of the individual soul to the soul of the universe, neither the mythical account in *Timaeus* nor the briefer allusion in *Phaedr.* 90 A allows us to conclude that the soul of our body is "taken from" the soul of the *σῶμα τῷ κοινῷ*. In reality the fiction of a "World-Soul" is intended to serve quite other purposes than the derivation of the individual soul from a single common source.

<sup>22</sup> *Tim.* 34 C; *Lg.* 891 A-898 C.

<sup>23</sup> Acc. to the account in *Phdr.* 246 C, the soul suffers its downfall into the earthly existence if *δ' ἑστὶ κέκευθ' ἔστω*, i.e. the *ἐμψυχία* in the soul, tends towards the earth—247 B. It must, therefore, be the result of the preponderance of the appetitive impulses. This, however, can only happen if the *λογιστικὸς* of the soul has become too weak to drive the soul-chariot any longer as its duty was. Hence the supporting wings, i.e. the *νόησις*, of the soul-horse fall off. It is thus a weakening of the cognitive part of the soul that causes its downfall into materiality (just as it is the measure of their capacity for knowledge that determines



trichotomy of the soul is original and the division of the citizen body into three parts is derived and explained from it; cf. 435 E.—The view that Plato was never quite serious about the threefold division of the soul but always spoke of it as something semi-mythical or as a temporarily adopted hypothesis, will not appear plausible on an unprejudiced study of the passages in the Platonic writings that deal with the threefold division of the soul.

<sup>11</sup> *Rp.* x, 611 A-E (c. 11), shows clearly that the reason which made Plato abandon his conception (given in the first sketch of the *Rep.* and still maintained in the *Phaedrus*) of the natural trichotomy of the soul into parts or divisions was the consideration of its immortality and vocation to intercourse with the *θεῶν καὶ ἀθανάτων καὶ ἀνδρῶν*.—The emotions and passions by which the soul is "lettered" *ἐνδὲ τοῦ σώματος*, explain its tendency to clothe itself in another body after death, *Phd.* 83 C E. If the emotions and passions were indissolubly linked to the soul the latter could never escape from the cycle of rebirths.—On the other hand, if only the *λογιστικόν*, as the only independently existing side of the soul, goes into the place of judgment in the other world there would seem to be no reason that should tempt this simple uncompounded soul to renewed *ἐνομήματα*, a process which implies materiality and desire. (This difficulty troubled Plotinus too.) Plato takes into view the possibility of an inner corruption of the pure and undivided intellectual soul which makes a future state of punishment and purgatory possible and intelligible and explains the existence (until a complete return to purity is achieved) of a tendency or constraint to renewed *ἐνομήματα* even without a permanent association with the *σώματις* and the *ἐπιθυμητικόν*.

<sup>12</sup> *τὸ ἀλογιστικόν* *ψῆμα* the soul is *μοναδικόν*, *Rp.* x, c. 11 (611 B, 612 A). Hence it is *τὸ ἄσπεκτον ἀδιόλητον ἢ ἄγγυς τ. νοῦν*, *Phd.* 80 B.

<sup>13</sup> The intellect-soul *ἀθάνατον ἀρχὴν θεοῦ* ζῆλον is the creation of the *θεογονικός*; the other faculties of the soul, *θυμὸς*, *ἐπιθυμία* (and *αἰσθήσεις* therewith), *φυγὴ* *ἕως θεοῦ* (*Tim.* 51 C), are all added to the soul at the moment of its union with the body by the subordinate deities: *Tim.* 41 D-44 D; 69 A-70 D (c. 14, 15, 31). The same idea appears in *Rp.* x, 611 BC. *τὸ αἰσθητικόν* *μέρος* *τῆς* *φυγῆς* is distinguished from the *ζωοντικόν*: *Polit.* 309 C.

<sup>14</sup> *τὸ σώμα* *καὶ* *αἱ* *ταύτων ἐπιθυμίαι*, *Phd.* 86 C. The soul moved by passion suffers *ὑπὸ σώματος*, 85 CD. In death the soul is *καθαρὰ πάντων τῶν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα ταύτων καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν*, *Crat.* 404 A.

<sup>15</sup> *Tim.* 43 C. It is only as a result of this violent and contradictory excitement through the physical perception of becoming that the soul becomes *ἄσπεκτον* (which is originally foreign to it) *ἕως τῆς αἰῶνος ἐνστάτης θεοῦ*, 44 A. (It will in time become *ἱερὰ* once more and can become wise, 44 BC. In the case of the animals, which can be inhabited by the same soul, it will remain always *ἄσπεκτον*—one may suppose.)

<sup>16</sup> . . . *συναρτῶν χάριεν, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸ ἔσπεκτον (χάρειν)*. *Rp.* 498 D.

<sup>17</sup> In accordance with popular thought (but obviously also in perfect seriousness and without any special concession) death is regarded as *τῆς* *φυγῆς* *ἕως* *τοῦ* *σώματος ἐγκαταλήψῃ*, *Phd.* 64 C; *Gorg.* 524 B. Hence, it usually happens that the soul *μυθίστορε* *εἰς* *"Αἴδου καθαρὰς ἀμειψόμεθα, ἀλλὰ* *δεὶ* *τοῦ* *σώματος ἀναμείβεσθαι ἑξέσθαι*, *Phd.* 83 D. (—*δεῖ*, i.e. with the exception of the few complete *φιλόσοφοι* that do not need further purification in Hades, and this is, in fact, the doctrine of the *Phd.* itself; cf. 114 C, 80 E, 81 A.)

<sup>18</sup> Purgatory, punishment and rewards in the other world: *Gorg.*



523 B.; *Rp.* x, c. 13 ff., 614 A ff. [vision of Er, son of Arminios in the continuation of the first version of the *Odyssey*]; *Phd.* 110 B-114 C. We must not here go into the details of the individual myths in which it is still perhaps possible to distinguish what parts Plato has taken out of ancient poetry and popular legend and what comes from theological and particularly Orphic doctrinal poetry—or even (*Rp.* x) from Oriental fables—and how much he has added independently on his own account. (A few remarks will be found in G. Etig, *Acheront.*, *Leips. Stud.* xiii, 305 ff.; cf. also Döring, *Arch. Ges. Phil.* 1893, p. 475 ff.; Dürerich, *Nekyia*, 112 ff.) He usually distinguishes three classes among the souls (only apparently two in *Phdr.* 248 A): those who are affected with curable faults, the hopelessly and incurably guilty (who are condemned to eternal punishment in Tartarus without rebirth: *Gorg.* 525 C ff.; *Rp.* 615 D; *Phd.* 113 E); and, thirdly the *δίκαιος βέλτερος*, *δικαίων* and *δίκαιος*. This is the system of *Gorg.* 525 BC, 528 C; *Rp.* 615 BC. (With these come also the *δίκαιος*, 615 C, who neither deserve punishment nor reward—of them Er said *ἐλάττω, οὐκ ἔστι μέρμερ*. Perhaps older theologians had already concerned themselves with these, not being satisfied with the fate assigned by popular mythology to the *δίκαιος*—see Append. vii—it would have been a natural subject for the professional attention of these Schoolmen of popular superstition.) In *Phd.* 113 D ff. the question is even more minutely dealt with. Here we have (1) *οἱ μέντοι βέλτεροι* (the vicer's sons' infamia e senza lode), (2) *οἱ ἀνέροι ἔχοντες*, (3) *οἱ δίκαιοι ἡσυχασταί*, (4) *οἱ διαφερόντως δίκαιοι βέλτεροι*, and (5) the *δίκαιος* of these *δίκαιοι*, the real philosophers, *οἱ φιλοσοφῆσαντες καὶ ἐκπαυμένοι*—these are not born again. In the other classes are assigned their appropriate purgation, reward or punishment. Here classes 2, 3, and 4 correspond to the three classes of *Rp.* and *Gorg.* (which may perhaps be modelled on the divisions popularized by older theological poetry—see above, chap. xii, n. 82). Novelties are the *μέντοι βέλτεροι* and the true philosophers. For these last the abode upon the *μακίστην ῥήσιν* (*Gorg.* 528 C), or, what comes to the same thing, upon the surface of the earth (*Phd.* 114 BC), is no longer sufficient. They go *ἐν μετέωρῳ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν* (115 D), which means that they are really freed entirely from temporal existence and enter into the unchanging "Now" of eternity. [As far as the complete escape of the *φιλόσοφοι* is concerned the account in *Rp.* x, c. 13 (614 A-615 C) does not contradict that of *Phd.* The only reason why this is not mentioned in *Rp.* is that these absolutely enfranchised souls could not appear upon the *Λυμναί* there mentioned; 614 E.]—Of these various accounts that of *Phd.* seems to be the latest. In *Lg.* there is yet another indefinite allusion to the necessity of undergoing a judgment after death: 904 C ff.

<sup>82</sup> Choice of their new state of life by the souls in the other world, *Rp.* 617 E ff.; *Phdr.* 248 B. The purpose of this arrangement is made clear by *Rp.* 617 E: *αἰεὶ ἐλπιέοντες ἑαυτοὺς δικαίους* (cf. *Tim.* 42 D). It is, in fact, a theodicy and at the same time secures the complete responsibility of every man for his own character and deeds (cf. 618 C). There is no idea of founding a determinist theory upon it.—The choice is guided by the special character of the soul (which it has developed in its previous life) and its tendencies (cf. *Phd.* 81 E; *Lg.* 904 ff.). For the same reason there is no choice at the occasion of the soul's first *ἀναμύθησις* (*Tim.* 41 E); after that, in later births, a definite descent in well-marked stages in *πῆμα* can be observed, each conditioned by the degree of corruption attaching to the soul (*Tim.* 42 B ff.).

All of which can very well co-exist with a choice of its own fate by the soul conditioned by its own nature.

<sup>31</sup> *Supperple*, *Tim.* 87 D.

<sup>32</sup> At least three (as in *Pl.*, *O.* II, 75 E.), acc. to *Phdr.* 248 A. Between each two births there is an intervening period of 1,000 years (*Rp.* 615 A; *Phdr.* 249 AB). This cuts away the ground from such myths as that of the various "lives" of Pythagoras (see *Append.* x).

<sup>33</sup> Incarnation in animals, *Phdr.* 249 B; *Rp.* 616 A, 620 A.; *Phd.* 81 E; *Tim.* 42 BC. That this part was any less seriously meant than any other part of his doctrine of metempsychosis is not in the least suggested by Plato himself. Acc. to *Tim.* 91 D-92 B, all the animals have souls that had once inhabited the bodies of men (see *Procl.*, in *Rp.* ii, 332 Kroll; he is trying to harmonize *Tim.* and *Phdr.*). In fact, the idea that a man's soul might inhabit an animal was precisely the great difficulty in Plato's doctrine of the soul. If, as is said in *Phdr.* 249 BC, a real animal-soul cannot enter into a human body because it does not possess *lógos* or the power of "dialectic" which constitutes the essential part of the human soul's activity, how can a real human soul enter into an animal's body when it is obvious that as an animal it can make no use of its *lógos*? (For this very reason many Platonists—those who were not satisfied with ingenious or artificial interpretations: cf. Sallust., *de Dis* 20; *Procl.*, in *Tim.* 329 DE—denied the entrance of the human soul into animals; cf. Aug. *CD.* x, 30, and partic. *Nemes.*, p. 116 Maith. Lucr. iii, 760, already seems to have such Platonists in mind.) The *lógos* of the soul seems to be absent from animals or to be present but undeveloped as in children; *Rp.* iv, 441 A B (or does it remain permanently bound in *áphorá*? see above, this chap., n. 33. Just such a theory put forward by exponents of *μετεμψύχωση* who would make the *ψυχή* always the same but not always equally active, is attacked by Alex. Aphr., *de An.*, p. 27 Br.). But acc. to the later doctrine of Plato the *lógos* comprises the whole contents of the soul before it enters a body; if the animals do not possess it then they do not strictly speaking possess a soul (*θύμῳ* and *ἐνθυμία* in themselves are not the soul; they are only added to the soul when it first enters into a body). It seems certain that Plato adopted the view that the soul migrates into the bodies of animals from the theologians and Pythagoreans, while he still believed that the soul was not pure power of thought but also (as still in *Phdr.*) included *θυμός* and *ἐνθυμία* in itself. Later, because it was difficult to do without the migration-theory of the soul on account of its ethical importance, he allowed the idea to remain side by side with his reorganized and sublimated doctrine of the soul. (On the other hand, metempsychosis into plants—which are certainly *ψῆα*, though they only have *τὴ ἐνθυμία*, *Tim.* 77 B—was never adopted by him from Empedocles; cf. *Procl.*, in *Rp.* ii, 333 Kr., and for the same reason: this idea was unimportant and indifferent from an ethical point of view.)

<sup>34</sup> *τὰς εἰς τὸν νοῦν τὸν νοῦν τὰς ψυχὰς ἀνδρῶν*, *Rp.* 517 B.

<sup>35</sup> *ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀφ' ὧν ἐστὶν αὐτὴ καὶ ἀδιασπάστως ὡς ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν*, *Phdr.* 248 D—the ancient argument from the fact that the individual soul (and of this Plato is speaking) has no beginning to the conclusion that its life can have no end.

<sup>36</sup> This much may be conceded to Trichsmüller's observations. "The individual, and the individual soul, is not an independent principle but only a resultant of the compounding of the idea and the principle of Becoming"—though this is not how Plato regards the

matter; hence in Plato—"the individual is not eternal (i.e. not necessarily), and the eternal Principles are not individual", *Stud. a. Ges. d. Begr.*, p. 115, 142 (1874). But all that Teichmüller has to say under this head is in reality only a criticism of the Platonic doctrine of the soul and does not help us to determine what exactly that doctrine was. Plato speaks always of the immortality, i.e. the eternity, of the individual soul; nowhere does he confound indestructibility to the "common nature" of the soul; and this fact is not even remotely explained by appealing as Teichmüller does to an alleged "orthodoxy" to which Plato is supposed to be accommodating his words. If from no other passage we should be obliged to conclude definitely from *Rp.* 611 A that Plato believed in the existence of a plurality of souls and in their indestructibility: *οὐκ ἔστιν αἰεὶ αἰσά (φύσις). οὐκ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ἰδέμεναι ψυχὰς ποσάμην ἐκκλινούσας, οὐδὲ αὖ τιθέμεναι*. Here the predicate of the first sentence is indubitably *αἰεὶ* only: it is affirmed that always the same souls will exist, not that *αἰ αἰσά αἰεὶ* ("the souls are always the same ones") as Teichmüller supposes, *Platon. Frage*, 7 ff., and it is asserted with all possible plainness that the plurality of individual souls, of which a definite number exist, is indestructible.

<sup>42</sup> E.g. appeal made to *revelat. analoγ. λόγος ἐν ἀναμάρτηταις ἀγγέλων*, and particularly to Orphic doctrine, in those places where he is speaking of the inward difference between the soul and all that is corporeal, of the soul's "death" in earthly life, of its enclosure in the *σώμα* in *εἴδος* in punishment of its misdeeds—of punishment and purification after death in *Ἔδση*, of the migration of the soul, its transmutability, dwelling of the pure in the neighbourhood of the gods (*Phd.* 81 BC, 83 C, 70 C, 81 A, 107 D E.; *Gorg.* 493 A.; *Crat.* 400 BC., *Men.* 81 A.; *Lg.* 870 DE, 872 E). Thus also is the origin of the tendency to compare the highest philosophical activity, or the beholding of the Ideas before all time, with the *ἐκστασις* of the mystics: *Phd.* 250 B.; cf. Lohs, *Agf.* 128.

<sup>43</sup> Nine (an ancient sacred number) stages from the φιλόσοφος downwards to the *νέμενος*, *Phd.* 248 DE.

<sup>44</sup> This is frequently stated in individual myths; cf. also *Phd.* 85 CD.

<sup>45</sup> *Phd.* 250 C (*δοτρεω*); *Rp.* 611 CD (*Γλαυκῶς*).

<sup>46</sup> *τὴν τοῦ ἔντος θήραν, Phd.* 86 C (*ἔντος αὐτῆς καὶ αὐτὴν ἀπορροαίνουσαν ἢ φύξῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔντος, TAI* 167 A. *αὐτῇ τῇ φύξῃ θανέτω αὐτὴ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, Phd.* 86 D).

<sup>47</sup> *ἐνταΐνα, Tim.* 46 CD. *τοῦ καὶ δυνάμει, 47 E ff. (ὁ θεὸς ἐκ πολλῶν ἐνταΐνων, namely τὴν ψαζόν, Rp.* 378 AC).

<sup>48</sup> The *σώμα* with which the soul is bound up is a *συνέσις*, *Phd.* 86 B (*θεμελίον* of the soul, 87 D). The *αἰσά* in the world are regularly said to come from matter until in *Lg.*, *αἰσά* by *αἰσά* with the *ἐνταΐντι* *φύξῃ* of the world, there appears an evil World-Soul that works evil.

<sup>49</sup> Particularly in *Phd.*, *καθαίρεται—καθαίρεται—αἰ φιλοσοφία ἑστὴν καθαίρεται* in contrast with the *καθαίρεται φύσις*, 87 A ff., 89 BC, 90 E, 92 D, 108 B, 114 C. Katharsis of the soul through dialectic *σοφία*, 230 C E. Expresses allusion to the analogous requirement of *καθαίρεται* by *αἰ τὰς τελειὰς ἡμῶν κατασκευάσεις, Phd.* 86 C.

<sup>50</sup> *καθαίρεται εἶναι τοῦτο ἐμφανέει, τὸ ἡμεῖς δὲ τι μάλα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τῆς φύξῃ καὶ ἰδίᾳ αὐτῇ καὶ αὐτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἀναρροαίνουσα ἢ καὶ ἀποκτείνουσα, καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ θανάσι καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ καὶ ἐν τῇ θανάσι καὶ ἐν τῇ θανάσι καὶ ἐν τῇ θανάσι, ἀναρροαίνουσα ἀναρροαίνουσα ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐκ τοῦ σώματος, Phd.* 87 C. Thus *κατασκευάσεις* and

διδραμία, and more particularly φρόνησις, are καθαρμίδες τις, 89 BC. ὅπως τε καὶ καθαρμίδες of φιλοσοφία, 82 D.

<sup>32</sup> φιλοσοφία teaches the soul εἰς αὐτὴν συλλέγεσθαι καὶ διδραμίζεσθαι and to ἀναγαγεῖν from the ἀνάγκη of the senses down πρὸς ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, Phd. 83 A.—ἐν καθαρῷ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀκαλλίστηται . . . φέρονται τὰ σῶμα καὶ συσχεθρομένη αὐτὴ εἰς αὐτὴν, 80 E, 78 C.

<sup>33</sup> . . . καθαρὰ ἀκαλλίστηται τῇ τῷ σώματος ἀφροσύνῃ . . . γινώσκουσα δ' ἑμῶς αὐτὴν πᾶσι τὸ εἰληκυῖα, πρὶν καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαρὸς ἐφέπτεσθαι πρὶν καὶ θιμῶν δ', Phd. 67 AB.

<sup>34</sup> For the ἀγαθόν, ἡ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἰδέα, αἰτία both of ἀλλάττειν and of ἐπιστρέφειν but identical with neither (they are only ἀγαθοποιῶν) and διὰ μάλιστα γινώσκουσα—cause of the γινώσκόμενα and not only of γινώσκουσας, αἱ both εἶναι and αἰεῖν, οὐκ ἐστὶν ὅτι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ αἰτίᾳ πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ ἀνδρῶν ἐπιστρέφοντες—see Rp. vi, c. 19 (304 A ff.), 517 BC. Here τὸ ἀγαθόν, as the reason and active cause of all Being is itself placed beyond and above Being (as it is regularly with the Neoplatonists) and identified with Godhead (the θεὸς αὐτὸς, Phil. 22 C); this last is, however, in Tim. set aside by αἰεὶ with the Ideas, of which τὸ ἀγαθόν is now the highest.

<sup>35</sup> ἡ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἰδέα πρῶτον μάθημα, Rp. 503 A.

<sup>36</sup> The epimachy of the soul, Rp. vii init.

<sup>37</sup> The philosopher, ἐξιστάμενος τῶν ἀνθρωπείων συνεδυμένων καὶ πρὸς τῷ θεῷ γινώσκοντος, ἐνθουσιάζει ἀλλήθει τοῦ πάλαι, Phdr. 249 D.

<sup>38</sup> ἡ κατὰ διαιλεκτικὴν, Rp. 537 C. εἰς μίαν ἰδέαν συναρῶντα ἄνθρωποι καὶ πολλοὶ ἀνθρωπῶν (and again κατ' αὐτὴν τῶν αὐτῶν what is unified)—this is the business of the διαιλεκτικὴν, Phdr. 265 D. ἐκ πολλῶν οὐλοφάντων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναρῶμενον (ίδεαι), Phdr. 249 B.

<sup>39</sup> Gradual ascent of dialectic upwards to πρὸς δ' ὅτι ἀγαθόν, Rp. 532 A f., 511 BC, 534 B ff.—το αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, Smph. c. 28-9 (211 B). Its aim is ἐπιστημὴ τῷ βελτίστου ἐν ψυχῇ πρὸς τῷ ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς αἰεὶ θεῶν, Rp. 532 C.

<sup>40</sup> The philosophic θεωσιότης at the end of the dialectic ascent ἐφαίρηται παρὰ τὴν τι θεωσιότην τῇ φέσει καλῶς καλῶ, Smph. 210 E—exactly as in the τέλος καὶ ἐκτελεσθὲν μυστήριον, 210 A. ἐλέγχων καὶ ἐκείνῃ καὶ εὐδαίμονα φέροντα μυστήριον τε καὶ ἐκτελεσθέντες ἐν αὐτῇ καθαρῇ, Phdr. 250 C.—It is a visionary and a suddenly acquired apprehension of the world-order, not one obtained in discursive thought. We may compare the way in which Plotinus, with a recollection of such Platonic passages, describes the arrival of ἐκστασις—ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐφαίρηται φέσει ἀλλ' ὅτι (5, 3, 17; cf. 5, 3, 17).

<sup>41</sup> The soul εἶναι τῷ θεῷ, Phd. 80 A. It is συγκρίνεται τῷ τε θεῷ καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ τῷ αἰεὶ ὄντι, Rp. 611 E—συγγένεια θεῶν of men; Ig. 899 D. The eternal and immortal is, as such, divine. The real Ego of man, the ἀθάνατον, ψυχὴ ἐκτελεσθόμενον, after death goes πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, Ig. 958 B.

<sup>42</sup> The βεῖον, ἀθάνατον ἀμείνονον, part of the soul is ἀθάνατον ἀρχὴ ὅπως εἶναι, Tim. 41 C, 42 E. The φέροντες of the soul (its "wing" Phdr. 246 D) τῷ θεῷ εἶναι, Alc. 133 C.—In Tim. 90 A C this ἀμείνονον τῇ ψυχῇ εἶναι is actually called the εἶναιον which man has εἶναιον ἐν αὐτῇ.

<sup>43</sup> The eye is ἡμιουδωτότατον τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀργύρων, Rp. 508 B.—Goethe is alluding either to these words or to the phrase of Plotinus taken from them, 1, 6 (περὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, 9).

<sup>44</sup> ἐπιστρέφειν καὶ ἀλλάττειν are both ἀγαθοποιῶν, Rp. 509 A—the soul something θεωσιότης, Phd. 98 C.

<sup>44</sup> From the *philosophía* of the soul and from the question *án dōreton kai álōn éphierai órōsiōn* its real nature can be discerned as one which is *εγγενής τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἀθάνατος καὶ τῷ δαί δότι*, *Rp.* 511 DE; *Phd.* 79 D. With the *εγγενής* of the soul we achieve contact with the *δοτεον* *δε*, *Rp.* 495 E. If the Ideas are everlasting, so must our soul be, *Phd.* 78 DE. By its power of *φρονεῖν ἀθάνατα καὶ θεία* the *ἀφροσύνη φύσις* has itself a share *αὐτῷ δοῦν ἐνδέχεται* (i.e. with *νόος*) in *ἀθάνασία*, *Τίμ.* 90 BC. This thinking "part" of the soul *πρὸς τῇ ἐν ἀθάνατῷ εγγένειαν ἐπὶ γῆς ἡμεῖς εἶπεν, ὅτι δοταὶ φύσιν αὐτῇ ἑγγενῶν ἀλλ' ἀθάνατον*, *Τίμ.* 90 A.

<sup>45</sup> *Λόγος τῷ σωματι* from the body and from sense-perception, *Phd.* 83 AB, 85 A, 87 D. *λόγος* and *καθαρός* of the soul by *φιλοσοφία*, *Phd.* 82 D. *λόγος καὶ λογὸς τῶν σωματῶν* (of the body) *καὶ τῆς ἀφροσύνης*, *Rp.* 515 C.

<sup>46</sup> *θεῖος εἰς τὸ θυναιδὲ ἀσφαλίτω γίγνεται*—said of the true philosopher, *Rp.* 500 D; *ἀθάνατος*, *Smp.* 212 A. The *φιλόσοφος* is perpetually in contact with the *θεῖ δαί* and the *θεῖον*, which last is with difficulty recognizable by the eyes of *τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχῆς*, *Soph.* 254 A.—*οὐ μὴ θεῶσι θεὸς μὲν* (as e.g. Empedokles called himself) *ὡς αὐτῶν ἴθου τοιαύτης προσεγομένης*, a different sense from that

*ἐλλὰ γίγνεσθαι πλὴν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ*, *Rp.* 502 C (cf. *Phileb.*).

<sup>47</sup> The flight *ἐνδένει* *δεινὰ* produces *ἀραιῶναι θεῷ κατὰ τὸ θυναιδὲν*, *Tat.* 178 E. *ἀραιοῦσθαι θεῷ*, *Rp.* 613 A (τὸ κατανοεῖσθαι τὸ κατανοεῖν *ἀραιωθῆναι*, *Τίμ.* 90 D).

<sup>48</sup> The soul that has through philosophy become completely "pure" is withdrawn from the cycle of Rebirth and from the whole material world. Even as early as *Phdr.* the souls of the *φιλοσοφώμενοι* after a third *ἐναυμάσις* are exempt for the remainder of the *παράδεισος* of 10,000 years, while the real and unwavering (*δαί*) philosopher remains for ever free from the body. That at least must be the meaning of 248 C-249 A. The subject is then treated in more detail in *Phd.*: Release of the *φιλοσοφία ἡνωτὶς καθαρῶμενοι* for ever from life in the body (*δοτεν αὐμάναν ζῶσι τὸ παράδεισος εἰς τὸν ὅσπερ χρόνον*, 114 C)—entry of the pure soul to its kin (*εἰς τὸ εγγενές*, 84 B) and its like (*εἰς τὸ θεῖον αὐτῇ, τὸ δαίδει*, 81 A), and *εἰς θεῶν γένος*, 82 B—and to the *τοῦ θεῖου τοῦ καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς ζευσοῦς*, 83 E. Still more mythologically expressed—*Τίμ.* 42 B1) (*δ τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόσος* *Tat.* 177 A). Throughout we have the release theory of the theologians re-expressed in a philosophical and more elevated manner (*Orphic: μεταγμέναι*, *Phd.* 81).

<sup>49</sup> . . . *οὐ μέλιον θηλάου* . . . , *Phd.* 114 C.

<sup>50</sup> To the *αἰθέρι αἰθεία, τὸ δοτεν μένον κατὰ τὴν ἀληθεῖ λόγον προσέχει* *Τίμ.* 37 E.

<sup>51</sup> It is true that not until it becomes associated with the body does the soul, by obtaining *αἰσθήσις, ἐκθυμία, θυμὸς*, and all the other faculties that bring it into touch with becoming and Changing, obtain what can strictly be called its individual personality. The perfectly

individuality. He did not distinctly raise the question of the seat and origin of individuality in the souls. He is content to suppose that a plurality of individual souls was living before their entanglement with Becoming, and to conclude from this that in eternity, too, after their last escape from *yénous*, the same number of individual souls will still be living. Numerical distinctness (which affects in a scarcely intelligible manner the spaceless and immaterial) has to do duty with him for qualitative distinctness which would alone be able to account for the self-consciousness of this plurality. Acc. to the picture given in *Tim.* c. 14 (41 D ff.) the souls created by the *δημιουργός* are evidently all alike (hence also is *γίνεσθαι πάλιν τεταπεινὴν μὴ αἰών.*, 41 E), and only when they are in the *σῶμα*, and bound up with mortal portions of soul, do they react in different ways to what affects them from without—and so become different. (This is so, however, in the pre-existent period, too, acc. to *Phd.*; but in that account *θυμός* and *διθυράμς* are also bound up with the soul in pre-existence.) The influence of the lower soul-partners and of the *τροφή* *παίδευσίς* (*Tim.* 44 B) makes the *λογισμοί* also of the souls differ among themselves. This argued individual characterization, the fruit of differing *παίδια* καὶ *τροφή*—something quite the reverse of the "common nature" of "soul" in general which Teilharder supposes to be meant here: *Stud.* 143—in taken with it by the soul to the place of judgment, i.e. Hades, *Phd.* 107 D. When, however, by the best *τροφή* *παίδευσίς* it has become completely pure and free from all the trammels of the physical and perishable and departs into bodiless existence in the *αἰθέρ*—then in truth all individual distinctness has been dissolved out of it. Still, it must endure for ever as a self-conscious personality; for that this is what Plato meant cannot be doubted.

<sup>74</sup> *Phd.* 83 D.

<sup>75</sup> *χαρίζεσθαι* ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς, *Phd.* 67 C. *διαχωρεῖσθαι*, 83 A (quite in the manner of genuine mysticism—it is the "separateness" of the man who is to behold god, of which Eckhart speaks).

<sup>76</sup> *Phd.* 64 A ff., 67 E.

<sup>77</sup> *Phd.* 114 C.

<sup>78</sup> τοῦ σώματος πρόθεσις καὶ μεταί, *Crat.* 404 A.

<sup>79</sup> τῇ συγγενεὶ πλησιάζει καὶ μάλιστα τῷ ὄντι ὅπως, *Rp.* 490 B.

<sup>80</sup> The soul *ἔσθαι χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται πρὸ κοινοῦ ποιεῖν ἔργα, καὶ ὅπως*, *Phd.* 63 C. In the same way the Appearance years after the Idea; see above, this chap., n. 9.

<sup>81</sup> τῇ φρονήσεως κτήσιν, *Phd.* 63 A ff.

<sup>82</sup> περιδοθῆαι καὶ ἐνθύνει ἐκείνῳ φέρεται ὅτι τάχιστα. φωνή δὲ ὁμοιωμένη θεῷ καὶ τὸ δυνάσθαι, *TAL.* 176 AD.

<sup>83</sup> *Rp.* 523 A-524 D.

<sup>84</sup> Beyond all other things it is the *κόσμος* of the world of Appearance that awakes the memory of that which has once been seen in the world of Ideas: *Phdr.* 250 B, 250 D ff.; *Smp.* c. 28 ff. (210 A ff.). Plato gives a peculiar reason for this, but in reality it is due to a vigorous re-emergence of the fundamental artistic sense—the æsthetic element in his philosophic speculation and enthusiasm—which the thinker had so violently suppressed in obedience to his theory that the *μυθοποιεῖν* and all the arts are merely imitations of deceptive imitations of the only true Reality.

<sup>85</sup> Not *μάθησις*—only *ἀνάμνησις*, *Phdr.* 249 BC; *Mrm.* c. 14 ff. (80 D ff.); *Phd.* c. 18 ff. (72 E ff.). [This theory occurs regularly in

It appears that he did as a matter of fact derive it from the anticipations and suggestions of earlier teachers of metempsychosis: see above, chap. xi. §. 88.)

<sup>11</sup> *Rp.* vii init.

<sup>12</sup> *Ἡρώδης δὲ θεῶν δέξεται καὶ θύει μετὰ φροσύνης γυρίσας, Tāt.* 176 B.

<sup>13</sup> *αἱ ἀνθρώποι οὐκ ἴσασιν τὴν δόξαν αὐτῶν, Tāt.* 173 D B.

<sup>14</sup> *Tāt.* 172 C-177 C. The philosopher is unskilled in the life of the everyday world and its arts, and is quite indifferent towards them. Commonplace people, if he is at any time drawn into the affairs of the market place or the law courts, regard him as εὐθύς, ἀδύνατος, ψάλλας. Sometimes βαῖς καὶ παραδουλοῖ αὐτὸν (οἱ ἄνθρωποι φιλοδοξοῦσι) καὶ πωρύνουσιν ἔχοντες ματαιότης, *Soph.* 216 D; *Rp.* 517 A—passage from the later writing of Plato. Even as early as *Plat.* 249 D *ἐφ' ὧν τὸν φιλοσοφῶντα ἀποδοκῶνται καὶ πρὸς τὴν βίαν γυρίσμενος ποδοκῶνται* καὶ τὸν πολλὸν αἰσιν παρακινῶν αὐτῶν.

<sup>15</sup> *ἱκανοὶς ἀλλὰ μὴ θρασυδαής* is the injunction made to the philosopher, *Rp.* 52 A; at least, in *οὕτως* as they are *Rp.* 520 B. After death comes the reward δέδοται φιλοσοφίας καὶ ἀνὰ πρῶτον καὶ οἱ πολυπραγμονήσαντες ἐν τῷ βίῳ, *Gorg.* 526 C. *ὡς περ εἰς θανάτου ἀνθρώπου ἰκανοὶς* the true philosopher will *θουχίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ ἀνὰ πρῶτον*, *Rp.* 498 D.

<sup>16</sup> *τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόματα μεγάλα καὶ σπουδῆς οὐκ ἔστι, Lg.* 803 B.

<sup>17</sup> *Gorg.* 521 D. *ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ κυβερνητοῦ.* *Rp.* 498 E (cf. also *Men.* 99 E, 100 A).

<sup>18</sup> Not *ἐκείνους* καὶ *ἐνθυμῶν παρασκευαστέ* but rather *καὶ ἑαυτοὺς*, *Gorg.* 518 C. 521 A; cf. 464 B B.

<sup>19</sup> *Gorg.* 519 A. All these worldly matters seem to him *φάντασμα*; just as all the Apparitions in the world of Becoming are for him but *φάντασμα*, *Rp.* 515 D.

<sup>20</sup> *Gorg.* c. 78 B. (523 B B.).

<sup>21</sup> *ὅπως ἡ τρέφουσα ἑστίαις τῷ βίῳ, Gorg.* 527 E—(this is the real subject of the *Gorg.*, viz. *ὅτινα καὶ τρέφουσι ἑμ.* 500 C, and not the nature of *θυσίαι*—and it is this which gives its special emotional tone to the dialogue).

<sup>22</sup> *Gorg.* 515 C B., 519 A B. Summary: *οὐδένα ἡμῶς ἴσμεν εὖ ὅπως ἀγαθὴ γεγονέναι τὰ πολιτικά ἐν οὐδὲ τῇ πόλει*, 517 A.

<sup>23</sup> *οὐκ ὡς καλὸν τι ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον πρὸνταυτας, Rp.* 540 B.

<sup>24</sup> It is now the *σπουδὴ ἐν τῷ βίῳ*—inaccessibility to the *ἐκείθεν*—ὅς *σπουδοῦντες* δεῖ *ἐκείθεν* πρὸνταιν, *Rp.* 519 C.

<sup>25</sup> The *ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καλῶνται* (even including *σοφία* regarded as practical shrewdness: *Rp.* 429 B B.) as *ἐγγὺς* *ἐκείναι* τῶν τοῦ σώματος become of secondary importance compared with the virtue of *ἀφρόνησις*, i.e. of dialectic and the contemplation of the *ἰδέα*, *Rp.* 516 DE. This alone is *ἐκείθεν*, something *μᾶλλον* than those bourgeois virtues, *Rp.* 504 D—philosophy stands high above *ἐκείθεν* *καὶ καὶ πολιτικῇ ἀρετῇ, ἥ ἑστίαις καὶ πολιτικῇ γυμνασίᾳ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ* *καὶ καὶ τοῖς*, *Plat.* 62 BC.—This, too, rightly understood, is the real point of the inquiry in *Men.* Explicitly, indeed, the dialogue only concerns itself with that *ἀρετή* which is commonly so regarded and is based on *ἀλήθει* *ἰδέα*, coming into existence by instinct (*οὐκ ἔστιν*); which, however, to the philosopher is not *ἀρετή* in the proper sense of the word; that name he would only give to *ἐκείθεν*, the only sort of knowledge that can be learnt and acquired as a permanent possession,

<sup>6</sup> *Rp.* vii, c. 15 (535 A, 536 D); cf. vi, c. 2, 5 (485 B, 487 B; 489 D, 490 E).

<sup>120</sup> καὶ τοὺς μὲν (ἐλέγξει ἀληθείας) πᾶντα δὲ ἅμα περιέχειν φαίμεν, τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς, ἀσθενέων δὲ γένος βραχέ τε, *Tim.* 51 E.

<sup>121</sup> φιλόσοφος πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι, *Rp.* 494 A. φέρεται of a completely philosophical kind, πῶς ἤμιν ἀμυλῶνται δαπάναις ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ φέρεσθαι καὶ εἰλεῖν, *Rp.* 491 B.

<sup>122</sup> "That into which I sink myself—that becomes one with me: when I think on Him I am as God that is the Front of Being"—the true mystic note. For the mystic, knowledge of an object is real oneness with the thing known; knowledge of God is union with God.

<sup>123</sup> *Rp.* 540 B.



## CHAPTER XIV

### THE LATER AGE OF THE GREEK WORLD

#### PART I

##### PHILOSOPHY

Plato and the Platonic account of the nature, origin, and destiny of the soul closes a period. It marks the end of that theological and spiritualist movement to the force and significance of which nothing bears clearer witness than the fact that it could have such a conclusion. After this point its development ceases—at least it disappears from the surface of Greek life: like one of those Asiatic torrents with which the ancients were familiar it buries itself underground for a long stretch of its course, only to reappear eventually, with all the greater effect, far away from the place of its origin. Even Plato's own school almost immediately after the death of its master and directing spirit turned its attention in a direction quite other than that which he had given it.<sup>1</sup> To have retained the Platonic outlook would have made his pupils even more isolated in their very different age than Plato himself had been in his own.

Greece entered upon a new and final phase of her development. The ominous breakdown of the older political fabric at the end of the fourth century might have seemed likely to put an end to the natural vitality of the Greek peoples. With the conquest of the East by Macedonians and Greeks, however, new tasks were set before that people and with the new task they acquired new faculties. The *polis*, indeed, the purest expression of Greek constructive ability, could not be restored to life. Such of the old and narrow city-republics as had not perished completely in that stormy period only languished in a stagnant peace. Rare, indeed, are the exceptions in which (as particularly in Rhodes) a more vigorous and independent life asserted itself. The new and swollen cities of the Macedonian Empire, with their motley populations drawn from many nationalities, could not make good the loss. The Leagues in which Greece seemed to be making an effort to find a political organization of a wider

corruption and external violence. Even in its deepest and most essential character the old national spirit of Greece, which had drawn its strength from its clear-cut individuality, seemed to be suffering damage through the unlimited extension eastwards and westwards of Greek life. It did not cease to be an immeasurable advantage to be a Greek, but a Greek now meant anyone who had a share in the one thing that still distinguished and characterized the Greeks, namely, Greek culture—and Greek culture was no longer confined to a single nation. It was no fault of this Greek humanism that not a single one of the vast populations of the East (and in the West at last Rome stood alone) was able to make their own this culture so generously offered to the whole world, so that there, too, all should become *Greek* who were capable of becoming free human beings. Nevertheless, from all countries and nationalities uncounted multitudes of *individuals* entered into the circle of this extended Hellenism. The way was open for all who could live without the need of a way of life and thinking modelled strictly upon national lines: for the culture which now united all Greeks and Greek communities was based upon science—and science knows nothing of national frontiers.

The science which could thus present itself as the guiding principle of such a large and heterogeneous mass of cultured people, must at any rate have reached a condition of stability if not of completely rounded finality. After all the stir and controversy of the previous centuries it had at last arrived at a period of contented enjoyment of its own resources: the long drawn-out struggle, the restless years of search were now held to have borne fruit. In philosophy at least there was a distinct slackening of the insatiable zeal and boldness of individual thinkers in posing new questions and wresting answers or in seeking for fresh solutions to old problems. A few great systems, formulated in accordance with the fixed tenets of the various schools of thought, still offered a refuge to those who demanded fixity and definition in their opinions; for centuries they kept up their special traditions without serious alteration until they, too, fell in pieces at last. A greater measure of independence and variety was displayed by the special sciences which since they had now been completely released for the first time from the leading-strings of philosophy proceeded to develop freely in accordance with their own principles. Art, too, was by no means devoid as yet of originality and attractiveness, and in spite of the

into a position of subservience and imitation. But it was no longer, in conjunction with the peculiar customs and manners of a people, the mistress and dispenser of wisdom and knowledge of the world. Art becomes a plaything and an incidental diversion: it is science that determines the general character and content of culture. But this scientifically minded culture shares in the natural temper of all science. Science has its feet firmly planted in life itself: it keeps men's minds actively employed in this world: it has small temptation to leave the firm ground of what is knowable and can never be too well known, to voyage out into the region of the intangible which can never be a subject of scientific inquiry. A cool rationalism, a calm adherence to the intelligible and thinkable, without any leanings to the gloomy terrors of a mysterious world of the unknown—such is the temper that marks the science and culture of the Hellenistic age and marks it more distinctively than any other period of Greek culture. Such mysticism as was still vigorous and effective kept itself timidly in the background at this time; in the everyday world it is rather the direct contrary of mysticism that we are made aware of: the unlovely results of the prevailing rationalism, a bleak reasonableness, a knowing and prosaic common sense such as stares dully at us from the pages of Polybios' History as the point of view of the narrator himself and of those of whom he writes. It was no age of heroes or of the heroic. A weaker and more delicate generation holds the field. The breakdown of political life and the disappearance of its obligations made it more possible than it had ever been before for the individual to lead his own life in his own way.<sup>8</sup> And he makes the most of his freedom, his culture, the treasures of an inward, private life enriched with all the brilliance and charm of an old and perfected civilization. All the past had thought and laboured on his behalf; he is not idle, but he is busy without ever being in a hurry, enjoying his heritage and taking his ease in the cooling sunlight of the long drawn-out autumn of Greek life. And he is little concerned to inquire what may follow when this brilliant, many-coloured world that surrounds him shall have vanished from his gaze. This world is all in all to him. The hope or fear of immortality has little effect upon the educated people of the age.<sup>9</sup> Philosophy to which in one form or another they are all more or less closely attached teaches them according to its particular mood to cherish that here —

had the doctrine of the eternity or imperishable nature of the soul any serious significance as the central doctrine of a system. Natural science ruled the day, while theology remained in the background and could only obtain a doubtful hearing (if it was even listened to at all) for its proclamation of the divine origin and everlasting life of the souls.

## § 2

At the outset of this period, and illuminating a long stretch of it with the light of his genius, stands the figure of Aristotle. In what this master *di color' che sanno* had to say of the soul's nature and destiny two voices are distinctly audible. The soul, he instructs us, is that which in a living and organic physical body brings the potentially existing to actual existence. It is the *form* to the body's matter, the culmination of the capacities of independent life residing in the particular body. Bodiless and immaterial itself, it is not the outcome of the mixture of the various parts of the body: it is the cause, not the resultant, of the vital functions of its body which exists for the soul's benefit as its "instrument".<sup>4</sup> It dwells within a natural organism and though it is itself unmoved it moves that organism as the source of its growth and nourishment, of its desires and locomotion, of its feeling and perceiving; while in the higher organisms it acts as the combination of all these faces. It is as little to be thought of as separate from the body—its own body—as the power of vision is in separation from the eye or as its shape from the moulded waxen image.<sup>5</sup> Theoretically, indeed, it is possible to distinguish between body and soul, but actually and in the animated organism they cannot be distinguished. When the living creature dies the matter of which it was composed loses its special adaptation to a purposeful organism, and this adaptation was its life; without it there can be no independent "Substance" (*substance*).<sup>6</sup> The Form, the functional power of the once living organism, its "soul", has no longer any independent existence.

This is the voice of Aristotle the physicist when he is speaking from the standpoint of a physical doctrine which includes the study of the soul "in so far as it occurs not without matter".<sup>7</sup> Aristotle the metaphysician takes us further. In the soul of man, besides the vital powers of the organized individual, there lives a spiritual being of more than natural character and origin, the "Mind"—"that in

the theologians had given to it: he omitted both the conclusions they drew and the exhortations they based upon it. We hear no more of the "purification" of the divine Mind within mankind. It has nothing impure or evil in it nor can any breath of pollution affect it from without. The effort towards the "other world" of purity, the denial and rejection of its earthly partner the living body, are foreign to the "Mind" of Aristotle.<sup>21</sup> It has no impulse to "deliverance" or self-emancipation; it knows of no peculiar task that points beyond this world. The presence of this "separable" Mind in the living man is an assured fact, and nothing more: no purpose in life is deducible from it. The fact itself seemed to be evident from the power that man possesses of grasping immediately a highest form of knowledge that is beyond demonstration, not as the result of the mental activity of his soul, for the apprehension is prior to the soul, but by means of a higher spiritual faculty, a special intellectual being that seemed to proclaim its presence and existence within man in this way. It is thus by way of a theory of knowledge not of a theological doctrine that we arrive at the distinction between "Mind" and "Soul". But the doctrine thus reasserted was in reality nothing but the old doctrine of the theologians. This "Mind", too, seems to the thinker to be a being akin to God. The pure contemplative existence, a life consisting in the contemplation of the final objects of intuition is counted as a privilege of the divine and of all divine beings, as the true purpose of vital energy and of its manifestation; and in the description of this state the sober reserve of his lecture style seems to be uplifted and almost illuminated with the warmth and brilliance imparted by a genuine glow of personal experience.<sup>22</sup> This pure activity of contemplation, finding its deepest satisfaction in itself, belongs to the divine in man—to the Mind; its whole life lies in this. This activity, however, the Mind performs and finishes in this life, while it is united with the body and the body's "soul". There is nothing left that can be thought of as forming the content of the life and activity of the Mind in its separate existence after the completion of its period of life on earth. Mind and the man with whom it is associated can hardly have a very urgent desire for that emancipation in "another world" which is thus left blank and without content for our thought. The thought of immortality cast in this form could no longer possess any real value or ethical significance for man.<sup>23</sup> It arises from a logical deduction, from metaphysical considerations, not

from a demand of the spirit. It lacks not only the distinctness that might have appealed to the senses and given direction to the imagination, but the power (or the intention) of playing a leading part in the conduct or direction of life on this earth. There is no inspiration in this doctrine—not even for the philosopher, though it was to him and his activity and his efforts that the picture and panegyric of "Mind", the philosopher in man, had really referred.

It was quite possible to abide by the teaching and philosophy of Aristotle, directed as it was to the observation and interpretation of the things of this world, while abandoning the advanced part of the doctrine of Mind—that Being which has sunk to the level of this world from the other world of divinity, which separates itself, with the death of man, once more to everlasting divine life though hardly to a continuation of individual existence. On this point in particular free discussion of the master's teaching maintained itself in his school: some, and by no means the weakest, of Aristotle's successors denied altogether and in every form the doctrine of immortality.<sup>24</sup>

### § 3

The dogmatic teaching of the Stoics on the subject of the human soul is closely bound up with the materialistic pantheism by means of which they explained all the phenomena of life, of being and becoming upon earth. God is All, and divinity is nothing outside this "all", which forms the world: the Universe is God. God is thus not only the matter but the form, the life and the power of the world. Divinity is the original matter, the ethereal Fire, the fiery "breath" which maintains itself or changes and in innumerable metamorphoses creates the world. God is also what supplies a purpose to this world and is the purposeful force—the reason and law of the world. The universal deity which is thus at once matter, mind, and formative principle sends out from itself at varying periods the multiplicity of Appearance and then again at another time takes back the multifarious and the divided into the fiery unity of its own breath of life. Thus, in everything that has shape, in everything that lives and moves, the content and the unifying form is God: he is and works as their "state" in inorganic things, as "nature" in plants, as "irrational soul" in the other living things, as rational and thinking soul in man.<sup>25</sup>

The soul of man, thus endowed with reason, is a fragment of the divine,<sup>36</sup> and is itself divine like everything else in the world but in a purer sense than all other things. It has remained closer to the first and original essence of the divine, conceived as "creative fire" (*πῦρ γενναιοῦς*), than the earthly fire which has lost much of its original purity and refinement. It is closer<sup>37</sup> than the lower matter that in all its changeful forms degenerates progressively as it gets farther and farther away from the divine fire by gradual loss of the tension (*τένσις*) that had once been living and active in the primeval fire; closer even than the material of its own body in which it dwells and rules. As something essentially distinct from the body, then, the individual soul comes into being among the elements of its body when that body is conceived, and it develops its full nature after the birth of the individual.<sup>38</sup> But even in its individual, separate existence it remains incompletely detached from the universal life that is present in it; it remains subject to the "universal Law" of the world, which is God, and fast bound by "fate", the "destiny" (*ἡ ἀνάγκη, αἰμασύνη*) which decrees the course of their existence for the totality of all Life and the individual lives.<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, the soul has its special gifts and special task—it is capable of self-determination and is responsible for its own decisions and acts. Though it is a pure emanation from the universal Reason and bound down to no irrational elements, it has the power of irrational choice and can resolve upon what is evil. Though they have all sprung from one and the same original source the individual souls are of very different character, intellect, and propensity of will. Unreason in thought, will, and conduct is common in the world; those who have real insight are few; in fact, the Wise Man, the man who keeps his own will in complete harmony with the universal and divine direction of the world, is but a picture of imaginary perfection, *natura humana exemplar*, never fully and perfectly realized in actual life.

Ethical interests demanded the freedom and independence of the moral personality and its will, which can only fulfil the requirements of duty by self-mastery and the overthrow of base impulses; but this independence was in conflict with the essential principles of Stoic metaphysics. The Stoics taught that the world (and the soul included in it) is only the necessary self-development of a single and absolute Being that excludes all independent and separate multiplicity. Nor could they recognize any principle of Evil, an anti-rational principle answering to the purity of divine power, working

evil and suggesting it, and making the individual capable of wilful disobedience to the laws of all-embracing divinity. Pure pantheism, uniting God and the world in indissoluble unity, cannot imagine a real conflict between humanity and divinity; it cannot postulate a principle of Evil through the overthrow of which a lost unity with God is to be restored. Pantheism makes no claims of an ethical or religious kind. The ingenuity of the Stoic doctors was exercised in vain in the attempt to find a way out of this dilemma.<sup>40</sup>

From the very origin of the school two tendencies were discernible in the teaching of the Stoa, derived as that teaching was from such different sources. On the one hand, the ethical doctrine of the Cynics, to whom the Stoics owed the greater part of their practical teaching, threw the individual back upon his own resources and made everything depend upon the determination of his own will. It thus pointed in the direction of the most self-sufficient individualism—to an ethical atomism. The physical doctrine derived from Heraклеitos, on the other hand, merged the individual completely into the omnipotence and omnipresence of the All-One; and therefore, as its ethical counterpart, demanded that this relation of the individual to the universal Logos of the world should find expression in a life lived completely *ex ductu rationis*, in unconditional abandonment of the individual will to the Universal Mind that is the World and God.<sup>41</sup> In actual fact it was Cynicism that had the profounder influence in ethical matters. The universal Law and order of the world, embracing both universe and individual in its absolute decrees, threw its net too widely to be able to answer closely enough to the needs of narrow and individual existence. No practical ethics could possibly unite this distant and final aim with the individual man in a single nexus of ordered self-determination. The intermediate link between the universe and its laws, on the one hand, and the individual with his private will, on the other, had formerly been the Greek *polis* with its law and custom. But it was a cosmopolitan age, and for the Stoics as well as for the Cynics before them the city-state had lost most of its educative force. The individual saw himself more and more left to his own devices and forced to depend upon his own strength—his life had to be ordered on self-erected standards and guided by self-found rules. Individualism, which gave its tone to the age more decisively than in any past period of Greek life, began to win a footing even in this pantheistic system. The "Wise Man" who is a law to himself in perfect self-



determination,<sup>43</sup> and feels himself bound only to those like himself,<sup>44</sup> is individualism's fairest flower.

But the soul, thus elevated to a height where it was capable of much that was impossible for or only incompletely within the reach of its weaker sisters, began more and more to seem like something rather different from a mere dependent offshoot of the One divine power that is the same everywhere. It is, in fact, regarded as an independent, divine, and self-enclosed creature in those passages where in Stoic literature, as in the older literature of the theologians, the soul is called a "daimon"—the daimon dwelling within the individual man, and given to him as his associate.<sup>45</sup> Death, too, is regarded by this professedly monist system as a separation of soul from body<sup>46</sup> in accordance with what was really a naive or a conscious spiritualism. In death, then, this soul-essence whose independence had been so marked even in life, does not perish with the body—it does not even lose itself again in the One from which it had taken its origin. An infinitely extended individual life is indeed not attributed to the individual souls: only God, the one Soul of the World, is eternally indestructible.<sup>47</sup> But the souls which have arisen by separation from the one and all-embracing divinity, survive the destruction of their bodies: until the final dissolution, in the Conflagration that will make an end of the present period of world-history, they persist in their independent life: either all of them (as was the older teaching of the school) or, as Chrysippos, the master of Stoic orthodoxy, taught, the souls of the "Wise" only, while the others have been lost in the general life of the Whole some time previously.<sup>48</sup> The stronger ethical personality is held together in itself for a longer time.<sup>49</sup>

From the point of view of physical science and materialist doctrine<sup>50</sup> it was also hard to see why the soul, composed of pure fire-breath, which even in life had held the body together and had not been held together by the body,<sup>51</sup> should disappear at once when that body was disintegrated. As it had once held the body together, so it might well and all the more easily hold itself together now. Its lightness carries it upwards into the pure air under the moon, where it is fed by the breath that rises upwards and where there is nothing that can put an end to it.<sup>52</sup> An "underworld" region like that of popular imagination and theological teaching, was expressly denied by the Stoics.<sup>53</sup> Their imagination preferred to exercise itself in an imaginary extension of life in the Aether, which was their region of

the souls;<sup>46</sup> but as a rule it appears that such flights of fancy were avoided. The life of the souls after death—that of the wise as well as of the unwise—remained indistinct and without content<sup>47</sup> in the imagination of those whose life was still upon earth.

Thus, the doctrine of the soul-personality and its continued existence (never simply expanded into personal immortality), which was in reality not required by the metaphysical principles of Stoicism, and could indeed hardly be reconciled with them, had in fact no serious significance for the general intention and substance of Stoicism—least of all for Stoic ethics and conduct of life. The philosophy of Stoicism is directed to the study of life, not of death. In this life on earth and only here can the purpose of human endeavour—the reproduction of divine wisdom and virtue in the human spirit—be fulfilled in manifold contest with contrary impulses, fulfilled, that is, in so far as such a thing is possible for lonely and isolated fragments of divinity.<sup>48</sup>

But virtue is sufficient in itself for the attainment of happiness—a happiness which loses nothing through the brevity of its duration and to which nothing would be added by the prolongation of its span.<sup>49</sup> Nothing in the doctrine of Stoicism points man, or the Wise Man, to another world beyond the life of the body and outside this earthly theatre of conflict and duty, for the fulfilment of his being and his task.

#### § 4

The limited doctrine of immortality which, as we have seen, was not an essential part of the teaching of Stoicism, began to be called in question as soon as the rigid dogmatism of the school was subjected to the too-searching criticism of other schools of thought. In the clash of opinions Stoicism began to be doubtful of the absolute validity of its own teaching. The boundaries of orthodox doctrine once so firmly drawn now became more fluid; exchange and even compromise became common. Panaitios, the first writer among the pedantic professors of Stoicism to achieve a wider popularity for his writings, became the teacher and friend of those aristocratic Romans who found in Greek philosophy the impulse to a humanism that the barren soil of Rome could never have produced unaided. And Panaitios differed in more than one point from the strict orthodoxy of the older Stoicism. For him the soul is formed of two distinct elements<sup>50</sup>—it is no longer simple and undivided, but com-

pounded of "Nature" and "Soul" (in the narrower sense).<sup>55</sup> In death these two elements separate and change into other forms. The soul having had its origin at a particular point in past time now perishes in time. Being capable of grief and subject to the destructive influence of the emotions it falls a victim at last to its own pains. Panaitios, while remaining a Stoic, taught the dissolution of the soul, its death and simultaneous destruction with the death of the body.<sup>56</sup>

His pupil Poseidonios, who as a writer possessed an even greater influence than Panaitios with the great majority of cultivated readers who belonged to no special school of thought, returned to the older Stoic doctrine of the simple and undivided nature of the soul as fiery breath. He distinguished three faculties but not three separate and independent elements in the human soul, and as a consequence of this view had no further need to believe in the dissolution of the soul into its component parts at death. He also denied the origin of the individual soul in time, from which the doctrine of its destruction in time had seemed to follow by a logical necessity. He returned to the old theological idea of the pre-existence of the soul, its life since the beginning of the created world; and could therefore go on to assert its continued existence after death—at least till the time of the next destruction of the World at the hands of omnipotent Fire.<sup>57</sup>

It was not an inward and private necessity that led to this transformation of the old teaching of the School. Doubts and criticisms levelled at it from outside—from the Sceptics in particular—had necessitated the change. While some gave up the struggle, others sought refuge in a re-arrangement of the figures of the dialectical game and by the introduction of fresh characters.<sup>58</sup> Immortality might be abandoned to criticism or reaffirmed in either case with equal indifference. The Platonic and poetic version of Stoicism provided by Poseidonios may have found a wider response among the readers of a highly cultivated society who felt the need of a doctrine of immortality more as a satisfaction to the artistic fancy than from any deeper or more temperamental causes. Cicero, the most eloquent representative of the Hellenized Roman culture of the time, may perhaps give us a picture of the refined and æsthetic partiality with which these ideas were taken up. In the *Dream of Scipio* and the first book of the *Tusculans*, he gives an account, mainly based on Poseidonios, of the belief then held of a continued life of the soul in the divine element of the Aether.<sup>59</sup>

## § 5

Stoicism had a long and vigorous life. More than ever during the first and second centuries of our era did it fulfil its real task of acting as a practical guide to conduct, not as a mere museum of dead erudition. It made good its claim to provide its adherents with the autonomous freedom and independence of a mind at peace with itself, whose virtue was proof against the tribulation and failure of life, and not corrupted by its plenty. It was not always blind imitation of a literary fashion or the love of displaying virtuous paradoxes that attracted the noblest of the higher Roman aristocracy to the doctrines of Stoicism. Not a few of them guided their lives in accordance with its principles and even died for their convictions. Not entirely "without tragic emotion", as the Stoic Emperor would prefer it, but at any rate with conscious and deliberate purpose—not in mere unreasoning stubbornness<sup>42</sup>—did these Stoic martyrs go to their death. Nor was it the unquestioned certainty of a continued life in a higher existence that made them so ready to give up life upon this earth.<sup>44</sup> Each in the special manner dictated to him by his own temperament and the circumstances of his life, they still speak to us, those leaders of Roman Stoicism—Seneca the philosophic director of the world's conscience, Marcus Aurelius the Emperor, and those instructors and patterns of the aspiring youth of Rome, Musonius and Epictetus. The eager and unswerving effort of these wise men to educate themselves to the attainment of freedom and peace, of purity and goodness of heart, wins our admiration—not least in the case of Seneca in whom the struggle for self-mastery and philosophic calm must have been a continual war with his own too-receptive and imaginative nature. But just as they looked for no supernatural helper and redeemer but trusted to the power of their own spirit for the assurance of success, so they required no promise of a future crowning of their labours in an after-life of the soul. The whole scope of their endeavour lies within the limits of this world. The old Stoic belief in the continued life of the individual soul until the annihilation of all separate creation in the World Conflagration<sup>46</sup> is regarded at the best as one possibility among many<sup>48</sup>—it is perhaps but a "beautiful dream".<sup>47</sup> But whether death is a transition to another form of being or a complete termination of individual life—to the wise man it is equally welcome, for he measures the value of life not by the number

of its years but by the richness of its content. At bottom Seneca is inclined to the view that death is the end of all things for man, after which "everlasting peace" awaits the restless spirit.<sup>61</sup>

The Stoic Emperor is uncertain whether death is a dissipation of the elements of the soul (as the atomists teach) or whether the mind survives in a conscious or an unconscious existence that must yet disappear eventually in the life of the Whole. All things are in perpetual flux—so the Law of the universe has willed it—nor shall the human personality maintain itself untouched and unchanged. But even supposing that death is a "putting out" of his small individual candle, the wise man is not afraid: to the melancholy that is the prevailing mood of his gentle, pure, and high-strung character Death, the annihilator, seems to beckon like a friend.<sup>62</sup>

The tougher spirit of the Phrygian slave and freedman needed no conviction of personal survival to enable him to face the battle of earthly life with courage and intrepidity. What has been made must be unmade: without hesitation and without regret the wise man gives himself up to the laws of the rationally-ordered universe in which the present must make way for the future—not indeed to be lost entirely, but to be changed and to merge its individuality, its unimportant self in new manifestations of the creative stuff of Life. The Whole does not perish, but its parts change and alter their relations among themselves.<sup>63</sup> The pantheistic principles of the school which had been taken over from Herakleitos and which made it permanently inconceivable that the diminutive individual spark of life could achieve a lasting separation from the central fiery mass, had become a settled conviction. The passionate abandonment of the personal, short-lived self to the everlasting Whole and One had become a fixed habit of mind. No longer did it seem intolerable that the individual existence should pass away after a brief span of life; it was possible to remain a Stoic and yet assert expressly, like Cornutus the teacher of Persius, that with the death of its body there is an end, too, of the individual soul.<sup>64</sup>

### § 8

The atomist doctrine renewed by Epicurus demanded in the most emphatic manner of its adherents that they should abandon the belief in personal survival.

For the atomist the soul is corporeal, a compound made

up of the most mobile of the atoms which form the plastic elements of air and fire. It occupies all parts of the body, and is held together by the body, while at the same time, and in spite of this, holding itself in essential distinctness from the body.<sup>71</sup> Epicurus also speaks of the "Soul" as a special and enduring substance within the body, a "part" of the corporeal, not a mere "harmony" resulting from the association of the parts of the body.<sup>72</sup> He even speaks of two parts or modes of manifestation in the "soul": the irrational, which holds the whole body in its sway as its vital force, and the rational, situated in the breast, which exercises will and intelligence and is the last and most essential source of life in living things, without the undivided presence of which death occurs.<sup>74</sup> *Anima* and *animus* (as Lucretius calls them), distinct but not separable from one another,<sup>75</sup> come into being in the embryo of man and grow to maturity, old age and decay, together with the body.<sup>76</sup> If death occurs it means that the atoms belonging to the body are separated and the soul-atoms withdrawn—even before the final dissolution of the body, the separable "soul" disappears. No longer held together by the body, it is blown away in the wind, it disappears "like smoke" in the air.<sup>77</sup> The soul, this soul that had animated the individual man, is no more.<sup>78</sup> The material elements of which it was composed are indestructible; it is quite possible that they may at some future time combine together with the life-stuff to produce new life and consciousness of exactly the same kind as had once been joined together in the living man. But, if so, it will be a new creature that thus comes into being: the original man has been annihilated by death; there is no bond of continuous consciousness uniting him with the fresh creation.<sup>79</sup> The vital forces of the world are continuous, undiminished, indestructible, but in the formation of the individual living creature they are only lent temporarily, for this occasion and for a brief period, after which they are withdrawn for ever from the particular creature. *Vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus res.*

After his death the individual is unaffected by the fate of his inanimate body; <sup>80</sup> nor should he be troubled by the thought of what may happen to the atoms of his soul. Death does not concern him at all; for he only is when death is not; where death is, he is no longer there.<sup>81</sup> Sensation and consciousness have left him at the dissolution of body and soul; what he cannot possibly feel affects him no longer. Epicurean maxims are never tired of driving home

this proposition: death is nothing to us.<sup>62</sup> From every possible direction, from abstract principle and practical experience in actual life, Lucretius labours to demonstrate the truth of this view<sup>63</sup> as ardently as other philosophers seek to prove its opposite. Physical science has no more valuable service to render than that of convincing us of its truth.<sup>64</sup> Just as the wisdom of Epicurus has no other purpose than to protect man, of all creatures the one most sensitive to pain, from distress and anguish—and even pleasure is but the removal of pain—so more particularly, in putting an end to the fear of death and the craving after unceasing life, it serves this finite life itself,<sup>65</sup> that is committed to us once and for all and never repeated.<sup>66</sup> If a man has once succeeded in realizing that he will cease to be in the very moment of death's coming, he will neither be oppressed with terror at the threatened loss of self-consciousness nor will the terrors of eternity<sup>67</sup> or the fabulous monsters of the spirit-world below the earth<sup>68</sup> darken his existence by casting their dark shadow over all his life.<sup>69</sup> He will devote himself to life without repining, neither fearing death nor seeking it.<sup>70</sup>

He alone—the ideal Wise Man of the Epicurean faith—will know how to live as the true artist of his own life;<sup>71</sup> he will not waste the precious time in vain preparations for the future,<sup>72</sup> but will cram every moment to the full so that his brief span of existence will have all that a long life could give. Long life, in fact, even life without an end, would not make him any happier or any richer. What life has to offer it has already offered—anything further must only be a repetition of what has gone before: *eodem sunt omnia semper*.<sup>73</sup> The Wise Man has no reason even to look for an eternity of life.<sup>74</sup> In his own personality, in this present "now", he possesses all the conditions necessary to happiness. The very transience of this supreme happiness to which mortality can attain makes it seem the more valuable to him. To the development and the enjoyment of this, the only life that belongs to him he will devote himself exclusively. In ethical matters, too, the atomist doctrine holds good. There is no such thing in nature as an essential community of human beings—still less of humanity—there are only individuals.<sup>75</sup> In associations entered into by free and unforced choice the individual may attach himself to the individual as one friend to another; but the political societies that men have invented and set up among themselves have no obligations for the Wise Man. He is himself the centre and indeed the whole circumference of the world surrounding

him. State and society are valuable, and indeed only exist for the protection of the individual and to make it possible for him under their enfolding care to develop his own personality in freedom.<sup>96</sup> The individual, on the other hand, does not exist for the state, but for himself. "It is no longer necessary to save the Hellenes or to win crowns of victory from them in contests of wisdom."<sup>97</sup> Such is the decision reached with a sigh of relief by a civilization that has attained the highest point of its development and is now overcome by a lassitude in which it no longer sets itself new tasks, but takes its ease as age may be permitted to do. In its lassitude it no longer hopes, and in all honesty no longer cares, to extend the period of its existence beyond the limits of this earthly life. Calm and untroubled it sees this life, dear though it may once have been, fade away, taking its leave and sinking into nothingness without a struggle.



# NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV

## PART I

<sup>1</sup> At first the philosophy of Plato's old age lived on in spirit in the Academy. Just as his pupils carried on his Pythagorean speculations about numbers, reduced his imaginative suggestions as to a daemonic nature intermediate between that of God and man to pedantic system, and elaborated the theological strain in his thought to a gloomy and burdensome *deisdaimonia* (witness esp. the *Epinomis* of Philippos of Opus and in addition all that we know of Xenokrates' speculations)—so too they retained and respected for a time the Platonic doctrine of the soul and the ascetic tendency in his ethical teaching. For Philippos of Opus the aim of all human endeavour is a final and blessed emancipation from this world (which, however, is only possible for a few of those who are, in his special manner, "wise"—573 C ff., 992 C). He is a mystic for whom this earth and its life fall away into nothing: all serious interest is confined to the contemplation of divine things such as are revealed in mathematics and astronomy. Again, the Platonic doctrine of the soul, in its mystic and world-renouncing sense, lies at the bottom of the fabulous narratives of Herakleides Pontikos (in the *Ἰατρικὰ*, *Ἐπειροδύμους*, etc.). This, too, accounts for the youthful attempts in this direction of Aristotle himself (in the *Ἠθικά* and probably also in the *Περὶ γεννητῶν*). This side of his doctrine was as it seems systematized from the standpoint of the latest stage of Platonism by Xenokrates in particular. It may be merely accident that we do not hear very reliably of anything indicating an ascetic tendency or an "other-worldly" effort after emancipation of the soul in connexion with Xenokrates. Krantor (in his much-read book *περὶ φιλοσοφίας*) was already capable of employing the Platonic doctrine of the soul and the imaginative fancies that could be attached to it simply as a literary adornment. And before him his teacher Polemon betrays a turning aside from the true Platonic mysticism. With Arkesilaos the last vestige of this whole type of thought disappears completely.

<sup>2</sup> *τοὺς θεοὺς ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ὅτι τὰς ἀρετὰς ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ οὐδὲν ἂν εὐχόμεθα εὐχαρῆσαι*, Arist., *Meta.* 1075a, 19 (in maxima fortuna minima licentia est, Sall., C. 51, 13). Freedom in this sense indeed was a thing of the past.

<sup>3</sup> Not that such hopes or fears were entirely absent. The reader will remember the case of Kleombrotos of Ambrakia (Call., *Ep.* 25), who by reading the *Phaedo* of Plato (and completely misunderstanding the meaning of the prophet, as not unfrequently happens) was led to seek an immediate entrance into the life of the other world by a violent break with this one—and committed suicide. This is an isolated example of a mood to which Epikteitos bears witness as common in his own much later time—the desire felt by many young men of ardent temperament to escape from the distracted life of humanity and return as quickly as possible to the universal life of God by the destruction of their own individual existence: Epict., I. 9, 11 ff. But in the earlier period such violent manifestations of other-worldly fanaticism were of rare occurrence. Hedonism was

capable of leading to the same result as we may see from the *Ἀποκαταστάσις* of Hegesias the Cyrenaic, called *ὁ νεκροβύτης*, whom Cicero mentions together with this same Klesimbrotos: *TD.* i. 83-4.

<sup>2</sup> τὸ σῶμα πως τῆς ψυχῆς ἔστιν (γάρναι), ὡς ὁ πύλον τῆς πύλης ἔστιν—and not vice versa: *PA.* i. 5, 845b, 19.

<sup>3</sup> The ψυχὴ is related to the body as ὁπία is to the οὖν, i.e. as the effective power residing in the ὄργανον (not like ὁρμητήρ, the individual act of vision). It is the ἐκείνη ἀπελόμενα of its body *de An.* ii. 1, 412a, 27. There is no σύνθεσις of σῶμα and ψυχὴ; they are simply "together" like the wax and the ball formed out of the wax: *Top.* 131a, 20 ff.; *GA.* 729b, 8 ff.; *de An.* 412b, 7.

<sup>4</sup> ἀπελθεύοντες γὰρ (τῆς ψυχῆς) οὐκ ἐστὶν ζῆλον ἔσθαι, οὐδὲ τῶν μορίων οὐδὲν τὸ πρὸς ἀξίανται, πλὴν τῷ σχήματι μένον καθάπερ τὰ μεθεστέρεα λυθωθεῖαι, *PA.* 841a, 18.

<sup>5</sup> *Meta.* 1028a, 5: καὶ ψυχῆς ἔστιν θεωρεῖναι τὸ φαντασθῆναι, ὅτι μὴ ἔντο τῆς αἰσῆς ἐστίν.—οὐδὲ γὰρ γὰρ πρὸς ψυχὴ φύσις, ἀλλὰ τι μέρος αἰσῆς, *PA.* 841b, 9. The subject of τὸ μακροβύτιον of the soul is studied by ὁ πρῶτος φιλόσοφος: *de An.* 403b, 18.

<sup>6</sup> λόγος δὲ νοῦν, ὃ διακρίνεται καὶ ἀπολαμβάνεται ὁ ψυχῆ, *de An.* 429a, 23.

<sup>7</sup> The νοῦς and its θεωρητικὴ δύναμις δοκεῖ ψυχῆς γένεσι ἵσταται εἶναι καὶ πῶς μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ αἶμα τοῦ φέροντος, τὸ δὲ λουὴ μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἐστὶ χωριστὸν πλ., *de An.* 413b, 25.

<sup>8</sup> There can be no doubt that Aristotle's opinion was that νοῦς was uncreated and existed without beginning from eternity: see Zeller, *Stoic. Phil.* A. 1882, p. 1033 ff.

<sup>9</sup> εἰσέρχεται ἐκτελεῖται into the man as he is being made, *GA.* 736b, 28; cf. ὁ θάραξεν νοῦς, 744b, 21.

<sup>10</sup> νοῦς is ἀπρόθετος, ἀσυνετός, οὐ μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς—it has no physical ὄργανον, *de An.* iii. 4. οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ (τοῦ νοῦ) τῇ ἐνέργειᾳ κοινωνοῦσιν σωματικῇ ἐνέργειᾳ, *GA.* 736b, 28.

<sup>11</sup> μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, *de An.* 429a, 10 ff. ψυχὴ πᾶς ἄρα, ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς γινώσκῃ, 429a, 28. ὁ νοῦς . . . μὴ πᾶς ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς, *Meta.* 1070a, 28.

<sup>12</sup> The ζῆλον α. μακροβ. δύναμις, *Phys.* 252b, 26.

<sup>13</sup> νοῦς, θεοτέραν τι καὶ ἀκαθάρτη, *de An.* 408b, 29.—τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ εἶναι μέρος, *GA.* 736b, 28 (737a, 10). εἴτα θεῶν δὲ εἶναι τῶν δὲ ἡμῶν τὸ θεότατον, *EN.* 1177a, 15. νοῦς is τὸ συγκρινόμενον to the gods, 1178a, 29.—τὰ ἀνθρώπων γένος ὁ μέρος μετέχει τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ἡμῶν γινώσκων ζῆλον ὁ μέγιστος πάντων, *PA.* 656a, 7.

<sup>14</sup> ὄργανον τοῦ θεωτεῖναι τὸ νοῦν καὶ φαντασθῆναι, *PA.* 836a, 28.

<sup>15</sup> *Meta.* A 7, 9.

<sup>16</sup> *EN.* 1178b, 7-22; *Coel.* 292b, 4 ff.

<sup>17</sup> So too ἐκτελεῖται τὸ νοῦν καὶ φαντασθῆναι τὸ μέρος ὁ νοῦς, *de An.* 429a, 7.

<sup>18</sup> ἀγγάνειν is the term often applied to the activity of νοῦς, i.e. a simple and indivisible act of apperceiving the ἀσύνθετα. This act not being composite (of subject and predicate), like judgment, leaves no room for error: the act simply occurs or does not occur—ἀληθὲς or ψεῦδος does not enter into the question with it. *Meta.* 1051b, 18-26 (ἀγγάνειν, 24-5), 1027b, 21.

<sup>19</sup> τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ γυναικώτερον καὶ πρότερον καὶ αἷμα τοῦ συμπερόμετος, *An. Po.* i. 2. Tὸ ἀμείνων ἐπιστήμη ἀκατάσκευτος (72b, 19) belongs to νοῦς. There is only a νοῦς—not an ἐπιστήμη (as being a ἴδιον ἀκατάσκευτος, *EN.* 1139b, 31)—τῶν ἀρχῶν, τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστήμης, *EN.* vi. 6. Thus also νοῦς is ἐπιστήμη ἀρχῆς, *An. Po.* 100b, 5-17. τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀρετῶν καὶ πρᾶγμα νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος, *EN.* 1143b, 1 (cf. *MM.* 1197a, 20 ff.).



<sup>14</sup> It is only as an argumentum ad hominem that the view is suggested on one occasion, that βέλτιον τῷ πῶ καὶ μετὰ σώματος εἶναι (καθάρως εἶναι τὸ λῆγεσθαι καὶ πολλοῖς συνδυασι), *de An.* 407b, 4.

<sup>15</sup> *EN.* x, 7-9.—Θαυσι ἡ φιλοσοφία θεωρητικῆς ἔχοντες ἔχον καθάρως καὶ τῷ βέλτερον. εὐλογον δὲ τοὺς εἰδότες τῶν ἡγετανῶν ἥβια τὴν θεωρητικὴν εἶναι, 1177a, 28. The εὐφρόν requires no σύνεργον (as the σώματος and the δεισιφρόν do), and is εὐμαρτέστερος in himself. The activity of νόος is the most valuable as being θεωρητικῆς and because war' αὐτῇ οὐδέποτε ἐφίσταται τέλος. A sufficiently long life of the theoretic activity of νόος is τελεία εὐδαιμονία ἀνθρώπων—indeed, this is no longer an ἀνθρώπινος βίος, but rather υπέρτατος ἢ κατ' ἀθρώπων—α θεῶς βίος as νόος θεῶν τι ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὑπάρχει. Therefore man must not ἀνθρώπων φρονεῖν but εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανάτῳ (be immortal already in this life) καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ εἶναι κατὰ τὴν κρείσσειον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ (1177b, 31 ff.). This τελεία εὐδαιμονία, as a θεωρητικῆς ἐνέργεια, brings the thinkers near to the gods whose life does not consist in πράξεις (not even virtuous) or ποιῆν but in pure θεωρία, and this can be so with the life of man (alone among the ζῷα) εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται τὴν τῆς ποιήσεως (θεωρητικῆς) ἐνεργείας ὑπόθεσιν (1178b, 7-32). Nowhere do we meet with so much as the shadow of an idea that the εὐδαιμονία of the θεωρητικῆς βίος can only become τελεία in "another" world, or is conceivable as existing elsewhere than in the life on earth. The only condition for τελεία εὐδαιμονία that is made is μέγας βίος τέλειον (1177b, 28)—nothing lying outside or beyond this life. The θεωρητικῆς βίος has its complete and final development here upon earth.—τέλειος βίος is mentioned as necessary for the obtaining of εὐδαιμονία, *EN.* 1100a, 8; 1101a, 16. But εὐδαιμονία is completely confined within the limits of earthly life; to call a dead man εὐδαίμονα would be γελοῖως ὀρεσθαι, for he lacks the ἐνέργεια which is the essence of εὐδαιμονία—only a mere shadow of sensation can belong to the νεκρούμενος (almost the Homeric conception) 1100a, 11-29; 1101a, 22-b, 9.—Since it is impossible for the individual to enjoy an unending permanence and share in τὸ αἰὲ καὶ θῖον, it follows that the continuation of the individual after death consists only in the continuance of the αἶθερ—not of the αἰὲς (which perishes) but only of the αἰὲρ αἶθερ which persists in the series of creatures propagated on earth: *de An.* 415a, 28-b, 7; *GA.* 731a, 24-b, 1. (Borrowed from the observations of Plato, *Sym.* 206 C-207 A; cf. also *Lg.* 721 C, 773 E; *Philo.* *Incr.* *Μυστ.* 8, ii, p. 495 M., after *Κριταλαος*.) It was much easier for Aristotle to take this conception seriously than it was for Plato with his particular outlook; only for the passing requirements of his dialogue does Plato adopt the Heraklitean view and expand it: see above, chap. xi, n. 18.

<sup>16</sup> εἶμαι δὲ τοῦ γενέσθαι τὸ εἶναι καὶ φρονεῖν ἀφαιρεθῆναι οὐ βίον ἀλλὰ χρόνον εἶναι τῆς ἀθανασίας, *Plu., Is. et Os.* i, fin., p. 351 E. Origen (*Cels.* iii, 80, p. 359 Lom.) draws a clear distinction between the ἀθανασία τῆς ψυχῆς of Platonic doctrine and the Stoic εὐδαίμονος τῆς ψυχῆς on the one hand—and this Aristotelian doctrine of the τὸ κατ' ἀθρώπου: οἱ νοιοῦντες περὶ τοῦ θάνατος καὶ οἱ ἀθανάτων (Barnes' Ed.) καὶ μέντοι (κατὰ Eald.) θεωροῦντες (= βίον) ζῆσαντες (—this is how the passage should be read).

<sup>17</sup> Theophrastus discussed (by the method of ἀναγὰς fashionable with the school) the obscurities and difficulties inherent in the doctrine of νόος, particularly of the reduplicated νόος, the νοητικὸς and the νοητικῆς. True to his character, however, he adheres to the fixed dogmas of his school of the νόος χωριστῶς which ζῆσαντες αὐ καὶ δῶσαντες.

*diōphros* is *ἐκαστὸν αἰσθητικόν* with man and being *ἀσώματος* is also *ἀθάνατος*: *Frag.* 83b, p. 226 ff.; 83, p. 178 Wism. (*θρησκία* belongs to *νόος*, *θυμὸς* *καὶ αἰσθητικόν*, and is therefore without *ἀθάνατον*, *fr.* 12, § 26). The *νόος* is *ὑπερθεὶς τῷ σώματι* [*τῆς ψυχῆς*] *καὶ ἀθάνατος*, *fr.* 53. To the *νόος* and its *θρησκία* we must suppose the word *ἀσώματος* *ἐκαστὸν* *θεῶν* to refer—for this is the teaching of *Thphr.* also: [*Jol.* *Or.* vi, p. 165 A.) Nowhere is there any indication that for him the immortality of *νόος* had the slightest importance for this life and its conduct. Nor has it any in the ethical doctrine of the very theologically inclined *Eudemos*. Here the aim of life—the *ἀρετὴν* *ζήσαν* which is *αὐταρκατεία*—is said to be *τὸ κατὰ θεοῦ θρησκία* which is carried on by the *νόος*, *τὸ δὲ κατὰ θεοῦ*, 1248a, 27; in this process it is best *ἀσώματος* *ἐκαστὸν* *θεῶν* *κατὰ θεοῦ* *νόος* *τῆς ψυχῆς*, 1249b, 22. For the sake of *τὸ ὑπερθεὶς* man wishes *τὸ κατὰ θεοῦ*, 1245a, 9—but upon earth and in the body: there is no thought of the other world. (This would have been quite natural and to be expected of this semi-theological thinker who, e.g. speaks quite seriously of the separability of *νόος* from the *σώμα*—the *κατὰ θεοῦ* *νόος* *τῆς ψυχῆς*—in bodily life and of its higher intuition in *ἐκστασεις* and veracious dreaming: 1214a, 23; 1225a, 24; 1248a, 40.)—To this first generation of Peripatetics belong also *Aristoxenos* and *Dikaiarchos* who did not recognise any peculiar substance of the "soul" apart from the "harmony" brought about by the mixture of bodily material. *Dik. ἀρμονίαν τῆς αἵτης ἐκστατικῆς* *τῆς ψυχῆς*: *Atticus* ap. *Eum.*, *PE.* xv, 810 A. *Aristox.* and *Dik.* *nullum omnino animum esse dixerunt* *Cic.* *TD.* i, 51; 21; 41, etc.; *Dik.* (in the *Λογιστικὴ* *ἀγωγή*) expressly controverted the doctrine of immortality, *TD.* i, 77. (It remains very remarkable that *Dik.* who naturally knew nothing of a *separabilis animus*, *TD.* i, 21, nevertheless, believed not merely in *madic* dreams—that would be just intelligible, *ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἀγνοῦν*, *Arist.*, *P. Nat.* 482b 5.—but also in the prophetic power of *ἐκστατικῆς*, *Cic.*, *Div.* i, 5; 113; *Deor.* 418a, which invariably presupposes the dogma of a special substance of the "soul" and its separability from the body.)—*Straton* "the naturalist" (*d.* 270), for whom the soul is an undivided force, inseparable from the body and the *αἰσθητικόν*, gave up completely the belief in the *νόος* *κατὰ θεοῦ* of Aristotle: he cannot possibly have held any doctrine of immortality in any form or under any limitations.—Then follows the period of pure scholarship when the Peripatetic school almost gave up philosophy. With the return to the study of the master's writings (from the time of *Aristonikos*) they gained a new lease of life. The problems of the parts of the soul, the relation of *νόος* to the soul (and to the *νόος* *κατὰ θεοῦ*) were discussed once more. It became more and more common, however, to set aside the *νόος* *κατὰ θεοῦ* *ζήσαν* (cf. the definition of the soul given by *Andronikos* ap. *Galen* v. 7. *τῆς ψυχῆς* *φύσις*, iv, 782 f., K.; *Theophr.*, *de An.* ii, 58, 11; 58, 8 Sp.). This meant the denial of immortality (which belonged to *νόος* only): e.g. by *Boethios*: *Simp.*, *de An.* p. 247, 24 ff. *Hayd.* (*Sto. Vol.* iii, 267 Arn.). A different view again, and one which even went beyond Aristotle, was held by *Kratippos*, the contemporary of *Boethios*: *Cic.*, *Div.* i, 70; cf. 5; 113. *Alexander* of *Aphrodisias* the great *ἐκστατικῆς* absolutely banished the *νόος* *κατὰ θεοῦ* from the human soul. (This is the divine *νόος*, which is perpetually *νόος* and *κατὰ θεοῦ* *ἐκστατικῆς*, and that, too, already *κατὰ θεοῦ* *κατὰ θεοῦ* by the *ἐκστατικῆς* *νόος* of man. It enters into the latter *ἐκστατικῆς*—though not locally, for it is incapable of change of place, p. 113, 18 f.—with the individual act of *νόος* by the *νόος* *ἐκστατικῆς*, but it never becomes a *μῆκος* *καὶ ἀθάνατος* *τῆς* *ἐκστατικῆς*

ἐμμένει ψυχῇ: Alex. de An., p. 107-B; p. 90 Br.). For him *voûs* is *χωρικός* and *ἀθάνατος*, *ἀκράτης*, etc., whereas the human soul exactly like the *εἶδος* of its *σώμα* from which it is *ἐχωρικός* perishes at death together with its *σῶμα* *ἐλκός*, completely: *συνεβέβαιον τῷ σώματι*, de An., p. 21, 22 f.; p. 90, 16 f. The individual soul thus perishes: the imperishable *voûs* had not communicated itself to the individual. —The indestructibility of the individual *voûs* of man (and this was indubitably what Aristotle himself taught), a doctrine derived not from experience but from pure logical inference, had in reality no serious significance for the general teaching of the Peripatetics so long as they preserved their independence. Finally, indeed, they too were swallowed up in the ferment of Neoplatonism.

<sup>21</sup> *ἔτις, φύσις, λόγος, ψυχὴ, ψυχὴ λόγον ἔχουσα καὶ διδόντα*, Plu., *Virt. Mor.*, 431 BC and A. Through all these and all things in which these are—*ἔτις καὶ ὁ νοῦς*, D.L., vii, 138 f. [ii, p. 192 Arn.]

<sup>22</sup> Our soul an *ἐνσώματον* of the *εὐφυὲς* *νόμος*, D.L., vii, 143 [ii, 191 Arn.]. We often find the soul of man called an *ἐνσώματον τοῦ θεοῦ* (*θεός*), *θεὸς ἐνσώματος, ἐνθρόνους* (see Gataker on M. Ant., pp. 48, 211; Ed. 1852)—and often even *θεός* (see Bombäcker, *Epictet. u. d. Stoic.*, p. 76 l.).

<sup>23</sup> (*ἡ ψυχὴ*) *ἀραιότερον πνεῦμα τῆς φύσεως καὶ λεπτομέρεστερον* . . . Chrysipp., ap. Mu., *Stoic. Rep.* 41, p. 1052 F [u, 222 Arn.]. "Nature" is *πνεῦμα* that has become moist, soul the subtle *πνεῦμα* which has remained dry (Galen, *iv*, 783 f. K. [p. 216 Arn.]).

<sup>24</sup> The *βρίθος* is created as a *φύσις*, and only afterwards becomes a *ζῷον* by *περίσφυξις* (derivation of *ψυχὴ* hence!). Chrysipp., ap. Plu., *Stoic. Rep.*, 1052 F [p. 222 Arn.]. Thus comes in *φύσεως ψυχὴ*, Plu., *Prim. Eng.* ii, p. 948 C.

<sup>25</sup> It would almost be possible to employ the semi-Stoic language of Philo to describe the soul as conceived by this Stoic Pantheism: *τῆς θείας ψυχῆς ἐνσώματον ὃ ἐμπεριέει (τίμμεται γὰρ οὐδὲν τοῦ θεοῦ κατ' ἐνσώματον, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκείνισται)*, Q. Drl. *Pet. Insid.*, 24, 1, p. 209 M. But in orthodox Stoic doctrine the idea prevails that the individual *ἐνσώματιστα* are completely detached from the universal *θεῖον*—but at the same time without denial of ultimate connexion with the "All" and the "One".

<sup>26</sup> Acc. to the older Stoic doctrine as systematized by Chrysippus the soul is absolutely simple and unified, having sprung from the universal Reason of God which contains no *λόγος*. Its impulses (*ἄρμω*) must on this view be rational) just as much as its willed decisions (*κρίσεις*): it is affected from without by *δαίμεις*, which, being itself a development of the highest reason, God, can only be good and rational. It is quite impossible to conceive how, on the principles of the older Stoicism, erroneous judgment or excessive and evil impulses could arise. *ἡ τῶν κακίων γένεσις* is rendered unintelligible as Poseidonius maintains in opposition to the subtle observations of Chrysipp., on this head (see Schmekel, *Phil.* d. mittl. Stoa, p. 327 B.).

<sup>27</sup> *ἀποδοῦναι τῷ φύσει ζῷον* (but our *φύσις* are *μέρη* τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ), i.e. in harmony with the words: *ἵμενος ὅπως εὐρίν ὁ ἀρθεὶς λόγος ὁ θεὸς πάντων ἀρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὡν τῷ θεῷ, καθ' ἡγεμονίαν πάντων τῆς τῶν ὅλων διακρίσεως ἐστίν*, Chrysipp., ap. D.L., vii, 87-8 [iii, 3 Arn.]. This obedience to the rational order and governance of the world—the *δένειν ἑαυτῷ*, Sen., *V.B.*, 15, 3; *Ep.* 18, 5; *Πυκθῆναι θεῷ*, Epict. i, 12, 6, etc.—is more often regarded as a passive attitude of self-abandonment adopted consciously and with *συγκατάθεσις*: *πρὸς μοι λόγῳ εἰς ὃ ἐν θέλῃ, ἀπογνησκοντά σοι, σὺς εἰμι καὶ, Epict. ii, 16, 42. θέλω γίνεσθαι τῷ*

νόμῳ αὐτῷ θέλει, καὶ ἐπιφέρει (this sounds very like "make God's will your own will"), Ench. 8. Much the same idea occurs already in the lines of Kleantes *ὅπου δὲ μ' ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ἐν γ' ὁ Περσέμενος καλῶ* [i. 118 Arn.]. But such "affirmation of the universe", understood in the full pantheistic sense (cf. Kleantes τὴν κοινὴν μένιν ἐκδέχεται φέρει ὃ θεὶ ἀποκαυθεῖν, *οὐδὲν δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ μένους*, D.L. vii. 89 [i. 136 Arn.]), could not lead to an ethical teaching of active character and concrete substance.

<sup>41</sup> The *νόμος* is *νόμος ἀνθρώπων*: *οὐκ ἐστὶν γὰρ τῇ ἀλευθέρῳ ἐξουσίᾳ ἀνθρωπίνῃ*, D.L. vii. 121. Laws and constitutions do not apply to him: Cic., *Ac. Pri.* ii. 136.

<sup>42</sup> Enemies and strangers are *πρὸς σπουδαίους* to one another—*καὶ αἱμὴ καὶ φίλοι αὐτοῖσι αὐτοῖσιν μένου*. Zenon, *ἐν τῇ Πιολυσεῖ*, ap. D.L. vii. 32-3 [i. 54 Arn.].

<sup>43</sup> *ὁ παρ' ἐκείνῳ δαίμων* which one must keep in harmony *πρὸς τὴν αὐτῷ τῷ δαίμονι ἑοικέντος βουλῆν*, D.L. vii. 88, after Chrysipp. [ii. 6 Arn.]. In the later Stoic literature, the only part of it which has come down to us, we often hear of this *δαίμων* of the individual—*sacer intra nos spiritus* (Sen., *Epist.*, M. Ant.: see Donhäuser, *Epikd.* 83). It is generally spoken of in language that seems to regard it as something *separable* from the man or his soul, including the *ἡγεμονικόν*: *Ζεὺς παρὶθεν ἐκείνῳ ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ἐκείνου δαίμονα καὶ παρὶθεν ἐκείνου ἐστὶν αὐτῷ καλῶ*, Epict. i. 14, 12; *ὁ δαίμων ἐν ἐκείνῳ σπασσέντος καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἴδμεν*, M. Ant. v. 27. *ἀδύνατον τὸ δαίμονα*, Epict. iii. 22, 53 (one can ask questions of it, as Sokrates did of his *δαίμων*, as something other and different from oneself). This *δαίμων* then does not seem to be simply identifiable with the "soul" of man like the *daimon* in man of which the *theologians* speak. It is conceived and spoken of in language that suggests rather the "protecting spirit" of a man as known to popular belief (cf. now Usener, *Götternamen*, 294 ff.). *ἀνὴρ δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρεστὴς τῷ θεῷ γενομένης μεταγωγῆς τοῦ βίου*, Menand. 550 K. (where the idea of two daimonic partners in the life of man is already rejected: Eukleides Soer. had spoken of such, cf. Censor., *D.N.* iii. 3, and in a different way again Phocyl., *fr.* 15). Plato himself speaks (with a *δαίμων*) of the *δαίμων* *ὅστις ἕλπει εὐλόγηται* (and guides the departed soul into Hades): *Phd.* 107 D. The idea, however, must have been much older: it appears fairly clearly expressed in Pindar's words, *O. xiii.* 28 (*Ζεὺς πάτερ*), *Βαρυμέντος εἶδεν δαίμονος εἶδος*, where the transition to the meaning "fate" for the word *δαίμων* has not yet been completed. Later (with the Tragedians and other poets) this use became very common, but even then still presupposes the belief in such personal daimonic partners in the life of man: the use would have been quite impossible otherwise. (*δαίμων* = *πάρος*, Pl., *P.* v. 121 f., and already in Thgn. 161, 163. When Herakleitos says *ἔσθ' ἀδελφίῳ δαίμονι*, *fr.* 121 Hy., 119 D. he uses *δαίμων* in the sense of fortune in life. The word means both *ἔσθ'* and condition of life at the same time in Pl., *Ap.* 817 E, *οὐδ' ὅμως δαίμων λήθεται. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ δαίμονος ἀρπάζεται*, where the derivation of the metaphorical use of the word *δαίμων* from a belief in a special *daimon* belonging to the individual man can still be seen plainly. See also [Lys.] *Epist.* (2), 78. But the metaphorical use comes as early as *Θ* 106, *πάρος τοῦ δαίμονα δαίμων* = *πάρος ἀφ' ὧν*.)—The personal existence of the *daimon* is still far removed from all danger of such abstraction in a very remarkable case: in Halkarameos Poseidonios and his *ἐργον* decide that on the first day of the month they will offer *δαίμονα* *ἀγαθῷ Ποσειδωνίου* . . . *πρῶτον* (Gr. Ins. in Br. Mus.

iv, 1, n. 889, p. 70, l. 35. The *imcr.* seems to date from the third century B.C.). Here then offering is made to the *dyadē daimōn* (see above, chap. v, n. 133) of the *living*, just as offering was made on birth-days, and at other times also, to the *genius* of Romans; *dy. 2.* is here clearly equivalent to *genius*. Apollo whose advice had been sought at his oracle had expressly enjoined (*ib.*, l. 9) . . . *τιμὴν καὶ ἰδωσάμεναι καὶ ἀπαθὲν δαίμονα* *Προσθήμενος καὶ Γόργυος* (the latter, P.'s mother, seems to have been already dead: l. 34).—This special *daimōn* attached to individuals with whom it can be contrasted (as Brutus can be with his *daimōn* *mundi*: *Plu., Brut.* 36) is distinct from the individual's *ψυχή*, though it is natural to suppose that it may have arisen from the projection of the *ψυχή*—conceived as very independent—outside the man himself, in which it would again resemble the Roman *genius*. (The daimonic *φύλαξ* of *Healed* [cf. above, p. 67 ff.], belong to quite a different range of ideas.) At any rate the Stoics had this analogous popular conception in mind when they spoke of the *εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαίμων* as something different from the man himself and his *ὑπερμαρτίαι*. They use it, however, only as a figure of speech. The *daimōn* of the individual really means for them "the original, ideal personality as contrasted with the empirical personality" (as Bonhöffer very rightly puts it: *Epikt.* 84)—the character the man already is ideally but must become actually (*γίνεσθαι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν* . . .). Thus the *daimōn* is distinct from the *ψυχή* (*ἡδυσία*) and yet identical with it. It is a semi-allegorical play upon the idea of the *daimōn* as individual *genius* and at the same time as crown or summit of the human personality—just as Plato had used the word already incidentally, *Tom.* 90 A. Finally—for the Stoics did not seriously wish to establish the existence of an independent protecting deity that enters man from without and rules over him—the *ὑπερμαρτίαι* is the same as the *daimōn*. Thus in *M. Ant.* iv, 27, the *daimōn* is completely identical with the *ἐνδωκεῖσθαι ἑαυτῷ*, and the *ἐνδωκεῖσθαι καὶ λόγος* (cf. also iii, 3 *fin.*; ii, 13; 17; iii, 7. *τὸν ἑαυτοῦ νοῦν καὶ δαίμονα*). The fact, however, that this *ἐνδωκεῖσθαι καὶ ἑαυτῷ* can be called a *daimōn* bears witness to a tendency to conceive the soul-spirit as something independent and more cut off and separated from the common and original source of divinity than was possible for Stoic pantheism of the stricter sort (to which the terms *ἐνδωκεῖσθαι*, *ἐκδωκεῖσθαι* *καὶ ἑαυτῷ* were more apt). A decided approximation was thus made to the theological idea of the "soul" as an individual daimon which persists in its separate existence. To this view Pseudo-Dionysius went over completely: he regards the individual *daimōn* that lives in man as *εὐνομένης ὡς τῷ τῷ δαίμονι καὶ λογισμῷ* (*Pom. ap. Gal.* v, 409), and no longer as the dependent *ἐνδωκεῖσθαι* of the latter, but as one of many independent and individually characterized spirits that have lived from all time in the air and enter into man at birth. (See Bonhöffer, *Epikt.* 79-80, and also Schmeidel, *Phil. d. mittl. Stoa*, 249 ff., 256.)

<sup>42</sup> *ὁ δὲ δαίμων δὲν χυμώμενος ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι* . . . Chrysipp. *ap. Nemes., NH.*, p. 81 *Matth.*; Zeno and Chrysipp. *ap. Tert., Adv.* 5 (ii, 219 *Arm.*).

<sup>43</sup> Everything comes into being and perishes, including the gods, *ὁ δὲ Ζεὺς μὲν αὖτε ὅτις δὲν*, Chrysipp. *ap. Plu., Sto. Rep.* 38, p. 1052 A; *Comm. Not.* 31, p. 1075 A ff. (ii, 309 *Arm.*).—*ἐνδωκεῖσθαι* but not *ἐκδωκεῖσθαι* of the human soul (*ib.*, 223).

<sup>44</sup> *Κλεισθένες πῶς οὐ νόμος (τὸς φύξαις) ἐπιλαμβάνεται (ἄδην) μέγας τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, Ἰππικῶν δὲ τῶν τῶν νομῶν μόνων*, D.L. vii, 157.



A statement often repeated without mention of the two authorities: Arius Did. ap. Eus., *PE.* 15, 20, 6, p. 822 A (the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\alpha\iota$  τῶν ἀφάντων καὶ ἀλόγων ζῶντα perish immediately with the death of the body, C) and others (ii, 223 Arn.). Chrysippus' doctrine comes also in Tac., *Ag.* 46, si ut sapientibus placet non cum corpore extinguntur magnae animae (cf.  $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\lambda\upsilon\varsigma$   $\psi\upsilon\chi\alpha\iota$ , Pl., *Def. Or.* 18, p. 419 f.); cf. omnium quidem animas immortales esse sed fortunas bonorumque divinos, Cic., *Leg.* ii, 27, not quite accurately put.

<sup>11</sup> The ἀσθενέστερα  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  (ἀδύ  $\delta\epsilon$  δυν. τῶν ἀκαθάρτων) perishes sooner,  $\eta$   $\delta\epsilon$   $\iota\sigma\chi\upsilon\sigma\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha$ , εἰς ἐντὶ καὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς remains μέγα  $\tau\eta\varsigma$  δυνάμεως, (Pl., *Phaed.* 103a, 4, 7 ap. Dov. 390a).

<sup>12</sup> The predominance of the materialistic point of view is remarkable in those Stoics who acc. to Seneca, *Ep.* 57, 2, existimant animam hominis magno pondere extrinseci permanere non posse et statim spargi, quia non fuerit illi exitus liber (which reminds us of the popular belief that the soul of one who has died in a high wind εὐθεὶς διασπύσσεται καὶ ἀνέμῳ, Pl., *Phaed.* 70 A, 80 D; see above, chap. xiii, n. 8).

<sup>13</sup> οὐ τὸ σῶμα τὰς  $\psi\upsilon\chi\alpha\varsigma$  ἀνέχει ἀλλ' αἱ  $\psi\upsilon\chi\alpha\iota$  τὸ σῶμα,  $\iota\sigma\chi\upsilon\sigma\alpha\iota$  καὶ  $\eta$   $\epsilon\delta\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha$  καὶ  $\iota\sigma\chi\upsilon\sigma\alpha\iota$  καὶ τὸ  $\delta\epsilon\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma$   $\sigma\pi\alpha\sigma\epsilon\iota$ , Posidon., ap. Ach. Tat., *Isag.*, p. 133 E Petav., borrowed from Arist. (*de An.* I, 5, 411b, 7), but a thoroughly Stoic idea as contrasted with Epicurean doctrine (see Heinze, *Xenokrates*, 103 f.).

<sup>14</sup> S.E., *M.* ix, 71-3. The naive but quite plain statements go back to Posid., as has often been pointed out (e.g. by Corsen, *de Pos. Rhod.*, p. 45, 1878, and others). So, too, do the similar remarks in Cic., *TD.* i, 42. Posid., does not appear to be uttering heterodox opinions in this case, so far as we can see.

<sup>15</sup> καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὰς  $\psi\upsilon\chi\alpha\varsigma$   $\iota\sigma\chi\upsilon\sigma\alpha\iota$  ὑποφῶσκει κάτω φεροντας.  $\lambda\epsilon\pi\tau\omega\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$  γὰρ οὕτως εἰς τοὺς ἀνὰ μέλλων τόπους καυκωφορούσιν, S.E., *M.* ix, 71. This physical reason was in itself enough to make it impossible for the Stoics to believe in a subterranean region of the souls: εὐθεὶς "ἀδύς, εὐθ' Ἀχέρων, οὐδὲ Κωκυρὸς κτλ., Epict., iii, 13, 15. It is the regular Stoic doctrine: see Bushoffner, *Epict.* 86 f.; cf. Cic., *TD.* i, 36 f.; Sen., *C. ad Marc.* 19, 4. When Stoics speak occasionally of *inferi* or  $\beta\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\varsigma$  as the abode of the souls, they are only using metaphorical language. When the word is not a mere conventionalism, they mean the regions nearer the earth, the cloud regions and lower levels of the air,  $\delta$  κατωχρόνιστος καὶ κατωχρόνιστος ἀήρ (Corn., *ND.* 5, p. 4, 17 L.; other exx. in Heinze, *Xenokr.* 147, 2). Here the "unwise" souls (the monster, less buoyant ones) are supposed to remain after death (*circa inferum* as Tert., *An.* 54 says, alluding to Stoic doctrine—and this is obviously where the *inferi* mentioned at the end of the same chapter are situated). This ἀήρ (distinguished from the higher regions of the air) =  $\beta\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\varsigma$ , must have been what Zeno referred to when he spoke of the *loca turbosa* where the souls of the unwise have to expiate their folly (quoted and varied by Lact., *Inst.* 7, 7, 13, in a Platonic sense [i, 60 Arn.]).

<sup>16</sup> Abode of the souls in the air: S. E., *M.* ix, 73; Cic., *TD.* i, 42-3, both probably after Posid. Cf. sapientum animas in superis mansionibus collocant (Stoici), Tert., *An.* 54. Generally: εἰς τὸν ἕλκα μεταρθεῖν said of the departed souls, M. Ant. iv, 21.  $\iota\pi$  τῇ  $\pi\epsilon\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omega\sigma\iota$  . . . διαμένοντες τὰς τῶν ἀνορθώτρων  $\psi\upsilon\chi\alpha\varsigma$ , Ar. Did. ap. Eus., *PE.* xv, 822 A [ii, 225 Arn.]. (Gradus) ascent to ever higher regions, Sen., *C. ad Marc.* 25, 1—hardly orthodox Stoic doctrine.—The conception may possibly belong to the older Stoicism, and may underlie the opinion of Chrysipp.:  $\sigma\phi\alpha\iota\sigma\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ —as *fiery matter*—τὰς  $\psi\upsilon\chi\alpha\varsigma$

μετὰ δέσμων γίνεσθαι, ap. Enst., *II*, 1288, 10 f. [224 Arn.]. Poseid. seems to have worked it out further, probably making use also of Pythagorean and Platonic fancies to which he was distinctly inclined. The Pythagoreans had fancies about the souls hovering in the air (see above, chap. xi, n. 33), of the sun and moon as places where the souls lived (chap. x, n. 76). Acc. to Poseid. the souls inhabit τὰς ἀνὰ ἐκείνην χώραν (S.E., *Ad*. ix, 73) as suitable for divine but not perfect creatures. It is the souls who are meant when people speak of δαιμόνες (S.E. § 74), or ἡρώες (Stoic in this use D.L. vi. 15) (ii, 320 Arn.); cf. *heroes et lares et genii*, Varro using Stoic language (ap. Aug., *CD*, vii, 6, p. 282, 14 Domb.). The whole air is full of them: Pos. ap. Cic., *Div*. i, 64. Something very similar given as Pythag. doctrine by Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 32; see above, chap. xi, n. 36. But Poseidonion (esp. if he is really the source of the Ciceronian *Soma*, *Scip*.) seems to have emulated more particularly the imaginative efforts of Herakleides Pont. and his story of Empedokles' vision (see above, chap. ix, n. 111). Herakl. contributed largely to popularising the idea that the souls inhabit the air and giving it shape; the interest with which his fancies were studied is shown by the quotations from his book so common from Varro down to Proclus and Damascius. He must have been led to make the souls, on being freed from the body, float upwards and occupy the stars or the moon—which are inhabitable heavenly bodies: *Dox*. 343, 7 ff.; 350a, 10) by the view—just as the Stoics after him were—that the soul is an αἰθέριον σῶμα (Philop.)—ἀερόειδος, a *lumen*, Tert., *Ad*. 9. In this he is following an idea that had been common in the 5th century (held by Xenophanes, Epicarmos, Eurip.: see above, p. 438 ff.), and had even attained popular vogue. This idea from the very first led to the conclusion that the soul, when ready for it, enters αἶθρ' ὀψιὸν αἰθέρα and ascends to the upper regions (of the aether). Herakleides carried this idea further and embellished it with philosophical and astronomical fancies. (On another occasion he seems to have denied substance and consistency to individual "souls": *Plu*., *Mor*. v, p. 698 Wytt.—a view to which his doctrines of the ὅμοιοι might easily have led him.) Poseidonion then took up this idea of Herakl. In this way, or at least not uninfluenced by this semi-philosophical literature, the belief in the abode of the "souls" in the aether attained the popularity that grave inscriptions witness for it (see below, ch. xiv, 2, n. 135).

<sup>14</sup> Cicero, following Poseid., imagines a blissful observation of the earth and the stars by the souls in the air: *TD*, i, 44-7 (cf. Sen., *C. ad Marc*. 25, 1-2); and similarly in *Soma*, *Scip*.; in both cases the idea certainly comes from Herakl. Pont.

<sup>15</sup> *ἡδοναῖα καὶ βροδ* [i, 38 Arn.].

<sup>16</sup> A frequently repeated Stoic dogma (stated with particular fullness by Senec., *Ep*. 93): see Catalani on M. Ant. (iii, 7), p. 108-9. The happiness of the (Stoic) wise man does not require μῆκος βίης *relaxio* as Aristot. had maintained (see above, n. 32). In this point Stoic and Epicurean doctrine fully agreed: magni artificia est claudere totum in exiguo: tantum sapienti sca, quantum deo omnis aetas patet (Sen., *Ep*. 63, 11, and see below, n. 82).

<sup>17</sup> Acc. to Panaitios there are *deco genera* in the soul which he calls *inflammata anima* (Cic., *TD*, i, 42). It is at any rate very probable that Panaitios (and Boethos—roughly contemporary with Pan.: see Comparetti, *Ind. Stoic*, p. 78 f.—acc. to Macr., in *S. Scip*. 1, 14, 20) regarded the soul as compounded of two elements, *aer et ignis*, not

as a single and uncomposed *simplex insimplex* as the older Stoics had thought (see Schmuckel, *Philos. d. ant. Stoa*, 324 L.).

<sup>14</sup> *déus* and *déus*: Pan. ap. Nemes., *NH.*, p. 213 Matth. This clearly shows a tendency to a psychological dualism: Zeller, *Stoics and Epicureans*, p. 542 f. What further suggestions were made by Pan. about the division of the soul remains very problematical. The only more precise statement is Cicero's, *T.D.* I, 80 (speaking of Pan.), *animitudines* *tres* *hominis*que *seruitus* a *mente* et *discreta* *putat*.

<sup>15</sup> Panaitios denied not merely the immortality but even the *harmatē* of the soul after death: Cic., *T.D.* I, 78-8. Two reasons are there given: everything that has come into being (like the soul of man at birth) must also perish—the Aristotelian principle: see above, n. 25; what can feel pain (as the soul does) must become diseased and what is diseased must eventually perish. (Here the destruction of the soul from its own inward decay is asserted—not from the effect of external force at the world conflagration, the periodic occurrence of which Pan. at least called in question.) Acc. to Schmuckel (*ant. Stoa*, p. 309) it follows from Cic., *T.D.* I, 42, that Panaitios also added a third argument: that the soul being composite must suffer the dissolution of its parts in death which change into other elements. This does not indeed at all follow from the passage, but such a view would almost have been inevitable with Panaitios' doctrine of the soul and had already been suggested by Carneades in his polemic against the indestructibility of the divine and of every *ψῆμα*—an argument to which Pan. on the whole yielded.

<sup>16</sup> Poseidonios distinguished in the human soul not three parts but three *δυνάμεις* *παρ' αἰσίας* *ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ* *ὁργανώδεις* (Gal. v, 515), namely, the Platonic three, the *λογιστικόν*, *θυμητικόν*, *προθυμητικόν* (Gal. v, 476). The last two are the *δυνάμεις* *ἔλογον* (they only give *φασσάειν* the special forms taken by their impulses: Gal. v, 474, 509). The *αἰσία* are not judgments nor the consequences of judgments but the motions (*κινήσεις*) of these *δυνάμεις* *ἔλογον* (Gal. v, 429; cf. 378). In this way alone is it possible to understand how passion or wrong-doing can arise in man; it is because soul is not (as Chrysipp. had taught) pure reasoning power (cf. also Gal. iv, 820). There exists then in man an *ἔλογον* *καὶ* *κατάθετον* *καὶ* *ἔθνος* in addition to the *δαίμων* *συγγενὴς* *τῷ* *τῷ* *ἔλῳ* *κἀπορ* *διακονῶν*: Gal. v, 469 f. Now, indeed, this is possible when the soul is a single *αἰσία* and in its nature nothing but divine *νοῦμα* it is difficult to say.—Pos. too was quite ignorant of an evil principle in the world, not the divine or contrary to the divine principle. The ethical teaching of Stoicism had always contained a dualism which is here transferred to the physical doctrine where it was originally unknown. From the time of Pos. there is an ever growing tendency to emphasize the contrast (which was, however, always familiar to the older Stoics as well) between "soul" and "body", the *inutilis caro ac fluids*, Pos. ap. Sen., *Ep.* 82, 10. In view of this contrast the "soul" too is no longer said to come into being with the body or with the physical conception of the individual (cf. *γεννῶνται* *τῷ* *σώματι* *καὶ* *μεταγεννῶνται* *ἐκ* *αὐτοῦ* [*τῷ* *σώματι*], Chrysipp. ap. Plin., *Sto. Rep.* 1063 D [ii. 222 Arn.]), but rather to have been living before that, in the separate life of the divine. It is nowhere expressly or authoritatively stated that Poseidonios held the "pre-existence" of the "soul"; but that view has been rightly attributed to him, fitting in as it does with his other ideas, and because it is often introduced and taken for granted in those passages where

Cicero or Seneca are following Pos. (see Corssen, *de Pos. Rhod.*, p. 25 ff. But we may not read the doctrine of pre-existence into S.E., *M.* ix, 71, as Heinze, *Xenok.* 134, 2, does). If the soul-*δαίμων* was in existence before its incarnation it can presumably only enter the body with the conception of the individual life *βίωσις*, *tractus animatus* as Cic. puts it, *Div.* ii, 119; a passage obviously related (as Bonhöffer, *Epikt.* 79 remarks) to the statement in *Div.* i, 64, where he is speaking of the *immortales animi* of which the air is full—and there Pos. is mentioned by name as the authority. From its pre-existent life in the air the "soul" enters into man. The multitude of individual bodiless souls—not only the one impersonal soul-substance of the world—were thus living before their *ἐκσάρκωσις*, and the Stoic pantheism thus turns into a rather questionable "pantheismism". On the other hand, Poseidonios in opposition to his teacher, Panaitios, adheres to the doctrine of the periodic extinction of all life in the one Soul of the World, the original Fire: cf. *Dor.* 38Ba, 18; b, 19. Holding this view he cannot very well have put the origin of each of the individual soul-*δαίμονες* before the beginning of the particular world-period in which they live. Nor can the survival of the souls after their separation from the body be prolonged beyond the next *ἐκσάρκωσις* (which makes Cicero's *immortales animi* inexact: *Div.* i, 64, after Pos.). Thus, although the survival which Panaitios had denied is reaffirmed it does not go beyond the qualified doctrine of immortality which the older Stoics had held. At the same time Pos. could hold, with Chrysipp., and other Stoics, that there was a *καταστροφή* *καλλυψή* (*M. Ant.* xi, 1) after the world-conflagration and even that each individual man of the previous world-period would be restored again in precisely the same place (Chrysipp. ap. Lact., *Inst.* 7, 23, 3, etc.; ii, 189 Arn.; cf. the Orphico-Pythagorean fantasy: above, chap. x, n. 47). But this would not amount to an *ἀφάρτα* for the individual: the individual life has been interrupted and is separated from its *ἀναστροφὴν* by a long interval of time.—There is no satisfactory reason for assigning to Pos. the belief in a series of *μετεμμετώσεις* of the soul—as Heinze does, *Xen.* 132 ff.—though such an idea would not have been hard to arrive at, even while holding fast to the doctrine of the final *ἐκσάρκωσις*. But the dubious accounts given by many *ἀσφαγέ* of Stoic teaching on the question of the *μετεμμετώσεις* *ψυχῆς* need not necessarily refer to Poseidonios; nor are we bound to draw this conclusion because they reappear in Plutarch. Plu. does indeed here and there follow Poseidonios, but he never hesitates to add Platonic ideas or fancies of his own invention, a fact which makes it most risky to attempt to fix an exact source for any particular detail in his variegated mosaic.

<sup>41</sup> Schmekel (*Phil. d. m.H. Stoa*, 1892) maintains convincingly that Panaitios was led to his view of the nature and fate of the soul chiefly by the polemic of Carneades against the dogmatic philosophers and particularly the Stoics. It is less certain that Poseidonios and his heterodox views are influenced by respect for Carneades. It is certain, however, that Pos. differs from Chrysipp., and still more from Panaitios. There is thus an indirect connexion between him and Carneades, to whose criticisms Panaitios had in the most essential points given way.

<sup>42</sup> That Pos. is being used in the first book of *Tusc. Disp.* is admitted on all hands (as to the extent of that use conjecture may indeed be various). It is at least very possible in the case of *Soma. Scip.* (see Corssen, *Pos.* 40 ff.).—The attraction of such theories of immortality

remained an aesthetic one with Cicero (and probably among all the cultured of his age and social circle). Where he is not speaking rhetorically or in pursuance of a literary pose—in his letters esp.—he shows no trace of the conviction that he defends at other times with so much ardour (see Boissier, *Rel. rom. d'Aug. aux Ant.* i, 58 L.).

<sup>41</sup> οὐ γὰρ πᾶσι μαρτυρεῖται, ἀλλὰ λογισμῶν καὶ ἀπορίας though not always quite ἀπορίας (M. Ant. xi, 3).

<sup>42</sup> Julia Rarus when condemned to death by Gaius only attempts to enquire whether there is any truth in the belief in immortality: Sen., *Tr. An.* 14, 8-9. De natura animae et dissociatione spiritus corporisque inquirebat Thrases Paelus, before his execution, with his instructor Demetrius the Cynic: Tac., *A.* xvi, 34. They have no firm conviction in these matters that might serve to explain or account for their heroisms (Cato reads the *Phaedo* before his suicide: Plu., *Cat. min.* 68, 70).

<sup>43</sup> nos quoque felices animas et aeternae sortitas says the soul of her father to Marcia: Sen., *C. ad Marc.* 26, 7, in antiqua elementa vertemur at the *dépense*.

<sup>44</sup> Sen., *Ep.* 88, 34.

<sup>45</sup> bellum somnium, Sen., *Ep.* 102, 2.

<sup>46</sup> Where Seneca admits more positive conceptions of a life after death he never goes beyond a fortasse, si modo vera sapientium fama est (*Ep.* 63, 16): a deliberate concession to the consensus hominum (*Ep.* 117, 81) or the opiniones magnarum virorum test gratissimam propositum magis quam probantium (*Ep.* 102, 3). Following the conventional style of consolatory discourses he gives such expressions a more vivid turn in the *Consolations*: e.g. *Marc.* 25, 1 ff.; *Helv.* 11, 7; *Polyb.* 9, 8. But even there the idea of personal immortality hardly seems to be taken seriously. In the same pieces death is commended simply as putting an end to all pain, and, in fact, to all sensation: *Marc.* 19, 4-5. In death we become again as we were before being born, *Marc.* 19, 5; cf. *Ep.* 54, 4, mors est non esse, id quale sit iam scio, hoc erit post me quod ante me fuit; and *Ep.* 77, 11, non eris: nec loqui. So that whether death is a *finis* or a *transitus*, (*Prov.* 6, 6; *Ep.* 65, 24), it is equally welcome to the wise man who has made the most of his life, however short it may have been. Whether he goes then to the gods or whether on the other hand nothing is left of the mortal creature after death aequo magnum animum habebit (*Ep.* 93, 10): cf. nunquam magis divinum est (pectus humanum) quam tibi mortalitatem tuam cogitat, et scit in hoc natum hominem ut vita defungeretur cet., (*Ep.* 120, 14): ipsum perire non est magnum, anima in expedito est habenda (*QN.* 6, 32, 5): to be ready is everything.—Of the old Stoic dogmas the only one that seems to remain certain for Seneca is that of ἀνύπναιος at the new creation of the world, *Ep.* 38, 10-11: mors intermisit vitam, non cepit: venit iterum qui cum in lucem reponat dies; but that is not in any way a consolation: multi fecerant nisi oblitus rediret. Consciousness ceases with the coming of death in this world-period.

<sup>47</sup> It is very rarely that the utterances of the Emperor on the subject of what happens after death resemble those of a convinced Stoic of the old school. The souls are all parts of the one κοινὸν στοιχεῖον of the world which though extended over so many individual souls yet remains a unity (*x.* 8; *xii.* 30). After death the individual soul will survive for a period in the air until it is merged into the universal soul σὺν τοῖς πάντεσσι σπέρματικόν λόγον (*iv.* 21). This implies the survival of the personal self for an undefined period, but it is

not a fixed conviction of M. Ant. As a rule he allows the choice between *σβένει ἢ μετέσται*, i.e. immediate extinction and merging of the individual soul (Πανάσι) or its removal into a temporary abode of the souls in the air (*αἱ εἰς τὸν ἀέρα μετεστέλλονται* *ἀρχαί*, iv, 21; cf. v, 53). Or else the choice is between *σβένει*, *μετέσται* (both in agreement with the Stoic doctrine of the *σύνεσις* of the soul) or *ανεξέρχεται* of the soul-elements, in case the atomists are right (vii, 32; viii, 25; vi, 24)—a dilemma which really comes down to *συνερχόμενος* or *σβένει* (= *ἀφθόνως εἰς τοὺς τοῦ κόσμου σπέρματικὸς λόγους*); and *μετέσται* falls out. This is probably the meaning also of x, 7: *ἦτοι ανεξέρχεται στοιχείων ἢ τῶσδ' (in which τὸ πνευματικόν disappears εἰς τὸ ἀσώματον) and πῶσδ' only of the last σωματικόν that man preserves in himself: for here (at the end of the chapter) the identity of the individual soul with itself is given up in the Heraklitean manner (see above, p. 370). Sometimes the choice is presented between *ἀνασθέναι* or *τρέπεθ βίος* after death (iii, 3) or *αἰσθάνεσθαι* *ἐντοίῃ* in an *ἐλλοίαν* *ζῶν* (viii, 54). This is an allusion to metempsychosis (in which the envelope into which the soul goes is another but its *αἰσθάνεσθαι* does not become *ἐντοίαν*): it means the turning of the *soul-principle*, exhaled in death, to new forms of life united to the previous forms by no identity of soul-personality. In this case we can indeed say *τοῦ ἔτι οὐ παύει*: but there can be no idea of the survival of the personal ego, *ἢ τῶν ἑλκων εὐνοίαις ἐκδομένοι* *ἐργ* (xii, 21; viii, 5). The wise man will say it with calmness: his soul is *ἐντοίμος* *δὲν* *ἡδὴ ἀσολυθῆναι* *δὲν* *τοῦ σώματος* . . . xi, 3. Living among men to whom his way of thought is strange (*ἐν τῇ διαφύσει τῆς συμβιώσεως*) he sighs at times *θάρσος* *ἐλλοίαν*, *ἢ θάρσος* . . . ix, 3; cf. Bonhöffer, *Epikt.* u. d. Stoa, 59 ff.*

<sup>18</sup> I shall die without revealing God *εἰδὼς ὅτι τὸ γενόμενον καὶ φθαρόναι δεῖ*. *οὐ γὰρ εἶμι νῦν ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπος, μέρος τῶν πάντων ὡς ἄρα ἡμέρας ἐνοσθῆναι με δεῖ ὡς τὴν ἄρην καὶ ἀρραβεῖν ὡς ἄρην*, Epictet. ii, 5, 13. The present must make way for the future *ἐν ᾗ περιέσθαι ἄνθρωποι τοῦ κόσμου*, ii, 17-18; iv, 1, 108. Death brings with it not complete destruction, *οὐκ ἀπώλειαν*, but *εὖν* *πρότερον* *εἰς ἕτερα μεταβάλλει*, iii, 24, 81-4. But the personality of the now living individual does indeed perish completely in death.—Cf. Bonhöffer, *Epiktet*, 65 f.; cf. also the same author's *Εἰκὼς* *der Epiktet*, p. 26 ff., 52 (1884).

<sup>19</sup> Cornutus ap. Stob., *Ecl.* i, 383, 24-284, 2 W.

<sup>20</sup> The *ψυχὴ* *αἶμα* (the only *δωμάριον* is empty space which is merely a passage way for the *σώματα*), D.L. x, 67 (p. 21 Ua.). It is a *σώμα* *λεπτομερές*, *καρ' ὅταν τὰ ἀτομίσματα* (i.e. of atoms to a body) *παρασπέρμινον*, *παρασπέρματάτων* *δὲ* *σπέρματα* *θερμοὶ* *τυτὴ* *πρόδιον* *ἔχοντι*, D.L. x, 68. Cf. Lucr. iii, 126 ff.; more precise is iii, 231-40. It is the *ἀτομίσματα* which *τὴν ψυχὴν* *σπέρματι*, D.L. x, 84. *vas quæsi* *constitit* *etiam*, Lucr. iii, 440, 555.

<sup>21</sup> Lucr. iii, 94 ff., 117 ff.

<sup>22</sup> The *ἐλλοίαν* *δ' ἐν* *τῇ* *λεπτῇ* *πρόσπαρατοι* *σώματι*, *τὸ δὲ* *λογικὸν* *ἐν* *τῷ* *σώματι*, Sch. D.L. x, 67 (p. 21 Ua.), *fr.* 312, 313 Ua. *anima* and *animus*, Lucr. iii, 136 ff. The *anima*, though it is diminished



<sup>16</sup> ἡ δὲ δόξα . . . τὸν παντελὲς βίαν παρεσκευάσεν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ αἵματι χρόνον προεβλήθη, *Seml. κε* (p. 73 Un.).

<sup>17</sup> οὐκ ἔστι φυσικὴ κενωσις τοῖς λογικοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους.—εἰς μεσημερίαν κοιμησάμενος, *fr.* 523. Αἰσχροῦς ἵσται τοῖς τῶν πλεθρῶν ὁρχαῖς *fr.* 554, 552, 9.

<sup>18</sup> εἰ γάρ μοι γάρων τῶν σφύων κείνται, οὐχ ὅστις μὲ ἀδικᾷ, ἀλλ' ὅπως μὲ ἀδικῶνται, *fr.* 530.

<sup>19</sup> οὐκ ἐστὶ θεὸς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τοῦ Ἑλλήενος, οὐδ' ἐπὶ σφίσι σπεύδοντες παρ' αὐτοῖς τευχάνειν . . . *Method. fr.* 41.



## CHAPTER XIV

### PART II

#### POPULAR BELIEF

Philosophic teaching and the philosophic outlook were at this time by no means confined exclusively to the narrow circles dominated by particular schools. Never more widely or more effectively than in this Hellenistic period did philosophy in one shape or another provide the basis and common medium of a culture that no one of moderate wealth and leisure would willingly be without. Such ideas as educated people of the time generally possessed, dealing in a more connected and definite form with the things of this life and existence that lie beyond the scope of immediate perception, were all drawn from the teaching of philosophy. To a certain extent this is true also of the current views as to the nature and destiny of the soul. But in the region of the unknowable philosophy can never entirely replace or suppress the natural—the irrational beliefs—of mankind. Such beliefs were in their natural element in dealing with such subjects. They influenced even the philosophically enlightened and their authority was supreme with the many who in every age are incapable of understanding the disinterested search for knowledge. Even in this supreme period of universal philosophic culture, popular beliefs about the soul still remained in force, unmodified by the speculations or the exhortations of philosophers.

They had their roots—these beliefs—not in any form of speculative thought but in the practice of the Cult of Souls: and that Cult, as it has been described \* for an earlier stage of Greek life, still went on unaltered and with undiminished vigour. This may be asserted with confidence, though we can produce no very important evidence from the literature of this later period. The character and content of that literature is such that we should hardly expect to find such evidence in it. But for the most part the literary evidence from which we were able to illustrate the Cult of Souls in an earlier period may be taken to apply equally to the age with which we are now dealing. Even in its final years Lucian's pamphlet *On Mourning* bears express witness to the survival of the ancient and sanctified usages in their fullest compass. We hear again of the washing, anointing,

and crowning of the dead, the ceremonious lying-in-state upon the bier, the violent and extravagant lament over the dead body, and all the traditional customs that are still in full force. Last comes the solemn interment of the body—the articles of luxury burnt together with the corpse of the dead man or buried with him in the grave—articles that had once belonged to him and which he is supposed to enjoy even in death—the feeding of the helpless soul of the dead with libations of wine and burnt-offerings—the ritual fasting of the relatives only broken, after three days, in the Banquet of the Dead.<sup>1</sup>

The dead man must not be deprived of a single one of "the customary things"—only so can his well-being be fully secured.<sup>2</sup> The most important of these is the solemn interment of the body. This is carried out not only by the family of the dead man, but in many cases also by the society to which he may have belonged.<sup>3</sup> In these times when the cities sought to make up for the loss of more serious interests in their life by an often touching care for the immediate and the insignificant, deserving citizens were frequently honoured with elaborate funeral processions in which the municipality took part;<sup>4</sup> the city fathers would then probably decree that representatives should be sent to the survivors and commissioned to express the sympathy of the city in their loss and distract their minds from their grief by a speech.<sup>5</sup>

The ritual act of burial, the object of so much pious zeal, was the very reverse of the indifferent matter that philosophy loved to represent it.<sup>6</sup> The sanctity of the place where rests the dead is also a matter of great importance, not only for the dead man himself but for the rest of the family which desires to be still united in the life of the spirit world, and so inhabits a common burial-ground (generally outside the city, very rarely within,<sup>7</sup> but sometimes, even yet, actually inside the house).<sup>8</sup> The founder of a family-grave desires the members of it to be joined together in the same grave for at least three generations.<sup>10</sup> Those who have a right to be buried there take steps—religious and legal or municipal—against the profanation of this family tomb and sanctuary by the burying in it of strangers or the pillaging of the vault—a practice that became increasingly common in the final period of the antique world.<sup>11</sup> There are innumerable grave-notices threatening money penalties in accordance with the ancient law of the city, to be paid into the public treasury by those who violate the peace of the grave.<sup>12</sup> No less common are the inscriptions which place the grave and its sanctity

under the protection of the underworld deities, invoking at the same time the most shocking curses—torments and calamities both temporal and eternal—against profaners of the holiness of the tomb.<sup>12</sup> Especially the inhabitants of certain districts of Asia Minor, only very superficially Hellenized, give themselves free rein in the accumulation of such violent execrations. In their case the dark superstitions of ancestral and native worship of gods or spirits may have infected the Hellenes also—it is often the Greeks who become barbarian rather than the barbarians who are Hellenized in the history of Greek relations with these stubborn and barbarous native populations.<sup>13</sup> But even in lands where the Greek population has maintained itself without admixture such execrations are occasionally to be found in graves.

As time went on and the sanctity and peace of the grave began to be more and more seriously threatened, measures of all kinds were taken for its protection. The grave is no mere chamber of corruption: the souls of the dead dwell there,<sup>14</sup> and therefore is it holy; as a sanctuary it becomes completely sanctified when it has received the last member of the family, and is enclosed for ever.<sup>15</sup> The family so long as it lasts continues to pay the regular Soul-Cult to its ancestors;<sup>16</sup> sometimes special foundations ensure the payment for ever<sup>17</sup> of the Soul-Cult of which the dead have need.<sup>18</sup> Even those whose burial place lies far away from the graves of their own family<sup>19</sup> are not entirely deprived of benevolent care and cult.

The pre-supposition of all Cult of Souls—that the dead survive to enjoy at least a gloomy sepulchral existence in their last resting-place—is everywhere vividly implied. It speaks to us with archaic simplicity from those grave-stones upon which the dead, as though still accessible to the sounds of the human voice and able to understand the words of the living, are addressed with the customary words of greeting.<sup>21</sup> Sometimes the dead man himself is provided with a similar greeting which he is supposed to address to the passers-by<sup>22</sup>—between him, confined to his grave, and the others who still walk about in the daylight a dialogue takes place.<sup>23</sup> The dead man is not entirely cut off from the affairs of the upper world. He feels an access of fresh life when he is called by the name that he had once borne in his life-time, and the memory of which is now preserved only by his gravestone. His fellow-citizens call upon him three times by name at his burial;<sup>24</sup> but even in the grave

he is capable of hearing the precious sound. On a gravestone at Athens<sup>25</sup> the dead man enjoins upon the members of the actors' guild to which he had belonged to call upon his name in chorus whenever they pass by his grave, and to gladden him with the sound of hand-clapping, to which he had been accustomed in life. At other times the passer-by "kisses his hand"<sup>26</sup> to the dead man; a gesture which denotes the honour paid to a Hero.<sup>27</sup> The soul is not merely alive; it belongs now, as primitive and age-long belief expressed it, to the Higher and Mightier Ones.<sup>28</sup> Perhaps this exaltation of the wrath and power of the dead is the meaning of the custom by which the dead are called the Good, the Honest (*καὶ ἀγαθοί*). This usage must have become established at an early period,<sup>29</sup> but it is not until these later days that it is first employed as an addition to the simple words of greeting addressed to the dead on gravestones. In this use it is not uniformly current: it is rare in Attica (at least, on graves of natives of that country); whereas in Boeotia, Thessaly, and the countries of Asia Minor it is frequent and almost universal.<sup>30</sup> In fact it is natural to suppose<sup>31</sup> that this mode of address, originally a euphemistic title addressed to the ghosts of the dead who were conceived as quite capable of acting in a manner the very reverse of that attributed to them by the word, was intended to suggest the power belonging to the personality so addressed as one who has risen to a higher form of existence—and to venerate him with becoming awe.<sup>32</sup>

### § 2

The conception of the departed spirit as one who has been raised to a higher state of dignity and power receives clearer and more conscious expression where the departed one is called a Hero.

This class of intermediate beings standing on the border line between mankind and godhead—the world of the Heroes—was in no danger of extinction at this period of Greek religious belief. The attitude of mind that could think of certain special souls as withdrawn from the limitations of visible existence and raised to a higher spiritual state remained still vigorous and was even able to give birth to new conceptions.

In its original and proper sense the name *Heros* never indicated an independent and self-sufficient spirit. *Archegetes*, "leader" or "originator", is his real and distinctive title. The *Heros* stands at the beginning of a series, taking its origin

from him, of mortal men for whom he is the leader and "ancestor". The genuine Heroes are the ancestors, whether real or imaginary, of a family or a house; in the "Heroes", after whom they wish to be called, the members of a society, a clan, or even a whole race honour the *archegetai* of those groups. They are always men of power and influence, prominent and distinguished from other men, who are regarded as having thus entered into the life of Heroes after their death. And even in later times the Heroes of a more recent elevation, though they may no longer be the leaders of a train of descendants taking their origin from them, are yet regarded as distinguished from the people who worship them by their peculiar virtue and dignity. To become a *Hero* after death was a privilege reserved for a few great and uncommon personalities who even in their lifetime were not as other men were.

The companies of these old and specially chosen Heroes did not suffer the fate of forgetfulness which would have been their second and real death. The love of country and city, undying among the Greeks, attached itself in reverent memory to the illuminated spirits of the past who had once protected and defended their native land. When Messene was refounded in the fourth century the Heroes of the country were solemnly called upon to become inhabitants of the city as they had been before—more particularly Aristomenes, the never-forgotten champion of Messenian freedom.<sup>33</sup> Even at Leuctra he had appeared in the melée of the fight, doing battle for the Thebans.<sup>34</sup> Before the battle, Epameinondas had secured the favour of the Heroines of the place, the daughters of Skedasos, by means of prayer and sacrifice.<sup>35</sup> These were events of the last heroic age of Greek history, but the cult and memory of the local Heroes of the Greek countries survived into a much later age. Leonidas was worshipped by the people of Sparta for many centuries,<sup>36</sup> and the champions of the Persian Wars, the saviours of Hellas, were worshipped by their remote descendants.<sup>37</sup> Even in imperial times the inhabitants of the island of Kos still worshipped those who had fallen to secure their freedom centuries before.<sup>38</sup> Such individual cases allow us to see what was the general rule: the memory and cult of a Hero lived on as long as the community remained in existence whose duty it was to maintain his worship. Even those Heroes—a class by themselves—who have secured their immortality through their fame in ancient poetry<sup>39</sup> still retained their cult undiminished. The heroic

figure of Hektor still preserved life and reality for his worshippers in the Troad or at Thebes.<sup>40</sup> Even in the third century of our era the district of Troy and the neighbouring coasts of Europe still kept fresh the memory and the cult of the Heroes of Epic renown.<sup>41</sup> Of Achilles, who had a special fate, we must speak in another connexion.<sup>42</sup>

Nor did less splendid figures vanish from the memory of their narrower associations of worshippers. Autolykos the founder of Sinope retained his cult even in the time of Lucullus.<sup>43</sup> At a quite late period the relics of the specially popular Heroes of the Pan-Hellenic games were still the subject of many superstitions<sup>44</sup> that bear witness to their continued influence. Heroes to whom healing powers were ascribed continued to do works of healing and to be worshipped, and their number was even extended.<sup>45</sup> Mere local spirits, whose very names had been forgotten, nevertheless lost none of the honour that came to them from their beneficent miracles; such were, for instance, that Philopregmon of Potideia who was celebrated by a late poet,<sup>46</sup> or the Hero Euodos of Apollinopolis in Egypt who dispensed "good journey" to those who honoured him in passing by his monument.<sup>47</sup>

But all Heroes were not yet reduced to such casual salutations from occasional passers-by. In many places<sup>48</sup> the regular festivals and sacrifices to Heroes still survived—even human sacrifice was still sometimes made to spirits who were held capable of special exhibitions of power.<sup>49</sup> In a few cases the festivals of Heroes are the chief feasts in the annual calendar of a city.<sup>50</sup> The names of Heroes quite as much as of Gods were used in oath-taking<sup>51</sup> at treaties made by Greek cities so long as they retained their independence. Foundations were dedicated to the honour of Gods and Heroes together.<sup>52</sup> Cult associations called themselves after the Heroes they met to worship.<sup>53</sup> Special priests of certain Heroes were regularly appointed.<sup>54</sup> Even in the second century, in his book of travels, Pausanias is able to inform us of not a few Heroes whose cult, as he distinctly says, had gone on unbroken in their cities down to his own day.<sup>55</sup> The annual festival of the Heroes who had fallen at Plataea was still celebrated with the greatest pomp in the time of Plutarch, who describes every detail of its archaic ceremonial.<sup>56</sup> And at Sikyon, at the same time, the Heroic festival of Aratos, the founder of the Achæan League, was still celebrated, though here the centuries had robbed the occasion of many of its former glories.<sup>57</sup>

In all such ceremonies it was to a single and definite spirit-personality that the devotion of men was offered. Each of them received the cult that was due to him by the terms of some old-established and sanctified foundation. Nothing was further from men's minds than the loose and vagur conception, expressed sometimes by ancient writers, that *all* brave men of the past or all outstanding individuals of whatever time are to be regarded forthwith as Heroes.<sup>41</sup> It was still clearly and consciously felt that elevation to the rank of Hero was not a privilege that belonged as a matter of course to any particular class of mankind, but, wherever it occurred, was essentially a ratification of quite exceptional worth and influence displayed already in the lifetime of the Hero. Following this conception even the Hellenistic age added to the number of the Heroes by drawing upon the great men of the present. A little earlier Pelopidas and Timoleon had been honoured in this way, and now the figures of Leontheneas, Kleomenes, and Philopoimen were raised to heroic glory.<sup>42</sup> Even Aratos, the very incarnation of the sobriety of a too matter-of-fact age, at the end of a life devoted with ardour but without enduring success to the service of his country, was supposed by his countrymen to have passed over in a mysterious manner into the realm of heroic semi-divinity.<sup>43</sup>

As in these cases whole populations honoured individuals so also did narrower and much humbler associations, even in this rationalist age, elevate their helpers and protectors to the rank of Hero and honour them as such. The slaves of Kos thus honoured their former comrade and leader Driniakos ;<sup>44</sup> at another place there was a Hero who protected all refugees who took shelter with him ;<sup>45</sup> at Ephesos there was a Hero who had been a simple shepherd.<sup>46</sup> At the time of Augustus, a benefactor of his city, Athenodoros, the philosopher, had been made a Hero by grateful Tarsians after his death.<sup>47</sup> It sometimes happens that a Hero of the distant past may find himself confused with a descendant of the same name whom his contemporaries put in the place of his own ancestor and worship in his stead.<sup>48</sup>

So little were men grown out of the ideas centred round the cult of Heroes that, accustomed to the ever-increasing adoration of the " Mightier and Better ", every age was eager to add to their number from the men of the present. They did not always wait for the death of the individual so honoured before beginning to address him as *Heros* ; even in his lifetime he must enjoy a foretaste of the honour that was destined

to be his after his departure from this life. Thus, Lysander was saluted as a Hero after his victory by the Greeks whom he had liberated from the despotism of Athens; and in the Hellenistic age many a fortunate army commander or mighty king received the same honour. Of the Romans Flamininus the friend of the Greeks was the first to receive it.<sup>64</sup> This misapplication of the cult of Heroes to the living then became still further extended.<sup>65</sup> It may be that sometimes it was a real feeling of unusual merit that fired the impulsive temperament of the Greeks; but in the end the custom became almost a meaningless convention; even private individuals were thus called Hero in their lifetime<sup>66</sup> and heroic honours—even the foundation of annual athletic games—were granted to living persons almost indiscriminately.<sup>67</sup>

And at last when it was necessary to honour an individual whom the love and passionate regret of a monarch elevated to the rank of Hero after his death then, indeed, the age could hardly do enough in the hyperbole of pomp and ceremony. The funeral honours paid to the dead Hephaestion are an extravagant example of this.<sup>68</sup>

If in such cases the limits between the worship of a Hero and the adoration of a god seemed almost to have disappeared, we still have evidence of individual cases in which the survivors, without actually naming them Heroes, offer to their much-loved dead a memorial cult that hardly falls short of full heroic honours.<sup>69</sup> Nor is it only in such cases as these that we perceive the signs of a tendency to exalt the Cult of Souls everywhere and to approximate it to the worship of ancestors in the ancient Cult of Heroes. It emerges clearly enough, for all the brevity of their language, from the multitude of epitaphic inscriptions in which members of simple citizen families are addressed with the title of *Heros*. At any rate, it betokens an increase in the importance and dignity of the dead when a tombstone expressly announces that an individual citizen has been "heroized" by the city after his death. And this is what not infrequently happened—early in Thera and later on in many other places as well.<sup>70</sup> The same conclusion must be drawn when we hear of associations declaring a dead member to be a *Heros*;<sup>71</sup> or when a society recognizes a dead man as *Heros* on the formal motion of an individual.<sup>72</sup> Families, too, become accustomed to giving the name to those of their number that have died before the rest; and a son will thus speak of his father, parents of a son, and a wife of her husband—either informally or by a formal declaration naming



the dead one as *Heros*.<sup>75</sup> A higher and mightier form of existence after death must be imagined for the departed when he is thus distinguished so explicitly from the ordinary multitude of the dead—still more so in those cases when the dead man, elevated to a mystic communion with higher forms of life, loses his own name and receives in exchange that of a Hero of long-standing honour, or even that of a God.<sup>76</sup>

In every case that is known to us, the "heroizing" of a dead person by the city or a society or the family is carried out entirely on the independent authority of those bodies. The Delphic Oracle, without whose deciding voice it was hardly possible in early times for the company of the elect to receive any addition,<sup>77</sup> was, in these days when the prestige of the oracle had sunk almost to nothing, no longer applied to for its sanction. The consequence was hardly avoidable that the licence thus accorded to corporations and families should widen still further the bounds of the Heroes' kingdom. In the end, these boundaries broke down entirely. There were cities and countries where it became the custom to apply the title of "Hero" as an epithet of honour belonging to all the dead without distinction. It seems that this extension of "heroizing" to all the dead first became common in Boeotia,<sup>78</sup> though here it was not quite universal—Thespiæ was an exception.<sup>79</sup> Thessalian grave-inscriptions give the fullest evidence for the heroizing of the dead of every age and description. But the custom spread to every country populated by Greeks; <sup>80</sup> only Athens is less unrestrained <sup>81</sup> in the bestowal of the title of Hero upon the dead—a title which retained no more of the old and essential meaning of the word (which perhaps survived longest in Athens) than to say that the dead were really now dead.<sup>82</sup>

In spite of such indiscriminate application the name "Hero" still continued to be something of a title of honour. An honour, indeed, that was thus accorded to everyone without distinction was in danger of becoming the reverse of an honour. But isolated phrases of a naive and popular character make it clear that a difference was still felt to exist between the "Hero" and those who were not honoured with this distinguishing epithet.<sup>83</sup> When the name of Hero was thus applied to all the dead, not in exceptional cases but as a rule, the glory and distinction of which the idea of the "Hero" was thus deprived must have fallen in some measure upon the individual dead, if they

and the Heroes could meet on common ground. Thus, even the dissipation of the heroic honour and its indiscriminate application to all the dead is in reality but another indication of the fact that even in the decline of the ancient world the power and dignity of the departed soul had not declined too, but had, on the contrary, grown greater.

### § 3

The souls of the departed show their power and the fact that they are still alive more particularly in the effect that they have on this life and on the living. For the purposes of the Cult of Souls they are regarded as confined to the region of the inhabited earth; they continue in the grave or near it, for a time or permanently, and can therefore be reached by the offerings or the prayers of their living relatives. There can be no doubt that at this time men still believed, as they had done since the earliest times, in a kindly relationship between the family and its departed members, an exchange in which offerings were made at the grave by the living and blessings vouchsafed by the Unseen. It is true, however, that we only have imperfect records of such calm and comfortable family belief in the survival of the departed and of the part they continue to play in the daily life of their descendants.

But there is a more sinister variety of intercourse with the souls or spirits of the dead. They sometimes appear unsought to the living; they can be compelled by the force of magic to use their powers in the service of the living. Both these possibilities apply more particularly to those unquiet souls whom fate or their own hands have deprived of life violently and before their time; to those who have not been consigned to the peace of the grave by ceremonious burial.<sup>64</sup> The enlightened of the time do indeed refuse to believe in ghosts and haunting spirits of the dead that wander without rest about the place of their tragic fate, and make their presence disagreeably felt by the living.<sup>65</sup> But the populace, even in such enlightened days, gave the fullest credence to stories in which the existence of a spirit-world seemed to reveal its sinister reality, trespassing at times upon the world of the living. Regular folk-tales of spectral apparitions, vagrant ghosts of unfortunate souls, vampire-like spirits of the grave,<sup>66</sup> are preserved to us in some numbers—chiefly such as appealed to a perverted philosophy, the *casaniens sapiens* of an outworn age, as seeming to confirm its fancies of an invisible world between heaven and earth. In Lucian's *Lover of Lies* the grey-beard

philosophers entertain each other in portentous seriousness with such communications from the spirit world.<sup>87</sup> Plutarch himself is quite seriously convinced of the reality of some ghostly appearances.<sup>88</sup> Philosophy, which at this time was going back to Plato, found in its system of demonology a means of making such old wives' tales intelligible and credible to itself.

Finally, the time arrives when the violent and arbitrary interference with the unseen world—sorcery and spirit-raising—becomes a part of orthodox philosophy. The popular imagination of the Greeks did not have to wait for instruction from their barbarian neighbours, who had reduced the irrational to a system, before they could believe in the summoning of spirits from the deep. Magic in this sense was of extreme antiquity in Greece.<sup>89</sup> But in the fusion and intermixture of Greeks with barbarians which marked the Hellenistic age similar and cognate superstitions from all the corners of the earth met together and acquired strength from their union. It was foreign sources rather than Greek which chiefly contributed to swell the turbid and noxious stream of sorceries and spirit-raising, the practical application of an irrational theory of the nature and being of the soul in separation from the body. The lofty heaven of the old Greek gods was beginning to grow dim before the troubled vision of this later age; more and more their place was taken by a mob of idols and an obscure rabble of lesser devils. In this chaotic medley of Greek and barbarian demonology the companies of unquiet souls and ghosts of the dead easily found a place. The ghost was no longer an alien when the Gods themselves had become ghostly. When both Gods and spirits have to answer to the spells of the sorcerer the souls of the dead are seldom left in peace.<sup>90</sup> We possess some relics of the art of spirit-raising in the Græco-Egyptian magic books; and we can now see with our eyes specimens which illustrate the practical outcome of this delusion in the magic charms and exorcisms that were scratched on tablets of lead or gold and placed in the graves—as the natural abode of the spirits which were to be compelled—where they have been found in considerable quantities in modern times. Among the sinister influences that are thus conjured to do the work of vengeance, punishment, or destruction upon the conjurer's enemy, the unquiet souls of the dead are also regularly mentioned. To them is attributed the power and the will to intervene with malevolence and obstruction in the life of men, no less than to the other spiritual

powers of heaven and hell in company with whom they are summoned.<sup>81</sup>

#### § 4

The Cult of Souls for all its expansion gave no assistance to the picturing of what might be the condition of the departed souls independently of their connexion with the living. Those who troubled themselves about such matters and sought farther information were obliged to have recourse, if not to the systems of theologians and philosophers, then to the imaginative accounts and pictures of ancient poetry and legend.

The idea of a distant realm of the souls into which the strengthless shadows of those who had departed this life disappeared had not lost its hold on the popular imagination even of these later ages—difficult as it might be to reconcile<sup>82</sup> such an idea with the pre-suppositions of cultus with its customary worship and sustenance of the souls confined within the grave. The belief in a distant kingdom of the dead could not but continue to be current among men for whom the Homeric poems remained the earliest manual and school-book in the hands of youth and the source of instruction and entertainment to every age. The passionate indignation with which philosophers of the Stoic as well as the Epicurean faith attacked the beliefs resting on the teaching of Homer cannot be explained except by supposing that Homer and his picture had remained a guiding force with the masses who were uninstructed in philosophy. And, in fact, ancient writers use language which shows that the ancient conception of Hades was by no means discarded but on the contrary was still vigorously alive among the populace.<sup>83</sup>

As to what might go on down below and the general appearance of the underworld—these were questions that the invention of theological and semi-philosophic fancy, each according to its special lights and preconceptions, strove to answer in eager competition.<sup>84</sup> But such attempts to picture the condition of things in the kingdom of the souls—attempts which reached their highest point in the elaborate chiaroscuro of Vergil's Hades—remained the exercises of ingenious fancy and rarely pretended to be anything else. A distinct and authoritative popular system of belief on these points was scarcely possible when the orthodox religion of the state formally and dogmatically rejected everything of the kind.

It would, indeed, have been more natural if in connexion with the idea of the congregation of souls enclosed in the

kingdom of the underworld deities a belief in a compensatory justice to be found in this after-life of the dead, had grown up and obtained popular currency. The oppressed and needy who feel themselves deprived of their share in this world's goods think only too easily that somewhere there must be a place where they too will some day enjoy the fruits that others alone are allowed to pluck upon earth—and place that “somewhere” beyond the boundaries of this world and of reality. Pious belief in the gods expects to obtain the prize, so often denied upon earth, in a realm of the spirit. If indeed such a conviction of a compensatory justice to come<sup>58</sup>—reward of the virtuous and punishment of the wicked in a hereafter—was really more widely and seriously held in this age than it had been before,<sup>59</sup> then the cult of the underworld deities as it was practised in the mysteries of the states and the various religious societies must have contributed in a large degree to bring this about. And contrariwise, the belief that the punishing and rewarding omnipotence of the gods would be felt in a hereafter must have brought an unbroken stream of adherents to those mysteries which in fact offered their help and mediation in the life to come. Those only could imagine that they had detailed knowledge of the enigmas that lie beyond the reach of all experience, who could surrender themselves entirely to the dogmatic teaching of a closed sect. We may in fact take leave to doubt whether the gruesome pictures of a place of torment in Hades, with its undying punishment in devouring flames, and the similar fancies that later authors sometimes express, were in reality anything more than the private imaginations with which exclusive and superstitious conventicles sought to terrify their members.<sup>60</sup> The charming pictures of a “Land of Arrival” to which death sends the much-tried children of men, may have been more widely accepted. Homer, the universal instructor, had stamped them upon men's memories. For the poet the Elysian plain had been a place situated upon the surface of the earth to which the occasional favour of the gods was able to translate a few of their dearest favourites, that they might there enjoy, without seeing death, unending bliss.<sup>61</sup> In imitation of the Homeric fancy, the poetry of the following ages had imagined the translation of many other Heroes and heroic women of the legendary past to a secret life of bliss in Elysium or in the Islands of the Blest.<sup>62</sup> Later fancy, which saw in Elysium the Land of Promise to which all men who had lived in a manner pleasing to the gods

would be taken after their death,<sup>100</sup> now placed its Elysium or Islands of the Blest in the interior of the earth beyond the reach of all save disembodied souls. In later times this became the currently accepted view, but the subject remained undefined and subject to variation. Men must still, in fact, have imagined The Isles of the Blest, the abode of privileged spirits, to be situated upon the surface of the earth (though, indeed, far away beyond the limits of the discovered countries of the globe), when attempts could be made to find the way there and to bring back news to the living. The attempt attributed to Sertorius was only the most famous of such voyages of discovery.<sup>101</sup> Why, indeed, should these magic Isles remain for ever undiscovered upon the borders of the inhabited world that yet offered so wide a field for discovery, when everybody knew of the island in the Black Sea, often visited by living men, where Achilles, the supreme example of miraculous translation, lived for ever in perpetual enjoyment of his youth? For centuries the island of Leuke, the separate Elysium of Achilles and a few select among the Heroes, was visited and revered with religious awe.<sup>102</sup> Here men thought they could discern in immediate perception, and in actual physical contact, something of the mysterious existence of blessed spirits. The belief in the possibility of miraculous translation to an eternity of unbroken union of body and soul, thus palpably and visibly substantiated, could not completely die even in this prosaic age. The educated did indeed find this conception so strange and unintelligible that when they come to speak of translation legends of the past they profess themselves unable to say what exactly the ancients had supposed to occur when such miracles took place.<sup>103</sup> But the populace, which finds nothing easier to believe in than the impossible, once more naively accepted the miracle. Did not the examples of Amphiaraios and Trophonios plainly establish the fact of translation to underground retreats? And to them as being still alive in their caves beneath the earth a cult was offered until an advanced period.<sup>104</sup> The translation of beautiful youths to everlasting life in the kingdom of the nymphs and spirits was the subject of many folk-tales.<sup>105</sup> Even in contemporary life the miracle of translation seemed not altogether impossible.<sup>106</sup> When the kings and queens of the Macedonian empire of the East began to receive divine honours in imitation of the great Alexander himself, it was not long before men ventured to affirm that at the end of his earthly existence the Divine Ruler everywhere

does not die but is merely "carried away" by the gods and still lives on.<sup>107</sup> It is the peculiar property of divinity, as Plato clearly expresses it,<sup>108</sup> to live for ever in the indivisible unity of body and soul. A court-bred theology could the more easily make such demands upon the belief of subject peoples in the Semitic East, and possibly in Egypt too, because native <sup>109</sup> legends had already told of the translation to immortal life of individual men dear to the gods and akin to the gods in nature; just as similar stories became common in Italian legends too,<sup>110</sup> though possibly only under the influence of Greek models. Indeed, quite apart from obsequious courtliness, Greeks and half-Greeks were quite capable of entertaining the idea<sup>111</sup> that the darlings of their fancy, such as Alexander the Great, had not suffered death but had been translated alive to the realm of imperishable physical existence. This is shown clearly enough by the success which attended the appearance, in Moesia at the beginning of the third century A.D., of another Alexander. This imposter travelled from land to land with a great train of Bacchantes, and everywhere men believed in his identity with the great monarch.<sup>112</sup> A little earlier they had believed with equal credulity in the reappearance upon earth of the Emperor Nero,<sup>113</sup> who, it was thought, had not died but had merely disappeared. When Antinous, the beautiful youth beloved by the Emperor Hadrian, sank and disappeared in his watery grave he was at once regarded as a god who had, in fact, not died but had been translated.<sup>114</sup> The miraculous translation of Apollonios of Tyana is reported with the utmost seriousness;<sup>115</sup> like the other marvels and mysteries in the strange and enigmatic existence of this prophetic figure, it found believers enough.<sup>116</sup>

But such unbroken continuance of the united life of body and soul, begun upon earth and carried on in a mysterious abode of bliss (the oldest form taken by the idea of human immortality in the Greek mind), was never attributed to more than a few specially favoured and specially gifted individuals. An immortality of the human soul as such, by virtue of its nature and composition—as the imperishable force of divinity in the mortal body—never became a real part of the belief of the Greek populace. When approximations to such a belief do occasionally find expression in popular modes of thought, it is because a fragment of theology or of the universally popular philosophy has penetrated to the lower strata of the uneducated populace. Theology and philosophy remained the sole true repositories of the belief in the

immortality of the soul. In the meeting together and conjunction of Greek and foreign ideas in the Hellenized Orient it was not Greek popular tradition but solely the influence of Greek philosophy, that, finding favour even outside the limits of Greek nationality, communicated to foreign nations the arresting concept of the divine, imperishable vitality of the human soul—upon the impressionable Jewish people, at least, it had the profoundest and most deeply penetrating influence.<sup>317</sup>

### § 5

All the various modes of conceiving the life enjoyed by the soul after the death of the body, as they had been explored, modified, and developed in the course of centuries, were admitted on an equal footing to the consciousness of the Greeks in this late period of their maturity. No formulated body of religious doctrine had by a process of exclusion and definition given the victory to any one conception at the expense of the others. But where so much was permitted and so little proscribed it is still possible to ask how these various formulations of belief, expectation, and hope stood in relation to each other. Were any more popular and more readily received than others? To answer this question it is natural to suppose that we have only to turn to the numerous inscriptions from the gravestones of the people. Here, especially in these later times, individuals give unhampered expression to their own feelings and thus reveal the extent and character of popular belief. But information derived from this source must be carefully scrutinized if it is not to lead to misconception.

If we pass in imagination through the long rows of streets in which the Greeks placed the memorials of their dead, and read the inscriptions on the tombstones—they now form part of the accumulated treasures of Greek Epigraphy—the first thing that must arrest our attention is the complete silence maintained by the enormous majority of these inscriptions with regard to any hope—however formulated—or any expectation of a life of the soul after death. They content themselves with recording the name of the dead, adding only the name of the father and (in the case of a foreigner) the country of the deceased. At the most, the custom of some localities may add a "Farewell". Such stubborn silence cannot be satisfactorily explained simply on the grounds of an economy practised by the surviving relatives



of the deceased (though in some cases a municipal regulation against wordy inscriptions may have given countenance to such economies).<sup>114</sup> The very silence of this people that was never at a loss for words to express its meaning whether in verse or in prose, is in itself expressive. Where so little need was felt to give utterance to hopes of comfort, such hopes cannot have been of very vital consequence or matters of much assurance. Men rescued from forgetfulness only what had been the exclusive property of the individual—his name: the appellation which had distinguished him from all others in his lifetime and has now become the barest and emptiest envelope of the once living personality. Inscriptions in which precise hopes of a future life are expressed form a very small proportion of the great mass of epitaphic records. And of these very few again are in prose. Not as simple records of plain and authentic fact do such provisions and announcements of a blessed and hoped-for futurity present themselves. They need the artistic pomp and circumstance with which poetic fancy and extravagant affection clothe their inspired voyages beyond the region of cold and matter of fact reality. This is certainly significant. Even among the poetic epitaphs the majority allude only to the life which the deceased has now done with, looking back upon the circumstances of his life—his fortunes and activities and character; giving expression, often with the most convincing sincerity, to the regret and dependence of the survivors; fixing attention exclusively upon things of this world. Wherever, at last, allusion is made to a future life, the tendency is rather to let fancy roam far beyond the limits of experience and sober reflexion to a vague and visionary land of promise. Such lofty aspirations needed more than any others the elevated language of verse. But we should run the risk of falling into grave error if we concluded from the preponderance of such aspirations among the metrical epitaphs that these were the normal views of the city folk who were their contemporaries.

The simple and archaic conception which perpetuates the old Homeric attitude and views without a complaint or a regret the disappearance of the soul of the departed into Erebus, is of the rarest occurrence among these sepulchral verses.<sup>115</sup> More commonly we have the prayer that the departed may "rest in peace", expressed in the traditional formula<sup>116</sup>—a formula that really refers to the dead man lying in his grave but also contains a further allusion to the "soul" that has departed to Hades.<sup>117</sup> The idea is not yet dead

that there is a realm of the souls which receives the departed—Hades, the world ruled over by the Underworld deities, the "Chamber" of Persephone, the seat of primeval Night.<sup>121</sup> Here a state of semi-conscious existence is conceived to prevail, under the umpire of "Forgetfulness", drinking of which<sup>122</sup> the consciousness of the soul is darkened. Here "the majority"<sup>123</sup> are assembled, and the dead man is visited by the reassuring thought that he may greet once more the souls of those who have gone before him.<sup>124</sup>

But sterner conceptions also occur. There is occasional reference to a judgment<sup>125</sup> that separates the souls in the world below, dividing them into two and sometimes three<sup>127</sup> classes in accordance with the deserts which they have earned on earth. There is no lingering over the pains of the damned,<sup>126</sup> in the description of which the theological imagination had indulged so frequently. A more simple-minded fancy did not need such pharisaical satisfaction in the misfortunes of sinners in order to heighten its own assurance of superiority. There is no trace of a sentiment of penitence and terror indulged in for its own sake. The soul hopes to come by its rights;<sup>128</sup> to reach the "Blessed", to arrive at the Isles or the Island of the Blest—to Elysium, the abode of Heroes and demi-gods.<sup>129</sup> Such hopes are very commonly expressed, but as a rule only in a brief phrase of confidence and hope. We rarely meet with any elaborate or alluring picture of the abode of the blessed.<sup>130</sup> That abode is generally placed within the limits of the underworld kingdom of the souls,<sup>131</sup> and such anticipations, when particularized, refer commonly to a "Place of the Good", which in various forms is represented as the hoped-for dwelling-place of future life.<sup>132</sup>

But we also meet with the view that the company of the good is entirely removed from the region of underworld darkness.<sup>133</sup> For many individuals the hope is expressed or the certainty announced that after death they will have their dwelling in the sky—in the shining *Æther*, among the stars. This belief in the elevation of the disembodied soul to the regions above the earth is so frequently repeated in various forms in this late period that we must suppose that among those who entertained precise conceptions of the things of the next world this was the most popular and widely held conviction.<sup>134</sup> This belief that the soul rises to the neighbourhood and even the community of the heavenly deities<sup>135</sup> has its origin both in religious aspiration and in philosophy. Its roots, indeed, stretch back to a much

earlier period<sup>137</sup> and we may suppose that even in these later days it was derived from and very largely supported by the popular conception, disseminated by Stoic writers, of a living "breath", which composes the human soul, and its effort upwards to the heavenly regions.<sup>138</sup>

But such language is in many cases plainly nothing more than a conventional formula which has already lost all vital significance; it rarely goes further than the expression of a hope that the soul will mount upwards to the heavenly heights. Very occasionally, in the adjective "immortal"<sup>139</sup> applied to the soul (which only sleeps in death),<sup>140</sup> we may detect the influence of mixed philosophical and theological ideas. We soon come to an end of the inscriptions which give expression to the doctrines of theology and of theologically minded philosophy as to the divine nature of the soul, its brief pilgrimage through earthly life and destined return to its true home in a divine incorporeal existence.<sup>141</sup> There is no certain mention of a belief in the transmigration of souls.<sup>142</sup> Of the specifically Platonic doctrine or its influence there is scarcely a trace.<sup>143</sup>

Another type of belief derives its strength not from the teachings of philosophers but from the usage and popular practice of religion. This is the belief of those who hope to be conducted after death to a blessed life by the special care of a god, presumably the god to which in their life-time they have offered particular devotion. Such a god will lead them by the hand, they hope, and conduct them into the land of bliss and purity. One who has thus "obtained a god as his leader"<sup>144</sup> may face the future with equanimity. Together with Hermes the "messenger of Persephoneia",<sup>145</sup> Persephone herself is most frequently mentioned among these conducting deities.<sup>146</sup> Perhaps in this we may see a reminiscence of the hopes awakened and cherished in the Eleusinian and other related mysteries<sup>147</sup>—hopes otherwise expressed on these tombstones with striking rarity. On the epitaph—certainly a late composition—of a Hierophant of Eleusis who "goes to the Immortals", the dead man is made to commend, as a mystery revealed by the gods, the ancient opinion illustrated by stories like that of Kikobis and Biston<sup>148</sup> "that death not only brings no evil to mortals, but is rather a blessing".<sup>149</sup> A gloomy philosophy has in these latter days of the old religion and worship of the gods taken hold of the mysteries themselves and given them an attitude of hostility to human life that was not originally theirs.<sup>150</sup> We are reminded of the mysteries again when we find prayers

or promises that the dead shall not drink of the water of forgetfulness in the realm of the souls, but shall be given the "cold water" to drink by the God of the lower world; that he shall be refreshed at the spring of Mnemosyne, the bath of immortality, and so preserve intact his memory and consciousness, the necessary conditions of full and blessed life.<sup>121</sup> Here there appears to be a reference to the promises made by particular secret cults in which the departed has specially recommended himself to the powers of life and death. This must plainly be the case when, instead of the Greek Aidoneus, there is mention of Osiris, the Egyptian Lord of Souls. "May Osiris give you the cold water" is a common prayer expressed in a formula that is of frequent and significant occurrence in late epitaphs.<sup>122</sup> Of the numerous secret cults of these later times that promised a blessed immortality to their adherents, there is but infrequent mention in the grave-inscriptions: occasionally at the most there is an allusion to the special favour, reaching even beyond the grave, which belongs to the initiated in the mysteries of Mithras.<sup>123</sup>

No doubtful promises, but real and practical experience forms the basis of the belief of those to whom the dead has appeared visibly in a dream to assure them that his "soul" has not been annihilated by death.<sup>124</sup> The oldest proof of the continued existence of the soul remains in force the longest. The pupil hopes for something higher from the master whom death has taken away from his sight: he prays to him that, as he had once in life, so he will now continue to stand by his side, assisting him in the pursuance of his profession as a physician—"Thou canst, for now thou hast a more divine part in life."<sup>125</sup>

Expectations of an energetic after-life of the departed soul, expressing themselves in many forms, are widely current; but such expectations never achieve a unified, dogmatic form. Nor was anyone forbidden to cherish for himself and inscribe upon his grave-stone, unorthodox opinions of every kind—even though they should point to the very opposite of such expectations.<sup>126</sup>

A dubious "If" precedes on many epitaphs the anticipation of a conscious life of the dead in full possession of the senses, or a reward of the dead in accordance with their deserts: "if anything yet remains below". Such phrases are of very frequent occurrence.<sup>127</sup> Indeed the doubt itself is set aside when it is distinctly asserted that after death nothing of the man remains alive. All that men say of Hades and its terrors or its consolations is the fabled invention of poets: darkness

and nothingness is all that awaits us below.<sup>155</sup> The dead turns to ashes or to earth; <sup>156</sup> the elements out of which he was created take back what is their own.<sup>157</sup> Life is only lent to man and in death he restores the loan again.<sup>158</sup> In death he pays tribute to nature.<sup>159</sup> The bitter outcry of the survivors against death, the savage beast of prey, loveless and pitiless, that has snatched away their dearest from their side, shows small hope of the preservation of the vanished life.<sup>160</sup> Grief and complaint, say others, are vain both for the dead and for the living; no man returns; the parting effected by death is for ever.<sup>161</sup> Only submission is left.<sup>162</sup> "Take comfort, child, no man is immortal"—so runs the conventional phrase current among the populace and inscribed by many upon the graves of their vanished dead.<sup>163</sup> "Once I was not, then I was, and now I am no more: what more is there to be said?"—so speaks the dead from more than one gravestone, addressing the living who is soon to suffer the same fate.<sup>164</sup> "Live," he cries to the living, "for there is nothing sweeter granted to us mortals than this life in the daylight."<sup>165</sup> A last thought reverts once more to the life that has been left behind on earth. The body dies, personality vanishes, nothing is left alive on earth but the memory of the deeds and virtue of the departed.<sup>166</sup> But there is a continuance in the life of others, more vital than in the empty sound of fame, achieved by him who leaves behind him on earth children and children's children. There are many who, in these later ages too, are content, in the true spirit of Antiquity, with this blessing and desire no other consolation for their own annihilation.<sup>167</sup>

## § 6

But such reassertions of the antique temper were of rarer and rarer occurrence. The ancient world to which it had given such toughness and energy of purpose was on its death-bed. With the end of the third and the beginning of the fourth century it enters upon its last agony; a general failure of nerve had long threatened the lonely bound masses that shared in the Græco-Roman civilization. In the general atrophy that beset its old age the vigorous blood of the genuine and unadulterated Greek and Roman stocks was flowing but feebly. Now the universal process of decay sets in irresistibly. It was its own inherent weakness that made the attacks of outside forces so ominous to the old world. In the West the old order vanished more swiftly and submitted more

completely to the new forces, than in the Hellenized East. It was not that the old civilization was any less rotten in the East than in the West. The enfeebled hand and the failing mind betray themselves in every utterance—in the last spasms of vital energy that inspired the art and literature of moribund Greece. The impoverishment of the vital forces out of which Greece had once brought forth the flower of its special and characteristic spirit makes itself felt in the altered relation of the individual to the whole, and of the totality of visible life to the shadowy powers of the unseen world. Individualism has had its day. No longer is the emancipation of the individual the object of man's endeavour; no longer is he required to arm himself against all that is not himself, that is outside the region of his free will and choice. He is not strong enough, and should not feel himself strong enough, to trust to the self-conscious strength of his own intelligence. Authority—an authority that is the same for all—must be his guide. Rationalism is dead. In the last years of the second century a religious reaction begins to assert itself and makes itself felt more and more in the period that follows. Philosophy itself becomes at last a religion, drawing its nourishment from surmise and revelation. The invisible world wins the day over the meagre present, so grievously bound down by the limitation of mere experience. No longer does the soul await with courage and calmness whatever may be hidden behind the dark curtain of death. Life seemed to need something to complete it. And how faded and grey life had become!<sup>17</sup>—a rejuvenation upon this earth seemed to be out of the question. All the more complete, in consequence, is the submission that throws itself with closed eyes and eager yearning upon another world, situated now far beyond the limits of the known or knowable world of the living. Hopes and a vague longing, a shrinking before the mysterious terrors of the unknown, fill the soul. Never in the history of the ancient world is the belief in an immortal life of the soul after death a matter of such burning and exacerbated ardour as in these last days when the antique civilization was preparing itself to breathe its last.

Hopes of immortality, widely espoused by the masses and fed rather on faith than on reflexion, sought satisfaction in the brilliant ceremonial of religions that easily outshone the simple worship of every day officially undertaken by the city. In these new rites the worshippers united in the secret cult seemed to be placed more directly in the hands of the gods; and, above all, a blessed existence hereafter was assured to pious

believers. In these days the ancient and hallowed mysteries of Eleusis awake to a new life and remain in vigorous activity till nearly the end of the fourth century.<sup>171</sup> Orphic conventicles must have attracted worshippers for ages ;<sup>172</sup> the Hellenized Orient was familiar with many such orgiastic cults.

In the mixed populations of the East the new religions proved more attractive to the Greeks, too, than their old worship of the gods of Greece. Clear and definite obligations, fixed commandments and dogmas, holding the weak and frail individual in their stronger embrace, seemed to belong more peculiarly to these foreign worships than to the old beliefs of Greece. Rigid and unalterable maintenance of primitive ideas and practices seemed to give the former the stamp of sacred and certain knowledge. From all men they demanded perfect submission to the God and his priests ; perfect renunciation of the world, conceived as dualistically opposed to the divine ; the purging away of the contamination of its lusts by purifications and sanctifications, ceremonial expiations and asceticisms. By these means the faithful prepared themselves for the highest reward that piety could conceive : an unending life of bliss far away from this unclean world in the realm of the holy and the consecrated. To the belief in a blessed immortality these foreign mysteries contributed their much desired support ; and the populace welcomed their message of salvation with all the greater eagerness since their varied and impressive ceremonial contrasted so strikingly with the plain and homely worship of the Greek gods. In the symbolism of these exotic cults men seemed to discern a mysterious and secret knowledge ; and to the divine figures illuminated by such a halo were easily attributed strange and magical powers beyond belief or experience. The cult of the Egyptian deities had long been familiar both in the East and in the West, and they maintained and extended their influence down to the last days of the ancient religions. The Phrygian deities, the Thracio-Phrygian cults of Sabazios, Attis, and Kybele, and the Persian worship of Mithras were later comers, but they, too, took equally firm root and spread over the whole extent of the empire.<sup>174</sup>

The higher culture of these last centuries, having become credulous and avid of marvels, no longer looked with contempt upon the means of salvation and sanctification which had once been left almost entirely to the lower orders of the population. The most cultivated and educated people of these times used their culture and their education simply to justify everything mysterious and incomprehensible in itself—even

when it was expressed in the most physical symbolism. The newly awakened religious interest of the populace had coincided with a return on the part of philosophy to the teaching of Plato; a teaching which itself tended towards religion. Platonism had invaded the doctrine of other schools at many points, and it had already acquired a new home for itself in the restored Academy, where once an un-Platonic Scepticism had overthrown the teaching of the master. Now a new Platonism comes forward and overwhelms all the other schools of philosophy. Absorbing the doctrines of Aristotle and Chrysippus (which it fancied it could reconcile with Platonism), it weaved them into its own special teaching so that the whole presented a subtle and far-reaching system of thought. The speculative system of Neoplatonism, into which the old age of Greece, in spite of its weariness, contrived to introduce so much profundity, spirit, and ingenuity (together with a luxuriant mass of scholastic folly), fills the history of the last centuries of Greek thought. Its fundamental tendency is, once more, a turning away from the life of nature, and a determined invasion of a transcendent world of pure spirit; and it was by this tendency that it satisfied the needs of its time. The Sole and First Cause, lying beyond all being and continually expressing itself in creative emanations, yet never troubled or impaired in its perfect and eternal transcendency; the development, in an unbroken process from this One, of the world of thinking, of the Ideas and pure thought preserved in it—the world of Spirit and the world of Matter—until at last, in longing and desire,<sup>174</sup> all things created return to the origin of all Being: to describe and express all this is the single theme, persisting throughout all variations, of this philosophy. The whole fabric of reality, the interplay of cause and effect, depends upon the inherence of the thing caused in its Cause from which it takes its origin and to which it returns at last. That which in the evolution of nature takes its origin from the One, and degenerates more and more completely, in the darkness and corruption of Matter, as it gets further away from its source—now becomes Man and seeks in morality and religion a conscious return to the pure and everlasting and unailing One. The divine does not descend to earth and man must reach upwards to the divine heights in order to unite himself with the One that is before all multiplicity. This union can be brought about by the pure exercise of the human reason, but also in the mysterious harmony of the individual life with the First Cause that is beyond all reason in the ecstasy



that is above all rationality. It can be achieved when at last the whole series of rebirths has been passed through, whereupon the pure soul, the divine in man, enters into the divinity of the Whole.<sup>174</sup>

To fly from the world—not to work within the world to produce something better—is the teaching and injunction of this last Greek philosophy. Away from all separate, divided Being, upward towards the uninterrupted glory of the One divine life, the soul wings its way. The world, this visible world of matter, is fair, says Plotinos, for it is the work and image of the divine, present and working in it. A last gleam of the departing sunlight of Greek sensibility seems to break through the words in which Plotinos rejects the Christian-Gnostic hatred of the world.<sup>175</sup> The ugly, he says, is strange and contrary to God as well as to Nature.<sup>176</sup> But the soul must no longer rest in the world of created beauty.<sup>177</sup> The soul is so profoundly conscious of its derivation from the supra-sensual, of its divinity and eternity, that it must rise above all created being and reach out to the One that was before the world and remains for ever outside the world.<sup>178</sup>

This philosophy, profoundly estranged though it was from the old Greek attitude to life with its enjoyment of the world, nevertheless felt itself called upon to oppose the rising tide of the new and irresistible religion. It took under its protection the ancient Greek culture and the ancient faith that was so inseparably bound up with that culture. Its most convinced supporters, with the last of the Emperors of the old faith at their head, threw themselves whole-heartedly into the fray. And before them rode the Genius of ancient Hellas, and the old beliefs of Greece. But when the battle had been fought and lost it became apparent to all the world that it was a corpse that rode before the exalted combatants, like the body of the dead Cid Campeador fastened upon his horse and leading his hosts against the Moors. The ancient religion of Greece, and with it the whole civilized life of the Greek world, faded and died at that discovery, and could not be recalled to life. A newer faith, very differently endowed and having power to crush the heavily laden soul and point it upwards in absolute submission to the divine compassion, held the field. The new world that was coming into being had need of it.

And yet—was Greece quite extinguished and dead for ever? Much—only too much—of the philosophy of its old age lived on in the speculative system of the Christian faith. And in the whole of modern culture so far as it has built itself upon

Christianity or by extension from it, in all modern science and art, not a little survives of Greek genius and Greek inspiration. The outward embodiment of Hellas is gone; its spirit is imperishable. Nothing that has once been alive in the spiritual life of man can ever perish entirely; it has achieved a new form of existence in the consciousness of mankind—an immortality of its own. Not always in equal measure, nor always in the same place, does the stream of Greek thought rise to the surface in the life of mankind. But it is a river that never quite runs dry: it vanishes, to reappear; it buries itself to emerge again. *Desinant ista, non perunt.*

(but not very frequent) of common burial grounds belonging to *klairos*: e.g. in Kos, *Inscr. Cos.* 355-9. *Epheboi* bury their dead member, *CIA.* II, 3308; *epheboi* do the same, *AM.* *Mitt.* ix, 36. A member contributes as *ephebe* of the *collegium* out of his own means for the benefit of dead members of an *ephebe*, *ἐκ τῆς καθ' ἑαυτὸν εὐχρηστίας* *αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν νεκρῶν αὐτοῦ*, *CIA.* II, 621 (about 150 B.C.). Another *ephebe* *ἐκ τῆς καθ' ἑαυτὸν εὐχρηστίας* (*ἐκ τῶν κερμάτων*) *ἐκ τῶν κερμάτων* *νεκρῶν αὐτοῦ* from Attica, third century B.C. *CIA.* IV, 2, 623b; cf. *ib.* 615h, l. 14-15; *Rhod. Inscr.* in *BCH.* IV, 138. *Dionysiasitai*, *Athenasitai* in Tanagra *ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν τῶν βίβων*: *GDI.* 960-2 (*JG.* Sept. I, 663-4). The *Isakheiai* in Athens (third century A.D.) offer a crown and wine at the burial of a member: *AM.* *Mitt.* 1904, 261, l. 168 ff. *ἐκ τῶν κερμάτων* and even *ἐκ τῶν κερμάτων* *καὶ τῶν, ὅ ἐστιν*, *ἐκ τῶν κερμάτων* erect the monument, *CIG.* 3191, 3112. (*Τοῦτο*) *ἐκ τῶν κερμάτων* bury together the members of their *ephebe*, *IPE.* II, 58-6. *gymnasarch* also undertakes *τῶν ἐκ τῶν κερμάτων ἐκ τῶν κερμάτων*, *Inscr. Pri.* II, 252, l. 16: noteworthy also is II, 374 B, l. 21-3. A few more are given by E. Lech, *Zu d. griech. Grabchriften* (*Festchr., Friedhöfen*, 1895).



κατὰ δημοσίαν, ἐνταυτὴ κατὰ πόλιν ἐν τῷ δημοματίῳ τοῦ νεκροῦ  
νόμου, Κασίου, *G.D.* 3501, 3502 (time of Augustus). The city buries  
a youth νεκρὸς ἐν ταύρῳ, *Epigr. Gr.* 222 (Antiochos).—Ulpian,  
*Dig.* 47, 12, 5, implies the possibility that lex municipalis permittat  
in civitate sepeliri.

<sup>19</sup> *εἶπον*, i.e. probably grave and monument, of Nessia set up by her  
husband in his own house: *Epigr. Gr.* 682 (Rome).

<sup>20</sup> Thus *Inscr. Perg.* ii, 580, (ἀνὰ δὲ δεξιὰ κατὰμαχίαν τὸ μνημεῖον τῷ  
ἰδὲς πύργῳ . . . καὶ τῷ νότῳ, ἑαυτῇ γυναικὶ εἰσείας, ἐκείνης  
ἐπιφώνησαντες ἐν ἀνδοχῇ καὶ. Similar directions, *ib.*, p. 591,  
and frequently. The series includes the old and traditional circle of  
the *dykensis*: see above, chap. v, nn. 141 and 146 (where *μέχρι*  
*ἀνδοχῆς* καίῳ should be read).

<sup>21</sup> There was even a Solonian law against violation and plunder of  
tombs: *Cic.*, *Leg.* ii, 64. The specially invented word *νεφέριχος*  
shows that such practices were frequent at a quite early period;  
cf. *επατίων φάρα*, Herodotus, v, 57. Complaint on account of the rifling  
of a tomb: Egypt. papyr. of 127 B.C., *Köhne's et al.*, xxvii, 2,  
p. 161 f. Frequent rescripts of emperors of the fourth century against  
the profanation of graves, *Cod. Theod.* ix, 17. But even emperors  
of second and third centuries had to deal with the subject: *Dig.* 47, 12,  
and cf. Paul., *Sent.* 1, 21, 4 ff.; *sepulchri violati actio*, Quint., *Decl.*  
298, 368, 373. Grave-thieves were a favourite character in romance:  
e.g. ap. Xen. Eph., Chariton and others. Epigram of Greg. Naz.  
on the subject of looted graves, *Anth. Pal.* viii, 176 ff. From the fourth  
century the Christians in particular seem to have been a danger to  
heathen burial places (cf. Gotthoff, *ad Cod. Theod.* ix, p. 156 text.)—  
in fact, ecclesiastics were specially given to grave-robbery: *Novell.*  
Valentinian 3 (p. 211 Kitz.), Cassiod., *Var.* iv, 18; *bestiarii latrones* (Amm.  
Marc. 28, 1, 12), were then frequent. An Egyptian anchorite had  
at an earlier period become *latronum maximus et sepulchrorum*  
*variator*: Rufin., *Vit. Patr.* 9 (p. 446b Ruzar.).

<sup>22</sup> *Inscr.*, indicating such sepulchral penalties are rare on the main-  
land of Greece, common in Thrace and the Greek cities of Asia Minor,  
but most frequent of all in Lykia. Most of them belong to the Roman  
period, but also appeal occasionally to *ταῖς τοῖς ἀρχαῖος νόμοις* of the  
city (cf. also Korkyra, *CIG.* 1933); or refer to the *λύκαρος τερψικράτης*  
as though it were a local process of law which had perhaps been con-  
firmed by an Imperial ordinance (*ἐπιτάχματα ἑστὶν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοις καὶ*  
*τοῖς παρῶν νόμοις*, *inscr.* from Tralles: see Hirschfeld, p. 121). They  
therefore cannot be simply borrowed from the Roman custom, but  
belong to the old law of the country esp. in Lykia where a similar  
prescription has been found dating from the third century B.C.: *CIG.*  
4529: see Hirschfeld, *Königsb. Stud.* i, pp. 85-144 (1897)—doubt is  
thrown on the legal validity of the penal clauses in such *inscr.* by  
J. Meckel, *Festg. f. Jhering*, p. 109 ff. (1902).

<sup>23</sup> Crimes directed against those who bury unauthorized persons in  
a grave or damage the monument are rare in European Greece: e.  
Argina, *CIG.* 2140b; Thessaly, *BCH.* xv, 668; Athens, *CIA.*  
1617-20; among these is a Demetrian grave, 1427; a Chian,  
1428; 1417-22 are set up by Herodes Atticus to Apia Regilla and  
Polydendron (cf. K. Keil, *Pauly-Wiss.* i, 2103), but his coquetting with  
the cult of the *πρόμας* proves nothing for the common opinion of his  
fellow citizens. Sepulchral crimes are particularly common in ins-  
criptions from Lykia and Phrygia; also Cilicia, *JHS.* 1891, p. 228, 231, 267;  
a few also from Halkarnassian graves: Samos, *CIG.* 2280.—The

grave and its peace are placed under the care of the underworld deities in these ins.: παραδίδωμι τοῖς καταχθονίοις θεοῖς τούτου τὸ ἄφρονος φιλάνθρωπον κτλ., *CIA.* iii, 1423-4. Cf. also a Cretan inscr. *Ata.* *Mitt.* 1893, p. 211. Whoever introduces a stranger into the grave or damages the grave δειβὴς ἵστατο θεοῖς καταχθονίοις (thus in Lycia, *CIG.* 4207; 4290; 4292), ἀεὶβήσεται τὰ περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τε καὶ θεῶν πάντων καὶ ἡρώων πάντων (from Iktos in Phthiotia, *BCH.* xv, 568). ἑμπεριπαλεῖ ἵστατο θεοῖς καταχθονίοις, *CIG.* 4252b, 4259, 4300e, i, k, v, 4307, 4308; *BCH.* 1894, p. 326 (n. 8)—all from Lycia. (The formula occurs already in a Lyk. inscr. of 240 B.C.; *BCH.* 1890, p. 184: ἑμπεριπαλεῖ ἵστατο—the archons and citizens who neglect to offer the yearly sacrifice to Zeus Soter—θεῶν πάντων καὶ ἀστυνίων δ' ἄρχων κτλ., which thus corresponds exactly with the oldest Lyk. inscr. with sepulchral penalty, *CIG.* 4259). ἵστατο ἱεροσυλὸς θεοῖς κταμένον καὶ καταχθονίοις, *CIG.* 4283 (Pinara in Lycia). This must mean: he shall be regarded as having transgressed the law against δειβειν, ἱεροσυλία (cf. αἱ νόμοι οἱ περὶ ἱεροσυλίου, *Teos.* *SIG.* 523, 51), τυμβωρυχία, having at the same time offended against the gods (see Hirschfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 120 l.). More particular is another Lyk. ins.: ἑμπεριπαλεῖ ἵστατο θεοῖς πάντων καὶ Ἀγνῶν καὶ τοῖς τέκτοσι (as the special gods of the country), *CIG.* 4259, 4303, (iii, p. 1138), 4303 e<sup>2</sup> (p. 1139). In Cilicia ἵστατο ἑσθλαῖος ἢ τε τοῖς Δία καὶ τοῖς Σελάμοις, *JHS.* xii, 231. Phrygian: κεχολωμένον ἔχοντα Μῆνα καταχθονίου, *BCH.* 1896, p. 803, 81: cf. ἀνακηλόμεθα Μῆνα καταχθονίου εἰς ταῦτο πρῆμμιον μηδὲν εὐέλθειν, *Amer. School at Athens* iii, 174. The same is intended by the peculiarly Phrygian denunciation ἵστατο αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν θεόν, πρὸς τὴν χεῖρα τοῦ θεοῦ, πρὸς τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ, *CIG.* 3872b (p. 1099), 3880, 3802 f.o., 3943: *Amer. School* iii, 411; *BCH.* 1893, p. 246 ff. That these are Christian formulae—as Ramsay, *JHS.* iv, p. 400 l., supposes—is hardly likely. Equally unlikely in the case of 3902r (Irene rightly protests against the idea): ἵστατο αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν ζῶντα θεόν (the same occurs again in a decisively non-Christian sense: *BCH.* 1893, p. 241 καὶ τῷ καὶ τῷ κρῖναι ἡμῶν (κρίνει apparently = death in *CIG.* 8731, from Rome, which, considering the words ἀγαλὰν εἶμι 'Hliou, can hardly be Christian). τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἀρχῆς μετέβηται, *CIA.* iii, 1422. Unclear threat: οὐ γὰρ μὴ σπείρει . . . *CIG.* 2140b (Aegina). The profanation of graves is covered in more detail: τούτῳ μὴ γὰρ βαρὴ, μὴ θάλασσα πλωτῇ, ἀλλὰ ἐκρηφωθήσεται πωγύνῃ (the same on the ins. of Herod. Att. agree so far at least in intention, *CIA.* iii, 1417-22). πᾶσι τοῖς κακοῖς κείρων δόμοις, καὶ φρεσὶ καὶ σπυρτὶ καὶ τεταρατοῖς καὶ δάφοντι κτλ., *CIA.* iii, 1423-4 (similar curse on a lead tablet from Crete: *Ata.* *Mitt.* 1893, p. 211). The first half of this imprecation represents the regular formula in such cases and hence—μὴ γὰρ βαρὴ κτλ.; cf. Wensink, *Diss.*, p. vii, and a Jewish-Greek inscr. from Euboea: 'Σθ. 'Αρχ., 1892, p. 175: it occurs also in *CIG.* 2864, 2867 (Halkidikeans); 4303 (p. 1138 Phrygia). δόμοις τοῖς καταχθονίοις θεοῖς δίκην, 4190 (Cappadocia). ἀρῶνα νέκτα λίαντα, χήρον βίον, οἶκον ἑρημον, ἐν πυλὶ πάντα δόμοις, κακῶν δὲο χειρὶ δίκην, 3862, 3875, 400 (Phrygia). These are all peculiarly and originally Phrygian; something similar seems to occur in ins. in the Phrygian language: see Zacher, *vergl. Sprachf.* 28, 381 ff.; *BCH.* 1896, p. 111 ff. Phrygian, too, is the curse αὐτῷ δ' αἰῶνος περιπέσονται σωματόεις, *Egyp. Gr.*, p. 149, *Amer. Sch.* *Ata.* ii, 168—i.e. may his children die wretched. (More plainly νέκτα δόμων περιπέσονται σωματόεις, *BCH.* 1893, p. 372.) Sometimes the additional phrase is found καὶ περὶ βίοντος δὲ δάβει τοῦ καταχθονίου θεοῦ τυμβωρύχου καὶ κεχολωμένου.



# NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV, 11

<sup>12</sup> *τάφος, δεικνύμενος γράμμα, inscr. from Athens (second c. A.D. *Mitt.* 1892, p. 272, l. 8. *ἐλθέτω θυγάτηρ* !  
 libations at the grave: *Epigr. Gr.* 120, 9-10.*

<sup>13</sup> The *ἐκτάφιος*: this is the name given to those *δαιτυρεῖαι* for the *ἐκταφίαν* *τάφον*, *EM.* 181, 44. They even had a burial place of their own: *ἐκταφίαν τάφον* on a marble vase from Rhodes, *JGM. Arg.* 1, 858.

<sup>14</sup> This *χαίρει* repeats the last farewell which accompanied the removal of the body from the house (*Eur., Alc.* 826 f.). Cf. *χαίρει μαι ὦ Πάριον* and also *Ἄλκιος δῖπμων*, the words with which Achilles (*Ψ* 179) addresses his dead friend lying upon the funeral pyre. So too on tombstones *χαίρει* must be intended to suggest the continued sympathy of the survivors and the appreciation by the dead of that sympathy. Does it also imply veneration of the departed as *ἡρώων*? Gods and Heroes were also addressed with this word: cf. *χαίρει δὲαὶ Ἡρόκλειον*, etc.—The passer-by calls out *χαίρει*: *χαίρειται ἡμῖν. ὁ παρόντων οὐ δυνάμενος*, *Alt. Mitt.* ix, 263; and cf. *Epigr. Gr.* 218, 17-18; 237, 7-8; cf. *Loeb*, op. cit., 278 f.

<sup>15</sup> *χαίρει* is said by the dead man to the living: Böckh on *CIG.* 3775 (ii, p. 908); cf. *χαίρειται ὁ ἀναγνούς*, *IG. Sic. et It. (IG. xiv)* 350.

<sup>16</sup> *χαίρειται ἡμῖν. χαίρειται καὶ ἐν καὶ αὐτοῖς*, *CIG.* 1968 (more given by Böckh, ii, p. 80; see also on 3278); *Inscr. Cox*, 343; *IG. Sic. et It.* 60, 318; *BCH.* 1893-4, 242 (5), 249 (22), 528 (24), 533 (36); especially noteworthy is p. 529 (28), *Ἀλκιος Λακίμος χαίρει. καὶ ἐν γὰρ ὁ παρόντων* "χαίρειται ὅτι ταῦτα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ἐμοὶ χαίρειται ἀναγνούς". To call upon the dead is an act of *εὐεχέειν*.

<sup>17</sup> At the burial of a woman who is being given a public funeral *ἡμετέροις ὁ βίμωτος τοῖς τὸ δῶρον αὐτῆς*, *GDI.* 3504 (Knidos; in the time of Trajan). In the same way the name of the *ἄγων* was called out three times at a sacrifice in his honour: see above, chap. iv, n. 62.

<sup>18</sup> Tombstone of Q. Marcus Sitalo (circ. second century A.D.), *Alt. Mitt.* 1892, p. 272, l. 5 ff. *τοῖς γὰρ δὲαυ Βρομῖον Πυθῖον τε εὖ κατέκλυθον, δεικνύμενος γράμμα καὶ μαρτυροῦσα τάφος ἄλλῃ μαρτυροῦσιν ὅτι αὐτοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐμαρτὴ βασιλεὺς ὁ παρόντων ἀναγνούς χαίρει. Those who are thus charged answer, *εὐσεβέων Ἐπιδάμων καὶ νηὶ ἡρώων*.*

<sup>19</sup> Often represented on Attic *lekythoi*: Pottier, *Les lekythes blanches*, p. 57.

<sup>20</sup> The gods and their statues are honoured in this way: Sittl, *Griechen.* p. 192.

<sup>21</sup> *βελτίους καὶ ἡρώωνας*, *Arist., Endom. fr.* 37 [44].

<sup>22</sup> *χαίρειται* was a euphemism for *δαιτυρεῖται* in a treaty between Tegea and Sparta: *Arist., fr.* 342 [592]. They become *χαίρειται* only after death. This ancient and evidently popular expression gives far stronger grounds for believing that *χαίρειται* was applied to the dead than does the passage from *Thuc.*, *Cd.* x, 16 (xlii, 3), for the opposite view (the *μαρτυροῦσιν* writes on a tombstone that a dead woman and her family *χαίρειται* *ἡμῖν*, from which *Loeb* concludes that the word really "denotes a quality of the living and not of the dead", op. cit., 281). It is possible at the same time that those who used such words did not mean anything special by their *χαίρειται χαίρει*, and at any rate only thought of it as a vague adjective of praise. But that was not its real meaning.

<sup>23</sup> *χαίρειται χαίρει* and the like, with or without *ἡμῖν*, are very commonly met with on epitaphs from Thessaly, Boeotia, the countries of Asia Minor (and Cyprus as well: cf. *BCH.* 1896, pp. 343-6; 353-6). On





p. 131, 1). Hektor in particular appears, works miracles, and his statue *καλὰ δὲκέρειον ὑπερὰ κορυφῇ τοῦ τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ*, pp. 161-2. Legend about Antilochos, p. 155, 10 ff. Palamedes appears, p. 154. On the south coast of the Troad opposite Lesbos he has an ancient temple in which *θεοῦν* to him *ἑκατόντες οἱ τῶν δαυαλῶν εἰκοσὶν ἑτάροις*, p. 184, 21 (see also *V. Ap.* iv, 13). Sacrifice to Palamedes as a Hero, 163, 29 ff.—*Manic* power attributed to the *ἑσπερ*, 135, 21 ff.; 148, 20 ff. (to Odysseus in Ithaca, 195, 3 ff.). Hence Proteilaos in particular, who appears at Elaious in Thrac. Chers. to the vineyard-keeper into whose mouth Philostr. puts his story, has so much to say even about what he had not himself seen or experienced. Protes. is still fully alive (*ἔγ*, 130, 23); like Achilles (in Leuke, etc.) he has his *ἑσπερ δὲ δὲ ὑπερέρειον* (131, 31). A vision of Protes. appearing to an enemy makes him blind (132, 8). (To meet a Hero often blinds a mortal, cf. *Hdt.* vi, 117, and the case of Stesichoros and the Dioskouroi.) He protects his protégé's fields from snakes, wild beasts, and everything harmful: 132, 15 ff. He himself is now *δὲ Ἀἰθῶν* (when he is with Laodameia, now in Phthia, and now in the Troad (143, 17 ff.). He appears about midday (143, 21, 32; cf. *Append. vi*). At his ancient oracle at Elaious (mentioned already by *Hdt.* ix, 119, 120; alluded to by Philostr., p. 141, 12) he dispenses oracles more particularly to the champions of the great games, the heroes of the age (p. 146, 13 ff., 24 ff., 147, 2 ff., 15 ff.; famous contemporaries are mentioned: Eudaimon of Alexandria, victor at Olympia in *Ol.* 237, and Heliς well-known from the *Γαλακτοκόμος*). He heals diseases, esp. consumption, dropsy, ophthalmia, and ague, and he helps people in the pains of love (p. 147, 30 ff.). Prot. also gives oracles in his Phthiotic home Phylake (where he pays frequent visits), 148, 24 ff.—It is the regular series of miraculous performances normally attributed to the *ἑσπερ* of older legends, that Proteilaos carries out here.—On Mt. Ismaros in Thracē Maron (*Ἐσπερίος νῆος*, *Ol.* : 197) appears and *ἑσπερ τοῖς ὑμνοῖς* to whom he sends rain (149, 3 ff.). Mt. Rhodope in Thracē is haunted (*οἰκίη*) by Rhesos, who lives there a life of chivalry, breeding horses, practising his weapons, and hunting; the woodland animals offer themselves willingly as sacrifices at his altar; the *ἄνεμος* keeps the plague away from the surrounding *κῶμος* (149, 7-19).—The legendary details from Philostratos here selected for mention may be taken as really derived from popular tradition (cf. also W. Schmid, *D. Antikismos*, iv, 572 ff.).

<sup>10</sup> Again in 375 A.D. Achilles preserved Attica from an earthquake (*Zosim.* iv, 18); in 390 he kept Attic away from Athens; *ib.* v, 6.

<sup>11</sup> *Plu., Lucull.* 23; *App., Mithr.* 83. Lucullus was Roman enough to carry off from the inhabitants of Sinope their much-honoured statue of Antiochos, to which the elaborate cult was principally attached: *ἑσπερ* Antioch. *ὡς θεῶν*, *ἔγ* *καὶ* *παύσιος* *ἀνδρῶν*, *Str.* 348.

<sup>12</sup> See above, chap. iv, nn. 118-20.—*Herone* of Kyniska (sister of Agésilas) in Sparta as victor at Olympia: *Plu.* 3, 15, 1.

<sup>13</sup> Hero-physicians: see above, chap. iv, § 10. Our knowledge of the cult and activity of these Herones is chiefly derived from evidence from later times.—An evidently late creation is the Hero Neryllinos in the Troad, of whose worship, healing, and prophetic powers Athenag., *Apol.* 26, has something to say (*Lob. Agl.* 1171). *ἑσπερ* *ἑσπερ*, *Toxaris*, in Athens: *Luc., Scyth.* 1; 2. (The special name of the *ἑσπερ* *ἑσπερ* may be Lucian's invention, but not what he tells us of his cult.) There was a permanent cult of Hippokratēs in Kos in the time of Soranos: the Koans offered sacrifice to him (*ἑσπερ*) annually on his birthday

(see above, chap. v, n. 88) : *Sotia*. ap. *Antim.* 7, *Hipp.* 450, 13 West. (miracle at the tomb of Hipp. in Larissa: ib., 451, 55 B.). The doctor in Lac., *Philops.* 21, makes an elaborate sacrifice (something more than *θύσις*) annually to his bronze statue of Hipp.—A good story thoroughly in the manner of popular folk-lore is that told of Pellicleus the Corinthian general who was also worshipped as giving help in sickness and the magic tricks that he (simply as *ἄσας*) was able to play on the Libyan slave who had stolen the gold pieces which used to be offered to him: Lac., *Philops.* 16-20.

<sup>41</sup> *Anth. Pal.* vii, 684 ('*Ἀθῆναι*, probably the Macedonians).

<sup>42</sup> *CIG.* 4838b (see above, chap. iv, n. 60). The name expresses the idea: *τίβη* was the greeting which the dead man returned to the traveller, *CIG.* 1866.

<sup>43</sup> Another example: bulls are still sacrificed in Megara in the fourth century A.D. officially by the city to the Heroes who had fallen in the Persian wars, *IG. Sept.* i, 53.

<sup>44</sup> At the monument of Philoparion, *Flav.*, *Philop.* 21.

<sup>45</sup> *ἐν ταῖς Ἱπποκρίτοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐκταταῖς*—in Priamos and Hierapytna in Crete (third century B.C.), *CIG.* 2354, 37. Annual festival of the *Ἱππο*, in which were held *ἐχθροτέρων ἀνδρῶν* for Asklepiades and those who had fought with him in one of the city's wars. A decree honouring the grandson of this Asklep. has been found at Eski-Manyas near Nyzikos. *Att. Mitt.* 1894, p. 23.

<sup>46</sup> In taking an oath they swore by the gods *καὶ ἑσπερ καὶ φερόμενος* (Dreos in Crete): *Cauer, Delic.* 38 A, 31 (third century B.C.). Treaty between Rhodus and Hierapytna (second century A.C.), *Cauer*, 44, 3: *ἐξῆσθαι τῷ Ἀσκληπ καὶ τῷ Πάλλει καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις θεαῖς πᾶσι καὶ πόλεως καὶ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἑσπερ, δεῖσι ἔχοντι τὰς πόλιν καὶ τὰς χώρας τὰς Πόλιν . . .* Oath of citizenship from Chersonesus (third century), *Silb.*, *Berl. Abh.* 1892, p. 480: *ἐσπέρ . . . ἑσπερ δεῖσι πόλιν καὶ χώραν καὶ ταῖς ἑσπερ ἔχοντι τὴν Χερσονήσον*.—Similar oath. from earlier times: see above, chap. iv, n. 4 (and cf. *Ditt.*, *Dem.* 64: *μακάρεσσι . . . καὶ ταῖς ἑσπερ ταῖς ὑψηλοῖς ἐσθ.*).

<sup>47</sup> e.g. inscr. from Antypalaea BCH. 1891, p. 632 (n. 4): Damastion son of Hippias dedicates a fountain and trees *θεοῖς ἑσπερ τοῖς . . . ἀσκληπείῳ ἑσπερ ἀνδριάντι χάρων*.—A grave is dedicated *θεοῖς ἑσπερ*, *CIG.* 3272 (Sagynas), i.e. probably *ἐ καὶ ἑσπερ* (cf. *θεοῖς δαίμονι*, 3627, etc.).

<sup>48</sup> *Collage of ἑσπερ*: *Foucart, Assoc. relig.* 236 (49), 233 (56). *CIA.* II, 630. In Boeotia, *Att. Mitt.* 3, 296 = *IG. Sept.* i, 3735.

<sup>49</sup> e.g. inscr. on one of the seats in the theatre at Athens: *ἑσπερ Ἀνδρόν καὶ ἑσπερ ἑσπερ*, *CIA.* III, 280.

<sup>50</sup> *Δαμῆδονος δὲ καὶ δὲ εἰς τῷ Ἀλφειῷ κατ' Ἀφροδίτην νεαὶ, αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἑσπερ*, *Paus.* I, 35, 3 (*Ἀλφειῷ* in Salamis in 5th century A.C., *CIA.* II, 467-71). *ἑσπερ*, δὲ καὶ δὲ εἰς τῷ Θερμῷ (in Argos), 2, 20, 5. *καὶ εἰ* (Thera) *καὶ εἰς τῷ ἑσπερ* κατ' ἑσπερ *ἑσπερ* ὡς αὐτῷ, 3, 1, 8. He also bears witness to the still surviving cult of Paedion as Hero in Megara, I, 41, 6; Terros in Megara, I, 41, 9; Melampous in Argos, I, 44, 5; Aristomenes in Marmaria, 4, 14, 7; Aitrios in Elis (*ἑσπερ*, δὲ γυναικῶν ἐν καὶ δὲ εἰς κατ' ἑσπερ ἐν τῷ Ἀλφειῷ, 5, 4, 4; cf. the *γυναικῶν* who looks after the *ἑσπερ*: above, this chap., n. 4); Sostratos the *ἐσπερ* of Herakles in Dyme, 7, 17, 6; Iphikles in Phoenia, 8, 14, 9; the boys slain at Kapbyai, 8, 23, 6-7; the four lawgivers of Tegea, 8, 48, 1; the *ἑσπερ* in Katana, 10, 22, 4-5.—Of course, it does not follow that where *Paus.* mentions other very numerous Heroes without to

expressly saying that their cult still survived, he means that those cults had died out.

<sup>10</sup> Plu., *Aratid.* 21.

<sup>11</sup> Aratos received from the Achaeans after his death *θεῖον καὶ τιμὰν ἀριστέα* in which he may take pleasure himself *εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀποχρήμασι ὅτε νῦν αἰσθάνται*, Polyb. 8, 14, 8. He was buried at Sikyon, *ἐν αἰσινήῃ καὶ οὐτὴν τῆς πόλεως*, in a *τέκος περιούριον* called the *Ἀράτειον* (cf. Paus. 2, 8, 1; 9, 4). Sacrifice was made to him twice a year, on the day when he had freed Sikyon, 8th Daisios, the *Σωτήριον*, and on his birthday; the former was carried out by the priest of Zeus Soter, the latter by the priest of Aratos. They included: Hymn by the Dionysiac *παῖδες*, procession of *παῖδες* and *ἐφηβοί* in which the *γυμνασιῶται*, the *δωδεκάθετοι* wearing crowns, and the citizens took part. Of all this only *ἐκθύματα* *μυρὰ* still survived in Plutarch's time, *οὐδὲ πλείονας τῶν τιμῶν ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ πραγμάτων ἔλλαντο* *ἐκλεισθέντων*, Plu., *Arat.* 53 (οὐτὴν: cf. epigram in c. 14).

<sup>12</sup> *πότερ' ἡμῶν νομίζουσι τοὺς σφόδρα αἰσιμαῖς ἀνδρας, καὶ ἰδὲ μάλιστα ἐξέλκοντο ἔθνος, ἐν' αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν χυδρον*. But only a few of them have regular *τελερὰς* *ἡμῶν*: D. Chr. 31, p. 335 M. [l. 243 Arn.], *οἵτινες qui patriam conservarint, adjuverint, auxerint* become immortal: Cic., *Som. Scs.* 3, which also goes too far.

<sup>13</sup> Pelopidas, Timoleon, Leontineus, Aratos become Heroes: see Keil, *Anal. epigr.* c. *onom.* 50-4. Kleomenes Plu., *Cleom.* 38. Philopoimen, *Philop.* 21. *Ισέθιον* *τιμὰν* annual sacrifice of a bull and hymns of praise to Philop. sung by the *πῆν*: D.S. 29, 18; Liv. 39, 50, 9; *SIG.* 286. See Keil, op. cit., 9 ff.

<sup>14</sup> In Sikyon Aratos is held to be the son of Asklepios who had visited his mother in the form of a snake: Paus. 2, 10, 3; 4, 14, 7-8 (favourite form of stories of divine parentage: see Marx, *Mythen u. Sagen*. Thesaur., 132, 2).

<sup>15</sup> The very charming and characteristic story of Drymeaktes, the leader and law-giver of the *ἀρσένες* in Chios, is told by Nymphodoros (ap. Ath. vi, c. 88-90), as having happened *μυρὰν ἀπὸ ἡμῶν*. He held a *ἥρα* in which he was honoured under the name of *ἡμῶν εὐμενὲς* (by the *ἀρσένες* with the fruits of their plunder). He frequently appeared to masters to whom he revealed the *οἰκτιρῶν* *ἐπιβολὰς*.

<sup>16</sup> Hesb. *Γαβήθιος* *ἔθνος ἔθνος, ἐν καὶ τοὺς παραφθίνοντες εἰς αὐτὸν εἶναι* (καὶ) *θανέναι*.

<sup>17</sup> Pixodaros, a shepherd of Ephesos, discovered in a strange fashion a very excellent kind of marble, a discovery which he communicated to the authorities (for use in temple-building). He was made a Hero and renamed *ἡμῶν εὐάγγελος*: sacrifice was made to him officially every month, *Ἀνέλετος*, Vitruv. 2, 2.

<sup>18</sup> Luc., *Macrob.* 21 (for Athenod. see FHG. III, 485 l.).—In Kos an *εὐαῖον* in the theatre was dedicated to C. Stertinus Xenophon (court-physician to the Emp. Claudius) *ἡμῶν*, *Inschr. Cos.* 93.—In Mitylene there was even an apothecosis of the historian Theophrastus (the friend of Ptolemy: cf. *Γλ. Πομπήης* *ἱερὰν* *πρὸς Θεοφράστου* with full name, *Ath. Mitt.* ix, 87); Tac., *A.* vi, 18. *Θεοφράστου* *θεῖον* on coins of the city, and cf. *Εὐφρονος* *ἡμῶν*, *Ἀποβόνη* *ἡμῶν* *εἶναι*, etc., on the same city's coins (Head, *Hist. Numm.* 486).

<sup>19</sup> On a *σῆμα* in Messene there was a portrait of a certain Aithidas of the beginning of the third century B.C.; instead of whom a descendant of the same name is worshipped: Paus. 4, 32, 2. In the market place of Mantinea stood a *ἱερὸν* of Podares who had

distinguished himself in the battle of Mant. (362). Three generations before Paus. visited the place the Mantinians had altered the inscription on the *Areion* and dedicated it to a later Podares, a descendant of the original one, who lived in the Roman period: Paus. 6, 9, 9.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Kail, *Anat. Epigr.* 82.

<sup>11</sup> Cyt. paid to king Lysimachos in his lifetime in Samothrace, SIG. 190 (*Archaeol. Unters. auf Samoth.* ii, 85, n. 2). "Heroising" of Diogenes pharouchos of Demetrios: in 229 B.C. he was bribed by Araios to lead the Macedonian garrison out of Attica: see Köhler, *Hermes*, vii, 1 ff.—ὁμοίως ἐκείνῳ τοῦ δέμου νόθῳ, φιλοειδέμενος, ἄνευσις, εὐεργεσία διὰ τῶν νόθων, αὐτοῦσις ἡ δέκατος ἑκατομῆτος, *Inschr. Cor.* 76. This is a decree made in the lifetime of the *heros* (or why αὐτοῦσις?). who is probably identical, as the editors suggest, with Nikias, tyrant of Kos in the Strabo's time: Str. 658; Perizonius on Ael., *V.H.* i, 29.

<sup>12</sup> *ἥρωας* applied to a living person occasionally on ins. of the imperial age, SIG. 2583, Lykos, Crete: 3665 *ἥρωας*, living, Kyzikos second century: *Att. Mus.* vi, 121 (Kyzikos again) *ἡρωοῦσιν* *ἐκδομένους* *ἥρωας* also certainly living.

<sup>13</sup> When Demetrios Poliorketes conquered and rebuilt Sakyon in 300 the inhabitants of the city which is now called "Demetrias" offer to him while still alive, sacrifice, festival, and annual *θύματα* *ἀπ' αἰῶνος* (*ἀλλὰ τοῖσιν αὖτ' ὁ γὰρ ὁ δῆμος φέρειν*): D.S. 20, 102, 3. Later this frequently occurred: Marcellus, Lucullus, etc., are well known. But the matter did not stop there. The inhabitants of Leta in Macedonia in the year 117 B.C. decree to a prominent Roman, besides other honours, *εὐχόμεθα αὐτῷ ἑῶνα ἡμετέρας κατ' ἔτος ἐν τῷ δασιῳ μεγί, ἕως καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκδομένοις ἡ δῶμος ἐκτελέσονται* (*Arch. des Mus. senats.* 3c série, iii, p. 278, n. 127). This implies that all *εὐχόμενοι* were by custom offered such games at that time.

<sup>14</sup> D.S. 17, 115. Alexander after inquiry at the oracle of Asclepius commanded that he should be worshipped as *ἥρωας* (the oracle having granted in his cave *ἰσχυραῖς* *ἡρ ἥρωας*, but not *ἡρ θεῶν θῆου*): Arrian, *An.* 7, 14, 7; 23, 6; *Plin. Alex.* 72 (an *ἥρωας* was immediately set up to him in Alexandria *Arg.*: Arrian, 7, 23, 7). This did not prevent the superstition and verity which flourished together in Alexander's empire from occasionally worshipping Herph. as *Ἡρακλείου θεῶν εὐεργετῶν*.—D.S. probably only exaggerates the truth: 17, 115, 6, cf. Luc., *Calpurn.* 17–18. (The new *heros* or god immediately gave proof of his power by appearances, visions sent in dreams, *ἰσμενα, μαρτυρία*, ib. 17.)—Elaborate pomp at the funeral of Dem. Poliork.: *Plin., Demetr.* 55.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. the Testament of Epikteta and other foundations mentioned above, this chap., n. 18, and chap. v, n. 128. Or cf. the elaborate arrangements which Herodes Atticus made for the funeral, etc., of Regilla and Polydorus (but *ἥρωας* *ἡδονοῦσιν* is only said in the weakened sense in which *ἥρωας* had been current for a long time): collected by Kail in *Pauly-Wiss.* i, 2101 ff. The extravagant manifestations of grief that Cicero offered to the memory of his daughter were modelled on Greek originals (and upon the certainly Greek *auctores qui dicant heri id oportere*: *AN.* 13, 81, 1). In *AN.* 12 he gives an account of their architectural side: he frequently calls the object that he meditates an *ἡδονοῦσιν*; cf. *consuecudo* *fr.* 5 Or.).—Cf. the Temple-tomb of Pompeilla, who like another Alkestis died instead of her husband, whom she followed into exile as far as Sardis: her death was caused by breathing in the breath of the sick man. Her

temple is at Cagliari in Sardinia, and is adorned with many ianæ. In Latin and Greek: *IG. Sic. et It.* 807, p. 144 E. (first century A.D.).

<sup>10</sup> ὁ δὲ δῆμος (occasionally also ὁ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος) δῆμος (Thera, *CIG.* 2467; *Ross, Inscr. Gr. Ined.* 200 ff. (and sometimes outside Thera: *Loch, Zu d. gr. Grabscr.* 282, 1) ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἐρίπασεν (ἐν τῇ θήρᾳ) . . . ἔφασκε. Cf. also (Thera) *Ath. Mid.* xvi, 166; *Epigr. Gr.* 181-2.

<sup>11</sup> φρονίμων δὲ τοὺς ἐργαζόμενοι (the members of a collegium of Dionysiacs) δυνὺς δῆμονοθεῖαι διανοίας καὶ διατεθεῖαι ἐν τῇ ἐργῇ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, ἵνα καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῶν, ὅς ἐστιν ἀλλοτρίος ἐνέμαχον αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν ἀναρτῶν γλῶσσαν, *Inscr. of Petraea*, second century A.D.; *CIA.* iv, 2, n. 623c, 45 ff. In Argos a guild, apparently of tanners, -uta up an

<sup>12</sup> Like it

in a dream

city of Priæ

*αἰθερ, Epigr. Gr.* 774).

<sup>13</sup> Κάτωθεν τῶν ἱδίων γενεῶν δῆμονοθεῖαι (Thera) *CIG.* 2471. From the same place come many more exx. of δῆμονοθεῖαι by members of a family: 2472b-d, 2473; cf. 'Ἀνδροθένης φιλομένην ἦν ἡμεῖς . . . ὁ δὲ δῆμος (Macedonia) *Arch. mitz. Anz.* iii, 1876, 286, n. 130.—This is probably how we should understand the matter when in sepulchral epigrams one member of the family addresses or refers to another as δῆμος: *Epigr. Gr.* 483, 510, 552, 674.—But ἡμεῖς συγγενεῖς, *CIA.* iii, 1460, must have a fuller sense than the otherwise usual δῆμος. It distinguishes a true ἐργαζόμενος. Prob. this is also the meaning of ἡμεῖς τοῦ δῆμου τῶν ἡμετέρων, *GDI.* 3701 (Kos). Something more than simple δῆμος is also probably intended by the language of the Pergamene *Inscr.* (specially distorted to suit the *λοφωφία*) *Inscr. Perg.* ii, 587, 'I. Μυρόδωρος, ὁ καὶ Νίανος (ἡμεῖς) ἀναθεῖται ἐν τῇ δῆμου (ἡμεῖς).

<sup>14</sup> It is true that it is difficult to find certain exx. of the identification of a dead man with an already existing and honoured δῆμος of another name. Of the various examples generally quoted for this perhaps the only relevant is the Spartan *Inscr.* 'Ἀριστοκλῆς ὁ καὶ Ζῆθος. *Ath. Mid.* iv, 166, B, 2. Identification with a god is of frequent occurrence: cf. *imagines defuncti, quas ad habitum dei Liberi formaverat* (uxor), *divitiis percolens honoribus*: *Apul., M.* viii, 7. (Cf. *Loeb, Agl.* 1002, who also thinks of the example given in the *Plutarchus* of Eur.; but the resemblance is only a distant one.) The dead man as δῆμος: *Epigr. Gr.* 82; *Διονύσου δῆμος*, *ib.* 705; cf. the dead man of *CIG.* 6731, *δῆμος αἰμα Ἥλιον*. Many similar exx. of the representation of the dead in accordance with the types of Dionysos, Asklepios, Hermes are given by *Ross, Archæol. Aufs.* i, 51; *Dencken in Roscher, Lex.* i, 2568.

<sup>15</sup> See above, chap. iv, p. 128 ff.

<sup>16</sup> See *Keil, Syl. Inscr. Bosn.*, p. 153.

<sup>17</sup> In Thespis the ianæ do not show the addition of δῆμος to the name of the dead until Imperial times: see *Dittenberger on IG. Sept.* i, 2110, p. 367.

<sup>18</sup> Many exx. of δῆμος, δῆμος γενεῖν παῖς, etc., are collected and arranged by *Dencken in Roscher's Lex. u. Homer*, i, 2548 ff. See also *Loch, Gr. Grabscr.*, p. 282 ff.

<sup>19</sup> As *Keil* has already observed, *loc. cit.* [n. 78].—At any rate ἡμεῖς still preserves its full sense when the council and people of Athens, in the first century A.D., to describe a woman of position after her death, *CIA.* iii, 880. Or again, when the Athenians as well as the



ap. Ens., PE. II, 36, p. 863. It is certain that Plu. did not simply invent such a story: he may perhaps have found it in some older collection of miraculous *δυσβόλαιαι* such as, for example, Chrysippos did not disdain to make. The probability that Plu. got this story of mistaken identity from a collection of folk-tales is made all the likelier since the same story occurs again in a popular game. Of a similar character is what Augustine has to say on the authority of Coen. Labeo: *Civ. Dei* 22, 28 (p. 822, 1-5 Thom.). Augustine himself, *Civ. pro Mor.* 15, tells a story exactly like that of Plu. (about Curia the *curialis* and Curia the *faber ferrarius*), which, of course, is supposed to happen a little before his time in Africa; and once more at the end of the sixth century Gregory the Great introduces a vision of Hell by the same formula: *Dial.* 4, 38, p. 384 All. Migne. The inventive powers of ghost-story-tellers is very limited: they keep on repeating the same few old and tried motifs.

<sup>10</sup> Plu., *Dio.* 2, 85; *Cimon.* 1; *Brut.* 38 f., 42.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. above, chap. v, n. 23; chap. ix, nn. 105 f.

<sup>12</sup> *ψαῖδες ἀνθρώπων ἀνακαλεῖν* among the regular arts of the magician, *Cels.* ap. *Orig.*, *Contr.* 1, 62, p. 127 Lomm.

<sup>13</sup> See Append. xii.

<sup>14</sup> And in consequence we sometimes have the most surprising confusion of the two states of being. Lucian, e.g. (in *D. Mort.* frequently, cf. 18, 1, 20, 2, and *Neryon.* 15, 17; *Char.* 24) speaks of the dead in *Hades* as skeletons lying one upon another, *Asiakos* allowing them each one foot of earth, etc. (The Romans have the same confusion of ideas: *semper tam puer est*, says Sen., *Ep.* 24, 18, at *Cerberus* timeat et tenebras et larvalem habitum nudis ossibus cohaerentem. Cf. *Prop.* iv, 5, 3, *Cerberus*, . . . *ieiunio terreat ossa sona*, etc.) There is also a confusion between the grave and *Hades* in such expressions as *μητ' ἀποβλέπεισσι κείνοισι*: *Epigr. Gr.* 239, 1, *σκήπτω γὰρ κείροι Πλουτὸς ἐμμελέσθους*, 226, 6; cf. above, chap. xii, n. 95. Such a mixture of ideas was all the more natural seeing that *Ἅιδης* also occurs as a metaphor for *τύμβος* (see below, n. 135).

<sup>15</sup> *ὁ καλὸς ὁμοῖος οὐκ ἰδιώτης ἐσθλὸς καλοῦμαι, Ὀμήρου καὶ Ἡσιόχου καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μυθολογικοῖς περὶ τούτων μυθώματα, τάντων τινὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς βαθύν Ἅιδου ἐκτελέσθαι κατὰ Luc.* *Luc.* 2 (continued to c. 89). Plu., *Suav.* *Viv.* 27, 1195 AB, thinks that οὐ πῶς πολλοὶ ἀπὸ φόβου τοῦ Κερβεῖος, having to fill broken pitchers and the other terrors of *Hades*, as being *πρότερον καὶ τιτάρω δόγματα καὶ λόγους μυθεύουσιν*. And yet as protection against these things people are always seeking *τελέταις καὶ καθαρμοῖς*.

<sup>16</sup> See *Griech. Roman.* 261, *Eitig Acheruntica* (*Leips. Stud.* 13, 251 ff.).

<sup>17</sup> Man hopes that after death he will see *τοὺς τῶν ὑβρίζοντες ἀπὸ πλοῦτος καὶ δυνάμεως κατὰ ἄλλαν ὕλην τίοντες*, Plu., *Suav.* *V.* 28, 2, 1105 C. Reversal of earthly situation in *Hades*: *τὰ πράγματα δὲ νοθμητικῇ ἀντιστάσει*—*ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οἱ πλείους γελῶμεν, ἀντιώμεθα δὲ καὶ οἰκτιζόμεθα ἐν πλοῦσι*, Luc., *Catast.* 15; cf. *DM.* 15, 2; 25, 2; *Isotimía, Isogyria* in *Hades* and *δμοιοὶ πόδες*. *aequat omnes cunctis*; *ignemur nascimur, parcs morimur*, Sen., *Ep.* 81, 16—a favourite commonplace: see Gataker on *M. Ant.* vi, 24, p. 235 f.

<sup>18</sup> How far indeed this really happened is of course not to be answered decisively. The Celsus against whom Origen wrote his polemical treatise looks at the matter from the popular point of view on the whole. (He is no Epicurean as Origen supposes: but neither in fact is he a professional philosopher of any kind, but rather



# NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV, II

an *idiot* with inclinations to philosophy of all sorts and esp. to the  
art at the time.) He distinctly a

μῆτι' ἰσὺι μῆτι' δὴλαυ ρυὶ δρῶν  
κεῖται τοῖς δόλοισι καὶ ψεύει δέ.....

*Seneca de ira* (sp. Orig., *Cels.* 3, 18, p. 270 Lomén.).—On the other hand, it is significant of the temper of the very "secular" Graeco-Roman society which was at the head of affairs at the end of the last century B.C., that Cicero at the end of his work, *de Nat. Deor.* (iii. 81 ff.), in discussing the various means of obtaining a balance between desert and punishment, virtue and reward, in the circumstances of human life, never even mentions the belief in a final balance and recompense after death. (He only mentions among other things the visiting of the sins of the father upon his descendants on earth—90 ff.—that old Greek belief [see above, chap. xii, n. 85] which really excludes the idea of an after life.) Between the days of Cic. and those of Celsus ideas had changed. We know this from innumerable indications; even the next world was looked at in quite a different light in the second century A.D. from what it had been two centuries earlier.

"*exemplis animas sua pœr cni voluerunt sperare* are expected after death by many (while others regard death as merely an *ἀναθεωρήσιμος*): *Plu., Fort. Moral.* 30. 450 A. Horrible tortures in the *voluerunt* in Hades, fire, scourging, etc.: *Lucan., Phars.* 14 (carried still further in *Plu.*'s pictures of Hades, *Gen. Ser.* and *Ser. XI*). Fire, pitch, and sulphur belong to the regular apparatus of this place of torment; already in *Arach.* 372 A, sinners are scorched by burning torches *ἀλλοτρίοις πυρσίοις* (cf. *Lehrs, Popl. Aufs.* 308 ff.). How far such horrors really represented popular belief it is difficult to say for certain (they became quite familiar to Christian writers on Hell from classical tradition: cf. *Maury, Mages et Pasteurs, dans l'antiquité* 166 ff.). But Celsus, for example, though he himself believes in the punishments of Hell (*Orig., Cels.* 3, 49, p. 180) only appeals in confirmation of his belief to the teaching of *ἡγεμονία καὶ νόμος* of certain (not precisely defined) *ἱερεῖς*: 3, 48, p. 178; cf. above, chap. vi, § 2; chap. x, n. 62.

"See above, chap. ii, § 1.

"*Peleus, Kadmos, Achilles in the Islands of the Blest*: *Ni., O. u.* 86 ff. (Peleus and Kadmos the supreme examples of *εὐνομία*: *P. iii.* 86 ff.). In *Eur., Andr.* 1254 ff. Thetis promises to Peleus immortal life *ἄφθαρτος ἐν βέροις*. An ancient poem must have spoken to this effect of Kadmos (and of Harmonia his wife); both are transported *παρὰν τὴν αἰῶνα* *Eur., Ba.* 1338 f.: *παρὰν καὶ μολομένην* sp. *Sch. Pl., P. iii.* 153 (this would be after their "death" in Illyria where their graves were shown, and the snakes of stone into which they had been changed: see *Müller on Scylax* 24, p. 31). Achilles and Diomedes are *παρὰν τὴν αἰῶνα* acc. to the *shelton* on Harmonia: *Germ. pop.* fr. 10 Hgk. (Thus we often hear that Achilles is in the Is. of the Blest or in the *ἡδύτατος οὐρανός* which was regularly identified with them—cf. *ἡδύτατος οὐρανός* in the *παρὰν τὴν αἰῶνα*: *Lucan., Jap. Conf.* 17: *cf. ii.* 14—e.g. *Pla., Sym.* 190 E: *A.R.* iv, 813: [Apollod.] *Epit.* v, 5.

and an older invention than the common Is. of the I we first hear in *Hes., Op.* 156 ff. Diomedes in the same way after his *ἀθανασία* enjoyed immortal life in the island named after him in the Adriatic: *Ibyc.* sp. *Sch. Pl., N. x.* 12: *Str.* 283-4, etc.; but the *shelton* transferred him to the common dwelling-place of the Blessed Heroes.) Achilles, sometimes in *Leuka*, sometimes on the Is.

of the Blest, is accompanied by his wife Medea (in Elys.: Ibyc. Simon. Sch. A.R. iv, 814; A.R. iv, 811 ff.) or Iphigenia who had once been betrothed to him (in Leuke: Ant. Lib. 27 after Nikand.; different version by Lycophr. 163 ff.) or Helen (Paus. 3, 19, 11-13; Conon, 16; Sch. Pl., *Phdr.* 243 A; Philostr., *Her.* 211 ff. Kays).—Alkmene after her baby had vanished from the sight of those who were bearing the coffin (cf. Plu., *Rom.* 28) was translated to the *μακάρεσσι τόποις*: Ant. Lib. 28 after Pherecyd.—Neoptolemos is transported *ἐς ἡλίκωνας* *πύλους μακάρεσσι δὲ γαίαν*, Q.S. iii, 781 ff.—Among the other Heroes there Agamemnon is also implied: Artemid., v, 16.—In all these fabulous accounts the ls. of the Blest (Elysiom) remain invariably the abode of special and chosen Heroes (Harmodios' translation there in the *Idyllion* is no exception; nor is Lucian's jesting reference, *I.H.* ii, 17). It was only later imagination that, under the influence of theology, made this kingdom of Hles the common dwelling-place of almost all the *θεοί* &c.

<sup>100</sup> Fortunatorum memorant insulas quo cuncti qui aetatem egerint caste suam conveniant, Plant., *Ter.* 549 f. Menand. *Rh.*, *Encom.* 414, 16 ff. Sp., recommends the use in a *παρομοιωτικῶς λόγῳ* of the words: *οὐδέποτε τὸν μακάρεσσι τὰ ἡλίκωνας πύλους οὐκ εἶς* (—and even *καὶ τὰς καὶ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς τοὺς θεοὺς διαίτας οὐκ*); cf. p. 421, 16-17 Sp. And much later, *χαίρει ἀπειρησθῆναι αὐτὸν εὖ χαίρει τοὺς θεοὺς, ἐς μακάρεσσι τόποις ἔσθαι οὐδέ ποτε ἡλίκωνας*, Suid., *Ἀντώνιος Ἀλεξανδρινός* (410 B Gaiss.) from Dantesque.

<sup>101</sup> Sertorius: Plu., *Seri.* 8-9; Sall., *H.* 1, fr. 61, 62; Flor. 2, 10 (Hor., *Epod.* 16, 39 ff.). Some even thought that they had found (cf. Phoen. legends: Gr. *Human* 215) the *μακ. τόποις* off the west coast of Africa: Str. i, p. 2; iii, 150; Mela, iii, 10; Plin., *N.H.* vi, 202 ff.; Marcellus, *Aethi.* ap. Procl., in *Tim.*, p. 54 F, 55 A, 56 B, etc. Islands inhabited by spirits in the north: Plu., *Isis*, Gr. 18, p. 419 F; fr. vol. v, 764 ff. Wyt. Procop., *Goth.* iv, 20 (the *μακάρεσσι τόποις* are in the middle of the African continent acc. to Ndt. iii, 26; in Boett. Thebes, *Lyc.* 1204 with Sch.). Ps. Callisth. makes Alex. the Great reach the land of the Blest, li, 39 ff. There may have been many such fables which have been parodied by Lucian in *I.H.* ii, 8 ff., where he and his company *ἐν ἡμέρας ἑκατό χυμίων ἐμβάλεσκον* (ii, 10). It was always natural to hope that at the *Anthropodes* (cf. Serv., *A.* vi, 532) such a land of the Souls and the Blest might some day be discovered—as indeed many have thought they had discovered it in the progressive geographical discovery of the Middle Ages and modern times.

<sup>102</sup> Leuke, to which already in the *Aethiopis* Achilles had been translated, was originally a purely mythical place (see above, p. 66), the island of the palid shades like the *Ἀντρεὺς νῆσος* of Od. ii 11, at the entrance of Hades; cf. π 315. It is the same rock of Hades from which unhappy lovers cast themselves down to death, *ἔρως ἔχοντες* and *Ἀντρεὺς νῆσος* καὶ *Ἀνακρ.* 17, etc. (cf. Dietsch, *Nek.* 27 f.). *Ἀνάκρ.* the white poplar, as the tree of Hades, was used to make the garlands of the *Μυσταί* at Eleusis; cf. *Ἀντρεὺς νῆσος* at the entrance of Hades, *Epigr.* Gr. 1037, 2).—It was probably Milesian sailors who localized this island of Achilles in the Black Sea (there was a cult of Ach. in Olbia and in Miletos itself). Alc. already knows of the champion as ruling over the country of the Scythians: fr. 48b, *ἐν Βυζόντι καὶ δὲ δόρυ δόρυ δὲ Ἀχιλλεύς εἶναι* (εἶναι), Pi., *N.* iv, 49. Then Eur., *Andr.* 1229 ff.; JT. 436 ff.; finally Q.S. ii, 770 ff. Leuke was particularly identified with an uninhabited islet rising with its white limestone cliffs out of the sea at the mouth of the Danube:

*Killa* *ἐπὶ ἑβόλῃς*, Lyc. 189 (probably the Istros is meant but the latest editor simply substitutes "*Ἰστρον ἐπὶ δὲ*,"—a far too facile conjecture).—It stood, more exactly, below the *πλαῖα ἀράχα*, i.e. the most northerly mouth of the river (the Killa mouth): Arrian, *Peripl.* 20, 3 H.: (Scylax) *Peripl.* 48 prob. means the same island: cf. Louke, *ἐπὶ Ἰστρον*, *Max. Tyr.* 15, 7. It has been proposed to identify it with the "snake island" which lies more or less in the same neighbourhood: see H. Koehler, *Mém. sur les îles et la course cons. d'Achille*, etc., *Mém. Acad. S. Petersb.* 1826, iv, p. 599 ff. It was only by a confusion that the long sandy beach at the mouth of the Borysthenes, called *Ἀχιλλέως ἄσπις*, was identified with Louke (e.g. by Mela, ii, 90: Plin., *NH.* iv, 93: D.P. 541 ff.): legends of Achilles' epiphanies may have been current there too (as in other islands of the same name: Dionys. of Chibia ap. Sch. A.R. ii, 638): the Oibtopolilai offer a cult to *Ἀχιλλεύς Παράδεχης* there: *CIG.* 2076-7, 2080, 2084b-1 (*JPE.* i, 77-83). But as a settled abode of Achilles only Louke was generally recognised (there was a *ἄσπις Ἀχιλλέως* there as well: Eur., *IT.* 437: Hesych. *Ἀχιλλ. ἄσπις*: Arr. 21—hence the confusion mentioned above). Strabo's remarks on the subject are peculiar (vii, 206 f.). He distinguishes the *Ἀχ. ἄσπις* (which had already been mentioned by Hdt. iv, 55) from Louke altogether, and he places that island not at the mouth of the Istros but 300 stades away at the mouth of the Tyras (Dniester). But the place where sacrifice and worship was made to Achilles, as the abode of his spirit, was definitely fixed: and this was, in fact, the island at the mouth of the Danube (*κατὰ τὸ Ἰστρον τὰς ἑβόλῃς*, Paus. 3, 19, 11), of which Arr. 23, 3, gives an account based partially on the evidence of eye-witnesses (p. 399, 12 Mull.). It was an uninhabited, thickly wooded island only occupied by numerous birds: there was a temple and a statue of Ach. on it, and also an oracle (Arr. 22, 3), which must have been an oracle taken by casting or drawing lots (for there were no human intermediaries) which those who landed on the island could make use of for themselves. The birds—which were perhaps regarded as incarnations of the Heroes, or as handmaidens of the "divinity of light" which Achilles was, acc. to R. Holland, *Heroenzeit in d. gr. Myth.* 7 ff., 1896—the birds purify the temple every morning with their wings, which they have dipped in the water: Arr., p. 388, 18 ff. Philostr., *Her.* 748, p. 212, 24 Kays. (Cf. the comrades of Diomedes changed into birds on his magic island: Iuba ap. 191n., *NH.* x, 127—another bird miracle: ib., x, 78). No human beings dared to live on the island, though sailors often landed there: they had to leave before nightfall (when spirits are abroad): Amm. Marc. 22, 8, 35: Philostr., *Her.* 747, p. 212, 30-213, 8. The temple possessed many votive offerings and Greek and Latin ins. (*JPE.* i, 171-2). Those who landed there sacrificed the goats which had been placed on the island and ran wild. Sometimes Ach. appeared to visitors: at other times they heard him singing the Paean. In dreams too he sometimes appeared (i.e. if a person happened to sleep—there was no Dream-oracle there). To sailors he gave directions and sometimes appeared like the Dioskouroi (as a flame?) on the top of the ship's mast (see Arr., *Peripl.* 21-3; Scymn. 790-6; from both these is derived Anon., *P. Pind. Eux.* 64-8: *Max. Tyr.* 15, 7, p. 281 f. R.; Paus. 3, 19, 11: Amm. Marc. 22, 8, 35. (The account in Philostr., *Her.* 748, p. 211, 17-219, 8 Kays., is fantastic but uses good material and is throughout quite in keeping with the true legendary spirit—esp. in the story also of the girl torn to pieces by ghosts: 215, 8-30. Nor is it likely that

Phil. himself invented the marvellous tale laid precisely in the year 163-4 A.C.). Achilles is not regarded as living quite alone here: Patroklos is with him (Arr. 32, 34; Max. Tyr. 19, 7), and Helen or Iphigeneia is given him as his wife (see above, n. 969). Leognymos of Kroton, sixth century B.C., meets the two Aiantes and Antilochos there: Paus. 9, 19, 13; Conon 18; D.P. (time of Hadrian) says (345): ἀετὶ δ' Ἀχιλλῆος καὶ ἑταίρων φάτις ἄλλω φυχῇ εἰσέσσεσθαι θρηνησῶν ἀπὸ βήσσας (which Avien., *De. Orb.*, misunderstands and improves on: 722 fl.). Thus the island, though in a limited sense, became a true *μακάρεσσι νῆσος*—*insula Achilles eadem Lemus et Macaron appellata*, *Plin.*, *Nat. iv.*, 83.

<sup>126</sup> Cic., speaking of the "translations" of Herakles and Romulus, says *non corpora in caelum elata, non enim natura pateretur* . . . (sp. Aug., *Cl.*, 22, 4); only their animi remanserunt et aeternitate fruuntur, *N.D.* ii, 62; cf. iii, 12. *Plin.*, *Rom.* 28, speaks in the same way of the old translation stories (those of Aristeas, Kleomedes, Alkmenē, and finally Romulus)—it was not their bodies which had disappeared together with their souls, for it would be *κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, ἀποσώζον τὸ θεῖον τῆς φύσεως ἀπὸ τοῦ θνήσκει* (cf. *Pelop.* 18 fin.); cf. also the Hymn (represented as ancient) of Philostr., dealing with the translated Achilles: *Her.* 741, p. 208, 24 ff. K.

<sup>127</sup> Celsus and Plutarch both know and describe the ancient cult and oracular power of Amphiaraus (only at Oropos now) as still in existence: the same applies to that of Trophonios (like that of Amphilochos also in Cilicia). An inser. from Lebadeia (first half third century A.D.) mentions a priestess τῆς Ὀμοφύας τῆς Ἑλλάδος *κατὰ τὸ Τροφονίαν*, *I.G.* Sept. i, 3428.

<sup>128</sup> Ἀστειδίζω τὴν Εἰρήνην, τὸν αἰετῶνα, φρασκὸν νέμειν ἐξ ἀνείων καὶ πν ὑπὸς Ἀστακίδης (he has become divus, i.e. immortal): *Call.*, *Ep.* 24. Of a similar character is the legend of Hylas: ἀθάνατος ἔσονται, *Ant.* lib. 26; and of Boreas among the Maryandryoi (τυμβόληντος Hesych. *Βῶρμος, ἀφαισθῆναι Nymphis*, fr. 9). The Daphnis legend is another example, and even the story of Odysseus and Kalypso, who detains him in her cave and would like to make him immortal and ageless for ever, is in reality based on such legends of the Nymphs. (Even the name of the Nymph in this case indicates her power: to καλῶμεν her mortal lover, i.e. ἀθανάτῳ ποιεῖν.) Only in this case the spell is broken and the ἀναθεσίσις of the translated lover is never carried out. For other exx. of legends of the love of Nymphs for a youth see *Gruech. Roman.* 109, 1; a Homeric ex. in *Z* 21 of the νῆς Ἀθαρβέρη and Boekolion the son of Laomedon. The idea that a person translated by the nymphs did not die but lived on for ever, remained current: cf. inscr. from Rome, *Epigr. Gr.* 570, 9-10: τοῖς πάρος οὐ μύθος πιστεύεται· καὶ νῦν γὰρ δεδῆλν φρασκὸν ὡς νεκρὸν Νεῖβει, οὐ θάνατος. And again, p. 571: Νύμφαι κρηναίαι με συνήγαγον ἐν βύσσιν, καὶ τὰς σὺν νεκρὸν εἶπεν τοῦτ' ἔσας.

<sup>129</sup> In the extravagant and fanatical worship of Dionysos that was transplanted from Greece to Italy and Rome in the year 166 A.C. the miracle of translation was carried out in a very practical fashion (belief in its possibility was evidently firmly established). Machines were prepared upon which those whose disappearance was to be effected were bound: they were then transferred by the machine in *additos specus*; whereupon the miracle was announced: *superior a dis homines istos*: *Liv.* 39, 13. This only becomes intelligible in the light of such legends of the translation of mortals, body and soul, to immortality, of which we have been speaking.

<sup>107</sup> Plainly so in the case of Berenike the consort of Ptolemy Soter: Theoc. 17, 46. Theocritus addresses Aphrodite: *αἰδέομαι ἡνὶκα βαρύνειαι θεοῖσδε Ἀφροδίτῃ καλεσμένην αἰεὶ ἱερὰν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἀνθρώπων ἀνέσθῃς ἐπὶ τοῖς καλεσθεῖσι σέβασιν καὶ προσέδωκεν ἀνθρώποις καλέσασθαι. ἐν τοῖς καλεσθῆναι, ἴσθι ἢ ἐκκεῖθεν γὰρ (ἐπὶ τοῖς καλεσθῆναι) οὐ σέβασιν: cf. Inscr. Perg. i. 246, 3). Cf. also Theoc. 15, 190 ff. As a rule, however, this idea is not so definitely expressed (though it is plainly implied that translation is the normal way in which desired princes depart this life, in the story indignantly rejected by Arrian, *Anab.* 7, 27, 3, that Alexander the Great wanted to throw himself into the Euphrates *αἰεὶ ἐφ' ὅτι ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος μετατρέψει τὸν βίβην πρὸς τοῖς ἱερῇσιν θύκαισι καὶ ἐν τῷ αἵματι τῷ ἰσχυρῷ ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἀπὸ θεοῦ ὁ ἀναστρέψεται*—which is the regular and ancient idea of translation, exhibited e.g. in the story of Empedocles' end: see above, chap. xi, n. 41; and Christian pamphleteers transferred the fable to Julian and his end). The Roman Emperors also allowed such conventional miracles to be told of themselves, in which at least they were imitating the practice of the Hellenistic monarchs and the "consecration" fables usual at their death (they do not die but *μετατρέπονται ἐξ ἀνθρώπων. μὲν, εἰς θεοῦ, SIG<sup>3</sup>. 246, 16; Inscr. Perg. i. 249, 4; Inscr. from Hierapolis given by Fränkel (ib. i. p. 39a).* That the god is translated, his whole personality in *caelum* *erexit*, is implied as occurring at the death of an Emperor on the coins of consecration, in which the translated is represented as being carried up to heaven by a *Genius* or a bird (e.g. the eagle which was set free at the reign of the emperor: D.C. 86, 42, 3; 74, A, 8; Hdn. 4, 2 ff.); see Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsverw.* 3, 447, 3. Nor were there lacking people who maintained on oath that they had actually witnessed the translation of the emperor's body and soul to heaven, as had once happened to Julius Proculus and Komulus. Thus at the end of Augustus' life: D.C. 86, 44, 2, and that of Drusilla: 89, 11, 4. Sen., *Apoc.* 1. It was the official and only recognized manner in which a god can leave . . .*

<sup>108</sup> *Ps. 244 CD. εὐαγγέλιον . . . βίβη, ἀφ' ἧς ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ ψυχῇ, ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ σώματος, τοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ ψυχῇ. In acc. with the will of the θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῷ ψυχῇ. It is to this that I Oearch. alludes ap. Ath. 15, 670 B, ἐν τῷ σώματι (ἀλλὰ τὰ MSS.) καὶ τῷ ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ σώματι: hence they are ἀφ' ἧς, *Tam.* 4) AB.*

<sup>109</sup> Hagiastra, Enchir: see above, chap. ii, n. 38. Moses, too, was translated acc. to later legend, and Elijah (cf. after the battle of Panormos Hamulcar disappears and for that reason is worshipped with sacrifice: Hdt. vii, 168-7). In Egypt too: D.S. i, 25, 7, speaks of the ἐξ ἀνθρώπων μετατρέπονται, i.e. translation, of Osiris (for the expression cf. *Κάτω καὶ Πυλῶδες ἐξ ἀνθρώπων μετατρέπονται*, Inscr. *Arch. 18*), 18, etc., frequently).

<sup>110</sup> Stories of the disappearance (non c., . . . — cf. *φθόρος*) of Aeneas and Turnus, King I other: Preller, *Röm. Myth.*, pp. 84-5; 663, 2; 704. *Præcep.*, *Geol.* iv, 22 ff.

<sup>111</sup> So too Caesar in *deorum numerum* relates *est non ore modo decoratum sed et permaione volgi*, Suet., *Jul.* 88.

<sup>112</sup> D.C. 79, 18.—It is natural to suppose that some prophecy of the return of the great Macedonian was current and encouraged the attempt to turn the prophecy into a reality and predisposed people to believe in it. This at least is what happened in the case of Nero

and the false Fredericks of the middle ages. This seems to have been at the back of the superstitious cult of Alexander particularly flourishing just at that time (cf. the story told of the family of the Macriani by Treb. Poll. *xxx* *Jyr.* 14, 4-8). Caracalla (Aur. Vict., *Epit.* 21; cf. Hols. 4, 8; D.C. 77, 7-8) and Alexander Severus actually regarded themselves as Avatars of Alexander reborn and incarnated in themselves (the latter was first called Alexander at his elevation to the principate, certainly *omnis causa*, and was supposed to have been born, on the anniversary of Alexander's death, in A.'s temple: Lamprid., *Al. Sev.* 5, 1; 13, 1, 3, 4. He paid special honour to Alex., and as we are expressly told by Lamp. 64, 3, *se magnam Alexandrum videri videbat*).

<sup>112</sup> The Christian anticipation of the return of Nero (as Antichrist) is well known: he was supposed to have disappeared and not to have died. They based their expectation, however, on a widespread belief of the populace which the various *Pseudoneroi* who actually appeared turned to their advantage (Suet., *Ner.* 57; Tac., *H.* i, 2: ii, 8; Luc., *Jndart.* 20).

<sup>113</sup> This was the idea lying behind the deification of Antonius commanded by the Emperor: as may be seen from the connexion in which Celsus speaks of the matter (ap. Orig., *Cels.* 3, 36, p. 296 Loemm.): he mentions the disappearance of Ant. in the same context as the translation of Kleomedes, Amphitrace, Amphilochoi, etc. (c. 33-4).—The language in which the deification of Ant. is spoken of on the obelisk at Rome gives no precise idea of what happened: see Erman, *Mit. arch. Inst. rom. Abt.* 1896, p. 113 ff.—In this case, then, we have a translation effected by a river-god: cf. the water-nymphs mentioned above, n. 105. In the same way Aeneas disappeared into the river Numicus: Serv., *Aen.* xii, 794; Sch. Veron., *Aen.* i, 259; D.H. i, 64, 4; Arnob. l. 36. Ov., *M.* xiv, 588 ff.; Liv. i, 2, 6. cf. the fable of Alex. the Great's translation into a river: p. 107. Euthymus in the same way vanished into the river Kaikinos (supposed to be his real father: *Paus.* 8, 6, 4): see above, chap. iv, n. 118.

<sup>114</sup> Philostr., *V. Ap.* viii, 29-30 (not indeed from Damis as Ph. himself definitely asserts; but certainly from sincere accounts derived from the various adherents of Apoll.—none of the facts in the biography are Phil.'s own invention). Apoll. either died in Ephesus or disappeared (*ἀφανίσθη*) in the temple of Athens at Lindos or disappeared in the temple of Diktynna in Crete and ascended to heaven *ἐντὶ σήματι* (as Eus. *ado. Hierocl.* 44, 408, 5 Ka. rightly understands it). This was the legend generally preferred. His *ἀφανισμός* was confirmed by the fact that no grave or cenotaph of Apoll. was to be found: Philostr. viii, 31 ff. The imitation of the legends about the disappearance of Emperors is obvious.

<sup>115</sup> τὸν Ἀπολλωνίου ἐξ ἐλθόντων ἡδὲ ὅσων, θαυμάζοντων δὲ ἐν αἰφ., Philostr.

believing Thomas to whom Apoll. himself appears.

<sup>116</sup> Pre-existence of the soul, return of the souls of the good to their home with God, punishment of the wicked, complete *ἀφάνεσις* of all souls as such—all this belongs to the wisdom of Solomon. The Essene doctrine of the soul as described by Jos., *B.J.* 2, 8, 11, is also thoroughly Greek: it belongs to the Stoico-Platonic teaching (i.e. the Neopythagorean variety): see Schwally, *Leben u. Tod u. Forts. all. Israel*, p. 151 ff., 179 ff. [1892]. The *carmen Phocylideum* is the work of some Jewish author who obscurely mixes up

Platonic ideas with those of Greek theologians [cf. 104 where Bgk., *PLG.* ii, p. 85, rightly defends the MSS. *θεοί* against Bornay], and of the Stoics (108)—adding also ideas derived from the Jewish doctrine of the resurrection (115 at least is completely Greek: *ψυχὴ δ' ἀθάνατος καὶ ὀψύχως* [δὲ καὶ *ψυρρέ*]). In Philo's doctrine of the soul everything comes from Platonic or Stoic sources.

<sup>112</sup> e.g. in Sikyon as it appears: *Paus.* 2, 7, 2.

<sup>113</sup> Perhaps in *Epigr. Gr.* ed. Kaibel (which will be referred to in this section as *Ep.*), 35a, p. 317, but this belongs to the fourth century A.C. A late example (in prose), *IG. Sic. et It.* 1702.

<sup>114</sup> *γόνις ἔχεις θάλαμον*, *Ep.* 198, 4; cf. 103, 9; 538, 7; 551, 4; 559, 3: *IG. Sic. et It.* 229; Rhodian inscr., *IGM. Acq.* i, 151, 3-4 (first-second century A.D.): ἀλλὰ σὺ, θάλαμον, πρὸ φθιμένης ἀνέστης γόνις ἐνερθερ ἔχεις.—Eur. already has something similar: *Alc.* 463. see above, chap. xii, n. 121.

<sup>115</sup> The confusion of ideas is evident, e.g. in *Ep.* 700, *καίτοις ἔχεις γόνις θάλαμον ἀνέστης ἐνὶ γούρῳ*, cf. 222b, 11-12.—The real meaning of such wishes is indicated by Luc., *Luc.* 18; the dead son says to his mourning father, *θέλεις πρὸς σοὶ ἀναστῆναι κατακλιθεῖς ἐν τῷ μνήματι*.

<sup>116</sup> *Φερσέφονος θάλαμος*, *θάλαμος*, *Ep.* 35, 4; 60, 2; 201, 4; 231, 2; *Anth. Pal.* vii, 507-A "Serauides": *φθιμένους δέποιος θάλαμος*, *Ep.* 143, 2. *θάλαμος Νεκράς*, *AP.* vii, 232. (We need not hesitate to use the grave-epitaphs in the *Anthology* side by side with the actual sepulchral inscriptions. The former are sometimes the models of the latter, sometimes modelled upon actual epigraphic inscriptions, but always closely related to the more literary epitaph.)

<sup>117</sup> *Ἀθήνη καταΐκοντο νόμα*, *Ep.* 244, 10. *ἢν παραβῆτε ἐν νόμα Ἀθήνης*, 261, 20. (*Νόμα*, *Ἀθήνη* *ἔμμεν ἄλρον* ἐν νόμαί, 312.) *Μόρσι καὶ Ἀθήνῃ καὶ κατ' ἄλλων ἐν Αἴδα*, 521. (*Cl. AP.* vii, *Ἀθήνη* *θάλαμος*, 25, 4. *Ἀθήνη* *λάφυ*, 496; *Ἀθήνη* *πύλας*, 711, 716.) *Ἀθάνα* *ἐλθεῖν εἰς λαμίνες*. *Myrian* inscr. *BCR.* xvii (1894), p. 532, n. 34.

<sup>118</sup> *οἱ πλάκους* = the dead (like the Latin *plures*: *Plaut.*, *Trin.* 291, *Petron.* 42): *ἐκ πλάκων* in *Hades*, *Ep.* 373, 4: *AP.* vii, 791, 8; xi, 42. Already in *As.*, *Ecc.* 1073: *γραβεῖ ἐκπονηνταὶ κατὰ τῶν πλάκων*. *Call.*, *Epigr.* 5 [cf. *Boissac.* on *Euphr.*, p. 309]. Ancient oracle ap. *Polyb.* 8, 30, 7: *μετὰ τῶν πλάκων* = τῶν μεταλλευμάτων (*Tarentum*). Even in the present day: *ὅσοις πολλοῖς*, *Schmidt.* *Folkst.* d. *Nögr.* i, 235.

<sup>119</sup> *Ep.* 268, *μή μέρον, φίλ' ἄνερ, με' καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὐδὲν εὐρήσεις νῆν σὴν στήγανος ἔκταξις*. Cf. 556, 5 ff.; 397, 5. *Phrygian* inscr., *Papert American School.* vi, 208 (n. 427): a father addressing his dead son *καὶ σὺ ἐκταξίαν νότον θάλαμον φῖνας αὐτὸ ψυχῇ ἀθάνατον γὰρ ἀποθανόντος*.

<sup>120</sup> *οἱ δὲ τίς ἐν φθιμένους κρίνεις, ὡς λόγος ἀμφὶ θανάτῳ*, *Ep.* 215, 5. A mother boasts of the piety of her son in *Rhadamanthys*: 514, 5 (cf. 556, 21.). So too, in *AP.* vii there is little mention of a judgment (596 *Agathias*).

<sup>121</sup> The division of the dead into two classes is implied where the pious departed is said to be about to dwell ἐν μνήματι, etc. But the distinct separation of the dead into two or three classes (see above, chap. xii, n. 62) is rare in the sepulchral inscr.: *Ep.* 650, 8 ff., is an exception (but there one category is *ταχθονία*, the other in the *αἴθερ* —a Stoic idea).—A peculiar arrangement, implying the three classes, is given in [*Socr.*] *Epist.* 27, 1 (they are in the *τάρας εἶς*, and *ἀνέβαν* in *Hades*, and in the *αἴθερ*): *ταῖς εἶς κατὰ γὰρ ἐν εἰσελθὼν γούρῳ ἔσται*

εἰτε κατ' ὄνομα (ὅπως καὶ μᾶλλον περὶ τοῦ) Εὐκαίρου.—The same again in *AP.* vii. 370 (Diodor.) ἐν Διὶ (i.e. in Heaven) ἢ μακάρων.

<sup>114</sup> There is perhaps no reference in the grave-ines. to the punishment of the ἀσέβεις, and scarcely any in *AP.* vii [but cf. 377, 7 l. Erythraea].

<sup>115</sup> ψυχὴ δ' ἐν τῷ δίκαιον ἔβη. *Ep.* 502, 13; i.e. to the place to which it justly belongs.

<sup>116</sup> καί τις μακάρων νήσους θαλίη ἐνὶ πολλῷ. *Ep.* 649, 2; 365, 6; 649, 9. νήσον ἔχει μακάρων. 473, 2; 107, 2; *AP.* vii. 690, 4. μακάρων πεδίον. *Ep.* 516, 1-2. Ἥλκων πεδίον. 414, 8; 150, 6. πεδία Ἥλκων. 338, 2; 649, 3. χώρος ἡλκων. 813a. 6. μετ' εὐσεβέων ἐσθλὴν ἐν Ἥλκων. 654, 4.—ταῦ δ' ἄρ' αὖτε ἱερὸν δόμον. οὐδ' Ἀχέρωντος· ταῖον γὰρ βότου τέρεα ποταῖον ἐν. *Ep.* 228, 7-8. θαλάσῃ χώρος ἔχει φθιμένων. 539, 4. Ἀθηναίη, πρὸ δὲ παιδὸς ἐν θρώσσι φυλάσσουσι, εὐσεβέων δὲ χώρος ἱερὸν ἄσπετος. 228b, 7 (p. 520). ὄψεν' ἐν θμυθείω, 699 (καὶ μὲν ἔβη θέλει παρ' Ἀχέρων, *AP.* vii. 659, 3).

<sup>117</sup> Description of the charms of the μακάρων νήσων and the Elysian fields where οὐδὲ ποταμός ἐνθρώπων ἐνὶ βίῳ, *Ep.* 649. More elaborate in the poem of Marcellus on Regilla the wife of Herodes Att.: *Ep.* 1046 (she is μετ' ἁρώσταις ἐν μακάρων νήσοισιν, ἵνα Κρόνος ἐμβροταλέν, 8-9; Zeus had dispatched her thither with soft breezes, ἐν ὠκεανῷ, 21 ff. Now she is οὐ θνήσκει, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ θέλει, but a Hieronymo, 42 ff. In the poem of Proclus on θμυθείω she serves as an ὁδὸς νέμει of Persephone. 51 ff.).

<sup>118</sup> Clearly e.g. the place where Rhodemanthys holds sway in Hades. *Ep.* 452, 16-18.

<sup>119</sup> The χώρος εὐσεβέων clearly indicates Hades: 'Αἰδὼς τοῦτο πόλιν, εὐσεβέων δ' ὁδὸν εὐδαμον ἐς αἰών. *Ep.* 27, 3-4. cf. *μακρ.* from Rhodes, *IGM. Arg.* i. 141, of an old school-stamper—εὐσεβέων χώρος [σφ.] ἔχει. ' Πλευρὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ Κέρη κατέκλειον. Ἐρμῆς τε καὶ θεδοῦχος Ἐκάτη. πρὸς [αὐτῷ] εὐδαμον εἶναι, μυστικῶν τ' ἐπιστάτην ἔτατον οὐδὲν πῖστον πόλιν χάριν.—Not infrequently Elysion and the place of the εὐσεβέων are identified: e.g. *Ep.* 338. εὐσεβέων δὲ ψυχῇ (sc. ἔχουσι) καὶ πεδίων τέρματα Ἥλκων. τοῦτο σαφροσύνης ἔλαχον γένος, ἀμβροσίαν δὲ (the immortality of her soul) σώματος ὑβριότης οὐκ ἐπέτρεπε χρόνος. ἀλλὰ νῦν νέμειται (thus the stone: *Alb. Mith.* iv. 17) μετ' εὐσεβέων καθέσται.—If there is a judgment in Hades εὐσεβέων εἰς δόμον εὐσεβέων. *Ep.* 215, 5-6. Kure conducts the dead χώρον ἐν' εὐσεβέων. 218, 13-16. καὶ ἐν' εὐσεβέων θὴ θεὸς ἀμφροσύνην, 569, 12. εὐσεβέων χώρος, 298. τὸν δόμον, 222, 7-8. εὐσεβέων ναῖμας ἱερὸν δόμον, *IPE.* ii. 298, 11. ψυχὴ δ' εὐσεβέων οἴεται εἰς θέλαμον, *Ep.* 80 (*CIA.* ii. 3004). οὐδ' εἰς ἱερὸν θαλάμῳ, 222b, 12. οὐδ' ἐν κυκλώσιν θαλάμοις. 253, 6. ἰσθμὸς δὲ ναῖμα θέλαμα φερρομένην χώρον ἐν εὐσεβέων 109, 5-6. μετ' εὐσεβέων καταβασι, ἀντ' ἀμαρτίας. 256. θῆν' Αἰδῶς ἐς νυκτὴν εὐσεβέων, 241a, 16. εὐσεβέων δ' εἰσιν εὐσεβέων χώρος ἔβη φθιμένων, *Alb. Mith.* xi. 427 (Kotaphon). Late Roman *inscr.*, *IG. Sic. et It.* 1660; a wife says of her dead husband οὐκ οὐδὲ θέλαμα τοῦτο καταχθονίους θεούς, τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ταῦτ' εὐσεβέων κατατάξω.

<sup>120</sup> The χώρος μακάρων in the sky: ψυχὴ δ' εὐδαμον θαλάσῃ ἐκτέλειται ὅσον ἀστὴρ καὶ ἱερὸν χώρον ἔχει μακάρων. *Ep.* 324, 3-4. καὶ ναῖμας μακάρων νήσους. . . αἰσέτις ἐν κορυφαίῳ. Ὀλύμπου οὐρανὸν ὄντα, 649, 2, 8. The ἡλκων πεδίον outside the φθιμένων δόμον. 414, 8, 8. Sometimes both the heavenly abode of the blessed and the islands of the West occur together: [*Luc.*] *Drin. Enc.* 60.



Demosch. is after ἡ  
Heroses, or else in  
'Ελευθέρας.

<sup>138</sup> ψυχὴ πρὸς 'Ὀλύμπου δοξάλατον. *Ep.* 846a, 3. ψυχὴ δ' ἐν  
'Ὀλύμπῳ, 159, 261, 11. φλὸν δ' εἰς 'Αἴθεα θέμας, ψυχὴ δ' ἐν  
'Ὀλύμπῳ, *AP.* vii, 382, 3. ('Αἶθερ hupē = the grave as often; so  
too in *Ep.* 288, 4-5, ψυχὴ . . . ἐν αἰθέρι . . . ἑστία εἰς 'Αἶθερ  
ἀνθρωπος εἰς ἐνέμερος.) μετὰ πόντος ἐνὶ φάος Ὀδύμενος, *AP.* vii, 878, 5.—  
ψυχὴν δ' ἐκ μελέων αἰσανός ἐπὶ δ' ἔχει, *Ep.* 104b, 4. φραγ δ' αἰσανὴν  
μελέων, 482, 6. ψυχὴ μοι κείνι δώματ' ἐκουράνα, 281, 10 (and  
frequently in this poem in various forms). ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀταρυνός  
ψυχὴ πανταίνει σῶμ' ἐκασταμέντῳ, *AP.* vii, 337, 7; cf. also 383, 3;  
387, 2; 672, 1 and ix, 207-8. αἰθήρ μὲν ψυχὸς ἐπιτέλλεται, *Ep.* 21  
(fifth century a.c., see above, chap. xii, n. 149). Θερμόμαχος ψυχὴν  
αὐτὴν ἀνερφάλατος θεοποιεῖ αἰθήρ ὕπρθε ἔχει, 41 (fourth century a.c.  
but the αἰθήρ is not "purist"—αἰθήρ λαμπρὸς ἔχει is the more primitive  
version of the phrase given in the corresponding epigr. of the *Stesichos*).  
The αἰθήρ would be ὕπρθε: τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνέβουον ἐν αἴθρι, *Ep.* 842, 7.  
ψυχὴ μὲν ἐν αἰθέρι αὐτὴ διέει πύλας, 288, 4. ψυχὴ δ' αἰθήρην παρῆχει  
πύλον, 228, 3. ἐν αἰθέρι ψυχὴ ἔβη ἰμῆθερ, 323, 5.—ψυχὴ δ' ἐθανόντων  
βουλάς ἐπιτέλλομαι δαυρὶ δούρου, *Ep.* 324, 3. From Thyatira, *BCR.*  
1987, p. 461: θέφον δ' ἐβαλὼς 'Αρχίλαος σῶμ' ἰμῖο, ψυχὴ δὲ μὲν  
παρὲς δούρα καὶ θεοὺς *EEI* (read *EEI*). One company of the souls  
τείρουνται σὺν αἰθερίῳι χαρμέναι—ἦ στρατιῆς ἐν αἴθρι, *Ep.* 650, 11-12  
(Theophrastus) πῶς οὐ θεῶν δούροις αἶνον ἔχει, *AP.* vii, 84, 4.

<sup>139</sup> ψυχὴ δ' ἐκ μελέων παρῆχει μετὰ θάλασσαν ἄλλου φλυθε σὴ  
καίει δ' ἐν μακάρων δαίμονι, *Ep.* 243, 5-6. καὶ με θεῶν μακάρων  
παρῆχει θέματος δούρα ἰόντα, αἰσανίως το θέματα βλάτω φάος 'Ηρακλείδης,  
312, 9.—τὴν σῶμα ψυχὴν μακάρων εἰς αἴθρα θέτω, πρὸθεν μὲν θυγῆ  
πῶς δὲ φάος μέγα, 654, 4-5.—ἀλλὰ σὺν εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς *IG. Sic. et Il.*  
1420. ὅτι δὲ φάος μὲν ἔλουντ ἀπὸ γῆρας, εἰδόμενοι μὲν αὐτὸν ἔχουσι  
θεοὶ αἶσα δὲ σπῆς ἔδει, *AP.* vii, 570; 61, 2; 573, 3-4.

<sup>140</sup> See above, chap. xii, p. 438 ff.

<sup>141</sup> See above, p. 300 f. πνεῦμα, *Ep.* 230, 6; 613, 6; πνεῦμα  
λαβὼν θέτος αἰσανόθεν γαλῶνα χρόνον ὀρθωμένον (cf. πνεῦμα γὰρ  
ἐστὶ θεοῦ χάρις θνητοῖσι, *Carm. Phoc.* 108). 156, 2: πνεῦμα αἰθήρ  
ἐλθεῖν μέλα, δούρα ἔδωκεν (third century a.c.; see Köhler on *CIA.*  
ii, 4135).—This conception having become popular frequently occurs  
in the theological poetry of later times: e.g. χαρμέναι ap. Stob., *Eccl.*  
1, 49, 48, i, p. 114 W.: τὸ μὲν (τὸ σῶμα) λυθὲν δαυρὶ αἶσιν, ψυχὴ δὲ πρὸς  
αἰθέρα ἀνέβουον, ἀπὸθεν ἔλθε, μετὰφας εἰς αἶθρ' ἀσπῆν (read αἰθήρ)  
ἐν ἀγῶνι. Oracle of Apoll. Tyan. ap. Philon., *TA.*  
ἀθάνατος ψυχὴ . . . μετὰ σῶμα μαρμαίρει . . . ἀρῆσιν  
παρῶνται ἡμέρα καὶ νύξ.

<sup>142</sup> ψυχὴν δ' ἀθάνατον αἰσανὴν ἔχει θέματα, *Ep.* 35, 6 (*CIA.* ii, 3820,  
fourth century a.c.). *IG. Sic. et Il.* 940, 3-4: ἀθανάτην ψυχὴν μὲν  
ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ διὰς αἰῶνα παρῆται. *Id.* 942: . . . ἐνθάδε κείμαι,  
αἰὶν θεῶν—ἀνθρώπων μὲν λέγει τοὺς ἀθανάτους (from Call., *Epien.* 11, τὰς  
ἑλὼν . . . ἑλὼν θῆκεν αἰσανῶν, ἀνθρώπων μὲν λέγει τοὺς ἀθανάτους).—  
σὺν θέμας, Ἡρώδη, μετέβη δ' ἐν ἀμείνῳ χρόνῳ, *Ep.* 849.

<sup>143</sup> This retains its full and original meaning (as in Call., *Epien.*  
11); cf. *Ep.* 559, 7, λέγει Πανελίην αἰθῶν φραγ—οὐ θεμῶν θεμῶν  
τοὺς ἀθανάτους, ἀλλ' ἔκαστος φθόν ἔχει. More often as a more conventional  
phrase: 433; 101, 4; 202, 3; 204, 7; α' ἐκείνου θῆκε δ' ἀφῆκε,  
223, 3; 802, 2; *AP.* vii, 28, 1; 30, 2; 280.

<sup>144</sup> *Ep.* 461: ἀντιὸν σῶμα . . . εἰ δ' ἐθέλων ἐν μακάρων δούρου



conducts her (and Alceatis) before Dispatēr and Aenacura to be tried: after that a special *hōmōs angēlos* leads her to the banquet of the blessed (*C.I.L.* vi, 142). There is nothing Christian in this, any more than in the whole monument or its inscriptions. (The "angel" as an intermediate being between gods and men had long been taken from Jewish religion by heathen belief and philosophy: they were sometimes identified with the Platonic *δαίμονες*: see R. Hönig, *Archeol.* 112 f. These intermediate natures, the *ἀγγέλαι*, have nothing to do with the old Greek conception of certain gods as "Messengers" or of the Heru *ἑδδγγέλως*, etc. [cf. Usener, *Götternamen*, 268 ff.]) With the fanciful picture of Vibia we may compare (besides the Platonic passages mentioned above) what Luc., *Philops.* 25, has to say of the *μενίσκος ψυχῶν* who leads the souls into the underworld (cf. *ἀγγέλωντος αἰθέρος* less precisely in the parallel narrative of Ptolemy, *de An. fr.* 1, ap. Eus., *P.E.* 11, 36, p. 583 D).

<sup>141</sup> Hermes the conductor of the souls as *ἑγγέλως ψυχῶν* φέρων. *Ep.* 575, 1. Hermes brings the souls to Eubouleus and Persephone, *Ep.* 272, 9.—He leads the souls to the *μακάριον ᾠλίσμιον πρῖον*, 414, 9: 411: to the Islands of the West, 107, 2. He leads them by the hand to heaven, to the blessed gods, 312, 8 ff.

<sup>142</sup> *Ep.* 218, 15, ἀλλὰ σὺ, μακάριστα θεῶ, πολύνημον κοῦρον, νηὸς ἔν' ἐν' ἐσθλῶντων χώρον. *ἔχοντα χάριν*. 452, 17 ff. Of the souls of the dead man, his wife and children it is said: ἄλγεα δὲ 'Αΐδου (Hades does not admit everyone: cf. the dead man who prays of *πνέοντων χώρων ἑταίριον δαίμονας δόξαι*, *ἄλγεα δὲ εἰς 'Αΐδην ἀμείβει τὸν εὐνοῦντο*, 624), *πέντια νέρφε, καὶ θυγὰς προσηύκεται*, *ἵνα λαμβῇ Παῖδα μόνον*. To be thus received and conducted by a god or goddess is evidently regarded as a special favour. The abode of the *αἰετῆρες* is reached by those who have honoured Persephone before all other deities: *I.G. Sic. et It.* 1361. Zeus too conducts the souls, *Ep.* 311, 1: *ἀντὶ τοῦ πρὸς ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολύνημον κοῦρον, ἔστιν ὁ 'Ηλύσιον αἰθέρος ὄναρ Κρονίδης* (Hades, 516, 1-2). Speaking of a Ptolemy who has died young, Antipater Sid. says (*A.P.* vii, 241, 11 ff.) *οὐδ' ἂν οὐδὲ σε νύξ τε νυκτὶς δέξεται*: *ὅθ' γὰρ θάνατος τάχιστα σὺν 'Αΐδω, Ζεὺς δ' ἐκ δόμων ἀγχι*. Apollo also: Parmenias buried by her parents says (*ἐν μεγάλοις*) *οὐδ' ἂν ἐν σῶντι τάχιστα* (*ἵνα μὴ ἔχει νέρωνος Διὸς, ἔσται γὰρ 'Αυτὸλλῶν λῶν*) (doubtful completion) *ἀνέστην, ἵλῳ δὲ σὺν δὲ ὀφείλοντο*, *I.G.N. Arg.* i, 142 (Rhodan).—Tibull. is clearly imitating Greek poetry when he says (l. 3, 57) *sed me quod acilix tenero tuum* *utpote Arcturi ipsa Venus campos ducet ad Elysia* (the poet himself explains why it should be Venus: he has specially honoured her. There is no need to imagine a Venus Libitina). Phleg., *Metab.* 3, p. 120, 16 ff. West, 73, 1 Keil.: *Θοῖβος 'Αυτὸλλῶν Πύθιος . . . μοι ἰὸν κρατερὴν θάρσυνον* (the daemonic world) *ἐπιτρέφας ἔγωγεν εἰς μακρὰν καὶ δόμον καὶ Παροικονίην*.

<sup>143</sup> *Isidote*, *hierophantissa* in Eleusis (grand-daughter of the famous *κρηστὴς Ἰσμία*) is called by her epitaph (*Ἐφ. Ἀρχ.* 1885, p. 149, l. 8 ff.) *ἔφαγον ἐν γ' ἀρεταῖς ἐν καὶ σωφροσύνῃς*: *ἦ καὶ ἀμειβομένη δῶν μακρὰν καὶ νήσουσιν ἔφαγον, παρτοῖσι ἐνδὲ παρτοῖσιν*. (l. 20 *ἦ καὶ ἀμειβομένη δῶν καὶ ἀμειβομένη*.)

<sup>144</sup> By their noble death the gods show us *ἀρετὴν εἰς ἀθανάτων νηδύν* *καὶ ἄλλων ὃ ζῶντων*, *Hdt.* i, 31: cf. [Pl.] *Asiarch.* 347 C: *Σειν., T.D.* l. 117: *Plu., Cons. ad Apoll.* 13, 106 E: cf. *Ammon. Marc.* 26, 3, 18.—The epitaph of *Isidote* alludes to the legend, l. 11: *ζῶντι (Demeter) δὲ αὖ ἄλγεα γλυκερώτερον φέρονται θάνατος ὀνύχῃ καὶ Ἀργεῖον φέρειναι φέλιον*.

<sup>140</sup> Γλαυκὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ' ἀναιδὲς σῶματι Γλαυκῆς καὶ καλλῆς κερδόν.,  
πρετότατε σῶματόσδε. ὅρῃα πῶς ἐφίμας βροτοῖς φασαίμβροτα θανά-  
του, δεινὸν δ' ἔλθε παρ' ἀθανάτων. ἢ καλὸν ἐκ πανόρατος μυστήριον,  
ὃ μῶν ἐστὶν τὸν θάνατον θνητοῖς οὐ τανύ, ἀλλ' ἄνατον. (Εἰς. Διγ.  
1883, pp. 81-2 (third century A.D.). Below the statue of a daughter  
of this Glaucos, at Eleusis, there is an inscr., Γλαύκων δὲ γυνὴν  
θεοῖδαν, δε τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἱεροφαντήσας ὤχετ' ἐς ἀθανάτους. (Εἰς. Αρχ.  
1894, p. 203, n. 28, l. 11 ff.

<sup>141</sup> As a conventional formula: [D.H.] Rhét. 8, 5: ἐνὶ τάφῳ (of  
the funeral oration) παρὶ ψυχῆς ἀναγκασίον εἶναι, δεῖ ἀθανάτους, καὶ  
δεῖ τοὺς νομίζοντες, ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις, ἀμύδον ἰσως ἀπολλύσασθαι.

<sup>142</sup> —τὸν ἀθάνατον φιλέσμεν· τοδικα καὶ πρηνὲς λόφος ἐν ἀθανάτοις  
(we are reminded of the ἀθάνατος πρηνὲς out of which Glaucos  
drew ἀθανασία: Sch. Pl., Rp. 611 C). καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν νόστος βάλανος  
ἐν ἀθανάτοις, Ep. 368, 4 ff. There are two fountains in Hades,  
that (to the left) of Lethe, and (to the right) of Mnemosyne, from  
which cold water flows (l. 3): from the latter the guardians will give  
the suppliant soul water to drink καὶ τὸν ἔπειτ' ἄλλους μετ' ἡρώωνος  
ἀνέμῃ: sepulchral tablet from Petelia (about third century A.C.).  
IG. Sur. et fr. 638 (Ep. 1037; Hattisau, Proleg. 661 ff.). Mutilated  
copies of the same original have been found at Eleutheriai in Crete,  
BCH. 1883-4, p. 126, 628; cf. above, chap. xii, n. 52.—This, in  
fact, is the "water of life" so often mentioned in the folk-lore of  
many countries: cf. Grimm, D. Märchen, n. 97, with Notes iii, p. 178,  
328; Usterich, Abrazas, 97 l.; Nykyia, 94, 99. This is the fountain  
from which Psyche also has to bring water to Venus (Apul., M. vi,  
13-14); and it is certain that in the original Psyche-story it was  
not the water of the Styx that was intended (as Apul. supposes,  
but of what use would that be?), but the water of the fountain of  
life in Hades. It is a speaking fountain, *locales aquae* (Apul. vi, 14),  
and, in fact, precisely the same as that mentioned in a unique legend  
of Herakles given in [Justin.] *παρὶ Ἑλλήνων* 3 (p. 636, 7, ed. Harnack,  
Ber. Berl. Ak. 1886). Herakles is called ὁ ὄρη ἀφ' ὧν (ἢ πύλῃς,  
"making it gush forth," would be more acceptable) ἵνα λάβῃ ὕδωρ  
ἱερῶν ποταμῶ ἀθανάτων. Herakles makes the mountain gush forth  
by striking the speaking water out of the rock. This is exactly  
paralleled in the modern Greek stories given by Hahn, Gr. u. alt.  
Märchen, ii, p. 234; the Lamia who guards the water of life (τὸ ἀθάνατον  
νερόν, the phrase often appears in these stories; cf. also Schmidt,  
Griech. Märchen, p. 233) "strikes with a hammer on the rock till  
it opens and she can draw the water of life". This is the same  
ancient fairy tale motif. The proper home of this water of life is  
probably the lower world, the world of either death or immortality,  
though this is not expressly stated in the Herakles legend nor in the  
fairy tale of Glaucos who discovered the ἀθάνατος πρηνὲς (but probably  
also in the magic country of the West. Thus Alexander the Great  
finds the ἀθάνατος πρηνὲς at the entrance to the πανόρατος χώρα acc.  
to Ps.-Callisth. ii, 39 ff.; his story shows clear reminiscences of the  
Glaucos tale, its prototype, in c. 39 ff., 41, 2).—The Orphic (and  
Pythagorean) mythology of Hades (see above: chap. xi, n. 88;  
chap. xii, nn. 37-8; chap. vii, n. 21) then proceeded to make use of the  
folk-tale for their own purposes. In Ep. 658 the prayer also refers to  
the Orphic fable (CIG. 5772) ψυχῆν ἔμωρ δολῇ καὶ ἀναξ' εἶναι Ἀΐδωνος,  
and 718, 11, ψυχῇ ἀέμωρ ψυχρὴν ἔμωρ γενέσθαι. They mean: may  
you live on in complete consciousness. (The same thing in the negative:  
the dead man dwells ἔμωρ καὶ ἀέμωρ καὶ ἀναξ' εἶναι ἀβέδω, 414, 10:

αὐτὸς ἰσας Ἀθήνη 'Αἰθουίδης ἑταίρου ὄψεσθαι, so that I can perceive the mourning of the living for my loss, 204, 11. καὶ ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ἔγωγε σὺν ὅσῳις θανά, 334, 5.—Poetical allusion in *AP.* vii, 348: οὐδ' εἰ θῆται, ἐν δόρυμινον τοῦ Ἀθήνη ἐν' ἀπαι μὴ γὰρ εἴς θῆται.—Perhaps something of the sort already occurs in Pindar: see above, chap. xii, n. 37.)

<sup>16</sup> ἀθάνατος ἐστὶν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐδ' Ὀνειδος τὸ θυγὲρ ὄψεσθαι, *IG. Sic. et It.* 1489: 1703: 1782; *Rev. Arch.* 1887, p. 201. (And once the line καὶ δ' Ὀνειδος θυγὲρ ὄψεσθαι ἐστὶν χαρίσματα, inser. from Alexandria: *Rev. Arch.* 1887, p. 189.) ἀθάνατος παρὰ τοῦ Ὀνειδος, *I. Sic. et It.* 2088. The dead man is with Osiris, *Ep.* 414, 5. Osiris as lord in the world of the blessed: *desirio* from Rome, *I. Sic. et It.* 1047: δ' αἰώνος Ὀνειδος δ' ἔγωγε γὰρ παρασκευάζω καὶ τὸ βούλειον γὰρ νεπέρας θῆται.—It appears that the legend of the fountain of Mnemosyne and its cold water was independently developed by the Greeks and then associated subsequently with the analogous Egyptian idea or brought into harmony with it (certainly not as e.g. Böttiger, *Ni. Sch.*, thinks, originally belonging to the Egyptians alone and thence imported into Greece from Egypt). Egyptian Books of the Dead often speak of the cool water that the dead enjoy (cf. Maspero, *Et. de mythol. et d'arch. Egypt.* 1883, 1, 386 f.), as well as of the water drawn from the Nile and preserving the youth of the dead man: Maspero, *Notes of Exhum.* 24, 1883, pp. 89-100. The formula, "may Osiris give you the cold water" (everlasting life), does not seem to occur on original Egyptian monuments. It is prob. therefore modelled by Egyptian Greeks on their own ancient Greek formula.—On Christian ins. we often have the formula: *spiritum tuum dominus* (or *resurrectus* or a holy martyr) *refrigeret*: see Kraus, *Realemyth. d. christl. Alterth.* v, *refrigerium*. This is probably, as has been frequently suggested, an imitation of the heathen formula, like so many features of early Christian burial usage.

<sup>17</sup> On sarcophagi in Asia the lion is sometimes represented on the lid with the inser. describing the contents: δ' ἑστὶν [ἄν] καὶ ἀποκνὸς ἀθάνατος ἰσχυρὸς λίσσας καὶ γὰρ γυναικὶ αἰὼν ἀπορίας, etc. On another sarcophagus: Ἀδμήτος ἀθάνατος (three names) καὶ θυγάτηρ ἑστὶν καὶ Ἀρμονία βαβύων γὰρ παρὰ τὸν ἑστὸν τοῦτο γένος, *American School at Athens*, iii, p. 28, 91-2. These expressions must refer to something quite different from the otherwise not uncommon practice of representing lions or eagles on graves. I can only explain them on the supposition that the dead persons represent themselves and the relatives named in the forms which had belonged to them in the mysteries of Mithras, in which lions and lionesses formed the fourth grade, and eagles, ἑστὸι (or ἰσχυροί) the seventh (cf. Porphy., *Abst.* iv, 16); these are elsewhere called *παρὰς*.

<sup>18</sup> The soul of a dead son (who as it appears from ll. 1, 2, 6 ff. had been killed by a flash of lightning and therefore removed to a higher state of being [see Append. i]) appears by night to his mother and confirms her own assertion, οὐκ ἔμην θανάτος, *Ep.* 320. The soul of their daughter who has died *ἑσπας* and ἀθάνατος appears to her parents on the ninth day (l. 33) after death, 372, 31 ff. (The ninth day marks the end of the first offerings to the dead: see above, chap. v, n. 84; cf. "Apparitions of the deceased occur most frequently on the ninth day after death": a German superstition mentioned by Grimm, 1812, n. 856.) It is significant that the daughter who thus appears in a vision has died unmarried. The *ἑσπας*, like the *ἑσπας*, do not find rest after death: see Append. vii and xl. The





of men was going awry is simply paganism exacerbated perfidia (*Leg. Novell. Theod. si, i, 3*, p. 10 Ritt.).

<sup>119</sup> We know of a certain Nikagoras Mique. I, (significantly enough an ardent admirer of Plato) temp. Const. βασιλεὺς τῶν ἀγαθῶν 'Ελευσίου μυστηρίων, *CIG.* 4770. Julian, even as a boy, was initiated at Eleusis: *Euseb., V. Soph., p. 53* (Boiss.). At that time, however, in miserandam ruinam considerat Eleusina, Mamert., *Act. Jul.* 9. Here again Julian seems to have restored the cult. Valentinian I, on the point of abolishing all nocturnal festivals (see *Cod. Theod.* iii, 9, 18, 7), allowed them to continue when Praetextatus Procons. of Achaia represented to him that for the Greeks οὐλοῦτο would be ἀβύστος, εἰ μὴ λαίην καλῶσθαι τὸ σπύλον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος ἀγνῶτα μυστήρια κατὰ θεοῦς διεκτελεῖν, Zosim. iv, 3. (Praetext. was a friend of Symmachus and, like him, one of the last pillars of Roman orthodoxy; *principes religiosorum*, Macr., *S. l.* 11, 1. He was himself *sacerdos Eleusiniis*, and *hierophantis* there; *CIL.* vi, 1779; probably the *Πραξιφρανὸς ὁ ἱεροφάντης* of *Lyd., Mens.* 4, 2, p. 148 R. [p. 85 W.], is the same person.) In 375 A.D. we hear of a Nestorius (probably the father of the Neoplatonic Plotarch) as *ιεροφάντης νεκροφάντης* at the time (Zos. iv, 18). In 386 during the *hierophantia* of a *παῖς τῆς Μιθραϊκῆς τελετῆς* (whose oath should have excluded him from that office) the temple of Eleusis was destroyed by Alaric, incited thereto by the monks who accompanied him (*Euseb., V.S.*, p. 52-3). The regular holding of the festival must then have come to an end.—Evidence of later celebration of the Eleusinia is not forthcoming. The expressions of Proclus, which Maass regards as "certainly proving that the festival was still being held in the fifth century (*Orphicus*, 15), are quite insufficient to the purpose. Proclus speaks of various sacred ceremonies of initiation from which we *μυστήρια* something; of a *ῥήμα*, i.e. written tradition, of certain unspecified Eleusian *θελόδια*; of what the Eleus. mysteries *ἀναγκάζοντες* to the *mystai* (just as we might speak in the present tense of the permanent content of Greek religion). These passages prove nothing; whereas the imperfects which he uses elsewhere clearly show that neither temple nor festival existed any longer in his time. (He speaks, in *Alc.*, p. 5 Cr., of what used to be in the temple of Eleusis and still more of what formerly occurred *ἐν τοῖς Ἐλευσινίοις ἱεροῖς—ἱεῶσι καὶ.* in *Ti*, 293 C.) The festival moreover cannot have gone on without the temple and its apparatus.

<sup>120</sup> The Orphic hymns in the form in which we have them all belong as it seems to one period, and that can hardly have been earlier than the third century A.D. They are all composed for practical use in the cult, and that presupposes the existence of Orphic communities (see Schöhl, *Commun. et coll. quib. Graec.* [Set. Saubh.], p. 14 ff.; Dieterich, *de H. Orph.*).—It must be admitted that they were not purely and exclusively Orphic communities for which the poems were written. These hymns, called "Orphic" a posteriori, make use in parts of older Orphic poetry (cf. *H.* 82, 2 f., with [Dev.] 25, 11).

<sup>121</sup> Probably all these cults promised immortality to their *mystai*. This is certain in the worship of Isis (cf. Burkhardt, *Zeit. Compendium* 4, G.<sup>3</sup>, p. 195 ff.). Apul., *M.* xi, 21-3, alludes to symbolic death and reawakening to everlasting life as the subject of the *ἑσώματα* in the Isis mysteries. The initiated in that *resotis* (21). In the same way the *mystai* of Mithras are said to be *ἐν αἰώνιον ἡσαν*: *CIL.* vi, 310; 736. Immortality must certainly have been promised. Acc. to Tert., *Py. Haer.* 40, the mysteries of Mithras



included an image *resurrectionis*. By this the Christian author can only understand a real *ἀνάστασις τοῦ σώματος*. Did these mysteries promise to their Jews a resurrection of the body and everlasting life? This belief is the *ἀνάστασις τοῦ σώματος* (always a difficulty for the Greeks: *Act. Ap. xvii*, 18: 32; Plotin. 3, 6, 6 ff.) is in fact ancient Persian (Theopomp. fr. 71-2; Hübnermann, *Jb. Prot. Theol.* v, p. 222 ff.), and probably came to the Jews from Persia. It is possible then that it may have been the essential idea of the Mithras mysteries.—Hopes of immortality as they appeared to the mystics of Sabazios are illustrated by the sculpture of the monument of Vidia (in the Catac. of Praetextatus), and of Vincentius: *nemini antistes Sabazii Vincentius hic est. Qui sacra sancta deum mente pia coluit* (Garrucci, *Tr. Sepolcri*, etc., tab. 1-14, Nap. 1862).—It is difficult to see why Christian archeologists should regard this Vincentius as a Christian. He calls himself a worshipper of "the gods" and an *antistes Sabazii* (there cannot be the slightest objection to giving this meaning to *antistis antistes Sabazii*). The difficulties raised by Schütz, *Kaisersheim*, 44, are groundless: Sabazios = Sabazii is no more objectionable or doubtful than the genitives Clodia, Helia: see Ritschl, *Opus.* iv, 454-6. The arrangement of words, *n. n. Sab.*, is due to the exigencies of metre).

<sup>122</sup> ὃ φέρει τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς τὸν κόσμον διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἀποδοῦναι πᾶσι φέρον. Plot. 3, 5, 1. *σώμα ἀπύρατον ἐκείνου καὶ ἰφίπτεον αὐτῷ φέροντος ἀνδρὸς . . . ὡς δὲν αὐτῷ οὐ δύναται εἶναι*, 3, 5, 12: 1, 8, 2. *σώματι δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ὑποφύου (the soul desired the σῶμα, the φέρει the σῶμα):* 3, 3, 6.

<sup>123</sup> καὶ εἴη τὸ ἀποδοῦναι ὑποφύου (φύει), Plot. 3, 4, 6. In death ἀνδρὸς τὸ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ εἶναι ὑπὸ τὸ ἐν τῷ σώματι εἶναι, Porphy., 1. Plot. 2. Return *εἰς νεφέλην*, Plot., 5, 9, 1.

<sup>124</sup> 2, 9, esp. § 16 ff.

<sup>125</sup> τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀλαγδὸν ἐκείνου καὶ τῷ φέροντι καὶ τῷ φέρει, 3, 5, 3.

<sup>126</sup> Flight from the *ἐν σώματι σκόλος* to the *τῷ φέρει σκόλος*, etc., 3, 9, 2. And again in the *disc. treatise*, *v. τοῦ σώματος*, 1, 8, 8. Though even here it is in a different sense from that in which Plato speaks in the *Symp.* of the ascent from *κατὰ σῶμα* to *κατὰ λογισμὸν*, etc. Plotinus protests energetically against the idea that his own sense of beauty makes him any the less *φύγει τὸ σῶμα* than the hatred of beauty cultivated by the Gnostics; 2, 9, 18. He too waits here below, only a little less impatiently, for the time when he will be able to say farewell to every earthly habitation: *ib.*

<sup>127</sup> . . . καὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀποδοῦναι εἶναι καὶ ἀποδοῦναι πᾶσι ἐκείνου τῷ φέρει. *Plot. ἀποδοῦναι τῷ φέρει, φέρει μόνον ὑπὸ μόνον*, 4, 8, 11 ff.

## APPENDIX I

In many legends death by lightning makes the victim holy and raises him to godlike (everlasting) life. We need only remember the story of Semele who now *ἔσσι ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ ἀποθεσίου* *Ἄρδης κίρανος* (Pl., *O.* ii, 27), or that of Herakles and his vanishing from the pyre of wood lighted by Zeus' flash of lightning (see partic. D.S. 4, 38, 4-5), or the parallel accounts of the translation or death by lightning of Erechtheus (above, chap. III, n. 38). The primitive, popular belief finds unusually clear expression in the words of Charax ap. Anon. *de Isacod.* xvi, p. 325, 5 ff. West., who says of Semele, *νεκρὸν ἀνασφύρατον ἤφαισθ' ἐκείνη μὲν ἔσθ', δαίτη δὲ τοῖς διαβλήτοις λέγεται. θείας μοίρας λαχεῖν εἰρήσθηεν.* (In this account Semele is immediately raised to heaven by the flash of lightning—a version of the story frequently given by later authors: *Ἐρὲν γὰρ Ἐρεμῆν ἐν γῆ γῆς εἰς τὴν Ὀλύμπῳ κομ'εῖ* *ἄδ' ἔπειτα*, Aristid. i, p. 67 Dind. [*O.* 41, 3 K.]. Cf. Philostr., *Imag.* i, 14; Nonnos, *O.* viii, 408 ff. The passage of Pindar quoted above would also admit of a similar interpretation.) Generally speaking, *ὁ κίρανος* *ὡς θεὸς τιμῆται* (Artem. 2, 9, p. 94, 26) as one *ὄψ' διὰς ἐνταμψόμενος* (ib. 93, 24). The belief in such elevation of a mortal through the disruption and purification of his body by the sacred fire of lightning (a *τὴν καθάρσιν* of the highest kind—see chap. i, n. 41) need not be of late origin simply because it so happens that only late authorities speak of it in unmistakable terms (as Wilamowitz thinks, *Ind. Schol. Gotting.* Aik. 1895, pp. 12-13). Such lofty conceptions were by this time no longer the product of popular imagination. Besides, it is quite clearly referred to in the above-mentioned story of Semele (see esp. D.S. 3, 32, 2) and in those of Herakles, Erechtheus, Asclepius. In the same way lightning struck the tomb of Lykourgos (as afterwards that of Euripides) *ὡς θεοφύλακτος καὶ ἀμύκτος* (Plin., *Lyc.* 31). When the statues of the Olympic victor Euthymos at Locris and Olympia are struck by lightning it shows that he has become a Hero: Piny, *NH.* vii, 152. The body of the person struck by lightning remains uncorruptible: dogs and birds of prey dare not touch it: Plin., *Sup.* 4, 2, 3, p. 665 B; it must be buried in the place where the lightning struck it (Artem., p. 93, 6; cf. Fest., p. 176b, 21 ff.; Plin., *NH.* ii, 148). Every detail shows plainly that the *διαβλήτης* was regarded as holy. This, however, does not prevent death by lightning from being regarded on other occasions as the punishment of crime—as in the cases of Salmoneus, Kapanews, etc.; though in some even of these cases the idea is occasionally present that the lightning's victim is raised to a higher existence. This is distinctly so when Euripides in *Suppl.* makes a character call Kapanews, who has been killed by lightning, a *τέρας σαρπός* (835) and his *κύβητος* (*σῆμα*) *τέρας* too (881). *τέρας* never means

"accursed" like the Lat. *secur*: It is invariably a title of honour. Kapanews is here called "holy" just as Antakides, on his translation to everlasting life, is *ἅγιος* in Kallimachos; and as Hesiod speaks of the *ἅγιος γένος δαμόνιον* (with *ῥέμβος ἅγιος* cf. S. OC. 1543, 1763). We must not fail to observe that in this passage, where a friend of Kap. is supposed to be speaking, the latter is certainly not regarded by Eurip. as an impious person (as he is generally in Tragedy, and by Eurip. himself in *Phœn.*, and even in *Suppl.*, the enemy so regards him (496 S.), though acc. to this speaker Amphiaraios too is snatched away in atonement for his crime). Euripides in fact makes him highly praised by Adraktos (861 S.) as the very opposite of a *ῥέμβος*: and it is obvious that Eudora's sacrifice of her life which immediately follows is not intended to be offered for the benefit of a criminal and enemy of the gods. For these reasons Euripides ennobles the character of Kapanews and, consequently, the death of the Hero by lightning can no longer stand for his punishment, but is on the contrary a distinction. He becomes a *ἅγιος νεανὴς*. Thus, however, could not have been done by Eurip. unless the view that such a death might in certain circumstances bring honour on the victim and elevate him to a higher plane of being, had been at that time widespread and generally recognized. Eurip. therefore provides the most distinct evidence for the existence of such a belief in his time. (As one of the exalted dead Kapanews is to be separated from the rest of the dead and burnt *κατ' αἰῶνα νεκρός*: 935, 938, 1009—i.e. before the *ἀνδραγαθὸν* of the Goddesses at Eleusis: 88, 290.)—Finally Asklepieia, in all the stories that are told of his death by lightning (and already in Hes. *fr.* 109 R.), is never regarded as entirely removed from this life: he lives on as Hero or god for all time, dispensing blessings. Zeus allows him to live on for ever immortal (Luc. *DD.* 13), and acc. to later versions of the story, in the constellation Ophiuchus (*Ἑλισσέβη νεανέρ. 8*; Hygin., *Astron.* ii, 14); the real and primitive conception evidently being that he was transported to everlasting life by Zeus' lightning-flash. So Min. Fel. 22, 7. says quite rightly: *Asclepius, ut in deos surgat, fulminatur.*

## APPENDIX II

## μασχαλιωτός

*ἡμασχαλιωτός* is the word used by Aesch. *Clio.* 438, of the murdered Agamemnon. Soph., *El.* 443, says *ὅφ' ἐστὶ (Κλινειμφορίας) θανάσι δριμύτι ὥστε θωμνῆς ἡμασχαλιωτός*—also of Agamemnon. What particular abomination was meant by this brief statement must have been immediately understood by the Athenian public of the day. A more detailed account is given by Phot. and Suid., *μασχαλιωτός* (cf. Hesych. s.v.; Apostol., *Fr.* xi, 4), and they give Aristophanes of Byzantium as their authority. (Not from Aristophanes—for they differ in many particulars—but from a closely related source come the two versions

of the Scholium to Soph., *El.* 446 and *EM.* 118, 22 f.] According to their authority *μεσχαλισμός* is something done by the murderer (*ὁ φονεύωντες ἢ δι' ἐπιβουλῆς*—Aristoph.) to the corpse of the murdered man. He cuts off the extremities of his victim, strings the severed parts on a chain and puts them on.—On whom? on himself? or the murdered man? Aristophanes' words are un decisive: the Schol. Soph., *El.* 445, speaks in the first version of "himself" (*ἐαυτοῦ*, p. 123, 17 Papag.) and in the second of "him", i.e. the murdered man: *πρὸς τῆς μεσχαλίας αὐτοῦ ἐπιδέμαζον αὐτῷ* (*τῷ ἔκρῳ*), p. 123, 23; cf. 124, 5. This too is probably the meaning of Schol. Ap. Rh. iv. 477: *EM.* 118, 28-9, speaks distinctly of hanging the chain round the neck of the dead man. This is, in fact, the most probable version. The murderer hung the limbs, strung together on a rope, round the neck of his victim and then drew the rope under the armpits (*μεσχαλίας*): a proceeding which is far from being "impossible" (as has been said), as anyone may discover by trying it for himself. The murderer then crossed the ends of the rope over the breast of his victim and after drawing them under the armpits fastened them behind his back. From this process of drawing under the armpits the whole procedure is called *μεσχαλισμός*, and the *πέπλος* of the dead man thus fastened to his body are his *μεσχαλισμὰς* (Aristoph.).

Anyone who wishes to reject this description of *μεσχαλισμός* (as some have done recently) must first of all show from what source Aristophanes of Byzantium—whom no one who knows him would accuse of improvising such details or of concealing his ignorance by invention—can have got his information if not from actual report and historical tradition. The possibility that he arrived at it by straining the meaning and giving a private interpretation of his own to the words *μεσχαλίζω* and *μεσχαλισμός* is excluded by the nature of these words. They offer no hint whatever in the direction of the special meaning suggested by his account. We cannot indeed say (as Willamowitz does on A., *Cko.* 439) that "grammar" forbids us to accept the explanation of what happened in *μεσχαλίζω* given by Aristoph. To say: *ἐμεσχαλίσθη*, "he had to suffer *μεσχαλίζω*, *μεσχαλισμός*," is equally correct whatever sense we give to the process of *μεσχαλισμός*. But the word itself does not testify, by its mere form, to the absolute or exclusive correctness of Aristophanes' interpretation: it denotes without distinction absolutely any proceeding in which the *μεσχαλίας* figure at all. Verbs in *-ίζω*, derived from the names of parts of the body, can denote according to the circumstances the utmost variety of actions done to or with the part of the body concerned: cf. *κεφαλίζω*, *αἰχνοῖζω*, *τραχηλίζω*, *λαμβίζω*, *ὠμίζω*, *βαχίζω*, *χειρίζω*, *δακτυλίζω*, *γαστρορίζω*, *οὐρρίζω* (and even *πυλίζω*). What particular sort of activity applied to the *μεσχαλίας* is indicated by the verb *μεσχαλίζω* cannot be decided from the mere form of the verb. This only makes it the more necessary to adhere to Aristophanes' interpretation, which must have been derived from some other source, i.e. from actual knowledge. It may be true that *μεσχαλίζω*, considered simply from

the point of view of its form, might conceivably mean to tear the arm from the shoulder at the armpits (as Beaudorf suggests, *Monumenti von Athen* iiii, p. 132 A)—though such an *εμπεχόμενον τὸν βραχίονα* in the *μασχάλας* should rather be *εμπεσπυγέλλεαι* or *εμπεσπυγέλλεσθαι*. But that out of its many possible meanings the verb should have just this particular one is not suggested by anything: least of all by the sculptured relief on which the gods appear to be tearing out the right arms of their defeated enemies. Such scenes according to Beaudorf represent *μασχάλασμα*. But can the Greeks really have attributed to the gods this much execrated practice of cowardly murderers? We are not told by anyone that this scene represents *μασχάλασμα*—that is only a conclusion drawn from an apparent agreement between the representation and the view (itself as yet unproved) of what happened in *μασχαλίζεσθαι*. Is the correctness of the meaning assigned to the word to be proved in its turn from its agreement with the representation? A most palpable argument in a circle!

There is no valid reason for rejecting the statement of Aristophanes: and there must be very good reason indeed for so doing before we may discredit such an authority. He gives his information with no uncertain voice and no suggestion of hesitation, and it must be regarded as the simple account of well-established facts. It would receive additional confirmation—if it needed any—from the very meaning and conception of the word *μασχάλασμα*. *μασχάλασμα* must be the product of *μασχαλίσμης*: they are, in fact, the severed *μέμνα* of the murdered man, with which too Aristophanes identifies them. *Σοφοκλῆς ἐν Τροίῃσι πύθορ μασχαλισμάτων εἶρηται τὸν μασχαλισμὸν* (probably a mere oversight for *τὸν τμήμα*): Suid. s.v. *εμπεσπυγέλλεθαι* [Soph. *fr.* 306 = 623 P.]. If *μασχαλίζεσθαι* had consisted in the dislocation of the arm from its socket, it would be impossible to say what such *μασχαλισματα* might be. They are without doubt identical with what are otherwise called, in descriptions of mutilations of the corpse of a murdered man, *ἐκτόγματα* (Jason after the murder of Aegystion *ἐκτόγματα τέμνει θανάτου*, A.R. iv. 477; cf. Schol. and E.W. 118, 22 B.), *ἐκτομήματα*, *τέμνη* (*τὰ ἐκτομήματα καὶ ἐκτομήματα τὸ τέμνω*, Hecych.). These expressions allow us to conclude that the whole procedure is intended to offer the murdered man as a sacrifice to some sort of *ἐκτομῆσαν*. The *μασχαλισματα* are the *δωρεὰ* of this sacrificial victim. Indeed, Aristoph. of Byzantium, ap. Phot. (Suid.) *μασχαλισματα*, definitely states that *μασχαλισματα* was the name given to *τὰ τοῖς ἡρώεσι λυνθέντων ἀπὸ τῶν ὁπλῶν* (not *ὁπλῶν* as the edd. give; as also Nauck, *Arist. Byz.*, p. 231) *πρὶν δὲ τοῖς τὰς θύρας θύεσθαι*. This refers—though it does not seem to have been remarked by those who have hitherto dealt with the passage—to the parts of the body which were cut off from the raw flesh of the *λυνόμενος* before the sacrifice, laid on the severed *μυοὶ* of the victim, and burnt up completely with these: the *δωρεῖσθαι* in fact so often mentioned in Homer [A 480 f.; B 423 f.; γ 456 f.; μ 306 f.; ζ 427 f.]. If these *ἐκτομήματα* could also be called (in

a comparison) *μεγαλήμερα*, that again shows that at the *μεγαλήμερα* there was no tearing out of an arm from its socket, but that in reality the extremities of the murdered man (—*δεσποτῆμας* *μήρη* *νέκρου*) were hewn off and a piece cut off *ἐκ παντὸς μέρους τοῦ σώματος* as the grammarians following Aristophanes say. Only in this case is the proceeding like that which took place at the *ἀποθήειν* when the sacrificer *ἐκοψεν μέρη ἀπὸ παντὸς μέρους* (Aristonic. in Schol. *A* 481; Apollon., *Lex. Hom.* 171, 8; *Lex. Rhel.* ap. Eust. *A* 481, p. 134, 38: *ὡμοθίγους τὸ ἐκ' ἑκάστου μέρους τοῦ σώματος ἀντέμνετο καὶ ἀνέψαυε ἐκ' ὅσας* [so the last word should be written here too, though Eustath. found—and was surprised—*ὡμῶς*] *καὶ ἐνέβαλε αὐτὸν τὸ πῦρ ἐπὶ τῇ θοῦνῃ*). So too it is said of Enmaios: *ὃ δ' ὡμοθνεῖτο σπέρματι, κείνου ἀπὸ μέρους μάλιστα*, § 427 l. (this is the passage in which *φασίμενος* [d. νεογόνος], *εἰ δὲν τὸ ὡμοθνεῖν*; Schol., B.L. *A* 481; it is this passage, and not *A* 481, which is meant by Henrych. too s.v. *ὡμοθνεῖν*, when he says *ἐφ' ἧς αὐτὸν δ' αὖτε "Ὀμήρος"*; cf. also Dion. Hal. 7, 72, 13).

*μεγαλήμερα* was then essentially an offering intended to avert evil or, what comes to the same thing, a kathartic offering (i.e. a symbol indicating such an offering). It was consummated by murdering *ἐνὶ τοῖς καὶ φασίμενος* (Sch. S., *El.* 445): *ὅσας τὰ τῶν μέρους ἐκείνου* as Aristoph. Byz. says (p. 221 N.); *τὸ ἵππον ἀποσπᾶσθαι* as we are told by Apollonius *Prov.* xi, 4. All these mean the same thing. But besides these there may still have been another intention present in the minds of the superstitious. The mutilation of the murdered man took place according to Sch. S., *El.* 445 (in the second version; there is something similar even in the first, p. 123, 18 f.) *ἵνα, φασί, δούλης γένετο πρὸς τὸ ἀντίποινα τὸ φασί*. The mutilation of the corpse was transferred to the *φασί* that was leaving the body—such is the ancient conception to which Homer too is not a stranger (cf. e.g. *λ* 40 ff.). If the dead man is mutilated he will not, for example, be able to hold or throw the spear which in Athens was borne before the murdered man at his funeral (if he left no kinsman as avenger behind him) and was then set up beside his grave ([D.] 47, 68; Eur., *Tro.* 1147 f.; Poll. viii, 45; later up., *EM.* 354, 33 ff.; *AE.* 237, 30 f.)—certainly for no other purpose than that of supplying the dead man himself with a weapon with which to take vengeance on his own account since no one else would *βοηθεῖ* him. (Thus among the Tasmanians a spear was planted on the grave of the dead that he might have a weapon ready for fighting: Quatrefages, *Hommes fossiles et hommes sauvages*, p. 346.) Probably the Greek murderer when he *μεγαλήμερα*, calculated in exactly the same fashion as the Australian negro who cuts off the thumb from the right hand of his fallen foe in order that his soul may no longer be able to hold a spear (Spencer, *Princ. of Societ.* i, p. 212).

In Soph., *El.* 446, the murderer after the *μεγαλήμερα* also wipes the bloody instrument of death on the head of the murdered man. Murderers did this *ὡς περ δυνάμενοι τὸ μῦθος τὸ ἐν τῷ φασί*

(Schol.). There are passages in the *Odyssey* which allude to the custom (*μήν ἄρ' ἔγωγε δ' εἰ κεφαλῇ δαμάξαι*, v 82) as well as in Herodotus and Demosthenes (see Schneider on *Elæna*). Their meaning is quite correctly given in Eust. on *Od.* v 92: *ὡς εἰς κεφαλὴν θάψεν δάκρυα* (τοῖς νεφελωμένοις) *τραυματίας τὰ κακὰ*. Evidently a mimic version of *εἰς κεφαλὴν αὐτ.* Something similar is intended when the murderer sucks the blood of the murdered man three times and spits it out again three times. Ap. Rh. describes such a scene (iv. 477 f.); and something similar occurred in Aesch. (fr. 354; *E3f.* refers to this in immediate connexion with *παροχαιόμε*). Here too the object is the *addeper* of the murderer, the expiation of the impious deed. (ἡ *ἀλγὺς αἰθέριος* *δολοκτασίας ἰδμεσθαι* A.R.; *ἀνεπίδου* *θεῖ* *καὶ αἰσθησέσθαι ἐνδία*, A.) Spitting three times is a regular feature in magic charms and counter-charms: in this case the blood of the murdered man and with it the power of vengeance that rises up out of the blood, is averted. (*despicimus conitantes morbos, hoc est. contagia regerimus*, Plin., *NH.* 28, 38.)—What "savage" tribe ever had more primitive ideas or a more realistic symbolism than the Greek populace—and perhaps not populace only—of classical times in the sinister backwaters of their life into which we have here for a d?

## APPENDIX III

## ἀμύητοι, ἄγαμοι AND DANAIDES IN THE UNDERWORLD

In Polygnotos' picture of the underworld were to be seen the figures *τὸν αἰ μαραμένον, τὸν αἰ θνήσκον* 'Ἐλευσίνι δὲ οὐδενὸς θαμείνας λόγῳ—*an old man, a woe, a young and an old woman, who bear water to a sister in broken pitchers*: Paus. 10, 31, 8-11. The myth is evidently founded upon an etymological play on words—those who have neglected the "completion" of the holy *ritus* and are *ἀμύητοι* *θεσπῶν* (h. *Gor.* 482) must perform the vain labour in the realm of Persephone of carrying water in broken vessels: the *δανάειοι* *ἄγαμοι* *δανάει* (*Asiack.* 371 E). It can only have been an oversight that made Pausanias forget to say that the *αἰσὶς* is *νεκρῶσις*, for this is essential to the story (see Pl., *Gor.* 493 BC; Philostr. ap. Ath. 433 F, 18 [2, p. 235 K.]; Zenoeb., *Proc.* ii, 8, etc.), and certainly cannot, as Dierckx, *Neddyo*, 70, imagined, be replaced by the *αἰσῶν* *δανάει*. That the *αἰ μαραμένον*, the *ἀμύητοι*, as the inscription on the picture called them (Paus. § 8), were in fact those who had neglected the Eleusian mysteries is only a conclusion of Pausanias' (or of his authority), as we see from the way he speaks in § 11; but it is probably the right conclusion. The Orphics took over the Eleusian fable, but exaggerated it to the point of absurdity: they *τοὺς δανάειους καὶ ἀμύητους ἀνελὼν* *ἄνθρωποι* *ἀνεγνώσαντες φέρον* in Hades (Pl., *Rp.* 363 D; *Gor.* 493 BC). In this they followed a hint given by a popular proverb—representing one of the *ἀμύητοι*—*νεκρῶν* *ἄνθρωποι* *φέρον* (which is also Roman: cf. Plaut.,

*Paus.* 102: as an "ordeal": *Plin.*, *NH.* 28, 12). It is not until later (nor in surviving literature before the *Arctostichus*, 371 E: though perhaps a little earlier on vase paintings from South Italy) that the story occurs in which it is the daughters of Danaos who are punished in Hades by having to fill the leaking vessel. The reason given for this punishment is their murder of the sons of Aegyptus in the marriage bed: but why did the punishment take this particular form? Clearly in the case of the Danaides their non-fulfilment of an important *vilos* is required in the ever *éreléte* *élepetes*. Their marriage union was uncompleted through their own choice (thus marriage itself was often called a *vilos* and the wedding was preceded by *paréche* and compared with the *vilos* of the mysteries). In this it is certainly implied that their deed had not been expiated, and they themselves had not found other husbands, but had as it were immediately after their impious deed been sent down to Hades (cf. *Sch. Eur. Hec.* 886, p. 436, 14 Dind.). The daughters of Danaos came to the underworld as *dyumai*. To die before marriage was regarded as the height of ill-luck by the common people (cf. *Welcker, Syll. ep.*, p. 49): the essential reason being that those who die thus leave behind them nobody who is called upon to keep up the cult of their souls (*E. Tro.* 380). Other ideas may have been vaguely combined with this. Thus, on the graves of *dyumai* a *loutróphoros* was set up—a figure of a *naír* or a *κέρη* *loutróphoros*, or a vessel called the *loutróphoros* which has been identified with certain bottomless vases (see *Furtwängler, Samml. Sabouroff*, on Pl. ivii-lix; cf. *Wolters, AIA, Mitth.*, xvi, 378 ff.). Can this have referred to a similar fate awaiting the *dyumai* after their death, a fate such as was imputed to the Danaides in particular as mythical types of those who are *dyumai* by their own fault?—an ever unsuccessful carrying of water for the *loutrón* of the bridal bath. (*Dieterich, Nekyia*, 78, with some probability takes this as the reason for the water-carrying.)

Of these two myths, was the one which appears later in order of time—the story of the Danaids—merely a subsequent development out of the earlier one (even said to occur on a black-figured vase), which told of the vain water-carrying of the *dyumai*? I cannot be so sure of this as I once was. I cannot indeed admit (with *Dümmler, Delphica*, 18 ff., who, however, fails to prove an earlier date for the story of the Danaids' jar) that it would be difficult to imagine how a special class of human beings came to be replaced later on by certain mythical representatives such as the Danaids were. But it is a very suspicious fact that the Danaids do not as a matter of fact represent the particular class of mankind—the *dyumai*—whose place they are supposed to have taken as their mythological representatives. They are not *dyumai* at all, but *dyumai*. The *dyumai* and their *éreléte* *élepetes* in Hades must have been familiar in popular belief: in addition to this the mythical fable of the similar behaviour of those who had neglected the *vilos* of initiation may have sprung up, but certainly not as the model of the *dyumai* story, more probably as a subsequent



rebanding of it for the purposes of mystical edification. (The story of the *dyman* has a much more primitive and popular flavour; and it alone gives a definite relation between the special labour of water-carrying in Hades and the nature of their default on earth.) The mythical fate of the *dyman* was then forgotten owing to the competing interest of the story of the *damna*, which, in fact, absorbed it, when a poet—for a poet it must have been—took up what still-surviving custom and its accompanying legend applied to the *dy*. In general and transferred it to the Danaïdes. This version of the myth was then victorious in the general consciousness both over the popular tradition about the *dyman* and the mystery-fable of the *damna*.—It remains to be said that the Danaïdes (and the *damna* too in a lesser degree) were supposed to be punished by their *dreleis idraias*. This, so long as it was a matter of the *dyman* simply, cannot have been the meaning of that fate of purposeless toil in their case any more than it was in the case of Oikhoë. Even Xenophon, *Oec.* vii, 45, lets us see that the vain toilers are not as a matter of fact intended to inspire horror, as sinners, but rather pity. His words are: *οὐδὲ δαίτι, οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν τετραμήνην νύκτα ἀνελθὲν λυγόμενοι ὡς εὐαρίστηται, δεῖ μὲν μὲναις θάνατον; ἢ δὲ, δέη ἢ γυνή, καὶ γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἶναι, καὶ τὰ δὲ γὰρ ἀναθεῖναι.* This gives us the attitude of mind from which the whole story originally grew up.

## APPENDIX IV

### THE TETRALOGIES OF ANTIPHON

I ought not to have admitted the doubt suggested in chap. v. n. 176, as to the genuineness of the Tetralogies traditionally ascribed to Antiphon. I have examined more carefully the well-known linguistic variations between the Tetralogies and speeches i, v, and vi of Antiphon, and also the recently noticed divergences (see Dittenberger, *Hermes*, 31: 32) of the Tetralogies from Athenian law (for which the author, like the declamation-writers of later times, substitutes occasionally a "*quæscholasticum*"—a purely fanciful creation but one more suited to pleading in *utramque partem*). All these objections seem to me, on maturer consideration, insufficient to make us reject the identity—otherwise as well established—of the author of the Tetralogies with the author of the Speeches.

## APPENDIX V

RITUAL PURIFICATION EFFECTED BY RUNNING WATER,  
RUBBING WITH ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE SUBSTANCES  
(σικῶλα, FIGS). ABSORPTION OF THE *materialis peccans*  
INTO EGGS.

For the purpose of ritual purification it is necessary to have water drawn from running springs or streams, or from the sea: *Θιλάων ἀδελφὴν σὺν τὰς τρεῖς καὶ δύο, Eux., II. 1193.* (Hence in the united



It is also *λέων φάσμα*: Artem. iii, 50 (cf. Gp. 18, 1, 8, with notes of Nicias). As being able to keep off daimones (in wolf-form) it was then used in religious "purification".—Figs are also used for the purpose of religious cleansing and securing (*ἁγὰ* figs particularly important decem et avertentium in tutela sont. Macr. 3, 20, 2-3). Figs used *ἐν καθάρσει*: Eustath., Od., p. 1572, 57 (?) is this the meaning of the *καθάρσει* of the eyes with figs in Pherecr. ap. Ath. 3, 78 D [132 K.]. Hence *ἑστὶ καθάρσιος* = *καθάρσιος* (Eustath.). Figs the best *ἀντιφάρμακον*: Arist. ap. Jul., Ep. 24, p. 505, 7 ff. From the specially magic properties of the fig comes the idea that fig-trees are never struck by lightning: Plin., Sup. 8, 9, p. 884 C; Gp. 11, 2, 7; Theoph. Noun. 200, 288 (and cf. Rh. Mus. 50, 584); Lyd., Mæar. fr. fab. 1, p. 181 W.; 4, 4, p. 68 W. The *φάρμακοι* at the Thargelia (above, chap. ix, n. 28) wear strings of figs round their necks (Heliad. ap. Phot., Bibl., p. 394a, 5 ff.), and are beaten with branches of the fig-tree (*ὑπὸ δῶ*) and with *αἰλλὰς* (Hippocr. fr. 4, 5, 8; Hsch. *αἰλλῆς ῥέμα*): here again the figs have a kathartic purpose (Müller mistakes this, Dorians, i, 348), as is shown also by the presence of *αἰλλὰς* as well (cf. in general Theoc. vii, 107; v, 121). Before the *φάρμακοι* were driven out of the city as scapegoats they were thus "purified" with the above-mentioned *αἰλλὰς* and *αἰλλὰς*. The same thing is said in the story of the ravens which parodies this expiatory rite. The ravens are offered up to *Διὶ Πάρι* as a sort of *φάρμακον*—*καταθίσκοντας ἐνθάδε ἀφίειν ζῆντι, καὶ ἐκλύειν τῷ Διὶ φάρμακον ἐς ἀφάνει* (Arist. fr. 454 [498 The.]); for a similar *καταθίσκω* (*εἰς ἀφάνει*) see the commentators on Macr. iii, 58, Diogen. v, 49; cf. τῇ *ρῆσι* (regarded as a daimon), *φάρμακον ἐς ἀφάνει* (Philostroph. Her. 179, 8 Kays.).—Rubbing-off of the "impurity" was effected also with the dead bodies of puppies (*αἰλλὰς ὁ σκύλας*, Theophr., Ch. 28 [15]). These *ἀνισμοὶ* *ἀνισμοί* were rubbed down with the bodies of puppies (which had been sacrificed to Hekate): *καταθίσκοντας*, and this is *καταθίσκω*, Plin., Q. Rom. 68, p. 280 C.

It was believed that these materials (wool and the skins of animals) were also employed received into themselves the harmful and polluting substances. This is why eggs are also used as *καθάρσιος*: e.g. in *P. Mag. Lond.*, n. 121, l. 522 ap. Kenyon, *Greek Magic* in B.M. i, p. 101 (1893): *γράφει τὰ ὄντα εἰς ψὰ δύο ἀμνηνὸν καὶ τῷ ἐν καταθίσκει* (sic) *οὕτως ἐστὶν*. More (u. Loewe, *Lat. ed.* 2 Zuph. 1700), p. 256 f. They were meant to absorb the impurity. *ἐκλάμβανον τὰ τὰ καταθίσκοντας* *κατὰ*, Auct. v. *ἀνισμὸς* ap. Clem., St. vii, p. 644 P.

## APPENDIX VI

HEKATE AND THE Ἑκατικὰ φάρμακα, GORGYRA, GORGO, MORMOLYKE, MORMO, HAUBO, GELLO, EMPOURA, ETC.

Hekate herself is addressed as *Γαργύρη καὶ Μορμολύκη καὶ Μόρφη καὶ καλὴ μορφή*: Hygin. ap. Hipp., RH. iv, 36, p. 102, 67 D.-S. Sch. A.B.

iii, 801, says of Hek. *Ἀγῆστῃ καὶ φάσματι δαίμονισσιν* (cf. Eur., *Hek.* 568; D. Chr. iv, p. 73 M. [l. p. 70 Ara.]; Hsch. *δαίμων*, τὸ καλούμενον Ἐκτόντος (φάσματι Ἐκτοῦτος, *Matth.*, V. Procl. 28) καὶ πολλὰς αἰτῆς μεταβάλλειν τὸ εἶδος αὐτῆς καὶ Ἐμπεύουσαν καλεῖσθαι. Hekate-Empousa also in Ar. *Togon* fr. 800-1; Sch. Ar., *Ran.* 283; Hesych. Ἐμπεύουσα. Thus Hekate is the same as Gorgo, Mormo, and Empousa. Baubo also is one of her names: *H. Mag.*, p. 288 Abel. (Baubo probably identical with the *Βαβῶ* mentioned among other χθόνια in an inscr. from Paros: *Ἀθήναιον*, v, 15; cf. the male personal names Βαβῶν, Βαβελίς. *Βαυβῶ* can hardly be etymologically connected with βαυβῶν unpleasantly familiar in Herodotus (though the mistake has been repeated in Roemer, *Myth. Lex.* II, 3025); one does not see how a female daimon could be named after a male δαίμων. The nature of Hekate makes its move probable that she got her name from βαῖ the noise of the baying hound: cf. *Beardson, P. Mag. Par.* 1911.) Baubo, too, is elsewhere the name of a gigantic nocturnal spectre: Orph. *fr.* 216 Ab.; Lob., *Ag.* 823.—Elsewhere these δαίμονες, or forms in which Hekate, Gorgo, Mormo, etc., appear, are found as the names of separate infernal spirits. *Γοργόνα*: Ἀχέρωντος γυνὴ Apollod. x. θεῶν ap. Stob., *Ec.* i, 49, p. 419, 18 W.; cf. [Apollod.] i, 5, 3. *Γοργὼ* is probably only the shortened form of this daimon (she is alluded to as an inhabitant of Hades as early as Or. l. 634; in the κακὸν βῆμα of Herakles [Apollod.] 2, 5, 12; χθονία *Γοργὼ*, Eur., *Ion*, 1053). Acheron, whose consort she is, must have been regarded as the lord of the underworld. We also hear of a mother of the underworld god: in Aesch., *Ag.* 1235, Kassandra calls Klytæmnestra θύοισιν Ἀΐδου μήτρας. In this very striking phrase it is impossible to take θῆιν in its generalized sense (as Lob. does: *Ag.* l. p. 292), and the whole phrase as merely metaphorical = αἰωνόφρονα. Why μήτρα in particular? And, above all, what would be the point of θύοισιν? Klytæmnestra, of course, it goes without saying, is only metaphorically called the "raging mother of Hades", i.e. a true she-devil; but the thing with which she is compared, from which the metaphor is taken, must have been a real figure of legend. In exactly the same way, in Byz. Greek, τῆς δαιμόνης μήτρας is a figurative expression for a wicked woman: see *Καλλιμ. καὶ Χρυσόστομ.* 2579 ed. Lambros; cf. ib., 1306, τῆς Νηρηίδου μήτρας. In German too "the devil's mother", or grandmother, or the devil's wife or bride, are of frequent occurrence in a metaphorical sense: Grimm, p. 1007; 1607. But in all these cases the comparison invariably implies the existence of real legendary figures to which the comparison refers; and often enough in mediæval and modern Greek folk-lore these creatures actually occur. We may therefore conclude that the θύοισιν Ἀΐδου μήτρας was a real figure of Greek legend, "Hades" in this connexion cannot be the god of the underworld, common in Homer and a regular poetic character elsewhere, the brother of Zeus and Poseidon. In that case his mother would be Rhea who certainly cannot be identified with the θύοισιν Ἀΐδου μήτρας. In local mythology there were numerous other underworld

gods any of whom might be loosely called "Aἰψα, the word being used as a general name for such deities. But the "raging" mother of the underworld god has the most unmistakable resemblance to Hekate who lies about by night on the wind (see above, chap. ix, p. 287 f.; below, App. vii) *φωγὰς νεφέων μίνα βαρυχόουσα* (Reins, *RA. Mus.* 48, 161 n., compares her legs well with the "huntsman of Hades"). It seems almost as if the two were identical: local legend could quite well have made Hekate the mother of the underworld god (just as she was the daughter of Adrasteia, or of Eubouleia, i.e. of Hades). If she is the same as *Μορμώ* (cf. the *Hymn. ap. Hipp.*, *RH.* iv, 35) then she was also known to folk-lore as the foster-mother of Acheron. This title is applied to *Μορμολύχης* τῆς μητρός of Acheron in Sophron *fr.* 9 Kibel. But *Μορμώ* is simply the abbreviated form of *Μορμολύχης* as *Γαργώ* is of *Γαργύρα*, and cf. also *Μορμώ* Hach., and with metathesis of *ρ*, *Μορμώ* ἰδ. (*Μορμώ* is mentioned together with *Λαμία*, *Γαργώ*, *Ἐφελύχης*, as a legendary creature in Str., p. 19, and see Rohdken, *Tim. Lex.*, p. 179 B., *Μορμολύχης*.) *Μορμώ* also in plural: *ἄνεμος μορμόνας πνέοντα (φωβόντα)*, Xen., *HG.* 4, 4, 17; Hach. *μορμόνας* ἐλάνθρας βαίοντες (i.e. "wandering", as in Hesiod, and like the *Κρίονες* in the Pythagorean *σύμβολον*, and the *ἄλκονες*, the quiet and wandering soul whom name is derived from *ἄλκεω*—so Lob., *Paraph.* 450). Besides this we have *Ἐναιρ* too in the plural: Luc., *Philops.* 38 fin. (perhaps only generalising); *τρεῖς αἰ* *Ἐναιρ*, P. Mag. Par. 2025 f.; *Ἐναιρ* (with *ἄλλα εἰδωλά*), D.P. 725, etc., to say nothing of *Γαργύρας*. *Μορμώ* as a bogey to frighten children: *Μορμῶ δάσκει*, Theoc. xv, 40 (cf. *ἄνδρα* *Μορμῶ* in), a theatrical piece, probably a farce: *IGM. Aeg.* i, 123g. So too is the monster *Ἀδμυ* that kidnaps children: *Duria*, *fr.* 35 (2 FHG); D.S. 20, 41; Hieracrit., *Incred.* 34, etc. Some details in Friedländer, *Davidson. u. d. Sitteng.*, i, 511 f. (as a nickname *Λαμῶ*: Sch. Ar., *Eq.* 62). *Mormo* herself is called *Λαμία*, *Μορμώ* τῆς καὶ *Λαμίας*, Sch. Greg. Nz. ap. Rohdken, *Tim. Lex.*, p. 182a. With *Mormo* and *Lamia* *Γελλά* is also identified (Sch. Theoc. xv, 40), a ghost that kidnaps children mentioned already by Sappho, *fr.* 44; Zenob. iii, 3, etc. *Καρπῶ*, too, is the same as *Ἀδμυ* (Herych). *Lamia* is evidently the general name (see above, chap. iv, n. 115), while *Mormo*, *Gello*, *Karko*, and even *Empousa*, are particular *Λαμῶ*, who also merge into one another. Just as *Mormo* and *Gello* coincide, so also do *Gello* and *Empousa*: *Γελλὰ εἰδωλὸν Ἐμπεσφ.* Hach. (*Empousa*, *Lamia*, and *Marmolykai* the same: Philostr., *V. Ap.* 4, 28, p. 145, 16 K.). *Empousa*, who appears in continually changing shapes (Ar., *Ren.* 286 B.), is seen by human beings at night (*ὠντομένη φάσμα* & *Ἐμψουα*, V. Aschis. iott.: Philostr., *V. Ap.* 2, 4), but even more commonly at midday (like the Hekate of Lucian): *μεσημέριος ἄνρ τοῖς περιγυμνῶς ἐμφάνεται*, Sch. Ar., *Ren.* 293. She is, in fact, the *daemones meridiani* known to Christian writers as *Diana* (Lob., *Apl.* 1082; Græmm, 1162). For devils appearing at midday see Rochholz, *Glaube u. Br.*, i, 87 B.; Maxmhardt, *Ad.*

*Welt u. Felds.* ii, 135 f.; *Huberland, Ztschr. Völkerpsych.* xiii, 310 ff.; *Drexler in Myth. Lex.* ii, 2802 ff.; *Ciccam*, 1661. Hekate, in so far as she appears as an *εἰδωλον* in the upper world is identical with Emp. and with Berbo, Gorgo, Mormo, as well as Gello, Kariko, Lamia. (Arr. to Sch. A.R. iv, 628 Stesichoros, *ἐν τῷ ἐνθάδῃ εἰδωλῷ* [*εἰδωλὸς* Bergk on Stes. fr. 13 quite unconvincingly] *εἶδε Ἀψιδίτῃ τῇ ἐνθάδῃ φέρετ θυγατέρα δίας*. Here Hek. herself seems to be described as "a kind of Lamia", for she was generally regarded as the mother of Skylla, e.g. by Akousilaos [73 B, 27 Vers.], in the Hesiodic *Eoiai*, 172 Ks. (Sch. A.R.), and even in A.R. himself who in iv, 628, explains the Homeric Krataia (p. 124) as merely a name of Hekate.)—The vagueness of feature and confusion of personality is characteristic of these ghostly and delusive apparitions. In reality the individual names (in some cases onomatopoeic formations to suggest terror) were originally the titles of local ghouls. In the long run they all come to suggest the same general idea and are therefore confused with each other and are identified with the best known of them, Hekate. The underworld and the realm of ghosts is the proper home of these feminine daimones as a whole and of Hekate too: most of them, with the possible exception of Empousa, give way entirely to Hekate in importance and are relegated to children's fairy-tales. In the case of Gorgyra (Gorgo) and Mormolyke (Mormo) this fact is clearly attested. Lamia and Gello carry off children and also *δαίμονες* from this life, like other daimones of the underworld, Keres, Harpies, Erinyes, and Thanatos himself. The Lamia rise to the light from their underground lair—*λαπίδες τινὲς ἱεραποθέτες* (the oldest writers of histories) *ἐν μέσῃ καὶ νύκτι ἐν γῆ ἀνέμψαντες*. D.H., *Thuc.* 6. Empousa appears on earth at midday because that was the time when sacrifice was offered to the dead (Sch. Ar., *Ron.* 280: sacrifice to Heroes at midday: above, chap. iv, n. 8). She approaches the offerings to the creatures of the lower world because she herself is one of their number. (In the same way the chthonic character of the *Scirmes*—they are closely related to the Harpies—is shown by the fact that they too appear like Empousa at midday and oppress sleepers, etc., according to the popular demonology. See *Cruquius, Philol.* 50, 97 ff.)

## APPENDIX VII

The *Hecatai* of Hekate cause fear and sickness at night: *αἱ δὲ Ἰουναὶ φέρονται παρὰ γῆρας ὅτι ἐνύκτι αὐτὰς εἰδέναι*, Trag. *Interp.* fr. 375 (Purcum suggested Aesch.). They form the *νυκτερῶν ἀνέμων* 'Evidēs. Eur., *Hel.* 570. (These *νυκτερῶν τῶν θεῶν* are probably also referred to in the *defixio* CIG. 5773; *Wünsch, Tab. Defix.*, p. 17b.) They are nothing else than the restless souls of the dead wandering in the train of Hekate. Nocturnal terrors are produced by 'Ενύκτι εὐφροδῆ: καὶ ἡμίαντες εἰδέναι, Hp., *Morb. Sect.* (vi, 362 L.). Hence Oryph., *H.* i, 1, calls Hekate *φρυγὰν νυκτός μύνα βαρυφόνου*. The souls which thus wander about with Hekate are

in part those of the *δαίμοι*, i.e. of those who have died before the completion of their "destined" period of life. *καὶ παύειν ἐξέσθαι βίον*. Soph., *Ant.* 896; cf. Phrygisch. in *AB.* 24, 22, and *πρόμαχος ἀναγὰς*. *Isacr.* Col. 372. Thanatos has acted unjustly towards them *ἐπ' ἡγευμένη βίον τούτων πρὸςφάνας δαίμω*, Orph., *H.* 87, 5-8. The period of conscious existence on earth which they had left incomplete they must now fulfil as disembodied "souls": *αἰὲν ἰμμάτῃ μορτὸ πρᾶνεντας (αἰήμας) ἐν οὐκὲν ἀγᾶρῃ ἰστικ, δόμῃς ῥεῖσσις τὸν ἀπὸ πρᾶνεντας* quas tum pervisum est si non intemptivè obissent, Tert., *Am.* 56. (They haunt the place of their burial: *ἡμεῖς ἐν τρυγίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῷ δεῖν τούτων πρὸςφάνας*, *P. Mag. Par.* 1408; cf. *CIG.* 3658b.) For this reason it is often mentioned on gravestones (and elsewhere: *Ent.*, *AK.* 166 f.) as something specially to be lamented that the person there buried had died *δαίμοι*: see *Epigr. Gr.* 12; 16; 193; 220, 1; 221, 2; 313, 2-3; *ἀρεστος δαίμοι*, 336, 2; and cf. 372, 32; 164, 3; *CIG.* 5574 (see also App. iii and chap. xiv. pt. ii. n. 153, *δαίμοι*). Gello who herself *παθόντος δαίμων ἀναλόντος* then becomes a *φάρμακον*, slays children and causes *ταῖς τῶν δαίμων θανάτοις*, Zenob. iii, 3; Hsch. *Γελλῶ*. The souls of the *δαίμοι* cannot rest but must continually wander: see Plaut., *Mos.* 499. They (*δαίμων ἐκώλωε ἔχοντες*, *H. Hec.*, l. 15; Orph., p. 280 Ab.) are the creatures which accompany Hekate in her nocturnal wanderings. The *Hymn.* to Hekate, p. 289 Ab. (cf. *P. Mag. Par.* 1777 B.) addresses Hek. thus (10 E.): *δαίρ' Ἐκάρη τροχίτην, πρὸςφάνας, φάρμακ' ἔχοντα (ἔχοντα Μην.)*, *ἢ τ' ἰλαγὰς θεοῦν μὲν δαίμω (δαίμω τ' ἐφύβωτος?) χαλεπὴς τ' ἐκταρμύτης, τῇν' Ἐκάρη σε καλῶ ἐν ἐκταρμύτης δαίμοι καὶ τινες φάρμακ' ἔχοντα ἄγῃσι τε* (=ai Meia), but this position of *τ'* is a regular Hellenistic usage; occurs frequently in Orac. Sibyll.) *δαίμωις ἀνὰ*. Thus the *δαίμοι* became the typical haunting spirits *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. Just as in this *Hymn.* they are summoned (with Hek.) for unholy purposes of magic, so an *δαίμοι* is sometimes expressly invoked in the *defixiones* which were placed in graves (esp. in those of *δαίμοι*: see the instructions given in *P. Mag. Par.* 332 B., 2215, 2220 f.; *P. Anastasy.*, l. 336 B.; 353): *λέγω τῷ δαίμω τῷ κατὰ τούτων τῶν τάφων, etc.*; Roman *defixio*, *I. Sic. et It.* 1047; *ἐξορκισμὸς* or *κατάφρων δαίμοι*, leaden tablet from Carth., *BCH.* 1898, p. 299 (*Tah. Defix.*, p. xvi); cf. also *P. Mag. Par.* 342 f.; 1380 B.; *κατάφρων* (the victim) *δαίμων*, leaden tablet from Alexandria, *Rh. Mus.* 9, 87, l. 22: a lead tablet from Phrygia (*BCH.* 1893, p. 251) has: *γράφω πάντας τοὺς ἰστικ ἀνὰ τῶν δαίμων κατὰ τῶν δαίμων Ἐκάρη Ζεφύρον, etc.* In the curses of *Epigr. Gr.*, p. 149, the *Ἐκάρη καλόντες δαίμονες* alternate with *δαίμοι συμφορῆς*: see also Stettin, *Amer. Sch. Athens*, ii, 168.—Everything that has been said of the *δαίμοι* applies also to the *βροχόντες* (or *βίαια*, a term found in the magical papyri: cf. also *βροχόντες* *πρόμαχος*, *P. Mag. Par.* 1650): they are a special kind of *δαίμοι*: they had no rest, see above, chap. v, n. 147; Tert., *Am.* 56-7; Serv., *A.* iv, 386, quoting the *physici*; cf. also Heliod., 2, 5, p. 42, 20 ff. Ed. A *βροχόντες*, who has thus been deprived of his life, has to make special supplication for admission

into Hades: *Epigr. Gr.* 625; cf. *Verg.*, *A.* iv, 696 ff. Such souls become *ἀλκόμενοι*, wandering spirits; see above, *Append. vi*, p. 582; wandering of a *ψευδόμενος*, *Plu.*, *Cim.* 1.—Finally the souls of unburied persons who have no share in the cult of the souls of home in the grave are also condemned to wander (cf. *Eur.*, *Her.* 31-50): see above, chap. v, p. 163. The *εἶρας* is detained *ἐνθάδε*: *Soph.*, *Ant.* 1076, and wanders about the earth: *ἀλκίμν.* *Eur.*, *Tro.* 1683; cf. *Tert.*, *Am.* 58. Hence the souls of these *εἶρας* could be forced to appear and answer the sorcerer: *Hellod.*, p. 177, 15 ff. Bk.; *εἰς κοδίκην Μενιδίου* the wanderings of the soul cease: *Plin.*, *Ep.* 7, 27, 21; *Luc.*, *Philops.* 31 fin.—The art of the *μάντις* and of the *καθεστῆς* (and of the *δωμδεῖνα γυνή*, *Plu.*, *Superst.* 2, p. 166 A) is supposed to keep off such nocturnal terrors; it is "purification" precisely because it drives away such unholy beings. It is also a kind of *καθάρσιον* that is employed when *ἀνομολαλίες* (instead of to the dogs: *Ath.* 409 D) are thrown out *ἐν τοῖς ἀμφότεροις ναομίμοις νεκρῶν καὶ φέροις* [*Harmodios of Leprea* ap. *Ath.* 149 C], i.e. to Hekate and her rout which also appears as a pack of hounds.

## APPENDIX VIII

## DISINTEGRATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND REDUPLICATION OF PERSONALITY

In that period of extreme excitement the Greeks must have had frequent experience of the abnormal but by no means unusual psychical state in which a division of consciousness takes place and becomes apparent. The single personality splits up into two (or more) distinct centres of consciousness; and these give rise to two personalities (succeeding each other, or contemporaneous), with a double will and a double intellect appearing in one man. Even unprejudiced psychological observers of our own time are unable to describe such phenomena, which appear (spontaneously or produced experimentally) in certain neuropathic conditions, except as a reduplication or multiplication of personality. A second self comes into being, a second centre of consciousness following or by the side of the first and normal personality, which is generally unaware of the existence of its rival. (Probably the most complete and cautious account of these matters is that given by Pierre Janet in *L'automatisme psychologique*, Paris, 1889.) When such phenomena appear in conjunction with marked religious or spiritualistic tendencies they are naturally explained in accordance with these intellectual preconceptions. The appearance in a man or woman of an intelligent will, unguided or unperceived by the normally dominant personality, is conceived as the entrance of a foreign personality into the individual; or as the expulsion of the real soul of the individual by such a demonic or spiritual visitor. Nothing, however, is commoner, in all ages, than the religious or spiritualist preconceptions that lead to such an explanation; and so



what the Greeks called *incubans* or *navígeroi* *de* *thali* has been a very frequent explanation of such mysterious occurrences from the earliest times (and in the present day). It has appealed just as much to the person affected by such "reduplication of personality" as to those round about him (unless they have been scientifically educated). The actual experience of such phenomena is generally a fact; fancy begins only with the explanation offered. For the Greeks the Pythia was always the best known example of such "possession" of a human being by a foreign will or spirit which seemed to enter violently and from outside into the human individual, having little correspondence (as it usually happened) with the character or the intellect of the "medium" in his or her normal state of consciousness. The Sibyls, Bakides, *Βάκχοι*, the seers and priests of purification, Epimenides, Aristæus, and so many others, were further cases of the ascent of the soul to the divine or the entrance of a god into the soul. It was inevitable that the idea of an immediate relation between the soul and the divine, and of the divine nature of the soul itself, should grow up in connexion with such cases as these, and seem to be authenticated in them more than in any other way. Greece is not the only place where this has happened.

## APPENDIX IX

### THE GREAT ORPHIC THEOGONY

The information about a coherent Orphic Theogony and Anthropogony which has come down to us from the statements of Neoplatonic philosophers and their contemporaries, is derived, as Lobeck very rightly concluded, from the *de rebus orphicis* *Orphicis theologia*, the set of *ἀλλήλοισι διαμαρτυροῦναι* (Damasc. *Princ.* p. 380 K.). This last statement means that they were explained in lectures given by the heads of the Platonic school since the time of Syrianos (*Orphicis theologia* of Syrianos: Procl. in *Tim.* 98 B; Scholia of Proclus on Orpheus, *et vel ut eis videtur de rebus orphicis*: Marin. V. *Procl.* 27). Written commentaries were also published, more particularly in order to prove the *συμφωνία* *Orphicis*, *Περὶ ὁμοῦ καὶ ἰσότητος* (Syrianos wrote a book with this title, wrongly ascribed to Proclus by Suidas: see R. Schöll on Procl. in *Rp.*, p. 5. Probably the work of Syr. *et vñ* 'Orphicis theologia' is the source of Orph., *frs.* 123-4, which are traced back in the *Θεογονία*, § 50, to *Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἰσούσι συμφωνοῦναι*. From Syr. also probably comes the citation from Orpheus *ἐν τῇ τοῦ ὁμοῦ* *ἀλλήλοισι*, *ib.*, § 61). The older Neoplatonists before Syrianos took little notice of the Orphica. Plotinos gives no quotation at all (though perhaps an allusion in 4, 3, 12; see Lob., p. 565). Iamblichos quotes nothing from immediate acquaintance, Porphyrios, who read everything, gives a little (*frs.* 114; 123 *Ench.* from Porph.; 211) and what he does give certainly comes from the Rhapsodist. In fact

the Neoplatonists as a whole when they quote Orpheus from their own knowledge (and do not, for example, simply write "Orpheus" instead of "Pythagoras": see above, chap. x, n. 5) use the *Rhapsodiai* only, as Lobbeck rightly maintains, p. 466 (Abel did not realise this, to the detriment of his collection of the *fr.*). The title of the poem they used can hardly have been *Θεογονία*. (This seems to occur as a title in *fr.* 188 (Clem. Al. from auct. *α. ἀλωεῖς*). In *fr.* 108 it is only a description of contents; *fr.* 310 is spurious. In Suidas, Gaisford's MSS., we do indeed read of a *Θεογονία*, *δὲ* "α": but the figure indicating the number of lines corresponds most suspiciously with that of the previous *δραματίσματα*, and in any case would be insufficient for the great length of the *ἰαχυθία*.) It seems extremely probable (as Lobbeck already suspected, p. 716, 720) that the simple description: an Orphic poem divided into several *Rhapsodiai*, *ἑπὶ λόγος ἐς ἰαχυθίαν κθ'* (Suid.), was the real title of the poem, which consisted of several *ἰαχυθίαι*. This *ἑπὶ λόγος* (the plural only means that there were several books) is, however, a different one (Lobbeck missed this, p. 716) from the *ἑπὶ λόγος* which Epigenes (ap. Clem. Al., *Sir.* i, 21, p. 144 F.) attributed to the Pythagorean Kerkops. (And again when Suid. attributes the 34 Rhaps. to the Thessalian Theognetos or to Kerkops he also means the *αὐτὸς ἑπὶ λόγος* not divided into Rhaps., and confuses this with the later and much extended *ἑπὶ λόγος*.) The older *ἑπὶ λόγος* is that alluded to by Cic., *ND.* i, 107, and prob. also by Plu., *Simp.* 2, 3, 2, p. 838 D (*fr.* 42): the quotation in *EM.* (*fr.* 44) from the 8th Ilk. refers to the later *ἑπὶ λόγος*. But it is certain that the *ἑπὶ λόγος* in 2d Bk., the poem possessed by the Neoplatonists, from which by far the greater number of our fragments are taken, was not a work of the sixth century, written for instance (as Lobbeck was inclined to think, 803 f.) by Oromakritos. It is even untrue—regrettably enough we might add—that as the Neoplatonists presumed (and Lobbeck believed in consequence: p. 808, 829 f., 802, 813) Plato knew and made use of the "Rhapsodies". (This emerges with particular plainness from Gruppe's study of the question in *Jb. Philol. Supp.* xvii, 689 ff.). And when this is gone no other evidence for the earlier date of the Orphic Theogony in this form is left. And in the very few passages in which a real coincidence (and not a doubtfully assumed one) exists between the Rhapsodies and Pherekydes, Heraclitus, Parmenides (see Lob., p. 532; Kern, *Thägen*, p. 52; Gruppe, p. 706) or Empedokles, the poet of the Rhapsodies is the borrower not the creditor. The age in which he lived cannot be precisely determined; the fact that Neoplatonic writers are the first to quote him does not settle the question; it is uncertain whether he lived after (as I think) or before the (otherwise unknown) Hieronymos whose statement about an Orphic Theogony is quoted by Damasc., *Princ.* 381 f. K. In any case Gruppe (p. 742) has correctly appreciated the character of the bulky poem (equalling or even surpassing the length of the *Iliad*), when he says that it consists in the main of a loosely connected patchwork of older Orphic tradition.

There are many points in which agreement between the Rhapsodies and older Orphic teaching and poetry is still demonstrable; lines from older Orphic poems were taken over unaltered; subjects from older Orphic Theogonies were combined, sometimes without regard for their divergent character: different versions of the same motif occur together. Thus we have the *xarixevny* (modelled eventually upon Menoid) twice over: in the first version Zeus swallows Phanes, in the second the heart of Zagreus. Both mean the same thing; the devouring of the heart of Zagreus may perhaps belong to the older Orphic legendary material, the devouring of Phanes to the later. The personality of *Θάρα*, however, cannot have been unknown even to the older stratum of Orphic poetry. D.S. I, II, 3, quotes a line of "Orphus", which certainly was not taken from the Rhaps., in which *Θάρα* is mentioned (and identified with Dionysos). And in a gold tablet, folded up with the tablet bearing an inscription of Orphic character, *J. Sic. et It.* 843, and found in the same grave near Sybaris, there occurs in addition to other (illegible) matter a list of divine names which includes that of *Θάρα* (and also *Περσεφονη* here apparently distinguished from *Θάρα* with whom this figure of Orphic theology is generally identified): see Comperetti, *Notizie degli scavi di antichità*, 1879, p. 157, 1880, p. 156. This establishes the existence of this figure of Orphic mythology as early as the third cent. B.C. (the prob. date of these tablets).—We may therefore employ the facts derived from the Rhapsodies with some confidence for the reconstruction of Orphic poetry and doctrine at those points at least in which coincidence with older Orphic teaching and the fantastic creatures of Orphic theology can still be proved. [I leave these remarks exactly as they stood in the first edition of this book, for they still fully correspond to my own opinion. Others in the meanwhile have expressed divergent views, esp. Comperz, *Greek Thinkers*, i, p. 539. But that Gruppe's proof of the fact that Plato did not know the Rhapsodist Theogony is "wholly unsuccessful", is something which no one has yet sought to show upon intelligible grounds. Until such a disproof is forthcoming the belief in the early date of the Rhapsodies has no real ground on which to stand.]

## APPENDIX X

### PREVIOUS LIVES OF PYTHAGORAS. HIS DESCENT TO HADES

Pythagoras' miraculous power of remembering what had happened long ago in previous lives seems to be already alluded to in the lines of Empedokles, 470 ff. M. = fr. 129 D. The legend in which it was related how Pythag. showed that he had once been Emphorbos the son of Panthous who had been slain by Menelaos in the Trojan war, must, at any rate, have been put forward at an early period. The story is often told or alluded to: D.S. 10, 6, 1-3; Sch. V.

on *F* 28; Max. Tyr. 16 (i. 287 f. R.); Porph., *VP.* 26-7; Iambli., *VP.* 63; Philostr., *V. AP.* 1, 1, 1; 6, 7, 4; *Her.* 17, p. 192, 23 ff. Ka.; Tatian, *Gr.* 23; Hor., *C.* 1, 28, 10; Ov., *M.* 15, 160 ff.; Hygin. 112; Lact., *Inst.* 3, 18, 16; cf. also Call., *fr.* 83a (completely misunderstood by Schneider) who even calls Pythag. "Euphorbos", as Hor. does and Luc., *DM.* 20, 3. The story is always told in such a way as to imply that no intermediate *transmigrations* of his soul had taken place between Pythag. himself and Euphorbos (they are definitely excluded in Luc., *Call.* 17).—Why was Euphorbos in particular selected? The fact that through his father Panthous he had a special connexion with Apollo, like Pythagoras (a true  $\phi\omega\chi\phi$  'Ἀπολλωνεύης': cf. also Luc., *Call.* 16), can hardly have been sufficient reason (as Götting, *Opusc.* 210; Kräpke, *Sov. Pythag.* 67 f. suggest).—Euphorbos was taken up and made one of a whole series of previous incarnations (Althalides—Euphorbos—Hermotimos—Pyrrhos the Delian fabermax—Pythagoras) by Herakleides Pont.: D.L. viii, 4-5 (with which agree Hippol., *RH.* 1, 2, p. 12, 34 f. D.-S.; Porph., *VP.* 45; Tert., *An.* 28, 31; Sch. Soph., *El.* 62). Starting with Althalides (to whom Herakleides was perhaps the first to ascribe the gift of miraculous memory in addition to other miraculous powers) the power of *ἀνέμνησις* in life and death was transmitted through all the links in the chain down to Pythag. himself. (The story of the shield of Euphorbos was now transferred to Hermotimos for obvious reasons.) According to D.L. Herakleides  $\phi\omega\chi\epsilon\iota$   $\nu\epsilon\pi\iota$   $\alpha\iota\tau\omega$   $\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\epsilon$   $\lambda\acute{\omicron}\gamma\iota\sigma\iota$  ( $\tau\acute{\alpha}\nu$   $\Pi\upsilon\theta\alpha\gamma\omicron\rho\epsilon\alpha\varsigma$ ). It is very possible that the language is here inexact and Herakleides did not (as the words of D.L. would strictly suggest) appeal to a statement of Pythagoras (in a book) but represented him as saying all this (in a dialogue). If this is correct, apart from the incarnation as Euphorbos which he took over from the tradition, Herakleides invented all the rest, according to his own fancy. The fable was then taken up with variations by others: in Sch. A.R. i, 845, two versions derived from the fiction of Herakl. but diverging in some points are mentioned (one being supported by *oi*  $\Pi\upsilon\theta\alpha\gamma\omicron\rho\epsilon\iota\sigma\iota$ , the other by Pythagoras himself—in a book?  $\Pi\upsilon\theta\alpha\gamma\omicron\rho\epsilon\alpha\varsigma$   $\phi\omega\chi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$  are the actual words). What Gellius 4, 11, 34, has to say on the authority of Klearchos and Dikaiarchos differs (except in the matter of Euphorbos) entirely from Herakleides (and the names given should not be altered). But it may, nevertheless, be essentially the same fable over again, this time in the form of a parody of Herakl. (which is not very likely in the case of Klearchos but suits Dikaiarch. very well). Encouraged by these predecessors Lucian in the *Cock* (19-20) carried still further the parody of the fabulous tale. The story of Herakleides seems to be seriously used in the  $\gamma\mu\alpha\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$  in which Pythagoras  $\alpha\iota\tau\epsilon\iota$   $\phi\omega\chi\epsilon\iota$   $\delta\epsilon$  'ἑνὲ  $\kappa\alpha\iota$   $\delta\epsilon\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\omega$   $\delta\epsilon\upsilon\tau\epsilon\rho$   $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\varsigma$   $\delta\iota\delta\iota\mu\alpha$   $\nu\alpha\pi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\mu\epsilon\kappa\alpha$   $\delta\epsilon$   $\delta\epsilon\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omega\upsilon\sigma\iota$ , D.L. viii, 14. As Diels, *Archiv. f. Gesch. Philos.* iii, 468 f., shows to be very probable, this was in the pre-Pythagorean book written in the Ionic dialect, not before the third century and divided into three parts, which D.L. quotes and makes use of (viii, 8; 9; 14; cf. also Sch. Pl., *Sp.* 800 B).

Pyth. here states that he appears on earth from the underworld "every 307 years", and the calculation may possibly be based on the series of lives invented by Herakleides and the Chronology of Apollodorus (in which case it could not be before the last century B.C.), thus: Pythag. born 572, Pyrrhos 779, Hermotimos 986, Euphorbos 1193 (in the first year of the *Panath.* acc. to Eratosthenes and Apollodor.), Aithalides 1490. It must indeed be admitted that this method of reckoning makes the gross error of calculating from birth to birth instead of from the death of A to the birth of B. (Other intervals are given in *Theologum. Arithm.*, p. 40 Art. [218 = 8<sup>1</sup>: D.L. viii, 14, should not be altered to suit this as I once proposed]; Sch. Herm. Lucan. ix, 1, p. 288, 12 Vs. [462, ? an error for 432 = 2 x 216; cf. *Theol. Arith.*, p. 40, 30])—The existence of a Pythagorean writing belonging to the period before Herakleides, in which these previous lives of Pythag. were mentioned cannot be certainly proved. It might be supposed (as I once supposed: *RA. Mus.* 26, 353) that the conjunction of the legend of Pythagoras' previous lives with the descent of P. to Hades, which appears in Sch. Soph., *El.* 62, and Tert., *An.* 28, is ancient and original: in which case the previous lives would have been described in a Pythagorean *καρθέσις* *εἰς* *ᾗδεα*. But the conjunction is quite arbitrary and is not such as would be likely in a Pythagorean book on the descent: the descent is, in fact, told as a parody, the form which had been given to it by Kermippos, and with the implication that it is untrue. Not is it very likely that the previous lives would be described in connexion with a descent to Hades, considering that Pyth. remembered them while alive on earth and not in a condition of ecstasy, and did not learn of them in Hades. It would be more natural that, vice versa, an account of the previous lives should also include something about *εἰς* *ᾗδεα*—the *ἀδελφικός* included that also: cf. D.L. viii, 4 fin. (see the decisive objections to my previous view raised by G. Ettig, *Acherontica*, Leips. Stud. 13, 289 f.). This applies equally to the view of Diels<sup>1</sup> (*Archiv.*, p. 489) that Herakleides (in his work *εἰς* *ᾗδεα*) told of the previous lives of P. in connexion with the descent of P. to Hades and that Herakl. was the first to make P. go down to Hades. There is nothing to prove that Herakl. did this or to make it even probable. Without any

<sup>1</sup> What Diels, *Parmenides*, p. 15 (1897) says in support of his view might stand if we were willing to ignore the fact that Pythag., as has already been remarked, remembered his previous lives while he was still alive, and not in the ecstatic condition—not *ἵνα παρέμνηται καὶ ἐμνήσκειτο*. But this is a fact, so that Diels' view remains untenable.—I cannot see what there is of a "rationalist" character (Diels) in the fact that Pyth. saw Hesiod and Homer in Hades undergoing punishment *ἐν* *ᾗδεα* *κατὰ* *τὴν* *ἀρετήν* (D.L. viii, 21). This is, in fact, an anti-rationalist, priestly invention (and so I see Diels' arch also understands it, *Nahyia*, 120). This fact certainly does not tell against the view that the Hades poem had its origin in the north for the first half of the fifth century B.C.

grounds for doing so Diels supposes that what Pythagoras (acc. to Sch. Ambros. on c 271) "ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔπεμψε τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀρχὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπορίας," was said by Pythag., not in a book going under his name, but in a dialogue by Heraclideides (who is not even mentioned in that Schol.). There is no reason at all to doubt that these words (as Lobeck supposed, 944) came from a book ascribed to Pythagoras himself, in which he described his ekstasis and ecstatic visions (cf. Sch. Arist. 199b, 1 f., 13 ff. Br.). There is no further definite evidence for the existence of such a Pythagorean *Katabasis* εἰς Ἅδου (for the γένεσις of D.L. viii, 21, has another and better interpretation, as already remarked). But a fairly early date for the origin of at least a legend about a descent of P. to Hades (and of quite definite statements about it with a propagandist aim) is attested by Hieronymos of Rhodes ap. D.L. viii, 21. (But we should not without more definite reason ascribe the invention of the fable itself to Hieron., as is done by Hüller, *Hier. Rh. frag.*, p. 25. What reason could Hieron. have had for inventing anything of the kind?) Further, the lines of the comic poet Aristophanes ap. D.L. viii, 96 (fr. 12 K.), already suggest that such legends were in existence in the third century B.C. Whether the work on the subject of Pythagoras' descent to Hades called forth the legend or whether the legend was already current and called forth the book, must remain undecided. But in any case the book included no account of the previous lives of Pythagoras; these (apart from the older legend of P. and Euphorbos) were first put forward by Heraclideides Pont., (but not the Descent of P. to Hades).

## APPENDIX XI

## INITIATION CONSIDERED AS ADOPTION BY THE GOD

The Myster whose soul is speaking in the first of the gold tablets found at Sybaris (Iliels, No. 18) says, L 2-8: *ἐμπερὶ δ' ἐνδὲρ ὀρεφάνῃ μοι παρὰ τὴν μητέρα, θεομήτορ δ' ἐν ἐνὶ κόλποις ἔδωκε χερσίν* θεομήτορ. This ἐνὶ κόλποις ἔδωκε . . . can hardly mean anything else than: I seek (as *ἐμπερὶ*) the protection of her maternal bosom (or lap). It would certainly be attractive to take this (with Dieterich, *de hymn. Orph.*, p. 36) as referring to a symbolical act, corresponding to the ceremony in which in Greece and elsewhere, the adoption of a boy, his reception into a new *γένος*, was symbolically represented. (D.S. 4, 38, 2 in particular records the process; see Wesseling's learned note there; cf. also Preller, *Gr. Mythol.*<sup>4</sup> i, 702.) But such a symbolical proceeding if it was to bring about the association of the *μύστης* with the goddess must have taken place already in the *δῶμα* once held upon earth—here we are in Hades, and it is to say the least of it difficult to believe that this *θεομήτορ ἐν ἐνὶ κόλποις* can have been supposed to occur in Hades in the neighbourhood of the goddess herself (a fact which made a merely symbolical act of the kind supposed quite

unnecessary).—Apart from this the views of Dieterich are quite sound: the ceremony was essentially regarded as an adoption of the *μύστης* by the goddess or the god, as a reception of the initiated into the divine *γένος*. The *ἑκείνος* (who represents the god himself) *ἑλελάσμενος* *τὸν νέον* in the Sabazia seems actually to have had this meaning. Further the *μύστης* is sometimes called *γενναίος*, or in *astrum* *γενναίος* (Apul., *Ap.* xi, 21; *CIL.* vi, 510; 736); the day of his initiation is his *μετέσις sacer* (Apul., *Ap.* xi, 24, where *metesim sacrum* should be read): in these circumstances we may venture to recall that the above-mentioned solemn rites of adoption also represented a *new birth* of the *θεὸς νέος* from the womb of his new father (see D.S. i.e. Hence Hera is called the *θεοτέρα γενναία* of Herakles whom she adopted: Lycophr. 39; and hence also the adopted is called *θεοτεργέννητος*, i.e. reborn: Hsch. s.v. ad fin.) This conception also provides the simplest explanation of the fact that the *μύστης*, who has received the *εὐεργεσία* into the divine *γένος* to which he himself already belongs, can be called the *πατήρ* or *πατρὺς* of the *μύστης* (Apul., *Ap.* xi, 25; Tert., *Apol.* 8; *ad Nat.* i, 7)—he effects the entrance of the new member into his own family. (In Greek the name for such a mystic "father" seems to have been *μεγαμύστης*, *CIG.* 3178, 3195.)—This conception of a *new birth* by initiation reminds us of the Christian idea of *rebirth* by baptism (which in its turn is developed from older Jewish ideas: see ANTH., *Ant. Mysticismism*, p. 171, n.). It is nevertheless one which the Greeks themselves had at an early date. The *μύσται* of the Eleusinia seem to have been not far from regarding initiation as an adoption into the divine *γένος*.

In the ps.-Platonic *Asiarchus*, p. 371 D, we read in the description of the *χάρως ἐκείνης*: *ἐνθάδε τοῖς μεμνημένοις ἐστὶν τις προσβολή καὶ τὰς δόξας ἀγνοοῦντες πλείους συντελεῖται· τὰς αὖτ' οὐ καὶ πρῶτον μέμνηται τῆς τιμῆς, ὅτι γινώσκῃ τὸν θεόν· καὶ τοῖς κατὰ Ἡρακλῆα τοῖς (perhaps it would be better) καὶ διδύμοις κασιγῆταις εἰς "Αἶδον πατέρα ἄλγος ἐκείνη (i.e. at Athens) μεμνημένοι καὶ τὸ θάνατος τῆς δόξης νομίζοντες κατὰ τῆς Ἐλευσίνης ἐπαύονται.*—Here Asiarchos (for it is to him that Sokrates is speaking) is plainly described as *γινώσκων τὸν θεόν* simply and solely because he belongs to the *μεμνημένοι*. According to Wilamowitz (*Gött. Gel. Anz.*, 1906, p. 984) he is called *γινώσκων τὸν θεόν* only as a member of the *γένος* of the *Ἐλευσινῶν* to which he apparently belonged. But that anyone just on the strength of the by no means uncommon fact that he belonged to a *γένος* that happened to trace its earliest origin from a god (for it is certain even that the *Ἐλευσινῶν* did this)—that anyone on this account should have dared to call himself a "member of the same family as the gods" is to say the least of it difficult to parallel. In this case at any rate nothing of the kind can be meant. From the general principle that the initiated have a *προσβολή* in Hades it is deduced, simply as conclusion from premise, with a "surely then"—(*τοῦτ' εὖδ' αὖν*—), that Asiarchos too may hope to enjoy this same honour (*τῆς τιμῆς*). It is then entirely impossible that, to account for this hope, a reason

should be implied and expressed which, like the supposed descent of Axiochos from the gods, had nothing to do with the mysteries and the privileges of the *μύσται*. If it was the (alleged) descent of Axiochos from the gods which secured him *τιμή* in Hades it would be quite meaningless to accompany the mention of the *τιμή* thus secured to Axiochos with an allusion to the *τιμή* obtained on quite different grounds by the *μεμνημένος* (which yet is mysteriously equivalent to that obtained by right of birth). This allusion, moreover, is put in such a way that it quite unambiguously includes the special case of Axiochos in the common denomination of the *μεμνημένοι* of whom he is said to be one. The fact, indeed, that the privileges of the *μεμνημένοι* is the only subject alluded to throughout is shown also by the third and last sentence: the famous cases of the initiation of Herakles and Dionysos are only mentioned as emphasizing still further the importance of *μνηστῆραν* for those *εἰς ἔθελον κατεόντες*.

Here then Axiochos can only be called *γεννῆσθε τῶν θεῶν* in so far as he is *μεμνημένος*. Why, indeed, he *παύσας*, before other *μεμνημένους*, should have a claim to the honour of *σποχρία* is something that our text does not say and that can hardly be extracted from it. It certainly appears that Axiochos has a special privilege beyond that of other *Μύσται*. Had he reached a specially high stage of the *εὐλη* which was not open to everyone and at which kinship with the gods was first fully assured? Did the family of the *Ἡρακλείδαι* undertake some active part in the *μύσται* which gave them a closer relation to the gods? In any case his claim to be regarded as *γεννῆσθε τῶν θεῶν* must have depended on his having been initiated at Eleusis.

Now this kinship with the gods to which he thus attains can only be made intelligible, if, in accordance with the analogies adduced above, we regard the *μύσται* (or perhaps only its highest stages) as a symbolic adoption by the divinities, suggesting or representing entrance into the divine *γένος*. No one will maintain that *γεννῆσθε τῶν θεῶν* is a "very unnatural phrase" (Wil.) for one who has been "adopted" by the gods, who will recall the fact that at Athens the adopted person was inscribed *εἰς τοὺς γενεάς* of the adopter (Is. 7, 13; 15; 17; 43), or, which is precisely the same thing, *εἰς τοὺς συγγενεάς* of the adopter (Is. 7, 27; 1). Thereby he becomes himself *γεννῆσθε* of the members of the *γένος* into which he thus enters; he is now their *γεννῆσθε*, or, as it is once expressed in an absolutely equivalent phrase, their *συγγενεὶς κατὰ τὴν νομίαν* (Dem.) 44, 32).

Thus the fully initiated is *γεννῆσθε* of the divine family, *κατὰ τὴν νομίαν*.

## APPENDIX XIII

### MAGICAL EXORCISMS OF THE DEAD ON LATE *κατάδεσμοι*, *φάρμακα*, ETC.

Invocations and conjurings of *δαιμόν* and other *πνευματικά* of an earlier period are mentioned above (p. 594 f.). To a later period belong





indeed even more common than in Greek-speaking countries. (The Latin definitions are collected now by Wansch, *Tab. Defix.* xrv f.) The practice had a long life and is not quite dead even to-day. On the Roman side examples from the seventh and eighth centuries are by no means rare: see e.g. [Aug.] *Hom. de Sacrileg.*, § 20. For a Greek example see e.g. the story ap. Sophronius, *SS. Cyri et Iouannis Hirsouta* (aetec. vi), chap. 33, p. 3825 Migne: magical objects were buried under the door-step of the victim's house; were discovered and dug up; whereupon the death immediately followed of—not the victim but—the magician.

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 (The emendation *miser* is already  
 mentioned, as I see too late, in the  
 Mauriner edition of Justin Martyr.  
 The apparently traditional *ἐν*  
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 grammatical grounds [analogous  
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 poetry, are not unknown in prose:  
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