BY FLORENCE IRWIN

THE COMPLETE AUCTION PLAYER

MASTER AUCTION

HOLDING HANDS

BRIDGE FOR THINKERS

Bridge for Thinkers

By

Florence Irwin

Including the Revised Laws of Auction, 1926, the Etiquette of the Game, and a Chapter on Contract Bridge

G. P. Putnam's Sons
New York — London
1927

Made in the United States of America

PREFACE

I break a long silence (during which there has seemed to me no special need for a new book on Bridge) in order to say a few things to Bridge THINKERS as opposed to Bridge AUTOMATONS—to actors as opposed to puppets—to possible leaders as opposed to dyed-in-the-wool followers.

I have always been impressed by the contrast between a sheep-dog and the stupid sheep he manages and directs. There is one of him, there are many of them. When he leads them aright they follow blindly; should he lead them astray they would follow just as blindly. Their thinking is done for them, and they never even question the path they take.

What makes a leader?

A leader may have leadership thrust upon him, he may seek it, or he may be entirely self-appointed. He may be a good leader or a bad one, intrinsically strong or intrinsically weak, primarily interested in his

subject as exploited by him or primarily interested in himself exploiting his subject. The history of politics, of business, of finance, of commerce, all prove this. If leadership come to a man as the accolade of proven ability and if his message be one of conviction, then it is generally safe to follow him—though not even then, without thinking, weighing, and deciding. He, like yourself, is human; he will probably make fewer mistakes than the average man but he must make some, so take nothing blindly. But when leadership is the result of a love of notoriety, a talent for self-advertising, and a constant effort to exploit oneself through one's subject, it marks the acme of danger to become a blind follower.

Together with the rest of mankind, we as a Race must admit to the defects of our qualities. Our best endowments are the virile traits of the pioneer—fearlessness, independence, self-reliance; these, combined with the quickest natural tempo in the world, have made us what we are. The danger in the quick tempo lies in a tendency toward nervous irritability and a disdain of anything old-fashioned. The danger in our other gifts lies in an absolute greed for whatever

is newest; we are too prone to ask—not what is best, but what is newest; not what is old and tried, but what is fresh and exciting.

It is many years since Auction was really in the making, since the proper suit-values were fixed, the basic principles discussed, tested, and decided. Since then, there has been absolutely no change in count (except the superficial change in honour-scores), in play, in values, in the capabilities of the cards themselves. But there have been countless changes in the bidding-advice given by most Bridge-writers. Heralded always as the best, the most knowing, the most practiced, the most nearly infallible, they then bade you never to dare to do the things they are now bidding you never to dare to omit doing. The inference is inevitable: either they were wrong then when they were so sure they were right, or they are wrong now though so sure they are right. Another rather disconcerting inference is that, if former history be any criterion, by this time next year, or the year after, these present wonder-bids will almost inevitably be superseded and you will all have to take another turn.

In such fields as medicine and surgery, methods and practices must change because

old theories are disproved by later discoveries. But mathematical principles can never change, and on them is Bridge built. On them I founded my original Bridge beliefs, and by them I retain those beliefs. In every field of science and research there have been phenomenal changes since the days of Euclid; there have been none at all in mathematical principles. Never to change is never to improve, *provided* one has been wrong in the first instance; if one has been right, change would certainly be regrettable. And in any case, too frequent changes can hardly fail to mark instability of conviction, and errors either past or present.

Although my bidding-beliefs remain precisely what they were when I wrote my former book, although constant practice has steadily increased my faith in them, my readers may not feel as I do and may well want a personal trial of later methods. These, I teach habitually to all my pupils—having first grounded them in the conservative game which I sponsor—and I permit them free choice as to their eventual decision; no player can rank as good till he understands all accepted methods and conventions. Feeling that I owe my readers

the same duty that I owe my pupils, I here present to them a *résumé* of present-day Bridge, of the variations and disagreements between different "schools" of bidders, of the proper use of the new bids, and of what I consider their advantages and pitfalls.

F. I.

HASTINGS-ON-HUDSON.
March, 1927.

CONTENTS

Bridge for Thinkers

Bridge for Thinkers

CHAPTER I

THE BID

DIFFERENTIATE sharply between the *opening bid* and all other first-round bids; also between all first-round bids and all later-round bids.

In what I shall henceforth designate as the "conservative" game (the game for which I stand) no bid is *purely* informatory. While every bid must, and does, convey information, it also shows a willingness and ability to assume its own responsibility and to play the suit named. There are no forced bids imposed upon the partner of the bidder. Every bid is a legitimate offer to buy the hand on the terms stated. While it often happens that the bidder would *rather* play another suit (one that he cannot yet bid legitimately), it never happens that he has

not the material to play the bid he has named, should no one else bid. In many cases he and his partner find, after various legitimate bids, that it will be much better policy to decide finally on a suit quite different from the one first chosen by either of them; a perfect combination of the two hands is eventually made, but it is made by a series of real bids.

The horror of constant forced bids being demanded of a partner who holds nothing, is entirely eliminated. No one ever says to his partner, "I'm going into this place, but for God's sake don't leave me there"; instead, he says: "I'm going into a place which I consider perfectly safe, and where I am quite willing to stay. But if you know of any hidden danger, or if you know of a better place, or if together we can find a better place, I will come there with you."

In the informatory school, bids are made which the bidder knows he cannot play, and in which his partner knows he may not be left. By a certain ready-made system, information is given without responsibility being assumed. The number of tricks named in the opening-bid is not an indication of what the bidder thinks he can make, but of whether he may, or may not, be left with his bid.

The system must be learned by rote, and great results are claimed for it.

As between these two schools, thinkers will range themselves according to character and type of mind. The man who likes the conservative school, will like, throughout his career, the principles on which it is built and will infallibly choose them in every issue. The man who likes the informatory school may be counted upon to choose, always and everywhere, the principles for which it stands. The man who says, "I don't like this sort of thing, and though everyone else does it, I certainly won't," will once more range himself against the many men who say, "I didn't use to like this sort of thing and I used to say so. But if everyone else does it, why shouldn't I?" The sheep, as usual, will follow a leader without the effort of thought or will; the faddist will wildly demand the newest thing, be it good or bad; and the opportunist will ask what is easiest and most convenient.

Another point to remember about any informatory system is that it *will work only amongst those who know and use it.* Even amongst informatory bidders there is great discussion as to what constitutes the perfect

system; so-called authorities differ, and each is sure he is right. In different sections of this country, multiple-bids, and other signals, mean quite different things. And in other countries, where there are *at least* as many good players as here, none of these systems (except the informatory double) is used at all. As against this, the conservative game is everywhere understood, for the simple reason that it tells the truth and means exactly what it says—instead of meaning something quite different, the implied meaning being intelligible only to its devotees.

I have written so often and so specifically on the bidding-principles of the conservative school, that they may here be very briefly re-summed:

The *opening* bid is made by the player who first bids, be he dealer or not. Its minimum requirements are:

I. Five trumps.

II. Ace or King at the top.

III. Seven "points," counting *two* for every honour and *one* for every plain card.

IV. One "quick" outside trick. This must be an Ace, or a King with at least one card to back it, but it is by no means necessary that it should be (as formerly urged by

so many writers) a King-Queen. While it is true that a barely guarded King is often lost, it is equally true that its loss often establishes a Queen or a Knave in the partner's hand. Only in the case of a hand that holds seven or more trumps should this outside trick be regarded as dispensable.

After the opening-bid, other first-round bids are rather more free. Though, strictly, they should still be headed by the Ace or King, these tops may occasionally be dispensed with, *if the suit have great length*, or if the adverse bid be particularly distasteful. The outside trick may also be disregarded—though with a certain risk. A singleton or a blank in the suit named by the adversary, is an excuse for bidding a long suit that lacks its tops, as a secondary bid on the first round.

The prime requisite for a second-round bid (and for all later-round bids) is length. The suit may lack several of its tops; the hand may lack the outside trick; but the trumps must positively be long. Thus, if a player pass on the first round and come in on the second, one of two things is apparent: his hand is long, but it has weakness somewhere: he lacks either his tops, or his

side-trick. Greater care should be used in raising his bid.

The Raise in this school is rendered much more sure and safe than in any other, because of the soundness and reliability of the bid. It requires two things: a "trick" and a "raiser." A "trick" may be any one of four things, and a "raiser" any one of six (the same four and two more). In other words, there are four things that may be regarded either as the requisite "trick" or as the "raiser," while there are two additional things that are "raisers" only, and may never be used till the necessary "trick" is first deducted from the hand.

The four things that may be either tricks or raisers are:

I. Any four trumps.

II. A guarded (or nearly-guarded) trump-honour.

III. A side-Ace.

IV. A side-King, guarded.

Raisers are these same four things, plus two others:

I. Singletons.

II. Blank suits.

A plain singleton is one raiser, a singleton Ace is two raisers. A blank suit is also two

raisers—provided, of course, that the hand has trumps enough to take the ruffs.

The trick and the *first* raiser must lie in different suits (spread your investments). It follows that an Ace and King of a side-suit (lying in the same suit) do not constitute a raise.

A singleton trump, or a blank in trumps, voids all rules for tricks and raises. Side-strength should then be used to carry the bid to another suit, rather than to raise the partner's bid.

The overcall will be specially discussed in a chapter devoted to it.

The Informatory Game

In the informatory game, it has been decided that it is now possible to open on Queen-high suits, on Knave-high suits,[1] or on four-card trump-suits—even without an outside trick: all these bids may be made only in cases where certain other conditions

[1] Throughout this book, I shall use the word "Knave" instead of "Jack," because that is my invariable habit when speaking. In the charts I shall continue to indicate the Knave by the letter "J," to distinguish it from the K for King.

exist, but they may be—nay, must be—made.

This is exactly what players used to do when they first began to play Auction, and before practice decided them that it was a dangerous and useless custom. The difference lies in the fact that then such bids were made to *play*, while now they are made to *inform*. By this system, certain information may be given, but unquestionably, certain other is lacking. The information given is that the hand of the bidder holds *two quick tricks* (these, I shall definitely describe in the next paragraph). To offset this, the information that is lacking is: that the bidder has at least five trumps (he may have four or any number exceeding four): that his suit is headed by one of its highest two cards and will therefore be in command on the first or second round (it may be headed by such card or cards or by almost any other card. The information conveyed is therefore much less explicit, the assurance to the partner that the suit may safely be played, is lacking).

The one requisite for an opening bid, as I have said, is "two quick tricks." These may lie both in the same suit, in which case the suit must be at least five cards long.

Or they may lie in different suits. Either, neither, or both, may lie in the suit named; but in all cases, the hand must be worth four-tricks-in-all, should it be played in the suit named. "Quick" tricks are reckoned thus:

Single Cards

Ace, one trick.

King (guarded by one or more small cards), one-half trick.

Queen (guarded by two or more small cards), one-quarter trick.

Combinations

Queen-Knave, one-half trick. (With, or without, others.)

King-Knave-ten, three-quarters trick. (With, or without, others.)

King-Queen, one trick. (With, or without, others.)

Ace-Queen
King-Queen-ten } One and one-quarter trick. (With or without, others.)

Ace-Queen-ten
Ace-Knave-ten
King-Queen-Knave } One and one-half trick. (With, or without, others.)

Ace-King } Two tricks. (With, or
Ace-Queen-Knave } without, others.)

Ace-King-Knave. Two and a quarter tricks. (With, or without, others.)

Ace-King-Queen, two and a half tricks. (With, or without, others.) Not three tricks, because the third round might be ruffed, and allowance is made for that fact.

Or, to condense:

¼ ..... Q-x-x

½ ..... K-x
Q-J-x

¾ K-J-10

1 ..... A
K-Q

1¼ ..... A-Q
K-Q-10

1½ A-Q-10
A-J-10
K-Q-J

2 ..... A-K
A-Q-J

2¼ ..... A-K-J

2½ ..... A-K-Q

Now, while all this is as set as it is cumbersome, it is neither deep nor difficult. It may be, and probably is, mathematically provable by the theory of chances and by permutations of combinations; but so, too, is the bidding of the conservative school. Nor does this latter presuppose, as a necessity, as high a percentage of luck. It takes more account of *dangers* and less of *hopes*. In order quickly to master the values and combinations of the informatory school it is only necessary to remember:

I. The actual rank of the cards—the precedence of Ace over all other cards, of King over all save Ace, and so on.

II. The superior value of first rounds over second ones, of second over third, and so on.

III. The fact that a sequence-stopper doubles the value of its lowest card: as the second card of a sequence a King is raised from a half to a whole, a Queen from a quarter to a half, while the Knave behind the Queen again raises the latter from a quarter to a half.

IV. That Knaves are valueless as counters, they are merely intensifiers of Queens and tens.

V. That many small cards, as guards, do

not raise the value of the holding above that of a mere guard.

The system, though easy to any practiced player, is very complicated and frightening to beginners. *Yet we must remember that it is sponsored by the same writers who explained the change in the honour-count (making it multiples of ten for all suits) by the reasoning that it "would make the game so much easier for beginners."*

The logical answer to this plea, is that surely no game of skill was ever made for beginners.

The next point to consider is the opening suit-bid that lacks its tops. I quote an example from a recent book:

♠ J 10 x x x
♡ A K x
◇ A Q x
♣ x x

This, the author points out, is a much better hand at spades than at no-trumps. True; any practiced player would agree. The author further states that it is too good a hand to throw; and, again, unanimous agreement is imagined and conceded. But I insist that team-work is spoiled, confusion

established, and danger and disaster invited, by *opening* that hand with a spade-bid. *This particular hand is not nearly as important as permanent reliance in a partner's opening soundness, nor as the fact that his bid* ALWAYS *means presence of tops, instead of* SOMETIMES *meaning their presence, and* SOMETIMES *their lack.* What becomes of reliance?

After an opening bid by any other player, I should bid the hand at spades on *any* round —first, or later. But as opener, I should certainly bid it as a no-trumper, with hopes of spades on a later round. Either adversary may bid, your partner may bid in warning or support (true, the dangerous deletion of warning weakness overcalls from no-trumps by the players of the informatory school kills this particular chance of a second-round spade-bid), and even if no one bids and you are left with your no-trumper, there is a very small percentage of cases where you would suffer for it.

There is, what seems to me a discrepancy in the author's explanation of this hand. He claims:

(a) That the hand is a dangerous no-trumper and a safe spade.

(b) That the method of opening the bidding

with a major-suit two-bid to show lack of tops is old-fashioned and has therefore been abandoned (and I agree). The hand must therefore be opened at "One spade."

BUT, the author further claims:

(c) *That any initial bid of one is an invitation to the partner of the bidder to go to no-trumps.*

The clear inference is that the holder of this hand, wanting spades and fearing no-trumps, *asks his partner to bid the suit he dreads.*

It is conceded that many situations can be imagined where this hand would pay better in spades than in no-trumps—particularly those all-too-familiar ones where the partner holds all the missing high trumps and a shortage (in this case) of clubs. But while we are at the fascinating business of imagining, let us take an equally imaginary (but equally possible) case, where the spade-bid would be the more disastrous. As here



At one no-trump Z makes ten; at one spade he loses fifty. A cannot bid, nor can Y who, moreover, holds the three trumps demanded of their partners by the four-trump bidders. B, holding a weak, but fair, hand, though lacking a spade-stopper, might pass Z's spade, or he might double informatorily—according to the score and his character. If B doubles and A passes (knowing that, together, he and B should defeat Z's spade) Z loses 100 instead of fifty. Should B double and A bid a no-trump, he can make two-odd. In every case, Z's spade-bid scores for the adversary while his no-trump bid scores for him, himself. And can you not picture Y's disgust if the adversaries play

no-trumps and he leads the suit his partner has bid, only to find its major-tierce in the adverse-hand, and a very possible better opening spoiled? A club-lead from Y, or even a diamond-lead, would be much better policy.

False information, given by an opening Knave-bid!

Thinkers, think!

It is admitted of this hand by its author that it holds a hidden danger in spades, even though that bid be recommended. Should second-hand hold a spade-stopper (the Ace is imagined) and get the bid at one no-trump, and should the partner of the spade-bidder hold a guarded King of spades and lead it in response to the spade-bid, a trick is lost: being on the safe side of the Ace, that King should make. A still more deplorable loss would be if the adverse spade-stop should be a mere King (considered safe because of its position over the opening-bid) and the opener's partner should hold Ace-Queen; by leading spades, the entire hand may be made for the adversary and his defeat transformed into victory. The lead would turn his losing problematic stopper into a sure and safe one.

As with opening Knave-bids, so with opening Queen-bids. Though less dangerous, they are still illegitimate openers; they may be made *occasionally* by good players, but they should always be looked upon as illegitimate but excusable (because of certain conditions), never as standard and habitual.

Of course, to all players of all schools, the great object is to go game-in-the-hand. Equally, of course, that there is no possible bidding-system, by which this can infallibly be accomplished is apparent to anyone, and is proven by the charts and game-scores given in any book published. *Play* is at least as important a factor in such schemes as is bidding, while the holding of the necessary cards quite outranks them both. Why, then, should a player not prefer to go game in two or more *safe* partial-game hands, (as with warning weakness overcalls) rather than to be defeated on both of them through attempting the impossible?

The next point to consider in informatory bidding is the habit of bidding without any side-trick in the hand—a habit which I insist is extremely unsafe, except on *at least* a seven-trump holding. That such a hand as the following could be opened at "A dia-

mond" seems to me outside the range of possibility:

♠ 7 5 2
♡ 9 3
◇ A K 7 4 2
♣ 8 6 4

Yet that is the tenet of the informatory bidders.

When a player's opening bid can be depended upon to show that he has *certainly*, not only a minimum of five trumps to the Ace or King, but also an outside Ace or guarded King, the information is extremely valuable to his partner in later rounds, supposing the adversary to have bought the hand. Enough Aces and Kings are often shown (in dummy, by the Declarant's play, in the hand of the partner of the original bidder) to enable this partner to read the exact side-trick indicated by the first bid, and to use it as a sure means of putting his partner in.

I quote an example given by a recent author in which he claims that an opening bid on five trumps to the Ace-King, without an outside trick, gave the partner of the opener an otherwise impossible no-trumper and game-in-the-hand. That he gets his

no-trumper, I admit; but he can never get his game *unless* the adversary should play atrociously.



Z opens with "One club," which Y carries to "One no-trump." It is evidently taken for granted that B's opening lead shall be a spade, which seems to me almost incredible.

As B, I should immediately read Y with the Ace-Queen of hearts and the Ace-Knave of spades. For this reason, I should be determined that I would try to play both hearts and spades *after* him, thereby making my King-Knave of the one, and my King-Queen

of the other; one trick won by my partner would then save game.

Many, many lessons have I given to teach pupils to avoid such a lead as this spade-lead from B. In a short suit (not longer than four), with but two winners, not many rounds can be established, and a King-Queen on the safe side of an indicated Ace should never be touched. Any false-lead, or "Dodging-lead" is preferable. Should the hand hold a nine-spot in another suit, the escape is easy. The original lead of a nine against no-trumps says to the partner: "Don't sacrifice anything on this suit, unless for purposes of your own. Don't return it, unless for the same reason. Either I have no suit that is worth leading, or my suits must come to me through the no-trump hand."

Suppose a player held these cards:

♠ K Q 7
♡ K J 8 4
◇ 10 9 5 4
♣ Q 2

Would he be silly enough to lead the heart up to a no-trumper? Such a lead would be

equivalent to the spade-lead in the hand just shown.

Returning to this hand, B's choice is very easy. He has another four-card suit, of which he expects little and which he does not mind sacrificing; its top card is sufficiently high to give him hopes of a possible fourth-round (with three or four re-entries) should he be so unlucky as to go through an honour in his partner's hand. His proper lead is either the nine, or the four, of diamonds. Y can then not possibly take game.

I showed this hand of B's to several of the best players I know, giving them the bidding and keeping the rest of the hand concealed. Without exception, they led the diamond.

Oh, for such adversaries as the indicated B!

The next point to be considered is the four-trump make (with, or without, side-help) so highly vaunted by the informatory school.

By plain counting, it is easily seen that if a player hold five cards of his own suit, there are but eight outside his hand and three players to hold them. One-third of eight is two-and-two-thirds. Normally, the bid-

der's partner has two chances of holding *three* trumps to one of holding but *two*, trumps. With three, the trump situation is beautifully clear; there are but five adverse trumps, divided between two hands. Even imagining the worst—that one adversary is blank while the other holds all five—even then, he cannot hold more than the Declarant; and in addition, the blank adversary, with another very long suit, will almost certainly bid.

Coming to uneven distribution, should your partner have but two trumps, you still have the balance of power—seven out of thirteen; should he have a singleton, he may be able to overcall, in trumps or no-trumps; failing this, you are still in no desperate straits. You have five trumps in one hand and a sixth in the other (a much better holding than a four-three distribution). The seven adverse trumps are divided between two hands. It is unlikely that either hand holds more than you.

As against this, and comparing situation for situation, if a player bid on four trumps, there are nine at large, divided amongst three hands. Even distribution would be three in each hand—and nothing is so unusual as

exact evenness. Should the bidder's partner hold fewer than three, one adversary *must* hold as many as the Declarant (he may even hold more) and cannot be exhausted without personal exhaustion. The Declarant cannot possibly hold the "long" trump and exercise the great privilege of trumping in. And should the partner hold a singleton and no overcall, defeat is inevitable.

In cases where the partner has more than his even share of trumps, the five- or six-card bidder is raised into absolute ease and affluence, the four-card bidder merely into safety.

The great advantage for the player of a trump-hand, is his ability to exhaust adverse trumps and then to play the hand like a no-trumper, with the personal privilege of being able to trump in while no one else can. This advantage is entirely lost to the four-trump bidder. Nor can he ever take a ruff—for what could he do with but three trumps left? Unless with very unusual side suit (and remember, *they demand no side-trick* whatever) there is scarcely even an advantage in drawing trumps; he makes three—possibly all four—of his trumps, and then where is he? If he starts to establish a

side-suit and loses control during the process, he has no way of getting in again, no trump with which to stay an adverse onslaught. Even a cross-ruff won't help him, and in many cases neither will a weak-hand ruff; he needs all his trumps to bleed his adversaries, and after he has them bled he is in no better case than they.

Condensed, these are the essential things to remember about four-trump makes (presupposing nothing sensationally over-good in the dummy, when exposed):

They must be played like no-trumpers, with a trump name. (But the adversaries may not wish so to play them, and may do some exceedingly unpleasant things if left with their trumps undrawn.)

The slightest material on which they may be bid without outside help is Ace-King-Queen-small of trumps; the small trump and the nine other cards in the hand all being trash. Rather hopeful!

Equally valuable is rated Ace-King-Knave-ten. No outside help necessary.

All weaker four-card combinations must hold some outside strength—the degree of such strength demanded varying according to the strength or weakness of the trump

holding. King-Queen and two-small would need more outside help than would Ace-King and two-small. Ace-Knave and two-small is weaker than Ace-Queen-Knave-small, and so on.

Such suits should be bid at "One."

There is no differentiation between major-suits and minor-suits. A club and a spade are bid exactly alike, if their length be four cards.

Four-card suits (or longer ones) are all classed as "long" suits (I have really no adequate words to say what I think of such "length"). Three cards and less are considered "short" suits (one is thankful for that mercy!) And we are further informed that "A short suit" (remember, that means *three cards or less*) "should never be bid originally regardless of its strength." "Should never be bid at all," would be my personal advice.

Now, here comes the crux:

In order to render four-card bids safe, the partner is told that he must be very careful about raising, and also in denying the suit, when he cannot assist it. You see, when a man bids, it may be on four trumps, it may be on more. *You can not tell.* As his part-

ner, you may have a perfectly good raise for a five- or six-card bid, and one of which it would be extremely useful to him to know; but with a four-card bid it would never do. Unless distinctly over-strong, you may not risk it. An over-weak bid necessitates an over-strong raise. Many average raises are lost, and lost on occasions where the danger does not exist and where they would consequently have paid.

If you have fewer than three trumps (fewer, that is, than your full share by equal distribution) or fewer than two to an honour, you must deny the suit. All very well if you can; *but suppose you can't!* What, for instance, are you going to do (your partner having opened with "A heart"), on this hand?

♠ K 9 8 7
♡ 9 2
◇ 10 5 4 3
♣ 8 6 5

Hundreds of hands have I seen, as poor as that and poorer. If the partner have bid on five-or-more hearts to the Ace or King, together with another honour, *and* with an outside trick to boot, he isn't going to suffer

much. If he have bid on four trumps and not an outside trick, I certainly pity his plight. *The more you bid on four-card suits, the more times there must be when your partner doesn't hold enough trumps to make your bid safe.* You take long risks, on the *hope* that he will have all that you want him to have (either help, or material for denial); the *danger* of his having neither is disregarded. As against this, the conservative school, less avid of constant bidding, more alive to danger as well as to hope, asks more to bid and less to raise, demands more of one's self and less of one's partner, is less dependent on denials of help (which may, or may not be possibilities, even when they are necessities), and can therefore less easily be inconvenienced.

The great test of an innovation is usually the question, "Does it pay?" Regarding the four-card bid, its sponsors say that it does; as against this, many men whom I have met—men who talk of "Hundred-dollar Rubbers" and whose Bridge-winnings are heavy and constant—assure me that it doesn't—in their cases, at least. Having tried it out, they have permanently dropped it.

"Forward" bidding undoubtedly pays, but *not* when it is so forward as to be rash. Whether or not the four-trump bid is rash I leave my readers to decide for themselves. In such decisions, the best factor is personal experience. But in order that your experience shall be really valuable, you must use the four-card bid *right*, if at all.

Original Bids by Players other than the Dealer

A dealer having passed, an opening-bid by second-hand may be made on exactly the same material as that needed by the dealer.

Two players having passed, third-hand's bid should show rather more than minimum, or even average, strength. His partner's pass may be regarded as something of a warning. Still, it is to be remembered that there are cases when the partner is longing for a second-round chance, and that third-hand's opening will furnish that chance. It will, however, equally furnish it to the adversaries. The informatory players demand (for a third-hand opening after two passes):

(a) Two-and-a-half quick tricks divided amongst three suits.

Or,

(b) Three quick tricks divided between two suits.

These, as a minimum.

Three players having passed, a fourth-hand opening may invite disaster, by starting a second round for everyone. On a hand that promises game, it should always be made. It may also be made (on a clean score) in a major-suit whose holder is willing to go to three or four, unassisted. And again, it may be made on a clean score, in no-trumps, provided there is strength in the majors (yet not enough to bid them). In this situation, should the adversaries essay a second-round bid it is not apt to net them game-in-the-hand. On hands where the adversaries have already scored, a fourth-hand opening is to be very seriously weighed and every chance against its advisability considered. These are the tenets of the conservatives.

In the informatory school a fourth-hand opening must be one-half trick better than a third-hand opening. Three quick tricks with protection in three suits, three-and-a-half, with protection in but two suits.

As a matter of fact, while this sounds quite

complicated and impressive, a little study of the charts given in the books shows that it may very easily be memorized.

No-trump Bids

The informatory bidders have here reverted to the old methods used in the game's infancy. While they bid suits very lightly, just as most players used to do (possibly only four trumps, and possibly not an outside trick), they are much more afraid of no-trumpers. The reason for the reversion is easily seen. Having discarded all weakness overcalls of warning, they dread no-trump disaster. They have thus lost all chance of the tentative no-trumpers which so very very often score an otherwise impossible game, which in nine cases out of ten score a partial game (either of themselves, or by playing the suit, major or minor, named by a warning weakness overcall), and which in nine-tenths of that other tenth case, are taken away by the adversaries—leaving an infinitesimal number that may suffer defeat. And even this summary says nothing of cutting the adversary out of the first no-trumper, or of pushing him to two in suit.

We all know that a singleton, or a weak doubleton, is a weakness in a no-trumper. A *weakness*, but not a necessary *deterrent*. Recent writers of the informatory school insist:

(a) That with three strong suits and a singleton it is unwise to risk a no-trumper, and that a suit should be bid, even if only on four cards. I take exception to this on the following grounds: since a four-card bid is "virtually a no-trumper with a trump name," it is rather dodging the issue; since a four-card suit cannot afford ruffs the singleton should be as great a deterrent in suit as in no-trumps; and since at least some of your "strong" cards must be Queens, they would be much more useful in no-trumps than in trumps.

(b) That if your singleton be lower than a Queen, the no-trump bid is rendered absolutely impossible. Again I disagree.

(c) That even with a weak doubleton, any suit-bid—even a minor, even a four-carder—should almost always be chosen. My objections to this reasoning are based on the following grounds: it is not too much to hope for one stopper of one suit from your partner's hand; and your own hand being evenly

divided, it is an allowable premise that the adverse suit is likewise somewhat evenly divided.

Imagine yourself to be bidding no-trumps on four hearts to the Ace, four clubs to the Ace-King-Queen, three spades to the Ace-King, and two poor diamonds; what are the chances in your favor? These:

I. That an adversary will bid.

II. That your partner will bid, in warning, or from a strength overcall.

III. That your partner will have the diamonds well stopped, or merely stopped. Of the eleven missing diamonds, at least a few should go to his share.

IV. That, even with no real stopper in diamonds, he shall hold enough small ones to cut down great length in either adverse hand.

V. That, with most of the diamonds, and all of the high ones, adversely held, they shall be well enough divided between the two adversaries to make them harmless.

VI. That, even if bulked in one hand, it shall be that of the adversary who has *not* the lead, and who therefore cannot get the suit led without bidding it—which lets you out.

As against these favorable chances, what are the adverse ones?

That great established diamond-length shall lie in the hand of the leader, that he will not bid them (as of course he wouldn't), that your partner shall have no bid—warning or otherwise—and that the second adversary (unaware of his partner's schemes) shall also pass. *Only when all these things happen at once, can your no-trump bid hurt you.*

A recent actual hand will make a good example. It was the first deal of the sitting:



This was opened with "One no-trump," which closed the bidding and scored game.

Opened at "One Club," as advised by the informatory bidders who are so averse to taking a chance on one suit, the opening bid would again close the bidding. There is surely no other hand at the table that can venture a bid. The player would just miss game, losing two diamonds and a spade. Had the diamond-Knave been a singleton and the hand have held a fourth heart, the no-trump bid would still have scored game, and the heart-bid have been a sad mistake. Had the thirteenth card been a spade, game would have been no safer, no better, in spades than in no-trumps.

Choice of Suits

By players of the conservative school, whenever a hand offers a choice of bid the suit with the highest value is chosen, except that hearts and spades are given the preference over no-trumps. On hands that could bid one no-trump but not two, but which could go to two or more hearts or spades, the no-trump may be chosen first—although with the attendant danger that no one else may bid, and that the opener may be forced to play his less profitable bid.

With these general principles the informatory bidders still agree, with certain exceptions. It is obvious that a four-card two-bid would be a long risk; therefore, a four-card suit must be bid first at "one," even when it is the lower in value, and the longer and higher suit must be saved for later rounds and higher bids. To the conservatives, such bidding would mean that the first-named suit was at least five cards long with Ace or King at the top and at least one other honour, and that the later-named suit was long, but lacked its tops.

Again, a minor-suit bid is given preference over a major, as an opener, if its length exceed that of the major by more than two cards—a seven-card club-suit will outrank a four-card spade-suit. Or a suit of five clubs to the Ace-King-Queen is bid before a suit of spades holding only the Ace and four small cards: there, the conservatives would never dream of bidding the spade, and would certainly bid the club—using the Ace of spades as their necessary side-trick; it follows, therefore, that the two schools here make the same bid, but for different reasons.

As between two equally valuable majors, everyone agrees that the higher should be

bid first—in order to use the "Shift" if necessary. This Shift, however, should not be employed late in the hand, since it might not be welcome to the partner who at that point, could not safely deny it.

With a possible Shift, should a player show a major first and be assisted by his partner, he should not thereafter show his minor. But if he should show his minor first, he should later show his major even though his partner have assisted the minor. Should the partner assist a first major, he should not show a second major.

Should your partner change your first suit-bid to a no-trumper, let him alone if your bid was in a minor; he has done just what you asked him to do. But if your first bid was a major, his change to no-trumps shows lack of assistance and a fear of your suit; his no-trumper may be very poor, it may be bid merely of necessity; you should show your second suit—whether it be major or minor. If he go again to no-trumps, let him alone. He really wants it.

If your partner should change your first suit-bid to another suit-bid, show your second suit—unless it be the one he has bid.

Should he overcall your no-trumper by a

suit-bid, don't go back, except with a hundred Aces. If you are extremely strong, the suit-bid may well net you game. If you are not, the suit-bid may well be safer.

And never forget that a no-trumper is apt to be disastrous when the two hands do not "fit." After you and your partner have bid two or more suits against each other it is rarely profitable to compromise on a no-trumper. Suit is safer.

It is well to remember that with two almost equally valuable suits, one broken and the other compact, the compact suit is the safer side-suit, as here:

♠ A J 10 8 4
♡ A K Q 3 2
◇ 10 9
♣ 6

Except with negations from partner, the hand should be most valuable with spades for trumps and hearts for side-suit.

I do not agree with those who say that to bid any major against the other major as bid by partner, is a negation of help for him. Take this hand:

♠ K x x
♡ J 10 9 x x x
◇ A x
♣ x x

The partner has bid spades. Now, although this hand has a spade-assist, the hearts would make wretched side-suit but good trumps. I should bid them. They may well find support with partner; or even if he have nothing better than two small ones, it would still be a good trump suit. Should he have less help than that, he should go back to his spades and you should let him alone, or assist him if adverse bidding makes that necessary. Of course, should he be a four-card bidder, he would be unable to go back to his spades, and that is another instance where a good combination of hands is wrecked by four-card bids. I suppose with such bidders, the hearts could never be shown.

An example of the desirability of a suit-bid over a no-trumper when the partners' hands are at variance, is here shown:



Anyone in Z's place would bid a heart: the conservatives on account of the good trumps and the outside trick, the informers because of the three-and-a-half tricks in the hand—one trick in spades and the balance in hearts.

I should certainly not think that A would bid—and it would clearly do him no good. Yet he has two quick tricks—three-quarters in clubs, another three-quarters in diamonds, and one-half in spades. He has no possible bid except a no-trump—and heaven help him in that, because the deletion of weakness overcalls would seal B's warning lips against spades.

Y must overcall the heart-bid, in clubs or in no-trumps. In clubs, he can go game and slam—losing nothing but one trump: the lead would be a spade, won by dummy, then the three major hearts, Y throwing a diamond and a spade; a diamond finesse which wins; a spade, trumped in dummy; another diamond, won by the Ace; another spade, trumped in dummy; a winning club finesse; the Ace of clubs; loses to the ten, and takes the balance of the tricks.

On a clean score Z might not care to pass the clubs, and might return to his hearts. In spite of his singleton and A's strength, he too can again take game; he loses (if he plays right) only a heart, a diamond, and a club.

But if Y says no-trumps, Z positively must not leave him in—because of that singleton Ace. He must return to hearts.

At no-trumps Z–Y would miss game, because the lead would be a spade, and A, able to stop every suit, would always lead spades through Y. Suit pays better than no-trumps, because the two hands do not fit.

In spite of the many claims of the informers that by their system the two hands are better combined and more successful bids reached, I am entirely unconvinced, and can

produce, in proof, many hands where game is scored by the conservatives, while the informers must find themselves tongue-tied.

The object of this latter school, is to show "two quick tricks, as aid to whatever bid the partner essays." Now, take this hand:



Z cannot bid, because he has but one-and-three-quarter tricks, one in diamonds, and three-quarters in hearts.

He has not a two-heart bid, because that means *definitely* six-trumps to the Ace-King-Queen (see next chapter on preëmptive bids). I can certainly not imagine him opening with any bid higher than two.

A cannot bid: he has a half-trick in spades and a trick in diamonds.

Y cannot bid: he has but a trick in spades and a half-trick in clubs.

B cannot open after three passes with less than three quick tricks; he has but two, and certainly no bid. The hand is thrown.

By the conservative method, Z bids his hearts because he has the necessary material. A must pass or double. If he pass, Z scores game, losing a heart, a diamond, and a club. *A game which would be totally wasted by the informers!*

If A doubles informatorily, he will wish he hadn't. Should B go to no-trumps, Z will lead his own weakest suit, in order to get the hearts through B's stopper. The result will be overpoweringly disastrous for A–B.

There is positively *no* "system" that will turn losing cards into winning ones. None which is infallibly efficacious. None which will beat the present sane conservative bidding, presupposing the same luck. None, where complications and set forms will pay better than common-sense, honest straightforwardness, and the proper "feel" of the worth of card combinations.

The fact must be once more stressed that,

while no *Law* may ever be broken, any *rule* may be—provided the occasion warrants. No inexperienced player knows whether or not the occasion *does* warrant a liberty, therefore all players must follow all rules till they acquire experience and skill. And again, when liberties are correctly taken, they must definitely rank as *exceptions*, not as ordinary, general, and licensed procedures. For instance, in a recent game, I opened this hand at "One spade":

♠ 10 9 8 6 5 4 2
♡ A 2
◇ A 6
♣ A 4

It could not be opened at a no-trump, because of the extreme shortness of all suits save spades, and the fact that not one of them held more than one possible trick. It was certainly much too good a hand to throw, and it scored us game. Yet that does not prove that it is generally, or even often, a good thing to open with a suit that is ten-high; nor does it prove that such a bid is legitimate; nor yet, that it is often desirable. What it does prove is that

though conservative rules are always safe guides (and even necessary ones most of the time), long experience makes occasional liberties allowable and advisable. In other words, rules may be broken with *discretion*, and discretion can be acquired only after exceeding great practice.

CHAPTER II

PREËMPTIVE BIDS

I HAVE never wavered in my dislike of all preëmptive bids, but I shall here (as in all further questions of decision) first present their case as taught by their sponsors and admirers, and then voice my own objections. My readers can thus read one-half of the argument, or all of it, according to their tastes.

No two-bid ever preëmpts. (Just what I have always said.) It must be made for informatory purposes purely.

No two-bid should be made to show lack of tops. (Just what I have always said.)

No two-bid should be made in no-trumps, because of a hundred Aces. (Just what I have always said.)

Now, mark this next argument:

One short year ago, the informers were claiming, teaching, insisting, that while a two-bid in a minor meant "Take me to

no-trumps," a two-bid in a major meant "Let me alone." I was insisting, claiming, teaching, that this was a thoroughly bad system. And what do the informers say now? That such a system proved "too complicated and confusing for most players" (those poor "most players" who must be so amazingly stupid, and on whose backs so many burdens are laid), and that it has therefore been abandoned. In other words, players wasted their time learning it.

An opening two-bid must now mean one exact and explicit thing, namely: Six cards (at least) to the Ace-King-Queen—with, or without, outside help. The three tops, and three others.

A three-bid shows seven tricks.

A four-bid shows nine tricks.

A five-bid shows eleven tricks.

A preëmptive bid in either major generally shows shortness in the other major. The effort is to shut out that other major, should it be adversely held.

A preëmptive bid in a minor should never be made, unless the hand promises a probable game. (And that, of course, should be plain to the blindest.)

A preëmptive bid should never be made

on a very strong hand, one that fears no adverse bid, one that is sure of obtaining the contract no matter what happens. This, too, must be clear to anyone. If you are not afraid, don't scream. It is better to hear any possible adverse bids (thus placing honours), or to get the contract as low as possible (thus making possible many tentative finesses barred by the very high bid).

Preëmptive bids should nearly always be confined to suit.

Preëmptive bids are rarely successful after either adversary has bid. It would be a vain effort to try to block information which has already been given. There are, however, many exceptions to this, as here: your adversary has bid one major; you hold a singleton of his suit, great length and strength in some other suit (preferably the other major) and considerable side-strength. By bidding your hand to its ultimate safe limit, you may shut out possible raises from the second adversary. These raises, once given, might enable the two adversaries to obtain the bid ultimately, to push you to defeat, or to decide to take a small defeat themselves rather than let you play the hand. This I quite admit.

To sum up the preëmptive principles in a few words, a one-bid or a two-bid is purely informatory, while any bid higher than two is intended to preëmpt.

And now for my objections:

First, preëmptive bidding spoils teamwork between partners. It seems odd that the same players who are so anxious to "inform" before they will take a risk on real bidding, discard utterly this care when it comes to preëmptive opening-bids.

A preëmptive bid spoils all warnings from partner.

A partner is the most important person at the table, the one most necessary to please. *And the preëmptive bidder gives not one thought to him.* So anxious is such a bidder to inconvenience his adversaries, it never occurs to him that he might be inconveniencing his partner *and no one else.*

Take this hand:



I should think that any preëmptive bidder, in Z's place, would certainly open with at least three spades. Y (*the only person who has the slightest desire to bid against Z*), would clearly hesitate to say four hearts; it is an impossible bid; it is an equally impossible situation, *created solely by Z's greed.* Z can not possibly take game. He can not possibly make his bid. He has inconvenienced no adversary. He has greatly inconvenienced his partner—who could go game in hearts against any attack.

Properly bid (that is, bid with due regard to partner's possible convenience) Z will open with one spade, A will pass, and Y

will say two hearts. Z might pass, might say two spades, or might say two no-trumps; in either of the latter two cases, Y would say three hearts, and would triumphantly play the only game hand at the table.

My second objection is that adversaries are not so easily silenced as the preëmptive bidders seem to think. If they have that strong suit that is feared, they are extremely apt to bid it as blithely against a preëmptive opening as against any other. They are even apt to bid it still more blithely—knowing exactly what the adversary fears. Partners are *silenced*, enemies are *goaded*. In such cases the preëmptive opening is *futile;* in cases where the adversaries weren't going to bid anyhow it is *unnecessary*. Rarely, indeed, is it *necessary*, *effective*, and *welcome to partner*, all at the same time.

Again (my third reason): Has it not often happened to you that a preëmptive bid from the adversary has told you (what you would not otherwise surely know) that he fears some other suit, that he is determined to play the one he has named, and that he can be dangerously forced in it?

Why, in the name of common sense, did your adversary want to tell you that? Why shriek

a secret? Secrets should be whispered. Why tell the world of a dangerous, but unsuspected, weakness?

Isn't it a bit infantile—a bit primitive—to think only of the noise one is making, and to feel sure that it will frighten the adversaries, without remembering that it will also tell them that one is frightened one's self?

To me, that seems too clear to miss.

CHAPTER III

THE RAISE

To players of the conservative school, the raising rules are very simple.

To raise a trump-bid, one must have at least two trumps (of any size). Then one deducts a "trick" from the hand, and raises as many necessary times as there are "raisers" in the hand.

The "trick" and the *first* "raiser" must lie in different suits. Either may be in trumps; neither need be.

Four things are "tricks," and six things are "raisers"—these same four, plus two more. In other words, all "tricks" could also be used as "raisers"; but there are two other things which are "raisers," which could never be "tricks".

"Tricks" are:

(a) Any guarded (or nearly-guarded) trump-honour. Or:

(b) Any four trumps (no matter how small). Or:

(c) Any side-Ace. Or:

(d) Any side-King (guarded, but not necessarily well-guarded).

"Raisers" are any of these same four things, plus:

(a) Any singleton in side-suit. (Worth two raises if it be an Ace, one raise if it be any other card). Or:

(b) Any blank suit. (Worth two raises.)

In both these last instances, the hand (counting on its ruffing-possibilities) must hold enough trumps to take the ruffs.

To raise no-trumps, *any* guarded honour is a trick, any other guarded honour is a raiser. Even Queens and Knaves, if guarded, can be counted on to win, whereas in a trump-make they might be ruffed.

The partner who first raises no-trumps must hold a stopper in the adversaries' suit, or suits. And that is all there is to it.

The informatory school demands much more for a raise. Their bidding requirements being much lighter (lack of top trumps and lack of a fifth trump being no bars), their raising requirements are bound to be much more heavy. Once more they count

tricks by quarters, halves, and wholes (if there be such a word); a half-trick is useless unless there be some other half-trick to raise it to a whole trick.

To raise a trump-make, the raising hand *must* hold at least three trumps (or two, to one of the three top honours), after which, tricks are thus reckoned:

½ . . . . . Any doubleton.

1 . . . . . Trump-Ace.
Trump-King (one or more small cards).
Trump-Queen, (one or more small cards).
Four or more small trumps, headed by Knave or any lower card.
Side-King (one or more small cards).

1½ . . . . . Side-singleton.

2 . . . . . Side-Ace.
Side-King-Queen.

2½ . . . . . Blank side-suit.
Side-Ace-Queen.

To bid "one," originally, Dealer or second-hand, must hold *four* tricks, (the two "quick" ones, plus two probable ones). Raiser, (to go to two), must hold *four* tricks.

Third-hand, opening after two passes, to bid "one," must hold *five* tricks (one extra, because of partner's negation). Raiser (going to two), must hold *three* tricks (one less, because of partner's strength).

Fourth-hand, to make an original bid of "one" after three passes, must hold six tricks. Raiser (going from one to two), must hold *three* tricks.

In the conservative school, there are no "delayed" raises (with the possible exception of the all-trump raise, discussed in a later chapter). A raise is a raise immediately, or never.

As against this, the informatory school is less "informatory" on its opening-bid (which rather spoils its claims). It may be but four cards long, it may be more; it may have its tops, it may lack them. The partner may have a raise under the more favorable conditions, which would not be a raise at all under the less favorable ones. He has, therefore, sometimes to wait until he sees

whether his partner is able to go on unaided, then to give his raise on a later round.

If a Dealer, or a second-hand, go from one to two unassisted, he must have *six* tricks His partner may raise once on *three* tricks.

If third-hand go from one to two unassisted, he must have six tricks. His partner may raise him once on *three* tricks.

And the same is true of fourth-hand.

If a Dealer or second-hand go to three unassisted (having opened at one), he must have *eight* tricks. His partner may raise him on *two*.

The same is true of third-hand and of fourth-hand, and of their partners.

If a Dealer or second-hand raises his own bid to four, unassisted, he must have *nine* or *ten* tricks. His partner may raise on *one* trick.

The same is true of third-hand and fourth-hand.

These teachings come from the same instructors who changed the honour-count, *because it was too difficult for beginners to reckon honours by the same multiples as the corresponding suit-values*, and who substituted a universal count in multiples of ten. One rather wonders if they forgot their

beloved beginners in making this complicated scheme for bidding and raising.

Nevertheless, many players have told me that they are thankful for the changed honour-count, *as an offset to the losses they suffer on four-card bids.* What they lose on bidding, they can partially regain by lucky holding.

CHAPTER IV

THE INFORMATORY DOUBLE

LET me first present the case of the Informatory Double, as presented by its lovers.

Generally speaking, the double of one no-trump shows another no-trump and a desire to know the partner's best suit. The double of one in suit shows a no-trumper except for that suit. At least, it shows strength in all three of the suits not named by the bidder.

It is extremely necessary to distinguish between informatory doubles and real ones. Three things are to be considered: the size of the bid (very few low bids are doubled for business); the question of whether it is a suit-bid or a no-trump-bid; and the question of whether the doubler's partner has already bid. Also, whether the double is made at the first chance, or is delayed.

The double of one no-trump, or of one or two in suit, is always informatory, *provided* the partner of the doubler have not already

bid, and also provided that it be made at the first opportunity.

The double of one in a major-suit shows that the doubler is calling for the other major-suit. His partner should always bid it holding *any* four cards of that second major —no matter how weak. He should, with this holding, choose the second major in preference to no-trumps—even with two stoppers in the adverse major. He should choose the second major (with any four cards) in preference to any longer and stronger minor.

Should he lack these four cards, he must still bid. With but one stopper in the adverse suit, no-trumps would be a long risk. The partner of the doubler should choose a four-card minor if he lack average high cards; but if the high cards in his hand be above average, he may risk the no-trump bid, even if he hold but a single stopper in the adverse suit.

He must bid a *three*-card minor (! ! ! !) if his only four-card holding be in the suit named by the adversary and doubled by his partner, and if such holding be very weak.

In other words, the partner of the doubler MUST bid, except in those cases where he

knows his hand, plus his partner's hand, can positively defeat the doubled one-bid, or two-bid. Then he may pass—sure of victory above the line. In this case, the bidder, knowing himself to be certain of defeat, must *redouble* informatorily. This will keep the bid open till it comes to his partner, *who must bid his best suit, no matter how poor.*

If a player bid, raise his own bid after an adverse one, and later double any adverse bid, the double is business.

But if a player bid, and then double an adverse bid (without raising his own), this double is informatory, is equivalent to a re-bid, and must so be regarded by the partner. It must not be left.

In numerous cases, when explaining informatory doubles, their sponsors say, "It should here mean thus and so, *unless otherwise agreed upon.*" It is obvious that to readers in various localities, I can not possibly explain what these "otherwise agreements" might be or mean.

Now for my side:

If the *adversaries* of an informatory double never help it out (by bidding) it will fail sickeningly often. The partner of the doubler *must* bid; it follows that his adversaries

mustn't. No matter how rich, they should leave the rescue-business to the partner on whom it is imposed—and the chances are long that he'll hate it. There are, I admit, some few cases where it pays to take an adversary out of an informatory double, but they are much rarer than the cases where it doesn't. The *habit* of doing it is very common, and it is deadly. A safe rule (one that has a few, but a very few, exceptions) is this: *Never take your adversary out of a false double, never leave your partner in one.*

This happened once to me:

My partner bid a no-trump, and I was planning to overcall, holding six spades to all five honours, when second-hand doubled the one-bid. I passed. I was bound to have a second chance at my spades, because one of two things must happen: either third-hand must bid, or (should he pass), my partner must redouble informatorily. Third-hand, after long hesitation, bid "Two spades" on four to a seven—his only four-card suit. My partner, with a singleton spade, passed, so did the doubler, *and so did I!* We took ten tricks, our book being five. It was pointed out to me by the disgruntled adversary that I had thrown away a game. A

game! We had made the value of a rubber. Each trick that we took was worth fifty instead of nine. Our book was five, not six. No matter where you write it, I'd rather have two-hundred-and-fifty than forty-five. Eight, and nine, and ten, honours are scored above the line—yet no one seems to dislike them! Had this hand happened after we had scored one game on the rubber, I should have bid my spades; but on a clean score I greatly preferred passing. The one-doubler comforted himself thus:

"Well, anyhow partner, I don't regret that double. They would have gone game."

Game! Would you spend two-dollars-and-a-half to save forty-five cents?

The pity is that many players seem to take no account of a few little items like the following:

The many informatory doubles that fail.

The many that are futile—the adversaries playing the hand in spite of them.

The many that are saved by the adversaries—who rush to the aid of the doubler's partner, and by their own bid spare him the necessity of any unwelcome duty. They seem to think that the burden has been laid upon *them*—that *they* are the ones bound to

bid—so obligingly do they hasten to do it. The point is this: if the partner of the informatory doubler *wants* to bid, he'll do it even against an intervening adverse bid; and if he *doesn't* want to bid—was wondering with secret fear what he could possibly say—then the adverse bid helps and relieves him to an infinite degree.

And lastly (as an item to be noted):

How expensive an informatory double may be.

It "gets by" because it is so laxly and vaguely noted, remembered, and considered. By writing a hand on paper, or spreading it on a table, in demonstration, it is easy to prove how poor was the false double. Or else, how it was the adversaries who saved it. Or else, how it had no effect whatever, except to let the bidder place the strength against him. Full many a questionable finesse have I been able to take in the successful direction, because of the placing of the adverse strength by means of an informatory double.

In actual play, no one stops to discuss a hand at the time, very few remember accurately what is past, just as few reflect upon it. Repeated failures seem not to impress

while happy results are lauded and noted, often without the realization that the same result could have been obtained by straightforward bidding.

For very long, England stood out against the informatory double on purely ethical grounds of clean sportsmanship. In spite of constant persuasion, she insisted, that *consultation* between partners was no part of the game: that a player had three privileges —bidding, passing, and doubling—and that the informatory doubler did none of these things; that instead, he consulted (always a thing barred): and that conventions of the *tongue* were unsportsmanlike. All of which is true.

It is no excuse to say that as "everyone hears the double and understands it, it is therefore perfectly aboveboard." Suppose I deal and bid "A no-trump"; suppose the next player says, "I, too, have a no-trumper. Partner, what is your best suit?" That is heard and understood by everyone; there is nothing secret about it. But is he permitted to say it? He certainly is *not.* So he says *exactly* that, under the unassailable word of "Double."

Suppose, again, I bid "A spade," and he

has a no-trumper except for a spade-stopper; he wants to ask whether his partner can stop spades. Everyone would hear the question, it would be entirely open and aboveboard. Is he permitted to ask it? You know that he isn't. So he asks it by saying "Double."

For a long time, as I have said, England resisted the falseness, the softness, the convenience (?), of the informatory double. The Portland Club (possibly the greatest card Club in the world) legislated against its use in the Club's rooms. Many writers wrote against it. But at last, England capitulated and accepted its use by its admirers. *If there was nothing wrong with it, why did all those practiced players think there was?*

It is not the wearing away of resistance that proves a thing to be good; it is more likely to be the first shocked surprise that proves it to be bad!

In every generation there are acres of shifting sand and a very few bulwarks.

It takes strength to be a bulwark.

Even granting England's final acceptance of the false double, many of her best and most noted players detest it on the grounds that "It spoils the game." "You have to give the public what it wants," they have

said to me, "but it certainly spoils the game."

They further say that, as a matter of convenience, they consider the informatory double of suit much better than that of one no-trump. This latter, all practiced players agree, is a very risky business (yet it is the one most beloved by the average player). By doubling one no-trump, you are matching general (but vaguely indicated) strength against general strength—a doubtful proceeding, with an even chance of success or failure. In the other case, you are matching almost-general strength against announced strength in one suit—a much safer proposition.

One of the worst features of the informatory double is that, if used at all, it will always be over-used. Another is that there are countless opinions as to its proper use: on no other subject have I heard as many squabbles, disagreements, and criticisms, between partners.

And finally, it is unnecessary—in that its place can almost always be filled by straight bidding.

I will once more record my own substitute for the informatory double:

If my adversary bids no-trump and I have

another no-trump, I let him play it if the score is not vital. Against my hand he can not go far.

If the score is vital, I bid two no-trumps against his one (but don't do this unnecessarily unless you like trouble.) My partner will let me alone on general strength or on complete poverty; holding a suit that is five cards or more, he will bid three in that suit; a three-bid is one more trick than the accepted two-bid overcall from no-trumps —but it's a mighty honest extra trick.

If my adversary bids in suit, and I have general strength except in that suit, again I let him play if the score is not vital. Against my three suits he won't go far. If the score is vital, I take an honest risk and bid no-trumps without a stopper in his suit—the only situation where I would do such a thing. I'm facing the loss of the rubber and I'm trying to save it even at a risk.

If my partner stops the adverse suit, I am as well off as if I had doubled the one-bid in suit. If he has any five-card suit, I am better off, for he will overcall my no-trump by a two-bid in his suit.

And in any case, our sportsmanship can not be assailed by anyone in the world.

CHAPTER V

THE REAL DOUBLE

I SHALL never cease to be shocked at the number of doubles that are lost, nor at the nonchalance with which good players and (otherwise) good bidders regard their loss. I look upon one lost double in an evening as a tragedy, while two are a disgrace.

I may lose *chances* of doubling—I do; but I never lose a double. No one should, generally speaking. And I'd *rather* lose chances than doubles.

The player who habitually loses doubles is one of three things: stupid, grasping, or phenomenally unlucky. A stupid player can not tell a good double from a bad one; a grasping player over-reaches expensively; an unlucky player should beware of doubles.

On none but surprising hands should doubles be lost. *Bids* must often be lost, of course; they are frequently made in the full expectation of being lost—to save a

greater loss. But no one would ever *double* on purpose to lose. *A hand can not be played without bidding; it can perfectly well be defeated without doubling.* Therein lies the great difference.

On doubtful hands, it is better to be satisfied with fifties than to reach for hundreds.

Against an over-quick doubler, adversaries will never take bad risks—and one *wants* them to take bad risks.

No one should ever double the only bid he can beat. He lets his quarry out.

No one should ever double a non-game-going bid (thereby turning it into a game-bid) unless he is absolutely *sure* of defeating it.

No one should double solely on his partner's bidding, or hand. The partner is the one to do that.

No one should double unless he has the book in his hand; he should trust his partner for the odd, only.

Against the make, no one should count on taking a single trick in a suit of which he holds seven or more, if he, himself, is blank in another suit. One of the adversaries is too apt to be blank in his long suit.

Count *losers* to bid, and *takers* to raise or double.

Having doubled, the adversaries should take (generally) all the quick tricks possible. The higher the bid, the truer this is. The partner of a good doubler should never interfere with the double unless he can take a sure *rubber* (not the first game), by returning to his bid. Or else, unless he has lied in his own bidding (as by bidding on a Queen) and thus given his partner false hopes. The fact that he, himself, holds none of the suit his partner has doubled should not frighten him; that only goes to prove that the trumps are all piled up in his partner's hand—a much better arrangement than if they were divided.

And above all, no one should double on trumps alone, and especially on a long line of little trumps. I think this is the weakest and most idiotic form of double, and it is surprisingly frequent.

Here is an example:



It was the first deal on a new rubber. Z opened with "Three diamonds," A and Y passed, and it came to me (B). I said "Three hearts," and Z answered with "Four diamonds," which was doubled by my partner. Had I known his game as well then as I did later, I should have gone to four hearts; but feeling as I do about interfering with doubles, realizing that he sat on the safe side of the diamond-hand, that four diamonds were not game, that the score demanded nothing, that my partner surely would not have doubled a twenty-eight point bid (risking turning it into fifty-six) unless he were sure of defeating it, that he had not given me

a raise, and that I, myself, held four losers and a possible fifth (for a trump might make against me), I passed.

My partner had *three* raises for me, which he had denied. His four trumps to an honour are a "trick," his King of spades is one raise, and his blank clubs are two more raises. We should have made a heart small slam (losing only the Ace of spades). Instead, Z made a diamond small slam on a four-bid doubled: 384 points, 192 of which were a present from my partner—and a total difference of 532 points on the results of the hand, actual and potential! To say nothing of the fact that the adversaries, and not we, were game-up.

This same partner presently doubled an adverse bid of three hearts (on a clean score) and the adversaries just made it. The gift of another game!

Here is another remarkable double. This time I was A, and my partner was a player of really great repute. I had heard much of his game, I had heard him tremendously quoted, I had known of many questions referred to him for decision, but I had never seen him play; indeed, this was our first meeting, and I was greatly pleased when we

cut together. On the rubber-game, with the score at 24–20, this hand was dealt, (I was A):



The bidding ran thus:

Z, "One heart."

A, "Two diamonds."

Y, "Two hearts."

B, "Three diamonds." (Awful! Two little trumps, and the King of hearts marked as a loser.)

Z, "Three hearts."

A, "Four diamonds" (on honours, score, and partner's raise).

Y, "Four hearts."

B, "Double." (! ! ! ! ! ! !)

Z wisely refrained from redoubling, and of course, I thought I could help. I had those three major clubs all alone, I had the Ace of my own suit, and I supposed that many trumps were nicely bulked in my partner's hand.

Z made a small slam on a four-bid doubled.

B said he doubled "*on my bidding.*" Why not leave me to manage my hand while he attended to his?

That rubber could never have been ours, but why lose it so expensively?

A redouble may be as expensive as a double.

No one should redouble unless he is sure, not only of making his own bid, but also of defeating any adverse bid which may ensue. And not even then, if he would rather play than defeat. Of course, he can return to his bid, *but how does he know that he will get doubled again?* Here is a case where, in reaching for its shadow, the greedy dog lost his sure bone. I watched this hand played, and I thought the bidding was awful:



Z opened with "Three no-trumps," and A said "Four spades."

Z said "Four no-trumps," and A doubled. Z *redoubled.* A went to five spades (he could make four, and his honours would cover his defeat).

But of course, Z wanted to play that hand. He said, "Five no-trumps," *and no one doubled him!* His first redouble had frightened his quarry.

He made 270; he should have made 540. It was in his grasp, and he threw it away.

CHAPTER VI

THE OVERCALL ("DON'T TAKE ME OUT ON TRASH")

EVERYONE agrees that, in a trump make, it is apt to be inconvenient—if not disastrous—should dummy have a blank, or a singleton, in trumps. In all cases where one partner bids a suit and the other partner lacks, or almost lacks, that suit, he should overcall *if possible*. That is, he should go to no-trumps or to another suit *provided* his hand at all warrants it. He should not make any very poor bid—it is better to let his partner's bid stand; he should beware of *increasing* the contract unless with real reason—for he might hit a suit in which his partner was short; and he is relieved of all responsibility if the intervening adversary bid. You can not call a partner "off" when he isn't "on." The adversary's bid has done that for you; your mere pass is a signal of lack of help. Nevertheless, it is well to remember that

even in this case, any real bid made against your partner will warn him not to raise his own bid on a later round, and is therefore useful.

With the informers, a holding of three trumps (or two to a high honour) is regarded as the smallest demanded; with fewer, a player should warn, if possible.

It is in *no-trumps* that the question of an overcall arouses discussion. All players agree in wanting a *strength* overcall from no-trumps; the division in tastes arises over the weakness overcall. I admit that this is deadly when given unnecessarily, or on insufficient material; but I firmly believe that when properly used it is the greatest of saving graces.

In this discussion, for and against the weakness overcall from no-trumps, neither side is "right," neither is "wrong." It is a question of taste and of disposition, purely and simply. One man buys Bonds as an investment: they can't go up and they can't go down; he can't "make a haul," and equally he can't be ruined; he is the man who will believe in the warning overcall from weakness. Another man buys Stocks; they may go up or they may go down; he may make his

"haul" or he may be ruined; he prefers either chance to that of smaller safety; he is the man who will never want a weakness overcall: "Don't take me out on trash," he picturesquely begs.

IT'S TRASH, ONLY TILL IT'S TRUMPS. No trumps are trash—not even six to a seven-spot, or five to a ten. But in no-trumps they would certainly be the most worthless of trash.

To those who dislike all weakness overcalls it is necessary to give no instruction except this: never use them. Even if you like them yourself, never give them to a partner who dislikes them; but in this case, always ask him to give them to you.

Those who believe in weakness overcalls (and in these ranks I shall always enroll myself), must learn to use them aright, else they will become a deadly nuisance.

An overcall must be at least five cards long. (The informers permit four-card overcalls: the conservatives would never dream of bidding "two" on four cards).

A heart overcall must mean at least five hearts: they may be good, or poor: the hand may hold outside help, or it may totally lack it.

As with hearts, so with spades.

A diamond overcall must show at least five cards; they may be good or poor; *but the hand must hold not one guarded honour outside the diamonds*, not one single possible re-entry. With as much as one side-re-entry, it is better to let the no-trumps stand.

As with diamonds, so with clubs.

It is obvious that no minor-suit overcall should be made on a suit that is *established*—such as five or more to the Ace-King-Queen, or to the King-Queen-Knave. Even without outside re-entry, such a suit would be an enormous no-trump assist; the partner would probably hold at least two small cards, and could therefore use it. The object of a weakness overcall in a minor is—not to play the suit—but to save disaster. If disaster does not threaten, then there is no occasion for a warning.

It is a very rare no-trumper that can stand unaided, with never a trick from dummy, never a re-entry as a means of a finesse toward the strong hand. Such hands, alone, are safe no-trumpers if warnings of danger are to be deleted.

Now, a warning is useless if it is not heeded. The player who is called from his

no-trumper *should not return to it.* Except with a hundred Aces, or a hand so strong that it can stand entirely alone, or one so closely knit as to need no finesses:

WHEN CALLED OFF, STAY OFF!

With the deletion of weakness overcalls, no-trump bids are greatly decreased. Many are necessarily passed which, if bid, would have scored game-in-the-hand; many more which would score partial game (either by the no-trumper or by the overcall) and two such hands make a game: many a hand is thrown which might have been profitably played.

An actual hand which I have often shown is a startling example of the truth of these premises. I will here repeat it.

A dealer dealt himself this hand:

♠ A Q 4
♡ A K 5
◇ A J 9 2
♣ K 9 8

Anyone will admit that he held a beautiful no-trumper. He bid it. This was the distribution of the cards:



Z can not possibly make the odd at no-trumps, *for the reason that he can not get into dummy to take a single finesse.* He is forced always to lead from his own hand straight up to the enemy.

At clubs, Y goes game.

THOSE CLUBS WERE TRASH TILL THEY WERE TRUMPS. Not after.

Suppose Z should say to himself, (after a club overcall), "My partner stops clubs while I stop everything else." Suppose he should therefore go back to "Two no-trumps"! Still greater would be his fall.

WHEN CALLED OFF, STAY OFF!

Why does everyone agree in liking a suit

overcall from strength? Because it is easier to go game in suit than in no-trumps.

This is just as true of minors as of majors. There is no intrinsic difference in the suits; they are exactly alike in principle and in handling, in power and in pitfalls. Except for the difference in value, it would be easier to go game in any suit than in no-trumps (that is, any suit-bid can be less easily balked, less easily ruined, because the Declarant after exhausting adverse trumps, can play what is virtually a no-trumper for the adversaries while he, himself, has the added privilege of being able to trump in—an enormous advantage). No-trump had to be placed at the head of the suit-values; with a low count, it would practically never be played except on evenly-split hands with high cards in every suit. No risk would ever be taken in its behalf.

It is easier to go *game* in very big clubs or diamonds (unestablished, but very long) than in no-trumps. It is easier to go *safe* in poor (but long) clubs or diamonds than in no-trumps. It is never easy to go game in no-trumps with a dummy that takes not a single trick. And finally, it is much easier to win rubbers by scoring game in *two*

partial-game hands than by going down on both of them (playing no-trumps with a useless dummy). The reason that "only five out of every hundred hands go game from partial game" (if that claim be true), is that so seldom are the low suits given a chance. If no one ever plays them (preferring to grasp at impossible no-trumpers), naturally they won't often prove winners.

In the following hand, I was Z. The score was game-all.



I bid one no-trump—and I could not have made the odd. A passed and my partner overcalled with two clubs. B passed, because he was sure that neither could we go

game in clubs, nor could he (probably), in no-trumps or hearts. His judgment was quite correct. We played clubs and scored three-odd—which the adversaries considered extremely negligible.

The next hand was thrown, and the next was this, (my partner is now Z):



The bidding ran:

Z, "A diamond." Many preëmptive bidders would have opened with three or four; but with six losers in his hand, my partner didn't.

A, "Double."

Y (I), "Pass."

B, "A heart."

Z, "Three diamonds." (He knew now, from the double, that A did not hold a guard in diamonds, and that he therefore would not lose a trump-round. He knew, from B's forced bid, that he could immediately trump B's best suit. The false double had greatly helped him, had justified his modest opening, and had helped A–B not at all).

A, "Three hearts." (Misled by his own false double and its effect.)

Y, "Four diamonds" (preferring game to doubling, sure that his partner wanted to play that suit, and not sure of the position of the hearts).

Closed.

The lead was a club, and Z made just four-odd (losing two clubs and a spade). Had the lead been a heart, he would have made five-odd.

However, that first game was won in minors, and was one of the five-out-of-a-hundred that are said to be taken from a partial game.

As it happened, that sort of luck ran throughout the sitting, and our very considerable victory was due to the overcall principles that I have just laid down in this chapter.

CHAPTER VII

THE ALL-TRUMP RAISE

PLAYERS disagree about all-trump raises. Conservatives detest them. Nevertheless, many players insist that they must be given.

I do not like them even as a delayed raise. To pass a raise on the first round and give it on the second, should mean that is an all-trump raise (except by the informers). Even so I do not like it, because I have seen it fail too often. Your trumps and your partner's all fall together, the adversary is soon exhausted, there is no object in pulling trumps (just from yourself), and there may be little else in either hand; the adversaries will lead, and they won't lead trumps; they may well kill your bid before you ever get in. "I can't get in" is a speech that belongs to the infancy of Bridge. We all used to make it in the long ago when we both bid and raised on trumps alone. Then we got

wiser and demanded outside assets in both hands.

I admit that it is comfortable to know that the trumps are not all held against you. I admit that it will encourage your partner to go up in his suit if he has had a raise from you, and that often he stops—discouraged by your silence—when he might have been well able to continue. Just as surely as he discovers that you had five of his suit to the Queen, or four to the Ace or Ace-Knave, just that surely will he chide you for refusing a raise, even with nothing else in your hand—not another King, nor Ace, nor singleton nor blank suit. Just the same, I insist that an all-trump raise is an invitation to disaster.

The late Mr. Ernest Bergholt, an English writer for whom I have always had the greatest admiration, was a supporter of the all-trump raise, and I will show you an actual hand which he quotes. So unconvincing is it, one realizes that he can not have retouched it in the very least—it would have been the easiest possible task to have made it less assailable.



The score is not given. Z bids "One heart" without an outside trick; he has (in my opinion) a second-round bid, not a first round.

A says "Two diamonds," and Y "Two hearts"—on nothing but three trumps. B goes to "Three diamonds," Z to "Three hearts," A to "Four diamonds," and Z to "Four hearts," which closes the bidding. Mr. Bergholt pointed out that Z went down only 100, from which he deducted 40 for honours (English count)—a net loss of only 60 points.

That seems to me very remarkable bidding, raising, and passing.

In the first place, B has another raise which he never makes, and has no right to deny. With his Ace of trumps, his Ace of clubs, and his King-Knave of spades, he has a second raise which he should not shirk. His partner must have at least one quick trick outside trumps—else he would never have bid as he has done. It must be the King of clubs, or the Ace of spades, or both. A has a double for a four-heart bid, and either A or B has a double for a five-heart bid should Z essay it. A can make a small slam in diamonds with nine times honours; or, should he elect to play against a possible five-heart bid from Z (who seems to fear nothing from side-suits), he should double and score 300 points—from which Z would be very welcome to deduct 40 for honours. Even so, Z loses the equivalent of the rubber-value. But with a second raise from B, and with his own honours, A would certainly risk bidding the small slam which he can make. He would lose one heart-round and that is all, because he would get a club discard on dummy's fourth spade.

I will show one more all-trump raise. It was given to me in Paris by an Englishman with whom I was playing, and he will go to

his grave convinced that it was good. I am Z in the following hand. I do not remember the score:



I opened with a bid of "One spade" which I think no one will criticise.

A said "Two hearts," and my partner said "Two spades." B went to "Three hearts," I passed, and my partner bid "Three spades." B bid "Four hearts," I passed, and my partner bid "Four spades." B said "Five hearts," I passed, and my partner said "Five spades," which A doubled.

A (wishing the hearts to come to him) led a club, and I lost 400 points on a hand in which I held twelve of the thirteen trumps

including all the honours, and which I had continually passed after my opening-bid of one, and as soon as I heard the hearts opened on my left. I bid one, I was raised to five, and I lost 400 minus 45. A–B could have made a heart small slam, and I would gladly have had them do it. With all the cards against you, it is much cheaper to lose passively than actively.

CHAPTER VIII

FOURTH-HAND BIDS

It was once no uncommon thing to open the bidding in fourth-hand (after three passes), on the most ordinary hands and regardless of score; another bidding chance was thus given to every player, and the opportunity was often seized by delighted adversaries who thereupon proceeded to score game. Finding that this was very poor policy, players grew more wary and adopted the slogan: "After three passes, never bid in fourth-hand unless you can go game." The result of this practice was that many more hands were thrown.

A far better rule (and one now universally used by the conservatives) is : Never open the bidding (as fourth-hand) when to do so *might give the adversaries a chance of game.* In other words, an opening-bid from fourth-hand should (on a clean score) hold sufficient strength in both majors as to make it prac-

tically certain that the adversaries can not come in on the second round with a bid that might score game. Either they will have to bid in a minor, or their possible major-bid will be held in leash by the cards of the fourth-hand opener.

This hand would not warrant a fourth-hand no-trump opening on a clean score:

♠ K 3 2
♡ 9 8 6
◇ A K 10 4
♣ K Q J

This hand, on the contrary, would:

♠ K Q 9 8
♡ A K 6 4
◇ 9 8 6
♣ A 3

You should be able, either to play that hand yourself, or to stop an adverse game in any suit.

No one should open the bidding in fourth-hand unless he is willing to raise his own bid several times, unassisted. Particularly is this true when the adversaries have something on the score. I recall a hand which I once

held at the Anglo-American Club at Menton. I had had a long run of poor cards, and my present partner (on the hand I am about to show) was a very clever player. I sat fourth, and after three passes, I opened with "one diamond"—which certainly sounded idiotic. But these were my cards:

♠ A
♡ —
◇ A K Q J 10 8 6 5
♣ K Q J 10

I had no strength in the majors, but I was willing to go to a small slam unassisted. Even if I bid a Grand Slam, my honours would cover my possible one-trick loss. Preëmptive players would have opened with a six-bid. That would have lost me all chance of a possible double. I preferred to creep up, as though not so overwhelmingly strong, and possibly double my winnings. Should my partner bid anything, I should go back to my diamonds. The adversaries could certainly not bid no-trumps; after passing on the first round they could not probably, even by concerted action, safely bid seven hearts or seven spades (we were using

the American bidding). As it happened, no one else bid at all, and I made my small slam.

The informers, as I have already said, open the bidding in fourth-hand if they hold three quick tricks divided amongst three suits, or three-and-a-half quick tricks divided between two suits.

CHAPTER IX

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE HANDS

EVEN excellent players sometimes forget that not every good hand should be bid. Everyone loves to bid if he has the cards, and the hope of finding enough assistance with one's partner to make game possible, burns strong in every breast and on every deal. But the fact that a pass is often the best policy (even with excellent cards) can not be too strongly stressed. One hand will be sufficient to point this moral:

Z opened with "One spade," and A and Y passed. B held this hand.

♠ A J 9 4
♡ 4
◇ A K J 10 7 5
♣ K 6

He could have bid a light no-trump or a strong diamond, and he chose the latter course. What he should have done, was pass.

He could have closed the bid in a suit that he knew could not possibly score game, for his would have been the third pass. He had no reason to think that he could go game in diamonds, nor bid them to any very high point. Still again, he could not hope that his diamond-bid would send his partner to no-trumps, for that partner could hardly be able to stop spades nor to know that B stopped them. And what is still more important, B might start a more dangerous bid from the enemy, on the second round, and that was exactly what happened. Z–Y switched to hearts, and took rubber.

Against an opening heart-bid, Z should have bid his diamonds—defensively. Against any other bid (at that score) he should have passed—sure of saving game, not sure of making it, and from fear of a switch. And against an adverse spade, he should have been delighted to play. He had every reason to expect to make two diamond-rounds and at least one spade. Another spade, or a club, or a heart-ruff, or one trick in his partner's hand, and the game was saved.

All players should think twice before bidding once. They should remember that defensive hands are often as useful as offen-

sive ones; they may even hold as strong cards.

Holding a long and established minor-suit and having the lead, it is nearly always wise (on a clean score) to pass an adverse no-trump bid. Even with an established major this is good policy, unless the balance of the hand be strong enough to promise a probable game. Should you sit on the wrong side of the no-trumper, you would, of course, have to bid your suit (minor or major) in order to have it led.

CHAPTER X

CARD-PLACING (INFERENCE)

THE one great differentiation between expert players and merely good ones, is card-placing. Reading the closed hand by every spot, every play, every signal, every inference that can possibly be drawn, is the great hall-mark of the expert. It is, I believe, an ability that can never be unconsciously acquired—which never drops on one as a delightful endowment—but one which must be mastered by painstaking study.

A beautiful example of expert card-placing is shown in the following actual hand, Z being a college-student, and therefore a player of no very advanced years:



The score was 20–0 on the rubber-game, in favour of A–B. Z opened with "Two no-trumps" (to shut out hearts), A passed, and Y said "Three no-trumps," which closed the bidding.

The lead was the trey of hearts, and the deuce lying in dummy proved to Z that this was the fourth-best card of a four-card suit, and that B, in consequence, must hold six hearts. B's play of the King to the first trick, proved that A had led from the Queen.

The average player in Z's place, after winning the first round perforce with the singleton Ace, would next try a finesse in spades or diamonds. This Z was too wise. He

realized that the finesse would be straight into the long heart-hand, and that he would be defeated if it failed. He realized, further, that one odd hand is apt to make another odd hand; as he held a singleton in hearts, some other player might hold some other singleton—it would be worth while to find out. Having lost control of the adverse suit, he would play a few safe rounds and see what he could discover. He led the King of clubs.

The moment that A's eight fell, Z said to himself, "An eight on a first round. Aha!"

He led the Queen of clubs, and A threw the deuce of diamonds. At this play—the second card of the third round, the tenth card played from the entire fifty-two—Z read every spot in every suit in every hand, and made a Grand Slam. This was his process of reasoning.

A, having led from a four-card suit, could hold no five-card suit. Holding a singleton club, his hand must be divided into three fours and a one. Deducting that singleton from A's hand, there must have remained twelve cards divided amongst three suits—spades, diamonds, and hearts. Since no one of these might hold as many as five

cards, it followed that each must hold four. Had A held any four-card suit headed by a King, he would not have led from a Queen. He had therefore four spades, (but not the King), and four diamonds (but not the King). Four spades in A's hand, four in Z's, and four in dummy, left one for B—a singleton King. As with spades, so with diamonds. B's original hand therefore stood revealed as holding six hearts to the King, a singleton King of spades, a singleton King of diamonds, and the Knave–9–5–3–2 of clubs. Z dropped those two lone Kings on dummy's Aces, finessed clubs through B to his own King-ten, and scored Grand Slam.

Another beautiful example of card-placing was shown me by Mr. William Dalton. The hand had been sent to him by the late Mr. Elwell, who had played it while sitting in the position of B—that is, playing against the make. I have no exact copy of it, and it is two years since I saw it—and then only once—so the following diagram is approximate. However, in all essentials it is like the original hand. Z was playing no-trumps and the score was 20–0 on the rubber game for him and Y. It looked rather hopeless for A–B.



A led the five of clubs and B (Mr. Elwell) played the Queen. Z won with the Ace——seeming to have the suit well protected for at least one more round, and seeing his own short suit (hearts) apparently stopped in dummy. The situation looked very smooth as he needed but the odd. He finessed his Queen of diamonds towards dummy.

The moment that A played the *eight* to this round, B said to himself: "My partner holds no diamonds lower than an eight." The next thing he noted was that A *held no diamonds higher than the eight*, for there they all were in plain sight. A's eight was therefore a singleton.

Now B proceeded to card-placing, thus:

"My partner's five of clubs was his fourth-best. He has no fifth-best for all the lower clubs are held by dummy and me. He has no five-card suit, else he would not have led from a four-card one. *He holds therefore three fours and a singleton.*"

But this was not all: behold the second step of card-placing! B went on thus:

"My partner holds four spades, dummy holds three, and I hold two—so Z has four. My partner held four clubs, dummy held three, and I held two—so Z had four. My partner held one diamond, dummy held four and I held four—so Z had four. My partner holds four hearts, dummy has three, and I have five—*so Z has a singleton.* His hand, too, must be divided into three fours and a singleton."

B won that first diamond-round with his King, and instead of returning his partner's suit, attacked the Declarant's short suit. He led the five of hearts. Z's Ace fell, and A's attention was immediately attracted.

Z made his three diamonds—A throwing two spades and a club. Z next finessed the Knave of spades and A made his King. He led the Knave of hearts, with the result that Z *didn't even make the odd trick.* A–B took

four hearts, one diamond, one spade, and two clubs. The hand was lost to Z, the rubber was saved for A–B, all by B's card-placing and consequent switch of suit. Of course, the cards were exceptionally well-placed for inference, but how many players would have read them as well?

The only recipe that can be given for acquiring this habit of card-placing is the following:

Note habitually all cards played, but particularly high (or moderately high) ones played to early rounds. These always show short holdings. Short holdings in one adverse hand always mean correspondingly long holdings in some other hand; your own and dummy's you can see; the remaining one can be inferred.

Note always the *presence* of a high card or the *absence* of a low card on the first round of a suit—or on any other early round.

The moment that any other player refuses a suit on any early round, be on the alert to reason what he *must* hold in its place. How long must be his other suits? How high their top cards? What number of cards, in the suit refused by him, must his partner hold?

A player who refuses any suit on its first round, must have held originally thirteen cards divided into three lots, instead of four. Also the suit refused by him must have been divided amongst three players instead of four.

By reasoning habitually in this way, the ability to place cards is eventually acquired.

CHAPTER XI

NEVER SACRIFICE AN HONOUR ON YOUR PARTNER'S SHORT LEAD

THE precept, "Never Sacrifice An Honour On Your Partner's Short Lead" is so familiar, so basic, so necessary to the most primitive Bridge equipment, that it seems almost ridiculous to have to reïterate it. Yet experience shows that many excellent players are entirely ignorant of it. So often have I encountered this ignorance, I have grown very wary of making any short lead with a partner whose game I do not know.

All prejudice and criticism of short leads would speedily disappear if all players were instructed properly on this important point.

A short leader can never do any harm.

His partner can do much harm.

A short leader can never "clear the suit" for his adversaries—for the reason that, as far as he is concerned, the suit was cleared against him from the time the deal was

completed. He could never stop it, for he never had a stopper in it.

His partner is the one who should beware of "clearing the suit" for the adversaries. If he, too, lacks a stopper in it, then no harm is done by the short lead—and no good. The entire suit belonged to the adversaries from the beginning. But if the partner of the short leader *has* a stopper, and sacrifices it, then indeed does he commit the sin of clearing for his adversaries. *Let him hold on to this stopper till the last possible moment.* Even though he never makes it, let him use it as a block and obstruction.

A short lead is a singleton or a doubleton —higher of two.

An eight or a nine, led against any declared trump (as an opening lead) should always be a short lead. Any other card *may* be a short lead.

The way to detect a short lead (on the part of the partner and of the Declarant) is to use the Rule of Eleven, to look at the number of the suit held by dummy and by one's self, and to draw conclusions from what one sees.

The most striking example that I have ever seen of the harm that may be done by

the partner of a short leader lies in a hand which I have already published, but which I will repeat here. On its original appearance, I was A, and the deal was the first one of the rubber-game.



Z opened with "Three spades," and I led the nine of hearts. Dummy played the ten, and my partner, (who must have known that the lead was short, both from the fact that the card was a nine, and from the number in her own hand and in dummy) made the terrible mistake of "sacrificing" her Queen to the trick. Z made a grand slam, rubber, and 90 honours. Had my partner

withheld her Queen on the first round, Z could have made but two-odd, and would have been defeated.

The score would have been 90 minus 50 instead of 503; the difference was due—not to the short lead—but to the response to that lead. I could never have stopped hearts; my partner could, and sacrificed her stopper. Though she could never have made her Queen, she could have blocked the suit in Z's hand and made havoc. The short lead was the only possible one that could have defeated the bid. The response to it was fatal.

Properly played, on my nine of hearts, dummy should have played the ten—in the hope of enticing the Queen from B. B should have held on to this Queen, because I had told her plainly "I hold nothing in this suit." Was it sense for her to reply, "I have a nicely-guarded honour; let me get it killed at once"? Should she not rather have said, "Since you have nothing, let me block as long as possible, even though I never make my Queen"?

B would have played the trey, and Z—having failed to tempt the Queen to her death, would have been forced to overtake

his own card in order to unblock. He then would have drawn five rounds of trumps (else I would get my ruff, and lead through dummy's diamonds). On these five rounds, I should have followed, of course; dummy should have thrown the seven of clubs, the deuce and six of hearts; and B should have thrown: the eight of diamonds, the four of hearts, the Knave of diamonds, and the Knave of clubs. Her low club is the most valuable card in her hand: it is "get-outry," which she needs more than re-entry. If she holds no card of escape, she will infallibly be forced eventually to lead the red suits up to dummy.

If Z now, in the attempt to make B do this, should lead his Ace of clubs and follow it with the nine, B must throw the Queen on the Ace, and take the nine with the King. She should then lead her four of clubs—not caring greatly whether Z wins it or whether I do (I am A, you know), only ducking the necessity of leading a red suit to dummy. The play will turn my wretched hand into a vital one, and Z will never take another trick. If he has already made his King of hearts before throwing the lead, he is defeated by one trick; if not, he is defeated by two.

Of course, should the partner of a short leader hold the Ace of the suit, he will generally play it to the first round. That is not "sacrificing"; that is "taking." Whether he will return the suit at once or not, depends on what he sees in dummy and his own hand. Sometimes it is desirable to give a partner the immediate ruff which he has demanded by his short lead; sometimes it is better, by the knowledge gained on dummy's disclosures to forfeit this ruff rather than establish too good a thing for the Declarant.

Yet, on hands similar to this, I have been repeatedly assured by good players that it matters not whether they play an honour (as third hand) to that round, or withhold it, as "the honour is dead anyhow." This speech I have heard on both sides of the ocean, and very, very often.

One more example will be sufficient:



Z is playing hearts. A's only lead is a trump, or his singleton Knave of diamonds. The heart would lose him all possible advantage which might accrue to him through his long line of small trumps, so he wisely chooses the diamond. If B covers dummy's Queen, Z makes five-odd; otherwise, the odd only.

CHAPTER XII

THE ECHO; THE ONE-CARD ECHO

THE Echo, as generally known, is made on a partner's King-lead. To play high to the first round (King) and lower to the second round (Ace or Queen) is an invitation to a third round; it means one of two things: that you had originally only two of that suit, and want to ruff it on the third round, or that you have a guarded Queen which will be in command on the third round.

Another exceedingly useful Echo is when the partner of the leader wants the suit continued for reasons of safety; though he can neither ruff the third round nor take it with the Queen, he does not want his other suits led through.

No one should ever echo with an honour. The leader might take it for a singleton, and might accordingly lead a small card on the second round, expecting a ruff.

The One-Card Echo is used at no-trumps

solely. When your partner leads against no-trumps and dummy plays a card you can not cover, you should play—not your lowest, as would be natural on a trick already lost—but your next-to-highest: this to unblock, and as a signal to your partner, that he may the better read the suit.

An instance of the havoc resulting from the ignorance of this rule may impress:



It was a clean score and Z was playing one no-trump. A led his fourth-best diamond, and Z was immediately hopeless of the result of the hand unless luck should be tremendously with him. He put up dummy's King,

and B (who should have played the Knave) not knowing the one-card Echo, and realizing that there was no danger of blocking, played the deuce—both literally and figuratively. A, an extremely astute player, never dreaming that his partner could be ignorant of the Echo, immediately reasoned thus: "My partner has but one card higher than the deuce—or even his deuce may be a singleton. Should he hold one more, it can not be the Queen nor the Knave, else he would have thrown it to avoid blocking. Z must hold the Queen, the Knave, and two more. To lead the suit again would be but to establish it for him."

Z, being in dummy, finessed the nine of clubs which A won. No matter how much he feared A's diamond hand, and no matter how he played, Z could not avoid finessing into A's hand. A, winning the round, next reasoned that Z's strength must lie in the minors, with a mere stopper or two in the majors. Accordingly, he led a heart through dummy's King. Dummy played the nine, B the ten, and Z false-carded with the Ace, thus leading A to place the Queen in B's hand. A, coming in once more with a club, led another heart. Z went game, making

three hearts, three clubs, two spades, and a diamond. Had B played correctly, Z would have made the odd only, A–B taking four diamonds and two clubs. Had Z been of the informatory school, and had he feared any no-trump that held a weak doubleton, he would have opened with "One Club" and been left with it (supposing A to pass, knowing that Z could not go game). Z–Y would then have scored 18 on the hand, instead of 10—a negligible difference.

CHAPTER XIII

THE DISCARD

THOUGH some players still retain the old discard from strength, or from weakness (generally the latter), the really perfect discard is from Encouragement or Discouragement. Should the first discard be a seven or higher, it is encouragement—asking that the suit be led; should the first discard be lower than a seven, it is discouragement, asking that the suit be not led. This permits choice (low from a poor suit or high from a good one, according to the occasion and the balance of the hand). It also permits degrees of insistence—the higher the first discard, the more urgent the call for that suit.

Should a player feel that he lacks the material to make either of these discards safely and distinctly, and should he see that he will be forced to discard more than once, he can reverse the signal. To throw two discour-

agement cards in reverse order will turn them into encouragement; to throw two encouragement cards in reverse order turns them into discouragement.

Encouragement and discouragement cards are used in following suit as well as in discarding—but only on the leads of one's partner. Should your partner lead an Ace, he hasn't the King; you can tell him whether or not you have the King, by playing encouragement or discouragement on his Ace; he will thus know whether to drop the suit or continue it. Should the King lie exposed in dummy, an encouragement play from you would show the Queen.

CHAPTER XIV

CONTRACT BRIDGE

THIS new form of Bridge comes to us from Europe. Its special point is that *no player may score more than he bids.*

As yet, no Laws have been formulated and there are certain points which have to be settled definitely—as herein noted.

The score below the line is exactly the same as heretofore, except that no one may score more than he bids. All tricks over the contract are scored above the line at fifty each (100 if the bid be doubled, 200 if redoubled).

No honours are scored except four-in-one-hand (100 in all suits), five-in-one-hand (200), and four-in-one-with-fifth-in-partner's (150).

Four Aces in one hand count 400, or 200, according to previous agreement (one of the mooted points).

The rubber-bonus is another point of differentiation. The proper way is to score it at 400; only by placing it very high can it

be made sufficiently profitable to play below the line in a game where the score above the line is so heavy. The other way of counting the rubber is to give 100 honour-points for any first game, and 200 points for the second game. This would make the rubber-bonus 300, *provided* one side won two straight games.

Should the losers also have one game, their 100 points would offset the 100 points on the winner's first game, and the rubber would count but a paltry 200.

Slams are another point of differentiation. The proper way is to score no slam *unless it has been declared;* no player can get a bonus for a Grand Slam unless he has bid seven—then he gets a bonus of 400 points; he can not get the bonus for small slam unless he bid six—then he gets 200 points. As against this, other players score even undeclared slams: sometimes at 300 for Grand and 150 for small; sometimes at 200 for Grand and 100 for small.

There is a special Bonus of "Well-played" in every hand, for one side or the other. When the Declarant makes his bid, he gets a bonus of 50 honour-points for "well-played," and he also gets his overtricks at 50 honour-

points each. When the adversaries defeat a hand, they get a "well-played" bonus of 50 honour-points, and in addition, they get 50 points for each trick-of-defeat. The bonus for "well-played" (whether won by the Declarant or the adversaries) is doubled in a doubled hand, quadrupled in a redoubled hand.

The tricks-of-defeat are scored as in straight Auction (50 apiece in an undoubled hand, 100 if the bid be doubled, 200 if it be redoubled). EXCEPT IN ONE SPECIAL CASE, NAMELY:

As soon as one pair of partners have won their first game they become what is called "Vulnerable," and are open to heavier defeat-penalties. The next game will be their rubber-game, and *on any rubber-game the first trick-of-defeat is worth to the adversaries 200 undoubled, 400 doubled, 800 redoubled* (or, as by previous agreement, 100 undoubled, 200 doubled, 400 redoubled). It costs either two, or four, times as much as any other trick-of-defeat (as by previous agreement). To the adversaries who are not "Vulnerable," (not yet having scored any game), the first trick-of-defeat is no more costly than any other. For instance:

Z–Y have one game while A–B have none. If Z–Y play the next hand and lose, (the first trick of their defeat is worth four times as much as any other (or twice as much, as by agreement.)

But if A–B play the hand and lose, each trick of their defeat costs only 50 undoubled, 100 doubled, or 200 redoubled, as in straight Auction. But the moment A–B have won a game, they, too, become "Vulnerable" and subject to the heavier penalty. *All later tricks-of-defeat are scored as in straight Auction, even for "Vulnerable" players.*

The following table will show the scores above the line:

Four Honours in one hand (any suit).... 100
Four in one, fifth in partner's (any suit) 150
Five in one hand (any suit).....200
Four Aces in one hand (no-trumps)
400 or 200 (as per agreement)
Grand Slam, declared.....400
Small Slam, declared.....200

Or else:

Grand Slam declared or undeclared
300 or 200 (as per agreement)

Small slam declared or undeclared
150 or 100 (as per agreement)
Rubber 400

Or else:

First game 100
Second game 200

In addition:

For the Declarant:

Each trick over contract (regardless of suit) ..... 50 undoubled
..... 100 doubled
..... 200 redoubled
Bonus for playing any hand successfully (well-played) ..... 50 undoubled
..... 100 doubled
..... 200 redoubled

For the Adversaries:

For first-trick-of-defeat of Declarant's contract on HIS rubber-game .....
..... 200 undoubled
..... 400 doubled
..... 800 redoubled

Or, (as per agreement)

.....100 undoubled
.....200 doubled
.....400 redoubled

For all other tricks-of-defeat on ANY contract..... 50 undoubled
.....100 doubled
.....200 redoubled

Extra bonus for defeating any hand (well-played)..... 50 undoubled
.....100 doubled
.....200 redoubled

CHAPTER XV

SOME HANDS

THE first hand I shall show concerns a question of bidding. The score is 18–0 cn the rubber-game in favour of A–B and I am Z.



At the score I did not dare pass, so I opened with "One heart." A passed, my partner

said "Two diamonds," and B said "Two spades." From then on, I raised the diamonds against the spades (bid by B and raised by A) till they went to "five." It was in England, where it takes seven diamonds to beat five spades. Well, I bid them, I was doubled, and we made it. The first lead was the Queen of clubs, and my partner played the hand at an immediate cross-ruff. This he could afford to risk, as our ten trumps were in perfect sequence down to the seven-spot.

B–A could have made only two-odd in spades. I should have led a heart, because my partner's bid had denied that suit. He would have ruffed and (fearing the diamonds because we both had so many) he would have led three rounds of clubs (I echoing and ruffing the third round). Another heart from me, another ruff from him, and we should have had five tricks.

The great question, however, concerned my opening-bid. One man insisted that I should have opened with "Three hearts—to shut out adverse spades"—the old question of shutting out your enemy, with never a thought for your partner. "There *is* no such bid as one heart," this man assured me. He spends his life playing, is said to live by

it, is a strong advocate of all false and conventional bids—having learned them in America, but as much as a year-and-a-half previously, and of course they have since changed once more—and was considered a very brilliant player—an opinion in which I am sure he fervently concurs.

Now, not only could we not have made three hearts (two being our maximum), but the bid would totally have shut out my partner, who would certainly not have bid four diamonds, knowing nothing of my hand. Had I opened with three hearts I should have been left to play them, and I should have been defeated. Thanks to my opening "noise," my partner and I should never have known of each other's diamonds. Every time A took a heart-round he would force me with a spade. Losing three hearts to him, and ruffing the adverse spades, I should soon have been exhausted. Passing the spades (instead of ruffing) I should lose them all, and should throw away good cards. Endeavouring to force in my turn by leading my diamonds, I should have lost them to the wrong adversary—B.

An "informer" could not have opened that hand at all, as Z; it holds but one-and-a-half

points. A would have opened with a spade, Y would have bid diamonds, and the eventual result would have been exactly the same. The highly-vaunted new method could not have beaten the old and tried one.

Of course, had we wanted to be in the fashion, we would have comforted ourselves for the one-trick loss on my three-heart bid (if I had made it) by saying that "It was well worth it, to keep the adversaries from going rubber in spades." Never a word about our own lost rubber in diamonds!

Here is an instance of what I consider very misleading bidding. It was the first deal on the rubber:



Z passed, expecting to bid on the second round. A made the dreadful bid of "One club." Y, having that all too prevalent idea of shutting out the adversary, said "Three hearts." B, who might have been expected to raise his partner's bid, evidently knew that partner too well: he said "Four diamonds." Thanks to Y's preëmptive bid Z was now shut out; he had a "raiser," but no "trick" for the hearts; nor did he feel like attempting four spades, knowing nothing of the suit, holding two trump-losers, and three more losers in the suits adversely declared. Y made what seemed to be an unassailable double; had he, instead, bid four no-trumps, (as he could have afforded to do), Z, knowing then that Y stopped both clubs and diamonds, might have essayed "Five spades" and could have made them; against a heart-lead he could make five-odd, against any other lead, a small slam. The entire chance for scoring game in spades or no-trumps, was spoiled by Y's unnecessarily high heart-bid and his later double.

B, who might have been expected to switch to his partner's suit after the double, stuck to his guns and refused the increased contract. A could have made four clubs, B

made four diamonds *doubled*, and with them he made rubber.

Oh, those horrible doubles of non-game-going bids!

You will remember that A had bid clubs. Could Z (leading against the diamonds) with only two trumps in his hand, and with neither of them a stopper, be expected to lead his singleton club right into the adverse suit, in the hope of a ruff? It would have been a most unwarranted risk. He led the ten of hearts to his partner's bid.

B ruffed, and led a trump, which Y won.

Y (knowing his own clubs as Z could not possibly know them) might now have tried two club-leads. However, he could hardly have cared to establish dummy's suit. Instead, he led another heart—which gave B the game: his losses were two trumps and a club.

Certainly that game was a present from Y (considered the most brilliant player of his circle and holding the best hand at the table). His over-bid, his poor double, his second lead, were all gifts to A–B.

Here is an instance of the value of a weakness overcall ("But don't take me out on trash"). The score is love-all:



At no-trumps Z scores just the odd, (provided B blocks the diamonds as he certainly must). At diamonds, Y makes five-odd. Those diamonds were "trash" only till they were trumps—and so, with the balance of the hand—trash for no-trumps, aids in a trump call.

Here is a hand which should have been used defensively, and one in which the false double fooled its maker and ruined his partner.

A–B are game in.



Hoping for a no-trumper, Z bid "One diamond." Against this minor bid (from a scoreless adversary) A should have passed. Y would have bid a heart, or a no-trump. Against the former, A could save game. Against the latter, he could bid his clubs (in order to have them led) and could hope to save game—which, again, with a club-lead he could certainly do. Instead, he doubled —informatorily. Y (just about to bid hearts) passed, and B could do nothing but bid "Two hearts." A lovely instance of the usefulness of the informatory double. It would have been very nice had the *adversary* relieved the situation; it was distinctly

unpleasant when the task was left to the *partner.*

Z said "Three diamonds."

A (misled by his own false double) went to "Three hearts."

Y (unwisely) doubled.

A bid "Four clubs."

Y doubled. He led a diamond; Z made two rounds and A trumped the third with the nine, Y refusing to over-trump. A made one round of trumps, and led a small spade—won by Y, who immediately led another. B and Z covered, and A won. He made his Ace of hearts and lost the Queen to Y. Y led another heart, which A was forced to trump, or to lose. He went down 300 points, thanks to his own foolishness and his love of informatory doubles.

Yet, the hand being over and the cards hopelessly mixed, this was the speech that A made to his partner:

"It was a lucky double for us, partner. *They could have gone game in anything*—hearts, diamonds, or no-trumps."

Has that speech a familiar ring?

There was no suit in which Z–Y could have gone game, presupposing a club-lead from B against no-trumps (in answer to A's second-

round bid). Even had there been, it would have been a first game, not a rubber.

The following hand is an example of execrable play. It was murdered by a man who is a constant player. It is also an example of how a bluffing double can work against an unthinking bidder. It was the first deal of the sitting and I was Y—the other three players being men—none of them Americans.



Z said "One no-trump," A passed, and I said, "Three hearts"—having already discovered that innuendoes were lost on my then partner. Back he went to "Three no-trumps"—just the same.

A now entered the arena with "Four diamonds"; I answered with "Four hearts," and my partner with "Four no-trumps" (reasoning, I suppose, that he had the diamonds twice-stopped, although that was by no means certain, that I had the hearts, and that he had the clubs and spades).

A said "Five diamonds," I said "Five hearts," B doubled (just to send my partner back to no-trumps), and the ruse worked. Z bid the five no-trumps, B doubled, and I, discouraged (and realizing that my partner might not have a single heart, and that the King and ten might both make against me) passed. I could have made a heart small slam on a five-bid doubled. Z played the hand in a way that can scarcely be credited.

A, obligingly, led a diamond which Z won. Although one round would have established my hearts and given him a small slam, *he never touched them.* Seemingly obsessed with the idea of making the spades come up to him as the diamonds had so obligingly done, or else scheming for some unheard-of method, he made his two major clubs and led a small one—this in the face of the fact that A's refusal of the suit entirely placed it for him. B, winning the third club, led a diamond—

while I sat by in acute agony. Z won the diamond, *led another club*, and never took another trick. On paper it looks impossible, but it really happened. Z is a player in excellent repute at his card-clubs, and he was in entirely fit condition—neither ill, nor in any other way incapacitated. Brain-storm, I suppose—for which I had to pay equally.

At the doubled heart-bid we should have scored 246 plus honours; at the doubled no-trump we should have scored 310; instead, we lost 700. And we had magnificent cards —all the Aces, three of the Queens, and a King, eight of the twelve high cards.

On this next hand, I was Z, and A–B were 20–0 on the rubber.



I opened with "A no-trump," which my partner overcalled excellently with "Two spades." B said, "Three diamonds," and I said "Three spades. A raised the diamonds and I raised the spades. One more diamond-raise from A closed the bid at five diamonds.

I, feeling entirely confident that one or the other of the adversaries quite lacked spades, led the Ace of trumps, following it with another trump the moment that dummy's exposure disclosed the weak-hand ruff. The bid was beaten. Against any other lead, A–B would have scored small slam.

IN ANY HIGH BID IT IS BETTER TO LEAD THE SUIT THAT THE ADVERSARIES DON'T EXPECT, THAN THE SUIT THEY DO.

Nevertheless, though there was a reason for the trump-lead in this hand, it is too often made—right up to the Declarant's strength—because the leader has nothing else he wants to lead, because the trump-lead won't hurt *him*, because he has—apparently—never a thought that he might be ruining his partner's trump-holdings, or because—most maudlin of all reasons—he "won't lead from a King" (and concerning

this foolishness, see next chapter). As here:



Z bought the bid at "One spade." A led a trump, "because it wouldn't hurt him, and because he didn't lead from Kings." *It was the only lead which would give Z game.* Because A had few trumps himself, he had every reason to hope that his partner might have some. *Every lead through that partner might hurt him, and might help Z.* Anything that hurts B, equally hurts A—so the trump-lead *did* "hurt him."

There was but one re-entry in dummy, and consequently but one chance for Z to lead trumps through B. A's lead gave him that

second chance which he so badly needed. Any other lead that A could have chosen—from a King, from a Queen, even from split honours, would have held Z to three-odd.

Nor could Z have gone game in no-trumps. *He had a non-game-going hand, except for that present made by A's trump-lead.*

The following hand teaches a very useful lesson that I often wish were more stressed: *seek your partner's side-suit.* It was the first deal of the rubber:



Z opened with "One heart" on his honours. B said "A spade." Z bid his hearts to four, unassisted, A always raising the

spades, till he finally doubled the four hearts. Quick tricks were very necessary to A–B.

A led the King of spades. B might have overtaken and made his two major diamonds—which would have been his book, and would have left but the odd to his doubling partner. But the play would have established both the Knave of spades and the Queen of diamonds in dummy—they might have proved valuable tricks on which Z could get later discards, the Ace of clubs making sure re-entry. Z passed the trick because it was so very obvious that his side-tricks must lie in diamonds.

A's next lead was the King of clubs. This established the suit definitely for Z–Y. It also killed the value of A's own guarded Knave of trumps. Should A take the ruff he was inviting, he would never win a trump-round. The ruff was therefore no blessing.

Z killed the King of clubs, made his three major hearts, and gave A his Knave. Opportunity was once more in A's grasp; the only possible lead was a diamond. Instead he led a spade "to force the strong hand." It was a piece of luck for which Z might have prayed—without, however, much hope of an

answer. But he got it. What cared he for the "force"? He took it blithely, discarded his two losing diamonds on dummy's clubs (so obligingly established by A), and made his doubled bid.

The next lesson is this: Don't play unusual hands in a commonplace way.



The score was 27–0 on the rubber-game in favor of A–B, and I was Y. The hand was played in an English country-house. My partner (Z) dealt, and opened with "Two diamonds." A said "Two hearts," and I (after some thought) said "Two no-trumps," which closed the bidding. I didn't like my

bid, but the score pressed; I couldn't raise the diamonds on side-Queens, and I had the hearts twice-stopped. I made four-odd; I should have been defeated.

B led the Knave of hearts, which I won. Dummy was now disclosed with his wealth of diamonds, and his two Aces for sure re-entry. Also, the poverty of his two singletons—for in no-trumps shortness is woeful weakness. In one of dummy's suits I was certainly well protected; I would scarcely have bid two no-trumps with but one heart stopper. *But what about dummy's other short suit?* That—rather than the hearts, should have been the point of attack. And it would have defeated me.

On winning the first heart, I led my *small* diamond. This was to make re-entry in my own hand, should the adversary win the trick and throw the suit back to me—in the hope of forcing dummy to lead away from the Ace-Queen of spades. The play was unlikely, but I had to think of everything that might happen. I, the bidder of two no-trumps, *hadn't a single re-entry in my hand.* Dummy had plenty. But if spades must be led by one of us, it should be by me.

On winning the diamond, A took two

rounds of hearts and gave me my last heart. And now, no finesse was necessary, because I had thrown dummy's three spades on the heart-rounds. Everything was mine.

Supposing A had overtaken the first heart-lead, and led a club to dummy's singleton. On taking this, I must lead a diamond. Winning with his Ace (first round or second, as he pleases) suppose A should lead another club—right up to blankness. B just covers anything that I play, and puts his partner in with a heart. They make three clubs, two hearts, and a diamond. I am beaten, instead of going rubber.

I watched the following hand played in another English country-house. Y was a player admittedly less strong than the others, and was extremely modest about his game. The other three were players of repute. It was the first deal on the rubber.



Z said "A heart." He was a player who did not believe that an outside trick is necessary. Also, he had honours. A passed, as did Y who—in my opinion—should have called a spade. B (a particularly steady and brilliant player) bid "One no-trump."

Z "Three hearts."

A "Three no-trumps."

Y (after a long hesitation), "Four spades."

Closed.

B led the King of diamonds, and then, seeing dummy's singleton, stopped. His next lead was a particularly thoughtful one. He saw that he and dummy had all the hearts but two, and that dummy held very shaky-

looking re-entry. If both those missing hearts were in Y's hand, A could trump the first round. If both were in A's hand, Y would get two immediate discards—that was the risk. And finally, if the two missing hearts were divided, one in each hand, dummy's long suit might be killed, as Y might never be able to get back into it. The chances were two to one in favor of the heart-lead, and B made it—leading his fourth-best heart.

Had Y been a better player, he would have taken the trick with dummy's ten. At least four hearts to the Knave were marked as being in B's hand, because he had bid no-trumps after the heart-bid. But Y played dummy's Queen. If he had now led a *small* spade from dummy, finessing with his own Queen and leaving the dummy's ten for re-entry, or if he had led the ten (letting it go through) and ruffed a diamond in order to get back into dummy, his hand would have been entirely unassailable. On the two major hearts he would have had two discards; by playing the ten to the first heart-round he would have prepared discards for all three of his losing clubs.

There is said to be a slight percentage

against a finesse in a ten-card suit of which the King lacks. That is to say, if Y had known as much as that, he would have played his Ace of trumps to the first round —and he would have lost by the play. It was a case where ignorance was bliss. But Y went even farther astray than that; he gave A–B their one chance of defeating him —and A lost it.

Being impressed with the fact that he could ruff hearts after winning the first round in dummy, Y led dummy's smallest heart. It was perfectly clear that he intended to ruff it. A should have passed the trick; then the trumps would have come up to his hand; or, if dummy trumped a diamond in order to put trumps through A, the heart-suit would be killed. A foolishly trumped the four of hearts, and Y made his four-odd. If Y had led a *high* heart from dummy, B would have been right to trump, to keep Y from discarding; but the play would have been fatal to Y. The lead of a low heart (forcing his own hand) was equally poor, but was rendered good by A.

The diamonds, never mentioned, would have proved A–B's best bet. They would have scored five-odd against any play. Z–Y,

going to five hearts, would have been beaten. In England, a five-diamond bid can be covered with a four-spade bid (36 over 35); these four spades Z–Y could safely bid, but not five.

The next hand seems to me the most subtle yet given. Proper finessing, card-placing, good end-play, forcing the adversaries to lead a certain suit, all have a share in its intricacies. It is the first deal on the rubber, which somewhat forces the bidding. In addition, each side has lost enough above the line to be unwilling to lose the rubber.



Z seemed to be on "Easy Street." He had both the deal and an excellent major-

hand. He opened with "Two hearts"—which merely goaded A into a bid of "Three diamonds." If he had to lose, he might as well lose in one way as in another. By playing the hand he would at least score his eight honours and give himself and his partner another chance at rubber. Moreover, *Z was evidently anxious to play hearts, and might be forced to the danger-point.*

Y and B passed, and Z bid the expected "Three hearts."

A and Y passed, and B said "Four diamonds." The inference now was that A had shot his bolt in covering the first bid, and that what side-strength there was in the combined hands of the adversaries might be looked for with B.

Z said "Four hearts," which closed the bidding. B might have made a very weak second raise, but with four of Z's suit, but two of his partner's, the two major spades and the chance of a ruff, the uncertainty of his club-King, and the fact that his partner's bid had evidently been forced (since it had never been raised by its maker) all conspired to induce him to play against the make. As a matter of fact, he and A could have made five-odd diamonds with

nine times honours, and the rubber with them.

A led two rounds of diamonds the second of which was trumped by Z. He led three rounds of trumps, landing in dummy on the third round. He then made a finesse which is made by nine out of every ten players—he finessed dummy's Queen of clubs toward his own Ace-Knave. The play cost him the rubber. B covered the Queen and Z won with the Ace. He now held a losing club and two losing spades. These, with the one diamond already lost, defeated his bid of four. He should have played the hand as follows:

Landing in dummy with the Queen of hearts, he should have led a small club and finessed his own Knave. The play winning, the King was marked as probably lying with B. *It should be Z's object to throw B in when he was unable to lead anything but a club*—from a guarded King to Queen-small in one adverse hand and Ace-small in the other.

It is always wrong to finesse an honour toward an Ace (Queen toward Ace-Knave, or Knave toward Ace-Queen) *unless you hold the nine, or the ten, or both, in one hand or the other:* the ten in a short suit, the nine, or

the ten in a long one. Particularly is this finesse poor in a very short suit; by covering, the adversary is nearly always able to establish a lower card for himself or his partner.

Now, as to card-placing:

A's refusal of trumps had placed four with B.

B's play of the Knave of diamonds to the second round had marked him as holding no more (four hearts, two diamonds).

A's play of the nine of clubs to the first round had shown that he held neither the King nor any card lower than the nine (King-eight-seven-six-five with B).

It is now proven that B has but two spades —*either or both of which must be strong.* Probably both, as he would scarcely have gone to four diamonds with only two trumps, had his side-strength been only a good spade and a very uncertain King of clubs. A had refused a second raise; B had given it. B has probably both the Ace and King of spades, and no other of the suit. If he has, Z can win the rubber. If he has not, rubber was impossible from the beginning. The sole chance must be taken.

On making the Knave of clubs in his own hand, Z must draw B's last trump. B has

now no diamonds and no trumps—nothing but spades and clubs. If both of his spades are winners, he must then lead the clubs; just what Z hopes! Z throws B in with a spade, and makes his four-odd.

Note that had Z, himself, held the Ace-and-one-spade, B would be marked with the King-and-one. Unless the bid had been five, Z would not try to catch that King—he would *want* B to make it on the second spade round, that he might be forced to lead a club. Z would make his Ace and throw B in with the King. Then the club-lead would come from B, perforce.

CHAPTER XVI

CONCERNING LEADS

SAVE only the lead from two touching honours and the fourth-best card at no-trumps, there is no lead that has not its foolish detractors.

One player detests all short leads—yet in their proper place (*and* with a partner who understands the correct response to them) they are often the only way of saving game or defeating the bid. A short lead is best made when the leader has a trump-stopper and *one extra trump*—the Ace of trumps with one, the King with two, the Queen with three—and so on; one trump more than a mere guard. At such times, the lead of a singleton is often very valuable.

Particularly when your partner has made a first-round bid (provided he is a conservative player and a sound bidder) and when you hold the Ace or King of his suit (and know that he *must* hold the other) is such a

singleton lead valuable. Don't open then with your partner's suit; open with your singleton; stop the trumps at the first possible moment, put your partner in, and you will get your ruff. This, however, is not the only situation when a short lead may pay. The only times when you should *not* make one, is when your trumps are either too poor or too good; with a singleton trump it is foolish to expect to get a ruff; generally it is foolish with a weak doubleton trump. And it is always foolish to ask for a ruff, or to take one, when your trumps are good enough to use in defeating the bid.

Another player does not object to a singleton lead, but detests a doubleton. And it must be admitted that this lead is not a very desirable one, if it can possibly be avoided; though short, it isn't short enough.

Still another player does not like to lead an Ace—for the reason that "Aces should kill something—Kings or Queens." Despite this reasoning, the fact remains that an Ace-lead (against declared trumps) is the second-best lead in the world—second only to that from two touching honours. It holds the lead; it gives a chance to look at dummy—to make a second lead through dummy's

broken strength; it gives the partner a chance to play an "encouragement"-card (seven or higher) and thus to say, "I have the King; come on." The entire scheme for the adversaries of a trump-hand, is to make all the quick tricks they can (Aces and Kings) before the Declarant gets in and runs the hand to suit himself.

The most foolish of all objections (and the most often reiterated) is the objection to the lead from a King. Someone once must have said (ignorantly), "I *never* lead from a King" and the entire unthinking horde must have echoed the chorus to the skies.

True, it is primarily a lead against no-trumps—but not marked by that fact as an impossible lead against suit.

True, it is not as good as a lead from two touching honours—but you don't always have those.

It is not as good as an Ace-lead, but you don't always have that.

And you must lead something.

But for these (and the possibility of a proper singleton lead), *it is the next-best of all possible leads.* Certainly better than the lead from a Queen, or the lead from a Knave, in that the King is higher than either of these

and will the sooner be in command. Just as an Ace-lead is better than the lead from a King, so is the lead from a King better than that from any lower card.

Its detractors urge that "You may lead directly up to the Declarant's Ace-Queen." So you may; but even if you do, you still have your King nicely guarded on the safe side; whereas, by making some foolish lead (to avoid leading from a King) *you may just as easily lead up to the Declarant's Ace-Queen* AND STRAIGHT THROUGH YOUR PARTNER'S KING—a pretty kettle of fish! Again, it is urged that by leading from a King, you may find the Ace-Queen right over him, in dummy; true again—but don't weep. You may rest assured that if you hadn't led the suit, the Declarant would, at the first chance; he'd take the finesse right through your King. What have you lost by the play?

Believe me, you'll lose much more by foolish leads than by a good solid lead from a King.

The one lead that seems to me absolutely pernicious is the antiquated one of "top of nothing"—the highest of three or four worthless cards. If anyone ever was advantaged by that lead I certainly was not there

to see it. What does it mean? What can it gain? What can it establish? If a doubleton, the top-of-two, is too long to be a good lead, certainly the top-of-three is worse. The lead is senseless, and may well confuse one's partner. Were it a real "short" lead, he should never "sacrifice" any possible honour he might hold. Were it top of trash, he *might* (by putting up his honour) establish for you a third or fourth round. How is he to know?

In the one case he would be establishing the suit for the adversary; in the other, for his partner. And there is no way by which he can tell the one situation from the other.

CHAPTER XVII

"ALWAYS"

EXCEPT in the case of the LAWS—which may never be broken with impunity—the word "always" is as poor at Bridge as in Love. There *is* no Always.

Think of the players who "always" cover an honour with an honour—regardless of whether they are establishing a lower card for the adversaries or for themselves.

Think of those who "always" play "Second-hand low, third-hand high, fourth-hand take it if he can." (Horrible! The rheumatism of Bridge!)

Think of those who "always" draw trumps the moment they get in—regardless of whether dummy should first get a few weak-hand ruffs!

Think of those who "always" do *anything*. And pray to be delivered.

This I saw:

A player led the Queen of clubs against

no-trumps and dummy went down with a singleton club. The partner of the leader held King-seven-trey-deuce. Now the play here is *generally* the King on the partner's Queen, as a signal and to unblock—but not *always*. That Queen might have meant either Ace-Queen-Knave and others (in which case the King would have been the proper play) or it might have meant Queen-Knave-ten and *one* other—leaving the Ace and three others with the Declarant. Now, should two of these others happen to be the nine and eight, the play of the King on the Queen would establish infallibly two rounds of the suit for the Declarant. The partner of the leader considered all this, saw he could not possibly block the suit in any case, saw that he could give encouragement with a seven-spot, and played that card. To his surprise, the leader immediately dropped the suit. At the end of the hand, it was disclosed that the leader—who had held five clubs to the Ace-Queen-Knave, *and a sure re-entry in a guarded King of spades*—had dropped the suit because its King had not fallen, and he made subsequently great outcry, thus: "You must ALWAYS play the King on the Queen. Anyone will tell you that."

Not anyone who knows a little more than the mere general rule.

The trouble there was with the leader. The proper lead was the *Ace* of clubs—not the Queen. The lead of an Ace against no-trumps calls for the throw of your partner's highest; it discloses plainly the situation; it cannot be ambiguous; it cannot mean either of two things; with a sure re-entry card it was the only correct lead.

There are certain obligatory plays in certain clearly-defined situations. This leader —who could so easily have made the situation clear, instead made it ambiguous—and then took refuge behind the much-abused word of "always."

CHAPTER XVIII

LAWS AND RULES

I FIND it very irritating when people fail to differentiate between the *Laws* of Bridge and its mere *rules*. They are as distinct and separate in the game as in Life itself.

Laws set values and standards; in Bridge, the suit and honour values, the count for rubber, for slam, for defeats and victories; in Life, all values and standards—for currency, weights, measures, and so on.

Laws provide protection for one individual against another; they name specifically the punishments for those who transgress them —this punishment for this sin, that for that. They may be broken ignorantly, carelessly, or wilfully—but the punishment remains the same.

No one may say, "I will keep this Law, but not that one." He may not choose his favourite Laws and discard all others.

Rules are mere formulas which are better

kept, but whose infringement incurs no set punishment. They may even differ with different individuals. One man may make certain rules for his life, another may make different ones. It may be your rule to take cold tubs in the morning, it may be mine to take hot ones at night. No one will interfere with either system; there is no punishment for evading either, neither, or both. Other rules may be practically universal: working by day, sleeping by night, eating at certain set periods; even so, there is no punishment for breaking them.

Rules should be followed—*generally*.

Laws *must* be kept—*always*.

In Bridge, there are rules for leading. You are foolish if you do not learn and follow them, for otherwise you will confuse your partners disgustingly. But there is no punishment for breaking these rules—other than the probable loss of some of your possible gains.

There is the Rule of Eleven. If you are ignorant of it, or if you know it but neglect to apply it, you may suffer by failing to get the utmost possible from your hand, but you will suffer in no other way.

It is far different with the Laws. Break

one of those, and your offense will positively be punished, your enemy will have his sure redress. And mark you, you cannot choose to obey one and to evade another, and yet go scot-free.

If you choose to disregard one Law, I am at equal liberty to disregard another. As here:

You and I are playing against each other and I am scoring. The make is a spade, and I am playing the hand. During its progress, you quit a card and then take it back, or you drop one and restore it to your hand, or you revoke and don't want to count it, or you give your partner some forbidden information and beg off from the consequences. When that hand is finished, I may announce that I am going to score my tricks at 100 apiece instead of 9, *and I shall have just as much right to do it as you had to take your liberties.* It is a Law that sets the suit-values, and it is a Law that forbids you to do the things you have done; if you break one, I may break another; if you have a right to your liberty, I have a right to mine.

You positively cannot use the Laws as a *protection*, and shirk them as a *punishment.* Nor can you adhere to one and discard another.

CHAPTER XIX

CONVENTIONS

IT would be impossible to play Bridge without conventions.

But there is every difference in the world between conventions of *play* and conventions of *speech*.

Every lead is a convention. Every echo is one. Every signal, every first discard—all these are conventions, but conventions of play. That is what a card-game is—talking with one's cards. It takes skill to give these signals, it takes skill to read them, there is always the sporting chance of lacking the proper card and of having to circumvent that difficulty by the exercise of one's wits. Combined with judgment, memory, and inference, the use of these conventions is what makes card-skill.

In a perfect card-game speech should be absent. But in a bidding-game speech is necessary. *Only when such speech is used*

to cover the exact necessity of bidding and nothing more, can the highest ethics of cards be kept, the highest ideals of decency and clean sportsmanship upheld.

False bids—bids and doubles which say one thing and mean another—are conventions of the tongue and circumventions of long-established standards. It takes no skill to make such a set of speeches—anyone could do it; it takes no skill to learn them, a fool could master that; there is no sporting chance whatever—nothing short of suddenly being struck dumb could possibly cause inconvenience.

You may say that by bidding "A heart," I announce by word of mouth, that I hold the Ace, or the King, or both. That is true; but I cannot bid without speaking, and bidding is part of the game; my bid is honest and means exactly what it says—no more, no less; and finally, *I am assuming the responsibility for it, just as it stands.*

The word "Double" means that one wants the adversary to play his bid, and that one expects to beat it. It has been claimed that "Double" may mean anything one chooses; but unfortunately for that claim, the word has an exact meaning of its own, and one

which has been accepted for years. You might say that you could make the word "Book" mean "Horse"; but your couldn't, except by a false and artificial convention.

Suppose you and I are playing against each other. I say "One no-trump" and you say "Double." Why don't you say in so many words, "Partner, I too have a no-trumper—a hand of divided strength. Tell me your best suit." Why don't you say that instead of saying "Double"? *Because you are not allowed to.* So you evade the spirit of the Law while sticking to the letter, you force a false meaning into an unassailable word, and you get your illegitimate information across.

It is the same thing if I make a bid of one-in-suit and you want to tell your partner that you have strength in every suit but that. It being strictly forbidden that you should make such a speech, you make it again by the false use of the unassailable word "Double."

You may claim that this is all open and above-board, since it is not secret, since everyone at the table hears and understands it. *Then why have you been distinctly forbidden to say it plainly?* Everyone would

hear it then, everyone would understand it; yet you are forbidden to say it. So you say it unassailably.

A Bridge player has three privileges open to him: they are bidding, passing, and doubling. The one-doubler does none of these. He is too strong to pass, too mean to bid, and unequal to a real double. What he actually does is to *consult* with his partner—a thing specifically forbidden since the beginning of card playing.

What he really says is this:

"Partner, without taking the responsibility of making a real bid and running the risk of choosing some suit inconvenient to you, I'll tell you as nearly as possible what I hold: this will keep the bid open for you and give you a pretty fair idea of my hand. Then you tell me what you have, and together we should be able to get the hand without any real risk."

Pretty!

CHAPTER XX

PHRASEOLOGY

THERE is one American Bridge expression which I regret—both because it is a localism (understood nowhere else) and because it does not seem very desirable *per se*. It is the word "By" for "Pass" or "No."

"Pass" means, obviously, "I pass,"—a very terse, clear, proper speech.

"No," means "No bid"—equally terse, clear, and proper.

But "By" can mean nothing but "It's by me" . . . *What's* by you? Probably several things—two other players, a score-pad, perhaps a pack of cards. It is not an admirable expression.

Nor is the word "Set" for defeat.

Nor is the word "Bust"—quite the worst of the lot.

Knave seems to me a much more attractive word than *Jack;* the latter sounds like slang.

Deuce and *trey* are positively the only

proper terms for the lowest two cards of each suit. If you want to call them "twos" and "threes," you should then call an Ace a "One-spot."

CHAPTER XXI

OVERBIDDING AND UNDERBIDDING

OVERBIDDING is the commonest of faults, and a very expensive one. Underbidding, though much less frequent, may be almost as costly. To waste a good hand for lack of a raise that should have been forthcoming, to give away rubbers that might have been saved at the expense of one trick, is almost as bad as playing ridiculously poor hands, or continually spending six or seven dollars in the vain effort to save two-dollars-and-a-half.

It would be impossible definitely to fix a point at which courage becomes foolhardiness, or where conservatism ceases to be a virtue. With too weak or too wooden a partner you may long for a little dash; but with a constantly unreliable one you will certainly long for balance; and as you feel about your partners, so will they certainly feel about you.

It has often been urged that it pays to spend a hundred points to save the first

game, and anything short of five hundred points to save rubber—since 250, plus for one side and minus for the other, is the equivalent of five hundred. But I think this would be a very expensive calculation to live up to. Five hundred points above the line is a loss not to be taken lightly; and if, after such a loss, one loses the rubber in addition, then indeed is it a tragedy. And they nearly always are the rubbers that *are* lost—those whose rescue is so desperately attempted.

It is foolish to try to "save" a rubber when the adversaries are game-in. It is foolish to try to save one at any score, without cards. Unless they have held unusual honours, your adversaries can never win very big rubbers on their own bids alone. Penalties are what make rubbers mount. And penalties are what adversaries can never get except as a gift from one's self or one's partner. If they have all the cards they may score slams. Aces by the hundred, eight and nine times honours in the major-suits; but then, if they have such cards as that, how could rubber possibly be "saved" from their grasp?

We have all seen instances where a des-

perate bid on seven or eight cards to a Knave (and nothing else, and no other announced help from partner) has turned the tide, scored game, and saved a rubber apparently lost. But we have undoubtedly seen more instances where such a bid has merely increased losses.

Certain players seem actually to have the "hunches" they claim to have, and to make bids of this sort at just the lucky moment. But for most of us, I think plain old-fashioned common sense is the best guide. The best recipe that I know for proper caution, is to cease to think of the thing as a "game" with "points," but to turn those points clearly into the money they represent and then to multiply that amount by ten (this, because we play presumably for an amount which we can well afford to lose, and which would therefore fail to impress us). Multiply by ten the money represented by the bid: multiply by ten the amount you stand to lose by bidding, by refraining. Take exact account of the material at hand, multiplying and dividing not at all. Think of the result of the entire sitting (not of just that one rubber); think how much longer you have to play—to hope for better cards; think

whether it will pay to decrease the winnings of the previous good rubbers, or to increase the losings of the previous bad ones. Think of how well, or how badly, Luck has treated you at the present sitting —of whether or not you are playing "in luck."

And above all remember, in making your calculations, *the possibility of having your risky bid doubled!*

To forget this, might be to give yourself a very unpleasant surprise. Instead of losing the 200 of your calculations, you may find it turned into 400. Multiplied by ten, this would make a difference of 4000 points to translate into money.

And above all, we must remember that few partners are any more perfect than are we, ourselves. To demand solid and absolute reliability from a partner for ninety-nine hundredths of the time and then to expect him to show risky dash at exactly the right moment, is as silly and unreasonable as to hate him most of the time for his plunging and then to hate him equally because at a certain critical moment he refuses to plunge and reverts to caution.

It is like everything else. We cannot hope to "have it both ways."

CHAPTER XXII

LUCK

I BELIEVE in Luck, and I think it is a pity that so great a game as Bridge should have so high a luck-percentage. Chess is a perfect game because it is one hundred per cent skill. Roulette is one hundred per cent luck. Baccarat has two per cent of skill to ninety-eight of luck. The luck percentage at Whist, Bridge, and Auction (all children of the same family) has been variously placed anywhere from forty to sixty. It is certainly too high; the veriest beginner holding all the cards can beat the most expert player in the world. Nullos raised the skill percentage of Bridge enormously (and, since nothing can hold more than one hundred per cent) correspondingly decreased the luck percentage—but they were killed for various reasons: card-politics, their difficulty, and the fact that most gamblers didn't want their good hands spoiled.

In any physical game equipment and utensils play a very large part. With the greatest care the sportsman chooses his gun, his foils, his racquet, his clubs. Artists in every line are dependent on their implements; no matter how great their skill, without the proper equipment they cannot do themselves justice.

In Bridge, no man may choose his equipment—yet he is just as dependent on it, just as helpless without it, as is any other player of any other game.

Imagine putting a skilled tennis-player on the courts, armed only with an old rake or broom, and expecting him to vanquish perfectly-equipped adversaries. He'd never win a set, probably not a game, possibly not even a point.

I believe in luck because I have seen it. In my intimate circle—players with whom I have played constantly for years—there are conspicuously good holders who rarely have a really bad sitting, who rarely cut the weakest partner, who nearly always cut the cards that give choice; and there are just as conspicuously poor holders (though just as strong players) who rarely hold very good hands, and who cut unfortunately nine times

out of ten. All these players admit freely their luck—either good or bad.

Now this I notice: the bad holders may sometimes get disgruntled—but they do not get weak and they do not get selfish; they look upon easy hands as a wonderful piece of luck—not as a natural right. But the exceptionally good holders lose interest if their cards desert them for even a short time, or they get panic-stricken, or they lose skill. Also, they are apt to get selfish; having nearly always had undue advantages, they *want* undue advantages always. It's like the man who has always had to work and the man who has never had to work: the first expects it; the second hates it.

Now, we would none of us think very highly of a person who wanted more than his share of good food, good drinks, comfortable chairs; yet it is a very usual thing for Bridge players to want more than a fair share of the cards, and to be very elated over getting them—even to want them on every deal. That is what I mean by Bridge selfishness. The good sport wants just average cards and a good fight—with a chance of superior skill winning. It is one thing to *get* all the good cards—you can not help that; it is

quite another to *want* all the good cards—you can quite well help that.

To the claim that card-luck always evens up "in the long run," I reply yes, possibly—*if* by "the long run" you mean a million years. Certainly not in that portion of each human life that is spent at a card table. I mean, certainly not *of necessity;* it may, or it may not—for that is the very essence and nature of luck.

Nothing in Life exactly "evens up": not beauty, nor charm, nor wealth, nor health, nor opportunity, nor luck.

In the great *aggregate,* card-luck may even up—but assuredly not in each and every individual case. That *would* be a miracle—that no matter how much or how little a man might play, the Lord (or Luck, or mathematics) would see to it that before he stopped he should hold exactly as many Aces and Kings as every other player! ! ! !

When you think how many Bridge hands you have held in your life and that no two of them were ever identical—that probably very few hands in all time in all the world have ever been identical—you realize a little of the infinite possibilities of combinations.

Nothing is so unusual as *undesigned* rep-

licas, nothing more rare than exact evenness. Did you ever see a tree or a bush with every branch alike? A mountain-range with every peak the same?

Average holders always insist that luck evens up, because with them, it does. That's what makes them average; that's what average means. *But everyone isn't average!*

I know many "good holders" who will admit that their luck is far above average; I know plenty of others who love to think they win purely by skill. I know many "poor holders" who realize better than can any outsider how long they have to wait for a good hand; but of course, I also know many wretched players who are convinced that their constant losses come from bad luck, when everyone else knows of a very different cause.

CHAPTER XXIII

"GOOD PLAYERS"

I WONDER how many hundreds of times it has happened to us all to be assured that "So-and-so is a wonderful player," only to find on acquaintance that So-and-so shines by his reputation only, and that he hasn't the vestige of a claim to it! The mere fact that a player counts and remembers the cards doesn't make him a good player. The fact that he generally wins doesn't necessarily mean that he is a good player. Even planning his hands well and taking advantage of most of the offered possibilities needn't mean that he is a good player.

He may be excellently able to play his own hand and dummy's in combination, yet hopelessly at sea in card-communication with his partner when playing against the make.

I have met so-called good players who didn't know their leads, never heard of an echo, "never could understand that Rule of

Eleven" (or never heard of it), yet who (in spite of this last lack) religiously led the fourth-best card of their longest suit against a no-trump make—even though it made no sense to them.

I have met "good players" who *always* covered an honour with an honour, and boasted of the fact; who would finesse a Knave toward an Ace-Queen when the next card in the suit was a four-spot: who always gladly and joyfully availed themselves of the chance of a ruff in their strong trump hand, forcing themselves to exhaustion.

Yet they believed, and all their friends believed, that they were wonderful players.

They say it "takes a lady to recognize a lady." It certainly takes a good player to recognize a good player.

CHAPTER XXIV

YARBOROUGHS

A "YARBOROUGH" is a hand which holds nothing higher than a nine and (properly speaking) *not a single trump*. "Neither Ace, face, nor trump"—nor yet a ten.

There is no reward as an offset to such a hand, and there never has been. You may not throw it and demand a new deal, and you never might. Yet the belief that its holder may claim some consolatory offset is surprisingly prevalent.

They say that the name comes from a certain Lord Yarborough who—in the old days of Whist—was a notoriously poor holder. At the conclusion of a hand, any one of the players who had held very poor cards might say, "My hand must have been intended for Yarborough." He got nothing for it—it was merely a remark.

Many, many letters have I received asking what is the compensation for a Yarborough. Many players write me that they always claim a new deal on picking up a hand that has no Ace nor face.

What about trumps? A hand cannot even be called a Yarborough if it holds a single trump; and no one can say, on picking up his cards, that he has not a single trump—because he does not even know what the trump is to be until after the bidding has closed. Then he may find that he has a Yarborough, but he certainly may not claim a new deal.

Did it ever occur to such players, I wonder, that what may be poor for them may be very good for someone else? That if they want to play *their* good hands, the other players may have similar tastes? That to throw a hand (even if permissible) might spoil a Grand Slam with 100 Aces for one's partner? And finally, that if a player might throw a hand which he didn't like, the adversaries would of necessity be entitled to the right to *make* him throw a hand that he *did* like? In other words, if a player should refuse to play when his hand held nothing higher than a nine, his adversaries

would have the right to demand that he throw every hand that held nothing *lower* than—say an eight, or a seven. That would simply be the reverse of the medal!

CHAPTER XXV

BRISTLES (SHORT, SHARP, AND POINTED)

CARDS win.

There are few faultless players.

Players can bear the bad luck of others much better than they can bear their own.

No one wants to hear of *yours*.

Most persons will tell of *theirs*.

No one really enjoys losing.

The poorest losers are apt to be the most complacent winners.

Good card-manners are by no means universal.

Card-rooms are not the hot-beds in which courtesy and generosity flourish best.

Time-honoured superstitions—even if not actually believed—are nevertheless very generally regarded.

Most players have a beautiful faith in their own skill and knowledge.

The best players are generally the slowest to blame and the quickest to praise.

The most brilliant conversation in the world—the most sparkling witticisms—will not be appreciated at a card-table. Save them.

At a Bridge table one may learn many of Life's most useful lessons.

The time spent there is far from being time wasted.

TABLE SHOWING THE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF A CALL ON A 5 CARD SUIT OVER A 4 CARD SUIT

Number of cards in trump suit held by Z	*Number of cards in trump suit held by Y*	*Number of times in 10,000 deals*	*Number of times an opponent holds four or more trumps*	*Number of times an opponent holds five or more trumps*	*Number of cards in trump suit held by Z*	*Number of cards in trump suit held by Y*	*Number of times in 10,000 deals*	*Number of times an opponent holds four or more trumps*	*Number of times an opponent holds five or more trumps*
4	0*	146	146	146	5	0*	255	255	171
	1*	961	961	648		1*	1,390	1,390	525
	2	2,424	2,424	918		2	2,919	1,821	461
	3	3,108	2,004	498		3	3,058	978	116
	4	2,218	712	86		4	1,737	166	
	5	908	86	—		5	544		
	6	212	—	—		6	91		
	7	26	—	—		7	8		
	8	2	—	—		8	—		
	9	—	—	—					
		10,000	6,333	2,296			10,000	4,610	1,273

* Trump suit of Z denied by Y except he, Y, holds A, K or Q.

If a partner denies the trump suit when he holds 1 or 0 only, then if Z holds four trumps, in the remaining 3,990 cases an opponent will hold four or more cards in 5,226 of them, and will hold five or more in 1,502 cases.

Similarly if Z declares on a five trump suit and Y denies when holding 1 or 0 of them, then in the remaining 3,355 cases an opponent will hold four or more cards in 2,965 of them and five or more cards in 577 cases.

Calling on a four card suit it is 13 to 9 that an opponent holds four or more trumps. Calling on a five card suit it is 15 to 1 against an opponent holding the same number or more of the suit than the declarer. *It being assumed in both cases that the partner takes out the call when he holds 1 or 0 only.* (See above for exception.)

(Table compiled by William Clark of London and used by permission.)

THE MOST USUAL COMBINATIONS OF CARDS IN THE HANDS OF TWO PARTNERS

Combinations	*Percentage*	*Combinations*	*Percentage*
8.7.6.5	23.604	10.7.6.3	1.165
7.7.6.6	10.486	10.8.5.3	.655
9.7.6.4	7.285	9.8.7.2	.596
8.7.7.4	6.556	11.6.5.4	.596
9.6.6.5	6.556	9.9.5.3	.455
8.6.6.6	5.245	10.8.4.4	.455
7.7.7.5	5.245	9.9.4.4	.315
9.7.5.5	4.917	11.7.5.3	.238
8.8.6.4	4.917	10.8.6.2	.238
9.8.5.4	4.098	10.9.4.3	.202
8.8.5.5	3.319	9.9.6.2	.165
9.8.6.3	2.185	11.7.4.4	.165
10.7.5.4	2.185	10.7.7.2	.158
8.8.7.3	1.966	11.6.6.3	.158
10.6.5.5	1.966	11.5.5.5	.134
9.7.7.3	1.456	8.8.8.2	.134
10.6.6.4	1.456		99.271

(Table compiled by William Clark of London and used by permission.)

THE

LAWS OF AUCTION

AS ADOPTED BY

THE WHIST CLUB

TOGETHER WITH THE

ETIQUETTE OF THE GAME

---

13 WEST 36th STREET, NEW YORK

Printed in the United States of America

THE LAWS OF AUCTION BRIDGE

At a meeting of the Board of Managers of The Whist Club the following laws applicable to Auction Bridge were approved and adopted, to become effective April 5, 1926.

NEW YORK, February, 1926.

In offering its 1926 code to the Auction Bridge players of the world, the Card Committee of The Whist Club acknowledges with appreciation the assistance of the Committees of the American Whist League and the Knickerbocker Whist Club.

FOREWORD

For the benefit of the many players who have recently taken up Auction Bridge, the following explanation is made:

Laws are not drafted to prevent dishonorable practices; that they cannot accomplish. Ostracism is the only adequate remedy. The real object of the laws is to define the correct procedure and to provide for the situations which occur when a player through carelessness gains an unintentional, but nevertheless an unfair, advantage. Consequently, penalties when provided are moderated to a minimum consistent with justice. A player guilty of an offense should earnestly desire to pay the full penalty and thus atone for his mistake. When this essential principle is thoroughly understood, penalties are paid graciously and cheerfully, improper claims are not presented, arguments are avoided, and the pleasure of the players is materially enhanced.

THE LAWS OF AUCTION BRIDGE

PLAYERS

1. The game of Auction Bridge is played by four persons: two play as partners against the other two, each pair constituting a side.

CARDS

2. (*a*) Two packs of playing-cards with different backs are used.

(*b*) A correct pack contains fifty-two cards divided into four suits of thirteen cards, one card of each denomination to a suit.

(*c*) A perfect pack is one in which no card is torn, soiled, or otherwise so marked that it may be identified from its back.

(*d*) Any player may demand two new packs to replace correct and perfect packs, provided he do so at the end of a hand and before the ensuing cut. The opponents of the player demanding them shall have the choice of packs, unless the demand be made at the beginning of a rubber, in which case the dealer has the choice.

RANK OF CARDS IN DRAWING OR PLAY

3. The cards of a suit rank: Ace (highest), King, Queen, Jack, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2 (lowest).

RANK OF SUITS IN DRAWING

4. In the draw, as between cards of equal rank, the suits rank: Spades (highest), Hearts, Diamonds, Clubs (lowest). High wins.

THE DRAW

5. For the purposes of the draw, a shuffled pack shall be spread face down on the table. Each player draws by lifting a card from the spread pack and showing its face. If a player show more than one card, or one of the four cards at either end of the pack, it is a misdraw by that player and he must draw again.

FORMING TABLES

6. (*a*) A complete table consists of six members. In forming a table, candidates who have not played rank first and in the order in which they entered the room. Candidates who have played, but are not members of an existing table, rank next. Candidates of equal standing decide priority by the draw; high wins.

(*b*) Before the beginning of a rubber, a candidate may enter any incomplete table by announcing his desire to do so. Such announcements, in the order made, entitle candidates to places as vacancies occur.

MEMBERS LEAVING A TABLE

7. If a member leave a table, he forfeits all his rights at said table, unless he leaves to make up a table that cannot be formed without him and, when leaving, announces his intention of returning when his place at the new table can be filled; in which case his place at the table he left must be reserved for him. When a member leaves a table to make up a new table which cannot be formed without him, and does not claim the right to retain his membership in the old table, he shall be the last to draw out of the new table. When two members leave a table pursuant to this law, the law applies to both.

PLAYERS LEAVING A TABLE

8. (*a*) A player leaving a table may, with the consent of the other three players, appoint a substitute to play in his absence. Such ap-

pointment becomes void upon return of said player, or upon conclusion of the rubber; in any case, the substitute, when released, regains all his previous rights.

(*b*) A player who breaks up a table by withdrawing from a table of four at the end of a rubber, or who, after availing himself of the privileges of paragraph (*a*), fails to return before the end of the rubber, cannot claim entry elsewhere as against the other three players from that table.

DRAWING FOR PARTNERS AND DEAL

9. (*a*) A table having been formed, the members draw. He who draws highest becomes the first dealer and has choice of packs and seats; he may consult his partner before choosing, but, having chosen, must abide by his decision. He who draws second highest is dealer's partner and sits opposite him. The third highest has choice of the two remaining seats; fourth highest takes the vacant one. The members, if any, who draw lower than fourth, remain members of the table but do not play in the current rubber.

(*b*) If, at the end of a rubber, a table consist of five or six members, those who have played

the greatest number of consecutive rubbers are the first to lose their places as players, but do not lose their standing as members. The draw decides between players of equal standing.

(*c*) At the beginning of every rubber the players draw for partners and for choice of seats and packs.

THE SHUFFLE

10. (*a*) After the players are seated at the beginning of a rubber the player on the dealer's left shuffles the pack which dealer has chosen. All players have the right to shuffle, dealer having the right to shuffle last.

(*b*) During each deal the still pack is shuffled by dealer's partner, who then places it face down at his right (at the left of the next dealer).

(*c*) The pack must be shuffled thoroughly in view of all the players, but not so as to expose the face of any card.

(*d*) If any provision of this law be violated, any player, before the deal starts, may demand a new shuffle.

HAND

11. A hand begins with the cut and ends when the last card is played to the thirteenth

trick; or when any or all of the remaining tricks have been conceded by either side.

THE CUT

12. (*a*) Dealer, immediately before the deal, places the pack before his right-hand opponent, who lifts off the top portion and places it beside the bottom portion toward dealer, who then places the bottom portion on top. This constitutes the cut.

(*b*) If the cut leave fewer than four cards in the top or bottom portion; or any card be faced or displaced; or there be any doubt as to where the pack was divided, or as to which was the top and which the bottom portion; or any but the proper player cut; or any but dealer complete the cut; or any player shuffle after the cut, a new shuffle and a new cut may be demanded by any player.

THE DEAL

13. (*a*) The deal begins after the cut, and ends when the last card has been placed in turn in front of the dealer. Dealer distributes the cards one at a time, face down; the first card to

the player on his left, and so on until all fifty-two cards are dealt, the last one to dealer.

(*b*) Except at the beginning of a rubber, the player to deal is the one on the left of the last previous dealer.

CARDS TOUCHED DURING DEAL

14. If any player, except dealer, touch a card during the deal and thereby cause a card to be faced, making a new deal compulsory, the side opposed to the offender may add fifty points to its honor-score.

NEW DEAL (COMPULSORY)

15. I. There must be a new deal by the same dealer with the same pack:

(*a*) If the cards be not dealt to the proper players into four distinct packets of thirteen cards each.

(*b*) If, during the deal, any card be found faced in the pack, or be exposed on, above, or below the table.

(*c*) If, before play begins, it be discovered that more than thirteen cards were dealt to any player.

(*d*) If, during the hand, one player hold more than the proper number of cards and another less.

II. There must be a new deal by the same dealer with a correct pack if, during the hand, the pack be proved incorrect. The current hand is void, but all previous scores stand. The pack is not incorrect on account of a missing card if found in the still pack, among the tricks, below the table, or in any place which makes it possible that such card was part of the pack during the deal. Any player may search for it; if it be not found, there must be a new deal by the same dealer with a correct pack.

NEW DEAL (OPTIONAL)

16. During the deal, any player who has not looked at any of his cards may demand a new deal:

(*a*) If the wrong player deal; if the dealer omit the cut, or deal with the wrong pack.

(*b*) If the pack be imperfect.

In (*a*) the new deal is by the proper dealer with his own pack; in (*b*) by the same dealer with a perfect pack. If no legal demand for a new deal be made under this law before the

end of the deal, it stands and the player on the left deals next with the still pack.

THE AUCTION

17. (*a*) The auction begins when the deal ends, and ends after a declaration that three players in proper succession have passed. The first legal act of the auction is a bid or pass by the dealer. Thereafter, each player in turn to the left must pass; bid, if no bid have been made; make a higher bid, if a bid have been made previously; double the last bid made by an opponent, or redouble an opponent's double, provided no bid has intervened. Each pass, bid, double or redouble is a declaration.

(*b*) When all four players pass, no bid having been made, the hand is abandoned and the next dealer deals the still pack.

BID

18. A bid is made by specifying any number from one (1) to seven (7) inclusive, together with the name of a suit or No Trump, thereby offering to contract that with such suit as trump, or with No Trump, the bidder will win at least the specified number of odd tricks.

RANK OF BIDS

19. A bid of a greater number of odd tricks ranks higher than a bid of a less number. When two bids are of the same number, they rank: No Trump (highest), Spades, Hearts, Diamonds, Clubs (lowest).

INSUFFICIENT BID

20. (*a*) A bid, unless it be the first bid of the hand, is insufficient if it be not higher than the last previous bid.

(*b*) A player having made an insufficient bid may correct it without penalty if he do so before another player has called attention to the insufficiency, or has declared; in which case an insufficient suit-bid must be made sufficient in the same suit; an insufficient No-Trump bid, in No Trump.

(*c*) If the player on the left of the insufficient bidder declare before attention has been called to the insufficiency, the insufficient bid stands and is treated as if sufficient.

(*d*) If any player, other than the insufficient bidder, call attention to the insufficiency before the insufficient bidder has corrected his bid and before the next player has declared, the bidder

must make his bid sufficient and his partner is barred from further participation in the auction. In such case, the bid may be made sufficient by substituting any higher bid in any suit or No Trump.

IMPOSSIBLE BID

21. If a player bid more than seven, the bid is void, the offender and his partner are barred from further participation in the auction, and either opponent may:

(*a*) Demand a new deal.

(*b*) Require the declaration to be played by the offending side at seven (undoubled or doubled).

(*c*) Direct that the auction revert to the last legitimate declaration and be continued by his side from that point.

BID OR DOUBLE OUT OF TURN

22. An out-of-turn bid is void, unless the opponent on the left of the offender declares before either the in-turn bidder declares, or before any player calls attention to the offense.

When the out-of-turn bid is void, the auction proceeds from the declaration of the proper bidder, and the partner of the offender is barred

from further participation in the auction; but the offender may declare thereafter in his proper turn. When the partner of the offender is the in-turn bidder, such turn passes to the next bidder.

When the opponent on the left declares before the in-turn bidder, and before attention is called to the out-of-turn bid, the auction continues from that declaration and there is no penalty.

A double or redouble out of turn is subject to the same provisions and penalties as a bid out of turn, except when it is the partner's turn to declare, for which Law 26 (*g*) provides.

PASS

23. When, in his proper turn in the auction, a player does not bid, double or redouble, he must pass; he should do so by saying "Pass" or "No Bid," and the turn to declare is thereby transferred to the next player on the left, unless such pass ends the auction.

PASS OUT OF TURN

24. (*a*) If no bid have been made:

A pass out of turn is void; the proper player

declares, and the offender may not bid, double, or redouble until the first bid has been overbid or doubled.

(*b*) If a bid have been made:

A pass out of turn is void; the proper player declares, and the offender may not bid or double until the declaration he passed is overbid or doubled.

In either (*a*) or (*b*): if the player at the left of the offender declare before attention is called to the offense, the pass becomes regular, the auction proceeds, and the offender may declare in turn.

In either (*a*) or (*b*): if it be the turn to declare of the player on the right of the offender, a declaration by the in-turn player made before his partner declares is regular and calls attention to the offense.

DOUBLES AND REDOUBLES

25. During the auction and in proper turn, a player may double the last previous bid, if made by an opponent, or redouble an opponent's double. A double doubles the trick value of the last previous bid; a redouble multiplies by four the trick value. Doubling or redoubling

does not change bidding values, nor values of honors or slams. A bid which has been redoubled may not again be doubled or redoubled.

A double of an opponent's double is a redouble; a redouble of an opponent's bid is a double.

ILLEGAL DECLARATIONS

26. (*a*) A double or redouble, made before a bid has been made, is a double or redouble out of turn, for which Law 22 provides the penalty.

(*b*) If a player bid, double or redouble, when barred from so doing, either opponent may decide whether or not such bid, double, or redouble shall stand; and, in any such case, both the offending player and his partner must thereafter pass.

(*c*) A bid, double, or redouble made after the auction is ended is void. It is not penalized if made by Declarer or his partner, but if made by an adversary, Declarer may call a lead from the partner of the offender the first time it is the turn of said partner to lead.

(*d*) A pass made after the auction is ended is void; no penalty.

(*e*) A double or redouble of a redouble is

void, and either opponent of the offender may demand a new deal, or add 100 points to the honor-score of his side.

(*f*) A double of a partner's bid or a redouble of a partner's double is void. Penalty: the opposing side may add 50 points to its honor-score.

(*g*) If a player double or redouble when it is his partner's turn to declare, the opponents may consult before declaring further, and elect:

(1) To call the bid made before the offense the final bid.

(2) To call the doubled or redoubled bid the final bid.

(3) To demand a new deal.

(*h*) A player is not required to name the bid he is doubling or redoubling, but if he do so and name any bid other than the one he might legally double or redouble, his declaration is void; he must declare again, and his partner is barred from further participation in the auction.

CHANGING DECLARATION

27. A player who inadvertently says "No Bid" when meaning to say "No-Trump," or *vice versa;* or who inadvertently names one suit

when meaning to name another, may correct his mistake before the next player declares.

A change in the number of odd tricks bid (except to make a bid sufficient), or from Pass to any bid, may not be made.

By "inadvertently" is meant a slip of the tongue, not a change of mind.

Except as above provided, a player may not change his declaration; and if he attempt to do so, the second declaration is void and may be penalized as a bid out of turn.

CARDS EXPOSED DURING THE AUCTION

28. If, during the auction, a player lead or expose a card, it must be left face up on the table; and if it be a 10 or higher card, the partner of the offender is barred from further participation in the auction.

If the offender become Declarer or Dummy, the card is no longer exposed; but if the offender become an adversary the card, regardless of its rank, remains exposed until played.

If the player at the left of the offender become Declarer he may, before the Dummy is exposed, prohibit the partner of the offender from leading the suit of the exposed card. When

two or more cards are exposed by the same player, all are subject to the provisions of this law; but the Declarer may not forbid the lead of more than three suits.

THE CONTRACT

29. At the end of the auction the highest bid becomes the contract. The partners who secure the contract undertake to win at least six tricks (the book), plus the number of tricks named in the contract.

The partners who secure the contract become respectively Declarer and Dummy. The player who first, for his side, named the suit or No-Trump of the contract, becomes Declarer; his partner, Dummy. The partners who do not secure the contract become the adversaries: the one on Declarer's left hereinafter termed Senior; the one on Declarer's right hereinafter termed Junior.

THE DUMMY

30. (*a*) After the end of the auction, the play begins, and continues until the last card is played to the thirteenth trick. Senior leads; Dummy places his cards face up on the table and Declarer plays Dummy's cards in addition to playing his own.

(*b*) During the play, Dummy may not:

(1) Warn Declarer that he is about to lead from the wrong hand, nor tell him which hand has the lead. Penalty: either adversary may name the hand from which the lead shall be made.

(2) Suggest a lead or play by touching or naming a card, or otherwise. Penalty: either adversary may direct that Declarer make such lead or play such card (if legal) or refrain from doing so.

(*c*) Except as provided in (*b*), Dummy has all the rights of a player, unless he intentionally sees the face of a card held by Declarer or either adversary.

(*d*) If Dummy have intentionally seen any such card, he may not call Declarer's attention to:

(1) Any legal right. Penalty: forfeiture of such right.

(2) A card exposed by an adversary. Penalty: the card is no longer exposed.

(3) An adverse lead out of turn. Penalty: the adversaries, after consultation, may decide which of them shall lead.

(4) An adverse revoke. Penalty: the revoke may not be claimed.

(5) The fact that he has refused a suit by asking whether he have any or none of it. Penalty: Declarer may not change his play and is liable for any revoke resulting therefrom.

LEAD AND PLAY

31. When a player places a card face up on the table, his act is a play. The first play to a trick is a lead.

A lead or play is completed:

(*a*) By an adversary, when the card is so placed or held that his partner sees its face.

(*b*) By Declarer, when the card is quitted face up on the table.

(*c*) By Dummy, when Declarer touches or names the card. If, in touching a card, Declarer say "I arrange," or words to that effect; or if he be manifestly pushing one or more cards aside to reach the one desired, touching the card does not constitute a lead or play.

CARDS EXPOSED DURING PLAY

32. During the play the following are exposed cards:

(*a*) When two or more cards are led or played simultaneously, the offender may designate

which one is led or played, and the others are exposed, except any one so covered that its face is completely concealed.

(*b*) A card dropped face upward on the table, even if picked up so quickly that it cannot be named.

(*c*) A card dropped elsewhere than on the table, if the partner see its face.

(*d*) A card so held by a player that his partner sees any portion of its face.

(*e*) A card mentioned by either adversary as being in his own or in his partner's hand.

(*f*) If an adversary who has played to the twelfth trick show his thirteenth card before his partner plays his twelfth, the partner's two cards are exposed.

(*g*) If an adversary throw his cards face up on the table, they are exposed, unless such act follows a claim by Declarer of a certain number, or the rest of the tricks.

(*h*) A card designated by any law as "exposed."

PENALTY FOR EXPOSED CARDS

33. (*a*) There is no penalty for a card exposed by Declarer or Dummy.

(*b*) A card exposed by an adversary must be left face up on the table and Declarer may call it (*i. e.*, require its owner to lead or play it) whenever it is the owner's turn to lead or play, unless playing it would cause a revoke.

(*c*) Declarer may not prohibit the lead or play of an exposed card, and its owner may lead or play it whenever he can legally do so: but until played, Declarer may call it any number of times.

LEADS OUT OF TURN AND CARDS PLAYED IN ERROR

34. (*a*) After the auction ends and before Senior leads, should Junior lead or expose a card, Declarer may treat it as exposed, or require Senior (the proper leader) to lead a card of a suit named by Declarer. Dummy may call attention to the offense; but should Declarer and Dummy consult regarding the penalty, it is cancelled. Should Dummy show any of his cards before the penalty is selected, Declarer may call the exposed card, but may not call a lead.

If an adversary lead out of turn during the play, Declarer may call the lead of a suit as soon

as it is the turn of either adversary to lead, or may treat the card so led as exposed.

(*b*) Should the adversaries lead simultaneously, the correct lead stands and the other is an exposed card.

(*c*) Should Declarer lead out of turn either from his own hand or Dummy, such lead shall stand, unless an adversary call attention to the error before he or his partner plays. When attention is called to the error in time, Declarer must lead from the proper hand; and, if that hand have a card of the suit led from the wrong hand, he must lead that suit.

(*d*) Should any player (including Dummy) lead out of turn, and next hand play, the lead stands as regular. If an adversary lead out of turn, and Declarer play next, either from his own hand or Dummy, the adverse lead stands as regular.

(*e*) Should an adversary who has played a card which is a winner as against Declarer and Dummy, lead another or several such winning cards without waiting for his partner to play, Declarer may require said adversary's partner to win, if he can, the first or any of these tricks,

after which the remaining card or cards thus led are exposed.

(*f*) After a lead by Declarer or Dummy, should Fourth player play before Second, Declarer may require Second player to play his highest or lowest card of the suit led, or to win or lose the trick. If he have none of the suit led, Declarer may call his highest of any designated suit; if he hold none of the suit called, the penalty is paid.

(*g*) Should Declarer lead from his own hand or Dummy, and play from the other hand before either adversary plays, either adversary may play before the other without penalty.

(*h*) If a player (not Dummy) omit playing to a trick and then play to a subsequent trick, Declarer or either adversary (as the case may be) may demand a new deal whenever the error is discovered. If no new deal be demanded, the surplus card at the end of the hand is considered played to the imperfect trick, but does not constitute a revoke therein.

(*j*) Whenever it is suspected that any of the quitted tricks contain more than four cards, any player may count them face downward. If any be found to contain a surplus card, and any

player be short, either opponent of the player who is short may face the trick, select the surplus card, and restore it to the player who is short; but this does not change the ownership of the trick. The player who was short is answerable for any revoke as if the missing card had been in his hand continuously. Should the side in whose tricks the surplus card is found have failed to keep its tricks properly segregated, either opponent of such side may select a card from the tricks improperly gathered and restore such card to the player who is short.

TRICKS

35. (*a*) A player may lead any card he holds; after each lead, each player in turn to the left must follow suit if he can. A player having none of the suit led may play any card he holds.

(*b*) A trick consists of four cards played in succession, beginning with a lead.

(*c*) A trick containing one trump-card or more is won by the player who plays the highest trump-card. A trick containing no trump-card is won by the player who plays the highest card of the suit led.

(*d*) Declarer gathers all tricks won by himself or Dummy; either adversary may gather all tricks won by his side. All tricks gathered by a side should be kept together and so arranged that the number thereof may be observed, and the identity of each trick readily established. A trick gathered by the wrong side may be claimed by the rightful owners at any time prior to recording the score for the current hand.

(*e*) A quitted trick may be examined upon demand of any player whose side has not led or played to the following trick.

(*f*) The winner of each trick leads to the next, until the last trick is played.

ODD TRICKS

36. (*a*) Odd tricks are tricks won by Declarer after he has won six tricks. The first six tricks won by Declarer constitute his book and have no scoring value. If Declarer fail to win the number of odd tricks called for by his contract, his side scores nothing but tricks; but if he fulfil his contract, his side scores for all odd tricks, including any won in excess of his contract.

(*b*) When Declarer fulfils a doubled contract, his side scores the doubled value of his odd tricks in its trick-score; and, for making his contract, a bonus of 50 points in its honor-score. If he make more than his contract, his side scores an additional bonus of 50 points for each extra trick. When the contract has been redoubled, each bonus is 100 points instead of 50, and the odd tricks count four times their normal value in the trick-score.

ODD TRICK VALUES

37. Each odd trick counts in the trick-score:

With No-Trump	10 points.
With Spades trumps	9 "
With Hearts trumps	8 "
With Diamonds trumps	7 "
With Clubs trumps	6 "

Doubling doubles these values; redoubling multiplies them by four.

UNDERTRICKS

38. (*a*) The book of the adversaries is seven minus the number of odd tricks named in Declarer's contract; when the adversaries win a

trick or tricks in addition to their book, such tricks won are undertricks.

(*b*) The adversaries score in their honor-score for all undertricks; 50 points for each undertrick when the contract is undoubled, 100 points when the contract is doubled, and 200 points when the contract is redoubled.

HONORS

39. In a No-Trump contract the honors are the four Aces; in a suit contract the honors are the Ace, King, Queen, Jack, and 10 of that suit.

HONOR VALUES

40. Honors are scored in the honor-score of the side to which they are dealt; their value is not changed by doubling or redoubling. All honors held by either side are scored according to the following table:

TRUMP HONORS

0 in one hand, 3 in the other, count 30 points.								
1	"	"	2	"	"	"	30	"
1	"	"	3	"	"	"	40	"
2	"	"	2	"	"	"	40	"
2	"	"	3	"	"	"	50	"
0	"	"	4	"	"	"	80	"
1	"	"	4	"	"	"	90	"
0	"	"	5	"	"	"	100	"

NO-TRUMP HONORS

0 in one hand, 3 in the other, count 30 points.								
1	"	"	2	"	"	"	30	"
1	"	"	3	"	"	"	40	"
2	"	"	2	"	"	"	40	"
0	"	"	4	"	"	"	100	"

One or two honors held by a side are not counted.

SLAMS

41. Either side winning thirteen tricks scores 100 points for Grand Slam. Either side winning twelve tricks scores 50 points for Small Slam. Slam points are added to the honor-score. When Declarer's contract is seven and he wins six-odd, he counts 50 for Small Slam although his contract fails.

REFUSE AND RENOUNCE

42. To fail to follow suit is to refuse: to refuse when able to follow suit is to renounce.

THE REVOKE

43. (*a*) A renounce becomes a revoke:

(1) When a renouncing player or his partner, whether in turn or otherwise, leads or plays to the following trick.

(2) When the renouncing player or his partner claims the remaining tricks, or any of them.

(*b*) When one side claims a revoke, if either opponent mix the cards before the claimant has had reasonable opportunity to examine them, the revoke is established.

(*c*) When a player has incurred a penalty requiring him to play the highest or lowest of a suit, or to win or lose a trick, or to lead a certain suit, or to refrain from playing a certain suit, and fails to act as directed when able to do so: he is subject to the penalty for a revoke.

(*d*) When any player (except Dummy) is found to have less than his correct number of cards, and the other three have their correct number, the missing card or cards, if found, belong to the player who is short and he is answerable for any revoke or revokes as if said card or cards had been in his hand continuously.

REVOKE AVOIDED

44. A renouncing player is not penalized for revoke under the following circumstances:

(*a*) A renounce by Dummy must be corrected if discovered before the lead to the next trick.

After such lead, the renounce may not be corrected. There is no penalty in either case.

(*b*) Should Dummy leave the table, Declarer cannot be penalized for revoke, unless an adversary call the renounce to his attention in time to enable him to correct it.

(*c*) When a player refuses, any other player may ask whether he has any or none of the suit led; and if he admit that he has renounced before his renounce has become a revoke, he shall be subject to the penalty for a renounce, but not to the penalty for a revoke. Dummy may not ask the above question, if he have intentionally seen a card of another player.

RENOUNCE PENALTY

45. A renounce made by any player (except Dummy) may be corrected by such player at any time before he or his partner has led or played to the following trick. In that case there is no revoke penalty; but the player, if an adversary, may be required to play his highest or lowest card of the suit led. Declarer, instead of calling the highest or lowest, may treat the card played in error as exposed. A Declarer who has renounced may be required by either

adversary to play his highest or lowest, if the adversary on his left have played after the renounce. Any player who has played after a renounce may, if it be corrected, withdraw his card and, without penalty, substitute another; if an opponent have led to the next trick, that lead may be changed.

REVOKE PENALTY

46. The revoke penalty for either side is:

Two tricks for its first revoke.

One trick for each subsequent revoke (if any).

These tricks are taken at the end of the hand from the tricks of the revoking side and added to the tricks of the other side. They count exactly as if won in play and may assist Declarer to make his contract or to go game; or may assist the adversaries to defeat the contract, in which case they carry full bonus values. If they make the total twelve or thirteen tricks for either side, they carry the proper slam bonus. If the contract be doubled or redoubled, they count at the doubled or redoubled value in the trick-score of the Declarer, and carry their full bonus (if any) in the honor-score of either side. After surrendering these tricks, the revoking

side may score for its remaining tricks as it would if it had not revoked. If the revoking side have not enough tricks to pay the penalty in full, surrendering all it has pays the penalty: if it have no trick, there is no penalty.

TIME LIMITATION OF REVOKE CLAIM

47. No revoke penalty may be claimed after the next ensuing cut; nor, if the revoke occur during the last hand of the rubber, after the score has been agreed upon; nor, if there have been a draw for any purpose in connection with the next rubber.

CLAIMING TRICKS

48. If Declarer claim the remaining tricks or any number thereof, either adversary may require him to place his cards face up on the table and to play out the hand. In that case, Declarer may not call any cards either adversary has exposed, nor refuse to trump a doubtful trick when able to do so, nor take any finesse unless:

(*a*) He announces his intention to do so when making his claim; or

(*b*) The adversary on the left of the finessing hand had refused the suit before the claim was made.

CONCEDING TRICKS

49. (*a*) Declarer may concede one or more tricks unless Dummy promptly objects; but if Dummy have intentionally seen a card in the hand of a player, he may not object. If, after a concession by Declarer and before objection by Dummy, an adversary face his cards, they are not exposed.

(*b*) Either adversary may concede one or more tricks to Declarer, unless the other adversary promptly objects; but if the conceding adversary face his cards, they are exposed.

GAME

50. A game is won when one side makes a trick-score of thirty (30) or more points. A game may be completed in one hand or more; each hand is played out, and all points won are counted, whether or not they are needed to make game. No trick-points are carried over from one game to the next; each side starts a new game with a trick-score of zero.

RUBBER

51. (*a*) A rubber begins with the draw and is completed when one side has won two games; when one side wins the first two games, the third game is not played. The side which has won two games adds a bonus of 250 points to its honor-score. The side then having the greater total of points wins the rubber.

(*b*) When a rubber is started with the agreement that the play shall terminate (*i. e.*, no new hand shall commence) after a specified time, and the rubber is unfinished at that time, the score is made up as it stands, 125 points being added to the honor-score of the winners of a game. A hand, if started, must be played out; but if a player refuse to finish it, his opponents may elect whether it be thrown out or counted at their estimate of the probable result.

(*c*) If a rubber be started without any agreement as to its termination, and before its conclusion one player leave; or if, after an agreement, a player leave before the specified time, and in either case fail to appoint an acceptable substitute, the opponents have the right to consult and decide whether the score of the unfinished rubber be cancelled or counted as in (*b*).

SCORING

52. (*a*) Each side has a trick-score, in which are recorded only points earned by winning odd tricks; and an honor-score, in which all other points are recorded.

(*b*) At the end of the rubber, the total points of a side are obtained by adding together its trick-score and its honor-score, including the 250-point bonus if it have won two games. Subtracting the smaller total from the greater gives the net points by which the rubber is won and lost.

(*c*) A proved error in the honor-score may be corrected at any time before the score of the rubber has been made up and agreed upon.

(*d*) A proved error in the trick-score may be corrected at any time before the next auction begins: or, if the error occur in the final hand of the rubber, before the score has been made up and agreed upon.

(*e*) A proved error in addition or subtraction may be corrected whenever discovered.

CONSULTATION AND SELECTION OF PENALTIES

53. Laws that give "either partner," "either opponent," etc., the right to exact a penalty do not permit consultation.

(*a*) If either partner suggest or name a penalty, he is deemed to have selected it.

(*b*) If either direct the other to select a penalty, the latter must do so; and, if an attempt be made to refer the privilege back, the penalty is cancelled.

(*c*) If either say (in effect), "Which of us is to select the penalty?" the penalty is cancelled.

(*d*) A proper penalty once selected may not be changed.

(*e*) If a wrong penalty be selected, the selection must be corrected upon request of either opponent.

(*f*) If a wrong penalty be selected and paid without challenge, the selection may not be changed.

(*g*) A reasonable time must be allowed for the selection of a penalty.

(*h*) If, instead of exacting a penalty at the proper time, either opponent of the side in error declare or play, no penalty may be exacted.

INFORMATION

54. (*a*) During the auction, information must be given concerning its details; but, after it is

ended, should either adversary or Dummy inform his partner regarding any detail of the auction, except the contract, Declarer or either adversary (as the case may be) may call a lead the next time it is the turn of the offending side to lead. At any time during the play, any player inquiring must be told the final bid, and whether it was doubled or redoubled; but no information may be given as to who doubled or redoubled.

(*b*) Any player (except Dummy) may, before a trick is turned and quitted, demand that the cards so far played be indicated by their respective players; but should either adversary, in the absence of such demand, in any way call attention to his own card or to the trick, Declarer may require the partner of the offender to play his highest or lowest card of the suit led, or to win or lose the trick.

(*c*) Either adversary, but not Dummy, may call his partner's attention to the fact that he is about to play or lead out of turn; but if, during the play, an adversary make any unauthorized reference to any incident thereof, or to the location of any card, Declarer may call a lead when it next becomes an adversary's turn to lead.

Any such reference by Dummy may be similarly penalized by either adversary.

(*d*) If, before or during the auction, a player give any unauthorized information concerning his hand, his partner may be barred from further participation in the auction.

ETHICS AND ETIQUETTE

Offenses against the ethics and etiquette of the game are unpardonable, as they are not subject to prescribed penalties. The only redress is to cease playing with those who habitually disregard the following:

1. Declarations should be made simply, without emphasis, and without undue delay.

2. A player who has looked at his cards should not indicate by word, manner, or gesture the nature of his hand; nor his approval or disapproval of a bid, double or play; nor call attention to the score.

3. A player should not allow any hesitation or mannerism of his partner to influence his own declaration or play.

4. If a player demand that the bidding be reviewed, or that the cards played to a trick be indicated, he should do so for his own in-

formation and not to call his partner's attention to any bid or play.

5. An adversary should not lead until the preceding trick has been gathered; nor, having led a winning card, should he draw another from his hand before his partner has played to the current trick.

6. A card should not be played with emphasis, nor in such manner as to draw attention to it; nor should a player detach one card from his hand and subsequently play another.

7. No player should hesitate unnecessarily in his play, in order to create a wrong impression regarding his hand.

8. Dummy should not leave his seat to watch Declarer play.

9. Except when permitted by law, a player should not look at a trick that has been turned and quitted.

10. A player should not purposely incur a penalty, even though willing to pay it; nor make a second revoke to conceal a first.

INDEX TO LAWS

LAWS OF
CONTRACT
AUCTION BRIDGE

1927

ADOPTED AND ISSUED BY THE
KNICKERBOCKER WHIST CLUB
35 WEST 43rd STREET, NEW YORK

Made in the United States of America

PREFACE

Contract Auction Bridge, as its name implies is a variation of Auction Bridge, the chief difference being that the declarer can score towards game only the number of tricks he contracts to win. Two Spades, bid and made, allows the declarer to score two tricks only in the trick column, regardless of the number of tricks won. Should declarer have bid two Spades and made four, only the two contracted for are scored below the line in the trick column, the two additional tricks being scored above the line in the honor column. Contract has been played in Europe for the last ten years. In the United States it is comparatively new, and like all new games, it is not yet standardized.

In framing the present code, the Card Committee gave careful consideration to the several American counts in vogue and also to the existing European count. The so-called Vanderbilt count of 20 points per trick for clubs and diamonds, 30 points for spades and hearts and 35 points for no trump, to-

gether with a game value of 100 points had much to recommend it, but, if adopted, it meant a new game rather than an added feature of the present game of Auction. By retaining the present Auction values for tricks and games the Committee feels that it has provided players with a way to play Contract Auction without in any way detracting from the present game. As the code now reads, it makes Contract an added feature of Auction and one that can be learned and adopted by Auction players without much trouble.

The bonus and penalty points have also followed those of Auction closely, and wherever possible have been made consistent. The only changes made are those rendered necessary by the large premiums placed on slams. It has been found that players will take unusual chances to prevent a slam being made, and to cure this "flag flying," the Committee increased the penalties very considerably after the third trick. The revoke penalty has also been changed to fit in with the larger values of the tricks.

The "vulnerable" feature of the game has been made optional and may be played or not as the particular group may decide. It undoubtedly adds much interest to the game

and makes it much more exciting. Like all novelties, however, it may or may not take with the public.

In conclusion, the Committee feels that the code presented is the best possible under existing conditions, and recommends its adoption by Contract players generally.

THE CARD COMMITTEE,
KNICKERBOCKER WHIST CLUB.

January 25, 1927.

Preface by Wilbur C. Whitehead.

LAWS OF
CONTRACT AUCTION BRIDGE

The Laws of Auction Bridge govern Contract Auction with the following amendments and exceptions:

ODD TRICK VALUES

1. Odd Trick values are the same as in regular Auction, viz.:

No trump	10
Spades	9
Hearts	8
Diamonds	7
Clubs	6

Doubling doubles these values; redoubling multiplies them by four, as in regular Auction.

2. When declarer fulfills his contract, his side scores in the trick column only the number of odd tricks named in his contract (whether undoubled, doubled, or redoubled). Tricks made in excess of his contract are

scored in the honor column of his side. *See Law* 9.

GAME

3. As in regular Auction, 30 points in the trick column are required for a game.

GAME BONUS

4. The winner of any game, whether first, second, or third, scores a bonus of 200 points in the honor column.

RUBBER BONUS

5. As in regular Auction, when one side has won two games, the rubber is completed. The side which has won two games scores a bonus of 300 points in its honor score, in addition to the bonuses for each of the two games it has won.

HONOR VALUES

6. As in regular Auction, honor values are unaffected by doubling or redoubling. The following honor values are scored:

At a trump declaration, four honors in one hand.....	100
At a trump declaration, five honors in one hand....	150
At No Trump, four Aces in one hand.....	150

"VULNERABLE" OR DANGER ZONE

7. A side that has won a game on the rubber is said to be "vulnerable." When a vulnerable side assumes the contract, all penalty and bonus points are increased. *See Laws* 8 *and* 9. A side having no game on the rubber is said to be "invulnerable." When both sides are vulnerable, penalty and bonus points are increased for both sides. (It is optional with players whether the vulnerable or "danger zone" with its increase of penalty and bonus points shall be played.)

BONUS FOR FULFILLING CONTRACT

8. When a declarer fulfills his contract, he scores a bonus in the honor column as follows:

	Points
When invulnerable, if undoubled	0
" " " doubled	50
" " " redoubled	100
When vulnerable, if undoubled	0
" " " doubled	100
" " " redoubled	200

BONUS FOR OVERTRICKS

9. For any tricks made in excess of his contract, the declarer scores a bonus in the honor column as follows:

	Points
When invulnerable, if undoubled, for each overtrick	50
When invulnerable, if doubled, for each overtrick	100
When invulnerable, if redoubled, for each overtrick	200

	Points
When vulnerable, if undoubled, for each overtrick	100
When vulnerable, if doubled, for each overtrick	200
When vulnerable, if redoubled, for each overtrick	400

PENALTY FOR UNDERTRICKS

10. If declarer fail to fulfill his contract, he scores nothing whatsoever except honors, if held, and the opponents score for undertricks as follows:

IF DECLARER IS INVULNERABLE

	Points
If undoubled, for each undertrick	50
If doubled, for first three undertricks (each)	100
If doubled, for fourth undertrick	200
If doubled, for all subsequent undertricks (each)	400
If redoubled, for first three undertricks (each)	200
If redoubled, for fourth undertrick	400

	Points
If redoubled, for all subsequent undertricks (each)	800
If undoubled, for each undertrick	100
If doubled, for first three undertricks (each)	200
If doubled, for fourth undertrick	400
If doubled, for all subsequent undertricks (each)	800
If redoubled, for first three undertricks (each)	400
If redoubled, for fourth undertrick	800
If redoubled, for all subsequent undertricks (each)	1600

SLAM BONUS

11. No bonus is allowed for a slam made but not bid. When a slam is bid and made, the declarer scores a bonus as follows:

	Points
When invulnerable, for Little Slam	500
" " " Grand Slam	1000
When vulnerable, for Little Slam	750
" " " Grand Slam	1500

These bonuses are the same whether the contract is undoubled, doubled or redoubled. When Little Slam is bid and Grand Slam made, there is no extra bonus over the bonuses for Little Slam and for extra trick. If a Grand Slam is bid and a Little Slam is made, there is no bonus for the Little Slam.

REVOKE PENALTY

12. The penalty for the first revoke is two tricks, as in regular Auction. The penalty for each subsequent revoke is 100 points in the adverse honor column.