WHERE FREEDOM FALTERS

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BY

THE AUTHOR OF

THE POMP OF POWER

"A people must be very rich before it can afford the luxury of democratic institutions."

ANATOLE FRANCE

LONDON

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

1927

First Published in 1927

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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

PREFACE

WHEN *The Pomp of Power* was published anonymously, it was suggested that this was a publisher's device for arousing interest. It is, I think, due to the publishers to say that the anonymity was a stipulation upon which I had insisted. It may have proved profitable to them, but they were in no way responsible for it. Nor was it any idea of gain which actuated me in imposing that condition. Indeed, in that respect I had no interest in the success of the work, since before it was printed I had already sold all my rights. I did, however, desire the book to be judged upon its merits. I neither wished nor believed that the anonymity would be long preserved. Had I desired it to be absolute I should have taken more care to cover my tracks. But I thought that it might last such time as was necessary for the critics to make their various pronouncements.

The reviews, taken as a whole, were, in my opinion, quite as favourable as the book deserved. Even had they been otherwise, I should, of course, have nothing to say in rebuttal. But an error of fact falls in a different category; and I take this opportunity of correcting the only one which, to my knowledge, was made by any critic.

It is, I am sure, the legitimate ambition of anyone who writes a book to obtain the approbation of the *Manchester Guardian*. But I could not hope that the views which I happen to hold upon political and kindred subjects would find me any favour in the sight of that great newspaper. In the result I was treated more

leniently than I had, perhaps, any right to expect. But I was surprised, as well as sorry, to read that "The very index of *The Pomp of Power* is redolent of animosity towards Haig. 'Fails Lanrezac' is the first entry, whereas the writer elsewhere admits that the alleged 'Failing' was an act of obedience to Sir John French."

I was surprised because I thought any reviewer would know that an author rarely, if ever, compiles the index, or even sees it before publication. It may be possible to argue that he ought to do so; but the fact remains that in practice he does not. When I first received copies of *The Pomp of Power* I observed a number of errors in the index, and immediately called the attention of the publishers to its many imperfections. But I was astonished to learn that it was necessary to tell any reviewer where the responsibility lay. I need hardly add that whatever his sins of commission or omission (and they were manifold), it is grotesque to imagine that the compiler of the index harboured any malice against Lord Haig. The head and front of his offending was that he wanted to earn a few guineas too quickly.

I was sorry to read the comment I have quoted, because it showed that the critic who wrote it gave me no credit for possessing even a vestige of common sense. According to his own statement, made in all seriousness, after writing in the text that "Haig (acting under French's orders) did not give him (Lanrezac) the support which he had conditionally offered," and even going to the extent of explaining in a footnote that Lanrezac, while objurgating French, added: "Of course, I never thought that General Haig, a true gentleman and a real soldier, was responsible,"[1] I deliberately contradicted this in the index, so as to make it appear that Lord Haig was at fault. I should imagine that anyone acting that way

[1] See *The Pomp of Power*, p. 53.

might reasonably be considered demented rather than malicious.

Lady Oxford and Asquith, in the *Autobiography of Margot Asquith*, has written: "In a book, entitled *The Pomp of Power*, which I have just received, I find a wholly erroneous account of what occurred in December 1916. On page 155 I read: 'Asquith came back on Sunday; and that afternoon the Unionist members of the Government wrote him that they resigned if Lloyd George did. In fact, they did send in their resignations, but withdrew them when Asquith replied that the matter raised by Lloyd George was not settled.'

"None of Mr. Asquith's colleagues resigned, nor did a single member of them write to him. No one was more surprised than his Unionist colleagues when they were summoned to a meeting, suddenly and unexpectedly called on Sunday, the 3rd of December—to which Lord Lansdowne was not invited. We were subsequently told that the written decision taken at that meeting was torn up on its way to 10, Downing Street; all that we received was a verbal message to the effect that some of the colleagues wished the Prime Minister to resign." [1]

In brief, I stated that the Unionist members of the Government met, and sent Mr. Asquith their resignations, but subsequently withdrew them. Lady Oxford and Asquith's account is that at the meeting in question a letter was written, of which she does not state the contents; but that it was torn up by those who were bringing it to Downing Street, and that instead, Mr. Asquith was told verbally that some of his colleagues wished him to resign. I might point out that all of Mr. Asquith's Unionist colleagues could not have been (and, indeed, I venture to state as a matter of fact that they were not) so surprised as is alleged at being called to

[1] See *The Autobiography of Margot Asquith*, vol. ii. p. 246.

this Sunday meeting to consult with each other; for the meeting was necessarily summoned by some of these very colleagues themselves. Nevertheless, if Lady Oxford and Asquith thinks there is any substantial divergence between these two accounts, I do not hesitate to accept hers as being the more accurate. However, I am myself unable to see that there is any real difference; and would not consider it worth while to refer to the matter were it not that Lady Oxford and Asquith apparently regards it as being of some importance. For when her "Autobiography," previous to its appearance in book form, was published in the columns of a Sunday newspaper, she added to the part I have quoted a rather bold assertion to the effect that those who made such mistakes in writing of political events must have obtained their information from the servants' hall. Lady Oxford and Asquith chose to ignore that my relation of what I happened to know about this period (and I made no claim that my knowledge was at all exhaustive) was obtained from day to day, as events occurred, from two people, one of whom, a member of Mr. Asquith's Cabinet, I repeatedly named—Mr. Walter Long, afterwards Viscount Long of Wraxall. But it was characteristic alike of Lady Oxford and Asquith's courage and of her indiscretion that she should have been so daring as to manufacture a cap to be worn by writers guilty of errors of fact: for surely no responsible person in this generation has been obliged to make so many retractions, and to submit to so many contradictions as Lady Oxford and Asquith herself. I may add, that I did not see any good reason to accept a suggestion, pressed upon me at the time, that I should then controvert in the Press what Lady Oxford and Asquith had written, in order to increase the sale of another book of mine which was to appear soon thereafter. But I wondered then, and still

have some idle curiosity, as to why this infinitesimal difference should have excited such an outburst of ire.

Lady Oxford and Asquith is on firmer ground when, in speaking of Mr. Balfour's defection, she says: "Mr. Lloyd George could never have formed his Government in the December of 1916 had Mr. Balfour or the Labour Leaders refused to join it. It is at least probable that neither Lord Curzon, Lord Robert Cecil, Mr. Walter Long, nor Mr. Austen Chamberlain would have served under the present Prime Minister if their old chief had stood out at that moment, and I doubt if Mr. Bonar Law or Sir Edward Carson, even with the assistance of a large part of the Press, could have succeeded in the task." [1]

I had myself written: "The most essential point was to obtain the support of Mr. Bonar Law. Although perhaps even that might not have sufficed to carry the day had not Mr. Balfour also deserted Mr. Asquith." [2]

As I do not propose to return to this subject later, I will venture to make some digression here. Lady Oxford and Asquith is, I think, undoubtedly correct in her conjecture in so far as it refers to Mr. Walter Long. I had, subsequent to a lengthy conversation with Mr. Long, written him the following day, as he had requested, regarding the whole situation. I stated that it appeared to be too late for any of the remedies he had suggested; that the movement in favour of Mr. Lloyd George seemed certain to succeed; and that those Unionist Leaders who did not declare themselves in time would lose office. I was told the next day—a Saturday—that Mr. Long had greatly resented the bluntness with which I had defined the issue. It happened that I had already arranged to motor on Sunday with him and one other person to Esher, where a War Office organization was

[1] See *The Autobiography of Margot Asquith*, vol. ii. pp. 246–7.
[2] See *The Pomp of Power*, p. 146.

then engaged in devising many curious and ingenious weapons of war. My diary reminds me that Mr. Long was somewhat stiff in his conversation on the way to Esher. There, after we had been shown all that there was to be seen out of doors, we were given a small cinema exhibition, which concluded by the pictures of various members of the Cabinet being shown on the screen. When that of Mr. Lloyd George appeared, Mr. Long whispered an exclamation which left no doubt as to his sentiments.

The fact is that Mr. Long wished to continue to take an active part in public life. He would eminently have preferred to serve under Mr. Asquith. But, once convinced that a change was inevitable, he would not have minded it so much had it been effected by other methods. As he once said to me while he was still undecided as to the course which he should pursue, he would have looked at the whole matter in a very different light had Mr. Lloyd George frankly told the Prime Minister, in the presence of the other members of the Cabinet (as Mr. Joseph Chamberlain had once done), that he was in disaccord with his policy—or with the way in which he was conducting the war. But Mr. Lloyd George was talking against, and in that way was opposing his chief, outside the Cabinet. In effect he was repeating in many quarters Lord Chatham's famous phrase: "I can save this country and I know that no one else can." There were not lacking those who encouraged him in this belief. But Mr. Lloyd George never put himself definitely in opposition to Mr. Asquith when he met him face to face at the Council board. Tradition, temperament, and the habits of a long political career, all revolted Mr. Long against what was, when all is said and done, a political intrigue carried on to some extent by one or two of Mr. Asquith's Ministers

who had not a too delicate sense of loyalty, but mainly by outsiders: that is, by men who, though undoubtedly actuated by patriotic motives, did not hold any official position. Mr. Long, although fully alive to the manner in which politicians could use newspapers (that dated from the days of Delane—and earlier), could never accustom himself to the theory that newspaper proprietors should use or control Governments. In the last analysis it must be admitted, even in these days when the power of Parliament has declined, that members of the House of Commons anyway have a mandate bestowed upon them by the electors; while that claimed and exercised by the owners of newspapers is entirely self-conferred. Once Mr. Long did enlist under Mr. Lloyd George, he served him with the same loyalty as he had shown Lord Salisbury a generation earlier.

My own part in this matter was entirely involuntary, and not particularly to my liking. It naturally interested me to know what was taking place, but it is probable that in any event I should have been aware of that to the same extent. It was not information of which I desired to make any use. I had some time before bought *The Outlook* for the very purpose of having a vehicle for the expression of my views. But though I am writing from memory, and without any examination of the files, I think I am right in saying that throughout these weeks that newspaper contained no reference to what was transpiring.

At the end of October 1916, a Government official who dabbled in politics, and was often used as an intermediary, asked me to take a certain course respecting the movement in favour of Mr. Lloyd George's accession to the Premiership. I wrote in reply that when Mr. Lloyd George (who was then making little secret of his conviction that Mr. Asquith was not prosecuting the

war successfully, or of his wish to succeed him) had the support of three or four Unionist members of the Coalition Cabinet, he would, in my opinion, become Prime Minister; but that it was futile to expect that he would take any courageous or decisive step jeopardizing his own position unless and until he was certain of that backing. Upon my return from Paris, a couple of weeks later, I was told that this Government official had been calling daily at my house to inquire whether I had come back. Indeed, he arrived again that very morning. He asked me to go with him to see Sir Starr Jameson. The latter told me that the matter was being advanced along the lines indicated in my letter; and that all efforts were being concentrated upon securing the adhesion to Mr. Lloyd George of three members of the Unionist Cabinet. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that I do not suggest, nor did Sir Starr intimate, that my letter had had any effect in getting the affair on that clear basis. I was pressed by Sir Starr, as well as from another quarter, to try to bring over Mr. Long. It was known that the latter had for some time been in the habit of frequently sending for me to discuss and to get outside views on the situation, and of occasionally asking me to embody my statements in memoranda which he used with his colleagues or others. It was with great reluctance that I finally agreed to do so. Not that I was opposed to the change. I thought that that state of affairs had come to pass which I had foretold Mr. Long some two or three months earlier would render it inevitable. It was apparent that at no distant date Mr. Asquith would be forced out, and that Mr. Lloyd George would take his place. So far as my opinion went I considered it likely to be as beneficial as it was inevitable. But I did not see why I should have the least connection with the negotiations. I finally consented to place the matter before Mr. Long,

solely because I knew that he wished to remain in office, and that he did not realize the extent to which the situation had already developed. I was also aware of Lord Northcliffe's opposition to the retention of either Mr. Balfour or Mr. Long—which made the latter's speedy decision all the more desirable in his own interests. Incidentally, Lord Northcliffe completely failed to comprehend the influence of Mr. Balfour's example in a crisis of this nature. As I have already observed, and as Lady Oxford and Asquith has rightly said, it is quite possible that the result would have been different had Mr. Balfour resolutely supported Mr. Asquith.

It thus fell to my lot to persuade Mr. Long that his remaining in office depended upon his deciding in time to join those who were ready to follow Mr. Lloyd George. Elsewhere I have recounted how Mr. Long was at first incredulous; how even when convinced of the facts he was averse from leaving Mr. Asquith, and suggested one or more alternative plans; and the final result.[1]

I might add, in support of my statement, that I did not welcome being involved in the matter, and that I never went to see Mr. Long except when he sent and asked me to do so; and that when he desired me to see Mr. Bonar Law, I declined to accept that mission.[2]

One morning when Sir Starr Jameson had sent to my house and asked me to come to 2, Great Cumberland Place, I found on my arrival there that he was out. Upon his return he announced, with the nearest approach to excitement I ever saw him display, "We have found the man to bring Bonar Law around—Max Aitken. Do you know anything about him?"

I knew neither Sir Max Aitken nor anything about him, beyond the bare facts that he had made a fortune

[1] See *The Pomp of Power*, pp. 149–55.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 151–3.

in Canada; that he sat in the House of Commons for Ashton-under-Lyne; and that he was a relation of Bonar Law and was supposed to have been active in securing his election as Leader of the Unionist Party, thereby avoiding a possible disagreement between the followers of Mr. Walter Long and of Mr. Austen Chamberlain. It was presumably for this latter service that he had been made a baronet.

In point of fact, I do not think that Sir Starr Jameson had personally any part in the negotiations with Aitken. Sir Starr's rôle in the whole matter was entirely subordinate. Although he never told me so, and was probably unaware that I knew it, he was simply acting under the directions of someone else. Anyone who cares to name that person will be naming a man who really did hold the strings of this intrigue in his hands; and who, until Aitken appeared on the scene, and to a large extent even afterwards, controlled the course of events of the whole affair.

In a review of Lord Beaverbrook's booklet, *Politicians and the Press*, Mr. St. Loe Strachey remarked: "We want much to hear from Lord Beaverbrook the truth as to the overthrow of the Asquith Ministry, and of the part that Lord Beaverbrook is alleged to have played. Was it he, or another, who succeeded in the switching off of his friend, Mr. Bonar Law, from the Asquithian to the Lloyd Georgian side?"

It is understood that Lord Beaverbrook's account of this episode was written soon after it occurred. But the opinion of at least one person who has seen some portions of it is that, when published, it will have to be accepted with considerable reserve. Nevertheless, it is a necessary part of the history of that period, especially as it is unlikely that anyone else recorded everything at the time in such detail. When Lord Beaverbrook

will see fit to speak for himself is doubtful. But in the meantime it is not difficult to answer Mr. Strachey's query up to a certain point. Two facts can be positively stated. The first is that Mr. Bonar Law was urged to withdraw from Mr. Asquith's Ministry, and to cast his lot with Mr. Lloyd George, by various people: some of whom probably pressed that course upon him at an earlier date than did Lord Beaverbrook. It is, of course, impossible to say absolutely that Mr. Bonar Law would not have arrived at the decision he did, even without the intervention of Lord Beaverbrook. But the second undeniable fact is that those who really inspired the movement to oust Mr. Asquith, and who nursed it for several weeks, were certain that it was Lord Beaverbrook who was responsible for Mr. Bonar Law's final action. Apparently Lord Beaverbrook himself was of the same opinion; and that was in no small degree the cause of his indignation when he was not given in the new Government the post which he coveted, but was forced to content himself with a peerage.

Burke wrote that "there is a sacred veil to be drawn over the beginning of all Governments." A veil (I purposely omit the adjective) has certainly been drawn over the end of the Asquith Government: and perhaps wisely, for if ever all is known I greatly doubt whether those most concerned will agree in saying that "*tout savoir est tout pardonner.*"

The late Lord Long of Wraxall, in the preface to his book entitled *Memories*, after criticizing the prevalent habit of using diaries in recording past events, proceeded: "As an instance, I would refer to a conversation I am credited with in one volume by an anonymous author, who, quoting from his diary, attributes to me a statement about a very distinguished statesman which I am quite certain I can never have made. The statesman in question

is one of my oldest friends. We have always differed in politics, it is true, but this has never made any change in our personal relationship, and I have always entertained for him not only a profound admiration, but a very genuine and sincere affection. Yet I am reported to have said to some unknown person, something to the effect that he had received many honours and distinctions without having any real claim to them. It is impossible that I could have talked, even to a most intimate friend, of another friend in terms of disparagement. But, in this case, as I have always had a great admiration for the abilities of the statesman in question, and most sincere regard for him, I cannot believe I ever said anything capable of the interpretation placed upon it by the writer of the book, though his diary is his authority.

"Apart altogether from the personal aspect of the case, many of those with whom I have discussed public men and public affairs, know very well that there is no opinion I have so consistently and resolutely contested as that which is expressed to this effect: 'There is X who has served in one Government after another yet he is a man of no ability and of no real political force.' At the obvious risk of being considered guilty of self-consideration, having served in Governments from 1886 to 1921, I have always disputed this contention and have steadfastly maintained that no man remains in the Government of any party, over a long period of years, in either of the Houses of Parliament, unless he possesses a very substantial claim to the confidence and esteem of his fellow-countrymen.

"While I have no doubt that my recollection in this case is accurate, I do not suggest that statements of this nature are deliberately invented. We all know how difficult it frequently is to remember the exact form which a particular conversation took on any occasion,

and for this reason I hold that no remark should be attributed to others and repeated without giving the individuals concerned an opportunity to verify the reference for themselves. If this had been done in this particular instance, I am sure that I could have shown that my meaning had been quite misunderstood, or that I had never made the remark attributed to me."

Lord Long obviously referred to my relation of some remarks he made about Lord Crewe, after we had passed him one day in St. James's Park. I am not going to discuss the opinion which Lord Long expressed about quotations from diaries. The case he made is undoubtedly strong; but, however regrettable that may be, it is much weakened by custom. Nor am I going to say that the conversation was not as I recorded it. But the incident raises another question about the way diaries should be used—if at all. My own was written without the faintest idea, much less with the least intention, that it should ever be published. If I had had that end in view, I should have been careful to set down much that I omitted, and which has now passed from my recollection. As it was, I wrote it only for myself—to remind me later of various events. For the greater part, therefore, it was written with a certain brevity, as I knew that the mere mention of an incident would bring to my memory the surrounding circumstances. But when it came to using this diary in print, I decided that while I might (as I did) omit portions, I could not fairly change or amplify any part that I did use. The result has been, in this instance at least, to give a false impression. I recall much else that Lord Long said about Lord Crewe on that occasion. It would be futile to repeat that now. But the paragraph from my diary as I now re-read it might certainly be taken to mean that he spoke deprecatingly about Lord Crewe; whereas in fact, while he

did think that the latter had been fortunate in life, he dwelt at some length upon the variety of his talents; and referred in terms of warm friendship to the many years they had been close friends. In any event, I greatly regret that the paragraph was published at all, on account of the annoyance it caused the late Lord Long; to Lord Crewe it was, I am sure, a matter of complete indifference.[1]

In *The Pomp of Power* I wrote: "To be a peer to-day is a handicap in the political world. Some thirty odd years ago three comparatively young men—George Curzon, St. John Brodrick, and the then Lord Wolmer—realized the fact and cast about for a way in which they might avoid the soporific House of Lords. They were advised (by Lord James of Hereford, I think) to consult a lawyer who could help them if anyone could—H. H. Asquith. However, even Mr. Asquith's ingenuity was not equal to that task." [2]

Shortly after the publication of the book I received a letter from Lord Askwith, (sent in care of my publishers), saying that I had correctly recorded the incident, but that he, and not Mr. H. H. Asquith (now Lord Oxford and Asquith), was the member of the Bar to whom Lord James of Hereford had sent the unwilling hereditary legislators. Lord Askwith added that he imagined the error must have come from my having been told the story in the course of conversation, thus not distinguishing between "Asquith" and "Askwith." This surmise was exact. It was Lord Midleton (formerly Mr. St. John Brodrick) who recounted it to me when I was spending a week-end with him at Peper Harow. Lord Askwith was also staying there; and had, in fact, left us only a

[1] I notice that in *The Pomp of Power*, this incident is given in the index as "Crewe, Lord, Mr. Long's amiable criticism of."

[2] See *The Pomp of Power*, p. 211.

few minutes earlier. It was doubtless for that reason that when Lord Midleton said "Askwith," he never realized that I might possibly think he meant "Asquith."

Finally, when *The Path to Peace* was published, Captain Peter Wright, in a lengthy review in the *Evening Standard*, asserted that I had been "one of the chiefs of our propaganda upon the Continent . . . his position was one of the heads of the propaganda for both countries"; and attributed to me various other activities which surprised no one more than myself. I have never met Captain Wright, and I am still curious to know who told him such tales. However, the principal statements—and the specific contradiction thereof—can be most conveniently and briefly set forth in the following letter of correction which I felt obliged to address to the *Evening Standard*.[1]

"We have received the following letter from Mr. Laurance Lyon, formerly M.P. for Hastings:

"In an article in the *Evening Standard* of March 2nd, Captain Peter Wright refers to me throughout two columns. I fail to understand why such details should be of any general interest; but, in any event, if statements of my supposed activities are to be printed, both your readers and I myself have the right to expect that they should be accurate. Unfortunately, the greater part of those furnished by Captain Wright are not only inaccurate but rest upon no foundation of fact. They have, however, the merit of being categorical, and, therefore, are easily refuted.

"1. 'He (Lyon) was one of the heads of the Maison de la Presse, the great pen near the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, where journalists of all nations were herded.

[1] See the *Evening Standard*, March 28, 1923.

. . . His office was the exchange through which English and French Parliamentarians were brought into contact during the war. If you wanted to meet some eminent French leader you rang up Laurance Lyon of the Maison de la Presse, and he arranged it.'

"I never had any position in, or official connection of any kind whatever with, the Maison de la Presse.

"Nobody ever rang me at the Maison de la Presse, for the excellent reason that I never had an office there or anywhere else in Paris during the war, nor was I ever asked to effect any introductions of the kind indicated.

"Further, although I did for some three years own *The Outlook*, I am not (somewhat to my regret), and never have been a journalist; but all my life have been otherwise occupied.

"2. 'He was the natural instrument for the French to use when they wanted to carry on a little propaganda amongst the British Pressmen in Paris, and, through them, insinuate their point of view on the British public.'

"These statements are answered when I say I never even knew (and do not to-day know) a single British Pressman or newspaper correspondent in Paris.

"3. 'He was one of the chiefs of our propaganda on the Continent. . . . His position is one of the heads of the propaganda of both countries.'

"I had no more to do officially with the British propaganda than I had with the French. It is true that I went to Paris constantly throughout the war; that I occasionally wrote letters to, or by request obtained information for, a member of the Cabinet; and that for a short time, and at infrequent intervals, I sent memoranda to the Ministry of Information. But I never was in any sense 'one of the heads of propaganda.'

"However, to satisfy Captain Wright's interest in me (I cannot well say to reward his accuracy), I may

add that if he wants to know why it was thought (rightly or wrongly) that I possessed some special knowledge of France and of the French political world, he will have to search back before 1914. Obviously, his good faith has been imposed upon: although I am rather surprised that one occupying the post which I believe he held, should have been obliged to rely upon second-hand information or mere gossip."

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WHERE FREEDOM FALTERS

CHAPTER I

THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND ITS MAKERS

Of the innumerable books written about the United States by inquiring travellers, the vast majority have been the work of British writers. Few of them had previously complied with Thackeray's proviso that no one should venture to write about that country "under five years of experience, and as many of previous reading." Agreeing perhaps in little else, this army of authors has been at one in making either the similarity or the dissimilarity of the country to Great Britain the touchstone of their approval or disapprobation. Until recent years the fact that customs and manners were not cast in the British mould was often sufficient ground for condemnation at the hands of visitors. Of these the most widely read was Dickens, whose caustic comments caused a national uproar. But the opinion, which, in a later generation, Theodore Roosevelt expressed about this episode will doubtless be adopted by posterity. Writing to one of his children, he said: "Dickens was an ill-natured, selfish cad and boor, who had no understanding of what the word gentleman meant, and no appreciation of hospitality or good treatment. He was utterly incapable of seeing the high purpose and the real greatness which (in spite of the presence also of much that was bad and vile) could have been visible all around him here in America to any man whose vision was both keen

and lofty. . . . Naturally, he would think there was no gentleman in New York, because by no possibility could he have recognized a gentleman if he had met one. Naturally, he would condemn all America because he had not the soul to see what America was really doing."

In more recent years the tendency has been to praise the American people and their institutions on the ground of their close resemblance to those of Great Britain. Scorn has largely made way for a species of genial patronage. But the error in fact is equally gross, although the intention is perhaps more laudable. The truth is, that making some allowances for its youth and consequent temporary crudeness, the country was never so dissimilar from England as it appeared to Mrs. Trollope and to various other writers; while to-day it is by no means so like as certain later critics seek to prove. The large influx of foreign population from Southern Europe, which inundated the country in the years immediately preceding the war, has had its effect. Lord Balfour's remark that the idea of a war between Great Britain and the United States "carries with it something of the unnatural horror of a civil war" would still find a sincere echo across the Atlantic. But speakers who are wont to wax enthusiastic about "the two great Anglo-Saxon nations" would be considerably astonished if they were to study the statistics which show by what a comparatively scant majority the country as a whole is Anglo-Saxon, and that the large cities are not so at all.

There is no doubt that a high percentage of these European importations of the last thirty or forty years has become, or in due time will become, Americanized, and will make good citizens. But there is a vast gulf between that and becoming Anglo-Saxons—whatever may be the precise definition of that bastard phrase. Residence for a fixed period and certain legal formalities will create

an American; but only birth and descent will make an Anglo-Saxon.

This condition alone suffices to account legitimately for very considerable differences between the two countries. Moreover, the tie between the United States and Great Britain—a tie of which the only outward and visible sign lies in the fact that, with some variations, they use the same language—is in practice not nearly so close or so solid as is alleged by those who theorize on the subject. This has been clearly illustrated in recent years. The United States did not fly to our aid—to the aid of the other "great Anglo-Saxon nation"—as soon as we began to feel the strain of the war. She did not enter the conflict at the first moment when we would have welcomed her assistance. On the contrary, she stood aside, until, for reasons of her own, she thought that her national interests, her honour, or her dignity demanded action. That was as it should have been. The first duty of any country is to itself. Sentiment may be a good cement, but it is a very frail foundation for international relations. Theodore Roosevelt, with characteristic common sense, epitomized the whole position correctly when he wrote: "On the whole I am friendly to England. I do not at all believe in being over-effusive or in forgetting that fundamentally we are two different nations; but yet the fact remains, in the first place, that we are closer in feeling to her than to any other nation; and, in the second place, that probably her interest and ours will run on rather parallel lines in the future." [1]

[1] In a letter from Roosevelt to Lodge, dated June 19, 1901. See *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge*, vol. i. p. 493. Five or six years earlier, at the time of Cleveland's Venezuelan Message, Roosevelt was decidedly more belligerent. He then wrote to Henry Cabot Lodge: "Let the fight come if it must; I don't care whether our seacoasts are bombarded or not; we would take Canada. . . ." "Personally I rather hope the fight will come soon. The clamour for peace has convinced me that this country needs a war." See *Selections from the Corre-*

But an objective study of the United States is perhaps opportune, partly because there, as elsewhere, the war definitely marked the end of an epoch, and partly because the country seems to have so outgrown its Constitution that, were it not for the ever-timely aid of the Supreme Court, it is doubtful whether, even with the procedure under which Amendments are feasible, it would be sufficiently elastic to meet the present situation. An acute American observer, the late Mr. Frank I. Cobb, editor of the *New York World*, went even farther. In a leading article, which is not yet forgotten, he wrote that all the new governments which have been created since the war are more democratic than that of the United States; adding that the spirit of the Constitution has been so perverted "that the United States is now the one country among the great civilized nations in which the will of the people can never definitely be put into effect, and in which it can be successfully overruled whenever a political cabal is organized for that purpose. Every intelligent American citizen knows that the machinery of government is breaking down. He knows that the public confidence in government is at the lowest ebb. He knows that government has ceased to function in harmony with either the political or economical necessities of the people, that it is rapidly becoming a thing apart from the actual life of the country and in a great degree indifferent to the life of the country." [1]

It should be said at the outset that in reality the

spondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, vol. i. p. 200, and pp. 204–5.

It is worth noting that, although he delighted in writing about such matters, Roosevelt's military judgments and criticisms were often worthless. An example is his statement about taking Canada; unless by "take" he meant only the capture and holding of a few strategic points, or some of the more important towns.

[1] *New York World*, December 5, 1920.

United States is to-day a plutocracy (or possibly an oligarchy) rather than a democracy. For the purposes of this inquiry one may adopt Professor Hearnshaw's definition of a democracy as being a form of government by which the majority of the whole adult population is the ultimate source of power; to which, however, I would add the qualification that that power must actually be exercised by a tangible majority. As will be shown later, that condition is far from being fulfilled by the people of the United States. Moreover, amongst the other minor elements essential to a true democracy is a division of wealth which is not vastly disproportionate. The fewer the great fortunes the more democratic the country; and the less evenly that wealth is distributed the more plutocratic it becomes. Viewed from this angle the United States has certainly less claim to the title of a democracy than has France—or than have various other countries. In 1916 the American Government Commission on Industrial Relations adopted in its report the following figures:

"The 'rich,' 2 per cent. of the people, own 60 per cent. of the wealth. The 'middle class,' 33 per cent. of the people, own 35 per cent. of the wealth. The 'poor,' 65 per cent. of the people, own 5 per cent. of the wealth."

Since 1916 the national wealth has increased so greatly that these conclusions would no longer be sound. But presumably the disparity is even greater to-day than it was ten years ago.[1]

Again, although man never has been and never will be successful in combating by legislation those inequalities

[1] The United States internal revenue statistics for the year 1924 show that there were then 75 persons who had reported net incomes of $1,000,000 or over, and had paid taxes thereon. Three of these had net incomes of $5,000,000 or over, of whom two were domiciled in the State of Michigan and one in New York. It is generally assumed that the former were Henry Ford and his son, and that the latter was probably John D. Rockefeller, Jr.

which emanate from the accident of birth, from the chances of life, and from divergencies of character, yet certainly they should be less prominent than anywhere else in a land where all can obtain a sufficient and comfortable living, leaving the acquisition of luxuries to be the field of competition. Yet, barring the fact (an important one, I admit) that there is no such extreme indigence as one meets in the large cities of Europe, in no country are these inequalities thrown into such clear relief, and in no country are they so real and serious as in the United States. This is the outcome of a plutocracy, which sometimes affects even the administration of fair and equal justice to all alike.

The general conclusion that the United States cannot reasonably be called a democracy differs little from that arrived at by Lecky, many years ago, when the plutocratic forces in the country were less apparent and less powerful than they are to-day. "The American Constitution, indeed, was framed by men who had for the most part the strongest sense of the dangers of democracy. The school of American thought, which was represented in a great degree by Washington and John Adams, and still more emphatically by Gouverneur Morris and Alexander Hamilton; which inspired *The Federalist* and was embodied in the Federalist party, was utterly opposed to the schools of Rousseau, of Paine, and even of Jefferson, and it has largely guided American policy to the present hour. It did not prevent America from becoming a democracy, but it framed a form of government under which the power of the democracy was broken and divided, restricted to a much smaller sphere, and attended with far less disastrous results than in most European countries." [1]

Nevertheless, it would ill behove any serious student

[1] See Lecky's *Democracy and Liberty*, vol. i. pp. 66–7.

of history to speak lightly of those who founded the first great republic of modern times. They were intensely human; and, caught in the whirl of a novel situation, they displayed with little reticence faults and passions which ofttimes led them astray. That alone should enable us to judge them intelligently and with indulgence. Indeed, any impartial verdict will pronounce that, whatever its defects, their work has withstood such a strain as they never imagined it would be called upon to bear. Unfortunately, they have themselves been the victims of their fellow-countrymen; the victims of that lack of a sense of proportion, and that baneful inaccuracy, which are among the outstanding weaknesses of the American character. To-day it is almost impossible to descry the real Lincoln; or to see him as a human being through the pseudo-historical haze with which his memory has been enveloped. The mass of literature which his career has evoked has, for the greater part, obscured the man and created a myth.[1] If such was Lincoln's fate within the space of fifty years, it is not extraordinary that in the course of a century the real Washington has been entirely obliterated, and a singularly unattractive perfection set up to take his place.[2] In some degree either the same lot, or a certain measure of oblivion, has overtaken many of his contemporaries.

In many respects Jefferson has fared best. Undoubtedly he was endowed with the mentality of a statesman: though, as a matter of fact, Jackson (who was very far from being a statesman) has had a more

[1] Naturally, this statement does not apply to all the biographies of Lincoln. Special mention should be made in this regard of Mr. Carl Sandburg's recent book, *Abraham Lincoln—The Prairie Years*, in which the absence of any attempt to write with literary style is more than compensated by the abundance of facts about Lincoln's life up to the day when he finally left Springfield to go to the White House.

[2] There has recently been a reaction; which, however, seems too prone to exaggerate or to place in the foreground Washington's human frailties.

direct influence upon the current of American political life. In other respects Jefferson was a somewhat ignoble character. I leave on one side the animadversions against him so often expressed by Theodore Roosevelt, since they rested largely upon dislike of his political doctrines. But it is undeniable that Jefferson was disloyal to his colleagues, and was not above attacking them anonymously in the Press; although it is the entries in his private diaries which give the clearest view of his petty and spiteful nature. John Adams, notwithstanding an excessive vanity which exposed him to ridicule, possessed certain distinctive if rather uncomfortable virtues, which he seems to have transmitted to his descendants. But the most brilliant of all was Alexander Hamilton. Even Woodrow Wilson, who would hardly have subscribed to all Hamilton's doctrines, told Colonel House that in political ability he excelled all his contemporaries. Undoubtedly Hamilton's fame is now secure, and well beyond the reach of any party prejudice. Nevertheless, he was something of an adventurer. Although he was more constructive and had more ballast than Aaron Burr, there were many points of resemblance between the two men. They were equally vain, egotistical, and of loose moral life. Each had curious visions of leading expeditions of conquest. Certainly the difference between them was not so great as adjudged by posterity, after Burr had spun out many years of a futile and discredited existence; and it would seem less to-day if Burr instead of Hamilton had fallen on the fatal day at Weehawken.

But undoubtedly the greatest was Washington, who in his lifetime, as since his death, occupied a place apart in the general estimation. He was by no means the cleverest. His own diaries give the impression of a rather dull man. But a happier and probably more

life-like picture was drawn by John Bernard, an English traveller, who as the result of an accident made his acquaintance on the roadside, and later accompanied him to Mount Vernon.[1] Certainly Washington's lack of mental flexibility sometimes irritated Hamilton, who used but was not scrupulously loyal to him; while the ill-natured Pickering would not even grant that he possessed any considerable talent as a military leader. In political matters he was often obliged to rely upon others, and was sometimes led astray. But it was his character rather than his abilities which procured him the first place; for Washington was never actuated by personal ambition. His patriotism was beyond all party strife, and the sound and sincere advice which he gave his fellow-citizens rang true because it was free from any alloy of self-conscious virtue. It is not without reason that time has confirmed the verdict of his own generation.

It is interesting to observe how the American Constitution has both exceeded and deceived the expectations of its authors. If those who governed England in bygone days were permitted to return to study the progress or the revolving process (call it which one will) of the art of governing, the frivolous but singularly astute Charles II would doubtless be surprised to find that there is now no way in which the sovereign can circumvent Parliament. The honest but obstinate George III would perhaps at last understand that a timely compromise is more often than not the only satisfactory resource even for a reigning monarch. While Queen Victoria would be startled to find that her successor on the throne wields little or none of that personal power which she inherited in 1837, but of which, unknown to herself, she had been entirely bereft before her death,

[1] Washington introduced Bernard to Jefferson because the latter, like Bernard himself, was enthusiastic about the theatre, a trait of Jefferson's character which is now generally forgotten.

more than sixty years later. But the astonishment of these former rulers would be mild indeed compared to the amazement of the framers of the American Constitution could they but see the results of their labours. One may well speculate whether Jefferson or Hamilton would be the more aghast. Jefferson would be appalled by the overwhelming authority of the Federal Government; and would search in vain for the measure of personal liberty which he always advocated, and which he perhaps thought had been secured to succeeding generations. He would remember the words of his first Inaugural Address, in 1801: "A wise and frugal Government shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labour the bread which it has earned." He would probably see more cause than there ever was in his lifetime for writing: "What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not warned from time to time that the people preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms."

The bewilderment of Alexander Hamilton would, indeed, proceed from very different causes; but, if anything, it would be still more profound. As conservative as Burke, he was no admirer of the Constitution. At the Convention he had presented his own plan. It provided for the election of a President for life; and the Senators were to enjoy an equal tenure of office. But the President was to have absolute power to veto any law; and, in one way and another, was to be invested with authority far exceeding that exercised by the British sovereign, whose yoke had just been thrown off. Nevertheless, when another form of government was adopted, Hamilton supported it by his powerful papers in *The Federalist;* and that public service is his greatest

claim to lasting renown. But although he did his duty as a patriotic citizen, he did not change his opinion. As late as 1802 he wrote to Gouverneur Morris (who to a large extent shared his views): "I am still labouring to prop the frail and worthless fabric."

To-day Hamilton would quickly perceive that his fear that the power granted to the States would unduly swell the tide of democracy has not been realized. However, in the same paragraph in which he boldly stated, "I do not think well of democracy," he also wrote: "The British Monarchy is the best government in the world." In brief, Hamilton admired and understood the uses of a landed aristocracy, kept within certain constitutional limits. But even more than he mistrusted democracy would he have detested and despised the plutocracy. No doubt he would willingly have assented to Theodore Roosevelt's view that "There is something to be said for government by a great aristocracy which has furnished leaders to the nation in peace and war for generations; even a democrat like myself must admit this. But there is absolutely nothing to be said for government by a plutocracy, for government by men very powerful in certain lines and gifted with the 'money touch,' but with ideals which in their essence are merely those of so many glorified pawnbrokers." [1]

The group led by Hamilton and Gouverneur Morris opposed the doctrines of Rousseau and Paine being adopted as the basis of the Constitution. It was in that direction that they anticipated the danger. But certainly neither they nor the other members of the Convention ever contemplated founding a plutocracy. The majority of those who took part in drafting the Constitution were men of means, but they were also men of birth and

[1] See *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, by Joseph Bucklin Bishop, vol. ii. p. 348.

position; and they valued the latter attributes quite as much as the former. A number of them had been educated in England; some had even been called to the English Bar. They naturally had none of the enthusiastic love of freedom professed, if not always exhibited, by the leaders of the French Revolution. It was not in America, it was not from Washington, that Lafayette imbibed those theoretical ideas about liberty and equality which he preached in the early days of that upheaval; unless, indeed, he took the words of the Declaration of Independence more seriously than did some of those who signed it, and who would doubtless have concurred in Roosevelt's confession that his reverence for that document was somewhat lacking, because it made certain untruths immortal. In 1792 Lafayette wrote complaining of the "aristocratic and counter-revolutionary principles" openly avowed in Paris by Gouverneur Morris. Only a singular delusion—one of those delusions of which throughout his long life Lafayette was from time to time a victim—could have led him to expect any other views from Morris, or perhaps from the majority of American statesmen of that period. The American Colonies had broken away from England not because their political conceptions differed from those generally held in that country, but solely because they felt that George III and his Ministers were imposing upon them, and were not acting in accordance with established canons of British equity. Only a few years after Yorktown, Washington did not hesitate to praise England, telling John Bernard that it was "the cradle of free principles." Both sides were somewhat affrighted by what might be the consequences of a successful revolt. Speaking in the House of Commons in December 1781, Lord George Germain (afterwards Lord Sackville) said there was no doubt that "from the instant when American inde-

pendence should be acknowledged the British Empire was ruined." And six months later—June 10, 1782—the First Lord of the Treasury, Lord Shelburne, told the House of Lords that "Whenever the British Parliament should recognize the sovereignty of the Thirteen Colonies, the Sun of England's glory was for ever set. . . . If independence were once conceded, if Parliament considered that measure to be advisable, he foresaw in his own mind that England was undone."

The course of events has proved these dire predictions to have been singularly infelicitous.

On the other hand, once the excitement of victory had passed, those who had led the former Colonies were more apprehensive of some future rising tide of democracy at home than they had ever been of the acts and the threats of Lord North's Government. The latter had irritated them by obstinate stupidity; but once goaded into action, they had known well enough how to organize a defence, which later developed into an offensive. Nor, whatever may have been the popular feeling, was their resentment in any way deep or abiding. The relations between the two countries had changed too quickly. Only six years before the Declaration of Independence, Benjamin Franklin, who probably had a better sense of proportion than any other American of his day, wrote in regard to the London Riots: "What the event will be, God only knows. But some punishment seems preparing for a people who are ungratefully abusing the best Constitution and the best King any nation was ever blessed with." And somewhat later he said: "I can scarcely conceive a King of better dispositions, of more exemplary virtues, or more truly desirous of promoting the welfare of his subjects." While it was not long after the surrender at Yorktown that John Adams recounted with as much feeling as any Adams could evince

his first audience at St. James's as Envoy of the new country. "'Sir,' said the King, 'the circumstances of this audience are so extraordinary; the language you have held is so extremely proper, and the feelings you have discovered so justly adapted to the occasion, that I must say that I not only receive with pleasure the assurance of the friendly disposition of the United States, but that I am very glad the choice has fallen upon you to be their Minister. I wish you, sir, to believe, and that it may be understood in America, that I have done nothing in the late contest but what I thought myself indispensably bound to do by the duty which I owed my people. I will be very free with you. I was the last to consent to the separation; but the separation having been made, and having become inevitable, I have always said, as I say now, that I would be the first to meet the friendship of the United States as an independent Power."

But the revolutionary leaders feared what their own fellow-countrymen might do if allowed much liberty of action. They decided that the yoke should be lightened but not entirely lifted, by those into whose hands it seemed to have passed. The Constitution was not drafted by men in the same mood as those who had launched the Declaration of Independence. It says nothing about the Rights of Man. But it was the outcome of discussions which were at least sincere, if somewhat ingenuous. "The people should have as little to do as may be about the Government. They want information and are constantly like to be misled," contended a delegate (Sherman) from Connecticut. "Inequality of property is the great and fundamental distinction in society," remarked Alexander Hamilton; and Gouverneur Morris agreed when he said: "Property is the main object of society." While Gunning Bedford, with a candour which has its charm, expostulated: "Are we to

act with greater purity than the rest of mankind? Our votes are actuated by interest and ambition." In brief, the makers of the Constitution gave ample evidence of their acquiescence in Goldsmith's lines:

> "For just experience tells in every soil,
> That those who think must govern those who toil."

The debates [1] show throughout that the duty of respecting the rights of property was uppermost in the minds of the majority of the delegates. It is therefore rather difficult to discover any historical foundation for President Coolidge's statement that "the Government of the United States is a device for maintaining in perpetuity the rights of the people, with the ultimate extinction of all privileged classes." [2] Roosevelt was more comprehensible when he said that "the very useful Federalist party," was "exceedingly anxious to devise methods for making believe to give the people the full power while really putting them under the control of a propertied political oligarchy": [3] although he himself, when President (as he recounts in his Autobiography), always treated the Constitution "after the manner of Abraham Lincoln, as a document which put human rights above property rights when the two conflicted." And that eminent American jurist, Mr. J. M. Beck (who will always be remembered as one of England's staunchest friends in the darkest days), has written: "While the Constitution of the United States was very much more than an adaptation of the British Constitution, yet its underlying spirit was that of the English-speaking race, and the

[1] The proceedings of the Convention were secret. Washington observed the injunction so meticulously that nothing whatever is to be gleaned from his diary. But Madison kept an exact record from day to day, and after his death it was purchased by Congress, and subsequently published.

[2] Speaking at Philadelphia on September 25, 1924.

[3] See *The Progressive Party*, p. 12.

common law." [1] And it is to be remembered that the spirit in question was that which prevailed in 1790.

The well-known American critic, Mr. H. L. Mencken, has, I think, shown even more clearly than did Lecky, both the aim of the framers of the Constitution and the manner in which the course of events has frustrated their designs. "The Fathers of the Republic, I am convinced, had a great deal more prevision than even their most romantic worshippers gave them credit for. They not only sought to create a government machine that would be safe from attack without; they also sought to create one that would be safe from attack within. They invented very ingenious devices for holding the mob in check, for protecting the national polity against its transient and illogical rages, for securing the determination of all the larger matters of state to a concealed but none the less real aristocracy. Nothing could have been further from the intent of Washington, Hamilton, and even Jefferson, than that the official doctrines of the nation, in the year 1922, should have been identical with the nonsense heard in the Chautauquas from the evangelical pulpit, and on the stump. But Jackson and his merry men broke through the barbed wires thus so carefully strung, and ever since 1825 *vox populi* has been the true voice of the nation." [2]

As between the framers of the Constitution, the arguments in favour of giving the preponderance of power to the Federal Government, or to the States, were succinctly summarized by Hamilton and by Jefferson respectively.

Speaking at the Convention of New York in June 1788, Hamilton said: "Gentlemen in their reasoning have placed the interests of the several States and those of the United States in contrast. This is not a fair view

[1] See *The Constitution of the United States*, by J. M. Beck, p. 20.
[2] See H. L. Mencken's *Prejudices*, third series, p. 28.

of the subject. They must necessarily be involved in each other. . . . The local interest of a State ought, in every case, to give way to the interests of the Union. For when a sacrifice of one or the other is necessary, the former becomes only an apparent partial interest, and should yield on the principle that the smaller good ought never to oppose the greater one."

In drafting some resolutions relating to the Alien and Sedition Laws, Jefferson put the case for the States in the following words: "The several States composing the United States of America are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general Government, but by a compact under the style and title of a Constitution for the United States and of amendments thereto. They constituted a general Government for special purposes—delegated to that Government certain definite powers, reserving each State to itself the residuary mass of right to their own self-government; and whensoever the general Government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force."

One of Hamilton's objections to the Constitution was that it would always be simpler for the State governments to infringe the rights of the Federal Government than for the latter to impinge upon those of the State government. Indeed, for half a century or more it did seem as if those who were opposed to a strong Federal Government had won. It is true that the Supreme Court, under the guidance of its famous Chief Justice, John Marshall, was known to have strong Federalist leanings. Jefferson recognized the danger to his doctrines, and bitterly opposed the right of that tribunal to interpret the Constitution, which, he contended, would thus become "a mere thing of wax in the hand of the Judiciary, which they may twist and shape into any form they please." But Marshall settled once for all the attitude

of the Supreme Court in respect to the Constitution;[1] and although this has been attacked both in his day and in our own time, few students of comparative political history will deny that alike in theory and in practice the advantages far outweigh any temporary disadvantages. Under this system the well-founded objection to written constitutions, on account of their rigidity, is removed. When the court declares any legislative enactment to be unconstitutional, the electorate may still enforce its wishes by means of an amendment to the Constitution; and while that involves time, the American people should be duly thankful for any period of enforced reflection before adding to the incredible number of laws on their statute-books. Moreover, it can fairly be said that the Supreme Court seems always to bear in mind its fiduciary position in respect to the Constitution. Upon the whole it has rarely fallen much behind the onward march of sober public opinion.

But in the early days of the Republic no judicial decisions seemed likely to affect the fact that the Constitution gave all undefined powers to the separate States. In a country which was bound to increase rapidly, and in an age in which successive inventions radically changed the course of everyday life, those undefined powers were certain to attain very considerable proportions. Moreover, for at least two generations there was a prevalent bias in favour of States' rights. Calhoun even went so far as to preach the gospel that a State, by the vote of its own electorate, might annul and bar the operation within its territorial limits of any law enacted by the Federal Government. And although the North brought the South back to the Union by force of arms, it should not be forgotten that Northern States had previously

[1] Roger Taney, when Chief Justice, did his utmost to undo Marshall's work.

asserted their rights to secede. As early as the days of Jefferson's presidency a number of Federalists gave their support to a movement for a separation of some of the Northern States from the Union. There was also the famous Hartford Convention; and, what was of less importance, in 1842 John Quincy Adams presented to the House of Representatives a memorial of some citizens of Massachusetts praying Congress "to adopt measures for the peaceful dissolution of the union of these States." But after the Civil War, and until two or three years ago, the marked tendency was to increase the authority of the central Government at the expense of the States. This inclination approached its high-water mark in the adoption, in 1913, of the Sixteenth Amendment, authorizing the imposition of a general income tax throughout the country; and reached it in 1920 when the Eighteenth (or Prohibition) Amendment became law—to which measure I will not here allude further than to say that being a sumptuary enactment, applicable to the whole country, it was the most direct check which the Government of the United States had ever placed upon personal liberty. It was probably this latter amendment more than anything else which has led to a widespread outcry that the power of the Federal Government is becoming excessive. It is significant that this alarm is not confined to either party. Some Republican leaders are as outspoken as any disciples of Jefferson against further invasion of States' rights. For instance, Senator Wadsworth of New York recently said: "I am convinced that we have reached a point in our government evolution where we had better pause and take stock. The proof of the necessity for this is, in my opinion, the tremendous steps towards centralization of power in Washington which we have witnessed in recent years. A study of the situation convinces me that if matters

continue a little while longer as they have been going, we shall witness the establishment in Washington of a great imperial government overtopping and submerging the power of the citizenship of the States and municipalities, with an army of bureaucrats in control; a governmental system that will gain more and more strength from its own momentum, and in the end will have the power to regulate the life of every citizen of this country. . . . We shall then no longer be a Federal Union of States whose inhabitants are competent to manage their own affairs. Instead we shall have established an imperial government, our sense of responsibility will have disappeared, our initiative will be destroyed, and democracy will have been wiped off the map." [1]

The first sign of the reaction was seen in 1924 in the overwhelming defeat of the proposed Child Labour Constitutional Amendment. However, it is possible that this amendment (giving the Federal Government power to regulate child labour throughout the country) would, in any event, have been rejected on its merits, even if not so decisively.

The Income Tax Amendment which I have mentioned allowed the Federal Government to impose the tax in each State irrespective of population. The result has been curious. In a recent year four States—New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Illinois—contributed between them more than 56 per cent. of the total tax returns. The State of New York alone paid about 30 per cent.[2] Yet these States have together only 8 Senators out of 96, and 122 members of the House of Representatives out of a total of 425.

The system by which the Senate is elected has always

[1] See the New York *Times*, April 11, 1926.

[2] The official returns for a later year—1924—show that out of a total of $704,265,890, the State of New York paid $286,774,000.

appeared to European jurists as one of the most patent vices of the Constitution; and evidently Americans now perceive the deadlock to which it may, and sometimes does, lead. The various States are represented in the Electoral College (which goes through the formality of electing the President) in proportion to their population. It may therefore safely be said that the East and the Middle West together are always able to elect their choice for President.[1] But on the other hand every State, no matter what its population may be, is entitled to elect 2, and only 2, Senators. Thus the States west of the Missouri River, which have a population of about 16,000,000 out of more than 100,000,000, elect 34 of the 96 Senators; and, if they ally themselves with the Senators from the Southern States, can always command a majority in the Senate. The executive and the legislative branches of the Government, therefore, may be, and often have been, in disaccord, thus leading to a situation which renders difficult any constructive legislation. It might be added that similar differences of opinion upon matters of importance may occur even when the President and the majority in the Senate belong to the same party. When Mr. Coolidge was nominated for the presidency (after he had filled the unexpired balance of the term to which the late President Harding had been elected) he was hailed as the leader of the Republican party. But it was a Senate controlled by that same party which had in the preceding months been passing various measures—such as the Soldiers' Bonus Bill—over his veto; and which at another period even refused to confirm one of the nominations he made for his Cabinet —something which had not happened for generations. His acclamation as leader of the party therefore seems somewhat ironical.

[1] See Chapter IV, *infra*.

Another constitutional weakness is that the Cabinet is not responsible to Congress. In reality it is merely a committee of advisers, chosen by the President with no power (apart from their duties as heads of departments) further than that which he sees fit to give them; and to whom, on questions of policy, he hearkens or not at will.

These defects render the conduct of foreign affairs, and especially any definite negotiations with other countries, difficult and unwieldy for the United States Government, and often unsatisfactory to the other party to the proposed agreement.[1] The general result of these inherent vices is now well understood by constitutional students; and it is significant that in the many republican governments established since the war, the decided tendency has been to adopt the French rather than the American model, especially in respect to making the Cabinet responsible to Parliament, and in limiting the powers of the President.

However, the failure of the United States as a democracy cannot be attributed only to its Constitution. The basic reason is alike simpler and goes deeper. Any form of representative government rests primarily upon the presumption that the people, refusing to be ruled by any autocracy or oligarchy, prefer to govern themselves. But that entails that all shall perform their proper share of the work; not only involuntarily (as when, for instance, they are chosen as jurors) but also voluntarily. The result then is government by the majority. But if a large proportion of the population refuses or neglects to fulfil its civic duties it is obvious that, in default of what used to be known as "a governing class," the political power will fall largely into the hands of professional politicians. That is exactly what has happened, to a large extent, in

[1] Upon this subject see Chapter II, *infra*.

the United States. Politicians are numerous, but statesmen are rare. Without attempting to give any exhaustive definition of either word, I think it may be said that one distinction between the two is that politicians are convinced that their country needs their services, are determined that their country shall not be deprived of them, and are even more strongly determined that those services shall in some way be well remunerated; while statesmen are willing and anxious to serve their country in whatever capacity they can be most useful, without any hope of reward. The latter class, never too plentiful in any country, is almost extinct in the United States. In no other part of the world which has any form of representative government do people so openly ignore both their duties as citizens and the welfare of the State. At a recent presidential election only a little more than 50 per cent. of the electorate voted. Of course negroes, although specially given the franchise by a constitutional amendment, are, by one device or another, prevented from voting in all the Southern States. But the figure of approximately 50 per cent. was arrived at by taking the country as a whole. In some States in the South the percentage was even very much lower. In other words, "government by the people" no longer obtains; and it is a minority—that is, the majority of about 50 per cent. of the electorate—which decide at the polls. It is still more significant that, after eliminating the negro vote, the 50 per cent. which did not vote is probably composed, on the average, of citizens of a higher type, and occupying more responsible positions, than is any corresponding percentage of those who did take the trouble to go to the polls. No one who investigates this subject in the United States can fail to be struck by the fact that so many men of education, intelligence, and repute will express their thorough contempt for politicians, and their suspicions

of the rectitude of their various governments; although it should be said that the Federal Government generally holds a higher place in their esteem than does that of their own State. But the same men will promptly add that nothing would induce them to have anything to do with public affairs; and that, apart from all other reasons, they cannot spare the time from their own business; that is, that the hours which they owe to the State they devote to money-making. However, it must be admitted that the conception of representative government whereby all do their share is not only, in modern times, a plan first practised in England, but even to-day (when there is no longer any powerful class of landed proprietors) is one peculiarly suited to the English character and temperament. It was adopted elsewhere often because of the erroneous idea that it was responsible for British prosperity. It is notorious that it has never achieved the same measure of success when copied by Latin nations. Some have been unable to form two stable parties; nearly all have learned the letter better than they have seized the spirit of British constitutional methods. But in the early days of the United States the public weal was the private concern of the average citizen. The difference which is now so marked is doubtless due largely to the vast influx of those who are not of Anglo-Saxon blood or kinship. To-day there is an American nation; but certainly there is no American race. Washington could say in his Farewell Address that he spoke to "Citizens by birth or choice of a common country . . . with slight shades of difference, you have the same religion, manners, habits, and political principles." In 1920, the total white population of the United States was approximately 95,000,000, of whom 14,000,000 were born in 45 different countries, and an additional 23,000,000 were wholly or partly of foreign parentage; while about 8,000,000

(counting those of 10 years of age and upward) were unable to speak the English language. Obviously the words of Washington would no longer be applicable or appropriate; and, equally obviously, Anglo-Saxon predominance is more a mathematical myth than an actual and working ascendancy.

The salient result of the constitutional weaknesses and inequalities to which I have adverted has been to engender a relative contempt for, and a positive distrust of, the whole parliamentary and administrative machine. Nor does the average American hesitate to express his sentiments on this subject.

That great maker of constitutions, the Abbé Sieyès, once said: "La confiance vient d'en bas, l'autorité d'en haut." In the United States a certain measure of authority does emanate from the constituted governments; but it is undeniable that the governed have only a very small degree of confidence in their governors.

CHAPTER II

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

THE great majority of Americans would doubtless affirm that the Monroe Doctrine is the corner-stone of the foreign policy of their country. And this declaration would be correct, for it is indeed the only phase of foreign policy to which there is any steadfast adherence. But the famous Doctrine has fallen upon barren days. There is no reason for its application in the present, or perhaps much probability of its necessity in the future, provided it is interpreted in its original and stricter sense: while any extension would arouse an immediate outcry from the very countries the protection of which has always been one of the avowed objects of its existence. This threatens to place the United States in a dilemma, which, it must be admitted, causes some mild amusement in various European chancelleries.

Mr. Charles E. Hughes is, presumably, an outstanding authority in the United States upon all constitutional questions. Speaking at Philadelphia before the American Academy of Political and Social Science, on November 30, 1923, at a celebration of the centenary of the Monroe Doctrine, Mr. Hughes, who was then Secretary of State, said that it had never been changed except by two modifications which did not in any way alter its essential character. When first promulgated it referred to European intervention, and this was subsequently extended so as to cover any non-American intervention in the Western hemisphere; while in the

time of President Polk the injunction against any future colonization had been enlarged so as to forbid the non-American acquisition of American territory even by transfer of dominion or sovereignty.

Mr. Hughes was at some pains to prove that the acquisition of Pacific possessions, and certain other activities on the part of the United States, were not inconsistent with the earliest interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. He was, perhaps, on firmer ground when he showed that in years gone by it was the Monroe Doctrine which had guarded the South American republics from possible invasion. But to-day there is no European Power which would even dream of either " oppressing or controlling the destiny " of any of the Central or South American republics, or of acquiring dominion over any of their territory. Even going back for the space of a generation before 1914 (throughout which period the United States occupied an infinitely less potent position amongst the nations than it does to-day) there was never any suggestion of an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine, unless it was in the occasional desire manifested by some countries to collect repudiated debts by forcible methods. The last important incident occurred in 1902 when a German fleet threatened to take possession of Venezuelan territory, in reprisal for various offences committed by President Castro, who was in reality the dictator of that country. The German Government assured Roosevelt that anything seized would not be permanently held; but the latter was convinced that Germany intended to take and fortify a Venezuelan harbour " with a view to exercising some degree of control over the future Isthmian Canal and over South American affairs generally." He therefore insisted that Germany should arbitrate her claims against Venezuela; and when she refused to do so, he fixed a delay of a specified number of days, at

the end of which he would send the American fleet to the Venezuelan coast to prevent any occupation, unless Germany had in the meantime reconsidered her decision. Before the time named expired, Germany agreed to arbitrate.[1] Nor has there ever been in recent times any serious attempt at colonization with the intent of obtaining national possession. There were only occasional sensational and wholly unsubstantiated rumours that Japan was seeking to make a secret arrangement of that nature in respect to a certain district in Mexico.

But between 1914 and 1918 the Monroe Doctrine was indeed in jeopardy, for the first time in its history. In the course of the speech from which I have already quoted, Mr. Hughes said: "We entered the Great War, not violating our tradition, for the cause of liberty itself was at stake." Quite true; but equally at stake was the Monroe Doctrine. Possibly Mr. Hughes included that under "the cause of liberty." But it would have been more candid to have said plainly that in the event of a German victory the Monroe Doctrine would not have been worth the paper on which it was written; and would only have served to advertise to the world that the United States was impotent to support or to enforce it except by empty declarations. For if the Central Powers had won, Germany would have had, and would have shown, a more bitter detestation of the United States than of some of those countries with which she had actually been at war. I am not attaching any undue weight to the German Emperor's imprudent remark to the American Ambassador, Mr. James Gerard, to the effect that Germany would settle with the United States after

[1] See *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, by Joseph Bucklin Bishop, vol. i. p. 221 *et seq.* Some English ships accompanied the German squadron to the Venezuelan coast; but Roosevelt was confident that Germany was the leader in the matter, and that England had no intention of seizing any territory.

she had conquered the Allies. But any one familiar (as Mr. Hughes must be) with the sentiments inspiring Germany until she saw herself faced by defeat (from the extreme consequences of which she then thought that President Wilson would save her) will realize that as a triumphant victor she would have emerged from the contest with a deep and contemptuous hatred of the United States. And (although I impute no such design to Germany) what would the American Government have done, or been able to do, if, for instance, Germany had taken or acquired possession of the province of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil? The United States would then have been as utterly unprepared as when she actually declared war in 1917; and in those circumstances would have had no Allies to hold Germany in check while an army was improvised, or to provide proper transport or convoys for troops when they were trained. In brief, a fact of which even statesmen like Mr. Hughes seem conveniently to lose sight is that amongst other things which the United States herself had at stake (altogether apart from the interests of the Allies or from any idealistic love of freedom) was the much-prized Monroe Doctrine. Germany made this point clear. It was before the declaration of war (although after President Wilson had broken off diplomatic relations) that the Wilhelmstrasse sent the famous cable, instructing the German Minister to inform the Mexican Government that if it would seize Texas and several other American States, Germany would give the necessary aid for their retention after the war.

However, the situation is so safe to-day that there might almost seem to be no use for the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Hughes evidently realized this fact; for he bluntly said: "The question is whether that Doctrine is still important under changed conditions. The answer must be in the affirmative. The fact that the intervention of

non-American Powers in this hemisphere is not threatened at this moment cannot be deemed to be controlling. The future holds infinite possibilities, and the Doctrine remains as an essential policy to be applied wherever any exigency may arise requiring its application." The truth is that although to-day the Monroe Doctrine is unnecessary as a protection against European Powers, it is useful as a cloak when the United States intervenes in the internal affairs of one or other of the Central American republics. Such intervention may possibly be quite justifiable. But it is not difficult to foresee that the situation might become involved if, in those circumstances, a republic which was a member of the League of Nations should appeal to Geneva. Doubtless that would result in a further exposure of the actual helplessness of the League.

Since the above was written a somewhat similar situation has been created by the proposed treaty between the United States and Panama, which has already been signed by Mr. Kellogg, and by Mr. Alfaro, Panama's Minister in Washington, but has not yet been ratified by the Legislature of either country; in fact the Panama Parliament seems to be opposed to it. The Second Article of this treaty provides that with a view to a defence of the Canal, Panama "will consider herself in a state of war in case of any war in which the United States should be a belligerent." But the Covenant of the League of Nations provides for certain submissions to the Council of the League before any resort to war. While by Article XX of the Covenant all the signatories "solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any negotiations inconsistent with" the Covenant. It is obvious that the treaty in question would be a flagrant breach of this engagement. Incidentally no one could doubt that in the event of war the United States would, regardless of all else, take every precaution for the protection of the

Canal; and that, in fact, the independence of Panama, if not illusory, is at least of a limited nature. But that does not affect the point at issue.

Certainly there can be no guarantee of what the future may bring forth. In the meantime, the Monroe Doctrine is naturally dormant. But further, there is some risk not that it will be needed because of the wicked activities of any European or non-American Power, but that it may only be these very Powers who will recognize its validity. Mr. Hughes declared that "While the Monroe Doctrine is thus distinctively a policy of the United States, maintained for its own security, it is a policy which has rendered an inestimable service to the American republics by keeping them free from the intrigues and rivalries of European Powers." At times the Monroe Doctrine has doubtless performed the very service which Mr. Hughes indicated. But republics are notoriously ungrateful; and the bald fact is that to-day the various South American countries have no apprehension of European intervention in their affairs, but are fearful of interference by the United States under the guise of some application of the Monroe Doctrine. They are fully alive to the fact that, as Mr. Hughes stated, the primary object of that policy is the protection of the United States. The Chilean deputy who recently urged that the time had come for a revision of the Monroe Doctrine, so that instead of "America for the Americans" the cry should be "South America for the South Americans," was only voicing the sentiments of the vast majority of those who inhabit that continent. There is at present a keen revival of interest in Latin Europe, with which South America has far greater natural and cultural affinities than with the United States. Moreover, the League of Nations plays a part in this situation. Some years ago Chile prevented the Tacna-Arica Boundary dispute from being discussed at Geneva,

and thereby caused the retirement from the League of Peru and Bolivia. But the fashion in which the American Department of State (to which the dispute was then submitted by Chile and Peru) bungled at every step, and finally succeeded in discontenting all concerned, has impaired the prestige of the United States, and has revived that of the League of Nations.[1] Even when Brazil recently withdrew from the League because she was denied a permanent place in the Council, the other South American republics refused to take the view that the slight was one which affected the whole continent. In brief, with those countries protesting that they need no protection against Europe but that they are suspicious of what the United States might possibly do in the name of the famous Doctrine, and proclaiming that they prefer to have their disputes settled at Geneva by a tribunal of which the United States is not a member, the Monroe Doctrine would seem to be moribund.

The general foreign policy of the United States was outlined by President Coolidge in his Message to Congress in December 1923, and the lapse of three years has made no change: "For us peace reigns everywhere. We desire to perpetuate it always by granting full justice to others and requiring of others full justice to ourselves. Our country has one cardinal principle to maintain in its foreign policy. It is an American principle. It must be an American policy. We attend to our own affairs, conserve our own strength, and protect the interests of our own citizens; but we recognize thoroughly our obligation to help others, reserving to the decision of our own judgment the time, the place, and the method. We realize the common bond of humanity. We know the inescap-

[1] Since the above was written the Department of State has suggested that the problem might be solved by the sale of the disputed territory to the third claimant, Bolivia.

able law of service. Our country has definitely refused to adopt and ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations. We have not felt warranted in assuming the responsibilities which its members have assumed. I am not proposing any change in this policy; nor is the Senate. The incident, so far as we are concerned, is closed. The League exists as a foreign agency. We hope it will be helpful. But the United States sees no reason to limit its own freedom and independence of action by joining it. We shall do well to recognize this basic fact in all national affairs and govern ourselves accordingly."

Compared with the well-chosen and sometimes stately language in which President Wilson couched his communications to Congress, President Coolidge's Messages seem rather commonplace and platitudinous. But in this one direct statement he undoubtedly expressed the opinion of the majority of the country regarding participation in the work of the League of Nations. In September 1919 I went to the United States, returning some seven weeks later. By chance a well-known Member of Parliament, who during part of the war had been on official duty in Washington, travelled by the same boat as myself, both ways. Upon our return we were each asked to tell the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons [1] our opinion regarding the future action of the United States in respect to the League. The Member to whom I refer expressed the view that the existing deadlock was largely the outcome of party politics, that the nation as a whole favoured joining the League, and that it would do so after the next presidential election. I had (and have) a very sincere respect for his judgment; but I believed that in this instance he suffered from the

[1] I should make it clear that this was not (as its name might seem to indicate) one of the official committees of the House of Commons, but an entirely unofficial body, formed by a number of members, irrespective of party, for the discussion of foreign affairs.

disadvantage of having seen the country only through that most obscure of peep-holes, an Embassy window. My own acquaintance with the United States was of a different and wider nature. I had arrived at another conclusion, which was the outcome of discussing the subject with men of both parties, as well as with many whose primary interest was in business rather than in politics. Moreover, it was during this period that President Wilson had been stricken by the serious illness which forced him to abandon his attempt to gain the support of the electorate against the Senate. But although his tour was thus cut short it had lasted long enough to show conclusively that the majority of the people were absolutely devoid of interest regarding the League of Nations; and that Mr. Wilson himself had lost whatever personal hold he may ever have had. At no time was he able to arouse any real enthusiasm; while independent observers could not help being painfully impressed by the almost callous indifference with which the news of his breakdown was generally received.

In looking over a note of the meeting to which I allude, I see that I ventured to predict that the next President would be a Republican; that in two years both Congress and the bulk of the people would be even more clearly against entering the League than they were then; and that although it would be rash to assert that the United States would "never" do so, it would be equally rash to prophesy that it would do so in the proximate future. The lapse of seven years has verified this view. To-day there is a considerable number of people who, for dissimilar reasons, think that their country ought to join the League. But the vast majority, irrespective of party, is opposed to any closer connection with the affairs of Europe. The extraordinary conditions (which amounted to a demand for a preponderant position) with which the

United States Senate qualified its consent to become a member of the World Court are sufficiently significant.[1]

Apart from the Monroe Doctrine and the negative attitude assumed with respect to the League of Nations the country has no definite foreign policy. A leading New York newspaper recently said, "Neither at home nor abroad are we regarded as having any consistent or decisive programme. . . . It is not merely a consistent policy that we lack, it is a foreign policy of any kind."[2] But this is a necessary if uncomfortable result of the American Constitution and political system. Theodore Roosevelt once put the whole matter very plainly in the course of a letter to the late Sir Cecil Spring-Rice: "It would be well-nigh impossible, even if it were not highly undesirable, for this country to engage with another country to carry out any policy save one which had become part of the inherited tradition of the country, like the Monroe Doctrine. Not merely could I, for instance, only make such an engagement for four years, but I would have to reckon with a possible overthrow in Congress, with the temper of the people, with many different conditions. In consequence, my policy must of necessity be somewhat opportunist; although as a matter of fact I have very definitely concluded what I intend to do if circumstances permit, so far as this Far Eastern question is concerned."[3] It is partly this limitation of action which is responsible for the fact that neither the United States nor the former allied countries have found to their

[1] It is interesting to note that the countries which (before the Conference at Geneva, which the United States declined to attend) notified the American Government of their acceptance of her reservations were Cuba, Greece, Liberia, Albania, Luxembourg, San Domingo, and Uruguay, the latter subject to ratification by the Legislature. On the other hand, Great Britain and two other Powers have since notified Washington that they find the reservations unacceptable.

[2] See the New York *Journal of Commerce*, January 1925.

[3] See *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War*, by Tyler Dennett, pp.

liking various phases of their intercourse since the war. It is, indeed, somewhat difficult to understand why the United States, which lost immeasurably less, and gained immeasurably more than any of her principal allies, should not be well content. But throughout the country one hears dissatisfaction expressed respecting the outcome of intervention in the war. During the first two or three years of the conflict American manufacturers were kept busy supplying the needs of the belligerents; and a steady stream of gold flowed across the Atlantic. Admitting that a war was inevitable, the situation of the United States was ideal. Someone had to fill the needs of the vast forces struggling in Flanders and elsewhere; and if someone had to do it, why not the United States? The stand taken by that country was perfectly legitimate. It was also logical: for the manufacturers and the employers, who together form such an important fraction of the community, did not preach pacifism any more than the bootleggers to-day preach the repeal of the Prohibition law.[1] There were, it is true, some unpleasant moments. It is not every people which would or could permit an Ambassador of a foreign country arrogantly and deliberately (and, as the result proved, with reason) to warn its citizens that if they crossed the ocean in a certain boat they would do so at their peril. But when the first emotion of the *Lusitania* tragedy had passed, the general opinion seemed to be that money could compensate for murder; and that indemnities would be sufficient satisfaction for the lives lost. There were, indeed, thousands who thought that such an insult could not be tamely accepted, but that the bulk of the nation held another opinion was proved by the re-election of Woodrow Wilson

[1] It is only fair to add that in the days immediately preceding the outbreak of the war, a great English newspaper urged that Great Britain should stand aloof, and get rich by selling war supplies and materials to all the combatants.

for a second term. For those in charge of his campaign pleaded for votes on the specific ground that he had kept the country out of the war.

The subsequent entry of the United States meant the defeat of the Central Powers. That is, however, by no means the same thing as saying that the United States won the war; or even had the principal part in winning the war. Probably no good purpose would be served by citing in detail the extraordinary statements regarding this point which one hears, far too frequently, not only from those whose general ignorance may be their excuse, but also from men of position and intelligence. It will suffice to recall that one whose sturdy Americanism cannot be challenged, Theodore Roosevelt, said, with his habitual courage and lucidity, that the United States had not rendered as much service as the principal Allies; and that the British Navy, and the British, French, and Italian Armies had done most to bring about the downfall of Germany, thus ensuring the safety of the United States.

But the United States had a full share in dictating the terms of peace. According to President Wilson's sanguine prediction there was to be a peace without a victory; and the world was to be made safe for democracy. The state of Europe to-day might well be taken to prove that no absolute victory rested with the Allies. But, on the other hand, there has undoubtedly been a recession of the tide of democracy. Russia is controlled by a minority which spurns the majority and rules with an autocracy quite as defiant as was ever shown by the Romanoffs. Turkey is not a democratic republic any more than Bulgaria is a constitutional monarchy. In Greece, in Hungary, and in Spain there are military dictatorships. While Italy is flourishing (and I use the word "flourishing" advisedly: flourishing as it never did before) under a despotism which has reduced Parlia-

ment to an ignoble cipher; which openly and forcibly refuses any rights to any minority; which has throttled the Press; and which now contemplates making criticism of the government by any Italians living abroad an offence punishable by the loss of citizenship and the confiscation of property.[1] Never in the life of living man was democracy at so low an ebb.

How far these conditions are a reaction which was inevitable after the war, or to what extent the Treaty of Versailles contributed to produce them, is a purely speculative inquiry. But in any event that treaty was largely the work of Woodrow Wilson. If the representatives of the European Powers had been left to themselves they would have effected a very different arrangement, and one more suited to the circumstances. The United States might be expected to remember that it was its dictatorial representative who saddled Europe with a treaty which was not at all to its liking; and that it was the American Senate which then (as indeed it had a right to do) left Europe in the lurch to make its way out of the muddle as best it could. Yet instead of any such sentiment, one observes throughout the country a kind of fretfulness because cisatlantic nations are still in the trough of trouble; and a disposition to say, in the words of Lord Melbourne: "Damn it, why can't every one keep quiet?"

It would be misleading to suggest that President Wilson secured the peace that he wanted. On the contrary, the Treaty of Versailles contained much of which he did not approve; and omitted much which he would have preferred to have seen included. He was sometimes outwitted; and, after they had found the weak joints in his armour, sometimes overborne by M. Clemenceau

[1] It will be noted that whereas in Russia a minority ignores the rights of a majority, in Italy it is a majority which imposes its will on a minority; and as the rule of the majority is said to be the basis of true democracy, Mussolini's government is perhaps as democratic as it certainly is national.

and Mr. Lloyd George. He was more than once obliged to be traitorous to his own avowed principles: notably in regard to the treatment of China, and the inclusion of pensions in the German debt. Yet in many respects he moulded the Treaty to suit his own views by throwing in the balance the weight of the great country which he represented, and which finally rejected his work; thus leaving the Allies to bear the brunt of a Treaty to which they had agreed solely in order to obtain the support of the United States in safeguarding its execution. For this Mr. Wilson was directly responsible. The statesmen of all the great Allied nations were wise enough to realize that it needed the full strength of a coalition government to make a peace which would be satisfactory to their fellow-countrymen. But Mr. Wilson made it a party question; although in fact he did not even have the same plenary constitutional powers as did his colleagues at the Peace Conference. However, Mr. Wilson ruled that only his party—and, indeed, only himself as leader of that party—should have anything to do with the making of the Treaty. Although he was not only his own Prime Minister but also the chief executive of the Government, thus occupying a position held by no one else at the Peace Conference, he alone came to Paris representing his party rather than his country; and he alone saw his work repudiated by the legislature of his country. His attitude is the more extraordinary when one remembers that he was, of course, fully aware that his party had no solid majority in the Senate; and that only a few weeks before the Conference opened his injudicious appeal to the electorate to support his party on national grounds had been rejected at the polls.

How tragic was his error—one which probably cost him his own life, and which certainly wrought incalculable harm to the whole world—was recognized

even by impartial friends and well-wishers. Writing in October 1919 Sir William Osler, himself then ill in bed, and a dying man, said: "We are all so unhappy about Wilson—poor man, no wonder he has broken down. Think of the strain of these years. And the pity of it all is that had he come over as President of the United States and not as head of the Democratic party, and had Root with him, all this delay and trouble would have been saved. Damn Politics and Parties." [1]

The explanation, if not the excuse, for the futile course pursued by President Wilson is to be found partly in his lack of experience, and partly in his character.

Woodrow Wilson, after having been a school-teacher or college professor all the days of his working life, became Governor of New Jersey, when his defeat in a factional fight, which had been bitterly waged for some years, would in any event have entailed his resignation as president of Princeton. Two years later he became President of the United States. He therefore took up the burdens of what is perhaps the most responsible office in the world, practically without any political experience; a picture which throws into bold relief the advantage of having properly trained constitutional rulers. There had, it is true, been in comparatively recent times one other President who also arrived in Washington with a somewhat slim record of previous public service; and, curiously, that was the only other Democratic President elected since the Civil War. Grover Cleveland

[1] See *The Life of Sir William Osler*, by Harvey Cushing, vol. ii. p. 670. Statesmen themselves sometimes have cause to realize the drawbacks of their calling. Soon after Lord Salisbury had felt obliged to leave out of his Cabinet Lord Iddesleigh, who had been his colleague for many years, the latter suddenly died in his ante-room. Lord Salisbury wrote: "As I looked upon the dead body stretched before me, I felt that politics was a cursed profession."

passed from being successively Sheriff and Mayor of Buffalo, to the governorship of the State of New York; and from that post directly to the White House. But, apart from the essential difference of character, there was the further important distinction that Cleveland, as a practising lawyer, had dealt with men and affairs all his life.[1] Wilson, however, was not a man of any worldly knowledge. Even his literary attainments were more scholastic than scholarly. He was not one of those students whom time mellows. One fancies that he would have been different had he been a lover and constant reader of the Classics, which often—more often than is generally supposed—have a profound influence in later life. But his knowledge and his mental tendencies were largely pedantic; and the passage of years only rendered him more self-contained and self-sufficient and eventually impaired his sense of proportion. Woodrow Wilson's high ideals are not generally questioned; although possibly Roosevelt was right when (in a letter written only a few days before his death to Mr. Ogden Reid, editor of the *New York Tribune*) he said, with some emphasis, that Wilson was a doctrinaire rather than an idealist. But tragedy lay in the fact that while idealism may serve as a beacon, it is not immediately transmutable into results; and that, in any event, Wilson was the last man to attain any measure of success in that delicate task. One of his fellow-citizens, who appears to have been in sympathy with him during his lifetime, and who to-day remains amongst his admirers, has summarized

[1] It is a strange coincidence that on his retirement after his second term, Grover Cleveland elected to spend the rest of his days in Princeton, where Wilson was then a professor. It is said, however, that there was far from being any sympathy between the man who had been the first Democratic President after the Civil War and the one who was destined to become the second; and that, indeed, Mr. Cleveland looked with little favour upon Mr. Wilson.

his character in a manner which leaves little to be said: "His inexperience in the business of national politics, his unfamiliarity with the names and characters of men, his vast indifference to patronage and the assumption that he often made of his own mental superiority over others—that is to say, his major delusion that he had a first-class mind—led him into many blunders, many inconsistent positions for a liberal to take. . . . It was the fundamental and fatal weakness of Woodrow Wilson that, constituted as he was, he trusted his own powers, his 'first-class mind.' He did not see that he must convince his adversaries. He had dreamed of a world too noble for its inhabitants; so naturally he set out upon a task too high for his own mortal achievement. His Peace Commission carried no weight with it either in America or Europe." [1]

But perhaps the most perfect likeness of Woodrow Wilson was the one which he himself sketched of Jefferson Davis: "He had the pride, the spirit of initiation, the capacity in business which qualify men for leadership, and lacked nothing of indomitable will and imperious purpose, to make his leadership effective. What he did lack was wisdom in dealing with men, willingness to take the judgment of others in critical matters of business, the instinct which recognizes ability in others and trusts it to the utmost to play its independent part. He too much loved to rule, had too overweening a confidence in himself, and took leave to act as if he understood better than those did who were in actual command what should be done in the field. He sought to control too many things with too feminine a jealousy of any rivalry in authority."

It is, however, extraordinary that at the Peace Conference the Allies, and especially France, should apparently

[1] See *Woodrow Wilson*, by William Allen White, pp. 292 and 874.

have taken it for granted that the Treaty would be ratified by the United States Senate. It will be remembered that, after a stubborn contest, M. Clemenceau finally abandoned his demand for the permanent occupation of the left bank of the Rhine; and agreed to an occupation limited to fifteen years in consideration of a guarantee of military aid by Great Britain and the United States in the event of France being attacked by Germany. It was, however, specified that the British guarantee would not be effective unless the one signed by President Wilson likewise became applicable. Some years ago, in another work, I pointed out how the Treaty was presented to the French Parliament without any reference to its being rejected in the United States or to the consequences which would then ensue: "Certainly M. Clemenceau and his French colleagues did not attach sufficient importance to the probability of the Treaty not being ratified by Congress. That appears clearly from M. Tardieu's own statement to the Chambre des Députés on September 2, 1919:

"'La question qui se pose à vous, après s'être posée à nous, est aussi simple qu'elle est grave. Elle se pose dans une seule formule que je vais mettre devant vos yeux, et sur laquelle de même que le Gouvernement a décidé, vous aurez dans quelques jours à décider aussi. Cette question, la voici: laquelle des deux solutions suivantes valait le mieux pour la France? Ou bien l'occupation d'une rive gauche du Rhin separée de l'Allemagne pour une durée non définie, mais avec nos seuls moyens, mais sous notre propre responsabilité, mais dans une position d'isolement politique et militaire en face d'un pays toujours plus peuplé que le nôtre, mais aussi sans droit contractuel de vérifier ce qui se passait en Allemagne au point de vue militaire: mais enfin et surtout malgré les objections formelles de la Grande-Bretagne et des Etats-Unis; ou bien, l'occupation de

cette même rive gauche qui demeure allemande dans les conditions qui définit le traité, mais avec le droit de prolonger l'occupation et de réoccuper, mais aussi avec la destruction des fortresses Rhénanes et la neutralisation de la rive gauche de 50 kilomètres sur la rive droite, mais aussi avec le droit d'investigation, mais aussi avec la participation de nos Alliés à l'occupation Rhénane, mais enfin et surtout avec l'engagement d'aide militaire immédiate de la Grande-Bretagne et des Etats-Unis ? '

" This succinct statement proves clearly that either M. Tardieu did not take into account the possibility of the treaties being rejected by the United States (thus causing the alliance with Great Britain also to fall to the ground); or that he consciously did not place the matter fairly before the Chambre. The latter hypothesis is of course untenable. There remains, therefore, no doubt that the repudiation of the treaties by Congress was not seriously considered. Otherwise, would M. Tardieu have dared to direct the attention of the Chambre ' Enfin et surtout ' to the military engagements of Great Britain and France, without drawing attention to the fact that, in the event of such rejection, France would be in the position of having irrevocably surrendered her claim to permanent occupation without getting any guarantee of assistance if attacked ? " [1]

It seems almost incredible that, with so much at stake, Mr. Wilson was not interrogated as to his own belief about ratification by a Senate in which he could not count upon any sure majority. His only public pronouncement on the subject had been his speech during the brief visit he made to the United States in the course of the Peace Conference, when he stated that he would weld together the League of Nations and the Versailles Treaty in such a manner that his political opponents

[1] See *The Pomp of Power*, pp. 288–91.

would be unable to accept the Treaty and to reject the League. Evidently even then he anticipated opposition. But what he did not foresee was that the result of these tactics might be the defeat of the Treaty itself. Of all the secrets of the Peace Conference the one which legitimately arouses the most interest, and, in the last analysis, one that is vital to Woodrow Wilson's fame, is whether he privately communicated to M. Clemenceau or to Mr. Lloyd George, his own opinion. If so, did he say that he was certain of ratification, or that it was likely, or unlikely, or doubtful ?

I believe that I am correct in stating that Mr. Wilson was never directly asked to and never did express any definite view regarding this matter to the representatives of the other Powers. M. Tardieu has admitted that, in any event, the British and French Governments were not entirely unaware of the position. Indeed, the fact that it was specifically provided that the British guarantee should not be effective unless and until the American Senate ratified the similar undertaking given by President Wilson, indicates clearly that the possibility of rejection was in the minds of the English and French plenipotentiaries. M. Tardieu asks what else he and his colleagues could have done. It is probable that they made the best bargain they could; and it is possible that they made a better bargain than any one else would have made. But M. Tardieu skips an important point —the point I am here discussing—namely, what did the representatives of France actually think at the time would be the result ? One would gather from M. Tardieu's book [1] that they were fully alive to the risk, but that they accepted it with their eyes open, as a *pis aller*. Writing a few months later than M. Tardieu I said, " My own conviction, based upon various conversations which

[1] See *La Paix*, by André Tardieu.

took place at that period, is that, whatever M. Tardieu himself may have thought, the belief prevalent amongst both French and English statesmen was that Mr. Wilson would obtain ratification of the Treaty. They appeared to attach little importance to the fact that the American Senate had on prior occasions rejected treaties signed by American plenipotentiaries. Nor were their views greatly influenced by the knowledge that Wilson was faced by a hostile majority, which he had done nothing to conciliate, and had, indeed, further antagonized." [1]

But I am now able to state that it was M. Tardieu himself (who spoke with some authority because during the war he had spent a considerable time in the United States) who constantly told M. Clemenceau that the Treaty was certain to be ratified, and that the country would be behind President Wilson. While on the other hand, the French Ambassador at Washington, M. Jusserand, more than once during this period warned his Government that Mr. Wilson would have the support neither of the politicians nor of the electorate. But the insistence of M. Tardieu (and who can be more insistent ?) prevailed. Even if no better arrangement could have been obtained, the facts remain that it was M. Tardieu who advised that the guarantee of military assistance in time of need would certainly be confirmed ; and that his advice was wrong.

But if it seems incredible that no serious effort was made to discover the prospects of ratification, that was only one of the strange omissions which distinguished the Peace Conference. It is difficult to believe, but it is true, that there was never any verification of the credentials and powers of the delegates. Presumably this formality was forgotten or neglected, because it was largely a meeting of Prime Ministers, all of whom knew

[1] *The Pomp of Power*, pp. 292–3.

each other more or less well—the war had at least done that much. But if the Conference had at the outset proceeded (as it should have done) to an examination of credentials, attention would from the very first have been directed to the fact that President Wilson was not the potent statesman he was held to be; but that, on the contrary, he had far less powers for making a treaty than any of the other principal delegates. As Senator Lodge had pointed out nearly twenty years earlier, a treaty made by the President of the United States with a foreign Power is only "a mere project for a treaty." If that had been clearly understood from the day Mr. Wilson arrived in France there would have been a very different Treaty of Versailles.

The British Foreign Office must have been fully alive to the situation. It had already had experience in negotiating a convention with a President of the United States and then being obliged to reconsider it as amended by the Senate. Lord Lansdowne, when Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, expressed his surprise that, after the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty had been signed, it should have been changed by a legislative body. Senator Lodge (who, as a New York hostess once told Lord Ullswater, "discriminated against the English") put the matter bluntly: "Mr. Hay and Lord Pauncefote open the negotiation for the modification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. . . . After due discussion they agree upon and sign a treaty. That agreement, so far as Great Britain was concerned, requires only the approval of the King for its completion, but with the United States it is very different, because no treaty can be ratified by the President of the United States without the consent of the Senate. . . . But he (Lord Lansdowne) does not seem to have realized that the Senate could properly continue the negotiations begun by Mr. Hay and Lord

Pauncefote by offering new or modified propositions to His Majesty's Government."[1]

Obviously treaty-making in such conditions is more difficult than satisfactory. But the United States is sporadically equally original in the conduct of every branch of foreign affairs. This sometimes arises from the fact that, while the State Department possesses many experienced officials, the diplomatic service counts in its ranks comparatively few men of ability who intend to stay in the career.[2] The situation in this respect is better than it was twenty years ago; but even to-day the great prizes are too often bestowed as the reward of political services: and as the value of the services rendered is generally taken into consideration rather than the fitness of the candidate for the post, the result has sometimes been curious. I am quite aware that British ambassadors are also occasionally chosen outside the ranks of the *carrière*. There are sometimes special circumstances which render this desirable; although it is, I think, always regrettable when the public welfare does exact that the great rewards should be withheld from those who have given a lifetime to the service of their country abroad. Such an appointment was that of Lord Reading to Washington. But this and some similar appointments were made solely on account of the peculiar fitness of the person in question to meet the exigencies of the

[1] See *Scribner's Magazine*, 1902.

[2] Chief Justice Taft rendered a doubtful service when, at the beginning of his term of office as President, he displaced, for personal reasons, Mr. Henry White, who was one of the few thoroughly trained American diplomats. —Since this note was written, I have seen that Roosevelt, in writing to Sir George Trevelyan, spoke of Mr. White as "The best man in our diplomatic service, who had, most unfortunately and improperly, and for reasons of unspeakable triviality, been turned out of the service by President Taft" (see *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, by Joseph Bucklin Bishop, vol. ii. p. 125). I believe that in certain circles there is no great secret as to what were thought to be President Taft's reasons; but I am unaware that they have ever been stated in print.

situation, and were in no sense an advancement or a reward.[1]

It is worth remembering that the United States has always given of its best in choosing ambassadors to send to the Court of St. James. John Hay, Joseph Choate, Whitelaw Reid, Walter Page, and Mr. J. W. Davis (without going farther back), are a few of the names which will occur to every one, and they followed predecessors who were equally distinguished. The present Ambassador, Mr. Alanson Houghton, is of a type somewhat different from those I have mentioned, but on the other hand he is still farther removed from those successful politicians who prove to be so incompetent in diplomacy. A member of a family which for some generations has been prominent in business, himself a practical man of affairs, with some intellectual proclivities, he has also that natural dignity which is an essential in diplomacy. But it must be added that, when Ambassador in Berlin, Mr. Houghton gave marked evidence of being out of sympathy with the French and French claims, and of being more friendly towards Germany and her representatives; while he has more than once plainly evinced the same predisposition since coming to London. But it was as recently as March 1926 that he was responsible for an incident which might have proved serious; and which showed how even a clever but comparatively inexperienced diplomat may unwittingly fall into a trap of his own making.

Mr. Houghton was at that time taking a brief holiday in the United States. He had been received by President Coolidge and had made his report to the State Department regarding the situation in Europe. A day or two later he gave an interview to the Washington

[1] I might add that Mr. Gladstone once expressed himself as preferring ambassadors *ad hoc* to professional diplomats.

correspondents of various European and American newspapers. At an informal gathering of that nature Mr. Houghton can speak exceedingly well. The correspondents quickly noticed that they were getting something different and much better than what they were accustomed to obtain from the average ambassador on leave in Washington. The fact that Mr. Houghton's observations were tinged with sarcasm and a touch of malice betrayed one of his temperamental defects as a diplomat; but only added zest to the occasion for the correspondents. Their enthusiasm (which was purely professional) visibly communicated itself to Mr. Houghton; who is more accustomed to formal although well-deserved tributes to his ability, than to any more personal or popular form of success. Quite obviously this led him to go somewhat farther, and to speak somewhat more freely than he would have done upon mature reflection: l'appétit vient en mangeant. His customary caution deserted a very cautious man.

Without attempting to give a complete summary of the remarks which the correspondents immediately found so interesting, and which, twenty-four hours too late, Mr. Houghton and the State Department found so embarrassing, it will suffice to recall that he declared, *inter alia*, that European statesmen had learned nothing from the war, that Europe did not want disarmament, and that the League of Nations was developing into an ordinary continental alliance.

It is, I think, more easy to take exception to Mr. Houghton's wisdom and good taste in making such comments than it is to impugn their accuracy. The last of the assertions I have quoted is undoubtedly exact; that referring to disarmament is partially true—European countries would like limited disarmament, but each on its own terms; while the criticism of European states-

men is merely a matter of Mr. Houghton's personal opinion. The outburst of indignation when the Ambassador's statements were cabled to France was caused partly by the openly hostile tone in which he referred to that country, and by his effort to make it appear militarist; but mainly by the fact that his statements were taken as being equivalent to the publication of his official report to the President and to the Department of State. The latter promptly cabled instructions to the American Embassy in Paris to publish the following denial: "The State Department announces that neither Ambassador Houghton nor Minister Gibson communicated to other than officials the nature of their reports to the President or Secretary of State." That was the exact letter but was very far from being the spirit of the truth. Mr. Houghton never told the correspondents what he had or had not said to the President or to the State Department. But what had happened was very simple. At least one of the correspondents promptly realized that, in the circumstances, Mr. Houghton could not have used two voices. An experienced diplomat might well have disclosed to the President and to the Secretary of State his opinion that Europe in general and France in particular were rotten to the core; and have subsequently informed newspaper correspondents that everything was for the best in the best of all possible worlds. But it was clearly incredible that any Ambassador on leave should first have given the President and the State Department a glowing account about conditions in Europe, and then have confided to the correspondents, in terms of barely veiled contempt, that European countries were wallowing in the trough of ruin, and that their leaders were incompetent. Clearly he must have told his official superiors as much, if not more, than he told the applauding correspondents. The accounts of

the interview, therefore, properly stated that he had painted this picture of the position for the President and the Secretary of State: a fact which has never been, and which, of course, cannot be denied.

It has been said that an Ambassador is a man who goes abroad to lie for his country. But Mr. Houghton, who probably has little use for diplomatic traditions, proved to be an Ambassador who came home to tell the truth (as he saw it) to his country.

What I have already recounted will show the thorny path that all Foreign Offices must tread in their diplomatic intercourse with the United States. I propose now to examine briefly the chief diplomatic adventure upon which the latter has embarked since the war—the summoning of the nations to the Washington Conference—and its policy, so far as it appears to be fixed, upon the major matters coming within the scope of its interests.

In 1916 Congress passed a Naval Appropriation Act which provided for the expenditure of more than $500,000,000 upon naval construction. The execution of this programme was suspended on account of the war. After the Armistice the keels of a number of ships were laid down, and the whole plan, which was even extended, received the support of President Harding's Republican administration. What then led to the calling of the Washington Conference, with its central idea of seeking a basis for the limitation of naval armaments? For if the Conference was successful it manifestly entailed the abandonment of the 1916 programme, the completion of which had been, up to that time, the avowed policy of the American Government.

There is no reason to doubt the absolute sincerity of Mr. Hughes's personal belief in the desirability of disarmament. Indeed, I think it may further be said that the country as a whole welcomed the Conference

for the very reason that it thought that after having refused to join the League of Nations it was timely to make some open contribution to the world's peace. But it is equally certain that there would have been no Conference at the instance of the United States, had there not also been the expectation that, within perfectly legitimate bounds, the result would be favourable to that country. It has been suggested that the policy of constructing and maintaining a greatly increased navy was given up because of the difficulty already found in manning ships. But one must look farther and deeper for the real reasons. They were two in number. In the first place it was discovered that, with the greatly increased cost of construction, the 1916 plan would place upon the taxpayers a burden which would be thought intolerable. The party leaders realized that to have prevented the country from entering the League of Nations, while presenting it instead with an annual naval account of colossal proportions, would not make either for popularity or for votes at the next election.

There was also the question of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This pact had originally been made in 1902. It was revised and renewed in 1905; and again, for a period of ten years, in 1911. But in order to guard against ever being called upon to take the part of Japan in a conflict with the United States, the British Foreign Office then insisted upon the insertion of a provision which relieved either of the parties to the Alliance from the obligation of going to war against any country with which it had a general arbitration treaty. This limitation aroused the most bitter opposition in Japan. There was no secret about its object. Indeed, Lord Bryce and the American Secretary of State, Mr. Knox, had concluded negotiations for such a treaty as was contemplated by the clause I have cited.

Article III of this convention provided that any disagreement between Great Britain and the United States as to whether or not the dispute was a subject for arbitration thereunder, should be submitted to the Joint High Commission of Inquiry composed of three members from each country; and that arbitration should ensue only if all, or all but one, of the members of the Joint High Commission decided that the dispute fell within the scope of the Treaty. But when submitted to the Senate it was rejected upon the ground that this clause providing for the mode of determining whether or not any particular matter fell within the scope of the Treaty, and making unanimity less one vote necessary for an operative decision, was a surrender of sovereign power. An arbitration treaty which allows each party to decide for itself what can be arbitrated thereunder, is manifestly of little value. The result of the Senate's action was to defeat the friendly intentions of the British Government; and to leave the United States uncovered as against the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This was finally remedied in September 1914 when an agreement, known as the Peace Commission Treaty, was negotiated by Sir Cecil Spring-Rice and Mr. Bryan; which the British Foreign Office notified Japan it would regard as a general arbitration treaty within the meaning of the modification inserted in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in 1911.

Although it was said that this Alliance was based largely on commercial considerations, there is no doubt that in reality Great Britain sought protection against Germany and Russia. The development of its own foreign policy, as well as the course of subsequent events in 1922, rendered this partly unnecessary. Even before the war, when the Alliance was still useful to Great Britain, it had sometimes proved embarrassing. Cecil Spring-Rice told Roosevelt that it had almost cost Eng-

land the understanding with France.[1] After the war England had little to gain by it, except as an offset to the pending augmentation of the American Navy. But without any actual renewal for a specified period it continued in force after 1921, on the ground that it had not been expressly denounced. Great Britain and Japan, however, jointly notified the League of Nations that if in any instance the procedure under the Alliance was inconsistent with that of the Covenant of the League, they would adopt the latter.

One of the principal results of the Washington Conference was the cancellation of this Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Its place was taken by the Four-Power Agreement, whereby the British Empire, the United States, France, and Japan undertook to respect the rights of each other in "their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean." But it was also agreed that the *status quo* should be maintained in regard to fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific; an exception being made for the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, the "islands composing Japan proper," and the coasts of the United States and Canada. How great this concession was on the part of the United States appears when one remembers that in 1921 it had no naval base in the Pacific for a large fleet, although there were several places at which one might have been made. Moreover, the island of Guam, which is only 1,400 miles from Japan, and the Philippines, are both so weakly fortified that Japan would have no trouble in seizing them at the outset of a war. The abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance did, indeed, relieve the United States from any possibility of ever having to confront the united British and Japanese fleets. In reality that was never considered to be a serious possi-

[1] *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War*, by Tyler Dennett, p. 60.

bility. But the American Government objected to the Alliance because it thought that its very existence encouraged an aggressive military spirit in Japan. The other view (and I believe the sounder one) was that that disadvantage, if, indeed, it was one in fact, was more than outweighed by the advantage that during its continuance England could always exercise a certain control over Japan.

But in any event I am unable to agree with those who contend that the cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a diplomatic victory for the United States. That was undoubtedly one of the aims of the American Administration when it called the Conference. But too much was paid for the result. England lost nothing by the termination of the Alliance, which had, from her standpoint, served its purpose and outlived its usefulness; although when Japan's stand forced the British Government to agree not to develop Hong-Kong, it was compelled to proceed to make Singapore a great naval base. Japan, which had received the invitation to the Conference with suspicion, especially as it had already arranged for a naval-construction programme almost as vast as that contemplated in 1916 by the United States, came to Washington rather unwillingly. However, she obtained in the Four-Power Agreement some security in place of that alliance with Great Britain which was so greatly cherished by the Japanese people. But above all she scored a material success in wringing from the United States the undertaking whereby there can never be any American naval base nearer Japan than Hawaii, and Guam and the Philippines are left practically undefended. Upon the whole transaction the United States was certainly a poor third.[1]

[1] While the United States trade with the whole world increased about 100 per cent. from 1918 to 1925 its trade with Asia increased about 800 per

Nor has the naval-disarmament agreement operated to her advantage. Briefly, this provides for what is known as the Five-Five-Three standard. That is, in the final rearrangement the capital-ship tonnage displacement of the navies of the British Empire and of the United States shall not exceed 525,000 tons each, and that of Japan shall not exceed 315,000 tons; France and Italy both being limited to 175,000 tons. No ship exceeding 35,000 tons displacement is to be constructed or acquired by any of the countries signing the treaty; and no capital ship is to carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 16 inches. It should be explained that a capital ship is defined as being a vessel of war having a displacement in excess of 10,000 tons, or carrying a gun with a calibre over 8 inches. The agreement was a boon to Great Britain; which, at the moment, would have been financially unable to compete with the scale of shipbuilding upon which the American Government had proposed to engage.

However, since the Washington Conference it has been abundantly demonstrated that it was a vital error to have circumscribed the construction of any particular class of ships, instead of making the restriction apply to the total tonnage of all classes computed together. For, as the Five-Five-Three ratio does not apply to ships under 10,000 tons, England, France, and Japan are now busily engaged in increasing their respective navies, in different degrees, by vessels under 10,000 tons, which are, therefore, unaffected by the decisions of the Washington Conference. The United States, however, seems to be standing somewhat apart from this competitive augmentation. To-day its Navy is inferior

cent. during the same period. The foreign trade of the Philippines has increased about 500 per cent. in the last twenty years. Its present annual value is nearly $300,000,000; and about 66 per cent. of the total is with the United States.

to the British Navy in cruisers. Just what is the comparison with Japan, it is difficult to say. But it is known that great activity in naval construction prevails in that country. Sir Herbert Russell, who was formerly Reuter's special correspondent in Japan, is responsible for the statement that "her shipyards are humming with activity, in the construction of every type of warcraft which the terms of the compact leave her free to build. Her current programme, not merely proposed, but actually in various stages of materialization, is as big, in point of total tonnage, as those of the United States and Great Britain combined"; while the latest news from Japan is that the naval-construction budget (which, however, has not yet been passed by the Diet) has been fixed at 285,000,000 yen, for the five-year period until 1931; being somewhat less than the 294,000,000 yen spread over a four-year period, which was demanded by the Naval Ministry, but considerably more than the 170,000,000 yen originally offered by the Finance Minister, who claimed that the national finances could not bear any greater strain. The provisional programme for the five-year period now includes four 10,000-ton cruisers, sixteen 1,700-ton destroyers, one 2,000-ton submarine, four 1,700-ton submarines, and three river gunboats.

Upon the whole it is clear to-day—and it will, I think, be even clearer in the future—that the Washington Conference was an ill venture for the United States, and that her diplomacy was at fault. But I know no warrant for Admiral Rodgers's statement that the Conference was inspired by England.[1] The American Government conceived the idea and launched the invitations; and would have been very irate at the time had any attempt

[1] In the course of a meeting of the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, Mass., in August 1926.

been made to deprive it of this credit. It is true that Great Britain was entirely responsive to the suggestions for a conference made by Washington. Each country entered the Conference with the intention of attaining aims that were not very dissimilar; but also with the further proper intention of zealously guarding its own interests. I agree with Admiral Rodgers that in that Great Britain was more successful than the United States.

The discussion of the Conference leads to what sensational newspapers, in California and elsewhere on the Pacific Coast, were wont to call the Japanese Peril. The workings of the Japanese mind are as impenetrable as is the actual situation in Japan at any given moment. It is impossible to say whether or not the Japanese are unduly inflated by their speedy rise to world power—a feat which is without parallel in modern history. Do they contemplate any further extension of their domination? To what point does their ambition reach? Theodore Roosevelt, who at one stage certainly trusted them too much, ended by having an uneasy feeling on the subject. Writing to Cecil Spring-Rice he said, "I wish I were certain that the Japanese down at bottom did not lump Russians, English, Americans, Germans, all of us, simply as white devils inferior to themselves, not only in what they regard as the essentials of civilization, but in courage and forethought, to be treated politely only so long as would enable the Japanese to take advantage of our various national jealousies, and beat us in turn." [1]

All that can be confidently asserted is that their policy seems to be directed towards the acquisition, or the control, in one way or another, of the greater part of the former Chinese Empire. Certainly the manner in which, during the war, Japan secretly took advantage

[1] *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War*, by Tyler Dennett, p. 47.

of the opportunity to force China, a country with which she was at peace, to sign a treaty making various concessions of the most important nature, while seeking to compel the Chinese Government not to disclose the agreement to Japan's own allies, was one of the most treacherous actions of which recent history has any record. But although Japan has perforce changed her methods she has not altered her aims. To-day, while turning to her own account as best she can the civil conflict raging in the country, she seems inclined to align the Chinese with the Japanese people against any future interference by Europe or the United States; and there is little doubt that that will be her policy if and when the present Bolshevist movement is checked—or the Nationalist movement subsides. This is not indicative of any change of heart. For although there has been an outburst of liberalism in Japan, the military caste is still in force. But Japan realizes that any forcible dismemberment would only lead China to appeal to the Powers.

Japan also has its population problem. The increase is over 750,000 annually. The last census of which there is a complete record gave a total of 59,736,764 for Japan proper, being an increase of 4,000,000 over the preceding census taken five years earlier. Undoubtedly overpopulation and the want of an outlet has led to many a war; and in Japan the fate of the crops decides the annual lot of the vast poor population. The impression is sometimes given that the Japanese are being bottled up as a result of their exclusion by the United States and by some of the British Dominions. But the fact is that the Japanese are not colonizers, and that it is extremely difficult to persuade them to leave their native country. Despite all efforts there are to-day only 332,000 Japanese in Korea, out of a total popula-

tion of 17,005,000.[1] The number of Japanese living abroad in 1920, according to an official statement, was 581,400. Of these 134,000 were in China, 120,000 in the Hawaiian Islands, and about the same number in the United States. Both the Japanese and the Brazilian Governments have done their utmost to encourage Japanese to emigrate to Brazil; but the total number in that country is less than 40,000. Nevertheless there is great bitterness in Japan on account of the exclusion from the United States. This resentment is caused largely by the fact that the Japanese are in this measure put on the same level as all other Asiatics; for although they keenly contend for their own equality with the white races, they will not admit that other Asiatics are on a basis of equality with themselves.

The idea that there should ever be a war between the United States and Japan, seems at first sight to be preposterous. I leave on one side the question of what cause could arise—for the intentions of nations are often a sufficient and the only real cause; in the words of Gibbon, "for every war a motive of safety or revenge, of honour or zeal, or right or convenience, may readily be found in the jurisprudence of conquerors." The Spanish-American War may serve to illustrate this dictum. But it would seem that the certainty of an American victory would deter Japan from such a mad enterprise. However, according to Sir Herbert Russell the Japanese argument is "Could the United States hope to win a war with her, with Manchuria as the objective? From the Panama Canal to Tsushima is a mighty long stretch, and a stretch unrelieved by any bases on the way—assuming Guam and the Philippines to have been seized—nor with any recuperating haven at the end."

I believe that it is more likely than not that the

[1] See *International Relations*, by Raymond Leslie Buell, p. 169.

inevitable course of events will one day bring about this most extraordinary conflict. It will necessarily be mainly, if not entirely, a naval war; and war at sea is even more uncertain than war on land. I think it not only possible but probable that the United States will suffer great humiliation and grave reverses; but impossible that she should not finally be the victor. Claude Farrère, who resembles the late Pierre Loti, not only in having been an officer in the French Navy, but in his love of the East, and in his detestation of Anglo-Saxons and all their works, predicts that there will be a clash in the Pacific, and adds: "Au fait, c'est tant pis pour les gens qui forcèrent, en 1854, le Japon à sortir de cet isolement séculaire dans lequel il se complaisait et qu'il n'aurait jamais brisé volontairement. Ces gens-là n'est-ce-pas ?—les gens de commodore Perry—étaient Américains ?—Alors, à chacun selon ses œuvres ! et tant pis pour l'Amérique, si plus tard elle regrette un geste qui fut exclusivement américain"; and he concludes by prophesying that the Japanese will inflict an overwhelming defeat upon the Anglo-Saxons.[1] Perhaps, after all, Commodore Perry did not do such a good day's work for his country when he forced Japan to open her door. In any event it is curious that the United States, which compelled the Japanese to renew their relationship with the rest of the world, and to allow foreigners to penetrate their territory, should, three-quarters of a century thereafter, feel obliged to bar Japanese from entering her own ports.

In the meantime the situation does not render any

[1] See *Mes Voyages*, p. 281. Incidentally the author makes a curious error when he says (page 279), translation: "There are as yet only one hundred and twenty millions in Japan, while the United States counts a much greater number of citizens." The population of Japan is really about sixty-five millions, and that of the United States is probably something under one hundred and twenty millions.

less difficult the task of the United States in the Philippines. For a number of years these islands were admirably governed, and the natives were slowly but surely being taught how to govern themselves. But during President Wilson's administration there was a complete change of policy. Congress passed a law—the Jones Act—the preamble of which gave the Filipinos reason to believe that they were to be granted their independence almost immediately. So long as Mr. Wilson remained President the Governor-General then in office, Mr. Burton Harrison, generally interpreted and administered this law in the sense of the preamble rather than in that indicated by the body of the enactment. Upon the return to power of the Republican party there was a reversal to the former system, despite an agitation which to some extent still continues. The Republican policy seems to be based upon an undertaking to give the Filipinos their independence when they show that they are able and willing to establish an independent and democratic (using that word in its non-party sense) form of government; and when, in these circumstances, they profess a desire for complete independence. It may be remarked in passing that the proviso that the government should be democratic in its nature is not without its significance. For when an increased measure of control was placed in the hands of the Filipinos, the politicians promptly showed that a class government was more to their taste. There can, indeed, be no reasonable doubt that the Filipinos are not yet, and for many years to come will not be, fit to maintain a democratic form of self-government. But even if that sufficient reason were absent, political necessity would prevent the United States from permitting at present an independent republic in the Philippines. For Japan might then acquire there, by arrangement or otherwise,

a site for a naval base; and that alone would enable her "to isolate Eastern Asia from commercial or political or military relations with, or support from, either Europe or America." [1]

I have indicated generally the outline of the foreign policy of the United States; as well as the difficulties inseparable in diplomatic relations or negotiations with Washington. But this will not be permanent. Leaving aside any question of the League of Nations, and without discussing the traditional practice of holding aloof from other countries, I have no doubt that the United States will eventually be brought into closer relations with Europe; and precisely because, for economic reasons, that will, in the course of time, be the policy most to her advantage. In the meantime, it must be confessed that the United States is not creating any reserve of amity amongst European nations. Upon the whole this is not so much the result of anything she has done or has not done, as the misapprehension, suspicion, and irritability, aroused by the amazing difference between her idealistic professions for the welfare of the world, and her almost uniform practice of ruthlessly seeking and enforcing her own material advantage without much consideration for any other country.[2] Europe, with its long and varied past, could not be surprised by the sight of any country thinking only of its own interests. But the logical Latin races are shocked by the crudeness which permits these declarations, and the conduct so inconsistent with them, to synchronize with an impudence

[1] See "Relations in the Far East," by William Howard Gardiner, in *The Atlantic Monthly*, April 1924.

[2] Possibly one should make an exception for the surrender, at the Washington Conference, of the right to fortify the Philippines and Guam (although I am not expressing any opinion upon the wisdom of that action). However, the American Government would have been in rather an embarrassed position if the Conference had broken up on that question.

that seems truly startling. They ask themselves whether it is barefaced hypocrisy, or a veritable species of national self-deception. England knows full well that it is neither one nor the other. Yet how can one define it? The great underlying reason is, I think, the entire absence of any sense of proportion, and the indifference to, or ignorance of the relative value of words: defects which are so marked a feature of American life, alike in all public and private relations. The Press itself is redolent of a reckless use of language, amounting often to absolute inaccuracy: an inaccuracy which is hardly the less dangerous when of a benevolent intent. To some extent the United States is misunderstood in Europe; and I believe the cause lies along the line I have indicated.[1]

[1] I refer in subsequent chapters to the questions of the relations between the United States and Canada, and the debts owed by European countries; see Chapters III and IV.

CHAPTER III

THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

For the greater part of a stretch of some three thousand miles only an imaginary boundary line separates the United States from Canada, which is inhabited by a people the majority of whom speak the same language, and have, in the main, the same habits, ways, and conceptions. Twenty-five years ago the two countries were much less alike than they are to-day. Indeed, the primary impression of one who revisits Canada after that lapse of time, is that it has become greatly Americanized, at least in all that is external. Nevertheless no serious manifestation of any desire to bring Canada into the Union is ever shown either by the American Government or by the American people. No doubt Canada would be welcomed into the fold; but the question is considered beyond the realm of practical politics; and in the United States one rarely hears any allusion to it.[1]

There is a certain constant movement from one country to the other. A number of Americans settle in the Western Provinces annually. But they do not all stay, nor is their total number so large as it was a few years ago. On the other hand there is always some drift from these very Provinces to the United States; composed mainly, I think, of those who seek a less severe climate. At one time Canada was in this way losing a

[1] The feeling is very different from that which prevailed in 1867, when the American House of Representatives rather impudently passed a resolution protesting against Confederation.

serious proportion of its immigrants. But that is now checked by the quota for each country fixed by the American Government; and those who cross the border-line to stay in the United States are chiefly native Canadians, who are exempted from any quota regulations, or Americans who have for some time been living in Canada. Nevertheless the figures are instructive and in some respects amazing. From 1911 to 1921 the immigration to Canada amounted to 2,123,000; while during the same period there was in Canada a natural increase of about 1,100,000. Yet during that decade the total population of the Dominion was increased by only 1,500,000.

In 1920, 117,000 people came to Canada, and 90,000 left it to live in the United States. But in 1923 the number leaving was enormously increased. This was largely due to the extraordinary exodus from the Maritime Provinces, which was undoubtedly the part of the country most severely affected by the Fordney-McCumber tariff. The result of that measure has been a serious state of stagnation throughout the length and breadth of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island. Artisans who could get no work flocked with their families to the United States, where they found employment at wages higher than they had ever earned in Canada; and higher even when due allowance was made for the greater cost of living. This situation is still one of considerable gravity; and the reiterated expressions coming from these Provinces of a desire to withdraw from Confederation caused the Government to appoint a Royal Commission to examine the whole subject; and in December 1926 a report advising certain concessions was published. Speaking generally, it would appear that the Maritime Provinces have received all that was originally guaranteed them. But it seems

equally clear that, partly but not entirely for such exterior reasons as an unfavourable American tariff, these Provinces are deriving considerably less benefit from Confederation than is the rest of the country.

The latest figures of immigration into Canada show some increase. The total number entering in 1925 was 84,907, while it is estimated that during that year 67,428 Canadians went to settle in the United States, and 39,987 Canadians returned from that country. The corresponding figures for the first seven months of 1926 are given as 86,480, 60,135, and 40,180 respectively.[1] This shows a continued improvement, but the net actual gain is still far below the needs of the country; and also below what the country has a right to expect, especially in view of the excess population in Great Britain. An English weekly newspaper discussing this subject as recently as September 1926 said: "All the Canadian politicians, newspapers, millionaires, and professors affirm that never will Canada join the United States. That is just why in my opinion the thing will happen. A State is never in real danger until its integrity and independence are guaranteed by its neighbours. To be sure, all 'nice' people favour English connection. They come to England every year and have many friends here. Some of them even bear English titles. But in democracies it is not the nice but the nasty people who govern."

I entirely agree with the last statement. Also it is true that whereas a quarter of a century ago no one would either care or dare to utter aloud the word "annexation," the matter is one now openly, although not frequently, discussed in the Press and in the course

[1] For the first nine months of 1926, 112,835 people came in, being an increase of over 66 per cent. Of these immigrants 41,419 were British, 16,776 from the United States, and 54,640 from other countries.

of ordinary conversation. But so far as one can discern the vast majority would be equally opposed to severing the tie with Great Britain and to closer political relations with the United States.

The *Spectator* recently gave some prominence to a statement made by an American publication shortly before the Canadian General Election of 1926: "If the Liberals win, then the British Government may as well give up their idea of a solid British Empire. Here the approaching elections must be regarded as a milestone in Canadian history." [1]

But the elections were not fought on that issue, directly or indirectly; nor is there any sign that the Liberal party proposes to cultivate closer relations with the United States. The Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, had emerged from the General Election of 1925 shorn of his majority. However, with the aid of the Progressives, a group elected chiefly by the constituencies of Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchewan, he had, for nearly twelve months, managed to maintain a tenuous hold on office. But one day the Progressives deserted him; and, consequent upon his defeat in the House of Commons, Mr. King asked the Governor-General for a dissolution. This was refused; and instead Lord Byng sent for the leader of the Conservative Opposition, Mr. Meighen. The latter had previously received definite assurances from the Progressives that they would continue to give him their support. This enabled him to tell the Governor-General that he would have a majority in the House of Commons. He was, therefore, entrusted with the task of forming a Ministry. Subsequently, in circumstances which are somewhat obscure, but which in any event are not very creditable

[1] See the *Spectator*, September 25, 1926, quoting the *Magazine of Wall Street*.

to them, the Progressives did not abide by their undertaking. Mr. Meighen was thus placed in a minority; and in these circumstances the Governor-General granted him a dissolution.

In the campaign which ensued it was alleged in the Press and on the platform that Lord Byng had been constitutionally wrong in refusing to accede to Mr. King's request for a dissolution. It is difficult to see the justification for the contention that the Sovereign or his representative has no discretion whatever about granting or refusing a dissolution; and that he must simply obey the Prime Minister. Both precedent and common sense are against such a view.[1] I believe that no farther back than in 1910 the King declined to give Mr. Asquith a dissolution when he first requested it; and only agreed to do so some days later because the Prime Minister then put forward reasons which he had not advanced in the first instance, and which appeared to the King to constitute a sufficient ground to entitle the Government to the dissolution which it demanded.[2]

[1] I understand that Lord Parmoor considers that Lord Byng was entirely justified in refusing to give Mr. King a dissolution; but I am unaware of the exact grounds upon which this opinion is based.

[2] My attention has been directed to a correspondence in the Canadian Press between Mr. J. S. Ewart, K.C., and Mr. R. A. Reid, both of the Canadian Bar, in which the latter referred to the King's refusal, in 1910, to grant Mr. Asquith a dissolution, and cited as his authority Sir Almeric Fitzroy's *Memoirs*. Mr. Ewart dismissed this in a decidedly offhand fashion, alleging that it was simply gossip. While Sir Almeric's volumes contain many facts of historical importance, no one would contend that they were historical treatises. But, equally, no one who knows Sir Almeric would be inclined to doubt the veracity of any of his categorical statements, any more than they would accuse the late Lord Morley of speaking lightly on such subjects. However, Mr. Ewart is manifestly one writing in his study, without any acquaintance with the personages whom he names, or any first-hand knowledge of the incidents to which he refers. Sir Almeric's exact words (dated November 16, 1910) are "Lord Morley, in discussing the matter this morning, was perfectly frank in agreeing that the King's position in refusing Mr. Asquith's request was a very strong one." This shows clearly both that the King considered that he possessed some discretion in the matter,

It is, however, questionable whether after having refused the request made by Mr. King for a dissolution when the latter had lost (temporarily as it proved to be) the support of the Progressives, he should have given one to Mr. Meighen when the latter eventually found himself in the same position. Possibly the Governor-General would have been wiser to have sent then for Mr. King. For such a situation there is no exact precedent. But presumably Lord Byng adopted what he considered the most expeditious way of securing a stable government, and ending a situation which was beginning to cause uneasiness throughout the country. However, the major offence laid at the Governor-General's

and that Lord Morley was of the same opinion; and, moreover, that the latter thought that in the particular instance that discretion had been properly exercised, even as against his own political leader, for Lord Morley was then Lord President of the Council. If Mr. Ewart had read a few pages farther (or had cared to quote from them), he would have added that a few days later—November 18, 1910—Sir Almeric wrote: "The situation has developed to a point at which the King's scruples in regard to an immediate dissolution have been overcome. He was in London on Thursday, and Asquith appears to have satisfied him that the Government, being so convinced of the contumacy of the House of Lords, were without moral strength to remain in office unless they were free to draw fresh authority from the constituencies." Nothing could be clearer than this general assumption of, and concurrence in, the fact that the Sovereign was invested with discretion in the matter. But if Mr. Ewart had referred to Mrs. Asquith's *Autobiography* (vol. ii.), he would have seen that on November 15, 1910, Mr. Asquith confided to her that it appeared doubtful whether the King would grant a dissolution, and that otherwise he would, of course, be obliged to resign; and that on November 17th, after an Audience, Mr. Asquith relates that the King had yielded to his reiterated request. The confirmation of Sir Almeric's statements could not be more complete. I cite the above as evidence available to Mr. Ewart, or to anyone else who arrives at his conclusions solely by referring to what has already been written on the subject. My own recollection of what was told me some years later by a Radical statesman (who, however, did not enter the Cabinet until a little later), was in accord with what anyone would naturally deduce from the excerpts above quoted. But after reading Mr. Ewart's dogmatic statement (stigmatizing as gossip whatever disproved his case), I made some inquiries; and I can state on authority that the King would not at first grant a dissolution; and subsequently did so when Mr. Asquith made out a better case, that is, when he adduced stronger reasons.

door was not that he did not, upon Mr. Meighen's defeat in the House of Commons, revert to Mr. King; but that he originally refused to give the latter a dissolution, to which it was claimed that he possessed, as Prime Minister, some species of inalienable right. And still more curious was the allegation of the definite injury inflicted upon the Liberal party by letting Mr. Meighen go to the country as Leader of the Government. It was said that it was thereby deprived of the control of the political machinery necessary for a General Election. Those making use of that cry seemed to be quite unconscious what they were, in effect, saying—namely, that that machinery could have been used corruptly by them, or that it would be used corruptly by their opponents. It is a fiction which dies hard; but the truth is that the mere fact of being in office (which carries with it the duty of appointing returning officers) does not, of itself, make a difference of a single seat. I am far from saying that a well-established administration, which has during some years of prosperity apportioned the loaves and fishes, does not derive, in an appeal to the country, a very sensible advantage from being actually in power. However, that was not the position of Mr. King's Government, which had existed precariously for less than a year. In any event my argument is directed exclusively to refuting the exact claim made—namely, that the control of the election machinery might govern the decision at the polls; and I might add that the very result of the elections demolishes that theory.

Lord Byng's action proved to be a boon for the Liberal party. Mr. King made the most of the constitutional question, and was thus enabled to avoid more awkward themes. But its real effect on the electorate came from the current idea that the Governor-General had acted at the instigation of the British Government.

Such interference, entirely apart from any question as to whether or not Lord Byng had followed constitutional practice, would have been generally (and properly) resented by the great majority of Canadians. It is, however, incomprehensible that any one having average intelligence, together with a reasonable knowledge of the past, could have imagined that such intervention was possible. But as the report met with wide credence, I suppose the explanation is that, under an extended franchise, whatever may be the average degree of native intelligence, the kind of knowledge necessary in such matters is largely lacking. I hasten to add that Mr. King never either stated or insinuated anything to this effect; nor, I am sure, did he ever inspire others to do so. But all his followers were not equally cautious. Mr. Henri Bourassa had no hesitation in asserting that Lord Byng's course had been directed by Downing Street; although he wisely did not attempt to give his authority for the accusation. Mr. Bourassa was the leader of the former Nationalist party, with Mr. Armand Lavergne as his chief lieutenant. Negatively the two did what they could to prevent troops going to the aid of Great Britain in the South African War, and later in the European conflict. Their affirmative accomplishment, during an association of approximately ten years, consisted in making it obligatory that the time-tables of railways, and the directories issued by telephone companies, and similar publications, should be printed in French as well as in English. Then the party dissolved. Mr. Lavergne, who began political life as a Liberal, joined the Conservative party. Mr. Bourassa became an ardent follower of Mr. King. He even, in the course of the campaign, professed his personal devotion to his new leader; although it would be difficult to perceive any affinity between the witty and altogether

Gallic Bourassa (who undoubtedly often mocks inwardly at his dupes) and the solemn Mr. King, who is totally deficient in any sense of humour: unless, indeed, it lies in the fact that in 1837 Bourassa's maternal grandfather, Louis Joseph Papineau, was the leader of the rebellion in Lower Canada, and King's maternal grandfather, William Lyon Mackenzie, was its leader in Upper Canada.

If Mr. Bourassa lacked either learning or intelligence one might wonder whether he himself sincerely believed that Lord Byng had acted at the dictation of England, or whether he rated so low the mentality of his French-Canadian compatriots (thousands of whom always flock to hear one of the most eloquent speakers in the country) that he thought he could safely trade upon their ignorance. But Mr. Bourassa is able and well-informed in a degree which, in that respect, places him far above most of his political bedfellows. He may sometimes deceive others; but he never deceives himself. After the General Election the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Amery, took an early opportunity to deny explicitly that the Government had in any way whatever sought to direct or control the attitude of the Governor-General. It is characteristic not so much of Mr. Bourassa as of the general neglect of such amenities in Canadian political life that the Quebec politician did not then feel called upon publicly to correct his misstatement; and that no one was surprised that he did not do so.

This injection of the constitutional question was a minor factor in Mr. King's success. It was not the major cause of his victory, although it certainly was responsible for the size of his majority. But the basis of Mr. King's strength is that he is supported at one and the same time by the West, which favours a lower tariff, and probably a wide measure of Reciprocity with

the United States; and by the Province of Quebec, which, upon the whole, adheres to Protection. It is the latter Province which is the corner-stone of the Liberal edifice. Any political leader who can count upon 60 out of 65 seats in a House of Commons consisting of 245 members, must commit an extraordinary number of blunders to avoid obtaining a majority.[1] Mr. King nearly accomplished that difficult feat in 1925; but it would have been unreasonable to expect that the deed would be performed again twelve months later.

The history of the Liberal *bloc* in Quebec is interesting. Many years ago it was the favourite pastime of the parish priest to denounce the Liberal candidate, if not from the pulpit at least at the meeting held after Sunday morning mass. In those days Quebec was largely Conservative; but the execution of Louis Riel, after the North-west Rebellion of 1885, began the rout of the Conservative party. It was completed a few years later when the indefatigable Israel Tarte, himself an erstwhile Conservative, was instrumental in exposing the scandals in which Sir Hector Langevin and others were involved. In any event, in 1896 the opportunity came to return to power a French-Canadian Prime Minister, Wilfrid Laurier, undoubtedly the most picturesque and probably the greatest figure produced by Canadian political life. Quebec was, therefore, safely Liberal so long as Laurier lived; whilst before his death it was consolidated in an undying opposition to the future Conservative Leader. For it was Mr. Meighen who put through the House of Commons the hated Conscription Act (for which, with characteristic courage, he has always taken the full responsibility), that rendered him for all time anathema

[1] In the General Election of 1925 the Liberal party won 61 seats in the Province of Quebec, and exactly the same number in the General Election of 1926.

to the Province of Quebec. It is true that Quebec, like Ontario, favours Protection. But the present tariff is fairly high; and although Mr. King may be pressed by his Western supporters to lower it materially, French Canadians are more influenced by what Mr. Meighen has actually done in the past, than by what Mr. King may—or may not—do in the future. Even Mr. Meighen's promises of a higher tariff availed him nothing; in fact the result was disastrous. In Quebec they would not listen to the voice of the charmer; while in the West, with its Free Trade tendencies, his Quebec speeches were so fatal to his cause, that his party came back with only one seat between the western limits of Ontario and the Rocky Mountains. In brief, it is no particular liking for the prim and in some ways puritanical King which makes French Canadians vote so solidly for the Liberal party, but a determination that Mr. Meighen shall never again be Prime Minister. In fact, 115,000 more votes were cast for Conservative than Liberal candidates. However, the total votes for Progressives, Liberal Progressives, and other groups, more than make up this difference; and as in some constituencies there was no Liberal candidate on account of a direct arrangement with the Progressives, a part at least of the votes given for the latter should, in any comparison with the Conservative total, be reckoned as Liberal. The unofficial vote, by parties and Provinces, was as shown in the table opposite.

Certainly, French Canadians can take no exception to Mr. King's war record. I give it in his own words, as cabled to England: "It was almost inevitable that sooner or later Mr. Mackenzie King's 'war record' should become a subject for hecklers. The fact that during the war he was in the United States receiving American pay for an American job is still fresh in the

minds of many Canadians. During the final speech of his Western campaign last night the Premier was interrupted by a man wanting to know what he did in the war. 'When the Great War came I, like other men, had my obligations to consider,' replied Mr. King. 'In the States,' shouted the heckler. 'I had to consider my duty to my father, who was blind, to my brother with tuberculosis, who has two children dependent on him, to my sister with her heart failing, to my mother with no one else to care for her,' Mr. King proceeded. 'I said to myself, "I can leave all these obligations and go to

Province.	Conservative.	Liberal.	Progressive.	Liberal Progressive.	Labour.	Independent.	U.F.A.
Prince Edward Island ..	27,938	25,501	—	—	—	—	—
Nova Scotia ..	121,510	97,858	—	—	6,518	—	—
New Brunswick	86,865	74,304	—	—	—	—	—
Quebec	263,026	460,252	—	—	—	8,025	—
Ontario	675,725	435,116	50,236	41,279	6,282	5,267	—
Manitoba ..	83,769	36,397	22,126	38,353	17,202	—	—
Saskatchewan .	67,086	125,323	38,265	13,425	—	—	—
Alberta	49,904	38,233	—	—	8,359	176	60,457
British Columbia ..	100,119	68,264	—	—	11,792	4,322	—
Yukon	805	628	—	—	—	—	—
Totals ..	1,476,747	1,361,876	110,627	93,057	50,153	17,790	60,457

London and take a position in some office there." I was forty years of age, and they would not let me at that age go to the trenches. I said, "I can leave all this, or I can do my duty as I see it as son, as brother, as one on whom great responsibilities rest." '

"Proceeding, Mr. King said he thought the conciliation of labour disputes in the war industries would be rendering the largest possible service. He described the work he did in this connection for the Bethlehem Steel, Bethlehem Shipbuilding, General Electric, and Colo-

rado Fuel and Iron Companies—all, he said, engaged in furnishing supplies to the Allies." [1]

As Mr. King (perhaps with doubtful taste) introduced his private affairs in his defence, it is only fair to state that his devotion to various members of his family was well known. Nevertheless his explanation is at least curious. His reference to the trenches is, of course, pure nonsense, and a somewhat barefaced attempt to draw a herring across the trail. No one would ever have thought of sending him where he would have been so useless; but that was not the only kind of service exacted during the war. On the other hand, he probably did do some useful work in settling industrial disputes in the United States. But there is a great difference between being asked to go there by his own country or Great Britain, and going to suit his own convenience and interests, and later obtaining letters of approbation from the manufacturers concerned. The weak point in his statement (and Mr. King must have known it) is that it lays down the rule that in time of war a man may suit his own convenience, and leave his country if he thinks it to his own interest and profit to do so. There were in Canada others besides Mr. King who had heavy and pressing family obligations; who, unlike Mr. King, were liable to be and were sent to the trenches despite these obligations; and who did not have (and perhaps would not have taken) his opportunities to make the war profitable. For when Mr. King discovered that he had no chance of being taken into the Union Government, he left the country, only returning at the close of the war. During the last Canadian election campaign it was asserted on the platform by responsible speakers and repeated by responsible newspapers, that Mr. King had been paid a salary of $75,000 by the

[1] *Daily Telegraph*, October 1925.

Rockefeller or other organizations by which he was employed during the war. I believe that the amount named is fantastic. Probably it was because he himself regarded it in the same light that Mr. King did not contradict the allegation. But possibly he would have been wiser to declare, once for all, how much he did gain by leaving his country. In any event, it was a profitable exodus: it not only supplied him with an income of dimensions which remain to be disclosed, but it also made him Prime Minister. For the Province of Quebec put him in office (just as the Quebec members at the Liberal caucus were responsible for his choice as successor to Sir Wilfrid Laurier) not on account of anything he had done, but on account of what he had not done. As Woodrow Wilson owed his second election to the fact that he had kept his country out of the war, so Mr. King owed his to having kept himself out of the war.

Nothing but blind political partisanship could lead any one to regard either Mr. Meighen or Mr. King as a statesman. The former, who possesses a wider vision than Mr. King, and who is also intellectually his superior, might conceivably become one were it not that in Canada one must graduate to that high estate from the lowly position of a politician; and as a politician Mr. Meighen is hopeless. His cold and analytical, but very candid, speeches never aroused any enthusiasm in large public audiences; while when he spoke in the House of Commons his biting sarcasm always made more enemies than friends. Moreover, he is singularly inept as a political tactician. Even the courage and frankness which are his distinctive virtues do not compensate for these failings.

Mr. King, on the other hand, is an excellent platform speaker. It is true that except when discussing a constitutional point or some kindred subject, he uses a good

deal of fustian; but it serves its purpose. He is almost equally effective in the House of Commons provided the question is one that he thoroughly understands. But if he is obliged to discuss a subject of practical finance, he is limited by the information furnished by the permanent officials; and is apt to flounder sadly if led beyond its tether. But Mr. King was not always equal to a duel with the quicker and more pungent Mr. Meighen; and that unfortunate politician's exclusion from the present House of Commons must add materially to the Canadian Prime Minister's comfort and peace of mind.

Mr. King's greatest quality is a dogged perseverance and industry, which conceal and more than make up for a mentality which moves slowly. He is not a man of any general intellectual attainments, nor has he any intellectual curiosity. Exceedingly well informed on what may be called his own subjects—economic theories, the history of labour movements, and similar matters—he is both ignorant of, and indifferent to, the vast body of general literature, both French and English, the classics, and *belles lettres* in general. But he constantly reads and knows the Bible as do few men at the present day. His general political belief appears to resemble that held by Liberals who were to be found in England a genera tion ago, but who are now almost as extinct as the dodo. He cherishes an almost childlike faith in the magic of the word "Liberalism"; and is apt to think that it can cure all ills. In that he resembles the group of young Liberals who began to attain prominence in England about 1905. Since then, although they have increased in wisdom, they have lost some of their idealism. But Mr. King, who has never grown up politically, remains the same.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier did not leave much in the way of political relics; but Mr. King did not gather up even

the flotsam and jetsam which might have been collected. Laurier was undoubtedly an opportunist; but in these days that is apparently almost a necessity. A politician who should hold to his principles as firmly as did the late Lord Salisbury would go down in sorrow to the grave. Possibly, also, Laurier was a French Canadian before he was a Canadian. His painful wabbling about sending troops in the South African War, and the stand he finally took in the last war, showed plainly the way the twig was bent. But he was a great orator and a striking personality. No one who saw the Jubilee Procession of 1897 will ever forget that in that vast and extraordinary heterogenous conglomeration, Laurier was one of the three figures which alone attracted the attention of all spectators. But Mr. King seems to have inherited nothing from him—except his house.

The belief is often expressed that Mr. King will seek to lead Canada into political relations with the United States. Undoubtedly he is more American than English in his ideas; and is probably much more at home in the United States than he is in England. A Paris newspaper was not far wrong when it said that he is more American than English, "like the majority of the modern Canadians, and above all, a politician rather than a statesman." [1] Nor is it likely that he is particularly attached to the connection with Great Britain. His war record speaks for itself; and it has not lessened the suspicion which has always existed, even amongst many members of his own party, regarding his sentiments on that subject.

In 1925, when it was rumoured that he was preparing to diverge from England in the matter of the Locarno Treaty, the Toronto *Globe*, once the most undeviating Liberal newspaper in Canada, sternly rebuked him: "Only the narrowest conception of our relations to

[1] *Le Quotidien*, October 6, 1926.

Great Britain and the Empire could thus dictate our attitude. By adopting that course the Government would be serving notice that past benefits which Canada now enjoyed under the Flag are to count for nothing, and that future advantages which she looks for are not to be encumbered by the expectation that she will perform her share of the Imperial partnership for the advancement of the common weal. . . . If the adoption of such an attitude as that which the King Government is said to meditate does not mean desertion of the Mother Country in her hour of need, it is nothing but a meaningless assertion of independence, which Britain not only willingly but specifically concedes. Such a course of action, while totally uncalled for, would prove mischievous in giving a wrong impression to the world at large of our attitude to the Motherland."

In respect to relations with Great Britain Mr. King was later reported to have said:

1. Neither Great Britain nor the other Dominions should seek to control those foreign affairs which are the primary concern of one Dominion.

2. That the Dominions should not seek to control foreign affairs which are the primary concern of Great Britain.

3. That, on the other hand, all Governments of the Empire must confer on issues fundamentally affecting all parts of the Empire.

Commenting upon these declarations the Toronto *Globe* remarked: "Premier King's contention will not be disputed that, in working out the problem of a policy on foreign affairs, a first essential is to distinguish between matters which are of primary interest to one part of the Empire, and should be settled by it, and those which are of interest to all, and should be settled by common con-

sultation. But those matters of primary interest to one part of the Empire are questions essentially domestic, in which trade relations are involved, and in these the Dominions already enjoy the fullest independence. On diplomatic issues, on the great questions of peace or war and imperial defence, the whole Empire is vitally concerned, and the action decided upon by the partner in whose hands the problems primarily rest must be the action concurred in by every part of the Imperial Commonwealth if the Empire is to hold together and the security of all is to be assured."

I think that the majority of the electorate, if public attention was specifically directed to this subject, would probably adopt the views expressed by the Toronto *Globe* rather than those attributed to Mr. King. But the whole question goes somewhat farther. It is understood that at the recent Imperial Conference Sir Austen Chamberlain explained to the representatives of the Dominions that Great Britain followed the only logical course in facilitating the Locarno Treaty, but that, of course, the Dominions were free to ratify the Treaty or not as they saw fit; that Newfoundland and New Zealand were in favour of absolute ratification, Australia desired to ratify with certain reservations, and the other Dominions did not wish to ratify at all: the result being that the latter course was followed. But the episode is instructive as illustrating that upon these questions the Dominions are by no means at one amongst themselves.

Entirely apart from the Locarno Treaty, the Conference attempted to find a formula which should be a constitutional declaration of the absolute equality of the Dominions with Great Britain; and, rightly or wrongly, Mr. King is said to have been one of those who most strongly urged this as a necessity. Looking at the question from any practical standpoint it must be

admitted that at the present time the Dominions enjoy the fullest freedom, and that no declarations inspired by theoretical politicians could result in any real extension of that freedom. Great Britain cannot commit the Dominions to participation in any war; and the latter can in each instance decide whether they will render any support. In one way, and in one way only, are the Dominions not in a position of "absolute equality" with Great Britain. England pays for its own defence by collecting what is necessary from its own taxpayers; the Dominions, by their own choice, are in the subsidiary position of having their defence paid for by someone else. Any discussion about "absolute equality" is futile so long as that situation continues. The answer sometimes made is that the Dominions have no need of any defence. If that were so they would indeed be in a more fortunate situation than any other country in the world. But the facts are otherwise. I will refer only to the case of Canada; although it may be said in passing that the Australian position is at least equally exposed. In the event of a war in which Great Britain took part there is no doubt that her opponents would seize Canadian shipping even if Canada were not lending Great Britain any direct aid in the conflict. Obviously this would proceed from the fact that Canada is a component part of the British Empire. It may be replied that if so danger can be avoided by breaking all Imperial ties. But, in that event, will any sane person, with a knowledge of history, contend that Canada, with her less than ten millions, would always be able to maintain her independence next door to a country having more than ten times her population? In this connection it is interesting to read the remarks made from time to time by Theodore Roosevelt in his private correspondence. They are indicative of the secret

views of a masterful man who never hesitated to convert his ideas into deeds whenever a favourable opportunity was offered. Writing to Mr. F. C. Moore, on February 9, 1898, he said, in the course of a comprehensive statement of his views regarding an American foreign policy, "I should myself like to shape our foreign policy with a purpose ultimately of driving off this continent every European Power. I would begin with Spain, and in the end would take all other European nations, including England." This was in time of profound peace. If ever there was a prospect of a clash with Great Britain, Roosevelt spoke much more openly of taking possession of Canada. Nor, in the circumstances, was there anything extraordinary in his attitude.

The satisfactory point about the Report of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee of the Imperial Conference held in 1926 is that to all intents and purposes, it effected no real change in the actual situation.[1] Indeed, the greatest alteration was the recommendation that the Royal Title should be changed from "George V, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India," to "George V, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India." Surely if that purely Irish change gives any satisfaction to the Irish, no one will begrudge it to them. The same may be said of various necessary but quite harmless attempts to define situations which spoke for them-

[1] If this interpretation be incorrect—if, as has been claimed, the work of the Conference goes so far as to touch the fabric of the British North America Act—the door has, indeed, been opened to a variety of complications. While one may well question the right of the Federal Government to agree to the alteration of an enactment which is based upon the concurrence of the different Provinces.

selves. The really interesting feature was that the Report gave the impression of having been written, or at least that its composition was controlled, by a statesman of experience, who realized the necessity of satisfying politicians from the Dominions by giving them concessions about which they could make speeches, but which in reality meant nothing.

The truth is that the Dominions have long since obtained, upon very advantageous terms, all the liberties which they can properly enjoy as part of the Empire. It is not difficult to foresee that attempts to achieve any other status than that at present in existence would only result in sooner or later placing the Dominions outside the pale of the Empire. There is no reason that those who want that should not openly say so, and give their arguments in favour of that procedure. But there is every reason why the Dominions should not be placed in any anomalous or doubtful position in this respect, through their representatives, without any direct authorization by the electorate, taking up any position on these subjects at meetings which are more or less secret in their nature.

Mr. King has been accused of wanting to lead the country to annexation. It may be taken for granted that although he might possibly prefer closer relations with the United States, his primary consideration is the retention of office; and that he will not make any movement in that direction unless and until he has been given reason to believe that it will be ratified by the electors at the polls. And whatever change there might be elsewhere, there is no doubt that anything tending towards annexation would demolish the structure of sixty sure Liberal seats in the Province of Quebec. In this regard it might be well to observe Mr. King's course in respect to the suggestion, which has arisen since the recent

Imperial Conference, that Canada might now join the Pan-American group. Probably no course would, in the long run, ultimately prove more disastrous to the cause of Canadian independence. The United States at present dominates, and will continue to dominate, that movement. The result has been to breed a spirit of cordial detestation throughout South America. *La Nacion* expressed the actual sentiment of the whole continent when it recently asserted that the United States never overlooked an opportunity to talk of the Pan-American spirit, but never missed an occasion to increase its trade by erecting some barrier against a South American Republic. What would Canada have to gain by being associated with either the alleged oppressor or with the oppressed? In the same way it is now insidiously said by American political writers that the Monroe Doctrine protects Canada as fully as does Great Britain. It does not require any lengthy consideration to perceive that that theory is as dangerous as it is fallacious. *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*

Before leaving the subject of Federal politics in Canada, mention should be made of the curious arrangement whereby, under a statute to that effect, the Leader of His Majesty's Opposition is paid an annual salary of ten thousand dollars. The practical reasons for this are apparent. The duties of a Leader of the Opposition in the Federal Parliament are such as will properly occupy his whole time and attention; and the choice would be very restricted if only a man having private means were eligible. I believe that many years ago a number of Liberal members of Parliament abandoned their sessional allowance (which was then only one thousand dollars) to Mr. (afterwards Sir Wilfrid) Laurier, who otherwise would have been unable to devote himself exclusively to his political work. But the objections to such a course

are manifest, and it is not surprising that already at least one Province has adopted the system instituted in Ottawa. However, if the practical reasons are excellent, the constitutional position is less clear. His Majęsty's Opposition has no legal existence as such; the nearest approach being its recognition by the Speaker of the House of Commons in according its Leader precedence in various ways. But the idea that the King should give his assent to a Bill providing for the payment of someone for leading attacks upon his chosen advisers is, to say the least, somewhat Gilbertian. It is noteworthy that upon succeeding to this salary a newly chosen Leader of the Opposition is not obliged to seek re-election in his constituency on the ground that he has accepted an office of emolument under the Crown—a regulation which still prevails in Canada. The theory appears to be that although he is paid by virtue of a statute which has received the Royal Assent he is exempted from the obligation of seeking re-election because his work is performed for the House of Commons and not for the Crown: an argument which appears to be more specious and ingenious than logical and constitutional.

No account of relations between Canada and the United States would be complete without some description of the Province of Quebec; in many respects a unique and amazing corner of the world in this day and generation. This Province is the largest in the Dominion, being about three times the size of France. It has rich material resources which are carefully fostered by a wise Government: extensive agriculture, the pulp industry, the output of which is now estimated at twenty million dollars annually, and mineral deposits which are as yet largely undeveloped; while its industries, together with those of Ontario, produce more than three-quarters of all that is manufactured in Canada.

According to the census of 1921 the population of Quebec is more than 2,500,000. But the interesting points are that 93 per cent. are native-born Canadians, while the native-born percentage of the population of the whole Dominion is only 77·7 per cent.: and that of the total population of Quebec 82 per cent. are French Canadians.

Quebec has no counterpart in any quarter of the world. It is, in certain aspects, reminiscent of a French Province under the old Bourbon Monarchy, which has had the good fortune to find that the Governor sent there from Paris is an intelligent and benevolent despot. It is conservative to the last degree: I use the word in a non-political sense, for the present Provincial Government is nominally Liberal. The bulk of the people are economical. It is significant that although Montreal employs more workers in its industries than does Toronto, the total amount paid in Toronto in salaries and wages exceeds the similar payments made in Montreal. Quebec has its special laws (an adaptation of the Code Napoléon) and the right to have all proceedings conducted in French as well as in English. It is excessively prosperous. Strikes are almost unknown, for the Roman Catholic Church intervenes to settle most disputes through an organization named the Federation of Catholic Workers of Canada, which also prevents international trade-unions from obtaining any commanding position in the Province. It is characteristic of the intense nationalism of the French Canadian that the constitution of the Catholic Federation specifically states that one of the reasons for its existence is that "the greater part of Canadian workmen are opposed to the domination of Canadian organized labour by American organized labour." Montreal, the principal city of the Province, is the financial centre of the country; and the latter

possesses that solid basis which can only be supplied by a thrifty people firmly attached to their native soil.

> "Ill fares the land, to hast'ning ills a prey,
> Where wealth accumulates, and men decay:
> Princes and lords may flourish, or may fade:
> A breath can make them, as a breath has made;
> But a bold peasantry, their country's pride,
> When once destroy'd, can never be supplied."

Where else to-day within the broad bounds of the British Empire is there a peasantry whose cardinal principle, the mainspring of their action, is love of the soil?

It may be said—and with some truth—that Quebec is reactionary: for instance, it does not allow women to vote, or to practise law, or to possess other privileges now generally accorded elsewhere; or that its Government is somewhat undemocratic. But a much more pertinent fact is that it is the best-governed Province in the Dominion. If it is difficult to find a statesman in Federal politics there is no such trouble in Quebec. The Prime Minister, M. Alexandre Taschereau, is resourceful, prudent, and, where the need demands, courageous. It is regrettable that only the Province of Quebec gets the benefit of his outstanding abilities, and that he refuses to seek a wider field. But at least M. Taschereau has always been ready to go into the English Provinces, and to explain, without excuse or apology, the attitude of his French-Canadian compatriots. I can hardly imagine that he was quite serious when he suggested to an Ontario Educational Conference that the solution of the dual language problem was to be found in bilingualism throughout the Dominion. But the value of his utterances lies in his reiterated statement that the French Canadians will always retain their language, and that their mentality will always remain French. The recognition of these basic facts is essential.

M. Taschereau found the finances of the Province in good condition, but he has further strengthened the position of the Treasury. An excellently administered Liquor Law brings tens of thousands of American visitors, and the hundreds of thousands of dollars which they leave behind (in 1926 the amount was said to have exceeded $57,000,000) have gone largely towards the making of good roads. It is needless to say that this Liquor Law has not entirely altered human nature. But it is responsible for the fact that in Montreal one finds less drunkenness than in any large American city; and none of that open defiance of the law for which the vast majority of the latter are to-day notorious. The records show that while Quebec has 26·8 per cent. of the total population of Canada, only about 18 per cent. of the total number of crimes are committed within her borders.

As has already been stated, inhabitants of the Province of Quebec are by nature as conservative as they are thrifty. They would cordially agree with the famous Lord Falkland's saying that when it is not necessary to change it is necessary not to change. They cling to the French language, but despite their speech and their customs, they are, in sentiment, no more French than English. Strictly speaking they are more thoroughly Canadian than those who live in any other part of Canada. They have no recollections of, or ties with, any Mother Country. For them Canada—the soil to which they are so attached—is everything: and nothing else counts. That is perhaps the truest and purest form of patriotism. Loyalty is something different: it is fidelity to the person of a Sovereign, or to one's engagements to support certain political institutions. But it is the love of "la patrie" —the love of the actual countryside—which constitutes patriotism. Dean Inge in the Preface to his recent work

England [1] has aptly recalled that while German officers were recommended to read the famous speech which Shakespeare puts in the mouth of Henry V before Agincourt, it was significant that English war poetry, "the poignant sincerity of which goes to our hearts as we read it, constantly dwells on the rural life of England." He mentions Owen, writing of the "green fields and the school I knew," and Julian Grenfell listening to the song of the blackbird. But I think he omits the most subtle although almost unspoken expression of the love of the land—Rupert Brooke's lines:

> "If I should die, think only this of me:
> 'That there's some corner of a foreign field
> That is forever England.'"

The French-Canadian devotion to Quebec, to the country their forefathers conquered from the wilderness, and which they so jealously guard for themselves and their descendants, rises to no such heights of expression; but it is of the same nature. It makes a strange contrast with the almost complete absence of sentiment for any spot shown by Canadians of English descent. When the personal tie with England is broken they seem always ready to go wherever their material interests may call them, and make their home wherever they may wander: homeless in the true sense of that word. In Quebec there are scores of farms which have been owned and occupied by the same family for a century or more. It would be difficult to find many in the Province of Ontario.

From what has been said it might appear that the French Canadians do not value the connection with Great Britain. As a matter of fact they prize it just as much as Canadians of English descent, but only for selfish and not for sentimental reasons. They want

[1] *England*, by the Very Rev. W. R. Inge, p. xi.

anything they can gain by it, but do not want to give anything in return. M. Boni de Castellane, whose early life of frivolity, and later fame as a wit, have obscured the fact that he is a very astute observer, has written: "Mes compatriotes sont, en général, des gens ordonnés, mais avares et petits, sans reconnaissance pour ce que l'on a fait pour eux." It is a hard judgment which only a Frenchman would dare to pass upon the French. In point of fact it directs attention to, but exaggerates, one of the most glaring defects of the race; and that defect the French Canadians have preserved with the same fidelity they have shown to other French characteristics. They do not see why they should assist England in time of war. They can conceive no reason why they should leave their country, which is not being attacked, in order to fight overseas. Their natural counsellor—the country parish priest—who more often than not is himself the son of a *habitant*—agrees in that view: and although the priests no longer raise their voices loudly in political strife, their influence is probably as potent as it was fifty years ago. The French Canadians contend that they are themselves in no need of military protection, but when they do think that they require to be safeguarded in any way, even as against their English compatriots, it is to England that they turn. At one time there was a movement in some Provinces to obtain the abolition of the appeal from the Supreme Court of Canada to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. But M. Alexandre Taschereau seized a suitable opportunity to declare firmly that the Province of Quebec would not be in accord with the proposed change. The French Canadians have no mind to be left at the mercy of an English-Canadian majority, even on the bench; they insist upon their right of appealing to Cæsar.

The leaders of French-Canadian thought, both eccle-

siastics and laymen, are under no delusion about what would be the result of annexation to the United States. They know that they, and they alone, would suffer material loss; that their race, and their race alone, would lose in power and in relative importance. Doubtless they would be allowed to retain their laws, but their language would certainly cease to receive any official protection or recognition. Theodore Roosevelt expressed the views of his fellow-countrymen, when, in an article published on the very day of his death, he said: "We have room for but one language here, and that is the English language." While the influence of the Roman Catholic Church would be diminished in a variety of ways. The French-Canadian leaders acknowledge that they could not have, and do not want, any greater measure of freedom than they enjoy at present as a component part of that loosely knit organization which is known as the British Empire. In some ways they are wiser than their English compatriots.

While I regard with great respect any considered opinion of Dean Inge, I have no hesitation in saying that his views upon this subject are entirely erroneous. He has written: "The French Canadians used to fear that their language, their customs, and, above all, their religion would be in danger if Eastern Canada were merged in the larger aggregate of a North American Republic. But the number of Irish, Italians, and Poles in the United States is now so great that the Roman Catholic Church is acquiring great political influence, intimidating journalists and politicians and threatening to interfere with the system of general education. The French Catholics would now have little to fear from absorption." [1]

My own knowledge of the United States leads me to

[1] See *England*, p. 142.

take direct issue with Dean Inge's assertion that the Roman Catholic Church is there intimidating journalists and politicians; and I cannot forbear suggesting that so grave an accusation should not be made without some tangible proof being adduced in its support.[1] That, however, is a question apart. Nor, indeed, would I have been inclined to comment at all upon Dean Inge's remarks had they been limited to the statement that "the French Catholics would now have nothing to fear from absorption"; for that is simply an expression of Dean Inge's personal opinion of what would be the result of annexation. But the first words of the passage I have quoted, "The French Canadians used to fear," apparently purport to give the prevalent French-Canadian view on the same subject—which is a very different matter; and to suggest there has been a change of mind. The fact is that the French Canadians fear annexation to the United States just as much to-day as they ever did, which means they believe that they would thereby lose, *inter alia*, the very privileges mentioned by Dean Inge. But, although constantly vigilant, they do not think to-day, and never have thought, that annexation is imminent; or that it is, or ever has been, a question of practical politics. I believe that if Dean Inge would consult any of those who are unquestionably the leaders of the French-Canadian race they would, whether ecclesiastics or laymen, tell him that they want no closer, but also that they want no less close, connection with Great Britain than at present; that they repudiate all Imperial responsibilities; and finally that they do not foresee and certainly do not want to see their country annexed to the United States. Dean Inge supports his

[1] Simply in order that my contentions should not be thought prejudiced, I ought perhaps to state that I am not a member of the Roman Catholic Church, but hold that faith of which Dean Inge is such a distinguished exponent.

argument by the assertion that "there is a very large number of citizens of the United States who have settled in Canada and who do not disguise their expectation that the whole continent will one day be brought under their flag." It is true that many citizens of the United States have crossed the border. It is also probable that a great majority of them would favour annexation. But that they generally express that hope (or, I believe, that they expect to witness its realization) is an exaggeration. Dean Inge might also legitimately have added that many French Canadians have settled in the United States, and especially in New England. But this fact has not altered the innate opposition of the French-Canadian Roman Catholic prelates, priests, and people, to any form of closer political connection with the Republic which only an imaginary boundary line separates from their own country.

There are possibly some who sincerely cherish a vision of a Canada which is absolutely independent in name and title, as well as in fact. But the more influential amongst the French-Canadian race clearly realize that their country might then be in a dangerous position; that they might then be called upon to defend themselves; and that there would be no material benefit to offset these very serious disadvantages. All the French Canadians ask is to be left alone; and although their attitude is in some respects open to criticism, a perfectly contented people is certainly a refreshing novelty in these days of restless dissatisfaction.

In my opinion the developments which time will finally (but at no near date) bring in its wake will render abortive their aim to preserve intact their present happy position. This might come about in any one of a variety of ways. The inherent divergence of interests between the industrial East and the agricultural West

might play a part in the final disruption of the Dominion. To-day the political differences are temporarily in abeyance; but hatred of Mr. Meighen will not prove to be a permanent link between Quebec and the wheat-growing Provinces. At one period after the United States had settled the dispute between the North and the South by the arbitrament of arms, which spurned the right of self-determination, it seemed as if it might be faced with another, if less acute, problem, arising out of the same diversity between the East and the West as that which is now apparent in Canada. However, that trouble gradually righted itself; largely because in the United States the West (using that word to indicate an exact geographical division, and not in the sense in which it is generally accepted colloquially) has not remained purely agricultural. The climate and other reasons peculiar to the North-western Provinces prevent any hopes of a similar solution in Canada. The growing dissatisfaction of the Maritime Provinces, unless promptly checked, might also be an eventual factor in the solution. Or, perhaps, a situation might arise in which the part of the population holding Imperial sentiments might either become a minority through the influx from the United States and from various Continental countries; or, in disgust at being blocked by Quebec in an endeavour to draw nearer Great Britain at some crisis, a majority of Canadians of English descent, seeing no prospect of future accord on such subjects, might purposely ally themselves with the Western Canadian section, which undoubtedly is, and will continue to be, more drawn towards union with the United States.

Obviously it would be idle to carry such speculations beyond the region of a bare statement of possibilities. But the important and significant fact is that, according to the view held by thoughtful French Canadians (which,

I think, is absolutely correct from their standpoint), any change must be for the worse so far as their race is concerned. They cannot hope to have more special privileges, more freedom to govern themselves as they like, or a more secured position in a country in which they are in a minority. They might very well have less. It is quite comprehensible that all their efforts are directed towards maintaining the present delicate balance, which favours them more than it does any other part of the country. There is no present sign of anything which will upset it. But sooner or later the disturbing elements will make their appearance: the situation, taken all together, is just a little too perfect to be permanent.

However, at present there is no Annexation party in Canada, and no annexation threat from the United States. In the meantime the French Canadians, who were once thought to be in such dire need of protection, will continue to multiply much more rapidly than their English compatriots,[1] and to overflow beyond the boundaries of the Province of Quebec. And this race, which for more than a century and a half, in a country under British sovereignty, has not been absorbed by intermarrying with a people which surrounded it on all sides, which has kept to itself, which has clung to its own religion and has continued to speak its own language, and which has dwelt under its own laws, will form a tranquil anachronism in a world distraught by the mania

[1] The figures of the Provincial Health Service for the month of August 1926 will give some idea of the usual increase in the Province of Quebec. In that month there were 6,592 births; while the total number of deaths was 2,890, of which 1,106 were those of children less than one year old. The death-rate was 18·949 per thousand of the population as compared with a birth-rate of 80·77. There were 1,683 marriages in the Province in this month. In May 1926, out of 20,141 births throughout the Dominion, 7,207, more than one-third, were in Quebec. But the infantile death-rate in the Province is higher than in other parts of Canada.

of rapid progress; and will pursue its peaceful and prosperous way under the benevolent autocracy of M. Alexandre Taschereau—and his successors.[1]

[1] Since writing this chapter, I have seen the following statement made by M. Alexandre Taschereau in London, October 1926: "Never so long as there is a French Canada will there be annexation of Canada by the United States. I do not believe that there is any real movement in that direction. There are 3,000,000 French Canadians in Canada and they are a very happy lot. They have much love for British institutions, where we have found liberty in everything we cherish. I believe we are the most free people in the world."

CHAPTER IV

PRESIDENTS AND POLITICS

FROM the earliest days of organized society, man's greatest difficulty has been to find a suitable form of government: one which would present sufficient attractions to the governor to render it probable that he would walk delicately and which would provide some safeguards against undue oppression of the governed. But after experiments extending over many centuries, it would seem that Pope displayed unusual insight when he wrote:

> "For forms of government let fools contest,
> Whate'er is best administered is best." [1]

For fifty years preceding the war the tendency was to laud that republican type of government of which the United States was the chief example. It was held up for admiration as being the last word in democracy. But the conflict which was "to make the world safe for democracy" has resulted in a distinct drift in the opposite direction. Many of the recently formed republics are marked by every sign of autocracy. Others—and especially Germany—recall Thiers's favourite phrase in the days after 1870, when he blocked the way both of the old Bourbon line and of the Orleanists, while pretending as long as possible that he was not infringing the pact of Bordeaux: "A republic without republicans." Although President Coolidge stated in a recent speech

[1] This was not the view held by Macaulay, who refers to Dr. Johnson's "erroneous" opinion "that forms of government have little or no influence on the happiness of society."

that the majority of the new countries had based their constitutions upon that of the United States, the fact is, that, after due consideration, each and every one of them deliberately rejected it in favour of some other form. Indeed, the United States cannot fairly be called a good advertisement for republican democracy, if that is taken to imply manhood suffrage. The essential basis, and the very foundation of democratic government, is that the whole electorate shall take an intelligent and continuous interest in the conduct of political affairs. But the inhabitants of the United States considered as a whole are not a political people. All they ask is to be allowed to enjoy the blessings of material prosperity and to indulge in the pursuit of wealth. In most European countries a member of the legislature commands a high degree of respect; but in the United States he is, more often than not, regarded with suspicion. For the greater part the most respectable people refuse to have anything to do with public affairs. It is difficult not to admit that there must be some great defect in a system under which (according to a recent estimate) four million illiterates—that is, four million people unable to read or write—vote for the election of the Chief Magistrate of the country, while, on the other hand, such a comparatively small number of the total population go to the polls at all, that newspapers, in the hope of stimulating interest, go to the length of offering prizes to the States making the best records. The charge of political indifference holds good in almost every section of the country. The figures appear more striking in the South; the indifference there being all the greater because the result is more certain—the Democratic party being impregnable. The vote in South Carolina may be cited as a curiosity. In 1920 there were in that State 721,000 citizens of more than 21 years of age. Of this number

889,000 were negroes, and therefore, despite the Constitution, were only nominally citizens in so far as the right to vote was concerned. However, that left a balance of 388,000 voters. Yet only 67,000 voted at the Presidential election of 1920; and only 51,000 at the Presidential election of 1924. In Tennessee only 18 per cent. of the possible total vote was cast in the Senatorial election of 1922; the successful candidate being elected by 12½ per cent. of the voters. Perhaps even more significant are the statistics of the whole country. In the Hayes-Tilden election of 1876, 86 per cent. of those eligible cast their votes. In the Wilson-Hughes election of 1916—less than half a century later—the number of those exercising their right was reduced to 65 per cent., while in 1920 it came down to 52 per cent. In 1924, despite an ardent agitation to bring electors to the polls, only 51·3 per cent. of those qualified to vote took the trouble to do so. The highest percentage was in the State of Wyoming, where 70·8 per cent. of the electors voted.[1]

When one remembers the struggle made in many countries in order to obtain the right to vote, and the nonsense talked about the blessings of the franchise, these figures seem to constitute a strange and bitter comment upon the instability of human wishes.

Emerson characterized politics as a deleterious profession. That is an inevitable consequence when those best qualified ignore their duty to the State. For then the conduct of elections, and sometimes the real power,

[1] The figures respecting the election of 1924 were given by *Collier's Weekly*, March 7, 1925, and were those on which that publication made its awards. In September 1926, the National Get-Out-the-Vote Club, one of the large party organizations which had worked towards that end in 1924, issued a pamphlet which, while admitting that in South Carolina only 6·5 per cent. of the electorate went to the polls, contended that the total results showed that the tide had turned. It also gave the highest percentage; 82, to the State of West Virginia.

is thrown into the hands of professional political manipulators, who, in struggling against each other, employ corruption upon a vast scale. One of the most notorious illustrations of this statement happened as recently as 1926. In the State of Pennsylvania three Republican candidates took part in the Primary election for a seat in the United States Senate, one of them having the avowed support of President Coolidge. In passing it may be said that the Primary system by which each party elects its own candidate, and which was designed to supplant the caucus dominated by the political machine "boss," has failed in its purpose. So far from purifying elections, this election within an election has only opened the door to frauds of a more menacing nature. The rumour that before his death Mr. Roosevelt, once its most zealous supporter, had concluded that its disadvantages far outweighed its advantages, is probably correct.

In the election to which I refer, the Primary was all the more important because, Pennsylvania being a strongly Republican State, the victor was practically assured of final success. In the result these candidates, belonging to one and the same party, spent approximately $2,005,000 in the contest; in which, incidentally, the one favoured by the President was defeated. In another Senatorial election held in 1925 in the State of Illinois the total expended was about $850,000, one unsuccessful candidate having personally contributed $350,000—figures which are astounding, unless, indeed, they are compared with the colossal sums used in the Pennsylvania election.

Those in charge of these campaigns claim that no law was violated. If that statement is accurate, it simply means that the election laws of the United States are in dire need of drastic revision. And all the more so since

it was generally admitted that one or more of the candidates were obnoxious to certain great business organizations. In any event such huge sums could not have been spent to the advantage of anyone had there been a large body of public-spirited citizens, holding convictions which could not be influenced, and to which they were certain to give expression upon election day. Apart from any question of illegality, the political immorality of such proceedings is undeniable. Moreover, elections involving such an enormous expenditure are strangely out of place in a democracy, if only because they debar from active political life all but the rich or those supported by the rich; while they make a farce of such democratic phrases as government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Yet the custom appears to be taking root. For as recently as 1922 there was a Senatorial investigation, and a momentary spasm of public indignation when the successful candidate in a Primary in the State of Michigan, Senator Newberry, or his supporters, admitted the expenditure of $195,000. The actual total was probably somewhat greater. In any event, the Senate then, by resolution, expressed the opinion that the expenditure of such an excessive sum was "contrary to sound public policy, harmful to the honour and dignity of the Senate, and dangerous to the perpetuity of a free government." Nevertheless, the gap between the 1922 and the 1926 amount is startling. Apparently the value of seats in the United States Senate has increased much more rapidly than that of seats on the New York Stock Exchange.

In 1920 a sub-committee of the Senatorial Committee on Privileges and Elections investigated (taking evidence under oath) the amounts spent by and for candidates, avowed or otherwise, for the Presidential nomination in either party. It reported that the following was a fair,

although not a full or exhaustive, statement of these expenses:

Doctor Nicholas Murray Butler, Republican	$40,550
Governor Calvin Coolidge, Republican	68,875
Governor James M. Cox, Democrat	28,000
Governor E. I. Edwards, Democrat	12,900
Senator Joseph Irwin France, Republican	None
James W. Gerard, Democrat	14,040
Senator Warren G. Harding, Republican	113,109
Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock, Democrat	3,337
Herbert Hoover, Republican	173,542
Senator Hiram W. Johnston, Republican	194,393
Governor Frank O. Lowden, Republican	414,984
William G. McAdoo, Democrat	None
Senator Robert L. Owen, Democrat	8,505
A. Mitchell Palmer, Democrat	56,910
Senator Miles Poindexter, Republican	77,150
Senator Howard Sutherland, Republican	4,145
General Leonard Wood, Republican	1,773,303
Total	$2,980,033

One may note, perhaps with satisfaction, that the race is not always to the swift. General Wood's supporters had expended the huge sum of $1,773,303, more than half the total amount spent by all the other aspirants; but the nomination went (as a compromise) to Senator Harding, whose expenses were only the comparatively modest sum of $113,109.

Obviously these and other corrupt practices will endure so long as men of standing in the community continue to say that they will not contaminate themselves; and, as a fact, actually will not sacrifice themselves by any active participation in political life. But a corrupt democracy is worse than, for instance, a benevolent autocracy, inasmuch as it is more hypocritical. When Byron wrote that a democracy produced an aristocracy of blackguards, he was drawing somewhat heavily upon his poetic licence; but more astute political observers

have noticed that it is the tendency of democracies to place men of mediocre attainments in the highest office. That is, perhaps, perfectly natural. The mediocre man is approximately the average man; and it may well be argued that he is best fitted to understand and represent the majority of any particular nation. But certainly he is not inspiring; and more often than not he lacks training for his post. The net result seems somewhat disproportionate to the effort necessary for its achievement.

Some comparison of the rulers produced by the various systems tried in modern times is not without interest. After a period when by general consent might was right—the period in which, according to Stendhal, the continual presence of danger made strong personalities, —came the era of Divine Right. That was always a comfortable and sometimes a comforting doctrine for those who dwelt in its shadow. England was the first country to throw it overboard. The writing on the wall was apparent even before 1688. Macaulay recounts that Sir William Temple repeated to Charles II an observation which M. Gourville, "a very intelligent Frenchman well known to Charles," had once made to him in Brussels: "A King of England who was willing to be a man of his people is the greatest King in the world, but if he wishes to be more, by Heaven he is nothing at all!" And Charles II doubtless reflected how painfully his father had, at the end, learned that lesson; and probably foresaw how little it was likely to profit his brother, James II.

The Georges, each of whom was more English than his predecessor, governed constitutionally. Even George III never had so much personal power as is generally believed. Wraxall, in telling of the circumstances of Lord George Germain's elevation to the

Peerage as Lord Sackville, says: "This is one of the few Peerages which, in the course of half a century, George the Third has been allowed to confer, wholly independent of ministerial intervention or recommendation, from the impulse of his own inclination." [1] If the first three Georges were stupid, dull, and uninspiring, it was only George IV who was personally objectionable in any marked degree; while the lengthy Victorian reign, for all the stodginess which it possesses in our eyes to-day, was admirably in keeping with its epoch; and at its close the Sovereign was vested with the somewhat limited powers which belong to the British Crown to-day. As George V truly said to the American Ambassador, Mr. Walter Page, in 1917: "People are talking much about absolute monarchs; there is no monarch, thank God, in Europe who has the power of the President." [2]

In the days following 1870, M. Thiers once declared that sovereigns must learn to realize that they are in reality hereditary presidents: but in England that lesson had already been taken to heart.

It is difficult to define what is loyalty in these times: but probably it consists in devotion to an institution and to the person who, for the time being, typifies it, rather than in any more personal form of fealty. But leaving aside any question of loyalty, there would not appear as a matter of common sense anything to be gained by exchanging a monarch with restricted powers, who from his earliest youth is brought up to fulfil the duties of his post, for a system by which a political whirlwind every four years results in someone quite possibly unfit for the position being pitchforked into the Chief Magistrate's chair.

The experience of France has been more varied and

[1] Wraxall's *Historical Memoirs of My Own Time*, p. 416.
[2] *Life and Letters of Walter H. Page*, vol. iii. p. 366.

more unfortunate. After about a century divided between the reigns of two useless rulers, the ignorant Louis XIV who looked like a King and who brought his country to the verge of ruin, and Louis XV who completed. the ruin while boring himself and every one else, came the last three Bourbons of the elder branch—whose reigns were separated by the Revolution and the Napoleonic eras: Louis XVI, Louis XVIII, and Charles X. They have been not unfairly described as a fat locksmith, a country-town wit, and a worn-out *boulevardier.* Of Charles X it should also be remembered that to the very last he counted upon Divine aid for the Lord's anointed. On that hot July evening, in 1830, when Paris was in a ferment, the King, who was at St. Cloud, stopped his game of cards for an instant to reassure Marmont, who commanded the troops, and who, with reason, was afraid of the morrow. "Don't be alarmed; Jules has seen the Virgin and all will be well," the "Jules" in question being Jules de Polignac, one of that family always so fatal to the Bourbons. But Napoleon's Marshals had not been taught to mingle supernatural visions with military operations. They had been trained to reserve the Te Deums until after the victory. Marmont left full of forebodings, which were soon justified by the King's enforced abdication.

And so, passing by the reign of the bourgeois Louis Philippe, and the brilliant days of the Empire of Napoleon III, France finally arrived at a durable Republic; although almost until the last moment the head of the Bourbon family, the Comte de Chambord, might have seized the throne had he not insisted upon the Fleur-de-Lis and rejected the Tricolour; had he not refused to have anything to do with the plans of that intriguing but brilliant prelate, Monseigneur Dupanloup (the Atterbury of his day), to whom he finally wrote:

" J'attends peu de l'habileté des hommes et beaucoup de la justice de Dieu."

The Third Republic, which gave scanty promise of any lengthy existence, has now survived the storm and stress of half a century; a much longer life than has been enjoyed by any regime since the Revolution. And what manner of men has France had as her chief ruler since the choice has been in the hands of the electorate—acting indirectly through the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, sitting as one body for that purpose? Thiers, an old man of great cunning and deep sagacity, was at the helm until the German troops had actually quitted French soil; a man of first-rate ability and of manifold talents, despite the pettiness which debarred him from being a great man. MacMahon, a soldier, and at heart a Royalist, who, notwithstanding the episode of Seize Mai, was loyal to his oath of allegiance to the Republic. A parallel might well be drawn between him and Hindenburg. Grévy, an astute politician, but of second-rate calibre, who was even re-elected to a second term of seven years, but who was soon thereafter compelled to resign on account of the misdeeds of his son-in-law, Daniel Wilson. Sadi Carnot, the grandson of the famous organizer of victory, and himself somewhat above the average of French Presidents. Felix Faure, an amiable man of affairs, who quickly became inflated because of the fact that his office brought him into contact with the great ones of the earth, and who made himself more or less ridiculous. Casimir Périer, scion of a house famed in the annals both of French politics and of French finance, but who himself proved to be a weakling, unable to carry the weight of the office which he resigned. Then followed a period of fourteen years filled by two respectable nonentities, M. Loubet and M. Fallières, who added no lustre to the post, and who, in

varying degrees, were suspected of undue economy, regardless of public appearances. Far different was Poincaré, a strong, determined man, if somewhat narrow in his views, whose career is part of the history of Europe for the last fifteen years. To him succeeded the unfortunate Paul Deschanel, who, after causing the withdrawal of his lifetime enemy, Clemenceau (whom all men, himself included, had expected to be elected President until within seventy-two hours of the event), vanished unhappily within a few months. Millerand, like Poincaré, belongs to the history of to-day.

In this period of half a century the French Republic produced perhaps three or four rulers who represented it absolutely worthily. The others may be ranked in downward gradations; although upon the whole the list is a fairly creditable performance for a democracy. A similar review of the Presidents elected by the people of the United States during approximately the same time will bear out rather more clearly the assertion that in democracies the tendency is to bring down the level, and to bring mediocrities into high places. If the comparison is unfavourable to the United States (as in my opinion it is), that may well proceed from the fact that there the election is more directly controlled by the people.

The immediate successor to Lincoln was a man of little education and of still less tact, who, in moments of stress or excitement, sometimes partook too freely of alcoholic liquors. Nevertheless, he was rather hardly treated in being impeached. For the next eight years, Grant, the victor of the war, was President; an office to which he brought his great popularity, but no other qualifications. Personally he was honest; but in saying that he was not a political knave one is almost forced to the conclusion that politically he was a fool. His second administration

made Washington the scene of such corruption that Henry Adams considered the very atmosphere of that city to be polluted. It was one of the most scandalous periods in the history of the United States. The most recent American historian who has written upon the subject has been unsparing in his criticism; and has characterized Grant's conduct by saying "the presidency was a trust, but he treated it as a perquisite and a plaything." [1] Then came Hayes, a dignified nonentity, who for four years occupied the position to which the votes of the people had actually elected his opponent, Tilden. His successor, Garfield, who was assassinated almost at the beginning of his term, was pronounced by Roosevelt to have been the most brilliant man who ever went to the White House, although tainted by the defect of ignoring the misdeeds of his supporters. Garfield was undoubtedly a man of considerable ability; but a careful study of his long political career does not seem in any way to justify Roosevelt's high estimate. Chester Arthur, a professional politician, whose manner and personal appearance were his chief assets, succeeded him. Then came one of the few men of outstanding merit, and the first Democrat elected after the Civil War, Grover Cleveland. Benjamin Harrison, a cold and uninteresting man, but a good lawyer, may have been slightly above the average of his predecessors; but it was a low average. McKinley, an amiable character, who possessed neither a strong personality nor any personal attainments, was made President simply by virtue of the determination of that very able man of affairs, Mark Hanna. A well-known historian has pronounced Hanna's action in choosing McKinley as a Republican candidate, and in finally imposing him upon the American people as "the most grotesque episode in

[1] See Ellis Parker Oberholtzer's *A History of the United States Since the Civil War*, vol. iii.

American politics." [1] Rarely has anyone come to the White House with such a delightful personality and so little political acumen as Mr. Taft. His task was undoubtedly made more difficult by the fact that he followed immediately the exciting Administration of Theodore Roosevelt. But in any event a man whose mind was so judicial was entirely out of place in an executive office. Of Harding, who, like McKinley, was a politician living in a small town in Ohio, it will suffice to say that although himself uncorrupted, he was from the day of his election, or before, in the hands of a few rogues who speedily brought shame upon his Administration. *Felix opportunitate mortis* might well be his political epitaph.

If one considers these names in detail, the best that can be said is that democracy is easily satisfied.

In a roll so largely composed of more or less uninteresting and vapid politicians, there was one man who almost changed the nature of the high office with which he was invested; who became more famous throughout the world than any of his immediate predecessors; and who left a name which has undoubtedly a permanent place in history. Glimpses of Theodore Roosevelt's career, and of his character, are to be gleaned from various monographs, as well as from his autobiography, and from his delightful letters to his children. But in many respects the surest guide is his correspondence with Henry Cabot Lodge, published by the latter shortly before his own death. I know nothing in the political history of any country similar to these letters, which extend over a period of thirty-four years. Lodge was a statesman and a scholar. But, unlike Roosevelt, he made few friends amongst his fellow-men; his temperament hardly allowed him to do so. However, they were alike in that they were

[1] *The Life and Letters of John Hay*, by William Roscoe Thayer, vol. ii. p. 135.

both professional politicians in the best sense of that word. Roosevelt was a man of moderate means, while Lodge had inherited a more ample fortune; but from the days of their early manhood they devoted themselves to the pursuit of politics, putting aside any hope of adding to their incomes by practice at the Bar, by business, or otherwise. Indeed, it is probable that neither of them ever made a penny (apart, of course, from their official salaries), except by writing books or articles; Lodge limiting himself to historical studies or political questions, while Roosevelt, at one time or another, wrote upon almost everything under the sun. Their letters show how from the beginning Lodge believed that his friend would reach the highest office in the State; how he watched over him and advised him; and, so far as possible, held him back from committing indiscretions. When after many years Lodge disagreed with Roosevelt upon a vital question, the statement in which he announced that he could no longer support him, but that he would take no part in the campaign, did not lack a touch of pathos. Of both it may truly be said that they served their country well and faithfully throughout their lives. "Who serves her truly sometimes saves the State."

Roosevelt's outstanding characteristics were undoubtedly his high courage and his untiring energy. He understood thoroughly that the party system went to the very heart of constitutional government. Until he founded the short-lived Progressive party, it was only as a Republican, and from within the ranks of that party, that he sought to effect reforms. As he once said: "A man cannot act both without and within the party; he can do either, but he cannot possibly do both; each course has its advantages and each its disadvantages, and one cannot take the advantages or disadvantages separately." But no thought of his own political future ever prevented

him from doing what he thought was proper or from saying what he thought was right. Thus, at a meeting in Arkansas, speaking after the Governor of the State, who had made some excuses for lynchings, Roosevelt did not hesitate to rebuke him sternly in the presence of many who, no doubt, did not themselves disapprove of that way of taking precedence of the law of the land. Or when in Rome he first refused an audience with the Pope when the Vatican made it a condition that he should not visit the Methodist mission; and then, when an official of that faith issued an exultant and ill-bred address on the subject, he promptly cancelled his engagement to meet the leaders of the Methodist movement in Italy.

As Henry Adams said: "Power, when wielded by abnormal energy, is the most serious of facts, and all Roosevelt's friends knew that his restless and combative energy was more than normal. Roosevelt, more than any other living man within the age of notoriety, showed the singular primitive quality that belongs to ultimate matter —a quality mediæval authority assigned to God—he was pure act." [1] When Roosevelt occupied the White House, life in Washington was interesting. His Administration was always doing something which fired the enthusiasm or the imagination of the country. For instance, when an American citizen, Perdicaris, had been captured by the notorious Moorish brigand Raizuli, the State Department cut short the negotiations by cabling the American consul: "We want Perdicaris alive or Raizuli dead." [2] Every traveller of note was to be found paying a visit to the President, who, with equal facility and interest, discussed literature with John Morley, the prize-ring with John L. Sullivan, or the habits of birds with a famous ornithologist. Throughout his life Roosevelt read omnivorously, but

[1] See *The Education of Henry Adams.*

[2] John Hay, who was then Secretary of State, concocted this message.

rather as one curious about all things than as a trained scholar. Lodge, whose literary tastes were more delicate and discriminating, was wont to make fun of the quantity as compared with the quality of what he read. Nearly everything that came to his net was fish. But, strangely, Roosevelt had no liking for Shakespeare, until, rather hesitatingly, he included his works in the famous pigskin library which accompanied him to South Africa. However, Cromwell is on record as having said: "Away with Shakespeare and his descriptions of human passions. It offends against every commandment of the Decalogue. The kind of fun I like is the harmless joke of sitting on my hat." While Byron once remarked to Tom Moore: "I say, Moore, what do you think of Shakespeare? I think it is d——d humbug."

In the realm of politics Roosevelt was high-minded without being an impractical idealist. He was ready to learn from others, and always openly sought the best available advice. In other words, he was the antithesis of Woodrow Wilson. While he firmly believed that the President should be a strong man, he also freely recognized the futility of attempting to act as if he were omnipotent in the State. Thus in 1905 he wrote Lodge about the desirability of the State Department keeping in touch with the leaders in the Senate, and with the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, so that "we shall be spared —and without regard to which side is at fault—the irritation and indeed the humiliation of starting to negotiate treaties, of committing ourselves to them in the eyes of foreign people, and then of failing to put them through; . . . I do not want to start anything the Senate won't approve."

It would have been well alike for himself and for the civilized world if Woodrow Wilson had had a similar sense of realities, and of the position in the body politic which

the Constitution and custom alike accorded the Senate. Equally sane was Roosevelt's idea of the proper relations between the United States and Great Britain. As he expressed it privately to Lodge: "On the whole I am friendly to England. I do not at all believe in being over-effusive or in forgetting that fundamentally we are two different nations; but yet the fact remains, in the first place, that we are closer in feeling to her than to any other nation; and, in the second place, that probably her interest and ours will run on rather parallel lines in the future."

It is doubtful whether Lodge, who was by way of being an Anglophobe, and who contended that France should be in the sphere of the United States rather than in that of England, was very much in accord with these views.

Roosevelt's *flair* for foreign affairs was again shown in his foresight of German policy. The friendly days he passed with the Kaiser did not blind him.[1] Writing in 1911 he said: "If war is averted, it will only be because Germany thinks that France has a first-class army and will fight hard, and that England is ready and able to render her some prompt assistance. The German War Plan contemplates, as I happen to know personally, as possible courses of action, flank marches through both Belgium and Switzerland. They are under solemn treaty to respect the territories of both countries, and they have not the slightest thought of paying the least attention to these treaties unless they are threatened with war as the result of their violation." [2]

[1] During his visit to Berlin in 1910 the Kaiser and Roosevelt one day together inspected a body of German troops. Afterwards the Kaiser sent Roosevelt photographs of this scene, indorsed with commentaries which were so indiscreet that the Wilhelmstrasse, in great alarm, subsequently tried its utmost to regain possession of them.

[2] *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge*, vol. ii. p. 409.

Naturally, Roosevelt was, especially in his letters to Lodge, decidedly outspoken about both the dead and the living. Amongst the former he held Jefferson, whom he thought was "not even excepting Buchanan, the most incompetent chief executive we have ever had," in particular detestation. "The more I study Jefferson, the more profoundly I distrust him and his influence taken as a whole," he wrote; and, upon another occasion: "Of course, I am simply unable to understand how the American people can tolerate Wilson, but then in retrospect I am simply unable to understand how they could have tolerated Jefferson and Madison in the beginning of the nineteenth century"; while even in writing to an English correspondent, Mr. F. S. Oliver, he did not scruple to say: "Thank Heaven, I have never hesitated to criticize Jefferson; he was infinitely below Hamilton! I think the worship of Jefferson a discredit to my country; and I have as small use for the ordinary Jeffersonian as I have for the defender of the house of Stuart—and I am delighted to notice that you share that prejudice with me. I think Jefferson, *on the whole*, did harm in public life."[1]

However, Roosevelt is not the only American who can now see Jefferson as he was. A painstaking student of certain periods of American history recently wrote of him: "A gentleman . . . who listened eagerly of evil reports concerning his friends and associates, and who wrote them down in vicious little secret diaries; who concurred hypocritically in the deliberations of his colleagues, and attacked them scurrilously and anonymously and under the mask of venomous hirelings in his *National Gazette*. A gentleman who, whatever the extent of his undeniable contribution to the national welfare, was also to lend himself to many unlovely stratagems."[2]

[1] *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time*, by Joseph Bucklin Bishop, vol. ii. p. 23.
[2] *Lives and Times*, by Meade Minnigerode, p. 172.

Possibly Roosevelt's weakest point was his lack of judgment about men with whom he actually worked, or with whom he was brought into conflict. This is shown particularly in the epithets he used about those who were temperamentally opposed to him. It was comprehensible that he did not like Mr. E. L. Godkin, who was for so many years the editor of the New York *Evening Post.* But to call him a "malicious liar" was foolish; for Godkin was quite as sincere and upright a man as Roosevelt himself. There was a good deal more truth in his characterization of Carl Schurz (Republican though he was) as "a prattling foreigner." But at first sight it is not clear why he always went out of his way to speak contemptuously of Winston Churchill, with whom he never had anything to do. He summed him up as a "poor public servant," and mentions "I have refused to meet Winston Churchill, being able to avoid any scandal by doing so." While elsewhere, in referring to the American novelist of the same name: "I mean, of course, our Winston Churchill, Winston Churchill the gentleman."

Churchill never came across Roosevelt's path, and although Lodge once wrote he considered him "conceited to a degree which is hard to express in words," that was only in reply to one of, and was not the source of, Roosevelt's derogatory remarks. I think I (and no doubt others) could indicate the origin of this curious dislike. Roosevelt was always ready (sometimes too ready) to adopt whole-heartedly the opinion of his own friends about those he did not himself know; and his judgment of Churchill, and of several other people, was doubtless based upon statements made to him by a certain Englishman, who was for many years amongst his intimate friends. Whoever was responsible did not err on the side of fairness to Churchill.

Of another Englishman, Roosevelt, in his early days,

wrote, "Did you see in the last *Century* a most scathing review of Lord Wolseley's article on Lee? If that flatulent conqueror of half-armed savages chanced to read it, it will just make his hair curl. What a fool he is! For him to criticize Grant and Lee is like old Tippecanoe Harrison criticizing Wellington and Napoleon." I have never read the article in *The Century*, but Roosevelt put himself in the wrong merely by calling names. For Wolseley not only gave an impetus to the British Army at a time it was much needed (a fact acknowledged by men who did not belong to his particular school) but possessed many parts. Few men were so fitted to pass judgment on any campaign or general. In that respect, he was, of course, inestimably more competent than Roosevelt, who himself never hesitated to criticize any military commander; while Wolseley's long and close friendship with Edmund Gosse, and with so many who had no interest in military matters, bore witness to his versatility. Indeed, it is Roosevelt's military opinions which were of little value. The place which he assigned to Lee is clearly out of proportion to the latter's merits; although it is, I believe, quoted by Sir Frederick Maurice in his life of that general.

With his other characteristics Roosevelt could hardly be expected to have a judicial mind. As a matter of fact he was never able to comprehend the ways of lawyers. On one occasion he wrote, "We now need on the Supreme Court, not better lawyers, but broadminded, far-seeing statesmen, utterly out of sympathy with haggling technicalities." And, in discussing a possible appointment to that tribunal, he remarked that what was important was to know the "real politics" of the man who was under consideration. For Roosevelt never forgot that it was the Supreme Court which was the final arbitrator in constitutional differences. He was always fearful of

decisions which would follow the precepts of Jefferson rather than those of Marshall.

It was his restless energy which was partly responsible for the creation of the Progressive party. He was probably wrong in presiding at its birth; and possibly was almost equally at fault when he stifled it some years later. But it is only fair to recall that he had literally forced Taft upon a very unwilling Republican party—it was especially reluctant in the West—by promising that the latter would pursue his policies in the same way; which Taft, once ensconced in the White House, did not see fit to do. In the three-cornered election which ensued Roosevelt's hold on the country was shown by the fact that the established and well-organized Republican party was at the foot of the poll, being able to carry for Taft only two States—Vermont and Utah. But it was thus Roosevelt who indirectly was responsible for Woodrow Wilson becoming President.

Roosevelt's later years were somewhat pathetic. Many statesmen come into their own too late in life, as did Disraeli: Mr. Lloyd George once told me that he thought that had been the greatest tragedy in English political history. One would be inclined to say that Roosevelt reached his apex too early, were it not that the enjoyment of all things in life is necessarily keener during one's physical prime. When Roosevelt was in Africa on his big-game expedition, he wrote to Lodge that he realized that his day was past, adding, "The last statement sounds melancholy, but it really isn't; I know no other man who has had as good a time as I have had in life. No other President ever enjoyed the Presidency as I did; no other ex-President ever enjoyed himself as I am now enjoying myself, and as I think likely I shall enjoy life in the future." [1]

[1] See *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge*, vol. ii. p. 237.

It is doubtful if he did. The wild days of the Progressive party were entirely to his taste. But afterwards his only outlet was writing for various publications with which he was connected from time to time, and in making speeches in different parts of the country. Writing and talking, while quite sufficient to satisfy some temperaments, are only auxiliaries for men of action; and Roosevelt was essentially a man of action. But he never again had any power; and while he kept himself busy, as his nature demanded, it was about matters which sometimes were not of great importance. Gone were the days when he would exchange chaffing notes with Lodge and Root, and arrange to spend the afternoon on horseback, after settling the affairs of the nation. Although never a pessimist he may have vaguely felt the truth which lurks in Mark Twain's dictum that a man who is a pessimist before forty-eight knows too much, but one who is an optimist after forty-eight knows too little. Possibly it was a sense of impending boredom which led him to undertake his South American expedition. Certainly it lacked any valid excuse. It is significant that in the correspondence published by Senator Lodge there are no letters whatever referring to this matter. As a matter of fact, did Lodge seek to dissuade him from setting forth? Roosevelt had then passed the age when he could safely take the risks incidental to such a journey; and he was not, except as an amateur, either a scientist or an explorer. The result was what might have been expected. He nearly lost his life, and he actually gravely impaired his health. He was never again the same man, and his shortened days were often marked by painful illness. It preyed upon him that he was powerless to do anything active throughout the war. Idle speculations are the recreations of students of history: and one of the two which always attracts me most is to imagine what would

have happened if Roosevelt had been President in 1914 and the following years; the other being how and where the British forces would have collected themselves had Napoleon routed them at Waterloo. The anxiety Roosevelt felt for his sons, and his grief at the death of the youngest, Quentin, added to the darkness of those days. Moreover, he was for some time out of touch with public opinion: doubtless he felt, as did Lodge in 1916, that "it does seem at times as if the one object of this people is to get all the money they could individually and locally, and sacrifice everything to the preservation of life, comfort, and amusement"—a somewhat severe condemnation from such a thorough American as was Henry Cabot Lodge. When the United States finally entered the war, Roosevelt did his utmost to get permission to raise troops and to obtain some command in the field. It was a foregone conclusion that Woodrow Wilson would not show any generosity on that subject; although it is only fair to add that the War Department possibly felt that his presence in France would lead to embarrassments. Nevertheless, it should also be remembered that Clemenceau himself appealed to Wilson to send him, pointing out the benefit it would do to the cause of the Allies. However, he lived to see the defeat of Germany; and until the end he spoke in no uncertain accents. It was often impossible to comprehend what Woodrow Wilson meant—sometimes even Colonel House was at a loss—but there was never any difficulty in understanding Theodore Roosevelt. Perhaps that was one of the reasons why the people always responded to him. When Wilson was stricken with illness in 1919, the indifference of the country impressed foreign observers who happened to be in the United States at that time. But once, when the rumour spread that Roosevelt was dying, the New York *Tribune* spoke for the whole country, when, at the head of its editorial page, it printed

the following sentence: "Theodore Roosevelt—Listen! You must be up and well again; we cannot have it otherwise. We could not run this world without you."

His last service was to expose, in his usual plain language, the fallacy of the League of Nations. Only a few days before his end he wrote, "It is, of course, a serious misfortune that our people are not getting a clear idea of what is happening on the other side. For the moment, the point on which we are foggy is the League of Nations. We all most earnestly desire such a league, only we wish to be sure that it will help and not hinder the cause of world peace and justice. There is not a young man in this country who has fought, or an old man who has seen those dear to him fight, who does not wish to minimize the chance of future war. But there is not a man of sense who does not know that in any such movement if too much is attempted the result is either failure or worse than failure."

In December 1918 he was again in hospital, but in January he was able to return to Oyster Bay. His servant went to wake him one morning: but he was to wake no more. Greatheart was dead.

Mr. Coolidge and Theodore Roosevelt are as far apart as the poles. The present President is a native of Vermont, probably the poorest State in the Union. He possesses all the virtues which are characteristic of the New England Yankees; who, despite their very solid merits, are not a "sympatique" race—although, as William James wrote: "A Yankee is also, in the last analysis, one of God's creatures."

Mr. Coolidge is notable for a marked gift of saying nothing. Talking seems to necessitate a painful effort on his part. Moreover, he has none of the intellectual endowments which distinguished Roosevelt, nor even his knowledge of the world at large. His life was passed

entirely in Massachusetts, in going from one Government post to another somewhat higher, until finally he became Vice-President. The office and the man seemed to suit each other; for it must be admitted that Mr. Coolidge is somewhat insignificant, and the mind of man has not yet invented any more insignificant office than that of Vice-President of the United States. It has, apparently, tamed even Colonel Dawes, who made a sensational attack on the Senate rules the very first day he presided, but whose subsequent doings have received very little publicity. Only the late Mr. T. R. Marshall, by his happy and pleasing wit, was able at one and the same time to occupy that post and to make a personal niche for himself in Washington.

Chance, in the shape of sudden death, made Coolidge President, exactly as it had made Roosevelt some twenty years earlier.[1] But there the parallel ends. There is nothing to remind one of Roosevelt, when Mr. Coolidge, a little figure with a pinched face, receives the newspaper correspondents; and when "The White House Spokesman," as, under a curious fiction, he must be called in all published accounts of the interview, smuggles to the bottom any of the written questions which are at all embarrassing, and answers the others in a drab voice and with a marked economy of words. Nor is there the slightest similarity between Mr. Coolidge's platitudinous speeches and the bold and sturdy utterances with which Roosevelt used to electrify his fellow-countrymen. But perhaps the gulf between the two men, both loyal American public servants, belonging to the same political party, may

[1] It is said that Mr. Coolidge's political luck has for many years been proverbial throughout Massachusetts. It is on record that when he was chosen as the Republican nominee for Vice-President, one of the newspaper writers at the Convention (Mr. W. S. McNutt) exclaimed: "That's the end of Harding; he'll never be able to stand against 'Coolidge luck.' Mark my words: he'll die before his term is out and Coolidge will be President."

be best illustrated by recalling that recently Mr. Coolidge referred to the Declaration of Independence as " a great spiritual document " ; while Roosevelt did not hesitate to say that it was a document for which he had very little reverence because it made certain untruths immortal. Mr. Coolidge was repeating what he had learned as a boy, and had probably said at innumerable Fourth of July celebrations. Roosevelt, a man of wide reading and critical judgment, pronounced an opinion dictated by his knowledge both of history and of the ways of men. It might be added that an American historian of sterling reputation, James Truslove Adams, has written that " the document, which consisted of a preamble and a list of grievances, was easily open to attack. The philosophy in the former had at once all the weakness and all the idealistic inspiration which we have already attributed to the doctrine of natural rights. . . . The Declaration was of necessity a party document in which only one side of the case could be represented, and in which the most had to be made of that, in order to influence as far as possible all the colonies and all shades of opinion."

Nevertheless it would be unfair not to state that Mr. Coolidge possesses not only a certain measure of political sagacity, but also considerable courage : for he has not hesitated to veto measures of which he disapproved—and which the party which calls him leader then proceeded to pass in the face of his objections. It would require something more than brazen flattery to apply the word " great " to Mr. Coolidge, even while he occupies what is probably the most influential office in the world. But he has served to cast doubt upon the soundness of Roosevelt's theory (which was also held by Woodrow Wilson) that that office requires a strong and strenuous man. For Mr. Coolidge, despite his critics, is a President with whom the country at large seems well satisfied.

But the outstanding and by far the most interesting personality in American life to-day is undoubtedly Mr. Alfred Smith, who is serving his fourth term as Democratic Governor of the State of New York. Mr. Smith, who began life as a salesman in a fish-market, has no greater intellectual attainments than Mr. Coolidge, and considerably less education. But he is endowed with the invaluable faculty of making friends wherever he goes, while as a politician he is both shrewd and courageous. He is a product of Tammany Hall. But Tammany to-day is more respectable than of yore; and it is by no means certain that it has not become so through its connection with Mr. Smith. Anyway the latter's personal character and record are alike unbesmirched. His weakness as a Presidential candidate lies in other directions. He is by religious faith a Roman Catholic; and he is openly opposed to the existing Prohibition laws. It is questionable whether this would not suffice to break the "Solid South." Since the Civil War the Southern States have voted for the Democratic candidate, quite irrespective of the exact shade of his political opinions. It made no difference that in immediately succeeding elections that candidate was a Free Silver Democrat like Bryan, and a Gold Democrat like Alton Parker. Only a border State here and there, like Kentucky or Tennessee, has broken away on rare occasions. Yet it is doubtful whether the South, the home of religious ignorance and bigotry, and which in many sections had adopted Prohibition long before the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, would stand the double strain. However, both the country and the Democratic party itself would be eventual gainers if the Solid South were, once for all, split asunder. It is, of course, utterly illogical that a nation which boasts that its laws secure liberty and equality to all its citizens, should, by tradition and custom, debar the members of

any religious faith from the highest public office, for a tradition backed by public opinion is much more potent than any statute which may run counter to that opinion. But from Colonial days onward there has always been a considerable degree of religious intolerance throughout the country. Indeed, of the original Thirteen Colonies, Maryland was the only one which expressly guaranteed religious liberty.

It is true that the Roman Catholic Church has in other lands and in times gone by sometimes brought down on its own head political suspicion or exclusion. While occasionally the Church has made authoritative pronouncements which are difficult to reconcile with the tolerance it demands for itself in every country where it is not in the ascendancy. The last notable instance was when Pope Leo XIII, in his Encyclical on Human Liberty, declared, "Justice and Reason forbid the State to be atheists or, what amounts to the same thing, to entertain identical sentiments towards different religions and to accord them all the same rights." But would any Pope to-day make to the world a similar pronouncement?

The large Roman Catholic population in the United States has always shown the same loyalty as other citizens in the performance of its civic duties. Roosevelt entertained no doubt upon this question. Answering someone who had written him that the mass of the people would never support a Presidential candidate who was a Roman Catholic, he said: "I believe that when you say this you foully slander your fellow-countrymen. I do not for one moment believe that the mass of our fellow-citizens, or any considerable number of them, can be influenced by any such narrow bigotry to refuse to vote for any upright and fit man because he happens to have a different religious creed." While to a correspondent who wrote him about some alleged connection of Mr. Taft, then a Presidential

candidate, with the Roman Catholic Church, Roosevelt replied in the following unmistakable terms:

THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON,
October 16, 1908.

MY DEAR MR. ——

I thank you for your letter of the 14th instant. If asked by Mr. Taft, I should most emphatically advise against his making any declaration as to his religious belief such as your friend suggests. If there is one thing for which we stand in this country, it is for complete religious freedom and for the right of every man to worship his Creator as his conscience dictates. It is an emphatic negation of this right to cross-examine a man on his religious views before being willing to support him for office. Is he a good man, and is he fit for the office? These are the only questions which there is a right to ask, and to both of these in Mr. Taft's case the answer must be in the affirmative. In my own Cabinet there are at present Catholic, Protestant, and Jew—the Protestants being of various denominations. I am incapable of discriminating between them, or judging any one of them, save as to the way in which he performs his public duties. The rule of conduct applicable to Catholic, Protestant, and Jew as regards lesser offices, is just as applicable as regards the Presidency.

Very truly yours,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

Although the absurd Ku Klux Klan has now lost a great part of the influence it had for a few years, a prejudice against Roman Catholics still exists in the South. The surest way to kill it, there and throughout the country, would be to break the precedent, and nominate a Roman Catholic. Even if he were defeated, it would be a step

in the right direction, if Democracy is sincere. And Mr. Smith would, in other respects, be one of the strongest candidates who has gone to the polls in many years.

To-day the great trouble in the United States, apart from the apathy of the electors (and possibly one of the causes of that apathy) is that there is little or no difference between the policies of the two parties. As the late Lord Salisbury (then Lord Cranbourne) pointed out many years ago, the theory of constitutional government is that there should be two parties supporting different definite opinions. For many years the tariff was the great issue. But it has been shown that even a Democratic Administration will not now alter it to any marked extent. Therefore, as the Republican party has a better record in office, there would seem to be little prospect of Democratic success unless it be by reason of the personality of the Presidential candidate. Since Lincoln was first elected, nearly seventy years ago, there have been only two Democratic Presidents, Cleveland and Wilson, each of whom held office for two terms. In 1884 Cleveland got a majority of a few hundred votes in the State of New York, partly because Roscoe Conkling was bitterly opposed to Blaine, and partly because the famous "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion" address suddenly placed the latter in an awkward position, from which he was unable to extricate himself on the spur of the moment. When Cleveland again carried New York, in 1892, it was said that Platt had betrayed Harrison. But if the Republican party was ill served on these occasions, that has still more often been the fate of the Democratic party in its efforts to win that State. Not once or twice, but time and again has Tammany Hall been treacherous at a Presidential election—caring only about securing the State offices, and sacrificing everything to that. Moreover, many men of affairs, who call themselves Democrats (but who have no connection with Tammany

Hall) constantly and consistently vote for the Republican candidate in a Presidential election. The practical result of all this is well illustrated by the figures of the election of 1924. Out of 3,260,000 votes cast in the State of New York at that Presidential election, Mr. John W. Davis, the Democratic nominee, and a resident of New York (although a native of the State of West Virginia) received only 950,700. But at the same election Alfred Smith, the Democratic candidate, was elected Governor, having a substantial majority over his opponent, Roosevelt. If nominated for President, Mr. Smith would, of course, have the enthusiastic support of Tammany Hall. But, on account of this very distinction which is drawn by so many electors between State and Federal positions, it is by no means absolutely certain that he would carry New York; although he probably would do so. And I see no particular reason why he should get a majority in Pennsylvania or in Illinois (each of which has a large vote in the Electoral College) or in various other States which have never given a Democratic majority in twenty years. The following table, showing the percentage of the total votes cast which was given the Democratic candidate by these States in every Presidential election since 1896, is instructive:

	1896.	1900.	1904.	1908.	1912.	1916.	1920.	1924.
New York	41	45	44	43	43	47	30	29
New Jersey	38	43	40	41	42	44	30	21
Pennsylvania	38	38	29	38	35	43	29	19
Connecticut	34	42	40	38	34	48	35	30
Massachusetts	28	40	39	37	37	48	29	25
Illinois	43	45	34	42	40	45	27	23

It is therefore questionable whether, in the quite probable event of the Solid South being broken, Mr. Smith could get a majority even if he did carry New York.

But there would be a possibility if he gained Ohio, which has twice gone Democratic; Indiana, which has gone the same way once, and where the vote has often been very close; California, which saved Wilson from defeat in 1916; and some other doubtful States.

The fact remains that the only politician in the country who is to-day capable of winning any widespread personal popularity is a Democrat; but a Democrat who carries a handicap. In the South, where nearly every one is a Democrat, one constantly hears Smith referred to as a public danger.

Speaking generally, the political world in the United States at present is singularly drab. It contains no figures which arouse either the enthusiasm of Americans or the interest of foreigners. It is perhaps because they, like the other elements of the country, are becoming completely standardized. There is absolutely no one outside the Cabinet who attracts the faintest public attention. The tawdry and superficial Bryan has no successor. Senator Borah has now passed his apex. It is generally recognized that he now typifies the things he might have done, as he once typified the things that he was going to do. Amongst President Coolidge's official advisers there are only two who call for the least comment. Mr. Herbert Hoover is entirely out of place in Washington (except as a good departmental administrator) and, therefore, he seems somewhat different from his colleagues. A mining engineer who, at the very outbreak of the war, took upon himself the task of feeding Belgium, the efficiency he showed in that sombre undertaking soon made him an international figure. But it did not give him a political mind; and as a politician he is singularly incompetent. In February 1917 Mr. Hoover said: "America will be rich, prosperous, and wealthy as the result of the war. We shall have made untold millions of this wealth

out of the woe and welter of Europe. The money which has come to us from these people is money in trust, and unless America recognizes this trust we will pay dearly and bitterly for its possession." As a member of President Coolidge's Cabinet, Mr. Hoover has given every evidence of having completely forgotten this comprehensive, if succinct, declaration. That is, I think, all the more regrettable since there is every likelihood of the part of his prediction which is still unfulfilled being verified as amply as that which has already come to pass. But the most notable personage in the Cabinet is undoubtedly Mr. Andrew Mellon. The United States is fortunate in having a great financier at the head of its Treasury; for it is due to him that the income-tax payer has seen such substantial decreases in his annual contribution to the expenses of the State. It would probably be better if trained bankers were more often placed at the head of the Treasury in all countries. Yet in the United States an economist who is a theorist, or a politician who has had little practical experience in finance, is often chosen as Secretary of the Treasury. The English tradition is the same. Gladstone, Disraeli, Lord Randolph Churchill, Mr. Lloyd George, and many others became Chancellors of the Exchequer ("the poets of arithmetic are they," according to Byron) when their claims to distinction did not in any way rest upon their financial achievements. It is true that Disraeli, the impecunious and literary Disraeli, was rather aghast when Lord Derby chose him for that post. But his native ability aiding, he acquitted himself creditably; which probably only meant that, following the example of his many predecessors, he leaned somewhat heavily upon the permanent officials. Mr. Gladstone falls in a different category. While making full use of all the technical aid available he had a pronounced fondness for financial problems; and displayed

both imagination and ingenuity in solving them. It is a coincidence that both Mr. Gladstone and Lord Randolph Churchill terminated their official careers because they opposed the amount which the majority of their colleagues wished to allot for the naval or army estimates; although in each case there were some underlying reasons, which, in the one instance gradually, in the other precipitously, led to the end. It was Lord Randolph's resignation which opened the way for one practical banker to become the head of the Treasury—the Mr. Goschen whom he had entirely omitted from his calculations. But as a rule English Chancellors of the Exchequer have been educated while in office; and while not bankers before, some of them might well have become so afterwards—as Mr. McKenna actually did.

However, Mr. Mellon is a national figure in the United States by reason of his knowledge and his position in the world of finance, and certainly not in any way by virtue of his personality. The political field is actually a desert, without any oasis.

One curious legislative custom which prevails at Washington remains to be mentioned. A member of Congress may, by consent, technically make a speech without uttering a single word. He simply gives his oration to the editors of *The Congressional Record*, where it later appears, duly beginning, "Mr. Speaker"; and punctuated by as much applause as the politician himself sees fit to insert. The acme of the ridiculous is that such speeches can apparently be made after Congress has actually adjourned. Thus in 1926 the adjournment was on July 3rd, but from *The Congressional Record* it would appear that speeches (called "extension of remarks") were made until July 16th, at a cost to the country of about $19,000. In this way the members of Congress can have inserted in the *Record* speeches which they have

CHAPTER V

COLONEL HOUSE—AND HISTORY

More than thirty years ago Texas elected as its Governor James Hogg, a lawyer well known throughout the length and breadth of that immense State. He held the office for two terms, a period of four years. Anyone who goes to Texas to-day will find that although the names of the numerous Governors since 1890 have long since been forgotten, that of Hogg is still frequently to be heard. I know of no outstanding measure which, in the public mind, remains connected with his career. It seems to be the recollection of a strong personality which has saved his memory from oblivion after the lapse of more than a generation.

Edward M. House, then a young man, having been born in 1858, was one of Governor Hogg's closest supporters. Later he was also the determining factor in the choice of many of his successors. As more often than not there was a contest for the Democratic nomination (which in Texas, then as now, was equivalent to an election) he must, in the course of years, have triumphed over many opponents. But in a sojourn in that State I was impressed by the fact that not only was he always referred to with marked respect, and sometimes with affection, but that neither his name nor any of his political activities were ever mentioned with the slightest tinge of bitterness or hostility. Evidently he was not a man who made enemies. Probably that was partly because he never wanted and would never accept any office for himself. This unusual

attitude caused his disinterestedness to be generally recognized. Moreover, he rarely appeared in the foreground in public. He might control a convention, but he would generally do so without taking part in its meetings.

House had been left by his father a fortune which, in his own words, was "sufficient for all moderate wants." He doubtless added somewhat to it during his more active years in Texas. But he was never immersed in business, and took advantage of his independent situation to follow his own inclinations. Those led him to study closely and continuously the political position and prospects of the country, and of his party. He also gave some time to travelling, spending several months in Europe on many occasions. During these years he studied political history more or less extensively. His early education seems to have been interrupted, and without any definite plan. He entered Cornell at the age of twenty, but stayed there only two years. In any event there remained considerable gaps in his historical reading, as was sometimes (although very rarely) apparent when he later became a factor in European affairs. Indeed, it can fairly be said that he was more fitted by temperament than he was by knowledge for what he attempted to do during the period when he represented President Wilson in Europe.

In 1910 Colonel House, thinking that a Democratic success might be possible at the next Presidential election, began to look for a suitable candidate. At one moment he believed that the late Judge Gaynor, then Mayor of New York, might be the man required. But in November 1911, a year before the election, he met Woodrow Wilson, then Governor of New Jersey. From the first House considered Wilson to be the best man available. He was not, however, House's discovery.

It was Colonel George Harvey who had picked him out, and had launched him as a candidate for the governorship of New Jersey. One of the black spots on Wilson's memory is that later, during his first Presidential election, he broke with Harvey in a fashion which can only be termed brutal, solely because he thought that his support was doing him more harm than good. The deed was all the darker since Harvey, in having put Wilson forward for the New Jersey governorship, had extricated him from a very awkward situation. For Wilson had then just lost the fight which for some years he had been waging at Princeton, and would, in any event, have been obliged to surrender his post as head of the university. However, gratitude was not one of Woodrow Wilson's characteristics.

Colonel House worked unceasingly for Wilson, making the large Texas Democratic vote in the Convention a certainty, and a pivot for the delegates of other States. Moreover, he rendered an even more important service by gradually, and very adroitly, inducing William Jennings Bryan to look with favour upon Wilson. Later his experience was of service in the campaign; and he helped Wilson to choose his Cabinet by doing the necessary spade-work about the many possibilities—work for which Wilson himself had neither the inclination nor the capacity. But he neither wanted nor would he take any office. The new President came to the White House knowing that there was one man, personally disinterested, and having the experience in dealing with politics and politicians which he himself lacked, who had already given sterling proofs both of his ability and of his personal devotion. Such a find was an inestimable boon to a man who walked much alone, and who was assuming a burden too heavy to carry without some confidential outlet. Wilson, who was one year older

than Theodore Roosevelt, had passed the half-century mark, and had not, from all his past life, one single near friend who could be of service to him. But until the signs presaged the break in their relations he seems to have thoroughly appreciated all that House did for him; and to have been almost affectionate in his intercourse with the man of whom he once said, "his thoughts and mine are one."

When House had set out on his quest he was not even a member of the Democratic National Committee; and indeed he was little known beyond the boundaries of the State of Texas. It is a strange reflection that the ruler of what is in some respects the greatest country in the world, and certainly the ruler who has more power than any other, should have attained that office mainly through the efforts of a quiet politician who, without having any official mission, started from Texas to search for a man fit to be President; and that the choice should have fallen upon one whose whole political experience was contained in two years' service as the Governor of New Jersey. Apparently some republics gamble in a way which would affright older countries.

It is also interesting, before going farther, to consider the analogy between this friendship and the one which bound together Roosevelt and Lodge. In each instance the President had a friend whose devotion to him exceeded any personal ambition, to whom he felt he could safely confide anything, and upon whom he relied implicitly. But there the parallel ceases. Their very origins were different. Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge belonged to the same world; and it was not that of Woodrow Wilson and of Colonel House. Lodge sprang from a family which for generations had had an established position in Boston. One may per-

haps be excused for repeating the old and well-known rhyme:

> "In the beautiful city of Boston,
> The home of the bean and the cod,
> Where the Lowells speak only to Cabots,
> And the Cabots speak only to God."

Roosevelt was the scion of a family which for many long years had been of equal importance in the life of New York. Both as a matter of course went to Harvard. Their friendship began some years later through the fact that each had political aspirations, and from their early days were active in politics. On the other hand, neither Wilson nor House had whatever advantage may accrue in a democracy from bearing a well-known name: while Wilson, until he was fifty years of age, earned his living as a pedagogue; and was to a great extent cut off from any active participation in life and from much mingling with his fellow-men. Roosevelt's general reading and knowledge were infinitely greater, as his tastes were more catholic, than those of Wilson, while Lodge was certainly more scholarly. Wilson, however, could write a better State Paper than Roosevelt. Both Roosevelt and Lodge, quite independently of holding any office, had for many years had friends amongst men of prominence in Europe. Wilson's knowledge of that continent was confined to a few weeks spent in England; while it was only when he acted for Wilson that Colonel House began to meet men of public note beyond the limits of his own country. At Princeton Wilson had written or taught that the President should be a leader; and Roosevelt undoubtedly was one during the years he dwelt in the White House. But when Wilson himself became President he was forced to follow public opinion. He could not make it. Despite his frequent use of the word "democracy" the truth was that he never could get

as near to the people as did Roosevelt. During the war Wilson was sometimes obliged to delay action until public opinion caught up with him. How Roosevelt would have acted if he had been President in those days is a speculative question, the consideration of which would lead one too far afield. But it may confidently be asserted that in any event his course would have been less tortuous and more comprehensible than that followed by Wilson.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that Lodge, who was in no way democratic (but who at least did not prate about democracy), could never have negotiated as delicately as did Colonel House, nor could he ever have formed the close friendships that House did with Grey, and with other statesmen. But even Colonel House, with his heavy endowment of prudence, often showed, in respect to foreign affairs, an extraordinary *naïveté*, which was not amongst the failings of either Lodge or Roosevelt. The latter were more men of the world than House; and, as Anatole France shrewdly remarked: "Le monde est vain, tant qu'il vous plaira. Pourtant, ce n'est point une mauvaise école pour un homme politique."

The friendship between Roosevelt and Lodge lasted from their early manhood until broken by Roosevelt's death. That between Wilson and House endured for about eight years. How and why it was severed is not generally known. It is said that Wilson never gave any reason even to House. The most generally accepted version, and the most credible, is that at the time of Wilson's absence from Paris upon his brief visit to America during the Peace Conference, House allowed a certain matter to be decided in a way to which he knew Wilson was opposed. That is quite plausible as an excuse; but not as a reason. Everything tends to show that loyalty

is one of Colonel House's inherent qualities. If one dismisses any idea of disloyalty, there remains only the possibility that he took some responsibility upon himself, and in so doing ran counter to Wilson's wishes. But considering how often Wilson had appealed to him for guidance, and how he had long been given a free hand in his dealings with the rulers of other countries, that would not have been very heinous; and certainly not sufficient to outweigh the years of unselfish service which Wilson had formerly often acknowledged. The fact is that for some time Wilson had been drifting away from Colonel House. There is little doubt (and there is no good reason why it should not be said) that the underlying cause, or one of such causes, was Mrs. Wilson. House and the President's second wife had never been in complete sympathy with each other, and the latter did not look favourably upon House (or anyone else) being so near to, or having such great influence over, her husband. But in any event these men who had been so close to each other in momentous days never met after Wilson's return from Europe. That was not the fault of Colonel House. After Wilson was stricken by illness, House wrote to him suggesting a plan whereby he might improve his position with the Senate in respect to the Treaty of Versailles. In the words of the ablest of Wilson's biographers, Mr. William Allen White: "The letter breathed the fine chivalric spirit, and came clearly from an unselfish and fraternal heart. He waited five days, then ten. No answer came. He wrote another letter not quite so glowing with affection, but happy, cheerful, and hopeful, again offering to come. Again a week passed, two weeks, a month, and no answer came. The letters were never acknowledged. . . . And neither by message nor any indication of word or deed did he ever hear from his friend again. House had reached the

scrap-heap!" And Wilson lingered on the scene, a disappointed man and a helpless invalid, for another five years.

But the greatest distinction between the two friendships is that Roosevelt and Lodge were infinitely more practical. They knew better how to finish anything they began, and they were less likely to begin anything which they could not finish. A brief comparison between the correspondence of Roosevelt and Lodge, and of House's letters to Wilson (Wilson's letters have not yet been given to the world), will bear out this statement. They show that Roosevelt had a horror of starting anything which was not feasible, and that his plans and his aims were always definite; while House, although he was certainly a more practical politician than Wilson,[1] was constantly seduced by ideas more or less grandiose, which undoubtedly were intended for the welfare of the human race for all time to come, but which ignored too much both what had happened in days gone by, and also the passions, the suspicions, and even the ordinary facts of the existing situation. Moreover, his own affirmations were not always sufficiently clear when it came to the point of binding his principle. Colonel House excelled (as was proved more than once during the Paris Conference) when there was a definite question to be settled, the limits of which could not be overstepped. But left to himself he was too prone to bring forth some such scheme as the Pan-American Pact, or his curious plans for peace in 1916—which, as I propose to show, never had the remotest chance of success or of any tangible result.

[1] Some idea of the distance which Mr. Wilson's fancies sometimes led him away from reality was shown by the bizarre (and almost incredible) suggestion which he made to the French Minister, M. Jusserand, in October 1918: that the territory to be taken from Turkey should be placed under the government of certain South American countries, as otherwise the latter would have little opportunity to gain experience in national affairs.

But it is worth while first to quote Colonel House's view of Roosevelt. Referring in 1915 to the latter's criticism of Wilson's foreign policy, he says that for the first time in his career Roosevelt was "up against the real thing when it came to political sagacity, courage, and a well-equipped thinking machine." [1]

I take it that no one would deny that both Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson possessed a high degree of moral courage. There can be little doubt as to their respective merits when political sagacity was required. Who can imagine Roosevelt acting as did Wilson about Mexico—doing nothing except to lose much money and a few lives, and arriving at no result? Again, Wilson conceived the absurd idea that he could first ignore and then bully a Senate which his own deliberate conduct had already rendered hostile; while time and again, when he was President, Roosevelt (who liked his own way quite as much as anyone) pointed out that the Constitution gave the Senate certain powers which could not be overridden or eluded; and that it would be futile for him to do anything in which it would not concur. Seeing things as they are is "political sagacity"; and that was often what Wilson was incapable of doing.

An astute American observer has recently referred to a failing which is general amongst his fellow-countrymen: "It is the desire to believe. It is an insistence that the world is a world as we would like to have it rather than a world as it is. It is this tendency to go into the meeting-place—to push in if need be—with an armful of smiling hope and grinning benevolence but with intelligence checked in the cloak-room." [2]

This blindness to reality might often be attributed to Wilson but never to Roosevelt.

[1] See *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. ii. p. 95.
[2] See *Behind the Scenes in Politics* (anonymous), p. 232.

Any comparison of what Colonel House terms the "thinking machine" is necessarily more difficult, but if accomplishment of one's object is to be the test, Roosevelt was certainly more successful than Wilson. However, Colonel House himself gives, unwittingly, the line for another comparison between the two. In his diary, on April 15, 1914, during those early days when he was still showing Wilson the path which he should tread as President, he records: "I told him that all the really big men I had known had taken advice from others, while the little man refused it. . . . At another time in our conversation he remarked that he always sought advice. I almost laughed at the statement." [1] Even House himself evidently realized Wilson's defect in this respect. Roosevelt always listened to advice, and when he followed it, gave credit for it. But it is notorious that Wilson, although he did take House's advice for some years, came to his disastrous political end because he refused to consult anyone, and surrounded himself with subordinates whom he kept in the dark about what he was doing. Mr. Lansing has recorded that at the Peace Conference (although he was then Secretary of State) he was wont to learn about Wilson's proceedings, not from him, for Wilson ignored all his colleagues, but from the delegates of other countries.[2]

The most useful measure passed during Woodrow Wilson's Administration was the Federal Reserve Act. This law will probably protect the United States from those panics, a species of financial cyclone, followed by

[1] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. i. p. 181.

[2] I should add that Mr. Bainbridge Colby has written that both Wilson and Roosevelt were always most patient in listening to advice. But this is in direct contradiction, in so far as Wilson is concerned, to the circumstantial statements of Mr. Lansing and of many others. Possibly the explanation is that Mr. Colby only came into close official connection with Wilson after the latter's health was broken. A distinction is perhaps also to be drawn between listening to advice, when needs must, and seeking it.

some years of commercial depression, which used to sweep over the country at irregular intervals. It was after this enactment was on the statute-book, and after he had launched his Pan-American Pact (which came to nothing), that Colonel House turned his face towards Europe. The chief authority for what he did then and subsequently is to be found in the recently published *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, which are "arranged as a narrative" by Mr. Charles Seymour, a Professor of History at Yale University. It appears that some time ago Colonel House gave his papers to Yale; and an introduction which he has written for this book shows that it has his good will and authorization. It may be remarked in passing that the proceeding is characteristic. Colonel House would not write nor compile such a book himself, but in the background he holds the guiding-strings. He has been accused of being unduly egotistical and of making it appear throughout this narrative that he did much while Wilson did little. I am unable to discern any basis for that accusation. It may appear in that light to some critics simply because the absence of Wilson's letters throws into greater prominence the part played by House. But as Woodrow Wilson's executors refused to allow Colonel House to use that correspondence, it was not a matter in which he had any option.

When in London in 1913, House mentioned the plan which he had greatly at heart. Indeed, it was in his mind even before Wilson's inauguration. His diary records that on January 22, 1913, he told Mr. E. S. Martin that he wanted to get the incoming President to allow him to try to bring about a better understanding between the United States and Great Britain and Germany in regard to the Monroe Doctrine; and also a better understanding generally between England and Germany.[1]

[1] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. i. p. 245.

But it was only in the summer of 1914 that he was authorized by President Wilson to discuss his proposal with the statesmen in office in those countries. His idea, in brief, was an arrangement between the three countries (and Japan was also mentioned) looking towards a reduction of armaments as a guarantee for the maintenance of world-wide peace; including various other specifics for international amity. There was nothing new in the idea that the United States, Great Britain, and Germany would be the best guardians of peace. Speaking at Leicester as far back as 1899, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain had declared that England could not remain permanently isolated on the Continent of Europe; and had pointed out that an understanding with Germany (not necessarily a formal alliance "committed to paper") would be a "potent influence in the future of the world; and all the more so if the United States was a party to it." This, of course, was before the Kaiser's childish and indiscreet telegram to Kruger after the Jameson raid, and before the sentiments disclosed by Germany during the South African War, which for some years blocked the way towards any movement for closer relations between the two countries.

In 1914 House correctly summarized the position when, in a letter to Wilson from Berlin (to which capital he had first gone), he said: "The best chance for peace is an understanding between England and Germany in regard to naval armaments." But again, there was nothing whatever original in attempting that. England had, a few years earlier, made a definite proposal for a ship-building holiday, which Germany had contemptuously rejected. It is therefore difficult to see why House imagined that he could succeed. As a matter of fact, the Kaiser, during their half-hour conversation, told him that Germany must have a big navy; while at the same

time making the usual protestations that England had no reason to fear that it was to be used against her. In the whole interview there does not seem to have been anything of importance. The American Ambassador, Mr. James Gerard, subsequently wrote to Colonel House that both the Kaiser and Von Tirpitz "were most enthusiastic about you." However, there is reason to believe that the Kaiser was not greatly impressed. He had, some years before, taken a great fancy to Roosevelt, but House was not a man with whom he had any real point of contact. On the other hand the Wilhelmstrasse officials who met House thought very highly of him—both then and later. But the idea that his visit to Berlin hastened the war, or that (as the former German Emperor is reported to have said at Doorn) it nearly prevented it, may, I think, be taken as entirely without serious foundation.

House's conversations in London with Sir Edward Grey (now Lord Grey of Fallodon), Lord Haldane, Mr. Asquith (now Lord Oxford and Asquith), and others, covered a somewhat wider range, but resulted in nothing definite. They were interrupted by the gathering war-clouds, which also hastened House's return to the States. But in January 1915 he again set sail for Europe. Although his mission was unofficial he carried a letter from the President, emphasizing the latter's readiness to act as a channel of communication in an exchange of views between the belligerents, looking towards a settlement which would end the existing and which would prevent future wars. Apparently Colonel House's chief hope of accomplishing anything was based on conversations he had had with Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the United States. The latter assured him positively that he would find the German Government entirely reasonable, and that there would

be no obstacle about an arrangement providing for the evacuation of, and an indemnity for, Belgium, as well as a drastic scheme of disarmament in order to ensure permanent peace. The other Ambassadors in Washington were less encouraging. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, after first being sulky, was put in a good humour by being told "what a wonderful thing it would be to have the United States throw its great moral strength in behalf of a permanent settlement." But Jusserand and Bakhmetieff, the French and Russian Ambassadors, were not to be influenced by platitudes about "moral strength." Although Colonel House apparently could not recognize it then—or even later—they gave him his first glimpse of the real situation. They bluntly expressed their disbelief in Bernstorff's sincerity, and assured House that his errand would be fruitless.

Before considering the details of this and of his subsequent visit to Europe in the effort to bring about peace negotiations, it is worth while to note Colonel House's qualities and defects for his self-imposed task. In the first place, it must be put to his credit that he always obtained (finally if not immediately) and held the confidence of those with whom he dealt. In this respect his greatest triumph was the impression he made upon Sir Edward Grey. The latter, beyond all statesmen in England, and perhaps, indeed, in Europe, was unselfish, straightforward, and mentally free from any complex warpings. Intellectually he was not the equal of Asquith or of Balfour. His usefulness was lessened by the fact that, practically, he had never travelled abroad; and that he mixed little with his fellow-men at home. But his single-mindedness placed him in a class by himself. From the outset he and House fully appreciated each other.

Colonel House also had it in his favour that no matter

whether he was in England, in France, or in Germany, he never created any active hostility. The numerous volumes of memoirs and letters which have appeared since the war confirm the impression that he never left any ill-feeling in his wake. On the other hand, he carefully avoided even attempting to do anything with men whom he felt were out of sympathy with his aims, or whom he was certain would be unresponsive to his methods. He got on well with Mr. (now Lord) Balfour, whose speculative mind he no doubt interested. He could spend hours in agreeable, if not very practical, conversation with Lord Haldane. Mr. Asquith he admired, and in return the former was willing to listen to his plans and ideas; although the well-balanced Liberal leader had never any great faith in Colonel House leading the way to anything tangible. But from the beginning House realized that he could make no successful appeal either to Lord Curzon or to Mr. Bonar Law—to mention two men who were, in every respect, as wide apart as the poles—charmed he never so wisely; and, therefore, following his usual custom, he made no vain essays.

Colonel House never understood that holding forth about "the moral strength of the United States," or about plans to prevent all war in the future, meant little to nations which were actually at each others' throats, fighting for their lives, and determined to settle by force various material questions of present interest. A man less consumed by secret ambition to father projects which would change the course of the human race, or one even more essentially worldly, or more imbued with the teachings of history, would have comprehended this. But House did not fall into any of these categories. He was a rare instance of a man of action combined with an idealist. In the result he largely neutralized his own efforts. All his caution, the pains he took to

make friends in every camp, and his skill in smoothing away difficulties, were futile in result because he aimed too high. He recalls Lord Acton's remark that "ideals in politics are never realized, but the pursuit of them determines history."

He evidently thought that the American Ambassador, Mr. Walter Page, had become too English in his sentiments. From an American standpoint he may have had some justification for this view; although the English remembrance of Mr. Page can only be one of eternal gratitude to a staunch friend in time of need. Shortly after the publication of the first volume of Mr. Page's letters, I was told by one whose commanding position in the Department of State at one period of the war entitled him to speak with authority, that when Mr. Page was recalled to pass some weeks in Washington it was not, as he had imagined, in order that he might explain the situation in England, but that he might learn the opinions prevalent in the United States.[1] Colonel House also makes this quite plain. But in any event the fact remains that Page clearly understood the dominant feeling in England, which House never did.

After all, what sane person in 1915—or in 1916—imagined that there was the remotest chance of Germany, which during that period seemed still victorious, would agree at that time to evacuate Belgium and to pay an indemnity? Or who imagined that Great Britain would consider peace on any less favourable terms? Or that France would accept even those terms—unless abandoned by her Allies, who were pledged to support her claim for the return of Alsace and Lorraine? In the winter of 1915 anyone else, no matter what his

[1] The same authority regretted the publication of the Page letters as premature; and expressed to me his conviction that had Mr. Page lived they would not have seen the light of day for a number of years.

standing, who had come forward and told the British Government that Germany was ready to negotiate on that basis, would have been treated either as a fool or a busybody—even if he had given as his authority Count von Bernstorff, whose reputation in England was no higher than that which his father had enjoyed there in the eyes of an earlier generation. What placed House, apart from his obvious sincerity, in a favoured position was that he spoke for the ruler of the one country which Great Britain could not afford to antagonize. Lord Grey of Fallodon has, with characteristic frankness, stated that the Allies were always careful to avoid the one cardinal mistake which would have been fatal to their cause—a breach (not necessarily even a rupture) with the United States.[1]

Apparently Bernstorff had been the one and only person to tell Colonel House that Germany would consider such a proposal. The Ambassador was an excellent servant of his country. He prolonged a delicate situation to the utmost limit; and he advised the Wilhelmstrasse correctly about what the United States would do in certain circumstances, for which he obtained less credence at home than he deserved. Whether he was instructed to make this particular statement to Colonel House is very doubtful. And it is still more doubtful whether House really believed it. In any event, either he was singularly ignorant of the situation in Europe or he only pretended to believe Bernstorff. It is true that the latter once confided to his Government that he could do more or less as he liked with House; but Bernstorff was probably the dupe of House's pleasant manner. It is incredible that in January 1915 a man of House's intelligence, and having his sources of information, should have thought for a single instant that

[1] *Twenty-five Years*, by Viscount Grey of Fallodon, vol. ii. p. 155.

Berlin would evacuate Belgium and pay an indemnity. Possibly House simply wanted an opening, and imagined that by successive and continuous conferences with those in power in the different countries he would finally be able to evolve something, and to get some plan on foot. Indeed, it is significant that he once wrote to President Wilson that he would have Germany and her antagonists talking to each other before they knew it. That was exactly the way in which the important business of an American caucus or political convention was settled; and House was always possessed by the idea that a sufficient number of conversations between the proper people was sure to lead to something. And who knew this method better, and who more adept in utilizing it than Colonel House? But it was his knowledge of Europe and of Europeans which was woefully at fault.

In London, Colonel House had many cordial interviews with Sir Edward Grey, and with other members of the Cabinet. But as nobody had the faintest belief in the story of Germany's willingness to negotiate, there was no means of arriving at anything concrete. And although all shared Colonel House's opinion that it was highly desirable to prevent any future war, every one had his thoughts concentrated on what appeared to be a necessary preliminary—the successful ending of the war actually in progress. In March, Colonel House, therefore, proceeded to Germany by way of France. The Russian Finance Minister (if I remember rightly it was at that time M. Barck) and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Delcassé, had happened to come to London while Colonel House was still there. Sir Edward Grey told them of his presence and of the letter from President Wilson of which he was the bearer, and asked if they would like to discuss the situation with him. But both statesmen declined, and expressed the conviction that

Germany was so far successful that she would not listen to any reasonable terms. It was doubtless on account of this incident that Grey thought it would be better that House should not call upon Delcassé when in Paris. However, Colonel House feared that an omission to do so might be regarded as discourteous; and accordingly he was received at the Quai d'Orsay. His own account of what happened would amaze one, by its *naïveté*, were it not that since then that side of his character has become familiar to many. Writing to Wilson on March 14, 1915, he said that Delcassé, after it had been explained to him that the President understood the situation thoroughly, replied that "France greatly appreciated your keen interest and noble desire to bring about peace, and he was glad that I had come to Paris, and would look forward with interest to seeing me when I returned from Germany. He said he would then tell me in the frankest way what France had in mind and was willing to do. I did not press him to tell me this then, because I happen to know what they have in mind, and I did not want to go into a footless and discouraging discussion. I had accomplished more than I anticipated, for it was not certain that I would be received cordially. Even Sir Edward was a little worried. The main thing accomplished is that France has at least tentatively accepted you as mediator, and that, I think, is much. . . ." [1]

In other words, Colonel House did not want to be told that France insisted upon the return of Alsace and Lorraine; apart from other conditions about which she might have been more pliable. How he expected to effect a change of heart on the question of the lost provinces will appear later. But it is interesting first to examine what Colonel House actually achieved in this

[1] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. i. p. 400.

meeting which Delcassé had not greatly desired. He may well be correct when he says that he accomplished more than he anticipated, in that he was cordially received. Anyone who knew the late M. Delcassé is well aware that theoretical interviews were not to his taste, and that if he were bored he might not conceal his irritation. The reason for Grey's alarm is obvious. But the statement—"the main thing accomplished is that France has at least tentatively accepted you as mediator"—is absolutely misleading. France never at this time accepted President Wilson as mediator, tentatively or otherwise; unless, indeed, Colonel House meant by that phrase that if Wilson came offering, on behalf of Germany, Alsace and Lorraine, and the other reparations for which France contended, the French Government would accept them at his hand—which was a matter of common sense, needing no confirmation by any interview. But the word "mediator" means more than that; it implies committing one's fate to some extent to the judgment of another. That the French Government certainly did not do. Moreover, Colonel House apparently forgot that the very letter from Wilson which he carried as his credentials specifically rejected the idea that the President was to mediate. It "emphasizes the fact that House was representing not an official attempt at mediation, but merely the desire of the President to serve as a channel for confidential communication through which the belligerent nations might exchange their views. . . ." [1]

Subsequent to his meeting with M. Delcassé, Colonel House saw the late Mr. Willard Straight, who was on friendly terms with some of the officials of the French Foreign Office, and who was to convey through them the idea "that the really essential thing, and the big

[1] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. i. p. 360.

thing, was to strive for permanent settlement, and not for any small territorial advantage, which in itself would leave wounds which, in time, would lead to further trouble."

It may well be that Colonel House's theory was correct; but that is beside the question. The salient fact is that to expect France then to forgo Alsace and Lorraine was almost as strange as to imagine that Germany was ready to evacuate Belgium. The only thing stranger was that anyone undertaking to negotiate with French statesmen should have been so ignorant of the French character as to think that arguments such as those Colonel House advanced would be of any avail.

One more example must be given of the extraordinary *naïveté* displayed by Colonel House. Writing to President Wilson from Paris on March 15, 1915, he said: "I am trying to make a friend of de Margerie of the Foreign Office. He has lived in America, speaks English well, and is said to be almost as much of a force in the Foreign Office as Delcassé, besides being in Delcassé's confidence. I have some mutual friends on this job, and I will remain here long enough on my return to clinch it. I shall attempt the same thing in Germany, probably using Zimmerman as a medium. If I can establish such relations, the situation can scarcely get away from us. . . ." [1]

Such a letter requires no comment other than it indicates a rather pathetic attempt to control European affairs by American methods; showing that, for the moment, Colonel House had got entirely beyond his depth in strange waters.

It is better to state at this point that it was not until considerably later that House's real merits were appreciated by the French. At this period (I speak of what

[1] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. i. p. 402.

I know) he was regarded with a certain measure of suspicion. He did not make the same good impression in France as he had made in England. He might have —I don't know if he ever did—played on the feelings of Mr. Lloyd George by his schemes for the benefit of humanity; he mildly interested the speculative Mr. Balfour; and he endeared himself to Sir Edward Grey by the frankness of his proceedings. But in France there were no counterparts to these statesmen. The French are both more logical, more serious, and more formal than the English. Here was a man who talked of what they knew to be fantastic: Germany evacuating Belgium and paying an indemnity. Colonel House wrote that he had not wanted to hear France's conditions of peace; but the significant fact, which perhaps escaped him, was that Delcassé had no intention of discussing them with him until he had returned from Germany undeceived, and with his eyes fully opened to the facts.

Furthermore, the French are much more particular than the English in drawing a clear distinction between what is official and what is not. They could not understand an emissary who produced a letter from the President of the United States, saying that his mission was not official, and who then proceeded to talk as if he had the power of the President himself. A Government negotiating with him seriously could not tell whether or not in what degree he was responsible.[1]

After the United States came into the war, French

[1] In the same way there was at one time considerable curiosity in certain Government circles in France as to whether or not Lord Esher, who for some months was a rather strange figure in Paris, was there officially or otherwise. One was constantly being interrogated upon the subject. As a matter of fact, I believe that Lord Esher was watching the course of events at the request of some Government department; although it may also be true, as was then generally alleged, that he cherished the perfectly legitimate ambition of being Lord Bertie's successor at the Embassy. If I remember aright, he disappeared from the Paris scene soon after Lord Derby's arrival.

politicians were no longer blind to Colonel House's actual worth. But he could never have become friendly with Clemenceau (who had for House none of the antipathy with which Woodrow Wilson inspired him from the first day they met), and with other French statesmen, if he had openly urged France to abandon the idea of recovering Alsace and Lorraine.

From Paris, House went to Berlin. Herr Zimmerman quickly told him "that if peace parleys were begun now upon any terms that would have any chance of acceptance, it would mean the overthrow of this Government and the Kaiser." Colonel House wrote to Mr. Bryan: "Germany is not willing to evacuate Belgium at all, nor even France, without an indemnity, and Count von Bernstorff's [1] suggestion that this could be arranged was wide afield." As Sir Edward Grey wrote to him: "Your news from Berlin is not encouraging; it reduces Bernstorff's peace talk at Washington to 'Fudge.'"

Colonel House himself admitted to Wilson that he was sadly disappointed that they had been so misled by Bernstorff. This certainly supports the theory that House had actually placed credence in what the German Ambassador had told him. Nevertheless, I am bound to repeat that it seems almost impossible to imagine that House, with his native astuteness, could ever really have believed such nonsense.

In Berlin, as he was debarred from talking about peace, he spoke about the Freedom of the Seas, which was there regarded as a more agreeable subject of con-

[1] Certain German names are to be found in the records of those serving the State, generation after generation. When George I came to England, he brought with him his Hanoverian Secretary of State or Prime Minister, a Baron von Bernstorff. Lady Mary Wortley Montagu describes him as being "avaricious, artful, and designing, and had got his share in the King's council by bribing his women." Again, a Von Jagow was an aide-de-camp to Frederick the Great.

versation. But he accomplished nothing and, returning to London, he sailed for the United States a few weeks after the sinking of the *Lusitania*. He left behind him the impression that he was a firm friend of the Allies.

About six months later he was again in Europe. The President was not satisfied with the relations between the United States and the Allies, and he thought that House was the only man who could put them on a proper basis. But further than this—and much more important—House was on this occasion empowered to make a definite proposal looking towards peace. If the Allies would agree in principle to certain terms (which House did not think would be accepted by Germany), the President would call a Peace Conference; and if Germany would not agree to confer, or, presumably, agree to the terms in question, the United States would come into the war. In London, Colonel House again had innumerable interviews with Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Balfour, Lord Reading, and others. Before he left for Germany, on January 20, 1916, he had intimated that he would regard as a reasonable basis for peace the cession of Alsace and Lorraine to France, the restoration of Belgium and Servia, Constantinople to go to Russia, and a league of nations to prevent aggressive war. Amongst those whom he saw in Berlin were the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, Von Jagow, and Zimmerman. But in the course of a four days' visit he was able to convince himself that Germany would not be a party to any peace which would satisfy even the most modest demands of the Allies. Hastening on to Paris, he assured M. Briand and M. Jules Cambon that if the Allies could win alone, the President would stand aside and let them dictate their own terms; but that if they were losing, he would come to their rescue and guarantee a just peace. "I again told them that the

lower the fortunes of the Allies ebbed, the closer the United States would stand by them."

This was plain speaking which the French could understand. Nevertheless, it is hard to find Colonel House's exact warrant for going so far. The fact, *inter alia*, that the very night before the United States did declare war Wilson was so unwilling to take the necessary step that he said he would even then not do so if any way to avoid it could be discovered, gives rise to the suspicion that Colonel House's assertions might have proved deceptive.[1] That the French were not certain about Colonel House (as I have already stated) was now shown. For about ten days after he had been in Paris, the French Ambassador in London (acting upon instructions) was asking Sir Edward Grey whether House's statements could be taken seriously, or whether it was merely some election manœuvre in connection with the coming Presidential campaign.

In order to arrive at something concrete, Colonel House and Sir Edward Grey drafted a memorandum, setting forth that President Wilson was ready, on hearing from France and England that the moment was opportune, to propose a conference to end the war, "and that if Germany rejected the proposal, the United States would enter the war against Germany." This memorandum also stated what Colonel House considered reasonable terms, which were those already mentioned. President Wilson confirmed this document, inserting, however, the word "probably," so that it read "the United States would probably enter the war. . . ."

In *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*[2] it is said that "the value of the offer was in no way lessened

[1] President Wilson made this statement in an agitated conversation which he had that evening with the late Mr. Frank Cobb, editor of the New York *World*.

[2] Vol. ii. p. 201, note.

by the use of the word 'probably,' which was a conventional covering expression common in diplomatic documents." And it is also contended that the insertion of this word was necessary because the Senate shared with the President the control of foreign policy.

The first contention, with due respect, is nonsense. When one nation agrees with another to support it in waging war, no such "conventional covering expression" as "probably" is used; unless, indeed, it is actually meant to be an optional undertaking. While Woodrow Wilson's care in respecting the rights of the Senate was so seldom exercised that one may well be surprised to be told that it was accountable for any word in this document. However, the editor of Colonel House's papers apparently forgot that he had included in the volume a letter which proves conclusively that the word, so far from being a formality, was, in fact, the expression of President Wilson's real meaning and desire. On October 17, 1915, Colonel House had written to Sir Edward Grey an outline of the same plan—a proposal for a conference—saying that "if the Central Powers were still obdurate it would be necessary for us to join the Allies and force the issue." President Wilson, to whom the letter was submitted before it was sent, himself added the word "probably," making the sentence read "it would probably be necessary for us to join the Allies and force the issue."[1] As this was not a diplomatic memorandum, but an informal and private letter, signed by Colonel House, and committing the President to nothing, it is plain that he did not intend to give anything more than a qualified commitment to support the Allies; which is also consistent with all his subsequent conduct up to the very day of the declaration of war.

France and England never did notify the President

[1] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. ii. p. 90 and note.

that the moment was opportune. After his return to the United States, Colonel House brought what pressure he could to bear upon Sir Edward Grey, and he was equally disappointed and mystified by the fact that the Allies made no move. Yet the reasons are sufficiently clear. In the first place, the Allies thought that the President was much more likely to continue to write Notes than to fight. And they were in no mood to be committed to a conference which he would dominate, especially when he would not give any absolute engagement to support them in the event of its failure. They were absolutely right in their estimate of Mr. Wilson. Few rulers go to war gladly; but probably none ever went so reluctantly as did Wilson. Even after he had given Bernstorff his passports, consequent upon Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, he said (according to Colonel House) "that he would not allow it to lead to war if it could possibly be avoided." His reasoning was peculiar. He asserted that Germany was "a madman that should be curbed"; but he could not answer House's query as to whether it was fair to ask the Allies to do all the curbing. A few weeks later, however, Wilson found himself obliged to declare war; although he would gladly have seized any reasonable alternative even at the last moment. It is often declared by President Wilson's admirers that he could not have entered the war earlier because time was needed to prepare public opinion. Leaving aside any question about an earlier participation by the United States, the fact is that when Wilson did take the final step public opinion was not in any way prepared. It had been aroused to some extent by the discovery of the cable from the Wilhelmstrasse instructing the German Minister to Mexico to urge that country to attack the United States, and to promise

to support it in the final retention of Texas and several other border States. But Wilson was in no way responsible for that episode. In truth, as he himself was wedded to neutrality, he could hardly prepare the country for war. He had once taught that the President should always be a leader. But a man who at best was in doubt and was wrestling with himself could not lead. The result was that when war was declared the country was, so far as anything Wilson had done, as unprepared in respect to public opinion as it was in a material sense. Colonel House gives one or two instances of indifference or opposition to the war; while as late as June 1917 Major-General J. G. Harbord, then in Paris, confided to his diary the following significant passage: "Our American people are not, in my judgment, very keen for the war. They do not realize its perils. Losses in battle that also cost German lives they would understand; but if a troopship or two is torpedoed and a thousand or two American boys are drowned like rats, I doubt if the President could hold them in line." [1]

The Allies also recognized that if Wilson actually went to war at all, it would probably be only as the result of some disagreement between the United States and Germany, on the submarine question or otherwise, which left him no alternative. Naturally, they greatly preferred that events should take that course, since then the United States would presumably be in the conflict on the same basis as themselves.

Moreover, it was thought that—as the future was destined to prove—while the United States might declare war, she would be unable to wage it, and that it would take many months of preparation before she could do so. It was, therefore, at one period questionable whether

[1] *Leaves from a War Diary*, by Major-General J. G. Harbord.

the supply of ammunition and other materials was not more serviceable than anything else which could be got from the other side of the Atlantic. Of course the answer depended upon how much longer the contest would last, and whether the Allies could continue to furnish the necessary man-power, and to support the financial burden until the end.

The secret treaties amongst the Allies also militated against their calling upon the United States to act according to House's plan. For as he learned later, although he had been secretive only towards the public, those with whom he had dealt most confidentially had kept some secrets hidden from him.

Moreover, from June 1916 it was felt that Hughes might possibly defeat Wilson; and from Hughes, with Roosevelt behind him, one might reasonably expect more action and fewer Notes. In the result Wilson won, but with little to spare. Had Hughes acted more discreetly in California, or if he had not gone there at all, the outcome would doubtless have been different. As it was, the first reports received in Paris (where I happened to be during that week) were that Hughes had been elected, which caused almost unanimous satisfaction amongst French politicians. The fact that Wilson's re-election had been urged on the ground that he had kept the United States out of the war, had naturally not inspired confidence regarding his ultimate intentions.

Finally, Colonel House, so far as one can judge from his own *Papers*, did not realize that the influence of his staunchest ally, Grey, was waning. The first outward sign had been in July 1916, when Grey was forced to go to the House of Lords, thus making it clear that Lloyd George would become Prime Minister in the event of anything happening to Asquith. For Lloyd George's

strength throughout the country was increasing daily, although it was not until December 1916 that Asquith was ousted, an event which drove Grey temporarily into a much-needed retirement. For Colonel House the loss was mitigated by the fact that his successor at the Foreign Office was Mr. Balfour; for he had once said that Grey and Balfour were the only two in the Cabinet who spoke President Wilson's language.

During the campaign House wrote to Wilson, "The keeping of the country out of war and the great measures you have enacted into the law should be our battle-cry." Yet this same Colonel House had for some months been doing his utmost, acting for and in the name of President Wilson, to bring the country into the war. He had urged the Allies time and again, and with all his persuasive power, to request Wilson to call a conference on a basis which he felt sure that Germany would refuse to accept, promising that the United States would in that event declare war. He was grievously disappointed at not having succeeded. Nevertheless he advised that the statement that the President had kept the country out of the war—a statement in absolute contradiction to the truth—should be used to help to re-elect him. The editor of Colonel House's *Papers* explains this in the following somewhat airy fashion: "House had himself advocated a plan which under certain conditions would have brought the country into the war, and he had done so regardless of political consequences. Since the attitude of the Allies had prevented the execution of the plan, it would have been rather quixotic to have disregarded the political advantages resulting from the Allies' refusal." [1]

Yes; but exactly how would Colonel House's editor qualify, not what was not done, but what was done?

[1] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. ii. p. 361, note.

Without attempting to set up any high standard of political morality or ethics, it must be said that this was an excessively barefaced deception of a democracy. It was a manœuvre to which Mr. Lloyd George might conceivably have lent himself; but one which Sir Edward Grey would have contemptuously rejected: an illustration which, I imagine, would be very clear to Colonel House.

One touch of quite unconscious humour pervades, for some, the pages of Colonel House's *Papers*. Throughout, a great point is made of the secrecy which was maintained. Colonel House was himself, indeed, a model of discretion in this respect. But he seems never to have realized that all those with whom he conferred in England and in France were not equally silent by nature, by habit, or by training. In any event, many who were in confidential relations with some of those in office, and even some who were so only indirectly, were kept moderately well informed of his doings in 1915 and 1916. While many others who did not happen to be in that position would have no difficulty in picking out where there was some leakage, when they read Colonel House's enumeration of all those with whom he conversed. Not, I hasten to add, that all his secrets were disclosed. For instance, so far as I am aware, the existence of the House-Grey memorandum was not known outside of a small official circle until its contents were made public by Lord Grey of Falloden in the story of his political career.

So far as my personal knowledge goes, there was even less secrecy maintained in France than in England about Colonel House's sayings and doings. Nor did anything disastrous happen from the veil being thus lifted upon the plans and hopes of President Wilson's personal envoy.

Colonel House's two most notable visits to Europe failed entirely of their object. Indeed, when analysed,

it appears clearly that he never accomplished anything concrete; and (as I have already stated) never had the slightest prospect of doing so. There were many who never regarded House's efforts as being of any serious moment so far as securing a feasible peace was concerned; and if the correctness of that view still needed any confirmation, it has now been amply supplied by the publication of House's own papers.

Colonel House's greatest service during the war was in keeping alive and in protecting the good relations between the Allies and the Government of the United States. It is only fair to remember that at heart Woodrow Wilson was in favour of the Allies. When Mr. Brand Whitlock, the American Minister to Belgium, confessed that while his actions were neutral he was heart and soul with the Allies, Wilson replied: "So am I. No decent man, knowing the situation and Germany, could be anything else." But he was not always equally so; while his temperament, his disinclination to take any decisive step, and several unfortunate speeches, often made it appear that his opinions and his actions were not in accord, and that he made no material distinction between the moral position of the Allies and that of the Central Powers. But Colonel House was our friend in the same degree throughout. He showed that friendship in a practical way whenever possible. And although he sometimes questioned the wisdom of the Allied Governments, never did he waver in his firm belief that "the guilt of this stupendous tragedy lies with the Prussian military autocracy."

Colonel House's most effective work was really done after the entrance of the United States into the war; and not least at the Peace Conference. An attack of illness at a critical moment, and later his breach with President Wilson, diminished the sum total of what he

would otherwise have accomplished in Paris; and it is not too much to say that the civilized world was thereby the loser.

The story of how Colonel House set out from Texas to find a man whom he might make President of the United States; how he was successful in that task; and how he subsequently throughout the most momentous days of modern times played his part with the rulers of the earth, is fabulous. Seven almost unbelievable years! Theodore Roosevelt said that he had thoroughly enjoyed his presidency; and Colonel House might with equal truth claim that he had fully enjoyed that of Woodrow Wilson. But it is still more fabulous that such a freak of fortune, (satisfying surely to the overflow the ambition to be a secret power in the world which it is evident he always cherished), never changed his nature, or even affected his serenity. Lord Grey of Fallodon, who first in England appreciated his worth, has written what might well serve as his epitaph: "House longed to get good accomplished and was content that others should have the credit."

CHAPTER VI

THE UNITED STATES AS CREDITOR—AND AS DEBTOR

A COMPLACENT American journalist recently assured his fellow-citizens that the feeling against the United States which to-day prevails throughout a great part of Europe was inspired solely by envy of their affluence. The statement was correct in its recognition of a deep resentment, not only on the part of the foolish crowds which, in France, openly exhibit it to the American tourists, but also amongst many thinking people in various countries. But he was taking the matter too lightly when he alleged that envy was at the root of the trouble. No country begrudges the United States the prosperity she enjoys to-day, although naturally any country would like to share it. The ill feeling is engendered not by contemplation of American wealth, but by the conviction that that wealth is being used oppressively: and that, despite the idealism upon which her citizens have always prided themselves (sometimes rather too loudly), the United States, all things considered, bids fair to be the harshest creditor the modern world has ever known. The disappointment is all the greater because once the struggle of the war was finished it was England (a country whose statesmen are not prone to talk much about ideals) which offered to do more than her fair share to relieve the burden which was weighing down other nations. Lord Balfour, in a Note which will remain famous in the history of the aftermath of the war, pointed out

that the British debt to the United States and the debts of the Allies to Great Britain " were incurred not for the separate advantages of particular States, but for a great purpose common to them all " ; and although her Allies owed England more than twice the amount of the British debt to the United States, he proposed, on behalf of his Government, that there should be a general cancellation of all war liabilities. It was not unreasonable to expect that the United States, which then as now was incalculably richer than Great Britain (to-day the wealth of the latter is reckoned as one-fifth of that of the United States), which had suffered far smaller losses in both lives and property, and which avowedly had come into the war without any desire of profit or aggrandisement, would not be outbid in generosity. But the American Government refused to accept Lord Balfour's suggestion; and instead (while maintaining her high tariff wall, thus preventing European countries from making repayment by the sale of their products) negotiated separately with each debtor, and has attempted to extract every possible penny. It is not surprising that European observers are unable to reconcile this course with the frequent protestations of America's desire to help Europe; to which, if sincere, it would have been simple to give effect. Or that President Coolidge's smug satisfaction in stating that America " cherishes no purpose save to merit the favour of Almighty God " should be rather inconsistent with his ardent campaign as a debt-collector.

It is true that the United States has made some remissions, has graduated the interest payable, and has granted certain delays. But the principle upon which these arrangements have been made is that each country should pay according to her utmost capacity. As one cannot take what does not exist, it is clear that these

settlements are decidedly practical and in no sense generous: a creditor can go no farther than to search the pockets of his debtor. In the meantime Great Britain has proved that she was in good faith in making the Balfour proposal, by the fact that she has limited her demands from her debtors to what would be sufficient to satisfy her debt to the United States. Indeed, the total recovered will be even less if one does not count upon any repayment by Russia—certainly a very dubious debtor. At present the annual payment to the United States is thirty-three million pounds, and in two years it will be thirty-eight million pounds. Even if Great Britain's share of German payments eventually rises to fifteen million pounds, and France and Italy pay the annuities agreed upon, there will still be a gap of some million of pounds every year; while it should not be forgotten that when the Dawes plan reaches its apex, one way or another 60 per cent. of the total payments will have to be made over to the United States by the devastated countries for the relief of which reparation payments were demanded.

The difference between the settlements made by Great Britain and by the United States respectively with Italy is instructive.

	Great Britain.	United States.
Original loan	406 million pounds	339 million pounds
Present total	570 million pounds	420 million pounds
Total payments to be made ..	254½ million pounds	495 million pounds

As Mr. Philip Snowden, formerly Chancellor of the Exchequer, has written: "Great Britain has sacrificed 55 per cent. of the capital debt and all the interest upon it from the date of the agreement. America is to get the whole of her capital debt and seventy-five million

pounds of interest. It is true that for the first fifteen years Italy is to pay more to Britain than to America, but after that period her payments to America will, on the average, be double those paid to Britain. . . . Britain has made a clear gift to Italy and France of forty-four million pounds a year, or, in other words, has imposed an income tax upon her people of ninepence in the pound for the next two generations at least. . . . The most sanguine expectation of the yield of German reparations is not more than fifty million pounds a year, although the Dawes scheme provides for an eventual payment of one hundred and twenty-five million pounds a year. But no authority believes that Germany will ever be able to pay a sum approaching the latter figure; therefore, what all this amounts to is that America is going to take the whole of the German reparations and probably an equal sum in addition. This is not a bad arrangement for a country that entered the war with 'No indemnities, and no material gain' emblazoned upon its banners." [1]

Mr. Charles E. Hughes, in the course of a notable speech, told his fellow-citizens: "We entered the Great War not violating our tradition, for the cause of liberty itself was at stake. We have emerged from the war with the same general aims that we had before we went in. Though victors, we have sought neither territory nor general reparations. Our people have borne their own burdens, and in large part we are bearing the burdens of others." Mr. Hughes neglected to enter into any details regarding the burdens of others which are being borne by the United States.

In determining what justification there is for the European attitude towards the United States one must

[1] "The Debt Settlement," by the Right Hon. Philip Snowden, *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 1926.

consider first the reasons which led the latter to join the Allies in the war against the Central Powers; and, secondly, how the debts in question were contracted.

In 1914 the United States made no protest when Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium. It is, however, worth remembering that in the early days of the war Theodore Roosevelt did not hesitate to confess to a statesman of another country—Sir Edward Grey, now Lord Grey of Falloden—"I regard with horror the fact that the Government has not protested under the Hague Convention as to the outrageous wrongs inflicted upon Belgium. (I would have made the protest effective.)"

But the United States decided to stand apart from a war which was being waged three thousand miles away from her nearest coast; and proceeded to wax fat by selling munitions and other supplies to the Allies.

It was a perfectly legitimate stand. It might be added that it came at a convenient moment; for in the summer of 1914 there was considerable commercial stagnation throughout the United States, and great fears about the immediate future. If the Americans could stomach the drowning of their fellow-citizens on the *Lusitania*, after the German Ambassador in Washington had insolently warned them not to dare to cross the ocean on that ship, that was their own business. Certainly the Allies were better off during the first year in having the American people as a source of supply than they would have been had the latter offered assistance in the field; for, as was later shown, the United States would have been unable to furnish that aid without a delay of nearly a year. Anyway the policy of money-making in time of war (which one Radical newspaper even urged upon the British Government in July 1914) was in accordance with tradition. Germans and others

who occasionally raised their voices to suggest that if President Wilson really wanted to end the conflict he should put an embargo upon the exportation of war materials, ought to have remembered a certain page of American history. It may safely be assumed that President Wilson himself had not forgotten that Jefferson met his greatest defeat—greater even than his rebuff in the Burr trial, or his failure to have Marshall impeached —when he attempted to stop the Napoleonic wars by forbidding American ships to carry exports to belligerents. Within a few months the thrifty New Englanders, outraged at being deprived of an opportunity to enrich themselves, were pursuing an illicit trade which the Government found itself powerless to suppress; while Napoleon added point to the matter by interning American ships in French ports.

Germany's resumption of unrestricted warfare finally forced Wilson reluctantly to declare war. According to his own statement he did so in order to make the world safe for democracy. That was undoubtedly a laudable aim; although some, who are not absolutely convinced of the undiluted blessings of democracy, might prefer the reading "to make the world safe for civilization."

Another reason, however, was advanced by Colonel Harvey, who, in May 1921, when Ambassador to Great Britain, declared at a Pilgrims' Society dinner, "We sent our young soldiers across the sea . . . solely to save the United States of America." But apparently President Harding had little sympathy with that pronouncement, for he took occasion a few days later to talk of the sword which had been unsheathed "in behalf of suffering humanity." As a matter of fact there was nothing in Colonel Harvey's statement of which the United States had any reason to be ashamed. Self-preservation is not only perfectly legitimate but to be

forehanded in guarding the national security is to be statesmanlike. England actually went into the war because Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium. But it did not take the country long to perceive that had she not done so for that reason, and if she had refused to assist France on other grounds, she would herself soon have been at the mercy of Germany. The plight of the United States would not have been so desperate. The Atlantic is wider than the Channel. Yet the Kaiser's threat to the American Ambassador that he would settle accounts with the United States after the Allies had been defeated was by no means an empty one. Roosevelt, whose prescience in foreign affairs so far exceeded that of his contemporaries, was quick to realize the danger. As early as September 1914, in the course of a private conversation, he expressed the opinion that if Germany were to subjugate England in this war, she would invade the United States within five years. Moreover, had there been a rich and conquering Germany lording it in Europe the position of the United States would have been rendered all the more unstable by the fact that the large private loans or credits which had been made to England and the other Allies would have been irretrievably lost.

The situation was, at the time, recognized even officially by the United States Government. For in asking for subscriptions to the War Loans, the Treasury stated that they were essential for the country's protection and welfare. Nothing could be clearer. And when the bill authorizing the bond issue for credits to the Allies came before Congress, it was said by more than one speaker that the Allies were fighting the cause of the United States. Representative Mann put the matter plainly: "We are not prepared to place men in the field. We are not prepared to fight with our army.

We are not prepared to do much with our navy. . . . There is only one way in which to-day we can do more than make our war an academic discussion, and the only way left to us is to help finance those nations who are fighting our enemy."

Whether the United States came into the war to save civilization or to save herself it should be remembered that for more than two years prior to that time the Allies had been spending their best blood and substance either to make the world safe for civilization, or safe both for the Allies and for the United States; and that although American aid was undoubtedly necessary finally to win the war, yet (as Theodore Roosevelt reminded his fellow-citizens) it was the Allies who did most and sacrificed most to win it. To make only one comparison, the British Army loss was 908,371 and that of the United States 126,000. Even American financial authorities freely acknowledge that by far the greater part of the war burden fell upon the original Allies, and especially upon Great Britain. The following estimate, compiled by the Bankers Trust Company of New York, is illuminating:

RELATIVE COST OF THE WAR TO THE GREAT POWERS

(In "1913" dollars.)

	Gross Cost of War Per Capita.	Gross Cost of War Percentage of National Wealth.	Average Annual Cost of War Percentage of National Income.	Battle Deaths Percentage of Population.
Great Britain	524·85	34·49	36·92	1·44
France	280·20	19·36	25·59	2·31
Italy	124·59	20·59	19·18	0·92
Russia	44·01	13·11	24·10	0·98
United States	176·91	8·67	15·50	0·05

It is only fair to add that other American citizens of high repute have not hesitated to express themselves

freely to the same effect. Mr. Justice Clarke, who for many years was on the Supreme Court Bench, has said: "The money loan was used to purchase arms and ammunition, clothing and food, for more than six millions of men furnished by our Allies to fight for us as much as for themselves during the darkest crisis of freedom in a hundred years. More than a million of these men were killed, and more than another million of them were desperately wounded, during that fateful year while we were preparing to defend ourselves. In my judgment, on the basis of simplest justice, our former friends are entitled to a large credit on the loan for the lives they lost and ruined. These debtors of ours are also our best customers and they can pay the loans only by resorting to crushing taxation through many years. If sixty-two years is a fair allowance for Great Britain, France and Italy will require at least a century. Their trade for much less than a hundred years would be worth more to us than all that can possibly be collected from them."

Major-General John F. O'Ryan, who commanded a division in France, has gone even farther: "If it was a great moral obligation for us to have entered the war in 1917, was it not equally so prior to that year? If it was, then it follows that we are morally obligated to share in the cost of the war during that period." [1]

More recently, Mr. Newton D. Baker, who for some time was Secretary of War in Mr. Wilson's Cabinet, has advocated the cancellation of war debts even if only as a measure of commercial wisdom. In referring to the outburst in the United States against the Stevenson Plan, which, it was contended, made a British monopoly of the world's supply of rubber, Mr. Baker had pungently

[1] The *Literary Digest*, May 30, 1925.

remarked—" The American consumer has lost his sense of humour when he rails against Great Britain's ' great returns ' in the face of the fact that our own war-born monopolies in goods of every nature not only brought millions of profits to America at the expense of the entire world but were the direct means of adding hundreds of millions to the very debts whose payment we now demand." And in advocating the cancellation of the debts owing to the United States, Mr. Baker, after asserting that no distinction could properly be drawn between money lent before and money lent after the Armistice, wrote, " The fact is that not a penny of this money would have been lent by us or could have been borrowed by any of our debtor nations but for the war. Their need arose out of the contributions and sacrifices made by them in the war, and our willingness to supply it arose out of our belief that it was necessary, to our own interest, to sustain their military efficiency until the Armistice, and their economic stability after the Armistice, in order to prevent a collapse which would have cost us vastly more than the money we supplied. . . . Europe to-day is, and long has been, our best customer, consuming of our total exports more than double the amount of any other continent. In a very real sense, therefore, European buying in the world markets is a decisive factor in maintaining the price of our entire home product. It is not conceivable that the rest of the world will continue to trade with us during sixty-two years in which every one of them would have its own industries burdened by crushing taxes. Every country in the world has the experience of a vast and hopeless debtor class, and has realized that every so often it is necessary to wipe off the slate and start afresh as in a Scriptural year of Jubilee. This releases the energies of men, restores hope, cures political disorder, and gives life a fresh start. The analogy applies

perfectly to the present financial situation. The United States needs, not dollars, but a confident, prosperous, and peaceful world as a field for its industrial and commercial operations. That condition cannot be brought about so long as we continue to exact payments up to the capacity of the debtors to pay. If the foregoing observations are sound, the United States is not justified either in morals or the long good of its own industrial and commercial interests in adhering to its present policy with regard to the settlement of the inter-allied debts. The time has come when these questions, including the British settlement, ought to be reopened. Personally I believe that a mutual cancellation policy will be wise. Such a policy ought to relieve England, France, Italy, Belgium, and the rest of our war Allies both as to their debts to us and their debts amongst themselves, and in turn ought to require the release of some part of the burdens imposed upon them."

But the majority of Americans of equal standing with those I have quoted demand payment in full. Their general attitude was expressed by one of the most important amongst them, Judge E. H. Gary, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the United States Steel Corporation, when he said, " Our Government, in a polite and friendly way, should strictly insist that all debtor nations pay to this country the full amount of their claims, at the same time offering liberal terms as to time of payment and rate of interest."

Even more germane to the question of payment considered upon any moral grounds, is the way in which these debts were contracted, or more specifically, the manner in which the loans made by the American Government were spent. These advances began when the United States entered the war. It was a condition that they should be expended in the United States. In so far

as the British debt is concerned, it was incurred entirely in using these credits to buy American goods, and to buy them at high prices fixed by the American Government. While the Bankers' Press of New York has calculated that American bankers, manufacturers, and transport interests profited to the extent of over three billion dollars from French disbursements.

But for about a year after the United States conceived that her duty towards civilization or her own national safety and well-being, or possibly her honour, obliged her to wage war, she was unable to do so, on account of being totally unprepared to act. During that period the Allies were defending the interests of the helpless American, as well as their own. The United States could lend money (and did so—at a great profit)—but could not send men. As Mr. Glass, Secretary of the Treasury, said, "For substantially a year we had no considerable forces in Europe, and we were lending the money needed to purchase the supplies from our people of the materials necessary for the armies of the Allies, who were holding the Germans in the meantime." It is worth adding that the British casualties during these months when the United States was incapable of fighting aggregated about 800,000. One hears a great deal in the United States—a great deal too much—about that country having fought for the Allies. Obviously, although America's assistance was not only welcome, but doubtless necessary, there is not a scintilla of truth in that oft-repeated statement. All were fighting for themselves and for each other against a common foe. But the real distinction between the position of England and France on the one hand and that of the United States on the other, is that the former fought from the moment they had declared war until the day of the Armistice; while for a certain time they were also obliged to fight for the

United States, which had no troops in the field.[1] Had they yielded to the onslaughts of the Central Powers, had they been overcome, there is no doubt that Germany would have made the United States also suffer for their defeat. For if it is true that the Allies needed American aid in order to gain the victory, it is equally true that the United States alone would have been still less a match for the Teutonic forces. In the result the Allies held their own. But to-day it is evident that they are being called upon to pay somewhat dearly in dollars and cents, as in those hard months they paid in blood and human lives, for keeping the line intact for the United States as well as for themselves.

The table opposite shows the present position between the United States and its European debtors—although it is to be remembered that the proposed settlement with France has not yet been ratified by the French Parliament.

The settlement of the British debt calls for little comment. It is futile to argue now that better terms might have been obtained. Moreover, it is undeniable that, however heavy the burden, England strengthened her position in the eyes of the world by coming to an agreement, without undue haggling, regarding the payment of her debt, although her creditor refused to recognize any moral motive for substantially mitigating the weight. Lord Beaverbrook still from time to time attacks the settlement made by Mr. Baldwin, and invokes the shade of the late Mr. Bonar Law, who was Prime Minister at

[1] It is curious that those Americans who profess entire satisfaction with the existing situation rarely care to discuss this point. For instance, Mr. Eliot Wadsworth, Secretary of the World War Foreign Debt Commission, in the course of an able and lengthy article in which he defends the present attitude of the United States, says: "It is urged that America's loans were made at a period when she should have been fighting in the line. *I will not discuss the ethics of that point.*" (The *Boston Herald*, January 6, 1927.) The italics are mine.

SETTLEMENT OF DEBTS TO THE UNITED STATES.

Country.	Original Amount of Debt.	Accrued Interest as Funded.	Principal of Debt as Funded.[1]	Rate of Interest on Funded Debt.		Annual Payments on Funded Debt.		Total Amount to be Paid.	
				Initial.	Final.	Initial Year.	Peak Year.	(Principal Plus Interest.)	Term Years.[2]
	$	$	$	%	%	$	$	$	
Belgium ..	377,029,570·06	40,750,429·94	417,780,000	77–100	3½	3,840,000	12,861,850	727,830,500·00	62
Czecho-Slovakia	91,879,671·03	23,120,328·97	115,000,000	3	3½	3,000,000	5,884,725	312,811,433·88	62
Estonia ..	12,066,222·15	1,763,777·85	13,830,000	3	3½	483,000	548,550	33,331,140·00	62
Finland ..	8,281,926·17	718,073·83	9,000,000	3	3½	315,000	359,185	21,695,055·00	62
France ..	3,340,416,043·72	685,000,000·00	4,025,000,000	1	3½	30,000,000	125,000,000	6,847,674,104·17	62
Great Britain	4,074,818,358·44	525,181,641·56	4,600,000,000	3	3½	161,000,000	187,250,000	11,105,965,000·00	62
Hungary ..	1,685,835·61	253,164·39	1,939,000	3	3½	67,770	78,885	4,693,240·00	62
Italy ..	1,647,869,197·96	394,130,802·04	2,042,000,000	⅛	2	5,000,000	80,988,000	2,407,677,500·00	62
Latvia ..	5,132,287·14	642,712·86	5,775,000	3	3½	201,250	235,980	13,958,635·00	62
Lithuania .	4,981,628·03	1,048,371·97	6,030,000	3	3½	210,900	239,855	14,531,940·00	62
Poland ..	159,666,972·39	18,893,027·61	178,560,000	3	3½	5,916,800	9,315,000	435,687,550·00	62
Rumania ..	36,128,494·94	8,477,878·67	44,590,000	3	3½	200,000	2,249,020	122,506,206·05	62

[1] In reaching the funded principal of the debt in most of the agreements, certain relatively small cash payments were made, so that the original amount of the indebtedness, plus accrued interest, does not exactly equal the funded principal.

[2] Term of years for amortization.

NOTE.—These figures are taken from *Current History* for June 1926.

the time. But although Lord Beaverbrook's astuteness in financial matters is unquestionable, his attitude upon this subject is suspect by reason of his bias against Mr. Baldwin. The principal proprietor of the *Daily Express* has recently gone out of his way in an egregious little work,[1] to which I refer elsewhere, to protest that he has no prejudice against the Prime Minister; and, indeed, perhaps it would be more correct to say that he has an uncomfortable knowledge that so long as Mr. Baldwin is in office, he will never be admitted to the inner councils of the Conservative party. Hence his rather impertinent statement (which, however, caused some amusement to those aware of the situation), that he did not consider Mr. Baldwin "of Prime Ministerial timber." But even this did not tempt Mr. Baldwin to make public his opinion of Lord Beaverbrook.

It is about the still unsettled French debt that discussion has been most widespread and most bitter. I found in the United States that those who were most opposed to any leniency to France, were always eager to talk about that country's expenditure upon military armaments; and also to complain that she did not tax herself sufficiently.

People living in a country which extends three thousand miles from coast to coast, and whose nearest likely enemy is more than three thousand miles distant, have always dwelt in such a pleasant state of absolute security that they are quite unable to comprehend the feelings of a nation which has an hereditary foe at its very door, and which has suffered invasion by that foe twice within the memory of living man. The usual answer to that statement is that Germany will never again attack France, and that the idea is only a phantom of French nervousness. But if so, if there was no real danger of ever

[1] *Politicians and the Press*, by Lord Beaverbrook.

being called upon to fulfil the pledge, why was the United States unwilling to guarantee to come to the assistance of France if she were attacked by Germany? For clearly that guarantee involved no risk if the usual American argument upon this matter is to be accepted at its face value. However, if other nations will not guarantee the peace, it is surely only natural that France should be prepared to defend herself. As a matter of fact the French military budget is not unduly great. In 1924, out of a total expenditure of 400 billions of francs only 7·6 billions went for military charges; while the percentage of the total 1925 budget for the same purposes was 15·8 per cent. as compared with 19 per cent. in the United States budget, and 14·5 per cent. and 14 per cent. in those of Great Britain and of Italy respectively. Still more instructive are the figures recently given by M. F. François-Marsal, formerly French Minister of Finance, regarding the increases or decreases for military expenditure by the various countries in 1924-5, as compared with their expenditures for 1913–14;[1] Great Britain, + 32 per cent.; India + 99 per cent.; the United States, + 140 per cent.; Japan, + 89 per cent.; Belgium, + 74 per cent.; Italy — 10·6 per cent.; France, — 41 per cent. When it is added that the French national debt consumes 55 per cent. of the French revenue (as compared with 44 per cent. which Great Britain is compelled to set aside for the same object), the source of the real drain on the national resources is apparent.

The question of taxation is different. Undoubtedly the country was at first misled by M. Klotz (who was M. Clemenceau's Minister of Finance) and by others, who ought to have known better than to propagate the idea that France would recover from Germany all that

[1] "French Finances and the Franc," in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1927.

was necessary to reinstate her in the position which she occupied before the war. Moreover, the fact that until the depreciation of the currency reached an extremely low ebb the competition for existence was not unduly keen, also gave a sense of security which was utterly false. The position was the reverse of that which prevailed in England. There the financial basis was sound, but at the same time there was the most widespread commercial depression, and the consequent unemployment was to be counted only in the millions. In France the ordinary budget could not be quite balanced; while the extraordinary budget had comparatively little in the way of reparation payments on one side to offset the heavy outlay made by France herself to repair her devastated departments. But although this involved a constantly increasing inflation, and a financial situation which was far from stable, there was at the same time no unemployment. Indeed, the commercial activity was such, and the drain of the large cities on the country districts so heavy, that tens of thousands of Italians entered the frontier departments to buy or lease small-holdings, or to work on the farms. In the Lot and Garonne and in the Gers alone there are to-day probably at least fifty thousand Italians.

But despite this mirage, France has not been so undertaxed as her critics allege. Certainly the income tax has not been fully paid or collected, especially in the agricultural districts. In fact it has been said that in the Department of the Landes the return for one year was only in the neighbourhood of one thousand francs. But no one who knew France expected it to be otherwise.[1] It is not sufficient to enact a law; in order to be

[1] In *The Path to Peace* I quoted what the late M. Jean Dupuy said to me on this subject. All the predictions and forebodings of that astute observer have since been fully justified.

operative it must have the bulk of public opinion behind it. And French tradition is distinctly opposed to direct taxation. At the conclusion of a speech made in the United States in which I had stated these facts, one of the audience remarked that I had given away the whole French case by admitting that there was a law on the statute-book which was not duly enforced. Fortunately I was able to reply that I knew a still greater Republic where a law which even formed part of its Constitution was violated in the most flagrant manner on every side, despite the fact that millions of dollars were spent every year for the sole purpose of ensuring its enforcement.

Taking direct and indirect taxation together it appears, according to the figures of the National Industrial Conference Board, published in 1925, that Great Britain pays in taxes about 23 per cent. of the national income, France almost 21 per cent., Italy more than 19 per cent., and the United States 11½ per cent.; although presumably the latter figure is now less, consequent upon the reduction of the American income tax.

Nevertheless no one can deny that for a considerable period it was evident that some great concerted effort was necessary if France was to extricate herself from her present dilemma. That careful observer M. Jean de Granvillers wrote in his well-known work *L'Allemagne comme je viens de la voir*:

"A qui les voit et se rend compte des sacrifices que le citoyen allemand a consentis depuis l'armistice, combien apparaissent mesquines nos plaintes à nous qui vivons si largement et si grassement, sous un climat unique, avec toutes les richesses à notre disposition. Nous trouvons naturel d'avoir supporté, pendant quatre années, le poids de la guerre sans payer d'impôts, alors que les Américains et les Anglais s'en surchargeaient; nous trouvons naturel que l'Etat se contente de retirer de la

contribution foncière 225 millions de francs-papier qui représentent à peine la cent quarantième partie de budget des dépenses de 1925; nous trouvons naturel que les fraudes fiscales, chaque année, s'élèvent à 10 ou 15 milliards; nous trouvons naturel que les étrangers viennent, chez nous, vivre dans l'opulence, en dépensant, pour trois ou quatre personnes ce qu'ils seraient obligés de dépenser chez eux pour une seule d'entre elles; nous trouvons naturel que des gens munis de florins ou de livres, viennent acheter nos vignes et nos forêts? Si nous n'avons pas le courage de nous adonner immédiatement à un travail complet de revision fiscale, si nous n'avons pas le courage de faire rentrer dans la caisse de l'Etat, chaque année, une dizaine de milliards, tout en prenant des mesures draconiennes pour que le coût de la vie n'augmente pas—et cela est possible—non seulement nous perdrons notre puissance de premier rang, mais nous pouvons nous trouver, dans un avenir très rapproché, seuls à seuls en face d'une Allemagne à qui sa résurrection économique permettra de prendre par l'or ce qu'elle n'a pu nous prendre par les armes."

But for some time French politicians were a hindrance instead of an aid to their country. The Radicals, keen as they were to obtain power, did not know how to make any use of it. Mr. Sisley Huddleston, whose own Radical tendencies are well known, has rightly said: "The Radicals came into office at the time it was urgently necessary to face realities. They have floundered lamentably. Nothing that they condemned timidly when in opposition have they discarded after eighteen months."

At the same time the Socialists were obstructive. It is probable that another General Election about a year ago would have cleared the atmosphere better than anything else. But failing that, the best thing that could be hoped for was the return to office of M. Poincaré.

Undoubtedly he is not a statesman who inspires any personal enthusiasm. Cold in his manner, hard and sometimes vindictive in his actions, he walks alone. Nevertheless, M. Poincaré is a great Frenchman, who has given outstanding proofs of his patriotism, of his courage, and of personal abnegation. When as President of the Republic he realized the national needs, he did not hesitate to ask his lifelong enemy, Clemenceau, to become Prime Minister; while later, when he himself was again President of the Council, he resolutely pursued what he believed to be the proper policy. For M. Poincaré's greatest qualities are his tenacity and the way in which he faces the realities of any situation. Not the least triumph of his career is that he should have been given a vote of confidence by the very Chamber of Deputies which was elected to keep him out of power. Such an indorsement has a very different significance from that which M. Briand, once he ascends the tribunal, so often manages to obtain either by compromise or by virtue of his powers of persuasion. Those votes are tributes to Briand's personal charm. But any vote of confidence given to Poincaré is an acceptance of his policy, rather than a personal homage.

In any event the United States may rest assured that the word "repudiation" will never fall from M. Poincaré's lips, whatever he may think of American transactions. It is unfortunate that others in a high position in France have not always been equally discreet. Two years ago the president of one of the half-dozen largest trust companies in the United States recounted to me with some bitterness that a few weeks earlier he had lunched in Paris with a group of French politicians and bankers who had openly said to him: "If Germany does not pay us, we will not pay your country. What are you going to do about it?" The American banker, accord-

ing to his own story, had previously been in favour of a considerable reduction of the French debt, but as a result of this incident decided to advocate payment in full; and I am bound to say that I have since seen his name amongst those who were hostile to any leniency being shown. So much for the results of threatening repudiation. But it is not strange that Frenchmen should be unable to see how they can meet their liabilities unless their debtor, Germany, likewise fulfils her obligations; while it has yet to be explained why the United States has always been so tender about Germany's capacity to pay, and so callous whenever the capacity of France was in question.

In brief, the United States, which prolonged the war by keeping out of it until the moment when it was no longer safe to do so, in view of her own material interests, which in every respect suffered less than any other nation involved in the conflict, which emerged a creditor, whereas in 1914 she had been a debtor nation, is determined to exact the last penny from Europe. Her legal right cannot be denied. But is it too much to hope that henceforth one may be spared phrases replete with a complacent but meaningless idcalism which in existing circumstances only arouse contempt and excite bitterness throughout Europe?

But it is often forgotten, and especially by the United States, that if the Federal Government is a creditor, a number of State Governments are debtors, and debtors long in default. In a message to Congress President Coolidge said, in reference to the French debt: "I do not favour the cancellation of this debt, but I see no objection to adjusting it in accordance with the principle adopted for the British debt. Our country would not wish to assume the rôle of an oppressive creditor, but would maintain the principle that financial obligations

between nations are likewise moral obligations which international faith and honour require should be discharged."

President Coolidge could not (and presumably would not want to) lay down any different rule respecting debts due by Governments to private individuals or corporations from whom they have borrowed money. In any event, one who, with all respect, is a greater authority on such matters—Alexander Hamilton—once wrote upon the subject of public credit: "When a Government enters into a contract with an individual it deposes as to the matter of the contract a constitutional authority, and exchanges the character of legislator for that of a moral agent, with the same rights and obligations as an individual." It would, therefore, be interesting to have the views of the "White House Spokesman" regarding the debts which have for so many years been owing by various States to investors in England and elsewhere. But that is a subject upon which American politicians are strangely coy.

Nevertheless, the facts are extremely simple. The debts to which I refer have nothing to do with any which may have been contracted during the Civil War by the Confederate Government. Naturally, no one could have any claims for indebtedness of that nature. But the States in default borrowed the sums in question either before or after the Civil War. The details can be found in any annual report of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, which year by year, for more than half a century, has taken pains to warn the financial world regarding Governments which are in default in respect to their external obligations. In this list the names of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and North and South Carolina can be found side by side with those of Turkey, Honduras, Russia, Mexico, and

other delinquent countries. These States borrowed abroad, either between 1830 and 1838 or after 1865, various amounts for building railways, digging canals, establishing banks, and for other purposes. These debts amount to approximately $60,000,000, and the accrued interest makes a further additional total of $180,000,000. The moneys were lent upon the representation of the duly authorized agents of these States, and bonds were issued in proper form. In respect to the amounts borrowed before 1860, even American ingenuity has been unable to invent a shadow of an excuse. Regarding the debts incurred after 1865, it has been suggested that they were incurred by officials who were "carpet-baggers"; that is, who came from the North, and who were installed in power in the years immediately following the Civil War through the influence of the Federal Government. It is hardly necessary to point out that although that might conceivably be ground for controversy between the particular States and the Federal authorities, it could not in any way affect the indebtedness to those from whom the money was obtained.

As far back as 1843 the proposal was made that the Federal Administration should assume and pay the liabilities then incurred. "Mississippi was the first to pronounce the word 'repudiation.' Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Louisiana, and even Pennsylvania were staggering under the consequences of their improvidence. The credit of the country abroad was profoundly shaky. Foreign creditors asked why the National Government was not bound to protect American honour by seeing the State debts paid. The question of assumption was gravely considered, but Congress adopted an adverse resolution." [1]

But if the Federal Government did not assume the

[1] *Life of Henry Clay*, by Carl Shurz (American Statesmen Series), vol. ii. p. 211.

debts of the States, it went to the other extreme and aided repudiation. For the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides that a State cannot be sued without its own consent by citizens of another State or by subjects of a foreign State; while in many instances the defaulters have made repudiation doubly sure by boldly and without shame confirming it by statute.

It is only fair to add that even Americans have not hesitated to criticize this conduct. The whole matter was discussed at some length in *The North American Review* of August 1884, in an article entitled "Are We a Nation of Rascals?" Quite recently the New York *Herald Tribune* has expressed its opinion on the subject. No member of the Senate is more ardent in denouncing any delay on the part of the European Governments in settling their war-time indebtedness than Senator Pat Harrison of the State of Mississippi. It happens that that State is one of the most flagrant offenders. It was the first to repudiate. The Report of the Council of Foreign Bondholders for the year 1919 said: "The Council would be glad to hear what argument can possibly be adduced in extenuation of the conduct of Mississippi in repudiating payment of its loans in 1831 and 1838, which were duly authorized by the State Legislature, and were issued at a high rate in this country (*i.e.* England). The State invested the proceeds in the establishment of two banks, and so long as they prospered Mississippi paid the bondholders. But when the banks ceased to be profitable, the State not only suspended payment, but actually repudiated its debt. Such a step has not been taken even by so backward a country as Honduras." And the Report for the year 1920 remarked that, with the exception of Russia, there was no record of any similar case. Apparently the Council of Foreign Bondholders considers that the action of the State of

Mississippi is particularly heinous; unlike its representative in the Senate, who so often declaims against the European countries with which the United States was associated in the prosecution of the war. In its issue of March 7, 1925, the New York *Herald Tribune*, in a leading article under the caption "Debts and Their Default," referred to the attitude of this politician in the following terms: "If there is a Carnegie medal for unmitigated cheek we wish to nominate for its winner in the current year the Hon. Pat Harrison of Mississippi. This distinguished Southern orator rarely climbs to his feet without denouncing every foreign nation that is slow in paying its debt to this country. He castigates and scolds and withers. The very thought of 'repudiation' makes him tremble with righteous rage. Yet the Senator must know what most Americans would be glad to forget—that his own sovereign State, that bore and bred all this haughtiness and welkin-ringing righteousness, is some ninety years slow in paying some of its State bonds, owned chiefly abroad. The loans in question were made in 1831 and 1833. The proceeds were invested in banks, and when the banks failed, the statesmen of Mississippi turned a haughty shoulder towards the holders of those $7,000,000 of bonds. They trumped up various excuses for repudiating the debt, all of which the courts rejected. Interest has not been paid since 1841, and the bondholders are still whistling for their principal. The general honesty and credit of America need no defence. The nation pays its debts and has a right to expect its debtors to pay their debts. What we find nauseating is the spectacle of a Senator from the prosperous State of Mississippi, nearly a century overdue in its foreign obligations, attempting to preach to the hard-pressed nations of Europe, who acknowledge their indebtedness and only ask a few years' grace before

commencing to repay us. After the Hon. Pat gets his medal, we suggest that he transfer his moralizings to the State House in Jackson, Miss., where there seems to be real need for them."

Professor Raymond Turner, of Johns Hopkins University, retold the unedifying story of these repudiated debts in the January 1926 number of *Current History*, an American publication. A proof of the article was sent to the Governors of the various States involved; but it cannot be said that the answers received in any way improved the position of the States in default. But the reply of the Governor of Georgia, Mr. Clifford Walker, was unconsciously amusing; the latter part of this letter might even serve as a model for European Governments pressed for payment by the United States: "I have carefully noted the article to which you refer. The writer seems to be trying to be fair in his article, although he might have gone farther, and been a little more explicit, as the facts show that the debts which were repudiated were not contracted in the interest of the State but of individuals who were criminals. I am sure that you are interested in the South and will understand my suggestion when I say that the revival of those incidents is not and cannot be beneficial in any way, and I question the wisdom of continually washing our dirty linen. The South is now looking up and there are progressive and constructive incidents enough to engage our attention at present."

This is, however, the only trace of humour to be found in a sordid story. Is it strange that Europeans are quite unable to understand how some millions of Americans can calmly ignore the repayment of moneys borrowed by their State Governments for commercial purposes, and repudiate all obligation, and at the same time, in their capacity as citizens of the United

States, press for the liquidation of debts which, in the words of Lord Balfour, were "incurred not for the separate advantage of particular States, but for a great purpose common to them all"?

And this situation is another reason which causes Europe absolutely to distrust protestations of American idealism.

CHAPTER VII

ENGLAND TO-DAY: MR. BALDWIN AND LORD BEAVERBROOK

THE welfare of England and of Continental Europe is of vital concern to the United States, a fact which will become more evident as time passes. The foreign market will be of more importance than it is to-day to the American manufacturer the moment domestic prosperity slackens: which is bound to happen some time and which may occur at any time. The realization of this has caused some anxiety amongst thoughtful men of business, for although the United States could stand some loss of trade better than any other country, yet diminution of profits is never welcome. Obviously, to exact large annual payments from countries which are more or less debarred from American markets by a high tariff wall simply means that if those countries are to meet their obligations they must restrict imports from the United States as well as from other countries. In brief, one may impoverish one's customers to such an extent that they must cease to be large buyers. Mr. Newton D. Baker, who was Secretary of War in President Wilson's Cabinet, recently put this very clearly; and the interest and surprise evoked by his statements show that there is yet no genuine appreciation of the situation.

In urging a general debt cancellation policy, Mr. Baker pointed out that the United States was in no position to criticize European expenditures on military

armaments, since the only alternative was the maintenance of peace by moral force, to which the United States had refused to be a party. He considered it inconceivable that the rest of the world would continue to trade with the United States during sixty-two years while being taxed by the latter "for a cause and in a form to them not greatly different from the tribute which Rome imposed on her friends and enemies alike. We cannot sow seeds of international distrust, ill-will, and selfishness, and expect a harvest of friendship and of eager trade. There are springing up in the world economic unions and alliances against the United States, vastly more important and significant, vastly more important than the emotional outbursts of crowds in Europe against American tourists."

While in reference to the arrangement made for the payment of our debt to the United States Mr. Baker wrote: "The first of these settlements was with the British, and instead of being a magnificent achievement it is a magnificent disaster. It set a precedent impossible to follow with any other country, as none of our other debtors are even remotely able to settle on such terms. We are obliged therefore to discriminate, and in order not to make the case of our treatment of England too awkward, we must appear hard-hearted and exacting to every one else. More than this, England is our friend. Proud and powerful as we are, her policy and her friendship have protected us during the long years of our experiment in democracy, from the days when her statesmen welcomed the birth of our independence in the halls of her Parliament, through the establishment of the Monroe Doctrine, and down to the time when, in Manila Bay, her battleships stood cleared for action between us and the German fleet which was ready to prevent Admiral Dewey's success. . . . It was bad policy for us

to permit England to assume the burden involved in our settlement, and the dollars she pays will be dearly bought if they prolong by a day the recovery of England and her colonies from the sacrifices they made in the World War."

It is impossible to consider the political situation in England without first referring to the industrial crisis, and the period of stagnation through which the country is passing. The basic facts are so well known that a brief survey of them will suffice. After the war it was clear that the safest and best bulwark against the ills which were bound to follow was production on a larger scale than ever before. This need was generally recognized and widely preached. But it found no echo in the ranks of Labour. Partly because of a sincere belief in exploded or worn-out economic theories, partly because of an extreme minority element, which wanted only to obstruct, and had no interest in reconstruction, the plea for an increased output fell mainly on deaf ears. The British workman is still convinced that he is best furthering his own interests by keeping production within certain limits, even if not actually adopting ca' canny methods. But it is impossible to believe that his leaders, many of whom are men of outstanding intelligence, can sincerely hold that doctrine. Some of them are well acquainted with the United States. They know the pregnant facts. Those facts are that the American workman earns higher wages (even in proportion to the higher cost of living) than are, or under the present conditions could be, paid in England; and that, while at work he is surrounded with a measure of comfort and safety, and at home lives on a standard unknown in Great Britain. Moreover, although the employee is highly paid, there remains sufficient to provide generous profits for the employers and shareholders; notwithstanding

the policy of keeping machinery in a state of absolute perfection, and always obtaining the latest labour-saving devices, which requires the allocation of huge amounts for depreciation and renewal. A report on the cause of American prosperity, made recently by two well-known English engineers, Mr. Bertram Austin and Mr. W. Francis Lloyd, recalls that in the year 1924 the Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation, which owns properties valued at $153,000,000, set aside $81,400,000 for "depreciation, obsolescence, and the like." Anyone familiar with the current of American manufacturing is aware that these generous allowances are not merely bookkeeping expedients made with one eye on the income tax and the other on the shareholders. In the United States most modern factories are built, not, as is still more or less the case in England, as if they were meant to serve as a model and a monument for all time, but to be torn down and abandoned often within five or six years, in order to make way for something still more modern. The extent to which labour-saving devices are used, thereby increasing the power of production of each employee, is shown by some instances (which could be multiplied) given in the same report. Thus at the power-station of one of the Ford plants one man only is employed "to control the stoking of each battery of four coal- and gas-fired boilers which raise steam for 70,000 horse-power." At the Lincoln Motor Car Company's works in Detroit, one shop containing 78 machines is operated entirely by 22 men. While, to give one more example, at a plant of the Colt Patent Fire Arms Manufacturing Company, one man attends to eight milling-machines for small parts.

The happy state of affairs which prevails in the United States is generally attributed to the vast natural resources of the country and to the high protective

tariff. Undoubtedly both are factors in the general prosperity, but they alone would not be sufficient. The home market is a wide one, not only on account of Protection, but because it has been enormously enlarged by the standard of living by workmen, consequent upon the high wages they receive. Nevertheless, in the United States wages bear a more or less direct relation to production; and the soundness of this principle seems to be recognized by employees and employers alike. Nor is the consumer the sufferer, for the large sales and quick turnover make for low prices. While, as Emerson said, the American workman who strikes two blows with his hammer whilst the foreign workman strikes one is as really vanquishing the foreigner as if the blows were aimed at and told on his person. .

I need hardly add that every industry and every factory has not reached the state which I have outlined. Many can be found which have not yet attained a high degree of mechanical perfection. On the other hand, there are at least some industries in England which in that respect have little to learn from any other country. But as a picture of the whole the brief sketch I have given is fairly accurate. Similarly, despite the good relations between employers and employees, and the unity of purpose by which they are actuated, it cannot be said that there are no strikes in the United States. One part of the coal-trade is generally the least settled element in the country. But these qualifications do not alter the fact that the prevalent condition is one equally satisfactory to employers and employees; and that it has not been obtained by these two classes combining at the expense of the public—although that was, indeed, the way in which a coal strike in the United States was settled some years ago.

In view of this, one may at first wonder why English

Labour leaders do not favour and urge the introduction of methods which, despite the very different environment, would, to a large extent, be applicable in England, and doubtless with profitable results. The answer is not far to seek. In the United States employers and employees co-operate sincerely and even eagerly because they realize that high wages and good dividends are to be found only in constantly increasing production, and in constantly improving both the means and conditions of work. But the extreme faction of the English Labour element has very different aims. It would not welcome any close agreement, or an era of mutual confidence between employers and employees, even if it did bring in its wake a period of steady work and high pay. For these extremists, whose power is not altogether negligible, want to destroy rather than to construct. It is probable that in the recent long-drawn-out coal strike their ultimate goal was not nationalization, but the creation of a hopeless and chaotic state of affairs which, in their opinion, would have ended by the mines falling into the possession of the men. Even those who are by no means so extreme in their views would not favour the introduction of any system which would diminish their own influence. In the United States there is no political Labour party. But almost equally significant is the fact that in some great organizations where employers and their employees consult regularly about their joint interests, and together decide upon a policy, the representatives of the employees are chosen by secret ballot. This not only leaves little room for the professional agitator (who nowadays finds it more difficult than does any one else to get profitable work in the United States), but it keeps the men themselves free from that species of tyranny of which they are so often the victims in England.

Macaulay, in recounting the development of English

party government, after stating that neither the party which was always pressing forward, nor that which dreaded innovation, had a stainless record, but that each had great achievements in its record, continues: "The truth is that, though both parties have often seriously erred, England could have spared neither. If in its institutions, freedom, and order, the advantages arising from innovations and the advantages arising from prescription have been combined to an extent elsewhere unknown, we may attribute this happy peculiarity to the strenuous conflicts and alternate victories of two rival confederacies of statesmen, a confederacy zealous for authority and antiquity, and a confederacy zealous for liberty and progress. It ought to be remembered that the difference between the two sections of English politicians has always been a difference of degree rather than of principle. There were certain limits on the right and on the left which were very rarely overstepped. A few enthusiasts on one side were ready to lay all our laws and franchises at the feet of our kings. A few enthusiasts on the other side were bent on pursuing, through endless civil troubles, their darling phantom of a Republic. But the great majority of those who fought for the Crown were adverse to despotism; and a great majority of the champions of popular rights were adverse to anarchy."

The Labour parliamentary party not only has a number of extremists in its ranks, but possesses leaders who are sometimes subject to outside pressure which is, in reality, little in accord with their own sounder views. It thus happens that it has more than once outstepped those "limits . . . on the left" to which Macaulay refers; and has made it appear that the difference between it and the other great party in the State was one of principle and not of degree: a difference therefore

not susceptible to those compromises which have hitherto been responsible for our practical success, both in politics and in every avenue of commerce. It is for this reason that the disappearance of the Liberal party, entailing the secession of its more advanced members to the Labour party, would be a national benefit. The leaven which would thus be injected into the Labour party would probably result in the abandonment of certain trade-union economic heresies. It would certainly give that party that broader basis for appeal to the electorate without which it can never hope to be in office representing a majority. For its future depends upon its becoming a national instead of a class party, which it is at present.

Writing in 1921, I ventured to say that "So long as there is Parliamentary government the country will not allow a minority to impose its will upon a majority. Direct action on a large scale would probably solve the question quickly—to the discomfort of Labour." [1] The abject collapse of the general strike in 1926 amply justified this forecast; and since that event thoughtful Labour politicians have fully recognized the necessity of eventually going to the country upon a different and wider foundation. James Russell Lowell had every reason for writing that "The course of events is apt to show itself careless of the reputation of prophets." Therefore those who take the risk of foretelling the future may perhaps be allowed to congratulate themselves when they happen to do so with any measure of success. It is with this reflection that I have been re-reading the reports of several speeches I made in 1917 and 1918, in the course of which I predicted that the Labour party would speedily replace the Liberal party; and that in the ultimate result a number of the more advanced Liberals would join the Labour

[1] *The Pomp of Power*, p. 223.

party, while those of less Progressive tendencies would turn to the Conservative fold. At that time the Liberals were in the majority in the House of Commons, although divided into those who followed Mr. Lloyd George as head of the Coalition Government and those who remained in opposition under the leadership of Mr. Asquith. No such immediate disappearance of the Liberal party was generally foreseen, and I had reason to know that some of my future constituents thought my constantly repeated prophecy an amiable weakness, but rather a blot upon my political wisdom. While three years later I wrote: "The fact that Liberalism has little to offer Labour is one of the facts to which the leaders of the latter movement are fully alive. Any amalgamation is unlikely unless it is one whereby Labour swallows the remnants of the Liberal party. On the other hand, the Labour party has not had during the present Parliament the success which it had anticipated. It has not produced many men of first-rate ability; but that is hardly the cause of its failure, since no other party has much to boast of in that respect. Winston Churchill's gibe that Labour is unfit to govern—unfit in the sense that it has not the administrative capacity—is absurd. . . . It is essential that the Labour party should appeal to the country at large. A party which merely represents trade-unions will never come into power in England, for which one may be duly thankful, as that would be class government of the most pronounced kind. On the other hand, there is no possibility of increasing the number of trade-unionists to anything like the requisite figure. There are at present about 8,000,000 members of trade-unions in Great Britain. That is not sufficient to ensure a majority in the House of Commons. A great deal of talk about the absolute power of Labour is therefore nonsense. The power of Labour to cause inconvenience,

to lose money for workers and employers alike, temporarily to interrupt the course of ordinary life, and to do harm to the country, is almost incalculable. But that is not enough, especially in England. For some time the superior organization of the trade-unions enabled the Labour party to show a front which gave an exaggerated idea of its real influence if it was put to a decisive test. But as the origin of this strength was realized, other interests in the State also began to organize; while the railway strike of 1919 and the more recent coal strike have demonstrated clearly that so long as there is parliamentary government the country will not allow a minority to impose its will upon a majority. Direct action on a large scale would probably solve the question quickly—to the discomfiture of Labour; and the Labour leaders who know that quite as well as anyone else have, for the greater part, no stomach for a policy to which many of them are sincerely opposed, and of which many more doubt the sagacity. They realize that the country will not be bullied, and that any party in England which to-day openly says that a minority is to govern is simply slamming in its own face the door to office. The extremists will never admit that. But the recent strikes—and failures—have had their effect in convincing the rank and file that success does not lie that way. The only remaining course is to rest on the field of constitutional government, and to augment their forces. To achieve the latter end they will be obliged to do what every other fresh party has done before it came into power—to compromise. If they do so now before it is too late, while the country is not satisfied with a one-party power, and before anything else arises from the ashes of the Liberal pyre, they have every chance of forming the basis of one of the two great parties. The Labour leaders are therefore confronted

with the problem of some way securing a large proportion of that middle-class vote which Gladstone always had behind him, and which stuck to the Liberal party until the war. That can only be done by having a policy as free as possible from any suspicion of class domination. It was the fixed idea that the landed classes were getting too much and giving too little to the State—that they were trampling on the others—which solidified the middle classes against Toryism. Unfortunately for the Labour party the middle classes now have the idea that the trade-unionists want to impose their supremacy. Many things—such as ill-considered arbitrary strikes—have fostered this conviction; while the way in which the rates have gone up in many municipalities where Labour rules seems to indicate that a Labour Government would be without a rival in lavish expenditure of the taxpayers' money.

"All these facts and many more are being brought to the attention of the middle classes by non-party organizations which hope to prevent that vote going to Labour. But if the Labour party has any sincere idea of a national rôle it will realize in time that it cannot, in these days, expect to carry the country in support of its class legislation merely because, in days gone by, others were so ill-advised as to enforce legislation in favour of another class. In order to broaden its policy it will have to rid itself of its extreme element. In return it will probably get that much-coveted middle-class vote which will one day carry it to power." [1]

I believe that the passage of time has only served to prove the truth of these statements; for the Labour party has not yet obtained office by the support of the majority of the electorate. Writing some five years later, Mr. J. M. Keynes finally confesses that the Liberal

[1] *The Pomp of Power*, pp. 221–4.

party is unlikely again to be one of the two great parties in the State: "I do not believe that the Liberal party will win one-third of the seats in the House of Commons in any probable or foreseeable circumstances. . . . I do not believe that the Labour party will win one-half of the seats in the House of Commons." In these circumstances Mr. Keynes, while admitting the virtual extinction of the Liberal party "as a practical probability," naturally advocates a coalition or alliance of one kind or another. It is, however, difficult to see where that would be to the ultimate advantage of the Labour party. To-day the "virtual extinction" of the Liberal party is not very far from being an accomplished fact. Few will be found to disagree with Mr. Keynes's admission that the Liberal party is unlikely to obtain one-third of the seats in the House of Commons. But there is every reason to dissent from his prophecy that the Labour party will not carry the majority of the constituencies. There is, I think, no doubt that it will do so at no very distant date (although possibly not at the next General Election), and with no more drastic change than absorbing a certain number of Liberals, together with a tinge of their doctrine, while at the same time ridding itself of its own extremist element. Certainly there is even less inducement than in 1921 to cause the Labour party to consent to a coalition; and still more firmly to-day than then do I believe that any amalgamation will be one whereby "Labour swallows the remnants of the Liberal party." For the Liberal party has been castrated. It may still show some flicker of brilliance; but it is impotent to reproduce the species.

The only contingency in which a coalition would seem possible would be that in a moment of defeat or temporary discouragement the Labour party should yield to the blandishments of Mr. Lloyd George. But that

is a very unlikely conjuncture. It is true that upon a political scene where personalities are generally scarce the barrenness of the Labour party in this respect is particularly marked; and no one would deny that Mr. Lloyd George possesses a potent personality. But the Labour party might think the price too great, even though he could bring over with him the famous Campaign Fund Chest, which he refused to open freely for the benefit of the Asquithian Liberals. In fact it is doubtful whether he would prove to be an asset or a liability. His political record is not such as to arouse enthusiasm for any alliance with him. He wrecked one party and nearly wrecked another. While the idea of any division of authority with him recalls the words of Paul de Musset about his more famous brother, Alfred: "Que voulez-vous? C'est comme cela: Alfred a eu toujours la moitié du lit, seulement la moitié était toujours prise du milieu."

In speaking of Mr. Lloyd George, it is, I think, well that those who (like myself) criticize his policy—or, to be more exact, his lack of any fixed policy—and his personal and changeable conduct of foreign affairs after the Armistice, should also bear in mind that more than any other politician in England he was responsible for winning the war. He aroused the country at the most acute crisis in her history; and whatever he did before or afterwards, that must ever remain his great distinction. The passage of only a few years has served somewhat to obscure that fact; while it is doubtless true that the place which posterity will assign him may be far removed from that which would have been his had his career closed at the end of 1918. However, a live politician may be of more practical worth to his country than a dead statesman. Nevertheless, it is regrettable to see one who has occupied high places, and who for some

years had throughout Europe more influence than any other man of his day and generation, writing for the American Press articles which he uses as a vehicle for his vicious gibes at France, or for the display of his other animosities. Nature certainly did not intend Mr. Lloyd George to be a journalist. It is inconceivable that anyone who has seen and known so much of the affairs of the world can write such dreary twaddle. Divorced from his name his weekly letters could not find a publisher; and even backed by that renown they have few serious readers.

A party in search of a leader may be in a bad way, but a leader in search of a party is in a still more unfortunate position. And that is the situation of Mr. Lloyd George. He wants to lead some party (but a real party, not a corporal's guard) somewhere. There is no doubt that if given any encouragement he would go at least half-way in building a bridge connecting with the Labour party. He would then have some prospect of a return to the Promised Land; whereas a resurrection of the Liberal party (for the destruction of which he is himself the chief culprit) is hardly likely in his day. Moreover, he would not be in any way inconsistent in leading a diluted Labour party. It would only be the more advanced of the two parties in the State between which the electors would divide their political allegiance, and as such it would naturally be the one where Mr. Lloyd George would be most at home. The retirement of Lord Oxford and Asquith may nominally give Mr. Lloyd George a freer hand. But some of those who still remain sincere Liberals—Lord Grey of Fallodon, Sir John Simon, Mr. Runciman, and others—will probably see no reason to be scrupulously faithful to or to have any faith in him as their leader. He may now indeed have reached an *impasse* from which even his extraordinary mental agility

and political dexterity will be powerless to release him. But the fighting speech which he made at Kingsway Hall in November 1926 shows that he does not intend to accept failure without a struggle. His remarks also prove plainly enough that he realizes the actual situation. But although he was right in his admission that the Liberal party could only achieve power by an alliance with Labour, his warning to Labour that without that alliance it would remain in the wilderness was (as I have already pointed out) an utterly incorrect even if it was a sincere diagnosis. If the dissolution of the Liberal party should proceed only at the present rate the fraction which will eventually go over entirely to the Labour party will definitely change the latter's position. More amusing was Mr. Lloyd George's attack upon the Conservatives, whom he described as " cherubim with flaming swords that keep the children of man from entering Paradise." Mr. Lloyd George could work very well with these same Conservatives as long as they would have him, and his chief grudge against them to-day is that they do, indeed, stand with flaming swords, thereby preventing one particular child of Wales from entering the Paradise of Downing Street. If Mr. Lloyd George is obliged to continue crying in the wilderness, with little or no hope of return to power, he will no doubt finally echo the words of another sincere demagogue, who also had a full chapter of political accidents—Lafayette: " L'injustice du peuple, sans diminuer mon dévouement à cette cause, a détruit pour moi cette délicieuse sensation du sourire de la multitude."

Lord Balfour no longer plays a part. As leader of the Conservative party he turned his back alike on the high Toryism of Lord Salisbury and the Tory democracy of Disraeli, which might have changed the course of events, and which would certainly have stemmed the tide. Lord

Randolph Churchill saw the future clearly when, writing from Mafeking in November 1899, he said: "So Arthur Balfour is really leader, and Tory democracy, the genuine article, is at an end." But possibly Lord Balfour's most notable services to the State are those which he rendered during and after the war. For he possesses a greater aptitude than most Englishmen for being a wise European.

It is often forgotten that Sir Austen Chamberlain is not only among the Elder Statesmen, but that he actually outranks in date of service any Minister of the Crown now in office. Mr. Chamberlain is sixty-three years of age. He entered the House of Commons in 1892, and was given office in 1895, although he did not enter the Cabinet until 1902. Mr. Lloyd George first came to Westminster in 1890. Both he and Mr. Winston Churchill can count more years of office than can Sir Austen Chamberlain; but neither of them began their official life so far back. For Sir Austen had Lord Salisbury as his first chief; and amongst his colleagues in the Ministry were the Duke of Devonshire, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, and Mr. Goschen—names which seem to carry one back, not only to another generation, but into another world.

Sir Austen Chamberlain is by training and temperament better fitted to guide the course of foreign affairs than anyone who has undertaken that task since Lord Grey of Fallodon. His knowledge is certainly not more extensive and varied than that which distinguished the late Lord Curzon, but he is eminently happier as a negotiator. Lord Curzon had not a character which made for popularity. He also was not fully in sympathy with the more modern system of diplomacy; although it is doubtful whether that should be counted against him. He had the knowledge and the training which qualified him to conduct the foreign policy of a great country.

But he was, from time to time, virtually supplanted; and for some years he, as well as the country, was the victim of Mr. Lloyd George's antics in a field where he invariably encountered failure.

When Sir Austen Chamberlain took office our understanding with France was greatly weakened. Mr. Lloyd George had done the mischief by finally convincing French statesmen that he was utterly unreliable, and that while he might promise his support one day he was just as likely to withdraw it the next. His treatment of France is an inconsistent record of speeches varying from patronizing praise to rough rebuke. Presumably by virtue of being the last survivor of the Three who, at Versailles, had parcelled out the world, Mr. Lloyd George laid down the law as if he were entitled to dictate. He forgot that in the very heyday of his power Bismarck had said that Europe would not stand any "cock-of-the-walk business." It was Mr. Lloyd George who taught France that she must look elsewhere, since she could no longer rely upon Great Britain. And it was retributive justice that Mr. Lloyd George, who condemned France's policy in going into the Ruhr, should, at a crisis of his career, find that France would not act with him against the Turk: the vital distinction being that anyway the French Government was not dependent on British troops to carry out its Ruhr policy, while England was impotent to move against Turkey without the aid of a French army.[1]

Disraeli once said that a good understanding with France was "the key and corner-stone of modern civilization"; while the great naval historian, Admiral Mahan, regarding the future from the standpoint of a neutral,

[1] Mr. Churchill's imprudent call to the Dominions for aid on this occasion is not forgotten; and is still held up as a warning in far-distant parts of the Empire. It was an indiscretion for which the full price has not been paid.

wrote: "The vital centre of English intercourse is in the waters surrounding the British islands; and as the United Kingdom now depends largely upon external sources of food-supply, it follows that France is the nation most favourably situated to harass it by commerce-destroying, on account of her nearness and possession of ports, both on the Atlantic and on the North Sea. From these issued the privateers which in the past preyed upon the English shipping. The position is stronger now than formerly. Cherbourg presents a good Channel port which France lacked in the old wars." [1]

Sir Austen Chamberlain, who is much more friendly to France than ever was Lord Curzon, has restored good relations with the Quai d'Orsay. He has been on excellent terms with the Wilhelmstrasse. He has manifestly gone out of his way to establish a friendly link with Mussolini. The final issue of this latter policy has not yet been seen; and there may be some curious developments if Mr. Baldwin's Government remains in office for another two years.

Lord Birkenhead is now the colleague of some of those whom, when they were serving under the late Mr. Bonar Law, he assailed throughout the country upon the ground that they were not so clever as himself and some others who were then out of office. However, an incident of that kind would not disturb the equanimity of the former Lord Chancellor, who, in his younger days, was distinguished by an air of imperturbable impertinence. Lord Birkenhead is perhaps the most brilliant man of his generation. He is certainly the most polished speaker in England to-day. Of all speeches I have heard in legislative assemblies the one which holds first place in my memory for felicity of expression and grace of oratory, combined with cogency of argument, is that

[1] Mahan's *The Influence of Sea-Power Upon History*, p. 525, note.

made one day by Lord Birkenhead in the House of Lords, when he left the Woolsack to discuss the Divorce Bill, which was then before Parliament. At the India Office he seems hardly at home. However, a Cabinet which includes both Lord Birkenhead and Mr. Winston Churchill (who, according to Lord Beaverbrook's disclosure, once, together with Mr. Lloyd George, completely dominated the counsels of the Coalition Ministry) may supply surprises at any moment.

Of Mr. Churchill I wrote five years ago, while he was still a Liberal: "Party ties mean little to Churchill. He sincerely believes that the country has need of his services, and does not intend that it shall be deprived of them. He is first and foremost a great Winstonian. Other things being equal, his authoritative temperament inclines him naturally to Toryism; just as, on the other hand, Mr. Lloyd George, were the choice open to him, would rather be in power supported by the party which makes the most direct appeal to popular feeling." [1]

Mr. Churchill's outstanding characteristic is his courage. That is the rarest virtue amongst politicians the world over; which is all the more curious since it is undoubtedly the most profitable. As Voltaire said: "Un des plus grands malheurs des honnêtes gens c'est qu'ils sont des lâches." Mr. Churchill's courage is equal to any test, and can bear any strain except one: he cannot stand being out of office. To him political power is the very breath of life. In his opinion no other mode of life is comparable to that of the House of Commons —as seen from the Government benches. I always remember how earnestly he once described to me the way in which a man of any determination and ability could, once he had obtained a seat in the House of Commons, gradually reach office by a process of elimination.

[1] *The Pomp of Power*, p. 209.

Mr. Churchill has never suffered long in the cold shades of opposition. He is to-day fifty-two years of age, and since 1906 he has only been out of office for two years, apart from a period of some months during the war. But he becomes positively ill when he is bereft of power. I never forget the picture he presented one day when walking up St. James's Street during one of those unhappy periods of exclusion: his head sunk into his hunched shoulders, so that he appeared to have no neck; his eyes bent to the ground, or looking ahead without a glance to one side or the other; his face heavy, unsmiling, and of an unhealthy hue; an air of unrelieved gloom. He was at the moment passing the spot where Charles James Fox lived at a dark period of his career; and one involuntarily thought of the different fashion in which that statesman had met his political reverses and private worries. But Churchill, who looked anything but approachable, inevitably recalled the comment of Stendhal's Duchesse Sanseverina: "But nothing on earth would induce me to undertake the task of amusing a Minister who has lost his portfolio. That is an illness which nothing but death can cure, and which kills other folks. What a misfortune to have been a Minister when you are young."

Mr. Churchill has been criticized more widely and more bitterly than any politician of his day, with the possible exception of Mr. Lloyd George. He has made errors which undoubtedly deserved the disapprobation which they elicited. But upon the whole balance I believe that no one has received so much undeserved blame and so little earned credit as this great public servant. For to that title Churchill has a just claim. He has been Home Secretary, Secretary of State for War, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Chancellor of the Exchequer; and in every post he has displayed administrative ability

of the highest order, coupled with untiring zeal for the service of the State. Yet his name always evokes the mention of a few glaring mistakes or indiscretions, which the public has never forgotten, although it could not recall with equal facility the services he has rendered. In this Mr. Churchill is rather scurvily treated. But how far he is entitled to high rank as a statesman is entirely another question. Certainly his political life, taken as a whole, does not give him any right to be considered a safe and prudent guide in the matter of policy. But although he has a long career behind him, Mr. Churchill is still a comparatively young man; and the end is not yet.

Part of his troubles in life and the mistrust with which he is generally regarded arise from the fact that he does not present to the world at large a very engaging character. That he should so constantly and consistently follow the office is, I think, of small account. He makes no secret of his utter disbelief in the theory of "they also serve who only stand and wait." Obviously, Parliamentary government could not be conducted, except on the group system, were all politicians to act in that way. But Winston Churchills are few and far between. However, it is for his small faults that he has suffered in popular esteem almost as much as for his great errors. The almost contemptuous way in which Theodore Roosevelt always referred to him and his care to avoid meeting him are nothing less than extraordinary. Senator Lodge had found Churchill egotistical; but Roosevelt was the last man to let that influence him against anyone who possessed marked ability. Roosevelt's dislike may have been partly due to stories about Churchill's conduct when he gave some lectures in the United States and in Canada, after the South African War. But the incidents in question indicated nothing more serious than a certain

arrogance and lack of manners, and were hardly sufficient to justify such savage comments. It is probable (as I have already stated) that Roosevelt adopted the opinion of one of his English friends who was certainly hostile to Churchill. Churchill certainly possesses characteristics which have shown themselves amongst various members of the Spencer-Churchill family in different generations. It is curious that although the Dukes of Marlborough and the Earls Spencer are descended respectively from the second and third sons of the third Earl of Sunderland (who married one of the first Duke of Marlborough's daughters), those traits which have appeared so often amongst the Spencer-Churchills have apparently not exhibited themselves in the other branch of the family. Winston Churchill is a worthy descendant of Sarah Jennings, the wife of the great Duke, whose courage, love of power, and indiscretions amazed her own generation. The Duke, on the other hand, had a temper which nothing could ruffle. No man has been more unfairly treated and grossly libelled both by his contemporaries and by posterity, the gamut running from the virulence of Swift and the gossip of Horace Walpole to the fiction of Macaulay.

Speaking of Churchill's courage reminds me of the late Lord Beresford's opinion on that subject. During the war, while Churchill was still at the Admiralty, Lord Beresford one day got a letter from him, saying that he thought it most improper that one drawing the pension he did should publicly condemn the policy of the Admiralty as he had done in certain words. I understood that the reference was to some extra pension of which there were a limited number. Lord Beresford told me that he at once went to see Churchill, and assured him that he made the comments in question only at the Carlton Club; and that of the men who

were sitting with him at the table in the hall he could easily identify the one who had repeated his remarks. He named him to Churchill, who did not deny—nor so far as I remember did he admit—that that was the person who had given him the information. Lord Beresford, in relating the rest of the interview, criticized Churchill (with whom he often had disagreements) on several grounds, but he ended by saying that, " after all, Winston has great pluck. He always had. I only wish we had more like him to-day."

The course which Lord Beresford adopted about this incident was delightfully characteristic. He wrote to the man in question that he would thrash him if he ever again came to the Carlton. As " Lord Charles " was no longer young, I doubt if he could have carried out his threat. But the Beresfords know few limits when once aroused. I believe I am correct in saying that the offender never again entered the Carlton Club during Lord Beresford's lifetime. The latter's action was, of course, quite improper. But when it was suggested to him that he might get into trouble with the Committee of the Club, he took the stand that the Committee should also deal with members who disclosed private conversations to the Government. The man to whom I refer, who has since been made a Peer, once in my presence spoke slightingly of Lord Charles, being blissfully unconscious of the fact that I knew what had happened, and was equally aware that he took care never to come to the Carlton.

The prediction attributed to Jowett about the future success of Lord Oxford and Asquith and of the late Lord Curzon is famous; and many other statesmen have been marked for high distinction from the earliest days of their political careers. But in 1919 or 1920 few would have included the name of Mr. Stanley Baldwin

in any list of half a dozen men who were likely to become Prime Minister. He then occupied a comparatively unimportant ministerial post, the duties of which he seemed to perform with more devotion than anything else. To-day he is the most thoroughly English Prime Minister who has held office for many years. Mr. Bonar Law was a Scot; Mr. Lloyd George a Welshman; Mr. Asquith, it is true, is English by birth, but he never embodied the characteristics of the race in the same degree as does Mr. Baldwin; Lord Balfour, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and Lord Rosebery were all Scots; Mr. Gladstone was the son of a Scot; and Disraeli was the least English Prime Minister who has ever lived in Downing Street. To find as thorough an Englishman as Mr. Baldwin one must stop at Lord Salisbury, or delve even further back.[1]

Mr. Baldwin's character may be thrown into clear relief by contrasting it with one of his constant critics. Some months ago Lord Beaverbrook published a little book entitled *Politicians and the Press.* It provoked a certain amount of caustic comment; for, apart from its references to others, it was a strangely naïve and involuntary piece of unconscious self-revelation by a man who has played some part in public affairs.[2] Lord Beaverbrook dwells at length upon the achievements of one of his newspapers, the *Daily Express*, and defends the course it took in General Elections and at other times of crisis. He apparently thinks that it is the duty of newspapers and their proprietors to guide governments and to lead the public. And he obviously believes that

[1] Lord Palmerston, who was often cited as a typical Englishman, was, of course, of Irish descent. However, there is one link between him and the present Prime Minister—they were both Harrow boys.

[2] It is, for instance, faithfully dealt with in "Musings Without Method" in *Blackwood's Magazine*, February 1926. Presumably this article was written by Mr. Charles Whibley.

newspapers do actually exercise a great measure of control over the electors. The principal duty of a newspaper is, I think, to give news. However, that may be a matter of opinion. But Lord Beaverbrook's idea that newspapers influence votes, merely because the *Daily Express* has more than once chanced to be on the winning side, shows a certain ignorance of the history of journalism for the past quarter of a century. He might remember that a powerful and active Press was unable greatly to advance Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's Tariff Reform Campaign. Or let him count the number of times that the majority of New York newspapers (to which I refer because in their support or opposition they are more directly personal than our own Press) have vainly sought to turn votes in some specified direction. The fact is that even a highly successful newspaper like the *Daily Express* probably does not change the result in a single constituency; and if it has often backed a winner, that simply indicates that those directing its policy sincerely thought like the majority of the people—or were good political prophets and preferred to go with the crowd. Nor is there any more excuse for the delusion that one of the duties of a newspaper is gently to keep the Government of the day in the path it should follow; although the way in which, during recent years, several Cabinets have from time to time allowed themselves to be intimidated by the Press does provide, indeed, a certain foundation for this belief.

Still more curious is Lord Beaverbrook's suggestion that possibly it was his warning in the *Sunday Express* about the imminent fall of the mark which led to its collapse immediately thereafter. Lord Beaverbrook's financial training and his natural shrewdness doubtless enabled him to see what was bound to come. But his published prediction had no more to do with precipitating

the result than had the last eclipse of the sun. That he should cherish such a fancy arouses the suspicion that he may suffer from a predisposition to megalomania, that disease to which great newspaper proprietors (with some notable exceptions, like Lord Burnham) seem peculiarly susceptible.

Equally diverting are Lord Beaverbrook's disclosures of the emotions by which he was rent when his duty to the public, as one who controlled the electorate, clashed with the claims of private friendship. He recounts (and quite veraciously) that he has always been Spartan-like, and has never hesitated to sacrifice those nearest and closest to him on the altar of the *Daily Express*. When Sir Arthur Griffiths Boscawen sought re-election at Dudley in 1921, Lord Beaverbrook "intensely disliked attacking and defeating an old friend and colleague in the House of Commons, but the public considerations involved were paramount to the Empire," and on the night of the poll "the result came through—'Boscawen beaten by 276'—and I experienced both relief and compunction." Even more dramatic was the incident of which, in the following year, a still greater personal friend, Captain F. E. Guest, was the victim. He had the misfortune (as it proved to be) to dine with Lord Beaverbrook on a night when "no doubt every one's nerves were somewhat frayed by the events of the week." The conversation turned upon a recent by-election, and, again in the words of Lord Beaverbrook, "the discussion became extremely acrimonious, and finally ended in an open breach between Captain Guest and myself." A day or two later Guest arranged with the local Conservative leaders in East Dorset not to put a candidate in the field. But, according to Lord Beaverbrook, "the rank and file in the constituency were naturally opposed to any such arrangement. I was charged with responsibility

for Mr. Hall Caine, the son of the famous novelist, being introduced into the Division as an Independent Conservative candidate." Why East Dorset, with which he never had any connection, should have appealed to Lord Beaverbrook, is left in obscurity. But in any event he went to Poole to speak for Mr. Hall Caine, who was elected by a large majority. Lord Beaverbrook concludes: "I have often questioned myself as to whether the part I played in the contest was justified. Nothing has occurred since to modify my views that it was right to oppose the Liberal Coalitionist ex-Ministers. Yet in a sense I regret the course I took against Captain Guest. I can only plead that I was justified on the grounds of public policy."

The plea would ring more truly had Lord Beaverbrook himself shown more courage and restraint when he has been criticized specifically upon the grounds of public policy, and not by former friends, but by those who did not know him, and who had never had any connection with him, direct or indirect. In the course of the book to which I am referring, Lord Beaverbrook supplies to the public the effect that newspaper criticism has upon Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Winston Churchill, and others. He will therefore perhaps welcome an expression of opinion as to the effect which it has upon himself. Speaking with some knowledge of the facts, I do not hesitate to say that Lord Beaverbrook is, in such circumstances, the greatest whiner of the present day; a statement which, were it worth while to do so, I could enlarge upon and amply prove. For although Lord Beaverbrook possesses a reasonable share of human virtues, it happens that moral courage has not fallen to his lot.

After thus giving a partial record of his own activities, Lord Beaverbrook denies with a marked insistence

that there is any vendetta between himself and Mr. Baldwin. So far as the latter was concerned this assurance was hardly necessary. It is impossible to imagine any one less likely than Mr. Baldwin to pursue a vendetta; although the resolute line of conduct which he might see fit to adopt towards any particular individual might indicate that he did not agree in the latter's estimate of his own merits.

Lord Beaverbrook devotes a whole chapter of his little book to Mr. Baldwin, and concludes with the complacent statement: "The plain fact is that I believe the Prime Minister to be a man of the utmost honesty of intention, but I am compelled by experience to think that he frequently errs in his judgment." It is therefore interesting to examine Lord Beaverbrook's competence to give a verdict on the Prime Minister; and none the less so because Mr. Baldwin and Lord Beaverbrook are in nearly every way the antithesis one to the other.

Max Aitken was born a little less than half a century ago in a small town in the Province of New Brunswick. I am unaware when his family first settled there. In any event, none of them ever achieved any public prominence. Aitken began his career in Calgary, then a comparatively small Western town. It was probably the most unsatisfactory period of his life. Later he for some time worked as the agent of an insurance company. But in Montreal he soon became interested in the promotion and amalgamation of companies, and within a short time his ability and financial acumen enabled him to amass a solid fortune. Such rapid success did not pass unnoticed. In the course of his dealings he acquired some enemies, and a number of newspapers assailed him with more or less directness. His policy of simply ignoring these attacks probably did not lessen their extent or intensity. But that he felt the aspersions

was proved by the fact that (as he himself has averred) the very day he completed the last business transaction in which he proposed to engage he left Montreal with the firm intention never to return. Napoleon said of another man of affairs, whose departure from France he was regretting: "Il reviendra; on revient toujours à l'eau de la Seine." The Emperor's prediction was not fulfilled, for Dupont de Nemours stayed in Delaware, where his descendants live to-day, the proprietors of one of the greatest business organizations in the United States. But Lord Beaverbrook has from time to time revisited the banks of the St. Lawrence. Indeed, he has been at considerable pains to find favour in the eyes of his compatriots. He has himself written: "As Minister of Information I made a great feature of inviting the editors of newspapers in the Dominions and in neutral and allied countries to visit Britain. Better than any pumped-in propaganda of war was this method of making the leaders of the Imperial, neutral, or allied Press themselves the propagandists when they returned home. In the Dominions especially this was the strongest card in the hands of my Ministry, and the method undoubtedly produced a great effect."

That was not the main object for which the Ministry of Information was formed, but it was that to which Lord Beaverbrook devoted most attention, and certainly that in which he achieved most. I can best depict this by quoting from what I wrote some years ago. "Later Beaverbrook did his utmost to obtain a favourable Press in Canada. When he became Minister of Information (and no one who was at the meeting of the Unionist War Committee will ever forget the strange reasons which Mr. Lloyd George adduced for having given him that post) he succeeded to some extent. A small body of recognized experts on foreign affairs, who had done

that part of the work before the Ministry was instituted, refused to serve under Lord Beaverbrook. They emigrated to the Foreign Office, where their services were accepted and retained by Lord Hardinge, whom Beaverbrook's protests left cold and indifferent. The latter reorganized his department by bringing in a number of men distinguished in the literary world, and others well known in the City. But a large percentage of the rank and file were Canadians, whose experience of foreign affairs and whose knowledge of foreign languages was as limited as that possessed by Beaverbrook himself. The result was that the work of the Ministry, aside from the cinematograph and amusement part (which was excellently done), was greatly below the required level. It was a constant source of polite amusement to the Maison de la Presse, of which the founder and guiding spirit was the astute and accomplished Philippe Berthelot, who knows all the things about which Lord Beaverbrook is so essentially ignorant, but who, on the other hand, could never have amassed the money which Beaverbrook made in the promotion of companies. However, the Ministry of Information spent lavishly, and part of the expenditure went in paying the expenses of Canadian (as well as other overseas) journalists who were brought to England. All this had some effect in dissipating the strange unpopularity which Beaverbrook had incurred in his native country; although as late as December 1918, such a well-known paper as the *Ottawa Citizen* stated bluntly that he could never be elected to any office in Canada." [1]

An examination of the cost of this Ministry, and an analysis of the nationality of those employed, is still illuminative.

Having left Canada, Max Aitken arrived in England

[1] *The Pomp of Power*, p. 149.

a rich man as the result of his own efforts, although only about thirty years of age. He was a cousin of the late Mr. Bonar Law. This paved the way for his speedy election to the House of Commons, and more important still, was the basis of his political future. The exact relations between the two men is necessarily a matter of conjecture. Lord Beaverbrook has written that he came to value Mr. Bonar Law's judgment because he so often unexpectedly proved to be right. On the other hand, Beaverbrook was much the stronger character and much the abler man; and his influence with Bonar Law must often have been decisive. Until he bought control of and developed the *Daily Express* his connection with Bonar Law was Lord Beaverbrook's greatest asset in the political world. And even yet he resurrects his ghost periodically as a solemn warning to Mr. Baldwin that the arrangement which he made in Washington for the payment of the debt to the United States did not, in fact, have the approbation of the dead statesman. That settlement, indeed, is the subject of Lord Beaverbrook's constant criticism. Undoubtedly, the payments involved are most onerous. But the concrete questions, as I have already pointed out, are whether a better bargain could have been made; and, if that was impossible, whether it would have been preferable to leave the matter open despite the insistent demands of the American Government for some definite agreement. Naturally, Mr. Baldwin obtained the best terms he could; and it would be idle to argue that some of his critics might have obtained easier conditions. While the contention that it would have been better to do nothing, and to let the United States continue to press for payment, will hardly be generally admitted. I have already expressed my view about the policy followed by the American Government and apparently applauded by the majority of the American people

regarding the war debts; but the fact remains that legally they are just obligations.

Further, the opinion that Great Britain is an absolute loser by the settlement is not unanimous. Mr. Otto Kahn has not hesitated to express his admiration for the way in which this country has met her responsibilities. Speaking in 1924, he said: "England has shown nothing less than economic heroism in her undeviating adherence to sound and tested principles, to the highest standards of national integrity, and to those fine old traditions of commercial honour and economic righteousness which are amongst the principal pillars of the edifice of her greatness. . . . No appraisal or forecast as to the position of England is well grounded that fails to take account of the great racial qualities and deep-rooted traits of her people. They are 'carrying on' as of old, a little weary, perhaps, a little glum, and grumbling considerably, but facing the realities with clear and fearless vision, and bravely bending to the task."

It may be answered that this comment loses its force since Mr. Kahn, being an American, is an interested party. But Mr. Kahn is *si peu américain.* Born in Frankfort, about the year 1912 he seriously considered abandoning his American citizenship and contesting a constituency for the House of Commons; while throughout the war —even before the entry of the United States—he was a firm supporter of the cause of the Allies.

Lord Beaverbrook possesses a peculiarly quick mentality, a mind which is subtle without being complex, and considerable force of character. His intelligence is of the kind which enables him to grasp rapidly all aspects of any question, and his decisions are essentially practical, except when he seeks to gratify his private prejudices, for he is by no means so impartial as he claims. When

he first came to England, something less than twenty years ago, he was totally lacking in *instruction* and *éducation*—giving to both words the meaning they bear in French. The former defect he has since remedied to some extent by reading; but, as always when a man divides his life into separate watertight compartments, making his money first, and then beginning to learn afterwards, the joints are very apparent. But his natural abilities are more than sufficient to compensate for what might be a handicap to others.

It would be difficult to imagine any common interests which could link Lord Beaverbrook in any intimacy with Lord Oxford and Asquith, or Lord Grey of Fallodon, or Mr. Baldwin. But it does not seem unnatural that he should be sporadically friendly with Mr. Churchill, with Lord Birkenhead, and with Mr. Lloyd George. Indeed, he seems, from his own account, to be dining and scheming with one or the other of them whenever he is not hostile because his duty to the country has compelled him to follow a course which has brought him into conflict with them. It appears, however, to be fated that a difference of opinion with him on a matter of public concern should result in a private quarrel, and at least a temporary rupture of relations.

But Lord Beaverbrook has himself given the measure of his own character. A few years ago Sir James Barrie published in the form of a small book, entitled *Courage*, his Address as Lord Rector of St. Andrews University. It was, as might have been foretold, somewhat whimsical. But Lord Beaverbrook would have none of it, although Mr. Bonar Law had recommended it to him as a brilliant speech of advice to the youth of Scotland. He decided that Sir James was preaching light-heartedness and irresponsibility, and in a signed article took him to task in no measured terms in the columns of the *Sunday*

Express. According to Lord Beaverbrook, "Lord Leverhulme or Lord Inchcape, also shining examples of success, would be better advisers to the youth of Scotland than the Rector of St. Andrews on the subject of Courage. Their courage, which is true courage, is nothing like Sir James Barrie's version of it. It is that which enables a man to face the hard facts of life and to make the best of them for himself and for his people and his age. It is found indeed very often in the garret; but by the man who does not mean to stay there. The brains and courage of such men are worth more to the country in their own time than all Sir James Barrie's books, and, as for the future, posterity alone can judge whether an author's works will endure." And Lord Beaverbrook proceeded to preach his own little sermon on Courage, concluding by saying: "Our land, our machinery, our ships, our finance, which still makes the City of London the unrivalled mistress of the world of commerce, our capacity for providing long credits, above all our skilled artisans—all are there for the using. It only needs courage to turn them to account." [1]

And I seem to remember another article in which Lord Beaverbrook mentions that his earliest success dates from his boyhood days, when he would make it his business to win from his schoolfellows all their marbles. In brief, Lord Beaverbrook is nothing if not utilitarian. He believes that the primary object in life should be to get money, which is the source of power. He is himself the living proof of the truth of that theory. For if he had not been shrewd enough to make a fortune in early life, he would certainly not be where he is to-day.

But the views which Lord Beaverbrook avows and which no doubt he sincerely holds, show that he will

[1] The *Sunday Express*, June 25, 1922.

always be a stranger in England. Mr. Wickham Steed, in writing about the book from which I have quoted, truly said of him: "His ignorance of English ways is still profound. As one of his reviewers wrote, he looks upon this country with the eyes of a foreigner. If during the perturbations of war-time and of the early post-war years he might have been excused for not understanding the unwritten laws of healthy political life, there is less excuse for him now. Race jingoism is not the most abiding quality in the British character, nor are vociferous appeals to self-interest and to the meaner instincts of the people the surest methods of securing esteem or of wielding influence."

Lord Beaverbrook has both a liking and a decided talent for political intrigue. He can use this gift all the more freely, since his party ties are purely nominal. He may call himself a Conservative; but as the past has shown, he is a Conservative only if one admits that what Lord Beaverbrook advocates must, *ipso facto*, be the policy of the Conservative party. The concluding paragraph of his booklet illustrates his attitude in this respect more clearly than could any words of mine: "This is the policy of the *Daily Express* and of its vast circle of readers—Peace, Prosperity, and Empire. I believe that Bonar Law would have subscribed to every word of it. If it is not the policy of the Conservative party leadership of to-day, so much the worse for the party and the country to-day. For my own part, if my action is to be so limited and circumscribed by party exigencies that I am debarred from expressing my real views on the needs and future of the race and the Empire, I would at once quit public life altogether and return to the Canadian village from whence I came."

The menacing tone is characteristic of Lord Beaverbrook. However, I do not think that this particular

threat affords any ground for immediate alarm. But the suggestion of Lord Beaverbrook strolling along the banks of the stream from which he takes his title[1]—counting his marbles—surely offers a tempting theme for one of Mr. Max Beerbohm's sketches.

Dean Inge, in his estimate of the English national character, directs attention to the fact that "the absence of self-regarding prudential calculation distinguishes it from the ethics of success, so sedulously preached in America."[2] That draws the exact line of demarcation between the views, beliefs, and characters of Lord Beaverbrook and Mr. Baldwin. The former, who, whatever he may be by descent, is not in the slightest degree English by tradition or temperament, believes firmly in the 'ethics of success." Nor is it unreasonable that he should do so, for it is a rule of life which has answered his purpose.

Nevertheless, his extreme utilitarianism often limits his range of vision, since it causes him to leave out of account the effect of other instincts, which are at least equally firmly implanted in the English race. While a certain false candour with which Lord Beaverbrook writes when he himself or his actions are in question veils very thinly an egotism which oscillates between an almost childish *naïveté* and a virulent brutality. The fact that his disputes upon matters of public concern so often degenerate into personal quarrels is alien to the custom long prevalent in England. But when all is said the fact remains not only that Lord Beaverbrook possesses a first-rate intelligence, but also that there are very few men of his generation who have an equally sound and astute mentality. In this respect he is head and shoulders

[1] However, I now understand that "Beaverbrook" is the name of a hamlet.

[2] *England*, p. 63.

above the vast majority of politicians, not excluding those who to-day hold high office. His considered judgment, therefore, cannot be lightly dismissed, and he gives it as his considered opinion that Mr. Baldwin "is not of Prime Ministerial timber." Lord Beaverbrook advances several specific reasons for this conclusion, and it is not unfair to say that the broad general difference between the two men is that Mr. Baldwin does not believe in the "ethics of success" as the sole mainspring of conduct. It is possible that Lord Beaverbrook is right, and that it is only men of his own type who can successfully guide the country through this perilous period. If so, it means that statesmen of the kind who made England great in the past are not the breed which can to-day save her from decay. For Mr. Baldwin emphatically finds his place in the former category. However, Mr. Bertrand Russell's criticism of the existing order probably has more foundation, and is certainly pleasanter, than that sponsored by Lord Beaverbrook: "The complexity of the modern world increasingly requires intelligence, and Doctor Arnold sacrificed intelligence to 'virtue.' The battle of Waterloo may have been won on the playing-fields of Eton, but the British Empire is being lost there. The modern world needs a different type with more imaginative sympathy, more intellectual suppleness, less belief in bulldog courage, and more belief in technical knowledge. The administrator of the future must be the servant of free citizens, not the benevolent ruler of admiring subjects. The aristocratic tradition embedded in British higher education is its bane. Perhaps this tradition can be eliminated gradually; perhaps the older educational institutions will be found incapable of adapting themselves. As to that, I do not venture an opinion." [1]

[1] *On Education*, by Bertrand Russell, p. 44.

If it were necessary to describe the Prime Minister in two lines, they might be borrowed from Byron:

> "A man well known in the councils of the nation,
> Cool, and quite English, imperturbable."

It is sometimes forgotten that Mr. Baldwin himself has been a man of affairs at the head of a great industrial enterprise; and his admirers are too prone to allow his character entirely to overshadow his ability. A very general opinion in England is that Mr. Lloyd George is a great politician and Mr. Baldwin an indifferent statesman. But Mr. Baldwin is undoubtedly clever—*pace* Lord Birkenhead: a saving grace in that respect is the very fact that he is not too clever. Undoubtedly he has committed errors; but in that he only differs from some of his recent predecessors in that he accepts the results more stoically. It may well be contended that the General Election of 1923 was unnecessary apart from being an actual error. It is difficult to give a clear and satisfactory explanation of at least one part of his course with respect to the coal strike. But despite any mistakes he may have made, he is endowed with two qualities which, above all others, should be amongst the attributes of the head of any government: he illustrates by his mode of thought, his way of life, his tastes and pastimes, everything that is English at its best; and he inspires confidence both at home and abroad. He does not display the mental agility of Mr. Lloyd George. But, on the other hand, there is never any doubt about what he means; and he neither confuses others nor loses himself in the mazes of his own verbiage. He has, indeed, expressed his contempt for "that appalling twopenny ha'penny gift of fluency . . . the kind of rhetoric which stirs the emotions of the ignorant mob and sets it moving. It is because such forces can be

set in motion by rhetoric that I have no regard for it, but a positive horror."

A love of literature and an appreciation of what is beautiful in art and nature, is to be expected from one who has blood ties with the Burne-Joneses, with the late Sir Edward Poynter, and with Mr. Rudyard Kipling. Some of Mr. Baldwin's speeches show that while reading of the past he endeavours to apply its lessons to the present. Speaking early in 1926 to the Classical Association, he said: "The voices that speak to us across the death and rebirth of nations touch every emotion of each succeeding generation, as they touch those who had ears to hear in Athens and in Rome; but they reach us with the added solemnity and pathos which cling to remembered sayings of those we have loved and lost. Every ultimate problem was theirs, as it is ours, and the more you open your soul to their appeal, the more profound your pity for stumbling humanity, the more eager your effort to bind together the family of man, rather than to loosen it. . . . Thus the chance word of a Latin inscription, a line in the anthology, a phrase of Horace, or a chorus ending of Euripides, plucks the heart-strings and stirs a thousand memories, memories subconscious and ancestral."

And he understands his race. No one has given a better summary of one side of our national character than did Mr. Baldwin when he said: "We grumble, and we have always grumbled, but we never worry. There are nations which do not grumble but worry . . . the Englishman has a mental reserve owing to that gift given to him at his birth by St. George, so that by the absence of worry he keeps his nervous system sound and sane, with the result that in times of emergency the nervous system stands, when the nervous system of other peoples breaks. The Englishman is made for a

time of crisis and for a time of emergency. He is serene in difficulties, but may seem to be indifferent when times are easy. He may not look ahead, he may not heed warnings, he may not prepare, but when he once starts he is persistent to the death."

His own career vouches for the sincerity of the words he used when speaking at his old school, Harrow: "You mean by your greeting to assure me that you wish me well, and that whether I succeed or fail you have the belief in me that as a son of the Hill I will run straight; that I will bear my share of the burden; that if I fail I will not whine; and that if success is mine I will not be puffed up; but that I will try in all things to follow in the footsteps of those who have trodden this same difficult path before me; and that I will, with God's help, do nothing in the course of an arduous and difficult career which shall cause any Harrovian to say of me that I have failed to do my best to live up to the highest ideals of the School."

Dean Inge, after a thoughtful, and by no means inherently gloomy, review of the situation, has reached the conclusion that "it seems then, for every reason, unlikely that our position as a world Power . . . will endure much longer." I am inclined to dissent from this judgment, although I am unable to impugn part of the evidence adduced. Certainly the fact that our country is an island no longer serves to place us in a commanding position as in days gone by; in fact, we have to-day all the disadvantages and few of the advantages of that geographical situation. We cannot now afford to display what Gibbon (in referring to the Venetian Republic) called "the insolence of a maritime Power." Undoubtedly the times are difficult, and even dangerous. How could it be otherwise after such a catastrophic upheaval as was the recent war? Many

mistakes have been made, but is there not also a constant although slow advance in the right direction? Mr. Churchill lately told how beet-sugar sufficient to supply one-tenth of the population for the whole year is now being grown, and that the production will soon be enough to satisfy the needs of one-quarter of the population. The President of the Board of Trade recounted to the Dominion Prime Ministers the extraordinary increase in Imperial trade in several directions. Sir Robert Horne holds out hopes of solving our most vital problem by extracting oil from coal. There has been a distinct increase in foreign orders during the past few months. Other and more certain signs, all significant if none vastly important, might be cited. But, after all, these are only signs—encouraging though they be—and the roots of the whole matter lie deeper. In the first place we are perhaps too apt to forget to-day the extent and variety of our own natural resources; and the unassailable position which we still hold in certain manufacturing fields. The British Empire occupies a pre-eminent position in respect of the world's supply of gold, of nickel, and of tin, and in the growth and production of rubber, of wool, and of jute. Our share of the known oil supply is far from being negligible. Our supremacy in the cotton trade may be illustrated by recalling that out of 100,225,000 spindles in Europe, we own nearly 57,000,000; or by comparing the latter figures with the 16,800,000 in all India, Japan, and China, with their populations aggregating 850,000,000. And this is but the barest outline of a catalogue of our possessions—all intact, and some which have not yet reached their fullest development. Our danger does not lie in that direction; nor even in the fact that we are exposed to, and surrounded by, the high tariff walls of other countries—although there is something to be said on that subject. The real

question—the one which must, I think, agitate any thoughtful person to-day—is whether or not we have lost that initiative, that independence, that resolution, in brief, that spirit which, in the past, not only contributed to the successful exploitation of our vast resources, but which was responsible for many of those resources originally coming into our keeping.

After all, where are the indications of any deep-seated degeneration? They were, I believe, more apparent and more plentiful before 1914 than they are to-day. The fatigue, the momentary pessimism, the difficulty in readjustment, which were inevitable after the war, are in their nature something very different; something less permanent, and less fatal. But undoubtedly England and the English race will degenerate unless fair play and full play is given to efficiency. To draw the line of demarcation between just and proper legislation by which the State provides for and guards the welfare of the old, the weak, and the unfortunate, and still does not unjustifiably place a load on those who thrive by their own industry and toil, requires political courage: and all the more courage to-day because at the outset the politicians displayed more poltroonery than bravery. But, as Napoleon once said, "unless men are firm in heart and in purpose they ought not to meddle with war or government." In the last analysis the vital question is whether all classes have the same objectives in mind, even if they differ in their beliefs as to how they can best be attained. There are, indeed, some aspects of the situation which are difficult to comprehend. For instance, it seems strange that doles should be paid to such a vast number of unemployed when Australia and Canada are begging for men who could find work and homes in those countries. Possibly that may be explained by the lack of any well-defined system of

dealing with the subject, which is complicated on many sides; while certainly it is not every man who receives a dole to-day who would be welcomed as a suitable settler in the Dominions. But there remains another cardinal fact to be considered. No return of prosperity such as Great Britain could and should enjoy can be expected unless there is a sincere unity of effort between employers and employees. In this matter the employers are neither free of all blame for the past nor of responsibility for the future. Their attitude at certain periods of the recent coal strike might have called forth the wrath of fair-minded observers were it not that the masterly stupidity of the miners' leaders created a series of situations which necessarily stifled all such criticism. In any event, no sound basis can be reached without an abandonment of the trade-union fallacy that an increase in output reduces employment. On the contrary, augmented production reduces the price, widens the home market, and finally increases the number of employed. These facts are well established. Must one impute ignorance to the leaders of the employees of the various trades? Or do they not want all to share the blessings of prosperity? Are they indifferent about the future of their country, and only concerned to bring about the destruction of the existing order? National suicide is always a possibility; but I do not believe that its germ is to be found in the British race.

A great deal depends upon the orientation of the Labour party, and the time it takes to reach a sounder and a more trustworthy national basis. For it is more than likely that the next great constructive period will see Labour in power. But during the transition stage true statesmanship can do little more than (in the words of Lord Acton) "watch with hopefulness the prospect of incalculable change."

CHAPTER VIII

THE EUROPEAN SITUATION—AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

IT is regrettable that the protagonists of the League of Nations are so often prone to suggest that those who have little belief in its efficacy to prevent war are abettors of the doctrine that might should be right. As a matter of fact, many in that category have neither military affiliations nor tendencies. They may be very suspicious of pacificism; but they are by no means Chauvinists. They would much prefer that time should prove them to be false prophets about the League of Nations. But the fact that some of them rightly predicted in 1912, or earlier, that within a few years Germany would go to war (because she would be obliged to choose between making some use of her military machine, then at its apex of perfection, and seeing it begin to deteriorate), can hardly be expected to increase their belief in the good judgment of those who then, as to-day, held a diametrically different opinion of the future.

A sober, and, so far as temperament allows, an unbiased reading of history (if only to remind us that we are not so different from our ancestors as we sometimes flatter ourselves), a vigilant study of a present which is sometimes rather kaleidoscopic, and the application of the same degree of common sense as we use in considering matters of closer personal interest, constitute about all the layman can do to arrive at a clear conception and an impartial conclusion upon the affairs of

nations. Above all, it is well always to remember that "history made and history-making are scientifically inseparable and separately unmeaning."

For some years prior to 1914 I was utterly unable to comprehend how anyone who thus studied the situation objectively, and whose attention had been directed to the danger signal, did not realize that we were on the brink of a precipice. Naturally to-day, looking backwards, I am equally at a loss. I had no military ties, and thoroughly recognized the wisdom of the great Lord Salisbury's comment, that "soldiers are dangerous advisers as to a military policy." The idea of martial authority and regulations impinging upon the field of civil government (as is always to some extent necessary in time of war) was—and is—inherently distasteful to me. I had a similar dislike of militarists, and of pacifists—by which I denote not people who would like to bring about perpetual peace, but those who are willing to make improper national sacrifices towards that end. The former appeared to be more practical, in that they were more likely to attain their ends if given a free hand; but the two seemed to be alike objectionable. The generation to which I belong had never witnessed any conflict between the Great Powers. I had heard time and again, and year after year, rumours of impending war. But nothing ever happened; and I found it difficult to conceive that anything ever would in my day. I certainly did not believe that peace would last forever. The best analogy is the way a man of thirty generally regards the subject of his ultimate death: he recognizes that everybody dies in the course of time, but the contingency seems so remote from him that he can happily afford to ignore the disagreeable idea. I recollect that the German Emperor's speeches, always bombastic and sometimes threatening, made me

see, dimly, a darker picture. But even when a ruler seems to be talking to Europe, it is sometimes difficult to know how much is actually meant for home consumption. The German Government was, as taxation was reckoned in those pleasant days, laying upon the people imposts which were heavy in proportion to the national wealth, in order to maintain and augment a powerful army and navy. Obviously, warlike utterances were necessary from time to time, especially in view of the growth of the Socialist party. It was, therefore, hard to distinguish between the wheat and the chaff; although the notorious "shining armour" speech was not susceptible to any explanation greatly in disaccord with the literal meaning of the words used. I had passed a short time in Belgrade a few weeks after Austria had annexed Bosnia and Herzogovina. But although Serbian exasperation was at a high pitch, it was admitted that without Russia she was powerless; and at that moment Russia herself was impotent, and there was no probability of the fulfilment of Napoleon's alternative prophecy, that the Cossacks would overrun Europe. The contest about Morocco showed that Germany would continue to bully her Western neighbour if she could do so with impunity. The result proved that she could not. Did that mean that she would desist, or that she would interpret it as a sign that now she must actually use force?

I had lived for a number of years in France, and it is probably not an exaggeration to say that I had a considerable knowledge of the French, their character, and their political ramifications. I had no sympathy with the foreign policy of M. Rouvier. That eminent financier deliberately turned his back upon Gambetta's final adjuration to his fellow-countrymen. In the last speech the great orator ever made in the Chamber of

Deputies, speaking on the Egyptian question, and referring to the fact that for the previous ten years France and England had co-operated in their Western policy, he said: "I know of no other policy capable of proving of assistance to us in the most terrible emergencies we have to fear. I say this with profound conviction, looking clearly into the future . . . ah! remember my words! Make any sacrifice rather than forgo the friendship and alliance of England."

But M. Rouvier, who was utterly opposed to any close relations with Great Britain, even dismissed his Foreign Minister, M. Delcassé, at the behest of Germany; although it was only the publication of some letters a few years later which definitely proved how badly Delcassé had been treated, and how badly Rouvier had behaved. A country is sometimes compelled by force to jettison its national dignity. Such, for instance, was the unhappy plight of Roumania at a period in the war when Russian aid had failed her. But to do so under other circumstances is always bad policy, not to put it more strongly; and the reaction is certain. The atmosphere was much healthier when M. Clemenceau became Prime Minister. An incident then arose about some deserters of the French Foreign Legion, who happened to be of German nationality; and for the first time since 1870 the Wilhelmstrasse found itself faced by a French Government which held its own, and was ready to give as good as it got in all diplomatic interchanges.

In France I was never able to perceive any aggressive spirit. In fact, the old idea of revenge, and the dream of an attempt to recover the lost provinces, seemed to have died out. On the other hand, a clearly defined recrudescence of the national character was to be observed at this time. Those comprised in the generation which should have been at its prime from about 1890 were tainted

with a fatal pessimism—a legacy from the war of 1870, which had embittered the plastic period of their youth. As M. André Tardieu once said, they were too often prone to practise a patriotism of resignation. But a new breed began to come to the front at the beginning of the century. There was now a dogged determination no longer to submit tamely to threats from Berlin; and a serious, if not very cheerful, resolution to fight if that proved to be the only alternative to submission to demands inconsistent with the honour and independence of the country. Curiously, it was at this moment that outdoor sports began to obtain the popularity that they now enjoy in France. I remember when football was absolutely unknown in Paris. To-day many a match draws thousands of spectators.

I may add that I was led to study the general situation more closely, as the result of a conversation with a distinguished Belgian who, both on account of his position and by reason of his tried judgment, was one of the most notable figures in public life. He concluded by saying: "It is strange. Like myself, you are not extreme in your views and are inclined to suspect the judgment of those who are. You have stated the facts correctly so far as you go; perhaps I should say so far as you know them. Yet, although we are temperamentally in accord, we draw different deductions from the same facts. I think the reason is that you have never lived in war-time. I have noticed that those who have not known war can rarely perceive the danger of its recurrence. I lived through one such period. Belgium escaped that time, but I fear that she will not have the same good fortune again."

A few months' careful study convinced me that this view did not proceed merely from pessimism.

It is perhaps fortunate that we were not led into an

alliance with Germany before we came to a good understanding with France. When in 1899 Mr. Joseph Chamberlain realized that Great Britain could not "remain permanently isolated on the continent of Europe," he indicated that it must appear evident to everybody that the natural alliance was "with the Great German Empire."[1] However, that appeared less apparent to everybody, and especially to Mr. Chamberlain himself, after Germany's attitude during our South African vicissitudes.

If there had been any definite understanding with Germany it would doubtless have entailed some halt in the naval construction in both countries. But there is no reason to think that the effect would have reduced Germany's army, or that it would have resulted in checking militarism, or those designs of German preponderance in Europe which were then ripening. It is improbable that we would have been dragged in Germany's wake in her attack upon France. But no matter what any treaty might have contained, Germany would undoubtedly have ignored its provisions if it had suited her to do so. That statement is in accordance not only with German conduct in 1914 but with the history of Prussia under the Hohenzollerns. At best our situation would have been unfortunate. It would have been difficult to have made an immediate *volte face* and to have joined forces with France against our ally of the day before. And does anyone think that Germany after subduing France would have been content to stop there? As it was, when in 1912 Lord Haldane did discuss the subject with the German Government,

[1] Speaking at Leicester, November 13, 1899.—This suggestion could have found little favour in the eyes of Mr. Chamberlain's former ally, Sir Charles Dilke, who was a pronounced friend of France, and whose activities had been suspected by Bismarck on account of his intimacy with Gambetta.

it was our Entente with France that was our safeguard. It is doubtful just how near Sir Edward Grey was to agreeing, in exchange for satisfaction about German naval conditions, to adopt the clause proposed by the Wilhelmstrasse, whereby Great Britain would have engaged herself to " observe at least a benevolent neutrality should war be forced upon Germany." But when M. Poincaré said bluntly that that would mean the termination of the understanding with France, the proposal was rejected. It has been suggested that this arrangement would not have prevented England from supporting France in 1914. But the danger of the plan was obvious. No matter what happened, Germany might contend, and in the result she did actually contend, that war was forced upon her. Lord Grey of Fallodon in referring to this matter has justly written that : " There was no formula that could be trusted to define the real aggressor in advance." Gibbon truly said that "aggressor" was " an ambiguous name, the seed of discord." While the revelation of Bismarck's methods in the notorious Ems despatch was a warning against the futility of such formulæ.

The German Emperor always deplored our Entente with a Latin race which he classed as decadent. But upon the whole the political and military authorities in Germany were satisfied with the situation as it stood in 1914. Germany was under no engagement to consult Great Britain. Moreover, she was convinced that we would not go so far as to extend aid to the French ; and that we were a declining race, with no martial spirit, with only a negligible army, and with troubles of our own which would keep us fully occupied. The outburst of astonished rage which greeted the announcement of our decision to support France, amply proves the correctness of this reading. At first sight it seems

extraordinary that Germany should have been surprised by the attitude of the British Government. For in 1911, during the discussion between France and Germany about the Morocco situation, Mr. Lloyd George had made his famous Mansion House speech, which, as Mr. Winston Churchill has since written, was "intended to make it clear that if Germany meant war she would find Britain against her"; and at the time it was so interpreted in Germany. But in 1914 the Wilhelmstrasse was inclined to believe that England was threatened by rebellions in Ireland, India, and possibly elsewhere, which would prevent her giving any assistance to France. For this view, so far as it actually prevailed, Herr von Kuhlman, the Counsellor of the German Embassy in London, was largely responsible.

This leads naturally to the question of what country was guilty of precipitating the war. I may say at the outset (repeating what I wrote some years ago) that the insertion in the Treaty of Versailles of a clause whereby Germany admitted her guilt, was, in my opinion, an act of the rankest folly. It could serve no good purpose, but it might and did cause a great deal of unnecessary trouble. A treaty at the conclusion of any war is, in the last analysis, merely the final act of force. In so far as it obliges the loser to do or not to do certain specific things it is useful and necessary. But to make the representatives of a country sign their names to a profession of belief, which they will deny five minutes before and five minutes after, is certainly childish. In this instance it has had the effect of more or less raising as a practical issue what should by now be merely an academic question. For the Germans were quick to perceive that if they could obtain the deletion of this clause it would place them on firm ground for demanding the revision of the whole treaty. German

diplomats have never made any great secret of this. Hence the ceaseless agitation. How much Germany still has this matter at heart is shown by the fact that within twenty-four hours after she was admitted to the League of Nations Herr Stresemann made a speech protesting against Germany being affixed with this stigma. He spoke, it is true, at a gathering of his compatriots in Geneva, which was said to be private. But it was not so private that his statement was not immediately cabled to the four quarters of the globe. Those responsible for the Treaty of Versailles have only themselves to thank for this situation, which would never have arisen had they been content simply to enumerate in the Treaty the things which Germany was to be obliged to do or to leave undone because she had lost the war. Moreover, that was the real reason of the penalties imposed. If Germany had been the victor she would still have been guilty in the same measure, whatever that may be; but she would have dictated the terms because she had won. This confusion of facts and opinions, of practical and of theoretical issues, showed the treaty-makers of Versailles in one of their most muddle-headed moods.

Discarding all fables of war councils and similar nonsense, and admitting that the state of Europe was such as probably to make war inevitable within a few years, the evidence is overwhelming that Germany had prepared so that when no longer able to enforce her ends by threats she might do so by force when the moment appeared opportune. Those who sincerely believe in the innocence of Germany should be ready to let posterity decide upon the facts as now known, and the published official documents. But it is significant that it is the friends of Germany who are not content to leave the evidence as the basis for that verdict. I

heard many protestations on this subject in Germany, but nothing which, in my opinion, could possibly weigh in the balance. Indeed, about the only person who seemed able to substantiate his view (which differed from that possessed by the majority) by facts and by sound argument was Max Harden. I have also read a great deal that has been written in the endeavour to exculpate the Central Powers. I leave on one side works of a vituperative nature which all seem to get entangled in a maze of fact and fancy. Of these *The Genesis of the World War*, by Mr. Harry Elmer Barnes, Professor of Historical Sociology at Smith College, may be cited as a fair example. Different people may sincerely draw different deductions from the same set of admitted facts. But in his haste to prove Germany guiltless, Professor Barnes strayed too far away from the facts themselves.[1] Moreover, his evident ignorance concerning many of those about whom he writes disqualifies him as a guide. He calls Mr. L. J. Maxse "the most vocal and detestable of British chauvinists—a man wholly comparable in his views to General Bernhardi, Ernest Haase, Carl Peters, Déroulède and Barrès." No one who knows Mr. Maxse can help smiling at finding him in that company. It is a little difficult to see the resemblance between that brilliant, if sometimes impracticable political writer, and Carl Peters, a man of action, who was notorious for his brutalities. But as a matter of fact did Professor Barnes ever meet, or ever discuss political questions with either Mr. Maxse, the late Maurice Barrès, or any of the others he names? I should be very much surprised if he had. If he possessed any first-hand knowledge of personalities, living or dead,

[1] Professor Barnes had, I believe, an interview with the former Kaiser at Doorn—a privilege granted only to those who first furnish ample proof of their bias.

in England and France, he would realize how droll he has been. Should it be necessary to find a French counterpart for Mr. Maxse there is one ready to hand. There are many points of resemblance between Maxse and Léon Daudet, the differences being in Maxse's favour. On the other hand Professor Barnes's characterization of Lord Grey of Fallodon's *Twenty-five Years* as, "his weak, dishonest, and evasive memoirs," is not likely to commend him even to those who do not hold the same political views as the former Foreign Secretary.

Perhaps the most serious attempt to discuss this question is that made by Mr. J. S. Ewart, K.C., of the Canadian Bar, in a work entitled *The Roots and Causes of the War* (*1914–18*). He gives and discusses in great detail the telegrams which passed in the last days preceding the war. I am, however, unable to see that anything in favour of Germany can be drawn from these last-minute despatches. What is most striking in Mr. Ewart's book is that while he analyses all these telegrams with the most painstaking care, he plainly shows that he is quite innocent of any knowledge based on personal observation of the sentiments actually displayed in France and in Germany in the years immediately prior to 1914. He dismisses as "a very ridiculous assertion" the statement that German rulers had any idea of world-domination, and suggests that it is explicable "only by the mental unsettlement produced by the war." But this rather pontifical judgment (obviously pronounced by one who has studied books and documents, but is without any first-hand knowledge of the conditions existing before the war) hardly explains how that conclusion was arrived at and stated before and not after the war, by observers who were studying the situation on the ground.

Of more weight is the admission of the German

Government itself as published in a *White Book*: "Austria was bound to say to herself that it would be compatible neither with the dignity nor the self-preservation of the Monarchy to look on any longer inactive at what was going on across the frontier. The Imperial and Royal Government informed us of this view and asked our opinion. With all our heart we were able to give our Ally our agreement with her estimate of the situation, and to assure her that any action which she held necessary in order to end the movement in Serbia against the existence of the Monarchy would meet with our approval. In this we were well aware that possible warlike action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia into the field, and thus involve us in a war according to our treaty obligations. But recognizing the vital interests at stake for Austria-Hungary we could neither advise our Ally to yield more than was compatible with her dignity nor refuse her our support at so grave a moment. . . . We therefore left Austria a completely free hand in her action against Serbia, while taking no part in the preparation."

Although I conceive that the question of who is going to pay for the war is of more present importance than who was responsible for it, I am incapable of discerning any wisdom in the plea that we should draw no lesson from all that happened during the four years of strife. In international relations the only thing more foolish than not to forgive soon enough is to forget too soon. I have no intention of reflecting upon the German people, who in many respects are by nature as kindly as any in Europe. But I recall that their history shows (even making allowances for the excesses always committed by large bodies of armed men of any race) they have always waged war with a savagery unknown amongst other Western European nations. Perhaps this may be

defended upon the theory that the greater the "frightfulness" the sooner the end of bloodshed. A letter from the former German Emperor to the Emperor of Austria, written at the beginning of the war, states this in so many words, while deploring the necessity of what was then happening in Belgium. That is quite in accord with what German writers have advocated, and with what German troops have done in pursuance of the orders of their commanding officers. Not going back further than the last war, and rejecting all ridiculous rumours about wandering mutilated children and similar tales, there remains a well-authenticated list of brutal murders of civilians. I confine myself to France alone, and I cite only a few of these cases, when I recall that the Mayors of Lagny and of Senlis, the curés of Viviers, of Longuyon and of several other parishes, and the school-teachers of Cutery and of Fresnois-la-Montagne, were shot. It would be easy to enumerate many similar acts. To mention any of them seems to Radical journalists as what one of them has characterized as "an attempt to stoke up and rekindle the dead ashes of hatred of Germany." I concur without reserve in the fullest condemnation of anything said, done, or written with that object. But that is no reason for evading disagreeable matters through false sentimentalism. Possibly the German authorities sincerely believe that it is their patriotic duty to wage war in the fashion which they and their predecessors have heretofore followed. The conduct of any war is in the hands of the soldiers; the civilians who sign many treaties in the interest of peace have nothing to do with that. And who has advanced or can advance any convincing proof that the Prussian officer has undergone a change of heart? Certainly that is not the impression of those who have come in contact with him since the war. And unless there is such an alteration it

would seem to be more sensible to remember now than to be indignantly surprised if the same method reoccurs.

The one thing which it seems more natural for men to do than to fight from time to time, is to proclaim loudly after they have had their fill, that never—never—will they fight again. Modern history is a repetition of these protestations, which in recent centuries have been coupled with more or less ambitious plans for controlling the actions of future generations. Disraeli once spoke in the House of Commons of "the nineteenth century with its extended and its elevating tendencies." Certainly before 1914 any of us would have asserted that we had attained a degree of civilization vastly superior to that which our ancestors had reached two or three hundred years earlier. But, apart from externals which are no criterion of real civilization, all we showed in the war was that we had learned to butcher more people in a given space of time and by means which were more cruel and repulsive than any known to our forefathers. We proved up to the hilt that Anatole France was right when he wrote: "Ce que les hommes appellent civilisation, c'est l'état actuel des mœurs, et ce qu'ils appellent barbarie, ce sont les états antérieurs."

That the men who emerged from directing the most gigantic slaughter in the annals of the human race should have thought themselves qualified to point out the way to an eternal peace would seem to indicate a considerable degree of fatuity, and certainly shows a complete absence of any sense of humour. As I have already mentioned, the general idea was not even original. As far back as the early years of the eighteenth century the Abbé Castel de St. Pierre was the author of a plan for an organization called "la Société des Nations," the council of which was to pass judgment, without any appeal therefrom, upon all European conflicts of which

there appeared to be any possibility. The chief result of this proposal was the expulsion of the Abbé from the Académie Française in 1718. Curiously enough, amongst his principal admirers was the Maréchal de Richelieu, who did his utmost to force the Académie to reverse its decision. While another and still more famous soldier, Prince Eugène, was reported to have said that if all sovereigns were wise they would adopt this project.

After more than one great European conflict those most active therein have signed a treaty which was to usher in an era of perpetual peace. Upon the conclusion of the Napolèonic wars the victors, banded together under the title of the Holy Alliance, undertook to prevent any future outbreak. Nor were all these efforts insincere. The combatants having suffered severely in every way, having been satiated with bloodshed, and perhaps recognizing how little the results were commensurate with the sacrifices entailed, had every desire never again to be involved in war. These designs of various governments reflected not only the wishes of their peoples, but also their own erroneous belief that the mistakes of one generation will change human nature in the next. There are, I believe, many private letters written after 1815, saying in effect that one benefit of those long years of warfare was that the descendants of the writers would never seek to decide their differences by force of arms. Yet who at the battle of the Somme ever thought of the battle of Waterloo ?

Equally ancient are the objections of those who insisted that such attempts were bound to fail. These sceptics make a curious medley—men who would seem unlikely to be in accord upon any question. Without going back too far, I will recall that when in his last years John Adams was asked for the support of his name

by an association formed "to discourage war," he replied that his long experience had convinced him that wars were "as necessary and as inevitable in our system as Hurricanes, Earthquakes and Volcanoes. . . . Universal and perpetual peace appears to me no more or less than everlasting passive obedience and non-resistance. The human flock would soon be fleeced and butchered by one or a few. I cannot, therefore, be a subscriber or a member of your society."

The late Lord Morley (who, by the way, detested Woodrow Wilson and all his works) when requested, in 1919, to give his opinion about the Covenant of the League of Nations, replied: "I have not read it and I don't intend to read it. It's not worth the paper it is written on. To the end of time it will always be a case of 'Thy head or my head'; I have no faith in such schemes."

While a person of a very different political hue, Theodore Roosevelt said: "Let us support any reasonable plan, whether in the form of a League of Nations or in any other shape, which bids fair to lessen the probable number of future wars, and to limit their scope, but let us laugh at any or all assertions that any such plan will guarantee Peace and Safety to the foolish, weak, or timid characters who have not the will and the power to prepare for their own defence. Support any such plan which is honest and reasonable, but support it as a condition to, and never as a substitute for, the policy of preparing our own strength for our own defence."

But it was natural that the greatest and most costly of wars should be followed by the most determined and the most grandiose effort to control the future. For we have established a strong claim on the attention of our children and grandchildren by having sold posterity into bondage more definitely (the total direct servitude

being fixed at sixty-two years) than did ever any preceeding generation.

The old-fashioned treaties or alliances simply imposed the will of the Great Powers upon their weaker neighbours, who were given no voice in deciding either their present status or their future destiny. But in reality it is not different to-day. At the Peace Conference M. Clemenceau sternly announced that the smaller countries could take no part in the deliberations—which was, indeed, the only feasible course. Their fate was, therefore, decided by the omnipotent but far from omniscient Four—who later became the Three. Generally, although not always, those most closely interested were given a hearing. But in the result they were simply told what and where to sign. If they did not do so (and China, with some dignity, refused the rôle allotted to her in the comedy) it made no difference. The edicts of the Three were akin to the laws of the Medes and Persians. The one people who eluded them were the Turks—"the unspeakable Turk"—who, as a matter of course, were to be manacled for the future. But Turkey simply refused to ratify the Treaty of Sèvres; and subsequently, at Lausanne, defied the Powers, adding, in effect, the insolent query, "And now, what are you going to do about it?" Of course the Powers did nothing; and Turkey has gone on her way.

At Geneva it may at first seem to be very different. All the countries which accepted the almost world-wide invitation are represented, the small as well as the great; and all have votes. But the organic weakness lies in the fact that the real power rests in the Council, which, in practice and effect, can act independently of the Assembly. The Great Powers sit in the Council permanently, while under the recent arrangement other seats are allotted to a few delegates from other countries,

elected by the Assembly for various terms. The scramble for votes at the first election under this plan, and the bargains which were made, were strangely reminiscent of an American political caucus. For instance, Downing Street would probably have preferred to have kept France's ally, Czecho-Slovakia, out of the Council, but was finally obliged to support her, as the alternative would doubtless have been the election of the Irish Free State.

When the Great Powers act together they do and can dictate to the rest of Europe just as much as did the Holy Alliance more than a century ago. The form in which things are accomplished has changed a good deal more than has human nature itself; and despite all the brave talk about the right of self-determination, the best policy for any minor Power is still that given by La Fontaine:

> "Petits princes, videz vos débats entre vous;
> De recourir aux rois vous seriez de grands fous.
> Il ne faut jamais les engager dans vos guerres,
> Ni les faire entrer sur vos terres."

Amongst themselves the Great Powers obstruct, and always will obstruct, the ostensible objects of the League, by reason of the fact that they all reserve matters which they will not submit for decision. In this respect the most open offender (but the most honest, precisely because the frankest) has been Italy, which bluntly defied the League regarding the occupation of Crete at the time of her dissension with Greece. Mussolini then simply acted as he thought best in the interests of his country; and no doubt he would do exactly the same thing again. Since that episode the Council of the League, naturally fearful of a further loss of prestige, has been careful to avoid any clash with him. When

any possibility of a dispute with the Duce now arises it bears in mind the words of Aristophanes:

> "Best rear no lion in your State,—'tis true,
> But treat him like a lion if you do."

The influence of the League beyond Europe is crippled by the fact that the United States still stands aloof; and there is little prospect of any change in her attitude within the near future. The curious variety of restrictions with which she surrounded her offer to join the World Court is significant. There is, however, always the possibility that the League of Nations may offend the susceptibilities of the American Government by taking a too active part in the affairs of South America. The republics which form that Continent are not yet absolutely certain whether they prefer Washington or Geneva as a tribunal of last resort; although they undoubtedly consider the League a protection against any forced interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, or a policy of Pan-Americanism of which they might be the victims. In 1920 Peru and Bolivia withdrew from the League because Chile prevented the Tacna-Arica boundary question being submitted for settlement at Geneva. The President of the United States then agreed to act as sole arbitrator between Chile and Peru, Bolivia being unwisely excluded. The State Department, which was glad to see the matter transferred to Washington, thereupon proceeded to give an excellent exhibition of diplomatic blundering. The President's decision at first excited the ire of Peru, but it also provided for a plebiscite under conditions which, as should have been foreseen, Chile would never in practice permit. The Commission sent to South America to carry out the award was, therefore, forced to return without accomplishing any-

thing—a rather lamentable spectacle.[1] The one definite result of Washington's unskilful intervention has been to arouse in South America the idea that the League of Nations might, at some opportune moment, prove a very useful barrier against the effect of that very Monroe Doctrine which is supposed to be their protection against Europe. For it is North American rather than European aggression of which South American statesmen are afraid to-day. A member of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies, Señor Edwards Matte, voiced a prevalent sentiment, when he recently advocated a revision of the doctrine, saying, " The moment has come in which we should say, not 'America for the Americans' but 'Latin America for the Latin Americans.' " Even the withdrawal from the League of Brazil, on account of not being given a permanent seat in the Council, has not diminished this widespread sentiment; and Chile readily accepted one of the seats for a fixed period which were created upon the recent reorganization. However, Latin-America's opinion has not yet crystallized to that consistency which it will probably obtain within a few years. If it then appears that she has finally elected to look to the League of Nations as arbitrator and protector, the American Government will be in a rather risible position in respect to the Monroe Doctrine.

The ardent supporters of the League of Nations point proudly to the fact that interwoven with its work are the treaties concluded at Locarno—that beautiful spot which, until 1925, was better known in fiction than in history, for it was to Locarno that the Duchesse Sanseverina took Fabrizio after his escape from the

[1] The Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg, has since suggested that the disputed territory should be sold to Bolivia—undoubtedly this would solve the question; and, incidentally, would extricate the Department of State from an unenviable position.

citadel of Parma. There is nothing new in nations signing treaties engaging themselves to keep the peace. It would be novel if all of them should scrupulously observe their undertakings. The Locarno Treaties may well be a step in advance; of that time alone can bring the proof. But the strange point is that they assume that armed forces are available, since the pledge is to use them when necessary. These pacts are, therefore, quite inconsistent with disarmament; and yet the whole future of the League of Nations seems to lie in that direction.

Emphatically I am not amongst those who believe that any good is to be found in warfare, nor do I share the notion that it is in any way essential to national virility. As Colonel Brocklehurst (afterwards Lord Ranksborough) once wrote to William Stead, "The fact is that war is war, and a very nasty, beastly, dirty, undignified business at the best." But war can only be prevented by making men not want to fight, or by making it impossible for them to fight. It is doubtful whether the former method is feasible. The instinct to have recourse to force, sometimes under a sincere sense of grievance, sometimes simply in order to seize, under some pretext, what belongs to one who appears to be weaker, is not an acquired, but an inherited characteristic; and it is one which has also been handed down by example, if not by precept, from generation to generation. It is strongly ingrained in the human race. If, indeed, it ever could be successfully eradicated, it could only be by a long process of education; and it is highly unlikely that that would be continued, without interruption by posterity, for the required length of time.

The latter remedy is simply disarmament. How far that is practicable may be questioned. The most distinguished protagonist of the League of Nations, Lord Cecil of Chelwood, has said that the case for the reduction

of armaments is unanswerable. But that statement is accurate only with the qualification that security is also assured. This naturally raises a host of difficult problems; not the least of which is the question of comparative land and naval disarmament. Undoubtedly Germany, as a member of the League of Nations, will now contend that under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles the other European Powers are bound to proceed to reduce their own armed forces. There is some ground for this contention (as I pointed out some years ago) [1] in the words preceding the clauses regulating German disarmament: "En vue de rendre possible la préparation d'une limitation générale des armements de toutes les nations, l'Allemagne s'engage à observer strictement les clauses militaires, navales et aériennes ci-après stipulées." France, however, is unlikely to admit that interpretation. Indeed, *Le Temps* recently not only repudiated it but contended that by the Treaty Germany is for all time put in a position of inferiority. It is true that according to the Treaty the partial disarmament of Germany is to be permanent. But that might be taken to support the argument that the reduction of the German forces was to be followed by those of other countries. However, apart from any dispute about intent, it is manifest as a matter of practical politics that it would not be possible to keep Germany in a state of inferiority for all time. Any Power that wished to do that should have opposed the admission of Germany into the Council of the League of Nations: for to put that country on a plane of equality in settling the affairs of Europe, and to expect her at the same time to accept, without protest, such an absolutely subordinate position, is absurd.

The present position of the League of Nations is none

[1] *The Path to Peace*, p. 361.

too strong; and its future seems doubtful. Its comparative success or absolute failure in bringing about some measure of disarmament will perhaps be decisive. The outlook, therefore, is not encouraging. For conferences extending over a period of five months in order to find a common ground, only exposed differences between the Powers which appeared to be almost irreconcilable. Perhaps the greatest point of difference was that Great Britain, the United States, and Japan wanted naval disarmament to be based on the classes of vessels (as was done at the Washington Conference); while the countries which depend chiefly upon their land forces —France, Italy, Belgium, and others—wished it to be determined by the total tonnage. I am bound to add that the latter method would undoubtedly be more effective.

At best the League of Nations can only be a limping giant so long as the United States stands aside. But in any event impartial observers now admit that those who from the outset contended that expectations were being raised too high, were right. The League has done much good work of a minor nature, and will doubtless do more. But it has been powerless to prevent a number of little wars (although it did stop the threatened conflict between Greece and Bulgaria) and it has been defied, politely or insolently, by more than one country. Moreover, the Great Powers have latterly begun to make it their puppet, and to conclude arrangements between themselves elsewhere than at Geneva, afterwards imposing their will upon the smaller nations, and using the League simply as an agency for the registration of their pacts. The Locarno Treaties, whatever their intrinsic merit, were simply a revival of the custom, whereby during centuries, in the intervals of fighting amongst themselves, the Great Powers have, in one way or another,

undertaken to control the European situation. If any statesman at Locarno sincerely thought differently, he was deceiving himself; which, in a politician, is several degrees worse than deceiving others.

In the same way Mussolini makes his own arbitration treaties with Spain and with Germany—quite indifferent to the bleatings at Geneva. In this fashion the League, if one regards it stripped of all the trappings which bolster it up, runs no small risk of being reduced to a level very much lower than that which it was originally destined to occupy.

Nor do the Great Powers scruple to ignore the spirit of the Covenant of the League when they think it is to their interest to do so. One incident will suffice. In 1926 the government of Abyssinia (a country which is a member of the League of Nations) received from the British and Italian Governments Identic Notes informing it, in the words of the Abyssinian protest to the League, that: "These Governments had arrived at an agreement to support each other with a view of obtaining a concession for the British Government to undertake the conservancy of waters of our Lake Tsana, and for the Italian Government to construct a railway through our Empire. We have been profoundly moved by the conclusion of this agreement arrived at without our being consulted or informed, and by the action of the two Governments in sending us a joint notification. . . . We have the honour to bring to the notice of all States, members of the League, correspondence which we have received, in order that they may decide whether that correspondence is compatible with the independence of our country, inasmuch as it includes a stipulation that part of our Empire is to be allotted to the economic influence of a given Power. We cannot but realize that economic influence and political influence are very closely

bound up together, and it is our duty to protest most strongly against an agreement which, in our view, conflicts with the essential principles of the League of Nations."

It is quite comprehensible that the Secretary-General of the League was not very anxious to publish this document, which, taken in its entirety, was a decidedly sardonic production. But the Foreign Office in its reply, and Sir Austen Chamberlain in his explanation to the House of Commons, made the somewhat specious plea that the Identic Notes did not, in themselves, reserve any part of Abyssinia to Italian economic influence, because all the British Government had agreed, so far as it was concerned, was to recognize that influence—which in no way bound the Abyssinian Government. The Foreign Secretary did, indeed, make it clear that England herself was not going to take any advantage of Abyssinia. But he would not guarantee what Italy might see fit to do, and he did not give any explanation of why he had undertaken to support her. In brief, he disclosed no justification for such Notes having been sent at all to an independent nation. In its protest the Abyssinian Government had very pertinently remarked: "On our admission to the League we were told that all nations were to be on a footing of equality within the League and that their independence was to be universally respected, since the purpose of the League is to establish and maintain peace among men in accordance with the will of God. We were not told that certain members of the League might make a separate agreement to impose their views on another member, even if the latter considered those views incompatible with its national interests." To this Sir Austen Chamberlain gave no satisfactory reply. He was unable to do so. For the statement that all members

of the League are on the same footing is grossly false. If any sensible person ever had any doubt on that point, this incident sufficed to dispel it. For had the United States been a member of the League, would Sir Austen have dared to have been a party to addressing such a note to that country?

I hasten to add that I am only commenting upon the explanation given by the Foreign Secretary, and that I am far from criticizing his action; for I have no doubt that Sir Austen Chamberlain had excellent if undisclosed reasons for his arrangement with Italy, and that, in one way or another, it was in the interest of Great Britain. I am here only seeking to make it clear that the whole proceeding was absolutely at variance with the spirit of the League. And such proceedings will continue to occur from time to time. "Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose." The only difference suggested by Sir Austen Chamberlain's curious explanation is that while Governments are quite as predatory as of yore, they are less plucky in owning up.

Dean Inge has well said that "It would be rash to count upon the disappearance of the oldest and most costly of human follies. . . . We all wish well to the League of Nations; perhaps the majority can echo the pious hope that 'something good may come out of it.'"

But one must look beyond Geneva to get a true idea of the situation and to appraise the prospects of peace.

In Germany, despite a certain measure of unemployment and some months when the trade balance was unfavourable, the position is excellent. To-day Germany is surpassed only by Great Britain and the United States in the extent of her foreign trade: from 1924 to 1925 there was an increase of 35·5 per cent. as compared with 1·4 per cent. in France, 10·9 per cent. in the United Kingdom, and 11·4 per cent. in the United States. The

revenue for the first six months of the fiscal year beginning April 1926 exceeded the estimate by 130,000,000 marks. Germany's currency is the most stable in Europe. All this is due mainly to the Dawes Plan, which was the direct result of the French occupation of the Ruhr, and which not only gave Germany the necessary start, but also protection against pressure on the part of her creditors. But it remains to be seen whether the Allies are, in their turn, to derive any real benefit from this famous arrangement, or whether its operation will be halted once Germany has used it for her own purposes. It is somewhat ominous that already the German Press is not only asserting that it will be impossible to meet the heavier payments in the coming years, but is contending that the second annual instalment was met only by contracting loans abroad; although the report of the Agent-General for Reparations states that Germany made this payment out of her own resources.

In respect to her foreign policy Germany appears to be acquiescent about Alsace and Lorraine, but there is every reason to think that she regards the loss of Danzig and of Silesia as only temporary. M. Paul Doumer once told me that the late Tsar had said to him that a kingdom of Poland would cause more trouble than all the Balkans. Certainly Poland is at present the weak link in the European chain, although there may be no imminent danger. But Germany will not accept the situation as final; while, on the other hand, as the late M. Krassin told me as far back as 1919, Russia always bears in mind that she can at any time throw Europe into disarray by attacking Poland. Russia herself has so far fulfilled the prediction which I hazarded five years ago: "The situation would be different if there was any suggestion that the Romanoffs might be restored, but that is no longer within the realm of practical politics.

Doubtless the Soviet Government does not represent the Russian people in a constitutional sense, but it is the *de facto* Government. While just as there is no restoration to be anticipated from outside, so there is no immediate prospect of any proper constitutional development from within. What is much more probable is that the present régime, after some dissension between its two extreme elements, will adapt itself to the needs of the country and will continue to retain the actual power." [1]

There is, however, a general feeling that Herr Stresemann is not showing all his cards. France has some reason to think that while the concessions which Germany demands are quite definite, the return which France is to receive therefor is decidedly less sure and tangible, and might well prove to be illusory. It is a danger to which M. Poincaré is evidently alive.

Undoubtedly the best element in the situation between France and Germany is the protection afforded by the Steel Consortium which was finally agreed upon in September 1926. Many Frenchmen and many friends of France have for some years contended that that was the proper step. I recollect that when lunching one day in the summer of 1920 with M. Loucher (who, I imagine, was entirely in accord with the idea) I was laughingly told that it was a curious policy to be urged by an Englishman, since, in a commercial sense, England might be the sufferer.

France, having managed to survive the financial

[1] *The Pomp of Power*, p. 268. The present situation in Russia is almost an impassé. After the early excesses of the revolution, the Bolshevists found that they were unable to cope with the tenacity of the peasants, and were forced to reverse their policy about the ownership of products. To-day one group advocates heavier taxation of the peasantry. But the fact is that while low taxation has never diminished the distrust with which that class regards Moscow, any material increase in taxation would probably have unpleasant results.

folly of the Herriot Government, is now going through that highly unpleasant period following an inflation; which, in her case, has become all the more unpleasant because so long delayed. Nevertheless, the fact that the country is being taxed as heavily as possible, and that a determined effort is being made to collect the taxes, as well as to diminish expenditure, is already having its effect. It is significant that prices are increasing (that is, that the internal purchasing power of the franc is decreasing), while at the same time the value of the franc abroad is mounting. No sign could be better.

France is, of course, always faced by the fact that her population is almost stationary, while her neighbours are increasing so rapidly that they must find some outlet for their surplus. In the four years from 1920 to 1923 inclusive, the absolute excess of births over deaths in France was 442,000, while in Germany it was 2,318,000. Italy has increased at about the rate of 400,000 each year during that period. This is really the darkest feature in the future of France as one sees it to-day; for nothing can save a country which deliberately commits suicide. But the more immediate result is that the Government is troubled by the enormous number of unnaturalized foreigners who are now in France, nearly 900,000 out of an approximate total of 2,500,000 being Italians. Nevertheless, this gives an opening not to be neglected by a country which has a stationary birth-rate. When the undesirables are eliminated, there will still remain between one and two millions who, being of Latin origin, should make good French citizens. But until recently both the laws and the bureaucracy barred the way to speedy and cheap naturalization. In the meantime France has become somewhat sensitive about the large influx of Italians into the frontier departments—especially in view of some of Mussolini's speeches.

It is difficult to discover the exact position in Italy. Certainly there has been a great improvement in almost every avenue of national life within the last few years. It is obviously unfair not to give Mussolini the credit for this amelioration since his advent to power, for he would undoubtedly have been blamed if the tendency had been in the other direction. Moreover, it is absurd to rail at his methods. It is true that they would not be acceptable in England or in the United States; but that statement proves nothing more than it says. The vital point is that in Italy it is not, as in Russia, a minority governing a majority, which would probably be hostile if it were trained to express itself. Russia is an autocracy. But I understand that the great test of a democracy is that those in office should represent the majority. Who will be bold enough to assert that the majority of Italians, if given the opportunity to pronounce an untrammelled judgment, would not support Mussolini? In fact, the clearest thing in the whole situation seems to be that Mussolini does truly represent his fellow-countrymen. It is a much more difficult matter to grasp exactly what is the meaning of Fascism.

In some respects the position of Italy is difficult. At the beginning of the war the late M. Paul Cambon, referring to her procrastination, rather cruelly said, "L'Italie! Elle volera au secours de la Victoire." As a matter of fact, Italy, after negotiations with both Austria and the Allies, did sell her support to the highest bidder whom she thought could and would perform what was promised. But in all the circumstances I am unable to see anything very venial in that. To-day Italy has a population which is increasing too rapidly, especially for a country which possesses no coal or iron deposits. Part of Mussolini's discourses are probably only meant to impress Italy and the Italians. But he

is undoubtedly sincere when he talks about room for expansion, and he hopes that by constant reiteration he will bring the other Great Powers to the same point of view. In reality Italy would be all but impotent in any direct clash with France, and perhaps no one realizes this more clearly than does Mussolini. On the other hand, disagreement with France's friends in the Near East might possibly lead to widespread trouble. Certainly the Albanian incident, and the way in which Jugo-Slavia was deceived in that matter, are not reassuring. But that simply means that Italy might, either purposely or by one day involuntarily going too far, precipitate a European war. It would be a great gamble; but against no country would the odds be so great as against Italy. I imagine there is no doubt that any fixed ideas that Mussolini has on the subject of expansion really mean expansion at the expense of Greece or Turkey. I believe that there may yet be surprises in the general understanding between Chamberlain and Mussolini; and that England's strangely silent acquiescence in Italy's Albanian *coup* may possibly be only one step in the Mediterranean policy which our Foreign Office is steadfastly following.

Upon the whole the future peace of Europe probably depends largely upon whether (failing some friendly cession of colonies by other countries) Germany will remain content with the restricted, and Italy with the extended, boundaries allotted to them respectively after the war.

CHAPTER IX

AMERICAN PROSPERITY AND AMERICAN CIVILIZATION

THE phenomenon of the overflowing American prosperity has recently led various industrial and other organizations to send missions in an attempt to discover the underlying causes, with the hope that they might copy them with the same happy results. The report of one of these visitations,[1] typical of many, concluded that "the present prosperity can be traced to the adoption of and strict adherence to a few cardinal principles in the management of industrial enterprises." Amongst the elements more particularly cited are the importance attached to a large volume of sales and a small profit, the rapidity of turnover which entails only small capital requirements, and the extensive use of labour-saving appliances.

An American writer[2] has more succinctly limited to four the contributing factors to that American affluence which, he asserts, is responsible for much bitter envy throughout Europe. He places first the constant posibility that the labourer of to-day will be the employer of to-morrow. I should be inclined to regard this as an effect rather than as a cause of prosperity. But be that as it may, it is obvious that it is bound to become a less prevalent and less potent factor now that the

[1] Report of two engineers, published in the English *Review of Reviews*, February 15 and March 15, 1926.

[2] "The Basis of American Prosperity," by Isaac F. Marcosson, in the *Saturday Evening Post*, July 31, 1926.

stream of immigration is restricted. Prohibition I should likewise regard as a doubtful source; the case remains to be proved. It has probably led to employers getting more work out of their employees, and to the latter spending their wages in a healthier way than formerly, or even saving a portion; which is all to the good. But it is questionable whether a measure which is responsible for widespread lawlessness and which entails the annual expenditure of many millions of dollars in vain efforts to enforce it, may fairly be reckoned as one of the origins of national prosperity. Incidentally, it should be noted that labour organizations are opposed to the existing Prohibition laws, on the ground that they interfere with personal liberty.

More doubtful still, and even more fantastic, is the third reason advanced—"the American Constitution and form of government, which avoid the upheavals due to European parliamentary systems, which turn out cabinets overnight and disrupt the fiscal order." I am unable to recall any setbacks to prosperity due to "European parliamentary systems"; and while it is true that cabinets are sometimes turned out overnight, it is equally true that they are generally replaced the next morning—more or less—and all certainly without the slightest disturbance to the normal course of commercial activity. Far different is it under the American Constitution. Every fourth year, from June to November, the country is in a turmoil on account of the campaign preceding the Presidential election. This is so well known that for some generations the Presidential year was universally accepted as a year of poor business. This was especially so when the fate of the tariff usually depended upon the election; for obviously some months of doubt upon that subject were not likely to make for healthy business. It is true that the last two or three Presidential elections have

not been disturbing in the same degree. But this improvement cannot in any way be attributed to the Constitution; and even to-day a Presidential election is more inimical to business interests than are half a dozen changes of cabinet in any European country.

Much sounder is the fourth cause given, namely, that the geographical situation of the country makes it a self-contained economic unit.

I think, however, that, broadly, American prosperity (apart from that which accrued during or as an aftermath of the war) might fairly be attributed to the natural resources of the country; its geographical position; the high protective tariff; and in the line of human intelligence, the fact that the American working man is thoroughly convinced that high production means high wages—a truth which is, apparently, quite beyond the comprehension of his English brother. In discussing this question in the United States one cannot fail to be struck with the small credit for existing conditions which the average citizen is inclined to ascribe to natural resources, and the flattering estimate which he places upon the efforts and energy of himself and his fellows. However, the present prosperity was mainly developed not by those who were indigenous to the soil, but by those who came from Europe within the last half century. These emigrants had never shown any commanding ability in their native countries; and had they remained there they would to-day doubtless be in the same position as are those whom they left behind. For the greater part they passed through the portals of the Promised Land ignorant and poverty-stricken; and the subsequent change in their condition has not been due to what they brought with them but to what they found there. Their environment has been quite as great a factor as any native ability on their part.

The commanding position which its natural resources and supplies of raw materials ensure the United States may be seen from the following figures, which give the American percentage of the total world-production:

Coal production	43·5 per cent.
Petroleum production	71·9 per cent.
Copper production	52·7 per cent.
Iron ore production	55·0 per cent.
Pig-iron production	60·2 per cent.
Steel ingots and castings production	59·8 per cent.
Wheat production	21·3 per cent.
Cotton production	52·0 per cent.
Lumber production	52·6 per cent.

The United States is probably now at the apex of its prosperity: although the country may for a long time yet continue upon the same wave; and even when it descends to a lower level may still, relatively, be far in advance materially of other nations. Until a few years ago the country, taken as a whole, was more an agricultural than a manufacturing one. In 1900 the urban population was 30,797,895 and the rural 45,197,390. But in 1920 the urban population, for the first time in the history of the country, exceeded the rural; the figures being 54,304,603 as against 51,406,017. At the same time the United States was the greatest manufacturing country in the world, and yet was able to consume itself about 80 per cent. of its own production. Moreover, it was (and is) the creditor of a number of European countries for amounts which it would take more than sixty years to liquidate. What nation before ever enjoyed such a profusion of wealth, or such pre-eminence over its fellows?

To-day, however, the United States is more a manufacturing than an agricultural country. The tendency which has produced this change is bound to continue progressively. The time, therefore, will eventually come

when the manufactured output will be enormously greater than Americans themselves can consume; and when foreign countries and their internal conditions will have to be taken into account much more than is now necessary. The day will even arrive when the lessened agricultural products will no more than suffice—and eventually will not even suffice—to feed the increased population. However, that period is still far distant; and the farmer may suffer a long time yet from the effect of a tariff which is too high for his welfare.

The price of farm products has recently averaged only 35 per cent. above pre-war prices, as compared with an increase of 59 per cent. upon non-agricultural products. The situation of the farmers is such that they are threatening to cause trouble to the Republican Administration unless definite steps are taken to aid them. They lay the blame chiefly upon the tariff. But although (despite all specious explanations to the contrary) the farmer does not benefit by the tariff as does the rest of the community, the root of the trouble goes deeper. Agriculturists will only prosper when they limit the number of middlemen and they co-operate in selling their produce, thus to some extent controlling prices. To-day they buy in a sellers' market and sell in a buyers' market. The manufacturers' Protection is, in some degree, at the expense of the farmers; and when organized labour occasionally tries to increase wages and decrease hours, it also is seeking a preference the burden of which will ultimately fall upon the farmer: for the purchasing power of the latter is diminished in proportion to any decrease in effort whereby the workman is enabled to buy his food. But above all these considerations broods the immutable fact that of all occupations farming is the most speculative. In no other calling does one run such a constant risk—a risk which continues up to the

very moment that crops are safely gathered in—of seeing the work of months destroyed by nature in a few hours —by a gale, by an untimely frost, and by too much as well as by too little rain. The farmer's only protection is in co-operation. Unfortunately, no class is so unfitted to work in that way; which also explains why a farmers' political revolt, although often troublesome and sometimes momentarily successful, never ripens into a permanent political power in the State.

If the agricultural class is not content there is also one region in the United States which to-day is not sharing in the general prosperity. New England was once a great grain-growing section of the country. The competition of the West ousted her from that position. In 1881 there were 13,148,000 acres under cultivation, but only 6,114,000 in 1920. New England, however, had quickly turned to increasing her textile trade, in which for many years she was pre-eminent. But now the South uses in her own mills a great part of the cotton which she grows. In 1897 there were less than 4,000,000 cotton-spindles in all the South. To-day there are more than 17,000,000. In New England the mills are no longer running at their full capacity. Cotton goods manufactured in the cotton-growing States are sold in Boston more cheaply than they can be made in Massachusetts. It is even claimed that the English manufacturers of certain textiles are, at times, able to undersell the home product.

With these exceptions, however, the whole country, and all classes of the community, are extraordinarily prosperous. It is interesting to inquire how this superabundant affluence has been used, and what has been its effect upon a people, many of whom were lifted almost overnight from the direst poverty to a state of well-being far exceeding their fondest dreams.

Concrete figures offer the most striking picture of the wealth of the United States, and of the comparative ease enjoyed by its inhabitants. The following table gives the number of each class of income which was assessed in 1924 and the amounts collected:

Dollars.	Number.	Amount.
		Dollars.
Under 1,000	344,876	145,629
1,000 to 2,000	2,413,881	10,432,394
2,000 to 3,000	2,112,993	10,207,284
3,000 to 5,000	1,800,900	26,865,387
5,000 to 10,000	437,330	28,827,994
10,000 to 25,000	191,261	78,068,669
25,000 to 50,000	47,061	109,359,811
50,000 to 100,000	15,816	136,636,004
100,000 to 150,000	3,065	75,677,735
150,000 to 300,000	1,876	92,480,898
300,000 to 500,000	457	45,771,131
500,000 to 1,000,000	242	42,585,301
1,000,000 and over	75	47,207,203
Total	7,369,833	704,265,440

But since 1924 the exemption limit has been raised and the tax rate has been materially lowered throughout the whole scale. The enactments of 1918, 1921, 1924, and 1926, respectively, have successively lightened the taxpayers' burden. The table shown on page 276 gives the amounts payable thereunder, by a married man without dependents.

In 1924 the actual surplus was $505,366,000, although the President had predicted only about $330,000,000; and his prophecies were likewise greatly exceeded in the two following fiscal years, when the surpluses were $250,505,238 and $377,767,816.

It is unnecessary to refer to the huge fortunes amassed further than to say that 74 people paid on incomes of over $1,000,000, four of them having incomes in excess of $5,000,000. In some instances these vast accumula-

tions, to the acquisition of which men have devoted a strenuous lifetime, seem to be more of a nuisance than anything else. The case of the late Mr. Frank Munsey may be taken as an outstanding example of many others which might be cited. Munsey, who early in life came to New York from the State of Maine, was a cold, self-contained man, possessed of great astuteness and even more tenacity. For a number of years he worked harder (to use his own words) than any man ought to work;

Income.	Act of 1918.	Act of 1921.	Act of 1924.	Act of 1926.
Dollars.	Dollars.	Dollars.	Dollars.	Dollars.
3,000	60	20	7·50	—
4,000	120	60	22·50	5·63
5,000	180	100	37·50	16·88
6,000	250	160	52·50	28·13
7,000	390	250	75·00	39·38
8,000	530	340	105·00	56·25
9,000	680	430	135·00	78·75
10,000	830	520	165·00	101·25
15,000	1,670	1,060	515·00	311·25
20,000	2,630	1,720	975·00	618·75
30,000	4,930	3,520	2,275·00	1,778·75
40,000	7,730	5,840	3,995·00	3,198·75
50,000	11,030	8,640	6,095·00	4,878·75
60,000	14,830	11,940	8,635·00	6,798·75
70,000	19,130	15,740	11,535·00	8,958·75
80,000	23,930	20,040	14,835·00	11,258·75
90,000	29,230	24,840	18,495·00	13,658·75
100,000	35,330	30,140	22,575·00	16,058·75

and during that period his ventures were constantly on the verge of bankruptcy. Eventually, however, the magazines which he founded made a fortune, which he increased manifold by other enterprises. He never married, and upon his death it was found that the bulk of his estate, then estimated at about $40,000,000, had, after making provision for collateral relations and for several friends, been left to the Metropolitan Museum of Art. It is noteworthy that in his lifetime Munsey was never known to evince any artistic tendencies—

indeed, his magazines, although strictly moral, were rather debasing from any artistic standpoint, and if he had any interest in the Metropolitan Museum it was sedulously concealed. The truth seems to be that he did not know what to do with the wealth which he had been at such pains to gather—a curious commentary upon human ambitions.[1]

What the prosperity of the United States has produced, is, primarily, a well-fed, well-clothed, and contented people, although one lacking in any sense of proportion. Benjamin Franklin, who had as keen a sense of proportion as any American who ever lived, would be horrified if he could spend a week-end in the United States of these days.

The American people not only enjoy every known mechanical convenience, but they have considerable means for gratifying the artistic senses. Stendhal's gibe that in America a man is bored, grows dull, and that besides "over there there is no opera for him to go to," is now no longer true—at least in respect to the opera. But this, and the various other advantages resulting from a continued and widespread prosperity, have not yet served to produce an intellectual or even a highly civilized race.

The latter opinion is not one in which one can expect Americans themselves to concur. In fact, they are somewhat prone, not only to go to the other extreme, but to announce their conclusion with considerable complacency. Not very long ago, in August 1923, the editor of a well-known publication stated in its columns: "There is

[1] Another newspaper proprietor, Colonel William Nelson, who owned the Kansas City *Star*, one of the foremost newspapers in the United States, also left his millions, subject to his daughter's life estate therein, for the purchase of pictures for the public. But Nelson was a man of much fuller character than Munsey, and had at least shown his tastes and leanings during his lifetime.

only one first-class civilization in the world to-day. It is right here in the United States and the Dominion of Canada. It may be a cocky thing to say, but relatively it is first class, while Europe's is hardly second class, and Asia's is about fourth to sixth class." Miss Agnes Reppelier recounts that when she quoted this in a lecture she gave in New York: "My audience took it at its face value and cheerfully, I might say enthusiastically, applauded the sentiment. It was evident that to them it was a modest statement of an incontrovertible fact, and they registered their cordial agreement. They seemed—so far as I could apprehend them—to believe that we were, like the Jews, a chosen people, that our mission was 'the uplift' of the human race, and that it behoved those who were to be uplifted to recognize their inferior altitude." [1]

The most important point about this curious confession of faith is that it was not made (as might be imagined) by the editor of some unknown country newspaper. The writer was the editor of *The Ladies Home Journal*, a publication which has an enormous circulation throughout the length and breadth of the land, and which is in the same ownership as that weird and highly profitable weekly *The Saturday Evening Post.*

Mr. David F. Houston, who throughout the late President Wilson's two terms of office was a member of his Cabinet, was not far from saying the same thing, although in less bombastic tones, when he wrote: "The United States is in a position of leadership in all the fundamental, idealistic, moral, and spiritual forces which make a nation great and constitute a worthy civilization. It seeks as its highest aim to have a clean national household from cellar to attic." [2]

[1] *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 1926.
[2] *Harper's Monthly Magazine*, June 1924.

Such declarations inevitably remind one of the immortal Sam Slick, who said: "We average more physical, moral, and intellectual force than any people on the face of the airthe. We are a right-minded, strong-minded, sound-minded, and high-minded people. I hope I may be shot if we ain't."

However, opinion is not unanimous on this subject, even in the United States. Mr. Houston may well rub his eyes in amazement when he reads the later pronouncement of such an historical authority as Professor John H. Latane, of Johns Hopkins University: "It is more than high time that we should get over the idea that the United States is the greatest and best nation on earth. No country has such a record of imperialism as ours since 1900; no country has added a fraction of the population or territory that we have done or occupied so many countries. On top of it all we profess our own moral superiority to the rest of the earth, after we have gone through the rottenest period of moral corruption in public administration any modern civilized country has ever seen, with the participants still on trial, and have more murders than any country on earth. Our talk of morality makes the whole world tired."

But from a European point of view what the United States has in fact abundantly proved is the truth of what was written many years ago by the late Mr. W. E. H. Lecky: "It must, I think, be added that modern democracy is not favourable to the higher forms of intellectual life. Democracy levels down just as much as it levels up. The belief in the equality of man, the total absence of the spirit of reverence, the apotheosis of the average judgment, the fever and the haste, the advertising and sensational spirit which American life so abundantly generates, and which the American Press so vividly reflects, are all little favourable to the pro-

duction of great works of beauty or of thought, of long meditation, of sober taste, of serious and uninterrupted study." [1]

Of course, it all depends upon what one seeks to accomplish by civilization and what meaning one ascribes to that word. As a recent writer has wittily, but quite truly, said: "The objects of American civilization are to substitute cleanliness for beauty; mechanism for men, and hypocrisy for morals. It devotes so much energy to obtaining the means to make life possible that it has none left to practise the art of living. Hot baths and more hot baths, large, larger, and ever larger hotels, fast, faster, and ever faster cars, golf played by ever fatter and more vulgar men . . . cocktails and culture, psychoanalysis and faith-healing, sensual poetry and sensational sports, supported and maintained by an illiterate governing class ready to be imposed upon by any quack or charlatan who can persuade it to take an interest in what it imagines to be its soul." [2]

During the war, the French, especially in the country districts, were wont to imagine (as someone remarked) that every American soldier was a Sir Galahad and a millionaire combined, and were greatly aggrieved when they sometimes discovered their mistake—on both counts. But at the same moment the average American in the ranks was denouncing the French as uncivilized —(the French, who for more than a century have undoubtedly been the fine flower of modern civilization!)— because, forsooth, they did not have a plenitude of bathrooms and telephones. This aptly illustrates the different meaning which the word "civilization" conveys

[1] *Democracy and Liberty*, vol. i. p. 131.

[2] *Thrasymacus, or The Future of Morals*, by C. E. M. Joad. The author predicts that the development of bourgeois civilization in England will probably take the same course.

to Europeans and Americans. To the latter, ancient Greece at her best, if she could be reincarnated, would seem uncivilized; although Dean Inge is not alone in thinking that any race of the present day is intellectually far behind the Athenians of the fourth and fifth century before Christ. But so generally are material things set up as the test, that when Mr. William Allen White, one of the most original and most distinguished of newspaper editors in the United States, wants to tell of the charm of life in the State of Kansas, he lays stress upon the fact that his immediate neighbourhood has 25 miles of hard-surfaced roads, and more telephones and Ford cars than there are heads of families.

Undoubtedly, if the definition given of the word "civilization" by the majority of Americans were to be accepted, they could rightly claim the leadership. For they possess more than 82 per cent. of the total number of motor-cars registered throughout the world, and 67 per cent. of the telephones and telegraphs. No development of the last two decades has been so striking or so important as that of the motor-car industry. To-day $8,000,000,000 are spent annually in the United States in buying new cars or in repairing or altering old ones. The total number of "passenger-cars and trucks" in use throughout the country is said to be more than 17,500,000. No one seems to be a complete American unless he owns his own automobile. Many tens of thousands of people, enjoying an income upon which an English family would maintain at least two domestic servants, have no servants at all—but they own a car. Someone has complained that "the state of mind which prefers a resident cook to a private motor-car is not legislated for, no longer recognized." But I doubt if it ever was in the United States. Anyone can buy a car on the instalment plan at more or less usurious rates

of interest. This system has attained dangerous proportions in the United States. The Farmers' Loan and Trust Company of New York has estimated that even in 1924 75 per cent. of the motor-cars sold were bought on the instalment plan. In California there is said to be an automobile to every 3 inhabitants; in Iowa one to every 4·1, and so on down the list. No doubt this craze has enhanced the physical well-being of the nation; and perhaps, as is sometimes alleged, has also led to the increase in the savings-bank deposits. It is amusing to hear both the prohibitionists and the motor-car manufacturers claiming full credit on both scores; doubtless each has contributed something. But there is another side to the picture. The most innocent, if one of the most troublesome, drawbacks of this flood of motor-cars is the congestion of traffic in the larger cities, thus raising a problem which still remains unsolved. More important is the fact that the general use of automobiles is held partly responsible for the enormous increase in crimes of a violent nature. Moreover, it seems also to have created a disregard for the safety of others, and even for the value of human life. In the year 1924—in the comparatively brief space of twelve months—5,030 people were killed in motor-car accidents. In eleven months of the year 1926 there were 6,128 fatalities in 78 cities, and 988 deaths in New York alone in the course of the whole year. The insurance companies have long since concluded that of all accidental fatalities, those caused by automobiles easily rank first. For they have increased from 1 death per 100,000 in 1907 to 18 deaths per 100,000 in 1925. However, it is only fair to add that this augmentation on the basis of population is not so bad as it seems, since there has been a decrease in proportion to the numbers of cars in use. In 1910, when there were only 600,000 automobiles in

the country, the mortality percentage was 3·3 per 1,000. To-day, when there are 17,500,000, the total does not greatly exceed 1 per cent. per 1,000 cars. Obviously, a large proportion of these accidents must be due to carelessness, which can only be classed as criminal. If it were otherwise, it would mean that motor-cars themselves were most dangerous vehicles under any conditions.

An acute American observer has recently recorded a view which does not often find such positive expression in print: "This is not the place to discuss the disintegrating and degrading influence of the motor-car—although I fancy that the motor-car has done more than the war, or religious scepticism, or jazz, or movies, or the Volstead Act, to corrupt and vulgarize the body politic." [1]

The cinema is the other great national amusement in the United States. It is said that not less than 20,000,000 people attend these theatres every day. The cinema has the doubtful advantage of giving a maximum of recreation at a minimum of mental effort. Certainly it is in no respect intellectually stimulating, nor does the average American picture seem to be particularly elevating. There are, of course, numerous censorial bodies; but, as is the way of censors the world over, they are chiefly distinguished by the oddity of their actions.

Although the possession of material objects and the pursuit of amusements of the least intellectual type are, in the popular opinion, the only test of civilization, there are, and always have been, some who realize the true situation, and who see the danger of going astray and running after false gods. Conspicuous amongst those with vision was Theodore Roosevelt. Writing in 1905 to the French poet Mistral, he said: "All success to you and your associates! You are teaching a lesson

[1] "The Plight of the Genteel," by Katherine Fullerton Gerould, *Harper's Monthly Magazine*, February 1926.

that none need more to learn than we of the West, we of the eager, restless, wealth-seeking nation; the lesson that after a certain not very high level of material well-being has been reached, then the things that really count in life are the things of the spirit. Factories and railways are good up to a certain point. But courage and endurance, love of wife and child, love of home and country, love of lover for sweetheart, love of beauty in man's work and in nature, love and emulation of daring and of lofty endeavour, the homely workaday virtues and the heroic virtues—these are better still, and if they are lacking, no piled-up riches, no roaring, clanging industrialism, no feverish and many-sided activity shall avail either the individual or the nation. I do not undervalue the things of a nation's body; I only desire that they shall not make us forget that besides the nation's body there is the nation's soul."

Despite many protestations of idealism (which are not by any means all insincere), and the manifold and rather pathetic efforts to attain some measure of "self-improvement," it is undeniable that Americans are essentially a material race, who place the acquisition of wealth in the front rank of human achievements. It is their touchstone and their measuring-rod. Anatole France might well have been thinking of them when he wrote: "Car l'argent est devenu honorable. C'est notre unique noblesse. Et nous n'avons détruit les autres que pour mettre à la place cette noblesse, la plus oppressive, la plus insolente, et la plus puissante de toutes." Nevertheless there is still some truth in de Tocqueville's remark that "although the desire to acquire wealth is the dominating passion of Americans, there are times when their souls seem to burst the bonds which bind them, and suddenly soar heavenwards." However, it is not an insult but simply the statement of a fact to say that

Americans to-day are, in a large degree, a race of *parvenus*. That is, a considerable proportion of them have become rich too quickly: so quickly that it has been quite impossible for their culture to keep pace with their wealth. It is true that this is a fault which time corrects; although only in the second or third generation.

But although Americans appreciate comfort, and especially anything that will minimize exertion, either mental or physical, they have comparatively few affirmative enjoyments in life. For the men their business constitutes not only a constant occupation but their main pleasure. Even if they do not really work hard—and so many do not, unless the mere attendance at an office can be called work—they are unhappy when divorced from it. What Henry Adams wrote some years ago holds good to-day: "Bored, patient, helpless; pathetically dependent on his wife and daughters; indulgent to excess; mostly a modest, decent, excellent and valuable citizen; the American was to be met at any railway station in Europe, carefully explaining to every listener that the happiest day in his life was the day he should land on the pier at New York. He was ashamed to be amused; his mind no longer answered to the stimulus of variety; he could not face a new thought. All his immense strength, his nervous energy, his keen analytic perception were oriented in one direction, and he could not change it. Congress was full of such men; in the Senate, Sumner was almost the only exception; in the Executive, Grant and Boutwell were varieties of the type—political specimens—pathetic in their helplessness to do anything with power when it came to them. They knew not how to amuse themselves; they could not perceive how other people amused themselves. Work, whisky, and cards were life." [1]

[1] *The Education of Henry Adams*, pp. 297–8.

Perhaps the most extraordinary feature in American life is the general ignorance—ignorance alike of what is passing in the outside world, and ignorance of literature past and present—which is to be met amongst American men, except possibly on the Atlantic sea-board and in the largest cities. I passed some time in a town which has a population of approximately 180,000. I may mention that I there met Babbitt—many Babbitts; and was surprised to find that Mr. Sinclair Lewis had taken very little literary licence when he depicted that personage. But what most impressed me was the ignorance, and still more the indifference to that ignorance, of those who were in every way the leaders in the life of this city; the most active and successful bankers, lawyers, and others of similar standing—a number of whom had been educated at one or other of the three greatest universities in the United States. I am well within the facts when I say that I have never encountered such crass ignorance in any town of similar size in England, or in France, or elsewhere in Western Europe. I was never able to discover anyone who had the least conception of, or took the faintest interest in, the political situation or personalities of other countries, nor was there any wider familiarity with books or their writers. I was unable to find anyone who had even heard the name of Marcel Proust. Anatole France was known—rather dimly and chiefly in translations—to a few young men who had left college only a few years earlier. The English novelists of the present day were more widely read, but mainly by the younger generation; upon the whole their works were not greatly appreciated. However, I am unfit to comment on that subject, for I myself was unable to derive any enjoyment from the popular American novels of to-day. Some of them I found sordid, but sordid novels also appear with consistent regularity in England and in France. Others

were too local for my taste; but an American might reasonably bring the same charge against many British works of fiction. I tried to read a monumental novel by Mr. Theodore Dreiser, but could not wade through such a mass of bad English. I was setting no high standard. All I asked was to be amused. But the defect which, for me, tainted the output of most American novelists, was their appalling dullness. Obviously, such a judgment is too personal to be of the least value; although I would be prepared to maintain that the United States does not possess any novelist who writes with the same distinction as Mr. Galsworthy, unless it be Mrs. Wharton, who is not nearly so good a story-teller; or any writer so witty and pungent as Mr. Bernard Shaw—except Mr. H. L. Mencken, who, *facile princeps*, is in a class by himself.

Leaving the field of fiction I found a still greater scarcity of readers for historical or biographical works. Mr. Henry Ford once expressed the opinion that "History is bunk," and one is sometimes inclined to think that the majority of his fellow-countrymen agree with him. I purposely made a test respecting half a dozen biographical or critical books. Not one of a number of men who had both ample means to buy them, and ample time to read them, was even aware of their existence. Such widely separated writers as the late Colonel Repington and Mr. Harold Nicholson were equally unknown. The only English book of that kind which seemed to have penetrated so far was the *Memoirs* of Lady Oxford and Asquith. I should add that several of the works in question were to be found in the excellent public library which this town possesses.[1] I examined the cards, and

[1] I would like to take this opportunity of expressing my thanks to those in charge of that library, who kindly kept me supplied with the books I wanted throughout a tiresome illness.

discovered that they had all had a few readers; but evidently amongst those who had still their way to make in the world.

The United States is said to be a great reading country. I think it would be nearer the mark to say that it is a good book-buying country. For outside of certain centres no one seems to read much except novels and magazines; the most popular of the latter being the many frothy ones which have sprouted within the last ten or fifteen years. A not unfair generalization would be that it is a country where every one reads—something—but where few people think.

Mr. Hilaire Belloc saw things as they are: "For example, each latest fad in the physical or historical jargon of guesswork is accepted for gospel, after a fashion far more universal than with us. With us it is a mark of intelligence and reading to ridicule the successive imaginaries which are presented to us for realities—The Cave-man and The Nordic Race, and all the rest of the ephemeral procession. To accept these things seriously and make them a basis for action or even thought is associated in the European mind as something imperfect in a man's training. I have even heard them called 'Suburban' and 'middle class' by middle-class people in the suburbs; and when things get as far as that it is a wonder and a sign. For instance, such ephemeral books as these *Outlines of History* and the rest, have about them, in the eyes of the cultured in Europe, something comic and absurd. The musty belated elementary 'science' and history of their authors, half of it already proved wrong, and the other half guess-work, is a joke—especially with the French, who are keenly alive to the fun of such figures. But in America I found that trumped-up stuff taken quite seriously." [1]

[1] *The Contrast*, by Hilaire Belloc, pp. 82–3.

In brief, the United States cannot claim any superiority in civilization upon the ground of its literary output or appreciation. Nor do its daily newspapers make any better showing. I leave aside the fact that a large percentage of them are disfigured and debased by the more or less vulgar comic supplements; that their headlines are generally the reverse of artistic; and that the make-up too often shows the subserviency of the editorial and news pages to the needs and demands of heavy advertisers. But what is still more striking is the local character of the news in even the most metropolitan dailies. As an American journalist recently wrote: "Bits of European news squeeze in as best they can." And when one begins to get accustomed to what seems a perverted sense of news-values, one is irritated by the loose and inaccurate reporting. The omission of the main points of a story, a too-constant repetition, and often one or more contradictory statements within the space of a single column. The leaders—or editorials—are in many instances flabby. Even when they avoid that pitfall they rarely show the scholarly touch which is generally to be found in *The Times* or the *Manchester Guardian*, not to mention any other English newspapers; or that full complement of information which distinguishes articles in *Le Temps*. Indeed, if I were asked to indicate the best part of most of the greater American newspapers I would quite unhesitatingly point to the pages controlled by the sporting editor.

The Chicago *Tribune* brazenly announces itself in its own columns as "The World's Greatest Newspaper." The mere fact that it finds it so necessary to bellow its claim would be a sure proof (if any were needed) that no one else ever admitted it. But probably the daily repetition of the statement is regarded by the owners themselves as a journalistic joke, somewhat in the nature

of the letter from the *Old Philadelphia Lady* which the late James Gordon Bennett printed day by day for so many years in the Paris edition of the New York *Herald*.

Within the last decade newspapers in most of the larger cities of the United States have made huge profits. It must be put to the credit of their proprietors that they usually spend a generous proportion of these gains in perfecting the mechanical side, and in extending the news service. But it is regrettable that in the latter respect they so often obtain so little for their money. Many newspapers maintain highly paid European representatives. But, with a few notable exceptions, American correspondents in Europe seldom rise above what is actually puerile. Their point of view never ceases to be strictly American; which may be patriotic, but which certainly does not make for work of a high order. Possibly the reason is that they are often put in a position for which they have had no previous training, and for which they possess no natural aptitude. Anyway, whatever the reason, the columns of the American Press demonstrate the fact. I found that the newspaper which kept one best in touch with the political situation in Europe was undoubtedly the Baltimore *Sun*, for while it had its own firm opinions and prejudices, it took care to give, as a matter of news, both sides of every question, written by Europeans as well as by its own correspondents. Its readers might see one day the views of "Pertinax" (M. André Géraud of *L'Echo de Paris*), and the next the very different views of Mr. Robert Dell, of the *Manchester Guardian*.

Next to the Baltimore *Sun* in this respect I would place the *New York Times*. Indeed, the latter gives much more space (although not, I think, more in proportion to its size) to foreign affairs than does the Baltimore *Sun*. But it is not so concerned to retain the

services of European writers of diverse shades of thought. After the *New York Times* (but a long way behind) comes the European correspondence of *The Christian Science Monitor*—as I was very much surprised to discover.

Speaking of the American Press as a whole, and in its various aspects, it may, I suppose, be said that it is adapted to the needs and desires of the nation. A country generally has the Press which it deserves. But it would require some temerity to assert that it shows the way to any higher form of civilization than that which prevails in Western Europe.

But although Americans may live in a narrow groove, they are excessively intelligent and exceedingly well informed about all which affects their own business. That is, they have specialized, and it is specialized men that one meets throughout the United States to-day. Disraeli said that a great country was a country that produced great men. An anonymous American writer has recently pointed out that this system is not likely to have that effect: "If in the process of weighing intelligence you take out the minds of men who are near greatness and line them up, certain facts about them appear that have never appeared before. I have written down a list of thirty Americans who have almost achieved greatness, and suddenly it is disclosed to me that twenty of them fell short because they were specialized men. They are men of character, but I am not looking at character. I am looking for the quality of the mind—true, high intelligence which is necessary to give us great leaders. And the specialized man is often short-weight in that test. The specialized man may not be to blame; perhaps he is the creation of the times in which we are living and of our high-pressure commercial or industrial life. We insist upon developing a great banker, a great railroad president, a great engineer, a great sales expert, and

then we are foolish enough to think of them as great men. Of course, the truth is that it does not follow that these specialists can be drafted when the task is one of great political or national human leadership. It is quite possible that a man may be a great specialist, and still be far, far away from being a great man." [1]

But great men are rare in any country. What is more noticeable, although quite in keeping with the vogue of standardization, is that while passing notorieties are common enough, the number of men of actual national distinction is comparatively small. Perhaps it is difficult to project one's fame in a continent which stretches over 3,000 miles. However, "one of the most remarkable men in our Country, sir," whose frequency appalled Dickens, is still to be found in many a small town, especially in certain parts of the country.

What is more pregnant is that the existing system does not breed interesting men. I would not go so far as Carlyle, who, in one of his grumpy moments, once asked Cobden what the United States had done, except beget, with unexampled rapidity, 25,000,000 of the greatest bores on the earth. But I am bound to admit that American men often remind me of the story that Schopenhauer was wont to place beside his plate, at the restaurant where he habitually dined, a gold piece, which, as it became known after many years, he had vowed to put in the poor-box if any man started a conversation upon any subject except women, wine, or horses. I believe that a wager that the conversation of Americans, in the class to which I am now referring, would be limited to their own business, motor-cars, or their golf score, would be equally safe. Apart from these subjects their conversation has little body. It cannot be said of them as Lord Morley said of Matthew Arnold: "He did not

[1] *Behind the Scenes in Politics* (anonymous), pp. 241, 242.

willingly talk about nothing, which might seem a peculiarly modest virtue, if it were not so uncommon." But Emerson, who declared that conversation is a main function of life, would to-day find his countrymen disappointing.

It would be interesting to trace to what extent the universities, of which there are a multitude throughout the length and breadth of the land, are responsible for this state of affairs. Many years ago Freeman was amazed by the number of American colleges, and wondered if their degrees had any real value. A satirist who recently published his views on the same question was not far wrong when he said that "nothing is easier in America than to attend college, and nothing harder than to get educated." [1] The great difference between American and European universities is that in the United States "college is to fit you to do things—build bridges, cure diseases, teach French. It is not supposed to help you to be." [2] All the universities, with a few notable exceptions, are cluttered by a multitude of what are really technical schools: the result being that the stream of university life, as understood in England, is either completely dried up, or exists as a rivulet of minor importance. Specialization flourishes but humanistic culture is at a discount.[3] On the other hand, the average American seems to attach an exaggerated importance to the privilege of writing after his name B.A., or some other more complex sign of a degree. I have seen it stated that there are at present approximately 500,000 university students. The

[1] *Plato's American Republic*, by Douglas Woodruff, p. 80.

[2] *Upstream*, by Ludwig Lewisohn, pp. 155, 162, and 169.

[3] Since the above was written I have read the enthusiastic comments about American universities which Mr. St. Loe Strachey makes in *American Soundings*. A reviewer has summarized them by saying: "He is delighted with the multitude and popularity of the American universities. That their culture is not at present always worthy of their equipment strikes him as of little moment." Apparently, therefore, I differ from that distinguished writer, not in the conclusions I draw, but in the importance I attach thereto.

thirst for knowledge is commendable, and it is, therefore, all the more to be regretted that it should be so ill regulated. The majority of the universities have on their rolls an undue proportion of students (many of them pluckily paying their own way by performing all kinds of tasks), who are in no sense fertile soil. "There must be capacity for culture in the blood. Else all culture is vain." The university teaches them nothing useful that they would not be able to learn elsewhere. In the result, owing to the vast amount of "*instruction*" and the marked paucity of "*éducation*" to be found in many universities, the country is overrun by many men who may be called "*instruits*," but who are certainly lacking in "*éducation*." It is perhaps for this reason that one encounters so few scholarly men, except amongst those who devote themselves entirely to the pursuit of knowledge, in one form or another. The great majority of professional or business men have apparently no sympathy with the idea that education is a constant process which never finishes. This is partly on account of lack of energy; a strange charge to bring against Americans, and which, perhaps, might be better expressed—but I am adopting the words of Jowett, although he was not using them in reference to the inhabitants of the United States. In his introduction to Plato he says: "The want of energy is one of the main reasons why so few persons continue to improve in later years. They have not the will, and do not know the why. They 'never try an experiment' or look up a point for themselves; they make no sacrifice for the sake of knowledge; their minds, like their bodies, at a certain age become fixed . . . the troubles of a family, the business of making money, the demands of a profession destroy that elasticity of the mind."

It is also noticeable that practically no men of

scholarly distinction are to be found in political life. There have been exceptions, like the late Henry Cabot Lodge, and there may be some to-day; but they are few and far between. I would be at a loss to name amongst outstanding American politicians those who, in this respect, are on a level with the late Lord Morley, or the late Lord Bryce; with Lord Oxford and Asquith, or with Mr. Baldwin—who is amongst the wise men who realize that as one passes the meridian of life the classics have an indefinable power to lessen the regrets and to smooth the asperities of human existence. This lack was noticed by many when the late President Wilson came to the Peace Conference. For in the United States it was the custom to cite him as a man of scholarly attainments, although the late Senator Lodge was under no such illusion. But in Paris, beside Mr. Balfour and some of the other English and French statesmen, he gave the impression of being exactly what he had been all his life, and what he was by disposition and temperament—a schoolmaster with a schoolmaster's rather narrow acquirements, and one to whom neither the classics on one side, nor science on the other, made the faintest appeal.

The evil result of the system as outlined is, however, beginning to attract attention. Only a few months ago an eminent authority, Mr. Clarence C. Little, the President of the University of Michigan, wrote: "Students desiring to enter college for selfish or self-centred purposes, or with only a feeling of individual rights and privileges, should certainly be viewed with as much distrust as those conditioned in plane geometry. It is strange to notice how little has been done to develop this side of admission requirements during decades of polishing the academic details until they deserve poetic treatment by Gilbert and Sullivan. . . . This is all the more extraordinary when we realize that a steadily in-

creasing sense of public obligation and duty is the great outstanding need of the citizenry of a nation faced with our problems. We can scarcely appreciate, I believe, the seriousness of the conditions which we as a country must face in the next twenty-five or thirty years. . . . It is obvious that we should turn our attention to the development of methods for the detection of qualities which indicate that candidates for admission are amenable to training for such service." [1]

Undoubtedly the rush to the universities on the part of many who have little comprehension of the higher, as compared with the utilitarian purposes of some years spent in certain studies, and, above all, in a certain environment, and who, in any event, have little prospect of obtaining that culture, being barren soil at the best, has played and is playing its part in draining the country districts and crowding the larger towns—crowding them to some extent with professional men of indifferent calibre. Whilst a similar rôle is that of those hybrid institutions, the correspondence schools, which now have more than 3,000,000 students. It is significant that between 1870 and 1920 the number of farmers and planters decreased from 77,320 to 57,550 per 1,000,000 of population—a decline of more than 25 per cent.; and that during the same period the number of farm labourers decreased from 74,848 to 37,544 per 1,000,000. But what is more striking, and more visible to the eye than any statistics, is the number of apparently abandoned farms which one sees throughout New York and in some of the New England States. And this ocular testimony is in accord with such figures as are available. In the State of New York there are to-day fewer people living on farms, or in villages having a population of less than 2,500, than there

[1] "The Disappearing Personal Touch in College," *Scribner's Magazine*, November 1926.

were in 1820. While since 1870 farm land has been abandoned at the rate of 100,000 acres every year. Obviously, the drift to the universities is not the only, and indeed is not the principal cause of this change of occupation; and all the less so it may be argued because most universities now have a course in agriculture, and teach those who want to learn how to farm as readily as they teach others how to practise law. Nevertheless, it is partly accountable for this tendency.

Equally curious is the fact that despite their decrease in population, the rural districts have, in many States, managed to retain a preponderance of representation in the State legislatures. This is all the more important because upon many questions, and notably in respect to Prohibition, the views or interests of the country districts are in vital opposition to those of the large cities and towns. Thus more than half the total population of the State of Illinois lives in Chicago. But that city only has 19 out of 51 State Senators, and 57 out of 153 members of the legislative assembly. In Chicago those of English and Irish descent amount to 18·4 per cent. of the total; and out of 2,701,705 people there are 1,946,298 who are either foreign-born or the children of foreign-born parents, and who for the greater part (unlike the rural population) are unable to perceive either virtue or common sense in a law which deprives them of their beer and wine. A number of other cities in different States are in a similar position. The situation is all the more strange because the Constitution for most of these States provides that there should be a reapportionment according to the changes in population every ten years, or within some other stated period, which has already long since elapsed.[1] Nevertheless, in many instances

[1] The Constitution of the United States makes reapportionment mandatory every ten years. But this basic constitutional provision has also been ignored by the politicians.

this has been deliberately blocked by the rural representatives, who are actually in the majority in the legislatures. It may be added that they are supported and encouraged in this stand by the Prohibition leaders, who have everything to lose and nothing to gain by a fair representation according to population; but who, apparently, have not the same respect for State as they profess for Federal constitutional laws.

Returning to the subject of education, it is nothing less than extraordinary that the richest country in the world, which also boasts of being the most progressive, should have let its public school system [1] decline as it increased in wealth. One is amazed to discover that the United States stands tenth amongst the countries in the world in primary education. The percentages of illiterates are as follows:

Nation	*Illiterates*
Germany	0·2
Denmark	0·2
Switzerland	0·5
Netherlands	0·6
Norway	1·0
Sweden	1·0
Scotland	1·6
England	1·8
France	1·8
United States	6·0

This is an improvement upon the position of 1910, when the percentage of illiterates was 7·7, but on the other hand the United States then stood ninth instead of tenth on the list. Evidently some other country has been progressing more speedily.

One is naturally tempted to ascribe this high percentage of illiterates to the negro and to the recently-

[1] I am, of course, using the words "public school" in the American and not in the English sense.

arrived foreign population. But, as a matter of fact, the native illiterates number 3,100,000, and in this total the excess of negroes is not very great, the figure being 1,850,000 as compared with 1,250,000 whites. Nor is there any marked geographical feature in this educational survey. Indeed, it is said that three of the most "progressive" Northern States contain more illiterates than any other three States in the country. In any event, believers in the virtues and blessings of democracy, and the rule of the majority, are entitled to whatever satisfaction they can derive from the estimate that 4,000,000 people who were unable to read or write voted at the last Presidential election.

The principal cause given for a condition which one would expect to find only in a poor country, is that children, and especially boys, are taken away from school too early. I will refer later to the question of Child Labour, but in the meantime it may be said that if the reason advanced is correct, it is only an explanation, and not in any way an excuse.

School buildings, especially in the larger towns, are impressive; but Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, who was Minister of Education in the Coalition Government, was probably right when he said, in effect, that these admirable structures did not compensate for the failure in intellectual thoroughness. In any event, there are not enough school buildings. At the beginning of the scholastic year 1923–4, it was calculated that there were over 300 cities and towns which had not sufficient accommodation for the number of school-children, and that this meant that at least 1,000,000 children could get only part-time instruction. In the City of New York alone there were only 74,000 seats in the high schools for 106,000 pupils.

The American school system seems to have degen-

erated. The teachers are poorly paid; but probably that was always so, for teachers have always been poorly paid the world over. Nevertheless, it seems undeniable that the type is not what it was, and that in many instances English is taught by foreign-born teachers, whose own knowledge of the language is far from perfect. While in the East the schools are crowded with children who, being either foreign-born or the offspring of foreign parents, use a colloquial English so defective that parents of Anglo-Saxon descent are, year by year, less willing to send their children to the public schools.

The charge that many children are withdrawn from school at too early an age leads directly to the question of Child Labour. Congress has several times attempted to regulate this subject by Federal legislation, but as the Supreme Court pronounced these efforts unconstitutional, it passed, in 1924, a resolution submitting to the various States an Amendment to the Constitution which would have given it the right to "limit, regulate, and prohibit the labour of persons under eighteen years of age." This proposed amendment was speedily defeated by the adverse vote of a number of the State legislatures. The fact that it came for consideration at a time when there was a reaction against the centralization of power in the hands of the Federal Government (caused, to a large extent, by dissatisfaction with the Prohibition Amendment) undoubtedly contributed to its defeat, and allowed certain business interests, as well as those who were more sincere, to make the most of the argument that the amendment would unduly interfere with the parental control of children. Despite, or perhaps on account of the mass of material issued by both parties to the controversy, it is difficult to come to an exact conclusion upon the merits of the question; that is, whether or not the present regulation by the different

States is sufficient. But upon the whole it would seem that the prevailing degree of illiteracy in the United States is, in fact, partly due to the employment of children; while the statistics giving the number of children employed, varying as they do, would appear to indicate that Child Labour is used to an extent which is hardly justifiable in a country which is so rich as the United States. The Census Report of 1910 showed that 1,990,225 children, between ten and fifteen years of age, were engaged in some gainful occupation. The Census Report of 1920 placed the number at 1,060,838, 378,063 being under fourteen years of age. But the decrease, which was mainly amongst children used in agriculture, was largely due to the fact that the 1910 census was taken in April, and that of 1920 in January. Moreover, the census figures do not include those under ten, or those over fifteen. It has been stated that more than 3,000,000 children between seven and sixteen years of age are employed: but I am inclined to think that this is somewhat beyond the actual number, and also that the statement that 1,000,000 children leave school every year for work on the farms, in factories, and in mines or elsewhere, before they have had adequate instruction, is a slight exaggeration. But even after making these allowances, the fact remains that a large number of children who ought to be at school are employed in some gainful occupation, and sometimes in an occupation which is either too strenuous, or which, by its very nature, is likely to be injurious to health. While the statistics for 1925 showed a considerable augmentation in the number of children at work. Some of the States have enacted laws which are reasonably stringent, but others have been decidedly less careful about the welfare of working children. In any event it is a matter for grave surprise that there should be any increase in the use of

Child Labour in any corner of the United States, the wealthiest country in the world.

The superlative reason why there is no special brand of civilization which may rightly be called American, is that, for the moment, there is hardly an American race. Just as money alone is incapable of producing the highest and best type of civilization, so are mere laws and enactments incapable of creating a race. A Czech who arrives in the United States at the age of thirty, who stays there five years, and complies with certain formalities, may legally become an American citizen; but from any natural standpoint he remains, and always will remain, a Czech—as far removed from what was once known as the American type as he is from a South Sea Islander. No human law can alter this law of nature. In the early days of the Republic the American race was composed mainly of people of Anglo-Saxon origin; those whose forefathers had come, either in search of religious liberty which they were unable to find in England (and which they speedily proved themselves unwilling to grant to others in America), or who had sought out the new land looking for adventure, or in pursuit of easily acquired wealth. Washington might well say in his Farewell Address: "Citizens by birth or choice of a common country . . . with slight shades of difference you have the same religion, manners, habits, and political principles." Even in the days of Lincoln these words might still have been used without being too grossly misplaced. But to-day they would be a mockery. To whom would they be addressed? To a conglomeration of over 100,000,000 people coming from 45 different countries. Out of a total white population of about 95,000,000 (according to the 1920 census figures) there were 58,431,957 natives, both of whose parents had also been born in the United States: a majority, but with not much to spare; 13,712,754 were

foreign-born; 15,694,339 were the offspring of parents both born in some foreign country; and 6,991,965 had one native and one foreign-born parent.

If the cities are taken alone, those born of native parentage are to-day in the minority. The figures are: those born of native parentage, 25,446,229; foreign-born, 10,336,983; of foreign parentage, 11,304,886; of half-foreign parentage, 4,401,486.

The Census Report for 1920 shows that in the city of Chicago, with a total population of 2,701,705, only 18·4 per cent. were English and Celtic by descent, the balance being Slavic and Lettic (including Poles, Czechs, Russians, etc.), 28·1 per cent.; Germanic, 23·5 per cent.; Scandinavian, 9·7 per cent.; unclassified (including Hebrews, Magyars, Armenians, etc.), 9·5 per cent.; Latin and Greek (including French, Italian, Spaniards, Greeks, etc.), 8·5 per cent.; unknown, and mixed mother-tongue, 2·3 per cent.

Of the 13,271,254 foreign-born in the country, about one-half have become American citizens. They form part of the American nation. It would be a misuse of words to say that they form part of an American race. They, and those of foreign parentage, have swamped, temporarily at least, what was once, with some degree of reason, called the American race. But in justice it should also be remembered that it is this foreign influx of the last half-century which is partly responsible for the present wealth of the country, as it provided that elementary labour which few American citizens will, after the first generation, condescend to perform.

Before 1914, about 1,000,000 foreigners came every year to take up their abode in the United States. In 1880, 83 per cent. of the foreign population of the United States had come from the northern countries of Europe, and 17 per cent. from Central and South-east Europe, Russia,

and countries outside Europe. Forty years later 60 per cent. belonged to the latter group. The change was not one for the better.

The human stream from Europe was first interrupted by the war. Then Congress enacted a law limiting the immigrants from any one country, in any year, to 3 per cent. of the number of persons born in that country who were already resident in the United States according to the Census of 1910. This reduced the annual total from 1,000,000 to about 357,000. But in 1924 a still more stringent law was passed, whereby the annual quota was fixed at 2 per cent. of the number of natives of any country who were already resident in the United States according to the Census of 1890, plus 100. This brought the total down to 161,000; and from July 1927 it will stand at about 150,000.[1]

How drastic were these changes may be seen by the quota allowed under the first and second restricting enactment, as shown on the opposite page.

Japanese, as Asiatics, are now excluded entirely.

The result of this legislation is that hereafter 75 per cent. of the annual total of immigrants will come from North-western Europe, and only 25 per cent. from what are considered as the less desirable countries. Senator Reed, who drafted the 1924 bill which was adopted by the Senate, has stated that this will be permanent. If so, it will eventually have a severe repercussion, not only in the United States, but in some of the over-crowded and more or less poverty-stricken countries of Europe.

Plainly, the closing of the gates—the gates of what the European peasant regards as the terrestrial paradise—is not in accord with the principles of democracy: and the

[1] Since the above was written the Senate has passed a resolution delaying until July 1928 the coming into operation of the last alteration.

fact that it is only the country which claims to be the greatest democracy in the world that has adopted such stringent regulations is not without its irony. But were I an American of Anglo-Saxon stock, I would be heedless of this inconsistency, and would only regret that such legislation had not been enacted a little earlier. Certainly it came none too soon if the foreign-born were not to oust the native, and if those from South-eastern Europe

Country.	First Act.	1924 Act.
Great Britain and Ireland	77,342	62,558
Germany	67,607	50,229
Italy	42,057	3,989
Poland	30,979	8,972
Russia	24,405	1,892
Sweden	20,042	9,661
Czecho-Slovakia	14,357	1,973
Norway	12,205	6,553
Roumania	7,419	7,031
Austria	7,342	1,090
Jugo-Slavia	6,426	835
Hungary	5,747	588
France	5,729	3,978
Denmark	5,619	2,882
Finland	3,921	245
Switzerland	3,752	2,181
Netherlands	3,602	1,137
Greece	3,063	135
Turkey	2,654	123
Lithuania	2,622	402
Portugal	2,465	574
Belgium	1,563	609
Latvia	1,540	217
Esthonia	1,348	202

and Russia were not to outnumber the Anglo-Saxons. In January 1927 the Presidential Commission on the immigration quotas found that of 94,820,915 whites given by the Census of 1920, approximately 53,500,000 were of immigrant stock, and 41,000,000 of original native stock. In the breathing-spell which it has now got the country may be able to digest and assimilate the horde of invaders. It will be no easy task.

It is said that Mr. Gladstone was wont to ask travellers returning from the United States whether the sceptre of civilization was being transferred there from Europe. To-day the answer is as plain as it was then. As Mr. Bertrand Russell has written: "The intellectual level in Western Europe and the artistic level in Eastern Europe are, on the whole, higher than in America. In almost all European countries the individual is less subject to herd-domination than in America; his inner freedom is greater even where his political freedom is less. In these respects the American schools do harm." [1]

The United States, with all its riches, with all the qualities both of head and of heart possessed in no scanty measure by its inhabitants, will produce no civilization equal to that of Europe for many a long day to come; unless, indeed, we speak a different language, and mean a different thing, when we use the word "civilization."

[1] *On Education*, p. 45.

CHAPTER X

THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: PROHIBITION AND PROHIBITING

FROM the ardent fashion in which they legislate, it might be imagined that Americans possessed great faith in the virtue and value of laws. There are said to be more than 2,000,000 enactments to-day in force on the Federal and State statute-books. Innumerable law-makers, members of the various legislatures, are adding to this total at the rate of about 100,000 new enactments every year. But, in reality, the people have little faith in all this. As I have already shown, they take little interest in choosing those who are set in authority; and they take still less in the actions of those individuals once they are elected, always provided that there is no interference with their business. The result is that any one who took the trouble to examine the statute-books of all the States of the Union would be able to compile a greater collection of freakish laws (some of which also directly infringe personal liberty) than is to be found in any other part of the civilized world. The deeds which are, in different States, counted as offences, range from the teaching of Darwinism in schools to the crime of hotel proprietors in putting on their beds blankets too short for men six feet in height.

The American people do not think that laws are made to be broken, but it is by no means sure that they are to be inviolably kept. The evasion of law seems to have been a national pastime from the earliest days of

the Republic, and to have become more prevalent in proportion as vexatious legislation increased. This is the natural result of an indifferent and negligent public allowing busybodies to enact laws for which there was no public demand, and still less actual need. The late Vice-President Marshall summarized one aspect of the subject when he remarked: "I like the English way best. The English don't make laws until they know the people want them."

Lawlessness, accompanied by acts of violence, although certainly more general in the United States than in England as far back as 1850 (and probably much earlier), only showed a marked increase about 1890. But the last few years have witnessed an even more rapid and more serious development. Throughout the country, from coast to coast, there has arisen a brazen defiance of the criminal law of the land; and so far the forces of justice have been powerless to stem it. It is difficult to ascertain the exact origin of this orgy of crime, but there are probably several sources. The most bitter opponents of the Prohibition Amendment to the Constitution sometimes point to it as the root of all evil, arguing that all that has happened is the natural sequence of an unenforced and unenforceable national law. But that is certainly not the only, and not even the chief cause of what was at first called a wave of crime. Undoubtedly, however, the fact that Prohibition is not enforced, and is openly flouted—and even by those who are generally considered respectable members of the community—has served to bring all law into contempt. While the contention that Prohibition as at present enforced has lessened crime is untenable, and absolutely at variance with the facts.

Another reason advanced is that a certain recklessness of life has been engendered by the war. Yet that conflict in no way affected the ordinary existence of those

who remained in the United States. The number of those who saw the slaughter of human beings was comparatively small. Moreover, a couple of years under fairly administered military discipline was much more likely to make an honest working man out of a loafer than to convert a good working man into one. The number of men demobilized in England was immeasurably greater, and only too often they were unable to find any employment. Yet there was no such outburst of crime as that which still holds sway in the United States eight years after the Armistice. The suggestion is sometimes made that the very fact that there was a war caused a feeling of unrest which led to crime. The force of this argument would be more comprehensible if applied to some country which was near the scene of action, which was affected from day to day by the varying chances of the conflict, and which emerged broken morally, or bankrupt in a financial or industrial sense. But the United States enjoyed its fattest and sleekest years during and after the war. The country was never so rich and never more prosperous. Those who are professional criminals to-day are so by choice, or by long habit, for they are not driven to it by lack of employment. Upon the whole, the war cannot be held responsible in any large degree.

The principal cause, no doubt, is that in the last years before the laws restricting the admission of aliens were enacted, a class flowed into the country much less desirable, and much less fit to become good citizens, than any which had previously crossed the ocean. I think that an investigation of an average thousand cases of crime in America to-day would show two striking features: a preponderance of foreign malefactors, even in proportion to the foreign population, and the comparative youth of the wrongdoers.

But the real root of the evil must be sought in another and more responsible quarter. It lies in the laws and in the administration of justice. Too many laws with too many technicalities; the distortion of trial by jury in the adoption of a system whereby the judge on the bench is bereft of any real power, and the men in the jury-box are left without any proper guidance; and too many judges who are dependent upon political supporters for their next as well as for their last election to the Bench. As far back as 1908 Chief Justice Taft said that "the administration of criminal law in the United States is a disgrace to civilization . . . the trial of a criminal seems like a game of chance, with all the chances in favour of the criminal. And if he escapes he seems to have the sympathy of a sporting public."

The reasons why the United States is to-day the most lawless country in the world are that the cheaply intelligent scum of a mixed population has realized that the wave of crime has mounted so high that the officers of the law are unable even to discover and arrest any very large percentage of the wrongdoers; that if they are arrested they can obtain bail and resume their activities; that if eventually brought to trial there is a maze of technicalities in which their freedom may be found; and that in any event a clever lawyer, not greatly restrained by the judge, can often muddle or mislead the jury; that even if they are convicted they can have the benefit of two or three appeals which will probably give them another year or more of liberty; and that if they are finally incarcerated their term will be shortened, sometimes by political influence, but anyway by the laws specially enacted for their protection and well-being. Delay always works in favour of the criminal, and one way or another delay is to be obtained at every step from the very moment he is arrested. The clause

of the Constitution of the United States which guarantees every criminal a speedy trial is to-day a farce, for the last thing a criminal wants is speed. His first step is to obtain bail; which, except in the most serious cases, is now granted almost as if it were his right. In England the only bail accepted is the guarantee of a friend, or of friends, of the accused, who satisfy the Court that they possess sufficient property to pay the amount stipulated in the bond in the event of a default of appearance; for bail is always collected in England. But in the United States bond companies are allowed to give bail. They are paid by the accused for doing so, and thus it is simply a matter of the accused depositing money, leaving it to himself to decide whether it will be more in his interest to lose his deposit or to appear when called for trial. This is one of the most vicious customs which has attached itself to criminal procedure. The result is that the professional criminal is set free to prey again on the public; and, incredible as it may seem, it has happened that an accused who is at liberty on bail has been arrested for a second offence committed during that very period.

How greatly the chances favour those who commit murder was recently exposed in a pithy remark by an American jurist of ripe experience, Judge Marcus Kavanagh, who for nearly thirty years has been on the Bench of the Superior Court. Speaking to the Bar Association of St. Louis, he said: "If a man deliberates whether he shall kill another he knows that the chances are three to one that he will never be arrested, twelve to one that he will never be convicted, and more than one hundred to one that he will not die for his crime."

The best idea of the extent to which the forces of law and order are unable to check or cope with crime may be obtained by some comparison between the

United States and other parts of the world. Mr. Laurence Vieller, an American authority on the subject, has found that during the past twenty-five years homicide has increased 100 per cent. in the United States; and that to-day there are in proportion to the population twice as many murders as in Italy, four times as many as in South Africa and in Australia, eight times as many as in New Zealand, Spain, Norway, Ireland, England, and Wales, and eighteen times as many as in Scotland. In the year 1923 there were 42 murders in the Metropolitan area of London, with its population of about 7,500,000. In 1921 there were 261 murders in the City of New York, and 137 in Chicago. In 1922–3 there were 5·5 homicides in the City of New York per 100,000 of the population; 12·7 in Chicago; 24·4 in Louisville; 25·5 in New Orleans, and 34·7 in Nashville. But even these extraordinary figures pale before the record of the city of Memphis, where there were 66·2 homicides for every 100,000 of the population. Nearly 10,000 murders are committed in the United States every year. Senator Borah is the authority for the statement that "During the last ten years 85,000 people, from poison, the pistol, the knife, or other unlawful means, have suffered death." [1] Eighty-five thousand! A greater number of lives than the United States lost throughout its participation in the war.

In the city of St. Louis, 13,444 crimes were reported during a period of twelve months in 1923–4, and only 374 people were actually punished. Robbery is thirty-six times as prevalent in New York, and one hundred times in Chicago, as it is in London. On account of the decrease in crime, nearly half the prisons in Great Britain have been closed within the last twelve years.

[1] "The Age of Uproar," by H. Chatfield-Taylor, *The Century Magazine*, November 1925.

Since the end of the war 25 gaols have been devoted to other purposes. In the United States the prisons have become crowded at the very time they were being left empty in England. In 1914 there were 792 prisoners in the Atlanta penitentiary; in 1925 this number had risen to 3,325. In England the calendar of those accused of crime is practically cleared in the course of each of the four legal terms into which the year is divided. In the United States the calendars are glutted. Many of those accused of crime are to-day free, simply because it would be a physical impossibility for the judiciary to keep pace in trying all who are arrested. The robberies committed are so audacious that the United States Government has thought it necessary to order 3,000 specially designed armoured cars for its mail service.

It is sometimes alleged that the reason for this state of affairs is that the United States is a comparatively new country. But the same excuse might, if it were necessary, be advanced for the Dominion of Canada. Yet in the years between 1911 and 1921 there was throughout the United States an average homicide mortality of 7·2 per 100,000 population; while during the same period the corresponding figure in the adjacent Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec was 0·5. It is impossible to account for this striking difference except on the ground that in Canada criminal procedure is speedy, and the penalties imposed are adequate, while in the United States the very reverse is the rule, and anything else is a notable exception.

Apparently Americans have never under any circumstances been wont to treat crime so seriously and so sternly as have the British. The eminent mining-engineer, Mr. John Hays Hammond, in the course of some interesting reminiscences, has pointed out that in earlier days the man who was accustomed to settle his disputes

by using his "gun" found when he crossed the border into Canada that he had to behave in a very different manner, and he adds: "The outstanding dissimilarity between British and American frontier camps reveals itself most startlingly in this: the almost universal respect for law in the 'wild days' of Colonial ore-fields, like Kimberley and Johannesburg in South Africa (which lured all sorts of nationals from all over the world), and the almost equally universal disrespect for law in the great Western camps of the United States. The causes behind this contrast are a subject worthy of study by the American bench and bar, and by our peace-officers of superior rank no less." [1]

It is unpleasant to advocate capital punishment as a deterrent for murder, but the facts speak for themselves. Any comparison of the statistics of the United States with those of a country where that crime means a quick trial, and death for the convicted slayer, will tell its own tale. Those who have been familiar with France for the last twenty or thirty years will recollect that in the early days of the present century there was, to all intents and purposes, no capital punishment. It was never legally abolished; but it was understood that any murderer sentenced to pay the extreme penalty would be reprieved by the President. For some years the guillotine was never used. As the members of the criminal class began to understand that they ran no risk of losing their own lives, the number of murders increased. It finally rose to such an extent that an indignant people recalled the quip of the late Alphonse Karr, who said that he favoured the abolition of capital punishment, provided that "Messieurs les assassins commencent." The penalty of death was again inflicted, and immediately there was a marked decline in such crimes. Mr. Charles S. Darrow,

[1] "Strong Men of the Wild West," *Scribner's Magazine*, March 1925.

one of the best-known defenders of criminals amongst the lawyers of the United States, and who is strongly opposed to capital punishment, has written: "It is true that there are more felonies in the United States than in England in proportion to the population. In many important instances the American penalties are much harsher and more brutal. The executions in England are fewer in proportion to the population than in America, and, in cases where death sentences are pronounced, a much larger proportion receive clemency there than here." It is probably not so much the severity as the certainty of the punishment which is a deterrent from crime. But anyway the fallacy of this argument is apparent. The fact that there are fewer executions in England in proportion to the population merely proves that England is more law-abiding than the United States—not that severe penalties do not follow more surely, and with effect. The proper comparison on the point Mr. Darrow was discussing is the percentage of executions in proportion not to the population but to the number of murders committed. Those figures would certainly not have supported Mr. Darrow's contention; the percentage in England (where undetected murders are not very frequent, and unpunished discovered murderers are still scarcer) being enormously higher. Mr. Darrow's statement that in England "a much larger proportion receive clemency than here" may be correct; I have no figures giving the numbers of convicted murderers pardoned by the Home Secretary, and by the Governors of the various States, respectively. But, in any event, it is misleading. The true comparison is the proportionate comparison of death sentences pronounced in each country upon criminals convicted of murder. But those figures also would be adverse to Mr. Darrow's theory.

That distinguished critic, Mr. Heywood Broun, has written that "the fear of death has failed signally as a deterrent of crime." But he forgot to say where. The fact is that there are fewer murders committed in the whole of England and Wales than in the City of New York, just because in England murderers are promptly tried, and, if convicted, promptly hanged. Or let Mr. Broun reflect that in Canada, in one year, when there were seventeen murderers convicted (which accounted for a great proportion of the murders committed), the number was not greater—was not, for instance, several hundreds, which, allowing for the difference in population, would have placed Canada on a par with the United States in this respect—precisely because every potential murderer knew that if he were discovered he stood a good chance of being hanged. Or will Mr. Broun explain how it is that there are so many fewer murders where murderers are executed than in countries where they very often escape the penalty? If in saying that the fear of death was not a deterrent he was relying upon the evidence afforded by the United States his comment rests upon no basis of fact. For in that country criminals have no fear of death simply because they know that they run little or no risk of it. As Judge Kavanagh stated, the chances are a hundred to one against any murderer being executed in the United States. And the very crime on which Mr. Broun was then dwelling—the murder of the boy Franks by Leopold and Loeb—showed once again how little danger of death is incurred by murderers.

This extraordinary case attracted wide attention in 1924, and had a sequel which, at the time, was thought to be a final blow to capital punishment. In Chicago, two young men, Loeb and Leopold, eighteen and nineteen years of age, the sons of wealthy parents, kidnapped

and murdered a fellow-schoolboy, Franks, who was fourteen years of age. The crime was revolting in the extreme. It had been deliberately planned for many weeks; and its only object was the excitement or thrill which was to be obtained from having done such a deed, and being sufficiently clever to escape detection, while the police and public were alike wondering who were its perpetrators. At the trial the counsel for the defence (Mr. Darrow, whose views I have already quoted), faced as he was by a full confession, wanted nothing further than to save the accused from the extreme penalty. Hard put to it to accomplish even that, he decided that in the state of public opinion his clients had everything to lose and nothing to gain by the intervention of a jury. For under the Illinois law, if a jury finds the accused guilty, it also fixes the penalty; but upon a plea of guilty it is the judge who determines what shall be the sentence. The accused therefore pleaded guilty. But days were then spent by the defence adducing evidence for the purpose of showing mitigating circumstances justifying something less than the extreme sentence, and by the prosecution bringing forward evidence in rebuttal. This testimony, as the judgment stated, was as detailed and elaborate as if the case was tried before a jury. Such a proceeding at such length is a characteristic offspring of American procedure. Even at a trial with a jury, no British court would have allowed much of the medical testimony which was presented. No English judge would have permitted hours to be taken up in technical evidence regarding the ductless glands of one of the prisoners, based upon the theory that as a result of their condition he was suffering from "a diseased discrepancy between the intellect and the emotions." Reading this and other medical evidence, which seemed even more absurd and farther away from

the real issue, one was, however, assailed by the uncomfortable feeling that perhaps English courts lagged behind, to the detriment of the accused, in their appreciation of the discoveries of modern science. Although it did seem rather queer that the part played by the ductless glands had never seemed of importance until the sons of men worth some millions were in the dock. It was, therefore, a relief to learn from other medical authorities, not subpœnaed in the case, that such contentions were not generally acknowledged as having any sound foundation. Possibly the trial-judge was of the same opinion. Anyway, while he stated in his judgment that it had been of extreme interest, and a valuable contribution to criminology, he decided that, although all this evidence showed the murderers to be abnormal, yet a similar analysis of other accused persons would probably also expose some abnormalities. Upon the whole testimony he concluded that the crime was one of singular atrocity, executed with every feature of callousness and cruelty. He therefore pronounced a sentence of life imprisonment for the murder (and a term of ninety-nine years' imprisonment for the kidnapping, which was a separate charge in the indictment), saying that in not imposing the death penalty (and expressly specifying that he might do so in other cases) he was " moved chiefly by the age of the defendants, boys of eighteen and nineteen. . . . This determination appears to be in accordance with the progress of criminal law all over the world, and with the dictates of enlightened humanity."

The sentence may have been in accordance with the precedents of the State of Illinois, where, it was said, only two minors had ever been executed. But the learned judge was undoubtedly going too far when he claimed that it coincided with " the progress of criminal law all over the world." In any survey of the admini-

stration of justice extending all over the world one surely cannot entirely ignore Great Britain, her Dominions and Dependencies; and it would have been impossible to bolster up that statement by the decisions of the courts in those countries. Anyone familiar with British practice in any part of the globe knows that a British court would draw no distinction in punishment between young men of eighteen or nineteen and those of twenty-one, when it had been proved that the former had planned and executed a crime even more deliberately than could the average man of the latter age.

Under the Illinois statutes (unlike in England, where the only penalty is death) the sentence for murder may be death, or imprisonment for life, or for any term of not less than fourteen years. When either of the two latter sentences is imposed, the Department of Public Welfare can later, at its discretion, interfere, and free the prisoner on parole. In recognizing this fact the trial-judge urged the Department never to exercise that power in favour of Leopold and Loeb. But the passage of time does many things, and no people forget so quickly as those who inhabit the United States.

The sentence in this widely discussed case was hailed as a victory for their cause by those opposed to capital punishment, and was generally admitted to be a blow by those who believed in its maintenance. The leaders of the Bar seemed to concur in the latter view, especially as it was one of those very rare instances when the majority of the American public, the least vindictive people in the world, and the most open to any plea for clemency, no matter how illogical and ill-timed, seemed for once to favour the imposition of the extreme penalty. However, two years after the event it would seem as if it had had no effect, one way or the other, upon the whole question.

It is only fair to add that the prosecution of the Leopold and Loeb case was remarkable inasmuch as there was little of the delay which so often disfigures the administration of criminal law in the United States. Sentence was pronounced one hundred and twelve days after the commission of the crime. However, this result was partly due to the fact that counsel for the defence were also anxious for a speedy disposition of the matter.

The basis of criminal law in the United States was originally that which was to be found, and which still prevails, in England and the British Dominions. To-day the two are as far apart as the poles. The first difference which one observes in an American court is the time taken to choose a jury. In England that process never lasts more than a few hours; and no sane person will contend that the ends of justice (which, first and foremost, should provide a fair trial for the accused) are thereby put in jeopardy. In the United States, especially in a murder case, it often takes a week, or even longer, to get a jury.

The next difference which is apparent on the surface is that the judge plays a comparatively unimportant part. Upon the objection of counsel he decides whether or not any particular evidence is admissible; although an appeal is often taken from his ruling. But he does not, as under English practice, control the course of the trial, interfere when he sees what seems to be a perversion of justice, and, while instructing the jurors that they, and they alone, must decide upon the facts, give them the necessary guidance, taking care that it is the essential and not irrelevant points which are put forward for their consideration.

In a number of States the judges have been deprived of what are undoubtedly their proper and most useful

functions. Fortunately, no such restrictions have been placed on the Federal judiciary. But if the rôle of the judge is diminished in the State courts, that of counsel and jury is enhanced. The jurors, partly because counsel are permitted to wander too far afield, and to confuse the issues, partly because they themselves are left too much to their own resources, are prone to bring in verdicts which may accord with their feelings and prejudices, but which take little account either of the evidence presented, of the facts proved, or of the law applicable to those facts. In France the jury of the Department of the Seine has long been notorious for its decisions, and especially in cases where a wife has rid herself of her husband. But as the administration of French law does not profess to be governed by the same tenets as those which safeguard justice in England, that is not surprising. However, the United States is still called an Anglo-Saxon country (although in reality it is so only by a scant majority), and its law is ostensibly more or less similar to the criminal law of England. But even the jurors of the Department of the Seine are not more indulgent to wives who have converted themselves into widows than are an average "twelve good men and true" in the United States. A perusal of the records of such trials within recent years is instructive. Upon the whole, I think the French jurors are the more unbiased, for they seem to set free some very unprepossessing specimens, while American jurors are noticeably influenced by the good looks of an accused woman.

Lest it should be thought that these comparisons express only the prejudices of an observer from overseas, I may state that a great American authority apparently holds similar views. Chief Justice Taft has said: "The power that makes for despatch and thorough-

ness in the English criminal procedure is the power which the court exercises to sum up the evidence to the jury after the case has finished and the arguments are all in. He helps the jury by his summing up, winnows out the chaff, and enables them to see clearly what the evidence is. He does not control their verdict, because they do not infrequently differ from him, but he does enable them with his wise suggestions to reach a sound conclusion."

Even after a jury has been finally chosen the delays and the length of a trial are amazing. The examination of witnesses, the interminable and unchecked wrangles of counsel, the extraordinary number of hours often taken in addressing the jury, exceed anything which has ever been seen elsewhere. In 1923 a committee of the American Bar Association, which had spent some time in making investigations in England and France, illustrated the speed of English justice by the following account of a trial for murder: "One Roland Duck had been accused of the murder of a woman by cutting her throat. The crime was committed on May 3rd. The coroner's inquisition was held on May 8th; the Whitsuntide holidays of the court intervened, so that the trial was delayed until May 30th. But for the intervention of the Whitsuntide holidays, the defendant would have been on trial within three weeks of the time of his crime. The case was called to trial on the day following the indictment. One of the most eminent public prosecutors in England, Sir Richard Muir, was assigned by the Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir Archibald Bodkin, to conduct the case for the Crown. The defendant was represented by a faithful and earnest barrister and two solicitors. The defence was insanity, said to have been caused by epilepsy and shell-shock suffered while the defendant was a soldier overseas. The jury was accepted

within ten minutes. When the jury were called into the box, there was no examination made in court as to their knowledge, qualifications, or fitness to try the particular case. In fact, not a single question was asked a juror by counsel on either side, although both sides had the right to do so. Only one challenge was exercised, and that in the case of the sole woman juror called, and she was excused. Officials informed us that women are thought to be more severe than men in criminal cases. We were informed by the judge that this single challenge was the only one that had occurred in his court in three years. Each juror was separately sworn. Twelve witnesses were examined, ten for the prosecution and two for the defendant. The examination of witnesses proceeded with extraordinary rapidity. The judge conducted a large part of the examination; he controlled, limited, and directed the examination by counsel. Cross-examination was short and to the point. Leading questions were frequent. The summation of each counsel occupied thirty-five minutes. The charge (summing up) of the judge lasted nearly an hour. The case was submitted to the jury at 6.15 p.m. The jury retired and returned a verdict of 'guilty' within twenty minutes. Immediately thereafter the judge put on the black cap and sentenced the defendant to death. There is but one punishment for murder in England. The whole trial lasted about six hours, including an hour's adjournment for lunch and half an hour for tea."

It should be added that until comparatively recent times there was in England no appeal from a criminal conviction by a judge of the High Court. But there is now a Court of Criminal Appeal. The difference, however, between that tribunal and those to which similar appeals are taken in the United States, is that it leaves no cases standing from term to term; and that, indeed,

judgment is generally pronounced on the same day as the argument is heard.

The administration of British justice is invested with a considerable degree of pomp and ceremony, which is shown by the robes and gowns worn by the judge and counsel, by the extreme respect shown by counsel to the court, and in a variety of other ways. Except in the Federal Courts, none of this is to be found in the United States. Instead, the proceedings are marked by informality, the extent of which differs in various localities. I have seen judge and counsel in their shirt-sleeves, and smoking permitted in the court-room. But charming as this may seem, it has its disadvantages. Once the court has put itself on the same level as counsel and jurors, it cannot, in moments of stress, assume that dignity and that commanding position which it behoves the judiciary to possess. Instead of the bench rebuking counsel, they often berate each other. It is only in the United States that I have known of a judge telling counsel to "shut up"; nor does it seem likely that the good administration of justice is likely to benefit by such scenes at the conclusion of a murder trial as were described in the following newspaper account of a Chicago proceeding:

SHEPHERD WAS ACQUITTED
OF MURDER CHARGE

MOST EXTRAORDINARY SCENES OF DISORDER
EVER SEEN IN COURT

JUDGE LAUGHED MERRILY

WOMEN COWERED IN TERROR—NEWSPAPER
PRINTED VERDICT BEFORE JURY
REPORTED

"William D. Shepherd was acquitted of the charge of murdering his wife's ward, William Nelson McClintock, to-night, amid the most extraordinary scenes of confusion

and disregard of the usual court-room conventions ever seen in a large city. Flashlights boomed and flared almost in his face as he stood drooping on the arm of his attorney, with a roar and a smoke so great that his figure could hardly be seen, and the words of the clerk, reading the verdict, could hardly be heard. Women cowered in terror as the heat of the flashes hit their cheeks and the backs of their necks, and cried out as photographers leaped over tables and chairs, holding their cameras and flashlight apparatus high in the air, and shooting almost as they jumped. The room was a turmoil of jumping, rushing figures, crying out directions, and for others to get out of the way, while Judge Thomas J. Lynch, as two bailiffs rapped feebly for order, laughed merrily at the disorder beneath him."

Another surprise is the extent to which a country which prides itself on being practical allows technicalities to defeat justice. An indictment has been quashed because the State of West Virginia was therein referred to as " W. Virginia " instead of " West Virginia " in full. A man convicted of a crime was set free because it then appeared that the word " the " had been omitted from the indictment. Another conviction was set aside because the indictment had charged the accused with carrying brass knuckles " on *or* about " instead of " on *and* about " his person. Similar instances might be cited by the dozen.

But it will be noticed that these various proceedings to defeat the ends of justice can only be set in motion by astute lawyers. Once the criminal is in the toils, he is himself helpless until he is out on bail, or has evaded the law. All this costs money. In the United States there is one law for the rich (whether respectable or criminal) and another for the poor. The former can

always buy delay, and often something more. The latter have no such recourse; and usually their cases are the ones which receive the promptest attention. They are given their Constitutional right—a speedy trial.

The pardon and parole system which prevails, with variations, in most States is undoubtedly one of the major causes of the startling increase in crime throughout the country. A judge may give an indeterminate sentence—for instance, imprisonment for from ten to twenty years; and in any event the Parole Boards, appointed by the State, may materially reduce even a definite sentence pronounced by a court of justice. In a number of States the prisoner may be paroled upon the expiration of one-half of his maximum sentence; while in some States this may be further reduced by allowances for good conduct while in prison. Thus in Rhode Island and Wisconsin a sentence of ten years may mean five years, less good-conduct reduction. In Maryland a convict may be paroled at the expiration of one-third of his sentence; in California after he has served two years; whilst in Minnesota and Iowa a convicted person is eligible for parole at any time after he has actually entered prison. A report compiled by the Missouri Association for Criminal Justice shows that a ninety-nine year sentence (which is sometimes given in that State) generally means 11·19 years in prison; and that a life sentence is expiated by an imprisonment of 10·89 years.

Naturally, as the statistics prove, crime has increased in proportion to the development and extent of this pernicious system (in which, of course, I do not include the good-conduct remissions, which have a logical basis). This is fully confirmed by the report of a minute inquiry recently made by a committee of the legislature of the State of New York, which, in order to put some check

on the parole system, recommended that in passing an indeterminate sentence a judge should be allowed to make the minimum sentence two-thirds of the maximum sentence, instead of only one-half, as formerly. This advice has, I understand, been followed by legislation giving it effect. Moreover, under a recent law criminals must in that State be sentenced to imprisonment for life upon a fourth conviction.

The primary result of the parole system is to limit still further the power of the judge who has heard the evidence. Who is so well qualified to determine for what period, within the limits fixed by statute, the convicted man should be secluded? Certainly not the members of the ordinary Parole Board, who are usually engaged in some other occupation or business, who see the convict's petition and any objections made by the prison authorities or others, but who have not the faintest chance of knowing as much about the matter as the trial-judge, even if they have carefully perused every word of the evidence. Moreover, members of these boards are not infrequently approached by politicians, who have been their supporters, asking that a certain prisoner's petition should be granted for political reasons.

But what is the cause of this mistrust of the judges, who have been trained to weigh evidence, and who certainly are not generally hard-hearted? The answer is simple. The aim of the parole system is to reform the criminal; the principal aim of the law which the judge administers is to protect society. Undoubtedly both objects are laudable; and a plan by which they could be pursued together would be near perfection. But if one of the two must be put first, which should it be? In British law it always has been, and it to-day is, the protection of society. In the system which is being so largely followed in the United States the rights of the

public are practically ignored, and the sole consideration is the personal welfare of the convict. In reality, nothing substantial is done for the reformation of the unfortunate man, for the custom adopted in some institutions of supplying occasional cinematograph entertainments and other forms of amusement is not a serious step in that direction. But it is difficult to perceive upon what principle Parole Boards proceed. Consider the case of a man sentenced to serve a term of ten years, who at the end of four years applies for his liberation on parole. It is not to be presumed that the conviction itself was unjust, therefore it cannot be denied that, under the law of the land, he deserved to suffer some term of imprisonment. Does the Parole Board which grants his petition consider that he has become a changed man by passing four years in prison? If so, it attributes to itself the wisdom of Solomon in being able to discern that four years have wrought a radical change, but that any further detention will be detrimental. Or does it think that even the four years were harmful, and, therefore, releases the prisoner as soon as the law allows it to do so? Or that judges are, as a rule, too severe in passing sentence? In that event they should agitate for the abolition of imprisonment, or for the further curtailment of the powers of the judiciary.

The assertion is often made that the conviction of the criminal should not be an act of revenge. I am unaware of any country where it is used or regarded in that light. But in some countries it is considered both a just punishment (a punishment which the criminal knows in advance he will incur) and a deterrant. Those who talk only about the reformation of the criminal (although they do, and perhaps are able to do, little that is practical towards that end) are almost invariably loud in their contention that punishment is not a deterrent.

But the facts speak against their fancies. Any American who holds that theory need not go far for the proof. In Canada there is, in proportion to the population, not only less, but infinitely less, crime than in the United States, because there are infinitely more convictions in proportion to the crimes committed; and because it is generally known that the sentence meted out by the trial-judge must actually be served. This statement still holds good even when every allowance is made for a mixed population; which, in any event, is also possessed by Canada, although in a much smaller degree. If the cause and effect which I have indicated are a coincidence, it is strange that that coincidence can be found in every part of the world where British justice is administered. As Lord Darling recently said: "In Canada a malefactor is not regarded by a hysterical populace as a psychological complex nor as a film artist gifted with an especial charm of complete sincerity in the playing of his part. Indeed, I found that lately certain homicides of a class who in the United States have achieved their psychological and social success, under the endearing name of crooks, were, for having practised their art in British Columbia, incontinently hanged."

The most unfortunate feature of the misdirected efforts to which I have referred is that the criminal himself is more often their victim than their beneficiary. Many of the latter should, for their own sake, be incarcerated. Investigations have shown that a large percentage of those paroled return to a career of crime. It is the fashion in some quarters nowadays to assert that crime is a disease. If so, it is an infectious one. Undoubtedly early environment and heredity are often, one or both, responsible for the first untoward steps of those who become habitual criminals. But granting the fullest force to that argument, it does not supply

a reason why these unfortunates should be let loose upon society. However, it does indicate where the cure, or rather the eradication, of the disease can be undertaken most usefully and with the most prospects of success. Apart from changes in criminal law procedure, and in the administration of justice, the diminution of crime could to some extent be achieved by more care about the assimilation of the youthful foreign population; and the results would be evident if much more heed were paid to both the quality and the quantity of primary education: just as in the medical profession (leaving surgery on one side) doctors have made their greatest advances in preventive medicine, even although all of them do not entirely agree with the late Sir William Osler's low evaluation of therapeutics. Further, and altogether apart from any question of teaching, the public schools need a higher standard than the one which, too often, they at present possess. That is only to be obtained by having, in many instances, teachers of a higher standing. It would cost money—millions. But the manner in which the United States, with its vast wealth, and with this grave problem, which can best be solved by beginning to make good citizens out of malleable youth, skimps as it does in education, is a fault for which it will later pay dearly.

Amongst certain classes, even those who are personally honest harbour a feeling of admiration for the successful criminal. Crime, if it escapes detection and punishment, is not regarded with any great opprobrium. These more or less ignorant people sometimes even see a hero in a criminal. When not long ago one of the most notorious characters in Chicago, a man responsible more or less directly for a number of murders, not to mention lesser offences, was killed by a rival in crime, his body lay in state, with all the magnificence suitable to the

occasion which money could command, while thousands of people, some tearful, all curious, passed by the bier. It is this unhealthy sentiment which needs to be crushed in the schools, as the homes cannot be reached.

It is worth noting that the lawlessness which is now so prevalent in the United States is not of the same type as that of the earlier days of the Republic. It is no longer a question of frontier outposts or of a wild and woolly West. In fact, the places farthest removed from what are known as the centres of civilization are now the safest. The criminal of to-day is the product of the poorer parts of the large cities; and it is in the populated communities that he commits his depredations. The rest of the country is probably more law-abiding in respect to crimes of violence than ever before. In the South, lynching has ceased to be a virtue. In 1924 the total number of people lynched in the whole country was 16, which is said to be less than in any previous twelve months of which there is any record. Ten States were responsible for these examples of mob rage. In 1925 the total number was 18, and in 1926—29. But even these figures compare favourably with those of earlier years—for instance, 64 persons were lynched in 1921 and 61 in 1922.

In nearly every American city the police are blamed for getting so few criminals into the toils in proportion to the number of crimes committed. Judge Otto Rosalsky, of the New York Court of General Sessions, declared, in October 1925, that the Detective and the Police Departments were fully aware of the identity of the criminals responsible for the murders and open robberies which were occurring daily. Sometimes there are suggestions of police corruption. I believe that this is entirely the wrong path for any who sincerely want to reform and make effective the administration of criminal

justice. A society where political corruption goes fairly deep, and where, at times, the public seems inclined to applaud the successful criminal, is not, at best, a very healthy atmosphere. I am unable to see why the police should be expected to have higher standards than their employers. There may well be, from time to time, some police corruption in different cities, but that is a side issue. The police are certainly not responsible for the existing epidemic of crime. But in the larger towns they are not sufficiently numerous to control it; while nowhere, upon the whole, are they properly supported by the public.

The great offenders, once again, are those composing that majority of citizens who neglect their public duties. After all, everyone is not murdered or robbed or blackmailed; and, therefore, so long as one is not personally involved the best thing to do (while agreeing that it is a beastly mess) is to attend to one's own business, and make what money one can. This, coupled in many quarters with the sneaking admiration for the criminal who is clever enough to befool the authorities, is the American spirit—which naturally often finds its expression in the verdicts of juries—and such it ever was. As far back as 1838 the famous Philip Hone wrote in his diary: "It has often been said that a man must have great luck to get himself hanged in this country. It is certainly a melancholy proof of the depravity of our morals that the most flagrant offences against the law and the most atrocious violations of the peace and good order of society go daily 'unwhipped of justice' by the misjudging lenity, if not the base corruption, of men elected to preserve as jurors the purity of our legal institutions. Two cases have lately occurred not by any means calculated to make us proud of the name of Americans."

A foreign critic is open to the retort that Americans like their country as it is in this and in every respect. I do not think that it would be made seriously by any one of standing. Indeed, I believe that the majority of Americans who think, regret existing conditions, even if they do not do much to remedy them. Few would be found to agree with Judge Gary's statement that, despite frequent defiance of the Constitution, the United States is a law-abiding country.

The Prohibition situation inevitably enters into this matter. The crux of that problem is that the Prohibition laws do not prohibit. I purposely refrain from making any great use of the prolific statistics on this question, for they are made to prove too much by each side to the controversy. If I were to comment upon them at all, I should say that a careful study of them during a period of some years has proved to my satisfaction that they favour those opposed to the Eighteenth Amendment and to the Volstead Act. Similarly, I do not propose to attach any undue weight to the statement of extreme partisans; although, as Emerson said: "The right partisan is a heady, narrow man, who, because he does not see many things, sees some one thing with heat and exaggeration."

Miss Elizabeth Marbury, who is not unknown in Europe, has written of "the destructive force which the Eighteenth Amendment has let loose upon our people. Drugs, disease, drunkenness, and disaster have followed in its wake. Bootlegging is now one of the most popular and most prosperous industries in the land. Legislators have become perjurers, and lawmakers are now law-breakers. The demoralization of our youth is now a ghastly certainty. Alcohol is taking the place of mother's milk. Never in the history of civilization have young boys and young girls indulged in strong drink as they

are doing to-day. There are thousands of pious Prohibitionists who refuse to recognize this fact, and who point with complacency at their own boys and girls as convincing examples of the untruth of such slander, but let these same people frequent ballrooms, dance-halls, private parties, and public restaurants in the majority of our large cities, and they will find the hip-flasks in evidence, and the consequent conditions a sorry spectacle. . . . Prohibition is no longer an experiment. It has been tried out with the dire result that it has deranged the morale of America. We have become a nation of liars, of hypocrites, and of lawbreakers. Let us keep the saloons closed, but let us restore liberty to our homes." [1]

Such assertions are vigorously denied by the advocates of Prohibition. But those attacking the legislation now in force are in a stronger position in that they can point to the existence of the very evils which they proclaim; whereas the Prohibitionists are obliged, for the greater part, to predict the benefits which will ensue at some future period. I was unable to observe the least improvement in the situation, taken as a whole, after a lapse of some years. Indeed, it seemed to me to have become worse. It may be difficult to say exactly when an experiment becomes a failure; but certainly in that respect every day is now counting against Prohibition.

On the other hand, it would be idle to deny that Prohibition has done some good. The disappearance of the bar, where spirits and all other alcoholic liquors were freely dispensed, is an undoubted amelioration. Moreover, any employer of labour on a large scale will say that since the Volstead Act became law his men have done more and better work. All the great industrialists are firm believers in Prohibition—for their employees In fact, the three classes of the community which advo-

[1] *My Crystal Ball*, pp. 817–19.

cate the measure are the sincere disciples of Prohibition, the employers, and the bootleggers. The gain to the two latter is sufficiently obvious; but the employees as represented by the labour organizations are, for their part, under no delusion, and announce their opposition to Prohibition upon the specific ground that it is an interference with personal liberty. Those who are absolutely disinterested are chiefly fanatics. That is probably the fairest and most charitable explanation of the fact that all, except the most astute amongst them, are quickly led into accusing any who disagree with them of some corrupt motive, in default of being able to produce arguments or facts. They are, apparently, determined to prove that the law of the majority can become the worst of tyrannies. In this I am assuming that they have a majority. The result of any referendum on the subject would naturally depend upon the form in which the questions were submitted. There would, undoubtedly, be a majority against any return to the uncontrolled bar or saloon; but I think that there would also be a majority—and a greater one—in favour of some modification of the present laws. In 1926 a straw vote (a favourite American device for sounding public opinion), conducted by the newspapers of the country, gave an overwhelming majority in that sense. But in such a matter straw votes are somewhat deceptive, as the discontented and those who want a change are much more certain to record their votes than those who are satisfied with existing conditions. More significant were the results of referenda held in several States at the time of the November 1926 election, which, in most instances, clearly proved dissatisfaction with the present law. But leaving aside all such signs, I believe that any unprejudiced observer who visited different parts of the country would come to the same conclusion.

For the outstanding feature about Prohibition is that it does not prohibit. From the moment, on board ship, when my steward said: "Sorry, sir, but you can't get a sherry and bitters now; we've passed the Statue of Liberty" (which evoked a recollection of Madame Roland's ejaculation: "Liberty, Liberty, how many crimes are committed in thy name!") until some weeks later when, at a dinner in a restaurant, with bottles of champagne on the table, I saw a police sergeant (who was accompanied by two satellites) bend down to speak to our host—not, as I anticipated, to demand his name, but to request a subscription for some police games—it was always the same thing. The people who are sufficiently wealthy get what and all they want without any difficulty. Those who are obliged to consider expenditure are more limited in their choice. The main difference from the past (always apart from the abolition of the bar) is that more people drink spirituous liquors, as they are cheaper and easier to obtain. But everywhere the law is broken with impunity. In the year ending June 30, 1926, there were 44,022 convictions throughout the country; which admittedly did not represent 1 per cent. of the violations. Sir Arbuthnot Lane, the distinguished surgeon, depicted the situation exactly when, in 1925, after a visit to the United States, he said: "Prohibition is really a farce in America. You can get liquor anywhere. Poor people get poisonous stuff, and the rich get good liquor. I saw more drunken people during the month I was there than I have seen in England for the last two or three years. I have seen drunkenness everywhere—in the streets and on trains. Everybody seems to carry alcohol. I hope Prohibition is never introduced into England."

This defiance of the law, by all classes of the community, constitutes a scandal such as has never been

seen in any civilized country in modern times. Theodore Roosevelt summarized this aspect of the question when (with no reference to Prohibition) he wrote in his *Autobiography*: "I steadfastly refused in the past to advocate any law, no matter how admirable in theory, if there were good reason to believe that in practice it would not be executed. I have always sympathized with the view set forth by Pelatiah Webster in 1783—quoted by Hannis Taylor in his *Genesis of the Supreme Court*: 'Laws or ordinances of any kind (especially of august bodies of high dignity and consequence) which fail of execution, are much worse than none. They weaken the government, expose it to contempt, destroy the confidence of all men, native and foreigners, in it, and expose both aggregate bodies and individuals to many ruinous disappointments which they would have escaped had no such law or ordinance been made.'" [1] And withal, the Prohibition enactments are a great expense to the many taxpayers who will not obey them. For over and above the loss in excise revenue, and in customs duty upon importations of wine, there is the enormous annual expenditure in the vain attempt to enforce the law. The appropriation for the year 1926 was $10,600,000, to which must be added $9,600,000 for the coastguard service; and more than $27,000,000 is being asked for the year 1927. The total amount collected in fines and forfeitures for the year ending June 30, 1926, was $512,586, which affords a basis for calculating the direct cost. But these sums would be of little avail even if all the Prohibition agents were incorruptible, instead of betraying their trust, as General Andrews, the head of the system, told a Senate committee they so often do. Mr. Buckner, the Federal District Attorney for New York, put the matter clearly:

[1] *Theodore Roosevelt—An Autobiography*, p. 341.

"Enforcement will be a farce till you pay to make it something else. For this year Congress has appropriated $10,600,000 for the whole country. Here in New York I can prosecute smuggling cases, interstate shipments, big bootleggers, and the men higher up; I can do little more. If you believe in effective enforcement give me the means for it. For the Southern District of New York I need 3,000 Prohibition agents, at $3,000 a year each with expenses; 59 Assistant Federal Attorneys at $4,000; 100 Deputy Marshals at $3,000. A small army of commissioners, clerks, court attendants, and court stenographers. I need special funds for large operations; for the whole State $15,000,000 a year would be a very low estimate. You must add the cost of Federal police courts to that. If your demand for enforcement is not bluff, make Congress pay the money. . . . There is no moral support in writing a solemn law on the books, and undertaking to enforce only part of it. It is the unenforced law which produces graft and bribery, and corruption and crime. If Congress is willing to provide court machinery, money, and men for 20 per cent. enforcement, then we should only have 20 per cent. law. If it is willing to enforce the law 50 per cent., then the law should be cut down to precisely the 50 per cent. which Congress is able or willing to enforce."

This frank statement by an official who, whatever his personal opinion about the wisdom of the Prohibition Laws, had been most active in their enforcement, put the Prohibition leaders in a visible dilemma. They could hardly say that they were satisfied with the existing measure of enforcement, for they were constantly complaining that it did not go far enough. But they did not dare admit to the taxpayer that actual enforcement would cost so much. Once again, they did not wish to face the facts.

Yet the central fact is very plain. A national Prohibition measure cannot be enforced. It is the realization of this, and the growing disgust with the scandal of the widespread defiance of the law, which is crystallizing the opposition of many thoughtful men. The country has proved for itself what has already been demonstrated elsewhere. Norway, a small, homogeneous country, is abolishing Prohibition because it was found to be unenforceable. Ontario, for long a stronghold of Prohibition in Canada, decided, in 1926, that the law was a failure. For once the rural vote agreed with that of the larger towns; while the leaders of the movement for the repeal of the law (leaving entirely on one side the active political supporters of the Government which proposed the change), were not extremists, but men who, rather against their will, had been convinced after a trial that Prohibition was not feasible for more reasons than one.

Naturally, the obstacles to enforcement of a Prohibition law are very much greater and more numerous in a vast country like the United States than in Norway. Long before the Eighteenth Amendment there were various sections of the United States which wanted, and which had, laws prohibiting the sale of alcoholic liquors. But there seems to be no logical reason why, for instance, the State of Kansas should impose its will upon the State of New York, from which it differs more in habits, customs, outlook upon life, and all else save language, than does England from Sweden. The active head of the Prohibition organization, Mr. Wayne Wheeler, in the course of an interview said: "You must not judge the law by its enforcement. The law is right. Enforcement depends on local sentiment. A community that wants 100 per cent. enforcement will get 100 per cent. enforcement. A community that wants 50 per cent. enforcement will get 50 per

cent. enforcement. A community that wants no enforcement will get no enforcement." [1]

Mr. Wheeler apparently did not see that he had given away his case, and had, in effect, admitted that all the law could do was to bring about local option, despite the fact that it professed to go so much farther. And that is, indeed, the exact situation. To-day, in every community, there is local option as to whether the law shall be observed or ignored.

I believe that the clearer it becomes that enforcement is impossible, the more powerful will be the demand for some modification. The argument that there should be no discussion of any change because Prohibition is now embodied in the Constitution is insincere. There are other Amendments to the Constitution which are absolutely ignored or abated, and which thus—like the Fifteenth Amendment—have become a dead letter. But the Eighteenth Amendment will never be allowed to sink into oblivion in that fashion, for in one way or another it provides an income, or more, to too many people. Undoubtedly, it would be a difficult process to repeal a constitutional amendment. But American ingenuity will, no doubt, eventually solve the problem, either by altering the Volstead Act (which fixes the percentage of alcohol) or otherwise.

In the meantime the sorry spectacle which the United States presents recalls the sage words of Anatole France: "C'est que les lois ne règlent jamais rien. Une loi, lorsque les dirigeants la formulent, est depuis longtemps passée en usage. Elle ne fait que sanctionner les mœurs. Si elle les contrecarrait, elle resterait lettre morte."

[1] "Prohibition as It Is," *The World's Work*, March 1925.

CHAPTER XI

THE FLIGHT OF FREEDOM

In 1922 the State of Oregon passed a law which obliged all citizens within its boundaries to have their children educated at the public schools. The operative clause of the enactment read as follows: "Any parent, guardian, or other person in the State of Oregon, having control or charge or custody of a child under the age of sixteen years, and of the age of eight years or over, at the commencement of a term of public school of the district in which said child resides, who shall fail or neglect or refuse to send such child to a public school for the period of time a public school shall be held during the current year in said district, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and each day's failure to send such child to a public school shall constitute a separate offence."

The penalty was fixed at "a fine of not less than five dollars nor more than one hundred dollars, or imprisonment in the county jail for not less than two or more than thirty days, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court."

In 1925 the Supreme Court of the United States pronounced this law unconstitutional, saying, *inter alia*, "The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all Governments in this Union repose, excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,

coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."

Similar attempted inroads upon personal liberty are of constant occurrence in the United States, and sometimes they are successful. Nowhere else in the world is it so necessary always to bear in mind Patrick Henry's warning that eternal vigilance is the price which must be paid for liberty.

Mr. Elihu Root once remarked that in a self-governed democracy man must have a love of liberty, and that that meant not only one's own, but also other people's liberty. But that is precisely what many of Mr. Root's countrymen will not admit. A number of them are always trying to impose some restrictions upon the rest of their fellow-citizens. They forget that although without democracy liberty may be only a privilege, yet without liberty democracy is only a despotism.

The lack of liberty can be observed and felt upon all sides in the United States. One of the results of American democracy seems to be that the average man is incapable of minding his own business, or at least is prone to take an undue interest in the private affairs of others; which is, in itself, an infringement of personal freedom.

The way in which the power of testamentary disposition has been practically diminished by custom is another example of the gradual extinction of the rights of the individual. The law of wills, although changed in some respects by various statutes, is (except in the State of Louisiana), to all intents and purposes, based upon the Common Law; and there are no limitations similar to those contained in the Code Napoléon. But the manifest tendency of the courts has been such that wills are now often attacked by those who are relations in some more or less remote degree, alleging undue influence or the incapacity of the testator, upon evidence which, in any

English court of law, would be considered far too flimsy to carry any weight whatever. The result of this, coupled with the ordinary uncertainties, and the extraordinary delays and the expense of the law, is that in many instances heirs or legatees prefer to make some settlement of claims for which there is no solid foundation; the intentions of the testator being thereby defeated.

A clearer illustration of the absence of liberty is the way in which the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution has for many years been openly and shamelessly evaded. For it is notorious that in the Southern States negroes are, in one way or another, prevented from voting. Although, strangely enough, it has happened that a negro has controlled political patronage through his influence with a Republican Administration in Washington.

It is likewise difficult to reconcile American policy in respect to Radical aliens with anything approaching democratic freedom. As an illustration, it may be recalled that within the last two years the State Department has refused to allow Count Karolyi and his wife to enter the country. My own political views and instincts are so far at the other end of the scale that I can hardly be suspected of having the slightest sympathy with anyone preaching or holding the doctrines of communism. But, to make it absolutely clear, I may add that I consider that Count Karolyi has, in the past, been a most mischievous person, although now, and especially beyond his own country, no longer dangerous; with the activities of his wife in public affairs I am less familiar. But it is surprising that so powerful a country as the United States should pay any attention to such a weakling. I believe I am right in saying that, within recent years, Count Karolyi has been allowed to enter and to reside in England; and the kingdom still survives. The Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg, in speaking of his action in this

matter, very truly said that no foreigner had any inherent right whatever to enter the country; and that Congress might admit or exclude anyone as it saw fit. But the same thing may be said of any other country. The point is that great countries do not usually exercise those powers in that way. But, after all, the United States probably gives no more latitude to her own citizens. Where could even native-born Americans make, secure from police interference, such inflammatory and subversive speeches as may be heard in Hyde Park Sunday after Sunday? Anyone who attempted to speak that way in the United States would speedily find himself in jail. I hasten to add that I realize to the full the right of every country to govern itself in its own way. More than that, such repression may possibly be the right way, although I doubt it. But I am only suggesting that such a course is hardly consistent with any great measure of liberty; and that in the United States there is less right of free speech than there is in England. Perhaps Gouverneur Morris was not so far wrong when he told Lafayette that he was opposed to democracy on account of his love of liberty.

Matthew Arnold said that, in his time, England had an upper class materialized, a middle class vulgarized, and a lower class brutalized. The upper class always was materialized, because its ranks were recruited from the men who had acquired wealth—and more so as time passed. To-day Matthew Arnold would find that the lower class was no longer brutalized, and that the middle class has been so squeezed between the upper and the nether millstone that even its vulgarism is not so evident at present. But in the United States classes (for they exist even there) are much more fluid; and certainly these criticisms would not be applicable. There the common factor of all classes is that good will which Professor Santayana has rightly said is the great American virtue.

Whatever other comments one may make, it is undeniable that this good will is a national quality, abundant as it is nowhere else, and that it will survive after many defects have been outgrown. For despite all the captious views which may be expressed about many sides of American life and American policy, no one can seriously doubt that when the country develops a national conscience and a national opinion it will worthily fulfil the leadership to which it is inevitably destined. To-day the great weakness is that the people are far from being a homogeneous nation—are perhaps less so than ever before. Time will remedy that.

The line of demarcation between my criticisms, taken as a whole, and the sentiment which is fairly prevalent throughout the United States, is that I believe that the country will only attain later that commanding position which many Americans complacently believe it has already achieved. That complacency is, however, less unreasonable than the attitude of those who decry everything American, simply and solely because it is not English; for that view I have neither respect nor sympathy. But fitness for leadership amongst the nations of the world does not proceed only from the possession of vast natural resources, and of a great population capable of extracting untold wealth from those resources. It exacts also a national character which is rarely, if ever, attained until a race has passed through the fire of affliction; until it has suffered a crisis which threatened its very existence, and which entailed heavy sacrifices. Such was the Civil War; and, incredible as it may seem, it is by no means beyond the bounds of impossibility that the United States may again be purged.

If the American people are content simply to be the world's bankers there is, of course, no need to look farther. But moral and actual leadership amongst the nations

rightly falls not to the countries which merely lend money and descant vaguely about ideals, but to those which take an active part in the affairs of the world, and willingly accept the risks which are incidental to doing so. Obviously, no nation can aspire to that premier position which definitely shows that it prefers to shirk all responsibilities and to follow the policy which seeks only perfect safety. That is the course pursued by the American Government to-day. It is a phase which will pass.

But, as Lord Acton said: "Liberty is the delicate fruit of a mature civilization": and the United States has not yet arrived at that stage of its development.

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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED
LONDON AND WOKING