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THE SOCIOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW

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ABSTRACT

The Sociological Point of View.—A multitude of special researches must be the means of advancing sociology. They must be guided by the sociological point of view. That point of view may itself prove the greatest contribution of sociology to the interpretation of life. It includes the realization that while all values exist in individual experience yet distinctively human life derives its content from society, that biological evolution alone, even at its highest, would leave man a naked and dumb brute. *Social evolution.* The superstructure built upon the foundation supplied by biological evolution is (a) a set of acquired biological complexes constituting a "second nature"; (b) the conscious opinions, sentiments, and conduct of individuals thus equipped; (c) the material wealth and artificial groupings of persons which such activities produce. All values inhere in these conscious activities (designated (b)), and these activities are what sociology seeks to explain and so far as possible to control. They are indefinitely modifiable. They show three stages of evolution: that of "instinct," that of "custom," and that of "rational acceptance." The third is now dawning. *Social structure and social function.* It is error to regard institutions as social structure. They are ways of doing things. Doing is function, the groups that do are structure. Doing, activity (mental more than muscular), is the social process, in the most important meaning of that phrase. Even in a static society that which remains static is the "ways of doing." The social reality is human life, and the word society "virtually a verbal noun." *Social causation.* This point of view includes also an analytic idea of social causation, applicable to all divisions of social life and including natural physical, artificial physical, biological, and social causes. "Association" is a causal relation between the activities of different individuals. The sociological point of view excludes particularism, explains and so dissolves biases and bigotries, recognizes weal and woe as facts to be explained and the problems of ethics as problems not of speculation but of objective knowledge and practical control.

A book written eleven years ago by a distinguished representative of one of the other social sciences contains these words: "As for sociology, it seems to me a highly important point of view rather than a body of discoveries about mankind."¹

At the date of that utterance this society had existed only five years. It was hardly to be expected that it should have contributed greatly toward building up "a body of discoveries about mankind." Everyone who really thought about the matter realized that sociology must be a project for a time before it could become an achievement. And if at so early a day it already could

¹ James Harvey Robinson, *The New History*, p. 83.

contribute "a highly important point of view" for the study of mankind, it had done quite as much as could be asked so soon, and had justified the hope that it might in time lead to "a body of discoveries."

If sociology is in fact to reach a body of discoveries, that is to say, of new facts and new principles of explanation, it must do so by the accumulation of a multitude of special researches bearing upon small problems, each by itself incapable either of establishing any sweeping generalization, or of leading to any far-reaching practical application. As I have remarked in another connection, "The greatest danger to sociology is that eagerness for application will divert men from the strictly scientific pursuit upon which both comprehension and application ultimately depend. Preoccupation with practical aims may even obscure the fact that sociology has a distinctive scientific task."¹

As we are turning our faces more and more resolutely toward the pursuit of specific research, it may be appropriate to occupy this opening address in making sure that we hold clearly in mind the characteristic point of view, which perhaps may still be regarded as the best and biggest thing that sociology has or is, and the chief instrument of progress in research. It may be that sociology may always render its chief service, not by the discovery of new facts, but rather by the interpretation of the facts of history and of the present in the light of its "highly important point of view." It may be that the consistent maintenance of this point of view and the formulation and dissemination of the interpretations which that point of view discloses will do more than any other agency in dispelling the ancient bigotries that have blinded nations and social classes, in revealing both the possibilities and the limitations, as well as the methods, of education and reform, and in revolutionizing the creeds and philosophies which in the past have rendered imperfect guidance to mankind.

The figurative phrase "point of view" refers to something that the *mind* has. The only things the mind can have are ideas and feelings. A point of view then is a set of ideas or feelings—or both—already in the mind, which determine what else can get in.

¹ *Sociology and Ethics*, p. 28.

A point of view opens the mind to some facts, and often closes the mind to other facts. A good point of view enables us to see the facts as they are. A true sociological point of view would be one that would enable us to see human life as it is, to see it broadly and to see it deeply. The sociological point of view is not a single idea or a single feeling or interest, but a set of clear ideas and developed interests, which together constitute a preparation to see human life as it is.

The point of view of sociology has already been voluminously discussed and one who reverts to it can hardly hope to escape from repetitious commonplace. And as we still differ more or less upon fundamentals he is also in danger of falling into what would be an impropriety on this occasion by a somewhat contentious advocacy of his own individual point of view. In seeking to steer a middle course between these two evils, he can hardly escape incurring both of them to some degree.

One element in the sociological point of view is the realization that human life, in so far as it is anything more than the necessary functioning of man's physical organism, is a product of association. If one of us could have grown to maturity in complete isolation from society he would not have become a man, in our sense of the word, but would have been less man than the naked savage. He would have been a dumb brute, leading an existence little distinguishable from that of a chimpanzee. Naked he would have been; a suit of clothes has a social history that was already far advanced when Sarah stood spinning in the tent door of Abraham. Dumb he would have been: this English which I am speaking is not mine but ours, the property of a society which was already old when the Sanskrit element in our language was a spoken tongue. The rudest savage tribe lives a life which has been socially evolved, which though far less advanced than ours, is nevertheless ancient and such as no individual member of the tribe, living in isolation for a single lifetime, could possibly have brought into being.

Human life is a set of activities made possible by man's animal organism but by no means prescribed by his animal organism. Biologists assure us that there is no reason for imagining any

notable progress in the biological evolution of man since the time of Aristotle or of Moses and Rameses, or for thinking that we have any noteworthy biological superiority to the skin-clad savages who probably held cannibal ceremonies with human sacrifices and druidic rites in the forests of northern Europe four thousand years ago. But we share in a social evolution which is over and above biological evolution, which all this time has been going forward and has given us science, political and economic arts and institutions, a religion, and a moral code which these ancestors of ours did not possess.

Human life not only has been socially evolved, but is socially perpetuated. Now that the biologists well nigh compel us to believe that characteristics acquired during the lifetime of the individual cannot be passed on to his descendants by biological heredity, we are forced to realize that the task of passing on the socially accumulated heritage of ideas, sentiments, and practices will always be a social problem—the problem of educating each new generation into fitness for membership in the advanced society into which it is born.

Although the individual human life is a participation in the age-long social life, yet for the moment individuals are supreme. We as individuals are the trustees of the social heritage; the hope of perpetuating and augmenting this heritage rests with us as individual participants in the social life, and all *values* are realized only in individual experience.

This distinctively human life in which we share exists at three levels: first, as a set of acquired biological complexes; second, as a current of conscious activity; third, as overt behavior.

The ability of the human animal to become man is his ability to form acquired complexes. It has become "natural"¹ to me to call this thing I write on a desk; it is "natural" to the German to call it "ein Pult." It has become "natural" to us to call the thing one wears on his head a hat; it is "natural" to the Frenchman to call it "un chapeau." Think of having a whole vocabulary ingrained

¹ That is, it has become as ingrained a tendency as if it were natural. Speaking precisely, nothing "becomes natural" after birth.

in your neuro-muscular system so that it functions as easily as breathing! Similarly the preference for eating potatoes with a fork, the habit of lifting the hat to a lady, the sentiment for the Stars and Stripes, all our acquired tastes, our skills, our moral code, our customs, and our institutions have become parts of us as acquired modifications of our organic structure. Here the miracle of the germ cells, by which all the multitudinous parts of the human organism are provided for by units found in a microscopic cell and each with the specific characteristics of our own particular ancestors, is equaled if not transcended by the miracle of structural plasticity by which after birth we grow into Americans, or Germans, or Frenchmen—into civilized human beings.

At its second level the social life is a current of conscious activity. We are unconscious of our neuro-muscular complexes. We know their functioning as ideas and feelings—as conscious activity. It is this stream of conscious activity that we call “our life.” This it is that *contains all the values of human existence*. All else is sociologically important only as the condition or as the manifestation of this stream of conscious experience. It is this second phase of social reality that we want to have accounted for by social science and promoted by social practice.

In addition to the acquired biological complexes, and in addition to the stream of conscious activity, the third aspect of social reality is its manifestation in speech, conduct, artificial groupings of individuals, and material products. By these we know the social activities, as we know electricity by its effects. Thus speech, conduct, artificial groupings, and material products compose a third aspect of social reality which must be included in order to complete the perspective, and it is they which give to the social activities objective manifestation.

But let it be repeated that it is the second phase of the social reality which we recognize as “our life,” and which contains all life’s values. The collections in an ethnographic museum are important as revealing a social life which has produced them and which lies beneath them. If we collect the religious masks and paraphernalia of a South Sea Island tribe and even learn to imitate their dances and incantations, that does not make their religion

ours. If all the typewriters in America should be shipped to a tribe in central Africa which has no written language, they would not have the typewriter but a pile of junk. And though not one typewriter would remain in America, we should have the typewriter in its essential aspect, ready to embody itself in steel. To burn down all the churches in America, would not destroy Christianity. It still would live in the hearts and minds of Christians. To destroy every courthouse in the land would not abolish the institution of the court; it still would live in the only place where institutions have ever lived, in the hearts and the minds of men. If we were to emigrate to a foreign shore and lose all our baggage on the journey, we should carry with us our civilization wherever we carry our life—for it is our life.

Human life, because it is a process of acquired activity, is indefinitely modifiable. Tastes, moral codes, creeds, customs, institutions, pass through almost unimaginable permutations. Our sentiments approve it when we bury the body of a loved kinsman in the ground to decay and be the prey of worms. Others are revolted by our practice, and their sentiments approve the eating of the body of the honored dead in a solemn feast. Human nature is *second* nature built on the well-nigh immutable foundation of animal nature. The study of comparative sociology makes it clear that what is most repugnant to our second nature may seem wholly natural² to other men, that what is most revolting to our sentiments is customary elsewhere. A social science confined to the study of the customs and institutions of our Western civilization is mere provincialism, blinded by the illusion of the near. It is like what zoölogy would be if limited to the study of birds, or what botany would be if limited to the study of the trees of the north temperate zone.

In the permutation of customs and institutions those practices which cause suffering tend ultimately to disappear and those which allow the success of the life-process tend to spread and survive. As the glorified robbery of Vikings and Thugs and the glorified murder of head-hunters, absolutism in government, slavery, duel-

² Using the word in the sense defined in footnote 1, page 4.

ling, and polygamy, all of which have been regarded as necessary expressions of human nature, have ceased to be institutionalized and established in the approved sentiments of advanced society, so war will go, and mere acquisition as a socially recognized form of success will go. One who has no faith in progress is like a fly on a Sequoia complaining that the tree does not grow. There is this difference. Unlike the growth of a tree, the evolution of society is cumulative and accelerative and the next century may well see more progress than a thousand years once saw.

In social evolution three stages are discernible; and like a slow dawning the third is now coming on. First came the stage of *instinct* and *biological necessity*. In this stage instinct was appealed to by objects which were perceived and relatively little by ideas which had been invented, so that the simple instinctive patterns of conduct were but little obscured. Moreover, in this stage, death was so active a selective agent that no activities could become prevalent and traditional which seriously violated the conditions favorable to physical survival. Next came the stage of the *vagaries of custom*. In this stage man had learned to defend himself against death so that it became a less active selective agent, and therefore activities could become prevalent and traditional which were more or less unfavorable to physical survival. And the mind reacted to its stimulating natural and artificial environment with ideas and sentiments which overlay the simple, instinctive patterns of response with an elaborate and fantastic embroidery. The third stage is that of *rational acceptance*. By the time this stage is reached, death though working more slowly, has worked over longer periods of time, as an eliminating agency. Moreover, other selective agencies, such as physical and mental discomfort, economic competition, disapprovals enforced by socially created forms of prestige, and finally reason, have eliminated many of the vagaries of custom, and customs are largely replaced by institutions, and wanton vagaries by rational choices.

For brevity, though with some risk of misunderstanding, these three may be called the periods of *instinct*, of *custom*, and of *reason*. The first was mainly prehistoric, but vestiges of it survived into

the age of observable custom. The third is mainly in the future, but its beginnings are already evident.

It is often said that the institutions of society are the social structure. This I am persuaded is an error. Institutions are not structure but function, they are ways of doing things—ways of making laws, ways of choosing officials, ways of trying and punishing criminals, ways of conducting industry, and so forth. The institutions of a society are those parts of its activity which are rationally approved methods of achieving rationally approved ends.

Function is acting—structure is what acts. In society "what acts" is usually a group. A function implies a structure. An institution implies a group. But the criterion of an institution as distinguished from mere fashion or custom is the rational element included in the activity. A group may carry on a given activity as a mere custom—later on the same group may carry on the same activity as an institution because the activity has become rationalized. After that it is capable of rational change and progress as mere custom was not. Social *structures* are composed of groups—such as nations, parties, sects, casts, economic and other functional groups, cultural groups—and also individuals. Individuals considered not as animals, but as persons, as Christians or Mohammedans, as Republicans or Democrats, as carpenters or blacksmiths, are as truly products of social evolution and parts of the social structure as are those groups into which individuals combine. Now these *groups of individuals*, which compose the social structure, are of course highly important social facts. But the task of sociological explanation can no more be fulfilled by studying them, except as products and conditions of social activities, than the task of botanical explanation can be fulfilled by studying the structures of plants without reference to the physiological processes which produce these structures. From the point of view of the practical application of science that is an enormous understatement of the case, for practically the forms of plants are more important to man than their life-process, but the social life-process is the life of man itself with all of its distinctive values. The facts of greatest importance to sociology both scientifically and practi-

cally are those activities which compose this social life-process, prevalent activities socially evolved, which give men their social individuality and form them into groups, and which are conditioned by these groupings, very much as biological life first forms and then is conditioned by biological structure.

This idea that the social reality in its most essential aspect is a process of activity is an essential part of the sociological point of view. It entitles us to say that the sociological point of view is functional.

Twenty years ago the idea of "the social process" was elaborated in a discussion which culminated in the assertion that the word "society" is virtually a verbal noun.¹ Since then the phrase "social process" has been growing into general acceptance as a technical term in sociology, but it has taken on a variety of meanings, all justified in that they correspond to facts, but more or less unfortunate in that they refer to different facts, and therefore give to a technical term more or less conflicting meanings. To one the social process is the fact that social activities condition each other through the suggestion of ideas, the sympathetic radiation of sentiments, and the imitation of overt practices. To another "social process" is any change that takes place in a society or a population so that the idea of a multitude of social processes replaces the idea of *the* social process. To all the phrase "social process" at times means social evolution. But the deepest and most useful meaning of the phrase is that *in social evolution that which evolves is itself a process*—not merely a structure but a process. In the most static society the reality which has evolved and remains static is a process. The most rigid custom or the most unchanging institution is a process of activity that is repeated and repeated, a way of doing things, a set of ideas defining conduct of emotions or judgments approving that conduct, of expectations which count upon the prescribed conduct and of activities which embody these ideas, approvals, and expectations in overt deeds. Even the idea of an activity is itself an activity. An idea is not a thing; it is an event in the life-process. And the social process is the life-

¹ E. C. Hayes, "Sociological Construction Lines," *American Journal of Sociology*, X, 623 and 753.

process—the evolving process of human as distinguished from merely animal life—and sociology is the study of human life, in so far as man's life is made up of activities which are not prescribed by his physical nature, but learned by participation in society. The social reality is human life and the word life is virtually a verbal noun.

Another essential element of the sociological point of view is the idea of causation as applicable to social life, including a definite notion about what to look for when attempting a causal explanation of the facts of social life.

In seeking such explanation we must look, for one set of factors, to the *natural physical environment*, the succession of night and day and summer and winter, which condition the work and the play of peoples, the differences in climate, natural resources, accessibility, and other geographic conditions of different population areas.

Second, we must take into account the *artificial physical environment* with which different societies provide themselves: good or bad roads, railroads, water, lighting, and sewer systems, housing, and the like. This "technic" or artificial physical environment is closely related to the geographic conditions and both affect life in the same general way. Waterworks affect life as brooks once did, houses as caves once did, pottery affects life as the presence or absence of horns or cocoanut shells once did, woolen mills affect it as the presence of fur-bearing animals once did, railroads affect it in the same way as rivers and mountain passes. But it is essential both scientifically and practically to distinguish between the geographic and the technic conditions because the geographic environment is fixed by nature while technic conditions, being artificial, are subject to human control and present a large part of the problem of progress.

Another important distinction is between this technic or artificial physical environment and the social activities by which this artificial environment is produced. When analyzing the conditions that mold social life it is essential to make this distinction, because social activities and the physical products of social activities affect life in widely different ways. If a railroad is built through

an area inhabited by pastoral nomads it may engage them in trade and transform their life, yet they may not learn to build railroads, the social activity of building railroads does not spread among them. It is merely the physical thing that affects them. On the other hand, when a social activity spreads by suggestion, radiation, or imitation, and sets up psychic accommodations between the new activity and old activities, we have the kind of causation which is traced by social psychology and a totally different thing from the effects produced by the physical products of social activity as material things. To confuse these two is that "mixing things" which is "the great bad." It is ignoring a discrimination which is essential to thoroughly scientific analysis.

To be sure, a social activity is not complete and cannot be causally important unless it is physically expressed. But when fear written in the face of a terrified man affrights his neighbor and a panic spreads it is not the wrinkling of the skin of his face that is the essential social fact, but the psychic state of one which is affecting the psychic state of another through the medium of facial expression. It is *social activity, in its essential psychic character*, whether expressed by the face, the voice, the pen, or the hand, which is the third and greatest of the types of causes which affect human life. The conditioning of social activities by each other is the Hamlet which plays the dominant rôle in the drama of social causation.

The distinguishing characteristic, the one essential criterion of a social situation, is the conditioning of the psychic activity of one person by the psychic activity of another person. *The most useful definition of the word association is this: "association is a causal relation between the activities of associates."* Association is not a kind of activity; on the contrary any kind of human activity whatsoever may enter into the relation which is association. The blacksmith bending an iron and the apprentice who imitates him or the watching urchin who resolves to become a blacksmith are associating as truly as speaker and listener.

Besides the geographic and technic conditions and the conditioning of social activities by each other our explanations must take into account the *biological traits*, both hereditary and acquired,

of the populations by whom social activities are carried on. But when we learn that decade after decade one county in the British Isles has twice as many illegitimate births to each thousand infants born as another county, and that with equal regularity a third county in the British Isles has ten times as many, we recognize the absurdity of finding our sociological explanations exclusively in the universal instincts or predispositions or interests of mankind. Universal traits of mankind do not account for the variation in human behavior from county to county, from nation to nation, and from age to age. Of course the universal desires, interests, or instincts of mankind are ever present factors entering into the situation, and their identification is a service the importance of which I would be the last to minimize. Nevertheless for purposes of sociological explanation the differences of natural endowment due to differences of heredity or the fluctuations in population quality caused by vice, by occupational deterioration, or by microbes may be more important than those universal interests, desires, or instincts which form the common background of all social life, savage, barbarous, or civilized.

Many sociologists still speak of the native desires, interests, or instincts¹ as the "social forces." While fully recognizing that the biological life of man is in a sense the fountain from which all social activity flows, and that socially evolved activity is in reality a modification of man's instinctive life, we must at the same time recognize that no explanation of the infinite variety of social activity can be found in the universal traits of human nature, whether these traits be called desires, motives, interests, or instincts. If our conception of sociological explanation is to have scientific validity, it must make room for these facts: first, that explanation of this varying and evolving social activity must be sought in variable conditions; second, that these variable conditions are of the four types enumerated, first, geographic; second, technic;

¹ The term instinct has been greatly abused in attempting to account for human action, and some sociologists go to the extreme of avoiding the word altogether, but I am convinced that a comparative study of the biological equipment of man and of the higher gregarious animals compels us to recognize the instinctive equipment of the human species.

third, biological; fourth, social or associative, that is, psychic activities as conditions of the activities of associates.

I must be allowed to reassert my conviction¹ that the scientific conception of social causation is not the operation of forces but the presence of conditions—variable conditions—and that the use of the word “force” as a synonym for “cause” is a metaphysical survival of anthropomorphism. It is anthropomorphic in that it derives its conception of cause from human action regarded as a cause, while we are looking for the causes that affect human action. I am as confident as ever that sociology has no more occasion to speak of any social force than biology has to speak of vital force. It may be that force is omnipresent. But force is far more certain to be apparent in the resulting human activity than in the cause which conditioned it. An Australian settler stumbles upon a nugget of gold—an inert thing. There ensues in the settler a tumult of activity which spreads to other settlers and modifies the activity of the civilized world. Human instincts of course are present in every human activity, but the human instincts do not function in a vacuum; their functioning is always conditioned. And human instincts considered alone do not afford an explanation of any social activity whatsoever. Anyone is at liberty to speak of the inborn instincts as the social forces if he is willing to run the risk involved of obscuring the complex, matter-of-fact nature of social causation.

Association is sometimes spoken of as the social force. But when we mean association, why not say association, and when we mean instincts, why not say instincts, and let the phrase social forces be replaced by more adequate analysis?

As to the developed interests and desires, as distinguished from inborn instincts, far from being the explanation sought, they are themselves social activities to be explained. To speak of socially developed desires as the forces which explain social life is no better than it would be to speak of the beating of the heart as the vital force which explains physical life—it is a part of that physical life

¹ Compare *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, V, 77 and 98; *American Journal of Sociology*, XVI, 613 and 642.

which the biologist seeks to explain, just as socially developed desires are a part of the social life which sociology seeks to explain.

Training in the search for all four of the different types of facts by which the life of society is molded, in all the multiple forms in which these four classes of facts appear and produce their effects, is the best possible defense of the mind against the vice of particularism which besets all social science—the vice, that is, of finding a cause and treating it as *the* cause, when the causation of any social situation is never due to a single factor but is always multiple and complicated. Sociology when it is truly scientific is in perpetual protest against the vice of particularism. Very few of those who are but partially trained in sociological method are able to escape this pitfall, and even for the most expert to give just recognition to both physical and psychic factors in social causation is well nigh as hard as for the camel to pass through the eye of a needle. The sociological point of view includes habitual regard for the necessity to observe the causal significance of geographic, technic, biological, and psychic (or social) causes in molding the social life.

The principles of causation which come into perspective from the sociological point of view are applicable to the explanation of social activities of every kind, to the evolution of languages, religions, moral codes, educational systems, arts and ceremonies, economic practices, and political institutions. Especially the application of that type of causal relations to which the word "association" is applicable, namely, the causal relations between the psychic activities of different individuals, which appear in the communication and suggestion of ideas, the sympathetic radiation of sentiments, and the imitation of practices, a type of causation the elucidation of which includes the laws of prestige, and of interference and assimilation or accommodation, is equally essential in the explanation of all the great subdivisions of social life. And it is mainly by virtue of this fact that human life appears from the sociological point of view as a single division of reality and a single field of research, a research which cannot be confined within limits narrower than the range throughout which those principles of causation operate which it is the special business of sociology to investigate.

Another element in the sociological point of view is a keen appreciation of the struggle to be objective and unbiased. This all science aims to be. But it is recognized, especially since Herbert Spencer wrote on *The Study of Sociology*, that to be objective and unbiased in the study of that social life of which we ourselves are a part, is incomparably difficult. One who occupies the sociological point of view is not only aware of the difficulty and necessity of objectivity in this field of study, he is helped toward achieving it as he could be in no other way by his training in the observation of social causation. When one realizes that his own opinions and sentiments are results of causation and that under other conditions he would have held the opposite ideas and sentiments, his bigotries tend to evaporate.¹ There is no other discipline that can be compared with the study of sociological explanation as a means of dispelling partisan conceits and all the manifold bigotries that hitherto go so far toward subjecting human life and social organization to a *reductio ad absurdum*.

Finally the sociological point of view is ethical. We do not blush to affirm it. When the sociologist is told that science deals with what is, and that philosophy alone can deal with what ought to be, he answers that human weal and woe are parts of what is, and that they are as truly subject to causal conditions, and therefore to scientific explanation, as any other facts. He holds that a description of human life which omits the element of values is as incomplete as a description of the animal world would be if it forgot that animals have heads. It would omit essential facts. He has learned that moral codes are as truly products of social evolution as languages, or economic and political institutions. And he holds

¹ Not long ago when visiting a home for the feeble minded, I became interested in a pitiful imbecile. He could not talk much and his few words were accompanied by horrible grimaces. But he was able to say with emphasis that he was a Republican and a Methodist. Of course this does not imply that Republicans and Methodists are more likely to be imbecile than other people, but that the causes which make us Republicans, Methodists, and the like, are causes which can operate upon an imbecile. One who never develops beyond the mental age of seven is an imbecile, and the social causes to which we are exposed settle for most people the question whether they are to be Republicans, or Methodists before they reach the age of seven. Before we are capable of independent, rational decision upon such themes, most of our bigotries, biases, and partisanship have become thoroughly ingrained in our organisms.

that as the study of every other object of knowledge has passed from the realm of metaphysical speculation to the realm of science or objective research, so the study of ethics must make that transition, and that the theoretical and practical problems of ethics can be truly solved in no other way than by the study of the facts of life, as life is lived by men in society.

I trust that even though it require some threshing of straw that I have threshed before, the choice of this theme for the present occasion is justified by the vital importance of a growing agreement among sociologists in a clear conception of the sociological point of view, and that it is not rendered less appropriate by the fact that I have the privilege of speaking in the presence of representatives of the great science of politics. In the opening sentence I quoted a noted historian who eleven years ago was already exhorting his colleagues to avail themselves of the sociological point of view. I see no reason why that point of view should not become the common property of all the social sciences, for while each of the social sciences pursues its characteristic researches, they are all engaged in the upbuilding of a "body of discoveries about mankind," in the development of more adequate comprehension of that current of interrelated activities which gathers momentum and content as generations pass, and is nothing less than the tide of human life. The comprehension and so the guidance and promotion of this tide of human life is the supreme intellectual and practical task of mankind, and it is the necessarily co-operative task of all the social sciences.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

The Development of Historical Sociology.—Down to the opening of the twentieth century historical sociology received more attention from writers than any other phase of the subject. In the last generation, however, interest in the history of society has greatly declined, and historical sociology has been eclipsed by psychological, biological, and statistical sociology, and, above all, by practical or applied sociology. This failure to maintain interest in historical sociology during the last twenty years has been particularly disastrous, for it was during this period that critical anthropology and social history were placing at the disposal of the sociologists, for the first time, a sound method and a reliable technique for exploring social origins and reconstructing the history of society. *Influence of Darwinism upon sociology.* There were many forces operating to create historical sociology from the days of the Greeks to our own, but the most effective influence was the development of the Darwinian hypothesis. While there were many grotesque results of the attempt directly to apply the Darwinian formulas of biological evolution to social processes, yet the evolutionary stimulus was what created historical sociology in its modern form. "Social Darwinism" and the assumption of universality and uniformity in the evolution of social institutions and cultural traits were the chief errors of interpretation introduced into historical sociology as a result of Darwinism. Perhaps the most important phase of the development of historical sociology has been the progress in the method of investigation and synthesis. Either the intuitive method or a priori deduction prevailed down to the Darwinian era, with but rare exceptions. The first important group of historical sociologists followed the extreme comparative method of such anthropologists and ethnologists as Tylor, Morgan, Frazer, Letourneau, and Post. Perhaps the most flagrant and influential offender was Herbert Spencer. This school sorted out facts to suit their particular theory of social or cultural development, but disguised this unscientific procedure by bringing forward a seemingly convincing mass of concrete data and compiling a paralyzing bibliography. *Reaction against the extreme comparative method.* Durkheim rejected *in toto* the comparative method, but his substitute was even more doubtful in its procedure and results. He risked all upon the study of a single institution in one area from data of a highly unreliable nature. Hobhouse clearly revealed the defects of the older comparative method, and attempted to introduce the method of statistical correlation and the theory of cultural adhesion, anticipated over thirty years ago by Tylor. But his results were largely invalidated, due to the defects in his original plan of classification and the selection of units and data for study. *Value to sociology of the historico-analytical method.* The historico-analytical method, introduced by Boas and his disciples, has at last given us a sound method for investigating social and cultural development, but it has been little followed by anthropologists, and scarcely at all by historical sociologists. In spite of the defective method which has thus far prevailed in historical sociology, certain valuable work has been done in sketching out the broad stages of social evolution, in tracing the development of the state, and in making important preliminary and tentative studies of special social institutions. Historical sociology needs to be revived on the basis of the sounder contemporary methods, and earnestly cultivated, for, without a knowledge of the social past, we cannot understand the social present or plan intelligently the social future.

I. INTRODUCTORY

It is not the purpose of this paper to set forth a complete exposition and a bibliographic summary of all the important contributions to every field of historical sociology. Rather, I shall attempt to select the chief typical tendencies and achievements in this branch of sociology, indicating the intellectual environment in which they arose, their significance in the sociological movement, and their defects. Incidentally, it will be a part of my purpose to explain the eclipse of historical sociology in the last fifteen years, and to indicate reasons for expecting its revival on a more extended scale and with a far more reliable and promising method and body of fact and doctrine.

II. SOME ASPECTS OF THE ORIGINS OF HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

In reviewing the contributions of the typical writers on historical sociology down to the present time, the most striking fact which is likely to come to the attention of the student is the prevalence of a subjective attitude upon the part of the writer and the pursuance of the *a priori* method, in order to utilize the alleged facts of social development to substantiate some special doctrine of the writer or his school. From Plato until Vico, Hume, and Ferguson, if not to Boas and the critical anthropologists, one rarely discovers a writer on the history of human society and social institutions who looks upon the development of society in an objective manner, with the avowed intention of discovering just what the nature and stages of this process have been.

The beginnings of interest in, and reflection upon, the problems of social genesis go back to the primitive attempts to account for the unique and divine origin of early states. Familiar examples of this type of historical sociology are the Osiris Myth, the Gilgamesh Epic and its Hebrew appropriation in the Book of Genesis, and the numerous myths and epics of national derivation and genesis which flourished among the Greeks and Romans.¹ The primitive foundations from which these tales were constructed have

¹ See J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*; R. W. Rogers, *Cuneiform Parallels to the Old Testament*; and the easily available Hebrew and classical myths of origin in the Old Testament, Homer, Virgil, etc.

been preserved for us in the creation myths of the uncivilized peoples of the present day.¹

Perhaps the first group of thinkers who thoughtfully and rationally considered the problem of the origins of organized society were the Greek Sophists of the fifth century B.C. They seem to have believed in an unregulated state of nature, which was ended when civil society was created through a governmental compact.² One of the most complete and remarkable accounts of social genesis produced in ancient times was that set forth by Plato in Book III of his *Laws*. He assumed much the chronological measure of Mr. Wells when he stated that "every man should understand that the human race either had no beginning at all, and will never have an end, but will always be and has been, or that it began an immense while ago."³ He presented rather a Rousseauian picture of the felicity of the life of primitive people, and traced the gradual break-up of primitive society as it passes through the patriarchal and tribal period into the civil state, which he clearly held to have been founded by means of a governmental contract.⁴ Aristotle gave very little attention to the problems of social genesis, and his brief explanation of the matter was analytical rather than historical. He was chiefly concerned with demonstrating the social nature of man and traced the progressive expression and realization of this social instinct in the family, the village, and the state.⁵ An approximation to the historical and comparative method is to be seen in his alleged study of 158 constitutions as the basis of his *Constitution of Athens*.⁶ One of the most neglected, and yet one of the most striking, of the early discussions of social and political evolution is that contained in the sixth book of Polybius' *History of Rome*, in which he turned aside from his main theme to indicate the basic reasons for the supremacy of the Roman state. He foreshadowed Hume, Ferguson, and Gumplowicz by

¹ See Kroeber and Waterman, *Source-Book in Anthropology*, pp. 516 ff.

² E. Barker, *Greek Political Theory—Plato and His Predecessors*, pp. 55 ff.

³ *Laws* vi. 780 (Jowett edition).

⁴ *Laws* iii. 676 ff.; cf. Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 307-11.

⁵ *Politics*, i. 2 (Jowett edition).

⁶ Aristotle, *On the Constitution of Athens*, translated by Kenyon.

his doctrine that the state originated in force. He was in line with Sumner in his postulate as to the customary basis of morality. Finally, he anticipated Spinoza, Hume, and Adam Smith by his discussion of reflective sympathy as a social force.¹ Infinitely the most modern and satisfactory of classical theories of the history of society was that offered by the great Epicurean poet, Lucretius, in his effort to indicate the evolutionary and naturalistic character of the development of the universe and society independent of any aid or interference by the gods. He traced the origins of life, man, society, and the state, indicating the various stages of cultural and social evolution with astonishing accuracy. His remarkable *De rerum natura* was far the most notable contribution to historical sociology down to the modern period.² The Roman Stoic philosopher, Seneca, is significant for having carried still farther than Plato the Rousseauian notion of the idyllic life of early man. He contended that man had originally lived in a golden age without avarice, sin, or crime until the appearance of private property. This produced jealousy, strife, and a general state of war and misery which made necessary the establishment of the state and civil society.³

One of the most significant results of the development of this doctrine by Seneca was its adaptation by the Christian Fathers to serve as the accepted Patristic view of the course of social evolution. The fathers identified Seneca's "Golden Age" with the state of man before the "Fall" and held that the subsequent period of misery, confusion, and disorder was none other than that which followed the expulsion from Paradise. The establishment of the state, but more especially the coming of Christianity, served to make mundane existence more tolerable, though but a preparation for the bliss of the elect of the City of God in the world to come.⁴

¹ *The History of Polybius* vi. 5-15 (translated by Shuckburgh).

² *De rerum natura* v (translated by Watson); cf. J. Masson, *Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet*; H. F. Osborn, *From the Greeks to Darwin*.

³ *Epistularum moralium* xiv. 2; cf. A. J. Carlyle, *History of Medieval Political Theory*, I, 20-25.

⁴ Justin Martyr, "First Apology," in *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. I, chap. xvii; Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," *ibid.*, Vol. I, Book V, chap. xxiv, sec. 1; Lactantius, "Divine Institutions," *ibid.*, Vol. VII, Book VI, chap. x; "The Workmanship of

This conception of the history of society prevailed through most of the Middle Ages, through the writers often tended to forget the original felicity and to stress chiefly the miseries of existence before the establishment of the Christian polity.¹

The most remarkable contribution to historical sociology between Lucretius and Adam Ferguson was embodied in the *Prolegomena to Universal History* of the Arab scholar and statesman Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406). He not only produced what is regarded by some as the first real philosophy of history, but also, in his description of Arab society, contributed one of the best studies of primitive society down to the rise of modern anthropology. He also far surpassed Plato and Lucretius in tracing the stages in the evolution of human society and civilization.²

In the latter part of the seventeenth century there appeared two important contributions to historical sociology in the writings of the French publicist, Jean Bodin, and of the Spanish Jesuit, Jean de Mariana. Bodin distinguished carefully between society, which he believed to develop naturally out of the social instinct, and the state, which he contended was a product of force and coercion.³ Mariana's view of social and political development was strangely like that of Seneca and Rousseau. Mankind had originally dwelt in a state of undisturbed happiness, but property brought avarice, crime, and general disorder. It was found necessary to establish a form of superior civil power, which was done by means of a governmental compact.⁴

God," *ibid.*, Vol. VII, chap. iv; Tertullian, "Scorpice," *ibid.*, Vol. III, chap. xiv; "Apology," *ibid.*, Vol. III, chap. xxiv; Athanasius, "Against the Heathen," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. IV, sec. 2; Ambrose, "De officiis," *ibid.*, Vol. X, Book I, chap. xxviii; Augustine, "On the Good of Marriage," *ibid.*, Vol. III, sec. 1; "The City of God," *ibid.*, Vol. II, Book V, chap. xix, Book XIX, chaps. v, xv; St. Jerome, letter quoted in Robinson, *Readings in European History*, I, 86-87; Gregory the Great, "Pastoral Rule," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. XII, Book I, chap. iii; Isidore of Seville, *Etymologies*, XV, 2; Carlyle, *op. cit.*, chaps. viii-xv.

¹ Carlyle, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-12.

² See R. Flint, *The History of the Philosophy of History in France*, pp. 158 ff.; G. DeGreef, *Le Transformisme social*, pp. 115-18. There is a French translation of the *Prolegomena* by M. S. De Slane.

³ Jean Bodin, *The Six Bookes of a Commonweale*, translated by Knolles, 1606; F. W. Coker, *Readings in Political Philosophy*, pp. 230 ff.

⁴ *De rege et regis institutione*, chap. i.

The most prevalent type of historical sociology during the seventeenth and eighteenth century was that which traced the evolution of society and the state through a social and governmental compact. The distinction between the social and the governmental compact was first clearly drawn by Aeneas Sylvius in the fifteenth century, and was still further elaborated by Richard Hooker in the sixteenth. While such writers as Hobbes, Sydney, Spinoza, Locke, Pufendorf, Rousseau, and Kant employed the doctrine of the social contract to substantiate quite different propositions in political theory and practice, they were generally agreed that man originally lived in a state of nature, from the miseries of which he escaped through the medium of an agreement of all to live an orderly life in organized society. Civil government was subsequently established through a contract of the people with the ruler or rulers whom they had chosen. It is interesting to note, however, that the specific historicity of this conception was not regarded as a vital point by many of the advocates of the social contract theory. With Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant, and, to a lesser degree, with Rousseau, it was chiefly a philosophical proposition.¹ One of the most significant results of this body of doctrine for historical sociology was Rousseau's highly imaginary and poetical eulogy of the "noble savage," living a carefree and paradisiacal existence, from which he had been reduced to misery and chains by the development of culture and the institution of private property and the state.²

The historical and psychological weakness of the social contract theory, as presented in its classic form, were attacked by three writers who may be said to have been the first to restore the historical point of view in sociology to the place it had held with Plato, Polybius, and Lucretius. Vico, while not devoting himself particularly to the demolition of the social contract, emphasized the necessity of pursuing an inductive and historical approach to social problems. The possibilities of such procedure he himself demonstrated in the fields of philology and jurisprudence.³ Hume showed that the

¹ F. Atger, *L'Histoire des doctrines du contrat social*.

² *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences; Discourse on the Origin of Inequality; The Social Contract*. These appear in a good English edition in the *Everyman's Library*. The standard critical edition with a French text is that by Vaughn.

³ *La Scienza nuova*. There is a French translation by Trivulzi. Cf. B. Croce, *The Philosophy of Vico*.

social contract theory was a philosophical monstrosity, a psychological impossibility, and something which was denied by the concrete facts of history. He stressed the importance of sympathy in the development of society, and contended that the state had its origin in force and owed its persistence to the gradual perception of its utility by mankind.¹ Even more modern in viewpoint was Adam Ferguson's *History of Civil Society*. He stated the idea of the origin of the state in conquest and force so clearly that Gumpłowicz has claimed him as the first great exponent of this school of sociological thought. Further, he foreshadowed Boas and the critical school of anthropologists by insisting that we must discard preconceived hypotheses as to the nature of primitive man and his institutions, and study primitive society as it actually exists. If we do we shall find the situation far different from that pictured by such writers as Rousseau. Another interesting adumbration was his insistence that the current tendency to regard primitive man as widely different from modern man was highly misleading. While Ferguson may have fallen short of his canons of proper procedure in historical sociology in his own works, which progressively became more conventional, his discussion of method and procedure was of real significance and surprising modernity.²

The next impulse to historical sociology came from the philosophy of history and the history of civilization to which Vico was an early contributor. Voltaire's *Essai sur les Mœurs*, Turgot's *Sorbonne Discourses*, Condorcet's *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humaine*, and the works of Saint-Simon represent the more important French contributions to this field, all marked by a greater or less degree of rationalism, skepticism, and optimism.³ In the works of Lessing, Herder, Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel one finds, along with a gradually fading rationalism, the Romantic trend in the German philosophy of history, with its emphasis on national character, the indwelling of *Geist*, and dis-

¹ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Green and Grose edition, Vol. II, pp. 183, 258-73; *Essays, Moral, Political and Literary*, Vol. I, Part I, Essay V; Part II, Essay XII.

² Ferguson, *op. cit.*, Part I; cf. W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*, pp. 65-71.

³ R. Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France* (1894), pp. 262-339, 395-421.

inct mystic tendencies.¹ Yet with all its monstrosities, the Romantic impulse was, as Lord Action has well insisted,² remarkable for the scope of the historical interests which it stimulated. In the work of Auguste Comte rationalism and romanticism of a French brand were combined to furnish the historical background of the first formal system of sociological doctrine.³ While there is little doubt that historical sociology is something far different in method and content from the philosophy of history, yet in its attempt to find some meaning and significance in the flow of events in the past the latter contributed much in the way of both impulse and data to the development of historical sociology.⁴

No little importance must also be assigned to the development of critical historical scholarship in the work of Ranke and his disciples and students in many countries. While there was little of the sociological orientation or interest in the most of the scientific history of the nineteenth century, yet, by improving the mechanism or research, it did much to advance and refine the inductive method of research in historical sociology and it brought forth a vast amount of concrete material which has either been utilized or still awaits exploitation by the historical sociologist.⁵

The last of the pre-Darwinian impulses which may be said to have influenced the development of historical sociology was the initial interest in historical economics and economic history evident in the work of Heeren, Sismondi, Comte, Hildebrand, Roscher, and Knies. The genetic point of view, the breadth of interests, and concern with social reform which characterized the group brought them exceedingly close to the borders of historical sociology.⁶

Unquestionably the most potent influence contributing to the development of historical sociology was the Darwinian theory of organic evolution and its reaction upon social science. It gave concrete and convincing evidence to substantiate the brilliant

¹ K. Flint, *The Philosophy of History in France and Germany* (1874), Book II.

² *Historical Essays and Studies*, pp. 345-46.

³ *The Principles of a Positive Polity*, especially Vol. III.

⁴ P. Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, 1915 edition.

⁵ Cf. *Encyclopedia Americana*, XIV, 243-50; G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*.

⁶ J. K. Ingram, *History of Political Economy*, chap. vi.

intuition of Lucretius and the ancient evolutionists, and indicated that human society, as well as organic life, was the natural product of evolutionary forces operating over an immense period of time.¹ While many grotesque errors grew out of the attempt to carry biological formulas directly over into sociology, and much effort was wasted in drawing grotesque analogies between biological and social structure and processes,² the evolutionary impulse was unquestionably the force that put historical sociology in its contemporary manifestations thoroughly upon its feet.³ It followed two major lines of development—the social Darwinism of Gumpлович and his school, and the comparative or classical anthropology of Lubbock, McLennan, Tylor, Lang, Frazer, Westermarck, Letourneau, Post, Lippert, Kovalevsky, and Morgan.⁴ Both of these lines of development will be touched upon later in the paper and need not be further described in this place.⁵

What may be narrowly and technically described as the systematic historical sociology of the latter half of the nineteenth century was both created by, and based upon, the comparative anthropology of the writers just mentioned. This is particularly apparent in such special works as those by Westermarck and Howard, and is not entirely absent from the more modernized con-

¹ Cf. L. M. Bristol, *Social Adaptation*, pp. 56-102, 162-81.

² F. W. Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State*, chap. iv.

³ F. H. Giddings, "Darwinism in the Theory of Social Evolution," in the *Popular Science Monthly*, July, 1909; A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution*.

⁴ Cf. Goldenweiser, "Four Phases of Anthropological Thought," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, XVI, pp. 50-55. It will probably be desirable to specify just what is meant by the term "comparative" or "classical" anthropology, as used in this article. I mean by that the work of the first great school of modern anthropologists mentioned in the paragraph above. I have severely criticized the work of this school for the reasons indicated. Many writers, who would not dissent from this criticism, complain that it is unfair to condemn the comparative method as a whole because of the errors of the first group extensively to employ it. The problem thus resolves itself into a matter of terminology. I have preferred to reserve the term "comparative method" for a description of the approach of this early group of scholars, and to apply to the newer attitudes of Boas and his school the term "historico-analytical" method. Those who prefer may well distinguish these two widely different methods by such terms as the "older comparative method" and the "new comparative method."

⁵ See below, pp. 26 ff.

tributions of Thomas, Webster, and Hobhouse. The most masterly synthesis of historical sociology yet produced, Book III of Professor Giddings' *Principles of Sociology*, was based essentially both upon the method and the data of the comparative school, as, indeed, it had to be when written. While the critical historico-analytical anthropology of Boas and his disciples in this country and of Marett and others in Europe has provided a new and far sounder method for studying social evolution, and has destroyed most of the positive conclusions of both comparative anthropology and the earlier historical sociology, it has been but little appropriated by sociology. The primary reason for this is probably the fact that interest in historical sociology, which was, perhaps, ascendent before 1900, has declined to a surprising degree in the twentieth century, and sociology has provided few who have been interested in reconstructing our knowledge of social evolution on the basis of the newer and more assured methods and results of the critical anthropology. It is not without significance that the first real attempts to indicate the significance of the scientific anthropology for an accurate history of society have been executed by professional anthropologists, Marett, Wissler, Lowie, and Goldenweiser.¹

III. SOME TYPICAL PHASES OF THE PROGRESS OF METHOD IN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

One need not concern himself especially with the history of method in sociology before the entry of the Darwinian concepts, for, with few, if any, exceptions, the method was deductive or intuitive. Even what little study was made of concrete data was usually for the purpose of substantiating some preconceived scheme of social evolution, such as the social contract. In the case of Ibn Khaldun one finds something of a concrete inductive approach, but even in such instances as those of Lucretius the modernity of the generalizations was in large part the product of brilliant intuition.

The first important effect of Darwinism upon historical sociology was the impulse which it gave to the attempt to carry over directly the assumptions and formulas of evolutionary biology

¹ R. R. Marett, *Anthropology*; C. Wissler, *The American Indian*; R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*; A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*.

into an explanation of social evolution, without the necessary modifications in view of the wide difference in the nature of the data under analysis. This line of approach was usually combined with an extreme acceptance of the comparative method in anthropology and, thus, embodied many major errors in both methods and results. The best-known examples of such works are Gumpłowicz's *Der Rassenkampf* and Oppenheimer's *The State*. Though the central thesis of these writers is regarded as one of the most important of the contributions of sociology to social and political theory, yet this must not obscure the monstrous errors in method which have disfigured their efforts in their attempts to substantiate their doctrines through the presentation and organization of concrete data.¹

Equally influential and characteristic of this period was the contemporary development of the classical or comparative anthropology, and its reaction upon historical sociology. Dr. Goldenweiser will discuss the premises and methods of the comparative school, so that nothing more than the briefest summary will be necessary here. This school assumed that there was an organic law of development in social institutions. The theory of unilateral evolutionary growth was adhered to, along with its implications of gradual and orderly changes, largely the same world over, and, in general, proceeding from simple and confused relations to complex and well-co-ordinated social adjustments. On account of the assumed unity of the human mind and similarities in the geographical environment, it was held that we must expect parallelisms and similarities in culture and institutions among peoples widely separated in their geographic distribution. Finally, it was considered valid, in reconstructing the record of social development, to link together a series of isolated examples of any type of culture, taken from the most diverse regions and periods of time and irrespective of the totality of the cultural complex from which each was taken, in a prearranged scheme of evolution, holding that such was a proof of the natural course of social evolution and cultural growth.² Among sociologists who espoused the comparative

¹ Cf. *Journal of Race Development* (April, 1919), pp. 394 ff., and *Journal of International Relations* (October, 1921), pp. 238 ff.

² Cf. F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, pp. 155 ff.

method Herbert Spencer was, with the possible exception of Letourneau, unquestionably the one who accepted it in its most extreme form and the one whose writings have been most influential. His somewhat naïve description or, perhaps better, confession, of his method of procedure in tracing social evolution is outlined in the following passage from his *Autobiography*:

With the entry of this new division of my work, the marshalling of evidence became a much more extensive and complicated business than it had hitherto been. The facts, so multitudinous in their numbers, so different in their kinds, so varied in their sources, formed a heterogeneous aggregate difficult to bring into the clear and effective order required for carrying on an argument; so that I felt much as might a general of division who had become commander-in-chief; or rather, as one who had to undertake this highest function in addition to the lower functions of all his subordinates of the first, second, and third grades. Only by deliberate method persistently followed, was it possible to avoid confusion. A few words may fitly be said here concerning my materials, and the ways in which I dealt with them.

During the five and twenty preceding years there had been in course of accumulation, extracts and memoranda from time to time made. My reading, though not extensive, and though chiefly devoted to the subjects which occupied me during this long interval, frequently brought under my eyes noteworthy facts bearing on this or that division of Sociology. These, along with the suggested ideas, were jotted down and put away. The resulting mass of manuscript materials remained for years unclassified; but every now and then I took out the contents of the drawer which received these miscellaneous contributions and put them in some degree of order—grouping together the ecclesiastical, the political, the industrial, etc.; so that by the time I began to build, there had been formed several considerable heaps of undressed stones and bricks.

But now I had to utilize the relatively large masses of materials gathered together in the *Descriptive Sociology*. For economization of labor, it was needful still further to classify these; and to save time, as well as to avoid errors in re-transcription, my habit was, with such parts of the work as were printed, to cut up two copies. Suppose the general topic to be dealt with was "Primitive Ideas." Then the process was that of reading through all the groups of extracts concerning the uncivilized and semi-civilized races under the head of "Superstition," as well as those under other heads that were likely to contain allied evidence—"Knowledge," "Ecclesiastical," etc. As I read I marked each statement that had any significant bearing; and these marked statements were cut out by my secretary after he had supplied any references which excision would destroy. The large heap resulting was joined with the kindred heap of materials previously accumulated; and there now came the

business of re-classifying them all in preparation for writing. During a considerable preceding period the subdivisions of the topic of "Primitive Ideas" had been thought about; and various heads of chapters had been settled—"Ideas of Sleep and Dreams," "Ideas of Death and Resurrection," "Ideas of Another Life," "Ideas of Another World," etc., etc. Taking a number of sheets of double foolscap, severally fitted to contain between their two leaves numerous memoranda, I placed these in a semi-circle on the floor round my chair; having indorsed each with the title of a chapter, and having arranged them in something like proper sequence. Then, putting before me the heap of extracts and memoranda, I assigned each as I read it to its appropriate chapter. Occasionally I came upon a fact which indicated to me the need for a chapter I had not thought of. An additional sheet for this was introduced, and other kindred facts were from time to time placed with this initial one. Several sittings were usually required to thus sort the entire heap. Mostly too, as this process was gone through some time in advance of need, there came a repetition, or several repetitions, before the series of chapters had assumed its final order, and the materials had all been distributed.

When about to begin a chapter, I made a further rough classification. On a small table before me I had a large rude desk—a hinged board, covered with green baize, which was capable of being inclined at different angles by a movable prop behind. Here I grouped the collected materials appropriated to the successive sections of the chapter; and those which were to be contained in each section were put into the most convenient sequence. Then, as I dictated, I from time to time handed to my secretary an extract to be incorporated.¹

Lewis H. Morgan is somewhat difficult to classify as chiefly a comparative anthropologist or a historical sociologist, but it seems best to regard him as primarily a member of the classical school of anthropologists. While much more systematic and thorough in his study of primitive social institutions than Spencer, Professor Lowie has recently shown that Morgan's method was essentially the same and his conclusions no less unreliable.² His *Ancient Society* has probably done more both to stimulate and to distort historical sociology than any other work.

The next notable example of method in systematic historical sociology after Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* was Book III of

¹ Herbert Spencer, *An Autobiography*, II, 324-26.

² R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, *passim*. Morgan was of course a field-worker and descriptive ethnologist of unusual ability, while Spencer knew nothing of primitive people through contact with them. W. H. R. Rivers, in the *Kinship and Social Organization*, deals more charitably with Morgan than Lowie does, but his leniency does not seem warranted.

Professor Giddings' *Principles of Sociology*. While insistent upon the most rigorously scientific methods in sociology as a whole,¹ the important division of his book on historical sociology followed the comparative method in a thoroughgoing way. But it was much less naïve in its assumptions, procedure, and results than the works of Spencer and Morgan, and showed an unusual acquaintance for a sociologist with the best works then available in the fields of anthropology and history. Those who have followed Professor Giddings' lectures on historical sociology since 1896 know that he has made respectable progress in keeping informed regarding the newer developments in anthropological methods and research, though there is no doubt that his fertile intuitive mind tends toward rather more sweeping generalizations than some critical anthropologists would sanction.²

The introduction of even greater qualifications in accepting the extreme methods and conclusions of comparative anthropology was evident in the critical introduction and summary comments in W. I. Thomas' *Source Book for Social Origins*. While much of the illustrative material cited was from writers of the comparative school, the editor did not hesitate to point out the limitations of this approach to social evolution and gave some indication of an acquaintance with the earlier critical work of Boas and his school.³ Other works on historical sociology accepting the comparative method, albeit somewhat gingerly, were Hobhouse's *Morals in Evolution*⁴ and E. C. Hayes's *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*.

The first sociologist of note thoroughly to reject the comparative method in a published work of significance was Émile Durkheim. In his *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*,⁵ he rejected the procedure of the comparative school in attempting to derive the

¹ F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, Book I, chap. iii.

² F. S. Chapin's *Historical Introduction to Social Evolution*, avowedly based on Professor Giddings' more recent views, illustrates the progress of his thinking on historical sociology since 1896.

³ W. I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, pp. 3-26, 316-17, 530-34, 733-35, 856-58.

⁴ Hobhouse accepts the comparative method with many more reservations in the second edition of his work than he did in the first.

⁵ There is an English translation by J. W. Swain.

laws of social evolution from the study of many social institutions as they have appeared in most diverse regions and periods of time. He contended that any valid conclusions as to social evolution must rest rather upon an intensive study of but one social institution on the basis of its manifestations in a single and definite cultural area. For his own work he selected the development of religion in Australia. Critics have insisted, however, that Durkheim went to the other extreme from the procedure followed by the comparative school and introduced quite as many methodological errors as he had rejected. Not the intensive study of a single institution in one cultural area, but only the critical comparison and analysis of carefully gathered and sifted data from many different cultural areas can establish any law of institutional or cultural growth. Further, Australian ethnography and ethnology have not been pursued with sufficient critical care to make the available data of sufficient reliability to justify generalization even for that continent alone. As Dr. Goldenweiser has well said of this aspect of Durkheim's work, "the fact itself that the author felt justified in selecting the Australian area for his intensive analysis shows plainly enough how far from realization still is the goal which his own life-work has at least made feasible, the rapprochement of ethnology and of sociology."¹ It seems to be agreed that, as a basis for generalization, Durkheim's study of primitive religion is as unreliable as the results of Frazer's studies on the basis of a far different method. The value of his book must be found in the sociological and psychological acumen and not in the reliability of the method of investigation or of the ethnographic material adduced to substantiate the conclusions.²

Perhaps the most interesting innovation in method which has been the work of a historical sociologist was the attempt of Professor L. T. Hobhouse to introduce the method of statistical correlation into an investigation of the evolution of social institutions in their relation to the progress of material culture. In an earlier

¹ *American Anthropologist* (October-December, 1915), p. 723.

² See the masterly discussion of the defects in Durkheim's method by A. A. Goldenweiser in *The American Anthropologist* (October-December, 1915), pp. 719-35; and in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods* (March 1, 1917), pp. 113-24.

work, *Morals in Evolution*, Professor Hobhouse had relied upon a critical utilization of the comparative method. This excursus may, indeed, have impressed upon him the risks of this method. In his *Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*¹ he proposes to introduce a new method of investigation through the means of the statistical correlation of the stages in the progress of government and justice, the forms of the family, and the nature of war and its reaction upon social structure with the epochs in the development of material culture. This is, in fact, as Professor Hobhouse frankly admits, but an elaboration of the method proposed by Professor Edward Burnet Tylor in 1889 in his famous essay "On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions: applied to the Laws of Marriage and Descent."² Professor Hobhouse offers the following excellent criticism of the comparative method and indicates the difficulties of establishing valid generalizations concerning social evolution:

Theories of social evolution are readily formed with the aid of some preconceived ideas and a few judiciously selected corroborative facts. The data offered to the theorist by the voluminous results of anthropological inquiry on the one hand, and by the immense record of the history of civilization on the other, are so vast and so various that it must be an unskilled selector who is unable, by giving prominence to the instances which agree and by ignoring these which conflict with his views, to make out a plausible case in support of some general notion of human progress. On the other hand, its theories are easily made, they are also easily confuted by a less friendly use of the same data. That same variety of which we speak is so great that there is hardly any sociological generalization which does not stumble upon some awkward fact if one takes the trouble to find it. Anyone with a sense for facts soon recognizes that the course of social evolution is not unitary but that different races and different communities of the same race have, in fact, whether they started from the same point or no, diverged early, rapidly, and in many different directions at once. If theorizing is easy when facts are treated arbitrarily, a theory which would really grow out of the facts themselves and express their true significance presents the greatest possible difficulties to the inquirer. The data themselves are vast but chaotic, and at every point incomplete. They fall into two main divisions. On the one hand, there is historical record of the civilizations; upon the other there is the immense field of contemporary anthropology. In both alike the data are equally difficult to ascertain with precision, and when ascertained to reduce to any intelligible order. In the

¹ London, 1915, executed with the collaboration of G. C. Wheeler and M. Ginsberg.

² *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, XVIII (1889), 245-72.

history of civilization we have full studies of many institutions, and we can learn something, not only of what they were at any one moment, but of their development in time, their genesis, their rise, their maturity, their decay. But even here the information often breaks off short at the most interesting point. Beginnings are frequently matter of conjecture. The nature of institutions, as they appear on paper, may be known to us, while we are left to reconstruct their actual working from casual examples, hints, and references that leave much to the imagination. We find them decaying without intelligible cause, and often enough we are faced with the fact that more thoroughgoing inquiry has completely revolutionized our view of an institution which had been taken as thoroughly explored and fully interpreted by earlier schools of historians. So is it also with the anthropological record. Here indeed we have a handful of monographs made by trained and skilled observers in modern times, which leave nothing to be desired excepting that the work had been carried out three or four generations ago before contact with the white man or with other more civilized races had begun to corrupt the purity of aboriginal institutions. Outside these monographs we have a vast mass of travellers' reports, good, bad, and indifferent, data which it is impossible to ignore and yet which can seldom be taken at their face value. Moreover all anthropological data of this kind, however simple the life of the people with which they deal, are modern: with the exception of the few available references that we have to the peoples that surrounded the Greeks and Romans in Herodotus, Tacitus, and other writers of antiquity, the great bulk of anthropological inquiry dates from the last three or four centuries, and it is sometimes forgotten that the peoples of whom they treat must have lived as long, must in a sense have had an extensive tradition behind them, and to that extent are as far removed from the true primitive as civilized man himself.¹

Critics have, however, called attention to certain serious defects in the execution of Professor Hobhouse's project, while admitting the excellence of the method if the data were adequate and the detailed application rigid. They have alleged that, by his arbitrary division of primitive peoples into the lower and higher hunters, etc., he inevitably obtained from his study what he had assumed at the outset in his preliminary classification. Again, his selection of the "tribe" as the statistical unit makes specific accuracy and definiteness impossible, because of the great variation in the nature of the tribe.² To me it seems that the most damaging criticism which may be directed against the work is the author's admission that the anthropological data gathered by skilled and critical

¹ *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*, pp. 1-2.

² See the criticism of Tylor on this point in the *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, XVIII (1889), 270 ff.

investigators are not sufficient to warrant the undertaking of any such enterprise as he has attempted, and his willingness to use the highly unreliable material gathered by missionaries and travelers in the absence of trustworthy information.¹ Further, a survey of the authorities used indicates that, like Durkheim, Professor Hobhouse had not realized the serious methodological errors that had been involved in the procedure of compiling the material for such widely used monographs as Spencer and Gillen's monographs on the Australian data. In other words, not only did he fail to limit himself to reliable anthropological monographs, but also to discriminate critically between the relative reliability of the monographs used.²

The accepted scientific method in reconstructing the early history of society—that evolved and elaborated by Boas and his school, Wissler, Lowie, Goldenweiser, Kroeber, and others—has not yet been adopted by any historical sociologist in any work of significance. It may be well that a number are in preparation which will embody these results, but none have yet appeared. The extension of this method into sociology has been the result of the synthetic work of these anthropologists themselves, in such books as Boas' *Mind of Primitive Man*; Wissler's *American Indian*; Lowie's *Culture and Ethnology*, and *Primitive Society*; and the forthcoming work of Dr. Goldenweiser on *Early Civilization*. One may well doubt whether many sociologists in America are acquainted with this revolutionary work, and one may be certain that most sociologists abroad know nothing of it, for here even the anthropologists are for the most part ignorant of it and proceed serenely in the excesses of the comparative method of Morgan, Lubbock, Tylor, Frazer, Letourneau, Lippert, Gumplowicz, and Kovalevsky.³

¹ Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 30-44. A comparison of Hobhouse's results with those of R. H. Lowie in his *Primitive Society* is instructive.

³ The most flagrant contemporary offender is Sir James G. Frazer. See the convincing demolition of Frazer and his methods by Robert H. Lowie in *The Freeman* (March 30, 1921), pp. 67-68. Perhaps the clearest example of the application of this new method is contained in A. A. Goldenweiser's "Totemism: an Analytical Study," in the *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. XXIII. It might also be pointed out that its results are particularly damaging to the basic dogmas of the comparative anthropology concerning totemism.

IV. THE POSITION OF SOCIOLOGISTS IN REGARD TO THEORIES OF CULTURAL EVOLUTION

While the important theories of cultural evolution are, perhaps, more significant for *Kulturgeschichte* than for historical sociology, they cannot be ignored by the latter. It may be quite true that, as Professor Lowie has shown, there is no close correlation between material culture and forms of social organization. Yet, social institutions are a part of the general cultural complex of any group, and their development and changes may be assumed to illustrate certain patterns and, perhaps, laws, of transformation.¹

There have been advanced by cultural anthropologists some three chief doctrines or explanations of cultural growth and change. The first was that expounded by the comparative school, namely, the theory of independent origins and transformation. They held that cultural and institutional similarities and parallelisms have an independent origin, due to the unity of the human mind and also to environmental similarities. Changes in social institutions are likewise due to causes arising independent of any contiguous cultural group. This doctrine, of course, embodied the apotheosis of human initiative and capacity for invention.²

At the opposite pole from this school of writers was that group which accounted for cultural growth and transformation on the basis of contact and diffusion. They held that the instances of invention and independent origins of culture were very few indeed, and that changes in culture were due almost entirely to the introduction of new cultural traits or elements from without. This view of cultural evolution was anticipated by Tylor and Ratzel and was elaborated by Frobenius, Graebner, and Elliot Smith. It has been accepted by Rivers, Foy, Ankermann, and Schmidt. While possessing considerable validity, especially as an explanation of the spread of material culture, it has many weaknesses from psychological and geographical viewpoints.³

¹ Cf. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, chap. i.

² See Morgan, *Ancient Society*; D. G. Brinton, *The Basis of Social Relations*; E. B. Tylor, *loc. cit.*; E. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*.

³ See F. Graebner, *Methode der Ethnologie*; G. Elliot Smith, *Migrations of Early Culture*; W. H. R. Rivers, *History of Melanesian Society*, Vol. II. See the discussion in A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, chap. xiii.

Recognizing the defects of both of these older theories Ehrenreich in Germany and Boas and his school in America have substituted a critical or historico-analytical procedure. They assign full credit to the theory of independent development and invention as the cause of many cultural origins and changes, and yet, recognize that diffusion is an important principle and factor in accounting for cultural progress and transformations. Particularly significant is the searching analysis of alleged cultural parallelisms from the historical and psychological point of view which has been carried on by this group. They have satisfactorily proved that many alleged parallelisms are similar only in superficial externals and not in their psychic or cultural content or historical development. They have, further, demonstrated that real parallelisms may have developed from quite different origins through the operation of such genetic principles as "convergence" and "limited possibilities in the development of culture." The revolutionary significance of such positions cannot fail to be obvious to any thoughtful historian or sociologist.¹

Inasmuch as historical sociologists have, almost without exception, adhered to the comparative method of studying social genesis they have, naturally, accepted the basic tenet of this school on the subject of cultural evolution, namely, the theory of independent origins and development. But they have done so for the most part unconsciously and without any deliberate consideration of the problem. They have in no way examined the arguments advanced for these different methods or carefully weighed the merits of each. Aside from a suggestive article by Professor Ellwood² there is no evidence that historical sociologists have, as a group, acquainted themselves to any degree with the problems of cultural evolution or these major solutions offered. It is scarcely necessary to urge the need of vigorous, if belated, activity on their part in this direction.

¹ F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, chaps. v-vii; A. A. Goldenweiser, "The Principles of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Culture," in *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. XXVI; R. H. Lowie, "The Principle of Convergence in Culture," *ibid.*, Vol. XXV. It is true, of course, that there are important theoretical points of difference between members of this newer critical group of writers. I have attempted to deal with this point in the *Sociological Review*, October, 1921, pp. 211 ff.

² *American Journal of Sociology* (May, 1918), pp. 779 ff.

V. SOME SIGNIFICANT RESULTS OF THE WORK OF HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGISTS

In spite of the fact that we may safely assume that far the greater part of the work in historical sociology has been founded upon a fundamentally erroneous method and that many of even the most dogmatically held results of this method are of very doubtful validity or utterly useless, nevertheless, one cannot discard as worthless the achievements of historical sociology up to the present time. It may be worth while briefly to estimate what significant contributions to the history of society have already been made by sociologists which are of relatively assured accuracy and permanent value.

1. *The stages of social evolution.*—One of the most illuminating and valuable of the phases of historical sociology has been the effort of writers in this field from various points of view to distinguish, characterize, or mark off the major stages in social evolution. The first epoch-making effort along this line was the work of Auguste Comte. Comte did not rest satisfied, as so many have contended, with a purely intellectual theory of social evolution. His famous division of history into the theological, metaphysical, and positive stages applied merely to his notion of intellectual progress. His stages of social evolution were based upon a more comprehensive set of factors.¹ His complete demarcation of stages in the history of society included a theological-military period, a metaphysical-legalistic age, and the modern scientific-industrial era.² Herbert Spencer believed that the chief social transformation thus far achieved was that from a society organized primarily for war to one oriented chiefly for industrial purposes, this change being accompanied by a progressive decline in state activity. He risked the generalization that a third period might be attained in which ethical and social considerations would play a dominating part.³ Walter Bagehot held that the three chief periods of social and cultural evolution had been that of the formation of codes of custom,

¹ *The Principles of a Positive Polity*, Vol. III.

² Cf. W. A. Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*, pp. 393-94, with F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 303-4.

³ *Principles of Sociology*, II, 568 ff.

that of the struggle of local groups dominated by customary codes, with the resulting formation of states, and, finally, that of the dissolution of the domination of custom by the appearance of the age of discussion.¹ Durkheim has viewed social evolution as primarily a passage from a social system based upon the mechanical and constraining solidarity of group repression of individuality to a social system founded upon the organic and voluntary solidarity of the social division of labor and the functional organization of society.² DeGreef asserted that the history of society can be most intelligently summed up as the transformation from a régime based upon force to one characterized by voluntary contractual social relationships.³ Novicow contended that social evolution was a process of substituting progressively higher for lower forms of social conflict. The serial succession of these basic types or periods of social conflict have been from the physiological, through the economic and the political, to the intellectual, or highest form of social conflict.⁴ Ratzenhofer and Small have suggested that the vital social transformation has been from a "conquest-state" to a "culture-state," carrying with it the realization of a progressively more adequate range of social interests.⁵ Hobhouse states that the stages of social and political evolution have been those in which kinship, authority, and citizenship have been the basis of social cohesion and social organization.⁶ By far the most thorough and illuminating scheme for organizing the evolution of society is that which has been suggested by Professor Giddings. He divides social evolution into the following stages: *zoögenic* or animal society, *anthropogenic*, or the society of man in the stage of the transformation from animal to human tribal society, *ethnogenic*, or tribal society, and *demogenic*, or the society of the so-called "historic" period. This last era he further divides in the military-religious period, which roughly corresponds to that of oriental

¹ *Physics and Politics*.

² *De la Division de travail social*.

³ *Introduction à la sociologie*.

⁴ *Les Luites entre sociétés humaines*.

⁵ A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 193 ff.

⁶ *Morals in Evolution* (1915 edition), pp. 42 ff.; *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, pp. 126 ff.

antiquity, and the early Middle Ages, the liberal-legal period, or that of Greece and Rome and early modern history, and the economic-ethical period, or that since the Industrial Revolution.¹

While these characterizations of the outstanding ages or periods in social evolution differ somewhat they are not mutually exclusive, but rather reflect varied points of view and widely diverse methods of studying the history of society. They constitute one of the most significant phases, both of the development of historical sociology and of the contribution of sociology to history.

2. *The origins of the state.*—A complete sociological theory of the origin of the state involves a consideration of the following problems—the socio-psychological origins of human association in the most general terms, the sociological and psychological forces involved in the origins of political leadership, the nature and progress of tribal society, and the causes for and nature of the rise of the territorial state.

The sociological doctrines that have been adduced to explain the origins of human association are numerous and varied, but they are rarely contradictory, and the final synthesis of sociological doctrine will, in all probability, accord in a different degree recognition to all of them. It will suffice here to mention some of the more important views of the better-known sociologists. In such a category would belong the theories of sympathy from Adam Smith to Alexander Sutherland, the closely allied doctrine of mutual aid and spontaneous co-operation, set forth by such writers as Kropotkin and Novicow, the notion of a gregarious instinct, as elaborated by McDougall and Trotter, Giddings' emphasis on the "consciousness of kind," the effect of imitation expounded by Hume, Bagehot, Tarde, and Baldwin, the subordination of the individual by the impressive force of the group, as viewed by Durkheim, LeBon, Sighele, Gumplowicz, and Sumner, and John Fiske's theory of the prolongation of human infancy.

The socio-psychological explanations of the rise of political superiority and subordination are closely allied to these interpretations of the origins of associated life. We have Spencer's doctrine of fear, Bagehot's and Tarde's theory of imitation, DeGreef's and

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, Book III.

Fouillée's modified version of a theory of political origins through self-interest and a voluntary contract, Kropotkin's and Novicow's stressing of co-operative activity, Durkheim and LeBon's insistence upon the influence of impression, Mallock's, Faguet's, and Mumford's exposition of the significance of leadership and dominating personalities, McDougall's theory of an instinct of self-abasement and an emotion of subjection, and the attempt to reach a synthetic interpretation in Giddings' notion of differential response to stimulation and the theory of protocracy, and in the well-balanced studies of Baldwin, Cooley, and Ellwood.

The first modern attempt to trace the historical development of political origins through tribal society rested on the theory, which was supposed to be of biblical origin and sanction and had been confirmed by the generalizations of Aristotle, Bodin, Pufendorf, Locke, and Blackstone, namely, that the patriarchal organization of society had been the earliest form of family, social, and political life. This thesis received its ablest synthesis and defense in the *Ancient Law* and other monumental contributions to historical jurisprudence and politics from the pen of Henry Sumner Maine.¹

This point of view was attacked by J. J. Bachofen in his *Das Mutterrecht* published in 1860. He maintained the existence of a primordial promiscuity in sexual relations and a subsequent development of a matriarchate, or a polity dominated by females. But he was a follower of the methods of Vico and Wolf rather than those of Darwin and Morgan, for he based his generalizations upon data drawn from a study of classical mythology and tradition. This rather archaic line of approach was soon abandoned for what has come to be known as the "evolutionary" approach to historical sociology. A group of distinguished scholars, most notable among them being Sir John Lubbock, J. F. McLennan, Herbert Spencer, Andrew Lang, W. Robertson Smith, Albert H. Post, Edward B. Tylor, Lewis H. Morgan, James G. Frazer, Charles Letourneau, and Daniel G. Brinton, brought the evolutionary principles of

¹ The following account of the theories of the evolution of the state drawn from anthropological theories has been greatly condensed because it is a special subject of Dr. Goldenweiser's paper.

Darwinian biology to bear upon the reconstruction of the early history of human society and reached results equally disruptive of the position of Maine. While there were important differences of opinion in matters of detail among these writers, they were in general agreement upon essentials of method and results.

Applying these methods and assumptions, described elsewhere, to the study of early society these writers arrived at a series of definite conclusions. The monogamous family shows a slow but distinct development from original promiscuity, and the family of any type is a late product, developing within the older kinship or gentile organization of society. In the development of gentile society certain definite and successive stages can be isolated and their sequence correlated with the development of material culture. The first type of extensive human grouping was found in the endogamous horde, where there were neither fixed family nor other wider relations. This stage was followed by the appearance of definite kinship or gentile society, associated with the exogamous clan which was inseparably connected with a totemic complex.¹ The earliest form of gentile society was the maternal clan, which was in time invariably succeeded by the paternal clan, this transformation in the basis of relationship being definitely correlated with progressive advances in material culture. The paternal clan was gradually strengthened into a patriarchal organization of society, which, through the development of property and the infiltration of foreigners from economic attraction, was in time superseded by the abolition of kinship principles and the establishment of the territorial state and civil society. This orderly synthesis of social and political evolution was most comprehensively organized and most effectively set forth in the famous work on *Ancient Society* by Louis Henry Morgan.²

Since Morgan's day new methods of anthropological investigation and synthesis and more thorough studies of existing primitive society have served to discredit the principles of investigation

¹ It should be pointed out that Frazer, in his *Totemism and Exogamy* has admitted that totemism and exogamy are not inseparable.

² See also E. B. Tylor, "On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions," *Journal of Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XVIII, 1889.

followed by the evolutionary or classical school of anthropologists and to disprove the conclusions which they reached by the employment of these methods. In fact, more careful investigation even according to the old methods enabled Westermarck to prove inaccurate the assumption of a primitive promiscuity.¹ The basis for the newer point of view was laid by very painstaking studies of primitive cultural areas with the attempt to study the data in an objective manner. Space forbids the mention of more than a few representative examples of this type of indispensable anthropological research. In any such enumeration would come the studies of Australian data by Cunow, Brown, and N. W. Thomas; Rivers' great monographs on the *Todas* and the *History of Melanesian Society*; Seligmann's survey of the Veddas; the Torres Straits investigations undertaken by A. C. Haddon and a group of English scholars; the investigation of African data by Roscoe and Pecheul-Loesche; and, particularly, the careful studies of American areas by the participants in the Jesup North Pacific Expedition, and by Boas, Wissler, Lowie, Kroeber, Goldenweiser, Spinden, Dixon, Parker, Goddard, Mooney, Speck, Swanton, and others. This unparalleled data, together with a more objective and scientific attitude toward its interpretation, has brought about, not only more reliable doctrines concerning social evolution, but has also shown that the facts of social development are far different from what was earlier supposed. The more critical school has proved that the assumption of a universal law of evolution from the simple to the complex is not invariably true with respect to culture or social institutions. It has shown that parallelisms in culture and social organization in different areas do not imply identical antecedents or necessitate similar subsequent developments. Similarities may grow out of "cultural convergencies," proceeding from widely varied antecedents or they may be produced by imitation of a common pattern.²

¹ *History of Human Marriage*.

² Excellent discussions of the newer anthropological methodology are to be found in F. Boas, *Mind of Primitive Man*, chaps. iv-viii; R. H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology*; and A. A. Goldenweiser, "Principle of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Culture," in *Journal of American Folklore* (1913), pp. 259 ff. Consult further references in Goldenweiser, *loc. cit.* The best sources for these methodological improvements are the critical notes and reviews in the *American Anthropologist*.

The application of this more scientific method to the study of primitive society has been nothing short of revolutionary. The universality of gentile society cannot be proved; many groups have developed to a relatively high stage of culture without any relationship system wider than the family. Where gentile society exists there is no general tendency for relationships to change from a maternal to a paternal basis; in fact it may be doubted if there is one well-authenticated example of an independent change in kinship from maternal to paternal in the whole range of primitive society. Further, there is no evidence that maternal kinship is correlated with lower material culture or paternal with more advanced economic life. Finally, totemism has been totally dissociated from exogamy. It is evident that the whole fabric of the scheme of social evolution provided by the evolutionary school has perished and Professor Lowie has well expressed the obituary notice of this school:

To sum up. There is no fixed succession of maternal and paternal descent; sibless tribes may pass directly into the matrilineal or the patrilineal condition; if the highest civilizations emphasize the paternal side of the family, so do many of the lowest; and the social history of any particular people cannot be reconstructed from any generally valid scheme of social evolution but only in the light of its known and probable cultural relations with neighboring peoples.¹

These more critical principles and more assured results in anthropological research have been chiefly an American product and associated with the work of Professor Franz Boas and his pupils.²

It is not, of course, to be implied that all sociologists have assimilated the results of the more critical ethnology; indeed, most of them rest their theories of social evolution on the old Morganian ethnology and not a few regard the work of Boas and the critical school as impious if not impish. Yet, they cannot long disregard these epoch-making advances and it can be safely predicted that at no distant date the sociological theory of political origins will rest upon the firm foundations of critical ethnology.

¹ R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, p. 185.

² The definitive synthesis of the newer views of primitive society is contained in the notable works of Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*; and A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*. Another remarkable synthesis for American data is Clark Wissler's *The American Indian*.

The next problem in the sociological theory of political origins centers around the tracing of the origin of the developed territorial state. Older views, following Aristotle, traced it as a natural expansion of grouping from tribal society. Morgan and the evolutionary school accounted for political origins on the basis of the rise of property and the necessity of a more advanced type of political and legal institutions to cope with these more complex economic problems. Gradually, however, the doctrine has gained ground that the territorial state was primarily the product of forcible subjugation through long-continued warfare among primitive groups. Today this may be said to be the sociological theory of political origins and development. This view is not a new one; it certainly may be traced back as far as Polybius and has had its exponents in every succeeding age.¹ Hume in his *Essays* and Adam Ferguson in his *History of Civil Society* may be regarded as the founders of the modern version of this doctrine. Spencer and Bagehot worked over the doctrine in the light of evolutionary concepts, but it is with the work of Ludwig Gumplowicz and his theory of the *Rassenkampf* that this important contribution to the sociological theory of the state is usually associated. Gumplowicz forecast this interpretation in his brochure on *Race und Staat* in 1875 and expanded it in two later works, *Der Rassenkampf*, 1883, and *Grundriss der Sociologie*, 1885. It has been taken up and elaborated, among others, by Ratzenhofer in Austria, Oppenheimer and Simmel in Germany, Jenks in England, and Small and Ward in America. Briefly stated, this theory rests upon a doctrine of the group constitution of society, based on the principle of *syngenism* or "the phenomenon which consists in the fact that invariably in associated modes of life, definite groups of men, feeling themselves closely bound together by common interests, endeavor to function as a single element in the struggle for domination." From the earliest days the "process of history" has consisted chiefly in the struggle between social groups for the advancement of their economic interests. The conquest of one group by another led to the sub-

¹ I have tried to summarize briefly the history of this view of political origins, including the theory of Gumplowicz and later writers, in an article in the *Journal of Race Development* (April, 1919).

jection of the conquered and the establishment of the authority of the conquerors. This process went on, continually increasing the territorial scope of the authority of the successful group. Yet, to gain internal strength and unity the rulers of the expanding group were compelled to grant concessions to the conquered, and the process of assimilation began. Gradually, cultural assimilation and physical amalgamation were achieved and the national state was produced. During this process social classes were developed within the state in the shape of conquerors and conquered, religious and economic classes. As political institutions developed, these classes struggled for political power, so that they might use the law-making authority in their own interest. From these crude origins to modern times, this conflict of interest groups within the state has furnished the raw material and the *rationale* of political processes.

Though this view of political development has received the general assent of most sociologists,¹ some have vigorously criticized it as minimizing the element of co-operation and other peaceful agencies, such as industry and trade, which have undoubtedly been a potent factor in the history of the state. Among the better known of such writers have been Sutherland in his *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, Kropotkin in his *Mutual Aid as a Factor in Evolution*, and Novicow in his *La Critique du Darwinisme social*.² Eclectic writers have tried to work out a synthesis and show that while conflict has played the greater part in political origins, peaceful co-operative elements have not been without great influence in the past and will probably be even more powerful in the future. Such a point of view has characterized the doctrine of Giddings, Hayes, Ludwig Stein, and Tarde.³

3. *Special studies of the development of specific social institutions.*—In the matter of studying the growth of such special types of

¹ Cf. Lester F. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 204 ff.; *American Journal of Sociology*, VII, 762; XV, 679-80; *Publications of the American Economic Association* (3d series), V, No. 2, 187 f.

² Cf. *Journal of International Relations* (October, 1921), pp. 238 ff.

³ Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 316; E. C. Hayes, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, pp. 538 ff.; L. Stein, *La Question sociale*, pp. 123-24, 352 ff., G. Tarde, *Les Transformations du pouvoir*, pp. 36, 50, 174-85.

social institutions as those relating to marriage and the family, property, law, morals, and religion one finds that much the same situation prevails as in the analysis of the evolution of the state and society in general. Much the greater part of the anthropological material on these subjects has been compiled through the use of the unreliable and obsolete comparative method, and, with almost negligible exceptions, all the sociological studies of these institutions have been based upon these products of comparative anthropology. In the case of the study of the history of the family and allied practices and institutions the works by Letourneau, Westermarck, Starcke, Hartland, Frazer, Grosse, Howard, and Goodsell, which constitute the more important strictly sociological works on the subject, are all based on the comparative method, in some cases with an utter lack of critical judgment. The same criticism might also be passed upon the works of Letourneau and others on the evolution of property as a social institution; upon the treatment of the development of law by Maine, Letourneau, Ihering, Post, and Frazer; upon the history of moral concepts and practices by Sutherland and Westermarck; and upon the analysis of the history of religion by La Saussaye, Lubbock, Tylor, Frazer, Jevons, and Brinton. Certain laudable improvements in the more crude forms of employing the comparative method are to be seen in the study of the family by Elsie Clews Parsons, in Sumner's remarkable repertory of concrete data illustrating the history of folkways and mores, in Webster's study of the history of "Rest Days," and in the comprehensive work of Hobhouse on *Morals in Evolution*. Thomas sounds a word of caution in using the comparative method in his critical comments on material in his *Source Book* touching upon the evolution of specific social institutions. Durkheim rejects the comparative method in studying the development of religions, but, as we have already seen, accepts in its place as objectionable a type of procedure. We have an excellent critical synthesis of the evolution of the family, property, law, religion, morals, and religion in the works of Marett, Lowie, and Goldenweiser,¹ but these writers are all professional anthropologists whose contributions have

¹ R. R. Marett, *Anthropology*; R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*; A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*.

scarcely affected the complacency of most of their fellow-anthropologists, to say nothing of sociologists. In short, one may conclude that the work done by sociologists in the field of the history of special institutions is as backward in method and as unreliable in content as their achievements in tracing the evolution of society in general. Yet, one would be supercilious if he were to deny all value to the foregoing work. It has performed the indispensable task of preliminary classification and generalization, upon the basis of which later constructive criticism may proceed.

VI. THE DECLINE OF INTEREST IN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the history of historical sociology is the decline in the interest in this field in the last two decades. From Comte to Giddings the historical aspect of social problems interested more sociological writers than any other phase of the subject. Even many comprehensive works on the "principles of sociology" devoted more attention to social evolution than to the analysis of other sociological data. In the last twenty years, however, there has been an extremely marked decline of interest in historical sociology. Not since the publication of Giddings' *Principles of Sociology* in 1896 had there been produced a systematic treatise on the history of human society until the appearance of Professor Chapin's *Introduction to Social Evolution* in 1913, and of Professor Hayes's textbook in 1915. The works on special aspects of historical sociology, such as Hobhouse's *Morals in Evolution*, Oppenheimer's *The State*, and Westermarck's *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, have been few, indeed, compared with the vast output in the fields of analytical, biological, psychological, statistical, and, above all, applied sociology.¹

It is not easy to discover a complete explanation for this falling-off of interest in historical sociology, but it seems safe to assert that it was primarily because of the rise of interest in the other fields through which an approach might be made to sociological

¹ Compare the works in Peabody's *A Reader's Guide to Social Ethics* with the scant bibliography which could be compiled of works on historical sociology produced since 1900.

problems. The historical and the biological methods were in the air between 1850 and 1900, and it was but natural that they should come to influence greatly, if not to dominate, the sociological works of this period. At the close of the century the analytical, psychological, and statistical methods of investigating sociological problems were just becoming popular, and it is not surprising that these methods should come to usurp the sociological field for a generation with most fertile and valuable results. The growth of state activity in this period, the reaction of sociology upon charity and philanthropy, and the greater pecuniary advantages of specialization in applied or practical sociology, served to give that field a popularity which quite exceeded that of any other. Another influence which unquestionably operated indirectly to diminish the activity and interest in the field of historical sociology was the socialization of history in the writings of such historians as Green, Blok, Rambaud, Lamprecht, Breysig, Steinhausen, Turner, Shotwell, and Beard. Historians of this type in part remedied the shortcomings of historical sociology in recent years. In fact, the social historians and the anthropologists were about all that kept alive an active interest in social genesis. Sociologists were often inclined to look for historical data in the works of the social historians instead of gathering it themselves, and were not adverse to shifting the burdens of investigating social genesis to the anthropologists.

This collapse of historical sociology after 1900 was doubly disastrous, for it was during just this time that the critical anthropologists and the well-trained social historians were putting in the hands of the sociologists a new and more reliable mechanism for exploring the history of human society. The older historical sociology had been built up on the doubtful foundation of social Darwinism and comparative anthropology, but, by the time that the newer anthropology appeared there was little or no historical sociology to take advantage of its revolutionary achieved results. Yet, this now should prove an added impetus to the revival of the historical approach to sociological problems, for today we have an unprecedented assurance that the execution of careful work in this field by the newer methods will yield significant results of a permanently valuable character.

A sound and reliable historical sociology, giving us an accurate conception of the development of human society and its institutions, would have a value far beyond the yielding of pedantic satisfaction. Such knowledge is one of the indispensable preliminaries to any valid scheme or program for social reform, as well as one of the most potent forces likely to generate a desire for social improvement. As Professor James Harvey Robinson has very well said:

Society is today engaged in a tremendous and unprecedented effort to better itself in manifold ways. Never has our knowledge of the world and of man been so great as it is now; never before has there been so much general good will and so much intelligent social activity as now prevails. The part that each of us can play in forwarding some phase of this reform will depend upon our understanding of existing conditions and opinion, and these can only be explained, as has been shown, by following more or less carefully the processes that produced them. We must develop historical-mindedness upon a far more generous scale than hitherto, for this will add a still deficient element in our intellectual equipment and will promote rational progress as nothing else can do. The present has hitherto been the willing victim of the past; the time has now come when it should turn on the past and exploit it in the interests of advance.¹

It may be safely contended that, however much aid they may obtain from anthropologists and historians, the sociologists cannot afford to allow their historical viewpoint and information to be developed for them by any other group of students. No other than a sociologist with a genetic point of view and a command of accurate historical methodology will be likely to have that broad synthetic approach to the study of social development which is the great desideratum of contemporary social science.

¹ *The New History*, pp. 23-24.

FOUR PHASES OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL THOUGHT: AN OUTLINE¹

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ABSTRACT

Four Phases of Anthropological Thought. The Evolutionary School.—Postulates of the evolutionary school include the theories of the psychic unity of mankind, of the general similarity of physical environmental conditions, and of parallelism in historical development. The method of evolutionists, as Spencer, Jevons, Westermarck, and Letourneau, was comparative. Survivals were used as proof of evolution, interest was directed to origins and first origins, and diffusion was treated slightly. Illustrations of the evolutionary theory were found in economics, social organization, art, and religion. *The diffusionists.* While Bastian and Ratzel recognize the facts of diffusion, Graebner stands out as the first real diffusionist with his rejection of evolution and his interpretation of the spread of culture as a unit through diffusion. W. H. R. Rivers differs from Graebner by his emphasis upon psychological explanations, by his interest in the mechanisms of diffusion, and in his combination of evolution with diffusion. Both Rivers and Graebner, however, use diffusion as a general principle of interpretation, disregarding proof or even historical probability. *Critical ethnology.* The positive contributions of the critical school were in its historical approach and in its psychological standpoint. Its concept of culture area combines objective and psychological features in relation to independent development and diffusion. *Recent tendencies and future outlook.* The limitations of the critical school lies in its absence of synthesis, its neglect of the hypothetical approach, its oversight of the developmental aspect, and its lack of contact with other sciences. Recent tendencies in interpretation are those of neo-evolutionism, of rehabilitation of the comparative method, of convergence versus parallelism, and of a new type of origins. Such contributions of psychoanalysis as racial unconscious, recapitulation theory, etc., must be rejected, but Freud's interpretations of magic taboo, incest, etc., are theoretically acceptable.

THE EVOLUTIONARY SCHOOL

Beginning with very early times man has played with the idea of evolution, although the speculations of primitive folk on this topic have usually referred to matters inorganic and organic, but not social. Social evolution is a relatively recent concept. Adumbrated by Auguste Comte, dialectically developed by Hegel, the idea of an evolutionary development of civilization received its

¹ Anthropological theory and method have undergone such multiform transformations in the course of the last two generations, that a volume would barely suffice to cover the principal phases of these ideologies. This essay represents a somewhat elaborated table of contents of such a volume.

first precise and elaborate formulation at the hands of Herbert Spencer. The astronomical speculations of Laplace and Kant, the geology of Lyell, and von Baer's embryology co-operated in the shaping of Spencer's ideas, while Darwin's *Origin of Species* came in just in time to help him complete his biological scheme.

In approaching the sociological field, Spencer found himself in a quandary. The material had not been elaborated; there was very little of it available, moreover, that could be used to bolster up an evolutionary conception of society. As is well known, Spencer then made a daring excursion into descriptive data, and, with the help of a number of assistants, succeeded in amassing a formidable collection of facts which he put to use in the *Sociology* and the *Ethics*. It is of importance to remember here that the evolutionary conception was in no sense inductively derived from historical material. In astronomy, in geology, in biology, and even in psychology, evolution was at least in part based on observed phenomena in these fields. Not so in sociology or history. Here the evolutionary frame appeared ready-made in advance, and ever after the sagacity of social evolutionists was hard put to it in their attempts to force social phenomena into this frame.

The postulates of the evolutionary conception in its relation to society were these. From a psychological standpoint, Man represents a homogeneous group—there is psychic unity. Physical environmental conditions encountered by Man are everywhere similar, barring details. On this general background of similar physical stimuli and equally similar psychic responses, social evolution proceeds in all places and groups along comparable or even identical lines. This is parallelism. The stages through which civilization proceeds are thus fixed in order, if not in time. A stage, that is, may be precipitated here, delayed there, but come it must, at its proper place and before the next stage can be ushered in. This evolutionary development, moreover, proceeds gradually, through an unceasing accumulation of relatively slight accretions. As a final edge to the theory came the idea of progress, which added a melioristic touch to the entire scheme. Not only did society develop inevitably, uniformly, and steadily, but the general drift of its movement was toward betterment.

In the application of the theory of evolution, some held that civilization as a whole was subject to these regular transformations, but as this conception proved a trifle too grotesque even for the daring of the early evolutionists, a somewhat more discriminating version early took its place. It was taught that the units of evolutionary development were the separate aspects of civilization, such as social or political form, economic conditions, art, religion, and the like.

The principal method utilized by the early evolutionists was comparative. An enormous stock of data gathered from all peoples, times, and places was utilized to fit the pigeonholes of the evolutionary scheme. Those were the days of voluminous compendia and never ending lists of authorities quoted. Spencer's *Sociology*, Hartland's *Legend of Perseus* and *Primitive Paternity*, Westermarck's *The Origin Development of the Moral Ideas*, a later work of similar type, are good illustrations, while Letourneau's prolific pen, by its exaggerations, reduced the entire method to absurdity.

The idea of survivals, which first appeared in E. B. Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, was used by evolutionists as a methodological tool in the building up of their systems. Thus, realistic meanings of geometrical patterns were interpreted as survivals of originally realistic designs; or, the importance of the maternal uncle was taken as proof of a former prevalence of maternal descent. The postulates at the root of the idea of survival were three: the development of civilization, the persistence of civilization and the different extent to which these two principles were operative in the several aspects of a particular culture. This resulted in cultural lags, some features, once useful or otherwise correlated with the rest of civilization, finding themselves lost in the rear of cultural advance, meaningless, or of changed meaning, and but loosely articulated with their cultural milieu.

To the evolutionist the problem of origins, of ultimate origins, was one wrought with significance. For, if the course of evolution is fixed, then the knowledge of each step brings insight into universal law, and the first step carries within it the potentialities of all that are to follow.

The evolutionist, constructive, enthusiastic, and daring though he was, could not but recognize the presence of certain factors which marred the harmony of his beautifully balanced schemes. Among these factors the diffusion of cultural features was most conspicuous. The evolutionist was aware of the constant contributions received by any particular civilization in the form of things and ideas derived from other civilizations. These foreign importations, from the first, proved resentful of the pressure of the evolutionary frame. In fact, they persistently refused to abide within its limits, and thus spoiled the picture. The evolutionist's weapon against the phenomena of historical contact was contempt. The facts were there, undeniably, but they were disturbing agencies, irregularities, intrusive factors. In theoretical significance they were not to be compared to the facts of "inner growth." To envisage clearly the features of evolution, it was necessary to analyze out and eliminate these intrusive factors.

Follow a few examples of evolutionary schemes: In the domain of economics, pottery was made to play the part of a fixed stage of advance, Lewis H. Morgan having been one of the staunchest supporters of this theory. Then there were the three classical stages of economic progress, the hunting, pastoral, and agricultural stages. In the ownership of property, communal holding was regarded as universally antecedent to individual ownership. In social organization, the first origin was sought in the horde characterized by promiscuous sex intercourse. This was followed by group marriage, then by the clan, the gens, and finally, the family and village. The succession, clan-gens, was particularly insisted upon, Bachofen, McLennan, and Morgan having embraced the theory that maternal descent had everywhere preceded paternal reckoning and that the tracing of descent through the mother was also accompanied by a general pre-eminence of women—a matriarchate. The favorite evolutionary theory in art was the derivation of geometrical designs from realistic ones through a process of gradual conventionalization. In religion, an illustration is provided by Spencer's derivation of religious worship and ceremonialism from fear, the belief in ghosts, and the cult of ancestors.

It is worth noting here that schemes of cultural evolution were but seldom worked out in detail. Here Spencer stands at the head of the list. It is true that Wundt also introduced a carefully argued scheme of evolutionary stages, particularly in religion, but his conception was much more complex than that of Spencer and provided for many alternatives. Other evolutionists, such as Frazer, Hartland, or Westermarck, were satisfied to build on the evolutionary conception as a general background, making only occasional specific applications of it in the course of the systematizing analysis of concrete data.

It is significant that the evolutionary conception of society was ushered in through the halls of prehistory, where there were relatively few accredited facts, many loopholes, and therefore ample space for speculative padding. It must never be forgotten that social evolution is a dynamic scheme of historically successive stages, while the paucity of historically demonstrable stages has always been and will probably remain the sorest spot in the concrete equipment of the student of prehistory.

It is therefore not surprising that the theory of social evolution should have been taken seriously by sociologists to whom history was but a field of application of relatively abstract principles. Historians, on the other hand, whose professional preoccupations had imbued them with a wholesome respect for concretely demonstrable historic successions, were but little impressed by the tenets of cultural evolutionism. Lamprecht might, perhaps, be classed as an evolutionist, but his "eras" are, after all, highly plastic conceptions, leaving room for a multiplicity of specific conditions.¹ Moreover, he never intended to make use of the "eras" as a universal scheme of evolution. Kurt Breysig in his *Die Geschichte der Menschheit* stands even closer to the classical evolutionist. But his major interest lies, again, not in evolution as such, but rather in the concept of historic law.²

But, withal, the lure of cultural evolution was manifold. The scheme was simple and definite. It gave promise of final solutions. It was, moreover, flattering to racial pride. At once picturesque

¹ See his *Die Moderne Geschichtswissenschaft*.

² Cf. also his later *Der Stufen-Bau und die Gesetze der Welt-Geschichte*.

and impressive in its garb of multicolored facts, it also proved a happy hunting ground for the exercise of the creative imagination.

But now we must turn our attention to a different group of students and to ideas of a strikingly contrasting caste.

THE DIFFUSIONISTS

Important components both of evolutionism and of diffusionism are already contained in the life-work of the philosopher-ethnographer, Bastian, and the geographer-anthropologist, Ratzel. While Bastian's teaching is known to posterity mainly through his insistence on the *Elementargedanken*, certain basic ideas and institutions common to all mankind, he was equally concerned about developing the supplementary concept of *Völkergedanken*. The latter, the folk ideas, represented the concrete cultural creations, built up on the basis of the elementary ideas in specific geographico-historical settings. The territorial homes of such cultures Bastian designated as geographical provinces. These provinces may be regarded as the prototypes of the culture areas of modern American ethnology. Bastian's handling of the concept of cultural diffusion, while verging toward mysticism, has also certain similarities with modern procedure.

For Ratzel, primarily a geographer, the subject of prime concern was the relation of civilization to its physical setting. In fact, he conceived of civilization as the culminating efflorescence of the geologico-geographical process. Later in life, when he faced the problem of diffusion versus independent development of cultural features, Ratzel's theoretical attitude was curiously inconsequential. With reference to the spiritual aspects of culture, in which he was less interested, such as religion, social organization, and, perhaps, art, he was willing to admit the feasibility of the independent development of similarities. In material culture, on the other hand, which was his special domain, he represented a non-compromising diffusionism, for in this way alone, he claimed, could investigation be directed toward the disclosing of further and further historical connections and of the geographical wanderings of cultural features. Ratzel also set concrete examples of studies of the dispersion of objects of material culture in such investiga-

tions as that of the distribution of African bows and a number of others of similar type.

All this left the theory of diffusion in a fairly vague condition.

The problems of diffusion were raised to greater clarity and precision in the works of E. B. Tylor. Even in his *Primitive Culture*, which in the main is oriented according to evolutionary perspectives, he frequently allows for the possibility of similarities in culture arising through historic contact in diffusion. It is true that he usually rejects such possibilities in favor of an interpretation through independent development. But in his *Researches into the Early History of Mankind* and in the *Anthropology*, he faces the problem of diffusion with an open mind. In certain instances, in fact, he adopts an interpretation through diffusion where the modern ethnologist would reject it, as for example, in the cases of the couvade and of the magical cure of disease by means of sucking.

The first real diffusionist of the modern pattern was F. Graebner. He not only succeeded in developing a theory and methodology of ethnology, but became the founder of a school represented by such men as Foy, Ankermann, and more recently, W. Schmidt, and others. Graebner's concrete investigations were ushered in by an essay on the culture of Oceania in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* for 1905, followed by a more detailed investigation of what he called The Melanesian Bow Culture (*Anthropos*, Vol. IV, 1909) and by many subsequent articles, while his theoretical principles are set down in his work *Die Methode der Ethnologie*.

Graebner rejects the evolutionary conception *in toto*.¹ Instead, he proposes to interpret most, if not all, cultural similarities through the historic contact of peoples, resulting in diffusion or borrowing, or through an ultimate common origin followed by dispersion. The purpose of ethnology thus becomes the reconstruction of old contacts and of the wanderings of things and ideas over the surface of the globe.

The analysis of cultural similarities opens the way for Graebner's theoretical system. In this analysis he is guided by two criteria, a qualitative one, referring to the shape or form of

¹ As his arguments are here almost identical with those of the critical school, they will be cited in the next section.

material objects or the structural and functional peculiarities of social systems or ideas; and a quantitative one, which refers to the number of such points of similarity between two cultures or cultural features. The next step in Graebner's reasoning is, perhaps, the most significant one for an understanding of his viewpoint: it is his attitude toward the geographical distance between two tribes or localities in which cultural similarities are discerned. He disregards the distance. If an analysis of similarities, teaches Graebner, has convinced one of their reality, the way is opened forthwith for an interpretation through diffusion. Whether the similarities in question are found in two neighboring tribes, or whether continents and oceans intervene, is of no importance—the interpretation made in one case must hold also for the other.

Operating on this basis, Graebner constructs his cultural waves and strata, using as units for his reconstruction, cultural features found in many tribes and often separated by vast distances.

While the islands of the South Seas and Australia are the areas to which Graebner has applied his theories in greatest detail, he has also extended his analysis to African cultures. Meanwhile, Father Schmidt, a recent convert of the "Culture Historical School," has undertaken an analysis of South American cultures in the spirit of Graebner's method. North America has, so far, been spared, excepting some relatively brief references in Graebner's *Anthropos* article, but it is to be expected that the civilizations of the North American Indians will also soon be categorized and stratified in truly Graebnerian fashion.

A diffusionist of a very different type is W. H. R. Rivers. Like most English anthropologists, Rivers, a psychologist by training, began his anthropological studies from the angle of an evolutionist. However, he soon became interested in specific problems, made some interesting psychological investigations under the auspices of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits, and successfully applied to the study of social organization the so-called genealogical method, for the introduction of which into ethnology Rivers is responsible. The first suggestions of Rivers' speculative tendencies may be found in his admirable monograph on the Todas, where he argues that the ethnologist is

free to operate with historical reconstructions, however speculative, if only the results tend to interpret coherently certain otherwise disconnected facts derived from ethnographic study. While engaged in his somewhat protracted researches in Melanesia, Rivers was greatly impressed with the cultural complexity of these islands. At the same time he became interested in the Graebnerian approach. After this, he rapidly developed into a dogmatic diffusionist. The postulates of his system are set down in three articles: "The Loss of Useful Arts,"¹ "The Sociological Significance of Myths,"² and "The Contact of Peoples."³ Rivers' system of interpretation is applied on a large scale in his work on *The History of Melanesian Society*, the second volume of which consists in an elaborately argued but purely speculative reconstruction of Melanesian cultures. Here the theory of diffusion of cultural features is used as general principle of interpretation, quite apart from the historical demonstrability of diffusion in particular instances.

Both the contrasts and the similarities between Graebner's and Rivers' modes of procedure are instructive. Unlike Graebner, Rivers is not concerned with the detailed analysis of similarities. Instead, he starts out with a set of principles which in themselves are thoroughly acceptable, such as the importance for cultural borrowing of the relative level of two civilizations, the possibility of a profound cultural influence exerted by a relatively small number of immigrants, the frequent loss of even useful arts under certain conditions, and so on. Having established these principles, Rivers operates with them in highly speculative fashion in his attempt to reconstruct the past background of present cultural situations. In the case of Graebner, on the other hand, the main speculative element lies in his basic assumption of interpretation at a distance. With this principle assured, he then proceeds with the accumulation of concrete material, with the innocent air of a purely descriptive ethnologist. Again, Rivers' method is more plastic and his reasoning more discriminating. He makes effective use of psychological factors, which are almost completely disregarded by Graeb-

¹ In an anniversary volume presented to E. Westermarck in 1912.

² *Folk-Lore*, XXIII (1912), 307 ff.

³ *Essays and Studies Presented to William Ridgeway*, 1913.

ner. The fundamental similarity of the two systems consists in the attitude of both authors toward diffusion, which they utilize as a general principle of interpretation, without subjecting the theory to the test of historic demonstrability or even probability in particular instances, or weighing it against the alternative interpretation through independent development.¹

CRITICAL ETHNOLOGY

While evolutionism was reaping the well-earned harvest of its pioneering efforts, and diffusionism was exposing the sins of evolutionism with one hand while committing similar ones with the other, significant changes were taking place in the field of ethnology. The ethnographic researches of the last two generations have resulted in a tremendous accumulation of first-class descriptive material. Ethnographic museums were established and filled with masses of specimens representing all ranges of primitive industry and art, ready to be examined with all the care and minuteness which their segregation now permitted. Young ethnographers, trained in the many methods of cultural study, cut deep into the native civilizations of Australia, Africa, and America.

As a result of this intensification of the methods of field study, primitive civilizations ceased to represent to the student chaotic conglomerates of curious customs and beliefs and began to appear to him in their historic complexity and the kaleidoscopic variety of their individual forms. He now cared less, for the time being at least, about the processes of the remote past and more for those picturesque as well as instructive transformations which were taking place before his very eyes in the primitive civilizations still available for study. Seeing culture at work could not but exercise a chastising influence on one's historic imagination, for the thought

¹ The sad spectacle of the deterioration of the theory of diffusion into a purely fantastic system of speculation is presented by the work of one of Rivers' followers, Professor Elliot Smith. His eminence as a physical anthropologist contrasts strangely with the wholly uncritical methods which he applies in his attempt to demonstrate certain cultural contracts, world-wide in their sweep. In the hands of Professor Smith, in fact, interpretation through diffusion, which in a sense is opposite to that through evolution, is reduced to a level in no way superior theoretically to that occupied by the older ideology, for in both cases the argument is supported by a voluminous but defective and critically undigested comparative material.

was obvious and irrepressible that what was happening now in living primitive society had to be accepted as a standard and guide in one's estimate of past probabilities.

Presently, the introduction of the statistical method made it possible to reduce to fairly measurable terms the study of even such evasive phenomena as myths, while the development of prehistoric philology opened up undreamed-of vistas into the realm of primitive psychology, in particular of those deeper layers of the unconscious psyche which express themselves in the categorizing of experience as represented in the forms of grammatical structure.

While this was going on, evolutionism was growing topheavy with its over-elaborated and imaginative structures, and its very foundations began to give way under the onslaught of the critical mind. Among students of anthropology, those of North America found themselves in an especially fortunate setting for carrying on the attack on evolution. They had the advantage of well-nigh inexhaustible stores of primitive data at the very doors of their universities. To gather a fresh glimpse of primitive reality it sufficed to take a brief vacation from one's academic duties and delve into prehistory among the Iroquois, Haida, Omaha, or Zuni. The rigor of scientific method, moreover, was forcibly ushered in through the labors and personality primarily of one man, Franz Boas, whose training in exact science, combined with a mercilessly critical mind, fitted him admirably for that muckraking work in the domain of anthropological vagaries, the results of which have at this time born their ripe fruit.

The prime postulate of evolution, the psychic unity of mankind, remained, it is true, unshaken. Not so the other postulates as to the significantly similar physical environment of all early civilizations. It was shown that each similarity could be countered by an equally impressive difference, also that physical environment could in no sense be regarded as a major determinant of the character or development of civilization.¹ It was also made clear that the

¹ See, for example, Wissler's "The Psychological Aspects of the Culture-Environment Relation" (*American Anthropologist*, Vol. XVI, 1914), "Aboriginal Maize Culture," etc. (*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXI, 1916), Goldenweiser's "Culture and Environment" (*ibid.*), and the chapter on "Culture and Physical Environment" in Lowie's *Culture and Ethnology*.

so-called laws of history were more conspicuous by their exceptions than by their regularities, that the paths followed by different civilizations, however parallel in certain respects, were marked by innumerable individual peculiarities, specific, complex, and unforeseeable.

In the domain of social organization, for example, it was shown that neither the hypothesis of promiscuity nor that of group marriage had any firm foundation in descriptive material, that no valid reasons could be advanced for the universal priority of clans to gentes, that the individual family, instead of being a late product of evolution, was omnipresent even in most primitive society, etc. Criticism was also at work over the evolutionary theories of industry, of art, of religion, with similarly devastating results.

The main target of the critical ethnologist became the favorite method of the classical school, the so-called comparative method. It could now be shown that the all too numerous facts canvassed by the evolutionist could in no sense be regarded as proofs of evolution, for the very possibility of substituting a cultural stage found, for example, in an Indian tribe, into a loophole left by a missing corresponding stage somewhere in Africa, was based on the assumption that the processes were throughout parallel. But parallelism was one of the major assumptions of evolution; hence, the comparative material, as organized by the evolutionists, could only be regarded as illustrative of evolution accepted as a postulate, not as proof of evolution.

A similar fate befell the theory of survivals, for the very designation of a cultural feature as a survival presupposes the assumption of a particular preceding stage, as a proof of which the survival was constituted by the evolutionist. But if doubt is thrown on the reality or identity of this preceding stage, then the first question to be asked is whether the so-called survival actually is one or of *what* it is the survival, or whether it does not represent an incipient stage of a development still to come rather than a survival of a past stage. This was accompanied by an ever decreasing interest in origins, particularly in first origins. If a step in cultural advance does no longer represent a principle, then the first step shares the fate of the others. Their particular individualities may still

preserve their charm, but they lose their significance as revealing facts of general bearing and of theoretical import. Thus reconstructive enthusiasm waned and was replaced by a less imaginative but more solid concentration on the facts, processes, and mechanisms still observable in prehistoric society.

While at one with the upholders of diffusion in their critical attitude toward the theories of evolution, the historically minded ethnologists turned against the diffusionist when they found him overstepping the bounds of critical method and developing a dogmatic system of interpretation not one jot superior to that of his conquered foe.

The ethnologist could not indorse Graebner's optimism with reference to the categorical validity of his criteria of cultural similarity, for it could be easily shown that the qualitative criterion is practically never applicable in a purely objective way, room being always left for subjectivity and point of view.¹ The quantitative criterion, on the other hand, was ultimately resolvable into units whose similarity could be estimated only qualitatively. This being so, Graebner's interpretation at a distance is revealed as theoretically inadmissible. By disregarding the geographical factor, he, *ipso facto*, disregards historical probabilities. Thus, the culture historical school is exposed as inherently unhistorical. The uncertainty in our estimation of similarities, carries with it as a corollary the ever present importance of the historico-geographical factors.

Against Graebner, also, it was urged that culture is not a mechanical but a psychological conglomerate, that the relations even of material objects lie in the psychological level and that a just estimate of cultural reality could never be reached by a purely objective enumeration of objects and features of culture in their co-existence and geographical distribution. What was true of one chronological level was equally applicable to succeeding stages in cultural transformation. The never ceasing operation of psy-

¹ See, for example, the critical discussions of Graebner by Lowie ("On the Principle of Convergence in Ethnology," *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, Vol. XXV, 1912), Boas ("A Review of Graebner's *Methode der Ethnologie*," *Science*, N.S., Vol. XXXIV, 1911), and Goldenweiser ("The Principle of Limited Possibilities," etc., *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, Vol. XXVI, 1913).

chological factors should never be disregarded when one deals with the persistence in time of cultural features. It was insisted, finally, that culture, contrary to Graebner's assumption, does not spread or diffuse as a unit, but that different aspects of culture have their own rates, mechanisms, and conditions of diffusion.

While indorsing Rivers in those particulars of his theory and method in which, by comparison with Graebner, he appeared more discriminating and cognizant of the psychological connotations of civilization, the ethnologist found himself in sharp opposition also to this representative of diffusionism. For Rivers' reckless application of the speculative method had to be condemned as opposed to all the tenets of sound historical reconstruction. It was a case of a curious misapplication of a method admirable in one domain to another to which it was radically unsuited. What could be done in theoretical physics, where the conceptual serviceability of a theory was the test of its validity, could not be done in a historical reconstruction, where the specific probability of a theory with reference to a particular historical setting was the only possible test.¹

The positive contributions of the critical school of ethnology are closely correlated with its achievements in the directions enumerated above. Among these first place must be assigned to the adoption of the so-called historical point of view. Of this, two special phases may be cited. On the one hand, primitive cultures are examined in the totality of their present interrelations, each tribe being considered both as a unit and in its relations to other tribes. On the other hand, cultural changes which are to be interpreted historically are referred to cultural antecedents, not to racial, environmental, or general psychological ones.

The historical point of view is correlated with and supplemented by the psychological standpoint. By this is meant that not behavior alone, but the psychological setting of behavior is examined. Note is also taken of what people think of themselves and of their own ideas and customs—these are the so-called rationaliza-

¹ Cf. here my review of Rivers' "History of Melanesian Society" (*Science*, Vol. XLV, 1918), also "A New Approach to History" (a review of Teggart's *Processes of History*, in *American Anthropologist*, Vol. XXII, 1920).

tions. Again, it is realized that the interrelations of cultural features always lie in the psychological level. Primitive cultures, finally, are expressed and appraised in their own terms. In this also the historico-psychological standpoint contrasts with the evolutionary one, in which primitive civilizations are envisaged as stepping-stones to higher civilizations or *the* civilization, namely, our own.¹

An important conceptual and methodological contribution of the critical school, the bearing of which lies as much in the future as in the present, is the culture-area concept. The continent of North America is divided by the modern ethnologists into a small number of geographical areas, the differentia of which consist, on the one hand, in the presence or prevalence of certain cultural features, on the other, in the special types of interrelation of such features. The presence of such culture areas does not, however, mitigate against the relatively free distribution of cultural features over the continent. Thus, individual features are seen to behave in their distribution as if they were independent and non-related to other features, while forming relatively permanent associations with such features, in special culture areas. The rationale of this apparently contradictory situation consists in that the tracing of the distribution of individual features is a wholly objective statistical enterprise, whereas the culture-area concept is both objective and psychological. The application of the culture-area concept throws much light on the problems of independent development and diffusion, for new cultural features or variants of old ones are constantly seen arising within such areas, while other features are being diffused across the boundaries of culture areas to other tribes and cultures.

It has been stated that the task in ethnology of the culture-area concept is by no means accomplished, for the theoretical generality of this concept leads one to reject its applicability to North America alone. Approximations to culture areas have, in

¹ See Boas' *Mind of Primitive Man*; the chapter on "Culture and Psychology" in Lowie's *Culture and Ethnology*; and Goldenweiser's "Principle of Limited Possibilities," etc. (*Journal of American Folk-Lore*, XXVI [1913], 282 ff.), and "History, Psychology and Culture," etc. (*Journal of Philosophy*, XV [1918], 8 ff.).

fact, been worked out in Africa. Modern civilization, again, presents an identical phenomenon in its geographico-historical differentiation of national or local cultures. It is thus to be expected that other regions of the primitive world will, with deeper knowledge, also present aspects which the student will succeed in subsuming under the culture-area concept.

RECENT TENDENCIES AND FUTURE OUTLOOK

It must not be imagined that the critical school represents the last word in the advance of anthropological thought. It has, on the contrary, conspicuous limitations. One of these is the almost total absence of synthesis among its contributions. Synthesis always involves stepping beyond or rising above the facts. It thus requires not merely knowledge and insight, but also courage and constructive imagination. Absorbed in his work of critical analysis and specific concrete investigation, the critical ethnologist has developed a certain timidity in dealing with ideas, a fact regrettable in itself and which has greatly reduced the serviceability of ethnology for the other social sciences.¹

Another weakness of the critical ethnologist is his exaggerated skepticism in the face of hypotheses. It must, after all, be remembered that criticism and method are useful in proportion to the presence of constructive ideas to work upon; in the absence of these, method and criticism are doomed to sterility.

Related to the last point is the relative neglect of the developmental aspect of culture. It is clear enough that the rejection of the evolutionary theory as a specific formulation of the developmental process does not imply that there is no development in civilization. It is, in fact, apparent that the very opposite is the case. And, if so, the ethnologist is called upon to continue the task of the interpretative historian below the level of written records into the indefinitely chronologized phases of prehistory. There he will no doubt find less regularity and a greater number of

¹ In most recent years, however, a number of works have appeared which foreshadow the recrudescence of the synthetic spirit. Cf., for example, Wissler's *The American Indian* and Lowie's *Primitive Society*, a book synthetic in form if not in content.

missing links than might be wished for, but the task will not be denied. Certain steps in the direction here indicated are now being made in various quarters. One group of such attempts may be classed as neo-evolutionism.

The universality, the regularity, the gradual character of the evolutionary process, may be rejected. Is there anything that remains of evolution? Yes, if one's aim is less pretentious, if decennia are substituted for centuries and millenia, and if, instead of the whole of civilization or of one broad aspect of it, single cultural features or a few interrelated ones are taken as the point of departure, evolution can still hold its own. There is no longer inevitableness or fixed law, but certain principles or trends of development may well be discerned. In the development of mathematics or philosophy, in the growth of mechanical concepts and inventions, in the division of society into classes or groups of specialized labor, certain fairly regular trends are discernible which stand out amidst the complexities of the historic process and justify a certain degree of foresight and prophecy. These processes may not be in the narrower sense historical, in so far as they do not comprise the historic process in all its complexity, but they are trends, fairly definite lines of development which stiffen the historic process, as it were, and hold it to certain fairly plastic frames or limits.¹

As one of the phases in the rehabilitation of evolution must be classed the concept of convergence, which takes cognizance of the fact that the development of similarities in cultural features once dissimilar or less similar, can often be observed. Thus, convergence is revealed as a developmental process which must be introduced in place of the older idea of parallelism or, at times, as supplementary to it. As a modern illustration may be cited the development of pragmatism or of behaviorism from various sources and in different fields.²

While it was shown that origins and first origins no longer constitute part of the anthropologist's task, a different type of

¹ For further elaboration of this point compare my article on "History, Psychology and Culture," etc., referred to before, particularly section VII, "The Deterministic Historical Category."

² See, in this connection, the above-mentioned articles by Lowie on "Convergence," etc., by Boas on "Graebner," etc., and my "Limitations of Possibilities," etc.

reconstruction of origins or early developments is coming to the fore. Such origins are not posited as specific historic happenings placed at the inception of an evolutionary series and fit to explain its nature. No, they are avowedly speculative constructs, based on the knowledge of the present and of the more recent past and projected into remote antiquity in the form of generalized settings, providing room for a considerable variety of specific origins.¹

With neo-evolutionism, convergence and the rehabilitation of origins, there goes a partial recrudescence of the comparative method. Now that the heat of muckraking enthusiasm has cooled, the critical ethnologist begins to realize that the perspective provided by a comparative command of material constitutes an essential adjunct of the intensive study of specific cultures and areas and that as a guide and check in all interpretative attempts, the comparative outlook cannot be dispensed with. In view of the brilliant results brought by the comparative method in such sciences as, say, anatomy or philology, it would indeed be curious if in social science it should prove inapplicable. The trouble with the comparative method of the evolutionist lay in the uncritical acceptance of material and in the utilization of static units to bolster up a dynamic conception. When buttressed with critical safeguards and applied to purposes which it is fit to serve, the comparative method emerges as one of the most valuable tools of historic and prehistoric research.

Another heuristic concept which seems to hold promise for the future is what may be designated as the idea of relativity in the social sciences. It may be shown that such concepts as accident and determinism in history or the relation of the individual to society or civilization, or even the much-abused concept of progress receive new meaning and can be profitably applied in historic study and interpretation, if the data to which they are applied are limited and definitely circumscribed and the point of view from which they are to be envisaged is clearly defined. Thus shorn of their metaphysical connotations, these concepts, once so sorely

¹ For attempts in this direction, see my "Origin of Totemism" (*American Anthropologist*, Vol. XIV, 1912) and "Form and Content in Totemism" (*ibid.*, Vol. XX, 1918), Boas' "Origin of Totemism" (*ibid.*, Vol. XVIII, 1916), Lowie's "Family and Sib" (*ibid.*, Vol. XIX, 1919), etc.

overworked, then rejected as empty, artificial, or overabstract, may once more be applied to enhance the systematization and comprehension of social phenomena.¹

Among the attempts to interpret civilization psychologically, the recent contributions of psychoanalysis deserve a word of warning and commendation. Some of the concepts utilized by psychoanalysis, in this connection, must be categorically rejected, such as the racial unconscious, the recapitulation of racial developments in the lives of individuals, the overzealous identification of the contents of dreams and myth, etc. But, when a psychologist like Freud attempts to interpret magic, taboo, or incest at the hand of a deepened psychological insight and a more definite method, he may still err in particular interpretations, but theoretically his attempts are to be welcomed. It can no longer be doubted that psychoanalysis has stiffened the fiber of psychological method and theory and has opened new avenues of approach to heretofore hidden or merely suspected psychic forces. Of course, the serviceability of these interpretations, as of all attempts to reduce cultural phenomena to the terms of an individual psychology, are useful and permissible in proportion to the generality of the phenomena to be explained. If, on the contrary, the cultural feature analyzed is sporadic in its occurrence, psychological interpretation tends to become speculative and the usefulness of its application in individual instances is reduced by the inevitable intrusion of powerful cultural determinants.²

¹ For a somewhat detailed exposition of this standpoint, see my article on "History, Psychology and Culture," etc.

² Interesting ideas on this and correlated topics will be found in the following essays: Hocart, "Ethnology and Psychology" (*Folk-Lore*, Vol. LXXV, 1915); "Psychology and Sociology" (*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXI, 1915); Wissler, "Psychological and Historical Interpretations for Culture" (*Science*, Vol. XLIII, 1916); Rivers, "Sociology and Psychology" (*Sociological Review*, Vol. IX, 1916); Haeberlin, "Theoretical Foundations of Wundt's Folk Psychology" (*Psychological Review*, Vol. XXIII, 1916); Kroeber, "The Superorganic" (*American Anthropologist*, Vol. XIX, 1917); see also discussions by Sapir (*ibid.*, pp. 441-47) and Goldenweiser (*ibid.*, pp. 447-49), "The Possibility of a Social Psychology" (*American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXIII, 1918) and "The Eighteen Professions" (*American Anthropologist*, Vol. XIX, 1917); Haeberlin, "Anti-Professions" (*ibid.*); and my "History, Psychology and Culture," etc. Cf. also discussions of this essay by Charles A. Ellwood (*Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XV, 1918), F. J. Teggart (*ibid.*) and H. D. Sheldon (*ibid.*).

If the curtain upon the future may be lifted for a moment, the desirable as well as the probable outlook for ethnological study seems to lie somewhat as follows. What we want is more synthesis, deeper psychological penetration of material at the hand of linguistic method and psychoanalytic interpretation and further extension of a more critical and relativistic standpoint in historic study. To the historian, ethnology will bring an increasing number of samples of unique civilizations, those of localized primitive groups. To the sociologist, it offers valuable illustrations of a society built on folk-psychological patterns, in which general principles of social interaction and development remain relatively unmarred by the excessive complexity and the rampant individualism of modern civilization. The economist may find in ethnological material a valuable counterpoise to that narrowness of outlook and one-sidedness of interpretation which almost inevitably result from his concentration on the modern world with its temporarily inflated economic determinants. For the curious lay reader, finally, the panorama of ethnology is rich with suggestions of the variety of man's achievement and of the fundamental psychic unity of mankind.

THE HISTORICAL METHOD IN THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

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ABSTRACT

The Historical Method in the Analysis of Social Phenomena.—The historical method varies in meaning according to the different problems of the various sciences. One meaning has great vitality where the problem is to differentiate and ascertain the cultural and the psychological factors present in all social phenomena. The first step is to determine the cultural factor which is done by the historical method. Only after the cultural factor is known can the psychological factor be understood. The inadequate exposition of the cultural factor is the great weakness of social evolution, biological sociology, and climatic and psychological explanations. *Culture and psychology.* The relationship between culture and psychology is quite complex; and although determining the psychological factor is the last rather than the first step, nevertheless a knowledge of psychology is of great importance and may indeed help in tracing the history. In modern social problems the historical method is as important as in ethnology, although in the former field it tends to become highly statistical and analytical.

The historical method and science.—There are of course many different kinds of methods used in sociology, as indicated in the terms deductive, inductive, objective, classificatory, descriptive, historical, experimental, analytical, statistical, etc., methods, of course, overlapping somewhat and more or less interrelated. The purpose of this paper is to discuss briefly only one of these methods, the historical. I shall not, in reviewing this method, be interested in presenting merely the formal relationships of the historical method to the different types of sociological problems nor to the various other scientific methods; but I shall be concerned in discussing this particular method, if not comprehensively, at least in those relationships where it has greatest vitality.

There are several different meanings to the word historical. In the branch of study known as *history*, we think of the historical method as the description of events by the use of documents, records, and authorities. In *anthropology*, the historical method means the collection and use of cultural facts to explain ethnological phenomena; and it is contrasted with the earlier speculative

methods on the one hand and with the psychological or racial explanations of cultural phenomena on the other. In *economics*, however the historical method is largely descriptive and is contrasted with the analytical. Thus the German historical school is interested in describing the historical development of economic institutions while the English classical economists are primarily concerned with analyzing the economic life into the different economic factors and their various interactions. In *sociology* historical is the term used to characterize the procedure of the historical sociologists, more particularly the method used in studying the history of society, the development of culture, and the evolution of social institutions. In all these fields, then, the historical method has one common element, namely, the collection of cultural facts leading up to the phenomena. In some cases getting the facts means written documents, in other cases it means digging in the soil. Sometimes the method is simply descriptive. In other cases considerable analysis is involved leading to inquiries into causes.

In the usual discussions of history and sociology, the central theme is the merits and possibilities of description on the one hand and law and cause on the other. History is frequently seen as a purely descriptive study while the mission of sociology is said to be the formulation of processes, causes, and laws. This controversy has been ably treated by many writers and it is not proposed to discuss here this important phase of the relationships. We are here primarily concerned with the historical method as it relates to the psychological explanations of social phenomena.

Causes versus historical description.—In that part of sociology that is concerned with the history of social institutions, there has been and is emphasis on recording historical facts. But the collecting of historical data soon led to an inquiry into causes. It is probable that this search for origins and causes was greatly stimulated by Darwin's success in finding the causes of the origins of species as contrasted with the purely descriptive work of earlier biologists. Whatever may have been the reason, the search for causes in sociology seemed to be more pressing or more highly appreciated than mere description and the collecting of facts.

Since frequently the facts and descriptions did not exist, the inquiry into causes became at times speculation about causes.

Interpretations other than historical.—It so happened that explanations of social origins were not sought so much in history as in climate, race and human nature. There was particularly a tendency to account for culture and social institutions in terms of biology and psychology. So historical sociology yielded ground to biological sociology and psychological sociology. The following illustrations are instances of these types of explanations. Climate is said to explain certain differences between the cultures of the Eskimo and of the Pueblo Indians. Buckle tried to show the influence of the aspects of nature upon religion and art. Teggart, following the lead of others, traced the origin of the state in the migrations to the terminals of the river valleys. Race as a cause of culture is as far removed from the historical method as climatic interpretations, as we see in the racial theories from Gobineau to Madison Grant. The Greek culture is due to the genius of the Greek people and the negro culture is low because of the inferiority of the African race. An illustration of the psychological interpretation is Herbert Spencer's theory of the origin of religion, which he attributes to the experiences of early man with dream phenomena. Bachhofen, McLennan, and others seek the origin of the clan in the sex instinct. All these foregoing examples of the climatic, racial, and psychological causes of cultural changes are illustrations of interpretations other than historical.

The inadequacy of race and climate as explanations.—As time went on the collection of additional data by the historical method showed many of these racial, climatic, and psychological explanations to be fallacious. Thus researches of field workers have disproved the inevitable priority of the clan over the civil type of organization and the necessary precedence of the matrilineal form of tracing descent. Then followed a development of the critical attitude; and its continued application has resulted in a healthy skepticism of such explanation and a greater appreciation of the historical method. Climatic explanations have been pointed out by Goldenweiser to be quite generally an inadequate explanation of culture; and climate is shown to possess chiefly a limiting

value. Thus the culture on Manhattan Island has undergone the greatest changes within five hundred years. Climate could not account for such changes as the climate is substantially constant over this period. So similarly is race inadequate to account for culture. For instance, there have been great changes in culture in England in the past three hundred years but there could not have been any significant racial change in that time. And in Europe at the present time there are wide divergences in cultural status within areas occupied by the same racial stocks. Culture varies with race constant. Such cases illustrate the inadequacy of race and climate as explanations and suggest the importance of history and culture.

A methodological principle—The value of the historical method is seen most frequently and appears most convincingly in contrast to psychological analyses. The relationships of these two factors have been the theme of discussion in several very able papers, by Kroeber,¹ Lowie,² Goldenweiser,³ Wissler,⁴ Rivers,⁵ Haeberlin,⁶ Ellwood,⁷ Hocart.⁸

There are undoubtedly many intricate and complicated relationships between psychology and history. But it seems to me that one conclusion can be drawn that is of the utmost significance and the greatest vitality, despite the fact that the formulation of it seems very simple. This conclusion, which is a methodological rule of guidance, is the principal idea of this paper. It is

¹ A. L. Kroeber, "The Superorganic," *American Anthropologist*, XIX, 163-213; "The Eighteen Professions," *American Anthropologist*, XIX, 283-89; "The Possibility of a Social Psychology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXIII, 633-51.

² Robert H. Lowie, "Psychology and Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI, 217-29; *Culture and Ethnology*.

³ A. A. Goldenweiser, "History, Psychology, and Culture," *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method*, Vol. XV, Nos. 21, 22; "The Superorganic; a Rejoinder," *American Anthropologist*, XIX, 447-49.

⁴ Clark Wissler, "Psychological and Historical Interpretations for Culture," *Science*, XLIII, 193-201.

⁵ W. H. R. Rivers, "Sociology and Psychology," *Sociological Review*, IX, 1-13.

⁶ H. K. Haeberlin, "The Anti-Professions," *American Anthropologist*, XIX, 756-59.

⁷ Charles A. Ellwood, "Theories of Cultural Evolution," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXIII, 779-801.

⁸ Hocart, "Ethnology and Psychology," *Folk Lore*, LXXV, 115-38.

as follows: In segregating and measuring the two factors, the cultural and the psychological, that are present in all social phenomena, the first step is to determine the cultural factor, which is commonly done by the historical method. The psychological factor can only be seen clearly after the cultural factor is known and the historical setting is understood. If the attempt is made to determine the psychological factor before the cultural factor is known, the probability of error is generally so great as to make it untrustworthy.

The value of the historical method in ascertaining the psychological factors.—The point is very clearly shown in the article by Rivers, previously referred to. Westermarck in discussing the institution of blood feud, common among primitive peoples, had attributed it to the motive of revenge. This was a psychological explanation. Rivers, who had done a great deal of field work in Melanesia where the blood feud exists, showed as a result of careful historical work that in many parts of the world and particularly in Melanesia, the blood feud is not accompanied at all by the motive and feeling of revenge. In some cases the practice was largely ceremonial and in others the motives were essentially religious. Whatever the psychological element in a particular instance may have been, the point is, that it could only be revealed after the historical method has shown the cultural factors.

Psychology and history in mother-in-law avoidance.—The mistake of trying to explain a social phenomenon psychologically before a historical account is given is shown by Lowie¹ in discussing Freud's² psychological explanation of mother-in-law and son-in-law avoidance rules, a custom widely spread among primitive cultures. Freud's explanation is partly on the basis of conflicts in the proprietary interests in the woman on the part of mother and of husband, and also partly on the *Oedipus complex* motive of the husband and the motive of identification of the mother with the daughter. But Lowie claims this psychological explanation to be inadequate and erroneous, for the reason that in two groups living side by side, the mother-in-law avoidance will be a custom with one group and

¹ R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, pp. 84-97.

² S. Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, pp. 19-29.

not with the other. Such is the case, for instance, with the Hopi and the Navaho. The Navaho man avoids his mother-in-law but the Hopi man does not. On what grounds can we credit one set of psychological motives to the Hopi and a different set to the Navaho? We do not know what causes these peculiar rules, but the actual historical investigations in ethnology show that Freud's psychological explanation is, at least, inadequate.

The foregoing illustration of parent-in-law avoidance introduces some interesting points regarding the relations of the cultural and the psychological factors in social phenomena. Lowie's test is a very severe one and needs some examination, for, at first glance, it would seem that the psychological factor cannot help to explain social phenomena except in a relatively small number of instances. His test is that unless the social phenomenon is found in all cultures, it cannot be psychologically determined, for aside from race differences we cannot assume that the peoples with one culture possess one set of psychological factors and that peoples with another culture possess a different set. Only a few such universal social phenomena are found in all cultures, such as marriage, the family, leadership, co-operation, etc. These phenomena are surely psychologically determined because people could not live without them in any culture. But because the foregoing is true we are not justified in saying that, in other social phenomena less universal, psychological influences are not causative factors. Indeed there are two factors, the cultural and the psychological, in all social phenomena, as illustrated by the relationship $x+y=z$ (assuming the proper constants and the relationship to be linear). Now if no matter how we vary x , the culture, we always get some z representing the family, then the family is psychologically determined.

Let us consider, however, another relationship. Suppose that whenever we have a culture with matri-local residence we always have mother-in-law avoidance and that whenever we have a culture without matri-local residence we do not find mother-in-law avoidance, then we may say that rules of residence determine the avoidance rules, that is, the social phenomenon is culturally determined. With a variation in x we find always a variation in z . But it must not be forgotten that this is also a psychological cause;

y is still in the equation. Freud's *Oedipus complex* and identification may still be the psychological factor that is a cause of mother-in-law avoidance, which may not be effective except in matri-local residence.

It is important to know, say, that out of many cultural situations only a particular one, matri-local residence, will occasion these avoidance rules. Such information may indeed satisfy the interest of the culture historian. But such a fact, important though it is, may not satisfy the sociologist or the psychologist. It is an incomplete account because it does not tell us about the psychological factor, y , in the equation. It should be remembered that not only is the cultural situation, x , a variable, but the psychological factor, y , is also a variable. Lowie seems to imply that there is only one type of variability in the psychological factor, y , that interests us, namely, the variability by groups. If this variation from one group to another were the only variability of the psychological factor, then we would be right in assuming it a constant except for possible racial differences. But the psychological factor varies in two other regards. It varies by individuals within the group, as, for instance, from mental defect to genius. This type of variation does not apply in the case of mother-in-law avoidance; but it is a very important type of variability in modern social problems. Also the psychological factor varies within a particular individual (and hence in groups of individuals). For instance, each individual possesses a great variety of psychological mechanisms. His psychological equipment consists of many different reflexes, instincts, capacities, etc. And it is interesting to the sociologist, for instance, to know what part of the psychological equipment is a factor in such a strange custom, say, as *couvade*, just as it is important for the sociologist to know what are the motives involved in crime. So we are interested in knowing what particular psychological factors, of the many possible ones, are active in producing parent-in-law avoidances. Is it the *Oedipus complex*, proprietorship, or the identification motive? It is important to point out again that the historical method resulting in a detailed description of the cultural situation would help greatly in ascertaining the particular psychological factors involved. This Freud has not done.

I have dwelt unusually long on the analysis of the avoidance problem, not of course because of the intrinsic importance of the problem itself, but because it seemed to be an illustrative type. The relationships between the cultural factors and the psychological factors in parent-in-law avoidance illustrate the relationships existing in general in problems involving psychology and the historical method. While both the cultural factor and the psychological factor are present in all social phenomena, there are some problems where we are probably much more interested in the historical factors than in the psychological; but there are also some problems where we are greatly interested in the psychological factors.

Our interest in culture is usually great where the psychological factor is least particularistic in its cultural expression. Anger may be expressed in many different ways, such as brawls, games, arguments, dueling, and war. To find the factor of anger in war may not impress us as so important as the discovery of the economic factor. So also with inventiveness, which is apparently not particularistic in its cultural expression. At one age, with steam engine and boat, inventive ability will produce the steamboat. At another age with different cultural elements the same inventiveness will produce, say, paper, gunpowder, or the wireless telegraph. The same inventive ability will not everywhere and at all times produce the same invention; the particular invention will be determined by the status of the existing culture at the time. So there are phenomena where our interest is largely in the historical; other illustrations are, for instance, the rise of capitalism, or the origin of constitutional government, or changes in the modern family.

But there are other problems where we have considerable curiosity in regard to the psychological factor. We may wish not only to know that exogamy had its origins in residence rules and property rights, but we may wish to know more about the psychological factors involved. Similarly, animism is perhaps a result of the cultural development of religion and science, but our understanding is also helped by knowing that the animistic world is the result of the operation of the psychological mechanism of projection.

We must conclude, therefore, that the cultural factor and the psychological factor are both important. Our interest may at one time lie more in ascertaining the cultural factor and at another time more in ascertaining the psychological factor. Our thesis is, however, that the historical method helps us to ascertain both factors. We can seldom be certain about the psychological factor until we know the cultural conditions and the history, and indeed unless we know them we are very likely to go wrong with our psychology. It thus comes about that the historical method is not only the correct procedure for determining the cultural factor but also for ascertaining the psychology of the phenomenon.

Psychology as an aid to the historical method.—Knowledge of the psychological factor, of course, depends also upon a knowledge of psychology. For if we did not know psychology we would not recognize the psychological factor when a historical analysis uncovered it. Thus, a cultural analysis of certain taboos regarding the dead might not reveal to us the true psychological factor unless we had knowledge regarding the ambivalence of the emotions. Indeed it is quite possible that a knowledge of psychology may help us to get the history of the phenomenon. The helpfulness of such a knowledge is certainly true in criminal procedure. A crime is committed and we wish to know who is guilty. In getting the facts and the history of the crime, every detective and criminal lawyer knows the value of motives as guides in the search for facts. But an acquaintance with historical sociology and anthropology led me to think that a great number of mistakes have been made through too much leaning on psychology and too little on history, and that a too facile use of speculative, popular psychologizing is dangerous. It is, apparently, easier to impute motives than to go through the hard work of getting facts.

The historical method and social evolution.—To what fields of sociology is the historical method most applicable? It has already been implied that the historical method is particularly useful where it is desirable to know both the cultural and the psychological factors. It seems to me to be especially valuable in the field of social evolution and in the explanation of the changes in social institutions and their development. Let us look briefly at

the study of social evolution. Most of the unsatisfactory early work on social evolution was defective because the attempt was made to determine causes of development before the facts of development were known. In other words the history was not known. Further pursuit of history naturally tends to remedy such defects.

Furthermore, most of the writers on social evolution seem to assume that culture has evolved because man has evolved, if not in bodily form certainly in mind, that is, mind in its biological aspects. This is a biological interpretation, not a historical interpretation, and it seems to me that biological facts to substantiate the theory are not yet positively known to exist. I do not consider it as proved that there has been any evolution of man or his mind since the last ice age. If this biological stability of man should be true, then we should have to abandon a biological interpretation of social evolution, and fall back on a historical explanation. It is indeed quite conceivable that if the cave men of the last ice age had had as much native mental ability as modern men, then the development of social institutions and the evolution of society would have gone forward very much as it has and no more rapidly. In other words, it is quite conceivable that social evolution can be explained on historical grounds alone. And certainly before accepting the biological account of social evolution, in lieu of lack of biological proof, I should want to know first the historical factors.

Such a position is justified by a consideration of the work done on the evolution of one social institution, namely, the family. Early writers on the family seemed to have assumed that a development from promiscuity through group marriage, the clan, exogamy and polygamy to monogamy, was due to an evolution in stability of the sex instinct. But later historical work shows that no such evolution has taken place. The development of the family need not imply a biological change in the nature of the sex instinct. Certainly the need in social evolution is more history and less biology.

The historical method and race.—Another proper field for the application of the historical method, it seems to me, is the prob-

lems of race and culture. To attribute cultural differences to race is a very common practice. From the point of view of methodology it is immensely difficult to get a technique which will show conclusively and in detail how race is responsible for cultural differences. It is very easy to say that race accounts for cultural differences (much easier than to work out the cultural facts); but to attribute these differences to race is not to prove the proposition. On the other hand, the historical method has frequently shown that differing cultures are due to cultural causes and not racial factors. The point may be illustrated by a consideration of French and American traits. The French are said to be thrifty while Americans are said to be extravagant and wasteful. These traits are sometimes explained as racial traits. It is, of course, very difficult to trace out the psychological mechanisms that made for thrift and extravagance and measure them, whether they be an instinct of accumulation, or self-display, or repression devices. On the other hand the historical factors are very convincing, particularly when we know that Americans and French are not widely differing racial types. The Americans have natural resources abundant in proportion to population and a high development of the industrial revolution, which the French have not. Both these two factors, natural resources and the factory system, lead to the rapid accumulation of much wealth. One would expect, I think, in such different cultural situations that the same people would in one case be thrifty and in another extravagant. In other words, history would seem to account for the phenomenon. Similarly, other problems of race and culture can best be approached by first seeking out the historical facts.

The historical method and modern social problems.—It is not necessary to give further illustrations to show that the historical method is peculiarly applicable to the history of society. To what extent, we may ask, is the historical method applicable to that field of sociology which we designate as modern social problems. There are certainly many social problems to which the historical method is applicable. As illustrative we choose the phenomenon of the I.W.W. The peculiar activities of the members of the Industrial Workers of the World, called sometimes I.W.W.-ism,

have been explained psychologically. Life for those casual laborers who became I.W.W., life without women, without children, without church, without community life, and without organized recreation, is said to lead to a repression of instincts that breaks out in unrest and turmoil so characteristic of the I.W.W. This may be true, but it certainly is not the whole story of the I.W.W. for the casual laborers had been living this sort of life for decades in the logging camps before the Industrial Workers of the World were ever heard of. Why did a psychological situation lead to the I.W.W. after 1905, the date of the origin of the I.W.W., but not before. Evidently some further historical factor must be known before the phenomenon is explained.

Or consider certain questions raised regarding the position of women in society. Are the differences between men and women biological or cultural? There certainly are biological differences but very probably many of the apparent differences are due to cultural factors. Thomas,¹ Coolidge,² and others have shown that some of these differences, for instance, are due to man's economic position as holder of the purse strings. Whatever the result may be, it seems the most fruitful procedure first to show historically the cultural factor.

There are, however, in our modern social problems a great many instances where the psychological factor is most important as a methodological guide. Crime is sometimes of this type. Some individuals commit crime because they are psycho-pathological. Their psycho-pathological condition is the cause of the crime, and the particular psychological condition can only be understood from a knowledge of abnormal psychology. In such cases, we have the cultural factor very nearly constant, and the variability lies in the psychological equipment of differing individuals. That is, a large number of individuals will live in the same cultural environment, say the slums, but of those living thus only a certain number will be criminals, and these may be at the lower end of the curve of distribution of psychological traits, which deviations we call psycho-pathological. It is true that in another environment they may

¹ W. I. Thomas, *Sex and Society*.

² Mary R. Coolidge, *Why Women Are So*.

not have become criminals, but it is also true that in the same environmental situation not all individuals become criminals, but certain psycho-pathological types.

So also with the phenomenon of radicalism, there are psychological factors as well as cultural. The cultural situation of the proletariat tends to produce radicals; but so, also, often does an inner mental conflict, even in individuals who are economically well off. But even in all these cases where the importance of the psychological factors is great we are largely aided in ascertaining the psychological factors by a prior determination of the cultural facts. Consider, for instance, strikes of the modern industrial world. What are the psychological factors that produce strikes? We surely cannot tell without history. Strikes may occur for a great variety of motives; but the particular motives of a particular strike can only be known from a history of the strike.

The historical method as related to the statistical and analytical methods.—In some social problems, the historical method is resolved into other techniques which it is convenient to call by different names, such as the statistical or the analytical. For instance, in studying the business cycle, the problem is not so much to determine whether it is psychologically or culturally determined, nor what the psychological or the cultural factor is; but the problem is to find which of several possible cultural factors are effective and the degrees of their effectiveness. For instance, is the business cycle due to fluctuations in the quantity of money and credit, to overproduction, to fluctuations of crops, or to climatic changes? Such inquiries become highly analytical and when refined become largely statistical. There are many such problems where we are not particularly concerned with the psychological factors, although of course they are present; but the real problem is to measure the relationships of several different cultural factors. Of course, a *history* of business cycles is of great help in tracing the particular economic factors; but history is of most value when it has become analytical and statistical. Thus the historical method tends to grow into statistics and analysis.

Conclusion.—In conclusion, then, the historical method is particularly fruitful in the study of the history of society and is

also valuable in the analysis of social phenomena when we are trying to ascertain the cultural, psychological, biological, and climatic factors. The historical method is usually not only the best first procedure in such analysis, but is a remarkable safeguard against mistakes in diagnosing for the other factors. The historical method, in its extreme simplification, means getting the cultural facts. But such undue simplification does injustice, for instance, to the method as it bears on the complicated relationships of sociology and psychology. The historical method has wide applicability not only to social evolution but to modern social problems. In the latter fields it tends strongly to develop into analytical and statistical methods, with the purpose of discovering causes and laws.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ENVIRONMENT AS A SOCIAL FACTOR

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ABSTRACT

The Significance of Environment as a Social Concept.—A thoroughly scientific theory of environmental influences could be developed only after the modern scientific theories of inheritance had rendered confusion of environmental and hereditary determination of conduct and disposition impossible and when an analysis of the psycho-social environment had been made possible by the development of social psychology. The influence of environmental factors falls into three fairly distinct periods of development of the individual, the preconceptual, the prenatal, and the postnatal. *Civilization and character products of environment.* The psycho-social environment exerts its influence primarily in the postnatal stage of development. This type of environmental influence makes itself felt directly through the sense perceptions and indirectly through the process of rational interpretation, and because of its volume and its extensive differentiation, it has come to correct and dominate the instinctive controls. Thus modern social life and personal character are the product primarily of the psycho-social environment. In this way civilization outgrows the dominance of instinct and sets up social norms of its own of an environmental origin.

Before the nineteenth century the inheritance and the environmental methods of the transmission of human and other animal characteristics were not carefully distinguished, even by the most effective thinkers. It is true that the term instinct, or its equivalent, was in use among the Greek philosophic writers, and we find it appearing intermittently in the writings of the metaphysicians and theologians of the Middle Ages. It is to be met with occasionally in Shakespeare's plays and in the philosophic treatises of the English and the continental writers before the nineteenth century, and especially in the books of the Scottish school of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. There is a chapter on instinct in one of the compilations of Goldsmith on natural history and another in Herder's masterpiece, and some of the French writers of the Enlightenment make frequent use of the term. The philosophers with a Calvinistic bent appear to have had an especial proclivity for the instinct interpretation of character, along with their more general doctrine of predestination. But the

conception of instinct, as a sort of mental aspect of the general doctrine of heredity, was vague and relatively undefined. Hume, for example, one of the more critical and concrete philosophers of the time, with a decided psychological interest, invokes the term, but he rarely gets down to the use of specific instincts. The conspicuous lack of the earlier ages is a critical definition of the term and a classification of instincts which would permit of constructive organization of character and the manipulation of the instincts for the ends of effective social organization and control.

Such concrete and functional thinking had to await the future development of biology. An adequate theory of heredity could not be produced before the appearance of the science of the cell. Following the work on the cell came the rapidly constructive thinking of Darwin in connection with the theory of pangenesis, the vastly richer hypotheses of Weismann and the transforming discoveries of the Mendelians. Hitherto heredity was conceived of merely as a method of transmitting accumulated traits, however these traits may have been obtained; and after the decay of the theological endowment theory and the metaphysical essence theory, so closely allied respectively with the doctrines of a special creator and the hypothesis of natural law, the more common assumption was that the traits came immediately or originally from the environment.

Various theories to account for the storing of these environmentally originated traits for future transmission were worked out. Lamarck's hypothesis now seems crude to us, but it was probably as penetrating as was possible without some detailed knowledge of the structure and functioning of the reproductive cells. Darwin's theory of pangenesis must be considered apart from his earlier gross environmental studies of evolution on the basis of geographic distribution, as an attempt to use the new knowledge of the cell as a basis for the explanation of the assumptions regarding transmission to which his general geographical studies had led him. It was the most complete attempt so far to account for the assumed storing in the reproductive cells of the environmental accumulations known as acquired characters. More recently the mnemonic theory and revisions of the Darwinian theory of pangenesis have

aimed at the same lines of explanation. But further developments in the understanding of the cell have led to the rejection of the doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characters and have substituted the theory of the essential continuity of the germ plasm enunciated by Weismann and the differentiation and specialization of inheritance according to definite ratios of occurrence set forth by Mendel and the Mendelians. Accordingly we cannot account for the environment's influence upon human character and social organization in this simple and direct manner. Any effective explanation must fall back either upon a theory of environmental domination of selection for inheritance on a Mendelian basis, or upon some adequate account of the direct effects of environment upon individual traits and social organization, which results are to be explained as transmitted socially rather than biologically.

It was to be expected that the earlier theories of the transmission of character traits would assume that this transmission was internal or hereditary rather than external or environmental. Such a doctrine found its theoretical justification in the old metaphysical doctrine of natural law, which accounted for things on the assumption of essences or essential principles dwelling within them. On the concrete practical side it had the weight of long observation back of it, the empirical experiences of the stock breeder and the agriculturist who had observed that like produces like. Since the days of the myths it had not been believed, except possibly among the unlearned who gathered their wisdom from the folk traditions, that transformations of type took place in the process of reproduction. What was observed to be true in certain definite processes of inheritance for the plants and lower animals was assumed by analogy to be true for man, even in his mental life and with respect to his moral and social qualities. Because these were observed to follow the principle of "like father, like son," it was assumed that such characteristics were inherited. When the actual mechanism of the process of inheritance was not known, such an assumption could not easily be disputed. The coming of Mendelism, however, has made necessary a far-reaching revision of the old traditions regarding the easy inheritance of all sorts of characteristics, especially of those which are dependent, on the one hand,

upon the external transmission of some ponderable body foreign to the chromosomes, such as a toxin, or hormone, or a bacillus or a bacterium, and, on the other hand, of those traits which are defined in terms of moral and social or other abstract values, instead of in terms of their concrete biological structural organization. With the elimination of these two large classes of traits from the possibility of inheritance under the Mendelian conception of heredity, inheritance as a biological and a psycho-social concept is greatly diminished and that of environment is of necessity correspondingly increased.

The theory of environmental controls in the transmission of traits has developed much more slowly than that of inheritance controls. This is particularly true of the large group of controls lying within the psycho-social environment. The chief reason for this is the greater degree of abstraction which is necessary to perceive the functioning of the environmental controls. The similarity of parent and offspring is easily perceived and since the attention in connection with the explanation of this similarity is directed primarily to the process of reproduction, and since inheritance itself is a concept derived at first empirically from the concept of reproduction, this similarity has been attributed universally to inheritance. But the day of the crude reproduction correlation concept of inheritance has passed, and not even a professor of biology in a reputable university can any longer define heredity as the degree of resemblance between parent and offspring.¹ Inherited traits are something more than those characteristics which come from parents; they are those traits which come from parents in certain ways, that is, through the chromosomes of their reproductive cells.

It has been difficult to concentrate upon the apparent process by which biological traits are produced in the organism by the environment because, frequently, nothing identical or closely similar to the resulting trait is to be found in the environment. Consequently the connection cannot be naïvely assumed, on the basis of likeness, as in the case of the older reproductive concept of inheritance. The connection in such cases can be discovered only by a process of analysis and synthesis, which is often highly

¹ Gamble, *Animal Life*, p. 230.

abstract, and is therefore, in its higher forms, dependent upon the development of the sciences, whose formulas and principles must be employed in the process of abstraction. A large part of the work of modern science, both in its development and in its applications, is concerned with the working out of mechanisms and hypotheses of mechanisms for the production of organic character by dissimilar environmental factors. A science of environmental transmission, therefore, had to await the development of abstract science in general. Even the old empirical theories of environmental influence tend toward the assumption of similarities, on the analogy of inheritance through reproduction, as witness the popular beliefs (once accepted by the learned) regarding pre-natal influence and the doctrine of signaturism in medical magic, as for instance the treatment of smallpox with an infusion of the scarred leaves of liverwort, and the slightly more abstract and sophisticated belief that the loftiness of mountains reproduces itself in a loftiness of the human spirit.

Much more difficult is it to discover environmental causation in the psycho-social environment when the apparently more obvious explanation of inheritance transmission is at hand. The external transmission of mental, moral, and social traits from parent to offspring is much more difficult to explain to the relatively uninformed in science than is the crude inheritance theory based on the simple reproduction concept. It is a much more abstract concept, the putative relationship is much less direct and much more detailed in content. But with the modern sciences of the cell and Mendelian inheritance and of psychology and sociology before us, both processes become highly abstracted and we can no longer make our choices between the two explanations on the easy basis of naïve probability, but we must choose the more difficult, and the more accurate, course of relative critical demonstrability. The demonstration of the environmental transmission and production of psycho-social traits is only now in process. It has lagged somewhat behind the development of the Mendelian theory of inheritance and is a necessary correlate to it; for the theory of environmental transmission must take care of what the Mendelian hypothesis cannot cover.

In a large sense the concept of environment is more inclusive than that of heredity, for after all it is the organization of the environment which selects the so-called successful variation or mutation for survival instead of extinction. Whatever may account for the change in the chromosome which gives rise to the new trait—and there is no reason to suppose that this producing condition or cause is not environmental, where it is not produced by fertilization—all traits that would survive must demonstrate their capacity to aid the containing organism in a successful adjustment to whatever environment exists for it. Heredity does not create its environment, although it helps to modify the future environment. In fact, whole races or species are eliminated in short order when cataclysmic changes occur in the environment, simply because the mechanism of inheritance cannot change rapidly enough to cause the type to conform to the new environmental demands. Consequently, heredity may be said to have developed in the service of the environment as a method of stabilizing the type of organisms to a certain mean adjustment to the environment, in order that it may not fluctuate to the point of self-extinction through radical and random responses to untypical phases of the environment, while at the same time it maintains such continuity of existence as to preserve past selected accretions of value to the type and retains sufficient flexibility through environmental selection of variations that the type will not perish because of divergence from the main line of environmental development. Thus the type is able to become much richer in content or complexity and specialization of function without undergoing extinction, because its life-history has been transferred from the individual exclusively, to the race. It is possible that it was because of such a situation and need that reproduction came to be mediated through the specialized reproductive cells rather than through fission or budding, thus giving a greater weight to the race life as against the individual's life-history in determining the character or capacity for adjustment of the offspring, while at the same time providing, through pairing and fertilization, for a greater degree of stable variability within the category of heredity than could be secured through fission. However that may be, heredity

cannot set environment aside; it can only stabilize its fluctuations, eliminate or repress the minor and short-time ones, and correlate them into longtime pressure processes, corresponding to the type history, while adjustments within the heredity are made to the fluctuating environment with such a degree of resistance as to preserve the functional continuity of the type without destroying its existence altogether from rigidity.

Recent biological, psychological, and sociological studies bearing on the question of environment have acquainted us with certain facts which can be summarized here only in the briefest manner. In those fields where the environmental controls are purely physical or biological, we must be especially brief. First, we may consider an example of the influence of the physical environment. "The French botanist Bonnier divided a common dandelion (*Taraxacum vulgare*), and grew one half in the lowlands and the other half in the mountains. While the former grew into a tall and slender plant, the half raised in the Alpine heights grew into a plant of very different appearance, with longer roots, much shorter stems, smaller and more hairy leaves, larger and brighter flowers. Each variety will produce its like in its own locality; but seeds of the Alpine plant will produce only the lowland form if sown there, and vice versa, the seeds of the lowland form will grow into the Alpine form in the mountains. Moreover, if either form be transplanted into the other region, it will soon grow into the variety characteristic of its new habitat."¹ If the variety of *Primula sinensis* with red flowers "be grown in a hothouse at a temperature of between 15 degrees and 20 degrees centegrade, it will yield white flowers. Brought back to a normal temperature it will again bring forth red flowers. Which modification appears depends on the stimulus."² The differential influence of feeding, a biological environmental control, upon the development of the organism can be equally strikingly illustrated. "The egg from which the queen [bee] is produced is the same as the other eggs, but the worker nurses, by feeding the larva only the highly nutritious bee-jelly, make it certain that the new bee shall become a

¹ E. S. Goodrich, *Evolution*, p. 36.

² *Ibid.*, p. 37.

queen instead of a worker."¹ It is claimed by some physiologists that the feeding of thyroid to animals during pregnancy will cause them to give birth to young with a very large thymus gland.² Whether this be true or not, it is a matter of observation that the mother's diet influences the development of the child. Of a similar influence upon offspring and upon the generating organisms themselves are the numerous toxins, drugs and narcotics, and hormones from the ductless glands, the supply of which depends so largely upon the character and regulation of the biological, or even physical, environmental controls. To be sure the inheritance factor is not absent from such developmental processes. It exists as the long-time correlation or standardization of environmental values referred to above. But the differential characteristics, those which give definition and character to these types in distinction from other types, are due to differential environments. Such differential characterization is as much as can be claimed for any set of factors. Both heredity and environment are always present in the shaping of every higher organism.

With respect to the psycho-social environmental controls, recent abstract analysis of social processes has uncovered much material illustrative of the working of these factors upon the individual character and the social organization. The whole subject of the physiology, the neurology, the psychology, and the sociology of habit formation is pertinent here. The analysis of the mechanics of suggestion imitation, rational imitation, and original rational adaptation, begun about half a century ago, and the newer data of the psychoanalysts and Freudians, have given us the external and much of the neuro-psychic mechanisms for the transmission of traits from one person to another and the development of consequent differential traits in any individual as the result of definite psycho-social environmental pressures. When we come to realize the significance of these factors for environmental control we shall attribute a new significance to the social psychology of the Tarde-Rossian type, the reputation of which has recently suffered somewhat from the biological preoccupation which has dominated even

¹ Jordan and Kellogg, *Animal Life*, p. 153.

² L. Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality*, p. 281.

the minds of the sociologists during the last ten or twenty years. These data have already been applied very successfully to practical ends in connection with education, politics, business, and literature. Advertising and propaganda have become largely phases of social psychology, as indeed has the writing of successful scenarios and novels. Extension work, political campaigns, the dissemination of culture and the encouragement of the fine arts can be carried on with a maximum of success and economy only when these factors are duly recognized and utilized. Special sciences, such as educational psychology, the psychology of advertising, the psychology of politics, are growing up around the principles of social psychology, which is itself fundamentally the science of social control through the organization and manipulation of the psycho-social environment.

Such, in the most general terms, being the significance of environment for the developmental process, we may now turn to a somewhat schematic analysis of the types and incidents of environmental influences, that is, to the mechanics of environmental transmission at the various stages of individual development. Obviously we shall not have occasion in this paper to offer an account of the mechanics of hereditary transmission.

For convenience, the individual developmental process may be divided into three stages, which we may call respectively the preconceptual, the prenatal, and the postnatal, corresponding specifically to (1) the history of the parent reproductive cells before the point of conception or fertilization, (2) the period of the development of the organism from the point of fertilization to the point of birth, approximately nine months later, and (3) the development and history of the organism from the point of birth to the point of dissolution or death, when it ceases to function as living organisms function. Until fairly recently whatever happened to the organism in either of the first two of these stages was attributed to inheritance and the developments in the third stage were assigned sometimes to inheritance and sometimes to environmental influence. Gradually, however, the reputed importance of environment in the third stage has increased at the expense of inheritance. We have also come to recognize that environmental pressures are

frequently exerted long before birth, in fact, in some instances, before conception, and inheritance is fixed, not all along the line from the point of conception to that of birth, but at one point only, that of the fertilization of the ovum by the sperm. Whatever the newly formed organism, which begins life as a single cell, receives from the parents through their fertilized reproductive cells by way of inheritance, is fixed and determined when the chromosomes of the one parent cell unite with those of the other parent cell. These inheritance determiners thus formed will control the inherited organization of the offspring's organism throughout the remainder of its life and will determine its development. But no new determination of character can come from inheritance channels, for the parent cells have acted once for all. All new and additional traits must come from the environment, either the prenatal or the postnatal, as modifications of the predisposed line of hereditary development; and these modifications are legion. They begin to occur immediately after fertilization and increase in volume and importance until anywhere from the twentieth to the fortieth year, or later, of postnatal life, for persons of normal intelligence, and for a shorter period for the feeble-minded, depending on the degree of their defect.

If we consider the sources from which these environmental forces or pressures arise we may designate them as three. First, the physical environment, such as objects which act upon the organism directly, producing traumatisms, modifications of structure, or displacements of the position of the organism as a whole, and also those forces which act in the main indirectly upon the organism, usually by conditioning its development and its functioning, including temperature, humidity, altitude, contour, soil and mineral resources, electrical condition of the atmosphere, and the like. Secondly are to be mentioned the factors of the biological environment, which are difficult to distinguish functionally from those of the physical environment, and which often operate in the two ways above described. In addition, they may operate much more intimately upon the organism, because they, in certain of their forms, constitute the food supply and thus operate directly and indirectly from within the organism as conditioners of its

development and functioning. Also, certain other forms of the biological environment enter the organism as guests and perform radical functions of transformation of either a normal or a pathological character. Thus the great host of germ diseases, not to stress the disorders caused by parasites or the beneficial functionings of certain bacilli, constitute no inconsiderable portion of man's biological environment, in this case operating within the organism itself. Furthermore, both the biological and the physical environments—and even the psycho-social environment, which we have not yet discussed—may set up certain functional and structural dispositions or slants of the organism, more or less permanent in character, which inevitably condition further biological functioning and, more important still, help to form its spiritual life, that is, the organism's functioning through mental, moral, and social adjustments, or the attitudinal and valuational adjustments which it makes to the outside world. Thus a personality may be rendered sensitive, irritable, egotistical, altruistic, self-depreciative, constant, or fickle, and a host of other things which may be fairly adequately expressed in the everyday language of men. Such relatively constant slants or dispositions of the organism, centering more often, perhaps, in the nervous system than in the gross physiological organization, may properly be regarded as a third type of biological environment, in this case residing wholly within the organism and affecting primarily, although not wholly, the personality as such.

Finally, we may mention the factors of the psycho-social environment, which condition the development and functioning of the organism, in addition to the two types of environmental factors mentioned above. The psycho-social environment consists of all those associated activities of men, in actual process or hypothecated in fiction or theory, which are apprehended in the consciousness or the subconsciousness of people and which are products of the psychical processes of the actors. Under this environmental category must be included, among other things, all the traditions of men coming down even from the most primitive times, the myths and folk tales, superstitions, the beliefs in religion and aesthetics, in morals and in the practical and political conduct

of life; the written creeds, the constitutions, statutory enactments, administrative rules and diplomatic formulae and interchanges; the daily newspaper, literature of all the manifold kinds and voluminous extent; the speeches of agitators and the partisan plea of the trusted representative of the sovereign people, the resolutions of committees of protest and the prayers of minorities and majorities to their governments, of the devout and the wicked to their divinities; the voice and aims of assemblies, of crowds and other temporary organizations, of publics, and of institutions. In fact, all the multitudinous sources of mental stimulation which in our civilization are available for the organization and the direction of thought, in particular the printed sources, which have so multiplied in recent times as to surpass by far in volume and influence all other sources put together, except daily talk and random interchange of opinions, and which constitute a vast magazine from which men extract their opinions, imbibe their attitudes and draw the data for their constructive thinking, in so far as they are trained for this process, go to make up the surpassing richness of the psychosocial environment.

This environment has become so rich and varied in content and so strategically powerful that it dominates and transforms the instinctive nature of man in the early years of his individual development. For the early savage, who possessed a comparatively insignificant psycho-social environment, instinct was very largely in the saddle. What meager technique, traditions, and beliefs had been handed down to him from the past by way of halting oral language held powerful sway over his imagination, but the volume of these was not sufficient to modify greatly the operation of his instinctive urges. But the history of men has been the story of the growth of institutions, with their rich content of tradition and customs, belief and ritual, suggestion and rational interpretation, which have now come to have an immense volume and which are clamped down upon the developing child from the cradle and mold him after their own images, for good or evil. The instinct is but the beginning of his mental life, and even this has been largely selected into a vestigial character by the social institution of post-natal care, so that it does not function even in the earliest infancy

unmodified by environmental pressures. The delayed instincts never are able to appear in their native simplicity and operate uncontrolled by the conventions and other social valuations and standardizations which take hold of and dominate the fields of social action in which they are to function. For example, the sexual instincts and the maternal instincts find socially evaluated and prescribed grooves ready made for them when they appear and here they must be kept, or the organism will pay the penalty of conflict or disorganization. The fields of activity in which they function socially—reproduction and child care—are now standardized and controlled, as far as the minds of rational and socialized individuals are concerned, long before these delayed instincts appear. In fact, the psycho-social environment embodies a great mass of tradition, public opinion, propaganda, and literature, scientific and other, prescribing how these activity complexes must function. Mere instincts cannot be permitted to overturn this laboriously, often carefully, built-up system of psycho-social environmental controls. Not even the purely vegetative instincts connected with food and respiration are permitted to retain their pristine simplicity, but are disturbed and modified or suppressed by modern cookery and the other arts and mutilations of life. The psycho-social environment masters us all; perhaps not as the philosopher would desire, but certainly in ways which tax the imagination of the ordinary man.

The results of this discussion of the sources of environmental pressures may be stated graphically in the following partial and incomplete classification.

- I. Subjective Environmental Factors (those operating from within the organism or from the parent organism in close contact, operating directly upon the individual)
 1. Impacts and traumatisms
 2. Drugs and Narcotics
 3. Germ infections
 4. Toxins
 5. Hormones and vitamins
- II. Objective Environmental Factors (those operating from sources outside the organism and in the main indirectly through the conditioning of the life processes, but sometimes directly)

6. Physico-geographic environment
 - 1) Contour and surface: (a) Rivers, (b) Seas, (c) Mountains, (d) Mountain passes, (e) Deserts, (f) Plains, (g) Plateaus, (h) Swamps, (i) Forests (j) Distance
 - 2) Altitude
 - 3) Light
 - 4) Temperature
 - 5) Humidity
 - 6) Electrical conditions
 - 7) Succession of seasons
 - 8) Inorganic resources: (a) Iron and other metals, (b) Coal and other fuel minerals, (c) Water, (d) Plant foods, especially nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus
7. Organic factors—fauna and flora
 - 1) Animals for food
 - 2) Animals for power
 - 3) Plants for food and healing
 - 4) Plants for clothing and shelter
 - 5) Parasites
 - 6) Germ life
8. Psycho-social Factors
 - 1) Psychic organizations
 - (a) Traditions, (b) Conventions, (c) Beliefs, (d) Creeds, (e) Dogmas, (f) Prayers and spells, (g) Folk superstitions, (h) Myths, (i) Theologies, (j) Cultural ideals, (k) Artistic and aesthetic principles, (l) Codes, (m) Constitutions, (n) Proverbs and folk wisdom, (o) Scientific hypotheses, (p) Scientific experimental data and laws, (q) Propaganda
 - 2) Social activity organizations: (a) Language, (b) Customs, (c) Rituals, (d) Institutions: (domestic, economic and industrial, religious, moral, aesthetic, political, legal, cultural, educational, military) (e) Business enterprises and corporations, (f) Cultural clubs and organizations, (g) Religious bodies and denominations, (h) Military organizations, (i) Political parties and clubs, (j) Administrative and executive organizations, (k) Educational activities and organizations, (l) Art organizations and activities, (m) Domestic activities, (n) Reform associations, (o) Criminal and vicious activities and organizations

It will be noted that the items or factors here enumerated are classified under two general headings, according as they are primarily subjectively placed and act in the main directly upon the organism and as they are objectively placed and act primarily and

for the most part indirectly upon the organism. This twofold division is not altogether mutually exclusive in its arrangement, for the classification is a two-dimensional one. It seeks to list the factors according to developmental traits as well as the types of environmental influence operating upon the organism in each of those stages. Thus, generally speaking, Part I is intended to cover the preconceptual and the prenatal stages, while Part II covers the postnatal stage of development. Even within each general group there is some slight overlapping of the terms of the classification, but this overlapping has been avoided in so far as was possible. No claim is made as to completeness of classification, although it is hoped that it approaches fairly well toward completeness of outline. Any one of the terms might be expanded into numerous subdivisions and in the subdivisions themselves a great many co-ordinate terms might be added. Its purpose is primarily to illustrate the range of the sources and the extent of the environmental influences of a definite sort which operate upon man and his institutions.

We may now take up a concrete application of this classification to the different stages of development, with a view to determining at least a rough approximation of the environmental factors at work upon the organism in each stage. For purposes of clearness we may profitably start with the pre-natal stage. The environmental factors which may be assumed to be at work in this stage are, in part at least, as follows:

I. General Physical

1. Impacts
2. Muscular strains
3. Traumatisms
4. Temperature
5. Nutritional elements

II. Special Physical

1. Poisons, such as lead, arsenic, strychnine, etc.
2. Drugs and narcotics, such as alcohol, morphine, etc.

III. Biological—of external origin

1. The acute infectious diseases, such as syphilis, tuberculosis, typhus, and typhoid

IV. Biological—from the mother

1. Toxins arising from: (a) Germ infections, (b) Drugs and narcotics. (c) Fatigue in extreme cases, (d) Undernutrition in extreme cases (e) Malnutrition in extreme cases, (f) Shock and strain in extreme cases
2. Effects from the above in shortening the period of gestation and bringing on premature labor.

V. Biological—from the mother

1. Normal or abnormal vital functioning of the mother
2. Hormones from the ductless glands
3. Vitamines from the bloodstream (possibly)

Under the first of these groups belong the various injuries done to the child while in utero. These may occur as the result of falls, attempts at abortion through the use of physical methods or drugs, or various accidents due to improper eating or drinking, excitement, shock or illness of the mother, where the cause is purely physical and does not fall under one of the other headings. Whether such poisons as arsenic, lead and other chemicals (second group), some of which may be taken into the mother's system from her contact with the industrial arts, act directly upon the child from the blood stream or indirectly through the abnormal stimulation of the mother's muscular system, glands, and secretions, they may have very marked effects upon the unborn child. Some pathologists deny that drugs may be carried from the mother to the child through the blood stream in such quantities as to produce an addiction in the nerve tissues of the child, while others cite cases of such supposed occurrence. In one such case the child is supposed to have been born with a morphine addiction taken over from its drug-using mother and was successfully treated for this addiction. If such effects are possible from drugs and narcotics, the way is opened up for the explanation, purely in terms of prenatal pressures, of what was formerly regarded, even among pathologists, as inherited alcoholism, tolerance for nicotine, etc., but which we now recognize, in the clearer light of the Mendelian theory, could not be such. In any case, the indirect effects of these poisons upon the child through the organism of the mother is sufficiently marked.

That a few of the germinal infections may penetrate from the mother to the relatively protected child is well enough known to

medical science and the social worker concerned with child welfare. The more conspicuous cases have brought this fact to the attention, although study of it has only begun in interest. The most dangerous of these germ infections, and the one most studied in its effect upon the unborn child, is syphilis, more than one-half of the stillbirths being currently attributed to this single cause. The child may be infected with such a disease, the infection run its course, and the child die before its birth; or it may reach the end of term, or it may be prematurely born, leaving the disease to run its course afterward. Even in the case of comparative recovery from a severe prenatal infection the delicate and incompletely developed tissues of the child, especially those of the nervous system, are likely to be permanently injured, with the result that the child is handicapped for life by some special organic weakness, mental defect, or glandular derangement which makes its organism unduly susceptible to attacks from disease germs, toxins, shock, or other depressive influences in the postnatal period of development. It is this third group of prenatal factors which is responsible for most of the degenerative influences upon the child in utero, unless possibly we should except the toxins arising from this and other sources. The effect of the other factors is primarily to shorten the term of embryonic growth with all the consequences for the postnatal development of the child which this involves.

Doubtless one of the most prolific sources or forms of prenatal pressures from the environment is that of the toxins generated in the mother's organism and transmitted to the child. Such toxins may arise from germ infections, from the operation of poisons, drugs and narcotics upon the mother's tissues, and possibly from excessive fatigue, undernutrition, malnutrition, and shock and strain. Such toxins have been produced experimentally in at least the cases of undernutrition and malnutrition, and it is very possible that they are produced under ordinary conditions of organic growth in certain cases. These toxins may operate directly upon the child's tissues, producing degenerative conditions, or they may operate in some indirect manner, such as by influencing the secretions of the ductless and other glands. I have attempted to arrange the sources of these toxins in something like the order of

their frequency and importance. Some of the more conservative physiologists and pathologists might even deny that some of the conditions placed toward the end of this list could produce toxins which would affect the child. The possibility of adverse effect upon the child from all of these sources included under Group IV is very great and constitutes a strong argument for the careful hygienic regimen to which thoughtful mothers subject themselves during pregnancy and especially for the protection of working women against the adverse effects of industrial occupation. The effect of the last four of these factors listed under Group IV is more frequently to bring on labor prematurely than to produce a pathological condition of the embryo's tissues or directly to disarrange the process of its development. So far we have spoken only of the pathological prenatal environmental effects. Another group of prenatal environmental influences, in the main normal and helpful to the development of the foetus, deserve mention. These are the hormones developed from the mother's ductless glands and the vitamins which may possibly be taken from her blood stream. In a general way, also, the normal functioning of the mother with respect to her digestion, circulation, glands, mental condition, emotional poise, and the like, constitutes at least an indirect if not a direct physiological environmental condition for the proper development of the child. This important group of environmental influences ordinarily escapes our attention because it is the more usual condition. It will be segregated into its several aspects and measured quantitatively only as science advances to a completer analysis of the physiology, psychology, and sociology of reproduction as they pertain to the maternal organism as a whole, rather than as they pertain merely to the processes of copulation, fertilization, embryonic development and parturition, on which processes it has been largely concentrated up to the present. Physiology has already discovered the hormones and the vitamins and has developed theories regarding their origin and functioning. Some beginnings have been made in the application of this knowledge to the study of the prenatal environmental controls of the child. An instance has already been mentioned in the case of the supposed influence of thyroid feeding to the mother upon the size of the

thymus gland in the child. Definite observations have shown enlargement of the thyroid in the child as a result of the maternal secretion. Also the relative enlargement of the foetal uterus and the occasional secretion of milk in the infant's breasts at the time of birth indicate that the maternal hormones under the stress of great activity have had their effect upon the glands and organs of the child. Is it not reasonable to suppose that, even though the foetus normally manufactures its own hormones, it is not unaffected by the general state of the maternal secretions and its development is somewhat conditioned thereby? As yet accurate methods of measuring such effects have not been worked out, nor has the subject itself been adequately studied. Also, we may suppose that without a proper supply of vitamins, which can come only through the nourishment supplied by the mother, the child cannot develop the proper neural and muscular tone and will be deficient in resistance to infections and incapable of making normal advances in growth. But at the present time this effect is impossible to demonstrate because of the lack of a method by which the actual operation of the vitamins upon the foetus can be detected and measured.

The factors affecting the unborn child, according to Professor Richard E. Scammon, of the University of Minnesota Medical School, may be classified and characterized as follows:

1. *Sex*.—This is the largest factor affecting weight and differential development.

2. *The activity of the mother during pregnancy*.—The greater the activity of the mother the less the weight of the child.

3. *The age of the mother*.—The older the mother the larger the child until the mother has attained the age of thirty-five.

4. *The number of previous pregnancies*.—The number of pregnancies increases the weight of the child until the third or fifth pregnancy, independently of the age of the mother.

5. *The germ infections, such as syphilis, tuberculosis, typhus, and possibly typhoid*.—These infections affect not only the weight of the child but also the normality of its development in other ways, as explained above.

6. *Race*.—The peoples of northwestern Europe are heaviest at birth, and the weight decreases the farther south and east, generally speaking.

7. *Social condition of the mother*.—This and the next two factors are deceptive. The real factor here is probably the greater activity of the mother, more mothers having to work at exhausting tasks the poorer their social condition.

8. *Illegitimacy*.—Illegitimate children are lighter than those born in wedlock. This factor, however, reduces to the younger age of the mother, the fact that the child is usually the first born, and the fact that the mother is ordinarily a working girl.

9. *The seasonal incidence*.—Although season is supposed to have a weight correlation, none was found in the study of 1,900 cases in Minneapolis by Professor Scammon and Miss Brinton.

10. *Length of period between pregnancies*.—It is possible, although it is not definitely confirmed, that the longer the period between pregnancies the heavier is the weight of the new born.

All of these factors except the first and the sixth, sex and race, are clearly environmental rather than hereditary. This classification, it will be noted, is of a general statistical character, stating results merely. It does not attempt to arrive at the physiological and other internal environmental conditions which produce the results listed under the several categories; such was roughly attempted in the preceding classification and analysis of prenatal environmental factors. However, it presents a striking argument for the importance of the environmental conditions of the prenatal development of the child. According to Professor Scammon these factors carry over in their effect on development for a longer or shorter time in the postnatal period.

The preconceptual environmental factors need retain us very briefly. Strictly speaking, the child does not exist before the point of conception, but the material out of which it is to be formed by the union of the two parental reproductive cells does exist and is subject to environmental influences. It must be remembered that the reproductive cell consists of two parts, the cytoplasm or outer part, and the nucleus or inner part, which carries the chromosomes. According to the Mendelians, whom we must

accept as authoritative at the present moment, the inheritance of the offspring is determined in the chromosomes which unite, after a process of division and elimination, and enter into the new one-celled organism which is the beginning of the child. But this new being does not start life with merely nucleus and chromosomes; it has body also, so to speak. That is, the new cell, being made up of both cytoplasm and nucleus, receives cytoplasm from both parent cells, although, because of the greater supply available, it receives more cytoplasm from the mother's cell. Whatever may have happened in an environmental way to this cytoplasm now becomes a part of the body endowment of the new individual. Whatever is thus transmitted from parent to offspring through the cytoplasm of the reproductive cell obviously is not inherited, for it is not carried in the chromosomes.

What environmental factors may operate between parent and offspring in this way? The most general answer would be that anything which can be transferred from the somatic to the reproductive cells through general and ordinary physiological processes may be thus transmitted to the child environmentally. It must not be forgotten that the reproductive cells, although they are self-generative through fission, must draw their nutriment from the somatic secretions and fluids; that is, they ingest the substance of somatic cells. They are also subject to the general temperature conditions of the somatic portions of the organism and they are to a certain extent subject to contact with wandering foreign bodies coming from the somatic organism. May we not safely say, therefore, that the parental reproductive cells may possibly be affected by nutritional elements, hormones, vitamins, temperature, occasional infecting germs, toxins generated within the parental organism, and possibly by drugs and poisons taken into the parent's organism from without? If we grant this conclusion it is obvious that the range of the environmental influence in the preconceptual period upon the future offspring is very considerable, although it is markedly less in the number of items and generally in the influence of each item than in the prenatal period of development, because of the more effective isolation of the reproductive cells.

The question may arise—I have met it frequently—as to how we can distinguish this imputed preconceptual environmental influence from heredity. May not, after all, so far as we know, these factors which are supposed to have been carried in the cytoplasm or in its environment have entered the nucleus and have affected the chromosome determiners and thus have produced a hereditary effect? There are tests for this supposition. In the first place, mere entrance of one of the factors into the nucleus, supposing that it could be transmitted from this point, would not render it hereditary. It would have to become an integral part of some chromosome to influence the heredity in the Mendelian sense. It is not likely that a disease germ or a toxin would be incorporated into a chromosome and thus reproduce itself continuously in future generations. Also it would be necessary for such a trait to reappear according to some definite ratio in future generations to be regarded as hereditary. More important still is the fact that the introduction of a disease germ into the nucleus would in all probability destroy the whole nuclear content and thus render reproduction from that cell impossible. The introduction of toxins in large quantities would probably have the same effect. But the toxins could scarcely reproduce themselves in the nucleus, even if they could be incorporated into the chromosomes without destroying the latter; for the supply would soon disappear and this source of inheritance of toxins would prove ineffectual. Finally, it must be remembered that for any such factors to be inherited they themselves, and not their products or results, would have to be transmitted through the chromosomes. If we admit, as seems possible, that some or all of these factors, especially the nutritional elements, temperature, toxins, and hormones, might, under some conditions, so influence the chromosomes as to change their nature and thus modify the inheritance, still it would not result that these factors would thereby come to be inherited. Only their effects would be inherited. For example, Professor Tower's experiments with potato beetles seem to show that the permanent mutations which he produced did not involve the transmission of the agent with which he produced them.

The major purpose of this tentative analysis of the environmental factors at work in the prenatal and the preconceptual

stages of development has been to show how large a range of traits appearing in the new-born child, which were formerly attributed to inheritance, must be explained in terms of environmental causation. The old notion, still popularly current, that inheritance covers everything received in the organism up to the point of birth, must go by the board, while room is made for the operation of environmental forces throughout the period of the development of the organism and even before that development begins as a new entity. A few of the traits which may now be attributed, in part at least, to these early environmental influences, which formerly were assigned exclusively to inheritance under the older theories, are feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, cretinism, and various other psychopathic and neuropathic conditions, rickets, syphilis (still called hereditary in many serious works by biologists and pathologists), malformations, including such characteristics as acephaly and the cyclopean eye, nervous lesions, digestive and nutritional derangements of early infancy and childhood, glandular derangements, the so-called diatheses, and the like.

Turning now from the prenatal and the preconceptual periods of development to the postnatal period, we find that all these factors are at work here also. But they operate in somewhat different ways, because the sources of infection and contact are no longer through the prenatal reproductive cells and the organism of the mother. In fact each of the categories of factors outlined under the discussion of prenatal environmental influences finds itself greatly expanded to include numerous other sources and types of influence and infection not here listed. For example, the number of germ diseases to which one is liable in the postnatal period is vastly multiplied. The same is true of the chances for toxic influence; for each organism, taking its own food and drink and coming in contact with various substances which may be taken into the body in a variety of ways, is able to manufacture toxins on a large scale. The liability to drug addictions and to poisons from without is also greatly increased. Impacts, muscular strains, the variety of nutritional modifications, temperature modifications, increase almost without limit. Likewise the self-acting organism manufactures its own hormones and the function-

ing of its ductless glands is conditioned largely by the strains imposed upon them from the organism's activities and the toxins and foreign bodies introduced into it. Vitamines are taken directly into the organism through its food supply, and the organism's general condition has a more direct effect upon the development of functional and structural traits. In addition to this increased operation of the same factors found in the two earlier periods of development, are many additional ones which act indirectly and often at long range, but nevertheless act very effectively. These we have classified generally as physico-geographic, climatic, organic, and psycho-social. We need not, at this point, expand these general rubrics into their subdivisions, nor is there space for an analysis of their effects upon individual character and social organization. Besides, this aspect of environment has been recognized in the more recent textbooks on sociology and is beginning to receive fairly adequate treatment there. The space given to it here must not be held to indicate its relative importance.

The most significant type of environmental factors operating upon man in the postnatal period of development is the psycho-social, consisting of all the psycho-physical contact and cultural content phenomena of modern society. The psycho-social environment operates with any degree of directness only in the post-natal period of development, because only here are the senses which can mediate it at the service of the child. This type of environment is not limited to the institutions, although they constitute the larger part of it; it embraces in addition all those less well-organized and less permanent forms of social organization and social value foci which influence human conduct and thinking. To name these institutional and non-institutional environmental controls in detail would require more space than this paper occupies. Nor is it necessary to name them, since they are generally familiar in outline to everyone interested in the structure of society. To describe their working in detail would, obviously, involve the writing of a treatise on social psychology. We may therefore content ourselves for present purposes with the omission of the same sort of semi-detailed analysis of the psycho-social environmental factors as was made of those environmental factors operating in the preconceptual

and the prenatal stages of development, and devote our time to an account of the methods by which the psycho-social environment can operate in the building up of individual attitudes and social traits.

Before the development of Mendelism, with its specific definition of inheritance traits and the reduction of them to unit characters, the concept of the instincts was for the most part relatively vague and writers on the subject had more to say about the working of "instinct" than about the operation of the specific "instincts." But the concrete turn given to the whole question of inheritance by the propagation of the Mendelian laws stimulated the psychologists to work out unit psychic characters on the analogy of unit anatomical characters, and there have appeared as a consequence numerous classifications of instincts within the last twenty years or less. One may get the full force of this contrast in the methods of attacking the problem of psychic inheritance by comparing Henry Rutgers Marshall's *Instinct and Reason*, published in 1895, with McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology*, or Thorndike's *Original Nature of Man*, published in 1908 and 1913 respectively. The attempt to reduce the concept of instinct to a concrete working basis was wholly praiseworthy, but the method of doing it was not very scientific, when viewed from the standpoint of a biological definition of instinct. Writers of the McDougall type, who still represent the prevailing method, made the mistake of defining instinct in terms of the functional value of the activity for society instead of in terms of its structure. Now any biologist would know that it is structure which is inherited. It is not possible to inherit a social or moral value, because it is not possible to inherit an abstraction. The result of the McDougall method of isolating instincts was to bring together the most dissimilar and constantly changing types of activities under one general heading and give them a common name because they possessed a common social or moral value. In this way groups of acts which had no internal structural unity were spoken of as unit characters, and the same act might be included in a number of activity complexes of different social values and functions and, therefore, be regarded as different instincts. The fact is that not instincts, but acquired habit com-

plexes, were being isolated, and even these were not constant in their structural organization, but only in their social value and functioning. Psychologists of the type of Thorndike have realized this and have attempted to break up the habit complexes named after their functional social values into the concrete structural original activity processes which constitute them and name them accordingly. This has been successful in part only, but the results so far have uncovered two facts of value to the social psychologist. One is to the effect that the preponderant portion of the great activity complexes, formerly misnamed instincts, are acquired elements received from the psycho-social environment, and the other fact is that the psycho-social environment is more powerful in forming the character and attitudes of the individual than is man's original inherited nature.¹ In primitive society and the early life of the infant, instinct may have been more powerful than habit, although this assumption may be questioned in the case of the infant of today, because another animal with well-developed habits of child-care—its mother—makes good its lack of instinctive adjustment to the life-processes. As pointed out above, the volume of environmental controls has now become so great that the instincts which remain complete in the heredity of the human child rarely have an opportunity to function unmodified in social situations, but are made to conform in a super-organized expression to social standards and values. This process of transformation of the instincts under environmental control has gone so far that the psychoanalysts have sounded a warning to the effect that dangerous conflicts between the original and the acquired nature of man have become manifest in modern life. However, it is likely that some of the most stressful conflicts exist between values set by opposing habit activity complexes.

The dominance of character formation by the psycho-social environment comes about in this way. The dynamic factors in human society, such as the increase of population and its consequent pressure upon the industrial arts, the growth of knowledge and technique, and the utilization of the natural resources and

¹ L. L. Bernard, "The Misuse of Instinct in the Social Sciences," *Psy. Rev.*, March, 1921.

inventive processes in general make necessary new adjustments in society. These new alignments call forth a new set of inventions, including institutional and other more temporary group organization, directed at first to the satisfaction of man's instinctive needs, but in the course of time becoming ends in themselves. Thus there arise, in the process of adjustment to the dynamic factors in society—which multiply so rapidly in modern civilization that the slow process of biological selection cannot produce new instincts to take care of the adjustments to these factors—at first a set of secondary wants or desires or interests, which are embodied in the institutional or other psycho-social content. In time these are overlaid and modified by further derived values or ends, until the instinctive element no longer dominates in them, and in many cases the socially imposed value is in contradiction to the suppressed or transformed instinctive one. In this way modern man has come to be largely an artificial, clothes-wearing, idea-imitating, convention-copying, even at times a thinking, animal who turns his instincts to the service of artificially conceived ends in an artificial, but much improved, society. The original ends set by his selected instinctive food and sex, fear and associational, needs and interests no longer dominate his life, but they become incidents to the main current of a competitive and co-operative socialized existence.

It is possible to impose these environmentally determined values upon man because, due to his higher brain organization, including the hundreds of millions of incompleated neurones with which he begins postnatal life and his consequent power of habit formation, he has learned to mediate abstractly his action in adjustment to the outside world, either by means of his own previous abstracted experience adjustments or, more frequently, by copying those already worked out and stored in the psycho-social environment, that is, in institutions, in funds of scientific knowledge, in literature, and the like. Thus civilized adult man is able to reverse the process of individual adjustment to a very considerable extent. Instead of always acting first and thinking afterward, as the child at first tends to do, he develops environmentally derived inhibitions upon action, as well as abstracted thinking symbols, which

enable him to work out abstractly a course of conduct (it may be done either consciously or subconsciously), often even in contradiction to his instinctive or more naïve habit impulses and to put it into overt action from within outward. Thus the cerebral neurones, directly and indirectly, have become the chief distributors of adult human action. Language, with its powers of abstract symbolization, has enabled man to transform the perceptions of the senses of sight and hearing—which in civilized society become adapted to types of environmental stimuli unknown to the instinctive nature of man—into activity values for which his instincts do not equip him. His mind, through the aid of artificially and environmentally organized sensory perceptions, and language, which represents compressed abstracted symbolizations of meaning, becomes a great abstracting and distributing apparatus for the transmission of the psycho-social environment. In this way the artificial or derived psycho-social environmental processes and values are able to transmit themselves largely intact.

In this respect psycho-social environmental transmission is perhaps as independent of the instinctive organization of man—although not wholly independent of it—as is the hereditary transmission of biological traits through the segregated reproductive cells independent of the somatic cells. The analogy is not complete, because each individual develops his power of abstraction originally from an inherited basis of neural response. But, as pointed out above, the abstracting power once developed with appropriate acquired symbols mediating the process, the seat of control of the neural adjustment or thinking process tends to be shifted, through revised and analytical perception processes, from the internal control of instinct and previously formed habit organization to newly apprehended psycho-social environmental control factors. The act now begins in the cerebral cortex and may be extended to muscular response, if conditions are favorable, or it may never get beyond the initial stage of neural cerebral organization. Where we have a succession of such incompleting activity processes, one neural adjustment running over into the other, without eventuating in overt muscular activity, we have what we call thinking, or a preliminary adjustment of the organism on the basis of intellectual

processes. These may take place either consciously or subconsciously, and thus the adjustment may be either consciously or subconsciously made. It may also remain permanently incompletd, as most of our thought adjustments do.

In this way most of the activities not of a reflex or purely habitual character are dominated by the psycho-social environment, and practically all of the content of our evaluational thinking—that which does not go over into immediate muscular response—is so dominated. Thus it is seen that the instincts do not control habit formations, except among primitive men and possibly the younger children. The older we grow, if at the same time we become wiser, that is, acquire more abstract symbolical thinking content, the farther away we get from instinctive domination and the more we come under the control of the values and processes of the psycho-social environment. For most men these values and processes are imposed without much reflection or abstract valuation on their part; they are merely copied. But the more thoughtful, the better-informed, types of men take them over reflectively, that is, they in some measure consciously transform their environment as well as adapt to it.

Such, in brief, is the method by which we obtain our higher habits or psycho-social environmentally controlled activities and attitudes and ideal values. The most important, the major, controls, in civilized society come in this way. We are just beginning to develop a science of environmental transmission comparable to that of biological transmission and to differentiate the two in our thinking, and rationally to plan and organize the environmental psycho-social ones. This is the chief, but not the only, task of social control. At a day when the more timid sociologists are almost ready to surrender to their aggressive competitors in biology we need to realize that our problem of environmental controls is at least as important and certainly as complicated and absorbingly interesting as that of the biologists. Furthermore, we should recognize that both the biologists and the sociologists work toward the same general end of social and racial betterment and should co-operate instead of compete.

ETHNOLOGICAL LIGHT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

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ABSTRACT

Ethnological Light on Psychological Problems.—Many important practical problems are at the same time important theoretically, which is both fortunate and unfortunate, for while interest is lent, prejudice is aroused. Sociology has at times wrongfully assumed that general psychology can determine in advance the nature of the persons who constitute groups. *Social origins*, which is the comparative study of ethnological material, offers an indispensable method in this field. The current psychological methods often err in abstracting the person and assuming as innate that which is social in origin and nature. This is in line with a very ancient and widespread tendency which identifies the natural with the familiar. Nature is often only the older and more venerable convention. Specific instincts which are so often assumed as innate cannot be identified as innate when the infinite variety of customs is studied. Ethnological material offers a neglected field for the study of psychology, for the human personality is created in a social situation and can be found only in some concrete set of social relations.

It is at once fortunate and unfortunate when the important practical problems are also the problems of greatest interest to the theorist. It is fortunate, for it gives a sense of reality and vitality to the work of the theorist which is a distinct advantage: it is unfortunate in so far as it tends to becloud the issue with prejudices and interests which even the scientist may vainly strive to escape. These prejudices and interests not only confuse the mind of the investigator, hindering his method and warping his conclusions, but condition the reception of his work by his critics and his public to the lasting detriment to the cause of truth.

There are many questions which are of concern to the social psychologist which fall within this category and which clearly show the effect of preconception and bias. I have in mind such questions as the relation of nature to nurture, the relation of original nature to the modifications effected by social experience, including the origin of the differences between the several racial and national groups. Of most emotional interest is the problem of the capacity and possibilities of the colored races, and the effects of miscegena-

tion. Less important but still within the list would come such questions as the nature of religion and of superstition, the differences between the sexes, the problem of the nature and number of the human instincts or whether there should be any such instincts assumed, the relation of the individual to the group, and such like.

The greater part of these questions are rightly regarded as psychological, and the sociologist usually assumes that their solution must come from individual psychology and that groups cannot be understood without the possession of these solutions from the laboratory. Now the ethnologist has a similar problem, and he has decided that he does not need to wait for the results of psychology. At least Lowie has so argued in his *Ethnology and Culture*. Of course the ethnologist is chiefly interested in setting forth the objective cultures and as his material is objective, his ideal is to form hypotheses without assumptions concerning the mental processes of the people whom he studies.

It is the object of this paper to call attention to the attitude toward social origins which the sociologist can take and which has been so much neglected. If we assume that personality is a group resultant, that human nature is inconceivable apart from language, then it is clear, since there is no such thing as a language in general, that personality will develop in a concrete local situation. If we assume that human nature cannot be conceived apart from wishes, and if we agree that ideals and life-organizations can only exist in a society, then the study of social origins ought to throw much light upon human nature. Each group develops its own type of leadership, and its own brand of human nature, and the study and comparison of widely separated groups is therefore one method of studying psychology.

The psychological methods are familiar, being matters of common knowledge. Introspection has never been wholly discredited, but its limitations have been increasingly recognized of late, for introspection is always memory, and memories, alas, are influenced by our wishes and greatly modified by them. And the wishes of the individual are always related to the wishes of the group, the purposes of the individual to the purposes of the group, so that

introspection reveals human nature as modified and fashioned in social life.

Experiments in laboratories have clarified many difficult questions, but the results have, on the whole, been of most value, when the problems have been most simple. Experiments on sensations have yielded the largest results, and in these cases it is not always easy to distinguish psychology from physiology.

A distinctly newer method is that of abnormal psychology. The recent and well-known attempts of Freud and others to apply the concepts used in their work with neurotic patients to normal psychology are not so helpful as was at first hoped. And when the writers go farther afield and explain social origins by psychological principles, it is no longer acceptable. The explanation of totem and taboo by Freud which enables him to explain the culture of African natives on the basis of the dreams of neurotic Austrian women is as simple and naïve as it is unsound. A recent explanation of this method recites the story of a Fuegian who related that the first man climbed down out of heaven on to earth by a grape-vine. The psychiatric ethnologist writes that this is frankly a sex myth, the inverted bowl of the sky being the uterus, and the grape-vine being the umbilical cord!

Still another type of genetic explanation has arisen from a study of the war neuroses of soldiers. Now soldiers who break down with so-called shell shock are for the most part suffering from fear. The abnormalities of sex observed among them are most apt to take the form of homosexual practices. And it was to be expected that the writers on these cases should attempt to apply the conclusion to social origins and the mind of primitive man. The influence of this can be seen in *Psycho-therapy* by Kempf.

All that needs to be pointed out in this connection is that psychiatric theories of primitive man assume a sort of recapitulation and vestigial reversion which does not stand the test of objective field investigation. Primitive man is not to be understood nor most clearly viewed from the consulting-room of the neurologist in our great cities.

Quite another method of studying human nature is that of animal psychology. Unfortunately, this is chiefly anecdotal in

character, and uncritical in the highest degree. It can hardly be called a method of explaining instinct. It is rather a custom. Most of the discussion of curiosity, constructiveness, fear, anger, and such like has leaned chiefly on the dog, the wolf, the ant, and the bee. An Englishman recently wrote a book on human instincts, the greater part of which is taken up with the opinion of former writers of books, but when one comes toward the middle of the volume upon the first discussion of an instinct, it is concerned with the wild ox of Demaraland.¹

None of these methods should be minimized. In their own field they stand independently and even outside it they sometimes suggest analogies and insights that are of great value, but they do not get to the real data of their problem. If we are to understand human nature, we must study human nature; and if we study human nature, we must not study some unreal and deceptive abstraction of it. Individual or differential psychology is a very fruitful field. But its data are partly social.

In one sense it is true that the views of human nature which we now hold to be erroneous have a common error. They all tend to identify the natural with the familiar. They failed to take account of the larger human group. Savages they did not have access to, and babies were not considered of sufficient importance. The philosopher who believed in God thought of his belief as natural. He who believed in a king held that the rule was by divine right and in accordance with the very nature of the universe. Those who opposed a doctrine did so from the belief that their own introspections were a revelation of nature itself. Descartes taught that ideas were inborn, and the inborn ideas of Descartes were those current in the Europe of his day. Locke taught that the mind was a blank and the slate wiped clean, but he made no study of children, nor did he have any real method of assembling facts.

The confusion of nature with the customary still exists as a heritage from the Greeks themselves. They indeed made a distinction between nature and convention, but the nature which they described seems to us to be merely an older convention. Aristotle taught that it was natural for a negro to be a slave, but

¹ Of course this does not refer to experimental animal psychology, which is not a study of human nature at all, but exists quite independently.

not for a Greek. In the stoic worship of nature, the wrongs and ills to which men were accustomed were inflicted on the sufferer by nature. Said Marcus Aurelius, "When you kiss your child, say to him, 'Perhaps you will be dead tomorrow.'" Mr. Strachey records of Doctor Arnold that when he lay in pain upon a couch he asked his son to go thank God for this pain which had been sent to him. Many who read this passage feel that somehow the poor are the naturally unfit. McDougall records in his book on *Is America Safe for Democracy?* that the negro race is very strong in the instinct of submission.

The point of all of this is that men have generalized broadly upon a fractional experience, in realizing the extent to which plastic human nature can be made to assume definite forms. Instincts asserted of human beings have been created by psychologists, and sociologists alike to "explain" any given phenomena, whether war, pioneering, or vagabondage. Biologists may doubt the Darwinian formula of survival and natural selection as applied to individuals, but psychologists have kept the faith when considering instincts. We have plenty of trouble now, but in the Golden Age nature was always right and every instinct was brought in on account of its survival value. The implications of the current doctrine are three in number:

1. Instincts are the same in man and animals.
2. Instincts exist because they were first useful.
3. Instincts can be observed in their activity by anyone who will make himself familiar with human conduct.

A corollary of these beliefs is that individual psychology formulated according to this method is a prerequisite to the question of group life.

It seems necessary to question all these assumptions. There is probably a real difference between man and the animals. A study of cultural groups does not wait for the psychology of the individual. On the contrary, the individual can only be known fully by means of the methods of social investigation. The group will help illuminate the nature of this process.

And here comes in the task of the sociologist, for it is he who is chiefly interested in the processes of human nature which are involved in culture and which the ethnologist notices only inciden-

tally. If the problem of instincts cannot be solved by a study of primitive peoples, at least the problem could be greatly illuminated. One writer asserts that hunting and fighting alone interested primitive man. Therefore, all work is drudgery and no one ever really likes it. The student of primitive life might investigate further instances of the building of houses, clearing of land, child-caring, and other forms of group life which bear no relation to hunting or fighting, and which are intensely interesting. The findings on this subject would throw much light on the theoretical question involved. Graham Wallas insists that the human race inherits an instinct for irregularity in work, and since primitive man did no regular work, modern man finds it irksome. The response of primitive people to regular work like their response to regular meals could be noted, and the facts ought to throw some light on the problem.

The burden which primitive man has to bear is very heavy at the present time, particularly the moral burden. Primitive man is blamed for juvenile delinquency, marital infidelity, family desertion, dislike of work, crime, and war. The thin veneer of civilization is a metaphor from the furniture factories at Grand Rapids, but it implies an unjustifiably uncharitable view toward the poor savage. Anyone who has carefully studied the literature of primitive peoples, and has given due weight to the absence of punishment of their children, and who has considered the relative completeness of the social control which they have developed, will look for another explanation of our adolescent rebellion. It is entirely possible that we ourselves have invented many original sins and that there are new and modern ways of acting the fool. Certainly, the question of a native tendency to storm-and-stress on the part of the adolescent can be illuminated by a study of primitive peoples. On this, as on many psychological problems, it is possible to shed much light from ethnology.

Many other questions, such as that of the culture epochs on which hangs the question of recapitulation, the question of sex differences, and the relation of the individual to the group, are all capable of illumination by methods which include the comparison of cultures.

For example, the theory of culture epochs is passing in ethnology. Polyandry was supposed to be a phase of culture having a definite

relation to a specific form of economic organization. When, however, it is found that polyandry exists in Tibet where there is agriculture, among the Todas who are pastoral, and among certain Eskimo tribes who are still hunters, the conclusion which the social psychologist is led to make is fairly obvious.

Another instance of the value of this method is in the names of relationship which the ethnologists are now studying with great zeal and promise of interesting results. When we find that among many peoples there is no word for father or mother, but only a word denoting parent; when in other societies there appears no distinction between child and grandchild, or between mother and aunt—when these and a score of other similar facts are noted, the conclusion is inevitable that the psychological basis of the family is a more variable phenomenon than is usually assumed. On this psychological problem there remains yet much light to be shed from the study of primitives.

The study of words is in itself very instructive, and the structure of the grammar of primitive people which is as yet so imperfectly known, will in future lend much real aid to the study of human nature.

The sex differences are still highly important to us and form a problem as yet quite unsolved. Schurz in a classic utterance has explained the outstanding facts of primitive life to be the well-known psychological fact that women are not gregarious. Mrs. Talbert, however, in her work among the Ibibios describes a most elaborate system of secret societies, thus discrediting the explanation by objective citation of new facts.

The question of diffusion as against independent origin, which is now a storm center of ethnological debate, must be settled by the ethnologists and anthropologists among themselves. The argument is now often so heated that epithets and names fly very freely. The sociologist should and will wait for the experts to agree, but the point here is that when they shall have agreed we shall be able to know much more than we now know about the relations of the individual to the group.

The social psychologist must no longer assume that he cannot attack the problem of collective behavior or understand cultural groups without a working theory of individual psychology. Social

psychology was at one time proposed as the science of the individual as modified by the social processes of the group. We must take seriously the statement that no such pre-existing individual is discoverable.

Primitive man has been very frequently invoked as an explanation of some social phenomenon of modern life. He has oftener been coerced into justifying a political interest or buttressing an established practice. He has at times helped a devoted reformer in his effort to uproot established institutions that have cumbered the ground. He has done much service in furnishing the human element in mythologies and cosmologies. Sociologists have used him to furnish concrete confirmation of their deductive conclusions. Herbert Spencer used him to show that evolution demanded a halfway stage between animal and man. Sumner brought him in to prove that man is an irrational and helpless creature, too plastic and too helpless to boast. Westermarck employs him to illustrate his own doctrine of instincts and the emotional doctrine of morality. McDougall makes use of him, as do most psychologists, to illustrate and confirm the doctrines of the instincts.

Few of us have, however, studied him. Here lies a vast treasure of psychological knowledge for the most part untouched. Primitive man who is really primitive is gone and gone forever. None of us ever saw him alive. Contemporary uncivilized peoples exist, and the careful, objective, scientific study of their manners, customs, ritual, speech, and other behavior is destined richly to reward those who are able to study them. We may indeed hope to solve some of our theoretical problems here.

The social psychologist must no longer assume that collective behavior can only be studied after we have in hand a complete statement of the nature of the individual. Social psychology is not merely a study of the modification of the individual that occurs in social situations. It is time to realize that these facts are ready to hand, and that the individual which psychology was supposed to study does not exist and never did. And, since he does not exist, he cannot be modified in a social group. On the contrary, he is created in a social group. He can be found only by looking there.

SLOGANS AS A MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

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ABSTRACT

Slogans as a Means of Social Control.—Some devices kindred to the slogan are the watchword, catchword, and motto. The slogan comes to us from the Scotch and originated in the wars of the clans. Its purpose was control. It has spread to other areas such as politics, religion, and business. *Social control through slogan.* Sources of strength are found in such features as antithesis, alliteration, euphoniousness, punning, apparent obviousness, brevity. The use of slogans may be questioned in so far as they perpetuate undeliberative responses.

In discussing the subject "Slogans as a Means of Social Control" I shall consider (1) some kindred devices and their meanings, (2) the origin and definition of the term slogan, (3) the fields in which this device is most used, (4) some reasons for its effectiveness, and (5) some evils of its promiscuous use.

1. Among the countless devices employed by those who aspire to master the human herd, one finds "watchwords," "catchwords," "mottoes," "shibboleths," and "slogans." The "watchword" was originally a password or countersign employed by guards and scouts in times of hostility. It served to distinguish friends from foes. The medieval castles were guarded by the ward by day and the watch by night. Thus the watch was the one to be especially careful, for some means of recognition had to be used instead of sight. The watchword was distinctively a declarative night word.

Later usage is broader. The watchword is now a rallying-cry or signal for action and, as such, is indistinguishable from the slogan. Sumner tells us that "a watchword sums up one policy or doctrine, view or phase of the subject. It may be legitimate and useful, but a watchword easily changes its meaning and takes up foreign connotations or fallacious suggestions. Critical analysis is always required to detect and exclude the fallacy."¹ Thus the watchword retains some of the obscurity of its original circumstance,

¹ *Folkways*, p. 177.

although in changed form. As a nightword it was clear-cut and unequivocal, but as a day word it has assimilated questionable and obscure features.

The "catchword" was originally the last word spoken by one actor as a cue for the next speaker. It was also the first word of any printed page reproduced at the end of the previous page as an aid to the memory. But while the actor still has his cue, the printed page no longer has its catchword. The device has been caught up into the realm of larger social activities and additional meanings have been incorporated. The aim everywhere is to make sure that the attention does not wander, the memory does not become listless, and the loyalties do not stray. It is thus in the same category as the catchword and functions as a means of social control.

The "motto" embodies a similar notion. The etymology of the term discloses its imitative origin. Probably it was once just any word that was muttered or repeated to fix attention, arouse the feelings, and exclude distractions, and thereby become declarative. In modern use it is any brief, pithy saying, a *multum in parvo*, offered as a standard or objective for popular action. It can hardly be distinguished from the war cry.

It is of interest to note that newspaper editors have been fond of mottoes. The *New York Chronicle* in 1842 put its energies back of this noble sentiment: "God and the elevation of the people." *Bartram's Cheek*—a Michigan paper—in 1869 was whole-souled for "Beauty and Business." *Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly* in 1870 favored: "Progress; Free Thought; Untrammelled Lives."² Other journalistic mottoes are bombastic, grandiose, or smart, as the case may be. But they purport to epitomize a program and dazzle the eyes with an urgent objective. They are thus closely related functionally to the slogan.

The "shibboleth" is almost an exact synonym of the watchword. It is a Hebrew term signifying an ear of corn or a stream. But what interests us is the *use* rather than the meaning. The story is that one of the Judges employed this word as a means of distinguishing the fleeing Ephraimites from his own followers, the

² Hudson, *Journalism in U.S.*, 1690-1872, p. 738.

Gileadites. It seems that the former were unable to pronounce the "sh" sound in the word shibboleth and thereby disclosed themselves as enemies.¹

Originally, therefore, the shibboleth was employed to elicit a reaffirmation of a loyalty already declared. It was a purely arbitrary method of obtaining information as to mental attitude in a crisis. One who could and would speak the accepted watchword or pronounce the shibboleth was regarded as a friend and supporter, a member of the we-group. In the case of the latter term one trembles to think of what must have happened to those who were tonguetied or otherwise crippled vocally. But in times of stress and popular realignment one must shout the proper word without quibbling or take the consequences. A critical attitude is no more tolerated than was lisping to that brave chieftain Jephthah.

2. Turning now to the "slogan" we may note first of all that it comes to us from the Gaelic and appears to be a contraction of two words, "slaugh," meaning an army or fighting group, and "ghairm," meaning a call or calling. Among the Highlanders the "slaugh-ghairm" was the rallying-cry or gathering-call to assemble and unify in times of clan danger or aggression. It was variously the name of the clan and often the name of the place of meeting. The people, separated in space and thought, were suddenly lifted out of themselves and swept into a social movement by "the slogan's deadly yell," as Sir Walter Scott has it.

But while the Scotch may have given us the term, the idea and the practice of using some powerful word stimulus or other kind of stimulus to fuse and fortify defensive or aggressive bands are ancient and world-wide. This device may be found among all peoples in one form or another. It is as essential to strife as any weapon used.

Hence, however different their origin, the devices enumerated above have evolved to practically the same point. They were and are instruments of the agitator and the conscriptor. And they are piercing and ruthless instruments. If any differences remain they may be found in this, that watchwords and shibboleths serve to cut sharply into the miscellaneous moods and interests of the common life and secure attention. The mottoes, catchwords, and

¹ Judges 12:4-6.

slogans indicate some desirable objective and secure active participation in its attainment. After one is *in* and approved by means of the former, one must follow the slogan and "put it across."

By way of definition, therefore, it may be said that a slogan is any brief, popularly reiterated challenge to immediate participation in competitive or conflicting interactions. It is not found in the field of scientific investigation for there is no desire to gain adherents. In this area, the truth is wanted, not numbers.

3. This last point introduces the question of those areas within the larger field of competition and conflict where the slogan operates with unmeasured virility. Further analysis reveals its employment in the propagandist and aggressive departments of war, business, politics, religion, and education. Individuals and families set up standards of this sort to which they make efforts, more or less heroic, to adhere.

Originating in the brazen throat of war, the slogan has not ceased to be an effectual war-instrument. It is still impossible to war successfully without it. A returned soldier wrote me last summer that the outstanding, ever-reiterated, clarion challenge to American soldiers—the slogan that helped the soldiers to associate readily and agreeably with all sorts and conditions of men, endure and even enjoy the otherwise deadening routine of military drill, master those weakening waves of homesickness that attacked their muscles at the most inopportune times, become knit up into an invincible and terrific engine of destruction, recover almost miraculously from serious wounds and illnesses, and to finally "put it across" while they were "over there"—that slogan was "Get Germany." That was the central theme to which studying, traveling, drilling, charging, and all other military operations were but minor variations. And "Get Germany" brought forth its brood of subsidiary slogans such as, "Put it across," "Over the top," "They shall not pass," and others.

Not less spectacular and powerful was the influence of this device upon the populace at home. The thinking and unthinking alike were gathered into a tidal wave to "make the world safe for democracy." The political, social, and religious idealists were captured by the term "democracy." The dull and meticulous

were awakened and set at work by the term "safe." That famous sloganizer, Benjamin Franklin, was unceremoniously resurrected and riveted to the game of selling War Saving Stamps. His manly voice, quit of its sepulchral accents, sounded forth, vigorous and clear, in the mottoes, "Thrift is Power" and "Save and Succeed." These words gathered in the close-fisted.

And in a campaign to "Make the world safe for Democracy" what could be more adroit than to print and sell "Liberty Bonds"? For this is a most contradictory phrase in any other connection. And so it remains that Americans of the twentieth century, no more than Highlanders of the fifteenth, can successfully prosecute a war without the ubiquitous slogan. War without slogans? One can as readily think of trains without engines or barrels without hoops.

We are all familiar with the use of slogans in political campaigns. Every election brings out a new set, some of them local and some national in popularity. Notable examples are, "Less government in business; more business in government," "Remember the Maine," "The full dinner pail," "No taxation without representation," and countless others, some of which I will mention in an examination of the effective features of the slogan.

In business the vigorous intention everywhere is to overwhelm the buying public and gain support. The bombardment is spectacular, voluminous, continuous, and relentless. *Printer's Ink* recently compiled something over three hundred and fifty slogans that are *nationally* known. Those of merely local circulation must number up in the thousands. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the above-mentioned periodical states that: "The slogan was coined as a means of stressing trade-mark significance in the advertising appeal." This may be true as an account of the introduction of this device into selling campaigns, but the slogan was coined, that is to say, was originated, in a very different manner, as I have shown.

The athletic fans are well acquainted with the power of this instrument. It has often made a winning team. Large-scale and small-scale religious enterprise would be seriously crippled without it. And America has throbbed more to this type of appeal, perhaps,

than other nations because of the numerous sects and their former bitternesses. For example, one denomination uses "Our Plea" with much unction. It also proposes to "Speak where the Scriptures speak, and remain silent where the Scriptures are silent,"—an undertaking of such considerable proportions that, of course, it has not lived up to it. "The Evangelization of the world in this generation" became the zealous cry of the hosts of young people who gathered in Toronto twenty years ago. "Men and Millions" was the rallying call of a denominational campaign several years ago—but the millions smothered the men.

The history of education is liberally besprinkled with slogans betokening the influence of the propagandists. Few of us are unacquainted with "Education according to Nature," "Social efficiency," and "The project method."

The numerous campaign drives for money to support various worthy enterprises have flung showers of watchwords about our ears and before our eyes. The Red Cross challenges respect and support by declaring itself "The Greatest Mother in the World." The Y.M.C.A. has insisted and demanded that "The Y stands for you; You stand for the Y."

And every party revolt within any larger whole has been unified and spurred on by some unforgettable slogan. The restless poor foregather to the strain of "Unreasonable profits," "A fair day's wage," "The emancipation of labor," while the contented rich patriotically cry back, "America for the Americans," "Law and Order," and others.

I suppose it will never be possible to accurately enumerate the realignments effected by this visual and vocal lassoing. Certain weaknesses of the popular mind, combined with certain excellencies of the slogan, make us reasonably assured that much more is accomplished in this manner than might at first be suspected. Many of the thoughtful and self-controlled are gathered in because this type of infection operates in defiance of man's sound intelligence. On the other hand, if every movement attracts its "lunatic fringe," as Roosevelt spoke of it, there can be no question of the mighty influence of the slogan on this wing of the populace. Between these groups one finds the masses who evidently thrill and yield to new phrases and terms.

In the field of social suggestion, as in archery, it is still true that

. . . . many a shaft at random sent
Finds mark the archer little meant.

But it is equally true that this type of shaft is well aimed and finds the mark selected. What the projectors of slogans wish is numbers. They aim to touch the multitudes and there can be no reasonable doubt of great success.

4. The features which make the slogan so effective are too numerous even to mention, let alone delineate, in this paper. I shall have time to point out only a few. In a lecture several years ago the "vagabond" poet, Vachel Lindsay, stated that he was out to bring poetry to the attention of the people. And in order to do this he had to surpass the electric sign. What he meant was that the popular mind is so distracted and surfeited by countless appeals that any new one had to be more incisive and spectacular than the best to be heeded.

But the popular mind is, at the same time, so superficial and unguarded that such an appeal is captivating. If there were prolonged concentration and rigid absorption, this instrument would not work. Moreover, if people were universally satisfied and not everlastingly craving some new thing, slogans would fall harmless, as darts against a battleship. And some have thought that Americans are peculiarly susceptible. But however that may be, it is probably true that this device has reached its greatest perfection in this country.

I am endeavoring to say that, if the soil is excellent, the seed is unsurpassed. The qualities now to be enumerated are not found in every slogan, to be sure, but most of them are strengthened by several.

a) A frequent characteristic is rhythm. The words "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" make pleasant music in the ears of multitudes. A large number of phrases and sentences are metrical in form and can be scanned. Examples are, "Proven by the test of time," "Quickest way to duplicate," "The interest of one is the interest of all," "Woven where the wool is grown," "Handle it mechanically." Henry van Dyke is reported to have said that the phrase, "The skin you love to touch," is highly poetical. The

words "Americanism," "Democracy," and many others, are repeated as much for their euphoniousness as for anything else. Certainly clear ideas about their essential meanings do not warrant such frequent employment. The masses are always ready for a war dance if some clique or leader will only suggest the measure and beat time.

b) The alliterative quality is very often found. We have "Foods of the finest flavor" and we have them "From contented cows." We have the "Eight with eighty less parts," "Land to the landless," "Politics for the people," "Men and Millions," "Mine to the miner," and many others.

c) The appeal is much strengthened by the combination of alliteration and antithesis. "The golden rule against the rule of gold" has played its part as has "Sink or swim." During the silver issue some opponents of the proposition were captivated by the proposition, "The white man with the yellow metal is beaten by the yellow man with the white metal." In 1844 the watchword, "Fifty-four forty or fight" almost provoked war. No such excitement could have been produced by shouting "twenty-one sixteen or fight."

d) Besides the recurrence of letters there is the ringing repetition of sounds. "An apple a day keeps the doctor away," "Cheaper to 'dye' than to buy," "A Kalamazoo—direct to you," "The handy candy," "Tippecanoe and Tyler too," are familiar illustrations of this feature.

e) Le Bon says:

Affirmation pure and simple, kept free of all reasoning and proof, is one of the surest means of making any idea enter the minds of crowds. The conciser an affirmation is the more destitute of every appearance of proof and demonstration, the more weight it carries. The religious books and legal codes of all ages have always resorted to simple affirmation. Statesmen called upon to defend a political issue, and commercial men pushing the sale of their products by means of advertising, are acquainted with the value of affirmation.

We have already noted examples of affirmation combined with repetition of letters and sounds. Le Bon further says:

Affirmation, however, has no real influence unless it is constantly repeated, and so far as possible in the same terms. It was Napoleon, I believe, who said that there is only one figure in rhetoric of serious importance, namely, repetition.⁴

⁴ *The Crowd*, pp. 141-42.

So we are faced at every angle with unabashed pronouncements such as, "If it isn't an Eastman, it isn't a kodak," "The standard of the world," "The utmost in clothespins," and "Eventually—why not now?" In such cases the facts are all in, the argument is done, it is just a question of time until you are led away to be milked by these enterprising firms. The doctrine of predestination has hardly more finality.

And when the auditory appeal is enforced by the visual on every hand and everyday, for weeks and months and years, there are few minds strong enough not to be affected.

f) Brevity has its part in making the slogan effective. After some examination and comparison it was found that slogans average about four words. Thus they are like coins, condensed and economical. But they are different in that they always pass above their value. This brevity is suggestive with reference to the receptiveness and retentiveness of the popular mind.

g) The appeal to curiosity is not infrequent. For example: "Have you tried one lately?" and "There's a reason." Or again: "Ask Dad—he knows," and "Ask the man who owns one." In these also one may note a quiet confidence that any examination undertaken will reveal only the merits of the case. There is also a subtle suggestion of flattery, for the final decision seems to rest with the investigator.

h) Sloganizers are fond of punning. This equivocal play on words is found particularly in advertising. Examples are: "Hasn't *scratched* yet," "A *case* of good judgment," "Time to *re-tire*," "The *makings* of a nation," "When it rains—*It* pours," "All they're *cracked* up to be," "Have you a little *fairy* in your home?"

i) Of course the sentiment of patriotism is not neglected. There are those saviors of our country who propose "The national drink," "The national joy smoke," and offer themselves as "Home-builders to the nation." Politicians sometimes assure us that "Trade follows the Flag." Occasionally this feature takes the form of unrelieved boasting, but this increases the attraction for certain people.

j) The propagandists, out of the extremely high purposes by which they are moved, do not hesitate to enter, all unbidden, the inner sanctuary of one's private life. Their breezy assurances of

disinterestedness and commanding joviality are quite irresistible. They greet total strangers with a cheerful "Good Morning" and then, having observed some suspicious stains on your chin, casually inquire if you "have used our soap yet." This is an illustration of the fact that slogans are no respectors of those protecting formalities that have been preserved through the centuries. Personal privacy and isolation are wiped away by slogans. There are no longer any areas inaccessible to this penetrating device.

k) Certain slogans appear to be meaty and unavoidable conclusions of profound thought. To illustrate, we might mention, "Safety first," "He kept us out of war," "Make the world safe for democracy," "Open covenants openly arrived at," "The dictates of right reason," "Too proud to fight," and many others. These phrases have every appearance of representing solid realities. As phrases they are inimitable. As capsular philosophies they are unsurpassed. But who can say what they mean? The average man certainly cannot say what they involve and where they lead. Therefore they are a trap for the unwary.

l) An authoritative note is sounded by some slogans in addition to the affirmation already pointed out. Many of them are hortatory in character. Some power, it seems, has the right to tell us to do this and that without end. "Do your bit," "Go to church Sunday," "Restore the land to the landless," "Vote for Mr. So-and-so." These commands gain ascendancy by reason of the popular tendency to mythologize. They create a psychic strain and this allows the old habits of servility to reassert themselves.

m) Many slogans are strictly class-appeals. Emotions are aroused over old antagonisms. "The demand for labor," "Down with the capitalists," "Just distribution," "Change the system," "Anarchists," "Bolsheviks," and the like thrust into the center of consciousness pet ideas and feelings of disgust or loathing. They are calculated to hold up impossible dream-objectives or awaken a basic human fear.

n) The apparent obviousness of meaning is an effective feature. But it is full of snares. What could be more simple and attainable than to be "True to the faith"? In America who could raise any objections against "Make the world safe for democracy"? Any-

body ought to favor "America for the Americans" or leave the country. So would the average man reason. But thoughtful people know that these terms have meanings which are too deep for utterance. When widely used, therefore, the appeal is to popular credulity.

o) Obscurity of origin, combined with euphoniousness, timelessness, and other features, adds greatly to the strength of the slogan. It is then that the popular imagination tends to invest them with extraordinary powers. On the other hand, if the originator is known and happens to be in a position of prominence, his sayings are taken at more than face value.

Many other features of this device might be indicated but these will serve our purpose here. By way of summary Professor Sumner says of watchwords and other verbal coinage:

They are familiar, unquestioned and popular, and they are always current above their value. They always reveal the invincible tendency of the masses to mythologize. They are personified and superhuman energy is attributed to them. "Democracy" is not treated as a parallel word to aristocracy, theocracy, autocracy, etc., but as a Power from some outside origin, which brings into human affairs an inspiration and energy of its own. The "People" is not the population but a creation of mythology, to which inherent faculties and capacities are ascribed beyond what can be verified within experience In all these cases there is a tyranny in the term.¹

In his essay on "War" Professor Sumner further says: "If you allow a political catchword to go on and grow, you will awaken some day to find it standing over you, the arbiter of your destiny, against which you are powerless, as men are powerless against delusions." He might have said this of religious, educational, industrial, and all other catchwords and phrases. Passing unchallenged, they become the arbiters of the people's destinies. They are significant factors in social control.

It may be objected that business slogans are in a different category, and such is the case. Certain fundamental differences are revealed by study. But these differences are in qualifying features rather than in effects. They all accomplish control although they do it in different ways. A very summary statement of this differ-

¹ *Folkways*, p. 176.

ence must be included. In general, religious, political, and educational slogans are characterized by a cloudy profundity, by what the Greeks called "pathos," by a virile historical relevance, and they usually refer to persons, principles, and situations. On the other hand, modern business slogans are clever, sprightly, open-faced, and friendly; they center about things and are, like Topsy, historically unattached.

It is to be observed further that, while many slogans are complete sentences and therefore propositional statements, others are just subjects flung out, like wandering stars, for reception and elaboration by the popular mind; they are left to weave what halos and spin out what filaments of light they can. No trouble arises relative to these detached subjects until one attempts to connect the qualifying predicates. Then the snares appear in troops.

5. Coming now to the last consideration, namely, some evils of the indiscriminate use of the slogan, it may be noted, first of all, that hosts of people allow themselves to be ruled by unquestionable and undiscoverable authorities which "to doubt would be disloyalty; to question would be sin." The coiners of slogans may work in the dark without fear of exposure and work quite ruthlessly. This may be necessary but it is a costly phase of our democratic progress.

Possibly the most unfortunate feature of the slogan is its ambiguity. This point has already been noted but it needs emphasis. A little reflection, instead of opening wide the highway of thought, always plunges one into the morass of tangled and contradictory meanings. Take the phrase "Back to normalcy." It sounds good. It appears to represent something desirable. But what does it mean? Was the president philosophizing when he put this verbal token into circulation, or was he playing to the crowd? "Back" to something always sounds good to the routineer; it sounded good to the war-weary. "Normalcy" suggested—well, what it suggested. Anything. Everything. Nothing. The phrase caught the attention of the people and lined them up. But where did it take them?

What does it mean to be "True to the faith"? This is a phrase eloquent of vagueness. It is a saint-seducing phrase. It has

awakened more animosities and precipitated more strife than it has ever allayed. Each individual is more or less true to some faith. But it is rarely expressible in satisfactory terms.

The term "democracy" is almost as inclusive as the sky in its ability to shelter diverse beliefs and opinions. Everybody vocalizes energetically in favor of "Americanism" but nobody can give a consistent interpretation of it. Thus the method of control by slogans is dubious because it depends upon over-simplification.

This type of control is objectionable because it perpetuates undeliberative responses. The people are rallied suddenly and hurriedly. The coiners of slogans and the users of them do not present challenges to thought but to action. They desire numbers not critics. They are adherents to the "do-something" philosophy. And so the slogan might be described as an effective device for the prevention of thought.

Great quantities of slogans being presented for appropriate responses, it might be supposed that the necessity of selection from among them would occasion some careful scrutiny and a deliberate choice. But it is probable that the one that touches the most agreeable feelings gets the attention and support and all others are simply ignored. Thus any sort of analysis of possibilities is avoided.

As an unchivalrous invasion of one's private life, slogans are of questionable moral value. Even if they came as disinterested messengers, the objection would still be valid. But when they come heavily charged with a pestiferous bias and have no purpose other than to precipitate conduct favorable to the propagandists no matter how oblique their intentions, the objection is greatly augmented.

The slogan is strong just in proportion to the weakness of individuals in capacity for guarding the portals of the mind. Drunkards, opium fiends, and other perverts have been made by outsiders taking possession of their thought processes at the critical moment. Suggestions, neatly built into and heading up the half-formed wishes, have produced criminals and other types of the anti-social. But the slightly opened door is no hint to the sloganizer. He bursts in and takes possession of the house, expelling complacency and turning order into restless irritation. When one

has been afflicted with tuberculosis, one's life is never the same; a dangerous weakness always remains. When one has been assaulted by a slogan a weakened condition abides. In a Western city an enterprising firm—to speak politely—makes business by smiting the senses of the people with this: "When you think of victrolas, think of ——'s." Here is a pair of ideas tied together inseparably. And repeated enough it would take a very determined person to break the chain. When one idea appears in consciousness, it is not one idea but twins. When thirsty, think of Old Scotch. When you have a headache, think of some nostrum to cure it. Do not say "dye," say the name of some particular brand. Do not say newspaper, say *Star* or *Journal*.

You cannot argue with disease germs. You cannot argue with slogans. Both are in the system and rooted before one knows it. The emotional life of man assumes and supports the absoluteness of its objects. Since slogans touch the emotional life mainly, they tend to become absolute. Only reflective thought qualifies and limits and so escapes the tyrant. Since habit is largely the arbiter of our daily choices, those who help to make our habits exercise control over us. Sloganizers and their instruments accomplish this end with multitudes. They secure actions first and then possibly some thought. And they secure actions favorable to others than the actors, quite largely.

Therefore the only safeguard that can be suggested is another habit, namely, that of rigid criticism. Sumner says:

It is by criticism that the person is protected against credulity, emotion, and fallacy. Suggestion is a legitimate device, if it is honestly used, for inculcating knowledge of principles of conduct; that is for education in the broadest sense. An educated man ought to be beyond the reach of suggestion from advertisements, newspapers, speeches, and stories.

And of course he should not be trapped by slogans.

PATRIOTISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

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ABSTRACT

Patriotism and Internationalism.—Patriotism is an inheritance from primitive group life and is non-moral and irrational as applied to present nationalism. In groups that have suffered oppression it is pathological and must be dealt with patiently. *Perversion of patriotism.* Patriotism is stimulated artificially and immorally. It aims to be absolute. There is great value in loyalty, but it should be pluralistic rather than absolute. Ten per cent to 25 per cent patriotism would be about normal, and the rest of loyalty should go to communities of interest already international. The separation of church and state showed the possibility of divided sovereignty. This would be extended to include economic, culture, sport, and many other interests. If we were aware of the interests which are significant in our lives instead of focusing on perverted patriotism, we should find that we are already internationally organized.

As preliminary definitions we may consider patriotism as the emotion of loyalty for whatever one considers as his fatherland, whether nation or state. Internationalism, on the other hand, assumes a loyalty to some form of organization among nations, and involves an intellectual element lacking in patriotism.

As a matter of fact, the nation is a growth from innumerable simpler social forms, and the growth to internationalism is relatively but little more complex than has been the growth to nationalism.

First let us consider briefly the origin and nature of patriotism. The origin of patriotism is as humble as that of all of our inheritances. It comes from the dim past in which the human species was formed. The necessities for biological survival both for the young and for the adult demanded an immediate response to the needs of the group. Thus the impulse of group defense and mutual aid early identified the individual with the group. The emotion which accompanied the recognition of this identity is the beginning of loyalty and of patriotism. It is a biological inheritance no more moral in its beginning than hunger, since like hunger it was necessary for survival.

As the individual evolves, survival becomes more complex, and the group in which survival is posited is determined by the aspect of the self which is considered significant at the moment. At one time it may be the physical self, at another the economic, and at another the spiritual. In other words the whole variety of complexes by which the self is measured determines the particular direction of the struggle to survive. Because this impulse makes the individual lose a smaller self in a larger one, loyalty to the group has come to be esteemed as the highest virtue, though as an impulse it is totally blind and indiscriminating.

It is as impossible for patriotism, as such, to rationally estimate social values as it is for hunger to select food in terms of calories. Both hunger and group loyalty are essential assets to life but they are ill adapted to absolute unquestioned control of life, and yet that is what patriotism has demanded. In the "secondary groups" or the "Great Society" all native predispositions need to be constantly subjected to reanalysis.

One aspect of patriotism is nationalism. This is a very modern phenomenon. It must be distinguished from mere state organization with which it is sometimes identical and sometimes in opposition. The principle of "self-determination of nations" indicates the popular acceptance of the difference of interest between the state and the nation. Ireland and Korea are examples of national patriotism in opposition to their sovereign states.

Nationalism is not uniform and simple; it results from various conditions and has characteristic reactions.¹ In certain respects the psychology of the individual and of the group are parallel. This may be seen especially in inferiority and superiority complexes. The patriotism of an oppressed nation is full of pathological elements akin to inferiority complexes in individuals. The survival sought is "national self-respect." The symptoms are constant, the most characteristic is hypersensitiveness. Anyone at all familiar with the Irish can vouch for this. There is a disregard for personal survival that is quite abnormal. This form of nationalism tends to become chauvinistic, that is, attention is focused on

¹ See "The Sentiment of Nationalism," by Max Handman in the *Political Science Quarterly*, for an illuminating discussion of various types of nationalism.

nationality to the exclusion of everything else. It is a result of injustice in which the personality of a nation is felt to be disgraced. There is no more hope that a nation suffering from this oppression will make more than the meagerest advances in the direction of internationalism, than that a sick man will take up the full activities of health. A very large portion of the peoples of the world are still suffering from present or past experiences of oppression and they cannot be expected to act as normal groups. Even if the Irish Free State is well set going it will require a long period of convalescence. Germany suffered injustice from the France of Napoleon, and France was dominated by the Germany of Bismarck, and the Succession States of Austria-Hungary are full of psychoses. And there are India, China, Korea, Egypt, Pan Africa—more than half of the human race—still in national relationships in which national self-respect is demanding satisfaction. In Mexico, Santo Domingo and Haiti, all of whose economic advantage would be greatly enhanced by acquiescing in the domination by America, the patriots are utterly indifferent to material advantage in their desire to have self-respecting freedom. Just as Ireland, Poland, and Czecho-slovakia care nothing for the economic advantage of relationship with the dominant nations, so Asia and Africa are entering into a state of mind which has all the earmarks of nationalistic patriotism, and which will make the problems of Europe look like child's play by comparison.

In spite of all this there are gleams of hope. Statesmen, publicists, and the common people are being awakened to a new idea of statescraft. Political practice and political science are about where pedagogy was when it began to change from discipline of fear to discipline of freedom and attraction. Bad as Europe now is it is immeasurably more likely to succeed, if it can make economic recovery, than under the old system in which the system itself went to smash. The example of England's finally yielding something to Ireland is a precedent for herself in other relations, which will affect India and China, and is a demonstration to all the world that the domination of empire can be yielded.

We also have patriotism of the aggression type in which the motive is glory or prestige rather than "self-respect." This has

not the same sort of pathological elements. America, England, and Germany are outstanding examples.

But whatever the nature and object of patriotism it is always artificially stimulated. The individual is not born into any groups except the immediately personal ones to which he will adhere patriotically without artificial stimulation. The technique for arousing patriotism has become highly specialized. Appeals to hate, fear, glory, and honor are always used along with the magnification of the history and heroes of the country. Leadership is taken by intellectuals, because of their knowledge of history and principles. It is well said that if it were not for the few agitators the people would never think of their plight as being undesirable.

It can be said categorically that patriotism is always aroused by immoral means. The greatest perversion has been in the teaching of history from the national point of view. The children are nurtured on history out of focus. In individuals manifestations of egotism are considered a vice, but in nations egotism is practiced as a virtue. The resultant self-complacency is both tragic and absurd. We admit that in wartime the propaganda for patriotism transgresses truth in its appeal to hate and vainglory, but it differs in degree only from that of peace time. Hatred of other nations is emphasized much more than love of one's fellow-nationals, thus the blind impulse of hate is used to enhance the blind impulse of patriotism and we supinely call the result moral.

The most false thing of all about patriotism is its demand that it be unqualified and absolute. The scope of any state or nation is so accidental and temporary that there can be no proper rational basis for unreasoned and undivided loyalty to it.

Pope Gregory the Seventh describes the origin of nations in the following picturesque words:

Who is ignorant that our existing dynasties all derive their origin from such men, from the proud, from the impious, from perjurers, murderers, and robbers, from men stained with every crime that can debase human nature; and whose blind cupidity and intolerable insolence inspired them with the only motive they ever had in governing, namely, a tyrannical wish to domineer over their fellow creatures?¹

¹ 53d Epistle.

It would be difficult to overestimate the moral and practical value of loyalty. I agree with Professor Royce that it is the prime virtue; but I insist that, like love, it may often be blind. As it manifests itself in patriotism it merges the individual into larger interests, and identifies him with a complex of groups which breaks down the hostility which tended to keep them apart. Sight of the flag or singing the national anthem will make a crowd of cosmopolitan boys thrill with common purpose. But when the boys thrill at one song and their parents at another, we see that what is the content of patriotism is entirely an accident. The trouble is that we limit our patriotism, by hard and fast boundaries, as though our survival were all within those boundaries. We all have many interests necessary for our full existence which have no more relation to frontiers than the area on which the sun's rays fall.

My second point is that the way out is by the substitution of pluralism of sovereignty for the monistic absolutism of patriotism. Laski has brilliantly and exhaustively shown in the history of the struggle between the church and the state that an actual division of sovereignty has been established in principle. This struggle was a long and hard one, and I hope that the establishment of other loyalties just as significant as these may have an easier career.

The preaching of 100 per cent patriotism is one of the greatest obstacles to clear vision and progress. It is a doctrine of absolutism which has no basis in fact. My thesis in this paper is that the facts demand the substitution of 10 to 25 per cent patriotism for 100 per cent patriotism. This proportion will account for the peculiarly provincial values that our particular fatherland has contributed to our development, and signifies for our survival. No one can be normal who has no sentiment of loyalty to that which is intimately related to him. Our geographical environment, local history, language, and mores contribute to our unique individuality and deserve their proper proportion of allegiance. I spent part of my early life a few miles from Plymouth Rock and part of it among the mountains of New Hampshire. I glory in the Pilgrim traditions, and the sight of mountains always gives me joy. When I am in a foreign country I always thrill at the sight of an American flag. America means something real to me, but not all of reality.

The 75 to 90 per cent of loyalty that is left belongs to values in our lives that are international rather than national. If history could be taught as Mr. Wells urges that it should be taught we might soon all learn that even in the most different of us there is more that is common to all than is peculiar to any. And if we go back of history to biology we can see that while races may differ from one another by a fraction of a per cent the rest is common heritage. While I was inspired by sentiments gathering about Plymouth history I also owe much to the Roman Forum and Magna Carta and, Protestant that I am, to the Roman Catholic church and to the faith of Israel.

Mr. L. P. Jacks¹ urges that in behalf of internationalism we should develop various "communities of interest." It is my claim that we already have enough communities of interest to change the whole nature of social organization if we could only become aware of them. I agree fully with Mr. Jacks that there is no hope in immediate political internationalism. That will come last and only after there has been a complete reorganization of political concepts in terms of economic and social values.

When we get this awareness of vital international interest it will be as easy to enlarge the emotion of patriotism from its present artificial limits as it was to get it to its present national character from the tribal and feudal groups which preceded the present stage. A direct attack on the fallacy of the inherent validity of the present objects of patriotism will be ineffective, but if we can stop the immoral and untrue area of its cultivation we shall eventually find ourselves loyal to international interests which are vital in national life in the same way that we have found national values significant in community life.

The most obvious and perhaps the most important present international organization is the economic. Both capitalism and proletarianism have discovered their wider interests, the former more in practice, and the latter more in program. International trade is old but the complex economic organization of the present is too modern for us to have adjusted our sentiments and loyalty to it. It applies to banking, production, and commerce. When

¹ *Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1920.

I was in Russia, just before the war, I took my letters of introduction in Moscow to the building of the International Harvester Company whose headquarters are in Chicago, but whose name nevertheless indicates its scope. I also saw all over Russia the products of the National Cash Register Company of Dayton, Ohio, and in St. Petersburg, as it was then called, I visited the American Consul in the Singer Building. While the Rothschilds symbolize international banking, they merely set the pace. Wall Street almost means international finance. A year ago I met in Bucharest, Sophia, and Belgrade the same representative of the Guaranty Trust Company, who had just come from Warsaw and whose headquarters are in London. The publication everyday in papers throughout the world of the foreign exchange values of money indicates how closely all are involved.

The international nature of communication emphasizes the absurdity of national limitations by the feeling of annoyance every time its free passage is obstructed, and with the coming of the airship and wireless, customs officials and censors at frontiers will become as obsolete as communication by beacon fires.

It is still possible to play upon the tremendous prejudice of patriotism for partisan and political purposes. Capital uses it most effectively for throwing sand in the eyes of the public in its own behalf in the class struggle. Much popular support was gained by the United States Steel Company by implying that there was something alien about the strikers and something peculiarly American about the company. Judge Gary told the Interchurch Committee that it was a conflict between "Americanism and bolshevism." In the light of the well-known international connections of the Steel Company it sounded like an effort to divert attention for special advantage.

Of course prejudice is largely unconscious and unintentioned, but much of the present anti-Semitism is due to the wave of local patriotisms which follow every war and which sees in the Jew, who is a member of many nations and who does business across boundaries, an aggravating antithesis to their own emotions. It is difficult to hate a principle, and the Jew serves as the personal symbol. But commerce needs to go on. There is no greater

chauvinistic bitterness than existed among the Succession States of Austria-Hungary a year ago, and yet in the course of the summer there was much evidence of increasing exchange of commodities. The process by which it was brought about I saw illustrated on the top of the Carpathian Mountains at the frontier between Poland and Czecho-slovakia. At the time, the hostility between the two states was exceedingly bitter. There were barbed wire and armed guards, but at the otherwise deserted station there were three Jews, one from Czecho-slovakia and two from Poland arranging for the exchange of manufactured goods from the former, for petroleum from the latter. This exchange satisfied imperative needs and the Jews performed a necessary service, but at the same time gave the anti-Semites another point of attack. The Little Entente was formed primarily for economic advantage and is the beginning of some sort of Danubian confederation among nations all of which are chauvinistic.

It is obvious to me that we must soon recognize that plural sovereignty applies as clearly to economics as to religion. Economists have taught the principles of free-trade for a generation, but at the same time they have not objected to the teaching of absolute patriotism, with the result that there has been no diminution of the tendency of patriotic politicians to raise protective tariffs.

The success of socialism as compared to Christianity in riveting attention on the international ideal has been quite remarkable. Patriotism has given us tribal gods, while Socialism has made the international interests of the proletariat surprisingly clear. Whatever objections one may have to other aspects of socialism it has accelerated our thinking on the vital character of international interest.

The Roman Catholic church has claimed and held loyalty without conflict with the essential patriotic interest, and while less articulate the same thing is true of other religions and even of sects. Judaism, Greek Orthodoxy, and Mohammedanism do not know national limitations, but Quakerism, Methodism, and Bahaism also go about their business without political consideration, though the struggle to attain this freedom has been hard and there are many scars and cripples.

If we take culture in general we see that there is much more that is internationally common than that is peculiar. It would be difficult to have imagined such irrational and accidental divisions of loyalty as developed in Europe. There is not a single natural line that has been followed. The linguistic divisions of Slavic, Teutonic, and Celtic bear only the vaguest relation to the highly esteemed Nordic, Alpine, and Mediterranean, and these even less to the political units. The potential differences among the people of China and of India are as great as those that have developed in Europe, but we assume an ultimate unity in China in spite of the division into North and South and the conflicts of provinces; and in India we see a merging of what seemed to be insuperably antagonistic. The point in this is that it is entirely accidental whether we have a large or small object for our loyalty. Either China or India will make a unity of at least twice as many people as all of Europe.

Science is admittedly international, but so is sympathy. We feel no shock in giving help to starving children even in Germany. There are many other dominant interests that are more or less international and they are increasing in number very rapidly, and we might much better give our attention to discovering them than in perpetuating a patriotism that is no longer true. We are all now a bit ashamed that we carried our hostility to Germans, to German music, and even to the German language. In the early years of the war the common soldiers insisted that the Christmas spirit was international.

I do not undervalue the emotion of patriotism. In fact I would agree with John Morley, "to deride patriotism is the mark of impoverished blood, but to extol it as an ideal or an impulse above truth and the general interest of humanity is far worse." But it is my claim that already more than half of the values that give reality to our lives are internationally in existence, and that the possibilities of pluralistic sovereignty make it entirely possible to be loyal to them. Most specific patriotic claims are anachronous.

Both decentralization and pluralism of patriotism are even now taking place within the British Empire. The prime ministers of the colonies have met on the level of equality with Lloyd George, and the degree of loyalty asked of Ireland is as slight as the actual

authority of the king. We are already beginning to put into practice a national tolerance exactly like religious tolerance. In the constitutions of the new states of Europe provision is made for the guaranteeing of rights to religious and national minorities. This is a new thing in sovereign states, and enlarges the range of pluralism. In America we had recognized the principle of tolerance until the absurd concepts of "hyphenated American" and "America first" were exploited. Then we lost it, but in spite of our retrogression we still have pro-English, pro-Irish, and even pro-Japanese citizens, as well as the various oppression loyalties of our immigrants.

To be loyal is necessary to the nature of normal man, but to have a perverted patriotism is inconsistent with the new groupings essential for his survival. It is our duty as teachers and seekers of reality to resist the claims of an absolutism which can no longer find any rational justification.

HEREDITARY HUMAN GROUPS IN THEIR RELATION TO DISTINCTIVE CULTURES

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ABSTRACT

Hereditary Human Groups in Their Relation to Distinctive Cultures.—The amount of time necessary to establish a biologically hereditary group of plants, animals, or men is short by the process of mutation; it is longer, but is often surprisingly short by the process of deliberate hybridization. Biologically hereditary human groups have the tendency to produce distinctive cultures as part of their group protective and defensive devices. Special study should be given to hereditary human groups because they have perfected distinctive cultures. *Immigration and nationality.* Those interested in the building of modern immigrant nations should heed the apparent truth that only those nations will long survive which follow the age-long law that distinctive and natural cultures are protective devices.

Four factors play the chief rôles in determining the distinguishing characteristics of human groups, namely, those of heredity, environment, daily history, and ideals.

On the subject of the hereditary group, I shall attempt to suggest three points: First, the shortness of time necessary for the development of some hereditary groups in familiar forms of life, including the human; second, that distinctive cultures developed by hereditary human groups become protective and defensive devices in the preservation of those groups; and, third, that more commonly in all phases of life we should turn our attention to hereditary groups of peoples, already made or in the making, as the originators and carriers of distinctive cultural contributions to the world.

So frequently has it been said that there are no pure so-called races or groups of mankind that we should first note some illuminating truths brought to light by recent studies in heredity. They show the falsity of the common idea that a long lapse of time is necessary to establish or "fix" the characteristics of a pure breed among plants, animals, and men—all of which are governed by the same laws of heredity. Today we know that certain individual

plants, animals, and men differing markedly from all their ancestors are as "pure-bred" gametically as though they and their ancestors had been quite indistinguishable for 100 or 1,000 years. Such individuals are scientifically called "mutants" or "sports."

No matter what may be the causes of variations resulting in mutations, it is thoroughly established that when "mutants" or "sports" are bred *inter se* they produce new hereditary groups which are as "pure-bred" as are the members of any old-line group. Further, so prepotent is the mutant that the careful and intelligent breeder time and again has had the good fortune to establish a new hereditary group from a single original mutant. Genetically speaking, mutants are potential ancestors; they are not descendants. Classically speaking, mutants spring full-fledged from the head of Zeus; speaking United States, mutants are like Topsy—they "just growed." The facts are that mutants are equipped to start new hereditary groups. But new hereditary groups are also quickly produced by the selective breeding of individuals showing slighter variations, and also by the process of the hybridization of typical members of two or more distinctive breeds. A few illustrations showing use of mutations, and others of hybridization, in producing hereditary groups will make my meaning clear.

In the plant world there is the pink-fleshed grapefruit mutant of Florida scientifically reported in May, 1921, but discovered during the season of 1906-7 by Mr. R. B. Foster. One limb of a Walters' grapefruit tree bore the new pink-fleshed fruit. Since 1914 trees of this unusual variety have been catalogued and distributed by a nursery under the name of the "Foster," the discoverer.¹ Those trees are "pure-bred"; they resulted from one original bud mutant on a Walters' grapefruit tree.

East and Jones reported in February, 1921, a new "pure-bred" round-tip tobacco which in Connecticut they "made to order from specifications drawn by manufacturers and consumers of cigars, and the growers of tobacco." It required only the fourth generation of hybrids before the new tobacco was secured, but now after

¹ T. Ralph Robinson, "The Bud-Sport Origin of a New Pink-Fleshed Grapefruit in Florida," *Journal of Heredity* (May, 1921), pp. 194-98.

a three years' test "it is as uniform in type as any of the older varieties," and, besides, it possesses superior original qualities.¹

In the animal world the recent American product, the Polled Hereford cattle, is a good illustration of the mutant among animals establishing a hereditary group. In 1901 the first herd of Polled or hornless Hereford cattle was made in Iowa. In less than twenty years there were 6,911 herds headed by Polled Hereford bulls; they were scattered in forty-four states, as well as in Mexico, various South American countries, Canada, Hawaii, the Philippines and Australia.² The story in brief is as follows: In 1901 a circular letter was sent to all members of the American Hereford Cattle Breeders' Association inquiring for hornless "freaks" among pure-bred and registered Hereford cattle. Four male and ten female hornless mutants were thus located. The four males and seven of the females were purchased, and brought together to make a herd in Iowa. Thus was set up the foundation herd to breed a new pure-bred beef cattle. The Polled Herefords are a pure hereditary group, varying from the ancestral stock in at least three distinctive characteristics, namely, hornlessness, early maturity, and thriftiness. As has been noted, Polled Herefords have greatly increased in numbers since those first calves were dropped in 1902, but they are no more "pure-bred" than were the calves then born for the first time to a polled mutant sire and a polled mutant dam of the Hereford breed.

A new heredity group of animals has been fixed by the process of hybridization since the year 1912. I refer to the "Lamona," a new general purpose breed of poultry made by Harry M. Lamon. He used three established breeds of poultry to produce the new breed. Dr. George M. Rommel, secretary of the American Genetic Association and also Chief of the Animal Husbandry Division of the United States Department of Agriculture, says this about the new hereditary group: "The breed has progressed far enough so that type and various characters, such as color, the red earlobe

¹ E. M. East and D. F. Jones, "Round-Tip Tobacco—A Plant "Made to Order," *Journal of Heredity* (February, 1921), pp. 50-56.

² *Polled Herefords*, issued by B. O. Gammon, secretary of The American Polled Hereford Breeders' Association, Des Moines, Iowa, 1920.

and the white-shelled egg, have been fixed."¹ So sure are the genetic experts and scientific breeders in the Department of Agriculture that the new breed is made, that April 23, 1921, the Secretary of Agriculture approved, naming it "Lamona" after its maker.

In the world of men some few new or recently reported mutants which are pure-bred are the following:

There are the "slit-eyed people" of northeastern Georgia. Four generations of them were reported by Mr. H. P. Stuckey in 1916. The appearance of the eye is entirely unlike the slit eye seen so frequently in the Orient as an extreme case of the typical hereditary Mongolian eyelid. In the Georgia cases clear or unobstructed vision is possible only when the face is elevated by "throwing back" the head.²

We have the group with short fingers and toes, due to absence of one phalanx from each digit, except the thumb and great toe. Dr. Farabee published this case in 1905. He presents the heredity of five succeeding generations with several collateral lines of descendants.³

There is the group of piebald persons reported by the writer in 1914. This group was studied through three successive generations.⁴

A most peculiar mutant has just been reported. It is the toothless mutant, also without head-hair, reported in a preliminary paper February, 1921, by K. I. Thadani, among the Hindu Amil community in India. Those people are locally known as "Bhudas." This toothless and hairless character is also sex-linked—only the males being affected, though born of normal appearing mothers who are the daughters of other Bhuda or affected men. Though no case of intermarriage between the

¹ Harry M. Lamon, "Lamona—a New Breed of Poultry," *Journal of Heredity* (January, 1921), pp. 2-29.

² H. P. Stuckey, "The Slit-Eyed People," *Journal of Heredity* (April, 1916), p. 147.

³ William C. Farabee, "Inheritance of Digital Malformations in Man," *Papers of the Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University*, III, No. 3 (March, 1905), pp. 65-87.

⁴ Albert Ernest Jenks, "A Piebald Family of White Americans," *American Anthropologist* (New Series), (April-June, 1914), pp. 221-37.

toothless and hairless males and the females who carry and transmit the character to their sons is known to Mr. Thadani, there is, of course, good reason to expect that toothless and hairless females as well as males would result in certain proportion of the offspring of such marriages; a pure-bred group with all offspring affected could be made by deliberately breeding animals so characterized.¹

There are the three families of pure albinos consisting of albino husband and wife, each family having pure albino offspring, reported by Davenport in 1910.² It recalls to mind the Minnesota albino herd of Holstein cattle.³

I have brought these facts of plant, animal, and human hereditary groups—some from mutants, and others as the result of hybridization—in order to make clear that hereditary groups are being established at the present; and, further, because the laws of heredity are old and not new, to show that hereditary groups have always been forming. These extreme cases of human hereditary groups are brought to illustrate beyond dispute the working of the laws of heredity in producing hereditary human groups. In the same way groups varying advantageously for survival and cultural advancement have been formed.

Many hereditary human groups have perished. Many others have persisted and are with us today. The field anthropologist is familiar with distinctive hereditary groups of peoples in isolated islands, in numerous mountain pockets, in areas segregated by commanding physiographic barriers, and even in villages scattered over areas of uniform environment. Many groups with distinctive cultures are older than their own historic records. Some, however, are recent, such as the Englishman's group, the result of hybridization, which is only 855 years from the date of its last ethnic and cultural contributor. Another one is forming now by hybridization in Pitcairn Island, bred up of Polynesian and

¹ K. I. Thadani, "A Toothless Type of Man" (a preliminary paper), *Journal of Heredity* (February, 1921), pp. 87-88.

² C. B. Davenport, "Hereditary Albinism," *Journal of Heredity* (May, 1916), pp. 221-23.

³ See article by J. A. Detlepsen, "A Herd of Albino Cattle" (with illustrations), *Journal of Heredity* (November-December, 1920), pp. 378-79.

British ancestors. Another is unquestionably forming by hybridization in our own Appalachian Mountains where the recurrent physical type greets the observant visitor in every cove in which he loiters—yet I failed to find there adults of more than four generations of known American birth and hybridization.

The weaknesses and limitations of the body of early man compelled him to cultural activities, if he would survive; his fortunate variations toward intelligence superior to his competitive animal neighbors enabled him to begin lowly cultural activities. In time, man intensified those distinctive cultures which protected and defended him. So, again, in time, certain hereditary groups have specialized in those cultures which were particularly protective in preserving their integrity. Thus guarded and defended by distinctive cultures strong, intelligent, and self-conscious hereditary groups have preserved themselves even without the sustaining help of the old home environment. Even scattered about the earth some of those hereditary groups have survived primarily because of their distinctive cultures. It is probable that many of the groups which have perished did not succeed in developing strong distinctive culture.

This brings me to the second point of this paper—that distinctive cultures developed by hereditary human groups become protective and defensive devices. I shall suggest a hereditary group known by all to be so old, so pure-bred, and so distinctive in physical, psychic, and cultural aspects that no one can seriously question the case.

Because of the ease with which cultures travel from one advanced cultural group to another today, because also there are such persistent efforts to put the culture of one group over on another (seen especially in missionary endeavors in religion, education, medicine, sanitation, etc.), and, further, because developing "wants" invite the distinctive culture of one group into the very heart of another group (as seen in modern commerce, and in scientific agricultural and zoöcultural importations from foreign lands), my second point can be made clearer with fewer facts by the use of such an old and well-known group as the one I propose to use, though similar truths could be brought almost endlessly from other hereditary groups of people.

The Jewish people are before us as a hereditary group freed from the influence of stable or uniform physical environment. This is one of the most pure-bred groups in modern civilization. Inter-marriage between Jews and non-Jews has much more commonly removed the Jew from his group than it has added non-Jews to the Jewish group. There have probably been one hundred "emancipated Jews" to one person converted to the Jews. Throughout the diaspora the emancipated Jew has been a cause of deep sorrow to the Jewish people. Some modern authors say 10 per cent are or will be emancipated; Zangwill puts it at about one-third. Leaving aside the emancipated Jew, one cannot deny that the Jewish group is a decidedly pure-bred hereditary group.

Others besides, and since, Frederick Adams Woods, have proved that man inherits mental as well as physical characteristics. I shall use a few recent and readily accessible quotations, all from Jewish authors, to show that the Jews believe they have preserved from the time of their racial inception the same characteristic reactions to the problems of life.

Untermeyer, writing of contemporary Jewish poetry in America, says:

I shall, however, mention certain outstanding racial characteristics and illustrate how strikingly these qualities are being evoked in the literature—and particularly the poetry—of contemporary America. Even the lightest sketching of our literary backgrounds reveals that troubled energy, that probing dissatisfaction, that intent and almost too intense introspection which is so eternally Semitic. The exponents of this spirit revivify their ancient inheritance.¹

Again, a Jewish intellectual leader in America writing over the pen name of "S. Baruch," says:

In the dim dawn of our history, on the plains of Chaldaea, our father Abraham (whether a historical person or a figment of tradition does not matter) began the process of weeding out from our hearts and minds certain legends; he demolished the idols of his tribe. Generation upon generation of our ancestors have diligently labored at this weeding-out process; with the result that to break idols has become Judaism's mission.²

¹ Louis Untermeyer, "The Jewish Spirit in Modern American Poetry," *Menorah Journal*, VII (August, 1921), 121.

² S. Baruch, "Whither?" *Menorah Journal*, V (June, 1919), 125.

What is truer? I leave you to supply the long list of names from the days of Old Testament history down to yesterday's new from Russia.

Against racial and cultural disintegration the Jewish group has ceaselessly struggled. Properly to witness this struggle for race preservation it must be realized that, in the words of Simon, "The nationality of the Jew is inseparable from his national God."¹

We cannot deny that the Jews in their religious beliefs and practices have developed a decidedly distinctive culture. This culture they have used, and have been driven to use, toward protective and defensive ends.

Simon says:

What in fact the Jewish nation has been doing during the last two thousand years is only a continuation, under different conditions, of what it was doing before the Exile. It has been preserving its identity as a nation, which no merely physical weapon could have secured, by means of spiritual defences—that is, by turning its national-religious idea to that use which circumstances dictated, ever adapting and developing that idea and its consequences under the stress of changing conditions, to the end that it might live.²

Again, the same author says:

It is in response to the national instinct of self-preservation that we Jews in exile have woven around our belief in a universal God an all-embracing web of ceremonial practice, which for the best part of two thousand years has been at least as essential to Judaism as any particular religious belief. For the salvation of the individual soul a set of dogmas and moral rules may be enough; but if a nation wishes to preserve itself after it has lost the ordinary attributes of nationhood, it must have a distinctive mode of life. It goes without saying that the characteristic Jewish mode of life has come down to the present day as something specifically religious. For the Jew took with him into exile nothing but his God and his Law, and the development of his national life had to proceed in a single channel. With parliaments and armies and navies, with the making of roads and railways, with the development of styles of art and architecture, with the devising of improved mechanical means for the satisfaction of human wants—with all these things the Jewish nation as such has had nothing to do since the dispersion. The national energies had to find their outlet in the working out of a scheme of life which should preserve the identity of a nation without a territory or a parliament or a gun or a ship to call its own.³

¹ Leon Simon, "Religion and Nationality," *Menorah Journal*, V (August, 1919), 231.

² *Ibid.*, p. 231.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

Enough has been said, I believe, strongly to suggest that a hereditary human group, as it develops the cultures necessary for its continuance, tends to intensify and thus to make distinctive that particular culture which best preserves the purity of the group. Remember it is at all times dominated by the biological urge to survive and replenish the earth. It seems to be true that dominant and distinctive cultures so far in history—or up to the time of the making of immigrant nations—have commonly come from strong hereditary human groups. The two have been quite inseparable.

The third point I desire to suggest in this paper is that, more commonly than we have, we should turn our attention to the study of hereditary groups of people as the originators and carriers of distinctive cultures for the enrichment of civilization. We should do this in all phases of cultural life—in the social, economic, political, educational, moral, and aesthetic fields. It appears true that the hereditary group, carrying no foreign cultural burdens, bears the load of its own cultural activities with least friction, because those activities are of its own development. They are necessary and they have been made to fit. Thus each group, on its then level of development, tends to perfect its distinctive cultures. Its cultural devices tend to become really cultural art, due to harmonious practices stripped of superfluities.

As the educated man today reaches for and prizes the pure-bred plants and animals to enrich his economic world through their perfection and prepotency, so I am certain we should go to pure-bred and distinctive cultures to enrich and make more varied the present and future fruitage of civilization.

There is a powerful and meaningful message in this whole subject for modern nation builders. Evidently the nations which will long survive will breed their own and highly develop their distinctive cultures.

INFLUENCE OF HEREDITARY TRAITS ON HUMAN PROGRESS

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ABSTRACT

Hereditary Traits as Factors in Human Progress.—A rather neglected factor in the recent development of sociology is the importance of hereditary traits of the individual as the starting-point of human progress. If there can be no progress without the social environment and the social heredity it is evident that nothing can be done without the individual human traits or natural inheritance. Progress is determined by the extent to which superior hereditary traits are put in touch with opportunity. The foundations of association are found in the primary human instincts. They are modified by the physical and social environment. Together with the emotions they represent the driving power of human association. *Control of hereditary traits by intelligence.* Human progress demands that instincts and emotions should be placed more fully in control of intelligence. The program of society is to discover and utilize these superior individual traits by giving them the right training and the right environment. Differences of individual traits should be recognized and superior traits put in touch with opportunities; thus individual responsibility will not be lost and group activity will be made effective. *Tradition and progress.* All progress occurs through the breaking away from tradition. The social heritage may be for or against human progress. Great inventors, great religious leaders, great statesmen and great educators are those that have the courage to break with convention and thus cause a mutation which lifts society to a higher plane. Progress of today is a call to the superior. We may not be spending too much time on the mediocre and the inferior, but we do not fully recognize that all progress depends upon utilization of superior individual traits.

The great complexity and tremendous activity of modern social life are overpowering. Organization and super-organization from the local group to the international combination present such a network of interlacing forms and overlapping agencies that the intelligence of man seems unable to direct them. The dominance of group activity makes a machine-made world with mass play in industry, education, religion, politics, and social order. The individual seems overwhelmed in the social plexus and appears insignificant in comparison with social functions. As major problems of life are involved in the interrelationships of groups the sociologist turns his attention to the function of the group. He faces the tide of oncoming events, observes the mass play of civilization, studies society in its social complexes and concludes that the hope of human progress is wrapped up in process of the group.

No doubt the influences of group activity in building personality and furnishing opportunity to the individual are normal processes of development, but the recent importance attached by philosophers to the activities of the group would lead one to infer that in the beginning society created man, generated his instincts, and endowed him with reason, in short that man was "pre-formed" in the womb of the social group. Yet it is well to remember that society is not born and the individual is; that the first creation was not a swarm but an individual; that the stream of life in the germ plasm passing from individual to individual makes society possible. While the importance of society in shaping personality is freely admitted and group activity as a center of dynamic achievement is evident, the hereditary traits of the individual are the points of departure for all human progress. Moreover, the individual becomes a permanent, persistent factor in the whole process of social life. Though society furnishes the means of growth of the completed personality and demonstrates that man cannot develop without the interaction of members of the group, he is the original material out of which society builds itself. Hence it is that in the consideration of human progress or social progress as one of its phases, hereditary traits of the individual should receive full consideration. At least the individual is not a myth, nor a hypothesis, but a living reality in the evolution of sentient beings, and especially to be accounted for in all social processes.

The characters of the physical individual are determined by factors or potencies in the germ plasm of the parents. They are expressed in the body forms and body functions of the offspring. The perpetuation of individual traits and their variation through the union of the sexes produce qualities which determine the individual differences. This gives an opportunity for progress through individual variation. This process of evolution, however, is not a creation but a transformation, progress being determined through variation and mutation. The development of the body and of the brain of the individual has probably reached its climax so far as physical power is concerned. There is not likely to appear a physical superman on account of the limitations of differentiation and wherever we have highly specialized physical development as

in the nervous system it is offset by decline in other physical functions; at least the size and the power of the brain seem not to have changed in many centuries. This is true of other organs of the body. The hope of progress consists so far as the body is concerned in developing what nature has provided by natural and successful combinations. The direction of human heredity in the future may yield large returns by giving nature an opportunity to select superior qualities and giving opportunity for the development of those physical hereditary traits. In this the direction of the intelligence might do a great deal while nature makes her selection in her own workshop. From the very beginning of the life in the germ cell, through the embryonic period, after birth, and to the end of individual life, the environment modifies the development of the individual. The hereditary traits are thus vitalized intrinsically and modified extrinsically through the process of life-development.

But primarily these traits are not determined by the environment of the body cells but by factors and potencies originally existing in the germ plasm. Following the same law after birth, these traits may be modified and given opportunity for development by social environment. The individual dies at maturity and passes on the hereditary characters. All that he has acquired during his individual life does not visibly affect the offspring. The latter begins not where the parent left off, but just where he began, and must live over the life of experience, of trial and error, in developing the individual body. But he has inherited from his ancestry the accumulation of social heredity out of which comes the second possibility of progress. Unit characters are handed on from generation to generation, and these are sometimes superior and sometimes inferior, but are unchanged in their fundamental characters by environment and education.

In making this statement the writer is approaching very close to the long controversy over the relative value of heredity and environment which he does not expect to enter at this time except to say that one is as important as the other and both are necessary. For progress cannot be made without improvement along both lines. While biologists are very strong in

their assertions that acquired characters cannot be transmitted there is no lack of argument that environmental conditions may modify and slowly influence through the long generations the qualities of hereditary traits. Darwin asserted that progress was not possible without this. Subsequent biologists have entirely discarded the idea but now a new class of scientists are experimenting under the hypothesis that there is a possible middle ground of slowly changing hereditary traits due to environmental influences. If permanent characteristics are transmitted and acquired characteristics are not, improvement in the racial stock may take place only in the variation of the germ cells. However, it is possible improvement of stock may take place through the modification of the germ plasm by the body cells by slow degrees through long spaces of time. It is possible that the influence of nourishment of the germ cell may cause the determiners certain variations in selection. The experiments are largely based upon principles worked out in immunity. It is certain that there are various bodily unit characters which are transmitted from parent to offspring. Progress is determined by not only the kind and quality of these hereditary traits that are transmitted but especially in the variations which permit new combinations through blending or through accentuation of some qualities and the recession of others, and finally as has been stated in the slow modification of the hereditary selection from generation to generation.

The hereditary mental unit traits are more difficult to discover than the physical, but enough investigation has been carried on to show that the same law controlling physical heredity controls the mental and that the hereditary mental traits or strains are inherited in the same way as the physical. The factors or potencies in the germ plasm determine the character of the mental traits appearing in the offspring. Here as in the physical no traits are inherited directly but only the power exists in the germ plasm to create traits in the offspring similar to those in the original parent. So the child at birth is endowed with hereditary strains which determine his possibilities of development. At birth it begins its life by sensation and reflex action but soon is influenced in its development by its environment both physical and social. At

first he has no power to choose his environment but as his body and mind develop he has within him more or less power to select his environment. Thus the individual heredity comes early in contact with social heredity but the law of selection continues and whether we consider the child biologically or psychologically we find in the very beginning the germ of individual life with its chemical, physical, and vital reactions. Through the embryonic period it draws its very being from the life of the individual who gave it birth, but the development of that life is determined by the stimuli given by physical and social environment. The germ plasm which represents the point of life-departure of the individual has power to determine the possibilities of future development but it does not control the development except in the selective power of the individual. The germ plasm cannot be a social mother originally, nor can society be the mother of the germ plasm; nevertheless hereditary traits are to a certain extent the social determiners because of the element of selection that enters into social heredity.

Thus if heredity can do nothing without environment likewise environment can do nothing without heredity. The social contact is stronger in building up the personality of the child; it brings out and makes possible the potentialities of heredity but environment, social or physical, cannot lay the foundations of life, it can only modify character and make opportunity for development. Granted that no person can be created a full-functioned human person without the social environment the group must first have individual traits before it is formed.

So we find that the individual may be modified during the succeeding generations biologically and psychologically, first through the laws of selection and differentiation determined in the germ plasm and then by adaptation to environment. But adaptation is determined by the quality of hereditary traits combined with the influence of the social group. The environmental influences act in accordance with the law of selection because the social heritage handed down from generation to generation of acquired characters gives him variety of activities out of which he may select those which best advance his development. As the traits that occur in the individual may reappear in the offspring of the next genera-

tion and in the process of inheritance as well as in the process of development, there is no distinct line of demarcation between physical and mental evolution; they necessarily go together so that the potentiality of hereditary traits reveals itself in the psychical as well as in the biological world.

Thus the primary instincts which appear at birth and in the subsequent years immediately following birth are fundamental human traits. These instincts may be modified by habits and environment through the long generations. Primarily the instincts act independently of intelligence but in the course of development of the individual they may become subordinate to the intelligence and are directed by it.

Psychologists have never reached an agreement as to the nature of the human instinct, its time of inception, and its subsequent modifications. The confusion arises largely because investigators have approached the subject from various points of view and because the relation of instinct to intelligence has not been clearly determined. The instinct is a universal quality of sentient beings and is of greater variation and extent in man than in any other animal. In the procession of the species instinct has been discovered in some of the very lowest animals. It expresses itself in different ways in different animals but is an ever constant factor in the process of evolution. Another reason why investigators are confused regarding the nature of the instinct is because they fail to recognize the laws of differentiation involved in its development. Instincts appear in different ways in genetic development. Variation is a constant process and as mind and body of the individual have the same origin they develop in accordance with the same law. Under similar stimuli instincts give similar reactions in the attempt to satisfy biological and psychological purposes and finally in the reaction of the social heredity and social environment there comes an idealism which can find expression only in social activity. Individuals must have a larger expression of their lives in social co-operation. This co-operation may be approached along the lines of instinct but reaches its most fruitful results by direction of intelligence. Hence instincts, emotions, and reason act by differential processes and seldom express themselves in exactly the same way.

Because of the very nature of instinct and its mode of action it is quite normal that investigators approaching the subject from different points of view and from different fields of investigation should have widely different conceptions of instinct and hence make widely different definitions of it. The error comes in trying to reduce a changeable function of life permitting great variation to a fixed formula. One might as well say that there is no such thing as a mind, or indeed no such thing as consciousness because of the excessive variability of those two definite phenomena as to say there are no such things as instincts. There is something which is not reason nor intelligence, nor physical nor chemical force which appears and reappears in each successive generation without habit, without instruction, without imitation. One may as well call it instinct as to call it the "great indefinable." Birds, ants, and bees exhibit actions coming from inherent qualities of their life. They do not come from intelligence, nor reason, nor emotion; they are simply instincts as real as any other quality discovered in sentient beings.

Man as we know him has developed more or less intelligence although his motives are derived from the instincts and emotions. Social heredity gives the infant protection and has given him habits and environmental influences from the very beginning of his life of sensation and reflex action. Yet the same law of instinct that moves in the lives of lower animals is applied to him. He performs certain functions not determined by intelligence or reason, similar to those of all animal life. Call them instincts. It does not matter that these are more or less influenced by environment, especially social environment, or directed by intelligence. The law is there and because of the complex organization of man these instincts operate in a great many diversified ways and because of the influence of the complex environment their expression must be more or less irregular. The instincts are really the sources of human association. These accompanied by the emotions are more powerful in human action than all of the direction of reason and intelligence. They represent the urge of association and the foundation of mutual attraction.

One of the most confusing things regarding the interpretation of the instinct is the fact revealed by observation and experimenta-

tion that instincts do not all appear at the birth of the child but appear as needed. Thus all the instincts that pertain to self-preservation and defense occur early in the child, later comes the sex instinct, and subsequently the maternal instinct which appears after the more complete development of the individual. Religion comes still later, which represents an expression of many instincts and emotions. All the way along, in the development of the individual, habit interferes with instinct, giving it a deflected action from its hereditary impulse. Environment suppresses or accentuates it or causes it to act in certain ways. The social organization also influences its mode of expression and the intelligence seeks to guide and modify it in various ways, but with all of these modifications the large part of the actions of human beings is determined by the instincts and the emotions. It is only in the very recent history of the human being that the intelligence has attained the ascendancy and so limited is its power and so irregularly imperfect is its rule that the instincts and emotions still represent the dominant forces of individual and social life. Human progress will be measured in the future just to the extent which intelligence becomes a guide and a director of these forces.

Society as an entity could not write a book of merit, compose a symphony or invent a machine; but individuals with superior hereditary traits may do these things. Society through education and accumulation of wealth makes it possible to protect these hereditary traits and to utilize these products and assist the inventor in accomplishing his purpose. Social heredity which represents the traditional accumulation of knowledge and skill of the past handed down from generation to generation gives the individual his workshop. The influence of this social heritage in shaping the life of the individual increases as society becomes more complex. If the hereditary traits determine the possibilities of development the social heredity furnishes the opportunity. The influence of social environment on the personality will bring to light the modification of social selection, for the social selection modifies the individual in his choices. Whether the hereditary trait will find opportunity for full development and full achievement will be determined by genealogical, physical, and mental characters and the selective training and selective environ-

ment given respectively to the superior, the mediocre, and the inferior.

For progress is dependent upon hereditary traits on one hand and environmental conditions and processes on the other. It is difficult to determine what constitutes progress. Among philosophers happiness is more frequently set up as the ideal of human life than any other. This largely comes from moralists, while biologists hold that the perpetuation of the species is the great aim of life. Perhaps both are right but the question cannot be settled in the case of the former without determining the ideal or in the case of the latter without determining what the species will do after perpetuation.

Much confusion of thought arises from failure to draw a clear line between influences arising from individual hereditary traits and social heredity. This is indeed difficult because in development the two work co-operatively and simultaneously. The inheritance of former generations not only provided the tools of workmanship but knowledge, through experience, of how to modify environment. The child is born into a status of language, of law and social organization, of religion and education, with an accumulation of the vast material products of the previous ages. As an individual he cannot inherit the experience of his parents but must begin where they began, but social heritage surrounds him and envelops him with a multitude of opportunities to build his personality. It provides the means and shapes the course of his development. But social heritage in itself does not insure progress because there is good and bad social heritage just as there are strong and weak individual hereditary traits. The binding influences of tradition in religion, language, and social customs frequently paralyze effort and keep the group or race from going forward. How often has religious taboo or religious sanction kept the intelligence from laying hold of better things and starting the race on a new line of development. Likewise traditions and customs of government have kept people from liberty, which otherwise would have been their rightful heritage. The traditions of royalty, nobility, and autocracy in Europe, long binding in their influence, are the real causes of the present devastation. War was a cruel and barbarous method of revealing inherent weakness.

Social heredity like individual heredity may be either good or bad. It frequently happens that the binding influences of tradition and custom of former generations and indeed the environment caused by social heredity may prevent variations in human society and retard progress. For most frequently is progress initiated by breaking with tradition, habit of thought or custom. Invention of a new form of government, a new law, or the discovery of a new application of physical force to environment brings about a change which may make for human betterment. It is merely the breaking away from customary usages of society but the change is started by an individual of vision. It is the man with superior traits that becomes the leader. True it is that society has furnished him opportunity, given him an accumulated mass of knowledge, possibly an education and a workshop, but society as a whole originates nothing, it merely adapts and uses the product of the inventive mind. At best there are few great leaders of human progress; few inventors in the industrial arts or in education, few great artists who have lifted art to a higher plane, few great seers who have given the world a new religious impulse, few statesmen who have caused a mutation in government and few great reformers who have lifted social action to a higher plane. The combination of characters through variation in the individual causes these superior hereditary traits which make possible the initiative of social progress. A more careful study of these traits and their adaptation to a social environment might lead us to a social process which would bring superiors into leadership. The potential genius must be put in contact with opportunity.

Social organization is not too complex, not too great and overpowering, to be wisely directed by the genius of man when brought into direct action. But the present social order is too large for the average brain of man. The average brain may turn the wheels of the machine but cannot direct it to a higher plane of utility. The superiors should be called to the front. In our universal education, with the popular notion of equality of inherited powers, too much dependence is placed on mediocrity. Not less attention to the education of the masses but more attention to the superiors would help solve the problem.

The work of the National Research Council to devise means of determining superior brain qualities of undergraduates, and to furnish impetus and opportunity to lead such superiors to devote their lives to higher education and scientific research is a step in the right direction. The examination of students by mental tests to discover their individual variation in capacity and traits, though incomplete in its methods and results, will have a tendency to utilize the inherent qualities in social adaptation or accommodation. These and other movements to bring to the front a neglected factor in human evolution will make efficient the intensive study of group activity so persistently and ably followed by recent sociologists.

There are not many ways in which society may direct the processes of human evolution so far as the improvement of the hereditary traits is concerned. The establishment of an environment which would induce the mating of superiors and protect against the mating of inferiors would gradually lead to a better racial stock. The arguments for and against the intermarriage of races and birth control hinge altogether upon the laws of natural inheritance. If too widely differentiated races intermarry the result is an offspring consisting of widely differentiated types of individuals ranging from high superiors to low inferiors but the larger number will be of the latter class. On the other hand if two races of superior type intermingle the result is a large number of superiors and a small number of inferiors. Yet if too close integration of similar stocks continues for a long time the danger is in highly specialized offspring which are unfitted to adapt themselves or accommodate themselves to a highly complex environment. Hence progress may decline. Finally if two inferior stocks intermarry the presumption is an occasional superior and a large mass of offspring whose tendency is downward because of lack of superior leadership. Thus racial heredity like individual, and indeed like social, heredity may be good or bad and in either case the rational selection that social heritage and nature give is the key to human progress.

SUMMARY

Granting the importance of social organization and group activity better results would be attained if more attention were

paid to the hereditary traits of the individual for these traits are the points of departure for all human progress. The individual is a real entity out of which the completed personality is created through social environment. The primary human instincts represent the foundation of human association; they are modified by the stimuli of physical and social environment; they are interfered with by habits induced by the same causes; they are controlled to a limited extent by intelligence. Human progress demands a larger control of intelligence over instincts and emotions. The program of society is to discover and utilize these superior individual traits by giving the right kind of environment. This may be done by selecting out of the great social heritage the special environment that will best develop the individual traits and by putting individuals of superior traits in touch with the opportunities of the right kind of environment. Finally, the co-operation of individuals thus effected will establish the proper directive agency of the group. Thus individual responsibility will not be lost and group activity will be made effective.

EUGENIC ASPECTS OF HEALTH

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ABSTRACT

Eugenic Aspects of Health.—Health means an abundance or at least a fair amount of vitality. It has been one of the principal factors in human progress. Eugenics means the improvement of a species by the mating of the best. This means little improvement of the specimens are generally of poor vitality, and healthy human beings are rare, as the draft records and other findings prove. Improvement of the race must come through eugenics based on greater vitality. The leaders of men have been healthy. Education must be modified so as to make health the central feature. In this way only will it be possible to reduce crime, increase vitality, and raise the ratio of men of talent and genius.

1. *Meaning of health.*—Health means freedom of action because it implies only a slight consciousness concerning the body; such consciousness is a feeling of diffused well-being owing to surplus energy. Somewhat more broadly, health means the state of the body which enables it to perform every function that can reasonably be expected of it, to accomodate itself to each ordinary task, and to be equal to some exertion without painful sense of fatigue. This implies as external signs erectness and firmness; as internal requisites, good construction, ability to adapt itself to widely divergent conditions of life or of climate without deterioration of energy; endurance, and resistance to morbid influences; and finally, it means self-control—mental, emotional, and sexual; briefly, a balance between organs and organism, so as to produce a co-ordinated whole, well equipped for action.

2. *Health as a factor in progress.*—There are, roughly speaking, six factors which have influenced the progress of mankind—food, geographic and climatic conditions, race characteristics, social heredity, physical heredity or eugenics, and health.

In the course of history each of these factors has had its influence and it is not necessary to evaluate its importance here. We may freely admit that in some countries and in some periods one factor predominated over the others; but an ultimate analysis would

prove that all factors had a bearing on the making of human history, and that they are interdependent. Favorable geographical conditions, for instance, will be accompanied by a larger food supply, and this would normally assure better health and a better physical heredity. There is a give-and-take between the factors, because life is a bundle of facts, not an abstract theory.

3. *Meaning of eugenics.*—Eugenics aims at the improvement of the human stock by the mating of the best individuals. The term "best" is, however, purely relative. The best man in a gang of thieves is still bad; the healthiest man in a malaria-stricken area is still far from well. The very finest specimen of a crab apple is still greatly inferior to a mediocre pippin or Baldwin. Mating the best specimens of a generally poor species will result in some improvement; it will, however, be neither far reaching nor rapid, because physical heredity moves within the narrow lines of direct descent, and there very slowly. We must, consequently, resort to the other aspects of eugenics if larger results are to be attained, e.g., the improvement of housing and diet, the better regulation of work, and the more equitable distribution of play and leisure.

Health is, however, the most important of these auxiliaries of eugenics.

4. *The health situation.*—Looking at the world's population as a whole, we find that a very large part of it is in poor health. In the tropics and subtropics from 60 to 75 per cent of the people suffer from one or two diseases, chiefly malaria and hookworm, either successively or simultaneously. These two diseases are often supplemented by others, epidemic, endemic, and chronic. This low state of health is indicated by the small working power of the natives in those countries. In higher latitudes the situation is somewhat better, because climate is more favorable, and medical and sanitary science is of a higher order. There are however, other conditions, e.g., factory work, crowding in tenements, contamination of the air, which counteract to a certain extent the beneficial factors created by science.

England may be said to have been the best-fed nation in Europe during the nineteenth century; but she had a rude awakening in

the Boer War. The percentage of those unfit for military duty was so large that Parliament ordered a special investigation with a view of finding some remedy. Our population is undoubtedly the best fed in the world, but we, too, had a rude awakening in 1917. Of the 1,300,000 volunteers examined in 1917 for the Army and Navy, only 448,859 were physically qualified, the rejections being 66 per cent. During the draft of 1917 and 1918 about 3,208,000 men were examined, of whom 521,606, or 16.25 per cent were utterly unfit for any military duty whatsoever. A comparison of the age groups of registrants showed that 76.89 per cent of those aged twenty-one were physically fit, and of the age group 21-30 only 69.17 per cent were fit. Of such a select group of men as college students are supposed to be, one in every four was physically disqualified for full military duty.

Among our school children health is not particularly good, according to Dr. S. Josephine Baker. About 15,000,000 of the 20,000,000 school children in this country are in need of attention today for physical defects which are partially or completely remediable. A special investigation of 247,735 children in New York in 1917 proved a total of 190,898 to suffer from some defect. Similar figures could be given concerning other classes of the population, but they would simply give us the same picture.

Of greater importance are the mental effects of poor health. The examination for hookworm disease made among United States soldiers confirmed in a striking way what the International Health Board had found elsewhere previous to 1917, and demonstrated that even light infections of hookworm are of great importance. Judged by the Binet-Simon and other tests, many full-grown soldiers who harbored comparatively few hookworms had the mentality of persons only twelve years of age. The mentality of 10,000 white men at Camp Travis who harbored the disease was about 33 per cent below normal. It is not necessary to speak of the retardation of school children who have been underfed or are suffering from even slight illness. No one can tell what the mental effects are upon the 15,000,000 children who suffer from a remediable disease. Mental tests of the Binet-Simon system among 340 school children in Queensland, Australia, showed that there was

an average retardation of approximately two years among children heavily infected with hookworm. The longer the infection persisted, the greater was the retardation. Even among lightly infected children it was nine months.

These boys and girls will grow up some day; they will be the fathers and mothers of tomorrow. What kind of parents will they make? The fathers will be limited in their mental outlook; they will be exhausted after a normal day's work; they will come home in an irritable frame of mind to meet more irritable wives and fretful children. Formerly mothers raised fairly large families without becoming exhausted or neurasthenic. Nowadays one child, if they have any at all, will suffice to drive many mothers into invalidism or make them nervous wrecks. What kind of children will there be from such parents? Plenty of crabapples but mighty few pippins. The children will be loathe to spend more time than necessary in the home with such nervous parents; they will seek excitement, because they do not know the boon of good health; they will "fight shy" of normal work since that taxes their limited physical strength too heavily; they will join gangs, vicious or criminal. It would take the pen of a Dostoyevsky to portray the married life of such a family; but meanwhile the divorce courts furnish ample evidence of the misery which some people find unendurable, while those of firmer moral and physical texture "grin and bear it." I am convinced that a larger percentage of divorces is ultimately reducible to poor health than to any other reason, although it is not a legal cause of divorce except in the veiled form of incompatibility of temperament or disposition. The balance and buoyancy which good health insures are lacking in these cases, and the only remedy is found in separation or resignation. The effect upon the children can more easily be imagined than described.

We know, though, what these children will do when they grow up. Regular exertion in systematic work is out of the question for them; those of lower mentality become paupers, gangsters, or criminals; those of higher mentality turn into revolutionaries, embrace spurious occupations, or take to some other form of parasitism. Since they have never become accustomed to regular mental or physical work, any promise of an easy life under a new

system of society seems attractive, and any form of activity which yields a living is readily resorted to. A physically poor specimen of man is apt to breed revolutionary ideas or accept them without much examination, because the capacity for doing so is lacking, and the absence of health with its balance inclines the individual to innovations merely for the sake of excitement.

5. *Eugenics based on health.*—It is beyond any doubt that society has progressed owing to the achievements of its talented men and women. The leaders have shown the way, and have often lost their lives in trying to overcome the passive or active resistance of the masses. We must have more leaders today and in the future than ever before; and they must be of a higher grade, because our civilization is more complex than that of the past. How can we get them? Only by cultivating health. Without health eugenics will always remain a utopian dream of the immature or a *pium desideratum* of the academicians. They may work out the technique of how long-haired and short-haired, or black-haired and white-haired rabbits hand down these characteristics in a straight line or by crossing; little good will be accomplished thereby, at least in the human realm, although breeders of animals may profit greatly from such experiments. Eugenists must make it one of their chief concerns to join physicians, sanitarians, hygienists, sociologists, and others, in improving the health of the community, because only in that way can a proper basis be laid for eugenics.

6. *Leaders are healthy men.*—A distinction should be made between subjective geniuses who, like "the heathen rage and imagine vain things," and the objective geniuses who work hard with the material at hand and succeed in improving the world along some specific line. Concerning the former, we may willingly grant Lombroso's contention that they were often degenerates, or Nisbet's that they were frequently insane. But even among the subjective geniuses the highest types were healthy. A few men only need to be mentioned. Socrates served as a hoplite, or among the shock-troops as we would say, and was put to death at the age of seventy. Measured both by length and breadth of life, most geniuses of modern times were men of good vitality. Sir Isaac

Newton died in his eighty-fifth year, and was, except during the last few years of his long life, not only a very busy man but a healthy man. Darwin was born with a good constitution which he unfortunately ruined, perhaps during the five years' journey on the "Beagle"; it stood him, however, in good stead as soon as he gave it a chance; and he not only accomplished a remarkable amount of work of the highest order, but lived to the age of seventy-three. Herbert Spencer is another man born with a good constitution which he ruined by overwork. Only a boy with first-class vitality could, at the age of thirteen, walk forty-eight miles in one day, forty-seven the second, and twenty the third with very little food during the three days. He lived to the age of eighty-three and accomplished a remarkable amount of work in both quantity and quality. The other member of this trio, Alfred Russell Wallace, passed the age of ninety, and kept vigorous in both mind and body till near his death. Among modern philosophers Kant and Hegel are, perhaps, unexcelled; they enjoyed good health, and Kant died at the age of eighty, while Hegel died of cholera at sixty-one—a disease which almost invariably proved fatal in those days. Among modern poets Shakespeare and Goethe easily take the lead. The great bard of Avon was only fifty-two when he died; this is a good age considering his many activities as actor, dramatist, manager, and above all, boon companion in "merrie England." He was able, notwithstanding the small compensation which actors and writers commanded in those days, to buy two houses in London, and another in Stratford. Of Goethe we know that he was an exceedingly busy man and that he enjoyed good health during his eighty-three years of life. He retained his vitality till death, and his mental vigor until within a year before when he finished his greatest work, the second part of *Faust*. Among the famous Italians four stand out foremost—Dante, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, Galileo. Dante was only fifty-six when he died; this was, however, a good age when we consider the many vicissitudes and the arduous labors of his life, which only a man of good health could have endured. Leonardo da Vinci was a person of splendid physique, outstripping younger men in feats of strength, and zealous in his multitudinous activities; he lived

to be nearly sixty-seven years. Michelangelo worked with furious intensity up to his seventieth year, and then had enough energy left to plan and complete great architectural works like St. Peter's in Rome. He was poet, painter, sculptor, architect, excelling in at least three lines. He retained full possession of his faculties until his death at ninety. Galileo was active along many lines in science, enjoyed good health and made a name for himself by working almost to his death at seventy-eight.

The list of great men who had good health could easily be extended, but the cases given will suffice to prove that men of genius have been healthy men.

7. *Results expected.*—If health should be improved more generally, we may look at least for three results: (a) Even eugenists have given up the idea of mating for specific qualities, e.g., musical, philosophical, or scientific ability, because, as Galton pointed out long ago, the genius is a rare combination of qualities. But, as he endeavored to prove, the unique experience of Athens from 500–400 B.C. in producing a large number of men of talent may be repeated by improving the health of the community. If, as Ward maintained, genius is fairly generally distributed; and if, as I have tried to prove, the man of genius is usually a healthy specimen; the mathematical ratio for increasing the number of men of high caliber would be greatly raised. (b) A healthy community will more readily adopt a eugenic program than one in which illness is taken as a normal occurrence. Many persons would prefer to marry healthy mates, but if they cannot get their first choice, they will be satisfied with second. This is a matter of statistics, not of pious wishes. Only the improvement of health will remedy the situation and increase the opportunities for a larger number of eugenic marriages. (c) The improvement of health will most probably assist in diminishing the number of criminals. The consensus of opinion among criminologists is now fairly agreed on the proposition that the criminal is below normal in health and structure. Making a suitable living is no easy task even for healthy persons; those below normal must find it much more difficult, and will resort to supposedly less strenuous methods to get their daily bread. And they will mate with those who are likewise inferior in

health; the breed of criminals is thus continued and is, perhaps, increasing in number and in boldness.

8. *What can be done?*—Scrap 50 per cent of our Navy, improve our system of education, and pay more attention to health. The cost of one battleship, about \$40,000,000, if applied to health, would produce results of permanent value. We have proceeded on the theory that the mind has nothing to do with the body. Whatever men of talent have arisen in our midst we have accepted as a gift from the gods. When we enjoyed good health, we sometimes thanked the Lord for the boon, but more frequently we wasted our substance in riotous living. Disease and illness we took either as an inevitable natural event or as a visitation from divine providence for the good of our soul. Our attitude has been that of the pious Yankee about whom his wife said: "Men are funny creatures; the very best of them do not know the difference between their souls and their stomachs. Now take Bateman himself, a kinder husband and a better Methodist never drew breath. Yet as sure as he touches a bit of pork he begins to worry himself about the doctrine of election, until there is no living with him. He'll sit in the front parlor and engage in prayer for hours at a time, till I say to him: 'I'd be ashamed to trouble the Lord with prayer when a pinch o' bicarbonate of soda would set things straight again.'" We have not made the connection between the physical and the mental, when we should have learned that lesson long ago from the Greeks. When we paid attention to the body it was as a thing apart from the mind. Usually, not even that was done.

The British government has spent many millions of dollars on education in the colonies. In many schools colored children are suffering from malarial enlargement of the spleen and nothing is done for their health; they are, however, taught the succession of the Plantagenet kings. In England the children learn a great many other and equally useless things, but little is done for their health, although a recent investigation showed 80 per cent of the children in some board schools to be afflicted with rickets. America is a little more alert to the danger of ill health. Yet even New York City spent only forty-two cents on health out of a total of forty dollars per child in 1915. The Smith-Sterling bill, now before

Congress, appropriates a total of \$200,000,000 to the different states on certain conditions, but only \$20,000,000 for the improvement of health. What is that among so many? One battleship costs twice as much, only to be sold as junk in a dozen years.

The question may be asked, What profit is there in making people well when they are not wise? The reply is, that a healthy man is a greater asset to society than a learned man who abhors and plans the overthrow of society, because he can never think clearly when his body is racked by almost constant pain and he has never felt the boon of buoyant and overflowing health. A well man may acquire wisdom; an undervitalized man never can, although he may cram his memory with knowledge. If eugenists take their task seriously they must begin with the improvement of the health of the many, not with the selection of the few for marriage. And education must pay more attention to health and less to the dead knowledge of the past.

Our fate is either in our own hands, or it is not. People in the past believed that various deities ruled everything from the cradle to the grave. In more recent times this determinism has been translated into terms of natural law, and we have been caught in another net of external causation. We have come to realize at last that our own actions have a goodly share in the making of our lives. We cannot do much in changing our climate or our physical heredity. But we can within reasonable limits improve our health by controlling our diet, housing, work, and mental attitude. We may be unable to produce leaders to order, but we can increase the chances for producing them by raising our standards of health. As modern men we must recognize that the responsibility for success or failure is our own. And education has a rôle to play in this matter.

There is much discussion at the present about vocational education, very little about the improvement of health. Yet, that should be the central feature of a rational system of education with the social sciences grouped around it. If it be granted that we need better men and women, more capable leaders, and a larger number of geniuses, we must begin by formulating new canons of education. It is within our power to do so, and

it must be done, lest we perish. The incapables, chiefly of a physical kind, had but a few years to live in the past, because the struggle for existence weeded them out. These people are now kept alive, thanks to our humanitarianism. It has, however, been pointed out by Herbert Spencer and others, that a great danger is lurking here for the capables, and various proposals have been made for averting it. These measures are in many cases excellent and should be enforced. The least objectionable and the most generally beneficial measure is, however, that for the improvement of health. And teaching along this line must be made in the schools, not in a perfunctory but in a real way. The whole future of society is dependent on a more capable class of men and women. The best way to produce them is by laying the strongest possible stress on the improvement of health. This is not a matter of a year or two, not even of a generation or two, but of many generations. The beginning must, however, be made now. It is for eugenists and sociologists to insist on the making of such a program, and for educators and physicians to work it out. For health and eugenics are interdependent, and in them lies the hope for the future.

THE NECESSITY OF AN ADAPTIVE FECUNDITY

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ABSTRACT

The Necessity of an Adaptive Fecundity.—Contrary to the general impression the death rate is falling faster than the birth rate in the advanced peoples; so that their natural increase is greater than a generation ago. In the last twenty to twenty-five years science and sanitation have reduced mortality about a fourth. Throughout history population has been perishing from two to four times as fast as in the United States today. *Family limitation.* Therefore we do not dare use all our fecundity; in fact we do not dare use half of it. The practice of family limitations is therefore unavoidable. Without it there would be *from one to three billions* of population in the United States by the end of this century.

Not long ago President Harding noticed in the photogravure section of a Sunday newspaper a picture of Mr. and Mrs. Domenico Zaccachea, of New York City, and their sixteen children; whereupon he wrote Mrs. Zaccachea congratulating her upon being the mother of such a splendid brood. The gesture won the President friends, no doubt, but did it strike a note which needs to be struck? The father of this family is a porter at twenty dollars a week. There is no evidence that he has unusual gifts to endow his children with. By complimenting him the President of the United States encourages our millions of commonplace citizens to court the gratitude of their country by begetting families of sixteen children. Is the country in need of them?

I

The other day I greeted a former student of mine who was born in 1830 when the world had had but half as many inhabitants as today. In her lifetime she has seen 850 millions of persons added to the human race!

The divine command, "Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth," was uttered to seven people, who were all that remained of mankind. There are now a quarter of a billion times

as many people as there were then. One can but wonder how much longer this emergency mandate is going to be considered as still in force.

Race suicide?

Since this phrase was launched twenty years ago, portentous big-wigs have been wont to send a chill down the spine of their hearers by picturing the enlightened stocks and peoples as headed for extinction because the full quivers of olden time are becoming rare. The clergyman with few children or none at all has felt entitled to thunder like a Hebrew prophet at couples who stop at three or four children whereas their grandparents gave the world ten or a dozen. Family restriction which first showed itself in the vital statistics of France about the middle of the last century, became visible in England in 1878, began leaving its mark on Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Australia in the eighties, attracted notice in Italy, Hungary, and Finland just before the close of the century, and appeared in Germany and Austria in the last decade before the war—has been pointed to as if it were a spreading leprosy. No one stops to consider where these peoples would find themselves today if they had gone on having progeny in the old happy-go-lucky fashion.

Because it affords such a splendid text for Jeremiads and because a hot controversy has raged about the morality of certain restrictive practices, the shrinkage in the size of families has attracted an enormous amount of attention. Every thoughtful person has heard of it, has been urged to confront it as "a grave problem." On the other hand, few but statisticians, life insurance actuaries, and public health officers have noticed the extraordinary lowering of the death-rate which has been brought about in the last forty years. No one has viewed it "with alarm" or lifted a trumpet against it. It has stolen upon us quietly like a genial south wind in February, like a night drizzle after an August drouth. And yet in most countries, so far as population growth is concerned, it quite balances and neutralizes that shortage of the baby crop which has inspired so many gloomy prophecies.

The thing is as plain as the black and white squares on a chessboard. Take the fourteen European countries which have

worth-while vital statistics running back for forty years or more. Compare their records for the half-decade 1881-85, with those of the last half-decade before the war, viz., 1906-10. You will find that in *nine* of them the death-rate fell farther than the birth-rate; so that in 1910 their natural increase was actually *greater* than it had been a quarter of a century earlier before forethought and prudence in the matter of family had given much evidence of its presence among the masses. Taking the average for the fourteen peoples, it appears that while the number of annual *births* per thousand of the general population was *five* less at the end of the period, the number of annual *deaths* per thousand was *five and one-half* less.

Impatient with the limitations of ink-on-paper, a certain yellow-journalist used to wish, when he had something of great moment to communicate to the public, that he could "make a noise resembling thunder." The statistician laments that he cannot thunder to a public which admires families of the Zaccאה type that in the last quarter-century for which we have complete statistics (1881-85 to 1906-10) the death-rate of Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Scotland declined about a *fifth*. That of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England and Wales, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland was lowered about a *fourth*. While that of Australia, Bulgaria, and Holland was reduced about a *third*. In the same period the mortality of the dozen chief cities of the world was reduced by *more* than a third.

Our own country has been tardy in collecting vital statistics. However, we have this most significant fact. In 1900 the death rate in our "registration area"—which then included two-fifths of the American people—was 17.6 per thousand of the population. In 1919 in a registration area which had expanded until it included three-fourths of us, the rate was 13—a reduction of a *fourth* in nineteen years!

II

Save our ingenuity in devising contrivances for blotting out human life, nothing in our time is so sensational as our success in vanquishing certain diseases. For example, in 1911 in the United States the deaths per 100,000 population from the fevers, including typhoid, typhus, and malaria, were only *one seventy-third* as numer-

ous as the deaths from these causes in British India. These fevers are not tropical maladies and there is no climatic or geographic reason for the great prevalence in India. Old records show that these diseases played havoc in this country a century ago. The reason why they scourge us so little today is that public authority has stepped in and applied the discoveries of preventive medicine.

It is this agency that has chased from us those grisly servitors of Azrael, bubonic plague, cholera, yellow fever, and smallpox. Moreover, thanks to increasing personal and social appropriation of the fruits of medical advance, another four of his reapers, viz., typhoid, diphtheria and croup, tuberculosis, and pneumonia have had their sickles dulled. Even at our present stage of knowledge, did the public but will it, they would have no more power over us than cholera has.

The progress of child-saving alone suffices to offset a large part of the fall in the birth-rate. Peeps into the infant mortality of the less-advanced peoples suggest that right down through history from a third to two-thirds of those born have perished in the cradle. A decade ago a quarter of the babies born in Hungary and Russia failed to live a year. In Chile in 1913 I found the loss to be a third, in some cities 47 per cent! Not long ago Moscow parents were losing half their infants within a twelve-month. As for the Orient, the fate of its innocents is horrifying. In 1910 in the innermost province of China an American medical missionary with twenty years of practice gave me his opinion that from 75 to 85 per cent of the children born in his district die before the end of the second year. The first census the Japanese took in Formosa showed that half of the babies born to the great Chinese population there do not live as long as six months.

On the other hand, where the lessons of modern hygiene and medicine have been well learned, infants are saved with a success that our forefathers would have attributed to magic. Already there are perhaps a dozen peoples that are getting more than nine-tenths of their children through the first year of life. Our country is near the foot of this enviable class but, nevertheless, there are twenty-five American cities which save nineteen babies out of twenty. It is in New Zealand, however, that the wee ones bear a

charmed life. In that happy land there are good-sized cities that lose the first year only *one infant in twenty-seven*.

III

That in our huge composite American population clogged with some extremely backward elements Death should take, year after year, but one in seventy or one in seventy-five is an utterly new thing in the experience of peoples. Even if we were a stationary people and not an expanding people, I suppose that only one in fifty or one in fifty-five would die in a twelve month. In all the life of our race extending over a thousand centuries and more the like of this has never been known. It behooves us to *adapt* our behavior to it as we adapt our behavior to artificial light or power machinery or the automobile. But we *see* these things, so we recognize at once the necessity of conforming our conduct to them. On the other hand, most of us *do not see* this latter-day crippling of Azrael and therefore do not realize that any change in our standards of judgment is called for.

For example, through its first millennium and a half—during which its doctrines crystallized—the Christian church was in the presence of a human mortality which must have been from two to four times that which we experience today. Naturally the church became fixed in the idea that overpopulation is nothing to worry about and in her inspired wisdom she branded as a sin the deliberate curtailment of conjugal fecundity. Can this position be maintained indefinitely into the future in view of the astounding success of modern medical science and sanitation in enabling people to live out a normal life-term?

IV

If only the good men who are so dogmatic in this matter would condescend to apply the test of arithmetic!

Conceive that as a people we came under the conviction of sin with respect to our current widespread practice of restricting the size of the family. Suppose that while keeping mortality down to thirteen per thousand, our women would feel it their duty to emulate the prolificacy of the *hausfraus* of Prussia during the decade before the war when the Kaiser constantly incited them to produce what turned out to be "cannon-fodder." Ignore migration into

or out of this country. Well, then, by the end of this century the United States would contain more people than all Europe does today.

Suppose again that while preserving human life with our present success we should for the next seventy-eight years have children at the present rate of the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and the Italians. In that case, the year 2000 would see the population of our country more than 500 millions.

However, the Teutons taught us to stigmatize the Latins as "decadent," and there is, indeed, reason for suspecting that in these peoples a great many couples have no more children than they think they can provide for. Their upper class and *intelligentsia* are by no means careless multipliers. Let us turn, then, to the simple and unspoiled peoples of the Balkans. If American women should give themselves to child-bearing with the whole-heartedness of the women of Bulgaria and Roumania, by the close of this century our country, if it kept its present mortality, would boast as many human beings as there are now in all Asia and Africa!

Go a bit farther. Suppose that American womanhood rose still more nobly to the demands of their Heaven-ordained destiny. Imagine that they bore children as freely as the secluded wives of British India or the women of Russia under Nicholas II. Of course, with so many babies in the population it would be hard to keep our low death-rate. Then too, low mortality and big families simply do not go together. Various studies show that families of more than nine are two or three times as likely to perish in their infancy as those born into families of less than five. Moreover, many women would have their lives cut short by excessive child-bearing. There are settlements of the foreign-born in our Middle West in which the typical woman dies trying to bring into the world a twelfth, fifteenth, or twentieth baby.

Nevertheless, imagine that with the aid of more skill and science we could hold our death-rate down to thirteen while the birth-rate swelled to forty-eight per thousand. In that case our country at the end of this century would have a population equal to that of the entire globe at the outbreak of the World War!

Let us venture on another hypothesis. More than any people in the world the French Canadians realize what we are authoritatively assured is the Christian ideal in this matter of reproduction.

Nowhere are women so submissive to the admonitions of their spiritual director, so resigned to the burden of children that is laid upon them. Hence a fecundity in certain parts of the province of Quebec which is not matched in any other part of the world where there is such a thing as vital statistics. In a year fifty-five babies are born per thousand of population—nearly two and a half times as many as in our "registration area."

To be sure, it is the graveyard rather than the nursery that is populated by these heroic sacrifices. Students of the Loyola School of Sociology and Social Service in Montreal have established that a baby born in that city is twice as likely to die in infancy as a Toronto baby, more than twice as likely to die as a New York baby and four times as likely not to survive the first year as a baby born in Brookline, Massachusetts. This, however, has really nothing to do with the matter of fulfilling one's duty in respect to reproduction.

Now if our people came to be as docile and devout as these *habitans* of French Canada, every couple willing to have "as many children as God sends," why then about three thousand of those born among us this year would as octogenarians see our country peopled by *three billions* of human beings, that is, by thrice the population of Asia and Africa today with seventy million folks thrown in for good measure. Of course no such numbers could be maintained here, but the calculation shows what we let ourselves in for if we take the Zaccachea family as our ideal.

Suppose that, instead of looking at the performance of other peoples, we should go to our ancestors for a standard. We do not know the birth-rate or death-rate of our great-grand-parents, but we do know that through the forty years intervening between the inauguration of George Washington and that of Andrew Jackson the natural growth of our population averaged 3 per cent a year. Should we equal their record for the remainder of this century the American people would then be two-thirds as numerous as the present inhabitants of the globe!

V

With such Matterhorns of prolificacy in full view, how mortifying appears the actual performance of American mothers. Even with the aid of the millions of big-family foreign-born in our midst,

their fruitfulness is only about a third of that of the French Canadians in the good old days and a mere half of what you find among the Slavic peoples. Our excess of births over deaths is only 70 per cent. Our natural growth of population is a little less than 1 per cent a year. Keeping this up for seventy-eight years and ignoring immigration, we should come to the year 2000 A.D. with only two hundred and twenty-two millions of population.

It is evident then that millions upon millions of American married couples—perhaps the majority of those of native stock—are in some degree slackers. They are regulating the size of their families and this by other means than marital abstinence. Nor is there any prospect that the situation will improve. For the death-rate of our people will be brought still lower. In twenty years the experimenters, the doctors, the public health agencies, and the social workers have pulled it down more than a quarter. Perhaps they can pare it down another quarter in the next twenty years. Why even if there were no fresh conquests of disease, the mere putting into effect *everywhere* among us of measures which are now operating with success *somewhere* would reduce our death-rate to one in a hundred each year. So one need not strain his imagination in forecasting an annual mortality of nine in a thousand or even eight. But as more parents and grandparents round out their lives and death is well-nigh banished from the nursery, there will be fewer gaps in families to be filled and we shall see the annual baby crop shrink to 19 or even 18. Even then, however, our population will be growing as fast as it now is and certainly as fast as it is possible for it to grow without lowering our standard of living.

There is, then, ahead of us an endless vista of restriction of the size of families. We shall leave unused an increasing portion of that fertility which became established in our species long ago in order to meet a rate of wastage which no longer presents itself in civilized life. In China about all of human natural fertility is needed in order to balance deaths, particularly the excessive mortality of infants. In Southern and Eastern Europe about half of this fertility is now required to maintain numbers. In Central Europe a third. In Scandinavia, Great Britain, Australasia and the United States a fourth or less. Some of us will live to a time

when a fifth or even a sixth of human reproductive power will suffice to keep up our population. To be sure, after several decades a stationary population would include such heavy contingents of the later age-classes that the annual death-rate would hover in the neighborhood of fifteen and perhaps 30 per cent of human fertility would be required if numbers were to be maintained. Even then, however, the calling into operation of as much as half of the reproductive power of our race would be sheer madness.

Fewer births in sympathy with fewer deaths, in order that human increase shall not outrun wealth production, signifies that a new thing has come into the life of mankind, viz., a fecundity that *adapts* itself to the economic prospect. In view of their miraculous victories over disease *adaptive fecundity* is, indeed, the only safeguard of the enlightened peoples against the dismal fate of overcrowded China. If such deliberate limitation of family size is a sin, then what an appalling prospect of Divine displeasure opens up! For with further reductions in the mortality rate an increasing proportion of American parents, an increasing proportion of the members of the white race, an increasing number of the peoples of the globe, will either have to violate what they are assured is God's law or else multiply until it will be necessary to hang out on our planet the "Standing Room Only" sign!

VI

If we have no cause to fear lest the advanced peoples grow too slowly it does not follow that all is well. Curtailment of fecundity is most practiced by the capable and ambitious and least by the inert and commonplace. Hence our people grows faster at the bottom than at the top. While the general American birth-rate is quite reasonable under the circumstances, there ought to be bigger families among the rising and smaller families among the stagnating, more progeny left by the gifted and fewer by the dull, less prudence in the good homes and less recklessness in the hovels and tenements.

But that, as Kipling would say, is another story.

ROUND TABLE

THE DELINQUENT GIRL

Mrs. W. F. Dummer, Chicago, Presiding

INTRODUCTION

MRS. W. F. DUMMER, CHICAGO

During the war a group of women were asked to co-operate with the government for the protection of girls about camps. Very shortly the work was changed, becoming part of a law-enforcement department, and these women were faced with a problem they had all too long ignored, that of prostitution. Any girl or woman suspected of venereal disease could be arrested and placed in a special hospital. That reports frequently showed 50 per cent of women so arrested to be free from infection made the justice of this procedure questionable, but it was an emergency health measure and it gave opportunity for the gathering of data, for new protective and preventive efforts, and for constructive work of rehabilitation.

The women made a new line of approach to the study of prostitution, that of modern psychiatry, which finds in each human being a problem for personality analysis and re-education. In his *Mental Conflicts and Misconduct*, Dr. William Healy had delved deep into the causes of asocial behavior, psychologists were finding close relation between emotional depression and intellectual performance, and cures were being effected both of nervous disease and delinquency.

Reviewing the monthly reports from Washington, the weekly reports of district supervisors, and following numerous case histories in detail, these women found their minds challenging traditional opinion both legal and scientific, concerning the delinquent girl. (The average age of the prostitute in a large western area was under seventeen years.) In an article in a medical journal, on the "Psychology of the Prostitute," Major Karpas had agreed with German criminologists that the prostitute was a type. The data gathered by the committee showed wide variety of type. Also, as some of these young girls were of superior intelligence, there came a doubt concerning the high percentages of feeble-mindedness hitherto given for delinquent women. If fear in soldiers could produce pathological symptoms both mental and physical, curable by psychiatry, might not some of this apparent feeble-mindedness be a hysteria, the result of shock? Most case histories showed early sex experience, treated, especially when pregnancy resulted, with utmost scorn, contempt, and condemnation. Surely the world offers to these little unmarried mothers as menacing a front as was faced by the soldiers in France. For girls passing through Juvenile Hall in Los Angeles, right environment is provided

where they receive friendly care and encouragement. As a psychologist said of the soldiers, "Morale is pumped into them." The fact that they have shown during pregnancy an advance in intelligence quotient amounting in some cases to ten points demands a reconsideration of opinion till further data give scientific basis for judgment.

In the introduction to Kammerer's study of *The Unmarried Mother*, Dr. Healy questions whether such a constructive act as bringing a child into the world should ever be classed as a crime. In work with juvenile delinquents it had been found that a girl may come through a sexual experience psychically unharmed whereas another, lacking such physical experience, may be so obsessed with thoughts of sex that she is far more difficult of rehabilitation.

One of the surprises of the war work was the definite number of married women carrying on, not commercial prostitution, but clandestine relationships. They were not vicious but childlike. Their husbands being away, they were unable, even with children, to get on without the aid of a friendly man. The need seemed, not money, but affectionate companionship. In some cases women seemed glad to escape from degrading conditions of marital cruelty, yet they were so simple minded as to accept instead a most casual relationship.

It is not in classified statistics that the value of this study made by women lies but in its effort to discover the psychology of rehabilitation. This new line of approach to the study of the delinquent girl is that of mental hygiene. As Freud cures nervous disease by releasing blocked emotion, so is delinquency curable. Whether or no we accept Freud's theory of sublimation—that the physical manifestation of life-force may be transmuted into psychical and social expression—certain it is that modern methods of correctional education are converting girls thought incorrigible and even psychopathic into efficient young women contributing constructively to the life about them. The first step toward the elimination of prostitution is a changed attitude toward the unmarried mother and her child.¹

SOME PROBLEMS IN DELINQUENCY—WHERE DO THEY BELONG?

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ABSTRACT

Some Problems in Delinquency.—This paper presents in detail two case problems in delinquency in which the social worker was obliged to seek some vital psychological interpretation in order to carry out social treatment and asks whether such problems and the kind of individual and social psychology which they require for their solution

¹Obtainable from Miss Jessie Binford, 800 S. Halsted St., Chicago, are the following pamphlets offered through the Inter-city Conference on Illegitimacy: "The Prostitute and the Mother Imago," by Wilfrid Lay; "Mental Hygiene Aspects of Illegitimacy," Marion Kenworthy; "Mental Hygiene Problems of Normal Adolescence," Jessie Taft.

belong legitimately to any science taught in college or university or whether psychiatry is the only source to which the case worker can go. *Value of Psychology and Psychiatry.* The intimate psychological or psychiatric interpretation, the individual intensive treatment, are fundamental for solving the problems of delinquency. No matter how ideal the social conditions, no matter how farsighted the laws, there will always be compensatory behavior in the lives of individuals, and some of this behavior is bound to be unwholesome and socially undesirable. Instinctive protective reactions on the part of society, even the more enlightened mass treatment in institution, will bring results only by accident. *The Scientific Treatment of Behavior.* What we need is a treatment of behavior so scientific that results instead of being accidental will be subject to intention and prediction. Biology studies the life-history of individual forms and explains any particular details of their behavior in the light of the life of the organism as a whole from birth to death. Where does a similar case study of human beings belong? Without it there can be no scientific solution of the problems of delinquency.

Delinquency is one of those blanket terms like insanity which has had reference more to the protective reaction of society toward it than to any specific content of its own. It is that which society is afraid of and punishes in a more or less instinctive way. Insanity, so called, has until comparatively recently been treated in the same external way in terms of fear and defense reactions. The labels "insane" and "delinquent" have been used like danger signals to block further advance and prevent scientific investigation of the manifold forms of human behavior which they conceal.

The necessity for getting away from such labels and treating the behavior underneath like any other manifestation of human instincts and impulses has been felt most keenly and consciously by two professional groups, the psychiatrists and the social case-workers. They have been under the pressure of immediate and practical need. The modern psychiatrist who has ceased to take refuge under the diagnosis must face the problem of bringing about radical changes in the behavior of a particular individual. The social case-worker too has discovered that her task of social adjustment of families and individuals depends upon a practical understanding of the way people behave and a technique for altering that behavior. No mere label or diagnosis is of any avail as long as Mrs. Jones remains on her doorstep an unsolved problem. The psychiatrist with his scientific training and approach has worked out theories for his practice. He has made hypotheses and tried them out in real situations. He has used the check of success or failure of an experimental method although laboratory control has been impossible. The case-worker, with much less scientific and technical training is compelled to work day in and day out in a more or less blind, instinctive fashion on problems of behavior that require a conscious technique and psychology no less than those which the psychiatrist handles.

Unless the rapid multiplication of psychiatrists combined with an equally rapid decrease in their fees enables them to take charge of all of the problems of human behavior now being treated by the case-worker we shall have to face the question of how the social case-worker is to be trained for her job. Where can she acquire the tools which will fit her for this supremely difficult task?

To what science may she apply for assistance? Has academic psychology or academic sociology any interest in this material? Are they concerned with the practical problems of human behavior and should they legitimately furnish scientific hypotheses arising from and tested out in the problems of everyday life? We should not expect the commercial chemist to use formulas which had been elaborated without reference to real elements and without experimentation. Can we expect the case-worker to go for her interpretations to any science which has few direct and intentional contacts with life as she meets it? The biologist and the physiologist make basic contributions but the case-worker, to be able to use them uninterpreted, has to have a scientific equipment which is rare indeed. The clinical psychologist is most helpful as long as the emotional and instinctive life is kept out of the situation. But he tends not to be interested in anything that cannot at once be reduced to quantitative terms and Mrs. Jones, emotional and irrational, resists such exact measurement. As a matter of fact, the case-worker, in desperation, has turned to the psychiatrist who alone, as far as she can see, is working with an effort at scientific interpretation and control in the very material and problems with which she struggles.

May I present to this conference in some detail two practical situations, problems in delinquency in which the social worker was obliged to seek some vital psychological interpretation in order to treat the case and ask whether such problems and the kind of individual and social psychology which is necessary for their solution belongs legitimately to the field of any science which is to be found in the college curriculum? Could the case-worker obtain the necessary insight and training from any source other than psychiatry?

Ruth, fourteen, Irish, pink-cheeked and blue-eyed, in her first year of high school, the picture of attractive innocent girlhood, had been taken to the house of detention for stealing a diamond pin and taking money from a teacher's desk. When her denials were finally broken down by proof, she confessed to a long history of petty thieving, hitherto unpunished and for the most part undiscovered. The facts in Ruth's history are as follows: Her mother, to whom she had a deep attachment, died when she was eight. The father married again very soon a nervous, irritable, nagging woman who never liked Ruth and whose presence was deeply resented by her. There was continual strife in which each struggled for the backing of the father, who in desperation, finally put Ruth and her sister in an orphanage. He failed to pay their board promptly and when the matron threw this up to Ruth in a quarrel, she ran away and took refuge with an old friend of her mother who had promised to stand by her in case of need. Her father, quite willing to keep the peace and escape financial responsibility, allowed her to stay on with these people for a year or two. In this family Ruth was under the authority of the only daughter, a young woman in her twenties, who had theories about bringing up children. She was inclined to be rather strict and allow little freedom in the matter of recreation or spending money. But when she was away, Ruth was allowed

generous spending money and a great deal of entertainment by the easy-going mother. She was never compelled to work as a return for her board.

It was in this situation that Ruth's stealing became a court affair. She had always taken change from her stepmother, she had taken food and anything she could pick up at the orphanage. She had ended by taking money at school, money from her foster parents, and the diamond pin from their guest. She had always lied successfully when accused and admitted the truth only when cornered in the affair of the diamond. Once this was out she told the rest of her misdeeds quite freely. She seemed to feel shame but very little repentance. She expressed contempt for her foster home and criticized each member of the family with clever, stinging sarcasm. She flayed her father and stepmother with her sharp tongue and her keen mind enabled her to see the weak points in those around her quickly and surely. She displayed a cynical attitude about everything and everybody. The only thing worth while was money but she admitted that stealing was a poor method of getting it. Education she wanted, not that she enjoyed studying but that she could not hope to make money without it. She took criticism badly and could always turn it off with a counter-criticism. She seemed lazy and unclean about her personal habits. She refused to bathe, or wash her clothes, and instead of studying at night sat up until all hours reading fiction. She declined to talk about sex, claimed not to be interested and to have no use for boys. Thought it too rotten to discuss. She had tested out various forms of religion, was skeptical of the church devotee because her father and stepmother came in that class. She was inclined to boast of her experience in the house of detention and talked freely of her family hatreds to everyone. She openly avowed her intention to work her father for money by coaxing, although she really despised him. On the whole, she presented a most unlovely picture, a personality not likely to arouse sympathy, approval, or affection from those around her. A psychometric test showed her to be distinctly superior intellectually, but inclined to react impulsively and carelessly. There is only one way in which the worker can get a sympathetic attitude toward such a make-up and that is to understand it, to see the human mechanisms back of it and the possibility of modifying them.

The interpretation which was used as a basis for treatment is as follows: Ruth was an intensely egoistic person, desirous of social recognition, approval, personal success, but due to lack of training, unfavorable conditions, and an impulsive, impatient make-up had never learned to work for her satisfactions or make her impression on society in constructive ways. She was quickly discouraged and resentful in the face of failure or hardship and at once turned to some pleasure experience as a compensation, something which would be obtained immediately and easily. She used boastful stories and even her misdeeds to heighten the impression of her own importance. Such behavior patterns are common enough in childhood, where there is so little direct control of environment and immediate gratification can be obtained through crying, tantrums, daydreams, or other indirect methods, but they are not appropriate

to a developing organism and must be abandoned for a direct objective dealing with the facts of life.

All of Ruth's normal cravings had been thwarted by her environment. She had lost her love object in the death of her mother. Her family ideals had been shattered. Her father had been exposed as unfaithful to her mother, and a weakling in the battle between the stepmother and Ruth. He was a failure as a provider and did not pay his debts. Ruth was forced to live in a home situation which had for her none of the elements of a home, nothing to be proud of, no loving approval and overlooking of faults, no faith, no support, and no assurance of safety. She was forced not only to give up her love object but to see it supplanted by an enemy, who also usurped her place and influence with the father. Undoubtedly her sex ideals also met with shock. She was convinced that her father had been interested in the stepmother before the death of the mother. Father and stepmother quarreled and made up, separated and came together repeatedly. Ruth saw marriage as a series of endless petty conflicts. Yet both parents were church goers, given to religious interests. Ruth's disillusionment with life was complete. There was nothing genuine, no real satisfaction. The father and mother who constitute the bridges over which the emotional life of the child may cross to a more and more social development had blocked normal growth and thrown the child back upon subjective or anti-social satisfactions.

One of the many defense reactions to such a thwarting of fundamental needs is that taken by Ruth, a cynical, suspicious, critical attitude toward everything and everybody. To want and never get satisfaction is too painful a state to keep up so the individual criticizes every possible love object that he may make himself and others believe he would not have it if he could. The reason he has no love object is that none are worth having, thus he defends his inferiority. Also he undermines any criticism from others by showing up the inferiority of the source. He is protected by having already discredited the other person. Moreover, there is a sense of power and superiority in being able to criticize everything, so it offers a natural compensation for the inferiority from which the critical or cynical person suffers. Not having admirable loving parents is a source of tremendous inferiority. A child of eight has no intelligent weapons with which to combat a hostile family situation. It has no chance against the egoism of the adults around it. All it can do is to react blindly in ways that offer some temporary solace. Stealing from the stepmother is a way of satisfying the need to fight with or injure or destroy the pain-giving stimulus. It gives the child a tremendous sense of power and victory. Here is something which he can do secretly and effectively. It really hurts the hateful object and it supplies pleasure-giving stimuli, such as candy, which are otherwise denied.

This vicious process is further strengthened by the fact that the continued thwarting of really fundamental needs and the checking of this normal growth makes the organism put undue stress on its compensatory auto-erotic satisfac-

tions which are obtained with little effort, such as eating, day dreaming, lying in bed, bed-wetting, masturbation, and the like. The subjective pleasure experiences are overemphasized while the objective play and work interests are not developed being overshadowed by the intensity of the conflicts in the love life of the child. If there is no intelligent effort on the part of adults to see that the child gets creative expression, genuine outlet for its energies in school and work and play, he easily learns to avoid work, to have no conception of work that is really an expression of his own interests, and to fall back on infantile or childish methods of controlling the environment almost entirely.

This was the course Ruth had followed and it made it almost impossible to bring about changes in her behavior. She was so absorbed in the injuries done her by life that she thought of nothing but pleasure compensations. She would face nothing that demanded effort or any unpleasantness. She had a right to take things because life owed her reparation. She saw nothing in school or work, or the ordinary habits of daily hygiene but hardship to be evaded if possible. She wanted nice clothes and felt she had a right to take them, but she saw no reason why she should take any responsibility for them. If a garment is torn or dirty, get a new one. She thought she ought to be placed where there were servants so she would have no housework and no laundry to attend to. She had no loyalty to anyone. She played one person against another and used everything to her own advantage as she saw it. As soon as an effort was made to give her insight she reacted to protect herself from the painful revelations by criticizing the worker and taking the attitude that there was a game going on between her and the worker in which each was trying to get ahead of the other. She could not believe in disinterested effort on her behalf.

Ruth was turned over to a child-placing agency with the foregoing interpretation of her behavior and suggestions for working on the problem, but with grave doubt as to the outcome. She was to be given as much gratification of her pleasure wants as possible in order to reduce the struggle to satisfy them and leave some of her energy and interest free to be developed along other lines. She was to be placed with a really superior person whom she might finally come to respect as genuine and her best chance would be to find some one person, the worker or the foster mother, who had real faith in her possibilities.

The social worker who took her over was young and enthusiastic, undaunted by the impossible and full of faith in her own ability to get results. She transferred this faith to Ruth. She never wavered in her belief that Ruth could change her ways. She lived through stealing episodes, truancy periods, every kind of discouragement and finally found a home which did some of the things we had hoped for. Ruth's first experience in this home was a summer trip and a glorious good time. When she came back there was little housework and a doctor's important business to help with after school. There was social prestige in this home. The mother, was a good disciplinarian and insisted

on the formation of certain daily habits of living, but she took Ruth in as a member of the family and had, like the worker, supreme faith in her own ability to make Ruth go to school every day, study her lessons and keep going in the path of righteousness.

Ruth responded surprisingly and for six months all went well. Then she began to be unhappy and asked to be removed, saying that she would make removal necessary if something were not done. Finally she had her way. It seemed evident that this home while successful in many ways had lacked the thoroughly admirable personality which we thought Ruth needed. The woman was hard, opinionated, and self-centered. Another home was found in which there proved to be serious marital conflicts in which Ruth was forced to be a party. Here the stealing broke out again. Then a high-school teacher became interested in the girl and invited her to her summer home for vacation. This was the great turning-point in Ruth's life. Here her desires for social superiority and pleasure were satisfied, and she was surrounded by real people for whom she felt at last the whole-souled, genuine devotion and admiration which was essential for her socialization.

From that moment there has been no trouble with Ruth, no more stealing, no more truancy, no shirking of lessons. She has gone to live with another teacher for whom she keeps house. Six months have passed and there has been no complaint. To complete this treatment and make it permanent, Ruth ought to be given insight into her own behavior and understand just what has happened to her. Then she would be armed against the accident of circumstance.

Contrast this with the apparently far more serious social problem presented by Mary, an alert, boyish, attractive girl of eighteen, the product of careless placements by a children's agency, at work in a department store after having reached first year in high school and reported to have been living with her weak, immoral mother, sharing the mother's young paramour, a boy only a little older than herself. The mother had been pregnant at the time and this situation had continued within the confines of one room, in the presence of a young brother who knew the relationships existing among the three. The mother was jealous of her daughter but when the baby came, all three were united in a common interest. Mary had finally broken away and come to the city to work but was about to return to her mother on a visit. Commitment would seem to be the natural solution, not only for the sake of society, but to save the girl from herself. It appeared almost self-evident that no girl except one needing institutional supervision and discipline would be guilty of such low-grade behavior.

However, if one goes at delinquency never from the point of view of the offense but always with the purpose of understanding the meaning of the behavior in terms of the individual's entire life history, there are no assumptions and no short cuts. The following case history was obtained. Because of the mother's promiscuity, Mary's paternity was uncertain. As a child in her

mother's home she had known only loose living, good-hearted, easy-going neglect and poverty. Illegitimate births were common in the family. There seems to have been complete lack of ordinary sex morality and social standards. The family lived a roving, hand-to-mouth existence. When Mary was ten, the court removed her and gave her to a child-placing agency. She was tried out unsuccessfully in several homes and finally made a good adjustment in a country home where she had good school opportunities, finishing the grammar grades at the head of her class. She entered high school with a continuing interest in school, accompanied by an increasing interest in boys. Her late hours, love for good times, and her rebellion against restraint worried the foster parents so that they gave her up. She was accepted by a city institution of excellent character and non-correctional where she was under strict supervision and was sent for the first time to a city school. She tried to enter the second year of high school with inadequate preparation, failing quite completely in every subject. Accident entered at this point in the shape of a new matron at the institution. The girls were trying her out and in her effort to control the situation she threatened to expel the next girl guilty of insubordination. Mary happened to be the victim. She was returned to the court and discharged to a married and apparently respectable sister. The sister, unequal to disciplining Mary, allowed her to go to her mother, then living in a wretched little house in another town with a young man by whom she was pregnant. There was only one bedroom containing a bed and cot. Mary shared the cot with the younger brother, a boy of fifteen. For about a year this situation continued. Mary broke away once only to return again. The mother finally went out to work with the new baby leaving Mary to keep house for her brother and the man. Finally Mary came to the city a second time and got a job. She wandered from one position to another and came in contact with a social agency just as she was about to give up and go home again because she saw no work ahead and was unable to support herself on what she was earning.

The social worker took the matter up as a vocational guidance problem and her first step was to find a girl's boarding-home where a decent social background could be obtained at a reasonable rate. Mary was distinctly worried about her lack of ability to make good wages and completely at sea as to what she wanted to do. She feared to give up the job she had to look for a better one and was ready to take anything that would permit her to settle into a comfortable routine. She was interested enough in her own problem to be willing to take a psychometric test to find out what her abilities really were.

The social worker and the psychologist between them worked out the following picture of Mary: In earliest childhood she had known little or no restraint and had been familiar with the freest sex life and complete absence of ordinary social standards as regards sex. But there had been affection, easy-going, good-natured attitudes, and a great deal of freedom. The loose living, the roving, unsettled existence had made it fairly easy for Mary to accept and

adjust to varying conditions so that foster-home placement was not the agonizing experience to her that it is to some children. Moreover, she seems to have been from the first an objective, eager, alert, social youngster who most fortunately compensated for her family inferiorities by a complete going over into school life and active energetic expression in work and play. Perhaps the fact that the teacher of the country school was a splendid fellow, just out of college who was like an elder brother to his pupils helped her to transfer her energies so happily and thoroughly in that direction. She hated housework, particularly because she had not only the foster mother, but the grandmother to please and directions were often conflicting. But she escaped this frequently by working with the man of the family on the farm all day long. This she recalls with real joy, because of all she learned about how things grow.

The dark side of her life here was her introduction to sex experience through the foster father. These experiences, shocking at first, were finally accepted as a matter of course and sank into the background of an existence in which objective interest, school, companions, good times, and farm work held first place. There seems never to have been any deep conflict nor any marked feeling of shame or inferiority. It was taken as part of the day's work, something which went along with living in this foster home which for the most part was desirable. She wanted to keep on with her school. She was afraid to tell the wife. She had none of the ordinary sex morality which most of us have absorbed from infancy. The easiest way was to keep still and adjust. When Mary was asked how she felt about sex, she replied characteristically and cheerfully "Well, the world is made that way, you just have to accept it. It isn't any use to worry about it, you might as well take people as they are." Although these years in Mary's life apparently left no scar, they did break down completely any sex inhibitions she might have had, aroused sex needs, and accustomed her to the habit of sex expression. It meant that when she went to live with her mother, she experienced no particular shock and was illy prepared to offer resistance to the advances of the mother's paramour who found her so much more attractive than her mother and with whom she was thoroughly infatuated.

The dismissal from her foster home seems to have been caused by behavior which was natural enough on the part of a developing adolescent girl. She merely carried over too much of her superabundant energy into parties and good times with boys. School, however, still held her. The really critical experience was the transfer to the city institution and the city high school. In neither situation was she at home and for the first time in her life she experienced failure and disgrace in her studies. She now had a genuine inferiority, a discouragement which undoubtedly reacted on her behavior at home. She grew indifferent and reckless, would not respond to scolding or appeal. The objective work and play expression, as well as the customary sex life, were cut off. There was nothing left but breaking rules to get a good time.

Expulsion from the institution meant the final break with school and she thinks it was then that her ambition died. She had no technical training,

she could get only underpaid, uninteresting jobs. Where was she to find an outlet for her young energy? The sister, less intelligent than Mary, had no influence and was only a source of irritation. Then in a restless seeking for something more satisfactory she went to her mother. There she was disturbed chiefly by the mother's jealousy and feeling she was doing her wrong, also by the presence of the younger brother. Finally the glamour wore off and she began to see the man in his true character. He was lazy, unreliable, disloyal, weak. He had none of the straightforward, eager active attitude of Mary toward life. Gradually she turned against the kind of person he was and after many struggles, finally broke away. It was at this point that she was found by the case-worker.

It seemed to the psychological examiner that the problem here was not the so obviously indicated sex situation, but the blocking of Mary's work and play interests and the complete quenching of her egoistic ambitions. The psychometric tests showed her to be well up to average if not above in intelligence. She was as interested in taking the test as the examiner was in giving it. Her intellectual curiosity was a delight. In the course of the interview she brought out a slip of paper with two long words on it which she had been treasuring, waiting for an opportunity to look them up in a dictionary. Throughout she exhibited a frank, straightforward attitude, an honest, unsentimental facing of facts, a complete freedom from cynicism or critical reactions. She put no blame on other people and used no evasive mechanisms. She had a certain pride and independence. When consoling herself for her lack of good clothes, she remarked, "My clothes aren't much but no man is paying for them and at least I have a contented mind." There seemed to be every basis for a satisfactory adjustment to life if the environmental opportunities could be provided so that her work and social interests would have a chance to develop and help to organize a more socialized sex expression.

The social worker was reassured and determined by this analysis of the problem. Mary herself was allowed to go over every detail of the intelligence tests and was told that ability like hers had a right to a better training. She faced what lack of education would mean in underpaid, uninteresting work. Her faith in her own power and ability was restored and her ambition revived. Her former failure in high school was explained and she became convinced that it was not too late even now to achieve success in school work. Meantime the case-worker built up the social background, finally raised scholarship money, and Mary went into the second year of the commercial course in a good high school.

There was never any attempt to deal with the sex side by repressive methods, never any interference with her social life, or any form of restraint. When she wanted to go to visit her mother, the whole situation was talked out with her and she was given the worker's attitude frankly and honestly but decision was left to her. She did not go. She has continued to associate with boys on an unusually free basis. She will go to see a boy friend at his home exactly as she would visit a girl. She could not be made to see why she should

not accept a boy's invitation to go to New York City for a sightseeing excursion. She was willing to stay at home to please the worker but was told she must decide on another basis. Only accident in the shape of the boy's illness prevented that escapade. Everything she does is talked over with the worker with the utmost freedom. Her standards are changing rapidly with her developing tastes and interests. She has made good in her school work consistently. She has been rash and unconventional in the extreme but has never, apparently, overstepped the boundaries of morality on the sex side. For a year and a half she has made steady progress and there is no indication that she will ever again become delinquent.

Ruth's case gives an illustration of delinquent behavior arising as an undesirable, unwholesome form of compensation for unsatisfied cravings for a normal family life, personal achievement, and social standing. Her emotional development had been checked and her behavior followed childish patterns. Both interests and methods of satisfying them were subjective. There was no active self-expression along legitimate objective lines.

Mary, on the other hand, had experienced a comparatively normal emotional and instinctive development with a wholesome, compensatory reaction in energetic work and play life. She had learned to meet life squarely and to pursue her own interests actively and persistently. Her sex life suffered from her social inheritance and a lack of socialization and idealization of expression but it was not auto-erotic or perverse nor was it a source of conflict.

The solution of Mary's problem depended on not mistaking it for something other than it was, and being content to provide the opportunity for the ongoing of her already well-developed objective interests with the faith that in the end they would provide the necessary inhibitory power for the control of her sex life.

The intimate psychological or psychiatric interpretation, the individual intensive treatment, are fundamental for solving the problems of delinquency. No matter how ideal the social conditions, no matter how farsighted the laws, there will always be compensatory behavior in the lives of individuals, and some of this behavior is bound to be unwholesome and socially undesirable. Instinctive protective reactions on the part of society, even the more enlightened mass treatment in institutions, will bring results only by accident.

What we need is a treatment of behavior so scientific that results instead of being accidental will be subject to intention and prediction. Biology studies the life-history of individual forms and explains any particular details of their behavior in the light of the life of the organism as a whole from birth to death. Where does a similar case study of human beings belong? Without it there can be no scientific solution of the problems of delinquency.

THE LOGIC OF DELINQUENCY

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ABSTRACT

The Logic of Delinquency.—The instinctive forces underlying the adaptation of the individual to life are (1) the drive toward self-maintenance and (2) the drive toward self-advancement. Analysis of the behavior of the delinquent reveals the blocking or thwarting of these forces and the development of a sense of inferiority. Consciousness of inferiority may arise (a) through discrepancy between the original equipment of the individual and the aspirations of his family; (b) through a false sense of superiority in childhood which unfits individuals for competitive struggle in adult life; (c) through fervid attempts at self-maximization; (d) through unfavorable comparison with others in the family circle. *The Mechanism of Compensation.* In this situation of pressure and unrest caused by childish desires, the emotional instability of adolescence may cause the girl to look upon sex as a means of putting herself across. Childhood is the period in which foresight and guidance by parents, teachers, sociologists, social workers, and physicians may most effectively direct the human forces of personality toward a higher plane of successful adjustment.

Recent progress in the understanding of delinquency has been largely due to the more complete and careful studies made of the economy of the personality of these so-called delinquents. In our present discussion we shall exclude for the sake of brevity those individuals who are suffering from a fundamental lack in their intellectual organization. Unfortunates of this group have long been recognized as social problems and of late years we have ceased to consider these individuals as socially responsible people, but we have learned to recognize that they are deserving of thoughtful guidance and control under the direction of organized social or community resources rather than to expose them to censure and punishment allotted to the so-called normal delinquents. From actual experience we have found that the most satisfactory means of adjusting members of this group is to furnish them with simple uncomplicated environments where they can be protected from the destructive influences of those who might find it profitable to use these simple minds as tools in their asocial trades.

The group with whom we shall concern ourselves is made up of those individuals who possess an essentially normal intellectual endowment. They belong to the class of average citizens endowed with the same capacity for work, play, growth, and adaptation as other members of society, but who for some reason have failed to make satisfactory adjustments and have accepted asocial measures as a means of putting themselves across. It is our task, then, to determine the "logic of their delinquency."

In the course of these studies we have been forced to ask ourselves what it is in the make-up of these individuals which has led them to accept this particular means of finding expression for certain of their inherent urges and cravings; that is to say, why have they reacted to a situation in a way which is unacceptable to society as a whole? In these studies of the economy of the personality we are forced to consider the human organism as a whole in order

that we may learn what forces from within the individual himself have influenced the growth of his personality and to determine to what extent the forces arising from without have contributed to create this complex personality as we find it.

In order that we may have a clearer concept and may better understand the conative forces at work in the economy of the individual it is pertinent that we should recognize the nature of these complex human strivings which tend toward the integration of this human personality. It is necessary that we consider the underlying instinctive forces which tend to drive this human unit in his attempts at adaptation to life. It is unnecessary in this presentation to occupy ourselves with a lengthy discussion of instincts but it is important that we recall the powerful conative forces exerted through the ego drive of every individual from the earliest inception of life as a unit.

Tansley divides these forces into two groups: first, the drive toward self-maintenance, or the will to live; second, the drive to self-advancement—toward the magnification of the individual. We are forced to recognize that satisfaction of these ego cravings is essential to the economy of the personality of everyone. Accepting this as a premise, we are led to appreciate the destructive possibilities which may result from the blocking or thwarting of these ego conations, and it is easy to see why it is that, given an individual who is frequently exposed to situations in which he fails to gain this necessary satisfaction of his ego strivings, the natural result will be the gradual development of a very definite feeling of inadequacy, or in more familiar terms, the development of a sense of inferiority.

We know from our observations of normal well-adjusted individuals that in their efforts to seek self-expression they are able to find satisfaction for their ego strivings along socially acceptable channels. The average man seeks a job, works regularly, does as good a piece of work as he is capable of doing, thereby gaining a sense of satisfaction from a job well done, draws his weekly pay, supplies his family with as many comforts as lie within his means, gains a real sense of gratification from the happy unit of his household, enjoys the simple entertainments available to a man of his social standing, and prides himself on being an honest God-fearing citizen. In other words, he represents the type of a successfully adjusted citizen (a normal man). We might give many other examples of normal men in other social settings, but since our concept of normality must at best be a relative one in which we recognize many possible variations in adaptation among any group of individuals, further illustration is unnecessary. It is, then, our task to determine how well an individual has acquitted himself of the necessity for making social adaptations, and in our study of the so-called delinquent it is our first concern to discover toward what goal the individual has directed his efforts at self-expression; second, to discover mechanisms utilized by him in his attempts at adaptation and to ascertain the relative effectiveness or ineffectiveness of his methods; third, to learn the motive or urge behind the act which is represented by his

asocial behavior remembering at the same time that he is blindly seeking a means of self-expression—in other words, a fulfilment of his ego drive.

In this group of so-called delinquents, we early discover elements in the personality make-up of the individual which point more or less directly to the blocking or thwarting of this ego urge and we are led to recognize the destructive forces at work in the personality of the individual which tend to create within him a definite sense of inferiority.

To be more specific, let us consider some of the possible sources through which this sense of inferiority may develop. On analysis of various situations we discover as one of the stumbling-blocks to success the very evident discrepancy between the original equipment of the individual and his aspirations or, in some cases it would be fairer to say, the aspirations of his family. What mechanism may the individual employ which will tend to alleviate the emotional conflict and very real distress which is bound to result from the recognition of his own personal discrepancies? Is it not possible that an individual forced to face a painful recognition of his own limitations may be unable through his own conscious efforts to make a satisfactory adjustment, and, at the bidding of this ever-present urge for self-maximation, may he not attempt to compensate for his inferiority through a behavior reaction which is of an asocial nature? Consider for a moment the child reared in a home where the parents in their youth were unable to obtain educational opportunities accorded the children of this generation. Through certain misguided conceptions they may have been led to place a higher premium on the values of education, believing that their particular economic and social lack would never have existed given a different educational background; impelled by this idea they seek to furnish their child with every educational opportunity to compensate for their own incapacities. But suppose that this child has an intellectual endowment of a low average caliber, that he is capable of making a good showing in grammar school work, but because of his intellectual limitations higher educational training is precluded, unwilling to recognize this inherent limitation, he is forced to continue the educative process beyond his capacity. He is bound, therefore, to meet with an ever-increasing opportunity for failure and through this painful experience of failure an ever-increasing sense of personal inadequacy will tend to develop. He is furnished with an emotional conflict between his personal and family aspirations and his individual capacity. Through wise guidance this child may be furnished with a satisfactory means of emotional adjustment through the simple evaluation of his innate capacities and through the medium of this understanding a constructive program can be devised in which cognizance of his limitations has been taken; that is to say, through wise handling he may be furnished a medium of expression through which he may find an opportunity for achieving satisfaction and success through the simplifying and reconditioning of his original desires. Should he continue to create intellectual goals beyond his reach, he will sooner or later be overwhelmed by this ever-increasing recognition of his inferiority and will tend to become more

unhappy, subjective, and maladjusted through the machinations of this vicious circle created by the persistent thwarting of his ego strivings. Is it not easy to see, then, why it is that certain of these individuals, seeking a means of compensation, may select a medium for gaining self-expression which is unacceptable to the social herd? Many examples of this are found in the run-aways, truancies, thefts, lies, etc., found among the behavior reactions of this so-called delinquent group.

A simple illustration of this is furnished in the case of a girl of fourteen and a half whose family were of the uneducated but law-abiding peasant type. The aspirations of this family were such that they were not content unless their oldest child should receive every educational advantage in order that she might obtain a recognized place in the world. School progress during the grammar grades was satisfactory but the girl had the capacity of a low-average normal, that is, she was endowed with a mental capacity of approximately twelve years. She was quite able to do grammar-school work, but forced to take on high-school work she experienced ever-increasing difficulty. Unable to recognize her failure at school as due to her own inadequacies, she began to project her irritation and discontent resulting from the conflict of continuous failure upon members of the teaching staff and school authorities. As a result of this bitter antagonism of months' duration, she was finally led to seek compensation for her believed mistreatment. In the company of another girl she visited the desk of one of the teachers and managed to destroy papers and personal data belonging to the teacher against whom she held a particular spite. She failed absolutely to take into consideration the effect of this act either upon the teacher or upon herself, but blindly sought a means of compensation for her discomfort. Through an evaluation of her capacities and the understanding and acceptance of her particular limitations, it was possible to furnish the girl with an opportunity for adequate social adjustments through the medium of a job in which she might succeed and through supplying club and reading interests where opportunities for making comfortable and satisfactory social contacts were found. Many illustrations which are explainable on a basis as simple as this one are found in actual practice, and the recognition of this ought to force us to study each case of maladjustment with a kind of open-mindedness which will assure the individual of a better social understanding.

Another basis for the development of this sense of inferiority finds its early roots in the experiences of the child who perchance progresses through school in a grade below his individual capacity. Through this he is permitted to achieve recognition of his success, and, conditioned by this false sense of security, he may develop a belief in his superior capacity, for is he not looked upon as a veritable genius by his family, paraded before all of the admiring friends and permitted to demonstrate his particular prowess in reciting a piece, or singing a song? Through the experiences of his early years of success he fails to properly evaluate his actual capacity, and, influenced by this false sense of security, he is quite unfitted to meet with conditions in later life outside the

immediate family circle, especially those which may tend to demonstrate his particular inadequacies. Take, for example, the boy going away from home to college or into business, forced for the first time in his experience to measure himself by the standards of others. He may refuse or may be incapable because of the implications of failure to adequately adjust himself to reality as he finds it, and may either tend to regress—preferring to avoid responsibility through some imagined physical incapacity—or, urged on by a sense of dissatisfaction, he may blindly seek a means of expression through which he may bolster up his waning sense of superiority.

Problems of allied nature may be found among the adult group. Consider the reactions of a man who habitually sets a standard of achievement beyond the limits of human scope. Success, social approbation, power through achievement only serve to heighten his fervid attempts at self-maximation. Goaded on by this intense drive, he tends to lose his sense of proportions and may be led to accept as a means of ego expression methods in business or professional life which do not conform to ethical standards, but furnish him a means of gaining power even though they are not acceptable to society as such. An all too common example of this is the man in financial circles who is ever seeking greater power, having exhausted the opportunities presented through acceptable social channels, he may persuade himself that the use of methods judged unfitting by the social group may serve his purpose best. In his attempts to maximate his ego he accepts methods which are illegal or at best asocial, failing to understand the true motive for his desires or to consider the possible destructive results upon others, so well protected has he become through his processes of rationalization.

Another and very important phase of this problem of delinquency results from the reaction of environmental influences as they play upon the individual through the contacts of the home. An example of this may be found in the experiences furnished the girl reared in a family setting in which from her earliest recollections she has been adjured to mold her thoughts, acts, and desires after the pattern furnished by an older sister, who perchance, has assumed the position of a paragon in the household. It is difficult to conceive the possible sources of emotional conflict, jealousy, antagonism, envy, and so on up and down the scale of emotional affective reactions that may arise during the long years of growth of this individual's personality, when the girl is never absolutely free from the irritations resulting from the attitude of the family. Picture the possible phases of adjustment to this situation on the part of the child spurred on by an inherent desire for self-expression along lines of development which would tend to furnish real satisfaction. It is possible under certain conditions for the child to make fairly satisfactory adjustments through channels of achievements other than that of the older sister or brother, and in actual experience many examples of this happy adjustment are found such as the development of a recognized capacity in the fields of art, music, scholarship, athletics, and so on through the many possible activities open to every-

one. But let us now consider the possible reactions of those individuals who for some reason, personal or environmental, do not seem to find a comfortable means of attaining recognition and gratification for their ego strivings. It is this type of person that we may expect to find included in the group of our so-called delinquents.

Add to this situation of pressure and unrest resulting from the thwartings of childish desires, the emotional instability which occurs at the adolescent period, aggravated by the new and startling physiological demands, is it not possible that the girl may be led to look upon sex as a means of putting herself across, for the very popularity and acclaim accorded her by her clientèle may furnish her with a very real sense of achievement, never before felt by her. This is well illustrated by a case of a girl of twenty who accepted sex promiscuity although devoid of the usual physiological attraction, for through the popularity and very evident appreciation of the men of her acquaintance she experienced a very real sense of satisfaction, which was no doubt, considerably heightened by her refusal to accept fees of any kind.

Many other possible determinants in the field of sex delinquency might be discussed but if in our consideration of cases of these so-called sex delinquents we can help the individual to understand herself, and assist her to make constructive adjustments which will furnish her with real satisfaction, we then can feel that we are at least attacking this problem of sex delinquency through a method of approach which may be expected to produce permanent results.

In our study of the behavior patterns of individuals coming under observation we find another mechanism employed equally as forceful in its effects as that of compensation. Through the medium of this mechanism of substitution the individual is aided in gaining very definite satisfaction for his urge to power by the substitution of one type of behavior reaction for another which is unacceptable because of the restraints and barriers created by society; through this behavior he obtains a vicarious satisfaction for his desires through the creating of symbolic substitutions.

A simple example of this may be found among the individuals who tend to enlarge the ranks of so-called radicals and agitators. In our study of the development of the personality of some of these men, we find a common childhood experience. The boy during his early years was often reared under the imperious rule of a father who stands in that boy's life as the origin of all suppression and domination. Is it not easy to conceive the opportunities for conflicts which may arise between this growing boy's aspirations for power and the oppressive domination by the master of the household? Resulting from these ever increasing conflicts of the growing adolescent can we not conceive a desire on the part of this boy to throw off the yoke of control and as he progresses in his process of emancipation from the home ties may he not carry over the same antagonistic attitude due to his earlier experiences, and through this medium of his former experiences project his antagonism onto all authority

as created by society through its codes and civil laws? And is it not possible to go a step farther and look upon his refusal to conform to the dictates of the social herd as due to an unconscious attempt to permanently rid himself of the burden of authority other than his own?

In this same connection we are led to believe that some of the cases of petty thieving and shoplifting are explainable on a mechanistic basis of substitution. In our study of members of this group we discover individuals who to all intents and purposes commit these asocial acts without any apparent motive, for they are neither in need of the article taken nor do they use the stolen goods to gain financial profits. We find girls of this class who come from good homes, surrounded by all the luxuries that might be desired. We are then led to ask ourselves, why should a girl of this class accept the rôle of a petty thief with all its implications and evident possibilities of social ostracism? As the result of our analysis of the existing conditions we are led to recognize that this behavior on the part of the girl is a very evident protest against that authority as defined by the social codes and ethics established by the herd, and that through the medium of this asocial behavior the girl finds a vicarious expression for deeper, more fundamental desires. Through the medium of symbolization, the petty asocial act furnishes her a vicarious means of obtaining a very definite sense of satisfaction. We are sometimes led in this connection to question whether moral values as placed upon the individual by society may not be considered as a possible determinant in the production of so-called delinquency.

If time permitted it might be well to continue this discussion in more detail for at many points it has not been possible to more than hint at the psychological implications of any given case. Furthermore there might be real worth in the presentation of possible methods which might be employed to further our efforts to control this problem of so-called delinquency, but for the purposes of this discussion to briefly outline the aims will suffice. We must consider as our primal aim the furthering of our study of the underlying factors in the personality of the individual which have tended to influence him in his reactions and adjustments to life: through this broader knowledge we will be better able to give actual help to the individual through furnishing him with an understanding of the true basis for his strivings. Through the medium of this new self-knowledge we may assist him in the necessary process of the modification of his instinctive cravings and desires in order that he may be better able to adjust himself to life along socially acceptable channels. Further, we will be led to recognize the necessity for early healthy adjustments on the part of the child to prevent possible fixations of these urges in a manner that precludes possible socially acceptable reactions. We must recognize that childhood is that golden period in which wise foresight and adequate guidance on the part of those parents, teachers, sociologists, social workers, and physicians who meet these problems will furnish a medium through which the children of today may make satisfactory adjustments to life as they start it, in order that

they as citizens of the morrow may meet the issues of reality in a normal, healthy manner. It is through the furthering of this concept and the application of the knowledge which we possess, that we may hope to conserve and direct the human forces of personality toward a higher plane of successful adjustment and by so doing we will exert a powerful influence against the further development of the so-called delinquent class.

THE ILLEGITIMATE MOTHER AS A DELINQUENCY PROBLEM

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ABSTRACT

The Illegitimate Mother as a Delinquency Problem.—Types of unmarried mothers include (a) the mentally subnormal; (b) the young, unprotected girl; (c) the more mature woman of good character led by false promises or weakly following instinct; (d) the really delinquent. Preventive social measures include proper care of the mentally subnormal; education in sex hygiene; safeguarding recreation; providing wholesome activities; re-education accompanied by the necessary restraint. Each case represents a variety of conditions and must be dealt with individually. *Age.* Unmarried mothers for the most part are young; one-sixth of a group studied were under 18. *Mentality.* Inferior mentality and psychopathic traits are important as predisposing factors. The need is urgent for protecting young girls mentally below normal. *Previous character.* Illegitimate maternity in at least half the cases reported on had followed other delinquencies. *Occupational status.* A large proportion of unmarried mothers have been gainfully employed before the child's birth, for the most part in the less skilled occupations. *Broken homes.* Abnormal home conditions, and low standards of family life are probably the most fundamental of the underlying cause of illegitimate maternity. Children born out of wedlock represent a disadvantaged group more likely than the average to suffer from bad heredity, unstable character, and harmful environment.

Delinquency, as the term is generally used, implies atypical conduct that brings a person into conflict with accepted community standards of action. Strictly speaking, all illegitimate maternity and paternity are antisocial, and it is essential that they shall be so considered, both for the protection of society against an undue burden and of the child against deprivation of his natural rights. Church and state, and in the main, public opinion, all hold the preservation of the family and the right of every child to parental care and support as fundamentally necessary to a stable and wholesome society.

In considering the delinquency aspects of illegitimate maternity from the point of view of reduction of the problem, it is necessary to analyze the factors that lead to the condition. Girls and women who become mothers out of wedlock may be divided into the following types: (a) The mentally subnormal girl who lacks controlling inhibitory instincts and is an easy victim because of helplessness. (b) The young, susceptible girl, unprotected from dangers, who gets into trouble because of lack of understanding, or through force. (c) The more mature young woman of good character who is led by false promises, or who weakly or rashly follows an instinct that under other conditions

would have been normal and social. (d) The really delinquent girl or woman, who knowingly chooses antisocial conduct, her illegitimate maternity being only an incidental evidence of repeated immorality. This type is undoubtedly to a considerable extent recruited from the preceding ones.

Preventive social measures are indicated: (a) proper care and protection of the mentally subnormal; (b) education in sex hygiene; (c) safeguarding the recreation of youth; (d) providing wholesome activities into which dangerous instincts may be diverted; (e) safeguarding society and the individual through re-education accompanied by the necessary restraint.

First in interest from a social point of view is the composition of the group of illegitimate mothers as compared with other mothers in respect to age, mentality, home conditions, and conduct. Preventive and reconstructive measures must be based on knowledge of how the individuals composing the antisocial group deviate—inherently or accidentally—from the average (that for want of a better measure is considered the normal). How much of the illegitimate parenthood represented by the more than thirty thousand white births annually in the United States may be properly attributed to delinquency, and what measures can be undertaken to lessen the problem? There can be no general rule for handling this most complex problem of human conduct. Each case represents a variety of conditions, and must be dealt with individually. But in this, as in other individual social problems, certain general facts emerge from study of the background of illegitimate parenthood, and these indicate underlying conditions that should be recognized and dealt with.

Age.—Undoubtedly, the individual and social maladjustments frequently accompanying adolescence are significant factors in illegitimate maternity. Unmarried mothers are for the most part young mothers, and a considerable proportion are girls in their 'teens. In order to secure a fair comparison of the ages of unmarried and married mothers, we have analyzed data secured from field studies in four cities, care being taken that each of the two groups represented similar distribution of nativity. Ages are given for first births to white mothers, in order that the two groups may be comparable. The comparative percentage distribution for the age groups follows:

AGE	PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION	
	Married Mothers (4116)	Unmarried Mothers (1486)
Under 18.....	5	17
18-20.....	27	30
21-24.....	39	39
25-29.....	21	10
30-34.....	6	3
35 and over.....	2	1

It is seen that slightly more than one-sixth of the mothers out of wedlock were under eighteen years of age. Of the group that may be considered

"normal," as conforming to law and custom, only one-twentieth were under this age. In the next age group there is very little difference—the proportion of unmarried mothers eighteen to twenty years of age being only 3 per cent higher; the proportions in the twenty-one- to twenty-four- year groups are the same. It must be remembered that we are considering here only first births, for both groups. With the exception of the earliest age group, there is a much closer approximation to the normal age distribution than might have been expected.

These age figures show the importance of preventive and protective work which will safeguard young girls from undesirable influences, and develop in them judgment and stability of character. Herein lies the most hopeful possibility for the reduction of illegitimacy and the delinquencies with which it is allied.

Mentality.—It is not difficult to demonstrate the importance of inferior mentality and psychopathic traits as predisposing factors. They are, in fact if not in theory, the most baffling difficulties confronted in efforts at prevention. It is obviously impossible to secure comparable figures as to mentality for the group conforming to social customs—the married mothers. But the rate for unmarried mothers is without question abnormally high. In several cities in which studies were made, 11 per cent, 9 per cent, and 8 per cent, respectively, of the unmarried mothers coming to the attention of agencies were known to be feeble-minded, subnormal mentally, or deranged. A still larger percentage were thought to be subnormal, though they had not been examined. In two rural sections in which similar studies were made, 13 per cent and 16 per cent of the mothers had been diagnosed as feeble-minded, subnormal, or insane.

Emphasis has often been placed on the possibility of preventing a part of this problem through adequate provision for the mentally subnormal. Analysis of data concerning child-mothers shows that the large proportion of more than one-fifth were known to be not normal mentally. Of the girls fifteen years of age and under, 30 per cent were so reported. The need is urgent for protecting these young girls, especially defenseless because lacking in intelligence. It has been shown, for four large cities, that one-sixth of all unmarried mothers were under eighteen years of age; the significance of the proportion of low mentality among them is obvious.

Previous character.—Often the birth of a child out of wedlock is only an incident in a career of immorality and other delinquencies induced by bad environment, absence of healthful forms of recreation, and unprotected youth. In a group of 320 girls under the age of eighteen years for whom there was information as to character, almost half were known to have been delinquent previous to this experience, and one-third of the whole number were known to have been immoral previously, twelve of them having engaged in prostitution—nine of the twelve were seventeen years old, two were sixteen, and one was fifteen years of age. Apparently the difficulty began in early ado-

lescence in a large proportion of cases. It is evident that illegitimate maternity, in half the cases at least, had followed other delinquencies.

Occupational status.—A comparison was made for Boston of the occupations of unmarried mothers previous to the birth of the child and of all gainfully employed women. Of almost seven hundred unmarried mothers, 86 per cent had been gainfully employed before the child's birth. Of the unmarried mothers sixteen to twenty years of age at the time of the child's birth, 83 per cent were engaged in gainful occupations; only 60 per cent of the same age group in the general population were gainfully employed.

The figures as to occupational status show that unmarried mothers are for the most part young wage-earners in the less skilled occupations. Almost a third of all gainfully employed women in Boston were classed as semi-skilled workers; the percentage among the unmarried mothers was the same. But 16 per cent of all wage-earning women were factory operatives—an occupation within the semi-skilled group—as against 27 per cent of the mothers. The most striking discrepancy is found in the percentages in the domestic and personal service group—25 per cent of all working women as against 55 per cent of the unmarried mothers.

Home conditions.—The incidence of broken homes or abnormal home conditions is an important causative factor in all forms of delinquency. In Boston, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia, where analyses were made of the history of unmarried mothers coming to the attention of social agencies, 32 per cent, 49 per cent, and 71 per cent, respectively, came from homes broken through the death of one or both parents, or through divorce, separation, or desertion. In a group of rural New York counties, 56 per cent of the mothers were from broken homes.

The close relation between home conditions and delinquency is brought out in analysis of the histories of 320 unmarried mothers under eighteen years of age. In almost half the cases in which the girls had been immoral, otherwise delinquent, or of poor character, the parents were delinquent or of poor character, or had been dependent upon charity. Where both parents were living and were present in the home, 55 per cent of the girls were of good character and 45 per cent of bad character. Where conditions were abnormal, 42 per cent of the girls were of good character and 58 per cent bad. These figures point to what is probably the most fundamental of the underlying causes—low standards of family life and the absence of wholesome home influences. Even before the special need for care occasioned by illegitimate maternity, a large number of these child-mothers had required care and protection outside their own homes. Forty of the 320 girls had been in correctional institutions or before courts; forty-three had been wards of child-caring agencies; and ten had been under care both as delinquents and as dependent children.

In this paper an effort has been made to show the status of unmarried mothers, in comparison with other groups, and to indicate thereby the need

for certain preventive or reconstructive measures. Another phase of the relation between delinquency and illegitimacy concerns the children born out of wedlock as representing a disadvantaged group more likely than the average to suffer from bad heredity, unstable character, and harmful environment. The following case illustrates in a striking way the various factors—hereditary, temperamental, and environmental—that frequently operate to bring a repetition of delinquency history in succeeding generations.

Twin sisters, seventeen years of age, were committed within a few months of each other to the same reformatory. The girls had different surnames—their given names happened to be the same—and they knew nothing about each other, but the close resemblance of the two led the superintendent to search out their histories. It developed that they were of illegitimate birth, and had been removed in infancy from their mother, an irresponsible almshouse inmate. They were adopted by families in different parts of the state. Both foster homes were supposedly good. After some years the foster parents of one of the girls found her difficult to control, and placed her in an institution from which she ran away after six years. She had had poor educational advantages, never going beyond the fourth grade in school. The other girl remained with her adopted parents until shortly before she was committed to the reformatory. She was troublesome and untruthful, and gave much difficulty at home and in school. At the age of 14 years she had attained the ninth grade. After this she worked in a laundry and did kitchen work in an institution, but was found unsatisfactory in both places. She finally ran away from home.

Both girls were committed for the same offense—vagrancy. Both had been seriously immoral; both were classed as mentally subnormal; both were epileptic, and both, when arrested, were afflicted with gonorrhea. Their early experiences had been much the same, and the same inherent traits developed in a strikingly similar manner.

Throughout the studies of the child-welfare aspects of illegitimacy, we have come upon records indicating that psychological factors tending toward delinquency may be in many cases concomitants of illegitimate birth. The natural instinct of pride in family, however humble, the feeling of security and responsibility that comes from belonging in a definite group, in the case of children deprived of normal family relationship are likely to become perverted into mental conflict when the child learns or begins to speculate upon the circumstances of his birth and the character of his parents. The result may be a feeling of inferiority, carelessness, and antisocial attitude based either on the idea that the weaknesses imputed to the mother may be inherited (it is doubtful if thought of the father's character enters), or a desire to "get even" for having been cheated out of natural rights to family and home. Very many of these children also suffer serious injury through being shifted about, subject to frequent changes that have not made for stability of character or adjustment to society.

JUVENILE COURT PROCEDURE AS A FACTOR IN DIAGNOSIS

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ABSTRACT

Juvenile Court Procedure as a Factor in Diagnosis.—The Juvenile Court is not a new idea in the history of law, but is based on ancient Anglo-Saxon chancery jurisprudence, its basic legal concept being the theory of *parens patriae*, or parenthood of the state in behalf of neglected and handicapped children. *Child-study as the basis for treatment.* Procedure is now socialized in the spirit of the modern clinic, which gives all the evidence concerning the child and full facilities for examination and treatment. Behavior-difficulties involve change in social status. The offender who is capable of citizenship, or partial citizenship, should be brought into normal relation with social groups. This is accomplished in Los Angeles by an experimental school known as "El Retiro" and a club sponsored by the women of the community.

In this discussion the phrase, juvenile court procedure, is understood to include the entire organization of a socialized court. This paper will try to trace the analogies of the court to the clinic and to indicate its power as a factor in the diagnosis and treatment of behavior-difficulties. That a court should be a clinic is not an entirely new idea in the history of law, in fact the basic ideas of the clinic, (1) full and flexible methods of examination which will obtain all the facts, (2) the power to remedy, are rooted deep in our Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and organized in the courts of equity. The modern juvenile court is organized to deal with the handicapped child. Its meaning for social and legal theory has been largely overlooked and attention has been fastened on its sentimental, or its practical aspects.

The socialized juvenile court for the analysis preceding a diagnosis should be equipped with case-work investigations, full clinical facilities for the diagnosis of physical disease, competent health examinations, a psychological laboratory, and a detention home, capable of giving to the child normal conditions of life and regimen and a wide range of outlets through work, study, play, and expression, and to the court a picture of the whole child, accurately observed under these conditions and in these activities. For the second stage the court should possess a legal procedure which is socialized, that is to say, equipped for service as a human institution. The chief elements in the socialization of juvenile court procedure may briefly be summed up as follows: (1) Jurisdiction by means of a petition, praying the court that something be done to safeguard the welfare of the child, rather than a complaint alleging that the child is guilty of an offense. (2) All the evidence, a court procedure which elicits the whole truth concerning the child, its parents, and social background, not merely those fragments of evidence which some lawyers may regard as competent, material, and relevant. The test of the truth received should be as rigidly accurate as in any other legal proceeding. (3) The principle of co-operation should be established between child and court, the family and the community and the court, as between patient and clinic. (4) Parental care—the California juvenile law states that the "care, custody, and discipline of a ward of the juvenile court . . . shall approximate as nearly as may be that

which should be given by his parents."² To secure the welfare of the child the court should possess access to a wide range of possibilities for the work of reconstruction: skilled programs of probation, the use of boarding homes, small specialized institutions, clubs, schools, camps, community-service enterprises of all sorts. (5) An essential element in socialization is that the court be dynamic. This is secured in California by statute that any order in the juvenile court may be modified.³ Life and youth are in flux, endlessly adapting, so too should be the legal recognition of these modified conditions.

With this equipment, secured partly by statute, partly by administration and an enlightened public opinion the juvenile court can serve as an important factor in the diagnosis and treatment of behavior-difficulties and social handicaps.

We have stated that too little attention has been given the legal and social significance of the juvenile court. From a legal point of view the juvenile court marks the discovery by America of the ancient Anglo-Saxon theory of *parens patriae*, or power of parenthood that exists in the state. It is necessary to explain this origin for the benefit of certain critics who think, or appear to think, that the juvenile court is passing, like a kind of benevolent mushroom, foisted on the body of the law by social uplifters and which will be no longer needed when society, like Alice in Wonderland, attains full stature.

The juvenile court is a court of equity or chancery with a long and highly interesting history. The chief business of the Court of Chancery was "to mitigate the rigor of the common law." This was a fundamental court, as ancient as the kingdom itself, declares Lord Hobart.⁴ For centuries among Anglo-Saxons the king, with quasi-parental, quasi-priestly function has represented the source of all legislative and judicial power. When courts of common law were established and precedents hardened the tissue of judicial procedure so that it could no longer adapt itself to the grievances of simple folk, there remained the appeal to the original source of judicial power for redress, that is to say, equity jurisdiction, which consisted in that part of the king's judicial prerogative in civil cases which he had retained in his own hands. Grievances were subject to petition to the king and the king turned over the matter in dispute to his deputy, the chancellor, who ordered the matter heard by a master, or referee, as the custom is today in some juvenile courts. The earliest applications for relief were from those who suffered by violence and the combinations of great men, against which they were unable to gain redress by the ordinary process of law.

Thus Aubyn de Clynton in 1321 complaining of a gross and outrageous trespass petition for a suit in equity on the ground that the "said Johan and Phillip hold their heads so high and are so threatening that the said Aubyn does

¹ Section 24, Juvenile Court Law. California Statutes, pp. 1002, 1023. *

² *Op. cit.*, section 9.

³ John G. Henderson, *Chancery Practice*, p. 62, Chicago, 1904.

not dare contest with them at the common law."¹ Frequently petitions were addressed to the king in his chancery, founded upon the poverty and defenselessness of the plaintiff and upon the force and power of the defendant. Thus matters of poverty, guardianship, witchcraft, custody, and estates of minors and those of unsound mind, matters of the protection of the weak and helpless against the strong, came to be heard in a separate court. How like the problems of the juvenile court and the domestic relations courts of today!

And procedure was elastic. So it is in modern chancery matters. The most noted American case referred to a master was that of the *Charter Oak Life Insurance Company vs. Cook County National Bank*. We quote Judge Drummond's injunction to the master to whom the case was referred: "Go to the bottom of the case, employ your own methods of investigation, arrive at your conclusions uninfluenced by what any other court may have done or said. In a case involving so many complicated issues as this, the responsibility for a just decision must rest upon the master; he alone can devote the time and study necessary to a thorough understanding of the whole case." It is a surprise to many to learn that the juvenile court has the fullest authority in time-worn usage for its procedure.

Anciently too did the forces and combinations that oppose the protection of the weak and helpless by the strong arm of the law voice their indignation—in 1377 the lawyers among the Commons petitioned the king "that the common laws . . . may be observed, and may not be defaced with masterships and other singularities." We do not hear, however, any complaints from those who were not lawyers, and matters continued to be referred, as Henry V said, in order "that ye make suche an ende in this matter that we be no more vexed hereafter with thaire complaints and God have you in his keeping."²

From a legal point of view the juvenile court created nothing new in 1898 when the Illinois legislature awoke to the horror of treating children as criminals. It merely defined offending children as handicapped and helpless children, included them in the provision which the law had already made for dependents, said explicitly that they could not be regarded as committing crimes, and threw around them the protection of the most ancient court in the history of our jurisprudence. Once more to quote a famous legal historian on this point: "The protection of the weak against the powerful, no matter whether the strength of the latter is the result of superior intellectual endowment, or of cunning, or of both, is yet one of the favorite sources of equity jurisdiction."³

With very little modification these old descriptions may be with equal truth applied to the children who come before the modern juvenile court. Neglect, ignorance, exploitation, cruelty, greed, may take their place before the bar of equity, formerly occupied by the haughty barons and sheriffs against whom the simple folk petitioned the king.

We have shown that the legal root from which the juvenile court sprang already possessed the principle of equity, or remedy, which is indeed the essen-

¹ Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

² *Op. cit.*, 77.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 86.

tial element of the clinic, and the second element, that of examination, or the application of scientific observation to the mental and physical condition of the ward has become an inseparable part of juvenile court procedure following the establishment by Mrs. William F. Dummer in 1908 of the first juvenile medical and psychological clinic in America, organized by Dr. W. Healy in Chicago.

There remains to indicate the sociological significance of the juvenile court. Considered from this point of view a judgment declaring a child a ward of the court is the declaration of a change in social status. The state has found him disabled and handicapped by lack of proper parental control, by neglect, defect, or unsatisfactory social conditions. He is therefore in need of reconstructive discipline, or re-education, and the state assumes guardianship of him temporarily or until his minority is ended. Accurately speaking the child has been subjected to stigma in this proceeding no more than would be involved in a change of guardianship. In public opinion however, the child, particularly the girl, has undergone a radical change in status, and has become by popular definition, a juvenile delinquent.

This handicap, however, is one usually accruing to conditions where accurate knowledge because of the complexity of the facts has been long delayed or withheld. Just as it has been necessary to loose the public mind from the concept of devils as the cause of insanity or yellow fever, so in the field of human behavior is it necessary to banish the concept of morality and immorality from the study of juvenile delinquency.

In modern times when a child violates the social code it is frequently because of lack of a uniform, authoritative definition of the social code. His idea of it is warped or confused. The various groups with which the child has come in contact, the family, the neighborhood, school, church, industry, and the recreational groups have not defined this code in a single voice, authoritatively and simply. The organs of expression of public opinion concerning the social code, the newspapers, the funny papers, the moving pictures, and street talk are still more confusing. If the modern young girl practices virtue she may not believe in it.

There are, of course, neurological, physiological, and mental elements in the girl's departure from the social code, but an important thing to reckon with is that after she has violated the social code and has undergone a change in social status, involving inferiority and guilt, not visited, as far as her observation goes, upon others who have held like views and been guilty of similar violations, there is need for the most tactful social treatment and the most radical and sympathetic recognition of her needs.

Precisely here, at this crisis, can the clinical factor of the juvenile court do the most good. Crises are not many in the life of the young person, that is to say, situations in which the need of the individual is the chief theme. Van Gennep, a French anthropologist, published a book in Paris in 1909, *Les Rites de Passage*, wherein the major and minor rites of primitive peoples in their sociological significance are surveyed. He finds that all have a certain

function, that of aiding in the passage from group to group, from one social status to another. Thus the situation at birth, baptism, entrance to school, puberty, the choosing of occupation, the initiation into fraternities, professions, and the like, the entrance upon marriage, parenthood, and death all have an analogy to a crisis. These situations may be called the crises of the threshold, and the ceremonies which surround them among primitive peoples are the rites of the passage of these thresholds.

For example, among the primitive Yaos, an African people, after the girl is initiated in honor of her attaining physical puberty, she and her companions carry on their heads with great ceremony and honor a miniature house built of logs, in order that they may be recognized symbolically by the whole tribe as the foundation of the home. How profoundly do we modern ones neglect the "puberty of the mind" is illustrated by the stories of the juvenile court girls!

The appearance in court may be likened to a crisis of the threshold. Here there is a summing up of assets and liabilities, issues are clearly defined, there is the dignity and importance of special treatment, and if there is a need of change of status, the legal nature of this change, rather than the popular one, should be pointed out, that is to say, that there has been assumption of guardianship on the part of the state because modern society has placed value on the safeguarding of its youth.

Court procedure then has a double rôle to play in its analogy to the clinic; not only must it diagnose the disability, but it must create in the mind of the child the consciousness of his need of treatment. This should be the only use of force in the situation, the same sort of force which brings the patient to the clinic and induces him to follow the prescribed course of treatment. A court procedure which is dignified, forceful, and flexible can accomplish this without charging the child with guilt.

When treatment begins the individual must be placed as promptly as possible in a situation that will develop a sense of the worth of personality, and emphasize the points held in common with other groups in the community. The problem is much the same as that of the immigrant, who in coming to America from Poland, as noted by W. I. Thomas, may have passed from the group where his status was that of the learned, respected scholar, to the status of the peddler. His gray beard, stooped shoulders, near eyesight, there being marks for honorable distinction, but here marks of difference and ridicule. So with the girl, on the "outside" her status connoted by a sleek coiffure, quick repartee, radiant cheeks, nerves and muscles attuned to the mysteries of jazz, these were her assets; when she comes under the court, they may all count against her in that bewildering process of "making good."

It is essential that some mechanism may be devised whereby the passage is possible without loss of self-esteem, and where the rewards are sufficient to impel the girl to pass the threshold from ward of the state to the threshold of normal citizenship. To create a situation where an individual *must* "make

good," where social forces make it practically inevitable, is a task requiring supreme genius for the "specialist in human relations." Often the necessity of responsibility starts the relearning process.

The creations of situation where "making good" is a necessity has been cleverly set forth in the moving pictures, as illustrated in the type dubbed the "Unwilling Hero" by Will Rogers. Often the dynamic force is mistaken identity. For example, Charles Ray portrays a shy, speech-defective clerk suffering from an inferiority complex. By accident he is mistaken for a brilliant, accomplished young salesagent. He is forced painfully, from point to point, along the path of success by the force of public opinion that insists in envisaging him under the species of successful and confident and refuses to permit him to take refuge in his own diffident and defective personality. Before he is able to unmask the new role has set, the needed adjustment completed.

In the treatment of juvenile delinquency that comes before the court and involves change in status there should be an integration of the forces that seek to establish new social relationships. Some mechanism of passing the threshold from status to status should be devised with sufficient strength to endure over the period of crisis.

An attempt to meet the problem of socialization has recently been begun in behalf of the juvenile court of Los Angeles County. For the girl whose normal relation to the family group has been severed by reason of the permanently broken home, parents dead, imprisoned, incurably ill, or defective, and the like, a girl whose behavior-difficulties make it impossible for her to be absorbed in the neighborhood group, there is usually no provision but the reformatory institution. A place of adjustment, a link between the court, the detention home, and the community is an important phase of diagnosis and treatment. El Retiro, a school for girls of Los Angeles County, is an experiment toward such solution.

The method of adjustment is as follows: Preliminary tests and examinations are made in the detention home and a more or less homogeneous group of girls in their teens are selected for El Retiro. An intensive program of work, study, play, and expression has been provided. Student government, that is to say, student participation in the conduct of affairs of group life, not a formal organization based on the least satisfactory elements of our government, the municipality and the police court, but rather a flexible, clublike organization of team work and community responsibility is maintained. After another period of observation at El Retiro a conference is held concerning the girl. At this conference all available sources of information are brought together. The referee of the court, the probation officer, physician, psychologist, superintendent of El Retiro, the principal of the El Retiro school, the recreation director (who later directs the program of the girl and directs the accomplishment of her project), and one of the girls chosen from the student body to represent the student-body knowledge and opinion—all these persons with specialized information meet to form a many-angled diagnosis. Traits of personality and

the reaction to group life are stressed especially. In this field of research no opinion is more competent than that of the girl who represents the student-body point of view, a mine of information hardly as yet touched by social research. The objective of the conference is the formation of a project or activity-goal for the new student, a task suited to her strength and personality and for which she will be responsible and receive the reward of recognition. On the completion of this project, usually from eight to ten months the girl is ready to leave El Retiro, that is to say, she has succeeded in some phase of group life and important clues for the adjustment of her personality in the larger community outside have been formed.

Since these results have been attained largely as the result of social relationships formed within the group at El Retiro, and by the use of the project method and student government, the girl is likely to have developed both self-confidence and group loyalty. The next essential was to form some social relationship for the complete passage of the girl into the community.

A girls' club was organized and a clubhouse secured in the city for about eighteen girls and their field secretary. The girls pay their board and work in stores, industries, etc. The housework is done by one girl who is paid by the others to act as homemaker. It is called the Los Angeles Business Girls' Club and is sponsored by the Los Angeles Business Women's Club, not as a charity but as an act of co-operation on the part of the business women with the younger and handicapped working girls of the city. Not all the residents are wards of the court, the chief requirement being that the girl be under twenty-one years of age and receiving the minimum wage. The club serves as meeting place for organizations of young people, business girls, college girls, etc. Thus any element of isolation, or unlikeness, is at an end for the girl who may be a ward of the court and she is brought into relationship with the normal forces of the community.

The following four cases, selected because they serve to illustrate the integrating processes at work in a socialized court procedure may be presented.

Evelyn is one. She is an orphan of Canadian extraction. Placed by a children's aid society in some six temporary homes she readily drifted into delinquency. For two years for her it was a succession of institutions, tempered by probation, after she came under the court. Then El Retiro was established. Her health was so delicate that she was sent there for observation for anaemia. There her central ability was discovered—leadership, and her chief interest—the design and manufacture of clothing. On graduation she became president of the alumnae group of girls and went to live at the clubhouse. She began earning \$22.00 per week as designer and shortly plans to open a shop of her own. As president of the alumnae organization she has succeeded in doing what no probation officer has done, the voluntary reporting of each girl's change of work, address, and new friends. If they are out of work through indifference or indolence her fluent scorn and her own stylish

costumes act on them as a spur. Her activity has two major outlets, leadership and craftsmanship.

Margaret is another. She was the oldest in a large family headed by a dissolute factory operative and a quarrelsome, complaining mother. The girl's home life was marked by coarseness and obscenity of language and her personality by alternate melancholy and violence. At El Retiro it became apparently probable that her behavior was the reaction made by her organism in seeking that for which it craved most, peace and security. She became an El Retiro homemaker. A troublesome asthma yielded to treatment based on quiet and contentment. She is now an officer of the alumnae association and she has returned to her own home which has become largely rehabilitated through her efforts. The club life apparently affords her all she needs of contact with the outside world.

Geraldine is a girl of eighteen, wrecked on the moving-picture industry. She was seduced by an under-director in attempting to sell a scenario, and was passed from hand to hand until her health broke. Her experiences were unbelievably tragic and unbelievably common. Her health, self-confidence, and charm were restored at El Retiro. On graduation she took to nursing but the key to her interest in everything was affection. A business man met her at the club and understood her genuine capacity. They were married. She has become an unusually successful wife and mother. She, too, is a club member, proud of her school and eager to assist.

Maggie was a rollicking, buxom girl of seventeen. Her parents were dead and her living relatives of doubtful reputation, indeed all the female members of her family had "gone to the bad." Maggie's own escapades were many. At El Retiro she was rough, noisy, daring, fearless, impetuous, in short filled with the spirit of adventure. She did not graduate but was returned to the custody of the probation officer. While on probation she became pregnant. In court she refused to tell who was responsible for her condition, but concocted a story of attack by a nameless man. The referee commented on her characteristics, her bravery, strength, resourcefulness, and gave her two weeks in which to find the man and bring him herself, unaided to court. Surprised but not daunted the girl succeeded. The man proved to be a soldier with a temperament much like her own. On careful examination, physical and mental, he was found to be a fit mate and was permitted to marry Maggie. This social rehabilitation has restored her to club life, much to her delight. For several months she has been happy and successful.

These four cases appear to illustrate certain varying types of human disposition and longing. W. I. Thomas has set forth four fundamental human wishes as follows: (a) the desire for new experience; (b) the desire for response (love and affection); (c) the desire for security; (d) the desire for recognition.

Somewhat from a different point of view, though allied in meaning, Graham Wallas in the *Great Society* finds that the chief human dispositions of behavior-goals are: craftsmanship, love, curiosity, and ambition.

Whichever mode we chose of envisaging the motive powers under which our young people react we should attend carefully to the need of diagnosis of the type with which we are working. How patiently and how alertly we should be on the lookout for individual differences in modes of feeling and response! How much suffering can we not avoid if we realize that human beings are not alike but infinitely and beautifully different! Our plans must fit the material if we would avoid collapse in building.

In analysis it has seemed to me that the four cases cited above illustrate certain factors of human variation, discovered late, but not too late to avoid permanent disability. Evelyn—craftsmanship and the desire for recognition; Margaret—the homemaker, the desire for security; Geraldine—the desire for response; Maggie—the desire for adventure.

Each of these girls has found social outlet in her contact with a group, similarly adjusted, with a similar relation to social status. All have experienced loyalty, that lately evolved and supreme kind of loyalty designated by Royce: "Loyalty is the devotion of the self to the community."

To sum up: the juvenile court can serve best as a factor in the diagnosis and treatment of behavior difficulties when the procedure is socialized. The initial step in this process is analysis based on examination of the physical, mental, and social factors involved; the second, an adequate mechanism for the passage of the individual from a status based on a warped view of the social code to a status in harmony with that code. The third step is the synthesis of the individual with the social forces of the community.

COMMUNITY PROBLEMS

Dwight Sanderson, Cornell University, Presiding

POINTS OF CONTACT BETWEEN CITY AND COUNTRY

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ABSTRACT

Points of Contact between City and Country.—There is growing discussion of the relation of city and country. For our purposes, town will mean all aggregations from hamlet to city. A phase of contact between town and country is an antagonism which seems to have intensified during recent decades. Some of the more or less tangible causes of this opposition are these: (1) The historic urbanite attitude of superiority toward farmers; (2) the farmers' dawning awareness of concentration of population and wealth in cities and the belief that it is at the expense of the country; (3) the growing class-consciousness among farmers, and organization to realize class interests; (4) especially the organization of farmers to secure what they consider justice relative to marketing of their produce, and kindred matters.

Basis of Co-operation.—There appears to be no certain and speedy relief for the strained relationship between rural populations and large cities. The ultimate solution would appear to be the realization of a social order giving entire justice to farmers. Small towns and villages and nearby rural people, however, should be able to agree and co-operate, providing merchants of the former will compromise

their prices and the latter will be willing to pay somewhat higher than mail order prices for the advantages of having a nearby village. Farmers' cooperative stores may accomplish something ultimately, but the outlook is not immediately hopeful.

The frequent discussions appearing recently on the relationships between city and country are an indication that a consideration of such matters is of importance and possibly further indicate that a strain exists between the two portions of society that is worthy of study. In most discussions it is assumed that everyone knows where the city ends and the country begins but critical students of rural society are aware of the difficulty in making hard-and-fast delimitations; and are quite certain that fixing the dividing line at 10,000, 5,000, or 2,500 is purely arbitrary and superficial. Further, there is a developing opinion that the villages and smaller towns have as many or more points of similarity to large urban aggregations of population than to the open country and that some of the points of similarity are so fundamentally significant as to debar classifying such places as rural.

There are certain things in which these small aggregations resemble the country, namely, in simplicity of living, democracy in personal contacts and freedom from social stratification, large recourse to and dependence on family domesticity, high respect for and conformity to the customary moral codes due to publicity of living, homogeneity of population, and relatively simple and undifferentiated industrial life. On the other hand there are numerous ways in which these small places are similar to large places as in compactness of population, the occurrence of numerous interests and interest organizations, domestic and communal conveniences and utilities, urbanized aspirations, and outlook of inhabitants, high degree of community spirit and solidarity, manner of living, dressing, and social intercourse, distinct consciousness of kind as urbanites resulting in a patronizing and condescending attitude toward country people, and an economic life constituted of non-extractive industrial pursuits accompanied with a highly developed motive of profit-taking.

In reality the small places are a kind of halfway house between the country and city, but, on the whole, are more like the latter than the former, because even the inhabitants of all save the merest hamlets of a few inhabitants identify themselves and their communities in aspirations, mode of living, and outlook on society with cities and more especially because the economic life is so highly motivated by profit-taking and the social psychology of the group is manipulated and controlled by those who are the more immediately concerned with profits. For the purposes of this discussion, then, these villages and towns of America will be considered as urban rather than as rural.

Since our national society is made up of two great component parts, the country and the cities, it is evident that there are numerous implicit but inconspicuous points of contact between the two. They are fundamental parts of a national and world-economy and each has functions to perform which are peculiar to itself and which the other half of society as well as itself needs in order to exist. That what the country is and does has a bearing in many

subterranean ways on what the city is and does and vice versa is so obvious that no detailed discussion is required and so will be taken for granted. There are, however, certain more explicit and conspicuous contacts which deserve attention, for out of these interactions and relationships have developed attitudes and movements which are of great moment.

Let us begin with a result of contacts between country and city, namely, with the fact of widespread antagonism and then proceed to a discovery of the causes in the contact of these groups with each other.

There are some great currents in population and wealth away from the country and toward the city which must impress the minds of the leaders in rural society.

There is little room to doubt that in some particulars the cities are developing at the expense of the open country and even of smaller cities and villages. In the study of population we observe that there has been no absolute decline in the nation as a whole in rural population. Only a few states actually lost rural inhabitants in the sense of having fewer at the last census than in the preceding one. But the country loses millions of people during a decade to the cities and the rate of increase of urban population is several times (5.8 during 1900-1910) that of the open-country rural populations. We also discover that in our nation a large percentage of the village and small cities are losing inhabitants and that the smaller the urban aggregation the greater is its likelihood of declining in population. Where these people who leave the villages go we cannot ascertain from statistics, but observation in a number of them is to the effect that most of the young people migrate cityward.

That a stream of talent from country to town is the accompaniment of the flow of population is obviously inevitable. It might be thought that it is only the more discerning who become dissatisfied in the country and go elsewhere. On the other hand, it could be contended that it is the nervously unstable and easily discouraged who do so. Only a resort to facts can settle this dilemma and the facts we have, indicate that the leaders in the United States in industry, commerce, finance, engineering, newspaper publication, pulpit, and other lines overwhelmingly have been born in the country. This would indicate that not only persons of leadership capacity but of extraordinary capacity have been uprooted from rural districts. And since there is no commensurate return of population and talent from urban to rural districts, the latter are made poorer and the former richer thereby.

There is also a disproportionate concentration of the wealth of the nation in the cities. The division of the national wealth between city and country for the census dates from 1850 to 1890 has been estimated. In that period of time the proportion of urban wealth increased from 44 per cent to 75 per cent of the whole, while the proportion of rural wealth decreased from 56 per cent to 25 per cent of the total. Rural wealth increased 400 per cent, urban wealth increased 1600 per cent. In 1890 when the rural population owned but 25 per cent of the wealth about 60 per cent of the population lived in the open country.

At that time the per capita wealth of the rural population was about \$423 as compared with \$1944 for inhabitants of cities and incorporated villages. We have no estimate as to how the case stands today, but probably the tendencies working to the advantage of urbanites has continued, so that the discrepancy is still greater.

The comforts and amenities of life seem to many to be located in towns. The homes have running water, inside toilets, bathing provisions, electricity for lighting and power, furnaces and equitable heating plants. The streets are paved and there are sidewalks so that in driving and walking there is no necessity to get into the mud. There are parks for outing, movies and playhouses to attend, lodges, churches, clubs, and organizations of all descriptions to belong to, frequent dancing, good schools, newspapers dropped at the door as soon as out, easily accessible stores and shops of all sorts, the stimulus of crowds in the street, parades, and pageants, and the opportunity to be clean and dressed up and frequently to stay so. In comparison with this understated array of attractions and distractions, the country appears to make a poor showing and only the decidedly rural-minded folk are content to live there. No blame can attach to cities for such concentration of appealing opportunities but the glowing contrast between town and country in this respect is none the less a fact.

Such a tremendous drift of population, talent, and wealth toward the city and such a multiplication of seductive attractions there constitute an impressive phenomenon. Statesmen the world over have pondered deeply their significance and sought to devise means of checking them. How could it be otherwise than that intelligent agrarians should envisage them as so many evidences of the encroachment of the cities on the country?

Opposition between country and city appears in a vague and hazy form out of the fact that farmers are farmers and town people are not, evidently being founded on location, mode of living, and calling. Says a recent writer:

"Urbanites have always arrogated to themselves a position of superiority relative to the agricultural classes. The city dwellers of Roman times called those on the land rustics and the literary men had much to say of the simplicity and crudeness of the rustic. Europe evolved its tillers of the soil into a distinct peasant class and its ignorance and stolidity are proverbial—the ideational product largely of white-bearded gentry delving in the field of urban literature. That the urbanites and townsmen of the United States 'look down on' the country-man is made evident in many ways. His rough dress, his tousley hair and beard, sometimes bearing chaff and straws, his lack of polish in social approach and conversation, his ignorance of city ways and manners have been mirrored in printed paragraphs and jibes of the press, playhouse, and street. The refined and superior manners of city dwellers are exhibited in the taunts the town boy hurls at the country boy when he puts his feet within the sacred precincts of the former. Conscious that he is different in clothes and calling and feeling at a great disadvantage, the country boy comes to partly

accept his assigned position to a lower class and to resent the situation and to 'want to get even.' Out of this situation that has persisted generation after generation has arisen a kind of unconscious class consciousness relative to each on the part of country and city dwellers."

When we approach the relation of antagonism between town and country from the side of economic interest we discover a perennial and world-wide source of renewal. From the time when the Roman slaves revolted against their masters down to the present, those on the soil have resented what has often been and always appeared to them to be their systematic exploitation by those in the towns. And those in towns have resented the imputations that they were exploiters, even when the accusation was true. Perhaps the data presented of the concentration of wealth in cities together with the startling fact that had it not been for the doubling of agricultural land values between 1900 and 1910, farming in the United States would have been conducted at a loss, are sufficient proofs that the farmers have been subject to exploitation. At any rate, rightly or wrongly, the agriculturists in North America, Europe, and Australia at the present time are quite generally agreed that the currents of business run against them unduly and that industrial, financial, and commercial organizations identified with cities are organized and operated to take undue profits at their expense.

Whenever a class becomes conscious of itself as a class and begins to organize as a class to rectify its real or imaginary wrongs, the opposition between itself and any other class or classes it deems to be the offender is immensely intensified. The farmers of the United States have been growing ever more class-conscious since the time of the Granger movement of last century and are organizing themselves for protection in both economic and political directions. But class-consciousness appears to be much weaker in America than in Europe. In Canada and the United States farmers are mobile, willing to leave farming for other occupations under great provocation, while the peasants of Europe are wedded to the land, and, even though resorting to the cities at times to work, continue to regard themselves as tillers of the soil. Moreover, recent events have intensified this class-consciousness in Europe. Mr. A. E. Taylor writes that "perhaps the most impressive result of the war is the destruction of feudalism. Practically every country in Europe that possessed feudal estates before the war has condemned them to division into small holdings for individual peasants. The agrarian question has been a burning problem in central Europe for a century. Most violently agitated in Russia because conditions were worst there, the problem was felt wherever large estates permitted tenants and agricultural workers to be exploited. More important than political freedom, more urgent than reform in education, more desired than change in government, more longed for even than abolition of compulsory military service was ownership of the land. . . . Now, it is precisely out of the sense of new possession that the present conflict between city and country in Europe has assumed an exaggerated form. The city is

trying to govern the policy of the country, and one reason why the country resists is because of the new-found sense of ownership of the peasant. The governments of most of the countries of Europe are more or less anti-agrarian and the situation has in some places developed into a veritable impasse. Because the agrarians of Europe have always possessed a class-consciousness they have always formed a political block. For a hundred years agrarian parties have been more or less influential in European politics and not infrequently they have held the balance of power."¹

Speaking of the British cooperative movement Sir Horace Plunkett writes: "I was in parliament from 1892 to 1900, and I remember one incident which brought home to me the political power of the trading interest and its hostility to cooperation. A minister of education nearly got his party into serious trouble for permitting the use in schools of a book in which the cooperative system was explained." Then relative to the Irish agricultural cooperative movement he continues: "The Irish movement was bitterly opposed by the country traders, who saw that joint purchase of agricultural requirements and joint sale of agricultural products not only would deprive them of a considerable portion of their business but would throw light upon the quality of all articles of common consumption and the prices charged for them, and they had even more political influence in Ireland than their brethren possessed in England. . . . In a backward agricultural community the political machine is generally run, not by the farming majority, but by the trading minority. . . . The control of the political machine in advanced industrial communities by combines and trusts was never comparable to the influence upon Irish politics of the village traders. It is generally known how 'big business' has aroused the ire of progressive leaders in American politics, but the way in which little business retarded rural progress in Ireland for a quarter of a century has escaped notice."²

That organizations of farmers has intensified the strife between city and country is generally recognized by students of the subject. Too often the blame is attached exclusively to the farmers as if they have no rights of self-protection. It is not always perceived that the business elements of cities have been organized as a profit-getting class for a long time and that the tendency is for all these elements to present a united front when ameliorative agricultural legislation is proposed or when farmers attempt cooperative enterprises. The press of the United States has been generally quite violent and bitter against the Granger movement, the Populist movement, and the Non-partisan League movement; and since the opinion of the press is determined by its advertisers and the advertisers are the businesses of the cities, it is evident where the source of opposition is.

¹ A. E. Taylor, "Conflict between City and Country in Europe," *Saturday Evening Post*, August 14, 1920, pp. 1 ff.

² *The Survey*, XLVI, 319, November 26, 1921.

It is probable that the business men of the small places have had no animosity against farmers as such but they have believed their profits threatened and have resented interference with their business. They have been strengthened in their organized opposition by the great interests in the larger centers. These larger marketing, transportation, and credit interests are prone to use their influence against movements which threaten ultimately to reach and regulate their operations. Consequently we have the exhibit of business from top to bottom being regimented for defense and offense, while on the other hand the farmers are forming in ranks, sometimes recruited by organized labor of cities, to improve their economic position. It is a menacing picture but one that appears inevitable as classes come to self-consciousness and form themselves into organizations.

The position of the business men in the villages and smaller towns is especially equivocal because of their close contact with farmers. In these smaller places the patronage is predominantly from the country. Without this trade and banking business the small businesses would fail and disappear. The merchant, bankers, and others are, therefore, under far greater dependence upon, and obligation to, agriculturists about them than to the strong interests in the large cities. Nevertheless they commonly align with the latter when farmers organize.

This attitude of the business element in small places appears all the more equivocal when it is remembered that the decrease of population in a third of the small places and the steady increase in the proportion of such places losing inhabitants during three decades indicate that the large cities are crushing them in a business way. It might be expected that the leaders in small places would have the intelligence to identify their interest with those of the agriculturists on which they immediately depend for success and so cooperate with rather than organize against them.

Although antagonisms between classes seem to be inevitable in the onward march of humanity, they are none the less deplorable because of the "bad blood" engendered between the opposing parties, the waste of effort and wealth incident to the struggle, the sacrifice of innocent bystanders, and the general resulting disorganization. The results of strife between town and country are so harrassing and deplorable, involving in the conflict all elements, institutions, and interests, at least in the smaller centers and often the large ones, that it would seem that all would welcome measures for mitigating the struggle, and, if possible, for ultimately eliminating it. But there is little hope of mitigation or elimination so long as common interests and justice in the distribution of the surplus are ignored.

Who can say what the outcome of this situation is to be or what can be done to mitigate it? We have heard voices from time to time saying that there is no class conflict, no basis for opposition between capital and labor, yet the lines are drawn there as distinctly and rigidly as ever. This other conflict between agrarians and urban businesses is almost as pronounced and clear-cut

as the other, based as it is on the distribution of the products of industry, and it is folly to shut our eyes to the truth and say that all will be well if farmers and business men will only get together.

If the farmers are right in their contentions that they receive an unduly small proportion of the proceeds from their produce, then they have a right to organize both economically and politically to protect their interests. But be it remembered that their cooperative efforts evoke about as much hostility as do their political attempts.

As between urban aggregations of all classes and the country perhaps the realization of an adequate land-settlement system will have a mitigating influence on the hostility, wherever the land question is the bone of contention, as in Europe generally. But there are also the marketing, the credit, and agrarian policy questions in Europe as in America and relative to these questions there must be recourse to both economic cooperative organizations and the exertion of political pressure. What form the political efforts shall take, whether the exercise of pressure on legislators and administrators by way of economic organizations or by the formation of distinct agrarian political parties, must be settled on the basis of expediency.

Perhaps the case is clearer concerning the relationship of the country to small towns and villages. There is a large mutuality of interests between the small town and the adjacent country. The small place has more interests in common with the country than with large cities. The business of such places is more dependent on the farmers than they on it; for easy transportation, the multiplication of trading centers, and the development of the mail-order business have made it possible for the latter to largely ignore the nearby village. But the stores, banks, and shops cannot find a substitute for the farmer's patronage.

On the other hand, a good local village is of unquestioned benefit to nearby farmers. It is a time saver in making journeys to do business. Better satisfaction is usually derived from buying goods over the counter, where their character and quality may be seen, than from the unseen purchase from mail-order houses. Local tradesmen will extend the credit that is often required by farmers. There is the advantage of the local bank for credit and deposit, of the doctor whose joke and visit are often more restorative than his medicine and whose close knowledge of the history of family ailments is a great asset; of blacksmith shop, barber shop, and of church and school. Good towns demonstrate their worth in land values, the nearer the town the higher being the value of farm land, doubtless the register of the price of convenience.

There are many directions for farmers and townsmen to take in their teamwork together. Good roads are mutually desirable. They extend the arms of trade into the country and make marketing centers more accessible to the farmers. Both sides have a common interest in promoting local industries. They make nearby markets for certain kinds of farm produce and serve as the basis of diversified farming. They increase the population of the town

and so create a larger trade basis for local firms. It has been demonstrated that larger schools and churches are advantageous; so here are other joint tasks for townsmen and farmers. And we must not forget the desirability of establishing county libraries with their branches in the various local communities and of joint clubs of town and country women.

Since it is chiefly over matters of trade that country and town are arrayed against each other, the question arises as to how they can compromise their differences. The local merchant insists that farmers and other consumers should patronize home industries and grow quite bitter over buying from mail-order houses. The farmer, in turn, insists that local prices of the things he buys are too high and for things he sells, too low. Are there any compromises or alternatives?

If both sides are sensible and fair, there is a basis of compromise between small places and the surrounding agricultural producers; but both sides must put themselves in the attitude of making concessions. The farmers, for example, should not be expected to sacrifice all they might gain as a result from purchasing goods away from home, nor should they expect small merchants to entirely meet the prices of huge and efficient urban establishments. But while the farmer should be willing to pay a percentage for the convenience of trading at home and having a nearby village, the merchants, in turn, should meet him halfway and make substantial price concessions. Thus, good sense and a desire for fairness on both sides will do much to make a completely cooperative town-country community.

A possible alternative has been sometimes suggested as a solution of this problem. The suggestion is to the effect that the development of cooperative stores by farmers might ultimately eliminate the small local middlemen, there being then nothing to quarrel over. It is further suggested that the present middlemen might then become managers and salesmen in these cooperative establishments. Now it is true that such cooperative stores have had a large growth in Ireland and some European countries and that they are being established in this country. It is also true that they might accomplish much in the direction of reducing prices to consumers at large and in securing better prices to farmers on their produce. But so far, American cooperative farmers' stores have not been a distinct success. They have ordinarily failed because of inadequate management, and we cannot hope much from them until individuals and associations establishing them learn that running a mercantile establishment is an enterprise requiring special training and ability.

Since much of the conflict between town and country centers in the farm marketing process, it may be well to say a word in that connection. As a result of my own search for light on the marketing situation, I have reached the conclusion that, as yet, we are largely in the dark concerning whether or not the markets are systematically loaded against the farmer. So far as I can see, no one has proved, beyond a shadow of a doubt, a conclusion either way. It is a strange fact that, in view of the many fine studies of the farm-marketing

question, a gap has been left here in our information. Personally, I have spent much time in an endeavor to bridge this gap by the application of scientific statistical methods and I have discovered the task more or less futile because so much needed information is unobtainable. As a consequence, the conviction comes that we are unable to justify the widespread claims so often made that the wheat market, for example, is manipulated by a small coterie of dealers against the producers. We must hope that the much-needed intensive, statistical research at this point may sooner or later enable us to pronounce an intelligent and valid judgment concerning this, and so, perhaps, contribute to the elimination of some of the strife existing between town and country.

WHAT THE RED CROSS IS DOING IN RURAL ORGANIZATION IN THE LAKE DIVISION

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ABSTRACT

What the Red Cross Is Doing in Rural Organization in the Lake Division.—In addition to regular Red Cross activities a number of chapters have undertaken home service extension. This social work has developed into four general types: case work with families; community organization; recreation; organization of existing agencies with co-ordination of their programs.

Since three-fourths of the Red Cross Chapters in America head up in towns of eight thousand population or less, it is readily seen that the Red Cross has a vital interest in the problems of rural people.

You are all acquainted with the regular Red Cross activities: such as service to soldiers and their families, public health nursing, first aid, nutrition work, instruction in home hygiene and care of the sick, and junior work in the schools. But a number of chapters have undertaken a broader social work program known as home service extension. In most cases this has consisted in family welfare work in towns. However, a few chapters in the Lake Division have employed rural workers who confine their efforts entirely to the country districts.

There are no hard and fast rules under which these workers operate and therefore the program varies in each of these counties according to the type of worker employed and the particular needs found to exist. Yet this work may be roughly grouped into four general types with certain activities like recreation and community organization common to them all. (1) The first type is characterized by case work among families. Olive Hill, Kentucky, Thornstown, Indiana, and Butler County, Ohio, are the best examples of rural case work being done in our Division. (2) The second type deals with the community as a case, and organizing community programs is the characterizing element; Scioto County, Ohio, furnished the best example of this class of work. (3) The third type uses recreation largely as the means of approach,

Covington, Ohio, and Richland County, Ohio, being examples of this type of work. (4) The fourth type seeks to organize the existing agencies and strives to co-ordinate the programs of each in a way to give the local community the maximum benefit to be derived from them. Muskingum County, Ohio, is cited for this.

Olive Hill, Kentucky.—A close examination would show that these lines of classification are but roughly drawn, since in each of the counties mentioned there is an amazing variety of things being done by the rural worker. For instance in the class of counties listed as the case work type, besides handling every conceivable kind of case, the Red Cross worker at Olive Hill finds time during the year for conducting six classes in first aid, holding numerous community meetings, organizing Girls' Camp Fire Clubs and girls' sewing clubs, a woman's club, a welfare league, and conducting a baby contest. In addition she secured and equipped a restroom for country women who come to town. She started a community library with 500 volumes, aided in two village clean-up campaigns, worked up a community Christmas tree, treating 500 poor children, supervised the playgrounds in a mission school one afternoon a week during the summer, started the modern health crusade in the schools, and put on the Red Cross Pageant of Peace.

Thorntown, Indiana.—Turning to the rural case-worker at Thorntown, Indiana, we find her indulging in conducting a class in domestic science for over-age and under-grade girls, carrying on a daily vacation Bible school, organizing Camp Fire Girls, starting playgrounds in several communities, training local volunteer play supervisors and conducting a child health conference and free clinic. In this she enlisted the co-operation of local doctors and dentists as well as that of the State Department of Health.

Butler County, Ohio.—Butler County, Ohio, was the other chapter mentioned as having undertaken the rural case-work program, but we find the worker here branching out also into other activities. She holds numerous community meetings at which local needs are discussed and plans made for meeting them. Such get-together meetings in the village of Coke Otto resulted in the formation of the Coke Otto Improvement Association which has undertaken a number of things such as repairing the roads by volunteer service, erecting a fire house and operating the fire engine by local volunteer squads. The organization is now working on securing electric lights for the village. This association repeated the kind of community Christmas celebration which they held last year under the direction of the rural worker.

The worker co-operating with the county Y.M.C.A. is rendering a distinct playground and recreation service in many places throughout the county by teaching games and recreational methods to groups of volunteer play leaders. In two communities this group was large enough to arrange a schedule providing two local supervisors for every weekly play evening.

The County Superintendent of Schools has asked the rural worker to report on families likely to have difficulty in sending children to school due

to lack of clothing or food. The County Health Commissioner requests reports on health cases and the township trustees are also using the worker's knowledge to good advantage.

Perhaps the most unique accomplishment of this worker during the year was the arranging for a rural community theatrical contest at the Butler County Fair. One community furnished a violinist, pianist, and leader for the festival. Five other rural communities staged competitive plays in the contest. Here is an incentive for community plays and pageants during the winter months.

Covington, Ohio.—Covington, Ohio, was named as one of the places where recreation characterized the work. This village organized what they insisted upon calling a Red Cross Community Council. Following this a rather careful survey was made with a number of state agencies participating. Recreation was found to be the crying need. They employed a young woman as recreational leader who was also charged with the responsibility of service to the soldiers' families.

They soon had installed a carefully supervised community picture show in the township auditorium which had been seldom used by the public. The school yards were converted into playgrounds during the summer months and a number of local leaders were trained for supervising play. The worker introduced physical training for girls in the high school and organized a gymnasium class for the ladies of the village. This service was later extended to include the high schools in one half of the county. The principal effort of the rural worker in the schools was expended in training teachers in recreational methods.

Richland County, Ohio.—Richland County, Ohio, also conducted a county-wide study with a number of agencies co-operating. Following the recommendations made, the local Red Cross chapter employed a recreation leader for the county outside of Mansfield. The various chairmen of the eleven Red Cross branches in the county constitute the County Council. This council meets once a month and directs the rural work program. The worker has now been operating in Richland County for about sixteen months. She began by establishing a close and cordial relationship with the County Superintendent of Schools and within a short time had introduced a series of games which were being played simultaneously in practically all the country schools. Soon play days were being conducted by districts; a number of schools coming together on Saturday, all prepared to play the same games. Growing naturally out of this was a tremendous county school picnic and play day held last summer with over three thousand present. Preliminary township field meets were held to select contestants for the big county meet.

At present in this county the school boards of four villages are conducting gymnasium classes which are recognized as a part of the regular course.

In addition the rural worker has succeeded in organizing a number of community baseball teams into a county league and a number of boys' and girls' basketball teams which also play in regular series.

In one place basketball was played in an old store building where the stove had to be placed on the platform while the game was in progress. Everything else in the village closed up at night when these games started.

The worker has also organized several Boy Scout and Girl Scout units. She has started three lyceum courses which are now operating in fourteen communities. In co-operation with the Y.M.C.A. she conducted a girls' summer camp with 160 enrolled. She has organized fifteen community clubs in the county, four of which are now building community houses. The house at Shiloh will contain an auditorium and gymnasium combined, a library and restroom, and in the basement will be a kitchen, dining-room, poolroom, and bowling alley.

Scioto County, Ohio.—Scioto County, Ohio, has attracted rather unusual attention not only because of the activity of the Red Cross rural worker there but because of her methods of procedure. The success of the work to a large degree is due to the fact that a live, active, and responsible committee is organized in each township. The committees were originally composed of four men and one woman in each instance. However, at their own request some of them have been enlarged and there are now 130 committee members in the seventeen townships. These committees work in the closest harmony and co-operation with the rural worker. They can be depended upon to give their time and energies unstintingly whether it be for making a community study, looking up individual cases that need assistance, arranging for a community sing, entertainment, or other forms of community meeting, or for any other project whatever.

The worker has shown her greatest power in being able to mobilize scores of helpers. In the spring of 1920 an arrangement was made whereby any doctor or dentist in the city of Portsmouth would give free service to one person each month referred to them by the Red Cross worker. In reality many doctors give free service to a number each month. Every Tuesday is Red Cross day for country people at the city dispensary. It is there that many operations have been performed without expense to the patient. Beside the doctors and dentists a large group of other people give volunteer service. There are troupes of volunteer play leaders and entertainers for the community evenings, and there is always someone who is ready to give an inspirational speech. The worker reports that more than two hundred volunteers have served in some capacity at least three times each during the past three months.

Muskingum County, Ohio.—The last county to be considered is Muskingum County, Ohio. The rural work in Muskingum County is meant to be a demonstration of approved methods of rural organization and a place where rural workers may be trained.

The organizer in this county is supplied by the Lake Division office while an assistant and all necessary expenses are furnished by the local chapter.

The worker is largely guided by a rural service council made up of representatives of twelve county-wide agencies. It might be mentioned in passing

that at the present time there are in the county twenty-seven agencies at work in the rural sections. At least twenty of these are interested in home betterment in some form or other such as health, recreation, child welfare, community organization, education, religion, etc. Beside these there are a great many local organizations doing a variety of things. In one town of 2,500 there was found to exist more than thirty organizations, no one of these being aware of the existence of so many other local agencies. The thing that has characterized the work in this county has been the splendid co-operation of all these groups and the readiness to co-ordinate their several programs so as to more adequately meet the needs of the county. As an example of this, beginning on April 1, and closing October 3, a county-wide educational campaign was carried out, using six motion picture programs on the following subjects: Boys' and girls' agricultural clubs, better schools, good roads, health, child welfare, farm and home conveniences. In this campaign active co-operation was secured of the Farm Bureau, the county schools, county health board, and Good Roads Council. Each of these organizations furnished films and a speaker to accompany the rural worker. Thirty-two communities were selected in the county and five programs were presented in each of these during the seven months. In all 68 films were presented at these meetings, 148 talks were given by the Red Cross worker, and 108 talks were given by representatives of other organizations. A total attendance of 28,880 was registered.

A mass of community activities have grown directly out of these meetings. In the same spirit the rural organizer attempted to socialize the county fair. In this project he secured the co-operation of seven agencies beside the Red Cross. They operated a lost and found booth, a restroom, a good literature table, an information stand for ex-service men, a better schools and churches booth, a first aid station, and a public health center.

The worker within the last two months arranged for forty-one addresses on sex and social hygiene to be given in rural communities by two representatives from the State Department of Health. The schools and the county health officials participated in this project.

A plan for a county library is practically completed. It was promoted by the rural worker circulating twenty state libraries from community to community, thus arousing sufficient interest to demand a county library system.

During the past year the worker, with the assistance of many other individuals has completed studies in twenty-one communities. Eight classes in home hygiene and care of the sick were conducted for country women. First aid courses are now being given to all students in the rural high schools of the county.

The worker is now busy planning some thirty community institutes to be conducted during the winter. He has already secured the pledge of co-operation on the part of all the agencies which can possibly be used in this undertaking.

It is supposed that these institutes will naturally take up the subjects for further consideration which were introduced in the educational campaign conducted during the summer.

The program in this county is in no sense superimposed but is being worked out by local community clubs, or community councils, and backed up by the existing agencies.

These are some of the outstanding activities of the Red Cross in rural work.

SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK

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HAS SOCIOLOGY A CONTRIBUTION TO THE EQUIPMENT OF THE SOCIAL WORKER?

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ABSTRACT

Results are reported from a questionnaire sent to 463 representative social workers of which 133 replies proved enumerable. While the data are not conclusive the replies corroborate the following conclusions: (1) That training is increasing and is increasingly expected; (2) that undergraduate sociology is not markedly vocational but is decidedly prevocational; (3) that without applied sociology the other branches of sociology have less professional value; (4) that teachers of sociology have quite as much to learn from social workers as vice versa; (5) that the professional school is needed to bridge the gap; (6) that job-analysis of social work is desirable; (7) that several other subjects are equally valuable, at least for certain kinds of social work; (8) that no undergraduate curriculum should be considered as true professional training; (9) that sociology has other values beside background for social work; (10) that further similar inductive study and discussion is worth while.

It is not, I assume, the purpose here to justify or even to test the results of sociology *as a science*. The search for and presentation of truths in this field, if not an end in itself, is as independent of any and all professions or livelihoods, as it is in any other science.

Moreover, it is not purposed here that we question the practical value of sociology for citizenship, for law, medicine, politics, or business. We are to examine it as a vocational or prevocational subject in one field—a field, to be sure, with which it is too frequently exclusively identified—that of social work. As teachers we wish our researches and analyses to be in form and content such as to be of greatest utility to the student if he becomes a social worker; and we wish to know how far we have succeeded.

In the past much improvement has been secured in this matter through discussion among teachers, and through sporadic interchange of personnel between social work and teaching. Occasionally, university teachers and social workers have got together on the problem. The professional schools of social work have bridged the gap between theory and practice. There are present today representatives of the various groups involved.

It was, however, the feeling of the writer that discussion in such groups as this would be more fruitful if we were to have a few facts for inductive inference. Educators, even in the sciences, have been unduly loth to inquire, in other than a *a priori* manner, into the results of their highly experimental efforts. As I tried to analyze the values obtained for my own field work from academic sociology, it occurred to me that it might be well to ask some others what had been the effects upon their lives as social workers, of the pabulum received by them from alma mater. Has it been medicine, food, or merely stimulant? Has it practice value, policy value, or only prestige value?

Six months ago at Milwaukee, the writer asked Mr. Allen T. Burns¹ whether academic sociology had ever consciously affected his work or methods in any way. He answered diplomatically that psychoanalysis might find such an influence in his unconscious. This, however, is not necessarily so bitter a pill as it may seem for us teachers.

When Lloyd-George is in executive action and makes a decision, does political science make a contribution to his equipment? Not consciously. His unconscious, organized and working, hands the correct decision to his consciousness for verification, and the act is done. It may be that principles of behavior serve similarly the seasoned social worker. We cannot undertake to psychoanalyze them for it, but we can make at least a beginning toward a test of our results.

The questionnaire which I sent out is a result of my curiosity. The limitations of the questionnaire method were, of course, recognized, but had to be accepted in view of the short time allowed for preparation. For a profession as yet so unstandardized it is, of course, impossible to formulate a brief schedule which would fit all cases. The result was a compromise. Every question justified itself by eliciting valuable responses, but some questions were inapplicable to certain large groups. No questionnaire can be made fool-proof, but there were remarkably few misunderstandings. The reactions varied all the way from a few undeserved praises down to two or three who merely remarked "*Gr-r-r-rrh!*" or "*Me-ao-ou psst!!!*" and let it go at that.

Four hundred and sixty-three questionnaires were issued, under joint sanction of this Society and of the American Association of Social Workers. There were 162 responses, of which 133 proved enumerable. Some arrived too late and may be included in a revision.

The heavy response in numbers, in quantity and in quality, to this detailed questionnaire was, in view of the short notice given, a pleasant surprise.²

¹ Retiring president of the National Conference of Social Work, Director of Americanization Studies for the Carnegie Corporation, and formerly Director of the Cleveland Foundation.

² The most painstaking and significant replies were in most cases from the best-known and busiest social workers. The writer takes this opportunity to acknowledge, for the organizations involved, the co-operation of the respondents, and to express his personal thanks.

The many thoughtful independent responses, especially from the most experienced workers, would alone justify the questionnaire, even if not a single schedule had been fully followed. It is impossible here to quote from these letters; the writer hopes soon to prepare from them a more extensive symposium, which will be again circulated, for comment and revision, to a smaller, select list.

It was impracticable to send out an inclusive mailing list. That used was based, however, upon the choice of the profession itself, as represented by its recognized organs and organizations throughout the country. The addition of a certain number of Pacific Coast names was made in order to correct in a measure the undue weighting of the East in most national organizations. There has been less formal training for social work in the far West, and there is less emphasis on the private agency and on the case-work sector of the field.

About half of a list so selected is naturally composed of the "old guard," those pioneers for whom there was no opportunity to study sociology in college; and it inevitably excludes most of the new generation, who have had the more up-to-date work of such teachers as Dr. Todd and others whom I see here. However, the automatic elimination (for the reason indicated) of the "veterans" from many of the results of this study, compensates somewhat for the omission of the youngsters. The bulk of the full replies are, therefore, from the second generation and the unusually successful in the third. This assuredly offers a group whose mature opinions should be valuable to us, and fairly representative of the full-fledged and successful social workers. Furthermore, the answers from such a group regarding salaries and standards of employment should be particularly practical in their bearing upon the vocational value of our teaching, and of value in the placing of social workers in new positions.

Of the total enumerated, fourteen had more or less of professional school training, of whom eight are in case-work. Those who had applied sociology in professional schools only are not included in the figures as having had applied sociology, since the purpose here is to evaluate college sociology.

Through a misunderstanding of my share of the discussion, questions bearing on Dr. Todd's topic were included in my schedule. The answers have since been made available to him. It is perhaps fortunate that my topic as assigned is so similar to his, as it makes it possible for you all to discuss the same subject for the entire period. But our ground inevitably overlaps to such an extent that, had we not already been friends, we might never be able to fight it out!

A broad distinction was attempted between types of courses, because of their probable differences in vocational effect. The distinction drawn between "theoretical," "historical," and "applied" sociology is, of course, not hard and fast. The results indicate, however, that figures based on "sociology" in general would have been comparatively valueless without some distinction based on subject-matter; and that the classification was useful wherever the answers follow it.

Because of limited time, both for analysis and for presentation, it was possible to present for discussion only a too dogmatic verdict. Coherence was probably sacrificed to brevity. The figures are available, however, for reference.¹

The variables in such a study are numerous, and the number of cases is too small in most instances for definite conclusions to be justified. A non-statistical collation of the opinions expressed will make possible a valuation of these factors. It is thought, however, that the number of cases upon which the generalizations here offered are based, is sufficient to reduce the influence of exceptional cases.

In certain respects the results are what would be expected, but it seems worth while at least to have verified the general impression. At other points the figures are perhaps somewhat revealing.

The writer will be quite satisfied if the present experiment leads to more thorough and conclusive study of the actual results for social work to be expected of our sociological teaching.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF INQUIRY

1. *Representative data.*—The data secured are reasonably representative of the profession in distribution by areas, by scope of agencies, and by types of work. They are probably equally representative of the distribution of sexes and ages in executive positions.

2. *Training of respondents.*—Over half of our prominent social workers have had at least some college sociology; nearly half of them, more than one kind of sociology; two-fifths of them in applied sociology. Only a sixth of the total, or less than a third of those who had any sociology, had taken other sociology without having also some applied. Nearly all of the younger generation had some academic sociology.

3. *Choice of profession.*—Applied sociology influenced more social workers in their choice of profession than did other sociology, but half of those who studied any sociology in college seem to have done so with the vocation already in mind, or were not influenced by it enough to recall and record it.

4. *Prestige value.*—Applied sociology comes first, and theoretical second, in securing positions in social work. This is proved from both the employers' and the employees' answers. Only one social worker responding apparently viewed unfavorably candidates trained in undergraduate sociology, and that person is also a teacher of social economics. Of those who had either theoretical or historical sociology only a third were helped by either of them in getting positions. For those who had applied sociology in college, on the other hand, nearly half were helped by it to jobs. Again, however, over half the answers in both groups are either negative, vague, or blank.

¹ Retained in the records of the Society.—Ed.

5. *Effect upon salaries*.—Approximately the same statements hold true of the effects of college sociology upon the salaries of social workers; but in general the effect was slightly less than in the securing of positions. Theoretical and applied here rank almost equally. Less than half were helped by any college sociology, in respect to salaries.

6. *Contribution to point of view and technique*.—Academic sociology contributes considerably oftener to the general point of view of a social worker toward his work than it does to his technique. This was less widely true of applied sociology, where over half of those who had it recall specific effects in their work. Valuable analytic comments were received in connection with these points. Several stated that they feel their lack of academic training in sociology. Most of those, however, who registered specific value in technique, failed to give any examples of this effect. If we count blanks as negative answers, we find almost half of this group registering no specific value obtained from any college sociology for their later work; but less than a fourth deny or ignore its general professional value.

7. *Relative professional value of social sciences*.—Among workers who had all three branches of sociology, in college, those who value theoretical first as part of their equipment about equal those who value applied highest. Historical sociology ranks low throughout the study, though certain prominent individuals value it highly. As taught in the past it seems, however, to make comparatively little contribution to the equipment of social workers, except workers among foreigners. Various other subjects, chiefly other studies of human behavior, are described as of equal or greater professional value.

Ignoring the distinction between the three ways in which subjects may be of professional value, nearly half of those who had any academic sociology had found some other subject equally or more useful in some way, and very few state specifically that no subject was more professionally valuable to them.

8. *Valuation by employers*.—From the employers' point of view, applied sociology again holds first place, with theory second, both for practical value to the worker, and in the consideration of prospective employees. Many employers, however, did not answer these questions, and additional data should be secured.

Many older executives register their appreciation of social theory either explicitly, by regretting their own lack, or indirectly, by extensive voluntary reading of it. Non-academic work was, however, not counted in this study.

Several employers of case-workers spontaneously express appreciation of the special value of the professional-school training.

CONCLUSIONS

In respect to the general topic, the Relation of Sociology to Social Work, the data collected aid the writer in the following conclusions: that under-

* As a profession, social work should be free of financial motives, but it will not be so until salaries and training are both standardized at a professional level.

graduate sociology is not markedly vocational but is decidedly prevocational; that without applied sociology the other branches of sociology have less professional value; that teachers of sociology have quite as much to learn from social workers as vice versa, and that the professional school is needed to bridge the gap.

The contribution of undergraduate sociology to the equipment of the social worker is chiefly in the general perspective restraint, and inspiration obtained, though applied sociology sometimes has specific value for technique.¹

The increasing proportion of leading social workers who have a sociological background, together with the attitude of employers, indicates that whatever shortcomings the courses have had or may have, they are still valued by the profession, and are expected to produce more generally the benefits they have already been striving to provide. Even where sociology has apparently lacked practice value or policy value, the fact that it has prestige value is a good sign. Even the knocks are boosts. People do not kick a dead horse.

Sociology is shown to be not the only pebble on the social workers' beach. The wide divergence in judgment evinced in regard to the value of various other sciences for different kinds of social work seems to indicate that we must not merely offer sociology *in general* as preparation for social work *in general*, but must subject social work to a process of job-analysis, to find all the specific prevocational knowledges, sociological or otherwise, most needed for specialties in the broad field of social work. Schools of social work should then require such subjects for admission to their corresponding special courses, and our colleges can then, in their prevocational work, more confidently adjust their curricula for what the economist calls "production in anticipation of demand."

Does the low percentage of specific value found in undergraduate sociology necessarily indicate that these courses are out of touch with life? Not necessarily. Judges on the bench would not expect from undergraduate political science any practice value at the bar. Biology is not practiced by doctors. It is probable that many employers of social workers are still expecting full vocational preparation from undergraduate work, whereas they should demand true professional training.

It should be understood that the writer does not consider that any undergraduate courses should be ranked as full vocational or professional preparation. Technical training should be demanded of all responsible social workers, and should be entirely postgraduate; but it should demand as prerequisites whatever undergraduate courses in social sciences are shown by inductive inquiry to have prevocational value. This is proved by the number and prestige of those workers who ascribe practical value to the undergraduate courses.

¹ That sociology adds to one's organized fund of knowledge seems obvious without inquiry.

Some of the replies contain searching criticisms of sociological pedagogy, and should lead teachers to learn more from social work in regard to their methods.

Social workers, on the other hand, must recognize that prevocational preparation for social work is not the only purpose for which academic sociology exists, and will, therefore, not expect us to dance altogether to their tune. A sociology which, being based upon the real experience of humanity, can socialize the experience of the next generation of professional and business men and women, will do greater social work than any number of social workers it might train.

Finally, the following lines of inquiry suggest themselves for later occasions of this sort: (1) A comparison of the value to social workers of college courses offered before 1900, with those offered by five- or ten-year periods since then, in order to gauge our progress and to inform employers. (2) A comparison of the value of courses offered since 1910, by institutions, each of its own graduates now in social work. (3) The same, by specific subject-matter, for different types of social work. (4) (and most important) The effects of social work upon the teaching of sociology.

WHAT TYPES OF COURSES IN SOCIOLOGY ARE MOST VALUABLE FOR THE SOCIAL WORKER AND HOW THEY MAY BEST BE PRESENTED

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ABSTRACT

Courses in Sociology Most Valuable for Social Workers.—The content and methods of presentation of sociology courses in preparation for social work depend upon the problem fields and the methods covered by social workers. The most practicable analysis divides the field into family welfare, treatment of delinquents, treatment of defectives, child welfare, health, industrial relations, community betterment. Methods include case-work, group work, institutional work, research, social publicity. Preparation for these various types of social work should include three divisions: (1) fundamental general courses to provide the base; (2) special field information courses to give background; (3) technical courses to cover approved methods. General courses on background and methods should be paralleled and supplemented by some form of laboratory work, such as visits and observation trips to social agencies, field practice, and genuine professional field training under properly qualified trainers.

In the interests of economy of time, we shall at once waive all questions as to whether social work is a profession *sui generis* or not. Nor shall we attempt to formulate a precise definition of either the objective or the field or the methods of social work. It is safe enough to assume that organized social effort has an objective, and it is apparent that it has a technique or techniques with which it is attempting to solve its problems. It is perfectly true that these techniques are still in process, but so is the technique of medicine or any other growing art. Our ground of discussion should be chosen

primarily from the social worker's standpoint and not from the sociologist's. Our first interest is in knowing what the social worker has to meet in the course of his work, what his problems are, what his resources are, what experience has shown to be the most valuable elements in general education, and what specific training is available or may be made available with his needs in view. This is the line we shall take rather than attempt to tell social workers what they ought to be doing, what they ought to be aiming at, and how they ought to reach their goal.

The reorganization of the National Conference of Social Work provided for grouping of activities and programs of the Conference under seven general divisions, namely, Children; Delinquents and Correction; Health; Public Agencies and Institutions; the Family; Industrial and Economic Problems; the Local Community. These permanent divisions of the Conference represent roughly the fields of social interest and the natural affinities between certain groups of workers and students. They do not, however, state clearly enough the precise types of problems which are presented to the individual social worker; nor do they indicate the methods or technique involved. They do not, therefore, constitute a base specific enough for the building of a training curriculum.

The study of education and training for social work made by Professor J. H. Tufts for the Russell Sage Foundation is not yet in print but I have been given to understand that the study followed a classification of social fields not altogether unlike that of the National Conference, although its principle is different. His point of departure is the relationship between a given social field and various institutions or society as a whole. He arrives at the following fields: the family, government, economic institutions, health and hygiene, recreation, education, religion, community life.

The American Association of Social Workers analyzes the field much more satisfactorily for the curriculum builder by separating objectives from methods, but considering both. Thus the problem fields are: child welfare; the family; delinquency; medical social service; public health; housing; leisure-time activities; the settlement; the school; industry; immigration; community development. The methods fall into: case-work; group work; community organization; institutional work; social research; publicity, finance, and other specialties. It is clear that in this analysis the problem field need not be and as a matter of experience is not so highly subdivided (for example the problem of the settlement or the immigrant is included in other fields) or if such subdivision is a merit there is no reason why it could not be even more detailed to include, say, mental hygiene, the rural community, or legal aid. Therefore I am inclined to favor a somewhat more concise division of the field into family welfare; treatment of delinquents; treatment of defectives; child welfare; health; industrial relations; community betterment. Likewise as to methods I should prefer the following outline: case-work, group work, institutional work, research, social publicity. It seems

unnecessary to differentiate either methods or fields between public, governmental or quasi-governmental, and private agencies.

The placement bureau of the American Association of Social Workers lists forty-two general types of social service jobs, some with still further subdivisions. It is not to be understood that these different types of social work are mutually exclusive. As a matter of fact there are certain fundamental modes of procedure common to all. They are divided off largely because within each group there is a certain emphasis which differentiates and colors the technique. The fact of kinship is established clearly by the constant migration of social workers from one field to another. That is partly due to the generalized training which these workers have received, and partly to the fact that social technique is still malleable.

In general it may be said that the preparation for these various types of social work should include three divisions. First, fundamental general courses; second, special field information courses; third, technical courses—the first to provide the base, the second the background, and the third the approved methods. The fundamental general courses should be given to every prospective social worker and should be of such nature as to be indispensable to all. The second, and particularly the third division, should have in mind the needs of the specialized worker; for example, the juvenile probation officer, the rural public health nurse or recreation worker, the large-scale industrial relations worker.

In line with this analysis and conformable to the experience of several outstanding social workers of success and national recognition, it was my privilege to lay out the training course for social workers at the University of Minnesota. In that course we stipulated that every student should receive instruction in the introduction to sociology, which included a study of the origin and development of human society; the various agencies which have determined the types of social life; social organization, institutions, and progress. The idea in this fundamental course was to present the normal life of society in its dynamic and functional aspects on the theory that nobody should attempt to initiate new social processes and machinery without some pretty clear idea of what society is like, how it is built up, how it may be changed, how its different constituent parts affect each other, and what its general drift seems to be.

On top of this more or less theoretical basis, it was considered desirable to offer some more precise idea of the process and content of those great currents of social amelioration which propose to transform present society and make it over into something newer, if not better. Therefore a course was designed called Modern Social Reform Movements, which includes a brief history of the attempts to overcome certain social maladjustments such as slavery, intemperance, unemployment, industrial strife, child labor, poverty, degeneracy, bad housing. It includes therefore a discussion of movements for public health, industrial peace and order, social insurance, the protection of

infancy and youth, public recreation; the use of the police power of the state; the literature of social protest.

Still more precise, and leading out of the general course on social reform movements, year courses were designed on the nature and treatment of dependents, defectives, and delinquents. These included the conditions in contemporary society out of which the social problems of the defective and dependent arise, the methods used or advocated for the prevention and alleviation of poverty and defectiveness, the causes of crime, the nature of the criminal, criminal procedure, methods of treatment, including preventive methods. Manifestly this course on dependents, defectives, and delinquents falls into the second division as we analyze it, namely, field survey or information courses designed to give a background to the student; a background in perception and also a background to enable him to make a sufficiently definite vocational choice to elect his training sequence. In this same group we should place also such courses as housing and child welfare. The latter course should include not only the institutional care of children, but all private and public agencies working on behalf of the child, with due attention to the legal aspects of child welfare, that is, child protective legislation, its development and administration.

At this point our analysis seems to part company with what has been pretty generally accepted as an orderly sociological sequence. Specifically, I mean that about the end of the Junior year of training, or the beginning of the Senior year, the student should normally cover more in detail problems in social psychology and social control, the family in its evolution, its various forms, its service to social evolution; methods of social investigation and social statistics; social progress. These courses on the whole are referable to the first division of fundamental general courses, yet at the same time they bear certain marks of the second group, and some of them, particularly in the field of social statistics and social investigation, might be classified as technical courses.

The third division of training should include such distinctively technical courses as medical social service, mental case-work, the technique of family treatment; that is, an indispensable study of social case-work; also if time and training resources allow, juvenile courts and probation as an application of case-work and as a meeting ground for general case-work and child-protective legislation. I should add here also a course on charitable administration, finance and publicity, a study of organizing charitable agencies, financing them and making the public aware of their work.

These courses on the background and the methods of social work should give the history, the experimentation, and the methods of the special fields of directed social effort. They are incomplete in themselves from the standpoint of technical training. They should therefore be paralleled by some form of laboratory work, the particular form and development of such laboratory work to be determined largely by the equipment of the training institution, the

social resources of the community, and their accessibility. For certain training institutions in certain localities, visits and observation trips to social agencies, public or private institutions, or industrial plants, are about all that can be achieved. This sort of watching in or looking over is not to be considered as field practice or field work, but rather in the nature of illustrative material, of somewhat the same kind (but more vivid because alive) as photographs, charts, diagrams, lantern slides, moving pictures. Such materials should accompany normally the courses in the first and second divisions, but with the third division of training, namely, the distinctive technique, should go intensive field practice under special trainers in properly approved social agencies, the results to be checked up by frequent conference and the whole thing to be conceived either as genuine laboratory practice or as internship.

One or two other scattering questions remain. For instance should the introductory course be specially arranged for social workers? My feeling is that any properly given course will meet their needs and that it should not be necessary to construct special courses for full-time social-worker training. There is no more reason for "social service sociology" than there is for "business sociology" or "Christian sociology" or "Baptist biology." It may be, however, that evening courses or extension courses given to social workers trained on the job should be specially arranged and constructed, since the problem in such cases is rather one of selection, elimination, and concentration of materials.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

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The Round Table at which Dr. Eliot and Dr. Todd opened up the discussion with the foregoing papers was attended by several hundred interested persons, at least a score of whom took part. The sense of the meeting was clearly that sociology does have a contribution to make to the equipment of the social worker. There were a few, however, who frankly questioned this, as for example did Dr. Thomas J. Riley, formerly director of the St. Louis School of Social Economy and now executive secretary of the Brooklyn Bureau of Charities. Others were in doubt as to this contribution, as was Mr. Frank J. Bruno, executive secretary of the Minneapolis Associated Charities and of the department of sociology of the University of Minnesota. Still others felt sure that sociology has a contribution to make but were not clear just what it is, as was Mr. Porter R. Lee, director of the New York School of Social Work.

Judging from those who took part, the contribution that sociology can make to the social worker is largely in adding to his fund of organized knowledge of the nature of social relationships in normal society and to his point of view toward social work (social philosophy) rather than to the technique of community organization or even of "getting Mrs. Jones to the clinic."

Time was limited but several speakers who had done professional social work as Dr. Arthur E. Wood, of the University of Michigan, and Mrs. Bessie Bloom Wessel, of Connecticut College for Women, indicated quite specifically how certain fundamental sociological concepts had been of great practical value to them in their work. The former stressed among other things the importance of understanding the differing mores and customs of foreign groups if one is to be a successful case-worker with the immigrant. The latter pointed out the value of the social evolutionary point of view to the social worker and the inspiration of such a concept as found in Lester F. Ward's discussion of teleology. One could not help but wish that time had permitted for the clear formulation of some dozen sociological concepts, such as: social evolution, including the evolution of social institutions, teleology, social control, the rôle of social heredity, the causal relationships of social phenomena, social solidarity, social maladjustments, the normal life, the normal family, without which no social worker dealing either with individuals or with social conditions can be said to be adequately prepared for work.

Dr. Lucile Eaves, director of the Department of Social Research of the Women's Educational and Industrial Union, Boston, pointed out that there were large sections of the country where social work had not been professionalized to the extent that it has been in the East or even along the Pacific Coast. In these other sections, sociology has played an important rôle in socializing many students and thus raising the level of intelligence of much worth-while volunteer social work. In so far as one of the objects of sociology is to make people better citizens, it is needed by social workers along with all others and is particularly of aid to the former in creating a more intelligent public opinion on which their work must ultimately rest.

Mrs. Helen Glenn Tyson, formerly head of the social service department of the University of Pennsylvania Hospital, Philadelphia, stated that she always required her staff to take a course in sociology each year if for no other reason than as an antidote to the possible narrowing effects of the day's work. Dr. Eliot rejoined that if sociology is an antidote for social work, the latter is an excellent antidote for that type of sociology that loses the common touch and a vital contact with reality.

REPORT OF THE RESEARCH COMMITTEE OF AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

SOME NEGLECTED FIELDS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH

I. FUTILITY OF THE DEBATE ON WHETHER SOCIOLOGY IS A SCIENCE

How much has been written on this question and with how meager results! Times without number the sociologist has been "put in his place" and has refused to "stay put." Convinced that he is dealing with a field which the other social sciences have not covered he has insisted that he has a contribution to make to human knowledge. His faith has been contagious with the result that no matter with what scorn or patronizing the "hard-boiled" economist, historian, and psychologist has treated his subject, an increasing number of students have found their ways to his classroom and insisted on reading his books. Nevertheless, such treatment of sociology has brought to him a healthy humility, and has caused him to search his heart and has inspired him to carefully scrutinize his methods. Discussion up to this point has made clear what sociology is about. In a broad way we know the field—that of men's social relations to each other. What we need now is explorations of the field of social relations—a careful description of how men react to social conditions, their resulting ideals, customs, institutions; of their choices and united actions; of the principles according to which they react to given conditions. Sociology has been twitted sometimes by economics as less definite and less scientific. I wonder if both do not need a great deal more careful research before they manifest any undue superiority, the one over the other. Take, for example, the theory of value in economics. I believe economic theory has it that values are determined by the resultant of the varying choices of individuals as between certain goods. Reduce to the lowest terms it is said that each individual says to himself, "Now I can get more satisfaction out of this thing than out of that, hence I prefer this above that." I wonder whether any economist has ever carefully gathered data to ascertain whether that is just the way individuals act. Does anyone know by careful study whether individuals determine their choices in this deliberate fashion? Perhaps a careful study of economic choices, which determine demand for an article, might discover that choices are determined by impulses, by imitation of others without such careful

balancing of one thing against another. Whether they do or not is not the point: rather I am calling attention to the fact that, so far as I know, no careful statistical study has been made of economic valuation on which might be based a theory of value. In many of the practical phases of economics, such as money, transportation, labor problems, etc., however, some very good studies have been made. Sociology is tarred with the same stick. It talks blithely about principles, when most of its generalizations have been made on inductions no wider than can be made in one's study from a rather wide reading of books on history, anthropology, and ethnology. I do not decry such study, but it should be supplemented by very much more intensive and careful study of present-day society. As an example typical of much which has gone before I may refer to a very recent book on rural sociology in which there is a chapter on "A Changing Rural Psychology." Here the statement is made that "we are taking cognizance of the changing psychology of the farmer." So far as I have been able to learn there have been no careful studies made to determine scientifically what is the psychology of the farmer. It should not be impossible to determine what are the attitudes of the farmer which reflect his opinions and beliefs, and his mental processes so far as they are socially determined and result in social reactions. Neither has such a study been made of the psychology of any other group in the population.

II. SOME FIELDS IN WHICH RESEARCH IS GOING ON

While it is bewildering, it is hopeful that all kinds of facts in the field of social relations are being collected. Never in the history of mankind have so many studies of men in his relations to others been made. We are studying the cost of living, wages, hours, height and weight of children, the incidence of venereal disease, morbidity and mortality statistics, members and classes of social organizations, methods of teaching, educational standards—only a few of the almost innumerable studies which have been made and of uncounted others under way. One stands appalled before the flood of studies which come out every year. Most of these studies are made in order to find light on particular problems. Someone wishes to find out how a court is functioning as a social agency. A study is made of the action taken in the cases covering a given period. To answer the question as to what are the results of the efforts made by the overseer of the poor to relieve distress someone of an inquiring turn of mind investigates what happens in the families relieved. Family budgets are studied to ascertain how much income a family should have to main-

tain a decent standard so that the family relief agency may know how much to provide. Some critic of the school system essays to find out what becomes of the students who have gone through its courses. If possible he compares what he finds with a parallel study of the results of another kind of curriculum. As soon as a problem like Americanization rises over the horizon of public attention, we study methods of Americanization. Play is studied to learn what influence it has on conduct in order to help us determine how much we should spend on playgrounds and how. Someone discovers a lot of middle-aged spinsters and widows who are working for a living. He wonders how many of these women are making provision for old age and proceeds to find out. The practical interest dominates.

Very little use has yet been made of this mass of material in an effort to arrive at sociological principles or laws. Perhaps it is impossible, or perhaps it is too early.

In addition to such studies there has been started recently some new studies which are full of promise. The psychologists have been studying native capacities of individuals along some lines. These studies have a bearing upon social theory. For example, tests have been devised which enable the psychologists to advise a person whether he has the proper native equipment to make a success as a musician. Such pieces of research throw light upon the problems of the sociologist concerning the relation of nature and nurture.

A study of the psychology of business and social management has begun. Some approaches have been made to the problem of giving greater scientific accuracy to social or community organization. We have talked much lately about community organization. Some have attempted to teach community organization without first determining the different existing types of such organization. How can *principles* of community organization be taught until a careful study has been made of existing organizations, their morphology, the ways in which they function, their processes, the conditions—economics, psychical, and social—under which they have decayed or flourished? Such studies are now being attempted in a number of our educational institutions.

Miss Richmond has written a textbook on how to diagnose "cases" which come to social agencies. It is most hopeful that she did not deduce the principles upon which diagnosis should be made out of her own rich experience as a family case-worker, as she might have done. She studied hundreds of "case" records from dozens of social agencies and from a study of these deduced the principles of social diagnosis. In

other words, research preceded generalization. Such a method marks a new day in the formulation of social procedure.

Mrs. Sheffield, of Boston, has begun an interesting study on the psychological factors in case-work. Hitherto, case-workers have been prone to give too little attention to the psychological elements in a situation, both in diagnosis and treatment. While they were apt in ferreting out the surface conditions in a case, such as sickness, lack of employment, death, unwise expenditures and bad physical and moral conditions, often they have ignored the psychological conditions which entered into the breakdown of a family and individual, attention to which is a prime condition of successful treatment. In a study of several cases of unmarried mothers, Mrs. Sheffield found that these psychological factors, such as lack of friendly attitude of the parents toward their daughter, difference of religious beliefs between the girl and the man and wrong mental attitudes of parents and girls, played a very important part in their fall. Only as the case-worker analyzed these factors, could she adjust the difficulties and bring social order out of the chaos.¹ Mrs. Sheffield's study suggests the necessity of studying the mental and social attitudes of a large number of cases in order to arrive at further principles of social diagnosis and treatment. Here is a field for the social psychologist. What is needed here is careful research. All social work would greatly benefit from such studies. A beginning in such a study has also been made, by those interested, in the "Americanization" of our foreign population. Thomas and Park have led the way in the study. They attempted to construct a social psychology of the foreign-born which throws light not only upon Americanization but upon how to deal with the foreign-born in every relation of life. The social worker who so frequently has to deal with the foreigner will profit from such sociological research.

Professor Giddings is having his students study the social stimuli in all kinds of meetings and the resulting social activities. Such study reveals the foundations upon which rest associated activities—social motives, social reactions, and groupings.

These are only examples of many pieces of research being started by the sociologists. By-products of teaching methods, these examples indicate an earnest attempt to carefully study sociological phenomena. Nevertheless, the number of such studies are too few in number to enable us to make very rapid progress in sociological science.

¹ *The Survey* (November 12, 1921), p. 241.

III. SOME NEGLECTED FIELDS FOR SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Sociology has been reproached with being largely speculation and social philosophy. No one knows this better than the sociologists themselves. Perhaps they are less pessimistic about it than some of their critics, because they know that no science has grown in a day. They can remember when physics was "Natural Philosophy," when botany was morphology, and when psychology was "Mental Philosophy." The time has arrived, however, when sociologists are no longer satisfied with a social philosophy based upon casual observation and the development of "systems." An increasing number are demanding that scientific methods be applied to social phenomena.

The fields where such methods can be applied are legion in number. Both sociology and social practice demand that the scientific method be applied to a study of the various aspects of our complex social life. By way of suggestion I name only two. I pass over the fields where the chief purpose of research is to get light upon practical methods of dealing with specific problems, such as the splendid studies of the Children's Bureau and state and other federal departments. Out of such studies we shall probably yet get data for sociological generalization, when once enough of them have been made and a synthetic mind like Herbert Spencer's attacks them. For the present, however, I wish to call attention to some fields in which studies are possible which will contribute to sociological theory.

One of the classes of social phenomena on which we need light in order to understand society is social organization. No such study has yet been made from the standpoint of sociological analysis. The Charities Directory in some cities does not do it. It is compiled primarily to enable social workers to know the names, addresses, and functions of other agencies in the city and state. The *Handbook of Social Resources of the United States* and the *Handbook of Social Resources, State of Alabama*, recently published by the American Red Cross, are modeled upon the Charities Directory. All of these, however, provide data for a sociological analysis of some of the social organizations. What is needed from the sociological point of view is a study of all the organizations, public and private, in an area large enough to supply a cross-section of society, an analysis of these into classes which have sociological significance and an interpretation of what the study reveals. Out of such a study one might be able to deduce some principles of social organization. By a comparison of the social organizations of one period with those

existing in a previous period it might be possible to learn scientifically how societies develop and the processes involved. What light such a study would throw upon the theory of social forces, social processes, laws of social development, and social causation only the study itself could reveal. In such a study, however, the phenomena would be objective and could be handled by the scientific method.

Another neglected field for scientific research is that of social psychology. A state of mind is hard to objectify. But the attitudes, ideals, laws, reactions to stimuli, customs, and institutions of a group are objective things which can be studied scientifically. They reveal states of mind. Those of one group can be compared with those of another. Those of the same group can be studied in different periods of time. Those of one race can be compared with those of another. Those of one social class or profession can be set alongside those of another, and likenesses and differences can be noted. No matter what the group studied, facts could be collected which on analysis and interpretation would undoubtedly yield a social psychology based upon exact scientific method. There is a world of material for such study all about. Case histories in dozens of social agencies, and in courts, furnish raw material for the social psychologist. Such a social psychology would not be remote from the interest of the social worker. It would be as vital to the social practitioner as anatomy and physiology is to the practicing physician or the nurse. It would bring order out of the present chaos in what is now poorly named "community organization." Is it too much to hope that it would supply principles which would be vital in social reform and social reconstruction; in economics and politics; in school curriculum and administration; in law-making and the administration of justice; in family rehabilitation and the treatment of the offender; in play and religion? Might it not in a thousand ways illumine our sociological darkness?

These two examples of possibilities for research are intended only to suggest fields which lie fallow for the sociologist. We have stressed the necessity of research for the development of sound sociological theory and for practical guidance in social practice. The effect of such research on methods of teaching might well be considered did time permit. That the application of scientific methods to sociological problems would also redeem sociology from the reproach of armchair philosophizing and systematizing is apparent.

J. L. GILLIN, *Chairman*

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL ABSTRACTS

At the annual meeting of the Society in December, 1920, the Committee on Abstracts outlined a program which was adopted. To carry this program into effect the committee was enlarged and continued with instructions to devise ways and means.

The program as outlined made it necessary to find funds to finance a minimum annual budget of \$2,568. This would mean an increase of from \$2.50 to \$3.00 per year in the subscription price of the *Journal* to each of 1,000 members of the Society. It is doubtful if at that price the present membership could be maintained.

There was the alternative plan of securing an annual endowment or subsidy from one of the national foundations interested in promoting research. Upon this suggestion the committee acted. Among the organizations with which the committee communicated were: the Russell Sage Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, and the National Research Council.

The outcome of the committee's inquiries indicated that the foundations were interested and sympathetic but naturally cautious in committing themselves. In one case, however, the information of the committee is explicit. No financial assistance can be expected from the National Research Council since sociology does not fall, in the classification upon which the council is based, within the field of natural sciences.

In the meantime, and before it seemed practicable for the committee to formulate a statement and present its case to any of the research foundations, the situation had changed.

Beginning with the July number the editors of the *Journal* have greatly extended its abstract service. The present purpose of the editors, in so far as concerns the abstracts, is outlined in a letter of Ellsworth Faris to the committee:

1. It is a plan of the *Journal* to extend the abstract feature. Recent issues have contained a far larger number of abstracts, and these have been improved in two ways: They occur in a classified scheme, so that it is possible to find more quickly material on a given subject; also, the abstracts have been themselves analyzed, and the subheads are printed in italics, thus making a valuable cross-reference feature.

2. The *Journal* articles are now preceded by an abstract prepared by the author according to a plan. It is the purpose of the editors to recommend this procedure to other journals in the field, with the hope that it may be widely adopted. Some journals have already adopted the practice, and several others are considering it. A general conformity to this plan would greatly facilitate the publication of abstracts.

3. The reprinting of the abstracts of articles on library cards is being considered. If a sufficient number of subscribers could be interested, it would be possible to print on library cards all our abstracts, and send them out in advance of publication. It might even be possible to reprint all the abstracts in the field in this way. The details of these plans are largely matters of expense and the *Journal of Sociology* has not made a final decision.

As a matter of fact the number of abstracts published in the *Journal* has increased from 18 in July to 41 in November. The January number of the *Journal*, the committee is informed, will publish 100 abstracts, and it seems not impossible that this expansion of the services can be maintained permanently.

Volume XXVI of the *Journal*, upon which the abstract committee based its estimates last year, contained 127 abstracts occupying 54 pages. If the present expansion of the service is maintained the *Journal* of 1922 will publish 600 abstracts, occupying a space of 120 pages, and this result will have been achieved without increasing the present size of the *Journal* or cost to the Society.

In considering changes in the present methods of publishing bibliographies and abstracts it is important to understand just how the thing is now done. The following statement of the matter is made by E. W. Burgess, who is in charge of this department, in a report to the committee on abstracts:

The work of securing bibliographies of books, pamphlets, and articles, and of preparing abstracts is carried on under the supervision of the members of the department of sociology in the University of Chicago by one Fellow and seven scholars in the department. No cost of this work is borne by the *Journal*; it is a free service to the *Journal* by the department. While the supervisory service of the members of the department is without compensation, the Fellow and scholars in the department receive stipends from the University and are assigned to this work on the *Journal* for the service thereby required. It may be of interest to state that the service called for in the Fellowship and scholarships aggregates 2,460 hours in the year.

The periodicals which are examined to secure the bibliographies are enumerated in an attached list. The total number of these is 193. The periodicals are distributed as follows: English and American 121; French 30;

German 27; Italian 12; Scandinavian 3. The bibliography and abstracts of the pamphlets are secured from pamphlets received by the *Journal* and from those listed in Public Affairs Information Service.

For each issue of the *Journal* the scholars carefully examine all the current periodicals in the attached list. On the basis of this examination they prepare tentative bibliography slips indicating their judgment as to whether the article in question should be merely listed in the bibliography, or listed and abstracted. They also indicate upon the slip the tentative place of the article in system of classification adopted in July by the editors of the *Journal*. These bibliography slips with the notations upon them are then submitted to the members of the department who determine—in general by independent examination of the periodicals—the bibliography entries, the articles to be abstracted, and the length of the abstract. By the regulation of the size of the abstract from twenty-five words for the shorter or less important articles to 350 words for the longer and more important articles, the editors of the *Journal* hope to further increase the value of the analyzed abstract service to the readers of the *Journal*.

An analysis of the lists of periodicals submitted with Dr. Burgess' report shows their distribution as to subject matter to be as follows: History, 2; Zoölogy, 2; General Science, 5; Public Health and Medicine, 8; Geography, 8; Anthropology and Ethnology, 9; Philosophy, 10; Biology and Eugenics, 10; Religion, 12; Psychology, 13; Economics, 13; Political Science, 20; Education, 21; Sociology, 28; General Literature, 32; total, 193.

These figures indicate that abstracts now printed in the *Journal* cover a much wider range of literature than that proposed by the committee last year, although the list does not include all the journals recommended by the committee as likely to contain valuable sociological materials.

This raises the question whether, in view of the improvements already made, it is necessary and desirable to continue the effort to secure funds that would enable the *Journal* to still further improve its abstract service.

In reply to this question it must be said (1) that the present scheme can, and ultimately should, be greatly improved; (2) that the manner in which abstracting is at present done throws an inordinate amount of labor on the faculty and graduate students of the University of Chicago; and (3) that no formal request for funds has yet been presented to any of the foundations interested in research.

Furthermore, it is important that there should be some sort of index of the abstracts now published. At present no such index exists.

Two methods have been proposed to meet this situation: (1) The abstracts as now published might, as suggested by Dr. Faris, be printed on library cards. (2) An annual index might be published which would at the same time be a survey and review of all the important sociological literature of the year.

Definite figures as to the relative cost of these two proposals have been obtained from the University of Chicago Press. The following memorandum was prepared by Donald P. Bean, of the University of Chicago Press:

Assuming that all of the abstract cards are printed originally in the *American Journal of Sociology* and that this type is used for their later reprinting for the bibliographical card index, I have estimated the expense of such a service as follows:

No. of Cards	No. of subscribers		
	100	200	1000
150.....	\$ 920.00	\$1,225.00	\$3,450.00
250.....	1,300.00	1,675.00	4,540.00
350.....	1,670.00	2,175.00	5,635.00

These figures include printing, addressing, inclosing, mailing, third-class postage, and a small allowance for the maintenance of lists and for promotion.

If the Society approves the idea of the abstract cards, I shall be glad to recommend to the Board of Trustees that the Press handle the Abstract service of (a) 150 cards and all expenses involved if the Society will furnish a subsidy of \$500.00 and guarantee at least 100 subscribers at 2 cents per card or \$3.00 per set, (b) 250 cards and all expenses involved if the Society will furnish a subsidy of \$750.00 and guarantee at least 100 subscribers at 2 cents per card or \$5.00 per set, (c) 350 cards and all expenses involved if the Society will furnish a subsidy of \$1,000.00 and guarantee at least 100 subscribers at 2 cents per card or \$7.50 per set.

These figures indicate that if all the 1,000 members of the Society wanted a card index to current literature it would cost them \$5.625 cents a year at the very least for 350 cards, not including in that sum of course the cost of the *Journal*.

On the other hand the cost of the annual index would be but \$1,000. This could be met by increasing the present annual dues from four dollars to five. In estimating the expense of the index it should be borne in mind that, with the present method of analyzing the abstracts, every single abstract would be indexed under three separate subject-headings.

In addition to this, on every article abstracted, there would be an author index. Every abstract would presumably, therefore, be indexed four times, so that if the *Journal* published 600 abstracts, including in that number the abstracts of its own articles, the annual subject index would contain something like 1,800 subject references and cross-references. In addition it would contain 600 references to authors, 2,400 items in all.

In addition it seems desirable that an annual index volume should contain authoritative reviews of all the literature upon certain general sociological topics. Under the arrangement outlined, of the 128 pages in the annual volume 60 would be reserved for reviews.

It is evident, from the foregoing analysis, that the Society, if it desires to do so, probably can maintain and extend out of its own resources its present abstract service.

On the other hand an index of abstracts of periodical literature is but a first step in putting sociology upon a research basis. Every year the amount of social investigation carried on by universities, by public, and by private agencies is increasing by leaps and bounds.

At the present moment business enterprises, manufacturing plants, newspapers, telephone companies, even labor organizations are beginning to maintain research departments as adjuncts of their administration.

The Ford Automobile Company and the Colorado Fuel Company maintain what they call "sociological departments." Public enterprises and social reforms are increasingly planned and executed on a basis of fact. Community trusts, like that in Cleveland and Chicago, are carrying an investigation to educate public opinion in their several communities in regard to social and civic problems. The New York Bureau of Municipal Research has been the model of other similar institutions in at least a score of cities in other parts of the country.

Finally there is a vast amount of information in the records of the courts, hospitals, and social agencies which if it could be systematically studied would throw light upon fundamental problems that academic sociologists are interested in, but which they have had to study for the most part at long range.

It is of the very first importance to sociological science that the universities should have access to existing materials, not merely in order to train students in social service and social investigation, but for the purposes of sociological research.

There is need of an organization that will do for sociology what the National Council of Research is attempting to do for the other sciences.

Any organization established to extend and improve the present bibliographical services of the Society to its members and to the public might eventually, if it was able to secure the necessary funds, undertake a wider and more important service, namely:

1. Establish itself as a clearing-house for social research and so bring about some sort of social co-ordination of existing studies.

2. Make a survey of types of investigation now in progress with the purpose of taking an inventory and eventually devising means for organizing and founding existing social information on various problems, local and national.

3. Study research problems that arise in connection with the attempts to apply existing concepts and methods of investigation to the solution of immediate and practical problems.

With a budget of \$10,000 a year a beginning could be made, and by limiting its operations largely to the task of exploration, a bureau such as has been suggested could in three years demonstrate its own usefulness, or at any rate indicate a way in which the services it sought to render could be better served by some other institution.

ROBERT E. PARK (for the Committee)

A. B. WOLFE

U. G. WEATHERLY

SUSAN M. KINGSBURY

F. STUART CHAPIN

THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON TEACHING OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE GRADE AND HIGH SCHOOLS OF AMERICA

At the call of Professor Leon C. Marshall there occurred an informal meeting at the William Pitt Hotel yesterday morning of two or three representatives each from the committees on social-science teaching of the American Economics Association, the American Political Science Association, the American Sociological Society, and the Association of Collegiate Schools of Business. At that meeting it was informally agreed to recommend to those societies, and also to the American Historical Society and the National Council of Geography Teachers that a joint commission of two representatives from each Association be appointed to continue the study of the appropriate presentation of social studies in secondary schools and to take such action in co-operation with the National Council of Teachers of Social Studies as may prove appropriate.

Professor Ellwood, of your Committee, has prepared a statement of the problem of social teaching in the public schools.

ROSS L. FINNEY, University of Minnesota, *Chairman*

E. S. BOGARDUS, University of Southern California

C. A. ELLWOOD, University of Missouri

G. R. MILLER, Colorado State Teachers College.

DWIGHT SANDERSON, Cornell University

WALTER R. SMITH, University of Kansas

A. J. TODD, University of Minnesota

A motion was made and carried that the Society authorize the President to appoint two members as representatives on a joint commission to continue the study of social studies in the public schools.

ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Secretary*

REPORT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

The American Sociological Society was represented at the Annual Meeting of the American Council of Learned Societies held in New York on January 29, 1921, by the undersigned. The routine business of reports of officers and committees was followed by a discussion of ways and means by which American Scholars could assist European Scholars to continue the publication of important humanistic undertakings of international importance which had been crippled or suspended as a result of the war. These publications were chiefly of a historical or philological character. The difficulty of raising funds for the purpose of assisting these international scholarly undertakings and collections of inscriptions was quite evident from the facts developed in discussion. The only matter of immediate interest to the Sociological Society was the proposal to establish a Bibliography of Humanistic Literature. No action was taken on this matter, however, and it developed that the proposal related to listing and not to abstracting articles. The plan thus had little significance for the Sociological Society's enterprise of social abstracts. As a member of the A.C.L.S., your representative compiled a list of sociological works for the James Jerome Hill reference library of St. Paul, Minn.

F. STUART CHAPIN,
Delegate to American Council of Learned Societies

THE WORK OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY—A SYMPOSIUM

EDWARD CARY HAYES, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

It seems appropriate to open the discussion of the work of the Society by giving an account of my stewardship in the office which I have held during the year now closing. The program for this year's meetings of the society has been characterized by three marked departures from our previous practice.

In the first place instead of arranging the whole program around a single topic, the afternoon and evening sessions have been divided into three "sections"—one devoted to "social evolution," one to "biological factors in social causation," one to "psychic factors in social causation." The former plan of having a single general theme for a whole series of meetings had distinct advantages. The treatment of a "live topic" is perhaps the best way to draw large local audiences, but the meetings of this society are held primarily for the benefit of the members who travel long distances to learn what progress their colleagues have been making in the specific researches in which they are engaged. Another and more important advantage of the former plan was the unity which it gave to our annual volume of proceedings. But the number of single subjects which can be profitably and scientifically treated as the theme of a three days' session is limited. Moreover such treatment of a single "live topic" tends either to make us bring in men who are not sociologists, but are actually engaged in public affairs related to the topic discussed, or to make us resort to a somewhat journalistic treatment of the theme in papers prepared for the occasion, rather than more truly scientific papers representing the prolonged, characteristic special work of the writers. This is far from meaning that all of the papers prepared by this "journalistic" method have been lacking in scientific value. On the contrary the former plan was for a time the wisest that could have been chosen. But the development of sociology in America has now reached a point at which we are justified in attempting a method more appropriate to a scientific society and specially calculated to realize the purpose for which the society is constituted.

The second departure from former practices is the inauguration of a system of committees to have charge of the various subdivisions of the program. Hitherto the president has had undivided responsibility for the program. These new committees are composed of men, each of whom is active in the particular division of the field of sociology to which he is assigned. And the business of these committee men is to act as scouts to discover the most important work being done anywhere in the country in the division of the field with which they are specially familiar, and to have this work reported at our annual meetings.

Nothing else that we can do can so stimulate actual productive research among our members. At the same time nothing else seems likely so effectively to safeguard us against the narrowing and objectionable kind of specialization, and the unbalanced teaching likely to result from that cause, as to bring together on the same program the men who are working most actively in the different divisions of our field to hear the results of each other's work. Moreover this arrangement is planned to enlist in the work of the society the participation of certain groups of scientists, especially the anthropologists and ethnologists, whose work is truly sociological, but who hitherto have been too little affiliated with this organization.

The third innovation is the institution of a series of "round tables," occupying the morning sessions and devoted to the discussion of practical applications of sociology. This has two purposes. The first is to afford more opportunity for volunteer participation. The members do not travel hundreds and even thousands of miles merely to listen to papers that they could read at home. They properly expect the stimulus of free discussion, and we want to become acquainted with members on whose participation we have not learned to count in advance. Each of these round tables should occupy an entire morning session, and this year's experience proves that two such round tables can profitably be carried on simultaneously each forenoon. The second purpose of this system of round table discussions upon practical themes is to enlist the interest and activity of groups of persons who are dealing with concrete facts and problems that are full of scientific importance and suggestiveness. Their contributions are of distinct value to those of us who are engaged in academic research, and by establishing this connection they may be led—we have had during these meetings definite ground to anticipate that they will be led—to handle the mass of facts with which they deal in such a way as to make them valuable as contributions to knowledge, and to utilize the principles of explanation which sociology is developing. This relation as well as that established by the strictly scientific sections of the afternoons and evenings, is calculated to co-ordinate the forces engaged in separate attacks upon a common objective.

As a minor incident to this year's program you will observe an effort to promote fellowship among the members by some variation from the usual social functions of our gathering.

A famous executive once said, "It is a far greater thing to set ten men to work than to do ten men's work." I have proceeded upon the theory that one way to promote the life of a society is to enlist a large number of people in its activities.

These innovations have been tentative and experimental this year. If continued they can be better carried out, partly as a result of this experience. I hope that in the discussion to follow you will freely express your criticisms and your opinions as to whether these plans should be continued in the future.

ALBION W. SMALL, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

In my judgment wisdom administers that the future of the society should be shaped by due deference to its past. This does not call for recourse to a pulmotor to receive comatose opinions or programs or methods. Nor does it involve persistence in policies that have merely the sanction of precedent. It does call for preservation of the attitude which has been our strength.

At the start we were a feeble folk with widely separated viewpoints, with divergent mental tendencies, with apparently incongruous aims, with scarcely perceptible affiliations. We had in common hardly more than one feeling that the traditional social sciences had failed to explain society and that a better way is needed to search into the mystery. We pledged our mental support in trying to find that better way. This was and is the vitality of our organization. We were more sanguine at first than we are now that sociology is destined to supplant all the other social sciences. We see at present that there will be glory enough if sociology can succeed in developing a technique which must be used in completing the best work that can be done by each and all of the social sciences. We seemed for a long time to be more at odds with one another than we were with the older social sciences, as to our problems, and as to ways and means of solving them. But we endured one another's essential interest in finding a new way of approach to the social mystery. We helped one another, and we built up a common tradition by hammering out our disagreements until we are now finding ourselves in possession of a distinctive manner of approach and a distinguishing objective. We are coming to see that we have hit upon a new procedure, which finds new meaning in human experience. We are not much interested at present in speculation as to whether this new procedure is a final procedure, whether it is the last key that will be needed to unlock the inner chambers of social mysteries, whether it will admit us to all the truths about society which the older procedures had left unexplored or insufficiently explained. We are busy now applying the categories of group relationships to all sorts of social conditions, and we are telling the world that group situations are only superficially observed so long as they are not translated into terms of group reactions.

But before we have fairly formulated this methodological result of the strivings of a generation, before we are generally aware of the revolutionary characters of this achievement, our centrifugal interests threaten to disrupt the unity of diversity in which we won our way out of the obscurity of our early gropings into clear vision of a task and a method. There is danger that sociologists will disperse in a dozen directions, and that they will degenerate with futility by too exclusive attention to specialties, and by failure to correct their vagaries by frequent orientation from the common center.

It would be a calamity for sociology and for social science in general if the society should cease to be the rallying-point, the clearing-house, the strategic center for all the different types of social investigations which start with the clue that men's lives cannot be understood unless their group relationships are fully

evaluated. I can see nothing but disaster for the interests now centering in the society if it should disintegrate into minor groups devoted each to a peculiar species of research and inattentive of the pursuits of the other groups. That would be merely repeating in microscopic measure, the major mistakes of the older sciences, against which sociology was a protest—the mistake of history and politics and economics each proclaiming to the other, “I have no need of thee!” The social sciences need one another, and the different specialties within the social sciences need one another, that each may not permit its blind spot to becloud its whole vision. In a word, let us afford all the latitude required for groups of specialists within our field to cultivate their particular interests; but for the safe anchoring of each of the specialties let us at the same time magnify the importances of the plenary sessions, the committee of the whole, the congress of congresses in which we preserve the habit of surveying all the special problems of society in the perspective of the largest outlook which our combined vision commands.

JAMES E. HAGERTY, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

The founders of the American Sociological Society had in mind an organization which would promote research in sociological theory. Since then there has been no intention of changing the purpose of the Society. Our organization has a distinct field the same as the National Conference on Social Work has a distinct field, the development of applied sociology.

I assume that the organization of our program into group conferences which has been inaugurated this year is in line with the original purposes of the Society as these conferences serve better the needs of the various groups in our membership.

Since the Society was organized we have often discussed the promotion of sociological teaching. The time seems especially opportune now for the extension of sociological teaching. Fifteen or twenty years ago the sociologist was challenged with *Is there such a subject as sociology?* and *Is sociology a science?* Moreover sociologists took a great deal of time telling what sociology is, and justifying their existence. They have long since ceased to do this. Now the existence of sociology is not only admitted by everyone, but there is great pressure for its introduction and expansion.

Practically every university and college in the United States is now teaching sociology or wants to teach it. In universities where departments of sociology are well organized the registration in sociological courses is rapidly increasing, and sociology is one of the most popular university subjects. The demand is now on us for the teaching of sociology in the secondary schools and within the next decade I look for great progress in the introduction of sociology in the high schools of the country. The responsibility rests upon this organization in determining the character of the sociology which is to be taught, for if we fail, something may be taught in the name of sociology which will not meet with our approval.

EDWARD A. ROSS, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

I had much to do with the policy followed in earlier years of our Society of focusing the annual meeting upon some social question of wide interest to our people. While this brought our young Society much attention and contributed to sell the annual volume of *Proceedings*, I am convinced that the time has come to pursue a different policy. I consider that our present meeting has been marked by papers of extraordinary merit and they possess such merit because they have not been written to order but embody the results of long reflection and investigation. Furthermore, I see clearly that the organization of committees, one for each section, to construct the best possible programs for that section brings to light more of the valuable work going on among sociologists than the construction of a program by the president or by one committee. I trust, therefore, that the innovations of our president this year will be retained and that our annual meeting will become an opportunity for submitting the results of the best work in our field that has been carried on by any Americans, whether or not they are members of our Society.

JAMES P. LICHTENBERGER, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

When Professor Hayes wrote me in regard to his proposed plan of dividing the program into sections and round table discussions it occurred to me that while it was extremely desirable to place the emphasis upon investigation and research, we should probably suffer some loss in the value of the proceedings which heretofore had presented discussions upon a general subject and had therefore made some contribution to social thinking in specific fields. I have been very much impressed by the value of the present program and of its high scientific character. I am still raising the question in my own mind, however, whether or not it might be possible to arrange the various round tables and discussions so as to contribute to the specific aspects of some general theme, thus giving a degree of unity to the meetings which would be desirable in the publications. If this could be done without sacrificing the emphasis upon original contributions it might prove valuable.

W. F. OGBURN, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

My long residence on the Pacific Coast has prevented me from having any experience with the program of the American Sociological Society. Hence my remarks on this topic are subject to a certain limitation of evidence. However, my feelings are quite positive and definite. I am opposed to having a single topic for the whole annual meeting of the Society. I think by far the better plan is to have a variety of topics on the program. This has been the procedure of the present meeting and I liked it very much. The reason for my attitude is that the meetings ought to stand for scientific research. Scientific research seems to me to be the one aim of our Society. Research is usually carried on by an investigator for a period of time extending over years on some

particular problem in which he is interested and has special qualifications. Only by a variety of topics will there be opportunity for the Society to hear the results of such investigation. I do not see how you can decide on a single topic, say in the summer preceding the December meeting, and assign some phase of this for research during the fall. There can be interesting comment under such a situation but not research, it seems to me. Imagine, for instance, in biology assigning some topic on circulation of the blood to T. H. Morgan, whose life-work has been given to the study of heredity and drosophila. I hope that the type of program inaugurated by President Hayes will be continued.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

It seems to me that it would be a great mistake to continue the former policy of the Society of selecting some question of the hour to be used as the general topic for discussion at its annual meeting. That policy was justifiable in a period of national crisis such as that through which we have just been passing. But now that peace has come, if we want ours to be a great scientific society, we must pay attention to the only way through which a great scientific society may be built up—namely, the presentation of papers embodying the results of research and critical scholarship. There would, of course, be no harm in having on the program of our Society each year one or more popular addresses on questions of the hour; but, in my opinion, it would not do to select a question of the hour as the general topic of our program and then ask persons of research ability to produce papers along that line. Worth-while research papers are not produced in that way. Such papers as we have listened to this afternoon and yesterday afternoon could not have been produced that way. They cannot be made to order. Dr. Bernard, for example, I happen to know, has worked at least a half-dozen years on his paper.

I do not believe that we shall sacrifice the non-academic constituency of our Society by putting on programs of research and critical scholarship at our annual meetings. On the contrary, I believe that the practical social workers and others who are members of our Society are members, not to get mere sensible opinions on questions of the hour, which they can get quite well in the popular magazines, nor to get the results of technical professional experiences in social work, such as are presented in the National Conference of Social Work, but rather to get the results of that broader social research and critical social scholarship which the very name "Sociology" has come rightly to suggest. I am not afraid of losing our membership if we make this a scientific society in the strict sense, provided, of course, that we present results worth while. I am, therefore, in favor of continuing the general policy begun by President Hayes of having special committees for each separate line of social research, these committees to have the responsibility of securing suitable papers for presentation in their sections of our program.

THOMAS J. RILEY, PH.D., GENERAL SECRETARY, BROOKLYN
BUREAU OF CHARITIES

I find myself in accord with the plan of committees and group conferences as proposed by our chairman. I believe also that the time has come when we should change from the policy of having one general topic for the whole yearly meeting and substitute for it, in part, papers and discussion on investigations, research, and experiments carried on in the field of sociology. In other words, I believe the time has come to accumulate facts and yet more facts in the record of our proceedings and not opinions and opinions on topics that have been assigned by some outlining program committee.

To illustrate what I mean and to submit it for consideration, I venture the following suggestion: that the American Sociological Society take such steps as may be found advisable to help the agencies of social welfare to devise such records as will make the material of scientific as well as practical value. At present there is an abundance of material recorded on helping needy families, the protection of children from cruelty, placing of children—and sometimes mothers—in institutions or families, probation and parole, etc., but it has been written almost entirely from the point of view of day to day use. Even for this purpose it is often inadequate and is far from uniform as among similar agencies. It should be not less practical but more scientific and more uniform.

If the sociologist will advise with the social worker as to what material and form would be desirable in these records from the point of view of a science of society and of teaching requirements, I believe such suggestions would be most welcome and would probably add also to the practical value of the records. Perhaps a joint committee of the American Sociological Society and the National Conference of Social Work could take this up and report back to both bodies.

PROGRAM OF THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING, PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA, DECEMBER 27-30, 1921

COMMITTEES IN CHARGE OF THE PROGRAM

Section on Social Evolution. Harry E. Barnes, Clark University; Hutton Webster, University of Nebraska; Robert E. Lowie, University of California.

Section on Biological Factors in Social Causation. Albert E. Jenks, University of Minnesota; Edward A. Ross, University of Wisconsin; Frank H. Hankins, Clark University.

Section on Psychic Factors in Social Causation. Charles A. Ellwood, University of Missouri; Charles H. Cooley, University of Michigan; Ellsworth Faris, University of Chicago.

Round Table on Community Problems. Dwight Sanderson, Cornell University; Everett Dix, Berea College; Walter J. Campbell, Y.M.C.A. College, Springfield, Mass.

Round Table on Sociology and Social Work. Frank D. Watson, Haverford College; Porter R. Lee, New York; James E. Hagerly, Ohio State University.

Round Table on the Delinquent Girl. Mrs. W. F. Dummer, Chicago; Robert E. Park, University of Chicago; Thomas D. Eliot, Northwestern University.

Standing Committee on Research. J. L. Gillin, Lucile Eaves, Eugene T. Lies, George B. Mangold, Robert E. Park, A. J. Todd, Howard B. Woolston.

Standing Committee on Teaching of Social Science. Ross L. Finney, E. S. Bogardus, C. A. Ellwood, Cecil C. North, John Phelan, Walter R. Smith, A. J. Todd.

Standing Committee on Social Abstracts. F. S. Chapin, Susan M. Kingsbury, Robert E. Park, U. G. Weatherly, A. B. Wolfe.

Tuesday, December 27

7:00-8:00 P.M. Informal Reception to all members of the American Sociological Society and their friends.

8:15 P.M. Joint meeting with American Political Science Association. CHANCELLOR JOHN GABBERT BOWMAN, University of Pittsburgh, presiding.

Presidential Addresses: "The Sociological Point of View." EDWARD CARY HAYES, University of Illinois. "The Development of Democracy on the American Continent." LEO STANTON ROWE, director general, Pan-American Union.

Wednesday, December 28

9:00-10:45 A.M. Round Table: "The Delinquent Girl." In charge of MRS. W. F. DUMMER, Chicago.

Discussion opened by JESSIE TAFT, Seybert Foundation, Philadelphia; MARION KENWORTHY, Vanderbilt Clinic, New York; EMMA O. LUNDBERG, Children's Bureau, Washington; MIRIAM VAN WATERS, Juvenile Court, Los Angeles.

11:00-12:45 Round Table: "Education and Research." Report of the Committee on Research. J. L. GILLIN, University of Wisconsin, Chairman. Report of the Committee on Social Abstracts. ROBERT E. PARK, University of Chicago.

Report of the Committee on the Teaching of Social Science in the Public and High Schools. ROSS L. FINNEY, University of Minnesota, Chairman.

- 2:30 P.M. Report of the Conference on Social Studies in the Public Schools. CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, University of Missouri.
Section on Social Evolution. In charge of HARRY ELMER BARNES, Clark University.
"The Development of Historical Sociology." HARRY ELMER BARNES, Clark University.
"Anthropological Viewpoints in Sociology." ALEXANDER A. GOLDENWEISER, New School of Social Research.
"The Historical Method in the Analysis of Social Phenomena."
WILLIAM F. OGBURN, Columbia University.
- 5:00 P.M. Annual Meeting of the Executive Committee. Room 139, Fort Pitt Hotel.
- 8:15 P.M. Section on Biological Factors in Social Causation. In charge of ALBERT E. JENKS, University of Minnesota.
"Hereditary Human Groups in Their Relation to Distinctive Cultures." ALBERT E. JENKS, University of Minnesota.
"Hereditary Traits as Factors in Human Progress." FRANK W. BLACKMAR, University of Kansas.
"Eugenic Aspects of Health." RUDOLPH M. BINDER, New York University.
"Controlled Fecundity." EDWARD A. ROSS, University of Wisconsin.

Thursday, December 29

- 9:00-10:45 A.M. Round Table: "Community Problems." In charge of DWIGHT SANDERSON, Cornell University.
"Points of Contact between Rural and Urban Communities." JOHN M. GILLETTE, University of North Dakota.
"What the Red Cross Is Doing in Rural Organization." Discussion opened by WILLIAM CARL HUNT, Director of Rural Organization Service, Lake Division, American Red Cross, Cleveland, Ohio.
- 11:00-12:45 Round Table: "Sociology and Social Work." In charge of FRANK D. WATSON, Haverford College.
"Has Sociology a Contribution to the Equipment of the Social Worker?" Discussion opened by THOMAS D. ELIOT, Northwestern University.
"What Types of Courses in Sociology Are Most Valuable for the Social Worker and How May They Best Be Presented?" Discussion opened by ARTHUR J. TODD, Chicago.
- 2:30 P.M. Section on Psychic Factors in Social Causation. In charge of CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, University of Missouri.
"The Significance of Environment as a Social Factor." L. L. BERNARD, University of Minnesota.
"Ethnological Light on Psychological Problems." ELLSWORTH FARIS, University of Chicago.
"Slogans as a Means of Social Control." F. E. LUMLEY, Ohio State University.
- 5:00 P.M. Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society.
Discussion of the work of the Society, introduced by FRANKLIN.

H. GIDDINGS, Columbia University; ALBION W. SMALL, University of Chicago; and JAMES E. HAGERTY, Ohio State University.

7:00 P.M. Subscription dinner.

Friday, December 30

10:00 A.M. Joint meeting of American Sociological Society, American Economic Association, and American Political Science Association. Ball Room, William Penn Hotel. JACOB H. HOLLANDER, Johns Hopkins University, President of the American Economic Association, presiding. "The Social and Economic Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment." ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, University of Minnesota. "The Basis of an Inter-American Policy." PETER H. GOLDSMITH, Director of the Inter-American Division of the American Association for International Conciliation. "The Economic Basis of Federation in Central America." HARRY T. COLLINGS, University of Pennsylvania. "Patriotism and Internationalism." HERBERT ADOLPHUS MILLER, Oberlin College.

GROUP MEETING OF RURAL SOCIOLOGISTS

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 27, ROOM A, FORT PITT HOTEL

2:30-5:00 P.M. Round Table: "The Rural Community and the Rural Neighborhood as Social Units." DR. C. J. GALPIN, Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. Discussion led by DR. C. C. TAYLOR, North Carolina Agricultural and Mechanical College; PROFESSOR J. H. KOLB, University of Wisconsin; and PROFESSOR DWIGHT SANDERSON, Cornell University.

6:00 P.M. Subscription dinner for Rural Sociologists, Fort Pitt Hotel.

GROUP MEETING ON SOCIAL RESEARCH

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1921, ASSEMBLY ROOM, FORT PITT HOTEL

2:00-5:00 P.M. Reports on Social Research in Progress. (Twenty minutes to each speaker.) "Cleveland Foundation Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in Cleveland." RAYMOND MOLEY, Director, The Cleveland Foundation. "Social Tests and Surveys of the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station." HORNE LL HART, State University of Iowa. "Research Based on Case Records." DR. LUCILE EAVES, Director, Research Department, Women's Educational and Industrial Union.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 28, FORT PITT HOTEL

6:00 P.M. Subscription dinner. "Methods of Social Investigation." "Social and Economic Conditions in Relation to Child Welfare." DR. ROBERT M. WOODBURY, Director, Statistical Research, Children's Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor. "Some Farm Population Studies." DR. C. J. GALPIN, Economist in Charge, Rural Life Studies, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR, DECEMBER 15, 1920, TO DECEMBER 14, 1921

Membership Statement

The total membership of the American Sociological Society for the calendar year 1921 is 923. The number of members in 1920 was 1,021. The decrease in membership may be chiefly attributed to the increase in the annual dues from \$3.00 to \$4.00.

Membership in 1920.....	1,021
Members resigning.....	83
Members dropped.....	202
Members deceased.....	6
Total lost.....	291
Members renewing ex officio.....	1
Members renewing exchange.....	6
Members renewing paid.....	723
New members.....	193
Total for 1921.....	923

Campaign for New Members

The membership campaign was conducted this year with little change from the established custom. The Secretary sent out 1,054 printed letters and 530 typed letters. Two hundred and fifty letters prepared and signed by Professor Dwight Sanderson and sent to a list of 250 rural sociologists supplied by Dr. C. J. Galpin contained an invitation to membership. In addition fifty teachers of sociology were asked to co-operate actively by presenting the opportunity for membership in the Society before graduate and advanced students. While all have not yet replied, the response at the present time exceeds all records in the past. Professor Edward A. Ross leads the field as usual, having sent in the applications of thirty-two of his advanced students. Others who have sent in large lists are Professor Rudolph M. Binder, Professor Charles A. Ellwood, Professor Ellsworth Faris, Professor Ernest R. Groves, Professor Edward C. Hayes, Professor Stuart A. Queen. The entire list is too long to read here. Many recommendations of persons for membership have been received from the general body of members of the Society.

Change in Secretary

As the successor of Professor Scott E. W. Bedford, for nine years secretary of the American Sociological Society, I desire to express my appreciation of his efficient organization of the details of the work of the Society. The systematic procedure which he worked out and the continuance of the devoted and effective service of Miss May G. Miller, the assistant to the secretary, facilitated the readjustment caused by the change in office.

Formation of Groups

During the last meeting of the Society two groups were informally organized. Both groups, the one on Social Research, the other on Rural Sociology, held a separate session and a subscription dinner at the present meeting. The group on Social Research reports three afternoon sessions at Milwaukee in June during the meetings of the National Conference of Social Work.

Deaths during the Year

The Secretary regrets to report the death of Professor W. H. Cheever, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Professor M. T. Merrill, Defiance, Ohio.

Respectfully submitted,

ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Secretary*

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TREASURER FOR THE FISCAL YEAR,
DECEMBER 15, 1920, TO DECEMBER 14, 1921

Following the action of the Executive Committee at its meeting December 28, 1920, discontinuing the practice of employing a public auditor, an Auditing Committee was appointed by the President of the Society. In a conference between the chairman of the committee and the Treasurer the decision was reached to secure the assistance of a public accountant.

The valuable service which an Auditing Committee may render the Society is evident from its report. The Treasurer urges consideration of the recommendations and suggestions made by this committee.

ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Treasurer*

Report of Auditing Committee follows.

REPORT OF THE AUDITING COMMITTEE

December, 22, 1921
Chicago, Ill.

Mr. Edward Cary Hayes, President
American Sociological Society

Your Committee has, with the assistance of a public accountant, examined the financial records of the American Sociological Society for the fiscal year ending December 14, 1921.

Entries have been compared with original vouchers of expense and in a few instances these vouchers have been examined in detail. Entries of receipts

for membership have been checked and the system of verifying items and totals has been observed as being satisfactory, although we have not examined and counted the entries on receipt stubs. The balance in bank has been found to agree with the statement received from the depository, and the bond of the Northwestern Electric Company, hereinafter referred to, has been examined.

The Balance Sheet (Schedule "A") and Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements (Schedule "B") as drawn by the Secretary and Treasurer, are found correct:

SCHEDULE "A"

BALANCE SHEET AS AT DECEMBER 14, 1921

<i>Assets</i>	
Cash in bank	\$1,133.10
NORTHWESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY	
6 per cent Gold Bond	500.00
OFFICE FURNITURE	118.65
Total assets	\$1,751.75
<i>Liabilities</i>	
Surplus as at December 15, 1920	\$ 809.48
Add excess of income over expenditure for period ending December 14, 1921	742.27
Credit from University of Chicago Press for its share of campaign expenses per Schedule "B"	200.00
Total liabilities	\$1,751.75

SCHEDULE "B"

STATEMENT OF CASH RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FROM DECEMBER 15, 1920, TO DECEMBER 14, 1921

<i>Cash Receipts</i>	
Dues from members, 1921	\$3,492.50
Dues from members, 1922	1,480.00
	<hr/>
Exchange with remittances	\$4,972.50
Postage with remittances	15.30
Interest on Bond	7.00
Royalties	45.00
	<hr/>
	424.84
	<hr/>
	\$5,464.73
<i>Cash Disbursements</i>	
American Journal of Sociology	\$1,853.16
Proceedings, Volume XV	1,452.30
Clerical aid, salaries	497.41
Postage and express	253.86
Printing	297.99
Secretary's expense	87.53
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Carried forward	\$4,442.25

<i>Brought forward</i>	\$4,442.25
Stationery	114.80
Society membership, American Council	40.00
Exchange on dues received	37.36
Auditing	25.00
Refunds on memberships	52.00
Office expense	9.60
Insurance	1.45
	<hr/>
	\$4,722.46

Excess of receipts over disbursements \$ 742.27

Summary

Balance, cash in bank, December 15, 1920	\$ 190.83
Total receipts for period ending December 14, 1921, as above	5,464.73
	<hr/>
	\$5,655.56
Total disbursements for period ending December 14, 1921, as above	\$4,722.46
Less credit from University of Chicago Press	200.00

Balance, cash in bank, December 14, 1921 \$1,133.10

Attention is called to the fact that the Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements (Schedule "B") includes in its cash receipts "dues from members for 1922." If the receipts from this source (\$1,480.00) had not been included in the statement, the apparent balance, cash in bank, December 14, 1921, \$1,133.10, would have been an actual deficit of \$346.90. For the information of the members of the Society, your Committee includes at this point a short table prepared by the Secretary-Treasurer to indicate the actual receipts and expenditures of the Society for the last four years:

Year	Receipts from dues	Total Receipts	Expenditures	Deficit	Cash Balance
1917.					\$380.65
1918.	\$2,415.35	\$2,810.70	\$2,863.87	\$53.17	327.48
1919.	2,598.30	2,962.79	3,196.74	233.95	93.53
1920.	3,172.50		3,815.90	223.94	-130.41
1921.	3,708.50	4,400.73	4,617.22	216.49	-346.90

It is noted that, with the increase in membership fee from \$3.00 to \$4.00, the income from the dues has grown from \$3,172.50 for 1920 to \$3,708.50 for the present year, although the number of members fell from 1,021 to 923.

It is suggested that in the future an analysis such as indicated by the foregoing table be included in the report of the Auditing Committee.

It is suggested that the present ledger account entitled "Office Equipment and Expense" be changed to read "Miscellaneous Expense."

It is suggested that an account under the heading "Investments" be opened in which will be carried the present item of "Northwestern Electric Company 6 per cent Bond" at the nominal valuation of \$500.00 which, except as a memorandum, now appears only in the financial statement.

It is suggested that the item of \$200.00 credit from the University of Chicago Press for "its share of campaign expenses," which now appears in the financial statement, be distributed among appropriate expense accounts in proportion to charges previously made for the campaign.

It is suggested that an annual valuation of *Proceedings* in stock be made, and this be carried in a ledger account and in the balance sheet.

It is suggested that a depreciation of 25 per cent on "Furniture and Fixtures" for the present and preceding years be written off, and that hereafter depreciation be calculated at the rate of 10 per cent annually.

Your Committee, fully appreciating the efficient service of the Secretary-Treasurer in the important task assigned to him, recommends the appointment of a Finance Committee to co-operate with him in the direction of the finances of the Society, subject to the action of the Executive Committee.

It is also recommended that the Executive Committee consider the adoption of a budget system for the expenditures of the Society. If this recommendation is accepted, it is suggested that the budget be prepared by the Finance Committee and approved by the Executive Committee.

Respectfully submitted,

Auditing Committee:

THOMAS D. ELIOT

J. M. KARP

WM. T. CROSS, *Chairman*

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MANAGING EDITOR FOR THE FISCAL YEAR, DECEMBER 15, 1920, TO DECEMBER 14, 1921

On December 15, the number of different volumes of the *Papers and Proceedings* on hand was as follows:

Vol. I.....	94 copies
Vol. II.....	16 copies
Vol. III.....	7 copies
Vol. IV.....	52 copies
Vol. V.....	56 copies
Vol. VI.....	5 copies
Vol. VII.....	58 copies
Vol. VIII.....	87 copies
Vol. IX.....	43 copies
Vol. X.....	198 copies
Vol. XI.....	1 copy
Vol. XII.....	121 copies
Vol. XIII.....	23 copies
Vol. XIV.....	73 copies
Vol. XV.....	412 copies

Respectfully submitted,

ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Managing Editor*

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

MINUTES OF THE

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA

DECEMBER 28, 1921

The meeting was called to order at 5:00 P.M. by President Hayes, in Room 11, Chamber of Commerce Building. In addition to the President and Secretary, there were present Professors Bogardus, Cooley, Dealey, Lichtenberger, Ross, Weatherly, and Wolfe.

Since the minutes of the last meeting were printed in the *Proceedings*, their reading was dispensed with. The reports of the Secretary and the Treasurer were read and approved. The report of the Auditing Committee presented by Professor T. D. Eliot was accepted and a motion carried expressing appreciation for the services of its members to the Society. Moved and carried that a Finance Committee constituted by members living in and near Chicago, serving in an advisory capacity with the Treasurer in conducting the finances of the Society, be appointed by the President in consultation with the Treasurer. The other recommendations of the Auditing Committee were referred to the Treasurer and Finance Committee with power to act.

The report of the Managing Editor was made and approved.

The Secretary stated that no report had been received from the delegates of the Society to the American Council of Learned Societies. Moved and carried that a report be secured and published, if feasible, in the *American Journal of Sociology*.

Professor Dwight Sanderson as chairman of the group on Rural Sociology made a statement, outlining its history and its desire to become a section of the American Sociological Society with its meeting at a time set apart for this and other groups. The Secretary on behalf of the group on Social Research made a similar statement. Motion made and carried that an invitation be extended to the rural sociologists to become a section in the Society, and its program, after consultation with the President, to be incorporated in the general program. Moved and carried that a similar invitation be given to the group on social research. Moved and carried that the arrangement of the relation of the Society to the Association of Training Schools for Professional Social Work be referred to the President.

Invitations for the next meeting were extended by the University of Cincinnati through Professor E. E. Eubank, by the University of Illinois through President Hayes, by Indianapolis and Indiana University through Professor U. G. Weatherly.

Motion made and carried that the President and Secretary be a committee to arrange the time and the place of the next meeting in co-operation with the American Economic Association, the American Political Science Association and the American Statistical Association.

President Hayes then proposed the institution of a Sociological Summer Camp for the discussion of sociological problems. After an expression of the opinion of the members present, no action was taken, and the meeting adjourned.

ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Secretary*

MINUTES OF THE
ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING, PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA
DECEMBER 29, 1921

The annual business meeting was called to order by President Hayes at 5:00 P.M. in the Auditorium of the Chamber of Commerce. Sixty-one members were present.

The report of President Hayes upon his administration and the discussion upon the "Work of the Society" are printed elsewhere in the *Proceedings*.

Moved and carried that the minutes of the last annual business meeting be not read, because they had already been printed in the *Proceedings*.

The Committee on Resolutions (J. P. Lichtenberger, A. B. Wolfe, and E. S. Bogardus) expressed appreciation to the city of Pittsburgh, the Chamber of Commerce, the Carnegie Institute of Technology, the Irene Kaufmann Settlement, and the local committee for hospitality and co-operation in promoting the conduct of the meetings.

The Committee on Nominations (E. A. Ross, chairman, C. H. Cooley, J. M. Gillette) recommended the election of the following persons for the different offices for 1922: president, James P. Lichtenberger; first vice-president, Ulysses G. Weatherly; second vice-president, Charles A. Ellwood; secretary-treasurer, Ernest W. Burgess; new members of the Executive Committee, Lucile Eaves and Charles J. Galpin. Motion made and carried that the Secretary be instructed to cast the ballot of the Society for the persons nominated.

President Hayes made a brief statement of his proposal for an Annual Summer Camp for sociological conference and discussion, suggesting that members who were interested should correspond with the Secretary.

A motion was made and carried that the President be authorized in response to an invitation from the World Friendship Bureau to prepare a message expressing the sentiment of the Society that permanent peace can be secured only through world-organization.

Moved and carried that the Executive Committee be requested to prepare and report upon a new plan for the election of the officers of the Society.

Motion made and carried that the two members representing this Society on the Joint Commission on Social Studies in Schools be authorized to confer with the National Council of Teachers of the Social Sciences with regard to its plan of organization and to report to the Executive Committee of the Society as to the desirability of affiliation with it.

Motions were made and carried that the Committee on the Teaching of Social Science in Grade and High Schools and the Committee on Social Research be continued.

Moved and carried that the question of raising the dues of the Society suggested by the Committee on Social Abstracts for the purpose of financing the publication of a sociological index be referred to the Executive Committee with power to act.

The meeting then adjourned.

ERNEST W. BURGESS, *Secretary*

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

MEMBERSHIP LIST FOR THE YEAR 1922

Alabama

Birmingham

Hickman, Thomas S., Route 8

Montgomery

Owen, Thomas H., Alabama State
Department of Archives and
History

Talladega

Holloway, William, Talladega College

Tuskegee

Work, Monroe N., Tuskegee Institute

University

Bidgood, Lee, P.O. Box 416

Lang, George

Phoenix

Heard, Mrs. Dwight B., Casa Blanca

Arkansas

Arkadelphia

Johnson, Charles D., Box 262

Watters, Mary, Ouachita College

Conway

Gooden, O. T.

Little Rock

Connor, Bishop J. M., 1519 Pulaski
St.

California

Berkeley

Aronovici, Carol, 1616 La Verelda

Coolidge, Mrs. Dane, Dwight End
Way

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