E657

WHAT IS TRUTH?

WHAT IS TRUTH?

by

GABRIEL WELLS

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY J. L. GARVIN

LONDON

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD.

1924

Printed in Great Britain
at The Westminster Press
Harrow Road
London W.

TO MY MOTHER
who taught me
to be true

Variety is the Spice of Life
Unity the Meat

FOREWORD

SOME of my friends have urged me to present my "Letters to the Press" in a collected form. On what grounds I fail to discern. I can imagine, however, my good friend, A. Edward Newton, if selected as the spokesman, to say, drawing upon his always fluid stock of Johnsonalia, "It is not done well, but one is surprised to find it done at all."

The letters nearly all relate to the war and its aftermath. One letter is the exception. It dates back to the year 1903—about eight and a half years after my first acquaintance with the English language. I include this letter, because it is the one dearest and nearest to my heart. I have left it entirely as it was originally written. In the others I have made slight alterations, but not affecting either the tenor or the substance.

I am grateful to the *Evening Post*, the *Times*, the *Sun*, and the *World* for their permission to reprint.

New York, November 3rd, 1923

NOTE

THE contents of Part I, as well as the Appendix, have been previously published in America. Those of Part II, with the exception of "Western Civilisation," which goes back to 1903, were done afterwards, and appear collectively now for the first time.

I am indebted to the editors of the *Spectator* and *The Nation* (London), the *Outlook*, the *Times*, and the *World* (New York) for their courtesy in granting the privilege of publication.

London, August 24th, 1924

INTRODUCTION

WHEN Mr. Gabriel Wells does me the honour, as I count it, of asking me to write an introduction, his own example makes the office light. His pages reveal him as an expert in concentration : the briefest preface best suits his compact method and acute phrases. When he addresses himself to a close argument upon the practical disorders and moral confusion of the world since the war, he both feels deeply and reasons hard. He is as full of points as a pin-cushion when you hardly can see the cushion for the pins.

As the form and manner of this volume are uncommon, its origins are to me attractive in more than one way. It seems to me a pleasant adventure for a great book-hunter, famous in both hemispheres, to bring out a first little book of his own. Mr. Wells has been a Nimrod of enterprise amongst the big game of literary and artistic collections, and those who are acquainted with him in that field know him to be as generous as bold. All the time there was another side to him. An American citizen with a life-long knowledge of Europe, he is profoundly concerned not so much with changing surfaces and momentary events as with the philosophy of international relations. He seeks to throw light on first principles. The World War and the perhaps deeper tragedy of the Peace—who yet knows ?—roused him to utter his thoughts in a running commentary through the newspapers and reviews. Gathered together for the present

volume, these reprinted pieces are worth while. In intense meditative sincerity and energy of compression they have more than the ephemeral touch. It must be said of them that they bear the original stamp of an independent mind, and are packed with challenges. I agree in the main with the spirit of all he writes about what is most important—the chaotic sequel of the war and the tasks of the future. I do not agree with him in some other things. No one could agree with him in everything; and I imagine him to be the last man to expect that insipidity.

When he takes for a title the question asked by jesting Pilate, Mr. Wells avoids the jest—for moral seriousness is the very pith of his purpose—but, like all wise modern men, he feels the irony as it was never felt before. The world, unlike Pilate, has had " to wait for an answer " in a thousand connections. It may have to wait a long time yet before there is any approach to an agreed definition or application of truth in international politics. But when we repeat " What is Truth ? " we can at least often show what it is not; and to that salutary work Mr. Wells makes a trenchant contribution. He sees a capital " V "—the initial of Versailles—as the " Scarlet Letter " of reproach across the record of diplomacy after the war. Like him, I believe that the Paris Treaties set Europe upon a false and dangerous basis. While righting much that had been wrong, they went on not to remove the root-causes of war but to nourish them by substituting new injustices, perils and follies for the former.

The new map in too many of its lines meant,

as was said at the time, " peace with a vengeance," from the standpoint of morals and wit ; while it was " the peace that passeth understanding " from the standpoint of constructive wisdom. The reconciliation of peoples was, and is, the guiding and supreme object of peace ; and my sense of the truth in this particular is that the object never will be attained until the Paris " Treaties " are either revised and rectified in several large ways, or made tolerable by wholly new federal arrangements. Until then, limitation of armaments, as Mr. Wells shows in other words, is like cutting off the tops of the weeds and leaving their noxious life in the soil. But the subject is tempting me too far, and I must leave it to his own sinewy handling.

Throughout he means to vindicate " life's fine loyalties." I like nothing better than his argument that character is inseparable from truth in action, and even from truth in the soul. It is the keynote of the volume ; and reminds us that there cannot be sounder politics anywhere without sounder life. If Mr. Wells had asked me to suggest a motto apt for the whole spirit of these reprinted pieces I would have quoted words more familiar in our father's day than in ours—" He lives most who thinks most, feels the noblest, acts the best." With this let a mighty book-hunter's own little book go out amongst the bows and spears of the critics ; but I hope the sequel will be kind to Nimrod's ewe-lamb.

J. L. GARVIN

Gregories, Beaconsfield

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART II

A DECLARATION OF INTERDEPENDENCE

ALL MEN ARE BORN DIFFERENT AND DEPENDENT. THROUGH CO-OPERATION THEY BECOME FRATERNAL AND FREE. CO-OPERATION IS THAT WHICH TRANSFORMS THE RAW MATERIAL OF ANIMAL EXISTENCE INTO THE FINE PRODUCT OF HUMAN LIFE. IF COMPETITION IS THE LIFE OF BUSINESS, CO-OPERATION IS THE BUSINESS OF LIFE.

PART I

THE HIGHEST VIRTUE

THE other day, in the course of an address delivered before the People's Institute in Cooper Union, Mr. J. G. Phelps Stokes took occasion to utter words to this effect: "I heard a prominent preacher say this morning that the highest virtue is love of country. Well, I do not think so. Nor do I believe love of family to be the highest virtue." And then he went on to say: "We need something larger, more comprehensive than altruism. Altruism is not broad enough a term. The highest virtue is "—and he begged leave to coin a word—" Omniism."

Now, there certainly is something greater than altruism, most cultivated people to the contrary notwithstanding. But I would ask Mr. Stokes to consider that love of country as well as love of family *is* something greater than altruism. Both love of country and love of family are examples, not of altruism, but of a virtue of an entirely different kind, that of loyalty. And there is nothing higher. The highest virtue is loyalty.

The preacher quoted by Mr. Stokes was both right and wrong in maintaining that love of country is the highest virtue. He was right in kind, wrong in degree. Love of country lies along the line of highest conduct, just as love of family does; neither, however, marks the ultimate point in the line.

In offering the word " omniism " as the highest term, Mr. Stokes seems to have failed to recognise that he was, at best, mending matters in a

quantitative way. What is wanted is a term which is qualitatively different from altruism—one which denotes, not a broader, but a higher attitude. In the moral world, as in the physical world, there are three available lines of behaviour, and three only: regard for self, which is Egoism; regard for others, which is Altruism; and regard for authority, which is Loyalism; corresponding to the three dimensions of length, breadth, and height. Egoism is the economic attitude; altruism, the ethical attitude; loyalism, the religious attitude.

Instead, then, of ascending to a loftier eminence, as he started out to do, and enlarging the moral horizon in that way, Mr. Stokes simply applied to his eyes a telescope, as it were, with his "omniism."

Let me wind up with an illustration: Suppose the United States were to go to war with all of Europe, would Mr. Stokes range himself on the side which contains the larger number of human beings? Or, suppose 20,000 people were to array themselves on one side, and ask me to adopt a certain course, while on the other side there were to stand a single woman—but that woman my mother—urging me to take a different course, does anyone think, other things being equal, that I would hesitate one moment as to what I should do? Why, I would laugh at them.

March, 1903.

GETTING TOGETHER

IT is a curious spectacle to observe the belligerent nations vying with each other in their protestations that none of them started the war, and all the while going on with the fight without a moment's pause.

I am reminded of a theory advanced by the late William James, the great psychologist, known as the James-Lange reflex theory. Professor James thus illustrates the theory: A man does not cry because he is sorry, he is sorry because he cries; he does not run away because he is afraid, he is afraid because he is running away.

Similarly, it would seem, the warring nations are fighting each other not because they have a grievance, but they have a grievance because they are fighting.

Be this as it may, and whether this nation or that nation started it, why, in the name of common sense, do they not accept the disavowal of the act and let it go at that? Why behave like children who are unable to retrace their steps? Why not act like men able to rise above themselves, and get together, look into each other's eyes, shake hands, and be friends again?

September, 1914.

WHO SHOULD VOTE?

LET me say in all frankness and sincerity that I am absolutely opposed to Equal Suffrage. Not that I am in favour of male suffrage and not of female suffrage. Oh, no; I hope I am too liberal-minded for that. To me, in fact, it is absurd for a State which is impersonal in its character to distinguish between man and woman, both of whom are alike integral parts of its structure. Elementally viewed, man and woman should receive equal consideration by the State. They should have equal standing and enjoy equal recognition. Man and woman are not beings that are different, but beings that are dissimilar. They are each other's counterparts. The distinction between man and woman is not one of kind, nor one of degree, but one of *aspect*. Man and woman, while opposite, are equal. There is no getting away from that position. This is why the advocates of woman suffrage have the best of the argument every time.

Human rights, eh? Are not women human beings? shouted the orator at his hearers, and he had them all in a frenzy of assent.

How, then, about it? Anything else to it? Nothing but a consideration of the issue itself.

The first step with that end in view is to make it clear to ourselves what the State is, and then determine what constitutes the unit of the State.

Now, the State is not an aggregate of individuals, whether they be men or whether they be women, or even whether they be both men or

women promiscuously thrown together. The State is an organism, that is an interjunctive self-producing system. Its unit, partaking as a unit must of the nature of the whole, is to be likewise an interjunctive reproducing entity. And such truly is the family. The *family* thus is the unit of the State, not man or woman individually. And it is to the family, not to either man or woman as such, that the suffrage belongs. The only question is, who is the better fitted of the two, both by nature and circumstance, to exercise this right for the family, man or woman?

But what about bachelors? Their franchise should be held in abeyance. A man who proves himself indifferent to the most vital interests of the State should not be entrusted with any participation in its government. Men should be allowed the privilege of voting, from the time they reach maturity, so as to acquire the needed civic training, up to the age, say, of thirty; and if they continue to remain unmarried, then they should be deprived from the exercise of their political rights. If they prefer to behave differently from the rest, they cannot with any good grace complain of not being treated as the rest.

September, 1915.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DRINK

A FRENCH writer, Beaumarchais, says somewhere that the difference between man and animal is that an animal drinks only when it is thirsty, whereas a man drinks also when he is not thirsty. That is to say, an animal drinks water, while a man drinks beer, wine, and what not, as well; for even man, of course, drinks water when he is thirsty.

Now, how comes it that man should incline to drinks which are not primarily intended to quench his thirst? There can only be one answer: to promote companionship. And companionship is not confined to relationship between one man and another man, but between man and himself. Banish drink and you will bring about the *animalisation* of man; his meals will be reduced to the sheer satisfaction of his animal appetite, with this distinction, that, unlike an animal, man will exceed the bounds of his appetite; for it is in the nature of man to want to exceed bounds. So, then, this is likely to happen, that people will be prone to eat more than they should, and certainly more than they would be apt to eat when there is a drink to intervene to temper their appetite, or to spoil it, if you please.

Really, I cannot perceive any clear gain by absolute prohibition. I am not presenting my own case, for I am not a drinking man, as the term is used. I take a drink occasionally, but I take it for companionship; and, at times, when I

feel my social self (which is the man in me) too far driven in, submerged.

All things considered—and above all things our imperative, all-overshadowing duty to shrink from no sacrifice that helps to win the war—I cannot but feel that the wiser course would be to leave wine, beer, and the like unprohibited. Of course the manufacture of drinks should be restricted, and the use moderated ; so as to keep it in accord with the demands of these war times. Let drinks be Hooverised, as food is ; only more stringently, so as to render food's priority claim the more emphatic.

I feel confident the result would be gratifying. Never has such pliancy been shown by a people at its country's call. Why unduly strain it ? Witness the religiously solemn observance of the gasless Sunday. What a unique opportunity there is at present to distill the drink problem itself and to inculcate habits of true temperance. Why, an inordinate person would be regarded as an ordinary offender !

September, 1918.

RECONCILIATION

I FEEL that a determined effort should be made to get the men in Washington off the fences before Christmas. I take the cue for my appeal from a remark the President once made. He said : " There is such a thing as being too proud to fight."

What a glorious application he could make of this, now, at the present juncture. Everybody is yearning for peace, and the only obstacle in the way is the antagonism which developed between him and the Senate. Why not get together ? Let him invite the leaders of both parties to meet him for the purpose of harmonising the points in dispute. Whoever then should prove a stumbling-block will have to bear the terrible responsibility of wilfully prolonging the world-wide misery. But no one would dare if the issue were clearly drawn. Let the President extend the hand of peace and goodwill, thereby making it possible to give the nation, nay, the world, the most consummate Christmas gift imaginable. It is in his power to do so, and it would be an act most becoming. And were I in his position I would do it, if needs be, by even outright yielding ; for there is such a thing as being too highminded not to yield. Rather be noble than right !

December, 1919.

ASSOCIATION AND LEAGUE

THE taunt is hurled at the advocates of an Association of Nations that there is no difference between it and the League, except in name. The difference is vital. The association, or, what it virtually amounts to, periodic world conferences, is intended to promote a spontaneous co-operation among the nations of the world and to foster the spirit of peace, while the purpose of the League is to create a rigid co-operation and to achieve peace according to the terms of the Versailles Treaty.

The association aims at an adaptive arrangement of international relationship tending to integration and stability; the League, on the other hand, provides for a hidebound arrangement tending to instability and disintegration. That's the difference. When shall we learn the lesson that the world is an organism, not a mechanism?

December, 1921.

NAME AND SUBSTANCE

THAT was a most clever heading *The World* supplied for my letter on the Association and the League. "Tweedledee and Tweedledum"—perfectly delicious. I could not avoid feeling somewhat flattered, amid my humiliation at my powers of presentation in setting forth so concisely the difference enabling *The World* in two words to explode it all. And now, where am I and where my little unsophisticated attempt at differentiation?

My plight brings to mind an apposite story. An Irishman was once asked which he would rather have, a collision or an explosion. "A collision, of course. In a collision, there you are; in an explosion, where are you?"

This story saved the day. For, still conscious of my bearings, it dawned upon me that, after all, I could not have been entirely annihilated.

What, then, is the real point in this celebrated controversy? I don't mean the point which lies clearly on the surface, to be picked up by any superficial observer who is not prejudiced or actuated by malice or spite. I mean the vital point which touches the substance. For anyone, indeed, to harp on the difference of the terms of Association and League is a reprehensible piece of casuistry. There is no appreciable distinction between the two words; which may be even used interchangeably, so much so that if Harding had called his "Association" League and Wilson had

called his "League" Association, the situation would have been "as you were."

But the vital point is this, that the League as we know it is wedded to a given definite treaty, whereas the Association as we know it is wedded to the moral conscience of the world.

And, incidentally, do you wish to know what I think, without the slightest trace of pro-Germanism, of that treaty? It is the most malevolent international moral atrocity ever perpetrated. It was not the outcome of an open-minded, broad-visioned conference, but of a mediæval tribunal of justice. Ship for ship, you remember: this being the twentieth-century version of an eye for an eye.

December, 1921.

THE TRAGEDY OF MONEY

I AM puzzled, terribly puzzled. I feel like one who stands before a complicated piece of machinery which is out of gear, and who is helplessly looking around for the expert mechanician to apply the magic touch. But, then, is plain ordinary common sense entirely alien to a problem that calls for expert handling? One should not think so—not if all things have ultimately something in common and are alike amenable to the law of reason.

What, then, is it that perplexes my untrained mind? It is the breaking down of the machinery of exchange, and the consequent paralysis of the world trade that is going on unchecked before our eyes.

And what is the cause of it—not the occasion, but the cause? It is, as we are told, that nearly all the available gold is at present in this country of ours, and that the other countries, therefore, cannot buy any foreign commodities, having no money with which to pay for them. So it is gold again blindfolding mankind. Verily, our plight is more pitiful than that of the Israelites of old who bowed down before the golden calf. With them, at least, it was a purely religious ceremonial, not seriously affecting their workaday life, while with us our object of worship has become a stern, all-pervasive reality.

Let me ask this very simple question: Suppose that a whimsical earthquake should pass over this country, touching only those steel-armoured vaults where that wonderful gold is

up, and that the earth should re-engulf the hoard—are we to understand that the world trade would automatically come to a dead standstill? That can't be so. I believe there is sufficient ingenuity present in mankind to find some expedient to relieve the situation. What is extraordinary is that the intellect of man has not already risen above the tangled affairs of the world and educed order from the prevailing chaos. The spectacle is almost pathetic—and one which will furnish to future historians a piquant morsel—to see the highly evolved twentieth-century mind lie benumbed beneath the hypnotic spell of gold. Is there no way to free ourselves from the seeming fatality of the situation? I am sure whatever means with my limited ability I am able to suggest would not begin to meet the exigencies of the situation. Perhaps I need not be quite so diffident, for did not once a mere apple have it in it to start an epoch-making train of thought?

I said above: Suppose through some elemental happening all the gold should vanish. What then? Well, my suggestion is, let us act as though it had disappeared, as if there were no gold at all. Yes, let us abolish the gold standard; let us remove gold at last from its pedestal, and in its place enthrone the standard of goodwill—not the spiritual goodwill, the legend we hang out at Christmas, but ordinary business goodwill, the goodwill which hard-headed merchants and stiff-necked banks recognise in their dealings with individual firms. Is this too idealistic? The late J. P. Morgan once said that he gave more heed to a man's character than to his bank account.

How much more forcibly this should apply to a nation, which is not a fleeting entity like an individual, but a historic entity.

The nations of the world have no ready cash. What of it? They still have their land, their natural resources, their factories, their people's industry; and, above all, their national pride. What is a pile of gold worth in comparison with all that? Does the United States of America, does England, does France, need a supply of gold to give value to its notes? Not even Germany, not even Hungary, does. Away with gold, then, as the standard of money. This time-befogged system is nothing but a sham and mockery. Incidentally the gold stored might be turned to better uses than letting it lie idle in the vaults. Let the standard of a country's money be the equation of its goodwill, character, and economic power. With these factors entering into the determination of the value of a country's money, I believe, in passing, that a mark, for instance, should have half its pre-war worth which would make it about 12 cents instead of half a cent, its present quotation. I am aware of the reckless printing of money that takes place in Germany, but we must not forget that this is the effect as well as the cause of the depreciation. The lower the mark falls, the more of it they have to print; and the more they print of it, the lower yet the mark sinks.

Of course, my proposal would necessitate another world conference, a series of conferences, most likely. By all means let us have these conferences. There is nothing more conducive to a

stable international relationship and a wholesome understanding among the nations than a conference of their representatives.

December, 1921.

INTERNATIONAL GENEROSITY

THAT was an illuminating phrase of M. Briand's, the phrase "moral disarmament." It has a peculiar aptness as applied to Germany. But is it accurate? It is not even happy. The phrase belongs in the category with the famous remark of a French Deputy who opposed the abolition of capital punishment by dramatically exclaiming, "Let *Messieurs, les assassins*, make the beginning." The fallacy comes of not distinguishing between the law of nature—the law of action and reaction, the law of tooth for tooth, eye for eye, which is the way of strict justice—and the law of humanity, which is generosity. *If you will repent, I shall not resent*—expresses the underlying idea of this higher law.

Not justice, but generosity, is the supreme law. Justice, forsooth! What man can stand up and face justice—cold, untempered, implacable justice?

How can Germany be expected to disarm morally; that is, to cease to hate? It is humanly impossible. Not even at the dictate of reason could Germany stop her rancour. In the moral realm the positive attitude precedes the negative. One has to feel kindly first before one can begin to cease hating. Moral armament, not disarmament, is what is needed. Germany needs it most, but the whole world needs it. Let France try to be generous to Germany, and Germany cannot help but strike back with the same moral weapon of appreciative sentiment.

As you do unto others so they will do unto you.

Germany hates France. True. But is France, with her feet firmly planted on the prostrate body of Germany, inspired by tender affection? Of course not; nor *could* France be expected to have love for Germany. Men are not angels. But she could, and she should, get herself, as behoves a human being, to set an ever so slender current of conciliation a-going. It would work like magic.

Last summer, travelling on the Oriental express, I was deeply impressed by the remarks of a cultured Frenchman, that her present leaders are imperilling France and precipitating the collapse of Europe. He was returning from a visit to Vienna. Tourists, indeed, would do well hereafter to inspect the *moral* devastation of Europe. Let the hint be taken from M. Briand and let attention be turned to the moral aspect of the world situation in preference to the physical. Once we become thoroughly imbued with the moral enormities which beset stricken Europe, and apply ourselves to their remedy, all the other dislocations will gradually drop into their normal positions. Of course, bread first; but even wholesome food turns into poison in a system soaked with acid. All our economics, finances, and schemes of physical disarmament will only help to set up cardboard fabrics.

The moral issue is the overshadowing issue—always, in all things, and everywhere. Let then the slogan be: the United Fates of Europe—nay, of the World.

December, 1921.

NO MAN'S WORLD

WHAT, precisely, is the matter with the world to-day? Simply this: its conscience is not functioning. The other day Gerhart Hauptmann, the noted German playwright, drafted a letter which he intended to address to the world conscience; but, as he looked around and could not visualise its presence anywhere, he abandoned the idea of dispatching it.

Conscience—what is it? It is the faculty of mediation. The possession of this faculty it is which marks off a human being from the rest of things. An animal shares with man, in a degree, every other sensitive quality except conscience or the power of mediation. Imagine, if you can, a dog intervening in a fight of two of his fellow beings, trying to compose their differences, and you would at once be struck with the presence of a human act. Mediation is man's specific business in the scheme of things. Take away mediation and you remove the moral cement that holds the world system together.

With delight I note the presence among us of Lord Robert Cecil, the distinguished English statesman. He disclaims to have come on any special mission, unless it be, as he says, merely to explain the League, and to furnish us with first-hand information of the state of affairs in Europe. What really must be in his heart, whether he would admit it or not, whether he is aware of it himself or not, is to try to arouse our sense of international solidarity. Sense of solidarity is but

another way to define conscience. Or, rather, it means conscience in its passive aspect.

Mediation is the word, however. The upper dog usually frowns upon mediation, not remembering that direct action never settles anything permanently.

April, 1922.

ETHICS OF INTERVIEWING

THE alleged recent interview of Mr. Kipling raises an interesting question in journalistic ethics and propriety. The question may be thus expressed: Is an editor who opens his columns to an interview free of all extra-legal responsibility for its publication?

After viewing the question from every angle, I am prepared to say, not only is the editor in an extended ethical sense responsible, but he is so even to a greater degree than the person who brings the interview to him, just as one who receives questionable property is more to be condemned than the man who offers it, for he is trading upon other people's weaknesses.

We all have our gripping moments, moments of intense emotional reactions, when we are apt to let ourselves go unmeasuredly. Then, again, we all have our private selves, as distinct from our social selves. Who is there who would not occasionally, under the influence of inciting circumstances, feel and express views which are foreign to his more deliberate attitude? Moreover, with some of us, as Prof. James said of himself, everything comes out wrong at first. As for myself, if I may insert a personal note, I have been more grateful to editors for their judgment in rejecting communications I sent to them than for their good-natured acceptance of others they published. It is the function of the editor to act the part of our sober second thought. I feel confident that if Mr. Kipling, always assuming that he might have

done it, had been given a hint of the odd and undignified character of the interview, he would never have countenanced its publication.

Of course, if some obscure person had given vent to such utterances, the editor would have thrown the rubbish into the waste basket. But not so when a Kipling is behind it. Oh, no, that would not be up-to-date journalism. The very fact that it is queer will heighten the sensation.

I can't help feeling that Mr. Kipling may have said something which could have been construed into a semblance of the published interview. I have read Sir Auckland Geddes's masterly speech on the theme the other day. He strove to counteract the effect upon the American public of what Kipling is reported to have said. I agree with every word of the Ambassador's noble utterance; yet, without fear of showing inconsistency, I venture to say that there is not an Englishman living, who lost a dearly-beloved member of his family, who does not in his unguarded moments feel—feel, not think—that we came in late; and there is not an Englishman without a job walking hopelessly the streets of London who does not at times think—think, not feel—that we went out early. There may be Englishmen who never have moments when they feel or think that way; but they are one of the three: they are either inordinately conceited, or they are devoid of intense emotion, or they are imbeciles. The situation in the case of Mr. Kipling may have been charged with a highly explosive suggestiveness that brought his own unforgettable sorrow in strong action; which, together with a sense of realised futility of the

sacrifices that were made, drove him into an impassioned tirade. Such an outpouring of the heart is the most sacred and intimate thing in the world, and should be so treated.

Now, the interview is brought to the editor. He is satisfied that the person who brought it may be relied on for truthfulness. But the tense emotional character of the interview should have made the editor pause. Suppose the interview took on the hue of the interviewer's own weakly sentimentality—but we will not suppose this. My point is that it is the bounden duty of the editor to refer such an interview back to the subject for confirmation, or for a calmer and more deliberate consideration. For surely he must have felt that nothing but mischief could be accomplished by publishing it. Unless the sole aim of a paper is to increase its circulation, the editor should want to convey to his reader only information and opinions which serve a rational and legitimate public purpose.

The paper, one of our best edited dailies, which scored this hit, has sponsored more sensational indiscretions than perhaps any other medium of publicity. Let its alertness and enterprise be admitted, often precipitating signal achievements; nevertheless public opinion would be well advised in discouraging such break-neck journalistic stunts.

September, 1922.

THE PORTENTOUS THREE

THE world is out of joint! Who is to blame? These three: Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George. And the least forgivable of these is not Wilson, for he knew not what he was doing; nor Clemenceau, for he knew what he was doing; but Lloyd George, for he cared not what he was doing.

I charge that the lack of earnestness on the part of Lloyd George is chiefly responsible for the present demoralisation of the world. Lloyd George can be serious, terribly serious—all good fighters possess seriousness—but he is constitutionally incapable of earnestness, real earnestness, moral earnestness. Seriousness is a matter of temperament; earnestness is a matter of conscience.

Let there be no weak sentimentality shown on the unseating of Lloyd George. He will be missed, to be sure; missed for his cleverness particularly. For he *is* clever, extraordinarily clever, uncannily clever. But cleverness, a virtue in a politician, is a vice in a statesman. A politician looks to the present, bent upon circumventing problems; a statesman looks to the future, aiming at a lasting solution.

We shall have less of meteoric flashes on the political horizon hereafter; but I, for one, prefer to follow the kindly, steady light.

October, 1922.

LLOYD GEORGE AS OBSERVER

I WISH I possessed Lloyd George's graphic pen, so as to discuss him adequately. I know my subject—I believe I do—but I lack the skill of sinuous presentation. What a wonderful man, with a driving power unexcelled! I have always admired Lloyd George, although I have never accepted him. He is a good musician, but a bad composer.

In his last published article, Lloyd George attempts to show that the Versailles Treaty is not at fault for the reparations tangle, as it specifically provides for a commission to determine the definite amount. This, it strikes me, is much like a tailor cutting the cloth in any haphazard manner at first, with the idea of making it all right when he comes to try the suit on. I actually once had such a tailor. He would cut everything in ample dimensions, and when on one occasion I showed impatience, he superiorly remarked that one always can make what is large smaller. Good philosophy but rotten tailoring, I thought; as he was pulling this way and that way to effect a fit.

Another point Lloyd George makes is that the non-participation of America in the Reparations Commission made that body of necessity possessed of a spirit of partiality. If only England could have had the support of America, the decision would have been each time more equitable. Perhaps so, but I doubt it. America was dominantly represented at the Versailles Conference

—and see what happened. Again, pray, what difference would it have made if America had participated in the London Conference? None whatsoever. As at that time Lloyd George was still running wild, no proposals of sanity would have availed. The American delegates would have been dazzled off their feet by Lloyd George's gyrations, just as the protesting Italian delegates were. Signor Nitti was crying out as in a wilderness.

Lloyd George, of course, possesses wisdom; but it is wisdom not of forethought but of forestalling. Thus, in his article the week before, he emphasised in words I cannot precisely recall, that whether it be occupying or annexing or seizing for productive guarantees, France has only one definite object, and that is to absorb permanently the left bank of the Rhine. Now, a number of disinterested observers have sensed this *arrière pensée* long ago. In my own humble opinion, even this does not cover France's entire aim. France at Versailles, and continuously after, has had one supreme end in view. It is to disable and incapacitate Germany for all future time. Only so, France believes, can she have permanent safety. Therein, I hold, is the crux of the situation and not, as Mr. Hughes proclaims, in the matter of reparations. Reparations with France is not the end, but the means.

Let us not forget that the French people, with all their emotional velleities, are a people of keen and practical judgment. It is not stupid obstinacy which makes M. Poincaré insist on his present course of costly policy—a policy fraught with all

sorts of risk. France does not need to be shown that this is not the method to realise actual cash from Germany. If Germany were to default on any just payments—payments the opinion of the world countenances—a few battleships would speedily bring her to her knees. But France's ulitmate aim is *not* indemnity. Indeed, I feel she would be more contented to forgo it than see Germany prosperous enough to pay. Witness the part France played in the Silesian apportionment. If to extract money from Germany was France's chief end, she would not have acted with such unrelenting rigour toward Germany's claim in the dispute with Poland.

The attitude of France reminds me of a charming lady of my acquaintance. I once took it upon myself to try to show her how foolish she was in persisting in a certain impossible course ; how she was throwing precious opportunities away, and was alienating her best friends ; but all she would reply was, " Oh, you don't understand, you don't understand."

January, 1923.

THE POTENCY OF A SLOGAN

I TRUST it will not be regarded presumptuous in me to propose a revision of the words inscribed on the banner of our political awakening: "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity."

Immeasurable is the benefit the launching of these words has accomplished; but incalculable, also, is the mischief that has followed in its wake. The good sprang from the air of emancipation these words exhaled; the bad has flown from the disbalance of the words in their conjunctive presentation.

The word *Equality* is what has borne down the constellation. It is redundant, being covered in its meaning partly by the word Liberty, and partly by Fraternity, while the undistributed remnant is—Fatuity. The time is ripe for a recasting. I take leave, therefore, to submit for the consideration of all thinking men, conservative and radical alike, the hoisting of these words: "Liberty, Fraternity, *Solidarity*."

May, 1923.

PASSIVE RESISTANCE

IT has occurred to me to offer a definition of Passive Resistance. It is unwillingness to co-operate.

Such an attitude may assume a great variety of forms, as paying no heed to one's contractual obligations, declining to meet one's associates half-way, turning a deaf ear to the voice of impartial opinion, and so on and so forth.

I wonder, under this test, who at this juncture is entitled to the prize ?

Passive Resistance is an undignified, unmanly course, and ought not to be resorted to except in case of utter defencelessness. Passive Resistance is the natural weapon of women and children.

May, 1923.

PROPAGANDA

THE motive of Count Apponyi's visit has been impugned. He is charged with the enormous impropriety of having come to plead the cause of his country. Has he, indeed? I wonder how a real full-blooded American citizen would have acted in his place. But it is propaganda all the same. I beg to differ on this point. Propaganda, as currently used, means the wilful spreading of misleading information. A man of the type of Apponyi, with all his intense patriotism, would be incapable of stooping to such objectionable activity.

To present the case of one's country, to strive to engage the interest and sympathy of other nations in its submerged, helpless condition, and to ask their support to enable his country to get back on her feet—is that to be considered an offending act? Oh, no, that can't be so, not in the home-country of fair play. No, America would never withhold a cordial, open-minded welcome to a visitor like the distinguished Hungarian statesman.

Were I, a former countryman of his, to find any fault with Apponyi, it would be that he is too punctilious, too reserved, in short not sufficiently—shall I say?—opportunistic. The Count's native hue of resolution pales at the threshold of action. It could have been desired that he had had something of the alert and ready Dr. Benes in him. The high regard in which his character and attainments are held all over the world, Apponyi

might have turned to better account in behalf of his country.

Poor little Hungary, as hospitable, chivalrous, upright a nation as there ever was. She was punished, because she remained loyal.

September, 1923.

PERSISTENT PASSIVITY

AMERICA'S persistent passivity is what to-day keeps the world out of balance. Nowhere is there anyone to exert a steadying influence. England would, but she can't. America could, but she won't. And in consequence there is no help in sight.

The hitch about us Americans is that we have too insistently dinned into our ears and too constantly flashed before our eyes—until the hypnotic effect is complete—that our national self-regard should be 100 per cent. America first, last and all the time is the corresponding slogan. But, unless an empty phrase, is this not tantamount to an absolute, self-absorbed isolation?

Should not, I ask in all humility and deference, the ratio be placed at 51 per cent. and the slogan be America first, other nations next, and Humanity all the time? This does not mean divided allegiance. Heavens, no! It means a free, rational, open-hearted allegiance. It means relieving the allegiance of its rigidity—that's all. Fifty-one per cent. is just as good and safe as the 100 per cent., for it represents controlling interest. It is in the *carrying into effect* of our determination that the full one hundred is the percentage needful, so as to make our action tell with full unbroken force.

What, then, is going to be the outcome of the present turmoil? None can tell. With the rational forces in a state of coma, we are at the mercy of the blind interplay of the elemental forces. We are groping in the darkness.

Well might one call out: Night, what of the watchman?

October, 1923.

ENGLAND'S UNHEEDED EXAMPLE

I HOLD the opinion that England committed a serious tactical error in settling her war debt with America. Not that I think an attitude of indifference would have been in order. It is inconceivable that a nation like England could assume such a course. The English people were practically unanimous that England should pay, no matter what the other nations decided to do. I remember the emphatic statement—typical of the responsible element in England—of my distinguished friend, Thomas J. Wise, that he would be willing to be taxed to his last penny for that purpose. Pride, of course, as well as honesty and sound business principle, enters into such sentiment.

My criticism does not refer to the fact of settlement itself, but to the time and the method. I cannot help feeling that the prime motive which actuated England in not deferring the settlement was her belief that it would give her the whip-hand over Europe. " I have paid my debts, although mainly incurred on your behalf—now France, Italy, please come along and do likewise." One should have thought that such a request would meet at least with a sympathetic response, particularly as it comes from a creditor who is now burdened to the straining point. Instead of that the request was treated with scorn and evasion. Who told you to pay ? As if the principle of one's conduct is to be determined by the principle of that of another.

What, then, should England have done? Here again I would like to guard myself against a possible charge of presuming to possess a superior wisdom. Had I been in Mr. Baldwin's place, I would have done just what he has done—it appeared so sound and promising. But events have a logic of their own, and often what at first appears wise turns out to be ill-advised in the end. Now I maintain that England's act of settlement is fraught with the gravest consequences. It has sensibly weakened her economic power; it has vitiated her relations with her allies, and it will make it almost impossible for her to carry on in character.

But here is my answer to the question: England should have called on America to initiate steps for an all-round settlement. England should have come to America and said: "We want something definite to be done about the war debts. We want to pay, and are anxious that this matter should be settled. We would suggest that you serve a uniform and formal notice on all debtors in the common cause, to take measures toward an arrangement of the war debts." The onus of collecting would thus have devolved upon America, where it belongs. Just imagine America, instead of England, being told by France that she will pay out of the mythical German C. bonds!

Had England done that, France would now be acting the part of the debtor in embarrassment, and would be eagerly seeking the support and co-operation of England. That would have given England the much-needed dominance in the affairs of Europe, and would have led the way toward a general stabilisation.

ENGLAND'S UNHEEDED EXAMPLE

As matters now stand, it is inevitable that the situation will develop into an open rupture between England and France. Not only because her treatment by France will be felt increasingly exasperating, but also for the reason that the tremendous burden England has to bear will cause her of necessity to take trenchant action.

October, 1923.

TOO LATE!

THE Reparations Conference is looming up on the international horizon at long last. It is too late, I fear. Not too late in an ultimate sense, for a sane optimism should suggest that the cumulative pressure of the natural agencies will bring forth in time's own time a state of balance in spite of all; but too late in a proximate sense; too late for this generation, at least.

My reason for so envisaging the situation is very simple: the authority of the Central German Government has been so completely undermined that her consent, even her unforced consent, to the terms of a settlement is more than likely to be rendered ineffectual by insubordination of the various units which compose the German Reich. As soon as Berlin begins to apply the screws upon her people in good earnest the members of the German body, owing to the existing bad co-ordination, will start first to resist, then revolt, and finally break away. We have left our starved victim out in the rain and the cold, not letting her in the house, until now her body is wrecked and her mind distracted. In creating the will to pay we have destroyed the capacity to pay. By capacity I mean the power of execution, which includes organisation as well as resources.

It may be that France herself, in her present *inwardly* still unchanged mood, does not dread such an eventuality; but the rest of the world does, and, in all good sense and conscience, should.

Germany was the backbone of Europe. If there had been no Germany, a Germany would have had to be devised. England, the only people which thinks internationally, has a deep realisation of this truth, as evidenced by the fact that, although Germany is a dangerous competitor, England wants Germany to exist.

Unfortunately, the human mind can deal successfully with a disorder up to a certain point only. Beyond that, it is powerless.

Too late, altogether too late.

October, 1923.

AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR

IS there no help for Europe? Can nothing be done to remove the incubus that saps Europe's body and desiccates her soul?

Yes and no!

It is my sincere and deliberate conviction that the cause of the existing deadlock lies in the fact that Europe's case has never been rightly diagnosed.

What is the true inwardness of Europe's obstinate plight? What is it that brought on the affliction, and what is it that prolongs and aggravates it?

Here is how I regard the situation:

The trouble originated at the dissecting table at Versailles. We all know that. Splendid, but did you ever bring yourselves sufficiently to realise, my friends, that the operating knife was *infected?* Infected with the venom of the vengeful spirit with which the knife was wielded. That's where lies the rub! It is not the amputations inflicted on Germany which put Germany on the decline. It is the imputations which were injected into her soul which undid Germany—undid Germany and unstrung the rest of the world.

Moral injury is the most fatal of all. Incomparably more devastating it is, wider-reaching, and longer-lasting than anything physical. It spreads havoc in the *hearts*, not in outward things. A physical wound time will heal; but time, by itself, only tends to harden a moral hurt.

The Versailles Treaty, thus properly appraised,

is, then, what laid the basis for the vicious complication.

Again, that which protracts the disorder, and holds it in its violently actue stage, to put it bluntly but in the kindliest spirit, is that the execution of the Treaty is dominated by a nation which chiefly inspired the Treaty—a nation whose mentality is of a pronounced *feministic* type.

This characterisation is not intended to be taken figuratively, but in a legitimate scientific sense. The sex quality, in its psychological bearing, applies to a nation as much as to an individual, the difference being only the difference which obtains between the psychology of an individual and the psychology of a nation.

Yes—and let us fix it in our mind and we shall better understand—*the reins of Europe are held by a woman*, resulting in a wayward course, getting us nowhere.

The French have a standing formula for clearing up a puzzling situation: "*Cherchez la femme.*" There we have it. The woman is at the bottom of it. In this case—the woman's way.

It is the characteristic of the feminine mentality to stress the irrelevant (the trimmings, as it were), to disregard the other side, and to stand out for a literal interpretation.

M. Poincaré's famous note, extolled by the French Press as a masterpiece of reasoning, sent in reply last summer to Lord Curzon's business-like statement of the British position, strikingly illustrates my contention. I don't remember the wording, but I recollect the gist and the trend.

Argues M. Poincaré:

You want us not to choke Germany in our effort to extract money from her, and then you turn around and ask us to pay you. Manifestly you have more consideration for Germany than you have for us.

We note, indeed, your remark that you, too, want Germany to pay; and yet, with a delightful inconsistency, disapprove of our going into the Ruhr to collect. Can't you see, that in disabling and terrorising Germany we compel her to will to pay? That this incapacitating process is not productive of payment, does not disturb us in the least; for we shall continue to remain in the Ruhr until full payment.

As for our debt to you, whereof you remind us, although we have had no thought of broaching the subject at all, we take this occasion to declare our full intention to pay it. We propose to do this, we don't mind telling it to you in advance, out of the German C. bonds prospected in the Treaty. The A. and B. bonds alone we shall keep for ourselves, and you surely cannot blame us for doing so, as these will be real money some day, which we can use to good advantage. For what purpose? That's our affair, sir.

Let us impress upon you, sir, with due courtesy as becomes an ally, that we believe in the sanctity of treaties, and that we, therefore, must insist that the Treaty concluded at Versailles be executed to the letter. Why, did not Germany herself sign the Treaty?

Brilliant reasoning, charming; but imbued with a lightsome disregard for the realities involved—all around and away from the vital point

that might get us somewhere. It is feminine reasoning, Monsieur Poincaré !

There is the Treaty, read it carefully, and you will find that what we want is nothing more but what the Treaty promised to give us—is the stereotyped refrain of M. Poincaré's pronouncements.

Did you ever make a promise to a woman and afterwards find it couldn't be fulfilled ? Will she listen as you reason with her and try to make her understand that you miscalculated your resources, or that some unforeseen reverses intervened ? Not if she is no more than woman. In vain you plead that your promise was sincerely meant at the time, but that now it might precipitate bankruptcy, if you were to do as you promised. All of no use—not even if the spectre of a divorce is hanging over the proceedings. What a blessed act it would be, for her as well as for everybody concerned, were you to be man enough to assert yourself at this juncture, and make reason, in face of emotion, prevail, and gently but firmly get her to realise the higher interest.

But enough. What of the remedy ?

By all means let us have the Reparations Conference ; even though, too late as it comes, it might only smooth out the ruffled surface. A beginning of unified action it will be, at all events. But, let us remember, not until the nations with a masculine strain shall reassert themselves, and not until a Conference of the Nations shall convene for the purpose of a comprehensive settlement—a settlement looking not merely to an adjustment of the material differences, but to effect a spiritual

atonement; that is to say, not until there is not only a scaling down of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty and its adjuncts; but, even to a greater degree, a grading up of the spirit in which they were conceived,—shall there be lasting Peace, and Civilisation be allowed to resume its steady forward march. It is the *spirit* of the Treaty which has to be rectified before Europe shall be able to rise from its benumbed condition and have its circulation restored. Let no one imagine that the law of humanity can be defied and the law of vengeance glorified without bringing on a moral paralysis.

May this—substantive instead of palliative—international conference not long delay its coming. Come it will, as come it must, surely as the sun will rise to-morrow. My only apprehension is that it likewise might be too late.

Will America rise to her unique opportunity, and grip the situation in a lusty, man-like fashion? I devoutly trust that America will.

The question is not whether America should or should not intervene—to that there might be two plausible, equally respectable, answers. No, that is not the question. The question is: Should America do it *now*, while there is still time to do it with peaceful means; or, should America let events go unchecked, weaving a formidable coil which it will take all the energy America can muster to break asunder—and then perhaps in vain?

To save Democracy we threw ourselves into the fray bodily. To save what infinitely transcends it, Civilisation, we hesitate to lift even a finger.

And yet—haltingly, to be sure—the world might proceed in its course, half Autocracy, half Democracy. But the world cannot move forward, half Anarchy, half Authority—half Disorder, half Order. It would be impossible, I say *impossible*, for us to continue in a state of ordered being, corporate or individual, such as to ourselves seems desirable, with Europe seething with the forces of disintegration,—not even were all lines of physical intercommunication cut. It would take the severance of the *intangible*, *moral threads*—the lines of invisible, sympathetic interaction—to make that possible.

To America belongs the initiative. Will she take it? Will she take it for the sake of France herself, for whom we all have a deep-seated affection; for the sake of Europe, the mother of us all; for the sake of humanity, wherein we all inhere and share our being?

Deep down in my heart something tells me that the sound common sense of the American people is bound soon to assert itself and express itself in definite action. How unlike America indeed it would be to leave a job unfinished—to refuse to act the part of a man! For war we gave everything; for peace we offer nothing—except charity.

Charity is fine—but Charity is not enough. "Charity for all and Malice to none"—the two together constitute true American tradition. But if no malice, then goodwill—and, in the approved American way, goodwill with a *go* to it.

"We are in the world and we've got to choose what active part we shall play in it—I fear rather quickly," to use the words of the late Walter H.

Page, a man who loved his country more than he hated its enemies.

I realise that the first active step to be taken should not be intended to be thoroughgoing. As in everything else, the principle of gradual development is one which it is wise to follow. The essential point is that the *trend* of our action be set right. If nothing more at the outset be attempted than the bringing about—with a view to ascertain and establish the necessary conditions of a stable peace—a conference at which Germany and the other outlawed nations are invited to participate, *that fact alone* will constitute a right move in the right direction—a move tending to rectify the spirit. The instantaneous effect of such a conference, thus broadly planned, would be to sweeten, to humanise the atmosphere; and to inaugurate a better understanding based upon mutual respect and recognition.

At this most critical stage something unconventional, something bold must be launched; if the heavy, adverse tide is to be turned. No timid, half-way measure would avail.

The situation is intolerable, woefully intolerable. It holds enough humiliating elements to cause one almost to hang one's head in shame to belong to this age.

Events are challenging our ability to cope with them—will we prove master?

The odds are against us—we have allowed events to assume a terrific massing power; we have stood by passively until they have gained an almost insuperable degree of momentum—to our everlasting disgrace.

All notwithstanding, let us not falter in our faith, nor relinquish our hopes, in the ultimate triumph of humanity.

For, in its essence, this is a *moral* world!

October, 1923.

PART II

WESTERN CIVILISATION

IT was with considerable expectancy that I took up Benjamin Kidd's recent book, entitled "Western Civilisation." Here must be a book, I felt as I commenced to read, that is not a mere echo, but an original voice. There was, however, some disappointment in store for me.

My chief criticism is that the work has at once no movement and no repose. The first defect comes from an absence of intermediate ideas; the second is due to a want of an internal analysis. I am aware that to say that something has neither movement nor repose is to utter a paradox; but, then, there is such a thing as motion in a circle.

Another criticism I have to make is that the language throughout is vague, diffuse, and cumbrous, while the sentence-units are submerged in qualifying clauses. Also there is a lack of balance in the formulation of the germ ideas. For instance, "Projected Efficiency" and "Ascendancy of the Present" are put forth as contrasted terms. Would it not have added to both clearness and force to put against "Projected Efficiency" the phrase "Current Efficiency"; or else to oppose "Ascendency of the Present" with "Ascendency of the Future"?

The central idea of the book is that the present and its interests ought to be brought under the sway of the future. Absorption in the present, that is to say, is to make way for projection into the future. And such shifting of the centre of gravity would be in keeping with the true spirit of Western

civilisation, with its keynote of dominant future.

Now, it is safe to say there never was a period since the dawn of enlightenment when there was greater need for striking this note of " futurity " than in these days. Our entire social fabric is tainted with the breath of self-centredness. Take, for example, the institution of marriage. Marriage is a contract, we say ; that is, it is something which must be regarded from the interests of the parties immediately concerned. Well, marriage is a contract, if we choose so to call it ; but a contract, in the words of Edmund Burke, as applied to the State, not only between those who are living, but between those who are living and those who are dead and those who are to be born.

A similar lack of a sense of solidarity, of a subordination of the present to the future, is traceable in our attitude towards the whole range of social life.

This book of Mr. Kidd is sure to attract wide and thoughtful attention, and is likely to prove a potent stimulus toward a clearing up of our social ideas, eventually leading to a crystallisation of the thought underlying Western civilisation and informing the theory of evolution—the thought of a subordination of the actual to the ideal, the economic principle to the ethical.

February, 1903.

WHAT IS TRUTH?

MIGHT I venture upon a tentative answer to the time-old question—What is Truth? The answer I herewith offer sprang out of a hard-pressed exigence.

We were engaged in an animated controversy, when I made an assertion which bore the obvious mark of exaggeration. It was somewhat on the order of the Biblical outburst upon the veracity of all men. My hasty remark was instantly pounced upon. Do you mean this to be taken literally? I was asked. No, I do not, my prompt and frank reply was. And then, on my part, I turned upon my challenger with this question: Is it *characteristic* of the thing or is it not? With equal candour the answer came that it was. Well, if it is characteristic, it is true, I retorted. *The character of a thing is the truth of a thing.*

Of necessity, Truth is an exaggeration, as it touches the ultimate phase. Truth relates to the principle, the type, the *character*. Fact, to the concrete manifestation.

A homely illustration will serve to set my point into relief: Cats are classed as treacherous animals, and yet we have met with individual cats that appeared to us as the embodiment of sweet attachment. The antithesis involved in this situation equates thus: Cats in general are treacherous—that's the truth. This specific cat is not treacherous—that's the fact.

Truth is real fact. Fact is apparent truth.

Here is another illustration: A story made the

rounds in England recently, that Lloyd George, during his stay in America, had been so impressed with the workings of the Tariff that he resolved to raise the flag of Protection upon his return, and on that issue to waft himself into power again. When he was nearing the shores of his country, however, the news was conveyed to him that Mr. Baldwin had forestalled him. Whereupon he executed a face-about, and forthwith trained his guns on such an " untraditional " policy. Now, is not this characteristic of the man? But Lloyd George denies it. Good—his denial, in all decency, we must accept to represent the fact. At the same time, the attribution to him of such strategy is the truth none the less. And the warrant for it lies in the character of this supreme master of opportunism. If he has not done it, he might have done it. It's in him, as we say. Might this offend? I should be intensely sorry. But then, Truth is bound to hurt, and the only immunity lies in a conversion of character.

In the consideration of a fact we have to regard the outward circumstances; in the determination of a truth we have to weigh the inward character.

One more example, at the risk of redundance. During the most critical moment of his intransigence to the Lodge-sponsored reservations, it is related Mr. Wilson received the ambassador of a foreign power. The conversation slid onto the League situation, when the visitor took occasion to entreat the President to be less unyielding in his attitude. This was the answer: " I appreciate your motives, Mr. Ambassador, but the Senate must take its medicine."

Did the incident actually occur ? I don't know, as who does ? Yet who will take it upon himself to denounce it as untrue ? Nor would a refutation carry any weight whatsoever, or serve a rational end. One might deny the circumstances of the tale —the fact ; but not its inward reality—the truth. And why ? Because it is held in character. The future historian will commit no offence against the sacredness of truth in recording this episode.

Oh ! just once more. In the law courts, when the truth in a case is hidden beneath a heap of conflicting circumstantial evidence—what, pray, is the reasonable logical procedure to which final resort is usually had ? The presentation of character-witnesses. Now, what does this signify ? Is it not that underlying this old-established legal custom is the belief that the ascertainment of character will enable us to get at the truth ? But how could it, unless Truth and Character be interversible concepts ? To be sure, the witnesses can actually testify only as to outward facts exemplifying a man's general conduct, and his standing in the community. But it becomes the jury to extract out of the varied and interrelated mass of testimony, by striking a balance and sifting out the temporal and spatial aspects, the essence of the thing—the truth.

In experience the edges of Truth and Fact commingle, rendering precise delimitation of their respective spheres all but impossible, and confusion in our terminology inevitable. How often do we not use the word truth when we mean fact, and the word fact when we mean truth ! Thus we would say : " We want to know the facts." Facts

are produced, an imposing array of observations and hearsay. Yet, somehow we feel that the *kernel* has been left untouched. We discover a loophole here, and another there, and we declare ourselves unconvinced. What we really wanted to know was the truth, and not the facts. Then, again, we would say: "Let's get at the truth." With great precision the principle involved in a given case is brought out, analogies are presented, drawn from contemporary life and from history, logical considerations are advanced, until our patience is exhausted, and the tension relieved by the practical man slowly rising, straightening himself out and asking this plain question: What, my dear fellow, can you tell us about the matter from your own personal experience? That's what concerns us at this moment. What you have seen with your own eyes, heard with your own ears, tell us that. Instantly the bubble is burst. And all this because what we actually were after was not the truth but the facts. The barrenness of most controversies is due to this very lack of discrimination between truth and fact. Fact is external, truth is internal. Fact is what is on the surface and lies open to our senses; truth, on the other hand, resides in the centre and can only be inferred, intuited or divined —Appearance and Reality. As applied to human beings, it is the difference between what one seems to be, and what one is—Reputation and Character. Reputation is pretence, Character is verity. Indeed, what do we mean when we say of a man—he is not true? Only one thing: he has no character.

This, then, I affirm with entire confidence: Truth is Character, as Character is Truth.

Is this definition true literally? It is not. If it were it would not be true. For in the strict sense, Character is Character, and Truth is Truth. But the spirit is what determines. And in the spirit it is gloriously true—Truth is Character.

November, 1923.

THE FALTERING SPIRIT AND THE TOTTERING TREATY

STILL to harp upon the operative enormities of the Versailles Treaty is like engaging in the masterly task, at this late day, of laying bare the discrepancies in the Bible. A schoolboy with his native faculties left unfettered would confine his comment to a significant shrug.

My present object is to probe deeper and to focus attention on the structural defects. Precisely in this lies the inherent organic drag in the Treaty: A false equation was struck between two incompatible concepts, resulting in a faulty, contradictory orientation.

There were two clear-cut courses open, either of which if consistently pursued would have given us immediate peace, with varying degrees of permanence.

One course was to adhere to the old-time ordering—grab everything in sight ; and, then, form a solid grouping of power for the maintenance of the situation thus created. Considerations of right and wrong do not enter into such dictatorial arrangements. Might is right, that's all. No appeal, either. This procedure is the course of violence, and has been followed in the making of all international treaties hitherto. Resting on sheer force as they did, without any moral backing, such settlements, however, had a relatively short duration. All things work together against evil schemes. But these settlements gave stability nevertheless, if only for a limited period. They provided for a

breathing-spell of normality; and all was well—on the surface.

The second course was the path of conciliation. Never in the history of mankind has there been a more propitious moment to raise the standard of humanity, and to follow its lead right straight through. The world was weary of strife to the point of despair. If only Mr. Wilson had stood out firmly, and had held fast to his plan of international unity, he would have carried everything before him, as he had the whole world close behind him. He would have come back to us on the ship bearing the name of the Father of his Country, as the Father of Humanity. Triumph lay in the palm of his hand for him to grasp.

If Mr. Wilson had but realised the full logic of his *personal* participation in the Conference! He then would have in his own inimitable manner addressed the opening meeting in words to this effect: Gentlemen, I came here for one single purpose—a purpose which is so dear to my heart and which I deem so supremely important that it caused me to disregard all other considerations of great moment and precedent which stood in the way of my coming. That purpose is to add the direct weight of my position toward helping to establish a relationship among the nations, such as will prevent all future wars. What is done is done. It is not in the power of man to undo the past. One may, indeed, find it possible to repair a harm by way of compensation; but even so one must beware lest in rectifying the past one prejudices the future. The sole task, however, before us at present consists in preparing along rational

lines for a lasting peace. With this end in view I propose that the nations here assembled, together with the neutral nations to be invited to join at once, and the remaining other nations to be made to join later in due course—that the nations of the world organise into a League for the furtherance of sympathetic co-operation, and the impartial adjustment of all international differences. The way to begin, gentlemen, is to begin at the beginning. I ask, therefore, that an immediate vote be taken on this motion.

If Wilson had only done that ! But he lost sight, at the critical moment, of his true mission. His vision became confused, his resolution shaken in the ongoing hubbub. He allowed himself by degrees to be drawn onto the plane of sordid barter. He hesitated and he lost. He came to fulfil the law of humanity, and remained to see it destroyed. He arrived as Cæsar and departed as Hamlet. There lies the tragedy of the ages !

Had the principle of the new-order policy been effectively proclaimed, the entire programme of the Conference would have resolved itself into the one all-embracing business of organising the League. To this body should have been referred the whole complement of interrelated problems arising from the war—a war which was fought with such utter virulence for the avowed object of ending war.

I am thoroughly convinced that Mr. Wilson would have won if he had held his ground. Am I too sanguine ? Let the sceptically inclined picture to themselves the opening scene of the Naval Conference at Washington. In a simple matter-of-fact manner Mr. Hughes introduces a

most stupendous, far-reaching proposal, which nearly took the breath away of those present, and the plan with some minor modifications is adpoted. And yet this occasion does not begin to compare in its emotive potentialities with that at Versailles. Wilson was then at the pinnacle of his glory in the rôle of redeemer, speaking as " one having authority " ; America's prestige shone with full compelling splendour, and the world's hunger for peace was at the intensest point.

With these conditions prevailing, is it a more sober and practical view to hold that the Conference would have coolly turned down Wilson's proposal, and thereby risk the complete and immediate withdrawal of America, and the consequent moral wrath of a world-wide public opinion ?

I repeat that Wilson could have accomplished the most signal triumph ever scored by man. He could have achieved anything that was laid on a solid moral basis. *Peace we want, but Peace with revenge is not Peace*, should have been the ever-recurring refrain of his message. I will have none of your patched-up peace, my country will have none of it, and all the peoples of the world will have none of it ! Nothing on earth could have withstood such a high moral stand.

But, to the undoing of all, no proposal was consistently followed through. A deadly compromise was effected, whereby the two irreconcilable lines of policy were jumbled together, subtly intertwined, in a manner, forsooth, that caused Mr. Wilson to take pride in defying anybody to disentangle the threads. Poor, unsuspecting Wilson, if he only knew !

This is how the high treaty-makers went about it: While wrangling in the approved old-time fashion over the spoils of the war, each of the Powers insisting with relentless vigour upon getting its full share, there was interfused with the provisions of such a war-breeding settlement, exceeding in arbitrariness any previous records, a covenant of peace.

And such a conglomeration was expected to endure! The patent absurdity of it. The devil's own fabrication! It is as if in a given dispute between individuals one of the parties were to take matters in his own hands, deciding everything to his own selfish satisfaction, and then agreeing that all differences thereafter should be submitted to an impartial tribunal; which body itself, however, should have no retroactive power, save with his own consent, which signifies nothing.

How plain it all is! Nor is intelligence anywhere lacking for the appreciation of the monstrosity of such arrangement. But we needs must persist in our narrow, short-sighted, indolent ways, refusing to be steered by the compass of our reason until the tumult of events presses the lethargy out of our system.

Let us have done at last with holding any further delusions about the Treaty. Let us rouse ourselves, and throw off the nightmare that stifles the very breath out of our common life. The Treaty is an impossible creation. Its framework is against all the laws of existence. It lacks symmetry, it lacks proportion, it lacks balance—all the essential elements of cohesion. Not even the mighty pillars of America's ratifying support could have held

such a wobbly structure in its position. Let the truth be manfully faced, and the consequences not be shirked. The Treaty is impossible.

Am I asked what's to be done? Let my answer be itself a question—What is the ordinary common-sense procedure when a building proves uninhabitable through faulty construction, and threatens to collapse and bury the occupants in its ruins?

October, 1923.

THE CONTRADICTORINESS OF HUMAN NATURE

PARADOX is innate to man. That's why human problems are so tantalising, and defy permanent solution.

I had this truth forcibly brought home to me again this morning as I came downtown in a tramway. A passenger was expostulating with the driver for not stopping for him on the wrong side of the street. When getting off he delivered an ugly parting shot on top. Incensed at the profane language, the motorman relieved his resentment in this amiable fashion: "Beat it. You g—— d—— squarehead." The poor man's good nature evidently had reached its breaking point.

Also in my mail as I reached my office there was a charming letter awaiting me from H. B. S., the well-known librettist, which concludes: "You are right, Gabriel. By all means let us have peace, even if we have to fight like hell to get it. . ."

What a bundle of contradiction is human nature. Therein lies at once its peril and its glory!

March, 1924.

THE CLUE

THE World, in a delightful editorial article pointing out in particular his one-time literary prominence in London, confesses to be at a loss to discover the secret of the eventual failure of the brilliant F. H.

Curiously, on the selfsame page *The World* furnishes itself the clue, where it quotes Gambetta's saying: "Great ability without discretion invariably comes to a tragic end."

March, 1924.

THE DAWES PLAN

I

THE one outstanding defect—and it is, I fear, a crucial defect—in the Dawes proposal is the absence of the human factor—the element of hope. The collation of facts seems to be sound, and the finding thereon correct, but the perspective is shut in. No smoothly working settlement can be devised without the fixation of the total sum to be exacted. I know the Dawes Committee had no authority to tackle that phase of the problem; but, then, its whole mission was in the last analysis merely consultative. A hint alone of a reasonable and feasible amount would have been sufficient, and would have at once made the report serve as a basis for a comprehensive and final adjustment. Nor could such a casual recommendation have been either ill-advised or improper; no more, or rather much less, than the inclusion of the military features.

Germany may accept the report, and I am disposed to think that under pressure of world-wide public opinion she will accept. But I feel confident that the settlement will prove only temporary, as both Germany's own self-confidence and the world's confidence in Germany is sure to break down under the precariousness of the ultimate outcome. On the other hand, with the total once definitely fixed, Germany might be spurred, not only to do as required, but to outdistance all expectations.

As a piece of machinery the Dawes Report is almost perfect. What is needed now is to endow it with human motive power. And this could be brought about by a Conference of all the concerned Powers, with the object of determining the total reparation amount, at which Conference Germany should be given a chance to be heard—not in the Lloyd George bluff fashion of "take it or leave it" —but in a fair and humane manner. Once the total is fixed, the rest would work itself out with more than automatic precision. All will then go forward with a *will*. Only where there is a will is there notably a way.

The Dawes Committee proposes to free Germany's hand. It behoves the masters now to free Germany's soul. Let it at last be a thorough job.

April, 1924.

II

LET me again emphasise my sincere admiration for the high structural and operative qualities of the Dawes Plan. It is a marvel of constructive workmanship. How nicely and logically part dovetails into part, until we have before us a most impressive and harmonious edifice ! But it is an edifice which is all structure, with one pervasive flaw—it lacks the base. And there's the rub. It is inconceivable that such master-builders as the members of the Dawes committee proved themselves should have failed to realise what lies patent to even a casual observer, that fixation of the total constitutes a basic postulate of any arrangement that is not presently to snap, to wobble, and then fall apart altogether of its own weight.

Can it be—I am most reluctant to advance the conjecture—that the omission was the result of a prearranged concession made to France in order to secure her assent ? More specifically expressed —can it be that the full reparation amount was again left in abeyance, so as to leave France in the continued possession of her stranglehold ? The provision for the retention of her army in the Ruhr in itself would seem to warrant such conclusion. Why indeed this extra army ? As if the Rhine army of occupation as countenanced by the Versailles Treaty was not sufficient for purposes of coercion, or as if anybody could stop France from sending

again another army anywhere into Germany when contingency actually arises! But very likely it is all a matter of upholding the principle of continuity, which we ordinary folks are not expected to grasp.

I don't care how hard within the limit of possibility it is deemed necessary and advisable to make it for Germany—whether of exact right or no—but do let the game be fairly played, in a spirit of far-sighted statesmanship. My passion for fairness may carry me too far; but I do want to see a square open deal handed even to a downright deliquent, if you please. Germany will sign, without doubt. What else could she do? But, once more, Germany will be made to sign under duress—this time in the form of a moral compulsion proceeding from a stampeded world opinion.

What a pity that we should have again failed to rise to the full height of our opportunity! My keen disappointment—may it be noted—springs more from my concern for the general welfare of all mankind, and particularly from an apprehension of the baneful effects an oblique course will have upon the victorious nations themselves, than from a sense of pity for the victim. In the long view—in the moral outlook, that is—pity for the wronged is misapplied. The more Germany is trampled under foot, the higher her rebound will some day be in the ripeness of time. By pressing a just cause with wrong measures we cause the host of moral forces to swing over to her side.

It becomes France in particular to heed the lesson of history, and to remember that it was the succession of the repressive strokes of the Napoleonic campaigns which eventually welded the

disparate national fragments into a compact and powerful Germany. The law of compensation works even while we seem to be wideawake.

April, 1924.

THE DAWES PLAN

III

WHAT mainly bothers me about the Dawes proposal is a besetting suspicion that its acceptance by the concerned Powers will not prove a whole-hearted affair. Somehow the note of sincerity does not make itself appreciably felt anywhere.

The general agreement, it strikes me, is largely the result of a realisation that the alternative course of rejection would be more detrimental, especially in the defiance it would denote of world-wide public opinion.

But more specifically: France accepts because the settlement on the basis of the Dawes plan permits her to remain in the Rhur, and endows the occupation with legitimacy. This with France is the main object. While getting a larger amount would seem to be desirable, still it would only cause her own creditors to be more insistent in their claims.

Germany accepts because it provides for a breathing space and because she prefers allied control to French control, and because the loan she is receiving will cause outsiders to take a more tangible interest in her fate.

England accepts because it will tend to restore allied control, and thereby enable her to recoup her erstwhile international prestige, and, incidentally, bring her in a modicum of reparation.

Italy accepts simply because Signor Mussolini

does not believe in sterile gestures, while Belgium accepts because France accepts. And America? America accepts because she doesn't—officially.

In sum, each of the Powers endorses the plan with a background of its own.

But why quibble? We have turned the bad corner, at all events. The wise course is now to press on towards the ever so elusive goal—Peace with Confidence.

We had a non-official commission to investigate the financial aspect—why not have a similar commission to examine the ethical phase?

Nothing is settled lastingly until it is settled wholly.

April, 1924.

THE FALLACY OF DISARMAMENT

DISARMAMENT is again to the fore. The American President and the English Prime Minister both made emphatic pleas for it recently.

Intensely pacific of nature, I am nevertheless inclined to question the present wisdom of any general disarmament movement. Under the prevailing conditions of bitter discord, general disarmament would be not only futile, but a great deal worse than futile. Instead of preventing war, it would facilitate its outbreak. What keeps the discontented nations down to-day is the preponderance in armament of the victor nations. Even an approximation to a proportionate distribution of armed power would at once bring forth a general conflagration.

How prone we are to scratch merely at the surface of problems ! It does not seem to occur to us that a proportional reduction leaves things substantially as they were. All the difference a reduction of the size of standing armies would make is in that of space and time, leaving the true essence of the situation unaltered. A smaller army, in other words, simply would mean, in case of war, less territory invaded and a slower rate of progress in attack. What is primarily needed is to raise the end, and not to reduce the means. With the spirit elevated, the weapons will of themselves drop from our relaxed hands.

France's position in regard to disarmament is logical. With fear as the premise, the clenched fist

is the natural conclusion. But France's alarm is largely self-produced. Her fear is the reflex of her own emotional excesses.

Let no one protest that France's cause is just. That is not the point. Much better were it for her own salvation and the peace of the world if France would press a wrong cause with right measures, than a right cause with wrong measures.

Moral armament before material disarmament.

April, 1924.

ENGLAND'S SETTLEMENT

I ONCE expressed the opinion that it would have served the cause of international stability better if England, instead of settling her debt singlehanded, had urged the United States to institute steps for an all-round settlement. I still hold this view. But looking now at the obverse side of the situation, I find a strong compensatory feature in the fact of England's assuming the burden independently. And for this reason: With M. Poincaré's stubbornly logical stand, any sustained pressure exerted upon France might have resulted into an even greater drasticity towards Germany, all ending in an intractable general disorganisation and chaos. At this England would have withdrawn from the continent of Europe and gradually have drifted into a state of transatlantic engrossment. What has kept England in partnership with wayward Europe is the stringent necessity of trying to recoup part at least of her European claims to offset her tremendous obligation to America. Were it not for that very debt, England would have turned her back completely to Europe, reluctantly indeed from a sense of international fellowship, but compulsorily as a matter of self-conservation. Temperament, expediency, dignity—all would have conspired to induce this course of severation.

Now, imagine Continental Europe left to its own devices!

April, 1924.

THE LESSON OF THE FRENCH ELECTION

IN our appraisement of the pendulum swings of political events we are apt to lay undue stress upon the immediate outward aspect, and to fail to seize the true inward portent.

The victory of the Radicals in the recent French election does not bespeak a triumphant radical temper of the French electorate. It means a dissatisfaction with the regime that prevails. Reactions have their negative and positive aspects. The negative, by its nature, is more or less Radical, as it implies a turning away. But in order that the act, as a whole, be truly radical, the positive phase must be expressive of a fundamental change of endeavour.

This point was strikingly illustrated in England upon the advent of the Labour Government. One hardly perceives a difference from the preceding order. And why? Because in its positive aspect the electoral rebuke did not carry a radical mandate. The English people wanted a change in its leaders, but not in its traditional policy.

Now, it would be rash to assume that the new French Government will come forward with an entirely fresh programme. In some respects it may prove even more onerous in its attitude toward Germany, if only for the sake of balance. The change will be in the tone of the policy. The tone of ruthlessness will be superseded by a spirit of conciliation. Germany must be made to repair the damage; yes, but not by means of a slave-like arrangement, under the lash of a contiguous

military establishment, imposing so much a year with no end in sight, nor any allowance for good behaviour. In dealing with human beings, humane methods only will avail.

All this points to a comprehensive international conference with a view to a reconstruction of the Treaties. If inevitable, why delay? There never will be peace in the affairs of Europe until the provisions and the spirit of those unworkable Treaties are adjusted to the postulates of human nature, and the potentialities of physical fulfilment. Disarmament won't do it; Leagues won't do it; Courts won't do it. Peace begins at the heart, and resides in a conciliatory agreement.

The true meaning of the French election is a demand for peace—a return to normality.

The time for effective action is ripe. Even M. Clemenceau, the celebrated bitter-ender, thought it opportune to release at last his iron grip from the deadly letter of the Versailles Treaty.

Hope once more is beckoning to stricken humanity.

May, 1924.

COOLIDGE

THE one bright ray which illumines the electoral horizon, with its confused issues and vague leaderships, is that which emanates from the personality of Calvin Coolidge. There is such a reassuring, confidence-inspiring touch in his bearing, the combined result of courage, wisdom and faith. Courage Coolidge has shown in his clear-cut vetoes, wisdom he displayed in signing bills not entirely to his liking, and of his abiding faith he has given splendid evidence during the sickening disclosures of corruption, and by the magnificent stand he has taken on the alternative projects of an International Court. The guiding motive of his actions could only have been the welfare of his country, they rang so true. No pride of opinion has he ever manifested, or undue consideration for the interest of his party, but at all times a supreme regard for what is best for the nation.

The country is fortunate in the sure prospect of having a man of this calibre continuing at the helm. Coolidge may not command knowledge as wide and varied as do some others of our national figures, nor as much experience or cleverness. But, far outweighing these in a chief arbiter, is the quality of unaffected poise. True wisdom is calm, as has been well said. Coolidge's unobtrusive nature, with its smooth magnetism, will cause an overwhelming sweep into his orbit. No matter whom the Democratic party may put up to oppose him, or whether there be a Third party in the field, it

will be Coolidge with most of those who place nation above party. Lucky the Republicans, with their unenviable record of inept foreign tinkering, dubious tax and bonus legislation, that they have a Coolidge, and a blessed thing it is for the country that a man of the right stature is to the front at this juncture of world-wide confusion. Coolidge approaches the Lincoln type more closely than has any other occupant of the White House. No brilliancy about him, nor ponderous mental equipment; but he has a fine sense of reality, and a firm but flexible power of determination. A true American type, in his every fibre. Observe him during the tenure on his own.

May, 1924.

AUTHORITY

ONE is pitied, or else overwhelmed with derision, in these days of ultra-enlightenment, if one comes forward with a plea for authority. A bigot, or even a "moron," a person is pronounced for putting faith in what by its nature excludes the suggestion of antecedence. There is no such thing as ultimacy, science avers. All things must arrange themselves in line, and await their turn in the endless procession of causal linkage.

It would lead me too far afield, were I to enter into a metaphysical discussion on this point, even if I had the ability to undertake the task. But, perhaps, a hint might suffice. If, then, the concept of an initiating cause is a figment, then the concept of authorship is unreal. Well is it? It is the only thing truly real. The creative act is the deed of eminence.

Now, the basis of authority is authorship. One's authority in a given sphere has the logical warrant in being thereof the author. I recall, some twenty years ago, when submitting Loyalty as the highest virtue, and defining it "as regard for authority," I thus spelled the word: Author-ity, in order to convey intuitively the thought in my mind, without detailed explanation. Regard for Authority I termed the religious attitude, distinguishing it from "regard for others" which is the Ethical attitude, and from "regard for ourselves" which is the Economic attitude. Egoism, Altruism, Loyalism—respectively.

In the sphere of human relationship there are

three cardinal forms of authority. The Family, the State, Humanity. By the Family I mean a state, by the State I mean a family, and by Humanity I mean the unity of universal kinship. The Family is the typic form of organic association, resulting from the union of complementaries; the State is the specific affiliation of these organic units; Humanity is the generic alliance of all mankind. From an evolutionary viewpoint the family constitutes Assimilation; the State Differentiation; Humanity, Integration.

To these three forms of Authority, the highest regard is due. Any being wanting in this respect is not a true human being. The element of sublimity is absent. The curve of one's being is not turned upward. Authority is the keystone of the whole moral structure. Animals have no moral feelings, because they have no appreciation of authority. Moral feeling arises from a sense of responsibility, and this postulates the existence of Authority.

What is the central trouble of the world to-day? Contempt for Authority. This is true of individuals as it is true of social groups, and even true of nations. We are puzzled to find the motive in the gruesome murder case of the two Chicago youths. There was no motive. Acts of deviltry are devoid of motive. Unmoral disposition is at the root of the act. The absence of loyalty in their make-up, a non-regard for authority, breeding a spirit of recklessness and irresponsibility is the prime explanation of the bestial misdeed. What is the trouble with Bolshevism, or any other of the various forms of social anarchism? This mainly—con-

tempt for authority. And indeed, what is the matter with the generality of the nations themselves? They possess proper self-regard, they observe a decorous consideration for the right of others, but their sense of international solidarity is atrophied—they lack woefully a regard for authority in its supreme form—Humanity. The frontiers of their territories are the boundaries of their loyalty.

Once more: Regard for Authority is the supreme requisite in the human being. Not Love is the greatest thing in the world; nor even charity is the consummate manifestation of human conduct. It is loyalty—regard for Authority. Love does, indeed, make the wheels of life go round; charity does soften the asperities and raise up the fallen; but that which holds it all together, gives continuity to the whole, and endows it with meaning is Loyalty. Devotion, I mean, to that which generates and sustains our spiritual existence, acquiescence in that which is superior, reverence for that in which we live and move and have our being.

June, 1924.

PRACTICAL IDEALIST

SENATOR BURTON, in his nominating speech at the Republican Convention in Cleveland eulogised President Coolidge as a Practical Idealist.

Somewhat in the manner of Pontius Pilate, the ever-alert Arthur Brisbane at once puts the question—What is a Practical Idealist? And, with his usual nonchalance, follows it up with an offer to the readers of his daily appearing comments on current events, captioned To-day, of a prize for the best definition, in ten words, of this seemingly contrary designation.

How would this do—One who in his aspirations reckons with Time and Place?

June, 1924

THAT FATAL TREATY

LET us be open and sincere. The Treaty concluded at Versailles cannot stand. Nothing short of a thorough re-making of the Treaty, the whole series of Treaties, will avail. Of this I am convinced with the full intensity of my conscious being. Am I pessimistic? Then it is pessimistic to warn one who is proceeding in the wrong direction that he will never reach his destination. The structure of the Versailles Treaty was erected upon a shifting, treacherous base, and it is bound to fall.

Indeed the Treaty is already crumbling. If the Dawes Committee had any meaning, it is that it exercised the function properly belonging to the Reparations Commission. If the present London Conference has any meaning, it is that it exercises the function properly belonging to the League. The logic of events proved superior to the logic of the human brain.

Supposing now we do at last bow to the inevitable, and frankly agree that the menacing structure be demolished—then what? The whole problem centres in the adoption of the right attitude. Peace can't be made with a warlike pose. Therein lies the gist of the solution. Let once the nations convene with the spirit of peace dominant, and all will prove plain sailing. The spirit is the determinant—always. I realise that facts are stubborn things, and can't be thrown down, as if they never were. The Treaty, such as it is, has hardened into a fact, and it can't be peremptorily done away

with. The newly-created nations, for example, could not be induced to surrender their hard-won independent statehood. But, then, they gained this autonomy so as to free them from the shackles of oppression. It would come with ill grace from these nations, under this aspect, to resist an offer of reunion which will preserve their nationality and its attendant political freedom. Moreover, experience must have brought it home to all these nations by this time that none can prosper in separation. Economically it is ruinous, politically dangerous.

Again, security, the chief concern of the nations which have gained territorial accretions and derived other benefits from the Treaty—security also can only be achieved through union. And by union in this connection I mean nothing less than a League of Nations. But let such organisation be devised not on Utopian lines, but in conformity to earthly realities. And what are these realities? For one thing, the nations of Europe are consumed with a perpetual fear and distrust of each other. Well, common sense would indicate that they come together, arrive at a just and harmonious understanding, and enter into a *Contrat Social* among themselves for their mutual protection, capped by an International Tribunal of Arbitration. The existence and recognition of such a court of adjudication implicitly outlaws war, as the use of force would have to have the sanction of the court; in like manner, as the resort to arms by the police and the militia in domestic affairs becomes legitimate only in cases of emergency and when sanctioned by the duly constituted authorities. The salvation

of Europe lies in its co-operative self-organisation. No other nation, or group of nations, outside the European system can render any direct assistance, if for no other reason than lack of intimate understanding and remoteness of interest. It is sheer mockery and, if solicited, should be regarded as an encroachment for Japan or even America to sit around the same council-table to discuss and determine differences of a specific European character. Their part should consist of arbitral ministrations. Such adjustive and proportional arrangement would be the logical method ; and, alone, would prove workable and beneficial. America is eager to help ; more so, as Mr. Hughes pointed out in his brief interview upon his arrival in London, than she is generally given credit for ; but America objects to being enmeshed in the tangled affairs of Europe. America's desire to help has borne the proportions of extreme generosity all along, even of outright sacrifice. I am of the confident belief that if the Versailles Treaty had been framed on genuine peace-lines, and America had been properly approached, she would have been willing to cancel the whole European indebtedness, especially that of France, for sentimental reasons, and even that of England, on grounds of fairness. But France preferred to forgo the benefit of generosity, so as not to be expected to show generosity on her part.

By all means, I say, let us have a League of Nations, but one with a League of Europe as its groundwork.

And now a few words about Reparations. Germany is to pay to the limit of her capacity. Whether

she provoked the war or not, she lost it. The loser is to pay the cost. Put it up to Germany in this way, and she will understand ; and, what is more, she will freely agree. But it is revolting to the most rudimentary sense of fairness to compel Germany to sign a confession of guilt, and on that basis found the claim to reparations. Such a procedure might have fitted in with the spirit that prevailed in the days of the Spanish Inquisition, but not with that at this stage of advanced civilisation. We would not tolerate the practice in our criminal courts, even in the case of a downright, irreclaimable profligate. The idea is abhorrent, and yet, as Mr. Lloyd George averred, the whole scheme of reparations rests on Germany's signed admission of guilt.

One thing more and I am done. Soon after the outbreak of the war, in September, 1914, while all belligerents were still busily protesting their innocence, and disclaiming all responsibility for starting the war, I wrote suggesting : Get Together. At this day, when all attest their good-will, and are disclaiming responsibility for the non-realisation of peace, I suggest : Stand Together.

None of us is without faults. We all partake in varying degrees of the common human frailties. We love and we hate. We love because we are loved ; we hate because we are hated. But often one's hate takes a form different from that which evoked it, and we fail to view it in the light of a natural reaction. We then regard it as unprovoked, and hate the more intensely in consequence. Europe is caught in the clutches of a vicious circle. Nothing can break the fatal spell but a liberal

outpouring of the spirit of humility and sacrifice. National self-regard is good, but it is good only if held in subordination to the regard for humanity.

July, 1924.

THE SEARCH FOR A FORMULA

I CONFESS to only a moderate interest in the proceedings of the London Conference now in progress. Being convinced that the European disorder calls for an intensive treatment, I cannot get myself to feel elated over the application of remedies, which are merely external and topical.

But, then, the removal or even the diminution of distracting and baneful symptoms cannot fail to exert a wholesome reflex influence upon the central seat of the trouble itself. So why not fall in line and smile, rather than stand off and grumble.

The Conference commenced its work in an atmosphere of optimism. This is but what might be expected, for to come together to take common counsel is naturally prompted by a desire to reach an amicable agreement. That's why I have always harboured a tender spot for Conferences. Permanent assemblies do tend to grow mechanistic and stale.

Everything went forward smoothly in the first sittings, until a succession of stern realities were encountered. The knottiest snag, thus far, has proved the financial feature of the Dawes Plan. Business is severely bent to steer clear of sentiment. To prevent a breakdown, the hunt for a formula was set afoot—a formula which was to satisfy preconceived susceptibilities, and to meet the exigencies of a successful floating of the proposed loan.

Here is an equation of the conflicting factors as it presents itself to my mind.

The Reparations Commission is to remain the body to decide on the question of defaults. This would be in accordance with the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. To be sure, it would be advisable to reconstruct the membership of the Commission so as to impart to it the grace of impartiality, which would gain for its decrees universal moral support. But it is the Reparations Commission which is to pronounce on all matters pertaining to Reparations and defaults thereon.

On the other hand, all matters relative to the loan itself—flotation, operation and safeguarding—are to be gathered up within the province of a Commission specially created for that purpose. If it be the proper course, that the Reparations Commission should be left in full charge as to affairs germane to its sphere, it is equally the just and proper thing, that all business connected with the management of the loan be in the care and under the supervision of a distinct Finance Committee.

The Reparations Commission thus pronounces upon points of default, and determines upon the sanctions to be taken; whereas the determination as to whether the compulsory steps are prejudicial to the loan is to be the function of the Finance Committee. If the Committee finds that the sanctions do jeopardise the safety of the loan, the Powers involved in the procedure are to be held liable. It should be, therefore, distinctly stipulated in the agreement that the Allied Powers, by any adverse action taken, singly, jointly or collectively, qualify by that act, *ipso facto*, as guarantors of the loan.

Two things should be borne in mind. First,

that the loan is purely a financial transaction, and bears no organic relation to the Versailles Treaty. It is an outside deal, pure and simple. In order to ensure its success, the loan should be left unmixed with any other of the phases of the situation. It is well to remember that the general public does not make its investments on grounds of philanthropy and peace loving. There would indeed be a number of high-minded people ready to subscribe the loan, but with these the subscription would be more in the nature of a donation to the cause of humanity.

Second, that the loan, while ostensibly tendered to Germany, is really intended to be passed on to the Allies. Even the part planned as Germany's share has for its basis the purpose to enable Germany to fulfil the obligations imposed upon her. Thus, in strict analysis, the immediate and ultimate beneficiares are the Allied Powers. They, therefore, should not expect the international money market to shoulder the sole responsibility, while themselves refraining from assuming any risk whatsoever. I venture to say that were it not for the prevalent distrust with which people everywhere have come to regard diplomatic understandings, it would have been the natural course for the Allied Powers categorically to guarantee the loan. But the delegates knew that the action would not be ratified.

However, I maintain that a contingent guarantee answers the purpose equally as well. The German assets are deemed amply adequate. The only danger lies in the inroad that might be made upon the availability and productivity of these assets. All that is required, consequently, is to provide

against such eventuality by establishing the principle of contingent responsibility.

Incidentally, the recognition of this principle of contingent guarantee would have a wonderful restraining effect upon any precipitate course of compulsory action.

A Formula to be evenly operative must be accurately correlated to the actual situation. It must be rational and adaptive, else it is apt to remain suspended in the air.

July, 1924.

Note.—Since this writing, the French Formula made its appearance, and has been accepted by the Conference. Good. In all probability it will work out well. But it is a compound, not a true equation. It is rooted in stark expediency, and not in the logic of the situation.

THE LONDON CONFERENCE

NOT to feel a flicker, at least, of hope over the outcome of the London Conference is to evince despair of human actions. True ; the Agreement is gaping with voids, and gasping with strains. But the acting will was under a super-heavy handicap. It is the manner of a cynic to fix his eye upon the flaws, in complete disregard of circumstances, and turn away with a scornful gesture. Leave him alone. The wiser and more wholesome attitude ever is to grasp a situation in its entirety, and note the tendency.

The tendency is in the right direction, that of conciliation ; albeit not sufficiently resolute. The organic weakness, indeed, of the agreement is its timidity. But no rigid insistence upon rights any more. Instead, an assertion of rights suffused with a dawning sense of higher duties. The start is good. The great question facing us now is—whether the tendency will deepen and solidify or waver and flatten out. I strongly fear that the new spirit may not long maintain its ascendency. My apprehension is based upon the insecurity of tenure, everywhere, of the bearers of the new spirit ; and upon the still graver circumstance of the wayward undercurrents flowing both from the as yet unchannelled regions, the newly created zones ; and the unregularised regions, the disrupted zones. These adverse currents combined are bound to retard and divert and even check the steady cumulative forward sweep of the movement.

The Conference has dealt only with a portion

of the situation, let us not forget; and with that in a purely material fashion. The spiritual equilibrium of Europe remains still unrestored. The Conference, in brief, has attacked merely the symptoms—the facts; but has left untouched the substance—the truth.

We shall have more conferences, undoubtedly; but they will all point a palsied finger to the source of the original iniquity—the Versailles Treaty. Let us not falter in our hopes, in spite of all; but we must not allow our hopes to lull us into a false sense of contentment. Better, far better, in the long run, would it have been to come to no agreement, and to let the fury of things, the inexorable pressure of events beat out a solution, than that the agreement be not made a stepping-stone leading to a higher, comprehensive, equitable settlement. Blind pressure rather than illusive tension.

The conscience of Europe will not be at rest, and its soul at ease, as long as the treatments of the problem continue to be sporadic and palliative —yes, until from our brows shall be blotted out that fateful V.

August, 1924.

THE GENEVA TRIUMPH

I FEEL some hesitancy in offering any criticism on the Geneva achievements, as I do not want to appear bent upon fault-finding. But restraint is not always commendable.

Mr. MacDonald expressed himself deeply gratified at the progress made. Public opinion generally seems to share this sentiment. I beg leave to dissent.

What was really accomplished ? We were treated to some bright definitions, in the first place. "The aggressor is the party to a dispute who refuses to submit to arbitration." What if neither of the disputants wants to arbitrate? An ordinary street fight between two individuals, even if they be unevenly matched, sufficiently illustrates the point. Moreover, on the strength of the definition, Germany might contend that the Allies were the true aggressors ; for it was they who persistently declined to entertain President Wilson's mediation offers. Nor is it, indeed, impossible, upon further reflection, although, in a true spirit, not probable, that, fifty years from now, the historian may actually, when assessing the war guilt, distinguish between those who started the war, and those who insisted upon continuing it to the bitter end.

Another definition : "Arbitration is justice without passion." Excellent. In a class-room none could be better ; but for practical purposes it is like painting the lily.

Security was not defined, but merely described.

" Security must be divided between inner and outer." But why introduce " inner " into relations international? As if any self-respecting nation would brook outside regulation of its own domestic affairs, even if such friendly foreign interposition should prove of efficient service! As for a definition—*Security is Mutuality*.

Now, let us take a glimpse beneath the surface of glittering generalities. Nothing tangible greets our inspection. Ah, if M. Herriot had left the hall arm in arm with Dr. Marx, *that* would have been something worthy to record in letters of gold! The differences between members of the Entente are of secondary importance. Of prime significance are the differences obtaining between the up-nations and the down-nations.

The real problem which confronts the world is: Shall the victorious nations keep armed for ever in fear of revenge, or shall they agree to a negotiated treaty with their unappeased enemies? We may shout peace, peace—but unless the spirit of peace be held in common, there will be no peace. The real Peace Treaty is yet to be concluded! Germany and Russia may not be *of* our world; but they are *in* our world. Consequently, we cannot well leave them out of our reckoning, whether this suits us or not.

Here, then, is the choice: Hold together or fall together!

September, 1924.

A LAYMAN'S PEACE PLAN

NOTE

THE present attempt is substantially as it was submitted to the Bok Award Committee. In its outlines it stands now broader, fuller also in details, with two sections added. But the central idea remains intact; and the original staccato structure preserved.

A PRACTICABLE PLAN BY WHICH THE UNITED STATES MAY CO-OPERATE WITH OTHER NATIONS TO ACHIEVE AND PRESERVE THE PEACE OF THE WORLD

SITUATION

THE first step in the consideration of any question is to establish the facts of the case, to ascertain the underlying conditions.

What are the conditions that confront us as we approach in a sympathetic, helpful spirit the case of Europe? We find the continent of Europe covered with units of population, living in close proximity, each with its own deeply cherished tradition, each with its sharply differentiated racial characteristics, each with distinct national ideals. Thus, with frontiers adjoining, with business pursuits crossing, with modes of life, language and customs differing, it is inevitable that friction between them should arise. It is the accumulation of the unadjusted residua of successive frictions which periodically breaks forth in armed clashes

—war. Europe is a hot-bed of animosities, always has been. With most of the nations of Europe the military equipment is not an instrument of defence, but of aggression. The army with the European peoples is still regarded from the angle of its primal combative origin. It has grown into a time-honoured institution ; forming part and parcel of the inmost corporate life, just as the Church does in its way, or the School System. The peoples of Europe are born to their enmity of the neighbouring nations —even glory in their antagonisms ! That's the situation " over there."

PROBLEM

How is this European situation to be met ? How are the animosities and dissensions to be composed, if they assume a threatening form ? In order that help be effective, responsiveness to its administration must be present. How then can America produce a relationship between the nations forming the continent of Europe, which will render Europe amenable to extra-continental assistance ?—that's the problem.

SOLUTION

Seeing that the nations of Europe have no genuinely sympathetic ties between them, all living at cross purposes with one another, there is only one avenue of approach open ; and that is the tie of their common humanity. Upon this aspect the appeal must be made, reinforced by considerations of a wider perspective of their own self-interest, showing that a spirit of mutual helpfulness pays even in the economic field.

A LAYMAN'S PEACE PLAN

My plan for the co-operation of America in the affairs of Europe is as follows: Let the United States of America submit a memorandum to the nations of Europe and suggest to them that they organise for purposes of mutual protection against each other's warlike attacks. This organisation is not to affect their national autonomy in the slightest, each nation yielding no more than the other, on the give-and-take basis. If the nations agree so to organise into a higher unity, to be styled, let us say, the Union of the Nations of Europe, America agrees to act the part of sponsor to it. That is to say, America stands ready to underwrite the aim and operation of such organisation.

Under this plan America is to become a charter-member of the European League. And America's function should be to serve as a neutral zone of equilibration. For this purpose an appropriate medium should be created, to be composed of representative men of international reputation. This body is not to act as umpire possessing the power of final decision, unless specifically thus designated in certain definite instances, but that of recommendation and moral suasion. The method of appointing this tribunal of conciliation is a matter of detail, and could easily be worked out satisfactorily. The body might be composed, we will say, of about twelve members, these to be either named by the President of the United States with the consent of the Senate, and approved by the League, or else named by the President of the League with the consent of the League, and approved by the President of the United States and Senate jointly.

ARGUMENT

America cannot logically or feasibly enter into any straight-out political association with the states of Europe. It should be borne in mind that America is a distinct continent, as well as a separate state. There is a large amount of sound reasoning behind the contention of the isolationists that America should stand apart and not allow herself to be tangled up in the affairs of the nations of Europe. Their thoughts indeed are not our thoughts, their desires not our desires, their aims not our aims. Only impractical visionaries could put faith in a scheme of a close-knit political fellowship between America and Europe. But, while I agree with the contention that America should not mix up with the affairs of Europe, I most emphatically dissent from the motives upon which the attitude of isolation is based, and the consequent policy of national self-absorption. America is part of mankind, and all that concerns mankind should concern America. None must shirk the burdens of humanity. The only question should be how to render our service rational and effective. It is my deliberate conviction that America's association with Europe on the basis of a close relationship would be of benefit to none, but rather be productive of all-round mischief. Our direct and active participation in a joint organisation would not be to the advantage of the European nations themselves, as the weight of our presence and the disparity of our interests would disarrange the complexion of that body. Moreover, our direct and equal membership along with the others, would render the organisation

thus formed lacking in organic quality. There must be integration as well as co-ordination in a system, else we get a mere mechanism which is at the mercy of the tangential play of events. The League of Nations for example as planned at Versailles, was a Utopian product, in the nature of things. It did not possess the structural quality that makes for solidity and permanence. There being nothing to balance the parts, the framework was bound to fall apart in time under the steady pressure of centrifugal influences. We can easily realise the truth of this statement if we picture to ourselves the individual States composing the United States of America as leagued together without the integrating action of the Federal Constitution.

I am quite aware that the offer of a restricted relationship might savour of condescension on the part of America. And yet it need not, if it be properly presented. The case is that Europe is in a state of distraction and strife, and that America comes forward with a plan of assistance. There is nothing unusual or far-fetched in such an approachment. One's duty to others who are in trouble does not demand that one assume the trouble, but assist to remove the trouble. If differences envelop our fellow-beings the rational course is not to identify ourselves, or mix in, with such differences, but to aid in composing them. This seems not to be much, but it is enough, and enough is better than much. To dress a wounded leg is less of a sacrifice, than to break our own leg out of sympathy, and in order to make things look even—but it alone answers the purpose.

WHAT IS TRUTH?

SUMMARY

The peace of the world hinges on Europe. Whether the trouble starts in Europe's own continent, or whether it arises in any other part of the world, the moving factor in it is some European power.

If Europe desires peace, a way could be found to assist her in achieving and preserving it. If Europe does not want peace, no outside power can insure it to her.

For my part, I make no doubt that Europe does want peace. The tempering currents of Civilisation have not left the mental state of Europe entirely unaffected. The difficulty with Europe is its hardened war-habit. Always war has been resorted to as the method of settling outstanding differences, until now Europe finds it wellnigh impossible to organise itself on a peace basis. This is why America's co-operation becomes imperative.

The co-operation of America, however, should not take the form of a direct association, but one which is indirect or mediate. Thus, the nations of Europe are to form among themselves a League, with America as the integrator. In cases where no satisfactory agreement can be reached, America might be approached to assist in the settlement. In this way only can and should America be related to the affairs of Europe. And it is the way best calculated to lead to a stable result. America standing outside the sphere of interest could act with impartiality; her judgment, therefore, would have moral strength, and enlist the support of world-wide public opinion. Moral influence, duly

organised, could be made indeed a power that would be irresistible.

Disputes there will always be. Conflict is imbedded in the texture of things. Strife can never be eliminated; it can only be adjusted and balanced. But in order that the process of adjustment and the act of balancing be rendered effective it is essential that these two functions be not concentrated in the same body. The members of the European League are, then, to do the adjusting themselves, and America is to do the balancing. I am convinced that by this arrangement a stable peace could be effected. No dissenting nation would dare to challenge the concerted opinion of the world which would follow in the wake of the impartial pronouncement of America. Even if America should only give moral backing to its attitude it would prove to be sufficient. But she might bring into play diplomatic severance, economic pressure and such like agencies, if absolutely necessary.

Such an arrangement would be in accord with American tradition—with its historic policy as emphasised in the Monroe Doctrine of continental differentiation, with its deep-seated sense of Humanitarian solidarity, and with its typical mode of action of helping others to help themselves. And such arrangement would also be most consistent with the dignity of Europe itself. Europe for Europe, as America for America, while all for all.

Let there then be a League of Nations of Europe, with America as a "non-resident," sustaining member, performing the function of a compensating balance-wheel.

DISCUSSION

1. Let it at once be admitted that this plan is not precise or thorough or definitive. It is indeed replete with shortcomings. But, then, no full-fledged plan can ever be hatched out by the human brain, nor would it prove steadily operative if such a feat were possible, in view of the ever-changing course of events. The essential thing in the formulation of a plan is that the controlling idea be sound and expansive. Those who clamour for a world-embracing plan, minutely worked out and nicely adjusted, had best leave such consummation to the gradual process of Evolution. The Universe itself is still in the making.

2. Let it also readily be conceded that the plan is rather lopsided. But that is largely owing to the diversity of the situations. What are the facts? The European nations cannot manage to get along with each other peaceably; while America, on the other hand, is practically free of such misfortune. Now, America desires to lend a helping hand, but she insists to do it upon her own terms; above all, in a manner that would not get her involved in the European dissensions. But, some will protest, America should not maintain such an attitude of reserve. Perhaps not; but that is not the point. Circumstances surrounding America's position being what they are, the only practical question is: Should a qualified assistance be accepted; or, being qualified, be dispensed with? To stand out for what ought to be, and, in the meantime, spurn anything that falls short of that, is hardly the part of wisdom.

The unilateral character of the plan is unavoidable. The seemingly patronising part which it assigns to America, always attaches to an act of rendering help. Thus when the nations of Europe tried to help Austria to get on her feet, their action was suffused with an air of superiority. *That* can't be helped.

3. The plan cavalierly brushes aside the present League as if it were not ? This it does for the good and sufficient reason that the League has signally failed of its primary object to maintain peace. An organ which fails to function at the moment of greatest need, is not entitled to serious consideration. Are we to forget the League's impotent conduct in the Corfu incident ? Or its general helpless attitude toward the Ruhr occupation ? Or its inane aloofness in the Greco-Turk debacle ? The notable performances of the League in such humanitarian, non-controversial matters, as the White Slave Traffic, the Opium Trade, or even the rendering of effective first aid—or, more properly, last aid—to a prostrate nation are no true credit items. Mussolini's one wave of the hand outbalances the values of the entire list as composers of peace.

4. The adherents of the League will resist any attempt looking to its demolition ? Let the League not be scrapped, but reconstructed on the principle of diversified structurisation. It will never operate effectively as at present constituted. Nor beneficially, either. Consider the Versailles Conference itself. It may sound paradoxical—as the American delegation unquestionably strove to exert a moderating influence—but I venture to say that the treaty

makers would never have indulged in such fiendish severity, if America had stood in the background, to be reckoned with. America's presence and active participation endowed the Conference with a sense of finality that caused it to act without all feeling of responsibility.

5. The plan is not sufficiently comprehensive ? True. I quite realise the possibility of complications of an interlocking character arising, which might affect equally the United States. But these are not troubles of a chronic nature, and are not likely to assume violent proportions. Easily in a world of an otherwise peaceful atmosphere a mode of settlement could be devised by creating an impartial body of arbitration adapted to such cases of transitory occurrence.

6. The plan is crude ? Its crudity has already been admitted. In the exact form in which it is presented it cannot be accepted. But the substance. the central idea, is what counts, and might be worth considering. It is : *Association with Differentiation* The Isolationists want Differentiation without Association. But this means Separation —impossible in a world which is one and inseparable. The Leaguers want Association without Differentiation. But this means Coalition—unfeasible in a world where Diversity goes hand in hand with Unity. Both elements are prime requisites in a healthy combination—Association as well as Differentiation. Together they produce a state of relationship which alone carries utility, duration and safety—a state which, in the true sense, embodies the transcendent idea—Co-operation.

A LAYMAN'S PEACE PLAN

POSTSCRIPT

Misgivings assail me as I ponder my plan. It is called practicable. And so it may be regarded, if the underlying idea is, as I believe it to be, rational and adaptive. But, it occurs, that for an idea, be it ever so judicious, to operate effectively, to become a working reality, the field of actuality must not only be conformable, but receptive. A seed may be sound ; but, for it to strike root and to grow, the soil must be fertile.

Now the existing conditions of Europe as created by the Peace Treaties present a barren, rocky, forbidding field. Nothing fruitful can be effected, until this situation is remedied—the ground cleared and the atmosphere sweetened. Upon a treacherous foundation no lasting structure can be reared. Germany may join and assent, Russia too, Hungary also, and all the other malcontent nations ; but it is not within human nature that such assent should flow from the fullness of their being. As long as man is man, his actions in the mass are bound to be determined not by will, nor even by reason, but by emotion. Much more to a nation, infinitely dearer, is its tradition around which its sentiments cluster, than all progress with its intellectual appeal.

It is my firm conviction that no workable peace plan can, by any human possibility, be devised under the prevailing circumstances. We may talk peace, profess peace, vow peace ; but, unless peace be in our hearts,—there can and will be no peace. The Treaties *must* be revised, if there is ever to be again peace in Europe, with any degree of

permanency. Let us cease to entertain any delusion on this score. I am not unmindful of the almost insuperable obstacles that block the path to a revision; but the task is not above the ingenuity of the human mind. The territorial stipulations it would perhaps be impossible now to recast without confounding the confusion. Be this granted. But the spirit can be, and it alone is what needs to be rectified.

And how? Let a sober second-thought general conference be convened, whose first and foremost business it should be *to make the principle of self-determination work both ways*. That's all. If Magyars should not dominate Slovaks and Roumanians, neither should Slovaks and Roumanians dominate Magyars. If it be only just and fair that France repossess the provinces which are wound up with her national aspirations, the same principle of equity demands that Germany be not made to fall a prey to France in what constitutes an integral part of Germany's national existence. This is what I mean by a rectification of the spirit. Nothing very subtle or recondite about that, I imagine.

With the spirit rightly set the original processes of subtraction and division, so to speak, should be substituted by the broader processes of summation and equation. And as the outcome of such statesmanlike *modus operandi*, there might be established primarily a regional association of the nations most closely related, historically, geographically and economically. None would lose, while all would gain by such a rearrangement.

The most urgent need of Europe is the creation of larger political and economic units. Europe, in

other words, has to be de-Balkanised by the setting up of systems of federation. In that way only can the elementary causes of friction and hate and unrest be removed. Its provincialism, its narrowly drawn tribal spirit, still hearkening back to the days of the Middle Ages, is the bane of Europe. To this phase of the problem should be given the first care.

Regional association, before all. Then let there be a continental association of all the nations of Europe for their reciprocal safety and mutual welfare. And, finally, an inter-continental association, on the basis of their common humanity, of all the nations of the world, for the safeguarding of the interests of all mankind.

Association, yes ; but with Differentiation.

The Westminster Press
411a Harrow Road
London W.9